El campo político que se va formando después de la revolución

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DRUG TRAFFICKING:
EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, UNITED SATES
Edited by
Álvaro Camacho Guizado
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRESENTATIONS
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Carlos Angulo Galvis
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Carl Langebaek
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PROLOGUE
Álvaro Camacho Guizado
THE VIEW FROM THE
UNITED NATIONS
Sandro Calvani
Should Colombia Just Reduce Its Illicit Crops, or
Also Diminish the Number of Cocaine Producers,
Slaves of Cocaine Traffickers, Slaves of Armed Groups?
THE VIEWS FROM EUROPE
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Georges Estievenart
Anti-Drug Strategy of the European Union
and Latin America
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Alain Labrousse
Cooperation in Terms of Drugs between the European Union
and Latin America
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THE VIEWS FROM
THE UNITED STATES
Ethan A. Nadelmann
Reducing the Harms of Drug Prohibition in the Americas
Peter Reuter
On the Consistency of United States Policy towards Colombia
Coletta A. Youngers
Drugs, Narco-Terrorism and United StatesLatin American Relations
THE VIEWS FROM
LATIN AMERICA
Luis Astorga
Mexico: Drug Trafficking, Security and Terrorism
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Francisco E. Thoumi
Drug Policies, Reforms, and Colombo-American Relations
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Alexandra Guáqueta
Transformation and Effects of Anti-Drug Cooperation
Between Colombia and the United States of America
(1970-2000)
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Ricardo Vargas Mesa
Drugs, War, and Crime in Colombia: A Symbiosis that
Nourishes the Extension of the Conflict
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PRESENTATIONS
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Carlos Angulo Galvis *
I am very pleased to welcome you to this International Seminar on drug trafficking, where a
very distinguished group of experts has gathered to analyze a particularly important topic
around the world; a topic, in regard to which, unfortunately, we are very far from attaining
a solution.
The enormously complex problem of drug trafficking has an undeniable
international reach and is no longer, as it was before, a problem solely of producing
countries. The influence this phenomenon has today, over the political, social and economic
structures of every country is acknowledged and perceived. It is regrettable that we have
plenty of examples here in Colombia. Nonetheless, such influence cannot only be seen
within a local framework. In the globalized era we are living in, this analysis must also
consider the effect that drug trafficking has on the international relations between countries.
Above all, we are dealing with a problem that has to be analyzed in an integral way,
and that should include the producing countries along with the consuming ones. We, in the
producing countries, often stigmatized, are the ones who suffer from the worst prejudices;
discrimination that includes environmental, economic, social-cultural and political aspects.
With regard to the Colombian case, it is a universally accepted fact that the
enormous strengthening of all insurgent groups is in great measure due to drug trafficking,
which, in turn, continuously meets the constant demand coming mainly from the most
developed countries. Unfortunately, Colombia has become a “problem” country, in which
corruption has increased and expenses for the judicial and penitentiary systems raised,
without having any positive effects at a general level.
Last week, on a trip I undertook to Canada, I saw, once more, the uselessness of the
above mentioned efforts. In an article published on October 19th by the National Post, I was
informed that a member of the Canadian Parliament was worried because marihuana was
being grown at a commercial scale in an elegant residential zone of Toronto. The article
also stated that marihuana was the mayor commercial crop in British Columbia, and that it
was being exported to the United States. You all can remember that some years ago,
*
Rector of Universidad de los Andes.
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Colombia was an important exporter of marihuana; today, fortunately for us, we have been
overtaken by other countries and by local production.
The next day, an article in the same newspaper dealt with a book by Norm
Stamper—former Seattle Police Chief. In this work he acknowledged that the measures
applied to counteract drug trafficking have not been successful: while the consumption
rates increased, he argued, so did the number of arrests. In 1980, 580,000 American citizens
were arrested accused of some kind of drug-related crime, and in 2003 the same kind of
arrests touched 1,678,000 people. The author of the book also took into account the
negative experience the United States had with alcohol prohibition during the last century,
and concluded that the most convenient solution is the depenalization of drugs and the
control of their use.
It is clear enough that eradicating drug plantations, which comes at such high costs
for Colombia, has not had the expected results. It is also clear that it cannot attain those
results as long as the demand from richer countries continues. Despite the colossal efforts
made to eradicate drug plantations, the drug prices on the streets of the main cities around
the world have not changed. It is therefore essential to effectively attack consumption. We
can continue in our never-ending task to eradicate illicit crops, but as long as the demand is
not controlled, the problem will remain unsolved.
There is a multiplicity of aspects that can be analyzed from different points of view,
ranging from punitive issues to public health dilemmas; and the possible solutions that have
been put forward stretch from extreme prohibition to an open market. In this context,
interesting ideas about depenalization and harm reduction have been suggested, and they
deserve to be considered by the international community.
International commitment to resolve this problem is urgent. And that does not mean
just talking about producing or consuming countries. It is about understanding how this
phenomenon affects the collective development of humanity by penetrating all of its social
spheres and harming it directly or indirectly.
With this in mind, we considered nothing could be better than to bring together a
group of experts from the United States, the European Union and Latin America during
these two days. They will describe and analyze the politics with which this affliction is met
and dealt with in each of their regions.
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The various debates that will take place during these days will enlighten us with
different perspectives that, I hope, will broaden the discussion about the effects the
production, distribution and consumption of internationally prohibited substances have on
our societies.
Given that the campus is the most suitable place for the discussion of highly
important topics for our country and for our world, we are very pleased to host this event.
Welcome to the Universidad de Los Andes.
Thank you very much.
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Carl Langebaek *
Álvaro has asked me to give a shorter speech than usual. More than that, he has requested
that I, in spite of being an archeologist, set a position on regards to the main issue of this
event. I want to make clear that I know little about drug trafficking. And that the closest
thing I think I know is related to coca consumption, centuries before cocaine was isolated
and both producing and consuming countries were involved in a series of the most absurd
and cruel war. A sequence that started in the 19th century when, what today we would call
“an international coalition”—at that time presided by Europe—invaded China so that it
would authorize the legal trade of opium; many years before prohibitions invaded the
Christian and Muslim worlds; and even before the existence of ridiculous legislations as
that in Peru, which allowed having coca crops at 2000 meters above sea level, but not at
1999.
Evidently, coca has little to do with cocaine. As a Peruvian anthropologist used to say,
it is just like comparing a donkey with a jet plane. More to the point, cocaine is not the
active component of interest for the coca consumer; instead he seeks another stimulating
substance called egnonina, Coca is no cause of addiction, although it might become a habit.
My comfort is that the history of coca might be an example of the effects that prohibitions
and stereotypes have, and might also give us some lights in the understanding of the
complex world of drug trafficking.
Hence, I decided to make a short reference to coca. We know that Central Andean
recollecting hunters probably tamed the bush more than 5000 years ago. Contrary to what is
usually thought, hunters are experts in the taming of plants, and, centuries before
agriculture appeared, they tamed those plants that gave them pleasure; among them were
coca, tobacco, yopo, and many others. This plant has been known in the territory that now
is Colombia, since approximately 2000 years ago. Archeological researches from the
University of Pittsburg and the Universidad de los Andes in the Alto Magdalena found coca
pollen belonging to the period when the famous monticules and statues there started to take
shape. Evidence found in other places is later than the former. Within Quimbayan gold
*
Dean of the Social Sciences Faculty, Universidad de los Andes.
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work, there are poporos connected to the chewing of leaves between years 500 and 600
A.D. In Nariño, small pottery figures whose bulky cheeks point out the chewing of coca
were shaped during that same period. Years later, tools related to the use of coca were
found in connection to Muisca mummies, and other figures also suggest that consumption
began at the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta around the year 1000 A.D.
Although meager, archeological contexts indicate that the use of coca was not
popular. It was limited to few people, especially men, who held important positions within
their societies. The information presented by writers suggests that this was the situation
when the Spaniards arrived. Even inside the Inca Empire, the privilege of chewing coca, or
at least one of its varieties, seems to have been regulated by the political control at Cuzco.
In other words, coca had a strong relation to political prestige; it was what anthropologists
call “a luxury good”.
Right after the Conquest, coca’s history began to change. The first description, written
by Vespucio in 1504, did not seem too humiliating: the explorer limited to note that
chewing coca was a bad habit, although not diabolic. By 1540, Cieza de León stated that he
considered it a vice, yet he was not excessively hard with the leaf. Even so, coca held an
acceptable position as part of the philosophy present during the first years of the Conquest
period. Meanwhile, in its Medical History of 1544, Nicolás Monardes praised it, just as
Juan Martínez affirmed, in 1560, that God had created coca because he considered it was
necessary for natives. Nothing within creation could be considered evil by nature, and coca
leaf was not to be the exception.
The Spaniards started consuming coca as well. Barbers recommended it to soothe
tooth pain, and Dominicans as well as Franciscans consumed it frequently in Peru, Ecuador,
and southern Colombia. It seems to be that, in Nariño, nuns were eager users.
But so much happiness could not last for long. Early in time, others also considered
that coca leaf could be used as a communication channel between natives and the Devil. In
1551, the Ecclesiastic Council at Lima concluded that coca was no creation of God, but
rather of the Devil, and as a consequence it had to be completely eradicated. From that
moment on, and throughout the Colony, the Church made numerous efforts to eradicate the
use of the plant. However, the simultaneous result was exactly the contrary. Documents of
only a few years after the Conquest suggest that the use of the plant did not diminish, but
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rather increased. Two examples illustrate the former: early chronicles record that at the
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, where today chewing coca is almost synonymous with being
native, consumption was limited to few people. As a matter of fact, it was only in the 18th
century that the use became a general habit. Yet, at that time there were already records to
support that the Spaniards were the ones who most cultivated coca, and benefited from its
trade. They owned crops at Villanueva, which were destined to satisfy the needs of natives
at La Guajira, who traded coca for pearls. Moreover, it was also the Spaniards who
transported coca into the Sierra looking to trade it with the natives.
Another example is that of Muisca territory. Jiménez de Quesada, its conqueror,
describes how natives chewed coca as part of special ceremonies, just as the first
documents suggest that owning a poporo and a mochila (rucksack) full of coca leaves was
one of the most precious goods caciques and religious specialists could own. Only 50 years
after the Conquest, writers mention the fact that Muisca males consumed coca all day long,
especially during hard working days. The reason: business profits were too high and,
regardless of the Church’s position, the Spaniards had decided to ask for a coca tribute and
use it to pay their workers. Jiménez de Quesada himself took control of one of the villages
known for coca production. One year later encomenderos had gathered enough coca in a
single year as to buy almost 2,000 Muisca blankets. They received a coca tribute, which
was also used to help the workers alleviate their hunger and appease their fatigue. Priests
and landowners at the southern part of the country continued profiting from the coca
business until the mid 20th century.
No prohibition stopped the use of coca. Social pressures to avoid looking like a native
moved the consumption to almost a total extinction within the Muisca territory, while at the
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta the need of looking as a native preserved its use; even if it
was not the same as that existing before the Conquest. Right at Potosi, a first native
generation born after the Conquest gave itself into the use of coca; yet the next one
preferred wine. During the 18th century strong defenders of coca consumption in the shape
of tea, as were Jose Celestino Mutis and father Julián, failed in their desire of competing
against Chinese or Indian tea, or even against coffee.
I repeat: coca and cocaine are two completely different things. Any comparison of
their nature is anodyne. However, it is clear that there are social parallelisms. Just as it
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happened one hundred years ago, economic forces stimulate the business and, at the same
time, ideologies try to extinguish it without achieving its goal. The situation is even worse
precisely because of consumption types invented in Europe during the 19th century, which
are more harmful than any indigenous use. And nobody would dare to compare the current
European, North American, or Latin American junkie to the native shaman. What's more, I
do not want to establish explicit analogies on those who, today, just as the 16th century
encomenderos, favor commerce, nor on those who, just as the Ecclesiastic Council of Lima,
justify repressive ideology. Even less do I want to point out who the victims are, because I
believe it is too obvious. However, what I do want to state today to the current audience, is
that today’s cruel war will probably bring the same results brought by the prosecution of
coca, but with a much higher cost. There is even an additional challenge in controlling a
much more harmful addiction by means of strategies different from repression, which never
was coca’s case.
It is time that I leave you with those who are experts on the subject. I want to
congratulate CESO for this event, especially Álvaro Camacho and Francisco Zarur. All the
same, I want to welcome our prestigious national and international guests.
Thank you.
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PROLOGUE
Álvaro Camacho Guizado *
It has been a great pleasure and honor for me to serve as host, on behalf of the Observatorio
de las Relaciones entre Europa y América Latina—OBREAL—and the Centro de Estudios
Socioculturales e Internacionales—CESO—to this Forum-Seminar, Narcotráfico: las
relaciones entre Europa, América Latina y Estados Unidos, which took place at the
Universidad de los Andes in October 24th-26th, 2005. To my knowledge, it is the first time
that analysts from these three parts of the world have gotten together to exchange thoughts,
points of view and political proposals on such a crucial subject for our contemporary world.
Not without effort, we have gathered together on this occasion experts that lead the
way in terms of their scientific and analytical capabilities. Our speakers are the world
authorities on this subject, and to have you amongst us is a real privilege. From your
arguments we have been able to build alternative and, of course, more effective views to
help us with the study of the national and international policies on production, distribution,
and consumption of illicit drugs.
I want to highlight the fact that the speakers have made a big effort to present their
analyses to us in a clear and concise way; moreover, they have given us suggestions and
recommendations aiming at overcoming some of the short-sightedness and simplicity with
which this problem has been examined. I want to start with one of the recommendations
Ethan Nadelmann has given us. His first suggestion is that we open up the debate, that we
abandon the fanatically charged perspectives and the prejudices, prejudices that have
originated in erroneous definitions of the problem and that have been translated into
policies that have only worsened the problem and turned the possible solutions into
something much more complex.
Both Ethan Nadelmann and Peter Reuter agree in thinking that policies that focus on
penalizing and criminalizing production and consumption not only have not succeeded in
reducing the problems but, on the contrary, have increased them. With respect to the latter,
even though there is a certain amount of cutback in consumption in the United States, the
*
CESO Director, Universidad de los Andes.
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policies have not changed and are still having doubtful effects. They both agree that it is
necessary to assert that, even though the unregulated, illegal or clandestine forms of
consumption cause harm, the prohibitionist policies (which Nadelmann ascribes to fanatic
points of view) and their effects on delinquency, penitentiary overfilling, judicial
congestion, the deviation of public resources, the extraordinary incomes of criminal
organizations, corruption and the building of social stigmas that target mainly the social
groups that are on the lowest part of the social pyramid, carry worse traumatic
consequences. Furthermore, these same prohibitionist policies hinder the development of
the public health policies destined to reduce the damage produced to the drug users by the
awful conditions in which the consumption takes place, thus creating a very destructive
association between illicit drugs and much more serious contagious diseases like hepatitis
and AIDS. In addition, Peter Reuter recognizes that the policies of the United States have
not been able to reduce drug supply in a significant way.
And, in the United States, this may be due, according to Francisco Thoumi, to the
belief by the authors and sympathizers of the radical prohibitionist policies, that the
consumption problem can be condensed into a few deviant behaviors that they must fix. For
Thoumi, US society has undergone noticeable social and cultural changes during the last
few years: patterns of settlement have increased urban segregation, and city centers have
become inhabited by a low income population that does not adjust to the traditional whiteprotestant stereotype; profound changes in family structure that have come out of the
increase in female employment and that translate into a declining child care; school
calendars that do not take into account our time demands; the isolation produced by the
new suburban settlement, in which familial units reduce the extent of their relationships
with other members of society; all of them constitute changes at the base of the new social
realities of this country; social realities that include the habitual intake of dangerous
substances. Taking into account these facts, very different policies to what is now in use
should be designed.
In a very explicit manner, Coletta Youngers has emphasized a description and
analysis of the dimensions that United States policy towards Colombia has taken: for her,
the main point of this policy is the consolidating militarization process. Alexandra
Guáqueta also rigorously documents this statement. This process is based mainly on the
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fact that for some time now in the United States the drug problem has been defined as a
national security problem. This definition, which is today supported by the war on
terrorism, has lead to the privileging of military and violent actions over other possible
options. In turn, this approach contrasts with the policies aimed at local marihuana
producers and synthetic drugs, which have more harmful effects on users. In his
recommendations, Reuter calls them “softer” alternatives. For Youngers, these kinds of
policies have had very damaging effects on Latin American countries’ sovereignty and on
human rights conditions; they have prompted the deterioration of civil liberties, stimulated
corruption in the authorities, increased the suffering of the poorest, affected Colombia’s
relations with its neighbors, and, especially, worsened Colombia’s war.
And both Youngers and Reuter remind us of something we experience every day: the
fact that our country is only important to the United States in terms of its status as a cocaine
and heroin exporter.
But we, Colombians, are not alone in this “war against drugs:” Luis Astorga tells us
that if in Colombia things are not getting better, in México things are not good either. In
fact, United States prohibitionist policy has had deadly effects in his country. Currently,
with help from Mexican authorities, the United States has been stimulating a growing
militarization. Despite the author’s claims that drug dealers have no intentions of fighting
with the government, which means that they do not aim at becoming political actors, the
idea that México is colombianizing is growing popular in that country. Astorga asks
himself if, on the contrary, United States is colombianizing its public relationships towards
Mexico.
That there are other alternatives, and that we Colombians could expect not to be
victims from the combination of drug traffic and those punitive policies, could be inferred
from the descriptions and analyses presented to us by Sandro Calvani, Georges Estievenart
and Alain Labrousse.
Calvani, representative for Colombia from the UNDOC, recognizes that the crop
substitution policy has had some success in Colombia, although the reduction of traditional
growing areas has been offset by the increase of new crops. And he presents us a new
alternative policy, which we should consider much more attentively. In fact, for the United
Nations it is imperative that we work on aspects like alternative development, based on
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creating suitably productive infrastructure with technology transfers, the consolidation of
communitarian commerce channels, the liberation of areas for conservation and
reforestation, and suitable training for forest management. All this complemented by the
strengthening of human and social capital.
Georges Estievenart and Alain Labrousse have profound knowledge of another
dimension of world policies: I am referring to those that are trying to find a place in
Europe. Both authors agree about the problems in building a united and effective policy.
National dispersal, the defense of sovereignty and decisions from every European Union
member, and the fact that there is not, according to Labrousse, a unifying and responsible
center that could put them into practice, has rendered it difficult to fix those policies.
Nevertheless, there are certain points of agreement, which constitute landmarks for each of
the countries: I am pointing to the common necessity to reduce consumption and, therefore,
health damage, to increase the number of successfully treated addicts, to decrease the
availability of illicit drugs and crimes related to them, and to combat money laundering.
Today, the agreed Strategy for 2010 is valid; and although it is less drastic than the
preceding ones, with the aim to make it more compatible with the different national laws, it
emphasizes consumption and health damage reduction through prevention, treatment,
rehabilitation and social reintegration. This is, of course, a more realistic and democratic
policy, directed to the wellbeing of the citizens.
And, thinking of Latin America, that policy has been consolidated in the so-called
Action Plan of Panama, which was set up on April 8th and 9th, 1999, and whose pillars are:
shared responsibility, an integrated, equilibrated and participative focus, sustainable
development and, above all, conformity with international law, which refers to respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the
promotion of human rights. In short, what Panama approved was to have more
coordination, information and experience exchange, in order to improve our capabilities to
face the problem. Basically, it proposed some measures that Colombia should adopt, like
promoting cooperation by the development of a Regional Observatory, coordinating the
controlled
delivery
process
and
supporting
the
non-governmental
cooperation
organizations. The Action Plan is a synthesis that relates to the necessity of helping each
other to increase research, information and evaluation on these topics.
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In addition, it is clear that the increasing European involvement in Colombia,
particularly in what concerns the search for solutions to the armed conflict, has not stopped
creating frictions with United States policy on the subject. Labrousse and Guáqueta
highlight this. Plan Colombia and human rights becoming a political issue are, for example,
matters that create tension between the two poles.
For us, Colombians, this forum-seminar is a golden opportunity. If there is a country
in this region that has suffered the illicit drug problem in its worst dimensions, it is
Colombia. Here, we haven’t even had the basis of a legitimating discourse on coca
production, as has been outlined in Bolivia and Perú. Here, the income deriving from the
growing and the commerce of coca has not benefited some peasant masses, as has
happened at some point in our neighboring countries. On the contrary, we have had to
suffer the concentration of drug-related income in three major organizations, whose actions
emphatically contribute to destroying the essential traits in the building of a nation: I am
referring to the drug dealing groups and the illegal armed apparatus that threaten or defend
the government, and that do it by means of disproportionate and ferocious use of force,
corruption, and violence. Everyone knows that cocaine and heroin have become the main
fuel of our war: they not only contribute to strengthen armed force capabilities, to threaten
and destroy human lives and physical infrastructure, but the enormous amounts of
resources have also been essential in the crumbling of the guerrilla’s political and social
justice platform. It has transformed the insurgent armed organizations’ way of life. This
process is documented by Ricardo Vargas in his text. And, on the other side of the political
spectrum, it has promoted the generalizing of violence, corruption, the expansion of illicit
crops, and the stripping and theft of traditional owners. Both sides of the armed conflict
have contributed in a decisive way to the destruction of entire peasant communities. It is
not without reason that Calvani informs us that 0.4% of landowners (15,273) own 61.2% of
the land (47,147,680 hectares): much of which is divided into areas of more than 500
hectares. And, 97% of landowners (3.5 millions) own 24.2% (18,646,473 hectares) of the
land. In the past 10 years concentration has increased and now drug traffickers control more
or less 4.4 million hectares of land that is generally underused.
But drug trafficking has not only created the monster that for convenience sake we
have called paramilitarism, in its criminal dealings, it has also been a factor in transforming
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huge portions of our urban youth into cannon fodder: be it sicarios, be it their victims. In
some of our cities being young and poor is a stigma that today frequently leads to death.
We condense all that is evil and destructive in drug dealing. Wouldn’t it be good if we
could, for example, decidedly adopt Ethan Nadelmann’s proposal with respect to
prioritizing efforts in terms of harm reduction, a concept which, taking into account the fact
that neither the use nor the prohibition of drugs will disappear in the near future, this author
defines as an strategic effort to reduce their negative consequences. We really do need that
kind of a policy: we not only experience damage in terms of threats to our institutions,
destruction of justice, corruption and violence; we also experience it in terms of
consumption: as it happens with other national products, we also export high quality
cocaine and heroin, that is to say, with high purity levels, and we keep an equivalent to the
very-low-quality coffee beans destined for local consumption: we keep a sort of
cocapasilla, the so called basuco, that has demonstrated its terrible effects on consumers: if
our visitors take a tour around Bogotá they will be able to see how basuco, to which other
ingredients of the same poor quality are added, turn human beings into subjects on the edge
of destruction.
We do need, then, international cooperation, but in a very different way to what we
have had until now. I do not want to be falsely optimistic, but would it be good if we
followed Nadelmann’s advice: according to him, in Latin America, we already have the
moral basis and the critical mass to induce changes in the dominant policy in the region,
and to learn from other countries that have adopted more reasonable policies than the carrot
and the stick.
Clearly, we must heed Reuters advice, when he tells us that we should not expect a lot
as long as we are only spending one quarter of one percent of the GDP, and less than 2.5
percent of government expenses on the war against crime; that it is also necessary that we
concentrate on soft development alternatives: that we expand government’s control
throughout the whole territory, that we keep on strengthening our Armed Forces, but with
less emphasis on the punitive and more on ways to stimulate social and economic
development; and that we do not promote corrupt institutions. All of them are, needless to
say, necessary measures, although, due to its bureaucratic character and to the fact that the
fight against supply is politically more tempting, it is improbable that the United States
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Congress will change its policies. As said by the author, “for better or worse, Colombia
should expect more of the same.”
Estievenart’s suggestions are also tempting and challenging, when he suggests that
OBREAL organize a group of experts from Latin America and Europe who would make an
effort to strengthen ties with respect to research, assessment, and programming of national
and worldwide strategies; a group that organizes annual meetings to discuss the main
themes, conducts studies and draws recommendations so that its results are shared and that
knowledge about the topic increased. It is an imposing task, but one about which we must
think seriously and for which we must find people ready to work.
Ladies and gentleman: no more of my impertinence. The only thing left for me is to
sincerely thank all the people that have made possible this event: the European
Commission, for its generous funding and support, Ramón Torrent and his team at the
Universidad de Barcelona, for their work in making OBREAL function effectively in all
respects. Ramón has been a constant supporter and a leader for this and other OBREAL
activities. I also want to thank our speakers, not only for their intellectual and academic
contributions, but because with their great helpfulness they contributed to ease the
organization of this event.
At a more domestic level, I would like to thank Ricardo Calderón and Semana
magazine, for taking part in the organization and the communication of the results of the
lectures and debates. I would also like giving my gratitude to Álvaro Sierra and the
newspaper El Tiempo and to Fidel Cano and the newspaper El Espectador for allowing me
to publicize the forum and share its significance.
And I should explicitly mention my debt in terms of gratitude to the Universidad de
los Andes, from the Rector Carlos Angulo and the Vice-Rectors of Studies and
Administration, to the Faculty of Social Sciences and its Dean Carl Langebaek; not only for
the support they have given us, but because, once more, they have proven than heterodox
thinking is welcome in this institution.
And still, at a more personal level I want to highlight the dedication, enthusiasm, and
efforts of Lina Mendoza; without her eager participation we would not be here today.
Pacho Zarur, my colleage, knows that I thank him every day. Heidy Casas has been the
closest thing to a heroine: with enviable stoicism, she has tackled all the problems, delays,
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bad moments and even worse moods that naturally come out when one gets itself into such
a mess. She has had the help of Neison Palacios and Mauricio Salinas, whom I also need to
thank. Lina was also responsible for the significant translation work, and I thank Guillermo
Díez for his proofreading.
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THE VIEW FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
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Should Colombia Just Reduce Its Illicit Crops, or Also Diminish the
Number of Cocaine Producers, Slaves of Cocaine Traffickers, Slaves of
Armed Groups?
Sandro Calvani *
With 80,000 hectares of cultivated coca and approximately 100,000 families dedicated to
this activity, Colombia is the biggest cocaine producer in the world.
Although 51% of the hectares have been exterminated between the years 2000 and
2005, UNODC satellite monitoring shows that new crops represent approximately 62% of
the total cultivated area. This high percentage has become the main obstacle to sustainable
reduction.
An important part of the reduction may be attributed to aerial aspersion and manual
eradication policies, which, in 2004, reached the historic goal of 139,200 fumigated and
eradicated hectares. Nonetheless, the high mobility of Colombian coca crops—together
with the difficulties encountered when searching for new cropping alternatives—triggers
the appearance of new yields every year.
Coca does not grow in forests by itself. It grows there because, every day, small
producers have to deal with isolation and lack of opportunities to commercialize their
products.
The relationship between illicit crops and armed groups makes the Colombian drug
problem one of the most complex in the world. Besides holding the monopoly over cocaine
base and poppy latex commerce, these groups also determine “taxes” to be paid by dealers,
laboratories, and landing strips—commonly known as “gramaje”—and assure territorial
control for the production.
Since drug-dealing income represents important revenue for the international weapons
market, these same groups trigger illicit crops within their zones of influence, and irregular
adversaries, guerrillas and paramilitary movements, fight for the control over such funding.
By financing armed groups (both guerrillas and paramilitaries), the drug business has
*
Representative-UNODC Field Office Colombia. The opinions expressed herein, do not necessarily represent
those of the United Nations.
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subsidized Colombia’s war. According to a study carried out by Colombia´s National
Planning Office (Departamento Nacional de Planeación), between 60% and 70% of
FARC’s and AUC’s financial resources come from drug dealing.
We must keep in mind the fact that other countries, which—at some point—have also
been major cocaine producers, have followed the same path Colombia has: all of them went
through a war or suffered internal conflicts. Drug dealers take advantage of armed conflicts
and, in the same manner, illegal armed groups benefit from drug dealing. During the last
years, Asian poppy and heroin production has moved to countries that suffer endemic wars.
Such is the case of Afghanistan and Myanmar, where Taliban and Burmese ethnic
guerrillas finance their operations with drug-dealing income. Another example is that of
Peru, which, in 1990, reached a record of 210,000 coca hectares, at the same time that
Sendero Luminoso (a Peruvian guerrilla group supported mainly by illicit crops) increased
its attacks. The same happened with Thailand and Uzbekistan, where data of poppy yields
matched the biggest conflicts among ethnic minorities. Last but not least is the Colombian
example, which in 2000 reached the record of 163,000 hectares under coca cultivation, in
line with the highest number of kidnappings ever seen—2,840 cases—and 142 attacks to
civilians.
Furthermore, the ownership and status of Colombian land is a special case: according
to a study of the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute (Instituto Geográfico Agustín
Codazzi), in association with the Agricultural Investigation Corporation-CORPOICA
(Corporación de Investigación Agropecuaria-Corpoica), 0.4% of the total number of land
owners (15,273) possess 61.2% of the total rural area registered in Colombia, the equivalent
to 47,147,680 hectares, most of them with extensions of more than 500 hectares.
Meanwhile, 97% of the registered owners—approximately 3.5 million people—hold only
24.2% of the national rural area, which is 18,646,473 hectares. This phenomenon is one of
the main causes of rural poverty, forced displacement, illegal armed groups, inappropriate
use of the land, and illicit crops.
Throughout the past ten years, an accelerated process of land concentration has taken
place, concurrently with a dramatic decrease in the cultivated area. Land concentration in
Colombia is associated with illicit crops. Buying land has become a business in itself, and
the price paid for the property is no longer related to its agricultural productivity, but to the
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possibility of its price increasing. 1 In this sense, drug dealers have found an investment
target: land accumulation—which gives them the title of “landholders.” With all this in
mind, it is important to highlight the fact that drug dealers have strongly contributed to the
problem of peasant workers’ migration towards agricultural frontier zones where illicit
cultivation is the main activity. Studies show that drug traffickers now own approximately
4.4 million hectares. 2
Even those who benefit from alternative development projects are concerned about
the Colombian land concentration phenomenon. As an example, inside the Forest Warden
Family Programme (Programa de Familias Guardabosques), only 36% of the families own
the land and have title deeds, 25% own the land but have no title deed, and the other 42%
live in farms that belong to someone else.
Only 3.6% of the rural territory is dedicated to agriculture. The remaining is divided
among the following: 50.7% is occupied by forests, 26% by pasture, 10% contains savanna
vegetation, 3.6% has other type of flora, 2.7% holds water bodies, and 1.1% bushes.
It is commonly said that Colombia is mainly an agricultural country; nevertheless,
statistics on land management prove the opposite. Nearly 36.34 million hectares of the rural
area of the country are used incorrectly because they are dedicated to activities that are not
agro-ecological; this means that terrains apt for competitive agriculture are used for cattle
raising and vice versa. Likewise, land meant for agro-plant-life activities is used for
extensive cattle rising.
Research has also concluded that, out of the total area of incorrectly used lands,
62.3% (36,349,313.8 hectares) is misused. We can geographically locate areas in the
Amazonia and Orinoquia where illicit crops have a very strong presence. Land
concentration and sub-utilization diminish the possibilities of generating employment and
generating alternative processes that might compete with illicit Colombian crops.
A process to achieve a better use of Colombian land and its de-concentration should
increase the possibilities of rural development and the opportunities of legal work, and at
1
Héctor Mondragón, “Ante el fracaso del mercado subsidiado de tierras,” in El mercado de tierras en
Colombia: ¿Una alternativa viable?, A. Machado and R. Suárez (coordinators), Bogotá, CEGA-IICA-Tercer
Mundo, 1999.
2
A. Reyes, “Contra-reforma agraria en Colombia,” in El Espectador, March 10th, 1996.
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the same time should reduce the number of cocaine producers and the groups of slaves of
cocaine producers or slaves of armed groups.
The problem with illicit crops will not be solved only by attacking the plant; it is just
as important to have in mind the approximately 100,000 families who sow the seeds,
assemble the greenhouses, take care of the cultivations, process and deal the coca base.
According to recent United Nations treaties and resolutions, the best way to fight
against illicit crops is to work directly with the people involved or with those who are
potentially vulnerable to the problem. According to the conventions, alternative
development is the best response to the need for a balanced strategy against illicit crops
because it builds an alternative economy and respects human rights.
In its twentieth Special Session on international control over drugs—held in Vienna
between June the 8th and the 10th, 1998—the United Nations’ General Assembly
acknowledged the fact that, in the war against illicit crops, there are many structural causes
linked to poverty, isolation, and marginality.
Alternative Development was defined as follows:
… a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural
development measures in the context of sustained national economic growth
and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action against drugs,
recognizing the particular social-cultural characteristics of the target
communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehensive and
permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs…
From that moment on, alternative development has been considered a key strategy to
prevent and counteract the devastating effects of illicit crops on rural communities, which
are usually located in environmentally fragile territories, and which are isolated from the
main urban centers. In its last Political Declaration, the United Nations stated the following:
“In cases of low-income production structures among peasants, alternative development is
more sustainable and socially and economically more appropriate than forced eradication.”
Alternative development’s main achievement is not its capability of substituting one
crop with another; more than that, it is the fact that it gives people the possibility to live a
lawful life, just as it gives citizens the security they lack. It sometimes happens that the
income produced by alternative development crops is not as high as that resulting from
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coca; nonetheless, it reduces the levels of violence and raises the quality of life, both of
which represent a great benefit to peasants.
Alternative development’s success depends on some aspects that need to be taken
care of to assure its value. Its strategy must be based on the creation of parallel processes
for the construction of human and social capital, which may be achieved by introducing
regional production projects that take into account economic, environmental, political, and
social sustainability criteria.
The general aspects to be considered by alternative development programmes are:
•
Adaptation of the local production infrastructure and transference of technology to
privilege the proper production mechanisms.
•
Consolidation of communal transformation and commercialization channels, which
assure the availability of safe and constant mechanisms for the inclusion of the
producers in the market.
•
Freeing conservation and reforestation areas by grouping production activities in the
proper zones, according to the regulations of the environmental authorities.
•
Training, accompaniment, social strengthening, and technology transfer oriented
towards forest management and protection.
Such aspects must be approached through the following four simultaneous and
coordinated components:
Social strengthening: For this component, actions are divided into two complementary
aspects:
Social capital: Seeks the creation and/or strengthening of organizations of producers
around the production activities and different businesses of their group. For this, activities
of social encouragement within the community and support to the management of the
associations’ board of directors must take place.
Human capital: Includes matters related to the establishment of principles oriented towards
individual self-management, knowledge accumulation, education, and health care of each
of the peasants involved.
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26
Establishment of production systems: By means of investments made on the properties of
associated peasants, this component facilitates the development of a production
infrastructure to generate a surplus for the inclusion of the producers in the market, as well
as the acquisition of resources that contribute to the achievement of a permanent
substitution of illicit crops.
Agro-industrial production and commerce: The main purpose of this component is allowing
the organizations to assume most of the steps in the production chains, in addition to
supporting the establishment of some complementary businesses as funding sources for
peasant associations. It includes the possibility of adopting mechanisms of communal
commerce for the alternative development program products, creating agro-industrial
processes, and opening stores of agricultural supplies for peasant organizations.
Productive and commercial alliances constitute the frame within which these projects
will be carried out. Their main purpose is to create a comprehensive structure to
communicate the use of modern techniques for production, storage, commercialization and
marketing, technical assistance, and business organization. Moreover, they will trigger the
introduction of innovative funding mechanisms (involving both public and private sectors)
and financial support mechanisms. Private businesses’ participation will take place in
different ways: subscription of agreements on product acquisition; planned sowing;
modalities of agriculture under contracting; agreements for the designing and execution of
projects with mid and long term production; agreements for training, technological
transference, and direct private investment in association with the peasants.
Monitoring and tracking: This component seeks to provide the organizations with the
necessary tools to handle information, control their stocks, and establish production goals,
in order to help them plan and guide the performance of each of the associations. Moreover,
the creation of local technical teams—together with regional officials—to track the
technical and financial performance of each association will contribute to reaching these
goals. Last, but not least, it is important to work on the design of Geographical Information
Systems (GIS), which will provide donors, governments and specialized institutions
accurate and up-to-date information on the activities and results in the field.
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27
After several years of work in Colombia, is can be stated that United Nations projects
have contributed to the creation of local social and human capital in areas with a strong
presence of illicit crops. The process of creating social capital has focused on strengthening
peasant organizations in 7 areas (states): Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare,
Meta, and Bolívar. The fact that those organisms are currently the local representatives of
alternative development is very encouraging. Nowadays, all the producers’ organizations
have signed commercialization agreements for their products and actively participate in
their local planning committees. Thus, alternative development’s achievements are not only
immediate but also sustainable.
Since 1996 we have helped approximately 8,000 peasant families by providing them
solutions such as double-purpose cattle raising (meat and milk), reforestation, traditional
agriculture (coffee, beans, cocoa, bananas, fruits, palmito palm, and sugar cane). We
estimate that, with our support to alternative development, approximately 6,000 coca
hectares have been eradicated and we have prevented the appearance of 50,000 more.
Commercial agreements with the private sector have triggered important alternative
changes because, with a “permanent demand” of legal products inside these areas, the
concept of Alternative Development is now less abstract to peasants and the possibilities of
competing with illicit crops are higher. With the aid of organizations such as FLO
International and Haavelar, we have taken Alternative Development peasants closer to
European markets. In 2004, peasant organizations of the alternative development program
obtained more than US$4 million resulting from the private market.
The commitment of Colombians in the reduction of illicit crops is clear. Nevertheless,
we could speed up the reduction process by investing in solutions for peasants, as well as
by creating profitable and sustainable options that raise their quality of life.
Every time someone sniffs cocaine in Europe, there is a victim of violence in
Colombia. Only a multilateral, comprehensive, and permanent plan, based on best
practices, will offer true human security to both sides of the drug problem. In this process, a
great challenge of vision and leadership is necessary.
True friends are acknowledged in the hardest moments.
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28
THE VIEWS FROM EUROPE
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Anti-Drug Strategy of the European Union and Latin America
Georges Estievenart *
Enlargement of the European Union Regarding the Drug Phenomenon: A Single
Market for Illicit Drugs?
After two decades of having limited its actions to its national territory, the European Union
has aimed to clarify its position towards illicit drugs throughout the 90’s decade, in order to
bring heroin consumption to an end and to fight against the HIV epidemic (directly induced
by the misuse of needles between drug addicts). The situational frame resulting from the
creation of the Single Market in 1993 made clear the necessity of elaborating a common
response. Twelve years later, the moment has come: the European Union has to make an
approach in order to know if its actual position is efficient enough to face real drug
problems. The drug situation in Europe has changed due to the fact that in May 2004, 10
new countries were accepted in the Community.
Drugs as a Global Phenomenon
Throughout the eighties, it was evident that, towards the end of the 20th century, drugs were
becoming for humankind one of the principal problems that was on a global scale. Its
“global” reach was present within its two different fields: first, because of the amazing
proportions drug trafficking has attained worldwide (a figure of US$400 billion each
year 3 ); and, second, because of all the possible implications, including medical, social,
legal and police-related affairs, along with production, trafficking and consumption of a
wide range of drugs—not only natural drugs but also another type known as “designer
drugs,” which were increasing in popularity in developed countries (United States and
Europe).
*
3
Honorary Executive Director of the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addictions.
Ten years after, in 2003, United Nations estimated it in US$600 billion.
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30
As a response to this challenge, in 1987 the United Nations designed a Global
Strategy known as Broad and Interdisciplinary Plan for Future Activities Regarding Drug
Abuse Control.
Since then, the international community has maintained its strict position which
currently makes particular reference to the United Nations’ Special Session Regarding
Drugs, held in New York in June 1998.
The main objectives and the principal components of all strategies against drugs
should be based on the following principles:
•
Shared Responsibility Principle.
•
Balanced and Global Point of View.
•
Creation and implementation of a structured national strategy.
•
Creation and implementation of a wide cooperation network.
Global Situation of Drugs in Europe during the First Decade of the 21st Century: Trends,
Challenges, and Perspectives
General drug consumption trends in the European Union do not justify any relaxation in the
efforts made, separately and as a whole by each of the 25 Member States, to fight against
the global drug phenomenon.
On the one hand, while heroin consumption—particularly by intravenous route—has
tended to decline, the average age of consumers has increased. On the other hand,
consumption of cannabis has become more popular, especially among adolescents, who
nowadays start consuming this type of drug at a younger age and in higher proportions than
those from previous decades. Consumption of amphetamines and ecstasy, the second most
consumed illicit drug after cannabis, is still increasing, though in smaller proportions than
the percentage established 4 or 5 years ago. Cocaine consumption is still popular and
youngsters are mixing-up more legal substances, especially alcohol, with other illicit
substances and designer drugs. Currently, poly-consumption among youth is one of the
most important problems for all Member States. Long term effects due to ingestion of
different powerful drug mixtures are still being investigated by scientists, altogether with
the consequences of regular and long term cannabis use. In addition to the drug
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consumption problem (between 1 and 1.5 million of consumers in 2003, today almost 2
million if we include the ten new Member States), there are new patterns and targeted
groups that require new answers and represent a challenge for public health institutions.
This panorama left no possibility for the objective of the Anti-drug Action Plan of the
European Union 2000-2004 to become a reality. In other words: “to substantially reduce the
number of adolescents (people under 18) who become drug consumers.”
Tendencies regarding access to drugs and drug trafficking in the European Union also
confirm increasing rates. Due to the fact that drug prices are, in general, stable, the impact
and consequences of such drug imports (to which, for example, we can also add internal
production of synthetic drugs) are an indirect stimulus to its consumption. This is one of the
reasons why drug problems must be a priority in all political agendas.
While the growth of the European Union includes ten new Member States, within
which drug consumption is rapidly increasing, some of these countries are still under the
average rate. Nevertheless, other Member States, such as the three Baltic ones, show a
dramatic expansion of the heroin consumed intravenously, and a striking number of new
cases of people infected with HIV virus and Hepatitis B and C.
Moreover, threats of new geopolitical risks do not only affect the 15 Member States
of the European Union and the other 13 Candidate States, but also all those other states that
control the different—and recently diversified—communication channels between Europe
and Asia, principally the routes to Afghanistan and its opium crops. After dropping to 200
tons in 2001, the level of opium production increased to around 4,200 tons during the years
2003 and 2004. This problem is a real threat to Europe, considering that approximately
90% of these quantities are sent to the West. In this sense, the surprising patterns of
trafficking and consumption whose destination, circulation channel and origin are Central
Asia and the Caucasus, Russia and Ukraine, must be understood as a time bomb threatening
the weakest and most exposed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the
European Union is also a target of these threats; therefore these problems must be solved
together and in a determined way.
Cocaine is going through a similar situation. It is true that, since 1999, global
production of cocaine in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has decreased:
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Table 1
Global production of Cocaine in Andean countries (Metric Tons)
Year/Country 1990
1995
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
189
240
70
43
60
60
79
107
92
201
680
695
917
580
440
390
Peru
492
435
175
141
150
160
155
190
TOTAL
773
876
925
879
827
800
674
687
Bolivia
Colombia
Source: UNODC, World Report 2005.
Nevertheless, while cocaine seizures in the United States (principal consumer of this
substance worldwide) tended to continuously decrease between 1991 and 2003 (dropping
from 180 tons to 135 per year), seizures in Western Europe increased from 20 tons in 1991
to 70 tons in 2003. This fact—proved and confirmed by the parallel evolution of the need
of addiction treatments for cocaine abuse (almost non-existent there during the 80’s and
90’s)—illustrates the recent acceleration of a very serious phenomenon caused by a relative
market substitution between the United States and Europe.
In short, drug consumption evolution inside Europe during the year 2000 year (which
should be the base of any strategic focus to the problem), may be described as follows:
1.
General increase of cannabis consumption, especially among teenagers.
2.
Increase of amphetamine and ecstasy consumption, especially among youngsters
belonging to the “rave” culture.
3.
Stabilization and, in some countries, reduction of heroin abuse (by intravenous route),
and stabilization of the number of deaths due to overdoses (between 7,000 and 9,000
deaths each year).
4.
Rapid and continuous abuse of cocaine, beyond the recreational patterns established
by the jet set.
5.
Serious increase of poly-consumption and poly-addictions, especially in young
people.
This scenery, different from general consumption patterns established during the 80’s
and 90’s, requires an urgent review and a redefinition of the strategic global objectives of
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the European Union. Besides, internal and external approaches of the fight against drugs
inside Europe need to be evaluated. Later on we will analyze how is this necessary reapproach being executed and which of the results achieved during the previous reference
period (Strategy 2000-2004) were taken into account at the time of designing future
strategies.
Single Market and Drugs
The main objective of the Treaty of Rome was to create a Single Market. After two
enlarging stages of the European Union (in 1973 Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland
became new Member States, and in 1981 Greece), and taking into account several
difficulties for the achievement of a Single Market, in 1983 Mr. Jacques Delors proposed a
White Paper regarding the creation of a Domestic Market. The Single European Act,
adopted in 1986 (year when Spain and Portugal became new Member States of the
Community) by the different Chiefs of State, clearly defines Domestic Market as “a space
without internal borders, where freedom of movement of merchandise, persons, services
and capital is guaranteed according to the dispositions of this Treaty.” After overcoming a
wide range of obstacles, according to the schedule established the Domestic Market finally
saw the light on January 1st, 1993.
Through abolition of national borders, tariff reduction, and stimulus to trade and to
free intra-community movement, the achievement of the Single Market has significantly
contributed to the economic prosperity of Europe.
Nevertheless, this new stage also implied, for those affairs regarding illicit substances,
a more flexible and less-controlled field for trafficking operations and for offenders (free
movement of people). This situation also gave place to detouring of legal chemical
products—also known as “precursors”—used for the production of illicit drugs inside and
outside the borders of the European Community (free movement of merchandise). This
situation also benefits laundering and recycling of illicit assets obtained from drug
trafficking (free movement of capital).
In order to protect the creation and performance of the Single Market from different
threats, it was inevitable to come up with controlling actions regarding these three fronts: it
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was the authentic battlefield of the “global drug phenomenon.” However, these decisive
actions were very limited due to the lack of a single true competence based on the Treaty of
Rome and under which the drug problem could be broached in an exhaustive wellstructured way.
Due to the lack of legal dispositions regarding this field, the European Community
had the opportunity to make a significant approach during the adoption of the 3rd
Convention of the United Nations regarding Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and
Psychotropic Substances in Vienna on 1988. This Convention principally focused on issues
such as international trafficking and police control. The European Community took part in
the International Conference at the end of the negotiations, and approved a restricted, but
decisive, order regarding “chemical precursors” (or products authorized and included in the
competences of the Community, in virtue of Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome). Also, the
European Commission had the opportunity of negotiating Article 12 of the International
Convention as a representative of the Member States. The Commission and its Member
States also persuaded the International Community to adopt this Article according to what
had been established in Brussels. This Article was also the first to be adopted by the
European Community regarding drug problems. On the same basis, the European
Community was part of the 3rd International Convention, accompanied by its Member
States, who were responsible for the other dispositions included in the Convention (a total
of 34 Articles).
Moreover, in 1989 President François Mitterrand addressed the other 11 Heads of
State and the President of the Commission with the aim of generating a coordinated
strategy regarding drug affairs on a European scale. This request also included the creation
of a European Monitoring Center for Drugs. From the proposal of President Mitterrand, the
ECCD (European Committee to Combat Drugs) was created. This organization gathered
different experts and coordinators related with drug-addiction from all Member States of
the European Community. The first European Action Plan against Drugs was approved
during the European Summit held in Rome in 1990. The Commission was asked to start
working on the creation of the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA), as well as on the Trans-European Net of national information systems and on
data-collecting centers such as the REITOX net.
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The EMCDDA is actually one of the multiple de-centralized agencies belonging to
the European Community. It was created in 1993, and it is completely operative since 1995:
it collects, analyses, and divulgates information about the drug phenomenon in Europe. The
Regulation by which the Monitoring Center was created establishes that its scope must be
exclusively the generation of objective, reliable and comparable information regarding both
the drug phenomenon and drug-addictions. The main objective of the Center is to generate
the necessary information in order to adopt pertinent measures, starting with reduction of
the demand, one of the focal problems. With the creation of an organization with these
characteristics, the Legislature contributed by giving the Community and its Member States
a clear, precise and reliable vision regarding the drug and drug-addiction phenomenon. This
vision will promote reflection and it will lead to a decision-taking period for those
authorities in charge of policies related with drugs. At that time, the construction of Europe
lacked of legal dispositions regarding drug problems. With this panorama the EMCDDA
was established under Article 235 of the Treaty (which allowed adoption of Regulations by
unanimity of the Member States).
At the beginning of the 90’s, The European Commission started significant Public
Health programs: prevention campaigns at a communitarian scope, programs and projects
destined to create cooperation nets between professionals, experts, non-governmental
organizations and care centers, and so on.
Furthermore, regarding the “free merchandise movement,” the Commission, under the
limited scope of the European Community in relation to precursors (according to what is
established on Article 12 of the International Convention), presented before the Council a
legal document (Regulation Draft) related with such chemical substances. This Regulation
includes legal products—such as acetone—exported for industrial purposes; however, in
some producing countries a small percentage of this trade is being used for illicit drug
production (such as heroin and cocaine). The Regulation Draft adopted by the Council on
December 13th, 1990 4 , establishes several procedures and measures in order to avoid the
detouring of some determined substances for illicit production of narcotics and
psychotropic substances. The mechanism of the European Community seeks to detect on
4
Regalmento del Consejo (CEE) No. 3677/90 dated December 13th, 1990, DO No. L 357 dated December
20th, 1990, p. 1.
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time the detouring of these substances from the legal market and to foresee different
cooperation measures between producers, operators and enforcement authorities.
The system was accomplished two years later, 1992, through a Council Directive 5 ,
which established the corresponding agreements within the Domestic Market (production
and set-in the market of some determined substances used in illicit manufacturing of
narcotics and psychotropic substances), including the implementation of control measures
(license possession, register numbers, and so on). Today, more than ten years later, this
Directive is being substituted by a Regulation.
Likewise, concerning “free movement of capital,” the European Community
complemented the compromises of the 3rd International Convention (Art. 5) through the
adoption, on June 10th, 1991, of a Directive relating to preventive measures for the use of
financial systems for money laundering 6 . In the case of precursors, the Directive establishes
different modalities of detection, prevention, and control of all suspicious transactions and
it foresees the cooperation between financial institutions (especially banks) and the TransEuropean police authorities. For example: “all credit institutions will require, through
several documents, the identification of their clients at the moment of executing business
relations or when performing high-amount transactions.” This Directive was modified on
December 2001 with the aim of expanding the list of infractions, credit entities and
financial institutions.
Finally, for those affairs concerning the “free movement of people,” the most
imperative initiative was adopted outside the normal framework of the European
Community. This fact took place due to the lack of jurisdiction of the Community
regarding the following matters: “Agreements for a gradual abolition of controls in
common borders” signed by some Member States of the European Union in Schengen on
June 14th, 1985, and on June 19th, 1990. This is the origin of the Application Convention of
1990. The so called “Schengen Community Agreement,” originally defined and agreed
only between five Member States of the European Community (France, Germany, Belgium,
Netherlands and Luxemburg), was redefined and enlarged due to the addition of eight new
5
Directiva del Consejo (CEE) No. 109/92 dated December 14th, 1992, DO No. L 370 dated December 19th,
1992, p. 76.
6
Directiva del Consejo (CEE) No. 91/308 dated June 10th, 1991, DO No. L 166 dated June 28th, 1991, p. 77.
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Member States in 1995. In 1997 it was finally included as a law disposition of the European
Union under the Treaty of Amsterdam.
It is a fact that the principal objective of the Schengen Agreement is the achievement
of a “free border” space. Yet, this Agreement also establishes a series of “compensatory
measures,” including strengthening of control of external borders and higher cooperation
and coordination between police authorities and legal authorities, with the aim of securing
and protecting freedom of movement in the area. Additionally, one of these essential
measures must be highlighted: the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS): A
complex database available for police and legal authorities for data exchange destined to be
used for people and merchandise investigations, which is also an adequate response to
drug-related criminality and trans-national trafficking.
Maastricht Treaty and Drugs
The Treaty of the European Union (“Maastricht Treaty”), effective since 1993,
represents an important step in the battle against drugs. This Treaty expanded the action
field of the Community concerning different matters: drugs and drug-addiction as a priority
for Public Health (as the first pillar), cooperation between Member States: drug trafficking
and delinquency linked to drugs, a priority for cooperation in the fields of justice and
internal affairs (as the third pillar), and as to Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: drug
production and trafficking, a priority for the cooperation with third-party countries—
producers and transit countries—(as the second pillar). Even so, this “package” of
communitarian competences has its strict limits: it states the impossibility of harmonizing
national anti-drug laws.
This legal frame generated new possibilities: for example, the creation of the
European Police Office, Europol. The Europol was created in 1994 with the purpose of
improving the efficiency and cooperation of the authorities in charge of preventing and
fighting terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and other serious international organized crime
matters. In fact, at its beginning it was the only European agency in charge of drug issues:
the so-called “Europol Drug Unit.”
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Another legal instrument adopted during this period, and also oriented to fight against
the drug phenomenon, is the Joint Action on legislation approaches regarding drug matters
(December 17th, 1996) 7 .
This Joint Action had as its major objective the strengthening of the cooperation
between Member States in the fight against drug-addiction and drug trafficking, through
binding measures of the different national legislations. Among the objectives of the Joint
Action that have been applied since 1997 are the following: 1) harmonization of the
legislations oriented to fight against illicit drug trafficking and to ensure all applicable
sanctions are the most severe ones for infractions of similar seriousness; 2) to guarantee a
closer cooperation between European police, customs and legal services; and 3)
collaboration oriented to promote a fast information system related to narcotics. Therefore,
this Joint Action strengthens a sort of “European Snake System” (as the existing monetary
snake), in which national laws are evolving without separating from the common “tunnel.”
The last objective was implemented on June 1997 with the adoption of the Joint
Action concerning new drugs 8 . This Action favored the creation, on a European scale, of a
rapid information exchange system concerning new drugs, as well as the scientific
evaluation of their sanitary and social risks, with the objective of implementing these
control measures in all the Member States. Until today, and according to the terms and
conditions established by the Joint Action, there have been nine risk evaluation exercises.
These exercises include risk evaluation concerning MBDB, 4-MTA, GHB, Ketamine and
PMMA. The EMCDDA plays an essential role in information exchange and in the
evaluation of new drugs inside the European Union. Also, due to a meeting held under the
sponsoring of the Scientific Committee of the EMCDDA, in 2003 the Council adopted a
decision concerning control measures and applicable sanctions to four new drugs: 2 C-I, 2
CT-2, 2 CT-7 and TMA-2 9 .
7
Acción Común 96/750/JAI dated December 17th, 1996, adopted by the Council according to what it is
established on Article K.3 of the Treaty of the European Union regarding legislation and action approach of
the different Member States of the European Union with the aim of fighting against drugs and preventing
illicit drug trafficking; DO No. L 342 dated 31/12/1996, p. 6.
8
Acción Común 97/396/JAI Dated June 16th, 1997, adopted by the Council according to what is established
on Article K.3 of the Treaty of the European Union regarding information exchange, risk and control
evaluation of new drugs; DO No. L 167 dated 25/06/1997, p. 1.
9
Decisión 2003/847/JAI of the Council dated November 27th, 2003, concerning control measures and
penalties sanctions related with drugs: 2C-I, 2C-T-2, 2C-T-7 and TMA-2. DO No. L 321 dated December 6th,
2003, p. 104.
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Six new drugs have been controlled since 1997. It is vital to highlight several
innovative measures promoted by the creation of this mechanism: first, for the first time
there was an integrated system that could count on fast information gathering, with the joint
help of the corresponding national information nets of Europol and of the EMCDDA;
second, the scientific evaluation of the sanitary and social risks detected with regard to
these new drugs; and third, an unanimous decision-making procedure between the Member
States, with the aim of submitting—or not—such substances to a European scale control.
This cooperation mechanism, which combines information gathering, scientific evaluation
and political decision-making, may be expanded to other areas, if the situation requires it.
Position of the European Union towards Drugs after the Amsterdam Treaty
The Amsterdam Treaty, effective since May 1999, represents a new stage in the
fight against drugs. This Treaty contemplates the objective of supplying citizens with a high
level of protection within “an area of freedom, security and justice.” Fighting against drugs
is a priority of this area and the Treaty refers, once more, to the possibility of implementing
preventive measures (Article 152), and to the creation of a reinforced cooperation
framework in the fight against illicit drugs (Title VI).
For the first time in the Public Health Area, the notion of “harm reduction” was
recognized and established in the legal fundamental text of the European Union.
The European Council held an extraordinary meeting on October 15th and 16th, 1999
in Tampere, Finland, focusing on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in
the European Union. In the conclusions resulting from this event, the Council determined
that all attempts to establish common dispositions, incriminations and sanctions had to be
focused on a limited number of priority matters, such as illicit drug trafficking. This
objective has been attained: the framework decision of harmonizing a sanctioning corpus
was finally adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 2003 10 . This framework
decision invites all countries to make sure that “all offenses... must be punishable through
sentences between 1 and 3 years in prison as minimum” (Art. 4.1 sanctions), or “between 5
10
Doc. COM/2001/0259.
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and 10 years in prison when a) offenses involve important drug quantities or b) when the
offense… imply those drugs that are most harmful to human health...” (Article 4, 2
sanctions).
After the European Summit of Tampere, in which the European Council stated the
importance of treating the drug problem exhaustively, the Strategy of the European Union
(2000-2004) was adopted in Helsinki in 1999. Also, the posterior Action Plan of the
European Union about drugs (2000-2004) was adopted in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal, in
the year 2000.
Both the Strategy of the European Union and the Action Plan of the European Union
require an interdisciplinary and integrated focus for the drug phenomenon. This focus must
take into account aspects such as drug demand and supply reduction as part of a balanced
strategy.
The Strategy 2000-2004 of the European Union establishes six principal objectives:
1.
To substantially reduce, within a period of 5 years, the diffusion of illicit drug
consumption, as well as consumption initiation, particularly among young people
under 18 years of age.
2.
To substantially reduce, within a period of 5 years, harms to human health caused by
drugs (HIV, Hepatitis B and C, Tuberculosis, and so on), as well as the number of
deaths related to drugs.
3.
To substantially increase the number of addicts successfully treated in different
rehabilitation programs.
4.
To substantially reduce, within a period of five years, the availability of illicit drugs.
5.
To substantially reduce, within a period of five years, the number of crimes related
with drugs.
6.
To substantially reduce, within a period of five years, money laundering and illicit
trafficking of precursor substances.
At the same time, the principal elements of the approach of the European Union are
stated as follows:
The European approach is evenhanded, interdisciplinary and integral. In the different
texts adopted in 1998, during the extraordinary session period of the United Nations
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General Assembly (Declaration about the directive principles applicable to drug
demand reduction and its corresponding Action Plan), appeared the following
objectives:
a) To reduce drug demand through prevention (especially among adolescents),
treatment and rehabilitation and through reduction of adverse consequences.
b) To prevent drug supply through the adoption of repressive measures, paying close
attention to the cooperation between police, judicial and customs services. Likewise,
to fight against organized crime groups related with drugs and money laundering.
c) To reduce illicit crops through different actions such as promotion of alternative
development.
d) To promote international cooperation.
The measures previously mentioned will compliment and strengthen each other.
This particular procedure, based on the effort of “reducing demand and adverse
consequences” made possible, throughout the years 1990 and 2000, the creation of a
common European Corpus dedicated to the drug phenomenon. In this sense, it is feasible to
talk about a “European model for fighting against drugs,” which focuses on reduction of
drug demand and harms to human health. In other words, it established different ways to
fight against all adverse and terrible consequences caused by drug-addiction, which, at
present times, affect European societies. This novelty of the European model, which leaves
aside all differences between the different national political situations, was confirmed in
2003 with the adoption of a “Recommendation of the Council dated June 18th, 2003,
relative to the prevention and reduction of health damages associated with drug-addiction.”
This document establishes the objectives and principles of the performance of the European
Union and of its Member States on this matter.
Additionally, it explicitly includes the following issues in the European Strategies
against drugs:
•
Substitution treatments.
•
Needle exchange programs.
•
Confidential medical attention.
•
Security education.
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•
First-Aid programs for drug users.
•
Vaccination against Hepatitis B and prophylactic measures against HIV, Hepatitis B
and C, Tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases.
Similarly, in some Member States several scientifically controlled experiences on
different drug matters, such as rooms for controlled consumption and heroin prescription,
are being developed.
The Joint Action Plan of the European Union considers elements related with all the
different aspects of the problem, and it highlights the importance of a procedure based on
information, cooperation and evaluation as essential elements for the successful
performance of the measures taken by the European Union, in order to solve this particular
problem. For the first time during its short time fighting drugs, the European Council stated
that:
The strategy of the European Union on the battle against drugs must be based
on a periodic evaluation regarding the character and scale of the drug
phenomenon and its consequences. Also, we must take into account all
knowledge acquired through research and through the experience gained with
previous programs. Additionally, we must evaluate the actual Strategy.
Later on we will see that, at the end of the strategic period 2000-2004, this particular
objective was only partially achieved.
Moreover, it is extremely important to highlight that the Action Plan is still based on a
fragile and unstable frame of the competences of the European Union. Nonetheless, it
should actually be supported by a general unique disposition that should be included in the
Treaty referring to the main and most essential elements of a drug strategy: coordination,
information and evaluation of the policies and measures. This fact prevents a qualitative
performance towards a creation of a true and efficient common strategy against drugs of the
European Union. Even so, the design of such Joint Strategy does exist and it is extremely
different from the model set out by United States, in which the main objective is repression
of drug production and trafficking, even if this means using military forces, fact which
leaves aside medical and social matters.
Anti-Drug Strategy of the European Union for the 2010`s
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The objective assigned by the Action Plan 2000-2004, related with the previous evaluation
of the advances and results of the Strategy—with the aim of correctly determining the
objectives of the following period—has been fulfilled in a symbolic but not very
satisfactory way. Probably, this is due to the fact that this was the first exercise concerning
these issues and to the general pressure not to enter into a mechanism considered politically
dangerous. The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addictions carried out the
work it should and could do, and it presented a snapshot of the Action Plan 2000-2004. In
other words, a comparative picture of the drug situation in Europe in 1999 (the year before
the initiation of the Action Plan), and in 2003 (the last year evaluated of the Plan), which
offers a reliable and clear evolution of the situation between 2000 and 2004, which is a very
useful platform to orient or re-orient the following Strategy and Action Plan. The general
panorama arising from this specific exercise was presented previously above in this
document.
Unfortunately, the evolution seen this way is rather unsatisfactory. While the Strategy
2000-2004 had objectives destined to pursuit substantial improvements (decrease) of the
indicators of drug consumption and trafficking, one can observe that real facts denote a
different situation: consumption increase, in particular, is almost general, except for heroin
consumption through intravenous route. Facing this situation, the political sector preferred
to undervalue (or hide?) the evidence collected by the evaluation—very poor evidence with
its corresponding results—in order to avoid a political debate on these specific affairs, and
it suggested the objectives for the following period (2005-2012!), more prudent and less
precise than those belonging to the Action Plan 2000-2004.
The European Commission, on its communication destined to the European Council
and to the Parliament “about the results of the final evaluation of the Strategy of the
European Union regarding drug affairs and the Action Plan for fighting drugs (20002004),” states the following:
The objective of the final evaluation is to qualify the level of fulfillment of the
foreseen activities of the Action Plan, to evaluate in which ways this Plan actually
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44
solves the objectives proposed related with drug affairs and to evaluate the impact of
both the Strategy and the Action Plan on the drug situation in Europe.
The impact of the policies related to drug issues is still being assessed, as well as the
lack of exact and quantifiable operative objectives in the actual drug strategy; these reasons
lead to the fact that this is not an easy task and the Action Plan does not simplify it.
Nevertheless, the procedure of evaluating the impact and defining new indicators and key
tools, which might be useful in the future as quality rules for adopting new strategies and
policies, is now being carried on (Doc. COM (2004) 707 at the end of 22. 10. 2004, p. 2).
Given the fact that the new Anti-Drug Strategy of the European Union (2005-2012)
was adopted by the European Council a month later (Doc. CORDROGUE 77 dated
November 22nd, 2004), it is not strange that the new objectives have been already defined
and stated without waiting for the fulfillment, in terms of political responsibility, of the
“procedure of impact evaluation and definition of the indicators and key tools, which might
be useful in the future as quality rules for adopting new strategies and policies.”
As a result, the Strategy shows very modest and inconsistent conclusions resulting
from this complex exercise:
The results of the final evaluation of the Strategy of the European Union concerning
drug issues, and the Action Plan related with drugs, indicate progress in attaining
some of the objectives of the actual Strategy. Moreover, several of the actions
established by the current Action Plan have been executed or are in an execution
phase. However, available data does not show a significant reduction of drug
consumption or a substantial reduction of drug availability.
The results of the final evaluation also confirm the following conclusions:
•
New and precise objectives and priorities must be set out in order to be translated into
indicators and operative actions in future Action Plans. They also must have
responsibilities and defined deadline terms for their application.
•
There should be an advance in the availability, quality and comparability of the
information about supervision of drug situation.
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45
•
All the objectives of a new Drug Strategy and of the different Action Plans must be
reflected on the multi-annual program that seeks to consolidate the area of freedom,
security and justice.
Now, the new Strategy is far from corresponding and responding to the previous
declarations. Setting out new objectives is now a task more complicated and less precise
than before. This fact makes any new evaluation more subjective, more difficult and less
useful than the situation for the Strategy and Action Plan 2000-2004. The following are,
therefore, the objectives set out for the years 2005-2012 (!):
•
Substantial reduction of drug consumption, addictions and damages to human
health and society caused by drugs. This objective will be carried out by the
development and improvement of a reduction system of the global demand, based
on actions that include preventive measures, fast intervention, treatment, damage
reduction, rehabilitation and social re-integration for all Member States of the
European Union…
•
A substantial improvement of the effectiveness, efficiency and knowledge of the
involvement and performances of the security forces and corps of the European
Union and all its Member States. These performances must be based on drug
production and trafficking, on detouring of precursor substances—included
synthetic precursors imported to the European Union—drug trafficking, financing
of terrorist attacks and money laundering linked to delinquency related with
drugs...
•
A substantial improvement of the efficiency and perception of the coordination
between Member States, and between them and the Commission, in the promotion
and creation of a evenhanded approach regarding drugs and precursor substances,
in relation to international organizations, international forums and with third-party
countries…
•
A better comprehension of the drug problem and the development of an optimum
response through a substantial and sustainable improvement of the knowledge
basis and its infrastructure.
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46
•
Setting-out the merits and deficiencies of the actual actions and activities at a
European level. Evaluation must still be an important element of the different
approaches of the European Union concerning drug policies.
In summary, the drug situation in the European Union shows positive changes (in
particular, stabilization of heroin consumption), but there are always new trends, new
patterns and products and, gradually, the common fear is that the European Market is
becoming a drug market without frontiers.
The European Union has only put up diffuse, unstable and weak measures in order to
fight this global phenomenon. Nevertheless, throughout the last 10-15 years, the 15
Member States of the European Union have created common responses, policies and
strategies. Still, the divergences will remain as a consequence of the enlargement of the
European Union (a total of 25 national policies instead of 15).
The Action Plan of the European Union does not rely on united and solid legal
support. It also presents deficient coordination between budgetary and priority issues
among the different Member States. (The European Union is expending approximately
€100 million per year on different projects and programs related to drugs.) Unfortunately,
the advances registered during the last Strategy and Action Plan 2000-2004, especially
concerning the stating of the concrete objectives of both instruments, are not extended in
the new Strategy (2005-2012) or in the Action Plan (2005-2008). This fact might imply the
deceleration of the procedure of consciousness and awareness of the great responsibilities
of the politicians and policy makers towards a growing phenomenon in the enlarged
European Union of 2000’s. These problems are also reflected in the relationship between
the European Union and the major zones of drug production, trafficking and consumption
such as America and Asia. Later on, we will refer to the strategic dimension of the relations
between the European Union and Latin America regarding drug affairs.
Anti-Drug Cooperation with Latin America: A Strategy inside the Strategy?
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47
For many years the cooperation between Europe and Latin America lacked a strategic
framework. It actually obeyed a logic based on instrumental and operational aspects, of
limited internal and organic action, which, at last, aimed to achieve the objectives of the
European Community, and after, of the European Union. The first empiric actions were
launched in 1987, when the budget heading the European Community was created for the
Anti-Drug Cooperation with Developing Countries. But it was not until 1999 that the
strategic framework was defined, based on a decision taken by the European Council of
Madrid, on December 1995. Meanwhile, both technical cooperation as well as the political
dialogue related with drug affairs with several Latin American countries had advanced. The
problem of compatibility between single concrete cooperation actions and the late creation
of a global reference framework has been, and still is, an obstacle difficult to overcome.
Global Action Plan for Drug Affairs between the European Union, Latin America and the
Caribbean (1999)
The Action Plan, adopted during an important meeting of the so called mechanism of
coordination and cooperation for drug affairs between the European Union, Latin America
and the Caribbean—created two years before in the city of Panama, on April 8th and 9th,
1999 ( Doc. CORDROGUE 19 dated April 15th)—and in plain conformity with the
effective International Agreements and with the International Community Patrimony
related with this matter (Session of the United Nations dated June 1998), is based on the
following principles:
•
Shared responsibility.
•
Focal point based on aspects such as integrity, balance and participation.
•
Sustainable development.
•
Complete Agreement with International Law, in particular with those rules
concerning strict respect to the Sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Member
States, and the ensemble of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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Furthermore, it is essential to remark that the Action Plan of Panama focuses on a
group of objectives destined essentially to fill preexisting voids in matters of coordination,
information and experience exchange, with the aim of improving the global capacity of the
countries participating in the battle against the drug problem. The Plan of Panama
represents a meaningful advance in the direction of establishing in a concerted and shared
manner between the European Union and Latin America several tools for giving support to
all aspects of the struggle against the drug problem, including programming, evaluating,
and investigating, in order to deal with a complex global phenomenon at a national,
regional and worldwide scale. The implementation of the principles and objectives herein
mentioned consequently presumes that, from now on, these aspects will be given priority in
any cooperation action between both parties.
The Action Plan will have the following objectives:
•
To promote coordination and cooperation with the aim of strengthening
institutional power and developing national and regional policies which allow
them to improve their capacity to deal with drug problems.
•
To improve, through agreed actions, the information systems between regions
related with the drug problem.
•
To promote cooperation between European Union institutions such as: Europol
and the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addictions (EMCDDA),
and agencies of Latin America and the Caribbean as the CICAD.
•
To share all knowledge and experience gained on the problem.
(Doc. CORDROGUE 19 dated April 15th, 1999, Chapter III: Global Objectives, p. 5)
However, this is the list of the cooperation headings which are divided into five main
action areas:
A.
Demand reduction.
B.
Supply reduction.
C.
Legal, police and customary cooperation and illicit drug trafficking.
D.
Money laundering.
E.
Policies for drug affairs and institutional strengthening.
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Focused on the aspects related with the improvement of “the global capacity” to face
the drug problem, we must highlight, particularly, the following work headings established
in the Action Plan of Panama:
A. Demand Reduction:
•
To promote implementation and development of national plans through
governmental institutions, in those countries that require it.
•
To study mechanisms that allow the European Union to share the methodology
applied on the EMCDDA with Latin American countries and the Caribbean,
taking into account the usefulness and acceptability that each country, in
particular, might have.
•
To promote connections between municipalities (cities) and the different civil
organizations, always taking into account the endless possibilities offered by the
existing networks pertaining to both sides. This kind of cooperation will generate
closer links that will facilitate the exchange of knowledge and of citizen
cooperation strategies, for example the URBAL Program.
•
To exchange information between regions about indicators which show drug use
and abuse and its impact on human health and society. On this specific aspect, the
Inter-American Data System regarding Drug Consumption of the CICAD
(SIDUC), with the support of the EMCDDA, should be able to improve data
recollection and share the information with different regions.
B. Supply Reduction:
•
Alternative development and illicit crop eradication:
•
To strengthen the institutional capacities of the beneficiary countries when they
require it.
•
Control of precursor substances and illicit drugs:
•
To promote information exchange and continued training for managing systems of
vigilance and investigation, and ways of detouring, focusing on the activities
being developed by the different regional institutions.
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•
To study and analyze the detouring of precursor substances by land and by sea
between regions. According to the conclusions presented, to consider the
implementation of adequate legal mechanisms and control operations.
In this context one may consider information exchange about risk analysis and
control of synthetic drugs.
C. Legal, police and customary cooperation and illicit weapon trafficking:
•
Legal, police, and customary cooperation:
•
To support those countries that require aid in the improvement of port, airport and
frontier method controls. This objective can be carried out by technical assistance
and economic aid in equipment acquisition. Moreover, to accomplish high-profile
training for agents belonging to the corresponding organizations.
•
Illicit weapon trafficking related with drugs.
D. Money Laundering:
•
To support the creation of specialized prevention units for money laundering, and
to provide training courses for legal, financial and police experts in those
countries that demand it.
E. Policies for drug affairs and institutional strengthening:
•
To support all countries that demand modernization and strengthening of their
legal, central and autonomous institutions.
•
To coordinate seminars, courses and workshops concerning legal formation with
the support and cooperation of the PNUFID and the CICAD.
Chapter V presents a series of recommendations: “To strengthen interregional
cooperation between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union,” which
creates a larger and closer strategic cooperation space between regions and the possibility
of creating new innovating and capacitating initiatives by the civil society: universities,
research and training centers, decentralized institutions, expert nets, non governmental
organization, and so on. Last but not least, there are some “Short term action proposals,”
which also have high strategic value. Among these we can highlight the following:
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•
Based on the experience gained by the National Monitoring Center for Drugs in
Venezuela, one should study the possibility of developing a similar Monitoring
Center in the Andean Countries.
•
To promote, with the support of the EMCDDA and several organizations pertaining to
both regions, cooperation between Latin American and European civil organizations
regarding reduction of drug demand.
•
To promote, in those countries where their legislation allows it, cooperation in
supervised drug delivery techniques and precursor substances, including information
exchange about operations and their results. In this sense, several special seminars
may be held with the aid of Europol.
•
To maintain interregional cooperation in order to support civil organizations of those
countries interested on reducing drug demand. By creating and organizing courses
and interregional study groups this objective may be accomplished, always taking into
account the national policies applicable to this matter, with the support of the
EMCDDA and other institutions belonging to both regions.
In conclusion, the Action Plan of Panama offers an excellent conceptual platform in
order to develop not only a punctual and instrumental cooperation, but also a strategicrange support cooperation program that attains human, scientific and civil resources for
confirming the need of a true strategic culture. In other words, this strategy promotes—in
an organized, hierarchical and coherent manner—the production of information and
scientific analysis permitting the examination of situations and policies and their impact. It
also supports posterior evaluation of risks with the aim of achieving the planning of future
policies and measures for both regions, starting from disperse, light and even hidden
elements, which are the principal fundamentals in accomplishing an ambitious project of
this nature.
Nevertheless, it is clear that these ideas and the conceptual framework are not enough;
we also need strong determination, from the other participating actors—financial,
administrative and technical sectors—who are, usually, not prepared for this type of
challenge, due to lack of political willpower and consciousness. Later on we will see that
this kind of imperfection is often an essential reality regarding drug affairs; the
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implementation of plans, programs and projects is always facing bureaucratic obstacles and
barriers, both in Europe and in Latin America. However, when a serious problem such as
the drug problem has been setout, we must all fight against it...
Operative Framework of Anti-Drug Cooperation between the European Union and Latin
America (1997)
The link between the European Union-Latin America Strategy and the General Anti-drug
Strategy of the European Union is rather weak: for example, the new strategy shows that
there are concrete plans for only specific regions of the world, without clarifying the
particularities of the regions and the imminent consequences concerning the content of such
strategies. Moreover, the same weakness is found when analyzing the operative framework
of the implementation of several “external” strategies of the European Union: “Regulation
(CE) Number 2046/ 97 of the Council of Ministers dated October 13th, 1997, related with
the North-South cooperation regarding the fight against drugs and drug addictions”
(Official Journal Number L 287 dated October 21st, 1997). This Regulation is established
under the general policy of cooperation to the development of the European Community,
and it is linked to the strategic framework of the national plans of the beneficiary countries.
The main priority established by this Regulation is “the development of institutional
capacity”; due to this specific reason the actions focus on the following aspects:
•
Application of national directive plans.
•
Application of Agreements between the European Community and certain developing
countries regarding different aspects (for example: precursors, money laundering, and
so on).
•
Demand reduction.
•
Promotion of pilot projects for alternative development (crop substitution).
•
Financing of courses, seminars and meetings (experience exchange).
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It is important to state that this Regulation does not include the possibility of
communitarian interventions regarding repressive measures and implementation of law.
Nonetheless, throughout the years the Community has also financed several projects
destined to this specific sector. Additionally, this framework was adopted in 1997—ten
years after the launching of the two first cooperation actions of the European Community
concerning the drug problem—and two years before the adoption of the Action Plan of
Panama (1999), for those affairs involving Latin America.
Therefore, the cooperation between the European Union and Latin America is
established according to the following premises:
•
Political dialogues between the European Union and Latin American countries
regarding drug matters issued in 1990, due in particular to the different activities
accomplished by the Dublin Group.
•
Bilateral and Sub-Regional Agreements (with the Andean Community, the CentralAmerica Common Market, Chile and Mexico), which establish specific “drug”
clauses as well as Thematic Agreements (precursor substances, money laundering and
Trade Agreements).
•
The Action Plan of Panama, which establishes several strategic objectives for the
cooperation between both regions.
•
The Strategy and the Action Plan of the European Union.
The link between the extent number of instruments and objectives is very difficult,
thus their application shows harmful incoherencies for both parties: for the beneficiaries
and for the image of assistance suppliers.
An external evaluation of the “North-South cooperation regarding the fight against
drugs and drug addictions” was performed in 2002 by demand of the European
Commission. This evaluation could be a valuable reflection point for reforming the actual
system: the most important identified defects are the lack of coherence and serious
priorities in the external “drug” policy of the European Union. Other additional defects are:
diversity/ inconsistence of the available financial, technical and administrative instruments,
the weakness of the coordination between action plans, programs, projects and field
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operations, and, finally, the exaggerated budget destined to certain international agencies
for the implementation of actions financed by the European Union.
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the
Andean Community (2003)
Even though it is a Bi-Regional Cooperation Agreement of new generation, the “Political
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member
States, on one hand, and the Andean Community and its Member States (Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) on the other hand” signed in Quito on October,
does not reflect, in a satisfactory and balanced way, the globalizing focus stated in the Antidrug Strategy of the European Union 2000-2004. Moreover, it does not reflect either the
emphasis of the Action Plan of Panama regarding the development of the own capacity of
the Partner-States for creating global national strategies, nor the necessity of establishing
adequate
information,
investigation,
formation,
evaluation
and
programming
infrastructures, according to the compromises established by United Nations (Special
session of 1998). Article 47 of the Agreement is a sort of “purchasing list” of common
work headings without a close and organic co-relation with the fundamental texts that
control the actions of the European Union in matters related with the fight against drugs.
This imperfection affects the credibility of the globalizing discourse of the European Union
regarding drug affairs. As illustrated by the brief fragment of this Agreement (Article 47):
Cooperation in the fight against drugs and the corresponding organized crime:
1. According to the principle of joint responsibility as an essential element of the
High-Profile Specialized Dialogue between the European Union and the Andean
Community, and to the common actions of the Group regarding obedience to the
Agreements about precursors and chemical substances, frequently used for illicit
production of narcotics and psychotropic substances, both parties agree that all
cooperation related with the drug problem will have as main objective the
coordination and intensification of the efforts executed commonly for preventing and
controlling all links participating in the global problem of illicit drugs. Also, both
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parties engage each other to fight against organized crime groups related with drug
trafficking through, for example, international organizations and treaties. Moreover,
both parties agree to use the Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism for drug
affairs between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Both parties will particularly cooperate in the application of:
a) Programs for preventing drug abuse.
b) Projects of formation, education, treatment and rehabilitation of drug-addicts.
c) Projects for harmonizing the different legislations and applicable measures concerning
the drug problem in Andean countries.
d) Common research programs.
e) Efficient cooperation measures and activities destined to promote and consolidate
alternative development, with the participation of interested communities.
f) Measures destined to prevent new illicit crops and their transfer to fragile regions
according to an environmental point of view or to zones that have not been touched by
this problem before.
g) Efficient application of measures destined to prevent detouring of precursor substances
and to control trade in these products. These specific measures are equivalent to those
applied by the European Community and the corresponding international organizations,
and in accordance with the Agreements established between each of the Andean
countries and the European Community concerning precursor substances signed on
December 18th, 1995, regarding precursor and all chemical substances frequently used
for the illicit production of narcotics and psychotropic substances.
Conclusion: What to Do?
One of the major difficulties for big organizations—such as the European Union—is
mobilization of civil society when dealing with problems or phenomena that affect it, as in
the case of drugs. This type of deficiency is evident in the development and implementation
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of the Strategy of the European Union on drug affairs. In the communication “about the
results of the final evaluation of the Strategy of the European Union regarding drug affairs
(2000-2004)” The European Commission acknowledges the following: “Civil society has
not been regularly consulted about drug policy making of the European Union; however,
such query must be accomplished regularly. This will be the main issue of the
communication of the Commission for the year 2005.”
On the other hand, it is necessary for the civil society itself to assume a strict position
towards this problem: it must not only be asked about the controlling policies, but it should
also act as a group that fights for the common definition and implementation of all policies.
This is the reason why, in order to finish this exposition, you will find a list of
recommendations/ proposals that could be examined, analyzed and may be carried out
during the Seminar held by OBREAL in Bogotá, on October 25th and 26th, 2005. Based on
these reflections, an action plan sponsored by OBREAL might be created with the aim of
strengthening the cooperation between civil actors belonging to the European Union and
Latin America, and to give consistency and coherence to those aspects that require it.
Therefore, we focused our final recommendations on the strategic chain mentioned before
in this paper: information, formation, investigation, evaluation and programming, which
also match the main priority of the Action Plan of Panama (see annex referring to concrete
recommendations).
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Annex
Various Actions and Follow-up Recommendations
Consequently, two patterns of thinking are followed from the facts previously mentioned:
cooperation between agents, for obvious reasons, does not leave space for an intensive and
sustainable development of ideas, experiences, knowledge, and reflection exchange
regarding crucial aspects, which are very delicate, and that belong to the information,
formation, investigation, evaluation and programming chain related with drug strategies
(national, regional and global strategies). Nevertheless, and parallel to this facts, it does not
give true importance to the roll played by civil society for those affairs concerning these
matters.
Therefore, it would be an important advance if the civil societies of both regions
began to assign time, energy and, when possible, intellectual, human and financial
resources in order to strengthen the conceptualization and implementation of this strategic
chain and its diffusion among professionals—current and future professionals—who
participate in strategic decision-making with respect to the drug phenomenon. The real
objective is not to substitute these activities with others belonging to several existing
institutions, but to generate an intellectual rise in value based on the results, advances and
eventual failures.
In this sense, OBREAL might take into account the possibilities of creating a group of
dedicated and serious experts from both regions (Latin America and Europe) with the aim
of preparing and organizing an annual seminar regarding the problem “information,
formation, investigation, evaluation, and programming” related with the Anti-Drug
Strategy. This seminar could be held one year in America and the next in Europe. The
group of experts will have to prepare, taking into account different works and investigations
of the corresponding institutions (for example: all Monitoring Centers): 1) a synthesis of
the comparative drug situation in both regions, 2) a report about all advances and programs-
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in-course regarding each of the five aspects previously mentioned, and 3) to present action
proposals and civil society mobilization for future time periods.
All resulting material could be widely diffused through different traditional and
modern communication channels such as publications and the Internet. In particular,
elaboration and availability of distance courses concerning this type of affairs—not very
popular until now, due to the fact that there are only few concepts and didactic means
available—would also be a tremendous step towards the consciousness of the civil society
and of the public sector while fighting this shared problem. All details for a feasible
program of this nature could be discussed during the Seminar in Bogotá, offering concrete
and constructive divulgation means for their works and investigations.
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Cooperation in Terms of Drugs between the European Union and Latin
America
Alain Labrousse *
The European Union plays an important role in the international fight versus drugs,
specifically, in both battlefields: trafficking and demand reduction. Still, it is difficult to
decide whether the war against drugs is a priority for the Union or not; it depends on the
meaning given to the word “priority.” Their Action Plan against drugs for years 2005-2012
responds to three major notions:
1.
At an international level, the adoption of a Policy on Drugs as part of the Global
Cooperation Policy.
2.
A balanced approach between the reduction of demand and the battle against supply.
3.
The “Shared Responsibility” principle between producing and consuming countries. 1
The Cooperation Policy is not a priority by itself within the field of the war against
drugs; instead we find that the idea of Cooperation towards Development is probably more
important, for it seeks to decrease drug production in the Third World countries. All the
same, other elements, not directly related to the war against drugs, are considered basic for
the European Union’s international policy: political dialogue, fair trade, human rights, and
the battle against corruption. In spite of their will to place drug problems within a broader
context, some actors inside and outside the European Union have requested a increase in
the priority given to this subject. Thus, during the Conference titled “The Drug Routes”—
which took place in Paris during May 2003—the Commissioner of the moment, Patten,
affirmed, “the fight against the drugs that enter the European Union is a priority that must
entail an increase in the cooperation towards development.” 2
*
Sociologist and Journalist. Founder of the Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), Paris.
Ann Vanout and Alain Labrousse, “Study: the EC financing for the fight against drugs in developing
countries,” IBF International Consulting, Bruxelles, October 2004.
2
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Michel Koutouzis, and Alain Labrousse, “La toile de fond des routes de la drogue” à
l’occasion de la conférence ministérielle “Les routes de la drogue de l’Asie centrale à l’Europe,” Paris, May
21st-22nd, 2003.
1
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Inside this field, the European Union’s intervention principle exists since 1987, year
when the European Council decided that the European Commission was to take part in the
arrangements for the International Conference on Drug Abuse. 3 That same year, the
European Parliament had the initiative of creating a funding line, called the Horizontal
Drugs Budget Line, meant to assist Latin American and Asian countries in their battle
against drugs. 4 Even though it has succeeded until today, this line had to wait ten years to
be legally established by the regulation No. 2047/97 of the European Council. Meanwhile,
the geographic lines among which the world outside the Union is divided (those who
benefited from bigger budgets) progressively became part of the drug dimension. Some
time later, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties represented an increase in the Union’s
involving in matters of drug policy, mainly with Article 152 (Public Health) and Title VI in
the context of Justice and Domestic Affairs.
Regardless of the former, we will see how, in spite of the declared intentions and its
philosophy—which intends to offer alternatives to the repressive policies of the other two
most important international actors in this area (the United States and UNODC)—the
European Union’s international cooperation with regard to drug issues, in general, and in
particular with Latin America, does not always respond to those proclaimed intentions. We
will see how the causes of this failure are bureaucratic—its sources of decision are severely
compartmentalized and its action tools fragmented—economic—insufficient resources—
and, most of all, political: as in the case of Plan Colombia, not all consequences are derived
from the positions adopted.
The European Bodies in charge of Foreign Policy in Regard to Drugs
Currently, in the European Political System there is a clear distinction in regard to drug
issues between internal and foreign politics. The Drug Coordination Unit, within the
General Direction for Justice and Internal Affairs (DGJHA), is responsible for the
coordination of internal actions. In matters of foreign actions regarding drugs, six main
institutions, bodies, or agencies are involved:
3
Karine Meaux, “L’action internationale de l’Union européenne en matière de lutte contre les drogues,” Lille,
Institut d’Études politiques de Lille, 1997.
4
Ann Vanout and Alain Labrousse, op. cit.
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•
The European Commission is an organism whose various services have a very
fragmented mandate. An important number of the Commission’s General Directors
have responsibilities within the drugs field: General Directions for Foreign Relations
(RELEX) and for Development are responsible for the coordination of the assistance
given to third countries (with the exception of countries that are candidates to the
Union, and who depend on the Enlargement GD). The Aid Cooperation GD (AIDCO)
is in charge of the identification, adoption, and assessment of these programs. Foreign
aspects are coordinated by the Inter-RELEX GD Drugs Coordination Group, created
in 2001, which gathers service officials of the so-called “Relex family” (RELEX,
DEV, ENLARG, AIDCO).
•
The European Council, whose Horizontal Council Work Group in Matters of Drugs
was created in 1997, seeks to assume a multidisciplinary role, and takes part in the
organization of all the activities related to drugs. Their missions were augmented in
order to include the coordination of cooperation with third countries.
•
The European Parliament: drug matters are introduced in several Committees, which
are the Development and Cooperation Committee; the Justice and Internal Affairs
Committee; and, finally, the Budget Committee.
•
The European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA in
English, OEDT in French). A Council Regulation (EEC) created it in February 1993.
EMCDDA’s role is to provide the European Union and the States that are members
with objective, trustworthy, and comparable information at an European level, in
regard to the drug phenomenon, addiction, and its consequences. The Center analyzes
the situation of drugs within the Union, and suggests sectorial or global responses.
When it was created, the Center had a list of six mandates, but dedicated itself only to
the first three ones, which were those related to the Union’s internal situation. Still, it
was supposed to include the other three—especially the fourth one, titled “Geopolitics
of the Supply,” which is clearly related to the international context. Nevertheless, in
2004 a new definition of their missions limited them to the countries of the Union and
to its candidates.
•
The European Council created Europol (Office of the European Police) on July 26th,
1995. It is a European organism in charge of increasing the effectiveness and
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cooperation of competent authorities to the States that are members, in order to
prevent and fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. It gathers
information and disseminates it among member countries, but has no possibility of
providing direct police intervention. The Europol is involved in the international
cooperation for the international repression of illicit activities, always in the field of
information. Its cooperation towards Latin America limits, also, to the exchange of
information on police services across Europe.
•
The Dublin Group is an informal body that focuses on coordinating the international
assistance policy for the battle against drugs. It was created in 1990 by initiative of
the United States. Its structure is based on regional groups known as the “mini-Dublin
Groups.” Its members, represented by a delegate of each embassy of each country (or,
in the case of the European Union, by the Commissioner), are: the United States, the
Member States of the European Union, the European Commission, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and Norway.
The simple description of these organisms, by which the European policy on drugs is
presented, illustrates its major weakness: the dispersion in matters of policy creation and,
most of all, in the translation of these into facts.
Beginnings of the European Union’s Drug Policy (1987-1996)
Since the beginning, the European Union’s drug policies have been different from those of
the United States and the United Nations. They have been presented by an organism thencalled the UNFDAC: they are located among a broader context of economic development,
particularly including actions in the fields of health, training, education, and rehabilitation
of drug users; they execute their actions in close cooperation with developing countries;
and assist NGOs at North and South. It is important to highlight that, among such
cooperation exists the European Committee of the War against Drugs (CELAD), which
seeks to promote international agreements on commodities, in order to assure their
commerce as well as more stable incomes for substitutions products. The first concrete
consequence of this policy took place in 1989, when the Plan Triennial (1990-1993) was
created seeking to help Colombia. It had a budget of 60 million ECUs. It connected
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alternative development projects to coca crops and projects of economic development that
were not necessarily linked to dugs. A similar policy was created in Peru and Bolivia.
One step further consisted in the extension of the Generalized Preference System
(GPS), which allowed the elimination or reduction of import taxes of merchandize coming
from drug-producing countries into the European Union. These commercial preferences
started in 1990, and applied, not only to the three Andean countries that produced coca, but
also to Ecuador, provider of chemical precursors. The Regulation associated to Central
American countries and Panama, territories among which coca travels, was adopted in 1995
(some time later Pakistan obtained the same advantages, which originated an India’s
protest).
According to the Andean Community Secretariat, during the period (1993-1996), the
period with the largest increases in trade, the GPS represented US$983 million and has
produced a gross product of US$1.8 billion and 120,000 new employment vacancies. The
GPS has also allowed the diversification of Andean exports towards the European market.
As a matter of fact, between 1991 and 2000, the number of products increased from 1554 to
1923. Colombia, whose 95% of products enter the European Union without paying any
tariff, is the country with most benefits received from the GPS. Among all the Andean
exports that enter Europe without paying taxes, or with important discounts, are: chemicals,
agro-industrial products, metals, jewelry, fruits, vegetables, and both alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages.
An extension of the GPS for Andean countries for the period 2005-2014 will depend
on the assessment of results obtained between 2002 and 2004. In regard to these matters
there will be special attention paid to the fulfillment of the suggestions given by the
International Labor Organization (ILO), in matters of fundamental principles and rights at
workplace, of the results of the anti-drug war, and of the impact of the GPS between years
2002 and 2004. However, non-official information received moves us to be not very
optimistic on the extension of the GPS, which might be replaced, instead, by another
mechanism of economic assistance to Andean countries. It is also important to mention
that, not very long ago, a debate was opened on the possibility of eliminating the subsidy
that European countries give to agricultural products, which allows them to compete in an
advantageous position in comparison to Latin American products, and which seems to be
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one of the causes of the rise in illicit production. 5 Countries such as France oppose to a
change in the policy, hoping to prolong the protection given to their farmers. Similarly,
wanting to protect the production of overseas French Departments, tariffs are assigned to
products such as bananas; and, in the end, they are also one of the causes to the problems
confronted by Latin American agriculture.
International Agreements and Judicial Mechanisms (1995-2001)
The December 1995 European Council at Madrid suggested the creation of a Coordination
and Cooperation Mechanism (CCM) in matters of drugs, between the European Union,
Latin America, and the Caribbean. 6 The concretion of such decision was a long and
complex process. More than two years went by before a meeting took place at Brussels, on
March 3rd and 24th 1998, in order to establish the bases of cooperation for the development
of concrete projects, within the frame of the Plan of Action. In May of that same year, the
Latin American and Caribbean countries adopted this instrument; Panama assumed the
temporary Co-Presidency as representative of the Latin American and Caribbean countries,
as Germany did on behalf of the European Union. During March and April of 1999,
technical meetings took place in Brussels and Vienna, in order to develop the plan. The
Plan of Action was adopted during the First High Level Meeting of the CCM and the
European Union, which took place in Panama City during April 8th and 9th of 1999. That is
why it is better known as “Plan of Action of Panama.” “It is inspired in the principles of
shared responsibility; integral, balanced, and participative focus; sustainable development;
and development in agreement with international law, especially with the respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States.” 7
A second High Level Meeting took place at Lisbon, on May 23rd and 24th , 2000. The
objective was to specify the main areas and projects to work on. Four main areas were
identified for the Plan of Action of Panama: demand reduction; resource laundering;
alternative development; and maritime cooperation. 58 additional actions of interest were
5
Ibán de Rementería, La guerra de las drogas. Cultivos ilícitos y desarrollo alternativo, Bogotá, Planeta,
2001.
6
“Mecanismo de Cooperación y Coordinación en Materia de drogas entre la Unión Europea, América Latina
y Caribe,” Informe Anual 2000-2001, UE/ALC/003/01/ESP, mimeographed, 7 p.
7
Op. cit., p. 1.
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included in the plan for the years 2000-2001. During the following meetings of the CCM
Technical Committee, which took place at Brussels and Vienna in 2000 and 2001, a fact
was highlighted: even when priorities differ from one country to another, at a general level
the cooperation necessities’ meeting points are the same:
•
The control of chemical precursors.
•
The creation or strengthening of the Financial Intelligence Units.
•
Sea and fluvial control.
•
Prevention of drug use.
•
Alternative development.
•
Institutional strengthening and support to the creation of National Drug Centers.
•
Training.
The Colombian delegation suggested the creation of a study group, for the
establishment of some indicators that would allow the assessment of actions in the fields on
asset laundering, precursors, weapon traffic, and other activities executed by the States in
the battle against drugs. 8
As consequences of these mechanisms, the European Union has presented 33 concrete
cooperation projects on the four main established areas. Most of those projects have a
bilateral character, although some of them have a possible bi-regional potential. An
example might be that referring to the creation of National Drug Centers within various
Latin American countries. 9 Other projects identified in the Lisbon document have come to
life in additional multilateral forums; some of which have the participation of State
members, such as the creation of the GAFISUD in the Financial Action Group area.
The “Plan of Action of Barbados” (1996-2001)
The coming into force of the international cooperation mechanisms on drugs between the
European Union and Latin America, although relatively slow, has not hindered the funding
of cooperation projects and concrete programs. Between 1987 and 1999, the Commission
8
9
Op. cit., pp. 4-6.
The first one started functioning in Venezuela in 2004.
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funded 319 projects, 41% inside Latin America (except the Caribbean countries), and 30%
in Asia. The most ambitious one was the “Plan of Action of Barbados,” which, between
1996 and 2001, focused on the reduction of drug supply. This Program predated what,
starting on year 2002 until today, was to be the international battle axis for the Union: the
notion of concentric contention of traffic, both of heroin and cocaine, across the transit
routes from the producing to the consuming countries. From this point of view, the
Caribbean countries were an essential part of the cocaine transit route.
The State leaders of the CARICOM countries approved the plan on July 1996; and it
was executed by means of the Santo Domingo Declaration on December 9th, 1997. For the
first time, the Plan united the United States and the European Union in supporting each
other in the battle against drugs in the countries across the region. The Santo Domingo
declaration specifies the twenty domains or types of main actions that should benefit from
the projects; among them were: prevention of laundering; training; harmonization of the
judicial frameworks; and the maritime cooperation by means of the Regional Control
System.
The European Union was the Plan’s biggest sponsor. Meanwhile, the PNUFID backed
five projects, 10 and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)—part
of the OAS—one.
In 2001, year when the Plan came to an end, the European Union entrusted its
assessment to a group of experts. Their verdict is balanced: they highlight contradictions
engendered by the existence of many sponsorships coming from countries or international
organizations with different objectives, sometimes even contradictory. Moreover, particular
interests of the countries from the region clashed. Paradoxically, one of this program’s most
negative consequences was that it blocked the cooperation between the Union and the
CICAD. Nowadays, the Union’s contribution to the CICAD is, for example, less than that
of countries such as the United Kingdom or Spain.
During the CICAD’s annual session, on April 2004, I had the opportunity of
interviewing the General Secretary, David Beall, on the subject. He, “diplomatically,” told
me that the collaboration with the European Union was not very positive, except from the
money-laundering field. His advisors were more explicit; they stated that the administrative
10
Former FNULAD.
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and financial procedures of the European Union were so complex, that working with it in
projects was almost impossible. I observed that during this session the European Union was
not represented by a member of the Brussels’s Commission, but by an official of its
Delegation in Washington, and that his presence was merely symbolic. Maybe the fact that
the CICAD’s Directorship is in the hands of Anglo-Saxons—particularly leaded by North
American representatives, and, in a lesser degree, Canada—explains the growing poles
apart of its relations with the European Union.
Philosophy of European Anti-Drug Policy for years 2000
The European Union’s philosophy, in matters of cooperation for the war against drugs, was
underscored in Patten’s speech of May 22nd, 2003. 11 This declaration has had, since then,
the value of a manifesto.
His philosophy may be summarized in five suggestions:
•
The first two are interconnected: it is about co-responsibility between consuming
countries in the North and producer countries in the South, and rejection towards
unilateralism. Co-responsibility was reason of former protests executed by Latin
American countries, to which the United States gave the first positive, at least formal,
answer. This response was given in the Cartagena Summit, which took place in 1990.
However, in the name of multilateralism, the European Union implicitly rejects the
annual certification process given by the United States. Thus, Patten states, “unilateral
statements, meant to isolate and punish a country or a region, are not liable for having
an impact.” This idea represents a clear distancing from the United States’ annual
certification policy, and support for the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM)
developed by the Latin American countries, and, to which all countries, including the
United States, must submit. 12
•
The third principle is that of fighting against supply and demand in a balanced way,
fact that is not always respected by the European Commission. As a matter of fact,
11
“International Policy of the European Union in Matters of Drugs.”
See, for example: Mecanismo de Evaluación Multilateral (MEM), “Estados Unidos de América.
Implementaciones de recomendaciones de la segunda evaluación”, informe final, April 2004. Particularly, this
report suggests to the United States to “… adopt planning mechanisms for areas currently dedicated to the
harvest of cannabis, and also for those that are not.”
12
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economic assistance is given to more projects on demand reduction for southern
countries, as well as for those of transit; still, the funds programmed for the reduction
of supply have always been higher. Yet, if taking in consideration the non-repressive
projects designed within the field of supply—as those of alternative development—
both items’ budgets end up being similar.
•
The fourth principle consists in connecting both projects against drugs with the
support given to global development inside the implicated countries, as well as to
their cultural, social, and political environments. One of the results of this principle
has been the addition of the drug’ issue to the Generalized Preference System (GPS)
(see above). Nonetheless, the European Union has not been coherent enough as to
suppress subsidies given to agricultural products; some of them, as for example milk,
compete with others coming from drug-producing developing countries. 13 All the
same, it is also important to have in mind that a debate on this subject was opened by
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, and that some progress might be seen
in the ensuing years. 14
•
Last but not least, the fifth principle refers to human rights within the context of the
battle against drugs. For example, this issue has driven the European Union to report
links between Colombian paramilitary groups and some army sectors in the country.
The fact that the approach of the European Union to the problem is more balanced
cannot be questioned; it is more objective, more inclined towards prevention and harm
reduction, than the position set by the biggest international actor, the United States. Even
though the latter assigns more than 95% of its budget to international cooperation, in order
to fight against supply, the battle has come to such point, that one might talk about a true
militarization of the war against drugs in those countries where it takes part. And one of
those countries is, as a matter of fact, Colombia.
Instruments and Strategy
13
Ibán de Rementería, op. cit.
Mark Vaile, “Agriculture: l’Europe étrangle les pays pauvres,” in Le Monde, November 29th, 2002, pp. 1 &
14.
14
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Regardless of the former, no principles are enough to appraise a policy. Several elements
related to the practical part of these principles, as well as to the instruments used, must be
analyzed. There are two main ideas associated to the Cooperation Policy of the Union;
these are:
•
The funding of geographical lines, in other words, services in charge of giving
assistance to the development of the area. For such purpose the world has been
traditionally divided into ACP (Africa, Caribbean countries and Pacific), ALA (Asia
and Latin America), TACIS (Central Asia and Caucasian), and MEDA
(Mediterranean) countries, among others. These lines manage considerable budgetary
amounts, and have integrated their funding to their drugs-related projects to the tune
of several million, or even to tens of millions of euros, as in the case of the Andean
countries, or Afghanistan today.
•
The other way of funding projects is by using the Horizontal Line of Drugs, which is
much more flexible and might subsidize pilot projects, as well as projects that connect
two areas—which is not available in geographical lines. However, the Drug Line also
had a much more limited budget—never more than €10 million—which diminished
over time until it disappeared completely in 2003.
Such a reduction in the budget is absolutely inconsistent with the Commission’s
priorities, which pointed towards an intervention in the drug routes, in both producing and
consuming countries. This intervention sought to establish concentric blockings to the
entrance of prohibited substances. For example, geographic lines may not sponsor transborder projects in Afghanistan (considered to be part of Asia), nor in Central Asia countries
that are members of the TACIS. Even if this drug route strategy has its logic, in the case of
heroin leaving Afghanistan by the north, and traveling across Central Asian and Caucasian
countries, plus Russia and Ukraine, it also implies a contradiction to another of the
principles of the Union because it benefits the battle against supply.
Then again, the route strategy is also applied to cases of cocaine traffic. The fact that
the projects have to do only with Latin American and Caribbean countries is very
debatable, even when leaving aside the idea of a possible success in the battle occurring at
the Caribbean, which might trigger an increase in the use of alternative routes within Africa
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and the Mediterranean, as well as in those previous ones across Eastern Europe which
worked many years ago and have been growing lately. In the end, the route strategy does
not apply to products such as hashish and synthetic drugs. Hence, the drug routes’ strategy
presents itself as an opportunistic device, and not as a very coherent one.
Keeping in mind all the former, it does not seem strange that in a global assessment of
the Drugs Line—of which I am co-author—we estimated that its functioning revealed a
lack of strategic vision, of continuity, and of a difficulty in coordinating with the
Geographical Lines, besides from having management problems caused by lack of
personnel. A reform in the European performance might bring improvement to this last
issue: “deconcentration” was put into practice starting in year 2004, in order to allow the
European Union Delegations of each country to locally administer their projects. This
should permit a better collaboration with local counterparts of other national and
international institutions.
An internal global evaluation of the Commission’s North-South Cooperation made on
July 2001—in matters of the war against drugs and drug addiction—includes an analysis of
the projects sponsored by Geographical Lines, which arrives to similar conclusions. The
authors critique the fragmentation of actions because of their lack of transparency,
insufficient coordination and knowledge of the officials, and, over all, a lack of systematic
assessments. This does not mean that they have not been successfully sponsored by the
Commission, not only for important projects, but also to be used as counterexamples of the
United States or the United Nations, who suffer from even worse deficiencies.
Plan Colombia: The Voice of the European Parliament
Although many times it does not reach its goals, the discussion on the Plan Colombia may
be used to visualize the target of the European Union’s policy. Colombian people know that
this Plan, created by the Administration of Andrés Pastrana, was deeply modified and
imposed, when ready, by the United States. 15 Colombia received US$1.3 billion during the
15
Plan Colombia was written in English, and no Spanish version was available before February 2000. For a
detailed analysis on Europe’s position, see Transnational Institute (TNI), “Europe and Plan Colombia.
Chronicle of a Commitment with an Uncomfortable Plan,” in Drugs & Conflict, Debate Papers, No. 1, April
2001.
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first phase, those of which US$1 billion was used for repression, especially in matters of
buying United States weapons and equipment. The European Union, who had a strong
partaking in the peace negotiations between the Pastrana Administration and the FARC,
stated, since the beginning, its reluctance, if not to say, its opposition, towards the project.
The first discharge against Plan Colombia was executed in the hands of the European
Parliament—highest political authority of the Union. The “Resolution on Plan Colombia
and the Support to the Colombian Peace Process” was adopted on February 2nd, 2000, and
the decision was almost unanimous (474 in favor, 1 against, and 33 non-participations). 16
Some of the paragraphs of the Resolution deserve to be quoted from the original version:
3. Believes that stepping up military involvement in the fight against drugs involves
the risk of sparking off an escalation of the conflict in the region, and that military
solutions cannot bring about lasting peace.
4. Warns that Plan Colombia contains aspects that run counter to the cooperation
strategies and projects to which the European Union has already committed itself and
jeopardize its cooperation programmes; expresses particular concern at the current
situation in the Putumayo region.
9. Stresses that European Union action should pursue its own, non- military strategy
combining neutrality, transparency, the participation of civil society and undertakings
from the parties involved in the negotiations.
15. Is convinced that, in the fight against illicit crops, negotiated and agreed solutions,
agrarian reform and alternative crops, together with criminal proceedings against
traffickers and money launderers, should take precedence over crop-spraying
campaigns; believes in this regard that the Union must take the necessary steps to
secure an end to the large-scale use of chemical herbicides and prevent the
introduction of biological agents such as Fusarium oxysporum, given the dangers of
their use to human health and the environment alike.
Within the Parliament, the Greens and the International Radical Party played an
important role. The Green’s proposals are even more radical than those adopted by the
16
Parlement européen, “Résolution sur le plan Colombie et le soutien au processus de paix en Colombie,”
Paperwork B5-0087/2001, January 18th, 2001.
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Parliament. 17 Thus, a Resolution presented in a seminar that took place on May 2001 in the
Parliament, quotes: 18
The approval given by the United States to Plan Colombia constitutes, without
doubt, an additional ingredient in the worsening of the critical humanitarian
crisis, for it strengthens military apparatus of war, adopts fighting strategies
against illicit crops that clearly affect peasants, small and medium producers,
and regionalizes the conflict, involving, in a direct or indirect way, neighbor
countries.
Plan Colombia: The Voice of the European Union
In spite of the unanimity present at the European Parliament, most of the countries, among
which we find Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and France, opposed Plan Colombia,
while Spain and the United Kingdom were in favor of the project. Meanwhile, France has
played an important role in the growing split in Europe because of the Plan Colombia. The
position of the Ministry of Foreign Relations is illustrated in some internal confidential
notes. 19 In one of these, after criticizing the fact that neither civil society nor guerrillas have
been consulted for their opinion on the Plan, it says: “If military targets are clearly
indicated, most of the Union’s countries highlight the lack of coherence in the economic
and social development strategy, as well as in the follow-up of the peace process. Most of
the projects are not concrete enough, and, anyhow, not likely to have positive short-term
effects on the achievement of peace.” 20
During a meeting that took place in Bogotá, on October 24th, 2000, the European
Union was clearly split on Plan Colombia. Its spokesperson, Frenchman Renaud Vignal,
declared that the European contribution (between US$100 and 300 million) would be
essentially assigned to “institution reinforcement” and “social development.” In order to
dissipate all ambiguity, he declared: “European assistance does not include any military
aspect (…) For the European Union there is no alternative to the peace process, nor exists
any military solution that might take to a long-lasting peace.” The Union’s delegate for
17
“L’Europe face à la crise en Colombie. Questions au Conseil et à la Commission et témoignages,”
Parlement européen à Strasbourg, May 17th, 2001.
18
“Europa frente a la crisis en Colombia,” Parlamento Europeo, Strassbourg, May 17th, 2001 [Original
version in Spanish.]
19
Alain Labrousse, “Rapport de mission (16 au 30 août 2001) sur la coopération française avec la Colombie
dans le domaine des drogues,” OFDT, February 2002, pp. 22-23.
20
Op. cit., p. 23.
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Latin America, Francisco de Camara, reasserted: “We want to contribute to peace, not to
increase tensions.” However, the most important part was Vignal’s underscore to the fact of
European assistance locating outside Plan Colombia, in order to, by supporting civil
aspects, not endorse military actions sponsored by the United States.
In order to mollify European critics, in a meeting in Bogotá, which took place on
October 2001, Washington suggested the Europeans subsidize the civil aspects of the Plan:
reinforcement of democracy; reduction of violence; protection of the environment; support
to health. Yet, this did not cause any change in the Europeans’ position. As a result, the
United States did not confront the Europeans but rather paid no attention to them. The
speaker of the Department of State at the moment for the Andean zone, William R.
Brownfield, affirmed: “No public support [on behalf of the European Union] had been
given to Plan Colombia up till now. To me this is a very positive step, and, in
representation of my government, I thank the European administrations. […] It is clear that
the projects sponsored by the European Union are not necessarily the same as those that
compose Plan Colombia; still, we share the same target of supporting the social
expectations of the Colombian people.”
It is true that unconditional support given to the United States intervention in Iraq has
moved Colombia apart from the European Union’s principles, and from the possibility of
broadening its cooperation. 21 This moved Commissioner Patten, during his visit to Bogotá
in January 2004, to “announce a reorientation of cooperation, towards institutional
strengthening, humanitarian crisis, Human Rights, the environment, and alternatives to drug
production.” 22
With the position established in regard to Plan Colombia, the European Union
highlighted its differences with dominant policies of the “War against Drugs.”
Unfortunately, communication on this position was very discreet. The European Union
never openly criticized Plan Colombia, with the excuse of it being a problem of exclusive
North American and Colombian interest. It did not suggest an independent assessment on
the effects of fumigations, neither did it answer to those Latin American countries that
wanted to get rid of constant United States pressures, but with the condition of having
21
Policy Paper, “Las relaciones Colombia-Unión Europea: de la incertidumbre al estancamiento,” No. 11,
October 2004.
22
Ibid.
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political and economic alternatives offered. This lack of projection in the hands of the
European Union, within the terrain of international politics, derives from the fact that it
does not have a centralized organism to make decisions and speak with authority in its
name on these issues. As I mentioned above, a recent deterioration has taken place in these
matters, which limits the field of action of the Drug Center of the countries of the Union
and other candidate countries. Plus, it also takes away the perspective of having
competition in the geopolitical area of supply, as it was planned from the beginning.
The Plan of Action 2000-2004 and Latin America
The Plan of Action 2000-2004 is coherent with the positions set during the discussion on
Plan Colombia. It presents six main objectives: 23
•
To assure that in the battle against drugs a higher priority is given to internal and
external policy of the European Union.
•
To follow-up the integrated and balanced approach to the fight against drugs, within
which supply and demand are elements that mutually reinforce each other.
•
To make sure that the gathering, analyses, and dissemination of the goals achieved
with the help of the European Drug Center and Europol, are trustworthy and
comparable.
•
To encourage international cooperation, including drug control as part of cooperation
for development.
•
To support the efforts of the United Nations and UNODC, in order to particularly
develop international cooperation based on the principles adopted by the UNGASS.
•
Without requesting additional funds, to successfully implement the new strategy and
new actions mentioned in the new Plan of Action, having sufficient resources to rely
on.
The Plan focuses on four topics: reduction of demand; reduction of supply;
international cooperation; information and assessment. With regard to international
cooperation, there is a particular emphasis put on drug-producing regions, and/or those
23
Ann Vanout and Alain Labrousse, op cit.
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across which drugs cross with their destination the European Union: countries that are
candidates to the European Union, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Central Asia. In a
press release of June 8th, 2001, the European Union reiterates its intention of focusing
efforts on the two main routes by which drugs travel to Europe: the heroin route, starting in
Afghanistan and ending in Europe, across Central Asia, Iran, Caucasus, Turkey, and the
Balkans; and the cocaine route, across America and the Caribbean. 24
The Union’s global Plan of Action comes to life in Regional Plans of Action, as the
Plan of Action against Drugs between the European Union and Latin America and the
Caribbean. The main approach includes Andean countries, intending to strengthen
democratic institutions, legislations, encouraging regional integration and socio-economic
development, as well as reinforcing cooperation, in order to fight against drugs, while
paying attention to their use.
Part of the Regional Support Plan for Latin America in the battle against drugs, is the
appointment of €100 million to projects on alternative development in Bolivia and Peru.
There is also a very special project of European direction: Peace Laboratories in Colombia,
which seek to eliminate the dependency on coca suffered by farmers; it also expects to
discourage poor people of migrating into regions of harvest. These projects support
alternative products, livestock rising, infrastructures, and a democratic process of protection
to the environment and the jungle. The regional plan executes within the Andean and
Caribbean countries in the following ways:
Bolivia
PRAEDAC: Supports alternative development strategies at the Chapare (Trópico de
Cochabamba), in strong relation with peasant organizations and local authorities. Such
authorities have facilitated infrastructure for sewer systems, education, health, and have
also built roads. All these activities have required popular participation. The project
received €19 million, and is composed by four objective areas:
•
To reinforce municipality.
•
To ease rural credit.
24
Op. cit., p. 38.
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•
To adopt a revision of property registers and land deed programs.
•
The rational administration of natural resources.
PRODEVAT: Program for the support of economic and social development in Arque and
Valle de Tapacarí, poor mountainous zones at the Cochabamba Department, in order to
lead the population to stop migrating to Chaparé to harvest coca. These projects have €16
million, and consist of four objective areas as well:
•
To improve farming production.
•
To improve the access to markets.
•
Social infrastructures, especially health and education.
•
The strengthening of municipalities.
It also includes development of tourism, environmental protection, and incentive
given to local languages (quechua) and their cultures.
APEMIN I & II: Support given to small mining industries in depressed areas of La Paz,
Oruro and Potosí Departments, with the intention of preventing migrations of the
unemployed to areas of Chaparé where coca is produced. It counts with €5 million and €7
million, respectively. Their objectives are:
•
To revitalize mining industry production at a small scale.
•
To reverse undesired effects mining industry has in the environment.
•
To develop basic utilities.
•
To strengthen the management capacity of local governments.
It also gives training to both miners and official employees, besides from supporting
loan schemes and the hiring of equipment.
Peru
Alternative development at Pozuzo and Palcaza. Sponsors’ initiatives are to both ease the
access to markets and to develop producing initiatives. Its budget consists of €22.6 million,
and its main objective areas are:
•
Development of infrastructure (transport, power, and so on).
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•
Development of production (forestry, stockbreeding, and so on).
•
To protect the environment.
•
To exchange farming products.
•
To rehabilitate agro-industrial production.
•
To develop credit.
•
To strengthen local governments.
Colombia
The support given to Peace Laboratories already mentioned extends the efforts made in
conflict resolution, which is one of the main objectives of the European policy for
Colombia. As a matter of fact, the projects are located within the Magdalena Medio, where
guerrillas and paramilitaries are present, as well as where coca is harvested. The objectives
of this project are:
•
To encourage peace culture and citizen rights.
•
Productive activities.
•
Development of infrastructure.
•
To strengthen institutionalism.
As a matter of fact, all this is about a group of small projects that resulted from citizen
initiatives. Within this context, giving up the cultivation of coca must be the result of a
peace culture and needs to be voluntary. A second phase of this project is expected to take
place in another region of the country. It will be executed in two different stages,
throughout a period of eight years. The European Union’s contribution for the first stage
(which will take approximately three years) will be of €14.8 million, while for the second
stage (approximately five years), will include €20 million.
The four basic topics of the program are:
•
Peace culture and integral development of rights.
•
Productive activities.
•
Infrastructures.
•
Institutional strengthening.
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The project also includes the voluntary eradication of coca crops. The second phase
covers regions at Norte de Santander, the Oriente Antioqueño and the Macizo
Colombiano/Alto Patía. It will have €33 million as capital, and will last until 2008.
The Caribbean
For the Caribbean region, drugs are placed within the regional cooperation frame, which is
to be subsidized with European Development Fund (EDF) resources (€8,830,768).
The attention paid to the region started with the “ Plan of Action of Barbados” (PAB)
(1996-2001) which mainly concentrated in the reduction of supply. It was perceived that in
the region the PAB was essentially autonomous, and did not pay enough attention to
demand reduction. Thus, as response, the region is now getting closer to a post-PAB phase,
divided in two different dimensions.
With regard to supply reduction, a Task Force on Delinquency and Security of
CARICOM is currently developing measures that include National Law and Order
Commissions, as well as Anti-Delinquency Master Plans, the strengthening of frontier
control measures, reinforcement of exchange of information and intelligence regimes,
weapon seizure in public places, and the establishment of a Mutual Legal Assistance
Regime and a Prisoner Exchange Agreement.
With regard to demand reduction, the Caribbean countries are completing a strategy
that expects to improve the assessment, prevention, and treatment of abuse of consumption,
as well as the exploration of alternatives to the repressive judicial strategy.
Current projects under the 8th EDF include:
•
Epidemiological Vigilance Program developed by the CAREC. It ended in December
2003.
•
Anti-Money-Laundering Project, developed by the Task Force of Financial Action.
•
Various national projects of demand reduction.
Under the 9th European Development Fund, support given to drug control will
concentrate in the creation and execution of regional strategies based on demand (Drug
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Demand Reduction Multi-Country Program) and supply (follow-up to the Anti-MoneyLaundering Project) reduction.
Conclusions
The European Union’s policy might be assessed in two levels: the mechanisms of its come
to practice and its principles. With regard to the first point, we already highlighted the
fragmentation of the policy. In an evaluation we did, we also underscored other
dysfunctions:
•
Lack of coordination: this deficiency is present between internal and external policies,
and inside both of them. It is increased by the frequent changes that take place in the
Commission’s structures.
•
Lack of knowledge of the Commission’s officials in matters of drugs.
•
Lack of assessment, which leads to, for example, funding the second phase of a
project whose first phase was a failure; such is the case of an alternative development
project for Morocco. Another example is that of the Peace Laboratories in Colombia
that decided to extend their reach into other regions, without having a clear idea of
their achievements and failures. Particularly, the first appraisals of the phase noted
that the project had problems “absorbing” the funds donated by the European Union.
These, apparently bureaucratic, differences might have crucial negative consequences.
For example, between 1980s and 1990s, Latin America and the battle against cocaine took
most of the budgets assigned by the European Union for the war against drugs. This
occurred, in spite of the fact that, until the end of 1990s, cocaine was consumed by a closed
circle of people (musicians, intellectuals, artists, etc), who did not represent serious sanitary
problems, or any threat to law and order. The heroin produced in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Turkey was the drug that caused more harm on a popular level and among European
youngsters as a whole.
It was only until the beginning of this century’s first decade that cocaine became the
most important threat, being consumed in injections or as crack. Since this occurred not
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only in Spain, 25 but also in most of the European countries, 26 the European Union started
“re-balancing” its sponsorships in favor of Asia; mainly leaning towards Afghanistan and
Central Asia. There are two explanations for this gap: on the one hand, the evident lack of
knowledge already mentioned. On the other, this deficiency translates into economic and
geopolitical interests: an increase in cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia in
matters of drugs takes place, when these countries symbolize geostrategic (battle against
Islamic terrorism) and economic (petroleum) interests.
The basis of the European policy in drug matters is that of a global policy, that will
join all cooperation items, balancing the different domains where drugs must be fought.
One might say that the European Union has developed an alternative model of the
repressive reproductions that step on human rights and health problems, among others.
There is a request of developing countries for these types of alternatives.
However, because of the fragmentation of European politics—the lack of knowledge
of most officials, added to the lack of continuous assessment—there is no sufficient
competence to reproduce in some regions projects that were successful in other regions, nor
to correct projects that failed, in order to avoid repeating them. The multidisciplinary
strategy that was successfully adopted by the European Drug Center within the Union has
not been exported for a lack of coherent external politics. For these matters drug-policy
centralization is needed, and should rely in only one organism and be expressed by means
of only one person; someone like, for example, a Commissioner for Drugs and Illicit
Activities. Besides from the former, instead of limiting the application zone of the Center’s
competence, more challenge and possibilities of action should be assigned to it.
Before everything else, the European Union lacks political will to try and impose
models that clash with North American interests, in particular. In this sense I share the
analysis of Colombian researcher Socorro Ramírez, who, in her essay titled “El frágil
esquema europeo,” 27 suggests that the European Union “prefers not to interfere within an
area that the United States considers to be of its influence.” This, regardless of the fact that
the United States progressively interferes more in Africa, territory that Europe considers
25
Carlos Resa Nesares, “La delicuencia organizada transnacional en España,” in Revista de Seguridad
Pública, No. 39, 1999, pp. 31-48.
26
Observatoire Européen des Drogues et des Toxicomanies (OEDT), “État du phenomène de la drogue dans
l’Union Européenne et en Norvège,” Rapport annuel, 2004.
27
Intervención en conflictos internos. El caso colombiano 1994-2003, Bogotá, Iepri, 2004, pp. 285-310.
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being zone of its influence. This irresolute policy is also present in the case of the Plan
Colombia, where, even if Europe has resisted supporting the opposition of the United
States, it has not divulged its position at all. My opinion is that, beyond any reform of
structures needed to overpass a fragmented policy, the European Union, in all international
forums—particularly in the Vienna Narcotics’ Commission—would have to step aside from
the North American position and present an alternative position that may be a minority
position in the short-term, but that might attract the support of many developing countries.
Yet, in order to achieve this, the member countries might have to unite their positions, and
this is a different story. 28
28
The same deficiency to unify positions was seen when there was an attempt to define positions with regard
to the invasion of Iraq.
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THE VIEWS FROM THE UNITED STATES
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Reducing the Harms of Drug Prohibition in the Americas
Ethan A. Nadelmann*
The failure of the war on drugs is practically conventional wisdom these days, not just in
the United States but throughout much of the world. That this failure is not just past and
present but also future is also acknowledged widely. Nowhere is this truer than in Latin
America, where long simmering dissent is popping up in more corners than can be
contained.
Drug policy discussions among policy makers and experts in the Americas used to
conclude with a standard recitation of mutual agreement to cooperate on reducing supply in
the South, reducing demand in the North, respecting sovereignty and making sure the drug
issue stayed on the back burner, away from more pivotal bilateral and multilateral issues.
Those recitations persist, but ring ever hollower.
Look at the evidence. The United States alone has spent hundreds of billions of
dollars, incarcerated millions of people, seized many tons of illicit drugs and eradicated,
directly or indirectly, hundreds of thousands of hectares (2.5 acres) both in Latin America
and within its own borders—just in the last decade. Eager to justify all this, United States
officials point to declines in the number of people who admit to using cocaine or
marijuana, 1 cynically ignoring the evidence that serious drug abuse and other drug-related
problems—overdose deaths, new HIV and hepatitis infections, not to mention the health
and social harms associated with the drug war—persist at levels far above those in other
industrialized countries. 2
United States officials similarly boasted of dramatic declines in coca production in
Bolivia and Peru a few years ago, notwithstanding the fact that Colombian producers
* Ethan Nadelmann is founder and executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance (www.drugpolicy.org).
1
John P. Walters, “Fiscal 2006 Budget,” in FDCH Congressional Testimony, February 10th, 2005.
2
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Diagnoses of HIV/AIDS-32 States 2000-2003,” in Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report (available at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5347a3.htm);
and European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Annual Report 2003: The State of the Drugs
Problem in the Acceding and Candidate Countries to the European Union, Lisboa, EMCDDA, 2003.
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instantly made up the difference. 3 Now they’re boasting of declines in Colombia, even as
production in Bolivia and Peru picks up. 4 A recent White House analysis reports that the
retail prices of cocaine and heroin in the United States are at all time lows. 5 No one knows
how much is stockpiled, and the market is increasingly global. It’s like pushing on a
balloon, some say. It’s like stepping on mercury, say others. No surprise, say the
economists: we’re dealing with a global commodities market, not an infectious virus.
Latin American leaders are not blind to the consequences of the United States
government’s political myopia. Colombia over the past two decades has been like Chicago
under Al Capone—times fifty. Much the same can be said of Brazil’s favelas, where urban
drug lords hold most of the power. In Mexico, the names of the major traffickers, and those
they intimidate, kill and corrupt, keep changing, but the stories stay the same. Poverty and
desperation are mounting in Bolivia and Peru among campesinos striving to feed their
families; ultimately they will plant whatever enables them to survive. The problems in
Central America, the Caribbean and Ecuador are much the same.
What’s the solution? Certainly not the “carrot and stick,” as United States officials
like to call it, of crop substitution and crop eradication. That’s been a tried and true failure
for decades, producing localized success stories that ultimately prove both ephemeral and
irrelevant to the bigger picture. “We don’t need alternative development,” Latin Americans
say. “We need economic development.” True enough, but even that’s no answer to the drug
problem. If it were, the United States—one of the world’s most economically developed
nations—would not be one of the world’s leading producers of marijuana and
methamphetamine. Meanwhile, there’s no better way today for a developing nation to
attract development assistance from the United Nations, the United States and other
governments than to produce lots of illicit coca and opium. Some incentive!
More and more the unspeakable is spoken not just behind closed doors but out loud,
and not just by intellectuals but by elected officials and other leaders. We all have drug
problems, they are saying, but most of our drug problems—the violence and corruption, the
empowerment of organized criminals and distortion of economies, even the human rights
3
James Mack, “Andean Initiative,” in FDCH Congressional Testimony, June 28th, 2001.
Jonathan D. Farrar, “Plan Colombia,” in FDCH Congressional Testimony, May 11th, 2005.
5
United States, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, The Price and
Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981 Through the Second Quarter of 2003, Washington D.C., ONDCP, 2004.
4
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abuses and environmental depredations—are the results of the costly and futile
prohibitionist policies effectively imposed on us by gringo power.
In June 1998 I drafted a public letter to United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan, published in The New York Times, which called on him to initiate a truly open and
honest dialogue regarding the future of global drug control policies. 6 “We believe,” the
letter said, “the global war on drugs is causing doing more harm than drug abuse itself.”
The hundreds of signatories included former heads of government and distinguished
ministers as well as Nobel laureates from around the world, but the list was from Latin
America was most striking. The signers included former presidents of Bolivia (Lidia
Gueiler Tejada), Costa Rica (Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias), Colombia (Belisario Betancur),
Guatemala (Ramiro de León Carpio), and Nicaragua (Violeta Barrios de Chamorro); former
foreign ministers in Bolivia (Antonio Araníbar Quiroga), Colombia (Augusto Ramírez
Ocampo), Peru (Allan Wagner), Venezuela (Simón Alberto Consalvi) and Nicaragua (the
Sandinista, Miguel D’Escoto Brockman); the authors Isabel Allende and Ariel Dorfman
from Chile as well as Argentina’s Nobel Laureate, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, and Mario
Vargas Llosa, the Peruvian writer and former presidential candidate; the former presidential
minister of Ecuador, Washington Herrera; the former presidential candidate, now president,
of Brazil, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva; Jesús Silva Herzog, the former Mexican ambassador
to the United States; as well as Diego Arria, former Venezuelan representative to the
United Nations. 7
Since that time, some Latin American leaders have gone even further, openly raising
the issue of legalization even while in office. “Why don’t we just legalize drugs?”
Uruguay’s president, Jorge Batlle, said in 2000.8 “The day that it is legalized in the United
States, it will lose value. And if it loses value, there will be no profit.” “My opinion,” said
Mexican President Vicente Fox in March 2001, “is that in Mexico it is not a crime to have a
small dose of drugs in one’s pocket... But the day that the alternative of freeing the
consumption of drugs from punishment comes, it will have to be done in the entire world
6
Drug Policy Alliance, “Public Letter to Kofi Annan,” advertisement, in New York Times, June 8th, 1998, pp.
A12-A13 (available at: http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/ungass/letter/).
7
Drug Policy Alliance, “Public Letter to Kofi Annan,” advertisement, in New York Times, June 8th, 1998, pp.
A12-A13 (available at: http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/ungass/sigs1/).
8
Clifford Krauss, “Uruguay’s Chief Is Frank (and Frankly Insulting),” in New York Times, January 11th, 2001,
p. A8.
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because we are not going to win anything if Mexico does it, but the production and traffic
of the drugs... to the United States continues. Thus, humanity will one day view it
[legalization] as the best in this sense.” “In the end,” said Fox’s former foreign minister,
Jorge Castañeda, in 1999 shortly before joining the government, “legalization of certain
substances may be the only way to bring prices down, and doing so may be the only
remedy to some of the worst aspects of the drug plague: violence, corruption, and the
collapse of the rule of law.” 9 “From the Colombian point of view,” said Jaime Ruiz, senior
adviser to President Pastrana, it’s “the easy solution. I mean, just legalize it and we won’t
have any more problems. Probably in five years we wouldn’t even have guerrillas. No
problems. We [would] have a great country with no problems.” 10
These voices articulate a sentiment that is pervasive, and both perplexed and angered
by the hypocrisy of the United States: global apostle of the free market in most cases but,
when it comes to certain drugs, passionately committed to a sort of anti-economics that
presumably had been discredited with the fall of communism. Indeed, United States drug
policy can seem so absurd that many in Latin America assume it’s not really about drugs
but rather a cover for other economic and security interests, or simply another way to
humiliate and subjugate weaker nations. Sometimes drug war strategies do dovetail with
other United States interests—such as the current desire to suppress leftist insurgents and
protect oil supplies in Colombia—but it’s important for Latin Americans to realize that the
United States really is a bit crazy when it comes to drugs. The same quasi-religious faith in
abstinence which produced alcohol Prohibition in the United States 11 remains vibrant
today, but the “demon rum” of old has been replaced by marijuana, cocaine,
methamphetamine and whatever else tempts our teenagers and excites the media. The
United States drug war may wreak proportionately greater harm on smaller countries, but
the greatest victim in absolute terms is the United States.
The fellowship of reason when it comes to drug policy can make for the strangest of
bedfellows. What do the Nobel Prize economist, Milton Friedman, 12 and the Republican
9
Jorge Castañeda, “How We Fight a Losing War,” in Newsweek, September 6th, 1999, p. 31.
Kick Russ, “World Leaders on Dope,” in Village Voice, June 5th, 2001, p. 36.
11
James A. Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History, New Haven, Yale University
Press, 2003, pp. 281-344.
12
Milton Friedman and Thomas Szasz, Friedman and Szasz on Liberty and Drugs: Essays on the Free
Market and Prohibition, Washington D.C., Drug Policy Foundation Press, 1992; Milton Friedman, “A War
10
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former United States Secretary of both Treasury and State, George Shultz, 13 have in
common with political leftists like Bolivia’s Evo Morales 14 or Lula in Brazil? 15 They all
think that United States drug policy is doing far more harm than good. The funny thing is
that Friedman and Shultz are more radical in their proposed solutions.
But no matter how much sense legalization makes for Latin America, it’s politically
inconceivable now and for the foreseeable future. Not one country—indeed no group of
countries—could realistically legalize cocaine or heroin unilaterally. To do so would be to
invite pariah status among the society of nations, and to be subject to potentially draconian
sanctions.
Most Latin Americans I know simply throw up their hands in frustration. Let’s pray,
they say, for the emergence of new synthetic drugs that will eliminate the demand for the
region’s illicit exports. But that prayer has been uttered, and gone unanswered, for decades
already. Even the spread of Ecstasy, methamphetamine and synthetic opiates in the United
States and elsewhere has offered no relief to Latin America.
Clearly there’s no easy answers, no quick solutions. But that does not mean there are
no alternatives but despair. Let me suggest ten steps that might prove productive.
First, open the debate! United States government officials work hard at keeping it
closed, both within the United States and outside. Expert reports are suppressed,
conferences cancelled, critics uninvited and disinvited. 16 United Nations agencies, the OAS
and other international organizations dare not engage the real issues, while the United
States drug czar studiously avoids debate with informed critics. United States officials fear
that to allow criticism of United States policies will be to legitimize those criticisms, and
the smarter ones know that the policies themselves are indefensible. But Latin Americans
need not go along with this censorship campaign. Better policies will flow from more
vigorous, open and informed debate.
We’re Losing,” in Editorial, Wall Street Journal, March 7th, 1991, p. A14, and Milton Friedman, “There’s No
Justice in the War on Drugs,” in Editorial, New York Times, January 11th, 1998, p. A19.
13
George W. Shultz, Editorial, Wall Street Journal, October 27th, 1989, p. A16.
14
Fiona Smith, “Bolivian Presidential Candidate Says He Would Oppose U.S.-Backed Coca Eradication,” in
Associated Press, September 21st, 2005, BC cycle.
15
Drug Policy Alliance, “Public Letter to Kofi Annan,” advertisement, in New York Times, June 8th, 1998, pp.
A12-A13 (available at: http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/ungass/letter/).
16
Transnational Institute, “Coca, Cocaine, and the International Conventions,” in TNI Drug Policy Briefing,
No. 5, April 2003, p. 3; and Ethan Nadelmann, “Commonsense Drug Policy,” in Foreign Affairs, No. 77.1,
January-February 1998, pp. 124-125 (available at: http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/foreigna1.cfm).
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88
Second, keep in mind that better cooperation among law enforcement and other
agencies is nice, but ultimately irrelevant to addressing the more fundamental problems.
Indeed, the constant focus on “improving cooperation” may well be counterproductive
insofar as it distracts policy makers from focusing on the substance rather than the process
of drug policy. Police, prosecutors and others involved in enforcing drug laws are often the
last ones to think critically about those laws. Many instinctively support those laws, and
habitually advocate for new criminal laws to improve their capacity to enforce old laws,
without ever asking how or why the laws were enacted in the first place, whether they still
make sense, or whether those laws might actually being doing more harm than good. That’s
not their job, after all.
Third, know the history of how and why Latin American nations embraced drug
prohibition in the first place. 17 Those who look will find that many drug laws were enacted
not in response to domestic drug abuse problems, but rather in response to pressures from
the United States government. They will find that no studies were commissioned to try to
determine the likely impact of prohibiting drugs that almost no one was consuming at the
time. And they will find that the supposedly scientific claims made about coca and
marijuana when they were criminalized in local laws and included in global anti-drug
conventions decades ago were grounded not in real science but in pseudo-science, racism
and prejudice.
Fourth, change the rhetoric. The war on drugs is not a policy to control drug markets
and drug use. It’s a prohibition policy, just like alcohol Prohibition was in the United
States. It represents not the maximum form of regulation but rather the abdication of
regulation, effectively putting whatever cannot be suppressed into the hands and pockets of
those willing and able to profit from the black market. Prohibition ended in 1933 because
most Americans made a clear distinction between the problems of alcohol misuse—which
they initially hoped Prohibition would solve—and the problems generated by Prohibition
itself. They came to understand that Prohibition had not only failed to reduce alcohol
problems, but had generated an entire other set of problems: violence, organized crime,
17
Paul Gootenberg (editor), Cocaine: Global Histories, New York, Routledge, 1999, pp. 46-79 y 183-191;
and Joseph Gagliano, Coca Prohibition in Peru: The Historical Debates, Tucson, University of Arizona
Press, 1994.
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89
corruption, booming black markets, escalating disrespect for the law, and even more deadly
black market alcohol. 18
People need to make that same distinction today. United States officials like to talk
about one big “drug problem” to obscure the fact that so many of today’s drug problems,
especially in Latin America, are the results not of drugs per se but of prohibition. Latin
American governments may have no choice today but to collaborate in this failed policy,
but at least they can start changing the rhetoric of their collaboration. We are committed,
they might say, to assisting the United States in enforcing its “drug prohibition” policies.
When mainstream media start referring to drug policy as “drug prohibition,” and start
distinguishing between the harms of drugs and the harms of prohibition, not just in their
editorials but also in their journalistic coverage, that will mark the beginning of the end of
the war on drugs.
Fifth, keep your eyes on Canada, where the drug policy debate has evolved rapidly in
recent years. A Canadian Senate commission called for legalizing cannabis and other major
drug policy reforms; 19 a Parliamentary commission subsequently offered its own,
somewhat more cautious, recommendations for reforms; 20 and even the prime minister said
it’s time for change. 21 Canadian cities are debating and adopting the sorts of harm reduction
measures that Western Europe pioneered in the 1990s. 22 If Canada can do it, so can
Mexico, Brazil, and others. It shouldn’t be so hard to insist that drug policies be grounded
in science, health and economic common sense, not prejudice, fear and abstinence-only
ideology.
18
David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, Kent, Kent State University Press, 2000, pp. 26-27, 74-74
and 112-113.
19
Canada, Senate Special Committee on Illicit Drugs, Cannabis: Our Position for a Canadian Public Policy:
Report of the Senate Special Committee on Illicit Drugs, Ottawa, Senate of Canada, 2002 (available at :
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=85).
20
Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Policy for the Millennium:
Working Together to Redefine Canada’s Drug Strategy: Interim Report of The Special Committee on Nonmedical Use of Drugs, Ottawa, House of Commons of Canada, 2002 (available at:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocomdoc/37/2/SNUD/Studies/Reports/snudrp01/snudrp01-e.pdf).
21
Tom Cohen, “Canada Proposes Decriminalizing Possession of Small Amounts of Marijuana,” in Associated
Press, May 28th, 2003.
22
Donald MacPherson and Mary-Louise Rowley, A Framework for Action: A Four-Pillar Approach to Drug
Problems in Vancouver: Prevention, Treatment, Enforcement, Harm Reduction, Vancouver, City of
Vancouver,
2000
(available
at:
http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca/commsvcs/planning/dtes/pdf/frameworkforaction.pdf); Donald MacPherson,
Zarina Mulla, Lindsey Richardson, and Theresa Beer, Preventing Harm from Psychoactive Substance Use,
Vancouver,
City
of
Vancouver,
2005
(available
at:
http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca/fourpillars/pdf/preventingharm_report.pdf).
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90
Sixth, recognize and embrace the potential alliance—both political and conceptual—
not just with Canada but also growing parts of Europe as well as Australia, New Zealand
and others. These parts of the world were quick to adopt “harm reduction” policies in the
1980s and early 1990s to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS by and among injecting drug
users. These policies included making sterile syringes more readily available to reduce
addicts’ needle sharing, expanding methadone and other treatment, establishing research
programs to provide pharmaceutical heroin to addicts unable to quit, and working directly
with drug users to reduce overdoses as well as anti-social behavior. 23 By and large, those
countries that embraced harm reduction were more successful in reducing HIV/AIDS,
hepatitis and other infectious diseases, as well as drug-related criminality and dysfunction,
than those countries that did not. 24 One now finds more and more support for harm
reduction in Brazil, Argentina and other Latin American countries in response to their own
growing problems with illicit drug use. 25
The notion of harm reduction originated as a public health approach to reduce the
harms of drug use by and among people unable or unwilling to stop using drugs. But today
harm reduction is often defined more broadly as a strategic approach to reduce the negative
consequences of both drug use and drug prohibition, acknowledging that neither is likely to
disappear in the immediate future. Implicit in this approach is the recognition that treating
drugs first and foremost as a criminal problem generates more harm than good. Therein lies
the commonality of perspective between those countries where the most deadly aspect of
23
Robert J. MacCoun and Peter Reuter, Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places,
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 265-299; Robert L. Hubbard, Drug Abuse Treatment: A
National Study of Effectiveness, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989; and Gerry V. Stimson,
Don C. des Jarlais, and Andrew L. Ball (editors), World Health Organization, Drug Injecting and HIV
Infection: Global Dimensions and Local Responses, Bristol, UCL Press, 1998, pp. 149-182 y 183-200.
24
World Health Organization, Programme on Substance Abuse: Multi-City Study on Drug Injecting and Risk
of HIV Infection: A Report Prepared on Behalf of the WHO International Collaborative Group, Ginebra,
World Health Organization, 1994, pp. 459-473; Erich Goode, Between Politics and Reason: The Drug
Legalization Debate, New York, St.Martin's Press, 1997, p. 126; and Nicky Metrebian, William Shanahan,
Brian Wells, and Gerry V. Stimson, “Feasibility of Prescribing Injectable Heroin and Methadone to OpiateDependent Drug Users: Associated Health Gains and Harm Reductions,” in Medical Journal of Australia, No.
168, 1998, pp. 596-600 (available at the Medical Journal of Australia web page:
http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/jun15/mtrebn/mtrebn.html).
25
Hilary L. Surratt y Paulo R. Telles, “The Harm Reduction Movement in Brazil: Issues and Experiences,” in
James A. Inciardi and Lana D. Harrison (editors), Harm Reduction: National and International Perspectives,
Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2000, pp. 137-154; Transnational Institute Drugs and Democracy
Programme, A Pointless War: Drugs and Violence in Brazil, Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, 2004, pp.
20-21 (available at: http://www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate11.htm); and Linda Hutchinson-Jafar, “HIV/AIDS
Continues To Increase in Caribbean,” in Miami Times, December 25th, 2001, p. 6A.
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drug policy is the spread of HIV/AIDS and those where organized crime, violence and
corruption represent the principal harms. In 1985, the conservative government of Margaret
Thatcher concluded that “the spread of HIV is a greater danger to individual and public
health than drug misuse.” 26 Accordingly, services which aim to minimize HIV risk
behavior by all available means should take precedence in development programs. The time
is well past for Latin American leaders to reach a comparable conclusion: that the harms of
drug prohibition represent a greater danger to Latin American societies than drug misuse,
and that efforts to reduce those harms should take precedence in government policies.
The implications for Latin America are many, but perhaps the principal one is the
opportunity to think afresh about the best ways to deal with coca and cocaine. Is there a
middle ground between the outright prohibition that has wreaked such havoc and the
outright legalization that seems politically impossible anytime soon? Consider the Dutch
“coffeeshop” system, which emerged as a de facto model of regulating retail sales of
cannabis notwithstanding the de jure prohibition; 27 or recent Swiss advances in trying to
license the production and distribution of cannabis, 28 or the proliferation of heroin
maintenance trials in Europe and now Canada to reduce the harms of illicit heroin
addiction. 29 None provide specific answers for dealing with coca and cocaine in the South
American context, but both can provide inspiration and stimulation for designing models of
de facto regulation.
Seventh, step up efforts to re-legitimize and legalize the production, sale and
consumption of coca-based products, i.e., products containing small amounts of cocaine.
Millions of people in Bolivia and Peru chew coca daily, a process which releases a slow
26
United Kingdom, Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, Aids and Drug Misuse, Part I, London, Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988, p. 17.
27
A. C. M. Jansen, “The Development of a ‘Legal’ Consumers’ Market for Cannabis: The ‘Coffee Shop’
Phenomenon,” in E. Leuw, IHaen Marshall (editors), Between Prohibition and Legalization: The Dutch
Experiment in Drug Policy, New York, Kugler Publications, 1996, pp. 169-181.
28
Swiss Federal Commission for Drug Issues, “Cannabis Report of the Swiss Federal Commission for Drug
Issues (EKFD),” Switzerland, 1999 (available at: http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/cannabise.pdf).
29
North American Opiate Medication Initiative, “Backgrounder,” September 2005 (available at:
http://www.naomistudy.ca/pdfs/naomi_background.pdf); Ambros Uchtenhagen, Anja Dobler-Mikola, T.
Steffen, et al., Prescription of Narcotics for Heroin Addicts: Main Results of the Swiss National Cohort Study,
New York, Karger, 1999; Wim Van den Brink, et al., Medical Co-Prescription of Heroin: Two Randomized
Controlled Trials, Utrecht, Central Committee on the Treatment of Heroin Addicts (CCBH), 2002 (available
at: http://www.ccbh.nl/ENG/index.htm); and Bing Spear and Joy Mott, Heroin Addiction, Care and Control:
The British System, London, Drugscope, 2002.
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drip of cocaine into the body. 30 The World Health Organization has concluded that coca
chewing is not harmful, and may even be beneficial to one’s health. 31 Millions of others
consume coca teas and tonics and other coca-based products. There are good reasons to
believe that these products, including lozenges and gums, could sell well internationally,
and that they would prove no more addictive, and possibly even less harmful, than the
caffeinated products with which they would compete. It’s time for a PR campaign to “put
the coca back in Coca Cola.”
The ban on international trade in coca-based products has no basis in science. 32
Recent scholarship on the use and criminalization of coca and cocaine in the United States
a century ago makes clear that neither the anti-drug rhetoric of the day nor the criminal
laws that followed distinguished between the most potent forms of cocaine, with their
higher potential for misuse, and the essentially benign coca-based and low potency cocaine
products that presented few, if any, problems. 33 The current United States prohibition on
importing coca tea and other coca-based products, no matter how benign, like the United
States ban on cultivating hemp (which is legal in dozens of countries) and selling hempbased food products reveal the quasi-religious nature of United States drug prohibitions and
the global drug prohibition regime. 34
Eighth, understand that the international anti-drug conventions do not present
insurmountable obstacles to reform. 35 European governments have become increasingly
30
Transnational Institute, “Broken Promises and Coca Eradication in Peru,” in TNI Drug Policy Briefing, No.
11, March 2005, p. 2 (available at: http://www.tni.org/policybriefings/brief11.pdf); United Nations, Office on
Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2004, volume 2, Statistics, New York, Office on Drugs and Crime,
2004 (available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2004/volume_2.pdf).
31
Phillip O. Coffin, “Coca Eradication,” in Foreign Policy in Focus, No. 3.29, 1998, pp. 1-4. The complete
document is available at Foreign Policy in Focus (http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol3/v3n29coca.html).
32
Joseph A. Gagliano, op. cit., pp. 119-139; and Paul Gootenberg (editor), Cocaine: Global Histories, New
York, Routledge, 1999, pp. 21-45 y 46-82.
33
Joseph F. Spillane, Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884-1920,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins U. Press, 2000.
34
Ronald K. Siegel, Mahmoud A. Elsohly, Timothy Plowman, et al., “Cocaine in Herbal Tea,” in Journal of
the American Medical Association, No. 255.1, 1986, p. 40; Jean M. Rawson, Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, Hemp as an Agricultural Commodity, Congressional Research Service,
January 5th, 2005. The complete document is available at Federation of American Scientists
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32725.pdf).
35
Cindy S. J. Fazey, “The Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the United Nations International Drug Control
Programme: Politics, Policies and Prospect for Change,” in International Journal of Drug Policy, No. 14.2,
2003, pp. 155-169; David R. Bewley-Taylor, “Challenging the UN Drug Control Conventions: Problems and
Possibilities,” in International Journal of Drug Policy, No. 14.2, 2003, pp. 171-179; and Craig Reinarman,
“Geo-political and Cultural Constraints on International Drug Control Treaties,” in International Journal of
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93
creative and bold in interpreting these treaties to accommodate their own drug reform
innovations. But there’s also a growing recognition that the prohibitionist elements of the
anti-drug conventions represent part of the problem, not part of the solution. These
conventions ultimately need to be revised, if not abandoned, but that process can begin with
creative interpretations of the current treaties as well as exceptions to their more
problematic provisions.
Ninth, don’t despair on prospects for reform in the United States, notwithstanding
Congress’s blind enthusiasm for tossing money down this particular sinkhole. More and
more conservatives think the Bush administration’s drug policy is a reckless waste of
money as well, and some also see it as stupid, cruel and counterproductive as well. 36 A
growing drug policy reform movement in the United States is proving increasingly
successful in reforming state and local drug laws and blocking new drug war initiatives in
Congress. Budget crises in many states have generated pressures to cut back on foolish
luxuries like the war on drugs. 37 The war on drugs costs roughly US$40 billion per year—a
lot of money, even in the United States. 38 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says the
drug problem is primarily about reducing demand, not supply. 39 The Pentagon, FBI and
Drug Policy, No. 14.2, 2003, pp. 205-208. These documents are available at Science Direct
(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09553959).
36
“Secretary Colin Powell States More Important than Winning the Drug War Is Controlling Demand by
Americans,” in CBS Evening News, CBS Television, April 26th, 2001; “The Right Angle,” in Poz Magazine,
June 2001 (available at: http://www.poz.com/articles/189_1199.shtml); Leslie Linthicum, “Former Governor
Enjoying Life, May Not Be Done With Politics,” in Associated Press, April 28th, 2004; William F. Buckley,
2004
(available
at:
Jr.,
“Free
Weeds,”
in
National
Review
Online,
June
29th,
http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.p?ref=/buckley/buckley200406291207.asp);
and
“Rep.
Hinchey, Rohrabacher, Supreme Court Plaintiff Raich, Others Call for House Passage of Medical Marijuana
Amendment to Protect Patients,” in US Fed News, June 14th, 2005.
37
“Proposed FY 2006 Federal Drug Control Budget Reduces or Eliminates Funding for Many State-Level
Programs,” in CESAR Fax, University of Maryland, College Park, No. 14.15, 2005; “The Federal Drug
Budget,” in Carnevale Associates, February 2005 (available at: http://www.carnevaleassociates.com/CA_PBFY2006_Drug_Budget.pdf).
38
United States, Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: FY 2006 Budget
Summary, Washington D.C., Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2005 (available at:
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/); National Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA), Shoveling Up: The Impact of Substance Abuse on State
Budgets, New York, National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2001
(available at: http://www.casacolumbia.org/pdshopprov/files/47299a.pdf).
39
Donald Rumsfeld, “Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: The Nomination of Donald
Rumsfeld to Be Secretary of Defense,” in Federal News Service, January 11th, 2001.
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CIA are all cutting back on drug enforcement and shifting their focus to terrorism. 40
Change is afoot.
Tenth, start to act and think strategically within Latin America. I suspect that if
someone convened a meeting of all the Latin American presidents and prime ministers and
foreign ministers—past and present—who have thought, whispered or proclaimed that the
drug war is a destructive sham, and that legalization or some other fundamental alternative
probably makes the most sense, the room would be standing room only. Invite other cabinet
ministers as well as leaders from the Caribbean, and you’d probably need an auditorium.
Such a meeting would likely reveal that this viewpoint represents not a deviant,
minority perspective but actually a majoritarian sentiment among regional leaders. There’s
often power, moreover, and courage, in numbers. It’s one thing for the United States
government to attack individual leaders who say the drug war is like the emperor’s new
clothes. It is quite another when the sentiment is expressed collectively.
I don’t think much will change in Latin America until that meeting happens, but it
could prove catalytic when it does. The global drug prohibition regime that evolved over
the past century is rotten to its core. It took the AIDS pandemic to provoke even modest
reforms, but now support for public health measures grounded in harm reduction principles
is blossoming worldwide, not just in Europe but even in China, Vietnam and Iran. 41 No
one, meanwhile, knows what to do about Afghanistan, whose illicit drug economy rivals
and possibly exceeds anything found in the Americas. But it is Latin America that
possesses both the moral standing and the critical mass of political leadership needed to
force a fundamental re-thinking of global drug policy in the XX Century.
40
FY06 Budget Priorities, United States Office of Management and Budget (available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/budget.html); Kelly Thornton, “In Terror's Shadow: AntiDrug Efforts Have Taken a Hit as the Fight Against Terrorism Has Siphoned Away Money and Personnel,” in
San Diego Union-Tribune, July 31st, 2005, p. A12; and Dan Eggen, “New FBI Cases Down Since 2001: Drop
Reflects Anti-Terrorism Focus,” in Washington Post, October 4th, 2005.
41
Jim Yardley, “Chinese City Emerges as Model in Nation's Effort to Reverse Once Abysmal AIDS Record,”
in New York Times, June 16th, 2005, p. A17; Alex Dominguez, “Chinese Official Tours Baltimore Needle
Exchange Program,” in Associated Press, July 22nd, 2005; “WHO Official Praises Vietnam’s HIV/AIDS
Strategy,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 3rd, 2005; and Karl Vick, “AIDS Crisis Brings
Radical Change in Iran's Response to Heroin Use: Health Concerns Given Precedence Over Prosecution,” in
Washington Post, July 5th, 2005, p. A9.
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95
On the Consistency of United States Policy towards Colombia
Peter Reuter *
Introduction
Two countries account for almost all of the United States’ drug imports: Colombia and
Mexico. Mexico is the principal source of foreign marijuana, the single most important
source of heroin and methamphetamine and the dominant conduit for cocaine and pseudo
ephedrine (the precursor for methamphetamine). Colombia produces most of the United
States-destined cocaine, now grows most of the coca from which that cocaine is refined and
is the second most important source of heroin for the United States No other country plays
more than a marginal role as a producer or conduit for the United States drug market.
The United States’ links to Colombia are otherwise limited. Colombia-United States
trade totals only US$8 billion in 2004, compared to US$160 billion for Mexico and US$23
billion for Brazil. Though Colombia has maintained a tradition of democratic elections in a
region characterized over the last fifty years by cycles of authoritarian, frequently military,
rule, it is not a regional political leader, so that the United States does not need to give it
particular attention for that reason.
Nor is immigration is a central issue, though Colombia’s role in drug trafficking to the
United States surely reflects the relatively large population of Colombian immigrants in the
United States. Of United States residents born in South America, more come from
Colombia than from any other single country; there were 600,000 from Colombia,
compared to 300,000 from Ecuador, the nation with the next largest number, in the 2000
Census. However, the number is still small when compared to other nations sending
immigrants to the United States. Mexico was the nation of origin for 9 million of the 2000
Census count. Colombia ranked only 14th among nations in terms of country of origin.
*
Professor of Public Policy, School of Public Policy and Department of Criminology at the University of
Maryland. Drug Policy Research Center, RAND. John Walsh provided helpful comments.
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96
It is hardly surprising then that United States policy towards Colombia is so focused
on reducing drug exports. Stripped of that, the United States has little reason to have more
than passing interest in programs aimed at Colombia. That nation’s domestic strife is tragic
but has had relatively modest effects in the Andean region, except through the response it
has generated from the United States.
Indicative of this is that of the 25 stories about Colombia that appeared in the New
York Times between November 29, 2004 and September 15, 2005, all but one included
substantial discussion of Colombia as a drug producer. 1 Argentina, which is approximately
the same size in population and economic terms and has experienced intense political and
economic turmoil, generated only nine articles in the NYT in the same period.
The administration of George W. Bush has made a major rhetorical shift, quite
surprising to most observers, in accepting that the origins of the United States drug problem
are domestic. President Bush, in his early meetings with President Fox of Mexico, publicly
acknowledged that the fundamental problem is that so many citizens of the United States
are dependent on cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine, not that there are so many
criminals in Colombia and Mexico who want to produce these drugs. The myth of the
pusher has largely been disposed of. However that has not generated any major change in
United States policy towards either Colombia or Mexico with respect to drug control, just a
toning down of the rhetoric.
This paper is concerned with United States policies toward Colombia. That requires
an understanding of the evolution of the United States drug problem so it begins by tracing
the patterns of drug use in the United States over the last twenty-five years, focusing
particularly on the period since 1990. Over the last fifteen years, United States drug use has
been declining; in particular cocaine and heroin consumption, which are the drugs of
concern for Colombia, have fallen. The second section examines how anti-drug programs in
Colombia fit into broader United States drug control policies. Though they attract
considerable rhetorical and media attention, these programs, both within Colombia and
interdiction, constitute a very small part of the total drug control effort. It shows both that
there is no evidence that toughness in Colombia has reduced the supply of cocaine or
heroin to the United States. Moreover, there are good theoretical arguments that it is not
1
However, for only three of those articles was drugs the primary topic.
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likely to do so in any sustained fashion. However, American toughness may have
substantially changed the nature of the drug-related problems faced by the Colombian
government and society. The final section argues that despite the decline in the United
States’ cocaine and heroin problems, policies toward Colombia are unlikely to change in
the foreseeable future.
United States Drug Problems, 1975-2005
Drug use in the general population has been through more than one cycle over the last thirty
years. Figure 1 shows the percentages of high school seniors who reported using any illicit
drug in the past year from 1975 to 2003, and the percentages of those ages twelve to
seventeen and eighteen to twenty-five who reported past-year use. Data on high school
seniors are taken from the MTF; age-group data are drawn from the NSDUH and its
predecessor. 2
Figure 1
Past Year Drug Use, 1975-2003
2
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse was conducted only once every two or three years prior to
1991, when it became an annual survey; hence the gaps in the data.
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60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
High School Seniors
Ages 12-17
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
0%
Ages 18-25
Sources: United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004; United States Department of Health and Human Services,
National Institute on Drug Abuse 2004.
For the most part, the surveys tell a consistent story. The prevalence of drug use
among younger Americans peaked around 1979, declined until 1992, rebounded somewhat
over the next five years, and then leveled off. 3 This pattern is politically convenient for
Republicans, some of whom have noted that drug use rose during the Carter and Clinton
presidencies and dropped substantially during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush
administrations. But it is hard to identify policy changes that might have led to the turning
points. Moreover, note that the figures estimate only the percentages of individuals who
used drugs, not the volume, severity, or effects of drug use. Because approximately half of
users in the NSDUH and MTF reported using only marijuana, prevalence figures are
heavily driven by marijuana use. Figure 1 shows overall drug use declining significantly
during the 1980s, precisely when crack use soared.
However for Colombia, what is relevant is the pattern of consumption of cocaine and
heroin. That is more easily described. Figure 2 provides estimates for 1988-2000 of the
number of those who used cocaine frequently and those who used heroin frequently; to
3
The rise from 2001 to 2002 shown by the NSDUH—but not by MTF—is likely the result of changes in the
methodology of the NSDUH survey designed to improve the accuracy of reporting.
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facilitate comparison on one graph the figure for cocaine has been divided by 3. Both series
show a gradual decline over most of that period. For the year 2000 both the cocaine and
heroin estimates are about one third below the 1988 estimate. Unfortunately there are no
more recent estimates available; my own judgment is that the numbers have not increased. 4
Figure 2
Number of Frequent Users of Cocaine, Heroin 19881600
1400
)Users (Thousands
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Cocaine/3
Heroin
2000
Source: What America’s Users Spend on Illicit Drugs 1988-2000.
For many observers this decline in numbers of regular users is surprising because the
prices of both cocaine and heroin have declined sharply; see Figure 3, in which heroin
prices have been divided by three to show again the similarity of trends over time.
However, the reduction in frequent user numbers represents the epidemic nature of use of
these addictive substances. We turn briefly to a sketch of these epidemics.
4
The estimates relied on a survey of arrestees in major American cities, the ADAM survey. That survey was
terminated in 2003 for budget reasons.
99
100
Figure 3
Retail Price of Cocaine and Heroin, 1981-2003
Price per gram in 2002 dollars
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Cocaine
20
03
20
01
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
19
89
19
87
19
85
19
83
19
81
0
Heroin/3
Source: The Price of Illicit Drugs 1981 to Second Quarter 2003.
In an epidemic, rates of initiation (infection) in a given area rise sharply as new and
highly contagious users of a drug initiate friends and peers. 5 At least with heroin, cocaine,
and crack, long-term addicts are not particularly contagious. They are more socially
isolated than new users and, knowing the pitfalls of prolonged use, may not want to expose
others. Moreover, they usually present an unappealing picture of the consequences of
addiction. In the next stage of the epidemic, initiation declines rapidly as the susceptible
population shrinks, both because there are fewer nonusers and because some nonusers have
developed “immunity,” the result of better knowledge of the effects of a drug.
In the past thirty-five years, there have been three major drug epidemics, each of
which has left a legacy of users with long-term problems. The first involved heroin and
developed with rapid initiation in the late 1960s, primarily in a few big cities, and heavily
in inner-city minority communities; the experiences of a large number of American soldiers
5
L. Hunt y C. Chambers, The Heroin Epidemics: A Study on Heroin Use in the Unites States, 1965-75, New
York, Spectrum, 1976; C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus
Demand Programs, MR-331-ONDCP/A/DPRC, Santa Mónica, RAND, 1994.
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in Vietnam may have been a contributing factor. By 1975 the number of new heroin
initiates had dropped significantly, 6 perhaps because the negative consequences of regular
heroin use had become so conspicuous in those communities. In an early 1990s sample of
street heroin addicts, Ann-Marie Rocheleau and David Boyum also found evidence of
much higher initiation rates in the early 1970s than in the following two decades. 7
Heroin initiation may have risen again in the late 1990s, but the indicators are
ambiguous. 8 The possibility of a new epidemic is troubling, since heroin addiction (at least
for those addicted in the United States rather than while in the military in Vietnam) has
turned out to be a long-lived and lethal condition, as revealed in a remarkable thirty-threeyear follow-up of male heroin addicts admitted to the California Civil Addict Program
(CAP) during the years 1962-64. Nearly half of the original addicts—284 of 581—had died
by 1996-97; of the 242 still living who were interviewed, 40% reported heroin use in the
past year, and 60% were unemployed. 9
Cocaine, in powder form, was the source of the second epidemic, which lasted longer
and was less sharply peaked than the heroin epidemic. Initiation, which was broadly
distributed across class and race, rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s and then declined
after about 1985. 10 Dependence became prevalent in the mid-1980s, as the pool of those
who had experimented with the drug expanded. The number of dependent users peaked
around 1988 and declined only moderately through the 1990s. Whether dependence on a
stimulant can be maintained as long as narcotic dependence is unclear, but there are
certainly many cocaine users who have, over a ten-year period, maintained frequent use of
the drug, albeit with less regularity than heroin addicts.
6
Nicholas J. Kozel y E. H. Adams, “Epidemiology of Drug Abuse: An Overview,” in Science 234 (4779),
1986, pp. 970-974.
7
United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, Heroin Users in New York, Chicago, and San Diego,
by Ann-Marie Rocheleau and David Boyum, Washington D.C., Executive Office of the President, 1994.
8
There have been some increases in the number of younger users admitted for treatment and in the number of
overdose deaths involving heroin among eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds. On the other hand, the share of
eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old arrestees testing positive for opiates has remained low. It is possible that
there has been a modest epidemic among young, middle-class adults.
9
Yi-Ing Hser, V. Hoffman, C. E. Grella, and M. Douglas Anglin, “A 33-Year Follow-Up of Narcotics
Addicts,” in Archives of General Psychiatry, 58 (5), 2001, pp. 503-508.
10
United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Crack’s Decline: Some Surprises across
U.S. Cities, by Andrew Golub and Bruce Johnson, NIJ Research in Brief, NCJ No.165707, July 1997
(http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165707.pdf).
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The third epidemic was of crack use. Although connected to the cocaine epidemic—
crack developed as a cheap and easy-to-use form of freebase cocaine 11 —the crack
epidemic was sharper and shorter, and more concentrated among minorities in inner-city
communities. Its starting point varied across cities; for Los Angeles the beginning may
have been 1982, while for Chicago it was as late as 1988. But in all cities initiation appears
to have peaked within about two years and to have again left a population with a chronic
and debilitating addiction.
The decline in the prices of cocaine and heroin has not triggered a new epidemic. That
probably represents the consequence of the reputation of the drugs, which is critical to the
rate of initiation, as suggested in a series of papers by Jonathan Caulkins and
collaborators. 12 Cocaine and heroin are still seen as dangerous to users and associated with
disease and failure.
Has tough enforcement, particularly against Colombia’s cocaine and heroin
production contributed to this gradual reduction in cocaine and heroin prevalence? For that
we need to consider how enforcement affects drug use.
Enforcement
Cocaine and heroin are distributed down a long chain, from overseas production to sale on
the street or in the dormitory. Each link in the distribution chain presents a different set of
enforcement opportunities and is associated with its own agencies and institutions. For
example, suppressing production and export in other countries is primarily a responsibility
of the State Department and the Department of Defense. At the other end of the distribution
system, street enforcement is principally carried out by local police departments with state
courts and prisons disposing of the arrests. It is useful then to break the enforcement system
into four components: source-country control, interdiction, high-level domestic
11
David T. Courtwright, “The Rise and Fall and Rise of Cocaine in the United States,” in Consuming Habits:
Drugs in History and Anthropology, J. Goodman, P. E. Lovejoy, and A. Sherratt (editors), London,
Routledge, 1995.
12
See, e.g., Doris A. Behrens, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gernot Tragler, and Gustav Feichtinger, “Optimal
Control of Drug Epidemics: Prevent and Treat—But Not at the Same Time,” in Management Science, 2001.
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enforcement, and street-level enforcement. I focus here on the first two: source country
control and interdiction.
Source-Country Control
Since most illicit drugs consumed in the United States are produced abroad, many have
concluded that programs aimed at reducing production or export from the source-countries
can make a difference to United States drug problems. International programs therefore
attract a great deal of political attention. The intersection of overseas drug cultivation and
trafficking with other foreign policy concerns has made these programs even more
prominent, particularly in Afghanistan, where opium production has returned to worldleading levels despite a ban enacted by President Hamid Karzai.
Three types of programs have been tried to reduce source-country drug production:
eradication, alternative crop development, and in-country enforcement. Eradication, usually
involving aerial spraying but sometimes ground-based operations, aims either to literally
limit the quantity of the drugs available for shipment to the United States, to raise the cost
of producing those drugs, or to otherwise discourage farmers from growing them.
Alternative development is the soft version of this; it encourages farmers growing coca or
poppies to switch to legitimate crops by increasing earnings from these other products.
Development strategies include introducing new crops and more productive strains of
traditional crops, improving transportation for getting the crops to market, and
implementing various marketing and subsidy schemes. Finally, the United States pushes
source-countries to pursue traffickers and refiners more vigorously, often providing
military equipment and training.
None of these programs receives much money. In fiscal year 2005, even with the
much-trumpeted Plan Colombia, drug expenditures overseas totaled less than US$1 billion
out of a total federal drug-control budget of US$12.4 billion. That estimate of expenditures
excludes large items such as incarceration and most prosecution costs. 13 The total also
ignores state and local expenditures on drug control, which might add another US$15-20
13
For a review of the tangled tale for these exclusions, which might bring the total to US$20 billion, see:
Peter Reuter, “Estimating Government Drug Control Expenditures,” in Addiction, forthcoming.
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billion to the total. International programs constitute a truly tiny fraction of the total United
States governmental sector expenditures on drug control.
The vast majority of the international programs money went to the Andean region,
since Mexico has so far, as a matter of national sovereignty, been unwilling to allow the
operation of United States programs on its territory. And although Asia is the dominant
region for heroin production, there have been no meaningful opportunities to intervene in
the major producing nations there, Afghanistan and Myanmar, as the United States did not
have an ambassador in either country for over a decade. The 2001 war against the Taliban
may eventually produce opportunities for reducing opium production, as the new
government works toward control in growing regions and seeks Western approval and
economic assistance. 14 But after a steep decline in 2001, opium production in Afghanistan
surged in 2002, accounting, according to United Nations estimates, for about three-quarters
of global output. 15 As of November 2004, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
estimates that Afghan production is near record levels, 4,200 metric tons, constituting 87%
of the world total. Few countries are willing to allow aerial eradication. It can cause
environmental damage and is also politically unattractive, since the immediate targets,
peasant farmers, are among the poorest citizens, even when growing coca or poppy.
Colombia and Mexico, neither a traditional producer of drugs, have been the sourcecountries most willing to allow spraying. For these governments the campaign has not
involved an attack on indigenous ways, though often on indigenous peoples.
Eradication has had one significant, if short-lived, success story: the drop in Mexican
opium production in the mid-1970s. An industry that had operated fairly openly in five
northern states, with large, unprotected fields, took approximately five years to adjust to
spraying. Production subsequently became much more widely dispersed, and growing
fields were reduced in size and hidden in remote locations. By the early 1980s, Mexico was
supplying as much heroin as before the spraying, but for about five years there was a
substantial reduction in availability in the United States, particularly in western regions
where Mexican supply dominated heroin markets.
14
The Taliban did cut production of opium drastically in late 2000. The United Nations estimates that total
production in 2001 (through the harvest season) totaled only 185 metric tons, compared to 3,276 metric tons
in the previous year. There is little suggestion that United States policies played any role in this cutback.
15
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International
Problem, New York, United Nations, 2003.
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105
Alternative development presents a very different challenge to source-country
governments. In contrast to spraying, it is politically attractive, since it involves
government increasing services to marginalized farmers. However, unless farmers believe
the government will maintain its commitment over a long period, they will not be willing to
incur the costs of shifting crops. In situations of political instability there will
understandably be skepticism about the ability of, say, the Bolivian government to assure a
dependable market and a reliable transportation infrastructure for pineapples from the
Chaparé. Though there are a few instances of well-executed local crop-substitution
programs, it does not appear that they have reduced drug production in any region of the
world.
The United States has also invested in building institutional capacity to deal with the
drug trade. Each year the State Department, in its annual International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), argues that the central problem of drug control in other countries
is a lack of political will and integrity. 16 Training investigators, strengthening the judiciary,
and improving extradition procedures are the stuff of efforts to deal with this issue.
Unfortunately, in both Colombia and Mexico, the corruption problems have been
seemingly endless, imbedded in a larger system of weak integrity controls.
Since 1986, the president of the United States has been required to certify that each
major producer and transshipment nation has cooperated fully in trying to reduce
production and trafficking. 17 If a nation is not certified, the United States will withhold
certain aid and trade preferences and vote against loans in international banks, such as the
Asian Development Bank. Whatever the rationale for this process, it has been tarnished in
practice by its obvious divorce from drug control. Certain pariah nations, such as Nigeria
(until recently) and Myanmar, are always decertified, while the largest single source for the
United States market, Mexico, with its long history of corruption in drug-control efforts, is
always granted certification. 18 The political costs of decertifying Mexico, given the close
16
United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington D.C., United States Department of State,
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1st, 2003, II-10.
17
Given the flow of Ecstasy from the Netherlands to the United States and the perceived insouciance of Dutch
officials, there was consideration of requiring the Netherlands to obtain certification in 2003.
18
Indeed, Mexican certification has been provided without the president having invoked the “national-interest
waiver,” which can be applied when other political considerations collide with evidence that a nation has not
been cooperating with drug-control efforts.
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and complex relations between Mexico and the United States, are unacceptably high. The
one strategic use of decertification occurred in 1995-96, when the Clinton administration
decertified the Samper government in Colombia, following allegations that drug-traffickers
had financed Samper’s presidential campaign. This turned out to have little effect on
collaboration between agencies in the two countries; it simply meant that the president’s
office in Colombia became isolated from the rest of the government.
At present, with an increasing acceptance that the United States drug problem is less
attributable to other nations’ production than to domestic demand, support may be growing
for a repeal of the certification law. Certification, if it remains, will continue to be no more
than ritualistic, though the annual report required by the law is often helpful on problems of
drug-control in each nation. The 2001 statement by President George W. Bush, at a meeting
with the Mexican president Vicente Fox, that the fundamental problem is Americans’
demand for these drugs, has helped take the energy out of the certification process.
Interdiction
A surprising number of Americans believe that the federal government must be complicit in
the drug trade, because otherwise such vast quantities of drugs would not be able to enter
the country. But these quantities, though generating tens of billions of dollars in sales
(US$37 billion for cocaine; US$12 billion for heroin), are in fact tiny volumes. Including
what is seized at the borders and in the interior, imports are estimated at about fifteen tons
for heroin and three to four hundred tons for cocaine.
Given the enormous volume of traffic and commerce across United States borders,
particularly from Mexico and the Caribbean, it is not hard to hide a few hundred tons.
Indeed, it can be seen as remarkable that interdiction seizes such a large share of cocaine
production—perhaps 35-40% over the whole production, international transport, and
domestic distribution system. Heroin seizures come closer to the 10% that orthodoxy has
enshrined as the share generally seized by enforcement agencies, but this is because most
heroin enters the country in small packages, reducing the potential for seizure.19
19
One particularly troubling mode of smuggling is “body-packing,” in which the smuggler swallows a
number of packages of the drug wrapped in condoms or similar protective material. Enough body-packers
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Interdiction was the principal federal enforcement program in the mid-1980s, when
there was an outcry in Congress for the Department of Defense (DoD) to “seal the borders.”
DoD was asked to take on a major role, augmenting the efforts of the Coast Guard and
Customs Service. In practice, DoD provides some actual interdiction resources but is
mostly involved in coordination and intelligence. Since the early 1990s interdiction has
attracted little political attention beyond the occasional call for increases. Interestingly,
polls consistently show that at least half of the American public believes interdiction is the
most promising way of controlling drugs. 20
The quantity of cocaine seized has fluctuated between around 105 and 140 tons since
the late 1980s, reflecting the flatness of estimated consumption over the same period. 21
There is more variation in the heroin figure; at 1-2 tons, the total can be affected by a small
number of large seizures.
Interdiction involves an unending series of adaptations by both smugglers and
enforcement agencies. There are large-scale shifts in routes, modes of transportation, and
techniques for hiding drugs. In the early 1980s much cocaine entered the United States
through Florida, but an early Reagan interdiction effort, run by then vice president George
H. W. Bush, pushed traffickers further out in the Caribbean and into Mexico. Mexico
remains the dominant route for cocaine and fairly important for heroin.
In the 1980s, a large share (no more precise statement can be made) of cocaine was
brought in by private planes, typically carrying two hundred fifty to five hundred kilograms
on each trip. By the early 1990s, smugglers had shifted to intermingling their loads with
legitimate commerce, especially in trucks crossing the border between Mexico and the
United States, a method of conveyance thought to have become more common following
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Technological innovations in detection are announced from time to time, such as
machines that can scan containers from the outside and identify cocaine through its pattern
have suffered drug overdoses when packages leak or burst to have generated a small medical literature on the
phenomenon. Not surprisingly, an early contribution to that literature came from an emergency room near the
Los Angeles International Airport. The recent film Maria Full of Grace provides a poignant portrayal of that
trade and its injuries.
20
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Interdiction and Incarceration Still Top Remedies,”
2001 (March 9th, 2003, in http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=16).
21
United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, What America’s Users Spend on Illicit Drugs 19882000, by William Rhodes, Mark Layne, Ann-Marie Bruen, Patrick Johnston, and Lisa Bechetti, Washington
D.C., Executive Office of the President, 2001.
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of heat reflection. It is impossible to determine how any of these innovations individually
affect the drug trade. However, we can say that by official estimates, drug import prices
have not risen, suggesting little increase in the effective risk of smuggling; and there seems
only a modest diminution in the total volume of drugs entering the country.
High-Level Enforcement
A larger share of the federal drug budget goes to efforts to investigate, arrest, prosecute,
and imprison those involved in the distribution of large quantities of drugs than to
interdiction. One cannot say that such funding goes to capturing more important or larger
distributors because, in fact, most of those caught have quite minor trafficking roles; they
are agents for senior traffickers. This reflects on the one hand that there are many more
agents than principals, and on the other that the principals invest more in protecting
themselves from detection. 22 An internal 1993 study by the United States Department of
Justice estimated that more than half of those convicted in federal court were involved in
retailing activities.
Drug dealers dominate the federal prison population: In 2002, federal prisons held
some 70,000 inmates sentenced for drug offenses, an all-time high. The annual fiscal cost
associated with this imprisonment is about US$2.5 billion. Drug offenders constituted 55%
of inmates in federal prisons in 2002, a share somewhat below the 61% peak “achieved” in
1994, but still a far higher fraction than for any year in the 1970s or 1980s. Figure 4 shows
the massive increase in federal incarceration of drug offenders over the past three decades,
both in absolute numbers and as a share of the total federal prison population. There has
been a rise both in the length of drug-related sentences (from seventy months in 1986 to
eighty-eight months in 1994, and then falling to seventy-nine months in 1999) and the share
of those sentences actually served; by 1999 the fraction was about four-fifths, reflecting the
combined impact of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and the guidelines of the
United States Sentencing Commission, as well as the end of parole in the federal system.
22
Given the pyramid-like nature the distribution system, where a 250-kilogram international shipment is
divided up through several stages of wholesale and retail dealing, and eventually sold at retail in as many as
250,000 one-gram transactions, perhaps fewer than 1% of all those involved in the drug trade can be
considered high-level principals.
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80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1970
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Federal prisoners sentenced for drug offenses (left axis)
Percent of total sentenced population (right axis)
Figure 4
Sentenced Drug Offenders in Federal Prisons, 1970-2002
Source: United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons 2003.
It should also be noted that federal drug enforcement imposes significant costs on
traffickers, besides from incarceration through the seizure of drugs, and the seizure and
forfeiture of other assets. These costs exceed US$1 billion annually, which can be thought
of as a tax primarily on the higher levels of the trade. My estimate is that this level of the
trade may account for only US$10 billion, so that it is a substantial tax on their earnings. As
a share of total revenues at retail level, a better measure of the price increasing effects is
only about 2%.
Retail Enforcement
Most people locked up for drug offenses are street-level offenders, apprehended and
punished by local police and prosecutors and imprisoned in county jails or state prisons.
Punishment of drug users and sellers has increased greatly since 1981, when concern about
cocaine became prominent. Arrests have approximately doubled, rising from 581,000 in
1980 to nearly 1,600,000 in 2000 (from 5.5% to 11% of total arrests). But a much greater
increase has occurred in the extent of imprisonment and other penalties. The number of
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commitments to state and federal prison, for example, has risen approximately tenfold to
about 450,000 in 2004.
Enforcement Effectiveness
We now turn to the question of whether this increased enforcement effort at various levels
of the cocaine and heroin is responsible for the decline in cocaine and heroin consumption.
That begins with an exploration of how enforcement affects consumption.
It was once widely believed that enforcement reduces drug consumption by limiting
the capacity of the illicit drug industry to produce and distribute drugs. According to this
view, a kilo of drugs eradicated or seized is a kilo of drugs that is not consumed, and a
trafficker or dealer removed or deterred from the drug trade represents one less person
delivering drugs to users. Indeed, under federal law, the National Drug Control Strategy
must include “an assessment of the reduction of drug availability against an ascertained
baseline, as measured by the quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine,
and other drugs available for consumption in the United States.” 23
This often-cited measure—the volume of a drug “available for consumption in the
United States”—suggests that the main purpose of source-country control is to reduce the
volume of drugs available for shipment to the United States, while the function of
interdiction is to prevent shipments from entering the country, thus reducing the amount of
drugs available for domestic distribution. In turn, domestic seizures are seen as removing
additional drug volume from the market, while arrests of traffickers and dealers and
confiscation of their assets diminish the capacity of the distribution system, thereby
preventing drugs from getting delivered to users. The one major study reflecting this
perspective concluded that interdiction is very effective because the volume of seizures per
enforcement dollar is higher than for domestic enforcement. 24
But the idea that crop eradication, seizures, and arrests directly reduce drug
consumption ignores the fact that drugs are bought and sold in markets, and that the actors
involved respond to economic incentives, which indeed is the notion underlying the
23
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. §1705(b)(1)(E)(2).
G. Godshaw, R. Koppell, and R. Pancoast, Anti-Drug Law Enforcement Efforts and Their Impact, Bala
Cynwyd, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, 1987.
24
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separation of programs into “demand reduction” and “supply reduction.” On the demand
side of the market, enforcement lowers the demand for drugs by incarcerating some users
(or forcing them into treatment) and persuading others that it is more difficult and risky for
them to buy drugs. On the supply side, enforcement lowers drug use by making drugs more
expensive.
Enforcement operations create risks for those in the drug trade—risks of arrest,
imprisonment, and the loss of drugs, money, and physical assets. Farmers, smugglers,
traffickers, and dealers take steps to reduce the impact of these risks—such as growing or
shipping more drugs to make up for losses, or switching to smuggling or distribution
methods that are less vulnerable to detection. To compensate for the costs of eradication,
seizures, arrests, and efforts to avoid enforcement, farmers, smugglers, and trafficking
organizations charge higher prices to downstream distributors and dealers. These higher
prices are then passed on to consumers, thereby reducing drug consumption.
How well this works in practice depends on two factors: how effective various types
of enforcement are in raising the retail prices of drugs, and how responsive drug
consumption is to changes in prices.
Source-Country Control
Coca and opium are grown in poor countries—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru for coca;
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Laos, Mexico, and Colombia for opium—where land and labor are
cheap and abundant. The result is that, despite eradication efforts, coca leaf and opium are
inexpensive, especially when compared to cocaine and heroin sold at retail. South
American coca farmers receive about US$300 for the amount of coca leaves necessary to
produce a kilogram of cocaine, which retails for about US$110,000 in major American
cities when sold in US$20 units of 200 milligrams, 60% pure. A kilogram of raw opium
latex sells for as little as US$200 in Colombia, the primary source country for heroin
imported into the United States. 25 When refined, a kilogram of opium produces one
hundred grams of heroin, which might generate US$50,000 in retail sales. 26 The general
25
26
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, op. cit.
At the street level, heroin is typically sold in US$10 units, commonly referred to as “dime bags.”
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pattern of prices increasing sharply through the distribution system is summarized in Table
1, which provides estimates of the value of a kilogram of pure cocaine (and its earlier forms
of leaf and base) at various stages of production and distribution.
Table 1
Cocaine Prices through the Distribution System (2003)
Product
Market Level 27
Effective Price/kg
Coca leaves
Farmgate/Colombia
$300
Coca base
Farmgate/Colombia
$900
Cocaine hydrochloride
Export/Colombia
$1,500
Cocaine hydrochloride
Cocaine (67% pure)
Cocaine (67% pure)
Import/United States
(100kg)
$15,000
Dealer/United States (1 kg) $40,000
Retail/United States (200
mg)
$110,000
Sources: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2003 and 2004; United States Office
of National Drug Control Policy 2001 and 2004.
These numbers cast serious doubts on the merits of crop eradication as an
enforcement strategy. Suppose that stepped-up eradication led to a doubling of the price of
coca leaf, so that it cost US$600 for refiners to buy the leaf that goes into one kilogram of
cocaine. Assuming that the US$300 per kilogram cost increase was passed along to
traffickers and dealers, the resulting change in the retail price of cocaine would be
negligible. In fact, leaf prices in the Andes have increased considerably since the mid1990s, with no corresponding rise in the retail price of cocaine.
If history is a guide, there appears to be one set of circumstances in which sourcecountry control can produce a meaningful increase in retail prices and a drop in
consumption. Cultivation levels are based on the expectation that a portion of crops will be
wiped out, and when eradication destroys a much larger share of crop production than
27
Figures in parentheses represent typical transaction sizes at that market level.
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farmers anticipate, a genuine shortage can result. Such a shortage lasts until traffickers find
new sources of supply and farmers adapt by increasing the total land area cultivated and by
scattering their plants in smaller, less accessible fields. In the interim (perhaps six months
to three years), consumption falls, and prices rise as users compete for a diminished supply.
Crop eradication has had a significant impact on United States drug consumption only
in the 1970s. In the early part of the 1970s, the Turkish opium ban (combined with the
breaking of the “French connection”) produced a substantial shortage of heroin on the East
Coast of the United States, which lasted for two to three years until imports from Mexico
and Asia picked up the slack. As discussed above, a major heroin shortage again developed
in the mid- to late-1970s, as the Mexican government engaged in widespread aerial
spraying of poppy fields. Mexican opium production fell by about 75%, and there was a
significant decline over four years (1976-79) in indicators of United States heroin
consumption, particularly in areas of the country where Mexican “black tar” was the
predominant type of heroin used.
However, if we look more closely at these experiences, it becomes clear that such
successes will be rare. In both situations, the relevant source country was by far the largest
supplier to the United States market. 28 And the resulting reductions in drug cultivation were
massive—at least 50% and possibly much more. Furthermore, the control programs were
sudden, almost out-of-the-blue moves, rather than moderate escalations of existing cropcontrol efforts.
Equally important were the political and economic circumstances that enabled the
central governments involved to undertake such bold action. The authority of the Turkish
and Mexican governments was largely unchallenged in the growing areas—something that
cannot be said about Afghanistan, Colombia, or Myanmar today. And in both Turkey and
Mexico, revenues from drug production and trafficking were, by the standards of other
major source countries, only a small part of national and regional economies.
Interdiction
28
Peter Reuter, “Eternal Hope: America’s Quest for Narcotics Control,” in The Public Interest, Spring 1985,
pp. 79-95.
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Bogotá is approximately 1,500 miles from Miami; Miami is roughly 2,700 miles from
Seattle. Yet the difference between wholesale cocaine prices in Miami and Seattle is very
small compared to the tenfold difference between wholesale prices in Bogotá and Miami. It
is clear that interdiction imposes significant costs on cocaine smuggling, and that these
costs have a significant effect on the import price of cocaine in the United States.
International borders represent locations where the government has unique authority to
search and inspect; they are more dangerous for smugglers than any other place.
But that fact does not mean interdiction is a particularly effective policy for reducing
the consumption of drugs. The key issue is how changes in the import price of drugs affect
retail prices. Let’s say a kilogram of cocaine sells for US$15,000 at import in Miami and
US$150,000 at retail in New York. Now imagine that more effective interdiction boosts the
import price to US$30,000. How would this affect the retail price of cocaine?
This question is a crucial one, because the answer determines the ultimate value of the
enhanced interdiction efforts. One theory of vertical price relationships, which Caulkins 29
has termed the “additive model,” argues that the import price is essentially a raw material
cost. 30 Thus, the wholesaler who previously bought cocaine at US$15,000 and now pays
US$30,000 has had roughly US$15,000 added to his per-kilo costs. The actual cost increase
will be somewhat more than US$15,000 per kilo; due to seizures, thefts, and other losses,
wholesalers have to buy more than one kilo of drug for each kilo they sell.
In a competitive market, the wholesaler will simply pass his increased costs along to
the next stage of the distribution chain. The buyer at this stage will thus face an increase of
US$15,000 in his costs, which he, too, will pass along. Eventually, the US$15,000 cost
increase reaches consumers, and the end result is that the retail price of cocaine increases
by US$15 per gram—or somewhat more, when all the losses and seizures along the
distribution chain are factored in. Analysts at the RAND Corporation have estimated that,
for cocaine and marijuana, each US$1 increase in the import price produces a US$2
29
Jonathan P. Caulkins, “The Distribution and Consumption of Illicit Drugs: Some Mathematical Models and
Their Policy Implications,” PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.
30
Peter Reuter and Mark A. R. Kleiman, “Risks and Prices,” in Crime and Justice, An Annual Review of
Research, Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (editors), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, No. 7, 1986, pp.
289-340.
114
115
increase in retail prices. 31 Overall, then, a doubling of the import price results in only a 10
or 20% rise in the retail price. Or, put another way, it would take a quintupling of import
prices to effect a doubling of retail prices. 32
Most of the few empirical analyses of interdiction have assumed the additive model.
And because the replacement cost of seized cocaine and heroin is a small fraction of their
final retail price—as little as 1% in source-countries, no more than 20% at the point of
entry into the United States—these analyses have concluded that the potential contribution
of interdiction to the reduction of drug abuse is small, or at least that it is not cost-effective
compared to domestic enforcement and treatment. 33
Although the additive model is conceptually compelling—no one would dispute it in
the case of a licit industry—some scholars have noted that it does not fit very well with
some historical price data. 34 In fact, some historical price data appear to be more consistent
with what Caulkins has called the “multiplicative model” of vertical price relationships,
which holds that a change of a certain percentage in price at one stage of production or
distribution brings about a similar percentage change at subsequent stages. The idea behind
the multiplicative model is that many of the costs of doing business in the drug trade—such
as the risk of employees and other dealers stealing drugs—are more strongly related to the
value of drugs bought and sold than to the quantity trafficked. Thus, the multiplicative
model predicts that if the import price of cocaine doubles from US$15,000 to US$30,000,
retail prices will also double, from US$150,000 to US$300,000, providing a much more
favorable assessment of interdiction.
Jonathan Caulkins examined cocaine prices in the 1980s and early 1990s and found a
remarkably consistent multiplicative relationship between wholesale and retail prices.
However, the data that indicated a multiplicative model were far from conclusive. The
trouble here was that, except during occasional shortages, prices were consistently
declining during this period, and so it is possible that the factors causing the decline
operated at all levels of the market. In other words, it may be that declines in retail prices
31
Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: Effects of Increased Military
Efforts in Drug Interdiction, R-3594-USDP, Santa Mónica, The RAND Corporation, 1988.
32
The estimate is constructed from a set of reasonable assumptions but has never been tested with actual data.
33
C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs, MR331-ONDCP/A/DPRC, Santa Mónica, RAND, 1994.
34
David Boyum, “Reflections on Economic Theory and Drug Enforcement,” PhD Dissertation, Harvard
University, 1992, and Jonathan P. Caulkins, op. cit.
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116
were not so much caused by the decline in import prices, but rather that both import and
retail prices were influenced by other factors. For example, the growth in the cocaine
industry internationally, and the development of crack markets domestically, may have
created economies of scale that lowered the costs of wholesale and retail operations.
In short, the nature of vertical price relationships in drug markets is still an open
question. And it is, of course, possible that the answer lies somewhere in between the
additive and multiplicative models. Indeed, some have speculated that the multiplicative
model may hold for retail transactions, but that the additive model may apply for higherlevel wholesale transactions. 35
Summing up, it is clear that interdiction imposes considerable costs on drug
traffickers. Import prices are much higher than they would be if American borders were
unpoliced. What is not clear is whether interdiction adds more than 10 or 20% to the retail
price of drugs; data are inconclusive. What is also uncertain is whether sizeable increases or
decreases in the interdiction budget have more than a negligible effect on retail drug prices.
It may be that a 50% reduction in interdiction funding would be inconsequential because
the remaining seizure effort would be sufficient to prompt traffickers to take costly
avoidance actions. In any case, given that standard economic reasoning casts suspicion on
interdiction, and bearing in mind the paucity of evidence linking shifts in the intensity of
interdiction to observed changes in retail drug prices (except, possibly, for marijuana), the
case for more expenditure on interdiction should be considered unproven, at least at current
levels of activity.
Did the Crackdown Reduce Cocaine and Heroin Consumption?
The last fifteen years have seen a gradual decline in many indicators of the severity of
United States cocaine and heroin problems. Not only have the numbers of addicts declined,
but so have prices and total expenditures. Whereas the total expenditures on cocaine and
heroin were estimated at US$154 billion in 1988, they had declined to US$64 billion in
2000 (in constant dollars). The level of violence around the drug markets appears to have
35
David Boyum, Heroin and Cocaine Market Structure, Cambridge, BOTEC Analysis Corporation, 1993,
and Jonathan P. Caulkins, op. cit.
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117
declined substantially too; that may reflect the aging of the populations of sellers and users.
Markets that consist mostly of 30 year olds are less violent than those in which most
participants are 20 years old; that describes the change particularly in street cocaine
markets.
There is no evidence that interventions in Colombia have contributed to the decline in
problems. The official estimates, both from the United States and the United Nations of
total coca production in Colombia, have shown declines in recent years, as reported in
Table 2. However there is considerable uncertainty as to these estimates; for example,
United States embassy officials in Bogotá have expressed their belief that the figures are
implausibly low. 36 Opium production in Colombia has been essentially flat since the mid1990s, so there is no basis for claiming that eradication programs aimed at that crop have
had any discernible effect.
Table 2
Coca Production in the Andes, 1995-2004
Potential Production of Dry Coca Leaf in Metric Tons
1995
1997
1999
2001
85,000
70,100
22,800
20,200
Bolivia
80,900
129,500
261,000
236,000
Colombia
183,600
130,600
69,200
49,300
Peru
349,500
330,200
353,000
305,500
Total
Potential Manufacture of Cocaine in Metric Tons
240
200
70
Bolivia
230
350
680
Colombia
460
325
175
Peru
930
875
925
Total
60
617
150
827
2003
18,500
168,000
50,790
237,290
2004
25,000
148,900
70,300
244,200
79
440
155
674
107
390
190
687
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005.
More telling still is that prices have declined throughout the period. 37 That is of
course only a crude test. If demand was falling rapidly, then perhaps enforcement aimed at
36
See, e.g., John Otis, “Drug War in Colombia: Is there any Progress?” in Houston Chronicle, June 21st,
2005.
37
DEA has reported that heroin of Colombian origin in 2005 was more expensive and less pure than it was
two years earlier. However the report is not documented and should be treated as conjectural, given the
noisiness of these data.
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118
the supply side may have prevented prices from falling still more substantially. There has
been no testing of the effects of the Colombia interventions specifically but again the
failure of export prices to rise in recent years is indicative of a failure. 38
The more likely explanation for the declines in cocaine and heroin use is that outlined
earlier in the discussion of epidemics. Both cocaine and heroin are perceived as risky drugs
by most potential users and even lower prices do not generate a new set of users. Perhaps
tough enforcement has cemented that belief in the public mind but that is surely a remote
connection for interventions in Colombia.
Implications for United States Policy toward Colombia
United States decision makers might thus be regarded as, under less pressure to deal with
cocaine and heroin problems, though it is not clear that there is much awareness of the
decline in the problems. 39 That could lead to a less aggressive policy toward Colombia, one
that takes into account a broader set of considerations than just cocaine and heroin exports
to the United States. There is as yet no sign of a change in policy. This last section explores
why this is the case.
In terms of both expenditures and rhetoric, Plan Colombia is the principal element of
the United States’ Colombia policy. For FY2005, US$725 million was approved for the
Andean Counter-drug Initiative. US$463 million of this was allocated specifically to
Colombia. About 3/4 of money allocated to Colombia went to counter-narcotics and
security and the other quarter was directed towards economic and social development.
By comparison, the United States Agency for International Development provided
only a few million dollars for all non-drug programs in South America in FY 2005. Plan
Colombia is the dominant stream of United States assistance to South America and
enforcement-oriented programs dominate that stream.
38
Two efforts at more sophisticated modeling of the effects of retail enforcement have yielded weak or no
evidence of such a price-increasing effect. See Shawn Bushway, Jonathan P. Caulkins, and Peter Reuter,
“Does State and Local Drug Enforcement Raise Drug Prices?” Unpublished paper, University of Maryland,
2003, and Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven Levitt, “An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders,” in
Journal of Public Economics 88 (9-10), 2004, pp. 2043-66.
39
In 2001 a Pew poll found that most Americans believed that the problem of illicit drugs had worsened. Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press, op. cit.
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119
Whether this emphasis on enforcement, a consistent feature of the last fifteen years,
benefited Colombia is a question rarely asked in the United States. Viewed from outside,
and without deep knowledge of the Colombian literature on the issue, the crackdown on
Colombian traffic and production appears to have at least transformed the problem in
Colombia. Whereas the Medellín traffickers as a group challenged the authority of the state,
contemporary traffickers, except to the extent that they have become part of the
paramilitary, merely corrupt officials. That would seem to be a gain for Colombia. The
Barco and Gaviria administrations undertook the counter-attack against the Medellín
traffickers on their own initiative but the support of the United States was certainly useful.
Perhaps even the endless extradition fight, for which United States government pressure
has been important, made a positive contribution to reducing the salience and
aggressiveness of the leading traffickers. Though only a handful of Colombian traffickers
are extradited each year, the deterrent effect might be substantial.
There are suggestions that during the Uribe administration, a number of prominent
traffickers have joined the paramilitary in order to obtain amnesty. 40 Indeed, some
observers fear that the amnesty process has allowed the paramilitary to become an
important influence in electoral politics and that some drug traffickers are acquiring
legitimacy and power and influence through this process. John Walsh (personal
communication) suggests: “In this scenario, the threat to the state is not so much one of
frontal warfare (although the paramilitary threat to turn their weapons against the state
remains implicit) but of mafia-like capture of the state.”
The involvement of the FARC and ELN, as well as the paramilitary AUC, in the
cocaine industry has been given considerable significance by the United States, post 9/11.
In 2003 the White House funded public service announcements that accused drug users of
supporting terrorism. Given the centrality of Colombia in United States drug supply
activities and the minimal flow of Afghanistan-source heroin to the United States, that
clearly referred to the guerilla groups in Colombia, which had been designated by the State
Department as terrorist organizations. Fighting drug production and trafficking in Colombia
could be presented as part of the Global War on Terrorism.
40
Washington Office on Latin America, The Colombian Conflict: Regional Impact and Policy Responses,
Washington D.C., 2005.
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120
This is perhaps a stretch of the term. The Colombian groups, notwithstanding the
indictment of three IRA members who provided technical support to the FARC, are purely
domestic. They neither seek change elsewhere nor are they supported in a substantial way
by foreign sources. They certainly are terrorist groups, using violence against innocent
civilians for political purposes, but that hardly makes them a threat to the United States’
security.
Nor is it clear that aggressive pursuit of coca and poppy growing peasants is an
effective method for reducing the power of the guerilla and paramilitary groups. To
understand the issues here, it is necessary to analyze of the emergence of these groups as
participants in the coca and poppy growing sectors. It is clear that they had minimal
involvement before the mid-1990s.
Thoumi provides an excellent discussion of the relationship between guerillas and the
cocaine and heroin industries. 41 Taxes on growing and early stage refining are a major
source of funding for the FARC in particular. The guerillas do not appear to have any
substantial role in the latter stages of the industry, reflecting their lack of relevant assets.
The FARC offer three kinds of protection for coca growers: protection against the
government, the AUC, and against themselves. The interesting question is whether
increasing the threat from the government raises or lowers their extortive powers. On the
one hand, it reduces peasant incentives to pay for protection, since they then face little
threat from eradication efforts. On the other it may increase guerilla group power. A better
understanding of the dynamics of extortion is required.
Crop eradication is also hardly a strategy for increasing political support for the
government in areas that grow coca and poppies. The government, having failed to protect
so many of these farmers in their prior locations, now appears primarily in the role of
depriving them of their best economic opportunity. This is not to deny the need for the
government to establish the rule of law but merely to recognize the political costs of doing
so when the harm of the activity is so distant from those bearing the consequences of
enforcement and when they see themselves as having so few productive alternatives.
41
Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2003.
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121
The other dynamic concerns the location of coca production. Until the late 1990s coca
growing occurred primarily in Bolivia and Peru. During the 1980s and early 1990s the
Sendero Luminoso taxed Peruvian production to support its terrorist activities but that is an
isolated episode. Otherwise, it has fueled corruption and occasionally political activity,
such as the cocaleras movement in Bolivia, rather than terrorism. 42
Three factors may have contributed to the shift of coca growing to Colombia.
Certainly, United States support of aggressive efforts to reduce the flow of raw material
from Peru to Colombia has helped make Peru a less attractive source for Colombian
refiners and traffickers. But two other factors, rarely mentioned by advocates of toughness,
may be just as important in explaining the decline. There has been a huge internal migration
within Colombia, with perhaps as many as 800,000 people moving away from areas where
paramilitary forces have committed massacres to more remote areas where farmers have
few commercial options to growing coca. Also, Ricardo Vargas has suggested that the
break up of the Cali Cartel may have favored the rise of traffickers with less international
reach-traffickers more oriented towards buying their leaf or coca paste from Colombian
sources. Consequently, as compared to ten years ago, Colombia is a more attractive source
of leaf and production has shifted there.
The relationship of these other two factors to United States interventions is difficult to
disentangle. The internal migration is itself a consequence of the struggle between the AUC
and the leftist groups. The government is not an innocent bystander but it is not obvious
whether control efforts at the current scale increase of decrease the problem. When
successful, the government should be able to restore security that allows for the return of
farmers to more productive areas but in the meantime they may exacerbate violence in
some areas and thus encourage the migration.
Similarly the break-up of the more internationalist Cali and Medellín groups, if it has
encouraged a “buy local” policy by refiners, may have benefited Bolivia and Peru as
nations at the expense of Colombia. The United States interest is of course distinct from
that of any or all of the three Andean nations so this redistribution does not weigh in their
considerations but for understanding the consequences of United States choices from the
Colombian view, this is of considerable interest.
42
Ibid.
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122
Policy Alternatives
What are the policy alternatives for the United States in its dealings with Colombia? To me
there seem two general options: benign neglect and a focus on the soft alternatives of
development. These are not discrete choices; the United States could cut back its total
involvement substantially, while increasing the flow of support for development activities.
Benign neglect is a rough label for doing very much less. Plan Colombia, which is
due to expire at the end of 2005, might be ended with nothing much provided in its place.
The United States’ expenditures on Colombia could decline to levels comparable to those
for other South American nations. DEA and other United States drug agencies might be
active in dealings with their Colombian counterparts, and the Unites States, military would
continue to provide some support for development of a stronger Colombian Army. But the
sense of the United States as a major force in Colombia’s affairs would end.
There are two justifications for such a policy. First, the evidence that the United
States’ interventions in Colombia have reduced its own drug problems is, at best, slight. My
own view is that the industry is too well established now for any but very short term gains
from more eradication efforts or even from pursuing traffickers. Second, the United States
has found itself supporting some corrupt and brutal institutions through these policies.
The consequences for the United States drug problem are, on this view, obviously
minimal. The price and availability of cocaine and heroin will hardly change at all. For
Colombia the effects are more complex. United States aid may be small change in the
context of United States drug policy but the dollar flows are not trivial relative to
Colombia’s own expenditures on drug control and military efforts. Thoumi 43 reports
analyses from the period 1978-1994 that showed drug control expenditures of less than one
quarter of one percent of GDP and less than 2.5% of total government expenditures. Even if
drug control accounted for 5% of Colombian government expenditures in 2005 that would
have generated a total expenditure of about US$1 billion. The United States contribution
would have amounted to an additional 75%. If Colombia believes that it serves its own
43
Op. cit., pp. 194-196.
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123
national interests to maintain the vigorous anti-drug campaign, then it will have to invest
substantially more resources than it does presently.
The other option for the United States would be to shift emphasis to development
efforts. Even Congress, which has tended to be more hawkish on drug policy than the
administration, believes that alternative development is under-funded. 44 The interesting
question is whether such spending can be justified. From the point of view of the United
States it is likely to merely redistribute growing areas. Those regions that receive aid will
become less attractive for coca and poppy growing because they will have more expensive
land and labor but there is plenty of cheap land and labor elsewhere in the Andes, indeed
probably even within Colombia. Moreover, given the instability of the areas most involved
in the coca and poppy growing, there is a question whether projects of lasting value can
even be mounted. Alternative development depends on convincing the targeted farmers that
the markets and infrastructures will be there for the bulkier crops that are competing with
cocaine paste. There have been enough occasions in recent years when the government has
lost control of specific areas that recent immigrants may doubt the government’s reliability
in this respect.
Alternative development then may be neither feasible on a large scale nor, from the
United States point of view, particularly valuable. From Colombia’s point of view these
programs have obvious attractions. They distribute money in ways that are uncontroversial
domestically and do not add to tensions in society. Their effects on actual drug production
are secondary at best.
Is Congress likely to support any change in policy toward Colombia? I claim no great
expertise about Congressional behavior but have found pessimism about the possibility of
positive change to be a fairly safe predictive strategy. Congress may have no great faith in
the current drug-oriented interventions but that is not of itself enough to lead to an
abandonment of programs that cost relatively little and generate a good deal of publicity. It
is a mantra to say that toughness is the low risk alternative for elected politicians. While I
think that is not broadly speaking true, given the rising costs of incarceration and the
awareness of racial disparities in the domestic effort, it is a fair statement for programs
44
United States Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, The National Drug
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, Washington D.C.,
2005, pp. 60-61.
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124
outside of United States borders. For better or worse, Colombia should expect more of the
same.
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125
Drugs, Narco-Terrorism and United States-Latin American
Relations
Coletta A.Youngers *
Historically, United States policymakers have approached the problems associated
with the consumption of illicit drugs primarily as a national security issue. Drugs are seen
as a threat to the United States, emanating from outside its borders—an external enemy
against which war must be waged. The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington exacerbated this tendency. Although foreign policy-makers’ attention is
largely focused on other parts of the world, the Latin American region is viewed through an
anti-terrorism lens and illicit drugs are deemed a “narco-terrorist threat.”
While United States international drug control policies have historically been a point
of friction between Washington and many Latin American countries, this chasm has
widened over differing views of the United States approach to terrorism and the tendency to
now cast a range of social problems, including drugs, as national security threats.
Opposition to United States national security and drug control policies are expressed at the
regional and governmental levels in Latin America, as well as by those most affected by the
policies on the ground. In addition, the annual United States certification process, which
links United States economic assistance and other benefits to achieving counter-drug
objectives, remains a point of contention. More than two decades after the so-called United
States war on drugs was launched, the United States government has failed to achieve a
regional consensus in support of its approach to illicit drug control.
Over this period, the internal dynamics of the illicit drug trade and consumption
patterns have evolved considerably. While in the past, illicit drugs were largely produced in
South America and Asia, and the largest quantity of consumers were in the United States
and Europe, this pattern no longer holds. Now, both production and consumption of illicit
drugs has become global. The United States now produces its own marijuana and the latest
*
Master in Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University. Senior Consultant, WOLA
(Washington Office on Latin America).
125
126
United States drug fad is methamphetamines, made in basement labs across the country. As
illicit drug production has flourished, so has consumption in production and transit
countries. Though United States policymakers still refer to Central America and the
Caribbean as “transit zones,” in fact, a significant quantity of the illicit drugs that arrive in
these countries remains there, which has led to an explosion of drug abuse and related
problems.
Nonetheless, the United States government has maintained a “supply-side” approach
to illicit drug control. Attacking overseas supplies by eliminating or reducing illicit drug
production and interdicting drug shipments is intended to reduce the availability of illicit
drugs in the United States. In theory, supply shortages should lead to higher prices and
lower purity. The higher cost of illicit drugs discourages demand by dissuading new or
infrequent users and encouraging chronic users to seek treatment or reduce consumption.
The supply-side approach has proven to be fundamentally flawed. As described in greater
below, prices for illicit drugs on United States street corners remain at all-time lows;
however, United States policymakers have yet to engage in meaningful debate on what has
or has not been achieved to date and what alternative policies might be more effective.
The “Militarization” of United States International Drug Control Policy
Though United States illicit drug control efforts go back decades—indeed, it was
President Nixon who first launched the “drug war”—it was in the 1980s that United States
international drug control efforts emerged at the top of the United States foreign policy
agenda. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan officially declared illicit drugs a threat to United
States national security. Responding to the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States, the
approach quickly gained bipartisan support. In 1987, House Speaker Jim Wright, a
Democrat, declared: “It’s time to declare an all-out war, to mobilize our forces—public and
private, national and local—in a total coordinated assault upon this menace which is
draining our economy of some two hundred and thirty billion dollars.” 45 As a result, Latin
American countries began to see moderate increases in United States anti-drug aid. It was
45
Andrew Liebman, Frontline: Stopping Drugs, Part II (WGBH/Public Broadcasting Service, February 17th,
1987: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/stoppingdrugs2.html).
126
127
the Andean Initiative, however, that led to what came to be called the “militarization” of
United States international drug control policy.
Launched by President George H. W. Bush in 1989, the Andean Initiative targeted the
so-called “source” countries of Peru and Bolivia, the main suppliers of coca leaf at the time,
and Colombia, the main producer of cocaine. The initiative was intended both to thwart
drug production and transit, and to strengthen and diversify the economies of the Andean
countries. However, military and police assistance was front-loaded in the five year plan,
while provision of economic aid was conditioned on obtaining significant disruptions to the
drug trade. In the end, the vast majority of the resources were allocated to local military and
police forces.
The Andean Initiative also included a dramatic escalation of training and other forms
of support for military and police forces in the region, a role for both local and United
States military forces, and an enhanced role for some local intelligence services in domestic
intelligence-gathering operations. At the same time, the United States Congress designated
the Department of Defense as the “single lead agency” for the detection and monitoring of
illicit drug shipments into the United States. In short, the United States military was
provided with significant resources to engage its local counterparts and a lead role in
combating illicit drugs.
Though not all in the Defense Department agreed with the expanded mission, for the
United States Southern Command (SouthCom), 46 the drug war became a way of
maintaining its role, influence and presence in the region as the Cold War came to a close.
SouthCom officials also viewed the drug war as converging with its previous roles and
mission. The low-intensity conflict strategies honed during the years of conflict in Central
America were quickly adapted to carry out the new mandate. As explained by Adam
Isacson,
By militarizing its war on drugs, Washington intensified some of the worst
aspects of its Cold War approach to Latin America. Fighting drug trafficking
provided a new rationale for military operations against an “internal enemy,”
46
The Pentagon has five geographical commands coordinating military activities throughout the world. The
United States Southern Command, or SouthCom, has responsibility for United States security and military
operations in all of Latin America and the Caribbean, with the exception of Mexico. It incorporates units from
all branches of the Armed Services.
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128
and counter-drug aid came with little incentive for institutional reform. This has
hampered promising efforts throughout the region to consolidate democracy,
improve civil-military relations, move toward cooperative security, and end
impunity for corrupt or abusive security force personnel. 47
In short, even as civilian elected governments took hold across the region and sought
to exert control over military forces and redefine their missions towards external—rather
than internal—threats, the United States military sought to enhance local military
capabilities. Of particular concern, Washington mandated a mission for the military going
well beyond external defense. Likewise, as the rationale for the United States military
presence and influence in the region waned with the end of the Cold War, the drug war—
and later the war on terrorism—allowed the United States military to not only maintain, but
expand its military reach across Latin America and the Caribbean.
For the most part, the United States war on drugs continued unabated throughout the
1990s. Upon taking office, President Bill Clinton emphasized United States international
drug control efforts in the Andean “source countries.” In a 1993 presidential decision
directive, the White House declared: “The United States has a vital interest in encouraging
and supporting nations in the Western Hemisphere to control the drug trade. We will
continue to treat foreign narcotics criminal syndicates as a threat to United States national
security.” 48 However, a skeptical United States Congress, then controlled by the
Democratic Party, cut funding for international drug control efforts, and Republicans began
accusing the administration of being “AWOL,” or having abandoned the war on drugs.
Plan Colombia
As the 1996 United States elections approached, both parties wanted to be seen as
“tough on drugs” and United States assistance for international efforts began to increase. 49
Aid to Colombia began to inch upwards in 1997; however, the militarization of United
States drug policy accelerated dramatically in mid-2000, when the United States Congress
47
Adam Isacson, “Las Fuerzas Armadas en Estados Unidos en la ‘guerra contra las drogas’,” in Coletta A.
Youngers and Eileen Rosin (editors), Drogas y democracia en América Latina: el impacto de la política de
Estados Unidos, Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2005, pp. 29-30.
48
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-14, November 3rd, 1993.
In 1994, Republicans gained control of the United States Congress and were more amenable to increasing
counter-drug funds.
49
128
129
approved funding for Plan Colombia, a massive five-year, billion-dollar aid initiative
named after a an earlier initiative with the same name by President Andrés Pastrana. The
initial United States aid package included US$860 million for Colombia, with the rest
going to neighboring countries potentially threatened by the internal conflict and the
country’s booming illicit drug trade. The vast majority of the resources were provided to
the region’s security forces. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, Colombia received
approximately four billion United States dollars, of which 80% was destined for military
and police forces. 50
Though the battle against insurgents and drug traffickers in Colombia has always
been murky, Plan Colombia was approved as a counter-drug initiative and some limits were
put on the use of United States military support for counterinsurgency forces. The tragic
events of September 11th, 2001 and the collapse of peace talks in Colombia in February
2002, however, bolstered the position of those in the United States government arguing for
a direct United States counterinsurgency role in Colombia. The Bush administration
requested and received congressional support for eliminating restrictions on providing
United States assistance and intelligence for counterinsurgency purposes. The fiscal year
2003 aid package included millions of dollars to equip additional army battalions to protect
oil pipelines in the northeastern part of the country. As the United States took on an explicit
counterinsurgency mission in Colombia, the number of United States troops and contract
employees in Colombia escalated, reaching a limit set by Congress of 800. 51
United States Military Expansion
The war on drugs and the implementation of Plan Colombia are two key factors
leading to the spread and decentralization of United States military facilities across the
hemisphere. Since the United States military withdrawal from Panama in 1999, the United
States military has extended its geographical presence across the region, as United States
facilities have moved to new areas and new United States military access agreements—
allowing United States forces to use local bases—have proliferated. The establishment of
50
For detailed analysis of United States assistance to Colombia, see the Center for International Policy web
page (www.ciponline.org/colombia/index.htm).
51
For additional information see Isacson, op. cit.
129
130
“cooperative security locations” (formerly called “forward operating locations”), which
essentially function as United States military bases, is one example. These are located in
Manta, Ecuador; Aruba; Curaçao; and Comalapa, El Salvador. Technically leased to
conduct counter-narcotics monitoring and interdiction operations, lack of effective
oversight mechanisms makes it impossible to determine the full scope of the operations on
these bases. SouthCom also operates over fifteen radar sites, mostly in Peru and Colombia.
According to SouthCom statements, the majority of these assets are “focused on the tactical
fights in Colombia.” 52
According to United States analyst John Lindsey-Poland, these are “in addition to
existing United States bases, including a missile tracking station on Ascension Island in the
Caribbean…Soto Cano in Palmerola, Honduras…and small military presences and property
in Antigua, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and on Andros Island in the Bahamas.” 53 In
addition, the long-standing United States naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which
serves as a logistics base for counter-drug operations, has taken on added importance as an
offshore detention center. All together, there are an estimated 8,500 to 10,500 United States
troops stationed at these military sights, not including those in Colombia or private
contractors. 54
Thus, even before September 11th, 2001, the United States military had effectively
utilized the drug war to maintain and expand military-to-military ties, to expand its physical
presence across the hemisphere, and to begin usurping authority from the United States
State Department in defining and implementing United States foreign policy. Some
counter-drug assistance that traditionally would have been channeled through the State
Department is now provided directly by the Pentagon. In short, it has taken on a “growing
and disproportionate role in United States-Latin American relations.” 55
The head of SouthCom visits Latin American countries far more than high-level State
Department officials; its staff of about 3,000 permanent military and civilian personnel
52
Reported in John Lindsey-Poland, U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean, Silver City and
Washington D.C., Foreign Policy in Focus, August 2004, p. 1.
53
Ibid.
54
Tom Barry, “Mission Creep” in Latin America—U.S. Southern Command’s New Security Strategy, Silver
City, International Relations Center, July 11th, 2005, p. 22.
55
Blurring the Lines: Trends in U.S. Military Programs with Latin America, Washington D.C., The Latin
America Working Group, Center for International Policy y Washington Office on Latin America, September
2004, p. 3.
130
131
makes it a significant political player in the region. 56 SouthCom has increased its
interaction with regional counterparts and other officials, precisely when other United
States government agencies face budget cuts and reductions in the diplomatic corps have
taken place. Journalist Dana Priest reports: “More people work there dealing with Latin
American matters than at the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture,
the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, and the office of the secretary of defense combined.” 57 To a
large degree, the United States military, via SouthCom, has become the main interlocutor
on United States foreign and military policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The New United States National Security Agenda
These trends have accelerated in the wake of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States and the United States invasion and subsequent occupation of
Iraq. Latin America has dropped to the bottom of the United States foreign policy agenda.
Nonetheless, in this new political environment, Latin America is viewed through the lens of
terrorism, even though there are no significant terrorist threats aimed at the United States
from the region.
A multitude of issues is now being cast in counterterrorism terms and discussed as
threats to United States national security. In his annual statement to the United States
Congress, SouthCom Commander in Chief, General Bantz J. Craddock lists the following
threats to “the stability and prosperity” in the region and hence to be addressed by
SouthCom: “transnational terrorism, narco-terrorism, illicit trafficking, forgery and money
laundering, kidnapping, urban gangs, radical movements, natural disasters, and mass
migration.” 58 Illicit trafficking is later elaborated as “preventing drugs, weapons and people
from reaching our borders.” 59 United States analyst Tom Barry points out that as national
security becomes a catch-all for the region’s problems, it loses its meaning and, most
56
Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, New York, W. W.
Norton, 2003, p. 74. Approximately 1,100 SouthCom staff is based in the region.
57
Ibid.
58
Posture Statement by General Bantz J. Craddock, United States Army Commander, United States Southern
Command, Before the 109th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 9th, 2005, p. 4.
59
Op. cit., p. 23.
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132
disturbingly, justifies “the militarization of an array of domestic and foreign policy issues
that would be better managed by non-military actors.” 60
Chillier and Freeman refer to the Pentagon’s approach as the “securitization” of social
problems, which they define as “labeling as terrorist threats long-standing problems that
would have previously been determined policing matters or social issues.” 61 There are two
risks to the present policy. First, according to United States scholar William LeoGrande, is
creating “exaggerated expectations about how amenable these problems will be to
traditional military instruments of power.” 62 Here, the lessons learned from the war on
drugs are instructive: A predominantly military approach to combating illicit drug
production has failed to make any dent in its supply or availability. Second, according to
LeoGrande, “by engaging Latin American Armed Forces to respond to these problems,
which are not primarily military problems in the first place, we run the risk of breaking
down the boundaries between civilian and military roles, especially in the area of public
safety.” 63 In other words, “securitization” leads to the further erosion of the line between
national defense and internal public order.
In addition, United States officials now often refer to the dangers of “ungoverned
spaces.” According to Secretary Rumsfeld, “In this hemisphere, narco-terrorists, hostage
takers and arms smugglers operate in ungoverned areas, using them as bases from which to
destabilize democratic governments.” 64 These ungoverned areas can be anything from river
basins to coastlines to unpopulated border regions. In other words, areas such as southern
Colombia, Brazil’s Amazon Basin or the triple border between Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay are threats to United States national security. Hence, yet another role for the
United States military is to support partner governments in asserting “effective
sovereignty” over these ungoverned territories, largely through joint military operations or
support for local military forces.
60
Barry, op. cit., p. 17.
Gaston Chillier y Laurie Freeman, Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security,
Washington D.C., The Washington Office on Latin America, July 2005, p. 6.
62
Testimony by Dr. William M. LeoGrande, Dean of the School of Public Affairs, American University
Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress,
September 21st, 2005, p. 2.
63
Ibid.
64
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, statement at Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Santiago,
November 19th, 2002.
61
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133
The Narco-Terrorist Threat?
Illicit drug trafficking was the first of these non-traditional security issues to emerge,
as described above, and in many ways paved the way for the expanded national security
concept. However, the drug issue is now cast almost exclusively in the counterterrorism
framework. Not long after September 11th, 2001, the United States Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, declared, “Terrorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic plague. They
thrive in the same conditions, support each other and feed off each other.” 65 General
Craddock, in responding to questions from Members of Congress, said that the terms
“insurgents” and “guerrillas” are less applicable today; rather, the “term narco-terrorists is
more appropriate” given “the incredible financial support they get from illicit drug
trafficking.” 66 SouthCom officials have also at times referred to illicit drugs as a “weapon
of mass destruction.” 67
Colombia remains the primary concern. According to former SouthCom Commander,
General James Hill, “narco-terrorists in Colombia remain the largest and most well known
threat in our region…by and large these groups consist of terrorists and criminals who
operate outside of the rule of law in pursuit of illicit profits rather than political
revolution.” 68 Three Colombian groups are on the United States State Department’s list of
designated foreign terrorist organizations: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC).
The use of such inflammatory rhetoric encourages the notion that the United States,
through its drug policy, must protect itself at any cost against the drug scourge emanating
from Latin America. Furthermore, the use of narco-terrorist rhetoric in coca-producing
countries essentially identifies small producers as military threats, suggesting that they are
somehow related to global terrorist networks. Casting coca producers as criminals rather
than valid interlocutors undermines efforts to seek dialogue and common ground through
65
Quoted in Nancy Dunne and James Wilson, “Colombian Rebels Indicted,” in Financial Times, March 19th,
2002.
66
General Bantz J. Craddock responding to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 21st,
2004 (http://armed-services.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?wit_id=3710&id=1277).
67
Quoted in United Press International, “DOD Wants More Forces for Colombia,” March 21st, 2004.
68
Posture Statement by General James Hill, United States Army Commander, United States Southern
Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, March
24th, 2004, p. 2.
133
134
negotiations. This is of particular concern in Bolivia and Peru, where negotiations have
proven effective at times in stemming social conflict and violence.
Efforts by United States policymakers to link local insurgent groups and terrorism are
nothing new. The “narco-guerrilla” theory first gained prominence in the early 1980s,
blurring the lines between counter-drug and counterinsurgency programs supported by
Washington. At a 1984 Senate hearing, federal officials warned that international terrorists
were turning to drug trafficking to finance their operations. 69 United States officials
claimed that Cuba and Nicaragua were using illicit profits from the drug trade to foment
insurgency groups across the hemisphere (though it was later more credibly argued that the
United States-backed contra forces were using drug money to support their war against the
Nicaraguan government).
The alleged link between drug traffickers and insurgents was an implicit component
of the first Andean Initiative, as administration officials depicted drug traffickers as tied to
leftist insurgencies, at the time referring to both Peruvian and Colombian groups. By the
mid-1990s, United States officials increasingly pointed to Colombia as the center of narcoguerrilla activity. Members of the United States Congress began debating “the frightening
possibilities of a ‘narco-state’ just three hours by plane from Miami.” 70
The financial resources obtained via drug trafficking and other illicit activities by both
the Colombian insurgents, particularly the FARC, and right-wing paramilitary groups is
now well-documented. 71 Nobody disputes that illicit drug trafficking fuels the Colombian
conflict. Nor is there any question that both left-wing and right-wing insurgents pose a
significant threat to Colombian society and are responsible for horrendous human rights
atrocities. Casting the FARC and other Colombian insurgents as “international terrorists,”
however, is simply off the mark, as they have yet to target the United States or any other
country beyond Colombia.
Beyond Colombia
69
“Drug Funds Termed Source for Terrorists,” in The Washington Post, August 3rd, 1984.
Statement by Republican Representative Benjamin Gilman, April 2nd, 1998.
71
Francisco E. Thoumi, Illicit Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes, Washington D.C. and Baltimore,
The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 8.
70
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135
Colombia is not the only potential “narco-state” in the eyes of United States
policymakers. Bolivia and coca grower leader Evo Morales are also being closely watched
by Washington. According to former SouthCom Commander, General James Hill, “If
radicals continue to highjack the indigenous movement, we could find ourselves faced with
a narco-state that supports the uncontrolled cultivation of coca.” 72 More recently, Bush
administration officials have claimed that recent citizen uprisings in Bolivia were the result
of efforts by Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez “to steer this revolution
toward a Marxist-socialist populist state.” 73 In an August 2005 tour of five South American
countries, United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed these allegations. 74
To date, no evidence has been presented to back these claims. The allegations, however,
raise serious concerns about how the United States will respond to the presidential victory
by Evo Morales.
While the threat posed by international drug trafficking to countries across the
hemisphere is very real, the highly-charged and highly ideological interpretation of events
in countries like Bolivia that predominates in the post-September 11th, 2001 policy-making
environment in Washington distorts the United States policy response. A populist revolt is
indeed underway in Bolivia, but most Bolivian analysts would agree that it is a homegrown phenomenon. Moreover, the underlying demand is for representative democracy—a
democracy that works for the people and not the privileged few. As Barry notes, “U.S.
national security has strayed dangerously far from reality in its assessments of the
region.” 75
Cuba provides another example of where the ideological underpinnings of the present
administration have a significant impact on anti-drug policy implementation. As the United
States government has sought to disrupt the transportation of illicit drugs through the
Caribbean, and in particular the Windward Passage, it could not afford to overlook Cuba
completely. Over time, anti-drug cooperation at the operational level has steadily increased.
The United States Coast Guard representative stationed in Cuba is in regular contact with
Cuban officials and is informed of counter-drug operations carried out in Cuba’s waters.
72
Posture Statement by General James Hill, op. cit., p. 5.
Reported by Jim Schultz, “Bush Brings the False Intelligence Game to South America,” in The Democracy
Center On-Line, volume 66, August 24th, 2005.
74
Ibid.
75
Barry, op. cit., p. 8.
73
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136
Other governments, such as Canada and Great Britain, claim to have excellent
cooperation with the Cuban government, pointing out that it is trying to show the
hemisphere that it is serious about collaborating with counter-drug efforts. The British
Ambassador to Cuba asserts that his government enjoys “a lot of cooperation” and that the
Cuban government is putting “sufficient resources,” given its overall budget constraints,
into the effort. 76 Indeed, Cuba has been largely successful in keeping illicit drugs out of its
own territory and has an exceptionally low incidence of drug use and addiction. In a June
2005 gathering of Caribbean counter-drug officials in Havana, Cuban officials repeatedly
called for the United States to sign an antinarcotics accord to allow for increased
collaboration. Yet such calls are routinely rebuffed by Washington, despite on-going
operational cooperation.
The State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report paints
a very different picture, placing the drug issue in the broader context of United States
opposition to the Castro government. The 2004 report alleges that “the primary focus of the
regime’s aggressive posture with respect to all activities deemed ‘illicit,’ including
narcotics trafficking, has been the repression of political and economic activities
permissible in most normal societies.” Ironically, the United States government’s biggest
complaint is that Cuba has failed to implement an “effective use of force policy.”
Concretely, this means that the Cuban government has been unwilling to shoot with the
intent to sink boats possibly carrying illicit drugs that refuse to obey warning shots. When
asked about this reluctance to use force, Cuban officials point to the risk of killing innocent
people, which would then be used against them by the anti-Castro forces within the United
States government.
Opposition to United States Policy
Though some local militaries have readily adopted the post-September 11th, 2001
United States national security policy, the approach has met with resistance in Latin
America. Many in Latin America and the Caribbean agree that concepts of security need to
be broadened to take into account human security—the overall well-being of individual
76
Interview with Ambassador John Dew, June 22nd, 2005.
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137
citizens—and the need for “multidimensional remedies that draw on all instruments of
national power: economic, political, and social, as well as military.” 77 They differ,
however, with regards to the priority placed on the role of the military by Washington. This
was evident at the 2004 hemispheric security ministerial, where ministers rejected the
United States proposal to create a multinational rapid response force capable of intervening
anywhere in the region to confront security threats. Chilean Defense Minister Michelle
Bachelet emphatically stated: “The Armed Forces are not the first front in the fight against
terrorism, but they can play a supporting role.” 78 Likewise, Brazil’s acting Defense
Minister said that each country “should maintain the sovereign right to identify its own
national security and defense priorities.” 79
In addition to United States national security policy, a range of issues have impacted
United States-Latin American relations since the OAS and its member countries first rallied
around the United States in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks.
Opposition to the Iraq war is widespread across the region, and both Chile and Mexico
stood up to the United States as the U.N. Security Council debated the issue. Many
countries have resisted United States efforts to sign “Article 98” agreements granting
United States troops and officials immunity in the International Criminal Court. In fact, as
Barry points out, “of the 22 countries sanctioned by Washington for their unequivocal
support of the ICC, eleven are in the SouthCom’s AOR (area of responsibility).” 80
More generally, beyond free trade negotiations, Latin America has received no
sustained attention from the Bush administration since the September 11th, 2001 attacks.
The administration’s saber-rattling on Cuba and Venezuela has irked many regional
leaders, who have failed to take up the administration’s call to isolate Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez. The fissures in United States-Latin American relations were perhaps best
illustrated by the election for a new Secretary General of the Organization of American
States (OAS). Though the United States eventually threw its weight behind Chile’s Jose
77
LeoGrande, op. cit., p 2.
Quoted in Barry, op. cit., p. 16. Original citation: Debora Rey, “South Americans Reject Terror PlanNations Worry U.S. Styled Force Could Give Military Too Much Power,” in The Houston Chronicle,
September 14th, 2004.
79
Ibid.
80
Barry, op. cit., p. 15.
78
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138
Miguel Insulza, he is the first OAS Secretary General to be elected that was not
Washington’s candidate.
Differences on Drug Policy
United States international drug control policy has long been a thorn in the side of
United States-Latin American relations, primarily due to differing views on how to
confront the issue and Washington’s heavy-handed approach, best exemplified in the
annual certification process described below. Since the Andean Initiative was first
launched, successive governments have resisted the involvement of military forces in
domestic counter-drug operations, though many ultimately followed Washington’s dictates.
The Bolivian government was particularly vocal with regards to its concerns about bringing
the army into counter-drug operations, pointing out that the country had withstood 182
military coups since its independence. In 1990, one Bolivian official testified before the
United States Congress:
Now is the time for the government of the United States to consider granting
additional cooperation to Bolivia for fiscal year 1990, which should ideally come in
the form of economic, rather than military, assistance. But if it is to be military
assistance, then it would help our efforts more if the emphasis is not on a new role for
the army in interdiction and/or repression. 81
The calls for more of a focus on economic assistance to address the poverty and lack
of employment opportunities that lead farmers to grow coca and others to get involved in
the lower levels of the drug trade have been a constant point of contention in bilateral and
multi-lateral discussions on drug policy. Repeatedly, Latin American governments have
called on Washington to provide more economic assistance within anti-drug aid packages.
In fact, not long before widespread protests led him to flee the country, Bolivian president
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada pleaded for more United States economic assistance, in part to
offset the economic losses generated by sustained coca eradication.
81
Samuel Doria Medina, Embassy of Bolivia, “Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control,” March 27th, 1990, p. 39.
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139
Indeed, opposition to United States-backed anti-drug policies contributed to the fall of
governments in both Bolivia and Ecuador. In the case of Bolivia, prior to the collapse of
Sánchez de Lozada’s government in October 2003, the United States government objected
to key components of accords under negotiation with the country’s powerful coca growers
federations, undermining possibilities for resolving ongoing conflicts. Continued United
States pressure on Sánchez de Lozada to meet anti-drug targets generated further protest
and unrest. Local opposition to the violence and conflict generated by United Statesmandated coca eradication—in part fueled by the view of many Bolivians that these were
contributing to the economic crisis—were one factor in the protests that brought down the
government.
Upon taking up the presidency, Carlos Mesa adopted a far more lenient approach to
the coca growers, a political necessity given the unstable situation. That trend has continued
with his successor, Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé. The fact that Bolivia has had three
presidents in less than two years is in part attributable to the United States government’s
pursuit of coca eradication in that country, despite the political instability and conflict it has
generated in an already volatile situation.
Ecuador’s Proposed Fumigation-Free Zone
Likewise, in Ecuador, opposition to the government’s support for Plan Colombia and
the United States “Cooperative Security Location” in Manta were among the factors
leading to the ouster of Lucio Gutierrez in early 2005. Prior to his 2002 election, President
Gutiérrez advocated a negotiated settlement to the Colombian conflict and promised to
develop an autonomous national security strategy independent of United States policy;
neither proposal was well received in Washington. Upon his election, when it became clear
that United States diplomatic and economic support were at risk, Gutiérrez reversed course,
embracing Plan Colombia and the United States presence at the Manta base.
The new Ecuadorian government, however, has returned to the previous platform of
developing a more autonomous national security policy, adopting a more critical approach
to Plan Colombia. Calls have been renewed for Colombia to avoid fumigation along the
Ecuadorian border due to the potential environmental and health consequences.
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140
Establishing a 10-kilometer fumigation-free zone along the border was a proposal that first
emerged at the beginning of the Gutiérrez government, but was quickly abandoned.
President Alfredo Palacio has now elevated the case to the level of the OAS and United
Nations.
At the root of the dispute between the two countries are dramatically divergent views
of the security situation—and ultimately of United States policy. As The Transnational
Institute points out:
Colombia insists on lumping all of the problems in the area together under the
heading of ‘narco-terrorism,’ against which there are certain specific measures, one of
which is aerial spraying of illicit crops. What concerns Ecuador, meanwhile, is the
harm caused by Colombia because of the proximity of the armed conflict, illicit drug
trafficking, and the existence and aerial spraying of crops. 82
The Ecuadorian government also complains that Colombia does not provide sufficient
security along the border to prevent the spill-over of the conflict into Ecuador. Colombian
military strategy, however, is more focused on mobile patrols and Plan Patriot, heavily
financed by Washington, targets other areas of the country.83
The Coca Issue in Peru
Finally, in Peru, while government of President Alejandro Toledo remains loyal to
United States anti-drug policy, at least in its rhetoric, demands are growing for an
alternative approach. President Toledo inherited a difficult and complicated situation and
within a year of taking office had to deal with “increasingly explosive protests stemming
from unattended social demands that had accumulated during the ten-year government of
former president Alberto Fujimori.” 84 Pressure by the United States government to achieve
82
Drug Policy Briefing, No. 15, Aerial spraying knows no borders: Ecuador brings international case over
aerial spraying, Amsterdam, The Transnational Institute, September 2005, p. 3.
83
Ibid.
84
Isaías Rojas, The Push for Zero Coca: Democratic Transition and Counternarcotics Policy in Peru,
Washington D.C., The Washington Office on Latin America, February 2003, p. 1. This WOLA Drug War
Monitor provides a thorough accounting of relations between coca growers and the Toledo government
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141
“zero coca”—in reference to the policy adopted by the Bánzer government in Bolivia—
within five years exacerbated the situation. This demand far exceeded what Washington
demanded of the authoritarian government of former President Alberto Fujimori, despite
the fact that Peru was embarking upon a difficult political transition.
Although President Toledo first adopted a policy of negotiations and voluntary
eradication in exchange for alternative development assistance, the government ultimately
had to resort to forced eradication in order to meet United States coca reduction targets.
This led to a cyclical pattern of protests in response to eradication efforts that continues
today. Often these have resulted in violence. They have also resulted in local governments
expressing their opposition to United States-backed coca eradication policies.
In June 2005, the regional government in Cuzco—which includes a department were
coca has traditionally been grown for local use—declared coca a “cultural patrimony,”
essentially allowing for its unrestricted cultivation. Not long after, the regional government
in Huanuco—a major coca producing region—followed suit. In September, Peru’s
constitutional tribunal ruled on the matter, unanimously deciding that the regional
governments did not have the authority to take such action. However, the tribunal members
also called on President Toledo to re-evaluate the policy because of its lack of success to
date. In particular, they questioned the focus on coca eradication as opposed to interdiction
efforts such as controlling the sale of chemicals used in manufacturing cocaine, and the
lack of an adequate agricultural policy for small farmers. 85
Many more examples could be provided of local protests or opposition. The point is
that twenty-five years after the United States first launched its “war on drugs” in Latin
America, there is still not a regional consensus in support of present United States policy. A
notable exception is the Uribe government in Colombia; however, for the most part, the
United States has resorted to using its diplomatic and economic muscle to obtain
cooperation with the “one size fits all” counter-drug policies adopted in Washington. Often,
as indicated above, Washington is able to dictate anti-drug policies over the objections of
important sectors of government and civil society.
during its first two years in office. For additional information see Isaías Rojas, “Política antidrogas, derechos
humanos y democracia en Peru,” en Youngers and Rosin, op. cit.
85
Rich Vecchio, “Peru Court Rules Against Coca Expansion,” Associated Press, September 28th, 2005.
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142
Moreover, drug policies are typically negotiated by United States officials with a
small group of local political elites, as well as military and police officials. There is little
role for legislative oversight, public debate and engagement with civil society leaders. Of
particular concern given the militarized nature of United States drug policy is the tendency
of the Defense Department and other United States agencies to negotiate directly with local
security forces, circumventing civilian elected officials ostensibly charged with oversight
and control of those forces. The way in which counter-drug policies are pursued by the
United States government is yet another cause of tension in its relations with governments
across the hemisphere.
The Certification Process
Perhaps no other aspect of United States international drug control policy provokes
more anger in Latin America than the annual certification process. Enacted by the United
States Congress in 1986, the law required that the administration “certify” to Congress by
March 1 of each year that countries are cooperating with United States efforts, or taking
sufficient actions on their own, to control drug production, trafficking and use. Though the
law was subsequently modified, as described below, the process continues today.
As the first step, a list of major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries is
drawn up, usually referred to as the “majors list.” Those on the list are subject to the
certification evaluation. According to the original procedures, Congress had thirty days to
overturn any decision with which they did not agree. Countries which were not certified
faced a range of sanctions, including the suspension of all United States foreign assistance
(with the exception of counter-drug and humanitarian aid), United States opposition to
loans by multilateral development banks, and possible trade sanctions. The administration
can also deny full certification but issue a “vital national interests certification,” which
waives the sanctions in the interest of United States national security but still carries the
stigma of Washington’s reprimand. Various Latin American countries have received such
waivers since the certification process was first implemented.
The certification process provides the United States Congress with a regular
mechanism for touting its get “tough on drugs” credentials, while casting blame for the
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143
nation’s drug-related problems beyond its own borders. Administration officials often claim
that it is a useful tool for leveraging cooperation from reluctant countries abroad. Many
independent observers assert the opposite: the humiliation and anger provoked by the
world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs unilaterally grading the progress of producer
countries undermines the very cooperation needed for effective counter-drug efforts.
Moreover, the scorecard approach rewards countries for arrests and seizures and other
quantifiable indicators, when in fact those may have little or nothing to do with actual
progress in stemming the flow of illicit drugs.
One direct consequence of this approach is the imprisonment of either innocent or
low-level offenders swept up in drug raids in order to meet arrest quotas. For example, the
2005 anti-drug accord signed between the United States and Ecuador actually mandates a
12% increase in arrests on drug charges. Such an agreement does not guarantee that major
drug traffickers will be apprehended; it only ensures that Ecuador’s prisons will remain
overcrowded. A recent study by FLACSO in Quito found that most of those imprisoned on
drug charges in that country are “mules,” small time offenders who carry drugs from one
point to another, who do so in order to cover the basic living costs of their families. 86 They
are subject to a twelve year mandatory minimum sentence. 87
The Decertification of Colombia
While the annual certification announcements provoke negative commentary across
the hemisphere each year, perhaps the most controversial decision was the Clinton
administration’s 1996 decertification of Colombia, the first time that the United States
government issued a full decertification of a United States ally and trading partner.
Colombia was decertified again in 1997, but the country was granted a national security
waiver in 1998.
Ostensibly, the decision was based on allegations that the recently elected Samper
government had accepted campaign contributions from drug traffickers. A more important
86
“Blanco y Negro: La mayoría de detenidos es por narcotráfico,” in Hoy, July 30th, 2005.
The maximum sentence for drug trafficking is twenty-five years. However, the maximum sentence for
murder is sixteen years. As a result, a small time trafficker can end up with a higher sentence than a mass
murderer.
87
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factor, however, appears to have been the domestic political climate. With the 1996
presidential and congressional elections looming, both Republicans and Democrats were
attempting to gain political advantage at the polls. The powerful Senator Jesse Helms had
declared his intention to overrule a presidential certification of Colombia and appeared to
have the votes to follow through. Clinton advisers argued that the president could decertify
Colombia himself and gain political points for being tough on a foreign government
perceived as allied with drug traffickers, or he could let Senator Helms reap the political
benefits.
Some former Clinton’s foreign policy advisers now lament that the decision was
based on domestic politics rather than sound consideration of the foreign policy
implications of the decision. They also admit that the decision to decertify Colombia was
extremely detrimental to the country, significantly weakening the government and hence
providing fertile ground for the territorial expansion of both leftwing guerrillas and
rightwing paramilitaries. Just recently, The Washington Post commented in an editorial that
“in Colombia, drug decertification that was intended to punish the government of Ernesto
Samper in the 1990s ended up hurting the entire country. Since 1999 it has cost Washington
about US$4 billion just to help Colombia recover.” 88 Initially, however, the decision was
touted as effective as President Samper capitulated on a number of key issues, including
allowing a dramatic increase in aerial fumigation of illicit coca crops.
The Mexico Debate
The role of United States domestic politics in the certification process became one of
the major complaints emanating from the region. Another major sticking point was the
hypocrisy of the process: Some countries could be decertified by Washington with little
political cost, whereas in other cases, that cost was simply too high. Mexico provided a
perfect example of the latter. The potential consequences of a rupture in relations with a
country that shared a porous, 2,000-mile border were beyond what most reasonable United
States officials were willing to risk. A range of bilateral concerns entered into play, including
88
Marcela Sanchez, “With Sanctions, We Lose,” in The Washington Post, August 19th, 2005.
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145
migration and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 89 Moreover, Wall Street
was rattled each time the decertification issue was raised with regards to Mexico, given the
interest of many United States corporations in maintaining stability and good relations with
Mexico. It was largely the debate on Mexico that led to revisions in the law.
For several years in a row after the Colombia decertification, the United States
Congress debated decertifying Mexico. Some analysts point out that “Certification became an
annual exercise in Mexico-bashing, as members of Congress roundly denounced Mexico’s
lack of progress in combating drugs and related corruption.” 90 In 1997, members from both
parties pressured the Clinton administration to decertify Mexico, a demand strengthened by
the arrest in February of that year of Mexican “Drug Czar” Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo on
charges that he accepted bribes to protect one of the country’s most notorious drug barons.
Others pointed to recent statistics that as much as 70% of cocaine in the United States came
over the Mexican border, and that it was also a major source of marijuana, heroin and
methamphetamines consumed in the United States.
Clinton officials—alarmed by the possible consequences—did not take the bait and
gave Mexico a full certification. Instead, they attempted to argue that whereas in Colombia,
corruption was rooted at the top, in Mexico it seeped up from the bottom and hence was
inherently different. At a congressional hearing in March 1997, then-Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Robert S. Gelbard, argued that in
Colombia the president and cabinet members are “corrupt,” whereas in Mexico there is a
“good” president attempting to reform “dysfunctional” institutions.
Mexico’s unique relationship with the United States, given the two countries’
intertwined histories, societies and economies, has led Mexico to strongly defend its
sovereignty in its relations with the United States. As with other issues, relations on counterdrug issues were often fraught with problems and tensions. 91 Mexico emerged early on as
one of the most vocal critics of the certification process, and officials made clear the extent to
which they were offended by it. The calls for decertification—and even the arguments put
forward by the State Department described above—provoked the ire of the Mexican
89
Ironically, NAFTA facilitated the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico, as border restrictions for commerce
were loosened up.
90
Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, “México: la trampa de la militarización,” in Youngers and Rosin, op
cit., p. 357.
91
Op cit., p. 327.
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146
government. President Ernesto Zedillo called for the United States to be subjected to the
same review. When President Vicente Fox was elected in 2000, he made overturning the
certification process a priority.
Revisions to the Certification Process
President Fox’s vocal opposition to certification sparked debate in the United States
Congress. During a state visit to Washington in September 2001, President Fox took
advantage of the opportunity to urge Congress to suspend the drug certification requirement
as a gesture of good faith in his new government. Because he represented a break with the
long-time rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)—and its long record of
corruption—members of Congress who had opposed past efforts to reform the certification
process expressed willingness to consider changes. President Bush also endorsed the idea,
indicating a commitment “to replace the annual counter-narcotics certification regime with
new measures designed to enhance international cooperation in this area.” 92
The office of Democratic Senator Chris Dodd had already introduced legislation to
suspend certification at least temporarily. The idea was to cool the debate, while giving time
for the OAS’s new multilateral evaluation mechanism (MEM), a possible alternative, to get
up and running. Concern with the animosity generated by the United States certification
process was a key factor leading the OAS to develop its own evaluation process. The MEM
has its own pitfalls, and critics claim that its credibility is limited by essentially allowing
countries to judge their own progress. On the other hand, it is a transparent process and the
information provided by countries for MEM evaluation is public and can be easily obtained
by Internet. 93 Moreover, it provides a multilateral approach that stands in stark contrast to the
United States government’s unilateral certification process.
In addition to the legislation proposed by Senator Dodd, several other reform proposals
were put on the table. Finally, in 2002, Congress modified the certification process. The
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2002-2003 requires the president to decertify only
those countries that “failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial
92
K. Larry Storrs, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2001, Washington
D.C., Congressional Research Service, January 8th, 2002.
93
See the CICAD page on the OAS website (www.oas.org).
146
147
efforts” to adhere to international counter-drug obligations. In other words, countries would
be automatically certified unless action was taken otherwise. The basis for evaluating
cooperation was changed to include international standards, and possible sanctions were
lessened somewhat as well. Finally, the ability of the United States Congress to overturn a
certification decision was eliminated. The latter was important from a political point of view,
as it reduced the likelihood of the annual hearings that members of Congress used for
political grandstanding and which so many governments across the hemisphere found
offensive.
These changes represented a significant step forward. Following the revisions to the
process, the annual decision on possible decertifications, which now takes place in
September, has received very little press coverage or attention on Capitol Hill. The changes
have defused tensions between the United States and Mexico and other countries. On the
other hand, the administration still has a powerful “stick” that can be brought out if it chooses
to do so. The United States continues to maintain its right to issue a unilateral judgment on
other countries.
The Venezuela Decision
The exception to this change in the political atmosphere came in September 2005 when
the United States refused to grant a full certification to Venezuela and instead issued a “vital
national interests certification.” When he first took office, President Chávez suspended
United States anti-drug surveillance over-flights over Venezuelan territory and more recently
curtailed military-to-military counter-narcotics cooperation. The certification decision,
however, came on the heels of weeks of political jostling between the two countries after
Chávez accused the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of using its agents for
espionage and suspended cooperation. Although efforts began almost immediately to reach a
new accord to allow the DEA to operate in the country, accusations continued to fly back and
forth. “The DEA was using the fight against drug trafficking as a mask,” declared Chávez,
“to support drug trafficking, to carry out intelligence in Venezuela against the government.
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148
Under those circumstances we decided to make a clean break with those accords, and we are
reviewing them.” 94
For its part, the United States State Department determined that “Venezuela failed
demonstrably to make sufficient efforts during the last 12 months to meet its obligations
under international counter-narcotics agreements and United States domestic counternarcotics requirements…” 95 The litany of complaints cited includes harsh criticism of the
Venezuelan government’s law enforcement efforts, including a “negative publicity
campaign” against the DEA, the removal of key high-level officials responsible for drug
policy implementation and allegations of corruption. 96 In response, Venezuelan Vice
President José Vicente Rangel declared that his government “doesn’t recognize”
Washington’s “moral, judicial, ethical or political authority” to pass such judgments, noting
that the United States is the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs. 97
Though the United States move was hardly unexpected, it prompted immediate
criticism across the political spectrum. John Walsh of WOLA, a progressive advocacy and
research organization, called the decision “a very blunt instrument, especially in a highly
charged political environment.” 98 Mark Falcoff of the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative think-tank, said that “this is a classic lose-lose situation” that plays into the
hands of Chávez. 99 The Venezuelan president has repeatedly proven adept at boosting his
support at home in the face of criticism by United States policymakers.
Critics also point out that the United States government’s decision provides evidence of
the ability for political manipulation of the system still in place. For example, while the Bush
Administration claims that there are not grounds for effective counter-drug cooperation with
the Venezuelan government, it did not want to lose the ability to fund groups supportive of
the Venezuelan opposition. Issuing a certification of national interests carries the stigma of
94
Patricia Rondon Espin, “Venezuela Leader Accuses DEA of Espionage,” in Associated Press, August 7th,
2005.
95
United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Statement of Justification: Venezuela, September 15th, 2005. After the determination was issued, there was
confusion in the Venezuelan press as to whether or not Venezuela was decertified or certified with a waiver.
Technically, the country was certified with a waiver; however, for all practical purposes, that is considered a
decertification and hence that term is often used to describe such status.
96
Ibid.
97
Quoted in David Adams and Phil Gunson, “Venezuela-U.S. division runs deep,” in The St. Petersburg
Times, September 17th, 2005.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
148
149
decertification, while allowing the administration to continue funding—according to the
determination—“programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions, establish selected
community development projects, and strengthen Venezuela’s political party system.” 100
In addition, Venezuela was effectively decertified, while Haiti was not, though it
appears to be moving in the direction of a narco-state. United States officials repeatedly refer
to Haiti as “the black hole” for transiting illicit drugs. Yet the State Department determination
blandly states: “While Haiti made efforts this year to improve its performance, we reiterate
our concerns…about the Interim Government of Haiti’s inability to effectively organize law
enforcement resources to permit sustained counter-narcotics efforts. Further, the national
criminal justice system must be significantly strengthened in order to be effective and gain
public confidence.” 101 These charges differ little from those routinely put forward in the case
of other countries, and fail to reflect the reality of a country now routinely referred to in
Washington circles as a failed state. Yet in terms of domestic politics, a stronger rebuke of
Haiti could bolster criticisms of the Bush administration’s decision to promote the ouster of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Trade Benefits
Certification is the biggest “stick” in linking United States economic assistance to
obtaining specific counter-drug objectives. A more recent, and equally problematic, approach
is to link trade benefits to achieving coca eradication and other counter-drug goals. When the
1991 Andean Trade Preference Act, which provides preferential tariffs for products from the
Andean region, was renegotiated in 2002, the revised version became the Andean Trade
Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). In particular, it explicitly links trade and
coca eradication. According to Richard Brown, Acting Charge d’affaires in Lima at this time,
“The condition, according to the law, is that in relation to new products covered by the law,
such as garments, shoes and tuna fish, the four governments must demonstrate that they are
combating drug trafficking with an efficient and successful program. This is how it will be
100
United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Statement of Justification: Venezuela, September 15th, 2005.
101
Ibid.
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150
decided if a government qualifies.” 102 Despite objections from Peru’s Foreign Minister, Alan
Wagner, the hard-line logic was repeated in the anti-drug accord signed between Peru and the
United States that year, which explicitly linked the provision of economic assistance to
meeting coca eradication targets, set by Washington.
The Impact of United States Counter-Drug Policy
For the countries where the United States war on drugs is being waged, the costs are
high. A three-year investigation carried out by WOLA evaluated the impact of United States
international drug control efforts on democratization and human rights trends in Latin
America and the Caribbean. 103 While recognizing the harm caused by the drug trade itself
across the hemisphere, the study focused on whether or not current policy mitigates or
exacerbates the myriad of problems caused by illicit drug production and abuse. The
conclusions reached illustrate the extent of the drug war’s collateral damage. The study found
that United States drug control policies destabilize democratic governments in a myriad of
ways:
• They contribute to confusing military and law enforcement functions, militarizing
local police forces, and bringing the military into a domestic law enforcement role.
• They thus strengthen military forces at the expense of civilian authorities—in a
region with a tragic history of military rule.
• They exacerbate ongoing human rights problems—in countries already plagued
with rampant impunity.
• They lead to the deterioration of civil liberties through the adoption of harsh antidrug legislation that often fails to comply with minimal due process standards.
• They generate significant social conflict and even political instability.
• They have led United States officials to pursue short-term anti-drug targets by
allying with unsavory and even nefarious characters—such as Manuel Noriega in Panama
and Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru—to the detriment of long-term democratic development.
102
103
“Combate contra las drogas debe ser eficiente y exitoso,” in El Comercio, August 23rd, 2002.
See Youngers and Rosin, op. cit.
150
151
• They often target the poorest sectors of society, which feel the brunt of United
States international drug control efforts.
When United States officials have acknowledged the damage caused by current
policy, they dismiss it as an unintended consequence of a top-priority mission. This logic
could have merit, if in fact the United States government was closer to achieving that
mission. In fact, however, Washington is farther from meeting its drug policy goals than it
was when the war on drugs was first launched.
United States officials routinely put forward indicators of success: the number of
hectares of coca and poppy crops eradicated, illicit drugs seized, arrests of alleged drug
traffickers and the like. These statistics indicate short-term tactical successes, yet they shed
no light on the ultimate goal, which is to reduce the availability and use of illicit drugs. As
indicated previously, the supply-side strategy is based on the premise that international
drug control efforts can drive up price and thereby drive down demand. By this measure,
drug control efforts to date have had no meaningful impact. 104
According to United States government figures, the retail price of cocaine dropped
steadily over the 1980s and early 1990s; thereafter, it more or less stabilized with periodic
fluctuations. Heroin prices followed a similar route. Purity of both drugs rose and then
stabilized. According to John Walsh, “As of mid-year 2003, the estimated retail prices per
gram of both powder cocaine and heroin were less than a fifth of their 1981 prices. Crack
cocaine cost 44% less at mid-year 2003 than it did in 1986.” He also points out that
decreased prices are not related to slackening demand for illicit drugs. 105 In short, the price
of illicit drugs is substantially lower and the purity higher than they were twenty years ago.
This downward spiral has occurred, even as United States spending on international drug
control efforts has increased significantly.
Figure 1
USA Expenditure in Efforts for International Narcotics Control vs. Price of
Cocaine and Heroin
104
See Thoumi, op. cit., chapter 12.
John Walsh, Are We There Yet? Measuring Progress in the U.S. War on Drugs in Latin America,
Washington D.C., The Washington Office on Latin America, December 2004, p. 4.
105
151
152
$4,000
$250
Cocaine price
Heroin price
Expenditure
$200
$3,500
$3,000(USA million dollars
*
$2,500
Price per pure
$150 gram
((USA dollars, 2002)
$2,000 Expenditure
$100
$1,500
$1,000
$50
$500
$0
$0
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Year
Source: Data prepared for the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy; chart compiled by
The Washington Office on Latin America.
The fumigation program in Colombia provides a dramatic example of policy failure.
Despite record aerial spraying of over 130,000 hectares of coca crops in 2004, the total area
under coca cultivation remained “statistically unchanged” at 114,000 hectares, according to
figures released by the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in
March 2005. Aerial eradication has led to a dramatic expansion in the areas where coca is
grown in Colombia. Once confined to three departments in the southern part of the country,
coca can now be found in almost all of the country’s departments and is now often grown
in smaller parcels, under shade, where it is harder to detect. Higher yield crops make the
challenge even greater. A fundamental reason for the failure of eradication efforts to date is
that the vast majority of coca is grown in small plots, by farmers or migrants who have few
other economic opportunities. The cash income from coca supplements subsistence level
farming. Thus, until alternative sources of income are put in place, farmers whose coca is
eradicated will simply replant. In fact, coca production in the Andean region has remained
remarkably constant over nearly two decades.
152
153
Figure 2
Coca Cultivation in the Andes
Compiled by: The Washington Office on Latin America
Recommendations for United States Policy
New standards of measure are needed for evaluating the impact of United States drug
control efforts. At a minimum, they should focus on the price, availability and purity of
illicit drugs in the United States and other consuming countries. A more appropriate
approach would be to focus on consumption levels and patterns, including the situation of
hard-core users. Possible indicators include the incidence of HIV/AIDS and other healthrelated diseases among the user population, rates of drug related crime, and levels of
violence in communities where drug abuse is prevalent.
This implies a fundamental rethinking of the approach to the drug issue and a shift
from a national security and “narco-terrorist” framework to one of public health. This, in
turn, implies reorienting strategies to focus on developing effective treatment and education
programs, including treatment upon demand, HIV/AIDS programs, realistic prevention
153
154
strategies, and community development. These strategies should be guided by evidencebased research and practical, community-based experience. Ultimately, the challenge is to
mitigate the harm caused by drug use and abuse to individuals and society at large.
Likewise, policy-makers should seek to reduce the harm or negative consequences
caused by illicit drug production and the policies intended to eradicate it. In concrete terms,
this means allowing Latin American governments to develop their own anti-drug policies,
without the threat of United States sanctions. In some countries, maintaining political
stability and strengthening democratic rule may be an essential first step necessary for later
achieving concrete anti-drug objectives. This approach also means eliminating many of the
elements of United States international drug control policy discussed above, including most
of the military component of United States counter-drug aid and training programs, the
certification process and other mechanisms that link the provision of United States
economic assistance to counter-drug aid, and forced and aerial eradication.
Applying a harm reduction approach to United States international drug control
policies should be accompanied by a fundamental shift in United States resource allocation
overseas—from military-oriented programs to economic assistance for equitable economic
development, including support for the rural sector, which is so often neglected in today’s
development models. In addition, far more resources need to be allocated to programs to
promote democratic institution-building. This includes long-term efforts to reform police
forces and the justice sector.
Finally, what would have the greatest impact on drug production and trafficking in
Latin America and the Caribbean would be for the United States to significantly reduce
demand for drugs. As noted, drug consumption is now a problem across the hemisphere,
but it is still the United States market that fuels the illicit drug trade the most. In the United
States, far more resources should be provided for treatment and education programs that
have proven to be effective. Only then will the hemisphere be on the path to a more humane
and effective drug control policy.
154
155
THE VIEWS FROM LATIN AMERICA
155
156
Mexico: Drug Trafficking, Security and Terrorism
Luis Astorga *
Introduction
The effort against drug trafficking in Mexico has been subject to the political
panorama resulting from the Mexican Revolution—known for having all supreme power
concentrated in the presidency, plus an army of popular origins that obeys presidential
power, and for the creation of a State party that congregates all forces that arise from
violent battles to be in command of political difference. It emerged with the 1914 United
States prohibitions of opium, opiates and cocaine, and from the rules established by the
Mexican Government itself during the decade of the 20’s regarding drugs such as
marijuana and poppy seed. United States control over Mexico began during this period.
Nevertheless, all efforts were mainly focused on both the prevention of opium trafficking
across common borders and on eliminating poppy crops inside Mexico, with the aim of
informing and demanding that the national government destroy them, and requesting
economic aid to accomplish this specific mission. Even when information on the
relationship between political parties and drug trafficking was frequently found during the
presence of Anti-Drug Agents from the United States Treasury Department in Mexican
territory, for several decades the main objective of the United States agenda did not put in
evidence such information. All data found was sent to Washington for its analysis and
further political use at the moment when, eventually, some kind of solution was needed.
The Departments of Treasury and State were the first institutions to gather all
information concerning drugs within Mexico. The first collected the reports of its Anti-drug
and Custom agents and the second all data found both by its Consuls—who were placed in
different Mexican cities—and its Embassy. 106 Both institutions aimed to include the drug
problem in the Mexican political agenda and in all Mexican media. There were not many
*
Sociologist, researcher of the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México (IISUNAM).
106
Luis Astorga, Drogas sin fronteras, México, Grijalbo, 2003.
156
157
voices, inside and outside the Mexican government, who did not support this fact or
presented alternatives to the interdiction scheme. One exception was that of Dr. Leopoldo
Salazar Viniegra, head of the campaign against alcoholism and other drug-addictions run
by the Health Department at the end of the 30’s; he was also the principal authority on
drugs issues in the Mexican government. Contrary to all hypotheses divulged throughout
the United States with the support of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)—supervised
by Harry Anslinger—Salazar Viniegra, based on his own investigations about marijuana,
concluded that such a drug was not dangerous and that it should not be prohibited. He
suggested that the State must control the drug monopoly, in order to establish low prices
and build care centers with medical assistance. The political pressure set out by Anslinger
had immediate effects: Dr. Salazar was removed from his position. Notwithstanding this
situation, in 1940 the Mexican Government approved a new Regulation on drug-addictions
based on the ideas presented by the doctor. The United States reacted by decreeing an
embargo of narcotic medicines against Mexico, which was put to an end when the
regulation was withdrawn. This was a “one and only” situation. Never again did the
Mexican Government tried to apply autonomous measures that were contrary to the vision
of the United States.
Evidently, not everything was imposed. Among the Mexican politicians there were
some who agreed with the punitive United States vision. They also were convinced that
there was no other way of fighting against the phenomenon, besides from new and strict
sanctions and the eradication of illicit crops. As for diplomatic affairs, strong relationships
between Anslinger and Óscar Rabasa—a prestigious official who worked at the Secretary
of International Affairs between the late 40’s and the 60’s—smoothened the agreements
between both countries on drug issues. For several years, United States Anti-drug agents
operated in a secret and armed way within the Mexican territory, and without having any
local authority protesting against this fact; on the contrary, they even supported the idea and
helped them. There were no signed agreements, but only informal meetings and tolerated
actions. United States authorities tried to maintain undercover all cooperation given by
Mexico, inside its borders, on detention and investigation of traffickers; they said that they
did not want to reveal these authorities to those who believed that working with United
States agents was displaying pro-Yankee behaviors.
157
158
The Andean Initiative of President Bush at the end of the 80’s implied stronger
participation of the Armed Forces in the Latin American battle against drugs. In Mexico,
civil institutions are legally responsible of supervising these aspects. Armed Forces can
only intervene upon request of the civil authorities. Before 1947, the Health Department
was in charge; from that year on the General Attorney’s Office (PGR in Spanish) took over.
By 1938, military forces participated for the first time in the campaign of illicit poppy crops
eradication in Sonora. In 1947 strong media hype was given to the military intervention in
the so-called “gran campaña.” The main objective was the eradication of illicit crops in
Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango. It was not until the “Operación Cóndor” (19751978) that the Mexican Government sent its largest troops—ten thousand soldiers—and
appointed the Secretary of National Defense (SEDENA) as supervising authority of such
strategy. In fact, civil authority was relegated to a second level. A decade before the
Andean Initiative, the United States had exerted pressure requesting aerial Paraquat
spraying for all poppy crops, in addition to having supported military control and presence.
Another argument presented by the Mexican authorities was the level of violence among
traffickers of the state of Sinaloa—place of origin of the most popular drug traffickers, even
today. Ironically, at that same moment, the United States was passing through a permissive
stage regarding marijuana use. For example, during the Carter Administration, several
states of the American union approved laws regarding the use of a minimal personal dose.
According to Peter Bourne, Carter’s special advisor regarding health affairs, the
United States supported the use of Paraquat only for spraying poppy crops, and it was the
Mexican Government who decided to use this particular substance for marihuana crops. All
the same, it was not the United States who supplied the substance; actually, they had to
import it from Europe. He stated that the Unites States was not as concerned by the
marijuana phenomenon as Mexico was; however, they did approve the special use of
helicopters furnished to the Mexicans for that purpose. 107
Since the early prohibition of certain drugs, the United States has considered
producing countries to be the real enemy; thus, they give priority to the impulse given to
crop destruction policies within exporting countries. When in 1986 President Reagan
107
See:
PBS,
“Interview
Peter
Bourne”
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/bourne.html).
(available
at:
158
159
signed the National Security Decision Directive—where, for the first time, it is stated that
drug trafficking is a threat to National security—he authorized the participation of the
Defense Department in a wide range of anti-drug activities. 108 There was an internal
concern at the moment because of the high percentage of North-American citizens
consuming illicit drugs; but also, and overall, there was an interest to intervene, in a
stronger and more decisive way, in the design and functionality of an anti-drug policy for
drugs that came from other countries. Threats were both internal, due to consumption, and
external, due to the fact that the main destination of drug “exports” seemed to be the North
American market.
By 1991, the DEA Director, Robert C. Bonner, stated that—concerning the concept of
drug trafficking as a threat to national security during the administration of Carlos Salinas
(1988-1994)—it was the first time in history that the Mexican Government assumed such
position. But the truth is that the first one to mention it was the previous President, Miguel
de la Madrid (1982-1988), who immediately recalled the thesis, originally stated by
President Ronald Reagan in 1986. In spite of such discursive recognition, its logical
implications did not reach their last consequences. President Salinas explained his
reasons: 109
My administration never supported the idea of the Mexican Army executing
certain investigations and fighting against new drug trafficking groups. It was not
necessary to grant these responsibilities, which in a democratic country were only
given to specialized authorities, to this corps in particular. Besides, they could not
omit the risk that drug traffickers tried to corrupt members of the Army, the main
institution for the security of any country. That is why the drug trafficking affairs
were specifically assigned to the Judicial Federal Police.
During his six-year term, President Ernesto Zedillo’s (1994-2000) was moved by the
same “reasons of national security” to adopt a stronger intervention of the Armed Forces,
for those tasks that neither Salinas nor De la Madrid had assigned to them. In 1995, a group
of Special Forces was sent to Chihuahua in order to capture Amado Carrillo, and several
108
Timothy J. Duna, The militarization of the U. S.-Mexico border, 1978-1992: low intensity conflict doctrine
comes home, Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1996, p. 25.
109
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, México: un paso difícil a la modernidad, Barcelona, Plaza y Janés, 2000, pp.
349-370.
159
160
army members were pointed delegates of the PGR for the northern states of the country.
Shortly before, the United States Secretary of Defense had visited his counterpart in
Mexico and had declared that only a “third link” was missing with that country: military
power.
The first alternate government—elected on July 2nd, 2000, and corresponding to
President Vicente Fox—decided to favor the Army, after 71 years of strict control, and
gave them faculties to interfere in all aspects regarding drug affairs. For the first time in
Mexican history a General was appointed head of the PGR. The Fox Administration
appealed to “national security reasons” as well. All the former governments conceived drug
trafficking as a threat to national security; the difference relies on the individual perception
of each of them about the capacity to control, contain, and take hold of the phenomenon, by
means of the security institutions and the provision of justice that they administer.
Perceptions and assessments of those institutions, added to the United States opinion on
these matters, resulted in decisions that imply the increasing participation of Armed Forces
in drug affairs. Each of these governments reacted in terms of what is perceived as the
inherited sixth-annual urgencies. Still, none of them leaned toward a State vision, or toward
an urgent and trans-sixth-annual plan for the creation of security institutions and provision
of civil justice, within which the participation of the Armed Forces was to be exceptional, a
last resource, and not something that seems to be a rule with no end in sight.
Just after the terrorist acts of September 11th, 2001, the Mexican Government declared
a “Red Alert” with the aim of controlling strategic zones such as oil deposits, hydroelectric
plants, airports and roads, among others. According to Ernesto Rufo Appel—former
Presidential Commissioner in charge of affairs regarding the northern border—the
migration of Mexicans to the United States decreased 60% during the three week period
following those terrorist acts. On the other hand, the chief of the SEDENA stated that,
because of such events, the crisis team of the Joint Chiefs of National Defense became
active. 110 Adolfo Aguilar Zinser—National Security Advisor—declared that Mexico was
neither residence nor transit zone for terrorists, and denied that President Bush had
requested the participation of Mexican military forces to support his policies. 111 Aguilar
110
Román González Álvarez, “Explica Aguilar la ‘Alerta Roja’”:, Excélsior, October 4th, 2001.
“Afirma consejero de Seguridad Nacional que Fox y Bush no discutieron apoyo militar,” El Universal,
October 5th, 2001.
111
160
161
recognized that terrorist acts had forced the Mexican Government to modify its security
strategy, and affirmed: “the national security agenda is not composed by hegemonic
premises, political interests, or ideological visions; the new security agenda focuses on the
main issues regarding the joint security of our continent, which are: organized crime, drug
trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.” 112 In fact, all these topics had already been
included in the agenda; still, the difference relies on the emphasis the United States put on
terrorism—which turned into the main issue—and the relation between such matter and
other subjects.
The Mexican Government acknowledged, in its own way and without doubts, that its
security depended upon that of the United States, and that changes made to United States
security policies defined the Mexican position toward that same issue. This was true, even
when the Mexican policy did not completely share the emphasis on terrorism. In time,
common borders and their surveillance acquired more importance. Aguilar pointed out that
security should be the main issue in the bilateral agenda, “but not at the expense of all the
other subjects.” 113 He referred to trade, tourism and other topics regarding illicit migrants.
Since then, in practice the United States has focused great part of its efforts—”according to
its own conception of security”—on its internal safety and on what considers a threat to it.
This text includes some examples on how the United States Government has tried to
articulate security, terrorist and drug trafficking matters with some political practices used
to impose its specific vision, and how the Mexican Government adopted that same position.
Hierarchy of Priorities
The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 forced the United States
Government to reorganize the hierarchy of the components of the security agenda.
Unfortunately for those who had developed an addiction to the subject, during the
subsequent weeks the issue of Mexican drug trafficking toward the United States almost
disappeared from the United States political speech. DEA authorities took advantage of the
112
Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “Obligan ataques a virar la política de seguridad,” in El Universal, October 14th,
2001.
113
“Pero no a expensas de todo lo demás,” “Agradece EU a México medidas antiterroristas,” in Reforma,
November 19th, 2001.
161
162
first opportunity they had to associate terrorism with drug trafficking, and afterwards they
classified the latter as a variation of the former. If they wanted to maintain their influence
and fight for the distribution of public financing, they had to adjust their traditional speech
to the new priority of the United States political agenda: The Taliban with opium
trafficking, the FARC with cocaine trafficking, the Arellano clan, and their possible links
with the FARC, and so on. A new political speech, which included the supposed
participation of international “narco-terrorists” focused on attacking the United States as
well as the stability of democratic countries, was shaped. Thus, the cooperation expected
from allied countries had to include diplomatic, legal, police, and military characters, in
order to face the new threat—or the combination of preexisting but potential threats. In the
past traffickers were able to execute terrorist actions. In other words, terrorism was a
possible strategy but not the main activity. Hence the “narco-terrorists” label. Pablo
Escobar was the paradigm. After September 11th, 2001, terrorism became the essential
matter and drug trafficking one of the possible strategies to fund activities of political
character and unsteadiness. Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda substituted for Escobar.
One of the political statements that circulated among the media after the attacks,
referred to the strict control mechanisms that were to be placed by the United States
Government throughout the country’s borders. Some people thought that this would bring
problems to the traffickers when introducing their merchandise into the country, and so that
it would remain inside national territory—especially in zones near the borders—which
would trigger an increase in the consumption rates. In that sense, some Mexican officers
made precipitate declarations that alarmed the people. Just as it happened with the
detentions of illicit trade leaders, the reinforcement of border control mechanisms did not
diminish drug circulation within the United States territory, or increase prices as
consequence of an eventual shortage. At least no North American authority has proven such
fact. 114 On the other hand, inside Mexico they assume that the availability of drugs is a
good reason for people to consume them in quantities that make the drug business
profitable enough for traffickers to decide not to cross the border. They also assume that, in
order to build a fast-track market, the only requirements are the will of the trafficker and
114
See: Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rocín (editors), Drogas y democracia en América Latina, Buenos
Aires, WOLA/ Biblos Publishing House, 2005.
162
163
his easy access to the drugs. Traffickers’ market strategies are overestimated, while the
resistance and decision capacities of consumers to face such temptation are underestimated.
In addition to the former, the United States has tried to increase its territorial security
to the north on the border with Canada and to the south with Mexico. Mexican security
depends on the United States nowadays more than ever. By 1986, during Reagan’s
Administration, the United States Government decided that drug trafficking was to be a
matter of “national security.” Drug consumption in the United States was, and still is, a
national health problem. To think that traffickers endanger North American national
security is a matter of definition of the content of the concept, of those who established
them, and of the power to impose them as a reason of the State within a specific historical
moment. It is not a matter of essence, but of perspective. Not even during the high water
mark of the Cosa Nostra was this organization considered a threat to national security. Only
when an increase in the consumption of psychoactive substances took place, and when
traffickers of ethnic minorities—mainly Colombians and Mexicans—started appearing,
were drug trafficking matters considered from a new point of view. Al Capone and the
Cosa Nostra did intervene in the internal policies of the United States. However, we have
not heard the same of any Latin American delinquent. Even when the first ones were listed
as public enemies, they were never considered as threats to the national security. Those
were other times, other priorities, other interests and other categories of perception. In
Mexico, the head of SEDENA, General Clemente Vega affirmed: “we can not shut our eyes
to the fact that drug trafficking threatens the integrity of the territory, sovereignty and
independence, and the country’s society.” 115 As in many other occasions, the political
declaration took over the argumentation.
The construction of meaning
Within the frame of the V National Congress for the Prevention of Crime—held in
Tepic, Nayarit, on October 2001—the head of PGR denied the fact that the tight United
States border controls, due to the terrorist attempts of September 11th, 2001, could have
115
Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “Ante el cambio el Ejército se ha renovado: Vega García,” in El Universal,
February 20th, 2003.
163
164
triggered an increase in drug consumption among the border population of North Mexico.
He stated:. “It does not mean that right now this fact is cause for the increase… I do want to
leave this clear, because it is not like that.”116 The Prosecutor denied affirmations of his
own office, like the ones of Mario Estuardo Bermúdez Molina, head of the Special Public
Prosecution Service for the Attention Against Health Crimes (FEADS in Spanish), who had
stated that cocaine coming from Colombia stayed at the Mexican border because of United
States control. Other examples of statements are those of Pedro Peñaloza, General Director
of the Prevention against Crime and Community Services, who affirmed that all drugs
remained within Mexican territory.
During a visit paid to Mexico during January, 2002—in order to meet with the
Mexican Prosecutor—John Walters, Head of the ONDCP, announced that the most
powerful drug trafficking organization in Mexico was that of the Arellano brothers. He
acknowledged that inside his country there were also strong drug trafficking organizations,
but he could not remember names or numbers; a frequent memory loss among United
States authorities. Walters praised the Anti-drug efforts of both Mexican and Colombian
governments. Links between terrorism and drug trafficking were mentioned throughout the
meeting. For the first time since he took charge, theses such as the following appeared in
the speech of the Mexican Prosecutor: “We want to keep in mind that terrorist
organizations are linked to the illicit business of drug trafficking and money laundering.”
Prosecutor Macedo declared that he had gone through “a hypothesis on the
repositioning of drug trafficking and its links with terrorism; our mission is to avoid that
this hypothesis becomes a reality, so we will increase information exchange with the United
States.” 117 Without doubt, Walters’ visit contributed to bring a thesis inside the North
American security agenda, which became stronger after September 11th, 2001. In a short
time, the United States Anti-Drug Authorities launched two different theories into the
media: the possible success of border control and the links between drug trafficking and
terrorism—without empirical support in the Mexican case—which they were accepted by
some Mexican officers without further analyses. The Prosecutor recognized afterwards that,
116
Vicente Hernández Elías, “Niega Macedo aumento en el uso de drogas,” Milenio, October 31st, 2001.
Jorge Alejandro Medellín y Ruth Rodríguez, “Vinculados, narco y terrorismo: Macedo,” in El Universal,
January 18th, 2002.
117
164
165
because of North American requests, Mexico reinforced its northern border in order to
prevent terrorist attacks into the bordering country.
In another meeting held in United States territory, Macedo and Walters discussed,
among other subjects, the possibility of joint following-up investigations on probable links
between drug trafficking and terrorism. 118 Later on, and after the re-appearance of members
of the guerrilla group Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI) in Guerrero,
the Prosecutor mentioned the subject one more time: “There are several connections
between the issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, kidnappings, arm trafficking and money
laundering, this task is an integral job we have to execute against organized crime” 119 Such
theory had no particular case as proof. During the Parliamentary Summit of the Americas,
held in Quito at the end of August 2003, Macedo avowed: “Narcoterrorism is one of the
biggest menaces to the stability and equilibrium of the institutions of the state.” 120 He said
it without supporting evidence or examples; as if this particular statement was a universal
truth.
The document The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 121
dated September 2002, quotes: “Poverty does not make poor people terrorists or murders,
however, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make vulnerable the weakest states
when facing terrorist nets and drug cartels within their borders.” Colombia is pointed out as
a country that illustrates the link between terrorist and extremist groups and drug trafficking
activities that help finance their operations. It is said that the original conflicts in Latin
America, particularly those related with violence generated by traffickers and their
accomplices, along with the “frantic drug trafficking, can endanger the health and security
of the US.” The countries that, in the American continent, have created a “flexible
coalition” and share their priorities with the United States are mainly Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico. Self-designated as representative of the forces of freedom,
democracy and the free market, the United States raises itself as a world-wide guardian of
118
David Carrizales, “México refuerza mecanismos de seguridad, en apoyo a EU,” in La Jornada, August
17th, 2002; Alfredo Joyner and Horacio Santini, “Necesario renovar el sistema de extradición: Macedo,” in
Milenio, September 19th, 2002.
119
David Vicenteño, “Pide Macedo no alarmar sobre guerrilla,” in Reforma, December 6th, 2002.
120
“El narcoterrorismo es de las más grandes amenazas a la estabilidad y equilibrio de las instituciones del
Estado,” and Gustavo Castillo, “Necesaria, política continental contra el narco: Macedo,” in La Jornada,
August 28th, 2003.
121
Go to http://www.whitehouse.gov
165
166
such values, and does so in an even stronger way after the events that occurred on
September 11th, 2001.
The document gives credit to a category of perception (“cartel”), which has not shown
its scientific pertinence at the time of designating the multiple illicit drug trafficking groups
that exist around the world. Instead, it works as a political, journalistic, police label and
linguistic convention, without having any demonstrable relation with its original economic
meaning. Still—beyond the lack of epistemological rigour to appropriately use language to
include one of its opponents—the United States Government stated that among its main
current worries is the possible link between terrorist groups and drug traffickers, which
might help fund destabilization strategies. It is clear that the risk already existed, and that in
several occasions the so-called terrorist groups and the special counterinsurgency ones, or
those of different types, from States that are considered as democratic, have adopted drug
trafficking to subsidize their activities; some of them wanting to justify their struggle
against the established power, and others finding protection in the national interest. In both
cases, the moral load associated to the trade of illicit psychoactive drugs, together with the
laws to punish the lawbreakers, have been ignored, because of pragmatic strategies to either
gain access to power or to retain it, and to impose their own values and exceptional rules.
Up to the moment, neither the Mexican nor the United States Governments have
connected the Mexican guerrilla groups to drug trafficking. However, DEA’s Head during
2002, Asa Hutchinson, tried to launch a thesis on the “narcoterrorist” threat within Mexico
being similar to Colombia’s, due to links between FARC and the Arellano Félix brothers’
group. The history of this relation had wide media coverage. On August 9th, 2000, the
Colombian citizen Carlos Ariel Charry Guzmán was arrested in Mexico. In November of
that year, after three months of detention, the FEADS of the PGR announced the expedition
of formal imprisoning warrants against Charry; Ismael Higuera Guerrero (alias “El
Mayel”); Enrique Harari Garduño—head of the Federal Road Police (died of a heart attack
in the Almoloya prison in 2004); and Enrique Guillermo Salazar Ramos, Deputy-Delegate
chief of the PJF in Tijuana. Charry was accused of being “likely responsible” for the
violation of the Federal Law Against Organized Delinquency, for having “leadership and
supervision tasks,” plus several charges against health—particularly those on “traffic and
introduction of a drug called hydrochloride cocaine into national territory.”
166
167
According to the FEADS, Charry and his brother Carlos Darío “were part of an
organization operating in Bogotá and San Vicente del Caguán, Colombia, dedicated to drug
trafficking, weapons, ammunitions, and safeguarding material, destined to subversive fronts
that had operations within the so-called zona de despeje”. The organization received
amounts in the millions of dollars, the result of drug trafficking, to be delivered to members
of FARC in the demilitarized zone at San Vicente del Caguán; it was specially addressed,
among others, to alias “Mono Jojoy” (alias “Raúl”).” Mexican authorities acknowledged
that Charry had been in Mexico several times, and that he had met with Higuera and some
other members of the Arellano Félix group. They pointed out meetings held at December
1999 and August of 2000. During this stage of the process, the FEADS highlighted the fact
that the Colombian source that supplied cocaine to the Arellano group had been
dismantled. 122 Meanwhile, the Department of State’s spokesman declared that the FARC
sent cocaine to the Arellano clan in exchange for money and “perhaps weapons.” 123 Many
of the media presented this possibility as a fact.
FARC opened in Mexico an office for political representation, which operated until
2001; only when the United States included such organization in its list of high-risk
terrorist groups it was finally closed. In 2002, Alejandro Ramos Flores—PGR’s DeputyProsecutor of International Affairs—reported from Washington that several “traffickers or
apparent drug dealers of the Arellano Félix group and the FARC” had been detained in
Northern Mexico. 124
With this new information in hand, the United States Drugs “Czar,” John Walters,
ruled out DEA’s scenery for México, and praised the Fox Administration’s
accomplishments in the battle against drug trafficking organizations. 125 Once this
possibility was eliminated, the only remaining suspects were several police groups, law
122
See: PGR, “Formal prisión en contra de Enrique Guillermo Salazar Ramos, Enrique Harari Garduño,
Carlos Ariel Charry Guzmán (a) ‘El Doctor’ e Ismael Higuera Guerrero (a) ‘El Mayel’ o ‘Rodrigo Sánchez
Ellis’,” in Brochure No. 610/00, November 28th, 2000; PGR, “Organización delictiva de los Arellano Félix:
principales detenciones,” in Brochure No. 214/02, March 10th, 2002; “Falleció el exdirector de la PFC
2004
(available
at:
Enrique
Harari,”
in
El
Vigía,
September
8th,
http://www.elvigia.net/print.php?seccion=generales&id=11463).
123
See: Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, “Colombian rebel connection to Mexican drug cartel,”
United States Department of State, November 29th, 2000.
124
See: A.P., “En México Procuraduría desvela unión FARC-Arellano Félix,” August 13th, 2002.
125
See: Maribel González, “Teme DEA narcoterrorismo en México,” in Reforma, August 9th, 2002; José
Carreño Figueras, “Copiará E.U. plan de la PGR,” in El Universal, August 14th, 2002; Maribel González,
“México, modelo a seguir en lucha antinarco,” in Reforma, August 14th, 2002.
167
168
enforcement officers, and some militaries linked to trafficking organizations. Save from the
former, it seemed as if they had forgotten, on purpose, previous and current political groups
who could influence such organizations. A latent fear seemed to exist within members of
the Fox’s Administration, hindering an exhaustive investigation on links between both
members of the PRI who had been displaced from power—mainly, although not
exclusively, inside the federal executive branch—or from the PAN—working in local
governments—and the drug trafficking issue.
In November 2002, the United States Senate approved the Homeland Security Act,
which includes a definition for “terrorism”: “any activity that (A) involves an act that (i) is
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources;
and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other
subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”
Besides from the responsibility of preventing terrorist attacks, among the activities
assigned to the Internal Security Department (ISD) are the following responsibilities:
“monitoring the relations between illicit drug trafficking and terrorism, having to
coordinate efforts in order to abolish such interactions, plus having to contribute to the
efforts of preventing illicit drug trafficking.” The ISD Secretary has enough authority to
appoint a high profile “Anti-narcotics Official” who will be responsible for coordinating
politics and operations inside the Department and between this institution, other
departments and federal agencies. All activities have to be related to illicit drug trafficking
to the United States, terrorism, and connections between both activities. This Official
should also act as Interdiction Coordinator for the Director of the Drug Control National
Policy.
During the XIX Bi-National meeting, held in November 2002, the expectations of the
Fox Administration of obtaining some kind of migratory agreement were not fixed.
However, an agreement to strengthen security at the frontier was signed; a subject of
undoubtedly more interest for the North American government. Prosecutor Macedo pointed
out that the Mexican government was worried by the fact that terrorist groups could use the
168
169
northern border to go into United States territory. Opposite to previous meetings, illicit
drug trafficking from Mexico toward the United States did not seem to be an issue of
mutual accusations, nor seemed to have been relevant at all. No official declared anything
particularly meaningful on the subject, and the media did not report anything extraordinary
either. 126
On December 2002, Prosecutor Macedo was appointed President of the InterAmerican Commission for Drug Abuse Control (CICAD in Spanish)—an organization that
is part of the OEA and created in 1986, the same year when the controversial process of the
unilateral “certification” instituted by the United States began. CICAD’s assessments were
meant to search for better cooperation mechanisms, but not to condemn or establish
sanctions against the Member States for all failures detected regarding drug issues. It was
said that the position had been given to him because of his performance as head of the
PGR. 127 Prosecutor Macedo pointed out that he would push the Multilateral Evaluation
Mechanism (MEM) in order to avoid United States certification from being applied more
than once. This was a goal established by the Mexican diplomacy since the government of
Zedillo. Concerning the certification process, he stated: “this subject irritated me, I did not
agree with the unilateral perception on the efforts of a country.” 128 He placed a request to
put into practice cooperation measures against money laundering, weapon trafficking,
terrorism funding and corruption. He said he would launch several measures to reduce drug
consumption. The lack of information and reliable data on these particular matters sets
hurdles to the design of preventive policies, he said. He assured that the American continent
was the region with highest levels of drug production and consumption. 129 He did not
mention any country in particular. President Fox closed the meeting and repeated one more
time that the battle against drugs and traffickers was a “merciless fight.” The report of the
MEM on Mexico presented achievements of the last two years and highlighted the increase
in drug consumption and trafficking by sea, especially across the Pacific Ocean. There were
126
Daniel Millán, “Impone EU su agenda en la Binacional,” in Reforma, November 27th, 2002; Víctor Hugo
Michel, “La extradición está a revisión en México y EU, dice Macedo,” in Milenio, November 27th, 2002.
127
“Asumirá Macedo de la Concha presidencia de la CICAD,” in Milenio, December 1st, 2002.
128
Alfredo Joyner, “El combate al consumo, nuevo plan antinarco,” in Milenio, December 3rd, 2002.
129
Jesús Aranda, “Macedo: América, el continente con más consumo y producción de drogas,” in La Jornada,
December 3rd, 2002.
169
170
also several suggestions on legislations for controlled chemical substances and those affairs
having to do with money laundering, among others. 130
Loaded Dice
A thesis circulated by the PGR on May 2003, particularly in the hands of José Luis
Santiago Vasconcelos—head of the Specialized Unit for Organized Delinquency (UEDO in
Spanish)—referred to the arrival of “articuladores” from five or six non mentioned traffic
organizations, Colombian paramilitaries and guerrilla fighters, who would come to Mexico
in order to insure the control of cocaine routes and the introduction of the substance to
United States territory. This was due to the self-proclaimed success of the Mexican
authorities in dismantling the main groups. 131 Almost all the groups linked to drug
trafficking in Colombia would have sent their operators. The only missing soul was that of
Pablo Escobar. This is no doubt awkward, since Colombian authorities and the media had
already communicated that the big Colombian organizations had been dismantled and,
therefore, they were operating in “cells,” as was stated by General Rosso José Serrano some
years before. The statement of the head of the UEDO presumed the premature and
definitive death of Mexican operators, as well as of their reproduction and leadership
capacities. It also acknowledged the existence of weakened and drifting groups who would
be waiting with wide open arms for new foreign chiefs who, in case of not feeling
appropriately welcomed, would try to impose their authority, even with violence. Thus,
some Colombians’ modus operandi was to be transferred to Mexico, giving space to the
self-fulfilling prophecy: Mexico’s “Colombianization.” Shouldn’t we be talking, instead, of
the “Colombianization” of United States policy toward Mexico?
The assertion was presented immediately after the meeting held in Washington
between Prosecutor Macedo and his United States counterpart, Ashcroft, together with the
130
Alfredo Joyner y Patricia Ruiz-Manjarrez, “Deficiencias antidrogas en el combate hemisférico,” in
Milenio, December 6th, 2002; Fernando Mayolo-López, “Proponen un escudo antidrogas,” in Reforma,
December 6th, 2002; Horacio Santini, “Otorgan calificación mixta a México en tarea antidrogas,” in Milenio,
January 31st, 2003; Maribel González, “Presume PGR su estrategia contra narco,” in Reforma, January 30th,
2003; Ariadna García, “Más recomendaciones contra tráfico de drogas,” in El Universal, January 31st, 2003.
131
José Carreño, “Preocupa a EU la presencia de narcos colombianos en México,” in El Universal, May 1st,
2003; Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “Arrests in Mexico unveil Colombian cocaine connection,” in The
Washington Post, May 8th, 2003; Mark Stevenson, “Colombians move in on Mexican drug trade,” in The
Washington Post, May 10th, 2003.
170
171
Commissioner for the White House Anti-drug Policies Office (Walters). Macedo did not
deny his subordinate’s statement, nor added anything to it. Actually, he postulated
Vasconcelos as the “natural candidate” to occupy the Deputy Prosecutor vacant at the
Organized Delinquency Service Investigations Office, which afterwards became true. Later
on, the Colombian President, Álvaro Uribe, affirmed that his government would support the
Mexican Administration in everything that was needed. 132 The loaded dice had been
thrown. The basic ingredients for the post-September 11th, 2001 obsession were present:
terrorism, drug trafficking, war on drugs, and violence. The Washington-México-Bogotá
axis had to be strengthened. With this scenery in mind it would not be a surprise to find any
United States Congressmen looking reelection, arguing the need to apply the dynamics of a
“preventive attack” across the border in order to stop “narco-terrorists”. The Mexican
authorities, who did not present evidence of their statements, while nobody asked for them
either, took care of setting the table and serving the dish.
Hot Frontier
In the morning of March 14th, 2003, the neighbors of the streets known as Niño,
Carmen, and Virgo, of the city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas, had to run for their lives when
Osiel Cárdenas—a 35 year old man, former trainer of drug-sniffing-dogs—and his gang
participated in a half-hour shooting against military forces and, it was said, members of the
AFI, UEDO and the FEADS. In fact, they were around 20 gunmen against 40 elements of
the Special Forces Aero Mobile Group (GAFES in Spanish). Cárdenas, leader of the Gulf
trafficking organization (cocaine, heroin and marihuana; present in, at least, 10 States:
Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Jalisco,
Zacatecas, Chiapas, and the Federal District), was considered successor of Juan García
Ábrego—who, according to the PGR, worked as partner of the Cali Cartel. Extradited in
1996 to the United States, he was captured unharmed and transferred to Military Camp
Number 1 and after to La Palma, former Almoloya, maximum-security prison. General
Vega, head of SEDENA, confirmed that three military personnel had been wounded, two of
132
José Carreño and Francisco Gómez, “Colombia ofrece ayuda contra sus narcos,” in El Universal, May 1st,
2003.
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172
them very seriously. He also declared that it had been a secret operation ordered by
President Fox, prepared during six months, and performed by Special Forces of the Army
and the Air Force. Inside the PGR, he added, only Prosecutor Macedo knew about it, and
was ordered to keep the secret. They believed that approximately 300 people protected
Cárdenas all over the country; some of them even within the Armed Forces and the PGR.
Two of his arrested gunmen had previously deserted from the Army.
The United States Government offered a two million-dollar reward for Cárdenas’
capture. He had been their target since 1995. On November 9th, 1999, in Matamoros,
Cárdenas and his people held hostages and threatened to death the FBI agent Daniel
Fuentes and DEA’s Joseph Dubois. The disappearance of four Mexican federal agents,
three months before Cárdenas’ capture, was attributed to him and to his organization. He
was part of those agencies and custom services “most wanted” top-ten list around the
world. The United States Ambassador to Mexico, Tony Garza, and Rogelio Guevara,
DEA’s Chief of Operations, congratulated the Mexican Government for the detention of
Cárdenas. John Walters, head of the ONDCP, did the same and added: “he represented a
threat for the security of both countries.” Governors of Tamaulipas—Tomás Yarrington—
and
Nuevo
León—Fernando
Elizondo
Barragán—congratulated
the
Federal
Government. 133
At this point, the FARC made another entrance into the scenery. This time they
happen to be linked to the Tamaulipas trafficking organization, with Osiel Cárdenas as
leader. In January 2004, the PGR captured in Mexico City—in Iztapalapa delegation—to
the Colombian Juan Pablo Rojas López, known as “El Halcón,” and other 14 traffickers
133
Mario A. Arteaga and Elia Martínez-Rodarte, “Detienen a Osiel Cárdenas,” in Milenio, March 14th, 2003;
Abel Barajas, “Capturan a líder del Cártel del Golfo,” in Reforma, March 14th, 2003; Juan José Ramírez,
“Detienen a presuntos narcos en Matamoros,” in Reforma, March 14th, 2003; Francisco Gómez, “Cae en
Tamaulipas jefe del cártel del Golfo,” in El Universal, March 14th , 2003; Ioan Grillo, “alleged drug lord
arrested in Mexico,” in AP, March 14th, 2003; “U.S. Customs Service Most Wanted Profile,” at:
www.customs.gov, consulted on March 14th, 2003; Kevin Sullivan, “Mexico seizes reputed drug lord,” in The
Washington Post, March 15th, 2003; Mario A. Arteaga, “Osiel Cárdenas fue recluido en el Cefereso de La
Palma,” in Milenio, March 15th, 2003; Angélica Mercado and Alfredo Joyner, “Fox confía al Ejército la
captura de capos,” in Milenio, March 15th, 2003; Abel Barajas, “Encarcelan a Osiel en La Palma,” in Reforma,
March 16th, 2003; Juan José Ramírez and Abel Barajas, “Cae capo del Cártel del Golfo,” in Reforma, March
15th, 2003; “Considera EU captura como gran victoria,” in Reforma, March 15th, 2003; José García and Efraín
Klérigan, “Aplauden gobernadores captura,” in Reforma, March 15th, 2003; Francisco Gómez, “Descabezan
cártel del Golfo,” in El Universal, March 15th, 2003; José Carreño Figueras, “Felicita EU a México por la
detención,” in El Universal, March 15th, 2003; Gustavo Castillo García and Armando Torres Barbosa, “La
historia del cártel del Golfo,” in La Jornada, March 15th, 2003.
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who worked with him. The authorities caught him carrying more than 2 tons of cocaine,
ready to be shipped to the United States via Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo, with an
estimated price of US$40 million, but they never mentioned any particular Mexican
organization as possible recipient. According to his own statements, Rojas started in the
business in the 80’s, when he joined the people of Pablo Escobar who were operating in
Mexico. The blows given to Escobar’s group left him without direct contacts, until 2002,
when the brothers Víctor and Manuel Mejia Múnera (alias “Los Mellizos”), appointed him
as delegate of their organization in Mexico. He was to be in charge of handling the cocaine
coming from Colombia, from the hands of the brothers Jaramillo Correa, Carlos and
Mauricio, who were also FARC’s operators. 134 The Mejía brothers—both paramilitary
chiefs of the “Vencedores de Arauca” block—contacted Rojas in order to supply cocaine to
the so-called “del Golfo” organization—commanded by Osiel Cárdenas as well. According
to Rojas, the transactions were made directly with them, although sometimes, and
depending on the route, the contact was made with the Jaramillo brothers. 135
After Cárdenas detention, the situation at the Tamaulipas frontier became more
complex. The battle for the control of the region between his followers and the band leaded
by the Sinaloan trafficker Joaquín Guzmán Loera (alias “El Chapo”) worsened. Due to the
frequency of violent confrontations among the bands of traffickers in different parts of the
country—specially in Nuevo Laredo, at the state of Tamaulipas—the United States
Ambassador to Mexico, Tony Garza, addressed a letter to the Mexican authorities
communicating his worries for the problems taking place at the border after the death of
that city’s Sheriff, which occurred seven hours after his appointment. Condoleezza Rice—
Head of the State Department—plus several officials of DEA, and some Mexican
entrepreneurial groups, responded in the same way. Shortly after, the Mexican Government
announced that a mission called “México Seguro” was to be launched soon, seeking to
control violence. The duty consisted in a group of military personnel and agents of the
Preventive Federal Police (PFP)—composed, mainly, of military personnel —who, in
addition to members of the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI in Spanish), were to be sent
to patrol the streets and establish controls across the border city and some other places in
134
See: PGR, “Desarticula PGR organización criminal dedicada al tráfico de droga,” in Brochure No. 089/04,
January 29th, 2004.
135
See: “La conexión mexicana,” in Semana Digital, May 21st, 2005.
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Sinaloa and Baja California. In spite of the situation, executions persisted. Thus, during the
first week of August 2005, the United States Ambassador decided to close down the
consulate at Nuevo Laredo. Government officials and other social forces considered it was
too much. Meanwhile, the Department of State supported the Ambassador’s decision. A
week later, the consulate was opened once again but the executions did not stop. Sometime
later, in the United States, the Ambassador confirmed that the closure of the consulate had
been some-kind of “punishment” imposed to the Mexican Government for not controlling
violence across the region. This set off serious criticisms of the Ambassador.
That same month, Governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared a State of
Emergency in several border counties. Their criticisms were addressed to both Federal
Governments because of their lack of attention to both migratory affairs and the violence
present at the border. In this context, the Customs Office and Border Protection Services of
the Internal Security Department announced that before November 2005 they would launch
an observation operation across the border of the states of Arizona, Texas, and New
México, with remote-control planes. Days before, the Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, and
the leader of the majority at the Federal House of Representatives, Tom DeLay,
acknowledged that a dozen Predator robot planes would be used for the surveillance of
Southeastern Texas ports, the Mexican border, and some other strategic places. 136
The Military Option
The Armed Forces have played an outstanding role in the detention of important drug
traffickers throughout President Vicente Fox’s Administration. It is a role that started
changing in a qualitative way on 1995—the same year of the beginning of the “third
link”—implying a closer relation between the United States and the Mexican Armed
Forces. In fact, Civil Authority (PGR) has become an institution that depends on the
SEDENA, although the law establishes that the military can only participate in drug issues
when the PGR requires so—it has been this way since 1947—just as before it depended
from the Health Department. During the 30’s, the main authority responsible for drug
136
See: “Aviones robot permanentes en la frontera,” in Univisión online, August 22nd, 2005; “Aviones robot
vigilarán frontera con México,” in Telemundo51.com, August 17th, 2005.
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issues was a General, José Siurob, who was also a doctor. The official media coverage
during Fox’s government has been in charge of the UEDO, SIEDO since 2003, and it has
been an important backing for the militaries in almost all their recent operations.
Neither the political parties nor the organized groups of civil society have questioned
the lack of precision of Articles 89 and 129 of the Constitution 137 —the SEDENA quotes on
its website the former, although not the latter, in relation to its participation in the war
against drugs. They did not analyze either what was the limit for the military obligations of
the PGR’s former chief, Rafael Macedo de la Concha—who resigned in April 2005—nor
what were his civil responsibilities as Attorney General. A pragmatic strategy of high
impact has been favored in the short term: the hunting of visible heads. A deadline has not
yet been set for the return of military to their operative positions within the war against
drugs (“whenever society decides so” repeated Macedo constantly when he was Attorney
for Military Justice), nor has it been set for those who have been “commissioned” to do a
strictly police job. Probable corruption and human-right violation problems that are related
to anti-drug activities have been placed under internal vigilance of the Armed Forces.
Which institution(s) will supervise, call, and report to the Armed Forces? The traditional
hermeticism of the armed institution nourishes, at least, the skepticism.
The analysis would have to be extremely forced in order to conclude that Mexican
traffickers include declaring a war to the State among their plans—it must be remembered
that it was the State who declared a “war” against drugs, thus, against drug traffickers—to
facilitate a foreign invasion, or to arrange a coupe de état. This might be true, unless we
think that the “war against drugs’” rhetoric that initiated during the Nixon Administration
in the late sixties was really a conventional type of war. The job of the traffickers implies
the violation of the laws that forbid them to carry on with their activities, and to take
advantage of the weakness of the institutions in charge of making such laws be respected.
Also, these institutions are obliged to train their staff members in an ethic for public service
and not for personal benefit or power gangs. They need to train personnel in order to be
137
Article 89, fraction VI: “Among the faculties and the obligation of the President one can find the power to
dispose permanently of the Armed Forces, in other words of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in order to
maintain Internal Security and to defend the Federation”; 129: “During peace time periods, any authority may
execute functions different than those strictly connected with military discipline. There will only be
permanent and fixed military control in castles, fortresses and stores directly depending upon the Government
of the Union; or in camps, bases or deposits, which in open and deserted areas, might become shelters for
military forces.”
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able to stand up with strong moral convictions against extraordinary offers of money, no
matter the amount. Their aim is not to create supermen but just honest public agents, whose
work can be recognized by society and be duly protected by a democratic state. Traffickers
have contributed to the weakening of such institutions, which already depended on the
hegemonic political party. They seek to mine the strong adversarial forces in order to take
advantage of such institutions for their own benefit; they aim to gain positions, but not to
substitute the institutions with others created under their self-image. They do not intend to
create the “narco-state,” which is simply an invention of the media. Not even Pablo Escobar
tried this. Nobody thought of the old hegemonic political power as a threat to national
security, for the simple reason that its members where those who also decided what or who
went under such category.
The United States considers that its police and justice institutions work as they
should, and that it is not necessary to include the Army into direct anti-drug activities
within its territory; even when, at some point, they appointed a General (McCaffrey), to be
head of the Anti-Drug Office at the White House. Because of self-conviction or political
pressures coming from the United States, heads of other states consider that this is not their
case, and that the only and last institution that could confront traffickers with certain
probable success within the logic of the war against drugs is the military, without
abandoning the use of police and civil institutions or what is left of them. An accumulation
of forces as well as a displacement of civil society from its main command and operation
positions is taking place; there is no deadline for the retirement of the military from those
positions, or for the creation of solid, competent, and trustworthy police institutions as well
as those of law enforcement. Why would the military forces in drug producing and
trafficking countries succeed in a battle that has been going on for almost nine decades in
the United States, and a little less in some others? If the military of those countries fail,
what is next: Direct intervention by United States military forces? The situation in
Colombia represents a great temptation and seems to be heading that way.
Mythology, Pending Tasks, and Permanent War
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For several years, the media and high profile officials of the Mexican and United
States governments have considered large trafficking organizations as highly dangerous,
and as a threat to national security and democratic institutions, among others. There is no
doubt on the fact that there are many traffickers to fear, but often the same authorities have
contributed to mystify the issue by attributing them supernatural powers and political
intentions. With enemies such as those, the authorities can easily justify their failure and
magnify their relative success. Such exaggeration also allows them to validate the request
for higher budgets and stronger punitive measures.
The Colombian General Rosso Jose Serrano—former Director of his country’s
National Police, and who captured the main heads of the Cali Cartel—pointed out in his
book Jaque mate, that the myth on these traffickers being unreachable and invincible made
everyone overestimate them. He also added: “I realized they were not as strong as I
thought.” 138 This was, without doubt, an important observation, which should make the
authorities and analysts think about the myths developed around traffickers: those authored
by themselves, their fans and supporters, and those created by the authorities, media, and
some researchers and analysts. Those myths flourish, in part, based on the non-critical
repetition of political, police, and media labels, without empirical reference, and which
have caused mental addiction. An example of this is the word “cartel,” which has been
constantly repeated in order to designate any group of traffickers, no matter if such groups
have or not the same characteristics as those economic organizations. People talk without
the knowledge of true facts; the stronger the shock, the better the label. Labeling does not
help to acknowledge the phenomenon; it is just an attractive wrapping to sell the product.
Both the alternation within the Federal Executive power in 2000 and the reshaping of
Mexican political power—that have taken place since the late 80’s—have modified the
existing relations between politics and drug trafficking, which existed during the
authoritarian regime with state party. In such relation the latter was subordinated to the
former, and the regime counted on coactive mediating institutions that had extralegal
attributes to regulate, protect and prevent drug traffickers from surpassing limits imposed
by the authorities.
138
Rosso José Serrano Cadena, Jaque mate, Bogotá, Norma, 1999, pp. 109-110.
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178
Without basic agreements between the main political forces of the country concerning
security and government affairs, and without firm security and justice institutions for the
periods of power alternation and the democratic transition, the scenario favored a stronger
relative autonomy in the field of drug trafficking in regard to political power, and thus
increased the possibilities of establishing new rules of the game. If the State lost its capacity
to rule and control violence, then extreme aggression appears as a way of accomplishing
hegemony in the area of drug trafficking; this also implies a bigger percentage of the
market and a positive power position over the other members of the field.
Without a doubt, the corruption of Mexican authorities, present at different levels, has
smoothed the progress of trafficking organizations. These institutions have done what they
know in order to accomplish their objectives and, in this sense, they have been efficient.
The authorities still do not know what to do to counteract the strategies of traffickers. A
long institutionalized history of corruption has nourished habits that are difficult to modify.
Both the removal of the PRI from the Federal Executive Power, after the elections of July
2000, combined with a Congress where none of the three main parties are a majority,
presented the possibility of starting to dismantle historical and structural links between
some groups that had ruled over political life and drug trafficking. Some have talked about
researching on what happened during 1968 and during the so-called “dirty war” against the
guerrilla, which took place in the 70’s. However, nothing has been mentioned on doing
some research on those who monopolized political power in the country for seven decades,
and in the area of drug traffic. It is one of the pending tasks of the alternation government.
According to the official indexes to measure the results of the anti-drug war, some
goals have been accomplished. The truth is that the situation has worsened since more
detentions and seizures have taken place because of the fact that with time there is more
production and more people involved in the business. In other words, the logic of the
market has developed faster than the punitive measures, and even quicker than those of
dissuasion and contention implemented since the beginning of the twentieth century. The
United States has not been able to control its internal drug demand, while it keeps hoping
other countries succeed in this field…with their advice! Moreover, they also expect that
they diminish supply noticably, and, if possible, completely. At least in the case of
marijuana supply increases every day, also because of the work of United States producers
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inside their territory. The slight reduction observed in the latest addiction surveys made in
the United States have been used to affirm that, as former United States Ambassador
Davidow used to say, the United States was succeeding with the policy being used.
It has been forgotten that the consumption of psychoactive substances has followed a
cyclic historic pattern and it would be premature to claim full victory on this field. At least
that is what the decrease in the age of drug consumers seems to tell us. The United States
strategy applied in its territory has focused on the diminution of extreme and open violence,
which is found more frequently in producing and transit countries, and in the enforcement
of law to those inside and outside its borders; with the only awkward exception of several
powerful institutions in their own financial system, number one worldwide for money
laundering, despite presumptive strict legal measures designed to control it.
The message seems to be that, for as long as undesired ethnic minorities do not
control the business, if violence maintains at minimum or sociably tolerable levels, drug
trafficking can continue and develop up to a certain point inside the borders. Outside
frontiers, the exigencies are higher and concentrated on the diplomatic, police, and military
links, which become narrower throughout time, in order to, apparently, try to win a war of
almost nine decades of growing failures; measured in the diversification of the market and
the amount of people dedicated to the business, but still not in the number of arrests and
seizures. No war has been won, but it has become permanent and has contributed to make
the other countries involved more dependent on the United States. This was not the explicit
target, but has still been accomplished.
Conclusions
Paradoxically, measures that implied bigger and more accelerated military presence in
the security of the country correspond to higher democratic advances within the Mexican
Society. As if the immediate or most probable scenario was that of war and not one of hope
during a civilization procedure. Pierre Sané, former Secretary of International Amnesty,
once expressed a concern that was shared by other sectors of the Mexican society: “The
appointment of a general to head civil justice may lead to a further militarization of justice,
when what is requested today is the elimination from military justice of certain areas of
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competence and the translation of them to civil justice.” 139 He added: “The fact that in the
police forces there are military forces shouldn’t be a problem if the military personnel
followed procedures respecting human rights.” 140 Nowadays, neither the Armed Forces are
an example of internal democracy nor their members are the best representatives. Their
historical hermeticism has left a print, which is now the second nature of its personnel. The
required transparency of the institutions in democracy will probably not be strengthened by
the military’s habits.
The Armed Forces showed their institutionalism in the July 2nd, 2000 elections, but
that did not turn their members, as if by a magical act, into convinced democrats or into
role models who respect human rights. Though the project intended to allow access to the
public, official information was still not presented; there even were voices—such as that of
Hugo Gutiérrez Dávila, Secretary of the Inter-Secretarial Commission for Transparency
and Fight against Corruption—who supposed that one of the “frontiers” to such law was to
be “determined by the concept of National Security;” 141 a polysemic concept and subject to
the arbitrary meanings of the national interest. Up to the moment, the content of the concept
depends more on what the United States includes in it, than on the real or imaginary threat
of the illicit drug traffickers or of any other social agents.
If before with civilians in charge one did not really know what was going on with
drug trafficking, with the military information is not better. Since 1986, the different
Mexican governments, regardless of their political tendency, adopted and enclosed
themselves into a trap, either willingly or influenced by United States pressure, which
compels those who decide to take their internal logic to its last consequence, to militarize
security organisms. It is not in vain to insist in the increasing probabilities of corruption
among military personnel when they are placed in operative positions of the anti-drug war.
Additionally, and even more serious, is the probable displacement of the historical relation
between drug trafficking, police, and politics, for the Armed Forces and militaries who
already occupy many of the power positions in safety organisms in the country. How much
139
Gerardo Jiménez, “Preocupa a AI militarización en PGR,” in Reforma, March 16th, 2001.
Verónica Valenzuela González, “Condena AI la militarización de las policías en México,” in El
Financiero, March 16th, 2001.
141
Renato Dávalos, “Ni carpetazos ni cacerías en la lucha anticorrupción: Gutiérrez D.,” in Excélsior, March
7th, 2001; Daniel Millán, “Promueven abrir información del gobierno,” in Reforma, February 1st, 2001; María
de la Luz González, “Es necesario acceso a la información,” in Reforma, March 25th, 2001.
140
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longer can the capture of drug trafficking leaders be politically exploited without visible
changes in the production, trafficking, export, and consumption of illicit substances inside
Mexico and the United States, or in the violence related with this business and the
institutional conditions for an effective democratic state? An emerging democracy that
needs to lean constantly and permanently on olive green crutches is not a complete
democracy. The “war against drugs” is a never-ending war. To include drug trafficking as a
matter of national security is to prolong military presence in the battle. Now, to adopt, in a
mechanical way, the thesis of the apparent and indissoluble link between terrorism and drug
trafficking, leads to the same strategy.
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Drug Policies, Reforms, and Colombo-American Relations
Francisco E. Thoumi *
Introduction
Policies against illicit drugs are currently the most important topic in the relations
between Colombia and the United States. As a matter of fact, the relations between these
two countries have been “narcotized” for at least the past 20 years. The influence of the
United States in Colombia manifests itself in many areas. Nowadays, the United States
provides a great amount of funds to the Colombian government’s battle against groups of
insurgents and counter-insurgents that participate in the illicit drugs business; Colombia
constantly extradites citizens requested by the government of the United States; both
countries declare and confirm their compromise to win the “war against drugs” and show
statistic indicators of the progress in this “war.” After September 11th, 2001, the illegal
armed Colombian groups were classified as terrorists by the United States, a fact that
allowed the Colombian government to use the funds provided by this country for the war
against drugs within the war against the armed groups, regardless of their ties to drug
trafficking. As of that moment, the Colombian government refers to those groups as bandits
and narco-terrorists without a political agenda. While feelings of anti-Americanism have
become stronger throughout Latin America in the past few years, and most governments are
trying to distance themselves from American policies, Colombia has become the United
States’ most trustworthy ally, to such a degree that many people believe that the Uribe
Administration is virtually an unconditional partner of the G. W. Bush Administration.
This alliance is fairly recent and the current harmonious relations between both
countries, although they reassert the traditional harmony between the two nations, are a
contrast to what occurred during the Samper Administration (1994-1998) when the United
States “decertified” Colombia in 1996 and 1997, and “granted a national interest waiver” in
1998. Despite the prevailing harmony, it is impossible to deny the fact that the relations are
asymmetric and reflect the enormous difference in power of the two countries. There are
*
Centro de Estudios y Observatorio de Drogas y Delito (CEODD), Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá. The
author appreciates Álvaro Camacho’s comments on the draft of this essay. The author has sole responsibility
for the opinions expressed here.
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about 600 United States advisers in Colombia, many of them members of the military, and
a great number of civilians employed both by the United States government as well as by
private companies with contracts from that government. The Colombian armed forces
receive training in the United States and they depend on the funds provided to them by the
United States—as is the case for many of the counter-drug programs, including those that
seek to strengthen the legal system, and the presence of the State in those areas ruled by
guerrillas and paramilitaries where illicit crops are grown.
Drug policies in the United States and in Colombia clearly complement each other,
and are an answer to the repressive and punitive perspective on the production, traffic, and
consumption of illicit mind-altering drugs; a view adopted by many in the United States
and most of the world nowadays. This perspective has inspired the international ordinances
developed during a century of conferences, conventions, and treaties ever since the 1909
international conference on opium in Shangai, and is accepted and promoted by most
countries in the world. By drawing a map of the countries that strongly support
prohibitionist policies towards mind-altering drugs, one finds that almost the entire world is
included in this list: the United States, Sweden, all of the former Soviet Union, Australia,
China, India, the countries in Oriental Europe, all of the Islamic world, African countries
south of the Sahara, Japan, Australia, and almost all the countries in Latin America. Also,
there is a consensus in Western Europe regarding the prohibition and control of the
production, traffic, and consumption of these drugs, although in many of these countries
and in Canada there is a movement that attempts to treat the use of drugs not as a criminal
problem, but as an issue with social roots relating to public health. This has led to the
creation of experiments and policies in these countries that seek to reduce the harm of these
activities. 1 In these countries there is also a tendency to accept the fact that production and
trafficking, especially in regard to the farmers that grow poppy and cocaine, are a social
phenomenon that reflects social problems. However, no strong movements that promote
free markets or significantly deregulation of cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines exist in any
country.
1
The United States government opposes to harm reduction in such a way that the current drug Czar, Walters,
constantly refers to this approach as “harm extension.”
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The Nature of the Problem Concerning the Formulation of Drug Policies 2
Drug policies have been formulated under simplistic conjectures about the cause of
the phenomenon. Many crime policies are based on a simple police model that assumes,
either implicitly or explicitly, that in every society there is a group of people with deviant
behavior that has been declared criminal by the current legitimate legal system and hence
has to be penalized. From this perspective, the organizations in charge of enforcing the law
obviously believe that it is a legitimate one, and that in every society a number of people
are born, who, due to their personality and attitude towards life, will tend to breach social
norms and laws legitimately imposed by the State. Within this framework, these people’s
deviant behavior generates social costs and this is why they have to be punished. In these
cases, the role of those in charge of enforcing the law is to apply it and penalize the
offenders. 3
The list of deviant behavior varies over time and among societies. Some behaviors,
like political and religious beliefs, which are considered to be deviant in one society may
not be in another. The UNODC 4 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; ONUDD, in
Spanish) believes that the international law created as a result of the conventions on mindaltering drugs reflects a unanimous agreement between all of the countries in the world on
the fact that the only permitted use of the drugs included in the lists of drugs subject to the
control of the conventions, the coca leaf being one of these, are medical and scientific
research. In other words, UNODC holds that there is a pact between all of the countries in
the world, signatories of the United Nations conventions, that includes the deviant behavior
regarding mind-altering drugs. This means that there cannot be ritualistic, social, or
2
The ideas expressed in this section have been developed in Francisco Thoumi, “Conflictos institucionales y
culturales en la formulación y evaluación de las políticas contra las drogas. Algunas referencias al caso
colombiano,” in M. Ardila, D. Cardona, and S. Ramírez (Eds.), Colombia y su política exterior en el siglo
XXI, Bogotá, Fescol-Cerec, 2005.
3
This is a generalized belief among the agencies and people in charge of enforcing the law. For example,
during a symposium of Chiefs of Police in Major Cities in the United States on October 6th, 1988 in Portland,
Oregon, a document was unanimously approved which declared: “we refuse the statement that current drug
laws have aggravated the drug problem. What has made the problem worse are individuals that make wrong
decisions.” (Edward J. Tully and Marguerite A. Bennett, “Pro-Legalization Arguments Reviewed and
Rejected,” in Rod L. Evans and Irwin M. Berent [Comps.], Drug Legalization for and Against, La Salle,
Illinois, Open Court, 1992.)
4
Oficina de las Naciones Unidas Contra las Drogas y el Delito (ONUDD), Informe mundial de drogas 2004,
New York, United Nations, 2004, volume I, p. 7.
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industrial use of the products included in these lists in any of the signatory countries of the
conventions.
Criminology is a relatively recent science and criminological studies have not
generated a consensus regarding the causes of criminality in a society. Crime has been
empirically associated to many factors such as poverty, alienation and anomie, genetics,
race, gender, ethnicity, feelings and political affiliation, family structure, levels of
education, and so on. Since the cause of crime is confusing and difficult to establish, many
policy makers choose to formulate and implement policies that, according to what they and
many others believe, protect society and its members from those people with criminal
behavior. In other words, from the perspective of any politician’s career, it is safer to do
something in order to protect the citizens of a community, even if that something does not
work, than to seek an understanding of the causes of criminality and endeavor a “soft
attitude towards drugs.” This creates a strong slant in favor of repressive policies.
Journalistic and governmental discourses on the cause of production, traffic, and
consumption of drugs are for the most part absolving and dismissive. For example, in the
United States the origin of the “drug problem” is thought to be the supply, while in
Colombia and most of Latin America it is perceived as a result of the demand. Declarations
such as: “if there was no supply, drugs would not be used,” and “if there was no demand,
these would not be produced,” are logically valid, but they are also trivial and do not
explain the main characteristics of the illicit drug markets. On the one hand, if the
availability of drugs determined its consumption then this factor would be the same in all of
the countries where users could have access to illicit drugs, which clearly does not happen.
On the other hand, if demand determines production then it should take place in all of the
countries that have the physical resources necessary for the production of illicit drugs,
which is also not the case.
The outline of production, traffic, and consumption of illicit mind-altering drugs the
mind is very useful in order to analyze the validity of the theories and hypothesis about
criminality. This outline is not consistent with the importance of supply and demand as
determining factors of production, traffic, and consumption of illicit mind-altering drugs.
The common market model used in economics, based on the concepts of supply and
demand, forecasts a very disperse distribution of production, traffic, and consumption.
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However, the outline shows a high concentration. On the supply side, cocaine can be
cultivated in all countries with a tropical humid climate. Cocaine paste can be refined in
any part of the world. Opium can be produced in all the countries where poppy is grown,
and heroin can be obtained from opium in any part of the planet. 5 Even though it is so easy
to produce coca, cocaine, opium, and heroin in many countries, these have centered in a
few and nowadays this concentration is extreme: Colombia produces approximately 70% of
the coca and cocaine, and Afghanistan, more than 80% of the opium and heroin in the
world. The statistics on drug consumption are weaker than those for production; they do not
offer information about the volumes of consumption but of the “predominance” in the
consumption of drugs, that is, the percentage of adults (generally between 15 and 65 years
of age) who have used drugs in the last month, the last year, or at some point during their
lives. These percentages show a very uneven distribution. In the case of opiates, the annual
predominance in Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Russia, and Latvia is greater (double or more)
than what it is in the remaining countries.6 Also, the prevalence of cocaine use in Spain, the
United States, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Argentina, and Australia is greater than what it
is in the other countries. 7 Despite the fact that the figures are not so accurate, it can be said
that the United States consumes approximately 35% of the total amount of cocaine
consumed worldwide and that 10 countries consume close to 80%.
Punitive and repressive policies against drugs have not been created accordantly to
the outline of drugs. Without a doubt, all societies have criminals; however, the rates of
criminality vary significantly over time and in space. In order to create efficient policies it
is essential to understand why criminality is higher during certain periods of time and in
particular societies than it is in others. Some basic facts prove this point. Firstly, people
with different personalities are born in every country; some will have a tendency to break
the rules. In other words, there is a “distribution of personalities” among the human beings
born in every society: there are people prone to being smiley, shy, studious, lazy, and so on.
Secondly, there is no reason to accept the fact that genetic differences make a country more
5
It is worth pointing out that at the beginning of the 20th century the most important exporter of cocaine was
the country we now know as Indonesia. At that time other exporters were territories in what is today
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka. The difficulties in exporting coca gave way to a strong political movement
in Peru that sought to industrialize coca, that is, produce cocaine for export (Joseph Gagliano, Coca
Prohibition in Peru, The University of Arizona Press, 1994).
6
Oficina de las Naciones Unidas Contra las Drogas y el Delito (ONUDD), op. cit., volume II, pp. 389-391.
7
Op. cit., pp. 392-393.
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inclined to crime than another, that is, that the distribution of the liability for crime is not
the same in different countries or moments. 8 Thirdly, the rates of criminality vary
significantly between the adults in different countries. To explain these differences it is
essential to understand the experiences each age group has, from the moment they are born
to the moment they act independently. Law in every country in the world treats minors in a
special way because it accepts the fact that these individuals are going through a stage of
development where responsibility for their actions is either limited or does not depend on
them due to their limited understanding of social and state regulations. The development of
adults is a process in which society instills restrictions upon each person’s behavior so that
as adults they can act reasonably within society. This is why, in order to understand why a
country has a high crime rate, it is essential to ask oneself: What is an adult made like in
that country? Alternatively, one may ask: Why is a Swede, a Norwegian, or a Swiss, in
average, more respectful of social and state regulations and laws at 20 or 25 years of age
than a Colombian?
Drug policies have not been created as an answer to the above-mentioned questions
nor to similar ones; they are based on simple assumptions about the cause of production,
traffic, and consumption of drugs. Politicians are reluctant to asking profound questions
about the cause of the factors related to mind-altering drugs, because any attempt to
establish the cause demands studying and questioning essential elements of a society, such
as its productive structure, institutions, and culture (values, beliefs, attitudes), which create
a strong social resistance because these topics are linked to the citizen’s identity. For this
reason, the “drug problem” is usually explained as something caused by external factors. In
the United States there is the tendency to define it as a problem caused by the supply of
illicit drugs from abroad, which is why policies that attack “the source” of drugs are very
popular. On the other hand, in Colombia the problem is usually associated to demand: “so
long as there is demand, there will be supply,” is a common affirmation that justifies the
production of drugs in Andean countries, and it implicitly reflects the inability of these
country’s governments to control illicit production and traffic. These exonerating
statements are very useful politically, but they avert an intense analysis that allows the
underlying and real causes of the development of the illicit industry, or the use of drugs in
8
Emilio Yunis, ¿Por qué somos así? ¿Qué pasó en Colombia? Análisis del mestizaje, Bogotá, Temis, 2003.
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both countries to be understood. These declarations lead to a quest for interpretations that
emphasize the dishonesty of those who create or apply the policies in the other country;
they appeal to nationalistic feelings that produce confrontations between citizens of
different countries; they contribute to a polarization of the debate on policies against drugs;
they hinder their evaluation; they increase distrust and become obstacles to understanding
those stances and arguments that are different or contrary to our own.
The first step to create effective policies requires the acknowledgement of the
complexity and the multidimensional and multidisciplinary quality of the factors related to
mind-altering drugs. These factors are associated with ethics and morals, public health,
economics, politics, international relations, anthropology, sociology, the legal system,
statistics, chemistry, ecology, and other fields of study. Due to the complexity and the large
number of disciplines engaged in the problem, there is not one that covers all of the aspects
of the phenomenon; the analysis and recommendations based in only one area of study have
a high probability of being incorrect or at least incomplete. Therefore, one should not be
surprised at the fact that drug policies have a high likelihood of failure and have “unwanted
consequences” that do not prevent their success. 9 (Should the previous clause be negative?
It would seem to make more sense to say “have ‘unwanted consequences’ that prevent their
success.”)
The soundness of knowledge and the contributions made by the different areas of
study vary and in many cases these are uncertain and precarious. The lack of knowledge
about the important aspects of psychoactive drugs is immense, not only in regard to the
social sciences, but in relation to “hard” ones. For example, the effect of drugs on users is
usually unpredictable and it often depends, amongst other factors, on the mood of the user
and the physical and social environment where the consumption of drugs takes place. It is
not clear to what extent drugs substitute or complement each other. Also, it is not known
9
Policies created by an economist may generate political reactions that make it impossible to achieve the
results that are wanted; meanwhile, policies created only by a political scientist usually have negative
economic effects. For example, policies that eradicate illicit crops can have negatives effects on the
environment if they generate a relocation of crop production. They can cause profound social problems if they
force people to move from their homes, and they facilitate the recruitment of illegal armed groups, and so on.
Some academics like LaMond Tullis (Unintended Consequences. Illegal Drugs & Policies in Nine Countries,
Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995) believe “undesirable consequences” are simply the effects of policies instead
of the result of policies created within a narrow frame that does not solve the complexity of the problem.
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with certainty if the use of one drug increases the chances of addiction to another. 10 In
regard to social structures and institutions, little is known about the key factors, such as the
characteristics that make some societies more inclined to the consumption, production, and
traffic of drugs than others. 11
The lack of certainty in knowledge also extends to the moral and ethical areas. How
to choose the most ethical position when comparing a parent that supports the
criminalization of drug possession for personal use because he/she does not want his/her
son or daughter to be a victim of drug dealers, with a parent that is against it because he/she
does not want his/her son or daughter to have a criminal record for life if they make one
mistake? This choice is based on personal values, but there is no absolute criterion to state
that one stance is superior to the other.
The importance given to ethical and moral factors in the creation of drug policies
generates other important problems. Firstly, since ethics and morals vary among individuals
and societies, a universal consensus cannot be drawn up regarding the use of drugs.
Particularly, there is a conflict between different positions, like the one held by the
UNODC, aforementioned, which states that the drugs included in the lists of the
conventions should only serve medical and scientific purposes, and those who believe that
recreational and ritualistic use can exist. This conflict can be translated as a disagreement
on the objectives of the policies. For those who deny the possibility of recreational and
ritualistic use, all other uses besides medical and scientific research constitute drug abuse. 12
This explains why eliminating drugs that nowadays do not serve medical or scientific
purposes is a crucial aspect of the policies. For those who believe recreational and
ritualistic uses are legitimate, the problem has nothing to do with eliminating drugs, but
with restricting their use in order to prevent potential social costs.
The inability to reach an agreement on the role of drugs in society and the objectives
of the policies towards drugs is a sign of the profound differences in the cultures of the
10
For example, it is commonly said that the use of marihuana leads to the consumption of other harder drugs.
However, those who claim this do not explain if the chemical elements in marihuana create a necessity for
other chemicals or if there are simply people who wish to experiment and begin with a drug that is thought to
be less risky. If the first case is true, then the prohibition of marihuana would affect the use of cocaine and
heroin, but if the second is true, then this would be untrue.
11
Francisco E. Thoumi, El imperio de la droga: narcotráfico, economía y sociedad en los Andes, Bogotá,
Planeta-IEPRI, 2002, chapter 2.
12
This is why the abuse and not the use of illicit drugs is mentioned in the UNODC documents.
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countries involved. For example, the American Puritan culture believes that seeking altered
states of mental perception is a sin and a sign of weak character. In Ancient Greece and in
many American Indian communities, seeking these states is part of the experience of
human life. 13
The lack of an agreement goes beyond what is ethical and moral and transcends to
other dimensions. For example, many scholars in the Andean countries deny the importance
of ethics and morals in the creation of global prohibitionist policies, which they interpret as
an expression of economic imperialism. In this sense it is commonly said that prohibition is
an effort of the United States to obtain greater benefits: “far from generating any sort of
wealth in Colombia, [illicit drugs] have drowned the country in corruption and violence. In
the United States the drug industry increases the gross domestic product. In Colombia it
destroys it.” 14 This statement has no economic basis, but creates feelings of exoneration
and makes Colombians feel like victims of the imperialistic policies of the United States.
This generalized belief among some journalists and scholars make it virtually impossible to
establish a fruitful dialogue with those who have opposing views.
It is interesting to look at why the above statement has no economic grounds.
Protectionism of national production is usually done by imposing duties, quotas, and other
measures that increase the profit of the state and reduce imports. The prohibition of drugs
greatly increases their importation costs. As a matter of fact, the United States pays at least
20 times more for Colombian cocaine than it would if it were legal. Therefore,
prohibitionist measures transfer resources abroad and reduce the aggregate demand in that
country. Also, in order to make this process valid it is essential that prohibitionist measures
do not create other negative side effects such as the strengthening of criminal organizations,
increases in corruption, and the alienation of minority groups, and so on, that negatively
affect economic development in the mid to long term. Otherwise, we would be before a
new theory of economic development through illegality that would recommend the
prohibition of the imports of high demand consumer goods in Colombia, such as cigarettes
13
For this reason Baco was a God in Greece and in Native communities in America drugs were used to
communicate with the spirits of the ancestors, make commercial deals, and facilitate social interaction, and so
on.
14
Antonio Caballero, “El costo de dos visas,” en Semana, No. 744, 1996, p. 139.
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and mobile phones, thus financially benefiting smugglers and contributing to the wealth
and development of the country.
Another factor that can be added to the aforementioned differences in the perception
of the problem, is the discomfort caused by the nationalist views of the countries involved,
which increase distrust and contribute to the inability to understand the opponent’s position.
The fact is that the creation and application of policies towards mind-altering drugs have
been influenced by a series of factors that go beyond the drug issue itself and include basic
values, beliefs, and attitudes of the societies involved. The truth is that mind-altering drugs
provide a fertile battleground for some of the cultural clashes that result from the process of
globalization.
The complexity of the issues related to mind-altering drugs and the importance of
cultural factors require that any reasonable policy accept the fact that there is not only one
way and that the successful path is made by walking. In other words, in order for polices to
be prosperous they must try and understand the underlying causes of the factors in question
and continually adapt as a result of the experience gained through time, changes, and
evolution of the institutions in each society. Even more, the process of creating and
applying policies should be one of trial and error, where it is accepted that the possibility of
making mistakes in the short term is very high.
The
Centralization
of
Drug
Production
and
Consumption
and
the
Characteristics of the Countries that Centralize them
Why are the production, traffic, and consumption of drugs centralized in some
countries? The answer to this question is not a simple one and the proposed answers are
usually not satisfactory. It has been said that in Colombia poverty, the unequal distribution
of wealth and income, the economic crisis, corruption, the country’s location halfway
between the traditional coca crop fields in Bolivia and Peru and high demand places in the
United States, have been determining factors for production. As it has been demonstrated
empirically, 15 the first four abovementioned factors are present in many other countries
15
Francisco E. Thoumi, op. cit., 2002; F. E. Thoumi, “Why a Country Produces Drugs and How This
Determines Policy Effectiveness: A General Model and Some Applications to Colombia,” in C. Rojas and J.
Meltzer (Comps.), Elusive Peace: International, National and Local.Dimensions of Conflict in Colombia,
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where the illicit industry has not centered itself. In fact, there are poorer countries that have
suffered far worse and more intense economic crises and that have governments that are
more corrupt than Colombia’s, and yet they have not developed an illicit drug industry. A
model of the theory of competitive advantage has been drawn in these publications, which
shows that the cause of the centralization of the illicit drug industry in Colombia is a
combination of the country’s geography, which has been a major obstacle in the creation of
strong nationalistic feelings and has been a determining factor in the incapacity of the
central government to exert sovereignty over the territory; the regional diversity that has
created local loyalties instead of national ones; the lack of a concept of strong central State
among conquerors, as well as in the native communities where the Indian chief’s domain
prevailed; the insufficient amount of strong armed forces that can create a national identity,
the violence that has destroyed communities and has displaced and uprooted a great amount
of people and has destroyed many nuclear as well as extended families, the absence of an
external enemy (in Colombia major conflicts have always been internal), among other
factors, have contributed to the fact that in Colombia there is a collective social capital
limited to family members and a few close friends, but an encompassing social capital that
creates bridges between different social groups and generates solidarity, trust, and
reciprocity within the community in a broader sense is clearly missing.
Development in Colombia after World War II weakened social control over behaviors
imposed by religion, family, groups of friends, academies and schools, and other similar
institutions. Urbanization and the strong demand for the State’s resources to a large degree
reduced investments in the legal and police systems within public expenses, thus
weakening the ability of the State to enforce the law and solve conflicts. In other words, a
process took place in Colombia where control over people’s behavior, established by the
State and civil society institutions, had weakened in a more dramatic and strong way than in
other Latin American countries. The institutional weakening of the State has been fertile
ground for Colombia to have the oldest insurgent movement in the world and for illicit
economic activities to flourish. Colombia was the first country in the world to produce false
dollar bills, assassins, and kidnappers who rely on extortion. It is the first or second Latin
Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005; F. E. Thoumi, “The Colombian Competitive Advantage in Illegal Drugs: the Role
of Policies and Institutional Changes,” in Journal of Drug Issues, No. 35, 1, Winter, 2005.
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American exporter of prostitutes to Europe and Japan, and it is a first-class producer of
false passports and false euros. 16 Colombia is a country where signs advertising that a
property is not for sale are put up in order to avoid false deeds; it is the country that coined
the term “desechable” (disposable) to refer to people who where victims of the “social
cleansing” process; it is a place where murders committed by illegal armed groups are
called “ajusticiamientos” (executions). On a daily basis, newspapers in Colombia tell of big
frauds and white collar crimes and any transaction or public business has to be questioned
and revised at various levels to avoid the plundering of public goods. Colombian capitalism
is referred to as “savage,” that is, the laws associated to a system that leads to social benefit
do not apply. The fact is Colombia has an extreme deficit of encompassing social capital
and a very low level of trust.
All human beings have a strong tendency towards egoism and personal benefit. The
main duty of social institutions is to precisely establish control over people’s behavior in
favor of the community as a whole. The situation in Colombia is more of individualism
than of control, because social and State control over people’s behavior was always weak
and disappeared within important groups of the society. The members of these groups are
extreme individualists, whose behavior is asocial and who contribute to the destruction of
the social capital that could have existed. For these individuals the consequences of their
actions on other people are simply irrelevant. That is, society’s well-being is not taken into
account in their decision making processes.17
All of the above made Colombia the best place for the development of the coca and
cocaine industries. 18 This is why the cause of the illicit industry must be seen within an
evolutionary process and not as an external factor. Colombia’s institutional weaknesses
made it the best place for its development. Once it was set up, the illicit industry acted as a
16
It is worth noticing how the tendency to an illegal and criminal economy has given rise to legal exportation
niches linked to the illegal economy. In this manner, the only goods that the automobile industry exports
outside the Andean Community of Nations is bullet armor proof glass; the tailoring industry exports
magnificent bullet proof vests, and the security industry exports services to Iraq and Afghanistan.
17
There are small exceptions in a few cases. For example, for the assassins of the communes in northeastern
Medellín in the late 80’s nobody was of value to them except for the members of their immediate families,
especially their mothers.
18
A similar synthesis explains why Afghanistan dominated the opium and heroin industry (Francisco E.
Thoumi, “Ventajas competitivas ilegales, el desarrollo de la industria de drogas ilegales y el fracaso de las
políticas contra las drogas en Afganistán y Colombia,” in Análisis Político, No. 54, May-August, 2005, pp.
30-48).
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catalyst that accelerated the process of social decomposition and institutional deterioration
that had begun a long time ago. In this sense, illicit drugs are not the cause of current
problems although they do make them worse. The truth is that the illicit drug industry is a
symptom of unresolved social problems which generate guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug
traffickers, and white collar crimes. 19
The situation in the United States is similar, but it is focused on the demand side of
illicit drugs. It is clear that the consumption of illicit drugs in the United States is
concentrated in two clearly defined groups. The first group is made up of young people
between the ages of 12 to 20, who consume approximately 20% of illicit drugs and
constitute 80% of the users. 20 The second group is made up of older addicts who, even
though they constitute only 20% of the users, consume 80% of illicit drugs. 21 Experience
shows that once a young person goes past the age of 20 without ever trying illicit drugs,
then the probability of him/her trying them is very low. It has also been empirically proved
that most people who have tried illicit drugs will stop consuming them out of their own
before they turn 30. This evidence shows that drug policies should concentrate on these two
groups. On the one hand, they must try and prevent young people between the ages of 12
and 20 from trying drugs, and on the other hand they must focus on treatment programs for
older addicts.
The proclivity for both legal and illicit drug consumption in the United States reflects
the profound social changes that have taken place over the last sixty years, which have
destroyed an important amount of encompassing social capital. 22 The great complexity of
the United States society makes it impossible to demonstrate what changes have been
19
I must admit that there is another school of thought, which believes that the emergence of the guerrillas,
paramilitary groups, and the illicit industry are calamities that have not destroyed Colombian institutionalism.
According to this school, the institutions are and have been very strong for they have resisted the attack of so
many calamities (Fernando Cepeda [Ed.], Fortalezas de Colombia, Bogotá, Planeta, 2004). This interpretation
of the problem in Colombia is very appealing to those who have had political and economic control of the
country, for it presents guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers as outsiders who are not a product of the
Colombian society, nor have risen because of its deficiencies. Therefore, within this frame of reference it is
not necessary to change the behavior of the elite and the only reasonable policy towards drugs, guerrillas, and
paramilitaries is the application of the law that is considered to be legitimately applicable to all Colombians.
In the case of drugs, the answer is the current repressive and punitive policies.
20
David Boyum and Peter Reuter, An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy, Washington, American
Enterprise Institute, 2005.
21
Ibid.
22
Francis Fukuyama, Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free Press,
1996; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of the American Community, New York,
Simon & Schuster, 2000.
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responsible for the deterioration of social capital and the increase in the demand for drugs.
The following are a few of the most important changes that need to be explored in order to
understand why social defenses towards illicit drugs have softened.
The evolution of the family has been an important factor in these processes.
Economic development and labor mobility have divided the extended family. Children
move away from their parent’s home at a young age, many times at 18, and very often their
jobs lead them to places far away from their parents. In most cases, grandparents no longer
play an important role in their grandchildren’s education and socialization.
Nowadays, nuclear families show high rates of divorce and sometimes marriage does
not take place. Single motherhood is very high and is no longer stigmatized. Teenage
pregnancy, that is, of girls in their formative years, has increased significantly. The case is
often of girls bringing up children, many of them who are incapable of reasonably
socializing the new generations.
Nuclear families are also threatened by work conditions. After World War II female
employment outside the home increased significantly and nowadays both members of a
couple work outside the home. Educational institutions have not adapted enough to these
developments, creating problems in the socialization and education of children. In regard to
this issue, it is worthwhile pointing out a very simple fact: school schedules were
established a long time ago on the assumption that children who come back home at 2:30 or
3 in the afternoon have an adult waiting for them, whether that is their mother or their
grandparents, who supervise them until the father comes home. Nowadays children come
home to be “supervised” by the television set. It is obvious that society needs an
institutional change that allows adults to supervise children between the moment they leave
school until the time their parents come home from work. 23
School holidays are also the result of institutional adaptations that appeared as a
solution to technological situations that have been overcome. Summer holidays last up to
three months and they were designed when the country was primarily rural and the
agricultural sector was run mainly by farm families who needed the children’s help during
the summer. When the country became urbanized this holiday was also useful because of
23
A few years ago, during the Clinton Administration, his wife Hillary, nowadays Senator from New York
and strong pre-presidential candidate for the next period developed a campaign based on the slogan: “it takes
a whole village to educate a child.” The fact is that village does not exist for a large number of children.
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the strong heat in the school buildings. Nowadays, with air conditioning and no farm
families, school holidays have become a supervision problem of the youngsters, which has
not yet been solved.
There was once the myth in the United States about the easy adjustment of
immigrants (the “melting pot” where all the different ingredients became diluted and lose
their specificity). This was true for the white European immigrants, but it was never true for
African Americans, involuntary immigrants, or for Mexicans or Native Mexicans. In the
past few decades Korean, Indian, Muslim, Vietnamese, and Latin American immigration
has been great and harder to adjust to. 24 This allows behavior that is considered to be
deviant or criminal by mainstream society that designs the laws to be thought of as
acceptable by other groups in society. Also, during the 20th century, a large percentage of
immigration has been illegal, which has increased the difficulties in adjustment and has
undermined the rule of and the respect for law. In reality, after World War II, more than
being a “melting pot” the United States has become a boiled dinner in which the different
members of the society keep their identities.
The bloodiest war the United States has been through was the 1861-1865 Civil War.
One of the main causes of this war was the struggle for the abolition of slavery. It did
indeed lead to the abolition of slavery, but it did not put an end to racial segregation and the
legal and de facto discrimination of African Americans in the entire territory. The civil
rights law, enacted one hundred years later, was a response of the federal government to the
legislative ploys of the states, especially those in the South, which developed many
methods to deny African Americans’ rights to vote, education, housing, and decent work.
This law ended formal segregation and allowed many African Americans, especially those
belonging to the middle class, to get out of the ghettos that had developed in the urban
centers of many cities. During the last few decades middle class suburbs made up of mostly
African Americans have confirmed the importance of an informal social segregation.
Although the African American middle class has grown significantly, it has not been
admitted completely within mainstream society. For example, interracial marriage has not
become common. It is true that many African Americans hold white collar jobs in
24
Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges of America’s Nacional Identity, New York, Simon &
Schuster, 2004.
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governmental bureaucracies and to a lesser extent in private sector companies. Without a
doubt there has been significant progress, but it has not been enough to achieve the dream
of a society blind to racial differences. The recent hurricane in New Orleans made it clear
to the eyes of the world and mainstream United States society that many African Americans
suffer grave problems.
One of the most serious problems generated by this process has been the
disintegration of the societies in the ghettos in which the groups of African Americans, who
lacked the necessary skills to compete with the broader society, remained. Nowadays, in the
ghettos there are few role models for young people because most professionals moved to
other areas and the people who stayed depend on social security to survive. The
disintegration of the African American society and family in the ghettos has been very
marked and severe and it has produced a group of people detached from society. These
persons show extreme individualistic tendencies and a lack of an encompassing social
capital similar to that of many Colombians. 25
The living conditions of some immigrants, especially Latin Americans, are similar to
those of the African American community in the ghettos. In both cases, gangs have played
an important role in the socialization and formation of young people’s identity. For the
members of these organizations breaking the law is a common ritual, and time in jail is a
symbol of status. 26 Therefore, it is of no surprise that “the effects on community
development resulting from the crime and disorder caused by the drug markets are
substantial in the inner city ghettos (where minorities reside) and fairly limited in the rest of
the nation.” 27 These same factors conclude that the negative effects of the consumption of
drugs over the productivity of people are highly centered in minority groups. 28
Most African American politicians strongly support those policies that attack drugs in
their places of origin. The importance and concentration of drugs in the ghettos makes the
negative effects of the repressive and punitive policies more intense in their communities,
and for this reason it makes sense to them to support the repression of drugs at their source.
25
Fukuyama, op. cit.
In the case of Salvadoran immigrants this is quite notable and interesting. Their “maras” (gangs) are very
violent and have spread throughout the country. The “Mara Salvatrucha”13 (MS 13) is the most famous and
most organized and it has various headquarters in many regions of the country and in El Salvador, and it is
also currently expanding to other countries in Central America.
27
Boyum y Reuter, op. cit., p. 33.
28
Op. cit., p. 32.
26
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Another element that contributed to the weakening of social capital was the
suburbanization that took place after World War II when a rise in incomes popularized
private automobiles. In the suburbs, each house is usually surrounded by land and separate
from the others. In these suburbs neighbors have little contact with each other, in many of
them there are no sidewalks, and public transport is scarce, especially after rush hour. The
only way of getting in and out of the suburb is by car. In this environment, nuclear families
tend to isolate themselves from their neighbors. Young people also tend to isolate
themselves in the suburbs because it is harder for them to have spontaneous encounters
with people of their same age. In this case, social activities have to be planned and
programmed beforehand. It is not surprising that when couples and families have problems,
alcohol and drugs are used as an escape.
Changes in the structure of retail commerce also affected communities. Town centers
used to have a combination of shops, offices, and housing. People used to have a lot of ties
with each other. Nowadays transactions in shopping malls are depersonalized without any
other social bonds between people.
Historically, the United States suffered a strong lack of manual labor. The country did
indeed enjoy an abundance of natural resources, capital, and technology in relation to
manual labor. This allowed workers to earn real salaries higher than those in other
countries. Globalization and the reduction of international transportation costs have
diminished the importance of the heritage of productive resources as the biggest factor that
determines people’s salaries, and in the case of the United States, it has forced a great
number of workers to compete with others in the rest of the world. This is why real salaries
in the industries of trade products and services have become lower worldwide. The
distribution of income in this process has been done unevenly and a large number of people
that have lost their jobs find themselves displaced and marginalized. The jobs that these
people can obtain nowadays provide them with salaries that are much lower than those they
used to earn in the past.
The increase in the amount of available goods and services has also created problems
because it has made older goods no longer satisfactory, and the pressure to obtain the
avalanche of new ones is extremely strong. This means that the same current real income
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produces less satisfaction than it did in the past. 29 This, together with the fall of salaries
mentioned above, has contributed to the fact that in each family both members of the
couple work outside the home and in some cases they have more than one job and work
long hours. In many cases the tensions in the family increase and relationships wither.
The little contact between parents and their children, the moving away of
grandparents, the falling apart of the extended family, and the rapid technological change
that has made the skills of older people become obsolete have affected communication,
comprehension, and intergenerational interaction and have made young people rely more
on their peers than on their parents and grandparents.
A unique human experience has taken place in the United States and it has produced
the most powerful nation in the history of mankind. However, despite its wealth, in the last
sixty years society has had great difficulty adapting to many of its citizens and there no
longer is any trace of the social capital that strengthened the community in the past. This
problem has been kept partially hidden from most of the members of mainstream society.30
The evolution of the American society has made it more prone to the consumption of legal
as well as illicit drugs. It is worth pointing out that nowadays the United States has
addiction problems related both to legal as well as illicit drugs and that the country is
overmedicated. The addictions that have appeared also include other types of behavior not
commonly associated to drugs. For example, nowadays in the United States there is an
“epidemic” of obesity like no other in the history of mankind. For the first time ever,
anxiety and insecurity lead people to abuse food, to the point whereby a very high
percentage of the population is obese. In regard to illicit drugs, the United States faces a
similar problem to Colombia. In both countries the solution to the “drug problem” requires
important social reforms and not only traditional policies.
Policies and Reforms
29
Gregg Easterbrook, The Progress Paradox. How Life Gets Better while People Feel Worse, New York,
Random House, 2003; Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice. Why More Is Less, New York, Harper Collins
Publishers, 2004.
30
The floods in New Orleans in September 2005 revealed these weaknesses and demonstrated that the racial
inequalities of the past still affect a considerable amount of African Americans.
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Policies against illicit drugs have focused on measures that target deviant illegal
behavior. These policies have been mostly punitive and are mainly based on police and
legal actions. The aim of these policies is to put an end to deviant behavior by making
people afraid of sanctions and losing their freedom.
In the United States, “in 1980 there were less than 20,000 prisoners in state
penitentiaries because of drug charges. In the year 2000 there were more than 250,000
under state custody.” 31 Toughness against people involved in the production, traffic, and
consumption of drugs has increased greatly in the past 25 years. In 1980, 581,000 arrests
related to drugs took place. This estimate increased to nearly 1,600,000 in the year 2000,
“the number of people sentenced to state and federal prisons has increased by a factor of
ten.” 32 Also, sentences have become harsher and in some states long minimum obligatory
sentences have been imposed, which has sometimes led judges responsible for applying
those sentences to rebel against these mandates.
In the United States not all policies are punitive. Prevention and treatment of users
and addicts also play a role, although secondary, to police efforts. Policies related to
treatment are diverse and difficult to evaluate. These include methods all the way from
counseling sessions in prisons to maintenance treatments with methadone, therapeutic
communities, chemical dependency treatment programs and detoxification, a series of
programs involving meetings, and group counseling. 33 However, there is a consensus
regarding the separation between the necessities and the treatments offered. According to
studies developed by the drug czar’s office (ONDCP) in 2001, 83% of those people who
needed treatment did not receive it. 34
In Colombia almost all of the policies against drugs are repressive and punitive and
include “voluntary” and forced, manual and aerial eradication of illicit crops, detection and
destruction of “laboratories” or “kitchens” where drugs are manufactured, interdiction,
confiscation and destruction of illicit drugs and the inputs used in their production,
reinforcement of the justice system, apprehension of individuals involved in the industry,
31
Boyum & Reuter, op. cit., p. 10. In United States jargon there is a difference between jails where prisoners
go after they have been prosecuted and those where detainees are held while a trial is in process. These
estimates refer only to federal prisons and do not include state and municipal jails.
32
Op. cit., p. 54.
33
Op. cit., pp. 57-58.
34
Op. cit., p. 63.
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extradition of the main participants to the United States, and confiscation and expropriation
of assets obtained with money from the illicit drug industry. All of these policies try to
reduce the profitability of the illicit industry and involve a broad spectrum of institutions
and individuals. The success of these policies demands the help of many institutions and
people in the private sector. Some of these being the financial sector, real estate agencies,
importers and merchants of chemicals, transportation companies, accountants, lawyers,
financial advisors, chemists, and in general all of those who come in contact with the illicit
industry. Also, within the public sector they compromise security and intelligence forces,
the legal system, the army, the police, the legislative system, a series of ministers like the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister for the Environment, the
Minister of Commerce, and so on.
Alternative development is the main “carrot” within the stockpile of policies against
drugs. These programs also seek to diminish the profitability of illicit crops in relation to
the cost-effectiveness of other rural activities. Worldwide this has been an ongoing learning
process that began by looking for other possible crops for those areas where coca was
grown. This proved to be not a good enough option for the farmers to abandon the illicit
crop fields because they found many difficulties in trading, resistance to plagues, price
fluctuation, and so on. From there on programs of integrated rural development were
adopted, which included infrastructure, utilities, health, financing and strengthening of the
communities. As a complement, other programs that seek to generate work in areas that
provide manual labor to the regions where illicit crops are grown have also been developed.
The experience of all of the alternative development programs in the countries where
they have been applied shows that they tend to relocate illicit crops to other regions or
countries. This is known as the “balloon” effect and in practice it means that national
supporters of these programs implicitly accept that, if they were to succeed, illicit crops
would move to other countries. It should be acknowledged that the “balloon” effect is hard
to measure and for this reason its magnitude can always be questioned. However, it can be
said that by suppressing crops in one country these will tend to move to more vulnerable
places, that is, ones that have the necessary conditions for their development. For this
reason, nowadays in Colombia crops have moved within the country to places far from the
internal markets and where there is not a strong presence of the state.
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All of these policies have been created within the context of the “war against drugs,”
where all weapons are good when used to fight against evil, and for this reason policy
makers do not give certain complex and indirect effects the attention they deserve.
Contradictions between their application, implementation and effects have been
underestimated. One example of these contradictions resulted from the application of the
extradition treaty at the beginning of the eighties, which resulted in a narco-terrorist
response from the “cartels,” which weakened the capacity of the State to implement other
policies. Another example: eradication increases the prices of coca, which in turn augment
the incentives to create new crop fields, at least in other places.
In order for policies to be successful they require a high degree of coordination, which
transcends the capacity of most governments. It is essential to coordinate the strengths of
the police, the army, the legal sector, security and intelligence agencies, the Ministry of
Agriculture, among others. Forced eradication must be accompanied by programs that
strengthen the community, otherwise, loyalty to the State, which is already scarce,
diminishes even more in those areas, which makes it harder for these policies to succeed in
the mid to long term.
Policies have not been created as a result of a national coordination effort that leads to
an agreement in regard to their necessity. Therefore, many of the key players, in order for
the policies to be effective, do not believe these are virtuous, which makes them very
vulnerable to corruption. For example, it is quite interesting that Colombia does not have a
State policy regarding illicit drugs, which has made policies reflect underlying situations
and the priorities of each government. Also, this deficiency shows the lack of a joint effort
from the society to eliminate the illicit industry. However, policies against drugs have been
created as if the main role of the State would be put an end to the illicit industry, that is, in
theory they should be a top priority for all State agencies. The fact is that for many state
staff, drugs have a relatively low priority, which makes the application of the policies very
hard.
Another problem policies against drugs have is that they cannot be evaluated, at least
using models and criteria developed by economics and other social sciences. This appears
to be a contradiction, but it is not. The point is that policies have been created from a moral
perspective within the scope of the “war against drugs,” and for this reason each policy is
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simply a different weapon and its effects all contribute to the warlike effort. If some
negative side effects result from the use of a weapon, like harm to the environment, these
cannot be attributed to the weapon but to the cause of the war, that is, the illicit drug
industry. Without a doubt these harmful effects are terrible and unwanted, but they are the
enemy’s fault. This is why evaluation methods like those used in economics, which
measure the costs and benefits of each policy and allow policies which have the least cost
per unit of benefit to be selected, cannot be applied here. Within the logic of the “war
against drugs” political evaluations can look for ways of reducing “collateral damages,” of
improving the efficiency of the policies in order to validate them and to achieve the set
goals, but they are not meant to question or judge them. For example, in the case of aerial
fumigation, it is possible to analyze the effectiveness of a herbicide and propose an
alternative one, but the elimination of the policy itself is not open for discussion.
Unfortunately, the “drug problem” cannot be resolved with traditional punitive
measures. The production, traffic, and consumption of drugs are a reflection of deeply
rooted structural, institutional, and cultural problems of the society in which they have
developed. Policies are based on a model where the problem is people with deviant
behavior in a society, these individuals need to be corrected, and punishing criminals and
changing the financial incentives can achieve this. In other words, there is no need to make
changes in society in order to diminish, on the one hand, people’s necessity to use drugs,
and on the other, the tendency towards lucrative illicit activities.
Both the United States and Colombia have suffered processes in which their
encompassing social capital has been destroyed or weakened and this has made both
territories fertile ground for the consumption, traffic, and production of illicit drugs. The
weaknesses of the United States and Colombian societies complement each other in a very
functional manner. It is as if their relationship were a match made in hell. Policy makers in
both countries deny the importance of these weaknesses and continue on with the “war
against drugs” as if the “problem” did not have deeper roots. The issue is simple, until both
societies recognize the necessity for social reforms that create more reasonable societies,
the “drug problem” cannot be solved, even if breakthroughs do happen once in a while. It is
also true that this diagnosis is not very popular and that many current powerful forces in
both societies reject it. Nobody likes to be asked to change, although people with a
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behavior defined as deviant or antisocial by the current legislation are an exception. What is
more, all the studies on social capital show that when social changes deteriorate it, it melts
quicker, but its reconstruction is slow, difficult, and uncertain. 35 Therefore, current policies
will probably carry on and in the future new explanations will be sought to justify the
continuation of the present repressive policies when these do not complete their goals.
This conclusion is not good enough for many politicians because it demands changes
in social behavior, which are difficult to achieve. These require great amounts of
leadership, persistence, and, in many cases, resources and significant social reforms.
Without a doubt, it is easier to stick to the repressive policies even if these are inefficient in
the long run. Ironically, it is because of this that politicians who are “tough” on drugs are in
reality very soft, for they deny the complexity of the phenomenon which they wish to
regulate and opt for force to appear “tough” instead of adopting difficult but necessary
policies. Nowadays we find that force as a political weapon has become less and less
efficient. The drug issue is a typical example of this.
35
Fukuyama, op. cit.; Putnam, op. cit.
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Transformation and Effects of Anti-Drug Cooperation Between
Colombia and the United States of America (1970-2000)
Alexandra Guáqueta *
Introduction
President Álvaro Uribe’s visit to his colleague’s—George W. Bush—ranch in
Texas, on August 4th, 2005, is a clear symbol of one of the key aspects of the
relationship between Colombia and the United States: both countries are good friends
and allies. Such tendency deserves special attention when taking in account at least
two of the main features that characterize the relationship between the United States
and Latin America.
First of all, political tension has been present throughout the history between the
United States and most of the countries in the region. And, secondly, most of the times
that the subject of drugs is included in the bilateral agenda and it acquires a significant
position—it is subject to political frictions and, even more, to diplomatic ruptures.
Examples include those frictions between the United States and Bolivia, Mexico, Peru,
and Panama. However, drugs and drug trafficking have permeated the ColombiaUnited States agenda for more than 30 years, and only between 1995 and 1997, during
the Clinton and Samper Administrations, were they the cause of a diplomatic crisis.
Since Colombia joined the war against drugs in the 70’s, both countries have built a
solid cooperation in the anti-drug war. 1
Nonetheless, in spite of this friendship, such close anti-drug cooperation has had
various counterproductive effects. Experts point out the existence of several kinds of
“collateral damages”: delays and errors in the launching of alternative development
programs have diminished the will of the peasants to eradicate coca crops; massive
*
PhD in International Relations from Oxford University. Current Academic Director of the Fundación Ideas para la Paz,
Bogotá, Colombia. This work does not necessarily reflect the Foundation’s position.
1
Alexandra Guáqueta, “Change and Continuty in US-Colombian Relations, 1970-1998,” PhD thesis,
University of Oxford, Somerville College, 2002. Also, “Change and Continuity in the US-Colombian
Relations and the War against Drugs”, en Journal of Drug Issues, volume 35, No. 1, 2005.
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aerial eradication has caused forced displacements and eventual health and
environmental problems; democratic institutions have weakened because of failures to
execute legal dispositions to regulate fumigation; and, last but not least, since the
opinions of the local leaders on the subject have not been taken into consideration,
civil control over the military has eroded and, indirectly, human rights’ violations have
been triggered at the hands of Colombian Public Forces. 2 Others would say that
prohibitionism itself has stimulated the profits of illegal armed groups from the
business, the continuation of violent armed conflicts and the funding of terrorist
actions. 3 All the same, other collateral damage that has also occurred will be presented
in this paper.
First of all, such strong anti-drug cooperation has changed several “rules of the
game,” which were implicit in the relationship between the United States and
Colombia; rules that defined to what extent the United States gets involved in its
friend’s domestic problems. That “prudent distance”, kept for so long, is at the present
time nonexistent. Some of its indicators are: the presence and volume of military
assistance in anti-drug operations; the strong incidence of the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and its contractors inside productive projects and
local management; the extradition of members of illegal armed groups to the United
States; and the political intervention of the United States in matters related to conflict,
peace, and other domestic affairs. This has influenced the fact that now, ironically,
bilateral relations are much more complex than before. Friendship and anti-drug
cooperation are now more difficult to handle. As it will be explained later, one of the
main reasons is the “politicization” of the presence of the United States inside
Colombia as subject matter and actor. Contrary to what happened before, there are
now many more internal debates and critiques of United States policies. 4
2
María Clemencia Ramírez, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Cycle of Drugs and
War,” in Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin (editors), Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Impact of
U.S. Policy, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
3
This argument was recently presented for the case of Afghanistan. See: John Simpson, “Rethinking the War
on Drugs,” BBC News, October 7th, 2005.
4
The politicization of the “United States” issue is somehow new in Colombia, but not in the rest of the
continent. How can the United States influence and assist other smaller countries without weakening that
State’s authority, and without triggering counterproductive reactions, which have been a constant challenge to
its hegemony inside Latin America? As of now, the only perceptible lesson understood by Washington is that
the United States must keep a “low profile” in its interventions, which is not always accomplished.
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Secondly, United States’ presence inside Colombia has also influenced the
relationship between Europe and Colombia, which is now problematic because of the
disagreements between United States and Europe on the best way to manage conflict
and drugs. 5 Likewise, Colombia’s alignment to the United States—given the
disagreements mentioned above—has hindered the process toward nation-building and
the efforts of the Colombian Government to gain authority among its opponents, who
look at Europe with regard to policies to surmount conflict, including some anti-drug
policies, and, in general, as political and economic model.
Third, relationships between Colombia and the Andean Region have been
affected by: a) the effects of the conflict itself (displaced people and trespassing of
illegal armed groups), which some social and political sectors of neighbor countries
attribute to anti-drug policies as imposed by the United States; and b) the United
States’ presence in Colombia which, by itself, generates fears—justified or not—of the
“true hegemonic intentions,” and engenders strong feelings of resistance. Thus, the
achievement of regional cooperation to overcome the conflict and control the drugs
problem has become more politically problematic. Experiences with Ecuador and
Venezuela are clear evidence of the problem. 6
This paper describes the process of expansion and institutionalization of bilateral
anti-drug cooperation, highlighting elements of change and continuity in the
relationship between Colombia and the United States. The analysis will be divided into
four periods: 1) the seventies, 2) the eighties, 3) from 1989 to 1998, and 4) from the
beginning of Plan Colombia until today. It ends with a reflection on the political
challenges Colombia and the United States face, with regard to the current
administration of their policies towards the “drugs of the conflict.”
Anti-Drug Cooperation Expansion between Colombia and the United States of
America
5
J. Roy, “Europe. Neither Plan Colombia Nor Peace Process. From Good Intentions to High Frustrations,”
Miami, European Union Center, Working Paper Series, 2, No. 7, June, 2002.
6
The other side of the story for these cases is the political context of the region, which is relatively adverse to
the United States and contrasts with the Inter-American agreement on the environment and the optimism of
the early nineties.
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Opposed to what traditional literature on drug trafficking and the United StatesLatin America relationship would suggest, United States has neither imposed
prohibition over Colombia by force, nor have disagreements been so strong or frequent
since anti-drug actions started, as has been experienced with the rest of the region. On
the contrary, both Colombian and United States experiences during the Drug War have
been of cooperation—stronger or weaker depending on the period, but still, in general,
existing. However, it is important to mention the only big exception to such
cooperation pattern: that is, the diplomatic crisis between the Clinton and Samper
Administrations (1995-1997), when the United States decertified Colombia because of
the financing of Samper’s presidential campaign on 1994 by the Cali Cartel.7
Anti-Drug cooperation began in the seventies and, during its first phases,
respected a key rule that was implicit in such bilateral relationship: the United States of
America were to maintain a prudent distance concerning Colombia’s domestic affairs.
In time, and, without any of the countries doing it on purpose, the rule started fading
away because anti-drug cooperation became more intense and the nature of the
corresponding policies seemed to demand it. By the end of the nineties, when the
Colombian armed conflict intensified, the United States was already involved from top
to bottom in a plethora of Colombian activities. Since the conflict was tied to drug
trafficking, anti-drug policies ended up being connected to the conflict, and the United
States Government became involved with peace and conflict issues, among many
others. This is the preface to Plan Colombia: a plan that appeared as result of the past,
but then moved the United States’ cooperation and role onto a different level.
Anti-Drug Cooperation in the 70’s
In 1970 there were half a million heroin addicts in the United States; ten times
more than in 1960. On 1971, 24 millions of Americans over 11 years old had
consumed marihuana at least once in their lives. 8 This drug consumption epidemic and
7
The certification is an annual evaluation performed by the United States Department of State and
Presidency. It evaluates the degree of cooperation each country presents with the anti-drug war. Such
evaluation is mainly a political instrument, useful for the Executive to exert pressure over other countries, and
to support the Congress when the Executive presents its accountabilities, regarding the foreign anti-drug
policy implementation.
8
David F. Musto, The American Disease, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 248.
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its association with the social disturbances of the moment evoked in the United States
Government a feeling of national emergency. More to the point, President Richard
Nixon decided to launch a war against drugs inside his country, since “keeping
dangerous drugs out of the United States [was] just as important as keeping armed
enemy forces from landing in the United States”. 9 In order to achieve this, he invited
the international community to follow his example. “[A]lthough the severity of the
problem varies widely from country to country—and is currently worse in the United
States than in many countries” international anti-drug cooperation was needed, “for the
production and manufacture of narcotics and dangerous drugs is immeasurably easier
to control than their illegal passage across national frontiers” stated the President. 10 He
formally instructed the Chiefs of Mission to convince leaders of countries where drug
production and trafficking occurred to “commit their governments to attacking the
narcotics problem with urgency and determination,”11 and promised cooperating
governments the “wholehearted support and assistance” 12 of the United States. By
1972, the United States had already signed anti-drug treaties with 50 countries,
including Colombia.
Recruiting Colombia was not difficult, which questions the idea about the United
States imposing prohibition by force, as well as that of prohibition being a puritan
United States aberration. 13 Both the Colombian government and its society had the
idea that drugs—in this case cocaine, heroin, and marihuana—were harmful. 14 This
was the reason to have laws against drugs production and consumption 15 —albeit
9
Unites States Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the President (from now on the PPP), Nixon,
1972, pp. 874-5.
10
PPP, Nixon, 1971, pp. 334-5.
11
PPP, Nixon, 1973, p. 442.
12
Nixon, 1972, pp. 874-5.
13
For prohibition culture in the United States see, among others, the following: Mathea Falco, The Making of
Drug Free America. Programs that Work, New York, Times Books, 1994; Robert J. MacCoun and Peter
Reuter, Drug War Heresies. Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2001, p. 66; and Musto, op. cit. The primacy of United States ideas in the region is debated in Rosa del
Olmo, ¿Prohibir o domesticar? Políticas de drogas en América Latina, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1992.
14
For example, when the first important consumption episodes took place in the sixties and seventies, experts
had many difficulties to present complete statistics because families felt ashamed enough to not report drugs
abuse or look for professional rehabilitation treatments. See: Augusto Pérez, Sustancias psicoactivas: historia
del consumo en Colombia, Bogotá, Presencia, 1994.
15
Regulation of psychoactive substances officially started with Law 11 of 1920. Later, in 1936, Articles 270
and 271 of the Penal Code introduced detention for cocaine and opium production and trafficking cases. By
1947, Colombia prohibited coca leaf harvests.
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incipient—and to participate in the United Nations conventions that preceded the
construction of the modern international anti-drug regime, together with one of its
central pillars, the Vienna Convention of 1988. From that moment Colombia and the
United States have been solid friends. In that sense, accepting its call to join the Drug
War was politically possible (not yet seen as internally expensive) and desirable;
moreover, the technical assistance figure was already present in the routine of the
relationship.
In this initial phase of bilateral cooperation for drug control, the—still limited—
United States assistance focused on helping Colombia to develop minimum capacities
to interdict, capture, and eradicate. On the one hand, this was to be achieved with the
help of the DEA’s training of Colombian police agents, by donating equipment and
vehicles, by funding of several anti-narcotic operations, and by, sporadically, working
with the DEA in joint operations. On the other side, Colombia’s task was to receive
training in order to improve the formulation and implementation of anti-drug policies.
In addition, both countries signed the Extradition Treaty in 1979.
In 1971, USAID gave the first small donations, before its mission ended in 1974.
A package of US$6 million came thereafter. 16 Between 1973 and 1977, the DEA
trained 600 Colombian officers, and in 1975 permanent offices were opened in Bogotá
and Cali. 17 In return, and honoring its compromises, Misael Pastrana’s Administration
created, in 1973, the Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes (CNE, “National Narcotics
Council”), and later, in 1974, organized the first Estatuto Nacional de Estupefacientes
(National Narcotic Statute); this was the first thorough anti-drug legislation. Besides
from the above mentioned, with the help of the United States, Colombian Customs
opened their own Anti-Narcotic Office, and the delegate of the National Attorney’s
Office to the Judicial Police Department adopted anti-drug duties. The DAS received
boats and communication systems, while the National Attorney’s Office obtained two
aircrafts and three helicopters to share with the National Police.
16
United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Assistance Authorization. Arms Sales Issue,
June 17th-18th, November 19th-21st, December 4th-5th, 1975, pp. 616-9.
17
Ethan Nadelmann, Cops across Borders. The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement,
University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, Appendix B.
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One of the most known and registered joint operations was Operación
Fulminante (1978-1979), which consisted in a plan to eradicate illicit crops and
dismantle marihuana traffic. For 180 days, Judicial Police supervised national territory,
including cities, airports, and roads, while the Colombian Armed Forces—who
received temporal duties to oversee, eradicate, and apply the Law in La Guajira—
supervised marine ports as well as jungles. 18 The United States donated vehicles, spare
parts, equipment and fuel, while the DEA contributed with intelligence to track
international trafficking routes up to Miami, besides focusing on marine interdiction
and distribution networks in Florida. Colombia’s contribution consisted of troops and
equipment. The Operation began in November 1978, and ended, as planned, in March
1979. Both United States and Colombian officials referred to the experience as a
complete success, because teamwork had worked fine. In any case, if seen from the
Colombian point of view and taking in account the political context, the Operation
fulfilled several needs: President Turbay showed his “true” compromise with the
cause, bringing into discredit rumors of possible drugs-corruption inside his
government; compromise with the United States was honored; marihuana traffic and
smuggling inside the zone was diminished, at least for some time; and guerrilla’s
presence in the Sierra Nevada was much better controlled.
Bilateral cooperation was not free from discussions. On the one side, significant
debates on possible advantages of legalization took place between Bogotá and
Washington. 19 Other debates discussed different types of policies and strategies,
always within the prohibition framework. Some examples: the possible need to
strengthen money-laundering; using Paraquat or not to eradicate crops 20 ; the utility of
18
República de Colombia, Procuraduría General de la Nación, Memorias de la Procuraduría, Bogotá, 19781980, p. 4.
19
Carlos Arrieta, et al. (editors), Narcotráfico en Colombia. Dimensiones políticas, económicas, jurídicas e
internacionales, Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, TME, 1991, pp. 302-7.
20
Memorias de la Procuraduría, 1978-1980, pp. 30-3; The Department of State Bulletin [from now on DOS
Bulletin] 81/2050; and United States House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Drug Control, Fact
finding Mission to Colombia and Puerto Rico, 1979. Peter Bourne, Carter’s main adviser for anti-drug
policies, had presented a report in which stated that when smoked, marihuana that had been fumigated with
Paraquat caused lung fibrosis. This was the antecedent to the Percy Amendment. Later on, Ambassador
Thomas Boyatt (1980-83) supported in a very enthusiastic way the use of Paraquat, and looked for enough
adepts inside the United States Senate as well as in Colombia, in order to introduce a program that combined
crops’ substitution and fumigation. See United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs,
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alternative development; and, what to do with United States addicts. Finally, the other
issue of discussion considered the responsibilities of each of the countries involved:
should the United States be accused responsible for consumption, or was it Colombian
production to blame. National Attorney González stated: “In several occasions I have
seen myself compelled to emphasize the need to increase technical and economic
cooperation by the United States, not only because it is compulsory given the nature of
its circumstances, but because they [the Americans] are obliged to contribute to the
fight.” 21 Based on the principle of “co-responsibility,” Colombia then articulated a
diplomatic position on such matters.
The interesting part of all this is that such disagreements did not lead to a
diplomatic conflict, nor stopped prohibition in Colombia. On the contrary, the result
was more cooperation and progressive adjustment of Colombian institutions to fight
drugs in a, supposedly, more efficient way. By asking for help Colombia played a
more pro-active role, because such attitude nourished cooperation.
In spite of internal flaws, by the end of the decade Colombia had harvested great
prestige and enhanced its image of being an efficient and committed fighter against
drugs. United States diplomatic rhetoric was generous: for example, in 1977, for
instance, Carter said Colombia was “committed to the purest form of democracy”, and
was a “very fine example for the rest of the world to follow”. 22 Friends of Colombia
inside the United States Congress mentioned that they were “impressed by the degree
of sincerity and effort of the Government of Colombia to deal with the problem”. 23
The DEA appraised its cooperation with Colombian agents as positive. 24 Not even the
rumors of possible corruption 25 inside the public sector elites—which were registered
in the famous Bourne Memo—were able to alter cooperation rhythms or change the
positive image Colombia had at the moment. For example, the United States’ Embassy
Permanent Commission on Investigations, International Narcotics Trafficking (from now on INT), November
1981, pp. 82-91.
21
Memorias de la Procuraduría, 1978-1980, p. 38.
22
PPP, Carter, 1977, 2, p. 1537-8.
23
United States House and Senate, Foreign Assistance Related Programs Authorizations [from now on,
FARPA], 1979, p. 132.
24
United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Narcotics Control Programs [from
now on INCP], May 9th, 1978, pp. 33-4; United States Senate, INT, pp. 117-8; United States Senate FARPA,
1979, pp. 215.
25
Arrieta et al., op. cit., p. 313.
212
213
affirmed that the Bourne Memo was not part of official politics, and the office in
charge of United States external drug policy—the then Bureau for International
Narcotics Matters (INM)—reported to the United States Congress that Colombia had a
“serious” commitment and that, also, all its operations were “successful.” 26
In contrast, in cases such as those of Bolivia, Mexico, and Turkey, the United
States chose to execute open and hostile pressure by means of public accusations and
assistance shortages in order to trigger a stronger commitment to the cause. 27
Anti-Drug Cooperation in the 80’s
The Colombian drugs problem changed radically during the eighties. Coca crops
multiplied progressively and drug trafficking increased, just as did their impacts:
violence and corruption, among others. This is how “narco-terrorism” was born:
violence exerted by the carteles—specially that of Medellín—in order to dissuade the
government from its anti-drug policies, above all extradition. Additionally, after a
strategic decision, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) decided
to systematically profit from the illicit drugs industry; thus they planted the seeds for a
further expansion of the armed conflict. In the meantime, paramilitarism was born as
well, and it was also connected to drug trafficking. With all this in mind it is hard to
deny that, at the moment, drugs and drug trafficking had become a real threat to
national security. For example, Colombian President Virgilio Barco branded drug
trafficking as “one of the gravest crimes against humanity” and asked to “save
humanity from its perverse consequences.” 28 Meanwhile, in the United States
President Ronald Reagan catalogued drugs as a threat against his country’s security.
Thus, many of the political debates on drugs problems that took place in Colombia and
the United States, focused on how to strengthen prohibition now that the threat had
expanded, even though debates on the “responsible cause” of the problem being supply
or demand—in other words, production or consumption—still took place. In the end
26
United States House, FARPA, fiscal year 1980, p. 266.
Eduardo Gamarra, Entre la droga y la democracia: la cooperación entre Estados Unidos y Bolivia y la
lucha contra el narcotráfico, La Paz, ILDIS, 1994; United States Senate, INT, p. 92.
28
Presidencia de la República, Virgilio Barco, Discursos 1986-1990. Reforma política y cambio democrático,
Bogotá. Imprenta Nacional, 1990, p. 19.
27
213
214
they always arrived to the same conclusion: bilateral cooperation must continue and
increase. Consequently, such cooperation continued to strengthen interdiction and
eradication, and worked to increase the Colombian capacity to capture drug dealers.
For this last issue, important adjustments were made to the international and
Colombian legal prohibition frameworks.
At the beginning of the decade, the United States gave Colombia a bigger sum
than the ones donated before: US$16 million to buy helicopters, boats, radar
equipment, transport vehicles, fuel, and to generate institutional capacity. 29 In 1980
they signed the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the Campaign for Narcotics
Prohibition, which gave birth to a completely new antinarcotics police unit—one of the
lessons of Operación Fulminante had been not to use the military in the fight against
drugs. 30 In time this unit became the most active and strong among the anti-narcotic
agencies in Colombia and the engine of bilateral cooperation. Until 1998 it was the
agency with higher funding: by the middle of the decade it had 11 companies (each
with 100 men) and 11 intelligence units, all of which were completely subsided
(except for their salaries and personal costs) by the United States, including gasoline
and equipment. 31
In 1987 a reform took place, raising its status within the National Police structure
and assigning it an aerial squadron. By 1988 it already had 14 airplanes, 21
helicopters, a base in Bogotá, and 3 others in key trafficking zones. 32 The DEA raised
its number of people to 16 steady agents, and assigned several embassy officials who
were to dedicate most of their time to illicit drugs’ issues. 33 For all these reasons joint
operations became more frequent. One to be remembered for its findings was an
29
Although the Ambassador Diego Asencio was “strong handed” in the drugs’ issue, he never tried to
aggravate problems with President Turbay. On the contrary, he tried to increase the United States assistance
package—ambassadors usually become intermediaries and promoters of their own interests, as well as of
those of the hosting country. In March 1979, the Subcommittee of Hemispheric Relations of the United States
Congress, finally approved a reform to the Act of Foreign Assistance, authorizing US$16 million in anti-drug
help for fiscal year 1980. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, PL 96-533, funds
for fiscal year 1980.
30
Interview with Luis Moreno, Narcotics Section of the United States’ Embassy, Bogotá, September, 1997.
31
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, United States Department of State, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR from now on), 1985, pp. 61-76.
32
INCSR 1987, p. 95.
33
United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Narcotics Control Programs Overseas: An
Assessment, February 22nd, 1985, p. 25-6.
214
215
operation against a six-processing-labs-complex, located inside the jungle in Guaviare,
better known as Tranquilandia; it was the biggest complex known at the time. For this
operation they created a team composed by Anti-Narcotics Police, the Group of
Special Operations of the National Police, together with several satellite agents of the
United States’ National Security Agency and the DEA. 34
There were other operations, which included United States Coastguards in
Colombian coasts. One of them was called Tiburón (Shark), and it consisted in
capturing and shooting, if necessary, trafficking ships heading towards the United
States—with previous Colombian authorization. 35 More operations, such as Hat Trick
I & II took place, these including United States Army ships. 36
It is worth noting that, by the end of the eighties there was a moderate increase in
Colombian and United States military participants inside anti-drug operations.
Nonetheless, important limits were kept: on one side, Colombian and United States
diplomats discussed if they should give or not responsibilities to United States officials
in joint operations where United States military actives were used; another discussion
considered the possibility of giving those officials unlimited entrance to territorial
waters without previously reporting themselves in each event. 37 Colombia also ruled
out the possibility of having joint operations with the United States military inside
national territory: “We gratefully receive all the assessment and equipment help you
give us. Still, joint operations we won’t, definitely won’t,” said General Miguel
Antonio Padilla—General Director of the Colombian Police—when the United States
tried to increase military support for the war on drugs at the end of the decade. 38 In the
same line, President Barco rejected the suggestion to create a Regional Anti-Drug
34
William O. Walker III, “The Bush Administration’s Andean Drug Strategy in Historical Perspective,” in
Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III (editors), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, Coral Gables, NorthSouth Center Press, University of Miami, 1996, p. 3.
35
United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Narcotics Control, April 20th-22nd, 1982,
p. 1448-9.
36
United States House, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel, Subcommittee on
Investigations, Narcotics Interdiction and the Use of the Military: Issues for Congress. Proceedings of a
seminar held by the Congressional Research Service. June 7th, 1988, August 24th, 1988, p. 55.
37
Interview to Clemencia Forero, former Vice Minister of Foreign Relations for the Americas, Bogotá, May,
1999.
38
The New York Times, July 9th, 1989, section 4, p. 3.
215
216
Multilateral Force. 39 Yet, after the murder of New Liberalism leader, Luis Carlos
Galán, in 1989, he did receive US$65 million in military equipment for the Armed
Forces and the Police. Nevertheless, Colombian never saw visible and controverted
deployments of United States troops such as the Blast Furnace operation in Bolivia in
1986, and Snow Cap & Support Justice, which took place at a regional level; 40 even
so, it did allow an increase in military assistance from the United States.
Another important task initiated in the eighties was eradication as a very frequent
but not permanent activity. Probably inspired in the success of Mexican fumigation, 41
United States officials claimed that eradication was more efficient and less expensive
than other measures, because it was executed “closer to the source.” 42 In December
1983, the National Narcotics Commission approved the use of herbicides for
marihuana fumigation. 43 The Colombian government authorized some manual and
aerial eradication, but abstained from fumigating guerilla-controlled territories when
considering that security risks were high, or when it was politically inconvenient
because of peace negotiations with the FARC.
Concerning prohibition, Colombia kept refining its anti-drug legislation. Law 30
of January 1986—also known as the National Narcotics Statute—was approved,
raising penalties for illicit drug trafficking and consumption, as well as for the traffic
of chemical precursors. It also introduced incipient language on the extinction of
domain. 44 Later, a special jurisdiction to judge those who committed crimes related to
drugs dealing was created, and, in 1988, threats and homicides committed by drug
dealers were jurisdictionally classified as terrorist acts. 45 Advised by the United States
Embassy and the Department of State, Colombia also adopted a penalty negotiation
scheme, adjusting elements from the United States and Italian systems for jueces sin
39
United States Senate, U.S. International Drug Policy. Multinational Strike Forces, p. 5 and 179 (on Barco’s
position), United States Congressional Research Service and United States House, Committee on Armed
Services, The Andean Drugs Strategy and the Role of the Military. Proceedings of a Seminar, Washington
D.C., GPO, 1990, p. 33.
40
See Richard D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador and the Drug
War, Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1998.
41
Peter Reuter, An Analytical Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy, AEI Press, March, 2005.
42
INCSR, 1985, p. 8.
43
INCSR, 1989, p. 71.
44
INCSR, 1987, p. 94.
45
INCSR, 1989, p. 72.
216
217
rostro—judges whose anonymity is guaranteed by the use of masks or two-way
mirrors.
In this same line, Colombia contributed to the strengthening of the international
prohibition regime, which was strongly pushed during that decade. In 1984 Bolivia,
Colombia, and other Latin American countries signed the Quito Declaration, in which
drugs trafficking was considered a crime against humanity. In October of the same
year, the New York Declaration against Narcotic Trafficking and Use was signed by
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, asking the
United Nations’ Social and Economical Council (ECOSOC) to create a convention
project against illicit narcotics and trafficking of psychotropic substances. This
convention—called the Vienna Convention—was signed in 1988. Finally, in 1986, the
OAS organized the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Narcotics Traffic,
giving birth to the Inter-American Commission for Drugs Abuse Control (in Spanish,
CICAD). 46
Taking in account the obvious weaknesses of the Colombian judicial and prison
systems—which constantly let big and small drug dealers free—among all the subjects
in the anti-drug agenda, the most complex was extradition. The treaty had been signed
without many setbacks, but its ratification required stronger efforts of political
persuasion by the United States Embassy, which found allies in the Ministry of Justice
and the Supreme Court. In 1981 the Colombian Congress finally ratified the treaty 47 ,
but later came the challenge of its execution. Before the murder of the Minister of
Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Colombia had refused to apply the treaty for reasons of
national “autonomy” and “dignity.” 48 Still, short time after the crime, President
Betancur authorized some extraditions. His successor, President Barco, was in favor of
extradition but the treaty had to overpass several obstacles, partly because of drug
dealers’ manipulations inside the public sector. For the first time the United States
used diplomatic coercion: 1988’s “mini-embargo” which, for a month, had harsh
46
www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad-history.htm
Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, “La lucha por la autonomía: la gran encrucijada de la política exterior de
Betancur,” in Heraldo Muñoz (Comp.), América Latina y el Caribe: políticas exteriores para sobrevivir,
Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1986, pp. 209-236.
48
Tatiana Matthiesen, El arte político de conciliar. El tema de las drogas en las relaciones entre Colombia y
Estados Unidos, 1986-1994, Bogotá, Fedesarrollo, Fescol, Cerec, 2000, p. 161.
47
217
218
United States custom procedures applied on Colombian travelers and exports. Still,
such impasse was quickly solved. The Embassy and the Department of State simply
wanted to send unequivocal signals to drug dealers, but did not doubt President
Barco’s cooperation. 49 It was clear that the Government had started a war against the
carteles and had cooperated with United States experts to make extradition real. 50 So,
while Bahamas, Brazil, Bolivia, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, and Paraguay, went through
the severe United States anti-drug certification process—which was continuously
reformed and strengthened along the decade—and while Panama underwent a military
intervention, Colombia was, in the end, praised for its efforts in spite of its mistakes.
The 1989 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report noted that few countries had
contributed with so many resources or had sacrificed so many lives in the Drug War as
Colombia had, and that such was the reason for them to admire its “determination.” 51
But, what was happening at the same time with the armed conflict and the links
between armed illegal groups and drug trafficking? Why didn’t the United States take
part then? Links between insurgence and drug trafficking were discussed for the first
time—and in a tangential way—in the United States Congress at the end of the 70’s.
By then, United States Ambassador, Thomas D. Boyatt, talked about a supposed
participation of M-19 members in the Guillot-Lara issue on drug trafficking and
Cuba. 52 Later on, in 1984, after the finding of Tranquilandia, it was speculated that the
FARC owned the complex; such fact strengthened the idea of possible bonds between
the guerrilla group and the illicit drug industry. Boyatt’s successor, Lewis Tambs,
talked about the existence of “narco-terrorism” in Colombia, statement that the
49
Interview to Phillip McLean, Advisor Minister for the United States Embassy in Bogotá, during the period
of Ambassador Gillespie. Also, Second Assistant Secretary of State for Andean Issues during the Bush
Administration, Washington D.C., August, 1999. Moreover, interview to Anthony Gillespie, Ambassador of
the United States in Colombia between 1985 and 1988, Washington D.C. August, 1999.
50
United States House, Select Committee on Narcotic Drugs and Control, Colombian Drug Trafficking and
Control, May 6th, 1987, p. 9. Fernando Cepeda mentions his suspicions on the infiltration of mafia elements
inside the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations. This explains the effort to keep up the cooperation
exercise within a restricted circle. Interview in Bogotá, May, 1999.
51
See: 1989’s testimony, attached to Congressional Research Service, International Narcotics Control. The
President’s March 1 Certification for Foreign Assistance Eligibility and Options for Congressional Action
(Washington D.C., CRS 1989).
52
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Drug Enforcement Caucus, The Cuban
Government’s Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, April 30th, 1983, p. 59.
218
219
Betancur Administration disliked, since it was in the middle of peace negotiations with
the FARC, and such term undermined the legitimacy of the process.
By 1985 the INM annual report clearly stated the existence of those same links,
by mentioning that the FARC charged US$445 for the protection of each cultivated
hectare, and US$410 for authorizing the transit of each processed kilogram. 53 It also
estimated their yearly profits—earned through taxes and diverse services—at US$99
million. Later on, in 1987, it stated that the FARC had acquired their own laboratory,
and that the Frente Primero controlled Guaviare’s production and processing. Even so,
such finding did not change the politics of anti-drug cooperation or the idea of
“prudent distance.” Nobody ever mentioned the idea of fighting against FARC or
ELN—as it had happened in Peru, where counterinsurgency and anti-drug tasks were
combined to deal with Sendero Luminoso. 54
Malcom Deas explains this United States self-restriction with the Colombian
size, independence degree, and civil tradition. 55 Such idea was confirmed by an
official from the United States Department of State at the time: “Colombia was a
democracy, a big country, and you just didn’t interfere in its affairs; it was a whole
different story than Central America.” 56 Other factors of the political conjuncture of
the decade also influenced the situation: those government officials and members of
the United States Congress who disagreed with Reagan’s policies for Central America,
had the tendency of rejecting the links between guerrillas and drug trafficking; thus, it
was not convenient for them to point out the links in the Colombian case. 57
Anyhow, drugs and drug dealing became more and more important to the
bilateral agenda throughout the decade. Hence, cooperation increased and so did the
United States’ participation.
Anti-Drug Cooperation in the 90’s
53
INCSR, 1985, p. 62.
At least in an open and explicit way.
55
Malcolm Deas, “Colombia durante el gobierno del presidente Betancur: las relaciones entre política
exterior, crisis centroamericana y proceso de paz nacional. Dos enfoques,” Documentos Ocasionales, 5, 1988.
56
Interview with Phillip McLean, Washington D.C., August, 1999.
57
For example, Anne Wrobleski, former director of the INM, stated that her office had “lost time” looking for
evidence to relate the FARC and M-19 to drug trafficking. United States House, Select Committee on
Narcotic Drugs and Drug Control, Colombian Drug Trafficking and Control, May 6th, 1987, p. 20.
54
219
220
Bilateral
anti-drug
cooperation
began,
in
the
90’s,
an
accelerated
institutionalizing phase that was stimulated by various factors. First of all, both United
States and Colombian bureaucratic inertia nourished the interest for the Drug War. In
the United States the roles of the Department of State—in the hands of the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL, successor of INM)—and of the
Department of Defense were essential to maintain and expand the United States
mission. In Colombia, agencies receiving assistance—such as Anti-Narcotic Police—
became dependent on United States funding and soon learned to request more and
more.
On the Colombian side, external anti-drug politics—consisting, basically, of an
“internationalization” of drug control according to the principle of co-responsibility—
also contributed to justify a stronger foreign assistance. Furthermore, Colombia’s
worsening condition was used as a reason for a broadening of both countries’
assistance programs. By the end of the 80’s and beginning of the 90’s the war of the
carteles vs. the Colombian State intensified with dozens of terrorist bombings all over
the country. In spite of the weakening of the carteles, achieved at the beginning of the
decade, coca crops proliferated. The illicit drugs’ industry fed the FARC’s and the
paramilitaries’ pockets, and in 1996 the armed conflict became aggravated.
This is how an important change in the objectives of cooperation took place: the
goal would no longer be to increase cocaine’s price in the United States in order to
ease consumption, but to protect the Colombian State by neutralizing the dangerous
drug carteles. Besides, to go further than a simple interdiction, anti-drug strategy
strengthened: several programs became permanent and United States donations
proliferated. While 1980’s average United States assistance (excluding 1989) was,
approximately, US$8 million, in the 90’s it was US$98 million; and, in 1999 the
United States gave Colombia US$317.6 million. 58 These data question the idea of
antagonism and diplomatic conflict always characterizing the anti-drug policy in the
58
Statistics are not adjusted to inflation. Information on assistance during the 80’s may be found in the United
States House and Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Authorizations for the corresponding
years. For the 90’s, see: Nina Serafino, CRS Report. Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, updated
until February 12th, 2001.
220
221
United States and in Latin America, and, instead, suggests that friendship and not the
strains helped as base to a stronger United States involvement within Colombia.
Another issue to be considered is that, during the 90’s, a particular political event
took place between both countries: the standard good relationship was temporarily
suspended. Between 1995 and 1997, Colombia was for the first time target of a strong
diplomatic coercion based on the certification requirements. Even so, such political
impasse did not affect the rhythm of bilateral cooperation. In the end, both accelerated
cooperation expansion and decertification contributed to completely eliminate the
implicit “prudent distance” rule. Instead, they triggered United States participation in
Colombia’s domestic affairs and, later on, in the Colombian armed conflict.
This anti-drug bilateral cooperation phase was opened with the Andean Strategy
launched by Bush Administration between 1989 and 1990, and with the Cartagena
Declaration in 1990 as well. 59 The murder of Luis Carlos Galán in 1989, at the hands
of the Cartel de Medellín, was the catalyst to the new feeling of urgency that was to be
attributed to the Drug War. Few days after Galan’s death, Bush talked to the United
States audience: “We have the responsibility not to leave our brave friends in
Colombia to fight alone (...) I spoke with President Barco last week and we hope to
meet with the leaders of affected countries in an unprecedented drug summit.” 60 The
institutionalization of the cooperation process continued after Bush left, motivated by
the National Strategy of Anti-Drug Control launched by Bill Clinton—which focused
on control activities in countries that produce drugs 61 —and by a renewed annual
certification application, starting on 1994.
It was agreed that interdiction and eradication needed to be strengthened with
more police capacities, higher Colombian military participation, and more United
States military assistance. There was also a need to enhance the control over money
laundering and chemical precursors; to take care of economic and social dimensions of
the supply in order to stimulate alternative crops to coca leaf, which could be sold in
59
United States House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Andean Strategy, June, 11th, 1991;
United States House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, The Andean Summit Meeting,
February 15th, 1990, March 7th, 1990.
60
The Washington Post, September 6th, 1989, p. A18.
61
United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations and Human Rights, International Aspects of the President’s Drug Control Strategy, November
3rd, 1993, pp. 2-9.
221
222
domestic and international markets; and to strengthen the Colombian institutions
whose mission was to apply Law and Justice all over the country. In order to achieve
all the former, both legal and bureaucratic adjustments were necessary.
Interdiction strengthened in many ways. First of all, efforts to prosecute carteles
were doubled. One outstanding operation was the search for Pablo Escobar after his
escape from prison in 1992. In that occasion President Gaviria authorized for the first
time the participation of United States militaries and intelligence agents in Colombian
territory. 62 Some time later they were able to capture important drug dealers from
Medellín and, during the Samper Administration, the head members of the Cartel de
Cali were captured. Secondly, territorial control was increased: with the help of the
United States, the Gaviria Administration created a Colombian Coastguard Force
within the Army. 63
In 1997 both countries signed the Maritime Interdiction Agreement, which
helped their corresponding forces to establish permanent coordination routines in order
to detain trafficking ships that traveled across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Aerial
space control—and territorial as a whole—was reinforced with the use and
introduction of Colombian and United States radars that were to be operated by both
countries 64 , and by an aircraft interception program, which was launched in 1995.
After the United States’ insistence to the Samper government, Colombia restored
extradition in 1997. Finally, in 1998—before Plan Colombia and during Samper and
Clinton Administrations—the authorization to create the first Colombian anti-drug
battalion was given. It was to be trained and equipped by the United States, and it
symbolized the first step towards a new change in the cooperation objectives: the war
against “narco-guerrillas” and “narco-paramilitaries.”
Eradication became a permanent task in the hands of Anti-Narcotic Police, and a
main issue in the cooperation agenda. In 1992 the Dirección Nacional de
62
The Ambassador Morris Busby requested the participation of Delta Force. See Mark Bowden, Killing
Pablo (www.killingpablo.com).
63
Juan Tokatlian, “Política pública internacional contra las drogas de la administración Gaviria y las
relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos,” in Francisco Thoumi (editor), Drogas ilícitas en Colombia. Su
impacto económico, político y social, Bogotá, Ariel, PNUD, DNE, 1997, p. 522.
64
Mayor Julio González R., “El uso del radar en el control del narcotráfico,” in Revista de las Fuerzas
Armadas, No. 114, 1992, pp. 26-7; Lieutenant Colonels Robert E. Harmon, Ramon A. Malave, Charles A
Miller, and Captain William K. Nadolski, “Counterdrug Assistance: The Number One Priority,” in Military
Review, LXXIII, 1993, p. 28.
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223
Estupefacientes (Nacional Narcotics Direction-DNE) authorized massive gliphosate
fumigation to attack poppy crops. 65 In 1994 the program was broadened to include
coca crops, and, in December of the same year, the Ministry of Defense and the United
States Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) signed an agreement to launch an
eradication campaign in Guaviare and Putumayo called Operación Resplandor, which
ended in 1998. To support this, the United States gave aircrafts, helicopters, as well as
the necessary inputs to the Police, besides from training hundreds of pilots. Later on,
the NAS and the Police expanded the eradication area to include the whole territory,
and the United States financed the construction of several military bases that would
give logistical support to Police and Army operations.
Such actions helped increase United States military participation in the design
and introduction of United States anti-drug policies in Colombia. Moreover, the United
States loosened rules on military assistance to foreign police forces and corps, by using
draw downs and by launching the Foreign Military Funding Program (FMF) destined
to buy military equipment, with the only condition that it had to be used in anti-drug
activities. 66 The Colombian Armed Forces also increased their participation in antidrug operations, particularly in rural areas with security problems caused by the
presence of illegal armed groups.
In regard to the economic dimension of the new integral cooperation, the Bush
package included the Andean Preference Treaty (ATPA), which lasted for a period of
10 years starting in 1992. It was complemented by the Enterprise Initiative for the
Americas, which aimed to encourage commerce and investments inside the continent.
Additionally, the United States transferred funds from the Economic Support Fund
through USAID, affirming that Colombia had suffered from great losses after the
breaking of the Coffee Agreement. Their main objective was to contribute to the
payment of the external debt, as well as to support the administration of justice, the
65
Interview to Gabriel de Vega, former Director of the Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, Bogotá, May
1999.
66
United States House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee, Oversight Investigation on the Andean Initiative, October 23rd, 1991, p. 89.
223
224
process of becoming aware of drug issues, and the development of programs to
encourage exports. 67
Following the same line, in July 1990, the United States finally lifted its veto on
Colombia’s admittance to the GATT and to the General Preference System. However,
it rejected the funding request for illicit crops’ substitution and for alternative
development, because they considered that those harvests were not owned by peasants,
but were property of the main drug gangsters. 68 Later on, in 1995, Colombia designed
the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (Alternative Development National Plan),
which was initially subsidized by the CICAD, the UNDP, and the IDB. By 1998 the
conflict had intensified, thus, the United Stated reconsidered their policy and gave the
first donation: US$500,000. Some time later, together with the Plan Colombia, they
institutionalized cooperation for productive projects through USAID and its
contractors.
Another new and main cooperation issue was the reform of the Colombian
judicial sector, justified by at least two ideas: first, extradition was not a solution to the
drugs problem by itself, but an alternate element to apply pressure; that is why
Colombia needed to develop its own capacity to apply justice in an effective way.
Second, the inquisitor system was too permeable to corruption; hence, it had to be
replaced with the United States-style accusatory system. A long and deep institutional
transformation process began—and it is not over yet—which, because of its nature,
opened the door for the United States to domestic political and bureaucratic sceneries
where before it had no participation.
The first initiatives focused on the protection of judges and public officials. 69
Subsequently, the United States financed the consultancy of a team of expert lawyers,
hired by USAID and FES to work in the constitutional reform that at the moment was
part of the National Constituent Assembly. The reform recommended the creation of a
National Attorney’s Office—just as the United States Attorney General’s Office—
67
United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Agency for International
Development’s Economic Assistance Strategy for the Andes and Other Programs, April 3rd, 1990, pp. 18-9.
68
United States House, The Future of Colombian Narcotics Control Efforts and the Andean Initiative, July
10th, 1991, p. 73. Interview to USAID officials, Washington, August, 1997.
69
ICITAP, Colombia Project and Description Budget, 1991, mimeo, pp. 10-1.
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225
together with other changes in the justice sector. 70 Later, Gaviria and Bush’s
governments subscribed a new agreement that lasted until 1996. Both International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Overseas
Prosecutorial Development and Training Program (OPDAT), from the Department of
Justice and USAID, contributed to the design and performance of the new office. The
ICITAP helped to create a new organizational structure for such entity, divided into
special units; some of them in charge of crimes related to drug trafficking. They also
wrote several manuals: one for Judicial Police, in which the roles of different
investigative entities where defined, within the framework of the new Colombian
judicial ordering plan; a Crime Scene Manual; an Investigative Assistance Entities
Guide; and, finally, a Manual to establish the Attorney General’s role, following the
parameters given by the United States Attorney General. 71
By donating computers and specialized programs, USAID supported the creation
of information systems for the Attorney General. It also gave massive training to
judicial officials and to those who took part in entities related with the judicial police.
Assistance included many things, starting with a “soft” disclosure of ideas—for
example, one of the goals set for the first National Training Plan designed by the
OPDAT consisted in producing “a change in the mentality of the judges and
prosecutors to adopt the new accusatorial system.” 72 —and ending with the
development of investigative and forensic abilities, together with the establishment of
internal ethical standards, the introduction of the new National Attorneys’ concept, the
improvement of coordination and communication among entities, and the training in
evidence gathering.
Besides all this preparation, the United States also donated the usual goods,
including office equipment, vehicles and radios. 73 In 1996, the treaty was renewed and
new budgets were assigned. 74 With these funds, 2,500 attorneys and investigators were
trained during that same year. During 1997, 3,100 magistrates and attorneys were
70
General Accounting Office [current General Accountability Office], Foreign Assistance. Promising
Approach to Judicial Reform in Colombia, Washington D.C., GAO, September, 1992, pp. 3-4.
71
Op. cit., p. 9; annex B. “Descripción de programa para las DOJ/ICITAP y DOJ/OPDAT, Actividades de
Apoyo al Programa de reforma a la Justicia en Colombia, 1998-1999,” mimeo, p. 4.
72
ICITAP, “Program Document,” 1997, mimeo, p. 6.
73
ICITAP, “Colombia: Plan de Acción para el año fiscal de 1994,” p. 4.
74
El Tiempo, March 7th, 1996, p. 6A.
225
226
trained; in 1998, 200 judges and attorneys received training in anti-money-laundering
and domain extinction measures; and during year 1999, a new unified curriculum for
investigators was designed. 75 In order to clear the system, a program of alternate
methods for conflict resolution was also launched; it was assigned to 10 Casas de
Justicia, which were created between 1995 and 1999. 76 In time the United States
created strong bonds with the General Attorney’s Office and other related entities, a
fact that contributed to the expansion and decentralization of its political influence.
Finally, throughout the decade Colombia continued to improve its anti-drug laws
and gave control functions to more entities. Among many others, it created the regime
against asset-laundering, approved the 1995 Anti-corruption Law, and created the
Financial Analysis and Intelligence Unit. The subduing policy was modified in 1997,
the same year in which the harshest penalties for drug trafficking convicts were
approved, and more power was given to the authorities to confiscate drug dealers’
properties. 77 Under the guidance of the United States Justice Department, substantial
reforms were introduced in the penitentiary system: Colombia maintained its
traditional international activism for the development and strengthening of the
international prohibition regime, especially inside the OAS, and short after the Action
Plan of the Americas’ Summit. However, the agenda was dual: on one side it wanted
to wipe out the legitimacy of the coercive United States diplomacy—which was based
on the capricious use of the certification—and on the other, it sought to prove
Colombia’s prohibitionist credentials.
Decertification and the Effects of the 1995-1997’s Diplomatic Crisis
All along the chapter we have highlighted the existence of a continuous friendship
between Colombia and the United States, which has lasted for a relatively long period—
including the times of the Drug War. Still, an important exception must be taken into
account: the diplomatic crisis between 1995 and 1997, period during which the Clinton
75
INCSR, 1996-1999.
INCSR, 2000.
77
Presidencia de la República, La lucha contra las drogas ilícitas, 1996; INCSR, 1997.
76
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227
Administration decertified Colombia on two occasions, with the argument that President
Ernesto Samper had not cooperated in the war against drugs.
Colombia fell into disgrace for several reasons: a more aggressive use of the
certification process during the Clinton Administration—as an INL strategy to obtain
better international results in the war against drugs; a tendency to consider narcocorruption a threat to the United States interests of encouraging regional democracy
and security; and President Samper’s political mistake of allowing drug dealers to
finance his 1994 presidential campaign.
The diplomatic crisis—the severity of this episode was compared in Colombia to
the secession of Panama in 1903—had various effects. One of them was to set a
precedent of political interventionism, contributing to the disappearance of that
“prudent distance” kept by the United States with regards to Colombian domestic
affairs. The first examples of this new behavior took place in 1994, when United States
officials met with Samper to “talk tough” and threaten him with the decertification if
he did not prove his commitment to the Drug War. 78 Along with the subsequent
decertification came multiple demands on details of anti-drug operations, which were
frequently accompanied of public and visceral criticisms of Samper at the hands of
Ambassador Myles Frechette, together with the Assistant Secretary for Narcotics
Control—Robert Gelbard—and others, such as Republican Senator Jesse Helms. With
this, not only the tradition of solving problems between both countries in a discreet
way disappeared, but also, the United States became one more actor inside the
domestic space. Public answers given by Samper and other members of his cabinet did
not help restrain the new United States’ style but, instead, nourished the avalanche of
public statements and demands.
Finally, the most notorious act of United States interventionism was the broad
and proactive instigation of the resignation of the Colombian President; an openly
hostile policy in international diplomacy, and very common when dealing with
“Banana Republics.” The United States followed closely the situation and supported
the Proceso 8,000, which, in the hands of the Attorney General, investigated possible
78
Interview to Michael Skol, Second Secretary of State for Inter-American Issues between 1994-1996,
Washington D.C., September, 1999.
227
228
links between politicians and drug dealers, as well as the decisions of the Colombian
Legislature on whether or not to take Samper to trial for narco-corruption and, in this
way, instigate his resignation. Examples of the former were the public statements of
rejection presented by Gelbard and Frechette, as a reaction to the decision of the
Chamber of Representatives to exonerate the President, in December 1995. In 1996,
Gelbard offered to certify Colombia in exchange for Samper’s resignation. 79
It has been discussed in political and academic groups if certification assured the
continuity of prohibition in Colombia, plus the achievement of specific goals—such as
the increase of eradicated hectares and the imprisonment of drug dealing gangsters
who belonged to the Cartel de Cali. It may be said that Samper’s desire to remain in
power unquestionably guaranteed his diligent fulfillment of bilateral cooperation
compromises just as the annual certification process imposed a faster rhythm to the
anti-drug operations. However, it cannot be stated that Samper forced prohibition onto
the Colombian State bureaucracy. Prohibition was already institutionalized with
technocrats and officials compromised to the anti-drug policy, who responded to
professional incentives or to their own beliefs about the need for controlling drug
trafficking. The combination of these two factors forced the bilateral anti-drug
cooperation issue to remain on the table, despite the fact that there was still a
diplomatic crisis going on in the upper echelons of the political elites. 80
The diplomatic crisis also served as a catalyst to unchain a systematic revaluation
of the United States politics toward Colombia. Such change implied the reformulation
of the Colombian “problem”—as a more complex one than simply drug trafficking and
pressures executed by dangerous carteles—along with the idea of counterinsurgency
as a key component of the United States political package for Colombia. This is how
doors began to open to a higher United States military and political participation in the
79
Staff Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Corruption and Drugs in Colombia. Democracy at Risk,
Washington D.C., Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1996; El Tiempo, December 18th, 1995, p. 1A; “No
buscamos tumbar a Samper,” in El Tiempo, July 3rd, 1996; “Samper alista respuesta al Memo de Frechette,” in
El Tiempo, July 2nd, 1996; Fernando Cepeda, “El Congreso colombiano ante la crisis,” in Francisco Leal
Buitrago (editor), Tras las huellas de la crisis política, Bogotá, Tercer Mundo, Fescol, Iepri, 1996, p. 84.
80
For information on anti-drug operations during this period see Presidencia de la República, La lucha contra
las drogas ilícitas, 1996. Un año de grandes progresos, Bogotá (no date, probably published in 1997) and
Rosso José Serrano Cadena (with the help of Santiago Gamboa), Jaque mate, Bogotá, Grupo Editorial Norma,
1999.
228
229
Colombian conflict. Nowadays, that same intervention takes place under the flag of
“war against terrorism.”
How did such reevaluation of United States policies towards Colombia take place
inside the context of the diplomatic crisis? Not every official from the Clinton
Administration agreed with the 1996 and 1997 decertification, or with the United
States political approach steered by the “drugs first” philosophy. Some of them
considered that the manner in which drug trafficking was prioritized and dealt with
worsened Colombia’s violent situation, especially this of violence linked to the armed
conflict. As a result, in order to analyze the nature and causes to the Colombian
conflict, it was necessary to look ahead of drug trafficking and carteles.
Fundamentally, there were two groups of people who supported such idea: on
one side there were those who had a social leaning, who wanted to revert the punitive
way of controlling drugs—especially, eradication. On the other, instead, there were
those “strong handed,” who wanted to lead United States efforts to a fight against
illegal armed groups, by giving more responsibilities to the Department of Defense. 81
Both points of view helped attract more United States political attention to the
aggravation of the Colombian conflict, and encouraged Washington to consider giving
United States politics a twist. Such turn would entail a raise in the United States
participation in the conflict, as well as a stronger interventionism in Colombia.
It seems ironic that that those Colombians who distrusted the increasing
influence of the United States in their country would have contributed to that
intervention. In order to avoid decertification—and breaking with the Colombian
tradition of lowering the profile of the armed insurgency—Samper and a small group
of advisers tried to convince the United States not to decertify the country. They
claimed that the guerrilla threat had increased dramatically, and that decertification
would only lessen the President’s authority to fight against illegal armed groups, or to
attract them toward a peace negotiation. They referred to “narco-guerrillas” and
emphasized that Colombia’s stability was crucial to the entire region, because of the
overflowing potential of the Colombian armed conflict. Thus, they said, decertification
81
Interview and conversations with Harry O’Hara, Responsible for the United States Department of State
during the Clinton Administration, Washington, August 1997 and July 1999.
229
230
was, in the end, a strong threat to United States interests. 82 Samper’s strategy was
different from that of President Betancur who, at the beginning of the 80’s, discredited
links between guerrillas and drugs, with the final intention of avoiding foreign
intervention in negotiations with FARC.
Unfortunately, neither the United States nor Colombia exaggerated when, in the
middle of the 90’s, they started to talk about the magnitude of the Colombian armed
conflict: the FARC had multiplied their fronts and had, by then, between 15,000 and
18,000 combatants. In addition, the ELN had evidently recovered and, by the time
when paramilitaries and the Armed Forces started striking it at the end of the 90’s, it
could count on almost 5,000 combatants. Meanwhile, paramilitaries decided to
multiply rapidly by coordinating their moves within a federated group called
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which, by the end of the decade, had
approximately 18,000 members. This was Plan Colombia’s prelude.
It is worth noting that the impact of the decertification process in Colombia can
be explained by the close relationship between both countries and by the existence of
an intense anti-drug cooperation. These two conditions made Colombia vulnerable to
United States opinions and actions. On the contrary, in the cases of Syria and
Myanmar the impact of decertification was much softer: both countries had little to
lose in terms of diplomacy and assistance.
The United States certification process was modified few years later, in 2001,
partly because of the way it had been applied in Colombia and Mexico. For many in
Washington, Helms, Gelbard, and Frechette’s strategy had not only been arrogant but
also counterproductive. In 1998, the OAS launched an alternate monitoring system for
the anti-drug war—the Mecanismo de Evaluación Multilateral (Multilateral Evaluation
Mechanism-MEM)—with which the certification was no longer a problem for bilateral
relations. Nonetheless, its implementation during the 90’s set important precedents,
and in the future the United States were to use other means to influence Colombia in
issues such as drugs and armed conflict.
82
Interview with Diego Cardona, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations for the Americas between 1994-1996,
Bogotá, May, 1999.
230
231
Plan Colombia (1998) and afterwards
In 1998 anti-drug cooperation started a new stage. The “armed conflict” variable
was formally included in the bilateral agenda. Anti-drug operations—which, since the
70’s, had gradually increased their funding and reach—now included the aim of
counteracting Colombian illegal armed groups. Both objectives were intertwined: with
more that 160,000 hectares in a year (see Figure 1), Colombia was now the biggest
coca producer in the world, and armed groups financed themselves with drugs.
Furthermore, by then the relationship had already suffered important changes. The
diplomatic crisis was over and both countries were “friends” again; still, friendship
rules had changed. Particularly, as a result of the intensification of anti-drug
cooperation, and of the diplomatic crisis between Samper and Clinton Administrations,
that prudent distance kept by the United States for so long had vanished. The new
dynamic of bilateral cooperation strengthened both tendencies: step by step,
overcoming the armed conflict would become in itself a goal of United States policy
and cooperation, instead of being a secondary purpose behind dismantling drug
trafficking. Secondly, the United States would get more and more involved in military
and political strategic details, in order to encourage the demobilization of the guerillas
and the paramilitary.
This time, cooperation was articulated through Plan Colombia, which, like many
other bilateral cooperation programs, was the result of various consensuses between
both countries and of diverse bureaucratic, political, and economic interests of theirs as
well. In Colombia, the Andrés Pastrana Administration (1998-2002) openly declared
the need for more international cooperation to overpass the armed conflict. He
demanded a modern Marshall Plan, which would help bring about a peace process with
the now called narco-guerrillas. He also referred to more political support from the
United States and several European countries. In general terms, United States officials
from the Clinton Administration accepted Pastrana’s invitation, because it matched
their intention of modifying old anti-drug policies, in order to include initiatives to
overcome the armed conflict.
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232
However, they did their own adjustments. Taking advantage of the fact that
Colombians had not yet marked out all the details of Plan Colombia, it was easier for
the United States to shape its content. In its original version—published in 1999—
Pastrana bravely suggested using manual eradication made by guerrillas as one of the
“carrots” for peace negotiations, plus a potential disarming, demobilization, and
reincorporation programs. Furthermore, because of the setbacks of the Colombian
economy and because of the high levels of external debt registered at the moment, 83
Pastrana also requested additional assistance for economic development. However, the
United States decided to keep the traditional punitive policy as the crux of the Plan,
together with big military and police assistance components for rural interdiction of
drugs, along with massive aerial eradication campaigns. Their main purpose was to
attack the “drugs of the conflict”; in other words, reduce the harvesting, processing,
and distribution of narcotics, in order to weaken the FARC and induce them to finally
negotiate. 84
In the end, Colombia received what the United States offered: the Ministry of
Defense, Anti-Drug Police, and the Justice and Security Direction of the National
Planning Department (DNP)—agency in charge of sketching the Ministry of Defense’s
budget—were in favor of raising United States military assistance. After intense
debates in the United States Congress, which took place between 1999 and 2000, 85
assistance for Plan Colombia was approved. In 2000, Colombia received US$977.3
million and US$248.3 million more in 2001. Besides, another US$440 million came to
complement programs in other Andean countries, as part of the regional focus of the
Plan. United States military assistance reached levels never seen before, making
Colombia, until 2003, the third recipient of United States aid, after Israel and Egypt. A
good part of those funds was destined to purchase equipment and provide training to
the Colombian army, in order to create anti-drug brigades whose mission, until 2003,
83
A broad controversy on different versions of Plan Colombia has taken place. A collection and discussion
of different texts can be found at Internet (http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid0001.htm).
84
United States General Accounting Office. Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia, Washington D.C.,
United States General Accounting Office, 2000.
85
Adam Isacson and I. Vaicius, Plan Colombia: The Debate in Congress, 2000, Washington D.C., Center for
International Policy, 2000.
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233
was Push to the South: entering Putumayo—in the southern part of Colombia—a
region rich in coca and a fortress of the FARC.
Operations combined intense campaigns of aerial eradication, military operations
for the dismantling of laboratories, and combat against guerillas. For this purpose,
several military bases were built in Colombian territory; Colombian aerial capacity
was strengthened with Black Hawks UH 60 and repaired helicopters; more emphasis
was put on the gathering and exchange of information on the activities of illegal armed
groups; and a general strategy for military modernization was designed. Thus, the
historical tradition of keeping Colombian militaries off anti-drug battles was broken;
hence, the Department of Defense gained a more important role within the bilateral
cooperation initiatives. Additionally, social programs, which included alternative
development projects, were launched, and became a permanent line of action—
strategically seen as actions to win the heart and soul of potential contributors of illegal
armed groups.
Funds destined for these programs—in proportion to the strictly military part—
became object of debates in United States and Colombia. A minor assistance portion
was distributed among human rights’ protection, assistance to displaced civilians, law
enforcement, a judicial reform, and support for the peace process. Finally,
extradition—a controversial issue from the 80’s and 90’s anti-drug bilateral
cooperation agenda—became a routine. In 1999, for the first time in nine years,
Colombia extradited a national to the United States; in 2001 another 23 drug dealers
were extradited (among them, “Juvenal” Bernal y Fabio Ochoa Vásquez 86 ); and in
2004, for example, President Uribe’s government extradited for the first time a highranking FARC officer—Simón Trinidad—under drug trafficking charges. By mid
2005, more than 200 Colombians had been extradited. 87
The new administration of George W. Bush (2001-2004 and 2005-2008) kept
United States compromises with Plan Colombia, and even reinforced it with the
86
INCSR, 2000.
“Prohibición de condenar a cadena perpetua a extraditados a E.U. puede complicar ayuda a Colombia,” in
El Tiempo, August 10th, 2005.
87
233
234
Andean
Regional
Initiative 88 —another
comprehensive
package
to
stimulate
“democracy,” “development,” and to fight against drugs. In 2002, Colombia received
US$522.2 million; US$770.2 million in 2003; US$699 million in 2004; and in 2005,
more than US$700 million were authorized again. Since negotiations with the FARC
had failed in February 2002, the Uribe Administration (2002-2006) received aid with
even more enthusiasm than the former government; he had decided to launch a strong
military attack against guerrillas, within the frame of the so called Política de
Seguridad Democrática (Democratic Security Policy), which matched Bush’s “strong
handed” philosophy.
The war against terrorism launched by the United States right after September
11, 2001, helped take the next step: justify United States assistance to fight against
illegal armed groups, even if they were not associated to drugs. 89 In October 2001, the
FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries were added to the United States list of international
terrorists. 90 One year later, the United States Congress broadened its country’s
authority to provide assistance to Colombia, in order to fight against threats different to
those of drug trafficking—for example, terrorist activities. It authorized Plan Colombia
helicopters to be used for military operations, even if they were not connected to the
anti-drug war; in former years, one of the conditions had been not to use them for this
purpose, not only to assure a better use, but also to limit United States participation in
the conflict. 91
More programs were approved in 2002: the Infrastructure Protection Program,
designed to fight against the FARC and ELN in Arauca—in order to, among other
things, protect the oil duct Caño Limón-Coveñas—and—since kidnap and extortion
had become the most profitable activities, together with drug trafficking, guerrillas,
88
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Acts, H.R.2506. Washington,
D.C., 2002.
89
The International Community, especially Scandinavia and some European governments and NGOs, and
United States NGOs, have criticized the possibility of a military exit to the conflict, exhorting, in its place,
dialogue.
90
Colin Powell, “Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” United States Department of State
(http://usinfo.state.gov).
91
Nina Serafino and L. K Storrs, Congressional Research Service, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY 2002
Supplemental and FY 2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, Washington D.C., Congressional
Research Service, 2002.
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235
and paramilitaries 92 —the Anti-Kidnappings Program in the hands of the Police and the
Armed Forces.
In 2004 the cap for military instructors and contractors of the Department of
Defense was raised from 400 to 800 and 600, respectively; 93 intensive aerial
eradication now covered other parts of the territory (farther away than Putumayo); and
the Plan Patriota (Patriot Plan), the main military operation launched by the Uribe
Administration, tried to get to the guerrilla rear guard in the Llanos Orientales and
Amazonia.
The military emphasis of anti-drug operations and the introduction of counterterrorism into the cooperation agenda forced changes in the routine of the bilateral
relations. On one side, diplomatic visits from United States military personnel to
Colombia, and from Colombian military personnel to Florida—South Commando
Base—and Washington proliferated. On the other, United States military intelligence
personnel and officers started having more frequent contact with Colombian military
personnel, through brigade and battalion training programs across the country. In daily
dialog, the Embassy’s Military Group (Milgroup), together with civil officials and
South Commando militaries, gained importance comparing with the NAS. Change
even caused frictions between NAS and Milgroup, on who would administer some of
the helicopters of Plan Colombia.
In Colombia, especially during the Uribe Administration, the Ministry of
Defense started leading the relationship with the United States. The confidentiality
aura of security issues, added up to the lack of expertise of the Foreign Secretary on
the subject, contributed to its loss of authority in the management of the bilateral
relationship—which was already limited. 94 Anti-drug police cooperation for drug
dealers’ interdiction followed its course, even though it lost political visibility in
regards to armed conflict and fumigation.
92
During the 90’s, Colombia had the higher kidnapping rate in the world, with approximately 2,000 to 3,000
per year.
93
Adam Isacson, “Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia,” in Yale Journal of International
Affairs, Summer-Autumn, 2005.
94
Since the Gaviria Administration, the Colombian Embassy in Washington became the most influential
office regarding bilateral relations.
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236
In the same way, the intensification of cooperation in the anti-drug war and,
particularly, a raise in the military assistance for anti-drug and anti-terrorist operations,
introduced more conditionalities in the area of human rights. They were, to some
extent, the result of the United States internal policy and of their bureaucratic and
political control systems, which, at the same time, are influenced by groups of interest;
NGOs, for example, when they lobby at the Congress and the Executive.
The first conditions imposed to Colombia on human rights were introduced in 1997
by the Foreign Assistance Act; in the report, the Human Rights Office of the Defense
Department criticized Colombia’s performance in the area. Also, the United States publicly
attacked the existence of links between militaries and paramilitaries. By 1998, in order to
qualify for military assistance, Colombia had to sign an agreement with the United States,
committing itself to watch over the good behavior of security organisms, and to
appropriately punish any eventual violation.95 Afterwards, along with Plan Colombia it
was established that both the Department of State and Colombia should evaluate together
and periodically the certification on human rights, similar to that on anti-drug cooperation.
Certification is to be emitted twice a year, and among the required standards are that those
Colombian military personnel who are mentioned trustworthy reports of human rights
violations are to be suspended from their positions; that the government must investigate
and punish those who have been reported; that there are no relationships with paramilitary
groups; and that the Department of State is compelled to consult with internationally
recognized human rights organizations as well as with United Nations’ High Commissioner
Office for Human Rights in Colombia.
In 2003 the United States suspended its assistance to the Aerial Force Unit CACOM
1, alleging that there were no results on the investigations of civilian deaths occurred in
1998 at Santo Domingo, Arauca; by 2004 the United States froze 12.5% of the military
assistance given to the country. In general, Washington has paid much more political
attention to the human rights’ certification—in contrast with that of anti-drug cooperation.
NGOs and opposing members of Congress have criticized the United States Government
for its intervention in Colombia, and for the military emphasis of its assistance. They have
95
See: United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Report Submitted to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
U.S. Senate, years 1978 to 2004.
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237
also attacked the Uribe Administration for his Política de Seguridad Democrática, because
of his apparent laxity towards paramilitaries, and for his lack of commitment to the
protection of human rights in Colombia. For example, in 2005, 22 Democratic Senators
requested that the Secretary of State—Condoleezza Rice—decertify Colombia, arguing that
multiple Colombian military personnel had unresolved reports for human rights’ violations,
as well as for links with paramilitaries.96 Wanting to fulfill the United States’ expectations,
Colombia has dismantled brigades, founded new controls for militaries—including a new
office at the Ministry of Defense, in charged of tracking accusations made to members of
the Armed Forces—and has retired more than 300 officers.
Finally, the most notorious characteristic of this phase has been the United States
meddling in the politics that surround the decisions taken to overcome the armed conflict in
Colombia. Such meddling has become more visible since the creation of Plan Colombia.
When the Pastrana Administration tried to negotiate with the FARC, the United States
expressed its pessimism in regards to a peace process. Some officials thought that the
Colombian government was not negotiating from a powerful position, thus, the FARC
would take advantage of its actions—such as approving the demilitarization of 42,000
square kilometers at Caguán—in order to increase its cocaine harvest and traffic profit, and
then strengthen its military capacity.97 The United States’ vision did not restrain the peace
process, even though it did shape the government’s strategy in order to include more
military and judicial dissuasion elements (“stick”) when confronting the FARC.
Following the same line, the United States has outlined the Colombian politicies
regarding the paramilitaries. It has pushed Colombian public safety institutions hard, in
order for them to consider paramilitaries a terrorist threat that should be battled. It has also
influenced the terms of negotiation between them and the Uribe Administration, which
formally began in Santa Fe de Ralito in 2004. As part of that process, by October of year
2005, 11,119 paramilitaries had already surrendered; according to official data, it is almost
96
“Congreso de Estados Unidos congela US$100 de ayuda a Colombia por no cumplir con derechos
humanos,” El Tiempo, June 27th, 2005.
97
Interview to Alexander Lee, Political Adviser of the United States’ Embassy, Bogotá, April, 2004. Instead,
Isakson states that United States policy has been counterproductive for a “political exit” of the conflict,
because Plan Colombia dissuaded FARC from negotiating with the government. See Isakson, Failing
Grades, pp. 149-150. Although it is difficult to establish which the estimates were taken in account by the
FARC at the moment, some officials close to the process believe that the illegal armed group never had the
intention of demobilizing during the Caguán negotiations with the Pastrana Administration. Interview to Jan
Egeland, West Point, May, 2002.
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238
half of the total number. Between 2003 and 2005—the year during which the Congress
processed the Ley de Justicia y Paz (Law of Justice and Peace), which was to demobilize
and reinsert paramilitaries—Bush’s government, together with members of the Congress in
opposition, NGOs, and think tanks, talked to President Uribe presenting their opinions
about such law.
In September 2003, 56 Democratic Representatives addressed a missive to the
President, presenting their “doubts on his will” to process the AUC for human rights’
violations and drug trafficking. In time more letters and reports came, asking for a real
dismantling of paramilitary structures, as well as the forfeiture by the paramilitaries of
goods obtained with drug money, the confession of relevant information on drug
trafficking, and a severe punishment for those involved with crimes against humanity.98
Throughout the second semester of year 2005—during the approval of the new
assistance package—United States Congress introduced conditions related specifically to
the implementation of the Ley de Justicia y Paz.99 For the time being, the Bush
Administration—in spite of the support given to Uribe and his strategy to demobilize
paramilitaries—has put pressure on the government, requesting that members of that illegal
group are not left unpunished, so that Colombia is not left subject to the criminal authority
of paramilitaries. By means of extradition, the United States has also tried to mould the
AUC’s calculations, threatening to call for their extradition if they do not submit to an
acceptable level of punishment. Keeping all the former in mind, center left-wing politicians
opposed to the Bush government would still like their country to be even harder on
paramilitaries.
It seems evident that during this new phase of bilateral cooperation, Colombia has had
to present results to the United States in its own terms, and that the United States has used
its authority and the power gained by the assistance given, to influence both political issues
(such as anti-drug policy, extradition, and what to do with the armed groups), and details on
the bilateral cooperation’s routine (which type of helicopters to buy, how to train the
Armed Forces).
98
See, for example: “Embajador de Estados Unidos califica de ‘escandalo’ discurso de jefes paramilitares en
el Congreso,” in El Tiempo, July 29th, 2004; “New Law in Colombia Inadequate to Prevent Future Violence,”
Washington Office on Latin America, June 24th, 2005.
99
“Congreso de E.U. condiciona apoyo económico para respaldar proceso con los paramilitares,” in El
Tiempo, July 6th, 2005.
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239
The New Anti-Drug Cooperation and its Political Implications on
Colombia’s International Relations
Issues and challenges in the relationship with Europe
Since Virgilio Barco’s Administration (1986-1990), Colombia has started
questioning Europe for its responsibility in the “universal”—not only Colombian—
drugs problem. At this time, Europe was the second cocaine consumer (after the
United States), besides from producing chemical precursors, and having banks
involved in money-laundering. Europe answered Barco’s call by increasing the
assistance given to Colombia for development programs and by giving custom
preferences—former drugs SGP, current SGP+—besides from launching police and
judicial cooperation activities for transport interdiction and the dismantling of drug
trafficking networks. The approach that several European countries had to cooperation
with Colombia in the war against drugs was somehow different. For example, many of
them did not always trust aerial fumigation or military assistance to develop
interdiction capacities and to carry out anti-narcotic operations. Meanwhile, Great
Britain discreetly became one of the main cooperators in terms of security and drug
control.
During the 90’s, disagreements on the Drug War took place between the United
States, Europe, and the United Nations, but did not bring political problems to
Colombia. The country merely received what each had to offer, and then requested
more cooperation, meaning not only donations but also adjustments in their practices
and legislations. For example, Colombia called for better controls over chemical
production and commerce within the European public and private sectors, in addition
to more attention to money laundering.
The level of European assistance increased after Pastrana’s call to the
international community—including Europe and the United Nations—he invited them
to support dialogues with the FARC, the Plan Colombia, as well as an eventual peace
process. Now different European countries were willing to help dialogs with the
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guerrillas. 100 At the same time, the international recognition of the fact that the armed
conflict was aggravating each day—issue that put Colombia inside the international
political radar—contributed to the attention that First World countries paid to
Colombia, and encouraged them to include it in their foreign political agendas, and to
develop their own plans to overcome the conflict. So, Europe, just as the United States,
added the conflict to its old cooperation agenda, which was formerly articulated
around a war against drugs.
We may also draw attention to several political performances: countries such as
France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland contributed to the Colombian
government’s approach to the FARC and the ELN; among them, Sweden and
Netherlands supported the OAS’s verification mission for the demobilization of the
AUC. Additional events such as the influence that Belgium and Colombian NGOs had
in the design of the Ley de Justicia y Paz, and the European donations to alternative
development projects—such as, for example, the so called Laboratorios de Paz (Peace
Laboratories)—also took place. Between 2000 and 2005, the European Union’s
(multilateral) assistance went from US$10.7 million, to US$65.9 million; in other
words, it multiplied more than six times in six years. Additionally, the average annual
European bilateral assistance given to Colombia between 1998 and 2005 was of
US$52.5 million. 101 Both amounts show a great transformation with regard to the aid
that Europe gave to Colombia throughout the 80’s, when both, bilateral and
multilateral help, were of only US$66 million. 102
A very interesting fact is that some European countries have done what a
hegemonic power would naturally do in its territory of domain: influence on the client
State’s identity and preferences, as well as on that of its inhabitants. During the last
decade Europe has positioned as an alternate legitimate model for the Colombian
people, having different opinions from that of the United States in matters of anti-drug
policy in the context of an armed conflict and how to overcome such conflict. Most of
100
Leonardo Carvajal and Rodrigo Pardo García-Peña, “La internacionalización del conflicto doméstico y los
procesos de paz. Historia reciente y principales desafíos,” in Martha Ardila, Diego Cardona, and Arlene
Tickner (editors), Prioridades y desafíos de la política exterior colombiana, Bogotá, Fescol, 2002.
101
Information based on the data of the Mapa de Cooperación Internacional de Agencia Colombiana de
Cooperación (ACCI), available at Internet (http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/acci/web_acci/resumen.htm).
102
Data obtained with the help of the OCED. See: International Development Statistics (IDS), available at
Internet (www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline).
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the European countries disagree with the military emphasis given to anti-drug and antiterrorist policies, and would prefer a higher social investment. 103 Proof of this were the
diplomatic arguments that took place between the United States and Europe, during the
designing process of Plan Colombia between 2000 and 2001, mostly because of the
military component and the massive and forced eradication issues. 104 For example, not
until June of 2002 did the European Union add the FARC to their list of terrorists, and,
even worse, the ELN was only included in April of 2004. In addition, besides Sweden
and the Netherlands, many countries have been skeptical of the paramilitary surrender
that took place in 2005, as well as of the Ley de Justicia y Paz.
It is important to mention the fact that some United States Government officers
think that Europe should increase its assistance to Colombia 105 , especially because of
its responsibility for the problems of that country due to the increase in their cocaine
consumption. The creation of the G-24, and the meetings in London (July 2003),
Cartagena (February 2004), and others in Bogotá, are attempts to better coordination
among donators for the Colombian situation.
Besides how valuable or not is the impact of the rising influence of Europe over
Colombia 106 , it is true that—taking in account the intensity of the United States-Colombia
cooperation, as well as the different points of view between the United States and
Europe 107 —this political situation has become a huge challenge for Colombia. The country
is now forced to execute a difficult diplomatic balance in order to keep good relationships
with Europe, and, at the same time, maintain its close cooperation with the United States.
Diplomacy itself has had to supersede the relationships among states, given that NGOs and
103
Still, it is necessary to highlight that Europe has been ambivalent in its politics towards Colombia, for the
reason that there is not much compromise to the extension of the validity given to custom preferences;
without them, Colombia would not be able to favorably export products alternative to cocaine.
104
Joaquín Roy, op. cit.
105
United States House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Aid to Colombia. The European Role in The Fight Against Narco-Terrorism, November 18th, 2004.
106
Ramírez warns that “in the end, one might impose a type of solution which is [not] necessarily adequate
for the country.” See: S. Ramírez, Intervención en conflictos internos, p. 345.
107
William Anthony Hay, “A Preliminary Reckoning: Prospects for US-European Relations After Iraq,” in
Watch on the West, Foreign Policy Research Institute, volume 4, No. 1, April, 2003; William Wallace,
“Living With the Hegemon: European Dilemmas,” in Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from Around
the World, edited by E. Hershberg and K. W. Moore, Social Science Research Council, 2002. It is necessary
to point out the differences within Europe and the European Union. United Kingdom, for example, has always
been akin to the United States. In the other pole are the Scandinavian countries, with protected socialdemocratic systems.
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pressure groups 108 have become an important part of the political scenery in which the
policies towards Colombia, as well as the domestic games for political power that shape the
opportunities (or their lack thereof) to achieve an effective guerrilla and paramilitary
demobilization, are defined.
Tensions with the neighbors
There has been more strain between Colombia and its neighbors during the past
five years, than in any other point in time. Such difficulties have been the results of
various confluent factors: among others, the close anti-drug bilateral cooperation
between Colombia and the United States, and the so called terrorism. It is obvious that
other factors, such as the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict—which many
attributed to the military campaign launched by Colombia and the United States
against guerrillas, and to the massive aerial eradication of illicit crops—are also part of
the diplomatic Andean jigsaw puzzle. Those policies—many in Venezuela, Ecuador,
and Bolivia argue—have triggered the movement of forced displacements, guerrillas,
paramilitaries, and Armed Forces towards neighboring countries. The rise of left-wing
political forces throughout the region 109 has also been crucial to such scenery; forces
that vehemently criticize United States presence in Colombia and the contents of its
anti-drug politics, together with Uribe’s security policy and his diagnosis of the nature
of the conflict. 110
Meanwhile, Colombia is not completely satisfied with its neighbors’ assistance to
capture members of illegal armed groups—who “abuse” their territories—and to stop
the traffic of weapons, drugs, chemical precursors, and money, which enrich them.
Actually, the aid of the neighbors for these issues is seen as weak or nonexistent.
108
Roberto Domínguez Rivera, “The Role of Networks in the EU’s Foreign Policy toward Colombia,” EuroWorking Papers, volume 3, No. 1, April, 2005.
109
It is important to contextualize the peak of left-wing politics within Latin America at the beginning of this
new millennium: at least one of the factors that have triggered the political mobilization of left-wing and
popular sectors throughout the region, is a profound discontempt based on poverty and inequality, which are
perceived to be consequence of the match of interests between national elites, globalization, and economical
and political United States interests.
110
Colombia Internacional, special edition titled Percepciones hemisféricas sobre la crisis colombiana, No.
60, July-December, 2004; International Crisis Group, “Las fronteras de Colombia: el eslabón débil de la
política de seguridad de Uribe,” September, 2004; Sandra G. Edwards, “Ecuador Gets Colombia’s Drift.
Aerial Eradication of Coca Crops on the Border,” WOLA Special Update, June, 2004.
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Presidents Uribe, from Colombia, and Hugo Chávez, from Venezuela, have had
seriously heated discussions. 111 In 2003, Colombia criticized Venezuela’s permissive
attitude towards the FARC—especially after an attack against the Colombian
Consulate in Caracas on February of that same year—and complained about a
recurrent “freedom of movement” granted to the guerrilla at Venezuelan frontiers.
Uribe then requested that Chávez and Colombia’s other neighbors declare the FARC
as terrorists. A year later, nearly 80 presumed Colombian paramilitaries traveled to
Venezuela in order to execute a coupe d’état against Chávez. This time, the
Venezuelan President alleged that there were “people out there in United States who
spend their time thinking about how to propitiate a war in Venezuela, in order to give
good reason for a posterior invasion. And one of the ways of accomplishing their goal
is to infiltrate terrorists, paramilitaries, assassination; they look for an event that struck
the country, in order to justify what happened to Haiti, or what will soon happen in
many Latin American countries: an invasion.” 112
That same year he also stated that. “On the Colombian side of the border, right
next to Venezuela, there are United States troops,” when referring to the United States
military personnel who were ordered to guard the oilduct Caño Limón-Coveñas in
Arauca. Because of the capture in Venezuela of Rodrigo Granda (diplomatic officer of
the FARC), between December 2004 and February 2005 bilateral relationships reached
their worst level since the 80’s. Colombia acted in not very orthodox manners, which
Venezuela referred to as “kidnapping” and violation of its sovereignty. The latter
removed its ambassador from Colombia and gave order of “freezing any agreement
and business with Colombia” for several weeks. In the interim, the United States’s
attitude towards Chávez—when, for example, it rushed to welcome Pedro Carmona as
new President during the 2002 unsuccessful coup d’état—has not helped dissipate
Venezuela’s worries. 113
111
See: Alexandra Guáqueta and Paula Peña, “¿Qué pasa en la región andina? Dilemas y retos de seguridad,”
in Nueva Sociedad, No. 198, July-August, 2005.
112
“Capturan a 88 presuntos autodefensas en Venezuela,” in El Colombiano, May 10th, 2004.
113
Jorge Domínguez, “Bush Administration Policy: A view Toward Latin America,” in ReVista Harvard
Review of Latin America, Spring-Summer, 2005; “Venezuela coup linked to Bush team,” in The ObserverGuardian, April 21st, 2002.
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Concerning the case of Venezuela, for President Chávez and his Bolivarian
ideals, the United States’ intention of forcibly becoming a social, political, and military
model, being opposite to those of the Andean people, represents one of the biggest
threats to the region. In this way, a new war against terrorism, launched by the United
States, plus the Andean Regional Initiative, the Plan Colombia, and Uribe’s Política de
Defensa y Seguridad Democrática—particularly its military components—were seen
as United States control and intervention instruments, as well as destabilizing factors
for the military balance between Venezuela and Colombia. In this context, Colombia’s
possibility of obtaining Venezuelan aid to supersede the conflict and the control of
drug trafficking has weakened.
To Ecuador, Colombia and the United States have become highly controversial
issues. Each of the last four presidents of the country since 1998 114 has received strong
domestic pressures to freeze any cooperation in favor of prohibitionism and the war
against terrorism. For example, by the end of year 2000, Gustavo Noboa’s government
started receiving complaints from citizens who referred to the negative effects
herbicides had on their health and harvests. Later on, Ecuador asked Colombia to
respect a 10 km non-fumigation zone next to the borders. In the beginning Colombia
answered by organizing seminars and workshops to determine the real effects of
gliphosate, but such actions had not much impact.
During Lucio Gutiérrez’ administration disagreements persisted, 115 so the OAS
conducted research on the subject, and its results denied any possible arguments for the
negative effects gliphosate might have on the health of the inhabitants of provinces
near Sucumbíos, Esmeraldas and Carchi. 116 Ecuador rejected such results, 117 and, in
2005, threatened to complain to the WHO, the OAS, the ICC, and the United
Nations. 118 Moreover, cooperation to stop weapon and explosives trafficking, as well
as visits of the illegal armed groups’ members to Ecuador, has been fragile. Currently,
seen as a legitimate resistance to repair socio-economic offenses, the Colombian
114
Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000), Gustavo Noboa (2000-2003), Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) and currently
Alfredo Palacio.
115
WOLA, “Ecuador Gets Colombia’s Drift,” June, 2004.
116
“Las fumigaciones alteraron la salud y los cultivos en 3 zonas,” El Comercio, August 15, 2005.
117
“Ecuador insiste en que glifosato sí daña la salud,” in El Universo, June 20th, 2005.
118
“No cesa lío por fumigaciones,” in El País, September 7th, 2005.
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guerrilla is still seen with sympathy by public opinion within some Ecuadorian sectors.
Thus, those sectors politically punish any Ecuadorian attempt to cooperate with Plan
Colombia.
Final Reflection
This paper has shown that the institutionalization of the process of cooperation
on drug control—which has lasted more that 30 years, and is based on the idea of drug
and narcotic trafficking as serious threats to security—turned into a mechanism that
modified the terms of the relationship between the United States and Colombia.
First of all, the comprehensive character of United States anti-drug policies
encouraged that country to meddle in various Colombian affairs, including economic
policies, institutional design in the justice area, criminal politics, anti-drug politics,
adjustments in the defense area, management of conflict and demobilization. Secondly,
the progressive militarization of the anti-drug policy removed the dividing line
between anti-narcotics and counterinsurgency, besides setting up bases for United
States military assistance meant to fight guerrillas and paramilitaries. In other words,
the Drug War eroded the usual “prudent distance” that, in spite of the asymmetry of
power, had been characteristic of their relation throughout most of the XX century.
Nowadays, such relationship is more like the classic pattern hegemonic power-client,
so common in the Western Hemisphere.
Even though Colombia and the United States solved their bitter diplomatic
disputes by the mid 90’s, the hegemonic power-client pattern might alter the meaning
of their friendship. Such relations were built right after the secession of Panamá, and it
implied a particular way of defining each one’s identity and the expectations each had
on their roles; based on the former, they established a cluster of accepted policies.
Friendship mitigated the unsteadiness of the balance of power between the two
countries, because it turned Colombia into a partner of the United States who shared
similar political values. Colombia was a respectable neighbor who deserved a different
treatment from those given to the typical “Banana Republics.” Today, Colombia might
be falling into such category.
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Even so, presenting an outcome of the United States new role in Colombia is not
very easy. It is true that the loss of autonomy is counterproductive to any country,
especially while it is building a nation and consolidating its internal authority.
Nevertheless, on the other side, it is valid to ask if Colombia would have been able to
stop the growth of the FARC and the ELN alone (supposing that their demobilization
is desired and necessary for the establishment of a liberal democracy). One might ask
if United States influence has been, in the end, positive for the strengthening of liberal
democratic values, including respect for human rights, ethics in the accountability
presented, and transparency.
The issue of the United States’ legacy as regional and universal power has been
carefully studied. Some highlight its efforts to globalize western democracy, 119 which
additionally—theoretically speaking—nourishes peaceful international relationships;
others, instead, warn about the most perverse aspects of its culture, such as excessive
individualism, pragmatism or hypocrisy (Abu Grahib case), and its strong
conservatism. Similar questions may be asked about Europe. Even so, the fact that
while the United States is still present in Colombia, Latin American relations with
United States will be complex is undeniable.
With regard to anti-drug policy, when taking in account the fact that one of the
war strategies against terrorism is to cut terrorists’ budgets, one might question the
validity and utility of Colombian and universal prohibitionism. 120 On the one side, it
could be said that anti-drug policies—particularly those meant to control moneylaundering—are useful to battle illegal armed groups which profit form drug
trafficking. Moreover, that the militarized version of anti-drug policy, which has been
institutionalized since the 90’s, is useful to battle armed groups (instead of
“conventional” drug dealers). It seems as if both wars complement each other.
Still, another point of view is valid as well: if neutralizing terrorist groups has
become the main legitimate goal of international security, there is an opportunity to see
drugs and drug policies in a different way. Since the priority is to abolish terrorism and
119
See, for example, Tony Smith, America's Mission. The United States and the World Wide Struggle for
Democracy in the Twentieth Century, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994.
120
In this same line, one of the strategies that have strengthened with regard to the resolution of armed
conflicts is to reduce the budgets of the participants of war, including the illegal armed groups. This is what
happened in Angola, when the Kimberly diamond certification process reduced UNITA’s budgets.
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armed conflicts, keeping in mind that drugs constitute one of the main profit sources of
terrorist groups, then, eliminating the nature of their profit could become a priority too.
Until now, prohibitionism has accomplished the complete opposite: giving an unusual
profitability to drug trafficking. Hence, some kind of legalization might reduce
terrorism’s funds.
In other words, fighting against terrorism might lead policy makers and the
audience to weight up in a different way the cost-benefit analysis, which supposes to
continue with drug prohibition, for the reason that it seems to be extremely expensive
in terms of financial resources for the terrorists.
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Figure 1
Coca leaf production in Colombia, 1981-2004
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
hectares
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
199
Year
Source: For years 1981-1988: NNICC Report, several years, in Carlos Arrieta, Luis J. Orjuela, Eduardo Sarmiento, and Juan Tokatlian, Narcotráfico
Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 1990, p. 58. For 1990-2004: UNODC, World Drugs Report 2005, New York, 2005, volume II.
248
Drugs, War, and Crime in Colombia: A Symbiosis that
Nourishes the Extension of the Conflict
Ricardo Vargas Meza *
Context
During the first five years of application of the Andean regional anti-drug strategy
(2000-2005) financed by the United States Government, known as the Andean Regional
Initiative (ARI), Colombia has fumigated the equivalent of 700,000 hectares of coca leaves.
Besides systematically spreading the chemical product Round Up Ultra (including the
active ingredient gliphosate), and of manually eradicating the illicit harvests, the antinarcotic authorities have increased the interdiction capacity, as evidenced by the figures for
2005, when 254 metric tons of cocaine and of basic paste were captured 1 . Furthermore, this
successful scheme of offensive actions has been complemented with record figures for
extradition: 304 Colombians in the period 2002-2006.
Nevertheless, the Office of National Drug Control Program (ONDCP) Bulletin of
mid-April, 2006 showed an increase of 30,000 hectares of coca leaves, above the figures
for 2004; that is, an upsurge of 26%. 2 Likewise, different observations of the behavior of
the availability and price of the drugs in markets such as that of the United States show a
strong inconsistency between the apparent successes of the anti-drug actions described and
their outcomes concerning the final offer and supply. 3
This discouraging panorama represents a continuation of the previous phase of the
application of the ARI. In fact, between 1994, when aerial spraying started in Colombia, up
to 1999, it was observed that the growth of the coca areas was uncontrollable despite the
constant spraying. For this reason, starting in 2000, when the most important strategy, the
*
Sociologist. Colombian Representative of The Transnational Institute. Director of Acción Andina.
Anne W. Pattterson, “Counternarcotics Strategy in Latin America,” testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,” Washington, March 30th, 2006.
2
See: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006, released by the Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, March, 2006.
3
See, as an example, Jonathan Caulkins, Peter Reuter, Martin Y. Iguchi and James Chiesa, “How goes the
War on Drugs,” Drug Policy Research Center, Rand Corporation, occasional paper, 2005; Drug Availability
Steering Committee, “Drugs Availability Estimates in the United States,” December, 2002.
1
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Plan Colombia, was initiated, the goal was the breaking up of the vicious circle of increased
replanting of coca bushes against the speed and intensity of the aerial spraying. And all this
with a cost that exceeded US$4 billion in five years. For this reason, the final results of the
period of Plan Colombia are much more revealing of the challenges of the aforementioned
strategy.
Nonetheless, in this second phase of the anti-drug strategy, and furthermore, in its
perspectives in the middle and long run, Colombia confronts, additionally, a complex
symbiosis between the internal armed conflict and its financial support by drug traffic. This
scenario obscures even more the strength of the evaluation figures of the anti-drug policy
results. This policy, in the same manner that the armed confrontation did with drug traffic,
has resulted in an increased involvement in the dynamics of the internal war.
Drugs and Security
One of the main characteristics of the past four years of the Anti-drug War in
Colombia is its involvement in the predominant global security context. In other words, that
war joined the battle against the funds of the existing armed organizations, especially those
of insurgent groups.
With this in mind, an outcome of the anti-drug strategy may be considered
inaccurate when the structural condition of the Colombian drug problem is not taken into
account: there is a war intrinsically related to the production and commerce of illicit
psychoactive substances, which holds back an eventual “denarcotization of the armed
conflict”. 4
The former scenery comes along with another issue of the current global world,
which is also linked to a tendency of making the criminal structure more political every
day. This matter relates to the leaning towards a criminalization (as a result of their actions)
of armed organizations, which declare themselves to be essentially political. In the
Colombian case both situations, mainly—although not exclusively—relate to drug
trafficking.
4
Fact stated in the Informe de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Report) 2003. See: PNUD “El
conflicto: callejón con salida,” Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2003, September 2003, Bogotá.
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The frame of the new emerging dynamics within which current conflicts take place,
shows that the Post-Cold War period aggravated the conditions that permitted a change in
the operational focus of criminal and terrorist groups. As a result, criminal groups have
gradually become part of political activities, seeking to manipulate settings that will
facilitate control over a high number of weak States. Meanwhile, terrorist groups have
found in criminal activities a new source of profit, different from those related to the State. 5
As a matter of fact, the political and security contexts that came after the fall of the
Berlin Wall triggered the creation, strengthening, and reunion of criminal organizations and
terrorist groups. This nourished a transnational scenery that contributes to a sophistication
of both illicit organizations and their operative systems. Such novel panorama generates
recent and tougher situations of insecurity. Unfortunately, since security—essentially— has
been focused on eventual threats from other State powers, some group of States were not
yet prepared for such a context.
In addition, and because of the dynamics of globalization, new issues have increased
insecurity and supported links between crime and terrorism. Those issues include:
1. More flexible frontiers.
2. Weaker States.
3. An increase in migrant movements.
4. The existence and improved ease of access to financial technology of global reach.
5. A more sophisticated and accessible transportation infrastructure.
All these factors have nourished a stronger “organizational hybrid” composed by both
criminal groups and associations identified as terrorists. According to these criteria, it is
important to highlight the fact that frontiers are giving a new meaning to their role: they
now have the possibility of becoming a source of insecurity of non-official groups, instead
of a threat in the hands of other States. 6
Analysts of the global security issue agree on the same answer: “eliminate the
sources of funds of hybrid groups”. For the most part, those measures intend to hinder
5
See Tamara Makarenko, “The crime-terror continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational
Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime, volume.6, No.1, February 2004, pp. 129-145.
6
Exactly to the point: An example might be the reports presented on the Andean regional lack of safety—
having as reference the Venezuelan case: the relation between Chávez Administration and the non-State
actors, such as pressure groups in Bolivia, or suspicions of the relation with Colombian guerrillas.
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credit card fraud, laundering of goods, smuggling, and any other illicit instrument required
for these activities, such as passports and fake identification documents, among others. 7
The former ideas have critical consequences on the type of responses carried out by the
States in matters of security and defense. In the end, novel non-official threat tendencies to
the security of the State become axes of the discussion; a debate that takes account of the
decisions of armed forces to participate in these types of actions, which imply repressive
military strategies. 8
It can be stated that criminal groups who have used terrorist actions seek to achieve—
more than a change in their status quo—the development of their operative capacity.
Actually, they are determined to make the best of their illicit activities. Recent criminal
phenomena make up a key political matter present in regions such as Central America, and
are considered a by-product of migratory policies.
Going deeper into this example, between 2000 and 2004, more than 20,000 Central
American youngsters were deported to their countries of origin—places that they only
inhabited while kids, with a language most of the times forgotten for having grown up in
cities like Los Angeles, where English is always spoken. In cases as those of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala, these gangs copy the same schemes, control drug trafficking and
local crime, draw borders around their own territory with the help of graffiti, and strengthen
their arsenals with remnants of M-16 and AK-47 rifles that the United States left after its
assistance to Contras in Nicaragua. 9
Meanwhile terrorist groups have broadened their spectrum of illicit activities,
accentuating their link to drug trafficking—a situation that allowed an enhancement of
7
Makarenko, op. cit.
The subject relates to the identification of threats, as new criminal organizations extended towards a broad
radius of action, as in the case of the Central American maras, and the type of security policies adopted by the
states and, even, by the regional security agenda.
9
See “‘Maras’: crimen global en español,” in El País, Madrid, July 31st, 2005. Los Angeles Police found out
this phenomenon for the first time during the riots that troubled the city in 1992, when local Salvadorian
gangs appeared as vandals—as the Mara Salvatrucha, “the most powerful juvenile gang in the planet”
according to Gustavo Sierra, a journalist from the newspaper El Clarín, who has done research on the subject.
The Salvatrucha has approximately 100,000 members between 10 and 30 years. Mara comes from
Marabunta. Their rival gang, the M-18, took its name from a street at the Los Angeles South Central, where
the phenomenon was nourished. On their web page (www.xv3gang.com) they state that they can count on
networks in Australia, Canada, and Lebanon. It is estimated that in Honduras, with 7 million inhabitants, there
are approximately 40,000 mareros, just as in México and in El Salvador, where, with a 6.5 million population,
there are around 20,000 gangsters. Some other hundreds of thousands of mareros might live in the United
States.
8
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power as regards geopolitical control, not only in the hands of insurgent organizations, but
also in those of diverse groups. 10 However, with the participation of these groups in fraud,
faking identities, and traffic of human beings, such activities have proliferated. According
to Rohan Gunaratma, Al Qaeda’s European financial network—headed by Algerians—has
a huge part in the fraud related to credit cards. He estimates the network’s income in US$1
million range. Another example is the case of paramilitary groups in North Ireland, who—
together with Albanian extremists—are implicated in a far-reaching smuggle of fake goods
(from cigarettes, to computers). 11
Colombia’s case is usually brought up as a recurring example of articulation between
drugs and terrorist groups. Still, even if this country’s armed conflict represents an
emblematic illustration of such a relationship, it must be underscored that its main actors
are far from being matched up to terrorist groups with global reach, as, for example, Al
Qaeda. Anyhow, it is worth establishing some elements for analysis of that articulation.
An Introductory View over the Participation of Colombian Insurgent Groups
inside the Drug Economy
A CIA report from July 1992, on the relationship between Colombian insurgent
groups ELN and FARC within the drug economy, presented the statements that follow. 12
Overall, cooperation relationships between armed groups and drug trafficking have
existed throughout history. In this sense, drug trafficking has used territorial control to:
•
Transport drugs; activity that, according to the CIA, had an increasing participation of
guerrillas.
•
Easily assemble laboratories and landing trips, and harvest illicit crops.
Following the same line, the report points out that drug traffickers use these
relationships to plan attacks against enemies of the government or of other drug trafficking
10
Makarenko, op. cit., presents various examples on this relation, see p. 135.
Makarenko, op.cit.
12
CIA, “Narco-insurgent links in the Andes”, Central Intelligence Agency CIA-Intelligence memorandum
DCI Counter-narcotics Center, July 29,1992.
11
253
254
organizations. We must highlight the fact that those links were less prominent in cases as
that of Sendero Luminoso, where associations had a more conflict-type character.
On the other hand, there are also references about the relationship between drugs and
armed conflicts, which are based on the identification of records for poppy opium
production. In this sense, a connection between FARC and ELN has been present since the
end of the 80’s. More to the point, even though by the mid-80’s both groups were already
involved with coca crops, Cocaine Basic Paste (CBP) and cocaine production, during those
days security organisms were not sure of the role played by drugs inside the total guerrilla
income. In fact, they thought that profit obtained from kidnappings and extortion was
higher.
The report also determines that the nature of the liaison between guerrillas and drugs
is related to a tax levied to both drug traffickers and harvesters (“gramaje”), and to the use
of routes located inside the areas of their control. It also mentions that one of the main
objectives of these incomes is the exchange of drugs for weapons and ammunitions, which
is carried out by drug traffickers or with money gained in the drug business. In this case the
deal is handled by smugglers.
Be that as it may, the CIA believes that those relations have not been harmonious but
rather problematic, up to the point where many drug traffickers have been impaired. Such
was the case of Sendero Luminoso, which fought to obtain better prices for the peasants, in
a context within which many drug smugglers were murdered.
However, the contribution of the guerrilla inside the illicit business also brought
serious problems regarding loss of loyalties; it triggered desertions of groups of combatants
who established direct contact with drug traffickers. Regardless of that point of view, that
by 1992 the diagnosis of the Colombian case did not point out any dynamic of strategic
confluence between paramilitary groups and the privatization of counterinsurgent strategy
is remarkable. Thus, the key issue was still the relationship between drug trafficking,
paramilitary gangs controlled by traffickers, and a battle against any legislative decision or
government policy.
Documents of US Intelligence highlight, on the whole, how Andean governments
were especially interested in having anti-drug assistance used against insurgent groups,
arguing that striking guerrillas implied striking drug trafficking. Yet, they did not reject the
254
255
idea of actions against involved armed groups having repercussions on the traffic of drugs
as a whole. 13 Nonetheless, they did not deny either the order of priorities within the Andean
armed forces, which was strongly related to the war against guerrillas. The following quote
is a clear example:
Even if no longer preoccupied by counterinsurgency requirements, the military in
Peru and Colombia would see their primary role as national defense and would be reluctant
to fully support counter-narcotics missions. They have consistently expressed concerns
over the legality, and potential public backlash of the participation of the armed forces in
anti-drug operations. Should their resources be diminished by budget stringencies,
however, the Peruvian and Colombian militaries might overcome their misgiving about
counter-narcotics operations in the hopes that by enlarging their efforts they would gain
increased United States military aid. 14
Different Types of Relationships between Insurgency and Drug Trafficking
Throughout History
Throughout its history, the Colombian case has had insurgent groups related to the
drug economy by means of three different dynamics:
1.
The levying of “gramaje”.
2. Various types of cooperation with drug trafficking, especially in situations related
with security services.
3. Recent autonomous control over important aspects of the drug business.
Since the circumstances associated with the appearance and the process of
consolidation of the drug economy makes the interrelation of the former dynamics much
more complex, those types are not part of a lineal process.
Besides from running the related routes, there is evidence of an early control of FARC
over the poppy crops and cocaine processing laboratories since the end of the 80’s. Even
so, the most shocking issue is still that of their involvement in the CBP business as
intermediaries ever since the mid-90’s; a circumstance that carried along varied
13
The document quoted in footnote 9 states the following: “Moreover, we believe officials in Lima and
Bogotá, if given anti-drug aid for counterinsurgency purposes, would turn against trafficking”.
14
Ibid.
255
256
consequences. The main context for this last example is a new Colombia, a cocaine
producer country, a situation that has brought new characteristics to its relation with drug
trafficking. As highlighted, the existent information suggests three basic types of insurgent
participation inside the illicit drug economy. They are:
“Gramaje” (taxes) associated to the initiation of drug trafficking in Colombia, and
levied on:
1. Processing laboratories: According to the DEA, US$30 was charged for every
cocaine kilogram produced within the controlled area. 15
2.
Landing trips.
3.
Control over poppy and coca leaves crops; especially over the largest ones
(typical Miraflores model, throughout the 90’s). They charged 20% to poppy latex
producers for their poppy harvests. 16 Poppy crops in the 90’s were controlled by the FARC,
mainly in Cauca, Huila, Quindío, and Tolima, involving fronts 2, 6, 13, 17, 21.
a. Drug traffickers’ CBP purchases.
b.Local intermediaries who profit from sales and purchases of CBP.
Different ways of cooperating with drug trafficking. The DEA believes that insurgent
groups worked as security employees of the biggest Drug Barons in the circumstances
previous to the escape of Pablo Escobar in July 1992, when Escobar himself contacted
them to request their services. Besides the former, the DEA presented charges against
delinquents who were connected to the ELN by cocaine shipments within the rural zone of
Turbo (Antioquia) in June 1993; they were members of the Ochoa gang. 17
Direct participation in different levels of the drug circuit:
1.
Sowing of crops and CBP processing.
2.
Assembly and management of crystallization laboratories. Early in the 90’s
(1992), a report of the Army stated that during an operation to dismantle a crystallization
lab in Arauca, in March 1991, they had found proof that implicated the FARC’s front 45.
15
Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA, “Insurgent Involvement in the Colombian
Drug Trade,” Drug Intelligence Report, June 1994.
16
DEA, op. cit.
17
DEA, op. cit. Such modality suggests links between security services, in order to control the territory. This
category is different from the direct participation in the drug business.
256
257
There are also data on early drug smuggling cases (exports). 18 In May of 1993, a 5 ton
cargo was confiscated in the hands of people related to the FARC who were traveling from
Chocó to the border with Panama. 19
Members of front 17 of the FARC were also accused during the early 90’s, of having
acted as brokers of producers interested in selling latex/morphine to drug dealers in Pereira
and Bogotá. 20
3.
Between 1995 and 1996, the FARC’s direct participation in the acquisition
of CBP. This took place in a context where drug trafficking had absolute influence over
Colombian domestic war.
4.
Last but not least, the administration of considerable amounts of CBP and
cocaine encouraged bonds with international drug traffickers, in order to expand the target
market of their cocaine chloral hydrate production.
Specific journalist references on the relationship between FARC and drug trafficking
at a regional level appeared throughout the 80’s (see Table 1).
Table 1
Relationships between FARC and drug trafficking at the end of the 80’s
Place and Date
Vichada, May 1986
Not known, May 1988
Case
Implicated
Farc co-owner of a cocaine
laboratory. According to El
Tiempo, “The FARC are
FARC
engaged with traffickers who
possess coca crops in the
ep jungle and and processing
ries in Meta, Vichada,
e, Caquetá and Vaupés
Scenario in which 6
s of FARC were eliminated
with the capture of 312 kilos FARC, Front 11
ne, 5 bales of coca leaves and
18
The first official references on the subject appeared in 1993.
DEA, op. cit.
20
DEA, op. cit.
19
257
258
Macarena Sierra, Bajo
Meta, and Guaviare, April,
d February, 1989
ainers of chemical precursors
Destruction of 74 processing FARC, activities attributed
ries, with the capture of
II Army Brigade. At this
e consolidation of “gramaje”
s of FARC accused of
tering them
f the product of each lot)
Rumors of the FARC’s participation in a robbery of 2 or 3 tons of cocaine, belonging
to Rodríguez Gacha, appeared within the context of the capture of drug trafficker Gonzalo
Rodríguez Gacha—accused of having assassinated left-winged political leader Jaime Pardo
Leal, on October 11th, 1987. The same happened with the death of Pedro Nel Jiménez—
killed on September 1st, 1986—which was related to the theft of Col $10,000,000 that were
guarded by one of Rodríguez Gacha’s trusted men, who’s last name was Plata. Stories of
the FARC’s fraud, extortion, and threats, inside scenarios where cooperation relationships
with drug trafficking were established, started to appear. The events considered the most
important, in relation to FARC’s fronts that were linked to drug trafficking, are presented in
Table 2.
Table 2
FARC’s Fronts and Drug Trafficking According to United States Intelligence
Front
Area of action
1
Guaviare
5
Urabá
9
Magdalena Medio
14, 15 Caquetá, Bajo y Medio Caguán, Llanos del Yarí
18
Córdoba
20, 12
Putumayo
An initial reconstruction of possible causes for bonds between crime and insurgent
groups is summarized in Table 3.
258
259
Table 3
Pragmatic Cooperation, Although Occasionally Unstable, and Some Times
Conflicting Short Term Alliances
Purpose of
Characteristics
Note on the role of the
the
of the
Specific lines
Cases
security agencies
lationship
elationship
Drug
Pragmatic
The initial
FAC had an early
• Drugs for
ing
tion, although
of FARC’s
ation in drug smuggling;
s
mes unstable and
ematic case was that of
• Safety for lab g in drug
mes problematic. y and operation ng took place tel azul”. The Armed
sting alliances 21
ns of
were reclutant to assume
• Safety for
ting
with
the
g missions. Cooperation
trips
United Stares is
• Agreements the
by the Armed Forces
ucture
needed
to
se of routes
counterinsurgency.
and
ship
drugs.
ed by
ero Luminoso’s nally, the legal extension
ncy
embers of
makes its participation in
ies that fought g tasks attractive
er capital gain
e peasants’
ere murdered
Criminal
Operative
Two members of the
• Kidnapping Japanese
s
ons 22
neur
Chikao
• Vehicle theft
n Granaderos (of the IV
atsu’s
• Faking
) cooperated with front
• Laundering ing and murder
th
ember 24 ,
ARC, as well as with
he gang “Los
turned him in ers of drugs and
the front 22 of
s. This took place in
ber 2005
Political
21
22
Conflicting,
Attempts at
and extremely ment targets
The takeover
of Palace of
has been
y signaled as a
political
tion between
nd drug
ers. CIA
nt of 1992
mated the
A political relationship
n drug traffickers,
tarism, private
nsurgency strategy, and
ment security agencies is
dated. This agenda was
red relevant over drug
The effects of this
ship regarding traffic and
on are unknown
The concept of alliance implies that the defense of common interests is the priority.
This concept is that of Tamara Makarenko, op. cit.
259
260
ship around
actions, which
wrong
ations
The paramilitarist phenomenon and the strong political functionality of drug
trafficking, along with the private counterinsurgent model, had consequences in the lack of
political cooperation.
Drug Trafficking, Insurgency and Frontiers
Colombia’s southern region scenery—especially in the case of Putumayo—illustrates
a good synthesis of the accumulation of experience on two decades of drug trafficking,
armed groups and frontiers.
Drugs are a specific task in the configuration and control of a strategic scenery
located at Putumayo, which also involves Caquetá, Nariño, and Cauca, as well as the
borders with Ecuador and Peru. These frontiers represent the new scenery where the most
recent dynamic of insurgent actions has taken place. Such dynamic includes:
1.
Scenarios related to asset laundering. 23
2.
Inputs’ smuggling.
3.
Weapon smuggling.
4.
Shelters and medical attention places for combatants wounded in war.
5.
Two-way routes aided by drug economy.
6.
Munitions’ supply.
It is worth remembering that Ecuador has been developing a growing relationship
with drug trafficking. Today, that dynamics is more visible. Thus, for example, in 2004
only 5.6 tons of illicit substances were sized. In 2005 captures increased to the impressive
23
Thus, for example, the fall of alias “Marcial” in the mid-2005 in Ecuador. He—who resided in Orito—was
a key person to the FARC, because he took charge of managing gas distribution, controlled the commerce of
CBP and laundered money of the organization.
260
261
figure of 45 tons. That is, the amount of cocaine seized multiplied 8 times. In the process
one thousand individuals have been arrested. 24
Furthermore, according to the DEA and Ecuadorian police, seven networks that
operate within Ecuador were recently detected, and it was found out that they are related to
the Valle (Colombia), Tijuana and Sinaloa (Mexico) cartels. In January 2005, a report of
the Fundación Seguridad y Democracia stated that the Brigada de Selva 19 Napo and the
Grupo de Fuerzas Especiales 24 Rayo, located at Sucumbíos, identified 25 illicit frontier
crossings along the territory shared with the Sucumbíos province and the Putumayo
department. 25 There are no estimates on the amount of resources these complex legal and
illicit networks move. Still, Ecuador’s tendency—as neighbor of Colombia—is also seen in
other areas of the borderline.
On the other hand, during the Administration of Alfredo Palacio, criticisms—at a
State level—have increased, with regard to the collateral effects that aerial spraying might
have over the frontier zones between that country and Colombia. 26
In Peru, even when only taking in account the situation at the border, its has been
proved that areas with coca crops within the Peruvian zone next to Puerto Leguízamo
(Putumayo) have increased, and they are both sown by Colombian workers and controlled
by Colombian groups. Nonetheless, the most outstanding dynamics seem to occur at other
points that are adjacent to Colombian drug trafficking geopolitics.
Drug Trafficking Regional Expansion
One of the characteristics of cocaine and heroin traffic of the last years has been its
strong expansion towards Central America and the Caribbean. Such issue progressively
engages more and more countries, most of them with a not very notorious drug trafficking
history. Let’s see some examples.
24
See El Tiempo “Carteles convierten a Ecuador en principal bodega de droga”, September 22nd, 2005.
Fundación Seguridad y Democracia “Putumayo: del protagonismo del Plan Colombia al olvido del Plan
Patriota,” n.d., Bogotá.
26
See René Maugé, “Fumigaciones funestas,” in El Comercio, Saturday, August 20th, 2005, Quito; “Parra Gil
y Carolina Barco se reunirán el miércoles en Bogotá,” in El Comercio, Sunday, August 28th, 2005, Quito;
Associated Press, “Ecuador Urges Colombia to Stop Fumigating Drug Crops,” September 1st, 2005;
“Frontera: No terminan líos por fumigaciones,” Agencies resume, Quito, in El País, September 7th, 2005,
Cali.
25
261
262
Venezuela
During the second week of October 2005 the Yemaya II ship was captured, along
with the seizure of 3.5 tons of cocaine—all being part of the Operación Goterón. Spanish
agents intercepted the vessel while it sailed across the Atlantic Ocean and headed towards
Spain. The fact that all its crew was Venezuelan means that there is a new tendency of the
participation of this country inside the drug transport business. 27 The situation turns much
more critical if confirmed that, in other cases, generals of the army and of the National
Guard took part in the smuggling of approximately 5 tons of cocaine each month;
everything turns even worse when noting that those were the arguments presented by
Washington to justify the decertification given to Venezuela in Anti-Drug War matters. 28
Among the highlighted points is the participation of a group of Venezuelan generals
in the drug trafficking business. 29 Based on a report on the case, Semana states:
Competent authorities among the Venezuelan civil judiciary have found out that
some members of the Venezuelan National Guard provide protection to drug
shipments that leave Venezuela. (…) In August and September 2004, the Venezuelan
Intelligence and Prevention Service Direction [Dirección del Servicio de Inteligencia
y Prevención de Venezuela (DISIP)] seized 50 and 40 cocaine kilograms,
respectively, which were shipped in flights of the Spanish airline Iberia. Posterior
investigations in the hands of the DISIP helped obtain arrest warrants for VNG
officers. It was later known that General Morgado learned about the pending
detentions and notified the VNG officers, who tried to leave Venezuela.
27
El País, “Apresado un pesquero venezolano cargado con 3.500 kilos de cocaína en aguas del Atlántico”
October 13th, 2005.
28
The United States decertified Venezuela in its commitment to the Anti-Drug War, making an exception
with the waiver for reasons of their national interests. One of the issues was the internal research at
Washington that considered the participation of members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces inside the business
of drug trafficking. Revista Semana, “Los militares y la droga”, October 3, 2005.
29
According to an interview published by Semana, one of the few who demanded explanations on the case
was the politician and journalist from Maturín city, Mauro Marcano. He was murdered in September 2004,
the same day he was going to report on radio and television the facts against, what he called “el cartel de los
soles”—referring to the badges used by Venezuelan generals.
262
263
Cases having to do with the generals are not the only ones that take part in the dossier
kept secret by the State Department. Still, the reasons because of which such document has
not yet been published attract attention, in spite of the fact that, apparently, the Department
holds charges supported by convincing proof and documents.
Based on differences of opinion on the reach of North American indiscretion
regarding drug matters, tension between Caracas and Washington keeps increasing. United
States military personnel, holding the responsibility of monitoring drugs, point out that
Chávez is an obstacle to the absolute execution of anti-drug control at a regional level. 30
Meanwhile, the Venezuelan armed forces have reiterated critiques on the effects that
Plan Colombia has had, and have even questioned the “real intentions” of the strategy.
Actually, according to Venezuelan military personnel, the Plan Colombia “is a latent threat.
We are concerned about the possibility of creating a border incident between both
countries, in order to look for excuses and apply the Democratic Letter, besides from
referring to the opinion matrix according to which we are nourishing subversion,” said
general Melvin López, quoted by the journal El Universal. The division general affirmed
that inside the Plan Colombia “there is a breeding ground,” which is analyzed by Venezuela
with “great tact and prudence.” 31 All the same, a serious impasse rises for the first time
from the presence of the DEA inside the country, questioning the real intentions of US drug
policy. 32
Central America
30
For Colonel Gary Gagliardi, Chief at the Manta Base, “with Venezuela as exception, the United States
controls parts of the regional drug trafficking from Ecuadorian territory, and the Caribbean with the help of
spy ships… we do not go into Venezuela because of the political problems with President Hugo Chávez.” See
El Universal, “EEUU advierte que roces con Chávez impiden rastreo antidrogas”, January 10, 2006, Caracas.
31
El Tiempo, “Plan Colombia es una ‘amenaza latente’ para Venezuela, dice inspector de la Fuerza Armada
venezolana,” web edition, September 12th, 2005.
32
VHeadline, “Conacuid counters DEA arguments against Venezuelan anti-drug record,” Thursday, August
18th, 2005; Domingo Alberto Rangel M., “En materia de drogas Chávez y Bush están raspados,” in Venezuela
Analítica, Monday, August 22nd, 2005, Caracas; “Presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, reestablecerá las
relaciones con la DEA,” in El Tiempo, August 30th, 2005, Bogotá; “Zar antidrogas responsabilizó de la
situación al presidente Chávez: Denuncian ‘serio deterioro’ en la cooperación con EE UU,” in El Universal,
Thursday, September 1st, 2005, Caracas; “La DEA no podrá participar en operativos policiales,” in El
Universal, September 2nd, 2005, Caracas.
263
264
According to Michael A. Braun, DEA’s operation manager, nowadays the major drug
smuggling and asset laundering organizations use the seven Central American countries, all
the way from South America to Mexico. 33 As a matter of fact, 90% of the cocaine destined
to the United States travels across the Mexico-Central America corridor. Suspicious
nocturnal flights departing from Colombia and heading towards the northern part of Central
America, particularly the area of El Petén in Guatemala, have increased since 2004. 34
In addition, Guatemala has become the arrival point of “go fast” motorboats, as well
as of ships carrying containers; both departing from the Colombian Pacific coast. Within
this context, the United States points at Belize as another base for Mexican drug trafficking,
where local organizations provide security services to Mexican drug dealers. Similarly,
most of the cocaine that crosses El Salvador is controlled by Colombian organizations that
have personnel living in that country.
On the other hand, Central America has high amounts of chemical precursors that
circulate throughout its territory, even though they are not produced there but rather
transported across the free transit zone in Panama. These seem to be related to networks
that import them from Asia.
The information presented above encourages the idea of an expansion of Colombian
drug trafficking, strongly diversifying its routes all over the Central American isthmus.
Likewise, it has managed to penetrate the institutions of some countries. Such is the case of
Panama, where the head of the war against drugs in that country was recently detained; that
is, the PTJ antinarcotics unit director—Rogelio Harris—accused of interacting with the
Colombian cartels, as well as of helping domestic dealers. 35
The Continuity of War, Drug Trafficking, and Paramilitarism
Even though the Colombian government demanded a cessation of hostilities as a basic
requirement for any peace negotiation with paramilitary groups, the current reconfiguration
33
DEA Congressional testimony, “Statement Michael Braun, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
November 9th, de 2005.
34
This scenery also presents the helplessness of aerial interdiction when 2 flights of 26 are detected; this
means a 7.7%. Aero-photographs taken by the North American intelligence system have detected a
clandestine airship cemetery in El Petén, Guatemala.
35
El Nuevo Herald, “Crimen organizado penetra seguridad panameña,” October 18th, 2005.
264
265
of paramilitary territorial power is related to the prolongation of the drug trafficking
business under its control, and with the continuity of war. Recent information suggests that
the impasse arising from their demands and those of the State, in regard to the fight for the
control over territories, is trying to be solved by means of the “recycling” of new
paramilitary generations associated with drug trafficking in a more direct way.
Currently, the information presented by the media, related to the presence of new
groups that seek dividends from the drug economy, sketches a map that matches routes and
strategic zones for drug trafficking and other collateral activities, such as inputs, gas, and
asset laundering (see Table 4). The former would ratify the difficulties of the Ley de
Justicia y Paz, as an efficient instrument to stop the control gained by mafia structures,
which the paramilitary organizations are currently developing across the territory.
Such scenery contributes to the approval of the statement expressed by AUC’s
advisor, Carlos A. Lucio, in regard to the “ruralization” of drug trafficking cartels; situation
that seems to be favored by the troubles present during the reinsertion process of most
members of these organizations, smoothening the recruit of demobilized combatants into
drug trafficking, as well as the creation of crime organizations. 36 This panorama presents
complex situations such as the kidnapping and murder of flower-growing business man
Hernando Cadavid in Córdoba. Former members of the paramilitary bloc “Héroes de
Granada” executed such actions.
Table 4 shows the first related data regarding the creation of paramilitary
organizations that intend to make official their permanence in control over strategic areas,
by means of armed organizations.
Table 4
Drug Trafficking and Paramilitarism within the “post-conflict” context until October
2005
Organization
Site of operations
Context
Drug Trafficking
name
“Frente Social
It seems as if FARC
Córdoba
por la Paz”
k its former territories
“Fantasmas”
Montes de María
36
Presentation for the forum “Paramilitarismo, desmovilización y política,” organized by the PNUD, Caracol
TV, Fescol, Semana and El Tiempo. Took place on September 20th, 2005, in Bogotá.
265
266
It’s presumed that they
ken advantage of “Bloque
They are supposed s” demobilization, in order
Norte del Valle— e same Machos leaded n benefits by means of the
“Autodefensas
pecially Zarzal,
ego León Montoya. de Justicia y Paz (Law of
esinas del Valle”
nillo and La Unión estimated size is 500 ce and Peace). They also
men
appen to be recruiting
ilized combatants who are
cated to drug trafficking.
Security organisms
Norte del Valle. hat they are the same
“Rondas
Same as above.
control the Cañón os leaded by Wilmer
esinas del Valle”
e Garrapatas.
la. Their number is
mated in 500 men.
They are part of the
ue Central Bolívar”,
“Águilas Rojas”
Catatumbo ntend to control drug
Águilas Negras”
ng in the border with
Venezuela
“Jairo el
Puerto Santander Coordinates a group
cario’s” men
orte de Santander
of 50 men
The leaders are:
Control over coca crops,
o (former financial
“Manos Negras”
rafficking routes towards
Policarpa, Leyva, r of the “Libertadores
and
r and the Pacific, and over
sario, Cumbitara, ”) and Johny (head of
“Organización
labs. Plus,
co, and Barbacoas uad). Groups of the
va Generación”
boleteo, extortion and
e Calima” are joining
drug trafficking.
se organizations
Amagá, previously They are extorting
“Águilas Negras”
esent at Salgar
k farmers, introducing
d by René, former
rently there were selves as a security
mber of “Bloque
ts there against the sm during the postMetro”)
rmed Forces)
conflict era
He had been in the
usiness for 20 years,
Not identified.
was landowner at
by “Lucas”, drug
Leader inside the asset
International agdalena Medio.
ing leader close to across Surinam and nally, he took part in ness for coca production.
Bloque Central
l, departing from ramilitary processes ponsible for exports and
ívar” directors
he early 80’s. He was laundering routes.
Colombia
dered inside of the
military post-conflict
enery. Close to
37
Another case that serves as proof of the fights is that of alias “Tábano”, who was supposed to be killed at
the Clínica Shaio in Bogotá, but, by mistake, a retired man was murdered instead. This case happened for
disputes on the control of assets in the oriental part of the country.
266
267
Javier Montañez and
Duque (E. Báez).
There are
ions on the possibility
m being murdered by
“Don Berna” 37
“Autodefensas
Ríos San Juan and 600 men who traffic
esinas Unidas del
audó at Chocó
eapons and coca
Norte”
Located within a
According to Colonel
Authorities broke
HLC laboratory zone of the Coper
Matamoros—commanding
t but there were no
res owned by the nicipality, at 80
of the XIII Brigade—the
tions. The group in
C inside Boyacá meters north from
produced at the complex
ould not be identified
Bogotá
the price of US$1.2 billion
. They produced 10 tons of
ure coca each month.
Source: El Tiempo, passim., and Semana.
On the Pacific Coast another situation related with the continuity of the functional
relation between drug trafficking and paramilitarismo is taking place. During the first seven
months of 2005, the Colombian authorities seized 115 tons of cocaine—as both terrestrial
and ocean cargo—while during 2004 they confiscated 178. 38 The biggest cargo ever seized
in the country was caught in July 2005, when the Armed Forces and the Police captured 15
tons of cocaine in the rural zone of Tumaco, Nariño. Regardless of the efforts of the
authorities, coca crops have increased in size and quantity in this area over the last years.
According to the official report that was presented at the time of the mission, that drug was
guarded by paramilitaries of the recently demobilized “Bloque Libertadores del Sur”. One
month later, coast-guarding units intercepted a speedboat while trying to leave through the
Golfo de Urabá, in the Atlantic Coast, with 3 tons of drugs.
An analysis on the most recent information 39 on the dynamics of Colombian drug
trafficking allows one to infer the presence of not only local tendencies, but also the
dynamics of regional and international order, within the areas controlled by paramilitary
groups. Below we present some of them.
38
39
See: “¿Por qué sale tanta coca?,” in Semana, September 12th, 2005.
See: UNODC, June 2005 “Censo de cultivos de coca”.
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268
Tendencies of illicit crop growth in areas of paramilitary control. The diverse areas
containing coca crops throughout the year 2004—especially those in Antioquia, Córdoba,
Santander, Magdalena, Caldas, and Boyacá—illustrate an important increase in harvesting
and drug trafficking activity. 40 Some of these areas match with others under paramilitary
control. Such fact seems to be even more important when considering the demand to a
cease in hostilities and illicit activities within the frame of the dialogues to demobilization.
Behavior of the positioning of laboratories. Most laboratories are usually located in
zones where there are no significant amounts of crops (even though some of them have
important growth rates in areas such as Santander, Caldas y Magdalena), but which are key
zones within the context of different routes. Such is the case of Valle (Pacific Ocean), 41
Santander (related to the influence from the South of Bolívar), Cauca (Pacific Ocean),
Boyacá (by air), Caldas, and Magdalena (Atlantic Ocean). Here we must highlight the first
appearance of departments such as Santander and Caldas in such cases as these.
The dynamics of these departments may be associated to an increase in drug traffic
activity within zones of paramilitary control; a process that was enhanced, in spite of the
cessation of hostilities agreed with the government, seeking to make progress in peace
dialogues.
International dynamics. Movement of aerial, terrestrial, and fluvial routes. In regard
to aerial routes, Colombian Air Forces reported an increase in the use of clandestine
landing trips located in farms, hostile zones, far-away towns, and abandoned terrains, all
across the departments of La Guajira, Sucre, Córdoba and in the South of Bolívar. In spite
of having improvements in the aerial control at the Brazilian border (especially at Vaupés),
its use has increased near the Atlantic Coast. 42
40
Ibid.
Ibid. The appearance of Valle occurs because of a war between Diego León Montoya and Wilmer Varela
(“Jabón”).
42
Report presented by the assistant director of the Defense Section of the Colombian Air Force, within the
frame of the XV meeting of chiefs of organisms in charge of fighting against drug trafficking in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The event took place in Cartagena, between October 17th and 21st, 2005.
41
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269
This situation also matches the poor results obtained in the interdiction operations at
the Puente Aéreo 43 , which have had high deficits, as is stated by the last report presented by
the US. General Accounting Office (GAO). 44
Between 2002 and 2005, US$68.4 million have been invested in this control structure,
and US$26 million are planned for 2006. The results obtained until now are not the best:
out of 390 suspicious airplanes, only 48 (12.3%) have been located by the Air Force. Once
situated, only 14 (3.6%) have been captured, including 4 that had already landed. In just
one case have they been able to seize drugs. Instead of calling the Anti-Narcotics Police, as
stated in the procedure manual, the Air Force regularly keeps quiet. The fly-overs of
suspicious airships over frontiers, plus a lack of coordination with the Police, ease most of
their escapes.
Such complex scenery points out the expressions of continuity in the relation between
war, conflict, control of private territory, and illicit privatization of counterinsurgent war. In
other words, it seems that the dynamics present at the moment in which negotiations with
former paramilitary groups begin to get reshaped continues, with the only difference of
having a strong focus on strategic areas for drug trafficking.
From the perspective of the goals of Washington’s drug policy for the Colombian
case, one of the biggest errors was not visualizing the complex articulation and
consequences of the drug trafficking issue within the context of paramilitary control. The
anti-drug policy was slanted, mainly and almost exclusively, towards the articulation of
drug smuggling with the funds of insurgent groups. Assumptions made behind the Plan
Colombia and the arguments presented, even today, to the United States to justify new help
requests for year 2006, are clear proof of that. Silence and, most of all, the lack of decisive
actions against the links between drug trafficking and paramilitary groups, extend, in pure
facts, to a decision of privatizing the counterinsurgent strategy; an environment in which—
and as a corollary—drug trafficking will maintain control.
As a matter of fact, the dynamic of war keeps strengthening drug trafficking
participation associated to paramilitary control and the defense of those regions where the
insurgent threat was cleared. Still, in that same context the idea is to turn to participation
43
Small airport for only domestic flight destinations.
GAO, “Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia has implemented new safeguards, but its
effect on drug trafficking is not clear,” September 2005.
44
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270
into politics, in association with the role of private security that, in practice, remains hybrid.
On the other hand, and as an implicit consideration, the goal is to broaden the protection
that the negotiation process gives with respect to extradition: a situation that eventually
remains within the frame of Washington’s acceptance given to the reinsertion process of
self-defense groups.
Even so, the guerrillas keep observing the possibility of locating in places where
paramilitary forces diminish; in these areas drug trafficking is a key aspect to fight for. The
creation of new illicit groups related to nuclei of demobilized combatants, the crisis of the
reinsertion process, and the continuity of the insurgent pressure over areas with
paramilitary control have created conditions enough to fear a continuum drug traffickingparamilitarism and counterinsurgent strategies; a phenomenon that may be confirmed in
strategic zones for its importance for drug production and traffic. Hence, let us analyze the
dynamics of this relation in a regional context in the southern part of Colombia:
A Particular Observation on the Continuity of Paramilitarism and Drug
Trafficking within Contexts of the Armed Conflict: Bajo Putumayo
The AUC are still present inside the urban area of the municipality of Puerto
Caicedo—within the region of Bajo Putumayo. 45 Civil authorities have exerted pressure in
order for the Police to be transparent at the time of dealing with the paramilitary issue. Before
the current local administration, the AUC practically governed over the whole territory. Their
rural agents were not able to move freely because they were at the risk of disappearing. All
the same, their objective was to erase the combat structure that supported the FARC. In its
climax, there were 200 paramilitaries located in La Pedregosa, with its center being “Casa
Bonita”. Now there are only a limited number of paramilitaries in the area. 46
The eventual demobilization of the paramilitary group would turn the citizens of
Playa Rica and Pedregosa into targets. Since the latter was base of the AUC commands
45
Interviews done during the fieldwork of September 2005.
In spite of the low number, anomalies still take place. One of them is the case of the driver of a country
wagon, who was disappeared “because they needed the car”. The vehicle is being used openly inside this
nucleus. Security organisms have not yet investigated the situation, and continue tolerating this type of facts.
Nonetheless, the high violence rate present at Puerto Caicedo is now decreasing. For example, during the
weekends, there were usually 4 to 5 dead people. Currently this has changed, although it cannot be affirmed
that is has disappeared completely.
46
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271
when they were strongly present in the area, there are serious concerns on the subject. The
case of Villaflor is a clear antecedent to all this: it is an abandoned rural area, which
suffered a violent punishment executed by the guerrilla. There they murdered two
“paseros” 47 who were accused of helping the army. This situation was reported to the Red
de Solidaridad, and to the Office of the national Attorney, but still no concrete measures
have taken place.
The AUC entered the Arizona point at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. At that
moment those who supposedly helped the guerrilla were murdered. One of the Major of the
Armed Forces was involved in the events and remains in prison. A section of the Office of
the National Attorney went to visit the place and found 5 dead bodies. This made things
worse and triggered a stronger presence of the Army. The guerrilla now remains in various
places of the municipality, as, for example, San Juan. The only attack that has occurred up
to this the moment has been associated to the Armed Forces.
A new and important situation illustrates changes in the structure of the relation
between the drug business and the events occurring at the zone. As a matter of fact,
paramilitary agents have re-appeared and the AUC has taken charge of the safety of the
traffic. Such service is offered to buyers, who are, again, intermediaries living at Puerto
Caicedo.
Until September 2005, coca crops were still in a growing phase, even though they had
been fumigated in four occasions, the last one at the beginning of 2005. It is estimated that
there are 11 regions with coca; among others, Puerto Anillo, Esmeralda, Cristo Rey, and
Pedregosa. The price of CBP was Col$1,850,000 per kilo, which was considerably higher
than the Col$1,500,000 maintained throughout 2005. Puerto Caicedo is a shipping point for
drugs that are to travel by land, supposedly heading towards Ipiales and Pitalito. The
guerrilla still exerts pressure over producers, forbidding any sale of CBP—. In Puerto
Caicedo, the territory is controlled by paramilitaries.
In the case of Valle del Guamuez-La Hormiga, paramilitaries still control the urban
area.
48
At the beginning, paramilitary domain was based exclusively on terror. 49 Nowadays
47
People whose work consists in helping others cross the river.
This means that they are still in control of the CBP business, which is related to the control of the group as a
whole. At the same time, they seek to impede that insurgency be the one who manages the economy in those
places where a higher supply of goods, assets, and services, takes place.
48
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272
they seek political legitimacy as security strength against the nearby presence of
insurgency. In general, within the region there is a serious worry for the effects that a
possible paramilitary demobilization might have. The perception is that the guerrilla is
growing stronger and that such process might consolidate once that demobilization takes
place. Nevertheless, paramilitary extortive power has also increased in the meantime.
One of the most recent attacks that the FARC have made against paramilitaries
occurred at El Placer in September 2005. Its result was 3 paramilitaries dead and 27
wounded, among which there were 3 civilians completely unconnected to the confrontation.
The event coincided with the imprisonment of “Marcial”, key person for the guerrilla’s
funding, for his role as front man in the laundering of dollars. Paramilitaries were present in
the urban area during and after an armed strike that took place in July/August 2005.50
It is also worth mentioning the fact that, within the context of the offense of the
guerrilla at La Esmeralda—where 3 individuals were dead and 10 wounded—, reports
involving cases of the Armed Forces against paramilitarism were presented:
1.
After having arranged a security mission at the Hospital La Hormiga—
where both dead and wounded were taken—the order was lifted between 5 pm and 8 pm in
order to evacuate the wounded; later on, in order to send away the dead, at 7 pm of the next
day the same thing happened. All this with the intention of preventing the registration of
their identities, and in this way interfering with possible judicial investigations.
2.
Apparently, a female public prosecutor was threatened by the paramilitary
leader of the area for having reported anomalies regarding the participation of state security
organisms.
49
Paramilitary leaders of the area are “El Tigre”, Commanding Officer Asprilla—recent information suggests
that he might have been murdered in Puerto Caicedo—Commanding Officer “Pipa”—who controls El
Placer—and Commanding Officer “El Diablo”. During the beginning of the paramilitary control, they forced
people to assist to their meetings by kicking their doors and forcing them to come out. Moreover, people
disappeared frequently. A situation that triggered a change was the tactical defeat they suffered in 2004, in the
hands of the guerrilla; this moved them to change their authoritarian mechanisms of power.
50
Within the context of the armed strike there were attacks to the oil pipes, generating dangerous situations
and certain harms to the civil population, especially to those who lived next to the affected areas. The
dimensions of the explosions destroyed several houses and put the lives of the inhabitants in serious danger.
This was the case of La Palestina and La Raya; the latter being the place where a great tragedy occurred,
because all the community lived there.
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The presence of paramilitaries has been continuous since 1998/1999, until 2005, when
a series of selective murders took place. 51 Once demobilization has occurred, the expected
scenery—in short and middle range terms—is that of a worsening in the humanitarian
situation. The main arguments for this statement are:
1.
The weakness of State security forces at the time of keeping strategic places
in order. This applies to the areas that are currently controlled by paramilitaries; such is the
case of El Placer and El Tigre, both important places for the commerce of CBP.
2.
The drug business engenders strong uncertainties on the reality of the
process. It is difficult to consider the possibility of an eventual resignation of armed groups
who control business in the zone, being both its source of support and counterinsurgent
control.
In regard to the serious situation of the increase in selective homicides, we add the
lack of existence of a justice that operates on time. Processes are usually opened and then
investigations are assigned to the SIJIN, in order to gather evidence and judge the ones who
are responsible. Nonetheless, the SIJIN almost always claims that there is a lack of security
conditions that are necessary to continue with such investigations. Thus, the cases remain
unsolved.
Drug Trafficking
In the region there is usually control over the production structure based on the use of
terror. So, for example, people who do not inform the AUC about the movements of their
CBP production are murdered. The same happens with those who sell it in places different
from those designed by the group. Apparently, a great part of the murders occurred at
Putumayo during 2005 were caused for these reasons.
Paramilitaries have also committed abuses during the last months. For example, the
owner of a gas station at El Tigre was disappeared, because he had sold gas to the guerrilla.
This argument is considered to be an excuse to take hold of the business, as it did happen.
51
Information published during the last two weeks of September 2005 refers to cases as that of a livestock
farmer who bought his animals in Ecuador, and later offered them to buyers at the Valle del Guamuez. It is
presumed that he was disappeared in the hands of paramilitaries.
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There have been other attempts to repeat such actions, but the population has developed
mechanisms of social pressure to stop them.
Coca has diminished in the most visible zones (as, for example, the main road that
communicates the multiple municipalities of Bajo Putumayo), but increases in areas farther
away. By the end of 2005, and after having experimented a fall to Col$1,500,000 per kilo
throughout the year, the price of CBP at the Valle de Guamuez was Col$1,800,000 inside
the urban area. Meanwhile, the FARC offer Col$2,000,000 throughout the rural zone. 52
Forced manual eradication started at El Tigre. Even if people are afraid of fumigation, there
have been no alarms on the first sprayings. It is presumed that paramilitaries are still in
control of the business, and that they have agents whom they provide with funds in order to
acquire CBP. La Hormiga is a place from which multiple CBP and cocaine shipments
leave. Thus, there are testimonies involving Ecuador, each starting from a different point of
the border.
1.
Fluvial Route: Across the frontier established by rivers Putumayo and San
Miguel.
2.
Terrestrial Route: Via Puerto Asís-Pasto-Ipiales-Ecuadorian Andean Zone;
Puerto Asís-La Hormiga-San Miguel-Lago Agrio-Ecuadorian Andean Zone.
3.
Orito-El Empalme-Ipiales-Ecuador.
4.
Marine Route: connection between Esmeraldas and the Nariñean Pacific
Coast.
Synthesis of the paramilitary process in the post-conflict scenery at Putumayo:
1.
Massacres have diminished and are meant to control key populations inside
the drug business.
2.
Within this frame, there have been selective murders—which have
notoriously increased in the cases of urban areas at La Hormiga and Puerto Asís. The strict
52
This does not mean that the FARC have a more balanced behavior in regard to the interests of producers.
Delays of almost 6 months in the payment to producers in some zones, together with the loss of cash in
producing zones—because of the management of resources seeking to accomplish the demands of war in the
hands of this organization—have produced a real economic disaster, hence, the loss of income and
employment for commerce and service activities in those areas where they lived on the profit obtained in the
transactions of basic coca paste.
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275
application of death penalty to farmers who sell CBP in unauthorized zones, or who do not
report their production, keeps increasing.
3.
In some areas, selective delinquent actions develop, seeking to obtain
vehicles or businesses (such as marketing gas).
4.
Personnel has been reduced in some zones, such as Puerto Caicedo; a
situation parallel to the negotiation process with the government.
5.
Diversification of their relations with drug trafficking: assuring safety to
agents, who reappear at Puerto Caicedo, or who give money and participate directly in the
drug commerce business, as is the case of La Hormiga.
6.
Getting beaten by the guerrilla; such was the case at La Esmeralda (Valle del
Guamuez), where three members were killed and other ten were wounded.
Conclusions
The persistence of the Colombian armed conflict—a scenario in which drug
trafficking is still the main fuel of war—turns on the relatively long term political reach that
the demobilization process of part of the paramilitary armies might have. Symptoms of the
recycling of new generations of demobilized forces, plus the growing influence of areas
controlled by these groups in the illicit economy, trigger serious questions of the existence
of a post-conflict scenery focused on peace building.
Additionally, there are changes in the mechanisms of territorial control—that include
everything, starting from the presence of occupation armies in areas politically and
economically desired, up to the dynamics of mafia control that cover illicit power over
municipal funds, the management of official employment at local and regional level, the
influence over contracts, and over the economic and administrative development at diverse
locations. The expectations of a territorial domination by insurgent groups in areas where
demobilizations take place—which at the same time present weakness symptoms in regard
to the control of State security organisms—occur in new sceneries of reassertion of the
extension of the conflict.
Within this context, the basic scenery does not lie on the (in)capacity of the Armed
Forces to win militarily over the insurgency. The biggest problem consists of the deficiency
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of the State at the time of executing sovereign power over marginal territories, power based
on the application impersonal rules of the game, and on the social and economic integration
of these areas with a project of State-Nation building. This is, however, a strategic goal
expected within the bases of the Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo).
The national government will adopt a model that allows the State to regain definite
control over those areas that have influence of the illicit armed groups, in order to achieve a
legitimate functioning across the complete national territory. It is supposed to be an integral
effort, joint and coordinated for its inter-institutional reclaim, presence and consolidation.
The model consists in the achievement of a gradual recuperation of the areas affected by
violence, by means of the actions of military forces, and, as consequence, to allow the
effective presence of National Police in municipalities where it currently does not exist,
with the intention of achieving the consolidation of these areas, by means of the action of
other State entities, in a coordinate inter-institutional effort. The purpose is to create a
virtuous circle of recuperation, presence, and consolidation of State control over areas of
the territory where armed activity is lesser, seeking to restore order and safety, which will
progressively expand towards the rest of the country. 53
As might be inferred from the case mentioned on the Putumayo department, a status
quo has been created, that limits the possibilities of accomplishing the objective stated by
the Plan de Desarrollo, which seeks to gain legitimacy of the State: paramilitarism, whose
appearance in the area is dated around 1998, has been controlling drug trade throughout all
municipal heads across Bajo Putumayo, regardless of Plan Colombia—implemented on
2000—or the negotiation process taking place with those groups—since 2005.
As a difference from the vacuity existing in the construction of socioeconomic
relations, based on the organizations and structures of legal services, the illicit network
consolidated within these areas has permitted the articulation of territorial organization
levels, which go from the international to the local; it has created a “non-territorial region”,
referring to spaces of flow of resources, which superimpose to the spaces of places
characteristic of national territorial states; and, finally, have created a symbiosis with the
53
República de Colombia, Presidencia de la República, Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2002, Bogotá.
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legal sphere—not as a result of the availability of funds—but as a mimesis used by illicit
elites in their economic and social articulation. 54
Selectivity in anti-drug decisions, in terms of financial combat to those carrying arms
as well as the counterinsurgent military offensive, is generating territorial emphasis that
opens gaps in the strategic integrality. The focalization of offensive actions in areas of
insurgent control, together with the presence of strong inequities in social and economic
investment in areas where war offensive is concentrated, also wounds the construction of
State legitimacy. 55 All the same, as we already saw, this favors the strengthening of drug
trafficking in areas of paramilitary control, whose perspective of reinsertion and return to
legality happens to be highly uncertain.
54
Characteristics of illicitity within the border zones, presented by Lia Osorio Machado en “Região, cidades e
redes ilegais. Geografias alternativas na amazônia sul-americana,” in Maria Flores Gonçalves, Carlos A.
Brandão, Antônio C. Galvão, Regiões e cidades, cidades nas reines. O desafio urbano-regional, São Paulo,
Editor UNESP, ANPUR, 2003.
55
On the inequity in the participation on the budget of alternative development in the most fumigated zones,
see: Ricardo Vargas, “Cultivos ilícitos en Colombia, elementos para un balance,” in Alfredo Rangel (Comp.),
Narcotráfico en Colombia, economía y violencia, Bogotá, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, October 2005.
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