Manifesto - Computer Science

Transcription

The
Onlife
Initiative
An initiative
of the
Stefana Broadbent
Nicole Dewandre
Charles Ess
Luciano Floridi
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
Mireille Hildebrandt
Yiannis Laouris
Claire Lobet-Maris
Sarah Oates
Ugo Pagallo
Judith Simon
May Thorseth
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Onlife, the Public(s) and Legal Protection by Design -
Contents
The Onlife Manifesto
Mireille Hildebrandt 3
Rethinking the Human Condition in a Hyperconnected Era
Commentaries
11
Why Freedom is not about Sovereignty but about Beginnings -
The Onlife Initiative - Background
26
Nicole Dewandre
Hyperconnectivity
35
Designing the Public Sphere: Information Technologies
and the Politics of Mediation - Peter-Paul Verbeek
Hyperhistory and the Philosophy oF Information Policies Luciano Floridi
36
View and exemples on Hyper-connectivity - Jean-Gabriel Ganascia
50
Identity, selfhood and attention
The need for an Onlife Manifesto - Sarah Oates
For a Grey Ecology - Claire Lobet-Maris - Stefana Broadbent
98
May Thorseth
Reengineering - The Concept of Life and Reinventing
in the Digital Era - Yiannis Laouris
115
Complexity, responsibility and governance
134
Distributed Epistemic Responsibility in a Hyperconnected Era Judith Simon
135
Good Onlife Governance: On Law, Spontaneous Orders, and Design Ugo Pagallo
The public sphere in a computational era 208
220
Public Use of Reason: In reality, virtuality or fictitionality? -
The Onlife Manifesto Philosophical Backgrounds Media Usages and
73
184
From Creative Commons to Civilized Commons:
72
the Futures of Democracy and Equality - Charles Ess
169
152
168
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236
The Onlife Initiative - Conclusion
247
Biographies of the Authors
249
The
Onlife
Manifesto
An initiative
of the
Being Human in a
Hyperconnected Era
Contents1
Preface
Preface
4
The Manifesto
5
Game Over for Modernity? 5
as it modifies our relationships to ourselves, to others and to the world.
In the Corner of Frankenstein and Big Brother 6
The ever-increasing pervasiveness of ICTs shakes established reference
Dualism is dead! Long live Dualities!
7
The deployment of information and communication technologies (ICTs)
and their uptake by society affect radically the human condition, insofar
frameworks through the following transformations1:
Control and Complexity
7
a. the blurring of the distinction between reality and virtuality;
Public and Private
8
b. the blurring of the distinctions between human, machine and nature;
Proposals to better serve policies c. the reversal from information scarcity to information abundance; and
9
The Relational Self
9
Becoming a Digitally Literate Society
9
Caring for Our Attentional Capabilities
10
d. the shift from the primacy of entities to the primacy of interactions.
The world is grasped by human minds through concepts: perception is necessarily mediated by concepts, as if they were the interfaces through which
reality is experienced and interpreted. Concepts provide an understanding of
surrounding realities and a means by which to apprehend them. However, the
current conceptual toolbox is not fitted to address new ICT-related challenges
and leads to negative projections about the future: we fear and reject what
we fail to make sense of and give meaning to.
1 The information and views set out in this text are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the
use which may be made of the information contained therein. Reproduction is authorised
provided the source is acknowledged.
1 Those transformations are fully described in the Onlife Background Note, pp.26-34 of the
present volume.
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The Manifesto
In order to acknowledge such inadequacy and explore alternative conceptualisations, a group of scholars in anthropology, cognitive science, computer
science, engineering, law, neuroscience, philosophy, political science, psycho-
Game Over for Modernity?
logy and sociology, instigated the Onlife Initiative, a collective thought
Ideas that hinder policy making’s ability to tackle the challenges of a
exercise to explore the policy-relevant consequences of those changes. This
hyperconnected era
concept reengineering exercise seeks to inspire reflection on what happens to
us and to re-envisage the future with greater confidence.
1.1 Philosophy and literature have long challenged and revised some founThis Manifesto aims to launch an open debate on the impacts of the compu-
dational assumptions of modernity. However, the political, social, legal, scien-
tational era on public spaces, politics and societal expectations toward poli-
tific and economic concepts and the related narratives underlying policy-
cymaking in the Digital Agenda for Europe’s remit. More broadly, this Mani-
making are still deeply anchored in questionable assumptions of modernity.
festo2
Modernity has indeed – for some or many – been an enjoyable journey, and
aims to start a reflection on the way in which a hyperconnected world
calls for rethinking the referential frameworks on which policies are built.
it has borne multiple and great fruits in all walks of life. It has also had its
downsides. Independently of these debates, it is our view that the constraints
and affordances of the computational era profoundly challenge some of
modernity’s assumptions.
1.2 Modernity has been the time of a strained relationship between humans
and nature, characterised by the human quest to crack nature’s secrets while
at the same time considering nature as a passive endless reservoir. Progress
was the central utopia, coupled with the quest for an omniscient and omnipotent posture3. Developments in scientific knowledge (thermodynamics,
2 The content of this initiative does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the
members of the Onlife group.
3 By posture, we mean the dual notion of stance and posing, or, in other words, of occupying
a position and being seen occupying it.
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electromagnetism, chemistry, physiology…) brought about an endless list
rethinking the worldviews and metaphors underlying modern political struc-
of new artefacts in all sectors of life. Despite the deep connection between
tures.
artefacts and nature, an alleged divide between technological artefacts and
nature continues to be assumed. The development and deployment of ICTs
In the Corner of Frankenstein and Big Brother
have contributed enormously to blurring this distinction, to the extent that
Fears and risks in a hyperconnected era
continuing to use it as if it were still operational is illusory and becomes
counterproductive.
2.1 It is noteworthy that Cartesian doubt, and related suspicions about what
1.3 Rationality and disembodied reason were the specifically modern attri-
is perceived through human senses, have led to an ever-increasing reliance
butes of humans, making them distinct from animals. As a result, ethics was
on control in all its forms. In modernity, knowledge and power are deeply
a matter of rational and disembodied autonomous subjects, rather than a
linked to establishing and maintaining control. Control is both sought and
matter of social beings. And responsibility for the effects brought about by
resented. Fears and risks can also be perceived in terms of control: too much
technological artefacts was attributed to their designer, producer, retailer or
of it – at the expense of freedom – or lack of it – at the expense of secu-
user. ICTs challenge these assumptions by calling for notions of distributed
rity and sustainability. Paradoxically, in these times of economic, financial,
responsibility.
political, and environmental crisis, it is hard to identify who has control of
what, when, and within which scope. Responsibilities and liabilities are hard
1.4 Finally, modern worldviews and political organisations were pervaded
to allocate clearly and endorse unambiguously. Distributed and entangled
by mechanical metaphors: forces, causation and, above all, control had a
responsibilities may wrongly be understood as a license to act irresponsibly;
primary importance. Hierarchical patterns were key models for social order.
these conditions may further tempt business and governmental leaders to
Political organisations were represented by Westphalian States, exerting
postpone difficult decisions and thereby lead to loss of trust.
sovereign powers within their territory. Within such States, legislative, executive and judiciary powers were deemed to balance each other and protect
2.2 Experiencing freedom, equality and otherness in public spheres becomes
against the risk of power abuse. By enabling multi-agent systems and
problematic in a context of increasingly mediated identities and calculated
opening new possibilities for direct democracy, ICTs destabilize and call for
interactions such as profiling, targeted advertising, or price discrimination.
The quality of public spheres is further undermined by increasing social
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Control and Complexity
control through mutual or lateral surveillance (souveillance), which is not
necessarily better than “big brother” surveillance, as increasingly cyberbullying shows.
3.2 In the onlife-world, artefacts have ceased to be mere machines simply
operating according to human instructions. They can change states in auto-
2.3 The abundance of information may also result in cognitive overload,
nomous ways and can do so by digging into the exponentially growing wealth
distraction, and amnesia (the forgetful present). New forms of systemic
of data, made increasingly available, accessible and processable by fast-de-
vulnerabilities arise from the increasing reliance on informational infrastruc-
veloping and ever more pervasive ICTs. Data are recorded, stored, computed
tures. Power games in online spheres can lead to undesirable consequences,
and fed back in all forms of machines, applications, and devices in novel
including disempowering people, through data manipulation. The repartition
ways, creating endless opportunities for adaptive and personalised environ-
of power and responsibility among public authorities, corporate agents, and
ments. Filters of many kinds continue to erode the illusion of an objective,
citizens should be balanced more fairly.
unbiased perception of reality, while at the same time they open new spaces
for human interactions and new knowledge practices.
Dualism is dead! Long live Dualities!
3.3 Yet, it is precisely at the moment when an omniscience/omnipotence
Grasping the challenges
posture could be perceived as attainable that it becomes obvious that it is
a chimera, or at least an ever-moving target. The fact that the environment
is pervaded by information flows and processes does not make it an omnis-
3.1 Throughout our collective endeavour, a question kept coming back to the
cient/omnipotent environment. Rather, it calls for new forms of thinking
front stage: “what does it mean to be human in a hyperconnected era?” This
and doing at multiple levels, in order to address issues such as ownership,
foundational question cannot receive a single definitive answer, but addres-
responsibility, privacy, and self-determination.
sing it has proven useful for approaching the challenges of our times. We
think that handling these challenges can best be done by privileging dual
3.4 To some extent, complexity can be seen as another name for contingency.
pairs over oppositional dichotomies.
Far from giving up on responsibility in complex systems, we believe that
there is a need to re-evaluate received notions of individual and collective responsibility. The very complexity and entanglement of artefacts and
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humans invite us to rethink the notion of responsibility in such distributed
the distinction when expressed in spatial and dualistic terms. The Internet is
socio-technical systems.
an important extension of the public space, even when operated and owned
by private actors. The notions of fragmented publics, of third spaces, and of
3.5 Friedrich Hayek’s classical distinction between kosmos and taxis, i.e.,
commons, and the increased focus on use at the expense of ownership all
evolution vs. construction, draws a line between (supposedly natural) spon-
challenge our current understanding of the public-private distinction.
taneous orders and human (political and technological) planning. Now that
artefacts taken globally have come to escape human control, even though
3.7 Nevertheless, we consider this distinction between private and public to
they originated in human hands, biological and evolutionary metaphors can
be more relevant than ever. Today, the private is associated with intimacy,
also apply to them. The ensuing loss of control is not necessarily dramatic.
autonomy, and shelter from the public gaze, while the public is seen as the
Attempts to recover control in a compulsive and unreflexive manner are an
realm of exposure, transparency and accountability. This may suggest that
illusory challenge and are doomed to fail. Hence, the complexity of interac-
duty and control are on the side of the public, and freedom is on the side of
tions and density of information flows are no longer reducible to taxis alone.
the private. This view blinds us to the shortcomings of the private and to the
Therefore, interventions from different agents in these emerging socio-tech-
affordances of the public, where the latter are also constituents of a good
nical systems require learning to distinguish what is to be considered as
life.
kosmos-like, i.e., as a given environment following its evolutional pattern,
and what is to be considered as taxis-like, i.e., within reach of a construction
3.8 We believe that everybody needs both shelter from the public gaze and
responding effectively to human intentions and/or purposes.
exposure. The public sphere should foster a range of interactions and engagements that incorporate an empowering opacity of the self, the need for
self-expression, the performance of identity, the chance to reinvent oneself,
Public and Private
as well as the generosity of deliberate forgetfulness.
3.6 The distinction between public and private has often been grasped in
spatial and oppositional terms: the home versus the agora, the private
company versus the public institution, the private collection vs. the public
library, and so forth. The deployment of ICTs has escalated the blurring of
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Proposals to better serve policies
derive from and aspire to relationships and interactions with other selves,
Conceptual Shifts with Policy-relevant Consequences for a Good Onlife
technological artefacts, and the rest of nature. As such, human beings are
Governance
“free with elasticity”, to borrow an economic notion. The contextual nature of
human freedom accounts both for the social character of human existence,
and the openness of human behaviours that remain to some extent stub-
The Relational Self
bornly unpredictable. Shaping policies in the remit of the Onlife experience
means resisting the assumption of a rational disembodied self, and instead
4.1 It is one of the paradoxes of modernity that it offers two contradictory
stabilising a political conception of the self as an inherently relational free
accounts of what the self is about. On the one hand, in the political realm,
self.
the self is deemed to be free, and “free” is frequently understood as being
autonomous, disembodied, rational, well-informed and disconnected: an indi-
Becoming a Digitally Literate Society
vidual and atomistic self. On the other hand, in scientific terms, the self is an
object of enquiry among others and, in this respect, is deemed to be fully
analysable and predictable. By focusing on causes, incentives, or disincen-
4.3 The utopia of omniscience and omnipotence often entails an instrumental
tives in an instrumental perspective, this form of knowledge often aims at
attitude towards the other, and a compulsion to transgress boundaries and
influencing and controlling behaviours, on individual and collective levels.
limits. These two attitudes are serious hurdles for thinking and experien-
Hence, there is a constant oscillation between a political representation of
cing public spheres in the form of plurality, where others cannot be reduced
the self, as rational, disembodied, autonomous and disconnected, on the one
to instruments, and where self-restraint and respect are required. Policies
hand, and a scientific representation of the self, as heteronomous, and resul-
must build upon a critical investigation of how human affairs and political
ting from multifactorial contexts fully explainable by the range of scientific
structures are deeply mediated by technologies. Endorsing responsibility in
disciplines (social, natural and technological), on the other hand.
a hyperconnected reality requires acknowledging how our actions, perceptions, intentions, morality, even corporality are interwoven with technologies
4.2 We believe that it is time to affirm, in political terms, that our selves are
in general, and ICTs in particular. The development of a critical relation to
both free and social, i.e., that freedom does not occur in a vacuum, but in
technologies should not aim at finding a transcendental place outside these
a space of affordances and constraints: together with freedom, our selves
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mediations, but rather at an immanent understanding of how technologies
and the right to focus our own attention is a critical and necessary condition
shape us as humans, while we humans critically shape technologies.
for autonomy, responsibility, reflexivity, plurality, engaged presence, and a
4.4 We have found it useful to think of re-evaluating these received notions
sense of meaning. To the same extent that organs should not be exchanged
and developing new forms of practices and interactions in situ in the
on the market place, our attentional capabilities deserve protective treat-
following phrase: “building the raft while swimming”.
ment. Respect for attention should be linked to fundamental rights such as
privacy and bodily integrity, as attentional capability is an inherent element
of the relational self for the role it plays in the development of language,
Caring for Our Attentional Capabilities
empathy, and collaboration. We believe that, in addition to offering informed
choices, the default settings and other designed aspects of our technologies
4.5 The abundance of information, including “big data” developments, induce
should respect and protect attentional capabilities.
major shifts in conceptual and practical terms. Earlier notions of rationality
presumed that accumulating hard-won information and knowledge would
4.7 In short, we assert that more collective attention should be paid to atten-
lead to better understanding and thereby control. The encyclopaedic ideal is
tion itself as a inherent human attribute that conditions the flourishing of
still around, and the focus remains primarily on adapting our cognitive capa-
human interactions and the capabilities to engage in meaningful action in
cities by expanding them in hopes of keeping up with an ever-growing infos-
the onlife experience.
phere. But this endless expansion is becoming ever less meaningful and less
efficient in describing our daily experiences.
This Manifesto is only a beginning…
4.6 We believe that societies must protect, cherish and nurture humans’
attentional capabilities. This does not mean giving up searching for improvements: that shall always be useful. Rather, we assert that attentional capabilities are a finite, precious and rare asset. In the digital economy, attention
is approached as a commodity to be exchanged on the market place, or to
be channelled in work processes. But this instrumental approach to attention
neglects the social and political dimensions of it, i.e., the fact that the ability
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Commentaries
To the
Onlife
Manifesto
In view of allowing to position him or herself relatively to the Manifesto, members had the possibility
to write Commentaries on the Manifesto. This generates a cloud of nuances and unveils the multiple
perspectives under which this text can be read and understood.
An initiative
of the
Luciano Floridi
Charles Ess
Claire Lobet-Maris
Yiannis Laouris
May Thorseth
Luciano Floridi
responsibility and co–responsibility are generating new challenges. Clearly,
there is much need for understanding the new phenomenon of so-called
§0.1 The transformations mentioned in this paragraph may be understood in
“distributed morality” (Floridi forthcoming).
terms of a fourth revolution (Floridi 2012) in our philosophical anthropology.
After Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud (or neuroscience, if one prefers), ICTs
§2.1 Modernity is also a pedagogical project: the intellectualistic (as in
(that is, Turing), are casting new light on our self-understanding.
Socratic intellectualism: the view that people make mistakes because they do
not know better) idea that more information (of all kinds, theoretical, techno-
§1.1 It may be preferable to speak of a informational era rather than a
logical, practical, etc., see the editorial project of the Encyclopédie) will lead
computational era, because it is the increasingly pervasive and ever more
to more learning, which in turn will lead to improved choices, and hence to a
important life-cycle of information (from creation through management, to
progressive amelioration of the human condition (Floridi forthcoming).
use and consumption, (Floridi 2010) that deeply affect both individual and
societal well-being. In a technical sense, computers and computation are
§3.1 What seems to be lacking, in affluent societies, is the fundamental enga-
only part of this wider phenomenon.
gement with the human project: the increasing amount of leisure appears to
find our culture unprepared. It is as if, having worked hard to gain the right to
§1.2 There are much more nuanced and balanced interpretations of Moder-
be on vacation, humanity might then be uncritically unprepared to make the
nity as a historical and cultural phenomenon, but the point here is not to
most of its most precious resource, time. Technologies are used to save time
offer a scholarly interpretation of a stage in the history of ideas. Rather, I
first, and then to kill it. So one of the pressing political questions that we are
understand the word “modernity” in the manifesto as a sort of philosophical
facing in advanced information societies is: what sort of human project are
portmanteau (or linguistic blend) that combines into one word the bundle of
we working on?
concepts/phenomena discussed in this and the following sections.
§3.2 The reader interested in knowing more about the idea of onlife may
§1.3 Paradoxically, the more ICTs advance, the more humanity appears
wish to consult (Floridi 2007).
responsible for how things go in the world – also in terms of forecasting and
prevention of consequences and future event – and yet, the more difficult
§3.6 The distinction between public and private will probably need to be
it becomes to identify specific sources of responsibility. Increasing levels of
re-conceptualised, because frameworks based on physical boundaries (the
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ever pervasive analogy of trespassing) and possession (the equally pervasive
also a serious risk of missing them. In the same way as we lack a post-West-
analogies of ownership and theft) are out-dated conceptual models, insofar
phalian way of approaching politics, likewise we are still missing a post–
as they are linked to a modern or “Newtonian” metaphysics based on inert
Guttenberg way of approaching pedagogy. The difficulty is further exacer-
things and mechanical interactions (Floridi 2011, forthcoming).
bated by the mental constrain imposed by the overbearing presence of the
book for so many centuries, which makes it hard to consider alternative
§4.1 The reader interested in knowing more about the idea of the relational
forms of education (think for example of the written assessment procedure);
self may wish to consult (Floridi 2011).
and by the omnipresence of ICTs, which constantly distract our reflection into
believing that the real issue concerns which technical solutions are or will be
§4.4 The phrase “Building the raft while swimming” is meant to emphasise
more feasible to manage learning processes involving digital natives, when in
the radical nature of the philosophical task ahead of us, rather than stressing
fact the fundamental problem is not how but what: what kind of knowledge
any anti-foundationalist philosophy. Understanding philosophy as conceptual
will be required and expected when living onlife.
design (Floridi forthcoming) means giving up not on its foundationalist vocation, but rather on the possibility of outsourcing its task to any combination
§4.6 What is ultimately finite, precious, not-renewable, and unsharable is
of logico-mathematical and empirical approaches. This was not Nueurath’s
actually time. When talking about finite attentional resources, we should also
intention, when he first introduced the metaphor of the raft in the 1930s. As
be concerned with the attention–time dedicated to something, because that
he wrote (p. 201 of (Neurath 1959)): “There is no way of taking conclusively
is neither boundless nor replaceable.
established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences.
No tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the
References
open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there
out of the best materials. Only the metaphysical elements can be allowed to
vanish without trace. Vague linguist conglomerations always remain in one
Floridi, Luciano. 2007. A look into the future impact of ICT on our lives. The
way or another as components of the ship.”
Information Society 23 (1): 59-64.
Floridi, Luciano. 2010. Information - A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
§4.5 Rethinking and developing new forms of education are certainly among
University Press.
the most exciting challenges of our time. There are great opportunities, but
- 13 -
Floridi, Luciano. 2011. The Informational Nature of Personal Identity. Minds
and Machines 21 (4): 549-566.
Floridi, Luciano. 2011. The Philosophy of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Floridi, Luciano. 2012. Turing’s Three Philosophical Lessons and the Philosophy of Information. Philosophical Transactions A (370): 3536-3542.
Floridi, Luciano. forthcoming. The Ethics of Distributed Morality. Science and
Engineering Ethics.
Floridi, Luciano. forthcoming. The Ethics of Information. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Neurath, Otto. 1959. “Protocol Sentences.” In Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer.
Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 199-208.
- 14 -
history, which was centered on the Western Europe and Americas, the
end of a type of philosophy and to the end of a social and economical
1. A careful attention to some aspects of the present society shows that
environment that was characterized by the illusion that knowledge itself
most of the concrete impacts of the computational era on the public
could lead to a perfect and total control of the nature. Does it mean that
space have been unexpected. This does not only mean that the compu-
we are entering in an epoch that some philosophers of the eighties and
ters and networks has proliferated faster than imagined before, but also
nineties, like Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard, have qualified
that the type of social consequences of these developments – e.g. social
as “post-modernity”? That is an open question that certainly deserves a
networks, micro-blogging, wikis, high-frequency trading etc. – have very
careful attention and some extensive discussions, which go far beyond
often been far away from the conceptions that many warned people had
the purpose of this manifesto.
before. As a consequence, policymakers need not only to be open to the
future developments of technologies and to their social effects, but also
3. My third comment is about first sentence of §2.1 that says “It is
to prepare to be surprised by the future.
noteworthy that Cartesian doubt, and related suspicions about what is
perceived through human senses, have led to an ever-increasing reliance
2. Undoubtedly, modernity is rooted in the “Modern Age”, even if it is far
on control in all its forms”. Obviously, it is not to throw out the baby with
more than a temporal era. As such, it begins at the end of the “Middle
the bath water.
Ages” that corresponds either to 1453, with the conquest of Constantinople, or to 1492, with the first travel of Columbus to the Americas.
The doubt, as introduced by Descartes, and all the suspicions about
Besides, modernity relates also to the Enlightenment philosophy, since
what is perceived, have contributed to build and to think the “conscious
the late 16th century, which put emphasis more on the results of expe-
self”. For instance, the Husserlian phenomenology is rooted on such a
rimental sciences than on the respect of traditional authorities. Lastly,
doubt, which corresponds to a crucial moment in the reflection. This is
modernity corresponds to the social and industrial development that
not directly related with the “ever-increasing reliance on control”, which
originated in the 18 century in Western Europe, especially in Great
is a consequence of the rationalization of the processes of production in
Britain, and that was characterized by the rationalization of the produc-
19th century modernity. To address this point, we need to distinguish the
tion processes. From this respect, the end of modernity that we affirm
reason from what Horkheimer calls, in the Eclipse of Reason, the th
in this manifesto corresponds simultaneously to the end of a period of
- 15 -
“instrumental reason”, which is characterized as “means to an end” and
which leads the reason to collapse into irrationality.
4. We say, in §4.2, “We believe it is time to acknowledge, in political terms,
that our selves are both free and social”. That is obviously true, but, in
itself, this idea is not new. For instance, during the French revolution, the
opposition between the Montagnards, whose most prestigious representative were Marat, Danton and Robespierre, and the Girondins corresponded exactly to the tension between an aspiration to social on the one
hand and an aspiration to freedom and economical development on the
other hand. However, the way this tension between freedom and fraternity is resolved depends on the technological artifacts that mediate our
interactions, which explain its particular twist in the present world.
- 16 -
Charles Ess
approaches to protecting more traditional notions of privacy in these
strikingly new technological and sociological landscapes. This can be
1. The shift towards a more relational self at least partly explains our
done - contra technological determinists who insist that individual privacy
increasing openness to what earlier were seen as unacceptable intru-
will inevitably disappear from online environments. So, for example, the
sions on strongly individual notions of privacy – i.e., the various ways in
recently amended EU ePrivacy Directive requires an “opt-in” approach
which we willingly engage in lateral and voluntary forms of surveillance
to website users. Rather than simply accepting without explicit notice,
through social media such as social networking sites (Facebook), micro-
much less consent, that a website records the visitor’s IP address, inserts
blogs (Twitter), publicly shared sites for audio-video uploads (YouTube),
tracking cookies in the visitor’s browser, initiates scripts and APIs that
etc.
facilitate the development of extensive databases that provide a richly
detailed account of the individual visitor’s online activities, etc. – the
At the same time, these shifts are complex and non-linear. First of all,
legislation requires websites to explicitly inform visitors of such actions
such shifts should not be taken to mean that young people in Western
and to request their explicit consent to doing so. While Google and others
societies are somehow giving up on individual privacy. On the contrary,
in the U.S. have reacted to these new rules by arguing it will “break the
by some accounts at least, they continue to insist upon
it.1
Internet”2 - so far, at least, mine still seems to be working just fine.
Moreover, as
I elaborate more fully in my chapter, Stine Lomborg’s work shows that
what emerges in online venues are “personal spaces” that are neither
As Andrew Feenburg has documented so clearly, using examples ranging
purely private in an exclusively individual way nor purely public (i.e., as if
from the steam engine to the Minitel in France, the introduction of new
individual privacy no longer mattered at all). Individual privacy interests
technologies always brings new risks – sometimes fatal ones, as in the
are hence alive and well in the age of the relational self.
case of steam engines that were flimsily made and thus frequently
exploded, injuring and killing those nearby. But rather than accepting the
2. Especially if these first remarks are accurate – there emerges here a
manufacturers’ claims that safer engines would be too expensive, etc. –
renewed and perhaps increased burden on policy makers to develop
eventually, and only after several thousand deaths, popular demand for
1 danah boyd and Alice Marwick. Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes,
Practices, and Strategies. “A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the
Internet and Society,” Oxford Internet Institute. Sept. 22, 2011.
2 John Gapper. 2012. Google protests at EU privacy rules draft. Financial Times, January 27,
2012.
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regulation grew to the point that it was introduced, and successfully so.3
By these lights, well-informed regulatory approaches, especially when
coupled with “digital literacy” approaches – e.g., those suggested by the
EU Kids Online project4 - have every reasonable chance of achieving
improved levels of safety, beginning with privacy protection.
3. We must be cautious about common calls for “direct democracy” via ICTs.
Such calls refer to plebiscite conceptions and have a long history in electronic media, e.g., with visions of “instant voting” via TV, etc. Such plebiscite conceptions, however, suffer well-known problems, beginning with
the dangers of the tyranny of the majority. To offset these risks, most
theorists enjoin some version of pluralistic and/or communitarian democracy, as part of representative democracy more broadly.5 We should not
let the technological affordances of ICTs – e.g., the broad-scale capacity
to gather and register opinions and preferences – overwrite our political
theories unawares.
3 Andrew Feenburg. Between Reason and Experience, p. 21. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
4 See: N. Sonck, S. Livingstone, E. Kuiper and J. de Haan. (2011) Digital literacy and safety
skills. EU Kids Online, EU Kids Online Network, London, UK.
5 As a start: Jeffrey Abramson, Christopher Arterton, and Gary Orren. The Electronic
Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics. New York:
Basic Books, 1988.
- 18 -
Claire Lobet-Maris
The complexity of IT systems, their globalization lead to distributed and
entangled responsibilities but also to a procedural inflation and a means-
“Men in plural […] can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk
ends confusion with all the cohorts of buzz politico-managerial words as effi-
with and make sense to each other and themselves.” (H. Arendt, the Human
cacity, transparency, accountability, competitiveness, quality and excellence
Condition)
leading to what Ch. Taylor describes as the ‘eclipse of goals’ (l’éclipse des
fins)
The plurality question and its contemporary fragility were my green line
when reading the Manifesto. The computational era challenges the condi-
The attention to the others, wonderfully approached by Goffman as the
tions of the plurality in many ways.
central human condition for an ‘engaged presence’ is also more and more
challenged by the ‘economy of attention’, attention being considered as the
The IT epistemological membranes (search engines, social networks, intelli-
central competitive factor structuring the exchange.
gent agents…), ever more complex that filters our relationships to the world,
to the others and to ourselves, lead to an extreme individualization and
If we take virtuality as ‘distanciation’, then what happens today is not a revo-
opacity of our human experiences and challenge the true conditions of men
lution but just a step forwards in the process of separation between men and
in plural. As well addressed by Virilio, this virtuality challenges our sense of
their human experiences, men and the others already observed by Arendt
orientation regarding alterity (the other)… and It is obvious that this loss of
when reading the ‘industrial revolution’.
orientation, this non-situation, is going to usher a deep crisis which will affect
society and hence, democracy.
Let us conclude this commentary on the Manifesto by a short quotation in
French, plurality obliges. “… Dans le monde moderne, ce qui est antagonique
The digitalization of our life, the injunction to be always “on” and visible
du politique n’est plus tant le privé que le social, ou le socio-économique qui
means also that there is no more shelter, intimate sanctuary to retreat from
s’étend démesurément… Dans le social, tout s’exhibe mais personne n’ap-
the regard of all and from the agitation of the world, this private sphere
paraît. Dans le social, tout se dit mais personne ne parle. (COLLIN, Fr., « Du
approached by Arendt as the human condition for the public one.
privé et du public », In Les Cahiers du GRIF, N. 33, 1986. )
- 19 -
Yiannis Laouris
In the chapters’ section, I elaborate on the requirements of technologies
needed in order to reinvent democracy in the digital era, especially in light
Working towards this Manifesto has been a most inspiring experience; being
of the virtual immortality and abundance of information, which inevitably
among philosophers in this think tank I was initially somewhat skeptical as
results in cognitive overload as captured in:
to the feasibility of quite different minded scientists, some with very strong
views, managing to converge to a text that satisfactorily draws attention to
§2.3 The abundance of information may also result in cognitive overload,
key concepts that require reengineering. I especially enjoyed the fact that,
distraction…
like the ancient Athenians, we treated philosophy, science and politics as
strongly interconnected disciplines. The world will benefit tremendously even
Democracy of the 21st century has come to refer almost exclusively to the
if the only learning from this exercise is just this!
right to take part in the political process, i.e., the right to vote. Since ICTs
open tremendous possibilities for real-time feedback and frequent polling, in
The Manifesto reflects my personal views; therefore I endorsed it. In his
the minds of many, extra voting equals more democracy. “Direct Democracy”
chapter, this author elaborates on the need to re-engineer the concept of
is a term coined recently and it refers to a specific (one of many) model of
life and how the emerging immortality of artifacts and information exerts
democratic participation in which all members have equal access, vote and
pressure towards achieving immortality of the mind and/or of the human;
voice on all issues. If we were to adopt such an approach in taking political
the blurring of concepts like “being human” or “being alive.” In this short
or other decisions, we would definitely create chaos. It should therefore be
commentary however, I chose to draw special attention to the risks created
rigorously distinguished and differentiated from massive but authentic
by the feasibility of direct democracy as encapsulated in §1.4 because of
democratic participation. The latter demands that all relevant stakeholders
their urgency:
are given opportunity to participate, and voice to argue over the issues that
influence their lives. Votes should be weighted in some way in order to secure
§1.4 … By … opening new possibilities for direct democracy, ICTs desta-
that decisions take advantage of what we call “collective wisdom.” This is not
bilize and call for rethinking the worldviews and metaphors underlying
a trivial problem to solve. Identifying who the “relevant” stakeholders are, or
modern political structures.
deciding who should have a (weighted) vote on which matters is extremely
complex. Even when the theoretical challenges are resolved, we will need to
develop systems that implement the theory.
- 20 -
Athenians of the Golden Age were engaged collectively in searching and
carefully examining meanings and alternatives together through a process
they called “deliberation.” They aim to fully understand the underlying
problems, clarify the debatable situation and achieve consensus. More than
two millenniums later, we need to reinvent democracy in ways that millions
can participate effectively. We must guarantee that the individual will have
access to all relevant information, alternatives, arguments, and predicted
futures that might emerge depending on the choices s/he makes. We will
probably need to invent new liquid forms of democracy where ideas can flow
from crowds and are shaped through a process of open deliberations. Future
citizens should somehow become capable of choosing alternatives harvesting their collective intelligence and wisdom rather than allowing personal
interests and pathetic behaviors of individuals prevail in the decision making
process. Since technology will be absolutely essential, the democratization of
the processes of design and development of such new technologies becomes
also fundamental requirement. We must furthermore guarantee access and
simplicity of interfaces.
In sum, we should design spaces and technologies as well as implement policies that respect our cognitive constrains, safeguard our attention and secure
our individual human rights and freedoms. We ought to develop systems
that guarantee the authentic participation of those whose lives might be
influenced by any decisions taken. Courses of action should be chosen based
on their capacity to facilitate change towards a collectively defined and
agreed desired ideal future state.
- 21 -
May Thorseth
bodies or other organisations are able to keep control, and information flows
are less transparent than before, this seem to have a negative impact on
The information abundance and the primacy of interactions over entities is
responsibility: no single institutions or individuals can be assigned responsi-
particularly important in dealing with the problem of the public, i.e. the ques-
bility as in pre-IT times. Technologies that are gradually substituting human
tion of how to make the public well informed. The importance of being well
responsibilities endangers individuals’ democratic freedoms – thus, there is
informed relates to issues like how to fight intolerance and fundamentalism
a need for research to focus on empowering-/disempowering developments
in particular. Besides, the problem of the public is about education: what foci
resulting from shortage of human interactions.
and what kind of methodologies to apply in teaching younger generations to
broaden their perspectives? As an example, a common exercise for school
Another very important issue is the public-private distinction. Rather than
children is to use the Internet to collect information for assignments. As yet,
speaking in terms of distinction between the two it makes better sense to
the teaching staff often seems to lack the relevant competencies for guiding
speak of complementary relations between them: home is no longer neces-
their students.
sarily a private space as distinct from public spaces. As an illustration, political and public negotiations need not necessarily take place in a public space
In political contexts the problem of information abundance also needs to
as Skype is available almost everywhere. And vice versa, when it comes
be resolved: The temptation to collect information by looking up websites
to private conversations they may just as well take place in public space.
rather than discussing or interacting with political opponents is a threat to
Further, what is conceived as private or public seems to have changed, too.
the public, particularly to making the public better informed. The case of
What used to be considered intimate among young people, like e.g. sexual
July 22, 2011 in Norway is but one example of lack of relevant interaction
relations are viewed far less private compared to parents’ occupations, or
between extremists and their opponents, i.e. more moderate and democrati-
political affiliations of today. Thus, rather than speaking of private versus
cally oriented people. One claim in the aftermath of this event has been that
public there is a need to emphasise the importance of context: whatever is
the public has not taken seriously extreme viewpoints as put forth on the
contested in public space is no longer purely private. Globalisation, not least
Internet. As a result, there has been insufficient public debate.
due to the spread of information technology implies a break down of any
clear cut distinction between private and public. As a consequence there is
Another important issue in the Manifesto is about distributed or (lack of)
a need to redefine public and private spaces, most importantly what sense
shared responsibility. As no single governmental or non-governmental
we currently want to make of these categories. As an example it is no longer
- 22 -
obvious that the consumption of private households/individuals is not a
public issue when discussing e.g. rights and responsibilities for commons like
natural resources. Knowledge is also a commons in this sense, and thus we
need to question whether there should be both rights and duties associated
with it. If we accept the premise that being well informed about societal
matters is not only a private matter, we do not necessarily have to conclude
that knowledge is a public matter. Private and public are no longer counterparts, but rather complementary categories being challenged by information
and communication technologies.
- 23 -
3. The first problem with a dichotomy is that it requires mutually exclusive
definitions, which presumes that it helps to partition reality into discrete
Dualism is dead. Long live Plurality (instead of duality)
and separate chunks. Though computational techniques may indeed
require such digitization, the reduction of the analogue flux of life to
What does it mean to be human in a computational era? The Manifesto
digitizable bites has its own drawbacks. Katherine Hayles has described
rightly suggests that though such a question cannot generate final answers,
the flaws and the costs of early cybernetics in her ‘How we became
it must be addressed to come to terms with the Onlife experience.
posthuman’, focusing on the attempt to disembody and dematerialize
information, abstracting from the content and the semantics to gain a
1. The Manifesto states that we prefer dual pairs to oppositional dichoto-
better view of its processing and syntactics. mies, explaining this in terms of the dual pairs of control and complexity,
taxis and kosmos, and public and private. This is of particular interest
4. Though we cannot deny that this attempt has yielded unprecedented
because the concept of dual pairs has a very specific meaning in mathe-
results, we must also acknowledge that at some point the processed
matics and is relevant for machine learning techniques, which are at the
information must be reintegrated in what Stiegler (pace Husserl) has
heart of the emerging computational infrastructure. called our own primary retention (individual memory), to acquire meaning
and to be part of our lifeworld. 2. Whereas a dichotomy has been defined as ‘a set of two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives’,1 a dual pair has been defined
as ‘a pair of vector spaces with an associated bilinear
form’.2
5. It is important, then, to note that the computational era is rooted in the
Though it
most extreme type of dichotomous thinking: that of constructing discrete,
would be interesting to investigate what this means in relation to control,
machine readable bits. To be human, here, means to remember that life
complexity, taxis, kosmos, public and private, I would prefer to investigate
is continuous and plural and experienced rather than calculated.
how we may proceed from thinking in terms of dichotomies and whether
this requires thinking in terms of pairs at all.
6. The second problem with a dichotomy is that it assumes jointly exhaustive alternatives, which entails that the pairs forming the dichotomy
1 http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?FalseDichotomy
cover all there is to be said about whatever they aim to describe. In
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_pair
his pivotal ‘The duality of risk assessment’, Claudia Ciborra has eluci-
- 24 -
dated how the hidden presumption that e.g. a risk analysis exhaustively
a propensity to keep things simple. I would, therefore, rearticulate the
describes a developing reality endangers the resilience of whoever
heading and speak of: Beyond dualities. Long live plurality.
depends on that analysis to remain safe. Smart Grids, policing, medical
treatment or the food industry should never assume that the data
derivatives that inform their risk analyses cover all that is relevant. To
prevent the kind of havoc that plagues our financial system we must
instead keep an open mind, assuming that the computational decision
systems that feed such critical infrastructure are as biased and fallible
as any smart system necessarily must be. To be human, here, means to
admit such fallibility as core to the wondrous fragility of life. 7. An interesting example of a dichotomy that confuses instead of clarifies
what it means to be human in the computational era, is the dualism that
pervades the domain of the philosophy of mind. The cartesian idea of a
separate res extensa and a separate res cogitans that together describe
reality has given rise to a series of interrelated problems that still haunt
much of our understanding of e.g. responsibility and accountability in a
world of distributed causation. To overcome the confusion that results
from this kind of dualism I believe that we should not merely turn to
overlapping instead of mutually exclusive dual pairs, but take leave of
the idea that reality should necessarily be described in pairs altogether. 8. Whether it makes sense to think in pairs or in other types of distinctions should depend on the context and the aim of our thinking, not on
- 25 -
The
Onlife
Initiative
An initiative
of the
Background document
Rethinking public spaces
in the digital transition
Contents
1. What do we mean by concept reengineering?
28
2. What do we mean by the digital transition?
29
3. Why such an exercise in the realm of the digital agenda? 30
a. The blurring of the distinction between reality and virtuality
“
condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and most recent
fears. This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness – the
heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of
30
‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty –seems to me among the outs-
b. The blurring of the distinctions between people, nature
and artefacts
tanding characteristics of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very simple :
31
it is nothing more than to think what we are doing.
c. The reversal from scarcity to abundance, when it comes
to information
What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human
d. The reversal from entity’s primacy over interactions to interactions’
primacy over entities 32
4. Process and outcome 33
”
- Hannah Arendt, Prologue of “The Human Condition”, 1958.
31
The deployment of ICTs and their uptake by society affect radically the
human condition, insofar as it modifies our relationships to ourselves, to
others, and to the world. This digital transition shakes established reference
frameworks, which impact the public space, politics itself, and societal expectations toward policy making. The Onlife Initiative intends to explore these
impacts within the policy context of the Digital Agenda for Europe.
- 27 -
1. What do we mean by concept
reengineering?
It is acknowledged that, collectively, we are undergoing a deep crisis, the
expression of which is apparent in economic, social, environmental, and
financial terms. In a less obvious manner, but equally, if not even more signi-
There is no such thing as a neutral apprehension of reality. Philosophy tells
ficantly, the crisis affects the public space, politics itself, and how we concep-
us that we grasp the world around us through concepts. Even when we think
tualise both ourselves and the world as well as our mutual interactions.
that we are representing our environment in a specular or objective way, our
Through the concept reengineering exercise, we intend to focus on the issue
perception is necessarily mediated by concepts, as if they were the keyholes
of public spaces and put philosophy in practice within the realm of policy
through which we inevitably see and perceive reality. Concepts show their
making.
efficacy by providing us with an understanding of our surrounding realities
and a means by which we are able to grasp those realities.
Sources of inspiration and references will be multiple and diverse, but the
notion of public space underlying this proposal is greatly inspired by, if
Knowledge aggregates around given concepts, and paradigmatic shifts
not borrowed from, Hannah Arendt. Her vision rests on the fact that poli-
happen when new concepts are designed, taken up, adapted or re-adapted,
tics emerge from the plurality and that the public space is the space lying
thereby providing a new basis for knowledge accumulation and for the
between us, where each of us can experience freedom. If that space-
production of a new sense of meaning (semanticisation).
between-us collapses, and if politics becomes only a means to an end
(whatever good this end pretends to be), then we are not far from totalitaria-
Concept reengineering is an activity that aims at putting ourselves in the
nism, she argues. She invites us to dissociate ourselves from the illusion that
best position to reflect meaningfully on what happens to us, and thereby help
the most efficient way to make society good is to make each of its members
us envision the future in positive terms. The dominance of negative projec-
a good person. To Jonas, who held this view, she replied: “if this was true,
tions about the future is often the signature of the inadequacy of our current
then we are lost!”1 And indeed, as humans, we all experience the internal
conceptual toolbox. We fear and reject what we fail to understand and
dialogue between good and bad. That we need sometimes to make this pola-
semanticise. So, the overall purpose of this concept reengineering exercise is
rized figure external can be part of building our collective identity, but we
to acknowledge such inadequacy and explore alternative conceptualisations
that may enable us to re-envisage the future with greater confidence.
1 TV broadcast discussion, Toronto, 1972 reported in “Edifier un monde, Interventions 19711975”, Hannah Arendt, p.98, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2007.
- 28 -
should not fool ourselves by thinking that we can really strive, through poli-
next step will be ubiquitous computing, i.e. a technology that has become
tics, to make each human a unequivocally good being. For that reason, this
so pervasive that it is invisible to us and totally embedded in our lives. In
exercise will focus on what matters for the public space, rather than what
their recent book, Dourish and Bell 3 argue that we have already entered into
matters for each individual, or, in other words, it will focus on the means and
the era of ubiquitous computing, rather than seeing it as something that
preconditions needed to reinvigorate the sense of plurality which is essential
may happen in the future. The ETICA research project4 has identified a list
if each of us is to experience freedom in this hyperconnected era 2.
of emerging ICTs5 that are bringing new, ethical concerns. In fact, together
with the current burgeoning of devices, sensors, robots, and applications, and
To the best of our knowledge, this experience of putting philosophy into prac-
these emerging technologies, we have entered a new phase of the informa-
tice is a genuinely new one, but should this not be the case, lessons will be
tion age, a phase where the hybridisation between bits and other forms of
drawn from similar past experiences. This is also part of the exercise.
reality is so deep that it radically changes the human condition in profound
ways. The ubiquitous computing vision is a reasonable asymptotic view,
which can be taken as the current background against which society is stri-
2. What do we mean by the digital transition?
ving to actualise its norms, values and codes of behaviour.
Let’s call digital transition the societal process arising from the deployment and uptake of ICTs. In a remarkable article “The computer for the 21st
century”, published in the Scientific American in September 1991, Mark Weiser
suggested that, after the mainframe and the personal desktop computer, the
2 “If philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of human
affairs, were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they would have to make the
plurality of man, out of which arises the whole realm of human affairs – in its grandeur
and misery – the object of their thaumadzein. Biblically speaking, they would have to
accept – as they accept in speechless wonder the miracle of the universe, of man, and of
being –the miracle that God did not create Man, but ‘male and female created He them.’
They would have to accept in something more than the resignation of human weakness
the fact that ‘it is not good for man to be alone.’” Hannah Arendt, ‘Philosophy and Politics’,
Social Research, vol.57, n°1, Spring 1990, pp. 73-104.
3 Paul Dourish and Genevieve Bell, Divining a digital future: mess and mythology in ubiquitous computing”, MIT Press, 2011.
4 Ethical issues of emerging ICT applications.
5 List of technologies: affective computing, ambient intelligence, artificial intelligence, bioelectronics, cloud computing, future internet, human-machine symbiosis, neuroelectronics,
quantum computing, robotics, virtual/augmented reality.
- 29 -
3. Why such an exercise in the realm of the
digital agenda?
a. The blurring of the distinction between reality and
virtuality
The digital transition shakes established reference frameworks in, at least,
Plato’s allegory of the cave, the distinction between body and mind, or that
four ways:
between internal fantasies and actual behaviours are fundamental and
ancestral dichotomies through which we think and act. They are three among
a. by blurring the distinction between reality and virtuality;
many other expressions of the dualist way of thinking. Philosophers have
b. by blurring the distinctions between human, machine and nature;
argued that these dichotomies are fragile and more illusory than one may
c. by reversing from scarcity to abundance, when it comes to information;
think. However, dualist thinking remains a pillar of common sense and of
d. by shifting from the primacy of entities over interactions to the primacy
the moral and political experience. By making virtuality more real than ever
of interactions over entities.
before, the digital transition undermines the real/virtual divide, and thereby
all dualist forms of thinking. This calls for new framings of several issues,
If not well considered, these issues push us back and forth between distrust
either through monism, a new dualism, or pluralism. Cognitive sciences can
and blind faith: none of these two are able to ground a good public life and
usefully complement the philosophical perspective with a scientific account
provide meaning. As a society, we are confronted with a learning challenge
of the link between the different ways of thinking (in pluralist, dualist or
of how to actively shape our lives in this technologically-mediated world.
monist terms) and behaviours.
Let us consider these four issues in turn.
In concrete terms, exploring these issues will shed light, for example, on the
level of continuity in behavioural and moral terms that should be expected
in the virtual and the physical public spaces. For example, anthropologists
tell us that it is common practice for people to lie about themselves on the
internet, not necessarily for bad reasons, but rather as a social practice:
minors and dating adults lie about their age, appearance, interests, and so
forth. Is this really affecting trust or, on the contrary, is it part of the acculturation of ICT tools by society, producing the shadow areas that any individual
- 30 -
needs to live as a human? Another issue relates to where one should draw
between humans and artefacts. The multiplication of artefacts, the inten-
the line between real and virtual when it comes to committing crimes, such
sification of industrial development on the whole planet and the increase
as murder or rape? At the physical end, it is and must be strictly forbidden
of monitoring means we may not exhaust the planet, which will pursue its
and severely punished. At the virtual end, when dealing with a mere solitary
course in the universe, but it surely exhausts the notion of blank nature or of
game, it can be considered as being part of the private sphere and tolerated
an endless reservoir.
as part of one’s own deep intimacy. Yet, there is a middle ground between
these two ends (social gaming, avatars, web-dating etc.), and it is not trivial
This means that our conceptual toolbox, still reliant on these once effective
to draw the line between the space where public morality has to apply and
distinctions between humans, nature and artefacts, needs to adapt to this
the space where inner dialogues and negotiations take place.
new reality, where these distinctions no longer exist. What impact does this
have on policy making in the ethical domain? What impact does it have on
the framing of the sustainability challenge in a prospective way?
b. The blurring of the distinctions between people,
nature and artefacts
c. The reversal from scarcity to abundance, when it
comes to information
Once upon a time, it was easy to distinguish people from artefacts and
nature. The blurring of the distinction has been increasing since Darwin and
the industrial era. After Darwin, we acknowledge that we are part of nature,
The common sense vision on knowledge and information is underlined by the
in full continuity with animals. Since the industrial era, artefacts and nature
omniscience/omnipotence utopia. The assumption is that, if only we knew
have become intrinsically connected, through the metabolism of the indus-
everything that there is to know, we would act perfectly, or, alternatively, that
trial development, which is drawing on natural resources. More recently, with
mistakes and wrong doings could be attributed to a lack of knowledge. This,
the use of medical devices, human beings and artefacts have also connected.
again, has been challenged by some schools of thought for some time, but
is now becoming commonplace. Indeed, we are orphans of the encyclopaedic
The digital transition acts as a huge accelerator of the blurring of these
ideal and subject to the new experience that the binding constraint is not our
once effective distinctions. The multiplication of sensors and prostheses, the
knowledge, but instead our attention capacity.
progress of cognitive sciences and biological engineering blur the distinction
- 31 -
d. The reversal from entity’s primacy over interactions to interactions’ primacy over entities
Information, and even knowledge, is like what used to be a natural resource:
plentiful. We have shifted our sense of boundlessness from natural resources
(now recognized as finite quantities) to information and knowledge. Indeed,
with the digital transition, there are fewer and fewer activities that do
We tend to pay more attention to what entities are, or should become, and
not produce a “digital shadow”. All the electronic devices we engage with
consider the interactions between them as secondary. For example, we focus
(portable or not) leave a recorded trace: where we are, what we read, what
on defining what the EU should be, trying to “overcome fragmentation” – as
we buy, not to mention the information we post about ourselves on social
we (too) often put it – in order to construct a coherent whole. By framing the
networks or blogs. Information is akin to natural resources of a third kind,
issue in this way, we consider fragmentation as a negative and, as a corol-
besides the non-renewable and the renewable, we have the exponential.
lary, consider unity as superior to fragmentation. Similarly, in our framing of
Instead of aiming at a global or encyclopaedic overview, we need to learn
relations with others, we often speak in binary terms: barriers (to be lifted),
to navigate through information-saturated waters, and make sense of and
or walls (to be erected), for example. Thereby, we fail to pay proper attention
value the abundance of information through data-mining and other filtering
to the quality and healthiness of interactions and relations between entities.
activities. This radical mental shift has consequences on our behaviours as
knowers, in our collective representation of what knowledge and information
We are too often inclined to think that the solution to our problems lies in
are, on the link between knowledge and action (consider the veil of igno-
greater leadership, or in upscaling power or control. In fact, sustainability
rance) and also, more concretely, on the framing of the fundamental right
rhetoric points to the need to rebalance the relationship to the self (focus on
to privacy, as the current principles of control and data minimisation on
identity) with the relationship to the other (focus on interactions). Achieving
which the privacy framework is built fail to grasp optimally the new societal
both more integration and more diversity can only be done with a relaxed
concerns regarding privacy, reputation and image.
approach to identity and a constructive approach to otherness6 . With the
digital transition, the importance of interfaces and interoperability is central.
The primacy of interactions becomes a matter of fact, and identity is to be
6 For an extensive presentation of this argument, please refer to N. Dewandre, The sustainability concept: can we stand between catastrophism and denial?; in European research
for sustainable development, edited by Carlo Jaeger, Joan David Tabara and Julia Jaeger,
Springer, Berlin, 2011.
- 32 -
seen as the result of all interactions, instead of as a control variable. One of
The Onlife Group has worked over 2012 and has chosen to deliver the
the practical implications of this mental shift is to pay less attention to size,
outcome of this process in the form of an Onlife Manifesto. Indeed, it quickly
to minimise narcissist concerns, to go beyond the fragmentation diagnostic
appeared in the process that although the background of each member was
and to analyse instead how the quality and efficiency of interactions can be
different, there was a strong common basis, which was worth spelling out.
improved to serve the overall purpose.
The Onlife Manifesto is the core output of this initiative, around which all
members have gathered and consider a useful piece for triggering debates.
4. Process and outcome
As may be easily understood, agreeing on a common engaging text has not
The goal of the exercise is threefold:
been an easy task for such a multidisciplinary group! In view of allowing to
(i) to check whether there were similar exercises in the past, and if appli-
position him or herself relatively to the Manifesto, members had the possi-
cable, draw lessons from them;
bility to write Commentaries on the Manifesto. This generates a cloud of
(ii) to validate or adapt the set of issues that should be considered7;
nuances and unveils the multiple perspectives under which this text can be
(iii) to consider each validated issue, by giving the following account:
read and understood.
1. examine the consequences of the shifts, paying particular attention to
Finally, each member has wrapped up in a Chapter his or her contribution to
the examples on the notion of public space and on the expectations
the debate.
towards public authorities.
2. sketch recommendations on new issue framings with a view to enhancing
As suggested by the flower on the webpage, the Manifesto, the Commenta-
the policy-grip on what sustains and reinvigorates the public space and
ries and the Chapters form an output, which reflects both a strong common
really matters to citizens.
ground and a rich diversity. We hope that this material will be helpful and
perhaps inspiring.
The outcome of this process will be the beginning of a wider discussion, both
7 The choice of issues proposed under section 3 is highly contingent, and should not be
perceived as exhaustive nor exclusive but rather as a proposal to trigger the process.
in meetings and through Futurium. Futurium is a vital tool aimed at encou-
- 33 -
raging participation from a wide range of actors, providing an open and interactive space for an inclusive thinking process. Participation from civil society
groups, ICT professionals, and any individual who wish to join the debate is
encouraged. Those interested in hosting workshops to discuss this outcome
are invited to send in proposals addressed to nicole.dewandre@ec.europa.eu.
Keeping the initiative moving and focused has been ensured by Luciano
Floridi, Professor of Philosophy and UNESCO Chair in Information and
Computer Ethics at the University of Hertfordshire, and Fellow of St Cross
College, Oxford; Charles Ess, Associate Professor in Media Studies, Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo; and Nicole Dewandre,
advisor on societal issues at the Directorate General Communications
Networks, Content, and Technology, of the European Commission, respectively chair, editor, and rapporteur. At the same time, this would not have
been possible without the remarkable engagement of all members, nor with
the most efficient support of Roua Abbas, Igor Caldeira, and Nicole Zwaaneveld.
This initiative8 is part of the “Digital Futures” project.
8 The content of this initiative does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the
members of the Onlife group.
- 34 -
Hyperconnectivity
An initiative
of the
Luciano Floridi
Hyperhistory
and the Philosophy
of Information
Policies
An initiative
of the
Luciano Floridi
Contents1
A. Hyperhistory
A. Hyperhistory
37
B. The Philosophy of Information Policies
39
More people are alive today than ever before in the evolution of humanity.
And more of us live longer and better today than ever before. To a large
C. Political Apoptosis: from the Historical State
to the Hyperhistorical MASs
measure, we owe this to our technologies, at least insofar as we develop and
40
use them intelligently, peacefully, and sustainably.
43
Sometimes, we may forget how much we owe to flints and wheels, to sparks
D. The Nature and Problems of the
Political MAS
and ploughs, to engines and satellites. We are reminded of such deep tech-
D.1 Identity and cohesion
44
D.2 Consent 45
significant threshold is there to acknowledge that it was the invention and
D.3 Social vs. Political Space
45
development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) that
D.4 Legitimacy
47
E. The Transparent State
48
Conclusion
48
References 49
nological debt when we divide human life into prehistory and history. That
made all the difference between who we were and who we are. It is only
when the lessons learnt by past generations began to evolve in a Lamarckian
rather than a Darwinian way that humanity entered into history.
History has lasted six thousand years, since it began with the invention of
writing in the fourth millennium BC. During this relatively short time, ICTs
have provided the recording and transmitting infrastructure that made the
escalation of other technologies possible, with the direct consequence of
furthering our dependence on more and more layers of technologies. ICTs
became mature in the few centuries between Guttenberg and Turing. Today,
1 The information and views set out in this text are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the
we are experiencing a radical transformation in our ICTs that could prove
equally significant, for we have started drawing a new threshold between
- 37 -
history and a new age, which may be aptly called hyperhistory. (Figure 1). Let
To summarise, human evolution may be visualised as a three-stage rocket:
me explain.
in prehistory, there are no ICTs; in history, there are ICTs, they record and
transmit data, but human societies depend mainly on other kinds of techno-
Prehistory and history work like adverbs: they tell us how people live, not
logies concerning primary resources and energy; in hyperhistory, there are
when or where. From this perspective, human societies currently stretch
ICTs, they record, transmit and, above all, process data, increasingly auto-
across three ages, as ways of living. According to reports about an unspe-
nomously, and human societies become vitally dependent on them and on
cified number of uncontacted tribes in the Amazonian region (http://www.
information as a fundamental resource. Added-value moves from being
survivalinternational.org/), there are still some societies that may be living
ICT-related to being ICT-dependent.
prehistorically, without recorded documents. If one day such tribes disappear,
the end of the first chapter of our evolutionary book will have been written.
If all this is even approximately correct, the emergence from its historical age
The greatest majority of people today still live historically, in societies that
represents one of the most significant steps taken by humanity for a very
rely on ICTs to record and transmit data of all kinds. In such historical socie-
long time. It certainly opens up a vast horizon of opportunities as well as
ties, ICTs have not yet overtaken other technologies, especially energy-re-
challenges, all essentially driven by the recording, transmitting, and proces-
lated ones, in terms of their vital importance. Then there are some people
sing powers of ICTs. From synthetic biochemistry to neuroscience, from the
around the world who are already living hyperhistorically, in societies or envi-
Internet of things to unmanned planetary explorations, from green techno-
ronments where ICTs and their data
processing1
capabilities are the neces-
logies to new medical treatments, from social media to digital games, from
sary condition for the maintenance and any further development of societal
agricultural to financial applications, from economic developments to the
welfare, personal well-being, as well as overall flourishing. The nature of
energy industry, our activities of discovery, invention, design, control, educa-
conflicts provides a sad test for the reliability of this tripartite interpreta-
tion, work, socialisation, entertainment, care and so forth would be not only
tion of human evolution. Only a society that lives hyperhistorically can be
unfeasible but unthinkable in a purely mechanical, historical context. They
vitally threatened informationally, by a cyber attack. Only those who live by
are all hyperhistorical in nature.
the digit may die by the digit (Floridi and Taddeo forthcoming).
It follows that we are witnessing the outlining of a macroscopic scenario in
which an exponential growth of new inventions, applications, and solutions
in ICTs are quickly detaching future generations from ours. Of course, this is
1 This is the way I understand the reference in the Manifesto to a computational turn.
- 38 -
B. The Philosophy of Information Policies
not to say that there is no continuity, both backward and forward. Backward,
because it is often the case that the deeper a transformation is, the longer
and more widely rooted its causes are. It is only because many different
Given the unprecedented novelties that the dawn of hyperhistory is causing,
forces have been building the pressure for a very long time that radical
it is not surprising that many of our fundamental philosophical views, so
changes may happen all of a sudden, perhaps unexpectedly. It is not the
entrenched in history and above all so modern (in the sense of this word
last snowflake that breaks the branch of the tree. In our case, it is certainly
explained in the Manifesto, pp.3-11), may need to be upgraded, if not enti-
history that begets hyperhistory. There is no ASCII without the alphabet.
rely replaced. Perhaps not yet in academia, think tanks, research centres, or
Forward, because it is most plausible that historical societies will survive for
R&D offices, but clearly in the streets and online, there is an atmosphere
a long time in the future, not unlike the Amazonian tribes mentioned above.
of confused expectancy, of exciting, sometimes naïve, bottom-up changes in
Despite globalisation, human societies do not parade uniformly forward, in
our views about (i) the world, (ii) about ourselves, (iii) about our interactions
synchronic steps.
with the world and (iv) among ourselves.
These four focus points are not the result of research programmes, nor of
the impact of successful grant applications. Much more realistically and
powerfully, but also more confusedly and tentatively, the changes in our
Weltanschauung are the result of our daily adjustments, intellectually and
behaviourally, to a reality that is fluidly changing in front of our eyes and
under our feet, exponentially and relentlessly. In the Manifesto, I described
this state in terms of “building the raft while swimming”, hacking Neurath’s
famous analogy. We are finding our new balance by shaping and adapting to
hyperhistorical conditions that have not yet sedimented into a mature age,
and in which novelties are no longer disruptive but finally stable patterns of
“more of approximately the same” (think, for example, of the car or the book
industry, and the stability they have provided).
Figure 1 From Prehistory to Hyperhistory
- 39 -
It is for this reason that the following terminology is only tentative and
with such initial steps. The following remarks represent the beginning of this
probably inadequate to capture the intellectual novelty that we are facing.
new effort.
Our very conceptual vocabulary and our ways of making sense of the world
C. Political Apoptosis: from the Historical
State to the Hyperhistorical MASs
(our semanticising processes and practices) need to be reconsidered and
redesigned in order to provide us with a better grasp of our hyperhistorical
age, and hence a better chance to shape it in the best way and deal with its
challenges successfully. With this proviso in mind, it seems clear that a new
The long-term perspective, introduced in the previous section, should help to
philosophy of history, which tries to makes sense of our age as the end of
explain the process of political apoptosis2 that we are undergoing, to borrow
history and the beginning of hyperhistory, invites the development of (see
a concept from cell biology: the State developed by becoming more and more
the fours points above) (i) a new philosophy of nature, (ii) a new philosophical
an Information Society, but in so doing it increasingly made itself less and
anthropology, (iii) a synthetic e-nvironmentalism as a bridge between us and
less the main information agent, because what made the State possible and
the world, and (iv) a new philosophy of politics among us.
then predominant, as a historical driving force in human politics, namely ICTs,
is also what is now making it less central hyperhistorically, in the social, poli-
In other contexts, I have argued that such an invitation amounts to a request
tical and economic life of humanity across the world (Figure 2). Three related
for a new philosophy of information that can work at 360 degrees on our
reasons are worth highlighting by way of explanation.
hyperhistorical condition (Floridi 2011). I have sought to develop a philosophy
of nature in terms of a philosophy of the infosphere (Floridi 2003), and a
1) Power: ICTs “democratise” data and the processing/controlling power over
philosophical anthropology in terms of a fourth revolution in our self-un-
them, in the sense that both now tend to reside and multiply in a multitude
derstanding—after the Copernican, the Darwinian, and Freudian ones—that
re-interprets humans as informational organisms living and interacting with
2 Apoptosis (also known as programmed cell death) is a natural and normal form of
self-destruction in which a programmed sequence of events leads to the elimination of
cells. Apoptosis plays a crucial role in developing and maintaining the health of the body
by eliminating cells once they become old, unnecessary, or unhealthy. I am indebted to
Judith Simon for having warned me against the dangerous overtones in the concept, with
its potential connection to Nazi views about biological purity and purification. Of course
this is not the way the concept should be understood here, I have just been unable to find a
better way of expressing the idea so far.
other informational agents in the infosphere (Floridi 2008, 2010). Finally, I
have suggested that an expansion of environmental ethics to all environments—including those that are artificial, digital or synthetic—should be
based on an information ethics for the whole infosphere (Floridi forthcoming). What I have not done is to outline a philosophy of politics consistent
- 40 -
of repositories and sources, thus creating and empowering a potentially
2) Space: ICTs de-territorialise human experience. They have made regional
boundless number of non-state agents, from the single individual to asso-
borders porous or I some cases entirely irrelevant. They have also created,
ciations and groups, from macro-agents, like multinationals, to international,
and are exponentially expanding, regions of the infosphere where an increa-
intergovernmental as well as nongovernmental, organisations. The State
sing number of agents (not only people, see above) operate and spend more
is no longer the only, and sometimes not even the main, agent in the poli-
and more time. Such regions are intrinsically stateless. This is generating a
tical arena that can exercise informational power over other informational
new tension between geo-politics, which is global and non-territorial, and the
agents, in particular over (groups of) human informational organisms. The
Nation State, which still defines its identity and political legitimacy in terms
European Commission, for example, recognised the importance of such new
of a sovereign territorial unit, as a Country.
agents in the Cotonou Agreement 3 between the European Union (EU) and the
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, by acknowledging the impor-
3) Organisation: ICTs fluidify the topology of politics. ICTs do not merely
tant role exercised by a wide range of nongovernmental development actors,
enable but actually promote the agile, temporary and timely aggregation,
and formally recognising their participation in ACP-EU development coopera-
disaggregation and re-aggregation of distributed groups around shared
tion. According to Article 6 of the Cotonou Agreement, such non-state actors
interests across old, rigid boundaries, represented by social classes, poli-
comprise: “the private sector; economic and social partners, including trade
tical parties, ethnicity, language barriers, and so forth. This is generating a
union organisations; civil society in all its forms, according to national charac-
new tensions between the Nation State, still understood as a major organi-
teristics”.4
The phenomenon is generating a new tension between power and
sational institution, yet no longer monolithic but increasingly morphing into
force, where power is informational and exercised through the elaboration
a multiagent system itself (see below), and a variety of equally powerful,
and dissemination of norms, whereas force is physical and exercised when
indeed sometimes even more politically influential (with respect to the old
power fails to orient the behaviour of the relevant agents and norms need to
Nation State) and powerful (se above), non-State organisations. The debate
be enforced.
on direct democracy is thus reshaped. We used to think that it was about
how the Nation State could re-organise itself internally, by designing rules
and handle the means to promote forms of democracy in which citizens
3See Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, Agreed Consolidated Text, 11 March 2010
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf
could vote on policy initiatives directly almost in real time. We thought of it
as a complementary alternative to forms of representative democracy. The
reality is that direct democracy has become a media-ted democracy, in which
4 I am grateful to Mireille Hildebrandt for calling my attention to this document.
- 41 -
multiagent systems (understood as distributed groups temporary and timely
financial markets and international investors, German public opinion, and so
aggregated around shared interests) have multiplied and become sources of
forth.
influence external to the Nation State. Citizens vote their representatives and
influence them via opinion polls.
A much more networked idea of political interactions makes possible a
degree of tolerance towards, and indeed feasibility of, localisms, separatisms,
as well as movements and parties favouring autonomy or independence
that would have been inconceivable in Modern times. From Padania (Italy) to
Catalonia (Spain), from Scotland (Great Britain) to Bavaria (Germany), one is
reminded that almost in any European country, for example, hyperhistorical
trends may resemble pre-Westphalian equilibria.5
Of course, the historical State is not giving up its role without a fight. In many
Figure 2 From the State to the MASs
contexts, it is trying to reclaim its primacy as the information super-agent
governing the political life of the society that it organises. In some cases, the
Because of (1)-(3), the unique position of the historical State as the infor-
attempt is blatant: Labour Government’s failed plan to introduce compulsory
mation agent is being undermined from below and overridden from above
ID in the UK6 should be read from this perspective. In many cases, it is “histo-
by the emergence of multiagent systems or MASs, which have the data, the
rical resistance” by stealth, as when an information society—defined by the
power (and sometimes even the force, as in the case of cyber threats), the
essential role played by intellectual, intangible assets (knowledge-based
space, and the organisational flexibility to erode its political clout, steal its
economy), information-intensive services (business and property services,
authority and, in the long run, make it redundant in contexts where it was
once the only or the predominant informational agent. The recent Greek crisis
5 The entry on “List of active separatist movements in Europe” in Wikipedia is both informative
and eye opening
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_Europe
and the actual agents involved in its management offer a good template: the
Greek Government and the Greek State had to interact “above” with the EU,
6 The Labour Government introduced the first Identity Cards Bill in November 2004, after
several intermediary stages, the Identity Cards Act was finally repealed by the Identity
Documents Act 2010 on 21 January 2011.
the European Central Bank, the IMF, the rating agencies, and so forth, and
“below” with the Greek mass media and the people in Syntagma square, the
- 42 -
finance and insurance), and public sectors (especially education, public admi-
lution or the growing trend in making central banks, like the Bank of England
nistration and health care)—is largely run by the State, which simply main-
or the European Central Bank, independent, public organisations.
tains its role of major informational agent no longer just legally, on the basis
of its power over legislation and its implementation, but now also econo-
D. The Nature and Problems of the
Political MAS
mically, on the basis of its power over the majority of information-based
jobs. The intrusive presence of so-called State Capitalism with its SOE (State
Owned Enterprises) all over the world and especially in China is an obvious
symptom.
The time has come to consider the nature of the political MAS more closely
and some of the questions that its emergence is already posing.
Similar forms of resistance seem only able to delay the inevitable rise of
political MASs. Unfortunately, they may involve huge risks, not only locally,
The political MAS is a system constituted by other systems, which, as a single
but above globally. Paradoxically, while humanity is moving into a hyperhis-
agent (Floridi and Sanders 2004), is
torical age, the world is witnessing the rise of China, currently a most “historical” Sovereign State, and the decline of the US, a Sovereign State that more
a. teleological, the MAS has a purpose, or goal, which it pursues through its
than any other superpower in the past already had a hyperhistorical voca-
actions;
tion in its federal organisation. This is risky, because the anachronistic histo-
b. interactive, the MAS and its environment can act upon each other;
ricism of some of China’s policies and humanity’s growing hyperhistoricism
c. autonomous, the MAS can change its states without direct response to
are heading towards a confrontation. It may not be a conflict, but hyperhis-
interaction: it can perform internal transitions to change its states. This
tory is a force whose time has come, and while it seems very likely that it
imbues the MAS with some degree of complexity and independence from
will be the Chinese State that will emerge deeply transformed, one can only
its environment; and finally
hope that the inevitable friction will be as painless and peaceful as possible.
d. adaptable, the MAS’ interactions can change the rules by which the MAS
The previous conclusion holds true for the historical State in general: in the
changes its states. Adaptability ensures that the MAS learns its own
future, we shall see the political MASs acquire increasing prominence, with
mode of operation in a way that depends critically on its experience.
the State itself progressively abandoning its resistance to hyperhistorical
changes and evolving into a MAS itself. Good examples are provided by devo-
- 43 -
The political MAS is thus an intelligent 7 MAS when it implements features
question of who or what the State is, but also the question of who or what
(a)-(d) efficiently and effectively, minimising resources, wastefulness and
belongs to the State and hence may be subject to its norms and actions.
errors while maximising the returns of its actions.
New political MAS cannot rely on the same solution. Indeed, they face the
The emergence of intelligent, political MASs poses many serious questions,
further problem of having to deal with the decoupling of their political iden-
which can only be quickly reviewed here.
tity and cohesion. The political identity of a MAS may be very strong and yet
unrelated to its temporary and rather loose cohesion, as it is the case with
the Tea Party movement in the US. Both identity and cohesion of a political
D.1 Identity and cohesion
MAS may be rather weak, as in the international Occupy movement. Or one
may recognise a strong cohesion and yet an unclear or weak political iden-
Throughout history, the State has dealt with the problem of establishing
tity, as with the population of twittering individuals and their role during the
and maintaining its own identity by working on the equation between State
Arab Spring. Both identity and cohesion of a political MAS are established
= Nation, often through the legal means of Citizenship and the narrative
and maintained through information sharing. The Land is virtualised into the
rhetoric of Space (the Mother/Father Land) and Time (Story in the sense
region of the infosphere in which the MAS operates. So Memory (retrievable
of traditions, recurrent celebrations of past Nation-building events, etc.).
recordings) and Coherence (reliable updates) of the information flow enable a
Consider, for example, the invention of mandatory military service during the
political MAS to claim some identity and some cohesion, and therefore offer
French Revolution, its increasing popularity in modern history, but then the
a sense of belonging. But it is above all the fact that the boundaries between
decreasing number of Sovereign States that still impose it nowadays. It is
the online and offline are disappearing, the appearance of the background
a sign of anachronism that, in moments of crisis, Sovereign States still give
experience, and hence the fact that the virtual infosphere can affect politi-
in to the temptation of fuelling nationalisms. The equation between State,
cally the physical space, that reinforces the sense of the political MAS as a
Nation, Citizenship and Land/Story had the further advantage of providing
real agent. If Anonymous had only a virtual existence, its identity and cohe-
an answer to a second problem, that of cohesion, for it answered not just the
sion would be much less strong. Deeds provide a vital counterpart to the
virtual information flow to guarantee cohesion. An ontology of interactions
replaces an ontology of things (Floridi 2007).
7 I am using the word ‘intelligent’ here is the same sense in which we find it in Artificial Intelligence, that is, as an equivalent to ‘smart’, when used in ‘smart technologies’.
- 44 -
D.2 Consent
huge political implications. What is moribund is not politics tout court, but
historical politics, that based on Parties, Classes, fixed Social Roles, and the
A significant consequence of the breaking up of the equation political MAS
State, which asked political legitimacy only once and spent it until revoked.
= Nation State = Citizenship = Land = Story and of the decoupling of iden-
The inching towards the so-called centre by parties in Liberal Democracies
tity and cohesion in a political MAS is that the age-old theoretical problem
around the world and the “Get out the vote” strategies (GOTV a term used to
of how the consent to be governed by a political authority arises is being
describe the mobilisation of voters to ensure that those who can do vote) are
turned on its head. In the historical framework of social contract theory,
evidence that engagement needs constantly renewed and expanded in order
the presumed default position is that of a legal opt-out: there is some kind
to win an election. Party (as well as Union) membership is a Modern feature
(to be specified) of a priori, original consent, allegedly given by any indivi-
that is likely to become increasingly less common.
dual subject to the political State, to be governed by the latter and its laws.
The problem is to understand how such consent is given and what happens
D.3 Social vs. Political Space
when the agent opts out of it (the out-law). In the hyperhistorical framework,
the expected default position is that of a social opt-in, which is exercised
whenever the agent subjects itself to the political MAS conditionally, for a
Understanding the previous inversion of default positions means being faced
specific purpose. Gathering consent around specific political issues becomes
by a further problem. Oversimplifying, in prehistory, the social and the poli-
a continuous process. The problem is to understand what may motivate or
tical spaces overlap because, in a stateless society, there is no real difference
indeed force agents (again, not just individual human beings, but all kinds
between social and political relations and hence interactions. In history, the
of agents) to give such consent and become engaged, and what happens
State seeks to maintain such co-extensiveness by occupying all the social
when such agents, unengaged by default (note, not disengaged, for disenga-
space politically, thus establishing the primacy of the political over the social.
gement presupposes a previous state of engagement) prefer to stay away
We have seen above that this may be based on normative or economic
from the activities of the political MAS. Failing to grasp the previous trans-
strategies, through the exercise of power, force, control, and rule-making.
formation from historical opt-out to hyperhistorical opt-in means being less
In hyperhistory, the social space is the original, default space from which
likely to understand the apparent inconsistency between the disenchantment
agents may move to (consent to) join the political space. It is not accidental
of individuals with politics and the popularity of global movements, inter-
that concepts such as civil society, public sphere (also in a non-Haberma-
national mobilisations, activism, voluntarism, and other social forces with
sian sense) and community become increasingly important the more we
- 45 -
move into a hyperhistorical context. The problem is to understand such social
and coordinated into a MAS, then the issuing agent has the new agency to
space where agents of various kinds are supposed to be interacting and give
make coffee at a set time. It is now the MAS that has a more complex capa-
rise to the political MAS.
city, and that may or may not work properly.
Each agent, as described in section four, has some degrees of freedom. By
A social space is thus the totality of degrees of freedom of the agents one
this I do not mean liberty, autonomy or self-determination, but rather, in
wishes to take into consideration. In history, such consideration—which
the robotic sense, some capacities or abilities, supported by the relevant
is really just another level of abstraction— was largely determined by the
resources, to engage in specific actions for a specific purpose. To use an
territory and hence by a variety of forms of neighbourhood. In the example
elementary example, a coffee machine has one degree of freedom: it can
above, all the agents taken into consideration are chosen because of their
make coffee, once the right ingredients and energy are supplied. The sum of
relations to the same “Island of Despair”. We saw that ICTs have changed
these agent’s degrees of freedom are its “agency”. When the agent is alone,
all this. In hyperhistory, where to draw the line to include or indeed exclude
there is of course only agency, no social let alone political space. Imagine
the relevant agents whose degrees of freedom constitute the social space
Robinson Crusoe on his “Island of Despair”. However, as soon as there is
has become increasingly a matter of at least implicit choice, when not of
another agent (Friday on the “Island of Despair”), or indeed a group of agents
explicit decision. The result is that the phenomenon of distributed morality,
(the native cannibals, the shipwrecked Spaniards, the English mutineers),
encompassing that of distributed responsibility, is becoming more and more
agency acquires the further value of multi-agent (i.e. social) interaction: prac-
common (Floridi forthcoming). In either case, history or hyperhistory, what
tices and then rules for coordination and constraint of the agents’ degrees of
counts as a social space may be a political move. Globalisation is a de-terri-
freedom become essential, initially for the well-being of the agents consti-
torialisation in this political sense.
tuting the MAS, and then for the well-being of the MAS itself. Note the shift
in the level of abstraction: once the social space arises, we begin to consider
If we now turn to the political space in which the new MASs operate, it would
the group as a group—e.g., as a community, or as a society—and the actions
be a mistake to consider it a separate space, over and above the social one:
of the individual agents constituting it become elements that lead to the
both are determined by the same totality of the agents’ degrees of freedom.
MAS’ newly established degrees of freedom, or agency. The previous simple
The political space emerges when the complexity of the social space—
example may still help. Consider now a coffee machine and a timer: separa-
understood in terms of number and kinds of interactions and of agents
tely, they are two agents with different agency, but if they are properly joined
involved, and of degree of dynamic reconfiguring of both agents and interac-
- 46 -
tions—requires the prevention or resolution of potential divergences and the
the political space. Compare two cases in which rules determine a game.
coordination or collaboration about potential convergences. Both are crucial.
In chess, the rules do not merely constrain the game, they are the game
And in each case more information is required, in terms of representation
because they do not supervene on a previous activity: rather, they are the
and deliberation about a complex multitude of degrees of freedom. The
necessary and sufficient conditions that determine all and only the moves
result is that the social space becomes politicised through its informatization.
that can be legally made. In football, however, the rules are constraints
because the agents enjoy a previous and basic degree of freedom, consisting
in their capacity to kick a ball with the foot in order to score a goal, which
D.4 Legitimacy
the rules are supposed to regulate. Whereas it is physically possible, but
makes no sense, to place two pawns on the same square of a chessboard,
It is when the agents in the social space agree to agree on how to deal with
nothing impeded Maradona’s ‘hand of God’ from scoring a goal,8 and that to
their divergences (conflicts) and convergences that the social space acquires
be allowed by a referee who did not see the infringement.
the political dimension to which we are so used.
Once we avoid the previous mistakes, it is easier to see that the political
Two potential mistakes await us here. One, call it Hobbesian, is to consider
space is that area of the social space constrained by the agreement to agree
politics merely as the prevention of war by other means. This is not the case,
on resolution of divergences and coordination of convergences. This leads to
because even a complex society of angels (homo hominis agnus) would still
a further consideration, concerning the Transparent State.
require politics in order to further its harmony. Convergences too need politics. Out of metaphor, politics is not just about conflicts due to the agents’
exercises of their degree of freedom when pursuing their goals. It is also,
or at least it should be, above all, the furthering of coordination and collaboration by means other than coercion and violence. Second, and one may
call this potential mistake Rousseauian, it may seem that the political space
8 In Argentina v England (1986 FIFA World Cup), Maradona scored a goal by using his hand.
“The ball went into the goal. Referee Ali Bin Nasser of Tunisia did not see the infringement and allowed the goal, much to the chagrin of the English players and management”,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina_v_England_(1986_FIFA_World_Cup)#.22Hand_of_
God.22_goal
is then just that part of the social space organised by law. In this case, the
mistake is subtler. We usually associate the political space with the rules or
laws that regulate it but the latter are not constitutive, by themselves, of
- 47 -
E. The Transparent State
oxygen that we breathe. It strives to be the ideal butler. There is no standard
terminology for this kind of transparent State that becomes perceivable only
There are two senses in which the State can be transparent. Unsurprisingly,
when it is absent. Perhaps one may speak of Gentle Government. It seems
both come from ICTs and computer science, one more case in which the
that the State can increasingly support the right sort of ethical infrastructure
information revolution is changing our mental frameworks.
the more transparently (that is, openly and gently) it plays the negotiating
game through which it takes care of the res publica.
On the one hand, the State can be transparent in the sense that it moves
from being a black box to being a white box. Citizens not only can see inputs
Conclusion
and outputs, for example levels of tax revenue and public expenditure,
they can also monitor how the State as a MAS works internally. This is not
a novelty at all. It was a principle already popularised in the 19th century,
Six thousand years ago, a generation of humans witnessed the invention of
when the State as we know it was in its infancy. However, it has become a
writing and the emergence of the State. This is not accidental. Prehistoric
renewed feature of contemporary politics due to the possibilities opened up
societies are both ICT-less and stateless. The State is a typical historical
by ICTs. This kind of transparency is also known as Open Government.
phenomenon. It emerges when human groups stop living in small communities a hand-to-mouth existence and begin to live a mouth-to-hand one, in
On the other hand, and this is the more innovative sense that I wish to stress
which large communities become political societies, with division of labour
in this contribution, the State can be transparent in the same sense in which
and specialised roles, organised under some form of government, which
a technology (e.g., an interface) is: invisible not because it is not there but
manages resources through the control of ICTs. From taxes to legislation,
because it delivers its services so efficiently, effectively, and reliably that
from the administration of justice to military force, from census to social
its presence is imperceptible. When something works at its best, behind the
infrastructure, the State is the ultimate information agent and so history is
scenes as it were, to make sure that we can operate as easily as possible,
the age of the State.
then we have a transparent system. This second sense of transparency
should not be seen as a surreptitious way of introducing, with a different
Almost halfway between the beginning of history and now, Plato was still
terminology, the concept of “Small State” or “Small Governance”. On the
trying to make sense of both radical changes: the encoding of memories
contrary, in this second sense, the State is as transparent and as vital as the
through written symbols and the symbiotic interactions between individual
- 48 -
References
and polis–State. In fifty years, our grandchildren may look at us as the last of
the historical, State-run generations, not so differently from the way we look
at the Amazonian tribes, as the last of the prehistorical, stateless societies. It
•
may take a long while before we shall come to understand in full such trans-
Floridi, Luciano. 2003. On the Intrinsic Value of Information Objects and
the Infosphere. Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4): 287-304.
formations, but it is time to start working on it.9
•
Floridi, Luciano. 2007. A look into the future impact of ICT on our lives.
The Information Society 23 (1): 59-64.
•
Floridi, Luciano. 2008. Artificial Intelligence’s New Frontier: Artificial Companions and the Fourth Revolution. Metaphilosophy 39 (4/5):
651-655.
•
Floridi, Luciano. 2010. Information - A Very Short Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
•
Floridi, Luciano. 2011. The Philosophy of Information. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
•
Floridi, Luciano. forthcoming. The Ethics of Distributed Morality. Science
and Engineering Ethics.
•
Floridi, Luciano. forthcoming. The Ethics of Information. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
•
Floridi, Luciano, and Jeff W. Sanders. 2004. On the Morality of Artificial
Agents. Minds and Machines 14 (3): 349-379.
•
Floridi, Luciano, and Mariarosaria Taddeo, eds. forthcoming. The Ethics of
Information Warfare. New York: Springer.
9 Many thanks to Massimo Durante, Charles Ess, and Ugo Pagallo for their many valuable
comments on previous drafts of this paper.
- 49 -
Viewand
Exemples on
Hyper-connectivity
An initiative
of the
D. Fortunes and Misfortunes of Patients’ Associations
Contents1
A. Preliminary
52
B. G-rid Democracy
53
B.1. Evolution of the Social Fabric
53
B.2. Diffusion Modes
54
B.3. Network Topology
55
B.4. Institutions as Processors
56
B.5. Parallel Computing
56
B.6. Grid Computation and Modern Democracy
57
B.7. G-rid Democracy
57
C. Wikipedia, A Realized Utopia
C.1. Evolution of the Editorial Governance
58
C.2. Traditional Governance of Editorial Projects
59
C.3. Facilities Induced by ICTs
59
C.4. Wikipedia Editorial Governance
60
C.5. An Unexpected Success
61
D.1. Preliminary
62
D.2. Brief Historical Recall
62
D.3. Medical Nemesis 63
D.4. Forty Years Later
64
D.5. The Shattering of Institutions
65
E. The Digital “Aura” in a World of Abundance
58
- 51 -
62
67
E.1. From Scarcity to Abundance
67
E.2. The Loss of the Aura 68
E.3. The Digital “Aura”
69
A. Preliminary
which individuals access knowledge and their internal memories are deeply
modified, which transforms human cognitive ability.
There can be no doubt that the information and communication technologies
(ICT) deeply impact the human society. The difficulty in appraising their effect
However, we think that hyper-connectivity is the main factor of change,
and anticipating the concomitant changes lies in the depth of that impact.
which means that, even if we face huge individual cognitive transforma-
In an attempt to understand the present evolutions, we propose to uncover
tion, this will have far less influence on society than network connectivity.
the underlying structure of this new world by revisiting its dependencies on
Our chapter investigates this point by referring to some concrete examples.
the hyper-connectivity on which it is grounded, and the consequences of this
More precisely, it first shows that the analysis of social networks cannot
hyper-connectivity, in modifying profoundly the network of inter-individual
be reduced to a study of the topology of connections, but has to take into
relations. Where we used to have ten to fifty close friends living near us, with
account the processes and their reciprocal dependences, e.g. their synchro-
whom we shared convivial relations, we may now have hundreds of acquain-
nicity or precedence relations. Then, it analyses the nature of present trans-
tances living on other continents, with which we currently exchange specia-
formations on three examples that refer respectively to the change in our
lized information about our main fields of interest that can be professional,
access to knowledge, to the change in the solidarity and assistance between
artistic or related to any kind of hobby. It naturally follows from these major
people and, thirdly, to the status and nature of artistic work. In each case,
changes in the scale and nature of individual relationships that the social
the network influences power relationships. Old well-established authorities
fabric is dramatically evolving. Therefore, to quote Aristotle, since “man is by
are questioned while new forms of domination emerge.
nature a social animal,” humanity is changing because society is changing.
But, how are humans and society changing? And, what does it mean to be
In other words, next to the three traditional Kantian questions, “What can
human, in this new society? It is to these questions we should like to address.
I know?”, “What ought I to do?” and “What may I hope?”, we would like to
Besides, the hyper-connected world is also a world of hyper-memorisability,
answer three current questions, “How can I know now?”, “How ought I to do,
where all the information is stored in huge databases and accessible anytime
now?” and “How may I hope, now?”, where “how” refers ways in which things
from anywhere, without any oblivion. And, it is a world of hyper-reproducibi-
are done and, more precisely, to the power relationships which make things
lity and hyper-diffusibility, where all the knowledge, and more generally, all
possible or impossible.
the works of the mind, i.e. all the music, all the paintings, all the movies, etc.
can be freely and massively reproduced and diffused. So, both the way in
- 52 -
B. G-rid Democracy
We deal with the first question by studying the way common knowledge is
built in a collaborative encyclopedia, namely Wikipedia, which greatly leve-
B.1. Evolution of the Social Fabric
rages on the properties of hyper-connectivity of the network. Note that, with
modern computers and telecommunication networks, the role and the status
of experiments are changing, which contributes to an epistemological break-
With the development of communication technologies, the interlacing of
through1
and therefore on the construction of knowledge. However, what we
inter-individual relationships has become progressively intricate and difficult
are interested in here is not the way new knowledge is built by scientists,
to comprehend. During thousands of years relationships have been mainly
but the way common knowledge is disseminated to the whole society when
hierarchically structured by families or tribes, and more or less anchored on
traditional authorities are no longer valid.
territory.
The second question is illustrated by a very particular example, which is the
The invention of scripture, horse transportation, printing techniques, the
surprising evolution of patients’ associations with improvements in commu-
compass, the triangular sail, steam machines, the telegraph, the radio, the
nication technologies. It clearly illustrates the new forms of solidarity that
telephone and now the web have each contributed to the extension of human
emerge in a networked society. Lastly, we deal with social recognition, which
interactions into wider spaces. Authority relations have expanded in scope
is the ultimate hope of humans, in a society where the abundance of infor-
from family, group, tribe and city to kingdom, nation, empire, continents, etc.
mation blurs the contributions and merits of all kinds.
And communication tools played a central role in these political transformations. In parallel with the extension of the scope of social interactions,
societies have often admitted simultaneously different powers, e.g. temporal
versus spiritual, local versus global, corporate versus central, etc., concomitance of which has been facilitated by the development of communication
technologies. For instance, printing techniques played an important role in
the dissemination of ideas, which contributed to the rise of Protestantism. In
the same vein, the decreasing cost of paper and the industrialization of print
1 Ganascia J.-G., “In silico’ Experiments : Towards a Computerized Epistemology”, in Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Piotr Boltuc (ed), American Philosophical Association
Newsletters, 07 (2), 11-15, Spr. 2008, ISSN 1067-9464
processes in the 19th century allowed the emergence of a broad audience
popular press.
- 53 -
Here, we attempt to draw a parallel between the social fabric, which results
ment of newspaper, and, the 20th, with radio and with television, that broad-
from the interlacing of individual relationships, and distributed computing.
casting took off.
More precisely, to record the structure of modern societies, we refer to the
topology of computer networks and the architecture of parallel machines.
Note that, in addition to these different modes of diffusion, which define
We hope that this will help us see the “OnLife” human condition from a
different logics of communication, spatial proximity plays an important role,
new and fruitful angle and that this could also help to clarify the notion of
or more precisely, played a crucial role during thousands of years while,
hyper-connectivity, referred to above.
today, with electronic communications, it plays no role at all. More precisely, technological enhancements considerably increase the scope and the
speed of information exchanges, ultimately making all the communications
B.2. Diffusion Modes
quasi-instantaneous on the surface of the earth.
It appears obvious that the connections between humans depend on their
Lastly, there are multiple communication networks that may coexist simul-
ability to exchange information and the way they communicate, both
taneously, which does not mean that everybody has access to all of these
greatly affected by the development of ICTs. Classically, telecommuni-
networks. Indeed, for different reason related for instance to physical proxi-
cation engineers distinguish different modes of diffusion: unicast, where
mity, the language used, the necessary equipment, etc. between networks
the exchange of information comes from one point – the sender – to one
are barriers that are difficult to cross. However, with the Internet this multi-
another – the receiver –, broadcast, where one point – the sender – sends
plicity of co-existing networks tends to be reduced. To illustrate this, let
simultaneously to all other points, and the multicast, where the information
us remind ourselves that the word Internet is an abbreviation of the inter-
is distributed from one point to a selected set of receivers. Those modes can
network locution, which means that this network originally constituted an
easily be reused to qualify human communications, which can be assimi-
attempt to connect all previous existing networks.
lated either to inter-individual, i.e. to unicast, or to collective exchanges, i.e.
multicast. However, natural communications do not allow exchange from one
person to all, that is to say, in technical terms, to broadcast information. It is
only with mass media, at the end of the 19th century, i.e. with the develop-
- 54 -
B.3. Network Topology
propaganda. However, writing was not only used by the central power in
Mesopotamia and poets very soon took advantage of writing to play with
The network topology corresponds to the arrangement of nodes through
words and signs2. Moreover, in the 20th century, the sole purpose of broad-
connections, i.e. to the structure of the network. It may be highly or weakly
cast was not to enable totalitarian regimes to enforce their power over indi-
connected and more or less centralized, which corresponds to different
viduals.
shapes. Among the most current forms, we can include rings, stars, buses,
hierarchies, trees, mesh networks, partially or totally connected graphs, etc.
Today, the web constitutes a fully connected network that covers the entire
In addition to the shape, cardinality, i.e. the size, and the degree of nodes,
planet. Its topology is studied by a new network science that tries to unders-
characterize the network. The shape depends heavily on the mode of diffu-
tand the properties of big graphs. Besides the size of this network and its
sion. For instance, unicast gives birth to topologies like rings, while broad-
“Deterritorialization” (i.e. the fact that connections are independent of land),
cast facilitates the emergence of stars and multicast generates hierarchies.
the mode of diffusion of the Internet, that is mainly unicast and multicast –
It also appears clear that the two last network characteristics, i.e. cardina-
in contrast with mass media, essentially broadcast – greatly transforms the
lity and the degree of the nodes, are strongly influenced by the development
shape of the network, breaking classical well-ordered topologies like stars,
of technologies, which considerably increase the number of people to whom
rings or hierarchies, to become a huge meshed network.
each one can be connected.
The web will certainly affect political forms; some people claim that it will
The topology certainly impacts power relations, which, in turn, influences
give birth to a new participative democracy, under which the influence of the
political forms in a way that is not yet fully understood. For instance, writing
nation is diminished or where sovereignty no longer stands. Nevertheless,
was invented in Mesopotamia for the sake of the Royal administration, which
the recent emergence of populism in Europe shows the weakness of these
hoped to centralize information. By the turn of the 18th century, the deve-
assumptions. To conclude, we cannot extrapolate the exact nature of trans-
lopment of printing techniques and public postal services based on modern
formation from an analysis of the topology of the network, neither can we
transportation (mail coach and railways) contributed to the creation of
use it to further characterize the state of society as, in itself, the topology is
hierarchically organized networks that have enforced the power of administrations. The development of broadcasted mass media in the 20th century
with radio, movies and television, helped totalitarian regimes to prevail using
2 Jean-Jacques Glassner, Ecrire à Sumer, 2000, éditions du Seuil, Paris.
- 55 -
static and consequently does not reflect social processes and the part they
However, with the geographical extension of political entities, the increasing
play in evolution of society.
number of people and the multiplication of tasks, institutions cannot work
undivided in one place. They need to split and work in parallel. Therefore, it is
possible to analyze institutions as parallel processors.
B.4. Institutions as Processors
B.5. Parallel Computing
To approach the social dynamic, I propose to refer to institutions viewed as
relatively stable formal social structures that are intended to play a role in
society. This definition of institutions is sufficiently vague to be discussed,
Before going into the detail of the analysis of institutions as parallel proces-
but the purpose here is not to give a precise account of this concept. We
sors, let us remind ourselves that people classically distinguish data flow and
just want to examine the social structures in charge of coordinating human
instruction flow, both of which can be single or multiple. This gives birth to
activities such as family, school, university, police, justice, etc. Each of those
four possibilities that are, SISD (single instruction, single data), SIMD (single
institutions has a function, for instance, the family is concerned with repro-
instruction, multiple data), MISD (multiple instructions, single data) and MIMD
duction, the school with education, the police with repression, justice with
(multiple instructions, multiple data). Further, along with grid computation,
the punishment of law infringement, etc. To achieve these functions, insti-
has recently appeared the possibility to distribute computation on myriads of
tutions can be viewed as processors that have tasks at their disposal. For
distant processors that are available through the Internet.
instance, schools provide teaching, justice considers breaches to the law and
puts people in jail or makes them pay fines, the police arrest criminals, etc.
As previously said, classical institutions can be assimilated to SISD, since
they work as a central processor, but, as soon as the task becomes complex,
In ancient times, when people were grouped in tribes, cities or small king-
assemblies tend to divide in specialized commissions and working groups.
doms, decisions were centralized in a unique place, the agora, the senate or
In the latter case, the institution can be viewed as MISD, because different
the monarch’s palace. Using a computer metaphor, we can then assimilate
algorithms, based on different background knowledge, work in parallel on the
institutions to single processors, eventually to multi-task processors, when
same set of data.
the same institution, for instance the agora, has different functions.
- 56 -
It may happen that some institutions have to apply the same procedures on
a consequence, the general architecture that corresponds to the new social
different data, which corresponds to the SIMD architecture. This is obviously
landscape is no longer hierarchical, neither circular nor “starred”, but meshed,
the case with schools having to teach the same things to different pupils
because connections are more or less randomly created between institutions,
organized into different classes. It’s also the case with justice, which has to
as required, no longer with geographical, moral or legal constraints.
judge all violations of law with the same rules.
Besides this meshed topology, institutions perform tasks on demand, accorLastly, some modern institutions can accept simultaneously multiple instruc-
ding to their own agenda and to their availability. This results in a totally
tions and multiple data (MIMD). However, whatever processor architecture
distributed and delocalized scenery, corresponding to the grid computation
corresponds to institutions, it is usually well ordered in a way that prevents
model. Put otherwise, the general model on which democracy is based is
conflicts.
no longer a centralized democracy as in Ancient Greece, with institutions
like the agora. Neither is it a representative democracy based on the legal
institutions of the Modern Age with assemblies, voting, constitutions etc. It
B.6. Grid Computation and Modern Democracy
corresponds to a new form of democracy that we shall call “Grid Democracy,”
because its structure reflects grid computation architecture, i.e. a meshed
As previously said, due to the many computers connected on Internet, it is
topology and a distributed and delocalized decision processes.
now possible to distribute computations to all distant processors available
through the web. This corresponds to the grid computation, mentioned above,
which allows freely sharing of heterogeneous and delocalized resources.
B.7. G-rid Democracy
With the Internet, traditional institutions, and especially democratic insti-
To conclude, let us recall that computer scientists know that changing
tutions that contribute to government, for instance assemblies, voting, etc.
machine architecture requires changing the algorithms. The introduction
tend to be highly transformed. The notion of political representation, which
of parallel computation forces us to rethink the processes that solve tasks,
has been rendered necessary because of the difficulties to communicate,
according to the type of parallelism used (SISD, MISD, …). Sometimes, this
tends, more and more often, to be substituted by stakeholders, which can
may lead to very efficient solutions, but not always; in any case, whatever
be non-governmental organizations, private societies, associations, etc. As
- 57 -
happens, we need to totally rewrite the programs according to the type of
in the creation of encyclopedias. Some even imagined that everybody would
parallelism that is implemented.
be able to freely contribute to the content of encyclopedias.
It seems to be the same with “grid democracy”: the procedures that demo-
More precisely, the structure of the Internet allows readers to participate
cratic institutions implement, like voting, decisions, public consultation, etc.
in the writing process by giving their opinion and by initiating or modifying
need to be re-thought and rewritten. In a way, this appears to be very posi-
articles. Readers become writers and may decide for themselves the items
tive, because the old hierarchies and traditional authoritarian relations seem
they want. The role of publishers is then transformed: they don’t create order
to disappear, which means that with “grid democracy” the democracy gets
any more. They arbitrate conflicts between authors/writers and ensure that
rid of ancient and cumbersome constraints. But, in this way, democracy also
the basic rules of ethics, for instance the rule of neutrality, are respected.
gets rid of many traditional democratic institutions and the fear is that this
might leads to democracy itself being got rid of.
This has resulted in new forms of editorial governance for encyclopedic
corpuses characterized by a reversal, more or less extensive, of the social
hierarchy for the administration of these projects. This text gives an account
C. Wikipedia, A Realized Utopia
of the governance of some of encyclopedic editorial projects, notably that of
Wikipedia.
C.1. Evolution of the Editorial Governance
Note that in the beginning, many of the well-informed specialists thought
With the development of ICTs, the physical constraints related to the produc-
that it was impossible to make the reader a writer. For instance, I organized a
tion and reading of books were significantly reduced. Very soon, many
working group in 1995 on the evolution of books3. While some had suggested
rejoiced in the new possibilities that seemed to be opening. They saw a
the possibility, with the web, of building an open encyclopedia, the most
great flexibility in the development and updating of encyclopedias and their
eminent specialist in this group, Sylvain Auroux, a famous linguist and editor
consultation. They also saw the possibility to greatly reduce manufacturing
of many collective books and encyclopedias, affirmed that an encyclopedia
and distribution costs, since it was no longer necessary to resort to printing
needs a closure. What is interesting with the Wikipedia project is that it has
on paper. Very early, some hoped to exploit these techniques to transform
the validation procedures and to have the reader play a more important role
3 Report on eBook (in French) - http://www-poleia.lip6.fr/GIS.COGNITION/livr.html
- 58 -
denied such authoritarian claims. However, as we shall see, it substitutes a
The publishers ordered the authors to write articles on pre-specified topics.
new social organization for the old one, which is interesting to analyze.
The authors made their copy under the authority of publishers and had to
revise their contribution according to the publishers’ comments. Finally, the
readers were happy to get the finished product, without intervening at any
C.2. Traditional Governance of Editorial Projects
time in its realization.
To understand what has happened, let us first recall that the word “ency-
C.3. Facilities Induced by ICTs
clopedia” comes etymologically from “cycle”: an encyclopedia aims to
surround and to enclose all the human knowledge at a given time. To this
end, use is made of the best specialists in all the fields of knowledge. The
With the introduction of ICTs, many technical constraints that had influenced
Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert, in the eighteenth century, is quite
the realization of traditional encyclopedias were lifted. Briefly speaking,
illustrative of this idea: it has resorted to 160 contributors, with various trai-
below are some of these disappearing constraints.
ning and jobs. Together they wrote 72,000 articles.
1. It is no longer necessary to print an encyclopedia for broadcast.
To implement such a project, a rigorous organization had been erected. The
2. Since there is no mass printing, the cost of distributing the encyclopedia
Encyclopedists have distinguished three functions between which they esta-
is extremely small, ultimately becoming quasi-negligible.
blished a strict hierarchy:
3. The encyclopedia is accessible anytime, anywhere, without any routing
problem. As a result, the potential audience is vast, since all humans who
• Publisher: responsible for recruiting authors, ordering and monitoring
read the language in which the encyclopedia is written are likely to use it.
their work,
4. With the point-to-point communication, readers can easily send
• Authors, appointed and controlled by the publishers and
comments and exchange on the articles they read. They can also rewrite
• Readers, who were neither supposed to contribute, nor participate in any
them.
way to the making of the encyclopedia.
- 59 -
These four points have two major consequences:
C.4. Wikipedia Editorial Governance
1. Since the cost of production and distribution are virtually nil we can
The Wikipedia model was developed from 2001. It has totally changed the
easily multiply versions, to the point of making local changes whenever
game by claiming to refuse any social hierarchy and any form of stratifica-
it seems appropriate, without waiting for a global revision. Nothing
tion.
prohibits a permanent rewriting or even a continuous writing of the
encyclopedia.
To assess the impact of this model, it is difficult to speak of success or achie-
2. Since readers can send their comments, nothing prevents us to take
vement, because it is a massive social phenomenon.
advantage of their contributions and —why not? — to offer them the
opportunity to write articles and become authors.
The numbers speak for themselves: more than 4 million articles in English
(September 2012), over 22 million articles in 285 languages, 77,000 active
All of this leads to evolve the classical triad “author - publisher - reader”.
contributors and some 470 million visitors per month (February 2012).
The results of these changes have brought about new modes of governance
Behind this surprising success, there is a social project. The designers of this
for the editorial process. However, technology is not deterministic: it does not
encyclopedia purport to create a new form of democracy based on a model
induce a single mode of governance; several online encyclopedic editorial
of self-organization completed by a few basic ethical principles, for example,
organizations coexist today. Not to extend the text of this contribution too
the requirement of neutrality and the prohibition on intervention in an article
far, we restrict ourselves here to the depiction of the governance model for
on an issue that concerns us directly.
Wikipedia, but there are many others.
More precisely, the encyclopedia Wikipedia involves different categories of
actors that perform different function, but between which it claims not to
establish any hierarchy, rather just regulations or rules:
- 60 -
•
Jimmy Wales, nominally in a position of ultimate authority,
•
The arbitration committee (15-18 members)
•
The “Bureaucrats” (34)
basic ethical rules, such behaviors are strictly condemned. Users considered
•
The Administrators (700 vicinity), as guilty are no longer allowed access to the encyclopedia. More precisely,
(Administrators, “bureaucrats”, and Arbitration Committee shall ensure
they can continue to consult the encyclopedia, but are not able to edit and to
that the principles of the encyclopedia are respected. They do not inter-
modify articles related to their business.
vene in the article contents)
•
Thematic editors (elected – 70 to 80% acceptance rate), these support
C.5. An Unexpected Success
items they monitor developments
•
Contributors (77,000 registered)
•
Registered readers who vote,
In conclusion, let us first recall that the success of Wikipedia was much unex-
•
Visitors (15 million visits per day in February 2012), finally,
pected. Before Wikipedia, the models of collaborative encyclopedias, which
•
Bots (i.e. intelligent artificial agents) that automatically correct spelling
were based on free and spontaneous public contributions, surprised most
errors, syntax or presentation items.
of the experts in encyclopedia publishing. For them, it was more of a naive
utopian view than a possible reality.
This organizational structure is completed by oversight mechanisms. Through
them, specialized editors examine the corrections of the items they support
As a consequence of the success of the new models, it seems that old
so as to locate abnormal activities, which are mainly recurring corrections
models, based on respect for skills and knowledge, are at risk of disappea-
on the same items. This helps to fight against what the developers of this
ring. Moreover, the new models, especially the one that Wikipedia represents,
encyclopedia use to call “vandalism” and which consists, for the most part, in
raise many questions about the status of knowledge in society, its financing
large corporations or associations altering articles that concern them in order
and control, and on those who can and must exercise control. In this regard,
to improve their image.
there is concern that low-skilled groups, groups funded by governments or
private pressure groups outweigh experts. Or, conversely, that the rules too
So regularly there are representatives of institutions, corporations, political
strictly applied restrict the freedom of authors.
parties or philosophical positions (e.g. creationists), who attempt to correct
articles on themselves more or less directly, which goes against the prin-
Regardless of these issues on the new status of knowledge in society, we
ciple of neutrality on which Wikipedia relies. Considered inconsistent with the
have here a concrete example of a modern model of governance brought
- 61 -
about by the development of ICTs. This model of governance is interesting by
public order, the politicians to govern, etc. During May 1968 in many deve-
itself. But it could also be generalized to other online institutions.
loped states of Europe and in the United States of America, the young
generation contested the legitimacy of the traditional social roles and the
genuineness of all kinds of authority. The power of the police, the judges, the
D. Fortunes and Misfortunes of Patients’
Associations
doctors, the professors etc. was questioned and debated. In the years that
followed, society was traversed by attempts to change the social fabric, in a
way that has led to a decrease in the power of traditional authorities.
D.1. Preliminary
The development of computer networks originated at the same time, in the
The previous section consisted of a description of the Wikipedia encyclopedia,
late sixties, with ARPANET, which was supported by the DARPA (Defense
a concrete illustration of a new type of utopia realized thanks to the use of
Advanced Research Projects Agency). There was no direct connection
information technology. This new section confronts ideas from May 1968, a
between the militaries who had funded ARPANET and the political activists
period propitious to generous social utopias, to the current evolution of the
at the origin of the events of 1968. Nevertheless, a few years later, in the
society. We consider here another concrete illustration that is focused not on
seventies and in the eighties, people, who had been strongly influenced by
the editorial process, as in the case of Wikipedia, but on the evolution of the
the ideas of May 1968 in their young age, greatly contributed to the deve-
health system and its organization, in particular on the evolution of patients’
lopment of computer and network technologies. In particular, some of them
associations. It illustrates how solidarity relationships can subsist on the
initiated the free software movement, the purpose of which was to institute
networked society and how some people promote new principles of ethics.
a new economic order based on a social utopia that was characteristic of
that period4.
D.2. Brief Historical Recall
There naturally follows from these considerations a question about the very
nature and the origin of the OnLife society, i.e. about of the society that is
Less than half a century ago, in almost all western countries as in the socialist world and the developing nations, social roles were well-defined: the
4 Fred Turner, From counterculture to cyberculture. Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth network,
and the rise of digital utopianism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, illinois, U.S.A
teachers were there to teach, the physician to cure, the police to ensure
- 62 -
shaped by the information and communication technologies and, more speci-
To try to answer the question relevantly, we explore here the specific ques-
fically, by the web: Does the structure of this society correspond to the spirit
tion of health maintenance and its recent developments. In particular, we
of free movements of May 1968? Or is it fundamentally different, and why?
are interested in the social organization of health systems, in the evolutions
In favor of the influence of May 1968, one can note that many traditional
of the authority of physicians and health industries, and their influences on
and well-established institutions seem to lose their credit. The web facilitates
medical cares.
retroactions and interactive relations between actors, which prohibits unidirectional influences. For instance, some applications like “rate my profes-
D.3. Medical Nemesis
sor”5, “review your lawyer”6, “rateMDs” (rate Medical Doctors)7 etc. allow any
student, any consumer, any patient etc. to give publicly their own evaluations of authorities. In addition, the development of cheap and light cameras
As an introduction to this question, let us consider the work a famous
and their coupling to the web enable anyone to capture and to broadcast
essayist of the seventies, Ivan Illich, who was representative of the state
sensitive information about authorities, for instance about a policeman who
of the opinion during this period. He wrote many controversial books
beats people on a metro platform, without the mediation of intermediaries,
on very different topics; for instance, he brought into question the role of
like journalists. As a consequence, state institutions, newspapers, media and
public education and the school 8, the benefits of technology9, the necessity
authorities tend to loose their exclusive privileges. More generally, the domi-
to work10, etc. He has also denigrated the medical institution in a famous
nant status of the officially stated knowledge may be publicly discredited on
book entitled “Medical Nemesis”11 where he denounced the omnipotence
networks. All of this might incline us to conclude that the networked society
of medical knowledge, which was quite unusual at this time. More preci-
realizes the spirit of May 1968. However, against this thesis, we note that
sely, he said that most of the successes of which the physicians prevailed in
the unbalanced power of the market has never been so important and that
the second half of the 19th and in the 20th century were illusory, because
social solidarity and public generosity seem to decline.
8 Deschooling Society. 1971.
5 http://blog.ratemyprofessors.com/
9 Energy and Equity. 1974 and Blasphemy: A Radical Critique of Our Technological Culture.
We the People. Morristown, NJ: Aaron Press. July 1995.
6 http://www.avvo.com/review-your-lawyer or
10The Right to Useful Unemployment. 1978 and Toward a History of Needs. 1978. 7 http://www.ratemds.com/
11Medical Nemesis. London: Calder & Boyars. 1974. - 63 -
they were not really due to modern medicine, but to social progresses, to
consequences of their pathology by exchanging information about treat-
hygiene and to the evolution of the standard of life. In contrast, he blamed
ments and practical aspects of social life and sustenance. At this time, there
the medical authorities who, according to him, were not only responsible for
was no web, but the patient associations took advantage of the progress of
the induction of iatrogenic diseases, i.e. of diseases that result from treat-
information and communication technology, especially the telephone, to help
ments or therapies, but also of human engineering, which has led to what he
exchanges, and the radio to advertise the associations.
called a social “iatrogenesis”, i.e. to the development of a social life and of
an economy under medical control and under the domination of the health
D.4. Forty Years Later
industry. In other words, he accused the medical body of not taking into
account the real needs of patients, but only their own interests.
Forty years later, there are tens of thousands of patient associations12,
Ivan Illich proposed a few solutions to make the social organization of health
which all use information and communication technologies to ensure their
more health-serving than industry-serving. Among them, he supported the
promotion, to exchange knowledge and to educate people. These associa-
recognition of many health professions, like herbalists, masseurs or yoga
tions not only help patients to get practical information about their disease
instructors, against whom he called the “Professional Mafia” of physicians. He
and the most appropriate treatments, but they act as lobbies and stakehol-
also recommended the promotion of health maintenance rather than sick-
ders in the health domain. For instance, they press public authorities to
care and payment with a fixed amount per capita rather than a fee-for-ser-
fund specific treatments and research; they urge pharmaceutical industries
vice. But, the most interesting suggestion for us here was to stimulate a
to develop new drugs; they force regulators to speed up evaluation proce-
patient-oriented medicine, rather than a milieu-centered medicine. He then
dures to facilitate the adoption of new medications; they analyze research
encouraged patients to organize groups for exchanging information about
protocols; they expose side-effects of treatments etc. The case of AIDS was
their diseases and how to live with the disease, and also for pressing govern-
particularly illustrative: very strong associations of patients forced medical,
ments to give public funds for research or industries to design new therapies,
industrial and public authorities to boost research and to accelerate adminis
more adapted to their cases.
Then, in the seventies and the eighties, associations of patients for specific
12For instance, the French HAS (« Haute Autorité de la Santé ») has counted more than 14
000 associations of patients for the only France.
diseases, especially chronic diseases, were formed to help ill people face the
- 64 -
trative procedures, to provide new treatments that have totally changed the
influence, it needs to employ full time administrators, who quickly establish
outcome of the disease.
a kind of bureaucracy, whose aims are a long way away from patients’ interests: quite naturally, these administrators become mainly occupied with
More generally, patients’ organizations take part in the negotiations between
the influence of their organization, which justifies their employment and
state authorities, research organizations and pharmaceutical industries. They
satisfies their personal ambitions. As a consequence, their prior concern is
are considered as official actors, which gives them power and recognition.
that their organization be considered as an essential stakeholder, and then
In this regard, the proposition of Ivan Illich, which was to promote groups
that it be involved in the main decisions, even if this activity has no direct
of patient to impose public control over the organization of medicine, has
relationship with patients’ interests and care. For instance, they want to be
been granted. We could conclude from this that the spirit of May 1968 won.
involved in new clinical trials and in the discussion with health care orga-
And, undoubtedly, things have considerably changed due, in part, to the use
nizations about reimbursement of treatments. It may then happen that
of modern information and communication technologies, which greatly faci-
industries would secretly negotiate with patient’s organizations to consti-
litates the retroaction of patient’s associations in public debates and the
tute coalitions of interests against state organizations or against physician
mobilization through the network of disseminated patients, who can now
organizations. In such cases, the patients’ organizations no longer represent
exert a strong pressure in case of need.
the interests of patients, but their own interests, which may coincide to the
interests of pharmaceutical industries, because they give them funds. It
However, recently, many
people13
have denounced the opacity of patient
follows that the current situation looks to be far away from the spirit of May
association funding, which comes partly from industries. To clarify this point,
1968, even if the patients’ associations oppose to the body of physicians and
let us recall that, when a patients’ organization grows up and augments its
its domination.
13Colombo C, Mosconi P, Villani W, Garattini S (2012) Patient Organizations’ Funding
from Pharmaceutical Companies: Is Disclosure Clear, Complete and Accessible to the
Public? An Italian Survey. PLoS ONE 7(5): e34974. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034974
Mosconi P, Colombo C (2010) Fostering a strategic alliance between patients’ associations and health care professionals. J Ambul Care Manage 33(3): 223–230.
Rothman SM, Raveis VH, Friedman A, Rothman DJ (2011) Health advocacy organizations
and the pharmaceutical industry: an analysis of disclosure practices. American Journal of
Public Health 101(4): 602–609.
D.5. The Shattering of Institutions
As already mentioned, the patient’s associations take advantage of the web
to increase their influence and to disseminate information to their participants. Since the web allows the direct mobilization of the people, it certainly
- 65 -
leads patient’s association to increase their influence. This is consistent with
In parallel, some physicians, who are not well recognized by the official bodies
the idea that traditional institutions, like medical authorities, now need to
of their profession, have taken advantage of the web to constitute them-
share their influence with new actors. In the case of patients’ organizations,
selves as advice givers. They promote, via medicine 2.0, new approaches of
it means that people, affected by the same disease, can now be connected
medicine that allow patients themselves to take charge, by being informed
throughout the web and exert a strong influence, while in the past, they
about their disease and possible therapies, and by adapting their treat-
would have remained isolated.
ment to their needs, according to their own knowledge and personal choices.
Without going into the details of this new medical practice, which include
Nevertheless, with the development of the web and, in particular, with the
self-medication, i.e. the process of prescribing treatment oneself, note that
participative web, new phenomena happen that make the official status of
it is very often opposed to institutional medicine, while meeting the needs of
both patients’ and physicians’ organizations more difficult.
patients who are seeking for information on the web. Besides, it is noteworthy
that today, because of access to scientific knowledge through the Internet,
To understand the current situation, let us recall that, as previously said, as
many patients affected by chronic diseases have a better knowledge of their
they grow up, the patients’ organizations are moving away from patients’
pathology and of the state of the art in the care of their condition than their
interests, towards their own interest, that is to increase their influence.
own medical practitioner.
Therefore, individual patients are less and less motivated by these organizations. In addition, they now become able to get information by themselves,
It follows from this that the body of physicians, which had been forced to
throughout the web, and to get in touch directly, through social networks,
negotiate with different actors, after having dominated alone the whole
with other people that are affected by the same disease, with whom they
health system for a long time, is now burst in the same way as patients’
can easily share their experiences. As a consequence, we observe that many
organizations. These phenomena correspond to recent, unexpected and
patients leave patients’ organizations. Paradoxically, these last are always
unpredictable social change. This unpredictability renders it difficult to
official representatives of patients in public negotiations, although many
answer our initial question, which concerned the parallel between the recent
patients are not affiliated. In other words, the patients’ organizations that
evolution of the OnLife society and the utopia of May 1968. On the one hand,
have become progressively recognized as official institutions shatter under
it is certain that information technologies have deeply changed society and
the effect of the Internet that allows patients to connect and interact each
have contributed to destroy the privileges of the old institutions like those
other, without their mediation.
- 66 -
of medical academies; on the other hand, it’s not obvious that the current
the one that is developed by Judith Simon (pp.140-145), to ethically condemn
evolution truly corresponds the ideals of May 1968.
the dissemination of wrong knowledge, as it was the case in the case above.
In conclusion, let us consider the current configuration where isolated
E. The Digital “Aura” in a World of Abundance
patients are seeking information about their disease on the web, while some
physicians disseminate information by themselves, without referring to the
E.1. From Scarcity to Abundance
knowledge of best specialists of their domain. The two parts are obviously
complementary. However, it may then happen that erroneous knowledge
circulates, while authorities, even when they give correct knowledge, are
Twenty years ago, I had a dream that was to live day and night, especially
discredited. That’s what happened two years ago, when many general prac-
the night, in a library. Today, this dream has become a reality: we all live in
titioners were opposed to the public vaccination proposed by the French
a huge library, where almost all the written books of the classical literature
government, because they were not involved in this plan. They then disse-
are instantaneously accessible, by day as by night. By the way, the world
minated misleading knowledge about the danger of the vaccination through
of knowledge is dramatically changing. It’s becoming a world of abundance
the web, with the aim to provoke the failure of the government plan. It fast
where all pieces of information are permanently at the disposal of every-
became very popular; for instance, one of these papers has been down-
body. To appreciate the amplitude of the evolution, let us have a glance into
loaded more than 1.5 million times. Following this, the public vaccination
the past. Up to the end of the Middle Age, books were so expensive and so
plan proposed by the government completely failed because the population
difficult to manipulate that only the happy few had access to them. In addi-
did not accepted it. It is certain that these general practitioners played a role
tion, this access was not permanent: it was required to be through a library or
in this failure.
a monastery, which precluded access during travels, even for the richest. In
the modern age, printing techniques allowed the reduction of cost and size of
This illustrates of the power of the Internet and the way it changes state
books and consequently their dissemination. However, despite these impro-
policy, that is, in our case, health policy. This also shows how the Internet
vements in manufacturing, books were always expensive and inconvenient,
affects the role of authorities, in particular scientific authorities. Lastly, this
which restricted their access to a small part of the population. It was only
provides evidence of the crucial need for networked society, where institu-
with the industrialization of the printing techniques, at the end of the 19th
tions and organizations tend to collapse, of an epistemic responsibility like
century, that the literature, the newspapers, the philosophical and scientific
- 67 -
E.2. The Loss of the Aura
essays and more generally all kinds of writings have begun to broadly disseminate across all society. In parallel, the techniques of lithography, invented
at the end of the 18th century but which have received a considerable deve-
Economic, political and aesthetic consequences of the mechanical reproduc-
lopment during the 19th century, considerably facilitated the reproduction of
tion of writing and images have had considerable effects on modern socie-
pictures, which was largely used to enrich books, newspapers and posters.
ties during the 20th century. It is not only access to works of the mind and,
Lastly, photography, invented in the second quarter of the 19th century, and
in particular, to works of art that has been facilitated, but the nature of their
then the phonograph and cinematography, both invented by the end of the
intellectual content and the way in which they influence humans that has
19th century, allowed progressively the automatic reproduction of pictures,
been transformed. On the one hand, physical objects of art, e.g. the physical
sounds and movement.
support of pictures, were becoming far less valuable because of their easy
reproducibility. Therefore, what had been previously attached to unique and
Nowadays, with the development of information technologies, the move-
singular items, which because of their irreplaceability conferred on them,
ment of mechanical reproduction seems to have been considerably ampli-
some magic properties, was disappearing, which made the nature of art
fied. It is neither surprising, nor new: this had already been anticipated in the
evolve. A famous essay written by Walter Benjamin in the second quarter of
20th century by thinkers like Paul Valery in 1931 in a small text entitled “La
the 20th century and entitled “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological
conquête de l’ubiquité”14. However, today, the quantity of available contents
Reproducibility”15 constituted an attempt to approach the nature of these
exceeds, far more than ever, our cognitive abilities. It results in modifications
changes. It has been very influential during the last 60 years especially, but
in our perception of works of the mind in general and of works of art in parti-
not only, in aesthetics. According to Walter Benjamin, with the mechanical
cular. Do these transformations simply prolong and extend the movement
reproduction of works of arts, in particular with photography, the part of the
initiated in the 19th century with the mechanical reproduction or do they
human in the making of art was greatly reduced, because the capture no
constitute a new qualitative step that characterizes entering into a world of
longer required the intervention of human hand, since the machine was auto-
abundance? That is the question we would like to discuss here.
matically recording the light. As a consequence, works of art, which had testified to an inheritance and a tradition since the origin of mankind, both by the
14Paul Valéry, « La conquête de l’ubiquité », (1928), in Œuvres, tome II, Pièces sur l’art, Nrf,
Gallimard, Bibl. de la Pléiade, 1960, pp. 1283-1287.
15Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other
Writings on Media, Harvard University Press, 2008.
- 68 -
art techniques utilized, which required to learn gestures, and by the symbolic
mainly put on the cult value, that is associated with the contemplation, which
references attached to the contents that were almost always conventional or
requires concentration; on the second, the accent is put on the exhibition
allegoric, have become, with these new inventions, closer to scientific inves-
value of works of art that are designed to distract the mass of spectators
tigations than to the sacred and supernatural. It follows that prosaic objects
and that no longer demand them to be absorbed. With mechanical reproduc-
of everyday life turned more and more often to be referents of works of art.
tion, the cult value of works of art that requires concentration and efforts
Baudelaire, who described the Paris streets, and Stéphane Mallarmé have
tend to decline while the exhibition value, which distracts the mass, becomes
attested this evolution in poetry. But, it could have been possible to see many
more and more prominent. As a consequence, the aura, which is attached to
other manifestations in different arts. In addition, the reception of works of
the cult value and to traditions, vanishes.
art was evolving with their massive reproducibility: it became collective and
simultaneous, with photos or movies, while previously it had essentially been
This loss of the aura is not only negative. It has aesthetic consequences. New
individual and contemplative.
forms of art that no longer refer to traditions and that eliminate cult value
are emerging among which one can note Baudelaire’s poetry, Cubism or
A key concept proposed by Walter Benjamin to approach these transforma-
Dadaism. But it has also less positive consequences that led political regimes
tions was the notion of aura, which he defined as “the unique phenomenon
– especially, the 20th century totalitarian regimes – to use new media and
of a distance, however close it may be.” The notion of aura was also linked
works of art for their propaganda. Lastly, it has economic consequences that
to the involuntary
memory16,
which had been introduced by Marcel Proust
lead works of art to focus only on the exhibition value.
to characterize a type of remembering that is both contemplative and
unconscious, and that contrasts with an intellectual and active access that is
implemented in the voluntary memory.
E.3. The Digital “Aura”
According to Benjamin, works of art are received and valued on different
As we recall, Walter Benjamin announced the loss of the aura consecutive
planes that stand between two polar opposites; on the one, the accent is
with the mechanical reproduction of works of art. The question, then, is
this: Does the development of information technology leads to a definitive
and total loss of the aura? In other words, are the information technologies
16Walter Benjamin, The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Charles Baudelaire, edited by
Michael William Jennings, (2006) Harvard University Press.
only the pursuit of mechanical techniques? Are they simply amplifying their
- 69 -
effects? Or, do they introduce a rupture? In the case of the aura, the question
pensive electronic storage devices. As a result, and by the same way of
concerns its current status: has it definitively disappeared? Or, does some
previously, we can say that we enter in a world of hyper-memorisability.
form of resurgence of the aura persist?
All the techniques of reproduction, diffusion and memorization that had so
Undoubtedly, digital technologies perfect the reproduction processes of
greatly contributed to the disappearance of the aura have been so consi-
works of art. Thanks to these, reproduction is nearly free: nowadays, it costs
derably improved that the result exceeds our cognitive abilities. As a conse-
neither a lot of money, nor large amounts of energy, to duplicate informa-
quence, our faculties of discernment are insufficient. The total available
tion. We could characterize this current ease to reproduce as being a state
content cannot be consumed by the human mind, even helped by powerful
of hyper-reproducibility by analogy to the state of hyper-conductivity for the
machines. In other words, it is becoming more and more difficult to filter the
electrical conductivity.
flow of data that assails every one of us, each day, and to focus on the relevant information. Therefore, we have to make choices, to decide on which
Furthermore, diffusion is also practically free and accessible to everybody.
object we will focus our attention and then to select, among the many pieces
Currently, it becomes possible for anyone to divulge in the entire world litera-
of information that concern our object of interest, which ones we would
ture, pictures or sounds without having to ask for authorization and without
prefer to explore. However, those different choices cannot be well informed,
owning any infrastructure, except a PC. As a consequence, today informa-
because they are anterior to our possession of knowledge. As a consequence,
tion is becoming eminently diffusible almost everywhere on the surface of
we choose according to some unconscious criteria that constitute a kind of
the earth. For instance, in 2011, during Arab spring, young students sent,
halo – or a cloud – enveloping the objects and attracting our mind. Such
with no support, videos of the public events in Tunisia or Egypt, while twenty
criteria correspond to the above-mentioned involuntary memory; therefore,
years before, in China, or in many other authoritarian countries, it had been
we call it the digital halo or the digital aura.
impossible to send images of the dramatic event that were happening in the
streets. Always by reference to the morphology of hyper-conductivity, we
Note that, as we have previously shown in our work on sousveillance17, this
shall characterize this state as a hyper-diffusibility.
digital aura becomes increasingly important because, in our world of exces-
Lastly, any pictures and sounds can be easily captured with very cheap
17Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, Voir et pouvoir : qui nous surveille ?, Editions du Pommier, Paris,
2009.
equipment, like a mobile phone, and then memorized on small and inex-
- 70 -
sive abundance of information, the power is far more often given to those
who are viewed than to those who
This notion of digital aura in relation to a specular value would be useful
watch18 .
to interpret many of the contemporary movements in art, especially the
generative art, which cannot be evaluated with respect to their exhibition
Our hypothesis here is that we can draw some parallels between this digital
value and no longer with respect to a cult value, but only with respect to the
halo and Benjamin’s aura. Among them, note that while the aura requires
number of possibilities that a program can generate. It would be suitable to
concentration, it is same with the digital halo. Furthermore, as we previously
follow with some precise examples, which would justify the two preceding
said, while the aura was directly related to involuntary memory, it is also the
hypotheses, but this would be far in excess of this chapter.
case that the digital halo is largely unconscious.
Recall also that Benjamin’s definition of the aura as “the unique phenomenon
However, as we previously mentioned, for Benjamin the notion of aura was
of a distance, however close it may be” could be directly applied to the digital
directly related to the cult value, to an attachment to traditions and to a
aura. Nevertheless, while in the case of Benjamin’s aura, close and concrete
contemplative attitude. It might seem surprising and even strange to affirm
elements of works of art helped to give access, through contemplation, to a
that, with the digital technologies, we adopt a contemplative attitude
far past, anterior to what can be provided by any voluntary memory, with the
oriented towards traditions. To be more precise, the first hypothesis, drawing
digital aura, close and concrete information elements help to give access to a
a parallel between Benjamin’s aura and the digital halo, needs to be comple-
far future that opens on new perspectives, despite all perceived dangers and
mented by a second hypothesis that states that, while Benjamin’s aura
fears.
was attached to a cult value, oriented towards traditions, the digital aura
is attached to a specular value, which opens on new opportunities. In other
words, while the cult value was oriented towards an immemorial past, the
specular value is oriented towards an accessible and free future that is full
of possibilities.
18Jean-Gabriel Ganascia, “The Ethics of the Generalized Sousveillance”, in Proceedings of the
ETHICOMP 2010 conference, 14 April - 16 April 2010, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona,
Spain.
- 71 -
Identity, selfhood
and attention:
An initiative
of the
Charles Ess
Claire Lobet-Maris
Stefana Broadbent
Yiannis Laouris
The
Onlife
Manifesto:
Philosophical Backgrounds,
Media Usages and the
Futures of Democracy
and Equality
An initiative
of the
Charles Ess
C.2. Recent work on Confucian traditions and contemporary communica-
Contents1
Introduction
75
Policy recommendations
75
tion technologies
A. The relational self and the Onlife Initiative: Descartes, phenomenology,
and the analogue-digital age
76
A.1. Background - From Norbert Wiener to enactivism and the embedded
mind
77
A.2. Background Phenomenology
78
A.3. Summary 80
A.4. How these developments prefigure and support our characterizations. B. Digital-analogue media and the (re)emergence of relational selves
81
84
B.1. Digital media and digital futures?
85
B.2. Trust, identity, and polity 85
C. Relational selves, democracy and equality?
C.1. Recent work in (Western) Internet Studies 88
89
- 74 -
94
Introduction
relational notions of selfhood, are any guide, it is not at all clear that the
democratic norm of equality will survive – at least, not without conscious
This contribution is made up of three sections. The first two sections (A,
choices as to our media usages and the sorts of selves we cultivate through
B) focus on who we are – and who we appear to be becoming – as human
those usages.
beings living in a hyperconnected age. These core matters of identity and
selfhood are approached through both Medium Theory (as affiliated with
In short, insofar as these theoretical and empirical findings hold – our media
Walter Ong, among others) and philosophical frameworks that include
choices and thus the kinds of selves we choose to cultivate will determine
phenomenology and Kantian and feminist ethics. Together these perspec-
in large measure whether our future societies will be more democratic or
tives foreground important correlations between media usages, selfhood,
non-democratic, and more egalitarian or non-egalitarian.
and our preferred political and social arrangements: most centrally, they
show a shift in Western societies from individual-rational notions of selfhood,
Policy recommendations
as these have correlated with the emancipatory politics of democratic
processes and norms, including equality – towards more relational-affective
notions of selfhood. Historically, relational-affective selves have correlated
These analyses suggest that we are at a critical point of choice with regard
with non-democratic regimes and hierarchical societies. Hence a core ques-
to our media usages – and thereby, with regard to the sorts of selves, poli-
tion is how far the shifts towards more relational-affective selves may imply
ties, and norms we choose to cultivate. In particular, a core insight under-
a loss of democratic processes and norms.
lying these reflections is the recognition of how far writing – beginning as
early as Plato, made explicit by the Stoics, and carried through especially in
I explore this question in the final section (C). On the one hand, recent empi-
modern emphases on (material-print) literacy as a necessary condition for
rical and philosophical work suggests that individual notions of selfhood may
democratic citizenship – works, in Foucault’s phrase, as a “technology of the
well survive and perhaps thrive in an age of (analogue-)digital1 media. On
self.”2 Stated differently, the literacy skills affiliated with material-print lite-
the other hand, insofar as Confucian models of democracy, as resting on
2 Michel Foucault. The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom. In J. Bernhauer & D.
Rasmussen (Eds.), The final Foucault. Boston: MIT Press, 1987; Technologies of the self. In
L. H. Martin, H. Gutman, & P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel
Foucault, 16–49. Amherst: Univ. Massachusetts Press, 1988.
1 In section B.1, below, I explain my reasons for using the phrase “(analogue-)digital” in place
of the simply “digital.”
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A. The relational self and the Onlife Initiative: Descartes, phenomenology, and the
analogue-digital age
racy foster a cultivation of the self as an autonomous, rational agent who is
thereby a necessary condition for democratic processes and norms, beginning with equality. By contrast, the sorts of skills and abilities required for
and fostered by digital media weigh more strongly towards the cultivation of
a more relational-affective self. Whatever the benefits and gains such a self
This section shows how three of the four challenges we highlight in the Onlife
may enjoy – again, historical evidence suggests that self is rather inclined
Manifesto, p.4 – beginning with the blurring of the distinction between reality
towards non-democratic processes and non-egalitarian structures.
and virtuality – have been explored, grounded, and prefigured in modern
philosophy, most especially phenomenology. The material in this section
These patterns thus highlight the need for an intentional development of
thus provides important historical context and philosophical groundings for
media literacies that foster both “digital media” literacies, as is commonly
the analyses and claims of the Onlife Manifesto.
emphasized, and more traditional, material- and print-based media skills and
abilities – especially as the latter are oriented towards the cultivation of the
Our background paper underlined four challenges to received frameworks
autonomous-rational self necessary for democratic processes and equality
evoked by the digital transition:
norms.3
1. by blurring the distinction between reality and virtuality;
2. by blurring the distinctions between human, machine and nature;
3. by reversing from scarcity to abundance, when it comes to information;
4. by shifting from the primacy of entities over interactions to the primacy
of interactions over entities 4
Three of these have been explored, grounded and prefigured in modern philosophy, most especially phenomenology. A brief look at how this is so may be
3 Recommendations along these lines are already suggested by Naomi Baron in her Always
On: Language in an Online and Mobile World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
4 Onlife Background Note, p. 30 of the present volume..
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A.1. Background - From Norbert Wiener to enactivism and the embedded mind
helpful for adding both additional historical context and philosophical substance to our shared understanding.
To do so, I offer in the following
We first need to recall that the hard distinctions between the real and the
(1) a brief summary of how Cartesian dualism underlies especially the hard
virtual, as mapped onto equally hard distinctions between the offline and
distinction between the real and the virtual in the 1990s, and the several
the online, especially unfolded in the relevant literatures on virtuality, virtual
ways in which late 1990s work in several domains, including neuroscience,
worlds, etc. in the 1990s: as can be seen in numerous sources, these distinc-
shift from Cartesian dualism;
tions squarely rest on the Cartesian dualism – one that radically divorces
a non-cognitive body (and with it, the whole of nature as “extended subs-
(2) some notes on significant developments in phenomenology that prefigure
tance”) from a non-extended and thereby fully disembodied mind. As but one
and ground such non-dualistic accounts, focusing on the work of Maurice
example: Katherine Hayles discerned this dualism at work in the foundational
Natanson5
as an example, followed by brief comments on more recent philo-
discipline of cybernetics as developed by Norbert Wiener.6 More broadly, this
sophers who extend phenomenological analyses and directly couple these
dualism reiterates ancient Gnostic and Greek dualisms that in turn root the
with contemporary neuroscience;
Western Orthodox teaching of Original Sin – whose Augustinian language is
in fact explicitly invoked in one of the key documents of early conceptions
(3) summary comments that link these phenomenological backgrounds and
of cyberspace, namely, William Gibson’s Neuromancer – the science fiction
insights to our guiding notions of “onlife” as first of all articulating just the
novel that propelled the term ‘cyberspace’ into popular culture and academic
refutation of the Cartesian-1990s’ dualism between the real and the virtual,
discourse.7 Correlative notions of a disembodied “liberation in cyberspace”
followed by
(4) pointers to how these developments likewise prefigure and support espe-
6 Katherine Hayles. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature,
and Informatics, p. 288. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Norbert Wiener. The
Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
cially “b” and “d” in our list.
7 See C. Ess, Self, Community, and Ethics in Digital Mediatized Worlds, pp. 5-7. In C. Ess and
M. Thorseth (eds.) Trust and Virtual Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives, pp. 3-30. Oxford:
Peter Lang, 2011.
5 the journeying self: a study in philosophy and social role. maurice natanson, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley. 1970.
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appealed both to “cyber-libertarians” such as John Perry Barlow8 as well as
eness. These newer, radically non-dualistic views are captured under notions
to some feminists and others rightly interested in overcoming the objecti-
of “embedded mind,” “embedded cognition,” and “enactivism.”11
fication and correlative subordination and violation of women (and others).
Other feminists, however, early on raised warnings against the “old Cartesian
A.2. Background Phenomenology
trick” of seeking to forget the body.9 Finally, by the end of the 1990s, this
dualism was increasingly refuted along a range of research and reflection,
including the work of Katherine Hayles, as we have just seen, as well as that
of Pierre
From a historical perspective, however, these non-dualistic views are prefi-
Lévy10.
gured and developed within the frameworks of 20th and 21st century
phenomenology.12 For example, by 1970, Maurice Natanson, drawing on the
At the same time, the Cartesian-inspired epistemological models under-
earlier work of Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Alfred Schutz, arti-
lying much of the work in Artificial Intelligence in the latter half of the 20th
culates a phenomenological account of the self as inextricably engaged
century – crudely, lumped under the name of cognitivism – was likewise rece-
with the world moment-to-moment. First of all, phenomenologists claim,
ding in the face of emerging evidence in the neurosciences that highlighted
we never experience “consciousness” as such, as abstract – but always as a
the inextricable interactions between the various mechanisms and processes
concrete and specific consciousness of (X). Natanson writes: “To be conscious
of “the body” and those traditionally affiliated with consciousness and awar-
is to be conscious of something, a something which then stands to the activity of consciousness as the meaning of its performance” (1970, 3). Such
consciousness, moreover, is that of a unitary self: “In the midst of action,
8 John Perry Barlow. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 1996. http://w2.eff.
org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration.
the choices we make and the results of our choosing are to be understood
in unitary fashion, as involving a being for whom the perception, evaluation,
9 Allucquere R. Stone. Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Boundary Stories about
Virtual Cultures.
In M. Benedikt (ed.), Cyberspace: First Steps, 81–118. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
11For an overview, see: Horst, Steven, “The Computational Theory of Mind”, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/computational-mind/.
10Pierre Lévy. Becoming Virtual. New York. Basic Books, 1998.
As well, similar shifts are definitive of empirical research on Internet-facilitated communication – specifically in what Barry Wellman (2004) characterizes as the turn from the first
to the second age of the Internet: see C. Ess and M. Consalvo, “What is ‘Internet Studies’?”
for a summary. In Consalvo and Ess (eds.), The Handbook of Internet Studies, 1-8. Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell.
12David Woodruff Smith summarizes phenomenology as ”… the study of structures of
consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.” (“Phenomenology,” The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/phenomenology/.
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and definition of the situation are aspects of an integral self, a being at the
our experiences of always being in a particular Here and Now – one defined
center and source of a world” (1970, 3). In this way, experiential conscious-
by our distinctive standpoints as rooted in our individual bodies. In particular,
ness is always relational – whether vis-à-vis its own self as made into an
Natanson uses the term “corporeality” to refer our first-person experiences
“object” of reflection and/or any further contents of consciousness, including
of ourselves as a distinctive embodied self:
other human beings and the world at large. For Natanson, this relationality
is captured precisely in the erotic as the exemplar of fully engaged – and
I am neither “in” my body nor “attached to” it; it does not belong to me or
fully embodied – interrelationship:
go along with me. I am my body. There is no distance between my hand
and its grasping. [….] Instead of the common-sense way of thinking of
[the self is] a being whose presence in the world is a unitary reality in
the body in space at some time, I am a corporeality Here and Now whose
which self and object are taken as integrally grounded in consciousness,
being in the world is disclosed to me as mine. (1970, 11)
understood as a directional force sustaining the entire range of perceptual life. Individual and action, self and situation, person and world are
Natanson points out that these efforts at description are difficult to under-
then bound to each other not only in their implications for each other but
take, difficult to articulate, and difficult to take up in part because
in their fundamental structure. Man [sic] is “in” the world as the lover is
in relationship to the one he loves, not as the bearings are “in” the motor.
(1970,
… we are the heirs to over three centuries of a philosophic and scientific
4)13
perspective based on contrary assumptions and committed to the basic
idea that man can be understood in qualitatively the same terms as all
In contrast, then, with an abstract, more or less universal self and body
other objects and events in the natural order. (4)
as located in an objective but external (Cartesian) grid of time and space
– phenomenologically, we constantly experience ourselves as a unique
This is to say: phenomenology resolutely resists the subordination of human
“I,” one who experiences the world around us from our unique, first-person
beings, our experiences, and our self-understandings to the early modernist
standpoint. Natanson contrasts “objective” notions of time and space with
polarities of “subjective” vs. “objective” knowledge. Rather, phenomenology
shares with existentialism, beginning with Kierkegaard, the insistence on
13Indeed, as we will see more fully in the following discussion of Sara Ruddick’s work,
any understandings of sexuality and the erotic as rooted in Augustian and/or Cartesian
dualisms are necessarily radically reshaped on such phenomenological grounds.
the epistemological legitimacy of first-person experience, contra its denigration as “mere subjectivity” in early modernity. This phenomenological refu-
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tation of Cartesian mind-body dualism is further elaborated in the work of
Enactivism emphasises the agent’s situation and embodiment in terms
Merleau-Ponty, which inspired, for example, the neologism developed by the
of its active, non-symbolic, non-representationally-based engagement
German philosopher Barbara Becker, Leibsubjekt – “Body-subject”.14
in its world. It is essentially anti-dualistic …. The agent is embodied and
dynamically-coupled to the world in which she is embedded; thus, agent,
More recently, Susan Stuart has likewise built on the work of Merleau-
world and action are necessarily intricately interwoven, and the agent’s
Ponty (and others) in her conjunction of enactivism with phenomenology.
body, experience, action, and world shape the way in which she deals with
Paraphrasing the work of Cotterill, Stuart characterizes enactivism as fore-
her everyday pragmatic concerns. There is an inseparability of mind and
grounding how
world, and it is embodied practice rather than cognitive deliberation that
marks the agent’s engagement with its world. (2008, 256)
… through a sensori-affective, felt dynamics, we build up non-conscious
intentional expectations about how our world will continue to be. In
Stuart goes on to explore possible linkages between the contemporary
agent-directed muscular movement, whether it is taking a step forward,
findings of enactivism and Kantian epistemology. I and May Thorseth have
reaching out with a hand, or simply looking around a room, we are asking
drawn on Stuart’s work (among others) as these highlight such linkages
tacit, non-propositionalized questions about our world and our position in
between non-dualistic views of cognition and selfhood in the philosophical
it (Cotterill 1995, 1998, in Stuart 2008, 15 256).
anthropology we have developed in our work on trust and virtual worlds, for
example.16
Stuart sees this view of embodied cognition as directly meshing with phenomenological accounts of our experiencing the world as embodied knowers-
A.3. Summary
and-agents:
These phenomenological analyses emphasize radically non-dualistic and
strongly relational notions of selfhood and embodiment in our knowing and
14Barbara Becker. The Disappearance of Materiality? In V. Lemecha and R. Stone (eds.) The
Multiple and the Mutable Subject, 58-77. Winnipeg: St. Norbert Arts Centre, 2001.
16Introduction. In C. Ess and M. Thorseth (eds.), Trust and Virtual Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives, vii-xxiv. New York: Peter Lang.
15Susan Stuart. From Agency to Apperception: Through Kinaesthesia to Cognition and Creation. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4: 2008): 255–264.
- 80 -
navigating the world. They thereby prefigure and complement the similar
These developments directly support two of the remaining characterizations,
turns we have seen in the late 20th century, including the literatures of
namely,
virtuality and virtual worlds (Lévy 1998), Internet studies more broadly, and
emerging neuroscientific views of enactivism and the embodied mind.
b. by blurring the distinctions between human, machine and nature;
and
A.4. How these developments prefigure and support
our characterizations.
d. by shifting from the primacy of entities over interactions to the primacy of
interactions over entities
Taken together, I hope it is now fairly straightforward to see how phenomenology thereby directly supports our first characterization of life in the
With regard to “b”: it would be helpful to recall and summarize here the
(analogue-) digital age, beginning with:
extensive phenomenological analyses of how human beings experience the
various tools we develop and use – most famously, beginning with Heide-
a. by blurring the distinction between reality and virtuality;
gger’s concept of “readiness-to-hand”. For us, the point is just that in our
experiences of using our tools in engaged and familiar ways– in Heideg-
Again, in the 1990s this distinction mapped hard distinctions between the
ger’s example, a carpenter using a hammer – we do not experience them as
offline and the online, between what Barlow, drawing on Gibson, characte-
alien objects radically separate from our subjectivity. Rather, “there are no
rized as “meatspace” vs. cyberspace – distinctions, finally, that rested on
subjects and no objects; there is only the experience of the ongoing task (e.g.,
squarely Cartesian (if not Augustinian, Stoic, and Gnostic) dualisms. The
hammering).”17
dissolution of these dualisms – in enactivism, feminism, and most especially
phenomenology in the 20th century – thus means the dissolution of a hard
reality/virtuality distinction as well. In particular, Barbara Becker’s neologism Leibsubjekt neatly anticipates and reinforces our defining neologism of
17Wheeler, Michael, “Martin Heidegger”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/
heidegger/.
“onlife” as a primary way of capturing these dissolutions.
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So far as I can gather, this thread of phenomenological analysis further
“Cyborg Manifesto,”19 however, feminist thought rejected such fears as
meshes with more contemporary views of “embedded and embodied cogni-
thereby resting on a mistaken binary.20
tion.” Steven Horst puts it this way:
Finally, these phenomenological and enactivist insights are likewise at work
Perception, action, and even imagination and reasoning are “embodied”,
in the Medium Theory I draw on, beginning with Marshall McLuhan’s defining
not only in the sense of being realized through some physical system,
principle in Understanding Media, “We shape our tools and then our tools
but in the stronger sense that they involve bodily processes that extend
shape us.”21
beyond the brain into the nervous system and even into other tissue and
to biochemical processes in the body. At the same time, even the brain
with regard to “d”: here again, the focus on relationality – over against, say, a
processes involved in cognition involve non-representational, non-com-
kind of Hobbesian focus on the individual conceived on the model of a (crude)
putational skills of bodily know-how. The mind is also “embedded”
atomism – is thematic in phenomenology as well as other 20th century
in its environment, not only in the sense of interacting with it causally
currents of thought.
through perceptual “inputs” and behavioral “outputs”, but in the more
As but one example in phenomenology: in her analysis and descriptions of
radical sense that things outside the physical organism—from tools to
various forms of sexual experience, Sara Ruddick first of all critiques more
prostheses to books and websites—are integrally part of cognition itself.
19Donna Haraway. A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in
the Late Twentieth Century. In Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature,
149-181. New York: Routledge, 1991.
We are, as Andy Clark puts it, already “natural-born cyborgs.”18
The cyborg – “cybernetic organism” – figure here is important. At least
20See Lennon, Kathleen, “Feminist Perspectives on the Body”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2010/entries/feminist-body/.
some early imaginings of cyborgs expressed precisely the great fear that
such beings ostensibly represented the breakdown and violation of a strong
nature-machine dichotomy. At least by the time of Donna Haraway’s famous
21This view is nicely paraphrased as follows:
18Horst, Steven, “The Computational Theory of Mind”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2011/entries/computational-mind/.
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Technology, according to McLuhan, is an extension of our own natural faculties. Just as
a knife is an extension of the hand, and the wheel an extension of the leg, writing is an
extension of speech and of memory. In this general metaphor, automobiles become extensions of our personal bodies, and the city an extension of our collective skin. Electronic
communication is an extension of our nervous system, just as computers are extensions of
our brains. https://www.historica-dominion.ca/content/heritage-minutes/marshall-mcluhan
dualistic understandings of sexuality--i.e., as something that occurs solely
At the same time, at least to some degree, this focus on interactions more
between “bodies” as somehow radically separated from their “owner’s” sense
than isolated entities is already at work in Kant’s epistemology. Broadly,
of selfhood and identity.22 Rather, a phenomenological account of our most
Kant makes clear that science, as resting on both mathematical and empi-
intense experiences (such as experiences of playing sports) foregrounds how
rical foundations, thereby focuses on the law-like relationships (Verhältnisse)
in such experiences, there is no felt mind-body dualism, but rather an imme-
between entities. This becomes perhaps most prominent in his Critique of
diate unity of self and body. Not all sexual experiences count (or need to
Judgment, with its focus on the sensus communis as an intersubjectively
count) for Ruddick as involving such direct unity: but she argues that those
shared sense of aesthetic judgment.25
that do are morally preferable first of all because in such experiences, our
own personhood and autonomy cannot be separated from our bodies, and
As a last example: in his “theory of communicative action,” Habermas
hence these experiences foster the Kantian duty of respect for the Other as
develops a phenomenological notion of a “life-world,” one “bounded by the
a person. Ruddick further argues that such sexual experiences thereby foster
totality of interpretations presupposed by the members as background
two additional virtues--namely, the norm of equality and the virtue of loving
knowledge.”26 Such a life-world, with its background of shared assumptions,
(Ruddick 1975, 98ff.).23 To recall Natanson, finally, our erotic engagement
is then the context for the communicative practices Habermas takes as para-
with an Other is at once the exemplar and a primary instantiation of our
digmatic of rationality. As characterized by his expositor, Thomas McCarthy,
inextricable relationality with one another as co-constituting our identities as
Habermas focuses on morality as intertwined with a socialized intuition that
embodied
beings.24
further brings into play the (equally Aristotelian) recognition that self-identity, as shaped by the society in which one finds oneself, “...is from the start
interwoven with relations of mutual recognition.”27 This interdependence,
moreover, “...brings with it a reciprocal vulnerability that calls for guarantees
22Sara Ruddick. Better sex. In R. Baker & F. Elliston (Eds.), Philosophy and sex, 280–299.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1975.
23From: C. Ess, Virtuality and Ethics.
Handbook of Virtuality. Oxford: OUP.
25See May Thorseth, Virtuality and Trust in Broadened Thinking Online. In C. Ess and M. Thorseth (eds.), Trust and Virtual Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives, 162-171. Oxford: Peter
Lang, 2011.
Forthcoming. In M. Grimshaw (ed.), The Oxford
26The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, p.
13. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985.
24For his part, Natanson develops this point most fully in his chapter 3, “sociality,” including
his comment: “We are before I am. Or, to paraphrase a classic pronouncement: We are,
therefore I am.” (1970, 47)
27The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 47. MIT Press, Hutchinson Press, 1978.
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of mutual consideration to preserve both the integrity of individual persons
Insofar as this is true, then our focus in the (analogue-) digital age on inte-
and the web of interpersonal relations in which their identities are formed
ractions and relationality rightly highlights these as brought forward in
and maintained.” (ibid)
striking new ways. But it may be more accurate to say that this is a renewed
focus, one that has been brewing for quite some time in modern Western
The phrase “the web of interpersonal relations,” finally, echoes and reinforces
philosophy (if not in Kant, then certainly in phenomenology) – and one that
especially feminist emphases on ethical decision-making within “the web of
would not seem unfamiliar to ancients in either Western or Eastern worlds.
relationships,” beginning with the work of Carol Gilligan.28
B. Digital-analogue media and the (re)emergence of relational selves
None of this is accidental for our project. As I have documented earlier,
Luciano Floridi’s information ontology, as he himself emphasizes, “draws on
the emphasis on the interconnection between all things familiar from recent
environmental and feminist philosophies—and, importantly, from such
This section begins with a warning against our focusing overly much on “the
non-Western views as Buddhism and Confucian thought.”29 This is to say:
digital” in our analyses, insofar as the analogue – most especially in the form
Floridi’s information ontology, among its many other virtues, brings forward
of humans’ embodied sensation and perception – does not disappear in the
precisely the ways in which computational technologies and computer
age of hyperconnected realities. Analogue embodiment further correlates
networks facilitate and enable our sense of selfhood as relational beings first
with a stubborn insistence in contemporary philosophy and Internet Studies
of all. But as it does so, it thereby reiterates at least parallel understan-
on singular identities. At the same time, as explored in the second part here,
dings of selfhood qua relational found in both modern (Western) feminism,
there is strong evidence suggesting foundational shifts towards more rela-
ecology, and phenomenology – if not in at least some version of Kant – as
tional and affective emphases of selfhood and identity in Western societies.
well as in both ancient Western and Eastern frameworks.
These shifts have enormous political consequences: most simply, where the
individual-rational emphases of Western (high) modernity correlate with liberal-democratic institutions and core norms such as equality – historically,
28In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1982.
relational (and more affective) emphases have correlated with less egalitarian and more authoritarian forms of power and control.
29C. Ess, “Floridi’s Philosophy of Information and Information Ethics: Current Perspectives,
Future Directions,” The Information Society, 25: 159–168, 2009.
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B.1. Digital media and digital futures?
enkinaesthetic engagement with the world remains deeply analogue.30 (As
various schemes of human enhancement and re-engineering are realized, all
A developing European “onlife” implicates at least two digitally-based tech-
of this may well change.)
nologies. The first (a) includes the multiple forms of (analogue-) digital
media, where ‘media’ refers to both (i) familiar technologies such as digital
(Analogue-) digital media are at work in other aspects of contemporary and
cameras and similar recording/storing technologies, often as embedded in
future onlife, including (b) the development of “social robots” such as “tele-
smartphones, for the production and distribution of diverse forms of media
noids.”31
qua content, as this content is (ii) distributed through (analogue-) digital
cation, including “hugs” – while being remotely controlled through Internet
media qua channels (computers and computer networks, but also more
and other forms of digital connections. Robots in various forms - including
“traditional” radio and TV broadcasts, film, print, etc.) and devices (including
“care-bots,” “warrior-bots,” and, of course, “sex-bots” – will become increa-
“mobile-locative” devices such as smartphones, tablets, and other portable
singly commonplace appliances in an analogue-digital future, for better and
devices that are both connected to the Internet/Web and are GPS-enabled).
for worse.32
A telenoid is designed to convey embodied forms of communi-
In these directions, the “mobility revolution” (better, in my view, ‘evolution’) is
a primary locus of the sorts of developments that we may anticipate to be
central to the further evolution of onlife.
B.2. Trust, identity, and polity
I think it increasingly critical to notice, however, that these technologies
A synthesis of philosophical approaches to trust has issued in a philoso-
remain analogue technologies, beginning with their inputs (voice, light, etc.)
phical anthropology that highlights the role of embodiment in our knowing
and outputs (sound, image, etc.). This is important for two reasons: (a) just
as we rightly concern ourselves with the affordances of digital technolo-
30Cf. Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 2002.
gies qua digital – so we need to attend to the affordances of the analogue
components of these technologies as well, or otherwise risk a potentially
31E.g., http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/humanoids/telenoid-r1-hiroshi-ishiguro-newest-and-strangest-android. Telenoids have been used in a pilot project on eldercare
in Denmark, for example, with promising initial results.
misleading myopia in our focus, and (b) highlighting the analogue side of
these technologies thereby highlights the embodied character of their desi-
32Cf. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from
Each Other. Boston: Basic Books, 2011.
gners, consumers, and users – i.e., as human beings whose sensory and
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and navigating the world, including a phenomenologically-rooted emphasis
McLuhan and others call “electric media,” including contemporary ICTs,
on the Husserlian “I” or first-person perspective (indexicality) as anchoring
appear to foster a shift from the modern Western emphases on the self as
our sense of experience in the world.33 There emerges here a stubborn insis-
primarily rational, individual, and thereby an ethically autonomous moral
tence on singular identity as rooted in the body, as well as in a Kantian epis-
agent towards greater (and classically “Eastern” and pre-modern) emphases
temology that foregrounds the role of a transcendental unity of apperception
on the self as primarily emotive, and relational – i.e., as constituted exclu-
in the construction of a coherent experience out of the otherwise fragmented
sively in terms of one’s multiple relationships, beginning with the family and
and incoherent data stream – a unity expressed in the phrase and episte-
extending through the larger society and (super)natural orders. This can
mological requirement of the “I think.” More recent work in philosophy on
be seen in the first instance in the movement, especially among the young,
“personal identity online” has reinforced these conceptions of identity, speci-
from strongly individual notions of privacy towards “publicly private/privately
fically with regard to online communicative
engagements. 34
A broad range of
public” sharing of information on social networking sites (Facebook et al) as
empirical findings from Internet Studies over the past decade or so likewise
well as in illegal sharing of copyrighted materials. These moves are followed
highlights the primacy of a singular identity – one that spans precisely the
by correlative shifts in privacy and copyright laws, i.e., away from laws built
increasingly blurred distinction between online and offline, as our phrase
around earlier media and strongly individual and exclusive senses of privacy
“Onlife”
suggests.35
and property – as manifest in the political program of the Pirate Party, for
example.36
On the other hand, the particular emphases defining such selves and identities appear to be in flux. In “Western” societies, the affordances of what
Par contra, in some Asian societies, the shifts go in the opposite direction –
namely from strongly relational emphases in selfhood and identity towards
increasingly individual emphases.
33C. Ess and M. Thorseth, Introduction. In C. Ess and M. Thorseth (eds.), Trust and Virtual
Worlds: Contemporary Perspectives, vii-xxiv. New York: Peter Lang, 2011.
37
These shifts are reflected not only in
36Cf. C. Ess, The Embodied Self in a Digital Age: Possibilities, Risks, and Prospects for a Pluralistic (democratic/liberal) Future? Nordicom Information 32 (2), June 2010: 105-118.
34Cf. C. Ess, At the Intersections Between Internet Studies and Philosophy: “Who Am I Online?”
Philosophy and Technology. DOI 10.1007/s13347-012-0085-4. (September 2012).
37Cf. Yunxiang Yan. The Chinese path to individualization. The British Journal of Sociology
61 (3: 2010): 489-512; Mette Halskov Hansen and Rune Svarverud (eds.), The Rise of the
Individual in Modern Chinese Society, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2010.
Accessible summaries of these developments can be found in C. Ess, Digital Media Ethics
(2nd edition), chs. 2, 3, 6. Oxford: Polity Press, 2013.
35Cf. C. Ess and M. Consalvo, “What is Internet Studies?” in M. Consalvo and C. Ess (eds.), The
Handbook of Internet Studies, 1–7. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011; C. Ess and W. Dutton,
“Internet Studies: Perspectives on a Rapidly Developing Field.” Introduction to special
issue, New media and society, in press.
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40
radical changes in social practices, such as younger people demanding indi-
Given important caveats,
vidual privacy (Japan, Thailand) as well as “privacy” shifting from an origi-
will reappear – perhaps in the hybridized forms suggested by Walter Ong’s
nally negative concept to a more Western concept of privacy as a positive
notion of the “secondary orality” of electric media (i.e., one that hybridizes
good (China): they are further reflected in changing privacy laws, including
primary orality with subsequent communication modalities of literacy and
the encoding of individual privacy rights in the Chinese constitution in recent
print – where these last two correlate with the rise of the modern rational
years – so much so, in fact, as to include discussions of introducing due
individual and liberal-democratic governance)?41 On the one hand, “Eastern”
process rights.38 (And this after a decade of the loss of due process rights in
movement (at least in parts of Asia, along with, perhaps, analogous move-
the U.S. and the
E.U.39)
a key question is how far these correlations
ments in the Islamic world, as manifest most dramatically in the recent “Arab
Springs”) appears to indeed be towards more democratic forms of gover-
Given the foundational importance of the rational-autonomous individual to
nance, as correlates of more rational-individual-autonomous conceptions
not only classical conceptions of privacy, but also to modern Western concep-
of self and stronger individual conceptions of privacy. On the other hand,
tions of liberal democracies, these shifts are of enormous political moment
“Western” movement towards more relational (and emotive) emphases of
as well. Specifically, as highlighted again in Medium Theory, classically rela-
selfhood correlate with, e.g., the erosion of due process rights for privacy, as
tional selves correlate with hierarchical social structures and non-democratic
well as increasing economic and political hierarchies in Western societies.
regimes.
These developments may point towards a convergence between “Western”
and “Eastern” societies of basic assumptions regarding identity and selfhood.
This convergence may appear, for example, in recently developed notions of
relational autonomy42 and what Luciano Floridi has circumscribed as distri38Suli Sui. The law and regulation on privacy in China. Paper presented at the Rising Pan
European and International Awareness of Biometrics and Security Ethics (RISE) conference,
October 20-21, 201l. Beijing, China. Cf. Graham Greenleaf, Asia-Pacific data privacy: 2011,
year of revolution? UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2011-29, 2011. http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914212
40Our Onlife colleague Mireille Hildebrandt has generously shared a wealth of relevant references that offer careful refinement and important revision regarding how we best characterize power relations in non-state societies.
39See Julie E. Cohen. Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday
Practice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
42E.g., Catriona Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism,”
Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4, Winter 2008): 512–533.
41Walter Ong. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Routledge, 1988.
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buted morality and distributed responsibility (p.46).43 These notions further
C. Relational selves, democracy and equality?
overlap with our Onlife colleague Judith Simon’s work on “Distributed epistemic responsibility,” included here (pp.135-151). All of this taken together
represents important new developments in our understanding of what moral
I explore these tensions more fully in two ways:
agency and responsibility might look like for selfhood and identity that
conjoins both rational-individual and relational-affective emphases – and
1. A review of recent work in (Western) Internet Studies that highlights
where the relationality in play here includes the multiple relationships shared
different expressions of “third spaces” of shared communication in online
and embodied in the online networks that constitute much of our hyper-
venues – i.e., ones that presume a sense of group rather than individual
connected reality.
privacy. At the same time, these third spaces sustain individual privacy
in significant ways, and thereby facilitate at least local or micro-level
Ideally, such hybrid individual-relational selves will be able to sustain the
forms of political activism and democratizing citizenship.
democratic processes and norms – including equality – that correlate with
This work brings to the foreground, however, a core tension between
modern emphases on rational-individual selves as cultivated through the
modern Western commitments to the values of equality, including gender
communication technologies of literacy and print. Indeed, as we are about
equality, and the values of more relational selves in late modern socie-
to see, some contemporary work in Internet Studies documents the survival
ties.
of modest forms of democratic engagements and individual privacy in online
environments. At the same time, however, the rise of the relational self and
2. Recent work on Confucian traditions helps
shifts away from individual notions of privacy suggest important analogues
(A) reiterate this core tension between these traditions (as rooted in rela-
with Confucian societies and their contemporary movements towards demo-
tional conceptions of selfhood) and Western commitments to robustly
cracy. How far equality may survive in these societies – and, by analogy, in
democratic regimes and a core modern value of equality, including gender
future Western democracies shaped by relational selves - are the foci of the
equality (rooted in more individual conceptions of selfhood), and thereby
final section.
(B) point towards what “democracy” might look like for more relational
(and, perhaps, more emotive) selves – both in praxis in contemporary
43Luciano Floridi. Distributed Morality in an Information Society. Science and Engineering
Ethics. DOI 10.1007/s11948-012-9413-4. 2012.
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parts of Asia and thereby as a concrete example of what “democracy 2.0”
– participants nonetheless carried on their discussions in what Stine Gotved
might look like in Western contexts as well.
characterized as a “parochial space”45: “Likened to a neighbourhood or resi-
C.1. Recent work in (Western) Internet Studies
dency association controlled areas, parochial space is familiar and certain
levels of privacy and safety are engendered.”46
There is something of a thread of recognition in Internet Studies that online
communication venues foster what might be called “third spaces,” i.e., ones
This sense (however illusory) of a partially private communicative space
shaped by a sense of group sharing and intimacy that is neither indivi-
characterizes manifold communicative phenomena in the age of Web
dually private in a strong sense nor public in some wholesale sense. So, for
2.0 as well, for example, in Patricia Lange’s account of how young people
example, Elizabeth Bassett & Kate O’Riordan described the interactions on a
using Facebook are able to carve out “publicly private” and “privately public”
listserve devoted to GLBT participation and discussion in terms of a “partial
communication strategies.47 At the same time, such spaces closely cohere
privacy,”
with recent notions of privacy as contextual48 and as “fractal.”49.
… because the participants constructed utterances that they stated they
would not convey to certain audiences such as their family. This facilitated the participant’s illusion that Gaygirls.com was a space over which
45Stine Gotved. Newsgroup Interaction as Urban Life. AoIR: State of the Interdiscipline, Conference Paper. University of Kansas, September 14-18, 2000.
they exercised some control, and in which they could expect quite high
levels of confidentiality, safety and freedom.44
46Bassett & O’Riordan, 2002.
47Patricia G Lange. Publicly private and privately public: Social networking on YouTube.
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13 (1: 2007), article 18. http://jcmc.
indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/lange.html,
While this sense of privacy is illusory from a technical standpoint – in fact,
the listserve was perfectly open to anyone, in effect, who wanted to drop by
48Helen Nissenbaum. Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life.
Stanford Law Books, Stanford, 2010.
44Elizabeth H. Bassett & Kathleen O’Riordan. Ethics of Internet research: Contesting the
human subjects research model. In Charles M. Ess (Ed.), Internet research ethics. http://
www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/ethics_bassett.html. Cited in Heidi McKee and James
Porter, The Ethics of Internet Research: A Rhetorical, Case-Based Approach, p. 81. New
York: Peter Lang, 2009.
49Susan Gal. A semiotics of the public/private distinction. Differences: A Journal of
Feminist Cultural Studies, 13 (2002), 77-95. Cited in Heidi McKee and James Porter, The Ethics
of Internet Research: A Rhetorical, Case-Based Approach, p. 74. New York: Peter Lang,
2009.
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Most recently, Stine Lomborg has analyzed a prominent Danish blog (Huske-
The upshot, finally, is a sense of shared personal or intimate space that corre-
bloggen, “The Memory Blog”) as constituting an online example of what is
lates with Georg Simmel’s account of “the sociable self” – a self engaged
called in Danish the Intimsfære (“sphere of intimacy”) – a shared communi-
in a network of relationships, where sociability means “highlighting similari-
cative space that is between strict individual privacy and wholesale publicity.
ties and de-emphasising individuality in conversation by „hiding intimate and
Lomborg’s analysis highlights fine-grained details of “phatic communication”
potentially uncomfortable topics because serious discussion disturbs and
between the primary blogger and her audience, communication that signals
threatens the continuity of conversation.” (ibid). Such a self, as Lomborg puts
“listenership, reciprocity, availability for conversation, concern and empathy,
it, is “one that is attuned to the norms and practices within the network of
and this, in turn, frames the blog as a personal
space.”50
These engagements
affiliation” (ibid).
further involve perspective-taking, “…evident in the ways the author and
readers collaboratively negotiate the appropriate content on Huskebloggen
This capacity to retain some element of individual privacy while participating
by attuning to each other.” (ibid).
in a shared intimate or personal space with others correlates with what we
have seen above as the construction of a “public privacy” in online venues, as
In particular,
a third space between purely individual privacy and indiscriminant publicity.
To maintain the blog as a personal space, self-disclosure plays an impor-
Moreover – and as we would expect in light of the historical and philoso-
tant role through the personal, even intimate, experiences and emotions
phical correlations between individual privacy and agency, on the one hand,
revealed in the blog conversation. By this means, both author and readers
and democratic processes on the other – this third space opens up distinctive
balance a fine line between, on the one hand, pressure to reveal personal
political possibilities, as described by Maria Bakardjieva in terms of “subacti-
issues as a preamble for developing relationships among participants
vism” and “mundane citizenship.”52 Bakardjieva acknowledges what we might
and, on the other hand, a norm of non-intrusiveness to protect each
think of as “the grand narratives” of conceptualizing the potentials of the
other’s [individual]
privacy.51
Internet and the Web for helping to realize and expand democratic processes:
these include communitarian and Habermasian frameworks that, from my
perspective, tended to dominate discourse and research in the 1990s and
50Lomborg, Stine. Negotiating Privacy Through Phatic Communication: A Case Study of the
Blogging Self. Philosophy and Technology 25 (2012):415–434. DOI 10.1007/s13347-0110018-7. P. 428.
52Bakardjieva, Maria. 2009. Subactivism: Lifeworld and Politics in the Age of the Internet.
The Information Society, 25: 91–104.
51Lomborg, 432.
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in the early part of the 21st century. These grand versions of democracy,
mark a “cultural turn” (Dahlgren, 2003) in the study of democracy and
moreover, are often pitted against equally grand dystopian visions – perhaps
political communication.57
most dramatically, the Orwellian “Big Brother” scenarios that “total transpa-
Drawing on classical feminist sources as well as the work of Lefebvre, 58 Beck
rency” online all but inevitably seems to entail.53 But Bakardjieva, prominent
on “subpolitics” 59 and Giddens’ notion of “life politics”60 as foci more appro-
for her various explorations of “the Internet and everyday life,”54 points to
priate to a second stage or late modernity, Bakardjieva describes subacti-
a more recent, somewhat more modest thread that runs squarely between
vism first in terms of its locus in
these grand polarities:
…the private sphere or the small social world. It blends ethics and poliA common feature of these works is the insistence that we should look
tics, or oscillates around that fuzzy boundary where one merges into the
for germs and projections of the political and public world in the private
other. It is rooted in the subject but necessarily involves collective iden-
quarters and daily dealings of individual persons. Everyday thoughts,
tities often in an imagined form—recall Anderson’s (1983) 61 imagined
conversations, and activities have a bearing on democratic politics (see
communities. It is constituted by numerous acts of positioning—often in
Couldry et al., 200755). Some of the necessary conditions for a func-
the imaginary vis-à-vis large-scale political, moral, and cultural confron-
tioning democracy exist at the level of lived experience, resources, and
tations, but also with respect to ongoing micro interactions and conversa-
subjective dispositions (Dahlgren, 2003).56 Put together, these arguments
tions. It is not about political power in the strict sense, but about personal
empowerment seen as the power of the subject to be the person that they
53Jensen, Jakob Linaa. (2007). The Internet Omnopticon. In H. Bang and A. Esmark (eds.),
New Publics with/out Democracy (pp. 351–380). Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur.
57 Bakardjieva 2009, 92.
58Henri Lefebvre. Everyday life in the modern world. New York: Harper & Row. 1971
54Bakardjieva, Maria. 2005. Internet Society: The Internet in Everyday Life. Sage.
59Ulrich Beck. The reinvention of politics: Rethinking modernity in the global social order.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997.
55N. Couldry, S. Livingstone, and T. Markham. Connection or disconnection? Tracking the
mediated public sphere in everyday life. In Media and public spheres, ed. R. Butsch, pp.
28–42. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007.
60Anthony Giddens. 1991. Modenity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.
56 Peter Dahlgren. Reconfiguring civic culture in the new media milieu. In Media and political
style: Essays on representation and civic culture, eds. J. Corner, and D. Pels, pp. 151–170.
London: Sage, 2003.
61Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
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want to be in accordance with his or her reflexively chosen moral and poli-
In short, this conception of subactivism foregrounds the political possibili-
tical standards. Its frames of reference are fluid and constantly shifting,
ties that attach to a more “mundane citizenship,” one primarily focusing on
responding to the ongoing dialogue between the subject and the cultural
micro-level efforts as empowerment rooted in individual and small group
discourses permeating his or her social environment. The decisions and
interests. While neither democracy on a grand (Habermasian or communi-
actions that constitute it have no permanent place in a person’s agenda.
tarian) scale – nor is this the complete loss of individual autonomy and its
They arise spontaneously, often as new dimensions of work, homemaking,
democratizing projects as threatened in more Orwellian visions. At the same
parenting, entertainment.62
time, the online communicative spaces that facilitate and foster such “subactivism” thereby share the same structures and characteristics of the third
While grounded, we may say, in an everyday lifeworld not immediately
or “personal space” described by Lomborg, i.e., one that balances between
focused on democracy in the larger, more prominent ways (e.g., the Arab
a (still protected) individual privacy and an indiscriminate publicity. Such
Springs) – this subactivism nonetheless contains the potential for not insigni-
third spaces, again, are best described in terms of “partial privacy” (Bassett
ficant political activity and impact:
and O’Riordan 2002), “contextual privacy” (Nissenbaum 2010), and “fractal
privacy” (Gal 2002). In particular, such spaces, as they allow individual parti-
Subactivism may or may not leak out of the small social world and
cipants to negotiate what they share for the sake of sociability and subacti-
become publicly visible, meaning that its acts and products, although
vism at the micro-level, thereby preserve a classic modern Western sense of
multiple, can remain insulated in the private sphere. This, however, does
individual privacy as protecting individual agency and autonomy – precisely
not condemn subactivism to inconsequentiality. The potential for it to be
for the sake of the project of being/becoming “the person we want to be”
mobilized by trigger events and transformed into overt public activism
(see Bakardjieva 2009, 96, above).
is always in place. It is that essential bedrock against which individual
citizens’ capacity for participation in subpolitics or in the formal political
In broadest terms, this would mean that the relational or sociable selves of
institutions of the public world is shaped and nurtured. (ibid)
late modernity, while fully entangled in the communicative networks facilitated by Web 2.0 technologies, may indeed emerge as hybrid selves, ones
that preserve at least some of the classic modern emphases on individual
62Bakardjieva 2009, 96; emphasis added, CE.
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autonomy and agency – including the democratic correlates thereof, at least
in local or small
the Enlightenment and fostering Western conceptions of democracy and the
scales.63
liberal state.66 Such a self is further marked by specific value commitments:
Core tension: equality and gender equality
Values such as knowledge, autonomy and equality are being strived for
At the same time, however, there is a key point of tension in the appeal to
to free people from any pre-given natural and social orders. These values
Giddens’ account of “life politics” – in contrast with the “emancipatory poli-
are important because they are about people’s life chances. Once people
tics” of classic Western modernity. As Pak Wong has characterized these:
are liberated from these constraints, they are propelled to consider the
questions concerning their self-actualisation. As such, life politics repre-
… where the former seeks individual liberation from (pre-)existing
sents an increasing emphasis on values such as authenticity, individuality
constraints, and aims to “reduce or eliminate exploitation, inequality and
and diversity.67
oppression” by “the imperatives of justice, equality and participation”
(Giddens 199164, p. 211 & 212), the latter is “a politics of lifestyle” that
The critical point here is: how far does the transition to late modernity – and,
concerns with the question of ‘how shall we live?’.65
in our terms, the shift towards a more relational (and perhaps emotive) self
as facilitated by “electric media” most broadly and digital media in particular
Wong further ties emancipatory politics to Charles Taylor’s account of the
– involve:
disengaged rational autonomous self as the sense of self emerging from
Either – an abandonment of the core values of emancipatory politics –
including autonomy, equality, and gender equality – in a “life politics” that
stresses different values,
63In terms we will see below in the contemporary Chinese context, such hybrid selves
could also be described as “bi-cultural” – i.e., holding together two forms of selfhood and
emphases that previously correlated two distinct cultural traditions.
64Anthony Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991.
66Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1989.
65Pak Wong. Net Recommendation: Prudential Appraisals of Digital Media and the Good
Life, p. 86. PhD thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Enschede, Enschede, The
Netherlands. 2012.
67Wong 2012, 86f.
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And/Or – “life politics” as presuming, building upon, and thereby always
Carr,68 Sherry Turkle,69 and Jaron Lanier 70) see contemporary media tech-
necessarily incorporating the core values – and conception of self – of
nologies as threatening either the modern disengaged (rational-autonomous)
emancipatory politics?
and/or expressive (Romantic) self as accounted for in Taylor’s work – while
the proponents (e.g., Clay Shirky 71) see these technologies as fostering preci-
The force of this question can be illuminated by exploring it within contempo-
sely the more relational (and perhaps emotive) sense of self at work in “life
rary Confucian philosophy and real-world political contexts – i.e., the People’s
politics.”72 For Wong, as we have seen, this remains an open debate – one
Republic of China (PRC) and its governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
that leaves us with some room (still) for choice in terms of what digital literacies, perhaps in conjunction with more classical literacies as rooted in literacy-print, we will take up, precisely in light of which sorts of social structures
C.2. Recent work on Confucian traditions and
contemporary communication technologies
and political regimes we prefer (i.e., more egalitarian vs. more hierarchical,
and more democratic vs. more non-democratic 73).
Most briefly, Wong’s thesis presents an exceptionally fine-grained analysis of
the shifts in conception of selfhood that are central here – in both Western
68Nicholas Carr. The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains. New York: W.W.
Norton, 2010.
and Eastern, specifically Confucian traditions. On the one hand, as we have
just seen, Wong finds an open tension between the sense of self and core
values of the emancipatory politics of classical Western modernity and those
69Sherry Turkle. Alone together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each
Other. New York: Basic Books, 2011.
of the “life politics” characteristic of what is variously characterized as “late,”
70Jaron Lanier. You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto. London: Allen Lane, 2010.
“second stage,” or “radicalized modernity”.
71Clay Shirky. Here Comes Everybody: How Change Happens When People Come Together.
London: Penguin, 2009; Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age.
London, Allen Lane, 2010.
In particular, after carefully reviewing a number of prominent critics and
proponents of Web 2.0 technologies, Wong argues that the dividing line
72Wong 2012, 102-114. Somewhat more carefully: Shirky argues that Web 2.0 technologies
foster precisely the individual autonomy and equality of Taylor’s disengaged modern self
– but Wong argues that this claim is inconsistent in light of Shirky’s larger commitments
(Wong 2012, 104f.).
between critics and proponents in large measure rests precisely on their
preferred conceptions of selfhood.
Simply, the critics (including Nicolas
73Wong 2012, 123f.
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Such a choice, to be clear, is consistent with what we can call the third spaces
at least prior to the past few decades – in Japan, Thailand, and China, that
of subactivism as a kind of shorthand for the accounts of online commu-
individual privacy must be something negative. At the same time, we can
nication and mundane citizenship in the work of Lomborg and Bakardjieva,
see in this conception of Confucian familial or group privacy, as rooted in a
as we have seen above. Specifically, a choice in favor of sustaining equa-
relational conception of the self, a counterpart or analogue to the sorts of
lity and democracy would thereby favor the literacies and media usages that
“partially private” third spaces described above as characteristic of contempo-
preserve individual autonomy and privacy of agents who at the same time
rary Western usages of digital media technologies.
participate in savvy ways in the construction of such third spaces.
This analogy with contemporary Western contexts is further strengthened
When Wong turns to Confucian thought and the Chinese Internet (as explored
in terms of the sense of selfhood at work here. Wong describes a “bicul-
both through CCP documents and official newspaper pronouncements),
tural” or dual sense of selfhood that has emerged in Confucian tradition
however, the tension between emancipatory politics and life politics becomes
since exposure to Western cultures – namely, that of a small self (akin to
pronounced and irresoluble.
the Western notion of the individual pursuing individual interests and desires,
etc.) vis-à-vis “the great self” as relational and thereby concerned first with
To begin with, Confucian thought is rooted in hierarchical and patriar-
the well-being of the country.75 But again, if there is conflict between the
chal family structures, stressing first of all the virtue of filial piety. This
great self and the harmony of the larger community vs. the small self and
family model becomes the model for the larger society, issuing in a clearly
its strictly individual interests, then the small self must capitulate. In the
hierarchical structure of a paternalistic (if not frankly authoritarian) regime
terms developed above, individual autonomy and privacy (of the small self),
responsible for the well-being of a clearly subordinate people whose primary
however it may be sustained in Western contexts in third spaces and subac-
virtues are keyed towards sustaining harmony (te) within the larger commu-
tivism, will be sacrificed for the greater good in a strongly Confucian context.
nity.74
75Wong 2012, 167. In this way, such a Chinese “bi-cultural” self parallels a similar sort of
dual consciousness in Japanese culture, characterized by Nakada and Tamura in terms
of shakei (the set of modern, Western conceptions and values, including democratic
preferences) and seken (traditional Japanese ways of thinking and feeling, including an
emphasis on the relational self). See M. Nakada, M. and T. Tamura. Japanese conceptions
of privacy: An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (2005):27–36.
DOI 10.1007/s10676-005-0453-1.
This means, in particular, that Confucian thought thereby foregrounds familial privacy vis-à-vis the larger society. This is in keeping with the sense –
74Wong 2012, 141ff.
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of “the people” to the government, a subordination willingly practiced as a
But this further means that within this Confucian context, fundamental
virtue of “the great self.”77
equality – both individual equality and with it gender equality – is simply an
untenable, if not frankly undesirable value. This point has been made, as
In future work I hope to elaborate further on what “democracy” might look
Wong points out, in the work of Mary Bockover. Bockover explicitly argues
like for more relational (and, perhaps, more emotive) selves – both in praxis
that “Western values of free expression, equality and free trade as well as
in contemporary parts of Asia and thereby as a concrete example of what
the idea of personal and political autonomy are incompatible with Confu-
“democracy 2.0” might look like in Western contexts as well.
cian
values.”76
While Wong argues persuasively that some forms of free
expression and free economic exchange might survive (or even thrive) within
Both Wong’s thesis and forthcoming publications on Confucian politics offer
contemporary (and future) Confucian China – equality (between individuals
very helpful and suggestive accounts – ones compatible with the “third
and between genders) will always disappear in the general subordination
spaces” and “subactivism” described in Western contexts as we have seen.
These accounts suggest that, insofar as Western developments may emerge
77From a philosophical perspective: Ames and Rosemont argue that there is nothing in Confucian thought that requires gender inequality, whatever the historical and cultural practices
may have been. Indeed, they note that “…there is at least some evidence that women could
be regarded as having some of the same qualities of the junzi at the time of, or shortly
after, the composition of the Analects” (Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, The Analects of
Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, p. 40. New York: Ballantine, 1998.) In this way, early
Confucian thought would parallel the gender equality practiced in early Buddhism as well
as in the first generation of the Christian communities; insofar as these analogies hold,
they suggest that gender inequality results from later acculturation processes, as an originally egalitarian tradition transforms itself in more hierarchical patterns in order to more
persuasively address and fit in with a larger culture.
76Bockover, M.I. (2010). Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition I:
Foundational Concepts, p. 170. Philosophy Compass, 5 (4), 307-316. Cited in Wong 2012,
168.
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We can also note that, broadly speaking, developments in the direction of gender equality
can be seen in some Asia societies as well as in other countries and cultures – often as
women’s economic situation improves (e.g., R. Inglehart and P. Norris, Rising Tide: Gender
Equality and Cultural Change around the World. Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University
Press, 2003). My point is not that equality, including gender equality must disappear in a
Confucian society: it is rather that the P.R.C., as a current instantiation of such a society,
exemplifies how these values are likely to remain suppressed.
in ways importantly analogous with North Asian Confucian (and Buddhist)
traditions, we can be cautiously optimistic that some form of democratic
processes and at least some characteristic democratic values may survive
and thrive as digital media technologies continue to interact with our senses
of selfhood, “life politics,” etc.
However that may be, these and other considerations (e.g., the ways in which
the “return of the body” in developing communication technologies brings in
its train the return and reinforcement of gender stereotypes in our self-presentations online) suggest that the classical modern conception of the self
as an individual autonomy, its democratic engagements, and specifically
commitments to individual privacy and the values of equality and gender
equality may well be imperiled in the transition from emancipatory politics
to “life politics” of late modernity. That is, insofar as the latter – and its
conception of the self as primarily relational (and, perhaps, more emotive
than rational) – is no longer seen to be rooted in and dependent upon the
former, but rather as fully replacing the former: then, as the contemporary
Chinese Confucian examples make clear, equality and gender equality will be
sacrificed – along with the individual or “small self” – for the sake of greater
harmony in a forthrightly hierarchical society.
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For a
Grey
Ecology...
An initiative
of the
Stefana Broadbent
& Claire Lobet-Maris
Contents1
From green ecology to grey ecology
A. Economy of attention: from abundance to scarcity From green ecology to grey ecology
99
The concept of grey ecology was introduced by P. Virilio in 2009, as a way of
100
thinking of the by-products of the digital revolution on the human mind. In
A.1. Attention as a Dynamics of Control
101
his work on the dromosphere (the space of technological acceleration), Virilio
A.2 Attention as competitive edge
103
argued that just as risks and accidents are intrinsic to technological inno-
A.3. Intimacy as a defense
104
B. The disembodiement and dataification of experiences
vation, pollution is the side effect of progress, to some extent its ‘normal’
but unacceptable companion. However, while the risks of the digital era are
105
well known (e.g. the end of privacy, state control, viral attacks, network melt-
B.1. Dis-embodiement
105
downs, data theft) and there is an active engagement on the part of experts,
B.2. Identity and data-ification 106
C. Back to the grey ecology
institutions and the public, to find technical and political solutions to reduce
their emergence and limit their effect, there is little thought and concern
107
about digital pollution.
e-waste, electromagnetic fields and overheated server farms. If pollution
C.1. Grey ecology as an ecology of the SELF:
the interactionist frame
is defined as the introduction of contaminants in the natural environment
108
causing adverse changes, it is unclear, even, what are the natural resources
C.2. Grey ecology as an ecology of alterity:
the political frame
Bibliography
The concept itself is difficult to define, evoking
that are being affected and that need protection. There is however, a growing
110
suspicion that the precious resources currently under stress are located not
112
in the environment but in our minds. Herbert Simon already in the early 70’s
suggested that : «...in an information-rich world, the wealth of information
means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes
the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a
poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among
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the overabundance of information sources that might consume it» (Simon
The producers of information, be they corporate or individuals, are competing
1971, pp. 40–41).
among each other for a fragment of time and focus and when such focus is
finally obtained it can create huge economic value.
A. Economy of attention: from abundance to
scarcity
The concept of ‘economy of attention’ was first developed by M.H. Goldhaber
(1997) as an alternative approach to the more traditional industrial and
monetary economy. In his model, attention becomes the central factor struc-
We usually speak of digital society as an abundant society as far as infor-
turing economic exchange. The power of such a model is very clear in the
mational resources are concerned contrasting this to previous ages in which
digital economy, where the most successful business actors are the media-
information was scarce, difficult to access and to disseminate. However from
tors between people and information which support the filtering, organising
the human perspective, this evolution may have gone in the opposite direc-
and trustworthy selection of content. When this is accompanied by tech-
tion, transforming what was abundant in the past – namely attention- in
niques to measure, quantify and monetize attention, new mechanisms of
a far more scarce and more distributed asset. If we follow the prevailing
trading can be developed.
cognitivist model of attention, which postulates a mental architecture that
has extensive computational capacities but a dramatic intrinsic limitation
For the individual however, who is the object of such contention, there is a
determined by our capacity to attend only to few elements at a time, the
big price to pay, which is a personal struggle for agency and control. Many
formidable multiplication of informational content has not been accompa-
users of digital media are complaining of a prevailing sense of losing their
nied by an equivalent increase in attentional processing and this is inevitably
mind, of being distracted, of wanting to do something and then being drawn
determining a competitive view of the allocation of this capacity. Following
into another task, and these concerns are becoming part of the common
the social and economic logic of all scarce resources, we are therefore
discourse about technology. Most professionals are currently testifying of the
witnessing the creation of a market for attention.
dramatic compulsion to check their email on a minute by minute base, reacting to incoming demands rather than being driven by a self-directed plan.
In this market the competition is fierce, as our screens multiply (TVs, laptops,
phones, tablets..) and our communication channels do the same. News
There are many factors coming to bear in this battle for the mastery of
contents compete with email, photos compete with music video with sms.
attention; agency, business models and social relations among them, In an
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attempt to go beyond a purely cognitive perspective, which has been predo-
Learning to control attention has been a significant objective of the educa-
minant when talking of information processing, we strive to put this issue in
tional system for as long as public education has been in operation. Teaching
a socio-historical but also political framework.
children to «pay attention» to focus on objects that are externally imposed,
has been a central part of school education. The importance of developing
such a «skill» is made manifest by the sanctions that accompany the lack
A.1. Attention as a Dynamics of Control
of attention, distraction or generic non-compliance to concentrating on the
teachers’ centre of focus. The layout and material environment of class-
In the workplace the mastery of attention has long been one of the axes of
rooms, with the rows of desks facing a central or elevated point, also indicate
social dynamics, used to extract value, dominate, create allegiance, stratify
the efforts of creating attention monitoring environments. Finally the whole
and empower. It is this relational nature of attention management that S.
process of isolating children from their family environments and personal
Broadbent (2011) has called attention to, attempting to shift the discourse
connections when entering the school premises also suggest an institutional
from a purely cognitive one to a social one where attention is a process
precursor of the situations that will be experienced in the workplace.
which creates value.
At work the equation between productivity and attention is deeply engrained
If we look at this issue, in a somewhat Marxist, Foucaldian and partisan
in managerial models. This hypothesis tends to be confirmed by T. Davenport
reading, it can be seen as a new step in the long path of the history of capi-
and J. Beck (2001), two “gurus” in the management’s world, when they claim
talism, as a new page of the disciplinary conditions of life : the first page
that the effective allocation of the employees’ attention is one of the key
concerned the body and the shaping of a working force; the second page
factor of the business competitiveness. Channelling, monitoring and control-
focalized on knowledge and the development of the scientific organization of
ling attention becomes thus engrained in work processes, rules, artefacts
work. The third page is the contemporary one and its object is attention. Our
and above all digital tools. The design of effective user interfaces, under the
hypothesis is that the digital age is marked by the discipline and control of
auspices of ergonomic principles ensure the elimination of potentially alter-
attention. This does not mean that attention was not an object of influence in
native perspectives or views and focus actions and reading on the essential
the past but that digital environments dramatically increase the stakes.
elements. Rules and procedures are drawn to exclude personal devices or
personal digital endeavours while on the job (by blocking external websites,
or internet access, or mobile phones). The digital surveillance of all online
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activities, through dedicated surveillance software, can give rise to sanctions
The political and economic challenges around attention management are
or the elimination of potentially distracting digital spaces.
made manifest by the way how different organisations react and regulate
access to personal communication channels, such as mobile phones or
On the opposite end, obtaining «digital trust» or «digital independence» is
Facebook, and uncover some significant social dynamics surrounding the
a sign of status, of trustworthiness of social promotion and acceptance.
control of this process. Greater freedom of access is in fact systematically
Having access to the whole range of the web, to personal communication
given to those members of an institution that are considered more trus-
devices and services, or more in general being bestowed with the «freedom»
tworthy and with a higher status, be it in age, position or education. There
of self-determining when and where to put one’s attention in the realisation
is in other words a much more stringent control of access for lower level
of one’s activities, is the ultimate sign of social recognition and of higher
and lower status jobs: said brutally while managers, academics and creatives
social status.
can access social network sites all day long, employees in retail, manufacturing, transport must keep their mobiles in their lockers. Digital divide is
Digital communication media have significantly extended the spaces, both
not any more only a question of access, availability or education, it is more
social and physical, in which personal exchanges are being performed.
profoundly linked to the management of other people’s attention, as diffe-
Written channels in particular, have expanded the contexts in which indivi-
rent social groups are controlling the groups they dominate by controlling
duals can maintain their intimate relations, allowing people to bring their
their attention.
personal sphere within institutional settings, such as schools, workplaces,
hospitals, that had banned them for many years. Calling a partner from
To some extent, this new social division evokes also the division made by
work, emailing friends from the professional computer, texting at school has
Sennett and Harvey between the globals who are very mobile both physically
become a universal practice, which while giving huge pleasure and comfort
and digitally, not grounded anywhere and therefore neither committed to any
to those that indulge in it, raises concerns in educators and employers on its
place, and the locals, a more static class both digitally and physically, often
effect on productivity. For the last couple of centuries, the control of atten-
very defensive of their localities. To these two classes, Baumann (2001) adds
tion, presumed necessary for effective work, has in fact, been associated
the underclass, excluded from everywhere, made mobile by poverty, war or
with the separation of individuals from their personal social environments,
discrimination; a ‘diaspora’ connected only by mobile phones and SKYPE.…
equating productivity with attention and isolation.
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A.2 Attention as competitive edge
tion of others. Digital technologies are, to some extent, the best vehicle for
this game, encouraging, enabling and animating it. For companies, captu-
T. Davenport and J. Beck (2001) claim that three terms dominate the
ring and holding their employees’ attention is important, not only to sustain
everyday life of managers : excellence, performance and urgency. Respon-
performance but also to ensure loyalty and commitment; attempting to
ding to these imperatives, makes the modern executive into the contempo-
retain staff in a business world that, thanks to the previous ethics of excel-
rary representative of the Weberian ethics of the Protestantism (N. Aubert
lence, has ‘manufactured’ individualistic competitors which are far more
et V. de Gaulejac 2007). In the eighties and nineties, they argue, the mana-
mobile than in the past. For companies, being always present on personal
gement “ethics of excellence“ created the moral foundation of a system stri-
communication channels, on web-platforms, etc., is a way to colonize the
ving to control the totality of a person; mobilizing psyches, capturing indi-
minds of their managers and to reduce their capacity to imagine another
vidual desires for success and career, expecting passion for work, with a
world. On the employees’ side, in a sort of Goffmanian ‘parade’, making
continuous control of employees’ adhesion to the values of the company. In
noise to brand yourself by permanently “newsing” people about what you do,
convincing employees that by working for the firm, they were working for
where you are, what you think, is a way to occupy the mental space of others
themselves, there has been a complete blurring of professional and personal
and to stay at the top of the competition. Z. Bauman compares this beha-
requirements, and companies emerged as institutions capable of media-
viour to that of bees: in a swarm of bees, to be at the top, you must make
ting individual destinies, supporting self-development, objects of true love,
more noise than the others and frequently change your direction.
and in the end the only instrument able to fulfill the need for immortality of
the self. (…) The acceleration of globalization in the last decade, with all the
This pattern of interaction brings with it a new set of pathologies of which the
consequences in terms of restructuring, delocalization, rationalisation, has
most common is what is being called a ‘burn out’ : the paradoxical feelings of
destroyed the ideological veneer behind the search for excellence, unveiling
being permanently exhausted, overloaded, pressurised by a constant sense
the true violence of economic relations.
of urgency and yet having a sense of losing productivity or being unable
to achieve a task. Controlling the attention of others and dealing with the
The new work ethics which has emerged from this highly fragmented and
constant sollicitation of others is accompanied by a dramatic sense of loss
global environment, creates particular interactions between people, marked
of self-direction, intentionality and planning. This is not only observable at
by the constant need to become visible. This quest for visibility takes the
the level of individuals, but can be also be seen at the level of whole compa-
form of a new social game in which everyone is striving to capture the atten-
nies which, after having made huge investments in IT, experience a clear
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decrease in their productivity. In a sort of prospective ‘magic’ intuition, H.
Another facet of the same problem is what R. Sennett (1977) describes as
Simon (1971)
had already anticipated the drama of the computational
the current tyranny of intimacy. This is in contrast to the traditional patterns
dream of omniscience-omnipotence for our ‘bounded rationality’, when,
of social interactions which were organized through clear social roles that
observing, with humour, the ‘data’s frenzy’ of managers, he said, in a sort of
each individual played in the different spheres of their life : as workers, lovers,
genial metaphor, “ an additional drop of water has never prevented anyone
parents, citizen.. Nowadays, observed Sennett the king (and the queen…) are
from drowning…”
absolutely naked. Social distances, masks and shelters have disappeared.
Which means that individuals have no sanctuaries to retreat to and hide
from the scrutiny of others, but feel always visible and transparent… raising
A.3. Intimacy as a defense
obvious questions for the plurality of social identities. And this explains the
increasing position of the home and of the inner circle of the family as a
The French expression of the ‘for intérieur’ can help us understand the
protective cocoon and the growing success of activities such as cooking and
human issues at stake here. In the Latin, ‘for’ means jurisdiction. The
gardening, which restore the sense of duration, agency and privacy.
common understanding (not the ecclesiastic one) of the ‘for intérieur’ is the
jurisdiction that each person applies to her/his self, what in social sciences
On the digital side, we also have an indication of this retreat onto the private,
we could also call a sense of agency. When talking about their experiences,
the intimate and the controllable. There is ample evidence, showing that
executives describe a sort of permanent blurring between In and On life, and
all new digital communication channels, from texting to Skype, from Face-
thus the impossibility to make this for intérieur exist vividly in their lives,
book to instant messaging, are being used to strengthen people’s closest
in. They talk of burning from the inside of themselves. But what is happe-
and most intimate relations. Contrary to common public discourse, people
ning in the workplace, is also happening to digital consumers in general. The
have not hugely extended their social network nor do they spend much time
sense of losing one’s sense of control when engaged with digital devices, is
communicating with unknown digital acquaintances. Close scrutiny of what
described by gamers, TV viewers, social media participants. They all talk of
people actually do with all the channels they have at their disposal, shows an
their devices as “time sucks”, as environments in which they lose their inten-
intensification of exchanges with very few close ties, often less than 5, that
tions and agency.
lead to the strengthening of these relationships. All the data on mobile and
internet communication we have at our disposal shows that users in most
countries are having short and frequent exchanges with the people that are
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B. The disembodiement and dataification of
experiences
closest to them. This constant and ubiquitous link between individuals and
their loved ones is very emotionally intense and the feeling of being always
within reach provides a profound sense of safety and comfort.
There is another aspect that exacerbates the issues around the control of
A recent survey made in Belgium on 3000 teenagers (S. Gallez and C. Lobet-
attention which is related to the widespread process of dataification of expe-
Maris, 2011) confirmed similar research in the US (Ito 2010) showing, that
riences.
most of the participants had an ‘entre soi’ connectivity based on intense
chatting and messaging with the small circle of the friends they have in ‘real
B.1. Dis-embodiement
life’. The teenagers did not separate virtual and real, but considered ‘online
spaces’ simply as a new social scene in which they can be together, exchange
ideas or tastes, experiment their social identity. The absence of distance
The professional and institutional realms have introduced a completely new
between their off and online lives makes them consider the virtual world as a
layer of objects and processes that are forcing employees, clients, citizens
concrete social reality dedicated to entertaining continuous contact with an
and patients to operate within virtual spaces characterised by unclear social
intimate group of friends and relations.
norms and regulations. The partial or total automation of workflows and
processes have been led by the predominant if not exclusive logic of an
Another way in which we can describe what we have being observing in our
increase in productivity and efficiency. The drive to optimise procedures and
research, is that the retreat onto the intimate is marked by the search of a
tasks in terms of cost effectiveness has totally determined the design and
“protective cocoon” to face an endemic uncertainty, and an extreme form of
specification of the systems deployed. The consequence of these transfor-
filtering out the excess of information (social and relational information in
mations are too many to discuss in detail here, but a couple stand out for the
this case).
elaboration of a general argument on the wy people are dealing with digital
information:
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•
many tasks have been decontextualised
•
many activities have been fragmented and are carried out in isolation
B.2. Identity and data-ification
The manipulation of symbolic elements on user interfaces that often carry
the same logic across a great variety of tasks (manipulating a client record in
a call centre is analogous to manipulating the configuration of temperature
Algorithmic systems, acting as new cognitive interfaces, are changing how
level in the control of an industrial process) means that from the cognitive
meaning is ascribed to the world, to its inhabitants, to their behaviours. They
perspective, workers are operating at an extremely high level of abstraction
are also changing the ways individuals are (automatically) identified, tracked,
and are operating on symbolic representations that are very distant from the
profiled or evaluated, often in real time, adding opacity (invisibility) to tradi-
object worked upon. The type of fragmentation of the information required
tional systems of identification, evaluation, and thus, of “government”.
by the computational models provided, often decontextualises single
elements of information and contributes to the sense of virtuality. Finally the
These systems raise a number of concerns regarding the access to infor-
fact that many activities are carried out as fragments and in social isolation
mation and the divide between public and private spheres. The growing
also increases the sense of dis-embodiement.
presence of these systems has to be understood through the paradigm of
liquid modernity. Automated, algorithmic systems ‘read’ our lives, screen
To some extent, what we observe is the progressive dominance of a specific
our emotions, calculate our bodies, in order to profile us and to select for us
regime, which Boltanski and Thevenot could have qualified as an industrial
the most appropriate information or decisions. But contrary to more clas-
regime, based on risk management, evidence-based practices and ‘procédu-
sical social mechanisms of socialization and control, these systems are invi-
ralisme’. The virtual and the real are questioned by this evolution since what
sible and unintelligible as far as their actors and their normative frames
we observe in the evolution of working practices is part of what Kallinikos
are concerned. Their processes question the notion of ‘alterity’ since these
calls the long journey of human distancing from immediate, social, living
systems draw profiles on the ‘mêmeté” (myself and the similar others) and
context through its abstraction into formal systems and categories : the
therefore raise the question of the possibility of an ‘agora’.
data-ification of the life.
most of those systems are increasingly considering the body and its biome-
Furthermore,
tric attribute, as the only objective or authentic source of our ‘personal
truth’, based on the central hypothesis that «the body does not lie» (F.K. Aas,
2007) . The flip side of this assumption, is clearly a lack of confidence in
people, their subjectivity and their agency. To some extent, one could read
this form of technological development, as one step more in the‘domesti-
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cation of the body’ as presented by Arendt in her comments on private and
opaqueness of the distance introduced by the digital environments (which
public spheres.
for their nature and for their novelty are stripped of the traditional signs
of relevance and importance which generally help us navigate the material
Overall we are seeing technological systems that develop techniques
world) mean that we have lost our cognitive props and therefore the compe-
to bypass individual intentions in favour of bodily states and statistical
tition for attention has become primitive and brutal. This brutality is even
averages, and a transformation of all experiences into fragmented elements
reinforced by the concern of Z. Bauman (2005- 2007), U. Beck (1986) and
of data. The combination of these two trends amplifies even more the diffi-
R. Sennett (2005) regarding the difficult conditions of the modern social exis-
culty of individuals to attribute meaningful categories to the information
tence, much more individualized than in the past due to the failure of our
they are attending to and increases their dependence on external mediators
traditional institutions of socialization.
to filter and structure the content they are exposed to.
All this leads, according to P.Virilio (1995) to a dramatic loss of orientation,
a significant disturbance in the relationship with oneself, the others and the
C. Back to the grey ecology
world.
Looking back, we have always lived in excessively stimulating environments
How to protect our attention, how to restore our sense of self, agency and
both in social and physical terms and attentional processes have allowed us
social orientation? The exploration of the concept of grey ecology could help
to operate successfully in such spaces. Our material and physical environ-
to design the path. We wish to explore this novel idea about ecology from
ments are as rich and as complex as our digital ones, probably even more
two different perspectives : the first one is clearly positioned into an interac-
so. We have been successful in the physical space, among other reasons,
tionist frame and go more deeply into the attention concept in its relation to
because artefacts and social norms have sustained the cognitive processes
the sense of self. The second perspective is related to theories of socializa-
by orienting and significantly reducing the attentional demand of our
tion and new social movements and explores the relevance of the concept of
physical environments. In the social sphere as well we have elaborated signs
ecology as a political path to restore the sense of alterity.
that guide attention, for instance social status provides a clear clue regarding whom we should attend to with priority. The joint effect of the recent
predominance of the economic metaphor surrounding attention, and of the
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C.1. Grey ecology as an ecology of the SELF:
the interactionist frame
4. Performativity can be linked not only to individuals but actions of the
devices, interfaces, networks of information through which dramas occur
and meaning is negotiated.”
More and more discussions about the digital are introducing considerations
about the self and its transformation. Like vultures circling above a carcass,
The question we would like to address in this concluding section of our
all of us involved in reflecting about the digital world, are hovering over the
contribution to the Onlife discussion and in the light of our arguments on
notions of selfhood and personhood trying to grapple with the doubt that we
the social nature of attention is the following : can a reflection on attention
are witnessing a redefinition of self. Annette Mahrkman for instance writes in
help us to shed some light on the debates on agency and selfhood. When
a recent paper:
we observe a modfication in our patterns of intentional action as we are
immersed in digital environments, is attention the hostage of the process or
“For me, a symbolic interactionist studying digital culture since the early
on the contrary, the enabler? It may be the case that it is the very nature of
1990s, these ways of being in the second decade of the 21st Century
our attentional mechanisms which allows us to engage so deeply with the
highlight certain elements of interaction that were not as visible in traditional
digital. In previous sections we have made the case that the nature of the
face-to-face settings:
code and algorithms determines our actions through the fragmentation of
activities or as Bolter says because it encourages users to «proceduralize
1. Boundaries between self and other are often unclear, particularly when
their behaviour” (p. 45) The fragmentation not only determines the tasks
information develops a social life of its own, beyond one’s immediate
and actions, it blurs the limits between the agent’s actions and the system
circumstances.
actions, in such a way that it becomes impossible for the agents to distin-
2. Boundaries of situations and identification of contexts are often unclear
guish between their intentions and the system’s. In the interplay with the
as dramas play out in settings and times far removed from the origin of
digital environments therefore, systems’ requests for attention are more
interaction.
than a simple appeal for the users’ consciousness, it is the urgent request for
3. Agency is not the sole property of individual entities, but a temporal
participating in the action. But this has been the case since the introduction
performative element that emerges in the dynamic interplay of people
of partially automated systems. and their technologies for communication.
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What is new and may have an even more distinctive effect on the definition
self and other when they are online (Gergen, 2000). The experiences
of self, is the fragmentation of information and activities among networks
described by gamers, programmers but recently simply people who are
of people through the digital systems. The collaborative online activi-
heavily engaged in email exchanges, all suggest a sense of flow and partici-
ties that now characterise the majority of «knowledge work» and that are
pation that by some is described as a loss of agency and other an exhilara-
being described in terms of swarms, collective intelligence, critical mass,etc.
ting extension of means.
are maybe the strongest manifestation of the shifting boundaries of the
self. When we put together a network of agents who are individually frag-
In order to understand how all of this is happening, we have to refer to our
mented by their interaction with their tools and who organise their mutual
exceptional, species specific, as Tommasello (2008) has shown, capacity to
activities around those fragments, is there a phenomenon of expansion or
join into other people’s attention. The development of the ability to envisage
dilution of agency? The constant reciprocal appeal to contribute with small
that other people have a state of mind different from one’s own, the capacity
bits of information, tasks, exchange, is just a more recent form of labour
to read other people’s intentions and finally the inclination to join into other
subdivision or does it fundamentally alter the relation to others? Are we
people’s attentional states, enables language, culture and co-construction.
observing a growing instrumentation of relations that make others into data
Joint attention is seen by developmental psychologists as a prerequisite for
or on the contrary as many visionaries of the Internet (Rheingold, Shirky,
language acquisition and it is potentially what explains that humans are the
Weinberg) the emergence of new forms of collective intelligence? The MIT
only species that has developed language and advanced forms of collabora-
Centre for Collective intelligence has the following motto: How can people
tion. It is also potentially what is making the hyperconnection proper to the
and computers be connected so that collectively they act more intelligently
digital world such a double edged sword. We are extraordinarily capable of
than any individual, group, or computer has ever done before? This question
collaborating with minimal information on very poor communication chan-
summaries the issue very well. nels (think Twitter or SMS) because our powers of empathy are so developed
and our capacity to infer and project meanings and intentions are supported
If this is the case, relinquishing attention to the collective flow is not a
by pragmatic processes of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) which again
problem, defending individual attention, as we have posited in the previous
rely on the sharing of attentional spaces. However it is also this power that
section, is counterproductive, because attention must be renegociated
loses us in the inordinate flow of requests, messages, instructions, informa-
constantly for the collective intelligence to work. Phenomenologically, many
tion so well described by Gergen.
people are already experiencing a sense of boundary redefinition between
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All of this means that an ecology of attention may in fact have much further
For A. Touraine (1993), the rationalization of life has progressively destroyed
reaching implications than initially intended. If joint attention is such an
the traditional correspondence between social organization and personal life,
extraordinarily developed social process which is involved in the core of our
leading to a massive de-socialization. “We no longer internalize social norms
activities and our sense of self; by addressing attention, and envisaging an
and roles…we no longer can understand or explain our individuality in social
alternative to «limited resource» model which underlies the monetization and
terms”. Placed into a Goffmanian frame, all of this means that we are losing
quantification of the process as we described above, we may in fact be ente-
the rituals and the codes that help us to preserve our face while preserving
ring the perilous waters of an ecology of the self.
the face of the other, a skill and process which is at the very root of social
ties.
C.2. Grey ecology as an ecology of alterity:
the political frame
This transformation leads, according to P. Virilio (2009) to a loss of orientation which in turn has tremendous consequences for the sense of alterity
and for democracy : “The specific negative aspect of these information supe-
The pervasive and obscure tracking of our digital life and its real time trans-
rhighways is precisely the loss of orientation regarding alterity (the other), a
formation into a myriad of fragmental and evolving profiles render both
disturbance in the relationship with the other and with the world. It is obvious
the social identity and the social belonging less understandable and more
that this loss of orientation, this non-situation, is going to usher a deep crisis
complex.
which will affect society and hence, democracy”
This leads, according to the beautiful expression of Th. Eriksen
(2001), to «the hegemony of fragments».
In a very similar vein, D. Quessda (2007), argues that the hegemony of fragThe brutality or the violence of the process could be related to the progres-
ments and of dynamic differences, makes the figure of the Other slowly
sive disappearance of the social habitus (P. Bourdieu, 1979) due to the
disappear: “It seems that we now live in a proliferation of differences. It is
extreme individualization and opacity of the attention channeling and profi-
not at all the same as the otherness (l’alétrité). The all-round contemporary
ling. This habitus was both a guarantee of a socially shared (class) episteme
exaltation of difference is perhaps the clearest sign of the disappearance of
of the world and a collective protection against the world complexity and
otherness. When men stop themselves to be crossed by a founding division,
uncertainty.
(…), the setting necessary for the existence of the Other disappears and all
- 110 -
figures vanish one after the other - whether in the form theological, political
For A. Gorz (1993), “Classical class analysis cannot provide an answer to the
or ontological.”
question of which social forces would be capable of achieving these transformations. There is no central front where decisive battles can be won
We all feel threatened by the loss of collective identity and of the aware-
through class confrontation. In other words, the front is everywhere, because
ness of otherness. To face such a loss different social groups have different
the power of capital is exercised in a diffuse fashion in every area of life”.
strategies:
“privileged social categories can recreate active participation
through voluntary association and thus control their own self through educa-
Grey ecology can be considered as an invitation to politicize our concerns
tion; but weaker groups either reject universalism and accept the authorita-
about our human and mental resources, just as green ecology did in the past
rian defense of a national or cultural identity, or become a mass of uprooted
with the natural resources. Grey ecology could open the door to new forms of
consumers of material or symbolic goods, unable to create original cultural
solidarity by setting a new front of collective engagement and general inte-
patterns” (A. Touraine, P. 54).
rest. A way to make clearer this new front is to compare it to what happened
to the ‘artisans’ at the end of the 19th century to the present situation. Now
The democratic challenge we are currently facing consists in finding a new
like then, we are witnessing the process of expropriation of human prero-
democratic basis of orientation or in other terms finding a route to escape
gatives: a hundred years ago it was the knowledge and gestures of the
from a “latent civil war between markets and tribes, mass society and closed
craftsmen that were being automated, more recently it is personal data,
cultures, imperial liberalism and aggressive nationalism”. (A.Touraine, P. 55)
history and digital traces that are being captured. These processes of rationalisation and automation impose order in an attempt to reduce the endemic
In the previous age of solid modernity or in the industrial period, exploita-
uncertainty and variability of human activity and control the limited atten-
tion, poverty and class conflicts, triggered the emergence of collective move-
tional capacity of humans (the operational one in the industrial world and
ments, making an industrial democracy possible. In the age of digital post-
the intentional one in the consumption world). Placed in this frame, attention
modernity, any collective movement (ex pluribus unum) is difficult to operate
can be conceptualized as a political and collective concern, as a new front for
due to the opacity of the ‘digital assemblage’ and to the extreme individua-
solidarity and resistance.
lization of digital lives. And this, as already pointed out, leads to the loss of
clear figure of otherness.
Why do we refer to ecology? For two main reasons. First of all, because as
well developed by A. Gorz (1993), the underlying motivation of ecology is
- 111 -
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- 114 -
Reengineering
Concept of Life
and Reinventing in the
Digital Era
The
An initiative
of the
Yiannis Laouris
Contents1
A. Reengineering the Concept of Life in the Computational Era
A.1. Introduction
117
117
A.1.1. Are Seeds or DNA Alive?
118
A.1.2. Is Plato Alive Today?
118
A.1.3. What Does It Mean to Be Alive?
119
A.1.4. What Does It Mean to Be Human?
120
A.5.3. Accessibility of Technologies 124
A.5.4. Privacy in a Globally Connected World 124
A.5.5. The Right to Digital Euthanasia 124
A.5.6. What Is Human? 125
B. Reinventing Democracy in the Digital Era
B.1. Introduction
125
125
B.2. Grand Challenges towards Reengineering
Democracy
126
A.2. Mind and Body
120
B.2.1. Challenge #1: Identify and Engage the
A.3. Immortality and Sustainability
120
Right Stakeholders
126
A.4. Pathways to Immortality
121
B.2.2. Challenge #2: Voting leads to Fair and Wise Results
127
121
B.2.3. Challenge #3: Protecting the Authenticity of Citizens’ Opinions
A.4.1. Challenge #1 To decelerate or stop biological aging
A.4.2. Challenge #2 To replace biological with manufactured tissues
and Anonymity 128
and organs 121
B.2.4. Challenge #4: Achieve true and not elusive Equality
128
A.4.3. Challenge #3 Regenerative Medicine
121
A.4.4. Challenge #4 To transfer the mind to a machine 122
B.3.1. Authentic Participation
128
A.5. Policy Implications
123
B.3.2. Respect Human Cognitive Limitations
129
A.5.1. Life Extension
123
B.3.3. Research and Tools that enhance Human Cognitive
B.3. Policy Implications
Limitations
A.5.2. Authentic Participation in Decision Making and Governance 123
References
- 116 -
128
129
130
For the purpose of this writing, I have chosen to expand on two issues that
outcome will always be wise and fair for everybody involved; (3) how to
are rather unrelated, but both intriguing. The reflections in the first section
protect the authenticity of citizens’ opinions and their anonymity; and finally
may become more relevant within longer-range horizons than the rest of the
(4) how to achieve true and not elusive equality among all citizens. The
concepts considered in this volume. Nevertheless, people alive today have
section concludes with a number of policy implications.
been tremendously fortunate to witness a number of scientific advances
(the internet, cloning, and stem cell and nanotechnologies) that have trans-
A. Reengineering the Concept of Life in the
Computational Era
formed our understanding of life to such an extent that they justify a review
of the need for concept reengineering with regard to what it means to be
“alive” or “human” in the computational era in a hyper-connected world. The
A.1. Introduction
mind-body problem is considered from the point of view of the implications
imposed by the emerging immortality of information. Different pathways
to immortality are summarized and the challenges for sustainability consi-
The distinction between life and death, between the living and the nonliving,
dered. The section concludes with a discussion regarding policy implications
has always been blurred in the spheres of the divine and the imagination.
with respect to (1) life extension, (2) authentic participation in governance,
By contrast, biology has offered a distinctive definition that has worked well
(3) accessibility of technologies, (4) privacy in a globally connected world,
for many centuries and served research advancements and developments.
and (5) the right to digital euthanasia.
This simple definition distinguishes the living by its capacity to grow (through
metabolism), respond (to stimuli), adapt (through natural selection), and
The second section discusses how the digital era opens tremendous possibi-
reproduce. A more accurate definition describes life with seven properties:
lities for real-time feedback, frequent polling and online voting for virtually
(a) made up of cells; (b) capable of reproduction; (c) based on genetic code;
anything anywhere. A model of “direct democracy,” where everybody gets to
(d) exhibiting growth and development; (e) needing materials and energy; (f)
vote about everything will open Pandora’s box and create chaos. Within the
responsive to its environment; and g) maintaining an internal balance. Inte-
context of hyper-connectivity, this chapter discusses four grand challenges:
restingly, the concept of an inevitable death is not usually included in the
(1) how to identify and engage the right stakeholders (i.e., those whose lives
properties of life; it is nonetheless implied.
will be influenced by whatever is discussed) in every particular situation; (2)
how to design and implement a system, which guarantees that the voting
- 117 -
A.1.2. Is Plato Alive Today?
While researchers operate with the above definition, they also often use
terms that portray something as if it were alive, even with the knowledge
that it may not meet all the above criteria. Researchers do this with a
Many might argue that Plato (like countless others) is alive today, at least in
conscious understanding that the distinction is known and that people are
the minds of the millions of people who have read, internalized, and repro-
aware of it. There are two archetypal examples.
duced his ideas and philosophy. In some sense, he could therefore be considered alive. Speaking more precisely, his ideas are alive but not he himself.
His ideas continue to develop and grow in the sense that they “metabolize”
A.1.1. Are Seeds or DNA Alive?
ideas coming from contemporary authors and use them to grow. These
respond in certain ways when confronted with present-day challenges; some
Seeds are made of cells. They can, in principle, develop into living organisms
of his ideas adapt to contemporary realities and therefore survive longer, and
that metabolize and grow; they have a genetic code; and they maintain their
they are continually being reproduced. One could argue that they could be
internal balance. In many ways, a seed may be considered to be alive. There
coded and that they manage to maintain their internal cohesion. Where, then,
is a definite period of viability when, if not planted and germinated, a seed
is the line drawn in the distinction between alive and dead? Even though his
will eventually die. Some seeds survive only a few days, whereas seeds
ideas meet many of the conditions of life, they cannot be regarded as a living
recovered from cold peat bogs have germinated after thousands of years.
organism, because they are not constrained within a finite body made out of
Nonetheless, seeds do not grow and do not respond to stimuli (at least, not in
cells, among other reasons. It is not in Plato’s mind that his ideas continue to
detectable ways). Therefore, they are not alive, as such, but they are poten-
live. Instead, they evolve and propagate only in the minds of so many others.
tially alive. In analogous ways, Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), as the code of
life, is also only potentially alive because it also does not meet several of the
The distinction implicitly made above is that whatever processes are the
criteria for living organisms. For example, it does not develop or grow and
object of study, they must take place within the original entity (in the above
does not metabolize. Nevertheless, it manages to replicate and propagate
case, in Plato’s mind). Is this a necessary requirement in our era, however?
and thereby secure the continuation of life. In both cases, these two entities
The advocates of the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998)
carry life within them, but they are not alive as such.
would argue that the container of Plato’s ideas (i.e., his mind) has simply
changed (to the minds of many). What, then, if technology allows a person’s
mind to work while inside a different host (e.g., a constrained silicon circuit or
- 118 -
a distributed network) after the body of that person dies? Would that entity
These developments invite humanity to rethink many of the concepts
meet the criteria used to describe being alive? It would be the same mind,
previously considered invariable, as summarized in the following questions:
and for all practical considerations capable of learning, reacting, developing,
and adapting eternally. It will, however, violate the requirement that a living
•
organism is made up of cells. If we choose to stick to this requirement, we
What does it mean to be alive? (Does the concept of life need to be revisited?)
can postpone the need to re-engineer our concepts.
•
What does it mean to be human? (Is the human really something more
than just information? If yes, then what?)
Computer technology and ICT in particular have created conditions for
•
digital as well as physical artifacts to not only remain “alive” for very long
If the processes responsible for the emergence of the mind become
immortal, can the mind then be separated from its container?
(virtually indefinite) periods, but also, more importantly, to be able to express
•
many of the properties previously reserved only for the living. The invention
If humans become immortal, what are the consequences for sustainability?
of the internet kindled irreversible transformations in at least two dimensions. In one dimension, it created a grid that connects people, knowledge,
A.1.3. What Does It Mean to Be Alive?
and machines. The internet of things added the nonliving, the environment,
and even nature at large to this grid. In another dimension, the internet
facilitated the development of new technologies and new spaces. Virtually
This foundational question cannot receive a definitive answer using today’s
unlimited data, information, and knowledge, as well as the products of
concepts, but addressing it is useful for dealing with the challenges of our
thoughts (e.g., digital footprints) and actions (e.g., traces of actions while
times. Nevertheless, to continue to teach the seven properties of life as if
browsing through or interacting in cyberspace), are, for all practical purposes,
they were sufficient to describe the living is not only counterproductive, it is
immortal. Sooner than many imagine, rudimentary versions of “human
also misleading.
minds” will be capable of continuing their own lives, “interacting” with
other people or beings and environments and learning from their actions.
- 119 -
A.1.4. What Does It Mean to Be Human?
that a cat can be alive and dead at the same time! The deliberations that
led to the Onlife Manifesto (pp. 3-11) have also encouraged the members of
The 1999 movie Bicentennial Man, based on Isaac Asimov’s novella published
this think tank to favor dualities over the classical oppositional dichotomies.
in 1975, and the movie A.I., written, directed, and produced by Steven Spiel-
Consequently, if we manage one day to upload a human mind to a machine
berg in 2001, have already provoked people into rethinking not only whether
(or the net), it will mean that the mind can be separated from the body but
a humanoid is alive, but also, more importantly, whether a humanoid should
at the same time will be an admission that the mind requires a body, albeit a
be granted rights reserved only for humans. Furthermore, taking up Hannah
different one. All the same, the challenges and implications will be the object
Arendt’s task of reconsidering “the human condition from the vantage point
of many studies to come.
of our newest experiences and most recent fears,” the discovery that humans
may be nothing more than information calls precisely for a reengineering of
A.3. Immortality and Sustainability
the concept of what it means to be human in the computational era. This
discussion invites us to reflect upon ourselves and not only define whatever
makes us human but also, more importantly, to identify those special charac-
One could argue that were humans to live longer or even become biologically
teristics that clearly distinguish us from non-humans and which we would
immortal, that would be devastating for the environment and for sustaina-
like to preserve (Yiannis Laouris).
bility. Moreover, many ethical questions arise, such as whether humans have
the right to live longer than other creatures, whether people should establish
rules and conditions to terminate life or agree to euthanasia, and how to
A.2. Mind and Body
determine who or what should live and die.
Can the mind exist without a body? Aristotle proposed that the mind (soul)
cannot exist outside a body and dies with it, whereas Descartes maintained
a rigid distinction between the realms of mind and matter. Scientists today
describe light as being both wave and particles, and quantum mechanics has
questioned the foundations of physics as we knew it for centuries by proposing that particles exist in all states at once (in coherent superposition) and
- 120 -
A.4. Pathways to Immortality
A.4.2. Challenge #2 To replace biological with manufactured
tissues and organs
Scientists and technologists aspire to achieve immortalities of different
types using completely different theoretical groundings and technologies.
This has already begun, with heart pacemakers, metallic joints, bionic
Each approach poses different conceptual challenges.
limbs, eye and ear transplants, etc. Research also goes one step further in
enhancing human capabilities by using technologies that are not necessarily designed as human homomorphs, as in the case of exoskeletons. Are
A.4.1. Challenge #1 To decelerate or stop biological aging
emerging cyborgs or, eventually, robots still human? Should we draw a line
or accept, as Minsky (2004) suggested, that “robots will inherit the earth, but
Scientists work on many different paths to decelerate or completely end
they will be our children”?
the process of biological aging. To begin with, we use different definitions
for aging, which of course impose different points of intervention. These, in
A.4.3. Challenge #3 Regenerative Medicine
turn, have different effects on the need to reconsider relevant concepts. For
example, if aging and cell death are pre-programmed, then breaking that
code opens up questions about whether someone placed that code there for
A term attributed to William Haseltine (founder of Human Genome Sciences;
a reason and whether breaking that code brings us close to that creator. By
Viola et al., 2003), regenerative medicine refers to the “process of repla-
contrast, if aging is simply a process of metabolic and cellular burnout and
cing or regenerating human cells, tissues, or organs to restore or establish
overuse, we may not need to reconsider any concepts. Moreover, if we view
normal function” (Mason and Dunnill, 2008). The theoretical and technolo-
aging as a multidimensional process of physical, psychological, and social
gical approaches range from attempts to regenerate damaged tissues and
change, then all of these changes need to be taken into consideration when
organs in the body and/or stimulating the body’s own repair mechanisms to
talking about aging. For example, according to Kyriazis (2003, 2005), chaos
heal previously irreparable tissues or organs, to replacing damaged tissue or
theory and entropy imply that more information will lead to more intellectual
organs either by growing (manufacturing) them in the lab using scaffolding
complexity, as well as more biological redundancy, i.e., less risk of aging and
technologies or “printing” (see also below) them layer by layer.
death.
- 121 -
Repairing the body from inside
organ to be alive, the constancy of the identity of the recipient, and even the
At first glance, the idea that nano robots inside our body will repair whatever
mind-body question. What’s more, the idea that someday we might develop
needs to be repaired does not affect our concepts of life, human, or identity.
printers that print printers (i.e., reproduction) challenges the very concept of
What, however, if these robots are controlled from outside? What about the
life.
concept of free will, for example?
A.4.4. Challenge #4 To transfer the mind to a machine
Reengineering whole organs
Organs are engineered using decellularizing a living organ (removing cells to
leave a clean extracellular structure) to keep only the skeleton. For example,
This usually refers to the process of transferring or copying a conscious mind
Stephen Badylak (2011), among many others, has developed a process that
from a brain to a non-biological substrate. Even though still considered by
involves scraping cells from the lining of a pig’s bladder and then drying it to
many as far-fetched science fiction, in some ways it has already begun. In
become a sheet or a powder. Stem cells then grow within the structure and
the not-too-distant future, digital agents may represent us to some extent,
re-create the organ. Scientists are also using artificially created structures to
behaving and acting like us. With the added functionality of learning from
serve as scaffolds to engineer, for example, heart valves or bladders.
their mistakes, they will have a life of their own. Thus, a rudimentary self will
continue to live in cyberspace even after our death. Once we have reached
Replacing tissues or organs using 3D printers
the point when an entirely, conscious self can be transferred, we will have
3D organ printers are no longer science fiction. Functioning prototypes have
managed to transfer the human mind to a machine. At that point, we will
existed for over 10 years now. Anthony Atala at the Wake Forest Institute for
face new questions, such as, what happens if the biological equivalent conti-
Regenerative Medicine (see, for example, Nakamura et al., 2005; Xu et al.,
nues to live?
2009) has been trying to print heart valves, kidneys, livers, and other tissues
using a technology analogous to inkjet printers, injecting human cells instead
of nano-sized droplets of ink.
The idea of “printing” human organs to replace those aging or malfunctioning
opens up new conceptual challenges with regard to what it means for an
- 122 -
A.5. Policy Implications
A.5.2. Authentic Participation in Decision Making and Governance
A.5.1. Life Extension
Today’s technologies enable many more people to live longer and better lives
In a world in which artifacts and information survive much longer than the
and therefore to be able to interact with each other for longer periods. Such
human body, there will be increasing pressure to also extend the human
technologies also allow them to share and interact in multiple public (real
lifespan. As Luciano (this volume, p.37) observes, “more people are alive
and virtual) spaces. This increased connectivity, in conjunction with greater
today than ever before,” while at the same time about 100,000 people die
access to information and knowledge, inevitably enables more people to
every day because of aging. Anticipating a significant prolongation of the
participate in debates and decisions. Such developments also increase the
human lifespan or wishing for immortality opens up a Pandora’s Box of
possibilities for disagreements and conflicts, however. The science of struc-
countless challenges related to evolution and sustainability. Research that
tured dialogic design predicts that the capacity of a community of stakehol-
aims at the prolongation of life expands in different directions, ranging from
ders to implement a plan of action effectively depends strongly on the
DNA manipulations to manufactured biological or bionic organ replacements,
genuine engagement of all those whose lives might be affected (Flanagan &
to nano-technology- and stem cell–technology based treatments. The ethical
Christakis, 2009; Laouris, 2012). Disregarding their participation is not only
and sustainability challenges that accompany these developments require
unethical but also means that any plans made are bound to fail (Laouris et
not only relevant research but also appropriate attention and policies (Mireille
al., 2008). Therefore, the concept and the means to such authentic parti-
Hildebrandt, this volume, pp.169-183). We might have to reconsider the right
cipation will need to be reconsidered and redefined. We are in urgent need
to live longer than other creatures on earth (or in the universe), the right to
of technologies that would enable massive collaboration to accelerate deci-
interfere with nature, and the right to take evolution into human hands.
sion making (Laouris & Christakis, 2007) and, consequently, positive social
change. The struggle to extend public spaces, in which humans interact and
increase affordances and freedoms, must be accompanied by parallel developments in methodologies and technologies that can effectively guarantee
that wisdom will always prevail in our choices and actions.
- 123 -
A.5.3. Accessibility of Technologies
if they are ever going to be able to tackle questions of decision making and
privacy in a globally connected world.
The intelligence, size, and every other physical and mental characteristic of
all species follow normal distributions with restricted standard deviations.
A.5.5. The Right to Digital Euthanasia
Technological developments that significantly enhance humans might, even
in the short term, significantly distort these distributions, especially if the
economic, social, educational, and other gaps between the rich and the poor
The feasibility of life extension increases the challenges to privacy because
on the planet remain as large as they are. Therefore, societies need to pay
the chances that an individual might wish to delete something about him-
increasingly more attention to issues of accessibility and wide participation.
or herself from the net undoubtedly grows with increasing life spans. Trying
to solve this problem, which at first glance appears rather technical, creates
enormous new challenges. The power to decide to erase any type of informa-
A.5.4. Privacy in a Globally Connected World
tion from the internet is one of the greatest controversies in the discussions
regarding EU Data protection regulation. In addition, the technical aspect is
Data and information immortality pose enormous challenges to the concept
a lot more complicated than one would imagine. This is because in order to
of privacy. Privacy has two aspects: the power to control what information
be able to trace and delete data that an individual has created, it would be
the individual wishes to reveal and the power to erase information that
necessary for the data produced by any individual (human or nonhuman)
belongs to or concerns the individual. While the first becomes increasingly
to bear some kind of signature and/or leave footprints behind, even when
complicated, the second is virtually impossible today because of legal and
the data are copied, moved, or otherwise processed by others at any later
technological constraints. For example, how are future humans protected
stage. This opens a Pandora’s Box of issues about privacy and anonymity.
from invisible manipulations that can take place via extensions of or attach-
Furthermore, consider the case of more complex digital creatures, originally
ments to their body and mind? Nothing remains strictly private or public.
created by someone. If a digital agent evolves and acquires new knowledge,
Privacy depends on the circumstances or even on one’s financial caliber. How
experiences, and skills, it starts to become something independent from its
is privacy defined when it comes to artificial agents or interfaces connecting
creator. Such possible futures force us to reconsider popular worldviews and
human brains with other brains or systems? The legal system and people’s
the concept of what it means for a being to be alive or dead (or somewhere
wisdom in general will need to catch up with developments in technology
in between) or for a being to exist or not to exist (or something in between),
- 124 -
B. Reinventing Democracy in the Digital Era
as well as who has the right to decide about the life, death, existence, or
extermination of such forms of life/information.
B.1. Introduction
A.5.6. What Is Human?
Democracy of the 21st century refers almost exclusively to the right to take
part in the political process (i.e., the right to vote). Nevertheless, the percen-
With the blurring between the living and the nonliving, between biological-
tages of citizens who choose to exert this basic human right have fallen in
ly-nature-made and technologically-nature-made artifacts, comes an urgent
Europe to an average of less than 80% (Poland and Switzerland close to
need to identify explicitly the true and deep characteristics that define
50%) and in the US to around 60%. At the same time, the European politi-
the human and distinguish people from the nonhuman. For example, only
cal-economic system fails to secure employment for 26 million people (ca.
humans are concerned with the meaning of life and the inevitability of death.
12%; Unemployment Statistics, 2013). It is, to say the least, disgraceful that
Moreover, the search for gratification and the ability to create conditions
some politicians blame the youth for their reduced interest in politics and
to develop rights and codes of ethics are found only in humans, although
diminishing participation in societal matters, when the politicians are the
there are rudimentary versions in some primates and dolphins. As far as we
ones who have failed to put in place accountable, transparent and efficient
knew until recently, only humans experience dreams while they sleep, have
mechanisms and processes to secure one of the most basic human rights:
a theory of mind, and express and understand humour. These are just a few
the right to work. Next to corruption, the unprecedented crises of institutions
examples of characteristics generally reserved for humans. Do we invest
and values and the lack of accountability, one of the root causes underlying
enough in research to understand the effects of hyper-connectivity and of
the failure of current systems of governance to respond to challenges is the
the extension of public spaces with practically infinite parallel virtual spaces
fact that those we elect as our representatives fail to lobby and promote for
on these presumably human properties? How many government policies or
the issues for which they have been chosen. One theoretical solution would
societal priorities care and nurture the above characteristics that truly distin-
be to put in place a more direct connection between people and law-making
guish humans from everything else in this universe?
and/or decision-making processes. The digital era has rendered all types of
intermediaries obsolete; why not use technology to also bypass our representatives? These lines of thinking draw attention to the fact that our current
- 125 -
B.2. Grand Challenges towards Reengineering
Democracy
concepts of fair and democratic processes might need to be reengineered to
meet the needs of our times.
B.2.1. Challenge #1: Identify and Engage the
Right Stakeholders
Since the digital era opens tremendous possibilities for real-time feedback,
frequent polling and online voting for virtually any matter from anywhere on
the planet, in the minds of many, more voting equals more democracy. Direct
democracy is a term coined recently, which refers to a specific (one of many)
The first challenge demands that everybody who is a stakeholder in a situa-
model of democratic participation in which all members have equal access,
tion must have the right to participate in any dialogue, deliberation, or deci-
voice, and vote on all issues. However, the truth is that if we were to adopt
sion on matters that are of concern to him or her. Indeed, the science of
such an approach in making political or other decisions, we would create
structured dialogic design predicts that “the capacity of a community of
chaos. It should therefore be rigorously distinguished and differentiated from
stakeholders to implement a plan of action effectively depends strongly
massive but authentic democratic participation. The latter demands that all
on the true engagement of all whose lives might be affected” (Flanagan &
relevant stakeholders are given opportunity to participate in, and voice to
Christakis, 2009; Laouris, 2012). Disregarding their participation is not only
argue over, issues that influence their lives. As simple as this might sound,
unethical, but also any plans made are bound to fail (Laouris et al., 2008).
we currently do not have the theoretical grounds or the technical means
We therefore need to develop systems that guarantee the authentic involve-
to implement such a model. How do we identify and engage those whose
ment of those whose lives might be influenced by any decisions taken. In the
lives will be influenced by whatever is discussed for every situation? How
era of globalization and hyper-connectivity, these are not trivial problems.
do we design and implement a system which guarantees that the voting
Should Europeans (or any others) have a say in what happens in Africa? Are
outcome will be fair and wise? How do we protect the authenticity of citizens’
the citizens of one European member state stakeholders in decisions regar-
opinions and their anonymity? More importantly, how do we achieve true and
ding the management of the economy of another member state? Current
not elusive equality? These questions, which constitute grand challenges
political, economic and environmental deadlocks have challenged previously
that need to be addressed with high priority within the 2020 horizon, are
widely accepted notions of who the stakeholders in a particular situation
explained below.
are. Even if we admit that stakeholders might extend outside previously
well-defined defined geographical boundaries, how do we design systems in
which their voting power is somehow weighted in ways that are fair and just
- 126 -
for everybody? Furthermore, what if decisions affect the “lives” of entities
hyper-connectivity era encourages us to reconsider concepts like those of
without a voice (living or non-living)? How do we secure their “participation”
fairness and equality and to reengineer the concept of democracy.
in a dialogue (Thorseth, 2011; Wasilewski, 2007) that “concerns” them?
Democracy has its roots in ancient Athens. Contrary to general belief, that
model was not entirely based on popular voting. Athenians of the Golden Age
B.2.2. Challenge #2: Voting leads to Fair and Wise Results
were engaged collectively in searching and carefully examining meanings
and alternatives together through a process they called “deliberation.” They
Decision making based on majority voting has been the prevailing and
aimed to fully understand the underlying problems, clarify the debatable
unquestionable model of democracy for centuries. We know that the majo-
situation and achieve consensus. They justified the correctness of their deci-
rity’s opinion is neither always just for everybody nor always right. Many
sion because they trusted their collective wisdom. The collectively agreed
societies, including the European Union, as well as the company law, have
course of action was backed up by all and it was considered unthinkable
developed policies and mechanisms to protect the rights of minorities.
or even unethical to go against it, not because it was a decision eventually
However, now that today technology theoretically allows everybody to vote
ordered by their king, but a decision taken democratically and shared by the
any time on any issue, we face a new threat: that of creating chaos. Inte-
great majority of those considered stakeholders. This model was workable
restingly, according to Özbekhan, Jantsch, and Christakis, who conceptua-
because the number of citizens participating was relatively small.
lized the original prospectus of the Club of Rome titled “The Predicament of
Mankind” (Christakis, 2006), the premature selection of corrective actions to
More than two millenniums later, we need to reinvent democracy in ways
problems (i.e., premature voting) based on popular vote leads to an extrapo-
that millions can participate effectively. To achieve this we must guarantee
lated future, which differs significantly from an ideal vision. This is because
that the individual has access to all relevant information, alternatives, and
we fail to capture and to address the inter-relations, inter-connections and
arguments necessary for him to her to vote responsibly. Courses of action
interactions between individual aspects (sub-problems) of the problematic
should be chosen based on their capacity to facilitate change towards
situation, which we are trying to improve. Popular voting on complex issues
a collectively defined and agreed desired ideal future state. In sum, votes
often results in erroneous priorities (“EPE: The Erroneous Priorities Effect:
should be not only be weighted in some way, to engage all relevant stakehol-
Dye and Conaway,” 1999). However, with no better model at hand, questio-
ders fairly; moreover the process that precedes voting should capitalize on
ning the validity of popular voting opens Pandora’s box. Nevertheless, the
what we call collective wisdom.
- 127 -
B.2.3. Challenge #3: Protecting the Authenticity of Citizens’
Opinions and Anonymity
more on the mind than on the muscle,” happened long time ago, but people
still work either a lot more than 8 hours a day or they remain hopelessly
unemployed. Likewise, Marx’s dream for a stateless, classless society he
Voting today is presumed to be confidential and a matter of individual choice.
called communism, where everyone can have what he or she needs, disap-
Yet, even today, especially in small communities, political parties can esti-
peared with the Berlin Wall.
mate who voted what by re-constructing simple puzzles comprised of
peoples’ networks, public statements and personal interests. In the era of
Our digital futures challenge not only concepts such as human/technology
digital hyper-connectivity and with digital privacy disappearing, there will be
relationships, presence, friendship, responsibility, agency, liability and capa-
greater need to protect one’s thoughts, opinions, judgments and eventually
bility, but also basic concepts of our existence such as freedom, equality,
choices and decisions.
mortality (see Yiannis Laouris same volume) and even purpose. What does it
mean to be free, or to be equal in the digital era? Achieving true freedom and
equality are enormous challenges that unless addressed within the context
B.2.4. Challenge #4: Achieve true and not elusive Equality
of the 2020 horizon, our world will have not future. In conclusion, our future
societies have to design technologies and implement policies to safeguard
Three words, liberté, égalité, fraternité (French for liberty, equality, frater-
the true individual human rights and freedoms.
nity-brotherhood), captured the essence of the French Revolution. Those who
sacrificed their lives dreaming for a better world have not done so in the
B.3. Policy Implications
name of an abstract meaning of democracy, but for a concrete vision of real
freedom, authentic equality and true brotherhood between all people. More
B.3.1. Authentic Participation
than two centuries have passed and one would be barely justified to claim
freedom, equality and brotherhood among 21st century citizens. The millennium hype that the emergence of information technologies would serve
As we have argued above, votes should be not only be weighted to justly
to close economic, educational, democratic, digital, and social gaps on our
engage all relevant stakeholders; moreover, the process that precedes
planet was not confirmed (Laouris & Laouri 2008). Alvin Toffler’s (1995) tran-
voting should be designed in such ways and supported by relevant techno-
sition to the Information Age, defined as the point when “progress depends
logies to capitalize on what we call collective wisdom (Bausch & Christakis,
- 128 -
2006; Flanagan & Christakis, 2009) and collective intelligence. Except for
time, with the number of “intelligent,” “living” digital creatures surrounding us
the University of Chicago (Wisdom Research, 2013), the MIT (CCI, 2013), and
also increasing exponentially, we might even have to fight for attention and
the Institute for 21st Century (2003), all in the US, there is little research
personalization.
in Europe on these matters. Stakeholder analysis, weighted voting, collective intelligence, collective wisdom, and management of complex societal
It is therefore not accidental that the Onlife Manifesto recommends that
systemic problems are just a few of the disciplines that need to be supported
“societies must protect, cherish and nurture humans’ attentional capabili-
and developed further. Even when the theoretical challenges are resolved, we
ties,” and concludes that “more collective attention should be paid to atten-
will need to develop techno-social systems that implement the theory.
tion itself” (p.10).
B.3.2. Respect Human Cognitive Limitations
B.3.3. Research and Tools that enhance Human Cognitive
Limitations
Since the time that Miller (1956) discovered that our short-term memory can
only hold seven, plus or minus two, items and Warfield (1988) proposed that
Future citizens will have to take a lot more decisions than they do today and
this number falls down to three items when we are expected to perform any
they will have to do this a lot more frequently. Alternatives are becoming
operations on them (such as compare them), scientists have been aware of
not only progressively more complex and their characteristics concealed
this eminent cognitive limitation. The overwhelming bombardment of today’s
and convoluted, but in addition one’s experience, perception of the world,
youth with information through digital screens that demand their attention
and even one’s own reality becomes increasingly diminished and subject to
more than 8 hours a day has brought to light another great limitation of our
manipulation. If today’s citizens feel powerless to participate in the deci-
cognitive abilities: our attentional abilities are also quite limited! It should
sion making process and their voice having no reasonable possibility to be
come as no surprise that the prevalence of the attention deficit syndrome
heard, how would citizens of the future feel like if we do not address these
(i.e., ADHD) has increased significantly over the past 2 decades of the infor-
problems? The question is what would it take to design new systems of
mation revolution. Furthermore, with the number of options increasing and
governance in which people’s authentic and real wishes can be taken into
the impact of our choices becoming less predictable, we need access to arti-
account. Future citizens should somehow become capable of harvesting
ficially intelligent agents to support us in evaluating options. At the same
their collective intelligence and their collective wisdom rather than allowing
- 129 -
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Complexity, responsibility
and governance
An initiative
of the
Judith Simon
Ugo Pagallo
Distributed Epistemic
Responsibility in a
Hyperconnected Era
An initiative
of the
Judith Simon
Contents1
Introduction
Introduction
136
A. Knowing Today
137
B. Responsible Research and Innovation
138
from the vantage point of our newest experiences and most recent fears”
C. Approaching Distributed Epistemic Responsibility
140
(Arendt 1958:5) as was suggested in the background note (pp.26-34) to
C.1. Epistemic Responsibility: Insights from (Social) Epistemology To explore what being human in a hyperconnected era could mean, we may
start with Hannah Arendt’s challenge to reconsider “the human condition
the ONLIFE Initiative. A core experience in our contemporary socio-technical
140
lifeworld - often resulting in fear - concerns responsibility and accountability:
C.2. Responsibility & ICT: Insights from the Philosophy of Computing 141
namely, the difficulty to attribute responsibility and to locate accountability
C.3. Epistemic Responsibility in Entangled Socio-Technical Systems:
in ever more distributed and entangled socio-technical systems. Think small:
Insights from Feminist Theory
D. Facing Distributed Epistemic Responsibility in case of a non-functioning internet connection? Think big: who’s responsible
145
D.1. Re-Conceptualizing Epistemic Responsibility
146
D.2. Governance for Epistemic Responsibility
148
References
about the difficulties of finding and reaching the person to make responsible
142
– accountable and liable – for the financial crisis?
Computer technology and ICT in particular has deepened and aggravated
these issues. Think of artificial agents, search engine algorithms, the personal
150
data handling of social networking sites; think of drones, robots in military
and health-care or unmanned vehicles, think of algorithmic trading: who is
responsible and especially if things go wrong – who is to blame: designers,
users, the technologies or rather the distributed and entangled socio-technical systems? What are the normative implications and who is in charge and
able to set the regulative frameworks?
On the one hand these are issues to be tackled by policy makers: regulations
are needed for algorithmic trading, for drone deployments, for the design of
- 136 -
electronic patient record systems - and for an overabundance of constantly
Clearly, these two perspectives are related. Actors acting within environ-
emerging new issues related to the attribution or assumption of responsibi-
ments shape these environments through their action just as much as those
lity in socio-technical environments. On the other hand, there are actions and
with an explicit governance mandate are themselves often part of the envi-
decisions to be taken by each and every one of us in our daily lives. When
ronments they intend to design and govern. Nonetheless, the distinction
meandering on the Web, where can we place trust and where should we be
enables fleshing out different tasks and duties – different responsibilities –
vigilant? How can we and how should we assume responsibility ourselves
related to either acting within systems or designing and governing systems.
and how can we attribute it to others?
A. Knowing Today
In this contribution I specifically focus on the responsibilities in processes of
knowing. I argue that concerning these so-called epistemic responsibilities
we are also facing new challenges in a hyperconnected era, which require
Our ways of knowing, be it in research or in everyday-life are on the one hand
thought and action both on a macroscopic level as well as on a microscopic
highly social: much of what we know, we know through the spoken or written
level. While reconsidering received notions of responsibility, it is therefore
words of others; research consists not only in collaboration, but also in buil-
advised to distinguish two relevant perspectives:
ding upon previous knowledge, in communicating information, in communal
quality assessment of scientific agents or content (e.g. peer review), etc. On
1. the individualistic perspective, focusing on individuals acting as
the other hand, technology, particularly information and communication
knowers within increasingly complex and dynamic socio-technical epis-
technologies, mediate and shape these practices of knowing to profound
temic systems. The leading question here is: what does it mean to be
extends. We check Wikipedia to find information about a city we plan to visit
responsible in knowing?
or some information about a historical incident, we rely on search engines
2. the governance perspective, focusing on the question how systems and
to deliver relevant information on a specific topic, we use ratings of other
environments should be designed so that individuals can act responsibly.
agents explicitly to assess the quality of products before buying them or
The leading question here is: what does it take to enable responsibility in
implicitly by accepting the ordering of search results or recommendations.
knowing?
Thus, contemporary epistemic practices have to be conceived as socio-technical epistemic practices.
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Within these entangled socio-technical processes of knowing, we rely in
regarding responsibility, particularly epistemic responsibility in a hyper-
numerous more or less transparent ways on other agents, human agents as
connected era.
much as non-human agents, infrastructures, technologies. However, what
does this mean for the two main issues addressed in this paper, i.e. what are
So what is RRI about? According to a recent leaflet by the European Commis-
the implications of this socio-technical epistemic entanglement for 1) being
sion: “(r)esponsible Research and Innovation means that societal actors work
responsible in knowing (individual perspective) and 2) for enabling responsi-
together during the whole research and innovation process in order to better
bility in knowing (governance/design perspective)?
align both the process and its outcomes, with the values, needs and expectations of European society. RRI is an ambitious challenge for the creation of a
While the former issue is of relevance to each and every one of us, the latter
Research and Innovation policy driven by the needs of society and engaging
is of special concern for policy makers. Particularly interesting cases for the
all societal actors via inclusive participatory approaches.”1
governance perspective are the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation initiatives which have been proposed by several national research coun-
More specifically, the RRI framework consists of six key areas: (1) engage-
cils in Europe (e.g. in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway) as well as by the
ment, (2) gender equality, (3) science education, (4) open access, (5) ethics
European Commission.
and (6) governance, the last one being an umbrella term for the first 5
areas.2 On the website of the European Foundation Center the same first
five areas of key relevance for RRI are also identified, area (6) on governance,
B. Responsible Research and Innovation
however, is missing while they list science communication and career as two
additional key areas of RRI. On this latter website, each key area is followed
The Responsible Research and Innovation strategy of the European Commis-
by short explanation. For instance, public engagement refers to the “enga-
sion is part of the prospective EU Framework Programme Horizon 2020
gement of people and civil society organizations in the research and inno-
as a successor to the Science in Society strand of the current Framework
Programme FP7. By combining the word responsible with research and inno1 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (last date of access 12.01.2013)
vation as two particularly knowledge-intense domains, it could be expected
that RRI will deliver at least some answer to the before mentioned challenges
2 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (last date of access 12.01.2013)
- 138 -
vation process and the integration of society in science issues” and careers
If RRI shall be of some use to tackle the challenges with respect to epistemic
students”.3
responsibility in a hyperconnected era, then we need to improve it on two
to “making careers in science and technology attractive to young
fronts. First, we need to add some meat to the notion of responsibility, to
Two observations may be illuminating: First of all, it seems that most of these
fill the term “responsible” in Responsible Research and Innovation with some
guidelines focus on what may be considered professional ethics or business
content. Second, when addressing epistemic responsibility in research and
ethics, i.e. appropriate professional behavior in practices such as hiring or
innovation, we need to focus on the ethics of epistemic practices themselves,
communicating. What appears rather neglected, in contrast, are the ethical
i.e. the responsibilities of epistemic agents as epistemic agents.
implications of the epistemic practices in research and innovation themselves. Second, despite looming large in the title of the initiative, the term
When asking what it may mean to act responsibly as an epistemic agent
responsibility is surprisingly underrepresented in the descriptions of RRI’s key
within socio-technically entangled systems, I will become obvious that epis-
areas and goals. In the summary on the website of the European Founda-
temic responsibility is a topic that links epistemology to ethics. Therefore,
tion Center the word “responsibility” is not to be found at all. In the leaflet
we do not merely need a subsection on ethics in Responsible Research and
by the European Commission, it appears at two instances: in the section on
Innovation: we need to understand and acknowledge - both in epistemic and
science education, it is argued that science education is needed to “equip
in political terms - that epistemic practices are inherently ethical practices.
future researchers and other societal actors with the necessary knowledge
and tools to fully participate and take responsibility in the research and inno-
In the next sections, I will start addressing some of the challenges we face
vation process”4 while in the section on governance it says that “(p)olicyma-
with respect to epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected era. In line with
kers also have a responsibility to prevent harmful or unethical developments
the aims of the ONLIFE Manifesto (p.3-11), the goal of this contribution is
in research and innovation”.
serve as a starting point for further inquiry, to ask the rights questions rather
than to present premature solutions.
3 http://www.efc.be/news_events/Pages/From-Science-in-Society.aspx (last date of access
12.01.2013)
4 http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/responsible-research-and-innovation-leaflet_en.pdf (last date of access 12.01.2013)
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C. Approaching Distributed Epistemic
Responsibility
our responsibilities are in granting authority to sources of information (Origgi
2008). While the topic of epistemic responsibility can be addressed with
respect to different sources of knowledge, such as memory or perception, it
There are various research areas that have provided invaluable insights
is most interesting in the context of testimonial knowledge practices, i.e. the
to important aspects of being responsible in knowing within entangled
practices related to receiving knowledge through the spoken or written words
socio-technical epistemic systems. To open up this topic, I will in the following
of others.
sections briefly introduce insights from three different fields of research:
research on epistemic responsibility in (social) epistemology, research on
In recent years, testimony has emerged as a central topic within social epis-
(distributed) moral responsibility in philosophy of computing, and research on
temology, the philosophical discipline addressing the various ways in which
distributed or entangled responsibility in feminist theory.
knowledge is social. In contrast to the abundance of publications on testimony (e.g. Coady 1992, Fricker 2007, Adler 1994) and related topics such
as epistemic trust (e.g. Origgi 2004, Simon 2010), epistemic authority
C.1. Epistemic Responsibility: Insights from (Social)
Epistemology
(e.g. Origgi 2008), epistemic injustice (especially Fricker 2007), epistemic
responsibility itself has only very recently attracted attention within analytic
social epistemology.5
Epistemic responsibility can be understood in terms of the duties of knowers
in giving and accepting reasons. Within analytic epistemology, for instance,
Although insights from social epistemology, in particular those addressing
it is discussed whether and to what extent epistemic responsibility is a condi-
epistemic practices in more applied settings are highly crucial to develop
tion of epistemic justification and knowledge. Some theoreticians focus on
a notion of epistemic responsibility for the 21st century, there are several
very basic questions concerning our duties to revise beliefs in light of new
shortcomings: First and foremost, due to this origin in the debates around
evidence, fundamentally related to the topic of doxastic voluntarism, i.e.
the epistemology of testimony, the focus of attention in this discourse of
the question whether we can voluntary control our beliefs. Others address
epistemic responsibility is also mostly on epistemic interactions between
the question of what being a good informant implies (Craig 1990), focus on
5 Confer for instance the conference on “Social Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility”,
which took place at Kings College in May 2012. http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/philosophy/events/kclunc2012.aspx
concepts of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and relate
epistemic responsibility to moral responsibility (Corlett 2008), or assess what
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C.2. Responsibility & ICT: Insights from the Philosophy of Computing
human agents, i.e. on the responsibilities of speakers and hearers in testimonial exchanges. Yet, taking into account that processes of knowing take
place in increasingly entangled systems consisting of human and non-human
agents, systems in which content from multiple sources gets processed,
The complexity and entanglement of social and technical compounds in
accepted, rejected, modified in various ways by these different agents, the
many digital systems has lead to difficulties in locating agency, accoun-
notion of epistemic responsibility needs to be modified and expanded to
tability and responsibility, which various philosophers of computing and
account for such socio-technical epistemic processes. Two issues need to be
computer ethicists aim to tackle. Unsurprisingly, there is a growing amount of
addressed in more detail than is currently the case in most analytic accounts
research on moral and legal responsibility in computing (cf. Coleman 2004),
of epistemic responsibility: a) the role of technology and b) the relationship
specific foci being autonomous agents (e.g. Coeckelbergh 2009) and robotics
between power and
knowledge.6
To put technology in general and ICT in
(e.g. Ugo Pagallo 2010). With respect to accountability, Nissenbaum’s (1997)
particular into the equation, we should turn to philosophy of technology
paper on accountability in a computerized society is surely an early seminal
and philosophy of computing. Regarding the relationship between power,
piece, in which different causes for contemporary difficulties in accountability
knowledge and technology, it has been feminist theoreticians in particular
attribution are already worked out: the problem of many hands, the problem
who have provided highly valuable insights. Thoughts from both fields will be
of bugs, using the computer as a scapegoat, and ownership without liability.
briefly introduced in the next two sections.
Of particular importance for the goals of this paper are Floridi and Sander’s
(2004) early considerations on the morality of artificial agents as well as
Floridi’s more recent analyses regarding distributed morality (Floridi 2012).
According to Luciano Floridi and Sanders (2004) something qualifies as an
6 It would be inadequate to argue that the role of technology or the role of power have been
entirely neglected in social epistemology. On the one hand, there have been attempts to
account for ICT (e.g. some works by Alvin Goldman (2008) and Don Fallis (2006), or the
special issue of the journal EPISTEME (2009, volume 6, issue 1) on Wikipedia. Moreover,
Fricker’s book “Epistemic Injustice” (2007) has also stirred a lot of interest in the relationship between power and knowledge. However, these developments are rather recent
and the classical assessment of testimonial processes remains focused on communication
between humans often still conceived as an unconditioned and a-social subject S, who
knows that p.
agent if it shows interactivity, autonomy and adaptability, i.e. neither free
will nor intentions are deemed necessary for agency. Such a concept of
“mind-less morality” (Floridi and Sander 2004: 349) allows addressing the
agency of artificial entities (such as algorithms) as well as of collectives,
which may form entities of their own (such as companies or organizations).
Another merit of their approach lies in the disentanglement of moral agency
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C.3. Epistemic Responsibility in Entangled
Socio-Technical Systems: Insights from Feminist
Theory
and moral responsibility: a non-human entity can be held accountable if it
qualifies as an agent, i.e. if it acts autonomously, interactively and adaptively.
However, it cannot be held responsible, because responsibility requires intentionality. That is, while agency and accountability do not require intentionality, responsibility does. Therefore, it seems that non-human agents – as long
Despite the fact that epistemic responsibility has only very recently attracted
as they a) do not exhibit intentionality and b) are considered in separation
attention within analytic epistemology, the term itself has already been used
– cannot be held responsible even if they are accountable for certain actions.
in 1987 as the title of a book by Lorraine Code (Code 1987). In this book,
Code addresses the concepts of responsibility and accountability from a
While these considerations on responsibility and accountability in socio-tech-
decidedly feminist perspective and argues that in understanding epistemic
nical systems are highly developed, the specific problem of epistemic
processes in general and epistemic responsibility and accountability in parti-
responsibility in ICT has not yet been in the focus of attention within philo-
cular, we need to relate epistemology to ethics. Criticizing the unconditioned
sophy of computing. Hence, it appears worthwhile to take the best from
subject S who knows that p, “the abstract, interchangeable individual, whose
both fields of research to develop a sound notion of epistemic responsibi-
monologues have been spoken from nowhere, in particular, to an audience of
lity within entangled socio-technical epistemic environments. Yet, instead of
faceless and usually disembodied onlookers” (Code 1995:xiv), Code empha-
starting from scratch taking a look at feminist theory proves highly illumina-
sizes social, i.e. cooperative and interactive, aspects of knowing as well as
ting, because different feminist theoreticians have not only focused on the
the related “complicity in structures of power and privilege” (Code 1995:xiv),
responsibilities of knowers in complex environments. They have also empha-
“the linkages between power and knowledge, and between stereotyping and
sized the important relationship between knowledge and power.
testimonial authority” (Code 1995:xv).
While Code’s work highlights the relationship between knowledge and power,
research by Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman adds technology to the equation
and therefore appears particularly suited to explore the notion of epistemic
responsibility within entangled and distributed socio-technical systems:
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Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad 1996, Barad 2007) delivers an “[...] epis-
sively challenge the prevalent dualisms of subject-object, nature-culture,
temological-ontological-ethical framework that provides an understanding
human-technology, and aims at opening up alternative, non-dichotomous
of the role of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural
understandings of technoscientific practices.
and cultural factors in scientific and other social-material practices” (Barad
2007:26).
A crucial concern of Barad is the revaluation of matter. Opposing the excessive focus on discourse in other feminist theories, Barad emphasizes the
Barad’s approach is theoretically based upon Niels Bohr’s unmaking of the
relevance of matter and the materiality of our worlds. Taking matter serious
Cartesian dualism of object and subject, i.e. on the claim that within the
and describing it as active, means to allow for non-human or hybrid forms
process of physical measurement, the object and the observer, Barad’s
of agency, a step that has been taken already with the principle of gene-
“agencies of observation”, get constituted by and within the process itself
ralized symmetry in Actor-Network-Theory. Yet, if we attribute agency to
and are not pre-defined entities. The results of measurements are thus
non-human entities, can and should they be held responsible and accoun-
neither fully constituted by any reality that is independent of its observa-
table? Plus, would this not be an invitation, a carte blanche to shirk responsi-
tion, nor by the methods or agents of observation alone. Rather, all of them,
bility by humans? Do we let ourselves off the hook too easily and throw away
the observed, the observer and the practices, methods and instruments
any hopes for responsible and accountable actions?
of observation are entangled in the process of what we call “reality”. For
Barad, reality itself is nothing pre-defined, but something that develops and
It appears that Barad’s view on non-human agency and her stance towards
changes through epistemic practices, through the interactions of objects
the ontological asymmetry between humans and non-humans has changed
and agents of observation in the process of observation and measurement.
from earlier articulations (Barad 1996) to later ones (Barad 2007). In 1996,
Reality in this sense is a verb and not a noun.
she still underscores the human role in representing, by stating that „[n]ature
has agency, but it does not speak itself to the patient, unobstrusive observer
Yet, interaction is a problematic term in so far as it presupposes two separate
listening for its cries – there is an important asymmetry with respect to
entities to interact. Thus, to avoid this presupposed dualism, she introduces
agency: we do the representing and yet nature is not a passive blank slate
the neologism of “intra-action”, to denote the processes taking place within
awaiting our inscriptions, and to privilege the material or discursive is to
the object-observer-compound, the entanglement of object and observer in
forget the inseparability that characterizes phenomena” (Barad 1996:181).
the process of observation. This terminological innovation is meant to discur-
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However, it seems that this special treatment of humans and especially the
we are entangled, not through conscious intent but through the various onto-
notion of representing does not well match her posthumanist performativity,
logical entanglements that materiality entails. What is on the other side of
as depicted some years later (Barad 2003). Finally, in “Meeting the Universe
the agential cut is not separate from us—agential separability is not indi-
Halfway” Barad offers a more nuanced dissolution of the distinction between
viduation. Ethics is therefore not about right response to a radically exterio/
human and non-human agency. By stating that “[a]gency is a matter of
ized (sic!) other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively rela-
intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something
tionalities of becoming of which we are a part.” (Barad 2007:393).
has” (Barad 2007:261), Barad moves the locus of agency from singular entities to entangled material-discursive apparatuses. But even if agency is not
This focus on responsibility and accountability relates back to Barad’s initial
tied to individual entities, it is bound with responsibility and accountability, as
framing of agential realism as an “epistemological-ontological-ethical
Barad makes very explicit: “Learning how to intra-act responsibly within and
framework”, a term by which she stresses the “[...] fundamental inseparability
as part of the world means understanding that we are not the only active
of epistemological, ontological, and ethical considerations” (Barad 2007:26).
beings— though this is never justification for deflecting that responsibility
Barad insists that we are responsible for what we know, and – as a conse-
onto other entities. The acknowledgment of “nonhuman agency” does not
quence of her onto-epistemology for what is (Barad 2003:829). Accountabi-
lessen human accountability; on the contrary, it means that accountabi-
lity and responsibility must be thought of in terms of what matters and what
lity requires that much more attentiveness to existing power asymmetries
is excluded from mattering, what is known and what is not, what is and what
(Barad 2007:218f).
is not.
Thus, the possibility to understand agency not essentialist as a (human)
This acknowledgement that knowledge always implies responsibility, not only
characteristic, but as something which is rather attributed to certain pheno-
renders issues of ethics and politics of such knowledge- and reality-creating
mena within entangled networks could be regarded as an invitation to shirk
processes indispensable. It also relates directly back to Barad’s emphasis
of responsibility. But this is clearly not the case for Barad. When developing
on performativity: epistemic practices are productive and different prac-
her posthumanist ethics, Barad concludes that even if we are not the only
tices produce different phenomena. If our practices of knowing do not merely
ones who are or can be held responsible, our responsibility is even greater
represent what is there, but shape and create what is and what will be there,
than it would be if it were ours alone. She states: “We (but not only “we
talking about the extent to which knowledge is power or entails responsibility
humans”) are always already responsible to the others with whom or which
gets a whole different flavor.
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D. Facing Distributed Epistemic Responsibility
Lucy Suchman shares many concerns of Karen Barad and her insights
promise to be of particular importance for considerations regarding
computationally mediated environments due to Suchman’s background in
To understand the epistemic responsibilities of knowers in our contem-
Human-Computer Interaction. Acknowledging the relational and entangled
porary, hyperconnected world, I think all insights outlined above need to
nature of the sociomaterial, Suchman claims that agency cannot be localized
be accounted for. Yet it still has to be explored and discussed in detail a)
in individual entities, but rather is distributed within socio-material assem-
whether, how and to what extent they can be aligned and b) what the impli-
blages. Resonating with Barad, she notes “[...] agencies – and associated
cations both on an individual and a governance level could or should be. That
accountabilities – reside neither in us nor in our artifacts but in our intra-ac-
means that we need conceptual advancements as well as practical solutions
tions” (Suchman 2009:285).
and guidance both for individuals and policy makers. Before I turn to both
tasks, let me recapitulate the challenges regarding epistemic responsibility in
The question, however, remains how exactly to be responsible, how to hold
our hyperconnected era.
or to be held accountable if agency is distributed. How can we maintain
responsibility and accountability in such a networked, dynamic and rela-
As knowers we move and act within highly entangled socio-technical epis-
tional matrix? Although I think that Suchman goes into the right direction,
temic systems. In our attempts to know, we permanently need to decide
she remains quite vague about this in her concluding remarks of Human-Ma-
when and whom to trust and when to withhold trust, when to remain vigi-
chine-Reconfigurations by stating that „responsibility on that view is met
lant. Loci of trust in these entangled and highly complex environments are
neither through control nor abdication but in ongoing practical, critical, and
not only other humans, but also technologies, companies, or organizations
generative acts of engagement. The point in the end is not to assign agency
– and they usually cannot be conceived in separation but only as socio-tech-
either to persons or to things but to identify the materialization of subjects,
nical compounds. This holds true for our daily life, imagine just the case of
objects, and the relations between them as an effect, more and less durable
someone booking a flight via the internet. It holds even more true for scien-
and contestable, of ongoing sociomaterial practices” (Suchman 2009:285).
tific environments, where information acquisition and processing involve
different hyperconnected agents and institutions.
Socio-technical epistemic systems are highly entangled but also highly differentiated systems consisting of human, non-human and compound or collec-
- 145 -
tive entities each equipped with very different amounts of power. To unders-
It is in these sociotechnical, hyperconnected and entangled systems, that
tand this, search engines are a useful example. In highly simplified terms,
the notion of epistemic responsibility is becoming a key challenge for both
search engines can be conceived as code written, run and used by human and
policy makers and us as individual epistemic agents processing information
non-human agents embedded in socio-technical infrastructures as well as in
in research just as much as in our every-day lives.
organizational, economic, societal and political environments. While there are
potentially many ways to enter the World Wide Web, search engines have
D.1. Re-Conceptualizing Epistemic Responsibility
emerged as major points of entrance and specific search engines nowadays
function as “obligatory passage points” (Callon 1986), exerting tremendous
amount of not only economic, but also epistemic power.
Responsibility is a rich concept, a concept that with many faces, a noun that
changes its meaning if coupled with different verbs. There is a difference
That is to say that the fact that both human and non-human entities can
between being responsible and taking responsibility: we can be responsible
qualify as agents does not imply that we have entered a state of harmony
for something, but deny assuming responsibility for it. This temptation to
and equality: there are enormous differences in power between different
shirk responsibility is probably as old as humankind and has lead to sophisti-
agents. To use Barad’s terminology, some agents matter much more than
cated techniques in cutting down chains of responsibilities in law or the insu-
others. And - for better or worse - those that matter most do not necessarily
rance sector. On the other hand, we may also accept the full responsibility
have to be the human agents.
for something, even if we are not, or at least only partially responsible. If a
minister steps back, because of some misconduct in his ministry he has not
In Actor-Network-Theory (e.g. Latour 1992, Law 1999), power is conceived
even been aware of, he takes responsibility, he responds. Moreover, responsi-
as a network effect – a view that is highly plausible and useful in the context
bility can be assumed oneself as well as attributed to someone or something
of search engines, recommender systems or social networking sites, because
else.
the power of specific search engines does not stem from any a priori advantage, but rather is the result of collective socio-technical epistemic practices
All these different meanings of responsibility and their intersections are
in which we all are involved: it is our practices of knowing, of relying and
crucial for understanding what it takes to be epistemically responsible in
using information which influence and shape the power distributions in our
socio-technical environments consisting of human and non-human agents.
environment.
For instance, before asking for criteria of how exactly responsibility can be
- 146 -
assumed or attributed and further how it should be assumed or attributed,
artifact in isolation, which cannot be made responsible. For socio-technical
we may start by asking these two related but distinctive basic questions
compounds, the possibility of attributing responsibility would still be given,
that are of increasing relevance in our computational age: 1) Can epistemic
hence this perspective may in the end well be compatible with Barad’s agen-
responsibility be assumed only by human agents or also by other agents? 2)
tial realism (Barad 2007).
Can epistemic responsibility be attributed to only human or also non-human
agents?
To my mind, the distinction between accountability and responsibility is
crucial and I think we need a strong concept of responsibility reserved for
As a first step to apprehend these questions, I suggest disentangling the
intentional agents to really account for Barad’s insights regarding the entan-
notions of agency, accountability and responsibility more carefully. While
glement between a) the social, the technical and the epistemic, as well as
both Barad and Suchman in the previous section seem to use the terms
b) between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Reconsider the core distinc-
synonymously, it seems fruitful to keep up a distinction. For this distinction
tion between being responsible and taking responsibility: while Barad rightly
between responsibility and accountability, insights from computer ethics
stresses our interdependences (or rather intradependences), the entangle-
can be used as a starting point. According to Floridi and Sanders (2004),
ment of human and non-human agents in knowing, being and doing, the
agency requires interactivity, autonomy and adaptivity, but no intentionality
process of assuming responsibility is and remains an intentional act.
is needed. Accountability is bound to agency only and hence also does not
require intentionality of agents. However, responsibility differs from accoun-
For epistemic responsibility this means that as responsible epistemic
tability exactly by requiring intentionality. Hence, if we agree with Floridi and
agents, we intentionally assume responsibility for what we claim to know.
Sanders (2004) that responsibility as opposed to agency and accountability
In full awareness of our socio-technical epistemic entanglement, we accept
requires intentionality, then it makes no sense to talk about responsibility
to be challenged for what we claim to know, we commit ourselves to
with respect to technical artifacts. A car cannot be made responsible for a
provide evidence for our claims and to revise our beliefs in the light of new
crash, it is the driver who is to blame - for negligence or ill-will - or maybe
evidence. Hence, to understand and improve our processes of knowing, to
the manufacturer, if a technical flaw caused the crash. Even if we think of
be responsible knowers as individuals, we first need to acknowledge both,
unmanned vehicles and the car drove autonomously, interactively and adap-
the deep entanglements between the social, the technical and the epis-
tively and then caused a crash, this car may be accountable for a crash, but
temic as well as between epistemology, ethics and ontology. However, the
it could not be made responsible. Please note that it is only the technical
only adequate reaction to this awareness must be to assume responsibi-
- 147 -
lity as an intentional act. It is only us humans – so far – that can take this
How would such frameworks to be conceptualized? Take the example, I have
stance, hence it is our duty to take responsibility for our interrelated ways of
briefly introduced before, Responsible Research and Innovation, which is
knowing, being and doing.
clearly meant to offer guidance for designing and governing environments
that elicit and support responsible epistemic practices. Yet despite its name,
However, what is also clear is that the ease with which epistemic responsibi-
Responsible Research and Innovation, as currently conceived, cannot fulfill
lity can be assumed differs between different socio-technical environments:
these tasks properly because it fails tackling important challenges worked
in some environments taking responsibility for what one knows is rather
out in this contribution, namely a) to properly acknowledge the socio-tech-
easy, in others it is much more difficult. Access to various types of evidence,
nical entanglement of knowers, b) to properly acknowledge the interdepen-
to supporting or contradicting information is essential to become epistemi-
dency of epistemical, ontological and ethical aspects of science, c) to support
cally responsible in knowing. It is in this sense that supporting open access
responsibility assumption and attribution and d) to be attentive to power
is a very important and valid aspect of Responsible Research and Innovation.
asymmetries within entangled socio-technical environments.
More generally it means that our individual efforts must be complemented
with appropriate policies that support environments in which epistemic
Hence, in order to really enable and support epistemic responsibility it would
responsibility assumption is enabled, fostered and incentivized.
be essential to revise and amend current the RRI guidelines by adding new
guiding thoughts such as the following:
D.2. Governance for Epistemic Responsibility
1. Acknowledge the interrelation of epistemology, ethics and ontology:
Knowing, doing and being are interrelated, i.e. our processes of knowing
Based upon conceptual work regarding the basic meaning of concepts such
have effects on what can be done and what we are – and vice versa.
as responsibility, accountability, action or intentionality, we need to come up
2. Keep in mind the deep socio-technical entanglement of contemporary
with practical solutions to support responsibility assumption and attribution
epistemic practices: Within our practices of knowing, we depend upon
in our hyperconnected reality from a governance perspective. We need to
other human and non-human agents just as much as these other agents
develop policy frameworks that enable and support epistemically responsible
depend on us.
behavior.
- 148 -
3. Bear in mind that epistemic relations are power relations: Within
Without denying the utility of personalized services, in order to act episte-
socio-technical epistemic systems, different epistemic agents, human as
mically responsible in an age of extensive profiling and personalization, we
well as non-human agents, such as algorithms, are equipped with diffe-
need the possibility to access, understand and to even trick the systems
rent amounts of power.
which are accessing, understanding and potentially tricking us. As Mireille
4. …
Hildebrandt stresses in her contribution, we need to develop “first (...) human
machine interfaces that give us unobtrusive intuitive access to how we are
Thus, if revised appropriately, RRI could provide guidance on how to act
being profiled, and, second, a new hermeneutics that allows us to trace at the
responsibly in research and innovation as particularly knowledge-intense
technical level how the algorithms can be ‘read’ and contested.“ (Cf. Hilde-
domains. Yet epistemic practices exist beyond research and governance
brandt’s contribution, p.173). We need policies addressing more broadly the
supporting epistemic responsibility accordingly has to be expanded beyond
challenges related to distributed epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected
advice or regulations regarding research and innovation. Each and every one
reality, policies to set the parameters for an environment where indivi-
of us has to assume epistemic responsibility for the things we claim to know
duals can act responsibility, i.e. where they can both assume and attribute
in our everyday life as well. When and whom should we trust to know about
responsibility even if they are deeply socio-technically entangled.
climate change, about the war on terrorism or just about the latest unemployment numbers? How vigilant do we have to be when accepting informa-
To conclude: On the long run, it will be essential to develop a concept of
tion received from various on- and offline sources?
epistemic responsibility that can account for the responsibilities of various
differently empowered agents within entangled socio-technical epistemic
While these are challenges that we all face on a daily basis, they also pose
systems and policy frameworks that provide guidance both for the individual
challenges for the governance socio-technical epistemic systems. In a
seeking to act responsibly in knowing and for the design and governance of
computational age characterized by ever more powerful personalization and
environments that support epistemically responsible behavior. The goal of
profiling techniques assuming epistemic responsibility becomes much harder,
this contribution has been to provide some starting points for further inquiry
because we may neither be able to decide which information we receive nor
rather than to present solutions already. This is only a beginning …
which information is received about us. After all, how can we be responsible
knowers if we cannot assess how trustworthy our sources of knowledge are?
- 149 -
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- 151 -
Good Onlife
Governance:
On Law, Spontaneous Orders,
and Design
An initiative
of the
Ugo Pagallo
Contents1
Introduction
Introduction
153
A. Defining Governance
155
B. Three Levels of Analysis
157
interconnected informational organisms that share with biological organisms
C. The Topology of Onlife Networks
159
and engineered artefacts “a global environment ultimately made of informa-
D. The Design of the Onlife Experience
162
Conclusions
164
multi agent (human/artificial) systems interact. This informational complexity
References
166
challenges concepts and ways of reasoning through which, so far, we have
The “Onlife Project” aims to shed light on how today’s information revolution
is affecting our understanding about the world and about ourselves: We are
tion,” i.e., what Luciano Floridi calls “the infosphere.” A crucial feature of this
new environment that is “Onlife” is illustrated by the complex ways in which
grasped the world and ourselves.
“
Consider the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and today’s debate on
The broader one’s understanding of the human experience,
the better design we will have.
whether and how we should change the EU Regulation 216/2008 and even
”
the 1948 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, so as to allow
the (semi-) autonomous flight of the drones. Here, we have to pay atten-
- Steve Jobs, The Next Insanely Great Thing (Wired, February 1996)
tion to the responsibility of UAS operators, manufacturers, maintenance
and safety contractors, contracting parties or air traffic controllers that
interact with autonomous or semi-autonomous machines, to avoid ground
damage, air-to-air collisions, communication interferences, piracy, environmental concerns, illegal searches in constitutional law, down to violation of
the landowner’s right and claims of nuisance and trespass in tort law. The
increasing capability of machines to be “independent of real time UAS-pilot
control input,” according to the UK Defence Standards definition of autonomous flight (2011), severely affects the traditional ability of philosophers
- 153 -
(and lawyers) to sever the chain of responsibility via notions of causation
legal and political points of view, in light of the complex ways in which multi-
and “fault.”
agent systems interact in the onlife experience. Indeed, today’s information
revolution calls into question the idea of the law as made of commands,
In his seminal 1996 paper Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Curtis
enforced through physical sanctions within the territory of a sovereign state.
Karnow proposed the example of “a hypothetical intelligent programming
Moreover, the information revolution affects democratic processes and gives
environment which handles air traffic control” such as “Alef.” The advan-
rise to specific challenges to traditional models of political legitimacy. The
cement of AI technology and, generally speaking, of autonomous artificial
complexity of this trend is stressed throughout this volume on “The Onlife
agents would ultimately break down “classic cause and effect analysis.”
Initiative.” Luciano Floridi (pp.36-49) calls for “a new philosophy of politics
Moreover, it seems problematic the aim to determine the types of harm that
among us”; Yiannis Laouris (pp.115-133) draws the attention to how “future
may supervene with the functioning of an entire processing system such as
societies will have to design and implement technologies and policies to safe-
Alef’s. In the phrasing of Karnow:
guard the true individual human rights and freedom”; Sarah Oates (pp.220232) dwells on the nature of the public agora that “should be conceptualized
No judge can isolate the ‘legal’ causes of injury from the pervasive
and protected in a way that tips the balance away from the elites and toward
electronic hum in which they operate, nor separate causes from the
the citizens”; May Thorseth (pp.236-246) insists on the possibility of public
digital universe which gives them their mutable shape and shifting
use of reason in the realm of digital transition, since “a virtual reality may
sense. The result is a snarled tangle of cause and effect as impossible
very well be communicative in a Habermasian sense”; Charles Ess (pp.73-97)
to sequester as the winds of the air, or the currents of the ocean (op.
and Mireille Hildebrandt (pp.169-183) cast light on modern Western concep-
cit.).
tions of liberal democracies and power relations in non-state societies, so as
to “illuminate questions of trust and virtual experiences as critical compo-
Luciano Floridi has recently addressed such forms of “distributed morality”
nents of ‘onlife’ in new ways”. Whilst these issues are intertwined with the
(see the second volume of his Philosophy of Information (forthcoming)). In
impact of digitalization “on our processes of knowing,” Judith Simon (pp.135-
this chapter, let me restrict the focus of the analysis and dwell on the legal
151) presents such issues as “the epistemic responsibilities in entangled
and political side of this “snarled tangle of cause and effect.” As an exer-
digital environments”.
cise of conceptual re-engineering, some words on notions and principles of
Here, let me reassess these ideas in connection with the concept of “gover-
the traditional framework seem necessary to pinpoint what is new from the
nance” and, in particular, of “good enough governance” as developed by the
- 154 -
United Nations over the past decades, that is, from Kofi Anan’s inaugura-
A. Defining Governance
tion speech as UN Secretary-General in July 1997, to work by Merilee Grindle
(2002, 2005, and 2010; however, I will refer only to Grindle 2005). The
purpose is to highlight what is specific to the legal and political dimension
The information revolution jeopardizes key traditional assumptions of legal
of our concept reengineering exercise in terms of “good onlife governance.”
and political philosophy: for example, the aforementioned idea of the law as
Accordingly, this chapter is presented in four sections: First, as in Plato’s
a set of rules enforced through the menace of physical sanctions (e.g., Kelsen
early dialogues, it seems fruitful to start with some definitions: see below
1949) often falls short in coping with the challenges of the information
in Section A. Then, attention is drawn to three different levels of analysis
revolution, namely cases of spamming, phishing, or identity thefts. Further-
that concern the notion of “good onlife governance,” namely the ethical, legal
more, an increasing number of issues, like national security, cyber-terrorism,
and technological challenges of the information revolution, as examined in
availability of resources and connectivity are systemic, in that such issues
Section B. Next, the focus is on the emergence of spontaneous orders on the
concern the whole infrastructure and environment of current legal systems
internet, namely, the kosmos-side of the “onlife experience” via the network
and, therefore, these problems have to be tackled at international and trans-
approach illustrated in Section C: the aim is to stress the ways in which
national levels. Unsurprisingly, national law making is increasingly short of
the topological properties of the kosmos affect the political planning of
breath, and this is why constitutional powers of national governments have
lawmakers and, hence, any good onlife governance. Finally, these ideas are
been joined – and even replaced – by the network of competences and
deepened with the distinction between game players and game designers
institutions summarized by the idea of governance. Leaving aside how this
in Section D. In addition to the traditional hard and soft law-tools of gover-
profound transformation impacts on democratic processes and models of
nance, such as national rules, international treaties, or codes of conduct, the
political legitimacy, what is important here to stress is how often modern
governance of a complex multi-agent system does increasingly hinge on the
assumptions on the state’s monopoly of power and legitimate violence are
technicalities of design mechanisms.
inadequate. National sovereign states should be conceived of as one, albeit
still relevant, agent in the legal and political arena.
In Good Enough Governance (2005), Merilee Grindle provides for eight
meanings of governance: in this section, it suffices to quote two of them. On
the one hand, according to the World Bank, the idea of governance concerns
- 155 -
“the process and institutions through which decisions are made and autho-
be questioned, prioritized and made relevant, so as to pinpoint what is new in
rity in a country is exercised” (in Grindle 2005: 14). On the other hand, Hyden,
the legal and political dimension of our concept reengineering exercise?
Court and Mease refer to “the formation and stewardship of the formal and
informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as
In his brilliant In Search of Jefferson’s Moose (2009), David Post suggests an
well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions” (ibid.). On
analogy between the American West of 1787 and today’s cyberspace:
this basis, the notion of governance can be furthered as a matter of “good”
governance. In the case of the World Bank, focus should be on inclusive-
Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the
ness and accountability established in three key areas, namely, i) “selection,
American West of 1787 is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian
accountability and replacement of authorities”; ii) “efficiency of institutions,
kind of place… And like the West of 1787, cyberspace poses some
regulations, resource management”; and, iii) “respect for institutions, laws
hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance,
and interactions among players in civil society, business, and politics.” In the
and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us
case of Hyden, Court and Mease, the concept of good governance can be
a remarkable instrument, one that has managed to solve prodigious
measured along six dimensions, i.e., “participation, fairness, decency, effi-
technical problems associated with communication on a global scale.
ciency, accountability, and transparency,” in each of the following arenas:
The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries faced:
“civil society, political society, government, bureaucracy, economic society,
How do you build “republican” institutions – institutions that respect
judiciary.”
equal worth of all individuals and their right to participate in the
formation of the rules under which they live – that scale? (Post 2009:
Drawing on such definitions, Merilee Grindle has objected to the length of
116-117)
the good governance agenda, because “interventions thought to contribute
to the ends of economic and political development need to be questioned,
The question begets three different levels of analysis. The first viewpoint is
prioritized, and made relevant to the conditions of individual countries. They
ethical and has to do with the foundation of any good governance in the
need to be assessed in light of historical evidence, sequence, and timing, and
onlife experience; the second level is both legal and political, since it concerns
they should be selected carefully in terms of their contributions to particular
the distinction between the emergence of spontaneous orders in the legal
ends” (Grindle 2005: 1). By following this methodological approach to what
field, and human (political) planning; the third approach is related to the
should be deemed as “good enough,” what are then the issues that ought to
aim of embedding legal safeguards into ICTs and other types of technology.
- 156 -
From a methodological stance, each level of abstraction can be grasped as
mational complexity of human interaction is not reducible to taxis alone and,
an interface made up of a set of features, that is, the observables of the
moreover, orders spontaneously emerge from the complexity of the environ-
analysis (Floridi 2008). By changing the interface, the analysis of the obser-
ment through specific laws of evolution (Pagallo 2010). Most of the time,
vables and variables of the three stances should strengthen our compre-
today’s research on governance, good governance, and good enough gover-
hension of the onlife experience and, more particularly, of the challenges of
nance focuses on the taxis-side of political dynamics, namely, the decisions
today’s governance. These different levels of analysis are discussed separa-
of institutional, societal, and economical actors, as a set of rules or instruc-
tely in the next section.
tions for the determination of other informational objects and agents in the
system. Still, we should reflect on the properties of the onlife multi-agent
system as a complex network that adapts to the environment through lear-
B. Three Levels of Analysis
ning and evolutionary processes, such as sophisticated signalling and information mechanisms. Complex systems are in fact characterized by a collec-
The first level of analysis concerning any good onlife governance regards
tive behaviour that emerges from large networks of individual components,
the foundations of what Luciano Floridi conceives as an “efficient” and “intel-
although no central control or simple rules of operation direct them. Accor-
ligent” multi-agent system, the model of which may represent a goal that
dingly, legislators, policy makers and, generally speaking, governance actors
could successfully orient our political strategy in terms of transparency and
shall preventively understand the nature of the field in which they aim to
tolerance: “Finding the right balance between representation and resolution,
intervene or, maybe, interfere (Pagallo 2012a). The point can be further illus-
while implementing the agreement to agree on the basis of ethical principles
trated with a metaphor of Lon Fuller: “The law can act as a gardener who
that are informed by universal human rights, is a current major challenge for
prunes an imperfectly growing tree in order to help the tree realize its own
liberal democracies in which ICTs will increasingly strengthen the representa-
capacity for perfection. This can occur only when all concerned genuinely
tional side.” Since this is the subject matter of Luciano Floridi’s contribution
want the tree to grow, and to grow properly. Our task is to make them want
(pp.36-49) in the volume, let me skip this part of the analysis.
this.” As it occurs with all the metaphors, however, we should take Fuller’s
parallel with a pinch of salt: in the case of the good onlife governance, the
The second level concerns Friedrich Hayek’s classical distinction between
“tree” can indeed strike back, as shown by how a number of attempts to
kosmos and taxis, i.e., evolution vs. constructivism, spontaneous orders vs.
govern the complex multi-agent system of the internet have been unsuc-
human (political) planning. Recent empirical evidence confirms that the infor-
cessful over the past years, because of the response of the kosmos. Think, at
- 157 -
least in Western societies, of how both the US Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)
can deliver choice and competition; innovation and opportunity; freedom and
and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) miserably failed last winter (2011-2012).
democratic accountability” (Kroes 2012: 2).
The third level of the analysis can be summed up with the distinction between
These different levels of analysis, to be sure, affect each other: game desi-
game players and game designers (Floridi forthcoming; Pagallo 2012b).
gners should take into account the development of spontaneous orders,
Although political planning does not exhaust the complexity of human inte-
much as, say, the transparent governance of a complex multi-agent system
raction, it does not follow that, pace Hayek, taxis cannot shape the evolu-
can ultimately hinge on the technicalities of design mechanisms. By paying
tion of kosmos. On the contrary, political decisions can determine the rules of
attention to the specificity of the political dimension in our concept reen-
the game as well as the very architecture of the system. Consider the ways
gineering exercise, however, let me prevent a twofold misunderstanding.
some Western democracies and authoritarian regimes alike have specified
At times, scholars address the challenges of the information revolution to
the functions of state action on the internet. Some countries, as France or
the traditional models of political legitimacy and democratic processes as
South Korea, have endorsed the so-called “three strikes”-doctrine, as a part
if the aim were to find the magic bullet. Vice versa, others have devoted
of the graduated system which ends up with the user internet disconnection
themselves to debunk these myths, such as a new direct online democracy,
after three warnings of allegedly copyright infringements. Other states, like
a digital communism, and so forth, by simply reversing the paradise of
China, have built up systems of filters and re-routers, detours and dead-ends,
such techno-enthusiasts (Morozov 2011). At the end of the day, we should
to keep individuals on the state-approved online path. Admittedly, some of
conceive today’s information revolution in a sober way, that is, as a set of
these architectural measures are not necessarily digital, e.g., the installation
constraints and possibilities that transform or reshape the environment of
of speed bumps in roads as a means to reduce the velocity of cars. However,
people’s interaction. Next section deepens this viewpoint with some tenets of
current advancements of technology have obliged legislators, policy makers,
network theory and, more particularly, in light of the topological properties of
and governance actors to forge more sophisticated ways to think about legal
today’s online kosmos.
enforcement and, moreover, the information revolution has made such decisions a critical part of the governance of the entire system. On this basis,
on 19 April 2012, Neelie Kroes has properly insisted on the open structure
of the internet and its neutrality: “With a truly open, universal platform, we
- 158 -
C. The Topology of Onlife Networks
The following Figure sums up the three models:
Several spontaneous orders on the internet present the topological features
of “small worlds” and scale free-networks. Even the internet as such, along
with the world wide web, spontaneously evolved since the early 2000s,
according to these topological properties. To grasp how such topological
properties affect any political planning, consider three key parameters of
every network, namely (i) its nodes, (ii) the average distance between nodes
or diameter of the network, and (iii) its clustering coefficients. This allows us
to single out three models.
The first one is represented by a regular network in which all of the nodes
As you can see, in the regular network, there are 20 nodes, each of which
have the same number of links: This network has high clustering coefficients
has 4 links, so that the blue node (the brighter one on the left) would need
but a long diameter since the degree of separation between nodes is high.
5 steps to reach the red one (the brighter on the right). What is striking with
a small-world network is how random links exponentially reduce the degree
The second model is a random network with opposite features: It presents
of separation between nodes: for instance, if 3 nodes are randomly rewired,
low clustering coefficients but a very short diameter. The explanation is that
the degrees of separation decrease from five to three. This means that, in a
random links exponentially reduce the degree of separation between nodes
circle of 6 billion (people) nodes as our world could be represented today, if
in the network.
random links in the network would be about 2 out of 10000, the degree of
separation turns out to be 8. But if they are 3 out of 10000, then 5!
The third model is a small world-network: Its peculiarity depends on the
apparent deviation from the properties of both random and regular networks.
Since the pioneering work of Stanley Milgram (1967) and, later, of Mark
Like random networks, small world-networks present a short characteristic
Granovetter (1973), the idea of small world-networks became in few years
path length, but they also share with regular networks high clustering coef-
one of the key words of contemporary scientific research by fostering a large
ficients.
set of empirical studies on the topology of complex systems. Significant
- 159 -
effort has been made in order to structure analytical models able to capture
why small world-networks can be both highly clustered and scale-free. This
the nature of small world-networks. Here it suffices to mention only two
occurs when small, tightly interlinked clusters of nodes are connected into
of these. The first small world-model was proposed by Duncan Watts and
larger, less cohesive groups.
Steven Strogatz (1998): They suggested to randomly rewire a small fraction
of the edges belonging to a low-dimensional regular lattice so as to prove
Drawing on this research, a first crucial point should be stressed, namely,
that the degrees of separation in the network would exponentially decrease.
the emergence of spontaneous orders that often go hand in hand with the
Yet, contrary to random networks, the shortening of the diameter proceeded
hierarchical structure of the kosmos. Significantly, in his seminal book The
along with high clustering coefficients as in regular networks. These small
Sciences of the Artificial (new ed. 1996), Herbert Simon insisted on this point,
world-features explain the results of Milgram’s and Granovetter’s research
i.e., the notion of “hierarchy” as the clue for grasping the architecture of
because short diameters of the network and high clustering coefficients
complexity and, moreover, the idea of “nearly decomposable systems” that
quantify both the low degrees of separation between two citizens picked
reconciles rigid top-down and bottom-up approaches: “the clusters of dense
up randomly in such a complex network like the American society studied
interaction in the chart” of social interaction “will identify a rather well-de-
by Milgram in the mid 1960s, and the “strength of weak ties” stressed by
fined hierarchic structure” (op. cit.). Furthermore, according to the “empty
Granovetter in the early 1970s.
world hypothesis,” the term of near decomposability denotes that “most
things are only weakly connected with most other things; for a tolerable
The second analytical model we need to mention was defined by Albert-
description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible interactions needs
Lászlo Barabási (2002): He noted that most real world networks grow by
to be taken into account.” In light of the differentiation of regular networks,
continuous addition of new nodes whereas the likelihood of connecting to
random networks, and small worlds mentioned above, we thus know that
a node would depend upon its degree of connectivity. This sort of special
Simon’s “empty world hypothesis” can be grasped with the notion of hubs,
attachment in a growing system explains what Watts and Strogatz appa-
since such hubs not only offer the common connections mediating the short
rently missed, namely, the power-law distribution of the network in a topo-
path lengths between nodes of the network, but also explain the clusters of
logical scale-free perspective: Small world-networks in the real world are
dense interaction in the chart of social relationships.
indeed characterized by few nodes with very high values and by most nodes
with low connectivity. The presence of hubs or of a small fraction of nodes
These topological properties of the network introduce a further crucial
with a much higher degree than the average offers the key to comprehend
point on how the structure of the kosmos affects the political planning of
- 160 -
the taxis and, hence, any “good onlife governance.” Whilst I assume, pace
the following spectrum: at one end, the “small worlds” of the internet in the
Hayek (1982), that there is no kosmos without taxis in the “onlife experience,”
early 2000s and their positive effects; at the other end, what the COPLINK
governance actors should really know the subject matter which they intend
program illustrated in the mid 2000s, namely that “narcotics networks are
to govern. The point can be illustrated with the words of Paul Ormerod:
small-world with short average path lengths ranging from 4.5-8.5 and have
scale-free degree distributions with power law exponents of 0.85 – 1.3”
In a scale-free network, we know that we need to identify the well-
(Kaza et. 2005). In between, we find more controversial cases, such as the
connected individuals and to try by some means to induce them to
“small worlds” of some peer-to-peer (P2P) networks as Gnutella (Pagallo &
change their behaviours. In a random network, we know that there is a
Ruffo 2007; Pagallo & Durante 2010). As mentioned in the previous section,
critical value of the proportion of agents we need to influence in order
Luciano Floridi’s information ethics provides for the foundations of the good
to encourage or mitigate the spread of a particular mode of behaviour
onlife governance and what he presents in this volume as an “efficient” and
or opinion across the network. This at least gives us an idea of the
“intelligent” multi-agent system. In a nutshell, from an ethical viewpoint,
scale of the effort required, and tells us that money and time which
what should be avoided or minimized is the “impoverishment of the infos-
is unlikely to generate the critical mass is money and time wasted.
phere” or entropy, whilst “the flourishing of informational entities as well as
In a small-world context, targeting our efforts is more difficult, but at
the whole infosphere ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating and
least we know that it is the long-range connectors, the agents with
enriching their properties” (Luciano Floridi 2006).
links across different parts of the network, or who have connections
into several relevant networks, who are the most fruitful to target
On the other hand, from a legal and political stance, the governance of the
(Ormerod 2012: 275).
onlife experience does not only hinge on the traditional hard tools of the law
and softer forms of legalized governance such as codes of conduct, guide-
Yet, a crucial aspect of the analysis concerns more the evaluation, than the
lines and the standardization of best practices. Rather, the new scenarios of
description of the kosmos which taxis aims to discipline. Lawmakers, policy
the information revolution have increasingly suggested national and inter-
makers, and governance actors should not only know whether they are
national lawmakers the aim to govern the onlife experience through the
dealing with a random network, a small-world network, a scale-free network,
mechanisms of design and IT architectures. Many impasses of today’s legal
and so forth, because they have to determine whether what spontaneously
and political systems can fruitfully be tackled, by embedding normative
emerges onlife can be conceived of as good or bad. On the one hand, think of
- 161 -
constraints and constitutional safeguards into ICTs. Let us assess this taxis-
First, design may aim to encourage the change of social behaviour. Think
side of the onlife governance separately in the next section.
about the free-riding phenomenon on peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing
networks, where most peers tend to use these systems to find information
and download their favourite files without contributing to the performance of
D. The Design of the Onlife Experience
the system. Whilst this selfish behaviour is triggered by many properties of
P2P applications, like anonymity and hard traceability of the nodes, designers
The concept of design can be understood as the act of working out the
have proposed ways to tackle the issue through incentives based on trust
shape of objects: we actually mould the form of products and processes,
(e.g., reputation mechanisms), trade (e.g., services in return), or alternatively
together with the structure of spaces and places, so as to comply with regu-
slowing down the connectivity of the user who does not help the process of
latory frameworks. Such a shaping is not necessarily digital: as mentioned
file-sharing (Glorioso et al. 2010). In addition, design mechanisms can induce
above in Section B, consider the installation of speed bumps in roads as a
the change of people’s behaviour via friendly interfaces, location-based
means to reduce the velocity of cars (lest drivers opt to destroy their own
services, and so forth. These examples are particularly relevant because
vehicles). Still, the information revolution has obliged policy makers to forge
encouraging individuals to change their behaviour prevents risks of paterna-
more sophisticated ways of legal enforcement through the design of ICT
lism, when the purpose of design is to encourage such a change by widening
interfaces, default settings, self-enforcing technologies, and so forth. Accor-
the range of choices and options. At its best, this latter design policy is illus-
ding to the phrasing of Norman Potter in his 1968 book on What is a Desi-
trated by the open architecture of a web “out of control” (Berners-Lee 1999).
gner (new ed. 2002), a crucial distinction should be stressed between desi-
In the wording of the US Supreme Court’s decision on the Communications
gning spaces (environmental design), objects (product design), or messages
Decency Act (“CDA”) from 26 June 1997, “as a matter of constitutional tradi-
(communication design). Moreover, in their work on The Design with Intent
tion, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that govern-
Method (2010), Lockton, Harrison and Stanton describe 101 ways in which
mental regulation… is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas
products can influence the behaviour of their users. In this context, it suffices
than to encourage it.”
to focus on three different ways in which governance actors may design the
onlife experience.
Secondly, design mechanisms may aim to decrease the impact of harm-generating behaviour rather than changing people’s conduct, that is, the goal
is to prevent the impoverishment of the agents and of the whole infosphere,
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rather than directly promoting their flourishing. This further aim of design
Thirdly, there is the most critical aim of design, namely to prevent harm gene-
is well represented by efforts in security measures that can be conceived
rating-behaviour from occurring through the use of self-enforcing technolo-
of as a sort of digital airbag: as it occurs with friendly interfaces, this kind
gies, such as DRMs in the field of intellectual property protection, or some
of design mechanism prevents claims of paternalism, because it does not
versions of automatic privacy by design (e.g., Cavoukian 2010). Of course,
impinge on individual autonomy, no more than traditional airbags affect how
serious issues of national security, connectivity and availability of resources,
people drive. Contrary to design mechanisms that intend to broaden indi-
much as child pornography or cyber-terrorism, may suggest to endorse such
vidual choices, however, the design of digital airbags may raise issues of
type of design mechanism, though the latter should be considered as the
strong moral and legal responsibility, much as conflicts of interests. A typical
exception, or last resort option, for the governance of the onlife experience.
instance is given by the processing of patient names in hospitals via infor-
Consider some of the ethical, legal, and technical reasons that make proble-
mation systems, where patient names should be kept separated from data
matical the aim of design to automatically prevent harmful conduct from
on medical treatments or health status: How about users, including doctors,
occurring. As to ethical reasons, specific design choices may result in conflicts
who may find such mechanism too onerous? Furthermore, responsibility for
between values and, vice versa, conflicts between values may impact on the
this type of mechanisms is intertwined with the technical meticulousness
features of design: we have evidence that “some technical artefacts bear
of the project and its reliability, e.g., security measures for the informative
directly and systematically on the realization, or suppression, of particular
systems of hospitals or, say, an atomic plant. Rather than establishing the
configurations of social, ethical, and political values” (Flanagan et al. 2008).
overall probability of a serious accident, however, focus should be on the
As to the legal reasons against this type of design policy, the development
weaknesses in the safety system, ranking the accident sequences in connec-
and use of self-enforcing technologies risk to curtail both collective and indi-
tion with the probability of their occurrence, so as to compare different event
vidual autonomy severely. Basic tenets of the rule of law would be at risk,
sequences and to identify critical elements in these sequences. All in all, in
since people’s behaviour would unilaterally be determined on the basis of
Eugene Spafford’s phrasing, it would be important that governance actors,
technology, rather than by choices of the relevant political institutions: what
sub specie game designers, fully understand that “the only truly secure
is imperilled is moreover “the public understanding of law with its application
system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in
eliminating a useful interface between the law’s terms and its application”
a lead-lined room with armed guards – and even then I have my doubts” (in
(Zittrain 2007). Finally, attention should be drawn to the technical difficul-
Garfinkel and Spafford 1997).
ties of achieving such total control through design: doubts are cast by “a
rich body of scholarship concerning the theory and practice of ‘traditional’
- 163 -
Conclusions
rule-based regulation [that] bears witness to the impossibility of designing
regulatory standards in the form of legal rules that will hit their target with
perfect accuracy” (Yeung 2007). Indeed, there is the technical difficulty of
The purpose of this chapter was to stress what is specific to the legal and
applying to a machine concepts traditionally employed by governance actors,
political dimensions of our concept reengineering exercise. Starting with
through the formalization of norms, rights, or duties: after all, legal safe-
current definitions of governance, good governance, and good enough gover-
guards often present highly context-dependent notions as, say, security
nance in Section A, the analysis dwelt on the complex ways in which multi-
measures, personal data, or data controllers, that raise a number of rele-
agent systems interact in connection with the distinction between kosmos
vant problems when reducing the informational complexity of a legal system
and taxis, on the one hand, and between game players and game designers,
where concepts and relations are subject to evolution (Pagallo 2010). To the
on the other. In the wording of chapter 2 of the first volume of Hayek’s Law,
best of my knowledge, it is impossible to program software so as to prevent
Legislation, and Liberty (1973), “one of our main contentions will be that very
forms of harm generating-behaviour even in such simple cases as defama-
complex orders, comprising more particular facts than any brain could ascer-
tions: these constraints emphasize critical facets of design that suggest to
tain or manipulate, can be brought about only through forces inducing the
reverse the burden of proof when the use of allegedly perfect self-enfor-
formation of spontaneous orders” (op. cit., 38). By considering the traditional
cing technologies is at stake. Going back to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
examples of local customs, international uses, or transnational markets,
on the CDA, “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
what is new today has to do with the evolutionary processes of spontaneous
governmental regulation… is more likely to interfere with the free exchange
orders and multi-agent systems that are ICTs-dependent; ubiquitous, that is,
of ideas than to encourage it.”
transnational; and, ultimately, cannot be reduced to the taxis-side of governance. Accordingly, on the one hand, legislators, policy makers and, generally
speaking, governance actors shall preventively understand the political, legal
and economical relevance of what scholars present as “network effect”: see
above in Section C.
On the other hand, governance actors should not only be grasped as lawmakers determining the rules of the game, through the traditional hard and soft
law-tools of governance. As mentioned in Section D, the new scenarios of
- 164 -
the information revolution have increasingly suggested complementing such
DRMs, automatic versions of the principle of privacy by design, three-strikes
tools, through the mechanisms of design, codes and architectures. When
approaches, China’s “Great Firewall,” or Western systems of filters in order
the aim is to broaden the range of people’s choices, so as to encourage the
to control the flow of information on the internet, the result is the model-
change of their behaviour, such design policy is legally and politically sound:
ling of individual conduct. As game designers dealing with the challenges of
By fostering both collective and individual autonomy, this approach to design
the information revolution, governance actors ought to consider the use of
prevents threats of paternalism that hinge on the regulatory tools of techno-
self-enforcing technologies as the exception, or a last resort option, to mini-
logy. Likewise, the aim of design to decrease the impact of harm-generating
mize the informational entropy of the system, or, vice versa, to promote its
behaviour through the use of digital airbags, such as security measures or
flourishing (and that of its informational objects). Otherwise, the risk is that
user friendly interfaces, respects collective and individual autonomy, because
legal and political issues of the information revolution may simply suggest
this approach to design does not impinge on people’s choices, no more than
governance actors, sub specie game designers, new ways of protecting
traditional airbags affect how individuals behave on the highways. What is at
citizens even against themselves.
stake with this latter kind of design has to do with the technical meticulousness and reliability of the project, or the impact of technical inaccuracies on
the individual wellbeing, rather than responsibility for the goal of the project:
think about the difference between security measures in the informative
system of an atomic plant and political decisions on whether such atomic
plant should be dismantled.
Yet, to complement the hard and soft-law tools of governance by design
entails its own risks, when the aim is to prevent harm-generating behaviour from occurring. Although many impasses of today’s legal and political
systems can properly be addressed by embedding legal safeguards in ICT
and other kinds of technology, there are several legal, ethical and technical reasons why the use of allegedly perfect self-enforcing technologies
raises serious threats of paternalism and, even, of authoritarianism. Whether
- 165 -
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The public sphere
in a computational era
An initiative
of the
Nicole Dewandre
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Sarah Oates
May Thorseth
Onlife,
The Public(s) and
Legal Protection
by Design
An initiative
of the
Bibliography
Contents1
A. ONLIFE after the computational turn?
171
A.1. Computational turn
171
A.2. Smart environments
171
A.3. What’s new here?
172
A.4. Which are the challenges?
172
B. Publics and their problems in smart environments
173
B.1. Smart environments and the public sphere
173
B.2. Public private social: Performance, exposure, opacity
173
B.3. Public Performance in the ONLIFE everyware
174
B.4. A plurality of publics, a choice of exposure, a place to hide
175
C. Legal Protection by Design: a novel social contract?
C.1. The nature of the social contract
176
176
C.2. Protecting modernity’s assets: Reconstructing the social contract177
C.4. Technology Neutrality and Legal Protection by Design
178
C.5. The proposed Data Protection Regulation
179
- 170 -
181
A. ONLIFE after the computational turn?
enable adaptive and proactive computing and thereby present us with an
entirely novel – smart - environment.
A.1. Computational turn
A.2. Smart environments
In my inaugural lecture I have reiterated the notion of a computational
turn, referring to the novel layers of software that have nested themselves
between us and reality. These layers of decisional algorithmic adaptations
I believe that whereas such smart environments have long remained a tech-
increasingly co-constitute our lifeworld, determine what we get to see
nological fantasy, they are now with us, around us, inside us. They anticipate
(search engines; behavioural advertising), how we are treated (insurance,
our future behaviours and adapt their own behaviours to accommodate our
employment, education, medical treatment), what we know (the life sciences,
inferred preferences – at least insofar as this fits the objectives of whoever
the digital humanities, expert systems in a variety of professions) and how
is paying for them (commercial enterprise, government). They provide us
we manage our risks (safety, security, aviation, critical infrastructure, smart
with a ubiquitous artificial intelligence that uproots the common sense of
grids). So far, this computational turn has been applauded, taken for granted
our Enlightenment heritage that matter is passive and mind active. Matter is
or rejected, but little attention has been paid to the far-reaching implica-
developing into mind, becoming context-sensitive, capable of learning on the
tions for our perception and cognition, for the rewoven fabric on which our
basis of feedback mechanisms, reconfiguring its own programs to improve its
living-together hinges (though there is a first attempt in Ess and Hagen-
performance, developing ‘a mind of its own’, based on second-order beliefs
gruber 2011, and more elaboration in Berry 2012). The network effects of
and preferences. This means nothing less than the emergence of environ-
ubiquitous digitization have been described extensively (Castells 2011; Van
ments that have agent-like characteristics: they are viable, engines of abduc-
Dijk 2006), though many authors present this as a matter of ‘the social’,
tion, and adaptable (Bourgine en Varela 1992); they are context-sensitive,
neglecting the extent to which the disruptions of networked, mobile, global
responsive, and capable of sustaining their identity by reconfiguring the rules
digital technologies are indeed ‘affordances’ of the socio-material assem-
that regulate their behaviours (Floridi en Sanders 2004). We should note,
blages of ‘the digital’. Reducing these effects to ‘the social’ does not help,
however, that ‘they’ do not need to be consciously aware of any of this, let
because this leaves the constitutive and regulative workings of these tech-
alone be self-conscious. Also, let’s acknowledge that we are not talking about
nologies under the radar. Moreover, we need to distinguish between digiti-
what Clark (2003) termed ‘skinbags’: neatly demarcated entities that contain
zation per se and computational techniques such as machine learning that
their mind within their outer membranes, surface or skin. The intelligence
- 171 -
that emerges from the computational layers engineered to serve specific
inference problem’. The thingness of our artificial environment seems to turn
purposes - while thriving on the added value created by unexpected func-
into a kind of subjectivity. In other work I have suggested that social science
tion creep – this emergent intelligence derives from polymorphous, mobile
has long since recognized the productive nature of the inference problem
computing systems, not from stand-alone devices such as those fantasised
that nourishes relationships between people (2011a). Parsons and Luhmann
in the context of humanoid robotics.
spoke of the so-called double contingency that determines the fundamental
uncertainty of human interaction (Vanderstraeten 2007). Since I can never
be sure how you will read my words or my actions, I try to infer what you
A.3. What’s new here?
will infer from my behaviours; the same goes for you. We are forever guessing each other’s interpretations. Zizek (1991) has qualified the potentially
In what sense is this a novel situation? Where lies the continuity with prece-
productive nature of this double and mutual anticipation by suggesting that
ding information and communication technologies? In his magnificent Les
‘communication is a successful misunderstanding’. What is new here is that
technologies de l’intelligence Pierre Lévy (1990) discusses the transitions
the computational layer that mediates our access to knowledge and informa-
from orality to script, printing press and mass media towards digitisation
tion is anticipating us, creating a single contingency: whereas it has access to
and the internet. Summing up, Lévy suggests we are in a transition from a
the data to make its inferences, we have no such access and no way of gues-
linear sense of time to segments and points; from accumulation to instant
sing how we are being ‘read’ by our novel smart environments.
access; from delay and duration to real time and immediacy; from universalisation to contextualisation; from theory to modelling; from interpretation
A.4. Which are the challenges?
to simulation; from semantics to syntaxis; from truth to effectiveness; from
semantics to pragmatics; from stability to change. Interestingly, his focus
is on ubiquitous computing and highlights the impact of the hyperlink, but
If going ONLIFE refers to immersing ourselves in the novel environments that
hardly engages with the computational intelligence described above. Core to
depend on and nourish the computational layers discussed above, then going
the novel, ambient intelligence, is the fact of being anticipated by invisible
ONLIFE will require new skills, different capacities and other capabilities.
complex computing systems (Stiegler 2012). Their capacity to generate data
To prevent becoming merely the cognitive resource for these environments
derivatives (Amoore 2011) and to pre-empt our intentions on the basis of
we must figure out how they are anticipating us. We must develop ways to
personalised inferences creates what Catherine Dwyer (2009) has called ‘the
extend the singly contingency to a renewed double contingency. How to read
- 172 -
in what ways we are being read? How to guess the manner in which we are
in some sense the plethora of autonomic decision systems are turning our
being categorized, pre-empted, foreseen? How to keep surprising our envi-
inanimate environment ‘ONLIFE’. Since we had decided to more specifically
ronments, how to move from proaction to interaction? In other work I have
look into what this means for the public sphere, or for the traditional private/
suggested that we need to probe at least two tracks: first, to develop human
public divide in itself, I will now try to engage with the notion of the public
machine interfaces that give us unobtrusive intuitive access to how we are
sphere and see whether and how smart environments generate a kind of
being profiled, and, second, a new hermeneutics that allows us to trace at
‘natality’ here. A novelty, a beginning, an empty space to experiment – with
the technical level how the algorithms can be ‘read’ and contested. For now,
as yet unknown affordances.
the point I would like to make is that the implications of going ONLIFE cannot
be reduced to privacy and data protection. I hope that the previous analysis
B.2. Public private social: Performance, exposure,
opacity
demonstrates a far more extensive impact that cannot be understood solely
in terms of the wish to hide one’s personal data. It requires more than hiding
one’s data; indeed it challenges us to engage with our environments as if we
are taking ‘the intentional stance’ with them (Dennett 2009).
Enough has been written about the shrinking of the private, the blurring of
the public/private divide and e.g. the loss of privacy in the public (Nissenbaum 1997). All this has been attributed to either the lure of self-publication
B. Publics and their problems in smart environments
in web 2.0, or to the secretive trading with and spying on our behavioural
data in the course of pervasive computing (Hildebrandt 2012).
B.1. Smart environments and the public sphere
Maybe we should return to Arendt (1958), when she spoke of the private as
a sphere of necessity (the household), the public as the space for freedom
Above I have tried to flesh out in what sense smart environments present us
(political action) and ‘the social’ as the emergence of mass society (bureau-
with a novel situation. My conclusion was that the computational layers that
cracy, individual self-interest and conformity). Her understanding of ‘the
mediate our perception and knowledge of the world are generating an envi-
social’ or what she calls ‘society’ is not altogether positive, to put it mildly. Is
ronment that simulates agency. Whereas the International Telecommunica-
the rise of web 2.0 antithetical to ‘the social’, because it concerns communi-
tions Union spoke of the Internet of Things as ‘the offline world going online’,
cation of one-2one, one-2-many as well as many-2-many, rather than many-
- 173 -
2-one? Or does the processing of Big Data present us with ‘the social’ come
of our self is hidden in our own prehistory (the infancy before we acquired
true, where it is constituted by machine readable bits and pieces that allow
language).
for the ultimate version of what Heidegger (1996) called ‘das rechnende
Denken’ (calculative thinking)? I am not sure, and I believe the jury is still out.
My question concerning the public in smart environments would thus be: how
The answer will be empirical and will depend on how ‘the social’ will evolve in
to design our ONLIFE in a way that affords a sustainable public performance,
smart environments.
an empowering opacity of the self and a range of exposures that incorporates the need for self-expression, identity performance as well as the gene-
I do think that Arendt’s understanding of the private and the public might
rosity of forgetfulness, erasure and the chance to reinvent oneself?
save us from dichotomous thinking, as well as from the glorification of
‘private life’ as a sphere of uncontroversial freedom. Though we must also
B.3. Public Performance in the ONLIFE everyware
come to terms with the fact that her glorification of the public sphere has
little connection with present day politics, which rather falls within the scope
of her depiction of ‘the social’. At the same time, also, we must note that
Maybe ONLIFE has two dimensions, as suggested above. The first concerns
her glorification of politics as a ‘theatre of debate’ [instead of the realm of
self-publication or reputation management. It is a type of social networking
household economics] is rooted in an appreciation of privacy as ‘some darker
(Facebook, Twitter, Foursquare, Instagram, Youtube, Training Intelligence
ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real,
Programs, Enhanced Reality), i.e. pervasive sharing of self-images, brief texts,
non-subjective sense’ (Arendt 1958). To speak and act ‘in public’ one must
photo’s, video’s, location, ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’, sport’s performance, health status,
leave the security of one’s home. But to distinguish oneself and to take the
professional reputation. The second concerns the ubiquitous measurement,
risk of being refuted, requires courage, daring and a place to hide. To recu-
calculation and manipulation of the data that leak from everyday behaviours,
perate from the tyranny of public opinion (Mill 1859) we need a measure of
which are used to predict, pre-empt and thus manage future states of mind,
opacity to re-constitute the self, far from the social pressures that could turn
choices and decisions, i.e. behavioural advertising, location based services,
us into obedient self-disciplined subjects (Hutton et al. 1988). In fact I would
fraud detection, actuarial calculations, remote healthcare, neuromarketing,
agree with Butler (2005), where she underscores the constitutive opacity
criminal profiling,
of the self, that invites reiterant attempts to invent a coherent narrative of
who we are, but at the same time escapes all narrative since the emergence
- 174 -
B.4. A plurality of publics, a choice of exposure, a
place to hide
Both seem to draw individual ‘users’ into Arendt’s ‘the social’: ‘users’ have
become what she calls ‘a society’. An assembly of individuals that are managing their reputation, while also being managed as a resource for government and the industry. I would add that the computational infrastructure is
In 1927 Dewey wrote The public and its problems. The book is an extended
in fact ‘using’ the traces that ‘users’ leave as its cognitive resource.
reply to Lippman’s (1997) analysis of democratic government in the age of
mass media, high tech instrumentation and societal complexity. I find his
What affordances must ONLIFE have to develop a shared, agonistically orga-
analysis and his normative position on democratic practice highly relevant
nised public space that allows a plurality of ‘users’ to develop a voice, to
for our enterprise. As Marres (2005) has demonstrated Dewey agrees with
partake in democratic decision-making and to hold each other to account.
Lippman’s diagnosis, but not with his cure. Whereas Lippman believes the
While at the same time providing them with effective means to withdraw, to
only solution is technocratic government, Dewey argues for a new unders-
unplug, to delete and start over.
tanding of democracy. For a start, he reminds us that representative democracy (voting) is a matter of delegation, relieving people from the burden of
•
•
•
How to protect ‘users’ against invisible manipulation (because of the
governing themselves. Second, he believes that once people discover that
hidden complexity), unfair exclusion (because of the lack of transpa-
their delegates are not doing a good job with regard to a specific issue, they
rency that disables contestation), and undesirable exposure (because
will seek out their fellows and form a public around this issue. Interestingly,
of the ubiquitous pressure to ‘post’ an update of one’s where/what/
the formation of publics and issues is a matter of co-constitution: no issue,
who-abouts?
no public [and vice versa]. This leads Dewey to understand democracy as
How to empower ONLIFE inhabitants in a way that enables them to
the process of the simultaneous construction of publics and issues, whereby
challenge the design of their world? Is this about renegotiating the social
people regain a measure of control over issues their delegates do not take
contract? Or is it about construction work: how to build an ONLIFE world
proper care of. Publics and issues are performed, constructed, fabricated –
that is not a global village, nor a walled garden, but an extended urba-
not given. Their articulation and their assemblage require hard work. There is
nity?
not one – given – Public, but a multiplicity of publics that changes shape in
How does this connect to the dimension of agency that is emerging
relation to the issues they frame. And also, in relation to each other.
within the ONLIFE experience; how could inhabitants or visitors of the
ONLIFE learn to guess how they are being anticipated?
- 175 -
C. Legal Protection by Design: a novel social
contract?
Dewey’s publics differ from Arendt’s public sphere. His publics are more
empirical and contingent and they have less continuity. In fact a successful
public will resolve its issue and cease to exist as such. However, both require
C.1. The nature of the social contract
individuals who take the risk of raising their voice, contesting common sense
and – more importantly – initiating the construction of a new common sense
around what they present as an issue. Dewey seems less concerned with
Having explained, in the first section, the challenges of an environment
opposing ‘the social’ with ‘the public’. His definition of democracy demons-
that comes due to a ubiquitous and pervasive layer of machine learning, I
trates a fundamental trust in the wisdom of crowds [to be distinguished from
have put forward, in the second section, the question of what this means
a naïve wisdom of ‘the Crowd’]. Like Mouffe (2000) in political theory and Rip
for the public, the social and the private. My conclusion was that we need
(2003) in constructive Technology Assessment, Dewey trusts the outcome of
to construct an infrastructure that allows for a plurality of publics, a choice
agonistic decision-making processes. His publics are always under construc-
of exposure and places to hide. Such an infrastructure cannot be taken for
tion – they thrive on, contest and challenge whatever pretends to represent
granted, it will not appear of itself, nor will it grow organically or ‘naturally’
‘the social’. They ground a natality in the midst of ‘the social’, a possibility for
from the computational layers we are currently putting in place.
radical reinvention of what is taken for granted.
The social contract that combined the idea of limited government with – ultiWhat interests me here is how we – a public constituted around the issue
mately – representative, deliberative and participative self-government was
of ONLIFE – can contribute to the design, the engineering, the construc-
the result of a historic bargain (Nonet 1978). This bargain sealed the auto-
tion of an ONLIFE that affords the formation and un-formation of publics,
nomy of the law in relation to politics on the condition of non-interference;
while protecting and cherishing the opacities of the individuals that make
the independence of the courts thus combined with the monopoly of the
these publics. In fact I believe that the draft Regulation of Data Protection
legislator to enact the law. We can summarize this as the legislator writing
holds several gems that may actually provide stepping stones to such an
and enacting the law, and the court speaking and interpreting the law. Let’s
ONLIFE. In the third part of this contribution I venture into the radical choices
invoke Montesquieu’s often misunderstood maxim: iudex - non rex - lex loqui.
it presents and the bridges it builds between legislation, architecture, social
Not the king but the judge speaks the law (Schönfeld 2008). This was an
norms and market forces (Lessig 2006).
attack on the medieval maxim that attributed all powers to the king: rex lex
loqui (the King speaks the law). The division of tasks that follows from the
- 176 -
historic bargain between enacting and deciding the law was based on the
are not analysing a world, we are building it. We are not experimental philo-
socio-technical infrastructure of the printing press; the checks and balances
sophers, we are philosophical engineers (Halpin 2008).’ Berners-Lee is not
of the Rule of Law depend on the sequential processing of written codes that
merely describing the activities of the architects of the world wide web he
can be debated, interpreted and contested by those under their rule. The fact
invented. He is calling them to account for the impact of their engineering
that the courts have the final word in case of a conflict guarantees a measure
on the constitution of mind and society. He is inviting them to build a new
of due process, making effective the fundamental rights that are part of the
res publica. Stiegler is more careful. He suggests that digital technology
social contract. This is not to say that the printing press ‘caused’ the Rule of
is a pharmakon: ‘it can lead either to the destruction of the mind, or to its
Law, but to suggest that it created a socio-technical infrastructure condu-
rebirth (ib. 2).’ Referring to Wolf (2008) he notes that the transition from the
cive to a specific division of tasks between the differentiated powers of the
reading mind to the digitally extended mind entails substantive changes to
state. This division has specific temporal dimensions: the court speaks after
the composition and behaviour of our brains. Though these changes may
the legislator enacts; courts are bound by the law enacted by the legislator,
be cause for celebration, they also threaten the constitution of the self. In
while in turn the legislator is bound by the interpretation of the courts – the
the course of his manifesto Stiegler reiterates the crucial question of what
circle is virtuous, it constitutes countervailing powers and creates room for
we need to preserve as a valuable heritage of the era of the ‘reading brain’
both enforcement and contestation. All this is part of modernity. It depends
(Wolf 2008). I want to hook this up with the need to reconstruct the social
on the internal division of sovereignty. Ultimately it depends on the mono-
contract, recognizing that the social contract is a modern invention enabled
poly of violence which is at the core of the operations of sovereignty; effec-
by the ICT infrastructure of the printing press.
tive protection of fundamental rights is only possible if the state can enforce
them. Even if they must be enforced against the state itself.
Though we might wish to declare ‘Game over for modernity’, this may
require us to give up on the social contract that protects against immoderate government. Let us remind ourselves that the end of modernity will not
C.2. Protecting modernity’s assets: Reconstructing
the social contract
necessarily bring the end of totalitarian governance. The hidden complexity
of computational layers in fact affords refined and invisible manipulations
that may be closer to the totalitarian nightmares of Kafka’s Trial (Solove
In his Die Aufklärung in the Age of Philosophical Engineering Stiegler (2012)
2004) and Foster’s Machine (Forster 2009) then to the dictatorial schemes
accepts the challenge introduced by Tim Berners-Lee, who argued that ‘we
of Big Brother watching you. Stiegler (2012) notes that ‘the spread of tracea-
- 177 -
bility seems to be used primarily to increase the heteronomy of individuals
A hierarchy that organizes countervailing powers may save us from the tota-
through behaviour-profiling rather than their autonomy.’ The ‘old-school’
litarian rule of transnational computational decision-systems. At the same
social contract will not necessarily survive when cut lose from the ICT
time we should acknowledge that the dreams of early cyberspace utopists
infrastructure of the printing press. The idea of the social as a distinctive
have not come through; the nation state has not lost its bearing and territo-
sphere is in fact typical for modernity’s reliance on information and commu-
rial jurisdiction has not become meaningless (Goldsmith and Wu 2008). This
nication technologies that sustain a further distantiation and differentia-
requires vigilance in the face of potential attempts to turn cyberspace into
tion of societal spheres. Oral societies do not have written constitutions
a set of Walled Gardens that might reinforce not merely totalitarianism but
capable of keeping their economic and military leaders in check, they require
also tyranny (Mueller 2010). We must investigate how the novel affordances
continuous calibration that entails a persistent threat of violence to keep
of cyberspace can be set free as well as constraint, in such a way that they
the vicious circle of private revenge at bay (Hoebel 1971). Societies of the
foster a fair distribution of capabilities (Cohen 2012). This urges us to take
manuscript (the handwritten script) have no means to contest written laws
into account that cyberspace may change the game for modernity’s incentive
for the majority that does not read or write; these societies thrive on the
structure, whereas it still nourishes on the system of legal-political checks
monopoly of the class of scribes that buffers between ruler and subjects,
and balances that was generated by modernity’s socio-technical infrastruc-
thus also protecting its own monopoly (Glenn 2007). Only the printing press
ture.
provides the specific affordances conducive to the agonistic framework of
representative, deliberative and participative democracies under the Rule of
C.4. Technology Neutrality and Legal Protection by
Design
Law (Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2007). My aim would therefor be to mine the
gems produced by modernity’s dependence on sequential thinking (Wolf’s
era of the reading brain) and its temporal structure that favours reflection
over reflexes (again, Wolf’s era of the reading brain). This entails an attempt
One way of dealing with the implications of cyberspace as a game changer
to engage with the benefits of modernity while passing over the lost territory
is to integrate legal protection into its socio-technical backbone: its hard-
of necessarily hierarchical and linear models of social life. To the extent that
ware, software and the numerous protocols and standards that enable and
hierarchy or linearity protect us from chaos and contingent power games, we
constrain its affordances. I have coined this ‘legal protection by design’,
will have to reconstruct and reengineer them and to keep them in bounds in
connecting the concept to research communities working on value-sensitive
function of the purpose such hierarchy should serve.
design (Flanagan, Howe, and Nissenbaum 2007), constructive technology
- 178 -
assessment (Rip, Misa, and Schot 1995), upstream engagement with scien-
brandt 2008 and 2011b). Wherever a technology changes the substance or
tific research (Wynne 1995), the concept of nudging in behavioural econo-
the effectiveness of a right, its articulation must be reconsidered to take into
mics (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), privacy impact assessment (Wright and de
account how we wish to reconceptualise and/or reframe the right within the
Hert 2012) and privacy by design and default (Cavoukian 2009; Langhein-
network of related rights and principles. The socio-technical infrastructure of
rich 2001). Contrary to notions like techno-regulation this is not about how
cyberspace often affects the network and the context of sets of rights; e.g.
to technically enforce legal compliance, because legal problems cannot be
rights to compensation based on tort or contract as well as rights to privacy,
solved by technical solutions.
due process and non-discrimination. Technology neutrality therefor requires
a lively debate amongst lawyers but also generate a similar debate amongst
The concept of legal protection by design refers to novel articulations of
the architects of cyberspace on how to reinvent, to reengineer and to rede-
fundamental legal rights into ICT infrastructures other than the printing
sign democracy and the Rule of Law in the ONLIFE environment.
press. Both lawyers and policy makers tend to display the Pavlov reflex of
writing and enacting new laws when legal problems occur, whereas cybers-
C.5. The proposed Data Protection Regulation
pace easily turns written law into a paper dragon. Modern law is articulated
in the technology of the printing press and in cyberspace its monopoly seems
hard to enforce. At the same time, however, the administration has deve-
Let’s now be practical. Though some inhabitants of the ONLIFE world may
loped techniques to automatically enforce written administrative rules by
claim that data protection is boring and concerns an outdated attempt to
translating them into automated decision systems. Social security, taxation
revive ‘old-school’ privacy, I would argue that the legal framework of Data
and numerous permits are now granted or imposed on the basis of such
Protection is particularly well tuned to the data-driven environment of
decisions. Legal protection by design must therefore not be confused with
cyberspace. Whereas the value of privacy may indeed have been an affor-
techno-regulation or technological enforcement of legal compliance (Hilde-
dance of the era of the printing press (Stalder 2002), we should not sit
brandt 2011b). Law is not administration, politics or policy. Legal protec-
back to sing its requiem but need to assess how it can be re-invented as a
tion by design instead implies that written legal rules and their underlying
dimension of the ONLIFE habitat. The Fair Information Principles that inform
unwritten legal principles develop a new type of technology-neutrality. Other
the legal framework of data protection seem particularly apt to cope with
than some authors suggest, technology neutrality requires a keen eye on the
the flux of de- and re-contextualization that drives cyberspatial innovation
normative implications of technological developments (Reed 2007; Hilde-
(Kallinikos 2006). So far, however, these principles were articulated as paper
- 179 -
dragons, trailing an irritating bureaucracy while at the same time enforce-
chance to play around with the system, exploring and inventing their iden-
ment seemed an illusion due to the lack of teeth, money and personnel of
tities in the interstices of the hybrid social contexts that shape their capa-
the data protection supervisors. Compliance was a matter of costs, to be
bilities. This should empower them – us – to establish a new hybrid social
taken into account after new business models were set in place.
contract that enables a plurality of publics, a choice of exposure and places
to hide. Writing did not erase speech, but it changed the nature of speech
The proposed Regulation is a game changer. It establishes a new incentive
(Ong 1982); computational layers will not erase writing, but it will change the
structure and is based on a salient understanding of law’s need for effec-
nature of the reading mind. This may be a good thing, but that will depend on
tive [not theoretical] technology neutrality. The Regulation presents the
how we invent the infrastructure that will invent us.
combined force of a mandatory data protection impact assessment, data
protection by default (data minimisation at the level of applications), data
portability (enabling an effective right to withdraw consent without losing
the value of self-generated profiles), the right to forget (requiring effective
mechanisms to achieve a reasonable measure of erasure of one’s personal
data if no legal ground applies for their processing), rights against measures
based on profiling (a right to object to being subjected to automated decisions and transparency rights as to the existence of such measures and their
envisaged effects) and finally data protection by design (which imposes the
duty of adequate mechanisms for compliance on commercial and governmental data controllers). All this would have no effect if the proposal had
not ensured efficient mechanisms to incentivize the industry to actually
develop data protection by design: the liability regime is inspired by competition law (fines of maximum 2% of global turnover) while the burden of proof
per default rests with the data controllers. This may finally create the level
playing field that challenges companies and governments to develop intuitive and auditable transparency tools. ONLIFE inhabitants will then have the
- 180 -
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- 183 -
Rethinking
the Human Condition
in a Hyperconnected Era
Why Freedom is not about
Sovereignty but about Beginnings
An initiative
of the
Nicole Dewandre
Contents1
A. The digital transition as a reality-check for Plato's utopia failure. 186
B. Omniscience/omnipotence: modern utopia,
human condition’s dystopia?
189
B.1. Current understandings of what it is to be human
189
B.2. Policy-making or the victory of the animal laborans?
190
B.3. Policy-making and the devaluation of the present
194
C. The Arendtian axiomatic reset.
194
C.1. Acknowledging natality
195
C.2. Embracing plurality
196
198
D. Reclaiming the public/private distinction in the light of plurality
and natality 199
E. The Arendtian axiomatic reset in a hyperconnected era
202
E.1. The proper mix of literacy and policy…
203
E.3. Coping with the risk of "reality theft"
204
E.4. Artefactual nature, as a reservoir of new beginnings
205
Conclusion: the task of the day for policy-making
C.3. Plurality-and-natality as an alternative to
omniscience-and-omnipotence
E.2. Rethinking privacy
202
- 185 -
206
A. The digital transition as a reality-check for
Plato's utopia failure.
public space to collapse, and this even under the cover of the best governance intentions.
Mary Midgley sees philosophy as plumbing, something that nobody notices
The digital transition is an opportunity to fix the pipes: it brings about a
until it goes wrong: ‘Then suddenly we become aware of some bad smells,
reality by which some key assumptions underlying our worldview, since Plato,
and we have to take up the floorboards and look at the concepts of even the
lose ground insofar as they simply stop being efficient. The digital transition
most ordinary piece of thinking. The great philosophers ... noticed how badly
projects us into a world where nature is pervasively intertwined with sensors,
things were going wrong, and made suggestions about how they could be
information devices and machines; we thus increasingly experience a reac-
dealt with.’1
tive and talkative nature, an animated nature, where it becomes more and
more difficult to distinguish between what is given and what is fabricated.
The bad smells, as I perceive them, concern the proliferation of truisms
Furthermore, the digital transition creates the worldly conditions for the
(including about progress, change and innovation), wrong alternatives
actual dissolution of the objectivity standpoint: indeed, we "touch" the fact
("either/or" framing when the "both/and" would be much more efficient),
that the abundance of information does not give access to an omniscient/
and fears and delusion when it comes to thinking and speaking about poli-
omnipotent posture, but rather that accumulation of knowledge pushes ever
tics and the public space. It would be wrong to say that we are in totalita-
further the remit of what is to be known. Like the sea recovering from the
rian times: fascism and communism have been defeated and democracy is
wave behind a boat, reality is thick and dense and recomposes itself, under-
alive, at least in the EU and other parts of the world. However, I feel that
mining any possibility to acquire or sustain a posture of omniscience and
we are unconsciously undermining essential elements of the human condi-
omnipotence.
tion, as set out by Hannah Arendt in her seminal book The human condition2:
the antidotes against the risk of totalitarianism are thereby weakened to a
It is paradoxical to realise that it is exactly when, and probably because,
dangerous extent so that it would not take much more than a spark for the
we can envisage what a total and ubiquitous knowledge would mean, that
the omniscience/omnipotence utopia appears to be a useless and decep-
1 Mary Midgley, interviewed by Else, L. (3 November 2001). “Mary, Mary quite contrary.” in
New Scientist.
tive fiction. By bringing us to the point where the omniscience/omnipotence
utopia cannot but be seen as a chimera, the digital transition, in a para-
2 Arendt, Hannah. (1958/1959). The Human Condition. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.
Hereafter referred to by the initials HC.
- 186 -
doxical gesture, calls for re-endorsing the fact that human action3 is preci-
simplicity of the matter. Generally speaking, they always amount to seeking
sely characterized by its irreversibility and its unpredictability, and this is
shelter from action's calamities in an activity where one man, isolated from
not necessarily for the worse4. Arendt writes in 1958: "Exasperation with the
all others, remains master of his doings from beginning to end….Plato's solu-
threefold frustration of action –the unpredictability of its outcome, the irre-
tion of the philosopher-king, whose 'wisdom' solves the perplexities of action
versibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors- is almost as old as
as though they were problems of cognition, is only one –and by no means the
recorded history. It has always been a great temptation, for men of action no
less tyrannical- variety of one-man rule."5
less than for men of thought, to find a substitute for action in the hope that
the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irres-
Today, the regular call on the need for leadership and political will attest that
ponsibility inherent in a plurality of agents. The remarkable monotony of the
not less than before, policy-making is pervaded by "the Platonic wish to subs-
proposed solutions throughout our recorded history testifies to the elemental
titute making for acting in order to bestow upon the realm of human affairs
the solidity inherent in work and fabrication"6 . In my view, as I hope to make
clear later in this contribution, policy-making relies too much on an omnis-
3 The word « action » is to be understood as defined by Hannah Arendt in the Human Condition. Hannah Arendt proposes to describe the vita activa by distinguishing three activities:
labor, work and action.
“Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body,
whose spontaneous growth, metabolism and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is
life itself […].Work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not embedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species’
ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an “artificial” world of things, distinctly different
from all natural surroundings […] .The human condition of work is worldliness. Action, the
only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or
matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live
on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow
related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition, not only the conditio sine qua
non, but the conditio per quam - of all political life.” HC, pp.9-10 (apart from the italics in
the last sentence, which are from Hannah Arendt, the highlights earlier in the quote have
been made by the author of this article in view of highlighting the distinctions between
labor, work and action). HC, p.9. More on this tripartition later.
cience/omnipotence utopia and is going too far in "substituting making for
acting". Don’t we regularly frame problems in terms of “lack of knowledge”,
as if perfect knowledge would allow perfect action? This argument, at the
core of the rationale for funding research, reaches out beyond that specific
purpose and pervades imaginaries. Isn’t the precautionary principle based
on the idea that it is somehow possible to foresee and avoid harmful consequences, as if making decisions was about making a choice between different courses of action, all anticipable?
5 HC, p.197.
4 More details about the shifts in the digital transition in the Onlife Background Note, pp.
26-34.
6 HC, p.202.
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Knowing, thinking, doing and acting can only be done from within ("building
Hannah Arendt, with her notions of natality11 and plurality12, offer a sound
the raft while swimming"7) and not from an external manipulative pers-
basis for balancing the omniscience/omnipotence utopia and for making use
pective. Immanence is becoming commonsensical and is to be endorsed
of what I’ll call an Arendtian axiomatic reset in policyframing.
in political terms, without this meaning nihilism or despair. This calls for
taking some distance from dramatisation, as a trick, and for recovering a
After having addressed the influence of the omniscience/omnipotence preju-
meaningful approach to the present, based on a responsible and modest
dice over policy-making, and after having presented how the notions of
approach to the challenges of our times. Policymaking should reclaim the
plurality and natality allow overcoming such prejudice, with the Arendtian
present and take responsibility for the choices we make in view of genera-
axiomatic reset, I shall propose an actualisation of the distinction between
ting "islands of predictability"8 and ensure that "meaning has a place in this
the private and public and, lastly, suggest that a policy approach based on
world"9,
plurality and natality means paying more attention to being responsive and
while holding in contempt the fact that "real stories, in distinction
from those we invent, have no author"10.
accompanying the building up of a new societal digital literacy, as it is unfolding.
7 This is my take from this sentence brought about by Luciano Floridi and which became the
motto of the Onlife initiative. See the Onlife Manifesto, p10
9 HC, p.212.
11Natality is not to be understood as « birth rate ». It is a technical term in Arendt’s thought
expressing the fact that the human condition is characterized by the fact of birth at least
as much as by the fact of death. For Arendt, the sustainability of the world is ensured by
the fact men and women constantly come to the world by birth and freedom is intimately
linked to the capacity to begin.
10HC, 165.
12For the technical meaning of plurality, see section 3.2. of this contribution.
8 HC, p.220.
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B. Omniscience/omnipotence: modern utopia,
human condition’s dystopia?
an object of enquiry, a "material", inherently heteronomous i.e., as fully determined by external materials, forces and processes.
B.1. Current understandings of what it is to be
human
As Arendt put it ironically, the definition of what is human in ethical terms
comes often close to definitions of what it is to be God15. Furthermore, she
reckons that freedom has wrongly been identified with sovereignty in poli-
What it is to be human depends on the register of discourse.
tical and philosophical thought: "If it were true that sovereignty and freedom
are the same, then indeed no man could be free, because sovereignty, the
In scientific terms, humans are treated as mere scientific objects, i.e., they
are elucidated with a view to predict and/or to manipulate
them13.
ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory
As pointed
to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one
to by Hannah Arendt, the scientific discourse is indexed on necessity: "what
man, but men, inhabit the earth – and not, as the tradition since Plato holds,
science and the quest of knowledge are after is irrefutable truth, that is,
because of man's limited strength, which makes him depend upon the help of
propositions human beings are not free to reject –they are compelling"14. In
others"16 . Understanding freedom as sovereignty has a huge price, the price
scientific terms, contingency is just another name for "epistemic failure", a
of reality: "sovereignty is possible only in imagination, paid for by the price of
not-yet-known. By denoting contingency with the term uncertainty, i.e., as a
reality"17. Ethical/philosophical narratives of what it is to be human contend
negative, certainty is made the norm or the ideal. And scientific knowledge is
with the need to escape from, or at least to balance with, a set of "things-
paired with certainty of facts, even after several decades of quantum mecha-
to-be-avoided": the scientifically-induced heteronomy as set out above with
nics which rather teaches us that uncertainty and indeterminacy are intrinsic
to scientific knowledge as well. This scientific register positions humans as
13In passing, no wonder machine will end-up being like humans, since we have patiently
paved the way for that by thinking of humans as machines: "Thought itself, when it
became 'reckoning with consequences', became a function of the brain, with the result that
electronic instruments are found to fulfil these functions much better than we ever could."
– HC, p. 294.
15See §10 of December 1952 in her Denktagebuch.
14Arendt, Hannah. (1971/1981). The Life of the Mind. San Diego: Harvest/HBJ, p59.
17HC, p.211.
16HC, p.210.
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the second categorical imperative of Kant18 , and the Hobbesian "state of
control beyond what can reasonably be predicted has also a high price, the
nature" and "war of all against all". "Humanity" in ethical terms is defined
price of plurality and freedom!
as a common opposite to these stance-to-be-avoided: human-as-a-machine,
human-as-a-self-defeated-violent-and-careless-individual. This violent and
human was defined as being different from animals.
B.2. Policy-making or the victory of the animal laborans?
A common feature of these scientific and ethical/philosophical approaches
In "the Vita activa and the Modern Age" section of the Human Condition20,
of what it is to be human is "control": when in scientific terms, control by
Hannah Arendt explains how the invention of the telescope changed the
others (including by myself-subject on myself-object); when in ethical terms,
relationship between truth and appearance. "Truth was no longer supposed
self-control (including with the help of God-as-a-reference) or control on
to appear…to the mental eye of a beholder"21. Indeed, as the telescope
the future course of events (freedom-as-sovereignty). But control, when
has demonstrated that we are fooled by our senses, "nothing could be less
decontextualized and pushed beyond its relevant remit, has more to do with
trustworthy for acquiring knowledge and approaching truth than passive
destruction than with anything else, while action is precisely characterised
observation or mere contemplation. In order to be certain, one had to make
by its unpredictability, hence the inherent impossibility to control its conse-
sure, and in order to know, one had to do"22. The telescope has undermined
quences: "Whereas men have always been capable of destroying whatever
deeply and for centuries our epistemological confidence in what we perceive
was the product of human hands and have become capable today even of
without instruments, either by our senses or by mere thinking and contem-
the potential destruction of what man did not make –the earth and earthly
plation. As a result, “in modern philosophy and thought, doubt occupies much
nature- men never have been and never will be able to undo or even to control
the same central position as that occupied for all the centuries before by
careless aspect is by the way strangely referred to our animality, as if being
reliably any of the processes they start through
action"19.
Hence, seeking
18"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end."
In Kant, I. (1789/1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Indianapolis/ Cambridge:
Hackett, p. 30.
20HC, p.225-297.
21HC, p.263.
19HC, p.209.
22Idem, ibidem.
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the Greek thaumazein, the wonder at everything that is as it is”23. This has
If there is no doubt that the Cartesian doubt has played a decisive role in this
had a great effectiveness in the relationship with nature and the universe.
course of action, the disappearance of thaumazein has had great damaging
Without the Cartesian “de omnibus dubitandum est”24, we would not have
consequences, at least in the field of human affairs.
taken the same technological path nor landed on the moon. The Cartesian
doubt has shaped the relationship of men to nature in terms of questions
Having been fooled by our senses until Galileo and Copernicus did not prevent
to be answered through experimental settings, and this has opened an era
humanity from living on the earth and no longer being fooled by our senses
where, on the one hand, technological artefacts have been invented and
did not prevent humanity from committing the notorious monstrosities of the
widely spread, and where, on the other hand, the conscience of the finiteness
20 th century. The suspicion against thinking and contemplating, in favour of
and fragility of the earth and the environment surrounding us has arisen.
the confidence in doing, has led, first, to the reversal of the primacy of the
The relationship between men and nature is made of triumph and pride, on
vita contemplativa over of the vita activa, and, second, within the vita activa,
the one hand, for all the technological artefacts, and fear and guilt, on the
it has modified the hierarchy 26 of the labour-work-action tripartition by
other hand, for the consequences of having “disturbed” the global ecosystem
putting work over action. Indeed, work is the activity of the doer, par excel-
to the point that we are now feeling responsibility for it 25. It is against this
lence, and a telescope is an object produced by Homo Faber.
general background that the development, diffusion and uptake of information and communication technologies take place.
The signature of this reversal in today's policy-making is the importance of
the "means-to-end" or instrumental logic, testified by the sequence: objectives, strategies, implementation, monitoring. Policies are means to higher
ends. The risk of this means-to-end logic in policy-making is to consider
that any means is good as long as it serves the end. Another shortcoming of
importing the means-to-end logic in the political realm is to lock-in or close
23HC, p.249.
down the capacity to begin. Indeed, the Homo Faber is judged against the
24"Everything should be doubted" [translation found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_
omnibus_dubitandum_est, page view January 11, 2013.].
25The term Anthropocene has been coined to hint at this. “It is an informal geologic chronological term that serves to mark the evidence and extent of human activities that have
had a significant global impact on the Earth's ecosystems.” In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Anthropocene, page view January 11, 2013.
26In her description of the vita activa, Hannah Arendt establishes a clear hierarchy between
labor, work and action. Labor stands at the lower end of the hierarchy because it is indexed
on necessity and action at the higher end, because it is indexed on freedom. Work stands in
between.
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conformity of his work with the original plan. "In contradistinction to fabri-
One of the main current higher ends to which policy-making is deemed to
cation, where the light by which to judge the finished product is provided by
be a means is "boosting growth and jobs". This in itself has also been antici-
the image or model perceived beforehand by the craftsman's eye, the light
pated by Arendt, even if, in the '50s and '60s of the last century, there were
that illuminates processes of action, and therefore all historical processes,
no "growth and jobs" issue at the level they are today. She anticipated that
appears only at their end"27. And indeed, political actors know that their
beyond the reversal of action and fabrication, or the “victory of Homo Faber”,
mandate cannot only be captured by a mere implementation of the original
there would be a second reversal, i.e., that the lowest of the three activi-
strategy. For example, although EU202028 is the overarching strategy of
ties in the vita activa tripartition – labor – would take over work and action
the Commission, it will be judged, not only on the implementation of this
with the “victory of the Animal Laborans”. Labor is the lowest of the three
strategy, but more surely on its sense of opportunity in dealing appropria-
activities in the vita activa, because it is defined by Arendt as “bound to the
tely with the crisis and the other events as they arise, in the course of time,
vital necessities”. It is indexed on necessity. It is highly repetitive and leaves
and on its ability to take initiatives. Similarly in national contexts, electoral
no trace behind. It is also characterized by its processual nature. Labour, in
campaigns are never won only on a bilan, but also on the ability to generate
that meaning, does not allow any room for experiencing freedom, nor the
trust and confidence with a winning mix of vision and skilful sense of oppor-
pleasure of appearing in front of others and experiencing the joy of plurality.
tunism. Hence, even if it would be stupid to deny that policy-making should
Indeed, for Arendt, what makes us human is what happens, once each of us
be transparent, soundly-based and monitored, it would be as stupid to think
has coped with the necessities of the biological life: "The 'good life' as Aris-
that transparency, sound foundations and monitoring is all that matters.
totle called the life of the citizen, therefore was ….'good' to the extent that by
Instead, what really matters is the ability to deal with the unexpected and
having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and
make sense of it. Policy-makers are judged on this very ability, their ability
work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own
to begin, to impulse and to make sense, much more than on their ability to
survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process"29.
achieve pre-defined goals.
The “means-to-end” register that has invaded the public space turns itself
into an even more pervasive register: the processual register. Policy-making
has not only substituted making for acting, but it has further substituted
27HC. p171.
28COM (2010)2020 final. Europe 2020 : A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth
29HC, p.33.
- 192 -
processing for making. This is a negative trend, according to Arendt, because
or denial of the notion of satiety threshold, phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom
processes leave no room for plurality and freedom, or for meaning. The poli-
and prudence, a critical value for public action in the Greek polis, is substi-
cy’s increasing and almost exclusive focus on processes thereby leaves unat-
tuted by hubris, i.e. extreme pride, arrogance and “never-enoughness” in a
tended a central aspect of the human condition.
systemic way.
One of the key features of the human condition is that human beings don’t
Facing this “growth and jobs” rationale, bound to the needs of a-satiable
need to allocate the totality of their energy to their survival: a surplus is avai-
organisations, there is another rationale: the one of precaution and funda-
lable. Human beings, if and when healthy, have a satiety threshold: at one
mental rights. The a-satiability of organisations and their overarching
point they have enough: they are not hungry, not cold, clean…and can turn
influence on policy-making in the name of growth and jobs may distort the
to other activities, for example engaging with others or fabricating objects.
use of these counter-tracks, as they are sometimes put forward only to
That satiety threshold, or better what happens beyond it, is what allows us to
block the invasiveness of the a-satiability of organisations, which they can
experience the human condition as such and enjoy freedom.
hardly do.
With the centrality of the “growth and jobs” rationale in policy-making,
Policy-making is locked in a vision which is either superseded by the
process and necessity have pervaded the rationale for policy-making. Neces-
overarching objective of "boosting growth and jobs" or by the quest for
sity has been hijacked to cover the survival needs of organisational beings,
control, certainty and predictability. In Arendtian terms, one might say that
rather than those of human beings. In contrast with human beings, organi-
policy-making is disconnected from endorsing the openness of the future,
sational beings, such as enterprises, have no satiety threshold. For these, by
through a double regression, first by running away from freedom by invoking
design, "more" is "better" and "enough" not part of their vocabulary! Addres-
causality, i.e., with work taking precedence over action, and then by redou-
sing needs of a-satiable beings, or, in other words, of beings not having a
bling causality with necessity, i.e., with labor taking precedence over labor.
satiety threshold, leads to the hegemony of necessity at the expense of any
The loss of this double regression is plurality and meaning.
sense of freedom and plurality. It is in this sense that what Arendt calls “the
social” has indeed colonised the public space. Wealth, which was a typical
private concern in Greek times, became a dominant public concern. With
an endless processual perspective anchored in necessity, and the oversight
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B.3. Policy-making and the devaluation of the
present
The present is what is broken. It is indeed mainly perceived and described
as what is broken and requires action to be fixed! Policies are then designed
to fix those problems: low-carbon, training, budgetary discipline. The present
The modern overarching confidence in progress and the lock-in of policy-ma-
is where problems lie and the future where solutions need to be found.
king in causality (means-to-end) and necessity (process) has deep conse-
Tomorrow will be better than today, thanks to the policies. As if there would
quences for the underlying representations of the past, the present and the
be no need for policies or institutions if there were no problem to be fixed.
future in policy-making: meaning and purpose are exported in the future,
In that framing, the bigger the problems and the worse the present, the
the present is ...what is broken, the past balances between “golden age” and
easier the demonstration! Metaphorically, policy-makers tend to describe
“never again”!
the challenges as if we had to run away from a fire or to hurry up to win a
supposed race. It is about pointing to the future as a fire exit from a present
Future is where meaning and purpose are stored: future generations are
in flames. This systematic, even if implicit, devaluation of the present has
called to justify policies, notably regarding climate change policies. Long-
pervasive consequences on the mood with which men and women interact
term objectives are set, against which current decisions are justified. The
with each other and with the world. It undermines the possibilities for a rich
long-term perspective is value-loaded, unveiling interestingly that the short
experience of plurality and freedom.
term has indeed been emptied of meaning and purpose. “Short termism” is
an expression denoting the inability of policy making to form appropriate
C. The Arendtian axiomatic reset.
judgments of what needs to be taken into account. It is de facto the signature of the fact that policy decisions have parted company with meaning.
This is highly problematic in the perspective of natality and plurality, as will
"The Platonic separation of knowing and doing has remained at the root of
be shown later.
all theories of domination which are not mere justifications of an irreducible
and irresponsible will to power"30. This dualism between knowing and doing
The past is either idealised or demonised, much more rarely simply endorsed,
mirrors the dualism between soul and body, between reason and emotion,
acknowledged and made sense of in a rationale and distanced manner.
between higher ends and mere means, etc… This dualism which seems to be
30HC, p.201.
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C.1. Acknowledging natality
designed in order to keep one of the polarities at a distance is bound to fail,
because what is kept at a distance springs with even more strength than if
it were recognized and dealt with. Understanding –or rather standing under-
Humans are not only mortal beings, but they are also born beings. With some
the failure of the omniscience/omnipotence utopia as the ground from which
irony, and a mental smile, Arendt wonders why philosophers have always
the human condition can be experienced and appreciated is a critical mental
considered mortality more important than natality, and ends more important
operation that we suggest can be called an "axiomatic reset".
than beginnings. She invites to pay much more attention to the fact that we
are born beings: “Death is the price we pay for having lived”31. Her philosophy
This axiomatic reset called for by Arendt stems from the lessons she draws
is anchored in the praise of beginnings. What makes the world sustainable is
from the darkest times of the 20th century: seeking to confer to human
precisely that human beings come to the world in a continuous flow.
affairs the solidity of the world of objects leads to monstrosities. This can
be seen as a political version of the Heisenberg principle. This principle
Looking at human beings as beginners brings a radically different perspec-
states that if you measure the speed of a particle, you "pay the price" of
tive than looking at them as beings that will eventually die. Let’s call the
not knowing its position and vice-versa. The political version of this principle,
latter the perspective of mortality and the former the perspective of natality.
as highlighted by Arendt, goes as follows: if certainty is to be trumped over
any other considerations, then we get only one outcome, the certainty of the
The mainstream timeline representation, where the future (our death) is in
worse! This is not to say that nothing can be known, nor that nothing should
front of us, and the past (our birth) is behind us, flows from the perspective
be controlled, but it means that misjudging what is to be controlled and what
of mortality. Acknowledging natality invites a shift in this representation. It
is beyond the remit of what can be controlled is a mistake which bears heavy
is to privilege a vision of the future as what is yet to come. In the perspec-
consequences.
tive of natality, the future is pushing us forward, instead of being what we
foresee and anticipate. In that sense, the future is behind us rather than in
The Arendtian axiomatic reset is acknowledging natality and embracing
plurality.
31Retro-translation by the author of the Denktagebuch French version « La mort est le prix
que nous payons pour la vie, pour le fait d’avoir vécu.» In Journal de Pensée, vol. 2. Paris:
Editions du Seuil, p.977 (July 1970, §66).
- 195 -
front of us32, because we do not see it, while the past is what we contem-
perspective of mortality is conducive to doubt and control, the perspective of
plate and learn from.
natality is conducive to confidence and wonder.
Let’s illustrate this shift in perspectives by another couple of spatial meta-
C.2. Embracing plurality
phors: a road versus a spring. In the perspective of mortality, the timeline is
like a road from birth to death: the present is like the point on the road where
the pilgrim stands walking towards his/her destination, symbolized as the
Plurality has been mentioned regularly in this contribution: it is time now
heaven, the grail or just the end. In the perspective of natality, the present
be more specific about what Arendt means with this word. As already been
is like a spring, where time, like water, flows from within the earth, and we
mentioned, for Arendt, the noblest part of the human condition is not that
spend our life in the present, i.e. where the water comes out.
Man mimics a monotheist God, but instead that there is plurality : "If philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from the everyday life of
In the perspective of mortality, the future is coloured with the certainty of
human affairs, were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy, they would
our eventual death, while in the perspective of natality it is coloured by the
have to make the plurality of men, out of which arises the whole realm of
recurrent remembrance of the “infinite
improbability”33
of our birth. In the
human affairs –in its grandeur and misery- the object of their thaumazein.[…]
perspective of natality, the fact that we shall eventually die does not account
They would have to accept in something more than the resignation of human
for a meaningful knowledge of the future; what shall eventually make sense
weakness the fact that 'it is not good for man to be alone'"34.
and be worthwhile in the future is precisely what shall come as a surprise,
as each of us as human beings came to this world. In that latter perspec-
Arendt describes plurality as the coexistence of equality, singularity and
tive, it is recognized that “what is” is the accumulation of infinite improbabili-
reflectivity.
ties, more than the predictable outcome according to causal laws. While the
First, equality is the component of plurality that denotes the fact that plurality is what happens between agents who recognize each other as other
selves. In that meaning, equality is not considered as an objective, but as an
32The metaphorical approach to the timeline owes much to Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors
We Live By (1984).
33HC, p.157.
34Arendt, H. (1951-1955/2005). The Promise of Politics. New York: Schocken Books, pp.38-39.
- 196 -
axiomatic stance. Plurality is what happens between agents, who consider
appearance in front of others, notably with speech and action, is a necessary
each other as other selves...
condition of revealing his or her identity: “Action and speech are so closely
related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same
Second, singularity, because what makes each human a human qua human
time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: who are
is precisely that who s/he is is unique. As long as we treat other humans as
you? In acting and speaking, men show who they are, they appear. Revelatory
interchangeable entities or as characterised by their attributes or qualities,
quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others
i.e., as a what, we do not treat them as human qua human, but as entities
and neither for, nor against them, that is in sheer togetherness"36 .
that happen to be human. Plurality is what happens between agents who
consider each other as other selves and who recognize an absolute singula-
In other words, identity is a double-key feature: one key is held by the self
rity to each self, to the point where this singularity trumps any other charac-
and one key is held by the other. Without this second key –the key held by
teristic to denote their identity...
the other- , identity is not completed. This is why appearance to others in a
public space is a central feature of the human condition. It also highlights
Last and by no means least, the third component of plurality is the reflective
why identity and interactions are so intimately connected37, and why atten-
nature of identity. For Arendt, the disclosure of the who “can almost never be
tion38 is such a critical ability for human beings to experience plurality.
achieved as a willful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of
this ‘who’ in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities”35, (i.e.,
To sum up, plurality is what happens between agents who consider other as
his what). The who appears unmistakably to others, but remains somewhat
other selves, whose identity is inherently singular and partly hidden to the
hidden from the self. It is as if our identity layed in an entity standing on
our shoulder or on the back of our head and was visible by all except by
oneself. Our face, which represents oneself for others, is never seen by our
self through his or her own eyes only. It is this reflective character of identity
that confer to speech and action such a revelatory role when it comes to
36HC, p.160.
disclosing the who and not the what. For entities for whom the who matters,
37See section 3D of the Onlife Background Note, pp.32-33.
38The critical importance of attention is at the core of the chapter of Stefana Broadbent and
Claire Lobet-Maris, pp.98-114.
35HC, p.159.
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self, so that appearance among equals is the only way to disclose fully one’s
own
The perspective of natality counters the omniscience-omnipotence utopia
identity 39.
without falling into the drawbacks of nihilism, because it encapsulates the
confidence in recurrent beginnings.
C.3. Plurality-and-natality as an alternative to
omniscience-and-omnipotence
Plurality is the second element of this alternative to an omniscience-omnipotence utopia. Indeed, as we have seen above, the key features of plurality are that each entity engaged in the relationship is (i) equal (all on the
Omniscience and omnipotence are deemed to be postures from which
same ground), (ii) singular (each who is unique) and (iii) partly hidden to
anything, including the realization of any utopia, is possible, provided suffi-
him or herself (the reflective character of identity). This threefold unders-
cient knowledge and control would be available. In an omniscience-omnipo-
tanding of plurality (equality, singularity, and reflectivity) undermines radi-
tence utopia’s worldview, relationships create no surprise, as a relationship is
cally an omniscience-omnipotence utopia’s worldview. Indeed, the equality
deemed to be a causal one. In that perspective, the totality of the meaning
between the engaged persons or entities subvert the asymmetry created by
lies in the cause. There is no room for meaning in an effect. An effect is
the polarization in terms of cause and effect; the singularity of each entity
soluble in its cause. An effect is not even an end. It is literally a non-event,
is a firewall against considering someone as an effect soluble in a cause: the
since the event is all included in the cause. The omnipotence/omniscience
singularity of the who is an anchor against instrumentalisation; lastly, the
utopia echoes the mortality perspective set out above. It closes down the
partly hidden identity undermines the omniscient-omnipotent utopia, as each
opening to beginnings and is antinomic to thaumazein, as what deserves
of us has to admit that s/he needs the others to access to his or her identity.
wonder, in the omniscience-omnipotence utopia’s worldview, is only… omniscience and omnipotence!
From this understanding of plurality and natality springs a specific understanding of human freedom. Human freedom is not about avoiding, escaping or vanishing limits, or about being as close as possible to omniscience
and omnipotence, but it is instead anchored in the capacity to begin, to live
among peers and access to our own identity through their recognition of our
39There is resonance between plurality and the approach of the relational self as proposed
by Charles Ess in his chapter as well as with the related section in the Onlife Manifesto
(p.9).
speech and action.
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D. Reclaiming the public/private distinction in
the light of plurality and natality
“Since action is the political activity par excellence, natality and not mortality,
may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical,
thought”40: the omniscience and omnipotence utopia, as an underlying rationale for policy-making, can thus be seen as an ill-defined transposition of a
For Arendt, the private space is where necessities are dealt with and the
metaphysical thought into a political thought. And this ill-defined transposi-
public space is where men –and I’ll add women43 – enjoy plurality and
tion threatens to collapse the public space.
freedom, through the revelatory character of speech and action: "life without
speech and without action (…) has ceased to be a human life because it is no
For these reasons, it is important to nurture natality and plurality, as
longer lived among men"44. In her view, the public is loaded with more onto-
powerful antidotes and alternatives to omniscience and omnipotence. Like
logical dignity than the private, because it is where freedom can be expe-
the Thracian servant girl laughing about Thales falling in the well while
rienced.
looking at the stars 41, the natality-plurality tenant is laughing at the aspirant
to omniscience-omnipotence trying hard to jump over his or her shadow42.
The private, as still visible in the etymology, meant originally to be deprived
from being among equals. Nowadays, privacy is hardly understood as "being
deprived” from anything! On the contrary: freedom is more on the side of the
private, and the rule of law on the side of the public. Property is associated
with wealth and accumulation, while property and wealth used to be only
the pre-condition for engaging in the public realm. Action has been substituted by behaviours, or by fabrication. In tyranny, as in mass society, "men
40HC, p.11.
41Famous anecdote in Plato, Theaetetus, 174A.
43The gender reading of Arendt is a most interesting issue that is not addressed in this
contribution. Those interested may enjoy Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, edited
by Bonnie Honig (1995. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.).
42In Configuring the networked self (2012). New Haven: Yale University Press), Julie Cohen
is providing a remarkable analysis of the policy challenges in a hyperconnected era, in a
natality and plurality perspective. I see a great proximity between natality, as set out here,
and her "semantic discontinuity".
44HC, p.157.
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have become entirely private, that is, they have been deprived of seeing and
hearing others, of being seen and being heard by
cannot account for the totality of the human experience: action (and plura-
them"45.
lity and freedom) has to have a place! For Arendt, the meaning of politics is
freedom. If indeed, omnipotence and omniscience were a possibility, there
Freedom has changed sides: privacy is now perceived as one way to protect
would be no room for politics, as politics is precisely the place where we
freedom, while publicity is more perceived as the realm of constraints (rule
experience the noblest part of the human condition, i.e. plurality and natality.
of law, accountability, transparency, justification, surveillance, etc…), than as
In the vita activa of the 21st century, the labor-work-action tripartition should
the realm of enjoying plurality and freedom.
not be seen hierarchically, i.e., with action, the public and the agora on the
top and labor, the private and the home on the bottom: instead, labor work
It is interesting to note that Hannah Arendt attributes the dissolution of the
and action form a trio generating a 3D-space. Failing to recognize action as a
public/private distinction and the profound change of their meaning to poli-
third dimension ends up in a degenerative perception of the human condition
tical modernity. In her terms, the invasion of the social in the public realm, in
and a flattening of the human experience.
the form of the nation state, which can be seen as a huge household, joined
up with the ancestral "great temptation, for men of action no less than for
Arendt mapped the private/public distinction with idealized represen-
men of thought, to find a substitute for action in the hope that the realm
tations of the home and the agora as they were supposed to be in Greek
of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility
Antiquity. There and then, the private was the household, the place where
inherent in a plurality of
agents"46 .
women and slaves took care of the necessities of life, while the public was
the space where men, freed from the necessities of life, could experience
The Arendtian axiomatic reset is not about going back to the Greek polis:
freedom, among equals. It is obvious that the public/private distinction does
pushing labour and work out of the public sphere, and concentrating politics
not correspond anymore to the distinction agora/home. It is my view that
on action only is not a credible option in the 21 century. However, the Arend-
the public/private distinction can most usefully be re-described in the 21st
tian tripartition of the vita activa in labour, work and action remains inspira-
century by indexing it primarily on the freedom/necessity polarity, and by
tional as it reminds us that labour (and necessity) and work (and causality)
leaving aside the space distinction (household vs agora), or the gender or
st
social one (men vs women and slaves).
45HC, p.53.
46HC, p.197.
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With that in mind, the private realm is where and when humans are bound
Arendt recognizes that plurality can best be experienced at city-level. "The
by necessity, deprived from appearance among equals, and thereby, confined
larger the population in any given body politic, the more likely it will be the
in a pre-political, infra-human life, while the public realm is where and when
social rather than the political that constitutes the public realm". The Nation-
human beings experience plurality, i.e. equality, singularity and reflectivity,
State is where conformity and mass behaviour substitutes for plurality. This
notably through speech and action. If one expands the constraints of the
can then only be worse for continental organisations, such as the EU, or for
biological life to the constraints of the function someone is expected to fulfil,
global governance bodies, such as the UN! With big numbers, plurality dege-
this provides a renewed basis for distinguishing the private from the public:
nerates into mere and unendorsed interdependence, while natality and its
the private is where and when a person is perceived as a what while the
inherent openness and unpredictability are perceived only under the catego-
public is where and when a person is perceived as a who. The experience
ries of uncertainty and risk.
of appearing to others as a who or as a what has little to do with the place
where the relationship takes place. Consequently, the distinction between the
Reclaiming a public/private distinction where the public is where plurality
public and the private has more to do with what is at stake in the relationship
is experienced while the private is the realm of functionality leads to the
rather than where it takes place.
need to recognize that plurality can also apply to intermediaries, legal entities, organisations, institutions, not only to humans. Let’s call ‘agents’ those
If we are considered, not as ourselves, but as a number (ID-number), an attri-
beings who experience natality and plurality. With that in mind, the EU level
bute (the amount of wealth, or a set of skills) or as a function (a consumer,
is a public space where Member States, as agents, experience natality and
a parent, a job holder), this is not a public appearance, but rather a private
plurality. Instead of being presented as an "instrument to solve problems" or
setting even if the relationship is between a so-called private entity and a
"a tool to make economies of scale", the EU can then be seen as a space of
so-called public entity. Indeed, then, the who does not matter; there is no
appearance for Member States, where they disclose their “who” and not their
plurality, but only functional interactions that can be modelled, calculated,
“what”. The same applies at UN level. Privileging plurality over functionality
and anticipated. This functional approach to relationships is close to what
is recognizing that, for the public space, reaching goals matter much less
was meant by being confined in the home, as the home is the metaphor for
the place where persons, instead of appearing to others for who they are, are
confined to fulfilling the tasks they are expected to.
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than securing a space where agents whose identities are singular and reflective interact together in a constructive and meaningful
are approached with « both/and » dualities rather than with « either/or »
way47.
dilemmas 48 .
To some extent, it invites to shift away from the dominance of a risk gover-
E. The Arendtian axiomatic reset in a hyperconnected era
nance approach to a literacy approach. Literacy is the set of skills, understood
in a wide sense, which enables the experience of plurality. Hence, abilities
to communicate are central to literacy understood in the wide sense. In a
E.1. The proper mix of literacy and policy…
pre-digital context, literacy is about reading and writing, but it goes much
beyond the technical ability and reaches out to the ability to understand, to
If action is indeed characterised as a beginning whose consequences can
contextualize and to be persuasive. For example, each of us learn very young
never be undone, scientific discoveries and technological developments are
and, most often, very painfully, the subtleties of communication. We all expe-
action by excellence, as they cannot be undone and correspond to new begin-
rienced the differences between what we want to say to our mother or to
nings. Thinking about what happens to us and framing the challenges in a
our best friend, or between what we want to say in confidence, and what we
hyperconnected era is one of our generation’s task, and this ought to be done
want to say loud and clear. When things go wrong, we learn and we adapt,
by balancing fears with confidence and control with wonder. Indeed, to rein-
and little by little, we acquire that extended literacy. Literacy is made of a
force and nurture the public space in a hyperconnected era, there is an urgent
mix of technical, social and ethical skills and considerations. It is also highly
need to balance the omniscience-omnipotence utopia, pervaded by fear and
evolutive. As put nicely by Siva Vaidhyanathan49, in the hyperconnected era,
control-seeking, with the plurality and natality perspectives, pervaded by
“we are all babies”! Indeed, who is aware of what is accessible to whom
confidence and wonder. This balancing generates a space where fears and
when engaging on social networks, browsing on the internet, buying online,
risks are compensated by the confidence in beginnings, shared intelligence
and practical wisdom. It generates a space where meanings are rooted in
« in-betweens » rather than in « the more, the better » and where challenges
48See the Onlife Manifesto, pp.7-8.
47This echoes with Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge University
Press, 1989; and with the notion of multi-agent-systems (MAS) as proposed by Luciano
Floridi in his chapter, p.43-47.
49http://www.cbc.ca/spark/2011/05/full-interview-siva-vaidhyanathan-on-the-googlization-of-everything/
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walking around with a mobile phone on, etc... Acquiring a digital literacy50
literacy can complement each other to address new challenges in a hyper-
is a collective and societal endeavour that requires an uptake and “natura-
connected reality.
lisation” of knowledge and codes, about the different modes of communication in a hyperconnected era, and their consequences for plurality. It is about
E.2. Rethinking privacy
adapting common sense, fairness, respect, responsibility, freedom, privacy
into to the new worldly conditions. Shaping this new version of literacy, which
can be called a digital literacy, is an emergent and ongoing process and all
The privacy regulatory framework grew out of two basic principles, known as
stakeholders are actively revisiting and reshaping them: there is no mono-
"data control" and "data minimisation"52. How long will these two principles
poly for taking part in such a game. Policy making has surely a contribution
remain effective, i.e., meaningful in protecting what people really care about?
to make in this endeavour, but it would be wrong to believe that policy can
In an era where data become “traces” and form a “digital shadow”, what does
deliver such literacy, as it is wrong to believe that policy could prevent risk in
data control really mean? In a big data environment where data processing
an absolute manner. In the societal and multistakeholder endeavour of this
is the name of the game, doesn’t data minimisation sound anachronistic?
constant updating literacy, there is a role for policy-making, as there is a
Data control and data minimisation were the appropriate principles to
role for each other stakeholder. Policy-making, by being aware of the current
protect privacy in a post-WWII but pre-hyperconnected era. These principles
emergence of new forms of literacy, can identify where and how it can be
must be honoured as long as long as there is no better alternative. But it is
responsive and add value to the workings of societal intelligence and the
obvious that there is a need to rethink what it is that people really expect
ongoing reshaping of the value content of the notions mentioned above and
to be protected and adapt the principles accordingly. Facing this challenge
adapt the policy frameworks
accordingly51.
This is not an easy task, as it may
will allow the EU to grasp the opportunities of a hyperconnected era, while
call for fundamental and uncomfortable revisions, leading to very sensitive
respecting European values and fundamental rights. Failing to do so will feed
policy transitions. In the next two sections, we'll exemplify how policy and
Manichean empty debates.
52As put in the European Commission's communication A comprehensive approach on
personal data protection in the European Union "Two important preconditions for ensuring
that individuals enjoy a high level of data protection are the limitation of the data controllers' processing in relation to its purposes (principle of data minimisation) and the retention by data subjects of an effective control over their own data. ". In COM(2010) 609 final ,
p7.
50Doug Belshaw is one of the scholars that have developed a very interesting perspective on
what a digital literacy entails (e.g., on his book The Essential Elements of Digital Literacies).
51This echoes with the notion of critical technology accompaniment proposed by
Peter-Paul Verbeek in his chapter (pp.208-219).
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E.3. Coping with the risk of "reality theft"
With that modest attitude, it is important to rethink and actualise what
fooling means in a hyperconnected era, particularly in view of the blur-
If privacy is a pre-digital concern that needs to be transposed and translated
ring between reality and virtuality53. There are at least two facets in this
in a hyperconnected era, the risk of reality theft is a new form of concern
rethinking: (i) how do the "old" means of dealing with this issue survive in the
that needs to be addressed.
hyperconnected world and (ii) are there new issues arising?
There are circumstances where it is accepted that fooling each other is
In the pre-digital world, the distinction between an original and a copy
part of the game: for example, on the April fool’s day. It is also societally
used to be a mean to counter fooling and to help each agent distinguishing
acceptable to fool someone to his or her own advantage, for example with
"reality" from fake: in the digital world, the distinction between original and
a surprise party on his or her birthday, or else to fool someone with his or
copy has lost the realistic dimension on which it has been established. Hence,
her consent, for example in artistic performances, where it is particularly
for example, all measures that were built on this distinction need to be
appreciated when the scenary and the performance is close to reality so
fundamentally rethought in a hyperconnected world54, to avoid perpetuating
that it is credible. However, beyond these very special circumstances, socie-
outdated distinctions, which stop being effective and lead to the proliferation
ties rest on a general consensus that fooling should be avoided, and there
of an absurd complexity. This is only mentioned as an example; here is not
are many rules, institutions and infrastructures to outlaw and make life diffi-
the place for jumping to concrete policy recommendations.
cult to those trying to fool their peers. Fooling others is indeed breaching
plurality. Beyond being inherently unfair, it leads to a "suspicion of all against
Beyond the dissolution of the distinction between original and copies,
all", which prevents any form of togetherness and dissolves plurality. Fooling
the hyperconnected era expands the possibilities for “reality theft”, in the
others knowingly and purposefully results de facto in a self-exclusion from
following more fundamental way. In the pre-digital era, it is reasonably easy,
the community of peers and from the ideal public space. These considera-
for an agent, to distinguish if the environment encountered has been “made
tions hint to the fact that there is a link between trust, literacy and policy. It
up” for, or tailored to, him or her. In these early days of the hyperconnected
is part of literacy to distinguish socially acceptable fooling and unacceptable
fooling. It is also part of literacy to be equipped to cope with or resist to
53See section 3A of the Onlife Background Note, pp. 30-31.
acceptable or basic fooling tentatives. In that respect, policy and regulation
54This issue, among others, has been pointed to in a meeting discussing the societal perspective on cybersecurity http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/security/docs/societal.pdf
are only a complement to literacy and common sense.
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E.4. Artefactual nature, as a reservoir of new
beginnings
reality, where “we are all babies” when it comes to digital literacy, this distinction is much more difficult to make. Most of us are unable to distinguish if
and when the price offered in an online environment or the result of a search
depend from the use by the provider or by the search engine of personal
Another effect of the hyperconnected era is to accelerate the blurring of the
data or profiling information, or if they would be the same for anybody else.
distinction between agents, artefacts and nature, in multiple and complex
Why does it matter? Let’s compare this to a pre-digital situation by imagining
ways. This distinction, however, matters a great deal for policy-making and
the following situation: I walk around in a shopping mall and stop in front of
our living together, notably with regard to allocating rights and responsibili-
a dress I find beautiful. Imagine that the more I look at the dress the higher
ties.
the price! I would be enraged and walk away, because I have the means to
notice it. This is part of the pre-digital mix of literacy, policy and regulation.
Natality and plurality offer criteria for distinguishing agents from artefacts.
In the online environment, there is no equivalent easy and commonsensical
As proposed in section 4 above, agents are those beings with a who that
way to identify if, when the price goes up, it is because the last seats of that
matters, beings experiencing plurality, contingent beings. Artefacts are those
flight (if I am booking a flight) have been taken by others, or if it is because
beings whose identity correspond to their external and functional descrip-
the operator is making use of my desire to buy a flight ticket to raise the
tion, i.e., beings for which the who and the what are one and the same thing.
price. It is my view that people are entitled to know, when engaging on the
An artefact is the object whose function corresponds to what it was meant
web, if the result of their search or the price offered to them is making use of
for. It is fully heteronomous. Artefacts form a world whose horizon is omnis-
information about them, or not 55. It has to do with fairness and dignity, more
cience and omnipotence, for a single agent, while agents –in the plural- form
than with privacy. It is also an enabler of plurality. There may be a role for
a world whose horizon is plurality and natality.
policy-making to accompany and facilitate the deployment of an increased
digital literacy, by ensuring that agents have the mean to orient themselves
Nature is then what is beyond the control of agents, what stands in front of
in a fair way in the online sphere.
them (Gegenstand), what is to be considered as a “given” and is solid and
resistant. Nature is the reservoir of new beginnings. It includes artefacts,
sensors, even robots to the extent that they escape agents’ control, and have
become part of the environment that they have to navigate within and make
55The challenge of profiling is addressed more fully in Mireille Hildebrandt’s chapter (pp.169183).
sense of.
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For the agents, the difference between nature and artefacts becomes the
Those arguing for the need to seek more control often do so on the basis
difference between what they have to cope with and what they endorse
that failing to do so would lead us in a dangerous relativistic "anything goes"
responsibility56 for. The dividing line separating the remit of fate from the
area. The fear of this "anything goes" is ignoring –at least- three essential
remit of responsibility is changing in function of time, space, and scale or
features of the human condition, i.e., (i) that human beings are not only "goal
granularity. Practical wisdom in a hyperconnected era consists, for each
seekers", but also "meaning shapers", (ii) that control-seekers are always
agent, be they humans, organisations, or institutions, in acknowledging
short of their own expectations and sooner or later self-defeated, and (iii)
where this dividing line lies, in each life situation, and in a perspective of
that human beings have a conscience and host an inner dialogue, which is
natality and plurality.
what makes plurality possible. If, by accident, this faculty of inner dialogue,
which is nothing else but thought, would be denied and disappear so that we
would all perceive others as merely functional beings, then indeed, it would
Conclusion: the task of the day for
policy-making
be the end of the presence of human beings on earth57.
The three proposals of the Onlife Manifesto58, i.e., the relational self, the lite-
In this contribution, I have argued that acknowledging natality and embra-
racy approach, and the need to care for attention, are not "ready-made" solu-
cing plurality is a much needed stance for making sense of what happens
tions meant to solve problems in an instrumental way. They are not items
to us with the digital transition. Indeed, staying exclusively focused on an
issued from some minds to be transmitted to other minds, like packages on
omniscience/omnipotence utopia, and the control-seeking perspective perva-
a packet-switched network. They are instead proposals that can bear fruits
ding it, prevents policy-making and all other stakeholders from experiencing
only after having been metabolized by those receiving them.
freedom in this emerging hyperconnected era and from benefitting from the
societal intelligence and resilience.
The relational self denotes those in need of plurality, that is those beings
with a satiety threshold, not reducible to their attributes or to a function,
57This is one of my takes from Arendt's Eichamnn in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of
evil (1963).
56Responsibility issues are developed by Ugo Pagallo (pp.152-167) and Judith Simon
(pp.135-151) in their respective chapters.
58See the Onlife Manifesto, pp.9-10.
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and whose identity is revealed by speech and action. It points to the need
of refraining from thinking about the other selves in functional ways. The
mutual interactions of relational selves give rise to the production of new
meanings and affordances, which constitute the ground for the literacy of a
society at a given time. Policies should be in resonance with and responsive
to the development stage of that literacy. Last, attention is the best we have
to offer to each other and is what turns plurality into reality: considering
attention as a commodity to be merely captured and exchanged can only
lead to a serious deterioration, if not a dissolution, of plurality.
All this calls for policy-making to nurture a wide and inclusive understanding
of the rationale of its action: besides interests, costs and benefits, optimisation and trade-offs, a key purpose of policy-making is to adapt the regulatory framework to meanings, norms and values as they emerge and crystallise in society, and to maintain and foster a vivid sense of natality and
plurality. Indeed if, together with Arendt, we believe that the purpose of politics is freedom, it is high time to endorse and make sense of the world we
are living in; it is high time to remember humans, and anybody else claiming
an agent's status, are deemed to be equal, singular and …in need of each
other to be recognized as who they are. Generationally speaking, the task of
the "day" is to nurture a common understanding of what plurality means in a
hyperconnected era!
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Designing
the Public Sphere:
Information Technologies and
the Politics of Mediation
An initiative
of the
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Contents1
A. New technologies
A. New technologies
209
B. New relations
210
C. New mediations
212
we hardly realize that the societal and cultural revolution they are causing
D. New governance
213
has only just begun. While most of the social and political discussions regar-
E. New citizenship
216
After a few decades of living with Information and Communication Technologies, we have got so much used to their presence in our daily lives that
ding ICT still focus on privacy issues and on the impact of social media on
interpersonal relations, a whole new generation of ICTs is currently entering
the world, with potentially revolutionary impacts that require careful analysis
and evaluation.
Two examples of this new generation of technologies can illustrate this. First
of all, there is the rapid development of ‘embedded’ information technology.
ICTs are starting to merge ever more intricately with our physical environment. Walls, beds, doors, cars - many everyday objects are currently being
equipped with forms of ‘ubiquitous computing’ or ‘ambient intelligence’, as
a large electronics multinational has come to call it. Objects in our lifeworld,
in other words, are becoming intelligent. Hospital beds can detect if patients
fall out of their bed or step out of it. Doors in geriatric homes can determine
who is allowed to go outside and who is not. Cars are increasingly taking over
tasks that used to be reserved to humans like lane parking, making emergency stops, and refusing to change lanes if it is too dangerous to do so.
This intelligification of our material world will have important implications.
Public space will literally become space with a public character - it will be
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the public of our actions and interactions. And the more out environment
processes will need to be reinvented when all information is available to
becomes aware of us, the more we need to become aware of the fact that
anybody at any time. The boundaries between the public and the private will
that is the case. Moreover, intelligent objects are increasingly being equipped
need to be redefined, when a quick glance at somebody’s face reveals all
with explicitly persuasive abilities. Smart mirrors in waiting rooms of medical
their activities on the internet. Security policy, privacy legislation, commercial
doctors can give us feedback on our lifestyle when entering the waiting
activities - it is hard to imagine a sphere of society that will not be affected
room. Smart training equipment in gyms can persuade people to exercise
by the advent of augmented realities.
just a bit more.
Technologies like these, in sum, seem to put us at the dawn of a new era.
Smart websites attempt to persuade users to buy specific things, or to
While many ethical discussions regarding technology are currently focusing
become a member of specific organizations. Our material world is develo-
on the biotechnological revolution, and the convergence of nanotechnology,
ping into an active and intelligent counterpart, rather than a mute, stable
biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science, the informa-
and functional environment. At the same time, our own relation to the world
tion and communication technologies of companies like Google and Philips
is rapidly changing. With the advent of technologies like Google Glasses,
are redesigning the world. How to understand these changes? And how to
the phenomenon of ‘augmented reality’ is rapidly gaining influence. Google
evaluate them?
Glasses consist of a pair of small, transparent monitors and a camera that
can be worn as a pair of glasses. This technology provides an extra layer
B. New relations
of information about the people, objects and images one sees. It can recognize the face of people you meet, and provide all information available
about them instantaneously - without these people noticing this. It makes
Understanding the relations between humans and technologies has been one
it possible to send and receive messages that can be composed with eye
of the central activities of the philosophy of technology in the past decades.
movements, voice input, or touch. This will enable people to communicate
In mediation theory, the central idea has developed that we need to blur the
with each other people in new ways, invisible for others.
boundaries between human and technology to understand the social role
of technologies. Humans and technologies cannot be located in two sepa-
If this type of augmentations will become widespread, this will have enor-
rate realms, but need to be understood in their interrelations. At the basis
mous implications for virtually all dimensions of society. Educational
of the theory of technological mediation is the work of the North-American
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philosopher Don Ihde. Ihde analyzes the various shapes that the relations
logy / world). From this relation, technologies have an impact on our relation
between humans and technologies can take (Ihde 1990). His central thought
with the world, without being explicitly experienced themselves. An air condi-
is that technologies help to shape the relations between humans and world.
tioning that automatically switches on and off, for instance, creates a context
Whenever a technology is used, it becomes a mediator between its users and
for the experience of human beings by producing noise or creating a specific
their environment, helping to shape the character of the relations between
temperature of the room. In all of these four human-technology relations,
both.
technologies move ever further away from the human being, as it were: from
an extension of our senses to a context for our experiences.
Ihde distinguishes four forms the relations between humans and technologies can take on. As we will see, though, new information technologies like
Ihde’s analysis has made possible an entirely new direction in the philosophy
the Google Glasses urge us to expand his framework. First, there is the
of technology. Rather than investigating what ‘Technology’ does to ‘Huma-
‘embodiment relation’, schematically indicated as human - technology) -->
nity’ and ‘Society’, his approach made it possible to investigate how specific
world. In this relation, technologies are extensions of the body, as it were.
technologies mediate human actions, experiences, and interpretations.
Humans experience the world ‘through’ technologies here, as when wearing
Against the gloomy theories of alienation that have been fashionable for a
glasses or using hearing aids. A relation with the world is also possible from
long time, it now becomes possible to investigate in more detail how tech-
the ‘hermeneutic relation’, though, schematically indicated as human -->
nologies actually help to shape new relations between humans and world.
(technology - world). Some technologies give us access to the world by giving
Scientific instruments help scientists to understand reality, medical-dia-
a representation of it, that requires human interpretation in order to be
gnostic technologies help to shape interpretations of health and illness,
meaningful - hence the name ‘hermeneutic’ - like a thermometer that gives
social media reshape relations and friendships!
a number rather than a sensation of temperature, or a sonogram that gives
a visual representation of an unborn child on the basis of reflected ultra-
New information technologies like Ambient Intelligence and the Google
sonic soundwaves. A third relation is the so-called ‘alterity relation’, sche-
Glasses, though, urge us to expand this framework. Smart environments
matically indicated as human --> technology (world). In this relation there is
with ambient intelligence, for instance, are only one step ‘further away’ from
a direct interaction between humans and technologies, like when someone
the human being than the background relation - but ‘closer to us’ in another
operates a copying machine, or repairs a car. The fourth and last relation
sense. The relations we have with such enviroments can be indicated as
Ihde distinguishes is the background relation, indicated as human (techno-
‘immersion’. Schematically these relations look like human <--> technology /
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world: these technologies merge with the environment while also interacting
interferes in novel ways with the ways we live our lives. Smart environments
with their users.
with ‘ambient intelligence’ are changing the character of the spaces in which
our lives take shape. When public spaces are equipped with smart cameras
Google Glasses add a new type of relation at the other end of the spectrum.
that can detect suspicious behavior, new norms will be installed. When the
Rather than merely being ‘embodied’, it adds a second layer to our world,
doors in geriatric hospitals will have RFID chip readers, they can automati-
which is often called an ‘augmented reality’. In addition to the sensory ‘embo-
cally determine who should be allowed to go out and who does not. When
diment relation’ with the world ‘through’ the glasses, it also offers a repre-
toilets will have sensors that can detect specific substances in our urine and
sentation of the world. Technologies like this offer not one, but two parallel
feces, new norms regarding health and illness, and new regimes for health-
relations with the world. We could call this a relation of augmentation. This
care will emerge. Moreover, these ‘intelligent’ technologies can also interact
relation consists of two parallel circuits: (human - technology) --> world and
with our decision-making processes. Under the name of ‘persuasive tech-
human --> (technology - world).
nologies’, products and systems are being developed to persuade people to
behave in specific ways. School toilets can detect if children have washed
their hands when they leave and urge them to do so when they forget. Smart
C. New mediations
windows in shops can determine the direction of one’s gaze and give extra
lighting to articles that seem to interest specific people.
New information and communication technologies, to be short, create radically new relations between human beings and the world around them. Not
In the configuration of augmentation, technologies like Google Glasses have
only the structure of these relations deserves further inquiry, but also its
the potential to radically change the character of social interactions. The
implications for social relations and human existence. What do all of these
mere look at somebody else will be enough for the face recognition system
new information and communication technologies do to us, from the new
to look this person up on the internet. This will result in a drastic reconfigu-
and unanticipated relations we develop with them? I will limit myself here to
ration of the boundaries between the public and the private. All one’s private
the relations of ‘immersion’ and ‘augmentation’ that I described above.
activities that are on the internet will be much more easily accessible. And
all resulting information will be available in social interaction in an asym-
In the relation of immersion, the material environment changes from a rela-
metrical way because people cannot see if the person they meet is simul-
tively stable background of our existence into an interactive context that
taneously checking them on the internet.
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Also, the permanent availability of email, messaging services and internet
On the one hand, the advent of ‘social media’ has urged us to acknowledge
information will give us an increasing ‘double presence’ in the world. Our
how deeply intertwined our sociality has become with materiality. When
physical, bodily presence in concrete spaces and situations will increasingly
Marshall McLuhan claimed that ‘the medium is the message’, it was hardly
be accompanied by a virtual, but still bodily- sensorial presence at other
possible to foresee that the mediating power of new media would become
places, with other people, and in different situations. Our being-in-the-world,
so strong that a few decades later people would start to wonder if Google is
as Heidegger called it, is developing into a being-in-multiple-worlds.
“making us stupid” and if virtual sociality is making us be “alone together”.
On the other hand, the examples of ‘smart environments’ with ‘ambient intel-
This quick exploration of the new configurations of humans and technologies
ligence’ have shown that our material environment now has unprecedented
shows that their implications are enormous. New information technologies
social capacities, persuading us to behave in specific ways, or reorganizing
will install new norms for human behavior have a political impact on how
the character of public spaces.
we interact in public space, help to shape the quality of interpersonal interactions, and so on and so forth. No realm of human existence will remain
Information technologies have made the boundaries between the social
unaffected. Our lives will be mediated in radically novel ways.
subject and the material object more porous than ever before. Social relations appear to be thoroughly mediated by technologies, while new tech-
At the same time, it is often hard to anticipate these mediations because
nologies appear to have a profound social dimension. This situation is a
information technologies also challenge the frameworks by which we have
serious challenge, not only for our metaphysical frameworks, but also for our
come to understand ourselves and the world we live in. Ever since the
self-understanding and for our ethical and approaches to technology. How
Enlightenment, we have understood ourselves as relatively autonomous
are we going to deal with this new situation?
subjects in a world of objects that we can investigate, manipulate, and
appreciate. But the self-evidence of this metaphysical framework - in which
D. New governance
subjects have intentions and freedom, while objects are passive and mute
- is rapidly fading away, now that information and communication technologies have started to challenge it seriously.
The blurring of the boundaries between humanity and technology that new
ICTs are bringing about has serious implications for our ethical and political
reflection. Implicit in many ethical approaches to technology, and especially
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regarding invasive technologies like ICTs, after all, is the model of a struggle
human. Rather than opposing them and putting all our efforts in resistance
between humans and technologies. While some technological developments
and protest, we should develop a productive interaction with them.
can be beneficial, this view holds, others compose a threat to humanity, and
therefore the role of ethicists is to assess if technologies are morally accep-
But how can such an interaction still be critical, when the boundaries
table or not.
between humans and technologies disappear? If human practices and experiences are always technologically mediated, there cannot be an ‘outside’
In ethical and political discussions regarding ICTs, the theme of the ‘Panop-
position with respect to technology. And if there is no outside anymore, from
ticon’ often plays an important role. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s analysis of
where could we criticize technology?
Jeremy Bentham’s prison design - a dome with a central watchtower from
which all prisoners can be observed without them knowing if they are being
To be sure, such a hybrid understanding of humans and technologies does
watched or not - some people fear that ICTs are creating a panoptic society
not imply that all roles of technology in human existence are equally desi-
in which privacy becomes ever more problematic, and in which asymmetrical
rable, and that human beings should redefine themselves as powerless
power relations can flourish.
victims of the power of technology. It does imply, though, that the ‘opposition
model’ of humanity and technology might not be the most productive model
However important it is to develop and maintain a critical attitude toward
if one wants to change undesirable configurations of humans and techno-
new information and communication technologies, this model of a ‘struggle’
logies. Ethics should not focus on determining which technologies should
between technology and society is still based on the very dualist metaphy-
be allowed and which should not. Technological development will continue,
sics of subject versus object that ICTs themselves have outdated by reconfi-
and human existence will change with it. Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur
guring the boundaries between subjects and objects, as described above.
in illis: the times are changing, and we change in them. The main focus of
When human beings cannot be understood in isolation from technology,
ethics, therefore, should not be on the question if we should accept specific
and vice versa, approaching their relation in terms of struggle and threat,
technologies or not, but on the quality of new intertwinements of humans
therefore, is like giving a moral evaluation of gravity, or language. It does not
and technologies.
make much sense to be ‘against’ them because they form the basis of our
existence. Technologies have always helped to shape what it means to be
In order to articulate such an alternative model for ethics, it is helpful to
connect to the later work of Foucault. In his lecture ‘What is Enlightenment?’
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(Foucault 1997a), Foucault develops an alternative account of the pheno-
Foucault reinterprets critique - the ‘enlightened’ activity par excellence -
menon of ‘critique’. Foucault is looking for an answer to what he calls ‘the
as a form of practical self-inquiry. Critique means: investigating what has
blackmail of the Enlightenment’. This blackmail consists in the pressure that
made us the beings that we are, what conditions our existence and what
is exerted upon those who want to criticize the Enlightenment, because all
has shaped our current way of living. And, most importantly, it does not take
their attempts are typically explained as being either ‘against’ the Enlighten-
place from an ‘outside’ position, but can only happen on the basis of positio-
ment. Anyone who dares to do open this discussion immediately raises the
ning ourselves ‘at the limit’. The human subject, after all, is always situated
suspicion of being against rationality, democracy, and scientific inquiry.
within the world to which it has a relation, and therefore critique can never
Foucault, however, explores if an alternative understanding of Enlightenment
come from outside. We can never step out of the networks of relations that
would be possible. This exploration is of utmost importance in the context of
help to shape our existence, to phrase it in a Latourian way. But this does not
the ethics of technology as well. Blurring the boundaries between humans
imply that we have to give up on critical reflection and self-reflection.
and technologies, after all, can easily be explained as giving up on ethics:
because there is no clear boundary to be defended anymore, it might seem
Foucault’s alternative account of Enlightenment offers an interesting escape
that ‘anything goes’. Therefore, an alternative model for ethics needs to be
from the specific shape the blackmail of the Enlightenment has taken on in
developed. Foucault’s answer, however trivial it may seem, is to reinterpret
the ethics of technology. The fundamental intertwinement of human beings
Enlightenment as an attitude, rather than the beginning of a new era. For
and information technologies implies that the frameworks from which we
Kant, as Foucault explains, Enlightenment was primarily a way out of “imma-
criticize technologies are always mediated by these technologies themselves.
turity”: using “reason” rather than accepting “someone else’s authority to
We can never step out of the mediations in which we are involved. The most
lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for” (Foucault 1997a, 305).
far we can get is: at the limits of the situation we are in. Standing at the
This requires critique: only critique can tell us under which conditions “the use
borders, recognizing the technologically mediated character of our existence,
of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must
our interpretations and judgments, our practices and preferences, we can
be done, and what may be hoped” (Foucault 1997a, 308). But for Foucault,
investigate the nature and the quality of these mediations: where do they
critique must not be understood as an attempt to transcend the world - as
come from, what do they do, could they be different?
Kant did - but as an attitude of always looking for the limits of what seems
to be given and self-evident.
Rather than letting ourselves be blackmailed by the Enlightenment - fearing
that the boundary-blurring between technology and society would make
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it impossible to have a reasonable and normative discussion about tech-
technology and to ‘protect’ humanity against technological invasions with a
nology - there is an alternative possibility for the ethics of technology. Not
more modest ambition to ‘govern’ technological developments by engaging
the assessment of technological developments ‘from outside’ is the central
actively with their social and existential implications.
goal of ethical reflection then, but rather its accompaniment ‘from within’, to
borrow a concept from the Belgian philosopher Gilbert Hottois (Hottois 1996).
E. New citizenship
The crucial question in such a form of ‘ethical technology accompaniment’ is
not so much how we should impose ‘limits’ to technological developments,
This critical accompaniment of ICTs can only take shape in concrete practices
but rather how we can deal in responsible ways with the ongoing intertwi-
of design, use, and implementation, in which human beings can get critically
nement of humans and technologies. The limit-attitude leads to an ethical
involved in how technologies mediate their existence. A critical way of using
approach that is not preoccupied with the question of whether a given tech-
information technologies then become ‘ascetic’ practices in which human
nology is morally acceptable or not, but that is directed at improving the
beings explicitly anticipate technological mediations, and appropriate tech-
quality of our lives, as lived with technology. Standing at the limits of what
nologies in creative ways in order to give their mediated existence a desirable
mediates our existence, we can evaluate the quality of these mediations
shape. At the same time, the design of information technology becomes an
‘from within’, and actively engage in reshaping these mediations and our own
inherently moral activity in which designers do not only develop technological
relations toward them.
artefacts, but also the social impacts that come with it. And policy-making
activities regarding the implementation of new technologies become ways of
This does not imply, to be sure, that all mediations are equally desirable, and
governing our technologically mediated world.
that we can never reject technologies. Rather it implies that ethics needs to
engage more deeply with actual technological artifacts and practices. Giving
Let me return to one of the examples I gave at the beginning of this contri-
up on an external position does not require us to give up all critical distance,
bution in order to elaborate how this critical accompaniment of technologies
it only prevents us from overestimating the distance we can take. An ethics
could be a fruitful form of ethical and political reflection on technology. As
of ‘technology accompaniment’ rather than ‘technology assessment’ should,
indicated above, one of the most salient aspects of the Google Glasses is
in fact, be seen as a form of ‘governing’ the impact technology can have on
its impact on interpersonal relations. Its ‘doubling’ of the relations between
one’s existence and on society. It replaces the modernist ambition to ‘steer’
humans and world adds a second layer to the communication between
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people, which remains invisible to the other person. When two people meet,
meaning of a quick glimpse at each other’s face in public spaces will change
they cannot see which information the other has available about them.
forever because everybody knows that the Google Glasses enables people to
Google’s search engine might reveal private information on the basis of face
look right through each other. Dealing with implications like this is not only a
recognition software, or it might confuse the person with somebody else.
challenge for users, but also requires the attention of designers and policy
Because this parallel information is only available for the person wearing
makers.
the glasses, an asymmetry comes about that makes open communication
more difficult and that radically transforms the character of public spaces
Designers should be more aware of the mediations that can occur when
and public life.
people use the glasses, in order to make a responsible design. This requires
experimentation, and creative redesign. When, for instance, one of the
Dealing with this new technology requires more than asking oneself the
main problems appears to be the possibility that somebody secretly checks
question if we should allow it to be applied in society, and if so, under which
someone’s face on the internet, it could be important to introduce a little
conditions. Rather than aiming for a ‘yes’ or 'no', ethical reflection should
warning light that gives a signal when the face recognition system is on. This
ask itself how this technology could get a desirable place in society. And for
would partly reduce the hidden character of what the glasses can do, and
answering this question, we need to think through the ethical dimensions of
therefore restore part of the symmetry that this technology takes away.
the design, implementation, and use of this technology.
Another option could be to redesign the software in such a way that it can
First of all, in the context of use, people will have to develop critical and
only activate face recognition when looking each other explicitly in the eyes
creative ways to appropriate this technology, and to integrate it in their daily
for more than five seconds. When people engage in this form of contact,
lives. Typically, people develop codes of use for dealing with technologies
they have reached a level of intimacy that is far beyond the regular quick
that have an impact on social life - just like it has gradually become normal
exchange of looks in public spaces. Designs like this can make it possible
that people do not answer incoming calls on their cell phones when they are
to remain relatively anonymous in public spaces, while making contact with
in a conversation, for instance. An obvious code that could develop would be
each other might also become more easy when both parties are open to that
that people put off their Google Glasses when they are in a conversation,
and allow more substantial eye contact.
to prevent that your conversation partner is searching information about
you on the internet, or is checking his or her email simultaneously. Still, the
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Also the character of the information that is revealed should be part of the
This requires, thirdly, new policy-making activities. If the main question
design of the technology. Google could give (or be obliged to give) people an
remains if we should or should not allow technologies like the Google Glasses
active role in determining their profile that becomes visible when their face
to be introduced in our society, we lose the possibility to address the quality
is recognized and looked up - just like the profile people are now making
of its social implications. At the same time, a blind and unregulated introduc-
of themselves on social media like Facebook or LinkedIn. In this way, people
tion of this technology in society would throw away the possibility of critical
would have more control over the ways in which they are present and visible
reflection and governance. The central question for policy-making activities
in public spaces, comparable to the impression people make on others in real
is how the Google Glasses can be embedded in society in good ways. Gover-
life, on the basis of, for instance, their behavior, the way they dress, and the
nance and regulation should focus on the quality of this embedding, rather
reputation they have.
than on the permission for it. This, inevitably, requires experimentation that
makes it possible to find the right balance between openness for change
Beside this, users should learn to deal with the effects the Google Glasses
and preservation of what we find valuable. We will need to ask questions
will have on their relations with other people - both when they wear the
like: which information should be disclosed and which not? Which aspects
glasses and when they are being watched with it. It will not be very difficult to
of ourselves belong to the private realm and which do not? And who has the
realize that other people might have all kinds of information available about
power to decide on that? Should people have the right to adapt the profile
you when they look at you. But that awareness should also grow regarding
that is connected to their visual appearance? How can the design of the
all activities people undertake on the internet. The Google Glasses integrate
Google Glasses embody the central values in our society? And how can users
the public space of the internet with public spaces ‘in real life’. This implies
be equipped optimally to integrate the Google Glasses in their daily lives in
a rearrangement of the boundaries between the public and the private, and
responsible ways?
the coming about of a new public space - as has happened before by other
media like the newspaper, the radio, and the television. Rather than merely
The information revolution has only just begun. The boundaries between
resisting and opposing the negative aspects of this development, we will also
human beings and information technologies are blurring ever more rapidly.
need to develop new forms of citizenship and citizenship education. Codes
This requires a normative framework that gives up the idea that we need to
of conduct and etiquette will have to develop, just like they exist in public
control technologies from outside, on the basis of a set of pre-given criteria.
spaces already now.
Rather, we need to develop ever better ways to understand how information
technologies affect us, and to get explicitly get involved in that process by
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critically designing, embedding and using information technologies from the
perspective of their mediating powers in human existence and our technological society.
- 219 -
Creative
From
Commons
To Civilized Commons:
The Need for an
Onlife Manifesto
An initiative
of the
Sarah Oates
Contents1
Background note
Background note
221
A. The need for a public agora 224
B. Towards A European Onlife Bill of Rights?
226
conviction that the internet is both unfettered by the norms of capitalism
C. Digital ‘Bill of Rights’ 227
and can bring fundamental political change to the globe is not surprising. The
From Creative Commons to Civilized Commons
231
References
233
realities about the way in which the digital world tends to reinforce the poli-
List of Manifestoes and Declarations Relating to Online Sphere
234
tical and economic status-quo, people still broadly ascribe open and disinte-
There is an astonishing gap between how people perceive internet ‘freedom’
and the realities of the digital sphere in the 21st century. The mistaken
internet was fostered by an unprecedented amount of social capital as well
as provides unique ways for humans to interact. In the face of some grim
rested roles to this communication sphere. It is possible that the internet still
can provide the type of support to human capital that was present to a large
degree in its early days within the research community. However, if we do not
acknowledge that the digital world has become largely colonized by market
and political forces, then it will be too late to preserve the essential social
value of the internet. It is important to articulate what is unique and important about being human in the digital age – and how the central positive
aspects can be preserved in the interests of the citizens, rather than for the
demands of states or corporations. This led the Onlife initiative to attempt to
articulate the key challenges to promote and protect citizen interests in the
digital era.
An examination of various ‘manifestoes’ and other documents that articulate rights (and responsibilities) in the online sphere show a wide range of
norms and ideals (see Table 1 for a sample list). However, a conviction that
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resonates through many of these declarations is the idea that the internet
lutionary ideas of the repudiation of the traditional ideas of both property
can fundamentally change how humans (and, by association, states) relate
and sovereignty are important, in that the internet does create the need
to one another. For example, Cyberspace and the American Dream states
to re-conceptualize traditional ideas about both property and sovereignty.
that the “powers of mind are everywhere ascendant over the brute force of
However, unsurprisingly for a Western-trained political scientist, I also call for
things” and implies that this is a shift in power away from traditional poli-
perspective in thinking about how the twin concepts of property and soverei-
tical institutions: “It also spells the death of the central institutional para-
gnty – the pillars of the modern Western state – are challenged by the online
digm of modern life, the bureaucratic organization. (Governments, including
sphere. There are three key points.
the American government, are the last great redoubt of bureaucratic power
on the face of the planet, and for them the coming change will be profound
1. It isn’t useful to talk about the ‘offline’ and the ‘online’ world any longer.
and probably traumatic.)” Even more striking is John Barlow’s A Declaration
We the Web Kids makes this point in relation more to the social habits of
of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), which identifies the internet as
the younger generation, but it’s a valid point throughout society as the
a completely new and different way of being human: “I ask you of the past
web is “not something external to reality but a part of it: an invisible yet
to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty
constantly present layer intertwined with the physical environment … The
where we gather.” The identification of the idea of ‘sovereignty’ is very useful,
Web is a process, happening continuously and continuously transforming
in that in many cases people are declaring that the norms of the internet
before our eyes; with us and through us. Technologies appear and then
are something new and different that transcend sovereignty and laws, some
dissolve in the peripheries, websites are built, they bloom and then pass
‘hacker’ manifestoes going so far as to redefine a ‘hacker’ as someone who
away, but the Web continues, because we are the Web; we, communica-
is reconfiguring not just a code, but society itself.
ting with one another in a way that comes naturally to us, more intense
and more efficient than ever before in the history of mankind.” Thus, it is
Overall, the comment in Cyberspace and the American Dream that “the
no longer useful to talk about the internet as though it were a separate
challenge is as daunting as the opportunity is great” is very compelling. The
universe. It is interwoven with human existence, with all the affordances
unique properties of the internet – the ability to transcend national borders,
and drawbacks this may bring.
to create content with virtually no economic barriers, to communicate instantaneously, for many-to-many networking – indeed do create great opportunity. But what opportunity and for whom? I will suggest that these revo-
- 222 -
2. The power of the nation-state (sovereignty) still matters immensely to the
3. Capitalism (property) remains a powerful force. This might seem like a
daily lives of citizens. It is pointless to pretend that the internet converges
very obvious statement, but it is a point that is absent from many of
the world in some way that erases thousands of years of history and
the manifestoes or discussions about internet rights. One manifesto (A
power politics. There is a stubborn (albeit commendable) attachment to
Crowd-sourced Declaration of Rights) even suggests that copyright can be
the idea that freedom is a global norm. It’s not – about half the people on
construed as a violation of online user rights. This is not the place for a
this planet live in non-free states in which their rights as human beings
discussion of the relative merits of societies that base order on the rights
are not recognized, much less protected.1 In terms of freedom of speech,
of property (see the writings of John Locke or the Communist Mani-
it’s even worse – Freedom House estimates that only 15 percent of the
festo) but one must acknowledge that property rights are a key element
world’s population live in countries that have free media. Thus, the recom-
of society (both national and international). As the internet has evolved,
mendation in reports such as those by the UN special rapporteur (see
it has become part of this property-based system, particularly in that
Table 1) that calls for the internet to operate as an engine for free speech
online activity is now increasingly monetized. Interestingly, the perception
in countries that lack protection for free speech altogether is commen-
of ‘property’ as it relates to the online manifestoes is mostly discussed in
dable, but completely unfeasible. One cannot expect states that seek
terms of copyright. The far more interesting and significant point about
power as a survival mechanism to cede the power of the internet comple-
property relates to ownership of personal data. Personal data, created as
tely to its citizens or – worse yet – to powers outside of the borders. It
people both interact and create content online, is a very valuable commo-
would be naïve and pointless to pretend that information and its control
dity and one upon which large corporations such as Google are based.
is not a critical part of how states acquire and maintain power.
While acknowledging the origins of the internet as particularly collaborative
and detached from economic or national concerns, it must be acknowledged
that the world has moved on. A more utopian view of the World Wide Web
did not stand up scrutiny in a recent introductory class in journalism at the
University of Maryland. Students were presented with a list of principles for
the WWW from their text, which included the idea that information of all
1 According to the U.S.-based non-governmental organization Freedom House, see http://
www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Population%20Bar%20Graph.pdf
kinds should be available through the same web window, users should be
able to link to any document in any space, there is no central control of the
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A. The need for a public agora
web, and that web software should be available free to anyone who wants to
use it (Hanson, p. 353). The freshmen were not so much skeptical as puzzled;
as budding journalists they viewed the web as a platform for their future
One of the implications of the idea of agora is that of the literal transla-
work rather than a utopian place free of the rules of the marketplace. At the
tion from the Greek as “marketplace”. As Hindman notes, most of the activity
same time, they very much agreed with one of the stated principles, that the
that takes place in the online sphere is commercial, as opposed to political
“web should be a tool not just for information but also for collaboration (inte-
or philosophical. At the same time, the internet is dominated by commer-
raction AND publication).” They are indeed the ‘Web Kids’ described by Piotr
cial entities, namely Google, Facebook and other internet-service providers.
Czerski in We the Web Kids (listed in Table 1): They don’t view the internet
Although these corporations arguably pursue a ‘norm’ of public service, in
as something separate or different from their daily lives. As such, while they
point of fact they are run as commercial entities and, as such, are ultima-
enjoy an unprecedented ability to access information and communicate, they
tely answerable to their owners or shareholders. To expect them to maintain
do this within the context of being young, American college students. There is
social good at the expense of corporate responsibility (i.e. profit for sharehol-
no ‘other’ sphere.
ders) would be irrational. In addition, internet-service providers must follow
the laws, even if they are repressive, in the countries in which they operate.
With these three key principles in mind – the fusion of offline/online spheres,
This tends to negate any democratizing potential of ICTs or even turn them
the continued dominance of the nation-state, and the colonization of the
into agents for state security forces (Karp, 2009). At the same time, states
online sphere by commercial forces – the Onlife initiative set out to iden-
are much more aggressively ‘colonizing’ the internet, as they increasingly
tify key concerns relating to being human in the digital age. At issue is the
abandon attempts at control and pursue co-optation of the online sphere
control of the online sphere, which holds the potential for either a new epoch
(Deibert et al., 2010). This includes the provision of paid workers to comment
of citizen-led work, life and play facilitated and enhanced by the ICTs – or the
in social-networking sites and even websites that closely resemble NGO or
development of the virtual sphere as another tool for elite commercial and
interest group sites, but in fact re-direct citizens to state-controlled informa-
political power. The following sections attempt to articulate concrete steps to
tion. This is in addition to digital spying that allows states to monitor, mani-
preserve the former.
pulate and even destroy opposition groups.
One of the key barriers to combating the erosion of a public marketplace of
ideas has been the failure to acknowledge its value and resource as a public
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good. In particular from the events of the Arab Spring, it has become clear
rather the media should present balanced news that attempts to support
that the ‘online public’ offers a new generation of democracy. This is due to
the civic sphere. This means that British television attempts to mediate the
the ability of the internet to inform, network and mobilize citizens, even in
world for the viewers, such as by discussing the motivations of Jihadi suicide
the face of a closed media and an authoritarian regime (Howard, 2011). Yet,
bombers or why social services fail to spot child abuse. There is a recognition
this online political capital remains elusive and conditional; there are still
that while adult media consumers have the right to be informed, they also
more examples of failures than victories of the online sphere in the progres-
have the right to not be bombarded with negative or disturbing images and
sion of democracy. Much of the discussion about the internet and democracy
information that is not contextualized.
has rested on the idea of the digital divide (Norris, 2001), which stresses
the necessity of internet access for democracy. However, the idea of access
If the same ideas are applied to the online sphere, it is clear that the current
misses the rather larger point about what people find once they reach the
European regulatory environment is a curious mismatch with the existing
online sphere. To return to the idea of the public agora, of what use is it to
norms of mainstream media. It is fair to point out that the internet has a
consumers if they enter a marketplace in which all the prices are fixed and
range of features that do not exist in the traditional media, namely the
goods are shoddy (such as in the Soviet Union)?
way in which information can be transmitted instantaneously among many
citizens with virtually no regard for filters, cost or national boundaries. The
Once there is a consideration of environment in the online sphere, rather than
standard response to this would be that the online sphere is ineluctable. Due
just the consumer that is the focus of the digital divide, it is possible to apply
to its lack of boundaries and definitions (it is simultaneously deeply private
existing policy and theory about media environment to the internet in order
via Email and intensely public via social-networking), it cannot be regulated
to safeguard a public agora from being subsumed by an agora controlled
in the same way as the traditional mass media. What I am arguing here is
by commercial or repressive state forces. As Hallin and Mancini note (2003),
that although it may appear to be ineluctable, the online agora is a precious
Europe has a strong focus on public or state media as a central part of gover-
public resource. Currently, it is being colonized by corporations and states, in
nance (as opposed to the United States, in which the commercial media are
ways that asymmetrically reassign the power of information and personal
seen as healthy part of a liberal state). Thus, while Americans might accept
data to the elites. What is needed is an understanding that a public agora
the libertarian view of the online marketplace, it would not be reflective of
should be conceptualized and protected in a way that tips the balance away
European media norms. As the British Public Service Model emphasizes, the
from the elites and toward the citizens. This is a fundamental step in esta-
media should not pander to the noisy needs of business or sensationalism;
blishing European rights to life, work and play in the information society.
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same when we discuss defining the limits between the personal and the
B. Towards A European Onlife Bill of Rights?
public. While these limits differ among various European countries and
citizens, it is possible to articulate social norms and regulations. And these
European citizens live in a ‘fog of data’ in the digital age. On the one hand,
norms should be articulated rather than left to chance.
the digital age augments life by giving individuals direct access to information and networks that previously were limited by physical or practical
Let me briefly digress to highlight an example of how this may work. There
barriers. On the other hand, as Stefana Broadbent and Claire Lobet-Maris
are several debates relating to the digital age and university education. An
wrote for the Onlife project (pp.105-107), the advent of the digital age has
early one was over whether academic staff should be obliged to have Email
eroded barriers between individual and self in new and challenging ways. In
addresses. This now sounds ridiculous, but this was a point debated about 15
practical terms, this raises concerns about data and identity theft. In more
years ago in my own department. Despite much discussion, no decision was
philosophical terms, this means significant challenges for people in nego-
taken (an unsurprising results for faculty meetings). However, it gradually
tiating a balance between different aspects of what it means to be human.
became untenable to try to remain off line when most colleagues and all
In particular, this raises problems in terms of preserving different levels of
students were on line, although as recently as five years ago older collea-
privacy as the digital presence merges various identities – including student,
gues still had significant problems using Email. At my former university in
teacher, worker, lover, child, sibling, parent, etc. – into a single visible entity.
Scotland, we started running all course administration through an online
As Broadbent and Lobet-Maris write, “The individual is always visible and
interface a few years ago. However, students still refused to use the elec-
transparent, open to the view of all.” This creates enormous stress on indivi-
tronic bulletin boards on the site, although they will routinely Email staff.
duals, in particular due to the lack of “unclear social norms and regulations.”
Interestingly, the same has been true of my American students as well. In
other words, students like the convenience of Email, but dislike the openness
But does it have to be this way? Without getting bogged down in a philo-
of asking questions on a web forum that all their classmates can see.
sophical discussion of the power of technology versus the will of Man, it is
possible to set out tenets that can help individuals to negotiate the digital
In addition, my Scottish university had not set rules about whether academic
landscape. In some ways, these can parallel how society negotiates issues
staff can – or even should – ‘friend’ students on Facebook as it was not
surrounding information in society in general. While the digital age brings
on the radar of university management by 2011. In the normal course of
challenges in new forms, the questions for humankind are essentially the
events, the relationship between academic staff and students is not a diffi-
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cult one to manage. There are strong British norms in place that dictate that
corporations and governments have, so far, been more effective at harves-
academic staff should have a professional, albeit hopefully cordial and even
ting information than protecting the rights of individuals. In addition – and
approachable, relationship with their students. This means that it is abso-
this is a more subtle and less discussed point -- individuals are vulnerable
lutely acceptable for a student to send an academic staff Email with ques-
to a range of factors in the digital age. Broadbent and Lobet-Maris define
tions about a course or an essay, but that it is not acceptable to send them
this (in part) within the frame of attention. Attention has become ‘mone-
links to pornographic videos (or for staff to do the same). Some academic
tized’ so that we are constantly playing the dual role as attention-consumer
staff may choose to ‘friend’ students virtually once they have graduated,
and attention-attractor in order to maintain or promote our place in life. Yet,
although friending them while they are still undergraduates and under the
there is more to being human in the digital age than a sort of meter that
technical guidance of the academic would be questionable. The problem
monitors the amount of attention we can attract in a crowded digital sphere.
is, as highlighted by Broadbent and Lobet-Maris, that in a sphere in which
We should not be reduced to our online rating, as measured through our
technology continues to erode the distance between Sarah-Oates-as-pro-
number of Facebook friends, Twitter followers, position in the Googlearchy,
fessor and Sarah-Oates-as-person, one needs clear norms and/or guidance.
etc. Individuals need to recognise that they should have agency and choice
Guidance was not forthcoming at this and many other universities, so indi-
in the online sphere and that they should have structures in place to support
viduals were left to negotiate these issues on their own. And they tended to
this agency and choice.
come up with different norms, often depending on the age of the academic.
Younger academics have fewer issues with the limitations between self and
C. Digital ‘Bill of Rights’
profession. While this can be viewed as positive in getting rid of stuffiness
and a cavalier attitude toward students by some, it can breed a dangerous
environment in which emotionally fragile students mistake professional rela-
How can we articulate these thoughts into principles for policy? The following
tionships for personal relationships (or fragile staff do the same). The rules
ideas were developed during the Onlife meetings from discussions at the first
need to be debated and articulated, not left to evolve fragmentally to spawn
workshops.
a situation in which no one is doing right and no one doing wrong.
I.
Everyone has the right to privacy. When attention is monetized through
What this example highlights, is that it isn’t useful or fair to leave negotiating
the constant harvesting of online personal activity and data, we lose
the evolving digital landscape to the individual. In part, this is structural as
privacy. When states chose to monitor citizens in the online sphere,
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we lose privacy. The ongoing argument to support the harvesting of
what is acceptable radicalized discourse in the online sphere. While
personal data has been that it is a contract between the internet-service
this is a part of a wider debate about the state, the public and infor-
provider and the individual, i.e. if you use Google or Facebook, you are
mation in the post 9/11 world, the harvesting of online data so radi-
allowing your data to be tracked in order to use the service. States use
cally realigns the power relationship between the harvester and the
a variety of arguments to support harvesting online information (either
subjects that this debate becomes much more pressing and urgent.
openly or covertly), ranging from a need to better respond to citizens
to anti-terrorism efforts. There are two fundamental problems with this
II. Individuals own their own data. This is a bold statement, in that the
‘contract’. First, there is evidence that ISPs as well as governments have
business model of many ISPs is based on the harvesting and sale of
not been clear with consumers or citizens about the way in which the
data to advertisers. This is not to suggest that ISPs could be stopped
data is tracked and used, creating a digital profile for users. Secondly,
from collecting individual data, but the idea of the right to one’s data
there is a widespread lack of individual awareness of how the private
should be considerably strengthened. There can be two views here
becomes permanently public in the digital age, which is reflected in the
that are compatible within the idea that individuals own their own data
way that people post information, images, video, etc. that are dama-
and the public own public data. In a cooperative move with ISPs, the
ging to themselves and others. In this way, individuals create perma-
data can be shared. For example, Google makes public a great deal
nent profiles of themselves that they cannot delete (or refute). Imagine
of its aggregate data via Google Analytics in an attempt to show the
a permanent record (with photos and video!) of all the stupid things you
value of search data in informing economic, social and political life.
did as a teenager. Or better yet, when you were drunk and a teenager.
However, Google does not make its data archive linked to individuals
public unless forced to do so by national laws – and as shown by its
There is a slightly more compelling argument that the state should
withdrawal from China, Google will resist this where possible. In a more
be able to react to obvious threats to state security that are visible in
pro-active approach, society can choose to block or severely limit the
the online sphere. However, as a U.S. Supreme Court justice once said,
way in which individuals are monitoring by ISPs. The United Kingdom
freedom of speech should only end when you stand up and yell ‘fire’ in
has moved in this direction last year by requiring ISPs to inform users
a crowded theatre, i.e. you should only lose the right to free discourse
about cookies and having users ‘opt in’ instead of ‘opt out’. The notion of
if you are creating a clear and present danger. In other words, there
informed consent imposed by law is an important and a useful direction.
should be a defined limit or test for what is state security risk and
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enthusiasm for it varies, but it’s not really optional. A college student
III. Everyone has a right to a personal life. This is linked to the issue of
who is not on Facebook (this appears to be shifting to Twitter but this
privacy as discussed above, but it is somewhat different. No one should
is a subject for a different essay) would be socially and academically
have to friend on line a teacher, student, co-worker, client, etc. There
isolated, missing the communication and even links to critical infor-
should be clear delineation between what is an online business/educa-
mation for study. Broadbent and Lobet-Maris also are correct to point
tion tool and what is a social/personal tool. Part of this is an issue of
out that a new digital divide emerges when management can remain
ISP design. Facebook, created by U.S. college students, is based on
online throughout a working day and workers cannot. This is the new
the American ideal of ‘networking’ in which personal and professional
type of digital divide that warrants attention and concern. The issue of
relationships are encouraged to merge. However, as has so often been
the timing and control of access should be considered in more depth.
the case with online interfaces, the sheer scale and scope of Facebook
has intensified this relationship in unhelpful ways (coupled with the
V. Switching off sometimes should be encouraged – and cultivated. Here, I
toxic need for attention that drives many people to compulsively post
will avoid tedious arguments that many parents (and professors) make
minute information about their personal lives on line). It has created
that specific environments such as the dinner table or the classroom
the ‘perfect storm’ to erode the boundaries between the personal and
would be enriched if there were no internet connection. As noted in
professional. And much like the academics who get complaints when
earlier meetings of the Onlife project, the internet has become a sort
they won’t ‘friend’ students on Facebook because other colleagues
of external brain for a lot of people. It has the ability to stimulate and
do so, it is deeply exacerbated by a dearth of norms. However, the
delight through access to information and people, supporting us in our
fundamental principle that you have a right to a personal life is key.
quest to be better informed as well as through enriching relationships.
However, this is where the point made about attention by Broadbent
IV. No one should have to switch off completely to protect himself or
and Lobet-Maris (pp. 100-105) is so important. We need to cultivate the
herself. Here the argument (particularly from the older generation) is
ability to pay attention and concentrate, as it is becoming a lost art.
that one can simply opt out of social networking or the online sphere
This type of focused attention is still necessary, in particular to learning
in general. This is almost impossible for a broad swathe of the popula-
and close relationships. Perhaps it isn’t so much about ‘switching off’ as
tion. For example, my students clearly use social networking to commu-
withdrawing from the public to private, as discussed in earlier points.
nicate with their peers at school and manage relationships. The level of
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VI. There should be ‘third spaces’ that are owned and regulated by the
reflect the divide between Democrats and Republican, who are typically more
European public. Again, here we have an issue in which the American
at odds over social values than economic issues. Despite this polarity – or
model of communication has come to dominate in Europe and it doesn’t
perhaps because of it – blogs are a particularly vibrant part of the U.S. news
really fit. In particular, Facebook operates under the U.S. libertarian
discussion, often quoted or even breaking political stories in their own right.
system, in which there is little distinction among the commercial, the
Online new sources have become popular, not just as elite influencers, but
private and the state in terms of information production and dissemi-
as news outlets themselves. Thus, the United States has more developed, if
nation. Americans reject the notion of the state as the instrument of
at times polarized, online political discourse than European countries such
social and political change; rather, they view the state as the hand-
as the United Kingdom. The question remains whether this is one of culture
maiden of the wishes of the public. While there is a lot of evidence that
or – as Scott Wright would argue – one of design. Wright, who has studied
the U.S. state is bigger, more powerful and more redistributive than the
the effect of different online formats on the nature of discussion, argues that
common American believes it to be, it also means that Americans are
online deliberation can be ‘engineered’ by particular web interfaces (2012).
quite comfortable with the fusion of commercial and political power in
Left to chance and/or the market, these deliberative spaces do not arise.
the information sphere. The same is not true of Europeans. European
This is in part because political interaction and discussion form only a very
countries have created either public or state broadcasting systems, as
small part of what people do on line. However, Wright’s research has found
well as tend to have a greater emphasis on the state’s role in inculcating
that when given opportunity and motivation, people are ready and willing to
public debate. This means that U.S.-designed internet interfaces and
discuss political issues and mobilise on line in the United Kingdom.
norms of data openness are not appropriate. It suggests that European
states (or the EU itself) need to be more pro-active in creating a public
The idea of an engineered online ‘agora’ is particularly important during a
‘agora’ in which citizens can debate and discuss political ideas in a less
period of crisis. My own research and that of others has found that online
polarized way, as well as in a way that is more supportive of European
discussion becomes more intense – and much more closely linked to offline
democracy at the national or Union level.
manifestations ranging from elections to protests – in times of political crisis.
As the Euro crisis comes to a head in Europe, where is the common space for
Here, one could reflect on some evidence surrounding political debate, parties
Europeans – as opposed to citizens of individual nations – to discuss and
and elections in the United States. As Richard Davis points out in his study of
debate these issues in a rational manner? At an even more fundamental
U.S. political blogs, influential blogs in the United States are partisan. They
level, where is the common space in which authoritative information about
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debt, taxation, fairness, rules and consequences can be exchanged among
However, there has been a lot of talk about internet ‘revolutions’, whether
a European public? The current coverage of the Euro crisis is, unsurpri-
it is the ‘Twitter Revolution’ in Iran in 2009 or the ‘Facebook Revolution’ in
singly, framed through the lens of national media. As a result, the public are
Egypt in 2011. While many of the manifestoes discussed above (especially
woefully uninformed – or even misinformed – about the information and
Barlow’s) describe the internet in revolutionary terms vis-à-vis power redis-
issues at stake. As in any disputed, nationalistic information sphere (think
tribution from existing elites to the masses, the twin forces of national power
Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia), there is no real accepted reality.
and commercial online dominance make that unlikely. Yet, there are enough
As a result, it is enormously difficult to discuss the issue in a ‘European’ way.
elements of the initial forces that shaped the internet to make it a social tool
that is unlike anything that has come before. An overlooked element of the
internet is speed – its ability to communicate instantly among many without
From Creative Commons to Civilized Commons
national or corporate frames is astonishing. In this particular way, the
internet rebalances power between elites and masses. So far, this dynamic
Social scientists often think in opposing dualities – voters versus non-voters,
has been more about challenging political elites than replacing them, as the
communists versus capitalists, citizens versus elites, war versus peace. We
experience in Egypt suggests. While states are learning to harvest the online
present a worldview in this way in order to stimulate debate, although within
world to better understand and/or control their citizens, traditional political
various epistemic communities the more useful debates often deal with the
institutions are not well designed to take full advantage of the social capital
shades of gray. For example, it is not as if there are vast crowds of citizens
offered by the online sphere. Rather, it may ultimately emerge that distri-
wandering about under the whip hand of a circle of elite leaders (although
buted power networks become more authoritative – and hopefully more
Left publications might put forth this case). Rather, as members of a society,
effective – at distributing democracy than established power institutions.
there are times when we contribute and times when we simply consume, not
really fulfilling the Leninist idea of ‘from each according to his abilities, to
The articulation of the rights (and responsibilities) of online citizens is a first
each according to his needs’ but rather in the less economical and elegant
step in preserving the potential of the online sphere to improve the condi-
way of taking on shifting roles of responsibilities and benefits. Thus, change
tion of Man. There is an element to the Onlife Manifesto that is revolutionary
is better understood as evolution rather than revolution.
and this is implicit in the both the manifesto itself and the recent reflection
from Charles Ess for the Onlife initiative (pp.17-18): Governments cannot be
passive in the face of evolving technology. Ess usefully points to the historical
- 231 -
evidence that businesses do not automatically safeguard consumers when
because there has been too much comparison of the internet to the tradi-
they introduce new technology (his example of the exploding steam engines
tional mass media. While the internet shares many of the same issues for
was particularly evocative). While this is regrettable, it is also understan-
the traditional media (journalistic ethics, news values, serving as propaganda
dable under the logic of the market. No single company could simultaneously
in times of war, ‘dumbing down’, etc.), the online sphere offers many addi-
bear the cost of innovation and public safety, particularly with the introduc-
tional, distinctive opportunities and threats to society. These are elegantly
tion of new technology. The problem is that the internet was supposed to
articulated in the Onlife Manifesto, but I think the next step is to articulate
be different; it was supposed to be a post-modern collaborative effort that
more forcefully that what we mean in all of this: The state needs to play a
was above the demands of both sovereignty or capitalism. That may have
role. What role, given that we have established that this is not about rela-
been true in the initial stages, but for the past decade there has been ample
tively straightforward issues such as access or protecting children (although
evidence that the internet is the prime locus for business (Google, Facebook,
those are specific concerns within a much broader discussion)? I believe that
etc.) and national controls (as evidenced by Syria switching off the internet
the manifesto shows that there is a need for the choices and tradeoffs in the
in late 2012). The notion that the internet does not have profound economic
online sphere to be made (forgive the pun) manifest. That is to say, people
and political power in the traditional sense is absurd, yet the clear vision
need not just connection to the internet or even engagement on the online
of this is blurred by a hazy memory of ‘cyber-utopia’ as embraced by Tim
sphere; they need informed engagement on a relatively level playing field
Berners-Lee et al.2
that has been engineered to prioritize the rights of citizens over the needs
of elites. On the one hand, this means a focus on more nuanced and useful
The problem is that the debate about the benefits and drawbacks (a crude
information for people of all generations and all socio-economic categories
duality) of the online sphere has not followed lessons of history, perhaps
in Europe about both the benefits and trade-offs (I like this better than risks)
in engaging in the online sphere. At the same time, governments need to
2 Ironically, the development of key points of the internet – such as packet-switching, TCP/
IP, the concept of Email, the World Wide Web and web browsers -- would never have been
developed without the early, open and collaborative nature of the internet that paralleled
the heavy involvement of academics and did not follow the laws of market capitalism.
However, commerce and nation-states have long since expropriated this free-ware
capital, a move that is perhaps so painful to early web developers that it seems underacknowledged. Certainly, there are elements of the online sphere that both spread and
foster values of disinterested participation, but they are now the exception rather than the
rule.
establish guidelines for internet-service providers such as Google, Facebook,
Twitter, etc. so that people who chose to use these services are aware of
data-mining, the surrendering of ownership of their images and words, etc.
For this exercise, we are discussing the EU, but in many ways this is the role
of national governments as well). So out of all this comes again this idea of
the pairing of rights and responsibilities, with perhaps a parallel to moto-
- 232 -
References
ring privileges. Just as citizens are responsible for safe driving, governments
are responsible for eliminating hazards from the motorways. Citizens have
the right to participate in the online sphere, but they have the responsibi-
•
lity to learn how to navigate it to protect themselves (and others). At the
Davis, Richard. 2009. Typing Politics: The Role of Blogs in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press
same time, governments have the responsibility to protect citizens against
•
Deibert, Ronald, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan L. Zittrain.
dangerous technology, such as that which allows excessive data mining
2010. Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in
and loss of privacy rights. If governments can foster the creative spark and
Cyberspace. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
the potential that brought the internet so far, so fast into our daily lives at
•
such a rapid pace, then it can help preserve (rather than destroy) the most
Hallin, David and Paulo Mancini. 2004. Comparing Media Systems. Three
Models of Media and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
promising way to unlock human potential on our planet. Manifestoes, ranging
•
from the Magna Carta to the U.S. Constitution to the Communist Manifesto,
Hanson, Ralph E. 2011. Mass Communication: Living in a Media World.
Third Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press (SAGE).
delineate fundamental shifts in the relationship between elites and rulers.
•
We are at a crossroads in terms of the power balance between citizens and
Hindman, Matthew. 2009. The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
elites/powerless and powerful in the digital world; the Onlife Initiative seeks
•
to make visible these issues and forces.
Howard, Philip N. 2010. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam. New York: Oxford
University Press.
•
Karp, David. 2009. Transnational corporations in ‘bad states’: Human
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•
Norris, Pippa. 2001. The Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information
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•
Wright, Scott. 2012. Politics as Usual? Revolution, normalization and
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List of Manifestoes and Declarations Relating to
Online Sphere
•
http://www.internetdeclaration.org/
•
•
Draft Code of Ethics for the Information Society
•
•
•
•
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001871/187196e.pdf
Source: John Perry Barlow, 1996
Rights and Obligations
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html
Source: Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL)
•
Declaration of Internet Freedom (2)
http://declarationofinternetfreedom.org/
Source: UNESCO
•
Declaration of Internet Freedom (1)
•
Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for
http://www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/rights-and-obligations/
the Knowledge Age
A Digital Citizen’s Bill of Rights
By Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth, and Alvin Toffler
Source: Keep the Web Open
Future Insight Release 1.2 August 1994
http://keepthewebopen.com/digital-bill-of-rights
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html
A Crowd-sourced Declaration of Rights
•
CATO Institute: The Libertarian Vision for Telecom and High-Technology
Source: Reddit Sub-Group
By Adam D. Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr.
http://www.reddit.com/r/fia/comments/vuj37/digital_bill_of_rights_1st_
http://www.cato.org/publications/techknowledge/libertarian-vision-tele-
draft/
com-hightechnology
Don’t Make Me Steal It
•
The Hacker Manifesto
Digital Media Consumption Manifesto
Source: +++The Mentor+++
http://www.dontmakemesteal.com/en/
Written January 8, 1986
Manifesto for Agile Software Development
http://www.mithral.com/~beberg/manifesto.html
http://agilemanifesto.org/
•
A Hacker Manifesto
By Par McKenzie Wark
•
The Euston Manifesto
http://eustonmanifesto.org/the-euston-manifesto/
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Published 2004 by Harvard University Press
•
•
UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/warktext.html
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue
THE ::CYBER COM/MUNIST:: MANIFESTO
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.
By Richard Barbrook
HRC.17.27_en.pdf
2007
•
http://www.imaginaryfutures.net/2007/04/18/by-richard-barbrook/
Note: This list is meant to be a useful sample rather than encyclopaedic. It
The Mozilla Manifesto
was compiled by Nicole Zwaaneveld for the Onlife Initiative.
2012
http://www.mozilla.org/about/manifesto.en.html
•
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy
By Global Network Initiative
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php
•
The Cluetrain Manifesto
By Rick Levine, Christopher Locke, Doc Searls, and David Weinberger
1999
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cluetrain_Manifesto
http://cluetrain.com/
•
Internet Manifesto
How journalism works today. Seventeen declarations.
2009
http://www.internet-manifesto.org/
•
We the Web Kids
By Piotr Czerski
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/02/we-the-webkids/253382/
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Public Use
of Reason:
In reality, virtuality
or fictitionality?
An initiative
of the
May Thorseth
Contents1
Introduction
Introduction
237
A. John Dewey and ‘the problem of the public’
239
B. Stefan Arkadievitch vs. Anders Behring Breivik: public reasoning
240
between the real, the virtual and the fictitious. This is motivated by the
C. Real or fictitious publics?
241
changes of borders between them, mainly due to the digital transition of
D. G.H. von Wright’s analysis of modern technologies
242
E. Upshot of the argument
243
The focus of this paper is on the possibility of public use of reason in the
realm of the digital transition. I would like to dwell a bit on the relation
public reasoning and public space. Not only have new venues offered new
possibilities for public reasoning. The essential and radical change goes
deeper as it has also brought changes to the meaning of ’public’.1 Both liberals and communitarians have previously drawn upon a distinction between
Conclusion - policy consequences and research agenda
recommendations
244
References
245
the public and the private realms, based on a somehow similar apprehension
of each of them: the private is comprehensive, while the public is political
(Rawls, liberal view). Even though communitarians disagree with liberals on
the liberal understanding of the meaning of the distinction, they still approve
of there being a limit to draw between public and private. And despite the
fact that liberals and communitarians understand basic freedom differently,
they both recognise and understand the public as a space where certain
values are protected and shared by the citizens. They may disagree on how
1 In this volume Mireille Hildebrandt (pp.169-183), Ugo Pagallo (pp.152-167), Nicole
Dewandre (pp.184-207) and Yiannis Laouris (pp.115-133) also discuss the private/public
distinction, although emphasising different aspects of it. The old problem of the public
as discussed by John Dewey is explicit in Hildebrandt’s chapter as italso is in this chapter.
Whereas she discusses the plurality of publics my focus rather is to question whether the
kind of public I have labelled fictitious really could count as one among many different
publics. This chapter concludes that it is not, and rather is to be equalled with private. Still,
we all seem to conclude that the private/public distinction needs revision on basis of new
ICTs of our time.
- 237 -
far to extend regulation of groups and individuals, whether they are citizens
hand there are no governing mechanisms ensuring that the communication
or not. However, when disagreeing they still understand ’public’ as something
on the internet is pubic in the sense we are used to think of the public, e.g. as
that applies to all. Thus, there is no such thing as a private space or meaning
an arena where arguments are being exposed to public scrutiny, the way e.g.
of ’public’, at least not ahead of the digital transition.
deliberate democrats understands this. The point to be made here is that the
very reason for public exposure of arguments, in order to be genuinely public,
My aim here is to demonstrate how it is possible, due to the digital tran-
is to improve public opinion (ref. e.g. Habermas, Dryzek, Fishkin).
sition of our medias today, to be profoundly mistaken about the public, or
more specifically about reasoning in the public sphere. Let me explain: on
The contrast to public use of reason in this sense is private use of reason,
the one hand the public sphere has truly been extended due to digital trans-
meaning that there is a limit of scope with respect to the audience. As an
formations. People can participate in all kinds of communicative fora across
example, confidential contexts like e.g. military operations counter public
borders. One context of particular interest to public reason is, of course, fora
contexts in this sense. Restriction on information flows is legitimised by
for exchange of political opinions, which is the basic reference for the discus-
referral to protection of some greater good.
sion of this paper.
However, the contrast between public and private use of reason needs not
The public space has truly been radically changed due to the digital transi-
contradict each other as long as they apply to separate contexts. A basic
tion, basically due to democratisation of information flows. Everyone with an
question I would like to raise here is whether these are as separate as the
access to an electronic medias can in principle upload or post whatever they
theoretical model seems to require. I shall argue that the digital transition
want to on the Internet. As the information flow at a global level is normally
complicates the matter, as it is no longer quite clear who the audience is. Due
not censored or curtailed – at least not in liberal democracies – the result
to the model sketched above public reason addresses a universal audience
seems to be that this new public space is for all. However, to the extent that
whereas private reason is limited in scope, like professional contexts or
this new space is conceived of as genuinely public we face a dilemma: on the
intimate contexts as hinted on above (ref. Kant, Onora ‘Neill). In order to
one hand most people tend to believe that everyone with an access to this
approach this seemingly new situation due to digital transition I shall take
new space is a participant on an equal footing with everyone else. This is the
one historical-literary and one current case as my reference points. Before
empowerment aspect of the story, as e.g. disempowered minorities’ condi-
introducing the cases I shall introduce John Dewey’s problem of the public
tions for participating in public debates have been improved. On the other
- 238 -
(1927), which seems to be even more relevant today due to out new infor-
though he does not come up with a solution to the problem he still hopes
mation technologies.
that society can someday use its technology to improve communication and
thus improve public interest in politics.
A. John Dewey and ‘the problem of the public’
The dominating technology of our time has to do with the digital transition we are discussing in the Onlife project. Deliberative democrats have
The argument I make here is to some extent the same as the one made by
suggested that online democracy is possible because of people’s access to
John Dewey (1927) in discussing the problem of the public, the problem being
worldwide communication. The reports of e-democracy and several trials
how to inform the public. The problem of the public is about how special
to enhance he communication between the people and it’s electors do not,
interests, powerful corporate capital, and the vagaries of public communi-
however, bear witness to great success (ref. e.g. Gøtze and Coleman, 2001).
cation make effective public deliberation difficult. The reason why the public
Thus, the problem of the public does not seem to be resolvable due to our
cannot compose a cohesive group is because there are too many publics,
new communication technologies, rather the contrary.
according to Dewey. This problem is, however, not a new one as even in the
past, the public has had other concerns than politics: “Political concerns
In the following I shall focus on this “rather contrary” conclusion with respect
have, of course, always had strong rivals” (Dewey 1927:137). In discussing
to our new information technologies, i.e. that they seem to counteract rather
the distractions of the past, Dewey explains that those distractions are far
than enable the kind of cohesive public that Dewey spoke of. Before we turn
more prevalent and bountiful in today’s society and citing technology as the
to further analysis we shall have a look at one historical-literary and one
main perpetrator. He believes that communication alone can create a great
current case serving as my empirical reference points.
community, that is a cohesive public (op.cit. p. 142). Thus, Dewey’s suggestion for a solution to the problem of the public is to improve communication.
This is how the public can become a cohesive group (ref. Dewey 1927).
Part of the problem of the public has to do with the technologies that tend
to draw people’s attention away from politics, as they are far more desirable topics of discussion for most people than the latest political news. Even
- 239 -
B. Stefan Arkadievitch vs. Anders Behring
Breivik: public reasoning
tion. Thus, he never run the risk of being forced (by some better argument)
to change, and even less to improve, his opinions. If he changed opinions it
was solely due to the papers he read – and any such change he compared to
Part of this old problem of the public not only prevails; rather it seems to
changing his hat! In this character we see the kind of citizen that gives rise to
have increased in the digital realm of transition. One reason why seems to
the problem of the public. Even though ABB, unlike SA is deeply involved with
be that we still lack governing procedures and institutions to ensure that
political issues, he is nonetheless restricted by the problem of the public.
people get well informed, even if the access to information is tremendously
The relevant similarity in the two cases is that ‘technologies’ in some sense
improved due to the digital transition. To be better informed is not about
seem to prevent them from being better informed. In Dewey’s analysis it is
having access to more information, but rather to know what to do with it.
about what draws people’s attention away from political concerns, as we can
Only then could we reasonably talk about people being better informed, i.e.
clearly see in both SA and ABB. While Tolstoy’s character believes that he is
being more knowledgeable. Thus, the digital transition seems to increase the
being sufficiently well informed through the media channels available to him,
risk of confusing more information with being better informed. Hence, addi-
ABB in a similar way acts as a media institution himself (ref. Cass Sunstein’s
tional to Dewey’s worries there is a new one entering the stage, which I shall
Dailey Me). Under standard circumstances we are used to thinking that
speak of in terms of the possibility of confusing a real public with a fictitious
public (media) institutions not only provide us with relevant information, but
one. In order to make my point clear I shall lean on two characters: Stefan
they also provide us with improved qualified information. None of the two
Arkadievitch in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, and Anders Behring Breivik, the mass
cases, however, seem to bear witness to either of the two becoming better
murderer of 76 people on July 22, 2011 in Norway. The latter also published
informed or more knowledgeable in a relevant sense.
a Manifest on Internet where he strongly argues against multicultural societies like Norway by spreading racist and extremist views of non-whites, in
The story of SA and ABB is meant to illustrate the difference between
particular Muslims. In the following I shall refer to the two characters as SA
increase in amount of information as different from being more knowled-
and ABB, respectively.
geable. Being more knowledgeable is a normative concept that cannot be
captured in terms of quantitative measurements. Such an assumption is a
Let’s first move to Stefan Arkadievitch. He never changed his mind, or the
category mistake as it confuses a descriptive concept of increased amount
papers he used to read. He never questioned the sources that he made use
of information with a normative concept of improved knowledge. Thus, an
of for being informed. He picked the papers that suited his class and his posi-
important aspect of ‘being better informed’ goes missing. This mistake
- 240 -
is quite widespread these days, as e.g. young students often are asked to
to seclusion there is a difference between the two cases, which is not only
submit assignments at school based on information gathered at the Internet,
of degree, but also rather of quality. This difference is one described above,
without having been trained in how to evaluate and select among the infor-
which I shall speak of as a difference between a real and a fictitious public.
mation and information channels they look up. As a result, they will not be
The first scenario is closer to those described by Dewey, the ABB case is not
trained in producing counterarguments unless they are exposed to them.
only a media problem as such, but rather has to do with a blind belief in the
In a likewise manner both ABB and Tolstoy’s character seem to be immune
possibility of creating a public by way of new technologies.
to counterarguments, and they both appear to stick to the opinions that are
predicated, either by the class one belongs to (SA) or by the person himself
It could easily be argued that the distinction between the real and the ficti-
(ABB). Still, I shall argue that there is a relevant difference between the two
tious equals the difference that could be drawn between the real and the
cases: referring to what is suitable to one’s own class or position presupposes
virtual (Ess and Thorseth, 2011). This is, however, misleading, as a virtual
some communicative relation to the surrounding community, as opposed to
reality may very well be communicative in a Habermasian sense, where
ABB’s case, as he seems to be completely secluded from any communicative
communication is based on public use of reason. By contrast, the fictitious
community. The latter character differs from the former in seemingly relating
public in ABB’s case is based in private use of reason, while pretending to
to the digital transition in
particular.2
make appeals to a real and universal audience.
There are two related, but still different phenomena involved in this compa-
C. Real or fictitious publics?
rison. On the one hand there is the possibility and risk of filtering, which
certainly differ in the two cases, but this difference is one of degree. Stefan
Arkadievitch’ opinions are based on a high degree of filtering, and so are
From the above I shall assume that Stefan Arkadievitch participates in a
ABB’s opinions, although to an even higher degree. However, when it comes
real public, as opposed to Anders Behring Breivik who is a member of a fictitious public, mainly unfolding in virtual environments. The main distinction
2 At this point I would like to point to Luciano Floridi’s concept of hyperhistory which I find
helpful in graping the radical difference between medias before and after the digital transition. Floridi makes the point the hyperhistory is characterised by social wellbeing being
dependent on ICT. Following this line of thought we may view ABB as grotesque illustration
of this point. Had ABB lived in history – e.g. at SA’s time – it’s doubtful whether medias by
then would have contributed to his wellbeing the wa the Internat has mad possible.
between the two ‘realities’ is not, however, whether it is virtual as opposed
to real, but rather private as opposed to public. The use of reason is still to
some extent public in SA’s case, while private as far as ABB is concerned.
Although the virtual character of the communication is not the main source
- 241 -
of the problem, there still seems to be a non-trivial connection between
Claim: the possibility of producing Daily Me make it possible to confuse
virtual environments and a fictitious public as the latter appears to be a
private and public use of reason; i.e. producing Daily Me as if it were based in
necessary, though not sufficient condition. This is because people very well
public use of reason.
may be confused about real and fictitious realities, while not posting their
confusion on the Internet. To some extent it makes sense to assume that the
Concern: the possibility of producing arguments as if they were part of public
digital transformation of the medias pose a radical threat in enabling radica-
reason in online environments; as if they qualified for addressing a universal
lisation of already extreme ideologies.
audience.
Cass Sunstein (2001) and many others have written extensively on the
The virtual is not the real enemy; rather it is the ideological aspect linked to
problem of filtering and group polarisation. The confusion being described
fictitious publics - the main reason being the possibility of ideological and
above does, however, add a new element of confusion. E.g., people may very
fictitious “publics”. A further question arising from this claim is, however,
well be able to produce their Daily Me while still being aware that they are
whether the kind of “publics” in view could exist without the digital and
making this choice consciously. The real danger is rather the risk of a real
virtual environments. My thesis is that it is not, thus pointing to a genuinely
confusion of arguments as if they were part of public reason. Post ABB this
new aspect of Dewey’s problem of the public.
risk has been expressed in terms of the influence this case – both the manifest and the trial – has on a broader public of people holding extreme ideo-
D. G.H. von Wright’s analysis of modern technologies
logical viewpoints. I shall argue that this risk of private use of reason as if it
were public is part of the problem of the public in the realm of digital transition. Onora O’Neill’s concept of publicizability applies here. The universalizability claim attached to this constraint certainly is absent in ABB’s case.
In his book Vetenskapen och förnuftet, 1986 (Eng. Science and Reason), he
puts forth the argument that technology and science tends to prohibit huma-
At this point I want to raise one question, one claim and one concern:
nity by forcing humans into a situation where we cannot but fight our own
Question: under what circumstances do ideologies based on private use of
human nature. The reason why is because we continuously try to transcend
reason jeopardize public reason?
our own limitations by trying to control our environments by way of science
and technology. By referring to the well-known Faust and Paradise myths he
- 242 -
gives an analysis of the human condition. The problem is not a new one (ref.
There is yet another aspect to be added to the argument put forth in this
Paradise myth); rather, it has to do with our efforts to solve problems that
paper. The problem we are speaking of is about a dilemma indirectly raised
are not in our capacity as humans to do. As an example, trying to solve the
by von Wright, having to do with a seeming contradictory development in
problem of evil, death or other existential queries by way of technology is to
human conditions. While continuously becoming more knowledgeable of
be categorically confused. A profound problem is that we apparently cannot
technical aspects of (scientific) knowledge we are also to an increasing
by try to overcome the limitations in question. Jon Hellesnes, a Norwegian
degree undergoing moral deterioration. This is von Wright’s position. Thus,
philosopher has in a similar way created the concept of ‘moral techno-
the more we try to solve our problems as limited and fallible by way of
logy’ (Hellesnes 1992). Briefly speaking this is about trying to solve moral
controlling our environments the more we encounter the problem of Faust, or
problems that are unlimited in scope by finite means, i.e. by treating infinite
Adam and Eve in Paradise.
problems as if they were could find a finite solution. The outcome of von
Wright’s and Hellesnes’ analysis is that humans are doomed not to succeed
E. Upshot of the argument
in their efforts to control both our condition as mortal and as subjects to
contingencies.
The analysis above aims at analysing the problem of the public in the new
The digital transition seems to influence human beliefs in infinity through
context of digital transition. Although the new communication technologies
complete control. The venue being discussed here is the Internet commu-
appear to be the main source of the problem I have argued that it is not
nication, visualised by the case of ABB. By creating environments as if they
only the technologies per se. The reason why the problem still seems to
were possible to control (ref. description in ABB’s Manifest) he is profoundly
have escalated due to technologies is, however, not only question of degree.
mistaken about the human limitations that von Wright and Hellesnes speak
The possibility of creating publics as if they were real is a phenomenon that
about. This is partly due to the extremist’s false belief in the space he has
heavily depends on accessibility of information technologies and the Internet.
created, as if it were a public space for genuine communication. Additionally,
Thus, the interplay of the new technologies and their governing mecha-
the mistake is also due to the confusion that opinions evading public scrutiny
nisms and institutions radically change the media contexts of the problem
represent better – or superior – knowledge.
of the public. However, the belief that infinite problems (here: not yet being
omniscient) can be finitely solved by way of science and technology is an old
- 243 -
category mistake (ref. Faust and Paradise myths). The quest for overcoming
addressing a universal audience, is fit for communication in the public space
imperfections as human stems from confusion about what it is to be human.
that is offered by the Internet. By contrast, only private use of reason is at
work in the kind of fictitious public practiced by e.g. ABB. 3
Involved here is also the old philosophical problem of implying ought from
is. On the one hand we have von Wright’s analysis emphasising the discre-
This further implies a transformation in our understanding of the ‘public’. To
tionary relationship between knowing much and knowing better. Whether
a certain extent it is no longer a counterpart to ‘private’ as we previously
we accept his negative conclusion about humanity may still be kept open.
have understood the term. By way of the Internet as a new medium acces-
We could still agree that having access to an almost infinite (sic!) amount
sible to people worldwide we see communities being established along new
of information can never guarantee that we have become better knowled-
“routes” – this is the extension of the ‘public’. But there is also a qualita-
geable. The other aspect of the transition from is to ought I, of course, the
tive difference between “old” and “new” publics, essentially having to do with
moral imperative, which is extendedly discussed elsewhere. Briefly, this impe-
much less control of inclusion/exclusion in the communicative communities.
rative is captured in e.g. von Wright’s criticism of turning science and techno-
What, then, is the most adequate way of conceiving of the ‘public’ in the new
logy into a one-dimensional measurement of progress. Even though we may
online environments of our time? Here I have revolved around a division line
not accept his conclusion that technological progress implies moral decline,
between real publics that may partly be understood as basically interactive
we may still accept the premises that these are different issues, although
where real communication is going on. By contrast, fictitious publics - like the
related.
addressees of ABB’s manifest - diverge from real publics in the sense that
they do not really exist in a communicative sense. This qualitative difference
between real and fictitious publics calls for normative and ethical analysis of
Conclusion - policy consequences and
research agenda recommendations
Onlife experience.
My main point has been to re-examine the problem of the public as it
emerges in the digital transition of our time. This far, there has been much
There is a need for research to contribute to a better understanding of
the Internet as a public space. The most pressing challenge is to create
responsible Internet users. Here I have suggested focussing on the difference
3Cf. Charles Ess’ chapter in this volume, notes 16 and 33, referring to a non-dualistic view
of cognition, trust and virtual words, partly being discussed in Ess and Thorseth 2011.
between private and public use of reason. Only public use of reason, i.e.
- 244 -
References
focus on the distinction between the real and the virtual – in research as well
as politically. By contrast, we rather need to identify and explore in further
details the difference between real and fictitious publics. This should result
•
Steven Coleman and John Gøtze. Bowling together: Online Public Enga-
in further research into fictitious publics, both with respect to individual
gement in Policy Deliberation, 2004. http://catedras.fsoc.uba.ar/rusailh/
responsibilities, but also regarding institutional and technological levels of
Unidad%207/Coleman%20and%20Gotze%20Bowling%20Together,%20
Internet communication.
online%20public%20engagement%20in%20policy%20deliberation.pdf
•
John Dewey. The Public and its Problems. Henry Holt & Co, NY, 1927.
•
John Dryzek. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics,
Contestations. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
•
Charles Ess and May Thorseth (eds.). Trust and Virtual Worlds. Contemporary Perspectives, NY, Oxford…,Peter Lang, 2011.
•
James Fishkin. Voice of the People. Yale UP, 1997.
•
Luciano Floridi (ed.). The Cambridge Handbook of Information and
Computer Ethics. Cambridge: CUP.
•
Jürgen Habermas. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Ethics,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.
•
Jürgen Habermas. Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press, 1996.
•
Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Judgment, transl. J.M. Meredith, Oxford:
Clarendon, 1952.
•
Immanuel Kant. An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”
transl. H.B. Nisbet, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1991.
•
Onora O’Neill. Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1989.
- 245 -
•
G: H. von Wright. Vitenskapen og fornuften, Oslo 1991.
•
G. H. von Wright. The Three of Knowledge and Other Essays, Brill, Leiden,
1993.
•
Iris Marion Young. “Inclusive political communication: Greetings, Rhetoric
and Storytelling in the context of Political Argument”. Paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, 1998. Iris Marion Young. Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2000.
- 246 -
The
Onlife
Initiative
An initiative
of the
Conclusion
Conclusion1
The 7-page Onlife Manifesto is our contribution on the shifts that policy
makers and other stakeholders need to consider in order to shape public and
This is not a conclusion, if a conclusion is meant to be wrapping up what
private action in a hyperconnected era. Each word of the Onlife Manifesto
should be remembered from the work being concluded.
has been carefully considered and if only one thing should be read, it is this
Manifesto and not this conclusion…
This is not an executive summary, if an executive summary is all what needs
to be read for grasping the added value of an initiative.
An essential component of this reshaping has to do with design: governance
actors ought to pay particular attention to this dimension of the onlife expe-
The Onlife Manifesto is the agora of this intellectual venture and the accom-
rience: in addition to the traditional hard and soft law-tools of governance,
panying material is a landscape where everyone is invited to walk or navigate
such as national rules, international treaties, or codes of conduct, the gover-
at leisure and hopefully be inspired, in a way that leads to revisiting his or
nance of a complex multi-agent system does increasingly hinge on the tech-
her referential frameworks. Indeed, none or few of the recommendations put
nicalities of design mechanisms.
forward in this work are “ready-to-use”: they all require an active reinterpretation or translation by each reader, depending where she or he sits in this
The reality as it unfolds in a hyperconnected era calls for reengineering
hyperconnected era.
concepts and reconsidering conceptual frameworks: this requires a research
effort from the social sciences and humanities research community, an open
This being said, we could have skipped the conclusion but chose to end with
attitude from all scientists towards genuine interdisciplinarity, and a pro-ac-
this:
tive attitude towards citizen’s engagement. Horizon 2020 offers a timely and
wonderful opportunity to support these three objectives and should be mobilised to this effect.
We consider that the work initiated with the Onlife initiative could usefully
be pursued in a second phase. Indeed, several paths have been opened and
require further explorations and refinements, notably regarding governance,
responsibility and attention.
- 248 -
Biographies
An initiative
of the
Luciano Floridi
Charles Ess
Claire Lobet-Maris
Stefana Broadbent
Yiannis Laouris
Judith Simon
Ugo Pagallo
May Thorseth
Sarah Oates
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Nicole Dewandre
Luciano Floridi
Luciano Floridi (MA Laurea Rome «La Sapienza», MPhil, PhD Warw, MA Oxon,
Jean-Gabriel Ganascia was appointed lecturer at the Paris-Sud University in
Dr. h. c. Suceava) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire
1982, assistant professor at the same university in 1987 and then professor
– where he holds the Research Chair in Philosophy of Information and the
at the University Pierre et Marie Curie (UPMC) in 1988, where he built the
UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer Ethics – and Fellow of St Cross
ACASA research team in the LIP6 laboratory. He was also project leader in
College, University of Oxford. Among his recognitions: Gauss Professor by the
the CNRS executive (1988-1992) before creating and directing the research
Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, the APA’s Barwise Prize, AISB Fellowship,
program “Sciences Cognitives” for the ministry of research (1993) and the
the IACAP’s Covey Award, and the INSEIT’s Weizenbaum Award. He is Editor
Scientific Interest Group “Sciences de la Cognition” (1995-2000). Today, he
in Chief of Philosophy & Technology. His most recent books are: The Philo-
coordinates for the UPMC the Erasmus Mundus Master Data Mining and
sophy of Information (OUP, 2011); Information: A Very Short Introduction
Knowledge Management and he is member of the Board the OBVIL Labex, in
(OUP, 2010); and The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer
which his team is working with the literary teams of Paris-Sorbonne Univer-
Ethics (CUP, 2010). His forthcoming books are: The Ethics of Information; and
sity.
The Fourth Revolution - The Impact of Information and Communication Technologies on Our Lives, both for OUP.
Initially focused on Knowledge Acquisition and Machine Learning, his scientific orientations evolved to Cognitive Modeling, Data Mining and Digital
Address for correspondence: School of Humanities, University of Hert-
Humanities. Thus was recently undertaken research on literary analysis
fordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK; l.flo-
(genetic criticism, stylistic), on intelligent TV and media recommendation
ridi@herts.ac.uk
and on the augmentations of eBooks. Lastly, Jean-Gabriel Ganascia contributes to computer ethics through publications and different social activities,
http://www.philosophyofinformation.net
for instance he is member of the COMETS (CNRS Ethical Committee), of the
CERNA and of the board of the MURS (Mouvement Universel pour la Responsabilité Scientifique).
- 250 -
Charles Ess
Claire Lobet-Maris
Charles Ess (PhD, Pennsylvania State University, USA) is Associate Professor
Claire Lobet-Maris is sociologist. She is senior professor at the Computer
in Media Studies, Department of Media and Communication, University of
Science faculty at University of Namur teaching sociology, organizational
Oslo, and Director, Center for Research in Media Innovation (CeRMI), Univer-
sciences and technological policy in bachelor and Master programmes of the
sity of Oslo. He has received awards for teaching and scholarship. His
Faculty of Computer Sciences and of the Faculty of Law. She is also Research
research and publications emphasize cross-cultural and ethical perspectives
Director at the Centre of Research Law, Information & Society (CRIDS)
in Internet Studies, and Information and Computing Ethics. Recent books
include Digital Media Ethics (Polity Press, 2009; 2nd edition in 2013), and
Her main domain is the sociology of the digital trying both to understand the
(with Mia Consalvo), The Handbook of Internet Studies (Wiley-Blackwell,
emergence and the meaning of the technological objects in our late moder-
2011). Recent journal special issues include (with William Dutton) “Internet
nity and their impacts on the social and personal life.
Studies: Perspectives on a Rapidly Developing Field,” new media and society
(2012), and “At the Intersections Between Internet Studies and Philosophy:
She is scientific member of the ethical board of Allistene (Alliance des
Who Am I Online?” (Introduction), Philosophy & Technology 25, (3: September,
Sciences et Technologies du Numérique - French Consortium of the major
2012).
R&D institutions) and of the Committee ‘Social Sciences’, Science Europe.
Ess has held guest professorships in Norway, Germany, Denmark, and
France, and is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Drury University (Springfield, Missouri, USA). Ess is a founding member of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP); he has served as
Vice-President and then President of the Association of Internet Researchers
(AoIR), and is now President of the International Society for Ethics in Information Technology (INSEIT).
- 251 -
Stefana Broadbent
http://www.ted.com/talks/stefana_broadbent_how_the_internet_enables_
intimacy.html
Director of the Digital Anthropology MSc. in the Department of Anthropology
at the University College London
Yiannis Laouris
Website Link: http://stefanabroadbent.com
Yiannis Laouris is a social and business entrepreneur, a neuroscientist
Positions held – past & present: Stefana is currently Director of the Digital
and systems engineer, currently working as Senior Scientist and Chair of
Anthropology MSc. at University College London (Web site: http://www.ucl.
the Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology Institute (www.cnti.org.cy) and
ac.uk/digital-anthropology). Between 2004 and 2008, she was Research
Future Worlds Center (www.futureworlds.eu). Laouris is founding member
Director at Swisscom, the national Swiss Telecom operator where she ran The
and elected Secretary General of the Cyprus Society for Systemic Studies,
Observatory of Digital Life to advise the company’s strategy on converging
member of the Board of the Institute for 21st Century Agoras and member
media. Previously she was Chief Officer of Human Interaction at IconMe-
of the Board of a number of high-tech companies. In the 90’s he founded
dialab/LBi. She holds a Ph.D. in Cognitive Science from the University of Edin-
CYBER Kids (www.cyber-kids.com), a chain of franchised computer learning
burgh and a degree in Psychology from the University of Geneva.
centers, which introduced IT in the lives of thousands of children and adults
in several countries. He promotes the application of broadband technologies
Discipline areas: Stefana Broadbent is a social scientist who studies people’s
and structured democratic dialogue as tools to bridge the digital-, economic-,
use of digital technology at home and at work.
educational- and inter-personal divides in our planet. He is an international
leader in the theory and application of the science of structured dialogic
Publications: Her book L’Intimite’ au Travail FYP Editions 2011 reports the use
design and conducts research towards developing systems to enable scaling
of digital communication channels to maintain intimate relationships and the
up participatory dialogic processes to engage asynchronously thousands of
impact of these emerging practices on the workplace.
people in meaningful authentic dialogues, thus accelerating institutional and
societal change. Laouris has published extensively in neuroscience, applied
See also her TED talk:
systems science and peace, and in the neuroscience of learning. He published
a few books and contributed chapters in many others.
- 252 -
Judith Simon
Ugo Pagallo
Judith Simon is senior researcher at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Ugo Pagallo is Professor of Jurisprudence at the Faculty of Law, University of
(Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis) and the Univer-
Turin, since 2000, faculty at the Center for Transnational Legal Studies (CTLS)
sity of Vienna (Department of Philosophy). She is also associate post-doc-
in London and faculty fellow at the NEXA Center for Internet and Society
toral fellow at the Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. In
at the Politecnico of Turin. Chief editor of the Digitalica series published by
the last years she has been visiting scholar at Stanford University and guest
Giappichelli and co-editor of the AICOL series by Springer, he is vice-pre-
researcher at the Department of Information Engineering and Computer
sident of the Italian Society on legal informatics. In addition to numerous
Science at University of Trento as well as the Artificial Intelligence Research
essays in scholarly journals, he is the author of eight monographs. His main
Institute (CSIC-IIIA) in Barcelona. In the FET-Open Project «Liquidpublications»
interests are AI & law, network theory, robotics, and information technology
she conducted research on changes in academia due to web2.0-technologies.
law (specially data protection law and copyright).
Currently, she is investigating the relationship between trust, knowledge and
ICT as the principle investigator of the research project «Epistemic Trust in
Socio-Technical Epistemic System» funded by the Austrian Science Founda-
tion. She is also member of the Onlife-Initiative (DG CONNECT), exploring the
extent to which the digital transition impacts societal expectations towards
policy making.
http://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/
http://www.itas.kit.edu/english/staff_simon_judith.php
- 253 -
Nicole Dewandre
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Nicole Dewandre is advisor for societal issues to the Director General of the
Peter-Paul Verbeek (1970) is professor of philosophy of technology and chair
Directorate General for Communications, Networks, Content and Technolo-
of the Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, The Netherlands. He
gies (DG CONNECT) at the European Commission.
is also chairman of the ‘Young Academy’, which is part of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is a member of the Dutch Council
She studied applied physics engineering and economics at the University of
for the Humanities and of the board of the Society for Philosophy and Tech-
Louvain, operations research at the University of California (Berkeley) and
nology. Verbeek is an editor of Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, De Academische
philosophy at the Free University of Brussels (ULB). She published «Critique
Boekengids, and SATS. Journal for Northern Philosophy. He is also a member
de la raison administrative, pour une Europe ironiste», coll. L’ordre philoso-
of the scientific advisory board of Philosophy & Technology. From 2010 until
phique, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2002.
2012 he held the Socrates chair at Delft University of Technology. Fall 2006
he was guest professor at Aarhus University, Denmark.
She entered the European Commission in 1983. She has been a member
of the Central Advisory Group and the Forward Study Unit, dealing with
Verbeeks research focuses on the ethical and anthropological aspects of
strategic analysis of research and industrial policy for the President of the
human-technology relations. He recently published Moralizing Technology:
Commission (1986-1992). In 1993, she supported the Belgian Presidency
Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things (University of Chicago
of the European Union in the areas of industry, energy, and consumer poli-
Press, 2011), analyzing the moral significance of technologies, and its impli-
cies. She then worked in «science and society» issues (women and science,
cations for ethical theory and for design practices. Among his other publica-
research and civil society), before being in charge of the «sustainable deve-
tions are: What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency,
lopment» unit that has been put in place in DG Research between 2007 and
and Design (Penn State University Press, 2005), and User Behavior and
2010. She is now working on the societal interface of the Digital Agenda for
Technology Design – Shaping Sustainable Relations between Consumers and
Europe.
Technologies (Springer, 2006).
More information: www.ppverbeek.nl
- 254 -
Sarah Oates
Applied Ethics: Governance of Health and Natural Resources (Norwegian
Research council 2012-2015) www.ntnu.edu/appliedethics/isp-fide. Working
There is an astonishing gap between how people perceive internet ‘freedom’
group leader in two other large scale projects: “Institutional obstacles to a
and the realities of the digital sphere in the 21 century. While the internet
sustainable politics” (part of “Rights to a Green Future” funded by the Euro-
was fostered by an unprecedented amount of social capital and provides
pean Science Foundation 2011-2015) www.greenrights.nl and “Ethical valua-
unique ways for humans to interact, the grim reality is that the contempo-
tion in agricultural land governance” (part of “Frogs, fuel, finance or food?
rary internet is being colonized by corporate and state interests. It is impor-
Cultures, values, ethics, arguments and justifications in the management of
tant to articulate what is unique and important about being human in the
agricultural land” (FORFOOD), funded by the Norwegian Research Council
digital age – and how the central positive aspects can be preserved in the
2013-2016), starting February 1, 2013. Additionally, ongoing NTNU project
interests of the citizens, rather than for the demands of states or corpora-
«Dialogues on Aquaculture: Nature-Technology-Governance» (cooperation
tions. If we do not act soon, we will lose the collective capital and freedom of
between philosophy, political science, biology/marine technology, economics)
the online sphere. We need to learn what it will take to preserve the rights of
www.ntnu.edu/dialogueonaquaculture.
st
public digital citizens.
Discipline areas:
• Global, deliberative democracy/ information ethics
May Thorseth
• Reflective judgment/ broadened way of thinking
• Procedural democracy/ fundamentalism
Professor, Department of philosophy, Norwegian University of Science and
• Governance and natural resources
Technology (NTNU) and Director of NTNU’s Programme for Applied Ethics
www.ntnu.edu/appliedethics, member of the management group of NTNU’s
Globalization Programme www.ntnu.edu/global.
Previous research (PhD
thesis and ca 15 international, peer reviewed articles) on multicultural
conflicts and global (internet) communication. Since 2000 project leader
of several large research projects in applied ethics, currently on ISP-FIDE
- 255 -

Manifesto - Computer Science

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