An internationalist national Islamic struggle?

Transcription

Copyright © 2010 SOAS. Reproduced by permission of IP Publishing Ltd.
http://www.ippublishing.com
South East Asia Research, 18(4): 757–91
An internationalist national Islamic
struggle?
Narratives of ‘brothers abroad’ in the
discursive practices of the Islamic Party of
Malaysia (PAS)
Dominik M. Müller
Abstract: Localized constructions of transnational Islamic kinship
or ‘brothers abroad’ are an integral part of discursive practices
within the community of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). Based
on empirical data gained from anthropological fieldwork between
2009 and 2010, this article examines domestic manifestations and
the implicit subtexts of the party’s foreign policy, with particular
regard to the Palestinian cause. Narratives of victimization and
heroism are thereby as important as demonizing projections of delinquency and evil, while at times images of local and external enemies
melt together. Furthermore, it is shown that PAS’s Islamist internationalism is essentially (g)local, whereas national and ummahist
identities are referred to only selectively.
Keywords: localization; transformative adaptations; transnational
Islam; Islamist politics; Malaysia; PAS
Author details: The author is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Anthropology/Cluster of Excellence ‘Formation of Normative Orders’, Goethe
University Frankfurt am Main, Senckenberganlage 31, 60325 Frankfurt, Germany. E-mail: dominikmueller@em.uni-frankfurt.de.
In the ideologies and cultures of rhetoric of most political Islamic or
‘Islamist’1 parties, Islamic internationalist arguments and nationalist ones
1
The term ‘Islamism’ is highly contested, and reasonable arguments have been made
for and against it (for an excellent overview of the debate, see Barzegar and Martin,
2010). In my usage, it is understood as describing a modern ideology and movement
that regards politics and Islam as inseparable, although, as Emmerson (2010) convincingly insists, what constitutes Islamism transcends the sphere of politics. A typical
South East Asia Research, 18, 4, pp 757–791 doi: 10.5367/sear.2010.0017
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South East Asia Research
go hand in hand. The present article examines this phenomenon in the
context of localized transformative adaptations and narratives of socalled ‘brothers abroad’ in contemporary discursive practices within
the community of the Islamic Party of Malaysia [Parti Islam SeMalaysia,
PAS].
Most of the data presented here are gained from anthropological fieldwork between February 2009 and June 2010, a fieldwork period of several
stays that altogether comprised 10 months.2
Brief overview of transnationalism in the organizational
history of PAS
Many scholars have discussed transnational dimensions in the history
of PAS and other Islamist organizations in Malaysia.3 Therefore, and
given the article’s main focus on contemporary discursive practices,
only a brief introductory overview will be sketched to situate the subject.
In PAS’s formative era and under the leadership of the left-wingoriented PAS President Burhanuddin al-Helmy (1956–1969), transnationalism was a central concern, for example, in terms of the
pan-Malayan nationalist vision of Melayu Raya [Greater Malaya]4 and
an inclination towards the ideological principles of the Muslim Brotherhood [Ikhwan al-Muslimeen] from Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and the Indonesian Masjumi Party.5 At that time, PAS’s transnational
2
3
4
5
concern of this movement is the normative conviction that it is a religious duty to
implement – what its adherents regard as – Islam on all levels of private, public and
social life in a ‘complete’ manner. The Islamist movement is diverse, fragmented,
polycentric, cellular and glocalized, though it has some common normative grounds.
Often it makes sense to use the term ‘Islamism’ in connection with qualifying adjectives, such as ‘political’, ‘violent’/‘non-violent’, ‘feminist’, etc.
The fieldwork was conducted for a PhD project at Frankfurt University, entitled
‘Islamism, youth and the contestation of normative orders: a study on Dewan Pemuda
PAS, the youth wing of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)’.
On the history of PAS, see Noor, 2004a, 2004b; Funston, 1976; Mohamed, 1991,
1994. On domestic impacts of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, see Stauth, 2002;
Noor, 2004b, p 330 ff; von der Mehden, 1990. For an account of PAS’s reactions on
‘9/11’, see Noor, 2002, 2003. On local effects of the so-called ‘Islamic revivalism’
with regard to the Malaysian Dakwah, youth and student movements since the 1970s,
see Abdul Hamid, 2002, 2007; Muzaffar, 1987; Nagata, 1984; Stauth, 2002; Zainah,
1987. For an overview of transnationalism in the history of the Malaysian Islamist
movements Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement of
Malaysia), Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), Islamic Representative Council (IRC) and
Al-Arqam (and its predecessors), which also carries a chapter on PAS, see Abdul
Hamid, 2009a.
Liow, 2005.
Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 150.
Narratives of ‘brothers abroad’ in PAS discursive practices
759
orientation largely focused on the formation of post-colonial order in
the region. Nevertheless, solidarity with physically distant Muslim brothers abroad was already a concern, for example, regarding the Palestinian
cause. As early as the late 1940s, PAS’s predecessor Hizbul Muslimin
had already established a Palestine Aid Committee.6
During the leadership of the staunch Malay nationalist Asri Muda
(1969–82), PAS’s political agenda became gradually more ‘Malaysian’,
and PAS joined the government coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) for
the first and last time in its history.7 To counter dissatisfaction with the
party’s development, Asri Muda tried to distract the PAS community’s
attention from domestic problems by speaking at length about the causes
of Muslims abroad (for example, Muslim separatist groups in Thailand
and the Philippines), and ‘even called on Malaysian Muslims to’ join
‘an international Muslim fighting force to help the Palestinians’ in 1975.8
Scandals, growing internal party anger over Asri’s leadership and a disastrous decrease in public support finally led to PAS’s exit from the
government coalition in 1978 and his spectacular ousting at the PAS
General Assembly in 1982.9 Fuelled by ‘key global events in the Muslim world that […] informed’ a groundbreaking ‘reorientation of PAS’,10
a new generation of reformist key figures such as Yusuf Rawa, Fadhil
Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Nakhaie Ahmad
took over the party’s leadership. With the intention of bringing PAS
back to the path of ‘true’ Islam, they institutionalized the new partyinternal order of ‘religious scholars leadership’ [kepimpinan ulama].11
Inspired by the transnational waves of Islamic resurgence, these nationalist Islamist internationalists revived PAS’s internationalist
component and pushed it to a previously unseen level. The party remodelled its ‘discourse with political vocabulary in line with
contemporary trends in global Islamism’.12 In contrast to its traditional
‘constitutive oppositional Other’,13 the Malay Muslim government party,
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO),14 PAS increasingly
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Liow, 2009, p 170.
Noor, 2004a, p 253 ff.
Noor, 2004a, pp 269–270; see also Nair, 1997, p 63; Liow, 2009, pp 171–172.
Noor, 2004a, p 326.
Liow, 2007, p 169.
Dewan Ulamak PAS Pusat, 2009.
Noor, 2004b, p 743.
Since Malaysia’s declaration of independence in 1957, UMNO has been the dominant party in all government coalitions.
760
disentangled itself from the emphasis on ‘Malay supremacy’ [ketuanan
Melayu], which was now regarded as illegitimate asabiyyah [ethnocentric clan loyalty].15 The new PAS leaders brought in a more internationalist
brand of Islamism, partly due to educational backgrounds and firsthand experiences of the ‘winds of change’ in the Muslim world during
their studies abroad (for example, Yusof Rawa came under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood during his studies in Cairo and Mecca
and attempted to bring PAS’s struggle in line with Islamist organizations abroad;16 and Abdul Hadi Awang studied from 1969 to 1973 in
Medina and 1974 to 1976 in Egypt, where he came into contact with
the Muslim Brotherhood).17 As Abdul Hamid18 notes, the ‘ulama-led
PAS has revived the importance of transnational Islam in its discourse,
though not to the extent of displacing the primacy of realizing an Islamic polity in Malaysia’, while ‘international issues have consistently
been high on PAS’s agenda since the ascendancy of Middle Easterntrained ulama to the helm of the party’.
Almost 30 years after the ‘ulama-leadership revolution’, frequent
symbolic interactions with foreign Islamist groups and expressions of
solidarity with ‘oppressed brothers’ abroad have become an integral
and ritualized part of PAS’s organizational culture.
Between constitutive Others and fictive brothers: main
considerations
PAS’s proclaimed Islamist internationalism is inevitably localized and
to some extent nationalist in nature. National and Islamist-internationalist identities are not mutually exclusive but complementary, and are
selectively referred to in particular situational contexts.
In the Malaysian political landscape, solidarity with ‘oppressed brothers
abroad’ – such as the Palestinian people, who will be referred to as the
main example in this article – serves as a powerful and contested symbol and resource. In local discourse, the Palestinian cause is usually
framed in Islamic terms. Therefore, if staged by the two Muslim parties
PAS and UMNO that aggressively compete over Muslim votes, expressions of solidarity with Palestine cannot escape from, in fact, being part
of domestic politics. At least to some extent, such expressions must be
15
16
17
18
Noor, 2004a, p xxix.
Noor, 2008, p 203.
Jomo and Ahmed, 1988, p 852; Noor, 2004b, p 350.
761
understood against the backdrop of the Malaysian ‘Islamization race’19
of historically generated ‘piety trumping’20 over Islamic legitimacy and
political power between these two parties that traditionally (re-)define
themselves in opposition to each other. As the article will show, this
relational aspect of PAS’s organizational identity is reflected in
transformative adaptations of the Palestinian conflict.
Furthermore, it will be illustrated that not only PAS’s constitutive
opposition to its estranged ‘brothers’ from the Malay Muslim party
UMNO, but also its ambivalent relationship with Shia ‘brothers abroad’
reveals tensions in its proclaimed struggle for an ‘undivided ummah’.
Fragmentation within this imagined borderless kinship community is
often emically claimed to be caused by the ‘evil plans’ of the secularist
West to ‘split the ummah’ and the ‘Westernized’ hypocrite [munafiq]
Islamic ‘enemies within’. Internal conflicts tend to be externalized by
blaming them on the usual suspects: secularism, Israel, the USA and
the West.
Talk about the brothers abroad is accompanied by a powerful emotional appeal. The narrative of victimization is thereby as important as
the narrative of heroization, just as in the case of enemy-Others such as
Israel and the USA, demonizing narratives of delinquency and evilness
are constitutive. Such emotional narratives find expression in the symbolic staging of solidarity and other practical manifestations of the
compassionate collective imagination of shared agony, shared struggles and common goals.
Foreign affairs and local practices – the General Assemblies
of PAS in 2009 and 2010
At the 55th Annual General Assembly of the Islamic Party of Malaysia
[Muktamar Tahunan PAS Pusat kali ke-55], which was held at Stadium
Melawati in Shah Alam in July 2009, the Party’s president, Abdul Hadi
Awang, ceremoniously handed over a cheque for Malaysian Ringgit
150,00021 to a representative of the Palestinian Islamist organization
19
20
21
Noor, 2003, p 79; Noor, 2004b, p 724; Liow, 2004; Liow, 2007, p 182, 2009, pp 15,
16, 201; Zainah, 2005, p 122.
Liow, 2009, pp 13, 15.
Malaysian Ringgit 150,000 = Euro 30,000 (July 2009). The donation was collected
by PAS’s newspaper Harakah. According to PAS’s Secretary General Mustafa Ali,
this was ‘the latest contribution of a total amount of 1.7 Mio Ringgit’, at the time
around Euro 340,000 (official homepage of the PAS 55th General Assembly, Website:
http://muktamar55.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
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Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS), Sheikh Marwan Abu
Ras.22 This gesture of symbolic solidarity and material support from the
PAS leadership for their Palestinian ‘brothers’ was answered by cheers
of enthusiasm from the audience, accompanied by shouts of ‘takbir’
and ‘Allahuakbar’, which within the cultural codes of PAS’s (and other
Islamist organizations’) event culture is similar to the clapping of hands
elsewhere. At the same event, other ‘special guests’ from abroad included members from Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (Khalilur
Rahman from its Sri Lankan branch) and Fathurohman Mahfudz from
Parti Bulan Bintang (PBB, Indonesia).23
At the next General Assembly of PAS that was held at Pusat Tarbiyyah
Islam Kelantan in June 2010, again, a delegation of four HAMAS representatives was given significant space in the limelight. A member of
22
23
&id=278:harakah-bukan-sekadar-sebuah-media&catid=37:muktamar-penuh&Itemid
=65, author’s translation, accessed 15 June 2010). It was not specified during which
period of time this sum came together. In addition, the Youth Wing handed over
19,000 Ringgit (3,700 Euro) to Marwan Abu Ras (Website: http://tasikhijau.blogspot.com/2009/06/muktamar-pemuda-menerima-tetamu.html, accessed 24 September 2009).
Marwan Abu Ras is a HAMAS legislator and chairman of the Palestinian Scholars
League. He was a close companion of HAMAS founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 2006). At the PAS Muktamar, he emphasized that the fight over
Palestine would be a fight of the whole ummah, and asked the ummah to ‘wake up’
and fight ‘side by side with the Palestinian people’ by all means, ‘including financial
support’ (author’s translation, Website: http://pemudasarawak.wordpress.com/2009/
06/08/wakil-hamas-gesa-umat-islam-bersama-palestine, accessed 20 July 2010).
In 2008, at the 54th General Assembly, guests from abroad included representatives
from HAMAS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Indonesia) and Ikhwan al-Muslimeen
from Jordan (Website: http://muktamar54.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=25&Itemid=47, accessed 28 July 2010; see also Abdul Hamid, 2009a,
p 153). Such visits are part of an organizational tradition to host delegates from
foreign Islamist organizations ‘adhering to variants of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Jamaat-i-Islami ideologies’ (Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 152) at PAS General Assemblies. It is based on PAS’s self-understanding of belonging to a larger transnational
Islamic movement [harakah Islamiyah] of like-minded organizations. Despite inescapable fragmentation and localized particularity, this movement shares common
ground in its normative understanding of which role Islam should play at all levels
of private and public life, a role imagined to be universally valid. PAS’s close contact with these Islamist organizations stands no comparison to UMNO’s relationship
with them, despite UMNO’s increasingly Islamist outlook, ummatic concern for ‘brothers abroad’ (Liow, 2009, p 170) and ambitious Islamic foreign policy (Nair, 1997).
For its General Assembly, UMNO has invited delegations from Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, Indonesia’s Golkar Party, the Indian National Congress, the Communist
Party of China and United Russia (The Star: ‘Foreign political parties invited for
Umno forum’, 29 July 2010). It should be noted, however, that PAS also tries to
enhance its network with non-Muslim states such as China (Liow, 2009, p 172),
though this is not (yet) reflected in the guest list of its General Assemblies.
763
Figure 1. A HAMAS delegate (Munir Said, second from the right) sitting next to a
representative from the Lebanese Hezbollah (second from the left) at the General
Assembly of Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat in Kota Bharu, Kelantan on 10 July 2010.
Photo by Dominik M. Müller.
HAMAS’s Political Bureau, Munir Said,24 gave two fierce and uncompromising speeches, one at the party’s main meeting, and one at the
Youth Wing’s General Assembly [Muktamar Tahunan Dewan Pemuda
PAS Pusat ke-51], which was held nearby at the Kelantan Trade Centre.
Once more, the event was also visited by other ‘dignitaries’ from abroad,
which included representatives from Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Eritrean
Islah Party, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, Philippines) and
the Islamic Adhaalath Party from the Maldives (see Figure 1).
Palestine was one of the most central – or at least symbolically most
visible – topics of this Muktamar. It started in the realm of clothing,
with many participants wearing ‘Palestine shawls’ (see Figure 2). An
24
In the past, he served as official HAMAS representative in Sudan and Yemen (Website:
http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=9980&jid=1&href=fulltext,
accessed 30 July 2010).
764
Figure 2. A Palestine HAMAS shawl that is popular among
PAS members.
apparently popular type of these shawls depicted the logo of HAMAS,
and was sold at several of the ‘PAS merchandise’ stalls. I had seen the
same type of HAMAS shawls being sold inside the PAS headquarters
[Pejabat Agong PAS] in Kuala Lumpur months before, as well as at
other events. However, the number of participants wearing them bore
no comparison to any PAS events that I had previously attended. Among
765
Figure 3. PAS President Adbul Hadi Awang (right) and PAS Deputy President
Nasharudin Mat Isa (left) wearing HAMAS shawls at the PAS General Assembly in
June 2010.
PAS key figures that were seen wearing these HAMAS shawls at the
General Assembly in 2010 were PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang, PAS
Spiritual Leader [Mursyidul ‘Am] Nik Aziz and PAS Deputy President
[Timbalan Presiden] Nasharudin Mat Isa (see Figure 3). Another type
of Palestine shawl also depicted the flag of Turkey – a novelty that had
to do with the raid on the six ships of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla by
Israel’s army on 31 May 2010, during which a number of Turkish activists were killed, on ships sailing under the Turkish flag. The Turkish
government’s protest against Israel was among the most vocal, and loudly
applauded in Malaysia, as reflected in the appearance of the Turkey–
Palestine shawls.25
25
When the Malaysians who had been on the ships arrived back in Kuala Lumpur, they
were received by several Malaysian politicians. Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin
Yassin was wearing the Turkey–Palestine shawl, as were many other UMNO representatives. These shawls became contested political symbols, just like the repatriates
766
Figure 4. Visitors walking over flags of the USA and Israel at the PAS General
Assembly in June 2010. The texts state ‘Sila Pijak’ [Please step on it!] and ‘Jahanam
Amerika, Jahanam Israel’ [Destroy America, destroy Israel].
At the PAS Women’s Wing General Assembly 2010, many of the
representatives wore colourful ‘Save Gaza’ headbands and Palestine
shawls, and at one point, a group of women burned the US and Israeli
flags in a symbolic statement of protest against these two nations.26
Directly behind the gates of the main Muktamar’s venue, two large
flags, a US and an Israeli one, were fixed to the ground, supplemented
by a written request – ‘please step on it!’ (Sila pijak!) (see Figure 4).
26
themselves. At the PAS General Assembly, PAS leaders seemed eager to be photographed next to Jamaluddin Elias, the Deputy President of the PAS-related NGO
Yayasan Amal, who had been on one of the ships.
For a series of pictures of this burning ritual, see Website: http://muktamar56.
pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=163&Itemid=64;
http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline
&id=164&Itemid=64; http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=165&Itemid=64; http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?
option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=166&Itemid=64 (last accessed 1 September
2010).
767
Not only did numerous visitors, including families with their children,
enjoy doing so, but a number of PAS Youth leaders also posed there for
a group picture, with broad smiles on their faces. Nonetheless, as in
previous years, PAS had invited the representatives of foreign embassies, including those of the USA. Although I could not identify whether
one of the few Western guests (totalling probably less than five, including myself, at the opening ceremony, and even fewer during the following
days) belonged to the US Embassy, it is clear that this behaviour of
PAS reflects a more general pattern of ambivalence in its political approach to Western countries. On the one hand, PAS is very active in
trying to cultivate and intensify contacts with Western embassies. This
is usually done by PAS’s Bureau of International Affairs [Lajnah
Hubungan Antarabangsa dan Hal Ehwal Luar] and individual key figures, and has been intensified particularly in its Youth Wing’s International
Bureau since the General Assembly of 2009, when Raja Mohammad
Al-Hiss27 was appointed as the Bureau’s new head. On the other hand,
anti-Western ideologies, rhetoric and symbolic practices are a dominant norm within the PAS community, and the West is seen by many
party members as the biggest (earthly) source of evil, social problems,
and by some as a natural enemy of Islam [musuh Islam]. Nevertheless,
courtesy calls are made to Western embassies, and US Embassy delegates are invited to PAS offices. In January 2010, the PAS Youth Wing
established an ‘official relationship’ with the US Embassy that in PAS’s
own media announcement was referred to as ‘historic’ [bersejarah] and
in line with PAS’s ‘government in the waiting’ approach.28 Another such
meeting, when representatives of a number of Western embassies were
invited, was held on 24 February 2010 in Kuala Lumpur.29 On 1 February
27
28
29
According to Dr Raja Mohammad Al-Hiss, his Bureau has three main objectives:
first, ‘to enrich the network between PAS, especially the PAS Youth, with all the
embassies and diplomats’, second, to ‘raise public awareness about international
affairs’ and third, internal education in order to ‘ensure that our leaders, especially
the youth leaders, are prepared to become a government’, for example, in terms of
‘understanding the international law’ (interview with Raja Mohammad Al-Hiss, Kuala
Lumpur, 7 December 2009).
Homepage of PAS Youth: ‘Pemuda PAS Jalin Hubungan Diplomatik Dengan Kedutaan
Amerika Syarikat’, 20 January 2010, Website: http://pemuda.pas.org.my/v2/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=891:pemuda-pas-jalin-hubungan-diplomatikdengan-kedutaan-amerika-syarikat&catid=1:terkini&Itemid=2 (accessed 17 July 2010).
It was attended by representatives from the USA, the UK, Germany, Finland, Poland, Iran, China and the EU. PAS Youth leader Nasrudin Hassan stated that this
meeting was ‘very important in order to show that Pemuda PAS has good relations
with all countries in the world’ (my translation), cited in Harakahdaily, ‘Pemuda
PAS adakan dialog dengan kedutaan asing’, 25 February 2010.
768
2010, two representatives from the US Embassy, Jeremy Nathan and
Ravi Manickam, were warmly welcomed by the PAS state chief of Perak,
Abu Bakar Hussein, and key PAS figure Nizar Jamaluddin, at a meeting in Perak.30 At the same time, numerous protest notes were handed
over to Western embassies,31 and demonstrations were held, particularly in front of the US Embassy. According to personal information
from within PAS, for many years the Party’s Deputy President Nasharudin
Mat Isa has enjoyed a good relationship with the US Embassy. He is
said to have been invited to George Bush Jr’s inauguration in Washington in January 2001. However, notwithstanding this good relationship,
he repeatedly appeared at PAS demonstrations in front of the US Embassy, the last time on 1 June 2010 when PAS handed over a memorandum
that demanded a stop to ‘military support’ for Israel.32 When trying to
achieve a deeper understanding – or what Geertz (1973) refers to as a
‘thick description’ – of PAS, one clearly needs to be aware not only of
the differences between internal factions, but also of different levels of
discourse between its public discourse on normative and/or populist
levels, and the more rational considerations behind the scenes, as well
as the implicit subtexts of this multivocality.
The ambivalence in PAS’s approach toward the ‘West’ reflects its
balancing between the two poles that constantly shape and reinforce its
internal struggles: the permanent cleavages between a normative idealism of an uncompromising Islamist stance in line with the proclaimed
‘basis of the Islamic struggle’ [asas perjuangan Islam] and the requirements of realpolitik. Many PAS figures, though not all of them, feel
that the political realities of the present coalition situation necessarily
require a high, and for idealists sometimes painful, degree of pragmatism. Many think that for the time being, some distancing of an
uncompromising, impatient insistence on the ‘asas’ [basis] may be necessary, for example, when it comes to PAS’s idealistic conviction that a
‘complete’ institutionalization of Islamic law including Islamic criminal
30
31
32
Homepage of PAS Perak: ‘KUNJUNGAN WAKIL KEDUTAAN AMERIKA KE
PEJABAT PAS PERAK’, 01 February 2010, Website: http://www.perak.pas.org.my/
index.php/arkib-artikel/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
1163:kunjungan-wakil-kedutaan-amerika-ke-pejabat-pas-perak&catid=51:aktivitiperak&Itemid=128 (accessed 17 July 2010).
On 9 July 2009, a PAS Youth delegation handed over a memorandum to the German
Embassy, protesting about the murder of a Muslim woman. On the same day, another protest note was handed over to the Chinese Embassy, protesting about the
oppression of Uighurs.
Harakahdaily, ‘PAS serah memo ke Kedutaan Amerika, bantah Israel’, 1 June 2010.
769
law [hudud, qisas, ta’azir] is a religious duty. Although both the hardliners
and the pragmatists regard this as being obligatory one day, a number
of leaders think that it cannot be done or even demanded too loudly in
public at this point, because the time for it is not yet ripe, and also the
Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition with the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR)
party and especially the Chinese-dominated non-Muslim Democratic
Action Party (DAP) would be in danger of breaking apart, much as
PR’s predecessor Barisan Alternatif did earlier.33 Both in terms of how
to deal with the West and with local political realities, PAS continues to
struggle between idealism and pragmatism.34
On the sidelines of the Muktamar in 2010, a closed-door meeting
was held between PAS leaders and some of the above-mentioned delegates of foreign Islamic parties. One point that was discussed was the
question of how to deal with the Jews, once Al-Aqsa [Jerusalem] had
been freed. While at demonstrations and public talks, slogans such as
the popular shout of ‘hancur Yahudi!’ [destroy the Jews!] or the linguistically slightly more creative ‘benci judi, benci Yahudi’ [hate
gambling, hate Jews] were frequently uttered during my research,35 the
talks behind the scenes took place on a more rational and differentiated
33
34
35
A PAS Youth member referred to an internal usrah meeting in ‘2002 or 2003’ where
Mujahid Yusof Rawa stated that it was not the right time yet to implement hudud and
an Islamic state [Daulah Islamiah], instead UMNO and corruption should be defeated first, and the substance (instead of the term) of an Islamic state should be
emphasized (interview with PAS Youth member, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 2010).
However, another Youth member argued: ‘When in Saudi Arabia hudud was implemented, nobody dared anymore to steal, to drink alcohol or to commit adultery’ (my
translation, interview with PAS Youth Central Committee member, Ampang, 12 February 2010). Yet another member criticized the fact that even within Pemuda PAS,
rarely would anyone understand hudud (interview with PAS Youth Central Committee member, Seremban, 8 February 2010).
The discussion about factions in PAS usually revolves around either the categories
of ulama, professionals and activists (terms that PAS members use to refer to themselves), or pragmatic Erdogans and idealistic Erbakans (terms that PAS members
nowadays tend to regard as ‘used by our enemies to split us’). Yang Razali Kassim
(2009) speaks of a more pragmatic, urbane and open-minded ‘New PAS’, as opposed to the ‘old’ one. However, it should be added that among most key figures of
the generation that is even younger than what he describes as ‘New PAS’, the trend
goes back to the positions of the old PAS, with a high degree of legalistic theologycentrism (a development that some of the elder so-called Erdogans have critically
noticed). The fact that names from Turkish politics (Erdogan, Erbakan) are incorporated is a noteworthy example of localized transformative adaptations.
Another such example is the visit of HAMAS parliamentarian Umar Misri to Gombak
on 11 December 2009, when a prayer for the ‘destruction of the Jews’ [kehancuran
yahudi laknatullah] was organized (Homepage of Pemuda PAS Gombak: ‘Pemimpin
HAMAS Ziarah Gombak’, Website: http://pemudagombak.com, 15 December 2009,
accessed 2 January 2010).
770
level. During the talk at the Muktamar, the Hezbollah delegate stated
that once Al-Aqsa was back under Islamic control and ‘pacified’,36 it
would be required by Islamic law that the Jews should be a protected
minority [kafir dhimmi] and must be granted certain places of worship
inside Jerusalem. This opinion, according to what I have been told by
one of the meeting’s attendees, was generally shared and accepted by
all participants – behind closed doors.
During his speech at the Muktamar, the PAS politician Mohamad Sabu
initiated another spontaneous round of collecting money for Palestine,
by suggesting that they handed round a number of kopiah [Muslim hats]
to be filled with money. I found myself in a position to pass on a kopiah
full of monetary notes to those sitting next to me, wondering whether
under German law my actions would constitute a criminal act of ‘supporting a terrorist organization’ (that is, HAMAS).
Be that as it may, at both General Assemblies in 2009 and 2010, Islamist
internationalism was a prominent topic and in the latter event was even
a dominant one. PAS members showed a strong interest in their ‘brothers’ from abroad, be it through attendance at speeches of international
guests, through enthusiastic applause (in the form of takbir), PAS members’ talks with reference to Palestine, or on other symbolic and
performative levels through the expressionist showcase of solidarityrelated ‘clothes’.
‘PAS is HAMAS, UMNO is FATAH!’ – localized adaptations
of the Palestine conflict
Among the numerous external conflicts that include Muslims and play
a role in PAS’s discursive practices, the Palestine conflict presently
appears to be of the highest priority.
In February 2009, shortly after the Israeli army had conducted ‘Operation Cast Lead’ and attacked targets in Gaza for about three weeks, a
PAS member told me that a popular slogan among PAS members and
supporters was ‘PAS is HAMAS, UMNO is FATAH!’ – an identification of PAS with HAMAS (and the pejorative equation of the Malaysian
government party UMNO with FATAH), which revealed a deep localized transformative adaptation. Following the same theme, on his Internet
36
When I asked a participant of this talk why they believed it would be realistic to
achieve this goal, he referred to the Quranic promise (on the theological level) and
to new qualities of rockets brought in from Iran that could allegedly now for the first
time reach targets deep inside Israel (on the more practical one).
771
blog, a PAS supporter referred to HAMAS as ‘PAS Palestin’.37 The basis
for such equations is the idea that UMNO (read FATAH) is a race-based
(Malay, read Arab) nationalist party, allegedly corrupt, insincere or ‘unIslamic’, whereas PAS (read HAMAS) is an incorruptible and righteous,
truly Islamic party.38 In fact, among PAS members it is taboo to criticize anything that HAMAS does, or to praise FATAH, while ‘the
Palestinians’ in general are constructed as Islamic role models. Nik Aziz
referred to UMNO’s approach to Islam as ‘Islam plastik’ [plastic Islam], in contrast to ‘Islam Palestin’ [Palestinian Islam],39 whereas the
latter seems to represent the normative ideal type for him.
PAS and its ‘traditional nemesis UMNO’40 have battled each other
ever since PAS was founded as an offspring of UMNO in 195141 (with
a short intermission of relative calm when PAS entered BN between
1973 and 1978).42 Against this backdrop, it can be argued that one variety of the Malaysian Islamization race or ‘holier-than-thou’43 ‘battle for
the legitimacy of Islam’44 between UMNO and PAS is the process of
‘Palestine trumping’. At first glance, both parties share an intense concern for Palestine.45 On several issues pertaining to the pro-Muslim
foreign policies of UMNO, PAS has even expressed its support.46 However, the question as to which of them appears to have the most solidarity
with Palestine may be regarded as just another battleground in the much
described competition between PAS and UMNO, wherein both of them
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
Ibnu Hasyim: ‘Mengenali PAS & UMNO Di Palestin’, Website: http://www.ibnuhasyim.com/2009/07/mengenali-pas-umno-di-palestin.html, 6 July 2009 (accessed 15
July 2010).
As another blogger puts it: ‘PAS & HAMAS: PARTI ISLAM. UMNO & FATAH: PARTI
KEBANGSAAN DAN ASSOBIYAH’ (my translation: ‘PAS & HAMAS = Islamic Party,
UMNO & FATAH = nationalist and communalist parties’), Website: http://mullahkane.
blogspot.com/2009/01/konflik-sesama-saudara-di-palestin-dan.html (accessed 27 July
2010).
Harakahdaily, ‘Islam plastik bukan Islam Palestin’, 23 August 2009.
Noor, 2004a, p 242; 2004b, pp 746, 749.
Funston, 1976, p 70; Noor, 2004a, p 72 ff.; Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 150.
Noor, 2004a, p 253 ff.
Chong, 2006, p 33; Zainah, 2005, p 121.
Martinez, 2005, p 151.
In rare cases, they have organized common demonstrations, for example, in front of
the US Embassy on 25 March 2003 to protest about the US invasion of Iraq (Liow,
2009, p 168). However, during my fieldwork, I only came across separate protests
on common concerns. For instance, the PAS Youth criticized UMNO for not joining
their protest march to the US Embassy (to express anger over the Israeli raid on the
Gaza Freedom Flotilla) on 4 June 2010, while Pemuda UMNO organized a separate
demonstration at Masjid Negara on the same day.
Liow, 2009, pp 171–172.
772
try to ‘out-Islam’,47 ‘out-Islamize’48 or ‘out-Islamicize’49 each other. While,
as a renowned scholar noted, PAS is ‘putting pressure on the government
by claiming legitimacy in speaking up for transnational Muslim causes’,50
it seems that UMNO in turn seeks to re-conquer this legitimacy by ‘outsolidarizing’ PAS with its own activities of staging ‘care’ for Muslim
causes abroad – a process that can be traced back at least to the 1980s,
when UMNO started its Islamization programme, turned the state into a
‘vehicle of Islamization’51 and thereby took the oppositional ‘wind out of
PAS sails’.52 In these mutual dynamics, the more solidarity a party appears
to show, the more Islamic credentials, credibility and moral capital can be
secured, with the potential for transformation into political power. Undoubtedly, both parties are well aware that such solidarity is a potent political
resource. At the same time, and notwithstanding its theatrically staged
character, much of the emotional outcry and compassion is real and ‘sincerely’ felt to be a moral duty by both PAS and UMNO activists. Similarly,
equations of PAS with HAMAS and UMNO with FATAH among PAS
members are emically ‘sincere’ and strategically useful at the same time.
PAS views HAMAS as the only politically and morally legitimate
government of the Palestinian people. By appropriating HAMAS’s discourse on the ‘morally depraved’, ‘decadent’ FATAH that is ‘corrupted
by the West’, PAS projects exactly this image of FATAH on to its most
important local rival UMNO. The compassion and solidarity with what
is locally constructed as an idealized picture of the brothers in Palestine
fuels the hate towards what is locally constructed as a demonizing picture of Israel and the West. The latter imaginative construction is then
adjusted to a regional context, internalized or appropriated, for example, by equating the local political enemy UMNO with the external enemy
Israel, or with FATAH. More than once, I heard someone shouting
‘UMNO Yahudi!’ [UMNO Jews!] The same equation appears in the
imagery of a VCD cover, entitled ‘UMNO pengkianat [sic] bangsa’
[UMNO the traitor of the nation/race], where an UMNO logo is placed
next to an Israeli flag53 (see Figure 5). Another such fusion is the slogan
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Liow, 2009, p 111.
Noor, 2004b, p 724.
Peletz, 2002, p 11.
Liow, 2009, p 181.
Liow, 2009, p 41.
This refers to a debate that linked UMNO to Israel, based on the accusation that the
(‘Jewish-controlled’) public relations company APCO Worldwide had created
UMNO’s slogan of ‘1 Malaysia’ based on a model of ‘1 Israel’.
773
Figure 5. Visual constructions of enemy-Others – a pictorial juxtaposition of ‘1
Malaysia’ and ‘1 Israel’.
‘benci judi, benci Yahudi!’ [hate gambling, hate Jews!] which was popular
in June 2010 when PAS debates revolved around licences for sports
betting and the ‘evilness’ of Israel as exemplified in the Gaza Flotilla
Raid. In March 2009, after the licence of PAS’s newspaper Harakah
had temporarily been revoked, PAS Spiritual Leader Nik Aziz compared UMNO with Israel when he stated that: ‘all their actions are like
Israel’s spite toward the Islamic ummah’ [Tindak tanduk mereka seperti
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Israel yang dendam terhadap umat Islam].54 The appropriative imagination that PAS is HAMAS and UMNO is FATAH (or even ‘like Israel’)
obviously serves the domestic political purpose to de-legitimize the
UMNO-led government as corrupt, decadent and Westernized, while it
supports an advantageous profile for PAS, which may result in an increase in Islamic credentials and votes among the ‘Palestine-sensitive’
Malay electorate.
When on 27 December 2008 the Israeli army started its three-weeklong military attack on HAMAS in Gaza, with the declared intention to
stop the rockets being fired by HAMAS targeting Israeli territory, this
led to a huge wave of protest and campaigns of solidarity in Malaysia.
All over the country, ‘road shows’, mass prayers for Palestine, the establishment of aid initiatives, calls for boycotts of brands, and
demonstrations took place. Several demonstrations were held in front
of the US Embassy, such as on 9 January, when a PAS delegation handed
over a memorandum while protesters were chanting slogans and burning US and Israeli flags outside.55 Nik Aziz walked over the flags of the
USA and Israel in a symbolic gesture of contempt during a protest rally
in Kota Bharu, and later burned the flags along with effigies of Peres
and Bush.56 Charity events and solidarity concerts were organized,57 aid
initiatives – some close to PAS, others to UMNO and government-related organizations – virtually outdid each other with depictions of dead
and wounded children, with the aim of demonstrating Israel’s ‘cruelty’,
the suffering of Gaza’s population, and to carry out effective fundraising
and public relations for both the Palestinian cause and their own.
In the realm of discursive micro-practices, during the course of my
fieldwork, again and again I came across manifestations of the veneration of and identification with what is locally imagined as HAMAS.
Inside the office of PAS Kawasan Besut (Terengganu), there were three
stickers on the door: one depicted a HAMAS logo; one showed HAMAS
leader Ismail Haniyah; and a third carried a picture of HAMAS leader
54
55
56
57
HarakahDaily, ‘Boikot akhbar pro-Umno 3 bulan – Nik Aziz’, 2 March 2009.
Malaysiakini, ‘Thousands in anti-Israel protests in KL’, 9 January 2009.
Harakahdaily, Bantah Israel: ‘Nik Aziz bakar patung Bush, Shimon Peres’, 9 January 2009.
On 24 January 2009, around 10,000 people gathered for a mass prayer ‘for Palestine’
in a stadium in Kota Bharu. The pop-nasyid group Raihan, whose Palestine-solidarity hymn ‘Untukmu Palestin’ [For you, Palestine] is often played at PAS events,
performed three songs (Homepage of Cakna Palestin: ‘Rakyat Kelantan pelbagai
kaum kutuk kekejaman Yahudi’, 24 January 2009, Website: http://
caknapalestin.blogspot.com/2009/01/rakyat-kelantan-pelbagai-kaum-kutuk.html,
accessed 27 July 2010). Another such popular local song is Rabbani’s title ‘Intifadah’.
775
Figure 6. Pictures depicting HAMAS founder Sheikh
Ahmad Yassin and the PAS leaders Abdul Hadi Awang (right)
and Nik Aziz (left) in a restaurant across the street of Maahad
Darul Quran Rusila (Terengganu).
Khaled Mashal. A local PAS member proudly explained to me that a
friend had brought them as a souvenir from the Middle East. In a restaurant across the street from Maahad Darul Quran Rusila, a school
founded by PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang and located next to his
house, three pictures were placed next to each other: one of Abdul Hadi
Awang, one of Nik Aziz, and slightly higher, positioned between both,
a portrait of HAMAS founder Ahmad Yassin (see Figure 6). The logic
of their arrangement speaks to a clear symbolic language of priority
and imagined relatedness in the transnational ‘Islamic’ – etically spoken,
Islamist – movement [harakah Islamiyah/gerakan Islam].
At many PAS events, ‘PAS merchandise’ is being sold. These ideological consumer products comprise not only those that depict PAS logos,
but also others that are related to the internationalist component of the
party’s identity – often with reference to Palestine and HAMAS. For
their users, they serve as symbolic markers of solidarity, belonging and
connectedness to PAS and its larger ‘struggle’. They include shirts, jackets, shawls, stickers and VCDs. The producers of the VCD ‘Kekejaman
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Figure 7. ‘Kekejaman Israel 2009 – Gaza Berdarah’ [Israel’s cruelty 2009 – Bleeding
Gaza], VCD produced by members of Dewan Pemuda PAS Kawasan Sungei Petani.
Israel 2009 – Gaza Berdarah’ [Israel’s Cruelty 2009 – Bleeding Gaza],
who belong to the PAS Youth branch from Sungei Petani, made use of
– or transformatively appropriated – original scenes of martial propaganda videos produced by HAMAS, and rearranged them with Malay
subtitles (see Figure 7). In that VCD, Malaysians were asked to support
Palestine in any form, including moral support through prayers, financial support and a boycott of certain brands58 that were alleged to be
58
Some PAS members admitted to occasionally visiting McDonalds and Starbucks. A
PAS Youth activist from Melaka explained: ‘Sometimes we boycott, sometimes not’.
777
Figure 8. A T-shirt sold at PAS events, depicting an ‘Islamic
warrior’ with a rifle and a Quran in his hands. On the back
of the shirt is the slogan ‘Save Palestine – Supporter
HAMAS’ combined with a HAMAS logo.
related to Israel. One shirt that was sold at PAS events depicted the logo
of HAMAS, combined with a masked fighter holding a machine gun.
On its reverse, a slogan clarified in no uncertain terms: ‘Supporter
HAMAS’ (see Figure 8). Similarly, headbands referring to Palestine
are often worn demonstratively at larger PAS events. Another such shirt
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Figure 9. ‘Remember! Remember the Jew(s) will be defeated
(Khaibar). The army of Muhammad will arrive!’ – a T-shirt sold at
PAS merchandise stalls.
carried the face of iconic HAMAS founder Ahmad Yassin.59 On the
reverse, a slogan says: ‘INGAT! INGAT YAHUDI AKAN KHAIBAR.
TENTERA MUHAMMAD AKAN DATANG!’ [Remember! Remember
the Jew(s) will be defeated. The army of Muhammad will arrive!] (see
Figure 9). The term Khaibar refers to a battle between the army of Prophet
Muhammad and a group of Jews over the oasis of Khaibar in 628 AD,
in which, despite them being outnumbered, was gloriously won by
Muhammad’s troops. 60 At PAS demonstrations, the Arabic phrase
‘Khaibar, Khaibar, Ya Yahud, Jaish Muhammad Safayood’ [Khaibar,
Khaibar, oh Jew(s), the army of Muhammad will arrive] can regularly
be heard. The same phrase is used by Islamist groups in other countries.
Amrozi, one of the Bali bombers of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – whose
brand of Islamism is very different from the non-violent one of PAS –
shouted it in the courtroom on the day he was sentenced to death. The
Lebanese Hezbollah named a certain type of rocket Khaibar-1. Another
example of contextually related micro-practices can be seen in the space
of self-expression and social interaction on the Internet. A PAS blogger
59
60
He was killed in an Israeli air strike in 2004 and is regarded as a martyr [syahid]
within the PAS discourse.
Khaibar also serves as a precedent case in Islamic law. Once the Jews surrendered,
they were granted the status of a protected minority.
779
from Terengganu posted the following on the social networking Website
Facebook:
‘Khaibar, khaibar O Jew(s), the Army of Muhammad will arrive. O
Jew(s), wait for the time when the army of Allah returns. Flare up the
holy war, liberate the whole state. The souls of the brave go forward
but have to die. Remember, Allah’s paradise awaits you. Stop dreaming, firmly conduct jihad. Khaibar, khaibar O Jew(s), the Army of
Muhammad will arrive. Silently sneak on heavy tanks. Don’t let your
step falter. Throw stones with full force, be assured we won’t lose.
The martyr’s bomb will shake the earth, scatter fear on the Jews.
Liberate Palestine, liberate it from evil. Forward soul, you become a
martyr!’61
The reference to Khaibar as a symbol of pride and victory over ‘the
Jews’ serves as a common discursive ground for the fragmented
transnational Islamist movement(s), while the enmity against Israel and
the Jews,62 and support for ‘the Palestinians’ are among the fields that
are most intensely shared.
An integral part of PAS’s event culture can be found in the sound- or
music-scape. At the fringes of the latest Muktamar, as well as at many
other PAS events, largely the same set of ideological songs is played
over and over again and can be heard somewhere in the background.
For instance, the lyrics of the party’s hymn (Lagu PAS) state:
‘Bersatulah wahai kaum muslimin’ – Unite, Muslims; […]
‘Berjihadlah wahai kaum muslimin’ – Engage in Jihad, Muslims
‘Biar syahid ataupun kemenangan’ – Let it be martyrdom or victory
61
62
Original: ‘Khaibar Khaibar ya Yahud, tentara Muhammad akan datang. Khaibar
khaibar ya yahud jaisyu Muhammad saufa ya’ud. Tunggu saatnya hai yahudi, tentara
Allah kan kembali. Kobarkan perang suci, bebaskan seluruh negeri. Jiwa-jiwa
pemberani maju meski harus mati. Ingatlah wahai diri, syurga Allah tlah menanti.
… Tinggalkan semua mimpi, berjihad teguhkan hati. Khaibar khaibar ya yahud jaisyu
Muhammad saufa ya’ud. Derap tank senjata berat, jangan surutkan langkah. Lontar
batu penuh semangat, yakin kita takkan kalah. Bom syahid mengguncang bumi, tebar
takut kaum yahudi. Bebaskan palestina, bebas dari durjana. Majulah wahai jiwa,
jadilah kau syuhada.’ The text was apparently taken from the lyrics of ‘Khaibar
Khaibar ya Yahud’, a song from the Indonesian nasyid-band Ar-Ruhul Jadid.
PAS Youth leader Nasrudin Hassan wrote in an article: ‘Jews are the traditional
enemy of the Islamic ummah. They are the main motivator of the spirit of enmity
against the Islamic ummah’ (Nasrudin, 2010, author’s translation).
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‘Berjuanglah wahai Ansorullah’ – Fight, helpers of Allah
‘Dengan matlamat daulah islamiah’ – with the aim of an Islamic state
‘Berkorbanlah wahai yang beriman’ – sacrifice, pious people
‘Dengan harta dan segenap kepunyaan’ – with all that you have.
By focusing on the heroic brothers that are literally fighting for Islam
abroad, PAS appears to project the proclaimed obligation of jihad and
an uncompromising sacrifice away from domestic struggles to some
extent on to the struggles of its brothers abroad. As the brothers are
locally constructed as noble heroes, who fight a shared struggle for a
shared cause, from PAS’s internal perspective they must – on a normative level of discourse, though not necessarily in practical reality – be
supported by any possible means.
For many years, PAS and HAMAS have cultivated a well established
organizational relationship, with delegates regularly visiting each other
and giving talks abroad. Personal contacts are vital for such organizational ties. Among PAS’s internationalists who are at the forefront of
such contacts is PAS Youth activist Riduan Mohamad Nor. He visited
a refugee camp in Jabalia, Gaza, in January 2009, at a time when access to Gaza was only possible through the tunnels that were being
bombed at that time.63 During other travels, he met several HAMAS
figures. At PAS activities, Riduan, who, as one of his friends stressed
is ‘a REAL activist’, is rarely seen without a Palestine shawl. He is
well aware of the role of performative communication and makes professional use of symbolic politics, such as when he made a theatrical
appearance at a demonstration with a baby doll in his arms64 that
symbolized dead Palestinian children. Rarely will any Palestine-related
PAS demonstration take place without him standing on the front line
with a megaphone nearby. For the more rational levels of discourse,
the 39-year-old, who is about to receive his PhD in political science
from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), has published numerous books. Some of them are directly related to Palestine, while others
63
64
This was advertised with a picture of his visit in one of his books (Riduan, 2009, p
412). In another book, he mentions a meeting with HAMAS ministers at Hotel Gaza
(Riduan, 2010a, p 155).
Another prominent PAS figure, Husam Musa, was seen with a bloodstained doll in
his arms at a demonstration in front of the US Embassy in January 2009 (Website:
http://pemuda.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=646&
Itemid=2, accessed 22 July 2010). Nik Aziz used dolls so that he could burn them: in
that case, the dolls symbolized George Bush and Shimon Peres (HarakahDaily: ‘Bantah
Israel: Nik Aziz bakar patung Bush, Shimon Peres’, 9 January 2009).
781
refer to the larger transnational Islamic movement.65 Such activities
serve a domestic purpose as well, notwithstanding their self-perceived
brotherly altruistic or humanitarian intention. It is not unlikely that
Riduan achieved the highest number of votes in the 2009 internal PAS
Youth elections partly because of his most outstanding and well publicized practical commitment to Palestine and his subsequent
status-enhancing credibility and trustworthiness.
For HAMAS, it is of strategic interest that Malaysian Muslims equate
Palestine with HAMAS. Its leader Khaled Mishaal met PAS’s Syed
Azman in Damascus, Syria in January 2010, where he claimed that ‘the
whole Palestinian people stand now behind HAMAS’.66 Within the PAS
community, a HAMAS-centric view largely ignores the existence of a
‘Palestine beyond HAMAS’, or Palestinian brothers who are ‘good
Muslims’ but nevertheless oppose HAMAS.
In the Manichean world view that dominates PAS discourses, the earth
is trapped in a divine struggle between the purely good (the sphere of
Allah) and the purely evil (the sphere of syaitan, Satan). This understanding of the world is often combined with an obvious indifference
towards any nuances that might blur the picture. The discourse-dominating thinking in binary oppositions includes ideas such as PAS/HAMAS
= good, UMNO/FATAH = bad; Palestinian struggle = Islamic struggle,
Israeli cause = Anti-Islamic cause – which corresponds to the thinking
in other clear-cut binary oppositions such as Islam v Jahiliyah,67 good
Muslim v bad Muslim, Muslim going to heaven v Kafir going to hell. In
line with such thinking, it seems that there is no interest in a two-state
solution; nor would detailed conceptions of peaceful reconciliation and
compromise between Israel and Palestine be something that PAS would
be interested in. A full liberation of Palestine and total destruction of
Israel appear to constitute the only acceptable objective for PAS.
For most PAS members, the Palestinian cause is essentially an Islamic
65
66
67
They include titles such as ‘Cinta di langit Gaza’ [Love in the Sky of Gaza] and
‘Gaza Menangis: Menelusuri Sejarah Perjuangan Palestin dan Pembantaian di Gaza’
[Gaza Crying: Following the History of the Palestinian Fight and the Slaughtering in
Gaza].
My translation. Quoted in Harakah: ‘Dunia masih meminggirkan rintihan Gaza’, 8–
10 January 2010, p N11.
Literally ‘ignorance’ or ‘barbarism’, it indicates a negative evaluation of pre-Islamic
life and culture as compared with the teachings and practices of Islam. In PAS discourse, it also refers to contemporary realities beyond what it regards as ‘true Islam’.
PAS Youth leader Nasrudin (2010) also speaks of ‘modern jahiliyah’ [jahiliyah moden],
a term that has been used before by Sayyid Qutb (Muhammad Qasim, 2002, p 8).
782
cause.68 It seems to be ignored that a section of the Palestinian people
see their struggle as territorial and political, rather than as a primarily
religious one – just as the fact seems to be ignored that there are also
non-Muslim Palestinians, who at times have been involved in fighting
for the Palestinian cause at arms (for example, in the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] whose founder was a Christian).
However, PAS’s ‘Islamized’ understanding of the Palestinian fight against
Israel and for territory is very much in line with HAMAS’s historic
‘achievement’ of making the Palestinian cause first and foremost a religious one. When HAMAS delegate Munir Said stated in Kota Bharu on
10 June 2010 that ‘HAMAS is not only a Palestinian movement, it is a
movement of the entire ummah! HAMAS means the continuation to the
struggle of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic ummah in Iraq, just
as it means a continuation for the struggle of all brothers’,69 his words
went to the heart of the Malaysian imaginations of a shared Islamic
struggle and movement between PAS and HAMAS.
Estrangement in the family? PAS and the Shias
The Islamic Party of Malaysia has an ambivalent relationship with its
Shi’ite ‘brothers’. Although many regard the Shi’ite brand of Islam as a
‘deviant teaching’ [ajaran sesat] and presently the majority of PAS
members view the Shia with a lot of scepticism,70 everyone will admit
that the role model of the Iranian revolution had a tremendous ideological impact on PAS.71 Similarly, it is clear that its own party-internal
‘revolution’, which in 1982 led to the formation of a new party-internal
normative order of kempininan ulama [religious scholars leadership]
and the related institutionalization of the Majlis Syura [religious scholars council] was inspired by the Iranian doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih
[Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists].
While Shi’ite Islam is regarded as substantially wrong by most PAS
adherents (with the exception of a very small faction that sympathizes
68
69
70
As Abdul Hamid (2009a, pp 151–152) noted, ‘in contrast with the government’s
official view, PAS’s unswerving commitment to the Palestinian struggle was justified on religious grounds’. He also mentions a ‘highly successful conference in 1989
to commemorate the first intifadah [uprising]’.
The author’s sound recording. Author’s translation, based on a translation from Arabic into Malay at the event by Khalil Abdul Hadi, Kota Bharu, 10 June 2010.
Shi’ite Islam is marginal and highly restricted in Malaysia. According to the US
State Department (2009), the Malaysian government continues ‘to monitor the activities of the small Shi’a minority’.
783
with Shia, but largely does so in secret), an emic anecdote indicates that
the opinion of Shi’ite ulama from abroad may at times have had remarkable effects on PAS. During the tenure of the late PAS President
Fadhil Noor (1989–2002), there was a heated internal debate about the
role of women in PAS, whether they should be allowed to contest seats
in parliamentary elections, and if so, under what conditions. Fadhil Noor,
who was generally known as progressive, supported the idea that women
should be allowed to contest elections. But he was aware of the sharp
resistances, especially among the – decisive – older generation of PAS
ulama, who categorically rejected the idea. According to a narrative a
PAS member told me, Fadhil Noor asked Mohamad Sabu, at the time a
Member of Parliament and known to have good contacts in Iran and
Lebanon, to invite a highly respected figure from the Shi’ite ulama of
the Lebanese Hezbollah to Malaysia in order to convince the conservative PAS ulama. As I was told, the Lebanese guest argued his point, and
none of the initially sceptical PAS ulama dared to object. In the end,
Fadhil Noor’s plan worked and – according to this narrative – had an
impact on the present situation in which PAS has prominent female
representatives such as Lo’Lo’ Ghazali and Siti Mariah Mahmud in the
Malaysian Parliament. As one-sided and oversimplified as this particular emic narrative may be, it is noteworthy that a religious scholar of a
foreign organization whose brand of Islam is locally considered to be
deviant, and that in parts of the West continues to be categorized a terrorist organization,72 apparently made an effective contribution to improve
the role of women’s rights in PAS.73
However, it seems that the trend in PAS tends to move further away
71
72
73
Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 151; Noor, 2004b, p 330 ff; von der Mehden, 1990.
Hezbollah is listed on the US State Department’s (2010) list of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations; the EU does not list it.
Conversation with a PAS Central Committee member, June 2010. PAS’s opening
towards female candidates was a multi-causal development in which this Shi’ite
scholar was just one element. Furthermore, PAS’s receptiveness to women in state
politics pre-dates this visit. In 1959, PAS had its first female parliamentarian, Khatijah
Sidek (Zawiah, 1991/92, p 23). However, she remained the only female parliamentarian for decades, and in 1980 PAS banned female candidates. As Abdul Hadi Awang
explained: ‘Since 1959 we have had a woman parliamentarian, (…). During the 1960’s
and 1970’s there were women candidates but after 1980 we decided that there should
not be any more women candidates. The reason is that elections in Malaysia are
immoral. We do not want women to be involved in such immoral things that [Barisan
Nasional] does during elections.’ (Islam Online: Interview: Abdul Hadi Awang,
Terengganu Chief Minister, Malaysia, 25 June 2001, Website: http://www.islam
online.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1156077757865&pagename=ZoneEnglish-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, last accessed 30 August 2010).
784
from seeing oneself connected to Shi’ite Islam. Even though guests
from Hezbollah continue to be invited to the PAS General Assemblies,
in 2010 their representative was not provided with a forum to hold a
talk, unlike the guests from Eritrea, the Maldives, the Philippines and
Palestine/Syria. A PAS politician regarded this as ‘discrimination’ against
the Shia.74 According to him, Abdul Hadi Awang finally even apologized for not giving him an opportunity to speak, when he met the
Hezbollah delegate in Kuala Lumpur before the latter returned to Beirut.
In a book published by PAS Youth activist Riduan Mohamad Nor, he
gives an overview of 34 ‘leaders of the modern Islamic movement’ [tokohtokoh gerakan Islam abad moden]. Notably, he does not mention one
Shi’ite figure there.75
When I asked a PAS member responsible for international affairs about
the party’s relationship with Shia groups abroad, he answered:
‘[…] with Iran, we also have some relation, not just in terms of politics, but also in terms of the development of the people, economics
and everything. And also with Hezbollah! We try to put aside the
differences among us, okay. Although we are Malaysians we are not
practising Shia, okay. And there is a lot of ideas about Shia. And also
what is Hezbollah, also practising Shia, we try to put aside. We try to
make use of Islam as a, common, common, what u say? … [D.M.:
“Common ground?”]… Ya, common ground! So, not try to discuss
about their belief, and also they are not to discuss about our belief.
[…] When we talk about Shia, it is, some say it is diverting from
Islam itself. Some say that they are defining Islam too much, extremely. But, we try to put aside, okay. Like what has been practised
in Northern Ireland. OK, although you are Protestant, although you
are Catholic, let’s put aside differences, let’s sit together, that’s what
we are trying to do under the PAS. Having a good relation with Iran,
having a good relation with Lebanon, under the name of Islam itself.
Not discussing about the differences. Because, if you keep on talking
about the differences, we cannot unite.’
PAS continues to send representatives and delegations regularly to Iran,
the two latest cases that I am aware of being a visit of PAS President
74
75
Conversation with a PAS Central Committee member, June 2010.
Riduan, 2010a.
785
Abdul Hadi Awang and Syed Azman in March 2010, when they met
leaders of the Islamic Motalefeh Party,76 and a visit of the national head
of PAS Youth, Nasrudin Hassan77 in March 2010.
PAS’s relationship with its Shi’ite brothers abroad and their organizations continues to be as ambivalent as ever. In contexts where it makes
sense to emphasize the commonality of religious brotherhood and blend
out the differences, this will be done. In others, being essentially different is brought to the foreground. To illustrate this point, it may be added
here that shortly before this article was finalized, a PAS member posted
a video on Facebook that warned about Shias and portrayed them as
liars, troublemakers and one of the biggest threats78 to the ummah.79
Another ironic situation emerges at the level of domestic party politics: from the Islamic perspective, UMNO members are brothers (if one
does not want to excommunicate them in takfir-manner and label them
infidel, as has been done in the past in the kafir-mengafir debates).80 A
key figure in PAS Youth told me:
‘UMNO is my brothers. Brotherhood. But different thinking. They
are, we are brothers, it’s my brotherhood. But the UMNO thinks different from me. We want the need of Allah Ta’alla, we do everything
for the need of Allah Ta’alla, for fulfil the responsible Allah Ta’alla,
but UMNO everything for the party. Different thinking. Different
direction. Everything from PAS is ibadah,81 what important thing for
76
77
78
79
80
81
The visitors attended an inner-Islamic ‘religious dialogue’ event (Harakah: ‘PAS
jalin persefahaman dengan parti Ahmadinejad’, 19–21 March 2010, p 2).
Personal information from Nasrudin Hassan, sms from Tehran, 5 March 2010.
Mohamad Sabu, who was detained without trial from 1984–86 and 1987–89 for alleged attempts to import the Iranian Revolution to Malaysia, stated: ‘Khomeini’s
movement […] drew my attention as well as my friends’ in PAS Youth in the early
1980s. […] we studied it, followed the events. […] A small number of PAS Youth
members became ardent followers of Imam Khomeini’s message. A few of them
attended courses held in Iran […]. Amongst the success of such interaction was the
setting up of Amal Unit [sic] which copied the success of the Jihad Sazendagi (JZ)
movement in Iran. […] this propaganda of the Shii threat is merely created to save
the thrones of the rulers in the Arab countries […]’ (Sabu, 2010). His sceptical position on claims of a ‘Shii threat’ is presently not representative for PAS.
Several key figures in PAS were (involuntarily) ‘tagged’ in it on Facebook. For a
link to the same video (‘Awas Perangkap Syiah – Syeikh Adnan Al-Ar’oor’ [Beware
of the Shii trap – Skeikh Adnan Al-Ar’oor], see Website: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pik3V5epnQU (accessed 16 June 2010).
Liow, 2009, p 38; Noor, 2004b, p 369; Stark, 2004, p 53.
Ibadah means worship or submission – in PAS’s discourse, this includes the ‘total’
implementation of Allah’s ‘commandments’. There are two types of ibadah: ibadah
umum (general ibadah) and ibadah khusus (special ibadah). The first refers to daily
786
PAS is ibadah. Important thing for UMNO is materialistic, that is a
difference.’82
Ironically, PAS’s political enemy UMNO consists of (estranged) brothers, whereas its non-Muslim coalition partner DAP stands outside this
fictive kinship community. Although regarded as friendly infidels, the
latter are imagined to be condemned to hellfire.83
While internally there is often a discursive emphasis on a oneness
that transcends all differences, when etically examined, the ‘Islamic
movement’ is essentially and inevitably diverse, fragmented, plural and
localized; whereas localization takes place in the form of transnational
interaction and localized transformative adaptations. While the movement may regard itself as universalist from its emic perspective, etically
speaking it is a particularist one (one of many), and is, furthermore,
internally subdivided. However, outsiders who point out internal conflicts are often accused of trying to ‘split the unity of the ummah’
[memecahkan kesatuan ummat Islam]84 and of being ‘enemies of Islam’.
A nationalist Islamist internationalism?
In the course of a growing political and cultural Islamization in Malaysia, the normative idea of a borderless, transnational Islamic brotherhood
[ukhuwah] grew in local discursive presence and importance. Beyond
this normative idea of ummahism, at least below the surface Malaysian
nationalism and Malay ethnicity are still powerful elements in the local
identities of many PAS members, as well as in the current tactical political
considerations of their leaders. One example of this was constituted by
82
83
84
activities that should be in line with Islamic teachings and performed with the intention of seeking Allah’s pleasure (for example, supporting one’s family, going to work
with good intentions). However, according to a PAS Youth figure, to establish hudud
[Islamic criminal law] is ibadah umum as well, and compulsory [wajib]. Ibadah
khusus refers to Islamic ritual practices such as praying, fasting, pilgrimage or reciting the Quran. Some ibadah khusus are compulsory, whereas some are considered
Sunna (encouraged but not compulsory: for example, reciting the Quran).
Interview with a PAS Youth member, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 2009.
PAS’s foreign policy is more compatible with UMNO than with DAP, while a comparable paradox can be observed with regard to the ‘bureaucratization of Islam’ that
was institutionalized by none other than PAS’s adversary UMNO itself (Liow, 2009,
p 43 ff; Abdul Hamid, 2009b, pp 13–17; Peletz, 2002, p 11). While UMNO has
turned the state into a ‘vehicle for Islamization’ (Liow, 2009, p 181) since the 1980s,
DAP has always opposed such developments. Ibrahim (2009) argued that UMNO
was the ‘political party nearest to PAS’.
For an emic example, see Nasrudin, 2010.
787
the angry protests by PAS representatives against the BN government’s
‘sell-out’ of Malaysian territory to Brunei85 and Singapore,86 where PAS
arguments were based on purely nationalist grounds. At least the Bruneian
government, with its Islamically defined state system of Melayu Islam
Beraja [Malay Islamic Monarchy], from a religious kinship point of
view consists of ummatic brothers. However, in that case, nationalist
Malaysian solidarity seems to be superior to religious solidarity. Another example is that in addition to the PAS anthem (Lagu PAS), the
Malaysian national anthem (Negaraku) is occasionally sung at PAS
events. At the opening ceremony of a PAS event in Perak,87 first the
hymn of Perak was sung, and afterwards the hymn of PAS – a remarkable order. Another example is Jamaluddin Elias, who was labelled a
‘national hero’ [wira Negara] at the PAS General Assemblies in 2010
after he returned from the Gaza Freedom Flotilla – a nationalist rhetoric, although his heroism was presented in Islamic terms as well.
For PAS, the simultaneity of Islamist internationalism and nationalist Islamism does not appear to be contradictory, and local–specific
particularities of the Malaysian Islamic movement and the globalist–
unitarianist imagination go hand in hand. However, this may be a problem in the minds of those who have left PAS and joined the competing
Islamist organization Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM). A PAS member
emphasized: ‘Hizbut Tahrir are part of our brothers. They are working
[for the] movement as an NGO, we are working as a Muslim Party.’88
The difference, though the emic emphasis of united brotherhood may
downplay it, is first, Hizbut Tahrir’s rejection of democracy89 and second, its challenge of the notion of the nation state as such, given its aim
to (‘re-’)establish a transnational Islamic caliphate.90 As Abdul Hamid91
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Malaysia Today: ‘PAS: Giving up oil to Brunei unconstitutional’, 3 March 2010. A
similar protest was uttered by a PAS Youth member from Sabah at the Muktamar in
June 2010.
Khairul Faizi, head of Dewan Pemuda PAS Johor, protested against a ‘secret deal’ of
the BN government to give away Malaysian territory to Singapore.
The event ‘Himpunan 10,000 Pemuda PAS Perak 2010’ was held in Kubu Gajah on
31 January 2010.
Interview with Mohd Adram Musa, Treasurer of Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat, Kuala
Lumpur, 7 January 2010.
Liow, 2009, p 137.
Although Hizbut Tahrir in principle challenges the idea of nation states, the situation
is more complex in detail, for example, in terms of the struggles to balance the
broader goals of the central and its localized(!) national branches, such as Hizbut
Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). For more on HTM, see
Mohamed Osman, 2010.
See Abdul Hamid, 2009, pp 150–151.
788
pointed out, ‘insofar as PAS’s external policies are concerned, its panIslamist leanings do not and have never reached the extent of advocating the restoration of a global caliphate which transcends the boundaries
of modern nation states. Capturing political power within Malaysia’s
democratic political system has always been its utmost priority.’ Transnationalist Islamist groups that operate beyond national party politics –
such as Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia – may have some impact on the way in
which PAS will navigate the internationalist component of its organizational profile in the future, as PAS is not only competing over support
with UMNO, but with several other Islamist movements as well.92
Interestingly, when Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia called on the Malaysian Army
to go to war against Israel (during ‘Operation Cast Lead’), in a way it
‘out-solidarized’ PAS.93 The normative rhetoric of the united ‘ummah
Islam’ stands in contrast to the reality of fragmentation and difference.
If in the discursive practices of PAS, internationalism and Islamist
nationalism go hand in hand without significant tension, we can conclude that emically, the question about transnationalism (or
internationalism, or Islamist cosmopolitanism) and nationalism is not
one of either/or, but of both at the same time. It depends on the requirements of particular contexts as to which of the two components one
refers to. This simultaneity must be understood against the backdrop of
how identities work in general: they consist of a wide multiplicity of
selectively emphasized (at times paradoxical) facets,94 and should not
be understood in a reductionist or ‘solitarist’ manner.
It can be argued that the idea of transnational Islamic brotherhood is
embedded in a transnational and translocal phenomenon of (g)localized
ummahism. Etically speaking, it cannot escape its de facto heterogeneity and inner conflicts, whereas internally it is imagined by its adherents
as transcending national borders in its very essence. Ironically, then,
discursive and practical manifestations of transnationalist ummahism
are inevitably localized in nature.
Ernest Gellner95 defined nationalism as ‘a political principle, sentiment and movement, …..which holds that the political and the national
unit should be congruent’. Ummahism can comparably be understood
92
93
94
95
Islamist civil society actors continue to add significant facets to the complex and
multi-layered dynamics of contestation over the present and future role of Islam in
the Malaysian state and society (Abdul Hamid, 2009a, 2009b; Lemière, 2010; Liow,
2009, p 113 ff; Hassan, 2002).
Mohamed Osman, 2010, p 102.
Sen, 2007.
Gellner, 1983, p xxvii.
789
as a transnationally oriented political principle, a sentiment and a movement, which holds that the political and the Islamic unit should be
congruent. Similarly, both the ummah and the nation share characteristics of ‘a mythical kinship community’.96 However, I would not go as
far as Saunders97 in his argument that the ummah serves as a ‘new’ or
‘ersatz nation’, a ‘non-territorial, postnational’ form ‘of allegiance that
will, in certain cases, fill the role played by nation-states in the recent
past’. At least in the present case, in which Malaysian national identity
remains largely unshaken within the PAS community, I find no indication that would justify speaking of a ‘postnational’ situation. Its globalized
Islamic identity does not replace national identity – it is complementary to it.
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An internationalist national Islamic struggle?

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