southeast asia`s terror threat: assessing the risks

SOUTHEAST ASIA’S
TERROR THREAT:
ASSESSING THE RISKS
DOMINO THEORY REDUX?
By Bill Tarrant, Deputy Editor, Southeast Asia
A half-century ago, Washington worried about Southeast Asian
nations falling like dominoes to an international communist
movement backed by Maoist China, and became bogged
down in the Vietnam War.
The ideology that animates the movements -- Islam -- also
prevents it from incorporating as well. The religion does not
have hierarchies. People can have different views. The jihadist
groups don't do politburos.
More recently, Southeast Asia was seen as the "second front"
in a global war on terror that began after the 9/11 suicide
airliner attacks, with an international brand of jihadism
replacing communism as the main threat to these nations.
A key issue for investors is the extent to which further militant
violence could undermine regional markets -- and how to
ensure their own security when travelling in the danger zone.
Reuters has taken a look at these issues -- including for
investors in the region -- in a package of stories. Read on for
more analysis and insight on Southeast Asia's Islamic
insurgencies.
The killing of one of Asia's most wanted men, Noordin Top, on
Sept. 17 was a coup in the decade-old battle against
Southeast Asia's violent Islamist movements.
Top had proclaimed himself al Qaeda's leader in Southeast
Asia. His death raises questions about how effective his group
can be without him.
Top and his allies in Jemaah Islamiah (JI) aimed to create an
Islamic caliphate across Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
southern Thailand and Southern Philippines. Even before the
9/11 suicide airliner attacks, they were trying to spark an
Islamic revolution with ambitious plots and attacks.
Their young foot soldiers dreamed these pro-Western nations
(which had banded together to form ASEAN under the U.S.
military umbrella at the height of the Vietnam War in 1967)
might fall like dominoes to the righteousness of an Islamic
jihad. Their martyrdom to the cause would given them a
blissful reward in heaven.
But just as Communism was not the monolith it was feared to
be in the 1960s -- China and the Soviet Union had split for one
thing -- so too has the Southeast Asian jihadist movement
failed to cohere into a singular movement.
Vietnam, it turned out, was fighting what it believed to be a war
of national liberation, and was (still is) historically suspicious of
China. Al Qaeda's jihad in Southeast Asia has stumbled over
similar misconcpetions.
JI's former military commander, Indonesian Riduan Isamuddin
or "Hambali", tried to pull together various insurgencies in the
region under an al Qaeda umbrella before he was captured in
Thailand in 2003. He even helped sponsor an "al Qaeda
summit" with bin Laden's lieutenants in Kuala Lumpur in 2000.
He failed mostly because the groups had different agendas
and a fragmented leadership. JI wants to establish its Islamic
caliphate. Thai separatist groups are fighting an ethnonationalist rebellion for a separate state. Rebels in the
Philippines want autonomy for Muslim Mindanao Island.
CONTENTS
3.
Analysis: Economic Terrorism Risks
4.
Table: Southeast Asian Insurgencies
5.
Scenarios: Regional Risks
6.
Analysis : Fragmented but Dangerous
7.
Factbox: Jemaah Islamiyah
8.
Q+A : Militant networks
9.
Analysis : How can companies respond ?
10.
Changing Militants’ Mindset
12.
How Militants Recruit
14.
Newsmaker : Nordin Mohammad Top
15.
Timeline : Jemaah Islamiyah Attacks
15.
Factbox : Abu Sayyaf
16.
Q+A : Thailand’s Insurgency
17.
Analysis : Indonesia’s Sharia Dilemma
18.
Factbox : Surviving Hotel Attacks
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ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC
TERRORISM RISKS
By Andrew Marshall, Asia Political Risk Correspondent
SINGAPORE - If the suicide bombers
who targeted two luxury hotels in
Jakarta this year hoped their attacks
would strike a significant long-term
blow against Indonesia's economy, the
reaction of financial markets suggests
they were wrong.
Economic warfare is at the heart of the
tactics of terrorism. A few militants with
primitive and low-cost weaponry can
cause economic destruction that
reverberates far beyond the physical
damage they inflict, impacting whole
industries and countries.
But the overwhelming evidence from
militant attacks over recent decades is
that the impact is almost always
temporary. In the long run, economies
and markets are remarkably resilient.
From the hijacked airliner attacks in
the United States on Sept.11, 2001, to
the suicide blasts at nightclubs in Bali
in 2002 and the Madrid and London
train bombings of 2004 and 2005,
markets have reacted in a highly
consistent pattern.
Domestic equities, bonds and the local
currency suffer a knee-jerk sell-off.
Risk appetite drops sharply and there
is a swift flight to quality, with investors
seeking the sanctuary of U.S.
Treasuries, and sometimes selected
commodities and gold.
But within weeks -- and usually days -asset prices recover. In the first trading
session after the 2002 Bali bombings,
the Jakarta stock market plunged more
than 10 percent and the rupiah dived
3.7 percent. But within 24 days stocks
were back at pre-attack levels, and the
rupiah recovered within 5 weeks.
risk averse and prone to panic and a
herd mentality in the face of
uncertainty and danger. For bold
investors, asset price weakness in the
wake of militant attacks is a clear
buying opportunity.
Second, once the initial panic eases,
investors take a more rational look at
the medium-term economic impact.
The direct economic impact in terms of
physical damage and loss of human
capital is much less of an issue than
the question of whether the attacks
have spill-over consequences that
magnify their cost.
To give one extreme scenario, a
militant attack that led to conflict
between India and Pakistan could
have a devastating global effect far
beyond the initial damage.
Thirdly, the micro impact of attacks
can be more serious than the macro.
While economies are resilient, sectors
such as airlines, tourism and insurance
are much more vulnerable. Portfolio
diversification can reduce this risk.
Finally, the extent to which attacks
have a long-term market impact on
industries and countries depends on
whether they cause investors to reevaluate
their
long-term
risk
assessments.
The 2002 Bali bombings fundamentally
changed perceptions of Indonesian
risk for investors and tourists. Later
attacks had less impact because the
higher risk level was already priced in.
Subsequent bombings in Indonesia
had far less impact even in terms of
short-run reaction. After the hotel
blasts in July, stocks sank 2.7 percent
but ended trade just 0.6 percent down.
LESSONS LEARNED
So what are the lessons for investors
and risk managers?
Firstly, the initial market impact from
terror attacks is likely to be overdone
and to unwind over subsequent days.
WORST-CASE SCENARIOS
In the southeast Asian context, this
means that even if militants in
Indonesia or the Philippines are able to
launch new attacks, the risk for
portfolio investors is limited.
The reasons can be found in human
nature -- behavioral economists have
shown that people tend to be naturally
A much more significant issue would
be if the risk profile of other countries
in the region changed dramatically.
3
Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are
key flashpoints -- the risks that
militants launch damaging attacks on
major economic or tourist targets is
widely regarded as low, but the longterm economic impact would be
disproportionately
high
because
country risk estimates would be
fundamentally re-rated.
For Indonesia and the Philippines,
many of the risks are on the upside -- if
either country can demonstrate it is
making
sustained
progress
on
reducing the threat from terrorism,
country risk ratings will be revised in a
favorable direction.
But this does not make Indonesian or
Philippine markets immune from
negative terrorism risk. The key issue
is whether insurgents can launch
attacks that would cause political
turmoil.
Indonesia has been a bullish story for
investors this year due to improved
economic and political stability and
expectations that President Susilo
Bambang Yodhoyono, newly returned
for a second term with a strong
mandate, will pursue much needed
market-friendly reforms and crack
down on graft.
But risk analysts worry that Indonesia's
progress is highly dependent on
Yudhoyono's personal power and
popular support. He has no obvious
successor who would have the
powerbase and determination to
maintain
stability
and
continue
reforms.
After the July bombings, Yudhoyono
said
militants
were
using
his
photograph for target practice. Police
said they had foiled a plot by militants
to launch a suicide mini-bus attack on
the president near his residence. Were
such an attack ever to succeed, it
would profoundly impact Indonesia's
future.
4
SCENARIOS:
REGIONAL RISKS
The killing of Noordin Mohammad Top
reduced the immediate threat from
terrorism in southeast Asia, but
analysts say the danger is far from
over. A key issue for investors is the
extent to which further militant violence
could undermine regional markets.
The evidence from decades of militant
attacks in southeast Asia and beyond
is that aside from short-term selling
pressure, the damage tends to be
limited. Yet terrorism can have a major
impact if it fundamentally alters a
country's risk profile.
Following is a round-up of key risk
scenarios in which militants could
significantly
damage
regional
economies.
ESCALATION AND
INTERNATIONALISATION OF THAI
INSURGENCY
In the past 5 years, the long-running
Muslim insurgency in Thailand has
escalated. Counterterrorism expert
David Kilcullen notes that in terms of
the casualty toll as a proportion of local
population, "the level of violence
makes
southern
Thailand's
ethnoreligious insurgency one of the
most intense in the world, second only
to those in Iraq and Afghanistan."
But because violence has been
confined to the south, and militants
have shown no inclination to strike
economic targets in Bangkok or key
tourist areas, the market impact has
been minimal.
The risk is that this changes. If
southern insurgents widen their
conflict, or if al Qaeda-linked militants
are
able
to
infiltrate
and
internationalize the conflict, the impact
on the economies of Thailand and its
neighbors could be severe.
So far, the prospect of this happening
appears remote.
"It is certainly reasonable to speculate
that at least some outside Islamist
entity has attempted to exploit the
ongoing unrest in southern Thailand
for its own purposes," said RAND
counterterrorism Peter Chalk. "That
said, there is (as yet) no concrete
evidence to suggest that the region
has been transformed into a new
beachhead for panregional jihadism."
Kilcullen notes that al Qaeda often
tries -- and succeeds -- in escalating
local conflicts by infiltrating the area,
provoking a harsh crackdown from
local security forces in cooperation
with Western powers, and then
exploiting popular discontent.
There are some key signposts for
investors to watch for that would
indicate the conflict could widen and
damage markets.
First, al Qaeda-linked militants could
attack targets in Bangkok or tourist
areas to try to provoke an escalation.
Second, if the insurgency worsened
and Western security forces were
given a more prominent role in tackling
it, this could turn a local struggle into
an international one. Kilcullen says
Thai and Western officials are well
aware of this risk and there is little
prospect that they would fall into the
trap.
Third, if the insurgency were to widen
the lawless, no-go areas in Thailand's
south, this would provide a possible
base for transnational militants even if
locals gave only tacit support.
And fourth, if a younger generation of
southern militants were to become
more radicalized, they may choose to
change the nature of the conflict. Signs
of this would be more extreme rhetoric
on Thai militant websites, or adopting
tactics such as suicide attacks, which
Thai militants have so far shunned.
MILITANTS ATTACK MAJOR
REGIONAL ECONOMIC HUB
A wide body of research suggests that
in the modern globalised economy,
small shocks can be quickly absorbed
but a major catastrophe in a key
financial or trade hub can have
magnified consequences that cascade
across world markets.
Because of the specialization of most
supply chains, an attack that causes
major disruption to a city's financial
5
district or to a busy port can cause
global knock-on effects.
Analysts say a successful attack in
Singapore, particularly on the port or
central business district, could have
such a global impact. And disrupting a
key shipping lane like the Straits of
Malacca could also have major
consequences -- a large proportion of
the fuel supplies for China and Japan
comes through Asian shipping lanes
that face a persistent piracy problem.
Several planned militant attacks on
Singapore have been foiled, and the
city-state is well policed. So again, the
risk of an attack is low in probability
but would be high in impact.
MILITANTS ASSASSINATE A KEY
REGIONAL LEADER
Economic terrorism can also be
disproportionately effective if it is
directed at key people -- particularly
national leaders who play an important
role in unifying unruly nations.
The assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a suicide
car bomb attack in 2005 illustrates the
damage that can be done. The killing
snuffed out a promising economic
renaissance in Lebanon and plunged
the country into a new cycle of political
instability and sectarian tension.
Analysts fear that a great deal of
Indonesia's success in recent years
has been dependent on the personality
and personal popularity of its
president,
Susilo
Bambang
Yudhoyono. He has no obvious
successor with the power and drive to
press on with his market-friendly
policies if anything were to happen to
him.
Indonesian police say they have foiled
at least one attempt by militants to
assassinate Yudhoyono with a suicide
bomb. If such an attack were ever to
succeed, it could drag the country
back into the political uncertainty,
lawlessness and policy drift it faced 10
years ago, with severe consequences
for markets.
ANALYSIS:
FRAGMENTED BUT
DANGEROUS
By Bill Tarrant
SINGAPORE - Jihadist violence
remains a key risk in Southeast Asia,
despite the killing of al Qaeda's selfproclaimed leader in the region, but it
is a fragmented movement with
leadership challenges.
Noordin Mohammed Top, who
famously eluded Indonesian police for
years, was finally tracked down at one
of his safe houses on September 16,
and died in a hail of gunfire along with
two of his top lieutenants.
Indeed, at an Islamic boarding school
near the house where Top was killed,
one of his associates was teaching the
next generation of jihadists martial arts
and the ideology of martyrdom as an
extra-curricular activity.
RETURN OF THE UNREFORMED
Muslim clerics and teachers in
Indonesia, southern Thailand, the
southern Philippines and Malaysia
continue to propagate radical
interpretations of Islam.
Key Indonesian fugitives remain at
large, some hiding out in the jungles of
the southern Philippines with other
militant groups.
Hundreds of Muslims detained in the
early part of this decade, when the
region was seen as the "second front"
in a global war on terror after the 9/11
attacks, are now being released -- and
some may prove to be unreformed.
Jihadist websites are easily accessible
to tempt them back into the fray.
Top, thought to have masterminded a
series of bombing attacks that killed
hundreds since 2002, had proclaimed
himself al Qaeda's leader in Southeast
Asia.
He may have intended the July 17
bombings of Jakarta hotels to
advertise that -- and reap the benefits
in recruiting, funding and "technology
transfer" that come with the al Qaeda
brand. His death raises questions
about who will fill his shoes and how
effective his group can be without him.
No one, however, is calling his demise
a knock-out blow against violent
jihadism in Southeast Asia.
"The superstructure that enables
terrorism to take place remains intact,"
said Rohan Gunanratna, a regional
terrorism expert at Nanyang
Technological Institute in Singapore.
"This superstructure involves the
distribution of terrorist and extremist
propaganda, fund-raising,
procurement, safe-houses, training,
and other support functions."
"It is unlikely, in the foreseeable future,
that we will reach a point where it can
be said that terrorism in the region has
been defeated or eliminated,"
Australia's Counter Terrorism
Ambassador, Bill Paterson, said in a
speech last week.
Yet the insurgencies in Southeast Asia
have been notable for their inability to
link up or coalesce around unified
leadership.
Jemaah Islamiah's (JI) former military
commander, Indonesian Riduan
Isamuddin, better known by his nom
de guerre Hambali, tried to pull
together various groups in the region
under an al Qaeda umbrella before he
was captured in Thailand in 2003. He
remains in detention in Guantanamo
Bay.
He was unsuccessful mainly because
the groups had varying agendas. JI
wanted to establish an Islamic
caliphate across Muslim-majority areas
of Southeast Asia. The Thais are
fighting
6
an ethno-nationalist rebellion for a
separate state. Rebels in the
Philippines want autonomy for Muslim
Mindanao island.
The ideology that animates the
movements -- Islam -- tends to keep
movements fractionalized.
"In dealing with these insurgencies it's
often hard to discern leadership," said
one expert who works on conflict
resolution in the region.
"And this is where Islamic culture plays
a role, because there are no
hierarchies in Islam. As a result,
everyone has a view," said the expert,
who could not be identified due to the
sensitivity of his work. "These groups
don't have politburos."
Top was effective because he was
ruthless, charismatic and educated.
His ability to elude capture led some
Indonesians to believe he had mystical
powers or protection.
Indonesian authorities have mined a
rich lode of intelligence since his death
that could lead to more arrests and
raids, complicating his group's
challenge to find fresh leadership.
PRICING IN RISKS
Countries and companies face various
kinds of risks from terrorism, and
markets, which have largely priced in
the threat, do not move much on oneoff events such as the Jakarta
bombings.
Singapore, embarrassed last year by a
daring jail escape of a high-profile JI
militant, worries that the biggest
container port in the world can be
attacked.
The Malacca Strait between Indonesia
and Malaysia, the world's busiest
shipping lane, is infested with pirates
and vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
(Photo: Indonesian National Police
spokesman Nanan Soekarna shows
photographs displaying Asia's Top at
the national police headquarters office
in Jakarta September 19.
REUTERS/Supri Supri)
Muslim-majority Malaysia has been
incident-free since suffering a spree of
attacks in 2000-2001 blamed on a now
defunct group allied to JI. But radical
literature is distributed and militants
are being recruited there, experts said.
Top and fellow JI commander Azahari
Husin, killed in a 2005 raid in East
Java, were both Malaysians.
The Thai insurgency, seeking to
recreate a Malay sultanate that once
straddled northern Malaysia and
southern Thailand, has the potential to
widen with implications for both
countries, if targets in Bangkok or
tourist centres are attacked.
Jihadist groups using sophisticated
tactics and technology can stage
spectacular incidents such as the
Jakarta hotel bombings to showcase
their international reach, experts say.
But local grievances are mostly what
motivate the young and
impressionable to strive for martyrdom,
experts say. Addressing them will go
far toward undermining the appeal
radicalism.
FACTBOX: JI
•
Founded around 1993, the goal of JI is the creation of an Islamic "super-state" spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern
Philippines, southern Thailand, Singapore and Brunei.
•
Initially involved in violent communal conflicts within Indonesia, the network is said to have forged international links with militant
groups such as al Qaeda, as well as Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.
•
JI has been blamed for several deadly attacks on U.S. and Western targets in Indonesia, including the 2004 Australian embassy
blast, a 2003 car bombing at the JW Marriot hotel in Jakarta, and the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed more than 200 people.
•
JI's structure and membership remain murky, but it is said to be Southeast Asia's largest jihadist organisation. Indonesian police
have arrested more than 300 suspected JI militants, and neighbours Malaysia and Singapore have arrested another hundred. Its
alleged one-time leader, bearded Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, was imprisoned for conspiracy but later cleared of wrongdoing
and released in June 2006. He denied links to JI.
•
The group's ability to carry out attacks was believed to be waning after the recent capture and execution of several high-profile
members. In November 2008 three JI-linked "Bali bombers' were executed by firing squad; in May 2009 Malaysia captured the
alleged leader of Singapore's JI cell, Mas Selamat bin Kastari.
•
Analysts say while the mainstream JI had backed away in recent years from supporting violence, at least on Indonesian soil, Top
had not.
7
Q+A: MILITANT
NETWORKS
By Bill Tarrant
SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Noordin Top,
leader of a splinter group of the
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) militant network,
was killed in a hail of gunfire when
Indonesian forces raided one of his
safe houses in Solo, Central Java.
Top and JI have had links to Osama
bin Laden's al Qaeda, responsible for
the 9/11 attacks in the United States,
and with other groups in the region.
Some leaders of regional militant
groups fought with the anti-Soviet
mujahideen in Afghanistan, forging
personal links. They returned home to
set up their own outfits to wage jihad,
create an Islamic state or fight ethnonationalist rebellions. However, their
varying agendas kept them from
coming under one umbrella.
But experts say a super-structure of
terrorism -- exchanges of money and
technology across the region,
distribution of hate material,
recruitment at Islamic schools -remains intact.
Here are some questions and answers
about those links.
WHAT LINKS DO REGIONAL
GROUPS HAVE TO AL QAEDA?
JI, blamed for a string of attacks in
2000-2005, once had strong links to al
Qaeda, but has since adopted a more
political agenda in Indonesia, where it
campaigns for an Islamic state.
Top declared his "Organization of the
Base" was al Qaeda's franchise in
Indonesia. He may have intended the
July 17 bombings of Jakarta hotels to
advertise that -- and reap the benefits
in recruiting, funding and "technology
transfer" that come with the al Qaeda
brand. Police found documents in last
week's raid regarding an "al Qaeda
Southeast Asia," but analysts say it
was little more than his network of
contacts and safe houses.
Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) in the
Philippines received funds from al
Qaeda. MILF no longer does, but Abu
Sayyaf has a connection through its JI
partnership. Thailand's separatists
have no known connection to al
Qaeda.
WHAT LINKS DO THEY HAVE WITH
EACH OTHER?
JI's former military commander,
Indonesian Riduan Isamuddin or
"Hambali," tried to pull together various
insurgencies in the region under an al
Qaeda umbrella before he was
captured in Thailand in 2003. He even
helped sponsor an "al Qaeda summit"
with bin Laden's lieutenants in Kuala
Lumpur in 2000.
He failed mostly because the groups
had different agendas and fragmented
leadership. What links did exist were
disrupted after governments began
cooperating with each other and with
the United States and Australia after
the 2002 Bali bombings.
Regional terrorism expert Rohan
Gunaratna said JI is trying to hook up
with Thai separatists -- three JI
members have been arrested in the
kingdom over the past year. Thailand's
ethnic Malay Muslim insurgents are
wary as they do not want to
internationalise their conflict with
Bangkok.
Abu Sayyaf and JI have basically
merged in the Philippines, Gunaratna
said. Indonesian militants seeking safe
havens have no trouble island-hopping
into neighbouring Philippines, including
Umar Patek, said to be JI's leader in
the Philippines, and Dulmatin, a JI
bomb-maker with a $10 million reward
on his head.
"Their agendas do vary, but terrorists
do cooperate and collaborate in the
region. There is sharing of technology
and finance," Gunaratna said.
WHAT ABOUT LINKS TO
AFGHANISTAN?
Some JI military leaders trained in
Afghanistan, including Hambali,
master bomb-maker Malaysian
Azahari Husin (who died in a
November 2005 police raid in East
Java) and Dulmatin.
Leaders and members of Abu Sayyaf
and the MILF were involved in the
8
Afghan conflict in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
Afghan veterans took control of one
Thai separatist group, Gerakan
Mujahideen Islami Patani (GMIP), in
the mid-1990s. Leaders of Malaysia's
now-defunct Kumpular Mujahidin
Malaysia were also veterans of the
Afghan conflict.
Personal links forged in al Qaeda and
JI training camps in Afghanistan and
Mindanao created a band of brothers
in the region. But many in a generation
of Southeast Asian militants that
fought with the mujahideen have been
killed or captured.
Some are being released from
detention, and experts see evidence of
them returning to the fray.
HOW DO INSURGENT GROUPS
FINANCE THEIR ACTIVITIES?
A few Indonesian charities may
knowingly or otherwise have given
money to militants, including JI, which
is not an outlawed organization in
Indonesia. Books, magazines and
videos espousing jihad have been
linked to JI and other legal fronts.
Al Qaeda used to give JI cash using
overseas migrant workers as couriers.
JI Members pay zakat, a religious tax,
to the group. Abu Sayyaf raises money
from kidnap ransoms, protection
rackets, smuggling and marijuana
cultivation. Much of MILF's money
comes from over a million Filipino
Muslims working in the Middle East
who contribute "zakat" to militant
charitable fronts.
In Thailand, a relatively inexpensive
insurgency is built on simple
homemade bombs, drive-by shootings
and ambushes. Rebels looted more
than 400 assault files from an army
base and 1.5 tonnes of ammonium
nitrate for explosives from a quarry.
Like Abu Sayyaf, some warlord-like
figures in the movement run protection
rackets and smuggling rings in many
villages they control.
ANALYSIS: HOW CAN
FIRMS RESPOND?
By Andrew Marshall
SINGAPORE (Reuters) - A decade
ago, the main terrorism risk for
business travellers was that they could
be caught up in an attack targeting an
embassy, government office or airliner.
Now, they are increasingly becoming
targets themselves.
The three-day assault on Mumbai by
10 gunmen in November was explicitly
aimed at disrupting business, and
among the targets chosen were two
hotels and a cafe popular with
foreigners. In the Jakarta suicide
attacks in July, the bombers detonated
their explosives close to groups of
foreigners in two luxury hotels.
Both Vickers and Ridley said it was
important for business travellers to put
terrorism risk in context. More prosaic
threats like disease, accidents and
petty crime tend to be much more of a
risk than militant attacks, even in the
world's danger zones.
"The reality is, there is a far greater
chance of being exposed to something
much less dramatic, and they tend to
be far less prepared and don't respond
appropriately." Ridley said.
But companies and travelers still need
to be aware of the risk of terrorism,
and plan accordingly. One issue is that
hotels are increasingly favored as
targets.
The killing this month of Indonesia's
most-wanted militant, Noordin
Mohammad Top, was a key step
toward reducing the threat from
terrorism in Southeast Asia, analysts
say. But one risk is that beleaguered
militants may scale back their plans
and focus even more on soft targets -such as business travellers.
"Hotels are often full of Western
business travellers, diplomats and
intelligence officers," risk consultancy
Stratfor said in a report on hotel
security. "This makes them target-rich
environments for militants seeking to
kill Westerners and gain international
media attention without having to
penetrate the extreme security of a
hard target like a modern embassy."
"In Southeast Asia, I'm a lot more
optimistic on the terrorist front," said
Steve Vickers, the Hong Kong-based
president and chief executive of FTIInternational Risk.
KIDNAP RISKS
Another threat to watch is an increase
in the kidnapping of foreigners,
security analysts say.
"What that will lead to, unfortunately, is
a move toward softer targets, and
softer targets typically in these
situations mean people move to
kidnapping or to small targets."
Tony Ridley, director for Asia-Pacific
security services at International SOS,
noted that militant attacks tend to be
designed to maximize fatalities -particularly of foreigners in many
cases -- rather than the amount of
destruction wrought.
"They want bodies, not broken glass,"
he said.
"There is likely to be a shift in strategy
in Indonesia, the Philippines, southern
Thailand because the militants have
suffered serious setbacks," Vickers
said. "So what can they do to come
back? They do have the ability to grab
people. So yes, the targeting of
individual travellers is a risk scenario."
Vickers said the kidnap risks were
higher for companies in remoter areas
away from urban centres, such as
resources firms.
A number of risk and security firms,
including International Risk, offer
training for executives on how to
behave if the worst happens, as well
9
as consultancy on resolving kidnap
situations.
For businesses and travellers seeking
to minimize the dangers, risk mitigation
consultancies offer several
suggestions.
"A lot of the problem with the foreign
multinationals is they all do everything
the same way," Vickers said.
"Everybody always stays at the same
hotel. You've got expats arriving at
airports with somebody holding a big
sign with their name on it."
Besides scrutinizing routines and
varying them intelligently, companies
and travelers need to be constantly
monitoring the danger in each country.
Vickers noted that risks can vary
widely -- in Pakistan the general threat
level is high but attacks tend to be
indiscriminate rather than specifically
targeting foreign business people -- so
a "one size fits all" approach is
unhelpful.
Security assessments also need to
take account of the fact that militant
tactics are always evolving. "The
problem with checklists is individuals
get too much of a formulaic approach,"
Ridley said. "Travellers need to be
prepared for the unexpected."
To some extent, technology can help -some travel can be dropped in favor of
videoconferencing or virtual meetings.
"But nobody does $10 million deals
over videoconferencing," Ridley said.
"The reality is, particularly here in Asia,
a lot of business is relationship based,
face to face, building trust."
Ridley and Vickers said that while
terrorism was a risk that companies
need to prepare for, it need not
hamper business.
"The important thing," Vickers said, "is
that with reasonable precautions, it
can still be business as usual."
CHANGING MILITANTS’
MINDSET
By Olivia Rondonuwu
JAKARTA - Jibril, a former Indonesian
militant, describes his years of military
training in Afghanistan from 1985 to
1987 as "the best holiday in my whole
life."
He was one of the first batch of
Indonesians to train in Afghanistan,
where he met other mujahidin, from
the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore,
India and Saudi Arabia, and learned
guerrilla tactics and how to make and
defuse bombs.
On his return to Indonesia, Jibril, who
like many Indonesians uses one name,
joined the Muslim-Christian ethnic
clashes in Ambon, Eastern Indonesia.
He spent three years on the run from
police who began rounding up Muslim
activists linked to militant group
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) after the 2002
Bali bombings which killed 202
foreigners and Indonesians.
Eventually, in 2006, he turned himself
in and joined Indonesia's deradicalization programme, a voluntary
scheme which tries to get militants to
accept a more moderate form of Islam.
The de-radicalization programme has
proved controversial.
Many Australians were shocked in
2007 when they learned that
Indonesia's counter-terrorism unit had
hosted a fast-breaking meal during the
holy Muslim month of Ramadan for
those convicted of the 2002 Bali bomb
attacks.
Jibril, now 46, is among the first to
admit that the programme has its
shortcomings.
He still firmly believes in "jihad". He
was taught by radical clerics when he
was young, and was strongly opposed
to raids by the Indonesian military on
Muslim activists in the early 1980s, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the
more recent "War on Terror" by the
United States and its allies.
The bonds between him and fellow
militants, whose agenda is to create an
Islamic state, means they will always
extend support to each other, he said,
including shelter from the police.
"Generally, if he is a brother, we would
help because we have a strong bond
of friendship," Jibril said. Despite the
risk they could be captured by police
and jailed for up to seven years, it is
hard to change the mindset of a
militant, he said.
"We are like water that has been
dipped with a teabag, we will never
become plain water again," he said.
DOES DE-RADICALISATION
WORK?
Some analysts also question whether
such programmes can be effective in
the long run or are, in fact, counterproductive. Some argue that in
southern Thailand, the peace
programmes actually played into the
hands of the insurgents.
Rehabilitation programmes by the Thai
military have been disjointed, serving
more as a public relations tool for the
authorities. Analysts say it is highly
unlikely any real militants have gone
through the peace-building camps,
which are held at army bases and
teach "correct" Islam, government
policy and the positive aspects of the
Thai state.
Thailand's Internal Security Operations
Command told Reuters a total of 1,363
people have been put through the
programmes.
Many sent to the camps as rebel
sympathizers are innocent villagers
from so-called "red zones" where
insurgent groups thrive.
Many "rehabilitated" Malay Muslims
were never involved in the rebellion
and not opposed to the Thai state. The
camps only turned some of them
against the authorities, radicalizing
them and steering them toward the
militant groups out of anger.
Upon returning to their villages, they
could be in danger, viewed with
suspicion by both the rebels and the
authorities.
"The government sent them to camps
to reprogramme, retrain and
indoctrinate them, and announced
publicly that those released would
become the eyes and ears of the
security forces," said academic
Duncan McCargo, who spent a year in
10
the region doing research for his book
on the conflict.
"Militant groups were suspicious that
they were informants and state officials
suspected them of being rebels. It had
a destabilizing impact on local
communities."
Across the border, Malaysia has
released 13 people so far this year
detained under its draconian Internal
Security Act, of which six are
suspected JI militants. One of them,
Mat Sah Mohd Satray was released
around the same time Noordin was
killed in Indonesia, before Eid al-Fitr
celebrations.
Mat Sah says he was detained for
seven years after police officers
discovered he attended religious
sermons in 1990s given by JI's
spiritual head, Indonesia's Abu Bakar
Bashir.
"I was put in a single cell for three
years and after that moved to a dorm
for good behavior. I didn't see the sky
and stars for seven years," Mat Sah,
46, told Reuters
"We had to attend religious classes
once a week. Most of the time we were
left alone to ourselves. There was no
rehabilitation, so to speak, and my
sentence was unfair."
BENEFITS FOR TIP-OFFS
In Indonesia, over 400 suspected
militants have been captured. About
half have subsequently been released,
and 238 have either completed or are
currently in the de-radicalisation
programme, according to a book
published recently by Petrus Golose, a
senior member of the Special AntiTerror unit.
Golose said 103 people agreed to
accept money from the government as
financial assistance, admit their
mistakes, and provide tip-offs or help
in the de-radicalisation programme.
Indonesian police claim it is possible to
win back some hearts and minds with
the de-radicalisation programme. One
of their best known successes at home
was Nasir Abas, the brother-in-law of
Mukhlas, one of the three Bali
bombers.
Abas trained in Afghanistan and was a
JI regional commander. But now,
following his capture, he works with
the police, lecturing to government
officials and targeted militants on the
inner workings of JI, and is frequently
quoted in the media.
However, for every Abas, there are
plenty of others who return to the fray.
Some militants have refused to
participate in the re-education
programme, others join in order to
qualify for the money. Few are willing
to co-operate and give tip-offs in
exchange for education and medical
care for their families.
Militant groups tend to be wary of
anyone who has been captured,
imprisoned and then released,
because of the risk they could have
turned informant or be tracked by
police and betray the movement.
Yet in many cases, once released,
they re-join the group, get involved in
the flourishing militant publishing
business, teach in Islamic boarding
schools, or help in other ways.
(Photo: Convicted Bali bomber Imam Samudera alias Abdul Aziz talks to his daughter
during his last family visit in Batu prison, Nusa Kambangan Island, in this October 29,
2007 file photo. REUTERS/Beawiharta)
Urwah, alias Bagus Budi Pranoto, was
arrested in 2004 and sentenced to
three-and-a-half years for harbouring
Azahari and Noordin Top, two of the
most wanted militants.
When he was released, he launched a
radical DVD business, then
disappeared from view until he was
found dead, along with Top, in a police
raid in Central Java last week.
Air Setiawan, a bomb expert, was
briefly detained in 2004 for possible
involvement in the Australian embassy
bombing in Jakarta that year. He was
freed because police didn't have
enough evidence to bring him to court.
Air was killed in August in Bekasi, on
the outskirts of Jakarta, when police
raided a house looking for Top.
Instead of Top, they found explosives
which were intended for an
assassination attempt on President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
11
HOW MILITANTS
RECRUIT
By Sunanda Creagh
more hardcore recruitment processes
such as oath-taking or weapons
training.
But these activities do not break the
law, posing a conundrum for
lawmakers who risk driving the groups
underground and offending voters by
cracking down on legal religious
activities.
JAKARTA - Unbeknown to 12-year-old
Andika Bayu Pamungkas and his
friends, the seemingly innocuous
martial arts sessions in their
Indonesian village were actually the
first steps toward being turned into
suicide bombers and militants.
Recruitment efforts of young,
malleable boys such as Andika at
schools and sports clubs is a routine
method used by militants in Southeast
Asia to cultivate the next generation of
suicide bombers and separatist rebels.
Andika and his friends discovered the
real purpose of their martial arts
classes when their instructor, Susilo
alias Adib, was unmasked as an
associate of Noordin Mohammad Top,
the mastermind behind a string of
suicide bombings. Malaysian-born
Noordin was being harbored in
Susilo's house.
"Susilo told my friends and I to stay
back at the house after all the other
students had gone home and the four
of us would learn martial arts. He was
afraid of other people finding out,"
Andika told Reuters. "He told us, 'This
is our secret. Don't tell your friends or
your parents, OK?.'"
Kevin Yovi Pratama, 9, was another of
Susilo's secret students. "We always
practiced in a room with the door shut,
so my mother and my friends wouldn't
know about it," he told Reuters.
Susilo also lectured at a nearby
Islamic boarding school where he told
students that suicide bombers were
"martyrs," rewarded in heaven for their
acts.
Recruitment drives such as these, as
well as other activities such as nature
trips, after-school activities and
blogging, can be stepping stones to
While the vast majority of Indonesia's
Islamic boarding schools are
moderate, a handful have played a
vital role in producing the region's top
militants.
"The problem is not so much the
curriculum as it is the small after class
religious study sessions, where
individual teachers can assess the
potential of students and draw them
into more extremist activity," analyst
Sidney Jones wrote in a report for the
International Crisis Group in August.
"Given the extent that radical
preachers have relied on 'nature
training' and other excuses to take
youth groups out to nearby hills for
physical fitness training, there should
probably be increased alertness on the
part of parents to such programs."
Several of the Indonesian schools are
linked to the regional militant network
Jemaah Islamiah (JI), which has as its
spiritual head Indonesian cleric Abu
Bakar Bashir.
Bashir's al-Mukmin boarding school at
Ngruki, Solo, produced several
graduates who went on to plan and
execute a string of deadly attacks in
Indonesia.
But JI does not appear to have been
involved in militant attacks in recent
years and Jones believes the current
centres of radicalism are more likely to
be other boarding schools in Java,
such as Al-Muttaqien, DarusySyahada, Mahad Aly and Darul Manar.
VIDEO INDOCTRINATION
Hand-picked potential militants are
often shown videos depicting the
violent oppression of Muslims in
places such as the Middle East, or
Ambon and Poso in eastern Indonesia.
"When you read about how Noordin
Top associate Syaifudin Jaelani
recruited people in the mosque, it was
by using videos of Ambon and Poso
and engaging younger people in
discussions," said Jones, adding that it
was Jaelani who recruited the suicide
bombers for attacks on two luxury
hotels in Jakarta in July.
Oath-swearing and eventual
introduction to more senior members
of cells would follow for suitable
recruits.
Similar tactics are used in southern
Thailand, where ethno-nationalist
Malay Muslims are fighting to secede
from Buddhist Thailand, which they
say treats them as second-class
citizens.
Thai insurgents rely on teachers to find
promising students, who swear an
oath of commitment and secrecy
before joining a clandestine, multi-cell
network whose senior leaders they are
never told about.
An ICG report in June suggested
Islamic schools in Thailand invited
devout Malay Muslim youths to join
"extracurricular indoctrination
programmes" before becoming rebel
foot soldiers. The classroom was the
first point of contact.
"Recruiters invite those who seem
promising devout Muslims of good
character who are moved by a history
of oppression, mistreatment and the
idea of armed jihad to join
extracurricular indoctrination
programmes in mosques or disguised
as football training," the report said.
Most of the young recruits are invited
to join small cells and are given basic
weapons training. They are believed to
be the perpetrators of the daily driveby assassinations carried out mostly
by pairs of young gunmen riding
together on a motorcycle.
The authorities view these schools as
breeding grounds for militants but of
late have eased off after years of raids
and crackdowns and scores of arrests
of teachers.
Bloody crackdowns, extra-judicial
killings and tough Thai security policies
12
have angered young, disaffected
Muslims and aided recruitment,
analysts say.
Many of the teachers, or 'ustaz'
studied in the Middle East and in
Pakistans. Thailand has named
several as suspected leaders of the
insurgency, though without firm
evidence, prompting some to flee
abroad fearing for their lives.
Some Thai Muslims -- as well as
Indonesians, Malaysian and Filipino
Muslims -- trained and fought with the
Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet
occupation in the 1980s, but analysts
see little evidence they are involved in
the Thai insurgency.
Yet bomb-making and guerrilla warfare
skills suggest some of the rebels are
well-trained. How and by whom, is
unclear.
Indonesia's Islamists appear to have
Middle East links, possibly to al
Qaeda. Noordin Top's trusted
lieutenant, Mohamad Jibril, who police
arrested for obtaining overseas
funding for the July 17 hotel bombings,
studied in Pakistan and is suspected of
making contact with radicals there.
An ICG report in August said Syaifudin
Jaelani, who recruited the July 17
suicide bombers and is still at large,
studied in Yemen and "almost certainly
had contact with al-Qaeda."
During the period 1985-1994, a couple
of dozen Indonesian Islamists trained
with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, said Jones, but that was less
common now.
JIHADI PUBLISHERS
In Indonesia, books, magazines and
videos produced by Jemaah Islamiyah
or Noordin Top's splinter group are
freely available at bookshops in
Indonesia.
Reuters found books by JI-linked
publishing house Kafayeh Cipta Media
at a Jakarta book store, while
"Jihadmagz" a magazine devoted to
Muslim holy war, was sold at Jakarta's
international airport. Blogs, Facebook
pages and online book order sites can
be found promoting JI and their
publications.
"The publications are important. They
are a way for them to continue the
spirit of the ideology," said Noor Huda
Ismail, who shared a room with one of
the Bali bombers when he was a
teenage student at Bashir's Ngruki
boarding school.
He said militants use the publications
to bolster their beliefs and justify
disobedience of national law, which is
described by many of these books as
un-Islamic and illegitimate.
"I call it shopping for fatwas," he said.
13
More important than the actual reading
material, however, are the networks
created by the jihadi publishing
industry.
"Part of the reason Noordin eluded
police for so long is because there
were so many people in that circle of
publishers who are willing to help him,"
he said.
South Thailand's insurgents are
unusually secretive and have no
known websites or publications.
Banning publications that promote
jihad would only draw attention to
material available on the Internet
anyway, said Jones, who is also
opposed to a crackdown on radical
schools.
"A more sophisticated strategy would
be to enforce tax laws," she said. "If it
were found, as I am sure it would be,
that these publishing houses had not
fulfilled all their legal requirements or
that some of the individuals had not
paid their taxes, then that would allow
for sanctions that didn't relate to curbs
on freedom of expression."
She also suggests undercover
monitoring of Friday prayers at
mosques where recruitment is known
to have taken place and training local
community leaders to be on the look
out for recruitment activities in their
neighbourhoods.
NEWSMAKER:
NOORDIN TOP
By Olivia Rondonuwu
The attacks came after a lull of four
years during which Indonesia achieved
political stability and strong economic
growth after a decade of tumult
following the ouster of former
autocratic president Suharto.
Indonesia's violent jihad seemed to
have subsided. Top's partner, the
Malaysian bomb-maker Azahari Husin,
was killed in 2005. Two Jemaah
Islamiah militants were jailed in April
2008, and three Bali bombers were
executed in November that year. Top
had not been heard from in several
years.
The July 17 attacks that killed nine
people, including two suspected
bombers, and injured scores, seemed
to signal he had returned to the fray.
JAKARTA - Noordin Mohammad Top
was one of Asia's most wanted men.
Top, a former accountant and maths
teacher, was killed during a police raid
in Central Java in September.
Police initially thought they had killed
Top during raids in August in Central
Java, but forensic tests later identified
the body as that of a suspected
accomplice.
Malaysian-born Top was once a key
figure in Jemaah Islamiah, a militant
group that aimed to create a caliphate
across Southeast Asia, but analysts
said he created his own more violent
splinter group in 2003.
He was suspected of planning the
bomb attacks on the JW Marriott in
Jakarta in 2003, on the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 and in Bali
in 2005 -- attacks designed to scare off
foreign tourists and businesses.
Experts said the near-simultaneous
attacks last month at the JW Marriott
and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta's
main business district used explosives
identical to those found in previous
Jemaah Islamiah attacks.
MAGIC POWERS
Top fled to Indonesia with Azahari
following a Malaysian crackdown on
militants just before the suicide airline
attacks in the United States on Sept.
11, 2001.
Intelligence officials said the two men
plotted attacks and recruited young
Indonesians, some of them from
Islamic boarding schools, to carry
them out. Top was the financier and
Azahari the bomb-maker. Newspapers
called them the "Money Man" and the
"Demolition Man".
Indonesian troops from the elite
Detachment 88 -- the same force that
apparently has tracked down Top -cornered Azahari, an engineer and
former university lecturer, at a house in
East Java in November 2005. The
father of two was killed, either by a
police bullet or by a bomb set off by an
accomplice.
Some mystical Javanese believe Top
must have possessed magic powers or
charms that protected him. He is
thought to have escaped a raid in
Central Java in 2006 when two other
alleged militants were killed.
14
Police put it down to his reluctance to
use easily tracked mobile phones and
his reliance on a close network of
sympathisers who guarded his
whereabouts and acted as his couriers
when he needed to send messages to
his cells.
Top re-married and depended on his
immediate family to hide and help him,
Indonesian counter-terrorism officials
have said, showing how hard it is to
snuff out militancy in Indonesia despite
hundreds of arrests and a
comprehensive programme to
deradicalise extremists.
Analysts said Top had been acting on
his own since 2003, and had gained a
near mythical status among some
younger, more radical members of
Jemaah Islamiah and other groups.
He reportedly made a video on DIY
bomb construction, which included
lessons on how "martyrs" should
perform their final ritual acts, including
prayers and debt repayments, and
how to create a video-will.
Top, 41, was born in Johor, southern
Malaysia, and completed a bachelor of
science at the University of
Technology, Malaysia in 1991. He
worked briefly as an accountant before
launching a career as a jihadist with a
bounty of 1 billion rupiah ($99,450) on
his head.
Top's disagreement with other Jemaah
Islamiah members over the use of
violence, even if they killed
Indonesians, led him in 2003 to form a
far more violent splinter group called
Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, or
Organisation for the Base of Jihad.
(Photo : Noordin Mohammad Top is
seen in this handout image released
by Indonesian police in Jakarta
September 19. REUTERS/Ho New)
TIMELINE: JI ATTACKS
•
1993 - Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar found Jemaah Islamiah while in Malaysia. The two return to
Indonesia after the fall of President Suharto in 1998.
•
1995 - Jemaah Islamiah operational chief Hambali is thought to be involved in a Jemaah Islamiah plot to bomb 11 U.S. commercial
airliners in Asia, the U.S. State Department says in 2003.
•
Dec 30, 2000 - Five blasts in Manila kill 22 people. In 2009, three members of Philippines militant group the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) are sentenced to life imprisonment for the multiple bombings, said to have been carried out under instructions and with
funding from Jemaah Islamiah leaders.
•
Dec 24, 2000 - Series of Christmas Eve blasts at Jakarta churches and elsewhere in the country kill 17 people and wound about 100.
At first thought by some to have political motivations, these blasts are later tied to Jemaah Islamiah.
•
Dec 2001 - A Jemaah Islamiah plan to attack diplomatic missions including the U.S., Israeli and British embassies, is foiled by
authorities in Singapore and more than a dozen suspected militants are arrested.
•
Oct 12, 2002 - Blasts on the tourist island of Bali kill 202 people, many of them foreign tourists, including 88 Australians. Jemaah
Islamiah is blamed. The United States designates the group as a foreign terrorist organisation after the blasts. Three Jemaah Islamiahlinked militants are executed for the attacks in November 2008.
•
March 2003 - Two blasts at the airport and a ferry pier in Davao, a southern port city in the Philippines, strike weeks apart, killing 38
people in total. Jemaah Islamiah-linked militants are blamed.
•
Aug 5, 2003 - Bomb outside JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta kills 12 people, including a Dutchman, and wounds 150. Jemaah Islamiah is
blamed.
•
Sept 9, 2004 - A powerful bomb explodes near the Australian embassy in central Jakarta killing 10 Indonesians and wounding more
than 100. The al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah is blamed for the attack.
•
Oct 2, 2005 - Suicide bombers linked to the militant Jemaah Islamiah network set off three blasts on the resort island of Bali that killed
23 people, including the three bombers and some foreign tourists. More than 100 people were wounded.
•
July 17, 2009 - Bomb blasts rip through the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta's business district, killing nine people
and wounding dozens in an attack analysts say could signal a resurgence of activity from Jemaah Islamiah.
FACTBOX: ABU SAYYAF
•
Islamic militant group Abu Sayyaf is one of the smallest but deadliest in the Philippines.
•
The Abu Sayyaf, which translates as "Bearer of the Sword", was formed in the 1990s by a charismatic Islamic preacher who had
returned from Afghanistan after the armies of the former Soviet Union were driven out of the country in 1989.
•
The Abu Sayyaf wants an independent Islamic nation in the Philippines, aligning itself with militants who espouse a similar vision of a
pan-Islamic super-state in Southeast Asia. It has been linked to al Qaeda and to Jemaah Islamiah.
•
The founder and leader of the Abu Sayyaf, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, was killed in December 1998 in a gunbattle with police and
was replaced six months later by his younger brother, Khaddafy Janjalani. Another brother, Hector, is in jail for murder and kidnapping.
•
Khaddafy was killed in a clash with soldiers in late 2006.
•
Yasser Igasan, a foreign-trained Islamic preacher, was believed to have replaced Khaddafy Janjalani, according to army intelligence.
But, the loosely structured Abu Sayyaf also has a nine-member "shura" (council) that makes key decisions.
•
Based on the Basilan and Jolo islands off Mindanao, it began with small attacks, targeting Roman Catholic churches, missionaries and
nuns but soon graduated to larger-scale assaults as well as high-profile kidnappings of foreigners, including abducting tourists from a
Malaysian resort island in 2000.
•
A year later it kidnapped tourists and workers from a resort in the western Philippines. Most were released on payment of ransom, but
three victims, including an American, were beheaded.
•
The group was blamed for the country's worst militant attack, the bombing of a ferry near Manila Bay in February 2004 that killed more
than 100 people.
15
Q+A: THAILAND’S
INSURGENCY
By Martin Petty
BANGKOK - Five years after a violent
rebellion erupted in Thailand's
southern Muslim provinces, the conflict
remains shrouded in mystery.
No credible group has claimed
responsibility for the near-daily attacks
or made their demands public.
The death toll from the unrest in Yala,
Pattani and Narathiwat provinces is
close to 3,500, with neither a military
victory nor a political solution looking
likely.
WHO IS BEHIND THE VIOLENCE?
No group has publicly come forward,
but analysts, academics and the
military believe the Barisan Revolusi
Nasional (BRN) Coordinate is the main
player.
The group is said to be a military
offshoot of the Patani Malay National
Revolutionary Front, a political
movement established in the 1960s to
seek independence, or at least
autonomy, for the region's ethnic
Malay Muslims.
A low-level insurgency in the 1970s
and early 1980s, fought mainly in the
jungle, ended with an amnesty for
fighters. The violence resurfaced in
2004.
Its leaders are unknown. The
government believes they may be
living in Malaysia or in Europe. The
authorities have long suspected
prominent local politicians, religious
leaders and Islamic teachers of
involvement.
WHERE DOES THE SEPARATIST
SENTIMENT COME FROM?
The region was once an independent
Malay Muslim sultanate called Patani.
Thailand, then Siam, first invaded in
1786 and, according to historians,
forced many people into slavery.
Patani was annexed by Siam in 1909
as part of a treaty with Britain and
successive governments sought to
assimilate the population into the Thai
Buddhist mainstream, with bans on
Islamic schools and attire and the
outlawing of the Malay dialect, Muslim
names and the teaching of local
history.
Uprisings were aggressively handled
by the authorities and pro-
independence figures disappeared or
were killed. Deep resentment still
exists and many Muslims say
Thailand, and its people, have long
refused to recognise their identity.
WHAT ARE THE REBELS'
CAPABILITIES?
Their attacks are brutal but simple,
ranging from drive-by shootings and
beheadings to arson and small-scale
bombings.
But beneath the surface, experts say,
the reclusive rebels have a complex
multi-cell structure of recruitment,
combat and control, with the
leadership known only to a few
members.
The military estimates the movement
has 3,000 operatives, among them
guerrilla fighters, informants and spies,
who spread fear and intimidation
among Muslim villagers to avoid
detection and protect the group's
identity.
"The insurgency is highly organised,"
said Anthony Davis, a security analyst
for Jane's Information Group. "The
secrecy is very effective, and militarily
they've stuck with what they know
best. They could keep this campaign
going indefinitely."
HOW IS THE GOVERNMENT
TACKLING THE VIOLENCE?
"Iron fist" military action, "hearts and
minds" campaigns and development
aid have all failed.
The military's intelligence capabilities
are basic at best, with few locals
willing to become informants or testify
because of fear of reprisal.
Like his predecessors, Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva has publicly ruled out
negotiation. He says the government is
open to some form of decentralised
administration for the deep south, but
he seems reluctant to pursue it.
"Bangkok needs to reduce its reliance
on a military approach, reach out to
the Muslim elite and make the people
feel valued, not isolated or
marginalised," said Rohan Gunaratna,
a security analyst and author of a book
on the Thai insurgency.
"It will be a prolonged and protracted
conflict if Thailand refuses to establish
collaborative external relationships."
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ARE OUTSIDE GROUPS
INVOLVED?
Despite reports of links to radical
Islamist groups or a wider global jihadi
movement, there is no evidence to
suggest the conflict is anything more
than a localised, ethno-nationalist
struggle by the region's Malay Muslim
majority.
However, analysts believe aggressive
crackdowns and any extrajudicial
killings by security forces, and the
perceived oppression of Muslims could
attract involvement by Islamic militant
networks such as al Qaeda, leading to
an escalation.
WILL THE VIOLENCE SPREAD?
The eruption of hostilities in 2004 led
to fears that the militants would attack
Western targets in Bangkok or holiday
hotspots such as Phuket or Pattaya. It
has never happened.
"Expanding their campaign to other
regions is not the target of this
movement," said Srisompob
Jitpiromsri, a Pattani-based political
scientist. "It's very specific. They are
attacking the Thai state from inside the
three provinces and want to protect the
identity of ethnic Malay Muslims".
Others, however, do not rule out an
escalation beyond the deep south if
the insurgents fail to make progress.
IS A POLITICAL SOLUTION
POSSIBLE?
Officially, no dialogue has ever taken
place between the government and the
separatists, but several analysts and
academics with sources inside the
national security apparatus have told
Reuters that meetings between Thai
representatives and rebels have taken
place, with no deal struck.
Political unrest in Bangkok and
changes in government have
prevented meaningful dialogue, while
a deep distrust of Thai state officials,
and their uncompromising rhetoric,
leaves little hope of a political solution
at present.
ANALYSIS: SHARIA
DILEMMA
By Sunanda Creagh
JAKARTA - Recent moves in
Indonesia, including plans by one
province to stone adulterers to death,
have raised concerns about the
reputation of the world's most
populous Muslin country as a beacon
of moderate Islam.
The provincial assembly in the
westernmost province of Aceh -- at the
epicentre of the Indian Ocean tsunami
that killed 170,000 people there nearly
five years ago -- this week decreed the
ancient Islamic penalty of stoning to
death for adultery.
The decision could still be overturned
once Aceh's new parliament is sworn
in next month.
But many, including Aceh's governor,
the central government in Jakarta, and
local businessmen, are concerned
about the impact a broadcast public
execution by stoning could have on
Indonesia's international reputation.
"The perception and the reaction from
the international community would be
condemnation," said Anton Gunawan,
chief economist at Bank Danamon,
who stressed he thought an actual
stoning unlikely.
"For investors who are relatively
familiar with Indonesia and know it is
mostly moderate, it might not have an
impact. But for people who don't know
Indonesia, they will think 'Oh, now I
have to be careful of it'," he said.
The Aceh case is one of several
showing how hardline Muslim groups
are influencing policy in Indonesia.
Local governments, given wide latitude
to enact laws under Indonesia's
decentralisation programme, have
begun to mandate sharia regulations,
including dress codes for women.
One ethnic Chinese Indonesian
businessman, a practicing Christian
who asked not to be quoted by name,
said he feared if the trend continued it
could lead to capital flight by the
wealthy Chinese, Christian minority.
"A lot of regional laws are going in that
direction. It's already alarming the way
it's going. It's a minority who are doing
this, but the problem is that the silent
majority just keep silent."
ANTIPORNOGRAPHY LAW
Last year, the government imposed
restrictions on Ahmadiyya, a minority
Muslim cult, following intense lobbying
by hardline Muslim groups to have
them banned.
PPP declined 2.8 percentage points to
just 5 percent of the total vote, while
the vote for another Islamic group, the
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), rose
only 1.5 percentage points to 9 percent
of the total.
President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono's party also backed an
anti-pornography law, which imposes
restrictions on certain forms of dance,
traditional dress and the depiction of
nudity in art.
Overall, the share of votes for Islamic
parties has steadily declined.
The law was widely condemned by
minority religious and ethnic groups,
including Balinese.
A new film law passed this month goes
even further, prohibiting depictions of
drug use, gambling and pornography,
and requiring film-makers to have their
plots approved by the Minister of
Culture before production can begin.
"I think the Islamic parties will be a
strong influence on the law-making of
the next cabinet," said Suma Mihardja,
who led a campaign against the antipornography law.
"Tension could be directed toward
xenophobia, racism, or religious
conflict as we see in Malaysia today."
Other legislation on the cards at the
national level includes a bill making
halal certification compulsory, instead
of voluntary as is now the case.
That would result in higher costs for
many food and pharmaceuticals
companies, domestic and foreign,
ranging from Nestle and Unilever to
Kraft Foods Inc and Cadbury Plc said
Suroso Natakusuma from the
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry.
"Every single item will need halal
certification and an external audit
process may follow," he said.
"The auditor may need to be sent to
the country where the product was
made to check the process is halal.
That means air tickets, hotels. This will
mean a lot of extra costs."
ISLAMIC VOTE FALLING
The religiously-inspired laws seem to
run against the wishes of the
electorate.
In the 2009 parliamentary election, the
vote for the conservative Islamic party
17
"People appear to be pandering to an
audience that isn't really asking for
anything," said James Bryson of HB
Capital, which invests in Indonesian
stocks. "The halal bill is not winning
any votes and it's making an already
complex system of certification even
more expensive."
"Many of these laws lately are
becoming more conservative,' said
Said Abdullah of secular opposition
party PDI-P who is on the committee
debating the halal bill. "The
government is trying to accommodate
the Muslim community but they are
actually not following our real
constitution."
President Yudhoyono, a former
general, won a second five-year term
in July on promises to continue the
battle against corruption and spur
economic growth.
In the run-up to elections, Yudhoyono
and his secular Democrat Party shifted
closer to a clutch of religious parties
including the hardline Islamist PKS, as
relations with his main coalition
partner, Golkar, grew increasingly
strained.
Resources-rich Aceh suffered a
decades-long conflict between
secessionists and the Indonesian
military. The tsunami and the 9.1
earthquake that spawned it brought
billions of dollars in aid to the
devastated land. That paved the way
for a peace agreement with separatists
-- whose political party won April's
election, and now must deal with the
new adultery law.
Aceh wants to attract more investment,
just like many other parts of Indonesia.
Holding public executions by stoning,
which could be televised and shown
around the world, could well make that
more difficult.
FACTBOX: SURVIVING
HOTEL ATTACKS
With hotels becoming an increasingly
popular target for militant attacks in
Asia and beyond, the issue of hotel
security and appropriate travel
precautions is growing in importance
for business travellers and tourists.
In the past year, militants killed at least
54 people in a suicide bomb attack on
Islamabad's Marriott hotel, 71 people
in the siege of the Taj Mahal and
Oberoi hotels in Mumbai, nine in a
suicide attack on Peshawar's Pearl
Continental, and seven in the
bombings of Jakarta's Ritz Carlton and
Marriott in July.
Following is a summary of advice on
hotel security, from travel security
firms and risk consultancies as well as
Reuters correspondents who often
stay in hotels in hazardous areas:
BEFORE YOUR STAY
• Seek security advice on the country
you are visiting. Government travel
advice is available on the Internet.
Specialist risk consultancies offer
advice on threat levels in each
country and specific dangers to be
aware of. "An issue to be aware of
is that in southeast Asia, within a
45-minute flight of Singapore or
Hong Kong you can be in a totally
different security environment," says
Steve Vickers, president and chief
executive of FTI-International Risk.
"Some travellers tend to be too
blase about that."
•
Check that your company has
assessed the hotel, and that the
assessment is up to date. "While
major ... chains may offer better
protection from the majority of
overall state of security within the
hotels can fluctuate from hour-tohour, day-to-day or even
seasonally," says Tony Ridley,
director for Asia-Pacific security
services at International SOS.
threats, they have been increasingly
targeted in some countries and the
•
On arrival at the airport, keep a low
profile and be aware of your routine.
"A lot of the problems with the
foreign multinationals is they all do
everything the same way," Vickers
says. "Everybody always stays at
the same hotel. You've got expats
arriving at airports with somebody
holding a big sign with their name
on it."
ON ARRIVAL
• Be aware of your surroundings.
"Look at how far your hotel is from
the office, the airport, meetings or
emergency services such as
hospitals or police stations," Ridley
says. Some of this can be done via
maps and Google Earth ahead of
the trip
•
•
Check the security measures for
vehicles and non-guests. Many
hotels check vehicles for explosives
and also screen people entering
hotels.
"If a hotel appears secure to the
casual observer, it is more likely it
has put protection measures in
place and is therefore a less
attractive target to criminals and
terrorists alike," Ridley says. "The
boundaries should be clearly
defined with measures to ensure
guests or patrons can only access
the grounds."
•
Check the exits, fire escapes and
alternative routes away from the
area. If a crisis erupts, you will be
prepared.
•
Choose your room carefully. In
many hotels, some rooms may
overlook a busy unsecured street,
while others face the hotel grounds
or areas with no traffic.
•
Assess room security. "Rooms
should have a number of options for
securing the door and viewing the
outside corridor so you can
preserve your security and privacy,"
Ridley says.
•
Check if the windows have
protective film. Many deaths and
injuries from bomb attacks,
particularly further away from the
blast site, are usually caused by
flying glass.
DURING YOUR STAY
• Make sure your company knows
where you are. If there is a crisis,
this will help with rescue and
extraction.
•
Monitor local media for any signs of
changes in the local security
situation. Events on the ground can
often move fast.
•
Be aware of the risk, but don't
panic. Risk consultants point out
that the danger of militant attacks is
extremely low, even in troubled
countries. Travellers can prepare
intelligently for possible risks, but
should keep them in perspective
REUTERS ASIA
Editor, Political and General News:
Deputy Editor, Southeast Asia:
Asia Political Risk Correspondent:
Bureau Chief, Indonesia
Bureau Chief, Thailand
Bureau Chief, Philippines:
Bureau Chief, Malaysia:
John Chalmers
Bill Tarrant
Andrew Marshall
Sara Webb
Jason Szep
Raju Gopalakrishnan
David Chance
john.chalmers@thomsonreuters.com
william.tarrant@thomsonreuters.com
andrew.marshall@thomsonreuters.com
sara.webb@thomsonreuters.com
jason.szep@thomsonreuters.com
raju.gopalakrishnan@thomsreuters.com
david.chance@thomsonreuters.com
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