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ISIG JOURNAL
Quarterly of International Sociology
Trimestrale di Sociologia Internazionale
volume XVIII – numero 3/4 – 2009
SUMMARY
pag.
PRESENTATION, Alberto Gasparini ………………………………………….……..………
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BORDERS THAT UNITE
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee, Roberto Lavarini ….………………………………...
Pan European Corridor Eight - Towards sustainable development, Reis Mulita ………….….
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BORDERS, TOWNS AND REGIONS
Beyond the borders of Mediterranean cities: The Mediterranean city in transition, Lila
Leontidou ………………………………………………………………….…..…………
Istanbul Italian Levantines among the other non-Muslims: A community’s fortune and
dissolution despite identity preservation, Alessandro Pannuti ….……….………..…….
Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European integration, Helga Schultz ….…….
Terre di passaggio, terre di confine, Raoul Pupo ……………………………………………..
What we’re walling in: The political, economical, and psychological ramifications of the
United States/Mexico border fence, A. César Carmona, Cassi Landrus, Daniel Miranda
BORDERS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
Human Rights and basic freedoms: New challenges in the post “cold war” Europe, Lev
Voronkov ………………….………………………………………………………….
Global developments and the role of the EU: An outlook, Vasile Puşcaş ..…………..…….
Anticorruption as revolution, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi ……………………………….………..
Identities: European ways to live the nationality, Emanuele Gatti …………………………..
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Editorial Board
Edgar F. Borgatta, University of Washington
Vincenzo Cesareo, Catholic University of Milan
Jürgen Friedrichs, University of Cologne
Renzo Gubert, University of Trento
Max Haller, University of Graz
John Hume, Peace Nobel Prize
Giuseppe O. Longo, University of Trieste
Zdravko Mlinar, University of Ljubljana
Antonio Papisca, University of Padua
Riccardo Petrella, University of Louvain
Vasile Puşcaş, Babes Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca
Bruno Tellia, University of Udine
Danilo Turk, University of Ljubljana
Antonio Zanardi Landi, Italian Ambassador
Tatyana Zaslavkaya, Academy of Sciences of Russian Federation
Director
Clemente Borando
Scientific Director
Alberto Gasparini
Editorial Executive Board
Anna Maria Boileau, Luciana Cominotto, Daniele Del Bianco (editor in chief), Maura Del Zotto, Giulio
Tarlao
ISIG JOURNAL is the quarterly journal of the Institute of International Sociology (ISIG)
The Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia was created on the initial project of its founder, Franco
Demarchi, which aimed at joining together rigorous scientific activity and a proactive effort in the
international cooperation filed, to promote sustainable development and the peaceful coexistence of peoples.
Located in Gorizia, a town on the border between two countries of then-divided Europe, in 1968 ISIG
became an international centre of excellence for research and an original laboratory elaborating solutions to
the needs of local, national and international societies. Thus, ISIG contributed to the scientific development
of new methodologies and theories. Today, the originality of ISIG stands out in the numerous research
activities carried out by the institute and in its commitment within the international academic and cultural
networks in which it operates, in its constant publishing and academic dissemination and training activities.
ISIG is thus rooted in the regional context but is also dynamically turned towards the international context,
within which it operates and is recognised as a centre of excellence in the fields of international relations and
cross-border cooperation studies, of ethnic relations and minorities studies, of peace studies and conflict
resolution, of society and social policy, of economics and local development, of democracy and civil
society, of futures and forecasting techniques, of territorial and environmental risk management.
© Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia (ISIG)
Printed in: Grafica Goriziana - Gorizia 2009
Quarterly journal registered at the Court of Gorizia, no. 229 of 26.03.1991
PRESENTATION
Alberto Gasparini
This, the second 2009 issue of ISIG Journal to be devoted to the subject of borders and the Mediterranean, is entitled Mobile borders between the Mediterranean and the continents around it.
As was pointed out in the presentation of the first issue, Mediterranean borders between integration
and disintegration, between opening and closure, the aim is to develop the theme of the complexity and
the multiple meanings of borders in a state of radical evolution. The articles published here set out to look
further into the question of Mediterranean borders in the 21st century. The current idea of the Mediterranean border has at least two dimensions.
The first is the resumption of a multiplicity of meanings after a period in which the rise of the modern
state and the ideology of nationalism led to the recognition of state borders and no others. Now, old
borders and new borders are born, die and shift in the context of the globalisation of the world, within
national orders, within social orders, within the ideologies of human rights and the rights of states, within
clashes between national sovereignty and international solidarity, within cities, and within a whole range
of other dimensions which are first at odds with each other and then co-exist, and then merge only to split
once more. All these factors make borders mobile over time and mobile in the intensity of their effects
and the ways in which they are manifested.
The second dimension is more spatial in character, and in the case of the Mediterranean there are
from time to time divisions between the continents surrounding it, leading to sharp conflicts of interest.
At other times the Mediterranean is at the centre of converging interests and negotiations which unite the
countries on its shores and behind them the continents around it. Correspondingly, borders either stiffen
considerably or become much weaker (fewer entry visas and border formalities), or even become virtual
(de-activated for practical everyday purposes). All this is explored in this number of ISIG Journal, which
is divided into three parts.
The first part centres on union – Borders that unite. Roberto Lavarini’s article Roads for goods,
roads for ideas focuses on the unifying role played by roads throughout history for a great many
European and Mediterranean countries, especially now by the modern north-south and east-west transport
corridors. Reis Mulita explores the practical logic of Corridor 8, which links Italy with the Black Sea, and
in particular considers its potential to promote the economic and social development of areas in need of
fresh impetus from outside.
The second part, entitled Borders, towns and regions, looks at the benefits and drawbacks of the
various types of borders. Lila Leontidou’s article compares European and Mediterranean towns separated
by borders in the sense that European towns are dominated by modernity and Mediterrenean towns by
informality. This produces urban competition between entrepreneurial European towns and Mediterranean towns, and between the same European towns, as happened at the time of the city-states. Leontidou
also shows how these borders between towns are destabilised by migrants and tourists. Alessandro
Pannuti penetrates the internal borders of Istanbul, separating the Italian Levantine minority and the
Turkish majority. Since they co-exist peacefully, the borders serve mostly to conserve the minority identity, though the task is not an easy one. Helga Schultz’s contribution shifts the focus to the borders between
twin frontier towns. Here state borders tend to be diluted by internal comparisons, creating a specific
identity for those who experience the two towns as a single – and singular – entity. This is why such twin
European towns stand as laboratories of European integration, harnessing their capacity to generate
differentiated integration. In Raoul Pupo’s analysis of Friuli Venezia Giulia the region is found to have
taken on an ambivalent function of a passage and a border, where everything becomes a manifestation of
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diversity as experienced in social, cultural and economic relations. Lastly, César Carmona, Cassi
Landrus and Daniel Miranda look at the fence built on the US-Mexican border as a symbol of American
insecurity and in terms of its political, economic and psychological effects.
The third part broadens the meanings of the Borders between Europe and the Mediterranean, making
them less concrete and less easily defined – yet they generate consequences at least as concrete as those
produced by visible and defined borders. Lev Voronkov shows how the end of the wall produced by the
Cold War, interpreted as an expansion of human rights and democratic freedoms, has actually thrown up
a new border between countries that respect human rights and others that do not, engendering new power
relationships between the two types of countries, which use new means of asserting their power. Starting
from the standpoint of globalisation, Vasile Puşcaş shows how Europe, moving within the borders of the
process, can become a successful player if it invests properly for the future. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi
observes the borders within a country and its external borders through the prism of the manifestations and
the spread of corruption. This is seen as a political, relational and cultural problem in which the fight must
be taken outside the courtrooms, otherwise corruption will shift the borders of the application/nonapplication of rules valid for the community to the application/non-application of rules valid exclusively
for personal interests. The last article in the third part of this issue of ISIG Journal is by Emanuele Gatti,
who looks at the identities which characterise, and the borders which distinguish, young transnational
professionals working in Brussels. This group has developed a complex identity, comprising segments of
local, national and supranational identities, which makes it different from external indigenous groups. The
author observes, however, that the group itself is divided by internal borders, because such a complex
identity differentiates between professionals coming from countries which recently entered the European
Union (Eastern Europe) and those from countries of longer-standing membership.
STRADE PER LE MERCI, STRADE PER LE IDEE
Roberto Lavarini
Università IULM di Milano
Abstract: La strada non è solo il modo per ottimizzare dei trasferimenti di merci o di persone ma è un
concetto carico di significati sociali non trascurabili. Anche laddove intesa solamente come via di
trasporto, l’analisi della strada non può prescindere dalla sua importanza nella produzione di cambiamenti socio-economici e organizzativo-gravitazionali per i territori che essa attraversa. Dopo un’attenta
analisi teorica dell’idea di strada e delle principali caratteristiche odierne delle città del Mediterraneo
l’articolo mira ad individuare tali caratteristiche e variabili attraverso l’analisi del Corridoio 5 ed il suo
impatto sul ruolo della Regione autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia quale ponte europeo verso i Balcani
occidentali ed il Mediterraneo.
Keywords: strada, città mediterranea, corridoio 5, organizzazione territoriale
•−•−•
1. Nella prima parte di questo saggio affrontiamo l’idea di strada
Esistono così tanti tipi di strade da poter affermare che sono tanti quanti i mezzi di trasporto inventati
nel tempo.
Perciò sono strade tutti i tracciati da quelli marittimi o aerei a quelli terrestri. Questi ultimi, poi, a
seconda delle dimensioni e della protezione del percorso, si chiamano tratturi, strade o autostrade. Anzi,
con questo ultimo termine si intendono anche i percorsi rapidi e senza scali di alcune rotte marine dette
appunto “autostrade del mare” o gli analoghi percorsi su binari, le “autostrade ferrate” per i treni che
trasportano non solo i container ma anche le motrici stesse.
Sono tutte diverse e tutte ben caratterizzate: le strade per le automobili non sono come le strade per le
carrozze a cavalli, né quelle dei treni assomigliano a quelle delle navi. Ultimamente, perciò, si tende a
parlare di “autostrada” come termine generico che identifica grandi flussi di merci, di veicoli, di persone.
Ma la strada è, a nostro avviso, soprattutto una “idea”, è un prodotto dell’uomo che la investe di tanti
significati. Molti di questi sono nuovi, altri ci arrivano dal passato.
Alfredo Oriani, innamorato della bicicletta, a sottolineare l’importanza della strada scrive: «Passano
più idee in una strada in un giorno che non ne escano da una università in un secolo: cento libri non vi
daranno di un popolo quella conoscenza che vi otterrete consultandolo a viva voce in un mese» 1. Non
molto incoraggiante per chi lavora in una università ma ha il pregio di servire a spostare l’attenzione sul
concreto più che sul teorico, sulla quotidianità più che sulla straordinarietà.
Ecco allora che possiamo vedere la strada come mondo, in quanto vi si trova uno spaccato di umanità.
L’idea più semplice di strada è di vederla come il segmento che collega due punti che possono essere
piccoli paesi, città medie o grandi metropoli. Non esiste una strada senza almeno un punto d’avvio. Essa
1. Infatuato dalla sua bicicletta, Oriani affidò alla storia alcuni provocatori epifonemi, del tipo: “Una
bicicletta può ben valere una biblioteca” oppure quello appena citato. Siamo all’inizio del Novecento e
già Oriani, forse senza saperlo, sta inventando la letteratura on the road! che avrà largo seguito nei
decenni successivi. Citato in Bruschi, Pagnini, Pinzauti (1991: 45).
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serve alle attività umane, permette il fluire delle persone, facilita i loro incontri congiungendo luoghi
anche molto lontani. Sulla strada si trasportano beni, “sostanze” utili alla sopravvivenza delle persone, di
una comunità. Questa sua funzione richiama alla mente il corpo umano con la sua rete di vasi sanguinei.
Anche questi sono strade che all’interno del nostro corpo collegano punti diversi e trasportano ciò che è
essenziale alla vita, alla sopravvivenza.
La strada è sempre esistita. Quando Dio maledisse e marchiò Caino “mandandolo ramingo per il
mondo”, lo costrinse a fare un percorso, un primo tracciato sul quale poi sarebbero passati altri. Un
percorso tutto da inventare come quello dei pellegrini che, nel passato, partivano dalle loro case spesso
senza alcuna informazione sulla strada da seguire per raggiungere il santuario. Bastava che uno dicesse
“per di qua” e tutti lo seguivano calpestando prati, facendosi largo fra i rovi, in pratica, costruendo una
strada. Soprattutto in pieno Medioevo, le strade erano essenzialmente di tre tipi: gli antichi tracciati lasciati dai romani, e di questi ne abbiamo molti ancora oggi, i percorsi degli eserciti, i percorsi dei
pellegrini. Il resto era un insieme di sentieri modesti, occasionali, limitati a un’area ristretta.
I romani sono stati dei grandi costruttori di strade, avevano capito che, per tenere saldamente in mano
un immenso impero erano necessarie le strade. Ancora oggi vengono ammirate come opera di ingegneria
e, se non fosse stato scoperto l’asfalto 2 meno resistente ma più liscio, elastico e facile da utilizzare, forse
sarebbero in uso ancora oggi. Proviamo a descrivere alcuni concetti associati alla strada contemporanea.
1.1. Strada come opera umana
In ogni tempo la strada è frutto di volontà e di ingegno e ancora oggi restiamo incantati nel vedere
larghe strade che con ponti altissimi scavalcano valli profonde o penetrano immense montagne con tunnel
larghi e bene illuminati. Città e popoli diventano sempre più vicini quanto migliore è la strada che li
collega. Lo studio del tracciato, la valutazione dell’impatto ambientale, la ricerca sui materiali utilizzati,
le forme architettoniche di ponti, svincoli, edifici di servizio, tutto è frutto di studio e segno della competenza raggiunta da un popolo. Le nuove autostrade di Dubai non sono paragonabili a quelle del deserto
australiano né a quelle eritree o colombiane. Perché ciascuna esprime la tecnologia, la ricchezza e la
cultura raggiunta di quei popoli.
1.2. Strada come mezzo
Attorno alle grandi città vi sono flussi che continuamente trasferiscono prodotti in entrambe le direzioni.
Nel nostro Paese, per facilitare gli spostamenti in auto delle persone si è dovuto proibire l’accesso alle
autostrade dei grandi veicoli nei week end. Il loro numero è così elevato da saturare una o due corsie delle
autostrade con gravi conseguenze sulla fluidità del traffico. Questo succede perché la strada viene usata
da chi lavora per trasferire le merci ma è importante anche per chi pratica il turismo permettendo alle
persone di raggiungere velocemente i luoghi della cultura, della storia, del folclore, dello sport.
1.3. Strada come fondamentale componente del sacro
Abbiamo già detto come le strade costruite dai romani siano state utilizzate dai pellegrini che lasciavano le loro case, ma c’era bisogno di conservarle, di fare manutenzione. Per questo, gli stessi pellegrini
hanno posto come gesto di grande devozione la cura delle strade, dei ponti, dei guadi.
Nel pellegrinaggio verso Santiago di Compostela, ad esempio, essi si facevano carico di una grossa
pietra, presa da una cava nei pressi del santuario e la portavano sulle proprie spalle affinché servisse alla
sua costruzione o alla manutenzione delle vie d’accesso. Abbiamo anche testimonianza di tantissimi
pellegrini che interrompevano il loro cammino per fermarsi con altri a sistemare un tratto di strada, a
costruire un ponte, a creare un ospizio o a edificare una cattedrale. Un vero servizio reso alla comunità,
un gesto di espiazione per le proprie colpe, un atto di devozione meritevole di benefici spirituali 3.
2. L’invenzione dell’asfalto risale al 1712 ed è attribuita ad un dottore greco, Eirinis d’Eirinis, che aveva
unito alla roccia in polvere della pece calda, ma questa formula, via via migliorata, viene adottata solo nel XIX
secolo combinandone l’applicazione alle pavimentazioni stradali costruite con il metodo di McAdam.
3. Per approfondimenti su pellegrinaggio, simboli e comportamenti si veda Lavarini (1997).
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
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La strada per il pellegrino rappresenta simbolicamente la via verso la grazia. La strada è l’aspetto più
aspro e faticoso di tutto il pellegrinaggio. Lungo la strada il corpo viene domato, si controllano i suoi
impulsi, si frenano le pulsioni perché macerare il corpo vuol dire liberare l’anima permettendole un più
facile incontro con il sacro che si trova nella meta. La strada è anche un luogo pericoloso. I briganti si nascondono nei suoi pressi per attendere il viandante da depredare. Non solo la difficoltà del camminare,
non solo gli attacchi degli animali, ma anche l’uomo, la creatura più feroce, rappresenta un concreto pericolo per chi è in cammino. Nel giubileo del 1350, oltre metà dei pellegrini che si recavano a Roma venne
aggredita dai briganti, soprattutto nell’inospitale agro-pontino.
Non era al sicuro nemmeno chi cercava rifugio in una locanda o in un villaggio. Molti osti sono stati
condannati per aver derubato o assassinato un loro ospite. Ci è giunta testimonianza che anche gli abitanti
di interi villaggi depredavano i pellegrini di passaggio. Ma lungo la strada c’era anche del buono. Negli
hospitales, lungo le vie di maggiore affluenza trovavano riparo coloro che si ammalavano o si erano feriti
durante il viaggio. Una forma di assistenza che progressivamente si trasforma nei moderni ospedali. I
monaci di alcuni monasteri vicino ai grandi passi alpini suonavano una campanella per tutta la notte
quando c’era la nebbia o una bufera per aiutare i pellegrini a orientarsi e a trovare il rifugio. Una zuppa
calda, un giaciglio di paglia non veniva mai negato ma solo per una notte.
Poi, molti ordini cavallereschi avevano come missione la protezione dei pellegrini lungo le strade di
tutta Europa. E pattugliavano i tratti più a rischio recando soccorso e rendendosi utili spesso anche solo
grazie alla semplice presenza.
1.4. Strada come opportunità
Lungo la strada si concretizzano molte opportunità.
Fino al secolo scorso le abitazioni e i negozi erano costruiti così a ridosso di una strada da non permettere nemmeno la costruzione di un marciapiede. Ancora oggi molte strade attraversano il centro di
grandi borghi e di piccoli villaggi. La casa sulla strada era segno di grande comodità, una sorta di privilegio che faceva aumentare il valore dei terreni sui suoi bordi mentre valevano poco quelli all’interno.
C’era chi costruiva un bar, un negozio di alimentari, un’officina, per far sostare i mezzi, auto, moto e camion, di passaggio. Le famose “trattorie dei camionisti” erano apprezzate per il buon cibo e il prezzo
ridotto. Poi si comprese che il traffico era rumoroso e inquinante per cui si è cercato di espellerlo costruendo le circonvallazioni e pedonalizzando il centro. Anche i servizi trovano una nuova collocazione
fuori dagli abitati in grandi centri commerciali, ovviamente vicini alle vie di grande traffico.
1.5. Strada come disincanto
Sulla strada si scorre veloci e la velocità è quella dei veicoli che l’uomo inventa per spostarsi da un
luogo ad un altro. Un tempo, lo si faceva a dorso di qualche animale, poi con i carri e le carrozze. Con
l’invenzione del motore a scoppio, la velocità è progressivamente aumentata tanto da richiedere percorsi
separati, protetti. Anche il veicolo è cambiato profondamente tanto da diventare un guscio in cui si ricrea
un ambiente speciale, confortevole. È insonorizzato, climatizzato, profumato, vi si può ascoltare della
musica o guardare un film. Il mondo esterno è nettamente separato. Ci sono lungo la strada altre persone,
anch’esse rinchiuse in altri gusci. Impossibile ogni contatto, anzi, pericolosissimo un contatto. Perciò,
atomi che scorrono a milioni in ogni direzione. Nessuna possibilità d’incontro né con loro né con chi vive
lungo il percorso. La strada è una sorta di sospensione, di estraneazione dal contesto. La percezione del
mondo perde la sua continuità. E tutto ciò è diventato caratteristico di ogni mezzo veloce.
1.6. Strada come alienazione
Le strade costruite appositamente per i mezzi veloci sono delle semplici linee nel panorama. Il
transito del viaggio antico oggi non esiste più 4. Esiste solo la partenza e l’arrivo, quello che sta nel mezzo va via via contraendosi, diventando sospensione. Si parte in aereo da un luogo con il suo clima e la sua
4. Il tema della struttura del viaggio, della sua evoluzione nel tempo e dei significati che ha assunto
fino all’epoca contemporanea sono sviluppati nel libro di Eric Leed (1992).
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temperatura, con il sole o la pioggia e, dopo qualche ora, ci si può trovare nell’altro emisfero con una
stagione, un clima, una temperatura diversi. Solo alcune ore, non giorni o mesi e il nostro fisico deve
rapidamente acclimatarsi, i nostri sensi devono adeguarsi. E dopo poco si torna nel vecchio ambiente
dall’altra parte del mondo. Con quali conseguenze? Ancora non si sa con precisione. È un fenomeno
relativamente recente ma già rappresenta un nuovo modo di vivere il mondo.
Se, invece, non si vuole perdere il contatto con il proprio territorio e, forse, proprio in risposta a queste
tendenze, sta affermandosi il “viaggiar lento”. È la negazione al fast, alla frenesia degli spostamenti.
Vengono privilegiati i mezzi lenti o l’andare a piedi, l’osservazione attenta dell’ambiente, i contatti con i
residenti. Le tappe lungo il percorso devono durare giorni non ore. Calarsi in realtà nuove, assorbire stili
di vita, integrarsi con storie, profumi e sapori. Forse, in tal modo si tenta di recuperare almeno in parte
l’alienazione del viaggiare veloce.
1.7. E, infine, strada come simbolo
La strada è la vita, anzi, la vita è un percorso fatto di tappe, di scelte nei bivi che ci si presentano
davanti. Una vita facile viene rappresentata con una strada larga, pianeggiante e senza ostacoli. Più
tortuosa e incerta la vita di chi deve superare sempre nuovi ostacoli, di chi lotta per conquistare nuove
posizioni. La strada rappresenta il dominio dell’uomo sulla natura, è la rete che imbriglia il territorio per
migliorare la qualità della vita di chi ci vive e lavora. Spiana percorsi, favorisce contatti. È il trait-d’union
fra città con storie, culture e tradizioni diverse favorendo lo scambio di idee, di informazioni, di
conoscenze. Più i popoli arrivano a conoscersi meno sono capaci di odiarsi. E la strada favorisce la reciproca conoscenza. È la loro stessa presenza a testimoniare il mondo civile. Perduti in un deserto o in una
foresta, se si arriva ad una strada è come giungere alla civiltà e sentire vicina la salvezza.
Un corollario a quanto detto è costituito da una particolarissima ma anche potentissima strada:
internet. È una strada “speciale” che riesce a diffondere ... tutto! Soprattutto le idee. Questa strada non
unisce nazioni e nemmeno città, lega individui, singoli individui fra loro. Miliardi di fili, miliardi di
impulsi nell’assoluta anarchia e con infinite alternative. Alcuni governi o organizzazioni statali hanno
tentato invano di darle una struttura, di imporre delle regole. Internet è, e rimane, un segno di libertà. Ma
Internet è utilizzato anche per diffondere prodotti reali e non strettamente virtuali. Internet rappresenta un
immenso mercato, così grande da coprire l’intero pianeta. In esso si possono proporre nuovi prodotti, farli
vedere con una webcam, farseli pagare e poi inviarli con i più diffusi mezzi di trasporto tradizionali. È il
trionfo della globalizzazione. Si può trovare un qualsiasi prodotto in una qualunque parte del mondo. Ma
anche della localizzazione perché favorisce la conoscenza e la promozione anche di quei prodotti locali
che prima erano diffusi in un territorio piuttosto limitato. Ora, presentati in internet, possono raggiungere
mercati molto lontani. Quindi, internet diventa una strada che si armonizza con le altre strade 5.
2. Il Mediterraneo e le città
Ora, dopo aver accennato ai possibili approcci all’idea di strada, cerchiamo di mettere in evidenza la
sua funzione di collegamento fra due punti, due territori, due mondi. I “grandi tracciati” delle moderne
vie di comunicazione, infatti, avvolgono l’Europa da Nord a Sud, da Est a Ovest, come un lunghissimo
filo di lana che la tiene unita, rendendola un unico tessuto territoriale.
Prendiamo come esempio il Mediterraneo. Possiamo considerarlo uno degli estremi delle diverse strade che connettono il Sud Europa con la parte continentale.
Il Mediterraneo è una realtà complessa e difficile da com-prendere in un unico abbraccio.
La sua forma ampia e allungata si incunea separando l’Europa dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente. Ma,
più che separare continenti e nazioni, esso le unisce attraverso le vie del mare, quelle autostrade d’acqua
di cui parlavamo poco sopra.
5. Una semplice applicazione è attivata da tempo da alcuni spedizionieri che, quando un loro cliente invia
una busta o un pacco in un altro paese, forniscono un codice che, inserito in un apposito sito internet, permette
di vedere dove si trova la spedizione, se ci sono stati dei disguidi o se ha già raggiunto il destinatario.
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
103
I paesi che vi si affacciano hanno storie diverse, hanno seguito percorsi evolutivi distinti. Le popolazioni
stesse sono diverse anche se via via nella storia si sono realizzate forme di coesione e di aggregazione.
Tutti i paesi, comunque, presentano aspetti che qui ci interessano particolarmente. Uno di questi è la
loro evoluzione urbana. Infatti, le strade solo teoricamente congiungono nazioni ma più concretamente
legano fra loro città, o al più territori ben delimitati.
E in tutti i paesi, le città si sono sviluppate secondo alcune linee ricorrenti.
Da più parti si osserva che tali cambiamenti costituiscono contemporaneamente una opportunità e un
vincolo per le popolazioni.
L’opportunità è quella di poter godere di un luogo per lo scambio di idee e di partecipazione attiva a
movimenti e mode. Una grande città offre molte opportunità di lavoro e si può accedere facilmente ad alcuni servizi. Anche la scolarizzazione è più elevata nelle città che nelle campagne. Nelle città si favorisce
lo scambio culturale, gli individui possono conquistare nuove dignità nel lavoro, promuoversi sia
umanamente sia socialmente, raggiungere degli obiettivi. La vita cittadina è favorevole anche alle donne
perché la loro emancipazione è più facile in un grande centro urbano che nei piccoli centri rurali. Ed è
sempre nella città che si possono diffondere i comportamenti riproduttivi consapevoli e responsabili.6
Ma la vita in città può anche essere un vincolo se i governi locali non sono in grado di fornire servizi
adeguati a una popolazione in rapida crescita, a un’area urbana che progressivamente diventa più ampia e
nella quale c’è la necessità di servizi, infrastrutture e sicurezza. Inoltre, va gestito con molta attenzione e
competenza il flusso di coloro che migrano dalle campagne circostanti verso le città, dei pendolari, dei
city users, dei turisti.
Negli ultimi decenni si sono manifestati degli aspetti negativi che stanno assumendo grande rilevanza
in tutte le città del mondo. L’inquinamento nelle sue manifestazioni più evidenti come le cappe di smog
che sovrastano le città con molto traffico, ma anche le polveri più sottili, difficili da osservare ma dannose
alla salute. Il degrado ambientale dovuto spesso all’abusivismo, alla cementificazione, alla speculazione
che antepone l’interesse personale al benessere comune. Infine, anche il degrado sociale con la
“specializzazione” di alcuni quartieri dove c’è la prostituzione, lo spaccio di droga, la delinquenza. A
tutto ciò le amministrazioni stanno cercando di far fronte arginandone gli effetti dannosi attraverso soluzioni diverse a seconda delle città: zone pedonali, le ZTL o zone a traffico limitato solo ai residenti,
ecopass, delibere anti accattonaggio e contro la prostituzione, ecc.
Anche tutto il bacino mediterraneo, come il resto del mondo, risente dei profondi cambiamenti che
segnano la nostra epoca.
Non solo si è modificata la struttura sociale con la tendenza al globale e con la nascita di grandi centri
urbani, sono anche cambiati molti assetti politici. I diversi conflitti medio-orientali, il terrorismo, il
tentativo di isolare i paesi ostili, i “paesi canaglia”, e il contemporaneo sostegno di quelli amici. I Balcani
in continuo fermento, l’Europa che non trova la giusta occasione per mostrarsi unita. Israele che,
accerchiato da paesi islamici, trova più facilmente alleanze al di qua del mare che alle sue spalle. E poi i
flussi migratori che percorrono rotte diverse ma sempre nella stessa direzione sud-nord.
Oltre ai difficili equilibri fra le nazioni si assiste ai diversi mutamenti interni ad esse.
Molte cercano nel turismo una facile soluzione ai propri problemi.
Paesi tradizionalmente chiusi agli stranieri hanno aperto le loro frontiere nel tentativo di inserirsi,
seppure con qualche limitazione, nei grandi flussi del turismo internazionale. Altri stanno cercando delle
specializzazioni nella produzione industriale, altri ancora mirano a potenziare e a commercializzare le
risorse naturali del loro territorio.
Scelte complesse, a volte molto sofferte con risultati, se non impossibili, comunque difficili da raggiungere in tempi brevi. Si sono rotti vecchi equilibri e ne sono nati di nuovi.
Osservando i recenti cambiamenti, sempre dal punto di vista sociologico, si può osservare una grande
convergenza delle diverse componenti: le città diventano sempre più grandi, le attività agricole sono
sempre meno scelte come professione, la natalità è in calo, c’è la tendenza ad una maggiore equità nella
distribuzione di beni e servizi. Ovunque nascono problemi di governance.
6. Giuseppe Pennella, Convergenze parallele fra concorrenza e cooperazione nelle città euromediterranee. Un altro caso irrisolto?, Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Dipartimento della Funzione
pubblica, in www.caimed.org.
Roberto Lavarini
104
Molti paesi che si affacciano sul Mediterraneo sono oggi colpiti dagli effetti della marginalizzazione
economica e della destabilizzazione politica causate dalla globalizzazione e si trovano a fronteggiare le
quattro sfide fondamentali dello sviluppo odierno (Pavone 2007):
¾ tecnologica,
¾ ecologica,
¾ demografica,
¾ istituzionale.
Per molti di questi paesi sta aumentando la popolazione urbanizzata a discapito di quella distribuita
sul territorio. Una concentrazione che favorisce la scolarizzazione per cui sta diminuendo la percentuale
degli analfabeti. Diminuisce anche la fertilità femminile e le famiglie non sono più così numerose come
pochi anni fa.
La tendenza a vivere in grandi centri urbani porta all’aumento della densità del vecchio nucleo
urbano. In molte città, le abitazioni del centro, vecchie e poco ospitali, hanno dei costi molto più bassi dei
nuovi palazzi che le circondano per cui vengono preferite da chi dispone di pochi mezzi economici ed è
disposto a condividere uno spazio ristretto con tutta la sua famiglia e persino con i parenti. Chi non trova
ospitalità nei vecchi edifici, cerca una sistemazione nella periferia urbana che si espande considerevolmente. Gli edifici che vengono costruiti, molto spesso in modo approssimativo, non rispettano la regolamentazione prestabilita né accedono a strutture importanti come i collegamenti alla rete fognaria, elettrica
e dell’acqua potabile. Spesso, mancano del tutto i collegamenti con i mezzi di trasporto pubblici. Aumenta enormemente il problema dello smaltimento dei rifiuti.
Sono problemi condivisi da gran parte dell’area sud-mediterranea e riguardano milioni di persone.
Nel 2003, il complesso degli abitanti dei paesi che si affacciano sul Mediterraneo sono 457,31 milioni 7.
La loro distribuzione non è omogenea per cui si è pensata una suddivisione in sei regioni che fossero simili
sia per territorio che per storia e popolazione.
I nomi con cui sono individuate queste regioni sono quasi poetici: Arco latino – Conca adriatica –
Fronte magrebino – Flesso libico-egiziano – Facciata mediorientale – Ponte anatolico-balcanico.
La popolazione varia moltissimo. La regione che comprende Italia, Francia, Spagna e Portogallo ha
quasi 170 milioni di abitanti, mentre all’altro estremo vi è la regione formata da Slovenia, Croazia,
Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania e Macedonia che non arriva ai 24 milioni di abitanti.
Regioni
Q1 – Arco latino
Q2 – Conca adriatica
Q3 – Fronte magrebino
Q4 – Flesso libico-egiziano
Q5 – Facciata mediorientale
Q6 – Ponte anatolico-balcanico
Popolazione al 2003
169.07
23.88
71.84
73.12
37.25
82.16
7. Centre for Administrative innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
105
Q1: Arco latino: Italia, Francia, Spagna e Portogallo
Q2: Conca adriatica: Slovenia, Croazia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania e Macedonia
Q3: Fronte magrebino: Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia
Q4: Flesso libico-egiziano: Libia, Egitto
Q5: Facciata meridionale: Israele, Libano, Giordania, Siria
Q6: Ponte anatolico-balcanico: Cipro, Turchia, Grecia
Il processo di Barcellona 1995-2010 si poneva come obiettivo quello di «… conseguire una graduale
costruzione di una Zona di Libero Scambio nell’area del Mediterraneo (entro il 2010) nella convinzione
che questa potesse agire come fattore di progresso sociale e contemporaneamente da volano economico».
Una affermazione di grande importanza per tutti i paesi confinanti e ancora di più per i paesi che
circondano il Mediterraneo per renderlo, in pratica, un mare interno. Già il nome di “Mare in mezzo alle
terre” lo suggerisce ma, ovviamente, questo non basta. Ci devono essere anche condivisione di intenti,
determinazione, capacità e convenienza. L’Europa sta plasmandosi come un’unica Patria attraverso lo
smantellamento delle barriere tariffarie e doganali. Si sta creando una zona caratterizzata da un livello di
protezione sensibilmente elevato se confrontato con ciò che si sta facendo nei paesi del Sud-America e in
alcune aree asiatiche. La quota di esportazione dei commerci internazionali nella nuova Europa nel 1990
corrispondeva al 16.81%. Nel 2005 questa quota scende al 13.29%.
Per quanto riguarda l’importazione, nel 1990 le quote erano pari al 17.72% e nel 2005 sono diminuite
fino al 14.67%. Sarebbe molto interessante vedere che cosa sta succedendo in questi ultimi anni con le
tensioni dovute alla crisi internazionale, con le difficoltà a livello mondiale della finanza 8.
8. Ten years after the Barcelona process: Assessment and perspectives.
Roberto Lavarini
106
La prima delle due figure riportate qui sotto si riferisce alle merci, la seconda ai servizi. Esse evidenziano il maggiore orientamento all’esportazione dei servizi e all’importazione delle merci dell’Europa del
1990. Comunque, è evidente che in quindici anni il trend si mantiene negativo e sembra inarrestabile.
25,00
25,00
20,00
20,00
15,00
15,00
import
export
10,00
import
export
10,00
5,00
5,00
0,00
0,00
1990
1995
2005
1990
1995
2005
In effetti, sembra che i paesi del Mediterraneo soffrano a causa della capillare diffusione della globalizzazione.
Si parla frequentemente di mercato longitudinale e latitudinale utilizzando simbolicamente il 41°
parallelo come linea di demarcazione concettuale. Ma l’idea di un mercato come quello delineato non può
essere la risposta ai moderni orientamenti. Sembra, infatti, che questo approccio sia superato. Inoltre, il
fatto che tutta l’area sia stata suddivisa nelle sei zone presentate poco sopra, sembra una sottolineatura
della difficoltà di “trattare” come un’unica entità un’area così vasta e differenziata. Con una facile semplificazione, perciò, si può dire che la sponda nord del Mediterraneo ha una popolazione sempre più
invecchiata e ricca, mentre nella sponda sud è più giovane, crescente e molto meno ricca.
Procedendo con le semplificazioni, possiamo dire che, per parlare di flussi fra Sud Mediterraneo e
Nord Europa, occorre analizzare i nessi, i collegamenti fra le rispettive città.
Questo può essere fatto premettendo alcune considerazioni.
Innanzitutto, nella stragrande maggioranza delle nazioni, la maggior parte della popolazione vive in
un centro urbano. Anche le industrie continuano ad appoggiarsi alle città per ottenere personale, alcuni
servizi importanti, e un primo mercato. Un ruolo così dominante della città sul complesso della nazione è
una lunga tradizione basti pensare al detto, diffuso nella provincia francese, “Paris n’est pas la France”,
dove ci si lamentava dell’identificazione dell’intera nazione con la sua capitale e del fatto che la maggior
parte delle risorse interne le erano destinate. D’altra parte, la comunicazione fatta da una singola città è, di
solito, molto più efficace di quella, necessariamente più generale, di una nazione.
Riteniamo perciò che si possa parlare di collegamenti fra due nazioni esemplificandoli e semplificandoli con quelli fra città.
A questo punto, è necessaria un’altra considerazione. Tutte le città sia del Nord che del Sud risentono
di una forte spinta alla globalizzazione.
«Vi è, oggi, un’aperta concorrenza fra le città per l’accesso ai mercati e alle attività globali che sembra
aver dato vita a sistemi gerarchici relazionali composti da città per così dire vincenti e/o in ritardo
sistematico di sviluppo» 9.
Le città rispondono a queste sollecitazioni seguendo alcuni precisi percorsi:
¾ innanzitutto, tutte tendono a migliorare la propria immagine;
¾ cercano di acquisire una caratterizzazione economica e funzionale per meglio inserirsi nelle strategie
internazionali delle città;
¾ nei paesi con una lunga storia di industrializzazione, attivano processi di de-industrializzazione e di
dismissione di ampie aree urbane;
9. Giuseppe Pennella, Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
107
¾ in tutti i paesi decentralizzano le attività produttive allontanandole dall’area urbana per cui risentono
della crisi del mercato del lavoro;
¾ studiano e pianificano dei programmi di riqualificazione territoriale dei nuclei storici e delle periferie
urbane.
Quasi tutti i paesi puntano sul turismo.
Infatti, sembra la soluzione ad ogni problema sia di tipo economico che sociale. Dopo un’epoca in cui
il turismo era demonizzato o, quantomeno, sottovalutato, attualmente gli si riconoscono alcune prerogative, riconosciute da tutti, come il miglioramento della qualità della vita. Vengono attivati mestieri orientati all’accoglienza, meno faticosi e economicamente più gratificanti di molti altri come quelli del settore
agricolo, ad esempio. Si dà spazio alla creatività e all’iniziativa personale, si entra a far parte di circuiti
internazionali nei quali è possibile un confronto di idee, di stili di vita, di culture.
Va anche detto che le iniziative atte ad accogliere i turisti creando percorsi, restaurando monumenti,
abbellendo le città, incrementando servizi, va a vantaggio dei residenti che possono usufruirne per tutto
l’arco dell’anno.
Per ultimo, ma non per questo meno importante, la sensibilità turistica crea un maggiore senso di
appartenenza. Un luogo apprezzato dai molti visitatori, che compiono lunghi viaggi pur di arrivarci,
acquista nuova luce agli occhi del residente.
Tutti hanno esperienza del fatto che la quotidianità appiattisce il mondo. Là dove abitiamo, nei percorsi abituali, le rilevanze storiche e artistiche piano piano diventano sfondo uniforme, invisibili e ignorate.
Sono lì, ci sono sempre state, hanno perduto la loro originalità, la loro attrattività. Al contrario, il fatto che
ci siano nuove persone che le ammirano, che le apprezzano, che per loro costituiscano una novità, fa sì
che anche i residenti le riscoprano, che le riattualizzino e che arrivino ad apprezzarle in una sorta di
empatia con tutti gli altri visitatori.
Il turismo, perciò, induce gli amministratori a compiere degli sforzi organizzativi ed estetici sul loro
territorio che favoriscano l’immagine locale, nazionale e internazionale. Una priorità è quella di diventare
“attraenti” nel senso letterale del termine. Attrarre, affascinare, quasi sedurre i potenziali turisti in un
perenne confronto con altre destinazioni vicine e lontane.
Fra le risorse maggiormente considerate in tutti i paesi che si affacciano sul Mediterraneo ci sono il
sole e il mare. Risorse considerate fino a poco tempo fa illimitate, inesauribili. Magari per poi scoprire
che così non è. Ne offre un esempio l’Italia che alcuni anni fa soffrì a causa dell’eutrofizzazione delle
acque. Molti fiumi riversarono nel mare delle coste adriatiche enormi quantità di potassio, che allora era
abbondante nei detersivi per ottenere un bucato “così bianco che più bianco non si può”. Questo portò ad
una massiccia produzione di alghe che infestarono le spiagge e le acque della riviera rendendo impossibile la balneazione. Un autentico shock che indusse a pensare che il mare non poteva essere considerato
una risorsa incondizionata ma che dovesse essere curato e protetto.
Comunque, il radicamento al territorio è generalmente premiante e, oltre al clima, al sole e al mare,
un’altra risorsa molto importante è l’enogastronomia con tutti i prodotti locali e i beni artistici.
Con la facilità degli spostamenti e la grande diffusione del comportamento turistico, tutte le destinazioni devono sentirsi in competizione fra loro. Oppure, detto altrimenti, una qualunque città, un qualunque territorio può essere una destinazione turistica. E i turisti bisogna andarseli a cercare, occorre stimolarli, incentivarli, attrarli utilizzando le armi della comunicazione, della suggestione, della seduzione e,
non da ultimo, i collegamenti per poterli raggiungere.
Nel suo libro, L’identità competitiva, Anholt (2007) afferma: «Non bastano i soli strumenti esterni
(poster, fotografie, slogan, creatività anche intelligente, e neppure budget, se preso in modo a se stante) a costruire un brand efficace per un territorio; ma sono invece necessari alcuni fondamentali presupposti, che
partono molto prima della gestione, pur complessa, di processi di comunicazione e si radicano nelle
caratteristiche ‘della gente’».
Turismo e reputazione sono correlati e l’immagine del primo si fonda sulla seconda e viceversa.
Anholt sostiene che una buona immagine turistica può essere attrattiva perfino di investimenti di
natura non turistica, proprio perché la buona immagine turistica costruisce reputazione anche nella mente
del potenziale investitore.
Egli lamenta come ancor oggi molti governi pur attenti al nation branding, lo identifichino come semplice problema di gestione comunicativa della marca, piuttosto che come gestione dell'interdipendenza
108
Roberto Lavarini
tra: brand, politiche, cultura, persone, investimenti e turismo.
«Costruire l’identità competitiva è un compito semplicemente:
¾ troppo importante per essere lasciato interamente allo stato;
¾ troppo importante per essere lasciato al mondo degli affari e
¾ troppo importante per essere lasciato alla società civile.
Solo una coalizione dei tre, gestita con attenzione può assumere l’incarico e portarlo avanti nel lungo
periodo».
Anholt aggiunge anche che il progetto «necessita dell’appoggio personale dei vertici del governo e
dello stato, perché se non sono le più alte cariche del paese a prendersi la responsabilità della gestione nazionale, questa non verrà considerata dagli altri come una priorità da seguire».
Ci sono molti esempi in cui la rinomanza di una città superi quella del paese che la ospita. Un esempio
classico è Parigi o Londra ma anche tantissime altre nazioni del mondo hanno una città, spesso la capitale, che le rappresenta e che le identifica.
È, perciò, per quanto abbiamo visto finora che, parlando di “corridoi”, si pongono alle loro estremità
delle città più che delle nazioni.
Un esempio, tanto per sottolineare l’importanza delle città, è che non si parla tanto di “corridoio plurimodale 5” fra Portogallo e Ucraina, ma di corridoio Lisbona-Kiev con tappe a Lione, Torino, Milano,
Trieste, Budapest, Lubiana, L’vov … per 1600 chilometri.
3. Parliamo allora dei “corridoi” che collegano Nord e Sud, Est e Ovest
È il corridoio 5 che più interessa il Nord-Italia perché con questo tracciato si può ovviare agli attuali
passaggi a Nord delle Alpi ottenendo una drastica diminuzione dei costi e permettendo di collegare
l’Italia con l’Europa dell’Est e l’Asia.
Il “corridoio 5”, che connette autostrade e porti (Trieste, Koper, Rijeka-Fiume, Ploce), amplia le possibilità per le aree interne (Repubblica Ceca, Slovacchia, …) di connettersi con i sistemi mediterranei in
alternativa a quelli del Nord-Europa.
Il tracciato è in fase di costruzione o di adeguamento e ci sono molte attese per il suo utilizzo una volta attivato completamente.
Nelle parole entusiaste del vice-ministro europeo alle infrastrutture, on. Martinat, il “Corridoio 5” è
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
109
«un asse destinato a portare sviluppo dove c’è degrado, comunicazione dove c’è desolazione, mercato
dove c’è bisogno».
Parole entusiastiche che mostrano come anche le istituzioni carichino di significati simbolici la sua
realizzazione.
Inoltre, il corridoio fa da volano anche per molte altre iniziative sia pubbliche che private e ci sono
enti pubblici e privati che hanno sviluppato interessanti progetti a riguardo. Alcuni di questi hanno trovato
l’appoggio dei governi locali e dell’Unione Europea.
Anche nel nostro Paese ci sono progetti di grande interesse che partono dal “Corridoio 5” e lo
connettono a molte realtà del Nord-Italia.
Ci sono progetti che permettono il potenziamento del sistema portuale ligure e veneto, collegamenti ferroviari con Svizzera, Austria e Germania. Ci sono progetti che integrano il trasporto su gomma, su rotaia e per nave
cercando la reciproca ottimizzazione. Come il piano di Nuova Marghera, illustrato nella figura qui di seguito.
Altri studiano le connessioni fra terra e mare, ossia fra ferrovia, strada e mare.
Si può, perciò, parlare di autostrade in una nuova accezione che non sia esclusiva dell’idea di auto, ma
intendendo un tracciato ad alta densità di traffico qualunque sia il mezzo utilizzato.
110
Roberto Lavarini
La mappa dell’Europa ha subito consistenti modifiche sia sul piano politico e amministrativo che dal
punto di vista sociale. I nuovi tracciati viari vanno a sottolineare le differenze e i crescenti bisogni di stare in
relazione, di comunicare, di scambiare prodotti. Nella mappa viene evidenziata la posizione strategica
dell’area balcanica, autentica cerniera fra l’Europa e il continente asiatico. Il Friuli Venezia Giulia aderisce a
quest’area. Esso collega ai paesi balcanici tutto il Nord Italia, e di conseguenza l’Europa dell’Ovest, ma
anche tutto il Sud del Mediterraneo mediante le vie d’acqua, in particolare con il porto di Trieste.
Il porto di Trieste, secondo molti osservatori, è la vera chiave di volta di tutto il sistema.
Ha una posizione geografica strategica nel collegamento Sud-Mediterraneo e Nord-Europa.
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
111
E, proprio a causa di ciò, molto è stato fatto ma ancora molto deve essere fatto. Nella tabella che
segue, infatti, si vede come il porto di Trieste nella movimentazione dei container possa ancora crescere
molto nonostante occupi una posizione media nel panorama dei porti italiani.
MOVIMENTO CONTAINER NEI PRINCIPALI PORTI ITALIANI
(migliaia di TEU)
Porto
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007*
Gioia Tauro
3.009
3.149
3.261
3.161
2.938
3.500
Genova
1.531
1.606
1.619
1.625
1.657
1.855
La Spezia
975
1.007
1.040
1.024
1.137
1.190
Taranto
472
658
763
717
892
756
Livorno
520
541
639
659
658
752
Cagliari
74
314
501
660
687
700
Napoli
444
433
348
374
445
450
Salerno
375
417
412
419
359
385
Venezia
262
284
291
290
317
329
Trieste
185
120
175
198
220
266
Savona
55
54
90
220
231
243
Ravenna
161
160
169
169
162
190
Ancona
94
76
65
64
76
107
Palermo
11
15
24
28
27
32
Catania
13
14
12
15
14
16
Monfalcone
1
2
1
1
1
Civitavecchia
21
25
36
45
33
n.d.
Trapani
17
13
10
n.d.
9
n.d.
Marina di Carrara
10
9
8
7
4
n.d.
Brindisi
1
2
4
2
3
Bari
12
24
20
10
Totale
8.243
8.921
9.493
9.688
9.878
10.772
* Dati provvisori (Fonte: Autorità portuali)
07/06
19.1%
11.9%
4.7%
-15.2%
14.3%
1.9%
1.1%
7.2%
3.8%
20.9%
5.2%
17.3%
40.8%
18.5%
14.3%
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
9.1%
Un’ulteriore conferma delle grandi potenzialità di Trieste e del suo porto viene visualizzata dalla mappa che
segue che mostra i collegamenti del porto di Trieste, in particolare con la Turchia e con il Medio Oriente.
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Roberto Lavarini
La sua è una posizione altamente strategica e ha un bacino di influenza che comprende tutto il NordItalia, l’Austria, parte della Germania, la Repubblica Ceca, la Slovacchia, la Romania, la Bulgaria e le
nazioni nate dalla ex-Jugoslavia. Un’area che ben si connette con i principali corridoi europei.
Trieste con il suo porto non riesce da sola, e nella situazione attuale, a far fronte a un impegno
crescente se non arriva ad integrarsi con le infrastrutture logistiche del Veneto e del Friuli Venezia Giulia.
Occorre “fare sistema”, rendersi complementari attivando circuiti virtuosi. In questo modo tutta l’area
può affermarsi come testa di ponte verso i mercati dell’Est-Europa e oltre.
Sul “Corridoio 5” si concentrano le attese di quanti vorrebbero vedere facilmente connessi i territori
dell’Ovest, a partire dal Portogallo, fino a quelli dell’Est come l’Ucraina e oltre verso l’India e la Cina.
Strade per le merci, strade per le idee
113
La vera opportunità di questa pianificazione sono la sua intermodalità e i vantaggi che derivano dalla
presenza del porto di Trieste in cui confluiscono diversi tipi di autostrade sia terrestri che marittime.
Il ruolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia con i suoi centri di Trieste, Cividale e Gorizia sarà quello non solo di
favorire le connessioni fra tutti e quattro gli orientamenti cardinali, ma anche di orientare scelte e strategie
future per creare un grande sistema di comunicazioni e di flussi di beni e servizi ma soprattutto di idee per
creare, finalmente, un nuovo paese.
In sintesi, ci sentiamo di sottolineare l’importanza dell’idea di strada. Questa, infatti, non è solo il
modo per ottimizzare dei trasferimenti di merci o di persone ma è carica di significati sociali non
trascurabili.
L’organizzazione del territorio sta cambiando. L’assetto politico è cambiato. Le città assumono valore
crescente e nelle città spesso si concentra lo “spirito” della nazione.
Le città mediterranee stanno tendendo tutte verso degli stessi obiettivi seppur provenendo da situazioni storiche molto diverse. E il gap fra Nord e Sud sta progressivamente diminuendo.
C’è un crescente bisogno di connettersi, di collegarsi anche fisicamente. Strade veloci, dirette, facili
da percorrere con qualunque mezzo. Ci si aspetta di trovare gli stessi beni e servizi ovunque.
Il ruolo del Friuli Venezia Giulia è determinante non solo per la posizione geografica, ma anche per la
sua “vocazione” mantenuta nel tempo e per le iniziative che sistematicamente e periodicamente vengono
promosse nei suoi Istituti e nelle sue Università.
Chiudiamo con l’affermazione del direttore Di Stasi 10 che, proprio a Trieste disse: «In questo importante momento storico, è assolutamente necessario che un numero sempre maggiore di imprenditori italiani diventi consapevole delle potenzialità dei mercati dell’Europa sud-orientale. E che l’internazionalizzazione delle imprese italiane sia efficacemente sostenuta dalle istituzioni pubbliche, nell’ottica di una
rinnovata collaborazione tra pubblico e privato, imprescindibile per una coerente strategia da seguire come sistema Paese».
Perciò, sono estremamente importanti le vie di comunicazione. Meglio se sono efficienti, diffuse e
praticabili da tutti.
Non dimentichiamo però che il fine è di costruire un solo Popolo e una sola Nazione che possiamo
chiamare Europa.
RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI
Anholt S. (2007), L’identità competitiva. Il banding di nazioni, città e regioni, Egea, Milano.
Bruschi F., E. Pagnini, P. Pinzauti (1991), Cultura turistica, Hoepli, Milano.
Lavarini R. (1997), Il pellegrinaggio cristiano, Marietti, Genova.
Leed E. (1992), La mente del Viaggiatore, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Pavone M. (2007), Flussi migratori – Prospettive di modifica nell’ambito della riforma del Testo Unico
dell’immigrazione, Presidenza dell’Animi, Associazione nazionale per l’immigrazione.
10. Direttore generale dr. Angelo Di Stasi delle Politiche di internazionalizzazione presso il Ministero
delle attività produttive (Trieste, 25 maggio 2004).
PAN EUROPEAN CORRIDOR EIGHT –
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Reis Mulita
International University Institute for European Studies − Gorizia
Abstract: The Balkans are now facing an unprecedented opportunity for social and economic development Corridor Eight, as a part of the core network of Pan European Corridors of transport and
communications, is seen as a key infrastructure based on the trace of an antic roman road “La Via
Egnatia”, enhancing movements of people, freights, information and experiences from west to east
through the Balkans area countries. For Corridor Eight to be a functional part of the core networks of
TEN-T and Pan European Corridors of Transport must be oriented toward a sustainable development.
It must be a clean, safe, secure, healthy and economically cost effective area. The article analytically
describes the nature and functions of Pan-European Corridors and it reviews the EU transport policy
before presenting the Corridor Eight as a tool for the sustainable development of the Balkans.
Keywords: Pan-European corridor, EU transport policy, sustainable development
•−•−•
1. What are Pan-European Corridors
Experiences of the human society has demostrated that transport and communication infrastructure
are crucial for social and economic development. While EU policy consider them extremely important
for social cohesion and integration of EU and Neighbour Countries.
Following this argument we can easily appreciate that the development of transport corridors and
networks in EU has been at the same attitude with the institutional strategies of European Union towards cohesion and enlargement policy. In the Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament, corridors of transport as regard to Pan European level transport policy are
considered: «[…]Ensure and promote sustainable development by taking into account the economic,
environmental and social consequences of infrastructure plans and projects and horizontal measures
[…]» 1.
According to EU policy the corridor and network concepts arose in two different contexts for the
development of pan-European infrastructure:
• At the level of the European Union with the planning of Trans-European Networks, of Transport
(TEN-T), recognised in the Treaty of Maastricht as an important stage in a process designed to meet
the twin objectives of integration and cohesion.
• At the “Pan-European Level”, namely a Europe open to the East and to the South in the Mediterranean region, with the identification of the priority extra-Community corridors adopted at the PanEuropean Transport Conferences in Prague, Crete and Helsinki.
1. Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries [Brussels,
31.1.2007 COM(2007) 32 final].
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1.1. What are TEN-T (Trans European Networks of Transport)
The European Union has developed the idea of Trans-European Networks (TENs) at the end of the
1980s. There is no doubt that freedom of movement for goods, persons and services is only possible if
the various regions and national networks making up the single market are properly linked by modern
and efficient infrastructure. Because of that reason the construction of Trans-European Transport
Network (TEN-T) is considered as crucial element indicating economic growth and employment. «[…]
Modern economies cannot generate wealth and employment without highly efficient transport networks
[…]» (Barrot 2005).
The TEN Community guidelines were adopted in 1996 (Decision No 1692/96), aiming at integrating
national networks and modes of transport, linking peripheral regions of the Union to the centre and
improving safety and efficiency of the networks. In 2001 a revision of the guidelines took place
(Decision 1346/2001/EC), to include seaports, inland ports and intermodal terminals. In this first
revision also the characteristics and criteria for specific projects and projects of common interest were
identified.
As part of a broader review of these Community guidelines, a High-Level Group identified the 30
priority projects of the TEN-T up to 2013 on the basis of proposals from the 25 Member States and the
former accession countries Bulgaria and Romania.
The priority projects only include: [… the most important infrastructures for international traffic,
bearing in mind the general objectives of the cohesion of the continent of Europe, modal balance,
interoperability and the reduction of bottlenecks […] 2.
In September 2001 the “multi-annual indicative programme 2001-2006” (MIP) was introduced. The
objective of the MIP was to secure smooth and timely financing for major projects (including the Essen
priority projects and Galileo) on a multi-annual basis.
The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) (European Commission 2005) priority axes and
projects defied by the HLG are written below.
1. Railway axis: Berlin–Verona/Milan–Bologna–Naples–Messina–Palermo
2. High-speed railway axis: Paris–Brussels–Cologne–Amsterdam–London
3. High-speed railway axis of south-west Europe
4. High-speed railway axis East
5. Betuwe line
6. Railway axis Lyons–Trieste–Divaca/Koper–Divaca–Ljubljana–Budapest–Ukrain border
7. Motorway axis Igoumenitsa/Patras–Athens–Sofia–Budapest
8. Multimodal axis Portugal/Spain–rest of Europe
9. Railway axis Cork–Dublin–Belfast–Stranraer
10. Malpensa airport
11. Øresund fixed link
12. Nordic triangle railway/road axis
13. United Kingdom/Ireland/Benelux road axis
14. West coast main line
15. Galileo
16. Freight railway axis Sines/Algeciras-Madrid-Paris
17. Railway axis Paris–Strasbourg–Stuttgart–Vienna–Bratislava
18. Rhine/Meuse–Main–Danube inland waterway axis
19. High-speed rail interoperability on the Iberian peninsula
20. Fehmarn belt railway axis
21. Motorways of the sea
22. Railway axis Athens–Sofia–Budapest–Vienna–Prague–Nuremberg/Dresden
23. Railway axis Gdansk–Warsaw–Brno/Bratislava–Vienna
24. Railway axis Lyons/Genoa–Basle–Duisburg–Rotterdam/Antwerp
25. Motorway axis Gdansk–Brno/Bratislava–Vienna
2. High Level Group definition on TEN-T (Trans European Networks of Transport) priorities.
Pan European Corridor Eight – Towards sustainable development
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Railway/road axis Ireland/United Kingdom/continental Europe
‘Rail Baltica’ axis Warsaw–Kaunas–Riga–Tallinn–Helsinki
‘Eurocaprail’ on the Brussels–Luxembourg–Strasbourg railway axis
Railway axis of the Ionian/Adriatic intermodal corridor
Inland waterway Seine–Scheldt
It is easy to see that more than 84% of these priorities are concentrated on rail ways, motorway of
the seas and Galileo project (communication and navigation) even for most of all it is very well-known
that railways in most cases are negatively cost-effective.
The figures emphasise the sustainable development orientation of the EU policy on the transport area.
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Map of the TEN-T and motorways of the seas
The Pan-European Transport Corridors and Areas were established during three Pan-European
Transport Conferences. The overall concept was developed at the first Conference in Prague in 1991.
Nine long-distance transport corridors as priorities for infrastructure development were defined at the
second conference in Crete in 1994. A tenth corridor and the Pan-European Transport Areas for
maritime basins were added at the third conference in Helsinki in 1997.
The Pan-European Transport Corridors include cross-border, road and rail traffic routes between the
EU and non EU countries as well as airport, sea and river ports along the routes serving as inter-modal
nodes.
A considerable part of geographic environment where transport activity lays down can be considered as a corridor of transport. When linking more than two countries they can be considered as trans
national corridor of transport.
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Map of the Pan European Corridors and areas defined by the HLG 2003
1.2. Pan-European Corridors of Transport
There are ten transportation corridors defined at the Pan European Level. Here down is presented the
list of them.
Corridor I:
Helsinki – Tallinn – Riga – Kaunas – Warsaw with the components
a) Road Corridor (Via Baltica) from Tallinn – Riga – Warsaw
b) Rail Corridor (Rail Baltica) from Tallinn – Riga – Warsaw
c) Branch (road/rail) from Riga – Kaliningrad – Gdansk
Corridor II:
Road and rail link connecting Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow – Nizhny
Novgorod
Corridor III: Road and rail connection between Dresden – Wroclaw – L’viv – Kiev
Corridor IV:
Road and rail connection between Dresden– Prague – Vienna – Bratislava – Budapest
Branches to Nuremberg, Bucarest – Constanta and Sofia – Thessaloniki/Istanbul
Corridor V:
Road and rail connection between Venice – Trieste – Koper –Ljubljana – Budapest –
Uzgorod – L’viv
Branch a: Bratislava – Kosice – (Uzhgorod) – L’viv
Branch b: (road): Rijeka – Zagreb – Cakovec
Branch b: (railway): Rijeka – Zagreb – Koprivnica – Dombovar
Branch c: Ploce – Mostar – Sarajevo – Osijek – Budapest
Corridor VI:
Road and rail connection between Gdansk – Grudziadz/Warsaw – Katowice – Zilina
Branch to Brno
Corridor VII: The Danube waterway with the components
a) Danube inland waterway
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b) Black Sea-Danube Canal
c) Danube branches Kilia and Sulina
d) Danube-Sava canal
e) Danute-Thissa canal
f) Relevant port infrastructures situated on these inland waterways
Corridor VIII: Road and rail connection between
Bari and Brindisi – Durres and Vlore – Tirana – Skopje – Sofiya – Varna and Burgas
Branch 1: Cafasan – Kaphstice/Kristallopigi
Branch 2: Sofia – Pleven – Byala (road)/Gorna Oriahovica (rail)
Branch 3: Burgas – Svilengrad – Ormenion
Corridor IX:
Road and rail connection between Helsinki – St. Petersburg – Pskov/Moscow – Kiev –
Ljubasevka – Chisinau – Bucarest – Dimitrovgrad –Alexandroupolis
Corridor X:
Road and rail connection between Salzburg – Ljubljana – Zagreb –Beograd – Nis –
Skopje – Veles – Thessaloniki
Branches to Graz, Budapest, Sofija and Florina
1.3. Pan-European Areas (PEA)
The third ECMT in Helsinki 1997 (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) institutionalised
the Pan European Areas as an important priority for the European transport policy in European and
trans-continental level.
There were defined four P.E.A.
Barents Euro-Artic Area: Multimodal transport area covering the northern provinces of Sweden,
Finland and Norway as well as the Oblasts Murmansk and Arkhangelsk and the Republics of
Karelia and Komi of the Russian Federation.
Black Sea Transport Area: Littoral countries of the Black Sea (Turkey, Georgia, Russia, the Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria) as well as Greece and Moldova (observer status for Armenia and Azerbaijan).
Adriatic-Ioanian Sea Transport Area: Littoral countries of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas (Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro).
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The Adriatic Ionian Initiative was established in at the Conference “Security of the Adriatic-Ionian
Region” held on 19-20 May 2000 in Ancona, Italy. The seven countries around the Adriatic and Ionian
Seas supported the initiative: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Serbia
and Montenegro. The basic document for this co-operation is the Ancona Declaration which has been
signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states. The highest body of the initiative is the
Council of the AII which consists of the Foreign Ministers of the member states and a representative of
the European Union.
The main objective of the all the activities is the achievement of political and economic stability in
the region through co-operation in solving specific problems, promoting sustainable.
Mediterranean Transport Area (MEDA countries): Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
1.4. Corridor Eight a general introduction
Corridor Eight is one of the Ten Pan European Corridors of Transport.
Based on the trace of the ancient roman road “La Via Egnatia” [Fasolo 2003] it links the Albanian
ports of Durres and Vlora with Bulgarian Black Sea Ports of Burgas and Varna. This corridor will be the
main East-West connection through Albania of Apenine and the Balkan. Consequently it will become an
important multidimensional link between Europe and Asia through the Balkan.
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Pan European Corridor VIII , Includes road and rail connection between: Bari and Brindisi –
Durres and Vlore – Tirana – Skopje – Sophia – Varna and Burgas
Byala/Gorna Oriahovica
Pleven
Bari
Durres
Tirana – Cafasan – Skopje – Sofia – Plovdiv – Burgas - Varna
Brindisi
Vlore
Svilengrad
Ormenion
Kaphstice/Kristallopigi
Map of administrative centres defined at the “Memorandum of Understanding in Bari 2002”.
Branch 1: Cafasan – Kaphstice/Kristallopigi
Branch 2: Sofia – Pleven – Byala (road)/Gorna Oriahovica (rail)
Branch 3: Burgas – Svilengrad – Ormenion
It passes along the Countries of: Italy, Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece.
On its way It cross these Border (Land) Crossings
1) Kapshtice/Kristallopigi (AL – GR)
2) Cafasan (Qaf e Thane) – Struga (AL – MK)
3) Kriva Palanka – Kyustendil (MK – BG)
4) Svilengrad – Ormenion (BG –GR )
It is composed of these transport modes: road, rail, maritime navigation, aviation
The total length of railways is 1.270 km, and the total road length is 960 km
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Pan-European Transport Corridor VIII has been
signed in Bari on September 9, 2002 by Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Italy and Turkey.
It gave new impulse to the accomplishment of the Corridor (Corridor Eight Secretariat Unit).
The task of coordinating and promoting the initiatives for the realization of Corridor VIII are carried
out by the “steering committee” (SC), comprised of Member States’ representatives and chaired by
Italy. Since the signing of the MoU, there have been annual steering committee meetings.
Pan European Corridor Eight – Towards sustainable development
123
There are varies sources financing the development projects on the Pan-European Corridors of
Transport.
According to the Member States of Corridor VIII there is a wish to extend the alignment from Burgas
and Varna across the Black Sea to Poti and Batumi as well as to the Motorways of the Sea (Southern and
Western Mediterranean) and the main Italian ports, Taranto, Gioia Tauro and Naples. The connection
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with TRACECA towards the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus region is to be supported by adequate and
compatible intermodal infrastructures and logistic systems on both sides of the Black Sea.
The revision of the TEN-T guidelines has identified 30 priority projects and axes like Motorways of
the Sea. The connection of Corridor VIII to the MoS could be improved from the ports of Bari and
Brindisi to Taranto as well as to the ports of Gioia Tauro and Naples via railway, road and Intermodal
infrastructure.
Linking with Nord Adriatic ports must be added as a priority for the future of Corridor Eight.
2. EU policy and prospective of the Corridor
To fully benefit from the accession framework, the Commission is of the opinion that cooperation in
the Western Balkan region should focus on the core regional network and encourages the countries to
sped up alignment of their national legislation with the Community acquis on transport and other
relevant areas.
The objective of the EU policy is to establish an integrated market for infrastructure and land,
inland waterways and maritime transport and to align relevant legislation with the Community acquis in
the Western Balkan region. «[…]The partner countries showed a remarkably strong commitment to
work together on transport, in particular in reforming the sector in an environmentally and financially
sustainable manner. […]» (European Commission 2003).
In recent years public investment are designated for the financing of the priority network for the
better connection of the Western Balkans to the EU, and in particular by financing corridors of transport
as an instrument of development and integration towards these countries.
3. Financing instruments for TEN-T and Pan-European Corridors
The new Guidelines of EU as regard TEN-T revised and modernized the plans drawn up in the
1990’s by concentrating investment priorities on 30 major trans-European axes and priority projects.
The estimated cost of the priority projects is € 250 billion, whilst the completion of the whole TEN
Pan European Corridor Eight – Towards sustainable development
125
network would exceed € 600 billion.
The priority axes of the Tens serve primarily long-distance and international traffic within the Single
Market of the EU. Trade and transport between the EU, its neighbors and other major trade partners
were, however, not covered by the assessment of traffic flows that was carried out in support of the
revision process. The Guidelines therefore do not include priority projects to link the EU with the
neighboring countries despite the high traffic volumes that currently exist on many such connections.
Nor are there any connections to the Western Balkan region.
There are varies resources financing the development projects on the Pan-European Transport,
while the best cooperation of stakeholders in national and international level , is required in order to
absorb different possible financial resources. While PPP (Public Private Partnership), must be one of the
main priorities regarding this topic.
4. Corridor Eight, towards sustainable development
«[…] Transport matters for the human environment. Its performance characteristics shape settlement
patterns. Its infrastructures transform the landscape. It consumes about one-third of all energy in a
country such as the United States. And transport emissions strongly influence air quality. Thus, people
naturally wonder whether we have a chance for ‘green mobility’, transport systems embedded in the
environment so as to impose minimal disturbance […]» 3.
The question I am going to address is whether Transport Along Corridor Eight might receive greater
benefit from embracing a definition of sustainable transportation than from relying on the present status?
Following this question I am presenting approaches toward a safe, efficient and affordable transportation system that meets society’s need for environmentally sustainable transportation.
For several important issues − such as planning and prioritising major transport links, ensuring
compatibility of technical standards, regulations and facilitating border crossing procedures − a
transnational and regional approach instead of several national ones is expected to bring substantial
benefits for the society.
For the most scientific thoughts the concept of sustainable transportation, means that the transportation system, and transportation activity in general, must be sustainable on three counts − economic,
environmental and social.
The question I want to raise as regard to the approach to be achieved consist on the argument that how
the government policies, will apply the concept of sustainable development to the transportation sector.
The world’s best examples vision of a sustainable transportation system is guided by the following
principles:
– highest practicable safety and security of life and property;
– efficient movement of people and goods to support economic prosperity and a sustainable quality of
life;
– respect for the environmental legacy of future generations of citizens;
– user pricing that better reflects the full costs of transportation activity and transportation infrastructure decisions that meet user needs;
– reasonable access to the national transportation system by EU’s remote (Target) regions;
– accessibility in the national network without undue obstacles for persons with disabilities;
– coordinated and harmonized actions across all modes of transport;
– and, partnerships and collaboration among governments and with the private sector for an
integrated, coherent transportation policy framework.
3. Commission Communication of 13 December 2005 on the review of the Sustainable Development Strategy - A platform for action (COM(2005) 658 final.
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Based on the considerable international literature review a sustainable transport system is defined
as one that: 4
– allows the basic access and development needs of individuals, companies and societies to be met
safely and in a manner consistent with human and ecosystem health, and promotes equity within
and between successive generations;
– is affordable, operates fairly and efficiently, offers choice of transport mode, and supports a competitive economy, as well as balanced regional development;
– limits emissions and waste within the planet’s ability to absorb them, uses renewable resources at or
below their rates of generation, and, uses non-renewable resources at or below the rates of development of renewable substitutes while minimising the impact on the use of land and the generation of
noise.
EU policy on CO2 emission
All the countries along sides Corridor Eight wants to be institutional part of EU. Italy, Greece,
Bulgaria already are part of EU. Other countries such as Albania, Makedonia, Turkia are looking
forward to be part of Europe. EU policy aim to ensure a balanced and sustainable development for both
the EU and its neighbors, while regional and intraregional cooperation is an important component of
this policy framework.
The need to better connect the transport networks of the EU with its neighboring countries, is set as
a clear priority in the process of integrating the neighboring countries into the EU markets and society.
This requires compatible and interconnected infrastructure networks as well as harmonized regulatory
environments. The EU policy clearly states that trans-European networks and policy makers in
governments along corridors should draw up strategies towards reaching this objective.
EU Policy also sets out concretely how the EU proposes to work with the neighboring countries and
in the development on transport sector and especially on transport infrastructure, the existing exercises
such as the Pan-European Corridors or the Euro-Mediterranean transport network form the basis from
which to move forward.
It leis on the own responsibilities of governments and policy makers in the countries along the Pan
European corridors of transports and communications to follow the standards of EU in these areas.
Regulating CO2 emissions of transport
In February 2007 the European Commission published a review of the EU strategy on reducing
carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) from new cars 5.
The European Union is committed under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
8% by 2008-2012 compared to the 1990 level. In March 2007 EU leaders committed to a 20-30%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions overall by 2020.
What countries in integration process will do to achieve EU standards, and EU climate change policy.
The role of transport in global warming
Transport is the worst performing sector under ‘Kyoto’ protocol. According to official statistics
transport CO2 emissions in the EU grew by 32% between 1990 and 2005. Other sectors reduced their
emissions by 9.5% on average over the same period.
The share of transport in CO2 emissions was 21% in 1990, but by 2005 this had grown to 27%.
Emissions from so-called ‘light duty vehicles’ (passenger cars and vans) are responsible for approximately half of this.
The EU target to reduce average new car emissions to 120 g/km was first proposed by Germany at a
meeting of European environment ministers in October 1994. The 120g/km target was formally
announced in a European Commission communication in 1995.
4. Sustainable Transport policies (ECMT).
5. The European Commission “White Paper” on European Transport Policy.
Pan European Corridor Eight – Towards sustainable development
127
The target has now been postponed three times. Originally the target date was set for 2005. The
1996 Council Conclusions introduced the term ‘by 2005, or 2010 at the latest’.
The 120 g/km target represents a 35% reduction over 1995 levels. As CO2 is directly linked to fuel
consumption, we can say that the 120 g/km target corresponds to a fuel consumption of 5 litres per 100
km for petrol cars and 4.5 litres per 100 km for diesel cars.
In September 2007, T&E presented the latest evidence of this − the progress of the commitment in
2006.
Regulating the fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of new cars is the single most effective policy
measure the EU can take to simultaneously tackle climate change, reduce dependence on oil, and to
spur investment in low carbon car technologies in Europe and elsewhere 120g by 2012.
The deadline for reaching 120g has already been postponed twice, first to 2010, then to 2012.
Recent research shows that if all cars on the market were equivalent to today’s ‘state of the art’,
CO2 emissions would already be 20-25% lower than today even without car engine downsizing, or a
move to hybrid technology.
Long-term targets for 2020 and 2025 are necessary to give the industry a long-term perspective for
the development of more fuel efficient cars. 80g CO2 /km is needed by 2020 and 60g by 2025 in order
to be consistent with scenarios to reduce CO2 emissions by 30% by 2020 and 60-80% by 2050.
How can countries along Corridor Eight achieve a sustainable development of the transport activity?
-
Cooperation and partnerships among countries along the corridor will achieve the challenge toward
a sustainable development. See for example the report by the chair Infrastructure Steering Group:
«[…] The partner countries showed a remarkably strong commitment to work together on transport,
in particular in reforming the sector in an environmentally and financially sustainable manner. […]»
(European Commission 2003).
- Strengthening Cross Border Cooperation and freedom of movements in border areas will benefits
societies and enhance sustainable developments.
«[…] Cross-border cooperation between adjacent regions in the EU and in the neighbouring
countries will play a growing role including actions to improve transport as well as to increase
cooperation in legal and administrative areas. […]» 6.
Professor Puscas (2004) emphasises also the importance of transport in integration processes for the
society through cooperation and partnerships.
«[…] economic actors would have more opportunities to interact and develop cooperation; also,
strengthened cooperation between customs offices would lead to increased efficiency in countering
transnational-threats (organised crimes, illegal migration, illegal trafficking in arms, drugs and
people) […]».
In this respect, intensified communication campaigns would increase awareness in local communities of the benefits resulting from regional cooperation, with an impact on regional development [...].
EU has experienced the highest freedoms in transnational level for movement of people, goods and
formations. Countries along corridor eight want to follow the same standards. To achieve this goal,
further cross-border issues, has to overpass, in achieving EU, border mobility standards.
For that reason a curtain measures in different levels must be undertaken, such as:
- legislation and administrative improvements
- technical and physical modernisation
- custom regime improvement, etc.
Professor Gasparini (2004) considers very important and a permament element of the knowledge
and interaction for the society and the border regime between the neighbouring countries.
6. Communication from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Extension of
the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries, Guidelines for transport in
Europe and neighbouring regions [Brussels, 31.1.2007 COM(2007) 32 final].
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Reis Mulita
«[...] The strange destiny of the border is to be a separation through which the meeting of diversities
becomes central, a line of people in movement but also of settled and indigenous people, a place of
profound segregation but at the same time one of communicating interests, cultures and the wish to
know those who are different. […]»
«[...] Human history, the history of communities, societies, states-and abuses of power- has been
manifested through the wish to explore what is on the border and beyond it, to know it, to feel the
thrill of experiencing the unknown and to dominate it […]».
Public Private Partnerships are suggested to achieve infrastructure investments in both new technologies which reduce global warming and renewable alternative energies
Such partnerships will support in different ways:
They generate financial support, knowhow and experience, supervision and evaluation of infrastructure and technology investment, transparency procurements, cost reductions, new mentality in freedoms
of individuals beyond the state control of investment.
Public Private Partnerships will generate energies to exploit more rationally the human and natural
resources, time and territory. It will reduce congestions, accidents, CO2 emissions, security and preserve
human and natural diversities, through a better spatial planning and new technologies.
I am of the opinion that a “a win – win principle” could be used in PPP raising with national and
international subjects and actors. Countries along Corridor Eight must offer their human and natural
sources as partnership to only strategic direct and indirect partners first, than to other market request.
Such a partnership in respect to market economy rules will benefit economies and society driving
sustainable developments towards wellbeing societies.
Italy must be considered as the best choice in direct partnership rising for Albania as the gate of
Corridor Eight. While long, soft and progressive terms must be implemented in partnerships with
Italian subjects
Partnerships with Italian and EU subjects by implementing new technologies and experiences will
diminishes the consequences caused as the result of transport activity along corridors such as accidents,
environmental issues, fragmentary , inequity, informality, diversity and conservation which actually are
evident along the corridor urban area. Because of these consequences, there are demonstrated law level
of transport flows along the corridor, making less attractive the business, tourism and other activities by
the respective countries.
- A more stabilised Balkan region will make more attractive transport flows by the Corridor and, it
also will attract more tourism, foreign direct investment along the corridor area.
- Considering other corridors of Pan European Network both competitive and complementary will
further sustain the prospect of the region and individual countries.
- A coalition for sustainable development along the Corridor among the public and non-public stakeholders, will contribute in harmonisation of the standards towards the sustainable future of transport
activity and urban areas along the Corridor.
Pan European Corridor Eight – Towards sustainable development
129
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European Commission (2003), High Level Group definition on TEN-T (Trans European Networks of
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European Commission (2007), Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries, Brussels, 31.1.2007 - COM(2007) 32 final.
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Sikow C. (2007), Guidelines for transport in Europe and neighbouring regions, Directorate general for
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Ispi.
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facilitation of its operation.
BEYOND THE BORDERS OF MEDITERRANEAN CITIES:
THE MEDITERRANEAN CITY IN TRANSITION
Lila Leontidou
Hellenic Open University
Abstract: After analysing the meaning of borders in the Mediterranean, the article looks at the urban
transition in the Mediterranean. It is argued that the European urban network is highly fragmented and
depolarized. The article proposes that we are witnessing a world-wide Mediterraneanization of inner city
landscape.
Keywords: urban transition, urban landscape, urban identity
•−•−•
Throughout its history, the Mediterranean was a route of communication between hegemonic city
states and colonies or independent cities. It was a bridge. During their glory days, Mediterranean cities
formed a sort of urban network by the sea. The most prominent historian of the Mediterranean-as-abridge, communicating cultural interaction and technological interconnection, was Fernand Braudel
(1977). He stressed the communication – though not the unity – of Islamic and Christian cultures centred
on Mediterranean cities, achieved as long as the sea was open to navigation, like a lake, while road
transport was harder. However, Braudel was writing in the first postwar decades, as were a group of
anthropologists (e.g. Baroja, Peristiany 1965; Bourdieu 1979), simultaneously working in Africa and
constructing a view about a unified Mediterranean (Cowan 2001). Braudel and the anthropologists worked independently from each other, but their analysis was in agreement, especially where they addressed
broader Mediterranean values. During a later period, however, they were all criticized by historians and
anthropologists who considered the Mediterranean as fragmented or as a sort of political counterreference (‘us’ vs. ‘them’) of the ‘advanced’ Northern Europe (Herzfeld 1987). This actually reflects our
experience of the Mediterranean as a border.
1. The first transition: The Mediterranean from bridge to border: Fragmentation, landscapes of
modernity, and informality
Throughout antiquity and at least until the Renaissance, “Europe” was the land along the Mediterranean coasts, and the sea acted as a bridge of communications among “European” settlements. As long
as commerce with the East lasted, Venice, Florence, Constantinople, have been metropolitan leaders and
cosmopolitan centres. Explorations, however, shifted Europe to the West: Genoa succeeded other Italian
towns, and in parallel Spanish and Portuguese ports rose to hegemony. Then, gradually, cities of the
North became the new metropolitan leaders (Jones 1990).
This transition followed a series of important events after the 15th century, which caused major
divisions across the Mediterranean and shifted the centre of Europe away from the glorious city states of
the Renaissance. The Eastern Mediterranean fell under Ottoman occupation in a period culminating with
the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Half a century later, the defeat of the Moors and the Spanish
Reconquista by 1492 divided the South from the North (Leontidou 2003; 2004). This very year Columbus
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Lila Leontidou
also embarked for America, bringing the port cities driving the explorations to hegemony. A new reality
emerged around the urban Mediterranean, and “Europe” was re-defined vis-à-vis the “others”, the
outsiders, on the South and the East. Actually twofold divisions emerged. The shift of Europe to the
North, away from Africa, was followed by the East/ West divide, a split between Orient and Occident,
which became as rigid as the North/ South. The fragmented Mediterranean sea became a border between
Europe and Africa, the Southern border of Europe.
These processes intensified rapidly during the next centuries and brought about a major transition of
the Mediterranean city. The celebrated industrial revolution pushed the Mediterranean down from core to
peripheral status in the global economy in a slow process of decline from the 17th to the 20th century.
Mediterranean cities did not go through any industrial revolution. They were marginalised and surpassed
by Northern ports in Belgium and Holland (Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam), and then London (Jones
1990; Mumford 1961-1966). The factory and the railroad, the capitalist economy, did not take root in the
South and were not the main forces transforming its cities. Capitalist development in Mediterranean
history has been different from that of Western Europe in many respects and the process of urbanisation
was not triggered by industrialisation. With the partial exception of Italy, which industrialised earlier, in
the rest of Southern Europe and Middle East, cities grew because of poverty and insecurity in the
countryside, informal work opportunities in the cities, as well as the Mediterranean culture of urbanism,
as discussed below. Fast urbanisation without industrialisation turned Mediterranean cities into large agglomerations in the world. Today (2007), population levels are higher than 10 million in Cairo (16) and Istanbul
(12), and over 5 million in Madrid and Alexandria, which constitute the 4 Mediterranean mega-cities.
Table 1 - Urbanisation without industrialisation: The 15 largest cities of South Europe and countries with
Mediterranean coasts (30.09.2007)
Global
order
11
24
26
49
64
78
84
88
90
96
104
113
121
124
134
Name
Al-Qāhirah
İstanbul
Paris
Madrid
Al-Iskandarīyah
El Djazaïr
Barcelona
Dar-el-Beida
Ankara
Athínai
Milano
Roma
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Napoli
Lisboa
English Name
Cairo
Istanbul
Paris
Madrid
Alexandria
Algiers
Barcelona
Casablanca
Ankara
Athens
Milan
Rome
Tel Aviv-Jaffa
Naples
Lisbon
Country
Egypt
Turkey
France
Spain
Egypt
Algeria
Spain
Morocco
Turkey
Greece
Italy
Italy
Israel
Italy
Portugal
Population
16,100,000
11,800,000
10,000,000
5,950,000
5,100,000
4,275,000
4,175,000
3,900,000
3,875,000
3,725,000
3,525,000
3,300,000
3,125,000
3,100,000
2,925,000
Source: Adapted by the author from data in http://www.citypopulation.de/index.html and http://ec.europa.eu/.
In Southern Europe, urbanisation was combined with urbanism and informality on several fronts,
including the economy and housing. Gramsci illuminated the Southern metropolis in ways contrasting to
those of Northern urban theory. Since the Summer School is based in Italy, it is basic to pay tribute to the
two major Italian intellectuals, the two Antonios, Gramsci (1971 edn) and Negri (2003 trsl), who offered
innovative insights in important aspects of Mediterranean city theory (Leontidou 1990); Afouxenidis
2006). They illuminated the Southern metropolis within a proper, Southern European, discourse about
economy and civil society, but they adopted antithetical approaches to urbanism. They have laid the
Beyond the borders of Mediterranean cities: The Mediterranean city in transition
133
foundations of a theory for the Mediterranean city, which must rest on the reversal of every aspect of the
Western and Northern modern landscape:
Modernity
„ Burgess model
„ Urban sprawl & suburbanisation
„
„
„
„
„
Location relative to CBD
Eclipse of neighbourhood community
Segregation – ethnic, class, income
Urban life cycles
Land use zoning
Mediterranean city
„ Inverse-Burgess model & popular suburbs
„ Compact cityscapes & spontaneous popular
sprawl
„ Multi-centred cityscape
„ Popular neighbourhoods
„ Segregation & vertical differentiation
„ Reversal of urban life cycles
„ Mixed land use
Despite the apparent stability of the inverse-Burgess model considered as “preindustrial” by Sjoberg
(1960), Mediterranean cities have long surpassed this stage. They are just restructured by forces different
from the North. Throughout the last century, Mediterranean cities have been stamped by cultures of
urbanism and by the concept of spontaneity, coined by Gramsci (1971 edn; see Leontidou 1990). These
forces cause recurring patterns and structures at the level of Mediterranean cityscapes, constantly
transforming them as follows:
(a) the inverse-Burgess spatial pattern, with the affluent classes in the centre and the poor on the periphery, undergoing constant gentrification of the inner city on the one hand, and spontaneous urban
development and popular suburbanisation on the other, with less planning than in other world
regions;
(b) a compact cityscape with tall buildings, narrow streets, small open squares, suburbs quite close to
the centre, and problems of consequent environmental pollution;
(c) social class and ethnic group segregation, vertical as well as horizontal, but milder than in the
Anglo-American city,
(d) mixed land use (horizontally and vertically) rather than zoning of residence and economic activity,
as well as bazaars, street markets and kiosks which “house” the informal economy within a postmodern collage (Leontidou 1990, 1997). In combination, informal work and informal housing or
semi-squatting challenge public top-down policy (non-) responses, solving problems of unemployment and homelessness by putting all the burden on the family (Kazepov 2005), and
(e) the proverbial spontaneous popular illegal settlements on the periphery reverse the experience of
Northern middle-class suburbs.
Reversals become even more definite, if we are seeking a theory which will not exclude post-colonial
Islamic cities. In Africa and the Middle East, the transition means the transformation of islamic cultures.
The strings binding together the Mediterranean city throughout the last century, have been stamped by
cultures of urbanism and by informality, but also by cultural hybridity. The former two, urbanism and
spontaneity, were analysed by Gramsci and have been, in fact, the main components of the Mediterranean
city theory. But let us first discuss hybridity.
Hybridity is reflected in complex urban landscapes, which appear as hybrid products of the cultural
history of the city state: ancient temples, walls, squares, markets – agoras, fora – mixed with byzantine
churches but also ottoman mosques and moorish palaces, along with today’s urban squalour. Hybridity
also has to do with the interplay of sacred and secular in everyday life, with religious rituals in Easter, Ramadan, saints’ feast days, and other occasions (Horden, Purcell 2000). Social control prevails over economic rationale in the Arabian Medina.
In fact, hybridity distinguishes Southern Europe from post-colonial Mediterranean cities in North
Africa and the Middle East. The latter are more hybrid and this has a depth, since, even today, they
animate Orientalism (Said 1978) and the division between secular or European vs. Islamic cultures.
Middle Eastern cities, from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to Sudan (Blake & Lawless eds. 1980) have
mixed and incorporated social control or “divine law”, while economic rationale is weak in the citybuilding process (Hakim 1986; Korsholm Nielsen et al. eds 2001). Medina, the arabic name for the old
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city, is extended into the Rabad, i.e. its suburbs or later additions, while the Kasbah, attached to the Medina, has long served as a refuge in case of defeat.1 In order to deserve the name of Medina the city must
have a mosque, a main through street and a governor’s residence. The bazaar or the herb and spice market
constitutes the public sphere of meeting and exchange. Space is sharply gendered (men/women, exterior/interior, public/private; Korsholm Nielsen, Skovgaard-Petersen 2001) and women are not allowed
into coffee houses and halls of many mosques. Clothing regulations make women “invisible”, and tensions have risen recently, since veiled women started to walk in European public places. Segregation
principles in Islamic cities are different from European ones, since each mahalla houses people of a
common ethnic or socio-economic background under the administration of a Mukhtar. Segregation has
been often sealed in gated communities guarded at night, not only in the colonial but also in the postcolonial period (Hakim 1986). Ghettoes and migrant quarters in European cities are only pale parallels of
mahallas (Leontidou 1997: 185-7).
In any case, both sides of the Mediterranean have hybrid cities: Arabian ruins are protected in both
Africa and in the Iberian, contribute in Andalusian cultural identities and constitute the main attraction of
those cityscapes. Antiquity is recycled in Greek and Italian Christian churches which are often built with
stones and columns from ancient temples (Leontidou 1997). Though secular and speculative building has
since surrounded Mediterranean sacred spaces and ruins, it has never eradicated their presence or
magnetism to residents as well as global tourists.
Urbanism, the attraction of the city rather than pastoral eutopias and the strong cultural heritage of
cityscapes (Leontidou 1990, 1997, 2001), really unites Mediterranean cities. All these civilizations
crystallized around the urban-oriented cultures, which sought dignity in the representation of the city as
civilization, as a space for citizenship. In geographical imaginations, cities remained synonymous with
civilization (Polis/ Politismos) and cultural identities were forged by urbanism. In Southern Europe today,
collective memories of the city state and its specific cultures and spatialities have never faded (Leontidou
2001). Mediterranean urban monuments, the ruins of city walls and ancient ports revive time through
space and its genius loci. The memory of the radiant city states and the quest for the cultural identity of
the urban citizen have largely accounted for fast urbanisation irrespective of late industrialisation
(Leontidou 1990, 2001). Massive urbanisation waves have not only been caused by rural poverty and
insecurity, combined with informal work opportunities in the city, but also by the culture of urbanism.
This is very pronounced in the work of Gramsci, but Negri, has the opposite disposition.
Last but not least, Mediterranean city theory has to include spontaneity, yet another contribution by
Gramsci, who used it in antithesis with conscious leadership in Mediterranean social movements. Modernity
has been diluted in spontaneity and informal modes of living and working (Leontidou 1990). The
reproduction of the informal economy and housing brings Mediterranean cities together. This creates a
postmodern collage of mixed land use in the urban landscape and society, before the label was even used in
art and academic discourse (Leontidou 1993). Through spontaneous popular suburbanisation, the problem of
homelessness has been solved by families rather than any welfare state, poverty has been relieved
informally, by income sharing, with the vulnerability of large population groups as a result. Precarious
popular owner-occupation in illegal self-built shacks ensures that poverty does not automatically lead to
homelessness, and that shacks can improve into more solid popular housing as the family income grows.
Spontaneous urban social movements and transient populations, like migrants, tourists and others,
have kept Mediterranean unity. Migrants mingle and create multicultural diversity and alternative locales.
Global tourism imaginations are inspired by memories from the period when the Mediterranean was a
bridge among cosmopolitan cities. The tourist gaze is still captured by cultural hybridity. In fact, this
collage of ruins and modernity, became the centre of the next transition!
1. The Medina is built according to various schools of law, among which the Maliki is the most influential in Morocco and Algeria, the Hanafi is predominant in Tunisia and Libya, and so on (Hakim
1986). The relatively few elements in the urban building language are combined in various ways permitting flexibility, diversity and complexity.
Beyond the borders of Mediterranean cities: The Mediterranean city in transition
135
2. The 2nd transition: Urban competition, the entrepreneurial city and ‘Mediterraneanesation’
The next major transition of the Mediterranean city follows EU integration with the Southern
expansion – EU accession for Greece 1981, for Iberian countries 1986 – as well as globalisation and postsocialist transformation, especially since the 1990s. The first signs of this transition, already from the
periods of dictatorships, were to be found in the attack of the state to popular illegal building (Leontidou
1990). Gramsci’s interplay between force and consent was represented in most cities by demolitions on
the one hand and ‘legalisations’ on the other, and often by the building of large housing estates.
Spontaneous popular settlements are now much rarer in the Mediterranean, and have been finally
eradicated in Southern Europe except Lisbon (Beja Horta 2004). Urban development has shifted to publicprivate partnerships with very weak planning by the state, or occasional urban design and restoration.
Entrepreneurial cities have emerged in Southern Europe, competing with other European cities, while at the
same time influencing the latter to “Mediterraneanise” their landscapes, as we shall soon discuss.
Throughout postmodern Europe, neoliberal globalization has caused the welfare state to shrink. A new
period of urban competition (Jensen-Butler et al. 1996), brings about the commodification of the city (or
“city marketing”, Kearns, Philo 1993), neoliberal strategies for visibility and centrality – at least where
possible, within the proverbial “blue banana” and its margins. The urban core is renovated. Production is
rapidly outstaged by consumption in postmodern Europe. The cultural economy of cities comes centrestage after losses in their industrial economy. They compete in order to stage global mega-events in order
to attract global tourism and, through it, entrepreneurial interest.
Throughout Europe, population movements nowadays indicate a revival of urban living. Gentrification swings Northern European and American ‘urban life-cycles’ towards a re-urbanisation trend (van
den Berg et al. 1982), enhanced by organised urban regeneration and new strategies of multilevel and
multi-agent urban governance. A strong component of place marketing is developing, urban entrepreneurialism. New modes of urban regulation emerge, from public reform and the welfare state to publicprivate partnerships.
Postmodern urbanism switches urban governance all the way round from urban planning to civic
design, from comprehensive reforms to selective local interventions, from deliberative to communicative
planning, from welfare planning for residents to urban regulation for global tourism and transnational
capital (Newman, Thornley 1996; Bailly et al. 1996). Two conflicting tendencies come to be harmonised
in postmodern cityscapes:
„ Uniqueness: Capitalisation of heritage, re-invention of tradition
„ and in parallel, homogeneisation: New postmodern urban spaces with global innovative design principles and architects.
In other words, postmodern culture seeks the re-invention of tradition, but also iconic buildings are
constructed as landmarks for the sake of place marketing. The past is valorised in urban design and
authenticity sought in the urban landscape. At the very same time, innovative iconic architecture is included in strategies for visibility, in place of the welfare state, reform and redistributive planning (JensenButler et al. 1996; Leontidou 1995; Kaika, Thielen 2006). In this, there is still flexibility for experimentation by local actors and agents (Leontidou 1993, 2001; Craglia et al. 2004; Kazepov 2005). This is negative where the burden of redistribution is placed on the family in weak welfare societies.
European cities now compete as city states once did, though with new methods and peaceful means. In
this race the Mediterranean has peculiar ambivalent advantages on many fronts. There is the resilience
due to the experience of constant urban competition within the respective nation states (Leontidou 1990).
Mediterranean cities have been constantly gentrifying and are therefore not facing any major restructuring
in this area. Reurbanisation has often preceded suburbanisation, as in the example of Greece. Southern
Europe slides easily from spontaneous urbanisation to postmodern urbanism. We have elsewhere analysed
its smooth transition to place marketing and postmodernism (Leontidou 1993). The preponderance of the
cultural economy comes naturally to cities which have not experienced much of an industrial revolution, and
is in harmony with urban entrepreneurialism, postmodernism and urban competition.
Visibility through the attraction of international mega-events becomes a priority also in the South. In
Greece, the origin of the Olympic Games, did really the city Athens in 2004 sell the Olympics to the rest
of the world, or vice versa? (Afouxenidis 2006). In 1992, corporate mobilisation and the culture of urban-
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ism led Spain to provide three success stories in urban competition, hosting international events: Barcelona for the Olympics, Madrid as the European City of Culture, and Seville of EXPO 92. Since then, the
international spotlight has often turned on the three cities. More generally, after the important administrative reform of 1978, cities in the various regions of Spain (Catalan, Castillian, Basque, Andalusian)
autonomously reaffirmed their identities in Europe and claimed a section of EU funding, centrality and
entrepreneurial interest (Garcia 1993; Leontidou 1995).
These neoliberal strategies are based on strong cultural identities and the capitalisation of heritage.
There is plenty of this potential in the pride of Mediterranean cities for their ancient and medieval
heritage, which is turned into an advantage in urban competition. Neoliberal developments are swinging
Mediterranean cities from pre- to post-modernism, without full-scale modernisation in-between (Leontidou 1993). Their mixed land use does not necessitate the re-design against zoning. The regeneration of
heritage comes naturally. These cities are theatres of memory (Crang, Travlou 2001), with a very strong
though contradictory relationship between urban movements and global tourism in the period of the
entrepreneurial city…
Southern cities even influence Northern cities in a process of “Mediterraneanisation”. This was first
named in Liverpool, but was also enacted in many other inner cities around the globe – central Baltimore,
Glasgow, the Melbourne and London waterfronts, the Graz island, ‘reconquered’ cities such as Lyon,
Strasbourg, Copenhagen, Melbourne (Leontidou 2001, Couch et al. 2007), and also more recently in
Eastern European cities of Hungary, Romania, Bosnia and other Balkan cities which belong to states with
Mediterranean coasts. London has adopted both “Mediterraneanisation” in the docks, and American highrises. North and South converge in three important ways:
1. Urban renovation with the revival of inner-city living and outdoor cafes and the valorisation of
historic heritage – ancient or industrial, productive or cultural, depending on the city in question.
2. Global architects, many of whom originate in Southern Europe – S. Calatrava, R. Piano, A. Tombazis
– mingle with other cultures but also disturb renaissance harmony, as in Venice, or construct whole
innovative complexes, as in Athens, Genova, Lisbon.
3. Another type of “Mediterraneanisation” relates with second homes and residential tourism2. Mediterranean seasonal family life patterns, fragmenting time between work and leisure, commuting and
suburban living, or between first and second home, within the year and the week, spread abroad. Since
the 1980s, moreover, another form of seasonal sprawl – or rather leapfrog development – affected the
Mediterranean city: residential tourism by North-South migrants lining the Mediterranean shores
(Leontidou, Marmaras 2001). This is an important version of suburbia, or rather counterurbanisation,
by affluent populations since the 18th and mainly the 19th century beyond city and indeed national
boundaries, and can be as removed from cities as the French Riviera is removed from French or
British cities, and Algeria is removed from Paris. Residential tourism has become more massive since
the Maastricht treaty, allowing purchases by foreigners, and spreads from the South of France to Italy
and Spain, where it has changed the face of Costa Blanca from Barcelona to Alicante, via Benidorm,
and Greece, first in islands, then approaching post-Olympic Attica (Couch et al. 2007). It involves
Northern European populations, who buy properties along Mediterranean coasts and islands and stay
there for maybe half of the year, or longer.
These processes discredit convergence theories, “urban life-cycle” models and evolutionist perspectives of the past. In postmodern Europe, Mediterranean urban trajectories are not “prior” to those of
Anglo-American cities, nor do they constitute their exact reversal, for that matter. The building up of positive Mediterranean urban identities preceded the industrial revolution and the latter is not a relevant
event in their own particular cultural development or urbanisation trajectories or urban landscapes, except
as a global constraint (Leontidou 2001). The past (from antiquity to Enlightenment) is constantly revived
and incorporated into the present. The fact that modernism, industrialism and Fordism did not take root in
Southern Europe, does not mean that these cities are pre-industrial, pre-capitalist, pre-modern, as often
portrayed in Northern urban theory. This grand narrative is wrong and unconvincing. It may be that these
2. Values for central living in Mediterranean urban Europe have been combined with a rural second
home for days of leisure. Second-home access also involves a lot of continental Europe, and has been
important in the creation of compact cities (Leontidou 1990).
Beyond the borders of Mediterranean cities: The Mediterranean city in transition
137
cities were rather long ago ‘post’-modern (Leontidou 1993). My analysis here has aimed at rejecting evolutionist and convergence models, the grand narratives which have kept Mediterranean cities captive of
anti-urbanist perspectives and locked in unsuitable theory for so long.
3. Post-colonial borders of exclusion and territoriality
Spatial divisions during the 2nd transition become more acute, both within cities, and between Europe
and the “others”. New exclusions and visible problems of vulnerability divide European cities (Leontidou,
Afouxenidis 1999). Cityscapes of poverty are created by pressures of immigration and ethnic tension, and
are divided between poverty and vulnerability on the one hand, and urban regeneration on the other. In
the South, polarisation in the past took the form of in/out of the city, with squatters as outsiders.
Postmodern urban regeneration creates new polarisation dynamics, displacing poor populations from the
city centre, and still putting the burdens on the family. Residents must bear the burden of renovation,
mega-events and urban competition in general. Earlier class structures have been recently diluted and
besides residents, there are commuters, business people (Martinotti 1993), but also global tourists, migrants and transient populations. The latter two figures densify their presence in cities, especially in ports
of Mediterranean Europe. Migrants from the East and the South have added to the problem of social
exclusion in the new millennium.
Post-cold-war Europe brings to the foreground the intense divisions that have emerged through the
last two centuries, between the European and the Middle Eastern Mediterranean cities. Forces of diversification between the North and the South of the Mediterranean speeded up after the Southern EU expansion in the 1980s, and especially in the post-socialist era. In the South – Africa and the Middle East –
post-colonial cities are polarised, conflictual, and often shaken by violence. As the cold-war walls are
being demolished, such as the most celebrated Berlin wall, but also the one in Gorizia between Italy and
Slovenia, walled borders are erected in the southeastern Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean as a border is centred on social divisions. In general, European Mediterranean
spatial segregation has been rather mild, compared with American and other patterns. Vertical differentiation has created a milder cityscape. But post-colonial Middle-Eastern cities are even more polarised.
Not only is there segregation and gated communities, but solid walled borders. Among these, the one
constructed by the Israelis on the West Bank is the longest and the most notorious. There is also still the
“green line” in Nicosia, Cyprus, yet another divided Mediterranean city within the EU. Post-colonial
cityscapes of the holy cities themselves, such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Canah, but also of Ramalla,
Beirut and other East Mediterranean cities, witness the rigidity and violence of ethnic divisions. The postcold-war epoch poses cultures and cultural identities as the main dimensions of social exclusion, fragmentation and conflict.
These constitute material evidence that the Mediterranean sea is no longer a bridge at the current stage
of globalization and restless geopolitics. It is still a border, hardening with war caused by foreign intervention and civil war. Huntington’s (1997) widest-read theory of the clash of civilizations, which influenced the work of many prominent globalisation theorists, has a direct negative impact toward the
perception of the Mediterranean as a border. His theory has been criticized but then endures especially
after September 11, 2001. In it, the Mediterranean springs to the foreground as the sea dividing Islamic
and Asiatic cultures on the one hand, from the Western secular culture on the other. It becomes a sea of
conflict, a border which increasingly hardens with globalisation and also with events from Ramalla to
New York.
However, this border is often trespassed.
It is trespassed in recent academic literature, though scholars keep stressing divisions to North/South,
East/West. There have been «two principal ways in which Mediterranean unity has been characterized: by
reference to either ease of communications, which we may conveniently label the interactionist approach,
or to common physical features, the ecologizing approach” (Horden, Purcell 2000: 10). The former has
now faded, while prominent geographers and urbanists who have analysed the Mediterranean during the
20th century consider the sea as a single entity (or a bridge), only within the orbit of environmental studies
(King et al. 1997). The postmodern confluence between South and North Europe will tend to fragment
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Lila Leontidou
the Mediterranean further, despite efforts for Euro-Mediterranean Union… EU cooperation programs did
not have much success or duration, and hardly touched the cities. They have tackled diplomacy and politics, or economy, considering peripherality and underdevelopment, as well as diversity, with vast
differences between South European cities, North African ones, and Middle Eastern Asian cities; but they
mostly dealt with the environment, desertification, water pollution, energy sources (Grenon, Batisse 1989;
Mairota et al. 1998).
The Mediterranean as a border is also trespassed by migrants – legal or illegal, floating to small European ports as “boat people” – who, against all theories, bring multi-cultural orientations to cities and symbolic borders animating interaction in the broader Mediterranean. Flows into Mediterranean cities have
consisted of internal migrants, refugees, then international migrants and illegal migrants from the South
and the East; of global tourism attracted by landscapes which are theatres of memory, with conspicuous
monuments of world heritage; and recently of residential tourism. The border is deconstructed by tourist
cruises and also tourism cooperation projects (Apostolopoulos et al. 2001), though tourism differs radically among Mediterranean regions and cities, especially after September 11, 2001.
There are also top-down efforts to trespass the border. Official initiatives for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation have started with the Barcelona Process. They are not yet successful but they have been recently renewed in Paris. These integrated efforts to re-make the Mediterranean as a bridge were discussed
at the Paris Summit of 13.7.2008, where a Union for the Mediterranean was confirmed, bringing together
several leaders around the Mediterranean and the Middle East, who were traditionally at odds with each
other.
Last but not least, borders are trespassed by networking. Besides urban competition among entrepreneurial European cities, there is also its opposite: intense urban interaction in networks binding cities
together. Among their objectives, there is the effort to re-make the Mediterranean as a bridge. Urban
networks are revived especially in postmodernity.
Conclusion
The city state may be never resurrected again in Europe, but the nation state is often questioned, and
even undermined, by ‘Europe of the regions’, movements for regional autonomy, and especially escalating urban competition. However, there is also its opposite: networking leads to the reconciliation of cooperation and competition, as in the economic sphere. Hundreds of different realities emerge and speeds
of urban and regional development are multiplied. Mixed land use, illegal building, segregation, horizontal and vertical, now diversified by immigration, reflect new processes and create the specificity of
Southern urban landscapes. Urban populations are seeking their local identities, to the point of the actual
personification of towns and cities.
Repolarisation and spatial divisions in some corners, but also socio-spatial homogenisation in others,
tear the European urban network apart and at the same time lead to its depolarisation: Northern cities have
to follow the culture of urbanism. Southern cities are not developing towards Northern models, as posited
by convergence theories which have come under severe criticism (Leontidou 1990; 1993). By contrast, I
venture to say, the “Mediterraneanisation” of inner-city landscapes in all corners of the world, exemplifies
ways in which, in postmodern times, Southern urban-oriented cultures have explicitly influenced and
literally penetrated the North.
Beyond the borders of Mediterranean cities: The Mediterranean city in transition
139
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ISTANBUL ITALIAN LEVANTINES AMONG
THE OTHER NON-MUSLIMS: A COMMUNITY’S FORTUNE
AND DISSOLUTION DESPITE IDENTITY PRESERVATION
Alessandro Pannuti
Grenoble Mendès-France University
Abstract: The Italian Levantine community has been living in Istanbul without mixing with the ruling
majorities for almost a millennium. Now it is on the threshold of dissolution despite its still preserved
unique civilization. How could identity be kept for such a long time? What was the role of the mid-19th
century revitalized minority environment? How did Turkish republican xenophobic nationalism affect this
environment? What is the real state of the Levantine’s identity preservation? How can their lack of
integration into Turkish society – rather than any compelled mass exodus – endanger their civilization in
a context where the minority environment has vanished?
Keywords: Italian Levantine, Istanbul, ethnic relations
•−•−•
«We have behaved very well with foreigners.
This is the cause of all our misfortunes»
Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842-1919)
Introduction
Some lands and cities seem to owe to their very geography the fate of an imperial position. These are
centres of convergence, knots of far-reaching webs, places of recurring migrations and settlements over
the centuries, such that the distinction between migrant and minority communities becomes quite pointless. The consciousness and will to keep taking on an imperial role imply both a political, sociological,
juridical set of rules and a social outlook not only based on tolerance but even on the positive endeavour
to encourage immigration and the pacific coexistence of migrant/minority communities, i.e. to endorse
and enforce multi-ethnicity and a cosmopolitan culture.
The opposite of such a framework is of course the ideal nation-state, aiming at its ethnic, “national”
homogeneity as best as it can. In particular, the building process of a nation-state from an empire is necessarily characterized by the implementation of nationalism, which in case of the presence of numerous,
strong and ancient non-native communities, can easily turn into xenophobia.
Indeed Constantinople-Istanbul has lived, and perhaps at their pinnacle, both of these features. Ever
since the Romans, imperial Byzantium has been a crossroad between the Mediterranean and the Black
Sea, Europe and the Levant, the Balkans and the Arabic-Persian-Central Asian (Turkic) cultural trilateral
area; since the Byzantines, Constantinople has been the principal Port of the Levant trading with the Italic
Maritime Republics (“Repubbliche Marinare”); and the 1453 Ottoman conquest of the city for sure was
not a breaking point along this line: thence came the first Italian merchant settlements in the city, their
continuity under Ottoman rule and thereafter.
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On the contrary, the breaking point was the building of the Turkish Republic in 1923, from the ruins
of an empire whose disintegration had been hurried by several independence wars and movements
throughout the 19th century, urged by the post-World war I military occupation by European powers
aiming at its final dismemberment. The new born Turkish Republic was a threatened state, in many ways
distrusting its resilience due to a lengthy decline. Turkish nationalism has taken many different forms
during its nation-state building, just as it is now under the pressure of the post-modern decline of the
nation-state 1; most of them ended up in xenophobic acts, from the 1928 linguistic restrictions on foreign
languages until the 1955 anti-Greek breakages known as the “6-7th September Events”.
Of the whole of Byzantine-Ottoman-Turkish Istanbul’s ethnic mosaic, we have only investigated on
Italian Levantines and Italian Jews, who are the smallest communities of non-Muslims in number, well
below the Rum or non-Hellenic Greeks (whose name recalls the Eastern Roman Empire, they have never
migrated from), the Armenians (among the first Christianised nations in history, who have periodically
migrated westwards from their native area between Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, which they have
always shared with the Kurds among others), the Ottoman Jews (mostly Sephardis exiled from 15th century Spain).
Levantines is the name given to European descendents of the Levant Ports settlers 2, whenever they
have settled: among those the Italians (or Italics) have always been the most numerous, although never
exceeding 12,000 to 14,000 people, a peak reached around the end of the 1920’s 3. A conventional dating
of the Constantinople Levantine community’s birth is 1204, i.e. the date of the Latins’ conquest of the
city during the 4th Crusade and their fortification of the Genoese district of Galata, whose tower is still
visible and visited today. This makes it the oldest European colony in the world. Ever since then, the
Italian presence has been uninterrupted and new migration flows have followed from various parts of
Europe, at different times.
As the title of this paper indicates, however, the analysis of the Italian Levantines is to be understood
as non-exclusive of other communities, for the Levantine community has been developing inside the
wider environment that used to include the whole of non-Muslim minorities. It is important to underline
that the Levantine community has perpetuated itself and moreover has been able to create an original,
unprecedented and unrepeatable civilization thanks to the existence of this unique social environment.
Rather than being assimilated by, and instead of integrating themselves into the ruling majority, the
Levantines have been given the chance not only to preserve their collective identity – that is their faith
and traditions, languages, institutions, habits including laws, ways of life, inside their relatively closed
urban frame – but also, across the centuries, to give birth to a huge civilization. This civilization had the
capability and the momentum to feed itself, i.e. to produce new works, discourse, literature, myths and to
1. Murat Belge is one of the foremost Turkish scholars on nationalism. On his link between
nationalism and the different stages of the nation-state, see Belge (2006).
2. Some scholars, such as Livio Missir di Lusignano and Rinaldo Marmara discredit the term and
prefer talking about “Latins”, but this latter name can only be referred to the members of catholic families
who were already present on the empire territories before the Ottoman conquest, and therefore became
Ottoman subjects. Some of them eventually acquired a European citizenship, often not related with their
original provenance.
3. The question of population counting is always quite hard in the Ottoman Empire since no census
existed. As for the censuses of the Turkish Republic, they are quite unreliable insofar as linguistic and
ethnic minorities are concerned, for ideological reasons. As far as Consulate registers are concerned,
which we have been thoroughly analysing in our doctoral work, they only used to register new entries,
and were very inaccurate about departures or deaths, so that in no given moment a computation is possible. Not to mention, as for the Italian citizens, that the Consulate of the Sardinian Kingdom, later Italian
Kingdom, only opened its residence in Constantinople a few decades before Italy’s unification. The
earliest population estimations come from Pontifical delegates, including Mgr. Cedulini sent by Gregory
XII in 1580, quoted by Marmara (2003); some more recent ones are given by European visitors of the
mid-19th century such as Baratta (1840) and Bessé (1854), both quoted by Sergio La Salvia (2007). For
calculations during the 20th century until the year 2000 see the abridged divulgation version of our thesis,
Pannuti (2006), passim but especially chapter V, or now the non-abridged version, Pannuti (2008: ch. III).
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“civilize” the newcomers from Europe, who ended up being “levantinised” in their culture and even in the
languages they were able to speak, after just one generation 4.
Unfortunately, the Levantine community is now on the threshold of disappearance. We were lucky
enough to meet the last “levantinised” generation, who is well above seventy years old and whose
valuable testimony we have gathered. Its following one has mostly deserted Turkey and migrated like
many Turks do or dream to. Since post-World war 2, Turkey’s migration balance is negative. The
newcomers transit rather than settling, and certainly don’t get “levantinised”. There have been emigration
flows of minority members due to a hostile political context, but this has not been the case for Levantines.
The unfavourable context for some minorities can and must at the most be charged with destroying the
minority environment.
This is why, rather than talking about disappearance of the Levantine community, we have chosen to
call it “dissolution”: we are going to show that if its foreseeable imminent death has the end of the
environment as its necessary condition, the sufficient condition of its death is demography, by no means
related to Turkish policies. As for the Levantine civilization, it now keeps being alive only in a handful of
precious elderly people’s memories, and just as few good-willing researchers’ works.
We shall therefore structure this paper into three parts: the first will examine the conditions for the
Levantine community’s existence and perpetuation, followed by the its regeneration in the 19th century;
the second part will deal with the Turkish republican nationalism and its consequences in terms of
xenophobic acts which caused the disappearance of the minority environment; the third part will concern
the Levantines’ proper “dissolution”, a mixture of identity preservation and lack of integration. This latter
has led to the end of “levantinisation”, in the context of an absent environment and of their subjective
(mythological) self-representation as a community in decline, and thereby, almost to the Levantine
civilization’s death.
1. Community’s perpetuation and regeneration
1.1. Byzantine-Ottoman juridical bases
Ottoman Empire historians well know the meaning and implications of the word ‘Capitulations’: the
treaties granted by the Ottoman sultans to Christian nations, conferring rights and privileges to their
subjects residing in the imperial territories. Capitulations are the juridical framework of the existence and
perpetuation of the Levantine community. What is not always remembered, however, is that the first
attribution of one Constantinople district to a foreign community, granting a wide range of liberties and
autonomies, especially to monastic orders around which the first colonies developed, dates back May
1082, when Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos issued them in favour of the Venetians (Marmara
2007: 219). On June 2nd 1453, just four days after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, under the
condition of surrender of their district and of personal subjection to Sultan Mehmet II, the Latins of Pera,
mostly Genoese by then, obtained the same privileges, which would be renewed by all subsequent sultans
to all Europeans: Levantine community was thereafter set under Ottoman rule 5.
4. Civilizational, cultural, literary and mythological aspects of “Levantinité” have been for many years
the axis of my research. See, besides Pannuti 2006a and Pannuti 2008 above-mentioned, Pannuti 2004,
Pannuti 2006b and Pannuti 2007.
5. The original text of the Capitulationi di Sultan Mehmet con li Perotti, written in Greek, was long
kept in aristocratic Levantine family, the Testas’ archives. A manuscript of the first half of the 17th century, Relatione dello stato della cristianità di Pera e Costantinopoli obediente al Sommo Pontefice Romano, commented and published by the Italian Levantine historian Eugenio Dalleggio D’Alessio, contains
an Italian translation of it, whose first paragraph is quoted hereunder: «Essendo al presente comparsi
gl’Ambasciatori Ballatan Pallavicino e Marchio de Franco con l’interprete loro Patritio per parte del
Popolo e della Nobiltà di Pera, et in segno d’amicitia mi presentano la chiavi della terra loro, e fattisi sudditi e sottoposti a me, così ancora io con tal conditione gl’accetto che possino vivere, reggersi e gover-
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Alessandro Pannuti
Practically, Capitulation privileges can thus be enumerated: freedom of entry, transit and residence;
freedom of faith and trade; freedom of estate purchase and property (at least by individuals); autonomous
jurisdiction in both civil and penal affairs between non-Muslims; right of a dragoman (official
interpreter)’s presence in the affairs including both Muslims and non-Muslims; domicile inviolability;
wide liberties in succession and testamentary matters (Mori 1906).
The Ottoman mark of this juridical system, in conformity with the Empire’s theocratic nature, was to
distinguish people – which, as we have pointed out, were presently still entirely formed of Ottoman
subjects – according to their religious identity, into ‘Millet’, commonly translated as ‘Nations’, among
which the “Millet-i Lâtin” that characterised the Levantines 6. Also, it was the highest religious authorities
– the archbishop, the chief rabbi, the Greek/orthodox and Armenian/Gregorian patriarchs, etc. – who were
given the charge of administrating justice inside their respective Millet, bearing the very rank of the
Sublime Porte’s ministers. European migrants thereafter came with their own “foreign” subjection which
they kept; they were referred to as ‘Frenk’ and benefited from the same legal status, thus de facto joining
the Latin Millet and moreover mixing up by marriage, so that gradually an increasing number of Levantines became foreign subjects.
From the 15th until the mid-17th century, the sociological results of this system were: the utmost importance of religious institutions and of religious collective identity rather than any national one – unlike
in Europe where national divisions were more and more enhanced by wars –, and the development of a
sort of aristocracy not by land possession but by the often inherited dragoman function, i.e. an “aristocracy of clergymen and civil servants”. These features apply also to the other minorities, for instance the
Greek/orthodox so-called Phanar aristocracy.
In particular, the Levantine community was organised around the “Magnifica Comunità di Pera”,
whose merchant families managed the monastic resources and estates. However a long decadence of these
patricians, despite the struggles to keep their social status through marital alliances 7, symbolised by the
papal abrogation of the “Magnifica Comunità” in 1669, also influenced the community altogether.
Meanwhile, the growing might of European states, their rivalries (particularly of France vs. the Central
Empire) inside the diplomatic chessboard where the Ottomans had also entered, implied the rising
influence of consulates – instead of the Catholic hierarchy – including in justice administration inside the
Millet-i Lâtin. An extended agony would have awaited the Levantine community, despite its privileges,
had a major revitalizing change not taken place in the mid-19th century, which boosted it to its apogee.
1.2. The mid-19th century turning point
The Ottomans had granted the Levantines the for-requisites for survival as a community: sufficient
autonomy to keep their faith, their laws, their languages and their urban anchorage. Nevertheless they
lacked communitarian institutions to reach the degree of organization necessary to form an organic community. This came mainly from the outside, i.e. from the fresh migration waves coming from Italy during
this period 8. A whole set of circumstances help understand Constantinople’s regained attractiveness for
Italians and their consequent flows. On the Ottoman side, there was obviously the promulgation of the
Gülhane Edict (or Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839), the first act of the Reform period (Tanzimat) which proclaimed
narsi sì come per il passato hanno fatto, senza ch’io vadi con l’esercito mio ad occupare in rovina loro la
terra».
6. Having agreed on this terminology, we shall be very careful not to confuse “nationality” with
“subjection”, later to become “citizenship” after the French Revolution. One could be “Ottoman subject
of Greek/orthodox nationality” and most Levantines were, at least at the beginning of this historical
process, “Ottoman subjects of Latin nationality”. Livio Missir di Lusignano is rightfully very keen in
pointing out these juridical aspects. See in particular, Missir (1976).
7. On this point see Nora Şeni (2007).
8. For our doctoral research, we have interviewed 70 Levantines of different families, and one of our
questions concerned their ancestor’s date of arrival in Turkey. The results were the following: 14% were
Latins’ descendents, 21% emigrated in the first half of the 19th century, 31% emigrated between 1850
and 1880, 22% emigrated between 1880 and 1900, 12% emigrated in the first decades of the 20th century.
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equality before law for all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of their religion or any other distinction. This
constitutional act had a strong symbolic importance in terms of guaranteeing religious freedom, although
it had little momentum on Levantines, who were more and more rapidly becoming foreign citizens 9, and
none at all on newcomers.
Besides, the economic environment of the empire’s last decades was characterised by a profusion of
Court expenditures in a struggling attempt to catch up with modernity: railways, transport, service supply
infrastructures, the army’s modernisation, new royal palace constructions and decoration; all those buildings and works appealed to European, mostly Italian engineers, craftsmen, artists and even simple workmen 10. The debts thus contracted – through the Imperial Ottoman Bank –, as well as the principal export
monopolies were also directly managed by Levantines and Ottoman Jews (mostly Protégés). In this period, new typically Levantines professions were thus born or developed to unprecedented extents: shipbrokers, insurers, bankers, import-export agents, specialised technicians becoming industrialists, and all
the lower workers of these sectors, new for Turkey, slightly late undergoing the well-known industrial
revolution 11.
On the Italian side, besides the commonplace reasons for mass emigration, which in that period had
still a wider range of directions than it took later on, in particular around the Mediterranean (Libya,
Tunisia, Egypt, Malta, the Aegean islands), a post-Vienna Congress (1815) consequence has to be taken
into account: Genoa was annexed to the Sardinian Kingdom, Venice to Austria. Both these states were
eager to implement a maritime policy towards the East, trying to get their share of the decaying Ottoman
Empire 12. The Sardinian Kingdom sent Count Ludovico Sauli to Constantinople in 1822, with the
mission of negotiating the opening of a Consulate there; he actually did much more: he made a survey of
the pitiful, lawless and rather wicked state of the community he found, and set the bases of its disciplining
9. In the 19th century, there already existed a new juridical status: the “Foreign Protégé”, given to
Ottoman subjects somehow at the service of, or in relation with a European Consulate and sometimes also
to citizens of a European state without consular representation at the Sublime Porte. With time, and for
almost everybody after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the “Protégé” status turned into full foreign
citizenship. Therefore some Levantine families, whose different members had worked for various European Consulates, had frequently come up to be awarded different citizenships and sometimes had genealogical links with different European aristocracies: ex. the Testas, lately made barons, having links with
Holland, Austria, Prussia etc. See inter alia Livio Missir (1981).
10. Many studies exist on the more or less lengthy stays of Italian architects and artists in Constantinople, in relation or not with some works commissioned by the sultans. Actually it is a very widespread
mythological theme in the Levantine literature to identify the reason of the first ancestor’s immigration with
a “call from the Sultan” to work as an artist or craftsman or military reformer. In documented history,
obviously, such peoples’ number is lower than what is reported in a mythological way in our interviews to
their descendents. Nevertheless the phenomenon is assessed. Among the most famous artists, both
Levantines (or ‘levantinised’) and non-settled Italians, we can quote: Raimondo D’Aronco, Giulio Mongeri,
Fausto Zonaro, Leonardo De Mango; and as musicians: Giuseppe Donizetti Pacha, and Arturo Stravolo.
11. The most reliable source on Levantine professions is the Constantinople Italian Chamber of
Trade’s magazine La rassegna italiana, published from 1896 to 1971, thoroughly analyzed in chapter II
of Pannuti 2006a; some other data about all Italian residents’ jobs can be drown from the Consulate’s
archives, Registro dei Nazionali, also analyzed in Pannuti 2006a.
12. A great number of Italian geopolitical studies on the Levant were published from the mid-19th
century until the 1930’s. Most of these “monografie coloniali”, which would deserve a semiological
analysis, re-discovering old Italic settlements, consider them as “colonies”, with the more or less admitted
goal of taking profit of them as bridgeheads for future colonization, like other European countries were
doing. This point of view begot the Levantines’ first disappointments towards their mythical motherland
Italy, from which, after mutual recognition and in return of human sacrifices in the Crimean, Libyan and
especially 1914-18 wars, they expected some material and organizational help for the existing communities as such, particularly concerning the implementation of State schools.
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under the future consular authority 13. The Austrians, rather than Venice, used Trieste as their main port
towards Constantinople, and they instituted a regular navigation line connecting the two cities in 1835:
the famous “Austrian Lloyd” 14.
Secondly, educated Italians got influenced by the cultural trend of Levant attraction: there were some
expectations that the Empire would westernize itself, and in parallel literary and artistic Orientalism,
reported for instance in the literary journey diaries from the East, alimented the fascination for the Levant 15.
Undoubtedly several educated would-be-Levantines migrated to the city seduced by Orientalism.
Thirdly and most importantly, a significant proportion of the 19th century Italian migration to
Constantinople consisted of political exiles, in connection with ‘carbonarismo’ and the Risorgimento
wars. According to Sergio La Salvia, the first-coming carbonari’s aim was to conspire in favour of the
philo-Hellenic cause (La Salvia 2007). Especially after the 1848 events, the exiles’ number certainly
increased considerably, and probably their plots were more oriented against the Habsburg Empire,
antagonist of the Ottomans in the Balkans. Garibaldi himself went several times to Constantinople, united
a group of friends who would become of utmost importance for the Levantine community’s future
institutional organization, since they later founded the “Società Operaia Italiana di Mutuo Soccorso di
Costantinopoli” we shall now look at. In Risorgimento ideals we find the convergence point between
three aspirations: the Ottoman modernist, reformist, westernizing spirit of the Tanzimat; some fresh political ideals of unity and solidarity (and to a certain extent republicanism) coming from Italy and spreading
at first semi-clandestinely through such foreign social clubs or associations as well as through freemasonry 16; a means of national based organization for the Levantine community, benefiting moreover
from the identity cement of patriotism.
1.3. The organizational framework and community’s revitalization
At the beginning of the 1860’s, almost all minority communities tended to be metamorphosed through
an organizational framework, based on clubs and associations or institutions which, for the first time, had
13. Sauli is also the author of the historical essay: Sauli (1831). In his report of the work done during
his diplomatic mission, he referred to the Levantines he found in 1822 in the following terms: «[La colonia] consisteva in sei o settecento Genovesi del volgo, facchini, mezzani, intromettentisi in qualsivoglia
pasticcio, uomini sfuggiti alla galera, soliti a vivere nelle osterie, nelle bische, ad aggirarsi di giorno e di
notte con fine per l’ordinario perverso, né alieni dal mettere la mano nel sangue per rubacchiare e compiere ogni maniera di delitti. Erano il terrore dei quartieri franchi di Galata e di Pera». Quoted by Claudio
Masi (1935: 11).
14. We obviously cannot tell how much did this navigation line contribute to the new migration flow
from Italy to Turkey. Still, from our set of interviewees, we have learned what follows of the Italian areas
their ancestor came from: the great majority came from middle-large maritime towns: 33 from Northern
Italy, 24 from the South, 14 from the Centre; out of the former group: 12 were Genoese and 15 came from
the whole of Triveneto (including 6 Venetians, 4 Triestines and some Istrians); from the Centre, most
were Livornese, a majority of whom Jews; from the South, the majority came from Sicily. Therefore the
above-mentioned maritime policies indeed were successful.
15. For instance the above-mentioned painter Leonardo De Mango acknowledged that he had come to
Constatinople under the inspiration of the journey diary by our famous Edmondo De Amicis (1877). In turn,
Levantine mythology and literature has paid much attention to and been a lot influenced by this Western
(especially French) journey literature: for example the Levantine writer Willy Sperco published an essay
(Sperco 1955) whereby he collected biographical data of all the French writers’ journey to Turkey from
Chateaubriand until that day adding an anthology from their descriptions, and in various other works he recalls some journey diaries dating back from as far as the 16th century, such as the one by Ghislain de
Busbecq. Contemporary Levantine writers share the same interest: Livio Missir (1979); also Giovanni Scognamillo has long been working on an essay on the Levantine neighbourhood of Beyoğlu, still unpublished,
whose third part be will include a 360 reference Istanbul bibliography, divided between works published in
Turkey and abroad, and subdivided between essays, researches and theses, novels, short stories, poetry.
16. The specialist of freemasonry in 19th century Constantinople is Angelo Iacovella (1997).
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a national rather than religious connotation. Their springing was usually endogenous, therefore unrelated
to consulates or government authorities. They had mainly three functions: socialization – i.e. creating
opportunities for gathering in recreational and/or patriotic contexts, philanthropy – which is the
Enlightenment inherited step from regular clergy’s charity towards modern States’ public policies, and
culture – both in terms of the working class’s cultural enhancement, and the awakening or rebirth of
national feelings through culture and indeed language in a minority environment.
For the Italian Levantines, the most important association taking on these functions was the Società
Operaia, founded in 1863 by a small group of Garibaldi’s close friends, in direct contact with the Italian
hero who was appointed as their President. Besides the above-mentioned functions, it is likely that its
solidarity including financial aid was primarily directed towards political exiles and the Risorgimento
campaigns. However by the 1870’s the Operaia had opened up to the whole of the Italian-Levantine
community, irrespective of social class or profile, political belief (the monarchists’ vs. republicans’
dispute had also been overcome…), closeness or dissent with the Consulate, etc. It mostly organized
balls, fund raising parties for charities, it had a library, and became very active and combative in the
opening of Italian High School (1888) and Giuseppe Garibaldi State primary school whose building was
also erected partly thanks to it 17. Later on, it also contributed to the opening of the Constantinople branch
of the Dante Alighieri cultural association.
A more typically Levantine, religious, multinational and purely philanthropic institution is the
Associazione commerciale artigiana di pietà in Costantinopoli (Palmieri 1902), founded in 1837, whose
42 little houses were used as a home for the poor and a shelter for widows and orphans of whatever
Christian nation. In 1888 the Consulate also promoted a charity purposed Società di Beneficenza
specifically for Italians.
The State schools were also coupled by some other Italian religious schools, as the famous Suore di
Ivrea’s girl primary school (still existing) and the Salesiani Fathers’ craft school (also existing as a private
Turkish school partly in Italian language), competing but not reaching the same popularity as the French
religious ones.
The already existing Italian Hospital took a modern shape and constantly employed Italian medical
and nurse staff since 1856. Later a paediatric hospital was also founded and ruled by Italian doctors.
Thanks to these associations, besides the official institutions such as the Consulate and the Italian
Chamber of Trade, the Italian-Levantine community both acquired a national identity aimed by a very
patriotic spirit, and shaped its very famous, mythological way of life, which has continuously been described
with nostalgia and self-contempt in Levantine literature (Pannuti 2004). A historical account of the
community’s social life chronicle, at least until 1925, can also be inferred through the magazine published
by the Chamber of Trade, La rassegna italiana, but it should not be forgotten that those accounts always
kept in a shadow the life of the Levantines’ majority life: that of workers, craftsmen, even unemployed who,
having failed in Istanbul, eventually had to be repatriated at the Consulate’s or the Operaia’s charge 18…
17. The two prime sources on the Società Operaia are: Goslino, Providenti (1906) and Marinovich
(1995). The former mentions at length how hard it had been to have the Italian government play its role
on the foundation of this school.
18. From Scognamillo’s Memories we can also read old Triestine Tata Caterina’s anecdote, also entered in Turkish literature. This humble Caterina, who could only speak her half-Venetian half-Slovenian
dialect, lived in miserable conditions surrounded by cats and by Italian magazines which she couldn’t
read, but whose photos helped her overcome nostalgia. A cold winter morning she was found dead,
covered by her magazines.
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2. Towards the disappearance of the minority environment
2.1. The Turkish republican nationalism
The evolution from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic is tantamount to the issue of a Turkish nationalist ideology and its endeavour to achieve a national state, just like the Greeks, the Armenians, the
Bulgarians, the Arabs and many other minorities had achieved or were in the process of claiming theirs.
Xenophobia was latent then, as a reaction to the more and more colonialist-like features of the
Capitulation regime. One of the first and most important Turk sociologists of that time, Ziya Gökalp
(1875-1924), pointed out the lack of a common collective consciousness between Turks and non-Muslims
and claimed that both groups were “one another’s parasites” 19. Contemporary historian Ayhan Aktar,
making a sociological analysis of the Turkish leadership of the 30’s, thus explains its own xenophobic
nationalism: «this group […] we can agree to consider as middle-aged in the 30’s, had studied in the
relatively modern schools opened by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and had actively participated into the 1908
revolution or at least had lived that period as adults. In the following years, such is the chain of events
that determined the development of minority hostile behaviours: Albania’s insurrection, the Balkan wars,
World War I and the Armenian genocide, Istanbul’s and Smyrna’s military occupation following the
armistice; all these episodes had been lived by the kemalist leadership as chapters of the national
independence struggle. […] Nothing else could be expected from them under those circumstances»
(Aktar 2000: 87-88).
However, the Jeunes Turcs’-kemalist nationalism was rather more complex than simple xenophobia,
since its prime concern was modernization which was synonymous with westernisation, and as Cossuto
rightfully writes: «For all Ottomans, the most evident mirror of modernity was also the closest to them,
that is the Levantines’ modernity, whose way of life thus became the instantaneous representation of an
Ottoman Empire in process» (Cossuto 2007: 337).
Therefore kemalist xenophobic nationalism was not one of minority community persecution or destruction or expulsion, but rather of imitation, assimilation and absorption (just the opposite of the Ottoman
model). When that was not possible, at least it tried to minimize and even deny their existence. This is the
reason for which the Republic’s censuses have systematically been prepared and carried out so as to
minimize the non-native groups’ size, so as to become political instruments of homogeneity propaganda 20.
Actually this ‘reassuring’ form of existence negation, besides being a reaction to the initial territorial
claims by some minorities and Western powers in the first years of the Republic 21, had also the effect of
showing to a lesser extent the rate of decline of all minority communities. In particular, no spectacular
exodus wave by any minority at any time and as a consequence of any given xenophobic act can be
19. Gökalp was Durkheim’s disciple, whom he had translated into Turkish, and his nationalism was
based not on ‘race’ or ethnicity but on culture. His idea of Turkish culture had much to do with Islam, and
therefore he was much against the Jeunes Turcs and later the kemalist ideology, inspired by massive westernisation. Unfairly to him, he is now only remembered in Turkey as the author of the ultra-nationalist and
rather populist pamphlet The Foundations of Turkism, much praised by nowadays hyper-nationalists and
neo-fascist tenants, although his most important scientific works, now almost forgotten, were Nationalisation, Islamisation, Westernisation (1918) and History of the Turk Civilization (posthumous, 1926).
20. Our analysis of the published Turkish censuses of 1927, 1935, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, in
ch. III of Pannuti 2008, owes a lot to Dündar (2000). He gives as much political importance to censuses
as to see them as the motive of minority persecutions, which we don’t agree with. We can observe, however, that before the 1927 census, Atatürk himself, conditioned by Greek and Western claims, thought
that the whole of the Turk population of Anatolia counted no more than 8 million people, while afterwards it was claimed, not without a nationalist pomp which now sounds rather preposterous: «Non-Turks
are almost as few as coming and going tourists in other countries. [… On the contrary] 13,648,270 people
belong to one species, one blood, one seed».
21. One of the US President Wilson’s famous “14 points” was about self-determination of minority
populations “living under the Ottoman yoke”…
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noticed, but rather a smooth decline towards some values which are closer and closer to what can be
expected to be almost reliable 22.
2.2. Xenophobic events affecting the minority environment
Having posed these two beginnings, we can rapidly quote the xenophobic events that, although not
having demographically undermined any minority community, still have severely wounded the minority
environment as a whole.
The first was the 1928 linguistic repression campaign called after its slogan “Citizen, speak Turkish!”.
Actually it was not government initiated; it was the Turkish Students’ National Union’s decision to put
into the political agenda the issue of minority communities speaking other languages than Turkish. Being
a non institutional act, no data is available nowadays insofar as the force (or violence) of its implementation. However it is likely that a certain inhibition about talking foreign languages in the street was
felt for some time, as some posters bearing the slogan were seen in different cities; moreover a rumour
spread that whoever could not speak Turkish would be expelled from Turkey. The Istanbul Jew Avram
Galanti (or Galante) published a little pamphlet just around that time, in which on the one hand he tried to
explain the historical reasons for some Jews not to have learnt Turkish, on the other hand he urged them
to do so as soon as possible (Galanti 2000). This campaign lasted almost a decade, and for reasons
probably related to the European anti-Semitism of the 30’s, it involved the Jews more than anyone else 23.
The xenophobic act remembered by the Levantine community as having had the most catastrophic
consequences is the 11th June 1932 law (N° 2007) on the banning of certain jobs on foreign citizens 24.
Levantine memory and mythology recall 7,000 departures to Italy thereafter, i.e. about half of the community. However no archive or other available data confirms such an exodus, nor do the Consulate
22. Let us report the following demographic table taken from Turkish censuses, noting that for some
years we have been able to prove that the given number was lesser than our estimations by up to 60%:
Distribution of the Istanbul population according to the mother tongue
Turkish
Greek
Armenian
Hebrew
ITALIAN
French
English
German
Spanish
Bulgarian
1927
574.592
1935
692.460
91.902
45.255
39.199
4.890
6.021
1.327
NC
NC
4.985
79.920
39.831
26.335
3.550
3.827
954
3.670
8.210
4.321
1945
1950
898.841 1.001.625
6.978
738
31.777
2.076
3.811
890
1.139
8.249
1.619
67.593
42.652
28.172
2.060
2.687
NC
1.379
NC
2.051
1955
1960
1.366.077 1.744.452
65.108
46.683
26.853
2.323
3.406
1.781
2.706
NC
1.374
49.081
37.280
16.754
2.150
2.549
3.477
2.761
2.777
1.187
1965
2.185.741
35.097
29.479
8.608
1.895
2.106
4.389
2.640
2.236
1.168
23. On March 4th 1937, the issue was still alive and echoed in the press, by an article on the daily
paper Tan titled “Turkish language in public places”, signed Ahmet Emin Yalman. Two days later, the
same paper published a reply: “Marsel’s open letter”, signed Mr. Marsel Franko (Marcel Franco), the
Jewish Community’s and the Grand Rabbinate’s Laic Council’s President.
24. These were mostly humble jobs, but traditionally done by foreigners (some were even quite
typical Levantine professions). Below is the list of such jobs: «Hawkers’ trade, musical activities, photography, hairdressing, typography, tailoring and hat and shoe manufacturing, brokering, row materials sale
in State monopolies, translation, tourist guiding, workers activities in building, iron and steel industry,
joinery, any permanent or temporary activity in the public transport, water supply, electricity, press
sectors, land transport driving, supervising and caretaking in residential buildings, offices, shops, commercial centres, hotels and enterprises, men’s and women’s services (waiters and waitresses) in hotels,
public baths, cafes, casinos, dancing places, pubs, including comparing and singing in bars». Also medicine, veterinary and chemistry were banned for foreigners.
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registers show any decrease in the number of new arrivals around that time. Actually some interviews
report of changes of job or unofficial practise of the formers. Moreover, most Levantines had some
ascendant of Greek (or Armenian or Jew) nationality, and therefore were also Turkish citizen in virtue of
a law dating 1928. Nevertheless, it is likely that the new Italian immigrants’ professional profile did
change as a consequence of this law.
The next act was much more severe, but specifically anti-Semite: it was the 1942 “Tax on Fortune”.
In the context of World War 2 implying possibly Nazi occupation of Turkey from Bulgaria or Greece 25,
widespread anti-Semitism charged the Jews of war speculation. The Ministry of budget asked its local
fiscal offices for an unofficial assessment of minority members’ revenues and fortunes and then published
completely arbitrarily exaggerated fiscal charges lists. These were often such as to oblige the Jews to sell
all their goods, still not extinguishing their fiscal debts. The Turkish citizen Jews who still had some debts
were sent to forced work camps in inner Anatolia, on railway building sites until their debt was paid 26.
The last such event was the 6-7th September 1955 breakage. Scognamillo wrote at length what he saw
of the destroyed Beyoğlu shops and houses the day after the facts (Scognamillo 2002: 135-139). In a
context of Turkish-Greek political tension about the Cyprus affair, the news of a bomb attack on
Atatürk’s childhood house in Salonica had provoked an outburst of popular rage against the Greeks’
shops and houses in Istanbul and Smyrna. Thousands of shops were turned upside down, many houses
were looted and their inhabitants beaten. Because of the Levantine interbreeding, some Levantines also
lost all their goods on that night, save a few who were protected by brave and friendly Turk neighbours or
by hanging the Turkish flag at their windows. All this was done before the eyes of completely inactive,
sometimes even implicated police and military forces. In the following days, the official explanation was
an unbelievable theory including communist provocation and spontaneous patriotic uprising. Some
Levantines and indeed some Greeks must have left Istanbul as a result of this and of fear, but our
interviewees who were directly involved generally said they had lost everything and therefore could not
even afford any trip abroad 27.
As a conclusion of this rapid series of tragic xenophobic acts, we can first of all notice that none of
them provoked any exodus, therefore the disappearance of the Levantine environment that we have
claimed as being their consequence was not an instantaneous result of a single trauma. Nevertheless we
notice that a constant and generalised intolerant outlook has been present in republican Turkey as a result
of nationalism. The resident foreigners, rather than benefiting from admiration in proportion with their
privileges, had now to hide their particularities or else to be replaced by locals, in their social and
economic positions. Murat Belge underlines how much this outlook has to be considered as a process,
also in relation with the changing population of Istanbul due to the constant inner migration flows of
25. It is reported that the German Reich’s Istanbul Consulate had already prepared the maps of a
Jewish ghetto to be built in Beyoğlu, in case the city was occupied.
26. This event was so traumatic that it is well known and studied in Turkey. A Minister’s high civil
servant, Faik Ökte, perhaps conscience-stricken, publish a pamphlet in 1951 under the title The Tragedy of
the Tax on Fortune (Varlık Vergisi Faciası) which started a public debate still quite alive since, a much
awarded film was made on the subject in 1999: Salkım Hanım’ın Taneleri, by Tomris Giritlioğlu, starred by
Hülya Avşar. Ayhan Aktar, whose above-mentioned essay is primarily based on this dramatic event, even
claims there was a more general intention of redistributing most of the Jews’ and other minority member’s
properties and enterprises to Turkish owners: a sort of “ethnic transfer inside the economy”. At any rate the
Fascist party’s Secretary General for Turkey, Marcello Campaner, in his 1943 report Colonia Italiana di
Istanbul. Realzione anno XX exactly quantifies how much the Italian Jews and the Italian “Arians” had paid
because of the Tax on Fortune, he makes some commentaries on how much more unfair it had been to the
former than to the latter, considering however that Italian Jews had been considerably luckier than Turkish
Jews, for their citizenship had prevented their deportation to forced-labour camps.
27. This is also a very much discussed event in recent Turkish history. The most complete and critical
essay on the topic is Dosdoğru (1993), which openly holds the militaries and secret services responsible
for a “systematically programmed and carried out guerrilla action by the MIT” [the Turkish intelligence
agency] which later on somehow claimed the paternity of what had been “one of the most brilliant applications of [their] techniques”.
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Anatolians 28. The minorities’ outlook has changed too, from arrogance to a widespread distrust and
bitterness against the Turks 29. As we shall see this outlook metamorphosis, this widespread distrust made
the Levantines huddle. This bore two consequences: preserving their identity in the short term, but also
refusing to share it or transmit it within any social environment whatsoever, out of a self-perception of
social death, which in the long run did lead to social death.
3. The Levantines’ “dissolution”
By the year 2000, nothing of the Levantine environment was left, except a few churches and other
buildings: Greek is not spoken in the street, Levantines are not recognizable from their European dresses
or hats, the Società Operaia – last of the original Levantine national clubs alive – is becoming an archive
research centre, the Artigiana is logically an elderly’s home, the Casa d’Italia is mostly used as a cultural
institute for Italian language teaching and for some odd lectures, the IMI (Italian High School) and the
former Italian Hospital have been undergoing “multiculturalism” for so long that almost all their users are
Turks, in the churches Masses are occasionally said in Turkish (and still Italian and French), there is no
more Levantine newspaper or bookshop or theatre or charity ball. Most importantly, if asked about their
community or their culture/civilization, the Levantines will invariably answer that it died long ago, after a
lengthy agony 30.
However, our interviews to Levantines, carried out between November 2000 and April 2001,
definitely prove that, at the individuals’ level, their identity preservation is intact, although such identity
may not be transmitted to the following generation anymore 31. To demonstrate this preservation, the
Levantine identity (rather than any national one) has to be borne in mind, and therefore three specific
criteria were chosen: the Levantines’ command of their four languages; a compound criterion for nationality belonging including the Levantines’ everlasting interbreeding and their national self-perception
rather than simply the circumstance of holding one passport (or a few); their lack of insertion in the
Turkish majority environment.
3.1. Levantine identity preservation and language command
The Levantine civilization was quadrilingual: modern Greek was the most widespread, working class,
daily-life language, Italian was the business and trade language, and that of sociability until around the
1870’s, when French became more dominant, a social marker of higher education and status, also the
language of culture and literary production 32; Turkish was widely ignored, at least until it became a
compulsory subject at school in 1928, but still today Levantines prefer not to admit that they can speak it,
28. Murat Belge’s point is that people cannot ‘forget’ all of a sudden how to live with ‘others’ with
whom they have been sharing a city and hundred year long history. About the 6-7th September Events he
writes: “An Istanbul’s citizen, used to do his shopping at Amiralis’ or at Mayer’s, couldn’t possibly get
up one morning and brake down all their shop windows on a fit of rage”. But obviously a class frustrated,
fortune seeking, constantly run down Anatolian newcomer, brainwashed by nationalism, eager to take by
any means the place of the “foreigner” could. See Murat Belge (1992).
29. This may also be due to a sort of perceived betrayal, since the whole of the Levantine intelligentsia
during the Turkish Republic’s first years had been unconditionally supporting Atatürk and his doctrines.
30. But we well know that the “decline of the Levantine world” is itself a Levantine myth, which has
been around ever since the 1930’s, when the community was almost at its numerical climax. See the
Italian-Levantine poet, journalist and novelist Angèle Loreley (alias Angela Ruta Karasu)’s unpublished
novel Les derniers Levantins, dating back to 1935…
31. It must be underlined that the average age of our 70 interviewees was 68.3 at that time, with a
mode value above 75. The distribution of age groups well reflected the community altogether, characterized by a very severe demographic unbalance.
32. This is why we consider Levantine literature as being part of the Italian migrant literature, but of
French expression.
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although they generally do so, with a slight Greek accent 33. This is the result of a sociolinguistic hierarchy of values between these languages which is still in vigour.
Our interviews were carried out in Italian in 80% of the cases, in French otherwise, but no interviewee
claimed not to understand Italian at all. Even in fewer cases (around 10%) did we come across Levantines
who could not speak French or Greek: most of them were too young (at any rate born after the 1950’s) to
have learnt these languages either at school or in their neighbourhood if not home environment.
The language presently most spoken at home is French, not Italian and certainly not Turkish. We gave
a psychological interpretation of this fact – which obviously has nothing to do either with communication
purposes or with social distinction, no more than with patriotism –: their home is probably perceived by
the Levantines as a rampart of their identity peculiarity, perhaps also as a temple of their affectivity.
Multilingual practice at home is systematically underestimated with respect both to commonsense and to
the admitted practice in the earlier generations’ household. This is a clear sign that admitting to speak
Turkish at home is considered as an identity threat of assimilation 34.
In the absence of the Levantine cultural environment, present day stimuli in Italian are mostly
confined to the (widespread) parabolic aerial picked up Italian television channels, much more rarely by
written or oral sources. These are satisfactory and efficient to preserve the command of Italian for the present generation, but insufficient to produce it for the next one, since daily family conversation and school
tuition lack.
Besides, only 35% of the interviewees’ children still live in Istanbul, i.e. the community has decreased
by nearly 2/3 in only one generation. Migrations have very seldom been directed towards Italy 35, sometimes they have been imposed for professional reasons, and their directions indicate the new commercial
flows concerning Turkey.
Additionally, a surprisingly low number of Levantine children applied to the Italian high school,
whose number of Levantine pupils irreversibly decreased following the fall of the Fascist regime which
had almost compelled Italian pupils to attend it 36.
3.2. The Levantines’ national identity
Another historical (also literary and mythological) distinctive mark of the Levantine civilization is
interbreeding. The starting point here is not the chancy if not random obtaining of the Italian (or other
33. In the past, the knowledge of Turkish was really an exception, almost limited to the dragomans
with their administrative court Ottoman language, which was quite incomprehensible for ordinary Turks
anyway. The legal obligation of Turkish learning in all schools – including foreign ones – was obviously
no guarantee of a perfect command, especially for a language learnt for the first time as a pupil. Actually
we have noticed systematically that middle-aged (and above) women tended to speak Turkish far worse
than men, for they usually were housewives, therefore not needing Turkish for working. However, it is
getting almost impossible to have a social life whatsoever without speaking Turkish. Therefore the
younger and/or active generation, even when working in a still Levantine or foreign environment thus
using other working languages, is now fluent in Turkish.
34. Only 7% of our interviewees, all ages included, “acknowledged” they spoke a mix of languages
including Turkish at home. Also the question about the languages spoken at their parents’ home, which
produced different answers than that about the present situation, reveals a constant inequality, or maybe a
deliberate distinction, between the languages spoken in the domestic inside and those spoken in the social
outside.
35. Furthermore, a non-negligible number of would-be permanent repatriations have ended up back in
Istanbul, after a negative experience had been lived in Italy.
36. Some families we have been talking to justify this choice by arguing that a recent Turkish law
applying also to double nationality holders (which is the case of most Levantines nowadays) compels
their children to attend Turkish State primary schools for 8 years, and thereafter it would be hard to learn
Italian to a sufficient level. But this is an inconsistent argument, since Turkish pupils also enter the Italian
High School at that age. Financial reasons, or the choice of other foreign high schools, in order to learn
more “useful” languages, are more plausible arguments.
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European) citizenship, but the increasing social value implied by obtaining or keeping it, since the modern era onwards. Long-living patriotism, alongside with the sociological prestige of a foreign citizenship
in Turkey despite Turkish hyper-nationalism, begot a strong habit of marriages of convenience and a
“good match hierarchy” just like the sociolinguistic hierarchy we have just mentioned. Besides, endogamous wedding meant a marriage between Christians irrespective their citizenship; for unclear reasons,
the most frequent lower class interbreeding was with Greeks, and only concerned Orthodox brides, not
husbands. Finally, one of the most taboo issues of Levantine civilization, i.e. the wedding with a Turk of
either gender, which by now is quite frequent indeed, has always existed although it was rare in the past,
and often has not impeded to give Christian first-names and a non-Muslim upbringing to mixed couples’
children 37. Interviews also testify that the overall tendency of Levantine interbreeding has not considerably increased in time, even compared to the times when the community’s size in Istanbul was sufficient
to allow a stricter application of endogamy.
Concerning the Levantines’ national self-perception, it should be pointed out that their refusal of
integration into the Turkish majority society – not incompatible with their full integration into the minorities’ micro-society – has generated an emphasis of their identity particularity in terms of their own nationalism. Their “Italianess” is associated with a nostalgic idealization of their imagined motherland,
strongly nationalistic, often identified with Fascism, which some of them have lived (or heard of) from
the outside, only in terms of an instrument to increase the prestige of Italian identity abroad. This is one of
the reasons why Levantines feel an ambivalent superiority/inferiority complex towards motherland Italians, based on exclusion or estrangement feelings, all the more difficult to bare since they realize that the
patriotic spirit they are driven by is now absent in Italy 38. This over-stressed nationalism implies the denial
of any affinity whatsoever with the Turks and some contempt for them; but surprisingly the Levantine interbreeding does not seem incompatible with nationalism, since it is indeed a sign of identity otherness.
3.3. Lack of integration
Rather than citing our interview data on the Levantines’ everlasting urban preference for their old,
traditionally European neighbourhoods as residence places, on their non-integration through education for
choosing foreign schools, on their practicing typically Levantine jobs and their reluctance to consider
their working place and lesser still the hobby environment as an opportunity for integration, it looks more
interesting to evoke the controversy on integration that is presently existing inside the community. Levantine contemporary essayist and novelist Giovanni Scognamillo, who is the only Levantine author to have
written almost all his works in Turkish and whose personality has made him perfectly integrated, has in
many occasions harshly criticized the community’s attitude 39. His criticisms can be summarised into four
points:
− the grievances against the Turks by the three Lausanne minorities are fair and justified, particularly
the Armenians’ and Greeks’, but he summons the Levantines to draw up an honest assessment of their
37. Nevertheless, the Levantine mythology utterly rejects the existence of Levantine-Turk weddings in
the past, even exceptionally, totally reprobates the nowadays practice, of which the common Turk and
Levantine university education seem to be designated as the prime responsible, and it is also full of
mythical narrations of forced migrations to Europe in order to prevent young girls from the risk of contracting a marriage beneath their station (!), of community excommunication threats towards “renegades”
and also of pre-marital abductions…
38. A wise old Levantine answered this question of national self-perception: «I’m more Italian than
the Italians, for when one hasn’t got something, it’s it he wants to have!»…
39. Scognamillo’s bibliography consists of about 50 books and more than 700 articles, mostly about
cinema, which has been his main interest subject ever since the 1930’s. His other topic is the Levantine
neighbourhood of Beyoğlu. We have been devoting chapter VII of Pannuti (2008) to his production on
Levantine civilization, which includes two different editions of his Memories: one of 1990, and
Scognamillo (2002), and several essays on Beyoğlu, including one on prostitution in the neighbourhood,
for which a great scandal arose…
154
Alessandro Pannuti
centuries long presence in Turkey, in order at least to free themselves of their scorn towards a country
where they have been living out of habit or profit;
− he appeals to them to give up their “colonialist outlook” and their nostalgia of unduly and undeserved
Capitulation privileges which is the real un-avowed cause of their refusal to integrate themselves;
− he points out the need to demystify the Levantine world and civilization, to clean it up from nostalgia,
as he has done in his essays and Memories, demystification including the Levantines’ fictitious
identification with Italians or Europeans 40;
− he underlines that, besides ethics, Levantines themselves are the very victims of their integration
refusal: especially their disregard for the Turkish language condemns them to loneliness, cultural
aridity, collective disappearance within general ignorance.
No written answer to these accusations has ever come from the community, which however sarcastically refers to Scognamillo as to “the Turk” and generally ignores him and keeps him in the background
from its now rare social events. However we have asked an influential, well representative, notable
member of the community how he reacted to Scognamillo’s position. Dr. Marinovich’s answer reversed
completely the perspective, in terms of the Turks’ acceptance of the minorities. According to him, despite
nowadays generalised tolerance climate, no non-Muslim subject has ever been considered the equal to a
Turk, even those whose particular talents and merits had boosted to the highest spheres of the Court;
again it is the Turks who wouldn’t give any bride to a non-Muslim; the Jews’ much further integration in
Turkish society than the Levantines’ is due to their lack of a referent country until recently; the
Levantines’ endeavour to preserve their isolation is tantamount to a struggle to save Christianity and their
language despite a Turkish hyper-nationalism which even enforced linguistic restrictions in the 1930’s
and proclaimed the juridical offence called “attentat au turquisme”, causing long-living feelings of
distrust upon the Levantines.
One straightforward observation is that, considering nowadays marginality of the Levantine minority,
not to say the almost total oblivion of its very existence by ordinary contemporary Turks, a Levantine’s
social and professional life confined to its own community never allows his reaching of any particular
achievement anymore. Scognamillo’s exemple, although very rare and “publicized” by his writings –
therefore his public fame – is not absolutely unique: very successful careers belong to fully integrated Levantines or depend on their becoming so: a typical such example is the multinational chemical holding’s
owner Aldo Kaslowski who is also vice-president of Turkey’s national employers syndicate Tüsiad 41.
Obviously, this rather typical dissymmetry of perspective between minorities’ and majorities’ responsibilities, which we tend to find in all similar non-homogeneous national societies, makes compromise or
even dialogue rather vain. Perhaps the only meaningful attempt to make a synthesis of these irreconcilable positions is to explore to what extent and in what ways lack of integration bares consequences on
the minority’s destiny.
Conclusion: How can huddling produce “dissolution”?
The whole concept of dissolution is a paradox. One expects a minority community to be dissolved into
the majority by a compelled or strongly encouraged assimilation, or by a voluntary integration: neither
happened to the Levantines. One could understand “dissolution” as the loss of original identity features:
after all, since the Middle-Ages, the Levantines were also called by the Turks “Tatlı Su Frengi”, “Fresh
Water Frenk” to signify they had lost some of the true (maritime) spirit of their Crusaders’ ancestors.
Some (usually not very benevolent) European 19th century writers may have found that, when they came
40. On this topic he once publicly said: «It’s pointless to deceive ourselves with delusive stories: all of
us well know how much Oriental we are, how much mixed-raced and how much different from the Europeans!». See Pannuti (2006: 197).
41. Going into as detailed a level as to quote individuals wouldn’t really have made sense if the very
well known public personality we are talking about had not made a point himself about his integration
into Turkish society, in the informal present-day Italian community magazine, La Gazzetta di Istanbul,
November 2000, p. 5.
Istanbul Italian Levantines among the other non-Muslims: A community’s fortune and ...
155
in contact to the Levantines, like Zaccagnini (1909) who used for minority communities in the city the
metaphor of carpet colours, which have been running into one another by washing over the centuries: this
is obviously a literal sense of the word “dissolution”…. But how irrelevant is the dissolution of the
original identity with respect to the magnitude of the wide-horizon, original, unique Levantine culture and
civilization!
The dissolution we are talking about is that of the Levantine civilization. Without the creative power
of “levantinization”, without any environmental frame, wilted by a lengthy self-perception of social death
and by distrust, the Levantine civilization has been refusing to be shared. Levantines generally adopted
the dictum “to live happy, live hidden!” Thus dissolution means for civilization to be confined to people’s
memory, to be let dissolve into oblivion, to let places of socialization become memorial places, and
eventually places of the mind…
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TWIN TOWNS ON THE BORDER AS LABORATORIES OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Helga Schultz
European University Viadrina − Frankfurt
Abstract: The article is concerned with a particular type of border towns: twin towns. After having
sketched a general European historical framework within which twin towns developed, the article looks
at disequilibrium, resources scarsity and marginalisation, institutionalisation and identity building and
as key variables to understand the phenomenon.
Keywords: Twin towns, European border, cross-border cooperation, urban cooperation
•−•−•
1. Definition and hypothesis
The 1st of May 2004, the day of the Eastern extension of the European Union, was the day of the twin
towns. From Frankfurt (Oder) and Slubice to Gorizia and Nova Gorica at the Italian-Slovenian border
came State Presidents and Ministers and even Romano Prodi as the President of the European Union, to
celebrate the night of European unification and fraternisation. Narva and Ivangorod (EE-RUS) or Brest
and Terespol (BY-RUS) were not under these celebration places, because not all Europe was unified. And
after this bright day, the everyday problems came back to the new borders of Europe, especially to the
twin towns. However, the twin cities on the border are laboratories of European integration, because they
are junctions of problems and have to become pioneers of cooperation.
Cities grew often on both riverbanks, because from the eldest times, rivers have functioned as trade
road, resource of energy and water supplier. Different from twin towns inside the countries, like Buda and
Pest in Hungary or Mannheim and Ludwigshafen in Germany, the most twin towns at borders have a
history of war and separation. For the young nation state of the nineteenth and twentieth century the idea
of natural borders was fascinating, drawn by mountains and rivers. Therefore, the twin towns usually are
located at rivers. Town, Border and river became a triad. As the sample shows (table 3), rivers separate 24
of the 30 town couples, and Helsingfors and Elsinore got the Oresund between. Twin cities in the closer
sense of this paper are city couples that are located immediately at the border, in opposite to each other,
only with the river between. Therefore, Vienna and Bratislava situated 65 kilometres apart at the Danube,
newly connected by the ferry “Twin City Liner,” came not in the schedule. The twin towns have a
common history, often as one institutional community for long time. The name, similar or different, is no
secure marker for common history. For instance, the German Rheinfelden and the Slovenian Nova Gorica
are new foundations in face to the old towns with the same name; meanwhile Słubice was an old suburb
of Frankfurt (Oder) who got a new Slavic name when she came to Poland.
This study based mainly on students research work at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt
(Oder). The students stand for a term or more at the investigated twin town, and their outcome regularly
was the master thesis. They show how every twin city got their own history and face, while some general
characters are obvious. Some hypotheses shall be given:
• Twin towns were established especially after wars, when the winners draw new borders. Demarcation
and nationalism stresses the cooperation even more the harder the legacy of the past is felt, and the
later the European Union was entered.
Helga Schultz
158
• The disequilibrium of size, resources, and quality of life between the twin towns is stressing the
partnership. At the same time, even this unbalance like the austerity of resources asks for cooperation.
• Since the 1990s, twin town cooperation got a boom of agreements, common projects, and institutions.
The agency of this institutionalisation is the urban elite who are enthusiastic about the European idea,
but not so successful to shake the benefit of cross border cooperation with public.
• Where both twins joined the European integration process for decades, combined identity could grow.
The European rhetoric coins this identity; meanwhile the essentials of a former common regionality
vanish.
2. Legacy of history
Most twin towns were outcome of wars. There are three different situations (Figure 1). The eldest
town couples are independent foundations, like Tui and Valença or Narva and Ivangorod. However, the
Teutonic Knights and the Russian Czar erected the fortresses Narva and Ivangorod against each other.
When the nation state fortified themselves with passport control, custom line, and frontier guards, the
rivers became borders. Then the city couples lost their links, which formerly connected economy and
urban life.
Border twin town
Without a war
Independent
foundation
End of the war
Departed cities
(Former one community) or
disruption of close
neighbourhood
After the war
Founded as supplement
or compensation
Figure 1 - Origin of twin towns on the border
There were four waves of border twins in Europe: after the Napoleonic wars, after the First World
War, after the Second World War, and after the Cold War, when the multi-ethnic Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia broke down. As the years of border drawing demonstrate, from each of these waves rose at
least five city couples of the sample. Real departed towns exist at the Olza, the Danube, the Oder and
Neisse, and the Save, where new borders divided old communities. Examples are the Czech-Polish
Teschen, the Slovak-Hungarian Komárom, the German-Polish Görlitz, and lastly the former Yugoslavian
Brod and Kostajnica. All these are located in the Eastern part of Europe. This physical partition of an
urban unit meant destruction and violence, in the extreme case expulsion of inhabitants. The third kind of
origin is rather modest. Sometimes a new town grew across the lost city at the other bank of the border
river. So built the Swedes the trade base Haparanda as compensation for Tornio that was under Russian
rule after the Swedish-Russian War 1809. Likewise, the Slovenians founded the new city Nova Gorica,
when the old town Görz became the Italian Gorizia after the First World War.
During the age of nationalism, border towns were frontier towns, used as fortified symbols of national
self-assertion. This held not in the same degree as in Belfast, Jerusalem, and Nicosia, the frontier cities
Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European integration
159
described by Joël Kotek (1999). However, nationalism formed everyday life at all borders. After war and
partition, bridges were detonated, cross border rails demolished, common public services disrupted. The
ethnic segregated population of the border twin cities became the outrider of prejudices and hostile
stereotypes against the neighbours, living with the back to each other. Only where the majority of
population in both twins were from the same nationality, like the Hungarians in Komárno-Komárom or
the Russians in Narva-Ivangorod, the feeling of common ground continued. Therefore, such communities
have to suffer the suspicion of irredentism.
The way from frontier cities to laboratories of European integration is long and hard. It started in
Western Europe in the fifties with the foundation of the European Community. The nationalistic rhetoric
and policy had to overcome by peaceful rhetoric and cooperation. The change succeeded mostly, where
the cross border “Euregios” shaped the pioneer twin town Eurode from the Dutch Kerkrade and the
German Herzogenrath. On the Scandinavian Peninsula, the traditional Northern commonality promoted
the mutuality of Haparanda and Tornio since the seventies. Even inside the Soviet block forced the
rhetoric of internationalism similar openness and cooperation between the twins, powered by mobilisation
of people and modest rising tourism (Jajeśniak-Quast/Stokłosa). Indeed, that remained an episode during
the seventies, and the attempt broke down when the Polish “Solidarity” became a threat to the rulers. At
the borders of the Soviet Union, such openness kept absent all the time.
Obviously, the way to cooperation in the European sense is particularly hard for the twin cities in
Eastern Europe, in the former Soviet block. They have not only to bear the most lasting past, often until
the youngest days, they are also latecomers in the European Union. As recently at the 1st of May 2004,
the custom control ended between the Polish-German twins, between Gorizia and Nova Gorica, Valga
and Valka, Český Těšín and Cieszyn, Radkersburg and Gornja Radgona, Gmünd and České Velenice or
Komárno-Komárom. The passport control between these twins continued until December 2007, when
they joined the Schengen area. Only Nova Gorica and Gornja Radgona got already the European currency, which was so helpful for the neighbourhood of the German-Austrian, German-Dutch and FrenchSpain border town couples. The labour market between all these city couples is generally closed, and
therefore commuting, so essential for the every day contact, is absent until now. The twin cities alongside
the external frontier of the European Union sustain tightened border controls and visa regulations, to
protect the Schengen Europe against smuggle and unwelcome migrants. That means, only inside the
European Union we can speak about twin towns as laboratories and protagonists of European integration.
3. Disequilibrium
The headline of this paper could be understood in an enthusiastic way. The look on the special history
of these communities has already dampened the optimism. The border twins are weak and fragile agents
of the European idea and practise, burdened with a backpack of particular handicaps and problems.
However, they are doomed to be pioneers, and to be successful.
An essential problem is the disequilibrium between both partners. There is the language problem first.
Bilingualism is not as widespread as assumed. Even the urban dignitaries have mostly no command about
the neighbour’s language, and use the European lingua franca English instead, as it is usual between
Valga and Valka since the former colloquial Russian receded. In most cases, the both neighbour languages are not equivalent: one is the “greater,” spoken by many millions of people around the world, the
other is “smaller,” limited to the own nation. That means, only the citizens with the smaller mother tongue will learn the language of the neighbour. This imbalance was result of investigations everywhere in
the twin towns. Even the wonderful school project “Eurobabel” in the German-Dutch Kerkrade and Herzogenrath failed lastly (Ehlers 2007: 154-159). Possibly, bilingualism remains a privilege of minorities,
despite all efforts of European Union programmes as “Learning the neighbour’s language.”
A longer row of other imbalances is accompanying this fundamental disequilibrium. All are handicaps of
partnership and cooperation, but even these handicaps urge for closer mutuality. Firstly, the majority of
twins differ considerably in size and population, as the figures evidence for 17 of 30 couples with at least
twofold population on the one side. In some cases, the twin town has only the weight of a suburb (table 3).
This means imbalance of taxpayers, of status and authority in the national hierarchy, of over all resources.
Helga Schultz
160
Problems for equal partnership could rose. For a fruitful mutuality, partners have to get equal rights for
different contributions. The major of Baarle-Nassau, the larger part of the both Baarle, has truly worded
the task as “mutual trust and consensus building,” based on “equality of both and autonomy of each”
(Schultz et al. 2002: 39). Disequilibrium of size and resources must not lead to unilateral advantages, only
for the smaller part. Sometimes, the larger, more industrialised city profits by the landscape and
recreation areas behind the river, as it is at the Biscay, where the Spaniards from Irún populate the beach
of the French Hendaye. Otherwise, the smaller has the old town centre with historic places of interest, as
the Swiss Rheinfelden. Difference and even disequilibrium base good cooperation to the benefit of both,
asking for common concepts of tourism, identity building, and environmental protection.
Neighboured Town
Competition
(Town couple)
Completion
(Double town)
Fields:
Infrastructure
Public service
Cultural institutions
Promotion of economics
Promotion of tourism
Figure 2 - Levels of neighbourhood (after Buursink and Waack 1998)
The gravest imbalance between twin cities exists in the level of welfare. Especially the newly joined
town couples in the European Union and the twins outside have such remarkable gap between the
neighbours, although they all have to struggle with serious economic problems after the transformation.
The feeling is often stronger, when there is a smaller gap between two poorer parts than a broader
between richer. Pejorative prejudges could become the result. In the twin towns at the German-Polish
border, the welfare gap is remarkable lower than between Germany and Poland at all, but it is the source
of fear and mistrust on the German side. Therefore, the hope for improvement of the mutuality between
the town couples is based to the optimism to overcome the welfare gap. Varied prizes and wages,
different levels of social services and health care are the real outcome of the gap.
However, this imbalance leads not only to illegal work and smuggling, but also to welcome commuting and cross-border trade. The entrepreneur’s association advocates the opening of labour market for
skilled personnel. The majors look for new inhabitants for their shrinking towns and the property owners
for new tenants from the other side. The cross-border trade is the most important branch where the old
industry broke down. It is always central for border crossing in twin cities, and therefore, the release of
custom control and tariff is fundamental for a blowing economy there. Strangely, sociologists speak
sometimes ashamed about this trade on bazaars and booths as “pathologies of the border.” Economists
know that even smuggling is the income supplement of the ordinary people, and for many of them it is the
only income. Legalisation of cross-border trade means decriminalisation of the people along the border.
Because of so manifold differences in the social and economic life, in tradition and environment, all
social and economic activities are imbalanced, going only in one or the other direction between the twins.
Even the manifold imbalance is a good reason to complete one another, not to rival. Ongoing from
Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European integration
161
competition to completion seems the precondition to become a double town in the sense of Buursink
(Figure 2). Obviously, our border twins have less opportunity to rival because the ditches are too deep. At
first, especially in the East of Europe, they have to go on to become a town couple.
4. Marginalisation and scarce resources
Further problems of border twins are marginalisation and scarce resources. Only three from these 60
cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants, and 27 have less than 20,000 (table 3). Twin cities on the
border are mostly small or just middle-sized. The three exceptions play a special international role: the
Bulgarian Rousse got the yet only, highly frequented passage over the Danube underflow; the Belarusian
Brest is the gate for Western trade to East Europe, because the track gauge is changing here, and the
French Strasbourg is a capital of Europe. Regularly, border towns are marginal to the international trade.
They got rather a passive position as needle eye, than as hubs of international trade. These are the metropolises: not Frankfurt (Oder), but Hamburg; not Kerkrade, but Rotterdam; not Terespol, but Warsaw.
Above all, border towns are marginal to the national economy with a halved hinterland. Unemployment is
higher than in the average of the country, higher in Gorizia than in Italy at all, in Český Těšín double so
high than in all Czechia, higher in Haparanda than in Sweden, higher in Görlitz than in overall Germany
or even in Saxonia (Wiatr 2005: 90, 91; Höhn 2005: 52).
Especially in Eastern Europe, where a dramatic breakdown of the old heavy industries followed the
transformation, unemployment rates increased and young people left the border towns for work in the
national boom centres or abroad. Therefore, these twin towns are faster shrinking than communities
inside the states. For instance, the twin towns at the Oder-Neisse Border lost since 1990 one fourth to one
third of their inhabitants for migration and decline in birth rate (Table 1).
Table 1 - Population of the towns at the German-Polish-border
Jahr
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
Frankfurt
Guben
(Oder)
86,131
30,791
82,323
28,000
75,710
25,245 (2000)
68,351
21,568 (2004)
62,594
20,568
Source: Statistic offices
Görlitz
72,237
67,755
62,076
59,284
57,111
Therefore, to eliminate the border barriers and to join the scarce resources of both twins is essential
for the improvement of the economy and the quality of life. That seems the only way to compensate the
disadvantages of marginalisation and the lack of resources. The first step is to open the needle eyes of
traffic. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the European traffic from West to East went off. For instance, in
the Austrian Gmünd, the twin of Česka Velenice, where before 1990 around 60,000 people crossed the
border, multiplied this figure to 3.5 millions in 2001 (Schultz 2004). As estimated in 1993 for Rousse and
Giorgiu, the own contribution to the border-crossing traffic was only five percent (Waack 1998: 145).
Tracks and tourists, commuters and shoppers overcrowded also the twin towns at the old internal EU
borders, like Irún and Hendaye or the both Laufenburg. The growing long distance haulage burdened the
twin cities and urged for new bridges and bypasses. The division of the long distance haulage from the
local cross-border traffic is part of the solution. Bridges and highways are not in the competence of the
towns, but in that of the state governance. Nearly all twin towns inside the European Union got new
bridges and highways outside the towns.
Not astonishing, that new bridges outside the now Schengen area took longer time, and are dedicated
only for the heavy load and long distance traffic. The needs of the local population are neglected, like it
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Helga Schultz
happen between Brest and Terespol, where visa, railway ticket and a one-hour-travel are necessary, to
come in the twin city immediately at the opposite bank of the Bug. The inhabitants of Rousse and Giorgiu
have similar situation. The famous Bridge of Friendship some kilometres outside the city centres are
mainly used for railway, tracks, and cars. The only alternative is a very expansive ferryboat. There are not
only physical barriers, but also institutional. Between Narva and Invangorod, where also a new bridge
shall be erected during the next year, the local population is seldom crossing the bridge, once overcrowded by the workers of the Krenholm textile mill. Only around 5,000 inhabitants got a special permission for border crossing to visit their relatives or graveyards. The Estonian guard close and save the
frontier of the European Union to Russia (Waack 2000: 179). Outside the Schengen area, essential preconditions for good neighbourhood and cross border cooperation are missing.
The location at the river caused the characteristic projects of twin cities. They have to cooperate for
water pollution control, flood control, sewage, and water supply. There is literally no twin town, where
connected services in this field are not in discussion at least. Common water plants often became the first
project for permanent cross border cooperation. The main reason is obviously “simply to save money,” as
the major from Haparanda told. Nevertheless, the gap between propositions and realisation is especially
high in this field. Sewage plants and water supply needs high investment and financial support, which
cannot come from the towns themselves. It seems an exception, when the twins can finance such projects
in private-public partnership, like in the both Laufenburg, in the Swedish-Finnish Tornio Haparanda, or
the Spain-Portuguese Valença-Tui. More often, both governments have to decide and contribute. Like
bridges, Sewage plants became a preferred subject of sponsoring by the European Union. As an example,
the common sewage plant of the German-Polish Guben-Gubin was haughtily presented at the Expo 2000
at Hannover (Jajeśniak-Quast 2001: 288-289). Planned for a population of 90,000 people, the plant is
highly over dimensioned. European sponsoring seems not the way to save money, but to spoil it, in opposite to the public-private partnership by the twin towns themselves. Otherwise, the most expensive
solution is the detachment of former common water supply and sewage. This happened in Narva and
Ivangorod. Enormous conflicts rose, which had to solve at the state level (Waack 2000: 187).
There are many other projects, to save money: common libraries, ice pavilions and indoor swimming
pools, hospitals and fire brigades for the use of both sides. However, the most striking examples for
success and failure we find in respect to crossing, using and saving the river. We could take the hypothesis, that cooperation is never so essential, as in the triad city-border-river.
5. Institutionalisation
As in all fields of policy, institutionalisation is indispensable for sustainable cooperation. The border
cities need agreements and regulations more than partners in the internal state do, because two systems of
law, cultures, and governance competences are touched. During the 1990s, institutionalisation jumped to
a new quality. Between the twenty border twins, we asked in 2001, the number of agreements accelerated:
five in the seventies, eight in the eighties, and 26 in the nineties. Some twin towns closed more than one
agreement.
No doubt, the European Union drove this progress. When the European Union opened itself to new
members in the East, she had the Schengen agreement already drawn up in 1985. Therefore, borders and
border region came in the focus of the “extension and consolidation policy.” Never before so many
programmes were established especially for border regions. Se sequence of Interreg is the most important.
Interreg II to III and Phare CBC as exclusive programmes for the former Soviet block improved the cross
border cooperation there. As a precondition, the European Union spent the finances only for cross-border
projects and on the basic of formal agreements. That should strengthen the sustainability of cooperation,
and the responsibility of the municipalities. All twin towns have benefited from this promotion, and
therefore, they draw projects and agreements. We can observe three steps or levels of institutionalisation.
The first is project-cooperation, for instance a common water plant, common using of indoor swimming pools or concert halls, or cooperation in a special branch of health care. This early step claimed,
“Simply to save money” for the best of the citizens. This rather spontaneous mutuality dominated at the
internal borders of the European Community during the seventies and eighties. The second level is an
Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European integration
163
agreement for permanent cooperation with meetings of mayors and councils, and committees for all relevant fields. Meanwhile all twin towns on the internal EU-borders, old and new, reached this level. Then
the twin towns feel a new barrier, grown by the institutionalisation itself. To get finances by the European
Union needs high efforts, and became harder. Elaboration of projects takes a lot of money and work
force. All twin cities except Haparanda and Tornio complain about this.
The third level is the joined twin city. There the twins establish not only permanent commissions and
continuous meetings, they arrange also a common body of public right beyond the both municipalities.
The joint body has to be equipped with own competences, and legitimated in a democratic way. Nicole
Ehlers, who investigated the “binational city Eurode” (Kerkrade-Herzogenrath) as a prototype, gives the
definition: «A binational city is a pair of neighbouring border towns whose local authorities aim at
achieving the economic, political-administrative and cultural integration of both towns» (Ehlers 2007:
52). She describes the establishment of Eurode, rooted in the every day problems of cooperation caused
by different law and governance. “Like a millstone” clasped the national legislations around the neck of
the twin cities. The joint body seemed the solution, acting in the framework of both states (ibidem: 16).
For the same reason, the Basque cities Irún, Hondarribia, and Hendaye established their consortium,
against resistance from Paris and based on Spain public law (Grünert 2005: 182-195). The binational city
seems not only the way, to overcome the difficulties of national legislation; she is also a vision of
integration, as the definition says. The Provincia Bothniensis came on this way to the planning of a new
common city centre “På gränsen-Rajalla” (Höhn 2005: 52-55). So the unified town became reality.
Twin City
Tornio-Haparanda
Irún/Hondarribia-Hendaye
Herzogenrath-Kerkrade
Baarle-Hertog-Baarle-Nassau
Görlitz/Zgorzelec
Table 2 - Joint binational cities
Joint Body
Provincia Bothniensis
Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi
Eurode
Joint administrative Body
Europastadt Görlitz/Zgorzelec
Year of
agreement
1987
1993
1997
1998
1998
No doubt, with the step from level two to three, municipalities enter a difficult field, in many respects
a terra incognita. The pioneer Provincia Bothniensis seems the most successful until now. She arose under
the umbrella of the Northern Community, one decade before Sweden and Finland joined the European
Union. Eurode claimed to be the first inside the European Union, while the Consorcio Bidasoa started
under the regional flag. The so-called Europastadt Görlitz-Zgorzelec began with high élan and got some
European rewards for successful cooperation. Nevertheless, after the failed application for the “European
capital of culture” in 2006, and under the stress of the crisis in the Polish-German relations, great projects
and successes are missing. There rose never a real joint body “Europastadt.” Backlashes and lack of
competences and finances discourage even the pioneers. Deficient authorisation makes even the council
meetings of Eurode to “ritual dances” (Ehlers 2007: 230).
Another way of future institutionalisation seems networking. The process started when Tornio and
Haparanda adopted the twins at the Estonian borders Valga-Valka and Narva-Ivangorod. Meanwhile,
around this relation rose the City Twin network, managed from the Finnish Imatra, and amplified by
Frankfurt (Oder)-Słubice, Görlitz-Zgorzelec, and the Polish-Czech Cieszyn-Český Těšín. Such networks
can widespread best practises and support the application for finances from the European programmes.
Beyond the European programmes, there are two other driving forces behind the accelerating
institutionalisation. One is the institutionalisation itself. For instance, a strategic concept for Gorizia-Nova
Gorica recommends establishing new networks, institutes, and public offices. One can suppose, that these
new institutions will elaborate new concepts, projects, and institutions. The benefit of institutionalisation
for the welfare of towns and citizens seems not evident at all. Another force is the interest and enthusiasm
of the urban dignitaries (Buursink). During a longer period of cooperation, the members of the municipalities become close and familiar with each other. That is a necessary, effective basic for success. There-
Helga Schultz
164
fore, the major of Kerkrade pictured the cooperation story with Herzogenrath like a love affair: «Kerkrade
and Herzogenrath first got acquainted with each other, then they nosed at each other, later they got
engaged, and finally they married» (Ehlers 2007: 16). Similar to this, the officials of the Basque consortium spoke about the cooperation as a “poetic idea”, which is more important than the economy (Grünert
2005: 190). Undoubtedly, the urban elites advanced on the way to cross-border integration faster and farer
as the inhabitants of their towns, whose did not get the same experiences. Even the third level of the joint
city seems rather the project of the urban dignitaries than of the citizens. From the Bothnian Arch to the Bay
of Biscay and to the Oder River, there are examples, that citizens did not follow the visions of their
municipalities (Schultz 2005: 24-25). That mirrors problems at the European level, where also the officials
at Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg cannot always communicate their visions to the European people.
Table 3 – European twin towns at the borders (author’s research)
City
A
B
Buchs
Schaan/ Vaduz
Irún/ Hondarribia Hendaye
Tui
Valença
Strasbourg
Kehl
Helsingborg
Elsinore
Inhabitants (~ 2000)
A
32,600
57,000/15,000
15,900
273,000
91,500
B
32,500
13,000
13,800
34,700
35,100
Country
A
CH
E
P
F
S
B
FL
F
E
D
DK
Border
River
Rhine
Bidasoa
Minho
Rhine
Oresund
Border
since
medieval
medieval
medieval
1697
1719
First wave
Laufenburg
Rheinfelden
Tornio
Ungheni
Kerkrade
Laufen
Baarle-Nassau
Widin
Rousse
Laufenburg
Rheinfelden
Haparanda
Ungheni, Iaşi
Herzogenrath
Oberndorf
Baarle-Hertog
Calafat
Giurgiu
8,300
32,000
22,700
35,200
51,500
6,500
6,100
52,500
169,800
2,060 D
10,600 D
10,400 FIN
4,200 MD
46,500 NL
5,500 D
2,200 NL
18,900 BG
74,200 BG
CH
CH
S
RO
D
A
B
RO
RO
Rhine
Rhine
Torne
Prut
Salzach
Danube
Danube
1801
1803
1809
1812
1816
1816
1831
1878
1878
Imatra
Gmünd
Komárno
Cieszyn
Gornja Radgona
Svetogorsk
České Velenice
Komárom
Český Těšín
Radkersburg
30,000
5,800
38,000
36,000
3,300
15,700 FIN
3,400 A
22,000 SK
26,000 PL
1,600 SLO
RUS
CZ
H
CZ
A
Lainsitz
Danube
Olza
Mur
1917
1918
1919
1920
1920
Third wave
Brest
Frankfurt (Oder)
Görlitz
Guben
Gorizia
Nicosia, north
Terespol
Słubice
Zgorzelec
Gubin
Nova Gorica
Nicosia, south
285,000
72,000
60,000
24,000
38,500
49.300
6,000
16,900
33,000
17,200
36,401
47,900
PL
PL
PL
PL
SLO
GR
Bug
Oder
Neisse
Neisse
-
1944
1945
1945
1945
1947
1974
Second wave
BY
D
D
D
I
TR
Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European integration
City
A
Fourth wave
Brod, Slavonski
Gradiška,
Bosanska
Kostajnica,
Bosanska
Narva
Valga
Inhabitants (~ 2000)
B
Brod
Nova Gradiška
Kostajnica,
Hrvatska
Ivangorod
Valka
A
B
165
Country
A
65,000
18,000
34,000 SLO
15,900 BiH
5,300
2,000 BiH
73,300
15,300
11,900
7,100
EE
EE
B
Border
River
Border
since
BiH Save
HR Save
1991
1991
HR
1991
Una
RUS Narva
LV -
1991
1991
6. Identity building
Common cross-border identity is the vision for the twin towns, as it is the unique European people for
the Union at all. The creation of new names like “Eurode” or “Slubfurt” – for Frankfurt (Oder) and
Słubice – express this vision. Common identity is bounded to the democratic legitimacy of the joint body,
and the weakness of both remains a problem for the dream of the transnational twin town. Transnational
rhetoric plays a special role. The metaphor of bridge building labels all twin towns, pictured by the real
bridges there. Obviously, the bridge metaphor meets the reality more than the gate metaphor. In addition, the
names of the bridges are symbolic: “Bridge of friendship” or “Bridge of Peace.” Such names are preferred
especially in the East of the continent where friendship and peace were rarely during the former century.
Nowadays, the European rhetoric advances: Nowhere can we find so many places, gardens, schools and
other institutions called “European,” as in the border twins. Could we take it as sign of sprouting European
identity, and are the inhabitants of border twins really the pioneers on this way, as Gasparini supposed?
Common identity base on more than one pillar, and cannot be shaped artificially. An open border and
mutuality to overcome marginalisation are only one condition. Also important is common history,
without hard conflicts and traumata that the twin towns can celebrate together. As we have seen, the
legacy of history is the easier the more it vanishes behind the horizon of time. Ethnic relationship and a
common mother tongue, as we find it in some twin towns, function as constant ground of common
identity. The basic is regional. Some twin towns kept common regionality despite of the dividing nationality. The most impressive example is the Basque identity of Irún, Hondarribia and Hendaye. This triplet
town proclaimed the preservation of Basque culture and language as first mutual goal. Therefore, the
consortium Bidasoa-Txingudi arranges Basque festivals and supports language teaching (Grünert 2005:
164-169). In the Torne valley around Tornio and Haparanda survived the Meänkieli dialect, nowadays
accepted as official regional language by the state (Höhn 2005: 39-41). The Romanian Furlan as regional
dialect around Gorizia and Nova Gorica is similar used by the Italian as by the Slovenian indigenous
people. The people of Český Těšín and Cieszyn disuse the old dialect, the so-called “Water-Polish,” but
the municipalities create in festivals and official rhetoric a common Silesian identity as Slavic identity,
cleaned from German reminiscences (Wiatr 2005: 106-108).
Indeed, regionalism is a double-edged sword. Regionalism can lead to separatism, as the Basque
example has shown in the past. It can also serve as vehicle of nationalism. We can observe the establishment of two regional museums: one Silesian at Görlitz, and one Lusatian at Zgorzelec. Indeed, Silesia is
since 1945 a part of Poland while Lusatia was always a landscape in Saxonia. Therefore, both neighbours
can see such foundation as an act of occupation in the name of regional history, as German revisionism
and Polish Piast myth. Moreover, regionalism is to weak, to bear transnational identity. It ran off when
the inhabitants of border towns were expulsed and exchanged. It disappeared overall by industrial migration, so the Basques are a minority in Irún now. It vanished by national integration that meant forced
assimilation of ethnic vaguely border populations, what happened at all borders in the start of the former
century. Nowadays, only a minority of mostly elder people keep the command of regional languages.
Even in the Basque Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi the municipalities use Spain for communication. Regional identity becomes folkloristic, or artificial.
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Helga Schultz
Therefore, a transnational European identity will be the future, as the official rhetoric is yet coined.
Where the twin towns live in the European Union for decades, the reality of common life develops this
consciousness, how it happened in Kerkrade and Herzogenrath. In the twin towns at the border is more
transnational neighbourhood than anywhere else, because there is the closest space of contact and conflict. At the 21st of December 2007, when the celebration of European extension was repeated because of
the expansion of the Schengen area, we could experience the whole scale of emotions: enthusiasm at the
Polish, Czech, Hungarian, or Slovenian side; scepticism at the German and Austrian side, depression in
the border regions of the Ukraine, Russia or Croatia. For the twin cities along the internal borders of the
European Union we can look forward to the future of successful laboratories of European integration.
REFERENCES
Buursink J. (1994), Double cities: Identity and marketing of a new urban product, in G.O. Braun (ed.),
Managing and marketing of urban development and urban life, Reimer, Berlin.
Ehlers G.A.N. (2007), The binational city Eurode. The social legitimacy of a border-crossing town,
Shaker, Aachen.
Gasparini A. (2000), “European border towns as laboratories of differentiated integration”, ISIG magazine [Borders in Europe. How Life is lived in border towns, border regions and border cultures], no.
4/1999 – no. 1/2000, Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale, Gorizia/Italy.
Grünert M. (2005), Am Golf von Biskaya: Irún, Hondarribia und Hendaye, in H. Schultz, op.cit.
Höhn J. (2005), Nahe dem Polarkreis: Tornio und Haparanda, in H. Schultz, op. cit.
Jajeśniak-Quast D. (2001), Kommunalwirtschaftliche Kooperation geteilter Städte an Oder und Neiße, in
H. Schultz (ed.), Grenzen im Ostblock und ihre Überwindung, Arno Spitz, Berlin.
Jajeśniak-Quast D., K. Stokłosa (2000), Geteilte Städte an Oder und Neiße. Frankfurt (Oder)/Słubice –
Guben/Gubin – Görlitz/Zgorzelec 1945-1995, Arno Spitz, Berlin.
Kotek J. (1999), “Divided cities in the European cultural context”, Progress in Planning, 52: 227-237.
Schultz H. (2004), Geteilte Städte oder Zwillingsstädte? Konjunkturen von Trennung und Kooperation, in
J. Becker, A. Komlosy (eds.), Grenzen weltweit. Zonen, Linien, Mauern im historischen Vergleich,
Promedia, Wien.
Schultz H. (ed.) (2005), Stadt – Grenze – Fluss: Europäische Doppelstädte, Berlin.
Schultz H., K. Stokłosa, D. Jajeśniak-Quast (2002), Twin towns on the border as laboratories of European
integration, Frankfurt Institute for Transformations Studies, Research papers No. 04/02, Frankfurt.
Seiler J. (2005), Im Isonzo-Tal: Gorizia und Nova-Gorica, in H. Schultz, op. cit.
Stokłosa K. (2003), Grenzstädte in Ostmitteleuropa. Guben und Gubin 1945-1995, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin.
Waack C. (1998), Das Städtepaar Giurgiu und Russe an der rumänisch-bulgarischen Grenze, in F.-D.
Grimm (ed.), Grenzen und Grenzregionen in Südosteuropa (Südosteuropa aktuell 28), München.
Waack C. (2000), Stadträume und Staatsgrenzen. Geteilte Grenzstädte des mittleren und östlichen Europa im Kontext lokaler Alltagswelten, nationaler Politik und supranationaler Anforderungen, Institut
für Länderkunde, Leipzig.
Wiatr A. (2005), Schlesien: Český Těšín und Cieszyn, in H. Schultz, op.cit.
TERRE DI PASSAGGIO, TERRE DI CONFINE
Raoul Pupo
Università di Trieste
Abstract: Le aree rivierasche dell’Alto Adriatico sono considerate per eccellenza terre di passaggio tra
il Mediterraneo e l’Europa centrale, e terre di confine non solo fra stati, ma fra grandi aree linguistiche e
culturali: quella romanza, quella germanica e quella slava. Il saggio esplora quanto di mitico e quanto di
reale vi sia in tale assunto alla luce delle acquisizioni più recenti della storiografia.
Keywords: Alto Adriatico, confini, minoranze etniche e linguistiche
•−•−•
Che le rive del golfo Adriatico, considerate terre di confine per eccellenza, costituiscano il passaggio
ideale fra Mediterraneo e centro-Europa, e in ciò trovino la loro storica vocazione, è uno dei luoghi comuni più frequentati non solo nella storia, ma anche nel linguaggio politico e – con grande abbondanza –
nella retorica, specie in epoca di enfasi transfrontaliera. Per nostra fortuna, in questo caso dietro al luogo
comune c’è anche una buona sostanza, anche se – come sempre – la realtà è assai più articolata delle sue
rappresentazioni di comodo. Vedremo dunque prima la dimensione del passaggio e poi quella del confine.
Cominciamo con i fatti. È un fatto che il golfo di Trieste – o di Venezia, a seconda dei gusti – costituisca il punto in cui il Mediterraneo si spinge più a nord verso il cuore dell’Europa. Un altro fatto, legato
anch’esso alla solidità della geografia fisica, riguarda la maggior facilità di attraversamento delle Alpi
orientali rispetto al resto della grande catena montuosa che cinge la penisola italica. Sul piano poi dell’economia naturale, le aree al di qua ed al di là delle Alpi risultano fortemente complementari; la fascia
adriatica offre olio, vino, sale, mentre quella transalpina dispone di metalli – anche preziosi, come l’argento – pelli, legname.
Tuttavia, queste evidenze morfologiche e climatiche non determinano la sorte dei territori e nemmeno
fissano per le popolazioni che li abitano un compito preciso, quello di fungere da tramite per gli scambi
nord-sud. Piuttosto, formulano una sorta di invito, la cui risposta dipende dal mutare dei contesti in cui
l’area alto-adriatica si è trovata inserita nel corso dei secoli.
Alcune permanenze di lungo periodo sono assolutamente evidenti. Fin dall’epoca protostorica si ha
notizia di un flusso di scambi a lunga gittata, mitizzato con il nome di via dell’ambra. Non che tali traffici
fornissero il sostentamento alle popolazioni locali, tuttavia indicano già una direttrice precisa: le rive del
golfo Adriatico costituiscono lo sbocco meridionale di una corrente di scambi che permane nel corso di
un paio di millenni. All’interno di questa continuità, mutano però i terminali marittimi, con una serie di
oscillazioni legate in buona parte alle trasformazioni istituzionali e politiche vuoi dei territori rivieraschi,
vuoi dell’entroterra.
Il primo terminale in ordine di tempo è Aquileia che, un po’ paradossalmente, potremmo dire svolga
tale funzione prima ancora di esistere: infatti la ragione della scelta da parte dei romani di quel sito preciso per erigervi una colonia, è dovuta in buona parte alla pre-esistenza di un centro di traffici, se pur non
urbano. Lo sviluppo dell’emporio aquileiense ci consente di capire come in realtà ad entrare in contatto
lungo le sponde adriatiche non siano soltanto due regioni contermini e complementari, ma due mondi, due
circuiti di traffici. Aquileia infatti non offre al centro e nord-Europa soltanto i prodotti del territorio, ma
anche quelli dell’industria mediterranea – ceramica, oreficeria,vetri – ed anche i prodotti esotici – sete,
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Raoul Pupo
porcellane – che fin in cima all’Adriatico arrivano dall’Oriente. Parallelamente, le merci provenienti dal
retroterra europeo trovano tramite Aquileia una possibilità di collocazione su di un mercato vastissimo.
Questa caratteristica permarrà nelle epoche successive, anche se risulterà ovviamente più marcata nelle
fasi di sviluppo che non in quelle di crisi prolungata, e costituirà una delle principali ragioni di attrazione
del Caput Adriae.
Aquileia dunque può svolgere la sua funzione fin quando permane il contesto che l’ha generata, vale a
dire lo stato romano. Nella tarda antichità però, i comodi valichi delle Alpi orientali adempiono ad
un’altra delle funzioni che li hanno storicamente connotati sul lungo periodo: quella di canale delle
invasioni della penisola italica, invasioni che fra il V e il VII secolo assumono le dimensioni di vere e
proprie migrazioni di popoli, in grado non solo di mettere in crisi la compagine imperiale romana, ma di
sconvolgere in profondità l’assetto complessivo del territorio, compromettendone gli equilibri idrogeologici e facendolo regredire alla fase pre-urbana.
Quando il mondo romano vien meno quindi, Aquileia scompare, ma non scompare la sua funzione.
Certamente, per qualche secolo la gran confusione dei secoli bui non favorisce gli scambi, mentre la distruzione di tutti i centri urbani fin oltre il Piave rende faticosa la definizione di un terminale alternativo.
E difatti, fin verso il XIV secolo si ha una molteplicità di punti di imbarco – come Marano, Latisana, o
anche Pordenone – alla quale corrisponde anche una molteplicità fluttuante di itinerari terrestri, ben
diversa dalla stabile univocità delle grandi strade romane.
Dalle nebbie alto-medievali emerge però progressivamente un nuovo centro di riferimento capace di
catalizzare i traffici transalpini: Rivoalto, che in seguito comincerà a venir chiamato Venezia, e che
soppianta – con le buone e con le meno buone – gli altri scali marittimi. Venezia è in grado di svolgere integralmente il ruolo che già era stato di Aquileia, perché diventa uno dei principali empori mediterranei,
verso il quale confluiscono non soltanto le produzioni rivierasche o quelle del grande artigianato italico,
ma anche quelle orientali, a cominciare dalle ricercatissime spezie. Fra il XII e il XV secolo il Mediterraneo ridiventa il grande motore dell’economia dell’Occidente; Venezia ne costituisce uno degli snodi focali e gli itinerari che attraversano le Alpi orientali ne ricevono un impulso tale da supportare, anzi, da richiedere, dopo secoli di eclisse, la creazione di nuovi centri urbani direttamente connessi all’esercizio dei
traffici, come Gemona e Venzone.
Venezia mantiene la sua funzione di terminale incontrastato sino al termine del XVII secolo, quando
si ha un nuovo cambiamento, legato ancora una volta al mutamento del contesto. Venezia è in piena crisi
di potenza e, contemporaneamente, i poteri del retroterra trovano nuovi assetti e nuovi interessi. Il nuovo
protagonista è l’Impero asburgico, appena emerso dalla lotta per la sopravvivenza con l’Impero ottomano:
i turchi non si accalcano più alle porte di Vienna, né sciamano lungo la valle del Vipacco, e questo fa una
bella differenza. L’Impero è desideroso di affermarsi a livello continentale e, dal momento che siamo in
epoca di mercantilismo, la via maestra per accrescere la ricchezza dello stato viene individuata nell’inserimento nei grandi circuiti dei traffici internazionali.
Sotto questo profilo però, rispetto alle fasi precedenti si è verificato un grande cambiamento: il Mediterraneo non costituisce più il circuito commerciale primario, perché oramai la via della ricchezza passa
principalmente per la Manica e per gli oceani. Ecco dunque che la prima scelta dell’Impero è la proiezione atlantica, tramite l’emporio di Ostenda, residuo dei possedimenti fiamminghi. Il disegno peraltro
fallisce, perché il nuovo arrivato sulla via delle Indie si scontra con i poteri già consolidati, inglesi e olandesi soprattutto. Riesce invece il tentativo parallelo condotto su di uno scenario secondario, ma comunque
appetibile e soprattutto abbordabile, quello Adriatico.
Qui Venezia non ha più la forza di difendere il proprio monopolio e deve perciò accettare la creazione
di un nuovo polo dei traffici, cioè Trieste, che cresce lentamente ma stabilmente e coglie la sua grande
occasione con il crollo dello stato veneziano alla fine del secolo. Da quel momento e sino alla fine del
lungo Ottocento il nuovo terminale adriatico dell’Europa di mezzo è Trieste, che svolge tutte le funzioni
già esercitate dalla città lagunare. In primo luogo, pone commercialmente in contatto il retroterra – cioè
l’area danubiana, parzialmente quella tedesca meridionale e per un certo periodo quella padana – con il
Mediterraneo e l’Oriente. In secondo luogo, diviene il riferimento di una sorta di provincia adriatica
unificata oltre che dagli scambi, dall’uso dell’italiano veneto.
L’evoluzione però dell’economia e della politica internazionale non si arresta, ed anzi accelera. Con la
seconda metà del secolo a determinare le ragioni degli scambi sono non solo le regole del mercato, ma la
Terre di passaggio, terre di confine
169
volontà degli stati, che oramai dispongono di strumenti sufficienti a convogliare i flussi di merci e
ricchezze. Cambiano anche i prodotti e, di conseguenza, le modalità di trasporto. Spostare locomotive o
quantità immense di petrolio, è decisamente più complicato che spedire botti di vino o profumi d’oriente.
Lo straordinario sviluppo dell’economia tedesca, ben collegata all’economia oceanica, unito alla maggior convenienza delle vie d’acqua per il trasporto delle merci, rischia di rendere assolutamente marginali
i traffici mediterranei. A mantenere vivi gli scambi fra Adriatico e centro-Europa c’è però lo stato
austriaco, che usa la forza delle istituzioni non solo per costruire infrastrutture, ma per convogliare sull’emporio mediterraneo nel quale ha tanto investito, i flussi di traffico da e per il bacino danubiano, grazie
alla leva fiscale ed a quella doganale. Il sistema Trieste – Oltremare – Austria e, in misura minore, Fiume
– Oltremare – Ungheria, funziona benissimo. I porti sono sufficientemente moderni, le ferrovie pure e le
tariffe vengono tenute artificialmente competitive. Il risultato è la ricchezza e il consolidamento del mito
del Litorale come finestra della Mitteleuropa sul Mediterraneo. Anche la società si trasforma in virtù dei
traffici, al punto che al fianco della Trieste medievale ne nasce una nuova che parla addirittura un’altra
lingua, non il friulano ma il veneziano, koinè commerciale in tutto il Mediterraneo orientale, e in cui
avvengono fenomeni che già si erano visti ad Aquileia e Venezia: incrociarsi e mescolarsi delle etnie,
pluralismo religioso, contaminazioni linguistiche, afflusso di capitali e idee, di lavoratori, imprenditori e
avventurieri, poveri in canna che diventano baroni dell’Impero e mecenati, ed altri che rimangono nel
fango o finiscono in galera. Insomma, la vita di un emporio in crescita tumultuosa, in cui contano ciò che
ognuno sa fare, ed una buona dose di fortuna.
La stagione d’oro però dura poco, sino al fatale 1914: assai meno di quanto era durata quella di
Aquileia e soprattutto quella di Venezia, e quindi l’accumulazione di capitale, se pur cospicua, sarà nettamente inferiore, come ben sa chiunque cerchi oggi un imprenditore a Trieste. Ancora una volta, la dissoluzione del contesto istituzionale ha conseguenze profonde sulla funzione di passaggio dell’area altoadriatica. La scomparsa dello stato asburgico significa la frammentazione del retroterra ed il venir meno
di un potere capace e intenzionato a concentrarne le risorse sulla via adriatica. Questa quindi si atrofizza,
perché il baricentro dell’economia mondiale oramai è ben lontano e non esiste nessun soggetto in grado di
compensare le convenienze del mercato. Non può farlo la realtà locale, che dal Settecento in poi è sempre
vissuta di apporti esterni, e non possono farlo gli stati nazionali, quello italiano e quello jugoslavo, che
controllano solo le rive adriatiche, ma poco o nulla influiscono sull’entroterra. Al massimo, gli stati nazionali possono difendere l’esistente, come fa l’Italia fra le due guerre, o raddoppiare i terminali, come fa nel
secondo dopoguerra la Jugoslavia con Capodistria, ma non possono far ripartire uno sviluppo emporiale.
E qui naturalmente finisce la prima parte della storia, perché quel che accade dopo il 1989 è di competenza di altre discipline, e all’autore di questo intervento non resta che contemplare i traghetti che salpano
per l’Asia Minore, sperando che prima o poi, si decidano a trasportare anche i turisti – me compreso –
verso Troia.
Parliamo ora di confini. E qui, notiamo subito una differenza con il discorso condotto finora. Abbiamo
visto come la funzione di passaggio costituisca una delle caratteristiche, potremmo dire una delle strutture
di lungo periodo della storia delle terre alto-adriatiche. Così invece non è affatto per la dimensione di
frontiera.
In epoca romana, alla sistemazione definitiva della Decima regio Venetia et Histria si accompagna
l’espansione nel Norico, nella Pannonia e nell’Illirico. Di conseguenza, come osservò già sessant’anni fa
Ernesto Sestan, quella alto adriatica è una romanità centrale, non periferica. Il limes non corre alle nostre
spalle e le imponenti fortificazioni delle Claustra Alpium Iuliarum, distanti pochi chilometri dal luogo in
cui stiamo parlando, costituiscono l’ultima linea di difesa della penisola italica contro chi riesce a superare gli sbarramenti di confine, centinaia di miglia più ad est.
Con il crollo dell’Impero romano invece, la fascia estremo-orientale d’Italia comincia ad essere attraversata da inedite linee di divisione, assai lontane però dal nostro attuale modo di intendere il confine. Si
crea ad esempio una differenziazione linguistica, perché la frontiera del latino arretra ad ovest delle Alpi,
sostituita a nord dai dialetti germanici e ad est da quelli slavi. È naturalmente una frontiera assai fluida,
che conosce nel corso dei secoli avanzamenti, arretramenti e sovrapposizioni, di cui la toponomastica
conserva tracce abbondanti.
Un’altra frontiera sorge, anch’essa di durata e di spessore assai notevoli, che però non separa le regioni nord-orientali italiane da quelle contermini, ma passa al loro interno. È la differenza tra il mondo
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Raoul Pupo
delle coste, già romano, poi bizantino, poi veneto, e il mondo dell’entroterra, barbaro, poi feudale. Il primo è il mondo della continuità, dove il potere rimane nelle città: quelle di antica fondazione disposte lungo la costa istriana da Tergeste a Tarsatica (Fiume), o quelle che i profughi dalla pianura hanno creato
nella fascia lagunare, come Grado, Torcello, Rivoalto. Il secondo è il mondo dell’invasione, dove le strutture urbane sono state cancellate e il potere sta nelle campagne e nei castelli.
Per alcuni secoli – tra il VII e il XII – questa frontiera di civiltà diviene anche frontiera religiosa, con
la complicatissima vicenda dello scisma dei Tre capitoli, ma anche quando lo scisma è superato, le differenze rimangono. In tutta la pianura friulana non avviene quel fenomeno che è invece tipico dell’Italia
centro-settentrionale, vale a dire la fioritura dei comuni, che si ferma a Venezia, per riprendere poi da
Trieste in giù, lungo la costa istriana. Al suo posto cerca di affermarsi una compagine come il Patriarcato
di Aquileia, che rimanda al modello feudale tedesco, in cui l’autorità del signore è frutto di continue
negoziazioni con le principali famiglie che traggono il loro potere dalle campagne e non dai centri urbani.
In quest’epoca, e si tratta di un bel fascio di secoli, il confine, così come noi lo concettualizziamo oggi, non esiste. È sparito assieme all’Impero romano e ricomparirà appena 1.300 anni dopo. Nel cuore del
Medioevo, sui territori a cavaliere delle Alpi orientali esiste invece un pulviscolo di poteri che dà luogo
ad un complicatissimo intreccio di domini e diritti. Un documento simbolico in questo senso, è la donazione del 1001, che attribuisce il castello di Salcano, il villaggio di Gorica e vari possedimenti connessi,
per metà alla chiesa di Aquileia, e per metà al conte del Friuli. Non si ha quindi una divisione confinaria,
ma la concessione in parti uguali a due soggetti diversi di una funzione di governo e di una percezione di
diritti sul medesimo territorio.
Più in generale, i possedimenti di famiglie aristocratiche ed enti ecclesiastici si intrecciano a macchia
di leopoardo sui diversi versanti delle Alpi, perché numerosi signori sventagliano i loro domini fra la
catena alpina, il Friuli, la Carniola e l’Istria – il caso più evidente è quello dei conti di Gorizia – con una
distribuzione talvolta casuale, ma in altri casi direttamente finalizzata a intercettare i flussi di traffici
transalpini, e possibilmente a deviarli secondo le loro convenienze. Ad esempio, i soliti conti di Gorizia
sono signori anche di ampie regioni dell’area tirolese-carinziana; hanno poi giurisdizioni in alcune località della pianura friulana (come Belgrado, Codroipo, Latisana, quest’ultima porto fluviale sul Tagliamento) ed infine acquistano la località di Venzone e ne fanno un centro di tipo urbano proprio sulla strada
che scende dai passi alpini. A questo punto il gioco è fatto: ai loro sudditi d’Oltralpe – e anche a quelli
degli altri signori germanici – i conti goriziani offrono la possibilità di percorrere una strada in cui tutti i
luoghi di sosta, di esazione di dazi e il punto d’imbarco sono sotto il loro controllo, dove i viaggiatori tedeschi trovano gente che parla la loro lingua, e in più possono godere di una protezione armata; dietro pagamento, si capisce, di una modesta tassa, il galaito.
Ecco dunque che intreccio di poteri e di giurisdizioni, inesistenza di barriere monetarie o doganali,
assenza di restrizioni al possesso di immobili in aree appartenenti a signori diversi, ovvero di limiti al
trasferimento di persone e attività, configurano una realtà senza frontiere, che noi non riusciamo in alcun
modo a rappresentare su di una mappa.
Il mosaico si semplifica grandemente alla fine del XV secolo con la formazione degli stati moderni,
vale a dire con l’instaurazione per un verso del dominio veneto e per l’altro di quello asburgico. Ciò da
luogo ad una più accurata delimitazione dei rispettivi confini, ma la frontiera rimane porosa, con un andamento tutt’altro che lineare. Ad esempio, la zona di Aquileia è imperiale ed è collegata agli altri domini
asburgici solo da un sottile corridoio lungo l’Isonzo. Il medesimo corridoio isola Monfalcone, dominio
veneto, dagli altri territori di San Marco. Pochi chilometri più ad ovest, l’enclave asburgica da Gonars a
Marano è collegata all’aquileiese solo dalla foce dell’Aussa, e in mezzo si incunea una punta di dominio veneto, in cui la Serenissima erige la fortezza di Palmanova, con evidenti finalità di deterrenza anti-austriaca.
La vera svolta arriva appena nella seconda metà del XIX secolo, con l’inizio dell’età contemporanea,
che secondo Charles Maier è scandita dall’affermarsi della logica della territorialità, fondata sulla centralità dello stato-nazione, e sostanziata dalla volontà ossessiva di tracciare confini d’ogni tipo, sul terreno
e nel corpo sociale. Il Regno d’Italia è uno stato nazionale, l’Impero austro-ungarico no, ma partecipa
della medesima esigenza di delimitazione e di controllo territoriale. Sempre secondo Maier, la metafora di
questa stagione da poco finita è la linea: linea di divisione fra stati, etnie, razze, classi e generi; e di linea
di collegamento fra centro e periferia, tra il cuore del potere e le ultime propaggini dello stato.
Terre di passaggio, terre di confine
171
Nel litorale austriaco, che nel frattempo gli italiani hanno cominciato a chiamare Venezia Giulia, sino
al termine del lungo Ottocento la politicizzazione di massa comincia a frantumare la società secondo le
linee della nazione, mentre invece sul piano dell’economia a prevalere sono le linee di collegamento:
infrastrutture ferroviarie e rotte marittime, che si congiungono nell’emporio. Vincerà la politica, e dopo il
1918 per un cinquantennio sia l’immaginario che il territorio giuliano – oramai divenuto davvero terra di
confine – sono attraversati da linee di frattura di ogni tipo. Linee di confine geografiche e linee strategiche, ovvero le seconde travestite dalle prime; linee di divisione etnica, al 51% o al 75%; linee di “bilanciamento etnico”; linee di “autosufficienza”; linea Wilson e linea Morgan; linee proposte da italiani, jugoslavi, inglesi, americani, francesi e russi; linee di demarcazione fra zone di operazioni e zone di occupazione, ed anche linee di confine mascherate da linea di demarcazione. Insomma, per mezzo secolo, a volerla rappresentare sulla carta l’area alto adriatica assomiglia ad un fascio di spaghetti gettato in una pentola d’acqua in ebollizione.
Il fuoco si spegne appena negli anni Sessanta del secolo scorso, dopo che però l’incendio ha devastato
la società locale. Le componenti nazionali si sono dovute adattare a forza alle gabbie degli stati per la
nazione, alcune sono scomparse, altre ridotte a reliquie. I confini rigidi degli stati nazionali, ulteriormente
inspessiti dalle contrapposizioni ideologiche, hanno quasi cancellato quella funzione di transito che per un
secolo e mezzo aveva costituito la principale risorsa delle terre alto-adriatiche.
È evidente quindi che di frontiera si può morire, ma chi invece vuole sopravvivere cerca di convertire
la maledizione in risorsa di posizione. La barriera che pur incombe alla vista e nell’inconscio, e il cui
illecito attraversamento può significare la morte immediata su di un filo spinato, comincia ad ammorbidirsi. La complementarietà esiste, le ragioni degli scambi sono forti, talvolta più delle leggi e dei controlli,
e la realtà del dialogo e dei piccoli traffici di frontiera si accompagna all’invenzione di un nuovo mito pacificatore, che cerca di sostituire quelli della stagione più corrusca del Novecento: non più confine barriera contro i barbari o gli imperialisti, baluardo dell’Occidente o avamposto del socialismo, bensì confine
ponte, il più aperto d’Europa tra paesi appartenenti a sistemi diversi. Quella fra gli anni Sessanta e gli
anni Ottanta del secolo scorso è una stagione di ottimismo della volontà, che qui ha Gorizia conosce uno
dei suoi più stimolanti momenti di elaborazione, e che rispetto al recente passato di divisione cerca di
recuperare la più antica dimensione del passaggio, dello scambio e della collaborazione.
Ad ogni modo, anche quella stagione si è conclusa con l’anticipato finire del secolo e quindi per il
momento è finita anche la storia. Al cittadino pertanto non resta che sperare, come sempre, che il futuro
sia migliore, mentre allo storico rimane la curiosità di sapere come i colleghi della seconda metà del secolo interpreteranno questo inizio di millennio in cima all’Adriatico.
WHAT WE’RE WALLING IN:
THE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL, AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO BORDER FENCE
A. César Carmona, Cassi Landrus, Daniel Miranda
The University of Texas at El Paso
Abstract: After the September 11 attacks on the United States, the U.S. government passed several acts
including the Real ID Act of 2005 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006, increasing security along the United
States/Mexico border, which included the implementation of a border fence. This paper asks, what are the
political, economic, psychological ramifications of this fence? Using government documents, economic
and environmental studies, as well as public opinion, the paper concludes that the impact of this fence
goes far beyond the border.
Keywords: Usa/Mexico border, security, cross-border co-operation, border management
•−•−•
«He only says, ‘Good fences make good neighbors’.
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
'Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it
Where there are cows?
But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.’…».
[Robert Frost, Mending Wall]
Introduction: The U.S.-Mexico border
The United States shares two different international borders with Mexico to the south ad Canada to the
north. The international boundary between the United States and Mexico is more than 3,110 kilometers
(1,933 miles) of land that extends from The Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean 1. The northern
international border with Canada is 6,416 kilometers (3,987 miles), excluding Alaska 2. Both borders
1. U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program. Border 2012. Page 4.
2. Janice Cheryl Beaver. U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts. CRS Report for Congress. November
9, 2006. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21729.pdf.
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A. César Carmona, Cassi Landrus, Daniel Miranda
offer a unique landscape, rich in biodiversity. Unlike the Canadian border, the Mexico border has the
world’s largest border populations (11.8 million) and has over 14 paired bordered cities.
The geographic make-up of U.S./Mexico border varies from desert to mountainous terrain, also
comprising rivers and wetlands which provide for rich animal habitats. Four U.S. states share the international border; California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. While the majority of the border is delineated
with some sort of fencing, the Texas-Mexico boundary is identified by the Rio Grande River. Out of the
four states that share this border, 14 U.S. and Mexican cities are separated by the international boundary.
Thanks to the rich biodiversity that flourishes in many of the border’s regions, animals such as the
jaguar, Mexican gray wolf, mountain lions, rare bird species, and various reptilians can be found
throughout the U.S-Mexico border. Many of these species’ survival depends on unrestricted mobility
during their migratory seasons.
The U.S. Mexico border is the world’s largest, comprising over 11.8 million people 3. Of the nearly
12 million people, close to 90 percent, reside within the 14 neighboring cities. Residing within the 4 U.S.
Border States are 8 Native American tribes. Some of these native nations have communities located on
both sides of the international boundary. Together, the shared efforts of the border region have helped to
expand and strengthen economies along this international boundary. In 2006 alone, there was over $332
billion of trade transported between Mexico and the United States 4.
Based upon the amount of traffic that crosses the U.S. Mexican border, it ranks as one of the most
frequently crossed border in the world. In 2003 the U.S. Department of Transportation recorded
incoming traffic into the U.S. with over 4,238,045 commercial truck crossings, 48,663,773 pedestrian
crossings, and 88,068,391 personal vehicle crossings 5. Such large commercial and personal traffic
provides a significant contribution to the overall economy of the border region.
1. U.S policy and politics
The 9/11 attacks spawned an immediate and reactive response to national security on behalf of the
U.S. government. On October 23, 2001, only six weeks after 9/11, congress responded hastily with the
PATRIOT Act, which focused on anti-terrorism legislation, implemented controversial increased security
measures, and nearly halted already backlogged immigration proceedings. Though the PATRIOT Act
called for increased security along both the Mexican and Canadian border, not until the Real ID Act of
2005 did congress begin to specify what security measures along these borders − specifically the
U.S./Mexico border − would entail.
The Real ID Act called for increased security along the U.S./Mexico border by initiating major study
into the means needed to secure the border. «The Under Secretary of Homeland Security … shall study
the technology, equipment, and personnel needed to address security vulnerabilities within the United
States for each field office of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection that has responsibility for any
portion of the United States borders with Canada and Mexico. The Under Secretary shall conduct followup studies at least once every 5 years» 6. It also called for a pilot program to institute various types of
ground surveillance technologies based on risk assessment with the goal of determining which methods
work best along the border. Types of technology include video camera, sensor, and motion detecting
technology. It also provides the Secretary of Homeland Security the right to waive laws wherever
necessary in the name of national security.
Increased border in the Real ID Act led to the highly controversial Secure Fence Act of 2006. With
this, Congress initiated the building of two layers of a reinforced fence extending from the Pacific Ocean
to the Gulf of Mexico. A seemingly implausible undertaking for many, this fence has entwined immigration, migration, and security in an indistinguishable fashion, and created political division among the
3. U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program. Border 2012. Page 4.
4. Embassy of the United States: Mexico. U.S. Mexico at a Glance. 2008.
5. U.S. Department of Transportation. U.S. Mexico Border Crossing Data.
6. U.S. Congress. Real ID Act Division B Title III Sec. 301a. 2005.
What we’re walling in: The political, economical, and psychological ramifications of …..
175
people of the United States, particularly those who reside along the border, the U.S. and Mexican governments, as well as Democrats and Republicans.
Both the PATRIOT Act and the Real ID Act called for harsher restrictions and provisions for
immigrants in the name of security. Policies particularly focus on immigrants crossing the border from
Mexico. These strict rules have been enacted in the name of national security and fighting the War on
Terror, creating a political link between immigration, particularly undocumented Mexican immigration,
and terrorism. This connection was exacerbated with the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which while calling
for 700 miles of reinforced fence along the 2,000 U.S/Mexico border, only calls for «…a study on the
feasibility of a state of-the-art infrastructure security system along the northern international land and
maritime border» 7. This sends a politically muddled message to both immigrants and residents along the
southern border.
Thus far, no terrorists have been found coming across the U.S./Mexico border. In fact those involved
in the 9/11 attacks entered the country legally by crossing the Canadian border. Despite this, the United
States Department of Homeland Security still insists a border fence is necessary for the safety of the
United States. Fear of immigration as a threat on the American way of life has throughout American
history led to strict immigration policies including strict immigration quotas in the early 1900s, the
Chinese Exclusion Act, legislation to oust Communists in the 1950s, and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Many see the PATRIOT Act, the Real ID Act, and the Secure
Fence Act as extensions of these types of government reactions. However, physically constructing the
fence has created a staunch political statement on behalf of the U.S. Government.
In their article about the effects of the attacks of 9/11 on immigration reform in the United States,
Kevin R. Johnson and Bernard Trujillo discuss the confusion created by linking terrorism and immigration and criticize the government’s reactions to the two subjects. «…[T]he fear of terrorism, feeding off
of a general tendency among many U.S. citizens to blame immigrants for the problems of the day, helped
to create a general ‘close the border’ mentality that commanded substantial support among the general
public…As a result, politicians from a wide variety of political persuasions endorsed some sort of border
enforcement strategy» (Johnson, Trujillo 2007: 10). There is a pervasive American idea that border
security equals national security. «Throughout the immigration reform debates of 2005-6, in which
terrorism fears often arose, there was a myopic focus on bolstering enforcement along the southern border
with Mexico despite the fact that there is no evidence of a terrorist entering the United States through
Mexico. Nor is there any evidence of any special need from a national security standpoint to greatly fear
migration from Mexico. A 2006 study found that no known noncitizen accused of terrorist acts in the
United States came from the South» (ibidem).
Will 700 miles of a reinforced fence along a 2,000-mile border really enhance security enough to
justify the continued money and time spent on the project? A 2007 article in the San Francisco Chronicle
asked the same question. «The Dec. 12, 2006, nonpartisan congressional report said the corps predicted
that the combined cost of building and maintaining the fence over a 25-year life cycle would range from
$16.4 million to $70 million per mile, depending on how heavily and how often the fence is damaged by
would-be border jumpers. At $70 million per mile, a 700-mile fence would cost $49 billion» (Hendricks
2007). In a speech at the 2007 Border Security Conference at The University of Texas at El Paso,
Keynote speaker U.S. Secretary of Homeland Defense, Michael Chertoff said, «[The fence] does not
mean a hermetically sealed border» 8. In addition, in some areas of Texas only a few miles of borderland
are being secured with the fence. «… DHS wants to put less than five miles of fencing around two cities,
Del Rio and Eagle Pass. ‘Just to get people away from crossing in the urban areas» 9. A 2008 USA Today
article also points out, «The entire border will not be fenced. Fencing is intended to deter or slow illegal
crossers, so it will go where agents need more time to catch them …» (Bazar 2008). In addition, a border
patrol agent interviewed by BBC News said, «[The fence] won’t stop everyone … But we believe most
7. U.S. Congress. Secure Fence Act Sec. 4a. 2006.
8. Negron Negron, Sito. Chertoff on Second-Guessers and Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
Newspaper Tree Aug. 2007.
9. Fighting the Fence. Economist 387.8584 (2008): 42.
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A. César Carmona, Cassi Landrus, Daniel Miranda
migrants will be deterred» (Kennedy D. 2008). Forty-nine billion dollars is an astounding number in itself, but when being spent on a project that the U.S. government admits will not completely seal the
border and will at best only slow down or redirect potential border-crossers, the worth of the entire border
fence becomes questionable. Johnson and Trujillo also point out, «Ironically enough, the only terrorists in
recent years who attempted to cross physical borders on foot were from the North … This demonstrates
the need to focus to a greater extent on the United States’ border with Canada, which is much more open,
and much less militarized, than the southern border» (Johnson, Trujillo 2007: 12). Therefore there is no
evidence justifying the building of a fence on the U.S./Mexico border for national security purposes. In
fact the United States’ best defense for building the fence seems to be the hope that it will deter an
occasional migrant in order to by time for Border Patrol agents.
Few are as affected by this fence as those who live along the border. Many border residents see the
fence as more a part of a political agenda rather than a legitimate security solution. A 2007 opinion posted
in USA Today said, «What’s difficult for people along the Texas border to swallow is that the decisions
about the fence are being made in Washington, where local residents are not being heard 10». This frustration over Washington’s agenda pervades throughout border region, particularly in Texas, where all land is
privately owned, ideally making seizing that land more difficult and more costly for the U.S. government.
However, Division B Title I Section 102 of the Real ID Act gives the Department of Homeland Security
the ability to waive laws. «…[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the authority to waive all
legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads…11». This allows the U.S. government to seize border
resident’s land without the adequate compensation allotted by the United States Constitution, which has
resulted in many lawsuits from very distraught Texas residents over the rights to keep their own land.
Very few borderland residents express concerns over the threat of a terrorist crossing the Mexican
border. Most worry about the environmental, social, and political impacts the fence will have on their
inseparable international communities. The border fence is dividing many areas, including wildlife
refuges. Some of these areas are the result of decades of work, funding and international cooperation. As
discussed later, those tasked with maintaining these wildlife areas fear for the biological progress, as the
fence will separate both animals and plant life with currently traverse freely without regards to political
boundaries. Despite residents’ concerns, Chertoff expresses little sympathy for environmental well-being.
«Mr. Chertoff may be taken aback by all the complaints … But he has vowed to press on … He says he
has attended too many memorial services for Border Patrol agents to muster much sympathy for ‘the
sensitivity of an owl’ 12». Chertoff’s comments convey clear adherence to this strict political and security
agenda with little regard to the worries of residents. In regards to environmental concerns and potential
solutions, «… Mr. Chertoff announced he would use authority granted to him by Congress to bypass three
dozen laws, including many environmental statutes, to build hundreds of miles of fence in Hidalgo
County and elsewhere along the border 13».
In addition to the environment, communities also transcend the U.S./Mexico border and have done so
physically, culturally and politically for generations. Cities, such as Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, Texas,
and Piedras Negras and Eagle Pass, Texas have maintained strong community connections and local
governments work hand-in-hand to solve problems affecting both sides of the border, recognizing the
deep-seeded ties shared on each side of the river. Many local governments fear the fence will result in less
political cooperation from both Mexican and American cities. The border community in El Paso, Texas
recently joined together to express their discontent by organizing international protests. One protest leader
said, «‘We want to call on residents along the way to let us how they feel about the border fence, and
how they think their communities will be affected by it’» (Washington). An article in The New York
Times stated, «Many residents and elected leaders in the Rio Grande Valley are opposed to the plan to
10. Treviño Marisa (2007), “Texans Raising Voices against Border Fence”. USA Today Aug. 2007.
Http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/08/texans-raising-.html.
11. U.S. Congress. Real ID Act Division B Title I Sec. 102(c)(1). 2005.
12. Fighting the Fence. Economist 387.8584 (2008). Pp. 2-3.
13. “Pact Is Reached on Barrier Plan in South Texas”, The New York Times, May 2008.
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build a fence. They fear that private land would be lost and that the sister communities in Mexico would
take offense» (“Pact”). Residents from both sides are not getting together to express concern over security
or possible terrorist threats. Instead they worry about risks that are not so easily assessed, such as
jeopardizing inherent and deeply rooted relationships among communities.
National governmental relationships have been damaged in addition to local ones. Both former Mexican president, Vicente Fox, and current president, Felipe Calderón, have condemned the border fence and
taken great offense to the United States’ using national security and terrorism as its justification for building it. «On 14 December 2005 Mexican President Vicente Fox denounced as ‘disgraceful and shameful’ a
proposal to build a high-tech wall on the US-Mexico border to stop illegal immigrants» 14. Just before
taking office, President Felipe Calderón reiterated the same sediment. «Mexican President-elect Felipe
Calderón had been meeting with the leaders of Central American countries in Honduras. Together, they
issued a declaration that lamented ‘the adoption of decisions that do not balance, in an integrated way,
immigration and security policies, in particular the decision [to erect] and the implication of the wall
along the border of northern Mexico and the southern United States’ 15». Not only does the fence directly
affect relationships between these two, neighboring governments, but it also extends an unfriendly,
political message into Latin America.
The border fence has dividing effect among politicians in the U.S. Unlike most political issues, there
is no clear-cut stance on the issue from either the Republican or Democratic parties. Although enough
congressmen voted to pass the Secure Fence Act in 2006, opinions on the matter remain very individualized. Democratic Senator, Hillary Clinton, and Republican presidential candidate, John McCain,
are among those who have mixed opinions about the fence. Both voted in favor of building the fence,
however Clinton opposes extending it 16. «McCain has a strong pro-immigration stance but voted for the
Secure Border Act in 2006. A Vanity Fair article quoted McCain as saying, ‘In the short term, it probably
galvanizes our base», he said. «In the long term, if you alienate the Hispanics, you’ll pay a heavy price.
By the way, I think the fence is least effective. But I’ll build the god damned fence if they want it 17».
Each demonstrates a conflicted opinion but does not offer a better solution, nor does he or she strongly
adhere to the idea that the fence will provide a significant amount of national security.
There are those, however, who staunchly support the fence. Former Republican governor, minister,
and presidential candidate, Mike Huckabee, not only supports the Secure Fence Act, but also wants
construction of a fence along the entire border with Mexico, not just the high traffic areas 18. On the
opposite end of the political spectrum, Texas Governor, Democrat Rick Perry hotly opposes any fence
along the Texas border with Mexico. He does not see the justification for it. «‘If you build a 30-foot wall
or fence, the 32-foot ladder business is going to get real good’ 19».
2. Economic impact
Treaties, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contribute too much of the
economic success along the border. NAFTA has helped to promote trade liberalization. Opponents to the
U.S.–Mexico border fence can claim that this fence will have the opposite results, creating a more
protectionist economy. Supporters of the fence argue that in addition to it protecting us from terrorists
14. US-Mexico Border Fence/Great Wall of Mexico Secure Fence. GlobalSecurity.org. Http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm.
15. Gomez Edward M. Bush’s Border Security: Mexican Opinion Not on the Fence. San Francisco
Chronicle SFGate.com. Oct. 2006. http://sfchronicle.us/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=15&entry_id=9568.
16. Border Fence is a Domestic Policy Centric Issue. Political Base http://www.politicalbase.com/issues/border-fence/17/.
17. Ibidem.
18. Ibidem.
19. Treviño Marisa (2007), Texans Raising Voices against Border Fence. USA Today Aug. 2007.
Http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/08/texans-raising-.html.
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A. César Carmona, Cassi Landrus, Daniel Miranda
and drug traffickers, it will decrease the immigrant labor supply by reducing the numbers of illegal
immigrants entering the U.S., who place a heavy financial burden on taxpayers. Regardless of the stance,
the fence will have direct and indirect economic implications. Although little research has been done on
these economic effects, the this section will illustrate some potential qualitative economic consequences.
2.1. Labor supply
If successful, the border fence will reduce the overall U.S. labor supply by stopping Mexican immigrants from entering the U.S. in hope of securing low-wage occupations. This action will have two
direct outcomes. The first effect will be an increase in wages offered in order to attract American laborers
who have refused to take such positions. As labor costs increase, so will production costs and retail
prices. The increase in prices will result in a reduction of the consumer’s purchasing power.
Table 1 - California’s economic growth compared to overall U.S. economic growth 20
Source: Center for the Study of Innovation and Productivity
A more macro based will be a reduction in labor supply and decreased competitive advantage to states
or regions that employ large numbers of undocumented immigrants. A perfect example of this is the state
of California. In an article published in the International Migration Review, characterized California as
having a “Mexicanized” labor force in the 1980’s. This effect gave California a distinct regional and
international competitive advantage in markets such as apparel, electronics, agriculture, construction, and
hotel operations. In the agriculture sector has estimated that close to 45% of the labor force consists of
undocumented laborers (Cornelius 1989, cited in Rubin-Kurtzman, Ham-Chander, Van Arsdol 1996). By
being able to employ a labor force with wages lower than the rest of the country, California’s economy
grew at a greater rate than the U.S.’s during the period of lax border patrol enforcement.
20. Center for the Study of Innovation and Productivity (2008). Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco. Http://www.frbsf.org/csip/data/charts/chart33a.cfm?init=1&state1=CA&selectedstate1=CA&state2=&selectedstate2=&state3=&selectedstate3=&selectedyear=allyear&datachoice=p3moachg&select
edregion=&selectedUS=US.
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2.2. Reduced demand of public services
Critics argue that the large financial burden immigrants place on state’s resources out way the
financial benefits they provide through payment in taxes. The types of services non-documented immigrants can receive include free public schooling, access to public healthcare (hospitals), and access to
public safety (police and fire) (Hanson 2005: 20). Supporters of the border fence argue that reduced
numbers of immigrants would help ease the financial burdens placed on states that have providing
services to individuals who do not contribute their share.
A study conducted by University of California, San Diego, and National Bureau of Economic Research, concluded that because most immigrant families are larger in number than American families and
earn on average less income, they place more of a burden on state resources. As a result, states with large
immigrant populations (border states) end up having their taxpayers pay more in taxes to finance the
services available to immigrants. Although this may be true, this finding does not apply specifically to
immigrants. In fact, this finding would have the same exact results if done on low educated large American families.
2.3. Quality of life
Without question, the construction of the border fence will affect the quality of life for people living
on or near the U.S.–Mexican border. The U.S. has many border cities and small communities where
families have homes, which will soon have a new 15 foot (3 meter) high fence in their backyard. People
who would once relax at the river and watch wildlife will not be able to do so. The Tohono O’odham
Native American tribe that has tribal members in both the U.S. and Mexico, will now be physically
separated from each other and forced to travel to the nearest port entry in order to come together.
Throughout the Southwest, especially along the Rio Grande River in Texas, wildlife habitats have
been created to help increase the biodiversity in the area. Such habitats have helped to strengthen the
economies of nearby towns by attracting wildlife enthusiasts from across the U.S. A large fence ultimately negatively affecting wildlife refuges, local economies might suffer due to fewer visitors.
However, the border fence will help to make smuggling large quantities of narcotics into the U.S more
difficult. The border fence will also help to strengthen the image of the American government amongst its
citizens by showing that it is taking proactive measures to provide for a safe and secure country.
2.4. Restricted access
Although the majority of the 11.8 million people living on the U.S./Mexican border live in one of the
14 sister cities, there is a large population of close to a million people that live either in small towns or in
rural communities that depend on the land’s resources. Along the border are ranchers and farmers are
heavily dependant on access to the Rio Grande water in order to nourish their crops or cattle. Without
free access, farmers will have to incur financial costs of purchasing water pumps and storage tanks.
2.5. Total costs
Despite the Department of Homeland Security stating on their website “Rivers, mountain ranges and
other geographic objects can provide a natural barrier to illegal entry” 21. A border fence is being built in
the mountains of Arizona and alongside the Rio Grande River. In order to complete the first stage of fencing, $1.2 billion has been set aside by the U.S. Congress to pay for approximately 700 miles of fencing.
Already, the construction of the fence is over budget. Some final cost estimates range as high as $49
billion. With a 25-year life cycle, taxpayers will be faced with having to replace the fence up to four times
a century at a cost that has yet to be determined. In addition to its construction costs, the fence will have
to be repaired and monitored by the U.S. Border Patrol. Innovative technologies such as cameras and
21. Department of Homeland Security (2008). Http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/border-fencesouthwest.shtm
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sensors, ground-based radar, and unmanned aerial vehicles will aid the border fence in deterring immigrants from entering the U.S. illegally.
The tools used to fight immigration since not one tool, border fence included, will prevent illegal
immigrants from entering the U.S. Consequently, all of these measures taken together add to the overall
cost of securing the U.S.’s border.
3. Psychological ramifications of the fence
This fence chain can lead to erratic behavior from the general public on both sides of the border. A
need to establish and protect boundaries creates many mixed emotions. If done at the right moment, a
controversial subject can effectively address an issue affecting the general public. The border fence sets a
tone that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. One generally would not see the United States and
Mexico as two homes in a neighborhood. Although current housing construction already has a fence, at
one time, it was the owner him or herself that determined when and how tall a fence was erected. Selfserving actions are not new to human behavior and interpretations of an action are felt on both sides of the
fence. There would not be so many clichés attached to the idea of ‘the fence’ if they held no weight in the
minds of those neighbors. The fence under construction along the boundary of the United States and
Mexico is having similar ramifications.
The population of the border region is substantial, estimated at some twelve million people. Ninety
percent of those millions live in 14 twin cities along the nearly 2,000 miles from the Pacific Ocean to the
Gulf of Mexico. Many of these twin cities have become increasingly dependent on each other. Cities such
as El Paso, Laredo and Nogales on the United States side are affected by the same issues as Ciudad
Juarez, Nuevo Laredo and Nogales on the Mexico side. Decisions for this fence come from Washington,
nearly 2,000 miles away from El Paso, the U.S.’s largest border city. Similarly, issues for Mexico’s own
border security come from Mexico City, a city over 1,100 miles away from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico’s
largest border city. This fence is not new. In fact, areas from California to Texas already had substantial
fencing to curb illegal immigration. This new fence, however, is taller and more secure. What message is
this sending?
The fence is met with great opposition on both sides of the border. Debate on immigration in the
American Southwest is rampant, and there are heavyweights on both sides of the issue. The American
public wants security, and that now includes keeping illegal immigrants out of the country. Again, the
human desire to establish territory and maintain security creates a psychological dilemma for many in the
United States who have never been to the border. Subsequently, the Mexican side represents all of Latin
America. The fence is not only seen as a means by which to alienate oneself from illegal immigration, but
figuratively and symbolically becomes a barrier for the United States and Canada. American media is
plastered with images of illegal immigrants being rounded up like criminals and taken into custody.
Media images also portray images of terrorists and lax security. All this visual symbolism creates hysteria
among American citizens, many of whom have never even been to the border nor understand the complex
shared way of life along it. All this, coupled with extreme disillusionment among border residents, the
border fence has created a division among immigrants by lumping together terrorists and immigrants and
a strained political economy for both the United States and Mexico.
This section will offer some insight into three important factions in play all stemming from the creation of the border fence by the Secure Fence Act of 2006. Since this act came into play, citizens on both
sides of the border have been affected, whether positively or negatively, by the decision to fence off 700
miles of a nearly 2,000 mile border. Specifically, the United States has given the effect to security to
combat three criteria that are now the source of border security: Immigration, Drugs and Terrorism. The
Minutemen Project stemmed out of Arizona in response to the hysteria created by President Bush
claiming that our borders had been lawless and unruly for years. This program of self-protecting the border has garnered support from Border States in addition to states off the border. Citing security, the group
manually patrols the borders in Arizona, California and New Mexico with smaller followings in Texas.
To add to this, a section on human rights will be presented to offer both sides of the fence. The humanization of humans is one of the most difficult things to do. Likening immigration to criminal activity has
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pushed for many of these people to be beaten, discriminated against and in some instances killed22. Finally, both areas will address the idea of security and the push for such abstraction to be at play encourages
many to ignore all aspects of rule of law for the greater good. Security has been thrown around very
lightly. No consideration has been given to the Canadian border despite marked evidence of terrorist and
drug activity. All attention is with Mexico and this establishes and at times justifies the acts of hysteria for
all parties involved.
3.1. Minutemen project
Citizens took the cause of immigration control into their own hands. The year 2004 saw the launch of
a citizens group led by Jim Gilchrist, The Border Minutemen. Much speculation surrounds this idea of a
‘volunteer border patrol’. This group of private citizens has been met with praise and scrutiny. The
project’s website 23 cites lack of immigration law enforcement as initiating their right to create this civil
vigilance syndicate. Despite this effort at simple law enforcement, the Minutemen have had break away
groups that do much more than simple law enforcement. Much of the fervor surrounding the Minutemen
group includes blatant disrespect for human rights, murder of immigrants and flagrant insubordination of
the job of the U.S. Border Patrol. However, the process of a modern militia seems appropriate. There is a
recognized lack of upholding the law by the federal government.
Put simply, the Minutemen Group are pointing out the failures of the United States Government in
enforcing immigration laws and securing the border. The mission statement is taken directly from their
Civil Defense Corps 24 website. «To see the borders and coastal boundaries of the United States secured
against the unlawful and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign military. We will
employ all means of civil protest, demonstration, and political lobbying to accomplish this goal». This
group does not exclude the Canadian border or the coasts, something that the border fence sponsored by
the government does. Additionally, it includes foreign military in its list of things to wall out. This
mission includes this to highlight the dire need to secure our borders; it suggests foreign military would
have a free entry. This leads to hysteria concerning security; people in Kansas do not want China invading along with immigrants through Mexico. The final sentence includes the phrase “employ all means …
to accomplish this goal” suggesting that there is nothing too extreme to commit in securing our border of
people, contraband and military. The group puts it plainly on the table and admits to a role of protector.
That is stronger than any feeling, they are not just protecting the United States, and they are protecting
their daughter, their son.
This group has many qualities that keep one hanging on the fence so to speak. It has seen much criticism from human rights activists and the children of immigrants. The passion from both sides is compelling and highlights the sensitive nature of this issue. For some people like the Minutemen, it is an issue
of protecting their families; but largely for the other side, those that support ending the criminalization of
immigration, it is the same strive to protect and guard.
3.2. Human rights
The problem faced by human rights groups and former immigrants is that groups like the Minutemen
are not completely unsupported by the federal government. That is not to suggest they are affiliated with
one another, but does suggest the federal government also feels a need to secure our borders from potential threats such as people, contraband and foreign military. How do you trump that? There are allegations of mistreatment of immigrant detainees, included in that are operating procedures by law enforcement. Recent Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on businesses have led to charges of
unfair targeting of Spanish speaking immigrants. In some cases this may be true, but to charge targeting
22. CBS News (2008), “Town Still Torn Over Immigrant Murder. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/08/13/eveningnews/main4349359.shtml.
23. Minutemen Main Website (2008). Http://www.minutemanproject.com/organization/about_us.asp.
24. Minutemen Civil Defense Corps Website (2008). Http://www.minutemanhq.com/.
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of Spanish speaking immigrants in an era in which the majority of immigrants in this country are Spanish
speakers is unfair. These groups that decry human rights and fair treatment generally are just as harshly
criticized.
Made up of mostly private groups from both sides of the border, there is a large cry from the Mexican
government itself that mirrors these efforts. In fact, Mexico has made the argument to the U.S.’s northern
neighbor of Canada. Immediately following the signing of the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Felipe
Calderon, Mexican President, pleaded a case to the Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper 25. This
move included many human rights issues, more importantly the number of immigrants that die in the
Arizona desert on their way to the U.S. This pulled at the heartstrings of the public. The fence became
equal to death and suffering; a long far cry from it being a regulatory security prospect. The issue facing
both countries is that the U.S. sees this as a security issue, regulating immigration and encouraging legal
immigration and the integration of immigrants into our society. Mexico sees this issue as one primarily of
human rights. There is a desire to protect their citizens abroad. This is seen as an issue that is primarily
driven by the expectation of returns to the home country after success is achieved. Naturally, there is a
need and a plight on both sides to regulate immigration and to stabilize relations between the two
countries. Converting the issue to one of human rights allows the Mexican government and other proponents against the fence to acknowledge sensitivities. In a 2007 article in the Connecticut Law Review,
author Maurice Hew Jr. suggests the failures to produce viable immigration reform were due mostly in
part to the attacks of September 11.
Although there is much to be said for the attempts at immigration reform, nearly all have been met
with opposition and failure. Senate Bill 2611 was a precursor to the Secure Fence Act of 2006 26. This
law would have allowed for a securing of the Southern Border with Mexico in addition to granting longterm immigrants to gain citizenship. Additionally, the bill integrated a guest worker program for new
immigrants to register legally. This bill did not pass before mid-term elections. This gave way for a rush
on approval of the Secure Fence Act of 2006. Despite all the laws and provisions established by this act,
Hew maintains that the fence will be «as ineffective as or more ineffective than worksite enforcement
because the human spirit that drives the foreign national to risk his or her life to seek possible employment in the United States will not be discouraged by a fence or technology» (Hew 2007).
3.3. Environment
It was likely thought that the environment would be the winning argument against the border fence.
Despite all issues of human rights, security and protection against terrorism, the idea of the environment
is a rising star in the world thanks to global warming and a new concern for preservation. Major
arguments against the fence include increased fauna along the border. Since animals and water do not
obey or recognize human boundaries, their success has been dependent on a free flowing system of integration. The problem facing environmentalists is the hysteria surrounding the idea of security and fencing
in. People from Kansas are not familiar with the environmental issues of the border and see it simply as a
means by which to save their families. Currently, California, Texas and Arizona have been the largest
advocates against the fence for environmental reasons. In Texas the Jaguar plays an incredibly important
role in this argument. By relying on cross-border travel, it creates the need to initiate and preserve its
numbers. In Arizona, the structure itself [the fence] has been trapping debris from floodwaters and is
stalling the flow. In California, the main concern is the Smuggler’s Gulch fence that threatens marine life.
With Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, waiving laws to build the fence, what
recourse is to be made? A New York Times 27 editorial suggests that Chertoff has waived the legal rights
of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Air Act to construct the fence. This allowance by the U.S.
25. CTV Globe Media. 2008. ”Mexico Urges Canada to Help Oppose Border Fence” http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061026/mexico_fence_061026/20061026?hub=TopStories.
26. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006. Senate Bill 2611. 109th Congress.
27. “Michael Chertoff’s Insult” The New York Times. 3 April 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/opinion/03thu3.html?pagewanted=print.
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government falls in line with the idea that the country must stay secure and must not allow any measures
to deny that ability to secure oneself. This idea has fed the hysteria and the following three sections will
outline opposition [environmental] in the states of Arizona, California and Texas.
Much of the issues surrounding Arizona are the wildlife concerns but more importantly flooding.
Parts of the 700 miles of fence is in Arizona and because of road blocks in both California and Texas,
much has already been constructed. The Borderlands Jaguar has been of great concern as they are a breed
that started in North America and spread south. Now the jaguar is coming back 28 and they are becoming
victims of Chertoff’s circumvention of the Endangered Species Act. The article, featured in a 2007 issue
of The Hindu, includes a harmed environment due to initial fencing in metropolitan areas of El Paso,
Texas and San Diego, California. This has led to immigrants being pushed to the remote nature areas of
the desert as well as trash and increased human footprint along the nature areas conducive to the Jaguar.
Conclusion
The issues surrounding the border fence will carry over to the new presidency and neither the
Republicans nor the Democrats will be able to stop the construction of the border fence. The symbol of
the border fence has become a symbol of the American sentiment fearful for their security. As discussed
above, the rushed passing and enforcement of the Real ID Act and the Secure Fence Act have neglected
studies focused on the political, economic, psychological, and environmental impacts attributed to the
border fence. It is an issue that needs to be discussed and studied more with an open dialogue promoted
by the government.
REFERENCES
Bazar E. (2008), “Some till rail over U.S. fence”, Usa Today, August 2008.
Cornelius W.A. (1989), The U.S. demand for Mexican labor, in W.A. Cornelius, J.A. Bustamente (eds.),
Mexican Migration to the United States, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, San Dieg. Cited in J.R.
Rubin-Kurtzman, R. Ham-Chander, M.D. Van Ardsol (1996), Population in Trans-Border Regions:
The Southern California-Baja California Urban System, The Center for Migration Studies of New
York Inc.
Hanson G. (2005), Why does immigration divide America? Public finance and political opposition to
open orders, University of California and National Bureau of Economic Research, Sand Diego.
Hendricks T. (2007), “Study: Price for border fence up to $49 billion study says fence cost could reach
$49 billion lawmakers’ estimate falls far short of total. Research service says”, The San Francisco
Chronicle, January 2007.
Hew M. Jr. (2007), “The fence and the wall (Mart) Maginot line mentality”, Connecticut Law Review, 39,
4, May.
Johnson K.R., B. Trujillo (2007), “Immigrant reform, national security after September 11, and the future
of North American integration”, Minnesota Law Review.
Kennedy D. (2008), “Divided views as US fence goes up”, BBC News, January 2008.
28. Huck Peter (2007), “Environmental Impact of the US/Mexico Fence”. The Hindu. http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2007112255881300.htm&date=2007/11/22/.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASIC FREEDOMS:
NEW CHALLENGES IN THE POST “COLD WAR” EUROPE
Lev Voronkov
The MGIMO – University
Abstract: After the end of the “Cold War” the consensus on problems of human rights and democratic
freedoms has been reached in Europe. The need to utilize these problems as a tool of political pressure in
order to achieve political concessions from other states became obsolete. Assistance to the new
democracies to make the democratic changes irreversible should be promoted with proper respect to
specific conditions of every country. Efforts to use the humanitarian problems as a political weapon in
post “Cold War” Europe can be interpreted as the tool of traditional struggle between powers for their
positions in the world.
Keywords: International relations, democratic freedoms, European foreign policy
•−•−•
Introduction
In December 2008 the 60-th anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the
United Nations, will be marked. The provisions of this document and its values have played and continue
to play a tremendous role in domestic life of European countries and in contemporary international
relations as well. The European Convention on Human Rights is based on them. Many European
countries have reached an impressive progress in implementing its values and in promoting human rights
as the basic value of their societies.
The “Cold War” confrontation between East and West, which dominated world politics for over forty
years, was ideologically motivated. This confrontation was based on the perception that the other
political, economic and social system was the threat to the basic values of human society. This ideological
conflict was encouraged by tough political, economic, military and other means of confrontation, which
was accompanied by growing incompatibility of the principles and values determining political and
economic grounds of their societies, methods of economic management, means of international politics,
resolution of social problems and, consequently, understanding and interpretation of human rights and
democratic freedoms. The dividing factors in relations between East and West in Europe have been
multiplying.
The gap in perception of values between communist and capitalist societies has been becoming
broader. The world became polarized along political, military, economic, cultural and ideological lines.
Each side tried to reinforce the strength of its ideology and its domestic and foreign policies by military
might, which was justified in the public mind as being necessary to guarantee peace and survival for their
peoples. Both sides have created enormous military capabilities and nuclear potentials able to annihilate
humanity. It has been getting clear that the hostile relations and competition between the military-political
alliances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)
under conditions of “Cold War” could result in a military conflict with unpredictable consequences for
survival of humanity on the Earth.
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The post war experience of the East-West confrontation had been clearly proving that it was impossible to win the “cold war” and to overcome the rivals by military means without putting the humanity on
the verge of annihilation. The necessity to switch over from the military-political confrontation to other
less dangerous non-military forms of competition between communist and capitalist models of socioeconomic development had been becoming obvious.
1. Humanitarian problems during the “Cold war”
During the “Cold war” the problems of human rights and fundamental freedoms have been the main
field of ideological confrontation between world communism and world capitalism - two incompatible
models of political, economic and social development of society. These problems were applied by the
anticommunist forces as an efficient tool of pressure on communist societies and one of the main means
of promoting changes of their nature.
The “Prague spring” in 1968 clearly demonstrated that the communist regimes did not have any
efficient internal means of coping with democratic changes of their societies, except military suppression
of them. The attempts to carry on a democratization of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia brought the
system to the verge of collapse. Only the military invasion of the united armed forces of Warsaw Treaty
Organization put the end of the “Prague spring”. Other forcible arguments, apart from “Brezhnev’s
Doctrine”, namely military interference in internal affairs of other countries aimed at preservation of
communist rule in them, had not been found.
This helped the western allies to understand that the most “aggressive” policy against communism
aimed at promoting changes of the communist regimes is linked not with further aggravation of military
pressure, military deterrence and containment, but with promotion of human rights and democratic
freedoms in their societies. These considerations determined the strategic course of western democracies
within the framework of the “Helsinki process”, induced them to accept the idea of Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to sign its Final Act.
The approval of the Final Act in Helsinki in August 1975 has become the important milestone on the
way to overcoming the East–West military confrontation in Europe and to switching it over to other
means and forms of East-West rivalry and competition. By signing the Final Act of the CSCE all
participating states determined jointly a kind of ‘rules of conduct’ in regulating hostile relations between
the competing models and their military-political alliances in order to prevent their transformation into a
military conflict or a ‘hot war’.
The strategic goals to be achieved by the USSR and its allies with the help of the CSCE could be
formulated in the following way:
- to get an international confirmation and recognition of the post-war “achievements” of communism
and its borders in Europe as well as of the Potsdam-Crimea system of international relations on the
continent;
- through measures of disarmament to lessen the economic burden of military expenditures and to use
additional financial resources for intensification of social and economic development of socialist
countries in order to win the competition with the world capitalism;
- to reduce any threat of military intervention of western powers in socialist countries aimed at
changing their political order and borders;
- through development of economic, scientific, technological and other forms of cooperation with
western countries to get access to modern technologies, to increase foreign currency deposits and to
utilize these new economic opportunities for speeding up the construction of communist society in
socialist countries;
- to ensure favorable international conditions for continuation of the communist experiment in their
countries and for gradual dissemination of communism to other states and continents.
Consequently, the USSR and its allies focused their main attention on inclusion of the main principles
of interstate relations in the Final Act, on means of reduction of armaments in Europe (the first basket)
and on economic and scientific-technological cooperation with the West (the second basket). In such an
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approach a defensive and protective measures aimed at conservation of the existing order in socialist
countries has been dominating.
Leaders of socialist countries were sure to be in state to keep under full and efficient control the
ongoing internal processes in their societies. They counted on getting everything they needed from the
West by limiting themselves with declaratory concessions. As this is well known, the provisions of the
Final Act constituted the general political commitments, signed by the highest political figures of the
participating states. They did not have an obligatory power like international treaties and could be
interpreted differently. On top of it, communist leaders had in their possession quite powerful machinery
of internal repression, which could be applied in case of necessity.
Western states hoped to realize the following strategic goals:
- with the help of promotion of human rights and democratic values in communist countries to
transform basic grounds of their political systems and to stimulate market reforms in them;
- through means of confidence building measures and partial reduction of armed forces and armaments to create preconditions excluding any opportunity for the communist states to concentrate
covertly their military forces and to perform a surprise invasion or attack against other socialist
countries for suppression of democratic changes in them in accordance to “Brezhnev’s doctrine”;
- through bridging or elimination of incompatibility of political and economic systems of communist
countries with the leading western powers to overcome the ideological confrontation between them,
to ensure recognition by socialist countries of the societal values of Western civilization and to
integrate them into contemporary system of international relations, which should promote lowering
of the existing interstate conflict potential in the world and strengthening grounds of international
peace and security.
The emphasis of the western countries was put on the third (humanitarian) basket. Their approach had
an offensive nature, aimed at bringing changes to the existing situation.
All CSCE participating states reached the agreement to follow the principle of consensus. In practice
this meant that every progress in achievement of the goals of one side must be accompanied by partial
concessions to demands of another side. This interconnection helped to get a momentum of gradual
changes in humanitarian field in the socialist countries in exchange of actions of western countries
confirming the existing order by political non-binding declarations. The philosophy of conditionality has
been elaborated in order to promote internal democratic changes in communist societies.
The “Helsinki process” has played the decisive role in overcoming the “cold war”. Problems of human
rights and democratic freedoms have filled the vessels of this process with blood.
2. Human rights and “velvet revolutions”
The processes of “perestroika” and “glasnost” in the USSR, initiated by Michail Gorbatchev, questioned the firmness of the existing economic and humanitarian grounds of the Soviet state. The ongoing
political and economic changes in the USSR corresponded objectively to those demands in these fields,
which the western countries had been promoting within the framework of the “Helsinki process”. These
changes have been strongly supported by public opinion in the USSR and stimulated cardinal changes in
other socialist countries, which resulted in “velvet revolutions” in them.
This contributed to qualitative changes in the content of discussions within the CSCE. The conference
on economic cooperation in Europe held in Bonn 19 March – 11 April 1990 has become a milestone on
this road. The participating states by consensus recognized the interconnection between political pluralism and market economy and declared that democratic institutions and economic freedom are the driving
forces of economic and social progress1. By stating that the USSR and other socialist states recognized
that their economic and social progress depended on changes in their economic and political systems.
Participants of the Bonn conference paid the main attention to means of eliminating incompatibility of
economic systems in the CSCE participating states on the basis of development of market economy in
1. Ocse (1993-1997), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Documents, Cd-rom.
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former socialist countries. They recognized by consensus the right for private property as inalienable part
of human rights. This right in former socialist countries and in the USSR was forbidden by law.
In this connection the participants of the conference recommended their governments to promote
privatization, to create favorable conditions for activity of private enterprises and to cut down involvement of states in economy. They accepted by consensus those principles of economic activity, which, if
being implemented in practice in socialist countries, would result in demolishing of administrative command system of economic management and in formation of market economies in them. Realizing the
necessity of providing them with an assistance in these efforts the participants of the Bonn conference
recommended to hold meeting of experts of OECD with experts of CSCE participating states in order to
stimulate the process of economic reforms in former socialist countries.
17 years passed since these decisions had been taken. Impressive progress was achieved in this field.
Economic systems of Russia and countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now recognized
internationally as market economies. Nevertheless, there are still many problems of further perfection of
tax systems, in creation of favorable investment climate etc. to be resolved. These processes can not come
to an end. They constitute permanent concerns in European societies.
The problems of human rights and democratic freedoms are at least not less complicated and demand
permanent attention. They are dependant not only on legislation in the field but also on a complex of
questions linked to historical development of a country, its social-economic situation, mentality of
population, national, ethnic, religious and other peculiarities of this state and on a level of political culture
and of maturity of its democratic institutions as well. These problems have much longer societal inertia
and delayed reaction to ongoing political and economic transformations in comparison with economic
problems. These national peculiarities can not be ignored.
Vienna CSCE conference has decided to hold three meetings within the framework of the OSCE Conference on humanitarian dimension: in Paris (30 May-23 June 1989), in Copenhagen (5-29 June 1990)
and in Moscow (10 September-4 October 2001). The final document of the OSCE conference in Vienna
accepted by consensus stated that pluralistic democracy and rule of the law are critically necessary to
ensure a respect to all human rights and democratic freedoms, for development of contacts between
peoples and for resolution of other humanitarian problems 2.
The principles of political organization of society included by consensus in the final document of
Copenhagen meeting called rightfulness of the existing political systems of the socialist countries in
question. These are free elections, representative form of rule, control of elected legislative bodies over
executive powers, observation of constitution by state authorities and governments, inadmissibility of
merger between parties and states, respect of the established legislative system in society by government,
administration and courts. In the humanitarian sphere these principles included legislative guarantees of
human rights and democratic freedoms, their correspondence to international law, efficient juridical
protection of every citizen against administrative decisions, human right for justified and open trial by
competent and impartial court, the right of every individual to defend himself privately or with assistance
of an elected lawyer, recognition of guiltiness only in case it is confirmed by a court.
Independence of judges and impartiality of court system, recognition and protection of independence
of attorneys in law, publication of openly adopted legislation, control of civilian authorities over armed
forces and police and some other important provisions have also been adopted. Apart from these ideas the
recommendation to all participating states to promote creation of independent national human rights
institutions and to ensure the rule of law has also been included into the final document 3. The recognition
of these principles by socialist countries meant that they took the political commitment to start
transforming their political systems.
The participating states agreed to study ways and means, which could permit the Council of Europe to
make its contribution to the humanitarian dimension of the OSCE. Participants of the Moscow conference
have adopted new means of control over execution of commitments by the CSCE participating states in
humanitarian field, namely establishment of observation missions to be sent to study situations or
2. Ibidem.
3. Ibidem.
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concrete cases, nomination of reporters for investigation and elaboration of proposals, creation of the
OSCE Committee of humanitarian dimension and other 4.
On 21 November 1990 in Paris the OSCE summit has accepted the Paris Charter for a New Europe. It
ascertains, in particular, that the era of confrontation and division of Europe is over and that a new epoch
of democracy, peace and unity in Europe is open. Heads of states and governments took the political
commitment to build-up, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of rule in the participating countries and to cooperate and to assist each other in order to make democratic transformation
irreversible 5.
Recognition of values of western societies, principles of market economy and pluralistic democracy by
the USSR and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe meant that the ideological differences in this
field had become a part of the past. This put the end of the “Cold war”. Forthcoming democratic transformations in former socialist countries could be carried on only within the framework of non-communist
scenario.
3. Problems of human rights in the post “Cold war” Europe
From this moment and on problems of human rights and democratic freedoms within the CSCE should
start to acquire qualitatively new dimensions. Theoretically speaking, any necessity for the West to utilize
problems of human rights as a tool of fight against a hostile ideology started to become obsolete and in
the new circumstances should be substituted by its concentrated efforts to assist the new democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe and in new independent post-Soviet states to maintain and strengthen the
momentum of democratic and economic reforms. The philosophy of conditionality could not any more be
applied in order to promote democratic changes in hostile societies. These societies did not exist any more
in Europe.
CSCE welcomed entry of many former socialist countries into the Council of Europe and their
adhesion to the European Convention on Human Rights. By doing so they took not only general political
commitments in the sphere of human rights and democratic freedoms, but also very concrete juridical
obligations, determined by the Status of the Council of Europe. Since that time a part of their commitments taken within the framework of the “Helsinki process” became the matter of concern for the Council
of Europe as well.
In order to assist the new democracies to make democratic transformation of their societies irreversible
a special seminar of experts has been held in Oslo from 4 to 15 November 19916. Varied assistance of traditional western organizations, including the Council of Europe, to the countries, voluntarily embarking
into the path of system transformation of their societies, has helped and continues to help them to carry
out deep democratic transformations in comparatively short historical period of time. Very important role
in this field has been played by TACIS program of the EU.
Those Central and Eastern European countries, which expressed their will to join the EU, received
considerable assistance of its bodies and funds in realization of not only economic, but also political reforms. This assistance resulted in remarkable progress, achieved by these countries in the field of human
rights and democratic freedoms. Apart from the Council of Europe almost all of them joined NATO and
EU. Nonetheless, this does not mean that these new democracies as well as traditional ones have already
resolved all the problems in the sphere of human rights and democratic freedoms and may be considered
as ideal untouchable models of democracy. There are still many problems in these countries, which are
waiting for their solutions.
But the focus of attention of western participants in the OSCE started to move to those countries,
which are still outside either NATO or EU. This caused certain geographical and functional distortions in
the activity of CSCE/OSCE in the field of human rights and democratic freedoms in favor of those
countries, which are not in the sphere of NATO or EU influence. The problems of human rights and
4. Ibidem.
5. Ibidem.
6. Ibidem.
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democratic freedoms as well as the conditionality logic continue to be used by western OSCE participating states and some OSCE bodies and organs in order to promote desired political changes in those
countries which are beyond the sphere of influence of western institutions and organizations. The
mechanisms of the OSCE do provide them with those unique opportunities, which are not available
through NATO, EU or other international organizations because the OSCE is entitled to deal with not
only international, but also internal political problems of individual participating states.
In the situation of non-existent ideological conflict between the OSCE participating states in the field
of human rights and democratic freedoms they continue to differ in levels of maturity of their democratic
institutions and in specific national conditions under which these democratic reforms are being
performed. Considerable differences in this field between states are fully justified and inevitable. Bilateral
and multilateral assistance to these unripe democracies, aimed at gradual improvement of the situation,
and their cooperation and acceptance of such an assistance can be very useful and promote real progress
in ensuring human rights and in strengthening democratic institutions in a society. These improvements
can not be imposed by foreign countries or international organization from outside.
But it can be counterproductive to utilize problems of human rights and democratic freedoms as the
political weapon of pressure on OSCE participating states in situations when their internal or foreign
policy does not satisfy some of the western powers.
After the end of the “Cold War” between world capitalism and world communism traditional competition and rivalry between ideologically like-minded great powers with compatible systems of market
economies may resume. Within the framework of their multilateral competition the problems of human
rights tend to be used as an efficient political tool of their struggle for better world positions. Any politicization of humanitarian problems and attempts to use them in self-interests of great powers at the expense
of human beings should be resisted.
After the “Cold War” the problems of human rights and democratic freedoms should not be any more
the object of political speculations. These problems are complicated and many-sided. They can be successfully resolved only by consolidated efforts of states, their political institutions and non-governmental
organizations with proper respect to the right of every state to look after those solutions in this field,
which correspond in the best way to its national conditions.
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ROLE OF THE EU:
AN OUTLOOK
Vasile Puşcaş
Chairman of the Institute for International Studies
Babes Bolyai University – Cluj Napoca
Abstract: Globalisation means new issues and topics: climate change, energy security, migration but
also a new dimension of competition in the world. So far, there hasn’t been a common approach to these
issues. People have looked for national solutions, and have put aside global spillovers. As the world is
becoming smaller, problems are becoming more global. The European model success and failures stand
as reference points for new regional co-operation around the world.
Keywords: globalization, EU, regionalism, international relations
•−•−•
1. Global developments, European examples
When addressing the global developments, we have to talk about globalisation. Citizens communicate
faster, and create a deeper interdependence of the living-and working space. But globalisation also
contributes to a proliferation of a unique dynamics of issues which represent not only benefits but also
challenges for all levels – from local through regional to global.
Nowadays, a new world order is emerging, shifting from a bipolar international system to a rather
complex one, with new upcoming pawns and actors asserting their position in new ways. The dynamics
of distribution of power at the global level and the deepening of interdependence are two basic
characteristics that are (re-)shaping the international system. This is the different geo-political landscape
in which there is a need to act and project our interests. Along with these dynamics, new ways to
approach challenges are also required. These sound effects are pressing even for more change. Therefore
a large part can be tackled on a continental scale. Globalisation means new issues and topics: climate
change, energy security, migration but also a new dimension of competition in the world. So far, there
hasn’t been a common approach to these issues. People have looked for national solutions, and have put
aside global spillovers. As the world is becoming smaller, problems are becoming more global.
When the time has come to put in action and benefit from this strategic thinking, the economicfinancial crises began to show its face. Unfortunately, in this difficult time, Member States act by focusing on the local level thereby putting the European interest on a second place. On the other hand Globalisation and “new regionalism” do not exclude one another and thus, cannot be considered with different
approaches. The EU stands as an example of the potential aspirations/results that can be achieved through
successful, peaceful regional integration in other parts of the world, such as the African Union, ASEAN
and MERCOSUR, however different the practicalities. The European model success and failures stand as
reference points for new regional co-operation around the world.
The “Open Regionalism” produces positive effects at the domestic and global level. However we must
not forget the essential element for this regional integration: political will and the permanent negotiation
process.
The model that the EU has crystallized in the past 50 years has been to firstly, reach an agreement on
common set of values and principles and then structure the institutions to enforce the rules and values agreed
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upon. This is considered to be a valuable approach when dealing with differences. EU’s experience is
important.
Now, the question is: Is the EU continuously adapting to new circumstances? And is it equipped with
the right set of values and policy tools? Further political entrepreneurial thinking and investment from
European stakeholders is needed, as well as focusing on people, ideas, resources, expertise and money.
The European Union, has grown from the conviction of an immediate post-war generation of leaders
in the West of Europe that only integration could bring the prospect of a stable peace and prosperity. The
European integration process focused until Maastricht and Amsterdam on the internal mechanisms, for
example developing the internal market.
As history moved on, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the ideas of freedom and democracy, as well as
the urge to return to Europe, grew stronger. After 1989 the international relations system has entered a
transition process. The European Enlargement process that fallowed, must to be considered also as a valid
argument for the need to reshape the international system. Since the beginning of the new millennium
the EU has been acting like a soft-power. After this momentum, the Convention debating the Future of
Europe discussed not only the necessary internal adjustments of the European construction, but also the
redefinition of the European identity and the global role of the EU, which is its soft power.
The European Union’s integrative model and (global) capacity and EU regulatory expertise are
valuable for the process of regulating and negotiating different and divergent interests in favor of
regional arrangements and international relations. Europe’s success as a global actor/model has generated
vivid debates in both academic and political circles. A fundamental ingredient of its success has been the
forging of a new approach to power and international issues: “soft power” approach.
EU’s power comes from its common values, or norms, namely the principles of democracy, the rule of
law, social justice, human rights and the commitment to a market economy, as well as social solidarity,
sustainable development and the fight against discrimination. These elements are the corner-stones of the
international identity of the European Union. For each of these fundamental values a coherent institutional system is watching over the enforcement of these rules.
The EU has reaped tremendous rewards from its soft power, the result of which is an enlarged Union
of 27 Member States and unprecedented peace and stability on the European continent. The transformation of Central and Eastern European Countries is one of the most important examples of soft power used
in its enlargement policy.
Its approach, as an international actor, should use this power as a source of influence in its relations
with its neighbours and around the globe. The potential of EU’s soft power in the future is to be taken in
consideration, for example, in the EU’s foreign policy, enlargement policy, neighbourhood policy and in
the relation with other important powers in the international system. It is the key to strengthening
alliances with China, India and new emerging markets, so vital for shaping the international system of the
decades ahead.
EU’s projection of these values through a set of policies provides a clear image of EU’s approach to
“soft power”. However, even in this game, there is competition; and now, the EU pays tribute to the
successful model it has put forward. For instance, China is an interesting combination between “soft” and
“hard” power. On the other hand, India is basically a “soft” power with regional ambitions since its
institutional fundamentals are not very supportive for the moment.
Moreover, soft power can also be a very important tool for a better understanding and communication
between different cultures and religions, for example for the Christian-Islamic dialogue. This tool can be
used to build up new bridges and bear down possible walls. However, the EU is not just about soft power,
it is a single market which represents a huge economic factor for countries wishing to do business with
the EU, now the largest trade partner in the world.
The European Union must be defined as a multiple actor, with a state- and a regional/organizational
dimension. Both are producing their effects. The Union is without doubt a soft power but the decisions
over the use of it lies in the hands of Member States, and therefore its future use will also be decided by
them. It is a certain fact that sometimes there are certain difficulties for the European Union in harmonizing all interests and take a rapid decision. The EU does not have, for now, a developed international
capacity although it has the potential, thus, is rather oriented on international commerce. The European
interest needs to be «specifically defined, strongly articulated, stoutly defended, and vigorously promoted,
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if Europe is to offer the right platform for the future». (Commission Communication, Global Europe:
competing in the world). The EU has to deliver a vision on how a global Europe is adapting to new needs,
protecting the needs and interests of its citizens, ensuring prosperity, solidarity and security for the next
generations as well as for the present generation. Consequently, EU’s Member States should shape a more
strategic approach for the European interest using smart power.
2. Toward an European approach
To reach this common approach, we need a few European arguments:
● The EU has evolved into a key actor over the past half-century. In terms of he fundamentals of its
mechanics, the international system functioning has not been changed essentially. Its decisional
process is still working in critical mass logic.
● Consequently, one of the main tools for increasing EU’s influence and weight in the international
system has been the enlargement process. The added value of this exercise is not comprised solely
by the arithmetical increase of the market, territory and resources, but more important of the
successful implementation of values and institutions.
● The waves of enlargement taking place in that period show a EU commitment to peace, freedom
and prosperity that has not only served the founding nations well, but which has continued to stand
as major argument to future Member States and aspiring Candidate Countries. This evolution
stands also as a proof of the EU negotiation-capacity, which has lead to a specific working method
in Brussels and Strasbourg, as well as in any other Member States capitals.
● Aside from this European enlargement process, the EU contributes to global governance norms
through its leading worldwide role in trade, competitiveness, energy policy, tackling climate
change and assisting less developed countries.
● The European Union is committed to encouraging multilateralism, and takes part in to an extensive
series of global, regional association and co-operation agreements with the rest of the world. Core
aspects of the EU’s power are: the external projection of its inner values ; regional initiatives and
CFSP and ESDP.
In the context of the international economic crises, both the EU Member States and the USA were
oriented more towards protectionism then integrationism. The EU aimed at the acceleration of the European decision-making process but focused more on targeting and strengthening the Internal Market and
less on aspirations to participate to the reconstruction of the international system.
Inconsistent support of the developing European project on a global scale generated a tendency towards a “global concert” (see G 20), without considering the construction of quality international organizations (see UN), including adjustments of EU’s prospective. Many European countries are represented in
the world’s important international organizations, with too many voices. In terms of weight and influence,
there is not enough United Europe. A conclusion might be that there is less union in Europe and less
Europe in the World.
A new international approach focusing on regulatory cooperation, convergence of standards and equivalence of rules is emerging as a result of sectoral bilateral discussions with third countries. The G-20’s
“multilateralism light”, brings together leaders that can change things and offers a pragmatic way to
incorporate China, India, Brazil and other emerging great powers into the joint management of international affairs. This approach should be further developed in the mutual interest of the EU and its partners.
In this case, the diagnosis of Jürgen Habermas is really true: «Only large-scale regional regimes which
are both representative and capable of implementing decisions and policies could make such an institution
workable (the institutions are seen as the existing multilateral organizations). The nation-states must unite
at the transnational level to form a manageable number such global players within the framework of the
supranational world organization, hence as members of the international community».
How will the rapid changes produced by globalisation, and the increasing influence of non-state actors
such as multinational companies, NGOs, international media networks, and even radical movements and
organizations, or the global economic and financial crises affect governments’ room to maneuver?
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What is needed, and what the EU is already evolving, is an influence or form of power that retains the
EU’s normative values, its soft power strengths, but which hardens, or tempers them. Identifying the right
combination of hard and soft power in an effective way , which is called by Prof. Nye “smart power”,
could be EU’s single solution to this challenges. Nye said «We need to recover the ability to combine our
soft power with our hard power if we’re going to build the capacity to use smart power».
As the EU continues to develop its role in the world, the challenge is two-folded: to ensure coherence
between the civilian and military sides and to use soft, attractive power more strategically in the international relations. The EU also plays an important normative role in shaping global regulation. The global
marketplace can work most effectively when there are common ground rules (see the international regimes). The EU has a well developed regulatory regime based on years of experience in helping its Member
States to reconcile their different approaches and find the right mix to allow the 4 freedoms to flourish
while respecting a minimum set of standards for its goods in areas like health and safety.
One of the main arguments of the EU is the attraction of being the world’s largest trade partner. As
Prof. Nye has said, you can ‘coerce with sanctions, or woo with wealth’. The European Neighborhood
Policy, or ENP, is a good example of “smart power” approach aimed at countries whose increased prosperity is of mutual interest for the EU. This means Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus to
our East, and to our South the entire Mediterranean rim, from Morocco to Lebanon. The attraction of
deeper relations with the EU is at the heart of this policy.
The EU has developed new approaches towards the European Neighborhood. I’m confident that that
the Mediterranean Union, the Eastern Partnership, the Strategy for the Baltic Space, and the European
Danube-Strategy and the Black Sea Synergy will generate political, economical and cultural benefits for
the Member States and Neighboring States on the local regional and global level.
Nowadays, the question that needs an answer is: what major challenge should be addressed by the EU?
The results of the recent elections for the European Parliament can be a clear indicator for the message
that European citizens gave. They are interested in their living-standard, so they expect from solutions
able to generate an economic development, to secure their jobs and the financial and economic system.
In this context, reshaping the international relations system and setting up an international stable financial
economic framework for the future are the two major challenges that the EU is facing.
We have to acknowledge the fact that, the crisis is shaking beliefs and approaches that have been
enshrined in European policies that is why there is a need in reshaping policies – the process already
started at the last European Council by reforming the European financial and economic system. The EU
needs to find an united stance in relation to these issues to overcome the crisis and to define a new stable
ground for the European economies and their contribution to the world economy. There is a need for a
coherent approach at the EU level to the economic crisis. So far there has been only a fragmented
approach, mainly of a Keynesian inspiration.
Having effective solutions for exiting this crisis is as important as safeguarding the achievements of
this half a century of European construction. The EU’s internal market, EURO, the fundamental freedoms
or the competition rules, are together elements of the safeguard system which enables the European
project to move ahead. The costs of the recovery need to be judged at a European scale and not just for
each Member State. So far, Member States have proved that economic integration may be the key for
economic development provided that they enforce the rules aimed at curbing fraudulent behavior.
In these times, swift and coordinated action is needed in Europe; previous commitments should not be
disregarded however. Common market rules, competition, the stability and growth pact are as important
as ever. Crisis is not a time to put even more pressure on public finance, but a time to start restructuring
spending and give investors more confidence. Restructuring the European financial system supposes a
sectorial approach of restructuring the international financial system. In other words, this represents an
impulse for the restructure of the whole international system. In this process, the EU can bring constructive expertise and implementation knowledge.
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3. Beyond EU integration
So far, the main source of EU’s common prosperity is considered to be the increased integration
process. Deepening should still be high up on the European agenda. But this is not enough anymore.
Europe needs to become a more competitive actor, and this requires an essential shift in the economic
paradigm.
Europe has not matched the growth of other powers – and this should be a genuine concern its members. To avoid the decline of Europe, governments must ensure the provisions of adequate means in industrial, cultural, diplomatic and military sectors – in the strategically interest of the Member States and the
European Union. As we are living very interesting and challenging times, not only for Europe but for the
world as well, economic sustainability should not be judged only in financial terms, but also in a social
and environmental logic as well. This area may provide a rather good opportunity for EU not only to act
as a global player but also to find new areas for spurring its competitiveness.
Such an approach together with coherent institutional reforms at the EU level may provide a good
basis for the EU to emerge as a stronger actor in the international system in the aftermath of the crisis. A
solution might be the final and complete ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in order to have an institutionally and internationally stronger Union. Once the ratification process has been completed, the Lisbon
Treaty will give the EU a clear single voice in the world, connecting the various different strands of EU
external policy and enabling a greater co-ordination of handling the EU’s external relations. The Lisbon
Treaty will give a yet stronger ground to the EU’s core normative values, such as democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms which underpin global governance norms. The EU will also
become a legal entity, allowing a formal membership within the international organizations. There can be
no doubt that big changes await the EU in its foreign policy dimension. The Lisbon Treaty, once ratified,
will make things easier for those who remain confused by the way in which the EU conducts itself. The
newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be at
the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, enabling the EU’s external actions to be more
visible and more coherent. The President of the European Council will give the Union a face to identify
with and the so often asked unique European phone number.
It is well known that the EU is the world’s largest integrated economy, the biggest trading entity, and
one of the largest markets. Sustainable economic and social development, economic growth, ageing,
migration, social politics, climate change, energy, security and international cooperation are the keywords for defining its future. These elements will also define the future developments in the international
system. On these issues the EU has right now important expertise and this potential should be used in the
cooperation with other international regional and global actors.
There are certain steps that the EU should take in the foreseeable future:
1. Today, there is a very real prospective to move ahead with the European integration of the region.
Significant driving force of the forthcoming changes in European democracy might be the influence
of development of the social sphere and community networks. “New regionalism” can be a pillar of
a new multilateral world order.
2. Europe can do better. A coherent and courageous global vision of the European Union is needed. A
new agenda for the European Union is demanded by a recent published report of a Reflection Group
formed of experts from the New Member States. They ask for reclaiming the EU for and with the
citizens. The youngest generation of Europeans, with their active role in forging the new digital
communication era could become the main agent for revitalizing the public sphere and the European
civic society. East and West, new and old will have to forge new political bonds requiring considerable
adjustments. With the rise of the importance of the European Parliament, the formation of pan-European political groupings and social communication networks will become more and more significant.
3. Today, the Union encompasses 27 countries with a half billion citizens living in a Europe that represents a model of freedom, security and integration. The Member States have experience of integrating an essential element of globalisation; they know transnational management of relations for
all categories of actors in the international relations.
4. The EU can become a real player on the world stage because of its wide-ranging and comprehensive
set of “smart power” tools. The EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never get the ability to
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shape world events, as they say they want, unless they are prepared to pay extra cost, not only in
financial terms, but also in terms of institutional and political reforms. Furthermore, the EU is an
economic and commercial power that is growing into a political player assuming its responsibilities
based on its ability to attract others and bring about changes in societies. Prosperity and stability will
be brought by economics and social policies. Therefore the EU needs political dialogue to take the
best decisions and to set up the right framework.
5. As Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for CFSP, recently said: «We should build a foreign
policy fit for the problems of the 21st century The European Union has to become a central pole of
power and cooperation, effectively engaging global actors and supporting the resettling of the international system, will be of decisive importance for its future».
The EU is obliged to reinforce its cooperation with the United States, the traditional partner of the
EU, and intensify efforts to build strategic relationships with the rising and responsible powers from
North and South, East and West and use its proved skills as negotiator, more often. Today, the way
of common culture, values and identity of Europe can encourage others.
6. As a conclusion, the European Union has to define the European interest for present days. This requires first of all a strong vision, building up/enforcing adequate functioning institutions and conjugated actions from all involved parts: the NGOs, the civil society, the economical and political actors
from the Member States and the European Union.
7. Europe is known in the world for promoting modern concepts of governance. It should continue to
reform governance successfully at home in order to enhance a similar change at global level. European Governance means achieved goods like “Good Governance”, “sustainable development”,
“flexicurity”. The White Paper on European Governance evidences five important political principles − openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. They should guide the
Union in organizing its way and pushing reforms forward. The European citizens must be aware that
European Governance standards are important for reshaping Global Governance, and making the
international system work.
8. Last but not least, discussing about the European Identity and European Leadership is needed. Redefining the European Identity in a global changing context is a precondition for an enforced and
more active European leadership. Therefore the EU has to keep the values that it stands for in the world,
but e must also be open for new ideas and always ready to act as a whole with its global partners.
9. Facing the post-crisis situation − the EU needs to go on with the internal developments and also with
its global activities and ensure an adequate participation to the international system. The EU had
certain advantages in the new international system, which are based on improved interdependence of
the state- and non-state actors. The interaction of actors in a network is nothing new for the European
model. The European Union is already structured internally as a multiple transnational actor.
10. The time has come to develop an up-to-date political mentality, to detach in a constructive way from
the Westphalian international system, structuring in a convergent way the activity of state – and nonstate – actors in a proper form to the international relations, as they occur today.
As we all can see, the European Union has acquired all attributes necessary for “smart power”. Now,
the way they will help to restructure the international relations system depends on a “smart European
leadership” which has to be dedicated to the European interest as part of a global game, game in which
the EU should not be only a part, but an active participatory actor.
The way the EU acts in common for efficiently restructuring its economic – financial framework is
defining the speed for overcoming the present crisis. Reshaping and defining the future role of the EU in
the international relations system is closely related to this issue. The EU’s political role in the new global
system is a function of the EU’s own desires, vision and determination.
An active worldwide role of the European Union is a precondition for moving all of these issues in the
direction we all seek – to transform the European Union into a real global actor based on strategic
investments for the future. In other words, into a successful player in the age of globalisation.
Global developments and the role of the EU: An outlook
197
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Armitage R.L., J.S. Nye Jr. (eds.) (2007), CSIS Commission on smart power: A smarter, more secure
America, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bildt C. (2007), The European Union’s soft power: A force to change, Hellenic Foundation for European
& Foreign Policy, Athens.
Center for EU Enlargement Studies in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2009), Europa as a
soft power. International conference report, April 6, 2009.
Checkel J.T., P.J. Katzenstein (eds.) (2009), European identity, Cambridge UP, Cambridge.
Commission Communication (2006), Global Europe: Competing the world – COM(2006) 67, 4.10.2006.
Commission Communication (2007), The European interest: Succeeding in the age of globalisation –
COM 3.10.2007.
Commission White Paper (2001), European Governance – COM 428, 25.07.2001.
Copsey N., C. Moore, C.M. O’Donnell (2009), Choices for Europe, Center for European Reform,
University of Birmingham.
Di Mauro F., S. Dees, W.J. McKibbin (eds.) (2009), Globalisation, regionalism and economic interdependence, Cambridge UP, Cambridge.
Grant C. (2009), “Winners and losers in the new geopolitics”, CER Bulletin, 66, June/July.
Grevi G. (2009), The interpolar world: A new scenario, Occasional Paper 79, European Union Institute
for Security Studies, June.
Habermas J. (2009), Europe the faltering project, Polity Press, London.
Harkin J. (2006), “Soft power”, The Guardian, January 28.
Miller H.V., A. Moravcsik (eds.) (2009), Power, interdependence, and non-state actors in world politics,
Princeton UP, Princeton.
Nye J.S. Jr. (2008), The power to lead, Oxford UP, Oxford.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2008), Global trends 2025: A transformed world, November 20.
Pentilla R. (2009), Multilateralism light: The rise of informal international governance, Center for European Reform, July.
Richardson H. (2008), Head of the Delegation of the EC to Japan (Speech), Smartening the EU’s soft
power, May 16, 2008.
Solana J. (2009), Europe’s global role- what next steps?, Ditchley Foundation annual lectur, Oxfordshire,
July 11.
Tassinari F. (2009), Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and non-Resident
Fellow at John Hopkins ‘SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations’, Where should the EU end?,
http://ftassinari.blogspot.com/2009/06/where-should-eu-end.html.
Telo M. (ed.) (2007), European Union and new regionalism, regional actors and global governance in a
post-hegemonic Era, Second Edition, Ashgate.
Paper presented to The International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, 30 July 2009. The European Commission addressed these challenges in 2007 by presenting
the communication “The European Interest: Succeeding in the age of globalization”.
ANTICORRUPTION AS REVOLUTION
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi
Romanian Academic Society - Bucharest
Abstract: Political corruption poses a serious threat to democracy and its consolidation. Why do so
many anticorruption initiatives fail? The paper argues that many anticorruption initiatives fail because
they are non-political in nature, while most of the corruption in developing and post-communist countries
is inherently political.
Keywords: Post-communist transition, corruption, civil society, international institution
•−•−•
In recent years, anticorruption has become a major industry, with global expenditures growing to an
estimated one hundred million dollars per year 1. To date, however, few successes have resulted from this
investment. We clearly speak more about corruption than we used to and spend more money combating
it, but there is little evidence that all this activity is accomplishing much. The handbook published by
Transparency International (TI) cites as best practices the laws or institutions adopted in various
countries, but their effects have yet to be measured 2. The World Bank’s “Anticorruption in Transition”
also discusses ongoing programs rather than already demonstrated successes (World Bank 2000).
Political corruption poses a serious threat to democracy and its consolidation (Diamond 1999: 92).
One year after the widely acclaimed Orange Revolution in Ukraine, one could already buy, though not
very cheaply, a seat in the Ukrainian parliament. The lack of success in curbing corruption, combined
with ever more widespread discussion of the issue, renders voters extremely cynical and threatens to
subvert public trust in emerging democracies.
Why do so many anticorruption initiatives fail? Can a more successful approach be built based on the
very few successes we have witnessed in recent years? The hypothesis I advance in this paper is that
many anticorruption initiatives fail because they are non-political in nature, while most of the corruption
in developing and postcommunist countries is inherently political. In fact, what we label corruption in
these countries is not the same phenomenon as corruption in developed countries. In the latter, the term
corruption usually designates individual cases of infringement of the norm of integrity. In the former,
corruption actually means “particularism” – a mode of social organization characterized by the regular
distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power
within such societies (O’Donnell 1997: 46-47). Few anticorruption campaigns dare to attack the roots of
corruption in societies where particularism is the norm, as these roots lie in the distribution of power
1. See Michael Bryane, “The rise and fall of the anti-corruption industry: Toward second generation
anti-corruption reforms in Central and Eastern Europe?” (Budapest: Local government and public service
reform initiative, 2004). Http://lgi.osi-hu (last accessed 03.15.2005).
2. Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Handbook: National Integrity System in Practice,
available at http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/ach.
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itself. Instead, anticorruption strategies are adopted and implemented in cooperation with the very
predators who control the government and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves.
Based on my personal experience as an initiator of a successful anticorruption campaign in Romania (as
well as a researcher of many failed efforts), I believe that electoral revolutions can lead to consolidated
democracies only if they are followed by revolutions against particularism, and that nothing short of such
a revolution will succeed in curbing corruption in countries where particularism prevails (Mungiu-Pippidi
2005a: 154-155).
1. Old particularism and new corruption
The Oxford English Dictionary defines corruption as the “perversion or destruction of integrity in the
discharge of public duties by bribery and favour”. This definition of corruption rests on the presumption
that the state operates under some norm of universalism and that public integrity is understood as equal
treatment of citizens, which may occasionally be infringed by favouritism. Even a brief historical review,
however, shows that until modern times those societies in which the private and the public spheres are
clearly delineated and the goal of government is the public welfare of equal citizens, have been scarce –
and they are still relatively few. Corruption can therefore only be understood in conjunction with the stage
of development of a particular state or society; it makes little sense to discuss corruption in relation to a
patrimonial or absolutist state, as the norm that applies within such societies is certainly not universalism.
Only after the modernization of the West European state was completed – and government became firmly
based on the assumption that public goods (from law and order, to jobs in the public sector) would be
distributed equally and fairly as a norm – can we meaningfully begin to discuss corruption in Europe.
Authors who ask why modernization and democratization seem to bring more corruption, and then look
for answers in the process of modernization itself, miss the fact that prior to modernization, a universal
delivery of public goods by the state existed only exceptionally.
As Max Weber puts it, only in the modern state is public office no longer considered a source of
income to be exploited for rents «in exchange for the rendering of certain services, as was normally the
case in the Middle Ages … It is decisive for the modern loyalty of an office that, in the pure type, it does
not establish a relationship to a person, like the vassal’s or disciple’s faith under feudal or patrimonial
authority, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes» (Weber 1969: 159).
Wherever the above does not apply, we encounter collectivistic and hierarchical societies based on the
organizational mode called particularism. It runs directly counter to universalism, the norm and practice
of individualistic societies, where equal treatment applies to everyone regardless of the group to which
one belongs. In the latter type of society, individuals expect equal treatment from the state. In the former,
their treatment depends on their status or position in society, and people do not even expect to be treated
fairly by the state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status. Max Weber
originally defined status societies, which are ruled by particularism, as societies dominated, governed by
convention rather than law, where certain groups monopolize powers of domination and sources of
income.
Status can best be understood in terms of the distribution of power, as it reflects an individual’s
distance from the groups or networks that hold power. In other words, the closer an individual is to the
source of power, be it a charismatic leader or a privileged group, the better positioned he or she is to
enjoy a superior status, and therefore more influence. Individuals who enjoy this privilege are linked in
status-based groups such as castes, orders or networks, and have much greater access to public goods. A
culture of privilege reigns in society. Individuals struggle to belong to the privileged group rather than to
change the rules of the game. There is widespread infringement of the norms of impartiality and fairness.
Influence, not money, is the main currency, and the benefits to an individual anywhere in the chain are
hard to measure. Favours are distributed or denied as part of a customary exchange with rules of its own,
sometimes not involving direct personal gain for the “gatekeeper”. Bribery often occurs as a means of
circumventing inequality; for the many people with lower status, bribing an official may be the only way
to secure equal treatment.
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201
Obviously, societies in the real world do not all neatly divide into the categories of particularism and
universalism but can be placed on an imaginary continuum between these two poles. To simplify, regimes
can be classified into three rough types using corruption as the main variable. The left end of the horizontal axis represents a monopoly of power and the right end represents liberal democracy. Most contemporary societies, as well as most non-European societies over the past one-hundred years, fall somewhere
in between these two extremes.
The first category includes patrimonial regimes and purely particularistic states. In these societies,
rulers, their families and their cliques are unaccountable, and can seize the property of any of their
subjects. They must, however, also show some restraint so as not to push their subjects to rebellion. Thus,
although the spoils of corruption can be large, traditional autocrats, unlike modern autocrats, tread carefully, and corruption remains limited, even in the absence of proper accountability.
The demise of traditional authority (or neotraditional authority, in the case of communist countries) is
seldom followed by liberal democracy, but rather tends to lead to intermediate regimes. In these cases, the
monopoly of power givers way, but the ensuing competition for power and spoils is not restricted by
formal or informal constraints. Not only are institutions of accountability missing, but the distribution of
power is unbalanced in favour of certain social or ethnic groups. The main prize in the competition for
power is the state and all of its resources: whoever seizes the state, seizes the day 3.
Even when formal democratic institutions are kept in place, as was the case in many former British
colonies in Africa, regimes developed that were even less concerned with public welfare that the
traditional ones had been. The historian Barrington Moore jr. labelled rulers in such regimes “predatory
élites”, who, in the process of generating prosperity for themselves, produce a degree of poverty otherwise unwarranted in that specific society (Moore 1978).
Where political change has occurred through revolution, we might expect more accountability to
follow, but this is often not the case. Revolutions aim at rapid progress, and revolutionary leaders often
gain legitimacy through charisma. They are less concerned with building institutions of accountability
than with completing the takeover of the state from the previous rulers (with the notable exception of the
American Revolution).
Within the intermediate category of regimes described above, which I call “competitive particularism”, corruption explodes. But because popular expectations change greatly once the traditional regime is
gone, social acceptance of corruption is no longer the norm. As it becomes clear that free elections can
bring about changes of government, albeit changes that do not produce better governance, forces within
society start pushing for mechanisms to hold rulers accountable. Even in poor illiterate societies people
do not tolerate corruption among new leaders as readily as they once tolerated abuses by traditional rulers.
The defence mechanisms against predatory élites vary greatly across “competitive particularist” societies,
which include Latin American delegative democracies, African competitive anarchies, and postcommunist electoral democracies, characterized by similar poor scores on corruption and democracy. The
differences between these regimes, however, are outweighed by their main similarity – the combination
of premodern and modern corruption, or rather of old particularism and new corruption. Unlike in traditional societies, where only a small group of people are above the law, in these regimes multiple groups
compete for this privileged position. Moreover, the unaccountable behaviour of rulers legitimates unlawful behaviour by citizens, and the distance between formal institutions (rule of law) and informal ones
(real practices) grows. In such a situation, democracy risks being discredited for good, and “captive states” are likely to result.
A special note should be made for the communist regime, which bred considerable corruption, though
it had explicit and extensive modernization goals. This occurred because the essential contradiction
embedded in the communist power structure, which allowed status groups such as the nomenklatura to
enjoy political and economical monopolies, subverted the regime’s modernizing designs. The communist
system created a “politocracy”, as power was the main instrument of allocating social rewards and political office was closely intertwined with social status, generating what Andrew Janos called a “modern version of the old tables of rank” (Janos 2000: 357). Examples of such status-holders during the communist
3. The phrase “Seize the state, seize the day”, belongs to Jeol Hellman. The model is described at
length in Migdal (1998).
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period ranged from the apparatchik, to the “director”, to the party member, to the civil servant or the state
in charge of distributing resources, always in short supply, to the members of any officially acknowledged
group, such as the Union of Writers and Journalists or even a sports club. As other sources of wealth and
forms of social stratification were gradually annihilated by communist regimes, status became the sole
foundation of social hierarchy, justifying Ken Jowitt’s label of “neo-traditionalism” (Jowitt 1992). It is
this original vicious distribution of influence, not democratization, that is to blame for the corruption we
encounter in post-communist societies.
In Western Europe and in North America, the historical process of building accountable government
and creating a politically neutral and professional civil service was generally lengthy and time-consuming
(Asmerom, Reis 1996). Depending on the historical context, various actors, from Swedish aristocrats, to
British financiers, to context, various actors, from Swedish aristocrats, to British financiers, to American
intellectuals, put forward assertive demands for professional and accountable government. These
demands for accountability led to changes in both formal and informal institutions. Thus in the third type
of regime, liberal democracy, the opportunities for corruption decrease and it becomes less common.
Once a balance of power has been achieved among social groups through an organic and gradual process,
universal rules and norms serve as significant constraints on major actors and their strategies within given
polity. Corruption does resurface, however, when accountability becomes weak or nonexistent (see, for
instance, the international government of Kosovo or the UN Oil-for-Food program).
Where the norm of universalism is not enforced and widely respected, democracy does not take root,
even if elections are held regularly; hence the significant association between the Freedom House (FH)
freedom score and the TI corruption perception index 4. In the 2000 World Values survey, people who
perceive more corruption within official ranks and a weak rule of law in their respective countries are also
the most democratic, endorsing democracy as the best form of government despite its imperfections. The
dissatisfaction of these citizens with the outcome of the democratic process seems therefore grounded in
the failure of their governments to provide, at a minimum, rule of law, and at a maximum, fair policy
making that does not favour certain groups over others 5.
2. Diagnosis, not just “anatomy”
In recent years, it has become fashionable for governments to invite international corruption-assessment missions and, at least rhetorically, to proclaim their commitment to curb corruption. The problem is
that both the assessment instruments (which result in a descriptive “anatomy of corruption”) and the
resulting anticorruption strategies seem to be simply replicated from one country to another. Donors
gather in grand anticorruption meetings, but they all result in the same stereotypical strategies. Impressive
efforts have been undertaken to formulate better theories of corruption, to develop comprehensive strategies to battle it, and to review anticorruption efforts around the world. Yet we still cannot properly diagnose corruption. A proper diagnosis means, that we understand the causes of a malady in the context of a
given organism. Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina famously opens with the observation that happy families are all
alike, while unhappy ones are each unhappy in their own way. A family therapist therefore has to solve
each riddle in its own terms.
4. Regression models conducted with democracy (FH score) as a dependent variable, and corruption
(TI score) and development (World Bank GNI) as independent variables (2004 data), then with corruption
as dependent and democracy as independent, controlling for development. The number of countries (191)
is the total number of countries where a TI corruption index is computed.
5. Based on the World Values Survey conducted by the European Values Study Group and the World
Values Survey Association. (Inter-university Consortium for Political and social Research [distributors],
2005). WVS models with subjective corruption (perception of how many officials are corrupted) as the
dependent variable, and the endorsement of the democratic regime, the satisfaction with the present
outcome of democracy, the satisfaction with performance of law and order agencies, and basic social
status controls, as the independents.
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To reach a proper diagnosis of corruption in a given society I suggest a qualitative strategy. Our goal
is to understand whether corruption is the exception or whether it is the norm. For each society, we must
ask: Are we dealing with modern corruption, where corruption is ‘the exception to the norm of universalisms’? Or are we dealing with particularism and a culture of privilege, where corruption itself is the
norm? Or, as it is frequently the case in the postcolonial world where the modern state was defectively
implanted on a traditional society, are we dealing with a combination of the two? If so, to what extent is
the government guided by universalist norms and to what extent is its main task to promote patronage and
cater to specific interest groups?
Direct and indirect indicators can be summoned to help answer these questions. What are the chances
of an excellent company winning a contract under a program such as Oil for Food if it is not networked
with either the UN or the Iraqi government? What is the likelihood of a contractor winning a bid for
public works if the owner is not related to anybody in the government distributing the funds? How many
of such companies have managed to win tenders in past years? Even when no domestic watchdog
monitors appointments to the public service of bids for public money, an analysis of past contracts
combined with minor investigatory work can establish the facts.
As a rule, status groups are not hidden. In fact, they are rather conspicuous and easy to identify. Who
owns the main TV networks? Who are the most influential publishers? What positions do their sons and
in-laws hold? Are they, by chance, ministers or members of Parliament? Are the same names always
present when goods are divided? A chart of the most influential people and their connections is more
telling than ten surveys on bribery, and can help us understand if corruption is the norm or the exception
in a given society. The diagnosis of particularism requires only minimal anthropological skills. If the
power brokers and gatekeepers are always the same, regardless of a change of government, they are
probably well-known, and local people will be able to identify them. The amateur anthropologist would
simply have to ask who is the person one should talk to in order to solve a problem in a given area.
There are also several indirect indicators that can contribute to the diagnosis of particularism:
• Persistence of widespread popular perceptions of government corruption despite changes in
government;
• Influential jobs being held by the same individuals or groups regardless of the outcome of elections;
• High political migration from opposition parties to the party in government;
• Widespread perception that politicians are above the law;
• A situation in which access to nearly every resource is intermediated by oligarchic networks;
• Failure to take legal action against even the most notoriously corrupt members of high-status
groups.
Although regimes based on particularism have many similarities, they also differ significantly from
one another. Particularism is not totalitarianism, and it can admit some degree of flexibility. Particularism’s ability to survive comes directly from its capacity to keep open minimal channels for upward
mobility – such as marrying into the right family or catering to the right patron- so that social entrepreneurs are more tempted to use those channels than to attempt to overthrow the whole system.
After a diagnosis of particularism, it is necessary to determine the degree to which a system is closed
or open. A closed particularism will generate more frustration, and thus is more vulnerable to a severe
crisis that will shake the whole system. A more open and flexible particularism, in which challengers are
accommodated and socialized into the rules of the game, is likely to be more resilient. This leads us to the
next important question: Are there regular losers from corruption, and is there anybody to speak on their
behalf? Also, are there credible actors to denounce corruption?
It is equally important to identify the nature of what exactly is being corrupted. Do we find distortions
of the universal pattern that the state should follow when treating its citizens? Do some companies benefit
from more tax exemptions than others? Do specific individuals enjoy privileges that are granted by the
government? Is the will of the voters being thwarted, or are public funds being diverted for private ends?
A related and important question is: What are the main spoils of corruption? Public influence is
always a currency, but is it the main currency? Are the state and everything in it, from offices to public
works, “privatized” informally by status groups and corrupted networks? In post-communist societies, the
state entered the transition as the overwhelmingly dominant actor in all realms of society. Therefore, the
state is often the principal agent of corruption in these countries, and the private sector is a fiction that
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predatory élites create in order to move to a more refined stage of public asset exploitation. In postcolonial societies, where the state is only one of the actors competing for control of the territory or the
economy, the principal actor may be found elsewhere, perhaps in the rebellious society, in foreign
business firms, or in neighbouring countries. There is an important qualitative difference between a state
bribed by a firm to provide a tax break and a state whose executives are also its main businesspeople who
gradually transform public assets into their private property (as is found in some post-Soviet states). In the
first case, police work might help. In the second, those who direct the police are themselves the guardians of
the corrupt system. In these cases, the system is also very likely to be organized hierarchically, much like a
criminal group, with those at the bottom collecting bribes that feed the upper levels of the governments.
In examining the nature of the spoils, one also must look at electoral corruption. The will of the voters
can be manipulated in many ways. In traditional systems in poor rural societies, resources are released by
gatekeepers in exchange for votes. In these societies, the voters have no choice. Their vote is a
commodity that they trade for their food, heating, or land. In more modern societies, voters can exercise
an autonomous will, and the choice rests with them. Campaign funds are needed to make a case to voters
in an open game of persuasion, but higher spending does not guarantee electoral success. American-style
campaign to finance legislation, which mostly regulates and exposes private contributions to campaigns,
is grossly irrelevant to countries where voters are illiterate and own no TVs. In these countries, the main
funding for political parties is public, and the chief commodity of the campaign is not private money (still
controlled by the state by various means) but rather administrative resources of every kind. Electoral
corruption varies greatly from Kazakhstan to Nigeria to the United States. It is a gross and frequent error
to think that the same solution might apply everywhere.
Freedom House scores offer some initial indication of whether a country is at the stage of competitive
particularism or liberal democracy. The distribution of power can be deduced from electoral history as
well as other events such as the sanctioning of a powerful and influential individual by a court. Power is
highly centralized in purely particularistic societies, disputed among groups vying for status in competitive particularistic ones, and relatively equally distributed in societies guided by the norms of universealism.
Determining “ownership” of the state is also helpful in diagnosing corruption. The World Bank has
developed an instrument to measure “state capture” versus state autonomy. But since it is based on
surveys of businesses, it does not answer all that we need to know about the nature of the state. We need
to trace the networks of power and privilege, to establish to what extent are public goods distributed
through such networks, and how thick, how closed, and how influential they are.
Polls can usually be trusted to determine the social acceptability of corruption. For example, do people
indicate in surveys that politicians, judges, and policemen stand above the law? We will find moderate
acceptance of corruption where particularism is the norm, low social acceptance in the phase of
competitive particularism, and very low acceptance in universalistic societies.
Measuring the distinction between the public and private spheres is more subtle, but indicators can be
easily found to determine whether there is no distinction (pure particularism), a poor distinction (competitive particularism), or a sharp distinction (universalism). Do executives in the public sector hire their
relatives? Are subordinates in the public sector used to help with the domestic affairs of their bosses?
A diagnosis of corruption needs to include both qualitative and quantitative elements. Quantitative instruments such as representative surveys, however, are more reliable for an analysis of the causes of
corrupt behaviour than for providing precise figures on its extent. For example, based on a European
Union survey conducted in the Balkans, it is possible to suggest that particularism is the rule of the game.
The analysis is based on cross tabulating the strategies that citizens employ to obtain a range of public
services and their satisfaction level with these services. The results show that only those who have some
important personal connections get satisfactory service. Those who lack such connections and are not
related to the right groups have to give bribes to get the needed resources, but this leaves them only
moderately satisfied. The great majority of people, who have no connections, must amass all of their
resources for one indispensable extra payment (for instance, to obtain surgery), and can afford to pay it
only once, or not at all 6. We must therefore determine whether corruption provides the means by which
6. Based on EU survey in five Balkan countries. See Mungiu-Pippidi (2005b: 49-68).
Anticorruption as revolution
205
whose who are low on influence and connections can buy access by means of a supra-tax. Do individuals
wind up paying more than others for normal treatment, or do they actually buy privilege? These are
critical distinctions, as in the former case building an anticorruption strategy based on a judicial
enforcement is certain to fail, while in the latter case it is indispensable.
3. Fighting corruption outside courts
It is often said that corruption is universal, that it has existed at all times and in every society, and that
it will persist as long as human nature does not change. This view blurs the crucial distinction between
corruption as a mode of social organization – particularism – and the occasional individual corruption,
that can indeed be found nearly everywhere. Electoral democracies cannot afford to blur this distinction,
however, as particularism can prevent consolidation into robust democracies. Most Western countries
fought the battle against particularism centuries ago, and they won. The case of American lobbyist Jack
Abramoff, who was convicted in 2006 of conspiracy to corrupt public officials, is illustrative: while it
shows that political and economic development does not bring about spectacular improvements in human
nature, it is proof that the system works and that culprits often do get caught regardless of their political
connections. The challenge is to ensure that emerging democracies succeed in doing what the Swedes
managed to do at the end of eighteenth century, and the British a century after: to build a government that
is both accountable and fair, and to construct societies that embrace universalism as the supreme principle
governing relations between the people and government, and among the people themselves.
The overall message of the anticorruption industry is that corrupt countries should replicate the
institutions of clean countries. Many countries, however, have adopted various Western institutions without affecting the core elements of particularism. The Ombudsmen, for example, which is a Scandinavian
institution that has been reproduced in many emerging democracies, has been largely unsuccessful, as the
historical process that promoted universalism at the expense of particularism in the Scandinavian
countries has not been replicated as well.
Thus it is important to identify the institutional triggers of such historical processes. In this light “best
practices” should include not only anticorruption legislation, but also anticorruption initiatives with
measurable results. There should we look for inspiration. If courts and legal battles against corruption are
conspicuously missing in this analysis, it is because in the countries I am concerned with, courts are not
autonomous from status groups, and legislation is frequently not implemented. Moreover, infringements
of the law are so widespread that solving corruption through the courts under conditions of competitive
particularism is simply impossible. Legal mechanisms can be effective only after the essentials of
particularism have been dismantled.
Who and what can stimulate change in the face of institutionalized particularism? The answer is not
obvious. Particularism cannot be fought by government – that is a contradiction in terms. Historically, it
has been the political opposition, civil society, or even enlightened despots who have promoted the
greatest strides forward. Populist parties, by contrast, have typically competed for power with anticorruption slogans, only to end up as corrupt as their predecessors. In many new democracies, as well as in
some older ones (the classic case is Italy), one can find status groups spanning the boundaries of political
parties and agreeing to divide the public sector among themselves. The term partitocrazia was coined
precisely to describe this situation.
The first step toward exiting the vicious cycle of particularism is to organize the losers in this system
against the status groups and the predatory elites – in other words, to build an insurrectional army. This
alliance should include not only idealists of civil society, but groups who stand to lose the most by
corruption. If churches and unions join NGOs and independent media, an effective alliance can be
formed. At least one political party should be lured into cooperation, creating incentives for other parties
to compete in proving who is cleaner. If democrats and civil society activists fail to embrace this cause,
nondemocrats, from right-wing populists to Islamists, will do so.
The second step is to institute the norms of universalism. The coalition should agree on some minimal
criteria for fairness and integrity in public life, and make them part of a full political program. These
criteria must be negotiated and widely debated across parties and with the government. Whether or not
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these criteria are incorporated in new legislation, they should be used to monitor top public servants and
politicians, and the results should be made public. If one or more political parties adopt the criteria and
promise to screen their members to comply with them, an important step forward will have been made,
and they should be given credit for their efforts.
The third step – and here international assistance is crucial – is to push for the adoption of some
“institutional weapons” that an anticorruption coalition or isolated anticorruption entrepreneurs can use.
This goal cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the government, but the implementation again
cannot be ensured without the active involvement of civil society. Besides transparency legislation, the
arsenal of “institutional weapons” includes the compulsory disclosure of wealth for politicians, civil
servants, and magistrates.
The final step is to create incentives for actors to “go clean”. These incentives are provided by
vigorous public monitoring and disclosure in circumstances which reproduce a sort of market mechanism,
such as elections, so that incentives for politicians to comply can be maximized. Using the institutional
weapons at hand, the “army” should try to unseat the status groups in politics or the professions by
waging disclosure campaigns and trying to end their monopoly of influence.
When are circumstances ripe for such insurrections against particularism? In situations where most
people are content with existing arrangements and do not feel that they personally have anything to lose
by corruption, you simply cannot fight particularism. Thus it is best to attack such systems during
economic crises or other periods of societal stress. A great political opportunity, such as joining the European Union for post-communist countries also provides a favourable environment, as European conditionality can also be invoked by domestic civil society fighting against particularism. In any case, civil
society is a more effective auditor and a more credible ombudsman than public institutions in such societies, and it should be supported financially so that it may perform these functions until the state becomes mature enough to take over.
There are also longer-term desiderates that can help to facilitate the success of anticorruption efforts,
showing that success can only come as a mix of domestic and international pressure:
• The international community should maintain strong external pressure for more accountability and
transparency.
• The dependence of citizens on the state should be addressed and gradually reduced by having
fewer employees on the public payroll, fewer resources directly controlled by the states, and so on.
• Mechanisms of free and fair competition should be built in each and every sector.
These non-exhaustive guidelines, inspired by a handful of successes on the ground, are not meant to
cast aside the vast arsenal of anticorruption tools that technical assistance programs can provide 7. Rather,
it is meant to warn against reliance on the wrong instruments for certain environments. An anticorruption
agency might work well in democratic Australia, with its tradition of an independent judiciary, but the
same kind of institution would fail to indict of arrest anybody who is “somebody” in the former Soviet
Union. The cooperation of governments is ideal if one can get it, but particularism cannot be fought by
relying on governments. There are no “win-win” anticorruption campaigns. Somebody stands to lose, and
in the societies we are most concerned with, those who stand to lose are on top. The fight against particularism in such societies is an intrinsic part of the greater modernization and democratization process. It
may at times look like civil war, but as the history of democracy shows, civil wars are sometimes needed
to advance the cause of accountable government.
7. This review is based on three very recent evaluations, including both success stories and failures:
Spector (2005); Tisne, Smilov (2004); Romanian coalition for a clean Parliament 2005: A quest for
political integrity, Polirom, Iasi, 2005.
Anticorruption as revolution
207
REFERENCES
Asmerom H.K., E.P. Resi (eds.) (1996), Democratization and bureaucratic neutrality, St. Martin’s Press,
New York.
Diamond L. (1999), Developing democracy. Towards consolidation, Johns Hopkins UP, Baltimore.
Janos A. (2000), East Central Europe in the modern world, Stanford UP, Palo Alto.
Jowitt K. (1992), New world disorder or the Leninist extinction, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Migdal J. (1998), Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in the
Third World, Princeton UP, Princeton.
Moore B. Jr. (1978), Injustice: The social bases of obedience and revolt, M.E. Sharpe, White Plains.
Mungiu-Pippidi A. (2005a), “The story of the Romanian coalition for a clean parliament”, Journal of
Democracy, 16: 154-155.
Mungiu-Pippidi A. (2005b), “Deconstructing Balkan particularism: The ambiguous social capital of
Southeastern Europe”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5: 49-68.
O’Donnell G. (1997), Illusions about consolidation, in L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, Y. Chu, H. Tien (eds.),
Consolidating the third wave democracies, John Hopkins UP, Baltimore.
Spector B.I. (ed.) (2005), Fighting corruption in developing countries: Strategies and analysis, Kumarian
Press, Bloomfield, Ct.
Tisne M., D. Smilov (2004), From the ground up: Assessing the record of anticorruption assistance in
Southeast Europe, Central European UP, Budapest.
Weber M. (1969), Economy and society III, Bedminster Press, New York.
World Bank (2000), Anticorruption in transition: A contribution to the policy debate, World Bank,
Washington.
IDENTITIES:
EUROPEAN WAYS TO LIVE THE NATIONALITY
Emanuele Gatti
International University Institute for European Studies - Gorizia
Abstract: The present article aims at analysing from a qualitative point of view the different meanings
that young transnational European professionals attribute to their national identity. Results show that it
is possible to identify two families of identity: monolayer, that is, a defined and exclusive national
identity, and multilayer, that is, various identities of different levels (local, national, supranational) which
live together. Moreover, it is possible to decline also these two families in subspecies. Interestingly,
people from the Eastern countries show a tendency towards monolayer identities.
Keywords: national identity, European professionals, high-skilled migration, expatriates, Expats, Euromovers
•−•−•
Introductions: States and nations in the globalised world
As many authors (inter alia Martinelli 1995; Vinci Giacchi 1995; Sassen 1996; Habermas 1998) note,
national state sovereignty has been decentralised and eroded: globalisation has put a number of vital
issues out of the single states range, requiring new multi-national institutions, while the increasing level
of complexity has pushed states towards a delegation of tasks to regional and local administrations.
Moreover, as well showed by the vast literature about globalisation, the improvements in transportation
and communication systems have changed the perception of distances, places and of the same globe. In
this context, the nationalistic idea of a clear and durable connection between a people and a place has
been put into question (Horowitz 1985; Hobsbawm 1990; Augé 1992; Hannerz 1996; Bonanate 2002),
while sovra-national forms of identity (European identity, cosmopolitism) are under analysis.
Globalisation creates the conditions that somehow make citizens of different areas of the globe feeling
involved in far events and even sharing the same emotions: «Military, political, economic and cultural
crises are increasingly defined as global crises; even relatively limited regional conflicts are seen as
global issues. Global society is beginning to be more than the sum of its parts; or, to be more precise,
more than a framework for the competition of its parts» (Shaw 1994: 14).
In other words, fragmentation, pluralism and the accent on differences on one side, and the movement
towards unity created by globalisation, the ecologic idea of being one only species on the Earth and the
human rights universalization on the other side are delegitimizing the idea of a democracy exclusively
coinciding with the national space: national states cannot be anymore the political arena highest level.
Moreover, in consequence of the feeling of proximity with very far people and of the spreading of
democratic universal values, a division among peoples based on an ascribed characteristic like the place
of birth becomes more and more anachronistic and arbitrary, as well as less and less appealing. Thus
Bonanate (1995: 26) can affirm that «if nation has had a historical ‘progressive’ function, it might have
exhausted it, and its path might be come to an end». Furthermore, Bonanate (1995) and Habermas (1998)
think that a democratic citizenship does not need to be enrooted in the national identity, as it can be based
on a set of (universally recognised) values.
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Despite of these claims, it is difficult to deny that the “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) still
have a great appeal on peoples, and that nationalism is having a renaissance everywhere, in the Western
countries too, often in the form of localism. But, as Hobsbawm (1990) explains, current nationalism is
not anymore a moving element of history, as it was during the 19th and part of the 20th century.
Hobsbawm’s position seems to be supported by the evidence that other senses of belonging are
acquiring importance to national identity detriment:
a) belonging to more private groups, like the genre, the ethnic group, the religious group, etc.; I would
call it private identity;
b) belonging to different layers of citizenship, from the local to the supra-national one; I would call it
multi-layer identity;
c) belonging to some conception of the world as a whole; I would call it cosmopolitan identity.
The multi-layer and the cosmopolitan identity, that is, the passage from a strictly national to a supranational identity find a strong boost in the present possibility, for millions of people, to directly (through
mobility) and indirectly (through media) experience the reality of other states. In particular, mobility has
been regarded by the European Union as a privileged instrument in order to support the risen of a
European identity, but the consequences of a period abroad are hardly predictable, as they depend on a
variety of factors. The only thing that seems to be sure is that the experience of the journey is able to
produce either a radicalisation or a transformation of travellers’ identities. “People found their self and the
sense of their place also considering themselves in contraposition with some place that somehow they feel
as very different” (Rose 1995: 72). In other words, using people from other countries as mirrors, mobile
individuals have the possibility to trace a differentiation between auto-identification (how I see myself)
and external identification (how others see me), this way gaining a deeper consciousness about their
national identity features. The final consequence of this process can be a reflexive process re-thinking the
national identity.
Data from Eurobarometer (2008a, 2008b, 2008c) surveys confirm year by year that the attachment to the
locality and to the country are strong and certainly much stronger than the attachment to the European Union.
Nevertheless, Eurobarometer’s surveys are of little help in understanding the possible new ways in
which individuals interpret their sense of belonging. Investigating individuals’ national identity selfperceptions with non-standard methods can throw light on the different ways people interpret their
attachment to their country. To do this, in the framework of a larger research dedicated to the analysis of
the intercultural interactions of European high-skilled migrants, the identity of young mobile European
professionals has been investigated 1.
1. Identity layers and high-skilled migrants identity
Analysing Brussels’ expatriates community (familiarly called Expats), it immediately catched one’s
eye the uniqueness of Expats’ profiles. The majority of my respondents had already travelled a lot,
showed a positive attitude towards displacements, seemed to have exceptional adaptation skills, are
multilingual and had a very high education level. This pushed me to treat them as a special type of young
mobile people, which I define Euromovers.
Euromovers do not face the same choice between an “or” and an “and” logic as traditional migrants,
1. 30 semi-structured in-depth interviews has been conducted among Brussels’ expatriates coming
from 25 European countries. Brussels, with its huge, multicultural concentration of high level migrants
from all over the world (familiarly called Expats), is the ideal place to study high skilled migration: in the
political centre of both the European Union and the NATO, expatriates related phenomena have a very
high intensity, this way being easily recognisable and analysable. Despite this, what is unique in Brussels
is not the presence of certain tendencies, but rather their intensity and their concentration. One of the
ideas that move the present work is that the most of the results which will be presented are highly
generalizable: similar phenomena, even though with local differences and on diverse scales, are very
likely to be found in every urban environment where a significant multicultural high level migrants
community is present.
Identities: European ways to live the nationality
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for three reasons: firstly, normally they are not compelled to move, but rather choose to do it, so they can
be occasionally homesick, or even nostalgic about their country, but do not need to exacerbate their
national culture features; secondly, they normally are abroad for limited periods, so they do not need to
renounce to their national culture; thirdly, they are high educated and usually able to reject any presumed
power differential between the origin and the host cultures. At the same time, living in a foreign country
may produce changes in their cultural identity. Consequently, what may happen is that the identity related
to their origin country becomes weaker, while some features of other identities are usually absorbed.
In order to better analyse the identity transformations that can happen to an Euromover through an
experience abroad, I will now propose a systematization of the different types of identity, based on the
diverse cases encountered among the interviewees. The table 1 illustrates this model, which is useful to
illustrate how cultural identity can be distributed according to some factors, like its intensity and the
object it focuses on (one or more states, one or more geographical areas).
Table 1 - Identity types
monolayer (or)
defensive
consolatory
horizontal
dominant
shifting
multilayer (and)
vertical
multilocal regional national
national
global
The monolayer identity, based on the “or” logic, can be of two kinds:
a. defensive: a strong exclusive national or local identity; in its highest degrees, it can manifest itself
in nationalistic and xenophobic positions; see for instance the following quotation:
There is a culture in each country so I think that member states should not lose their identity. We can
be together in the EU, but I don’t like this European identity, because the people will lose their national
identity and start to make everybody the same face. I don’t like that everybody has to know English,
because it’s important to have our own languages, but in many countries English is wide used, you can
see English words, but this way slowly you lose your national identity. National identity keeps the nations
together [interviewee from Hungary].
b. consolatory: a weak identity that arises when the individual is abroad, as an element of selfdefinition; it is based on a banal nationalism [Billig 1995], which manifests itself in outward
behaviours, like supporting the national soccer team; it normally arises when the person goes
abroad; see for instance the following quotation:
I tend to be more and more Swedish the more I stay outside Sweden. I think it’s quite common with
people here. I was watching the game against Denmark on Saturday, it was just a qualification game for
the Europeans, and I would have never watched a qualification back home, but here it’s a bit more…
going to my friends and cheer for Sweden. So I think you try to see your identity more when you are
outside your country and it becomes a bit more important for you [interviewee from Sweden].
The multilayer identity, based on the “and” logic, can be of seven kinds, distributed in two main categories:
1. horizontal: two identities of the same geographical level that live together;
c. dominant: a prevailing identity is mixed with some features of another identity; for example, a
person born and grown up in France, but with one German parent, can define himself a French
with an important German component;
d. shifting: a double national identity; having more identities, each one felt as equally important, the
individual skips from one to another; for example, a Romanian citizen emigrated to Belgium, who
feels Romanian in Romania and Belgian in Belgium;
2. vertical: two or more identities of different geographical level that live together, like in the following
example:
I am Spanish, but I am from Alicante. I have a bilingual community, and a slightly different culture.
This is something I know, but it doesn’t prevent me from saying that I am Spanish […] In Spain you
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know what we have: fragmentation. There are many people who would not say: “I am Spanish”, they
would say: “I am from Valencia”. I am Spanish, I am from Valencia, I am from Alicante and more locally
I am from my village. […] And I am not going to say European! [interviewee from Spain].
e. local: covers all the levels of the locality (village, town, sub-regional geographical area) up to the
regional level, like in the example above;
f. regional: covers the administrative regional level. In some cases it is ambiguous; for example, it is
not clear if Cataluña has to be considered as a regional or a national identity; moreover, regions are
not uniform internally; Italian regions, for instance, are divided by a number of parochialisms; in
other cases, reference can be made to areas which, being smaller than a nation state, does not
correspond to a single region:
Oh, well, I’m more Alpine than Austrian. I’m called Heidi, so... […] I’m proud of my roots because
they give me a lot of stability, but I’m also happy that I could come across it. As an Austrian identity... I
think you are really lucky when you are born as an Austrian, but as I told I feel more Alpine.
g. national: corresponds to the identification with a nation state;
h. multinational: for example the Scandinavian identity, the European identity, the Western identity:
I also identify myself a lot as from the East, for example in Spain I had a group of Czech and
Bulgarian friends, and we used to identify a lot like from the East: we knew the same things, the same
movies… [interviewee from Czech Republic].
i. global: corresponds to the perception that human beings are human beings everywhere, and that
cultural differences are weaker than the commonality created by human dignity and human
universal values and rights; such a kind of cosmopolitism can be integrated with an attachment to
narrower level of identity:
I would define myself like that I make of my place [the place I live in a certain moment of my life] my
home. […] you need to be conscious about where you are, to integrate where you are, but always keeping
in mind where you are from and what you left behind [interviewee from Spain].
[I see my national identity] As a Belgian. Part of the European Community, that is part of the world.
You have the feeling to be part of the world?
Yes. I have the feeling to be Belgian because I live in Belgium […]; when I am in Brussels I really
have the feeling to be part of the European Community and for me it’s a very important project […]. And
I’m part of the world also, because when I watch the news my life is influenced by what’s happening in
the world. I can’t say: “The rest of the world doesn’t matter”, […] what happens in the world has an
influence on my life, so I’m part of the world. And what I do can influence also the rest of the world.
How can you influence the rest of the world?
Because I’m part of something, I’m part of the European Community, and for example I’m working at
the university and the university is part of the European Association of all different universities, and it has
not a direct influence, but when you look afterwards, you can have consequences. Indirectly [interviewee
from Belgium].
Conclusions
On the basis of this model, it is now possible to analyse what kind of identity Euromovers show to feel:
a) only a minority of the interviewees have a local identity: they either have a strong national identity
or a multinational identity; this results allows to believe, generalising, that Euromovers’ global
horizon reduces the importance of locality in their self-perception;
b) more than a third of the interviewees have a multilayer identity, even though one of these layers
may be stronger than the others; in the most of the cases, this multilayer identity is multinational
(national + European), but in some cases it is shifting (national + national);
c) the interviewees from the East of Europe (with one exception) describe themselves in terms of an
Identities: European ways to live the nationality
213
exclusive national identity, what shows a tendency by the people from Eastern countries to have
exclusively a national identity;
d) half of the interviewees feel to some extent a European identity, but with important differences in
its nature and intensity;
e) only three respondents declare to be citizen of the world: the “global” identity is not widespread,
neither as a multilayer identity.
Generalising from these results, it is possible to affirm that Euromovers present two contradictory
tendencies:
1. a monolayer identity, usually a national one (only one interviewee identifies with his region rather
than with its state), prevails. In these cases, it seems that the Euromovers has very clear who he is and
where he is from, and that this very defined identity becomes a source of certainty to him. Such a
position is obviously accompanied by a rejection of the European identity, sometimes by the assumption of strong defensive positions. This tendency especially affects the people from Eastern Europe.
The fact that Eastern countries have been members only for a limited time respect to Western countries can explain this tendency: there, a European tradition has been affirming only in the last years,
and there is still little coincidence between the enthusiasm for the European project and the European
identity adoption. Europe, in fact, is broadly seen more as a source of economic opportunities than as
an ideal;
2. a multilayer identity is used to combine different and sometimes conflicting identities. In these cases,
Euromovers solve the problem of loyalty to the origin or to the host country by adopting an “and”
logic: some Euromovers shift from an identity to another one, others feel more than one belonging,
and others use broad labels, like the European one, to define themselves in addition to their national
identity. These tendency especially affects the people from the South of Europe.
An interesting notion that arises from this analysis is the reconciliation of a defensive monolayer
identity with a cosmopolite attitude of openness towards strangers. Euromovers may have a defined
identity and at the same time be interested in other identities. The contact with other cultures realised with
an attitude of openness usually leads to an identity change. Therefore it is true that Euromovers claim to
have a national identity, but this identity inevitably changes during the time. For example, the Lithuanian
interviewee lived in Italy for some years before she moved to Brussels and married a Spanish. She defines
herself as Lithuanian, but at the same time she admits that she would find difficult to go back to her
country. This means that, even though she still perceive herself as Lithuanian, her way to be such has
changed. This implies that even a monolayer identity is not stable and immutable; on the contrary, it can
be lived and perceived in different ways during the lifetime.
Another important conclusion supported by the collected data is that, no matter which identity a
person chooses, everyone needs to belong to one place, making of it his home. Those interviewees who
have not a precise identity make a great effort to define themselves by recognising in something: those
who do not have a precise national identity, for example, recognise in all the places where they have been,
or recognise in a more inclusive identity, like the European or the Western one. Therefore, it seems that
cultural identity is necessary for self-definition and even for self-perception. None of the interviewees is
satisfied with an exclusive global belonging, that is, with the idea that he is just a human being. Some
interviewees mention the fact that they are citizen of their nation, which is part of Europe, which is part of
the world, but they always go from the smallest to the biggest: they are from their state, then they are
from Europe and are citizen of the world. Marías [1980: 157] writes: «There is not a purely human reality, undifferentiated, to which you add at a certain point a difference. This is definitely a false scheme
[…]. There is nothing in the human that is just human, undifferentiated, neutral».
He follows a famous Joseph de Maistre claiming: «“In the course of my life”, he said, “I have seen
Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a Persian. But as
for man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, he is unknown to me”. Maistre’s
observation provides the basis for sociology» (Ossewaarde 2007: 367).
If we accept this position, it is not just that everyone needs to be defined by a number of characteristics, among which the provenience is an essential one, but also that everyone is defined by a number of
characteristics. As the majority of the individuals come from one place, and are defined by this prove-
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nience, it seems that those who do not have a marked and immediately recognisable identity create their
own one. This way they identify a place that they recognise as their home, they choose their home.
In this sense, I can affirm that identity, in a postmodern way, is the result of a choice. Identity can be
modelled, can be adapted to individual self-definition exigencies during the time and according to the
space or the cultural environment one is in. So everyone is from somewhere, but to define this where is a
personal decision.
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