Migration Action - Brotherhood of St Laurence

Transcription

VOL XXVII, NUMBER 2, 2005
Our Changing
Terrain: What doe
the future hold for
new arrivals?
Contributions to Migration Action may be sent via email to:
migrationaction@bsl.org.au
or post to the EMC at PO Box 1389 Collingwood 3066
Guidelines for contributors will be forwarded on request.
Migration Action
Contents
VOL XXVII, NUMBER 2, 2005
ISSN: 0311-3760
Migration Action is published by the
Ecumenical Migration Centre:
2
Editorial
95-97 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy,
Victoria Australia, 3065.
Tel: +61 3 9416 0044
Fax: +61 3 9416 1827
Email: emc@bsl.org.au
RASIKA JAYASURIYA AND SARINA GRECO
Recent Changes to Immigration Detention: An overview
3
ECUMENICAL MIGRATION CENTRE
The Ecumenical Migration Centre (EMC),
of the Brotherhood of St Laurence,
works for the development of Australia
as a multicultural society through
its welfare, educational, project and
community work. The centre has been
working with migrants since 1962.
EMC's work is diverse, from community
service and development to social action
and community education.
Within a framework of ensuring equal
access and rights for all Australian
society, EMC provides counselling
services and community development
activities to a number of ethnic communities, both established and newly arrived.
Playing Out the Asylum Seeker End Game: Forced
removal, voluntary repatriation and everything between
6
SAVITRI TAYLOR
Refugees and Regional Settlement: A simple equation?
15
JANET TAYLOR & DAYANE STANOVIC
Fruit Pickers, Undocumented Workers and Circular
Migration
28
PETER MARES
EMC also initiates research towards an
understanding of a range of issues, and
promotes change where necessary.
Editors
Rasika Jayasuriya and Sarina Greco
Special Thanks
Kath Holgate, Ainslie Hannan and Deanna Boulos
Cover Illustration
Photos: Lara McKinley and Rusty Stewart. Design: Heather Hoare
Layout
Pixel City Digital Design (03) 9380 8429
Printing
Art Offset (03) 9572 4400
It is not the intention of this journal to reflect the opinions of either the staff or the Board of
the Brotherhood of St Laurence. In many matters this would be difficult to ascertain, nor
do the editors think it desirable. The aim of the journal is to be informative and stimulating
through its various articles, suggestions and comments.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES
(per volume of 3 issues)
Individuals/Organisations $60 Concession $40
VOL )0(VII, NUMBER 2 2005
Abroad $70
Single issues $20
1
Migration Action
Editorial
As some of the most significant positive changes are implemented to improve Australia's immigyation detention policy
and practice, this issue of Migration Action. delves into the
possibilities and realities stemming from changes across the
immigration spectrtun and offers insights and considerations
for figure policy development.
In June, the Prime Minister responded to sustained criticism
over the Federal Goveriunent's failed mandatory detention
policy by announcing legislative changes that chip away
the harsher edges of mandatory detention that have caused
human suffering and desperation. These changes fall short of
achieving the complete overhaul that is needed, particularly
following the release of the damning Palmer Inquiry Report
on 14th July. This issue begins with the Ecumenical Migration
Centre providing a brief overview of the new legislation, the
Migration Amendment (Detention Arrangements) Bill
2005, and its implications. It is noteworthy that recent legislative changes have failed to address the ongoing punitive
and disaiminatory Temporary Protection Visa regime,
which was reconunended to be abolished in the Private
Member's Bills drafted earlier this year by Petro Georgiou
MP and other Liberal backbenchers (and were withdrawn as
part of the negotiations surmunding the introduction of the
Government's changes).
The Palmer Inquiry is the last of a long line of inquiries that
have found unaccountable and unaccepatable practices
in detention centres and staff lacking the training and
competentencies to deal with the mental health and well
being needs of vulnerable people. As the Brotherhood of St
Laurence stated at the time that the Palmer Inquiry Report
was released, it is time for the Government to end Australia's
disgraced and abusive detention system for which no-one is
being held accountable. DIMIA needs to now concentrate on
improving its role in the refugee determination process and
involve qualified welfare practitioners in caring for asylum
seekers, including children and the mentally ill. DIMIA
cannot continue to avoid accountability by contracting out
its responsibilities to Global Solutions Limited (GSL) Australia,
which places security and prison guards into care roles
which belong with trained welfare and social workers. This
is particularly significant in the light of DIMIA's commitment
to improving the culture, practices and review mechanisms
within the Department.
Improvements within the Government's immigration operations need to include adopting a role in post-return monitoring of people removed from Australia either forcibly or
through voluntary repatriation. Savitri Taylor examines the
spectrum of possible outcomes facing those asyhun seekers
2
whose protection visa applications have been rejected by
Australia, particularly in the context of cases where international protection may continue to be a legitiinate need. She
also addresses the incentives behind voluntary repatriation
packages offered by the Australian government and the issue
as to whether any real alternatives exist for rejected asylum
seekers. Taylor's article offers significant insight into the
implications of removal and repatriation for rejected asylum
seekers, framed within a broader international legal protection context.
In light of the federal and state government push for refugee
and migrant resettlement in regional areas, this issue features
an article based on the recently published research report
(Refugees and regional settlement: balancing priorities)
by Janet Taylor and Dayane Stanovic. This article looks at the
experiences of refugees resettling in regional Victoria and is
drawn from an exploratory research study focused on refugee
resettlement in Shepparton, Colac and Warrnambool. Taylor
& Stanovic draw on first hand experiences of predominantly
Iraqi and Sudanese refugees to illustrate factors for successful resettlement in regional locations and draw awareness
to some of the perceived barriers to successful resettlement,
which may amount to experiences of social exclusion. A
ntunber of important factors are considered in detail within
a social inclusion framework, including issues of Temporary
Protection Visas, employment, income and cost of living,
education, language, housing and availability and accessibility of services. The article highlights the policy implications of
the research findings, offering valuable conclusions.
The government's efforts to help build regional economies
and counter the issue of undocumented workers could
benefit from the leamings shared in Peter Mares' article,
which explores the notion of introducing a seasonal
migration scheme in Australia. Mares' examines the longrunning Canadian seasonal agyicultural workers model and
explores how this model could be adapted and iinproved
to offer a stable supply of labour to Australian agricultural
industries. He highlights the potential of such a scheme to
create economic opportunities for workers from Australia's
neighbouring Pacific nations, but warns of the possible
dangers with a seasonal migrant labour scheme and the need
to ensure sufficient checks and balances in any model to
protect the rights of temporary foreign workers. Mares raises
for consideration a policy initiative that could, if developed
cautiously, offer a win-win situation for regional Australia,
workers and the government alike.
RasikaJayasuriya and Sarilla Greco
Editors
VOL XXVII, NUMBER 2 2005
Migration Action
Recent Changes to Immigration
Detention: An overview
ECUMENICAL MIGRAITON CEN1RE
On 21st June 2005, the Australian Government introduced
the Migration Amendment (Detention Arrangements)
Bill 2005, amending Australia's immigration detention
regime in response to sustained criticism over the failings
of the current system of high security detention of unauthorised asylum seekers and other vulnerable people. The
abusive practices stemming from this system have been the
focus of recent inquiries and reports, including the suffering
caused to children and the mentally ill whose health and
well-being have deteriorated whilst being held indefinitely
in prison-like conditions.
Disappointingly, the legislation responds to the vast inadequacies of the immigration detention system by increasing
the non-compellable, discretionary powers of the Minister
rather than developing and mandating procedures that
operate in accordance with international best practice.
Nonetheless, the significance of the changes lies in the
reframing of immigration detention policy within broader,
more humane principles including: the international human
rights principle of detention of children as a last resort;
recognition of the importance of maintaining family units;
understanding that high security detention is unnecessary, disproportionate and detrimental for people posing
low risks of absconding; acknowledgement of the need to
process protection applications in a timely manner; and
recognition that review and accountability measures are
essential wherever people are deprived of fundamental
liberties.
Release of all families with children from highsecurity detention
On the 28th of July, 18 remaining families across Australia
were released from immigration detention centres into the
care of social welfare agencies and some refugee advocacy
groups with the Australian Red Cross as the lead agency
providing national co-ordination. All children being kept in
high security detention centres have now been released into
community-based facilities. This is a significant milestone
for Australian immigration policy. The Government has
agreed to cover all costs for the releases and individual
care plans have been prepared for each family. The care
plans fall within a well-developed national care framework.
People will be required to give an individual undertaking
to comply with immigration processes and there will be
no requirement for oversight by agencies of those families
released.
We believe that the release of these families acts as a trial
of a national consortium approach, with the Australian
Red Cross as the lead agency, and therefore shows a more
hopeful future for the management of onshore arrivals with
detention as the last resort. This knowledge and experience
will be used to underpin a national plan that will now extend
to ensuring adequate care of all asylum seekers, whether in
detention or currently living in the community with no
support. It will also demonstrate the need to extend these
principles and practices to other asylum seekers who are
over 18 years of age and pose no threat to the community.
Whilst the changes do not achieve a complete overhaul of
the failed immigration detention system, we have seen to
date a genuine commitment from the Government to implementing the changes and their intended benefits.
3
Migration Action
Overview of legislative changes:
• The Parliament affirms as a principle that a minor child
shall only be detained as a measure of last resort;
• The Minister has a discretionary power to release
children and their families from high security detention
facilities into the community, to reside at .a determined
residence without security supervision and with
reporting arrangements. This is being referred to as
Residence Determination and continues to be technically defined as a form of detention under the Migration
Act so as to not alter Australia's policy of mandatory
detention of people without a valid visa;
•
Review by the Ombudsman of all cases of those people
in detention for more than two years and subsequent
half-yearly reports by DIMIA to the Ombudsman if a
person is detained for longer than two years;
• The Ombudsman can make recommendations to the
Minister on the need to continue detaining a person, the
need to release them into the community or the need to
grant them a permanent protection visa. Importantly,
the Ombudsman's recommendations are not binding
on the Minister but assessments must be tabled in
Parliament within 15 days; and
• Three month time limits on processing asylum claims at
both the DIMIA primary stage and at the Refugee Review
Tribunal (RRT) secondary stage.
Release of families with children
1. The significant gain is that the Migration Act will be
amended to state that "the Parliament affirms as a
principle that a child shall only be detained as a
matter of last resort'. However, children will still be
detained for up to 3 months in Residential Housing
Projects (attached to detention centre facilities) whilst
the primary assessment is undertaken. In other similar
countries, the necessary health and identity checks are
carried out on children within 72 hours, in keeping with
the principle that the best interests of the child must
always be the primary consideration (Article 3.1, United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child). It is
also of great concern that only the Minister can exercise
a discretionary power to release a child and their family
from high security detention and decide the conditions
of their release. This has the potential to again lead to
the creation of an ad hoc system under which people
are treated differently. It is also important to note that
this change only affects families with children and there
is no acceptance yet that others (couples or individuals)
do not need to be detained.
4
2. Community release will be into a specific place
rather than a detention centre. This does not include
Residential Housing Projects which will be reserved
for those families required to return to detention (for
reasons such as compliance breaches) and for families
during their primary assessment stage (3-4 weeks),
during which time community housing arrangements
can be made. Families will be required to report
to immigration officials at specified times, but will
otherwise be free to move about in the community
without being accompanied or restrained by an officer.
By placing families into communities, children will be
able to attend school without security supervision.
3. Medical and material support to children and families
released into Residence Determination will be the
responsibility of DIMIA. The Detention Arrangements
Bill gives assurances of DIMIA's responsibilities to
deliver this support, and cases so far have demonstrated
DIMIA's willingness to fulfil this responsibility.
Oversight of implementation
4. Significantly, the changes will be implemented through a
high level Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) headed
by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet, Dr Peter Shergold, who formerly headed
up the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The IDC
will extend the responsibility for the implementation
of these changes beyond DIMIA and the Immigration
Minister alone. Significantly, the Department of Family
and Community Services (FACS) is represented in the
IDC along with the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trading (DFAT), the Attomey-General's Department and
ASIO. The IDC intends to meet regularly with members
of the Government who are interested in the progress
of the implementation of the changes, such as Petro
Georgiou MP and other Liberal backbenchers who have
been advocating for fairer refugee policies.
Review of detention
5. Those people who have been in detention for over two
years will have their cases reviewed by the Ombudsman
and, if their detention is continued, review by the
Ombudsman will take place on a half yearly basis. In
fact, all asylum claimants in detention have been there
more that 2 years so this review mechanism will cover
the existing case load of detained asylum seekers.
While review and accountability is increased via the
Ombudsman reporting to Parliament, the decision to
Migration Action
act on the Ombudsman's recommendations and advice
remains at the discretion of the Minister, which means
that no transparent principle for decision making has
been introduced. As mentioned, the Ombudsman's recommendations to the Minister are not binding, however
the Minister must bring the Ombudsman's recommendations before the Parliament within 15 days. As Petro
Georgiou states,
It is worth noting the extent of the
Ombudsman's powers. He has the power
to obtain information from such people
and make inquiries as he thinks fit; he
can bring evidence of breach of duty or
misconduct to the attention of agency
heads; he can obtain information and
documents by subpoena or summons;
he can grant a certificate that there has
been an unreasonable delay in deciding
whether to do an act or thing; he can
administer an oath or affirmation to
a person required to attend before him
or her; and he can enter departmental
premises and investigate there.
with efforts to remove them or upon their actual removal
from Australia. Importantly, long-term detainees cannot
apply for an RPBV, but must await an invitation from the
Minister. This, once again, rests on the Minister exercising a
discretionary power and leaves the process open to ad hoc
and inconsistent outcomes that have the potential to lack
transparency and accountability.
Links to the full text of the Migration Amendment
(Detention Arrangements) Bill 2005 and the
Government's Explanatory Memorandum can
be found at: http://www.ajustaustralia.com/
informationandresourcesfactsandstatistics.php
Time limits
6. The processing of protection visa applications will have
a three month time limit at the primary stage (DIMIA)
and a further three month time limit at the secondary
stage (RRT). If these timelines are not met, the Minister
will be required to table a report in Parliament. This will
be introduced into the Parliament in the next sitting in
August.
Removal Pending Bridging Visas
The Government's recognition that indefinite detention
is no longer a sustainable policy can also be seen with its
creation of the Removal Pending Bridging Visa (RPBV) in
June of this year. This new visa subclass has been created
to end the indefinite detention of long-term detainees who
have been found not to be Convention refugees but whose
removal from Australia has not been practicable (due to
reasons such as statelessness). On an RPBV, long-term
detainees are released into the conununity with a range of
welfare supports, subject to their having previously cooperated fully with DIMIA's efforts to remove them. The visa fails
to specify an end-point (after which a permanent resolution
should be reached), however, it can be ceased at any time
should a person breach their visa conditions, fail to comply
5
Migration Action
Playing Out the Asylum Seeker
End Game: Forced removal, voluntary
repatriation and everything between
SAVITRI TAYLOR
Introduction
This article considers the situation of asylum seekers whose
protection visa applications have been rejected by Australia.
It also considers the situation of asylum seekers who were
taken by Australia to offshore processing centres in the
'declared countries' (Migration Ad; s 198A) of Nauru and
Papua New Guinea and had their asylum claims considered
and rejected in those countries by Australian or Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
officials.
Rejected asylum seekers are persons who have been found
not to be in need of international protection. There are many
aspects of Australia's asylum seeker law, policy and procedures that raise legitimate concerns that among the asylum
seekers whose claims we reject are many persons who are, in
fact, very much in need of international protection (see e.g.
Taylor, 2005: 60-5; Kneebone, 2005). However, the only
way to get hard data on the actual occurrence of incorrect
rejections is to follow up on what has happened to asylum
seekers after they have been removed from Australia or a
declared country. The Australian Government does not do
this, arguing that post-removal monitoring is unnecessary,
because rejected asylum seekers are by definition persons
to whom Australia does not owe protection obligations;
impractical, because of the logistical difficulties and substantial cost that would be involved; and ought not in any
event be undertaken by Australian officials because it could
be perceived as an interference in the internal affairs of
other states (Vanstone, 2004: 23670-2; SLCRC, 2000: 3412). The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(HREOC) also has reservations about post-retum monitoring by Australian Government officials arguing that it might
actually endanger persons who would not otherwise be in
danger by drawing them to the attention of potential persecutors (SLCRC, 2000: 337-8). HREOC's point is a valid
one. On the other hand, the lack of such follow up does
enable the Australian Government to plead absence of proof
whenever the possibility of incorrect rejections is raised.
Frustration with this plea led the Edmund Rice Centre, in
conjunction with the School of Education of the Australian
6
Catholic University, to conduct a study in which they interviewed 40 rejected asylum seekers who came from, or had
been removed to, high risk countries. The Report which
came out of this study is entitled Deported to Danger and
was published in September 2004. The finding made in the
report was that '35 out of the 40 people interviewed were
living in dangerous circumstances immediately on arrival at
the point of deportation' (ERC, 2004: 2). The high proportion reflects the fact that the 40 interviewees were not a
random sample of all rejected asylum seekers, but rather a
sample of rejected asylum seekers who came from, or were
removed to, high risk countries. It is nevertheless a disturbing finding. More disturbing still is the fact that two of the
40 rejected asylum seekers interviewed had subsequently
been granted protection by another Western country (ERC,
2004: 5-6, 8; Jopson, 2004: 16).
Despite the findings in Deported to Danger, no reasonable person could possibly argue that Australia is always
wrong in its asylum seeker rejections. If Australia has
correctly determined that an asylum seeker is not in need
of international protection, there is no getting past the fact
that that person has no special immunity against removal
from Australia or the declared country as the case may
be. On the other hand, what must not be forgotten is that
'persons not in need of international protection' are still
human beings whose human dignity must be respected in all
circumstances. What must not be forgotten either is that a
rejected asylum seeker who is removed from one country is
of practical necessity removed to another country. Removal
is a controversial and politically sensitive process not only
because the removees are usually reluctant or resistant but
because the proposed receiving country may be as well. In
the absence of prior agreement, third countries are likely
to claim that the removing state has no justification valid
under international law for shifting its problem to them and
therefore refuse to admit the removees. As for countries of
nationality or former habitual residence, they may be uncooperative if, for example, they believe their economic or
other interests vvill be jeopardized by returns.
Migration Action
Enforced departure versus voluntary departure
Upon receiving a final rejection, failed asylum seekers may
leave Australia or the declared country voluntarily or they
may be removed involuntarily. Thus far, all departures of
rejected asylum seekers from the declared countries have
been voluntary (at least in the minimal sense of not having
been procured by physical force) and most departures of
rejected asylum seekers from Australia are also voluntary
in at least this minimal sense. This is not to say that force is
never used. In May 2005, Parliament was informed that:
In exceptional circumstances the use of restraint
on high risk removees during a removal
operation may be required. This includes cases
where the removee presents a high security risk
or behaves in a way that threatens the safety of
themselves or others (McGauran, 2005c: 110).
During the period July 2003 to February 2005, there were
21 incidents of removees being shackled hand and foot,
with four of these removees being gagged in addition
(McGauran, 2005c: 110). In the same period, there were a
further five incidents involving the use of hand restraints
only (McGauran, 2005c: 110). Leaving aside lawyers'
concerns about whether such treatment might, depending
on all the circumstances, involve violation by Australia of,
for example, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) which prohibits cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment (see Taylor, 2003: 215-29), the
political concern here is straightforward: it is not a good
look. The Australian Government tries hard to avoid getting
to the point of forcible removal because forcible removal
involves the potential for incidents which play badly in the
media (see e.g. Jackson, 2005a: 2).
The Australian Government's strategy for avoiding forcible
removal is to offer inducements for voluntary departure,
but at the same time to limit the alternatives to the unattractive ones of detention and/or eventual forcible removal.
The idea is to create conditions under which the individuals concerned will necessarily draw the conclusion that
voluntary departure is the best option available to them.
Practical obstacles to removal
A person who departs from one country of practical
necessity departs to another country. This can be a lot
easier said than done. It is a common practical obstacle to
the removal of rejected asylum seekers from Australia and
from the offshore processing centres that the person does
not have travel documents and their identity is disputed
VOL )0(1/11, NUMBER 2 2005
by their alleged country of nationality which refuses to
issue new travel documents. For example, Afghanistan's
government refuses to issue travel documents to persons
claiming to be Afghans but whose nationality cannot be
established (McPhedran, 2002: 15; Grattan, 2002: 11). This
is understandable because there was a known phenomenon of Pakistanis claiming to be Afghans in order to take
advantage of the high success rate of Afghan asylum seekers
before the fall of the Taliban. Individuals who are perpetrating nationality fraud are, of course, deliberately obstructing
their removal from Australia or the declared country by
their concealment of their true nationality. On the other
hand, Afghanistan has been a war zone since the 1970s
and official records of births, deaths, marriages and so on
(which are mostly kept at a village level) are in the words
of a Department of Immigration (DIMIA) official 'incomplete
and patchy' (Williams, 2004: 48).
An individual who is actually of Afghan nationality may
well find that their nationality is unverifiable, rendering
them de facto stateless. In other words, they are stateless
in a practical sense though not stateless in law. There are
other unfortunate individuals who are 'not considered
as a national by any State under the operation of its law'
and hence are de jure stateless (Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons, Article 1). Many Palestinians fall
into this category. Removal is almost impossible to accomplish where the person to be removed is stateless because
there is usually no other country in the world that can be
argued to have an international legal obligation to allow
that person entry into their territory.
Another practical obstacle to removal that often arises is
that of rejected asylum seekers being refused permission to
transit third countries en route to their country of nationality and/or having no practical means of entering their own
country. There have been allegations, for example in the
Deported to Danger report, that in their quest to secure
the departure of rejected asylum seekers from Australia
some DIMIA officials have encouraged those willing to
leave to procure false travel documents for themselves.
DIMIA has vehemently denied the truth of the allegations
(DIMIA, 2003b; DIMIA, 2003c). However, DIMIA is on the
record as having countenanced conduct which was not too
far different in its eagerness to rid itself of the Kadems, a
family of rejected Iraqi asylum seekers who 'presented
significant management issues' (quoted in McGeough, 2004:
1). In August 2003, Australia allowed them to fly to Vietnam
on one month tourist visas, even though they had no visas
for Syria and Iran, the subsequent destinations specified
in the air tickets paid for by Australia (Miller, 2003a: 6).
The family was denied entry to Vietnam at the airport in
Ho Chi Minh City because authorities did not believe they
7
Migration Action
were genuine tourists (of course they were not) (Miller,
2003b). The Kadems ended up back in Australia. What is
telling, however, is DIMIA's response to this turn of events.
According to a newspaper report:
more difficult question is whether the right of states to
remove an alien from their territory, imposes any duty on
the alien's country of nationality to accept their involuntary
return. Noll (2003: 70) points out,
A spokesman for Immigration Minister Philip
Ruddock blamed the family for telling their
story to the media. He said they had been
cautioned many times that a high profile would
not be helpful in arranging for them to leave.
"Something has gone wrong and unfortunately
the family will be coming back, and yet again we
will have to deal with the situation when it should
have been resolved months ago," he said (Miller,
2003b).
If the same argumentative technique of constructing a duty as a correlate to a right is
applied in the field of human rights, the right
to leave [article 12(2) ICCPR 1 produces a duty to
admit In order for the former to be effective, one
has to construct the latter. This line of argument
entails an all-or-nothing outcome. Either it is
accepted that the logic of correlates is part of
customary international law, thus validating
both an interstate duty to readmit citizens and a
human right to immigration, or it is denied that
customary international law embraces the logic
of correlates.
What the spokesman was really saying was: Ìf they had
kept quiet they would have been successful in deceiving
the Vietnamese authorities and then we would have been
rid of them'.1
A final common scenario is that of countries refusing to
accept the return of nationals unless they are returning
voluntarily. States that are parties to the Smuggling Protocol
are, in fact, under an obligation `to facilitate and accept,
without undue or unreasonable delay, the return of a
person who has been [smuggled] and who is its national or
who has the right of permanent residence in its territory at
the time of return' (Article 18(1)). In its 'Conclusion on the
return of persons found not to be in need of international
protection', the Executive Committee of UNHCR (EXCOM)
refers to this obligation in the Smuggling Protocol but also
makes the wider proposition that states have an obligation
to receive back their own nationals (EXCOM, 2003). In
the context of making the wider proposition, the EXCOM
Conclusion refers in one place to 'the right of States, under
international law, to expel aliens while respecting obligations under international refilgee and human rights law'
and in another to the 'right of everyone....to return to his or
her own country'. Gregor Noll argues that there is no logical
reason to posit that an obligation to receive back nationals
is a necessary corollary of the rights to which EXCOM refers.
It seems correct to say that an obligation to receive back
nationals involuntarily removed from another country
cannot be a logical correlate of the human right to return
to one's own country. While all persons have a human right
not to be arbitrarily denied entry into their own country
(ICCPR, Article 12(4)), this right is clearly not being invoked
by those being returned involuntarily (Noll, 2003: 72). The
1
8
ft is, at the least, hypocritical for countries such as Australia
that deny that a duty to admit is a correlate of the right to
leave (or that a duty to consider asylum applications is a
correlate of the right to seek asylum) to argue that their
right to expel aliens necessarily gives rise to a correlate
duty on countries of nationality to admit. However, they
may still argue, of course, that as a result of the EXCOM
resolution referred to above and other soft law instruments,
a customary international law obligation of the nature
asserted has emerged.
In practice, returning countries place reliance not so much
on legal argument as the fact that countries which profess
reluctance to accept the involuntary return of nationals can
usually be persuaded to take a different stance if offered sufficient inducement. For example, Iran has a usual practice
of refusing to accept the involuntary return of its nationals
(Skelton, 2003). Australia, when it found itself stuck with
277 Iranians who refused to return to Iran voluntarily,
managed to come up with a sufficient inducement for Iran
to depart from usual practice. In March 2003, the Australian
Government entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Consular Matters vvith Iran which provided for
establishment of a Work and Holiday visa scheme under
which young Iranians could come to Australia for working
holidays. In return, Iran agreed to accept the involuntary
repatriation of Iranian nationals from Australia (though not
from offshore processing centres). Australia also has written
return agreements with Afghanistan, Cambodia, China,
East Timor, Fiji, Laos, Papua New Guinea, South Aftica, Sri
The Kadems eventually decided that return to Iraq was their only remaining option. In late December 2003 they were delivered to
Iraq via Jordan under the escort of two immigration officials from Canberra, two officials from the Australian embassy in Amman, two
Jordanian intelligence men and a nurse' (McGeough, 2004: 1).
Migration Action
Lanka, Syria, Vietnam and Yugoslavia (DIMIA, 2004e).
The bottom line remains, however, that some rejected
asylum seekers are for practical reasons unable to depart
Australia or a declared country even if willing to do so.
Until very recently, all such individuals in Australia faced
the prospect of indefinite perhaps even lifetime detention.
However, the introduction of the Bridging R (Removal
Pending) Bridging Visa in May 2005 theoretically allows for
individuals who are unable, though willing, to be removed
to be released into the community pending their removal
becoming reasonably practicable (Migration Regulations,
reg. 2.20(12), reg. 2.20A and Sch. 2 cl. 070.5). Asylum
seekers taken to the offshore processing centres in the
declared countries were until recently required by those
countries to remain within the confines of the processing
centres at all times. According to the Australian Government,
this 'restricted visa arrangement' was not the same thing as
detention (McMahon, 2003b: 590). From an international
legal perspective, however, it was (Amnesty International,
2002: 17; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Gabaudan, 2002: 51)
and, although restriction on movement has recently been
relaxed,2 it probably still is. As at 30 June 2005, there were
still 34 rejected asylum seekers remaining on Nauru, all of
whom had been there since 2001 (Wroe, 2005: 9).3
Sticks and carrots
Sooner or later every rejected asylum seeker who is physically able to depart Australia or a declared country finds
themselves faced with just two theoretical alternatives:
departure or detention. The Australian Government believes
that the prospect of indefinite detention 'encourages' return
of those who are unwilling rather than physically unable
to return,4 and so does the credible threat of involuntary
removal. When asked at a Senate estimates hearing what
DIMIA planned to do if involuntary removals from Nauru
became necessary, a DIMIA official responded:
An arrangement will probably be made with
the Nauru government, or we will develop an
arrangement. But we have not actually got to
that point yet. We also think that, if you got to the
point of involuntary removals, people would go
voluntarily (McMahon, 2003a: 169).
This theory has already been put to the test in mainland
Australia. On 13 March 2003, after convincing Iran to accept
involuntary repatriation of Iranian nationals from Australia,
the Australian Government announced that Iranians then in
detention in Australia would be offered voluntary repatriation packages of $2000 per person as they became subject
to removal and would have a month to accept the offer
(DIMIA, 2003a). Thirteen Iranians had accepted the offer by
6 July 2003 (Schwartz, 2003: 4). At the end of August 2003,
two Iranians were forcibly repatriated. Shortly thereafter,
Iranians who had previously declined the offer were given
two weeks to accept voluntary repatriation packages of
$1000 per person (Shaw, 2003). As at 10 May 2005, a total
of seven Iranians had been forcibly repatriated and a total
of 28 Iranians had returned home voluntarily since the date
that the MOU between Australia and Iran came into effect
(McGauran, 2005a: 250). DIMIA expects further voluntary
returns to take place in 2004-05 (DIMIA, 2004d: 117).
The voluntary repatriation packages offered to Iranian
nationals in Australia who are subject to removal is the
carrot side of Australia's carrot and stick strategy for securing
the voluntary departure of rejected asylum seekers. Similar
carrots (and sticks) have been used to deal with other groups
of rejected asylum seekers. On 16 May 2002, Australia and
Afghanistan signed a MOU pursuant to which Afghanistan
agreed to facilitate the return of Afghan asylum seekers from
Australia and the offshore processing centres. Afghan asylum
seekers, who were located in Australia or an offshore processing centre on or before 16 May 2002 and were awaiting
decisions or had received negative decisions, were offered
a reintegration package to encourage their voluntary return
to Afghanistan (Ruddock, 2002). The reintegration package
which Australia offered consisted of a payment of $2000 per
individual (up to a modmum of $10,000 per family), the
purchase of airfares and a waiver of debts to the Australian
Government (DIMIA, 2004d: 116). On 30 May 2002, the
reintegration package offer was extended to all non-Afghan
asylum seekers in the offshore processing centres who
volunteered to return to their countries of origin (DIMIA,
2
According to DIMIA the offshore processing centres in Nauru are now 'open during weekdays and on Saturdays, so that the residents are
free to move around the island' (Charlton, 2005). In other words, the asylum seekers now appear to be subject to a regime of periodic
detention.
3
Most of these individuals were Afghan or Iraqi (Wroe, 2005: 9). The offshore processing centre in Papua New Guinea was mothballed in
2003.
4
For example, 11 Iraqis from Australia and 23 Iraqis from Nauru voluntarily returned to Iraq in the six months to 1 January 2004 (Moffis
and Kerin: 2004: 2). There was some evidence that those who chose to return did so only because the alternative was indefinite detention (ibid).
9
Migration Action
2004d: 116).5 Those who had already received negative
decisions (and had not applied for review) had to accept the
offer (if at all) within 28 days of receiving it (DIMIA, 2005).
Those awaiting decisions at the time of the offer were given
28 days from receipt of a negative decision, or if they chose
to apply for review of a negative primary stage decision
28 days from the receipt of a negative review decision, to
accept the offer (DIMIA, 2005).
As at 30 June 2004, 429 persons (mostly Afghan) previously detained at an offshore processing centre had voluntarily
returned to their countries of origin with the reintegration
package (DEvIIA, 2004d: 117).6 Another eight individuals had
accepted the package but had not yet returned to their country
of origin (DMA, 2004d: 117). One hundred and thirty Afghans
in detention in Australia also received the offer of a reintegration package (Davis, 2003: 137). As at 31 December 2004, 67
of these failed asylum seekers had accepted the package and
actually returned to Afghanistan (DIMIA, 2005).
In May 2005, it was announced that Australia and
Afghanistan had signed a new MOU pursuant to which
Afghans in Nauru and in detention in Australia, who 'have
been found not to be refugees', were to be re-offered the
reintegration package previously offered and given 45 days
in which to accept it or not (Vanstone, 2005b; Gordon,
2005).7 The added Incentive' this time round is that those
who do not accept the reintegration package will be subject
to forcible removal (Gordon, 2005).
Finally, it was announced in late April 2005 that processing
of the cases of about 1700 East Timorese asylum seekers
was almost complete and that around 50 of those whose
cases had been examined had not been granted visas and
were 'now expected to return to East Timor' (McGauran,
2005b). The individuals in question were offered a reintegration package and given 28 days to accept the package
or not (McGauran, 2005b; Carlton, 2005; Jackson, 2005b).
The implicit threat was, of course, that those who did not
return voluntarily would be subject to forcible removal.
Fortunately for the individuals concerned, the public outcry
to which their seemingly arbitrary rejections (Carlton,
2005) gave rise was great enough to cause the Minister for
Immigration to announce that she would reconsider their
cases (Vanstone, 2005a). The East Timorese are, however,
regarded by a large part of the Australian public as a special
case, partly for historical reasons and partly because most of
the asylum seekers in question have been living in Australia
for over a decade. Other rejected asylum seekers are unlikely
to attract a like degree of public support.
Rocks and hard places
The manner in which Australia procures 'voluntary'
departures of rejected asylum seekers means that many
departures are voluntary only in the limited sense of having
been procured without resort to physical force. It is not too
difficult to convince persons demoralized by prolonged
detention, and, in declared countries, cut off from sources
of independent advice (Taylor, 2005: 60-5), that they have
run out of other options.
In the case of individuals, who are not owed any protection
obligations, Australia can argue that quibbles about meaning
of 'voluntariness' are irrelevant since involuntary removal
is perfectly permissible. As mentioned at the beginning of
this article, however, it seems to be the case that Australia
sometimes incorrectly rejects asylum seekers to whom
international protection obligations are in fact owed.
Where departure is voluntary, Australia can rely on another
argument to refute the allegation that it has breached its
protection obligations even if the individual concerned
might be a person to whom such obligations are owed.
The argument is that a State cannot breach its international
protection obligations by simply allowing or facilitating
the exercise by a person of their human right to leave any
country (ICCPR, Article 12(2)) and/or their human right to
enter their own country (ICCPR, Article 12(4)). If Australia
is relying on the latter argument, however, it must be able
to show that the repatriation meets the UNHCR's criteria for
verifying true 'voluntariness'.
When talking about voluntary repatriation of refugees,
the UNHCR starts from the proposition that 'voluntariness'
implies "an absence of any physical, psychological, or
material pressure" (UNHCR, 1996: 11). However, acknowledging political realities, it is prepared to characterise repatriation as 'voluntary' if convinced that "the positive pullfactors in the country of origin are an oveniding element in
the refugees' decision to return rather than possible push-
5
In addition, a 'small number of Iraqis in detention in Australia', who requested reintegration assistance to return to Iraq, were given what
DIMIA describes as 'financial assistance equivalent to that offered to Afghan nationals' (DIMIA, 2004d: 116).
6
407 Afghans, 10 Iranians, four Turks, three Pakistanis, three Sri Lankans and two Iraqis (DIMIA, 2004d: 117).
7
At the time of writing, there were 56 rejected asylum seekers remaining in Nauru or in detention in Australia who claimed to be Afghans.
Nineteen of these individuals were accepted by the Afghan Government as in fact being its nationals and the nationality claims of the
other 37 were under investigation by that government (Vanstone, 2005b).
10
Migration Action
factors in the host country or negative pull-factors, such as
threats to property, in the home country" (UNHCR, 1996:
11). According to the UNHCR,
If refitgees are legally recognized as such, their rights
are protected and if they are allowed to settle, their
choice to repatriate is likely to be truly free and
voluntary. If however, their rights are not recognised,
if they are subjected to pressures and restrictions and
confined to closed camps, they may choose to return,
but this is not an act of free will (UNHCR, 1996, 11).
Sustainable return
Australia and similar countries consider removal of rejected
asylum seekers to be a very important aspect of their policy
responses to the irregular international movement of
persons not actually in need of international protection. The
reasoning is that, if those who try to use the asylum system
for non-asylum purposes find themselves back where they
started from, both they and others in their country of origin
will be deterred from malting similar attempts in the future
(Koser, 2001: 93-4). However, the reality is that rejected
asylum seekers who are simply returned to the circumstances that caused them to undertake iffegular movement in the
first place will be motivated to yet again attempt to escape
from those circumstances through irregular movement. As
for the compatriots of those returned, they are unlikely to
be deterred from seizing an opportunity to escape from the
misery of the here and now by demonstrations that their
efforts may be futile in the end.
A different category of returnee is the previously recognized refugee, who is forced to repatriate because found
to be no longer in need of international protection. There
are in Australia a grovving group of individuals who hold a
Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) Visa or an equivalent
temporary visa granted offshore.8 They are expected to
either leave Australia or reapply for Australia's protection
prior to the expiry of that visa. Before a change in the law
in August last year, an unsuccessful firther protection visa
applicant had to leave Australia immediately after the final
determination or become an unlawful non-citizen subject to
8
9
detention and removal. With effect from 27 August 2004,
a new visa category called the 'Return Pending Visa' was
introduced (DIMIA, 2004c). Most unsuccessful further
protection applicants are eligible for the grant of this visa
which gives holders an 18 month period at liberty in the
community to make arrangements to depart from Australia
(DIMIA, 2004c). This is certainly an improvement on the
previously existing state of affairs, but not necessarily very
much of an improvement from the perspective of the individuals concerned.
Receiving states often assert as a motherhood statement
that repatriation must, of course, be the ultimate goal of
those who have been refugees. The very word 'repatriation' seems to lend support to their assertion. Think, after
all, of the etymology. `Patria' means, in Latin, 'fatherland,
one's native country, homeland'. Re-patria: return to
one's homeland. Who, torn from home, would not want
to go home again? Yet, unwarranted assumptions are
being made here about what 'home' means. 'Home' has
a meaning beyond geography. The sense of 'home' inures
not just in the geographic location but more significantly
in the network of social relationships within which one is
embedded in that location. If only the geographic location
remains, it is probably no longer 'home' (Grove, 2001: 586;
Koser and Black, 1999: 6-7). Thus, it is often the case that far
from experiencing so-called repatriation as a return 'home'
the forced returnee experiences it as yet another displacement.9 From a more state-centred perspective, if forced
repatriation is engaged in prematurely, on a mass scale and
without the provision of adequate support, it may so overburden the 'home' country as to undo any improvements in
its economic, political and social circumstances and create
conditions which sooner or later will lead to new refugee
outflows (Loescher and Miller, 2003: 614).
As already mentioned, Australia goes to great lengths to
encourage voluntary return, and as part of this endeavour
often offers reintegration assistance. As well as the
various reintegration packages for rejected asylum seekers
described above, there is also a reintegration package on
offer to persons holding a Temporary Protection Visa, an
equivalent visa granted offshore, or a Return Pending Visa
who were in Australia on 27 August 2004 (DIMIA, 2004b).10
Secondary Movement Offshore Entry (Temporary) (Subclass 447) Visa or a Secondary Movement Relocation (Subclass 451) Visa
For example, the 50 East Timorese mentioned above, were undoubtedly refugees when they first arrived in Australia 10 to 12 years ago.
Although circumstances in East Timor have changed, they are reluctant to return there because Australia is now their home (Carlton,
2005; Jackson, 2005b).
10 The reintegration package consists of a payment of $2000 per individual (up to a maximum of $10,000 per family) and payment of the
cost of travel (DIMIA, 2004a; DIMIA, 2004b). The offer expires as soon as a person is no longer the holder of any of the visas specified
and it is a condition of acceptance that any outstanding protection visa applications and any immigration-related proceedings be formally withdrawn or discontinued (DIMIA, 2004b).
11
Migration Action
There is nothing inherently objectionable about this strategy
for encouraging voluntary return, in fact the reverse. The
provision of re-integration assistance is often of critical
importance in procuring returns which are. sustainable
as well as voluntary. While home countries must accept
the voluntary return of nationals because it involves the
exercise by those returning of their human right to do so,
the burdens placed on the resources of the home country
of precipitate return on a mass scale is exactly the same
whether return is forced or voluntary. Unless voluntary
return is adequately supported, it is unlikely to sustainable.
The IOM (1997: para 19) argues:
In most cases, assisted return is likely to be a more
durable solution than forced return. Where reasonable
reintegration assistance is provided, it bridges the gap
between return and initial housing and employment,
thus considerably enhancing the chances of a successful and lasting reintegration.11
In addition to the assistance provided directly to returnees,
the Australian Government endeavours to promote sustainable return through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
For example, since September 2001 Australia has provided
over $110 million in development assistance to Afghanistan;
over $21 million to UNHCR to support activities related
to Afghan refugees including repatriation; and over $6
million to the IOM `to support the Afghan Government's
management of returnees and displaced people' (Vanstone,
2005b). Australia's contribution to international efforts to
create conditions of sustainable return in Afghanistan is
commendable. However, the total amount of international
assistance to Afghanistan is not yet sufficient to get the job
done (O'Toole, 2005). In fact, speaking more generally, the
recognition that home countries need assistance in reintegrating returnees tends not to be accompanied by support of
the nature and at the level which will get the job done.
as soon as they are confident that the circumstances which
led to their flight have ceased to exist and/or that some host
countries vvill wish to encourage this choice. Reintegration
assistance contributes to the sustainability of return and for
that very reason makes return a more attractive choice for
individuals (Ghosh, 2000: 181). Countries of origin (which
are usually developing countries) are also more likely to
welcome returnees, if they are supported in the task of
reintegrating those returnees into the community (Ghosh,
2000, 181). More particularly, the local communities to
which expatriates return are more likely to be welcoming of
them if reintegration measures provide benefits and opportunities for the local community and not just the returnees
(Ghosh, 2000: 181). In other words, reintegration assistance
should be development-oriented. UNHCR is now attempting
through its Convention Plus initiative to promote the formulation of a generic multilateral agreement on the 'more
effective targeting of development assistance to support
durable solutions for refugees' both in countries of first
asylum and upon return home (UNHCR, 2005). The idea
is that the genetic agreement will 'set out shared understandings and commitments which can be relied upon and
incorporated into situation-specific multilateral agreements
designed to resolve a particular refugee situation' (UNHCR,
2005). This is certainly a step in the right direction. Even
more so, if the states involved in the relevant discussions
keep in mind that such assistance will do the most good if it
is tied into a wider national and international development
strategy (Ghosh, 2000: 181; Crisp, 2001: 10).
Savitri Taylor is Senior Lecturer in Law at La Trobe
University, Melbourne.
S.Taylor@latrobe.edu.au
Into the foreseeable future, there will probably always be
some asylum seekers who attempt to make non-genuine
protection claims. There will also continue to be individuals
who make asylum applications in good faith but are found
not to have an entitlement to international protection.
While such individuals may, of course, be returned to their
countties of origin it is preferable from the perspective of
host countries, home countries and individuals alike that
return be voluntary and sustainable. Likewise, it is likely
to continue to be the case that large numbers of asylum
seekers and recognized refugees will choose to return home
11 States that choose to provide reintegration assistance need, of course, to strike a balance between assistance so parsimonious that it
makes no real contribution to sustainable return and assistance so generous that it becomes in itself a migration pull factor.
12
Migration Action
References
Articles, Books, Reports etc
Amnesty International, 2002, Australia-Pacific: Offending
Human Dignity - The "Pacific Solution"(ASA 12/009/
2002).
Allegations of Corruption, DPS66/2003, I October <http:
//www.immi.gov.au/media_releases/media03/d03066.htm >.
ERC (Edmund Rice Centre in cooperation with School of
Education, Australian Catholic University), 2004, Deported
to Danger: A Study of Australia's Treatment of 40 Rejected
Asylum Seekers <http://wwvv.erc.org.au/research/pdf/
1096416029.pdf>.
Carlton, M, 2005, "A Department of Mean Spirit". The Sydney
Morning Herald, 7 May <http://www.smh.com.au/news/
Opinion/A-department-of-mean-spirit/2005/05/06/
1115092684623.html>.
Gabaudan, M (Regional Representative, UNHCR), 2002, Official
Charlton, K (Acting Director Public Affairs, DIMIA), 2005, "No
Razor Wire", Canberra Times, 2 July <http://canberra.yourg
uide.com.au/detaiLasp?story_id=4057694=2005&m=7&cla
ss=Your+say&subclass=General&category=Letters+to+Editor
&class_id=11>.
Ghosh, B, 2000, "Return Migration: Reshaping Policy
Approaches." Return Migration:Journey of Hope or
Despair?Ed. B. Ghosh. Geneva: International Organization
for Migration and the United Nations. 181-213.
Crisp, J, 2001, Mind the Gap! UNHCR, Humanitarian
Assistance and the Development Process (Working Paper
No. 43). Geneva: UNHCR.
Davis, S (First Assistant Secretary, Unauthorised Arrivals and
Detention Division, DIMIA), 2003, Official Committee
Hansard: SenateLegal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, Budget Estimates Supplementary Hearings, 4
November.
DIMIA (Department of Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs), 2005, Fact Sheet 80: Reintegration
Package for Afghans, 3 March <http://www.immi.gov.au/
facts/80reintegration.htm>.
DIMIA, 2004a, Fact Sheet 64a: New Measures for Temporary
Protection and Temporary Humanitarian Visa Holders,
30 August <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/64a_overview_
tpv.htm>.
DIMIA, 2004b, Fact Sheet 64b: Reintegration Package for
Temporary Protection, Temporary Humanitarian
and Return Pending Visa Holders, 24 August <hap://
www.immi.gov.au/facts/64b_reintegration_tpv.htm >.
DIMIA, 2004c, Fact Sheet 64c. Return Pending Visa, 31 August
<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/64c_rpv.htm >.
DIMIA, 2004d, Annual Report 2003-04<hdp:11
www.immi.gov.au/annual_report/annrep04/index.htm >.
DIMIA, 2004e, Answer to question 54 Taken on Notice, Senate
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Budget
Estimates Hearing 26 May 2004 <http://www.aph.gov.au/
senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/bud_0405/dimia/
a50-54.pdf>.
DIMIA, 2003a, Fact Sheet 80b: Reintegration Package for
Iranians, 31 July <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/80b_reintegration_iran.htm>.
DIMIA, 2003b, Allegations of Corruption - Investigations
Proceeding, DPS 68/2003, 3 October <hap://
www immi gov.au/media_releases/media03/d03068.htm>.
DIMIA, 2003c, What the Australian Did Not Tell You -
Committee Hansard: Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee, Migration Legislation Amendment
(Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002, 6 August.
Gordon, M, 2005, "New Deal for Afghan Refugees". The
Age, 19 May <http://www.theage.com.au/news/
Immigration/New-deal-for-Afghan-refugees/2005/05/18/
1116361614307.html>.
Grattan, M, 2002, "Detainees a Dwindling Problem." The Sunday
Age, 20 October.
Grove, A, 2001, "Immigration and Refugee Policy as a Debate
over Identity: A Choice between the Inclusivist Normative
Order and the Exclusivist Knee-jerk Reaction?" International
Politics 38: 583-91.
Human Rights Watch, 2002, Not for Export: Why the
International Community Should Reject Australia's
Refugee Policies.
Jackson, A, 2005a, "Passengers Shocked As Chained Gagged Man
Dragged Onto Jet." The Age, 28 January.
Jackson, A, 2005b, "Asylum Seekers Granted Reprieve".
The Age, 20 May <http://www.theage.com.au/news/
Immigration/Asylum-seekers-granted-reprieve/2005/05/19/
1116361674219.html>.
Jopson, D, 2004, "Home is Where the Hurt Is." The Sydney
Morning Herald, 29 September.
Kneebone, S, 2005, "What We Have Done With the Refugee
Convention: The Australian Way." Law in Context 22(2):
83-119.
Koser, K, 2001, "New Approaches to Asylum?" International
Migration 39(6): 85-101.
Koser, K and Black, R, 1999, "The End of the Refugee Cycle?"
The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatration and
Reconstruction Eds R. Black and K. Koser. New York and
Oxford: Berghahn Books. 2-17.
Loescher, G and Milner, J, 2003, "The Missing Link: The Need for
Comprehensive Engagement in Regions of Refugee Origin"
International Affairs 79(3): 595-617.
McGauran, P (Minister representing the Minister for Immigration),
2005a, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives
Proof Hansard, 10 May.
13
Migration Action
McGauran, P, 2005b, East Timorese Caseload, 27 April <http:
//www.minister immi gov.au/cam/media/media-releases/
medre105/05082.htm>.
McGauran, P, 2005c, Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives Proof Hansard, 23 May.
McGeough, P, 2004, "Gypsies of War Adrift in a World 'Without
Anchors." The Age, 5 April.
McMahon, V (Executive Coordinator, Border Control and
Compliance Division, DIMIA), 2003a, Official Committee
Hansard: SenateLegal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, Budget Estimates Supplementary Hearings, 4
November.
McMahon, V, 2003b, Official Committee Hansard: Senate Legal
and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration
ofBudget Estimates, 29 May.
McPhedran, I, 2002, "Fraud Probe on Afghans." The Herald-Sun,
23 July.
Miller, C, 2003a, "Flight from Australia on a Ticket to Nowhere."
The Age, 16 August.
2003b. "Asylum Bid Fails: Family Back in WA." The Age, 18
August <http://wwvv.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/17/
1061059722964.html>.
Morris, S and Kerin, J, 2004, "Don't Send Back Asylum Seekers:
Iraq." The Australian, 1 January.
Noll, G, 2003, "Return of Persons to States of Origin and Third
States." Migration and International Legal Norms. Eds A.
Aleinikoff and V. Chetail. The Hague: TMC Asser Press. 61-74.
Asylum seekers." The Refugees Convention 50 Years On:
Globalisation and International Law. Ed. S. Kneebone.
Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 193-232.
Vanstone, A (Minister for Immigration), 2005a, East Timorese
Caseload Will be Reconsidered, VPS 60/2005, 19 May
<http://www.minister immi gov.au/media_releases/
media05/v05060.htm>.
Vanstone, A, 2005b, Australia and Afghanistan Sign
New Agreements, VPS 059/2005, 17 May <http:
//www.minister immi gov.au/media_releases/media05/
v05059.htm>.
Vanstone, A, 2004, Parliamentary Debates, Senate Official
Hansard, 15 June.
Williams, J (Assistant Secretary, Unauthorised Arrivals and
Detention Operations Branch, DIMIA), 2004, Official
Committee Hansard: Senate Legal and Constitutional
Legislation Committee, Consideration of Budget
Estimates, 26 May.
Wroe, D, 2005, "From Nauru to Canberra: Freedom and
Friendship Rediscovered", The Age, 30 June.
Australian Legislation
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
International Legal Material
O'Toole, P, 2005, "Afghan refugees 'need more aid'." BBC News,
16 February <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_
asia/4269507.stm>.
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28
September 1954, [1974] ATS 20. Entered into force generally
6 June 1960 and for Australia 13 March 1974.
Ruddock, P, 2002, Reintegration Package for
Afghans Announced, MPS 38/2002, 23 May <http:
//wwvv.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/ruddock_
media02/r02038.htm>.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 19
December 1966, [1980] ATS 23. Entered into force generally
on 23 March 1976 and for Australia on 13 November 1980.
Shaw, M, 2003, "Deported Iranian Missing: Amnesty." The Age, 3
September <http://wvvw.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/02/
1062403515124.html>.
Schwartz, L, 2003, "Afghan Official Urges 'Slow' Return." The
Sunday Age, 6 July.
Skelton, R, 2003, "Living Life neither Here nor There." The Age,
18 February, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/
17/1045330536443.html>.
SLCRC (Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee),
2000, A Sanctuary Under Review: An Examination of
Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Determination
Processes <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/
legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-02/refugees/report/
index.htm>.
Taylor, S, 2005, "Sovereign Power at the Border." Public Law
Review 16(1): 55-77.
Taylor, S, 2003, "Chapter 8: The Human Rights of Rejected
14
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (Smuggling Protocol), 15
November 2002, [2004] ATS 11. Entered into force generally
on 28 January 2004 and for Australia on 26 June 2004.
International Policy Material
EXCOM, 2003, Conclusion on the Return of Persons Found Not
to be in Need of International Protection.
10M, 1997 , Return Policy and Programmes: A Contribution
to Combating Irregular Migration,MCIINF 1236, 10M, 5
November.
UNHCR, 2005, Convention Plus at a Glance (as of March 200_51
<http://www.unlicr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?t
b1=PROTECTION&id=403b306848ipage=protect>
1996. Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International
Protection. Geneva: UNHCR.
VOL )00/11, NUMBER 2 2005
Migration Action
Refugees and Regional Settlement:
A simple equation?
JANET TAYLOR & DAYANE STANOVIC
Introduction
A simple equation is sometimes presented: that regional areas
need population and workers and that refugees need jobs and
that therefore the refugees should go to regional areas. Our
research suggests the equation is not necessarily so simple.
Both the Federal Government and the Victorian State
Government have been developing policies to encourage
migrants and refugees to settle in regional areas to assist
the newcomers to gain employment and to help build
regional economies (DIMIA 2003; Withers & Powall 2003;
Department for Victorian Communities 2004; Vanstone
2005). This involves both relocation from metropolitan
areas and direct settlement from overseas. However the settlement needs of refugees cannot be assumed to be the same
as those of other migrants and earlier research has pointed
to their disadvantage in regional areas (Gray et al 1991).
This paper presents some of the findings of recent research
the Brotherhood of St Laurence has undertaken to explore
the settlement experiences of two recent refugee groups
(Iraqi and Sudanese) in selected areas of regional Victoria
and to explore the experience of social inclusion or
exclusion for members of these refugee communities. This
follows the discussion of social exclusion in refugee settlement in a number of recent papers in Migration Action
(Taylor 2004; Ramburuth & Stanovic 2004; White 2004).
Factors that promote or hinder social inclusion for refugees
are discussed below under the headings of social inclusion
and rights, resources and relationships.
The research project
This small exploratory study has focussed on the experiences
of Iraqi refugees in Shepparton and Sudanese refugees in Colac
and Warrnambool. Interviews and consultations were undertaken in mid 2004 with some 55 refugees (Iraqi and Sudanese)
and 22 regional and metropolitan community leaders and
service providers. There were five focus groups (three Iraqi:
men, women and young people; and two Sudanese: men and
women) and three family interviews (Sudanese).
was estimated at 3000 people, including some on Temporary
Protection Visas (TPVs). Sudanese settlement commenced in
Colac in 2002 and in Warrnambool in 2003. By mid 2004
there were some 60 to 70 Sudanese refugees in each town,
with the local meat works their major employers.
The time locations of refugee settlement could be compared
as follows:
•
Greater Shepparton (population 55,000) was already a
multicultural community to which Iraqi refugees chose
to come, initially to seek work and a quiet place, and
later to join those already there and to use the available
Arabic services, with refugees on TFITs joining the
existing community.
•
In Colac (10,000) Sudanese refugees were first recruited
by an employment agency for the local meatworks,
and were later joined by relatives from Melbourne and
overseas.
•
In Waffnambool (30,000) a small number of Sudanese
refugees were actively recruited from Melbourne as part
of a privately funded relocation project with humanitarian aims of settling refugees. This was associated with
the local government agenda of strengthening the local
economy.
Inclusive settlement for refugees in regional
areas
This paper draws together the experiences of the refugees
from the three locations—Shepparton, Colac and
Warrnambool. While there were some patterns and commonalities in their responses there was also considerable
diversity. In some cases the women gave different responses
from the men, the younger people from their parents, and
there were marked individual differences, for example, one
Sudanese woman was happy to be living in Colac, another,
in seemingly very similar circumstances, unhappy. Some
Iraqis were pleased with the lack of discrimination they
faced in Shepparton, while others were quite distressed by
the discrimination they had met there.
Iraqi settlement in the fruit-growing Shepparton area
commenced in the 1990s and by 2004 the Iraqi community
15
Migration Action
Choice of location
Regional settlement: the best things and the difficulties
We asked the refugees if they had a free choice where they
would want to live and received very diverse answers. Some
would choose to return to their homeland if it were safe and
peaceful; others, especially the young people, would choose
a major Australian city for its educational, employment and
leisure opportunities; and some were pleased to be where
they were, because they had work or felt safe and settled.
What the refugees identified as the best things about living
in their regional location often, but not always, reflected
their reasons for coming to the place. For those who had
employment, this was a key factor. Some were very positive
about the quiet and also the convenience of a smaller place
in terms of ease of getting around and not needing transport.
Some mentioned a cheaper cost of living. Some valued the
assistance from the local community, having friends of their
own group around them and, especially in Waffnambool,
the friendly local people. Some spoke of being in a place of
safety, in contrast to their homeland. The Iraqis emphasised
the value of the availability of bilingual workers, a benefit
not shared by the Sudanese groups.
At the moment I might not be able to live in my
homeland, just because of lack of security and there
is no stability so that is why I really prefer to stay
here.
(Iraqi man)
Why had the refugees come to the regional centres in
which they were living? Their primary reasons were to
seek employment and/or to join relatives and friends.
For example, the Sudanese men in Colac came to work
in the meat works and the women and children followed.
Other refugees spoke of multiple reasons for their choice.
Some placed a positive value on living in a small town as
a quiet place, especially to Wing up children. A number
of parents, both Iraqi and Sudanese, spoke of being better
able to control their children in a small town than in a city.
For at least one of the Sudanese, the 'quiet' included being
away from the demands of his community in the city. The
Iraqis also mentioned clean air as a reason for choosing
Shepparton (a number had children with asthma), as well
as its reputation for tolerance and being multicultural.
The main reason that I decided to move to
Shepparton because I mean all my kids were
experiencing asthma. The second reason, that I
fiel that I am able to control the behaviour of my
kids somehow better than living in a metropolitan
area. And again nevertheless there is a higher work
opportunity than some other places.
(Iraqi man)
It is very difficult to settle in a place where you don't
know anyone. This is why1came here ... two [relatives]
came here to Colac and then they settled here. So they
were working where they are still working now. 7hen
we rung them, we asked them if there's plenty ofjobs,
would you give us some information. They give us
information. And so as brothers, because we are
cousins, and then that's why we come.
(Sudanese man)
Some of the refiigees had come directly from overseas to
join friends or relatives who sponsored them and so had not
made an active choice of a country town.
16
For me because my husband has found a job here
... We are happy very happy, because we are here
[in Australia] 18 years and it's just not easy for my
husband to find a job. We have been in Queensland,
no job for him, in Melbourne.
(Iraqi woman)
The only reason we are here is because of employment. But the rest of the community, there is
nothing wrong, we are getting along with the
community and they are very supportive. But the
town is so small you cannot get what you want
(Sudanese woman Colac)
Here the social life is very easy and like they are
friendly and, for example, if you go to the church
here you get the whole family there in the church,
starting from the younger ones, but in Melbourne
you get the aged people, the grown up people but
you don't see youth or kids going to the church. The
rural areas they still keep their values, they keep
their respect and because we come from [a rural
area] we want to find the same environment
(Sudanese man Warrnambool)
What were the difficulties of their location? For some, the
lack of employment was the major difficulty. For people in
all three locations the limited tertiary educational opportunities was seen as a problem, in spite of the university
campuses in Shepparton and Warrnambool. Cost of living
was seen as higher than in cities by some people, in particular cost of food and of health services (because of lack
of bulkbilling GPs). Housing was a difficulty for some as
were limited settlement services and access to English
classes. Discrimination was a problem raised particularly
in Shepparton.
VOL )0CVII, NUMBER 2 2005
Migration Action
The Iraqi young people expressed their preference to live in
a bigger city: 'Like Shepparton is too small, so it's boring you
know'. One young man said of Melbourne:
It's bigger, and there is a lot of work opportunities,
and there's venues where you can spend your spare
time. For instance, there is not much available here
in Shepparton where we are living. It's normal the
city is always nicer and better than small towns.
(Iraqi young man)
There had been changes over time. In Shepparton, there was
some discussion of early difficulties overcome, as services
developed and the community became more familiar with
the newcomers. But there were also difficulties that arose
unexpectedly, for example increased abuse arising from the
public linking of Muslims and terrorism after the 2002 Bali
bombing:
Unfortunately it's the influence of the media and
unfortunately as well it's the government policy,
the government policy would like to stress the point
connecting between Muslim and terror. If that is
something [you get I from the higher ranking people,
what can you expect from the ordinary citizens?
(Iraqi man)
Feeling 'at home'
An important question for exploring the experience of
inclusion or exclusion for refugees is what would make
them feel 'at home' in their new location. The two main
things that would help the Iraqis feel at home were finding
work and reducing discrimination. Other obstacles to their
feeling at home were older children having to go elsewhere
for tertiary study, and, for TPv holders, the uncertainly of
their futures. Similarly, for the Sudanese, feeling at home
was associated with having work and being able to meet
their orrent needs. They also mentioned their enjoyment of
friendly relationships with local people and the importance
of living somewhere with no war:
Here the people ... are treating us in a good way and
as well there is equality between the peoples living
here. It doesn't matter we are Muslims, it doesn't
matter where we come from. There is no discrimination. The safety as welt
(Iraqi woman)
We've got the church here, and the weather here is
OK and they treat us well, so we are happy and feel
at home.
(Sudanese women Colac)
VOL )0C1/11, NUMBER 2 2005
Actually we are feeling at home here, the most
important thing is to meet with people and help
to socialise with them and go along with them,
because this is part of happiness. We are social by
nature and we like it here.
The decisive thing for refugees was the balance between the
advantages and the disadvantages of a particular location.
Some, overall, were quite happy to be living where they
were, in spite of some difficulties. For others, the problems
outweighed the benefits and they were likely to move on
because of lack of work or the high cost of living or to
undertake higher education.
In connection to myself, after my release from the
detention centre [I came here because] I've got a
friend living here in Shepparton and the second
reason that I decided to choose Shepparton rather
than other places [was] seeking a work opportunity,
but unfortunately my health later on deteriorated.
I've got kids at school and they built up a network
of friendship and as well [there is] the excellent
treatment of the service providers and the teachers
in the area and the officers that we really like and
appreciate. And we feel very comfortable here. And
you can say in general that we settled down.
(Iraqi man TPV not able to find work)
Social inclusion and rights
The acknowledgment of people's human rights is an
important aspect of their experience of being included in
a society. Refugees arrive with past experience of having
their rights denied. In this study some of the refugees spoke
positively about being treated as equals under Australian
law (in particular Iraqi women) and of safety from war
and persecution. Others had experienced some situations
where they felt their rights were not being recognised.
These ranged from lack of rights as tenants to some contacts
with the police. People on TPVs were very aware of being
excluded from various aspects of life by Australia's legal and
bureaucratic apparatus, with many rights withheld.
Temporary Protection Visas
A large number of Iraqi refugees who had arrived in Australia
by boat from 1999 and had spent time in detention centres
were subsequently recognised as refugees by the Australian
Government, but were granted only temporary protection
rather than the permanent protection that could be seen
as their right. Some hundreds of Iraqis in Shepparton,
including some we interviewed, were in this situation.
17
Migration Action
TPV holders could not bring family members to join them
in Australia, could not visit family members overseas and
return, and were not eligible for most settlement services
and income support available to other refugees (see Taylor
& Stanovic 2004). TPV restrictions hindered settlement for
the refugees in Shepparton (as elsewhere), for example by
limiting employment, by limiting assistance from employment agencies, by subjecting holders to the harsh income
tests which apply to Special Benefit and by denying access to
tertiary education. Some T'PV holders felt angry and humiliated by such exclusion:
Especially for students they are suffering a lot from
TPVs because we can't like plan for the future, we
can't get to uni, so I'm going to finish year 12 in
three or four months but my teacher said I can't get
to uni anyway because I have to pay fullfees and it's
too expensive. We can't plan, like ifthey want to give
a permanent visa they should do it early so we can
make a decision.
(Iraqi young man)
Social inclusion and resources
People can readily be socially excluded because of lack
of resources. Refugees typically arrive with very limited
material resources and have greater need for support than
other immigrants. In turn, regional towns often lack many
of the resources available in the cities. However, some
regional areas may well be able to provide the necessary
resources for particular refugees. Crucial resources for
settlement discussed by refugees in Shepparton, Colac and
Warrnambool included employment, income, education,
language, housing, health and other services. One of the
Sudanese outlined the very different resources needed for
life in his homeland:
At home you have everything, you have the land to
farm, you have the river you can getfish, you can be
without a job, you are OK But the problem is war
that really gave us a hard time ... Here you have to
plan for your future, what you will eat tomorrow,
so here is time management and you have to stick
on that
Employment
While local community and industry leaders spoke of the
regional need for labour, some refugees found difficulty in
getting any work. The type of work available was limited.
It was mainly low skilled, seasonal or casual. For example,
fruit picking in the Shepparton area was only available for a
few months a year, the jobs in the meat works in Colac and
18
Warrnambool were typically casual, and the work available
fluctuated and was influenced by factors such as drought.
Being laid off when work was slow meant the difficulties
of going back and forth to Centrelink to adjust benefit
payments and problems of how to meet commitments such
as rent. In any case, fruit picking and jobs at meat works
could be seen as entry work for fit young new anivals, but
were not necessarily the ongoing 'employment of choice' for
those with higher qualifications or seeking career advancement. Also some of the refugees had health problems which
would prevent manual employment. Some of the Iraqis felt
that the employment available to them was either 'left over',
what no one else wanted to do, or what no one else could
do, such as interpreting. Meanwhile some members of the
host community were critical of the Iraqis as 'not so keen on
manual labour'.
Unemployment was descnbed as 'a major problem' for the
Iraqis in Shepparton and a service provider estimated that
60 to 70 per cent of men were unemployed. A number of
the Iraqi men, women and young people to whom we spoke
had failed to find work and some were quite depressed
by their unemployment. Those we interviewed who were
employed were typically working in part-time jobs as
bilingual community workers. The Iraqis were particularly
upset that none of their 16 to 25-year-olds were in full-time
employment in Shepparton.
In Colac and Warrnambool, while most of the Sudanese men
to whom we spoke were working (in meat works), some of
the newest artivals were still seeking work:
The problem of being a small town, most jobs are
family things, so it's really difficult to have someone
from outside so the only place is [the meat works]. At
Ithe meat works I people come and go.
Yeah, now, I think I'm not part of Warrnambool
because I'm not working ... I don't have friends,
Australian friends. When I was in Melbourne,
we had some friends. We work together, we play
together, we play soccer together. I'm still part of
Melbourne.
With the exception of doctors, it seemed difficult for
refugees with professional qualifications, such as engineers
or teachers, to find work in their field in the regional
locations:
Working like picking the fruit or pruning, it's not
like a job that will improve their skills. And some of
them they are very highly educated and they've got
Migration Action
really very high qualifications. But you don't ask the
people with very high qualifications to go and work
picking fruit or pruning and most of the wintertime
there is no job, and even if they will work for the
part-time two days a week, it is still a very hard job
and there is no benefit from that job.
(Iraqi woman)
While in their relatively early days of settlement the
Sudanese were pleased to get work in the meat works of
Warrnambool and Colac, some saw this as a stage on the
way to higher education and job prospects:
Sometimes they are happy because they have
the opportunity to work; sometimes they are not
because that is not what they want to do for the rest
of their life. So the reason they are doing this job is
that they want to do something that will help them
do the further education, so like buying a car, so
when they pay off their car they may be able to do
something else but this is not the lifetime work for
them ... We are here for putposes for the short term,
so once we get what we want we will move because
there are no universities here.
Other barriers to getting work in regional areas (as in cities)
included: English language ability, recognition of skills,
unhelpful experiences with employment agencies, physical
and mental illness, and discrimination (including for Iraqi
women wearing the hijab).
I would like to do anything I can do, but that job
should be suitable to my age, suitable to my style
of wearing [the hijahl because I'm Muslim, as well
as suitable to my level of English ... I really would
like to work for an Australian factory, to be with
Australian people, not with Arabic people.
(Iraqi woman)
Income and cost of living
Refugees affiving in Australia are likely to have very low
incomes and high expenditures (Taylor 2004). The refugees
we interviewed were typically living on low incomes, either
on Centrelink payments (Special Benefit for those on TPVs),
or on low wages, often in part-time work. (Those working
full-time on casual rates of $14.50 per hour at the meat works
in Warrnambool could theoretically make $30,000 per annum,
but the work was not constant and casual workers had no sick
leave or annual leave, and some were earning less.) Not only
did they have low incomes, but also they often had high expenditure, for example as humanitarian entrants repaying airfares
VOL )00/11, NUMBER 2 2005
or trying to sponsor relatives to Australia, or fmancially assisting
large and scattered families in refugee camps or war zones:
We've got some obligation toward family members
and we have to support them financially [so they
can] survive. Actually we are depriving ourselves
from some life necessities in order to save some
money to send for those who experience financial
difficulties back home.
(Iraqi man)
We've got our own problems. Because we came a
long way and we left other people there, some are
in refugee camps, some are in Sudan, some are
in Egypt, and to us it's our responsibility to help
them also. It's one of our values that you can't have
anything just for yourself alone, you have to extend
to others ... Sometimes it is really difficult to settle
all your bills and evegthing, because you receive a
telephone call from Sudan from one of the relatives
that is suffering and needs some help and you have
to help.
(Sudanese man Waffnambool)
Costs that were reported by the refugees as difficult to meet
included medication especially for asthma, child care while
parents worked, obtaining driving licences and Centrelink
debts.
The question of whether cost of living was higher in the
regional centres than in the capital cities produced diverse
answers. In Shepparton some refugees felt costs were less
than in the city, some that they were more and some that
they evened out. Shepparton was seen as more expensive
for food including fruit and vegetables, petrol and medical
expenses, and less expensive for rents and for travel costs
because things were close by. Because of high costs some
Iraqi families were moving back to Melbourne. Members
of the host community were only partially aware of the
financial struggle of some refugee families. One community
worker noted that the Iraqis tended to live frugally and help
each other; another assumed they had few financial difficulties because they did not look poor', and because some
were able to visit Iraq and had started to buy houses.
The [Centrelink1 payment is just enough to rent
and to pay the bills, but you can't respond to any
requirement from the children, you can't have any
fun for them, you can't do anything. The payment,
it's very limited.
(Iraqi woman)
In Colac, the Sudanese found medical costs higher than
in Melbourne, the men found transport and housing
19
Migration Action
cheaper and the women found the food more expensive. In
Warrnambool, the Sudanese found housing cost more than
in Melbourne and local community workers described the
cost of living as a bit dearer than in the city.
Many of the refugees to whom we spoke found with the low
wages they earned, they had nothing left over at the end of
the week:
We came from refugee camps, where we were
getting rations from UNHCR. We expected that
when we came here to Australia our lives would be
different, but here is very expensive, like shopping,
[andl meat is cut differently. So the life is difficult
We get money because our husbands work, but the
money they are gettingfrom their employer is insuf
ficient for life expenses here, it leaves them with
nothing really.
(Sudanese women Colac)
Education
Schools provide an important site for the inclusion of
refugee children and their parents into the host community,
and educational opportunities are a key factor in enabling
future inclusion.
Educational resources needed for these refugees in
regional Victoria included English as a second language
(ESL) teaching for children at school, and tertiary training
facilities for school leavers and also for those who needed
to upgrade their qualifications or develop new careers. The
young Iraqis who were still at school spoke positively of the
assistance they received there, but it was still not necessarily
enough, for example, to bring their English up to Year 12
level. Community workers noted that local schools did not
necessarily have the resources to deal with children with
behavioural issues as a result of their refugee experience.
Parents wondered whether they would have to move to
the city to provide tertiary education for their children or
meet the costs of setting them up in Melbourne. Other rural
parents face the same dilemma, but generally with greater
resources and without the multiple disruptions and family
separations that the refugee families have already suffered
or the potential loss of cultural identity as a community if
their children leave.
For the Sudanese a major challenge was how to combine
work and study in order to improve their future prospects.
They needed time to study and appropriate courses to be
affordable and available:
20
If you want to go for study you cannot do it here
because by going to study you are not working and
if you are not working you cannot afford the living,
like the renting ... The problem will discourage some
from coming to ruralareas because this means you
have to confine yourself to work only. It will also
be hard for us because the most important thing is
education.
Language
Being able to communicate is essential to being included in
a society. For refugees ariiving in Australia with little or no
English the resources needed are twofold: interpreting and
translating services to enable communication in their own
language with the wider community, including Centrelink,
employment and medical services; and English tuition to
facilitate their development of English language skills.
Both federal and state governments have put considerable resources into language services; however there are
always new challenges as new arrivals bring new languages
not covered by existing services. Supplying the services
in regional areas is a further challenge, especially where
numbers of non-English speakers are still relatively small.
Some regional service providers found the funding model
of being paid to deliver English classes based on attendance
numbers, rather than by the hour, made classes unsustainable.
English classes provided an important social contact, especially for some of the women to whom we spoke, as did
individual home tutors. Costs of child care and transport
to enable people to attend classes were covered for some
refugees but not for others, depending on the delivery
model and funding. Provision of English classes for refugees
who were working was made difficult by changing shifts.
Providing for diverse needs in a small refugee group is quite
difficult in regional areas. For example among the Sudanese,
on the one hand there were women who had had no formal
schooling and were unable to read their own language let
alone English, and on the other hand there were men who
had learned English at school and had some tertiary qualifications but needed high level English assistance to enable
them to undertake further studies.
The teacher gives us things that are too much, we
are beginners. They always give us forms ... We
need more intensive support ... But here there is no
conversation, we don't know how to read, we need
more conversation.
Migration Action
The Iraqi conununity was very appreciative of the assistance
available to them in Shepparton from bilingual workers and
interpreters, for example in Centrelink and in schools as
well as at the Ethnic Council.
In contrast to the more established Iraqis in Shepparton,
the Sudanese in Colac and Warmambool had no locally
employed bilingual workers or interpreters, although they
had some access to phone interpreting services. The Sudanese
in Colac were Nuer-speaking while those in Warrnambool
were from different tribal groups, speaking different
languages. While some of the Sudanese spoke Arabic, not all
of the women did so, and the Arabic used differed from that
spoken by the Iraqis. Some of the Sudanese, particularly the
men, spoke English well and could sometimes interpret for
others, but this was not always possible because of work and
family commitments, and not necessarily desirable because
of privacy and skill issues in dealing, for example with
health, domestic violence or legal issues.
In my country we start to learn English ... I learn
English for three years but when we finish Grade 12
in my county and we go to work, in work there is no
English ... we speak Arabic.
The problem here is language. lf we are able to
express ourselves we can go to services by ourselves,
but because I don't have the capacity, my husband
has to inteipret everything for me ... Because I don't
have options I have to use him for everything, [even]
ifI go shopping.
Housing
It is often assumed that housing is cheaper in regional areas
than in the city, but this was the case only in some locations.
Some refugees spoke positively about the availability of
larger houses in regional areas. On the other hand there was
a shortage of rental housing in some places and at some times
and the housing available was sometimes of poor quality.
The shortage of rental housing was a problem in Colac and
during the fruit-picking season in Shepparton. The high cost
of housing was seen as a problem in Warrnambool:
In Melbourne, I was renting for $130 per week a
very good house, Housing Commission. Now I am
paying $220 per week, it is nearly double ... The rent
will discourage others from coming.
Three Sudanese families in Colac were sharing a house:
What I would like the government to do is to build
more public housing here so that we can feel we
are at home, so we can have our own house so you
can plan for the future, but the way we live now, we
don't have plans because we are living together,
three families in the one house.
Other issues included the role of real estate agents in access
to rental property and the refugees' perception of being
discriminated against on various occasions, for example in
having bonds withheld when leaving a rental property. For
new arrivals, it was difficult to get housing without references and with no employment.
Local community workers suggested that the scarcity of
public housing and the long waiting lists for local residents
meant that there was likely to be local resentment if newly
arrived refugees had access to public housing.
Initial assistance for refugees with housing should be
provided through DIMIA's Integrated Humanitarian
Settlement Scheme (IHSS); however few services were
available for the Sudanese refugees arriving directly to
regional locations from overseas (not relocating from other
parts of Australia). Early assistance with housing, including
the bond and a month's rent, had been a valuable part of
the Warrnambool Relocation Project but was not available
to subsequent arrivals.
Services
All three regional communities had developed some services
to assist the refugees settling, in addition to the English
language classes. For example, the Warrnambool Relocation
Project had allowed the local government appointment of
a Migrant Liaison Officer as a central contact point, while
in Shepparton the Ethnic Community Council in association with the TAFE provided a range of services. In Colac
a federal government (DIMIA) Living in Harmony grant
funded work to counter intolerance. However community
workers were having to take on tasks beyond their role (and
funding) to try to fill gaps in services and to meet the refugee
needs for intensive assistance.
Access to health services can be particularly important
for refugees because of their special health needs (from
post-traumatic stress to, for some Iraqis, possible effects
of depleted uranium) and their previous deprivation, for
example in refugee camps. Refugees interviewed raised
problems of health services, in particular the cost of medical
services because of the lack of bulk billing GPs and, for the
21
Migration Action
Iraqi women, the lack of female doctors. Lack of medical
interpreters was a further issue.
Access to transport and the availability of housing near
public transport were also important. Different approaches
to dealing with transport to English classes for women with
children ranged from employing a refugee woman as a
bus driver and child care coordinator to collect women
(Shepparton) to teaching women how to use public
transport (Warrnambool).
Other positive aspects of services for the refugees included:
•
Both Shepparton and Warrnambool developed committees to oversee refugee settlement with an emphasis on
agencies working together.
•
The availability of volunteers, particularly as English
home tutors, but also for wider activities, has been a
strength in these three communities.
Difficulties included:
•
•
The Migrant Resource Centre in Geelong struggled
to provide settlement services at a distance for new
anivals in Colac and Warrnambool.
Local service providers spoke of the huge amount of
work to 'be there' for the newly arrived refugees who
had often lived for years in refugee camps, and to
educate them about the complex Australian system.
▪ In some communities providing services to a refugee
group raised resentments from other groups.
•
In Shepparton Iraqi refugees with TPVs were not eligible
for some services available to other Iraqis. This caused
confusion and resentment.
•
In each location there were programs that had been able
to attract only short-term funding, while newcomers
continued to need the service.
Social inclusion and relationships
In considering three dimensions of social inclusion and
exclusion of refugees in regional areas (rights, resources
and relationships), the relationships arena is perhaps the
most complex. Relationships are affected by the diversity
within the host community, which can be both welcoming
and hostile to the newcomers; by the size and visibility of
the refugee group; and by the diversity within the refugee
group. From their compatriots, the refugees may experience
both support and pressure, and their key relationships may
be both local and international.
22
The refugees we interviewed generally felt welcomed by
their local communities. For some refugees being able to live
in peace was in itself welcome enough. Some, particularly
women with little English, lived fairly isolated lives within
their ethnic group, while others had considerable and
positive social contact with members of the host community.
There were some incidents of hostility and discrimination
reported.
All the refugee groups were very visible in their host communities. Their cultural characteristics affected community
relations: for example the Shia Muslim women's clothing,
dietary requirements and social prohibitions (for example
against shaking hands) could make this refugee group seem
less approachable to the host community.
At school some people say 'What's that you put on
your head?' How do you handle that? Some of them
they understand it and some of them don't
(Iraqi young woman)
While Shepparton was seen as welcoming with its long
history of multiculturalism, the Sudanese in the more Ànglo'
locations were also experiencing welcome, possibly associated with their novelty. 'People go up and talk to them' was
a comment made by service providers in Warrnambool and
confirmed by the Sudanese refugees. The work of the Living
in Harmony project in Colac was reported to have changed
community attitudes from 'standoffish to warm'.
People are really good. Even [people! you don't
know, they can greet you. That's very nice, different
from the city. They are very friendly.
While earlier studies of African Australians emphasised
the experience of racial discrimination (Nsubuga-Kyobe
& Dimock 2000), this was not a major issue reported by
the Sudanese in the present study. Anti-Muslim incidents,
however, were widely reported by the Iraqis.
It was suggested by community workers that the Sudanese
in Warrnambool were becoming part of the local community
through church and schools and contact with their neighbours. The Sudanese in Colac at the time of these interviews
had young children not yet in the school system.
Having a common language for communication is clearly an
important aspect of social inclusion, but openness to difference and goodwill on both sides are also crucial for successful settlement in regional areas. People spoke of activities
such as picnics and soccer matches which encouraged social
Migration Action
contact. Soccer seemed to offer an important potential point
of contact with the wider community as well as within their
own, for the refugees in all three locations.
Education of the host community was agreed to be a
necessary strategy by both community workers and
refugees. Young Iraqis who had experienced discrimination
spoke of the need to explain the situation of persecution
from which they had come. Iraqi community workers were
talking to local groups such as Rotary as well as to service
providers about the situation and culture of the refugees.
The Geelong Migrant Resource Centre has run community
forums on refugees in both Warrnambool and Colac since
the time of our interviews.
Like the school they are friendly, it is good, but some
people ... don't know what's Muslim or something,
like when I first come to Australia there was a girl
who called me Bin Laden junior' so there has to
be more explaining about this stuff Did you speak
to the teachers at school about this? At that time I
wasn't speaking English, I didn't know what to do.
(Iraqi young man)
The size of the refiigee community can be a crucial element in
its settlement and its relationship with the host community.
The large size of the Iraqi community has enabled services to
be developed, and has provided important cultural support
for its members, but at the same time may work against
inclusiveness in the host society, as in the comment from a
host community leader:
There's been so many of them there's been no need
really to include them.
In all three locations there were examples of positive press
coverage of the refugees settling, although there had been
some negative coverage in Shepparton when 'women only'
swimming sessions were first being planned.
Refugees emphasised the importance of their continuing
contact with and responsibility for relatives overseas. The
Sudanese explained their strong cultural imperative to care
for and support their extended family in Africa and to try
to bring them to Australia. Some of the Iraqis had recently
visited Iraq and been most distressed by the war-zone conditions in which their relatives were living. For these refugees
successful settlement would be very difficult while their
families remained in danger.
The refugees in all three regional locations kept contact
with friends and relatives in Melbourne, some visiting the
city for special events and, in turn, receiving visitors. This
indicates the advantage of regional areas with easy access
to larger centres.
Gender issues were significant especially when social activities were segregated along gender lines. Among the Iraqis
the potential isolation of the women at home was seen as
a problem by community leaders. Some of the Sudanese
women in Colac were missing the cultural support of their
larger community in Melbourne. The well-being of the
refugee women settling would in turn affect the well-being
of their children.
Areas for further research
This exploratory study raises questions for further research
in the following areas:
•
Primary or secondary migration. What are the differences in experience between those refugees moving
from the city to a regional area (secondary migration)
and those who arrive directly in a regional area (primary
migration)?
•
Maintaining families. What is the impact of regional
settlement on family integrity? For example will a
regional location suit both husbands and wives and also
older children?
•
Critical mass. What is the desirable size of refugee communities settling in regional areas? Larger numbers can
make service provision more viable, but may alter the
balance of community relations.
•
Number ofrefugee groups. How many different refugee
groups can a host community adequately support at the
one time? For example, what will be the impact on
resources available for Arabic-speaking refugees in
Shepparton of the proposed arrival of African refugees
with different language needs, but with similar needs for
assistance with employment and housing?
Conclusions
-
implications for policy
This small-scale study can only provide glimpses of the
issues of refugee settlement in regional areas. While it has
included some discussion with community leaders and
service providers in regional communities, the focus has
been on the experience of the refugees to whom we talked.
Nevertheless, the findings raise some general implications
for regional refugee settlement, concerning how to meet the
complex needs of the refugees, how to plan for the diversity
of both the refugees and the regional host communities, and
how to ensure informed choice.
23
Migration Action
The refugees
This study suggests that some of the supports needed by
refugees settling in regional areas are:
• specific to refugees
including recognition of their
experience of trauma, torture and loss; their disrupted
education and employment; their special health needs;
their anxiety about family still in danger overseas; and
the uncertainty and limitations for those granted only
temporary protection (TPVs).
—
• specific to refugees and other immigrants as
newcomers including the provision of language
felt the advantages outweighed the disadvantages, and
some were not happy and planned to move. It is difficult on
balance to summarise these diverse reactions, other than to
reiterate that regional settlement seemed to work well for
some people we talked to, but not for all.
Regional settlement meant for these refugees at best:
welcome, employment, safety and a good place to bring up
children; and at worst: unemployment, poverty, isolation
and vilification.
Regional communities
—
services, understanding of their cultural background,
and assistance in understanding the Australian system
at local as well as at state and national levels.
• specific to refugees and other residents of regional
areas including access to educational and career
There was considerable diversity within and between the
different regional locations in the study. Regional communities contain conflicting attitudes to refugee artivals. How
these balance out will have a major impact on settlement. In
this study attitudes included:
—
opportunities, an issue that causes many young people
to leave regional areas for the city; access to low-cost
housing; and access to affordable medical care.
The kinds of support needed by the refugees will apply to
some extent whether they settle in cities or regional areas,
but the resources available to assist them may be very
different depending on location.
Recognising diversity
In suggesting that regional settlement of refugees is not a
simple solution to either regional needs or refugee needs,
this study highlights the diversity that needs to be considered: the diversity of the refugees and of the regional areas
and their resources.
•
strong humanitarian support for assisting refugees to
start new lives
•
a strong need by certain employers in selected industries
for a flexible workforce
•
the desire for increased population to maintain facilities
such as schools
•
some hostility to outsiders, including those from a
different 'race' or religion, those who have been associated in public discourse with terrorists, and those who
might be seen as taking local jobs, working for less pay
or receiving extra services.
This study cannot make a comprehensive comparison of the
three locations, but notes that all three locations provided
positive examples of refugee settlement, but all three also
had some difficulties.
Refugees
The diversity among the refugees to whom we spoke was
considerable, in terms of education, employment experience, language skills, gender and immigration status—even
when they came from the same country. Another difference
was their response to their previous refugee experiences:
some were disabled by these, while others showed great
resilience.
Such diversity is not surprising, but it can be overlooked in
regional planning when the focus is on gaining workers for
specific local industries, for example, or finding places for a
new group of refugees.
In this study, most refugees saw both advantages and disadvantages in living in a regional area. Some were pleased
with where they were living and felt very 'at home', others
24
The role of policy in promoting social inclusion
for refugees in regional areas
The development and implementation of public policy
(social and economic) is critical to the success of regional
refugee resettlement. For policy to be an instrument that
assists social inclusion it needs to be dynamic and responsive to the resettlement needs of refugees and the host
community across time and place.
The Review of Settlement Services (DIMIA 2003) pointed
to the need for regional areas receiving refugees to have
adequate initial settlement services and to be able to provide
early employment. Regional communities wanting to build
their population need to be able to offer longer term stable
employment to encourage settlers to stay.
Migration Action
If DIMIA policy is to encourage refugees to selected regional
areas with plentiful jobs, affordable housing, strong
community support and good access to infrastructure such
as health and education (Hardgrave 2004), this could well
provide a good alternative to metropolitan settlement for
some refugees.
Regional settlement needs generous resourcing — but not at
the expense of refugee communities in metropolitan areas.
The selection by DIMIA of regional areas for extra resourcing
for refugees (Hardgrave 2004) raises the question of what
extra resourcing they will receive and what are the implications for other regional areas with refugee settlers.
Partnerships seem to be a key factor in facilitating
inclusive refugee settlement. One partner must be the
refugee community. At the planning level, partnerships
should include federal, state and local government and
ref-ugee communities, local services providers, businesses,
industry and citizens. Contemporary regional development
approaches involve place-based devolution of decision
making. This could be adopted by DIMIA in terms of local
identification of required resources and local participation
in decision making.
Policy options in supporting refugees into regional areas
include: ignoring relocation, supporting or promoting
relocation to a regional area, supporting or promoting
settlement direct from overseas and planned settlement
direct from overseas. The present situation includes a
mixture of approaches undertaken with varying involvement by federal, state and local governments, and it is too
early to compare their impact and effectiveness. One of the
effects of planned settlement is likely to be some subsequent
unplanned chain migration.
For the refugees an important aspect of regional settlement
is informed choice. Most of the refiigees in this study had
relocated from a city to the regional town, although a few
had come direct from overseas. Those who had relocated
were able to make direct comparisons with city life and
were generally pleased to have moved. To some extent
those who seemed least happy vvith their move were those
who had least choice, for example some of the women in
Colac who had come to join their husbands and some of the
young Iraqis in Shepparton who were there because of their
fathers' decisions but saw their futures elsewhere. Some of
the new anivals who had come straight from Africa to the
regional areas were still uncertain about their new homes.
The encouragement of skilled migrants (as opposed to or in
addition to refugees) as new workers and settlers presents
some of the same challenges for regional communities. It
should be noted that skilled migrants and their families are
entitled to even less income support than refugees, usually
having no social security support for the first two years.
In the light of the present study's findings some specific
policies may need to be reviewed. These include:
•
the consideration of refugee settlement within regional
development planning, considering the interaction
between labour market and housing.
•
the delivery of DIMIA refugee settlement services in
regional areas across large distances and to areas with
small numbers of refugees. This may require specialist
programs joined to existing services.
• the provision of English classes and the funding model
for them. There is a need to provide for people with
different levels of education, and funding per class
rather than per head may be more appropriate for
regional areas (if not for all areas).
•
education and employment services, to allow refugees
to develop career pathways. This approach could draw
on learnings from the Brotherhood of St Laurence's
successful pilot program, Given the Chance, a careers,
education and employment program for refugees (Kyle
et al. 2004).
The way forward
Regional settlement is likely to suit some refugees but not all
and it may suit some only in the short term. What is needed
to promote long-term settlement are policies that:
•
promote buoyant and sustainable regional economies,
which can provide education and employment pathways
for both the host communities and refugees
•
provide generous settlement services for refugees in
regional areas which can meet their special needs as
refugees as well as their wider needs as immigrants, and
can assist in building sustainable cultural communities
•
build on the host communities' capacity to welcome and
include newcomers.
The findings suggest that key goals for policies of refugee
settlement should be:
•
to promote informed choice for refugees
•
to ensure advance planning and capacity building in
areas of resettlement whether urban or regional, in
consultation with appropriate refugee groups.
25
Migration Action
In response to the simple equation that regional areas need
population and workers and that refugees need jobs and that
therefore the refugees should go to regional areas, this study
raises the question of why regional areas need workers and
population. If the answer is because of population decline
due to lack of 'employment of choice', lack of educational
opportunities and loss of services, these are all factors that
could weigh very heavily on refugee settlers. Problems with
these—employment, education pathways and services—
were all prominent for the refugees in this study. Refugees
cannot be the single answer for regional problems, although
they can make a contribution if appropriate resources are in
place. This paper argues that because of the special humanitarian considerations for accepting refugees into Australia,
we as a society have a strong obligation to assist their settlement as much as possible. They should not be seen as merely
a source of cheap labour.
Some questions for regional communities planning refugee
settlement:
Resources
What is the community's capacity to provide sustainable employment?
What is the community's capacity to provide career
paths for young people?
What is the community's capacity to provide choice of
employment?
What is the community's capacity to provide affordable
housing for people on low incomes?
How many new arrivals can the community accommodate and at what rate?
Relationships
The resettlement of refugees is a complex and long-term
task, complicated by unresolved conflicts overseas. One of
the refugees made this telling comment about the impact of
the ongoing war: 'Without peace in Sudan, we will never get
settled here'. The present research indicates, however, that
in the meantime Australia can contribute to a more hopeful
future by providing the kind of support that helps refugees
in regional areas to feel at home.
How will the community welcome newcomers with
refugee backgrounds, acknowledging their humanitarian needs?
How keen is the community to welcome newcomers of
diverse religious, language and cultural backgrounds?
What capacity does the community have to meet the
social support needs of refugees?
Are refugees welcome as people who may have welfare
needs and difficulties, and not only as workers?
Is the community willing to engage in two-way consultation with refugee communities in planning refugee
settlement?
Rights
Are refugees given sufficient and accurate information
about the regional community to make a well informed
choice about resettlement?
Janet Taylor is the Research Coordinator at the
Brotherhood of St Laurence, Melbourne, and Dayane
Stanovic completed her Social Work field placement
with Social Action and Research and the Ecumenical
Migration Centre at the Brotherhood of St Laurence in
2004.
jtaylor@bsl.org.au
26
Migration Action
Note
This paper is based on the full report of the project Refugees
and regional settlement: balancing priorities (Taylor &
Stanovic 2005). Readers who are interested in more detailed
accounts of the literature, the methodology or the settlement experiences in each of the three locations are refund
to the full report which is available on the Brotherhood of
St Laurence's website www.bsl.org.au (or to purchase a
printed copy contact the Brotherhood on (03) 9483 1386 or
publications@bsl. org . au).
References
Department for Victorian Communities 2004, Regional Migration
Incentive Fund: Guidelines and expression ofinterest 2004—
2007, viewed July 2004, <www.employment.vic.gov.au >.
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs (DIMIA) 2003, Report of the Review of Settlement
Services for Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants, May,
DIMIA, Canbeffa.
Gray, I, Dunn, P, Kelly, B & Williams, C 1991, Immigrant settlement in country areas, Bureau of Immigration Research,
AGPS, Canberra.
Hardgrave, G (Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs)
2004, Significant boost for settlement services in Australia,
media release, 11 May, Parliament House, Canberra.
Nsubuga-Kyobe, A & Dimock, L 2000, African communities
and settlement services in Victoria: towards best practice
service delivery models, DIMIA, Canberra.
Ramburuth, R & Stanovic D 2004, 'Social exclusion frameworks:
how well do they capture the refugee experience?', Migration
Adon, vol.26, no.2, pp.36-39.
Taylor, J 2004, 'Refugees and social exclusion: what the literature
says', Migration Action, vol.26, no.2, pp.16-31.
Taylor, J & Stanovic, D 2004, 'Services and entitlements: refugees,
migrants and asylum seekers', Migration Action, vol.26, no.2,
pp.32-5.
Taylor, J & Stanovic, D 2005, Refugees and regional settlement.
balancing priorities, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Melbourne.
Vanstone, A (Minister for Immigration) 2005, Victoria to benefit
from new migration initiatives, media release 21 February,
viewed 28 Febniary 2005, <http://www.minister immi gov.au/
media_releases/media05/v05034.htm>.
White, M 2004, 'Asylum policy in the UK and Australia: a pathway
to social exclusion?', Migration Action, vol.26 no.1 pp.4-13.
Withers, G & Powall, M 2003, Immigration and the regions:
taking regional Australia seriously, prepared for the Chifley
Research Centre by Applied Economics, viewed 28 February
2005, <http://wwvv.chifley.org.au/publications/immigration_
and_the_regions_25_sept_03.pdf>.
Kyle, L, Macdonald, F, Doughney, J & Pyke, J 2004, Refugees in
the labour market: looking for cost-effective models of
assistance, Ecumenical Migration Centre of the Brotherhood
of St Laurence, Fitzroy, Vic.
VOL )00/11, NUMBER 2 2005
27
Migration Action
Fruit Pickers, Undocumented Workers
and Circular Migration
PETER MARES
The death of Mr Tanginoa
Viliami Tanginoa died in the Maribyrnong immigration
detention centre in Melbourne in December 2000, just a
few days before Chiistmas. At about 8am, on the morning
that he was due to be sent back to Tonga, Mr Tanginoa
climbed up onto the basketball hoop in the detention centre
courtyard and refused to come down. Despite torrential
rain, he remained sitting on the hoop long after his plane
had departed, saying little, while detention centre staff
made sporadic and disorganised attempts to convince or
cajole him to end his protest. After eight hours, Mr Tanginoa
stood up and jumped head first onto the concrete below. He
died at the scene.
Prior to his detention as an 'unlawful non-citizen', Mr
Tanginoa had been working as a fruit picker near the town
of Swan Hill on the Murray River. During my investigations
into the circumstances of his death', I discovered that the
employment of undocumented migrants in horticulture
was quite common. Growers complained that 'Australians'
would no longer do such difficult work for the money on
offer; yet they also claimed that they could not afford to
pay higher wages or their produce would be priced out
of the market by international competition. This creates a
lose-lose-lose situation: growers lose because immigration
raids disrupt the time-sensitive harvest of valuable commodities; the Commonwealth government loses because it
misses out on taxes from the cash-in-hand employment of
undocumented workers and must carry out costly immigration enforcement and detention operations in an attempt to
rein in the practice; and the workers lose because they have
no legal status in Australia and are vulnerable to exploitation by employers and arrest by the authorities.
I began to contemplate whether it was possible to turn this
lose-lose-lose situation into a win-win-win equation. In
2003 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Conmittee
inquired into Australia's relations with PNG and the Pacific
and received numerous submissions dealing with this issue.
It consequently called for a trial scheme to employ Pacific
Islanders in seasonal jobs in agriculture2. The potential
benefits of such a scheme are obvious: it could reduce the
amount of illegal labour employed in horticulture and
allow growers to plan and harvest their crop with greater
confidence. It could enable government to capture a greater
proportion of income tax and save on compliance operations. Above all, it would offer a legal route to employment
and greater protection in terms of wages and conditions
for Pacific Islanders with limited job opportunities in their
home countries. Hopefully, it would make it less likely that
any other individual would end up in the same situation as
Mr Tanginoa.
It appeared to be a neat fit: Australian horticultural produces
have jobs and no workers; Pacific Island nations have
workers with no jobs. Yet converting the apparent symmetry
of this model into a viable system of circular migration is a
far more complex matter than it first appears. A close examination of the long-running Canadian Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program (CSAWP) makes this apparent.
Learning from Canada
CSAWP has brought seasonal agricultural workers to Canada
from the Caribbean since 1966 and from Mexico since 1974.
In 2002, authorisation was given for 19,000 workers to
enter Canada for an average of 4 months employment. (The
maximum stay allowable under the scheme is 8 months).
Farmers must offer a minimum of 240 hours work over
six weeks at or above prevailing Canadian wage rates,
free housing and cooking facilities. Employers advance
the travel costs but up to half this amount is later recouped
from the workers' wages. Employers must take out workers
compensation insurance while the migrants pay Canadian
taxes and are covered by Canada's universal health care
system during their employment.
Peter Mares 'A Death in the Rain' Australian Financial Review 19 December 2003 available online at: http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/
results.chtml?filename_num=00551
2
28
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, A Pacific Engaged: Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea and
the island states of the South-West Pacific. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August, 2003 on line at: http://www.aph.gov.au/
Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/png/report/index.htm
Migration Action
A major study of CSAWP as a 'model of best practice and
migrant worker participation in the benefits of economic
globalisation' was undertaken by the North South Institute
in Canada3. This and other research suggests that CSAWP
has benefits at a number of levels:
•
•
A key Australian concern in relation to seasonal labour
programs is that workers will fail to return home when
the picking is finished and will simply disappear into
the community. However overstay rates in the Canadian
program are extremely low. One reason for this is that
recruitment is skewed to select migrants deemed most
likely to return to their homeland — that is, workers who
are married with children still at home. More importantly
however, workers return to their homeland with the
expectation that they will be re-engaged to work in Canada
the following year and this circular migration 'partly
explains the lower number of overstayers compared with
those in other similar programs' in other countries5. More
than 70% of Mexican workers recruited for the scheme
are 'named workers': that is, they have worked in Canada
before and have been contracted to return by the same
employer. Recirculating workers in this way offers growers
the significant advantage of skills retention, reducing the
need to constantly train new workers that arises with the
employment of backpackers under Australia's working
holiday maker program.
The scheme provides opportunities for un- or
underemployed Mexican and Caribbean farmers to
eam income at pay rates well above those on offer in
their home countries. Workers use their savings and
remittances to improve housing, nutrition, clothing and
health care for their families at home.
• The scheme is accessible to some of the very poor in
the source countries, who do not have the financial
resources required to pay the guides or bribes required
to engage in cross border travel as undocumented
migrants. Recruitment of seasonal workers can be
targeted at impoverished regions, the unemployed and
the landless.
• The scheme has long term development outcomes in
source countries; in particular the children of migrant
labourers are likely to stay longer in school. Jamaican
workers were found to spend up to 35% of remittances
on children's education and there was a positive correlation between the number of years workers are employed
in CSAWP and their children's school leaving age.
• The CSWAP increases labour reliability for Canadian
primary producers at times of peak demand, and enables
them to plan production increases with confidence. The
seasonal employment of foreign workers maintains and
expands employment in higher skilled jobs, through the
expansion of associated rural industries (eg transport
services, construction, food processing).
• The scheme offers a legal route to farm jobs that might
otherwise be filled by undocumented workers and
creates mechanisms (at least on paper) to protect the
rights of foreign workers in terms of wages, health and
safety and regulated work hours - protections that are
completely denied to undocumented workers.
Canadian country towns benefit from the multiplier
effect of local spending by seasonal workers on goods
and services. A shop owner in the Canadian town of
Simcoe says the effect of local spending by seasonal
workers is 'literally like Christmas kin September'4.
The Canadian scheme is not without its problems however.
The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Canada
says the exploitation of migrant workers under CSAWP is
'Canada's shameful little secret'6. There have been occasional protests and strikes by migrant workers, cases of abuse
and exploitation, examples of sub-standard or overcrowded
accommodation, and industrial accidents due to insufficient
training, inadequate safety equipment or overlong working
hours.
Some of these problems are endemic to agricultural employment: as the Canadian union comments, the reason that
more Canadians do not take up farm work is probably that
it is 'dangerous, physically arduous, requires extremely long
3
See http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/research/completed/c05.html
4
Bauder, Harald, Preibisch, Kerry, Sutherland, Siobhan & Nash, Kerry 2003, Impacts of foreign farm workers in Ontario communities'
Communities' Sustainable Rural Communities Program, OMAFRA [online] http://wvvw.uoguelph.ca/geography/research/ffw/papers/
impacts.pdf
5
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World economic and social survey 2004, part II, international migration
[online] http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/
6
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Canada,`National report: status of migrant farm workers in Canada' December [online]
http://www.ufcw.ca/publications_main.cgi
29
Migration Action
hours, offers very low pay, and does not provide overtime
pay or statutory holidays'7. In Ontario, agricultural workers
are not covered by the Occupational Health and Safety Act
and are not permitted to join a union. For temporary foreign
workers the cards are stacked even more heavily in favour of
employers: each worker is contracted to a particular farmer
for the duration of the season, which makes it very difficult
for them to complain about poor treatment or working conditions. Farmers have the power to send foreign workers
home, at the workers' expense, before their contracts
expire, on the basis of 'non-compliance, refusal to work,
or any other sufficient reason'. These sweeping powers
are not checked by any process of review or appeal and
the union says workers have been sent home for expressing concern over inadequate housing, for not receiving
the hours of work contracted for, and because they have
become ill or injured. The worker's only recourse is to seek
help from consular liaison officers, but the conflicts and dual
roles of consular officials mean that they have an interest in
minimising conflict with Canadian employers and government authotities.
The fundamental issue here is the imbalance of power
between employers and temporary foreign workers. As
the union notes 'the program has been tailored to meet the
needs and suit the demands of employers and little attention
has been accorded to the needs of the migrant workers'8.
To quote Canadian researcher Tanya Basok, the seasonal
foreign workers are 'unfree'. Not only are they 'unable to
change employment, but they are also unfree to refuse the
employers' requests for their labour whenever the need
arises'9. She argues that it is this characteristic, rather than
low wages, which makes foreign seasonal workers so attractive to Canadian primary producers. Detached from their
home societies, foreign workers are temporarily disentangled from the ordinary obligations of family and community
and can be relied upon to work to demand with perishable
crops. Canadian workers are, by contrast, 'too free': they
may take time off to care for a sick child or elderly relative,
to play sport, attend a funeral or simply take a break. Or
they might decide to seek better paid work elsewhere.
Other potential problems with a seasonal
migrant labour scheme
There are potential problems with a seasonal agricultural
workers program for Australian agriculture that are not
canvassed in the available literature on the Canadian
scheme.
Firstly, while labour shortages in Australian horticulture
are well documented, there are persistent pockets of highunemployment in agricultural areas. For example, is it
appropriate to import labour from overseas when many
indigenous Australians remained excluded from the local
workforce in regional areas? Will the creation of a pool
of willing overseas workers further marginalise indigenous
Australians in terms of employment? A pilot project to
bring young indigenous workers from Cape York to pick
fruit in Victoria and South Australia has proved successful and is now being expandedl 0, but the organisers are
concerned that this still fragile initiative could be swamped
by a scheme to import workers from off-shore. And even if
seasonal workers are guaranteed payment at the prevailing
local wage, the impact of having access to a readily expandable pool of overseas labour from less affluent nations is
certain to have a depressing effect on agricultural wages in
the long term, further removing the incentive for Australian
workers to take up such employment, or condemning them
to surviving on less than a living wage if they do. This in turn
will create pressure for a steady expansion of the seasonal
labour program to allow in ever increasing numbers of
overseas workers. Other industries experiencing labour
shortages will no doubt use any such scheme to pressure
the government to allow them too to bring in unskilled or
semi-skilled workers from overseas (such as meatworkers,
aged care workers, or ancillary hospital staff).
Secondly, is it really possible to identify a 'season' of peak
demand for labour? In Leamington, Ontario thousands of
foreign workers are employed in the greenhouse industry,
where the seasons are rendered almost irrelevant. The
greenhouses are gas heated and grow three crops per year,
guaranteeing work in all but the two coldest months of
December of January. If the demand for labour is on-going
7
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Canada, 'National report: the status of migrant farm workers in Canada, 2003' [online]
http://www.ufcw.ca/publications_main.cgi
8
Ibid.
9
Basok, Tanya Tortillas and tomatoes: transmigrant Mexican harvesters in Canada McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal and
Kingston,2003
1° James, Milton, 'New thinking on indigenous employment' Australian Prospect, special report, Autumn, 2005, http://www.australianprosp
ect.com.au/
30
VOL )00/11, NUMBER 2 2005
Migration Action
rather than seasonal, why are overseas workers offered
only temporary employment? Why not offer the option
of permanent migration? The blunt answer to this from
a Canadian immigration official was that if the Mexican
workers were allowed to become permanent residents of
Canada, then they would quickly move out of the greenhouses and into better paying jobs, so the labour shortage
would reappearl 1. If this is the case then, we must acknowledge that the scheme is in effect a subsidy — it props up an
industry by constraining the freedom of its workers. If an
industry cannot source labour at the prevailing wage what
does that tell us about its viability? Does importing workers
prop up inefficiency or poor management practices; does
it inhibit innovation and reduce investment in plant and
equipment and so reduce productivity growth?
Thirdly, there are also potential problems in source
countries. Could a reliance on the remittances brought in
by labour migration inadvertently suppress or displace
productive investment in the home country? Is there a risk
that it will increase inequality and social tensions, as some
families, who have members working abroad, become significantly more affluent than their neighbours who do not?
Will it undermine family stability if parents travel overseas
for extended periods of time?
Finally, we must also consider the environmental issues:
does it make ecological sense to fly in workers to pick fruit
that will then be flown overseas to export markets? These
are all questions that we hope to address in the course of
our research.
Conclusion
Many of the problems apparent in the Canadian Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Program could be overcome with
better design and regulation. Even the United Food and
Commercial Workers Union does not suggest scrapping
the program altogether; rather the union has called for
essentially minimal reforms to increase the rights and
representation of foreign workers. As far as the Mexican
and Caribbean seasonal workers themselves are concerned,
research indicates that while they may have complaints
about the operations of the scheme, they would prefer to
remain involved rather than forgo the opportunity to work
in Canada. This suggests that the ùnfreedom' experienced
by seasonal migrants in the host country may be a lesser evil
than the privations of poverty that they otherwise expetience as unemployed workers at home, or the alternative
scenario of precarious employment as an undocumented
migrant.
If Australia is to proceed down the path of a seasonal
migration scheme, then the challenge is to construct a
program that improves the stability of labour supply for
growers, while at the same time giving voice to the visiting
workers and protecting their rights. In short, there needs to
be a system of regulation and checks and balances to mitigate
the structural inequality between employer and temporary
foreign worker. There are strong arguments for hastening
slowly and for thinking carefully about how such a program
should be constructed. Given Australia's historical and geopolitical relationship with the Pacific Island states, and given
those states limited options for economic development, an
appropriate place to start would be a pilot scheme to recruit
horticultural workers from Pacific nations as recommended
by the Senate Committee. In developing any such scheme,
we should keep in mind the words of Swiss writer Max
Frisch: 'man hat Arbeitskree gerufen, und es kommen
Menschen - we called for labour power and we got people'.
Growers may just want 'a pair of arms' to bring in the crop
before it spoils, but importing labour is not like importing
farm machinery. A seasonal labour migration scheme that
respects the dignity of migrant workers, protects their rights
and fosters their social and physical welfare does have the
potential to create a win-win-win situation with benefits for
growers, workers and government.
Peter Mares is a journalist and a senior research
fellow at the Institute for Social Research at Swinburne
University. He has funding from the Australian
Research Council to study the feasibility of a seasonal
labour scheme to bring workers from the Pacific to fill
horticultural jobs in the Murray Valley and recently
travelled to Ontario to investigate the operations of
Canada's seasonal workers scheme with funding
from the Canadian government's Faculty Research
Program.
pmares@swin.edu.au
11 Personal interview, Ottawa, Canada June 2005
31
-
HAVE THE
FACTS ON
REFUGEE
ISSUEs
$10.00
INCL.
P&H
This easy to read illustrated booklet has all the
'nuts and bolts information you'll need:
ri Australia's refugee and humanitarian
program explained
101
"This book doesn't give you theories or personal
interpretation, analysis and judgement. It just gives
you the truth, correct information on how things have
happened and leaves the reader to be an arbitrator."
Diverse perspectives such as the
Government, UN, asylum seekers, welfare
organisations, legal experts and academic
Yusuf Sheik Omar
President of the Australian Somali Youth Association
Recent changes
ORDER FORM
Latest statistics
(This becomes your tax invoice on payment)
BSL ABN: 24 603 467 024
Name: (Please print)
Order your copies
NOW for:
Organisation:
Address:
Phone:_(_)
Fax:
•
Households
•
Schools
•
Libraries
•
•
Waiting rooms
• Qr Please charge
Community groups
()
Email:
copies of "Refugee and Asylum Seeker Issues in Australia"
Please send me
•
Post Code:
State:
Suburb:
(ISBN 0 947119 97 3)
$10.00 per copy NO GST or P&H
I enclose cheque/money order of
BULK ORDERS
WELCOME
$
payable to: EMC/ Brotherhood of St Laurence
Bankcard
No:
/ / / /
Expiry Date:
my credit card $
MasterCard
Visa Card
/ / / /
/
Other
/ / / /
/ / / /
20% OFF
5 copies or more
Name as shown on card
Signature:
A
JUST
AUSTRALIA
wynyajustaustralia.com
Please return to:
Ecumenical Migration Centre PO Box 1389 Collingwood 3066
Ph: 9416 0044 Fax: 9416 1827 Email: emc@bsl.org.au
Refoge
,A,sy,kiffn
k
issoes In A
tf ;
Migration Action
Migration Action is Australia's only national, independent
journal devoted to refugee, immigration and multicultural
issues. Produced three times a year by the Ecumenical
Migration Centre, a community based agency with a 40
year history of leadership in this field, Migration Action has
been a trusted information source for 27 years. Migration
Action provides in-depth critical analysis and alternative
views informed by case-work and relationships with the
communities affected by the issues. It seeks to promote
informed discussion among decision-makers and the
general public alike.
Keep up to date
on the issues in
2005
PAYMENT DETAILS
(this becomes your tax invoice upon payment)
TWELVE MONTH
SUBSCRIPTION
BSL ABN: 24 603 467 024
Name
$60
Title
Organisation
inc P & H / NO GST
Address
Suburb
State
Phone ( )
Fax (
PostCode
TWELVE MONTH
SUBSCRIPTION
(CONCESSION)
)
Email
I enclose cheque/money order for Migration Action
payable to EMC/The Brotherhood of St Laurence
•
•
$40
$
inc P & H / NO GST
Or please charge my credit card: $
Bankcard
No:
0
MasterCard
0
Visa Card
0
Other
SINGLE ISSUE
000000000C1001J000
$20
Name as shown on card:
Expiry Date:
-
inc P & H / NO GST
Signature:
I would like to make a tax deductable donation of $
to the work of the Ecumenical Migration Centre
TOTAL PAYMENT:
Please return to:
TWELVE MONTH
SUBSCRIPTION
ABROAD
$
$70
Ecumenical Migration Centre: PO Box 1389 Collingwood 3066
How did you hear about Migration Action?
O
Friend/colleague
•
Seminar/VVorkshop
EMC
Ecumenical Migration Centre
0 Reference material/Resource
0 Other (please specify
inc P & H / NO GST
Since 1962, the Ecumenical Migration Centre has worked state-wide across ethnic,
language and faith boundaries to achieve the full participation of migrants and refugees in a multicultural and reconciled Australian society. Part of the Brotherhood of
St Laurence, we share a vision and mission: an Australia free of poverty
Brotherhood
of St Laurence
worltingfor an Australufrere or pommy

Migration Action - Brotherhood of St Laurence

Transcription

Similar documents

popopopopopo popopopopopo popopopopopo popopopopopo

Pre Performance Teaching Resource

Sharia and Refugee Law in Islam: An Overview - SID

About YWAM Newcastle

PDF - Monex Europe

Marvel: Ultimate Alliance

ERL-0631-GD PR

Many lawyers for many laws

Bar Of The Month March Quigleys

Cover Story