Issue 2 - The Breakthrough Institute

Transcription

JOUR NAL
L AT O U R Love Your Monsters / S A R E W I T Z Liberalism’s Modest Proposals
E L L I S Planet of No Return / K A R E I VA Conservation in the Anthropocene
S A G O F F The Rise and Fall of Ecological Economics /
NO.NO2. 2// FA
LL2011
2011
FALL
N O . 2 / FA L L 2 0 1 1
EXECUTIVE EDITORS
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger
MANAGING EDITOR
Ruchira Shah
A S S O C I AT E E D I T O R
Yael Borofsky
COPY EDITOR
Nicholas Adam
DESIGN
Dita Borofsky
All citations for Breakthrough Journal pieces can be found at our website:
www.breakthroughjournal.org.
Breakthrough Journal and Breakthrough Institute are generously supported by the following foundations:
The Comer Foundation, The Nathan Cummings Foundation, Nau Partners for Change, The Lotus
Foundation, The Bellwether Foundation.
Breakthrough Journal is published by the Breakthrough Institute at 436 14th Street, Suite 820, Oakland,
California 94612; journal@thebreakthrough.org; www.breakthroughjournal.org; 510-550-8800.
Issue No. 2, Fall 2011. Printed in the U.S.A. For a subscription to Breakthrough Journal or to send an
address change, please visit our website: www.breakthroughjournal.org, call 510-550-8800, or write to
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opinions expressed in Breakthrough Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the editors. Copyright 2011 by Breakthrough Journal and the authors.
CONTRIBUTORS
N O . 2 / FA L L 2 0 11
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER AND
ERLE ELLIS
TED NORDHAUS
(“Planet of No Return,” p. 39)
is associate professor of Geography
and Environmental Systems
at the University of Maryland,
Baltimore County.
(“Evolve,” p. 13) are executive editors
of the Breakthrough Journal and
founders of the Breakthrough Institute.
B R U N O L AT O U R
(“Love Your Monsters,” p. 21)
is professor and vice president for
research at Sciences Po Paris,
and author of We Have Never Been
Modern (Harvard 1993) and The
Politics of Nature (Harvard 2004).
He is a Breakthrough Institute
Senior Fellow.
MARK SAGOFF
(“The Rise and Fall of Ecological
Economics,” p. 45) is director of the
Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy at George Mason University
and author of The Economy of the
Earth (Cambridge 2007, 2 nd ed).
P E T E R K A R E I VA
DANIEL SAREWITZ
(“Conservation in the Anthropocene,”
p. 29) is a Breakthrough Institute
Senior Fellow and chief scientist
and vice president of The Nature
Conservancy and a member of
the National Academy of Sciences.
He, along with Michelle Marvier,
is the author of Conservation Science
(Roberts & Co 2011).
(“Liberalism’s Modest Proposals,”
p. 59) is professor of Science
and Society and codirector of
the Consortium for Science,
Policy & Outcomes at Arizona
State University. His latest book
is The Techno-Human Condition
(MIT 2011; coauthored with Braden
Allenby). He is a Breakthrough
Institute Senior Fellow.
ROBERT LALASZ
p. 29) is director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy.
He is founding editor of the
Conservancy’s blog, “Cool Green
Science” (blog.nature.org).
S T E V E N F. H AY WA R D
(“Modernizing Conservatism,” p. 69)
is F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at
the American Enterprise Institute
and the author of The Age of Reagan
(Random House 2001).
MICHELLE MARVIER
p. 29) is professor and department
chair of Environmental Studies and
Sciences at Santa Clara University.
She recently coauthored Conservation
Science with Peter Kareiva.
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SIDDHARTHA SHOME
(“The New India Versus the Global
Green Brahmins,” p. 91) is an
engineer at Parametric Technology
Corporation and a Breakthrough
Institute Senior Fellow.
CONTENTS
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7
/ FROM THE EDITORS
10
/ LETTERS
F E A T U R E S
13
/ MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER
AND TED NORDHAUS
Evolve
21
/ B R U N O L AT O U R
Love Your Monsters
29
/ P E T E R K A R E I VA , R O B E R T L A L A S Z ,
AND MICHELLE MARVIER
Conservation in the Anthropocene
39
/ ERLE ELLIS
The Planet of No Return
45
/ MARK SAGOFF
The Rise and Fall of Ecological Economics
59
/ DANIEL SAREWITZ
Liberalism’s Modest Proposals
69
/ S T E V E N F. H AY W A R D
Modernizing Conservatism
BREAKTHROUGH JOURNAL
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CONTENTS
(CONTINUED)
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R E S P O N S E S
81
/ DANIEL IKENSON
Against Manufacturing Policy
83
/ VA C L AV S M I L R E P L I E S
87
/ DEAN BAKER
Potshot at Progressive Economics Misses the Mark
88
/ R O B AT K I N S O N R E P L I E S
C U L T U R E
91
/ SIDDHARTHA SHOME
The New India Versus The Global Green Brahmins
97
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/ G A R D E N I N G T H E C L I M AT E
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FROM THE EDITORS
A
nyone seeking to predict the likely impact of the United Nations environment conference in Rio next year would do well to reflect on what
has happened in the 20 years since the 1992 Earth Summit. Back then, everyone
from world leaders to green NGOs to multinational corporations seemed to
agree that saving the planet demanded a fundamentally new model of economic
growth: sustainable development. While always somewhat hazy, the concept of
sustainable development generally meant some combination of corporate
responsibility, national parks, the pricing of nature, and special reserves where
peasants and indigenous tribes could harvest nuts and berries to sell abroad.
Like the green jobs movement of recent years, sustainable development was
meant to be a win-win-win for the poor, big corporations, and nature.
In retrospect, the notion that the developing world would ever follow a development trajectory fundamentally different from the one pursued in the West
appears quaintly naïve. Brazil is developing its forested interior, as Europe and
the United States did before it, with dams, farms, ranches, and roads in order
to sell its beef, soy, and minerals on foreign markets. Its indigenous people sell
logging contracts; its rubber tappers run cattle. China, meanwhile, is now
manufacturer to the world thanks to Confucian grit, industriousness, and cheap
coal — not waterwheels, solar panels, and respect for nature. In the process,
China has lifted roughly half a billion peasants out of grinding poverty.
And as Siddhartha Shome writes in this environmentally themed issue of
Breakthrough Journal, eschewing the ascetic path advocated by Mahatma
Gandhi, India has instead chosen modernization and integration into the global
knowledge economy.
For traditional greens, all of this is evidence that humankind is destroying
itself — but is it? Geographer Erle Ellis describes how humans have repeatedly
transgressed ecological limits since we were hunter-gatherers. Human civilization rests not upon natural systems but human ones, like agriculture, cities, and
industry, which have proven extraordinarily resilient to population and climatic
pressures. What’s at stake, Ellis and the other thinkers assembled here argue, is
not the survival of human civilization, but rather the contours and qualities of
our gardened planet.
Though barely audible against the loud claims of imminent catastrophe,
ecologists have decisively moved away from the conception of nature as a fragile
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FROM THE EDITORS
system in a tenuous state of balance. Over the last two decades, Mark Sagoff
notes, empirically oriented ecologists rejected the 1950s cybernetic view of nature
as a “system” where any disruption could result in its collapse — a theory that,
Sagoff explains, was built upon the Christian doctrine that nature existed as a
Great Chain of Being. In reality, esteemed conservation biologist Peter Kareiva
and his colleagues observe, nature has proven extraordinarily resilient.
Rising economic optimism in poor nations has been matched, over the last
two decades, by rising ecological pessimism in rich ones. As developed nations
became knowledge economies, their populations enjoyed greater wealth to travel
and experience the natural world, but also became increasingly alienated from
material (e.g., agricultural and industrial) production. Rising anomie and disenchantment with modernity, we argue in our essay, “Evolve,” have driven rising
skepticism about the ability of technology to improve our lives. Daniel Sarewitz
observes that liberalism’s turn away from technology and modernity beginning
in the 1960s also coincided with its turn toward a scientific rationality “unmoored from appropriate moral and experiential foundations.”
But if liberals rejected technology and modernization in the 1960s, there is
no reason they can’t embrace them today. One of the founders of science and
technology studies, Bruno Latour, points the way. Through a novel reading of
Frankenstein, Latour argues that we must learn to love our technologies as we
do our children — not reject them at the first sign of trouble. And given the
critical role played by tool use in human evolution, the two of us conclude, we
must understand technology as natural and sacred, not alien and profane. A
new liberalism should thus, Sarewitz argues, understand technology as a public
good — a way to achieve broadly agreed upon societal goals, whether for improved health or cleaner air.
Meanwhile, Kareiva and colleagues argue, for conservation to be relevant
in this new world it must move beyond the old parks and wilderness model and
find ways to shape development. We will not wall off the entirety of the Amazon
or the rainforests of Indonesia from all development as if we were protecting
Yosemite and Yellowstone.
Modernizing liberalism and environmentalism isn’t enough. Political conservatism, too, must get its act together. In this issue, Reagan historian and
American Enterprise Institute scholar, Steven F. Hayward, observes that, despite
its impressive recent electoral victories, conservatism is failing on its own terms.
Government is bigger than ever while social cohesion and economic opportunity are in decline. Tax cuts have created pervasive indebtedness and done
nothing to slow the growth of the welfare state. The Right must reconsider its
entrenched positions — including on the environment — if it is to revive conservatism for the 21st century.
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MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER AND TED NORDHAUS
Ultimately, if we are to be responsible planetary stewards, we need a new
view of both human agency and the planet. We must abandon the faith that
humankind's powers can be abdicated in deference to higher ones, whether
Nature or the Market. And we must see through the illusion that these supposedly higher powers exist in a delicate state of harmony constantly at risk of
collapse from too much human interference.
All of this will require a new posture and a new paradigm. We must open
our eyes to the joy and excitement experienced by the newly prosperous and
increasingly free. We must create a world where every human can not only realize her material needs, but also her higher needs for creativity, choice, beauty
— and wilderness. In the words of the father of the modern Indian
Constitution, Babasaheb Ambedkar, “The slogan of a democratic society must
be machinery, and more machinery, civilization and more civilization” — the
same tools needed, we might add, for planetary gardening.
— Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger
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LETTERS
THE TROUBLE WITH ALL ECONOMIC MODELS
Rob Atkinson’s “The Trouble with Progressive Economics” argues that in order
to be relevant to policy making, progressive economics must help corporations
become more innovative so that they can create greater wealth and more jobs.
While Atkinson pays lip service to the need for environmental standards, he
embraces the standard economic conceit that prosperity requires unending
growth. This consumption-driven model, subscribed to by virtually all of the
world’s major governments, ignores the reality that our planet cannot supply
enough material or energy to allow the current global population, let alone the
additional billions that are coming, to achieve American standards of living.
No amount of semantic debate among economists, whether progressive or neoclassical, about how best to ensure growth, can change this hard reality.
Economists need to develop a new economic model that values the resources
we have and equitably distributes them for all.
— Jonathan Fink,
Vice President for Research and Strategic Partnerships,
Portland State University
REDEFINING LIBERALISM
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger’s article, “Modernizing Liberalism,”
misses the mark. They narrowly define liberalism in terms of “redistribution of
wealth,” when they should define it as distribution of wealth. Left to its own
devices, capitalism does not distribute resources fairly, but rather concentrates
wealth and power in the hands of elites. Middle classes do not naturally emerge
or sustain themselves without intentional intervention by governments.
To their point, “Neither party dares ask middle-class taxpayers to bear any
of the costs associated with providing the basic public goods upon which competitive, modern economies increasingly depend.” They’re right. But no one
asked taxpayers to bear the costs of high unemployment, declining home values,
or corporate bailouts, either; nor should they.
The case for entitlement reform cannot be properly evaluated without considering the larger context of what has happened to the American economy.
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LETTERS
The lopsided distribution of wealth and changing labor conditions make it increasingly difficult for working people to earn a living wage, and the tax code
allows billionaires to pay less in taxes than their secretaries.
While entitlement programs may require some revamping to address looming insolvency, your characterization of America as an entitlement society, in
which Americans demand rising entitlements but don’t want to pay for them,
is unfair. The beneficiaries of entitlement programs have, by and large, paid
their dues to society and should be entitled to the fruits of their labor.
Civilized society needs to both share social risk through entitlement programs and invest in the future to ensure sustained prosperity for all. Attempting
to promote greater economic dynamism while ignoring those who are struggling
to survive is untenable; only propping up those who are financially under water
while not investing in the future is equally so.
— Mary Sue Schmaltz,
Metuchen, NJ
A N I N VA S I V E S P E C I E S
I greatly enjoyed Hannah Nordhaus’s article, “An Environmental Journalist’s
Lament,” and her candid discussion of the causes of honeybee declines.
As the author notes, the honeybee is essentially an invasive species, arriving
with the first settlers from Europe circa 1600. Given this, it might not be surprising that honeybees are under great stress and, as the article makes clear, not
so much from pesticides as from how enormously dependent commercial agriculture has become upon managed bees for pollination.
It was not always so. There are some 1,500 or so native pollinators around
the North American continent. Everything from flying ants, moths, bumblebees, and bats pollinate flowers and trees. And there are a good number of native
pollen bees as well, including carpenter bees, sweat bees, mason bees, and polyester bees. There are also squash, leafcutter, dwarf carpenter, alkali, and digger
bees. These native bees still help pollinate our gardens, parks, and forests.
Given the trouble that managed bees have gotten into, we would do well
to start relying more heavily upon native pollinators once again.
— Jake Blendford,
Seattle, WA
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LETTERS
KEY QUESTIONS
I welcome your inaugural issue as a hopeful sign of fresh thinking about the
state and future of our country. But I would suggest that the perception that
our country is on the wrong track and faces a bleak future is not well supported
by the facts. From 1947 through 2010, the economy grew at an annual rate of
3.3 percent while our population grew at a rate just under 1.23 percent annually.
By that measure, our nation has done very well, indeed.
What seems more in question today is not whether we will grow but how.
Where economically and where geographically will growth come from? How
will the benefits be shared? What social costs will be externalized and who will
bear those costs? I would love to see more discussion of these questions in future
issues. Congratulations and good luck with your new publication.
— David Schatsky,
Principal/Founder, Green Research
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EVOLVE
THE CASE FOR MODERNIZATION AS THE ROAD TO SALVATION
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER
AND TED NORDHAUS
S
ometime around 2014, Italy will complete construction of 78 mobile
floodgates aimed at protecting Venice’s three inlets from the rising tides
of the Adriatic Sea. The massive doors — 20 meters by 30 meters, and 5 meters
thick — will, most of the time, lie flat on the sandy seabed between the lagoon
and the sea. But when a high tide is predicted, the doors will empty themselves
of water and fill with compressed air, rising up on hinges to keep the Adriatic
out of the city. Three locks will allow ships to move in and out of the lagoon
while the gates are up.
Nowhere else in the world have humans so constantly had to create and recreate their infrastructure in response to a changing natural environment than
in Venice. The idea for the gates dates back to the 1966 flood, which inundated
100 percent of the city. Still, it took from 1970 to 2002 for the hydrologist
Robert Frassetto and others to convince their fellow Italians to build them. Not
everyone sees the oscillating and buoyant floodgates as Venice’s salvation. After
the project was approved, the head of World Wildlife Fund Italy said, “Today
the city’s destiny rests on a pretentious, costly, and environmentally harmful
technological gamble.”
In truth, the grandeur that is Venice has always rested — quite literally —
on a series of pretentious, costly, and environmentally harmful technological
gambles. Her buildings rest upon pylons made of ancient larch and oak trees
ripped from inland forests a thousand years ago. Over time, the pylons were
petrified by the saltwater, infill was added, and cathedrals were constructed.
Little by little, technology helped transform a town of humble fisherfolk into
the city we know today.
Saving Venice has meant creating Venice, not once, but many times since
its founding. And that is why her rescue from the rising seas serves as an apt
metaphor for solving this century’s formidable environmental problems. Each
new act of salvation will result in new unintended consequences, positive and
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negative, which will in turn require new acts of salvation. What we call “saving
the Earth” will, in practice, require creating and re-creating it again and again
for as long as humans inhabit it.
1.
Many environmentally concerned people today view technology as an affront
to the sacredness of nature, but our technologies have always been perfectly natural. Our animal skins, our fire, our farms, our windmills, our nuclear plants,
and our solar panels — all 100 percent natural, drawn, as they are, from the
raw materials of the Earth.
Furthermore, over the course of human history, those technologies have not
only been created by us, but have also helped to create us. Recent archeological
evidence suggests that the reason for our modern hands, with their opposable
thumbs and shorter fingers, is that they were better adapted for tool use. Ape
hands are great for climbing trees but not, it turns out, for striking flint or making arrowheads. Those prehumans whose hands could best use tools gained an
enormous advantage over those whose hands could not.
As our hands and wrists changed, we increasingly walked upright, hunted,
ate meat, and evolved. Our upright posture allowed us to chase down animals
we had wounded with our weapons. Our long-distance running was aided by
sweat glands replacing fur. The use of fire to cook meat allowed us to consume
much larger amounts of protein, which allowed our heads to grow so large that
some prehumans began delivering bigger-brained babies prematurely. Those
babies, in turn, were able to survive because we were able to fashion still more
tools, made from animal bladders and skins, to strap the helpless infants to their
mothers’ chests. Technology, in short, made us human.
Of course, as our bodies, our brains, and our tools evolved, so too did our
ability to radically modify our environment. We hunted mammoths and other
species to extinction. We torched whole forests and savannas in order to flush
prey and clear land for agriculture. And long before human emissions began to
affect the climate, we had already shifted the albedo of the Earth by replacing
many of the world’s forests with cultivated agriculture. While our capabilities
to alter our environment have, over the last century, expanded substantially, the
trend is longstanding. The Earth of 100 or 200 or 300 years ago was one that
had already been profoundly shaped by human endeavor.
None of this changes the reality and risks of the ecological crises humans
have created. Global warming, deforestation, overfishing, and other human activities — if they don’t threaten our very existence — certainly offer the
possibility of misery for many hundreds of millions, if not billions, of humans
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TED NORDHAUS AND MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER
and are rapidly transforming nonhuman nature at a pace not seen for many
hundreds of millions of years. But the difference between the new ecological
crises and the ways in which humans and even prehumans have shaped nonhuman nature for tens of thousands of years is one of scope and scale, not kind.
Humans have long been cocreators of the environment they inhabit. Any
proposal to fix environmental problems by turning away from technology risks
worsening them by attempting to deny the ongoing coevolution of humans
and nature.
2.
Nevertheless, elites in the West — who rely more heavily on technology than
anyone else on the planet — insist that development and technology are the
causes of ecological problems but not their solution. They claim that economic
sacrifice is the answer while living amidst historic levels of affluence and abundance. They consume resources on a vast scale, overwhelming whatever meager
conservations they may partake in through living in dense (and often fashionable) urban enclaves, driving fuel-efficient automobiles, and purchasing locally
grown produce. Indeed, the most visible and common expressions of faith in
ecological salvation are new forms of consumption. Green products and services
— the Toyota Prius, the efficient washer/dryer, the LEED-certified office building — are consciously identified by consumers as things they do to express their
higher moral status.
The same is true at the political level, as world leaders, to the cheers of the
left-leaning postmaterial constituencies that increasingly hold the balance of
political power in many developed economies, offer promise after promise to
address climate change, species extinction, deforestation, and global poverty, all
while studiously avoiding any action that might impose real cost or sacrifice
upon their constituents. While it has been convenient for many sympathetic
observers to chalk up the failure of such efforts to corporate greed, corruption,
and political cowardice, the reality is that the entire postmaterial project is, confoundingly, built upon a foundation of affluence and material consumption
that would be considerably threatened by any serious effort to address the ecological crises through substantially downscaling economic activity.
It’s not too difficult to understand how this hypocrisy has come to infiltrate
such a seemingly well-meaning swath of our culture. As large populations
in the developed North achieved unprecedented economic security, affluence,
and freedom, the project that has centrally occupied humanity for thousands of years — emancipating ourselves from nature, tribalism, peonage, and
poverty — has been subsumed by the need to manage the unintended conseBREAKTHROUGH JOURNAL
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quences of modernization itself, from local pollution to nuclear proliferation
to global warming.
Increasingly skeptical of capitalist meritocracy and economic criteria as the
implicit standards of success at the individual level and the defining measure of
progress at the societal level, the post-World War II generations have redefined
normative notions of well-being and quality of life in developed societies.
Humanitarianism and environmentalism have become the dominant social
movements, bringing environmental protection, preservation of quality of life,
and other “life-political” issues, in the words of British sociologist, Anthony
Giddens, to the fore.
The rise of the knowledge economy — encompassing medicine, law, finance, media, real estate, marketing, and the nonprofit sector — has further
accelerated the West’s growing disenchantment with modern life, especially
among the educated elite. Knowledge workers are more alienated from the products of their labor than any other class in history, unable to claim some role in
producing food, shelter, or even basic consumer products. And yet they can afford to spend time in beautiful places — in their gardens, in the countryside,
on beaches, and near old-growth forests. As they survey these landscapes, they
tell themselves that the best things in life are free — even though they have
consumed mightily to travel to places where they feel peaceful, calm, and far
from the worries of the modern world.
These postmaterial values have given rise to a secular and largely inchoate
ecotheology, complete with apocalyptic fears of ecological collapse, disenchanting notions of living in a fallen world, and the growing conviction that some
kind of collective sacrifice is needed to avoid the end of the world. Alongside
those dark incantations shine nostalgic visions of a transcendent future in which
humans might, once again, live in harmony with nature through a return to
small-scale agriculture, or even to hunter-gatherer life.
The contradictions between the world as it is — filled with the unintended
consequences of our actions — and the world as so many of us would like it to
be, result in a pseudorejection of modernity, a kind of postmaterialist nihilism.
Empty gestures are the defining sacraments of ecotheology. The belief that we
must radically curtail our consumption in order to survive as a civilization is
no impediment to elites paying for private university educations, frequent jet
travel, and iPads.
Thus, ecotheology, like all dominant religious narratives, serves the dominant forms of social and economic organization in which it is embedded.
Catholicism valorized poverty, social hierarchy, and agrarianism for the masses
in feudal societies that lived and worked the land. Protestantism valorized industriousness, capital accumulation, and individuation among the rising
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merchant classes of early capitalist societies and would define the social norms
of modernizing industrial societies. Today’s secular ecotheology values creativity,
imagination, and leisure over the work ethic, productivity, and efficiency in societies that increasingly prosper from their knowledge economies while
outsourcing crude, industrial production of goods to developing societies.
Living amid unprecedented levels of wealth and security, ecological elites reject
economic growth as a measure of well-being, tell cautionary tales about modernity and technology, and warn of overpopulation abroad now that the societies
in which they live are wealthy and their populations are no longer growing.
Such hypocrisy has rarely been a hindrance to religion and, indeed, contributes to its power. One of the most enduring characteristics of human
civilization is the way ruling elites espouse beliefs radically at odds with their
own behaviors. The ancient Greeks recited the cautionary tales of Prometheus
and Icarus while using fire, dreaming of flight, and pursing technological frontiers. Early agriculturalists told the story of the fall from Eden as a cautionary
tale against the very agriculture they practiced. European Christians espoused
poverty and peacemaking while accumulating wealth and waging war.
In preaching antimodernity while living as moderns, ecological elites affirm
their status at the top of the postindustrial knowledge hierarchy. Affluent developed-world elites offer both their less well-to-do countrymen and the global
poor a laundry list of don’ts — don’t develop like we developed, don’t drive
tacky SUVs, don’t overconsume — that engender resentment, not emulation,
from fellow citizens at home and abroad. That the ecological elite hold themselves to a different standard while insisting that all are equal is yet another
demonstration of their higher status, for they are thus unaccountable even
to reality.
Though it poses as a solution, today’s nihilistic ecotheology is actually a significant obstacle to dealing with ecological problems created by modernization
— one that must be replaced by a new, creative, and life-affirming worldview.
After all, human development, wealth, and technology liberated us from hunger,
deprivation, and insecurity; now they must be considered essential to overcoming ecological risks.
3.
There’s no question that humans are radically remaking the Earth, but fears of
ecological apocalypse — of condemning this world to fiery destruction — are
unsupported by the sciences. Global warming may bring worsening disasters
and disruptions to rainfall, snowmelts, and agriculture, but there is little evidence to suggest it will deliver the end of modernization. Even the most
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catastrophic United Nations scenarios predict rising economic growth. While
wealthy environmentalists claim to be especially worried about the impact of
global warming on the poor, it is rapid, not retarded, development that is most
likely to protect the poor against natural disasters and agricultural losses.
What modernization may threaten most is not human civilization, but the
survival of those nonhuman species and environments we care about. While
global warming dominates ecological discourse, the greatest threats to nonhumans remain our direct changes to the land and the seas. The world’s great,
diverse, and ancient forests are being converted to tree plantations, farms, and
ranches. Humans are causing massive, unprecedented extinctions on Earth due
to habitat destruction. We are on the verge of losing primates in the wild. We
have so overfished the oceans that most of the big fish are gone.
The apocalyptic vision of ecotheology warns that degrading nonhuman natures will undermine the basis for human civilization, but history has shown
the opposite: the degradation of nonhuman environments has made us rich.
We have become rather adept at transferring the wealth and diversity of nonhuman environments into human ones. The solution to the unintended
consequences of modernity is, and has always been, more modernity — just as
the solution to the unintended consequences of our technologies has always
been more technology. The Y2K computer bug was fixed by better computer
programming, not by going back to typewriters. The ozone-hole crisis was
averted, not by an end to air-conditioning, but rather by more advanced, less
environmentally harmful technologies.
The question for humanity, then, is not whether humans and our civilizations will survive but rather what kind of a planet we will inhabit. Would we
like a planet with wild primates, old-growth forests, a living ocean, and modest
rather than extreme temperature increases? Of course we would — virtually
everybody would. Only continued modernization and technological innovation
can make such a world possible.
Putting faith in modernization will require a new secular theology consistent
with the reality of human creation and life on Earth, not with some imagined
dystopia or utopia. It will require a worldview that sees technology as humane
and sacred, rather than inhumane and profane. It will require replacing the antiquated notion that human development is antithetical to the preservation of
nature with the view that modernization is the key to saving it. Let’s call this
“modernization theology.”
Where ecotheology imagines that our ecological problems are the consequence of human violations of a separate “nature,” modernization theology
views environmental problems as an inevitable part of life on Earth. Where the
last generation of ecologists saw a natural harmony in Creation, the new ecol18/
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ogists see constant change. Where ecotheologians suggest that unintended consequences of human development might be avoidable, proponents of
modernization view them as inevitable, and positive as often as negative. And
where the ecological elites see the powers of humankind as the enemy of
Creation, the modernists acknowledge them as central to its salvation.
Modernization theology should thus be grounded in a sense of profound
gratitude to Creation — human and nonhuman. It should celebrate, not desecrate, the technologies that led our prehuman ancestors to evolve. Our
experience of transcendence in the outdoors should translate into the desire for
all humans to benefit from the fruits of modernization and be able to experience
similar transcendence. Our valorization of creativity should lead us to care for
our cocreation of the planet.
4.
The risks now faced by humanity are increasingly ones of our own making and
ones over which we have only partial, tentative, and temporary control. Various
kinds of liberation — from hard agricultural labor and high infant mortality
rates to tuberculosis and oppressive traditional values — bring all kinds of new
problems, from global warming and obesity to alienation and depression. These
new problems will largely be better than the old ones, in the way that obesity
is a better problem than hunger, and living in a hotter world is a better problem
to have than living in one without electricity. But they are serious problems
nonetheless.
The good news is that we already have many nascent, promising technologies to overcome ecological problems. Stabilizing greenhouse emissions will
require a new generation of nuclear power plants to cheaply replace coal plants
as well as, perhaps, to pull carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, and power
desalination plants to irrigate and grow forests in today’s deserts. Pulling frontier
agriculture back from forests will require massively increasing agricultural yields
through genetic engineering. Replacing environmentally degrading cattle ranching may require growing meat in laboratories, which will gradually be viewed
as less repulsive than today’s cruel and deadly methods of meat production. And
the solution to the species extinction problem will involve creating new habitats
and new organisms, perhaps from the DNA of previously extinct ones.
In attempting to solve these problems, we will inevitably create new ones.
One common objection to technology and development is that it will bring
unintended consequences, but life on Earth has always been a story of unintended consequences. The Venice floodgates offer a pointed illustration.
Concerns raised by the environmental community that the floodgates would
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impact marine life have been borne out — only not in the way they had feared.
Though the gates are still under construction, marine biologists have announced
that they have already become host to many coral and fish species, some of
which used to be found only in the southern Mediterranean or Red Sea.
Other critics of the gates have questioned what will happen if global warming should raise sea levels higher than the tops of the gates. If this should become
inevitable, it is unlikely that Venetians would abandon their city. Instead they
may attempt to raise it. One sweetly ironic proposal would levitate the city by
blowing carbon dioxide emissions 2,000 feet below the lagoon floor. Some may
call such strong faith in the technological fix an instance of hubris, but others
will simply call it compassion.
The French anthropologist Bruno Latour has some interesting thoughts on
the matter. According to Latour, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is not a cautionary
tale against hubris, but rather a cautionary tale against irrational fears of
imperfection. Dr. Frankenstein is an antihero not because he created life, but
rather because he fled in horror when he mistook his creation for a monster —
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The moral of the story, where saving the planet is
concerned, is that we should treat our technological creations as we would treat
our children, with care and love, lest our abandonment of them turn them
into monsters.
“The sin is not to wish to have dominion over nature,” Latour writes, “but
to believe that this dominion means emancipation and not attachment.” In
other words, the term “ecological hubris” should not be used to describe the
human desire to remake the world, but rather the faith that we can end the
cycle of creation and destruction. /
— This essay was originally published in Orion Magazine,
September/October 2011.
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WHY WE MUS T CAR E FOR OUR TECHNOLOG IES AS WE DO
OUR CH ILDREN
B R U N O L AT O U R
I
n the summer of 1816, a young British woman by the name of Mary
Godwin and her boyfriend Percy Shelley went to visit Lord Byron in Lake
Geneva, Switzerland. They had planned to spend much of the summer outdoors, but the eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia the previous year had
changed the climate of Europe. The weather was so bad that they spent most
of their time indoors, discussing the latest popular writings on science and
the supernatural.
After reading a book of German ghost stories, somebody suggested they
each write their own. Byron’s physician, John Polidori, came up with the idea
for The Vampyre, published in 1819, which was the first of the “vampire-as-seducer” novels. Godwin’s story came to her in a dream, during which she saw
“the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put together.” Soon after that fateful summer, Godwin and Shelley married, and in
1818, Mary Shelley’s horror story was published under the title, Frankenstein,
Or, the Modern Prometheus.
Frankenstein lives on in the popular imagination as a cautionary tale against
technology. We use the monster as an all-purpose modifier to denote technological crimes against nature. When we fear genetically modified foods we
call them “frankenfoods” and “frankenfish.” It is telling that even as we warn
against such hybrids, we confuse the monster with its creator. We now mostly
refer to Dr. Frankenstein’s monster as Frankenstein. And just as we have forgotten that Frankenstein was the man, not the monster, we have also forgotten
Frankenstein’s real sin.
Dr. Frankenstein’s crime was not that he invented a creature through some
combination of hubris and high technology, but rather that he abandoned the
creature to itself. When Dr. Frankenstein meets his creation on a glacier in the
Alps, the monster claims that it was not born a monster, but that it became a
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ratory once the horrible thing twitched to life. “Remember, I am thy creature,”
the monster protests, “I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel,
whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed… I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.”
Written at the dawn of the great technological revolutions that would define
the 19th and 20th centuries, Frankenstein foresees that the gigantic sins that were
to be committed would hide a much greater sin. It is not the case that we have
failed to care for Creation, but that we have failed to care for our technological
creations. We confuse the monster for its creator and blame our sins against
Nature upon our creations. But our sin is not that we created technologies but
that we failed to love and care for them. It is as if we decided that we were
unable to follow through with the education of our children.
Let Dr. Frankenstein’s sin serve as a parable for political ecology. At a time
when science, technology, and demography make clear that we can never separate
ourselves from the nonhuman world — that we, our technologies, and nature
can no more be disentangled than we can remember the distinction between Dr.
Frankenstein and his monster — this is the moment chosen by millions of wellmeaning souls to flagellate themselves for their earlier aspiration to dominion,
to repent for their past hubris, to look for ways of diminishing the numbers of
their fellow humans, and to swear to make their footprints invisible?
The goal of political ecology must not be to stop innovating, inventing,
creating, and intervening. The real goal must be to have the same type of patience and commitment to our creations as God the Creator, Himself. And the
comparison is not blasphemous: we have taken the whole of Creation on our
shoulders and have become coextensive with the Earth.
What, then, should be the work of political ecology? It is, I believe, to modernize modernization, to borrow an expression proposed by Ulrich Beck.
This challenge demands more of us than simply embracing technology and
innovation. It requires exchanging the modernist notion of modernity for
what I have called a “compositionist” one that sees the process of human development as neither liberation from Nature nor as a fall from it, but rather as a
process of becoming ever-more attached to, and intimate with, a panoply of
nonhuman natures.
1.
At the time of the plough we could only scratch the surface of the soil. Three
centuries back, we could only dream, like Cyrano de Bergerac, of traveling to
the moon. In the past, my Gallic ancestors were afraid of nothing except that
the “sky will fall on their heads.”
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Today we can fold ourselves into the molecular machinery of soil bacteria
through our sciences and technologies. We run robots on Mars. We photograph and dream of further galaxies. And yet we fear that the climate could
destroy us.
Everyday in our newspapers we read about more entanglements of all those
things that were once imagined to be separable — science, morality, religion,
law, technology, finance, and politics. But these things are tangled up together
everywhere: in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in the space
shuttle, and in the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
If you envision a future in which there will be less and less of these entanglements thanks to Science, capital S, you are a modernist. But if you brace
yourself for a future in which there will always be more of these imbroglios,
mixing many more heterogeneous actors, at a greater and greater scale and at
an ever-tinier level of intimacy requiring even more detailed care, then you
are… what? A compositionist!
The dominant, peculiar story of modernity is of humankind’s emancipation
from Nature. Modernity is the thrusting-forward arrow of time — Progress —
characterized by its juvenile enthusiasm, risk taking, frontier spirit, optimism,
and indifference to the past. The spirit can be summarized in a single sentence:
“Tomorrow, we will be able to separate more accurately what the world is really
like from the subjective illusions we used to entertain about it.”
The very forward movement of the arrow of time and the frontier spirit associated with it (the modernizing front) is due to a certain conception of
knowledge: “Tomorrow, we will be able to differentiate clearly what in the past
was still mixed up, namely facts and values, thanks to Science.”
Science is the shibboleth that defines the right direction of the arrow of
time because it, and only it, is able to cut into two well-separated parts what
had, in the past, remained hopelessly confused: a morass of ideology, emotions,
and values on the one hand, and, on the other, stark and naked matters of fact.
The notion of the past as an archaic and dangerous confusion arises
directly from giving Science this role. A modernist, in this great narrative, is
the one who expects from Science the revelation that Nature will finally be
visible through the veils of subjectivity — and subjection — that hid it from
our ancestors.
And here has been the great failure of political ecology. Just when all of the
human and nonhuman associations are finally coming to the center of our consciousness, when science and nature and technology and politics become so
confused and mixed up as to be impossible to untangle, just as these associations
are beginning to be shaped in our political arenas and are triggering our most
personal and deepest emotions, this is when a new apartheid is declared: leave
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Nature alone and let the humans retreat — as the English did on the beaches
of Dunkirk in the 1940s.
Just at the moment when this fabulous dissonance inherent in the modernist
project between what modernists say (emancipation from all attachments!) and
what they do (create ever-more attachments!) is becoming apparent to all, along
come those alleging to speak for Nature to say the problem lies in the violations
and imbroglios — the attachments!
Instead of deciding that the great narrative of modernism (Emancipation)
has always resulted in another history altogether (Attachments), the spirit of
the age has interpreted the dissonance in quasi-apocalyptic terms: “We were
wrong all along, let’s turn our back to progress, limit ourselves, and return to
our narrow human confines, leaving the nonhumans alone in as pristine a
Nature as possible, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa…”
Nature, this great shortcut of due political process, is now used to forbid
humans to encroach. Instead of realizing at last that the emancipation narrative is bunk, and that modernism was always about attachments, modernist
greens have suddenly shifted gears and have begun to oppose the promises
of modernization.
Why do we feel so frightened at the moment that our dreams of modernization finally come true? Why do we suddenly turn pale and wish to fall
back on the other side of Hercules’s columns, thinking we are being punished
for having transgressed the sign: “Thou shall not transgress?” Was not our
slogan until now, as Nordhaus and Shellenberger note in Break Through, “We
shall overcome!”?
In the name of indisputable facts portraying a bleak future for the human
race, green politics has succeeded in leaving citizens nothing but a gloomy asceticism, a terror of trespassing Nature, and a diffidence toward industry,
innovation, technology, and science. No wonder that, while political ecology
claims to embody the political power of the future, it is reduced everywhere to
a tiny portion of electoral strap-hangers. Even in countries where political ecology is a little more powerful, it contributes only a supporting force.
Political ecology has remained marginal because it has not grasped either
its own politics or its own ecology. It thinks it is speaking of Nature, System, a
hierarchical totality, a world without man, an assured Science, but it is precisely
these overly ordered pronouncements that marginalize it.
Set in contrast to the modernist narrative, this idea of political ecology could
not possibly succeed. There is beauty and strength in the modernist story of
emancipation. Its picture of the future is so attractive, especially when put
against such a repellent past, that it makes one wish to run forward to break all
the shackles of ancient existence.
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To succeed, an ecological politics must manage to be at least as powerful as
the modernizing story of emancipation without imagining that we are emancipating ourselves from Nature. What the emancipation narrative points to as
proof of increasing human mastery over and freedom from Nature — agriculture, fossil energy, technology — can be redescribed as the increasing
attachments between things and people at an ever-expanding scale. If the older
narratives imagined humans either fell from Nature or freed themselves from
it, the compositionist narrative describes our ever-increasing degree of intimacy
with the new natures we are constantly creating. Only “out of Nature” may ecological politics start again and anew.
2.
The paradox of “the environment” is that it emerged in public parlance just
when it was starting to disappear. During the heyday of modernism, no one
seemed to care about “the environment” because there existed a huge unknown
reserve on which to discharge all bad consequences of collective modernizing
actions. The environment is what appeared when unwanted consequences came
back to haunt the originators of such actions.
But if the originators are true modernists, they will see the return of “the
environment” as incomprehensible since they believed they were finally free of
it. The return of consequences, like global warming, is taken as a contradiction,
or even as a monstrosity, which it is, of course, but only according to the
modernist’s narrative of emancipation. In the compositionist’s narrative of attachments, unintended consequences are quite normal — indeed, the most
expected things on earth!
Environmentalists, in the American sense of the word, never managed to
extract themselves from the contradiction that the environment is precisely not
“what lies beyond and should be left alone” — this was the contrary, the view
of their worst enemies! The environment is exactly what should be even more
managed, taken up, cared for, stewarded, in brief, integrated and internalized
in the very fabric of the polity.
France, for its part, has never believed in the notion of a pristine Nature
that has so confused the “defense of the environment” in other countries. What
we call a “national park” is a rural ecosystem complete with post offices, welltended roads, highly subsidized cows, and handsome villages.
Those who wish to protect natural ecosystems learn, to their stupefaction,
that they have to work harder and harder — that is, to intervene even more, at
always greater levels of detail, with ever more subtle care — to keep them “natural enough” for Nature-intoxicated tourists to remain happy.
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Like France’s parks, all of Nature needs our constant care, our undivided
attention, our costly instruments, our hundreds of thousands of scientists, our
huge institutions, our careful funding. But though we have Nature, and we have
nurture, we don’t know what it would mean for Nature itself to be nurtured.
The word “environmentalism” thus designates this turning point in history
when the unwanted consequences are suddenly considered to be such a monstrosity that the only logical step appears to be to abstain and repent: “We
should not have committed so many crimes; now we should be good and limit
ourselves.” Or at least this is what people felt and thought before the breakthrough, at the time when there was still an “environment.”
But what is the breakthrough itself then? If I am right, the breakthrough
involves no longer seeing a contradiction between the spirit of emancipation
and its catastrophic outcomes, but accepting it as the normal duty of continuing
to care for unwanted consequences, even if this means going further and
further down into the imbroglios. Environmentalists say: “From now on we
should limit ourselves.” Postenvironmentalists exclaim: “From now on, we
should stop flagellating ourselves and take up explicitly and seriously what we
have been doing all along at an ever-increasing scale, namely, intervening,
acting, wanting, caring.” For environmentalists, the return of unexpected consequences appears as a scandal (which it is for the modernist myth of mastery).
For postenvironmentalists, the other, unintended consequences are part and
parcel of any action.
3.
One way to seize upon the breakthrough from environmentalism to postenvironmentalism is to reshape the very definition of the “precautionary principle.”
This strange moral, legal, epistemological monster has appeared in European
and especially French politics after many scandals due to the misplaced belief
by state authority in the certainties provided by Science.
When action is supposed to be nothing but the logical consequence of reason and facts (which the French, of all people, still believe), it is quite normal
to wait for the certainty of science before administrators and politicians spring
to action. The problem begins when experts fail to agree on the reasons and
facts that have been taken as the necessary premises of any action. Then the
machinery of decision is stuck until experts come to an agreement. It was in
such a situation that the great tainted blood catastrophe of the 1980s ensued:
before agreement was produced, hundreds of patients were transfused with
blood contaminated by the AIDS virus.
The precautionary principle was introduced to break this odd connection
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between scientific certainty and political action, stating that even in the absence
of certainty, decisions could be made. But of course, as soon as it was introduced, fierce debates began on its meaning. Is it an environmentalist notion
that precludes action or a postenvironmentalist notion that finally follows action
through to its consequences?
Not surprisingly, the enemies of the precautionary principle — which
President Chirac enshrined in the French Constitution as if the French, having
indulged so much in rationalism, had to be protected against it by the highest
legal pronouncements — took it as proof that no action was possible any more.
As good modernists, they claimed that if you had to take so many precautions
in advance, to anticipate so many risks, to include the unexpected consequences
even before they arrived, and worse, to be responsible for them, then it was a
plea for impotence, despondency, and despair. The only way to innovate, they
claimed, is to bounce forward, blissfully ignorant of the consequences or at least
unconcerned by what lies outside your range of action. Their opponents largely
agreed. Modernist environmentalists argued that the principle of precaution
dictated no action, no new technology, no intervention unless it could be proven
with certainty that no harm would result. Modernists we were, modernists we
shall be!
But for its postenvironmental supporters (of which I am one) the principle
of precaution, properly understood, is exactly the change of zeitgeist needed:
not a principle of abstention — as many have come to see it — but a change
in the way any action is considered, a deep tidal change in the linkage modernism established between science and politics. From now on, thanks to this
principle, unexpected consequences are attached to their initiators and have to
be followed through all the way.
4.
The link between technology and theology hinges on the notion of mastery.
Descartes exclaimed that we should be “maîtres et possesseurs de la nature.”
But what does it mean to be a master? In the modernist narrative, mastery was
supposed to require such total dominance by the master that he was emancipated entirely from any care and worry. This is the myth about mastery that
was used to describe the technical, scientific, and economic dominion of Man
over Nature.
But if you think about it according to the compositionist narrative, this
myth is quite odd: where have we ever seen a master freed from any dependence
on his dependents? The Christian God, at least, is not a master who is freed
from dependents, but who, on the contrary, gets folded into, involved with,
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implicated with, and incarnated into His Creation. God is so attached and dependent upon His Creation that he is continually forced (convinced? willing?)
to save it. Once again, the sin is not to wish to have dominion over Nature, but
to believe that this dominion means emancipation and not attachment.
If God has not abandoned His Creation and has sent His Son to redeem it,
why do you, a human, a creature, believe that you can invent, innovate, and
proliferate — and then flee away in horror from what you have committed?
Oh, you the hypocrite who confesses of one sin to hide a much graver, mortal
one! Has God fled in horror after what humans made of His Creation? Then
have at least the same forbearance that He has.
The dream of emancipation has not turned into a nightmare. It was simply
too limited: it excluded nonhumans. It did not care about unexpected consequences; it was unable to follow through with its responsibilities; it entertained
a wholly unrealistic notion of what science and technology had to offer; it relied
on a rather impious definition of God, and a totally absurd notion of what creation, innovation, and mastery could provide.
Which God and which Creation should we be for, knowing that, contrary
to Dr. Frankenstein, we cannot suddenly stop being involved and “go home?”
Incarnated we are, incarnated we will be. In spite of a centuries-old misdirected
metaphor, we should, without any blasphemy, reverse the Scripture and exclaim:
“What good is it for a man to gain his soul yet forfeit the whole world?” /
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CONSER VAT IO N
IN T HE ANT H R OPO CENE
BEYOND SOLITUDE AND FRAGILITY
P E T E R K A R E I VA , R O B E R T L A L A S Z ,
AND MICHELLE MARVIER
B
y its own measures, conservation is failing. Biodiversity on Earth continues its rapid decline. We continue to lose forests in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. There are so few wild tigers and apes that they will be lost forever if
current trends continue. Simply put, we are losing many more special places
and species than we’re saving.
Ironically, conservation is losing the war to protect nature despite winning
one of its hardest fought battles — the fight to create parks, game preserves,
and wilderness areas. Even as we are losing species and wild places at an accelerating rate, the worldwide number of protected areas has risen dramatically,
from under 10,000 in 1950 to over 100,000 by 2009. Around the world, nations have set aside beautiful, biodiverse areas where human development is
restricted. By some estimates, 13 percent of the world’s land mass is protected,
an area larger than all of South America.
But while conservation has historically been locally driven — focused on
saving specific places such as Yosemite National Park and the Grand Canyon,
or on managing very limited ecological systems like watersheds and forests —
its more recent ambitions have become almost fantastical. For example, is halting deforestation in the Amazon, an area nearly the size of the continental
United States, feasible? Is it even necessary? Putting a boundary around Yosemite
Valley is not the same as attempting to do so around the Amazon. Just as the
United States was dammed, logged, and crisscrossed by roads, it is likely that
much of the Amazon will be as well.
Only with the rapid transformation of the developing world — from rural
or pastoral cultures to urban and industrial nations — and the unmistakable
domestication of our planet that has resulted has the paradox at the heart of
contemporary conservation become apparent. We may protect places of particular beauty or those places with large numbers of species, but even as we do,
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the pace of destruction will likely continue to accelerate. Whether or not the
developing world sets aside a large percentage of its landscapes as parks or
wilderness over the next hundred years, what is clear is that those protected
areas will remain islands of “pristine nature” in a sea of profound human transformations to the landscape through logging, agriculture, mining, damming,
and urbanization.
In the face of these realities, 21st century conservation is changing.
Conservationists have taken steps to become more “people friendly” and to attend more seriously to working landscapes. Conservation will likely continue
to create parks and wilderness areas, but that will be just one part of the field’s
larger goals. The bigger questions for 21st century conservation regard what we
will do with the rest of it — the working landscapes, the urban ecosystems, the
fisheries and tree plantations, the vast swaths of agricultural monocultures, and
the growing expanses of marginal agricultural lands and second growth forests
that, as agriculture and forestry become more productive and intensive, are already returning to something that may not be wilderness, but is of conservation
value, nonetheless.
In answering these questions, conservation cannot promise a return to pristine, prehuman landscapes. Humankind has already profoundly transformed
the planet and will continue to do so. What conservation could promise instead
is a new vision of a planet in which nature — forests, wetlands, diverse species,
and other ancient ecosystems — exists amid a wide variety of modern, human
landscapes. For this to happen, conservationists will have to jettison their idealized notions of nature, parks, and wilderness — ideas that have never been
supported by good conservation science — and forge a more optimistic,
human-friendly vision.
1.
Since the early 19th century, a number of thinkers have argued that the greatest
use of nature is as a source of solitary spiritual renewal, describing nature as a
place to escape modern life, enjoy solitude, and experience God. “To go into
solitude, a man needs to retire as much from his chamber as from society,” wrote
Ralph Waldo Emerson in his seminal essay, “Nature.” Cities and human development were portrayed as threats to these transcendence-enabling idylls, even
though the writers were mostly urban intellectuals. Nathaniel Hawthorne complained bitterly of hearing the railroad whistle from his country home despite
depending on modern transport to arrive at his own private Eden. Henry David
Thoreau famously extolled his self-sufficiency, living in a small cabin in harmony with nature; in fact, Thoreau lived close enough to town that he could
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frequently receive guests and have his mother wash his clothes. More recently,
Edward Abbey pined for companionship in his private journal even as he publicly exulted in his ascetic life in Desert Solitaire.
The conservation movement’s original justification for parks devoid of all
people (unless those people were naturalists or tourists) was born from the 19th
century spiritual view of nature as God. John Muir — who, at age 11, could
recite the Bible from memory — read Emerson religiously while living in
Yosemite. “No temple made with hands,” Muir wrote, “can compare with
Yosemite.” But if Yosemite was a temple, it was one full of commerce. Though
Yosemite was a state park when Muir arrived, it was occupied by Miwok Indians
growing crops, white settlers raising sheep, and miners seeking gold and other
minerals. Not long after he built himself a cabin and a water-powered mill,
Muir, as head of the Sierra Club, decided the other occupants had to go. Muir
had sympathized with the oppression of the Winnebago Indians in his home
state, but when it came time to empty Yosemite of all except the naturalists and
tourists, Muir vigorously backed the expulsion of the Miwok. The Yosemite
model spread to other national parks, including Yellowstone, where the forced
evictions killed 300 Shoshone in one day.
Beneath the invocations of the spiritual and transcendental value of
untrammeled nature is an argument for using landscapes for some things
and not others: hiking trails rather than roads, science stations rather than
logging operations, and hotels for ecotourists instead of homes. By removing
long-established human communities, erecting hotels in their stead, removing
unwanted species while supporting more desirable species, drilling wells
to water wildlife, and imposing fire management that mixes control with
prescribed burns, we create parks that are no less human constructions than
Disneyland.
Conservation is widely viewed as the innocent and uncontroversial practice
of purchasing special places threatened by development. In truth, for 30 years,
the global conservation movement has been racked with controversy arising
from its role in expelling indigenous people from their lands in order to create
parks and reserves. The modern protection of supposed wilderness often involves resettling large numbers of people, too often without fair compensation
for their lost homes, hunting grounds, and agricultural lands.
In 2009, the investigative journalist Mark Dowie, now professor of journalism at University of California, Berkeley, published Conservation Refugees,
which estimated, “About half the land selected for protection by the global conservation establishment over the past century was either occupied or regularly
used by indigenous peoples. In the Americas that number is over 80 percent.”
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servation to tens of millions, with one Cornell University professor estimating
that 14 million individuals have been displaced by conservation in Africa alone.
In the early 1990s, indigenous groups spoke out against these evictions at
various forums, including at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio. As a result, conservation groups pledged to respect and work with the communities
living in or around protected areas. Over the next few years, conservation organizations prioritized working with local organizations including indigenous
people in “stakeholder” meetings, “community-based conservation,” and “sustainable development.” Gorgeous photos of indigenous people started gracing
the glossy annual reports and fundraising brochures of conservation groups.
But by 2004, the conflicts had only increased. That spring, the International
Forum on Indigenous Mapping resulted in a declaration signed by all 200 delegates that the “activities of conservation organizations now represent the single
biggest threat to the integrity of indigenous lands.”
In many parts of the world, parks have become anathema to conservation.
Consider the 1982 effort to create a national park in Mburo, Uganda. In the
name of preserving the wildlife, the government violently expelled thousands
of men, women, and children from the surrounding region, without compensation. This expulsion proved self-defeating. In 1986, a new government
encouraged these conservation refugees to resettle their former homelands,
where they promptly slaughtered wildlife and vandalized the park facilities in
retribution.
In Indonesia, every major international conservation NGO has invested
heavily to stem the tide of deforestation and the decline of iconic species, such
as the orangutan. As a result, the country now has many protected areas. But
you would never know it if you were to visit them because these areas are so
heavily logged. Quantitative analyses of deforestation rates using satellite imagery reveal that forest loss is much greater inside protected Indonesian forests
than in forests managed by local communities for sustainable logging.
Conservation organizations counter these examples by saying that the displacements of people are old news. They point out that they have learned from
past mistakes. Today, most conservation NGOs have policies of best practice
intended to protect the rights of local communities, and conservation NGOs
are increasingly hiring social scientists and anthropologists who incorporate indigenous people into their conservation strategies.
But conservation will be controversial as long as it remains so narrowly focused on the creation of parks and protected areas, and insists, often unfairly,
that local people cannot be trusted to care for their land. In his 2005 book,
Collapse, the geographer Jared Diamond famously claimed that Easter Island’s
inhabitants devolved into cannibalism after they mindlessly cut down the last
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trees — a parable for humankind’s shortsighted overuse of natural resources.
But Diamond got the history wrong. It was the combined effect of a nonnative
species — the Polynesian rat, which ate tree seeds — and European slavery
raids that destroyed Easter Island’s people, not their shortsighted management
of nature.
2.
As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement’s justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values
to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk
of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.
But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of
nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever.
Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be
in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth
will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the
delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.
The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the
intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences. Al Gore made
a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance. And the 2007
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of
agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive
for the world’s poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems
in jeopardy of collapse.
The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea
of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance
of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much
less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The
American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been
extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky,
went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller’s sea cow to
the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.
These stories of resilience are not isolated examples — a thorough review
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of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following
major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types
of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of
these studies.
While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the
Northern Hemisphere, where “nature” is returning to former agricultural lands.
Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor
countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land
had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests. Even Indonesian
orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine
forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.
Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful
human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted
down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation. In the
Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species
has actually increased relative to before the explosions. More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria
at a remarkably fast rate.
Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish
San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for
their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern
United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to
live in cattle tanks — to date, it has been found in no other habitat. Books have
been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl
data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels. It’s doubtful
that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well
to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental
apocalypse.
Even that classic symbol of fragility — the polar bear, seemingly stranded
on a melting ice block — may have a good chance of surviving global warming
if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern
ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears
200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth’s history, developing a highly
specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends — the decline of sea ice and the potential increase
of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take
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advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment
changes again.
The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that
is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their
natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists
— places “untrammeled by man” — never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.
The effects of human activity are found in every corner of the Earth. Fish
and whales in remote Arctic oceans are contaminated with chemical pesticides.
The nitrogen cycle and hydrological cycle are now dominated by people —
human activities produce 60 percent of all the fixed nitrogen deposited on
land each year, and people appropriate more than half of the annual accessible
freshwater runoff. There are now more tigers in captivity than in their native
habitats. Instead of sourcing wood from natural forests, by 2050 we are expected
to get over three-quarters of our wood from intensively managed tree farms.
Erosion, weathering, and landslides used to be the prime movers of rock and
soil; today humans rival these geological processes with road building and
massive construction projects. All around the world, a mix of climate change
and nonnative species has created a wealth of novel ecosystems catalyzed by
human activities.
3.
Scientists have coined a name for our era — the Anthropocene — to emphasize
that we have entered a new geological era in which humans dominate every flux
and cycle of the planet’s ecology and geochemistry. Most people worldwide (regardless of culture) welcome the opportunities that development provides to
improve lives of grinding rural poverty. At the same time, the global scale of
this transformation has reinforced conservation’s intense nostalgia for wilderness
and a past of pristine nature. But conservation’s continuing focus upon preserving islands of Holocene ecosystems in the age of the Anthropocene is both
anachronistic and counterproductive.
Consider the decline of the orangutan, which has been largely attributed
to the logging of their forest habitats. Recent field studies suggest that humans
are killing the orangutans for bush meat and bounty at rates far greater than
anyone suspected, and it is this practice, not deforestation, that places orangutans at the greatest peril. In order to save the orangutan, conservationists will
also have to address the problem of food and income deprivation in Indonesia.
That means conservationists will have to embrace human development and the
/35
“exploitation of nature” for human uses, like agriculture, even while they seek
to “protect” nature inside of parks.
Conservation’s binaries — growth or nature, prosperity or biodiversity —
have marginalized it in a world that will soon add at least two billion more people. In the developing world, efforts to constrain growth and protect forests
from agriculture are unfair, if not unethical, when directed at the 2.5 billion
people who live on less than two dollars a day and the one billion who are
chronically hungry. By pitting people against nature, conservationists actually
create an atmosphere in which people see nature as the enemy. If people don’t
believe conservation is in their own best interests, then it will never be a societal
priority. Conservation must demonstrate how the fates of nature and of people
are deeply intertwined — and then offer new strategies for promoting the health
and prosperity of both.
One need not be a postmodernist to understand that the concept of Nature,
as opposed to the physical and chemical workings of natural systems, has always
been a human construction, shaped and designed for human ends. The notion
that nature without people is more valuable than nature with people and the
portrayal of nature as fragile or feminine reflect not timeless truths, but mental
schema that change to fit the time.
If there is no wilderness, if nature is resilient rather than fragile, and if people
are actually part of nature and not the original sinners who caused our banishment from Eden, what should be the new vision for conservation? It would
start by appreciating the strength and resilience of nature while also recognizing
the many ways in which we depend upon it. Conservation should seek to support and inform the right kind of development — development by design, done
with the importance of nature to thriving economies foremost in mind. And it
will utilize the right kinds of technology to enhance the health and well-being
of both human and nonhuman natures. Instead of scolding capitalism, conservationists should partner with corporations in a science-based effort to integrate
the value of nature’s benefits into their operations and cultures. Instead of pursuing the protection of biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, a new conservation
should seek to enhance those natural systems that benefit the widest number
of people, especially the poor. Instead of trying to restore remote iconic landscapes to pre-European conditions, conservation will measure its achievement
in large part by its relevance to people, including city dwellers. Nature could
be a garden — not a carefully manicured and rigid one, but a tangle of species
and wildness amidst lands used for food production, mineral extraction, and
urban life.
Conservation is slowly turning toward these directions but far too slowly
and with insufficient commitment to make them the conservation work of the
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21st century. The problem lies in our reluctance, and the reluctance of many of
conservation’s wealthy supporters, to shed the old paradigms.
This move requires conservation to embrace marginalized and demonized
groups and to embrace a priority that has been anathema to us for more than a
hundred years: economic development for all. The conservation we will get by
embracing development and advancing human well-being will almost certainly
not be the conservation that was imagined in its early days. But it will be more
effective and far more broadly supported, in boardrooms and political chambers,
as well as at kitchen tables.
None of this is to argue for eliminating nature reserves or no longer investing
in their stewardship. But we need to acknowledge that a conservation that is
only about fences, limits, and far away places only a few can actually experience
is a losing proposition. Protecting biodiversity for its own sake has not worked.
Protecting nature that is dynamic and resilient, that is in our midst rather than
far away, and that sustains human communities — these are the ways forward
now. Otherwise, conservation will fail, clinging to its old myths. /
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T HE PLANET O F NO R ETUR N
HUMAN RESILIENCE ON AN ARTIFICIAL EARTH
ERLE ELLIS
O
ver the last several decades, a consensus has grown among scientists that
humans have become the dominant ecological force on the planet.
According to these scientists, we are now living in the Anthropocene, a new
geological epoch shaped by humans. While some have hailed this forward-looking vision of the planet, others have linked this view with the perennial concern
that human civilization has exceeded the carrying capacity of Earth’s natural
systems and may thus be fundamentally unsustainable. In this article, I argue
that this latter notion rests upon a series of assumptions that are inconsistent
with contemporary science on how humans interact with ecosystems, as well
as with most historical and archeological evidence.
Ever since early humans discovered fire and the benefits of collaborative
systems such as collective hunting and social learning, human systems, not the
classic biophysical limits that still constrain other species, have set the wider envelope for human population growth and prosperity. It was not planetary
boundaries, but human system boundaries that constrained human development in the Holocene, the geological epoch that we have just left. We should
expect no less in the Anthropocene.
Humans have dramatically altered natural systems — converting forests to
farmlands, damming rivers, driving some species to extinction and domesticating
others, altering the nitrogen and carbon cycles, and warming the globe — and
yet the Earth has become more productive and more capable of supporting the
human population. This process has dramatically intensified in recent centuries
at a rate unprecedented in Earth’s (and human) history, but there is little
evidence to date that this dynamic has been fundamentally altered. While the
onset of the Anthropocene carries new ecological and social risks, human
systems such as agriculture have proven extraordinarily resilient to environmental
and social challenges, responding robustly to population pressures, soil exhaustion, and climate fluctuations over millennia, from a global perspective.
Though the sustainability of human civilization may not be at stake, we
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PLANET OF NO RETURN
must still take our responsibilities as planetary stewards more seriously than
ever. As the scale and power of human systems continue to increase at accelerating rates, we are awakening to a new world of possibilities — some of them
frightening. And yet our unprecedented and growing powers also allow us the
opportunity to create a planet that is better for both its human and nonhuman
inhabitants. It is an opportunity that we should embrace.
1.
Long before the Holocene, Paleolithic human systems had already evolved powers beyond those of any other species, managing to engineer ecosystems using
fire, to innovate collective strategies for hunting, and to develop other tools and
techniques that revolutionized human livelihoods from hunting and foraging.
The extinction of megafauna across most of the terrestrial biosphere demonstrates the unprecedented success of early human engineering of ecosystems.
Those extinctions had cascading effects (trophic downscaling) caused by the
loss of dominant species, leading to forest loss in some regions and forest regrowth in others. Paleolithic humans, with a population of just a few million,
dramatically transformed ecosystems across most of the terrestrial biosphere
and most coastal ecosystems, demonstrating that population size is not the main
source of the transformative power of human systems.
The onset of the Holocene, which began with the end of the last ice age,
roughly corresponds with the start of the Neolithic Age of human development.
During this period, agricultural human systems began to displace earlier
Paleolithic human systems, and human systems became dependent upon the
entirely novel, unambiguously anthropogenic process of clearing native vegetation and herbivores and replacing them with engineered ecosystems populated
by domesticated plant and animal species. This process allowed available land
and resources to support many more people and set the stage for massive and
sustained human population growth way beyond what was possible by
Paleolithic systems. In ten millennia, the human population surged from just a
few million to billions today.
While the warm and stable climate of the Holocene is widely credited with
enabling the rise of agriculture, more complex forms of human social organization, and the general thriving of human populations to a degree far exceeding
that of the prior epoch, it was not these new climatic and biophysical conditions
themselves that brought the Paleolithic era to an end. Rather, Paleolithic human
systems failed to compete with a new human system built upon a series of profound technological innovations in ecosystem engineering.
The dramatic, sustained rise of agricultural populations, along with their
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ERLE ELLIS
eventual success in dominating Earth’s most productive lands, demonstrates
that the main constraints on these populations were not environmental. The
Malthusian model holds that populations are ultimately limited by their environmental resources — primarily the ability of a given area of land to provide
adequate food. But this model makes little sense when engineered ecosystems
have long been the basis for sustaining human populations.
Throughout the world, food production has risen in tandem with the density of agricultural populations. Populations work harder and employ more
productive technologies to increase the productivity of land only after it becomes a limiting resource. This results in a complex interplay of population
growth, labor inputs, technology adoption, and increased productivity — a
process of agricultural intensification that still continues in many developing
agricultural regions today.
Until the widespread commodification of agricultural production over the
last century or so, agriculturalists — and likely their Paleolithic hunting and
foraging predecessors — used the minimal amount of labor, technologies, and
other resources necessary to support their livelihoods on the lands available to
them. In most regions, yield-boosting technologies, like the plow and manuring,
had already been developed or introduced long before they became necessary
to overcome constraints on local food availability for subsistence populations.
Improving agricultural productivity facilitated rising population growth and
density and placed greater pressure on food production, which, in turn, induced
the adoption of more productive agricultural technologies.
While this steady increase in the productivity of land use in tandem with
population seems to conflict with the environmental degradation classically ascribed to human use of land, the theoretical explanations for this are simple
and robust. The low-density populations of early farmers tended to adopt longfallow shifting cultivation systems (rotations of 20 years and longer), progressing
through short-fallow shifting cultivation, annual cropping, multiple cropping,
and the increasing use of irrigation and fertilizers as populations grew and land
became scarce.
Cultivation of agricultural land has resulted in all manner of environmental
degradation at local scales. Although agricultural productivity inevitably declines
after land is first cleared for agriculture and in agricultural systems without intensive management, there is little evidence of declining long-term productivity
in agricultural lands that have been managed intensively for millennia. Indeed,
the overwhelming trend is quite the opposite. Increasing demands upon the
productivity of agricultural lands have resulted in an increasing demand for
technological inputs (and labor, in the preindustrial era) in order to maintain
and increase productivity, which continues to rise in most agricultural regions.
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PLANET OF NO RETURN
2.
The long trends toward both the intensification of agricultural cultivation and
the engineering of ecosystems at increasing scope and scale have accelerated as
more and more of the world transitions from rural and agricultural societies to
urban and industrial ones. The exponential growth in population, resource use,
technologies, and social systems over the past half-century marks the most rapid
and powerful transformation of both Earth and human systems ever.
In the past two centuries, fossil energy has mostly replaced biomass for fuel
and substituted for most human and animal labor, revolutionizing the human
capacity for ecosystem engineering, transport, and other activities. Large-scale
industrial synthesis has introduced artificial compounds almost too numerous
to count, including a wide variety used to control undesired species. Synthetic
nitrogen fertilizers have helped to both double the amount of biologically reactive nitrogen in the Earth system and have largely replaced the use of native soil
fertility in sustaining human populations. Genetic engineering has accelerated
gene transfer across species. The waste products of human systems are felt almost
everywhere on land, water, and air, including emissions of carbon dioxide rapid
enough to acidify the oceans and change the climate system at rates likely unprecedented in Earth’s history. Wild fish and forests have almost disappeared,
receding into the depths of our ancestral memory.
At the same time, advances in hygiene and medicine have dramatically increased human health and life expectancy. Industrial human systems are far
more connected globally and evolve more rapidly than prior social systems, accelerating the pace of social change and interaction, technological innovation,
material exchange, as well as the entire tempo of human interactions with the
Earth system. Over the last two centuries (and especially the past fifty years)
most humans have enjoyed longer, healthier, and freer lives than we ever did
during the Holocene.
There is no sign that these processes or their dynamics are slowing down in
any way — an indication of their resilience in the face of change. As far as food
and other basic resources are concerned, we remain far from any physically determined limits to the growth and sustenance of our populations. For better or
for worse, humans appear fully capable of continuing to support a burgeoning
population by engineering and transforming the planet.
3.
While human societies are likely to continue to thrive and expand, largely unconstrained by any hard biophysical boundaries to growth, this trend need not
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be inconsistent with conserving and even restoring a solid measure of our ecological inheritance. As populations, consumption, and technological power
advance at an exponential pace, industrial systems appear to be evolving in new
directions that tend to reverse many of the environmental impacts caused by
agriculture and prior human systems.
Urbanization, perhaps the most powerful global change process of the industrial age, is rapidly concentrating human populations across the world into
the market-based economies of cities, decoupling most of humanity from agricultural livelihoods and direct interactions with rural lands. And while
urbanization is nothing new, its current scale and rate are unprecedented.
Urban economies of scale, particularly in human interactions and infrastructure, accrue as a result of population density and lead to improvements
and additional advantages in nearly all aspects of human systems, including better health care, incomes, housing, access to markets, transportation, and waste
treatment among many others. Urban populations also tend to experience much
lower and declining birth rates.
Yet the greatest global effects of urbanization may be realized outside of
cities, which occupy less than one percent of Earth’s ice-free land. Rural-tourban migration leads to the depopulation of rural landscapes, and massive
urban demand for food and resources leads to the upscaling of agricultural systems. The process is complex, but such trends tend to concentrate production
in Earth’s most productive agricultural lands, boosting agricultural yields in
these areas through intensive use of inputs and technology by large-scale farming
operations. Depending on whether governance systems are in place to take advantage of these transformative powers of urbanization, large-scale forest
recoveries can and have taken place in response to the widespread abandonment
of marginal agricultural lands.
As a result, massive urbanization may ultimately prove yet another stage in
the process of agricultural intensification. In this case, increasing human population densities in urban areas drive ever increasing productivity per unit area
of land, while at the same time allowing less productive lands to recover.
Multifunctional landscape management may then support both intensive food
production and habitat recovery for native and other desirable species.
4.
With urbanization shaping the Industrial Age, and as we move rapidly into the
most artificial environments we have ever created, the decisions we must make
are ever clearer. Indeed, even as urbanization drives advances in some forms of
agricultural productivity, the trend is rapidly spelling an end to some of the
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PLANET OF NO RETURN
most ancient and productive agricultural human systems the world has ever
seen — the ancient rice paddies of Asia are being transformed into factory
floors. As we did at the end of the Paleolithic, most of humanity is defecting
from the older ways, which will soon become hobbies for the elite and nostalgic
memories for the rest of humanity. Just as wild forests, wild game, and soon,
wild fish disappear, so do the human systems associated with them.
While there is nothing particularly good about a planet hotter than our ancestors ever experienced — not to mention one free of wild forests or wild fish
— it seems all too evident that human systems are prepared to adapt to and
prosper in the hotter, less biodiverse planet that we are busily creating. The
“planetary boundaries” hypothesis asserts that biophysical limits are the ultimate
constraints on the human enterprise. Yet the evidence shows clearly that the
human enterprise has continued to expand beyond natural limits for millennia.
Indeed, the history of human civilization might be characterized as a history of
transgressing natural limits and thriving. While the Holocene’s relatively stable
conditions certainly helped support the rise and expansion of agricultural systems, we should not assume that agriculture can only thrive under those
particular conditions. Indeed, agriculture already thrives across climatic extremes
whose variance goes far beyond anything likely to result from human-caused
climate change.
The Earth we have inherited from our ancestors is now our responsibility.
It is not natural limits that will determine whether this planet will sustain a
robust measure of its evolutionary inheritance into the future. Our powers
may yet exceed our ability to manage them, but there is no alternative
except to shoulder the mantle of planetary stewardship. A good, or at least a
better, Anthropocene is within our grasp. Creating that future will mean going
beyond fears of transgressing natural limits and nostalgic hopes of returning
to some pastoral or pristine era. Most of all, we must not see the Anthropocene
as a crisis, but as the beginning of a new geological epoch ripe with humandirected opportunity. /
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T HE R ISE A ND FA LL O F
ECO LO GICAL ECO NO MICS
A CAUTIONARY TALE
MARK SAGOFF
I
n September of 1982, a group of scholars met in Stockholm intending to
reform — even to revolutionize — the study of economics. The new ecological economists saw the economy as embedded in, and supported by, natural
systems; nature was not simply a factor in, but the foundation of, economic activity. By integrating models from ecology and economics, ecological economists
sought to provide scientific arguments for preserving the natural world.
The Stockholm meeting came at a critical time. During the 1970s, prominent environmentalists, encouraged by what they saw as a public awakening to
environmental concerns, issued best-selling books and reports that predicted
that if population, consumption, and with them the global economy continued
to grow, the world would soon run out of food and other resources. By the early
1980s, however, these predictions had been discredited. The public worried
more about unemployment and recession. They feared that the regulations environmentalists proposed would derail the economy or slow it down.
Environmentalists faced a populist backlash.
President Ronald Reagan swept into office in 1980 promising to get the
economy moving again. Reagan had campaigned against “environmental extremists” who he said favored “rabbits’ holes” and “birds’ nests” over jobs and
economic growth. He arrived in Washington determined to roll back environmental and other social regulations. He named anti-environmentalists to fill
top spots at the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the
Interior, and the Forest Service. The president promptly issued an executive
order that subjected every major regulation to an economic cost-benefit test.
The Reagan administration and other advocates of growth invoked mainstream economic science to justify pulling back regulations. Ecological
economists responded by attacking mainstream economic science and contended that mainstream economists failed to properly acknowledge the value
of the natural world and the services it provides.
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THE RISE AND FALL OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
The environmental movement quickly embraced ecological economics because it promised to reconcile ecology with economics in a new science that
would be reliably on the side of environmental protection. The MacArthur
Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and other large foundations invested
heavily in ecological economics. Leading environmental figures such as Amory
Lovins, Paul Hawken, Bill McKibben, and Al Gore, and popular writers like
Thomas Friedman picked up its language and its concepts, as did the United
Nations, European governments, and nongovernmental organizations.
Ecological economics set out 30 years ago to be a redemptive science — to
“right size” the human economy for its natural infrastructure. But today, ecological economics finds itself at a political and academic dead end. Trapped in
the amber of its mathematical models and conceptual constructs, ecological
economics presents an object lesson for those who would appeal to scientific
theories, rather than to popular concerns, to provide an intellectual and political
basis for an effective green politics.
1.
Ecologists and economists made unlikely partners — indeed, these disciplines
have often appeared at odds with, and determined to ignore, each other. As
Robert Costanza, the founding president of the International Society for
Ecological Economics, acknowledged in the inaugural issue of Ecological
Economics, “Ecology, as it is currently practiced, sometimes deals with human
impacts on ecosystems, but the more common tendency is to stick to ‘natural’
systems.” The modeling of ecological communities or systems seemed purposely
to leave out the human economy. At the same time, economists either took for
granted or ignored the principles, powers, or forces that ecologists believed governed the world’s natural communities. The market mechanism, or competitive
equilibrium, that mainstream economists studied assigned no role to the natural
ecosystem. Ecological economics sought to embed the study of economics
within a larger understanding of how ecosystems work.
Ecological economists also wanted to distinguish their scientific professionalism from the neo-Malthusian alarmism of the previous decade. The Club of
Rome’s 1972 best seller, The Limits to Growth, was associated in many reviews
with dire projections: for example, that the world would run out of minerals,
such as silver, tungsten, and mercury, within 40 years. In 1970, Paul Ehrlich,
the neo-Malthusian author of The Population Bomb, predicted that global food
shortages would cause four billion people to starve to death between 1980 and
1989 — 65 million of them in the United States. Further warnings poured
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MARK SAGOFF
forth in the Global 2000 Report (1980) and in annual State of the World reports
by Lester Brown and the Worldwatch Institute.
Neo-Malthusians argued that the world would not be able to grow enough
food to keep up with population, but this assertion was simply wrong. In fact,
world food production more than doubled between 1960 and 2000, and per
capita food production during that period also increased. In 1981, economist
Amartya Sen, who later won the Nobel Prize for his research, published a book
that flatly and effectively contradicted the idea that famines occur because not
enough food is produced. Sen showed that oppression, injustice, and destitution
— breakdowns in distribution, not shortages in production — cause famines.
With such “misleading variables as food output per unit of population, the
Malthusian approach profoundly misspecifies the problems facing the poor in
the world,” Sen wrote, noting that as per capita food production increased, the
world was lulled into a false optimism that famines would decrease. “It is often
overlooked that what may be called ‘Malthusian optimism’ has actually killed
millions of people.”
Ecological economists distinguished themselves from neo-Malthusian catastrophists by switching the emphasis from resources to systems. The concern
was no longer centered on running out of food, minerals, or energy. Instead,
ecological economists drew attention to what they identified as ecological
thresholds. The problem lay in overloading systems and causing them to
collapse. Costanza and colleagues wrote, “There may be close substitutes for
conventional natural resources, such as timber and coal, but not for natural ecological systems.”
Ecological economists described ecosystems as evolutionary systems: “complex, adaptive systems… characterized by historical dependency, complex
dynamics, and multiple basins of attraction.” These communities or systems
were assumed to evolve and, as a result, achieve an “adaptive” or a “dynamic
equilibrium” that could be modeled mathematically. E.P. Odum, whose
Fundamentals of Ecology was for decades the leading textbook in the field, pictured the natural world as a great chain or a “levels-of-organization-hierarchy”
ascending from smaller to larger, more inclusive systems (e.g., from genes, cells,
organs, organisms, populations, communities, to ecosystems). In an influential
paper published in Science in 1969, Odum described the natural world as “an
orderly process of community development” that is “directed toward achieving
as large and diverse an organic structure as is possible within the limits set by
the available energy input and the prevailing physical conditions of existence.”
In their 1967 Theory of Island Biogeography, Robert MacArthur of Princeton
University and E. O. Wilson of Harvard presented a similar view of evolution
as an orderly progression of natural communities toward a saturation of species.
/47
According to this theory, ecosystems exist in a state of equilibrium in which the
colonization by a new species is balanced by the extinction of a resident one.
Paul Ehrlich later updated the great chain metaphor to that of an airplane. “A
dozen rivets, or a dozen species, might never be missed,” he wrote with his wife
Anne Ehrlich. “On the other hand, a thirteenth rivet popped from a wing flap,
or the extinction of a key species involved in the cycling of nitrogen, could lead
to a serious accident.”
Ecological economists drew from thermodynamic theory to supplement
the ecological view that nature represents a constrained and constraining adaptive evolutionary system. In 1971, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, a Romanian
economist, published The Entropy Law and the Economic Process which argued,
“The Law of Entropy is the taproot of economic scarcity.” Herman Daly, an
early proponent of ecological economics and the leading theoretician of what
he called steady-state economics, built on the idea that a growing economy
must eventually wear out the energy potential (i.e., the organization and integration) of the natural systems in which it is embedded. Optimism based on
the “philosopher’s stone of technology,” he wrote, requires “suspensions of the
laws of thermodynamics.” In 1992, two prominent ecological economists argued that standard models of economic growth are problematic because “they
ignore the fact that the human economy is an integral part of a materially closed
evolutionary system.”
2.
Ecological economics also drew on theoretical methods and ideas that emerged
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee after World War II. Starting in
the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission employed scores of ecologists —
about 80 by 1970 — in dozens of projects that eventually grew into a
Big Science approach to computer-based modeling of what were then known
as biomes. From 1968 to 1974, various agencies funded the International
Biological Program (IBP); the federal government provided nearly $60 million.
The IBP produced little of intellectual interest but created a large class of project
managers, many of whom remain active today at governmental agencies funding
big think ecosystem research.
Surrounded by physicists at Oak Ridge, ecologists adopted computer modeling and other conceptual methods that distinguish mathematical from less
theoretical, and thus “softer,” sciences. The most influential ecologist of the
period, G. E. Hutchinson, insisted that theory was essential to science, declaring, “If we had no theory, there would be nothing to modify, and we should
get nowhere.”
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Hutchinson, along with his colleagues, posited what he called “formal analogies” to explain ecosystem structure and function in terms of equations drawn
from many sciences, including statistical mechanics, logistic population growth
curves, spectral analysis, circuitry, stoichiometry, thermodynamics, cybernetics,
and chaos theory. This was make-work for mathematicians. Anyone with some
mathematics and a metaphor — typically borrowed from some other science
— could model the ecosystem.
Ecologists of the period assumed “that ecosystems function in accordance
to some overarching rules that control structure and/or function,” without
checking that assumption against evidence. Princeton ecologist Simon Levin
wrote, “One must recognize the powerful adaptive and self-organizing forces
that shape ecosystems.” These forces were modeled in silico (on computers)
rather than observed al fresco (in the great outdoors). As ecology became a formal science, it mistook models for empirical evidence. “In studying the logical
consequences of assumptions, the theoretician is discovering, not inventing,”
Levin wrote. “To the theoretician, models are a part of the real world.”
Theory-based mathematical speculation about ecosystem structure and
function appealed to the academic and scientific community of the time. The
more abstract and mathematical the theory, the more respect it commanded
and the higher, albeit narrower, the threshold it set for professional success.
Mathematicians enjoyed prominent academic careers without having to engage
in empirical research or gain tenure in a department of mathematics. In 1974,
the late Leigh Van Valen, a formidable University of Chicago evolutionary
biologist, concluded that mathematical ecologists had formed a “clique” and a
“new orthodoxy” that considered gathering facts a “waste of time.”
3.
Liberated from the need to test their theories empirically, ecosystem ecologists
built their mathematical models upon ideas that can be traced back to Charles
Darwin’s contemporary, the British philosopher and biologist Herbert Spencer.
The explicit purpose of the International Biological Program — to determine
“the biological basis of productivity and human welfare” — was one that
Spencer himself might have recognized. Spencer envisioned a theory of systems
that would explain the evolution, not just of species, but of ecological communities and of human societies.
While Darwin’s theory of descent with modification, for which the fossil
record offered empirical evidence, explained the properties of species, Spencer’s
theory postulated a “universal law of evolution” which asserted that any collection of living things over time tends to self-organize in a “dynamic equilibrium”
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while dissipating energy. This principle became a program for interpreting
everything. Spencer’s theory of systems provided the critical bridge from 19th
century community ecology not only forward to 20th century systems ecology
but also backward to 18th century natural theology. As geographer Clarence
Glacken has written, “I am convinced that modern ecological theory, so important in our attitudes towards nature and man’s interference with it, owes its
origin to the design argument. The wisdom of the creator is self-evident… no
living thing is useless, and all are related one to the other.”
In 19th century America, naturalists who came of age at the time of the Civil
War were educated in the tradition we associate with “intelligent design,” the
idea that God’s fullness and magnificence is demonstrated in the perfect organization and replete diversity of the natural world. The 18th century English poet
Alexander Pope celebrated this idea, “Where, one step broken, the great scale’s
destroyed / From Nature’s chain whatever link you strike.” The scala natura or
Great Chain of Being served as the organizing metaphor for what would become
community ecology. This approach, according to historian of ideas A.O.
Lovejoy, exalted the “sufficient reason” that put every species in its place and
attributed self-sufficiency, self-organization, or “quietude” to natural communities — an ability to arrange and sustain themselves as God made them if left
undisturbed. The commonplaces of modern ecology, such as “everything connects” and “save all the parts,” recall the neoplatonic view of nature as an
integrated mechanism into which every species fits.
How were botanists, zoologists, entomologists, and other biologists able to
reconcile their education in natural theology with their acceptance of evolutionary biology? Stephen Forbes, who headed the Department of Zoology at
the University of Illinois, showed how this could be done. According to historian Sharon Kingsland, Forbes took from Herbert Spencer the belief that
evolutionary forces will achieve and maintain adaptive dynamic equilibriums
despite ever-changing relationships in ecological communities or systems.
In a seminal article written in 1887, Forbes described a glacial lake in Illinois
as a “system of organic interactions by which [species] influence and control
each other [that] has remained substantially unchanged from a remote geological period.” What could cause this system to organize and to maintain itself
for thousands or millions of years? Forbes wrote:
Out of these hard conditions, an order has been evolved which is the
best conceivable… that actually accomplishes for all the parties involved
the greatest good which the circumstances will at all permit…. Is there
not, in this reflection, solid ground for a belief in the final beneficence
of the laws of organic nature?
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In this paper, indeed, in this paragraph, Forbes performed intellectual feats
that remain impressive to this day. First, he assumed that there was an order, a
dynamic equilibrium, in the lake he visited. He had no empirical evidence
to show that the organisms he observed were ancient and enduring, nor did
he consider any necessary. Forbes, like Spencer, relied on deductive argument based in a universal theory of natural history. The best-adapted or (as
Forbes wrote) “adjusted” species will organize themselves into sustainable and
resilient communities.
Second, Forbes, like Spencer, called the dynamic force or universal law that
organizes nature in ascending levels or scales of complexity not God, but
Evolution. This substitution of nomenclature turned 18th century Great Chain
of Being theodicy — with its emphasis on pattern, scale, process, mechanism,
hierarchy, resilience, and plenitude — into ecology as it was studied throughout
the 20th century.
Frederic Clements, the most influential plant ecologist of the early 20th
century, who was also influenced by Spencer, agreed with Forbes that nature is
progressive and beneficent. According to ecologist S. P. Hubbell,
Clements believed that the community was literally a ‘superorganism,’
and that species were its organs and succession its ontogeny. He argued
that each species had an essential role to play in preparing the way for
the next serial stage in the succession toward the equilibrium or ‘climax’
plant community.
Because Spencer’s theory of adaptation applied not just to species, but also
to ecological communities, it allowed community ecology to hold on to its theological roots while it embraced a concept of evolution. By assuming that
anything God could do, evolution did better, biologists leapt from 18th century
natural theology to 20th century community ecology without missing a beat.
But for the mantle of mathematics that ecologists had draped over it, mid-20th
century community and ecosystems ecology could not be distinguished from
the more openly theological framework that Forbes had adapted from Spencer
and presented 80 years earlier.
4.
Ecological economists drew on the study of ecological systems — systems ecology — that developed after World War II in the context of Big Science and
postulated that ecological systems or communities are unified or governed by a
set of organizing principles. Nature itself, however, seems scandalously indifBREAKTHROUGH JOURNAL
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ferent to this philosophy. Ecologists who engaged in empirical research found
that the mathematical models devised by community and systems theorists were
not supported by observation other than by examples cherry picked for the purpose. Had theoretical ecologists been interested in empirical evidence, according
to ecologist John Lawton, they would have easily falsified any principle they
tested; there are “painfully few fuzzy generalisations, let alone rules or laws.”
As early as 1917, however, American botanist Henry Gleason (1882-1975)
had challenged the assumption that the living world is organized under enduring principles or by powerful forces. He argued instead that each association of
plants and animals is unique, ephemeral, spontaneous, idiosyncratic, extemporaneous, and a law unto itself. The sites that ecologists study, he believed, should
be seen as path-dependent histories rather than as rule-governed communities.
From this point of view ecosystems do not evolve; they just change.
Gleason argued that no general law, principle, model, or theory gets any
predictive traction on the comings and goings of species. In a recent article,
Daniel Simberloff, a leading contemporary ecologist, refers to the “longstanding
controversy stemming back to Clements, Gleason, and their contemporaries,
over whether a plant community is anything other than the assemblage of populations co-occurring in a specific place at a specific time: that is, to what extent
are communities integrated, discrete entities, and, if they are, what is the nature
of the integration?” Underlying this controversy is “the question of whether
community ecology itself actually has generalizations beyond trivial ones like
the laws of thermodynamics, and whether seeking such generalizations advances
the study of ecology at the community level.” Simberloff concedes that there
are no nontrivial laws, principles, or generalizations that predict events at the
“system” or the “community” level or that explain the integration these concepts
suggest. “Laws and models in community ecology are highly contingent, and
their domain is usually very local.”
William Drury found no emergent properties, governing rules, or integration in the forests he studied.
I feel that ecosystems are largely extemporaneous and that most species
(in what we often call a community) are superfluous to the operation
of those sets of species between which we can clearly identify important
interactions…. Once seen, most of the interactions are simple and direct. Complexity seems to be a figment of our imaginations driven by
taking the ‘holistic’ view.”
Simply put, the evidence does not support the idea that evolution applies
on a system-wide scale. New ecosystems appear all the time; the species found
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at a place rarely coevolved there. Nearly anywhere one looks one finds species
coming and going — many or most are recent arrivals. A group of 19 ecologists
wrote in Nature, “Most human and natural communities now consist both of
long-term residents and of new arrivals, and ecosystems are emerging that never
existed before.”
If creatures just show up at sites for their own reasons, which is usually the
case, the concept of evolution does not apply even as a useful metaphor at the
scale of the community or the ecosystem. As Drury argued, self-organizing
adaptive ecological communities or systems that achieve and sustain a dynamic
equilibrium are figments of the theoretical imagination driven by taking the
holistic view. Just because places change — nature is continually in flux — does
not mean they evolve. There is no dynamic order, force, or principle of selforganization that makes every hodgepodge a system.
5.
If the ecological foundations of ecological economics rested upon shaky ground,
the economic foundations were no less problematic. Ecological economists have
argued that because they cannot guarantee that growth is sustainable — that
new technologies will save the day — we should (to quote the literature) “degrow” the economy. “Given our high level of uncertainty about this issue, it is
irrational to bank on technology’s ability to remove resource constraints,” insisted Costanza. “This is why ecological economics assumes a prudently
skeptical stance on technical progress.” Ecological economists argued that what
they did not know about the ecological foundations of the economy could hurt
us, and that we ignored their uncertainty at our peril. In other words, they appealed to their own ignorance about ecosystem structure and function to
empower their “precautionary” position.
Mainstream macroeconomists — those who deal with indicators of economic performance such as employment, inflation, trade, productivity, and
national competitiveness — generally reject this precautionary stance. Robert
Solow, a Nobel laureate, spoke for many economists when he opined that if the
future is like the past, “there will be prolonged and substantial reductions
in natural-resource requirements per unit of real output.” He asked, “Why
shouldn’t the productivity of most natural resources rise more or less steadily
through time, like the productivity of labor?”
By shifting the content of their warnings from resource exhaustion to system
overload, ecological economists convinced few but themselves. Microeconomists swatted away the precautionary principles of ecological economists as
easily as they had earlier dismissed the jeremiads of neo-Malthusians like
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Ehrlich. The answer mainstream economics gave to system overload was the
same as its response to resource exhaustion: greater resource productivity and
technological innovation.
By the 1980s, in response to some of the same challenges and opportunities
that had inspired the creation of ecological economics, a group of mainstream
welfare economists had founded the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists. These neoclassical economists developed the field of mainstream
environmental economics to provide their own analysis of and prescription for
the environmental crisis. They rejected the thermodynamic theory of value ecological economists proposed — the idea that the constraint on growth is
“negative entropy,” meaning “the degree of organization or order of a thing relative to its environment.” Instead, environmental economists offered what they
called “utility,” “welfare,” or “willingness to pay” as the central value for environmental analysis and policy.
Environmental economists defined and measured welfare or utility in terms
of preferences or, practically speaking, the amounts people are 1) willing to pay
(WTP) for a good or 2) willing to accept (WTA) to relinquish it. They did not
describe pollution and other assaults on the environment in terms of entropic
forces wearing down the resilience of holistic and integrated evolutionary systems. They diagnosed environmental problems as market externalities, that is,
as uncompensated effects of economic decisions on third parties whose interests
— or whose WTP — those decisions did not take into account. Economist
Robert N. Stavins wrote, “The fundamental theoretical argument for government activity in the environmental realm is that pollution is an externality.”
Environmental economists had an advantage because they applied a framework that was already familiar in economic thought and therefore in policy
analysis and political discourse. During the 1990s, environmental outfits and
agencies staffed up with economists to attribute prices to externalities and discover market failures. Dueling cost-benefit analyses and opposing stories about
WTP or WTA began to co-opt, infiltrate, and even replace moral argument
and political persuasion.
In response, many ecological economists, including some who had criticized
the framework of neoclassical welfare economics, adopted it. It was easy to argue
that people are willing to pay a lot for nature and for the services it provides.
Accordingly, ecological economists, rather than continuing to construe economic systems as embedded in ecological systems, reduced their ambitions to
tweaking neoclassical cost-benefit models to assign higher existence values to
nature and lower discount rates to its use.
For example, in the most cited and well-known paper written in ecological
economics, Costanza and a dozen colleagues in 1997 applied what they con54/
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sidered to be the concepts of neoclassical utility theory to assign an economic
worth of about $33 trillion — much more than the value of the product of the
global economy — to what they called “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem
Services and Natural Capital.”
Ecological economists ended up fully embracing the slogan of mainstream
welfare economics that protecting the environment is a matter of getting the
prices right. A discipline that just a decade or two earlier had insisted the market
was embedded in nature had learned how to embed nature into the market.
6.
Having caved in to the normative framework of WTP or cost-benefit utility
theory, ecological economists have been unable to confront the reasons that led
Herman Daly, among others, to reject the market mechanism as an approach
to understanding environmental problems. There are exceptions. A few ecological economists chided their colleagues for “commodity fetishism” and called
for “conservation based on aesthetic and ethical arguments.” They cited the article, “Selling Out on Nature” by Douglas McCauley in Nature magazine, which
argued that “conservation must be framed as a moral issue,” because nature has
“an intrinsic value that makes it priceless, and this is reason enough to protect
it.” Costanza wrote in response, “I do not agree that more progress will be made
by appealing to people’s hearts rather than their wallets.” Gretchen Daily, a
prominent ecological economist, insisted that only by attributing instrumental
or economic value to nature can conservationists influence public policy. “We
have to completely rethink how we deal with the environment, and we should
put a price on it,” she said.
Ecological economics, when it embraced cost-benefit and market-based valuation, abandoned the ethos of much of the landmark environmental legislation
of the 1970s, which had rejected a market failure theory of pollution. These
statutes, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, were intended to protect
public safety and health against toxic wastes and hazardous emissions. This legislation rests on the same principle as common law: the belief that one person
should not injure or invade the person or property of others without their consent. Understood in this way, pollution represents an invasion of person and
property and therefore is to be enjoined, minimized, or tolerated unwillingly
until technology can do better. Environmental law is libertarian, not utilitarian,
because it seeks to protect people and property against peril and trespass rather
than to maximize utility. One person does not have the right to pollute and
thus to trespass on another even when it is socially efficient to do so. Economists
Maureen Cropper and Wallace Oates wrote in 1992 that “the cornerstones of
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federal environmental policy in the United States explicitly prohibited the
weighing of benefits against costs in the setting of environmental standards.”
In response to the Reagan revolution, ecological economists had followed
the cost-benefit bandwagon. But in doing so, they unwittingly played into their
opponents’ hands. By changing the political conversation from the question,
“What is a cause of what?” to “What is a cost of what?” ecological economists
substituted the technocratic framework of microeconomics for the ethical
framework of responsibility.
John V. Krutilla, an influential environmental economist and strong
environmentalist, demonstrated how pliable the idea of an ecological or environmental externality could become. He observed that people who contribute
to environmental causes must (by definition) benefit from them. Therefore,
ideological, political, and moral commitments could be factored into the costbenefit analysis (CBA) that measures social welfare and thus justifies
environmental policy. Once political views, ideological principles, and spiritual
beliefs were treated as consumer preferences, environmentalism could be
reduced to one more interest group battling for its piece of the economic pie
— for example, the aesthetic, cultural, and spiritual benefits of ecosystems.
The problem for environmentalists wasn’t that they were losing the epic
cost-benefit battles that raged through the 1980s and 1990s. They more than
held their own in the dark art of creating social welfare functions to justify whatever it is that one wants. But, ironically, there is ample reason to believe that
CBA has never significantly affected rulemaking or regulation at all.
Robert Hahn, an advocate of CBA, conceded, “The relationship between
analysis and policy decisions is tenuous.” He added, “There is little evidence
that economic analysis of regulatory decisions has had a substantial positive impact” and argued that “the poor quality of analysis can help explain some of
this ineffectiveness.” But the poor quality of much cost-benefit analysis is arguably a function of the fact that cost-benefit arguments are mostly invoked as
a kind of “open sesame” to defend or decry any governmental intervention.
Advocates and policy makers, to borrow an old saw, use CBA like a drunk uses
a lamppost: for support, not illumination. After Congressional committees, administrative agencies, and the courts tear through them, the political battles
that CBA is supposed to inform are settled in terms of liability, responsibility,
authority, and legality — not welfare maximization.
If CBA lacks an intellectual and legal basis and has only a tenuous
regulatory effect, why is it done? One reason is that so many people can do it.
As law professor Duncan Kennedy has explained, CBA or the compensation
test it implies is “just as open to alternating liberal and conservative ideological
manipulation” as is the political deliberation it is supposed to displace. However
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bad or mistaken cost-benefit accounting may be, it has a centrist effect,
“supportive of liberalism and conservatism together, seen as a bloc in opposition
to more left and right wing positions.” In other words, by engaging in CBA,
experts form a scientistic “centrist bloc” that agrees on “moderation, statism,
and rationalism.”
When partisans and opponents of environmental causes adopt the discourse
of market failure and social externality, they co-opt their political fringes and
tamp down the moral fervor of environmentalism, making the political conversation safe for expertise. Ecological economics has evolved into the more
pro-environment wing of standard environmental economics. This has depleted
the discipline of its initial energy. As long as the vocabulary of microeconomics,
including cost-benefit analysis, remains the lingua franca of environmentalism,
properly credentialed and preferably academic participants will have the policy
debate to themselves. Evidently, this temptation proved to be too much for ecological economists.
7.
Ecological economics aimed to be revolutionary, but it is now ignored by the
sciences it had hoped to transform. Both ecology and economics have changed,
but not because of the rise of ecological economics. The science of ecology could
not draw indefinitely on its roots in 18th century theodicy. As contemporary
ecologists have abandoned theory for empiricism, ecology has returned to the
long-suppressed view of Gleason, as Hubbell put it, that species are “largely
thrown together by chance, history, and random dispersal.” Species come and
go. Ecological sites do not have a structure or a function. They have a history.
The science of economics has moved on as well. Just when ecological economics caved in to the normative framework of neoclassical welfarism, empirical
work in behavioral and experimental economics profoundly undermined
that approach. Empirically-minded economists turned to studying the behavior
of institutions and individuals, rather than continuing to model abstract utility functions.
Ecological economists today try to put prices on ecosystem benefits and
services. This effort by environmentalists is self-defeating. If environmental decisions are fundamentally framed as questions of economic welfare, public
officials and the public itself will opt nearly every time for whatever policy
promises more economic growth, more production, and more jobs. Moreover,
in a world where human influence is as ancient as it is pervasive, it may be helpful to recognize that the natural environment where we live is less of an input
than an output of economic activity.
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Ecological economics today, its ambitions greatly diminished, has reached
senescence; it provides an academic assisted-living facility for “Great Chain of
Being” ecology and cost-benefit economics. A hybrid discipline, ecological economics crosses closet creationism with market fetishism. When ecological
economists dispute the relative importance of intrinsic vs. instrumental value,
the hybrid reverts to type.
The scientistic and self-referential controversies in which ecological economists engage drain away the moral power that once sustained environmentalism.
This moral power may return if environmentalists employ science not to prescribe goals to society but to help society to achieve goals it already has.
Environmentalists may then shape the natural environment of the future rather
than model and monetize the environment of the past. /
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T: The author gratefully acknowledges support from the National
Science Foundation, Award No. 0924827. The views expressed are the author’s alone and not
those of any funding agency.
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LIB ERALISM’S MO DEST
PROPO SALS
OR, THE TYRANNY OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
DANIEL SAREWITZ
“I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in
London, that a young healthy child well nursed, is, at a year old, a most delicious,
nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled…”
— Jonathan Swift, “A Modest Proposal,” 1729
J
onathan Swift’s famous satirical essay remains shockingly effective nearly
300 years after its publication. What was Swift’s secret? In part, it lies in the
deadpan delivery of an unspeakably macabre solution to the problem of Irish
poverty. But what really chills the soul is the author’s analytical precision — the
cold logic and hard data as the argument proceeds from problem statement to
proposed solution:
I have already computed the charge of nursing a beggar's child (in which
list I reckon all cottagers, laborers, and four-fifths of the farmers) to be
about two shillings per annum, rags included; and I believe no gentleman would repine to give ten shillings for the carcass of a good fat child,
which, as I have said, will make four dishes of excellent nutritive meat,
when he hath only some particular friend or his own family to dine
with him.
Swift is most obviously commenting on England’s predatory policies toward
Ireland, but “A Modest Proposal” is also an attack on scientific rationality
unchecked by experience, empathy, and moral grounding. Swift’s game was to
show that pretty much any position, however repulsive, could be advanced on
the back of rationality.
Where is Jonathan Swift when we need him? American liberalism, it turns
out, has been dangerously susceptible to the political confusion sewn by an uncritical devotion to scientific rationality and the false belief that right action can
be extracted from a set of scientific facts, however unmoored from appropriate
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LIBERALISM'S MODEST PROPOSALS
moral and experiential foundations. In the 1920s, liberal scientists and progressive reformers rationalized their support of eugenic policies through the
emerging science of genetics. Oliver Wendell Holmes authored a Supreme
Court opinion rendering constitutional the enforced sterilization of a woman
on the grounds that it was necessary to keep her from passing on her defective
genes, while another liberal lion, Louis Brandeis, supported the opinion. In the
early 1960s, escalating US involvement in the Vietnam War was in part justified
by liberal confidence in the power of scientific analysis to guide complex national policies. Later that same decade, leading liberal ecologists advocated
cutting off food aid to countries like India, where population growth was outstripping agricultural productivity.
Scientific rationality is a terrible foundation for progressive politics, yet
liberals seem more devoted to it than ever. As a result, the politics of rational
assessment is displacing the politics of liberal values. This evolution has led liberals astray on core moral issues. It has also alienated them from one of the most
powerful tools for creating a more equitable society: technology.
1.
American liberalism’s one big, galvanizing idea of recent decades has been that,
in order to protect the global environment, societies need to fundamentally
change the way they are organized. This idea emerged gradually from the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, gaining credence as scientific
research began to show evidence of worrisome change in a variety of large-scale
environmental systems, most notably the Earth’s atmosphere.
From this big idea emerged a proposal worthy of Jonathan Swift’s satirical
imagination: make energy more expensive. Because fossil fuel emissions were
disturbing the planet’s climate, fuel prices should be raised to force a reduction
in emissions and stimulate a transition to non-fossil energy sources.
If one were seeking a policy intervention that could simply and effectively
erode economic and social equity worldwide, one could hardly do better than
to increase the cost of energy. Production and distribution systems for energy
are an absolute foundation for material welfare in modern societies. In an interdependent world of billions of humans, there is no food, no work, no
economy without energy, and one’s capacity as an individual to participate
fully in that world depends on access to, and thus the cost of, energy. Access to
cheap energy in an industrialized world is a basic requirement for human development and dignity. This fact is so blindingly obvious that nearly every
large developing country has treated the idea of a global agreement to raise
energy prices as a joke of Swiftean character. The difference being, of course,
that it was not a joke.
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Energy equity ought naturally to be a core commitment of liberal-progressive politics, but somehow it became an inconvenience, an impertinence.
Liberals from rich countries, their sense of irony (not to mention equity)
apparently dulled to insensibility, defended their call for higher energy prices
by saying that poor countries will suffer the most from global warming — a
response that ignores the reality that poor nations already suffer the most from
disenfranchisement and disasters, and that any future for the poor in which
they are no longer poor or disenfranchised almost certainly requires that they
consume much more energy, which, of necessity, must be cheap. Indeed, access
to cheap energy is a core equity issue in rich countries as well, where poor people
suffer disproportionately from the impacts of rising energy prices.
My aim here, however, is not to critique climate change policy per se. What
I want to try to understand is why one of the centerpieces of the progressive
liberal agenda in the United States over the past decade or more presents itself
as a sort of irony-free “Modest Proposal” — an effort to address a real problem
in a way that is fundamentally antipathetic to the precepts of modern American
political liberalism.
2.
I take for my definition of American political liberalism the somewhat inchoate
family of ideas that understands government action as appropriately aimed at
enhancing economic and social equity, that is skeptical the marketplace can sufficiently advance social equity and justice on its own, and is optimistic about
the potential for social progress as a result of government action. In total, I
would therefore take it as a fundamental premise of American liberalism that
policies pursued through the erosion of economic and social equity are repugnant and anathema.
How then did liberalism become associated with — and, to some extent,
obsessed with — policies whose most obvious direct effects would be to undermine economic and social equity? Here I focus on two related causes. The first
is the tyrannical role that scientific rationality has come to play in the liberal
imagination and agenda. Second is the alienation of the liberal agenda from
technological approaches to social problems.
The value of science as an embodiment of rational thought and action has
been central to the American cultural identity since the nation’s inception.
Yet to the nation’s founders, this value was abstract: a knowledge of science
helped to cultivate general habits of rational thought that were deemed necessary
for the wise governance of democratic society. Today we think about science
much more concretely, not simply as a habit of mind, but as a source of facts
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and knowledge that can bring problems to light and tell us how to go about
solving them.
This more practical view of science in society did not, however, gain much
relevance until the early 20th century, when the technical complexity of the
world increasingly seemed to demand specialized expertise for its management,
and when developments in social and biological sciences seemed to offer important insights for guiding human action. As Walter Lippmann observed in
1922, the “theory of universal competence” was no longer up to the task of providing the necessary wisdom for governing the “Great Society [that] had grown
furiously and to colossal dimensions by the application of technical knowledge…. It could not be governed, men began to discover, by men who thought
deductively about rights and wrongs.” Now it required “experts who were
trained, or had trained themselves, to make parts of this Great Society intelligible to those who manage it.”
For any ideological perspective that saw government as at least partly in the
business of actively making society better, science in this diagnostic and advisory
mode became a powerful ally. And thus science, enlisted as a tool for defining
and advancing political agendas, has had a particular and natural allure for modern American liberalism dating back to its early 20th century variants.
3.
If liberals have erred — morally as well as politically — in placing too much
reliance on science as a political polestar, their even greater error, again both
moral and political, has been their gradual alienation since World War II from
the promise of technological change to effectively addressing social problems.
These two tendencies, as we shall see, are closely related.
There are, of course, plenty of good reasons to be worried about technology
and suspicious of the utopian claims of technology promoters. During the
1960s and 1970s, the threat of global self-immolation from nuclear weapons,
the despoliation of the natural environment through industrialization, the gruesome unleashing of new military technologies against the Vietnamese people,
and the depressing tendency of “technology transfer” to mire poor countries in
economic dependence, all fed into an understandable liberal skepticism about
technology as a source of human betterment.
But the most politically resonant strand of technological skepticism in the
post-World War II era has not focused on issues of power, equity, or distribution,
but rather on questions of risk to human health and environmental quality.
Such risks may be chronic (toxic chemicals in soil and water) or catastrophic
(oil spills and nuclear meltdown), but what unifies them are their origins in
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technology and their diagnoses in science. Indeed, the emergence of health,
environmental, and technological risks as galvanizing liberal issues in the late
1960s marked a thorough repudiation of the technological progressivism that
sat comfortably in mainstream American politics through the first half of
the 20th century. This repudiation brought with it a commitment to regulatory intervention as the cure for the ills that technology visited on humans
and nature.
At the same time, the foundations for risk-based liberal politics have increasingly lain with science and scientific evidence, as the political agenda for
risk has moved from the obvious and palpable (smog, burning rivers, vanishing
eagles) to the increasingly invisible and statistical (disappearing stratospheric
ozone, small changes in cancer incidences or cognitive function in large populations of people, gradual increases in average global atmospheric temperature).
Science also documents with increasing precision the declining stocks of
natural resources, from fresh water to soil to timber to fish, and thus supports
a robust neo-Malthusian strand of liberalism. As with the liberal politics of risk,
the politics of scarcity is also an expression of technoskepticism, because it declares (oblivious of history) that technological advance and substitution will not
be able to keep up with the technology-driven resource depletion that scientists
have measured.
The combination of risk- and scarcity-based liberal politics can only give
rise to political incoherence, as liberals find themselves, for reasons of risk, opposing new technologies that could help resolve issues of scarcity. An obvious
example is opposition to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). While one
strand of liberalism has opposed GMOs because of fears about potential health
and ecological risks, another strand has insisted that the combination of soil
and water depletion, pollution, and population growth is moving the world toward an agricultural productivity crisis — a crisis that GMOs can (and will)
help to avert. And, while it may now seem difficult to remember, in the 1970s,
the liberal politics of energy was a politics of fossil fuel scarcity. Predicted fossil
fuel shortages drove liberal demands for more conservation and energy efficiency
— the same technoskeptical demands that are now applied in the context of
fossil fuel overabundance, as the politics of energy scarcity transitioned to a politics of climate change risk.
A central theme of contemporary liberalism thus emerges from a reverence
for science that increasingly, and with ever-greater precision, documents the
problems associated with a technology-dependent society. Meanwhile, the
philosophical commitment to technoskepticism hampers liberals from achieving
their political and social goals because it constricts their imagination about how
to accomplish what’s important, often leading them to focus on small risks to
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individuals rather than the potential for very large benefits to society that technological advance can bring.
4.
Against the claims of contemporary liberal technoskepticism is the simple reality
that technology has often offered a uniquely effective path to advancing core
values that liberals care about.
A rather small set of technologies has made an incalculably positive contribution to human betterment in the past couple of centuries. Cheap, widely
distributed energy sources would be among these. Engineered systems for delivering clean water to, and removing dirty water from, people’s living spaces is
another. So is the advance of agricultural technologies, which has allowed agricultural productivity to keep up with (and of course to permit, as well)
exponential population growth, in a continuing repudiation of Malthusian pessimism. So is an array of basic medical technologies, from vaccines and
antibiotics to obstetric forceps and Cesarean sections.
The fact that these technologies are not perfect, may have adverse environmental impacts, are sometimes misused or overused, and are accompanied
by some degree of risk, does not in any way undermine what they have helped
to achieve.
Yet technologies are something of an embarrassment to postwar liberal ideological tendencies. An effective technological intervention can advance liberal
social goals without requiring the sorts of social change that liberals desire.
Science can guide politically progressive policies toward such goals, but technology threatens to make the policies unnecessary.
Consider the entrenched inequities in birth outcomes that continue to be
a stark symbol of injustice in the United States. Infant mortality among African
Americans is roughly twice what it is among whites. The overall rates of US infant mortality have long been unconscionably high relative to other rich
countries, mirroring America’s greater levels of socioeconomic disparity. From
this perspective, America’s unaffordable, high-technology medical system ought
to be an affront to liberal sensibilities.
But there are, it turns out, two twists to this tale. First, over the last few
decades, infant mortality rates among poor and minority babies in the United
States have declined at about the same rate as among the babies of more wellto-do parents. So, while the disparities remain distressingly resistant to change,
the absolute outcomes have improved more or less equally for everyone. These
declines are apparently explained almost entirely by prenatal, neonatal, and obstetric technologies that benefit poor and well-off alike.
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The second twist is that substantial efforts to address unequal birth outcomes through public policies have largely failed. More than forty years of
science-based progressive policies aimed at increasing the quality of prenatal
and maternal health care and nutrition among poor women in the United States
have had little or no positive effect on birth outcomes nationwide. The causes
of high infant mortality rates among poor people are complex, and deeply embedded in broader problems of socioeconomic inequity that continue to resist
political solutions and policy intervention.
The technological path may seem less ethically and psychologically satisfactory than the political path because it leaves unaddressed the underlying
social failures that contribute to inequity. This may create some reasonable sense
that the technological path provides us with an excuse for not taking the political path — that the available means distract us from the more important end,
from doing what is right, which is to solve the problem by making society better,
by reducing inequality, rather than by separating the problem from its social
context through a technological fix.
Yet, when the essence of a problem is amenable to capture by a technological
intervention, real progress can sometimes be made very rapidly, whereas political
paths to solving a bigger, underlying problem will almost always be much
slower, more uncertain, and less effective. This is what we are seeing in the infant
mortality case.
The technological path also offers political opportunities. Technologies that
solve a problem can also act as an organizing tool to bring diverse political and
institutional players together. Consider, for example, how the vaccine industry,
medical practitioners, health insurers, government regulators, school systems,
local governments, and individual families have all recognized a common interest that allows them to work together to ensure that almost all children in
the United States get vaccinated. The gravitational center of the near-miraculous
degree of cooperation among these fractious institutions and interests is the
technology itself — vaccines that yield reliable and desirable outcomes, and
thus motivate and justify the cooperation necessary to achieve an enormous
public benefit. To get a sense of how miraculous this degree of long-term
cooperation really is, imagine what it would take to coordinate a similar diversity
of interests on behalf of some broader political agenda like health care or education reform.
The suspicion of technological approaches to social problems is self-defeating, both because it prevents liberalism from exploiting the built-in political
logic of effective technological interventions, and because it actually commits
liberals to political pathways of social intervention that are not very likely to
succeed. When combined with the strong faith in science as a foundation for
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progressive policies, liberal alienation from technology results in the sort of
dumbfoundingly misconceived policy prescriptions that have arisen around the
problem of climate change. It was, however, not always thus.
5.
In 1944, David Lilienthal, the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), published Democracy on the March, a passionate expression of the scientific and technological optimism that existed amidst the social and economic
devastation of the Great Depression.
Lilienthal was an archetypal New Deal figure, confident that the combination of science, technology, rational planning, and democratic government
could help bring the nation back to its feet. His book was an explanation and
defense of the TVA, a New Deal initiative aimed at bringing electricity, flood
management, river navigability, improved agricultural practices, better health
and education, new jobs and economic opportunity, and restoration of the environment to an impoverished region of the United States.
While Democracy on the March seems quaint, if not somewhat scary in its
unvarnished confidence in grand technological schemes, Lilienthal was no technological utopian. He treats technology’s power as complex and ambiguous,
requiring holistic thinking and democratic oversight in order to fulfill its promise. The TVA he describes was democratically responsive and administratively
decentralized. Authority lay not just with formally trained technocrats, but also
with those who had local, real-world experience and expertise.
In many of its elements, Democracy on the March reads like a 21st century
primer for sustainable development. Lilienthal articulates ideas equivalent to
what today we would call systems thinking, sustainable business practices,
comparative effectiveness research, devolution of governance, public-private
partnerships, adaptive learning, and democratization of science and technology.
If Lilienthal’s technologically optimistic vision nonetheless sounds naïve to
today’s liberal ear, perhaps the problem is with the liberal ear, which seems to
find greater political resonance in abstract scientific diagnoses of risk than technological opportunities to improve human well-being. Thus was TVA advanced
on exactly the opposite political rationale that liberals adopted, half a century
later, for climate change. For TVA’s core idea was this: the best and most direct
way to improve the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley was to make electricity
— energy — cheap and universally available. What if we imported this outmoded strand of liberalism into the present, and tried to apply it to the climate
change problem? The starting place for formulating a politically attractive strategy that honors core liberal values might be this particular fact: 1.4 billion
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people lack access to reliable energy (and billions more are economically and
socially vulnerable to increasing energy costs). This number needs to decline in
the future, not increase, meaning that the shared human dignity of a growing
global population will require more energy in the future, not less. A commitment to increasing rather than eroding energy equity is a necessary precursor
to exploring new technological paths for delivering energy that is clean, reliable,
and affordable. This was the argument advanced in the “Hartwell Paper,” which
I coauthored with a small group of scholars in Europe, the United States, and
Japan. Energy equity, we concluded, is a globally unifying goal, whereas increasing energy prices is globally divisive.
Action therefore begins with the quest for more, cheaper, and cleaner energy
technology, not raising energy prices. And in this regard, the opportunities for
making progress are actually quite expansive. Technological advance is largely
a process of gradual improvement of existing technologies, and many potential
options for clean energy technology already exist as platforms for further improvement. What has been lacking have been a serious, strategic commitment
to the appropriate policies and necessary levels of investment that can catalyze
clean energy innovation. While technology has always been a faddish, if marginal, presence in the climate policy agenda (we liberals do love hybrid cars and
solar power, however expensive), innovation policy has never been taken seriously, and technological progress has generally been treated as if it would
automatically and miraculously appear as necessary.
Moreover, it may turn out that the world needs to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions more quickly and decisively than can be achieved even with an aggressive commitment to clean energy innovation. Here liberals have another
tool in their arsenal that they have forsaken as a consequence of their technoskepticism. The government has often been a primary investor and customer
for new technologies that advance public well-being. The TVA was based on
the belief that governments had an obligation to directly invest in public works
that could level the social and economic playing field.
Treating greenhouse gas reductions as a public good, like investments in
rural electrification, transportation, water and sewerage, national parks, and national defense, would exploit a historically powerful liberal rationale for directly
addressing technological problems that lack marketplace solutions. This public
good-public works approach has the political benefit of being relatively transparent in terms of motives and costs, unlike the ridiculously complex,
too-clever-by-a-half approaches to climate policy of the past 20 years.
A public goods-public works approach could provide new political options
for attacking climate and energy problems directly, for example through the
capture and storage of carbon dioxide from power plants. Here our friend the
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TVA, a public enterprise that operates 11 coal-fired plants with nearly 60 generating units, may offer opportunities. Congress could direct and fund TVA to
explore carbon dioxide capture technologies and to demonstrate them at increasing scale. This would be an appropriate next generation public good
mission for a public works program rooted in liberal values and a commitment
to the role of technology in advancing those values.
Since the decisive crash of the international and US climate policy frameworks in 2009, liberals have at last begun to more seriously embrace energy
innovation in the United States, but with some palpable sense that they are regretfully adopting “Plan B,” rather than doing what they should have done from
the beginning. Unfortunately, 20 years of fruitless fighting over the science and
politics of reducing risk by making energy more expensive has so utterly alienated conservatives from the very idea of climate change, that a program of
energy innovation that would once have been potentially appealing to many
conservatives for its wealth-creating, competitiveness-enhancing potential now
risks being viewed on the Right as a Trojan horse for failed climate policies.
Thus, the political debacle of climate change illustrates with excruciating
clarity the price that liberals have paid as a result of their overdependence upon
scientific rationality and their alienation from technology. Yes, much technology
is aimed at countering the unexpected effects of past technologies. Yes, technology creates new risks and uncertainties, reinforces power asymmetries and
anomie, and continually destabilizes social arrangements and even moral frameworks. But humans are an innovating species, and we are utterly committed for
our survival to an unending technological journey. In acknowledging this
perhaps uncomfortable fact, liberals would do well to recover the message
of pragmatic optimism in David Lilienthal’s Democracy on the March: that
technology tempered by democracy can be an incredibly powerful tool for
social betterment. /
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MODER NIZING CO NSER VATISM
A CASE FOR REFORM
S T E V E N F. H AY WA R D
W
ith their impressive election victory of 2010 and the emergence of the
Tea Party — the most significant (and disruptive) grassroots political
phenomenon since the anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s and 1970s
— conservatives and especially the self-conscious “conservative movement”
might be excused for exhibiting an air of triumphalism. The Democrats’ commanding majority in the House has been dispatched, the Senate and the
presidency are increasingly on the ropes, and fears that President Barack
Obama’s 2008 election might have represented a fundamental and lasting realignment of the American electorate are rapidly fading from memory. It might
seem that the long-standing conservative project to shrink the New Deal welfare
state by starving it of tax revenue, reigning in entitlements, and limiting its
reach into the lives of American families and businesses — begun in the Reagan
years and continued fitfully through the first and second Bush presidencies —
might be ready to recommence. And perhaps, this time, with help from the fervor of the Tea Party, conservatives may even finish the job.
For those willing to probe a bit deeper, however, it should quickly become
apparent that we badly need to take stock of our position. Conservatism, despite
these impressive electoral victories, is failing on its own terms. Start with the
social indicators, which are the most important to conservatives. America’s fastgrowing and largely minority underclass shows limited signs of progress or
assimilation to middle-class American life. And the white middle class — the
bedrock of conservatism’s political strength and social vision — is showing signs
of social stagnation and economic regress that should be sounding ominous
claxons in conservative meeting halls but, so far, have attracted only the attention of Charles Murray. Stagnant income growth and mobility and a shrinking
middle class are considered unhealthy by most conservative understandings of
social health, cohesion, and well-being. While conservatives have plenty of
macro ideas for increasing economic growth, they have fewer ideas about how
to secure a wider distribution of new wealth.
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MODERNIZING CONSERVATISM
Political and economic indicators bring more grim news. Thirty years after
the arrival of the Reagan Revolution, government is bigger than ever. The Reagan
years appear to have been little more than a mild speed bump in the progress of
ever-larger government. The regulatory state advances relentlessly on every front.
The soaring national debt threatens economic oblivion sooner or later. In short,
the Reagan era, for all that was accomplished, was not an analogue to the New
Deal era. In fact, the much-vaunted Reagan Revolution was not revolutionary
and failed to alter the nation’s basic long-term political trajectory.
Meanwhile, the continuing negotiations over the debt ceiling and deficit
reduction promise only further heartburn, as Congress is forced to choose either
cuts to popular entitlement programs, or deep reductions in national defense
spending, and/or tax increases. Given the painful price that conservatives have
repeatedly paid for proposing cuts to Medicare and Social Security, it is hard to
see how this ends well for conservatives.
By allowing their well-reasoned and often well-founded critiques of government action to metastasize into a categorical rejection of all prospective
government action, while continuing to deny the basic political economy of
the welfare state, conservatives increasingly find themselves in an ideological
and practical straightjacket. Where conservatives have succeeded in cutting government, they have done so by taking an indiscriminate fire ax to non-defense
discretionary spending. Meanwhile, they have had virtually no success at all in
cutting middle-class entitlements, which represent the lion’s share of federal
spending and continue their unrestrained growth. This kind of conservatism
would be unrecognizable to, for example, Calvin Coolidge, a current sentimental conservative favorite who favored minimum wage laws and child labor
regulations, or even to Reagan, who favored large-scale government science research beyond just missile defense.
1.
Conservatives have opposed, as a matter of deep principle, the expansion of
government, and most especially any tax increases that are seen as enablers of
government expansion. This position, coherent and sensible on its own terms,
refuses to confront its obvious defect: it has not stopped the growth of government, even on the metric of government spending, let alone regulation.
In the Reagan years, it was widely thought, though seldom articulated, that
the policy of holding the line on taxes amidst soaring budget deficits would
eventually curb the deficit through a starve-the-beast strategy. In one of his early
speeches in February 1981, which he largely wrote himself, Reagan said:
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S T E V E N F. H AY W A R D
Over the past decades we’ve talked of curtailing government spending
so that we can then lower the tax burden. Sometimes we’ve even taken
a run at doing that. But there were always those who told us that
taxes couldn’t be cut until spending was reduced. Well, you know, we
can lecture our children about extravagance until we run out of voice
and breath. Or we can cure their extravagance by simply reducing
their allowance.
Behind the scenes, Reagan’s economic team argued vigorously amongst themselves about the probity of this strategy.
The de facto starve-the-beast strategy was the great cop out of the Reagan
years. By assuming that restricting revenues would eventually compel reductions
in the size of government, the Reagan administration was able to justify avoiding
any serious attempt to reform entitlement programs. Beyond a few very minor
trims, every trial balloon of deeper entitlement reform was swiftly routed and
withdrawn. It is uncomfortable but necessary for conservatives to acknowledge
that Reagan’s disinclination to attack entitlements was one reason for his popularity — after an initial flurry, he did not seriously attack the welfare state.
Long-term evidence indicates that the starve-the-beast strategy not only
fails, but may make the problem of unrestrained spending growth worse, suggesting that a “serve the check” strategy might be a more effective means of
curbing the growth of government spending. The simple explanation for this
seeming paradox is that the starve-the-beast strategy currently allows Americans
to receive a dollar in government services while only having to pay 60 cents for
it. Rigorous analyses from centrist economists Christina and David Romer of
UC Berkeley, and from libertarian economist (and Reagan White House alumnus) William Niskanen conclude that the starve-the-beast strategy fails.
Strikingly, Niskanen’s analysis found that lower taxes correlated with higher levels
of federal spending. As a result, Niskanen argues that raising taxes may be the
most effective way to reduce government spending.
Thus, conservative attachment to a failing strategy has rendered the Right
incapable of reducing government spending. And yet, conservatives resist facing
up squarely to this grim reality for a variety of reasons, some of them having to
do with their undeniable successes of the last two generations. The first and most
significant triumph was the creation of the conservative movement itself, which
arose from the far fringes to the center of American political life in little more
than a generation. Having control of no significant institutions, especially in
the media or in academia, and possessing little depth of intellectual leadership,
the conservative movement created its own “counterestablishment” (as Sidney
Blumenthal was, I think, the first to observe) with remarkable speed. From the
epic defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964, the movement hardly paused to draw
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a deep breath, going on to capture and transform the Republican Party into a
wholly conservative party, culminating in its greatest victory with the election
of Ronald Reagan 16 years later.
Conservatives can point to several substantial policy victories over the last
generation that followed from their intellectual ferment and organizational ascendency. The reduction in income and investment tax rates is of a piece with
a broader reinvigoration of market processes, which included the successful,
large-scale deregulation of several industries (transportation, energy, communications). Other deregulated markets, however, have shown more mixed results
(electricity) along with some outright failures (the savings and loan industry
and the financial sector), suggesting that either the theory or practice (or both)
of deregulation is incomplete. Despite these cases of incomplete or counterproductive results, the conservative reinvigoration of markets and the discrediting
of central planning was a positive correction to liberalism worldwide, giving
rise to “third way” centrism, sometimes referred to as neoliberalism, a policy
blend guided by market dynamics alongside social insurance philosophy.
In terms of social policy, conservatism can be credited with welfare reform
that has substantially reduced dependency, as well with a reduction in crime
rates that proceeded largely according to conservative policy prescriptions. Yet
these are strangely limited examples. The reform of the New Deal-era welfare
entitlement has not been emulated in other entitlement or social insurance programs. The reduction in urban crime has helped center-city economic
revitalization in general, but Detroit, Cleveland, and other old industrial cities
are still basket cases. The conservative idea of “enterprise zones” in blighted
urban areas, an offshoot of supply-side economics, cannot point to any real success stories. Conservative ideas for education reform, especially school choice
and charter schools, have made only scant progress against determined opposition that seems unlikely to abate any time soon.
The end of the Cold War is perhaps conservatism’s greatest victory. Although
many aspects of this story are contestable, conservatives can at the very least
claim a greater clarity and consistency in their anti-Communism. But this very
success has contributed to the confusion and dissent among conservatives about
the nation’s strategy in a unipolar world facing the challenge of terror and
semi-state-based radical Islam. It is not clear how the lessons and strategies of
the Cold War era can be applied to this problem, if they are applicable at all.
2.
Even with the necessary qualifiers, these are substantial achievements, but it is
a mistake to allow triumphs to breed triumphalism. The conservative movement
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soldiers on — as any political movement should to some extent — in the belief
that it can and will achieve a complete and ultimate triumph over liberalism.
This is best observed in Grover Norquist’s slogan that the goal of conservatism
should be to shrink government down small enough to “drown it in the bathtub.” The self-conscious “Progressive movement” believes in the reciprocal
version of this goal of ultimate and complete triumph, as expressed by Ruy
Teixeira and John Judis’s thesis that demographic trends alone should eventually
swamp conservatives and produce a durable liberal majority that will enable a
more sweeping redistributionist agenda.
While the activists and political strategists must think and act in terms of
victory as a practical matter, conservative and liberal intellectual leaders should
not. There are three dominant political facts of our age that conservative
thinkers (and also liberals) need to acknowledge. The first is the plain fact that
neither ideological camp will ever defeat the other so decisively as to be able
to govern without the consent of the other side. This is not merely my
political judgment; it is sewn into the nature of America’s basic institutions and
political culture.
The second fact is that the divisions between Left and Right are fundamental and unbridgeable. A frequent trope of political rhetoric is that everyone
agrees about the ends; we merely disagree about the means. Although this is
often true at the level of a discrete policy issue (for example, broadening access
to health care), it is wrong at the deeper level of what might be called the “tectonic plates” that shift individual political battles. Reducing Left-Right
differences to disagreements over means has a numbing effect on clear thinking;
it is an obstacle to grappling with some of the larger problems — such as entitlement spending — that now need the sort of reform that goes far beyond the
business-as-usual tinkering around the edges. Left and Right have conflicting
modes of moral reasoning that cannot be easily synthesized or bridged.
Which brings us to the third major political fact of our age: the welfare
state, or entitlement state, is here to stay. It is a central feature of modernity itself. We are simply not going back to a system of “rugged individualism” in a
minimalist “night watchman” state; there is not even a plurality in favor of this
position. A spectrum of conservative and libertarian thinkers acknowledge this,
though this perception has not penetrated the activist ranks. Back in 1993,
Irving Kristol called for a “conservative welfare state” on the pragmatic grounds
that “the welfare state is with us, for better or worse, and that conservatives
should try to make it better rather than worse.” National Review’s Ramesh
Ponnuru noted in 2006, “there is no imaginable political coalition in America
capable of sustaining a majority that takes a reduction of the scope of the federal
government as one of its central tasks.” William Voegeli, author of the most
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trenchant critique of the welfare state (Never Enough) since at least Charles
Murray, concludes, “No conservative, either in the trenches or the commentariat, has yet devised a strategy for politicians to kick deep dents in the side of
the middle-class entitlement programs without forfeiting a presidency or a congressional majority.” And libertarian economist Tyler Cowen faces the reality
squarely: “The welfare state is here to stay, whether we like it or not.”
3.
Given these realities, how must conservatism revive itself for the 21st century?
For starters, we must admit that starve-the-beast has been a spectacular flop.
Reagan argued, both as governor and as president, for constitutional amendments requiring a balanced budget, limiting spending to a fixed proportion of
personal income, and imposing a two-thirds vote requirement to raise taxes.
These reforms — even if they could be passed through the difficult amendment
process — might have some effect, but their record on the state level suggests
conservatives will be disappointed. The two-thirds vote requirement for budgets
and taxes, along with the balanced budget requirement, has not kept California’s
welfare state from slipping into the abyss. Colorado’s constitutional spending
limit was breached and amended by the most conservative governor in the
state’s history, Bill Owens, because it proved defective in ways important
to conservatives.
Requiring the American people to actually pay for all of the government
they receive is, as Niskanen and others have convincingly argued, the most effective way to limit its growth. Right now the anti-tax bias of the Right results
in shifting costs onto future generations who do not vote in today’s elections,
and enables liberals to defend against spending restraints very cheaply. Instead
of starving the beast, conservatives should serve the check.
While increasing taxes will likely feel painful to many conservatives, there
are innovative ways to reform the tax code that might be palatable while also
increasing revenues. One area of tax policy where there is some room for maneuver would be family tax policy. While many households today — perhaps
half or more — do not pay any federal income tax, all working households pay
payroll taxes. One conservative idea that liberals ought to like well enough is to
expand the current $1,500 per child tax credit to something closer to $5,000,
which would wipe out a large portion of payroll tax liability and raise household
after-tax income considerably. The revenue loss could be made up through
broader tax reform that reduces deductions, credits and tax breaks both for individuals and corporations. A wholesale pro-growth tax reform that incorporates
both features might even allow for lower marginal rates along the lines of the
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1986 Tax Reform Act. For conservatives this would be a pro-family initiative
that would not involve the usual culture war issues. And this targeted tax cut
should appeal to liberals as well, who generally disapprove of tax cuts that reward
the rich but ought to be willing to support tax reform that would predominantly
benefit working families.
Next, conservatism must learn from its success in reforming welfare that
acknowledging the reality of social problems is not the same as agreeing with
liberals about their solutions. Keeping the welfare state solvent as the baby
boomers crash the rope line of eligibility will require tax increases far larger than
Americans are likely willing to bear. One might almost say that the welfare state
is the next bubble waiting to collapse. There is one obvious compromise policy
mechanism for reforming and securing entitlement programs: means testing.
Some conservatives, as well as the Paul Ryan plan, have embraced this in principle while others fear the premise embedded in it of recognizing the permanent
legitimacy of the welfare state.
Activists in both parties fear splitting their own constituencies. Conservatives
fear agreeing to such terms will mean accepting a losing position over the long
run. Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute worries:
There is no evidence that if conservatives agree not to try to roll back
the welfare state, liberals will agree to restrain its growth. More likely,
conservatives will simply become involved in a bidding war, in which
they will inevitably look like the less caring party.
Liberals worry that embracing means testing for entitlements will weaken
them as totem of a broader universal social contract and, by making them “poor
peoples” programs, will lead to an eventual decline in public support and to
their ultimate demise.
These seemingly reasonable fears of both camps are overblown. The experience of welfare reform suggests that there has been no “race to the bottom”
among the states to eliminate basic assistance programs, though, to be sure,
many have been severely constricted in the current fiscal crisis. But the current
fiscal crisis on the state level should be seen as a harbinger of the future for the
federal government if nothing is done. The force of fiscal gravity is virtually
certain to compel means testing at some future date. For liberals, the means
thresholds are likely to be more generous the earlier they are calculated; for conservatives, the tax increases are likely to be lower today than if postponed into
the future.
Another area ripe for conservative reappraisal is the environment. Conservatives who sensibly dislike both the centralized regulation of most environBREAKTHROUGH JOURNAL
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mental policy and the untethered apocalypticism of much of the environmental
movement have tended to respond with a non sequitur: the environment has
mostly become a cause of the Left, therefore environmental problems are either
phony or are not worth considering. To be sure, many environmental problems
have been overestimated, and the proposed remedies are problematic from
several points of view, but conservatives, with only a handful of exceptions,
have ceased sustained reflection on how to assess environmental problems seriously, or how to craft non-bureaucratic and non-coercive remedies for many
genuine problems that require solutions.
The tortured course that has led to the extreme polarization of environmental issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that this
polarization has been deleterious to both the aims of the environmental movement — which has allowed environmentalism to become so strongly associated
with the aims of the Left as to be no longer worth conservatives competing for
— and the long-term political viability of American conservatism, which has
at this point almost entirely conceded areas of sustained public concern (environmental health, the provision of parks, and the protection of wildlife and
scenic landscapes) to its political opponents.
There is a small subculture on the Right, known as “free market environmentalism,” that offers an alternate path toward environmental protection
consistent with conservative principles, including respect for property rights, a
strong preference for markets, and our congenital suspicion of government and
regulation. The conservative movement would be well served to take those ideas
more seriously.
Finally, conservatives must rethink their sweeping rejection of public investments in public goods such as science research and useful infrastructure.
Once upon a time, conservatives supported large infrastructure projects, such
as dams, water projects, the interstate highway system, and the Apollo project.
It is generally forgotten now that President Reagan supported both the international space station and the superconducting supercollider. In fact, over the
last 30 years, federal science research spending has tended to grow faster under
Republican presidents than Democratic ones. To be sure, there is no small
amount of government research and technology spending, including under
Republican presidents, that is caught in the maw of rent-seeking behavior and
ideological favoritism. Too often a favored pork barrel spending program is
called “investment,” degrading the worthy name and long-standing track record
of true public investment. But this is hardly reason to dismiss out of hand, as
many conservatives do, investments in truly public goods — goods the private
sector cannot or will not invest in, fearing the inability to capture their benefits.
Conservatives and liberals ought to be able to join hands on basic projects
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that modernize the infrastructure for roads, energy, and water. Efforts are needed
to explore ways of building environmentally responsible water storage and delivery projects in the parched West that would reduce the political friction and
economic cost of current water constraints. New roads and water projects could
integrate market mechanisms that reduce waste and promote efficiency. And
investments in energy should be made with an eye to making energy cheaper
and cleaner, not in subsidizing longstanding liberal technological fetishes like
high-speed rail or wind and solar energy.
4.
Of course, a reformation in conservatism demands corresponding reforms
within liberalism. Liberals need to acknowledge that the American people will
never support the high level of taxation — let alone wholesale redistribution
— that would be necessary to support the future welfare state that has been set
in motion. “Liberals who want a bigger welfare state and conservatives who
want a smaller one have a big thing to fight about, but nothing really to talk
about,” noted Voegeli. “If liberals and conservatives decide they can do business
with each other it will be because conservatives accept they’ll never sell voters
on the huge benefit reductions they ultimately seek, and because liberals decide
they’ll never sell the huge tax increases they ultimately need.”
Major policy changes almost always demand the consent — not the agreement, just the consent — of the minority party. While activists on each side
invariably complain that their side is quickest to sell out, over the last century
liberals and conservatives have routinely consented to the majority party to implement critical policies. There was significant Republican support for
Progressive Era reforms, as well as New Deal and Great Society policies. In the
case of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Republicans voted in favor of the bill in a
larger proportion of their total numbers in Congress than Democrats. Reagan’s
first tax cut bill passed the Senate 89-11, and then the House with about 50
Democratic votes, despite attempts by Democratic leadership to whip their
members into line against Reagan. The 1986 Tax Reform Act — the stepchild
of Reagan’s first tax cut plan — passed on a truly bipartisan basis.
Achieving policy compromise and the reconstruction of a “vital center” requires an end to the view of practical politics as a zero-sum game, in which
compromise is regarded as a defeat by both sides. Many of the Democrats who
voted for Reagan’s tax cut didn’t agree with or like it, but they consented to it
because they recognized the public consensus behind allowing Reagan a chance
to govern. In other words, minority party consent typically represents the general public support behind a majority’s course of action. President George W.
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Bush’s prescription drug benefit plan passed on a substantially bipartisan basis.
President Obama was simply oblivious to the meaning of the Tea Party, the lack
of Republican consent, and other related signs that a majority of Americans did
not like his health care bill. The obvious implication of this conception of consent is that Democrats cannot fix health care without the consent of
Republicans, and Republicans cannot fix Social Security or other entitlements
without the consent of Democrats.
Consent does not require surrender. Liberals and conservatives do not agree
about the principle of equality in American life and probably never will.
Conservatives emphasize equal opportunity while accepting or even celebrating
unequal outcomes. Conservatives see nothing inherently unjust about large disparities in the distribution of income or wealth, and also offer practical reasons
why unequal rewards make for a more dynamic, creative, and ultimately wealthier society. Liberals strongly prefer more equal results, with many viewing
disparities in income or wealth as random (Richard Gephardt once referred to
the structure of America’s wealth and income distribution as a “lottery”), and,
as a result, favor egalitarian policies and entitlement programs.
Even so, most liberals are not pure redistributionists, and generally support
policies that broaden opportunity for individual advancement, while few conservatives are entirely indifferent to the importance of income mobility and
social opportunity. Liberal policies to advance individual opportunity tend to
emphasize education, along with some job training efforts, to mixed effect.
Meanwhile conservatives have tended to favor using the tax code to bring about
rising incomes indirectly through higher rewards for capital investment in work
effort. This much derided “trickle-down” approach has some evidence in its
favor (for example, research showing the effect high corporate tax rates have on
wage levels and wage growth). But even without settling that argument it can
be noted that the supply-side string has been fully played out. Honest observers
on the Right acknowledge the stagnation of middle-class incomes (though disagreeing on the causes). While liberals and conservatives may disagree on the
very notion of equality, they can agree on certain points — for example, that
stagnating incomes are problematic — and can achieve policy agreement in certain key areas.
It may be that internal ideological reformation must precede bipartisan political compromise. Ideological extremists in both parties have repeatedly
succeeded in scuttling tax and entitlement compromises pursued by moderate
reformers in their respective parties, and at the moment, the prospects for any
compromises seem remote. It is easy and crowd pleasing to blame the intransigence of the other side, but this absolves both sides of serious self-examination
and self-criticism without which political progress becomes impossible for both.
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I have written this paper in the hopes that my fellow conservatives will recognize the need for a conservative reformation, and I believe that liberals must
follow suit. In their current incarnations, both conservatism and liberalism are
failing — not just because of poor strategies like starve-the-beast — but also
because neither movement has properly adapted to the changing fabric of modern society. Given this, when there is bipartisan compromise between two outdated ideological camps it is usually unsatisfying to almost everyone. The lesson
we should draw is that before the two camps can agree to an agenda truly in
the national interest, liberals and conservatives must first reform themselves. /
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AGAINST MANUFACTURING POLICY
DANIEL IKENSON
I
n “The Manufacturing of Decline,” Vaclav Smil makes some valid observations about US manufacturing and trade, but he perpetuates two myths —
that US manufacturing is in decline and that reducing the trade deficit should
be a policy objective — in order to justify industrial policy.
To argue that manufacturing is in decline, Smil relies primarily on “manufacturing output as a share of GDP” and “manufacturing export intensity.”
Manufacturing as a share of GDP peaked in 1953 at 28.3 percent, but in absolute terms, US manufacturing output has increased year after year, every year
(excepting declines during cyclical recessions). So if the manufacturing sector
in the United States has been growing absolutely, talk of deindustrialization and
manufacturing contraction is wrong.
Smil contends that the United States’s manufacturing sector “is badly trailing China’s.” But comparing manufacturing output of different countries is
always apples to oranges. As a large export processing economy, China imports
valuable components and other raw materials, then assembles them for export.
Meanwhile, US manufacturers produce higher value-added products not typically sold for retail, like chemicals, pharmaceuticals, airplanes, technical textiles,
and sophisticated components. Retail items that say “Made in China” or “Made
in Vietnam” may have a great deal in them that is, in fact, “Made in the USA.”
According to the United Nations statistics division and the National Association
of Manufacturers, US factories still account for more manufacturing valueadded than factories in any other country.
Smil argues America has lost its edge in advanced technology products, but
consider the iPod: it costs $150 to produce and is composed mainly of parts
made in the United States, Japan, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and China. UC
Irvine researchers analyzed these costs and found that $4 of that total cost is
Chinese value-added — mostly labor snapping parts together — amounting
to less than 3 percent of the iPod’s value. The other $144 is attributable to
components made elsewhere, but because China is the final assembly point,
the entire $150 production cost is chalked up as a Chinese import, adding to
America’s growing deficit in “advanced technology products.” Apple then marks
the iPod up nearly 100 percent, reinvesting profits in future product generations,
or distributing them to shareholders.
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AGAINST MANUFACTURING POLICY
Productivity gains — increased output with fewer inputs — are the wellspring of wealth creation and rising living standards. Thus, I strongly disagree
with Smil’s contention that manufacturing companies like Boeing, valued
at $50 billion, are better for the economy than service companies like
Facebook, also valued at $50 billion, just because Boeing has 160,000 employees, while Facebook only has 2,000. With 2,000 workers producing the same
value as 160,000 — one producing the same value as 80 — Facebook is 80
times more productive than Boeing, freeing up 158,000 workers for other more
productive endeavors.
Shouldn’t policy incentivize (or, at least not discourage) the kind of innovation and entrepreneurship needed to create more Facebooks? It’s easy to create
jobs. Instead of bulldozers, use shovels; instead of shovels, use spoons. But economic growth and rising living standards require making the most value with
the fewest resources possible.
Smil cites manufacturing export intensity as some reflection of lagging US
competitiveness. US export intensity (exports/GDP), he claims, is 13th out of
the 15 largest manufacturing economies. But with such a large internal economy, the United States has not needed high export intensity. Exports have not
been a priority for US companies, which enjoyed the luxury of having the
world’s biggest market as their backyard.
That longstanding advantage to American companies is starting to wither,
as developing countries grow and rich countries slow. US manufacturers will
now have to compete with world-class foreign manufacturers for the domestic
market, as well as for the business of the 95 percent of the world’s population
that lives abroad.
I largely agree with Smil when he concludes that the only reason America
has sustained such a high trade deficit is because it holds the world’s reserve
currency. However, his follow-up conclusion — a smaller trade deficit would
allow the United States to properly maintain and expand its infrastructure, creating new jobs and increasing US exports — is a non sequitur. A trade deficit
means more foreign-supplied capital is in the hands of the public and/or private
sectors and can be used for investment in things like infrastructure.
For US manufacturers to win more market share and revenues abroad,
exports and imports must increase — 55 percent of US import value is intermediate goods used in US production. Policy should aim to maximize economic
growth and investment, not focus on shrinking the trade deficit. The only
downside to the trade deficit is the public burden of US debt purchased by foreign capital, but this is a function of policy makers’ profligacy, not trade.
Governments are competing for investment and talent, which both tend to
flow into jurisdictions where the rule of law is clear and abided, the political
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DANIEL IKENSON
and business climate is more certain, asset expropriation is negligible, infrastructure is maintained, the local work force is productive, and so on. The
problem with the American economy is that none of the usual attractors of investment and talent are secure. While smarter governments around the world
woo investment in R&D facilities, high-end manufacturing plants, and educated workers with proper incentives, US policies treat investors and skilled
immigrants with contempt or indifference. It would be a mistake to mimic the
Chinese and adopt top-down industrial policy, rather than fix these problems
to reap what should be American economic advantages. /
Daniel Ikenson is associate director of the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade
Policy Studies.
VA C L AV S M I L R E P L I E S
In his response to my article, “The Manufacturing of Decline,” Daniel Ikenson
prefers to box with shadows and choose his own statistics rather than actually
address the issues that I have raised. In Mr. Ikenson’s bipolar world, America
must either implement Soviet-style industrial policy or pretend there is no problem at all as America’s manufacturing sector continues to lose ground to its
overseas competitors.
As a former resident of the westernmost province in the Evil Empire, I
hardly need to be warned of the dangers of “industrial policy.” Indeed, in my
piece, I openly eschewed centralized planning, noting that what was needed
was not price setting, quotas, or production subsidies, but rather expanded and
better vocational education, tort reform, lower corporate taxes, and health care
cost containment, as part of a focused national strategy to increase competitiveness in areas where the United States is already strong.
Mr. Ikenson marshals a number of statistics to prove that American manufacturing is not in absolute decline. But he will have to use those statistics in
another debate, for that is not a claim that I have ever made. What I have documented is that America’s manufacturing sector has retreated faster in relative
terms than in any other major industrialized country and that, as measured by
America’s low export intensity in comparison to our economic competitors,
America is a lagging exporter of manufactured goods.
Mr. Ikenson argues that America need not concern itself with export intensity because its domestic market has historically been so large that American
manufacturers did not need to compete for foreign markets. But one is hard
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pressed to understand how the fact that American firms did not need to compete for foreign markets in the past should lead us to conclude that America
need not worry about its global competitiveness today. To the contrary, the
unique historic circumstances that allowed America the luxury of ignoring foreign markets are fast coming to an end.
With developed nations in a long-term downturn, the vast majority of
future growth in global demand for manufactured goods will come from
foreign markets, mostly in the developing world. As such, the only way that
manufacturing will be able to retain a significant share of America’s economic
output, excepting starkly protectionist policies to keep exporters out of US
domestic markets, will be to increase the export intensity of our manufacturing
sector. Ikenson acknowledges this reality but has little to say about what to do
about it.
In the end, one gets the sense that Ikenson could live with an American
economy that ultimately doesn’t actually produce anything, especially if the alternative involves expecting the government to do anything about it. Ikenson
objects to my negative comparison of Facebook to Boeing, suggesting that the
fact that Facebook is valued at $50 billion — the same as Boeing — but supports only 2,000 jobs is in the long run the best thing for the economy. But
that begs the question of whose economy Facebook is best for. No doubt, a
company that is worth $50 billion dollars and employs only 2,000 people is
good for the global investing class. But for America’s unemployed and the many
more trapped in the low-wage service economy, Ikenson’s suggestion that
“Facebook is 80 times more productive than Boeing, freeing up 158,000
workers for other more productive endeavors” must seem like some kind of
cruel joke.
Andrew Grove, the founder and long-serving CEO of Intel, put the
dilemma in the starkest terms:
You could say, as many do, that shipping jobs overseas is no big deal
because the high-value work — and much of profits — remain in the
US. But what kind of a society are we going to have if it consists of
highly-paid people doing high-value-added work — and masses of
unemployed?
Perhaps if we lived in a frictionless world, with a single global economy,
where capital, goods, and labor could move at no cost, none of this would matter. China could make all the jets (as it might, soon enough, given America’s
neglect of its manufacturing sector and trade imbalance) and America could
make all the Facebooks. But in the real world, trade is actively managed, indus84/
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tries follow path dependency, and nations compete to create good jobs and actively help their firms seek a competitive advantage. Ikenson acknowledges this
reality, noting that “smarter governments around the world woo investment in
R&D facilities, high-end manufacturing plants, and educated workers with
proper incentives” — but seems unable to bring himself to acknowledge that
government policy has anything to do with any of it.
And why are talent and investment flowing into China in great quantities
despite the fact that the Chinese consistently steal intellectual property, expropriate assets, and more generally intimidate firms to great effect? Because they
also offer more tangible incentives for investment, including generous tax credits, free land, access to markets, and close proximity to suppliers, that have been
more than enough to overcome any reservations that investors and talent may
have about the rule of law or the business climate.
China will no doubt have its share of busts and there is no doubt that some
of its policies will prove to be unproductive in the long term. But ultimately,
China’s determination to compete for manufacturing, and not just in low-value
sectors like furniture and shoes, but also in advanced manufacturing sectors
such as pharmaceuticals and aviation, is entirely rational.
Advanced manufacturing positions a nation competitively in the race to develop new products and entire new industries. Today China manufactures a
rising share of pharmaceuticals consumed in the United States — tomorrow it
will design them. Today China exports increasing amounts of spare parts and
components for Boeings and Airbuses — tomorrow it will sell its own jetliners.
Asia and Europe can be expected to continue to help their domestic firms
compete for those markets. If the United States chooses not to — out of laissez-faire ideology or the inability to discern between top-down industrial
planning and competitiveness policy — then it is effectively giving billions in
global market value and millions of American jobs to other nations. /
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POTSH OT AT PROG R ESSIVE
ECO NOMICS MISSES T H E MA R K
DEAN BAKER
I
n his criticism of progressive economics, Rob Atkinson selectively ignores
details that do not support his criticism and advances a mistaken view of the
Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). First, Atkinson’s basic economic story is more than a bit confused. He touts Germany and Japan as
successes in contrast with the United States’s failure. CEPR has praised certain
aspects of Germany’s labor market policy and its short-work policy, which have
allowed Germany to lower its unemployment rate despite an economic downturn. That said, it’s not clear that Germany and Japan have actually been
successes in the way that Atkinson claims. German and Japanese productivity
growth has consistently trailed that of the United States over the last 15 years.
Though the gap is not huge, it certainly diminishes the contrast.
It is true that Germany and Japan, unlike the United States, have large trade
surpluses, but this is due in large part to informal protectionist barriers that
Atkinson would presumably not want the United States to adopt. The other
major factor hurting US trade is a seriously over-valued dollar that is stunting
the competitiveness of US goods. As we have repeatedly argued, the trade deficit
will not be manageable until the dollar declines to the point at which US goods
are competitive in international markets.
Furthermore, we have long been concerned with evaluating the supply-side
conditions that foster growth. Yet, Atkinson, in his dismissal of a vast body of
important research that indicates that growth is demand driven, suggests that
we focus on the latter to the exclusion of the former.
This characterization completely ignores our work on alternatives to the inefficient patent system for supporting prescription drug research. In a free
market, drugs are cheap, but as a result of patent protection, the United States
is projected to spend $3.7 trillion over the next decade on drugs. We could save
close to 90 percent of this money ($3.3 trillion) if drugs were sold in a free market. Replacing the research currently supported by patents would cost us
one-fourth this amount, at most.
CEPR has also proposed alternatives to copyright support for recorded
music and videos, software, and even textbooks that could potentially save more
than $100 billion a year.
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POTSHOT AT PROGRESSIVE ECONOMICS MISSES THE MARK
Our proposal for a financial speculation tax could raise close to $150 billion
a year, while making the financial sector more efficient by eliminating tens of
billions in transactions that serve no productive purpose.
We have also proposed expanding trade to subject highly paid professionals,
like doctors, engineers, and lawyers to the same kind of international competition as autoworkers and steelworkers. Patients could save themselves tens of
thousands of dollars by getting major medical procedures in countries with
more efficient health care systems, and the government could save trillions if it
let Medicare beneficiaries buy into the more efficient health-care systems of
countries like Canada and Germany. On this point, however, Atkinson appears
to be an old-fashioned protectionist.
Atkinson presents a misleading picture of the actual ideas being put forth
by progressive economics. Had he taken the time to look at our website, he
would have known that his caricature of progressive economists utterly missed
the mark. /
Dean Baker is codirector of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC.
R O B AT K I N S O N R E P L I E S
In my Breakthrough Journal article, “The Trouble With Progressive Economics,”
I argue that progressive economics is at a crossroads: continue with the same
tired redistributionist policies that attempt to stimulate demand but aren’t really
focused on long-term growth or recognize that growing demand is not equivalent to growth and develop an agenda focused on productivity, innovation, and
competitiveness. In his response, Dean Baker, of the Center for Economic and
Policy Research, claims that I have ignored a robust literature among progressive
economists supporting demand-driven growth. In so doing, Baker demonstrates
the continuing failure of progressive economics to take growth, productivity,
and innovation seriously.
There is indeed a robust literature on demand-driven growth among
progressive and Keynesian economists dating all the way back to Keynes
himself. But it is almost entirely limited to the relationship between demand
and growth during the recovery phase of the business cycle. And it’s true, there
is little debate among most economists that restarting demand (whether via
government or consumer spending) would clearly boost growth when the
economy is producing under capacity, as it is now. But the critical question
that progressive economics largely ignores is: what determines the production
capacity of the economy? Or, in other words, what determines long-term percapita income growth?
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The answer is productivity driven by innovation (i.e., the introduction of
new products and processes). This fact has been well established in the economic
literature for decades and yet, progressive economics still has little to say about
it. Instead, progressive economists mostly dress up redistributionist measures
as growth measures. Lest there be any doubt that this is the case, Baker’s response offers ample evidence.
Baker offers up several examples of what he calls “supply-side” growth policies, but every one of them turns out to be a redistributive strategy, taking
shares from corporations and/or professionals and giving them to consumers
and/or workers. Baker argues, for example, that eliminating patent protection
on drugs would lower the price of drugs for consumers. But doing so would
also greatly reduce reinvestment in life sciences innovation. Likewise, allowing
Medicare to pay less for drugs would produce similar results — a transfer payment policy giving consumers lower prices by reducing revenues to industry
that might be reinvested in R&D. Without reinvestment in innovation, Baker’s
policy suggestions are a prescription for a world of generic drugs that never
change or improve.
Similarly, ending copyright protection would certainly lower costs to consumers. After all, who wouldn’t want to be able to download the latest Hollywood blockbuster or new Windows operating system for free? But again, the
result would be no more blockbusters and Windows 7 would likely continue
to be our default operating system in 2025, just as it is now.
As for Baker’s last example, expanding trade to highly paid professionals is
a transfer policy, much like the patent and copyright protection examples —
workers would pay less for professional services, but professionals would make
less. Although Baker submits that I’m an “old-fashioned protectionist,” in fact,
I’ve done a lot of work focused on reducing the protections accorded to professions, including evaluating why the current ABA rules governing the unauthorized practice of law should be revised to allow consumers more choice in legal
services and pushing for liberalization of the services trade.
While some of the redistribution and fairness policies advocated by organizations like CEPR may have some ancillary innovation and productivity
benefits, some are just as likely to impede innovation and productivity. You can
argue for or against these policies on their merits, but ultimately these policies
do not grow the proverbial pie. What the United States economy needs to
be competitive in the globalized 21st century economy cannot be addressed
through intermittent productivity benefits that accrue as an afterthought of
redistributionist policies, but the reverse: policy that holds innovation and
productivity at its core. /
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T HE NEW INDIA VER SUS T H E
GLOBA L GR EEN BR AH MINS
THE SURPRISING HISTORY OF TREE HUGGING
SIDDHARTHA SHOME
O
n March 26, 1974, a crew of out-of-town loggers arrived near the small
village of Reni in the Uttarakhand Himalayas with plans and a permit to
log the nearby forest. Opposition to increased logging by outsiders had been
growing. But with the men of the village away one day for some government
work, the loggers took advantage of the men’s absence to start cutting down
trees. When word got back to the women of Reni, dozens of them ran to the
forest to confront the loggers.
Shouts filled the air as the women did something that would become a landmark event in the history of environmentalism. Accounts vary as to whether
the women actually hugged the trees, but regardless, they successfully prevented
the loggers from chopping them down.
In the years that followed, the Chipko movement — referring literally to
the Hindi verb “to stick” (as in, to the trees) — would become an international
media sensation. “Tree hugger” entered the lexicon as an all-purpose signifier
for environmental sympathies. Among greens in the West, the Chipko movement became a symbol of poor women standing up for nature, while for many
Indian elites at home, it provoked nostalgia for ancient spiritual customs and
traditional ways of village life that seemed to be fast disappearing in India’s
modernizing cities.
The Chipko story became iconic in rough proportion to the degree to which
it became detached from the actual events that transpired in Uttarakhand. From
the start, Chipko was driven by a desire among villagers for local autonomy
and economic opportunity. Outside efforts to protect the Himalayan forest
would spark a backlash among the very same villagers. The actual history of the
Chipko is the story of rural Indians’ efforts to establish local control of resources,
first by fighting the outside forest contractors who wanted to log their trees,
and then by fighting outside environmentalists who wanted to protect them.
Today the Himalayan region, like the rest of India, has chosen the path of
economic development and modernization. Even so, the idea that the women
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THE NEW INDIA VERSUS THE GLOBAL GREEN BRAHMINS
of Uttarakhand were hugging trees to protect the environment and prevent
economic development, repeated most famously by Vandana Shiva in her international best seller, Staying Alive, captivates the imaginations of Western
environmentalists and urban Indian elites alike. Sitting comfortably at the
intersection of environmental suspicions of modernity and India’s home-grown
ascetic tradition, the Chipko fable has profoundly misinterpreted and distorted
the true meaning of Chipko, and with it, the larger story of modernization
in India.
1.
The notion that poverty ennobles while wealth corrupts has transfixed elites for
centuries. It is repeated by those with wealth and power as both a cautionary
tale about the spiritually corrupting effects of wealth and a way to rationalize
their power in highly unequal societies. In India, this was manifested by the
glorification of asceticism in the traditional Brahminical value system espoused
by high-caste Hindus.
In the early 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi updated this Brahmin asceticism
by advocating an idealized vision of a traditional village-based society with limited needs, limited ambitions, and small-scale subsistence production. “We have
managed with the same kind of plough as existed thousands of years ago,” he
wrote in his 1910 book, Hind Swaraj. “We have retained the same kind of cottages that we had in former times and our indigenous education remains the
same as before.” Economic development, for Gandhi, was no prerequisite for
happiness. “A man is not necessarily happy because he is rich, or unhappy because he is poor,” he wrote. “Millions will always remain poor.” In Hind Swaraj,
Gandhi defended hereditary occupations, and thus, implicitly the caste system.
The Gandhian valorization of poverty and asceticism fit neatly into the
emerging cosmopolitan discourse of “sustainable development” for poor nations. With the rise of environmentalism in the 1970s, many Indian elites
started to justify asceticism and poverty not only as spiritually ennobling, but
as environmentally virtuous as well. “Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj has for me been
the best teaching on real freedom,” wrote Shiva, who trained as a physicist in
Canada. “For Gandhi, slavery and violence were not just a consequence of imperialism: a deeper slavery and violence were intrinsic to industrialism, which
Gandhi called ‘modern civilization.’”
Shiva and other green elites attacked modernization and development in
India as a calamitous foreign imposition on the rural poor by multinational
corporations and the World Bank; some even depicted the traditional (caste)
society as natural. Shiva valorized traditional village life, where women worked
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harder than “men and farm animals” and “invisibly with the earthworm.”
Environmentalists Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha argued that the
caste system was an ecological adaptation to reduce competition for scarce resources. They contended that caste groups in traditional Indian society “might
with profit be compared to biological species,” complete with “characteristic
modes of subsistence,” “distinct habitats,” and “ecological niches.”
But while the new green Brahmins naturalized poverty and invoked the interests of the rural poor as justification for their antimodern ideas, those ideas
never stood a chance in a democratic India. Neither Gandhi’s vision for India
in Hind Swaraj, nor the green Brahminism that developed in the 1970s, had
any significant following among India’s lower castes, who increasingly rejected
the exploitative nature of the traditional socioeconomic system. Even as early
as 1945, Jawaharlal Nehru, who would become India’s first Prime Minister
wrote to Gandhi, “It is many years since I read Hind Swaraj… but even when
I read it twenty or more years ago it seemed to me completely unreal.” Nehru
reminded Gandhi that, “the [Indian National] Congress has never considered
that picture, [portrayed in Hind Swaraj] much less adopted it.” It was the nationalist, nonviolent, and humanist Gandhi that poor Indians admired and
respected, not the Gandhi of asceticism, deprivation, and tradition.
2.
From its earliest moments, the Chipko movement was centrally focused upon
economic demands, access to resources, and control of local forests. For Chandi
Prasad Bhatt, who organized some of the first protests and efforts among local
communities to develop the forests for their own benefit, Chipko meant preserving people’s traditional forest rights, which, in his view, were being threatened
by a distant “bureaucratic set-up.” Although he was inspired by Gandhi’s promotion of economic self-sufficiency, Bhatt was not against development or industrialization as long as it was controlled by local communities.
But outsiders were quick to take up the cause, and they had very different
ideas about what the Chipko movement was about. Sunderlal Bahuguna, a welltraveled regional politician with good English language skills, supported the
Chipko demands and eventually became the charismatic face of the movement
outside the region. Influenced both by Gandhi’s asceticism and by a British environmentalist known as the “Man of the Trees,” Bahuguna presented Chipko
to his growing audience as a deeply conservative movement, interested only in
preserving the ecological balance of the Himalayas and the traditional socioeconomic order of its villages.
Bahuguna took his demands directly to the Central (federal) Government
/93
in New Delhi, correctly betting that his antidevelopment message would appeal
more strongly to distant metropolitan elites than to local government officials.
“Gandhi had foreseen the doomsday as early as 1908, when he wrote Hind
Swaraj,” wrote Bahuguna. “The objective of development is economic growth
or prosperity, but to achieve this temporary economic prosperity we have lost
peace and happiness.” Bahuguna’s message met with applause from his elite audiences, who hailed him as an ecological Gandhi, fighting the evils of modern
technology and commerce.
The rebranding of Chipko as an “environmentalism of the poor” worked
— at least in swaying influential figures. Bahuguna and allies won the support
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and international NGOs and succeeded in
enacting a slew of laws and regulations, all aimed at better conserving the
Himalayan forests. But the logging restrictions sparked a backlash in Uttarakhand. By the late 1980s, regional political groups such as the Uttarakhand
Revolutionary Party and Jungle Kato Andolan (which literally translates as the
“Log the Forest Movement”) began publicly exhorting communities to start
cutting down trees in defiance of what became known as the “Chipko Laws.”
These groups offered to clear cut forest areas on behalf of any community or
village wishing to initiate development projects. In the 2000 book, Of Myths
and Movements, historian Haripriya Rangan quotes former Chipko supporter,
Gayatri Devi:
Now they tell me that because of Chipko the road cannot be built, because everything has become paryavaran [environment].... We cannot
even get wood to build a house.... I plan to contest the panchayat [village
council] elections and become the pradhan [mayor] next year.... My first
fight will be for a road, let the environmentalists do what they will.
When researcher Antje Linkenbach visited Reni in the 1990s, the villagers
accused Bahuguna of misrepresenting the Chipko movement and even complained, perhaps apocryphally, that in some public events Bahuguna had used
another woman to impersonate Gaura Devi, a prominent Chipko activist from
Reni. Asked what they had gained from Chipko, the villagers interpreted the
question in strictly economic, not environmental, terms and replied that they
had not seen any gains at all except that “two boxes came with old clothes” and
some certificates.
But the most dramatic testimony came in a Press Institute of India workshop in which villagers from Reni and a neighboring village, referring to the
establishment of the Nanda Devi Biosphere Reserve in their area, complained
that the conservation laws and federal control had backfired. The local com94/
FA L L 2 0 1 1
SIDDHARTHA SHOME
munities were better at managing the forests than the federal government, they
asserted. “Now there is virtual plunder to supply valuable herbs to the Delhi
cosmetic market,” one man lamented. “So there is no protection in the protected area while the local villagers are denied their basic needs.”
3.
While deep greens romanticize village life and sustainable development NGOs
deliver solar panels, efficient cook stoves, and other “appropriate technologies”
to rural communities, Indian villagers are migrating to cities in massive numbers, drawn by the promise of economic opportunity. The popular mass
movement that would ultimately define Uttarakhand’s future would not be
Chipko, but rather the Uttarakhand statehood movement demanding regional
autonomy and development. In 2000, the new state of Uttarakhand was carved
out of Uttar Pradesh and today its leaders prioritize economic development, industry, and jobs.
Ultimately India’s destiny does not lie in the traditional village-based society
promoted by Mahatma Gandhi in Hind Swaraj, but in an entirely different paradigm envisioned by Babasaheb Ambedkar, the father of India’s democratic
constitution, whose ideas have become increasingly prominent in modern India.
During his life, Ambedkar, who was the leader of the Dalits, formerly known
as the “untouchables,” publicly and emphatically rejected Gandhi’s idealization
of India’s traditional rural order. “The love of the intellectual Indians for the
village community is infinite, if not pathetic,” Ambedkar wrote in 1948, “What
is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness,
and communalism?” He observed, “In Gandhism, the common man has no
hope… The ultimate goal of man’s existence is not reached unless and until he
has fully cultivated his mind.” Ambedkar argued:
Machinery and modern civilization are thus indispensable for emancipating man from leading the life of a brute…. The slogan of a democratic society must be machinery, and more machinery, civilization
and more civilization.
In contrast to the asceticism of Gandhi and the green Brahmins, Ambedkar
saw that liberating India’s lower castes from the exploitation of the caste system
could unleash the energy and creativity that might make India a modern and
prosperous nation. This is in fact what is transpiring across the subcontinent as
India’s enormous population embraces technological transformation, modernization, and urbanization in search of better lives and greater freedom. Rapid
/95
modernization and urbanization bring their own problems and challenges, but
they present far greater opportunities for the poor than traditional technologies
and the traditional village-based socioeconomic order — along with the potential for greatly reduced ecological impacts.
The modernization of India is, like that of the rest of the Global South, inevitable. While India’s ascetic tradition has many admirable aspects, it is also
the cause and effect of a caste system that has left much of its population living
in dire poverty for hundreds of years. Thankfully, modernization and urbanization are now finally breaking that cycle. /
96/
FA L L 2 0 1 1
GA RDENING T HE CLIMATE
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
T
he growing sense that we will not be moving away from fossil energy any
time soon has motivated a search for other ways to cool the planet. The
most-discussed proposal is to blow sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere, like volcanoes occasionally do. But doing so risks myriad downsides, including ozone
depletion and crop failure. Another way to cool the planet is to remove carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide can be captured inside of coal
plants or from the ambient air, but doing so is expensive, and significant innovation is required to make it much cheaper.
/97
GARDENING THE CLIMATE
There may be a better way: tree planting. But to make any serious dent in
carbon pollution, the scale must be much larger than a neighborhood or even
city-wide tree-planting effort. It must be Outback-sized. And trees are most effective, and economically and ecologically disruptive when they are planted on
land that is mostly barren.
Today, humans have the technology necessary to create continent-sized
forests. Water from the oceans could be desalinated to grow trees in the desert.
Research by cell biologist Len Ornstein suggests that if the Outback and the
Sahara were forested, together they would absorb nearly all the carbon currently
emitted every year from the burning of fossil fuels and forests.
Over time, the forests would generate rain, sun-reflecting clouds, and much
of their own water. They could cool some areas by as much as eight degrees
Celsius. And the nations that host these new forests could sustainably harvest
the wood to fuel wood-burning power plants.
With today’s technologies, Ornstein writes, such an effort would cost more
than capturing carbon from coal plants, but it would become much cheaper as
desalination technologies improve and the value of harvested wood is taken into
account. If the desalination is powered by next-generation nuclear, solar, wind,
and coal plants that capture their emissions, the project could also accelerate
energy innovation.
Such an endeavor would, of course, involve risks. More moisture could
bring more locusts to the Sahara, as wet years do, or stop nutrient-rich topsoil
from blowing into the Atlantic and feeding sea life. And the enormous
construction projects that would be required bring the risk of all kinds of
mismanagement.
Whether or not mega-afforestation ever comes to pass, let it serve as an inspiration to a thought: sometimes small isn’t beautiful. Over the next 100 years,
there will be roughly ten billion humans on Earth trying to live modern lives
and consuming large quantities of energy and water. For their world to be
ecologically viable and aesthetically pleasing, we'll need powerful tools to garden
it well. /
98/
FA L L 2 0 1 1

Issue 2 - The Breakthrough Institute

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