Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A

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the
Domestic
Understanding
of
Impact
International Norms:
A
Research
Agenda
Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr.
more than a decade, scholars, who have highlighted both the regor
ulative and constitutive functions of norms in international politics, have
challenged the structural realist paradigm, which focuses mostly on the
effects of variations in the distribution of capabilities among states under anarchy.' Until recently, the focus of scholarship on norms-like that of structural
realism-has been cast at the level of the international system, with norms held
to affect state behavior by providing solutions to coordination problems,2
1
The structuralrealist paradigmis most persuasively detailed in Kenneth Waltz,
Theory of InternationalPolitics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979). Important
critiques that in various ways focus on the normativity of the internationalsystem
include Hedley Bull, TheAnarchical Society: A Studyof Orderin WorldPolitics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and
WorldOrders:Beyond InternationalRelations Theory,"Millennium:Journal of International Studies 10 (1981), pp. 126-155; FriedrichV. Kratochwil,"ErrorsHave Their
Advantage,"International Organization38, No. 2 (1984), pp. 305-320; and Alexander Wendt, "AnarchyIs What States Make of It: The Social Constructionof Power
Politics," International Organization46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 391-426. For a forceful
defense of the Waltzean position, see John J. Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of
InternationalInstitutions,"InternationalSecurity 19 (1994/95), pp. 5-49.
2 ArthurA.
Stein, "Coordinationand Collaboration:Regimes in an AnarchicWorld,"
in Stephen D. Krasner,ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1983), pp. 115-140; Lisa L. Martin, "Interests,Power, and Multilateralism,"
International Organization46, No. 4 (1992), pp. 765-792.
? 2000 InternationalStudies Association
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF,UK.
Cortell and Davis
66
reducingtransactioncosts,3 providinga language and grammarof international
politics,4 and constitutingthe state actors themselves.5
Without denying the effects of internationalnorms at the level of the international system, a second wave of scholars has argued that international
norms also have important effects on state behavior via domestic political
processes.6 Two national-level factors have been shown to condition the effects of internationalnorms on domestic political processes and provide explanations for important cross-national variation in compliance with and
interpretationof internationalnorms: the domestic salience or legitimacy of
the norm, and the structuralcontext within which the domestic policy debate
transpires.'Domestic political structuresare importantbecause they condition
access to policy-making fora and privilege certain actors in policy debates, as
3
RobertO. Keohane,AfterHegemony:Cooperationand Discord in the WorldPolitical Economy (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984), esp. chs. 5 and 6.
4 FriedrichV. Kratochwil,Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditionsof Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge.U.K.: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989); Nicholas Onuf, Worldof OurMaking:
Rules and Rule in Social Theoryand InternationalRelations (Columbia,S.C.: University of South CarolinaPress, 1989).
5 For example, William Coplin, "InternationalLaw andAssumptionsaboutthe State
System," WorldPolitics 17, No. 4 (1965), pp. 615-635; MarthaFinnemore,National
Interestsin InternationalSociety (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); AlexanderWendt,"ConstructingInternationalPolitics,"InternationalSecurity(1995), pp. 7181; David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent StructureDebate?" International
Organization43, No. 3 (1989), pp. 441-473; Michael N. Barnett,"Sovereignty,Nationalism, and Regional Orderin the Arab States System,"InternationalOrganization49,
No. 3 (1995), pp. 479-510.
6Examples include Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., "How Do InternationalInstitutionsMatter?The Domestic Impactof InternationalRules and Norms,"
InternationalStudies Quarterly40 (1996), pp. 451-478; Audie Klotz, "NormsReconstituting Interests:Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa,"
InternationalOrganization49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 451-478; ThomasJ. Biersteker,"The
'Triumph'of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World:Policy Convergence
and Bases of Governancein the InternationalEconomic Order,"in James N. Rosenau
and Ernst-OttoCzempiel, eds., Governance without Government:Orderand Change
in WorldPolitics (Cambridge,U.K.: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997), pp. 102-131;
Amy Gurowitz, "Mobilizing InternationalNorms: Domestic Actors, Immigrantsand
the JapaneseState," WorldPolitics 51, No. 3 (1999), pp. 413-445.
7 This approachextends the prominentanalysis by PeterGourevitch,who has argued
the need to examine the effects of "thirdimage" factors on regime types and coalition
patterns, as well as the mediating effects of preexisting state structureson systemic
pressures. See "The Second Image Reversed: The InternationalSources of Domestic
Politics," InternationalOrganization32, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881-911.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
67
Peter Gourevitch argued.8 Similarly, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that the
ability of transnationalactors to promote norms (principled ideas) and influence state policy is dependent on domestic structuresunderstood in terms of
state-societal relations. Moreover, Jeffrey T. Checkel finds that the effects of
international norms are conditioned by domestic structures and the norms'
congruence with domestic political culture.Jeffrey W. Legro's researchshows
that organizationalcultures can mediate between internationalnorms and state
policy preferences.9
Whereas studies of domestic structuraldeterminantsof a norm's influence
are well developed, the same cannotbe said for the concept of domestic salience.
Scholars repeatedlyconclude that domestic salience is crucial to many cases of
states' compliance with internationalnorms, but they rarelyprovide definitions
or operational measures for the concept and, instead, merely assert that the
norm in question was salient.10
Furtherprogress on a domestic approachto internationalnorm compliance
hinges on the redress of two major shortcomings in the literature.First, insufficient attention has been devoted to the measurementof a norm's strength,
legitimacy, or salience in the domestic political arena." Second, the mechanisms and processes by which international norms can or cannot attain
theEconomy(New York:
8 See ibid.,esp. pp.900-907. Also, PeterHall,Governing
Oxford University Press, 1986); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank
Politics(Cambridge,
U.K.:CambridgeUniversityPress,
Longstreth,eds., Structuring
1992).
9 ThomasRisse-Kappen:
RelationsBackIn:Introduction,"
"BringingTransnational
in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing TransnationalRelations Back In: Non-State
Actors, Domestic Structuresand International Institutions (Cambridge,U.K.: Cam-
CoalibridgeUniversityPress,1995),and"IdeasDo Not FloatFreely:Transnational
tions,DomesticStructuresandthe Endof the ColdWar,"InternationalOrganization
48, No. 2 (1994),pp. 185-214;JeffreyT. Checkel,"Norms,InstitutionsandNational
StudiesQuarterly43 (1999),pp. 83Identityin Contemporary
Europe,"International
114;JeffreyW.Legro,"WhichNormsMatter?Revisitingthe 'Failure'of Internationalism," International Organization51, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31-63.
'0Forexamplesof researchwherethe domesticlegitimacyor salienceof an internationalnormor institutionhas playedan importantrole in promotingnormcompliInstitutions
ance,see CortellandDavis,"HowDo International
Matter?,"
esp.pp.471andSovereigntyin
472; KathrynSikkink,"HumanRights,PrincipledIssue-Networks,
LatinAmerica,"InternationalOrganization47, No. 3 (1993), pp. 411-441; Kevin
International
46,
Hartigan,"RefugeePoliciesin MexicoandHonduras,"
Organization
No. 3 (1992), pp. 709-730; Checkel,"Norms,Institutionsand NationalIdentityin
Interests."
Contemporary
Europe";andKlotz,"NormsReconstituting
11Foran exception,see Legro,"WhichNormsMatter?"
68
Cortell and Davis
domestic legitimacy remainunderexplored,as researchhas tended to be biased
toward processes and dynamics at the internationalsystem level.12
The two tasks are intimatelyrelated.Withouta clear definition of salience,
it is difficult to know what to observe or measure in the domestic political
context. Moreover,the identificationof the mechanismswhereby international
norms become domestically salient may lead to insights into variationsin the
degree of salience enjoyed by various internationalnorms in the domestic discourse. In turn,this should help to clarify the dimensions along which measures
for salience should be constructed.
The chief objective of this article is to identify avenues for subsequent
researchon the domestic impact of internationalnorms. The article operationalizes the concept of domestic salience and identifies several mechanisms and
conditions that may contributeto establishing the domestic salience of internationalnorms.The focus is not on understandinga particularinstanceof norm
compliance, but ratherthe factors that promote an internationalnorm's attaining the status of an "ought"in the domestic political arena.The goal is then to
provide a frameworkfor understandingwhy some internationalnormsresonate
in the domestic political discourse while others do not.
The article is organized in the following fashion. The first section defines
and operationalizes the concept of salience. The second section presents in
some detail hypothesized conditions and mechanisms leading to domestic
salience.The thirdsectiondiscusses the empiricalresearchnecessaryfor progress
towardthe formulationof testable, contingenthypotheses. The conclusion discusses the wider implications of this researchagenda.
THE DOMESTIC SALIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Internationalrules and norms have importanteffects by way of domestic political processes. The concept of salience highlights the varying strength of
12In a recent review of scholarship on norms and internationalpolitics, Martha
Finnemoreand KathrynSikkink tellingly focus almost exclusively on explaining the
emergence and operation of norms at the internationalsystem level, while largely
neglecting the growing body of literaturethat concentrateson the operationof inter-
NormDynamnationalnormsthroughdomesticpoliticalsystems.See "International
ics and Political Change,"InternationalOrganization52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 887-917.
The systems-level bias of this research has consequences. Analyses cast at the internationalsystem level are basically correlativeand capturegrouptendenciesratherthan
the effects of norms on particularstates and foreign policy decisions. If norms can be
counterfactuallyvalid, a point discussed below, a systems-level analysis of compliance will underestimatethe range of actors and decisions for which the norm was an
important,if not determinative,factor.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
69
internationalnorms-defined here as "prescriptionsfor action in situations of
choice"-within the domestic political context.13 Not all internationalrules
and norms will resonate in domestic debates. Rather,salience requiresa durable set of attitudestowardthe norm'slegitimacy in the nationalarena,such that
the norm is presumptively "accepted as a guide to conduct and a basis for
criticism, including self criticism."14 Salient norms give rise to feelings of
obligation by social actors and, when violated, engenderregretor a feeling that
the deviation or violation requiresjustification.15
When a norm is salient in a particularsocial discourse, its invocation by
relevant actors legitimates a particularbehavior or action, creating a prima
facie obligation, and thereby calling into question or delegitimatingalternative
choices.16 In policy disputes, claims based on salient norms shift and raise
the burden of justification necessary to overcome the claimant's position in
favor of competing options.17 To overcome the objection, one "must try to
show that the facts are not as they seem to be; or that the rule, properlyinterpreted,does not cover the conductin question;or thatsome othermatterexcuses
nonperformance."18
Yet the literatureon internationalnorms demonstratesthat there are multiple conceptual difficulties in measuring variationsin the domestic salience of
internationalnorms. For example, the danger of tautology is apparentin constructingvalid and reliable measures of a norm's salience in the domestic discourse. It would be easy, and wrong, to code a norm as salient merely because
state behavior is observed to be consistent with an existing internationalnorm.
13
Abram Chayes and Antonia HandlerChayes, The New Sovereignty:Compliance
withInternationalRegulatoryAgreements(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,
1995),p. 113.
14 RichardH. Fallon,"Reflections
on Dworkinandthe TwoFacesof Law,"Notre
Dame Law Review 67 (1992), as cited in Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty,p. 116.
For similardiscussions,see HerbertLionelAdolphusHart,TheConceptof Law,2d.
ed. (Oxford,U.K.:ClarendonPress,1994),pp. 56-57 and88-117; GregoryCaldeira
andJamesGibson,"TheLegitimacyof the Courtof Justicein the EuropeanUnion:
Models of Institutional Support," American Political Science Review 89 (1995),
p. 357.
15
Fora similarview of salience,see IanHurd,"LegitimacyandAuthorityin Inter-
national Politics," International Organization53, No. 2 (1999), p. 381.
'6Fora similardiscussionof the legitimatingfunctionof regimesin interstatedisof Principles,Norms,and Rules by
course,see HaraldMUller,"TheInternalization
TheCaseof SecurityRegimes,"in VolkerRittberger,
Governments:
ed.,RegimeTheory
and InternationalRelations(Oxford,U.K.:ClarendonPress,1993),p. 383.
'7See Kratochwil,Rules, Norms, and Decisions, chs. 4 and 5.
'8ChayesandChayes,New Sovereignty,p. 119.
Cortell and Davis
70
Needed are measures of salience that are independentof the particularbehavioral outcome being explained.'9
For their part, prominentinstitutionalistsfrom the rationalistand constructivist schools argue that the strength of a norm is a function of its level of
"institutionalization,"which means the embedding of the norm's tenets in the
state's constitutional,regulative,or judicial systems.20Precisely how and when
domesticallyembeddedinternationalinstitutionsinfuse actors'beliefs andthereby
affect behavior is underspecified. A more accurate-if less parsimoniousmeasurementof the domestic salience of a particularnorm would involve a
threefold investigation of changes in the national discourse, the state's institutions, and state policies.21
The first sign of an internationalnorm's domestic impact is its appearance
in the domestic political discourse.The introductionof internationalnorms into
the domestic discourse may come from state or societal actors and often takes
the form of demands for a change in the policy agenda. The proponentsof the
internationalnorm will invoke it to justify institutionalor policy change or to
delegitimize the preferencesof otherdomestic actors.Indicativeof the growing
salience of internationalinstitutionsis the formationof more organizedsocietal
groupingsdevoted to pressing for domestic institutionalchange or government
working groupsor committees chargedwith formulatingpolicy options consistent with the tenets of the internationalinstitution.
Changes in national institutions provide a second indication that a given
internationalnorm or the normativetenets of an internationalinstitutionhave
achieved more than nominal domestic salience. Institutionalchange comes in
several forms and degrees.22As a first step, the internationalnorm may be
embedded in domestic laws and procedures.The norm will enjoy greater salience if conflicting domestic institutions are eliminated or weakened, if
procedures are established that enable domestic actors to complain about
violations, if procedures exist or are created to sanction violations, or if a
'9For a similardiscussion,see RobertO. Keohane,"International
Relationsand
International Law: Two Optics," Harvard International Law Review 38 (1997),
p. 493.
20See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in
InternationalRelations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 4-5; Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, pp. 61-63.
21 HaroldKoh offers a
similarframework,arguingthat one might distinguish
norms.See "Why
of international
amongthe social,political,andlegalinternalization
Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?" YaleLaw Journal 106 (1997), pp. 26562657.
22 See the essays in Steinmoet al., eds., Structuring
Politics.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
71
state unit is created to monitor and implement compliance.23The more the
internationalnorm or institutionaccords with nationalinstitutionsand the more
numerous the mechanisms devoted to its reproductionand reinforcement,the
greaterits domestic salience.
A third indication of the level of salience enjoyed by an internationalnorm
involves analysis of the state's policies. The analysis may not be straightforward, as the state can change one policy to placate internationalor domestic
pressurebut fail to modify a host of otherpolicies and proceduresthatdiminish
or underminethe norm's impact. To gauge the implication of any one policy
change, requiresthe examinationof several policies, including those in related
issue areas.
Of the three measures of norm salience, discourse is the most importantif
also the least objective. This is true for several reasons. For one, changes in the
domestic discourse will precede and accompany changes in institutions and
policy and provide evidence as to the reasons for change. Less obvious is that
analysis of discourse can provide insights into "nonevents"that may be normgoverned. A focus on observable behaviormay be inappropriatefor explaining
situationswhere an actordid not choose a particularcourse of action, or did not
exploit an opportunityfor gain.24When certain behaviors are ruled out of the
range of acceptable alternatives, owing to internalizednormative constraints,
there may be no outward or observable behavioral traces on which to base
empirical analysis. Or, paradoxically,the most salient norms will be most evident when they are violated, as actors will feel a strong need to justify or
apologize for noncompliance.25
Measuringthe salience of norms requiresthe analyst to take actors' explanations for their behavior seriously, butjustifications need furtheranalysis. For
example, if an actor explains a particularbehavioralchoice in terms of a norm
or obligation, one would try to test the implications of that explanationin other
fields of behavior. If the norm governs behavior,a high degree of consistency
across related issues would be expected. Similarly, if an actor apologizes for
violating a norm and justifies noncompliance in terms of extenuating circumstances, then we would expect otherobservablebehaviorsand conditions. Mere
rationalizationscan be distinguished from forthrightjustifications because the
23
Koharguesthat"legalinternalization
normis incoroccurswhenaninternational
poratedinto the domesticlegal systemthroughexecutiveaction,judicialinterpretation,legislativeactionor somecombinationof thethree."See "WhyDo NationsObey
International
Law?,"p. 2657.
24See Peter Bachrachand MortonS. Baratz,"Decisionsand Nondecisions:An
Analytical Framework,"American Political Science Review 57 (1963), pp. 632-642.
25
On providingjustification,see Kratochwil,Rules, Norms, and Decisions, ch. 4.
72
Cortell and Davis
justifications can be reasonablyfit into a largerpatternof behavior and reconciled with prominentcontextual factors whereas the rationalizationscannot.
This approachto measuringnorm salience is admittedlyinterpretivist.Yet it
does yield a four-value scale-high, moderate,low, and not salient. When an
investigation of the domestic discourse, institutions, and policies shows the
norm'sobjectives, prescriptions,and proscriptionsto be uncontested,and when
domestic actors routinely invoke the norm to promote their interests, the norm
can be said to enjoy a high degree of salience. Somewhat less salient are those
norms for which the domestic discourse admits exceptions, reservations, and
special conditions. As long as such exceptions or deviations are embedded in
higherorder,principledunderstandings,andpermittedon nonidiosyncraticterms
and withoutinvidious discrimination,the normshouldretainsalience as a guide
to behavior and policy choice.26 Norms enjoying moderate salience then are
those that appear in the domestic discourse, producing some change in the
national agenda and the state's institutions, but still confront countervailing
institutions, procedures,and normativeclaims. When norms have entered the
national discourse but fail to produce an agenda or institutionalchange, they
can be said to enjoy a low degree of salience. Norms that lack domestic advocates or that are used to justify actions in purely idiosyncratic (nongeneralizable) terms are not considered salient.
Because internationalnorms vary in their degree of domestic salience, the
preceding discussion stresses the need for measurement.Yet the effect of a
particularnorm on behavior will rarely be a straightforwardresult of salience.
As FriedrichV. Kratochwiland John Ruggie have pointed out, norms are often
counterfactually valid and not "causes" of behavior that can be readily subsumed undera covering-law approachto explanation.27 Rather,the most important effects of salient norms result from processes of internalizationat the level
of the individual actor and persuasion at the level of discourse.
How Do
INTERNATIONAL NORMS BECOME
SALIENT DOMESTICALLY?
The previous section arguedthat a norm's domestic salience should be established by the analysis of nationaldiscourse, state institutions,and policies. But
26For a similarapproach,see ThomasRisse-Kappen,"PrincipledIdeas, InternationalInstitutions,and DomesticPoliticalChange:The Case of HumanRights";
unpublishedmanuscript(Konstanz:Universityof Konstanz,1995), pp. 10-11. See,
too,thediscussionof thelegitimacyof normsin ChayesandChayes,NewSovereignty,
pp. 127-134.
27FriedrichV. Kratochwiland John Gerard
A
Organization:
Ruggie,"International
No.
4
State of the Art on an Art of the State,"InternationalOrganization40,
(1986),
pp. 766-769.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
73
how are internationalnormsintroducedand embeddedinto these featuresof the
state's domestic politics?
This section draws on research in internationalpolitics and international
law to identify several plausible conditions, mechanisms, and processes that
contributeto the domestic salience of an internationalnorm. The discussion is
structuredaroundfive key factors.First,we addressthe "culturalmatch"between
the internationalnorm and nationalunderstandings,a factor that conditions the
impact of an internationalnorm once it enters the national arena. Second, the
analysis turns to four pathways or mechanisms throughwhich an international
normcan enterthe domestic arena:nationalpolitical rhetoric,the materialinterests of domestic actors, domestic political institutions, and socializing forces.
Whereas the first three mechanisms operateprimarilyat the level of domestic
politics, socializing forces generally emanate from interactionsat the level of
the state system.
The mechanisms should be regardedas neithercompeting explanationsnor
mutually exclusive. As suggested below, norm salience may be a function of
one or more of these factors in any one case. Before one can explore empirically how these conditions and mechanisms interrelate,it is necessary first to
identify and analyze each individually.
We do not address the interesting question of the origins of international
normshere. Many internationalnorms,such as those pertainingto humanrights,
have their origins in national discourses. The ways that new normativeunderstandings emerge and become salient in domestic contexts, and then come to
infuse internationalpolitics, is a worthwhile subject of analysis.28 The focus of
this analysis is limited to conditions and mechanisms mediating between the
existence of an internationalnorm and its impact on domestic politics and policy choice.
Cultural Match
Preexistingdomestic understandingsconditionthe impactof internationalnorms
in policy debates. Checkel refers to this condition as "culturalmatch."29 Using
the term "culture"captures why, if internationalnorms are to become salient
domestically, they need to resonatewith domestic norms, widely held domestic
understandings,beliefs, and obligations. The domestic discourse, then, provides the context within which the internationalnorm takes on meaning and
thereby conditions its operation.
28 Forexample,see EllenCarolDubois,"Woman
SuffragearoundtheWorld:Three
in CarlineDelaneyandMelanieNolan,eds.,
Phasesof SuffragistInternationalism,"
Suffrageand Beyond: InternationalFeminist Perspectives (New York:New YorkUni-
versityPress, 1994),pp. 252-274.
29Checkel,"Norms,InstitutionsandNationalIdentityin Contemporary
Europe."
74
Cortell and Davis
When such a cultural match exists, domestic actors are likely to treat the
internationalnorm as a given, instinctively recognizing the obligations associated with the norm.Domestic salience undersuch conditionsis automatic.Conversely, when the internationalnorm conflicts with understandings,beliefs, or
obligations established in the domestic sphere, domestic actors may then find
appeals to the internationalnorm to be ineffective in garneringsupport for a
particularpolicy.30 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl note that "althoughBritain
and Francemay face the same internationalnorms.. . the uniquenationalexperience of a country will make its propensity to follow that norm different."31
Similarly,aboutinternationaleconomic norms,RobertGilpinargues,"itis exceptionally difficult for tradeliberalizationto proceed when resistanceto increased
economic openness is located in the very natureof a society and in its national
priorities.... The existence of a liberal trade regime in a world composed
largely of 'illiberal' states is highly problematic."32
In some cases, recognition of an internationalnorm might be likened to
culturalimperialismor colonialism and cause domestic resistance or rejection.
Resistance to the norm might transcend societal distinctions or be limited to
particular groups within a society. For example, political elites might view
adheringto an internationalnorm as compromising the state's sovereignty or
their own capacity for rule. This appearsto be the case in many parts of Asia,
where ruling elites reject internationalcalls for policies reflecting Westernconceptions of humanrights and political pluralismwith appeals to the primacyof
"Asianvalues."33
Even if elites embracean internationalnorm,they may encounterresistance
from a domestic populace thatviews the norm'stenets as inconsistentwith their
30MargaretKeck and KathrynSikkink,Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Net-
Politics(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1998),reacha
worksin International
with
similarconclusion
respectto the abilityof transnational
advocacynetworksto
promotenormcompliance.Suchadvocacynetworks"aremorelikelyto be influential
if they fit well with existingideas and ideologiesin a particularhistoricalsetting"
(p. 204).
31
Norms:Some
GaryGoertzandPaulF. Diehl,"Towarda Theoryof International
ConceptualandMeasurementIssues,"Journalof ConflictResolution36 (1992), p. 653.
32RobertGilpin,"TheChangingTradeRegime,"in TakashiInoguchiandDaniel
Okimoto, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 2: The Changing International
Context(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress, 1988),p. 146. For an argument
normsthatreinforcedomesticprinciplesor standards
thatstatespromoteinternational
RelaPoliticsin International
of legitimacy,see G. JohnIkenberry,"Constitutional
tions," EuropeanJournal of InternationalRelations 4 (1998), pp. 162-164.
33
See RichardRobinson,"ThePoliticsof 'AsianValues,'"pp.309-327;GaryRodan,
"TheInternationalization
of IdeologicalConflict:Asia'sNew Significance,"pp. 328351;andMichaelFreeman,"HumanRights,Democracyand'AsianValues,'"pp.352366; all in Pacific Review 9, No. 3 (1996).
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
75
prevailing values, traditions,or aspirations.As for colonial America's embrace
of liberal neutrality rules, Mlada Bukovansky concludes: "Even if they had
wanted the U.S. to be a mercantiliststate on the British model (and they most
certainly did not), Jefferson,Madison, and Gallatinwould never have been able
to legitimate mercantilistprinciples on that basis. Their authorityand identity
lay in the promise to combat, not emulate, British mercantilism."34
The foregoing should not be read to imply that the relationship between
domestic understandingsand an internationalnorm'sdomestic salience reflects
an "either/or"dynamic-that is, it either resonates with the country's culture
and is salient, or it does not and is not. Rather, an internationalnorm might
confront a void about the behavior or issues it is intended to guide or regulate.
Ceterisparibus, the absence of preconceptionsand otheruniquenationalbeliefs
enhances the probability that the proponents of an international normdomestic or transnational-can establish the legitimacy of the international
norm in domestic discourse, laws, and institutions. Peter Haas writes:
If decisionmakershave no strongpreconceivedviews and beliefs aboutan
forthe firsttime,anepisteissue areain whichregulationis to be undertaken
mic communitycan have an even greaterimpactin shapingtheirinterpretations andactionsin this case andin establishingthe patternsof behaviorthat
they will follow in subsequentcases regardingthe issue area.35
Similarly, in a recent comparativestudy of norm diffusion, Checkel finds that
in Ukraine, which lacked a national normative frameworkabout questions of
national identity, newly empowered national elites have succeeded in institutionalizing "inclusive citizenship norms"developed by the Council of Europe.
As Checkel explains, "the lack of an institutionalized-and hence politically
influential-Soviet conception of identity has removed a potentbarrierto norm
diffusion."36
The fact that legitimating discourses are bounded by prevailing domestic
understandingsshouldnot obscurethe dynamicnatureof the relationshipbetween
domestic and internationalnormative structures. Both are usually evolving.
This implies that the match between the two sets of normative structuresmay
change over time-both greater consonance and dissonance are possibleand that the domestic salience of internationalnorms will vary accordingly.
34MladaBukovansky,"American
IdentityandNeutralRights,fromIndependence
to the Warof 1812," International Organization51, No. 2 (1997), p. 232.
35 PeterHaas,"Introduction:
andInternational
EpistemicCommunities
PolicyCoor-
dination,"International Organization46, No. 1 (1992), p. 29.
36JeffreyT. Checkel,"Norms,InstitutionsandNationalIdentityin Contemporary
Europe";unpublishedmanuscript(Universityof Pittsburgh,1996),p. 39.
76
Cortell and Davis
Culturalmatch as a condition mediating the domestic salience of international
norms is dynamic and malleable, as the discussion of rhetoricclarifies.
Rhetoric
The evolving nature of domestic normative understandingsdirects attention
toward political rhetoric-or persuasive discourse-as a mechanism for generatingcollective understandingsand the domestic salience of an international
norm.37
The pronouncementsof authoritativenational leaders illustrate how domestic understandingsaboutthe legitimacy of an internationalnormcan evolve.
Repeated declarations by state leaders on the legitimacy of the obligations
that an internationalnorm places on states usually raise the norm's salience
in the national arena. A single pronouncementof this type is unlikely to establish domestic salience. Instead, the effect of these declarations is cumulative. As authoritativeofficials set precedents and standardsfor themselves
and their successors, their normative pronouncements become part of the
society's legitimating discourse, establish intersubjectiveunderstandingsand
expectations at both the domestic and internationallevels, and constrain policy options.
The original embraceof an internationalnorm may be purely instrumental,
indeed cynical, yet still lead to salience. For example, Risse has documented
how authoritarianleaders' adoption of the rhetoric of universal human rights
norms in political strategies aimed at relieving outside pressures for domestic
reformor regainingforeign assistancehas legitimizedthese normsin theirstates'
domestic politics.38 As Risse notes, "if norm-violatinggovernmentsfind it necessary to makerhetoricalconcessions andto cease denyingthe validity of human
rights norms, this provides a discursive opening for their critics to challenge
them further:If you say that you accept humanrights, how come that [sic] you
37The effects of rhetoricaland persuasiveprocessesin international
politics are
and largely unexamined.See FrankSchimmelpfennig,
generallyunderappreciated
"RhetorischesHandeln in der internationalenPolitik," Zeitschriftfiir Internationale
Beziehungen 4 (1997), pp. 219-254; also Kratochwil,Rules, Norms, and Decisions,
esp. ch. 5.
Normsinto DomesticPrac38ThomasRisse, "TheSocializationof International
tices: Arguingand the StrategicAdaptationin the HumanRightsArea";paperpreparedfortheconferenceon "Ideas,CultureandPoliticalAnalysis,"PrincetonUniversity,
NormsandDomesticPolMay 15-16, 1998;also see JeffreyCheckel,"International
itics: Bridging the Rationalist-ConstructivistDivide," European Journal of International Relations 3 (1997), pp. 473-495, and DarrenHawkins, "DomesticResponses
to InternationalPressure:HumanRights in AuthoritarianChile," EuropeanJournal of
InternationalRelations 3 (1997), pp. 403-434.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
77
violate them systematically?"39 The domestic debate then shifts from being
concerned with whetherthe norm is legitimate to one concerningwhy it should
not be consistently applicable.
The rhetoric of societal leaders can also enhance the salience of international norms in the domestic political arena. The literatureon social movements finds that the leaders of such movements often cast their demands in
terms of internationalnorms, either making the case for national applicability
or decrying the state's failure to comply with internationalobligations. Across
a range of issue areas and national contexts, the appeals of societal leaders to
internationalnormshave succeededin establishingtheirsalience in widerdomestic political debates.40
Preexisting national understandingsmay provide argumentsboth for and
against accepting the internationalnorm.In situationswhere the matchbetween
the internationalnorm and prevailing domestic understandingsis partial, proponents of the internationalnorm face a political and rhetorical struggle that
will requirethem to argue convincingly for the priorityof one set of domestic
understandingsover others.
Domestic Interests
The society's legitimating discourse may also evolve due to considerationsof
material interest as espoused by state or societal groups. This mechanism can
also produce a congruence between domestic and internationalnorms where
one had not previously existed.
Studieshave demonstratedthatinternationalnormsaremorelikely to become
salient if they are perceived to support importantdomestic material interests,
whether economic or security. It is probably not enough to invoke an international norm as supportinga narrowdomestic materialinterest. Instead, one
must connect the particularinterest with the nation's more general beliefs and
durablenationalpriorities.For example, G. JohnIkenberryarguesthatthe Bretton Woods system, and the normativetenets thatJohn Ruggie terms"embedded
liberalism," were successful and politically possible because they "allowed
political leaders and social groups across the political spectrum [in the United
States and Britain]to envisage a postwareconomic orderin which multiple and
39Risse,"Socializationof International
Norms,"p. 19.
40See,forexample,NitzaBerkovitch,
"TheInternational
Women'sMovement:
Transformationsof Citizenship,"andDavidFranket al., "TheRationalization
andOrganizationof Naturein WorldCulture,"in JohnBoli andGeorgeM. Thomas,eds., World
Polity Formation since 1875: World Culture and International Non-Governmental
Organizations(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,1997).
Cortell and Davis
78
otherwise competing political objectives could be combined."41 In this way,
internationalnorms can serve to "bridgedomestic rifts, allowing for the convergence of diverse materialand ideal interests into a national interest."42
The argumentis basicallyWeberian.43Internationalnormscan become salient
in the domestic discourse by being linked to importantmaterialinterests, but
they are not easily reducible to those interests. Precisely which norms will
become salient in the domestic political arenawill be historically contingent, a
function of human agency in rhetoricalor political processes. Any numberof
internationalnorms may be consistent with a given constellation of domestic
interests.This is generally the case in regulatoryor technology standardization
questions, but the issue arises elsewhere, even in such "highpolitics" areasas a
state's security policy.
For example, a central principle of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) I regime was the desirabilityof locking in secure mutualsecond-strike
capabilityas a prop for stable nucleardeterrence.44Centralto this goal was the
Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,which limited strategicdefenses on both
sides to strategicallyinsignificantdeployments.In pursuitof treatyratification,
officials in the Nixon administrationstressed the benefits of establishing the
norm of "no strategicdefenses" as regulative of U.S.-Soviet strategicrelations
rather than the alternative and more encompassing norm of "mutual non-
41 G.
JohnIkenberry,"CreatingYesterday'sNew WorldOrder:Keynesian'New
in JudithGoldsteinandRobPostwarSettlement,"
Thinking'andtheAnglo-American
ert 0. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1993),pp. 57-86, quoteon pp.78-79.
See, too, Ikenberry,"AWorldEconomyRestored:ExpertConsensusandthe AngloAmericanPost-War
International
Settlement,"
46, No. 1 (1992),pp.289Organization
322. Forthe originalarticulationof the conceptof embeddedliberalism,see JohnG.
andChange:EmbeddedLiberalismin
Regimes,Transactions,
Ruggie,"International
Economic
in
the Postwar
Order," Krasner,ed., International
Regimes,pp. 195-232.
"American
and
Neutral
Rights,"p. 217. Similarly,Bier42Bukovansky,
Identity
of
Neoclassical
steker,"'Triumph'
Economics,"p. 120. The theoreticalpoint was
madein JosephNye, "NuclearLearningand U.S.-SovietSecurityRegimes,"Inter-
national Organization41, No. 3 (1987), pp. 372, 400.
43 Moreprecisely,it follows his notionof an "electiveaffinity"betweenideational
in
andmaterialinterests.See MaxWeber,"DieWirtschaftsethik
derWeltreligionen,"
GesammelteAufsiitzezur Religionssoziologie (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1947), vol. 1,
pp. 237-275, especiallyp. 252. See, too, H. H. GerthandC. WrightMills, eds. and
trans., From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1948), pp. 62-65.
44 See HenryA. Kissinger,"Detentewiththe SovietUnion:The Realityof Compe-
titionandthe Imperativeof Cooperation";
statementto the SenateCommitteeon ForState
Bulletin71 (1974).
eign Relations,September19, 1974,
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
79
vulnerability."45 Arguably, each was consistent with the general principle of
ensuringsecuresecond-strikecapabilityandwith U.S. securityinterestsas understood then. The results of having legitimized the no strategic defenses norm
insteadof the mutualnonvulnerabilitynormhadprofoundimplicationsfor future
force postures and the arms race. New technological innovations such as Multiple Independently-targetableReentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) were consistentwith a normof no strategicdefenses,
but might have been more successfully challenged by their critics if mutual
nonvulnerabilityhad been the domestically salient norm.46
Domestic Institutions
A fourth factor contributing to the salience of an internationalnorm is the
state's domestic political institutions. Domestic political institutions provide
the rules of the game for citizens and state officials, establish rights and obligations, identify what is legitimate and what is not, and, in the process, help
nationalactorsdefine theirinterestsdomestically and internationally.The incorporationof an internationalnorminto domestic institutionsenhancesits salience,
as argues the eminent internationallawyer Louis Henkin: "Wheninternational
law or some particularnorm or obligation is accepted, national law will reflect
it, the institutions and personnel of governmentwill take account of it, and the
life of the people will absorbit."47
Social scientists have reached similar conclusions from empirical research.
Forexample,Audie Klotz foundthatthe global racialequalitynormwas salientin
U.S. policy debates only after being incorporatedinto domestic legal frameworks: "by institutionalizinga new tenet of policy-that majorityrule in South
Africa must be encouraged-passage of the CAAA [Comprehensive AntiApartheidAct] inaugurateda periodof moreconsistentU.S. oppositionto whiteminorityrulein SouthAfrica."48 Similarly,KevinHartiganmaintainsthattheweak
impactof internationalrefugeelaws on Mexico andHondurasis explainedbecause
45See Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:American-SovietRela-
tionsfrom Nixonto Reagan(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1985), ch. 5,
esp. pp. 191-192.
46 Fordiscussionsof theproblemMIRVed
ICBMcreatedforarmscontrolanddeterrence,see HenryKissinger,Yearsof Upheaval(Boston:Little,Brown,1982),pp.269274; Paul Nitze, "The Relationshipof Strategic and TheaterNuclear Forces,"
International Security 2 (1977), pp. 122-132; Strobe Talbott,Deadly Gambits (New
York:Knopf, 1984), esp. chs. 13 and 16. Also see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
47 Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York:Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 60.
48
Klotz,"NormsReconstituting
Interests,"p. 476.
80
Cortell and Davis
"neither country's laws mention the concept of refugee, and neither country is a
signatory of the 1951 convention or the 1967 protocol on refugees. ... [Moreover,] changes in refugee policy were not accompanied in either country by the
ratification of international legal instruments [or] by changes in domestic laws." 49
A common effect of international norm creation is the simultaneous creation of vested interests and bureaucratic routines in a state's institutions:
When, in the HeadquartersAgreement with the United Nations, the United
States agreedthatmembersof foreign delegationsto the United Nations should
enjoy diplomatic immunity from arrest,that agreementwas built into the life
of New York.The laws of New Yorkreflect the agreement,police regulations
provide for it, the individual policeman is taught it, the citizen-grumbling
perhaps,-acquiesces....
In morecomplicatedways, acceptedinternationalarrangements-whetherof the
UniversalPostal Union, or NATO,or a fisheries convention-launch theirown
dynamism,theirown bureaucracywith vested interestsin compliance,theirown
resistancesto violation andto interferenceandfrustration.The EuropeanCommunityagreementsareobserved,in part,becausethey havebeenacceptedin membercountriesandenmeshedin nationalinstitutions;therearenationalbureaucrats
whose job it is to assurethatthe agreementsare carriedout;powerful domestic
groupshave stronginterestsin maintainingthese agreements.5:
The link between standard operating procedures and other institutional structures of bureaucratic agencies and the external normative environment in which
such agencies operate is studied across various disciplines and confirmed by
international law scholars,"5 the literature on international regimes,52 as well as
students of organizational behavior and psychology.53
49Hartigan,"Refugee Policies in Mexico and Honduras,"pp. 715, 717.
50Henkin, How Nations Behave, p. 61. A skeptic of deontic arguments, Robert
Keohane has proposed the concept of domestic institutionalenmeshmentas a mechanism whereby internationalnorms can affect state behavior. See "Compliance with
InternationalCommitments:Politics within a Frameworkof Law,"American Society
of InternationalLaw Proceedings 86 (1992), esp. p. 179.
51 For
example, Lauren B. Edelman et al., "Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of
Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers' Dilemma," Law and Policy 13 (1991),
pp. 73-97.
52For examples, see Nye, "NuclearLearning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,"
pp. 371-402; JohnS. Duffield, "InternationalRegimes andAlliance Behavior:Explaining NATOCounterForceLevels,"InternationalOrganization46, No. 4 (1992), pp. 819855; and Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural
Resources and the Environment(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
53 See Charles O'Reilly, "Corporations,Culture and Commitment:Motivation and
Social Control in Organizations,"California ManagementReview 31 (1989), pp. 925; Charles O'Reilly and Jennifer Chatman,"OrganizationalCommitment and Psy-
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
81
The foregoing discussion suggests that once internationalnorms become
enmeshed in domestic institutions,their prescriptionswill have an impact over
time on the interestsand actions of nationalactors. Habitualcompliance with or
application of the norm can lead to its salience, as it is seen as a "domestic"
character.
process and assumes a "taken-for-granted"
SocializingForces
Socialization, or the process by which new memberscome to adopt a society's
preferredways of behaving, has been studied by realist, liberal institutionalist,
and constructivistscholars of internationalpolitics.54Existing scholarshiphas
demonstratedthat among the principaleffects of internationalsocialization are
stable patternsof state interaction.Most analyses have studiedthe phenomenon
at the internationalsystem level. Yet the effects of internationalsocialization go
much deeper. Socialization provides an additionalmechanism by which international norms can become salient in the domestic political arena.
Classical realists, such as HenryKissinger,maintainthatthe constructionof
stable internationalorders is dependent upon the successful linkage of state
interests to internationallegitimizing principles. Socialization from this perspective is the process of reconciling states' (in particularrevolutionarystates')
individual aspirationsto generally accepted standards.55As Kissinger's historical analysis informs, internationalnorms became salient in domestic political
struggles as states were socialized to the Vienna system. He argues that Prince
Metternich'sconstructionof a legitimate internationalorder,based on conservative monarchicalprinciples,"enabledAustriato avoid the hardchoice between
domestic reform and revolutionary struggle; to survive with an essentially
unaltered domestic structure in a century of rationalized administration;to
TheEffectson Compliance,IdentificationandInternalization
chologicalAttachment:
of ProsocialBehavior,"JournalofAppliedPsychology71 (1986),pp.492-499; Edelmanet al., "LegalAmbiguityandthe Politicsof Compliance,"
esp. pp. 74-76.
54For a varietyof approaches
to the issue, see Waltz,Theoryof InternationalPolandTransformation
in the
itics, pp. 74-77 and 127-128;JohnG. Ruggie,"Continuity
WorldPolity:Towarda NeorealistSynthesis,"in RobertO. Keohane,ed., Neorealism
andIts Critics(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1986),especiallypp. 141-148;
HendrikSpruyt,"Institutional
Selectionin International
Relations:StateAnarchyas
Order,"InternationalOrganization48, No. 4 (1994), pp. 527-57; andAlexanderWendt,
"AnarchyIs whatStatesMakeof It."
55The distinctionbetweenstatusquo and revolutionaryor revisioniststateswas
forgotten(or rejected)by Waltzandhis studentsbuthas been rediscoveredby a new
for Profit:
generationof realistscholars.See RandallL. Schweller:"Bandwagoning
the
Revisionist
State
Back
International
19
In,"
Bringing
Security (1994),pp.72-102,
and"Neorealism's
StatusQuoBias:WhatSecurityDilemma?"
SecurityStudies5 (1996),
pp. 90-121.
82
Cortell and Davis
continue a multi-nationalEmpire in a period of nationalism."Moreover, by
reconcilingFranceto the Concertof Europeat the Conferenceof Aachen (1818),
the powers enhanced the prospects that the Duc de Richelieu and Louis XVIII
would survive continueddomestic turbulence.In linking France'sinternational
interests to the principle of monarchical legitimacy and the rule of law, the
powers strengthenedthe principle in Franceitself, where a large proportionof
the populationremained committed to revolutionarygoals and methods.56As
states became socialized to the post-Napoleonic order,the monarchicalprinciple was strengthenedand republicannationalismsimultaneouslydelegitimized
in domestic politics across Europe.
The effects of internationalsocialization today are seen in the policies of
the successor states to the Soviet Union. For example, Scott D. Sagan found
thatwidespreadinternationalacceptanceof the normsassociatedwith the Nuclear
Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) convinced Ukraine's leadership that renunciation of nuclear weapons was a necessary step toward achieving international
standing:"theNPT regime createda history in which the most recent examples
of new or potential nuclear states were so-called 'rogue states' such as North
Korea, Iran and Iraq. This was hardly a nuclear club whose new members
would receive internationalprestige."57 But "rogue states"do exist. Socialization is most likely and will require less effort when state leaders "aspire to
belong to a normativecommunityof nations.This desire implies a view of state
preferences that recognizes states' interactionsas a social-and socializingprocess."
Numerous scholars have pointed to "internalreconstruction"as a method
of socializing states to a particularinternationalorder.Those working in the
realist tradition have found the internal reconstruction of weaker states by
more powerful states to be a common feature of internationalrelations, particularly during periods of hegemony. As G. John Ikenberry and Charles
Kupchannote,
The hegemondirectlyintervenesin the secondarystate and transformsits
domesticpoliticalinstitutions.. . . Thehegemonimportsnormativeprinciples
aboutdomesticandinternational
politicalorder,oftenembodyingtheseprinciples in institutionalstructuresandin constitutionsor otherwrittenproclamations.The processof socializationtakesplace as elites in the secondary
56Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of
Peace 1812-22 (Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1957),p. 322.Also see PaulW.Schroeder,
The Transformationof EuropeanPolitics, 1763-1848 (Oxford,U.K.: ClarendonPress,
1994), pp. 554-557, 591-593.
57 Scott D. Sagan, "WhyDo States Build NuclearWeapons?ThreeModels in Search
of a Bomb," InternationalSecurity 21 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86, quote on p. 81.
58Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, p. 29.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
83
statebecome accustomedto these institutionsand graduallycome to accept
themas theirown.59
The ease with which the hegemon will achieve its goals is probablya function
of not only its own capabilities, but also the size of the gap between its preferrednormativeorderand preexisting beliefs and understandingsin the target
state.60
Scholars working in the liberal traditionor coming from a social constructivist perspective have found that socialization can occur as a result of the
actions of nonstate actors and may involve use of "soft"power resources, such
as moral leverage and technical knowledge. In a study of the diffusion of international science norms, Martha Finnemore found that "states were socialized
by internationalorganizationsand an internationalcommunity of experts-in
this case scientists-to accept the promotionand direction of science as a necessary and appropriaterole." The result has been the proliferationof national
bureaucraciesdevoted to science.61 MargaretKeck and KathrynSikkink identify transnationaladvocacy networks as another avenue where states come to
adopt internationalnorms. These transnationalgroups succeed not only "by
holding governments... accountableto previous commitments and the principles they have endorsed,"but also by framingtheir ideas in ways that "resonate
or fit with the largerbelief systems" of the target states.62
Widely recognized, the effects of socialization are neither one way nor
irreversible. Over time, the degree to which domestic actors regard an internationalnormas legitimate may hinge upon how much otherstates adhereto its
tenets.63Widescale noncomplianceby other states may inspire domestic actors
to challenge the norm's legitimacy and utility as a guide to behavior.Insofaras
both internationaland domestic legitimizing discourses are dynamic, the meaning of an internationalnorm and the proper bounds of its applicability in a
given domestic discourse may evolve, and not necessarily in lock-step with
similar evolutions in other states or interstatediscourses. Furtherresearchinto
andCharlesA. Kupchan,"Socialization
andHegemonicPower,"
59G.JohnIkenberry
International Organization44, No. 3 (1990), p. 292.
60Ibid.,pp. 313-314.
61 Martha
as Teachersof Norms:TheUnited
Finnemore,"International
Organizations
NationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization
andSciencePolicy,"International Organization47, No. 4 (1993), p. 593.
62
KeckandSikkink,ActivistsbeyondBorders,pp. 201, 204.
Amongothers,the argumentis madeby Ann Florini,"TheEvolutionof InternationalNorms,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly40 (1996), pp. 363-389; Richard
Civil SocietyTargetsLandMines,"
Price,"Reversingthe GunSights:Transnational
InternationalOrganization52, No. 3 (1998), pp. 613-644; and Finnemoreand SikNormDynamics,"pp. 901-904.
kink,"International
63
84
Cortell and Davis
the relationshipbetween the effects of socializing forces on the international
system and states' domestic politics is required because it remains poorly
understood.
PATHWAYS TO EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The previous section identified several plausible conditions and mechanisms
mediating between the existence of an internationalnorm and its salience in
domestic political debates. The necessary next step is empiricalresearchfocusing on how specific internationalnorms have and have not become salient in
several nationalcontexts.64 The pathwaysabove provide a startingpoint for the
development of inductively derived contingent hypotheses on the conditions
and mechanisms that produce the domestic salience of internationalnorms.65
Although inductive, the approachis not atheoretical.By investigating the
process or processes that led an internationalnorm to attaindomestic salience
in a particularcase, one seeks to identify conditions that may yield (or mediate
the effects of) that process in other cases. The goal of "processtracing"in this
instance is hypothesis generation.Before one proceeds toward a more general
theory linking internationalnorms and domestic discourse, a necessary first
step is the development of a set of conditional hypotheses relating initial conditions (including the presence of an internationalnorm) to outcomes (including the domestic salience of the norm).66Such a research agenda will help to
overcome some of the problemsthat others contend characterizeconstructivist
researchon norms, specifically the tendency to rely on correlationsas evidence
that norms "matter."67
Whereas the routes to domestic salience may be many and because knowledge of the mechanisms is limited, initial analysis should be flexible and process oriented.This approachcan help researchersremainopen to the possibility
64As notedby Paul Kowertand
JeffreyLegro,the literaturehas generallybeen
biasedtowardstudyingthose normsthathave affectedstatepolicies. See "Norms,
Identityand TheirLimits:A TheoreticalReprise,"in PeterJ. Katzenstein,ed., The
Cultureof National Security:Normsand Identityin WorldPolitics (New York:Colum-
bia UniversityPress,1996),p. 485.
65 Fora discussionof the
problemsassociatedwithexplainingthe effectsof norms
of
see
means
deduction, GregoryRaymond,"ProblemsandProspectsin the Study
by
of InternationalNorms,"MershonInternationalStudiesReview41 (1997), pp. 235-36.
66Onthe methodof processtracing,see AlexanderL. GeorgeandTimothyMcKeDecisionMaking,"Advancesin
own, "CaseStudiesandTheoriesof Organizational
InformationProcessing in Organizations2 (1985), pp. 21-58.
67 See, for
RelaTurnin International
example,JeffreyCheckel,"TheConstructivist
tionsTheory,"WorldPolitics50 (1998),p. 337.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
85
that the mechanisms and processes identified in the previous section may offer
complementaryratherthan competing routes to domestic salience.68
Because there may be multiple sufficient causes or mechanisms producing
domestic salience (the problem of equifinality), some of which are unknown
so far, generating hypotheses through deductive entailment would limit our
ability to generate knowledge and would provide little basis for moving beyond initial assumptions.Before we can move towardthe constructionof more
rigorous models that may provide interesting deductions, we need to catalogue the range of phenomena to be explained. The implications of equifinality underscorethe need for an inductive,process-orientedapproachto hypothesis
development.
One strategy for this type of hypothesis generation is the use of comparative case studies.69 Cases should be selected based on variation in relevant
outcomes. That is, one should look for cases where a given internationalnorm
enjoyed various degrees of salience across national contexts, as well as cases
where similar norms achieved various degrees of salience within a given domestic discourse. Longitudinal studies that investigate variation in the salience of a given norm over time provide a third source of data. Because the
goal is generating hypotheses and not testing for sufficient causation, arguments against selecting cases on the value of the dependent variable are not
applicable.
Of course, the approachescan be combined. One might examine variations
in the salience of the internationalnorm of free trade in a state such as Japan,
where the norm has become more accepted over time, with a view toward
identifying those factors that have hinderedas well as those that have fostered
the norm's domestic salience.70 One might then compare the Japanese case to
the history of the free trade norm in other states, such as the Federal Republic
of Germany.Although postwar Germany and Japan share similar positions in
the internationaleconomic order and were exposed to many of the same internationalforces thatwe have identified as possible pathwaysto salience, the free
trade norm's legitimacy was accepted much earlier in Germany,where it has
the problemsassociatedwith viewing differentanalyticalrelationshipsas
simplycompeting,see RonaldL. Jepperson,AlexanderWendt,andPeterJ. Katzenstein, "Norms,Identity,and Culturein NationalSecurity,"in Katzenstein,ed., The
68On
Cultureof National Security, pp. 68-72.
69Fora similarargument,see MichaelZiirn,"TheRise of International
Environmental Politics: A Review of CurrentResearch,"WorldPolitics 50 (1998), esp.
pp. 641-42.
70Thisexampledrawson AndrewP. CortellandJamesW.Davis,Jr.,"UnderstandInstitutions:The Case of Japanand
ing the DomesticConsequencesof International
theGATT/WTO";
Institutions:
Glopaperpresentedattheconferenceon International
bal Processes-Domestic Consequences,DukeUniversity,April 1999.
86
Cortell and Davis
also had much greater impact in domestic policy debates.71A cross-national
comparison of this sort might help to identify scope conditions affecting the
operationof the various pathways to salience.
What we are proposing at this stage is modest. It involves the use of case
studies as "buildingblocks" towarda more general theory of domestic salience
ratherthan "tests"of a fully developed model or theory.72 Persuadedthat the
logic of discovery is somewhatdifferentfrom the logic of testing, we anticipate
movement toward more rigorous tests-and perhapsancillaryhypothesis generation through deduction-at a future stage of research. Before much confidence can be ascribed to the validity of inductively derived propositions, they
need to be subjectedto analysis across a much wider range of cases than those
from which they were generated.
CONCLUSION
In the proliferatingscholarshipon norms in internationalpolitics, analystshave
found that domestic political factors often mediate the impact of international
normson policy choice. In additionto domesticpolitical structures,this research
suggests that the effects of an internationalnorm cannot be understoodindependent of the norm's salience in the domestic political discourse.
To date, this research has suffered from two central shortcomings. First,
therehas been little effort directedat constructingmeasuresof norm salience or
legitimacy in the domestic political arena. Second, the mechanisms or pathways by which internationalnorms come to infuse domestic understandings
have not been studied systematically. These questions are central to progress
toward a more comprehensive understandingof the effects of norms on international politics.
To redress these shortcomings and promote further research, this article
offers a means for measuringvariationin the domestic salience of international
norms.Moreover,it identifies severalmechanismsby which internationalnorms
may enter and take on meaning in the domestic discourse. The hope is that
empirical investigations of these mechanisms will lead to the formulation of
71Fora reviewof postwarGermany'sembraceof the free tradenorm,see Norbert
in KarlKaiserandHannsW.
als Weltwirtschaftsmacht,"
Kloten,"DieBundesrepublik
Maull, eds., Deutschlands Neue Auflenpolitik(Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995),
vol. 1, pp. 63-80.
72In doingso, we proposethe adoptionof a researchstrategyset forthby Andrew
BennettandAlexanderL. Georgein "DevelopingandUsingTypologicalTheoriesin
CaseStudyResearch";
AnnualConventionof the
paperpresentedat theThirty-Eighth
International
StudiesAssociation,Toronto,Canada,March18-22, 1997.
Understandingthe Domestic Impact of InternationalNorms
87
more precise hypotheses regardingwhen internationalnorms will have more or
less impact on state behavior.
Finally, an investigation of the processes linking domestic and international
norms may requireexplorations of the impact of various internationalregimes
on states' domestic politics. This research should also lead to a better understanding of the domestic bases of support for internationalinstitutions, a significant weakness of existing regime theory.73
73 Onthispoint,seeAndreas
PeterMayer,andVolkerRittberger,
"InterHasenclaver,
ests, Power,Knowledge:TheStudyof International
Regimes,"MershonInternational
Studies Review 40, No. 2 (1996), p. 221.