apostle james setzer

Transcription

Partners for Health Reformplus
Improving
Performance of
IDSR at District
and Facility
Levels:
Experiences in
Tanzania and
Ghana in Making
IDSR Operational
September 2006
Prepared by:
Lynne Miller Franco, ScD
University Research Co. LLC
James Setzer, MPH
Abt Associates, Inc.
This document was produced by PHRplus with funding from the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) under Project No. 936-5974.13, Contract No.
HRN-C-00-00-00019-00 and is in the public domain. The ideas and opinions in this
document are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of USAID or its
employees. Interested parties may use the report in part or whole, providing they
maintain the integrity of the report and do not misrepresent its findings or present
the work as their own. This and other HFS, PHR, and PHRplus documents can be
viewed and downloaded on the project website, www.PHRplus.org.
Kathryn Banke, PhD
Abt Associates, Inc.
Abt Associates Inc.
4800 Montgomery Lane, Suite 600 Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Tel: 301/913-0500 Fax: 301/652-3916
In collaboration with:
Development Associates, Inc. Emory University Rollins School of Public
Health Philoxenia International Travel, Inc. Program for Appropriate
Technology in Health Social Sectors Development Strategies, Inc.
Training Resources Group Tulane University School of Public Health and
Tropical Medicine University Research Co., LLC.
Order No TE117
Mission
Partners for Health Reformplus is USAID’s flagship project for health policy and health system
strengthening in developing and transitional countries. The five-year project (2000-2005) builds on
the predecessor Partnerships for Health Reform Project, continuing PHR’s focus on health policy,
financing, and organization, with new emphasis on community participation, infectious disease
surveillance, and information systems that support the management and delivery of appropriate
health services. PHRplus will focus on the following results:
Implementation of appropriate health system reform.
Generation of new financing for health care, as well as more effective use of existing funds.
Design and implementation of health information systems for disease surveillance.
Delivery of quality services by health workers.
Availability and appropriate use of health commodities.
September 2006
Recommended Citation
Franco, Lynne Miller, James Setzer Kathryn Banke. September 2006. Improving Performance of IDSR at District and Facility Levels: Experiences in
Tanzania and Ghana in Making IDSR Operational. Bethesda, MD: The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates Inc.
For additional copies of this report, contact the PHRplus Resource Center at PHR-InfoCenter@abtassoc.com or visit
our website at www.PHRplus.org.
Contract/Project No.:
Submitted to:
and:
HRN-C-00-00-00019-00
Murray Trostle
Karen Cavanaugh, CTO
Health Systems Division
Office of Health, Infectious Disease and Nutrition
Center for Population, Health and Nutrition
Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research
United States Agency for International Development
Abstract
Recognition of the need for effective disease surveillance and response is growing worldwide
due to increased risks of infectious diseases associated with population mobility, globalization, and
emerging and resurging diseases. The Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy,
promoted and supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa
(AFRO), has been adopted throughout the region’s 46 countries to strengthen surveillance systems
such that they inform public health decisions and disease control actions. This document describes the
efforts of the Partners for Health Reformplus (PHRplus) project in Ghana and Tanzania to support
improvements in the performance of IDSR. Ghana and Tanzania sought to address concurrently the
technical, organizational and workforce issues that could impede IDSR performance. The most
notable improvements were seen in reporting, analysis, and interpretation of surveillance data.
Strengthening and maintaining IDSR performance, however, is also dependent the following:
ensuring on-going supervision and follow-up; ensuring IDSR visibility and leadership at all levels;
understanding the links between IDSR and health system decentralization; and addressing structural
barriers to IDSR that are a function of the overall health system.
Table of Contents
Acronyms ..............................................................................................................................................ix
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................xi
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................xiii
1.
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response In Africa: A Key Component of the WHO/AFRO
Strategy to Reduce the Burden of Infectious Disease ............................................................................ 3
3.
A Practical Framework for Strengthening IDSR System Performance.......................................... 7
4.
IDSR Implementation in Ghana and Tanzania: Applying the Framework................................... 11
4.1
4.2
Ghana...................................................................................................................................11
Tanzania ..............................................................................................................................13
5. Approaches and Interventions: Improving IDSR Performance by Addressing Technical,
Organizational and Workforce Determinants at the District and Facility Level .................................. 17
5.1
Overcoming technical limitations to IDSR performance: defining norms and forms.........22
5.1.1 Ghana...........................................................................................................................22
5.1.2 Tanzania.......................................................................................................................23
5.2 Organizational determinants of IDSR performance: making the system work ...................24
5.2.1 Ghana...........................................................................................................................25
5.2.2 Tanzania.......................................................................................................................26
5.3 Improving workforce performance: capacity building and supportive follow-up..............30
5.3.1 Ghana...........................................................................................................................30
5.3.2 Tanzania.......................................................................................................................32
6.
Performance in Ghana and Tanzania............................................................................................ 35
6.1
6.2
7.
Ghana – IDSR Performance ................................................................................................36
Tanzania – Results of IDSR Performance...........................................................................38
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 45
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
Summarizing the Experience...............................................................................................45
Future of the tools and strategies developed in Ghana and Tanzania..................................46
Recommendations for strengthening IDSR performance at the district and facility level ..47
Conclusions on broader health systems issues and their impact on IDSR performance .....48
8. Summary and Recommendations for Future Directions in Improving IDSR Performance: the
Need for Health Systems Strengthening............................................................................................... 51
Table of Contents
vii
8.1
8.2
Summary .............................................................................................................................51
Recommendations for donor assistance ..............................................................................52
Appendix 1: Comparison of Priority Diseases
Appendix 2: Results of First Assessment of Factors in Ghana
Appendix 3: IDSR Task Analysis for Ghana
Appendix 4: Norms and Standards for IDSR Data Analysis in Tanzania
Appendix 5: Example of Task Analysis for District Level in Tanzania
Appendix 6: Process of Developing the Tanzania IDSR Capacity Building Package and Content of
Training
Appendix 7: List and Examples of Laboratory Confirmation Job Aids for Tanzania
Appendix 8: Job Aids in Tanzania: District Level Data Interpretation Job Aid
Bibliography
List of Tables
Table 1: Identification of Obstacles and Proposed Solutions ..................................................................... 18
Table 2: Solutions to Common Problems in IDSR Functioning in Tanzania ............................................. 28
Table 3: Indicators used to evaluate IDSR performance in Ghana and Tanzania....................................... 35
Table 4: Improvements in IDSR Data analysis in Ghana ........................................................................... 38
Table 5: Comparison of facility level timeliness and completeness results between 8 districts trained in
first two rounds and 4 districts trained last .......................................................................................... 40
Table 6: Improvements in IDSR Data analysis in Tanzania ....................................................................... 40
Table 7: Improvement in overall scores during IDSR training in Tanzania ............................................... 41
Table 8: Adoption and use of IDSR materials in other areas of the countries, as of January 2006 ............ 46
List of Figures
Figure 1: Determinants of disease surveillance and response system performance..................................... 8
Figure 2: Ghana initial intensive IDSR regions ......................................................................................... 12
Figure 3: 12 IDSR pilot districts in Tanzania ............................................................................................ 14
Figure 4: Completeness and Timeliness of weekly and monthly IDSR Reporting in Ghana (7 districts in 2
northern regions).................................................................................................................................. 37
Figure 5: Completeness and Timeliness of Weekly and Monthly IDSR Reporting from Facilities and
Districts in Tanzania (12 project districts)........................................................................................... 39
Figure 6: Example of training effect on reporting in Masasi district, Tanzania ......................................... 42
Figure 7: Simplified Framework of Factors for IDSR Improvement ......................................................... 45
viii
Table of Contents
Acronyms
CBS
Community-based surveillance
CCHP
Comprehensive Council Health Plan (Tanzania)
CDC
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CHMT
Council Health Management Team (Tanzania)
ComDAB
Communicable Diseases Analysis Book (Ghana)
DHMT
District Health Management Team (Ghana)
DMO
District Medical Officer (Tanzania)
EDCS
Epidemiology and Disease Control Section (Tanzania)
GFATM
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GHS
Ghana Health Service
IDSR
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation
MOH
Ministry of Health
NIMR
National Institute for Medical Research (Tanzania)
NSU
National Surveillance Unit (Ghana)
PHRplus
Partners for Health Reformplus project
QHP
Quality Health Partners project (Ghana)
RHMT
Regional Health Management Team (Ghana and Tanzania)
RHO
Regional Health Officer
SCD
Standard Case Definition
TOT
Training of Trainers
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
WHO
World Health Organization
WHO/AFRO
World Health Organization/African Regional Office
ZTC
Zonal Training Centre (Tanzania)
Acronyms
ix
Acknowledgments
The authors of this report would like to thank the following individuals who worked so hard to
improve disease surveillance and response, who documented what happened and who provided moral
and technical support along the way:
Facility and district level personnel in the three northern regions of Ghana and 12 pilot
districts in Tanzania who actually made use of the IDSR tools and strategies described in this
report;
Regional level staff in Ghana and Tanzania and at Zonal Training Centers in Tanzania who
provided support and guidance to the project team and to their districts;
The National Surveillance Unit (Ghana) of the Ghana Health Service/Ministry of Health and
the Epidemiology and Disease Control Section of the Ministry of Health (Tanzania) who
worked hard to make IDSR a reality in their countries;
Those at the highest levels of the Ghana Health Service/Ministry of Health and the
Tanzanian Ministry of Health and the National Institute of Medical Research who provided
effective support when it was needed to get things moving;
Dr. Dery in Ghana and the IDSR team working at the National Institute for Medical
Research in Tanzania, particularly Dr. Peter Mmbuji and Dr. Leonard Mboera, who all put in
endless hours developing effective tools and strategies and working with regional, district
and facility staff to understand IDSR and how to use these tools and strategies;
Counterparts at the Centers for Disease Control and the CHANGE project (AED) for fruitful
collaboration on work in the field;
WHO/AFRO staff that produced the original sets of materials that became the basis for
IDSR implementation and who supported countries through the process;
USAID in Ghana, Tanzania and the Global Bureau in Washington D.C. for supporting the
efforts described in this document;
PHRplus team members who worked in IDSR in Tanzania and Ghana; and
Dr. Anton Luchitsky and Dr. Kathleen Novak for technical review of this paper.
A special thanks to Dr. Murray Trostle of USAID/Washington, whose perseverance and support
made it possible for this work to come to fruition to help IDSR implementers in the field understand
the importance of evidence based decisions for appropriate public health response.
Acknowledgments
xi
Executive Summary
due to increased risks of infectious diseases associated with population mobility, globalization,
emerging diseases such as avian influenza, and the resurgence of diseases such as tuberculosis. A
strongly functioning surveillance system is essential to informing public health decisions and actions
that can prevent and control these diseases. In response to this need, the World Health Organization
(WHO) Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) developed, promoted and supported the adoption of the
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy across the continent of Africa.
The IDSR concept is straightforward and calls for countries to strengthen surveillance of priority
infectious diseases through: the use of simplified tools for data collection and analysis; integration of
various channels for reporting and feedback; providing timely surveillance information for decisionmaking and public health action throughout the system; and strengthening district level capacity to
generate and transform surveillance data into information that can inform public health action.
WHO/AFRO, in collaboration with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
produced a number of tools to provide countries in the region with the technical elements necessary to
strengthen their IDSR systems that included: a set of generic technical guidelines
(CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2001); district IDSR training materials (WHO/AFRO, 2001c); a district analysis
book developed in 2002 and revised in 2004 (CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2004); and priority monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) indicators developed in 2002 and revised in 2004 (WHO/AFRO, 2004).
The guidelines and other tools developed by WHO/AFRO and CDC, when disseminated to the
operational levels (district and facility), provided the basic technical information needed including
generic standards, forms, and information flows that countries could adapt. Yet, implementing the
IDSR strategy required countries (and their partners) to go beyond simply improving existing or
developing new technical elements, the “norms and forms.” If their surveillance systems were to
produce better data and more useful information, they would also need: sound technical standards;
effective organizational structures and processes that support effective implementation of those
standards; and a competent and motivated workforce. The technical determinants of IDSR
performance include technical standards, information system design, data collection forms, data flow,
availability of necessary technology and methods for analysis, reporting, and communicating
feedback and monitoring and evaluating outcomes. Technical determinants are what people often
think of first and foremost when trying to improve surveillance systems; past efforts to improve
system performance have often been limited to addressing weaknesses in these determinants alone.
The technical determinants, however, require functioning organizational processes and mechanisms
at the workplace to ensure that information flows where it needs to (in both directions and to all those
who can and should use it to make evidence-based decisions), that district and facility personnel have
resources at their disposal and the responsibility and authority to make decisions based on available
data, and that IDSR roles and responsibilities at all levels of the system are clear. System performance
also depends on the performance of the workforce, i.e. the ability and willingness of all members of
the IDSR workforce to fulfill their assigned roles and responsibilities.
Ghana and Tanzania were both early implementers of the IDSR strategy. Tanzania was the first
country in the WHO/AFRO region, followed closely by Ghana, to conduct an assessment of its
Executive Summary
xiii
existing infectious disease surveillance system and to develop an action plan. Both countries had
completed assessments and developed national IDSR guidelines and action plans by 2002. In both
countries, the focus of early IDSR implementation was in a limited geographical area: Ghana started
in its three northern regions, while Tanzania began in 12 districts spread throughout the country.
Both countries developed strategies and tools to concurrently address technical, organizational, and
workforce issues. Technical strategies included: creating a set of technical guidelines that defined
“norms and forms” for IDSR in general and for the specific priority diseases, clarifying standards for
IDSR data analysis, and creating technical capacity to collect, manage, analyze and communicate data
at national and district levels. Organizational strategies included: clarifying roles and responsibilities,
budgeting for IDSR at local levels, outlining clear procedures for IDSR tasks, creating mechanisms
for involving other actors in IDSR, resolving communications/reporting constraints, and
strengthening supervision. Workforce strategies included the creation of training capacity and
creating job aids for standard case definitions (detection and reporting), data interpretation, specimen
collection and transport.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data collected in 2004 and 2005 in Ghana and Tanzania were
used to assess levels of IDSR performance. The M&E results showed a positive, but somewhat
mixed picture of IDSR performance improvement. Some performance areas have not yet
demonstrated their results, in some cases because more time is needed to evaluate interventions
recently implemented, and in other cases because more remains to be done. However, both countries
had significant improvements in completeness and timeliness of weekly and monthly disease
reporting from facilities to districts, and from districts to regions. Improvements were also seen in the
accuracy of data reported (due to better compilation). Data analysis was conducted more frequently
at the district and facility levels, although there is still room for improvement at the facility level in
Tanzania. Assessment of improvement in outbreak management was not possible, due to the low
number of outbreaks, but performance appeared strong. Evidence of the use of IDSR data for
planning, monitoring and budgeting IDSR activities was seen in both countries, although actual
resource availability often hampered implementation. Areas still needing significant improvement
included feedback and coordination and district level monitoring and evaluation of IDSR
performance data.
The experiences in Tanzania and Ghana highlight the need to take conscious action to address
technical, organizational and workforce determinants at various levels of the health system in order to
improve performance. Although the technical components of the IDSR system are critical to its
proper functioning, attention must be paid to the operational and workforce determinants that also
govern how well IDSR functions. Training materials and job aids were developed to translate the
technical elements of IDSR performance into methods that directly supported improved workforce
performance. The situation analyses indicated that the technical elements of the system, as presented
in the Technical Guidelines, needed to be broken down into concrete, specific tasks for the wide
range of health system personnel involved in IDSR. The resources necessary to adequately bridge the
gap between adequately defined technical standards and workforce capacity to implement them were
often underestimated.
The IDSR teams in Ghana and Tanzania also recognized the critical importance of
organizational determinants of system performance. IDSR activities are implemented as part of the
broader health system and are affected by the system’s strengths and weaknesses. The workplace
environment, the workforce itself, and local actors and communities all have a strong influence on
how IDSR will function. How well a district can organize itself for its IDSR responsibilities depends
on management capacity, effective access and authority over resources, infrastructure, and clarity on
roles, responsibilities, and accountability. Resource, infrastructure, and accountability challenges
beyond the scope of the technical assistance provided by PHRplus in Ghana and Tanzania limited the
xiv
Improving Performance of IDSR at District and Facility Levels
improvement of IDSR performance during the lifetime of the project. Addressing these issues
requires addressing broader systems issues of decentralization, resource generation and allocation,
accountability, management capacity at the district level, and existence of IDSR champions at
national, sub-national and local levels.
The combined experiences in Ghana and Tanzania lead to the following conclusions that are
valid for both countries and likely to be applicable to other countries as well:
Many effective IDSR tools and strategies have been developed in Ghana and Tanzania, and
their use should be expanded beyond the initial implementation areas. Other countries can
take advantage of the investments in their development by adapting them to their own
country contexts without “reinventing the wheel.”
Supervision and follow-up are critical for performance improvement and sustainable results,
and fostering accountability for implementation of IDSR tasks.
More focus is needed on helping district and facility staff to advocate based on data, and to
translate IDSR data results into effective action plans.
Persons responsible for IDSR must engage stakeholders at all levels of the health system.
It is important to understand IDSR performance within each country’s decentralization
context to take advantage of decentralized powers while protecting critical centralized IDSR
functions needed for effective surveillance and response to disease events that cross
administrative boundaries.
Governments and programs need to address structural barriers to IDSR -- both those
exclusively in the IDSR domain and those that reflect broader health system issues -- such
as resource availability, accountability, and reliable communication mechanisms.
External technical assistance is limited in terms of the progress it can achieve in the absence
of investments in broader health system improvements.
IDSR is a cross-cutting function that runs across a range of disease control programs. IDSR and
the health system would both be well served by including IDSR in health system strengthening efforts
because, if functional, IDSR can provide the data needed for evidence based decisions and resource
allocation.
Executive Summary
xv
1. Introduction
due to increased risks of infectious diseases associated with population mobility, globalization,
emerging diseases such as avian influenza, and the resurgence of diseases such as tuberculosis. A
strongly functioning surveillance system is essential to informing public health decisions and actions
that can prevent and control these diseases.
The Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy, promoted and supported by
the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa (AFRO), has been adopted across
the continent of Africa. This document describes efforts to strengthen surveillance through the
implementation of the IDSR strategy by addressing technical, organizational, and workforce
determinants at the district and facility levels in Tanzania and Ghana. Efforts in these two countries
received technical and financial support from the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)1 and the WHO/United Nations Foundation (in Ghana). Hopefully the
experience and lessons learned from these two countries can assist others, both in Africa and in other
regions, who are engaged in strengthening their own disease surveillance and response systems.
Although both countries were able to make progress in strengthening their surveillance systems, the
existence of broader health systems constraints has left much work still to be done.
Section 2 of this document describes the development of the IDSR strategy by WHO/AFRO.
Section 3 presents a practical framework for strengthening IDSR performance, particularly at the
operational (district and facility) level. Section 4 describes IDSR implementation in both Tanzania
and Ghana, showing how the concepts in this framework were applied. Section 5 presents specific
strategies and tools developed and implemented in Tanzania and Ghana to strengthen IDSR
performance at the regional, district and facility levels. These strategies and tools focused on
overcoming the operational, workforce, and technical barriers to effective IDSR performance that
were identified through critical assessment and problem solving by IDSR implementers. Section 6
presents IDSR performance levels (2004-2005) achieved in Tanzania and Ghana, as measured by key
IDSR indicators. Section 7 summarizes the lessons learned and conclusions based on the results
achieved in the two countries, and Section 8 discusses future directions for efforts to improve IDSR
performance at the district and facility levels in Tanzania, Ghana and perhaps elsewhere.
1
USAID/Washington and USAID missions in Tanzania and Ghana provided support through Partners for Health
Reformplus (PHRplus) project. Additional support from USAID/Washington was provided through the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the CHANGE project.
1. Introduction
1
2. Integrated Disease Surveillance and
Response In Africa: A Key Component of
the WHO/AFRO Strategy to Reduce the
Burden of Infectious Disease
In Africa, infectious diseases (both endemic and epidemic-prone) are still the most common
causes of morbidity and mortality. To effectively control these diseases, health systems need access
to complete, accurate and timely information so they can target scarce resources in the most effective
manner. Integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) is a strategy to ensure the generation
and provision of this information to decision makers at all levels of the health system, and to ensure
that health officials can take informed and appropriate action to reduce morbidity and mortality from
priority infectious diseases. IDSR was developed by the World Health Organization Regional Office
for Africa and endorsed by all member countries in the region (WHO/AFRO, 2001a).
A series of major epidemics (particularly meningitis) in the 1990’s provided the impetus behind
WHO/AFRO’s renewed efforts to improve surveillance. These epidemics led to considerable
numbers of fatalities, due in part to the fact that effective early detection and response capabilities
were not in place. The large number of potentially preventable cases and fatalities brought the
surveillance systems’ weaknesses to the forefront, generating political will to strengthen surveillance
systems throughout the region. Generally speaking, surveillance data in Africa were recognized as
incomplete, not received in time to be used, and often of questionable validity. In addition, there were
concerns about whether health system staff – particularly those at the facility and district levels –
were able to analyze, interpret, and actually use surveillance data.
Disease surveillance has been described by WHO/AFRO as:
“...systematic data collection on the occurrence of diseases, disability and deaths; data
organization [in a] meaningful way; basic data analysis in order to extract useful information;
and timely and complete reporting. Based on the information generated, disease control
programmes make judicious decisions and take appropriate action. Disease surveillance
information is also useful for programme monitoring and evaluation.”
-- Strategic Plan for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in the
African Region 2002-2007 (WHO/AFRO, 2003)
In the 1990’s the barriers to effective surveillance and response in Africa included surveillance
system design issues, such as the existence of multiple, vertical systems that focused almost
exclusively on providing data for managers higher up in the system. Frequently there were few links
between those collecting and those analyzing the data, and between those responsible for data
analysis and those responsible for decisions and planning related to public health response and/or
routine service delivery. Surveillance systems also suffered from a general lack of resources and poor
transportation and communications infrastructure. These infrastructure problems made reporting and
2. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response In Africa
3
specimen transport difficult, if not impossible for peripheral health facilities – particularly during
annual rainy seasons. Funds for recurrent expenditures in health facilities and districts were lacking
for such basic supplies as pencils and paper as well as critical functions such as supervision and
training. Laboratory capacity was generally weak and the role of the laboratory in public health
surveillance was often poorly understood. There were few if any incentives for accurate and timely
data collection, and often disincentives existed for raising alarm by reporting an outbreak.
The IDSR strategy was developed to respond to the weaknesses in existing African infectious
disease surveillance systems; its objectives are outlined in Box 1. The key innovation presented by
the IDSR strategy was the integration of multiple existing and often confusing and overlapping data
collection forms and reporting mechanisms. A clear emphasis was placed on the need for
surveillance systems to link data to analysis and response mechanisms within the health delivery
system, particularly at the district level. Improving data availability alone would not be sufficient to
make surveillance a strong and effective tool to address priority diseases and threats to public health.
Box 1: Objectives of the WHO/AFRO IDSR Strategy
•
“strengthen the capacity of countries to conduct effective surveillance activities
•
integrate multiple surveillance systems so that forms, personnel and resources can be used more
efficiently and effectively
•
improve the use of information for decision-making
•
improve the flow of surveillance information between and within levels of the health system
•
improve laboratory capacity in identification of pathogens and monitoring of drug sensitivity
•
increase the involvement of clinicians in the surveillance system
•
emphasize community participation in detection and response to public health problems
•
strengthen the involvement of laboratory personnel in epidemiological surveillance”
-- Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in the African Region, pg. 4,
(CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2001)
The IDSR concept calls for countries to develop plans to strengthen surveillance of priority
infectious diseases through:
the use of simplified tools for data collection and analysis;
integration of various channels for reporting and feedback;
providing timely surveillance information for decision-making and public health action
throughout the system; and
strengthening district level capacity to generate and transform surveillance data into
information upon which to take action.
4
WHO/AFRO recommended that countries
focus their surveillance and response system
strengthening efforts on a limited number of
priority diseases, integrating systems both
horizontally and vertically, simplifying forms and
reporting, building laboratory capacity, and
strengthening the role of the district in surveillance
and response. The IDSR strategy seeks to render
surveillance and response activities more efficient,
more effective, and more relevant for those
working at the operational level, and builds on the
seven functions of effective surveillance systems
shown in Box 2.
Box 2: Seven functions of effective
surveillance systems (CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2001)
1. Identify cases of priority diseases/conditions
2. Report priority diseases/conditions
3. Analyze data
4. Investigate suspected outbreaks/other public
health problems
5. Respond to outbreaks/other public health
problems
6. Provide feedback
7. Evaluate and improve surveillance and
response
To assist countries in focusing and structuring their efforts in implementing the IDSR strategy,
WHO/AFRO outlined a broad and basic implementation approach that included:
sensitization of key stakeholders to the need to improve surveillance and response;
assessment of the system;
development of a plan of action;
adaptation of the technical guidelines;
adaptation of the training modules;
training at the district level;
dissemination of new IDSR tools; and
monitoring and evaluation.
Countries were encouraged to adapt and implement the IDSR approach in order to strengthen
surveillance and response. WHO/AFRO, with funding from the United Nations (UN) Foundation,
financially and technically supported efforts in five countries: Ghana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and
Southern Sudan. Other countries, such as Tanzania, worked directly with partners to identify
resources necessary to implement their action plans.
2. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response In Africa
5
3. A Practical Framework for Strengthening
IDSR System Performance
It was clear from the start that IDSR implementation would require countries and their partners
to do more than simply focus on the technical elements – the “norms and forms” of the surveillance
system – to produce better data and more useful information. Surveillance system functioning
depends on the interaction between many elements including sound technical standards;
organizational structures that support effective implementation of those standards; the clear definition
of roles, responsibilities and operational tasks; and organizational support to ensure that individual
workers are capable of fulfilling their responsibilities, combined with an organizational culture that
supports their motivation to do so. Figure 1 shows the interrelated nature of the technical,
organizational, and workforce determinants of surveillance system performance.
The technical determinants of IDSR performance include technical standards, information
system design, data collection forms, data flow, availability of necessary technology and methods for
data analysis, reporting, and communicating feedback and monitoring and evaluating outcomes.
Technical determinants are what people often think of first and foremost when trying to improve
surveillance systems. Past efforts to improve system performance have often been limited to
addressing technical weaknesses alone. The technical determinants, however, require functioning
organizational processes and mechanisms at the workplace to ensure that information flows where it
needs to (in both directions and to all those who can and should use it to make evidence-based
decisions), that district and facility personnel have resources at their disposal and the responsibility
and authority to make decisions based on available data, and that IDSR roles and responsibilities at all
levels of the system are clear. System performance also depends on the performance of the
workforce, i.e. the ability and willingness of all members of the IDSR workforce to fulfill their
assigned roles and responsibilities.
3. A Practical Framework for Strengthening IDSR System Performance
7
Figure 1: Determinants of disease surveillance and response system performance
Technical determinants:
Technical standards, information system
design, data collection forms, technology
IDSR
PERFORMANCE
Organizational/Workplace
determinants:
Structure, leadership, processes/procedures,
resources, incentives, clear roles and
responsibilities
Workforce performance:
Knowledge, skills, and motivation of
individuals working in the system,
organizational culture
When the IDSR strategy was adopted, many African infectious disease surveillance systems
lacked the basic technical framework to adequately carry out the seven basic surveillance functions
(See Box 2). Thus, WHO/AFRO and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) jointly
developed a set of generic technical guidelines (CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2001) to provide a
comprehensive framework for surveillance of 19 priority diseases in the region2, focusing on the
district as the crux of IDSR implementation. These guidelines contained both generic and diseasespecific information for implementing the IDSR functions at the district and facility levels and
provided much needed technical guidance. The guidelines responded to the need for standard case
definitions and reporting and analysis protocols to improve system performance. Countries were to
adapt these basic guidelines to meet their own needs and priorities. Appendix 1 presents the IDSR
priority disease lists for Ghana and Tanzania.
WHO/AFRO and CDC also collaborated to produce additional tools to provide countries in the
region with the technical elements necessary to strengthen their IDSR systems: a protocol for
assessing national communicable disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness and response
systems (WHO/AFRO, 2001b), district IDSR training materials (WHO/AFRO, 2001c), a district
analysis book developed in 2002 and revised in 2004 (CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2004), and priority
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) indicators also developed in 2002 and revised in 2004
2
Epidemic-prone: cholera, shigella, measles, meningitis, plague, viral hemorrhagic fevers, yellow fever;
targeted for eradication or elimination: polio (acute flaccid paralysis), dracunculiasis, leprosy, neonatal
tetanus; public health importance: pneumonia in children, AIDS, malaria, onchocerciasis, sexually transmitted
infections, trypanosomiasis, tuberculosis.
8
(WHO/AFRO, 2005). These generic tools focused on defining tasks and providing the technical
knowledge and skills needed by the IDSR workforce.
The guidelines and other tools developed by WHO/AFRO and CDC, when disseminated to the
operational levels (district and facility), provided the basic technical information needed including
generic standards, forms, and information flows that countries could adapt. The WHO/AFRO
technical guidelines also presented a generic framework defining the roles and responsibilities for the
various levels of the system: community, health facility, district, national and regional (i.e.,
WHO/AFRO).
Additional challenges not addressed by the above referenced WHO/AFRO guidelines and tools
included the creation of organizational structures to support surveillance and the development and
retention of a cadre of motivated and capable workers to implement the technical guidelines and tools
required for effective surveillance. Another important consideration was the level and effectiveness
of decentralization in any given country. IDSR emphasizes the district as the operational focus,
because it is at this level that data analysis and timely local response can be effectively organized.
Although every country has some health and administrative structures at the operational level, not all
“districts” have the same attributes in terms of authority over resources. As countries modify the
WHO/AFRO list of priority diseases to better fit their own local context, they will also need to adapt
these technical instruments to their evolving decentralized health and administrative structures and be
clear on the respective roles and responsibilities for IDSR at all levels of the system.
This document describes the efforts in Tanzania and Ghana to support improvements in the
performance of IDSR. Both countries took the approach that all three categories of IDSR performance
determinants (technical, organizational and workforce) must be addressed concurrently to make
sustainable improvements in surveillance. However, as will be discussed later, the projects in both
countries found (as is often the case for donor-funded projects) that they were able to make more
progress strengthening the technical elements of IDSR than the organizational and workforce
elements. The experiences of Ghana and Tanzania in developing a framework and tools for IDSR
implementation that addressed all three types of determinants and obstacles to system performance
provide some interesting insights that will be of value to other countries who are also attempting to
improve the performance of their surveillance systems.
3. A Practical Framework for Strengthening IDSR System Performance
9
4. IDSR Implementation in Ghana and
Tanzania: Applying the Framework
WHO/AFRO and CDC’s pioneering work in developing a generic set of technical guidelines
with a focus on strengthening efforts at the district level was critical in creating country-level
momentum to improve IDSR performance. Data on individual country progress in strengthening and
integrating disease surveillance according to WHO/AFRO’s IDSR strategy indicate rapid adoption of
the strategy and significant investments by member states. As of November 2005 (CDC, 2005), 43 of
the 46 WHO/AFRO countries had conducted assessments, 39 had adapted the WHO/AFRO
guidelines, 32 had conducted some level of IDSR training, and 16 reported having trained at least
60% of their districts. In addition, twenty-four countries reported producing a feedback bulletin at the
national level.
Ghana and Tanzania were both early implementers of the IDSR strategy. Tanzania was the first
country in the AFRO region, followed closely by Ghana, to conduct an assessment of its existing
infectious disease surveillance system and to develop an action plan. This section briefly describes
each country’s implementation of the WHO/AFRO IDSR strategy and describes how they, along with
their partners, tried to address specific organizational, technical and workforce issues.
4.1
Ghana
Following the general implementation strategy outlined by WHO/AFRO, Ghana’s National
Surveillance Unit (NSU) conducted an assessment of the existing infectious disease surveillance
system in 2000 (GHS/MOH Ghana, 2000). The assessment was carried out collaboratively with input
and assistance from WHO/AFRO and CDC3. The NSU used the assessment results to create a 5-year
Action Plan for implementing the IDSR strategic approach.
The UN Foundation (through WHO) and USAID (through PHRplus and the CDC) supported the
initial steps in the Action Plan by providing assistance to create and/or adapt basic IDSR building
blocks (guidelines, standard case definitions, etc.) and strengthen the capacity of the NSU to manage
and use surveillance data. The generic WHO/AFRO/CDC IDSR guidelines were reviewed and
adapted in 2001 to reflect Ghanaian epidemiology, disease priorities and programmatic needs. The
“Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in Ghana” were published
and distributed4 in 2002 (GoG/MOH/NSU, 2002). A separate, stand-alone pamphlet of standard case
definitions for the 23 diseases targeted by the Ghanaian IDSR strategy was also produced and
distributed to make the definitions more easily accessible to facility level and other clinical staff who
were to use them as the basis for case recognition and reporting under IDSR. The WHO/AFRO
training modules that focused primarily at the district level, were also adapted and printed
(GHS/MOH/NSU, 2005). In 2002, with the Technical Guidelines and training modules developed
and/or adapted, the responsibility for IDSR implementation shifted to the Regional Health
3
CDC support was funded through USAID.
Due to limited funding, not all health facilities in the country received a copy of the national technical guidelines
at that time.
4
4. IDSR Implementation in Ghana and Tanzania
11
Management Teams (RHMT), in accordance with the structures for implementation authority under
the new Ghana Health Service. The NSU, with some UN Foundation support, began conducting
training for district health management teams in one region. The NSU was responsible for technical
oversight and direction, but did not have its own funds to support IDSR activities and needed to
negotiate with the regions for the resources required to introduce and support IDSR.
At the request of the Ghana Health Services/Ministry of Health (GHS/MoH) in late 2002,
USAID, through PHRplus, provided technical and financial support for training and supervision to
improve IDSR performance in three northern regions of Ghana (Northern, Upper East and Upper
West) that included a total of 24 districts (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Ghana initial intensive IDSR regions
Recognizing that efforts to address basic technical obstacles were but a first step in an ongoing
process, Ghana adopted an approach of “continuous assessment and problem solving” as it began to
implement specific improvements to IDSR in the three northern regions. This approach took
advantage of existing opportunities and mechanisms for discussion and planning to examine, with key
stakeholders, the fundamental (and not just technical) issues and constraints to IDSR performance.
The RHMTs embraced the idea that every supervision visit was an opportunity for on-the-spot
problem solving and that solutions could/should be shared with others facing the same or similar
problems. A number of key opportunities for assessment and problem solving were created in Ghana
including:
Discussions at an initial IDSR regional planning workshop with regional and district teams
on roles, responsibilities, strengths and weaknesses;
Visits to the districts for additional information collection on capacity building needs of
district and facility staff and other organizational issues;
Discussions during capacity building and information sharing sessions on barriers faced and
mechanisms to overcome them; and
Obtaining information and integrating the problem-solving approach into supervision and
follow-up visits.
12
Starting with the initial planning workshop in February 2003, strengths and weaknesses
associated with the seven core functions of the existing surveillance system were outlined (see
Appendix 2), and technical, organizational, and workforce determinants of performance were
recognized and highlighted for attention. One clear conclusion drawn from this first collaborative
assessment exercise was that many more people were directly involved in the operation of the system
than had been previously recognized. At the facility level (the front lines of IDSR), many staff in
addition to the surveillance officer -- nurses, midwives, data clerks, clinicians and others -- had roles
to play in IDSR. Training and other capacity building efforts, therefore, would need to include all of
these personnel. At this February workshop, participants from all levels of the system completed a
task analysis (see Appendix 3) that confirmed this finding. It was immediately apparent that training
materials would need to be developed specifically for the facility level, and that these materials would
need to target skills and clarify roles and responsibilities for clinicians, data clerks, facility in-charges
and disease control officers.
Five-day District Health Management Team (DHMT) level training was provided to all
personnel in 24 districts in the three regions and an additional 12 districts in Brong Ahafo Region at
the request of the GHS/MoH. Three-day training for facility level personnel was carried out to cover
all health facilities in the three target regions. Technical support was also provided to strengthen
supervision of surveillance and response activities. In addition, under the Quality Health Partners
(QHP) project, subsequently funded by USAID, additional support will be provided to another 28
districts for IDSR implementation through 2009.
4.2
Tanzania
Tanzania conducted the continent’s first assessment of an existing infectious disease surveillance
system in 1998, with funding from USAID and support from WHO/AFRO and CDC (Brown,
Nsubuga and Eseko, 1999). Using the results of this assessment, a large group of stakeholders
prepared an Action Plan (Brown, Eseko, and Nsubuga, 1999). To guide the rest of the IDSR
implementation process, Tanzania established an IDSR taskforce in 2000. The taskforce was chaired
by the MoH’s Chief Medical Officer and composed of representatives from the various disease
control programs, the MoH Epidemiology and Disease Control Section (EDCS), WHO, USAID, the
Tanzania Public Health Association, and other key partners. The IDSR taskforce offered an on-going
organizational mechanism for the discussion of surveillance system performance, constraints to
performance and the modification of tools and approaches. It should be noted, however, that the
taskforce was not meeting consistently during 2004-2005.
With the creation of the IDSR taskforce, Tanzania sought to move ahead quickly with the
development of technical guidelines for IDSR. Although the production of the generic
WHO/AFRO/CDC Technical Guidelines was not complete, the Government of Tanzania wanted to
take advantage of the existing momentum and decided to move ahead with development of its own
technical guidelines (EDCS/MoH, 2001). The IDSR taskforce chose the 13 diseases that required
weekly and monthly reporting under the existing system as priority diseases for IDSR strengthening.
Tanzania’s Technical Guidelines contained revised forms for weekly, monthly and case-based
reporting, standard case definitions, information about each of the priority diseases, general
discussion of surveillance data analysis, and information on the elements of the IDSR strategy, all of
which were generally similar but not identical to those advocated by WHO in their generic guidelines.
It should be noted that Tanzania’s 2001 guidelines did not include all national disease priorities (such
as tuberculosis, AIDS, viral hemorrhagic fevers), they did not outline specific roles and
responsibilities of each level within the surveillance system, and there was no consistent format used
across diseases in their presentation in the guidelines.
13
Although the Tanzania Assessment and Action Plan had created momentum for strengthening
IDSR, lack of financial support slowed progress with IDSR implementation. The Tanzania technical
guidelines were introduced and reviewed at a meeting of Regional Health Officers (RHOs) in 2002,
but without specific funds available for training and dissemination, these RHOs were given the
responsibility for implementing IDSR with whatever resources they could find. When the first
versions of the IDSR training modules and the district analysis book were issued by WHO/AFRO in
2001, the EDCS facilitated the adaptation of these materials for Tanzania and subsequent
endorsement by the MoH.
During 2002, USAID began to provide technical assistance to support to IDSR in Tanzania
through three cooperating agencies: the PHRplus and CHANGE Projects and the CDC. The National
Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) was contracted by PHRplus to be the local implementing
partner at the request of the Ministry of Health.5 In collaboration with the Ministry of Health,
PHRplus/NIMR and CHANGE focused on addressing operational challenges to IDSR strengthening
in 12 pilot districts.6 The 12 districts were located in 8 of the 20 regions in the country, and were
selected to represent a variety of epidemiological contexts, accessibility and infrastructure (See Figure
3). The expected results from this technical assistance were: 1) establishment of an effective IDSR
system in the 12 districts; 2) replication to other districts; 3) data showing increased availability of
quality information; and 4) increased evidence-based decision making and response. While the
PHRplus and CHANGE projects were working in the 12 districts, the Ministry of Health also
continued, as resources allowed, with IDSR implementation in the rest of the country.
Figure 3: 12 IDSR pilot districts in Tanzania
Project districts
Appreciating the range of technical, organizational and workforce factors that would influence
the success of IDSR implementation, the pilot implementation team (PHRplus, NIMR and
CHANGE), in collaboration with the IDSR taskforce, initiated an in-depth situation analysis. The
situation analysis was conducted in 2002 (Franco et al., 2003) in 2 of the 12 selected pilot districts
5
NIMR was responsible for managing all local financial and technical support for IDSR in the 12 pilot districts.
The CDC worked mainly at the national level, developing epidemiological capacity (insertion of surveillance
and epidemiological training into the Public Health training curriculum), national level feedback mechanisms,
and strengthening of the laboratory network.
6
14
(Babati and Dodoma Rural). The situation analysis served as both an information collection activity
and an opportunity for in-depth discussions with council (district) health management teams
(CHMT)7 to analyze the realities of IDSR implementation, and to discuss performance expectations
and possible performance improvement strategies. The situation analysis used record review, indepth interviews with CHMT members, district officials and health workers, and focus group
discussions with community leaders and members. It included a mapping of the IDSR process, data
interpretation sessions, and planning. The situation analysis process took about 2 weeks for data
collection in each district, with additional time for analysis and discussion of results.
The situation analysis revealed that MOH efforts in 2001 to disseminate and promote use of the
IDSR technical guidelines through the individual initiatives of the RHOs were only partially
successful. The Arusha RHO had been able to organize training for Babati district with Babati
district funds, and 40 facility in-charges had received training and copies of selected portions of the
guidelines. The new forms were being used by some of the facilities, but timeliness and completeness
of reporting was still weak. In Dodoma Rural no training had taken place, neither CHMT members
nor facility staff had a copy of the IDSR guidelines, and new forms were not yet in use. Overall,
knowledge of the surveillance system and procedures was inadequate, and there was little clarity
about specific responsibilities of various district and facility level staff. The situation analysis results
provided guidance for determining priority actions for IDSR strengthening activities. The following
broad areas for action were identified: improving competence of health personnel; improving district
organizational capacity; improving support for IDSR within and beyond the health system; and
improving communications technology and laboratory networking.
In Tanzania a “cascade” training strategy8 was employed in the 12 pilot districts with the dual
purposes of: 1) improving workforce performance at the facility and district levels; and 2) developing
in-country IDSR training capacity so that capacity building activities could be replicated beyond the
pilot districts. An initial training of trainers (TOT) involved participants from the Tanzanian MOH
Zonal Training Centers (ZTCs), as well as Regional Health Management Teams (RHMT) and the
National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR). They in turn trained CHMT members, first in IDSR
and then as trainers. Then, the CHMTs trained facility staff in their districts. The project’s training
efforts left a core group of 51 trainers from the MOH, NIMR and ZTCs (28 of whom were members
of RHMTs) competent to train IDSR content to district staff, and 32 district staff able to provide
IDSR training to facility health workers. In total, 787 facility-level health workers from 591 facilities
were trained in IDSR throughout the 12 pilot districts.
7
This is equivalent to a District Health Management Team. Under the broad decentralization law, the district
councils are responsible for local administration, including health.
8
This training strategy involves training trainers starting at higher levels of the health system who will in turn
train others.
15
5. Approaches and Interventions:
Improving IDSR Performance by
Addressing Technical, Organizational
and Workforce Determinants at the
District and Facility Level
The framework of determinants of IDSR performance presented in Figure 1 can be used as a tool
to insure that implementation and system strengthening efforts are not limited to the obvious technical
determinants alone. By adopting the framework from the start, implementers are reminded that they
must look for and resolve obstacles to performance in all three areas. This can be done by ensuring
that assessment and ongoing support activities are designed to address all three types of determinants.
By engaging stakeholders in the assessment process, a creative problem solving environment is
created where assessment and resolution become an active process. Table 1 summarizes and
synthesizes how assessment and action were linked to resolve problems in all three areas in both
Ghana and Tanzania. This is followed by a description of the specific approaches and tools used in
Ghana and Tanzania to address each of the three types of determinants. Although many tools and
approaches actually address more than one determinant, they have been organized under their primary
target.
5. Approaches and Interventions
17
Table 1: Identification of Obstacles and Proposed Solutions
Constraint/Obstacle
How Identified
Proposed/Implemented Solution
Note(s)
Technical Determinants
Lack of clear, unambiguous
information on standard case
definitions, reporting procedures,
case confirmation and appropriate
response for priority diseases
Ghana and Tanzania: Initial
WHO/AFRO assessment
Ghana: IDSR Technical guidelines
for Ghana adapted from WHO/AFRO
model, printed and
distributedTanzania: IDSR Technical
guidelines for Tanzania developed
with limited distribution
Ghana: Technical guidelines dense
and not user-friendly requiring
additional job tools and materials to
improve workforce
performanceTanzania: Technical
guidelines not consistent in format
across diseases, no outline of roles
and responsibilities, dense and not
user-friendly
Lack of analysis and use of data at
district and regional levels
Ghana: Initial WHO/AFRO
assessment and visits to districts and
facilities
Ghana: Develop and distribute
Communicable Disease Analysis
Book (ComDAB) for use by facilities
to guide and instruct in required
analyses for priority diseases.
Develop analysis skills through
training and on-the-job support.
Ghana: The ComDAB has only
recently been printed and distributed.
No assessment of its effectiveness
has been possible.
Tanzania: Initial WHO/AFRO
assessment and visits to districts and
facilities, plus in-depth situation
analysis
Tanzania: Develop analysis skills
through training and post-training
district quarterly meetings and other
on-the-job support. Develop IDSR
data analysis program for use at the
district level, along with poster of
minimum IDSR analysis standards
and IDSR data interpretation guide.
Tanzania: Data analysis program
implemented late in project, so
adequate assessment of its
effectiveness was not possible.
WHO/AFRO assessment and visits
to districts and facilities; followup/supervision visits
Ghana: Installation of two-way radios
in facilities and corresponding
districts (financed by UN
Foundation). Creation of email
accounts for RHMTs to facilitate
electronic transmission of data.
Ghana: Resources were not
sufficient to improve communications
at all facilities nationwide and
communications difficulties remain in
some areas. Weak internet/email
infrastructure in Ghana limited
effectiveness of this solution.
Tanzania: Problem-solving sessions
during district quarterly meetings and
follow-up/supervision visits to identify
and implement creative solutions to
improve communications and
Tanzania: Some project districts
budgeted for communications
equipment in annual plans. Others
engaged groups such as local bus
services to deliver weekly and
Lack of reliable communication
capacity between health facilities and
districts
18
Constraint/Obstacle
Limited data management capacity
and use at all levels
How Identified
WHO/AFRO assessment and
discussions with national staff;
ongoing supervision and follow-up
visits
reporting.
Note(s)
monthly IDSR reports. However,
poor communications infrastructure
remains a challenge, particularly at
the facility level.
Ghana: Installation of local area
network equipment at NSU offices
and upgrade of computer hardware.
Development of Epi-Info based
programs to facilitate data
management and routine analysis by
NSU staff.
Tanzania: Development of Microsoft
Excel based program to facilitate
electronic data management and
routine analysis by district staff.
Tanzania: M&E showed that data
analysis at the facility level could use
additional support.
Organizational Determinants
Ghana: NSU had no resources to
implement activities in direct support
of IDSR system implementation or
operation. All activities must be
funded through regional, district or
external donor budgets.
Tanzania: National level had limited
resources to support IDSR
implementation.
Districts and regions do not include
surveillance activities in their
planning and budgeting
IDSR must compete with a myriad of
programs and priority activities for
time. Limited attention and resources
at district, regional and national
levels
Ghana: Discussions with NSU
Ghana: PHRplus strategy to focus
support efforts in three regions
(Northern, Upper East and Upper
west) to implement IDSR.
Tanzania: Initial project discussions
at national level
Tanzania: PHRplus support focused
in 12 districts to implement IDSR and
develop tools and strategies to be
used in other districts.
Ghana: Visits and discussions with
regional and district teams
Ghana: Reinforce need to include as
part of training and other capacity
building activities and interactions.
Tanzania: Situation analysis and
discussions with regional and district
teams
Tanzania: Worked with 12 project
districts to incorporate IDSR activities
in annual plans.
Ghana and Tanzania: Visits and
discussions with national, regional
and district teams
Ghana: No solution identified within
the limits of IDSR system
strengthening.Tanzania: Used
training, follow-up and supervision
visits with CHMTs to reinforce the
importance of generating, analyzing,
and using high quality IDSR data
19
Tanzania: After PHRplus ended,
national level continued to have
limited resources to support IDSR
implementation in all districts.
Constraint/Obstacle
How Identified
Note(s)
Districts and facilities did not have
sufficient supplies and materials due
to insufficient budgets and competing
priorities and programs
Ghana and Tanzania: Supervision
and support visits and follow-up
discussions with regional and district
teams
Ghana: No uniform solution identified
within the limits of IDSR system
strengthening.
Ghana: In one case, a region
decided to retain allocated funds
(rather than send to district) and print
and distribute forms, etc., in effect recentralizing this aspect of budgeting
and management
Districts and regions did not receive
allocated funds in a timely manner,
creating difficulty in implementing
IDSR activities and plans as
scheduled
Ghana and Tanzania:
Visits/discussions with regional and
district teams
No solution identified within the limits
of IDSR system strengthening
This is a problem which goes well
beyond IDSR and must be
addressed at the national level
Lack of accountability for
performance at many levels of the
health delivery system (not just
IDSR)
Ghana and Tanzania:
Visits/discussions with regional and
district teams
No solution identified within the limits
of IDSR system strengthening
This is a problem which goes well
beyond IDSR and must be
addressed at the national level
Tanzania: To the extent possible,
worked with districts to budget for
IDSR forms and basic materials in
annual plans
Workforce Performance Determinants
Lack of clear knowledge of IDSR
roles and responsibilities for many
different personnel categories,
especially at the facility level
20
Ghana: Task analysis performed at
workshop
Ghana: Development of training
program specifically for facility level
personnel;development of specific
training programs targeting different
types of personnel at each level;
development of separate technical
handbook for use by personnel at
facility level; development of
improved guidelines and methods for
supportive supervision of IDSR
activities
Tanzania: Initial discussions with
national, regional and district staff;
situation analysis
Tanzania: Mapping roles and
responsibilities; reinforcing these
during training and follow-up;
developing separate training
materials for district and facility levels
Constraint/Obstacle
Lack of skills and knowledge
required for IDSR function among
many personnel at all levels and
cadres
How Identified
Ghana: Task analysis performed at
workshop
Ghana: Developed training program
specifically for facility level
personnel; developed specific
training programs targeting different
types of personnel at each level;
developed separate technical
handbook for use by personnel at
facility level; developed and
distributed disease fact sheets to
clinicians; developed IDSR protocols
posters for use in health facilities;
developed improved guidelines and
methods for supportive supervision
of IDSR activities
Tanzania: Initial discussions with
national, regional and district staff;
situation analysis
Tanzania: Developed training
materials for district and facility staff;
developed and disseminated tools
and job aids
21
Note(s)
5.1
Overcoming technical limitations to IDSR performance: defining norms
and forms
Technical
•
IDSR
performance
•
•
Box 3: Tools and Strategies for addressing technical
determinants
Creating a set of technical guidelines that define “norms and
forms” for IDSR in general and for the specific priority
diseases
Clarifying standards for IDSR data analysis
Creating technical capacity to collect, manage, analyze and
communicate data
Workforce
Organization/
workplace
In both Ghana and Tanzania, even prior to the initial assessments in 1998 and 2000, the technical
limitations to IDSR performance were already apparent: both countries lacked clear and consistent
case definitions, reporting requirements and action thresholds, data management, analysis, and use
capacity, and communications infrastructure for effective IDSR performance. This section describes
efforts to address the identified technical constraints to surveillance system operation in each country.
Technical guidelines were the first tool developed in each country, and they provided the framework
for many of the other tools and approaches.
5.1.1
Ghana
Ghana’s efforts to strengthen the technical determinants of IDSR performance focused initially
on developing consensus on the overall guidelines and clarifying requirements related to analysis and
response.
Technical Guidelines: The first step taken during the technical guidelines adaptation process
was to identify and engage key stakeholders to discuss, review and agree upon the basic technical
parameters of the IDSR system. These stakeholders included regional and district service
delivery/program managers and implementers who would ultimately be responsible for the operation
of the system. The NSU worked effectively to coordinate the inputs of these stakeholders and
developed a consensus around the basic technical elements of the system including: the list of
priority diseases; standard case definitions for surveillance; reporting forms and requirements for all
diseases; alert and action thresholds; analysis requirements; and indicators for monitoring and
evaluating IDSR system performance. Achieving consensus required considerable negotiation and
discussion that resulted in the production of the Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease
Surveillance and Response in Ghana (GoG/MoH/NSU, 2002).
Standards for Analysis: Surveillance system assessments in Ghana clearly identified the lack of
analysis of disease data a constraint to effective use of those data for decision-making, planning
and/or action. This was seen at all levels, from health facilities to regional health management teams.
To define the requirements and methods for improved IDSR data analysis, the Communicable
Disease Analysis Book (ComDAB) (GHS/MOH/NSU, 2005a) was developed based upon a generic
template from CDC and WHO/AFRO (CDC/WHO/AFRO, 2004). ComDAB is a technical
companion to the IDSR Technical Guidelines and provides greater detail and templates that define the
types and frequency of analysis to be performed for each of the 23 priority IDSR diseases.
22
Strengthening capacity to use technology: The UN Foundation supported the establishment of
email accounts for all of the regional offices to facilitate communication and electronic data transfer
from the regional to national level. To provide the necessary structure and framework for routine data
transmission, the NSU developed and installed Epi-Info based (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA) software for the entry of IDSR data at the RHMT offices. This
software also provided a common file structure for data analysis at the regional and national levels.
The effectiveness of this intervention at the time was limited by the weak electronic communications
infrastructure in Ghana. Many of the regional capitals did not have reliable means of electronic
communication with the NSU and had to use other methods to ensure timely data transmission.9
Networking hardware was also purchased and installed to increase management capabilities and data
sharing and analysis among staff at the NSU headquarters.
Radio communication technology for IDSR reporting: Poor communication between levels
within the health system was a clear obstacle to IDSR function and success. A functional IDSR
system requires that all levels be able to communicate and transmit data effectively both as a routine
function and in the event of an outbreak. With financial support from the UN Foundation, the NSU
worked with regions and districts to install two-way radios in several facilities and districts to
improve communication and the rapid flow of IDSR data.
5.1.2
Tanzania
Technical guidelines: As mentioned in Section 4.2, Tanzania initiated work on its Technical
Guidelines prior to the publication of WHO/AFRO’s generic guidelines. Tanzania’s guidelines
included definition of the steps in surveillance and response, standard case definitions, a section
describing detection, confirmation, investigation and response measures for each of the 13 selected
priority diseases, and a set of new forms to be used for weekly and monthly reporting, case
investigation, etc. These guidelines were an attempt to clarify standards and unify information on
these 13 diseases so that health staff at various levels of the system would know how to conduct
surveillance and related activities.10
Standards and guidelines for district level IDSR analysis: Analysis of IDSR data at the
district level was consistently weak in all districts, as documented in both the initial assessment in
1998 and the situation analysis in 2003. Most districts were not producing any regular set of analyses
to monitor disease trends, nor were they monitoring IDSR system performance. Although the
Tanzania guidelines included a section on IDSR data analysis, they did not provide specific guidance
on what kinds of analysis were expected from the districts on a regular basis. PHRplus and NIMR
developed a summary table (See Appendix 4) detailing 24 standard IDSR-related analyses that should
be produced regularly by each district. This job aid was intended to provide guidance for analysis and
to serve as a reference for the person(s) responsible for IDSR data analysis. The analysis standards
were also incorporated into the database discussed below.
IDSR data management and analysis tool: Difficulty with the management of files and data
was frequently seen in Tanzania, and in many districts the facility reporting forms were not filed in an
organized way. All 12 pilot districts had computers (many of whom had them prior to the IDSR
strengthening project), but none were using them for IDSR data analysis. PHRplus developed a
district-level IDSR data management and analysis tool based in Microsoft Excel and consisting of a
9
However, over time, communications are improving and the system will become functional.
Certain limitations to these guidelines have been discussed in section 4.2 and are discussed in 5.2 and 5.3.
10
23
series of linked spreadsheets used at the district level to create an electronic database of IDSR data
from the facility reports. Information from the facility paper reports is stored electronically in an
organized manner, and the tool provides rapid analysis of the data and automatically creates the
tables, charts, and graphs described in the IDSR analysis standards poster. In addition, the tool
contains a template for creation of quarterly feedback reports from the district to facilities. The
database was installed in all 12 districts by NIMR staff, and at least one person in each district was
trained in its use.
5.2
Organizational determinants of IDSR performance: making the system
work
Technical
•
•
•
•
•
•
IDSR
performance
Organization/
workplace
Box 4: Strategies for addressing
organizational determinants
Clarifying roles and responsibilities
Budgeting for IDSR at local levels
Outlining clear procedures for IDSR tasks
Mechanisms for involving other actors in IDSR
Resolving communications/reporting constraints
Strengthening supervision
Workforce
In both Ghana and Tanzania, following the initial assessments, development of action plans, and
the adaptation of technical guidelines, the focus of support for system improvement activities shifted
to the region, district and facility levels – to those on the front lines where diseases are detected,
reported, and immediate action(s) taken. In both countries, technical guidelines and norms are set at
the central level but the responsibility and the resources for implementing those norms and guidelines
reside at the lower levels of the health system (regional and district levels in Ghana and district level
in Tanzania). As a result, the central offices responsible for disease surveillance (the NSU in Ghana,
or the MoH/ECDS in Tanzania) in both countries are forced to advocate and lobby the regions and
districts to consider IDSR a priority for funding and implementation. While technically in both
countries the central level oversees surveillance down to the regional and district levels, in reality
there are no strong organizational nor institutional links between these levels, resulting in reduced
accountability for the system as a whole.
A primary requirement for the successful functioning of any decentralized health system is the
clear delineation of authority, roles and responsibilities at each level of the system. Although the
Ghana Technical Guidelines, and to some extent the Tanzania guidelines, provided some general
description/designation of staff roles and responsibilities, improved IDSR performance required the
definition of functions, tasks and expectations for all involved personnel, with more specificity at the
district and facility levels. The clear articulation of roles and responsibilities was a pre-requisite for
the development of appropriate training materials (see section 5.3) as well as strategies to improve
performance at both levels.
24
5.2.1
Ghana
The Ghana Technical Guidelines included a table that outlined surveillance activities by level of
the health system. This served as a useful guide, but did not answer the question raised at the planning
workshop for the three northern regions of “who specifically needs to do what.” The need to answer
this question led to the development of a more detailed description of roles and responsibilities (See
Appendix 3) as well as the development of tools and strategies to help individuals at both facility and
district level fulfill these more clearly defined roles and responsibilities for IDSR. The tools and
strategies developed are described below.
IDSR Handbook for Facility Level Staff: Although the task analysis clearly indicated a
number of specific responsibilities for facility level staff, the procedures in the Technical Guidelines
were more generally oriented to district level staff. The development of the “Integrated Disease
Surveillance and Response: Handbook for Health Facility Workers in Ghana” (GHS/MOH, 2005)
provided facility level staff with specific information on their own roles, responsibilities, tasks and
performance expectations under IDSR. Using the Technical Guidelines as the base, the Handbook
provided specifics for facility staff and added the following:
specific information on facility level staff roles and responsibilities;
explanations of the critical importance of facility IDSR tasks to the surveillance system;
specific instructions on filling out all IDSR forms; and
explanations of specific reporting requirements for IDSR and for the routine health
information system.
The first draft of the Handbook for Facility Staff was developed prior to the facility level training
and provided significant inputs for the training materials. Its official review, however, took longer
and it was not available for full distribution until 2005 when it was adopted by the GHS/MOH for use
and dissemination throughout the country. In addition to districts in the three northern regions, this
Handbook has also been distributed in at least 28 other districts covered by the subsequent USAIDfunded QHP project.
Strengthening supervision: Supportive supervision is essential to ensuring that IDSR roles and
responsibilities are actually carried out and that procedural and/or resource issues are addressed.
Ongoing supervision and follow-up are also key to reinforcing work skills and retaining motivated
personnel. To strengthen supervisory support, efforts were made to ensure the existence of:
clear and useful supervision and support guidelines to lead supervisors through an instructive
and interactive visit with IDSR personnel (at health facility and district levels) based upon
field experience in supporting IDSR performance in the three northern regions;
resources to ensure that planned supervision activities were not delayed or canceled due to
the lack of available (but often budgeted) funds, or postponed due to other programs and
priorities communicated from above; and
ongoing capacity building for supervisory personnel to strengthen their ability to provide
supportive, on-the-job training and reinforcement of skills rather than the more familiar
critical “inspections” that were often performed in the name of supervision.
25
Assuring resources -- budgeting for IDSR activities: Ghana’s budgeting and allocation system
for district activities remains problematic for IDSR implementation. Budget allocations are small, but
more importantly, the amounts actually received are often smaller than the amounts originally
promised, and are often received late. However, at least one region developed a strategy for ensuring
that adequate IDSR forms would be available – the region removed the amount for reproducing IDSR
reporting forms from its districts’ budgets and then used the funds to produce and distribute the forms
for all their districts, effectively centralizing this responsibility.
5.2.2
Tanzania
Identification of organizational problems and strategies to address them began with the IDSR
system assessment (1998) and the situation analysis (2003). The situation analysis provided the
opportunity to discuss performance expectations and possible performance improvement strategies
with the CHMTs. The following organizational questions were raised:
Who was responsible for what?
How could transportation for reporting be ensured?
How could district officials and community leaders be engaged in both resource
mobilization and effective response to outbreaks?
What were the roles for the regional health offices and the laboratories?
More importantly, the situation analysis initiated the process of identifying IDSR teams and
defining the respective roles of individual health workers in health facilities, districts, and
laboratories. Appendix 5 shows the flow chart and task analysis for district level IDSR tasks resulting
from the situation analysis.
IDSR is not solely the work of the health system – other actors have roles to play to ensure
adequate case detection and response. Strategies were needed to engage district officials from outside
the health sector as well as traditional healers. Presented below are strategies and tools that were
developed by the PHRplus/NIMR IDSR strengthening team and used in some or all of the 12 pilot
districts in Tanzania for addressing organizational/workplace determinants of IDSR performance.
Manual for outbreak management: Many different outbreak management guidelines existed
in Tanzania – some in the Tanzania National IDSR Guidelines and some in other sources. Each
guideline focused on its own disease content and used its own format, and few outlined specific
district- or facility-level responsibilities. The PHRplus/NIMR team developed the Disease Outbreak
Management: A Field Manual for Council Health Management Teams (URT/MoH, 2004) to compile
the norms and standards from various sources into one comprehensive manual specifically targeted
for district use. The manual outlines processes and procedures for districts to follow when
conducting an outbreak investigation, as well as standardized disease-specific protocols for outbreak
management and laboratory confirmation. The protocols for each disease include information on the
standard case definition, action threshold, clinical features, modes of transmission, case management,
26
specific steps for control and prevention, and a list of supplies needed during an outbreak. The
manual was distributed to all project districts as part of the IDSR training program.11
Assuring resources -- budgeting for IDSR activities: Resource availability for IDSR was a
key constraint for districts in Tanzania. However, because districts have access to basket funds12, they
do have control over resource allocation. Several different strategies were used to ensure allocation of
resources for IDSR activities. As a result of the situation analysis exercise and the ownership
developed for IDSR, both Dodoma Rural and Babati districts included funding for specific IDSR
activities in their annual Comprehensive Council Health Plans (CCHP) for 2004. A workshop for all
12 project districts on epidemic preparedness in 2004 led to inclusion of resources for supplies in the
districts’ CCHPs. During district quarterly meetings and post-training follow-up visits, project staff
reminded CHMTs of the importance of including IDSR-related activities and expenses in their
budgets in the next district planning cycle.
Improving communications:
Barriers to reporting were discussed
during training sessions and during
quarterly meetings. During these
occasions, districts came up with a
number of innovative and often low cost
solutions to poor communications
infrastructure. Box 5 shows some of the
strategies implemented.
Box 5: Communication strategies in Tanzania
CHMTs and facilities used many different strategies to
improve communication and reporting, for example:
•
Increased installation and use of radio calls
•
Individual cell phones to send text (SMS) messages to
IDSR focal persons for zero reporting as well as
notification
•
Purchased and distributed bicycles and motorbikes for
facilities to use to travel to other facilities with reliable
communications equipment
•
Budgeted a small fixed travel cost reimbursement for
reports submitted
•
Agreements with local bus operators to take weekly
and monthly reports from the health facilities to the
district capitals for free, where they are dropped in
locked wood boxes (similar to post boxes) by the bus
driver and retrieved by the CHMT office.
District quarterly meeting and
feedback formats: Mechanisms and
procedures for reviewing results and
performance are critical to IDSR
improvement. While training supported
the districts to make positive changes to
improve IDSR, structured post-training follow-up was required to address ongoing constraints and
ensure sustainable improvements in each district. PHRplus/NIMR instituted the District Quarterly
IDSR Meeting (DQM), a 2-day event based on the agenda shown in Box 6, designed to provide a
forum for CHMT members to review IDSR indicators, work together on IDSR problem-solving, and
to build rapport with other sectors for improved
Box 6: Agenda items for District
surveillance and response. The entire CHMT, plus
Quarterly IDSR Meetings
CHMT co-opted members and some RHMT
1) Monitor/evaluate district IDSR performance
2) Identify obstacles to IDSR implementation and
members, attended the first day and a half of each
their solutions
meeting. The afternoon of the second day also
3) Identify and review IDSR activities in the CCHP
included district local officials (Heads of Water,
4) Build community support for IDSR.
Education, Agriculture Departments, etc.) and
focused on improving the collaboration between
these officials and the CHMT to improve IDSR performance. NIMR/PHRplus provided cofacilitation and some logistic support for one DQM in each project district, with the expectation that
11
Future dissemination plans will be determined by the IDSR taskforce.
Basket funds are funds contributed to a many partners, pooled and then distributed to districts on a per capita
basis. Use of these funds is dependent on approval of the Council (district) Comprehensive Health Plan and
budget.
12
27
each CHMT would adapt the meeting format as required and continue on their own to hold semiregular meetings focused on IDSR.13
Table 2 shows some examples of the kinds of problems and solutions discussed during these
quarterly meetings.
Table 2: Solutions to Common Problems in IDSR Functioning in Tanzania
Common problems
Possible solution
Lack of uniformity/clarity among districts about days of
the week on which to base IDSR weekly reports and
on days for reporting to next level
The MOH will decide on days of the week that cases
for weekly reports shall be based on and communicate
to all districts [this information had not been included in
technical guidelines].
Inconsistency in recording diagnosis by health workers
(does not match standard case definitions)
Health workers record the standard case definitions
according to IDSR guidelines, putting their diagnosis
into brackets if they wish to add more clarification.
Modified IDSR forms need to be used in all project
districts (many different forms in use)
CHMTs and health facilities from the project districts
have agreed to use the modified forms
Verbally communicated weekly information not
recorded at the receiving end (districts)
Verbal communication weekly reports will be recorded
by the receiving end (district/region).
Reports that arrive late from facilities after reporting to
the region not used
Late reports should be stored and used for updating
district data for compilation and analysis.
IDSR District Local Officials package: Preventing disease and combating outbreaks requires
the involvement of other non-health system actors. The IDSR District Local Officials package was
designed to help district local officials and other stakeholders understand IDSR, the diseases
involved, and the kinds of specific actions they could take in the surveillance and response process, in
collaboration with the CHMTs. The district local officials and other stakeholders targeted included
District Commissioners, District Executive Officers, Councilors, Ward Executive Officers, District
Education Officers, District Community Development Officers, District Water Engineers and District
Agriculture & Livestock Development Officers. The package, distributed to district local officials
during DQMs and other follow-up visits to districts, consists of four components:
A Call for Action brochure (URT, 2005d) for district local officials and other stakeholders
introduces the IDSR package and outlines the importance of district local officials taking
part in disease surveillance and response. It provides brief background information on health
service delivery in Tanzania and defines disease surveillance. Most importantly, the
brochure explains why disease surveillance is important, why the involvement of local
district officials (and the community) is critical, and what benefits they can draw from their
participation.
Disease-specific fact sheets (URT, 2005c) provide information about each of the 13 IDSR
priority diseases in simple and clear terms (in both Kiswahili and English) that can be easily
understood by people not involved in the health sector. The document describes specific
diseases in terms of: definition; who gets the disease; how the disease spreads; peak
transmission period; symptoms of the disease; interval between infection and when
13
Due to project timing constraints, the project was only able to support full DQMs in 8 of 12 districts. Modified
(shorter) DQMs were held in the last 4 project districts.
28
symptoms appear; how long a person can spread the disease; treatment; complications
associated with the disease; prevention; etc.
Action X Actors (URT, 2005a) are one-page fact sheets to help district officials see what
they can do concretely to support IDSR.
Communication for disease surveillance and response (URT, 2005b): Communicating
with various audiences about disease surveillance, prevention, outbreak, and response is one
key function for district local officials. This document outlines different mechanisms that
can be used to communicate the information and describes the elements of effective
communication (i.e., Audience-focused; Action-oriented; Interactive; Regular; Factual and
Appropriate).
Working with Traditional Healers14: Traditional healers play an important role in interpreting
health events in the community. During 2004-2005, PHRplus worked in Mpwapwa, one of the
project districts, to test a strategy to engage traditional healers actively in infectious disease detection
and reporting. The strategy involved:
Joint discussions between traditional healers and health personnel;
Exchange between CHMTs from Mpwapwa and other districts that had worked more
actively with traditional healers;
Sharing with district officials and others the government’s national act regarding traditional
healers (essentially, recognizing and legitimizing their role);
Interactive workshop between traditional healers, health workers, and Ward Executive
Officers;
Orientation to traditional healers about the IDSR diseases; and,
Introduction of a referral form and procedures for traditional healers to transfer their patients
to health facilities in circumstances where the healers feel they cannot treat the patients
effectively.
A review of reactions to these activities indicated that the traditional healers felt it improved the
channels of communication with health personnel, making it easier for them to openly refer very sick
patients. Health personnel appreciated the stronger relationship with traditional healers and felt it led
to a decrease in dangerous delays in patients seeking care. The Assistant District Medical Officer in
Mpwapwa stated in February 2005 that they were “…trying to empower healers. They know how to
recognize outbreaks but didn’t know the proper response.” He stressed that establishing linkages with
traditional healers was a “two-way cooperation. Normally we expected referrals from them, but not
for us to refer and rely upon them.” Patients expressed increased confidence in traditional healers,
feeling that the traditional healers’ efforts to refer them indicated sincere concern for their welfare.
Although no formal evaluation was done, CHMT members observed traditional healers
accompanying patients to health facilities and said that some traditional healers were coming to
discuss problems with them now that had not done so before.
14
This intervention was supported by the CHANGE project and NIMR.
29
5.3
Improving workforce performance: capacity building and supportive
follow-up
Technical
•
•
•
IDSR
performance
Organization/
workplace
Box 7: Strategies for addressing workforce
determinants
Bottom-up capacity building
Creating training capacity
Use of job aids for standard case definitions (detection
and reporting), data interpretation, specimen collection
and transport
Workforce
Several countries implementing the IDSR strategy utilized the WHO/AFRO set of generic
training modules (WHO/AFRO, 2001c) that provide technically solid epidemiological content and
relevant case examples. These modules target a large diverse audience.15 They were designed to be
self-instructional (to reduce training costs) and thus do not include participatory, interactive adultlearning methods. Since they were developed to serve all countries in the region, they could not be
country-specific; they focused on the “what” of disease surveillance rather than the “how.”
WHO/AFRO recommended that these generic training modules be adapted to fit country and local
epidemiological realities and to complement the specific protocols and procedures employed by
country programs. To fully support the development of a competent IDSR workforce, training
materials needed to be adapted to the local organizational context. Both Ghana and Tanzania took
steps to develop capacity building strategies that recognized the differing responsibilities of facilities
and districts and among various cadres within a single level of the health system.
Both Ghana and Tanzania utilized participatory training, group work, and exercises that built on
participant experience to demonstrate the relevance of what was being taught to their daily on-the-job
reality. Such adult learning techniques were new to many local trainers and they required either
additional training or team-teaching in a “see one, do one, teach one” approach before they could
implement these new training methodologies independently. In addition, both countries developed a
series of simple job aids designed to be quick reminders of tasks to be accomplished and the
procedures to be used. All tools were designed to support the technical IDSR norms and standards
while helping staff carry out their tasks efficiently and properly and were, when possible, covered in
the IDSR training.
5.3.1
Ghana
The IDSR capacity building strategy: Task analysis, assessment and discussions with local
stakeholders in early 2003 at regional and district levels led to agreement on and development of a
15
The following were suggested as the audience for these modules: clinical practitioners (doctors, nurses,
clinical officers, and medical assistants), public health officers, environmental health workers, laboratory
workers, data/record managers, and students (clinical, public health, environmental health and laboratory).
30
“bottom-up” training strategy for IDSR.16 In this approach, training was conducted first for facility
level personnel, and then later for district and regional personnel. This “bottom-up” training strategy
was chosen for two reasons:
(1)
the frequent failure of many top down training strategies where district staff are trained
and expected to train lower level staff (without sufficient technical, organizational or financial
support); and
(2)
the perception that it would be counterproductive to train district level personnel to use
data that would not yet be flowing to them and to supervise activities that were not yet being carried
out.
NSU, RHMT and DHMT stakeholders all agreed that it was better to start training personnel and
initiating activities at the facility level and then build capacity at the district level to support facility
level efforts and overall IDSR performance.
Another element of the capacity building strategy was a strategy of “see one, do one, teach one”
and was organized by inviting district personnel to the facility level trainings conducted in their
districts. This proved to be an effective way to familiarize the district staff with the newly clarified
IDSR roles and responsibilities of facility personnel. A clear understanding of how the system should
function at the facility level is essential if district personnel are to provide support and supervision. In
the initial districts, the IDSR team from PHRplus and the NSU were lead trainers/facilitators, with
district and regional staff participating as facilitators and observers. Key DHMT and RHMT
members attended facility level trainings to receive an update on IDSR specific roles and
responsibilities of facility level staff and become familiar with the training design and activities so
they would become facilitators for subsequent facility level trainings in the future.
Because the WHO/AFRO training materials
Box 8: Ghana’s facility level
focused more heavily on district level tasks, PHRplus,
IDSR training package
with the NSU and the RHMTs in the three northern
•
three days for in-charges and nurses
regions, developed specific materials for facility level
•
one day for facility statistics officers
staff (GHS/MOH/NSU, 2005c). The training package
(which was combined with one day of
for facility level staff was created using the analysis of
the training for in-charges and nurses)
•
a special half-day session for clinicians
surveillance tasks to be performed at the health facility
level by various personnel, the results of a rapid
training needs assessment, and content from the
Ghana-adapted training modules on IDSR for district health teams. The package included specific
content for three types of facility level staff (See Box 8). The facility level training materials
included a pre- and post-test and evaluation, post-workshop assignment, facilitator’s guide,
participant’s guide, and the handbook for IDSR at the facility level.
When the facility level training was completed, training at the district level followed in the three
northern regions and Brong Ahafo, focusing on outbreak investigation and analysis, response,
supervision, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tasks. These trainings lasted five days and were
attended by all of the DHMTs in the selected regions. RHMT staff participated as facilitators and,
based on the experience they gained, the NSU subsequently used these RHMT staff to provide
training support in other regions. Because Ghana had already adapted the WHO/AFRO training
16
Although IDSR district level training took place during the period 2003-2005 in several regions, only those in
the three northern regions and Brong Ahafo used this approach.
31
modules for district level training and had begun using them in the Volta region, it was not necessary
to develop a new set of materials. However, additional training materials (primarily presentation
slides that addressed the why, how, by whom, etc. of the IDSR district level tasks) were developed to
complement the self-guided WHO/AFRO modules (GHS/MOH/NSU, 2005b). These materials
permitted a more interactive training format. Further review of materials will take place in 2006,
supported by USAID’s Quality Health Partners project.
Job aids to facilitate worker performance: A number of job aids were developed to provide
quick reference and, often, visual reminders/reinforcement of the roles, responsibilities and skills
necessary for IDSR to succeed. The job aids included a wall poster with reporting requirements and
deadlines; disease specific fact sheets with Standard Case Definitions (SCDs) and reporting
requirements for clinicians; and the Standard Case Definitions for 23 Priority Diseases: For
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) pamphlet (GHS/MOH/NSU, 2004).
5.3.2
Tanzania
Capacity building strategy: Several challenges were encountered during the development of a
capacity building strategy in Tanzania. The Tanzania National IDSR Guidelines were developed
prior to the WHO/AFRO guidelines, and did not correspond to the IDSR functions that formed the
basis of the WHO/AFRO generic training modules. The strategy for the 12 project districts built
upon findings from the situation analysis, capacity building literature, other capacity building
materials used in Tanzania, the WHO/AFRO generic training modules, and input from key
stakeholders. Because the Tanzania technical guidelines did not contain a clear delineation of
responsibilities across levels, the training materials were developed with a particular emphasis on
helping district and facility staff to:
identify their specific job responsibilities related to IDSR (“what”);
understand the importance of doing these tasks (“why”); and
acquire the knowledge and skills needed to perform these tasks well (“how”).
Capacity building interventions addressed job expectations, performance feedback, motivation,
skills, and knowledge. Two complete packages of training materials were developed, including
participant manuals, instructor/facilitator manuals and TOT materials for both district and facility
level staff (URT, 2004b,c,d,e).17 Appendix 6 outlines the steps taken to develop the capacity building
package, and summarizes topics addressed in the district and facility level packages.
Training sessions used a participatory, interactive approach based on adult learning methods that
drew on and supported participants’ own experiences. For most participants, this was a significantly
different approach compared to previous trainings they had attended. To ensure the relevance of
training, each module concluded with an “application planning” section, in which participants worked
in teams to identify district-specific problems and develop strategies to resolve these problems that
they could apply after returning to their own real world work situations.
17
The facility level modules have been endorsed by the IDSR taskforce, but there is still work ahead in
harmonizing the district modules with the existing MOH modules adapted from WHO/AFRO. The IDSR
taskforce will address this activity in the near future.
32
In addition to developing training materials, there remained the challenge of creating local
capacity to provide training. The MOH’s original goal in having 12 project sites was to generate
effective training, tools, and strategies, and to create the capacity to replicate this package of
interventions and improve IDSR performance in other regions and districts throughout Tanzania. In
2004, when the country-specific IDSR training materials were being developed, Tanzania had 6 Zonal
Training Centers (ZTC), each covering 4 regions, to meet the training needs of districts and regions.
Capacity and performance of these ZTCs varied considerably, and staff members from the three
strongest ZTCs were selected to participate actively in the IDSR training for the 12 project districts.
ZTC staff were engaged in reviewing training materials and provided with an update on adult
learning/participatory training methods. With support from NIMR/PHRplus and RHMT members,
the ZTC staff members were subsequently responsible for training regional and district trainers,
coaching and mentoring new trainers, and supervising and supporting facility level training.
After the formal IDSR training sessions, PHRplus/NIMR staff visited the districts to further
support IDSR implementation and to identify and try to reduce obstacles to successful
implementation.
Job aids: Several job aids were developed and distributed to project districts: laboratory job
aids for specimen collection and transport, a poster of standard case definitions for all 13 priority
IDSR diseases, and a guide for IDSR data interpretation. These job aids were developed in response
to findings from the situation analysis and other initial pilot district assessment activities. For
example, laboratory data to support IDSR were weak, with inadequate quality and quantity of
specimens, incomplete documentation and missing or late laboratory data reports. Several underlying
causes were identified, such as shortages in supplies and reagents, a lack of trained staff, and a lack of
standard procedures. Health workers also had varying perceptions of their roles and responsibilities
related to laboratory confirmation of epidemic-prone diseases. Because specimen collection and
preparation for transport is often a rare task for facility and district health workers, job aids were
important in helping them to perform this task correctly. CDC, in collaboration with NIMR and
PHRplus, developed a series of job aids (sample shown in Appendix 7) for health facility and district
staff preparing specimens and for referral laboratory staff receiving specimens, providing feedback to
districts, and reporting results.18 The laboratory job aids were presented in a condensed, user-friendly
format, based on the accepted standards and norms. All jobs aids developed, tested and implemented
in Tanzania have been compiled by CDC and produced as a Compilation of Job Aids for Laboratory
Confirmation (URT and CDC, 2005) and disseminated to international partners and donors.
In addition to the laboratory job aids, a laminated poster showing the standard case definitions
for the 13 priority diseases was produced and distributed to health facilities in the project districts.
Some health facility staff photocopied the job aid and either hung it on the wall or put it on their
office tables for reference. Many health facilities also reported that the SCD job aid was being used
by other staff at their health facilities who did not attend the IDSR training.
A 2-page data interpretation guide was developed as a job aid to accompany the district IDSR
data management and analysis software tool described earlier. The guide was produced as a 2-sided
laminated reference card to aid the IDSR focal person (or District Health or Medical Officer, as
applicable in each district) to interpret graphs produced by the software. The guide included an
18
These job aids were submitted for technical review by national and regional (WHO/AFRO) laboratory
specialists, followed by a pre-test with regional and district health workers in Tanzania. They were adopted for
national use after additional review and national meetings of stakeholders.
33
overview of general data interpretation issues and steps, as well as questions to ask when reviewing
morbidity, mortality, and reporting timeliness and completeness data (see Appendix 8).
34
6. Performance in Ghana and Tanzania
This section reviews measures of IDSR system performance in both Ghana and Tanzania during
2004-2005. The data presented pertain specifically to those districts supported throughout the
PHRplus project. It should be noted that these data were not collected simultaneously in other nonintervention districts and, in some areas, the first data collection did not represent a true baseline. As
the interventions were designed and implemented as part of a full “package” of support to districts, it
is not possible to use these data to attribute measured changes in performance to any specific
intervention or strategy.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of performance is one of the seven functions of surveillance
systems and is a key element of the IDSR strategy. WHO/AFRO provided a list of suggested
indicators for districts to monitor as part of the generic guidelines, and later developed a more specific
and detailed set of indicators for districts (WHO/AFRO, 2005). Districts are expected to regularly
collect data related to these indicators, analyze results, and use the information to improve
performance for routine services as well as epidemic response. This section presents results for
selected “routine” IDSR M&E indictors, as well as additional data collection done in focus districts
and regions (7 districts in 2 of the northern regions in Ghana and all 12 project districts in Tanzania).
The additional indicators (shown in the bottom half of Table 3) were chosen to complement the
WHO/AFRO indicators, and to provide additional insight into improvements in system performance.
Data were collected in both countries during two periods, once in 2004 and once in 2005, and
complete data are also available in Gueye et al. 2005 and 2006, Ghana internal monitoring and
evaluation reports.
Table 3: Indicators used to evaluate IDSR performance in Ghana and Tanzania
Indicators
Ghana
Tanzania
WHO/AFRO Indicators:
Timeliness of weekly and monthly reporting (facility-district; district-region)
X
X
Completeness of weekly and monthly reporting (facility-district; district-region)
X
X
Routine analysis of data (facility, district
X
X
Effective laboratory confirmation process
X
X
Appropriate response to confirmed outbreaks
X
X
Quality of case management during outbreaks (case fatality rate)
X
X
Accuracy of reporting (facility-district; district-region)
X
X
Reporting of priority diseases using case-investigation forms (district)
X
X
Appropriate investigation of suspected outbreaks
X
Additional Indicators:
Surveillance monitoring (district, region)
X
X
Planning and monitoring based on IDSR data (district)
X
X
Investigation and response to outbreaks (region)
X
Outbreak preparedness (district)
X
Evaluation of outbreak management (district)
X
X
35
Indicators
Feedback (MOH-regions, region-district, district-facility, facility-community)
Ghana
Tanzania
X
X
Communication/coordination within and outside health sector (district)
Planning and implementation of IDSR activities (district)
X
X
X
Availability of tools and job aids (facility, district)
X
X
Health worker knowledge and skills on IDSR (facility, district)
X
X
Health worker attitudes towards IDSR tasks (facility, district)
X
X
Planning and implementation of supervision visits (district)
X
X
The specific results for Ghana and Tanzania include the availability of tools described in Section
5, and the following key aspects of IDSR performance: reporting, data analysis, outbreak
management, use of IDSR data, feedback and coordination.19
6.1
Ghana – IDSR Performance
Two rounds of monitoring and evaluation data collection were conducted with support from the
PHRplus project. Data were collected in a sample of seven districts (Bole, Nanumba, Tolon, Wa,
Nadowli, Gushegu and Tamale) in the Northern and Upper West Regions. Data collection took place
during July-August of 2004 and during July-August of 2005. At the time of the first round of data
collection, facility level staff in 4 of the 7 districts had received training, while district staff in only 2
of the 7 districts had received training. By the second round of data collection all districts had
completed IDSR training for both facility and district level staff. As a result, the data collected reflect
the level of IDSR performance at two points in time but do not represent a true “before and after”
scenario. In particular, improvements at the facility level (where many had already received training
prior to the 2004 data collection) can be attributed in part to the effects of the intensive, post-training
supportive supervision that was carried out during that period.
It should also be noted that there was significant staff turn-over in these districts between the two
rounds of data collection. In spite of having staff members from all health facilities in all of the
project districts during the period between May 2003 and August 2005, only 20-25% of staff
interviewed in 2005 had been trained in IDSR.
Availability of tools and job aids: Availability of tools, forms and job aids necessary for IDSR
improved between 2004 and 2005. There were large increases in the availability of the Standard Case
Definitions pamphlet (54% to 80%), the Facility Level IDSR Handbooks (0% to 60%), and the Log
Book of Rumors and Investigations (10% to 50%).20 Although for other IDSR forms, there were no
significant improvements, most facilities had community-based surveillance summary forms (65%),
generic case-based forms (75%), weekly reporting forms (100%) and monthly forms (98%) by 2005.
19
Full M&E reporting, including methods and samples for Tanzania (Gueye et al., 2005); (Gueye et al., 2006)
are available on the PHRplus website (www.phrplus.org).
20
Although the models for case investigation forms are available in the National Guidelines for IDSR and
training modules, they are not centrally produced and distributed to districts. The districts are supposed to
make copies from the above mentioned documents but due to lack of funds, rareness of outbreaks, inadequate
supervision, and/or lack of feedback from the referral laboratories, these case investigation forms have not been
adequately used and submitted.
36
The increased availability of most forms was due to NSU efforts to distribute them widely
through RHMT and DHMT channels as well as being distributed to participants at all IDSR training
sessions. The Facility Level Handbook and the Log Book of Rumors and Investigations had not yet
been distributed widely at the time of the 2004 data collection exercise. These two tools were
distributed primarily through supervision visits to facilities or district level review and information
exchange meetings that the districts organized periodically. The system was fairly effective in
communicating important technical information down to the facility level through existing
communication and support channels.
Reporting: The completeness (i.e. the percentage of expected reports received) and timeliness
(i.e. the percentage of expected reports received on time) of the weekly and monthly IDSR reports
submitted from facilities to districts and districts to regions improved between 2004 and 2005, as seen
in Figure 4 below. One RHMT member from the Northern region remarked, “When we visit a health
center we can quickly tell whether the staff have received IDSR training from the way their files and
work are organized and completed.”
% reporting
Figure 4: Completeness and Timeliness of weekly and monthly IDSR Reporting in Ghana (7
districts in 2 northern regions)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Facility 2004
Facility 2005
District 2004
District 2005
complete
Weekly
timely
complete
timely
Monthly
Data accuracy is critical to IDSR as a tool for public health action. The accuracy of data
included in the IDSR weekly and monthly reports improved at the district level (i.e. reports sent by
districts to the regions accurately reflected the data contained in the facility level reports received and
aggregated), rising from 46% in 2004 to 85% in 2005. Improvements at the facility level (i.e. the
facility level reports accurately reflected the data contained in the clinic/facility registers) were
relatively minor (82% to 86%), but the level of accuracy was already quite high at the time of the first
round of data collection (NB: many of the facility staff had already received training at the time of the
2004 data collection).
37
Table 4: Improvements in IDSR Data analysis in Ghana
2004
2005
Any analysis for IDSR diseases
57%
100%
Analysis current
0%
86%
District level:
Facility level:
Any analysis for IDSR diseases
41%
78%
Analysis current
2%
70%
Data analysis: Data analysis improved significantly, with both districts and facilities analyzing
their IDSR data and having analyses up-to-date (See Table 4). Most districts were up-to-date with
respect to required analyses for malaria (86%) and between 42-57% had current analyses for measles,
meningitis and guinea worm. Among facilities, 70% had current malaria analysis, although fewer had
performed analysis for measles, meningitis and guinea worm.
Outbreak management and preparedness: Appropriate management of suspected outbreaks is
essential to minimize morbidity and mortality. In 2004, five of the seven districts reported a suspected
outbreak of an epidemic-prone disease within the previous three months. In the 2005 round of data
collection, no district reported a suspected outbreak. The 2004 data indicated an average score of
76% (i.e. completing 76% of expected tasks) on outbreak investigation. The two districts having
already received training performed better than the districts where training had not yet been
completed (86% vs. 70%, respectively), primarily because they recorded the suspected outbreak in a
logbook at the district and analyzed and interpreted case-based data collected during the investigation.
Feedback and Coordination: Despite efforts to strengthen and improve support and
supervision to facilities and districts, the levels of feedback reported did not improve. Feedback from
regions to districts, as reported by districts, did not improve significantly over time (remaining around
65% as an overall score); feedback from districts to facilities only improved slightly from 51% to
63% (measured as the proportion of facilities reporting feedback from the district). This increase was
noted in district feedback on the quality of reports (54% to 80%) and on aggregated or comparative
data (22% to 57%).
Planning and use of IDSR data: Planning for IDSR activities and planning based on IDSR
data are two important components of system performance. By 2005 all of the seven districts used
IDSR data to describe the existing health situation in their annual plans, and six of the seven used data
as a justification for activities contained in their 2005 plans. All seven districts included core IDSR
activities such as training and supervision in their plans. Six districts had included IDSR review
meetings as part of the previous year’s (2004) plan and indicated that those activities had actually
taken place. All seven districts had included IDSR training in their 2004 annual or quarterly action
plans and all seven documented that these trainings had actually taken place.
6.2
Tanzania – Results of IDSR Performance
PHRplus also supported two rounds of monitoring and evaluation data collection in Tanzania. A
baseline assessment was carried out in early 2004 (Gueye et al., 2005), followed by a second round of
data collection during May-June 2005 (Gueye et al., 2006). For both rounds, data collection was
done in all 12 districts, including a sample of 109 health facilities (one hospital, two health centers
38
and 15 percent of dispensaries in each district). Data collection included record reviews, group
interviews, an individual survey of attitudes and motivation, and an assessment of IDSR knowledge
and skills (second round only). Baseline data were collected prior to any training events at the district
and facility levels. High staff turnover (as seen in Ghana) was evident. Only 60% of those
interviewed in the 2005 round of data collection had participated in IDSR training. Turnover was
particularly high in facilities, with a range of 21%-73% of facility staff interviewed in 2005 having
participated in the IDSR training. It should also be noted that some of the tools were not introduced
until 2005 (e.g., analysis standards, IDSR database, and interpretation guide), and so there was
insufficient time to evaluate their effects before the project ended.
Availability of tools and job aids: The two M&E surveys revealed little difference in the
availability of case investigation forms and registers. However, availability improved for the revised
weekly (65% to 91%) and monthly (76% to 90%) reporting forms. At the second data collection,
case investigation forms were available in fewer than 20% of facilities overall. The new weekly and
monthly data sheets were available in about half the facilities. It should be noted that the districts
were responsible for making and distributing copies of all of these forms. By 2005, half the facilities
had a copy of the standard case definition poster. At the district level, only 5 of 12 districts had the
laboratory confirmation job aids.21 However, all had received the Disease Outbreak Management
Field Manual, the data analysis standards, database, and interpretation guides.
Reporting: Timeliness and completeness of weekly and monthly reports increased substantially
at follow-up, with a few districts exceeding performance targets (80%) and most of the rest steadily
approaching these targets. The overall results for timeliness and completeness of reporting are shown
in Figure 5. One RHO commented on this dramatic improvement in the project district in his region
compared to his other districts: “While other [non-project] districts were reporting at approximately
50% completeness, the project district (Masasi) was over 90% complete every month.” Moreover the
RMO said he “can believe reports from Masasi – not so from other districts.”
% reporting
Figure 5: Completeness and Timeliness of Weekly and Monthly IDSR Reporting from Facilities and
Districts in Tanzania (12 project districts)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Facility 2004
Facility 2005
District 2004
District 2005
complete
timely
Weekly
complete
timely
Monthly
21
In some cases, this was because the persons to whom these tools were distributed (in trainings or follow-up
visits) decided to keep the tools for themselves rather than leaving them accessible for colleagues.
39
The 4 districts that were trained during the last round of training, however, continued to lag
behind. The facilities in these districts received only 2 days of training (instead of 4 days in the other
districts), and, due to the close-out of the PHRplus project, they received fewer post-training support
visits from NIMR staff to reinforce what they had learned in the IDSR training and to solve IDSR
implementation problems. Table 9 shows differences in timeliness and completeness of weekly and
monthly reports for the first 8 districts trained and the last 4 districts trained, corroborating the notion
that on-going support is needed to achieve the desired results.
Table 5: Comparison of facility level timeliness and completeness results between 8 districts
trained in first two rounds and 4 districts trained last
First 8 districts
Last 4 districts
Baseline
Final
Baseline
Final
Weekly reports
4%
68%
10%
15%
Monthly reports
30%
72%
12%
29%
Weekly reports
17%
80%
20%
39%
Monthly reports
40%
85%
19%
45%
TIMELINESS
COMPLETENESS
Data accuracy for reported cases (facility reports compared to district reports) improved slightly
for all diseases at follow-up. The range of agreement for frequent conditions between facility registers
with numbers in facility reports submitted varied from 13-52% in the baseline, while in the follow-up
it had improved to a range of 35-66%. Due to their small numbers, rare diseases were more likely at
both baseline and follow-up to be in agreement. Accuracy, however, still remains a problem.
Table 6: Improvements in IDSR Data analysis in Tanzania
2004
2005
Any malaria trend analysis
17%
75%
Analysis current
0%
33%
Any malaria trend analysis
28%
42%
Analysis current
3%
20%
District level
Facility level
Data analysis: Analysis of malaria data was used as an indicator for routine analysis of IDSR
data. Between 2004 and 2005, significant improvements were seen in the percentages of districts and
facilities analyzing malaria trends, although there was still room for improvement, particularly at the
facility level. It should be noted that the IDSR databases to facilitate analysis were installed only
shortly before the evaluation in 2005. One health facility staff member said:
“…Even about data analysis, in the past, even if they managed to deliver [the reports],
people at the health facilities felt as if it was a report for the district office only… But we didn’t
see that they were reports or data that were helping us here, in checking our situation…” [Eisele
et al., 2006]
40
A CHMT member reported:
“We bring [the analysis report] to the CHMT meeting and read it. We also look at the
annual trends…how is it compared to the past year. We see where we need to put more effort
depending on the data we have…we can see if in one place there is an increased prevalence of a
certain disease.” [Eisele et al., 2006]
In order to improve handling and analysis of IDSR data, computer software was developed and
installed in the pilot districts. The May 2005 analysis and response (A&R) Research Final Survey
(Eisele et al., 2006) found:
72% (8/11) of districts were entering data on completeness and timeliness
45% of districts were up-to-date on data entry
Trained personnel in 11 districts said the database tool made data entry easier. Other benefits
included: “improved data management,” “more accurate and reliable data”, “decreased
workload”, and “data accessible to all CHMT.”
Box 9 shows availability and use of the data interpretation guide shown in Appendix 8.
Application and Retention of Knowledge and Skills: The results in Table 7 for district and
facility level training pre- and post-tests (and the subsequent 2005 evaluation) show considerable
gains in knowledge, particularly for staff at the facility level. Data collected during the 2005 M&E
survey showed that although there was some training decay at the district level, trained personnel
were more knowledgeable than non-trained personnel. Weaknesses noted were related to data
analysis and M&E. At the facility level the M&E survey showed no indication of training decay.
Table 7: Improvement in overall scores during IDSR training in Tanzania
During Training
2005 Evaluation
Pre test
Post test
Trained
Not trained
District staff
67%
82%
74%
59%
Facility staff
39%
64%
64%
45%
41
Figure 6: Example of training effect on reporting in Masasi district, Tanzania
Masasi district, timeliness and completeness of weekly IDSR reports, 2004
100%
District training Facility training
90%
Percentgae
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
51
49
47
45
43
41
39
37
35
33
31
29
27
25
23
21
19
17
15
13
9
11
7
5
3
1
0%
Week number
Timeliness
Completeness
Training had an immediate and dramatic impact on weekly and monthly reporting, as seen in the
example from Masasi district (Figure 6). Similar patterns were evident in all 12 project districts. One
CHMT member stated:
“But after this training it has helped very much, even at the health centers. All of them have
realized that it is their responsibility, it is their responsibility even if there is no specific
person…everyone has to see that he has the responsibility of giving the required report. Also even
here at the district, right now if you ask about the district team everybody can explain to you
quite well how these diseases and their reports are being followed up.” [Eisele et al., 2006]
Outbreak management and preparedness: Five outbreaks were recorded in project districts
from January through March 2005. Outbreak management performance was generally strong
(average score of 83% of outbreak management tasks), as it had been at the baseline (where 10
districts reported outbreaks). The response component remained basically stable over time. High case
fatality rates in 2005 for cholera and meningitis, however, suggest the need for improved case
management for these diseases.
Feedback and Coordination: Feedback from the regions to the districts actually declined
somewhat from baseline levels, while feedback from districts to facilities improved slightly. Districts
continued to perform quite strongly in coordinating and communicating with partners and
stakeholders. Some districts used creative, inexpensive ways to provide feedback on timely and
complete reporting, such as sending a summary sheet of facility timeliness and completeness to all
facilities or posting it at the district office for all facility staff to see when they came for their monthly
salary collection.
Monitoring and Evaluation of IDSR performance by Districts and Regions themselves:
Districts are supposed to monitor their own IDSR performance. Although staff in 9 of the 12 districts
knew the IDSR indicators, only 5 districts showed any evidence in 2005 of calculating their values
(timeliness and completeness of reporting, analysis of data, outbreak response and case fatality rate)
42
and taking action on the findings. Only 4 districts met to review their IDSR performance data after
the first DQM organized post-training.
Planning and use of IDSR data: All districts reported having used data to plan and monitor,
and were able to provide examples. This did not represent a significant change from the baseline. The
challenge going forward will be to continue improving the accuracy, timeliness and completeness of
IDSR data so that districts can be confident that they are using high quality data in their planning and
monitoring activities.
43
7. Conclusions
7.1
Summarizing the Experience
The triangle in Figure 1, presented in simplified form in Figure 7, outlines the technical,
organizational, and workforce determinants related to IDSR performance. Both the successful and
less successful experiences in Tanzania and Ghana highlighted the need to take conscious action to
address all three determinants at various levels of the health system in order to improve performance.
Although the technical components of the IDSR system are critical to its proper functioning, equal if
not greater attention must be paid to the organizational and workforce determinants that also govern
how well IDSR functions.
Figure 7: Simplified Framework of Factors for IDSR Improvement
Technical
IDSR
performance
Organization/
workplace
Workforce
Both countries made a conscious effort to address a wide range of technical, organizational and
workforce issues to strengthen IDSR. Many of the initial efforts (training, materials and job aids
development) recognized the need to transfer technical IDSR information in order to improve
workforce performance. The situation analyses had indicated that the technical elements of the
system, as presented in the Technical Guidelines, needed to be broken down into concrete, specific
tasks for the wide range of health system personnel involved in IDSR.
The IDSR teams in Ghana and Tanzania also recognized the critical importance of the
organizational context and its impact on IDSR performance. Because IDSR is embedded into the
broader health system, it is affected by the health system’s strengths and weaknesses. The workplace
environment, the workforce itself, and local actors and communities have a strong influence on how
IDSR will function and all are affected by the complex interplay of factors in the overall health
system.
The M&E results presented in the previous section show a positive, although sometimes mixed,
picture of IDSR performance improvement. Some areas showed definite improvements, as can be
7. Conclusions
45
seen in reporting at the facility and district levels. Other areas have not yet demonstrated
improvement, in some cases because more time is needed to evaluate interventions recently
implemented, and in other cases because more remains to be done. In many cases, resource and
infrastructure limitations created limitations on IDSR performance results. Tackling these issues
requires addressing broader systems issues of decentralization, resource generation and allocation,
accountability, management capacity at the district level, and existence of IDSR champions at
national, sub-national and local levels. The combined experiences in Ghana and Tanzania lead to a
series of general conclusions that are valid for both countries and are likely to be applicable to others
as well. This section highlights some conclusions about the specific interventions introduced to
improve IDSR performance and about a variety of broader systems issues that influence that
performance.
7.2
Future of the tools and strategies developed in Ghana and Tanzania
One measure of the impact of work done in project districts is the replication of the work in other
parts of both countries. There are already examples of interest expressed by districts that neighbor
project districts in Tanzania to take up training and other reforms: Arusha Region has already begun
instituting training and IDSR reforms introduced in neighboring Dodoma, and Mtwara Region, aware
of the project in its district of Masasi, has asked for IDSR training materials to initiate training in its
other districts. In Ghana, IDSR support has been taken up by another project (Quality Health
Partners) which is using materials and tools developed and used in the three northern regions and
expanding implementation to another 28 districts in the 7 remaining regions of the country. Table 8
shows how the tools and materials have been used by other areas or as national tools.
Table 8: Adoption and use of IDSR materials in other areas of the countries, as of January 2006
Tools and Materials
Adopted officially by government
Being used in other areas
District Training Materials
IDSR task force will harmonize with
existing district training materials
X
Facility Training Materials
Endorsed by IDSR task force
X
Outbreak Management Manual
Endorsed by IDSR task force
X
X
X
Tanzania
Laboratory Confirmation Job Aids
Analysis standards and interpretation job aid
X
District Local Official’s IDSR Package
Package for working with traditional healers
Ghana
Continuous problem solving and learning
method
District Training Materials (additional materials)
X
Will be reviewed in 2006
X
Facility Training Materials
X
X
Facility level Handbook
X
X
Supervision guides
X
IDSR Wall poster
X
Standard Case Definition booklet
X
Communicable Disease District Analysis Book
X
IDSR disease fact sheets
X
46
In both countries, the strengthened IDSR systems have been used as a starting point for
addressing the concern about how to promptly detect and respond to avian influenza. In Tanzania,
USAID has funded a cooperative agreement that will provide additional resources to develop and test
approaches to adding influenza-like illness to the existing IDSR system. The tools and strategies
developed through PHRplus for strengthening IDSR can be easily modified or expanded to include
both avian influenza and other emerging infectious disease threats.
7.3
Recommendations for strengthening IDSR performance at the district and
facility level
This section presents recommendations on what districts and facilities can do to improve their
IDSR performance, based on the PHRplus experiences in Ghana and Tanzania.
Use existing tools and strategies: Many tools and strategies exist that countries can use to
strengthen IDSR, either because these strategies are already in place for uses other than IDSR or
because they have been tested as part of IDSR strengthening in other countries, such as these
examples from Ghana and Tanzania. There is often no need to “reinvent the wheel” – however, there
is a need to adapt “the wheel” to the operational context in which it will be used. When applying
existing tools and mechanisms, it is important to address the following questions:
Do standards and norms exist and are they available in formats that are easy for workers to
understand and use?
How are the roles and responsibilities for implementing these norms distributed across levels
of the system (sub-national, district, facility, community) and which specific cadre is
responsible for implementing them? Are roles and responsibilities documented and clear?
Are there organizational factors that prevent individuals from fully carrying out their roles
and responsibilities?
Is additional capacity building needed?
How will this capacity building be carried out and reinforced over time?
Although the capacity building materials developed in Ghana and Tanzania were oriented to
their specific health systems, the materials could be easily adapted for other countries. Much of the
content will be valid generically, and the methods used to build capacity are supported by both
research and experience (see Appendix 6). Successful adaptation of these materials to a different
country context would require a local task analysis to determine and document IDSR roles and
responsibilities at all levels, and modification of the training materials to match this local task
analysis. Similarly, many of the local innovations to solve operational problems could be modified for
each novel country situation, and the job aids adapted to the setting, priority diseases, and norms.
Ensure supervision and follow-up for improvement and sustainable results: The results
from both Ghana and Tanzania showed that guidelines themselves were not sufficient, and that, while
training had an important impact, it was not sufficient on its own to ensure sustained capacity and
implementation over time. Supervision and follow-up are key to maintaining and improving IDSR
performance. In Ghana, the impact of supervision and follow-up was demonstrated by improvements
7. Conclusions
47
between two post-training periods in terms of reporting and data analysis at the facility level. In
Tanzania, districts that received less follow-up showed less improvement than those receiving more
follow-up.
Frequent supervision and follow-up provide an opportunity to update skills, encourage
accountability, address problems and constraints, and motivate workers. In both Ghana and Tanzania,
tools and strategies (facilitative supervision guides in Ghana and district quarterly meetings and
supervision visits in Tanzania) were used to structure this follow-up so that capacity building and
problem-solving would take place. District and regional IDSR staff in both Ghana and Tanzania,
however, experienced difficulties in carrying out adequate and sustainable follow-up and supervision,
due to resource constraints at district, sub-national and national levels.
More work is needed on really making use of data for decision-making: Over the several
years of work described in this document, the majority of efforts were focused on the creation and
analysis of data, with somewhat less attention on the decision-making processes operating in these
contexts. Although obtaining data and transforming it through analysis into information are key steps
in the appropriate use of data for decision-making, more attention needs to be paid to the decisionsmakers themselves and the decision-making processes. In reality, there are still many barriers to
effective use of information, including the lack of resources and clear authority to take action at the
local level. In some cases, there are also political factors that may impede use of data to inform
public health action.
In both Ghana and Tanzania some evidence was seen of IDSR data analysis and interpretation in
district and regional plans, and some individual IDSR focal persons were extremely active in using
their information to advocate for action with various decision makers. This appeared to be related
more to individual personality and drive than indicative of a general tendency in the majority of
districts. Many of the IDSR staff in both countries often had strong technical skills, but few had been
trained as health managers. IDSR staff often had difficulty translating the results of data analysis into
action planning and effective implementation, as well as in knowing how to use data to advocate for
more resources or for specific decisions at higher levels. Future work on strengthening IDSR needs
to focus on building capacity to advocate, using data, and to translate results into implementation of
action planning. This should be a major focus of supervision and follow-up, and actions in this arena
will need to be integrated with general district level strengthening activities under decentralization.
7.4
Conclusions on broader health systems issues and their impact on IDSR
performance
IDSR is a set of functions and activities and its performance is influenced by many broader
health systems issues. The following conclusions focus on the interactions between IDSR and the
broader health system.
Engage stakeholders at various levels from the beginning: IDSR strengthening, like any
system strengthening activity, needs champions. Experiences from both Ghana and Tanzania show
that where and when leadership and direction did not exist, progress was limited. Support is not
limited to central level support, but also support from sub-national and district levels. IDSR
performance requires a sustained effort both for improvement and for maintaining improvement in the
timely flow of information and action over time.
Stakeholders include more than the IDSR staff (or those who carry out some IDSR tasks) at the
district and facility levels. RHMT engagement in training efforts in Ghana and Tanzania, and the use
48
of Zonal Training Centers in Tanzania, helped ensure broader knowledge and therefore support to
IDSR. At the district level, stakeholders included local officials who provided material and moral
support to IDSR, as well as having specific tasks. When all these stakeholders were actively engaged,
IDSR functioned better.
Strengthening IDSR performance requires leadership. At the national level, this means someone
who calls attention to the need to strengthen IDSR, who can clearly show why it is important, and
who motivates others to put effort into its improvement. Improving IDSR performance in many cases
means actually changing the way people work – so that they believe in the utility of the data being
collected, they examine that data to see what it says about what is happening, and they are convinced
that they can and should act on what the data tells them. Monitoring and evaluation of IDSR inserts
notions of accountability for what people do, because the IDSR performance data tell them clearly
whether they are performing up to standards. However, these types of changes in the “organizational
culture” need leadership and positive support.
Examine and seek to understand IDSR performance within the country’s decentralization
context: Both Ghana and Tanzania, as well as many other countries are in the process of
decentralizing their health sectors and overall local administration. The locus of decision-making and
authority over resources shifts with decentralization from the central level to the periphery. The IDSR
strategy itself calls for a shift in action/responsibility from the central to the district level. IDSR also
supports an integration of surveillance systems and more efficient use of resources to counteract the
top-heavy, vertical programs’ parallel systems in which data mostly flowed upward through the
system with little analysis and use at the district and/or facility levels.
Like most other health activities, IDSR requires national and intermediate level input related to
norms and standards (e.g., guidelines), capacity building, and follow-up. However, IDSR also
requires more active involvement at these higher levels for response to outbreaks or changing
epidemiological situations. While decentralization generally promotes a shift of resources to lower
levels, there still is a need to protect IDSR budgets at the national and intermediate levels.
The effects of decentralization in Ghana, for example, have left the National Surveillance Unit
(NSU) with extremely limited resources and no authority over the regional level. The NSU can only
use its influence to try to get regions and districts to conduct training, use materials and tools, and do
supervision and follow-up. Currently there is no entity with direct authority over the regions and
districts that can hold them accountable for their IDSR performance.
In Tanzania, decentralization and empowerment of the districts have left the regions with
extremely limited resources. In fact, in 2003, they had no budget from which they could fund their
travel to participate in outbreak investigations or to support districts in any IDSR activities beyond
those for routine RHMT supervision activities. Districts were left with financial responsibility for
IDSR, often without adequate budgets to cover activities or with resources coming in that were late
and/or inadequate. Accountability for IDSR was often somewhat unclear.
Need to recognize and address resource constraints to IDSR performance: The availability
of adequate resources that have been allocated and budgeted for IDSR is critical to improved IDSR
performance. In numerous situations, implementation of IDSR technical guidelines does not occur
due to the lack of these resources. For example, Ghana’s initial IDSR assessment identified the lack
of effective and reliable communication among many facilities in remote areas as a constraint to
system operation and performance. The need for rapid communication of data with respect to several
IDSR diseases is clearly spelled out in the technical guidelines. The lack of a reliable means of
communication posed a major obstacle to remote facilities in their ability to follow the technical
7. Conclusions
49
guidelines. Although in both Ghana and Tanzania, some creative solutions were found to address
communication constraints in certain districts, adequate resources were not available to address this
problem.
One key IDSR constraint is inadequate funding at the local level. This constraint is not specific
to IDSR, but adequate funds are needed in decentralized budgets as well as at the central level to
provide capacity building and supervision, technical updates, and response support. Resource
allocations are often inadequate. The small amounts of funding allocated must be split among several
programs and priorities at the regional and district levels, and as a result, IDSR is often shortchanged
or overlooked. Despite this challenge, regions and districts are still responsible for covering all of the
operational costs related to their IDSR responsibilities (e.g. reporting, managing outbreaks, etc.). Due
to these funding issues, many district teams were not able or willing to budget or actually spend funds
to support IDSR operation. Without basic inputs such as forms, the system’s performance/integrity
was in jeopardy. This is a danger faced by centrally structured programs like IDSR in a highly
decentralized system.
50
8. Summary and Recommendations for
Future Directions in Improving IDSR
Performance: the Need for Health
Systems Strengthening
8.1
Summary
The Ghanaian and Tanzanian experiences in strengthening IDSR performance show that much
has been done and much remains to be done to ensure that districts and facilities throughout a country
are collecting, reporting, analyzing, interpreting, and making use of surveillance data to make public
health decisions. Many of the tools and strategies used in these two countries could be easily adapted
by other countries. However, as described in the previous section, these tools and strategies are not
enough on their own. They need a functional system with sufficient resources for implementation
(forms, communication mechanisms, etc.) and for supervision and follow-up, as well as
accountability and support from strong leadership at all levels. Future directions for IDSR
strengthening need to address many of these broader issues.
The experiences in Ghana and Tanzania validate the notion that IDSR strengthening efforts will
have limited results if they focus solely on technical issues and do not also address key organizational
and workplace issues and constraints. In both countries the greatest amount of time, energy and
resources were spent addressing technical barriers to improved surveillance. This was a logical
starting point in each country; at the start of IDSR strengthening efforts, the surveillance systems in
both Ghana and Tanzania were technically weak and were generating data of dubious quality. The
IDSR teams recognized the need to strengthen the technical foundations first, and donor-supported
activities tend to have a comparative advantage in the technical realm.
While IDSR strengthening activities were weighted towards strengthening the technical aspects
of surveillance operations, some inroads were made in addressing organizational and workforce
determinants. The IDSR teams conducted task analyses and defined and documented IDSR roles and
responsibilities at various levels of the system. Using continuous assessment and problem-solving
approaches and creating job aids, the IDSR teams helped to build workforce capacity to carry out
these IDSR responsibilities. The results demonstrate success in improving reporting, data accuracy,
and data analysis. However, in both Ghana and Tanzania, IDSR teams recognized the limits to
improvements they could achieve, given the existence of larger organizational and workforce issues
that were beyond their managerial control.
A number of organizational and workforce constraints hampered IDSR systems improvement,
including: lack of sufficient/dedicated funding for staff salaries, materials, transportation for
supervision, etc; lack of adequate communications and transportation infrastructure; and a general
lack of accountability for systems performance within the overall context of health system operations.
A lack of demand for information produced by IDSR systems is one constraint to creating
accountability for its operation and performance. The lack of demand appears to be in part due to the
8. Summary and Recommendations
51
fact that while systems appear to be decentralized, the lack of adequate funding effectively limits
decision-making authority at the district and regional levels.
The lack of accountability for IDSR operation is also linked to the decentralized environment in
which many surveillance systems currently function, as well as to an apparently insufficient demand
for information for planning at higher levels of the health system. In the decentralized settings found
in both Ghana and Tanzania, each district is responsible for managing its own surveillance activities
using its own funding and basing activities on an annual plan. As a result, there is frequently a
substantial amount of variation in the priority placed on surveillance activities among districts. Even
when surveillance activities are included in district plans and budgets, funds are not always made
available in a timely fashion in order to support implementation of these plans. This can be
particularly disruptive to ongoing surveillance activities that require consistent adherence to clearly
defined protocols, norms, and standards. The absence of promised funds for planned IDSR activities
creates long periods without supervision, training and support for the system’s operation. These
funding constraints are typically systemic and affect all health services and activities in a similar way.
District level constraints are amplified in the absence of a strong centralized surveillance system
structure that sets standards, provides guidance and support, and offers a means of quality control to
ensure that surveillance in all districts throughout the country is conducted using similar methods and
resources. In Ghana and Tanzania, the central level did not have the resources to ensure proper and
consistent application of the technical norms and guidelines that were established, nor did they have
the authority to ensure that districts budgeted their funds to ensure that certain surveillance-related
activities took place. The central level surveillance units ended up functioning more as technical
advisors that needed to convince regions and districts to implement the systems, while their ability to
support implementation was limited. In such an environment IDSR must compete with a myriad of
other programs and services that also require the time, attention and (most importantly) resources of
the regions and districts. The ability of the central level to ensure that the IDSR system provides
consistent, high-quality outputs that can be used to guide public health actions and policy at all levels
of the system is limited to this advisory/advocacy role. The threat to system performance in such an
environment is clear. The need for districts to have adequate autonomy to set priorities in line with
their own specific needs and to use surveillance data to make locally-relevant decisions is consistent
with the need for a strong centralized system at the national level to provide quality control and the
structure and support required to improve surveillance in all districts.
These issues – funding, communications, and accountability – fall into the organizational and
workforce determinants of IDSR performance. Working in these areas is a challenge for donorfunded projects that are external to the health system and requires a different strategy from the typical
technical assistance project. Addressing system-wide issues is the responsibility of a variety of
national ministries which have the authority to implement changes. Donor-funded projects must
initiate dialogue with these ministries and support them to take on these challenges to complement
investments in technical assistance.
8.2
Recommendations for donor assistance
Donor funded activities must initiate dialogue with the various ministries and support them to
take on the above challenges to complement investments in IDSR technical issues.
IDSR is a key component of the health system and should be included in broader system
strengthening activities: IDSR is a cross-cutting function that runs across a range of disease control
programs. Besides the technical guidelines, more general capacity is needed to ensure
52
communications mechanisms exist and are usable, especially at the district and facility levels. IDSR
and the health system would both be well served by including IDSR in health system strengthening
agendas, because if functional, it can provide the data needed for rational decisions and resource
allocation choices. Examples of ways to do this include preparing integrated health system
strengthening proposals to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and other sources of funding. These proposals should be
designed to create and strengthen the infrastructure and general capacity to produce and analyze
disease data, and use it for decision-making.
Introduce and support more accountability into the system: Lack of clear accountability is
not a problem related only to IDSR. Most health systems do not yet have in place mechanisms to
ensure accountability for resource use and appropriate public health action. Some districts in
Tanzania tried to implement a system in which salaries would not be paid until reports have been
submitted. This caused considerable turmoil, because workers felt this was not fair, and that district
staff did not have the right to impose this system. Although unsuccessful, this was one local attempt
to introduce accountability. While training and job aids can help the workforce know what they are
responsible for doing, if no one holds them accountable for doing it, it is unlikely that they will
change their practices and fulfill all job responsibilities. Supervision, follow-up and feedback are
critical elements of an effective accountability system. Future IDSR strengthening efforts must build
in accountability for IDSR performance, as part and parcel of building accountability into the health
system overall.
8. Summary and Recommendations
53
Appendix 1: Comparison of Priority Diseases
Table 1: Comparison of selected priority diseases for IDSR: WHO/AFRO, Ghana, Tanzania
Based on information in published IDSR guidelines
N.B. It should be noted that WHO/AFRO provides a recommended list of 19 diseases and
suggests that countries adopt a list that reflects their epidemiological situation.
Priority Disease List
WHO/AFRO
Ghana
Cholera
Diarrhea with Blood (Shigella)
Measles
Meningitis
Plague
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Yellow Fever
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Acute Flaccid paralysis (AFP)/polio
Dracunculiasis
Leprosy
Neonatal Tetanus
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Pneumonia in children under 5 years
New AIDS cases
Malaria
Onchocerciasis
Sexually transmitted infections (STI)
Trypanosomiasis
Tuberculosis
Diarrhea in children under 5 years
Buruli ulcer
Lymphatic Filariasis
Viral Hepatitis
Schistosomiasis
Trachoma
Yaws
Rabies/Animal bites
Typhoid
TOTAL Number of Priority Diseases
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Epidemic Prone Diseases
Diseases Targets for Eradication and Elimination
Other Diseases of Public Health Importance
19
Tanzania
X
Bacillary dysentery
X
X
X
X
X
HIV/AIDS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
23
X
X
X
X
13
Appendix 2: Results of first assessment of Factors in Ghana
Table 2: Results of Ghana Continuous learning and problem solving approach, Wa Workshop, February 2003
CORE
FUNCTIONS
1. Identify
2. Report
STRENGTHS
WEAKNESSES
Human resources
• Clinicians
• Community-based
Surveillance
Volunteers
Inadequately trained, poorly motivated
staff
Poor remuneration and working conditions for
staff
Inadequate resources for
logistics/planning
Overworked/understaffed (not enough doctors)
Teaching, Regional, and District
hospitals/clinics equipped with
tools/laboratories
Lack of supervision
Knowledge about system and
what happenings should be
reported
Lack of communication/documentation
system
Report forms are available for
various activities
Volunteer fatigue
Poor reporting system
• Timeliness
• Completeness
• Vertical reporting
• Poor supervision
Poorly trained personnel
3. Analyze
and
Interpret
BUT WHY? COMMENT
Some human resources and
knowledge/skills in IDSR are
available
Inaccessibility and inadequacy of
transportation
Lack of computer/other skills to analyze
and interpret data
Lack of basic logistics/supplies such as
calculators
Poor documentation
Insecurity
Time constraints
Lack of funds for equipment and staff
development
Poor infrastructure development
• Electricity, telephone, computers, and
accessories (e-mail, fax, mobile phones, etc.)
Inequitable distribution of skilled personnel
No standard way of reporting
Inadequate staff and heavy workload
Natural hard-to-reach areas
• Floods, vast terrain and poor roads/vehicles
Staff not trained in data management
Time constraints due to having to fill in multiple
reporting forms
Lack of feedback
CORE
FUNCTIONS
4.
Investigate
STRENGTHS
Some available resources,
relevant skills (lab scientists and
clinicians)
All of the districts and subdistricts have disease
surveillance teams and regional
level SCD forms, PHRL,
PDRU/Lab
5. Respond
Systems in place that work well
to enhance communication and
team work so that districts can
respond quickly
The technical competence is
present, and IEC materials,
drugs, and other materials are
usually available if needed
6. Provide
feedback
District epidemic management
committee, as well as staff
available from other
decentralized agencies, NGOs,
volunteer community members
Districts hold quarterly,
monthly, and weekly meetings,
as well as Durbars (community
gatherings/dialogues) with
surrounding community to get
good feedback
Monitoring and supervision
WEAKNESSES
Poor staff attitude
Inadequate number of lab
scientists/other staff with relevant skills
Inadequate lab facilities, equipment,
and capacity to carry out detailed
logistics/transportation
Difficult terrain/populations to access
because of dispersed settlements,
incorrect addresses, and often the
communities are difficult to work with
Slow transfer of funds from the regional
to district and sub-district level
Non-functional District epidemic
management committee (DEMC)
because the roles aren’t clearly defined
Lack of regular interaction between
health staff and community members,
brings about apathy
BUT WHY? COMMENT
Inadequate funding for hiring and training of
staff, to motivate staff, purchase
supplies/enhance facility, or to facilitate necessary
activities
Disparity between the motivation and skill level of
staff
Insecurity due to tribal conflicts
Lack of motivation and poor attitude of staff and
health workers
Lack of understanding and differences between
cultural beliefs and values, educational and
poverty levels, continue to be a source of
contention between communities and the staff at
the health centers
Low level of awareness of importance
of surveillance activities
Irregularity of monitoring and
supervision activities at all levels
Poor sensitization to new reporting
forms
Inadequate resources and poor
communication systems result in late/no
Workload is too much for the few staff members
and there are too many workshops that distract
them from supervision activities
State of emergency in parts of the region or poor
infrastructure makes accessing some communities
impossible
CORE
FUNCTIONS
7. Evaluate
STRENGTHS
activities carried out at all levels
DHMT and SDHT hold quarterly
monitoring and supervision
activities, therefore the
potential for good supervision
exists
Staff at all levels are given
performance reviews
WEAKNESSES
BUT WHY? COMMENT
feedback
No standardized supervision or
evaluation checklist
Unreliable funding of surveillance activities
Lack of adequate funds set aside for supervision
activities
Logistical constraints
Heavy workload places a burden on unmotivated
and poorly trained staff
Staff have limited skills in leading
effective monitoring and supervision
activities
Appendix 3: IDSR task analysis for Ghana
Table 3: Example of Task analysis for health facility level for Ghana
Steps
1. Identify case
Desired performance
-Diagnose correctly using standard
case definition
2. Record information about case
-Record completely and accurately
case information on patient OPD
card and in consulting room (CR)
register
-Collect right quantity of specimen
at the right time with the
appropriate container
-Transport specimen under right
conditions
3. Collect and send specimen to
laboratory
-Test specimen using the standard
operating procedures
-Confirm diagnosis using standard
procedures/guidelines
4. Manage case and/or identify
case for referral
5. Report immediately to DHMT
office (in case of immediately
reportable disease)
6. Compile routine summary
-Manage case using standard case
management guidelines
-Refer case to the right place at the
right time with proper referral notes
(accurate history, results of any
tests and treatment given)
-Report case-based information of
suspected case using the fastest
possible means (telephone, fax,
email, radiophone)
-Follow-up with written report using
case based reporting form or line
listing form
-Compile weekly, monthly, quarterly
Tasks
-Take history and carry out physical
examination
-Make a diagnosis based on findings
-Match with standard case definition
-Record history, physical examination
findings, diagnosis on the OPD card
-Transcribe information from OPD card
into the CR register
-Make a request for the appropriate test
-Complete laboratory request form
-Collect specimen
-Label the specimen container
-Send specimen to laboratory
-Test specimen
Person responsible
Clinician (Doctor (MO),
Medical Assistant (MA),
Nurse)
Clinician
Clinician/CR nurse
Clinician
Clinician
Clinician/Lab scientist
Lab scientist
Lab scientist
Lab scientist
-Send lab results to requesting clinician
Lab scientist
-Manage case
-Identify case for referral
-Refer case (if any)
Clinician
Clinician
Clinician
-Notify DHMT
Facility-in-charge
-Compile weekly, monthly, quarterly
Facility biostatistics officer
Steps
reports
7. Report summary data to
DHMT
8. Participate in investigation of
reported outbreaks
9. Analyze and interpret data
10. Act/respond based on
analyzed data
11. Provide feedback
Desired performance
summary according to guidelines
-Report summary data according to
guidelines at the right time
-Take part in case management,
case search, and other activities as
required by the DHMT
-Prepare and periodically update
tables, charts, and graphs
according to guidelines
-Share information with facility
staff, community members, and
DHMT
-Carry out public health response in
collaboration with DHMT
-Mobilize community involvement in
response
Tasks
summary
-Report summary data to DHMT
Person responsible
Facility-in-charge
-Take part in case management, case
search, and other activities
Facility-in-charge
Other staff
-Prepare tables, graphs and charts
Facility biostatistics officer
-Share information
Facility in charge
Give feedback to health staff,
community members about
outcome of reported cases and
prevention activities
-Give feedback
-Carry out response
Facility-in-charge
Appendix 4: Norms and Standards for IDSR Data Analysis in Tanzania
Feedback reports
Outbreak-related indicators
Measures of IDSR performance (core
indicators)
Measures of
Disease Burden
Purposes:
1. Measure and track magnitude of disease burden (cases and deaths) in the district, detect outbreaks
2. Monitor and evaluate surveillance system performance indicators, identify areas needing strengthening, take appropriate action
3. Use data for planning (setting targets, planning interventions, evaluating interventions)
4. Share data with relevant stakeholders (produce feedback reports and summaries)
Area
1 Overall priority disease
morbidity in all outpatient
departments (OPDs) in district
Description
Total number of cases reported (< & ≥ 5 years)
for each priority disease (sum of all facility
reports, OPD only)
Type of Analysis Frequency
Line graphs & bar Monthly
charts
Data Source
IDSR district forms
2(a) & 2(b)
Purpose
Measure magnitude and trend of disease; detect outbreaks; set targets;
monitor changes; evaluate interventions
2 Priority disease morbidity in
each OPD in district
3 Overall priority disease
morbidity and mortality in all inpatient departments (IPDs) in
district
4 Priority disease morbidity and
mortality in each IPD in district
Number of OPD cases reported (< & ≥ 5 years)
for each priority disease, by facility
Number of cases & deaths reported (< & ≥ 5
years) for each priority disease (sum of all facility
reports, IPD only)
charts
charts
IDSR district form
2(b)
IDSR district forms
2(a) & 2(b)
Compare magnitude and trend of disease in OPDs across facilities in
district; target interventions
Measure magnitude of disease and deaths; detect outbreaks; set
targets; monitor changes; evaluate interventions
Number of cases & deaths reported (< & ≥ 5
years) for each priority disease, in each facility
with an IPD
charts
IDSR district form
2(b)
Compare magnitude of disease and deaths across facilities in district;
target interventions
Area
5 Completeness of facilities
reporting to the districts
Description
Proportion of expected weekly facility reports
received by the district (all facilities)
Bar chart
Weekly and quarterly
Data Source
IDSR facility form
3(b)
6
received by the district (by facility)
Proportion of expected monthly facility reports
received by the district (all facilities)
Bar chart
Monthly
Bar chart
Monthly and quarterly
IDSR facility form
3(b)
IDSR district form
2(b)
received by the district (by facility)
9 Timeliness of facilities reporting Proportion of expected weekly facility reports
to the district
received by the district on time (all facilities)
Bar chart
Quarterly
Bar chart
Weekly and quarterly
Purpose
Monitor & evaluate overall district IDSR performance with respect to
completeness of weekly reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over
time
Identify facilities requiring assistance to improve weekly reporting;
monitor and evaluate changes over time
completeness of monthly reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over
time
Identify facilities requiring assistance to improve completeness of
monthly reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over time
timeliness of weekly reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over time
received by the district on time (by facility)
received by the district on time (all facilities)
Bar chart
Monthly
Bar chart
Monthly and quarterly
received by the district on time (by facility)
Bar chart
Quarterly
IDSR district form
2(b)
Bar chart
13 Reporting of priority diseases Proportion of cases of epidemic diseases
using Case Investigation Forms reported to the district using Case Investigation
Form (AFP, cholera, measles, CSM, NNT,
Plague, VHF, Yellow Fever)*
*Refer to lab job aids to determine denominators
Quarterly and Annual
CIFs & IDSR district
form 2(b); line lists
Measure appropriate reporting for epidemic diseases with data
available for further analyses (leading to improved outbreak
investigation and response)
14 Feedback to health facilities on Proportion of facilities that have received a
IDSR reports
feedback newsletter from the district in the last
quarter
15 Routine analysis of data in
Proportion of facilities with all three of the
facilities
following: 1) use of summary data sheet, 2) use
of MTUHA book 2, and 3) presence of updated
graphs of disease trends for malaria, diarrhoea
< 5 years, and pneumonia < 5 years
Bar chart
Quarterly
Monitor & evaluate district capacity to provide appropriate feedback on
a quarterly basis
Bar chart
Quarterly
Based on reports
from facilities and
supervision reports
Based on supervision
reports
Area
Description
16 Timely notification of outbreaks Proportion of suspected outbreaks of epidemicprone diseases that are notified to the district
within 24 hours of surpassing the epidemic
threshold
17 Effective laboratory
Proportion of suspected outbreaks of epidemicconfirmation process
prone diseases in which specimen collection and
lab confirmation are completed according to
guidelines (Receive score of 6/6 on checklist)
Proportion (bar
Quarterly
chart over time)
Data Source
Outbreak reports at
district level
Purpose
Monitor & evaluate whether facilities are monitoring IDSR diseases and
taking appropriate actions (notifying the district) in a timely manner
7
8
10
11
12
Proportion (bar
chart over time)
IDSR district form
2(b)
IDSR facility form
3(b)
IDSR facility form
3(b)
IDSR district form
2(b)
Quarterly or annually, as Outbreak reports,
appropriate
laboratory reports,
and checklists
Identify facilities requiring assistance to improve timeliness of weekly
reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over time
timeliness of monthly reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over
time
Identify facilities requiring assistance to improve timeliness of monthly
reporting; monitor and evaluate changes over time
Determine whether health facilities are regularly analysing data
collected; identify facilities needing assistance with data analysis
Monitor & evaluate whether laboratory network is functioning and has
capacity to confirm diagnoses; identify areas for improvement
18 Appropriate investigation of
suspected outbreaks
Proportion of suspected outbreaks of epidemic- Proportion (bar
prone diseases that are investigated according chart over time)
to guidelines (Receive score of 7/7 on checklist)
Quarterly or annually, as Outbreak reports and Measure capacity of district to investigate outbreaks; identify areas for
appropriate
checklists
improvement
19 Appropriate response to
confirmed outbreaks
Proportion of confirmed outbreaks of epidemicprone diseases with appropriate response
according to guidelines (Receive score of 5/5 on
checklist)
Case fatality rate for each epidemic-prone
disease (cerebral spinal meningitis, cholera,
plague and rabies) and non-epidemic prone
disease (pneumonia, malaria, and diarrhoea)
reported in a confirmed outbreak
Proportion of confirmed outbreak reports that
include case-based data both recorded and
analysed
Proportion (bar
chart over time)
Quarterly or annually, as Outbreak reports and Measure capacity of district to respond to outbreaks; identify areas for
appropriate
checklists
improvement
Proportion (bar
chart over time)
Quarterly or annually, as Outbreak reports;
appropriate
case investigation
forms from
outbreaks; line lists
IDSR form 2(a)
Quarterly or annually, as Outbreak reports
appropriate
Measure quality of case management; identify areas for improvement
Purpose
Monitor & evaluate magnitude of disease burden in district over time;
evaluate changes over time and differences between facilities; detect
outbreaks; identify groups/areas at risk; plan and evaluate interventions
20 Quality of case management
and surveillance activities
21 Appropriate analysis of data
during outbreaks
Proportion (bar
chart over time)
Area
22 Epidemiological data
Description
Type of Analysis
Line graphs/bar
Summary (graph and tables) of trend of each
priority disease for each facility and summary for charts
entire district (by age group and total)
Frequency
To be sent from district
to health facilities
quarterly
23 Indicators
Results of the perfomance of each "Measures of Line graphs, bar
charts, tables
IDSR performance" indicator (# 5 - # 15)
calculated above at district level
Quarterly
24 IDSR reports
Quarterly summary report to be sent to the
regional level, facilities, and other stakeholders
Quarterly
Line graphs, bar
charts, tables
Data Source
District IDSR
database; based on
IDSR district forms
2(b)
District IDSR
database; based on
IDSR district forms
2(b)
District IDSR
database; based on
IDSR district forms
2(b) & 3(b)
Monitor & evaluate district ability to collect, analyze and use casebased data for decision-making during outbreaks
Monitor & evaluate overall district IDSR performance; identify areas for
improvement; compare facility performance and target interventions
Communicate district data to next level; provide timely data so region
can take appropriate actions and plan effectively; share with
stakeholders; share with facilities.
Appendix 5: Example of Task analysis for District level in Tanzania
Figure 2: Flow chart of IDSR steps at district level in Tanzania
F lo w c h a r t fo r ID S R S te p s a t D is tr ic t (C H M T ) le v e l
W e e k ly r e p o r ts
r e c ’d fro m
fa c ilitie s
B . N o tify
a p p r o p r ia te
p e rs o n /le v e l
A . D e c is io n to
in v e s tig a te /
re s p o n d
D . In v e s tig a te
(o u tb r e a k
in v e s tig a tio n a n d
c a s e c o n fir m a tio n )
C . C o m p ile w e e k ly
s u m m a ry re p o rt a n d
s e n d to r e g io n
Im m e d ia te
c o m m u n ic a tio n
r e c ’d fro m
fa c ilitie s o r
b o r d e r d is tr ic ts
A . D e c is io n
to
in v e s tig a te /
re s p o n d
E . O u tb r e a k
R esponse
B . N o tify
a p p r o p ria te
p e r s o n /le v e l
M o n th ly r e p o r ts
r e c ’d fro m
fa c ilitie s
C o m p ile d
r e p o r ts fro m
tr e a tm e n t c a m p
s d u rin g /a fte r
o u tb re a k
F e e d b a c k fr o m
R e g io n o n
o p e ra tio n s a n d
in fo
F . C o m m u n ic a te
o u tb r e a k to b o r d e r
d is tric ts
J . F e e d b a c k to
s ta k e h o ld e r s
G . C o m p ile m o n th ly
s u m m a ry re p o rt
a n d s e n d to r e g io n
R e s u lts a n d
in fo r m a tio n
fr o m la b s
F . F e e d b a c k to
s ite o f o u tb r e a k
( e .g . c o m m u n ity /
fa c ility )
H . A n a ly z e D a ta
I. E v id e n c e b a s e d
a c tio n
J . F e e d b a c k to
fa c ilitie s th r o u g h
s u p e rv is io n
m e c h a n is m
Table 4: IDSR Task analysis for District level in Tanzania
Steps
A. DECISION TO
INVESTIGATE/ RESPOND
Desired Performance
Rapid decision to investigate
based on incoming information
is made
Rapid decision to communicate
to appropriate person or higher
level is made
Tasks
•
•
Recognize outbreak potential (including cross-facility outbreaks)
•
Decide whether to investigate based on incoming information
•
B. NOTIFY
APPROPRIATE PERSON
OR HIGHER LEVEL
C. COMPILE WEEKLY
SUMMARY REPORT AND
SEND TO REGION
D. INVESTIGATE (OUTBREAK
INVESTIGATION)
D.
INVESTIGATE
(CON’T) (CASE
CONFIRMATION)
Decide whether extra support is needed from higher level (or different
person)
Information is rapidly
communicated to appropriate
person or higher level
•
Rapidly communicate to appropriate person and/or level
Completed weekly report is
communicated to region on
time
•
Compile weekly summary report from facilities
•
Send weekly summary report to region on time
District performs outbreak
investigation according to
disease specific outbreak
investigation protocol
•
Inform and assemble investigation team (as in guidelines)
•
Prepare for outbreak investigation at district level
•
Mobilize resources for outbreak investigation
•
E.
Receive weekly reports from facilities, immediate notifications and case –
based information from facilities or other districts, and rumours
District send specimens to
appropriate lab
Cases of suspected outbreak are
confirmed
Complete outbreak investigation form on suspected cases (data on patient
information, patient history, potential source of infection collected)
•
Analyse/interpret data to determine appropriate response
•
Search for other cases based on obtained information
•
Produce investigation report and send to national level
•
•
•
Prepare for outbreak confirmation at district level according to protocol
(including requesting supplies from lab)
Collect specimens according to protocol for all potential disease aetiologies
Fill out lab form requesting test(s) (including susceptibility) and supplying
patient information
Steps
Desired Performance
Tasks
•
•
F. OUTBREAK RESPONSE
Appropriate treatment and
preventive measures to control
suspected or confirmed
outbreak
Receive susceptibility information
•
Convene multi-sectoral epidemic response team
•
Prepare for response at district level according to protocol
•
Mobilise resources for outbreak response
•
Treat cases according to treatment guidelines
•
E OUTBREAK TO BORDER
DISTRICTS
H. COMPILE MONTHLY
SUMMARY REPORT AND
SEND TO REGION
ANALYSE DATA
Initiate control measures according to outbreak protocols (including
prevention and community mobilisation)
Prepare outbreak response report and sent to national level
Feedback of outbreak is
communicated to site of
outbreak and districts at risk
•
Summary data are updated
based on information on lab
data and treatment camps
Completed monthly report is
communicated to region
•
Compile monthly data from facilities
•
Review data and verify questionable data
•
Update data based on cases external to facilities (e.g. treatment camps)
•
I.
Receive test results from lab within expected time (test-specific) to confirm
epidemic
•
•
G. FEEDBACK TO SITE OF
OUTBREAK/COMMUNICAT
Send specimen to appropriate level lab immediately
Analysis of data according to
analysis protocols and needs
•
•
•
Communicate results of outbreak investigation and summary of actions to
stakeholders (including to those at site(s) of outbreak)
Send completed report to region on time with supplementary information
based on lab results or other information as appropriate
Assess availability of data for denominators
Perform analyses according to analysis protocols (including trends and
forecasting, geographic and demographic comparisons, incidence rates, case
fatality rates, etc).
Perform analyses on operations (timeliness and completeness performance
from facilities, supplies, managerial)
Steps
J.
EVIDENCE BASED ACTION
K. FEEDBACK
Desired Performance
Address routine IDS decision
making (adjusting resources,
strategies for prevention and
control programs)
Planning for surveillance and
input into CCHP
Monitor surveillance and
response operations
Address quality of incoming
data
Identify additional inquiries
(requiring further study)
Advocacy
Feedback of disseminated
analysed data and actions to
stakeholders, including
facilities and communities
Tasks
•
•
•
•
Use data for decisions and action in addressing routine IDS decision making
(adjusting resources, strategies, programs)
Use data for planning
Use data for decisions and action in monitoring district operations (supplies,
communications, needs, etc) including when needing extra resources (e.g.
human, drugs)
Use data for decisions and action in addressing quality of incoming data
(including facility information, timeliness, completeness, lab information,
denominator data)
•
Use data for identifying additional inquiries (requiring further study)
•
Use of data for advocacy
•
Communicate interpretations of analysed data and summary of actions to
stakeholders (including facilities and communities)
Appendix 6: Process of developing the Tanzania IDSR
capacity building package and content of training
Training package development process
1. Obtained and reviewed existing training materials, i.e, Tanzania Expanded Program on
Immunization training materials for vaccine-preventable diseases; IDSR training
materials from Ghana, and other countries.
2. Created and built a consensus on a list of priority IDSR actions and tasks with staff from
the MOH and CHMTs
3. Developed a succinct list of determinants of IDSR actions from findings of situation
analysis. Determinants included both external factors (dealing with systems and logistics
barriers) and internal factors (knowledge and skills, but also motivation, consequences,
accountability, self-efficacy, social norms). These embrace technical issues, systems
factors and behavioral aspects.
4. Engaged relevant personnel and institutions to help develop and conduct training:
worked with potential trainers (Zonal Training Centers) to develop a shared
understanding of the IDSR goals and ensure that they acquired an understanding of
IDSR issues and of how the approach to be used in this training needed to achieve and
contain adequate content on technical, systemic, and behavioral information and issues.
Their technical skills, practical experiences and understanding of socio-cultural, attitudes
and practices of health personnel in Tanzania were fundamental contributions in refining
of materials for the effective training.
5. Outlined a mix of capacity building interventions that together lead to adoption and
performance of the IDSR steps: group training, one-on-one instruction or on-the-job
training, peer counseling, tailored supervisory visits, incentives/positive consequences
for good performance, performance feedback protocols, reference materials and job aids
and guidance on which ones to use and when. A single method like group training alone
would not be sufficient or appropriate as a channel for adequately building capacity in all
IDSR actions. For job aids, the team developed clear guidance for health workers on
when and how to use them.
6. Developed draft materials and approaches by MOH, NIMR, PHRplus, CHANGE and Zonal
Training Centers through following the above steps developed a draft training materials
and approaches.
7. Pilot-tested draft materials and developed evaluation mechanisms for training: Pilottesting through pre/posttests of participants and other qualitative assessments. Training
assessments included a baseline prior to training, follow-up evaluation immediately after
training and subsequent follow-up during additional post-training visits.
8. Refined monitoring and evaluation tools, based on the experience in the pilot, and
recommended tools for ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the capacity-building
interventions.
9. Finalized a capacity building “package” - Package includes materials and guides for all
interventions (training, supervisory visits, reference materials, job aids, etc), and
monitoring tools for ongoing assessment of the capacity of health staff and of their
performance. The capacity building package includes three training programs: Training
of Trainers, District IDSR training, and Facility IDSR training. Each program includes a
facilitator’s guide and participants’ manual.
IDSR Training Topics at District and Facility Levels in Tanzania
District: 5-day training
Overview of the IDSR Strategy
Detect and Report Priority IDSR Diseases
Analyze Data on IDSR Priority Diseases
Interpret and Use Data to Respond to Priority
Diseases
Investigate and Respond to Suspected
Outbreaks
Prepare for Disease Outbreaks
Supervise and Provide Feedback
Build Support for Successful Surveillance and
Response
Monitor and Evaluate Performance of IDSR
Implementation
Develop an Action Plan
Facility: 4-day training
Introduction to IDSR
Detect and Record Priority Diseases Using Standard
Case Definitions
Report Priority Diseases
Analyze and Interpret Data for Action
Investigate and Respond to Outbreaks/-Epidemics
Successful Community Relations for Surveillance
Application Planning
Appendix 7: List and examples of laboratory confirmation
job aids for Tanzania
Table 5: Disease-specific and specimen-specific laboratory confirmation job aids in Tanzania
Disease-specific job aids
AFP for facilities/districts
Bacillary dysentery for facilities/districts
Bacillary dysentery for referral labs
Cholera for facilities/districts
Cholera for referral laboratories
Meningitis for facilities/districts
Meningitis for referral laboratories
Measles for facilities/districts
Measles for referral laboratories
Plague for facilities/districts
Plague for referral laboratories
VHF for facilities/districts
Yellow fever for facilities/districts
Yellow fever for referral laboratories
Specimen-specific job aids
How to collect blood
How to collect CSF
How to perform a skin snip
How to collect bubo-aspirate
How to use Cary Blair transport medium
How to obtain serum from whole blood
How to take a rectal swab and transfer to transport medium
Triple packaging system to maintain ambient temperature
Triple packaging system to maintain cold chain
Labeling specimens
Using trans-isolate transport media for CSF
United Republic of Tanzania
Ministry of Health
Job Aid for Laboratory Confirmation
(for health facilities and districts)
ACUTE FLACCID PARALYSIS
Case investigation form and
container of stool
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP). It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when
the action threshold has been reached.
Background
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) is the hallmark of poliomyelitis, a disease caused by poliovirus serotypes 1, 2, and 3. The Polio
Eradication Program has nearly halted ongoing wild-type poliovirus; however, serotypes 1 and 3 still circulate in several
African countries. In 1994, Tanzania began polio eradication activities such as routine oral polio vaccine immunization, national
immunization days, and active surveillance for AFP. The last case of polio in Tanzania was identified in 1996.
Poliovirus is transmitted from person-to-person by ingesting faecally-contaminated materials. Polio infection occurs almost
exclusively among children. Paralytic polio, though not fatal, has devastating social and economic consequences for affected
individuals. Only 1% of those infected have paralysis and the remaining cases suffer from a milder form of the disease.
Immuno-compromised persons may shed virus for several years. Risk factors for poliomyelitis include non-vaccination and
exposure to faecally-contaminated materials.
Standard case definition
For community level
Any sudden lameness in a child less than 15 years
of age.
For facility level
Any child less than 15 years of age with sudden
onset of paralysis including Guillain-Barré
syndrome. Or any person at any age with paralytic
illness in whom the medical practitioner suspects
poliomyelitis.
Confirmatory tests
Isolation and identification of poliovirus
Why laboratory confirmation is important
A stool positive for poliovirus type 1, 2 or 3 on one
or more cases will allow health officials to declare
an outbreak and to take appropriate action.
Action threshold
A single case at a defined locality or health facility
according to standard case definition is considered
a suspected outbreak. Specimens should be collected
immediately for laboratory confirmation.
Sampling strategy
Collect two specimens from each suspected case.
Specimen to be collected
Stool
National Surveillance Officer
Expanded Programme for Immunizations (EPI)
Ministry of Health
Mabibo External Area
Nelson Mandela Road
P.O. Box 9083
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Attention: National Surveillance Officer
This job aid was prepared through a partnership of the Tanzania MOH, NIMR, MUCHS, PHRPlus, AFRO and CDC.
For health facilities and districts
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: ACUTE FLACCID PARALYSIS
1. DOCUMENTATION
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Marker (water resistant)
l Case investigation form l Pen
l Patient register book
l Gloves
l Four ice packs
l Triple packaging system l National Surveillance
(See Job Aid for Triple Packaging
Officer contact information
System to maintain cold chain)
Steps:
Steps:
1.1 Complete a label with patient name, specimen
number, specimen type, date and time of collection,
health facility and district. (See Job Aid for Labeling
Specimens).
3.1 Transport the specimen to the National Surveillance
Officer for EPI as follows:
l Pack the specimen using a triple packaging
system with a solid cold box and ice packs
(See Job Aid for Triple Packaging System to
maintain cold chain).
1.2 Fill in a case investigation form completely with
the patient information. Make a duplicate form.
l Contact the IDSR* focal person in the district
1.3 Locate the patient entry in the register book, and
record the date and specimen type to be collected.
to arrange transport of the package. Ensure that:
National and international regulations for
shipping diagnostic specimens are strictly
followed.
2. COLLECTION & HANDLING
Specimen remains at 4-8oC (or at -20oC if
specimen is frozen) throughout transport.
Package reaches referral laboratory within
72 hours of specimen collection.
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Leak proof screw-capped container
Note: Collect two specimens from each suspected case within 14 days of paralysis onset. The two specimens should be
collected separately, 24 to 48 hours apart.
Steps:
2.1 Collect 5 to 10 grams (the size of a thumb nail) of
fresh stool. Place stool in a leak proof screw-capped
container.
3.2 Keep the duplicate case investigation form at the
district.
4. TESTING & DOCUMENTATION
Testing and documentation are done by laboratory staff
according to standard operating procedures.
2.2 Adhere a label to the specimen container.
2.3 Keep the specimen at 4-8oC.
If the stool cannot reach the National Surveillance
Officer for EPI within 72 hours, freeze at -20oC.
2.4 Safely dispose of all contaminated materials.
5. REPORTING
National Surveillance Officer for EPI should verbally
communicate results to the IDSR focal person in the district within 14 to 28 days after receiving the specimen.
Written communication should follow.
Steps:
5.1 IDSR focal person at the district should communicate
results to clinician and the local laboratory staff.
5.2 Clinician and local laboratory staff should record
results in their register book. Also record the date
and time the results were received and by whom.
*Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
Ministry of Health
BACILLARY DYSENTERY
container of stool
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for the collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of bacillary dysentery.
It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the action
threshold has been reached.
Background
Bacillary dysentery is an acute disease producing bloody diarrhoea and abdominal pain, most commonly caused by the bacterium Shigella. It occurs in both endemic and epidemic forms. S. dysenteriae type 1 (SD1) has caused most of the large bacillary
dysentery epidemics that have occurred across Africa. Epidemics in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990's spread to western
Tanzania via refugee migration. Isolates of SD1 from these epidemics were resistant to commonly used drugs, but susceptible to
nalidixic acid.
Bacillary dysentery is transmitted by from person-to-person through the ingestion of faecally-contaminated food or drink.
Infection due to SD1 is often more severe in young children and the elderly in which the case fatality rate can exceed 2%.
Antimicrobial resistance occurs more frequently among SD1 than in other Shigella serogroups. Risk factors for bacillary dysentery include overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation and unsafe water supplies. Refugee populations are at high risk.
For community level
Any person with diarrhoea and visible blood in
stool.
For health facility level
Any person with diarrhoea and visible blood in
stool and abdominal pain.
Action threshold
Two or more suspected cases at a defined locality
or health facility according to the standard case
definition in a week is considered a suspected
outbreak. Specimens should be collected immediately for laboratory confirmation.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimen from the first 5 to 10 suspected
cases. If any are positive, then collect every tenth
case during the outbreak.
Stool, or rectal swab, if patient is not able to pass
stool.
Presumptive diagnostic tests
Macroscopy and microscopy
Confirmatory tests
Isolation, identification and serogrouping.
Antimicrobial susceptibility.
A stool culture positive for Shigella dysenteriae
type 1 (SD1) on one or more cases in a week will
allow health officials to declare an outbreak and
to take appropriate action.
Antimicrobial susceptibility data will be used to
monitor resistance. These data will provide information for the MOH to develop a treatment policy
for the organism.
Referral Laboratory
(capable of performing the confirmatory tests)
Name of laboratory:
Contact person:
Postal address:
Phone:
email:
This job aid was prepared through a partnership of the Tanzania MOH, NIMR, MUCHS, PHRPlus, AFRO, and CDC.
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: BACILLARY DYSENTERY
1. DOCUMENTATION
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
l Specimen labels
l Gloves
l Triple packaging system
l Four ice packs
l Referral lab contact
information
Steps:
Steps:
Specimens).
3.1 Hand carry the stool to the local laboratory (for
macroscopy and microscopy).
Transport the tube of Cary Blair to the referral
laboratory as follows:
followed.
Supplies needed:
Specimen remains at 4-8oC throughout
transport. Do not freeze.
l Gloves
l One tube of Cary Blair
l Leak proof screw-capped
transport medium
container
l Adhesive tape
l Sterile cotton-tipped
applicators (swabs)
Note: Collect specimens from suspected cases during the
acute stage (two to four days after onset) and before antimicrobial treatment.
Steps:
2.1 Collect a fresh stool including portions with blood
and/or mucus. Place stool in a leak proof screwcapped container. Do not let stool dry out.
If patient is not able to pass stool, take a rectal swab
(See Job Aid for How to Take a Rectal Swab and
Transfer to Transport Medium).
2.2 Transfer a small amount of the stool (or the rectal
swab) to a tube of Cary Blair transport medium
(See Job Aid for Using Cary Blair Transport Medium).
2.3 Adhere a label to the specimen container and tube of
Cary Blair.
2.4 Keep the tube of Cary Blair at 4-8oC.
district.
4. TESTING
5. RECORDING & REPORTING
Referral laboratory should verbally communicate
results to the IDSR focal person in the district within
two to four days after receiving the specimen. Written
communication should follow.
Steps:
Ministry of Health
(for referral laboratories)
BACILLARY DYSENTERY
Petri dish containing
selective agar with
colonies of Shigella
dysenteriae
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of bacillary dysentery. It is
intended for referral laboratories capable of performing the confirmatory tests. Referral laboratories should use this job aid
upon receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. The job aid does not address the technical procedures for performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for confirming bacillary dysentery.
Background
Bacillary dysentery is an acute disease producing bloody diarrhoea and abdominal pain, most commonly caused by the bacterium Shigella. It occurs in both endemic and epidemic forms. S. dysenteriae type 1 (SD1) has caused most of the large bacillary
dysentery epidemics that have occurred across Africa. Epidemics in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990's spread to western
Tanzania via refugee migration. Isolates of SD1 from these epidemics were resistant to commonly used drugs, but susceptible to
nalidixic acid.
Bacillary dysentery is transmitted by from person-to-person through the ingestion of faecally-contaminated food or drink.
Infection due to SD1 is often more severe in young children and the elderly in which the case fatality rate can exceed 2%.
Antimicrobial resistance occurs more frequently among SD1 than in other Shigella serogroups. Risk factors for bacillary dysentery include overcrowded conditions with poor sanitation and unsafe water supplies. Refugee populations are at a high risk.
Sampling strategy for suspected outbreaks
Health facilities or districts collect specimens from
the first 5 to 10 suspected cases. If any are positive, every tenth case will be sampled throughout
the outbreak.
Specimen to be tested
Stool or rectal swab
A stool culture positive for Shigella dysenteriae
type 1 (SD1) on one or more cases in a week will
allow health officials to declare an outbreak and
to take appropriate action.
for the organism.
Confirmatory tests to be done
Referral laboratories should keep updated
contact information for the health facilities and
districts in their catchment areas.
For referral laboratories
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: BACILLARY DYSENTERY
1. RECEIVING
Upon receiving specimens for laboratory confirmation of
bacillary dysentery, the laboratory must be able to start testing immediately.†
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Laboratory register
l Pen or marker
Note: Gloves should be worn when opening package, and
when handling specimen and contaminated materials. Work
should be done in the laboratory.
Steps:
1.1 Log in the sender's name and address in the laboratory register.
1.2 Locate the case investigation form and the tube of
Cary Blair transport medium containing the swab.
1.3 Assess the condition of the tube and the documentation as follows:
l Tube should be labeled. Information on tube
label and case investigation form should match.
l Tube should be intact and not leaking.
l Tube should be cold, but not frozen.
Record the findings in the laboratory register and
on case investigation form. Reject unsuitable
specimens.†
1.4 Log in the patient information, the specimen information, and the date and time of receipt in the
laboratory register. File case investigation form
for later use.
1.5 Keep tube at 4-8oC. Immediately prepare for testing.
If any Shigella species are isolated, determine antimicrobial susceptibility pattern according to the SOP.
2.2 Throughout the testing, safely dispose of all waste
and contaminated materials.
Supplies needed:
l Case investigation form
Note: Results should be communicated within two to four
days of receiving the specimen. If communication is by
email or other indirect means, request confirmation that the
results were received.
Steps:
Isolation, identification, and serogrouping
3.1 Record the isolation, identification, and serogrouping results in the laboratory register and on
the case investigation form. Communicate the
results (positive or negative) immediately to the
IDSR* focal person at the district and at your level.
Susceptibility
3.2 Record the antimicrobial susceptibility results in
the laboratory register and on the case investigation form. Communicate the results immediately
to the IDSR focal person at the district and at
your level.
3.3 Send the original case investigation form to the
IDSR focal person at the district.
2. TESTING
Supplies needed:
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and supplies for isolation, identification, and serogrouping and
antimicrobial susceptibility of Shigella
4. STORAGE
Steps:
4.1 Store one or two representative isolates from the
outbreak.
Steps:
2.1 According to the SOP, perform testing for isolation,
identification, and serogrouping of Shigella.
†If laboratory cannot start testing immediately or if specimen is not
suitable, contact the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
(IDSR) focal person at your level.
4.2 Dispose remaining isolates according to the SOP.
Ministry of Health
vial of T-I inoculated with
CSF
CEREBROSPINAL MENINGITIS
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for the collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of cerebrospinal meningitis. It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the
action threshold has been reached.
Background
Cerebrospinal meningitis (CSM) is an acute infection of the central nervous system caused by viruses, bacteria, fungi, or protozoa. The most common aetiological agents are bacteria including Neisseria meningitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and
Haemophilus influenzae. In Africa, large epidemics are caused by N. meningitidis serogroup A and to a lesser extent, groups
C and W-135. Outbreaks may occur from November to May in sub-Saharan Africa in the meningitis belt extending from
Ethiopia to Gambia where the incidence may be greater than one case per 1,000 population. Tanzania is just south of the
meningitis belt and small outbreaks have been reported year round, especially along the northern and western borders.
CSM is transmitted from person-to-person by airborne respiratory droplets. The case fatality rate should be less than 10% if
there is prompt access to health care and proper management, and in the absence of highly virulent pathogens. Risk factors for
CSM include non-vaccination and overcrowding.
For community level
Any person with fever and altered consciousness.
For facility level
Any person with sudden onset of fever (higher
than 38.5oC per rectal or 38oC axillary) and any
one of the following: neck stiffness, altered consciousness, and bleeding under the skin.
Action threshold
A single suspected case at a defined locality or
health facility according to standard case definition
is considered a suspected outbreak. Specimens
should be collected immediately for laboratory
confirmation.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimen from the first five suspected cases.
If any are positive, then collect every tenth case
throughout the outbreak.
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), or blood, if lumbar
puncture is contraindicated or cannot be performed.
Gram stain and biochemistry. Latex agglutination.
Confirmatory tests
Antimicrobial susceptibility periodically throughout the outbreak.
Confirmation of N. meningitidis in CSF or blood of
one or more cases will allow health officials to
declare an outbreak and to take appropriate action.
Based on serogroup identification of N. meningitidis, health officials can decide if a vaccination
campaign is needed to prevent further cases.
Periodic antimicrobial susceptibility data will be
used to monitor resistance.
Referral Laboratory
Name of laboratory:
Contact person:
Postal address:
Phone:
email:
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: CEREBROSPINAL MENINGITIS
1. DOCUMENTATION
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Gloves
l Insulated box
l One ice pack
Steps:
Specimens).
information
3.1 Hand carry tubes 1 and 2 (for staining and biochemistry) to the local laboratory in an insulated box with
ice pack.
Transport the vial or blood culture bottle (for isolation
and identification) to the referral laboratory as follows:
system (See Job Aid for Triple Packaging
System to maintain ambient temperature).
Supplies needed:
Sterile gloves
Sterile gown
Sterile towels
Sterile swabs
Povidone iodine (10%)
Local anesthetic
Sterile needle and syringe
Alcohol (70%)
Sterile lumbar puncture
needle
System to maintain ambient
temperature)
Steps:
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Adhesive plaster
l Three small, sterile,
screw-capped tubes
l Sterile gauze pad
l Sterile needle and syringe
l One vial of trans-isolate
(T-I) transport medium
l Safe box for sharps
Note: Collect specimens from suspected cases before
antimicrobial therapy.
followed.
Specimen remains at ambient temperature
throughout transport.
district.
Steps:
2.1 Collect three tubes† of CSF (1ml per tube) by lumbar
puncture. For additional guidance, see Job Aid for
How to Collect CSF.
4. TESTING
The tubes of CSF should be handled as follows:
Tube 1 is for staining. Keep at 4-8oC.
Tube 2 is for biochemistry. Keep at 4-8oC.
Tube 3 is for isolation and identification. Transfer
CSF from tube 3 into a vial of T-I transport
medium (See Job Aid for Using Trans-Isolate
Transport Medium for CSF). Keep at ambient
temperature.
If lumbar puncture is contraindicated or cannot be
performed, collect blood for culture and transfer to
blood culture bottle (See Job Aid for How to
Collect Blood).
2.2 Adhere labels to the tubes and vial of CSF.
†If
only one tube of CSF can be obtained, it should be used
for isolation and identification.
Steps:
Ministry of Health
CEREBROSPINAL MENINGITIS
selective agar with
colonies of Neisseria
meningitidis
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of cerebrospinal meningitis.
It is intended for referral laboratories capable of performing the confirmatory tests. Referral laboratories should use this job
aid upon receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. The job aid does not address the technical procedures for performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for confirming cerebrospinal meningitis.
Background
Cerebrospinal meningitis (CSM) is an acute infection of the central nervous system caused by viruses, bacteria, fungi, or protozoa. The most common aetiological agents are bacteria including Neisseria meningitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and
Haemophilus influenzae. In Africa, large epidemics are caused by N. meningitidis serogroup A and to a lesser extent, groups C
and W-135. Outbreaks may occur from November to May in sub-Saharan Africa in the meningitis belt extending from Ethiopia
to Gambia where the incidence may be greater than one case per 1,000 population. Tanzania is just south of the meningitis belt
and small outbreaks have been reported year round, especially along the northern and western borders.
CSM is transmitted from person-to-person by airborne respiratory droplets. The case fatality rate should be less than 10% if
there is prompt access to health care and proper management, and in the absence of highly virulent pathogens. Risk factors for
CSM include non-vaccination and overcrowding.
Health facilities and districts collect specimens from
the first five suspected cases. If any are positive,
every tenth case will be sampled throughout the
outbreak.
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) or blood
Confirmation of N. meningitidis in CSF or blood
of one or more cases will allow health officials to
Based on serogroup identification of N. meningitidis, health officials can decide if a vaccination
Periodic antimicrobial susceptibility data will be
used to monitor resistance.
Antimicrobial susceptibility periodically throughout the outbreak.
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: CEREBROSPINAL MENINGITIS
1. RECEIVING
cerebrospinal meningitis, the laboratory must be able to start
testing immediately.†
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Pen or marker
Note: Gloves should be worn when opening package and
Perform testing for serogrouping of N. meningitidis.
Periodically throughout the outbreak, determine the
antimicrobial susceptibility pattern of any N. meningitidis species isolated.
Supplies needed:
Steps:
1.1 Log in the sender’s name and address in the laboratory register.
1.2 Locate the case investigation form and the vial of
trans-isolate (T-I) transport medium (or blood culture
bottle) inoculated with cerebrospinal fluid (CSF).
1.3 Assess the condition of the vial and the documentation as follows:
l Vial should be labeled. Information on vial
l Vial should be intact and not leaking.
l Vial should be at ambient temperature.
Record the findings in the laboratory register
and on the case investigation form. Reject unsuitable specimens.†
Steps:
Isolation, identification, and serogrouping
Susceptibility
1.4 Log in the patient information, the specimen information, and the date and time of receipt in the laboratory register. File case investigation form for
later use.
your level.
1.5 Keep vial at ambient temperature. Immediately
prepare for testing.
2. TESTING
Supplies needed:
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and
supplies for isolation, identification and serogrouping, and
antimicrobial susceptibility for confirming cerebrospinal
meningitis
Steps:
4. STORAGE
Steps:
outbreak.
4.2 Dispose remaining isolates according to the SOP.
2.1 According to the SOP, perform testing for isolation
and identification for confirming cerebrospinal
meningitis.
Ministry of Health
CHOLERA
container of stool
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of cholera. It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the action threshold
has been reached.
Background
Cholera is a disease that can produce profuse watery diarrhoea, caused by Vibrio cholerae bacteria serogroups O1 and O139.
In Africa, cholera may cause rapidly progressive epidemics, usually between January and April. In endemic areas, small outbreaks may occur as well as sporadic cases that account for less than 5% of all non-outbreak-related diarrhoea cases. In
Tanzania, cholera occurs mostly in the rainy season, usually caused by serogoup O1, biotype El Tor.
Cholera is transmitted from person-to-person through the ingestion of faecally-contaminated food or drink. It can cause severe
dehydration in a few hours; in untreated patients, the case fatality rate (CFR) may exceed 50%. If patients are properly managed, the CFR is usually less than 1%, but can exceed 5%. At least 90% of the cases are mild and remain undiagnosed. Risk
factors for cholera include lack of continuous access to safe water, attending large gatherings such as weddings or funerals, or
contact with persons who died of cholera.
For community level
Any person five years of age or older passing a
great amount of watery diarrhoea or who dies
after passing a great amount of watery diarrhoea.
For facility level
Any person five years of age and older who
develops severe dehydration or who dies from
acute watery diarrhoea.
Action threshold
according to standard case definition is considered
a suspected outbreak. Specimens should be collected
immediately for laboratory confirmation.
Macroscopy and microscopy
Confirmatory tests
A stool culture positive for Vibrio cholerae
serogroup O1 on one or more cases will allow
health officials to declare an outbreak and to
take appropriate action.
for the organism.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimen from the first five to 10 suspected
cases. If any are positive, then collect every tenth
case during the outbreak.
Stool, or rectal swab, if patient is not able to pass
stool.
Referral Laboratory
Name of laboratory:
Contact person:
Postal address:
Phone:
email:
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: CHOLERA
1. DOCUMENTATION
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
l Specimen labels
l Gloves
l Four ice packs
information
Steps:
Steps:
Specimens).
3.1 Hand carry the specimen to the local laboratory (for
macroscopy and microscopy).
followed.
Supplies needed:
Specimen remains at 4-8oC throughout
transport. Do not freeze.
l Gloves
transport medium
l Leak proof screw-capped
container
l Adhesive tape
applicators (swabs)
Note: Collect specimens from suspected cases during the
acute stage (two to four days after onset) and before antimicrobial treatment.
Steps:
2.1 Collect a fresh stool. Place stool in a leak proof
screw-capped container.
If patient is not able to pass stool, take a rectal swab
(See Job Aid for How to Take a Rectal Swab).
2.2 Transfer a small amount of the stool (or the rectal
swab) to a tube of Cary Blair transport medium
(See Job Aid for Using Cary Blair Transport Medium).
district.
4. TESTING
Steps:
2.3 Adhere a label to the specimen container and tube of
Cary Blair.
2.4 Keep the tube of Cary Blair at 4-8oC.
Ministry of Health
CHOLERA
selective agar with
colonies of Vibrio cholerae
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of cholera. It is intended
for referral laboratories capable of performing the confirmatory tests. Referral laboratories should use this job aid upon
receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. This job aid does not address the technical procedures for performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for confirming cholera.
Background
Cholera is a disease that can produce profuse watery diarrhoea, caused by Vibrio cholerae bacteria serogroups O1 and O139.
In Africa, cholera may cause rapidly progressive epidemics, usually between January and April. In endemic areas, small outbreaks may occur as well as sporadic cases that account for less than 5% of all non-outbreak-related diarrhoea cases. In
Tanzania, cholera occurs mostly in the rainy season, usually caused by serogoup O1, biotype El Tor.
Cholera is transmitted from person-to-person through the ingestion of faecally-contaminated food or drink. It can cause severe
dehydration in a few hours; in untreated patients, the case fatality rate (CFR) may exceed 50%. If patients are properly managed, the CFR is usually less than 1%, but can exceed 5%. At least 90% of the cases are mild and remain undiagnosed. Risk
factors for cholera include lack of continuous access to safe water, attending large gatherings such as weddings or funerals,
or contact with persons who died of cholera.
the first 5 to 10 suspected cases. If any are positive, every tenth case will be sampled throughout
the outbreak.
Stool or rectal swab
A stool culture positive for Vibrio cholerae
serogroup O1 on one or more cases will allow
health officials to declare an outbreak and to take
appropriate action.
for the organism.
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: CHOLERA
1. RECEIVING
cholera, the laboratory must be able to start testing
immediately.†
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
If any Vibrio cholerae serogroup O1 are isolated,
determine antimicrobial susceptibility pattern
according to the SOP.
l Pen or marker
Note: Gloves should be worn when opening package, and
Supplies needed:
Steps:
1.1 Log in the sender's name and address in the laboratory register.
Cary Blair transport medium containing the swab.
Steps:
Isolation, identification and serogrouping
l Tube should be cold, but not frozen.
and on case investigation form. Reject unsuitable
specimens.†
laboratory register. File case investigation form
for later use.
your level.
Susceptibility
2. TESTING
Supplies needed:
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and supplies for isolation, identification and serogrouping, and
antimicrobial susceptibility of Vibrio cholerae
4. STORAGE
Steps:
outbreak.
Steps:
4.2 Dispose remaining isolates according to SOP.
2.1 According to the SOP, perform testing for isolation,
identification, and serogrouping of Vibrio cholerae.
Ministry of Health
MEASLES
Case investigation form
and tube of serum
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for the collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of measles. It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the action threshold
has been reached.
Background
Measles is a febrile rash illness caused by the paramyxovirus Morbillivirus. In Africa, large outbreaks occur every few years
in areas with low vaccine coverage (<85-90%), and in areas where there is an accumulation of persons who have never been
infected or vaccinated. In Tanzania, the ministry of health is implementing an accelerated measles control strategy with casebased surveillance and documentation of vaccination.
Measles is transmitted from person-to-person via airborne respiratory droplets. It is among the most transmissible of human
infections among children and non-immune adults. The true incidence of measles far exceeds reported cases. In most Africa
countries, measles is the fourth leading cause of death in children less than five years of age. The acceptable case fatality rate
should be less than 1% of all reported cases and less than 5% of hospitalized cases. Risk factors for measles include non-vaccination, overcrowding, and exposure to infected individuals.
For community level
Any person with fever and rash.
For facility level
Any person with history of fever, skin rash and
any of the following: cough, running nose, and
red eyes.
Action threshold
Confirmatory tests
Serology for IgM antibodies to measles virus
Confirmation of measles IgM antibodies in serum
of two or more cases will allow health officials to
Health officials can decide if a vaccination campaign
is needed to prevent further cases.
A single suspected case according to standard
case definition in a week at a defined locality or
health facility is considered a suspected outbreak.
Specimens should be collected immediately for
laboratory confirmation.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimen from each suspected case.
Blood
Referral laboratory
(designated laboratory for confirmation of measles)
National Virology Laboratory
Department of Microbiology/Immunology
P.O. Box 65001
Phone: 022 2 15 0304
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: MEASLES
3. TRANSPORTATION
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Gloves
l Four ice packs
information
Steps:
Steps:
Specimens).
3.1 Transport the serum to the National Virology
Laboratory as follows:
l Pack the serum using a triple packaging
the patient information. Include the date of the last
measles vaccination, the date of rash onset, and the
date of specimen collection. Make a duplicate form.
followed.
Specimen remains at 4-8oC throughout transport.
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
l
Gloves
Tourniquet
Sterile gauze pads
Alcohol (70%)
Sterile needle and vacutainer
or sterile needle and syringe
l Sterile test tube (5-10ml),
if a sterile needle and
syringe are used
l Adhesive plaster
l Sterile pipette
l Sterile, screw-capped
tube (glass or plastic)
Additional supplies if health
district.
facility has a centrifuge:
l Centrifuge tubes for
balancing
Note: Collect specimens from suspected cases at the first
contact with the health facility.
4. TESTING
Steps:
2.1 Collect blood by venepuncture
into sterile syringe or tube
(See Job Aid for How to
Collect Blood).
2.2 Adhere a specimen label to tube
of blood.
Volume of blood
to collect
Adults
5-10ml
Children 2-5ml
Infants
0.5-2ml
seven days after receiving the specimen. Written communication should follow.
Steps:
2.3 Keep the blood at ambient temperature. Do not freeze.
2.4 Separate the serum from the blood clot (See Job Aid
for How to Obtain Serum from Whole Blood).
2.5 Adhere a specimen label to tube of serum.
2.6 Keep the serum at 4-8oC.
Ministry of Health
MEASLES
ELISA plate
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of measles. It is intended
for referral laboratories designated by the ministry of health for confirmation of measles. Referral laboratories should use this
job aid upon receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. The job aid does not address the technical procedures for
performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for
confirming measles.
Background
Measles is a febrile rash illness caused by the paramyxovirus Morbillivirus. In Africa, large outbreaks occur every few years
in areas with low vaccine coverage (<85-90%), and in areas where there is an accumulation of persons who have never been
infected or vaccinated. In Tanzania, the ministry of health is implementing an accelerated measles control strategy with casebased surveillance and documentation of vaccination.
Measles is transmitted from person-to-person via airborne respiratory droplets. It is among the most transmissible of human
infections among children and non-immune adults. The true incidence of measles far exceeds reported cases. In most Africa
countries, measles is the fourth leading cause of death in children less than five years of age. The acceptable case fatality rate
should be less than 1% of all reported cases and less than 5% of hospitalized cases. Risk factors for measles include non-vaccination, overcrowding, and exposure to infected individuals.
each suspected case.
Confirmation of measles IgM antibodies of two or
more cases will allow health officials to declare an
outbreak and to take appropriate action. Health
officials can decide if a vaccination campaign is
needed to prevent further cases.
Serum
Serology for IgM antibodies to measles virus
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: MEASLES
1. RECEIVING
2. TESTING
measles, the laboratory must be able to start testing
immediately.†
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
Steps:
l Gloves
l Pen or marker
Note: Gloves should be worn when opening package and at
all times when handling specimen and contaminated materials. Work should be done in the laboratory.
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and supplies for serologic testing for measles IgM antibodies
2.1 According to SOP, perform testing for IgM antibodies to measles.
Steps:
serum.
Supplies needed:
l Tube should be cold.
Note: Results should be communicated within seven days
of receiving specimen. If communication to the district
level is by email or other indirect means, request confirmation that the results were received.
Steps:
3.1 Record results in the laboratory register and on
later use.
4. STORAGE
Steps:
4.1 Store one or two samples from the outbreak.
4.2 Dispose remaining samples according to the SOP.
Ministry of Health
PLAGUE
and tube of bubo aspirate
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for the collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of plague. It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the action threshold
has been reached.
Background
Plague is a zoonotic infectious disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. Plague is endemic in many African countries
including Tanzania where the disease is presently active in Lushoto and Karatu districts.
Plague is a natural infection of wild rodents and is transmitted to other rodents and human beings by the infective flea. Plague
is also transmitted by direct exposure to infectious materials and respiratory droplets. Initial cases in an outbreak are usually
bubonic and subsequent cases present as pneumonic. The case fatality rate (CFR) in untreated bubonic cases may exceed 50%,
and in untreated pneumonic or septicaemic cases, it may approach 100%. With good management, the CFR should be <5%.
The risk factors for plague include exposure to wild rodents and their fleas, and exposure to infected individuals.
For community level
Any person with sudden fever and painful swelling
under the arms or in the groin area.
For facility level
Any person with sudden onset of fever and a history
of exposure to rodents, their fleas, or patients with
plague, and one of the following:
l painful swelling of inguinal or axillary lymph
nodes (bubonic presentation), or
l cough with blood stained sputum (pneumonic
presentation), or
l signs of severe bloodstream infection, such as
prostration, shock (septicaemic presentation)
Action threshold
according to the standard case definition is considered
a suspected outbreak. This is the threshold for action.
Contact the focal person for plague at the national
level to request assistance with collecting specimens.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimen from the first 5 to 10 suspected
cases.
Bubo aspirate for bubonic plague, sputum for pneumonic plague, or blood for septicaemic plague.
Wayson or Gram stain.
Confirmatory tests
Dipstick detection of F1 antigen.
Isolation and identification of Y. pestis.
Confirmation of Y. pestis of one or more cases
will allow health officials to declare an outbreak
and to take appropriate action.
Referral Laboratory
Name of laboratory:
Contact person:
Postal address:
Phone:
email:
For each presentation of plague, there is a separate
protocol for the collection and processing of specimens.
l
For bubonic presentation, see Job Aid for
Laboratory Confirmation: Bubonic Plague.
l
For pneumonic presentation, see Job Aid
for Laboratory Confirmation: Pneumonic Plague.
l
For septicaemic presentation, see Job Aid
for Laboratory Confirmation: Septicaemic
Plague.
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: BUBONIC PLAGUE
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Pen
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Insulated box
temperature)
information
Steps:
Specimens).
Steps:
3.1 Hand carry the calibrated tube (for dipstick test) and
the tube of diluted aspirate (for staining) to the local
laboratory.
Transport the tube of Cary Blair to the referrral laboratory as follows:
l Pack the specimens using a triple packaging
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
Gloves
Alcohol (70%)
Sterile gauze pads
Sterile needle (18-22G)
and syringe
l Sterile saline
l Calibrated tube (1ml)
followed.
applicators (swabs)
transport medium
l Sterile tube
Note: Collect bubo aspirate during the acute stage and before
antimicrobial treatment.
Specimens remains at ambient temperature
district.
Steps:
4. TESTING
2.1 Inject 0.1-0.5ml sterile saline into bubo. Aspirate at
least 0.2ml fluid. (See Job Aid for How to Collect
Bubo Aspirate).
2.2 Divide the diluted specimen as follows:
l Transfer 0.2ml into calibrated tube.
l Absorb a few drops onto the cotton-tip of the
sterile swab. Insert the swab into the Cary Blair
transport medium (See Job Aid for How to Use
Cary Blair Transport Medium).
l Transfer the rest of the diluted specimen into the
sterile tube.
2.3 Adhere a specimen label to each tube.
2.4 Keep the specimens at ambient temperature.
Laboratory should verbally communicate results to the
IDSR focal person in the district within seven days
after receiving the specimen. Written communication
should follow.
Steps:
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: PNEUMONIC PLAGUE
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Pen
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Insulated box
Steps:
3.1 Hand carry the calibrated tube (for dipstick test) and
tube of diluted sputum (for staining) to the local
laboratory.
l Package the specimen using a triple packaging
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Sterile, cotton-tipped
l Alcohol (70%)
applicators (swabs)
l Sterile container with
snap cap
transport medium
l Sterile needle (18-22G) and
syringe
l Sterile saline (1.0ml) in tube
Note: Collect specimens from suspected cases at the onset of
disease and before antimicrobial treatment.
temperature)
information
Steps:
Specimens).
followed.
Steps:
district.
2.1 Ask patient to spit out sputum (not saliva) into
sterile plastic container.
4. TESTING
2.2 Using the sterile needle and syringe, aspirate 0.5ml
sputum. Expel the sputum into the tube of 1.0ml
sterile saline. Draw liquid into syringe several times
to mix.
2.3 Divide the diluted specimen as follows:
should follow.
l Transfer 0.2ml into calibrated tube.
l Absorb a few drops onto the cotton-tip of the
sterile swab. Insert the swab into the tube of Cary
Blair transport medium (See Job Aid for How to
Use Cary Blair Transport Medium).
l Transfer the rest of the diluted sputum back into
the tube.
2.4 Adhere a specimen label to each tube.
2.5 Keep the specimen at ambient temperature.
Steps:
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: SEPTICAEMIC PLAGUE
3. TRANSPORTATION
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
l Pen
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Insulated box
temperature)
information
Steps:
Specimens).
Steps:
3.1 Hand carry the specimen (for dipstick test) to the
local laboratory.
Transport the blood culture bottles to the referral
followed.
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
l
Gloves
l Two blood culture bottles
Tourniquet
Sterile gauze pads
l Adhesive plaster
Alcohol (70%)
Note: Collect blood for culture at the onset of disease and
before antimicrobial treatment.
district.
Steps:
2.1 Collect blood by venepuncture
into sterile syringe (See Job Aid
for How to Collect Blood).
2.2 Divide the blood as follows:
l Inoculate each blood
Volume of blood
to collect
Adults
5-10ml
Children 2-5ml
Infants
0.5-2ml
culture bottle with blood to
yield a ratio of 1 part blood to 5 parts culture
broth. Consult laboratory for additional
guidance.
l Transfer 0.2ml blood into calibrated tube.
4. TESTING
should follow.
2.3 Keep specimens at ambient temperature.
Steps:
2.4 Adhere a specimen label to each specimen container.
Ministry of Health
PLAGUE
Petri dish containing agar
with colonies of Yersinia
pestis
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of plague. It is intended for
referral laboratories to use upon receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. The job aid does not address the technical procedures for performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for confirming plague.
Background
Plague is a zoonotic infectious disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. Plague is endemic in many African countries
including Tanzania where the disease is presently active in Lushoto and Karatu districts.
Plague is a natural infection of wild rodents and is transmitted to other rodents and human beings by the infective flea. Plague
is also transmitted by direct exposure to infectious materials and respiratory droplets. Initial cases in an outbreak are usually
bubonic and subsequent cases present as pneumonic. The case fatality rate (CFR) in untreated bubonic cases may exceed 50%,
and in untreated pneumonic or septicaemic cases, it may approach 100%. With good management, the CFR should be <5%.
The risk factors for plague include exposure to wild rodents and their fleas, and exposure to infected individuals.
the first 5 to 10 suspected cases.
Confirmation of Y. pestis of one or more cases
will allow health officials to declare an outbreak
and to take action.
Bubo aspirate for bubonic plague, sputum for pneumonic plague, or blood for septicaemic plague.
Confirmation tests to be done
Isolation and identification of Y. pestis.
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: PLAGUE
1. RECEIVING
plague, the laboratory must be able to start testing
immediately.†
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Pen or marker
all times when handling specimen and contaminated materials.
Work should be done in the laboratory.
Steps:
1.2 Locate the case investigation form and the specimen
container.
1.3 Assess the condition of the tube blood culture bottle
and the documentation as follows:
l Containers should be labeled. Information on
container label and case investigation form
should match.
l Container should be intact and not leaking.
l Container should be at ambient temperature.
Supplies needed:
Note: Results should be communicated within seven days
of receiving specimen. If communication to the district
level is by email or other indirect means, request confirmation that the results were received.
Steps:
3.1 Record isolation and identification results in the
laboratory register and on the case investigation
form. Communicate the results (positive or negative) immediately to the IDSR* focal person at
your level.
IDSR focal person at your level.
4. STORAGE
Steps:
4.1 Store one or two isolates from the outbreak.
laboratory register. File case investigation form for
later use.
2. TESTING
Supplies needed:
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and supplies for isolation and identification of Y. pestis.
Steps:
2.1 According to SOP, perform testing for isolation
and identification of Y. pestis.
Ministry of Health
container of formalin and
skin snip
VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of viral hemorrhagic
fevers (VHFs). It is primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or
when the action threshold has been reached.
Background
The term viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) refers to a syndrome that affects multiple organ systems in the body and causes damage
to the vascular system. Several different viruses can cause the VHF syndrome in Africa, including Ebola-Marburg, Lassa, Rift
Valley and Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever viruses. An outbreak of Rift Valley Fever occurred in Tanzania and neighboring
countries in the late 1990s. Although no cases of Ebola have been reported in Tanzania, outbreaks of this disease have occurred
in neighboring countries since 2000.
VHF is transmitted through direct exposure to infectious material and respiratory droplets. Many of the VHF viruses cause severe,
life-threatening disease, while some cause relatively mild illness. Only a minority of cases have hemorrhage or bleeding. Among
those with hemorrhage, the case fatality rate is from 15% to 90%. Risk factors for VHF include touching ill or deceased infected
persons or their secretions, or having direct contact with infected animals. Health care workers are at risk when standard barrier
precautions are not taken.
For community level
Any person who has an unexplained illness with
fever and bleeding or who died after an unexplained severe illness with fever and bleeding.
For facility level
Any person with severe illness, fever, and at least
one of the following signs: bloody stools, vomiting
blood, or unexplained bleeding from gums, nose,
vagina, skin, or eyes.
Skin snip from nape of the neck of deceased case.
Confirmatory tests
Immunohistochemistry
A skin snip testing positive for VHF virus on one
or more cases will allow health officials to declare
an epidemic and to take appropriate action.
Action threshold
A single suspected case according to standard case
definition is considered a suspected outbreak.
The district should immediately report any suspected case to the regional and national levels and
request assistance for collection of specimens and
management of the situation.
Sampling strategy
Because of the potential for explosive outbreaks of
some VHFs, it is not recommended that health
facility and district staff collect specimens from
live cases. If the suspected case is deceased, district
staff may collect a skin snip, provided blunt instruments are used.
Referral laboratory
(designated by the MOH for confirmation of VHFs)
National Health Laboratory Services
National Institute for Comminicable Diseases
1 Modderfontein Road
Sandringham, South Africa
Attention: Dr. J. Paweska
email: nicdmail@nicd.ac.za
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: VIRAL HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
3. TRANSPORTATION
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
information
System to maintain ambient temperature)
Steps:
Steps:
Specimens).
3.1 Transport the specimen to the referral laboratory
as follows:
system. (See Job Aid for Triple Packaging
l Contact the referral laboratory for guidance
on labeling package as “Dangerous Goods in
Excepted Quantities.”
Supplies needed:
l Bucket for disinfectant
l 10 litres of water
l Liquid bleach
(3 - 5% active chlorine)
l Punch biopsy tool
l Tweezers
l Blunt scissors
l Vial of formalin (20ml)
l Plastic bag
l Hand soap
Additional supplies for personal
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Boots
Latex gloves
Gown
Plastic apron
Heavy-duty gloves
Mask
Goggles
Note: Collect specimens as soon as possible following death
of patient.
Steps:
2.1 Collect a skin snip from the nape of the neck of the
deceased patient (See Job Aid for How to Perform
a Skin Snip). Place the skin snip in a vial of
formalin.
2.2 Adhere a label to the vial.
2.3 Keep the specimen at ambient temperature. Do not
freeze.
†Refer
followed.
†
protection
to the manual Infection Control for Viral Haemorrhagic
Fevers in the African Health Care Setting (WHO/EMC/ESR/98.2) for
information about using protective clothing.
district.
4. TESTING & DOCUMENTATION
Steps:
Ministry of Health
YELLOW FEVER
and tube of serum
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for the collection and processing of specimens for laboratory confirmation of yellow fever. It is
primarily intended for health facilities and district-level staff to use during an outbreak investigation or when the action threshold has been reached.
Background
Yellow fever is an acute infectious disease caused by an arthropod-borne flavivirus. Sporadic cases can occur regularly in
endemic areas. Large scale outbreaks occur every 3 to 10 years in villages or cities where yellow fever is prevalent. Since the
mid-1980's, there has been a resurgence of yellow fever in Africa; however, no new cases have been reported in Tanzania since
1954. Due to reports of yellow fever in neighboring countries, Tanzania remains a potential transmission area and active surveillance
is conducted.
Yellow fever is transmitted from person-to-person by Aedes mosquitoes (in urban cycle) or by forest mosquito species or forest
primate reservoirs (in sylvatic cycle). True incidence far exceeds reported cases. While only a minority of the cases is severe,
case fatality rates may be 25-50% among patients with the syndrome of hemorrhage, jaundice, and renal disease. Risk factors
for yellow fever include non-vaccination, or living or working in a location near woods or where monkeys are numerous.
For community level
Any person with fever and yellowing of eyes or
skin.
For facility level
Any person with sudden onset of fever, followed
by jaundice within two weeks of first symptoms
with a history of traveling from an endemic area.
Action threshold
Confirmatory tests
Serology for yellow fever IgM antibodies.
Confirmation of yellow fever IgM antibodies in
the serum of one or more cases will allow health
officials to declare an outbreak and to take appropriate action. Health officials can decide if a
vaccination campaign is needed to prevent further
cases.
A single suspected case according to standard case
definition is considered a suspected outbreak.
Sampling strategy
Collect specimens from all sylvatic cases. In urban
epidemics, collect specimens from the first 5 to 10
suspected cases, then from every tenth case.
Blood
Referral laboratory
(designated laboratory for confirmation of yellow fever)
National Virology Laboratory
Department of Microbiology/Immunology
Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences
P.O. Box 65001
Phone: 022 2 15 0304
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: YELLOW FEVER
3. TRANSPORTATION
1. DOCUMENTATION
Supplies needed:
l Specimen label
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
to maintain cold chain
l Four ice packs
information
Steps:
Specimens).
the patient information. Include the date of disease
onset and the date of specimen collection. Make a
duplicate form.
Steps:
3.1 Transport the specimen to the National Virology
Laboratory as follows:
l Package the specimen using a triple packaging
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
l
Gloves
Tourniquet
Sterile gauze pads
Alcohol (70%)
Sterile needle and vacutainer
or sterile needle and syringe
l Sterile, ordinary test tube
(5-10ml), if a sterile needle
and syringe are used
l Adhesive plaster
l Sterile pipette
l Sterile, screw-capped
tube (glass or plastic)
followed.
Specimen remains at 4-8 oCthroughout transport.
Additional supplies if health
facility has a centrifuge:
l Sterile centrifuge tubes
for balancing
Note: Collect a specimen as soon as the patient is admitted to
the health facility or is suspected as having yellow fever. Collect
another specimen from the same patient 7 to 10 days later.
Steps:
district with the IDSR focal person.
4. TESTING
2.1 Collect blood by venepuncture into sterile syringe or
tube (See Job Aid for How to Collect Blood).
2.2 Adhere a specimen label to tube
of blood.
2.3 Keep the blood at ambient
temperature. Do not freeze.
Volume of blood
to collect
Adults
Children
Infants
2.4 Separate the serum from the
blood clot (See Job Aid for
How to Obtain Serum from Whole Blood ).
2.5 Adhere a specimen label to tube of serum.
2.6 Keep the serum at 4-8oC.
5-10ml
2-5ml
0.5-2ml
Steps:
Ministry of Health
YELLOW FEVER
ELISA plate
Description
This job aid presents the protocol for processing and testing specimens for laboratory confirmation of yellow fever. It is intended
for referral laboratories designated by the ministry of health for confirmation of yellow fever. Referral laboratories should use this
job aid upon receiving specimens from health facilities and districts. The job aid does not address the technical procedures for
performing laboratory confirmation tests. It should be used in conjunction with the standard operating procedures (SOP) for
confirming yellow fever.
Background
Yellow fever is an acute infectious disease caused by an arthropod-borne flavivirus. Sporadic cases can occur regularly in
endemic areas. Large scale outbreaks occur every 3 to 10 years in villages or cities where yellow fever is prevalent. Since the
mid-1980's, there has been a resurgence of yellow fever in Africa; however, no new cases have been reported in Tanzania since
1954. Due to reports of yellow fever in neighboring countries, Tanzania remains a potential transmission area and active surveillance
is conducted.
Yellow fever is transmitted from person-to-person by Aedes mosquitoes (in urban cycle) or by forest mosquito species or forest
primate reservoirs (in sylvatic cycle). True incidence far exceeds reported cases. While only a minority of the cases is severe,
case fatality rates may be 25-50% among patients with the syndrome of hemorrhage, jaundice, and renal disease. Risk factors
for yellow fever include non-vaccination, or living or working in a location near woods or where monkeys are numerous.
all sylvatic cases. In urban epidemics, specimens will
be collected from the first 5 to 10 suspected cases,
then from every tenth case.
Confirmation of yellow fever IgM antibodies in
serum of one or more cases will allow health officials to declare an outbreak and to take appropriate
action. Health officials can decide if a vaccination
Serum
Serology for yellow fever IgM antibodies
JOB AID FOR LABORATORY CONFIRMATION: YELLOW FEVER
1. RECEIVING
2. TESTING
yellow fever, the laboratory must be able to start testing
immediately.†
Supplies needed:
Supplies needed:
Steps:
l Gloves
l Pen or marker
all times when handling specimen and contaminated materials. Work should be done in the laboratory.
l Standard operating procedures (SOP), reagents, and supplies for serologic testing for yellow fever IgM antibodies
2.1 According to SOP, perform testing for yellow fever
IgM antibodies.
Steps:
serum.
1.3 Assess the condition of the tube and the documentation.
l Tube should be cold.
later use.
Supplies needed:
Note: Results should be communicated within seven days of
receiving specimen. If communication to the district level is
by email or other indirect means, request confirmation that
the results were received.
Steps:
3.1 Record results in the laboratory register and on
If results are negative on specimens collected within
seven days of disease onset, ensure that a convalescent specimen is sent.
4. STORAGE
Steps:
4.1 Store one or two representative samples from the
outbreak.
Specimen-specific job aids
How to collect blood
How to collect bubo aspirate
How to collect CSF
How to obtain serum from whole blood
How to perform a skin snip
How to take a rectal swab and transfer to transport medium
How to use Cary Blair transport medium
Labeling specimens
Triple packaging system to maintain ambient temperature
Triple packaging system to maintain cold chain
Using trans-isolate transport media for CSF
JOB AID: HOW TO COLLECT BLOOD
This provides guidance on how to collect blood by venepuncture.
For safety, all of the supplies used to collect the blood are for single use only. Do not reuse.
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
Gloves
Tourniquet
Sterile gauze pads
Alcohol (70%)
l Sterile needle and vacutainer or sterile needle
and syringe
l Sterile test tube (5-10ml), if a sterile needle and
syringe are used
l Adhesive plaster
Before beginning the procedure, obtain consent from the patient.
1
Sterile gloves should be worn when
performing venepuncture and when
handling the specimen.
2
Place a tourniquet above the venepuncture site. Palpate and
locate the vein.
3
Disinfect the skin at the puncture site with alcohol (70%).
Allow the area to dry.
4
Do not touch the disinfected puncture
site with ungloved hands.
5
Perform venepuncture using a sterile vacutainer
or sterile needle and syringe.
Volume of blood
to collect
If using a needle and syringe, transfer the blood
to sterile test tube.
Adults
5-10ml
Children 2-5ml
Infants
0.5-2ml
6
Remove the tourniquet. Apply pressure to site with sterile gauze pad
until the bleeding stops. Apply adhesive plaster, if desired.
7
Adhere a specimen label to tube of blood.
8
Safely dispose of all contaminated materials.
9
Do not recap used sharps. Discard directly into
a safe box for sharps.
JOB AID: HOW TO COLLECT BUBO ASPIRATE
This provides guidance on how to collect aspirate from suspected buboes. It should be performed under sterile
conditions by a medical officer or clinician experienced in the procedure.
For safety, all of the supplies used to collect the bubo aspirate are for single use only. Do not reuse.
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Alcohol (70%)
l Sterile gauze pads
l Sterile saline
l Sterile needle (18-22G) and syringe
1
Sterile gloves should be worn when
performing the bubo aspiration and
when handling the specimen.
2
Disinfect the skin at the bubo site with alcohol (70%). Allow the
area to dry.
3
Do not touch the disinfected bubo site
with ungloved hands.
4
Inject a small amount of (0.1-0.5ml) of sterile saline into the bubo site
using a sterile syringe with a wide bore needle (18-22G). Aspirate at
least 0.2ml of fluid from the bubo.
5
6
Do not recap used sharps. Discard directly into a
safe box for sharps.
JOB AID: HOW TO COLLECT CSF
This provides guidance on how to collect cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) by lumbar puncture. Lumbar puncture is an
invasive technique. It should be performed under sterile conditions by a medical officer or clinician experienced
in the procedure. For instructions on performing lumbar puncture, consult the Oxford Handbook of Clinical
Medicine.
Supplies needed:
l
l
l
l
l
l
Sterile gloves
Sterile gown
Sterile towels
Sterile swabs
Povidone iodine (10%)
Local anesthetic
l
l
l
l
l
l
Alcohol (70%)
Sterile lumbar puncture needle
Small, sterile, screw-capped tube
Adhesive plaster
Safe box for sharps
1
Sterile gloves and gown should be worn when
performing lumbar puncture and when handling
the specimen.
2
Locate the space between L3,4 or L4,5
vertebrae. Follow the practice of your
health facility in giving local anesthetic.
3
Disinfect the skin at the puncture site
with povidone iodine (10%). Wipe off
excess iodine with alcohol (70%). Allow
the area to dry.
4
Do not touch the disinfected
puncture site with ungloved
hands or nonsterile items.
5
Perform lumbar puncture using a sterile spinal
needle. Collect CSF by allowing the fluid to flow
directly into the sterile tube. Do not aspirate
CSF. Recap the tubes tightly.
If CSF will be used for microscopy, biochemistry, and culture, collect 1 ml for each of these
tests in separate tubes.
6
Aseptically recap the tube tightly.
7
8
Do not recap used sharps. Discard directly into a
safe box for sharps.
JOB AID: HOW TO OBTAIN SERUM FROM WHOLE BLOOD
This provides guidance on how to process whole blood to separate the serum from the blood clot.
Supplies needed:
Additional supplies if health facility
l
l
l
l
has a centrifuge:
Gloves
Sterile pipette
Sterile, screw-capped tube (glass or plastic)
Specimen label
l Centrifuge tubes for balancing
1
Gloves should be worn at all times
when handling the specimen.
2
Keep the whole blood at room temperature until there is complete
retraction of the clot from the serum.
If the health facility or district has a centrifuge, spin the whole blood
at 1000xg for 10 minutes to separate the serum. Follow the standard
operating procedures for centrifuging.
3
Remove the serum using a sterile pipette. Avoid extracting
red cells.
4
Transfer the serum aseptically to a sterile,
screw-capped tube. Secure cap tightly.
5
Adhere a specimen label to the tube of serum.
6
Safely dispose of all contaminated materials and the remaining clot.
7
Keep the tube of serum at 4-8oC.
JOB AID: HOW TO PERFORM A SKIN SNIP
This provides guidance on how to perform a skin snip from a deceased patient. It should be performed under
sterile conditions by a medical officer or clinician experienced in the procedure.
For safety, all of the supplies used to perform the skin snip are for single use only. Do not reuse.
Supplies needed:
Additional supplies for personal
l Bucket for disinfectant
l 10 litres of water
l Liquid bleach
(3 - 5% active chlorine)
l Punch biopsy tool
l Tweezers
l Blunt scissors
l Vial with formalin (20ml)
l Plastic bag
l Hand soap
protection
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Boots
Latex gloves
Gown
Plastic apron
Heavy-duty gloves
Mask
Goggles
Before beginning the procedure, obtain consent
from the family of deceased patient.
1
Prepare disinfectant solution
immediately before starting procedure. Using liquid bleach, make
10 litres of disinfectant solution.
The final concentration should
be approximately 0.05 to 0.5%.
2
Put on the protective clothing
in this order:
boots, latex gloves, gown,
plastic apron, heavy-duty
gloves, mask, and goggles.
3
Arrange the scissors, tweezers, and biopsy tool for
use near the cadaver. Open the vial of formalin.
Take the cover off the biopsy tool.
4
Gently turn the head of the cadaver to expose
the nape of the neck.
Place the biopsy tool
perpendicular to the
neck and press down
into the skin up to the
guard. Rotate gently.
Remove the biopsy tool.
the tweezers, gently
5 With
lift out the core you cut
in the skin and use
the scissors to cut
the piece away, if
necessary.
6
Place the sample in the vial of
formalin. Close the cap tightly to
prevent leaks.
7
Dip the vial of formalin in the
disinfectant for one minute.
Set it aside to dry.
8
Place the rest of the equipment in the
disinfectant. If you need to
move the cadaver, do so
while you are still wearing
the protective clothing. When
you are finished, rinse your
exterior gloves in the disinfectant, remove them and
drop them in the disinfectant
bucket.
wearing the interior gloves,
9 Still
remove all of the disinfected
material from the bucket and place
in the plastic bag. Burn the bag in
the incinerator. Remove your
gloves and burn them.
your hands with soap
10 Wash
and water. The specimen is
not infectious after it is
placed in formalin and the
outside of the vial is disinfected.
Adapted from the reference manual Infection Control for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers in the African Health Care Setting (WHO/EMC/ESR/98.2).
JOB AID: HOW TO TAKE A RECTAL SWAB AND TRANSFER TO TRANSPORT MEDIUM
This provides guidance on how to take a rectal swab for diagnosis of acute bacterial diarrheal disease. Rectal swabs must
be transported in Cary Blair transport medium. Transport medium is used to preserve specimens for bacteriology testing.
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Sterile cotton-tipped applicators (swabs)
l One tube of Cary Blair transport medium
l Adhesive tape
l Specimen label
the tube of Cary Blair transport medium by plac1 Chill
ing it on ice packs or in the refrigerator 1 - 2 hours
before collecting the specimen.
Gloves should be worn at all times
2 when
handling the specimen.
the wrapper from the handle end of the
3 Remove
sterile swab. Do not touch the tip of the swab.
4
Moisten the swab in chilled Cary Blair transport medium.
5
Insert the swab through the rectal sphincter 2 to 3 cm and gently rotate.
6
Withdraw and examine the swab to make sure faecal material is visible
on the tip.
7
Push the swab completely to the bottom of the tube of Cary Blair transport
medium.
8
Break off the top portion of the stick so the cap can be
tightly screwed onto the tube.
9
After screwing cap tightly onto the Cary Blair tube, seal the
tube with tape to prevent leakage.
10 Adhere specimen label to the container.
11 Keep the specimen at 4-8 C.
12 Safely dispose all contaminated materials. Do not reuse.
o
JOB AID: HOW TO USE CARY BLAIR TRANSPORT MEDIUM
This provides guidance on how to transfer a specimen into a tube of Cary Blair transport medium. Transport
medium is used to preserve specimens for bacteriology testing. The specimen should be transferred to the
transport medium immediately after the specimen has been collected.
Supplies needed:
l Gloves
l Sterile cotton-tipped applicators (swabs)
l One tube of Cary Blair transport medium*
l Adhesive tape
l Specimen label
*For stool specimens, the Cary Blair tube should be chilled 1 - 2 hours before using it.
1
Gloves should be worn at all times when handling
the specimen.
the wrapper from the handle end of the sterile
2 Remove
swab. Do not touch the cotton tip of the swab.
3
Insert the cotton tip of the swab into the specimen. Make sure the cotton
tip of the swab is completely coated with specimen.
If the specimen is in a syringe, slowly release some of the contents to
completely soak the cotton tip of the swab.
4
Push the swab completely to the bottom of the tube
of Cary Blair transport medium.
off the top portion of the stick so the cap can be tightly
5 Break
screwed onto the tube.
screwing cap tightly onto the Cary Blair tube, seal the tube with
6 After
tape to prevent leakage.
7
Adhere specimen label to the Cary Blair tube.
8
Keep the specimen at 4-8oC.
9
Safely dispose all contaminated materials. Do not reuse.
JOB AID: LABELING SPECIMENS
This provides guidance on labeling specimens. Each specimen should be labeled. The information on the
label should correspond with the patient information in the register book and on the case investigation
form. Adequate labeling ensures that the laboratory results can be linked to the correct patient.
The label may be a piece of paper attached to the specimen container. Alternatively, the information may be
written directly on the specimen container.
1
Using this sample label as a guide, fill in the information on a label for
the specimen to be collected. Obtain the patient’s information from the
patient register book. Make sure your writing is legible.
Sample label
Patient name:
Specimen #:
Specimen type:
Date:
Health facility:
District:
Time:
Specimen #
When filling in the specimen number, use this format:
__ __ __
__ __ __
__ __
__ __ __
Region
District
Year of onset
Case #
l Use the standard abbreviations as designated by the
ministry of health to indicate the Region (3 letter code),
District (3 letter code), and Year of onset (2 digit code).
l Use the unique case number (3 digit number)
designated by the district.
Sample specimen #
ARU
_ _BAB
_ 05
Region
2
District
Year of
onset
Adhere the label to the specimen container. Do not attach the label to
the top of the specimen container.
00
_1
_
Region
JOB AID: TRIPLE PACKAGING SYSTEM to maintain ambient temperature
This provides guidance for packaging diagnostic specimens in three layers for transport to the referral
laboratory. Follow specific national and international regulations for shipping diagnostic specimens.
Gloves should be worn at all times when handling the specimen.
PRIMARY CONTAINER
The primary container contains your specimen.
Ensure the following:
l Container cap should be tightly closed and
sealed to prevent leakage.
l Container should be labeled with the
patient name and identification number,
specimen number, and date and time.
l Label should be adhered to the container.
Steps:
l Wrap absorbent material such as cotton wool
around the container. Use additional absorbent
material to cushion multiple containers.
SECONDARY CONTAINER
The secondary container holds the primary container.
Steps:
l Use a container that is durable, watertight,
and leak proof. If this is not available, use a
sealable plastic bag.
l Seal the case investigation form in a plastic
bag. Tape the bag to the outside of the secondary
container.
TERTIARY (OUTERMOST) CONTAINER
The tertiary container holds the secondary container
and protects it from physical damage and water. The
tertiary container also serves as the outer shipping
container.
Steps:
l Use a container made of corrugated fibreboard,
cardboard, wood or other material strong enough
to withstand the weight and shock of handling
and shipment.
l Pack tertiary container as shown in diagram.
l Label the tertiary container “Diagnostic
specimen.” As appropriate, use additional labels
(Do not freeze. Do not expose to heat. This side
up.).*
*Specimens in formalin require a “Dangerous Goods in Excepted Quantities” label on the tertiary (outermost) container. Contact the referral
laboratory for guidance on labeling the container.
JOB AID: TRIPLE PACKAGING SYSTEM to maintain cold chain
This provides guidance for packaging specimens in three layers to maintain cold chain during transport to the referral
laboratory. Follow specific national and international regulations for shipping diagnostic specimens.
Gloves should be worn at all times when handling the specimen.
PRIMARY CONTAINER
The primary container contains your specimen.
Ensure the following:
l Container cap should be tightly closed and
sealed to prevent leakage.
l Container should be labeled with the
patient name and identification number,
specimen number, and date and time.
l Label should be adhered to the container.
Steps:
l Wrap absorbent material such as cotton wool
around the container. Use additional absorbent
material to cushion multiple containers.
SECONDARY CONTAINER
The secondary container holds the primary container.
Steps:
l Use a sealable plastic bag that is watertight
and leak proof.
TERTIARY (OUTERMOST) CONTAINER
The tertiary container holds the secondary container and protects it from physical damage and water.
The tertiary container also serves as the outer shipping container.
Steps:
l Use an insulated carrier or carton of doubleply corrugated cardboard or plastic. Use
insulating material such as high density (3035kgs/m3) polystyrene (small bubbles and firm
when squeezed).
l Seal the case investigation form in a
separate plastic bag.
l Pack tertiary container as shown in
diagram. Four cold packs will maintain cold
chain for 2 to 3 days.
l Label the tertiary container “Diagnostic
specimen.” As appropriate, use additional labels
(Do not freeze. Do not expose to heat. This side
up.)
a) Primary container
b) Secondary container (sealed plastic bag holding primary
container)
c) Sealed plastic bag holding case investigation form
d) Absorbent material such as cotton wool
e) Four ice packs.
Place ice packs at the bottom of the box and along the
sides. Then place an ice pack on top of the specimen.
f)
If the specimen should remain cold, but not frozen, wrap
the specimen in paper or cardboard to prevent direct
contact with ice packs.
Insulating material
g) Tertiary container (outer carton of double-ply corrugated
cardboard or plastic)
h) Address labels on tertiary container.
i)
Diagnostic specimen label on tertiary container.
Appendix 8: Job Aids in Tanzania: District Level Data Interpretation Job Aid
IDSR Data Interpretation Guide for CHMTs
Overview
Regular use of this interpretation guide
(along with analyses produced by the
IDSR database) will allow the CHMT to:
• Detect epidemics early and respond early
• Estimate the number of cases/deaths from
priority infectious diseases
• Identify risk factors associated with
diseases
• Evaluate whether the district has reached
disease control targets
• Identify potential problem areas and plan
additional investigations as required
• Establish the next public health action steps
for improved health care delivery in the
district
Setting IDSR Targets
What is a target?
• Criteria against which a district measures its
performance towards goals such as
reduction of disease burden (cases, deaths,
disability) over time
Why set targets?
• Assess performance towards achieving
planned/desired goals
• Provide incentives for action
Key factors to consider when setting
targets:
• National and regional targets
• International targets
• Current performance level
• Available resources (personnel, equipment,
funds, supplies)
• Other related CHMT commitments
For further information, see:
• National IDSR Guidelines
• IDSR District Training Materials
• Standard Case Definitions Job Aid
• IDSR Surveillance Data Analysis Book
• Disease Outbreak Management Field
Manual
• IDSR Laboratory Job Aids
• District IDSR Analysis Standards Job Aid
• Disease-specific Roles & Responsibilities
IDSR data interpretation issues to keep
in mind
Why is data interpretation important?
Data collected by the IDSR surveillance
system are used by the CHMT for:
IDSR Data Interpretation Steps
1. Look at patterns (trends) over time
•
Detect unusual patterns requiring further investigation
•
Determine whether disease control efforts are having a positive impact
•Planning, implementing, and evaluating public
health interventions and programs
•Determining the need for public health action
•Assessing the effectiveness of disease
prevention and control activities in the district
Analysis and interpretation of quality IDSR
data can help the CHMT to:
•Detect trends signaling changes in the
occurrence of important infectious diseases in
the district
•Detect epidemics early so that the district can
respond quickly and minimize the number of
cases and deaths
•Provide estimates of how many cases and
deaths in the district are due to priority
infectious diseases
•Identify weaknesses in case management and
clinical practice in facilities, so that action can
be taken to improve facility performance
• Monitor, evaluate, and improve IDSR system
performance
IDSR DATA
INTERPRETATION AND
USE CAN REDUCE THE
NUMBERS OF CASES AND
DEATHS DUE TO PRIORITY
INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN
THE DISTRICT
Recognize normal seasonal variations of diseases in the district
•
Review trends in numbers of cases to:
•
Recognize which of the priority diseases affects the largest portion of the
population
•
Prioritize disease control efforts when resources are limited
•
Determine whether outbreaks are occurring
•
Determine whether disease control efforts have been successful
Review trends in numbers of deaths to:
•
Recognize which diseases have the largest impact in terms of mortality
•
Prioritize distribution and use of limited resources for diseases causing
the most mortality
•
Evaluate and determine whether it is necessary to improve case
management or access to health facilities
2. Look at the district as a whole (all facilities combined):
•
Combine IDSR data from all facilities to show the overall picture of the
disease situation in the district and track changes over time
•
Measure progress against disease targets in the district
3. Look at individual facilities:
•
Outbreaks may only occur in a small part of the district (look for a large
number of cases occurring in just one facility or neighbouring facilities)
•
Compare facilities against each other in terms of numbers of cases and
deaths for each disease. This will help to determine where efforts should
be focused or where control and prevention strategies should be
reviewed and/or changed.
4. Look at inpatients and outpatients separately
•
Inpatients tend to have more severe disease and their diagnosis is often
more accurate
•
Different types of prevention and control measures may be required in
inpatient and outpatient populations
•
Often disease control programs have objectives to reduce the number of
severe cases and deaths. Inpatient information may be more useful
when determining whether specific disease control programs are
working.
Interpreting Morbidity (Cases) and Mortality (Deaths) Data
Possible reasons for increasing cases or deaths
• Has a new health facility or hospital opened in the district?
• Is there improved access to some health facilities in the district?
(i.e. a new ambulance, improved roads)
• Are clinicians in the district using different diagnostic criteria or
standard case definitions so that more patients are classified as
having certain diseases?
• Have there been data recording errors?
• Has there been an increase in the number of health facilities
reporting information to the surveillance system?
• Does the increase reflect normal seasonal variation, for example,
does the increase occur at the same time as the rainy season?
• Has surveillance improved, so that more facilities are sending
their IDSR reports to the district?
• Has anything unusual occurred (such as environmental changes,
population movements, etc.) that would lead to an increase in
cases and/or deaths in the district?
• After considering the factors above, does it appear that more
people really are getting sick or dying in the district? If so, why?
This may require further investigation.
POSSIBLE ACTIONS
Focus on areas where the
CHMT can make an impact!
• Review IDSR work at all
supervision visits
• Work with facility IDSR focal
persons to improve data
quality
• Train new facility & CHMT
staff in IDSR procedures
• Ensure facilities have IDSR
materials and know how to
use them
• Improve and implement
health education activities
• Review and revise disease
targets based on current
data
• Provide feedback to facilities
quarterly
• Incorporate IDSR activities
into CCHP
• Work with laboratories to
strengthen case confirmation
and outbreak procedures
Possible reasons for decreasing cases or deaths
• Have any health facilities or hospitals closed (fewer reporting sites)?
• Are fewer facilities in the district reporting IDSR data to the district? Are you
missing data from facilities or hospitals likely to be seeing cases of the
disease?
• Have staffing changes (improvements) been made at any of the health
facilities, leading to better patient care?
• Have there been data recording errors?
• Have clinicians started using different standard case definitions, so fewer
patients are classified as having certain diseases?
• Does the decrease reflect normal seasonal variation, for example, does the
decrease occur during the typical “low season” for the disease?
• Have there been any large population movements out of the district?
• Does the decrease correspond to the introduction of any disease control or
prevention programs? Does the decrease reflect success of these programs?
• Have health education campaigns been implemented effectively?
• After taking into consideration the factors above, does it appear that fewer
people really are getting sick or dying in the district? If so, why? This may
require further investigation. Real declines should be noted if the CHMT is
implementing effective disease prevention measures.
If anything unusual appears: Look first for obvious reasons for unusual increases or decreases in the numbers of cases or deaths. If there is no obvious explanation, then the district may
be experiencing a REAL change in disease trends. If there is a REAL increase, the district may be having an OUTBREAK, and further investigation is required (See Disease Outbreak
Management Field Guide). If there appears to be a REAL decline in cases or deaths, see if it correlates with any disease control activities recently undertaken. These data may provide
evidence that the activities have been successful and can be used to further guide the district’s disease control and prevention activities.
Interpreting Timeliness and Completeness of Facility Reporting
Issues to consider
Possible Actions
Possible Causes of Poor Reporting Performance:
Are the same facilities consistently late with reports or not
reporting at all?
• Identify reasons for lateness or no reporting and work with
these facilities to improve performance.
Are many different facilities late or not reporting at
different times?
• Identify the facilities needing assistance and determine
possible reasons for reporting problems. Work on problem
solving with facility staff and identify concrete solutions.
Is there a difference between performance on weekly
reports versus monthly reports?
• Determine why one set of reports is more challenging than
the other. Work with facilities to improve their capacity to do
both sets of reports.
Is timeliness or completeness decreasing from week to
week or month to month?
• Determine causes of poor performance (talk with facility staff;
assess during supervision visits). Problem solve with facility
staff to identify ways to address weak areas.
---Assess district IDSR performance regularly---
• Transport problems (difficulty sending reports to district)
• Communications problems
• Facility staff do not know deadlines and thus do not send reports in
on time
• Facility staff have difficulty with reports and take a long time to
prepare them or do not do them at all
• New staff do not know that they should be reporting
• Insufficient supply of IDSR reporting forms at the facilities
• Facility staff send reports but do not know they are late (due to lack
of feedback from the district)
• Facility staff do not understand importance of IDSR reporting and
how the data benefit them
---Document data interpretation and use---
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apostle james setzer

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