Asian Home Invasion Robbery - Center for Crime and Terrorism

Transcription

Home Invasions & Identity Theft:
The Role of Asian Gangs
A Technical Report
by
The Center for Asian Crime Studies,
International Association of Asian Crime Investigators
Prepared for
The County of Orange, California
22 April 2004
Table of Contents
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Asian Gangs and Home Invasions: An Introduction............................................. 1
1.1
Tentative Research Models................................................................................. 1
1.2
Background ......................................................................................................... 2
Current Trends ......................................................................................................... 6
2.1
Younger Members .............................................................................................. 8
2.2
Female Gangs...................................................................................................... 9
Crime Trends .......................................................................................................... 11
3.1
Home Invasion Robberies................................................................................. 11
3.2
Residential and Commercial Burglary.............................................................. 22
3.3
Extortion ........................................................................................................... 24
Traveling Gangs ...................................................................................................... 25
4.1
Patterns of Mobility .......................................................................................... 26
Interviews................................................................................................................. 30
5.1
Police Officers: Questions and Response ......................................................... 30
5.2
Interviews with Convicted Home Invaders....................................................... 39
5.3
Summary of Interviews:.................................................................................... 51
Data Analysis........................................................................................................... 53
6.1
Identification and Selection of Cases................................................................ 55
6.2
Analytical Methods........................................................................................... 55
Results ...................................................................................................................... 56
7.1
The Modus Operandi Model............................................................................. 56
7.2
The Suspect Model ........................................................................................... 62
7.3
The Victim Model............................................................................................. 65
7.4
Victims’ Households......................................................................................... 66
7.5
Summary ........................................................................................................... 74
Asian Gangs and Identity Theft: An Introduction .............................................. 76
Identity Theft: Poor Data from Fragmented Sources ......................................... 77
ii
10
Hypotheses and Findings........................................................................................ 81
10.1 Identity Theft and Organized Criminality......................................................... 81
10.2 Asian Criminal Enterprises and Identity Theft ................................................. 85
10.3 The Migration of Gang-Related Identity Theft................................................. 86
11 Conclusions and Recommendations...................................................................... 88
11.1 Concerning Home Invasions............................................................................. 88
11.2 Concerning Identity Theft................................................................................. 93
iii
Preface
This report is the joint outcome of two studies. Dr. Gary Weaver, Executive Director of
the Intercultural Management Institute of American University, oversaw the program
details and the publication of this report at the request of Colonel M. Cordell Hart,
Director of the Center for Asian Crime Studies, the research and training arm of the
International Association of Asian Crime Investigators. Detective Sergeant Mark Nye of
the Westminster (California) Police Department and Dr. Mary Finch, independent
consultant, conducted the investigation of home invasions, while Mr. John T Picarelli of
the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center conducted the investigation of identity
theft for financial fraud. Biographic summaries of project team members and institutions
are found at the end of the report.
The authors of this technical report would like to thank Orange County, California, for
funding the project, and to thank the investigators of the Orange County Prosecutor’s
Office for sharing their investigative expertise and insights.
iv
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Hispanic style of dress on Asian gang members................................................. 7
Figure 2: Homicide scene—gang member armed with “The Club” was shot and killed in
gang rivalry (Courtesy of Westminster PD) ............................................................... 7
Figure 3: Girl gangsters at Rave – associated with home invasion crew.......................... 10
Figure 4: Gun dropped by fleeing home invaders & tools used to force entry into
residences
(Courtesy of Westminster PD) ...................... 13
Figure 5: Typical ski mask worn by home invaders and cotton gloves used to eliminate
fingerprints................................................................................................................ 15
Figure 6: Tattoo of arrested home invader........................................................................ 18
Figure 7: Loaded semi-automatic handguns recovered from vehicle occupied by home
invaders ..................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 8: Examples of 4 T’s tattoo on Vietnamese gang members .................................. 22
Figure 9: Tattoos adorned by Natoma Boys and Nip Family Gangsters .......................... 27
Figure 10: Weapons found at one location of the Nip Family Search Warrants .............. 27
Figure 11: Typical tattoo worn by members of The V, a notorious Vietnamese street gang
and a home invasion related tattoo worn by a leader of The V currently serving a
murder sentence ........................................................................................................ 29
Figure 12: Home Invasion Cases by State ........................................................................ 54
Figure 13: Home Invasion Cases by Year and State......................................................... 54
Figure 14: Cases by Day and Time................................................................................... 57
Figure 15: Cases by Day and State ................................................................................... 57
Figure 16: Number of Suspects......................................................................................... 58
Figure 17: Duration of Home Invasions ........................................................................... 61
Figure 18: Duration by State............................................................................................. 61
Figure 19: Age of Suspects ............................................................................................... 63
Figure 20: Number of Arrests per Case by State .............................................................. 65
Figure 21: Types of Residence by Neighborhood ............................................................ 66
Figure 22: Number of Victims by State............................................................................ 67
Figure 23: Number of Victims by Age and State ............................................................. 68
Figure 24: Percentage of Victims by Age and State ......................................................... 68
Figure 25: Level of Resistance by State ........................................................................... 69
Figure 26: Medical Attention by Resistance..................................................................... 70
Figure 27: Number Injures by Resistance......................................................................... 71
Figure 28: Quality of Victim and Witness Descriptions................................................... 72
Figure 29: Officers Responding by State.......................................................................... 73
v
Key Findings
This study originated from the concerns of experienced investigators who observed two
disturbing trends—a rise in Asian gang involvement in both home invasions and identity
theft for financial fraud. Law enforcement officials in Orange County also found that
other metropolitan communities across the country were discovering similar cases
involving of Asian gangs and the use of identity theft to foment financial fraud. As such,
Orange County wished to know:
1. If Asian gangs were engaging in home invasions and identity theft for financial
fraud around the country
2. If this was a trend that had its origin in Orange County or the West Coast, and
3. What best practices, if any, existed for investigating Asian gangs engaging in
home invasions and identity theft for financial fraud
The last concern also merged later with a request to validate the approach that Orange
County takes in Asian gang investigations, and the findings of these research projects
supported Orange County’s approach to gang investigations—the Regional Gang
Enforcement Team (RGET). Using a multi-agency approach, the RGET can easily
incorporate specialists, for example financial investigators in order to pursue identity
theft cases involving Asian gangs. Close ties to the Orange County District Attorney’s
office further serves as a platform for constructing the will to see such cases through.
Third, it is clear that Orange County’s law enforcement personnel, especially those
associated with the RGET, are some of the most knowledgeable when it comes to the
differences between Asian gangs, occidental gangs, Asian Criminal Enterprises, and
organized crime.
What follows are a series of key findings for each of the two foci of this report—that is,
Asian gangs conducting home invasions and identity theft for financial fraud. The
findings are further developed and supported in the body of the technical report.
Findings Specific to Home Invasions
Public Awareness and Prevention
Educate the public to better protect themselves against home invaders by
o Locking doors and windows, installing alarms, and avoiding opening the
door to strangers
o Being aware of their surroundings
o Avoiding keeping large amounts of cash or jewelry in the home
o Avoiding flaunting wealth or discussing it in public
o Paying attention to suspicious persons or vehicles in the neighborhood
o Being familiar with their neighbors
o Discussing safety procedures with children
o Monitoring children’s conduct and relationships
vi
o Consider developing guidelines for citizens to keep themselves safe if they
are victims of a home invasion
Work with the media
o Provide public service announcements to distribute information about
crime trends and prevention tips
o Publicize wanted home invaders or those arrested or convicted
o Encourage citizens to report suspicious activities or persons
Develop neighborhood watch programs in target areas
o Include home invasion awareness materials in neighborhood watch
orientation process
Improve relations with Vietnamese and other Asian communities
o Create web tip hot line
o Establish community-based police sub-stations
o Hire more Vietnamese and other Asian police officers
o Develop and maintain confidential and/or citizen informants
Procedures, Policies, and Further Research
Establish and strengthen relationships with law enforcement agencies in
neighboring jurisdictions
o Share intelligence information
o Encourage regular meetings between local gang units
o Improve communication and coordination between drug and gang units (if
separated) within and between jurisdictions
o Develop informal or formal task forces when necessary
o Monitor home invaders released from prison
Ensure that police officers are trained to respond to home invasion robberies
o Stress that suspects are likely to be well-armed and violent
o Consider developing policies for responding to home invasions if they do
not already exist
o Emphasize collection of evidence, such as fingerprints (where possible),
binding materials, or tools
o Recommend that officers look for common items associated with home
invasions, especially bindings, during traffic stops and other routine
activities
Track home invasions separately rather than together with other robberies
o Create a distinct category for home invasions in local, state, and federal
statistical databases
o Separate, centralize, and standardize home invasion record-keeping within
and among local jurisdictions
o Monitor the prevalence and characteristics of home invasions over time
Identify and contact other jurisdictions, statewide and nationally, with large
numbers of home invasion cases
o Encourage standardization of record-keeping and sharing of intelligence
and trend information
vii
o Share study results and encourage examination of home invasion cases in
other jurisdictions to develop a nationwide database with modus operandi,
suspect, and victim information that enables more comprehensive analysis
o Compare information on Asian gang home invasions with home invasions
by other types of gangs
Findings Specific to the Identity Theft Study
Identity theft is evolving as a mainstream criminal enterprise for both organized
crime and Asian criminal enterprises (ACEs), but not as much for occidental and
Asian street gangs.
ACEs are the organizations of the three aforementioned that most frequently
engage in identity theft.
Like other trends, the gang involvement in identity theft began in California and is
now a “business model” being exported to other parts of the US.
There is sufficient merit for gang investigators to have concern about Asian street
gangs engaging in identity theft.
The combination of the extreme fiscal and emotional harm that identity theft
incurs with the ability of Asian street gangs to systematize criminal enterprises
more than warrants increased attention to this phenomenon.
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Home Invasions and Identity Theft
22 April 2004
1 Asian Gangs and Home Invasions: An Introduction
Asian organized crime and street gang crime have been a major focus for the law
enforcement community since the late 1980s. The increase of Asian crime has been a
result of three factors: (1) the modification of the immigration laws in 1986, allowing
more immigrants to enter the United States; (2) the new influx of refugees from
Southeast Asian countries during the 1980s and 1990s after the end of the Vietnam War;
(3) the breakdown of family and community support in Asian communities due to the
sudden addition of these immigrants and refugees; and (4) lack of sufficient social
supports necessary from the hosting society due to the large influx of these new arrivals.
Home invasion robbery otherwise known as residential robbery is one of the most
popular Asian criminal activities, and has drawn attention from our country’s law
enforcement for several reasons. First, most home invasion crimes have produced
tremendous physical and psychological trauma for victim(s) and the community due to
the level of violence involved. Second, home invasions are often committed by a mobile
group (gang or non gang bandit groups) involving multiple jurisdictions, thus posing a
greater challenge to criminal investigations and the allocation of resources. Third, a
home invasion robbery is usually the result of systematic and careful planning. The level
of complexity of criminal modus operandi in each case varies greatly. Therefore, there is
a real need to produce a pattern of probability that can be useful for criminal investigation
and crime prevention.
Asian home invasion robberies are also showing three trends: certain groups have begun
to target non-Asian communities and are recruiting non-Asian individuals. Further,
Hispanic and Black gang members have begun to imitate the methods of operation of
Asian home invasions. In other words, Asian criminal groups committing home invasion
robberies are expanding their boundaries, which constitutes a threatening signal. Finally,
although we began to experience Asian home invasion robberies in the later 1980s, little
systematic and comprehensive research has been done on the subject.
1.1 Tentative Research Models
This project provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of Asian home invasions
to better understand the criminal modus operandi involved in Asian home invasions, it
provides a profile of suspects committing home invasions, and it describes characteristics
of victims of home invasions. This analysis has two principal components: 1) interviews
with police officials and gang members and 2) the examination of fifty-five cases of
home invasion in four states. With the information provided, the study also proposes
recommendations to enhance practices of criminal investigation, suggests new polices in
crime prevention and investigation, and suggests new public policy initiatives in crime
prevention to owners of individual residences and small businesses. We hope that this
project contributes to public safety, security and quality of life by expanding
understanding of these crimes and identifying strategies to combat them.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Immigrant History
To better understand Asian gang home invasion robberies we need to first look at where
they (suspects and victims) come from. We need to examine their personal and cultural
environment, how they have been influenced by the past and how they are impacted by
present circumstances. We will therefore present a brief history of Vietnamese
immigration to the United States, taken from William Cassidy’s “Nomadic Vietnamese
Armed Robbery-Fundamentals of Nomadic Vietnamese Residential Armed Robbery
Investigation” (unpublished manuscript, 1991). We need to study this phenomenon to
dispel myths and preconceived notions about the nature of our suspects, to understand
secondary migration patterns in the United States, and to reveal environmental factors
which affect targeting of victims and composition of armed robbery gangs. We also need
to examine the early formation of Asian gangs in America, why they formed so rapidly
and what has happened to the community as a result. We need to identify who they are,
why they are, what they do and how they move around virtually undetected in the
community.
After the fall of Saigon during the Vietnam War on April 30, 1975, thousands of refugees
(140,000 best known figure) were evacuated from Vietnam in the first wave. This first
wave of refugees consisted of former U.S. Government employees and their dependents,
as well as other professionals. This first wave of refugees was fleeing a war torn country,
but the U.S. soon experienced an influx of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Most of these refugees were educated, hard workers from good families and wanted
nothing more than to succeed in their new country. They had lived and worked with
Americans in their country during the Vietnam War. They assimilated quickly into the
American way of life, opening up businesses and communities throughout parts of the
United States.
In the sixteen years since 1975, numbers of Vietnamese and other
Southeast Asians in the United States have steadily increased. First wave
evacuees have been joined by hundreds of thousands of escapees fleeing
the political intolerance and economic privation that afflicts Indochina.1
The second wave of refugees of the late 1970’s to the early 1980’s were “boat people”
(peasants) who escaped their country on barges and make-shift boats, fleeing to the
United States for sanctuary. Many of them faced great hardships in their travels and were
victimized by Thai pirates who raped some of the women and killed men and children.
Along with the peasants and the poor who escaped Vietnam and fled to the United States
also came the criminal element, who only had intentions of preying on the weak refugees
for survival.
Another dynamic that comes into play involving the waves of refugees from Vietnam
concerns how the people in the successive waves differ and interact with one another.
1
See Cassidy (1991), p. 1
2
22 April 2004
Affecting the nature and incidence of criminal activity in each group might be the drop in
educational level between 1975 and later arrivals. There also appears to be less English
language competence by the later arrivals, which likely created greater communication
and assimilation problems among the group. The first wave of refugees left Vietnam as it
was crumbling, while the second and successive waves had to cope for a time with life
under a brutal regime. They were also faced with openly hostile receptions in Thailand,
Malaysia and Hong Kong during their escape and attempted relocation to the U.S.
Additionally the first wave refugees with higher education and better English language
abilities had more employment opportunities. The first wave refugees were seen as the
elite of the Vietnamese refugees entering and settling in the U.S. The later waves,
however, had less education and poorer language skills. Many of them were unemployed
or were unemployable and had arrived in the U.S. after escaping victimization. A large
population of the Southeast Asian criminals also came to the U.S. fleeing incarceration or
even death for crimes committed in their homeland. These refugees seem to have started
the increase in criminal activity throughout the Southeast Asian communities in the
United States.
The Southeast Asians who came to the U.S. were spread out over 14 states with the
largest concentration settling in Texas, Washington, and California. Others have since
settled in Nebraska, Louisiana, Colorado and other states with industries (slaughtering
plants, fishing or shrimping industry, or assembly plants) attractive to unskilled laborers
in search of employment. The refugees seemed to cluster together in large groups rather
than assimilating into the whole of the American society. They clung together where
they could easily adapt to their new surroundings and have each other for support. These
refugees moved into communities such as Westminster in Orange County or Versailles
Village in New Orleans, Louisiana, and other self-contained Vietnamese enclaves where
the refugees live among themselves, and practically shut off themselves off from the rest
of the world around them.
Asian criminals in these communities started out in small loosely knit “bandit groups”
who got together for a short period of time primarily to commit home invasion robberies,
extortions, burglaries and other property crimes. These bandits preyed upon their own
countrymen, increasing their personal wealth at the expense of those who easily
prospered in this new world.2
1.2.2 Current State of Asian Gangs
In the mid to late 1980s, these groups banded together as protection against other gangs
they encountered at the junior high and high school level, and in their respective
residential neighborhoods. They also banned together for social reasons. Their common
bond was their ethnic heritage and their inability to fit into the American way of life.
They created gangs in the search for brotherhood, unity in numbers, and love and respect.
The gang became their surrogate family. They soon evolved into a more organized group
and identified with typical gang behavior; some adopting similar characteristics of the
Hispanic gangs. They picked up these traits from spending time in correctional facilities
2
See Cassidy (1991), pp. 1-3.
3
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with other established Hispanic and Black gang members. The media and its portrayal of
street gangs also influenced them. They began to call themselves by gang names and
became somewhat more organized, with a more formalized group structure.3
Tattooing became popular with some members tattooing their gang names, the country of
Vietnam and other Chinese symbols on parts of their bodies. They also used cigarettes to
burn patterns in their skin that later formed scars. Some of the cigarette burns were in
very distinct patterns that usually stood for membership in a particular gang. Commonly
the presence of a cigarette burn symbolized their willingness to participate in criminal
activity. The more burns they had, the more vicious or hard-core they were. They also
began imitating the dress of Hispanic gangs, wearing loose fitting jeans or khakis, white
t-shirts, web belts, and some began to wear bandanas and hairnets or combed and greased
their hair back.
These gangs were usually made up of teens from 13-19 years old and numbered
about 20-40 members in each group. Most of the Vietnamese gangs which have
impacted California, primarily Orange County’s Little Saigon, have remained in groups
no larger than 40 strong; however, some multi-ethnic groups like the Asian Boyz and the
Tiny Rascal gang seemed to have banned together and some groups have reached over
500 members. Their membership has spread throughout the state of California and across
the United States, from California to Texas, Louisiana, and Washington, Oregon and
elsewhere in search of employment or other relatives from Vietnam.4
Asian street gangs are relatively new with regard to their counterparts in the gang
subculture, i.e., Hispanic, Black and other ethnic gangs. Asian street gangs are basically
in their first generation in America whereas the other mentioned groups are on their third
and fourth generations. These gangs have specific traits that set them apart from other
street gangs, yet they also adopt traits that are common to other street gangs.
In some ways Asian street gangs are different from any other gangs we have encountered
in law enforcement. These gangs are well organized with a sense of leadership or
direction, and they are extremely mobile, utilizing the fast moving freeway systems with
relative ease, traveling from city to city and state to state virtually undetected. Typically
they are involved in criminal gang behavior for economic gain.
When we talk about Asian gangs, we are talking about many different ethnic groups:
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and Southeast Asians. The Southeast Asians make
up the largest group, which includes the Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Hmong, and
Mien. Each one of these ethnic groups is dynamically different from one another even
though some share similar cultures or customs.5
What puts Asian street gangs well ahead of the rest of their counterparts is their pledge of
secrecy, ability to adapt and overcome law enforcement efforts brought against them, and
3
See Nye (2003).
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
4
4
22 April 2004
above all, their sheer determination to succeed. For thousands of years the Asians have
had customs that involve the formation of secret societies, groups or clubs. It is virtually
impossible for an outsider to penetrate these secret societies, called Triads or Tongs.
Asian street gangs today have similar traits of secrecy that make it difficult for law
enforcement officials to infiltrate these groups and combat them. These groups quickly
learn when law enforcement officials have discovered ways to thwart their criminal
activity, and just as quickly change the ways in which they carry out their business.
Lastly, it appears that Asian gang members follow the stereotype of hard work and high
achievement, and are therefore very successful in their criminal endeavors. This
researcher was once given an example of an Asian gang member by an Asian gentleman.
He told the researcher that Asians are very determined to succeed and are thus very
achievement oriented. He said that there are 4.0 students and there are 4.0 gang
members, but there is no mediocrity. In other words, an Asian person is either highly
successful in school or business or he is highly successful in his criminal enterprise.
Many Asian street gang members personally encountered in Westminster County are
“straight A” students, yet are involved in the gang lifestyle almost as deeply as the other
members who are not as gifted. These scholars are criminally sophisticated, and just as
ruthless and violent as the others, preying upon their victims without any sign of decency
or remorse.6
Asian street gangs have for many years preyed upon their own people of race. When
committing crimes such as home invasion robberies they torture members of the
household that are of their same ethnic group. When they commit crimes such as
extortion, and even strong-arm robbery and burglary they also often prey upon victims
from their own race:
Nomadic Vietnamese armed robbers have a substantial lack of remorse for
their victims. They feel they are righting wrong, correcting inequalities or
balancing the books. Victims are often spoken of in anger as if they have
somehow violated a sacred pact to share and share alike. This stems back
to the successive waves of refugees, where the first wave were the elite
and the second and successive waves who were left behind endured many
hardships along the way. These acts of gratuitous violence and torture are
culturally prohibited acts; such as rape and sexual assault of young
females, tortures of children and infants, the elderly, and pregnant females.
The criminals find no guilt by going against these norms and customs and
feel justified in this type of behavior as explained above. In the Village
mentality of the Vietnamese people (which extends to the criminal fringe
and is the foundation of every Vietnamese criminal gang) they see that
great wealth is antisocial, not a sign of success but a sign of selfishness.7
Although law enforcement’s efforts seem to be gravitating toward fighting Asian street
gang violence, it has been a long time coming. It is believed that this is because
6
7
Ibid.
See Cassidy (1991).
5
22 April 2004
relatively little information is known about Asian street gangs, and the victims of Asian
street gang violence are Asians themselves, many of whom do not report the crimes to the
police. As more non-Asian victims begin to be attacked by the Asian street gangs, we
will see more attention drawn toward combating the problem.
The following synopsis is a brief overview of Asian gangs, their history, makeup, place
of origin, and their methods of operation in the United States. The researcher’s expertise
lies in the area of Southeast Asian street gangs, primarily Vietnamese gangs that impact
the City of Westminster, and Orange County, California. Therefore, most of the
discussion will focus on Vietnamese gangs that impact Orange County as well as other
areas of the United States.
2 Current Trends
In the past few years, the Southeast Asian gangs have become even more organized, with
some hierarchical structure. One to three hardcore members who have usually spent time
in the state correctional system or have a strong propensity toward violence usually lead
the gangs. These leaders can change from time to time. The gangs have increased in
number; almost double that of five years ago. The gangs and gang members have
become more violent, adopting trends similar to that of Hispanic and Black gangs
throughout the country. They are forming violent gang rivalries amongst their own racial
groups, resulting in numerous homicides and other serious injuries.
The Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian gangs that used to be involved in the gangs for
profit or survival in the form of property crimes have focused much of their attention on
violence against each other. Drive-by or car-to-car rival gang shootings are on the
increase. Gang members are arming themselves sometimes with fully automatic
handguns (tech 9’s), assault rifles, shot guns and semi automatic handguns and are
opening up on each other. This is not a turf war as Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian
gangs are not territorial and are very mobile. This is a war over power, the fight for
recognition, with each gang striving to be the most notorious or most feared gang. The
gang/gang members earn respect by the amount of violence they project in the
community and the frequency with which they commit these violent acts.8
8
See Nye (2003).
6
22 April 2004
Figure 1: Hispanic style of dress on Asian gang members
(Courtesy of Orange Police Department)
Each member takes a sense of pride from being associated with a strong, powerful and
violent gang. The shootings and/or homicides are sometimes also the result of minor
confrontations between gangs who use to associate with one another and are now rival
enemies on the warpath. These wars or battles continue for long periods of time, with
each group committing several shootings against their rivals. Some of the shootings
occur in public places particularly in or around Vietnamese cafes or coffee house in Little
Saigon. Others occur in quite residential neighborhoods where some of the gang
members reside with their families.
Figure 2: Homicide scene—gang member armed with “The Club” was shot and killed in gang rivalry
(Courtesy of Westminster PD)
7
22 April 2004
2.1 Younger Members
The gangs have strongly impacted the high school and junior high school campuses.
Most of the gangs originating on these campuses associate regularly. Others join gangs
for protection against the gang violence on campus. The well-established Hispanic gangs
used to pick on these smaller and different students who they perceived were moving in
on their territory, until the Asians banded together to form gangs.
Sadly, many young Vietnamese today resort to delinquency, and some
even belong to various criminal gangs. Their behaviors are the result of
lack of guidance and care because many came to America without one or
both parents. “Most of the Vietnamese kids today, even the older ones,
don’t uphold any human values. They have no concern for their culture;
most don’t want to take the time to learn it. They don’t even listen to what
their parents say, let alone respect them.” Little Saigon like many other
Vietnamese communities in the U.S., has its own propensity for crime and
violence. Crimes range anywhere from extortion to car jacking; robberies
to nationwide drug rings, check scams, illegal gambling, and prostitution.
And many times, it is kids who are involved in these illegal activities.
Statistics indicate that Vietnamese gangs are ranked number one in terms
of brutality and rampant criminal acts.9
Some members of these newly formed gangs are as young as 12 to 13 years old. Smaller
or junior factions of already formed gangs are beginning to form at junior high school
campuses. Junior members are usually family members; younger brothers or sisters or
cousins to the older gang members, and associate with the older, more established gangs
on a regular basis. They in turn form small gangs at school.
The junior gang members form their own groups which they usually tell law enforcement
are nothing more than a group of friends or a party or dance crew. Some of these junior
gangs are involved in tagging; a phenomenon sweeping the state of California, where
massive amounts of personal and public property are vandalized by groups of teens who
spray paint their crew or gang names on businesses, homes, freeway overpasses and other
property. The members are also involved in vehicle burglaries, residential burglaries, and
assaults of others or rival gang members.
These junior or young gang members are training for recruitment to the more recognized
and organized street gangs. Some of the young members have already begun to
accelerate their assimilation into the more established gangs by acts of violence and the
carrying of firearms. Others have been trained by their older more sophisticated gang
associates on how to commit home invasion robberies; how to select targets, plan
operations and safely escape authorities after the commission of them.10
9
See Ngo (1995).
See Nye (2003).
10
8
22 April 2004
One group of young gang members, aged 13-15 years, was involved in auto theft and
burglary. Members who have been arrested and interviewed have indicated to law
enforcement that they stole up to two cars a day to be used as transportation to assist in
the commission of other crimes. Members break into and steal the vehicles in as little as
sixty seconds using very sophisticated methods, taught to them by older gang members.
They usually steal minivans and Honda vehicles. The minivan seats are taken out by the
suspects and the vehicles can then be used for the transportation of stolen contraband
taken in residential burglaries and home invasion robberies or during the commission of a
drive-by shooting against a rival gang. The Honda vehicles, a highly prized item by the
gang members, can be sold to other gang members or chop shops.
2.2 Female Gangs
Female Asian gangs have existed almost as long as their male counterparts; however,
with the passage of time, they have gained their own independence from the male gangs.
They formed their own gangs like the “Southside Scissors”, “Innocent Bitch Killers”,
“Lady Rascals”, “Silver Middle Girls”, “Oriental Dragon Girls”, “Crazy Viet Girls”,
“Asian Girls” and others. These gangs have slowly diminished over time however and
many of the aforementioned gangs are no longer in existence. Females however still play
an active support role to their male gang counterparts. They hide guns, money and other
loot for male gang members who are involved in home invasion robberies and other
crimes of violence.
The female gang members originally were little sisters to the male gangs. They
associated with the male gang members and sometimes participated in criminal activity,
acting as lookouts during burglaries, and as decoys during the commission of home
invasion robberies.
The female gang members and associates offer good company to the male gang members.
Most are young teenage runaways who travel along with their very mobile male
counterparts. The male gang members treat them with respect, much like little sisters or
cousins. The females aren’t usually sexually assaulted or even toyed with, unless it is
with their willing participation.11
The female gang members began to take on their own independence and became
involved in criminal activity of their own accord. Some became involved in petty theft
and burglary of commercial mall outlets. Some even participated in and/or committed
residential burglary.
11
Ibid.
9
22 April 2004
Figure 3: Girl gangsters at Rave – associated with home invasion crew
Trends of the female gang members in the 1990s, shows them to be more independent of
their male counterparts. They were becoming increasingly more violent. Rival female
gangs were having wars much like the rivalries of the male Asian gangs. The females
were arming themselves with clubs, knives, stabbing weapons and, in some cases,
firearms. Two very prominent female Asian gangs in the 1990s were the “Lady Rascals”
and the “Southside Scissors”. These gangs had been involved in several incidents of
violence including shootings and beatings of each other’s members. Their rivalry was just
as strong and violent as those of their male gang counterparts, as well as sharing the same
enemies (both hardcore gang members and associates).
Female gang membership however, in the past couple of years, has seem to be on the
decline with many members of already established and long-time gangs fading away.
There seems to be fewer new female gangs being formed; however, most of the active
male gangs have females that run with them and are allegiant to them and their cause and
provide intelligence to the gang. These females are able to cross enemy lines without too
much difficulty and can provide invaluable information about their rivals. Although
female gangs may still be in existence they are well adept at concealing the fact from law
enforcement, as there are many fewer documented members as was evident in the 1990s.
The female gang member or gang associate is just as violent and dangerous as the male
gang member and therefore should not be underestimated. The female gang members
will sometimes hold weapons for their male associates assuming that most male police
officers will not pay much attention to them or are less likely to conduct pat down
searches on them.12
The female gang members or gang associates, in some cases, have in the past dressed
very similar to the male gang members. They wore baggy, loose fitting clothing such as
baggy pants, oversized shirts, usually untucked, and in some cases, baseball caps. The
females would also carry beepers and wear belt buckles with gang insignias. They
tattooed themselves with gang names and monikers. The females were more apt to hide
12
Ibid.
10
22 April 2004
their tattoos than the males. Female gang members would usually tattoo themselves
between their fingers as well as other parts of the hand. Other locations where tattoos
could be found were the ankles, legs, chest and back. Due to the similarity in clothing
styles, the females would sometimes perpetrate a crime and be mistaken for males. This
does not appear to be the fact today. In the past couple of years law enforcement has
seen a dramatic decline in this trend. It is unknown if the female gangs themselves have
disbanded or members have grown up and left the gangs, or if they are just more
secretive about their membership. They seem to still have close ties to the male gangs
however, but don’t usually dress the part.13
In other cases the females can dress up for going out on the town and not look like gang
members at all. This can be very deceiving to the novice police officer that has no
knowledge of individual gang members. Therefore, caution should be utilized when
contacting large groups of females whether or not they are dressed in gang attire. Even
though they disguise their appearance, they usually drive the same vehicles they drive
when playing the part of the gang member. Therefore, it is important for law
enforcement officers to document not only individual gangs and gang members, but gang
related vehicles as well.
3 Crime Trends
The most common crimes perpetrated by the Southeast Asian gang members are: home
invasion robberies, armed and strong armed robberies committed on a person or persons,
residential and commercial burglaries, auto theft, burglary, extortion, drive-by and car-tocar shootings (including murder and attempted murder of rivals), other assaults and
weapons violations, with the most recent of the crime trends being check fraud, credit
card fraud, counterfeiting of documents including American Express Travelers Checks,
computer internet theft, identity theft and possession and sales of Ecstasy and other
controlled substances such as methamphetamines and cocaine.
3.1 Home Invasion Robberies
Home invasion robberies are probably the most violent and sophisticated crimes of the
century and have been a trademark of Asian gangs for many years. The home invasion
robbery is an extreme act of terror that involves the use of torture and occasionally
results in serious injury or death to the victims. These robberies are carried out by street
gangs or bandit groups. These criminals learn of would be victims usually by obtaining
inside information, they then surveil their targets much like the police surveil crooks,
then they enter the victim’s homes, and round up family members whom they later
threaten and commonly torture, to coerce the victims into providing instant information
about where to find items of value inside the house. The crooks then take the loot and
flee, leaving behind frightened if not psychologically damaged victims of all ages.
Home invasion robberies are carefully planned by members of a gang, bandit group or
home invasion crew. This crew will carefully select a target. A target will, in almost all
cases, be of Asian descent. He/she will most likely be an owner of a jewelry store,
13
Ibid.
11
22 April 2004
furniture store or other lucrative business in the Asian community. The target will drive
fancy cars, usually live in an upper class neighborhood, and has been known to flaunt
his/her wealth.
The target might be a gambler, utilizing the card clubs in the metropolitan area. The
victim might also operate a business out of his home, where the proceeds are not likely to
be reported to the I.R.S. Additionally, most Asian persons do not use banks to deposit
their earnings. In their country, the banking system was corrupt and not to be trusted.
Therefore, many Asians keep large amounts of money, gold, and jewelry in their home.
Some targets are also persons who are planning a trip to Vietnam. In these cases, it is a
common practice for persons traveling to Vietnam to bring gold, money, and other gifts
to friends and family members living there. These items will usually be readily available
before a trip. The victims may also be bookies or operate some type of off-shore betting
network, or drug dealers who supply the community with ecstasy and/or other controlled
substances. Sometimes the home invaders purchase drugs from the dealers then turn
around and invade their homes to get more drugs and the cash they left behind and any
other cash or valuables in the household. Victims may also be recent newlyweds who
receive expensive gifts, in the form of jewelry, gold or large amounts of cash, from
relatives or friends to start their new life. In most cases, the targets (victims) usually fit
one of more of the above profiles.
There is a reason for the target profile, according to numerous gang members who have
been interviewed by law enforcement personnel. If the victim or target owns or operates
a business out of his residence where income is not reported for same, or is involved in
illegal gambling, proceeds of which are not reported to the I.R.S., he is reluctant to
contact the authorities to report losses. This fact is well known to the suspects and is a
strong motivating factor for selecting such a target.
In some cases, the victims also feel that if the suspects are not apprehended during the
commission of the crime, then most likely the suspects will never be apprehended.
Victims also fear retaliation from the suspects who threaten bodily harm and even death
if the crime is reported or the perpetrators identified. Additionally, some Asian victims
do not understand the American Criminal Justice System, where suspects are given so
many rights, including the most important of all, bail or are released on their own
recognizes.
When an Asian victim reports a crime to the authorities, identifies the perpetrators, then
the suspects return to his home or business just hours or days later to threaten the victim
if he testifies, the victim feels that the suspect has bought off the police. The victim(s)
can not understand why this person or group of persons that he just identified as
committing a heinous crime against him and his family is out of jail and back to cause
harm to him and his family.
Therefore, the Asian victim has a strong distrust and confusion about the Criminal Justice
System. The Asian victim feels it is almost futile to report his crime to the authorities.
There must be an effort to educate the Asian immigrants/refugees as to the workings of
12
22 April 2004
the American Criminal Justice System. There is a need for close association and trust
between the police and the Asian community. The best way to build trust and
cooperation in the community is to have a unit specifically assigned to the community,
members of which spend a large portion of their time communicating with business
owners and other community leaders. Information packets should be written in
Vietnamese and distributed amongst the community, and Asian-speaking persons should
be available to answer law enforcement questions, and officers assigned to the unit
should rotate so the entire department learns about the Asian culture.
Home invasion robberies are probably the most sophisticated of the crimes perpetrated by
the Asian criminal. Selecting the target is just the first phase of the operation. The next
step is further planning and surveillance of the target.14
The victim in some cases is followed home from his business, from a gambling club or
other location. Once the victim’s house has been identified, it is then surveilled. In some
cases, the suspect may even know a family member or other occupant of the residence
who can supply specific information about the floor plan such as where each occupant
resides, if there is a security system, or if there are any animals in the residence that may
be a threat, and where valuables and any weapons can be located.
Figure 4: Gun dropped by fleeing home invaders & tools used to force entry into residences
The suspect gang members are commonly assigned specific tasks; one or more may be in
charge of watching the victims, while others are responsible for searching for valuables.
The suspects, usually numbering no less than two, and no more than six, are armed. The
weapons most commonly used by the suspects are large knives, small to large frame
handguns, and sawed-off shotguns. Other equipment or tools used by the suspects will be
telephone cords, electrical cords, or duct tape used to tie up and sometimes gag the
victims. Pillowcases will usually be used to cover the victim’s faces or are used to carry
stolen merchandise. Other tools are used to gain entry into the residences such as pry
14
Ibid.
13
22 April 2004
bars, metal cutting saws, bolt cutters and large frame hammers. Some of this equipment
or tools are obtained inside the victim’s residence once entry has been made.
An example of a home invasion robbery can be described as the following: the suspects
arrive at the victim’s residence in two separate vehicles. One is occupied by a lookout.
Both cars are either stolen or are cold-plated (have license plates stolen from other
vehicles). The rest of the suspects approach the victim’s residence. A ruse is commonly
used to gain initial entry in to the house. A common modus operandi is a young female
(criminal associate) will make contact at the front door asking for another school aged
person inside. Once the door is opened, the rest of the suspects force their way in and the
robbery is under way. One of the suspects is clearly in charge as he barks commands to
the other suspects. All the victims are rounded up by the armed suspects, and put in one
room where another armed suspect can watch them. The victim’s hands and feet are
bound with duct tape, telephone wires, zip ties, torn sheets or other similar material.
Pillowcases or blankets are often put over the victims’ faces so they will not be able to
remember specifics about the suspects. In many recent cases the suspects wear ski masks
or bandanas to cover their faces and conceal their identity until the victims are covered
up.15
Once the victims are secure in one location, the father or main male figure is usually the
first of the household to be threatened with violence to quickly direct the suspects to
money, jewelry and other valuables. The adult male victim is most likely the recipient of
a pistol whipping, a gunshot wound in a non-vital area, or another form of torture. The
torture is used for quick compliance, so the money and jewelry or other items of value
will be found directly. If torturing the main male member of the family does not work,
then other members of the family will be tortured. Reported incidents include young
female family members who are sexually molested and/or raped in front of other family
members. Children and small babies are dangled by their legs over the floor or the toilet
as the family watches helplessly. Other forms of torture that take place include the
burning of victim with cigarettes and shocking them with stun guns, the pouring of hot oil
over the victims lower extremities and in one case toothpaste being squirted up the
nostrils while socks are shoved in the mouth of the victims.
Once the suspects get what they want, they leave the location with the loot sometimes
taking the victim’s vehicle to make their escape. Before leaving the scene, a threat of
violence is issued to all family members. The message orders the victims to keep quiet
and not to report the incident to the police. The victims are told if the message is
disregarded, the suspects will return and the torture will be worse. Sometimes knives or
live bullets are left in the open as a reminder to the victims, should they return, their will
be serious consequences.
15
Ibid.
14
22 April 2004
Figure 5: Typical ski mask worn by home invaders and cotton gloves used to eliminate fingerprints
The commission of home invasion robberies has gone in cycles throughout the Little
Saigon area and around the country. These robberies were committed in large numbers
from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. There was a lull in robberies between 1996 and
2000. What was going on during this four year period? Was the slow down in robberies
due to the primary crews being locked up and put away from society, or could it be that
enhanced penalties for suspects arrested during the commission of a robbery caused them
to change their crime patterns, or could it be that they just moved on to different types of
crimes for one reason or another.16
Whatever the reason there was a large gap in home invasion robberies for a period of four
to five years. Then in late 2000, there was a large resurgence of robberies throughout
Orange County’s Little Saigon and surrounding communities, as well as across the
country in other states having clusters of Southeast Asian immigrants.
These criminals were more sophisticated than ever before. In the past investigators were
able to show photo line-ups of all local gangsters to victims and witnesses and, with some
luck, some of the perpetrators were identified, arrested and later prosecuted. However
today we are faced with more sophisticated gangsters who have adapted to law
enforcement identification techniques such as showing of photographs and lifting of
latent fingerprints.
The Asian criminals presently committing home invasions in and around Orange
County’s Little Saigon are wearing ski masks, bandanas and t-shirts to cover their faces,
and socks or gloves to cover their hands. The suspects are also immediately covering
victims with blankets. Unless law enforcement apprehends the suspects in the
commission of the robbery or immediately thereafter, it is very unlikely that we will ever
16
Ibid.
15
22 April 2004
be able to apprehend them. Therefore other sophisticated law enforcement techniques
need to be employed, to identify and later apprehend and convict these criminals, to
include the use of DNA. Law enforcement officers need to be trained on how to properly
collect items left behind or touched by criminals so as not to contaminate their later
scientific examination.
In the mid 1990s several members of a local Asian street gang were arrested by the
Westminster Police Department’s TARGET Gang Unit, assisted by several other outside
law enforcement agencies, following an extended surveillance of two of the gang’s crash
pads. Information was also obtained from an informant with intimate knowledge of the
gang’s activities.17
The surveillance of the gang’s crash pads lasted over a one week period and searched
warrants were subsequently served at both locations. The search of the first location
resulted in the discovery of two stolen handguns and a shotgun, a large amount of
ammunition, VCRs, stereos, televisions, karaoke machines, laser discs, jewelry, coin
collections, binoculars, cellular phones, scanners, US passports, identification cards,
expensive clothing and large amounts of cash. All of the loot was found to be stolen
from a series of home invasion robberies throughout Los Angeles and Orange Counties.
The investigation that followed revealed that members of this Asian street gang were
selecting their targets through the local phonebook. They would thumb through the
phone book, look for random Asian names, and make cold calls to the residences. They
would make repeated calls to the locations to determine when the residents were at home
and when they were away. Their intention was to burglarized the residences when the
victims were away; however, the suspects would go to the residences armed with
handguns should they encounter victims, which they did and many occasions. The
suspects also used cellular phones to communicate with one another in vehicles used to
surveil the victims, and used hand-held scanners to monitor the police radio traffic in the
area. The suspects also used Thomas Brother’s maps to coordinate their surveillance and
the avenues of escape. The passports they stole were to be sold to organized crime
groups for $5,000 to $10,000 a piece for use in smuggling illegal aliens, potentially for
the purposes of prostitution, into the country.
In yet another recent home invasion robbery the suspects preyed upon Asian victims in
Westminster California who were returning home from their wedding. In early 2001, an
Asian couple got married and had their reception at a restaurant in Little Saigon. While
the reception was underway four masks suspects went to their residence and forced entry
through the rear. The suspects ransacked the residence looking for cash, jewelry and
ecstasy. The suspects had information that the victims were drug dealers and had a safe
containing drugs and cash within the residence. The suspects not finding what they were
looking for waited for the victims to return.
Later that evening the married couple and two other family members, another male and
female, returned to the residence. As they entered the residence they were encountered
17
Ibid.
16
22 April 2004
by four masked gunmen. The gunmen immediately began pistol whipping the victims
before the victims could utter a word or even put up resistance.
One of the females was drug into a nearby restroom within the residence and was
stripped of her clothing. One of the male suspects then unzipped his pants and pulled out
his penis which he began rubbing on the female as her husband watched from his position
on the floor where he was knocked to and held. All the while the suspects yelled at the
victims and demanded a large diamond ring that they believed the victims possessed.
The suspects also demanded cash and other valuables. Not getting immediate response
from the victims one suspect took a pair of gardening sheers and pinched one of the
male’s pinkie fingers between the blades. When the victim did not respond with the right
answer his finger was cut to the bone, but not severed. The sheers were then placed on
the victim’s ear and his ear was snipped at the earlobe. It is unknown if the female victim
was sexually molested as she was not forthcoming on what occurred other than
previously stated. It is possible however that she was sexually molested although she
failed to acknowledge the fact due to shame associated with the attack.18
While the robbery was underway, one male victim was able to escape and called 911
from his cell phone while hiding under a futon in the rear yard. The male who escaped
did not live at the residence and was unable to pinpoint his exact location, but
Westminster Police Officers soon arrived in the general area. There must have been a
lookout in the area, for as soon as the officers arrived on scene the suspects fled the
residence. One suspect ran down a nearby alley, still wearing a ski mask and armed with
a loaded semi-auto handgun. That suspect was apprehended by officers on scene without
incident. He was later identified and it was discovered that he had been a previously
convicted home invader who was in his mid to late 20’s. The arrestee was also adorned
with a tattoo on his chest that clearly represented what he stood for, extreme violence.
The tattoo (photo below) depicts a masked invader holding an Uzi machine pistol. The
three additional suspects fled to a nearby flood control channel and escaped via an
adjoining spillway. The fleeing suspects left behind two handguns, a ski mask and a pair
of cotton gloves.
Officers located a female Asian parked nearby hours later. She said she responded to the
area to pick up her boyfriend who had called her to the area. She identified her boyfriend
who was a known Asian gang member on parole. Officers later went to the gang
member’s residence and conducted a consent search of his residence where they
discovered a black cotton ski mask with eye holes cut out, several pieces of expensive
jewelry and watches as well as a suitcase packed with clothing. The suspect was not
located at the residence. Further investigation revealed that the ski mask left behind by
one of the suspects scientifically matched to this suspect’s DNA. A warrant was sought
for his arrest.
18
Ibid.
17
22 April 2004
Figure 6: Tattoo of arrested home invader
From late 2000 to early 2001, there had been 14 home invasion robberies in a few months
of time that occurred in the cities of Westminster, Garden Grove, and Huntington Beach.
Members of the aforementioned police departments banned together to share intelligence
information and to develop a plan to apprehend the home invasion crew believed to be
involved in a majority of the crimes due to similar methods of operation employed by the
suspects. Officers from Orange County, from the cities of Westminster, Garden Grove,
Fountain Valley, Huntington Beach, The Orange County Sheriff’s, Orange County
Regional Gang Enforcement Team, CDC parole and Orange County Probation met and
conferred on these leads.19
Police Investigators armed with the suspect profiles and other informant information
discovered a possible crash pad of the suspect group in Stanton, and unincorporated area
of Orange County. Armed with this new information members of the respective
departments in this newly formed informal task force decided to serve search warrants on
two identified gang crash pads in Stanton. Two SWAT teams from Westminster and
Garden Grove Police Departments were assembled along with approximately twenty law
enforcement officers from the aforementioned departments, and all took part in
surveillance at an apartment building in Stanton. Not two minutes after the surveillance
began, suspects were seen leaving the apartments and getting into two vehicles.
Undercover officers followed the vehicles and learned that one of the vehicles contained
a male Vietnamese suspect wanted in connection to a Garden Grove home invasion
where a victim had been shot in the neck. The officers also believed the other vehicle
19
Ibid.
18
22 April 2004
contained a primary suspect wanted in connection to a Westminster home invasion
robbery.
It was soon decided that high risk car stops would be made on the vehicles. One vehicle
contained three occupants and the other a single occupant. A high risk car stop was
initiated approximately two miles from the target location. The first of the vehicles to be
stopped was a Lexus coupe. The driver of the Lexus failed to yield and drove around the
other suspect vehicle and attempted his escape. The officers then got behind the second
vehicle and initiated a high risk car stop. The vehicle stopped abruptly and the officers
ended up directly behind the vehicle on a busy street in a commercial district near a large
strip mall. The second vehicle then stopped directly ahead of this vehicle and was parked
directly in line with the first vehicle, approximately 100 yards away.
Officers, who stopped the first vehicle occupied by three males, began to issue
commands to the occupants to exit one at a time with their hands up. Approximately one
minute later, the driver of the vehicle exited the driver’s door armed with a semiautomatic handgun pointed in the direction of undercover officers nearby. The officers
who initiated the car stop opened fire on the suspect striking him several times. The
suspect went down, still clenching his handgun. This suspect who later died from his
injuries was identified as a Vietnamese gang member wanted in connection to a home
invasion robbery and attempted murder of a Garden Grove resident.
Two other male Vietnamese gang members were extracted from the same vehicle without
incident. Three other loaded semi-automatic handguns were found in the vehicle. The
suspect from the second vehicle (Lexus) stopped by undercover officers was later
identified as a Vietnamese gang member and California Youth Authority parolee, who
was on parole for home invasion robbery. All of the suspects arrested were from
different but allied Vietnamese street gangs.20
Figure 7: Loaded semi-automatic handguns recovered from vehicle occupied by home invaders
(Courtesy of the Orange County District Attorney’s Office)
Search warrants served moments later at the apartments under surveillance revealed ski
masks, bandanas, cotton and surgical gloves, pry tools, bolt cutters, hammers, chisels,
20
Ibid.
19
22 April 2004
shoes laces (used to bind some victims) and other items used in the commission of
robberies. Three additional persons were found at the apartment, one male and two
females.
A vehicle impounded at the apartment complex, another Lexus automobile was
impounded and later searched by investigators. The vehicle contained four large black
jackets, a shotgun and a quarter pound of marijuana. A female, the registered owner of
the vehicle, was later arrested and booked for the weapons and drugs found in her
vehicle. She was later determined to be the girlfriend of an outstanding home invasion
suspect from the aforementioned Westminster case involving the newly wed couple and
family.
A few months later Westminster investigators received word that there was a home
invasion robbery in Murrieta, Riverside County, nearly 60 miles east of Orange County,
where an officer was shot by one of the suspects. Westminster investigators contacted
the agency and learned the following. At approximately 4:00 AM a neighbor witness
noticed several males in dark clothing exit two vehicles which drove into the
neighborhood with the head lights out. As the occupants exited the vehicles they put on
gloves and continued walking down the street. Officers responded to the call thinking
that the suspects might be breaking into cars in the neighborhood. The city of Murrieta
had not had any home invasions to date.
As the officers arrived on scene, one officer made contact with a male, possible lookout,
who exited the bushes nearby. While one officer was making contact with this subject,
another officer saw another male nearby peaking over the side yard fence of a nearby
residence. The officer ran toward the subject who ran down the side yard of the
residence to the rear. The officer continued to give chase. Prior to the subject reaching
the backyard, he went down on one knee, spun around toward the officer and opened fire.
The officer was struck twice in non-vital areas. The officer returned fire and struck the
suspect several times. The suspect got up and ran to the backyard where he later
collapsed. At the same time, another suspect ran further west and engaged the other
arriving officers in gunfire. No additional officers or suspects were shot. Officers
requested the assistance of other allied agencies and five suspects were ultimately
apprehended. The suspect who was shot by the injured officer survived his injuries. He
was later identified as a suspect wanted in connection to a Westminster home invasion
robbery, and the boyfriend of the female arrested for the contraband found in the trunk of
her vehicle.
All suspects were later identified as members and/or associates of Vietnamese street
gangs from Orange and Los Angeles Counties. Three of the suspects were from different
yet allied gangs. Two additional suspects apprehended had no specific gang ties, yet one
was an alarm specialist and the other worked at a cell phone company. It was later
learned that the alarm specialist was at the location to disable the alarm, and the male
who worked for a cell phone company was identified as a suspect who sold the would be
victims of the attempted home invasion a cellular phone and had access to their home and
work address and other financial information.
20
22 April 2004
As a result of the coordinated effort between law enforcement agencies we were able to
apprehend a large group of violent Asian criminals who were responsible for a great
majority of the robberies in the area at the time. This coordinated effort has been in place
between agencies and gang units working Asian criminals for many years. Due to the
mobility of these nomad criminal groups, we have to regularly cross our boundary lines
and chase them into other cities, counties and states and without the assistance of other
law enforcement agencies, this could not be accomplished. If we fail to coordinate with
brother officers in other jurisdictions we will lose the battle against these mobile terrorist
groups.
Home invasion robberies are acts of terrorism carried out by young male and female
Asian gang members or bandit groups. According to gang members interviewed by law
enforcement personnel, these acts of violence are so matter of fact, the suspects who
perpetrate them call the home invasions “knock, knock.” They may say to one another
very casually, “let’s go knock, knock tonight.” Their reason for the robbery is to get
money for their daily existence. They, in almost all cases, don’t work and live a day-today existence. When they need money, they may do a home invasion robbery, strongarm robbery or residential burglary and the proceeds would go to pay the rent, buy
groceries, or supply enough money for them to go out on the town and “play” as they call
it.
One gang member who was interviewed by Mark Nye, who had previously been
convicted of home invasion robbery, and is the member of a reputed Asian gang, said that
his gang learned how to commit home invasions by watching Chinese movies. He said
these movies are extremely violent and are exciting to watch.
Other gang members have told this investigator that they thrive on violence and that the
loot is not the primary motivator, but that they like to have fun by raiding people’s homes
and terrorizing them. A tattoo commonly worn by these Asian criminals explains it in
part. The tattoo consists of four or five T’s (TTTT) or (TTTTT) usually in a line,
sometimes found in other configurations. The four T’s stand for four Vietnamese words,
“Tien, Tinh, Tieu, Thoi,” which translates to “Love, Money, Crime or Sin and Prison.”
The fifth T “Thu” stands for revenge or death. This tattoo is usually worn by ex cons,
parolees, or other hard-core gang members.
The meaning and significance of this tattoo is that it is a badge of honor, a meaning of
life for these gangsters. Several gangsters have explained the tattoo to this investigator
and the following is a synopsis of what he has been told. The first T means that they
have love for their fellow members (homies), the second T means that they are all about
making money no matter what it takes or what boundaries; legal, moral, ethical or
physical, they must cross. The third T stands for Crime and that they know as a gang
member they will have to commit crime as a means of survival and a right of passage.
The fourth T stands for Sin. Sin is a part of crime, yet has more moral messages. A sin is
against god or god’s wishes where as crime is a society norm and some laws are man
made and not from the Old Testament or sins in and of themselves. The fifth T stands for
revenge. This came along later in the mid 1990s when the gangs were involved in large
21
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scale shooting wars on the streets of Little Saigon, fighting for power and control of the
community and its potential rewards (from criminal activity in the form of drug sales,
extortion, robberies, etc.). Revenge was what was called for when one of their homeboys
was slain by a rival gang.
Figure 8: Examples of 4 T’s tattoo on Vietnamese gang members
All of the Ts therefore stand for the life of an Asian criminal. He is a person who lives a
day to day existence, fights for survival amongst enemy gangs, and displays extreme
violence against people of his own homeland without showing any signs of remorse.
3.2 Residential and Commercial Burglary
The Southeast Asian gangs are involved in numerous residential burglaries throughout
Orange County and other parts of California. In some cases, the locations are surveilled
much like they are in home invasion robberies.
In these cases the suspect gang members look for the telltale signs of Asian victims such
as sandals and other shoes left outside the front door (a sign of respect in the Asian
culture). The suspects canvas the neighborhoods looking for victims to burglarize. Once
they locate a possible target they usually back their vehicle up into the driveway or park
in a nearby location. While one or more persons wait in the suspect vehicle, the other
suspects make entry into the residence. A common form of entry is breaking a window
usually to the rear of the residence if an opened door or window is not located. The
suspects take money, jewelry, VCR’s, video games and sometimes handguns.
The jewelry and other valuables are most often sold to Asian businesses in the Little
Saigon area. The storeowners fear if they don’t purchase items form the suspects, they
may be the victim of some type of vandalism or bodily injury. Stolen items may also be
traded to other gangs or Asian criminals for guns or drugs.
It is not uncommon to find an unemployed juvenile gang member in the possession of
large amounts of cash and in some cases, gold and other jewelry. Any items located in
22
22 April 2004
their vehicle such as car stereos, VCR’s, and other components should be run to
determine if they are stolen or not. Burglary detectives should also be consulted as to
whether recovered items match any outstanding stolen property. Patrol officers
conducting traffic stops on these individuals should be cognizant of tools such as
binoculars, two-way radios, rubber or cotton gloves, duct tape or zip ties, knives and
other weapons, found during vehicle searches.
Commercial burglaries of computer stores, other electrical component stores, and grocery
storage locations are also targets of the Asian street gangs. Numerous computer
warehouses and other businesses that keep or sell computer chips have been burglarized
and robbed. The computer chip is an item that is difficult to trace due to the fact that the
chip has no serial number stamped on it, but there are other ways for law enforcement
and the company’s security officials to track them. Some computer chips sell for five
dollars to as much as a thousand dollars or more depending on their use. These chips can
be sold to organized crime individuals who have connections abroad. Some thefts of
computer chips that occurred across California and in other states have amounted to
million dollar losses. Other businesses, which fall victim to burglary, are electrical
component stores and warehouses where cellular phones, cars stereos, and other
components are stolen.
Grocery store warehouses are also burglarized and robbed. The loot is usually large
amounts of cigarettes. Cigarettes are in great demand and can be easily sold to gang
members, other Asian subjects and to Asian cafes or restaurants in Little Saigon. The
loot is very often sold back to the victims who will pay the suspects out of fear.
Most of the commercial burglaries seem to be committed by local Asian transients or
“hypes,” subjects who live their lives under the influence of heroin, cocaine or a mixture
of both. These burglars steal anything they can which they usually fence in the
community at a local business who might look the other way. Not to say that all of these
businesses that buy from these crooks, are crooked themselves, but some fall victim to
intimidation by the gangsters, and if they fail to give the subjects something in return for
the loot they offer, problems may occur at their businesses in the form of extortion of
legitimate customers, damage to property, etc. These burglars use many methods to enter
the businesses including cutting through roofs, and tunneling through walls. Some of the
methods of operation are sophisticated, and in many cases the suspects go undetected and
are never apprehended or prosecuted for lack of evidence.
In one particular commercial burglary that Mark Nye recalls, a local Vietnamese transient
“hype” that had numerous priors for this sort of crime, decided to have a go at it once
more. On this particular occasion, the burglar removed an air conditioning vent from the
roof of the mini mall clothing store to gain entry into the store without triggering the
silent alarm. The suspect then climbed in through the roof and jumped down into the
store, which was quite a fall. The suspect however, missed the floor by a foot or so and
penetrated the glass jewelry cases in front of the store. The suspect as a result severed his
foot at the heel. The suspect then made a hasty retreat up and out of the business without
taking any loss, and left his heel behind. The burglary investigators who arrived at the
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scene the following day discovered the broken glass case with a piece of human heel left
behind, and a blood soaked carpet and bloody bathroom. It appeared more like a
homicide scene that a burglary due to the large amount of blood spread around inside of
the business. The burglary detectives than put out a broadcast to all hospitals in the area
and asked if anyone might be treating a person with a foot injury, primarily, a person
missing his heel. One hospital reported that a male Vietnamese patient was suffering
from a badly injured right foot; it appeared that the victim was missing his right heel.
Armed with a glass jar containing a male’s heel, the burglary detective lifted the jar of
heel in formaldehyde and showed it to the victim/burglar. He said, “Are you missing a
heel, like this one?” The suspect failed to cooperate at first until he realized that the
detective was going to leave with his heel and book it into evidence. The suspect
instantaneously admitted to the burglary and greatly took his heel for the doctor to sew
back on. When the crook got out of the hospital I paid him a visit at home and took him
to jail for the burglary. This is one crook that may change his method of operation,
unless he plans to lose more of his extremities.21
3.3 Extortion
Extortion may also play a large part in the motivation and later commission of a home
invasion robbery. The Vietnamese gangs are highly involved in the extortion of
restaurants, cafes, nightclubs and other businesses in the Asian community. The gang’s
method of operation is to visit a new café, nightclub or restaurant and make their
presence known. The gang members will then gather in a large group, or will separate
with one member from the gang sitting at a different table in the location. The gang
members will then take up room that would normally be used by paying customers. They
will also put their legs across other chairs and, in some cases, even block the entrance of
the location. When a waiter/waitress attempts to take their orders, they will tell him/her
to go to the next table. The server is then sent to the next table, then to the next table, etc.
The gang members will not order or pay for any services. Frequently, the gang leader
will order drinks for the whole group, then ask for the bill, which he never intends to pay.
The gang members also stage fights inside the location where several glasses are broken
and other property is destroyed.
After a few such visits, the leader suggests that the owner should have protection from
the gangs. The gang leader never asks directly for money, only implies it. The owner,
who fears his restaurant will be destroyed or he will be forced out of business for lack of
legitimate customers, falls victim to the gang members’ tactics and pays. A requested
payment is commonly arranged to be made once a week or once a month. It ranges from
fifty dollars to as much as three hundred dollars a week depending on the size and
popularity of the location. This type of extortion is hard to prove based on the fact that
the gang member never actually demands payment but rather implies it by his actions and
the actions of his fellow gang members.
Other businesses in the Asian community also fall victim to extortion from the gang
members. The gang leader and his members may spend a lot of time in and around the
21
Ibid.
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22 April 2004
location. The gang members as well as the flashing of their gang related tattoos might
occasionally flash handguns. The gang leader or other hard-core member will eventually
approach the business owner and ask for a “loan.” This loan could be for as much as a
few hundred dollars. This loan, of course, is never paid back. The owner, fearing his
business will be damaged or destroyed if he resists or contacts the police, will usually pay
the gang member. Threat of harm to the businessman and his family by the gang and
their associates is also a chief motivator in extortion. If the victim fails to pay the
extortion money he and his family is very likely to be the victims of a home invasion
robbery, where the extortionists eventually get their payoff at the expense of the victim
and his family.
The business owner sees the payment as the “price of doing business.” It would be
cheaper for him to pay the extortion than to pay the damage that may be caused to his
business whether or not the police are contacted. The owner also knows that the police
will not always be around to protect him, and the gang in retaliation for his calling the
police or failure to pay the extortion will eventually attack him, his family or his store.22
4 Traveling Gangs
Southeast Asian gangs; Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Hmong, and Mien Gangs, by
their very nature, are extremely mobile or nomadic. This mobility may have something
to do with the great distances they traveled and the hardships they suffered upon fleeing
their war torn country to the United States.
Many of the Southeast Asian refugees came to the United States through various ports
and entered relocation camps. These refugees were subsequently distributed all over the
United States. The highest concentration of the Southeast Asians, primarily Vietnamese
refugees, ended up in Orange County’s “Little Saigon,” Westminster/Garden Grove,
California.
Some Southeast Asian refugees maintain ties with other Asians whom they lived with
temporarily in their original relocation camps. Still separated by several states, they
continue to maintain their close ties. As a result of these ties across state lines, Southeast
Asian criminal groups or gangs set up victims for their criminal associates who cross
state lines to make a few quick scores before returning to their home state undetected.
Additionally, gang members from established gangs may from time to time move from
one jurisdiction/state to another. These moves may be a result of adult family members
changing jobs, or of families of gang members attempting to get their son or daughter
away from the gangs, or the individual gang member getting away from aggressive law
enforcement or constrictive probation conditions. These subjects who have been
transplanted or relocated continue to maintain ties with their gang member associates.
These ties are sometimes later used as mentioned above, in setting up victims for their
criminal associates out of state.
22
Ibid.
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Law enforcement officers in California, Texas, Louisiana, Washington, Oregon,
Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Minnesota as well as other states across the
nation and Canada are contacting Southeast Asian gang members on a regular basis
coming from other states to commit crimes in their jurisdictions.
The following is a list of several Orange County based Southeast Asian gangs who have
been involved in criminal activity across state lines. The most often committed crimes
are home invasion robberies, extortion and transportation of weapons and narcotics.
Orange County based Asian street gangs in the 1990s had been engaged in a drug war
conflict backing up organized crime in Port Arthur, Texas.
4.1 Patterns of Mobility
In June of 1993, members of the Cheap Boys gang from Orange County, California were
contacted in Garland, Texas, in a vehicle occupied by four subjects. All four subjects
were arrested for possession of prohibitive weapons and suspicion of narcotics
possession. Two handguns, a .45 caliber and .380 calibers, as well as a butcher knife
with an 8” blade were found in the vehicle. Also found in the vehicle were two glass
vials, one containing a white powdered substance and the other a black tarry substance
possibly cocaine and heroin. All four suspects arrested were from the cities of Garden
Grove, Midway City, Tustin and Buena Park, all located in Orange County, California.
Members of the Cheap Boys gang have been contacted in Port Arthur, Texas and have
been involved in a drug war there. Both Cheap Boys and the Nip Family gang used to be
affiliate gangs and are now fierce rivals since a homicide in Garden Grove of a Nip
Family gang member by a Cheap Boys gang member on April 6, 1993.
In the mid 1990s, members of the Cheap Boys gang were aligned with a drug lord in the
Asian community of Port Arthur, Texas, while members of the Nip Family gang were
backing up the other drug lord, Phi Van Tran. There was a war between Phi Van Tran
and the other drug lord (the name of which is still unknown). Members of the two
aforementioned gangs from Orange County, California were fighting this war.
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Figure 9: Tattoos adorned by Natoma Boys and Nip Family Gangsters
It is believed, according to the Port Arthur, Texas Police, that members of the Nip Family
and the Natoma Boys gang may be involved in the attempted homicide of one of their
Vietnamese police officers. The incident consisted of the officer’s residence being shot
at during a drive-by shooting into an inhabited dwelling. Both the officer and his wife
were in bed when numerous bullets penetrated their bedroom wall and just missed the
tops of their heads.
The attack on the officer is believed to be from the Nip Family gang backing up Phi Van
Tran. This was apparently Tran’s way of sending a message to the Vietnamese officer
who was apparently creating some major problems for the drug lord over criminal
investigations whereby numerous members of Phi’s group were arrested in connection
with a home invasion robbery.
It is also believed that members of the Natoma Boys gang from Orange County were also
involved in the drug war and are in and out of Port Arthur, Texas and Orange County,
California. The Natoma Boys gang is strongly affiliated with the Nip Family gang and
The V (Asian street gangs).
The Westminster Police Department, along with the Orange Police Department and the
Garden Grove Police Department served multi-dwelling search warrants on 42 residences
of Nip Family gang members in four counties; Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and
Los Angeles, regarding a gang related homicide.
In 1992, members of the Nip Family gang in association with the Southside Scissors
(female Asian street gang) committed a home invasion robbery in Louisiana.
Figure 10: Weapons found at one location of the Nip Family Search Warrants
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22 April 2004
Past information obtained from rival gang members indicated that the Natoma Boys are
involved in large-scale organized crime. They are also possibly involved in the
transportation of automobiles to Texas and New York from California. It is unknown
what their contraband is, whether it is drugs, weapons or microchips, but their take is
approximately one thousand dollars per person per trip. The Natoma Boys are also
affiliated with The V also called the V-Boys. Both the Natoma Boys and the V-Boys
have been contacted in Sacramento involved in home invasion robbery and burglary type
activity.
On October 2, 1993 at about 2200 hours, the Pomona Police Department received an
anonymous call reporting a man with a gun at a billiard parlor frequented by Vietnamese
gang members. A Pomona Police Officer spotted a possible suspect running from the
location, gave chase, and apprehended a gang member who was wearing a bullet proof
vest. Other assisting officers surrounding the billiard parlor contained about 30 Asian
youths inside the location. No one was injured inside the location, but officers located a
loaded gun hidden inside next to a video machine. Another officer found parked at the
billiard parlor, a 1988 Ford Mustang convertible and a 1987 Nissan Maxima vehicle
connected to the suspect with the bulletproof vest and two of his associates. Inside the
Mustang officers recovered a variety of stolen weapons as follows: (5) .380 caliber semiauto pistols; (1) AR-15 fully automatic assault rifle; (1) Thompson .45 caliber rifle; (1)
9mm Luger semi-auto pistol; (1) M1-30 caliber carbine; (3) Importer rifles with folding
stocks; (1) Smith and Wesson 9mm semi-auto pistol; (1) Jennings 9mm semi-auto pistol;
(1) AA Arms 9mm semi-auto pistol; (1) Browning 12 gauge shotgun (sawed off) and an
assorted amount of ammunition for the above listed weapons.
At the scene of the above listed incident/arrest, Pomona Police Officers were able to
confirm that six of the firearms recovered were stolen out of several cities in Orange
County. The suspects arrested were later discovered to be members of two Southeast
Asian criminal street gangs; the Johnny Playboys and the Natoma Boys. The Johnny
Playboys had been active in Port Arthur, Texas years ago and were connected to
numerous acts of violence there. The Natoma Boys, originally from Westminster,
California, have been active in home invasion robberies, and weapon and narcotic sales
nationwide.
On October 2, 1993 at approximately 1550 hours, three to eight male Asians, armed with
automatic weapons, entered the Legacy Technology, a computer business at 1020
Lawson in the city of Industry. The suspects bound and gagged the seven employees at
the location and took their wallets, an undetermined amount of cash, and computer RAM
and CPU chips worth approximately $100,000. The suspects further told the male
victims that if they called the police, they would return and murder them and their
families. It took the victims two hours to free themselves.
It has not been confirmed, but it is possible that the above listed crime was committed by
the Natoma Boys and the Johnny Playboys gang members who had been arrested the
same day just hours later in Pomona for possession of seventeen (17) fully automatic and
semi-automatic firearms, including a bullet proof vest.
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The V-Boys gang otherwise known as The V is a very sophisticated Asian gang involved
primarily in home invasion robberies, extortions and drug rip-offs. The Westminster
Police Department T.A.R.G.E.T. Gang Unit over the past several years has arrested
several of the V-Boys gang members at crash pads throughout Orange and Los Angeles
Counties. A raid of three crash pads in Westminster, Buena Park and Fullerton resulted
in the recovery of numerous handguns, stun guns, binoculars, jewelry, stereo
components, and large sums of cash. Most of the items recovered were stolen from
numerous home invasion robberies throughout Los Angeles and Orange Counties.
Figure 11: Typical tattoo worn by members of The V, a notorious Vietnamese street gang and a
home invasion related tattoo worn by a leader of The V currently serving a murder sentence
(Courtesy of Westminster PD and the Orange County Sheriff’s Office)
The same set of V Boys were surveilled by the Target Unit, and other investigators from
neighboring agencies, from the city of Westminster, to San Gabriel and were finally
stopped on the 10 Freeway in Fontana. Eight members of the V Boys were detained and
four loaded handguns, stun guns, binoculars, gloves and gang paraphernalia items were
located in the vehicles. Information from informants revealed that the suspects we had
stopped were enroute to Texas to commit home invasion robberies.
A past raid on an Oriental Playboys gang crash pad in the city of Westminster resulted in
the recovery of two weapons found in a tunnel that ran underneath the residential house.
The weapons found were: a pistol grip shotgun and a .32 caliber handgun; two pairs of
police type handcuffs; a stun gun and maps covering the entire United States. It is
assumed by this evidence that the gang is most likely involved in home invasion
robberies around the country. The handcuffs are used to bind the victims; the stun gun is
used to torture the victims; and the other weapons are used to intimidate the victims
during the commission of a robbery. This is essentially the purpose of these weapons and
the ways they are used in a typical home invasion robbery.
In December of 1992, four members of Sons of Death were arrested for auto theft in the
city of Westminster. They were driving two stolen identical white Hondas. Both of the
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stolen vehicles had portable two-way radios that the suspects used to communicate
between vehicles. Both of the cars were stolen from Northern California and according
to the suspects were used for transportation only. The group was arrested in front of an
Asian Café in the city of Westminster that is believed to be involved in organized crime.
One of the suspects claimed to be the nephew of the owner of the café and had come
down to visit.23
There are many other Asian gangs, which by their very nature are very mobile. This
mobility, along with the sophistication of the crimes committed by the Asian gang
members, makes them the most dangerous and unpredictable of the gangs that prey on
the American people. They, because of their vast mobility can go almost anywhere
undetected by law enforcement personnel. As a result of the aforementioned facts, a
large percentage of the crimes that are reported, go unsolved. Therefore, it is important
for all law enforcement agencies to network and share intelligence information on Asian
gangs nationwide.
5 Interviews
The researchers interviewed eleven police officials in 2003 from the following
jurisdictions: Westminster (California), New York City (New York), Arlington
(Virginia), City of Falls Church (Virginia), Fairfax (Virginia), Houston (Texas), and St.
Petersburg (Florida). All of the officers/investigators worked in gang units, organized
crime units, or robbery homicide units, and most had personal experience investigating
home invasion robberies. The interview consisted of fifteen questions and each interview
lasting approximately one hour. Interviewees across jurisdictions produced remarkably
similar responses to the questions. Condensed responses will be given below, with any
contradictory responses noted.
The interviews served several purposes, including contributing to the development of
hypotheses, enriching understanding of the subjective elements of home invasion—
including actions and motivations of the suspects and the victims—and evaluating the
utility of existing and proposed policy responses to home invasion crimes. Interview
questions were organized on an interview form and are listed below.
5.1 Police Officers: Questions and Response
1. How do home invader(s) choose a particular house for home invasion casing?
Interviewees report that home invaders obtain inside information on the location from
friends, classmates, renters, boyfriends, girlfriends, etc. Home invaders often choose a
particular house by obtaining information from employees at restaurants where victim’s
weddings are being held or friends of guests are attending weddings, for example.
Alternatively, suspects may select a house for home invasion casing based on information
from another gang (local and/or out of state), from nail shops where victims show off
23
Ibid.
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22 April 2004
jewelry, or by following victims home from casinos. Officer Tran from the Westminster
Police Department states that:
Suspects are likely to form into a crew to commit a series of home invasions. They will
have a few older males to take charges of the operation. They solicited the assistance of
younger suspects to assist with the robbery by watching the victims. The younger
suspects will get a small percentage of the profit. The main organizers will also solicit
the help of outside sources to get more information on the victims. The source is usually
a friend of one of the victims or is aware of the victim’s financial status. It is common
that some of the victims will show off their jewelry when they are going to the nail or
salon shops. The source could be an employee at the business that later provides
information to the robbery crew. The source is not involved in the robbery but will
benefit from receiving a small percentage of the profit. Some of the robberies were
committed because the victims were not paying back the gambling debts which they had
borrowed from loan sharks. Suspects were sent to the victim’s house for collection.
Other robberies were committed because victims were ripping off other drug dealers
which resulted in debt collection by the suspects.
Home invasion robbers frequently choose their victims based on intelligence information
they receive. This can be from a close acquaintance such as a girlfriend or fellow gang
member, a victim they know personally or from someone who has an in for the victim
such as a client, business partner or employee. This inside information, combined with
some casing or surveillance, affords them a greater chance of success.
In Houston, Asian gang home invasions are now mostly drug-related, such as invasions
of drug dealers’ safe houses. Drug-related home invasions are especially profitable. In
Florida there were many Asian gang home invasions in the 1990s, but now gangs are
turning to more profitable white-collar crime like counterfeiting or identity theft. RICO
statutes making gang activity a federal crime with hefty prison sentences have also made
home invasions less popular.
Asian gang home invaders appear to choose victims based on ethnicity (targeting other
Asians and Asian-Americans) and wealth or perceived wealth. They often target
business owners. Home invaders will either know the business owners personally or they
will receive information from employees, neighbors, or even family members. Some
home invaders even work for the victim for a couple of weeks so they can study his or
her business habits, get information about the target’s house, family, and so on. Most
targets of home invasions are carefully selected, and if the home invader has inside
information the invasion takes much less time and is therefore less risky.
2. What is the most important factor for home invader(s) to select a house?
Typically the victim household will belong to an “Asian family” and the suspects will
have inside information about the amount of money or valuable property inside. In
Detective Selinske’s (Westminster) experience drug houses and gambling houses are
priority locations because of the amount of money or product that can be obtained.
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Usually the victims never report the loss and law enforcement is rarely brought into the
picture. The next priority includes business owners, especially jewelry dealers or those
who make large cash sales. After that, victims can include anyone, from individuals who
wear expensive jewelry to average citizens who have the unfortunate problem of having
sons, daughters or other relatives who trade inside information on them to the suspects.
Detective Proctor (Westminster) said the suspects are not usually concerned about
potential resistance by victims, which is actually part of the “rush” for them.
Home invaders thus select targets because they believe that there will be cash or other
valuables in the home. Recent immigrants have a historical reluctance to use the banking
system due to fear of corruption, and tend to keep large amounts of cash at home until
they become familiar with the banking system. Through surveillance home invaders
know when the occupants are usually at home, when they make bank deposits, and
whether they frequently bring cash home. At times businesspeople may even recruit a
gang to target their competitors.
3. Why do you believe that home invader(s) would use a weapon to commit a
home invasion?
Home invaders use weapons in home invasions to enforce compliance with their
demands. These weapons, primarily guns, are obtained through illegal purchases or theft.
They are not to be used specifically for killing, but possibly to injure victims if they are
not cooperative. Home invaders use weapons during home invasions to intimidate
victims. The most common weapons used by the suspects are handguns and knives.
According to Detective Selinske (Westminster), home invaders use whatever weapons
they have available, although most prefer handguns. The suspects want to overcome
resistance as quickly as possible and guns offer the best solution to the problem. “You do
not have to be close to the victim for them to get the picture.” For simple terror tactics,
knives can be employed, but they can generally be obtained after the suspects have
gained control of the location. Guns can be borrowed to do the job, either way; they are
in almost all cases stolen weapons. Very rarely do suspects use a gun that can be traced
back to them or someone close to them. Although suspects most likely feel they will be
able to overcome any resistance, it is Selinske’s experience that they will use their
weapons to injure and kill if they have to. He has seen victims who were already tied up
getting shot because they tried to warn others in the house by yelling.
Detective Proctor (Westminster) states that most of the weapons used by the suspects are
stolen, usually in other home invasions or burglaries. In regard to whether there is
usually specific intent to injure the victims, Detective Proctor said that the invaders like
what they do. They do not care if they injure or on occasion kill their victims. Some also
enjoy torturing and or sexually assaulting their victims. They do not have any remorse
for their victims and do not have any emotional attachment to them.
Thus weapons may be used as part of a ruse to gain entry into the home. A gang member
may pose, for example, as a delivery person, then force his way into the home at
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gunpoint. Weapons are then used for intimidation and control, with home invaders
ordering victims to “Do what we say or we’ll shoot you.” The homeowner can be
neutralized by a gun, and home invaders need to terrorize the victims so they won’t call
the police. Home invaders want to get in, take control of victims by placing them in one
location, and then get out. Tactics are similar to police tactics in that home invaders rush
in and secure people. Asian teens learn tactics through readily available video games,
paint gun games, and through movies. Typically handguns are used, as they are easy to
conceal. The guns are obtained through the black market, gun shows, borrowing, or
through burglary. Detective Bergman (Fairfax) reports that knives, machetes, baseball
bats, chains, crowbars, etc. are also used, with duct tape and wire ties to restrain victims.
4. How and where do you think home invader(s) would sell stolen goods after a
home invasion (fencing)? Why?
Sergeant Frank (Westminster) states that “They would sell to jewelry stores (in and
around the community). Easy to sell, no questions or ID’s required. Owners could pop
stones out of settings and melt down gold.” Detective Vi (Westminster) adds that once
the robbery is committed and the loot is taken, the suspects fence the property to middle
persons, with some of it being sold to jewelry stores, pawn shops and even some taken to
out of state merchants because it is harder to track the property.
Detective Selinske reports that home invasion suspects usually sell their stolen goods on
the street to people they meet in cafes, coffee shops, casinos and restaurants. Some have
a selected person or store where they will unload specific items such as expensive
jewelry, but very rarely do they pawn items. Again, the suspects do not want anything
being traced back to them, even if the odds are very low.
Detective Rick Rodriquez (Arlington) states that home invaders will pawn stolen goods if
they are not experienced, as police officers frequently monitor pawnshops. They may
also sell stolen goods on the black market, exchange goods for drugs or weapons, or give
goods (particularly jewelry) as gifts. Gang members may also sell items out-of-state, go
to Atlantic City and gamble, get rid of the money within their community, or even use the
money to start a business.
Thus, typically home invaders want quick cash. Charlie Cash (Houston) reports that in
the low-level street crime home invasions everything will be taken: jewelry, TVs, etc.
while in the mid-level drug-related home invasions only money and drugs will be taken,
with credit card numbers stolen as well.
5. What is the biggest factor (motive) that would cause home invader(s) to rob a
house?
According to Sergeant Frank (Westminster), they need money to pay rent, car, food and
utilities, guns, something for a girlfriend, but “also bail money for associates, money to
party, and sometimes the robbery is done as a contracted payback from a competitor or
spurned relationship.”
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According to Detective Selinske (Westminster), for the most part, suspects want the
money to live the high life, whether this means gambling, impressing girls, having a fine
looking automobile or gaining respect. For most suspects, it is about living for today in
style and living to impress their homeboys. Detective Selinske said he had one suspect
who talked about scoring $160,000 as his share of one hit against a bookmaker. He told
Selinske he blew through the money, visiting a whorehouse twice a day, gambling and
showing his girlfriend a good time. The money certainly wasn’t about putting away for a
rainy day, although according to Selinske, he imagines some smart suspects find a way to
hoard some away.
6. Do home invader(s) ever try to cover fingerprints or footprints in the house?
Sergeant Frank (Westminster) reports that home invaders sometimes sought to erase
fingerprints, shoeprints, etc. by using “WD-40, bleach and wearing gloves.” Detective
Selinske states that the experienced criminal will always dress down to commit the
robbery. This will include gloves, masks and dark baggy clothing and hats to conceal
their features, true size and hair styles. Actual names will not be use and sometime the
suspects alter their voices to throw off the victims. It is about not getting recognized or
caught from normal fingerprints or witness recognition.
Experienced criminals are more careful and will wear gloves or discard shoes afterward.
Many home invaders have an arrest record and have learned from experience. If home
invaders wear masks, they’re typically local, and if they don’t wear masks they’re from
out-of-state. Little evidence is usually recovered from home invasion scenes.
Complainants may also be confused and tell police gloves were worn (so officers will
assume no prints), when actually the gloves were removed after the victims were secured.
In New York, home invaders will usually wear ski masks or sunglasses even if they are
from out-of-town but they rarely cover their footprints.
7. Why would home invader(s) sometimes call off a home invasion already in
progress?
Home invaders might likely call off a home invasion already in progress if all of the
following existed: the victim(s) screaming, physical resistance put up by the victim,
police patrol car in the area, neighbors notice, they hit the wrong house. Detective
Selinske (Westminster) said the only time he has seen a home invasion being
discontinued is when a victim has been able to escape and alert the police. Physical
resistance or screaming is usually dealt with by the suspects beating the victim down,
controlling them by threatening someone else like a child or even killing them. The
suspects enter with a purpose and try everything they can to complete their crime,
because, like most criminals, once they start the crime, they feel entitled.
Detective Selinske said he recalled hearing a story where the investigator asked one
suspect why he shot the victim and the suspect replied, “He wouldn’t give me my
money.” [Emphasis added.] This is not to say the suspects are so engrossed in what they
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are doing that they don’t take precautions. Most have a look-out stationed nearby and
will warn them of police arriving so they have a chance to flee. Hitting the wrong house
will only mean the suspects try to score what they can from the house they enter, it will
not deter them from carrying out their original plan.
Det. Proctor (Westminster) states that the suspects will not call off a robbery in progress
for anything other than law enforcement’s presence. A resistant or screaming victim, the
wrong house, or other factors do not matter to the suspects. A resistant or screaming
victim can easily be silenced by the swift slap of a gun against his or her head, or a sock
shoved in the mouth.
Thus, a home invasion gang will often have a set plan for the crime. If anything disrupts
their plan, they will wait until a more opportune time to begin the home invasion.
Disruptions before the crime commences might include a police car driving by the home,
neighbors working outside, unexpected visitors at the home, or even a homeowner
answering the door while talking on the telephone. During the home invasion, a
disruption might occur if they can’t take control of the family and they are afraid
someone might call the police.
8. What kind of police countermeasures can stop home invader(s) from doing a
home invasion?
Detective Vi (Westminster) believes that effective police countermeasures for stopping or
slowing the amount of robberies being committed would be for the police to “gather
intelligence from the streets and find out who will have weddings at local Chinese
restaurants,” and to monitor the crowd there. Detective Vi stated that “Asians will
always have cash and jewelry at their residence especially if they work under-the-table,
so it would be useless to advise them to keep the property in the banks.”
Detective Selinske reports that the best way to discourage home invasions is through
education of normal potential victims. This includes the use of alarms, phone codes and
knowing whom your children are hanging around. It also includes advising them not to
advertise their wealth or keep large sums of money or too much expensive jewelry at
home at any one time. For those involved in illegal or illicit activity, law enforcement
obviously is left out as far as prevention. The main point if a shooting or homicide takes
place at one of these locations is to be able to recognize what you are actually dealing
with because stories or evidence does not add up. It is also very important to develop
your own intelligence network with anti-gang units and regional task force operations.
Additionally, law enforcement has to know who the players are or what the current trends
are. We have to be up to date or we will be caught short. This is especially true of Asian
gangsters who travel far and wide, both nationally and internationally, to commit crimes
like home invasion robberies.
Detective Proctor adds that special investigators need to be cross trained in special
weapons and tactics for response to in progress robberies, and forensic computer analysis,
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due to the fact that many of the Asian crime groups are more sophisticated and do keep
information on computers and other forms of digital logs.
Analyst Pete Francisco (St. Petersburg) reports that the most important countermeasure is
to educate the community of potential victims. Get the community more involved in
reporting crimes and providing information about the criminals. Set up Neighborhood
Watch systems. Many victims are worried about retaliation and don’t trust the police.
Let community members know that police aren’t interested in their immigrant status.
Developing rapport with the community and setting up a tip hotline and website is
important. Officers can walk complainants through procedures and sit with them in court
to alleviate concerns about retaliation. Many home invasions are not reported because
the victim was concealing money illegally or to save face, especially if there was a sexual
attack. Departments may also consider hiring more Asian officers. Employment
agencies need to be regulated.
Detective Charlie Cash (Houston) also advocates treating criminals decently so they’ll
provide information when they get out of prison. Officers can develop rapport with the
criminals and ask them to call when they get out. They can help the person get a job,
help his family understand what is going on, etc. Police officers need to be proactive and
develop confidential sources. Many informants are former criminals who want to turn
the other bad guys in so their own businesses will run smoothly. More cooperation is
also needed between local, state, and federal law enforcement.
9. Do home invader(s) use their personal vehicles in a home invasion?
Suspects committing home invasion robberies utilize stolen vehicles, relative’s vehicles,
friend’s vehicles and their own vehicles with the license plates covered, to transport them
to and from the home invasion robbery and to cart the loot away. They may also use
vehicles in home invasions that are rented with stolen credit cards in another’s name.
Some gang members come from wealthy families, with their parents working two or
three jobs. Parents may remain oblivious of their children’s activities to save face.
10. Do you see an increase of intra-racial teams in home invasions?
Some interviewees have seen an increase in intra-racial teams in home invasions, i.e.,
teams made up of Vietnamese & Cambodian, Vietnamese & Chinese, and Vietnamese
and Laotian ethnicities, but intra-racial teams are rare. Most Asian criminal entities are
made up of their own ethnic group because of a cultural upbringing in which one ethnic
group will see another group as inferior and because home invaders need to be able to
communicate with their victim(s) and with each other. When dealing with narcotics,
however, gangs may be more heterogeneous. In Florida, for instance, there is an increase
in associations just for the purpose of committing the crime, especially if local manpower
is needed because the criminals are from out-of-state.
11. Do you see an increase in inter-racial teams in home invasions?
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Detective Selinske (Westminster) has not seen a recent increase in these teams
committing home invasions. He has seen some Vietnamese teams that included a black
or a Hispanic, but they were rare. In his opinion it was like a training experience or it
was a drug related rip-off type invasion where the information came from the outsider.
Where the victims are Vietnamese, most outsiders are lost as far as language goes when
the crime is taking place. Vietnamese just do not have the same trust factor in other
individuals.
While Vietnamese gangs typically stay to themselves, they may recruit a Caucasian for a
ruse to get into a house. According to Detective Rodriquez (Arlington) Vietnamese
gangs are low-key, not as well known on the street, yet are more organized and
sophisticated than other gangs. They don’t usually wear gang clothing, and tattoos are
covered by clothes even in the summer. You need personal knowledge to tell if a person
is in a gang. Vietnamese gang members tend to be more violent, though, and are
involved in assaults, robberies, extortion, weapons trafficking, burglary, prostitution, and
gambling.
Sergeant Lancaster (Falls Church) reports that in Virginia the Cambodian population is
small, so they tend to mix with ethnic Vietnamese and other Asians. There are also some
gangs with both whites and blacks (e.g., TRG—the Tiny Rascal Gangsters). Virginia
gangs like B.T.K. (Born to Kill) are loosely structured compared to their New York
counterparts. In Texas some Asian gangs are working with non-Asians as they have
become more Americanized, but for the profitable drug-related home invasions the top
gang management is all Asian. Caucasians tend not to travel for out-of-state home
invasions.
12. Do you think that home invader(s) have emotional feelings toward victims
during intimidations?
Interviewees agree that home invaders typically do not have emotional feelings toward
victims. They intimidate the victims for one purpose, which is to get them to reveal
where their valuables are located or to open safes or locked containers. Detective
Selinske (Westminster) says he has found Vietnamese gangsters involved in these crimes
to be particularly emotionless. They downplay their need for or use of violence. He said
he has seen very little remorse from them if they injure, rape or shoot someone during the
crime.
Home invaders are typically interested in taking property from unresisting victims.
Weapons are shown to discourage resistance, and victims are usually seriously injured
only when resisting. Yet in some home invasions there might be high emotions due to
resentment over the victim’s financial success, and in some home invasions there is
atrocious violence (e.g., in one case a female victim asked “Why?” and her skull was
crushed with a hammer).
13. How many people would be needed to commit a home invasion? Why?
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Sergeant Frank (Westminster) states that “It depends on the size of the residence, how
many occupants inside and how many lookouts would be needed and the amount of loot
they plan to take (electronic goods vs. jewelry). Officer Tran (Westminster) believes that
the number of people needed to commit a home invasion robbery would be a minimum of
three; one to standby with the victim(s) and two to search. The more suspects involved
the less profitable it is when the money and/or jewelry is divided up. Also, more people
are not desirable since gang members don’t want too many people to know their business.
Detective Proctor (Westminster) reports that there is usually a lookout, possibly a
driver/lookout, and at least three more members of the crew running the crime inside the
house. Most of the robberies Proctor investigated had some type of prior casing, and the
crew’s size was determined by the intelligence they developed.
14. What is the percentage (estimate) of gang-related home invasions?
Interviewees agree that almost all home invasions are gang-related as far as Vietnamese
victims are concerned. This will include drug, gambling and bookmaking related home
invasion robberies where the suspects may be higher up the chain in organized criminal
activity. It is his experience, says Detective Selinske (Westminster) that most of these
individuals still hang with the gang members they grew up with and trust although they
tend to get their intelligence information from a little wider and more sophisticated group.
Analyst Francisco (St. Petersburg) reports that since home invasions require several
people young Vietnamese males with gang ties will often recruit associates to commit a
home invasion. When traveling, gang names are not usually used, and gang membership
changes. People will be dropped off in one state and picked up in another. Leaders will
change based on familiarity with the given area.
15. Can you provide any information to help us prevent home invasions?
Educate the community. Let them know what they do to make themselves targets (e.g.,
keeping large amounts of cash at home) and how they can change through public service
announcements and use of the local media. Law enforcement has come a long way since
1975 when we had the first large wave of Vietnamese immigrants. Police can also work
with the ethnic community’s media to help victims get over the fear of retaliation.
Community members will know when out-of-town groups are around, and should tell the
police. Develop rapport with the community, especially business owners, civic leaders,
and kids in school, and develop informants.
Police can also keep track of invaders (e.g., know whether they are in prison or not) and
keep the pressure on them. We need a nationwide system to track Asian gang members
as they travel and change names. The modus operandi (“M.O.’s”) are usually the same
for serial home invaders, and we need to be able to pull up that information. Form gang
units and regional task forces who will work with school resource officers to gather
intelligence thus catching criminals in the planning stage.
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We also need a better classification system. Right now local police departments as well
as state and federal databases don’t separately classify robberies, burglaries, and home
invasions. It is impossible to gain an adequate understanding of trends in home invasions
without being able to locate the records.
The best prevention is detailed investigation and intense gang-related prosecutions
against the gang members who commit the crimes.
5.2 Interviews with Convicted Home Invaders
One parolee from the California Youth Authority and four adults held by the California
Department of Corrections were interviewed in 2003. Prior to conducting the interviews,
which were held in the respective parole offices, interviewees were advised that this is a
study on home invasions for the purpose of educating law enforcement and victims of
crime to help prevent these types of crimes in the future. Interviewees were promised
confidentiality and were told that the information they provided would not be used
against them at a later time. Interviewees were also informed that they were not being
judged for their past criminal behavior, that they were the experts on the subject and that
it was important to provide as much information as possible regarding crime and the
crime of home invasion in particular. The following is a synopsis of the interviews
conducted along with a short biography on each interviewee, names withheld.
5.2.1 John Doe #1: California Youth Authority Parolee
John Doe #1 is a male Asian in his mid-twenties, on parole for attempted murder and
assault with a firearm. He also has priors for home invasion robbery. He is a member or,
according to him, an ex-member of a local Asian street gang. John Doe #1 said he joined
his gang when he was 13-14 years old. He has tattoos of “100% Vietnamese” and the
map of Vietnam among several other tattoos that cover the upper half of his body. He
said he joined the gang to gain respect for himself. He said the gang was his family who
loved him unconditionally and indefinitely. His gang provided him support and he
supported them by committing criminal activity and sharing the proceeds with them. He
looked up to the other older members of the gang, and he aspired to someday be like
them and have nice cars and his own apartment. He said he was arrested and locked up
for a drive-by shooting. He said he used to drive around with fellow gang members and
they kept a gun inside the stereo system. He said one day they ran into their enemy and
they had to take action. He said he was later apprehended after his photograph was
shown by police and identified by the victims.
John Doe #1 said he started committing home invasions to support himself and his
girlfriend. He didn’t have a job and needed money for a motel and food for himself, his
girlfriend and his fellow gang members or crime partners. He said he also wanted money
to have fun with, to take out his girlfriend and buy coffee, or just have a good time. He
said he gave most of the money he made to his older homeboys. He said he would rob
and steal to support the OGs (original gangsters) because he looked up to them and
respected them. John Doe #1 said that he first committed the robberies with close friends
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that he met in jail, not necessarily members of his own gang. He told me that he didn’t
trust anybody and had to commit the crimes with persons who were very close and
trusted associates.
John Doe #1 detailed a robbery. He said he would first knock on the door. He said he
just wanted the money and didn’t want to hurt his victims if at all possible. He said that
“If you don’t hurt the victim, you don’t leave evidence behind.” He said the more you
struggle or fight with the victim the more likelihood you will leave behind fingerprints or
some other evidence. He said he no longer wanted to commit these crimes because it
hurt his own people from the Vietnamese community. He has since fathered a child and
has a different view on life. He said “Now my family can be victims.” He now said he
actually fears for his soon-to-be wife, and his child, and what might happen to them if
they are attacked by gang members like he used to be. He said before he never thought
about his future, he lived a day to day existence influenced by his older brothers
(referring to older gang associates).
John Doe #1 said home invaders chose a particular house for a target “because somebody
points it out to you and they know that person. They know everything about the person
or the family; sometimes they are from the family or are close friends. Sometimes they
are friends from out of state.” The most important factor in committing a home invasion
is the money, and specifically the amount of money to be had. He said “you see the light
on in the house, you need money, and you go and get it.”
According to this source, home invaders always use weapons, particularly guns, during
the robberies. He said they buy them from other gangs on the streets or steal them during
prior robberies. He said they never usually put a bullet in the chamber because if they hit
someone with the gun, the gun won’t just go off. They primarily use the gun as a prop to
scare and/or intimidate victims. He said they often times also use knives, but someone in
the group always has a gun.
John Doe #1 said that once the robbery has been committed they have to get rid of the
property. They usually would send out the females to local Vietnamese cafés or other
businesses in the community and offer up the merchandise for sale. John Doe #1 said
that a lot of businessmen in the community, in particular Vietnamese café owners, will
buy property even if they know it is stolen because they can get the property very cheaply
and resell it just as quickly based on their own contacts and make a handsome profit.
John Doe #1 stated that the biggest factor or motive for him and his crew to commit the
robberies was that they needed money for existence. They needed money to rent a motel
for a few days, buy some food and clothes, and just survive. He said sometimes they
would net a lot of money in a robbery and it would last them for months.
With regard to covering their tracks or not leaving evidence behind, John Doe #1 said
that most of the time they have gloves on already. He said they don’t think about
covering up foot prints, or other types of evidence other than fingerprints, because he said
the police don’t care about that stuff unless it’s a murder or something very serious, not
just a robbery.
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When asked if there was any reason why a crew would call off a robbery already in
progress, he said if they hit the wrong house they may decide to leave because they may
not get the money they expect to get and it’s not worth the risk of getting caught. He said
in his opinion there were no other reasons to call off a robbery already in progress. When
his crew or others he knew carried out these robberies they would typically drive to and
from the scene in a stolen car or a friend’s car. He said they would not cover up the
license plate because that would only draw attention to it.
John Doe #1 said that in his opinion there has been an increase in intra-racial teams i.e.,
Vietnamese and Cambodian or Vietnamese and Laotian or Vietnamese and Chinese,
committing these robberies. He said it doesn’t matter what nationality you are from as
long as you can be trusted. That means you are either a member of the same gang or a
very close trusted friend or associate. He said he trusts no one. He said there isn’t much
inter-racial make-up in the teams, i.e., Asians with other races, except maybe for other
types of crimes.
When asked if he or other home invaders had any emotional feelings toward their victims
he said: “Yes I do. Not all of them though. Some of them enjoy it (the violence) and
others don’t.” When asked how many people would be needed to commit a home
invasion robbery and carry it out successfully he said, “Four to five. One is going to be
the driver and three or four go in. Two look for things while one looks over the people.
Sometimes fewer people (suspects) is better. He said it depends on how many people
(victims) are in the house. The more people you have the better chance you have of
getting caught.”
When asked what he thought the percentage of gang-related vs. non gang-related home
invasions was, he said: “It doesn’t matter if you are not from our gang. It’s all about the
money.” Most of the crews are made up of criminals not necessarily gang members. A
crew sets up to do some robberies, splits the money and property, and then they all go
their separate ways. He said they never work with their enemies, even if it means making
money. He said, “If you work with your enemy it’s like putting your head in a tiger’s
mouth. Why take the chance?”
When asked if there is anything law enforcement can do to keep robberies of this sort
from occurring, he said: “There is a rumor now that there are a lot of undercovers out.
They know the police are sending out a lot of undercover.” Officers should keep up with
developing informants in the community, which is the only way we will be able to find
out that the robberies are going to be committed, or who might be involved in them.
He also stated that most of the robberies happen around football season because a lot of
people gamble on the games and they raid bookies and others who have lots of cash on
hand. He said, “Now they will do anything right now. Lots of gambling, drugs, drug
dealers. Drug dealers put info out that people can buy drugs from him. That’s who we
rob.”
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5.2.2 John Doe #2: California Department of Corrections
John Doe #2 is a white male, 42 years old, with priors for robbery in concert of an
inhabited dwelling. He is due to get off parole later this year. He spent nearly nine years
on a level IV yard in a California state prison for a home invasion robbery that ended in
death for a victim. He is also a past drug addict and has been addicted to heroin, cocaine
and methamphetamine. John Doe #2 provided the address and the particulars of the
residence to the suspects who perpetrated the robbery. Doe said the suspect who killed a
young boy during the course of the robbery received life without the possibility of parole.
John Doe #2 said that the robbery was actually a drug burn. The victims’ residence was
that of a drug dealer who owed John Doe #2 some money and had been slow in paying.
He sent some of his “Tweeker buddies” over to the location to get some of his money
back and something for their trouble as well. The robbery went bad and an innocent
young boy was shot in the head by the drugged out suspect who was unfamiliar with a
handgun. John Doe #2 said he was tweeking bad himself and would do anything to get
dope. He said he would do check scams, burglaries, etc. He said the robbery was not
gang related, although some of Doe’s numerous tattoos bare the resemblance of those
adorned by others who are involved in white supremacy.
When asked to answer the questionnaire concerning home invasion robberies he said he
was fine with that as he was no longer a criminal. His life had been changed for the
better, according to him, due to a drug rehab clinic he attended while in prison.
When asked how a home is selected for a home invasion he replied that in his opinion it’s
usually dope related. He said you get information from other dope fiends that someone is
selling. You know he is going to have money and product on hand. The most important
factor in selecting target houses is the amount of money or dope in the house. The more
money the better.
As for the types of weapons used in home invasions, John Doe #2 said, “Guns, because
no body respects anyone without one. The rack of a shotgun speaks volumes.”
Any property or dope gained in the robbery is sold either to a fence or other drug dealer.
He said the reason or motive for the robberies in his opinion is to get money to buy more
dope.
Most of the home invaders in his opinion wear gloves when committing the crimes unless
they are done at the spur of the moment. The only thing in his opinion that would cause a
home invader to abort a robbery already in progress would be that the neighbors notice or
they hit the wrong house.
When John Doe #2 was asked what kind of countermeasures could stop home invasions
from occurring, he said, “Neighborhood Watch would be most effective or drug abuse
prevention like the S.A.P. Program in prison. You need to immerse someone in the
program for it to work.”
When asked if home invaders used stolen cars, their own cars or friend’s cars when
committing home invasions he said, “I don’t think it matters. They’re not usually
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thinking about getting caught. You only cover your tracks if you are thinking of getting
caught.” When asked if he thought home invaders had emotional feelings toward their
victims he said, “Depends on the person. I would have compassion, others might not.
Some brag about the violence.”
He was asked how many suspects would normally commit a home invasion and said,
“One is the best number. You have less chance of getting caught. You don’t have to
split the money with anyone. And you don’t have to worry about anyone talking (to the
police).” When asked if he could provide any information that would help reduce the
amount of home invasions in the future he said, “Lock your door. Put a peephole in your
door and don’t open it unless you know the person behind it. Don’t do dope and don’t
keep money or guns in your home or don’t tell anyone about it.”
Although John Doe #2 had some helpful insights into home invasion robberies and MOs
of criminals committing these robberies, his focus was on drug rip-offs from drug dealers
and not necessarily on standard home invasions as are committed in the Asian
community. There are some striking similarities however and that is why his interview
has remained in this report.
5.2.3 John Doe #3 (California Department of Corrections)
John Doe #3 is a 27 year old Asian male, who is currently on CDC parole first degree of
an inhabited dwelling (home invasion robbery). He spent the last seven years in a level
III yard in state prison. He is an ex-gang member of an Asian gang that he joined when
he was 14 to 15 years old. He was reluctant to give details regarding his gang
background, but was willing to answer questions concerning home invasion robberies.
He first had his head down when he was talking, then as we began talking about the
robberies and shared details of robberies the interviewer had heard about or investigated,
he became excited and sat up tall in his chair to share details about robberies that he
likely had actually experienced first hand.
When asked how or why home invaders select a certain house for home invasion casing
he said there has to be a lot of cash in the home. He said they get the information through
friends or from fellow gang members, and that if he can’t trust who he gets his
information from he can’t do the job. The most important factor for selecting a particular
house is the amount of money/cash in the house. He said, “You don’t think about the
police.”
Home invaders use weapons such as handguns when committing the robberies. He said,
“Normal people, when they see a weapon it would cause them to stop resisting and give
us what we want.” He said of the victims, “When you go in the house you don’t want to
hurt them. You just go in and come out. If you don’t have a weapon you have to use
force against them. Using a gun would prevent the people (victims) from getting hurt.”
He meant that if a gun is brandished by a home invader, the normal victim would do
everything they wanted and comply with their demands. If they did not have guns or
other threatening weapons, the victim would likely put up resistance and someone would
get hurt. He said a gun is the answer to quick compliance.
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John Doe #3 reported that once the robbery has been committed the property or
merchandise would be sold to someone he knows. He said pawn shops or other similar
locations do not give you enough money for the property. He said there is not enough
return on the investment: “We know people from jewelry stores or people who are in
directly related to the stores. They get the money for us.” Proceeds from the robberies
are used for survival of the gang member suspects. He said, “We don’t work, we don’t
want to work and we want easy money to support our lifestyle.”
When asked if he and others committing the robberies covered their fingerprints or
footprints in the house or made sure they left no evidence behind he said, “Yes, why not.
We wear gloves. Even some people put nail polish or similar object on their fingers to
keep from leaving fingerprints. It’s the same as using gloves.” When asked if he or
others would abort a robbery in progress for any reason, say, if the victim’s screaming
would cause him and the others to stop the robbery he said, “Depends on when people
inside are screaming. We would shut them down. It won’t be necessary to stop the
robbery because someone is yelling or screaming. We just have to be forceful and make
them be quiet.”
When asked what type of countermeasures might work to prevent home invasions he
said, “Neighborhood Watch programs may help more than anything. If no gang members
are around there’s no robbery. In that case an Asian gang task force may be effective.
It’s also too easy to get guns. Make it harder to get guns and maybe there won’t be as
many robberies. . . .When you’re in a gang you need a gun to protect yourself. You can
buy a gun, steal it, and get one from a friend or your gang member brother. The gun is
the most problem in this country now, especially in California. Buying a gun on the
street is the easy way to get it. It’s easy to get away with it too, because it can’t be traced
back to you.”
When asked what kind of car they would use when committing the robberies. John Doe
#3 replied that they would use what ever car they could get their hands on. He said they
don’t steal a car because the police may stop it if it has been reported stolen. They use
their own cars or friend’s cars. He said they don’t cover the license plates because the
victims won’t see it. He said they’re (victims) inside the house and they won’t be able to
see it. When asked if he and others committing the robberies covered their tracks or
otherwise were concerned about leaving potential evidence behind such as fingerprints he
replied, “We used ski masks in robbery. I don’t want anybody to see me, they could
identify me later. I only wore a glove on my gun hand. If you plan out the robbery you
know what to touch and what not to touch.”
When discussing the types of weapons used in home invasions and force used against
victims, he stated that: “There were two of us, me and a friend in the robbery. We both
have guns; one nine millimeter and one .38 and also a knife. We tied up the victims with
phone cords. They’re hard to break apart and they can’t use the phone to call police.
There were three victims in the house when we robbed it. They were a couple years
apart, 28 or so. We go after our own race.”
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John Doe #3 said that most home invasion crews are Vietnamese and Cambodian gang
members. He said they have to commit the robberies to support their families. Members
of the crews do not have to be from the same gang. They can be people who split up
after the robbery. He said, “They only think about the money.”
When asked if he had any emotional feelings toward his victims or if others he knew
possibly did he said, “Yes, that’s why I think everybody brings a gun. They don’t want
to hurt anybody. They just want to get the things and get out. Some [suspects] have kids
and family and care about them [victims].” He said some suspects are different however,
“They use force, they torture, they’re crazy, they get off on violence, and they are on
drugs or whatever. They don’t know them [the victims], they don’t like them. They
don’t want to kill them; they just want to hurt them.” Vietnamese and Cambodian guys
are different, though. He said, “You got to look at their country. They don’t think
violence is a big deal. They come here [America] and they don’t have anything. It’s all
about respect and they try to get it.” He said the victims of most robberies don’t report
them because they are afraid of what might happen next. They [suspects] threaten the
victims that they will be back and it will be worse next time.
John Doe #3 was asked how many suspects are needed to successfully carry out a home
invasion robbery. He said, “One is good enough. But you don’t want to do it with too
many people. There is more chance of getting caught and more people to share the
money with.” In his opinion most home invasions are gang-related. He said you
wouldn’t see different gangs doing robberies together; just friends who get together to
make money. Some of the crews are just people who want to make money, not
necessarily gang members, just criminals. He also said that lots of home invaders use
dope and that dope users do most of the crimes: “When you run out of dope, where do
you get the money? Those are the guys (drug users/addicts) who do things crazy and
torture people.” In his opinion about fifty percent of home invaders are repeat offenders
or have done prison time before: “Going to prison is not the life you want to live.” He
said, “I was glad I got locked up and get busted. I might be dead now if I didn’t get
locked up.”
When asked what we can do to prevent home invasions from occurring in the future he
said, “You need more police on the street. Double or triple might help. The more police
cars they see, the less likely they are to commit the crime ‘cause they fear they might get
caught and go to prison.”
At the conclusion of the interview John Doe #3 discussed the robbery he had been
arrested for and provided details as to why he was apprehended. He said one of the
victims had gotten away from them and hid in the closet with a cordless phone. He said
the victim called the police from inside the closet, and the police caught them inside
while the robbery was in progress. He said the police only found one knife because they
hid the property and guns, but four months later the victims found the guns and brought
them to court.
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22 April 2004
Although John Doe #3 said he would not commit home invasions again, it did not appear
that he had remorse for his victims. Instead, he only felt sorry that he got caught because
he and his fellow criminals overlooked a victim in the closet. It was apparent that he was
very excited about the crime when he was sharing the details. As he and others have
said, some home invaders “get off on the violence” as it seems apparent he did/does as
well.
5.2.4 John Doe #4 (California Department of Corrections parolee)
John Doe #4 is a white male, 25 years old, and a member of an Asian street gang from
southern California. He has priors for home invasion robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon, possession of firearms and has been addicted to methamphetamines. John Doe
#4 was incarcerated in a level III prison yard for five and a half years for his participation
in a home invasion robbery. He said he joined an Asian gang because he grew up with
other members of the gang, who are Asian, in Los Angeles County, California.
When asked about his crime, John Doe #4 said he and two others learned of a residence
that had lots of cash and jewelry on hand, in particular Rolex watches. They received the
information from a female who was friendly with the family as well as the gang. The
female was a friend and classmate of one of the teenage female victims and had been
inside the residence before. The female then provided details of the residence and
victims to the gang. Members of the gang then conducted a casing of the residence and
ended up committing the robbery during the daytime hours. He said he knocked loudly
on the front door while two other suspects stood behind him. There was no answer right
away, so he checked to see if the door was opened and found it unlocked. He entered the
residence followed by the others while another suspect stayed outside in a vehicle. He
found an elderly female victim in a bedroom and ordered her to get down at gunpoint.
He said they only located the elderly female in the residence who did not put up any
resistance. He said they gathered the loot and fled. He was arrested about a week later
when fellow accomplices who had been arrested identified him as a co-conspirator.
When asked how home invaders select a house for home invasion casing he replied,
“They research it. They see people wearing nice stuff, driving fancy cars and flaunting
their wealth. It’s usually and inside job, it’s organized.” The biggest factor in selecting a
target residence is knowing that money and property of value will be in the house. He
said they worry later about other stuff. When asked why home invaders use weapons to
commit home invasion robberies, and what types of weapons they carry he said they
carry guns for less resistance and for intimidation. He didn’t think most suspects would
use them. He brought a gun along with him during his home invasion and it was the only
gun among the group. He brought it along for intimidation and to prevent a struggle with
the victim(s): “If you have a gun with you, there is less likely to be resistance on the part
of the victim.”
When asked where he would sell stolen merchandise taken in robberies he said it depends
on what it is. “In our case it was Rolex’s. You need to know someone who can get rid of
it. Rolex can trace back to someone. Other things don’t matter.” John Doe #4 said the
biggest motivating factor in committing home invasions is that they need money, period.
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22 April 2004
He said it sometimes depends on the person: “It is a quick way to come up, to get rich.
If you have an expensive watch then you probably keep a lot of cash in the house also. If
you can afford a Rolex, then you can afford other nice things too. And it’s easier with
Asians. They don’t like law enforcement much, they don’t like banks, and they are more
apt to keep things in their home.”
When asked if he and his co-conspirators were careful not to leave evidence, particularly
fingerprints behind at the scene. He said, “Yes, you are going to be conscious. You have
to be careful not to touch anything. You don’t touch something you are not going to
take.” John Doe #4 was asked why home invader(s) sometimes call off home invasions
already in progress. He said if the victim(s) were screaming or they couldn’t subdue
them, the physical resistance on the part of the victim may cause them to abort. He also
said that if neighbors notice the suspects or see or hear a large amount of commotion in
and around the house this would also be a reason to abort the robbery.
The reason suspects commit home invasions as opposed to burglaries when the victims
are away from the home is that they (suspects) don’t have to spend time looking for the
property (valuables). They get what they want more quickly and don’t have to worry
about making too much noise. He said they most often make entry into the home through
the front door as it is less conspicuous then entering the house through the rear or a side
gate. The less conspicuous they are then the less likely that neighbors or other witnesses
will take notice and ultimately telephone the police.
When asked what police countermeasures would be effective in stopping suspects from
committing a home invasion in the first place he said that “neighborhood watch” was
probably the best at deterring suspects from committing the robbery. He also indicated
that home security, including barred doors and windows and a high quality alarm system
was a good deterrent. Additionally, he added that more police patrolling the area would
also make the target less attractive, for fear the suspects would not have the time to
commit the robbery without being detected.
In regard to the types of vehicles used in the commission of the home invasions, John
Doe #4 indicated that most often suspects would use vehicles that were not associated
with the suspect group and would cold plate the vehicles (change license plates) in case a
neighbor or other witness might be able to document the license plate. He also said that
after the robbery was committed the suspects would go to a location away from the crime
and change the plates back again to the original plates. Sometimes the suspects drive
away the victim(s) vehicles, particularly if they are high end vehicles such as Mercedes
Benz.
When asked about the ethnic breakdown of the suspects involved in a home invasion
robbery, he said that Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotians get along together and may
commit robberies together, but not Korean, Japanese and other Asian groups. He said it’s
not about the ethnic makeup of the group, “it’s about the money.” He doesn’t often see
Asians teamed up with non-Asians in robbery teams; they usually keep to themselves.
They rob from their own people (Vietnamese) and have a lot of insight into the culture
47
22 April 2004
and customs associated with their own race. He said, however, that Asians do team up
with non-Asians from time to time if they are members of the same gang or have a close
trusting relationship with one another.
When asked if home invader(s) have emotional feelings toward their victims he said he
didn’t think so. He said it depends on the individual (suspect). If drugs are involved, the
suspect is under the influence, or it is a drug rip-off, suspect(s) won’t care about the
victim(s)’ feelings. He said they don’t want to hurt anyone, and the less resistance on the
part of the victim the better, because they (suspects) are in and out more quickly. He said
that in his opinion victims are not purposely tortured without reason; however, they are
threatened with a variety of weapons, in particular knives. He said they use weapons to
intimidate the victims into giving up the property without a fight or argument. The
deployment of weapons usually leads to quick compliance on the part of the victim(s) to
lead them to property of value in an expeditious manner.
When asked how many suspects usually commit these heinous crimes he replied,
“Preferably two. . . .One to watch the victims and one to get the valuables.” He said the
more suspects involved the less the split of the loot. Additionally, the more suspects
involved the more likelihood of being caught either at the scene or later on during the
investigation if one of them talks to the police after being apprehended. A large majority
of the home invasions are committed by gang members, primarily Asian gang members.
He didn’t know the exact percentage but said that gang members are generally concerned
with easy money and are not interested in working for it.
When asked if he could give any insight into how we (law enforcement or the public)
could prevent home invasions in the future, he said that home security systems, dogs, and
task forces aimed at home invaders would prevent suspects from selecting targets in the
community. He said that Asian gang (police) task forces aimed at home invasion crews
would be particularly important in that they can link the crimes and suspects together and
ultimately apprehend the suspects, which would in turn reduce the number of robberies
committed.
5.2.5 Jane Doe #1: California Department of Corrections Parolee
Jane Doe #1 is a female Hispanic, 23 years old with no specific gang connections. She
was arrested at the age of 17 years for her part in a two-person home invasion robbery
involving a 13 year old female victim. Jane Doe said that she came from a dysfunctional
family with an alcoholic father who physically abused her on a regular basis. Her mother
died of complications from heroin abuse, having a hepatitis C infection that ultimately led
to kidney failure. She said she didn’t care much about her life and had no future goals.
She was doing poorly in school and had very few trusted friends. She drank alcohol
heavily and abused drugs, particularly marijuana and methamphetamines. After her
arrest for home invasion at the age of 17 she was placed on probation and since that time
had been arrested for grand theft auto and check fraud. She served three years in the
California Youth Authority for the subsequent crimes and probation violations.
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Jane Doe described the robbery she committed, which in her mind at the time was “no
big deal.” She said she had previously been brought to the residence by a couple of adult
males (residents) who offered her alcohol and drugs. She said they had some sort of
altercation during the visit and she left upset. When she had been at the residence she
noticed that it was filled with nice things, in particular VCR’s, TVs and other high-end
electronic equipment. She felt that there must be other property of value in the residence.
She wanted to get back at the males and later returned intoxicated and upset. She was
armed with a knife and was in the company of another female. She said she made contact
at the residence with a young female and demanded entry into the residence. She said
she immediately placed a knife to the female’s throat, even though the female did not
resist in any way. She then led the female around the house at knife point looking for
property of value. She ordered her female companion to gather up the VCR and jewelry
that she believed had some value. She then gathered up the loot and left the residence
without physically harming the victim. She said at the time she was not concerned for
the victim’s emotional well being and felt no remorse for any emotional harm of the
victim or for taking the loss from the residence. Since the time of her incarceration she
has had time to dwell on her past and now feels remorse for her victim and the emotional
harm she must have caused her.
Jane Doe #1 said that although this was the only robbery she said she had committed,
several of her acquaintances, other gang type associates, committed similar robberies on a
regular basis as a way of sustaining themselves and having liquid cash to purchase drugs.
She said she learned how to commit this robbery by talking with friends about similar
robberies they had committed.
When asked how home invaders chose a particular house when casing for a robbery she
said it’s usually an inside job. They would know who had money and who didn’t. They
(suspects) would either have been in the house before or knew someone who had. She
said the most important factor in selecting a house for a robbery is having knowledge of
the property of value in the residence and knowing about the persons inhabiting the
residence, including whether or not they would pose a threat. Like most of the others
interviewed, she said, “It’s all about the money.” If it wasn’t loot they were after it was
drugs, and her friends who committed similar robberies would regularly rob drug dealers
for “dope and money.”
She said that when she and her friends committed robberies they would have a weapon
with them, most commonly a knife. She said she was aware of others who used guns, but
she said guns were harder to come by. She said if they had guns they usually purchased
them on the streets from people they knew and trusted or would have people with clean
records purchase them for them. She said they would not use the weapons against the
victims unless they (suspects) were “cold hearted” or it was necessary to achieve their
goals.
When asked about how suspects get rid of the loot or get cash for the valuables she said
that they stash the loot for a few days, then look for people who want to buy it. She said
sometimes they have customers already lined up to buy the property before it is stolen.
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22 April 2004
She said they have known fences in the area or homeboys and homegirls (fellow
gangsters) that can get rid of it for them. The cash netted from the robberies is then used
to purchase drugs, alcohol and money to live on. She said suspects are lazy and they
don’t want to work for money. All they know how to do is rob and steal to survive. In
her opinion most of the home invaders, including the ones she has known, have had prior
criminal histories and are on probation or parole.
Home invaders usually cover their tracks by wearing gloves and sometimes conceal their
identity if they are known to the victims. Suspects sometimes call off home invasions
already in progress if neighbors or other witnesses notice them. They know that if their
activity is noticed someone will call the police. Even if they feel their identity has been
jeopardized, they continue with the robbery and take what they came for. They just
commit the robbery in an expeditious manner.
She said that a Neighborhood Watch is the suspect(s)’ greatest concern when planning or
pulling off a home invasion robbery. Additional concerns are the number of police in the
area and being unfamiliar with the area or residence. Stolen cars are most often used
when committing robberies. She said they don’t often use their own cars, but sometimes
switch plates on cars they borrow from other non-involved parties.
Jane Doe said she is not particularly familiar with how Asians team up for robberies, i.e.
their ethnic make-up, but said she did time with several Asian females who admitted to
being involved in home invasion robberies. She said the Asian females she spoke with
admitted to committing robberies with male suspects and to tying up victims during such
robberies. When asked if suspects have emotional feelings toward their victims during
intimidation, she said that she and others feel the victims’ fear, but it doesn’t affect them
(suspects), or change the way they carry out the robbery. Jane Doe said she didn’t
personally feel anything for her victim at the time of her robbery, and in fact she felt
detached from any emotions. She felt no connection with the victim during her robbery;
she was just going through the motions.
When asked how many suspects are typically used in home invasion robberies she said
that you don’t want to take anyone along anyone that you can’t trust and if there are too
many people (suspects) involved there is a greater likelihood that you will be caught. She
said the number of suspects involved usually depends on how many people (victims) one
might encounter in the residence. In her opinion most home invasions are gang-related.
She said you earn respect from your “homies” and are “down” for being violent and for
showing no remorse to victims. You get respect for showing no fear and for projecting
fear to your victims. The more violent your actions the more respect you earn amongst
your fellow gangsters.
When asked if she could provide any insight into preventing home invasions in the future
she said that neighborhood watch programs and more police in the area (patrols) would
be the best preventative measures. She also warned that victims should not answer the
door until they know who is on the other side. Parents should teach their children to be
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careful of strangers or answering the door to them, and should not leave their children at
home alone, particularly children under 14 years old.
5.3 Summary of Interviews:
All of the interviews of experienced police investigators/officers and convicted offenders
reinforced the argument that most aspects of home invasions are the same across
jurisdictions. A summary of the interviews conducted have shown consistent results in
the following areas:
Target/victim selection
Use of weapons/types
Fencing of property
Primary motivating factor of suspects
Effective police countermeasures
Type of vehicles used
Ethnic make-up of teams
Non-attachment to victims
Number of suspects involved
Suspect M.O. (common methods of operation)
It appears that more often than not victims of Asian gang home invasions are of Asian
descent. They are carefully selected due to their visibly noticeable signs of wealth; that
is, their fancy cars, jewelry, being owners of businesses, and simply being known to
others in the community as wealthy. Most seem to be inside jobs where the suspects or
suspects’ friends know the victims or have insight into the victims’ backgrounds.
Suspects have personal knowledge of the number of victims and the value of property
likely to be found in the residence. Armed with this inside information the robbery takes
less time to commit and there is therefore less risk of being apprehended. Drug related
and/or bookmaking related robberies seem to be more profitable and appear to occur as
often as other home invasions within the community.
Suspects are likely to be armed with guns and knives and use these weapons to intimidate
victims and provide suspects quick access to property of value, including cash, expensive
jewelry, and/or drugs. Weapons are also used to terrorize victims so they will not report
the crime to the police. It does not appear that most of the suspects necessarily intend or
want to use the weapons to harm victims, but will resort to their use if necessary. Based
on many of the law enforcement interviews conducted as well as personal experience,
some suspects “get off” on the use of violence and torture and actually enjoy inflicting
emotional trauma and physical harm on their victims.
The property obtained in the robberies seems to be commonly fenced within the
community through trusted associates, and sometimes arrangements are made for sale of
the merchandise before it is even stolen. The primary motive of the suspects appears to
be to obtain quick liquid wealth for an affluent lifestyle without having to work. Most
suspects appear to have no means of support, are not employed, and live solely off
proceeds taken from robbery victims. Some suspects are addicted to drugs and use the
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22 April 2004
cash and proceeds to supply their drug habit in addition to supporting their carefree
lifestyle.
Experienced criminals are careful to cover their tracks and/or conceal their identity
wearing ski masks, bandanas, and gloves of all types. Careful lengthy surveillance and
detailed background information on the victim and his residence are also conducted by
the experienced home invader. If masks are not worn by the suspects, then it is likely
that they are from out of state and have either been hired by locals to commit the robbery
or local gangsters have supplied them with the target in exchange for a cut of the loot. It
appears rare that suspects are smart enough to cover up footprints at the crime scene, and
many are still unfamiliar with law enforcement’s ability to collect DNA evidence.
Disruptions can occur during robberies. Neighbors notice unusual activity and summon
the police, or a victim escapes while the robbery is under way, or the victim physically
resists the home invaders, which causes the suspects to abort the robbery.
Effective countermeasures suggested by those interviewed have consistently been that
Neighborhood Watch programs are the most effective. If a strong Neighborhood Watch
program is in effect, suspects may not even select a target for fear of being noticed and
ultimately being apprehended. Frequent police patrols in neighborhoods also seem to
have a deterrent effect. Some suspects are concerned about Asian gang details that have
knowledge of gang members and/or robbery crews. It is also important for law
enforcement to develop rapport with the Vietnamese community through community
based sub-stations, having Web Sites in Vietnamese language with “web tip” hot lines,
and hiring more Vietnamese police officers who are familiar with the customs and are
fluent in the spoken language.
The racial make-up of the groups appear to be primarily Asian and usually homogenous;
that is, either Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian and not a combination of the groups.
Sometimes other non-Asians have been involved in the robberies, but only if they are
members of the same gang or are close, trusted associates. Vietnamese gangsters usually
stay to themselves, but the purpose of these robberies is to make money and some
associations will be made with members of other ethnic groups if they have something to
offer. These associations are usually made while incarcerated in local jails or other
correctional institutions.
There does not seem to be any emotional attachment between the suspects and victims.
The suspects appear as if they are there to do business and care little for the emotional
welfare and/or of physical harm caused to the victims.
The number of suspects involved appears to vary between two to as many as four or five.
The consistency here is that the suspects do not want to have too many crime partners;
only the number necessary to carry out the robbery and no more. The reason for having
the fewest number of suspects necessary is that the loot does not have to be divided into
several smaller amounts, and there is less risk of being caught either at the scene or later
on after one or more are apprehended and potentially “rat” on the others.
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Most of the robberies appear to be gang-related. Some of the associates are not gang
members, but are recruited for their special expertise or knowledge of the home or
victims. Some of the crews are from the criminal element, but not necessarily gang
members. It appears that many of the “crews” or “bandit groups” are made up of gang
members or criminal associates from a variety of gangs and/or criminal groups, with no
specific gang running the operation.
The suspect(s) method of operation appears to be fairly consistent as well. There is
usually a careful selection of the target. Background information is sought on the target
by persons who have direct knowledge of the victim, his residence, and wealth, as well as
specifically where property of value will likely be found within the residence. The
suspects commonly use stolen vehicles or vehicles which are not associated with the
group. They often “cold plate” (change license plates) the vehicles so no connection is
made between the vehicle and the suspects if a witness happens to copy down the license
plate number. The suspects generally enter the residence by use of ruse or force via the
front door. They then round up the victims into one area, and while one suspect watches
the victim, others look for the valuables within the residence. The suspects commonly
use gloves or items to conceal their identity, such as t-shirts or bandanas, or ski masks
covering their faces.
6 Data Analysis
The objectives of this study and the nature of the data available in a modest project of this
type have a powerful impact upon the selection of research and analytical methods.
Police records of individual cases of home invasion crimes in which Asian gangs are
suspected of involvement are the focus of the effort. The researchers identified fifty-five
such cases; they are drawn predominantly from Orange County, California (38), and
suburban areas of northern Virginia surrounding Washington, DC (12). A small number
of cases were identified in Kansas and Oklahoma. Figure 12 shows the distribution of
cases by state.
The cases range in time from 1994 to 2003. They are not evenly distributed; there are
two clear peaks in 1995 (11 cases) and 2001 (21 cases). As is clear from Figure 13, these
peaks are due solely to the high number of cases in Orange County during those two
years. The northern Virginia, Kansas and Oklahoma cases are overwhelmingly clustered
in 2000, 2001 and 2002, but without a comprehensive examination of police records from
the early 1990s to the present it is unknown whether home invasions are increasing.
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22 April 2004
40
30
20
Count
10
0
CA
KS
OK
VA
State
Figure 12: Home Invasion Cases by State
30
20
State
VA
10
Count
OK
KS
0
CA
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2002
2003
Year
Figure 13: Home Invasion Cases by Year and State
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22 April 2004
6.1 Identification and Selection of Cases
Northern Virginia—including the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church as well as
Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudon Counties—was selected as the focus for comparison with
Orange County based on a combination of its broad demographic similarity with Orange
County (though the total population in the northern Virginia cities and counties selected
is less than two-thirds that of Orange County), and its convenience to research staff.
Significantly, northern Virginia has a high population of Vietnamese and other Southeast
Asian immigrants and a large number of businesses owned by and serving these groups.
These businesses are concentrated in clearly defined areas, particularly in a region on the
border between the City of Falls Church and Fairfax County. Arlington County hosts
another, smaller concentration of these businesses.
Identifying cases of home invasion by Asian gangs was especially difficult because the
police departments contacted generally do not track home invasion separately from the
broader category of residential burglaries. As a result, the researchers relied on the
recollections of particular police officers to identify cases. To maximize their ability to
locate cases, the researchers typically contacted both gang units and records units within
individual police departments.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to establish gang involvement definitively in most
cases due to the lack of arrests or clear evidence that the crime was conducted by a gang
as such rather than an ad hoc group of individuals. Police records specify gang
involvement in 16 of the 55 cases (29%). Records indicate that gang involvement was
suspected but not certain in the remaining 39 cases (71%). Four cases involving groups
of Asian suspects that were not gang-related were discarded (three from northern Virginia
and one from Orange County). Comparison of the data from definite and suspected gang
cases suggest that they are generally similar. Where notable, differences are identified
and described in detail with the results of the analysis.
All cases identified were selected for study; thus, the data set approximates the
population of home invasion cases in the areas studied and is not a sample. From a
national perspective, the cases are a non-random sample, though they could ultimately be
incorporated into a nationwide dataset.
6.2 Analytical Methods
The relatively small number of cases in a limited study of this type considerably
circumscribes the statistical methods that can be applied. The nature of the variables
examined were often nominal (categories) or ordinal (ordered groups that are not
necessarily equidistant) rather than scaled (numbers). However, given the exploratory
nature of the project, even relatively simple analytical procedures can yield interesting
results and shape further study.
The bulk of the study results are presented through frequencies of cases that meet
particular criteria and cross-tabulations of variables. This was a particularly valuable
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22 April 2004
method in comparing home invasion cases in Orange County and northern Virginia and
produced important findings.
The level of detail in police reports and other differences among reports was a particular
challenge in that many reports did not address questions of special interest to the
researchers. For example, very few reports addressed the motivation for the home
invasion crime, i.e., whether the suspects were driven by their lust for money or sought to
retaliate for a perceived offense or collect a debt. Thus several interesting variables are
difficult to analyze due to the number of cases with missing values.
7 Results
The study results are presented in three sections: the modus operandi model, the suspect
model, and the victim model. A concluding summary section highlights some of the
most interesting findings.
7.1 The Modus Operandi Model
Examining the modus operandi of the selected home invasion crimes produces a variety
of interesting results. First and foremost is the favored timing of the crimes; several
periods during the week stand out. Monday evenings (6:01 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.) and
Thursday mornings (6:01 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.) are most popular and each account for 11%
of the total cases. Friday early mornings (12:01 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.) and Tuesday
afternoons (12:01 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.) are next most popular, accounting for 7.3% of cases
each. Thursdays, Fridays, and Mondays are the most popular days of the week, with
20%, 18.2%, and 18.2% of cases, respectively. Curiously, Thursday and Friday crimes
were common in both California and Virginia, but Monday crimes were frequent only in
California (eight cases) and rare in Virginia (one case). A random distribution across
days of the week would result in 14.3% of cases each day.
Home invasions occurred least commonly on Sundays and Wednesdays, which each
accounted for only 9% of cases. No home invasions took place during four specific time
frames: daytime Sundays (12:01 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.), mornings on Mondays and Tuesdays
(6:01 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.), and Thursday evenings (6:01 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.). See Figure
14 for a full breakdown of cases by day of the week and time of day and Figure 15 for a
breakdown by day and state.
7.1.1 Entry Techniques and Locations
Patterns also emerge in the methods and points of entry in home invasion crimes.
Although public fears of home invasion focus on ruses—criminals pretending to be
deliverymen, friends of a home occupant, etc.—this mode of entry is much more
common in Virginia, where it accounts for 58.3% of cases, than in California, where it
was used in only 15.8% of cases. In Orange County, suspects used forced entry in 44.7%
of cases or simply entered through an unlocked door or window in 23.7% of cases.
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12
10
8
Time (Coded)
6
12:01 pm to 6:00 pm
6:01 am to 12:00 pm
4
Count
12:01 am to 6:00 am
2
6:01 pm to 12:00 am
0
Missing
Sunday
Tuesday
Monday
Thursday
Wednesday
Saturday
Friday
Day of Week
Figure 14: Cases by Day and Time
12
10
8
State
6
VA
4
Count
OK
2
KS
0
CA
Sunday
Tuesday
Monday
Thursday
Wednesday
Saturday
Friday
Day of Week
Figure 15: Cases by Day and State
Forced entry was used in only one case (8.3%) in northern Virginia. Suspects hid on a
property in only 13.2% of cases in Orange County and did not employ this method at all
in northern Virginia. In only one case in each state did suspects follow the victim home.
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The front door was the preferred entry point; suspects used the front door to gain access
to the home in 44.7% of cases. A back door was the next most common access point to
homes and was used in 21.3% of cases. Not surprisingly, a front window was used in
only one case. The predominance of the ruse in northern Virginia likely contributed to
the fact that in all but one of the cases there in which an entry point was identified,
suspects entered through the front door. For comparison, suspects entered through the
front door in only about one-third of Orange County home invasions.
7.1.2 Number of Suspects
As is clear in Figure 16, the vast majority of home invasions in this study involved two,
three, or four suspects. Some twenty cases (36.4%) involved four suspects, thirteen
(23.6%) involved three, and eleven (20%) involved two. One unusual case involved
fifteen suspects, all teenage girls apparently united in righting a school-related wrong
done by a peer in the target home. No other case involved more than six suspects. There
is a modest difference in the mean number of suspects between the Orange County cases
(mean number of suspects 3.89) and the northern Virginia cases (mean 3.06), but the
difference narrows considerably (to 3.56 vs. 3.06) if the outlying case involving the
fifteen teen girls is excluded.
30
20
Count
10
0
Missing
2
3
4
5
6
15
Number
Figure 16: Number of Suspects
There is a slight difference between the mean number of suspects (3.69) and the mean
number who entered the home (3.31), reflecting the fact that some suspects left one of
their number outside as a lookout or driver. The magnitude of this difference (.38)
suggests that one suspect remained outside in roughly one-third of cases; however, this is
deceptive. In fact, one suspect remained outside in only 8.5% of cases, suggesting that
the use of lookouts/drivers is relatively rare. However, since the reporting of lookouts
depends solely on victims and/or bystanders noticing a lookout, it is difficult to determine
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22 April 2004
whether lookouts were actually present. Much of the difference in means can be
attributed to the disruption of home invasions in a few cases with high numbers of
suspects—in these cases, several suspects arrived but none were able to enter the home.
Victims were generally unable to say how suspects had arrived (60%).
7.1.3 Weapons and Other Instruments Used; Strategies Employed
Suspects employed guns of one kind or another in 89.1% of home invasion cases; they
occasionally combined guns with other weapons such as knives (21.8%) or clubs (3.6%).
The suspects used no weapons of any kind in 9.1% of cases. In one case, suspects used a
fake handgun. Specific data on the types of guns used was spotty, but semi-automatic
handguns seemed to be most common. The data did not allow an assessment of how
many suspects were armed or unarmed in any particular case.
Suspects employed tools relatively rarely—in only 20% of cases—and usually employed
pry bars (45.5% of cases when tools used) or screwdrivers (27.2% of cases when tools
used). They used bindings of various types in nearly half of cases (47.3%), with a clear
preference for cords (electrical extension cords, telephone cords), which suspects applied
in 42.3% of the home invasions when bindings were used. Zip ties (23.1%) and duct tape
(19.2%) were also common bindings.
Masks and gloves, to complicate efforts at identification and prosecution, were fairly
common. Masks were used by one or more suspects in 56.4% of cases for which data
was available (victims were uncertain in 12.7% of cases), though gloves were used in
only 36.4% of cases. Notably, masks were used by considerably more suspects in
Orange County than in northern Virginia, suggesting a greater level of sophistication
among Orange County’s home invaders. The mean number of suspects with masks in the
California cases was 2.26, with a standard deviation of 1.85 (high in relative terms),
compared to a mean of 0.30 with a standard deviation of 0.48 (also high in relative terms)
in northern Virginia. Taking into account that most suspects operate in groups of two to
four, the high standard deviation in the California cases suggests that groups tend either
to employ masks or not to employ masks as a unit. The lower figures in Virginia suggest
that one member of a particular group uses a mask but most do not. (The group of fifteen
teenage girls did not use masks, which could otherwise have inflated the standard
deviation of the Orange County cases.) Suspects also used gloves more frequently in
Orange County (39.5%) than in northern Virginia (25%).
Suspects attempted to isolate their victims by cutting telephone lines surprisingly rarely,
in 32.7% of cases. When available, police reports suggest that suspects generally
accomplished this by jerking telephone cords out of the wall. Alarm systems were
generally not a factor in the home invasions studied; alarms systems were reported in
only four cases (7.3%). Suspects disconnected just one of the four alarm systems (25%).
The low number of alarm systems in victims’ homes suggests that they might serve as a
deterrent; however, it is difficult to assess the deterrent value of alarms without knowing
their prevalence in the communities studied.
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22 April 2004
Victims reported the use of communications equipment (cellular telephones or radios) in
just five cases (9.1%), though over one-third of victims (36.4%) did not know whether or
not the suspects made use of communications devices.
7.1.4 Attacks and Violence
Suspects used physical violence in one-third of cases (34.5%) and simply bound or
confined their victims in nearly two-fifths of cases (38.2%) without employing violence.
Suspects did not use violence or bind or confine their victims in 27.2% of cases.
In the nineteen cases when suspects physically attacked their victims, fourteen (73.7%)
involved hitting, kicking or pushing. Only three cases (15.8%) involved cutting or
stabbing and only two cases (10.5%) involved firearms. All five of the cases when
suspects attacked with weapons were in Orange County.
Suspects engaged in sexual assault (groping) in only one case, in Westminster,
California.
7.1.5 The Robbery
As a rule, suspects in the home invasion cases under study ransacked the homes they
targeted. Suspects “partially” ransacked homes in 33.3% of cases and “completely”
ransacked homes in 42.6% of cases. Ransacking is likely both a function of the generally
short duration of home invasions—which encourages haste and recklessness by the
suspects—and the suspects’ use of such violent searching as a means of intimidation.
The vast majority of home invasions in this study (74.6%) lasted thirty or fewer minutes.
In fact, 36.4% of cases lasted only ten minutes or fewer. Just three cases (5.4%)
exceeded one hour; of those three, two cases were over within two hours. The victims in
the remaining case were kidnapped, removed from their home, and held for
approximately twenty-four hours. Figure 17 illustrates how the crime durations are
distributed.
There were notable differences in duration between the Orange County and northern
Virginia cases. In northern Virginia, 58.3% of home invasions lasted ten minutes or
fewer, against just 31.4% of cases in Orange County. And just 8.3% of northern Virginia
cases lasted thirty-one minutes or more, compared to 28.6% of Orange County cases.
The three cases with duration of sixty-one minutes or longer all took place in Orange
County. Figure 18 demonstrates the differences.
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22 April 2004
Unknow n
5.5%
>121 mins
1.8%
61-120 mins
3.6%
31-60 mins
<10 mins
14.5%
36.4%
10-30 mins
38.2%
Figure 17: Duration of Home Invasions
30
20
State
VA
10
Count
OK
KS
0
CA
Unknow n
10-30 mins
<10 mins
61-120 mins
31-60 mins
>121 mins
Duration
Figure 18: Duration by State
Predictably, cash and jewelry were the most frequently stolen items. Suspects stole cash
in 52.7% of cases and jewelry in 56.4% of cases. In eleven cases (20%), the home
invaders left with nothing. Thieves took electronics (stereos, cellular telephones,
computers, cameras) in 26.4% of cases. Suspects took other items only very rarely;
victims reported guns stolen in five cases (9.1%) and cars or credit cards stolen in two
cases each (3.6%). The principal difference between the appetites of Orange County and
61
22 April 2004
northern Virginia suspects was in their affinity for jewelry, which was stolen in 62.2% of
California cases and just 27.3% of Virginia cases.
7.1.6 The Departure
Over one-third (34.6%) of home invasions were disrupted for various reasons. Of these,
more than one-third (36.8%) were disrupted by the arrival of police officers. Four home
invasions, or 21.1%, were disrupted when victims called for help; three each (15.8%)
were disrupted by resistance from the victims or surprises, such as an unexpected arrival
at the home. One case was disrupted by an alarm and one case was disrupted when the
victim fled.
Perhaps surprisingly suspects were more likely to flee on foot (43.6%) than by car
(25.5%). Victims did not report how the suspects left their home in one-quarter (25.5%)
of cases and did not know whether suspects left together or separately in two-fifths of
cases (41.3%). When victims were able to report whether suspects left together or
separately, suspects appeared to flee together by a three-to-one margin (43.5% together to
15.2% separately). It is also possible that suspects fled on foot to a car parked out of the
victims’ sight.
7.2 The Suspect Model
As previously stated, sixteen of the fifty-five home invasions studied (29%) were
definitively linked to gangs in police reports. Gangs could not be linked conclusively to
the crimes committed in the remaining thirty-nine cases (71%), but were nevertheless
suspected of involvement.
7.2.1 Number of Suspects
The Modus Operandi Model presented findings on the number of suspects involved in
the home invasions examined here. As described earlier, two to four suspects took part in
the crime in approximately four out of five home invasions; four suspects were involved
in over one-third of cases.
7.2.2 Suspects’ Age
Assessing the age of suspects is quite difficult as it depends in the absence of arrests (and
therefore overwhelmingly) upon victims’ estimates. Some estimates are fairly precise,
for example, 24-26 years old, while others are not at all precise, such as 21-30 years old.
As a result, the researchers established three broad age categories: under 20 years old, 2130 years old, and 31-40 years old. No victim estimated the age of any suspect as over 40
years old. The lowest age estimate was 14-15 years old; the two suspects of that age
were accompanied by three other suspects who appeared to be in their early 20s.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, close to half of all suspects (46.8%) were estimated to be 21-30
years old. One-quarter (25.6%) were estimated to be 20 years old or younger. Just 3.4%
of suspects were believed to be 31-40 years old; victims were unable to estimate the ages
of the remaining one-quarter of suspects or provided age estimates that could not be
categorized (such as 20-40 years old, a range too broad to be analytically useful). Figure
19 displays the distribution of suspects’ ages in graphical form.
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22 April 2004
120
100
80
60
Count
40
20
0
14 to 20 years old
31 to 40 years old
21 to 30 years old
Unknow n
Suspects' Age
Figure 19: Age of Suspects
7.2.3 Suspects’ Ethnicity and Language Use
Suspects in the cases studied are predominantly (76.4%) ethnically Vietnamese, though
this is likely in large measure a function of the particular communities examined in this
project. Victims identified another 11.3% of suspects simply as “Asian,” with no specific
ethnicity; 6.9% of suspects were of unknown ethnicity (perhaps not seen by the victims).
Very small numbers of suspects had other ethnic origins: Chinese (2%), Laotian (1.5%),
Korean (1%), and Caucasian (1%). The ethnic breakdown of suspects did not differ
meaningfully by location.
Groups of suspects in individual cases are generally ethnically homogenous (70.9%),
though in nearly one-quarter (23.6%) of cases, homogeneity could not be established
because the ethnicity of one or more suspects was unknown. Eliminating the unknown
cases, 92.9% of groups are ethnically homogenous. This seems consistent with the
notion that gangs are formed within, but generally not across, particular ethnic groups.
Ethnic homogeneity of groups exceeded 90% in both the Orange County and the northern
Virginia cases.
Suspects used English to communicate in approximately one-third (34.5%) of cases and
Vietnamese in slightly more than one-quarter (27.3%) of cases. Suspects used both
English and Vietnamese in 25.5% of cases, all in Orange County. Virginia suspects used
English half again as frequently than their California counterparts, 41.2% to 26.3%.
Other languages—Cantonese and Korean—were used in 2% of cases or fewer. Victims
could not identify suspects’ spoken language in 3.6% of cases and no language was used
in 3.6% of cases.
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22 April 2004
The researchers attempted to assess suspects’ English language skills where possible—if
suspects used English during the crime or in custody—but data was unavailable in 36 of
the 55 cases (65.5%). The cases in which data exists are uninformative; 63.2% of
suspects were considered to have average language ability, 15.8% were considered to
have excellent language ability, and 15.8% were considered to have poor language
ability. This approximates a normal distribution (a bell curve) of English language skills,
which one would expect among any randomly selected group.
7.2.4 Evidence, Arrests, and Suspect Cooperation
Though the evidence collected in the cases studied was quite diverse—ranging from
audio recordings of gang members plotting a home invasion to an empty cookie tin left
by suspects who had devoured the contents during their crime—some patterns did
emerge. Because many home invaders bound their victims, and left the victims bound
when they left the scene, police officers were able to collect the materials used (duct tape,
zip ties, and even handcuffs in one case) in 54.5% of cases. Responding officers
discovered guns, knives or other weapons in 23.6% of cases and tools (screwdrivers, a
glass cutter, a hammer, and other items) in 9.1% of cases. Police were unable to collect
any evidence in 27.3% of cases. Fingerprints were collected in 15 cases (27.3%).
The collection of binding materials did not differ notably between the Orange County and
northern Virginia cases, though there were distinct differences in the weapons and tools
found at the crime scene. Police retrieved weapons in 31.6% of the California cases but
only 8.3% of the Virginia cases; they found tools in 13.2% of the Orange County cases
and none of the cases in Virginia, Kansas, or Oklahoma. Interestingly, northern Virginia
police collected no physical evidence whatsoever in two-fifths (41.7%) of cases, while
Orange County police left with no evidence in only 18.4% of cases. Likewise, Orange
County officers collected fingerprints in 34.2% of cases, though Virginia police found
fingerprints in only one of the twelve cases (8.3%).
Police arrested suspects in sixteen of fifty-five cases (29.1%) and generally arrested two
(six cases) or three (five cases) suspects. Northern Virginia police were somewhat more
successful in making arrests, doing so in 41.7% of cases. Orange County police arrested
suspects in 26.3% of cases. Figure 20 shows the number of arrests per case broken down
by state. When arrests were made, the mean number of arrests per case is somewhat
higher in the California cases than the northern Virginia cases, due primarily to success in
two cases that involved four and five arrests, respectively (Suspects in the five-arrest case
were betrayed prior to the planned crime by an informant who supplied an audio
recording of a strategy meeting).
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22 April 2004
50
40
30
State
20
VA
OK
Count
10
KS
0
CA
0
1
2
3
4
5
Number Arrested
Figure 20: Number of Arrests per Case by State
Overall, most suspects (61.1%) displayed “poor” cooperation with police. About onefifth (22.2%) provided cooperation at an “average” level, while 16.7% provided “high”
cooperation. Curiously, none of the Orange County suspects were rated as giving
“average” cooperation; all were considered “high” (27.3%) or “poor” (72.7%). No
Virginia suspects provided “high” cooperation; they were divided evenly between
average and poor (three cases of each).
Examining only those cases in which gang involvement was certain, the researchers
found a slight increase in “poor” cooperation (to 64.3%) and a larger increase in
“average” cooperation (to 28.6%) with a corresponding decline in “high” cooperation (to
7.1%). If some of the suspected gang cases did not in fact involve gangs, this would be
consistent with a hypothesis that gang members are less likely to cooperate with police
due to their greater loyalty to one another. Pursuit of that hypothesis is outside the scope
of this study, however, as the researchers’ aim is to examine behavior patterns by gangs
rather than criminals in general.
7.3 The Victim Model
Victims lived overwhelmingly in single family homes, which were the scenes of forty-six
of the fifty-five home invasions in this study, or 83.6% of cases. Four cases took place in
townhouses (7.3%), four cases in apartments (7.3%), and one case (1.8%) in a duplex.
(Duplexes have rarely been constructed in recent years and are increasingly rare.) The
selection of single-family homes likely reduces the number of potential witnesses and/or
surprise interruptions during the home invasion; it probably also reflects greater relative
65
22 April 2004
wealth on the part of the victims, who must be able to afford a single family home.
Police reports did not characterize the neighborhood in fifteen cases.
Approximately one-third of homes (32.7%) were located in upper middle class
neighborhoods, while another one-third (34.5%) were located in middle class
neighborhoods. Just 3.6% and 1.8% of homes were located in working class or lower
class neighborhoods, respectively. Victims in only four cases (7.3%) reported using
security systems in their homes; all were in single-family homes in upper middle class
neighborhoods. Figure 21 displays the breakdown of residence types by neighborhood.
20
Type of Residence
10
Single Family
Count
Tow nhouse
Duplex
Apartment
0
Missing
Upper Middle
Middle
Low Income
Working Class
Type of Area
Figure 21: Types of Residence by Neighborhood
7.4 Victims’ Households
The number of victims ranged from one (nine cases) to twelve (two cases), though
officers in one of the cases involving twelve victims expressed concern about the
possibility of a false report. The average number of victims was quite close to four
(3.93), though the mean was higher in the Orange County cases (4.16) than the northern
Virginia cases (2.50). Households included either two or four victims most frequently,
with ten cases (18.2%) in each category. Figure 22 reports the number of victims by
state.
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22 April 2004
12
10
8
6
State
VA
4
OK
Count
2
KS
0
CA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
12
Number of Victims
Figure 22: Number of Victims by State
Approximately one-half (51.4%) of victims were under thirty years old, divided roughly
evenly between eighteen years old and under (27.9%) and nineteen to thirty years old
(23.5%). Children sixteen years old or younger were present in 45.5% of households at
the time of the home invasion crime; adults over sixty-five years old were present in
29.1% of cases. Fifty-three point six percent (53.6%) of the total number of victims were
female and 46.4% were male.
Figure 23 displays the number of victims in each age category by state. The peaks in the
data are consistent with an effort to target households built around individuals in the 41 to
55 age range who have multiple children or grandchildren and, in some cases, one or two
of their parents in their homes. The fact that those in the 41 to 55 bracket represent only
18.4% of the total number of victims but are present in 54.5% of the households also
supports this hypothesis. Figure 24 demonstrates that the age distribution of victims
differs little between the Orange County and northern Virginia cases.
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22 April 2004
60
50
40
State
30
VA
20
Count
OK
10
KS
0
CA
18 and under
31 to 40
19 to 30
56 to 65
41 to 55
66 and over
Victim's Age
Figure 23: Number of Victims by Age and State
30
20
10
Percent
State
CA
VA
0
18 and under
19 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 55
56 to 65
Victim's Age
Figure 24: Percentage of Victims by Age and State
68
66 and over
22 April 2004
7.4.1 Resistance, Injuries, and Medical Attention
Victims generally offered little resistance (63.5%) or none (17.3%). Victims presented
“strong” resistance to home invasions in 9.6% of cases and “average” resistance in 9.6%
of cases. Victims in Orange County tended to offer more resistance than those in
northern Virginia, as is clear at the left side of Figure 25. Note that the “strong”
resistance in 8.3% of cases in Virginia is due to just one case and that there are no cases
of “average” resistance there.
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
CA vs VA
10
CA Percent
VA Percent
0
Strong
Average
Little
None
Figure 25: Level of Resistance by State
Fortunately, no victims were injured in a large majority of cases (69.1%) and no victims
were killed in any cases in this study. One victim was injured in 16.4% of cases and two
or three victims were injured in 5.5% of cases each. Four victims were injured in one
case (1.8%) and six victims were injured in one case (1.8%). Notably, one or more
victims were injured in only one of the northern Virginia cases; all of the remaining
fifteen cases in which victims were injured took place in Orange County.
Though victims were injured in 30.9% of cases, they sought medical attention in only
21.8% of cases. Thus victims were injured but did not seek medical attention in 9.1% of
cases, slightly less than one-third of the cases in which injuries occurred. These injuries
were likely minor cuts or bruises. Victims sought medical attention from paramedics or
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) in 7.3% of cases, about one-quarter of the cases
involving injuries, and sought treatment at a hospital in 12.7% of cases, or about twofifths of the injury cases. (The victim in the sole Virginia case sought hospital care.)
The relationship between victims’ resistance and injuries and medical attention is an
interesting one. As is clear from Figure 26, victims offering strong resistance did not
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22 April 2004
seek medical attention in 40% of cases, while at least one victim sought care at a hospital
in 60% of cases. Direct examination of the data shows that the home invasion crime was
disrupted (not completed) in all of the five cases in which victims resisted strongly—but
with serious injuries to victims in a solid majority of cases. Examination of the cases
showed strong physical resistance to the home invaders in most cases.
Home invasions were disrupted in a solid majority (80%) of cases in which victims
presented average resistance, though the data demonstrate that their resistance focused
primarily on calling the police or otherwise seeking help rather than physically
confronting their attackers. Graph 15 suggests that this is a more successful—though still
dangerous—strategy, in that victims did not need medical attention in 75% of cases and
sought hospital care in 25% of cases.
Victims who gave little resistance sought attention from paramedics or EMTs in 9.1% of
cases and from hospitals in 9.1% of cases. Victims who offered no resistance sought help
from paramedics or EMTs in 11.1% of cases; none needed hospital care.
y
100
80
60
Level of Resistance
40
Strong Percent
Average Percent
20
Little Percent
None Percent
0
None
Paramedic/EMT
Hospital
Figure 26: Medical Attention by Resistance
Curiously, when victims offered strong resistance and were injured, not more than one
victim was injured. As is clear from Figure 27, this was not true in the cases when
victims offered average or little resistance; in eight combined cases (14.6%), more than
one victim was injured. In fact, these cases are a majority of the cases when victims
presented average or little resistance. Only one victim was injured in 10.9% of cases.
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22 April 2004
Figures 26 and 27 demonstrate clearly that the safest course for victims was to avoid any
attempt to resist.
40
30
20
Level of Resistance
None
Count
10
Little
Average
0
Strong
0
1
2
3
4
6
Number Injured
Figure 27: Number Injures by Resistance
7.4.2 Reporting, Descriptions, Relationships, and Willingness to Testify
Previous writing on ethnically-based gangs has argued that victims may be reluctant to
report crimes that occur in their communities due to distrust of police, fear of retaliation,
and other factors, but the level of underreporting cannot be determined by this study. We
do know that 63.6% of crimes in this study were in fact reported by the victims and only
36.4% were reported by others. Moreover, an overwhelming 94.0% of home invasions
were reported within one hour of the event. Another 4.0% of crimes were reported
between one and two hours after the crime. Just one home invasion (2.0%) was reported
more than two hours later; that case was reported more than twenty-four hours later.
Victims requested language assistance in 40% of cases.
Both victims and witnesses were also quite willing to testify. Victims in 60.4% of cases
showed a “strong” willingness to testify, as did witnesses in 73.7% of cases. Victims
displayed an “average” willingness to testify in 33.3% of cases, though witnesses
demonstrated this level of willingness in just 21.1% of cases. “Weak” willingness to
testify was uncommon; police reported this level of willingness from victims in 6.3% of
cases and witnesses in 5.3% of cases. Needless to say, victims and witnesses who decide
to report home invasions or other crimes—especially when they decide quickly, as in
most of the cases in this study—are probably considerably more willing to testify than
those who elect not to report crimes at all.
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22 April 2004
Victims’ willingness to report home invasions and to testify could be related to the fact
that 77.8% of suspects were described as “strangers,” that is, they were not personally
known to the victims. On the contrary, however, victims displayed a strong willingness
to testify in eight of the ten cases in which the suspects were not strangers (when they
were family friends, children’s friends, casual or business acquaintances or when they
were led to the victims by someone in one of these categories). In fact, when victims and
suspects were strangers, victims demonstrated strong willingness to testify in a slightly
smaller share of cases that the total population (56.8% strong willingness to testify
against strangers, 60.4% strong willingness to testify overall).
Witnesses’ descriptions were generally superior in quality to the descriptions provided by
victims, though witness reports were available in only 34.5% of cases. Figure 28 shows
the relative quality of descriptions from the two groups.
Quality of Witnesses' Description
Quality of Victims' Description
60
70
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
Percent
Percent
20
10
0
Excellent
Quality of V Description
Average
10
0
Poor
Excellent
Average
Poor
Quality of W Description
Figure 28: Quality of Victim and Witness Descriptions
As is apparent, victims and witnesses in a comparable share of cases provided excellent
descriptions (victims in 29.4% of cases and witnesses in 31.6% of cases). However,
witnesses gave average descriptions much more frequently, and poor descriptions much
less frequently, than victims. In fact, witnesses gave average descriptions in 63.2% of
cases for which witness descriptions were available, compared to victims in 49.0% of
cases. And witnesses provided poor descriptions in only 5.3% of cases where witnesses
were available, while victims provided poor description in 21.6% of cases. There are a
variety of possible explanations for this discrepancy; two of the most plausible are that
victims’ descriptions degrade due to the trauma of the event, which is more removed for
witnesses, or that witnesses who could provide only poor descriptions simply do not
come forward, because they believe they have little to offer.
There are several differences between the northern Virginia and Orange County cases.
First, Orange County witnesses offered substantially better descriptions of suspects. All
witness descriptions in northern Virginia were rated as average, while fully 40% of
California witness descriptions were excellent. California victims were also considerably
more willing to testify; victims in 72.7% of Orange County cases displayed a strong
willingness to testify, while only 18.2% of Virginia cases fell in the same category.
Finally, Orange County cases were divided evenly among victim-reported and witness-
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22 April 2004
reported crimes, with 50% of cases in each group. Northern Virginia home invasions
were victim-reported in 91.7% of cases.
7.4.3 Police Responses
The most striking finding concerning police responses is the disparity between the
number of officers responding in the Orange County and northern Virginia cases. The
mean number of officers responding in the thirty-six California cases for which data were
available was 4.36, with a standard deviation of 2.62; just two officers were dispatched to
the crime scene in 30.6% of cases. In contrast, the mean number of officers responding
in the twelve northern Virginia cases was 10.50, with a standard deviation of 3.61; twelve
or fourteen officers responded in 50% of cases. Thus, on average, northern Virginia
police departments sent six more officers to the scene. It was demonstrated earlier that
northern Virginia departments made arrests in 41.7% of cases, compared to arrests in
26.3% of cases in Orange County, though in Virginia fewer fingerprint records are taken
and less evidence is collected overall. Figure 29 presents the percentage of cases in
which a given number of officers responded, segregated by state.
40
30
20
CA vs VA
Percent
10
CA
0
VA
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
Number of Officers
Figure 29: Officers Responding by State
Police departments used photo lineups to attempt to identify suspects in two-thirds
(66.0%) of cases and asked victims to identify property in 89.1% of cases. Photo lineups
were somewhat more common in the northern Virginia cases, where they were used
75.0% of the time, compared to 62.9% use in Orange County.
When photo lineups were not used, one or more arrests were made in just 14.3% of cases;
when they were used, one or more arrests were made in 64.7% of cases. Similarly, when
victims were not asked to identify property, one or more arrests were made in 26.1% of
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22 April 2004
cases and when victims were asked to identify property, one or more arrests were made in
80% of cases.
Canines were used in 14.3% of cases overall, though they were much more common in
Virginia than California. Dogs were used in four of twelve (33.3%) of cases with
available data in northern Virginia and just three of thirty-seven cases (8.1%) in Orange
County. One or more arrests were made in 57.1% of cases when canines were used and
in 25.5% of cases when canines were not used.
7.5 Summary
7.5.1 Modus Operandi Model
• Home invasions were most common during Monday evenings (6:00 p.m. to 12:00
a.m.) and Thursday mornings (6:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.) and least common during
daytime Sundays (12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.), Monday and Tuesday mornings, and
Thursday evenings.
• Ruses were used in 58.3% of cases in northern Virginia, but only 15.8% of cases
in California. Forced entry was used in 44.7% of cases in Orange County, but
only 8.3% of cases in Virginia.
• Suspects entered through the front door in 44.7% of cases and the back door in
21.3% of cases.
• Home invasions generally involved two (20% of cases), three (23.6% of cases), or
four (36.4% of cases) suspects who used firearms in 89.1% of cases and
occasionally used other weapons, such as knives (21.8%), as well.
• Suspects used tools rarely, in 20% of cases, but used bindings of various types
commonly, in nearly half of cases (47.3%). Cords (electrical extension cords,
telephone cords) were used in 42.3% of these cases, though zip ties (23.1% of
cases) and duct tape (19.2%) were also used in many cases.
• Suspects used masks in 56.4% of cases and gloves in 36.4% of cases; Orange
County suspects appeared more sophisticated, in that they used both of these
means to frustrate investigation more frequently than suspects in Virginia.
• Suspects cut telephone lines in about one-third of cases (32.7%) and very rarely
attempted home invasions in homes with alarms (7.3% of cases).
• Suspects used physical violence in one-third of cases (34.5%) and simply bound
or confined their victims in nearly two-fifths of cases (38.2%) without employing
violence. Most violence was limited to hitting, kicking, or pushing (73.7% of
cases); just 15.8% of cases involved cutting or stabbing and 10.5% involved guns.
All of the weapon-related violence was in California cases. Sexual assault was
very rare, occurring in only one of fifty-five cases, although this result might be
due to underreporting.
• One-third of home invasions studied (34.6%) lasted ten minutes or fewer and
38.2% lasted between ten and thirty minutes. During this time, 33.3% of homes
were partially ransacked and 42.6% were completely ransacked.
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Cash and jewelry were taken in 52.7% of cases and 56.4% of cases, respectively.
Jewelry was taken much more commonly in Orange County (62.2% of cases) than
northern Virginia (27.3% of cases).
One-third (34.6%) of home invasions were disrupted by police, calls for help,
resistance from the victims, and other means.
Suspects generally fled the scene on foot (43.6% of cases) rather than by car
(25.5% of cases), though many victims were not able to report how suspects
departed (25.5% of cases). Suspects generally fled together rather than
separating.
7.5.2 Suspect Model
• Almost half (46.8%) of suspects were between twenty-one and thirty years old
and one-quarter (25.6%) were twenty years old or younger.
• In cases when victims were able to see all of the suspects, suspects were
overwhelmingly (92.9%) in ethnically homogenous groups.
• Suspects in the cases examined were predominantly (74.6%) ethnically
Vietnamese, though this may be a reflection of the regions studied.
• Suspects used English to communicate in approximately one-third (34.5%) of
cases and Vietnamese in slightly more than one-quarter (27.3%) of cases.
Suspects used both languages in 25.5% of cases, all in Orange County.
• Bindings were the most common evidence collected (54.5% of cases), followed
by weapons (23.6% of cases) and tools (9.1% of cases). Police collected
fingerprints in 27.3% of cases.
• Weapons and tools were found more frequently in the Orange County cases.
Police collected fingerprints more frequently in the California cases as well.
• Northern Virginia police made arrests in 41.7% of cases, compared to 26.3% of
cases in Orange County. Most suspects (61.1% of cases) displayed poor
cooperation, which was more common in Orange County (72.7% of cases).
7.5.3 Victim Model
• Single-family homes were targeted in 83.6% of cases. Home invasions generally
occurred in upper middle class (32.7%) or middle class (34.5%) neighborhoods.
• The average number of victims present was approximately four. The age
breakdown of each household suggests that 54.5% of cases involved victims
between forty-one and fifty-five years old with some or all of their children,
grandchildren, and parents in the household.
• Victims generally offered little resistance (63.5% of cases) or none (17.3% of
cases) and offered strong resistance in just 9.6% of cases. Strong resistance
disrupted the crime in every case when tried, but resulted in a victim receiving
hospital care in three-fifths of those cases. Victims who did not attempt to resist
needed medical help, from paramedics or EMTs, in 11.1% of cases.
• Almost two-thirds (63.6% of cases) were reported by the victims and about onethird (36.4%) were reported by witnesses. Almost all (94%) home invasions were
reported within one hour.
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•
•
•
•
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Victims and witnesses showed strong willingness to testify in 60.4% of cases and
73.7% of cases, respectively.
Suspects had a direct or indirect relationship with the victims in 22.2% of cases
and were strangers in 77.8% of cases.
Witnesses generally provided better suspect descriptions than victims, perhaps
because they were less traumatized or because witnesses who could not offer an
average or excellent description did not come forward.
On average, northern Virginia police departments dispatched six more officers to
the scene of home invasion crimes than California departments.
Police departments used photo lineups to attempt to identify suspects in twothirds (66.0%) of cases and asked victims to identify property in 89.1% of cases.
Dogs were used in four of twelve (33.3%) of cases with available data in northern
Virginia and just three of thirty-seven cases (8.1%) in Orange County. One or
more arrests were made in 57.1% of cases when canines were used and in 25.5%
of cases when canines were not used.
Asian Gangs and Identity Theft: An Introduction
Identity theft is a criminal offense that, according to statistics, is on the rise. Asian gangs
have served as a fixture within major metropolitan regions for quite some time, renewing
themselves with each new wave of migration and gentrification. The combination of the
two phenomena seems likely, and indeed is something that the law enforcement
community of Orange County, California, has encountered recently. What drove the
commission of this report, however, was when law enforcement officials in Orange
County found that other metropolitan communities across the country were discovering
cases of Asian gangs and the use of identity theft to foment financial fraud. As such,
Orange County wished to know if Asian gangs were engaging in identity theft for
financial fraud around the country, if this was a trend that had its origins in Orange
County or the West Coast, and what best practices, if any, existed for investigating Asian
gangs engaging in identity theft for financial fraud. The last concern also merged later
with a request to validate the approach that Orange County’s RGET takes in Asian gang
investigations.
The final sections of the report begin with a review of identity theft, since a review of the
literature reveals that the criminal justice community is far from settling on an agreeable
definition and scope of identity theft, with an eye towards qualifying the volume and
veracity of the data set for this study. The report next turns to three hypothesis that the
research team developed to address the first concern of Orange County, and includes an
improved understanding of the different types of organized criminality that might engage
in identity theft. The report concludes with a discussion addressing the second of Orange
County’s queries, and includes an outline of how future research could benefit the
production of best practices.
For the production of these sections of the report, the authors consulted a wide range of
online and library sources, including official reports, media articles and scholarly pieces.
The authors supplemented this research with interviews and discussions with law
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enforcement and other experts in the metropolitan areas of Orange County, Washington
DC, Miami, and Philadelphia.
9
Identity Theft: Poor Data from Fragmented Sources
Identity theft is a widely recognized phenomenon without a commonly held definition.
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 establishes a comprehensive
definition of identity theft in 18 USC 1028(a) as someone who:
1) knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification document or a
false identification document;
2) knowingly transfers an identification document or a false identification document
knowing that such document was stolen or produced without lawful authority;
3) knowingly possesses with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or
more identification documents (other than those issued lawfully for the use of the
possessor) or false identification documents;
4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than one issued lawfully
for the use of the possessor) or a false identification document, with the intent
such document be used to defraud the United States;
5) knowingly produces, transfers, or possesses a document-making implement with
the intent such document-making implement will be used in the production of a
false identification document or another document-making implement which will
be so used;
6) knowingly possesses an identification document that is or appears to be an
identification document of the United States which is stolen or produced without
lawful authority knowing that such document was stolen or produced without
such authority; or
7) knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity
that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any
applicable State or local law;
Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse in San Diego, provides a more
simplistic definition:
[Identity theft] occurs when someone uses bits and pieces of information
about an individual—usually the Social Security number—to represent
him or herself as that person for fraudulent purposes.24
While both definitions appear authoritative enough, dissent amongst experts occurs when
definitions are applied to criminal acts. That is, experts oftentimes fail to agree on
whether identity theft is a criminal act unto itself, corresponding to such crimes as
Medicare fraud or credit card fraud, or a criminal method of achieving these ends. Due to
this confusion, the report adopted the phrase “identity theft for financial fraud” to limit
24
Beth Givens. 2000, July 12. Identity Theft: How it Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative
Solutions, Written Testimony for the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and
Government Information. See http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm
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22 April 2004
the focus of the inquiry as well as to state clearly the view of identity theft being a
criminal method that supports fraud.
Another result of this failure to define identity theft is that at the federal level of law
enforcement, no one agency has stepped forward to assert jurisdiction over identity theft
cases. A General Accounting Office has identified a number of different agencies that
hold jurisdiction over identity theft cases.25 While the Secret Service, given its mandate
to investigate financial crimes and fraud cases, is often the most active agency vis-à-vis
identity theft, a handful of other agencies are very active as well. The Social Security
Administration investigates cases of fraud involving social security numbers. The
Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division intercepts fraudulent tax
returns, many that are based on false or stolen identities. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the United States Postal Inspection Service also frequently encounter
criminal cases involving identity theft as well. Fragmentation at the federal level of law
enforcement has complicated data collection on identity theft given that missions and
data recording standards differ across these agencies, and the lack of a coordinated
approach led to little being found to serve as best practices for investigating identity theft
perpetrated by Asian gangs.
The same structures and resulting problems are found at the other levels of law
enforcement. Since local and state agencies are oftentimes the places where victims of
identity theft first turn, local and state agencies are charged with the responsibility of
opening identity theft investigations and, significantly, are the first authorities that can
address the concerns and fears of victims. A number of states like Virginia and Florida
have created task forces to study the problem of identity theft in the context of their own
states, focusing on the need for state-level legislation and state and/or local law
enforcement requirements to meet the growing impact of identity theft. Florida, for
example, has empanelled a special grand jury to hear identity theft cases, and has teamed
the grand jury with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to track and manage
cases in Florida.26 As of the end of 2001, only 3 states had laws on the book
criminalizing ID theft, though almost every state had done so by the end of January 2003
(see Attachment A for a list of state laws).
Many reports also note the role that the private sector has in fighting identity theft. The
three major credit reporting agencies (CRAs)—Trans Union, Experian and Equifax—
issue reports and evaluations of credit to creditors, and therefore are critical stakeholders
in any effort to address the problem. Likewise, since most criminals use stolen identities
to obtain fraudulent lines of credit, banks and other creditors are oftentimes victimized by
financial frauds predicated on identity theft. In fact, the major credit card companies—
Visa, Mastercard, and American Express—all have become more proactive in their
attempts to halt the granting of credit based on stolen identities before it occurs.
Provident Bank in Baltimore, for example, began to run credit checks on those trying to
25
US General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be Growing (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office), March 2002. Report GAO-02-363.
26
Thomas A. Sadaka. 2001, Nov 8. Preventing Identity Theft by Terrorists and Criminals, Testimony for
the US House Committees on Financial Services and on Ways and Means., pp.30-2.
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open accounts via the Internet or over the phone (i.e. instances when the checking of
identities in person is not done) in order to intercept cases of identity takeover.27
Reflecting the increasing attention that the private sector is giving to identity theft, the
American Banking Association, a large trade sector group, has created an entire program
to promote solutions to identity theft that the private sector can adopt. The leading
response to identity theft from the private sector, however, has been one of risk reduction.
Banks and other financial institutions have largely accepted the losses incurred from
financial frauds predicated on identity theft as part of doing business. The private sector
therefore vastly under-reports the incidents of identity theft that they encounter, thus
further depleting the data pool of known cases.
As the rapid increase of state laws attests, a marked increase in cases of identity theft has
occurred over the past decade. A landmark GAO study cited a 16 fold increase in the
number of calls to the fraud department of the Trans Union credit reporting agency
(CRA) between 1992 and 1997 as supporting the conclusion that identity theft was on the
rise.28 The same report noted that Secret Service arrests for cases involving identity fraud
were 8806 in 1995, 8686 for 1996, and 9455 for 1997. In fact, the GAO noted that over
93% of the arrests the Financial Services Division of the Secret Service made were tied to
identity theft. Another GAO report noted that the FTC’s Identity Theft Data
Clearinghouse, established in late 1999, had received a staggering 94,100 cases: rising
from 445 calls per week in November 1999 to over 3000 calls per week in December
2001.29 Some difficulties arise, however, in trying to measure the incidents of identity
theft, particularly since agencies have traditionally viewed it as a part of other criminal
acts and thus not a quantifiable crime unto itself. All in all, the majority of experts in the
field feel that identity theft is a significant, if not growing, problem for law enforcement.
What is driving this increase? Likely the primary reason is the ease with which criminals
can obtain identification documents. In short, the Social Security Number (SSN) serves
as a de facto primary identification number for Americans, but the legal framework to
protect the SSN as a primary identifier is not in place. For example, as there is no law
prohibiting the use of SSNs outside of the social security system, SSNs are oftentimes
used as identifiers for college students, drivers’ licenses, utility bills, military IDs,
medical practices, and a host of other uses. Most significantly, the SSN is the primary
piece of information required for most all credit and financial transactions in the United
States. The proliferation of usage overall, which makes the SSN more readily available
to thieves, coupled with the consolidation of SSN usage in the financial arena, is likely
the primary driver for identity theft in the United States.
Another significant factor is the practice of the financial sector itself. The liberalization
of banking and credit rules in the United States has led to a proliferation of credit cards,
27
Lynne Sanders. 2001, May/June. “Stopping ID Theft in its Tracks,” ABA Bank Compliance, pp. 35-7.
See http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/000055b7seplchdjuorvjekw/Resource9993.pdf.
28
US General Accounting Office. 1998, May. Identity Fraud: Information on Prevalence, Cost, and
Internet Impact is Limited. Report No. GCD-98-100BR.
29
US General Accounting Office. 2002, March. Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be
Growing. Report No. GAO-02-363.
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banking accounts, and lending mechanisms that all compete with one-another.
Furthermore, banks are now allowed to compete for business across the United States,
whereas older rules limited them to states where they had a physical presence. All this
has led to a frantic increase in competition amongst lenders and creditors that, in turn, has
created ever more opportunities for identity theft. Think of how many instant-access,
pre-approved credit card, mortgage and home equity offers you receive in an average
week—each of these serves as a potential opening for identity thieves. Related is the
proliferation of accounts and credit lines that consumers can now activate through
Internet and electronic banking, avoiding physical contact altogether. All this has
reduced the common checking of identification for credit and banking access to minimal
standards that are fueling an increase of skilled operators ready to take advantage.
Finally, some experts hold to a common-heard complaint—that white collar and financial
crimes do not receive the attention they deserve from law enforcement and/or the court
system. Beth Givens noted that “law enforcement resources are not yet sufficient to
investigate the majority of such crimes,” and that “penalties are minimal and rarely
include jail time. Community service and parole are the usual sentences.”30 Such low
risk of apprehension and such lenient sentencing, if still true, would create a risk and
reward matrix that greatly enhances the attractiveness of identity theft amongst
criminals—including organized crime.
The methods of stealing one’s identity are fairly straightforward. One set of methods
centers on mail and credit clips. Identity thieves can root through trash for unopened
credit applications, credit card slips, bank records, or other documents that have
identifying information on it. Garbage bins are targeted both at residences and at
businesses, which often do not shred their receipts and copies of credit slips. Mail theft
remains a problem, with identity thieves stealing personal mail from unsecured boxes for
records and identifying information. Finally, identity thieves also will sometimes contact
creditors or use USPS mail forms to change the mailing address of utility bills, credit card
statements, and even bank statements to an address under their control and thus obtain
another’s records.
Another set of methods identity thieves use center on the use of theft or deception to
obtain identity-related information. Trans Union, a major CRA, sites unauthorized
insider access and theft of records containing SSNs and other identifiers as the primary
method for identity theft.31 Another method was recently brought to light in a bulletin
from the Office of the Controller of the Currency, which noted that organized crime and
gangs were increasingly recruiting or seeking to place tellers into banks in order to obtain
identifiers from customers when they visited the bank branches.32 Identity thieves have
also been known to target third parties, such as cleaning staff or contractors working with
credit agencies, in order to access insider records. Finally, numerous reports have
30
Givens, 2000, p.3.
Stephanie Armour, 2003, Jan 1. “Employment Records Prove Ripe Source for Identity Theft,” USA
Today. See http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2003-01-23-idtheft-cover_x.htm.
32
OCC Alert 2002-4. 2002, April 25. “Identity Theft: Organized Gang and Teller Collusion Schemes.”
See http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/alert/2002-4.txt.
31
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surfaced recently of thieves using store clerks to double swipe credit cards, once through
the store’s machine and the second time through a reader attached to a laptop or palmtop
computer, to collect credit card and other information for later criminal use.
Finally, there are online and even more novel methods for obtaining identification
information. Supporting the oft-spoken dictum that the Internet is not a mystical place
where almost anything can happen, online schemes closely mimic the methods identified
above. Hackers can break into the records databases of companies to steal files, or use
insiders to provide them legitimate access codes for the same end. Thieves have recently
begun to use online job sites to collect resumes and other personal identification
information from unsuspecting job-seekers who think they are applying for legitimate
positions—a practice that prompted one of the largest online job sites, monster.com, to
email millions of its customers and warn of the practice.33 Finally, some thieves have
managed to obtain credit reports online and post or sell the SSNs.
In the end, what this brief overview of identity theft revealed to the project team was that
the data set for identity theft in general was poor at best and not likely to support
rigorous, validated findings. The lack of consensus on a definition of identity theft
amongst experts, much less among the numerous Federal, state and local law
enforcement and prosecutorial agencies handling such cases, made data collection
difficult and reconciliation of data even more so. Further, it became clear that, as the
following section details in more depth, the differing mission statements of these
agencies led to little data on the role that Asian gangs might play in conducting identity
theft. Hence, the report largely relies on more anecdotal data sets that, when coupled to
the interviews with experts in the fields of gang and identity theft investigation, led to
educated inferences on the implications on the hypotheses defined below.
10
Hypotheses and Findings
Using the data collection and interviews from the project, the team settled on three
hypotheses to address Orange County’s concerns. First, that identity theft is evolving as
a mainstream criminal enterprise for both organized crime and Asian criminal enterprises
(ACEs), but not as much for occidental and Asian street gangs. Second, ACEs are the
organizations of the three aforementioned that most frequently engage in identity theft.
Finally that, like other trends, the gang involvement in identity theft began in California
and is now a “business model” being exported to other parts of the United States. Each
of these hypotheses is outlined further and data, either supporting or falsifying them, is
provided.
10.1 Identity Theft and Organized Criminality
The first hypothesis is likely the most straightforward to evaluate so long as it is clear that
the objects of comparison are clear. Organized crime, for example, is an often cited
phenomenon by criminologists, law enforcement professionals, international
organizations, academic scholars, and numerous other entities. For each entity, scholar,
33
Associated Press. 2003, Feb 27. “Monster.com Warns of Identity Theft,” Wired. See
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,57852,00.html.
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and professional that studies or “works” organized crime, there is a definition that in
some way shape or form is contradictory to other definitions.34 From this wide range of
definitions, the study selected a broader definition that set organized crime apart from the
other types of organized criminality examined in this study—street gangs and ACEs. For
this study, then, organized crime groups are defined as “a continuing criminal enterprise
that works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand … through the
use of force, threats, and/or the corruption of public officials,”35
While most often associated with smuggling, extortion and vice rackets, organized crime
is increasingly adapting to more white collar crime models. Identity theft is fast
becoming the lynchpin in this strategy. In Arizona, an Afghan crime group utilized local
drug users as fronts to open lines of credit in others’ names and steal close to $100,000 a
month.36 In Las Vegas, a Federal task force shut down a Romanian crime syndicate
using stolen credit cards to defraud ATMs and casino cashiers—some $18,000 in one 90
minute span.37 Finally, there was a recent report that outlined how international
organized crime groups recruiting individuals working in local braches of global financial
institutions to obtain access to lines of credit, identities, and other financial information.
While the corruption of insiders is a common tactic of criminal organizations, what made
the latter report unique was that the groups combined fronts like religious and social
organizations with the recent rise of anti-American sentiment as the “hook” to recruit
like-minded individuals in such countries as Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Middle East
who then became the providers of identity information.38
Traditional gangs, on the other hand, have not rushed into identity theft in large numbers.
The definition of a street gang is nearly as contentious as the one for organized crime.
The team found that one of the better definitions for the purpose of this paper was the one
belonging to Jean Moore, who stated a gang is:
An unsupervised peer groups who are socialized by the streets rather than
by conventional institutions. They define themselves as a gang or "set" or
some such term, and have the capacity to reproduce themselves, usually
within a specific neighborhood.39
34
For an interesting analysis of definitions of organized crime, see Klaus von Lampe’s collection of
definitions at http://people.freenet.de/kvlampe/OCDEF1.htm.
35
Jay Albanese. 1989. Organized Crime in America, Cincinnati: Anderson. Pp. 4-5.
36
Ed Baker. 2002, June 16. “Afghan Crime Ring May Have Used ID Theft to Swindle Arizona Banks,”
East Valley Tribune.
37
John Smith. 2002, Feb 19. “Credit Card Scheme Paints Modern Picture of Mob Operations,” Las Vegas
Review-Journal. Page B1.
38
Andrew Conry-Murray. 2003, May 1. “Criminal Syndicates Use Anti-Americanism to Recruit Data
Thieves.” Network Magazine. Page 20.
39
Jean Moore. 1998. “Understanding Youth Gangs: Economic Restructuring and the Urban Underclass.”
In Meredith Watts (ed.). Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Youth and Violence. Stamford: JAI Press. Page
67.
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Gang experts the team spoke with repeatedly stressed that turf and loyalty, the latter often
based through common culture or ethnicity, are the defining essence of these gangs, and
serves as the major difference between gangs and organized crime—the latter is more
focused on illicit profits and economic gain.
But the research team learned that the term street gang remained too abstract for the
purposes of this study, especially given the need to focus on Asian gangs. The research
team found that the dichotomy of occidental versus Asian street gang worked best for this
project. Occidental is a term that Californian and other law enforcement personnel use to
describe those gangs that are not Asian in original, while the latter refer to street gangs
drawn primarily from the émigré communities from Southeast Asian countries and
Korea, but also including some Japanese and Chinese gangs. As a veteran gang
investigator for a local police department in Orange County outlined, significant
differences exist between occidental and Asian street gangs:
•
Education: Asian gang members display higher levels of education and tend
to not only remain in school but excel, while members of occidental gangs
rarely remain in school or attain levels of education beyond basic high school
level.
•
Mobility: Asian gangs are more often mobile and not connected to specific
turf, while occidental gangs are tied to the notion of controlling specific areas
of metropolitan areas.
•
Media Savvy: Asian gangs often emulate what they see in the media and
seek to engage the media.
•
Identity: Asian gangs are more embedded in communal and familial norms
and see respect or “face” as a foundational concept, while occidental gangs
are more closely tied to their struggle to retain their turf.
•
Public Persona: Asian gangs eschew the overt baggy and clothing, colors,
and other identifiers found in occidental gangs for more subtle forms of gang
identification.40
•
Organization: Asian and occidental gangs share a single leader structure, but
Asian gangs have a much more fluid leadership structure that can change
depending on the type of activity they will engage in. Occidental gangs have
a much more structured and inflexible organizational hierarchy, while Asian
gangs have a fluid and less structured organizational network.
In the end, these and other differences, such as the role of graffiti, led the team to take the
step of separating occidental and Asian street gangs as separate foci of analysis.
40
In fact, the investigator noted, Asian gang members often seek to fool police while “flying colors” as a
way of “gaining face” or respect from their other gang members.
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While organized crime is oftentimes linked to identity theft for financial fraud, neither the
interviews conducted nor the survey of media and other sources revealed few instances of
ties between street gangs and identity theft. Law enforcement and other experts have
noted links between occidental street gangs and identity theft in Salt Lake City, Los
Angeles, New York, and other major cities.41 For example a United States District
Attorney in New York City indicted the leaders and numerous members of a BloodBloodette gang that, among other crimes, earned thousands of dollars monthly from an
identity theft scheme.42 In another case, gangs purchased identities that an employee of
Teledata had stolen using unauthorized access to the computer systems of various clients
of the company, including the major CRAs, Ford Motor Credit, Washington Mutual, and
Dollar Bank.43
Some evidence of street gang involvement in identity theft was found outside of the
United States. The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada’s 2003 Annual Report on
Organized Crime noted that street gangs were becoming increasingly involved in
“counterfeit check and debit card fraud, primarily in the lower-level activities of stealing
personal identification numbers (PINs) and card skimming. It is also known that some
gangs are promoting themselves through websites and have members who have
specialized computer knowledge which could facilitate criminal activities.”44 The fact
that such trends were clearly identified in Canada might arise from a looser or more
inclusive definition of “gangs,” but it raises the issue of whether it is just a matter of time
before gangs turn their technical abilities to the conduct of criminal acts more serious
than downloading music or copying movies.
The lack of frequency with which of street gangs, either occidental or Asian, engaging in
identity theft for financial fraud reinforced the separation between formal organized
crime groups and street gangs as objects of investigation. What is more, the interviews
revealed that investigators were oftentimes surprised that they had not seen identity theft
by Asian gangs, while they held no such sentiment for occidental street gangs. Such
sentiment was often rooted in the sophistication, savvy, and business-like nature of the
Asian street gang, further supporting the split between occidental and Asian gangs as
objects for analysis.
Seeking validation or confirmation of this conclusion, the team asked experienced Asian
gang investigators in Philadelphia and Fairfax County (VA) to account for the lack of
cases. The interviewees often cited the lack of sophistication among gang members as
the main reason for not seeing evidence of gang involvement in identity theft. The lack
41
Matt Canham. 2002, Sep 1. “Gangbangers Going Underground: Crooks, Cops Grow More Sophisticated
in Their Methods,” The Salt Lake Tribune, p. B1; Darrel Giles. 2001, May 16. “Clean Cut but Still Cut
Throat,” Herald Sun (Melbourne), p. 37.
42
Robert Gearty and Bill Hutchinson. 2001, May 9. “Sweeping up Street Gang, Feds Indict 15 Bloods,
Bloodettes in E. Coast Crime Spree,” The New York Daily News, p. 3.
43
Steven Marlin. 2003, Jan 1. “Busted ID Theft Ring Part of a Growing Epidemic,” Bank Systems and
Technology, p. 8.
44
Report available at http://www.cisc.gc.ca/AnnualReport2003/Cisc2003/gang2003.html.
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of technical sophistication in occidental gangs was clearly the major explanatory factor
for their lack of involvement in identity theft, but investigators also noted that Asian
gangs tended to focus on computers and other technologies as forms of entertainment or
communication rather than as a criminal outlet.
Interviewees and other professionals also stated that the gangs focus on less sophisticated
criminal activities like robbery, extortion, and narcotics trafficking also represented an
explanatory factor. As one investigator from Orange County noted, street gangs focused
on more traditional forms of crime, while white collar crimes (including identity theft)
remained the purview of more organized forms of criminal syndicates. The fact that such
crimes have a long standing in gang activity suggests that street gangs are more atavistic
than innovative, but the study did not reveal enough evidence to evaluate this side
hypothesis.
Finally, the investigator from Philadelphia cited two obvious but overlooked potential
reasons for the lack of evidence. First, given that Asian street gangs would target the
Asian communities of metropolitan areas for identity theft and financial fraud schemes, it
was possible that the inability of these victims to obtain credit could serve as a deterrent.
Second, given the extreme reluctance of those in the Asian community to report crime, it
was likely that crimes such as these could occur with being reported to the police.
10.2 Asian Criminal Enterprises and Identity Theft
Bridging the gap between street gangs are what are becoming more commonly referred to
as Asian Criminal Enterprises (ACEs)—the final object of investigation for the study.
While not a true bridge between organized crime and Asian (or occidental, for that
matter) street gangs, ACEs serve a niche as a blended form of organized crime. The FBI
defines an ACE as:
A continuing criminal enterprise, motivated by profit. Criminally diverse,
the members engage in a variety of hi-tech organized criminal activities.
They are multi-jurisdictional and/or international in nature. They engage
in a pattern of racketeering activities, which usually focus on one type of
highly profitable criminal activity while committing other ancillary crimes
to further the enterprise and/or for personal gain. The enterprise is often
comprised of a network of highly mobile, diverse and loosely linked
criminal cells. The lack of structured hierarchy and membership with
many of these ACEs creates a challenge for law enforcement
ACEs draw the crème de la crème of gangs across the Asian ethnic spectrum in order to
operate sophisticated, oftentimes “white collar” criminal rackets. As one investigator
from Orange County noted, some street gang members entering their late teens who
likely had years of experience in a gang oftentimes become restless and wish to
“graduate” to more sophisticated forms of crime—that is, white collar and organized
crime. The ACEs, in the opinion of this investigator, serve as a training ground for the
skilled and talented members of this criminal class.
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The ACE lies between organized crime and street gangs. According to the same Orange
County investigator, an ACE will draw its members from different gangs, but it
transcends their individual gangs. As an example, the investigator noted one recent case
where an ACE had members from four different Asian street gangs, two of which were
heated rivals. If ACEs transcend and thus are distinct from street gangs, they fail to rise
to the longevity and continuity found within organized crime groups. For example,
ACEs have not adopted the names or the structures of organized crime groups.
Furthermore, as the definition from the prior paragraph notes, ACEs tend to organize
themselves around criminal enterprises, making them more dynamic and fluid
organizations than organized crime.
It is this flexibility, however, that makes them so difficult to identify and interdict. The
FBI has identified ACEs in over 50 metropolitan areas of the country, with major activity
found in such cities as Boston, Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York, Newark,
Philadelphia, Washington DC, and Seattle. Dr. Ning-Ning Mahlmann, an expert on
ACEs with the FBI, states the wide range of criminal activities ACEs engage in include
those both national and international in scope—smuggling, fraud, theft and intellectual
property piracy.45
The skill sets that ACEs possess act gravitate them to identity theft, and make them much
more prevalent perpetrators of identity-theft related crimes than street gangs. The
educational prowess, technological savvy, and businesslike appearance and approach of
ACEs leave them well positioned to engage in identity theft, a fact that investigators
across the country have discovered. While the evidence did not surface to allow a
comparison between organized crime and ACEs, it is clear that ACEs, not Asian street
gangs, should serve as the focus of gangs investigators looking for identity theft cases.
10.3 The Migration of Gang-Related Identity Theft
Turning to the final hypothesis, there is evidence that demonstrates that criminal
enterprises located outside California above the street gang engaging in identity theft.
For example, police in New York City broke up a gang of identity thieves working for
the Genovese crime family that paid employees of local stores to steal identifying
information from customers for the gang.46 Likewise, police in Las Vegas arrested a
Romanian crime cell that was stealing credit cards and using other identification data to
quickly generate numerous credit applications in rented hotel rooms jammed with
computer equipment, fax machines, and printers.47 Yet another article describes a group
that stole mail from boxes in Portland, Oregon, and then used the basic information in the
mail to order complete reports on the victims online, which included SSNs and addresses,
to generate a massive identity theft scheme.48 Finally, a Nigerian crime group in Chicago
45
Ning-Ning Mahlmann, “Asian Criminal Enterprise Program Overview: A Study of Current FBI Asian
Criminal Enterprise Investigations in the US,” available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/ningning.htm
46
Melissa Grace. 2003, Jan 4. “Mob-Tied Gang Wiped Credit Card Ids,” The New York Daily News, p. 5.
47
John L. Smith. 2002, Feb 19. “Credit-card Scheme Paints Modern Picture of Mob Operations,” Las
Vegas Review-Journal, p. 1B.
48
Robert O’Harrow, Jr. 2001, May 31. “Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age,” The Washington
Post, p. A1.
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used 2300 names stolen from blood donor lists over one year, combined with identities
they purchased on the Internet, to fuel a massive identity theft ring that the Secret Service
disrupted.49
The Secret Service also supported this claim. During an interview with a Secret Service
Agent overseeing financial crimes investigation, the investigator noted that Asian
organized crime was heavily involved in “skimming,” the practice of using a device
attached to a laptop or palmtop computer to obtain credit card information being swiped
at a commercial establishment’s checkout. The investigator stated there was a strong
likelihood of Asian organized crime recruiting gang members to carry out these
skimming schemes, but failed to confirm it beyond a suspicion.
The involvement of organized crime also spans the international and transnational realm.
In the United Kingdom, numerous reports link East African, primarily Nigerian, crime
groups and identity theft. The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the UK’s
central monitoring center for organized crime, recently reported that these groups are
seeking to infiltrate calling centers and banks to, among other things, harvest identities
for future fraud schemes.50 Another report noted that the FBI’s Bank Fraud Task Force
had identified an Afghan crime ring engaging in systematic identity theft and bank fraud
in Arizona.51 Finally, the same report, and recent testimony before Congress cited
earlier, sees terrorist organizations engaging in identity theft to raise funds for their own
ends. The conclusion from this anecdotal evidence is that organized crime is recognizing
the criminal rewards that they can obtain from identity theft have begun to adopt this as
another form of generating profits.
The same did not hold true, however, for street gangs. While Orange County
investigators noted cases in Texas, Minnesota, and Nevada, interviews with gang and
economic crime investigators in three major East Coast metropolitan areas revealed no
cases. A senior Detective on the Gang Squad of Fairfax County (VA) revealed that they
had no cases where Asian gangs (a significant issue in this culturally diverse county) had
engaged in identity theft. Interviews with the Miami gang enforcement unit and an
experienced Philadelphia Police Asian gang expert yielded no identity theft-related cases
involving street gangs, occidental or Asian. Finally, an interview with the Secret
Service’s Financial Crime Division failed to locate any cases at the Federal level
involving street gangs.
What this suggests is that the spread of the phenomenon in question is less systematic
than ad hoc—a fact that has significant ramifications for the way law enforcement
approaches the problem. However, it can also call into question that data that has been
thus far collected on the phenomenon. The interviews identified some data collection
49
Agence France Presse. 2001, July 7. “Nigerian Suspects Used Blood Donor Lists in Identity Fraud
Racket.”
50
Robert Watts. 2003, March 9. “Don’t Pay the Price of Identity Fraud,” Sunday Telegraph (London), p.
3.
51
Ed Baker. 2002, June 16. “Afghan Crime Ring May Have Used ID Theft to Swindle Arizona Banks,”
East Valley Tribune.
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issues that the investigators will have to resolve. The Fairfax County Detective noted
that their gang reports and records did not track identity theft as a specific item, and thus
searching their records would prove useless. Likewise, one Secret Service Agent noted
that the Federal Trade Commission’s database of identity theft cases, part of the larger
Sentinel data storing house, also did not contain information on gang or organized crime
involvement in identity theft. Finally, the officer in Miami stated that any cases
involving identity theft would likely be handled by their economic crimes branch and not
in the gang enforcement unit. As such, the investigators will have to rely more on
personal interviews and recollections from case notes in order to collect data for the final
report.
11
Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, the study was able to make strides in evaluating the role of Asian gangs’
home invasions and identity theft. The interviews and data search revealed enough
information to make informed evaluations, though the data was likely to substantial
enough to confidently validate or refute the proposed findings.
11.1 Concerning Home Invasions
As noted earlier, the lack of separate records for home invasions made data collection
quite difficult. Ultimately, the researchers collected police reports from officers or
investigators who worked on Asian gang crimes and identified cases of Asian home
invasion robberies by exploring the personal knowledge of those individuals and crime
analysts in their departments. Therefore, one of the first recommendations is that the data
(nationwide) be coded specifically for “home invasion robbery” or for robbery occurring
at a residential dwelling. Currently home invasions reports are not separated from
general robbery reports at national, state, or local levels. Consistent record-keeping by
municipalities and state governments would substantially facilitate the further research
necessary on these topics.
Gangs were common in Orange County in 1995 and were slowly spreading across the
nation. As the gangs began to grow, and as their members went in and out of correctional
institutions, they developed new methods of criminal activity, including home invasion.
In addition, the Asian gangs were very mobile; some members traveled regularly from
state to state to commit home invasion robberies. For example, some gangs traveled from
Westminster’s Little Saigon to Houston or to Oklahoma, Louisiana, Washington, Oregon,
Kansas and other states to commit home invasions that were set up by their criminal
associates in those states. Law enforcement officers interviewed in California strongly
believed that 1995 was the year in which home invasions were transformed from isolated
incidents to a regular tool of gang members looking for fast money.
Many of the law enforcement officers interviewed also believe that the lull in such crimes
between 1995 and 2001 was due to the apprehension and imprisonment of a number of
these “pioneers” of home invasions. Their co-conspirators who remained at large may
have turned to lower risk white collar crimes that promised equal or greater gains. The
fact that home invasion robberies received a lot of attention from law enforcement and
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the courts from 1995-2000, when first time offenders were receiving life sentences or
lengthy youth authority commitments, may also have been a deterrent.
The resurgence in home invasion robberies in 2001 could be a function of the release
from prison and recidivism of the first generation criminals. Investigators interviewed in
California believed that older, more sophisticated gangsters with prior convictions for
armed residential robbery were teaching the younger gang members how to commit these
crimes. Our research showed that although close to one-half of the suspects were 21-30
years old, one-quarter were twenty years old or younger.
What we can learn from this is that law enforcement needs to work more closely with
parole and probation officers and jail or prison officials to track convicted home invaders
once they are released from jail on bail or probation, or are released from prison on
parole. As we have learned from the past and from investigators, it appears that many of
the home invasions in the later years (2001) were likely committed by skilled repeat
offenders. If law enforcement officers closely monitor these subjects, they may prevent
further crimes or connect the subjects to new crimes and return them to prison.
The data collected from the police reports indicates gang involvement in 16 of the 55
cases or 29% of the cases. This is likely skewed due to the lack of arrests or identity of
the offenders in many of the cases examined as police records indicate gang involvement
was suspected in 71% of the cases. The police officers and investigators as well as the
convicted offenders interviewed believe that a majority of home invasions are gangrelated, but indicate that the crimes are not necessarily committed by members of the
same gang. Instead home invasions are carried out by bandit groups or “crews” made up
of members from several affiliated gangs.
This suggests that law enforcement officers, particular gang officers, need to keep up on
current information on the street regarding gang affiliations and associations among
gangs and share this information with robbery-homicide investigators and other officers
investigating these crimes. It is also very important for officers and investigators to share
gang intelligence and crime trend information with neighboring jurisdictions by
developing informal or formal gang or robbery associations. Officers attending these
association meetings should be forthcoming with information and provide as many
details as possible on crimes occurring within their jurisdictions, as Asian gang members
are extremely mobile and commit crimes across city, county and state lines.
The fact that most crimes occurred on Thursdays and Fridays (and Mondays in
California) suggests that suspects are committing the crimes to get money for weekend
spending sprees. Therefore it may be important for patrol officers to more heavily patrol
neighborhoods, particularly those with a large Asian population, on these days.
Forced entry into the home was common in California and ruse to gain entry was
common in Virginia. The front door was the most common entry point in forty-five
(45%) of the total cases with the back door being the next most common in twenty-one
(21%) of the cases. Suspects entered the front door in Orange County, California one
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third or thirty-three percent (33%) of the time, and in all but one case suspects entered via
the front door in northern Virginia by way of ruse. Alarm systems were not usually a
factor and were reported in only four cases or seven percent (7%) of the cases. This low
number of alarm systems in the victim’s homes suggests that alarm systems may serve as
a deterrent, as would not opening the door to strangers. These broad trends should be
conveyed to citizens and to neighborhood groups to help them protect themselves from
home invasion robberies.
The public may also benefit from the knowledge that victims who resisted home invaders
were commonly injured and often required emergency medical care. Law enforcement
officers and offenders frequently stated that suspects carry weapons (handguns, knives,
clubs) for intimidation and will use them if necessary to achieve their objectives. Under
the circumstances, it seems appropriate for local law enforcement to educate would-be
victims not to resist home invaders as it might likely lead to serious injury or death at the
hands of the suspects. Needless to say, victims must ultimately make their own
judgments and should resist or flee if they believe that their lives are in danger.
The fact that suspects stole jewelry much more frequently in Orange County than
northern Virginia suggests that Orange County victims may keep more jewelry in their
homes, that home invaders may have better intelligence and select targets likely to have
these items, or that Orange County suspects may have a better way to dispose of jewelry.
Whatever is the case, public education to discourage keeping cash and expensive jewelry
in the home and to discourage the display or discussion of these items could help citizens
to avoid becoming victims.
There seems to be a strong need for local law enforcement to reach out to the Asian
community and educate members of the community in how to better protect their homes.
This could include offering possible “helpful hints” in pamphlets or leaflets and holding
department or community seminars where these safety concerns are addressed.
A vast majority of the cases involved two, three or four suspects with the most common
having three to four suspects involved. Suspects used guns of one kind or another in
eighty-nine (89%) of the home invasions. Suspects occasionally combined guns with
other weapons (knives, clubs) and seemed to prefer semi-automatic handguns, although
the type of gun used was not always identified. These data are consistent with interviews
with investigators and convicted offenders. Accordingly, law enforcement officers
should be prepared to confront suspects armed with high velocity firearms and should use
extreme caution when approaching a scene of a possible home invasion in progress or an
incomplete 911 (emergency) call from a residence.
Suspects used bindings of various types in nearly one half of the cases examined.
Suspects who bound victims had a clear preference for cords (electrical, phone,
extension). Zip ties were used in twenty-three (23%) of the cases, and duct tape was used
in nineteen percent (19%) of the cases. Therefore officers investigating cases need to
collect any cords, zip ties, or duct tape used by the suspects to bind the victims as these
items of evidence may likely contain fingerprints, DNA or can be forensically connected
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to other evidence that may be later found at a suspect’s residence or in his vehicle.
Additionally, patrol officers need to be trained to look for or recognize these items when
conducting vehicle stops and further their investigation into what other types of evidence
or weapons may be present.
Masks and gloves worn by suspects, to complicate identity and prosecution efforts, were
fairly common. Masks were worn by one or more suspects in fifty-six percent (56%) of
the cases. Suspects wore gloves in thirty-six percent (36%) of the cases. Suspects wore
masks and gloves more frequently in Orange County, which suggests to the researchers
that suspects in California are more sophisticated and possibly more experienced. The
number of suspects who employ masks in California far exceeds the number of suspects
who use them in the Virginia area. In California the groups tend either to wear masks or
not as a group, whereas the lower figures in Virginia suggest that one member of a
particular group may use a mask but most do not. Not only does this suggest that the
California criminal may be more experienced or sophisticated, but if a suspect employs
the use of a mask, based on common sense, and the law enforcement and offender
interviews, he is most probably a local resident and is doing what he can to conceal his
identity to protect him from future capture. The suspects in Virginia may either be less
sophisticated, or may have come from jurisdictions outside the area where they may be
less concerned with someone recognizing them. Suspects unfortunately are well aware
that most police departments, city by city or state by state, do not readily share
information on criminals or crimes.
The shorter duration of crimes in northern Virginia suggests that suspects there may be
less confident in their abilities than their sophisticated and experienced counterparts in
Orange County or that they may be more concerned about the victims being able to
identify them the longer they remain at the scene because they use masks and gloves less
frequently. It is also possible that the communities, the number of police in the area, or
number of potential witnesses may play a part in the timeline of the robberies.
Over one third of the home invasions were disrupted for one reason or another; witnesses
noticing, victim’s resistance, police arrival, victim’s ability to call 911, etc. Of this
number, more than one third were disrupted by the arrival of police officers. This raises a
couple of questions: should officers respond within close proximity of the location to
scare off the invaders and cause them to stop their robbery attempts, or should they
carefully advance on the location and surprise the suspects inside? As a police officer,
the lead researcher would suggest the latter course, as surprise increases officer safety.
Once a house is surrounded, officers could start negotiations with the suspects and alert
the area SWAT Team. Suspects trapped inside may attempt to use the victims as
hostages, but this is likely less dangerous to victims than an immediate confrontation with
suspects who have had time to prepare.
Officers in Virginia appear to recover less evidence, despite the fact that they usually sent
more officers to the scene and that suspects in those jurisdictions wear gloves less
frequently than their counterparts in the Orange County cases. This may be due to lack
of officer training in the area of proper evidence collection or unfamiliarity with home
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invasions, which were clearly less common. Also, Orange County officers on a whole
collect their own fingerprints at the scene, whereas other departments may send out
forensic teams at a later time. If evidence is not collected expeditiously, it may be lost
due to the victims cleaning up the crime scene, or discarding or handling anything the
suspects may have touched thus contaminating the evidence. Therefore, it is paramount
that officers in all jurisdictions that are faced with like crimes be adequately trained to
preserve and collect evidence at these scenes.
The higher arrest rate in northern Virginia may be due to several factors. Northern
Virginia’s Vietnamese and broader Asian communities are somewhat smaller and may be
more widely dispersed than those in California, which reduces the pool from which
suspects must be identified. In addition, more suspects in Orange County wear masks
and gloves to conceal their identity. At the same time, more police officers and canine
teams are sent to the scene of robberies in northern Virginia, which may allow those
departments to saturate the area more quickly and apprehend suspects before they are
able to escape. Further study of the relationship between these variables and how they
may affect the difference in arrest rates—for example, through obtaining the time elapsed
between the crime and the arrest—would be useful. Examining conviction rates would
be constructive as well. In Orange County there are fewer arrests, but more evidence is
collected at scenes. Evidence is crucial at trial to aid in successful prosecution of
offenders.
Many past victims of Asian-on-Asian related crime have failed to report victimization by
the criminal element due to distrust of police, unfamiliarity with the justice system, fear
of retaliation or other reasons. Some victims of home invasions, in particular persons
involved in illegal activities (drug dealers, bookies, pimps), are not likely to report their
victimization to the police. Yet we have seen a recent increase in the reporting of these
crimes. This study could not track the number of unreported crimes, but of those reported
here, ninety-four percent of the cases were brought to police attention within an hour of
the robbery.
Further police/community interaction needs to be developed and education provided to
Asian families on how to respond if one is a victim of a robbery, both toward the suspects
during the crime or later when reporting the incident to police. It is also important to
explain the courtroom process involved and to follow-up with victims and keep them
informed of the proceedings to insure that they are not threatened or intimidated by the
suspects, their partners, or fellow gang members. The victims should be assured that
police officers are concerned for their safety and well-being, pressed to report any threats
or intimidation, and shown that such reports are handled expeditiously.
One of the most important factors discovered in the interview process with the police and
offenders was that Neighborhood Watch programs were hailed as a key factor in
deterring would-be home invaders. Therefore, it is of special importance for law
enforcement authorities to develop a close relationship with the community and to
promote the creation of Neighborhood Watch programs within residential neighborhoods.
Neighborhood Watch programs mean nothing more than neighbors knowing and looking
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out for one another. If residents know their neighbors, they will know if something is
amiss when a stranger or group of strangers appears at the neighbor’s residence.
11.2 Concerning Identity Theft
The hypotheses showed that there is sufficient merit for gang investigators to have
concern about Asian street gangs engaging in identity theft. The combination of the
extreme fiscal and emotional harm that identity theft incurs with the ability of Asian
street gangs to systematize criminal enterprises more than warrants increased attention to
this phenomenon.
11.2.1 Data Collection Concerns and Issues
During the course of the investigation, the research team encountered some problems
collecting data on instances of identity theft and Asian gangs. Aside from the issues
related to the integrity and structure of the data set addressed above, one of the most
vexing problems that arose in collecting data was the stovepiped nature of law
enforcement agencies. For example, the distinction between organized crime, ACEs,
Asian and occidental street gangs might appear academic and semantic on its face, but it
serves an important purpose for law enforcement. Large metropolitan law enforcement
agencies most often segregate gang enforcement, organized crime, and community
policing units from the main patrol body, and communication between these units was
often characterized in the interviews as being poor at best. Likewise, many departments
now contain a financial or economic crimes unit that will often claim jurisdiction over a
number of crimes related to identity theft. Communications problems with these units are
also common, according to those interviewed.
In some of the interviews the team conducted, such organizational structures made it
difficult for investigators to state with confidence if cases Asian gangs engaging in
identity theft existed in their agencies. Media sources and even official reports are
suspect due to their tendency to use “organized crime” and “gang” as interchangeable
terms. Likewise, cases of Asian gangs engaging in identity theft are not always evident
to investigators in one unit, as an informal survey of investigators the team spoke to
revealed that members of gang, financial crime, community policing, major crimes, and
other specialized units might handle the cases and not inform their fellow units that such
cases exist. Such problems are compounded when the investigators fail or ignore the
connection between identity theft and gangs, preferring instead to treat the incidents as
either a gang-related crime or a financial crime.
The other major limitation that the team encountered in the project was the lack of
understanding about key terms. Identity theft in particular proved to be a problematic
term. The team encountered the use of a far too broad definition of identity theft that
incorporates document fraud and false identification, oftentimes combining this with a
notion that identity theft is a crime unto itself. Other times, the team found that identity
theft was used synonymously with the forms of fraud it supports, such as credit card
fraud. Such confusion of terms could make it difficult to garner the true nature of Asian
gangs engaging in identity theft. Likewise, while most investigators the team spoke to
were knowledgeable of, and generally agreeable to, the differentiation between street
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gangs, ACEs, and organized crime, some noted that this nuanced understanding was not
the accepted norm, leading again to the likelihood that some instances were miscategorized.
11.2.2 Lessons Learned and Suggestions for Further Study
The evidence the team uncovered on Asian gangs engaging in identity theft for financial
fraud, coupled with suggestions from those experts the team interviewed and a review of
the data the team collected, led to four suggestions for investigators. First, the project
revealed that the lack of communication between gang and financial investigators is a
detriment in this field. As noted earlier, cases of gangs engaging in identity theft are
often sent to one division within a department without the other divisions knowing of it.
More problematic was that there was not always a clear jurisdictional arrangement, but
rather a division would “catch” a case and investigate it. The bottom line is not,
however, whether one division is better suited to investigate these crimes (that is an issue
best left to the individual departments in the team’s opinion). Rather, it is a good practice
that both financial crimes and gang investigators be made aware of investigations of such
cases for trend analysis, case management, and intelligence production. In short, without
knowledge of these cases, investigators cannot tie them to larger issues like gangs,
organized crime, or organized identity theft rings. As part of this effort, the team would
recommend the use of joint training to make gang, organized crime, and financial fraud
investigators aware of the requirements of their fellow investigators have for such cases.
Second is the need for training on identity theft and how it manifests itself. The
discussions with investigators and financial fraud experts made it apparent that patrol
officers and even investigators are often either unaware of what identity theft is or, worse,
have misconceptions of the crime. An example of the latter is the confusion of identity
fraud with document fraud, the latter being the creation of false immigration and other
documentation. While sometimes related, significant differences exist between the two
(see the primer) to warrant law enforcement officers having more nuanced definitions for
the two. Furthermore, since each state has different laws concerning identity theft,
officers should know the basics of identity theft, especially how it is defined in their state
(or jurisdiction) and procedures for handling such cases.
While identity theft is often misunderstood, there is growing recognition of the
differences between occidental and Asian gangs, first, and second between Asian street
gangs and Asian criminal enterprises. Investigators need to continue efforts to not only
share the differences between these organizations, but more importantly to share the
significant differences in approaching and investigating the activities of each group. That
the study was able to identify some publications in law enforcement journals and
magazines is an encouraging sign in this regard, as was the knowledge of the
investigators that the team spoke with during the project. Continuing to bolster this
understanding amongst fellow investigators will reap dividends later in the form of
improved best practices.
Finally, there is the issue of will and the desire to see identity theft cases through.
Unfortunately, there exist a number of hurdles that hinder prosecutions of identity theft.
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Likely the largest is the failure of banks and financial lenders to seek redress in identity
theft cases—they are often much more likely to either write off their losses or settle
through an insurance claim. As creditors, a significant victim of identity theft, have
failed to press through, it has led to identity theft sliding down on the list of priorities for
law enforcement. Another failure is located within the law enforcement community
itself, where investigators and District Attorneys often view identity theft as just another
form of financial or “white collar” crime. Such attributions often make identity theft
seem “victimless,” leading to what one identity theft expert termed a “no human
involved” designation. Such tendencies leave the individual, the other significant victim
of identity theft, feeling victimized and ignored. While no clear recommendation can
solve this problem, the ties of identity theft to gangs, organized crime, and indeed
terrorism might serve to elevate the desires of the banking sector, law enforcement and
prosecutors to recognize the harmful nature of identity theft.
11.2.3 The RGET and Investigating Asian Gangs
These recommendations support Orange County’s RGET approach to gang and identity
theft investigations. The RGET is based on a multi-agency approach, and can easily (if it
does not already) incorporate specialists in identity theft in order to pursue cases of Asian
gangs engaging in identity theft. Close ties to the Orange County District Attorney’s
office further serves as a platform for constructing the will to see such cases through.
Third, it is clear that investigators in the RGET are some of the most knowledgeable
when it comes to the differences between Asian gangs, occidental gangs, ACEs, and
organized crime. Finally, the team’s discussions with RGET investigators demonstrated
that they possessed at least a basic working knowledge of identity theft and how it
operates.
In the end, this project has settled the Orange County’s initial questions. Asian gangs are
engaging in identity theft, though it has yet to take hold in East Coast metropolitan areas
in the same way as it has on the West Coast. The team has also constructed a basic
outline for supporting the approach the RGET takes to such cases. However, the team
feels that this project serves as nothing more than a proof of concept, and urges Orange
County to undertake further and more rigorous research to evaluate how Asian gangs are
engaging in identity theft, the frequency with which these cases occur, the specific gangs
perpetrating the crimes, and any links between the gangs and/or ACEs. Furthermore, the
team feels that a wider and more sustained survey of metropolitan areas across the United
States and Canada will deepen the knowledge of this realm as well as lead to more
concrete and sustainable best practices. The team believes that the National Institute of
Justice, the research branch of the United States Department of Justice, is likely the best
source of funding for such a project, and that a team of experienced criminologists and
investigators from both gang and financial crimes units would deliver the best results.
95
Appendix A: State Laws52
Alabama
Alabama Code § 13A-8-190-201
Missouri
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.223
Alaska
Alaska Stat § 11.46.565
Montana
Mon. Code Ann. § 45-6-332
Arizona
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2008
Nebraska
NE Rev. Stat. § 28-608 & 620
Arkansas
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-37-227
Nevada
Nev. Rev. State. § 205.463-465
California
Cal. Penal Code § 530.5-8
New Hampshire
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 638:26
Colorado
Does not have an ID Theft law.
New Jersey
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-17
CT
Conn. Stat. § 53a-129a (criminal)
New Mexico
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-24.1
Delaware
Del. Code Ann. Tit. II, § 854
New York
NY CLS Penal § 190.77-190.84
DC
North Carolina
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-113.20-23
Florida
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 817.568
North Dakota
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-11
Georgia
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-120-128
Ohio
Ohio Rev. Cd Ann. § 2913.49
Hawaii
HI Rev. Stat. § 708-839.6-8
Oklahoma
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1533.1
Idaho
Idaho Code § 18-3126
Oregon
Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.800
Illinois
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16 G
Pennsylvania*
18 Pa. Cons. State § 4120
Indiana
Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5
Rhode Island
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-49.1-1
Iowa
Iowa Code § 715A.8
South Carolina
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-500, 501
Kansas
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4018
South Dakota
S.D. Cod. Laws § 22-30A-3.1.
Kentucky
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514.160
Tennessee*
TCA § 39-14-150
Louisiana
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:67.16
Texas
Tex. Penal Code § 32.51
Maine
ME Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17-A § 905-A
Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-1101-1104
Maryland
Md. Code Ann. Art. 27 § 231
Vermont
Mass.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 37E
Virginia
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-186.3
Michigan
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.285
Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.35.020
Minnesota
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.527
West Virginia
W. Va. Code § 61-3-54
Mississippi
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-85
Wisconsin
Wis. Stat. § 943.201
Wyoming
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-901
52
Source: Federal Trade Commission website (http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/statelaw.htm)
22 April 2004
Interviews Conducted
Home Invasion Team
We would like to offer special thanks to the following experienced law enforcement
officers and investigators who assisted in providing insight into this project. I would also
like to thank the following civilian police employees for their assistance in gathering data
for the project.
Police Officers/Investigators
Detective Peter Vi, Garden Grove, California Police Department
Detective Michael Proctor, Westminster, California Police Department
Detective Terry Selinske, Westminster, California Police Department
Sergeant Marcus Frank, Westminster, California Police Department
Officer David Tran, Irvine, California Police Department
Detective Bergman, Fairfax County, Virginia Police Department
Charles Cash, FBI Asian Organized Crime Unit, Houston Police Department
Criminal Intelligence Analyst Peter Francisco, St. Petersburg, Florida Police Department
Sergeant Edward Lancaster, Falls Church, Virginia Police Department
Lieutenant William Noble, Fairfax County, Virginia Police Department
Detective Rick Rodriquez, Arlington County, Virginia Police Department
Anonymous, New York City, New York Police Department
Civilian Police Employees
Police Services Officer, Sue Reeds, Westminster Police Department
Crime Analyst, Julie Romano, Westminster Police Department
Crime Analyst Dean Montanye, Arlington County Police Department
Identity Theft Team
All interviews, conducted under agreement of non-disclosure, are listed below.
United States Secret Service Agent, Federal Trade Commission, 14 April 2003
Investigator, Fairfax County (VA) Police Department, 15 April 2003
Representative, Federal Trade Commission SENTINEL Program, 17 April 2003
Former Detective, Anaheim Police Department, 20 October 2003
Sergeant, Westminster (CA) Police Department, 21 October 2003
Gang Investigator, City of Miami Police Department, 10 March 2004
Officer, Philadelphia Police Department, 15 March 2004
97
22 April 2004
Bibliography and Relevant Works
Agence France Presse. “Nigerian Suspects Used Blood Donor Lists in Identity Fraud
Racket.” 7 July 2001.
Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in America (Cincinnati: Anderson). 1989.
Armour Stephanie. “Employment Records Prove Ripe Source for Identity Theft,” USA
Today. 1 January 2003. See http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/200301-23-idtheft-cover_x.htm.
Ashcroft, John. Remarks at Identity Theft Press Conference. Washington, DC. 2 May
2002. See http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/050202agidtheftranscript.htm.
Associated Press. “Monster.com Warns of Identity Theft,” Wired. 27 February 2003.
See http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,57852,00.html.
“Attorney General Jerry Kilgore Announces Identity Theft Task Force: Group to Study
and attack ‘Fastest Growing’ Consumer Crime.” Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Virginia. 10 May 2002. See http://www.vaag.com.
Baer, Debbi. Identity Theft: Stealing Your Name and Your Money. US Postal Inspection
Service Law Enforcement Report. See
http://www.usps.gov/websites/depart/inspect.
Baker, Ed. “Afghan Crime Ring May Have Used ID Theft to Swindle Arizona Banks,”
East Valley Tribune. 16 June 2002.
Browning, Dan and Chris Graves. “The Identity Crisis.” Minneapolis-St. Paul Star
Tribune. 10 February 2002.
Canham, Matt. “Gangbangers Going Underground: Crooks, Cops Grow More
Sophisticated in Their Methods,” The Salt Lake Tribune. 1 September 2002.
Cassidy, William L., Nomadic Vietnamese Armed Robbery – The Fundamentals of
Nomadic Vietnamese Residential Armed Robbery Investigation, An occasional
paper of the International Association of Asian Crime Investigators, Beaumont,
Texas 1991.
Conry-Murray, Andrew. “Criminal Syndicates Use Anti-Americanism to Recruit Data
Thieves.” Network Magazine. 1 May 2003.
Davis, Patricia. “Better Records Make Alexandria Tops in Identity Theft.” Washington
Post. 6 March 2003.
98
22 April 2004
Dunlap, Russel. Asian on Asian Crime – Home Invasion Robbery, unpublished paper
presented by Sgt. Russel Dunlap Retired, of the Houston, Texas Police
Department – Organized Crime Unit, not dated.
“Gang Boss Could Get 80 Years.” New York Daily News. 21 April 2002.
Gearty, Robert and Bill Hutchinson. “Sweeping up Street Gang, Feds Indict 15 Bloods,
Bloodettes in E. Coast Crime Spree,” The New York Daily News. 9 May 2001.
Giles, Darrell. “Clean Cut But Still Cut-Throat.” Melbourne (Australia) Herald Sun. 16
May 2001.
Givens, Beth. Identity Theft: How it Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative
Solutions, Written Testimony for the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. 12 July 2000. See
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm.
Grace, Melissa. “Mob-Tied Gang Wiped Credit Card Ids,” The New York Daily News. 4
January 2003.
Hoar, Sean. “Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium.” United States
Attorneys’ USA Bulletin. Vol. 49, no. 2. March 2001.
Mahlmann, Ning-Ning. “Asian Criminal Enterprise Program Overview: A Study of
Current FBI Asian Criminal Enterprise Investigations in the US,” available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/ningning.htm
Marlin, Steven. “Busted ID Theft Ring Part of a Growing Epidemic,” Bank Systems and
Technology. 1 January 2003.
Moore, Jean. “Understanding Youth Gangs: Economic Restructuring and the Urban
Underclass.” In Meredith Watts (ed.). Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Youth and
Violence (Stamford: JAI Press). 1998.
Ngo, Quoc Hung, “Riding the Wave – Sex, Crime and Spring Rolls,” Viet Now
Magazine, July/August Edition 1995.
Nicholson, Brendan. “Cyber Gangs Skim Millions in Australia.” The Melbourne
(Australia) Age. 20 July 2003.
Nye, Mark D. Smile Now, Cry Later – A Study of Asian Street Gangs in Little Saigon, an
unpublished paper written by Sgt. Mark Nye disseminated to law enforcement
nationwide, California 2003.
OCC Alert 2002-4. . “Identity Theft: Organized Gang and Teller Collusion Schemes.”
25 April 2002. See http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/alert/2002-4.txt.
99
22 April 2004
O’Harrow, Jr., Robert. “Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age,” The Washington
Post. 31 May 2001.
Pollock, John and James May. “Authentication Technology.” Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Law Enforcement Bulletin. Vol. 71, no. 6. June 2002.
Rashbaum, William. “Officials Say Mob Stole $200 Million Using Phone Bills.” The
New York Times. 11 February 2004.
Reuters. “Do Net Cafes Provoke Bloodshed?” 24 February 2003. See
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,570047,00.html.
Sanders, Lynne. 2001, May/June. “Stopping ID Theft in its Tracks,” ABA Bank
Compliance, pp. 35-7. See
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/000055b7seplchdjuorvjekw/Resource9993.pdf
Sadaka, Thomas. Preventing Identity Theft by Terrorists and Criminals, Testimony for
the US House Committees on Financial Services and on Ways and Means. 8
November 2001.
Silvester, John. “ID Theft Used in Organized Fraud.” Sydney Morning Herald. 21 July
2003.
Smith, John. “Credit Card Scheme Paints Modern Picture of Mob Operations,” Las
Vegas Review-Journal. 19 February 2002.
Smith, R. “Identity-related Economic Crime: Risks and Countermeasures.” Trends and
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice. No. 129. 1999.
Tendler, Stewart. “Drug Gangs Move in on Pounds 1.3bn Fake Documents Trade.” The
Times of London. 18 August 2003.
“US Announces What is Believed the Largest Identity Theft Case in American History:
Losses are in the Millions.” US Attorney for the Southern District of New York
Press Release. 25 November 2002.
US General Accounting Office. Identity Fraud: Information on Prevalence, Cost, and
Internet Impact is Limited (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office),
May 1998. Report No. GCD-98-100BR.
US General Accounting Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be
Growing (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), March 2002.
Report GAO-02-363.
100
22 April 2004
Robert Watts. “Don’t Pay the Price of Identity Fraud,” Sunday Telegraph (London). 9
March 2003.
Zack, Margaret. “Eight Charged in Identity Theft Ring.” Minneapolis-St. Paul Star
Tribune. 21 February 2003.
101
22 April 2004
Biographies of Project Team Members and Contributors
Mary E. Finch, Ph.D., is an independent researcher and consultant for Asian crosscultural communication projects, specializing in Chinese psychology and business
negotiation. Dr. Finch is currently in private practice focusing on child and youth
communication and social adaptation issues.
Detective Sergeant Marcus Frank is currently the supervisor of the Westminster
(California) Police Department’s Special Investigations Unit. The S.I.U. is responsible
for the investigation of major fraud, corruption, white collar crime, vice and intelligence.
Sgt. Frank has over twenty years with Westminster Police Department and has worked in
the field of Asian gangs and criminal groups for a majority of that time. Sgt. Frank is
well known for his expertise in the field of Asian crime.
M. Cordell Hart is a retired Colonel in Military Intelligence (Army of the United
States), a past President of the International Association of Asian Crime Investigators, a
Chinese linguist and a former CIA Case Officer.
Detective Sergeant Mark Nye has over 17 years experience in law enforcement and is
recognized as an Asian gang expert in four California counties. He has provided training
lectures to five California academies and police training academies in three other states.
Now with the Westminister (California) Police Department's TARGET Gang Unit, he has
served at the Little Saigon Sub-Station, as a part of an FBI Task Force, as a Parole
Liaison Officer, and as a member of the Auto Theft Section and Street partrol. Sargeant
Nye has received over 400 hours of police training regarding gangs, with emphasis on
Asian street gangs and Asian organized crime. He holds an Advanced SWAT Certificate,
Advanced POST Certificate, Supervisor's POST Certificate, Advanced Homicide
Investigations certificate, and earned a BS in Criminal Justice from California State
University-Long Beach. Has written three papers, "Asian Gangs in Little Saigon,"
"Smile Now, Cry Later," and "Travelling Gangs."
John T. Picarelli is a Research Lecturer in the School of International Service at
American University and a Program Manager for the Transnational Crime and
Corruption Center (TraCCC). Mr. Picarelli, an expert in transnational threats and their
impact on national and homeland security, currently leads two major projects for
TraCCC: a revision of the instructional curriculum and methodology of the Law and
Spanish Departments at the US Border Patrol Academy, and a one-year study of the
convergence and divergence of organized crime and terrorism. Mr. Picarelli’s past
experience includes the development and implementation of a law enforcement training
curriculum addressing the trafficking in persons for foreign law enforcement and other
government personnel. Prior to joining TraCCC, Mr. Picarelli served as an analyst at
Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, conducting research and preparing briefings for the
defense and intelligence communities on organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Picarelli is completing his Ph.D. dissertation,
tentatively entitled “A Factoral Explanation of the Persistence of Trafficking in Persons,”
102
22 April 2004
at the School of International Service at American University. He earned his M.A. in
International Affairs from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the
University of Pittsburgh, and his B.A. in International Relations from the University of
Delaware.
Detective Michael Proctor is a 30 year veteran of the Westminster (California) Police
Department. He worked in the Robbery-Homicide Investigator for over fifteen years, and
retired in 2002. He has returned to the department as a part time employee investigating
stalkings. Detective Proctor is a nationally known expert on the field of stalking and has
authored and published a book on the subject. Detective Proctor’s experience includes
but is not limited to, investigating homicides, gang-related homicides, home invasion
robberies, other armed robberies, stalking and other crimes of violence.
Detective Terry Selinske is a 30 year veteran of the Westminster (California) Police
Department who retired in 2003. He is still working part time as a Detective at the
Westminster Police Department and is currently assigned to investigate unsolved
homicides. Detective Selinske worked as a homicide investigator for over 15 years and
his primary assignment was Robbery-Homicide. In his past assignment he investigated
home invasion robberies, commercial armed robberies and homicides of all types,
including gang-related homicides. Detective Selinske is a veteran of the Vietnam War.
Officer David Tran is a Vietnamese police officer with the Irvine (California) Police
Department. Officer Tran’s expertise and information is based on years of living in
Asian culture and in frequent discussions with former victims and gang members about
these crimes.
Detective Peter Vi is a member of the Garden Grove (California) Police Department and
currently is the lead investigator for the gang unit that specializes in Asian street gangs.
Detective Vi is a long time veteran of the GGPD with over 15 years law enforcement
experience. Detective Vi is a Vietnamese police officer who not only works in Little
Saigon, Orange County, but understands the customs of the Vietnamese people and
speaks the language fluently. Detective Vi has investigated Asian street gangs for over
ten years and is well known for his expertise on the subject.
Gary R. Weaver, Ph.D., is Professor of International Relations and Executive Director
of the Intercultural Management Institute in the School of International Service at
American University. Dr. Weaver has been a member of the faculty of American
University for over 35 years and has published numerous studies in the area of law
enforcement including "Police and the Enemy Image in Black Literature," "Psychological
and Cultural Dimensions of Hostage Negotiation," “Law Enforcement in a Culturally
Diverse Society," "The Genesis of U.S. Internal Unrest," and "Cultural Considerations in
Hostage Negotiations." He also conducts training programs and gives addresses to
various law enforcement agencies around the country including police departments, ATF,
the FBI, Customs Service, and CIA. Professor Weaver, the author of the edited volume
Culture, Communication and Conflict, received his Ph.D. in International Relations from
American University with studies at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and
103
22 April 2004
the Psychoanalytic Institute of Mexico and post-doctoral studies at The Washington
School of Psychiatry. He is the Principal Investigator for this study and also a principal
author.
104
22 April 2004
Project Team Institutions
The Center for Asian Crime Studies (CACS) is the research and training arm of the
International Association of Asian Crime Investigators. It is incorporated in the state of
Maryland and registered with the US Internal Revenue Service as a not-for-profit
endeavor under provisions of USC 501(c)3a. Its primary officers are Colonel Cord Hart,
Director; Special Agent Ken Sanz, Deputy Director for Administration; Dr. Sheldon
Zhang, Deputy Director for Research. See http://www.asiancrime.com/ for more on
CACS.
The Intercultural Management Institute (IMI), located at American University in
Washington DC, recognizes what a vital role culture plays in international business
today. IMI houses intercultural experts that offer training programs and consulting
services that provide organizations and workforces the skills and information they need to
manage cultural differences and flourish in the new global economy. The pace and
pressures of today's marketplace require that investments are strategically relevant, costeffective, and target-driven. To that end, IMI works closely with its clients to assess their
needs, identify their goals, and design the program or service fully customized to fit their
unique profile and bring its clients maximum returns. See http://www.imi.american.edu/
for more on IMI.
The Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET) was created in 1992
by the Westminster (California) Police Department as an innovative program that merged
gang identification, law enforcement, case preparation, witness support, prosecution,
sentencing, and probation into a single collaborative effort. Representatives from these
agencies work together in the police department to focus on the most dangerous repeat
gang offenders. The goal is to keep these offenders in continuous custody for as long as
possible, thereby lowering crime in the community. The success of the program has been
documented, and other police departments throughout the county have adopted this
approach. The program won a National League of Cities Award and a commendation
from the Governor of California. See http://www.ewpd.org for more on TARGET.
The Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) is the first center in the
United States devoted to teaching, research, training and formulating policy advice in
transnational crime, corruption and terrorism. Originally founded in 1995 with seed
money from the MacArthur Foundation and currently funded by the United States
Government and private foundations, TraCCC's fundamental goal is to better understand
the causes and scope of transnational crime and corruption and to propose well-grounded
policy to reduce and eliminate these problems. The growing phenomena of transnational
crime and corruption present a formidable challenge to the protection of national and
international security, economic development, democratic reform, and human rights.
Systemic corruption in one country often contributes to crime and terror at the global
level, and thus is a problem that must be faced by the international community. See
http://www.american.edu/traccc/ for more on TraCCC.
105

Asian Home Invasion Robbery - Center for Crime and Terrorism

Transcription

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