Suzuki Bunji and the Yuaikai
Transcription
Suzuki Bunji and the Yuaikai
The Japanese Labor Movement, 1912-1919: Suzuki Bunji and the Yuaikai Author(s): Stephen S. Large Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May, 1970), pp. 559-579 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2943244 . Accessed: 25/11/2012 06:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Asian Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Japanese LaborMovement, 1912-1919: SuzukiBunjiandtheYufaikai STEPHEN S. LARGE T HE historyof the labor movementin earlyTaisho Japanhas not drawn the attention of scholarswhichit deserves.In moststudiesof Japaneselaborhistory, the principallabor organizationof the I9I2-I9 period, the Yiiaikai ("Friendly Society")has been dismissedas an unspectacular do-gooders'mutualaid body.However,as the forerunner of the Nihon Rod5 Sodomei ("JapanGeneralFederationof Labor"), it was muchmorethanthisinterpretation would imply.As a legitimatereformmovementin itsown right,theYiiaikai developedintoa viablelabormovement in spiteof hostility againstorganizedlabor duringthisperiod.Since Suzuki Bunji founderof the Yiiaikai,dominatedit in its earlyyears,its growthmay (I885-I946), be studiedmainlythroughhis career.The patternof disputeswhichrackedthelabor movementin the twentiesand thirties may be firstdiscernedin Suzuki's struggleto retaincontroloftheYuiaikaiwhenhisleadershipwas challengedfromI9I6 on. Suzuki Bunji has been largelyneglectedby Japanesehistorians, suggestsNakamura Katsunori,becausehe was not an heroicfigure.'They have preferred to study the more dramaticpersonalities of the Taisho periodlike Osugi Sakae and Yoshino Sakuza, who struggled,suffered, and were persecutedfortheirbeliefs(both served time in jail; Suzuki did not). Superficially, Suzuki was quite the oppositeof the lean,hungry,and anguishedfigurecut by thelikesof Osugi. For a Japanese,he was unusuallyrotund.As opposedto therevolutionary apostlesof change,Suzuki looked morelikea prosperous businessman. His detractors, Osugi amongthem,tookpleasure in emphasizingSuzuki's softness.Osugi describedhim as a fat and greasylooking man witha brightred,plump face.2Yoshino Sakuzo, Suzuki's respectedseniorand view: Suzuki was a man with an easy smile and a close friend,offereda different cheerful, optimisticdisposition, alwayswell-likedby his teachersin schooland later by ordinaryworkers.3His immensephysiqueseemedto underlinehis jovialityand friendliness. Suzuki, with obvious relish,recountshow he used to have ordinary workerscome to his house on theirdaysoff,wherehe would servethemrice dumplingsand tellthemabouthorizonstheyhad neverdreamedof.4 Suzuki's vision of the labor movement'sgoals and tactics,indeed,the motives which governedhis actionsand ultimatelythe courseof the Yuiaikai,were rooted with an ardent in his philosophy,which combinedallegianceto social reformism and its accompanyinghumanitarianthrust.He firstcame into faithin Christianity a moderatedoctrineof change,whilea studentat Tokyo touchwithsocialreformism, in Historyat StephenS. Large is an instructor of Iowa. theUniversity 1 NakamuraKatsunori,"Suzuki Bunji to Taisho rodo undo" ["Suzuki Bunji and the Taisho Labor XXXII, No. I (Jan. Movement"],Hc5gakukenkyfi, I959), 43-44. 2 5SUgi Sakae, Zenshu [Collected Works],VI (Tokyo, I964), I70. s Yoshino Sakuzo, "Suzuki Bunji no soby6" ["Rough Sketch of Suzuki Bunji"], Rodo undo niju7nen [TwentyYears in the Labor Movement] (Tokyo, I93I), p. 5. Yoshinowas Suzuki's senior by six years. 4 Suzuki,RodJundo,p. 42. 559 This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 560 STEPHEN S. LARGE Imperial University.It was the guiding line of thoughtin the Social Policies Association(Shakai Seisaku Gakkai), an organizationof scholars,bureaucrats, and businessmento whichSuzuki belonged.He was particularly impressedby Professor Kuwata Kumazo who,fromhis lectureplatformand in the group,advocateda type of socialreformism whichemphasizedthatthe government, as the strongparty,had an obligationto help labor,the weak party;thatcapitalistsshould extenda helping hand to laborersin a spiritof mercy;and thatthe workersshouldestablishunions, mutualaid organs,and cooperativesto upgradetheirstyleof life.He favoredcomprehensivelegislationwhich would provide basic solutionsto labor problems.5 Kuwata's stresson labor unions and cooperationbetweencapitaland laborbecame thetwinpillarsofSuzuki'sconvictions on thelabormovement. The social reformist principleof harmonyand cooperationbetweencapital and laborwas one of Suzuki's main themesin the I9I2-I9 period,althoughas theperiod progressed, he graduallyde-emphasizedit. Severalmonthsafterthe foundingof the Yuiaikaiin August I9I2, he wrotean articlepublishedin the Yiiaikai paper,Yuiai shimpo, entitled"HarmonyBetweenCapital and Labor." In it he said, "The time when laborerswere slavesof the capitalistshas passed.Althoughtheyare laborers, they are men of independence."He reasonedthat productionwas the result of cooperationbetweenworkersand capitalists;so in the industrialprocessitself,there existeda basis forcooperationwhich could be extendedto the broad fieldof labor problems.6In an articleof the same titlein I9I4, he urged the capitaliststo put themselvesinto the shoes of the laborers.Relationsbetweencapitalistsand laborers should be like thosebetweenhusband and wife.7As will be seen later,when strikeserupted,Suzuki did his best to restrainthe workersinvolvedbecause he believedthatprogresscould be gained not by strifebetweencapital and labor but onlythroughharmony. Suzuki's socialreformism was a specialprinciplewhichdefinedhis basic approach to thelabormovement.It was not,as Osugi Sakae insisted,a systematic ideologyor labor theory.8 Suzuki was no theorist;he leftbehind no spate of writingson the theoryof the labor movementsuch as one findsin Osugi's works.He was rathera man ofaction,nota definerof ideology.He once wrote,"The Yiiaikai is nota society of words;it is a bodywhichstressesaction.It is not a collectionof thinkers."9 What matteredto him was bringingthe workersinto a unifiedmovement:"Unityis ... strength. We arein a worldwhereyoucannotdo anything unlessyouunite.... Unity is power."'"Possiblybecausehe avoidedany connectionwitha "suspicious"doctrine like socialismand becausehe devotedhis efforts in theearlyyearsof theYulaikaito thebasictaskof buildingup a base fortradeunionismin Japan,Suzuki was able to escape repressionfromgovernmentand businesscircles.At heart,he was a realist, actingaccordingto what was possible,given the environment of hostilitytoward 5 For a studyof the varioustypesof social reformism, see MatsuoTakayoshi,Taisho demokurashi no kenkyu[Studies of Taishd Democracy] (Tokyo,I966), pp. I49-52. 6 "Shihon to r6do to no ch6wa" ["Harmony BetweenCapitaland Labor"], Yu7aishimpo5,Dec. 3, I9I2, p. I. Some editorialsin this paper are unsignedbutscholarsagreethatSuzuki wrotetheedinamesare cited. torials,unlessotherwriters' 7"Shihon to r6d6 to no ch6wa" ["Harmony BetweenCapital and Labor"], Yu7aishimpo,June I5, I9I4, p. I. 8 (SUgi, pp. I7I-7 2. 9 Suzuki Bunji, "S6ritsu s6kan isshui nen" of the Foundingof the Yu7ai ["FirstAnniversary shimpo"], Yu7aishimpo,Nov. I, I9I3, p. I. 10 "Ketsug3 no chikara" ["Power of Unity"], Yiai shimpo,Oct.I5, I9I3, p. I. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 561 organizedlabor.Years later,he became identifiedwith what he termed"realistic socialism,"but in the yearsbeforeWorld War I, he rejectedsocialismas nothing morethana packageofunrealizabledreams. Suzuki'sfaithin socialreformist ideas and his realismled himto prescribe moderate tacticsforthe Yiaikai as a means to achievedignityand equalityforlaborers. His tacticsincluded,first,the creationof a centralizedlabor organizationwith branchesall overJapanintowhichlaborerswould be recruitedas rapidlyas possible. Second,throughthis organization,the quality of workers'lives would be raised. Much of the activityof the earlyYuiaikaicenteredon elevatingthe culturallevel of the commonworker.Suzuki and otherswrotearticlesencouragingthe workersto read."Readingis thebreadof themind,"Suzuki loved to say.Otheraspectsof selfcultivationwere not neglected."Take pains to cultivatephysicalstrength.. . . A healthymind dwells in a sound body."" Other articlesproclaimedthe virtueof of theworksavingmoney.Behindthiscampaignto sharpenthemind and integrity as an organizedbody, ers was the realizationthatin orderforthemto be effective theywould have to be preparedto take responsibleaction as individuals.Perhaps Suzuki and his assistantsin the movementwere guiltyof paternalism, treatingthe workerslike childrenin a spiritof noblesseoblige.But therecan be no doubt that Suzuki's concernfor developingthe workeras a whole personwas genuine.He sensedthatcapitalistslooked down on workersas so much rabble.He idealistically thoughtthatonce the workersbecamemore refined,the capitalistswould abandon thisdisrespect. A thirdaspectof the tacticsprescribedby Suzuki was the developmentof class as partof a broadconsciousness amongworkers.He wantedthemto see themselves based interestgroup.This selfawarenesswas indispensableto any sense of worker solidarityvis-a-visbusiness.Fourth,Suzuki wished to avoid alienatingthe business community. Instead,he wantedto wear down the suspicionstowardorganizedlabor whosegoal was and dispelthefearthatorganizedlaborwas a toolof revolutionaries to reconstruct societyfromtop to bottom.For thisreason,he opposedstrikes.Fifth, he wantedto rallysupportfromworkersfora campaignto repealthosesectionsof thePublic Peace Police Law whichrestricted laboractivitiesand enacta meaningful and perhapsundramatic. FactoryLaw. Taken together, thesetacticsweregradualistic But Suzuki thoughttheyrepresented a realisticprogramwhichwould giveorganized labora firmfoundation. contrivedby The apparentharmlessnessof the earlyYiaikai was intentionally Suzuki in responseto whathe correctly saw as a hostileenvironment. GeorgeTotten and AyusawaIwao bothmasterfully describethe fateof the Meiji labor movement, theformerpointingout thatthegovernment actuallysuppressedthelabormovement morevigilantly thanthe socialistmovement.12 ArticleSeventeenof thePublic Peace Police Law, which Suzuki criticizedrepeatedly, furnishedthe governmentwith a meansto crushlabororganizationsas it saw fit.ArticleThirtyof thesame law provided punishmentsfor violatorsof ArticleSeventeen.Factorylegislationdid exist (the FactoryAct of I9II), but fromlabor's point of view, it was pure tokenism " Suzuki Bunzi, "Kai-in shokun ni ichigon" ["A Word to theMembers"],Yuiaishimpo,Feb. i, 12 GeorgeTotten,The Social Democratic Movementin PrewarJapan(New Haven, i966), p. 6. 19I4, p. 3. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions STEPHEN 562 S. LARGE of the laborworld.'3The Treason Case becauseit appliedto onlya minorfragment and policeagencies on thepartof government of I9IO had kindleda hypersensitivity to changethe statusquo. Suzuki's account towardany movementwhichthreatened of thefoundingmeetingof theYiiaikai,whichrelateshow themembershad to come indicatesthepressures in thenighttwo by two to avoid policesurveillance, stealthily on laborin thelateMeiji,earlyTaisho period.14 thatthe Yiiaikai was designedto Given thisenvironment, it is hardlysurprising circles.The veryname "Friendly harmlessto businessand government appearutterly Society"was suggestedby Suzuki to allay suspicionregardingthe organization's As one scholaraptlysays,theplatformof theYiiaikai readslike a Sunday intentions. Schoolpledge: witheach otherand endeavorto attainthe objective i. We will harmonize ofmutualaid through unityandcooperation. to developintelligent 2. We willabidebytheidealsofthepublicand endeavor arts. in technical virtue, andmakeprogress cultivate opinion, 3. We will dependon thepowerof cooperation and endeavorto improveour soundmeans.15 statusthrough Suzuki made it his policyto printthe names and titlesof Yuiaikaiadvisersand councillorsin each issue of Yuiai shimpo and withgood reason,forthesemen were withhigh,unimpeachablesocial standing.He regardedtheirassociaall respectable, tionwiththeYuaikai as a kind of insulationto dispelsuspicionsaboutthe character of the movementand likenedthesemen to "gold leaf." These men spoke oftenat the popularlecturemeetingsheld regularlyformembersof the Yuaikai and wrote articlesforthe Yuiaishimpoand its successorRodo oyobisangyV.'6 Many of them came fromthe academic world. Besides ProfessorKuwata Kumazo, otherdistinguishedscholarslike Horie Kiichi and Takano Iwasaburowere associatedwiththe movement.Abe Isoo and Yoshino Sakuzo also acted as councillors.There were prominentmen frombusinesssuch as Hirano Ry5suke,a factoryowner; Yoshio Kisei, presidentof Tokyo Electric,who was a scientistwitha Tokyo ImperialUniversitydegree;and Soeda Juichi,presidentof theIndustrialBank of Japan.Kuwata, Horie, Takano, and Soeda were all membersof the Social Policies Association. Undoubtedlythe most prominentbusinessmanwhose friendshipand support meantso much to Suzuki was ShibusawaEiichi. When the two men met,whether of Shibusawa Shibusawagave Suzuki and theYuiaikaifunds,and whattheinfluence But Suzuki's among scholars.17 was on Suzuki personallyare mattersof controversy 13 An excellent discussionof the FactoryAct is by AyusawaIwao, A Historyof Labor in presented ModernJapan(Honolulu, I966), pp. io8-ii. 14 Suzuki, Rodo undo, pp. 52-64. When the foundingmeetingtook place the atmospherein Tokyo,as elsewherein Japan,was gloomydue to the deathof EmperorMeiji. The meetingwas held at the Mita UnitarianChurch. There were electricians,mechanics,lacquerwaremakers,milkmen and tatami makers among the fifteenwho attended. 15 Ayusawa, 16 p. 99. Suzuki givessketchesof theseand othermen associatedwith the Yfiaikaias advisersand councillorsin Rodo undo,pp. 64-87. Biographicaldata on manyof thesemen can be foundin Totten,Social DemocraticMovement. 17 Matsuo Takayoshi has argued that Suzuki firstmet Shibusawa sometimein I9I5 and that while Shibusawa may have contributedsome moneyto the Yfiaikai,the sum, and any influence it mighthave carriedwith it, were probablynot For Matsuo'sdiscussionand a resume extraordinary. of otherviewsof the Shibusawa-Suzukirelationship,see Matsuo,pp. I66-67. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 563 his successin forgingties with prominent friendshipwith Shibusawa exemplifies menoutsidethemovement. intermoderatereformers Generallyspeaking,Suzuki's associateswere altruistic, forsocialchangein thelaborworld.Although estedin theYuiaikaias an experiment Matsuo suggeststhat Suzuki consultedthem beforefoundingthe Yiiaikai, there powerin is no reasonto disbelieveSuzuki's claim thatthe grouphad no significant the reins Suzuki held contrary, On the shaping Yuiaikaiprogramsor policies.18 himselfand consultedtheseassociatesonly when he felttheycould be of use to him in the movement.The Yfiaikaioccupiedonly a portionof theirtime; Suzuki had consecratedhis entirebeing to the Yuiaikai.In a I9I3 issue of Yuiai shimpo he wrote,"The Yiiaikai is my burialground.I live withthe Yuiaikaiand pledge to die under the Yuiaikai.Members,please dig a burial pit for me. The laborersof the whole land are my friends,my parents,my children,my brothers.. . I cry, I laugh, I talk, I eat with them."'9 Severalwritershave emphasizedthe gentle,meek characterof the earlyYfuaikai. Totten,forinstance,describesit as a do-gooders'mutual aid societyforworkers.20 moreor less Hyman Kublin calls it a "benevolentassociationof workersfunctioning Ayusawa stressesits meekness in the mannerof the Englishmutual-aidsocieties."'21 and likensit to an "innocentlass."22All of these writersadmit that the Yiuaikai moved into a more militantposturenear the end of World War I but stressthe in the earlyyears.Nakamura feels that most Japanese organization'sharmlessness Judgingfromthe scholarshave likewiseregardedthe earlyYuiaikaias toothlessYP platformof theYuiaikai,thisverdictappearsvalid,especiallyin thelightof Suzuki's point of view which stressedharmony,not conflict, Christianand social reformist betweencapital and labor. Indeed, the earlyYuiaikaiwas far frombeing a labor unionas knownin theWest. and the Yiiaikai, fromits inception,was a reform But Suzuki was a reformer it would be movement.Ratherthan dwellingon its "mutual-aid-society-character," more accurateto underscoreits qualitiesas an incipientlabor union. A more balof the Yiiaikai, even for the earlyyearsup to I9I6, suggests anced interpretation thattheYuiaikaiand itsleaderwerenot,in fact,so meek:themovementdid challenge the statusquo in labor-capitalrelations.The earlyYuiaikaishouldbe evaluatednot in comparisonwith obviouslymore militantreformmovementssuch as those esto the actual positionof labor poused by anarchistsor socialists,but with reference in theearlyTaishl period. should not be allowed to obscurethe First,the mild aspectsof social reformism of reform. It containedrevolutionary implications fact that it was a philosophy The special mixtureof coupled as it was with a typeof progressiveChristianity. and ideas of social changecan be foundin manyJapaneseintellectuals Christianity in the Taisho period.Katayama Sen, Abe Isoo, Suzuki, Kagawa Toyohiko,Kawakami Hajime, Yoshino Sakuz5, and Osugi Sakae were attractedto Christianideas 18 Suzuki,Rod6 undo,p. 65. 19Suzuki Bunji,"Soritsus6kanisshuinen,"p. x. 20 George Totten, "Labor and AgrarianDisputesin JapanFollowingWorldWar I," Economic Developmentand CulturalChange,IX, No. i, Part 2 (Oct. I960), 21 Hyman Kublin, Asian Revolutionary: The Life of Sen Katayama(Princeton, I964), p. 223. 22 Ayusawa,p. 133. 23 Nakamura Katsunori,"Suzuki Bunji," liytu, XII (i967), II5. I90-9I. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 564 STEPHEN S. LARGE at one timeor anotheralthoughsomeof themabandonedtheirChristianorientation formoreradicalpointsof view.Kitazaki Toyoji,in his studyof Kagawa and Suzuki as reformers, pointsout thatKagawa's more militantideas in the labor movement werefuelledby an action-centered Christianity; Kagawa thoughtof thelabormovementas a religiousrevolutionary movementas much as a socialistmovement.24 In Suzuki's case, his understanding of Christianity embraced,first,a basic compassion forworkers;second,a desireto see themrecognizedas men,not brutes;and third, thekeyidea thatto achievethisdesire,changein thestatusquo was morallyimperative.His Christianity reinforced his social reformism at the heartof which lay the fundamentalcompulsionforchange.He saw the Yiiaikai as the centerof a movementtowardthe goal of labor unionism,a progressive enterprise which,hampered by a hostileenvironment, would have to move forwardwithextremeprudence,but forwardnevertheless. Perhapsthe cuttingedge of social reformism can bestbe appreciatedby a study of thedemandsof theYuiaikaivis-'a-vis theindustrialworld.These demandsare less piercingthanthedemandsmade laterin thewartimeyearsbuttheydo go farbeyond the SundaySchool toneof theoriginal1912 platform. An articlein 19I4, "From the Laborersto the Capitalists"pled forthesechangesin the labor world: more equal sharingof theprofitsof productionbetweencapitalistsand workers,equal treatment for all workers,a factoryemploymentsystemwhich would take into accountthe characterof the job applicantratherthan any personalconnectionshe mighthave, a fairsystemof promotionforfactory workers,an old-agepensionand bonussystem to rewardworkerswithrecordsof long service,programsto trainworkersin special skills, and recognitionby capitalistsof the individualityof workers.25Another demandwhich appearedfrequently in Yuiaikailiterature was the demand forlabor unions.26The very fact that therewas an organizationwilling to expressthese demandsat all in the earlyTaisho6periodis important. As Tottenwrites,"Subject labor remainedalmostcompletelyunorganizeduntilthe to continuoussuppression, timeof the FirstWorld War. The one importantexceptionwas the FriendlySociety."27In an intellectualsocietylike the Shakai Seisaku Gakkai, social reformism remainedan academic principle,isolatedfromany machineryof implementation. But in the Yuiaikai,social reformism becamethe guidingprincipleforan apparatus designedto bringaboutchange,albeitgradually. Second,theexpansionof theactivitiesof theYuiaikaisuggeststhatthe movement was potentially somethingmore than just a do-gooders'group. If the Yuiaikaihad beenbuilton loftyplatitudesalone,it would neverhave appealedto so manyworkers. But Watanabe Toru's studyshows that the Yuaikai organizationgrew steadily.28 From an originalmembershipof fifteenin August I912, the membershipclimbed wereover4,0oo regular to I,295 in June1913. ByFebruary and i9i5, there members, by Julyof thatyeartherewere over 7,000. The rateof increasewas to rise sharply 24 Kitazaki Toyoji, "Yuiaikaito r5d5 kumiai26 Suzuki Bunji, "Rod5 jigen" ["Labor Talk"], shugi" ["The Yfiaikai and Labor Unionism"] Rodo oyobisangyo,MarchI, I9I5, p. 5. 27 Totten,Social Democratic Movement, p. 3I. Taisho demokurashlno shiso [The Thought of 28 WatanabeToru,"Yuiaikaino soshikino jittai" Taishd Democracy], ed. Sumiya Etsuji, et. al. of the ["The ActualConditionsof theOrganization (Tokyo, I966), pp. 245-75. 25 "Rodosha yori shihonka e" ["From the Yfiaikai"],Jimbungakuhd,XVIII (Oct. I963), ILaborersto the Capitalists"],Yeiai shimpo, May 5, 70. 1914, p. 1. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 565 in i9i6. Watanabepointsout thatthe numberof associatemembers,while hard to was alwaysgreaterthan the actual regularmembershipof the organizadetermine, tionat anygiventime. The Yuiaikaicenterof operationswas in Tokyo but branchessprangup all over Japan.29The firstwas establishedat Kawasaki in I9I3 in a plant associatedwith Tokyo Electricwhose presidenthappenedto be a personalfriendof Suzuki and a Yfiaikaicouncillor.At the end of 19I3 therewere fivebranches;in I9I4 therewere where The brancheswere usuallyformedin districts sixteen,and in I9I5 fifty-one.30 as an organizationforthe cultivationof theYulaikaiwas regarded,by management, deviceon labor. good habitsamongworkers,as a kind of moderatingor restraining paid appearance harmless a This suggeststhatSuzuki's realisticpolicyof cultivating off;it does not mean, however,thatthe movementwas in facta supporterof the statusquo. Watanabe's studyindicatesthat the activitiesof the locals followedthe pattern set by the headquartersof the Yuiaikai in Tokyo. Before foundingthe Yuiaikai, Suzuki had launchedseveralprogramsin the Mita UnitarianChurch beamed at the workers.These programswere to remainan enduringpart of the movement, both centrallyand regionally.He initiated,forinstance,a seriesof popular lecture meetingsat whichprominentmen like Abe or Kuwata spoke.He openeda personal officewherehe advisedworkershow to deal with specificprobaffairsconsultation lems. He also establishedan athleticand recreationclub and tried to encourage Attendancewas usuallyimpressive. workersto bringtheirfamiliesto theseactivities. He had to removethe chairsfromone largeroomin thechurchand put down mats to accommodatelargergroupsreachingup to 700 people. also sponsored The brancheshad thesetypesof activitiesand, like headquarters, such organsas a reliefboard to assistdistressedmembersstrickenwith illnessor offices, injury,condolenceboardsto aid personswho had lostlovedones,employment at low prices,and securwhosememberscould buy necessities consumercooperatives ity societieswhose memberspooled funds against hard times. These programs of the workersinvolvedand theydid expose the laborersto reducedthe insecurity new ideas,especiallyin lecturemeetingswheremen like Suzuki or Yoshinotravelled to regionalbranchesand talkedabout labormovementsin Europe or the provisions of the igii FactoryAct.3' At leastsome workersbegan to see themselvesas partof was providedby I915 a movementseekinga betterday forlabor.At leasta structure in which the workerscould be graduallyorganized;in the absenceof thiskind of of theYuiaikaiin theTaish45period,thisis imporpriorto thedevelopment structure provedviableenoughand strongenoughto absorba largeinflux tant.The structure of workersin the wartimeyears.By the end of the war, the Yuiaikaiwas, without labororganizationin Japan. question,thestrongest the third index of A Yuiaikai'sviabilityas a reformgroupin its earlyyearswas in role Suzuki Bunji's disputeand strikemediation.Strikesand collectivebargaining were not legally recognized.Strikeswere more like spontaneousdemonstrations which usuallylacked coordination.In I9I4, therewere fiftystrikesinvolving7,904 strikes In I9I6, strikes In i9i5, thereweresixty-four involving 7,852persons. workers. 29 Starting in I 9I4, Yiiaikaibranchesemergedin Watanabe,p. 49. Koreaand Manchuria, 30Watanabe,p. 38. 31 Suzuki wrote a series of articlesexplaining Factory Law in Yu-as and criticizingthe I9ii shimpo. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions STEPHEN 566 S. LARGE numberedio8, involving8,4I3 workers.In I9I7, thenumbershotup to 398,involving From August I9I2 to August I9I5, Suzuki mediatedin seventeen workers.32 57,309 roseto twenty-seven.33 FromAugustI9I5 to MarchI9I7, thefigure labordisputes. One scholarpointsout thatSuzuki's actsof mediationweretheresultof his personal decisionto enterthe disputesand not the resultof any mandatefromthe Yu?aikai Suzuki was identifiedby all partiesconcerned Nevertheless, to enterthe disputes.34 known the Yuiaikaibecame increasingly as the head of the Yuaikai; henceforward, in labor. Suzuki did not encourageYuaikai membersto startor take partin strikes.His ideas on harmonybetweencapitaland labor precludedthiskind of militantaction and his realismregardedstrikesas a cursebecause theygave the businessworld a pretextforcallingon the police to crushthe strikersand rootout the Yuiaikai.His main motivein enteringdisputeswas to dispelthe notion,becomingpopularin the businessworld,thattheYuiaikaiwas behindthestrikesand puttingthematchto dry wood. On the otherhand, he was hardlya neutralmediator,to say the least. He wantedto pose as a championforworkers'rightsand he did his bestto reachsettlementsfavorableto the workers.He knew,as AkamatsuKatsumarowrote,thathis in such strikesas the Tokyo Muslin Company strikesin I9I4 "was performance in propagatingto theworkingmassesthefactof theYu?aikai'sexistence. effective Once the workersidentifiedthe Yfiaikaias an organizationon theirside, some of thembeganto flockto itsbanner. Suzuki's successin mediationstemmedfromhis abilityto bridgethe worldsof aware of therespectablemen attachedto the businessand labor.Many businessmen, to deal with YfiaikaiacceptedSuzuki as a negotiatorforthe workersand preferred their spokesman as him regarded Workers him ratherthanwiththeworkersdirectly. and respectedhis dedicationto theircause. a potentiallyseriousthreatto the A fourthreasonwhy the Yfiaikaiconstituted earlyyears,lies in the change the in statusquo, despiteits apparentinnocuousness which came over Suzuki himselfin I9I5, when he visitedthe United States.This by theAmericanFederationofLabor in I9I4 for tripwas in responseto an invitation as an expresa representative of Japaneselaborto attendthe I9I5 AF ofL convention onlythe sion of good will betweenthe two countries.AlthoughSuzuki represented allowed him to go abroadas a represen. Yuiaikai,themerefactthatthegovernment concession,amounttativeof laborwas, as Japanesescholarspointout,an important oftheYuaikai as a labormovement. ingalmostto tacitrecognition Suzuki was warmlyreceivedby laborgroupsin theUnitedStatesand had many in California.He was very particularly to addresslabor conferences, opportunities impressedby the organizationalstructureand concreteprogramsof the AF ofL, which included campaignsfor for an 8-hourwork day, abolitionof child labor, (Tokyo,I967), p. I4I. For a case studyof Suzuki's mediationactivitiesin strikessee his articleson the 33 Matsuo, p. I79. strike at the Tokyo Muslin Company, "T6kyo 34 Nakamura, "Suzuki Bunji to Taisho rodo musurinkaisha ni okerud6mei hiko mondai temmatsu" ["The Facts on the Labor Strike at und6," H5gaku kenkyu,XXXII, No. 2, 3 (Feb. Tokyo Muslin Company"],Ytuaishimpo,Sept. i, I959), 25-26. 35 AkamatsuKatsumaro, Nihon shakai unddshi, I9I4; Sept.I5, I9I4; Oct. I, I9I4; pp. 3-4. [The History of Japan's Social Movements] 32 Harada Shuichi,Labor Conditions in Japan (New York,I928), p. I77. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 567 establishment of labor insurance,and otherprogressive goals not yet a part of the publicYfiaikaiprogram."6 Katayama Sen, thenin the United States,was repulsedby Suzuki's appearance on Americansoil. Suzuki's posing as the spokesmanfor Japaneselabor agitated Katayama,who fanciedhimselfthe true representative of Japaneselabor in the United States.Indeed, Katayama,who had played such a remarkablerole in the Meiji labormovement, did represent theearliermovement;but Suzuki was farmore significant in the Taisha labor movement.When Katayama bitterly denouncedhis rivalas a "toolof capitalists"and theYuaikai as a "paperunion . . . a mereaggregationof names,"bothhis philosophicaversionto Suzuki's gradualismand his personal jealousycame to thefore.37 In America,Suzuki actedlike anythingbuta toolof capitalists. He toldAmerican audiencesthatJapaneselaborhad muchto learnfromtheAmericanlabormovement. But a new tone, a sense of urgencyand assertiveness previouslyundiscernible, enteredhis public remarks.On one occasion,this apostleof cooperationbetween capitaland laborstated:"Laborerstheworldoverhave commongoals and common interests.... We mustadvanceby transcending problemsofrace,religiousgroupings and nationalities....For thesake ofour commongoal,letus strugglein harmony... againsttheoverwhelming He began to talk morefrequently powerof capitalism."38 about struggleand conflict;more important, he explicitlyand publiclyidentified thecapitalistclassas theenemyagainstwhichlaborshouldwage a contestofstrength. It would be temptingto regardSuzuki's new enduringemphasison conflictas the resultof frustration faced by the Yuiaikaiin Japanin the earlyyears,but this would not be quite accurate.Suzuki, as a gradualistreformer, had been willingto move slowlyand cautiouslyin advancingthe cause of labor.Moreover,the growth of theYfiaikaihad been steady;therecordof themovement, giventheconditionsof the times,was successfuland Suzuki had enjoyedpersonalvictoriesas a mediator in strikes.His writingsreflect relativesatisfaction, not frustration, withthe progress of theYfiaikaiin theearlyyears. It would also be temptingto arguethatSuzuki was pushedintotakinga tougher line on the labor movementby dissidentelementswithinthe Yfuaikaimovement who wantedto go at a fasterpace usingmoreradicaltacticsin orderto bringabout a new day forlaborin Japan.Yet thisalso would be inaccurate.AfterI9I6, suchpressure did exist.But in the periodbeforehis Americansojourns,thereis no evidence thatSuzuki felthimselfunderpressureto changehis viewson thepace of themovementor its tactics.It was only afterhis tripsto the United Statesthatthe Yflaikai acquireda new groupof young,militantintellectuals who were laterto generatea revisionist movement whichchallengedSuzuki and hisideas. Suzuki's contactwith the AF of L mustbe regardedas a turningpointin him thinking.Suzuki had always understoodthe realityof conflictin society.In his he portrayed lifeas basicallycompetitive: writings, a seriesof conflicts forwhichone must be prepared-thiswas one of his themesfromthe beginningof the Yulaikai 36 Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H8gaku kenkyfi, no ki" ["Accountof Attendanceat the American Feb. I959, p. 36. Labor Convention"],Rodo oyobi sangyo,No. 53, 37 Kublin,pp. 224-25. Jan.i, I 9 I 6, pp. 8-9. 38 Suzuki Bunji, "Beikokurodo taikaishusseki This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 568 STEPHEN S. LARGE movement.89 But thisthemeof conflict had alwaysbeen subordinatedto the idea of cooperationwith capitalism.Now, cooperationwith capitalismbecame conditional on the recognition of labor'srightto organizeand to strike.When he returnedto Japanhe instituted reformsin the Yiiaikai and repeatedlydrummedhome the idea that"class unityis power."He called upon capitaliststo recognizethe Yuiaikaias a laborunionmovement, to recognizetherightof theworkersto organizeand strike.40 The toneof theYuiaikaimovementwas rapidlybecomingmore strident, moreconfident.To suggest,as some writershave done, thatthe organizationwas propelled by"forces"intoa moreradicalposition,or thatSuzuki,like a blockof wood floating on a quickeningtorrent, was carriedtowardradicalismby othermen against his will is onlypartlytrue.To a certaindegree,he initiatedand tookpartin theYfiaikai coursetowarda bolderprogram. In I9I6, the contextwithinwhichthe labor movementoperatedchangeddue to theimpactof thewar on Japan.AlthoughSuzuki was movingtowarda moreassertiveattitudetowardcapitalism, he was to findhimselfoutflanked bymen who wanted the Yflaikai to adopt even strongertactics and accelerate its programs for changeon behalfof theworkers.When strikeseruptedin late I9I6 and I917, Suzuki foundhimselfcaughtbetweenthesemilitantcolleagueson the one hand and business and government circleson the other.The militantswantedtheYflaikaito take advantageof the strikesand use themto exact concessionsfrombusiness.Governmentand businessthreatened to take suppressiveactionagainsttheYflaikaibecause it was widelybelievedto be responsiblefor unrestamong the workers.If Suzuki appeasedthemilitants, he would temptbusinessand government to openlystampout theYuiaikai.But if he appeasedthe forceswhichwere suspiciousof theYuiaikai,he mightalienatethemoreradicalfactionsin theorganization.The fateof theYuiaikai was boundup withthechoiceSuzuki was forcedto make. Betweenhis returnto Japanin JanuaryI9I6 and his nexttripto theUnitedStates in September,Suzuki worked at a feverishpace. He mediatedsix labor disputes, gave morethan ioo lectures(about his tripto America) in largeand smallmeetings all over Japan,and senta trustedaide, Matsuoka Komakichi,into the Kansai area to organizethemovementthere.One explanationgivenforthisfrenetic pace is that Suzuki passionately desiredto turntheYuiaikaiintoan organizationas strongas the AF ofL in as shorta timeas possible.41The burstof activity on Suzuki's part,including severalkey changes he made in the Yuaikai, indicatesthat he had left the United Statesdeterminedto quicken the growthof the Yuiaikaiand prepareit for the anticipatedstrugglewith capitalism.First,in an effortto centralizehis control overthemovement, he reorganizedthestructure of Yfiaikaiheadquartersand establisheda women'ssectionwithits own publication,the YuiaiFujin.42Second,he enof numerousregionalassociationsof variousbranches.These couragedtheformation associations(rengo5ai) were originallyorganized by Yuiaikai officialssent from Tokyo,but theywere actuallymanagedby workersin the respectiveregions.They 39For instance see Suzuki's article, "Waga shinai naru Yfiaikai-inshokun" ["My Beloved YuiaikaiMembers"],Yfiai shimpo,JulyI5, I9I4, p. I. to r5dd 40 Suzuki Bunji,"Nihon no kokuminsei undo" ["The JapaneseNationalCharacterand the Labor Movement"],RJdJoyobi sangyo,No. 6o, Aug. I, I9I6, pp. 2-9. 41 Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H65gaku kenkyfi, Feb. I959, p. 41. 42 Ibid.,p. 40. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 569 metregularlyand had considerable autonomyvis-a-vis headquarters.43 By May I9I7, therewerereng5kaiin Tokyo,Osaka, Yokohama,and Kobe. Matsuokawas theleading lightin theOsaka reng5kai;it and theKobe reng5ktiwerelaterto spearheadthe labormovementin theKansai area.Withthecreationofreng5kaiin theKansai area, the stage was set forthe subsequentKansai-Kanta rivalryin the labor movement. Throughthereng5kai,theYuiaikaiorganizationachievedan elementof stability and in areasfarfromTokyo. solidarity the moveAnotherindicationof Suzuki's awarenessof the need to strengthen mentwas his recruitment of youngmen who openlyespouseda passionate,idealistic desireforimprovingthe conditionsof labor.In I9I6, Nozaka Sanzo and Hisatome K5zo werebroughtintotheTokyo branchof theYuiaikai.Bothwereuniversity graduateswho impressedSuzuki becauseof their"innerfire."Nozaka was introducedto Suzuki by ProfessorHorie Kiichi in 9Ig5.At thattime,Nozaka was a studentat Tokyo ImperialUniversity eager to writean honorsthesison the Yiiaikai. Suzuki likedtheyoungman's sincerity.4 HisatomegraduatedfromWaseda in I9I6 and like intotheYuiaikaiby Suzuki personally.Hisatomelaterproved Nozaka was recruited himselfto be an adroitadministrator and had a hand in buildingup the Kansai branchof theYtiaikai.45 Nozaka and otheryoungintellectuals in the movementdespisedthe Shakai Seisaku Gakkai whichstillsuppliedmanyof theadvisersand councillorsof theYiiaikai. Althoughan intellectual,Nozaka identifiedwith the workersand wanted them, not the "respectable"men of the Gakkai, to lead the movement.Moreover,these youngermen stressedthe importanceof "power"in the labor movement,meaning thepowerthatcould be achievedif the workersunitedin thestruggleagainstcapitalism.They wanted action,not words; theydetestedgradualismand thoughtin termsof achievingreformsimmediately. For them,laborwas a vehicleforbringing about widespreadsocial reformsand eradicatinginjusticesrootedin the capitalist system. Besidestheseyoungintellectuals, Suzuki also made use of theabilitiesof men like Matsuokawho did not have an educationalbackgroundto speak of but had risen up throughthe ranksof labor.Fukuda Tatsuo and Hirazawa Keishichi,who were laterto playa keyrolewithMatsuokain themovement, enteredtheYiiaikai in I9I6, too. They formeda Labor ProblemsResearchGroup whichstressedthe experiences of the ordinaryworkersratherthan any theoriesas the key to planningthe course of the labormovement. As will be seen,thecleavagebetweenthe youngintellectuals and the worker-leaders became quite distinctin spite of theircommon claim to identifywith the workingrank and file.46 SeveralJapanesescholarsemphasizethe risingimportanceof democraticideas in I9I6 as yet anothercrucialchange which influencedthe labor movement.47 They notethatin I9I6 YoshinoSakuza publishedhis famousessayon democracyin Chu6 k&ronand thatKawakami Hajime's StoryofthePoor (Bimbo monogatari)appeared Matsuo,p. i8i. Suzuki,Rodo undo,pp. 85-86. 45 Ibid.,p. 87. 46 Biographical information on both the young intellectuals and the worker-leaders can be located in Totten,Socia DemocraticMovement. 43 44 47Matsuo presentsan analysis of the rising popularityof democraticideas in Japan during WorldWar I in his Taisho demokurashi, pp. I7779. Also, see his article,"The Developmentof Democracyin Japan,"The DevelopingEconomies, IV, No. 4 (Dcc. I966). This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 570 STEPHEN S. LARGE seriallyin the pages of the Osaka Asahi paper.48 One aspectof Yoshino's thought was his demandforequalitybetweenworkersand capitalists. Yoshino deploredthe continuationof old feudal worker-capitalist relationswhich bound laborersin a of equalslave-likestatusof inequality.He arguedforthebirthof a new relationship ityin which workerscould negotiatewith capitalistson a basis of equalityrather thansubmission.He wantedthemto be allowed to have laborunions.Suzuki welcomedtheseassertions becausetheytied in withhis own aspirationsforlabor.Other prominentscholarspubliclyproclaimedtheirsupportfor democraticideas. Ukita Kazutami and Oyama Ikuo of Waseda wereexamples.Anotherwas Sasaki Soichiof KyotoUniversity(not to mentionKawakami Hajime himself).Matsuo Takayoshi ascribesgreatimportanceto the risingpopularityof democraticideas in I9I6. He writes,"The trendof democracycontainingthesenew elementswas laterto severely shakethe Meiji Constitutional structure in theformof theRice Riotsand to expand and developtowardnew stages."49Admittedly, it is difficult to measureand judge theinfluenceof ideas on mass movements, but it seemsplausibleto argue thatfrom I9I6 on at leastsome of theworkersand theirleadersfoundstrength and inspiration in thediffusion of democratic ideas in Japan. The sharpincreaseof strikesfromI9I6 (io8 strikes,involving8,4I3 men) to I9I7 (398 strikes,57,309 participants)has alreadybeen mentioned.The trendcontinued Most intoI9I8, when therewere 417 strikesin which63,I37 men were implicated.50 commentators statethatthesestrikeswere aimed at obtaininghigherwages because in thewar periodpriceswere climbingrapidlywhile wages remainedstatic,thereby immensely reducingthepurchasingpowerof theworkingclass.Accordingto George Totten,it was not untilI929 thatthe numberof strikes(57I) exceededthe I9I9 figure.51The historyof theYiiaikai fromI9I6 to I9I9 mustbe studiedwithattention to this increasedactivityamong the workers. Watanabe Toru regardsthe last monthsof I9I6 as the beginningof the turning pointin Yiiaikai historybecausethe Yuiaikai'sinvolvement in severalstrikesin this For example,at periodultimatelyplungedthe organizationinto perilouswaters.52 the Japan Steel plant in Muroran (Hokkaido), 4,000 workersled by the Yuiaikai local stageda walkout.From his franticefforts to mediateand end thisand other strikeswhere the Yfiaikai was directlyinvolved,it can be concludedthat Suzuki Bunji did not himselfauthorizethem.They appear to have been organizedindedendently by thebranches.For thefirsttime,Suzuki's controlovertheYuiaikaibegan to slacken. The strikesat Muroranand otherplaces broughtthe Yuiaikaiunder increased suspicionin businessand police circles.The government, upon seeing the strikes spreadto arsenalsand munitionsplants,also tendedto blame the Yuiaikaiforagitating theworkers.In I9I7, as the numberof strikesrose,suspicionof theYiiaikai was translatedinto attemptsto crushit. The Yuiaikaibranchin the JapanSteel Works in earlyI9I7, setCompanyat Muroranwas ordereddissolvedby companyofficials new Yfiaikaibranches tinga precedentforplantsall overJapan.In I9I7, fifty-seven 48 Matsuo,"The Development of Democracyin Japan,"p. 626. p. 6n27. 0 KIbid., eds.,Saikinno shakalund,5[ReKyochokai, 15O centSocial Movements](Tokyo, I929), p. 255. 51 George Totten, "Labor and AgrarianDisputes,"p. 20I. 52 Watanabe, p. I7. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 571 were establishedbut seventy-four were dissolved.(For purposesof comparison,the numberof branchesfoundedin I9I6 was fifty-six, the numberdissolved,nine).53 Watanabecataloguesa long processionof cases wherethe brancheswereput out of commissionby the companiesafterstrikes.The incidentat Yokosuka Arsenalwas typical.Following a strikein which the YuTaikaibranch took part,the managementof the Arsenalrequiredall workersto sign a writtenpledge not to join the branch; Yulaikaimembersemployedat the Arsenal had to carrywrittenpledges statingthattheyhad severedconnectionswiththe Yulaikai.Suzuki appealed to the head of theArsenal,askingfora changeof thispolicybut was told thattheArsenal was nottryingto smothertheYuiaikai.This was obviouslyuntrueand not long after thisencounter, theYiuaikaibranchin theArsenalcloseddown.54 Suzuki's main problem,then,in I9I7 was how to preventthe extinctionof the Yu[aikaibranches.But just as seriouswas anotherdilemma,the risingchallengeto his leadershipof the Yuiaikai,which crystallizedin I9I7. Nozaka and Matsuoka combinedefforts in I9I7 in an attemptto seize controlof the Yfuaikaipaper,Rodo oyobisangyo (the successorto Yuiai shimpo). They also triedto seize controlof the Yuiaikaibudget.55 These were efforts to curtailSuzuki's controloverthe movement. It appearsthattheyfailedprincipally becauseSuzuki's allies objectedto the attempt. But this was the firstconcretemove against Suzuki's "autocratic"controlof the movement.It was thefirstsignalthatthe youngmilitantswanteda shareof power in he Yuiaikai.They were impatientwithSuzuki's gradualismand wantedto push the Yulaikaiinto the vanguardof the workers'increasingly assertivedrivefor concessionsfromthecapitalists. Suzuki had to taketheattitudesof men like Nozaka and Matsuokaintoconsiderationas he formulated his responseto themountingthreatagainsttheYiiaikai from businessand government. Presumablybecausehe thoughtthathe stillhad theupper hand in themovement, he decidedto framehis responseto thestrikes, and thethreat theycreated,in termswhichwould allay suspicionsthattheYuiaikaiwas behindthe wave of strikesin Japan.In making this response,Suzuki's chiefconcernwas to removethe dangerto the Yiiaikai fromits powerfuladversaries.This responsewas probablyrealistic,fora good case can be made forthe argumentthathad he associatedtheYfiaikaiwiththestrikes, theYuiaikaimighthavebeensystematically exterminated.Nonetheless,the responseSuzuki decidedto make also ran the riskof creating a deep fissurewithinthemovementbetweenhimselfand menwho would regard his strategy as a selloutto capitalism. Suzuki went to great,almostfranticlengthsin I9I7 to proclaimthe need for harmonyand cooperationbetweencapital and labor. In the pages of Rodo oyobi sangyo, he repeatedly called upon workersto be patientand refrainfromparticipation in strikes.56 The workerswere,he reasoned,too weak to challengecapitalism witha showof strength in strikes."Strikesare pugnaciousand pugnacityis barbaric," he asserted.57 He sympathizedwith the workers'demands for higherwages, but statedthateventuallythesedemandscould be realizedby peacefulmeans.Insteadof his formerstresson the powerof groupunityamong the workingclass,Suzuki beHe urgedthe gan to definepoweras basicallytheresultof individualself-cultivation. 53Ibid.,p. 38. Ibid.,p. 54. 55 Matsuo,p. 20I. 54 56 57 Watanabe,p. 54. Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H5gaku kenk4, Feb. I959, P. 43. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 572 STEPHEN S. LARGE on cultivatingthe mind and body.58But his main argument workersto concentrate of laborcould crushthe labormovementif theyso desired; was thatthe adversaries strikesprovidedthemwith an excuseto do so. When he went to the United States in contrastto his earlytrips,he did not in I9I7 to attendthe AF of L convention, talk about strugglewith capitalists.Instead,he said thatthe YuTaikaihad not come underthe influenceof Westernideas of class struggle,thatit did not disapproveof capitalism.He reiterated the capitalistsystem,and thatit did not wish to overthrow that the whole purposeof the Yuiaikaiwas to cooperatewith the capitalistworld in everypossibleway.59 Suzuki did not just mouth thesesoothingwords. He also took action to give themmeaning.In 19I7, he persuadedthe Yuaikai Conventionto issue a statement whichwas designedto clearthe air of suspiciontowardtheYuiaikai.The statement relatedhow the interestsof the workersand capitalistscoincided.Naturally,there Japan of opinionbut thesecould be resolvedthroughnegotiations. were differences must be strongeconomicallyand this requiredcooperationbetween capital and of thecountry.The statement labor.The Yuiaikaicherishedthisgoal, in theinterests was addressedto thewholenationand carriedSuzuki's signature.60 part of Suzuki's driveto coverthe Yuiaikaiwith an Perhapsthe most effective of a "LifttheEmbargoSociety"in August imageof innocencewas his establishment the exportof iron and steel materialsto I9I7. When the United Statesprohibited Japan,Japanesebusinessreactedby launchinga movementto lift this embargo. labor'ssupport Suzuki wantedtheYiiaikai to supportthismovementto demonstrate plus all of Suzuki's efforts of businessin a cause forthegood of Japan.This strategy, to show thattheYuiaikaihad not instigatedthe strikesor encouragedthem,greatly oppressionwhichthreatenedto engulfit. relievedthe Yiuaikaifromthe reactionary abate,of course,but afterAugust, SuspiciontowardtheYiuaikaidid notimmediately to rootout Yuiaikailocals slackened.For the moment,the Yuiaikaiappeared efforts perhapsencouraged to have survivedthe severechallengeof 19I7. The government, "wholesomelabor not oppose that it would later announced Suzuki's campaign, by meaningmoderateunions.61 unions,"presumably Suzuki's reversionto the principleof all-outcooperationwithcapitalismperhaps in suggeststhathe was capable of changinghis publicposture,whenevernecessary, the developto up efforts speed orderto safeguardtheYiiaikai. Given his quickened mentof the Yuiaikaiafterreturningfromthe United Statesin i9i6, it is probable not out of principle,becausehe out of necessity, thathe revertedto collaborationism realizedthat,forthe timebeing,the survivalof the Yiuaikaidependedupon such a course.In I9I8 he stilladvocatedtheneed forunionsin Japanand made publica plan union withYiuaikaimemfortheirrealization.He wantedto forman ironworkers' bersas a nucleusand to make thisunion a modelforothertradesto follow.He predicted,"The Yuiaikaiheadquarterswill become a General Headquarters,a central of variousworkerunionsall overthe nation."Indeed,thispredictionwas federation in i9i9. But evenin callingforunions,Suzuki wentout ofhisway to indicate fulfilled ["To my Fellow Members"],Rodo oyobi sangyd, SuzukiBunji,"Rod6 jigen,"p. 5. Suzuki Bunji, "Domei higyoto r5d6 dantai" No. 78, Feb. I, I9I8, p. 2I. Relationsin Post61 SolomonLevine,Indust*ial ["Strikesand Labor Groups"],R6do oyobisangy5, warJapan(Urbana,I 958), p. 63. No. 75, Nov. I, 1917, p. 5. 60 Suzuki Bunji, "Kai-in shokun ni tsugu" 58 53 This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 573 thattheywould be amenableto the stateand thatthroughthem,the workerscould betterservethestatein a spiritof patriotism.e2 however,wereunwillingto wait forbusiness His youngrivalsin themovement, to extendthe rightsthatlabor deserved.Nor were theywillingto and government withthestatusquo. Nozaka and Hisatomewantedto exploitthestrikes, compromise to blanketoverthefiresof worker not restrainthem.They detestedSuzuki's efforts discontent. They disagreedwith Suzuki over the questionof how the Yuiaikaishould react to thestrikes.They also clashedwithhim (and the"respectable"advisersand councillorsaroundhim) overtheRussianrevolutionand theRice Riotsof I9I7 and I9I8, Suzuki had been mostdisapprovingof therevolution.He lamentedthe respectively. When disorderwhich had befallenRussia and dislikedthe Kerenskygovernment. Lenin came to power,he was similarlydispleasedbecausehe abhorredrevolutionary Nozaka, however,was elated; he wrotean articlein the Yiuaikaipaper movements. fullofpraisefortheeventsin Russia,callingtherevolutiona greatlightfortheworld. The revolutionalso inspiredyoung men like Tanahashi Kotora and AsO Hisashi, who enteredthe Yuiaikaiin I9I9. They believedthatJapanstoodon the brinkof a socialistage and had littlesympathyfor moderateslike Suzuki. They exalted the role of Russian workersin shapingRussian historyand naturallythoughtthatthe cause.03 into a revolutionary Japaneselabor movementshould be transformed When the Rice Riotsbrokeout in I9I8, Suzuki immediately proclaimedthatthe in some Yiiaikai had nothingto do withthem.When Yiiaikai membersparticipated he fearedthat the riotswould inflamethe workersand give the of the outbursts, policea pretextforsmashingtheYuiaikai.He did his bestto discouragelabor'sparticipationin the riotsforthisreason.' But his youngrivalsin the Yfuaikaisaw the which the labor movementshould exploit. riotsas progressive, as an opportunity withtheiridealism. at cross-purposes Once again,theyfoundhiscautiousness Thus, by theend of I9I8, thereexisteda wide gap betweenSuzuki and men like Nozaka, Hisatome,Ash, and Tanahashi. His I9I7 tacticof supportingharmony but betweencapitaland labor had preservedthe labor movementfromdestruction it had also made his leadershipunacceptableto theyoungmilitants.He had reacted to the eventsof I9I7-I9I8 with hypercautiousness, justifiedfromhis pointof view becauseit was aimed at savingtheYuiaikai,but despicablefromtheirpointof view becauseit made the labor movementinsipid,a tool of capitalism.He remembered thefateof theMeiji labormovementand had builtup theYiiaikai in a periodwhen theenvironment hostileto organizedlabor.It was naturalfor had becomeextremely him to reactwiththiscaution.But the youngmilitantsdid not rememberquite so vividlythefateof theMeiji labormovementor,if theydid,theydid notgiveit much considerationbecause for them the times were changing.What appeared to be to theseyoungmen. From theirpoint threatsto Suzuki appearedas opportunities of view,Suzuki had forfeited his leadershipof themovementbecausehe had sold out to thecapitalists. 62 Suzuki Bunji,"Tekko Kumiai soshikino gi" Union Organiza["A Proposalforan Ironworkers tion"], RJdJoyobisangyo,No. 79, Mar. i, I9I8, pp. 5I-54. 83 As6 Hisashi, Shinshakaiteki chitsujoe [Toward a New Social Order] (Tokyo, 1922), p. 559. 64Suzuki Bunji,"Kome sod6to Yuiaikai"["The Rice Riotsand the Yfuaikai"],Rodo oyobisangy5, No. 86, Oct. i, I9I8, pp. 2-4. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions STEPHEN S. LARGE 574 A movementto expel Suzuki fromthe presidencyof the YuiaikaigatheredmomentumafterI9I7. At theend of 19I7 Hirazawa tookcontrolof theYfuaikaipublicationsand Matsuokatook chargeof the budget.Suzuki's power had restedmainly on his controlof thebudget,whichin turnhad restedon his abilityto obtainfunds fromoutsidecontributors in the early,lean years.Thus Matsuoka'sriseto a position fromwhich he controlledthe budget marked a considerableloss of power for Suzuki.65Moreover,a numberof Suzuki's advisersand councillorsseveredconnectionswiththe organization, principally becausetheydislikedthe ideas of the young new leaders.Slowly,Suzuki's originalallies in theYuiaikaieitherleftthe movement or foundtheirpowerreduced.6'6 In I9I8, the movementto reorganizethe Yuiaikai along more democraticlines bubbledup in theKansai area where,by thistime,a firmbase had been constructed for the labor movement.It was significantthat this revisionistmovementfirst gatheredmomentumin thearea whereSuzuki's control,centeredas it was in Tokyo, was relativelyloose. The movementwas guided and directedby men who, while remainingoutwardlydeferential to Suzuki, actuallycharteda courseof actionquite on theirown. When Kagawa Toyohikoreturnedto Japanfromthe United States in I917 and took the reinsof the Kansai sectionof the Yuiaikai,he inheritedthe handiworkof Matsuoka,who had sincereturnedto Tokyo to take a major post in theYiiaikai headquarters. The epicenterof theKansai revisionist movementwas the Kobe reng5kai,the leading forceof which was the Kobe local of the Yiiaikai. Kagawa, as leader of the local, took the initiativein establishingShin Kobe, a labor paper which emphasizedthe power of labor unity.This paper was reputedly Kagawa and Hismorepopularin the Kansai regionthantheRodo oyobisangy5.67 atome,who had leftTokyo to help build up the Kansai movement,plunged the This markedthe entryof the rengokaiinto the movementfor universalsuffrage. Taish5 labor movementinto the politicalarena. In March I9I9, Hisatome carried to Tokyo a petitionfrom2,239 Kansai workers,callingforrepealof ArticleSeventeen of the Public Peace Police Law. The documentwas circulatedin the Kanta area, whereapproximately 3,000 more workerssignedit.68The petitionmovement was just one exampleof how the initiativefornew, assertiveprogramswas being exertednot by the Kanta sectionof the Yuiaikaibut by the Kansai section.Matsuo about the groundswellof activism Takayoshimakes severalpertinentobservations in theKansailabormovement in I9I9. First,he pointsout thatthe commonworkersplayeda greaterrole in initiating theseprogramsthanearlier.Before,theylistenedpassivelyto men like Suzuki or his advisers;now, theygave the speechesthemselves.Nishio Suehiro,who joined the Yiiaikai Kansai branchin I9I9, was a good exampleof this tendency-heproved himselfan able laborleaderfromtheoutset. Second,the new activismof the Kansai labor movementhad littleto do with initiativesfromSuzuki and the Tokyo headquartersof the Yuiaikai.In reality,the withitsown publication, its own leadersand programswas Kansai labormovement, a separatecenter moremilitanttypeof labormovementwhichconstituted a different, of power in the Yuiaikai althoughnominallyunder the Yuiaikai headquartersin Matsuo, pp. I192-93. 66 Ibid.,pp. 192-93. 65 57 68 Ibid.,p. 209. Ibid.,pp. 2II-I2. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 575 1912-1919 Tokyo.In general,theKansai laborleaderswantedto givetheworkersauthority over theirown movement.Inherentin thispolicywas a rejectionof theleadershipof men like Suzuki Bunji."9 In December I9I8, the Kobe local had led the way in organizingthe powerful Yiiaikai Kansai Dameikai,whichwas a federation of reng5kaiin theOsaka-Kyoto area. The importanceof the Domeikai cannotbe overestimated because its format and philosophy, stressingdemocratization of the labor movementand a sharingof power,rejectedSuzuki's one-manleadershipand moderatereformism. It repudiated theleadershipof moderateintellectuals like Suzuki but stoppedshortof condemning all intellectuals as uselessin thelabormovement.Men like Hisatomedid notfallinto thisdespisedcategory. The changesin the labormovementorganizationmappedout in theKansai area presagedwhatwas to occurin theKant6 sectionof themovement in August I9I9. Each reng5kaiwas to elect representatives to a board of directors to overseethe coordinatedprogramsof the alliance.The outstandingcharacteristic of theDomeikai was thatitsleaderswereto be electedfromtheranksof theworkers. This did notpreventKagawa frombecominghead of the directorate. Hisatomealso held a key post on the directorate. Intellectualslike Kagawa and Hisatome shared powerwiththe workers'delegatesfarmoreequally than had Suzuki. The directors also had joint liabilityas a group; the presidentcould not dominatethe directorate autocratically and the advisersand councillorsof the various brancheswere not allowed even to sit in on directoratemeetings.Also the Di6meikaiformallyproclaimedin its foundingstatement thatitspurposewas to struggleagainstcapitalism. It was assertedthatonly the workerscould constructa new societyin which their rightswould be guaranteed.7 Suzuki was fullyaware of theimplicationsof the Domeikai forhis own position in the movement,and this is perhapsone reason why he plungedinto mediating activities involvingstrikeswhereKansai Yulaikaiorganswereconcernedwitha view to boostingboththemovement'scause and his own image in themindsof his opponents.But mediationwas not likelyto assuagetheresentment boilingup againsthim in the Kansai area,even had he managedto settledisputesin favorof the workers, whichhe was unable to do in mostcases.Kagawa publiclychastisedSuzuki fornot establishingstrikecommitteesto coordinateactivitiesin seeking settlements. He resentedSuzuki's insistenceon handlingthe mediationalone. Many workersleft Yiiaikai branchesin protestagainstSuzuki's intervention in thestrikes, onlyto rejoin later,hotlydeclaringthat Suzuki must be removedfromthe movement.In I9I9, feeling against Suzuki and the moderateleadershipat headquartersgained in in thevariousTokyo area reng5kai.7' strength It is doubtfulthatSuzuki could have quietedthe discontent had he remainedin Japan,but his trip to Paris in early i9i9 virtuallyassured his ultimateloss of power in the movement,forit gave his opponentsmore room to conspireagainst him.Beforetracingtheconspiracy, it is usefulto relatethechangethatSuzuki underwent in Paris. His traumaticexperiencetheremay partiallyexplainhis later"conversion"to socialism. Suzuki was summonedto Paris to assist the Japanesedelegatesto the Peace 69Ibid.,pp. 212-13. Ibid.,p. ZI6. 70 71Ibid.,p. 221. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 576 STEPHEN S. LARGE Conferenceon laborproblemsmainlybecausethe Japanesegovernment could think of no one else qualifiedforthe mission about going F2 Suzuki was veryenthusiastic to Paris and believed,when he leftJapan,that he would have an opportunity to advancethecause of laborat theepochalconference. Being a proudman,he perhaps overestimated his potentialrole. At any rate,the Japanesedelegationfailedto use his talents.He was told to remainon call in his Paris hotel room.Ayusawa,who knew Suzuki personally,wrote that Suzuki "waited in his hotel room patiently everyday but he was never called and the Peace Conferencecame to a close."73 Suzuki leftParis forthe United States,wherehe attendedthe AF ofL convention of I919 in AtlanticCity,withoutdoing anythingto advancethe cause of labor.He returnedto Japandisappointedand bitterly resentfulover havingbeen snubbedby the delegation.He had no doubthoped to repairhis positionin the Japaneselabor movementby participating in significant meetingsat Paris but thisgoal had been frustrated. He had gainedfromhis tripknowledgeof theInternational Labor Organization,in whichhe hoped to playa majorroleas Japan'srepresentative, butin terms of his powerpositionin theYuiaikai,he had gainednothingfromhis journeyto the West.The Japanesedelegation'slack of enthusiasmfortacklinglaborproblemshad the effectof convincingSuzuki thatthe government and businessworldswere still brutallyapathetictowardlaborin Japan.He saw once again thatmoderatecollaborationwithcapitalismwould not bear fruitin the futureany morethan it had in the past. Upon arrivalin Japanin JulyI9I9, Suzuki made clearhis negativeattitudetoward collaborationwith capitalismby rejectinga proposal fromShibusawa Eiichi that Suzuki participatein the establishmentof the HarmonizationSociety,a body designedto mediatebetweencapitaland labor.Suzuki laid down strongconditions beforehe would acceptthe invitation:capitalismmust recognizethe legitimacyof laborunionsand grantlabortherightto strike.Shibusawasaid thesedemandswere at thattimeabsolutelyunacceptableand Suzuki informedhis friendthathe would have no partin the HarmonizationSociety.Afterthat,his relationship withShibusawa quicklycooled.74 Suzuki's conversionto socialismtookplace afterhe returnedto Japan.Years later he commented: I have movedfromsocial reformism to socialism.At firstI believedin social reformism and considered socialisma bad thingor at leastpractically impossible. I feltthat. . . reformism was practical, effective in bringing out thestrongpoints of capitalism, in correcting its weak points.But whenI came faceto facewith laborproblems, thespiritof antagonism welledup withinme. The capitalists had treated thelaborers persistently as slaves.75 Now thathe returnedfromtheUnitedStatesand Europe,Suzuki acceptedthetrend forreconstruction in thelabormovementand voicedhis agreement withtheproposals in theYiiaikai forstructural changein themovement. It is doubtfulthatSuzuki could have respondedotherwiseto therevisionist movementin the Yiiaikai withoutbringingon his totalousterfromthe movement.His conversionto socialismmay have been partlya genuineresultof his disillusionment Ayusawa,p. 120-21. 73Ibid.,p. 121. 72 74 Suzuki,Rodo undo,pp. I86-98. 75 Ibid.,pp. i83-84. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 577 in Paris,but it was also a flagof surrenderto opponentswho were determinedto to It was thepricehe had to pay forbeingpermitted expel himfromthepresidency. remainin themovementhe had founded. and programs While he had beenin Paris,thedriveto revisetheYuiaikaistructure had coalescedinto two camps.Both camps wantedto struggleagainstthe capitalist betweenthem.The Asa-Tanahashisystem.But therewere importantdifferences wantedthe labor Hisatomefaction,who mightbe labeledthe "youngintellectuals," movementto become an instrumentfor class warfare.The Matsuoka-Hirazawa were preparedto undertakemore assertiveprograms faction,or "worker-leaders," in the labor movementbut did not like the overtonesof class warfare.They preferredto consolidatespecificgains forthe workersand the union movementrather of society. than to undertakeany grandioseprogramfor the total reconstruction should controlthe Matsuoka argued also that the workers,not the intellectuals, labormovement. had links with It shouldbe notedthatthe Asa-Tanahashi faction,in particular, the Wednesday Society,formedby Aso Hisashi after the Russian Revolution. towarddocThis Societystudiedsocial problemsand was profoundlysympathetic change. It took inspirationfromthe Russian revolution.76 trinesof revolutionary Later,togetherwith Yoshino Sakuz5, Aso and Tanahashi took part in the Dawn Society.This groupproclaimeddemocracyas thewave ofthefuture.The New Men's Society(Shinjinkai), foundedby Yoshino,also influencedmanyof the youngmen in thelabormovement.The link betweenthesesocietiesand theYuiaikairevisionists drew inspirationfromthese groups.Suzuki is importantbecause the revisionists believed,rightly,that Yoshino Sakuzo and his colleaguesin the Shinjinkaihad in theirquest to turnthe Yuiaikaiinto a more militant encouragedthe revisionists organization.77 democratic and revolutionary, The two revisionist factionsclashedalso overthe fateof Suzuki. The Aso-TanaMatsuokawas veryanxious hashigroupwantedto expelSuzuki fromthepresidency. to negotiatethe to avoid any open movementto get rid of Suzuki and preferred matterbehindthe scenes.He did not want Suzuki smearedin an open campaign, partlybecause this would tarnishthe image of the Yiiaikai. Afterall, Suzuki did symbolizethe movement;to denigratethe symbolwould be foolish.In privatetalks on May 22 with Hisatome and Aso, Matsuoka achieveda compromise.The men agreedthatSuzuki could remainin the movementas presidentif he agreednot to It was also agreed that interfere with the programsprescribedby the conspirators. power with the Aso-Tanahashi faction. Matsuoka would share decision-making but in a direc. Thus thereal centerof powerwould be locatednot in the presidency it was agreedthathe would be removed torate.If Suzuki resistedthisarrangement, fromthepresidency.78 Suzuki's fatehad been workedout in Tokyo while he was abroad.The revision. istscertainly knew thatthereexistedin thereng5kaiall overJapana growingsentimentin supportof majorpolicychangesin theYuiaikai.Many reng5kaiin boththe in supportof renovatingtheYuiaikai.79 Kansai and Kanto areasproducedresolutions 76 [Biographyof Aso Hisashi] (Tokyo, I958), pp. 77 126-27. Totten,Social DemocraticMovement,p. 141. Suzuki,Rodo undo,p. I85. 78Kawakami J6tar5,ed., Aso Hisashi den 79 p. 226. Matsuo, This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions STEPHEN S. LARGE 578 factions the compromisebetweenthe two revisionist It may be possibleto interpret for a before initiative to come to a settlement in Tokyo as an efforton theirpart had rivalry in the Kansai-Kant6 Yfiaikai area. the Kansai power change arose in order in quickly moved factions the Tokyo perhaps accumulatedsubstanceby I9I9; to dominatethenew Yuaikai ratherthansee the centerof powershiftto the Kansai area.80 Yfiaikai Convention I9I9 The changes institutedin the August-September, reflectedthe ambitionsof the young militantsfor the labor movement.These changesmarkeda turningpoint in Japaneselabor history.First,the Yiiaikai was renamedthe FriendlySocietyGreaterJapan General Federationof Labor (Dai of Nihon R45daSodomei Yiiaikai). The new name symbolizedthe transformation Second,theYuiaikaibrancheswerereorgantheYiiaikai intoa truelaborfederation. theYtiaiized intotradeor industrialunions.Beforebecominga generalfederation, kai had reallybeen an incipientlabor union withmanybranches.Now its identity was clarified;it became a federationwhich embracednot only formerYuiaikai duringthe war. Third, branchesbut otherunionsthathad organizedindependently were curtailedand replacedby a moredemothe absolutepowersof the presidency Among wieldedpowerin the federation. craticsystemwherebya board of directors thedirectors wereAso Hisashi,Tanahashi,and Hisatomewho had led therevisionist movement.Thus, Suzuki's personalcontrolover the organizationcame to a formal end althoughactuallyhis controlhad been reducedearlier.Fourth,the Convention resolutiondrawn up by Kagawa which in both formand adopteda twenty-point of the new organization.The resocontentexpressedthemilitancyand assertiveness theYfiaikaihad made pre. lution'sobjectiveswentfarbeyondany public statement viously.For example,the organizationnow called for freedomof labor unions; law and workman'scompensaof a minimumwage, laborarbitration establishment of the educationalsystem;amendtion system;universalsuffrage;democratization mentof thePublicPeace Police Law.81 the FriendlySociety The changesadoptedin the I9I9 Conventiontransformed in theWest. patternedaftersimilarorganizations intoa potentlaborunionfederation A new groupof men heldpower.New programsand tacticswereemployedin order to reacha broaderrangeof objectives.The Federationopenlysupportedstrikesas a legitimatetactic,whichindicatesthatthenew organizationwas infusedwitha militant spiritquite in contrastto the moderationthathad characterizedmost of the 30,000 leadershipunder Suzuki. In termsof numbers,therewere approximately personsassociatedwiththeFederation. Suzuki was able to remainin thenew organizationas titularhead partlybecause the Sodomei and its sweepingresolutionswere reallywhat he had been working towardeversince I9I2. By I92I, Suzuki had moved well beyondhis moderateposin thelabormovementby tureofpastyears,butoddlyenough,he was stilloutflanked likeYamakawa Hitoshi.Next to them, like Osugi Sakae and communists syndicalists he appearedto be a moderatesocialist.He remainedpresidentof theGeneralFederaof theselateryears,because tionuntil1930, quitean achievement giventheturbulence 80 The rivalrybetweenthe Kansai and Kanto branchesof theYuiaikaineedsclosestudy.The sugcongestionin this essaythat Kanto revisionists to outmasciouslyplannedtheirmoves specifically is tentative. neuvertheirKansai counterparts 81 For the completeresolution, see Suzuki,R6do undo,pp. I82-83. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.70 on Sun, 25 Nov 2012 06:15:21 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919 579 he was able to bend with the winds of controversy thatsweptinto the labormove. mentand toreit asunder. However,Suzuki's role in the So5d5meiafteri9i9 was quite different fromhis role in the I9I2-I9I9 periodforalthoughhe remainedpresident, he no longerruled themovementwitha freehand. The real issueof theconspiracyagainstSuzuki had not been the goals he had advocatedforthe movement,fortheyhad foundexpres. sion in the S6d6meiplatformdrawnup by the men who had plottedagainsthim. Rather,thereal issuehad been his "autocratic"controloverthemovement.Matsuoka feltthat Suzuki's intolerantattitudetowardmen who held different views in the Yuiaikaiwas objectionable.82 Tanahashiand As6 also deeplyresentedSuzuki's authoritariangrip on the movement.83 One contemporary writerneatlysummedup the importanceof the shiftof power fromSuzuki to a directorate: "In the past,it was Mr. Suzuki's Yuiaikai; now, it was the Yfiaikai'sMr. Suzuki."84 In conclusion,therewas virtuallyno labor movementin Japanin I9I2 afterthe in the Meiji period to organize labor. Yet by I9I9, a foundation failureof efforts existedin theYuiaikaifortheriseof an assertiveand potentially effective labororganization,theFriendlySocietyGreaterJapanGeneralFederationofLabor. The man mostresponsible forthecreationof a viablelabormovementin theearly Taisho periodwas Suzuki Bunji. A moderatereformer in immoderatetimes,Suzuki foundhimselfeclipsedin theeventsof I9I9 by men of moremilitantdispositionwho were impatientwithhis compromising tacticsand his authoritarian controloverthe movement.However,in a real sense,his pragmaticmoderationhad been a major factorin buildingup theYiiaikai. When the movementwas threatened withextinctionin I9I7, thesetacticsof compromise saved theYiiaikai althoughtheydiscredited Suzuki in theeyesof his rivals.His authoritarian controloverthemovementwas also important in guidingtheYuiaikaithroughdifficult times.At least,underhisdirection, theYfiaikaienjoyeda unityand stability amongitsleadersduringthe1912-l9I9 years of growthand development. In igig, afterthebirthof the Federation,the Japanese labormovementenjoyeda structural cohesiveness and strength it had not knownin the past. AfterI9I9, preoccupationwith ideologyon the part of the new leaders opened the door to bittertheoreticaldisputesin the labor movementwhich led to disintegrative splitsduringthenexttwo decades. With the comingof men orientedto revolutionary ideologyinto the Yuiaikaiin I9I9, the movement was labor was no longerguided by leaderswhose top priority unionism.Henceforward, thelabormovementwould become,in thehandsof itsnew not an end in itself,as it had been forSuzuki,but a meansto a larger manipulators, end, the revolutionof the broadersociety.The seeds of futuredisunityin the labor movementwere sown in the I919 struggleforpowerin theYfiaikai,when concern forthe promotionof revolutionary ideas in the ranksof laborand the emergenceof regionalrivalriesin themovementwerefirstdiscernible. 82 Sodomei Gojiinenshi kank6 i-inkai, eds., S6domei gojiinenshi [The FiftyYear Historyof I] (Tokyo,I965), 63-64. the GeneralFederation, 83 TokyoNichi-Nichi Shimbun,eds.,Yuaikaino soshikito kononaijc [The Organizationand Internal Conditionof the Yfiaikal] (Tokyo, I92I), p. 10. 84 Ibid.,p. 12. 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