EEOC Rules that Sexual Orientation

Transcription

LAW NOTES
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September 2015
ALREADY
COVERED
EEOC Rules that Sexual Orientation Discrimination is
Necessarily Sex Discrimination Under Title VII as Democrats
Introduce a Bill to Make that Interpretation Explicit
© 2015 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes & the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes Podcast are Publications of the LeGaL Foundation.
LAW NOTES
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
344 EEOC Says Title VII Bans Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Employment
346 Democrats Introduce “Equality Act” in Congress
347 European Court of Human Rights Rules European
Convention for Protection of Human Rights Requires
Italy to Enact Either Civil Union or Marriage Law for
Same-Sex Couples
348 California Agrees to Pay for One Transgender
Prisoner’s Sex Reassignment Surgery and Paroles
Another to Avoid Ninth Circuit Ruling
349 6th Circuit Holds That Obergefell Decision Is
Irrelevant to Sexual Orientation Equal Protection
Claim
350 Divided New York Appellate Division Court Finds
Giuliani-Era Adult Business Zoning Restrictions Are
Unconstitutional
351 Houston Equal Rights Amendment Will Be on
November 2015 Ballot
352 8th Circuit Rules on Pending State Marriage Equality
Appeals
353 2nd Circuit Expands Liability for Sexual Harassment
by Prison Guards
354 Federal Court Rejects Recalcitrant Kentucky County
Clerk’s Free Exercise Claim; 6th Circuit and Supreme
Court Refuse to Stay District Court Order
358 LGBT Legal Organizations Call for Decriminalization
of Sex Work as Federal Government Initiates
Prosecution of Rentboy.com’s Owner and
Employees
360 Maryland Intermediate Appellate Court Finds State
Precedent Precludes Applying “Best Interest of the
Child” Standard to Visitation Dispute of Divorcing
Lesbian Couple When Child Was Born Before They
Married
362 Federal Court Upholds $100,000 Jury Award to
Lesbian Plaintiff against United Parcel Service
365 Colorado Appeals Court Rules against Wedding
Cake Baker in Discrimination Case
367 Illinois Enacts Ban on Conversion Therapy for Minors
368 Utah Federal Court Requires Gender-Neutral
Interpretation of Donor Insemination Statute
369 Nebraska Court Holds Anti-Gay Adoption/Foster
Licensing Policy Violates 14th Amendment
371 Georgia Federal Court Parses Discovery Requests in
Transgender “Protection from Harm” Case
372 Italian Supreme Court Finds Sex Reassignment
Surgery Not Always Prerequisite for Legal Gender
Reassignment
373 Notes
425 Citations
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Editor-In-Chief
Prof. Arthur S. Leonard
New York Law School
185 West Broadway
New York, NY 10013
(212) 431-2156
asleonard@aol.com
arthur.leonard@nyls.edu
Contributors
Bryan Johnson, Esq.
William J. Rold, Esq.
Anthony Sears, NYLS ‘16
Matthew Skinner, Esq.
Matteo Winkler, Esq.
Production Manager
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© 2015
The LeGaL Foundation
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ISSN
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EEOC Says Title VII Bans Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in Employment
T
he Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal
agency that enforces Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, issued
a decision on July 15 holding for
the first time that Title VII’s ban on
employment discrimination because
of sex includes discrimination against
somebody because they are gay,
lesbian, or bisexual. This marks a
complete turnaround by the EEOC
from the position taken by the agency
throughout all of its 50-year history.
The Commission, acting in its
appellate capacity, overruled a 2013
agency decision that had rejected a
discrimination claim by a man who
had been denied a permanent Front
but decided that the Equal Pay Act
passed in 1963, which prohibited
compensating men and women at
different rates for the same work,
was sufficient, and proponents of
the bill feared that adding a general
prohibition on sex discrimination in
employment would endanger the bill’s
passage. Nonetheless, on the floor of
the House, Rep. Howard Smith (Dem.)
of Virginia, a long-time proponent
of equal legal rights for women,
introduced an amendment to add
sex, which was passed by an unlikely
alliance of pro-feminist liberals and
southern conservatives, some of whom
likely supported the amendment
hoping that this would make the final
really illuminating, apart from a floor
amendment attempting to reconcile
the bill with the Equal Pay Act, the
meaning of which wasn’t settled until
a Supreme Court ruling several years
later.
Consequently, the “legislative history”
provides no direct help in figuring out
what kind of discrimination Congress
intended to ban when it voted to add
“sex” to the list of prohibited grounds
of employment discrimination. Without
such guidance, the EEOC and the
courts were left to their own devices
in trying to figure out what this meant,
and the conclusion they reached early
in the history of Title VII was that it
was intended to prohibit discrimination
This marks a complete turnaround by the EEOC from the position taken
by the agency throughout all of its 50-year history.
Line Manager position by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Baldwin
v. Foxx (Anthony Foxx, Secretary,
Department of Transportation), Appeal
No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
(EEOC, July 15, 2015).
The EEOC went into business in
July 1965 when Title VII took effect.
That statute was the result of prolonged
struggle in Congress, including a
lengthy filibuster in the Senate led
by southern conservative Democrats
opposed to racial integration of the
workplace. Almost all of the attention
around Title VII focused on the
proposal for a federal ban on race
discrimination in employment. The bill
originally introduced in the House of
Representatives was limited to race or
color, religion, and national origin as
prohibited grounds of discrimination.
The relevant House committees did
study sex discrimination issues,
bill more difficult to pass. Because
“sex” was added as a floor amendment,
the committee reports on the bill do
not discuss its meaning, and Smith’s
amendment did not add any definition
of sex to the definitional section of
the bill, merely adding the word “sex”
to the list of prohibited grounds of
discrimination.
After the bill passed the House
it went to the Senate under a deal
worked out by the leadership to bypass the committee process, in order
to prevent it from being bottled up in
committee by the conservative southern
Democratic chair of the Judiciary
Committee, Senator Eastland, who
was a staunch opponent measure.
Instead it went directly to the Senate
floor under a procedure that allowed
little opportunity for amendments.
There was some brief discussion
about the inclusion of sex but nothing
against women because they were
women or against men because they
were men. As such, both the EEOC
and many courts ruled after the Act
went into effect that it did not apply to
discrimination because of a person’s
sexual orientation or gender identity,
both concepts that were largely missing
from American jurisprudence during
the 1960s. One commonsense reason
usually raised by courts in rejecting
such discrimination claims was that
if Congress had intended to ban these
forms of discrimination, there surely
would have been some mention during
the debates over the bill. They have
also pointed to the fact that bills to add
sexual orientation and gender identity
to Title VII or to enact a free-standing
law addressing such discrimination
have been frequently introduced in
Congress since the early 1970s, but no
such measure has ever been enacted.
September 2015 Lesbian / Gay Law Notes 344
Some courts have construed this
history to reflect Congress’s view that
Title VII does not already ban such
discrimination and should not ban it.
A Supreme Court decision from
1989, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, initiated a changing
landscape for sexuality issues under
Title VII. Ann Hopkins, rejected for
a partnership at Price Waterhouse,
won a ruling from the Supreme Court
that sex stereotypes held by some of
the partners who voted against her
application violated her rights under
Title VII. Writing for a plurality of the
Court, Justice William J. Brennan said
that Title VII applied to discrimination
because of gender, not just biological
sex. Later courts seized upon this
to justify taking a broader view of
sex discrimination under Title VII.
brought against federal agencies, where
the Commission plays an important
appellate role reviewing rulings by
federal agencies on internal employment
grievances. In 2012, the EEOC ruled in
a case against the Justice Department
that a transgender woman who was
denied a position because of her gender
identity had a valid claim under Title
VII. Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, 2012 WL
1435995 (April 20, 2012). This ruling
echoed many then-recent federal court
decisions, including some by courts of
appeals, finding that discrimination
because of gender identity almost
always involves sex stereotyping by
the discriminating employer. Late last
year, the agency, and then the Justice
Department, concluded that all gender
identity discrimination claims could be
investigated and prosecuted under Title
“Indeed, we conclude that sexual orientation is
inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an
allegation of discrimination based on sexual
orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII.”
By early in this century, there was a
growing body of federal court rulings
suggesting that LGBT people might
be protected to some extent under
Title VII, depending on the nature of
their case. If the discrimination they
suffered could be described in terms
of sex stereotypes, or if they could
show that they had been the victim
of sexual harassment that turned in
some way on their gender, they might
be able to maintain a legal claim of
discrimination.
Within the past few years, the EEOC
has taken a leading role in making
these developments more concrete,
first by its treatment of discrimination
claims within the internal investigative
process, and then through its decisionmaking on discrimination claims
VII. Pushing that position forward,
the Justice Department has filed suit
on behalf of the EEOC, or joined
ongoing private cases in federal court,
seeking to move the courts beyond
the stereotyping theory to accept that
gender identity discrimination is sex
discrimination.
The July 15 ruling by the EEOC seeks
to achieve the same thing for lesbians,
gay men and bisexuals confronting
employment discrimination. While
acknowledging the significance of the
Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse
decision and sex stereotyping theory
in widening the agency’s appreciation
of the scope of sex discrimination, this
ruling takes things a step further. “In the
case before us,” wrote the Commission,
“we conclude that Complainant’s claim
345 Lesbian / Gay Law Notes September 2015
of sexual orientation discrimination
alleges that the Agency relied on sexbased considerations and took his
sex into account in its employment
decision regarding the permanent
FLM position. The Complainant,
therefore, has stated a claim of sex
discrimination. Indeed, we conclude
that sexual orientation is inherently
a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an
allegation of discrimination based
on sexual orientation is necessarily
an allegation of sex discrimination
under Title VII. A complainant
alleging that an agency took his or her
sexual orientation into account in an
employment action necessarily alleges
that the agency took his or her sex into
account.”
The Commission amplified this
conclusion with an extended discussion,
grounding its conclusion in rulings by
several federal courts and pointing
especially to the well-established
principle that discriminating against
somebody because of the race of their
sexual partner has long been deemed
by the Commission and the courts
to be race discrimination. Logically,
then, discriminating against somebody
because of the sex of their sexual
partners would be sex discrimination.
The Commission also referenced the
recent marriage equality litigation,
noting the Supreme Court’s statement
in Obergefell v. Hodges that laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage “abridge
central precepts of equality.” Of course,
the Commission also explained that
recent court rulings have made clear
that stereotyped thinking about proper
gender roles, as well as behavior,
underlies much sexual orientation
discrimination, thus providing a firm
theoretical justification in the Supreme
Court’s Price Waterhouse case.
What is the significance of this
EEOC ruling? It is likely to result
in the agency initiating federal
court litigation, enlisting the Justice
Department, to push this interpretation
of Title VII into the courts. Although
federal courts are not bound by an
administrative agency’s interpretation
of its governing statute, the Supreme
Court has frequently deferred to agency
interpretations when they are seen as
consistent with the statutory language
and overall congressional purpose and
constitute a reasonable interpretation
of the statute. Here is where the
EEOC’s past rulings may result in less
deference than courts otherwise might
give. When an agency “changes its
mind” about an issue, courts may be
skeptical about whether the new ruling
is more political than legalistic. So it
may be premature to assume that this
ruling by the EEOC means that there
is no need to enact explicit federal
protection through a vehicle such as
the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA), which has been pending
in one form or another in Congress
since 1993, or the new Equality Act
(see below) introduced this summer.
Since there is little likelihood that
the current Congress will pass the
Equality Act, it will be useful for the
federal government’s primary civil
rights enforcement agency, the EEOC,
to be on record that sexual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination
that violates Title VII. EEOC’s view
may be influential with the agencies
that enforce the Fair Housing Act
and the other titles of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and its analysis may prove
persuasive to the courts, regardless of
the level of deference it receives.
The vote on this decision is not
indicated in the opinion (which was
drafted by the Commission’s staff), but
was reported in the press as a partyline vote of 3-2. Under the statute, the
five-member Commission may not
have more than three commissioners
who are members of the same
political party. The two Republicans
on the Commission voted against this
decision, but did not issue a written
dissent. A prime mover behind
the EEOC’s expanded view of sex
discrimination to encompass gender
identity and sexual orientation claims
has been Commissioner Chai Feldblum,
the first openly lesbian or gay member
of the Commission, who was appointed
and reappointed by President Obama
and confirmed by the Senate. ■
Democrats Introduce “Equality Act”
in Congress
O
n July 23, a group of almost
200
Democratic
members
of Congress introduced The
Equality Act in the House and Senate.
The lead sponsor in the House is Rep.
David Cicilline of Rhode Island. The
lead sponsor in the Senate is Senator
Jeff Merkley of Oregon. The bill
was introduced with 155 House cosponsors and 40 Senate co-sponsors, all
Democrats. Although they were invited
to do so, no Republican members of
either chamber agreed to co-sponsor the
bill prior to its introduction, even though
several Republicans in both houses have
voted for or co-sponsored at various
times the predecessor Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA), which has
been introduced in some form in every
session of Congress since the mid1990s. Abandoning the methodology
of ENDA, the Equality Act takes the
approach of amending various federal
civil rights statutes to add “sexual
orientation” and “gender identity” to the
existing lists of forbidden grounds of
discrimination. The measure is formally
identified as H.R. 3185 and S. 1858 in
the 114th Congress.
Among the statutes to be amended
are the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the
Government Accountability Act of
1995, the Fair Housing Act, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, and a statute
governing non-discrimination in jury
service.
Notably, the bill does not propose
to add “sexual orientation” or “gender
identity” to the list of grounds on
which discrimination is permissible as
a bona fide occupational qualification;
the proponents of the measure thereby
take the position that sexual orientation
and gender identity, like race or color,
cannot be legitimate grounds for
employment discrimination under any
circumstances.
Unlike ENDA, which focused
narrowly on intentional employment
discrimination, the Equality Act
will apply broadly to the areas of
public accommodations, access to
public facilities and public education,
employment (including government
employment), credit, and jury service.
The bill specifically provides that the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 “shall not provide a claim,
or a defense to a claim under, a covered
title, or provide a basis for challenging
the application of enforcement of a
covered title.” Thus, businesses and
employers subject to the statutes
amended by the Equality Act will not
enjoy religious exemptions any broader
than those already contained in those
statutes (together, of course, with the
ministerial exemption read into Title VII
by the Supreme Court as an application
of the 1st Amendment Free Exercise
Clause). Also unlike ENDA, the bill
does not eschew “disparate impact”
claims; wherever such claims could be
made under existing federal civil rights
laws, they could be made on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.
This is particular significant in that the
Supreme Court ruled for the first time
this past term that disparate impact
claims can be brought under the Fair
Housing Act, endorsing a position taken
by most of the federal circuit courts of
appeals.
The lack of Republican sponsors, at
a time when the Republicans control
the agenda in both houses of Congress,
suggests that the bill is going nowhere
in this session. However, introduction
of the measure is a first step towards
building support, in the hope that the
measure might pass in a future session.
It gives groups evaluating congressional
candidates an item to include on any
scorecard purporting to measure
support for LGBT rights, and can also
be used to pin down the positions of
presidential candidates.
The bill includes a lengthy section
of Congressional findings in an attempt
to counter any concerns about the
legislature’s jurisdiction to enact the
bill under the Commerce Clause and
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment.
BloombergBNA Daily Labor Report,
141 DLR A-14 (July 23, 2015). ■
European Court of Human Rights Rules European Convention
for Protection of Human Rights Requires Italy to Enact
Either Civil Union or Marriage Law for Same-Sex Couples
A
seven-judge chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”) has ruled that Italy’s
failure to adopt a same-sex marriage
or civil union law similar to those in
other European countries violates the
European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, in Oliari and Others v.
Italy, Applications Nos. 18766/11 and
36030/11 (July 21, 2015). While all seven
judges found Italy had violated Article
8 of the Convention, the panel was split
4-3 as to the basis of the violation.
Three same-sex couples had sought
of others.” Article 12 relates to the right
to marry, and Article 14 sets forth a nondiscrimination provision.
Neither the majority nor the
concurring judges went as far as to rule
or suggest that they were ready to hold
that Article 12 requires all member
states to establish a legal framework
of same-sex marriage or civil unions.
The majority of the panel noted that
it previously had ruled that there was
no right under Article 12 for same-sex
marriage, when the court found the
Article was not violated by Austria
because it had established a civil-union
“[T]he Court finds that the Italian Government
have overstepped their margin of appreciation
and failed to fulfill their positive obligation to
ensure that the applicants have available a specific
legal framework providing for the recognition
and protection of their same-sex unions.”
to marry in Italy and were rejected
by the civil authorities. All three
couples took legal recourse through
the legal framework in Italy, but were
unsuccessful. The couples filed actions
with the ECHR, arguing that Italy’s
refusal to allow them to marry violated
Articles 8, 12, and 14 of the Convention.
Article 8 states: “Everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence,”
and “There shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of
this right except as such is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health and morals or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms
law with rights similar to marriage. The
panel noted, however, that Greece had
run afoul of the Convention when it
created a civil-union law that excluded
same-sex couples. The majority set forth
the present state of the law in Europe:
24 out of 47 Convention countries had
some form of same-sex marriage, civil
unions, or both. The panel summarized
the last decade’s legal developments
world-wide with respect to same-sex
marriage, explaining the reasoning
behind major decisions, and stated
that the Court already had ruled that
“same-sex couples are just as capable
as different-sex couples of entering into
stable, committed relationships, and that
they are in a relatively similar situation
to a different-sex couple as regards their
need for legal recognition and protection
of their relationship.”
After disposing of several procedural
issues and ruling that the three couples
constituted “victims” with standing to
bring the action, the majority examined
whether implementing a same-sex
marriage or civil union law would
amount to a burden to the Government
of Italy. The court stated that Italy had
“failed to explicitly highlight what, in
their view, corresponded to the interests
of the community as a whole,” noting that
there were approximately one million
homosexuals and bisexuals in central
Italy alone and citing to various public
opinion polls showing that a majority
of the Italian people felt that same-sex
couples should have their relationships
legally recognized in some way.
The Court concluded that “in the
absence of a prevailing community
interest being put forward by the Italian
Government, against which to balance
the applicants’ momentous interests
as identified above, and in the light of
the domestic courts’ conclusion on the
matter which remain unheeded, the
Court finds that the Italian Government
have overstepped their margin of
appreciation and failed to fulfill their
positive obligation to ensure that the
applicants have available a specific legal
framework providing for the recognition
and protection of their same-sex unions.”
In a concurring opinion, three judges
presented an alternate theory for finding
Article 8 of the Convention had been
violated. The concurrence noted that
Italy’s constitutional court had already
ruled that the Convention required
Italy to enact a same-sex marriage or
civil union law; however, the Italian
legislature had failed to enact such a law.
The concurrence found that Italy’s failure
to comply with its own constitutional
ruling was sufficient on its own to find
that Article 8 had been violated and the
concurring judges would have found for
plaintiffs on this legal reasoning instead.
Having found there to be a Convention
violation, the majority awarded damages
and some legal costs to the three samesex couples. – Bryan C. Johnson
California Agrees to Pay for One Transgender Prisoner’s Sex
Reassignment Surgery and Paroles Another to Avoid Ninth
Circuit Ruling
O
ver the last two years Law
Notes has followed two cases
of
California
transgender
prisoners seeking sex reassignment
surgery [SRS]. Both are before United
States District Judge Jon S. Tigar.
An order for sex reassignment
surgery
for
Michelle-Lael
B.
Norsworthy, in Norsworthy v. Beard,
2015 WL 1500971 (N.D. Cal., April
2, 2015), is reported in Law Notes
(May 2015, pages 199-200). California
Attorney General Kamala D. Harris
appealed that ruling and obtained a
stay pending decision of the appeal.
The day before oral argument was to
take place, according to the Associated
Press, California Governor Jerry Brown
approved Norsworthy’s parole. The
state promptly moved to dismiss the
case as moot.
At the same time, California
officials announced a settlement in the
second case, Quine v. Beard, C 1402726 JST, early stages reported in
Law Notes (October 2014, page 438),
which Judge Tigar had set for trial in
January 2016. The settlement required
California as “promptly as possible”
to refer Shiloh Heavenly Quine to an
“agreed upon” genital sex-reassignment
surgical practice, to negotiate a
contract, and to pay for such surgery.
The settlement acknowledged that such
services were “medically necessary”
and that “no medical or mental health
clinician has indicated otherwise.” The
settlement attaches expert reports from
psychologists Randi Ettner (for Quine)
and Richard A. Carroll (for the state)
that document the necessity and serve
as useful references for future litigants.
Quine is serving life without parole, and
the settlement requires moving her to a
female facility after SRS and allowing
her access to property items (consistent
with security) that are designated “as
available to females only.”
Neither case was a class action.
However, according to the Los Angeles
Times (August 10, 2015), there are
nearly 400 transgender inmates in the
California penal system who may be
affected by this settlement. The Quine
settlement has a bit of systemic relief in
one section: California agrees to “review
and revise” its policies about inmate
property for transgender inmates that
was previously designated for one gender
only and to permit Quine’s comments
before finalization. The settlement also
notes that California “is reviewing
and revising its policies concerning
medically necessary treatment for
gender dysphoria, including surgery.”
rights. The federal government has also
overruled its prior National Coverage
Determination
prohibiting
SRS
coverage under Medicare. See Decision
2576 (May 30, 2014) of the Department
Appeals Board, Docket No. A-13-87,
of U. S. Department of Health and
Human Services. According to Lambda
Legal’s Impact (Summer 2015, page 11),
Medicaid now covers transgender health
care services in eight jurisdictions:
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New
York,
Oregon,
Vermont,
Washington (partial coverage), and the
District of Columbia. Prisoner litigants
It appears for now that California has averted a
Ninth Circuit merits decision on prisoner access
to SRS.
Judge Tigar is retaining jurisdiction.
It appears for now that California has
averted a Ninth Circuit merits decision
on prisoner access to SRS. This avoids
the potential of a Ninth Circuit clash
with the First Circuit decision denying
SRS to for a transgender inmate in
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.
2014), reported in Law Notes (January
2015, pages 3-4), and the prospect that
the Supreme Court will address the
issue in the near future. The Ninth
Circuit has perhaps tipped its hand in
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 2015 WL 3916977
(9th Cir. June 26, 2015), reported in
Law Notes (Summer 2015, page 288),
when it summarily reversed a screening
dismissal of a transgender prisoner’s
claim for “medically necessary
treatment.”
While
these
two
California
actions can be viewed cynically,
they represent progress in the slow
advance of transgender prisoners’
can use these developments positively
(particularly the Quine settlement) as
evidence of the “evolving” standards
the courts often apply in Eighth
Amendment
jurisprudence.
See
coverage of Crawford v. Cuomo, 2015
WL 4728170 (2d Cir., August 11, 2015),
below in this issue of Law Notes.
Plaintiffs Norsworthy and Quine
were represented by attorneys from
Morgan Lewis & Bockius, San
Francisco; and the Transgender
Law Center, Oakland. A copy of the
settlement in Quine is available on-line
at transgenderlawcenter.org. – William
J. Rold
William J. Rold is a civil rights
attorney in New York City and
a former judge. He previously
represented the American Bar
Association on the National
Commission for Correctional Health
Care.
6th Circuit Holds That Obergefell Decision Is Irrelevant
to Sexual Orientation Equal Protection Claim
A
panel of the U.S. 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled on
August 3 in Ondo v. City of
Cleveland, 2015 WL 4604860, that
the Supreme Court’s recent marriage
equality decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), is irrelevant
to an equal protection claim asserted
against Cleveland, Ohio, police officers
regarding the manner in which they
arrested two gay men on April 8,
2011. Referring to the “law-of-thecircuit” doctrine, Circuit Judge Alice
M. Batchelder relied on pre-Obergefell
6th Circuit precedents to apply the
“rational basis” test and find that even
if plaintiffs’ counsel had not waived
their equal protection claim, the police
had a rational basis for refusing to let
them wear pants for the ride to the
police station and the booking process.
One member of the panel, Circuit Judge
Jeffrey Sutton, dissented from this part
of the ruling, but not on the merits.
Sutton found that the court should have
ruled that the equal protection issue was
waived by plaintiff’s counsel at oral
argument and thus should not have been
addressed by the court.
Steven Ondo and Jonathan Simcox,
roommates, were returning home
after several hours of drinking at
2:00 AM on April 2, 2011. They “got
into a heated argument outside their
apartment building.” A neighbor came
out to confront them about the noise,
and Simcox told him to “fuck off.” “An
altercation ensued between the three
men,” wrote Judge Batchelder, “during
which the neighbor identified himself
as an off-duty police officer.” Evidently
the neighbor called the precinct,
because later that night the police
came and arrested the plaintiffs in their
apartment, resulting in them spending
two nights in jail. The police followed
up on the altercation with the off-duty
officer, getting arrest warrants against
Ondo and Simcox for “felonious assault
on a police officer,” and a SWAT team
showed up at their apartment building
at 7:00 AM on April 8 to execute the
warrant. Ondo and Simcox were not
dressed at the time, wearing only boxer
shorts. They allege that the police used
homophobic slurs and when they asked
to be allowed to put on pants, the officers
said “faggots don’t wear pants in jail.”
Further, they claimed that one officer
said “It’s a house full of fags here.”
They also allege that they were dragged
down to the police station in their
underwear and not given jumpsuits to
wear until well after they were booked,
an allegation that the trial judge found
to be contradicted by other evidence.
They filed their 42 USC 1983
civil rights lawsuit against the City
of Cleveland and 17 police officers in
January 2012, but their complaint was
deficient in specific factual allegations
against specific officers and even an
amended complaint fell short on this.
The City got several of the defendants
dismissed from the case so that it was
narrowed down to the SWAT team
members, and then moved for summary
judgment. Responding to the s.j.
motion, the plaintiffs alleged further
facts trying to bolster their case in
affidavits which made the allegations
based on “personal knowledge and
belief,” without specifying which facts
were based on “personal knowledge”
and which facts were based on “belief.”
The City moved to strike the affidavits
and the court granted the motion, on
the ground that only factual assertions
based on personal knowledge were
sufficient to ground the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim against specific police
officers. Then the court granted the
City’s summary judgment motion.
A major part of the 6th Circuit’s
opinion was devoted to explaining why
the trial court was correct to strike the
affidavits, and to examining the City’s
further argument that plaintiffs had
abandoned many of their claims at oral
argument. Ultimately, in the view of the
majority of the panel, plaintiffs’ counsel
had conceded at argument that if the
Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge’s
decision to strike the affidavits, the case
was basically over, but, wrote Judge
Batchelder, “Regardless of our stance
on abandonment, on the remaining
record the equal protection claim fails
as a matter of law,” and this is where
the court found that Obergefell made
no difference to the analysis. Plaintiffs’
counsel had stated at argument that the
entire equal protection claim boiled
down to the contention that the police
refused to let the men wear pants over
their boxer shorts because they were gay,
and this constituted unconstitutional
unequal treatment. There was also
a state law allegation of infliction of
emotional distress.
Plaintiffs argued that “state actions
involving homosexuals should trigger
some form of heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.” Wrote
Judge Batchelder, “First, Plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate that the state action
of which they complain burdens a
fundamental right. When the Supreme
Court held that state laws against
sodomy violate the Due Process Clause,
it did so using the language of rationalbasis review, rather than any form of
heightened scrutiny,” citing Lawrence
v. Texas. “The Court did not hold that
the Constitution includes a fundamental
right to homosexual conduct. Whether
the Court’s recent decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges recasts engaging in
homosexual acts as a fundamental right
is irrelevant, because the decision by
the police relevant here does not impair
Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in such
conduct. Nor can Plaintiffs establish
that homosexuals are a suspect or quasisuspect class. The Court has never held
that homosexuals satisfy the criteria
for such classification.” The court cited
two cases for this assertion, neither of
which deals with sexual orientation
claims. “The Supreme Court has not
recognized any new constitutionally
protected classes in over four decades,”
she continued, “and instead has
repeatedly declined to do so. Moreover,
the Court has never defined a suspect
or quasi-suspect class on anything
other than a trait that is definitively
ascertainable at the moment of birth,
such as race or biological gender. In
Obergefell, the Court was explicitly
asked by the petitioners and various
amici to declare that homosexuals are
a specially protected class, and thus
that government actions that disfavor
homosexuals are subject to heightened
scrutiny. But the Court held only
that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated because the challenged statutes
interfered with the fundamental right
to marry, not that homosexuals enjoy
special protections under the Equal
Protection Clause.”
Since the 6th Circuit has, in
its pre-Obergefell rulings, always
applied rational basis review to sexual
orientation discrimination claims, the
court decided that under the “law of the
circuit” doctrine, it must do so in this
case. Applying that approach here, the
court found that the police had provided
an adequate basis for their decision
to arrest the men and take them to
the police station in their underwear
— concern for the officers’ safety, as
the two men were agitated and were
being arrested for assaulting a police
officer — which, said the court, “is
presumed valid and rationally related to
a legitimate public interest. Therefore,”
wrote Batchelder, “Plaintiffs’ grievance
regarding being kept in their boxer
shorts until the police could issue them
jumpsuits, even if motivated in part
by sentiments regarding homosexual
behavior, still does not violate the
Constitution.”
Judge Sutton, concurring in the
court’s decision to affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment,
wrote that it was unnecessary to take
on the equal protection issue, as the
plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument had
waived the claim by conceding that if
the decision to strike the affidavits was
upheld the constitutional claim would
have to be dismissed. Judge Sutton,
of course, was the author of the 6th
Circuit’s opinion that was reversed by
the Supreme Court in Obergefell v.
Hodges. In that opinion, he had found
that the plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim was not subject to heightened
scrutiny, for essentially the same reasons
that Judge Batchelder articulated in the
panel opinion in this case.
Plaintiffs were represented by Sara
Gedeon on the appeal. ■
Divided New York Appellate Division
Court Finds Giuliani-Era Adult
Business Zoning Restrictions Are
Unconstitutional
I
n Dickensian litigation that has
persisted beyond the lifetimes of
both the trial court judge and one of
the original attorneys representing a
coalition of video stores, bookshops, and
topless dancing clubs, the Manhattanbased intermediate Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court, First Judicial
Department, affirmed that the 2001
municipal zoning amendments targeting
“60/40” adult establishments offended
the First Amendment. For The People
Theaters of N.Y. Inc. v. City of New York,
2015 WL 4429048, 2015 N.Y. App. Div.
LEXIS 6068 (N.Y. App. Div. July 21,
2015). Justice Barbara Kapnick wrote for
the majority, joined by Justices Angela
Mazzarelli and Paul Feinman; Justice
Richard Andrias penned the dissent,
joined by Justice Leland DeGrasse.
As part of former New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s efforts to
clean up the city when he took office,
the City Council in 1995 passed a
zoning resolution that banned adult
establishments from operating in
certain areas, including residential
neighborhoods, and within 500 feet of
another sex-related business, a school, or
a house of worship.
From the beginning of the litigation
that soon ensued thereafter, the city
has relied on a 1994 Department of
City Planning study identifying the
negative secondary effects of adult
establishments on the nearby quality
of life, including a downward pressure
on property values and an increased
crime rate in areas where the businesses
are most concentrated. This original
zoning resolution survived constitutional
freedom of expression challenges that
went all the way to the state’s highest
court and the Second Circuit in 1998.
See Stringfellow’s of New York, Ltd. v.
City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (N.Y.
1998); Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140
F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 816 (1998).
That legal resolution proved shortlived as new tensions arose over which
businesses were covered by the vague
wording of the zoning resolution. The
city eventually said a “substantial
portion” meant a business qualified
as “adult” if at least 40 percent of the
accessible floor space or stock was meant
for adult purposes. It then began bringing
nuisance proceedings against the new
mixed-use enterprises that emerged,
claiming they were following the 60/40
formula as a sham. The City Council
eventually passed amendments in 2001
to address the establishments that were
superficially complying with the 60/40
formula. These amendments removed
the originally ambiguous “substantial
portion” flag from the adult eating and
drinking establishment definition, and
brought tougher restrictions on all of
them.
After the City Council passed the
amendments, a variety of adult movie
theaters, video stores, and cabarets filed
suit in 2002 seeking to enjoin the 2001
amendments as facially unconstitutional,
and the actions were later consolidated.
The plaintiffs argued the city was
improperly relying on the 1994 study and
its conclusions about adverse effects in
the 2001 amendments. They contended
the city was impermissibly changing
the rules for businesses engaging in
constitutionally protected activities,
despite the fact that 60/40 establishments
were different from their predecessors
that solely offered adult entertainment.
The case has gone up and down the
New York State court system several
times in the last 13 years, with both sides
notching wins along the way. In the last
round, a trial court judge found the 2001
amendments facially unconstitutional in
2012 and permanently enjoined them.
On the case’s third trip to the First
Department, Justice Kapnick stresses
that the city failed to show the adult
businesses retained a “predominant
sexual focus.” First Amendment
aficionados will be disappointed by the
analysis in Kapnick’s opinion, which
does not include much familiar free
speech doctrine, but instead focuses
on a series of four factors identified
previously in an earlier round of the
litigation for the city to meet its burden of
proof: 1) if the signage of the businesses
strongly advertised adult content; 2) if
the establishments maintain a significant
emphasis on adult materials or activities;
3) if minors were allowed into the stores;
and 4) if the layouts made it difficult to
access non-adult material.
Kapnick recounts separately the
evidence presented at trial for adult
bookstores and video stores and adult
eating and drinking establishments,
but reaches the same result for both
categories because only one factor, a
predominant focus on sexual materials
or activities, tips in the city’s favor for
each. For example, she notes that “[t]
he city assumes that because the 60/40
clubs regularly feature topless dancing,
this automatically means that they retain
a predominant sexual focus. However,
there is nothing in the prior related
decisions that mandates that conclusion.”
In dissent, Justice Andrias says the
majority used an insufficient “mechanical
and mathematical approach, under which
the predominant sexual focus in the 60/40
businesses’ activities is quantitatively
outweighed by signage, policies towards
minors, and layouts.” He concludes that
the “record fairly supports the City’s
contention that the adult establishments
reviewed emphasized sexual activities
or materials over non-adult materials.”
With that understanding of the evidence,
he would find the 2001 amendments
constitutional in all respects.
In a footnote, Justice Kapnick
responds to Justice Andrias’s critique by
saying, “in fact, what we have attempted
to do, is separately and fully analyze
each of the characteristics that this
Court suggested should be considered in
making this determination.”
The 3-2 split of the Appellate
Division creates an appeal as of the right
to the state’s highest court, the Court of
Appeals, if the city wishes to continue
fighting for the zoning regulations. It
would seem Mayor Bill de Blasio might
be inclined; he has, in a similar vein,
recently decried the topless female
panhandlers known to approach tourists
in Times Square. – Matthew Skinner
Matthew Skinner is the Executive
Director of LeGaL.
Houston Equal Rights Amendment
Will Be on November 2015 Ballot
H
ouston citizens opposed to the
city’s Equal Rights Ordinance
enacted last year due to its
prohibition of discrimination because
of sexual orientation or gender identity
submitted petitions seeking to compel
the City Council to either repeal it
or put it on the ballot for a public
vote. Although the City Secretary
certified that the petitions had enough
valid signatures under Texas law to
require the Council either to repeal
the ordinance or place it on the ballot,
the City Attorney disagreed, and the
Council refused to reconsider the
ordinance. Litigation ensued and,
Council “to comply with its duties, as
specified in the City Charter, that arise
when the City Secretary certifies that
a referendum petition has a sufficient
number of valid signatures.”
The City Council, which was not
disposed to repeal the ordinance, voted
to submit it to the voters and approved
the following language: “Proposition
No. 1 [Relating to the Houston Equal
Rights Ordinance.] Shall the City of
Houston repeal the Houston Equal
Rights Ordinance, Ord. No. 2014530, which prohibits discrimination
in city employment and services, city
contracts, public accommodations,
The Texas Supreme Court issued a unanimous
per curiam opinion holding that the City Council
was required to reconsider the ordinance as
a result of the City Secretary’s certification
pursuant to the clear direction of the City
Charter provision on point.
on July 24, 2015, the Texas Supreme
Court issued a unanimous per curiam
opinion in In re Jared Woodfill et al.,
2015 WL 4498229, holding that the
City Council was required to reconsider
the ordinance as a result of the City
Secretary’s certification pursuant to
the clear direction of the City Charter
provision on point. Given the speed
with which events were moving –
including a statement by election
officials that if the measure were to be
on the November 2015 ballot, it would
have to be submitted with appropriate
wording by the end of August – the
court, dispensing with oral argument,
stated that it would “conditionally
grant the writ of mandamus” sought
by the petitioners and directed the City
private employment, and housing based
on an individual’s sex, race, color,
ethnicity, national origin, age, familial
status, marital status, military status,
religion, disability, sexual orientation,
genetic information, gender identity,
or pregnancy?” The ballot would allow
voters to case either a “yes” or “no”
vote on the question of repeal.
The proponents of repeal were
dissatisfied with this wording and
brought their complaints back to the
Texas Supreme Court, which issued
another unanimous per curiam opinion
on August 19 in In re F. N. Williams,
Sr. and Jared Woodfill, 2015 Tex.
LEXIS 749, 2015 WL 4931372. While
rejecting the argument that the phrase
“Houston Equal Rights Ordinance”
should not be on the ballot question, the
court held that the repeal proponents
were correct in their argument that,
pursuant to the Charter, the voters
should be asked whether they approve
the ordinance, not whether it should be
repealed.
The court said, quoting from the
City Charter, that if sufficient petition
signatures are presented and certified
by the City Secretary, the Council
“shall immediately reconsider such
ordinance or resolution and, if it does
not entirely repeal the same, shall
submit it to popular vote at the next
city general election,” and states that
the ordinance or resolution “shall not
take effect unless a majority of the
qualified voters voting thereon at such
election shall vote in favor thereof.”
“Section 5 of the Charter clearly
requires the vote to be on the ordinance
itself rather than its repeal,” wrote the
court. “Because the Charter clearly
defines the City Council’s obligation
to submit the ordinance – rather than
its repeal – to the voters and gives the
City Council no discretion not to, we
hold that this is a ministerial duty.” As
such, the Council had no discretion in
the matter. However, the court said, it
did have discretion to decide to refer
to the ordinance as the Houston Equal
Rights Ordinance, inasmuch as the
repeal petitioners had referred to it as
the Equal Rights Ordinance on their
petitions.
The court rejected the City’s
argument that a post-election contest
would provide an adequate remedy for
the petitioners. “We have previously
rejected this argument,” said the court,
“holding that if ‘defective wording can
be corrected’ prior to the election, then
‘a remedy will be provided that is not
available through a subsequent election
contest.’” The court “conditionally”
granted mandamus relief against the
Council, ordering it to “word the
proposition such that voters will vote
directly for or against the ordinance.”
If the Council does not comply, the
court will issued the writ mandating it
to do so. ■
8th Circuit Rules on Pending State
Marriage Equality Appeals
W
hen the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2583 (June 26, 2015),
that same-sex couples have a right to
marry under the 14th Amendment, it
technically reversed a ruling by the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals, which had in
November 2014 itself reversed rulings
issued by federal district judges earlier
in that year striking down state bans on
same-sex marriage in each of the states in
the circuit. Thus, as a technical matter the
Supreme Court was just directly holding
that the same-sex marriage bans in
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee
violate the 14th Amendment. As of
June 26, appeals were pending before
the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals from
three states – South Dakota, Nebraska,
and Arkansas – where the states were
contesting district court rulings striking
down their same-sex marriage bans. The
8th Circuit had scheduled oral arguments
to take place in the spring, but the court
cancelled the arguments, putting all the
state appeals on hold while the Supreme
Court case was pending.
After the Supreme Court ruled,
plaintiffs in the 8th Circuit cases asked
the court of appeals to affirm the district
court rulings and enjoin the three states
from enforcing their same-sex marriage
bans. The three states, on the other hand,
claimed that they had begun to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples
and to recognize same-sex marriages
in response to the Obergefell decision.
As a result, they argued, the lawsuits
against them were moot, since there
was no longer a live legal controversy
to be decided by the court of appeals.
They urged the 8th Circuit to vacate the
district court opinions and instruct the
district courts to dismiss these lawsuits
as moot, opposing the plaintiffs’ requests
that the 8th Circuit uphold the district
court injunctions.
On Aug. 11, an 8th Circuit three
judge panel issued three per curiam
rulings, rejecting the state arguments
using almost identical language holding
the state bans unconstitutional pursuant
to the Obergefell decision and tailoring
remedies for the situations presented by
each of the states. The panel consisted
of Circuit Judges Roger L. Wollman,
Lavenski R. Smith, and William D.
Benton.
In Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 14061, 2015 WL
4730871, the South Dakota case,
District Judge Karen E. Schreier had
issued a declaratory judgement and a
permanent injunction, but stayed the
injunction pending appeal. In Jernigan
v. Crane, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14020,
2015 WL 4731342, the Arkansas case,
District Judge Kristine G. Baker had
similarly issued a declaratory judgment
and a permanent injunction, staying the
injunction pending appeal. In Waters v.
Ricketts, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14019,
2015 WL 4730972, the Nebraska case,
District Judge Joseph F. Bataillon had
not issued a declaratory injunction yet,
but had granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction and the state
had filed an interlocutory appeal; the
8th Circuit had stayed the preliminary
injunction pending ruling on the appeal.
The court of appeals first addressed
the issue of mootness. It found that
the states’ “assurances of compliance
with Obergefell do not moot the case”
although the assurances “may, however,
impact the necessity of continued
injunctive relief.” The court premised its
mootness ruling on the precise language
that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy had
used in his opinion for the Supreme
Court, where he said that “the State
laws challenged by Petitioners in these
cases are now held invalid.” Wrote the
8th Circuit, “The Court invalidated
laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee” but not explicitly in the three
states whose appeals were before the
8th Circuit! Furthermore, the Supreme
Court had not directly addressed “all
issues raised by Plaintiffs here” and none
of the three states had repealed their
constitutional amendments or statutory
bans on same-sex marriage. Of course,
as none of the states in the 6th Circuit
had filed petitions for rehearing with
the Supreme Court, the Obergefell case
is at an end, and the Supreme Court’s
decision creates a binding precedent
that the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
must follow. Thus, the court found, it
was appropriate to affirm the district
court declaratory judgments in South
Dakota and Arkansas, and to affirm the
preliminary injunction in Nebraska and
send that case back to the district court
for an entry of final judgment in favor of
plaintiffs on the merits.
Turning to the question of injunctive
relief, the court of appeals panel felt that
it should be up to the district judges in
each case to decide whether injunctive
relief is warranted in light of postObergefell developments. Although
the states claimed that they have
been complying with the Obergefell
ruling, the challenged constitutional
amendments and statutes are still on the
books, so the court decided it was within
the discretion of the district judges
to determine whether injunctions are
necessary at this point.
Local attorneys were heavily involved
in the three lawsuits that were being
appealed, all of which had multiple
plaintiffs and many organizations filing
amicus briefs. In terms of national
movement legal involvement, the
Nebraska case was brought with the
assistance of the ACLU’s LGBT Rights
Project and the ACLU of Nebraska and
the South Dakota case was brought
with the assistance of the National
Center for Lesbian Rights. The lists of
organizations and attorneys filing amicus
briefs actually take up more pages than
the brief opinions issued by the court of
appeals in these cases.
The next step, of course, will involve
filing of motions for the award of attorney
fees to the plaintiffs under federal
statutes authorizing such awards to
prevailing parties in civil rights litigation.
It was widely speculated that the states
were seeking to have the district court
opinions vacated and the cases dismissed
at least in part to give them an argument
for avoiding having to pay attorney fees
to the plaintiffs. The 8th Circuit’s orders
affirming the district court decisions
should forestall that, since there can
be no argument that the plaintiffs are
“prevailing parties,” having obtained the
ruling on the merits that they sought. In
other parts of the country, several courts
have made substantial fee awards to the
attorneys who have represented plaintiffs
in the marriage equality cases over the
past several years, and new awards have
begun to be issued in response to postObergefell motions. ■
2nd Circuit Expands Liability for
Sexual Harassment by Prison Guards
W
hat the right hand had given
in Boddie v. Schnieder, 105
F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir.1997)
(sexual harassment of prisoners violates
the Eighth Amendment), the left hand
took away by requiring that the conduct
be “severe and repetitive.” Now, in
Crawford v. Cuomo, 2015 WL 4728170
(2d Cir., August 11, 2015), the Second
Circuit ruled: “A corrections officer’s
intentional contact with an inmate’s
genitalia or other intimate area, which
serves no penological purpose and is
undertaken with the intent to gratify the
officer’s sexual desire or to humiliate the
inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment.”
In so doing, the court limited (without
expressly overruling) the “severe and
repetitive” language in Boddie, which
had been invoked to dismiss myriad
sexual harassment claims within the
circuit, including the ones here by
United States District Judge Norman A.
Mordue, 2014 WL 897046 (N.D. N.Y.).
The unanimous decision was written by
Senior Circuit Judge John M. Walker, Jr.,
who was joined by Chief Circuit Judge
Robert A. Katzmann and Circuit Judge
Gerard E. Lynch.
Prisoners James Crawford and
Thaddeas Corley were incarcerated
in Eastern Correctional Facility. They
alleged that, on separate occasions,
a guard (Corrections Officer Simon
Prindle) “fondled their genitals for
personal gratification and without
penological
justification.”
Officer
Prindle removed Corley from a visit with
his wife, made him stand against a wall,
and fondled and squeezed his penis “to
make sure Mr. Corley did not have an
erection.” Four days later, Prindle made
Crawford stand against a wall, squeezed
and fondled his penis, roamed his hands
down his thighs, and threatened him with
solitary confinement if he protested. The
complaint also alleged twenty similar
grievances about Prindle from other
inmates.
Crawford and Corley sued Prindle,
the Eastern Correctional Superintendent,
the Corrections Commissioner and New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo, alleging
that Prindle’s superiors either allowed
him to sexually abuse inmates as a means
of control or were deliberately indifferent
to the abuse. The plaintiffs also named
as John Doe defendants the officers who
were present during Prindle’s abuse but
who did not intervene.
In Boddie, the court found insufficient
and not “cumulatively egregious” enough
to state a claim an officer’s attempted
“pass” at an inmate, involving squeezing
his hand, touching his penis, calling
him a “sexy black devil,” and bumping
into him “with her whole body vagina
against his penis.” The court noted that
Boddie was interpreted by district courts
as requiring multiple incidents with the
same inmate, excessiveness in duration,
direct contract (rather than through
clothing) or actions causing “physical
injury, penetration, or pain.”
In construing Boddie, the court reemphasized the adequacy of a single
severe incident or the cumulative nature
of less severe incidents, writing: “an
inmate need not allege that there was
penetration, physical injury, or direct
contact with uncovered genitalia.” Even
during a contraband search, “if contact
between an officer and an inmate’s
genitalia was initially justified, if the
officer finds no contraband, continued
sexual contact may be actionable….
In determining whether an Eighth
Amendment violation has occurred,
the principal inquiry is whether the
contact is incidental to legitimate official
duties, such as a justifiable pat frisk or
strip search, or by contrast whether
it is undertaken to arouse or gratify
the officer or humiliate the inmate,”
citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
320-21 (1986). “[A] search may not
be undertaken maliciously or for the
purposes of sexually abusing an inmate.”
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528
(1984).
Assuming the facts in the complaint
are true for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, the court found the Boddie
standard, as rearticulated here, to be met.
“Under Boddie, no amount of gratuitous
or sexually-motivated fondling of an
inmate’s genitals—even if limited in
duration or conducted through the
inmate’s clothes, as was the case here—
is permitted by the Constitution.” The
gender of the guard (or of the inmate) is
immaterial.
The court reviewed the “evolving
standards of decency” regarding sexual
abuse of prisoners, noting the passage
of the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609) and the
proscription of sexual conduct between
guards and inmates in dozens of states.
“These laws and policies reflect the deep
moral indignation that has replaced what
had been society’s passive acceptance of
the problem of sexual abuse in prison.
They make it clear that the sexual
abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as
a distasteful blight on the prison system,
offends our most basic principles of
just punishment.” In language close
to admitting error in Boddie, the court
“recognize[d] that particular conduct
that might not have risen to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation 18
years ago may no longer accord with
community standards” and that “we
believe that the officer’s conduct in
Boddie would flunk its own test today.”
Although there were no transgender
issues in this case, sexual abuse/
harassment of transgender inmates is a
chronic problem in Corrections. This
case has very helpful dicta for such
prisoner victims, as it allows a claim
to proceed based on sexual harassment
with intent to “humiliate.”
The court remanded on the issue of
qualified immunity to determine whether
it was “objectively reasonable” for
defendants, who include the Corrections
Commissioner and the Governor, to
believe that Prindle’s alleged sexual abuse
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
New York Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman and Solicitor General
Barbara D. Underwood filed the motion
to dismiss and defended it on appeal.
It remains to be seen whether they will
now continue to litigate. According to
the New York Times, a spokesperson
for the Corrections Commissioner
“declined to comment about whether it
still employed Officer Prindle” (August
11, 2015, page A-15). Crawford and
Corley are represented by New York
attorneys Adam D. Perlmutter, Daniel
A. McGuinness, and Zachary Margulis–
Ohnuma. – William J. Rold
Federal Court Rejects Recalcitrant
Kentucky County Clerk’s Free Exercise
Claim; 6th Circuit and Supreme Court
Refuse to Stay District Court Order
U
.S. District Judge David Bunning
rejected a claim by Rowan
County, Kentucky Clerk Kim
Davis that she has a First Amendment
right to refuse to issue any marriage
licenses in order to avoid compromising
her religious belief that a marriage
can be only between one man and one
woman. Granting the plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction requiring
Davis’s office to issue marriage licenses
in Miller v. Davis, 2015 WL 4866729,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105822 (E.D.
Ky. August 12, 2015), Judge Bunning
concluded that all factors federal
the August 17 Order generated some
confusion due to its wording) was to
grant Davis a short stay, leaving in
place her office’s policy of refusing to
issue marriage licenses through the end
of August. On August 19, Davis filed
an “Emergency Motion for Immediate
Consideration and Motion to Stay” with
the 6th Circuit, No. 15-5880, the parties
submitted briefs on August 23, and the
6th Circuit denied the motion for stay
on August 26. Davis still refused to
issue licenses, contending that she had
until August 31 to obtain a stay from
the Supreme Court. On August 28, she
Early reports on September 1 indicated that
she had refused to issue a license to a same-sex
couple, invoking “God’s authority” and saying it
was a “Heaven or Hell” decision.
courts consider in deciding motions
for preliminary injunctions favored
the plaintiffs, including likelihood of
success on the merits of their claim that
the clerk’s action was violating their
constitutional rights, and he granted the
injunction.
Davis, represented by Liberty
Counsel, a so-called Christian law firm,
promptly noticed her appeal to the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals and, upon
advice of counsel, refused to comply
with the injunction. Shortly after
noticing the appeal, Liberty Counsel
sought a stay of the injunction pending
appeal. On August 17, Judge Bunning
issued an Order denying the motion for
stay, but at the same time “temporarily”
staying the injunction until August 31
to give Davis time to apply to the 6th
Circuit for a stay. The net effect of Judge
Bunning’s actions (which required a
clarifying Order on August 19 because
filed an “Emergency Application” for a
stay with the Supreme Court (directed
to Justice Kagan, who hears motions
from the 6th Circuit), and a motion with
Judge Bunning seeking an extension of
his “temporary” stay until the Supreme
Court decides on the emergency motion.
Bunning quickly denied the motion.
Early in the evening on August 31, the
Supreme Court announced that Justice
Kagan had referred the application to
the full Court, which was denying the
stay. This meant that at the beginning
of business on Tuesday, September
1, Davis would be under court order
to resume issuing marriage licenses
to legally qualified couples, but early
reports on September 1 indicated that
she had refused to issue a license to
a same-sex couple, invoking “God’s
authority” and saying it was a “Heaven
or Hell” decision. After some couples
filed contempt motions with Judge
Bunning, he ordered that Davis and
her staff appear in his courtroom on
September 3 to answer the charges.
The lawsuit was filed on July 2,
2015, by two couples: April Miller and
Karen Roberts (same-sex couple), and
Kevin Holloway and Jody Fernandez (a
different-sex couple). Both couples tried
to get marriage licenses from the Rowan
County Clerk’s Office shortly after the
Obergefell decision was announced by
the Supreme Court, which reversed the
6th Circuit and affirmed a Kentucky
federal district court ruling for marriage
equality. Both couples were turned
down, being told that the office was
not issuing any marriage licenses. Both
couples then went to Rowan County
Judge Executive Walter Blevins, asking
him to issue them licenses. Blevins told
them that Kentucky law authorizes him
to issue licenses only when the county
clerk is “absent.” Since Clerk Davis
was not “absent,” but was continuing
to fulfill her other duties, Judge Blevins
concluded that he did not have authority
to issue marriage licenses. Although
at least seven neighboring counties
quickly began issuing licenses to samesex couples after the Supreme Court
ruling, these two couples insisted that
they wanted to get their licenses in
the county where they lived, worked
and paid taxes, and that they should
not have to travel out of the county in
order to get married, so they filed suit.
On August 4, Davis filed a third-party
Complaint against Governor Steve
Beshear, followed by a motion for
preliminary injunction seeking to bar
enforcement of Beshear’s mandate to
county clerks directing them to issue
marriage licenses in compliance with
Obergefell. Davis’s motion was denied
by Bunning’s action in ordering her to
comply with the mandate.
Unlike some other states where
clerks have argued that their controlling
statute does not require them to issue
marriage licenses, in Kentucky it is
clear that county clerks are supposed to
issue marriage licenses as a ministerial
function, so Davis rested her defense
on the proposition that she has a
constitutional right based on the 1st
Amendment and the state’s Religious
Freedom Act to refuse to have any
licenses issued by her office because of
her religious objections to being seen to
endorse same-sex marriages. Although
it is possible that one of her clerical
employees could issue the licenses,
Davis found this objectionable because,
she says, her name as county clerk
would still appear on the document, thus
implying her endorsement or approval of
the marriage. Under Kentucky’s statute,
the marriage license form includes
“An authorization statement of the
county clerk issuing the license for any
person or religious society authorized
to perform marriage ceremonies to
unite in marriage the persons named.”
Focusing on this, Davis argued that the
“authorization statement” constitutes
“an endorsement of same-sex marriage,
which runs contrary to her Apostolic
Christian beliefs,” wrote Judge Bunning.
Governor Beshear had tried to talk
her out of this position and had advised
her that if she was unwilling to perform
her statutory duties, she should resign
so that somebody willing to comply
with the law could be put in her place.
Davis refused, insisting that she intends
to serve out the remaining three-anda-half years of her elected term as
county clerk. As a fallback defense,
Davis also argued that requiring Rowan
County couples who want to marry
to go to a neighboring county did not
impose any substantial burden on their
newly-proclaimed 14th Amendment
right to marry, as weighed against the
significant burden on her freedom of
religion in requiring her to issue licenses
to same-sex couples. She explained that
her office had stopped issuing marriage
licenses to all couples, whether samesex or different-sex, because she did
not want to engage in discrimination
against same-sex couples.
Davis was sued in her official
capacity for her refusal to issue any
marriage licenses, which the plaintiffs
alleged “significantly interferes with
their right to marry because they are
unable to obtain a license in their home
county.” Davis countered that they
could go to a neighboring county, they
could get a license from Judge Blevins,
or they might in the future be able to get
a license on-line, pursuant to a proposal
being considered by the legislature to
move the licensing process out of the
county clerk offices. Judge Bunning
rejected these arguments. Pointing
out that the plaintiffs are “long-time
residents who live, work, pay taxes,
vote and conduct other business in
Morehead,” the county seat, they were
entitled to get their licenses locally.
Furthermore, he observed, “there
are individuals in this rural region of
the state who simply do not have the
physical, financial or practical means
to travel,” so the office’s refusal to issue
any licenses at all would substantially
burden some couples who want to marry
and do not want to incur the burden of
traveling out of the county to obtain
their licenses. The judge also noted
that 57 of the state’s 120 elected county
clerks had petitioned the governor to
call a special legislative session to enact
a law allowing them to refuse to issue
licenses to same-sex couples. Asked
Bunning, “If this Court were to hold
that Davis’ policy did not significantly
interfere with the right to marry, what
would stop the other 56 clerks from
following Davis’ approach?” If many
county clerks refused to issue licenses,
an “inconvenience” could become a
“substantial interference” with what
the Supreme Court has identified as
a “fundamental right.” Additionally,
Bunning agreed with Judge Blevins that
Blevins was not authorized by statute
to issue marriage licenses in place of
Davis when Davis was not “absent”
from work, and he concluded further
that putting the entire burden for issuing
licenses in Rowan County on Judge
Blevins, who has many other duties, was
not a “viable option.” As to the on-line
alternative, Bunning pointed out it was
only a proposal and so it did not respond
to the present concern.
Bunning found that the state did not
have a sufficient compelling interest
to protect Davis’ free exercise rights
that would outweigh the state’s interest
in upholding the rule of law, under
which the plaintiffs were entitled to get
marriage licenses in order to exercise
their fundamental right to marry, as
declared by the Supreme Court in
Obergefell. “Our form of government,”
he wrote, “will not survive unless we,
as a society, agree to respect the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions, regardless
of our personal opinions. Davis is
certainly free to disagree with the
Court’s opinion, as many Americans
likely do, but that does not excuse
her from complying with it. To hold
otherwise would set a dangerous
precedent.” Delaying the plaintiffs’
attempts to exercise their fundamental
right to marry imposes an irreparable
harm on them, the judge found, while
he disagreed that requiring the office
to issue licenses would impose any
substantial harm on Davis.
Bunning disagreed with Davis, for
example, that the authorization statement
on the form implied or communicated
that she personally endorses or approves
of same-sex marriage. It is merely a
statement in her official capacity as
county clerk that the applicants are
legally qualified to marry. Furthermore,
he rejected her argument that Governor
Beshear’s directive issued after the
Obergefell decision, instructing county
clerks to issue licenses to same-sex
couples, did not serve a compelling
state interest or that she was entitled to
a religious exemption from complying
with it. Bunning found that Beshear’s
directive was a religiously neutral
and generally applicable state policy
mandating compliance with the law
and not singling out religion in any
way. “While facial neutrality is not
dispositive,” wrote Bunning, “Davis has
done little to convince the Court that
Governor Beshear’s directive aims to
suppress religious practice.”
He also rejected her argument
that Attorney General Jack Conway’s
decision not to defend the marriage
ban in 2014, leaving the governor to
hire outside counsel to represent the
state before the 6th Circuit, provided
some kind of precedent for her seeking
an exemption from being required to
comply with her job. Bunning rejected
her attempt to draw an analogy, seeing
Conway’s position as an “exercise of
prosecutorial discretion” based on
Conway’s announced view that the
ban was not defensible in court, which
turned out to be correct at the level
of the Supreme Court. “By contrast,”
Bunning pointed out, “Davis is
refusing to recognize the legal force
of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
in performing her duties as Rowan
County Clerk. Because the two are not
similarly situated, the Court simply
cannot conclude that Governor Beshear
treated them differently based upon
their religious convictions.”
Davis also attempted to assert a free
speech claim under the 1st Amendment,
which was quickly disposed of under
Supreme Court precedents holding
that public employees speaking in
their official capacity do not enjoy
individual 1st Amendment protection
for their speech. After questioning
whether the act of issuing marriage
licenses can even be characterized as
speech, Bunning pointed out that any
speech involved in that process (such
as the statements on the license form to
which Davis objects) is state speech, not
Davis’s speech. “The State prescribes
the form that Davis must use in issuing
marriage licenses,” he wrote. “She plays
no role in composing the form, and she
has no discretion to alter it. Moreover,
county clerks’ offices issue marriage
Quoting from the Obergefell decision,
he wrote, “When such ‘sincere,
personal opposition becomes enacted
law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur
of the State itself on an exclusion that
soon demeans or stigmatizes those
whose own liberty has been denied.’”
“Such policies simply cannot endure,”
Bunning asserted.
Finally, having concluded that
requiring Davis to issue marriage
licenses does not substantially burden
her free exercise of religion, Bunning
rejected her claim to protection under
Kentucky’s Religious Freedom Act,
which does not grant more protection
than the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act on which it is based.
“Davis remains free to practice her
Apostolic Christian beliefs,” he wrote.
“She may continue to attend church
twice a week, participate in Bible Study
“[H]er religious convictions cannot excuse her
from performing the duties that she took an
oath to perform as Rowan County Clerk.”
licenses on behalf of the State, not on
behalf of a particular elected clerk.”
To Judge Bunning, it was clear that
the state was not compelling Davis
to communicate personal approval of
same sex marriages when it requires
her to issue licenses. When Davis issues
licenses, she is acting as an elected
official, not as a private individual.
Bunning also rejected her argument that
requiring her to issue licenses imposes
a constitutionally forbidden “religious
test” for her to be a public employee.
“The State is not requiring Davis to
express a particular religious belief as
a condition of public employment,” he
wrote, pointing out that what the state
does require is that “all state officials”
must “swear an oath to defend the U.S.
Constitution.” She swore such an oath
when she took office, he wrote, and her
refusal to comply with “binding legal
jurisprudence” has “likely violated the
constitutional rights of her constituents.”
and minister to female inmates at the
Rowan County Jail. She is even free to
believe that marriage is a union between
one man and one woman, as many
Americans do. However, her religious
convictions cannot excuse her from
performing the duties that she took
an oath to perform as Rowan County
Clerk.”
Concluding that it was in the public
interest to do so, Bunning issued
two orders. First, he ordered that the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction be granted. Second, he
ordered that “Defendant Kim Davis, in
her official capacity as Rowan County
Clerk, is hereby preliminarily enjoined
from applying her ‘no marriage licenses’
policy to future marriage license
requests submitted by Plaintiffs.”
Davis filed a Motion to Stay the
August 12 order, which Judge Bunning
denied in a new Order issued on August
17. Although Judge Bunning determined
that Davis’s request met none of the
requirements usually considered for
staying a court order pending appeal,
nonetheless he determined to give
her some time to seek a stay from the
6th Circuit. “In recognition of the
constitutional issues involved, and
realizing that emotions are running
high on both sides of the debate,” he
wrote, “the Court finds it appropriate
to temporarily stay this Order pending
review of Defendant Davis’ Motion
to Stay by the 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals.” This wording immediately
caused confusion, creating ambiguity
whether this was a temporary stay
of the Order denying Davis’s Motion
for Stay, or a temporary stay of the
August 12 Order requiring her to have
her office resume issuing marriage
licenses (including to same-sex
couples). The confusion was reflected
in media reports, which focused on the
conclusion that Davis had been excused
from complying with the Court’s order
for some unspecified period of time
while seeking relief from the appeals
court. Reacting to the expressions of
confusion, Judge Bunning issued a
clarifying Order on August 19, which set
a deadline for Davis to obtain relief from
the 6th Circuit. If Davis did not obtain
a stay from the 6th Circuit by August
31, Judge Bunning’s August 12 Order
would go into effect and any continued
refusal to issue marriage licenses could
subject Davis to a contempt proceedings
and liability to those denied licenses.
Davis filed her “Emergency Motion”
seeking a stay with the 6th Circuit on
August 19, arguing that in all prior
marriage litigation in Kentucky and the
6th Circuit, trial court orders had been
stayed pending appeal because of the
substantial legal questions or matters of
first impression involved in these cases.
Davis argued that the district court’s
answer to the question of conflicting
constitutional rights presented by this
case “should not be forced upon Davis
until her appeal is finally resolved.” She
argued that her “inability to authorize
and approve SSM licenses bearing
her imprimatur against her religious
conscience is protected by the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions,
along with the Kentucky RFRA,”
contending that Beshear’s mandate
to the county clerks “must survive
strict scrutiny, which the district court
acknowledged but failed to apply.”
She invoked the Supreme Court’s
Hobby Lobby decision in support of
her contention that “numerous less
restrictive means are available” to
accomplish the state’s purpose in
making marriage licenses available to
same-sex couples, and rejects Bunning’s
conclusion that any burden on her free
exercise of religion by requiring that her
office issue the licenses is “slight.” Her
motion signally failed to explain how her
constitutional claim could be asserted
consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, inasmuch as Governor Beshear’s
directive is a religiously neutral policy
of general application and is not directed
against any specific religious practices
as such.
In a brief order issued on August
26, the three-judge panel unanimously
wrote that, as Davis was sued only in her
official capacity, she could not “decline
to act in conformity with the United
States Constitution as interpreted by a
dispositive holding of the United States
Supreme Court.” Finding that there is
“little or no likelihood that the Clerk
in her official capacity will prevail on
appeal,” the court denied the motion. The
court pointed out that Davis’s “official
duties include the issuance of marriage
licenses” and she was required to
perform her “official duties.” Although
this would seem to have concluded the
matter, Davis refused to issue marriage
licenses the next day, contending that
under Judge Bunning’s “temporary
stay” she had until August 31 before
his preliminary injunction went into
effect. On Friday afternoon, August
28, her counsel filed an “Emergency
Application” with U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan, who is assigned
to hear emergency appeals from the 6th
Circuit, requesting that the Supreme
Court order the preliminary injunction
stayed pending Davis’s appeal on the
merits, and simultaneously filed with
Judge Bunning a request to extend his
“temporary stay” until the Supreme
Court rules on the application. Bunning
quickly rejected the request to extend
his temporary stay.
The “Emergency Application” to
the Supreme Court was presented in a
50-page brief, passionately arguing that
the preliminary injunction was a severe
abridgement of free exercise of religion
and essentially accusing Judge Bunning
and the 6th Circuit panel of running
roughshod over the constitutional rights
of Ms. Davis. A quick perusal of the
arguments suggested a disingenuous
straining
of
religious
freedom
precedents to suggest that exempting
public employees from fulfilling
essential job functions based on their
individual religious objections is no big
deal and falls within the mainstream of
First Amendment law. As an example
of such disingenuous straining, they
cited Garcetti v. Ceballos (in which
the Supreme Court held that speech as
part of a public employee’s job function
enjoys no 1st Amendment protection),
for the broad proposition that public
employees enjoy 1st Amendment
rights, without noting that the quoted
language referred to public employee
statements made in their private citizen
capacity, and not as part of their job. The
Supreme Court was careful to draw this
distinction; Ms. Davis’s attorneys were
not, providing a quotation out of context
that stands the case on its head, inasmuch
as she was sued in her official capacity.
This is the quality of lawyering and
legal advice that Davis was getting from
an ideological organization concerned
to delay same-sex marriages at any cost.
The Supreme Court provided no
explanation for denying the stay on
August 31, but none was needed in light
of the Court’s clear precedents holding
that citizens do not enjoy a religious
exemption from complying with neutral
state laws of general applicability, and
that public employees do not enjoy
1st Amendment rights in connection
with their official duties. However, on
Tuesday morning, September 1, a local
CBS-TV news crew accompanied a
same-sex couple to the clerk’s office to
record the denial of a license to them
and an insistent Kim Davis citing “God’s
authority” to justify her defiance of the
Supreme Court’s order. Some couples
then filed motions with Judge Bunning
seeking to hold Davis and her staff
in contempt of court, and he ordered
that they appear in his courtroom on
September 3 to answer the charges. ■
LGBT Legal Organizations Call for Decriminalization of
Sex Work as Federal Government Initiates Prosecution of
Rentboy.com’s Owner and Employees
O
n August 20, leading LGBT
rights legal organizations in
the United States issued a
joint statement supporting Amnesty
International’s August 11 Resolution
that advocates for the human rights of
sex workers. Amnesty International
(AI) called on governments on August
11 to repeal laws criminalizing sex
work, while asking states to move to
prevent and combat sex trafficking,
ensure that sex workers are protected
from exploitation, and enforce laws
against the sexual exploitation of
children. In short, AI suggests that
adults should be able to freely consent
to engage in sexual activity for
compensation without criminal penalty,
and that continued maintenance of
criminalization exposes sex workers
to exploitation, violence, and severe
health risks. (Reuters, Aug. 13). Just a
few days later, federal agents from the
Department of Homeland Security,
accompany by New York City police
officers, raided the Manhattan offices
of Rentboy.com, the largest gay escort
website in the world, carting away
business records and computers, and
arrested the company’s CEO and other
employees.
Sex work for pay is presently legal
in some countries (e.g., Canada, United
Kingdom), but outlawed in most. Even
those countries that don’t criminalize
prostitution as such generally maintain
laws against promotion and public
solicitation of prostitution. In the
United States, every jurisdiction (except
some counties in Nevada) treats sexual
activity for monetary compensation as
unlawful, although the jurisdictions
differ as to the classification of the
offense and potential penalties. The
Model Penal Code as adopted in
the states decriminalized private
consensual sexual activity between
adults, but not when such activity
involves a commercial transaction,
and courts have been unanimous in
holding that the Supreme Court’s 2003
decision striking down sodomy laws,
Lawrence v. Texas, does not create a
protected liberty interest extending to
commercial sex.
The LGBT organizations joining in
the statement were Transgender Law
Center, Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders, Lambda Legal, National
Center for Lesbian Rights, and National
Center for Transgender Equality. The
Joint Statement explains, “For many
LGBT people, participation in street
economies is often critical to survival,
particularly for LGBT youth and
transgender women of color who face
and sex trafficking,” continues the
Joint Statement. “And as UNAIDS
and the World Health Organization
have recognized, criminalization also
seriously hampers efforts to prevent
and treat HIV/AIDS – efforts in which
people involved in the sex trades are
crucial partners.”
Just days before the Joint Statement
was issued, the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security submitted a
Complaint and Affidavit in Support of
Arrest Warrants to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Brooklyn) on August
18, seeking to arrest the owner and
The Joint Statement describes the various
hazards faced by sex workers that are amplified
by the criminalization of their activities.
all-too-common family rejection and
vastly disproportionate rates of violence,
homelessness, and discrimination in
employment, housing, and education.”
The Joint Statement goes on to
describe the various hazards faced by
sex workers that are amplified by the
criminalization of their activities, with
a particular emphasis on the difficulties
experienced by transgender sex workers.
“Laws criminalizing sexual exchange
– whether by the seller or the buyer –
impede sex workers’ ability to negotiate
condom use and other boundaries, and
force many to work in hidden or remote
places where they are move vulnerable
to violence. Research and experience
have shown that these laws serve only to
drive the industry further underground,
make workers less able to negotiate
with customers on their own terms, and
put those who engage in criminalized
sex work at higher risk for abduction
employees of Rentboy.com, described
in the complaint as “a commercial male
escort advertising site that promotes
prostitution.” The complaint quotes
Rentboy.com advertising itself as the
“original and largest male escort service
online.” The Complaint was submitted
under oath by Special Agent Susan
Ruiz, who led the investigation leading
to the prosecution. The Complaint
requested that its supporting affidavit
and warrants be issued under seal to
prevent the defendants from fleeing
the jurisdiction, and indicated that the
accompanying statement under oath
by Agent Ruiz did not reveal all facts
uncovered by the investigation, just
those sufficient to establish probable
cause for the arrests.
On August 25, Homeland Security
agents appeared at Rentboy.com’s
offices on West 14th Street in Manhattan
and effectively shut down the website.
The defendants were listed as Jeffrey
Hurant (the owner) and employees
Michael Sean Belman, Clint Calero,
Edward Lorenz Estanol, Shane Lukas,
Diana Milagros Mattos, and Marco
Soto Decker. The title of the case on the
Complaint is United States of America
v. Hurant, filed in the Eastern District
of New York on August 18.
The complaint sets out a detailed
description of the Rentboy.com website,
defining terms, providing graphic
descriptions of the activities advertised,
and asserting repeatedly that the
disclaimers on the site were meaningless
and that the entire operation was set up
to connect customers with prostitutes.
Anyone seeking a detailed description
of the on-line male escort business will
find it in this complaint, which became
found detailed accounts by customers
of their experiences with the escorts,
including reports on the amount of
money charged by the escort.
It is unclear whether this action taken
against Rentboy.com was a precursor
to actions against similar websites
operated from the United States as
part of a more general crackdown on
the use of the Internet for commercial
sexual assignations, whether Homeland
Security is also targeting heterosexual
escort sites, or whether Rentboy.com
was singled out for prosecution because
of the brazenness of its owner, who
is quoted in the complaint as having
made clear in published interviews
that the purpose of the website was
to assist escorts in marketing their
sexual services. According to the
The complaint sets out a detailed description
of the Rentboy.com website, defining terms,
providing graphic descriptions of the activities
advertised, and asserting repeatedly that the
disclaimers on the site were meaningless and
that the entire operation was set up to connect
customers with prostitutes.
public upon serving of the arrest
warrants and was posted later on the
25th on Buzzfeed.com with an article
describing the arrests. The complaint
describes each of the defendants
(including aliases used by many of
them) and their role in the Rentboy.
com business, including past or present
escorting activity by some of them. The
complaint asserts that the term “escort”
is a euphemism for a prostitute. The
complaint describes typical escort
listings on Rentboy.com, including the
quotation of rates and the listing of
specific sexual activity that an escort
is willing to engage in. The complaint
also notes cross-references in some of
the advertisements to another website,
daddysreviews.com, in which can be
complaint, Hurant uses as an email
address
cyberpimp@rentboy.com,
which is hardly subtle. The complaint
quotes Hurant telling one interviewer,
“There is no place in this website where
somebody says I’ll have sex for money
because that is against the law. We can
talk about what you look like, what you
are, what you like to do, what people
say about you in bed. . . People say
I’m a great top, people say I fuck like
nobody’s business, but you can’t say I’ll
fuck you for two hundred bucks.” The
website includes a disclaimer that rates
quoted by the escorts on the site are for
their time, and that any sexual activity
that takes place is a private matter
between consenting adults.
In justifying the arrest of the
employees as well as the owner, the
complaint states, “There is probable
cause to believe that anyone employed by
the organization was aware that its aim
was the promotion of prostitution, based
on its publicly-disseminated advertising
and promotional material and the
content of the site itself.” Illustrating
the openness with which Rentboy.
com proceeded about its business, the
complaint describes how Rentboy.com
applied to the Department of Homeland
Security for an occupational visa for
one of its employees. It also describes
an annual public event held by Rentboy.
com, the “Hookies,” at which awards
were bestowed on escorts listed on the
site as the “best” in particular categories
of sexual performance.
The prosecution is premised on 18
U.S.C. Section 1952, which provides,
in relevant part: “(a) Whoever travels in
interstate or foreign commerce or uses
the mail or any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce, with intent to. . . (3)
otherwise promote, manage, establish,
carry on, or facilitate the promotion,
management,
establishment,
or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts
to perform - (A) an act described in
paragraph . . . (3) shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both. . . (b) As used in
this section (i) “unlawful activity”
means (1) any business enterprise
involving . . . prostitution offenses
in violation of the laws of the State
in which they are committed or of
the United States.” The complaint
cites provisions of New York law
criminalizing “promoting prostitution”
and engaging in prostitution activity
as the underlying unlawful activity
supporting prosecution under the
federal statute. News reports indicated
that the prosecution may also ultimately
involve charges of “money-laundering,”
but that is not specified in the complaint
submitted to the federal court to get
the arrest warrants. Neither does the
complaint cite take law violations,
although one would expect that the
investigation would have included close
tax audits of Rentboy.com, its parent
company and its employees as well. ■
Maryland Intermediate Appellate Court Finds State
Precedent Precludes Applying “Best Interest of the Child”
Standard to Visitation Dispute of Divorcing Lesbian Couple
When Child Was Born Before They Married
D
ue to the oddities of timing during
a transitional period in the legal
landscape, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals found in the context of
a divorcing lesbian couple that the nonbiological parent’s claim for visitation
with the child conceived through donor
insemination at a time when the women
could not marry in their domicile of the
District of Columbia must be dismissed
on standing grounds. It seems that by a
fluke of timing the women could have
married in D.C. before the child was
born, but did not marry until shortly
after his birth, and this turned out
to be determinative under Maryland
law. Conover v. Conover, 2015 Md.
App. LEXIS 107, 2015 WL 5037039
(Md. Ct. Spec. App., Aug. 26, 2015).
The Court of Special Appeals (an
intermediate appellate court) rejected
equitable claims, found that potential
constitutional claims on behalf of the
non-biological parent had not been
properly raised or preserved at trial, and,
in the opinion for the court by Judge
Robert A. Zarnoch, characterized this as
a “sad case” since “the present state of
Maryland case law leaves us no choice.”
In a concurring opinion, Judge Douglas
R.M. Nazarian wrote, “I agree with the
majority that this case is sad, but I would
add the adjective ‘frustrating,’” and he
wrote at length about how the current
legal parenthood regime in Maryland
was inadequate to meet the situation of
unmarried same-sex parents.
Maryland’s legislature adopted a
law authorizing same-sex marriage,
but only after the underlying events in
this case occurred. There is no question
that Maryland recognizes the District
of Columbia marriage of Michelle
and Brittany Conover. The question
is whether, in the context of a divorce
proceeding, Michelle has the standing
of a parent seeking visitation, or rather
should be treated as an unrelated third
party. The court found that existing
Maryland precedents, not altered by
passage of the Marriage Act, dictates
third-party treatment.
The women’s relationship began
in 2002, with some “breaks.” They
discussed having a child and Brittany
became pregnant through donor
insemination in 2009, at a time when
marriage licenses for same-sex couples
were available in three states but not
in D.C., where they were then living.
In March 2010, D.C. began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples
under a newly-enacted municipal
ordinance. On April 4, 2010, Brittany
gave birth to their son, Jaxon William
February 19, asserting a claim for
visitation rights, and then on March 14
filed a counterclaim for divorce pro se,
again raising the issue of visitation. At
the subsequent hearing on April 30,
Michelle was represented by counsel
but Brittany was not. Brittany claimed
Michelle did not have parental standing
to seek visitation, which Brittany
opposed. Michelle rested her claim on
a Maryland statute governing paternity
claims when a child was born before the
parents married, asserting that the court
should construe the statute to apply to
spouses of either sex, not just fathers.
The question is whether, in the context of a
divorce proceeding, Michelle has the standing
of a parent seeking visitation, or rather should
be treated as an unrelated third party.
Lee Eckel Conover. (The name
incorporates former surnames of the
parents’ families.) The birth certificate
listed Brittany as the mother and left
blank the space for father. On September
28, 2010, the women married in D.C. and
subsequently took a common surname,
Conover. They subsequently moved to
Maryland, which did not legislate for
marriage until a few years later, although
Maryland was, by virtue of an Attorney
General opinion, recognizing same-sex
marriages from D.C.
The marriage didn’t last very long.
The women separated in September
2011, but Michelle continued to
visit Jaxon regularly until Brittany
prevented further contact in July 2012.
Brittany filed a pro se divorce action
in Maryland on February 8, 2013,
which did not mention Jaxon. Michelle,
also proceeding pro se, answered on
The statute, Sec. 1-208(b), provides four
ways a man who was not married to the
child’s mother at birth could establish
parental status. If one gives it a genderneutral reading (as California has done in
similar situations), Michelle could assert
parental status under three of the four
methods. She also asserted equitable
claims, such as de facto parenthood and
estoppel.
Circuit Judge Daniel P. Dwyer issued
a decision on July 4, 2013, finding that
Michelle was not a legal parent of
Jaxon. As a “third party,” she could only
seek visitation if she could show that
Brittany was unfit as a parent or that
there were extraordinary circumstances
justifying the court in letting Michelle
seek visitation. The court found that
neither of those requirements were met,
and rejected her visitation claim, and
Michelle appealed.
First addressing constitutional issues,
Judge Zarnoch observed that although
“nearly half of her brief” was devoted
to attacking Maryland’s paternity and
legitimacy statutes as unconstitutionally
discriminating against women and gay
people, Michelle had not raised these
arguments before Judge Dwyer, Brittany
appearing pro se had not been called
to respond to them, and the Attorney
General had not weighed in. Zarnoch,
quoting another judge in an old case,
said that “it would be foolhardy in the
extreme to undertake the resolution of
such complex constitutional questions”
on this sort of record. However, Judge
Zarnoch observed, Brittany benefited
in this dispute by the well-developed
Maryland and federal case law on the
constitutional right of fit parents to
determine who would associated with
their children. As Michelle did not
the purpose of establishing custody or
visitation rights on such individuals. If
Brittany was seeking a child support
order against Michelle, it is possible
on these facts that such an order might
be forthcoming, but the statutes could
not be construed in the court’s view to
entitle her to be considered as a legal
parent for custody or visitation purposes.
“Moreover,” wrote Zarnoch, “there
is no gender discrimination or sexual
orientation discrimination because all
non-biological, non-adoptive parents
face the same hurdle, no matter what sex
or sexual orientation they are.”
Zarnoch also contended, “The couple
could have married before Jaxon was
born, but did not. The circuit court did
not err in failing to accord weight to
the prohibition on same-sex marriage
that once existed.” This is because D.C.
began allowing same-sex marriages
Even before D.C. was performing same-sex
marriages, the court pointed out, Michelle
and Brittany could have gone to one of the
other three states that authorized same-sex
marriages.
challenge Brittany’s fitness as a parent,
Brittany had a right to veto Michelle’s
demand for visitation, as the appellate
court agreed with the trial judge that
under Maryland law Michelle is a “third
party,” even though she had helped to
plan for Jaxon’s conception and had
married Brittany shortly after the child
was born.
Zarnoch reviewed Maryland case
law, showing that the state’s highest
court, the Court of Appeals, had rejected
the concept of de facto parenthood
in this context, observing that under
Maryland law, “A non-biological, nonadoptive spouse who meets one, two or
even three tests under ET Sec. 1-208(b)
[the paternity statute] is still a ‘third
party’ for child access purposes.” The
court agreed that the paternity statute
was enacted for the purpose of imposing
duties on unmarried fathers, not for
while Brittany was pregnant. Had the
women quickly taken advantage of
this, they would have been married
when Jaxon was born and Michelle
would have parental standing under the
general principle, followed in Maryland,
that the spouse of a woman who gives
birth is a legal parent of the offspring.
Even before D.C. was performing
same-sex marriages, the court pointed
out, Michelle and Brittany could have
gone to one of the other three states
that authorized same-sex marriages (all
without residency requirements) and
gotten married before conceiving Jaxon.
They also could have had Michelle adopt
Jaxon after he was born. (The court noted
in passing that as of that time it was not
totally clear that Maryland courts would
approve second-parent adoptions, but the
Court of Appeals had not ruled against
them. It would seem that once the couple
had married, a court would likely have
treated this as a step-parent adoption
and no more controversial, but that is
just hindsight from today’s perspective.)
There was evidence that the women
talked about adoption, but the expense
of a formal adoption was, in their view,
a burdensome and unnecessary expense
on top of the expenses of raising Jaxon.
Michelle argued that Brittany should
be barred from raising the parental
status issue, inasmuch as the women had
agreed before the child was conceived
that Michelle would be a parent, and
that Brittany had said and done various
things prior to and after the birth to
continue to induce Michelle’s reliance
that her parental status would be honored
and she did not have to go through a
formal adoption procedure to protect
her rights. The court was unwilling to go
down that path, pointing out that most
courts had rejected equitable estoppel
or parenthood by estoppel arguments
in such cases and that Michelle “had
ample time – years, in fact – to pursue
the adoption of Jaxon.” (Actually, she
had just over a year if one assumes that
Brittany would become uncooperative
about an adoption after the women had
separated, so the court’s characterization
may exaggerate Michelle’s window of
opportunity for this.)
Michelle’s appellate strategy was
focused on persuading the court that
she should not be treated as a “third
party” and thus should not have to
show “exceptional circumstances”
to overcome Brittany’s objection to
her claim for visitation, and that the
trial court should have afforded her
an additional hearing to address the
“exceptional circumstances” issue if the
judge was to decide it. The appellate
court was not persuaded, finding that
she had an opportunity to introduce
evidence on this point. Indeed, her
trial lawyer on the record said that the
evidence “screamed extraordinary
circumstances” and that this was an
“alternative argument” for her standing.
She had also briefed the issue to the trial
judge in a post-hearing memorandum, so
Judge Zarnoch found that the trial court
could not be faulted for reaching and
deciding the issue. Since Michelle had
not asked on appeal that the appellate
court address the correctness of the trial
judge’s conclusion on this point, the
court refrained from doing so.
“In conclusion,” wrote Zarnoch, “it
must be said that this is a sad case; nor
can Michelle’s desire for access to Jaxon
be questioned. However, the present
state of Maryland case law leaves us no
choice. The interplay between the State’s
paternity statutes and the marriage,
divorce, and child access rights of samesex couples is aptly characterized as
‘uncharted Maryland waters in an area
where the Legislature is better suited
to consider the competing legal and
societal values...’’ quoting from In
re Roberto de B., 399 Md. At 312-13
(dissent).
Although Judge Nazarian agreed
with the result, he concurred in a
separate opinion bemoaning the failures
of Maryland family law, asserting
that the “premise” underlying the
Court of Appeals’ rejection of the de
facto parenthood doctrine “no longer
holds, at least with regard to married
same-sex couples. If, as Maryland law
now provides,” he continued, “a valid
marriage between two women (or two
men) has the same legal validity and
force as a man-woman marriage, courts
should analyze the visitation rights of
same-sex spouses the same way they
analyze the visitation rights of oppositesex spouses. I acknowledge that
there may well be some challenges in
adapting our analyses to accommodate
the real-life differences in the way
children join same-sex families, but
it may not be that hard either, and we
have to start somewhere.” He concluded
that “the historic treatment of same-sex
parenthood is no longer up to the task.”
The next step for Michelle may be
an attempt to take this to the Court
of Appeals and seek reversal of the
precedent that bound the intermediate
court to rule against her. In a sense this
case is presenting a transitional problem
in light of the subsequent enactment of
a marriage equality law in Maryland,
followed by the Supreme Court’s
Obergefell decision. But, on the other
hand, same-sex couples, in common
with many different sex couples, have
children while cohabiting but without
marrying under varied circumstances,
so it is unlikely that the issues in this
case will not arise in future cases, even
with the option to marry or to adopt
available. ■
Federal Court Upholds $100,000 Jury
Award to Lesbian Plaintiff against
United Parcel Service
R
ejecting motions to set aside the
jury verdict, order a new trial or
reduce damages, U.S. District
Judge Jack B. Weinstein upheld a federal
jury’s award of $100,000 in damages
to Tameeka Roberts, an employee at
the United Parcel Service facility in
Maspeth, Queens, who complained that
the company had tolerated a hostile
environment created by her supervisor
and had retaliated against her when
she pressed her complaint to the New
York State Division of Human Rights.
Roberts v. United Parcel Service, 2015
WL 4509994, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97989 (E.D.N.Y., July 27, 2015).
According to Judge Weinstein’s
opinion, Ms. Roberts lives with her wife
and three sons in New Jersey. She began
working for UPS in 1995 and has had
about twenty different supervisors over
the past twenty years. Her “problem”
supervisor whose conduct led to this
lawsuit was Donald Woodard, a “fulltime area coordinator” who supervised
Roberts in 2007 and 2008, and then
again from 2010 through 2012, when
an incident in which Ms. Roberts was
seriously injured at work attributable
to misconduct by Woodard led to his
assignment to a different facility.
Roberts’ problems with Woodard
began in 2007 after she complained to
Woodard about a denigrating comment
he made to her about another lesbian
employee. “The next day,” wrote
Weinstein, “Woodard brought his Bible
to work and ‘showed [Roberts] where
[the Bible] says that being a lesbian is
wrong.’ He told her ‘It goes against the
Bible…. It’s a sin.’” Woodard admitted
making these comments in his trial
testimony. Roberts complained to her
shop steward and the head of security,
but apparently nothing happened in
response to her complaint. “During
the rest of 2007,” wrote Weinstein,
“Woodard repeatedly told plaintiff
that ‘being a lesbian is wrong’ and
that she was ‘going to hell.’” Woodard
made these comments in the hearing
of other workers, and told a coworker not to “hang out” with Roberts
because “she’s not living right. She had
demons. She doesn’t know who she
is.” Roberts complained to Woodard,
telling him “this is not church” and
“making comments about me being
a lesbian is wrong.” Woodard’s
comments continued similarly during
2008. Roberts would try to avoid
confrontation by walking away or
telling him to “leave me alone.”
The problem ceased in 2009 when
Woodard stopped working at the
Maspeth facility, but he returned as
Roberts’ supervisor in 2010 and his
comments resumed along the same
lines. Woodard again complained to
a union shop steward, but nothing
changed. Woodard told Roberts that
“two women being married is not
natural,” that “being a lesbian is wrong,”
that she was “going to hell” and she
needed to “change” her “life, the style,
the way” she was living. She repeatedly
complained to the shop steward. In 2011,
Roberts testified, Woodard threatened
to take a photo of her with a married
male co-worker and send it to the coworker’s wife, as if to suggest they
were having an affair. Roberts reported
this to her night manager and her shop
steward. The manager told her “do not
go to corporate” with this complaint,
because “I will handle the situation.”
Woodard’s comments then stopped for
a while, but in the late summer of 2012
he got started up again, and Roberts
renewed her complaints to the shop
stewards, who finally brought her to
Human Resources, where, apparently,
nothing happened.
What finally seemed to get the
company’s attention was a call Roberts
made on October 23, 2012, to the
UPS Corporate Concerns hotline,
anonymously. She identified herself
as gay and said she felt “intimidated”
and “harassed” because Mr. Woodard
engages in “religious rants at the job”
and makes “derogatory comments
about gays.” A few days later, Roberts
met with the local HR representative, a
manager, and her shop steward, and an
investigation of Woodard was launched.
However, the HR representative just
cautioned Woodard that “religion has
no place in the workplace” but took
no other action. Woodard stopped
making his comments to Roberts, but
she felt the company should have done
more, so she sent a letter to corporate
headquarters in Atlanta, claiming she
was being harassed by Woodard and
felt threatened, harassed and stressed
because of “this situation.” She asked,
“Why is Donald Woodard allowed to
Harass, Gay Bash and verbal abuse [sic]
his employees and still be employed at
United Parcel Service?”
The letter led UPS to open a second
investigation, this time by the UPS
Human Resources Operations Manager
for the District, Beverly Riddick. She
met with Roberts for half an hour
and told her that UPS was taking her
complaint “very seriously.” Riddick
met with Woodard, but, according to
the trial testimony, although Riddick
learned that Roberts’ factual allegations
were apparently true, Riddick did not
believe that Woodward’s comments
violated the law or company policy
but were merely “inappropriate.”
“Woodard was not told to desist,” wrote
Weinstein. Riddick also interviewed
the shop steward and two of Roberts’
co-workers. Although these interviews
also confirmed Roberts’ allegations
about Woodard’s conduct, Riddick
concluded that Woodard’s statements
did not constitute discrimination or
harassment, and so she testified at trial.
When Roberts ask her shop steward
about the status of the investigation,
he told her that her complaints were
“probably unfounded” as Woodward
was still supervising her. Shortly after
this, Roberts got permission from her
immediate supervisors to miss work
for a day in order to appear in traffic
court and this was noted on her time
card. But when she returned the next
day, her time card indicated she was
absent without calling. She became
convinced that Woodard had altered
the time card, although he denied
doing so. UPS terminated its second
investigation. Woodard was not given
any written warning and was left in
place supervising Roberts, but senior
management decided he should be
transferred eventually to another
facility and would be required to
review UPS policies and to complete
“two written statements,” which are not
described in the court’s opinion.
When she learned about the
outcome of the investigation, Roberts
filed a complaint with the New York
State Division of Human Rights early
in December 2012. She informed her
shop stewards and union delegate about
filing the complaint. Soon after, she
suffered injuries when a number of
packages feel and hit her face, shoulder,
arm and hand. “She looked up and
saw Woodard above her,” wrote Judge
Weinstein. “He was attempting a UPS
procedure called ‘breaking the jam,’
but he had not followed safety protocol,
which required notifying everyone
in the area and stopping the conveyor
belt.” Roberts ended up missing weeks
of work while tending to her injuries.
She wrote again to the NYS Division of
Human Rights, “stressing the adverse
impact this and other incidents had
on her health.” Woodard received no
discipline from UPS for violating work
rules but was transferred to another
facility in January 2013. Roberts was
unable to return to work until midFebruary.
Her lawsuit relied on the N.Y.C.
Human Rights Ordinance, which
provides greater protection for
employees than the state or federal
employment discrimination laws as
a result of an amendment passed in
2005 called the Local Civil Rights
Restoration Act. Responding to
evidence that state and federal courts
were not providing adequate protection
against discrimination for employees,
the City Council determined to
make it clear that interpretation of
the city ordinance should not be
limited by those federal and state law
interpretations. “The provisions of this
title shall be construed liberally for
the accomplishment of the uniquely
broad and remedial purposes thereof,
regardless of whether federal or New
York State civil rights laws, including
those laws with provisions comparablyworded to provision of this title, have
been so construed,” says the 2005
amendment. This amendment is crucial
to the outcome of Roberts’ case, since
it is possible that under state and
federal precedents, UPS might have
been entitled to have some or all of her
charges dismissed. Most importantly,
New York City precedents make it
easier for an employee to prove a hostile
environment claim and to challenge
employer retaliation.
Judge
Weinstein
devoted
a
substantial part of his opinion to a
detailed overview of the history of
anti-gay discrimination in the United
States, quoting extensively from briefs
filed with the U.S. Supreme Court
in the recent marriage equality case,
Obergefell v. Hodges. He also quoted
at length from a decision issued by the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Complainant [Baldwin]
v. Foxx (Anthony Foxx, Secretary,
Department
of
Transportation),
2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC, July
15, 2015), explaining why anti-gay
discrimination violates the federal ban
on sex discrimination. It is not clear
why the judge included this material
in his opinion, since the case was
brought under the NYC Human Rights
Ordinance, but he seemed to determine
to provide substantial support for
the conclusion that gay people have
suffered substantial discrimination
in the past that needs to be redressed
under civil rights laws.
The jury concluded that Roberts
proved she was subjected to a hostile
environment because she is a lesbian,
and that she suffered retaliation after
she complained both internally and
to the civil rights agency. The jury
determined to award her compensatory
damages of $25,000 for each claim and
punitive damages of $25,000 for each
claim, totaling $100,000, as well as
awarding her the costs of her litigation.
UPS had filed pretrial motions seeking
to get the case dismissed, and renewed
its motions post-trial, arguing that
Roberts had failed to prove a violation
of the law and was not entitled to the
damages. Weinstein rejected these
contentions out of hand.
Weinstein quoted the “guiding
principles” that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit had
summarized for analyzing claims of
discrimination and retaliation under
the NYC Human Rights Law in Mihalik
v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux, 715
F. 3d 102 (2013), and then used those
principles explicitly to refute every
argument UPS made.
“Defendant argues that plaintiff
fails to make a prima facie case of
hostile work environment because
she presents only ‘petty slights and
trivial inconveniences,’” he wrote. “To
the contrary, Woodard’s continuing
discriminatory
comments
about
plaintiff’s sexual orientation, made
over a number of years, show adverse
differential treatment. So too do the
significant failures of supervisors to
protect plaintiff against discrimination.
There was sufficient evidence for a jury
to conclude that a reasonable person —
who repeatedly was the target of such
comments as plaintiff and repeatedly
complained but found no recourse —
would consider the comments more
than a trivial inconvenience.” Weinstein
had noted that because of the more
protective interpretation required for
claims under the City’s ordinance, this
case, which might not have sufficed for
a hostile environment claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, clearly
qualified.
As to the retaliation claim, Weinstein
wrote, “Retaliation may be subtle
and hidden and can be hard to prove.
Juries are therefore given more leeway
in finding retaliation than in finding
discrimination. The jury had ample
grounds to find retaliation likely to deter
a worker from complaining of abuse.
Woodard and the defendant’s deliberate
adverse conduct – the jury could have
found – would likely deter a person
from engaging in plaintiff’s protected
activity (identifying as a lesbian). First,
not only did Woodard harass plaintiff
over a course of approximately six
years, but he harassed her after
she complained repeatedly, to her
supervisors and to him, of his ongoing
adverse conduct. Second, the jury
could find that shortly after the second
investigation, plaintiff’s time card was
changed by Woodard as a punishment
for protesting. Third, the jury could
find plaintiff was hit with packages by
Woodard in retaliation. Fourth, it could
find that defendant’s decision to allow
Woodard to supervisor plaintiff after
her repeated complaints demonstrated
so much disdain by management as
to itself constitute retaliation. Fifth,
Riddick’s investigation yielded no
tangible results, despite substantial
evidence of harassment; this knownothing attitude was itself a form of
retaliation by an implied expression of
contempt for plaintiff’s complaints.”
In short, Judge Weinstein really
threw the book at UPS!
He was equally dismissive of UPS’s
claim that the damages awarded by
the jury were excessive. $25,000 per
claim for compensatory damages and
$25,000 per claim for punitive damages
struck Weinstein as “modest” and “well
within an acceptable reasonable range.”
defendant retaliated because of her
complaints by altering her time card
and by failing to provide a safe working
environment for plaintiff, there was
sufficient proof of retaliation in central
administration’s
cavalier
attitude
towards plaintiff’s serious charges of
harassment.” Thus, she was entitled to
punitive damages “as a matter of law”
and “the modest award of each claim
was appropriate in light of the evidence
before the jury.” Weinstein rejected
the motion to set aside the verdict, the
motion for a new trial, and the motion
to reduce damages.
UPS could attempt to appeal
this to the 2nd Circuit, but Judge
Weinstein was careful to emphasize
the 2nd Circuit’s own guidelines for
evaluating such claims and to provide
He was equally dismissive of UPS’s claim that the
damages awarded by the jury were excessive.
$25,000 per claim for compensatory damages
and $25,000 per claim for punitive damages
struck Weinstein as “modest” and “well within
an acceptable reasonable range.”
As to the punitive damages, UPS had
the gall to argue that Roberts had not
shown that the company acted with
“malice” or “reckless indifference.”
“To the contrary,” wrote Weinstein,
“plaintiff demonstrated sufficiently
for a jury finding that defendant
acted with reckless indifference to
her multiple complaints of sexual
orientation discrimination over many
years. UPS was anything but prompt.
By 2012, when Riddick, a high-level
manager for defendant, conducted
an investigation, she determined,
contrary to overwhelming evidence of
discrimination, that no discrimination
had occurred. She did not discipline
Woodard in any meaningful fashion and
allowed him to continue supervising
plaintiff for a short period.”
Finally, Weinstein concluded, “Even
if plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
extensive sections of the trial testimony
to show that the jury had a strong
evidentiary basis for its verdict. Also,
his characterization of the damages
as “modest” seems correct, in light of
larger damage awards he noted in other
cases. This looks like a verdict that is
likely to withstand appeal.
Tameeka Roberts is represented by
Alex Umansky, Jessenia Maldonado,
Phillips & Associates, PLLC, and
Casimir Joseph Wolnowski, New York
attorneys. UPS retained suburban
counsel from New Jersey. Perhaps
they were not too concerned about this
case, but Weinstein’s strongly worded
opinion is calculated to wake them up!
Perhaps some heads need to roll in the
UPS Human Resources Department
after a judge determines that they have
a “cavalier attitude” about unlawful
discrimination. ■
Colorado Appeals Court Rules against Wedding Cake
Baker in Discrimination Case
C
ontinuing an unbroken string
of judicial rejections of free
exercise of religion defense to
discrimination claims against small
businesses that decline goods or
services to same-sex couples for their
commitment ceremonies or weddings,
a unanimous three-judge panel of
the Colorado Court of Appeals has
affirmed a ruling against Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., and its proprietor, Jack
C. Phillips, by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission in Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 2015
WL 4760453, 2015 Colo. App. LEXIS
1217 (Aug. 13, 2015). Judge Daniel M.
Taubman wrote the opinion for the
court.
Charlie Craig and David Mullins
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings
due to his religious belief, and also
because such weddings were not legally
recognized in Colorado.
Craig and Mullins filed a complaint
with the Colorado Civil Rights
Division, invoking the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act (CADA), which
bans discrimination because of sexual
orientation by public accommodations.
After investigation, the Division noted
probable cause and filed a formal
complaint, that was tried before an
Administrative Law Judge, who ruled
in favor of Craig and Mullins, rejecting
Phillips’ claimed religious exemption
defense. The Civil Rights Commission
affirmed the ALJ decision, issuing
a “cease and desist order” against
The court rejected the rationalization of status
versus conduct, observing that “the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that such
distinctions are generally inappropriate.”
planned in 2012 to get married in
Massachusetts and then to hold a
wedding celebration for family friends in
Colorado, where they lived. At the time,
the state of Colorado did not recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other
jurisdictions. They visited Masterpiece
Cakeshop and asked the proprietor, Jack
Phillips, to design and create a cake
for their celebration. Phillips declined,
stating to them that he does not create
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings
because of his religious beliefs. He
told them he would be happy to make
and sell them other baked goods, but
not a wedding cake. The two men left
the store and made arrangements with
another bakery. Craig’s mother called
Phillips to follow up, but he reiterated
his position that he would not make
Masterpiece, that required the company
to (1) take remedial measures, including
comprehensive staff training and
alteration to the company’s policies to
comply with the CADA, and (2) file
quarterly compliance reports for two
years with the Division describing
the company’s remedial measures and
documenting all patrons who had been
denied service and the reasons for the
denial. The court’s opinion does not
mention any fine or damages award.
Of course, since Craig and Mullins
had long since married and held
their celebration, there was no need
to order Masterpiece to sell them a
wedding cake.
Phillips appealed to the courts,
claiming, as he had maintained all
along, that his refusal to make a
wedding cake for the gay couple did
not violate the statute, and that he had a
right under the 1st Amendment to refuse
to create a wedding cake when this act
would conflict with his sincerely-held
religious beliefs. Phillips claimed that
he did not discriminate because of the
sexual orientation of Craig and Mullins,
but rather because he disapproved
of same-sex marriages on religious
grounds. He pointed out that he did not
refuse to do business with them because
they were gay, as he offered to sell them
any other baked goods, and sought to
draw a distinction between their status
and their conduct in having a same-sex
marriage. He pointed out, for example,
that he would equally refuse to design
a cake for two heterosexual men who
wanted to celebrate their wedding, to
advance his argument that he was not
discriminating based on status.
The
court
rejected
this
rationalization, observing that “the
United States Supreme Court has
recognized that such distinctions
are generally inappropriate.” Judge
Taubman quoted from Christian
Legal Soc’y Chapter of University of
California, Hastings College of Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), in which
petitioner contended that it did not
exclude individuals from membership
because of their sexual orientation, but
rather “on the basis of a conjunction
of conduct and belief that the conduct
is not wrong,” to which the Court
replied, “Our decisions have declined to
distinguish between status and conduct
in this context.” Taubman also cited the
majority and concurring decisions in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
in which Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
opinion said that a law criminalizing
homosexual conduct is “in and of itself
an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination” and Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring
opinion said, “While it is true that
the [challenged sodomy law] applies
only to conduct, the conduct targeted
by this law is conduct that is closely
correlated with being homosexual.
Under such circumstances, [the] law
is directed toward gay persons as a
class.” These comments were directed
against the state of Texas’s argument
that its “Homosexual Conduct Law”
was not specifically anti-gay because it
outlawed oral or anal sex between two
persons of the same sex regardless of
their sexual orientation, an argument
analogous to Phillips’ denial that his
rejection of Craig and Mullins’ order
was antigay. Taubman invoked as well
the highest-level judicial precedent
to deal directly with the issue in this
case, Elane Photography v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53 (2013), in which the
New Mexico Supreme Court upheld
a discrimination ruling against a
wedding photography who refused to do
business with a lesbian couple for their
commitment ceremony. Wrote Taubman,
“Masterpiece admits that it refused to
serve Craig and Mullins ‘because of’
its opposition to persons entering into
same-sex marriages, conduct which
we conclude is closely correlated with
sexual orientation. Therefore, even if we
assume that CADA requires plaintiffs
to establish an intent to discriminate. . .
the ALJ reasonably could have inferred
from Masterpiece’s conduct an intent to
discriminate against Craig and Mullins
‘because of’ their sexual orientation.”
Before addressing Phillips’ religious
exemption argument, the court dealt with
his argument that creating a wedding
cake is an artistic expression, and that
the First Amendment’s protection for
freedom of expression should shield
him from being compelled by state law
to create a wedding cake. “Masterpiece
contends that wedding cakes inherently
communicate a celebratory message
about marriage and that, by forcing it to
make cakes for same-sex weddings, the
Commission’s cease and desist order
unconstitutionally compels it to express
a celebratory message that it does not
support.” The ALJ had rejected this
argument, and so did the court. “We
conclude that the act of designing and
selling a wedding cake to all customers
free of discrimination does not convey
a celebratory message about same-sex
weddings likely to be understood by
those who view it,” wrote Taubman.
“We further conclude that, to the extent
that the public infers from a Masterpiece
wedding cake a message celebrating
same-sex marriage, that message is
more likely to be attributed to the
customer than to Masterpiece.” After
all, Masterpiece would be creating the
cake because of its legal duty not to
discriminate, not because it wishes to
convey its own message of approval of
same-sex marriages. The court drew
an analogy to the Supreme Court’s
rejection of law schools’ argument
that requiring them to allow military
recruiters on campus during the era of
“don’t ask, don’t tell” was compelling
them to express approval of that policy.
“The Supreme Court rejected this
argument,” wrote Taubman, “observing
that students ‘can appreciate the
difference between speech a school
sponsors and speech the school permits
because legally required to do so.’”
The court found this case distinctly
different from the Supreme Court’s
ruling that a parade sponsor’s 1st
Amendment expression rights allowed
the sponsor to exclude a gay group
from openly participating in the parade.
The Court saw that as a compelled
speech case, holding that a parade is
an intrinsically expressive activity
whose sponsor has a right to control the
views that are expressed, despite a state
public accommodations law banning
sexual orientation discrimination. “In
contrast,” wrote Taubman, “it is unlikely
that the public would understand
Masterpiece’s sale of wedding cakes
to same-sex couples as endorsing a
celebratory message about same-sex
marriage.” He noted that the law would
not prohibit Masterpiece and Phillips
from articulating their objections to
same-sex marriage. Furthermore, he
noted, “Phillips denied Craig’s and
Mullin’s request without any discussion
regarding the wedding cake’s design or
any possible written inscriptions,” so it
is unclear exactly what speech he would
be “compelled” to engage in when
decorating the cake.
Finally, turning to the religious
free exercise argument, the court
noted that under established Supreme
Court precedent, an individual is
not excused by his or her religious
beliefs from complying with neutral
laws of general application. Under
that standard, because the CADA is
such a law, no business or individual
can claim a religious exemption from
complying with it. The only exemption
generally recognized under the law is
for religious organizations that claim
an exemption from anti-discrimination
laws, for example, in their selections
of employees or contractors to perform
religious functions. The court rejected
Masterpiece’s argument that CADA was
not a neutral law of general application.
The law “does not compel Masterpiece
to support or endorse any particular
religious views,” Taubman pointed out.
“The law merely prohibits Masterpiece
from discriminating against potential
customers on account of their sexual
orientation,” he continued. Thus, “we
conclude that CADA was not designed
to impede religious conduct and does
not impose burdens on religious conduct
not imposed on secular conduct.”
Having found the law to be neutral
as to religion and generally applicable,
the court concluded that its application
to Masterpiece and Phillips turned
on whether the state had a rational
basis, the lowest level of constitutional
review. “We easily conclude that it is
rationally related to Colorado’s interest
in eliminating discrimination in places
of public accommodation,” Taubman
wrote. “The Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that states have
a compelling interest in eliminating
such discrimination and that statutes
like CADA further that interest. Without
CADA, businesses could discriminate
against potential patrons based on their
sexual orientation. Such discrimination
in places of public accommodation has
measurable adverse economic effects.
CADA creates a hospitable environment
for all consumers by preventing
discrimination on the basis of certain
characteristics,
including
sexual
orientation. In doing so, it prevents
the economic and social balkanization
prevalent when businesses decide to
serve only their own ‘kind,’ and ensures
that the goods and services provided by
public accommodations are available to
all of the state’s citizens.”
Finally, the court rejected Phillips’
argument that the Commission exceeded
its authority by imposing a remedy that
went beyond the specific complaint of
Craig and Mullins, requiring it to change
policies and create wedding cakes for
hypothetical future customers. The
court found that “individual remedies
are merely secondary and incidental to
CADA’s primary purpose of eradicating
discriminatory practices.” Masterpiece
had conceded that its rejection of this
request to create the wedding cake was
pursuant to a company policy, and there
was actually evidence in the hearing
record that they had also rejected doing
business with other same-sex couples,
so the Commission’s order “was
aimed at the specific discriminatory or
unfair practice involved in Craig’s and
Mullins’ complaint.”
Shortly after the opinion was
released, Phillips’s attorney announced
that an appeal to the Colorado Supreme
Court would be attempted. That court
has control over its docket and is
not required to grant review to this
unanimous court of appeals ruling, but
given the wide public interest in the
case, it would seem likely that review
would be granted. Numerous amicus
briefs were filed with the court from
such groups as the National Center
for Lesbian Rights, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State,
groups representing small business
associations, religious organizations,
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and
Lambda Legal Defense Fund. Phillips
is being represented by Arizona
attorney Jeremy D. Tedesco from
Alliance Defending Freedom, a socalled “Christian” legal defense group.
Craig and Mullins are represented by
Paula Greisen of King & Greisen, a
Denver firm, with Mark Silverstein
and Sara Neel, Denver attorneys,
and Ria Tabacco Mar, a New Yorkbased attorney for the ACLU LGBT
& AIDS Project. The Commission is
represented by the Colorado Attorney
General’s office. ■
Illinois Enacts Ban on Conversion
Therapy for Minors
O
n August 20, Governor
Bruce Rauner signed into
law H.B. 217, Public Act
099-0411, the Youth Mental Health
Protection Act, making Illinois
the fifth U.S. jurisdiction, after
California, New Jersey, the District
of Columbia and Oregon, to outlaw
the performance on minors of sexual
orientation change efforts (SOCE),
commonly known as “conversion
therapy,” which purports to change
an individual’s sexual orientation.
The action came just weeks after the
American Bar Association’s House
reports and resolutions issued by
professional associations opposing
the performance of such therapy
based upon studies showing the
harmful effects upon minors of
being subjected to such procedures.
The operative provision of
the statute, Section 20, provides:
“Under no circumstances shall a
mental health provider engage in
sexual orientation change efforts
with a person under the age of 18.”
It also provides that a consumer
fraud provision in connection with
the marketing and promotion of
The operative provision of the statute, Section
20, provides: “Under no circumstances shall
a mental health provider engage in sexual
orientation change efforts with a person
under the age of 18.”
of Delegates passed a resolution
urging states to enact such measures
(see below in Law and Society Notes),
but shortly after Liberty Counsel,
the so-called Christian law firm,
filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court, seeking review
of a 3rd Circuit decision rejecting
a 1st Amendment challenge to the
New Jersey law. Doe v. Christie, 783
F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, No. 15-195 (August 13,
2015) (see below in Civil Litigation
Notes).
Anticipating the likelihood of
litigation challenges to the law, the
Illinois legislature included in the
law an extensive body of legislative
findings, reciting in detail the
conversion therapy, making such
activity an unlawful practice under
the state’s Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.
The measure provides that mental
health providers who are found to
have engaged in providing such
therapy “may be subject to discipline
by the licensing entity or disciplinary
review board with competent
jurisdiction,” and amends the
Consumer Fraud Act to specifically
provide that a violation of the Youth
Mental Health Protection Act is
deemed to be an unlawful practice
under the consumer fraud act.
Similar bills are pending in other
state legislatures, including in New
York. ■
Utah Federal Court Requires Gender-Neutral Interpretation
of Donor Insemination Statute
D
uring a hearing on July 15,
2015, U.S. District Judge Dee
Benson granted a preliminary
injunction against Utah officials on
behalf of a married lesbian couple,
identified in court papers as Angie and
Kami Roe, ordering that Angie’s name
be recorded as a parent on the birth
certificate of their child, conceived
through donor insemination of Kami
during their marriage. On August 22
the court issued an opinion explaining
its decision. Roe v. Patton, 2015 WL
4476734, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96207
(D. Utah). The dispute concerned the
interpretation and constitutionality of
Utah’s Uniform Parentage Act section
on donor insemination, which provides
that when a married woman becomes
pregnant through donor insemination
with the consent of her husband, the
husband is treated legally as the father
of the child. Utah officials had taken
the position that this statute does not
apply to lesbian couples, such that
Angie would have to go through a
stepparent adoption process in order
to be recognized as the child’s legal
parent.
Angie and Kami were married
on December 20, 2013, the first day
when same-sex marriages became
available as a result of the U.S. District
Court’s decision in Kitchen v. Herbert.
Although the Supreme Court stayed
the district court’s order on January 6,
2014, it was subsequently determined
by the federal courts that marriages
contracted between those two dates
were valid and must be recognized
by the state. Angie and Kami decided
to have a child through donor
insemination, and Kami conceived
through that method at the University
of Utah Medical School on May 21,
2014, giving birth to their child, L.R.,
on February 7, 2015. Angie and Kami
signed the necessary papers under the
statute, but the state’s Department of
Health and the Office of Vital Records
and Statistics refused to recognize
Angie as a parent or to enter her name
on the birth certificate, arguing that the
statute, by its terms, only provided for
recognition of fathers/husbands, not
mothers/wives.
Judge Benson found that this
distinction raised an equal protection
question, especially in light of the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision
on June 26 in Obergefell v. Hodges. For
purposes of ruling on plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction, the court
had to determine whether plaintiffs
made a strong showing that they were
likely to succeed on the merits of
their equal protection claim, whether
Records and Statistics “recognizes male
spouses in Angie’s identical situation
as parents pursuant to Utah’s assistedreproduction statutes and issues a birth
certificate with both spouses listed as
parents without requiring that the male
spouses undergo a stepparent adoption
process.”
In light of Obergefell, the judge
held that the question before the
court was “whether the statutes as
written comport with the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment? May
Defendants extend the benefits of the
assisted-reproduction statutes to male
The judge concluded it was unnecessary
to decide whether to treat this as a sex
discrimination case or a sexual orientation
discrimination case, since she concluded that
the state had failed to meet the least demanding
rational basis test in justifying its reading of the
statute.
they would suffer irreparable injury if
denied injunctive relief pending a trial,
whether the balance of harms favored
the plaintiffs, and whether issuing the
injunction was in the public interest.
Benson directed most of her attention
to the first issue.
The judge concluded it was
unnecessary to decide whether to
treat this as a sex discrimination
case, invoking heightened scrutiny,
or a sexual orientation discrimination
case, as to which there is no binding
Supreme Court holding on the level
of scrutiny, since she concluded that
the state had failed to meet the least
demanding rational basis test in
justifying its reading of the statute. The
State conceded that the Office of Vital
spouses in opposite-sex couples but
not for [sic] female spouses in samesex couples?” Judge Benson found that
“Plaintiffs are highly likely to succeed
in their claim that such differential
treatment is unconstitutional.” The
only state interests that Defendants
articulated were concerns about the
accuracy of vital statistics records
and “making parentage clear,” which
Benson brushed aside, saying that the
Defendants had been unable to “specify
any tangible effect that recognizing a
female spouse as a parent would have
on the accuracy of those records” or
to explain how recognizing a female
spouse as a parent would undermine
the “clarity of parentage.” Neither
struck the court as a rational basis for
making a female spouse go through the
adoption process.
Judge Benson mentioned that the
stepparent adoption process imposed
expenses and was time-consuming.
A filing fee of $360 was required to
initiate the adoption petition. Angie
would have to undergo a background
check by the Utah Bureau of Criminal
Identification and the Utah Division
of Child and Family Services; she
would have to wait for a hearing before
a judge to be scheduled; then both
women would have to appear in person
at the hearing, leaving it to a judge
to determine whether the adoption
was in the child’s best interest. In the
meantime, lacking an appropriate birth
certificate, Angie would be unable
to prove to third parties that she was
a parent of the child or for the child
to fully enjoy the “protections and
benefits of having Angie as her legally
recognized parent.” Money damages
after the fact would be inadequate
to fully compensate for this, and in
general courts consider a deprivation
of constitutional rights to itself impose
irreparable injury, apart from any
other harm. As the state could show
no tangible harm if it were ordered to
recognize Angie as a parent and issue
an appropriate birth certificate, the
balance of harms favored the plaintiffs,
and the 10th Circuit has recognized
that “it is always in the public interest
to prevent the violation of a party’s
constitutional rights.”
Thus the court concluded that the
preliminary injunction sought by the
plaintiffs should be issued. The ruling
as the first of its kind post-Obergefell
and it was not clear whether the state
would seek to appeal from a final
judgement on the merits in this case.
The logic of the decision, in light of
Obergefell’s command that same-sex
and different-sex married couples be
treated the same, is impeccable, so an
appeal would undoubtedly be futile and
frivolous.
Plaintiffs are represented by John
M. Mejia and Leah M. Farrell of the
ACLU of Utah, and Joshua A. Block of
the ACLU LGBT & AIDS Project. ■
Nebraska Court Holds Anti-Gay
Adoption/Foster Licensing Policy
Violates 14th Amendment
L
ancaster County, Nebraska, District
Judge John A. Colborn ruled on
August 5, 2015, that the state’s policy
for approving adoptions of state wards
and foster care licenses for same-sex
couples violated the rights of gay people
and same-sex couples under the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Ruling in Stewart v. Heineman, Case
No. CI 13-3157, the court invoked
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges in support of its
ruling, but without explicitly stating
why Obergefell compels this result.
Nebraska Attorney General Doug
Peterson stated on August 6 that he will
file a motion to reconsider the decision,
sexual orientation or marital status
apart from inquiries already included
in the licensing application and home
study forms. In the summer of 2012,
the former Director of the Division of
Children and Family Services (CFS),
Thomas Pristow, told Service Area
Administrators and the Deputy Director
of the agency that they should no longer
follow Memo #1-95, and that DHHS
could place children with gay singles
or same-sex couples, provided that he
personally approve any such placement.
This was after the three plaintiff couples
in this case had been turned down under
the policy expressed in Memo #1-95.
The memo was subsequently removed
The lawsuit was initiated in 2013 by three samesex couples who were told during the period
2010-2012 that they could not be certified to be
foster parents.
and a spokesperson for his office said,
“The scope of the court’s order makes
placements in the best interest of the
child unnecessarily more difficult.”
Omaha World-Herald, Aug. 7.
The lawsuit was initiated in 2013
by three same-sex couples who were
told during the period 2010-2012 that
they could not be certified to be foster
parents because of a policy adopted
by the state’s Department of Health
and Human Services. In January
1995, DHHS issued Administrative
Memorandum #1-95, which directs that
foster home licenses may not be issued
to “persons who identify themselves as
homosexuals” or “unrelated, unmarried
adults residing together.” DHHS
indicated at the same time that the new
policy would not affect existing foster
placements or placements with a child’s
relative, and apparently the intent was to
institute a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy
under which staff would not ask about
from the agency’s website in February
2015 (after a federal district court had
ruled that the state’s same-sex marriage
ban was unconstitutional) but the
policy was never formally rescinded
in writing, Memo #1-95 does not
appear on the DHHS website’s page for
rescinded or replaced memos, and it has
not been replaced with a new written
policy statement. Indeed, the current
website makes no reference to a DHHS
policy on gay individuals or unrelated,
unmarried couples. According to
evidence introduced by the plaintiffs,
some consisting of statements by agency
officials at operational levels, it appears
that there is considerable confusion
within the agency and among agency
contractors about the status of this
policy, and that gay couples continue
to be routinely denied certification as
foster parents.
Judge Colborn rejected the agency’s
contention that removal of the policy
those applications approved at lower
levels are subjected to review at higher
levels within the agency. “It is not logical
that a procedure could prevent bias
when it does not deal with placements
that were rejected, or not recommended,
during one of the previous four stages
of review,” wrote the judge. “If the
Defendants wanted to prevent bias
against gay and lesbian couples, as well
as unmarried adults residing together,
Defendants would review denials of
placements rather than approvals of
placements.” On its face, the extra-tiersof-review process appears designed to
screen out gay applicants, not to prevent
bias against them. The court found that
the agency had acknowledged that there
was “no child welfare interest advanced
by treating gay and lesbian persons
differently from heterosexual persons
in decisions regarding licensing or
placement in foster or adoption homes.”
That being the case, once again the court
deemed the policy inconsistent with the
requirements of Obergefell v. Hodges.
The court ruled that the agency
must treat gay and non-gay applicants
the same, and same-sex and differentsex couples the same. Of course, in the
post-Obergefell world, the state and its
agencies must treat married same-sex
couples the same as married differentsex couples as a matter of constitutional
law. The court ordered the agency to
formally rescind Memo #1-95, and
to replace it with a Memo stating the
constitutionally appropriate version of
the current policy. (The absence of a
written policy clearly creates confusion
within the agency and may provide too
much unguided discretion to lower level
agency functionaries to discriminate
against gay applicants.) The court
enjoined the agency from “applying
a categorical bar to gay and lesbian
individuals, gay and lesbian couples,
and unrelated, unmarried adults residing
together seeking to be licensed as foster
care parents or to adopt a state ward.”
The court ordered that the same review
processes be used for all applicants, and
provided that “costs of this action are
taxed to Defendants.”
Given
the
state’s
reluctant
acquiescence to Obergefell and the
stated opposition by Governor David
Heineman to gay rights in general and
gay parenting in particular, it seemed
likely that the state would pursue an
appeal of Judge Colborn’s decision. ■
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from the website and the agency’s verbal
assurance to the judge that the policy
was no longer in place was sufficient to
make this case go away. Indeed, Judge
Colborn found as a matter of fact that
regardless of the memo’s absence or
presence on the website, there is evidence
that the agency, despite its disavowals,
imposes a higher level of scrutiny on
gay and same-sex couple applicants
than on other applicants. Indeed, a nongay individual or traditionally-married
applicant goes through two low levels
of scrutiny before final approval, while
gay or same-sex couple applicants
go through five tiers of scrutiny
culminating in personal review by the
head of the agency. Clearly there is an
unequal process.
First the court addressed the odd
posture of agency policy concerning
Memo #1-95. “The current stated
policy of DHHS is wholly inconsistent
with Memo #1-95,” wrote the judge.
“Memo #1-95 has not been rescinded
or replaced with the current policy. A
governmental agency cannot adopt a
new policy, and not rescind or replace
an Administration Memorandum that
is wholly inconsistent with the current
policy. It is the determination of the court
that Memo #1-95 should be rescinded,
and ordered stricken or replaced with
the current policy, for the reason that it
is not consistent with the current policy
of DHHS. Additionally, pursuant to the
holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015), the court must hold
that Memo #1-95 should be stricken as
it violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses.”
Turning to the challenge to the current
unwritten policy described in agency
testimony, the court found further
constitutional flaws. “Defendants have
not argued, nor have they identified,
any legitimate governmental interest
to justify treating gay and lesbian
individuals and gay and lesbian couples
differently than heterosexual individuals
and heterosexual couples in this review
process,” wrote Judge Colborn. In
fact, he noted, the agency claimed it
wasn’t treating them differently, but
the testimony belied that assertion. The
agency made the laughable argument
that the extra level of scrutiny on
approving gay applicants was intended
to “prevent bias against those persons.”
What makes this laughable was that only
Georgia Federal Court Parses Discovery Requests in
Transgender “Protection from Harm” Case
T
his writer rarely sees published
decisions regarding the nuts
and bolts of pre-trial discovery
in
prisoner
protection-from-harm
cases. In Green v. Hooks, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93376 (S.D. Ga., July 17,
2015), plaintiff Darius Ishun Green,
a transgender inmate, “begged” for
protective custody after repeated sexual
assaults from another inmate, Darryl
Ricard. In response, named parties and
“John Doe” defendants placed Green
“into protective custody with Ricard,
who then raped him.” [Italics by the
court.] United States Magistrate Judge
second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition; but he
ruled that the official’s “we don’t know”
answers were binding on the GaDOC
(but not the individual defendants),
prohibiting it from offering evidence on
the point at trial.
Green also sought to compel
production of: (1) all videotapes of
Green during his entire incarceration;
(2) documents about broken locks in
the protection unit and security audits
at the prison; and (3) documents about
sexual assaults, identifying transgender
victims. Judge Smith sustained
GaDOC’s objection to Green’s “fishing
Green sought a second deposition of a
“designated” official of the Georgia Department
of Corrections under F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6), who could
testify about the incident, name the “John Doe”
defendants, and identify relevant documents,
after the first such witness was so unprepared
she “effectively failed to appear.”
G. R. Smith’s decision discusses both
depositions and documents.
Green sought a second deposition
of a “designated” official of the
Georgia Department of Corrections
[“GaDOC”] under F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6),
who could testify about the incident,
name the “John Doe” defendants, and
identify relevant documents, after the
first such witness was so unprepared
she “effectively failed to appear.” The
witness could not identify the persons
responsible for Green’s protective
custody or Ricard’s placement in the
same unit, nor could she find some
of the documentation relating to
the events. Although she reviewed
the incident report and interviewed
available witnesses, her investigation
was “largely fruitless.” Judge Smith
declined to make a spoliation finding on
the missing documentation or to order a
expedition” of thousands of hours of
videos, relying on McBride v. Rivers,
170 F. App’x 648, 659-60 (11th Cir.
2006) (affirming refusal of production
of “all grievances,” ostensibly to
establish “subjective intent” in prison
case); but he allowed Green’s attorney
to conduct his own search of the
existing videos. He compelled GaDOC
to produce videos of Green’s movement
to protection and of the rape on the
two consecutive days these events
occurred; and he ruled that, “[i]f no
such video exists, it must certify that
it meaningfully reviewed the available
video surveillance for images . . . yet
found nothing relevant.”
On the broken locks and security
audits, GaDOC produced safety audit
summaries without supporting records.
Judge Smith ordered it to produce such
documentation on the cells holding
Green or her assailant, as well as
documents about “systemic security
flaws,” including: (1) faulty locks; (2)
free roaming inmates; (3) rapes and
sexual assaults; and (4) issues with
transportation to protective custody.
If the GaDOC has specific “security
concerns,” they must be addressed in a
particularized motion for a protective
order on those grounds.
GaDOC produced spreadsheets about
sexual assaults, but it said it “had no
way of knowing” who was transgender;
and it did not produce incident reports
about the listed assaults. Judge Smith
accepted that GaDOC could not identify
transgender victims, but he ordered
production of the incident reports,
since “they might help establish that
[the prison’s] administrators knowingly
turned a blind eye to prison sexual
assaults in general,” allowing redaction
for “appropriate” privacy and security
concerns – cautioning that GaDOC
“must not over-redact” and that Green
could move for release of information
in a report that was likely to lead to
admissible evidence.
Although these discovery rulings
establish useful precedent in protectionfrom-harm cases, the opinion does not
mention the Prison Rape Elimination
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601, et seq., or its
implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R.,
Part 115 [“PREA”] – perhaps because
the events occurred prior to the final
PREA regulations. While courts have
consistently ruled that PREA does
not provide a private cause of action,
the regulations are a fountain of leads
for discovery, mandating: action
plans to reduce sexual assault, audits
of performance, investigation and
reporting of incidents, protection of
witnesses, and retention of documents.
PREA
particularly
addresses
transgender victims of sexual assault,
and all prisons and jails are now
required by PREA to maintain some
of the documentation the GaDOC was
unable to produce in this case.
Green was represented by Mario
Bernard Williams, Williams Oinonen,
Atlanta. – William J. Rold
Italian Supreme Court Finds Sex Reassignment Surgery
Not Always Prerequisite for Legal Gender Reassignment
O
n July 20, 2015, the Italian
Supreme Court (Corte di
Cassazione) ruled that sex
reassignment surgery (SRS) is not a
requirement for completing the legal
gender reassignment procedure (No.
15138/15, X v. Minister of Interior &
Others).
The ruling follows a jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court that is very attentive
to the personal dimensions of questions
relating to sexual orientation and gender
identity. In so doing, it incorporates
and combines several principles
arising out of both the comparative
and the supranational contexts, in
particular from the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights
(see, for instance, judgments No. 8097
of Apr. 21, 2015 and No. 14329 of
June 6, 2013, A.B. et al. v. Comune di
Finale Emilia, recognizing the validity
of the marriage of a male-to-female
transsexual after post-marriage gender
reassignment; No. 2400 of Feb. 9, 2015,
A.A. & D.P. v. Comune di Roma et al.,
on the constitutional right to samesex marriage; No. 4184 of Feb. 15,
2012, Garullo & Ottocento v. Comune
di Latina, on the legal protection of
foreign same-sex marriages).
The question of an SRS requirement
in order to obtain legal gender
reassignment has filled Italian
courtrooms in recent times and is
currently under the review of the
Constitutional Court (see also Eur.
Ct. Hum. Rgts., March 10, 2015,
App. No. 14793/08, Y.Y. v. Turkey).
The question is central to Italy’s Law
No. 164 of April 14, 1982, regulating
gender reassignment, one of the first
European laws on the subject. Despite
its reincorporation in a reform of 2011
aimed at speeding up the various
proceedings that exist in the chaotic
and long-lasting world of Italian
civil procedure, the Law remained
substantially unchanged throughout
thirty years.
Its Article 1 establishes that
courts have jurisdiction over petitions
for gender reassignment “after the
modification of sexual characteristics.”
In addition, Article 3 provides that
“[t]he court authorizes [SRS] after
finding that a modification of sexual
characteristics is deemed necessary.”
At the completion of this procedure, the
court orders the registry office in the
municipality of residence (Ufficio dello
stato civile) to rectify the petitioner’s
sex and name(s) in the birth certificate.
However, since the Law does not
specify which sexual characteristics
—primary or secondary — must be
modified, courts have interpreted the
SRS requirement in different ways.
not required by the text of the law.”
In fact, in recent years medical,
psychological and psychiatric sciences
have developed new techniques that
changed the transition procedure, while
at the same time “a culture of human
rights” spread throughout Europe. Here
the Court mentions the reports of the
United Nations and the Council of
Europe on the subject, together with the
judgments of the Constitutional Courts
of Germany and Austria on the same.
In this respect, according to the Court,
whereas a judicial procedure is needed
to protect the public interest to ensure
that people’s sex and names are well-
The ruling follows a jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court that is very attentive to the
personal dimensions of questions relating to
sexual orientation and gender identity.
Whereas some courts have granted the
petitioners’ requests for rectification
without surgery (e.g., the Tribunals of
Rovereto, Messina, Genova, and Rome),
others have denied these requests
on the ground that, by avoiding SRS,
petitioners were allegedly seeking “to
vindicate a tertium genus” (e.g., Court
of Appeals of Bologna, Tribunals
of Vercelli and of Piacenza). Often
the former position was based upon
a human rights reading of the Law,
which privileged the protection of
health and the risks arising out of SRS,
while courts justified the latter position
with the need to respect the letter of
the law and prevent interfering with the
legislature.
Perhaps to avoid a conflict with the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court
ruling focuses on the interpretation of
Articles 1 and 3 of the Law, avoiding
any constitutional review. It concludes
that “the ‘chirurgical’ correction is
determined, the personal experience of
transsexual petitioners should not be
dismissed as capricious or unworthy.
If the goal of the Law is to protect
the transsexual person’s health, SRS
cannot be imposed as a requirement.
An appropriate case-by-case judicial
analysis is nevertheless still deemed
necessary. Therefore, courts may
grant the legal gender reassignment
if, according to the court-appointed
expert, SRS appears to be unreasonably
risky or unnecessary for the transsexual
person to reach full health. Because
the lower court had made the public
interest prevail over the latter’s needs,
its judgment must be reversed. Matteo
M. Winkler, Assistant Professor, Tax &
Law Department, HEC Paris – Matteo
M. Winkler
Matteo M. Winkler is an Assistant Professor in the Tax & Law Department at
HEC Paris.
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
OBERGEFELL RETROACTIVITY –
An important transitional issue in the
implementation of Obergefell v. Hodges
is the question of whether the Supreme
Court’s declaration that same-sex
couples enjoy a constitutional right to
marry should be applied retroactively.
This question was forcibly raised in a
pair of lawsuits filed by Lambda Legal,
Williams v. Colvin in the Northern
District of Illinois and Murphy v.
Colvin in the District for the District
of Columbia, contending that the
Social Security Administration (SSA)
should apply Obergefell retroactively
to recognize same-sex marriages of
couples who resided in states that did not
recognize their marriages prior to June
26, 2015. These cases involved claims
for surviving spouse benefits. In both
complaints, wrote Lambda, “Plaintiff
seeks to end SSA’s unconstitutional use
of discriminatory state laws to deny the
spousal status and eligibility for Social
Security benefits of spouses, widows,
and widowers who validly married
partners of the same sex.” Some of these
claims predate both U.S. v. Windsor and
Obergefell, in which the Supreme Court
first struck down as unconstitutional
the federal government’s refusal to
recognize all same-sex marriages
and then the states’ refusal to allow
or recognize same-sex marriages.
After Windsor, the SSA had taken the
position that under existing statutes
and regulations it could only recognize
same-sex marriages if the couple
resided in a state that recognized the
marriage. Nonetheless, LGBT advocacy
groups advised spouses living in those
states with potential social security
benefits claims to file applications
and appeals in order to preserve their
claims in case this restriction was
knocked down. The agency had been
denying or delaying responding to these
claims, most recently asserting that it
was waiting on the Justice Department
to advise about the issue of retroactive
application in light of Obergefell. At a
status conference in the federal court
in Chicago on August 20, the Justice
Department announced that SSA will
apply Obergefell retroactively, and will
process pending spousal benefits claims
for same-sex couples. DOJ attorneys at
the status conference stated that this
policy will apply to previously filed
claims still pending in the administrative
process or in litigation. DOJ did not
indicate when the new policy will be
officially published or implemented,
however, and the announcement did
not seem to contemplate the possibility
that other same-sex spouses could
file claims that would not be barred
by statutory time limits. Stand by for
further developments.
OBERGEFELL DOCTRINAL BASIS
– The Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell has drawn some adverse
criticism from LGBT rights advocates
due to the Court’s decision to premise
its ruling entirely on the right to marry
as a fundamental right, avoiding
the question whether a statutory
classification
that
discriminates
because of sexual orientation is subject
to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. Retired Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens injected
himself into the discussion in remarks
he delivered on July 31 to the American
Bar Association’s Litigation Section at
a function in Chicago. According to
his published text, he stated: “Probably
the most significant opinion announced
during the Term was Justice Kennedy’s
explanation for holding that the
Constitution protects an individual’s
right to marry a person of the same
sex. I was surprised by his decision
to rely primarily on a substantive due
process rationale rather than the Equal
Protection Clause but, after reflection, I
am persuaded that he was wise to do so.
The difference between categories of
couples capable of producing children
and those completely unable to do so
surely provides a rational basis for
treating the two categories differently,
but the substantive due process doctrine
is more appropriate for an all-ornothing analysis. The right to marry
– like the right to decide whether to
have an abortion, or the right to control
the education of your children – fits
squarely within the category of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment. Just as Potter
Stewart’s reliance on substantive due
process in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Justice Harlan’s and Justice
White’s reliance on the substantive
content of the word ‘liberty’ in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), were far better explanations for
those two correct decisions than the
concept of ‘privacy’ developed by the
majority opinions, I am persuaded that
a fair reading of the word ‘liberty’ best
explains the real basis for the Court’s
holding in the marriage case. The point
is strongly reinforced by the dissenting
opinions which rely heavily on earlier
decisions rejecting the substantive due
process analysis in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). But those dissents
incorrectly assume that our cases
overruling Lochner rejected the entire
doctrine of substantive due process,
whereas in fact they merely rejected
its application to economic regulation.
Indeed, it is ironic that all of today’s
dissenters (except Justice Thomas)
who accuse the majority of improperly
resurrecting Lochner, came much closer
to committing that sin themselves when
they decided to rely on substantive due
process as the basis for their conclusion
that the Second Amendment applies to
the States. It borders on the absurd to
assume that the word ‘liberty’ does not
include one’s right to choose a spouse
but does include a right to possess a
firearm in one’s home. . . I endorse the
Court’s holding that the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment protects
an individual’s right to choose his or her
spouse but I remain unpersuaded that
the Clause also protects an individual’s
right to use a gun. The dissenters have
things backwards when they argue that
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
it protects the latter but not the former.”
It is worth noting that several lower
federal courts disagreed with Justice
Stevens’ assertion that the differing
reproductive capacities of same-sex and
different-sex couples provided a rational
basis for treating the two classes of
couples differently, in ruling that state
bans on same-sex marriage did violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
SOCIAL SECURITY CLASS ACTION
– On August 3, U.S. District Judge
Percy Anderson dismissed a proposed
class action lawsuit on behalf of
married same-sex couples who received
notices from the Social Security
Administration (SSA)during 2014
seeking recoupment for “overpayment
of benefits” after the SSA got around
to recognizing same-sex marriages in
the wake of U.S. v. Windsor. Held v.
Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103605
(C.D. Cal.). Under Social Security, a
married couple may receive a smaller
monthly retirement check than the
total of what an unmarried couple will
receive as single participants. It took
the SSA more than a year to respond to
the demise of Section 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act and begin paying out
to same-sex married couples (in states
that recognized their marriages) at the
married couple rate. This was followed
by letters to beneficiaries, advising them
that they had been overpaid since June
26, 2013, and would have to repay the
SSA. Plaintiff Hugh Held received such
a letter in September 2014, demanding
$6,205.00. Plaintiff Kelly RichardsonWright received her letter in December
2014, seeking $4,129.88. Rather than
formally appeal these determinations
within the SSA, Held and Wright,
represented by a team of public interest
lawyers, filed suit on March 10, 2105,
seeking to represent all same-sex
spouses who had received or would
receive such letters from the SSA.
After the suit was filed, SSA quickly
determined that it should “waive”
these overpayments, and notified Held
and Richardson-Wright to that effect.
The Act authorized the SSA to waive
overpayments to a beneficiary “who
was without fault in connection with
the overpayment” when recovering the
overpayment would “be against equity
and good conscience.” Moving to
dismiss the lawsuit, the SSA argued that
the plaintiffs’ claims were moot and,
furthermore, that the class action should
be dismissed because neither plaintiffs
nor any proposed class members had
exhausted administrative remedies.
There is a mechanism for beneficiaries
to
appeal
such
determinations
administratively, and the SSA argued
that this is what plaintiffs should
have done to receive full relief, as
demonstrated by the SSA’s decision
to waive the overpayment claims.
Judge Anderson decided, based on the
exhaustion of remedies argument, that
he lacked jurisdiction over the claims
and granted the motion to dismiss.
When the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26, 2015,
this problem would have extended
to more same-sex married couples
when SSA would then recognize such
marriages regardless where the couple
is domiciled, but the agency’s action
clearly sets a precedent of not seeking
recoupment of any “overpayments” that
may be attributable to a delay by the
agency in adjusting payments to reflect
the newly-recognized marital status of
the beneficiaries.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE –
Addressing fears voice by some leaders
in the religious non-profit sector that
their tax exempt status might be at
risk if they refused to recognize samesex marriages, IRS Commissioner
John Koskinen stated that religious
colleges that would not accept samesex marriages were not at risk of losing
their tax exempt status. The question
was put to him at a Senate hearing by
Senator Mike Lee of Utah, who cited
the example of Bob Jones University,
which lost its tax exempt status due
to its racial policies in the 1970s. The
IRS determined at that time that an
organization that imposed racially
discriminatory policies on its staff
and students could not qualify as a
charitable, tax-exempt organization.
Koskinen stated affirmatively that
he was not going to move to remove
the tax-exempt status from religious
colleges and universities based on their
belief that marriage is only between
a man and a woman. Koskinen did
indicate that changes in public policy
could force the IRS to reevaluate that
position in the future, but that would
require the administrative procedure
of proposing regulations, receiving
public comment, and publishing final
regulations. Associated Press, July 29.
The process would be time consuming
and public enough that Congress could
intervene if it wanted to do so. Members
of Congress, including Senator Lee, are
seeking to intervene, as noted below,
with their proposed First Amendment
Defense Act, which would protect
entities from adverse consequences
under federal law if they refused to
recognize same-sex marriages.
ALABAMA – The Southern Policy Law
Center (SPLC) reported that its client,
Paul Hard, the surviving spouse of
David Fancher, will finally get his share
of the proceeds from a wrongful death
action. Hard, a professor at a university
in the Montgomery area, married
David Fancher in a Massachusetts
ceremony in 2011. A few months after
the wedding Fancher died in an auto
accident on Interstate 65 in Alabama.
Hard brought a wrongful death action
against the trucking company whose
vehicle had caused the accident, which
settled in July 2014. Because Alabama
did not recognize the marriage at that
time, the death certificate indicated
that Fancher was unmarried. Under
Alabama law, proceeds of a wrongful
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
death action go to surviving spouses or,
if the decedent was unmarried, to those
would inherit by intestate succession.
Fancher’s mother, Pat Fancher, sought
to claim the wrongful death proceeds
as Fancher’s only surviving intestate
heir. Southern Poverty Law Center filed
suit for Hard in the U.S. District Court,
seeking to overturn the state’s Marriage
Protection Act and Sanctity of Marriage
Act in order to establish Hard’s status
as a surviving legal spouse. This suit
was running in parallel with other
lawsuits challenging the Alabama
marriage bans. Although Fancher died
leaving a will designating Hard as his
sole beneficiary, under Alabama law
all proceeds of wrongful death actions
must be distributed to heirs at law
regardless of the existence of a will.
After the 11th Circuit denied a stay of
the district court ruling in one of the
other cases striking down the Alabama
same-sex marriage ban, state officials
issued a revised death certificate in
February 2015 showing that Fancher
was married and Hard was his spouse,
but because the state had an appeal to
the 11th Circuit on file which was stayed
pending a ruling in the Obergefell case,
the money was not paid out at that time,
being held by the clerk of court in an
escrow account. Pat Fancher argued
after Obergefell that the ruling could
not be applied retroactively to this
case, as the death occurred long prior
to the district court ruling invalidating
the Alabama marriage ban, but U.S.
District Judge W. Keith Watkins ruled
against her on that. On July 29, Judge
Watkins signed two orders: one denied
a motion by Fancher to set aside a prior
ruling that had dismissed her claim,
seeking to submit new arguments;
the other directed the court clerk to
disburse the settlement proceeds from
the wrongful death case ($552,956.69
plus interest earned) to Paul Hard
through his counsel, SPLC. The case is
identified as Hard v. Strange, Case No.
2:13-CV-922-WKW (M.D. Ala., July
29, 2015).
ARKANSAS – Responding to questions
posed by State Senator Bruce Maloch,
Arkansas Attorney General Leslie
Rutledge released Opinion No. 2015-075
(August 5, 2015), drafted by Assistant
Attorney General Ryan Owsley, on
questions about whether and under
what circumstances judges and justices
of the peace could refuse to perform
same-sex marriages. The opinion notes
that Arkansas law does not impose a
requirement on such officials to perform
marriage ceremonies, but authorizes
them to do so, and opines that answers
to the questions posed would turn
on how an Arkansas court would
construe the recently-enacted Arkansas
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a
measure adopted recently in response
to the marriage equality controversy
that has not yet enjoyed any appellate
construction from Arkansas courts.
The opinion cautiously refrains from
addressing whether JPs and judges
might be subject to liability in a suit by
a same-sex couple in federal court, but
opines that the Arkansas RFRA could
apply to a suit between private parties
and could provide a defense upon a
showing that being required to perform
a same-sex wedding would impose a
substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion rights of the JP or judge. The
Opinion notes that so long as there are
other JPs or judges or other authorized
to perform weddings who are willing to
do so, requiring a religiously-objecting
JP or judge to perform the ceremony
would not be the “least restrictive
alternative” to imposing an undue
burden on the religious objector. The
opinion totally evades (by omission) the
question whether a JP or judge should
properly be characterized as a private
party in such litigation, although it
notes some question about the basis for
a same-sex couple whose request that
a particular JP or judge perform their
ceremony could maintain any cause of
action against them under state law, and
thus doesn’t really address the question
whether a JP or judge, as a public
official, has a right under either the
Arkansas RFRA, the state constitution,
or federal constitutional law to refuse
to perform a public function based on
his or her personal religious beliefs.
Seeking “cover” for its conclusions, the
Opinion cites the “similar conclusion”
reached by the Texas Attorney General,
Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. KP-0025 (June
28, 2015), an opinion that is itself under
judicial attack. With due respect to AAG
Owsley, who was apparently handed
a politically-charged task to produce a
document to provide “cover” to his boss
and fall in line with the views of the state
administration, this Opinion, which
hems and haws and hedges at critical
points, the letter puts up a brave face
in defense of a questionably defensible
position.
FLORIDA – The Tampa Bay Times
reported on August 21 that state
officials plan to remove gender-specific
language from marriage and death
certificate forms by mid-September
2015, almost a year after a federal court
ruling that the state’s constitutional and
statutory ban on same-sex marriage is
unconstitutional. The state had filed an
appeal of that ruling in the 11th Circuit,
but the appeal was withdrawn after the
Supreme Court ruled on June 26 in
Obergefell v. Hodges that state bans on
same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.
Despite that ruling, state officials
have persisted in refusing to apply
the parental presumption to same-sex
married couples, and a lawsuit was filed
on August 13 by three lesbian couples
alleging that the state’s refusal to put
co-parent names on birth certificates
without an adoption proceeding violates
their right to equal protection under
the 14th Amendment. According to
the newspaper report, the state has
“filed a motion seeking clarification
on how the ruling that legalized samesex marriage in Florida applies to birth
certificates.” The question whether the
parental presumption (that the spouse of
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
a woman who gives birth is presumed to
be the child’s legal parent) should apply
to same-sex couples is being litigated in
several places around the country. Some
government officials have objected that
the presumption makes sense only in the
case of different-sex marriages, arguing
that it is physically impossible for a
woman to be the biological parent of her
wife’s child, and that the presumption
was intended to assure legitimacy of
children born to married women by
presuming that their husbands were the
physical progenitors of their children.
With modern reproductive technology,
however, it is of course possible for a
same-sex female couple to conceive a
child who is biologically related to the
birth mother’s female spouse by using
that spouse’s egg, fertilized in vitro and
implanting it in the other spouse, who
gestates the fertilized egg and gives
birth to the resulting child. . . providing
a counter-hypothetical in our Brave New
World. In light of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Obergefell that married
same-sex couples are entitled to be
treated the same as married different-sex
couples as a matter of due process and
equal protection, it seems appropriate to
apply the parental presumption and not
require same-sex spouses to go through
an adoption proceeding in order to be
listed as a parent on the birth certificate
when their spouse bears a child that the
couple intend to raise together. This
concept of “intentional parenthood” for
same-sex couples has been recognized
in California for a decade, and has
been embraced is several other states.
* * * The Tampa Bay Times (Aug. 15),
reported that Florida Attorney General
Pam Bondi was opposing a full award
of attorney fees to plaintiffs in the
marriage equality case that went to the
11th Circuit on the ground that the state
had voluntarily dismissed its appeal after
the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell.
Bondi claimed that the plaintiffs’
attorneys should not be compensated at
the state’s expense for any work they did
at the appellate stage. This is ludicrous,
of course. Bondi spoke before plaintiffs’
counsel had submitted a fee request, but
it was expected to come in at about half
a million dollars, as the state had fought
the plaintiffs at every point, requiring
extensive briefing and arguments,
including seeking clarification of the
scope of the court’s order when it was
contested by the state.
IDAHO – On December 19, 2014,
U.S. Magistrate Judge Candy W. Dale
awarded $397,300.00 in attorneys’
fees and $4,363.08 in costs to the
plaintiff prevailing parties in Latta v.
Otter, the challenge to the state’s samesex marriage ban. Because Governor
Butch Otter, the lead defendant, was
determined to fight tooth and nail
to avoid having to allow same-sex
marriage in his state, Judge Dale’s
prior merits ruling was not the end of
the matter, with appeals being filed
to the 9th Circuit and stays being
unsuccessfully sought from the Circuit
and the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs filed
a supplementary motion for fees and
expenses to cover representation in the
9th Circuit from May 24, 2014 through
January 21, 2015. On August 3, Judge
Dale signed a new decision and order in
Latta v. Otter, 2015 WL 4623817, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102635, granting
more fees and expenses over the protests
of defendants. The court ordered the
payment of an additional $216,460.00
in fees and $6,730.85 in expenses to
cover that period. The opinion goes
through the arguments about which
hours should be billed and at what rates
in excruciating detail.
INDIANA – Linda G. Summers, who
was dismissed from her employment
in the Harrison County Clerk’s office
when she refused to process a marriage
license application from a same-sex
couple due to her religious objections,
filed a federal civil rights lawsuit
against County Clerk Sally Whitis
and Harrison County on July 17, 2015.
Summers v. Whitis, Case No. 4:15-cv-93
(U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Indiana). According
to the complaint, which sets out in
detail (including Biblical citations) the
religious basis for Summers’ claim, after
the Supreme Court refused on November
6, 2014, to review the 7th Circuit’s
decision declaring Indiana’s ban on
same-sex marriage unconstitutional,
Whitis circulated to her staff an email
instructing them that it was the duty of
the Clerk’s Office to process marriage
license applications from same-sex
couples. “Even though it may be against
your personal beliefs,” said the email,
“we are required by state law to process
their applications. We are only doing
the paperwork and not performing
their ceremony.” A same-sex couple
applied for a license on December 8 that
Summer was “called upon to process,”
but she informed Whitis that she could
not prepare the paperwork “because of
her religious beliefs against same-sex
marriage,” and later that day she handdelivered a letter to Whitis requesting a
religious accommodation, pointing out
that other employees in the office were
willing to process such applications
and asking that she be excused from
doing so. Whitis terminated Summers’
employment the next day, characterizing
her conduct as “insubordination” and
citing the County’s personnel policy
that provides for discipline or discharge
of an employee who refuses to perform
assigned work or to comply with written
or verbal instructions from supervisors.
The complaint charges that Whitis failed
to make any attempt to accommodate
Summers and her religious beliefs,
in violation of Title VII, under which
employers are obligated to make
reasonable accommodations to the
religious beliefs of employees and not
to discriminate against or discharge
them because of their religious beliefs.
Summers is represented by Earl C.
Mullins, Jr., and Richard L. Masters of
Louisville, KY, and Chris Lane of New
Albany, IN.
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
KANSAS – U.S. District Judge Daniel
D. Crabtree issued a decision on
August 10 in Marie v. Mosier, 2015
WL 4724389 (D. Kans.), the marriage
equality case formerly known as Marie
v. Moser. (The lead defendant, a state
agency head, has automatically been
replaced by her successor, who by sheer
coincidence has almost the same last
name.) Last November Judge Crabtree
issued a preliminary injunction,
requiring the state to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples following
binding 10th Circuit precedent after the
Supreme Court denied review in Bishop
v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.
2014) and Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d
1193 (10th Cir. 2014). The preliminary
injunction was not stayed in light of the
Supreme Court’s refusal to review those
decisions, making marriage equality
a binding doctrine within the 10th
Circuit, including Kansas. However,
state officials – most notably Governor
Sam Brownback – proved recalcitrant,
licenses were available only in some
counties, and state agencies continued
to refuse to recognize the marriages.
The litigation was expanded to name
the heads of various state agencies as
defendants, but things remained on
hold until the Supreme Court ruled in
Obergefell on June 26. Then licenses
soon became more widely available,
but compliance by state agencies was
halting, as attempts by already-married
couples to file joint tax returns, put
spouses on state employee benefits
plans, and get new driver’s licenses
with appropriate surnames, continued
to encounter obstacles while agencies
said they were awaiting legal advice
about the impact of the Supreme Court
ruling. The plaintiffs asked Judge
Crabtree to issue a final ruling on the
merits accompanied by injunctive relief,
while the state sought to have the case
dismissed as moot, claiming that the
Supreme Court ruling had decided the
only legal issue before the court and that
the state was moving to comply with it.
Judge Crabtree, taking a tack similar to
that articulated a few days later by the
8th Circuit (see above), decided the case
wasn’t moot inasmuch as the Supreme
Court had only specifically ruled on the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage
bans in the 6th Circuit, although of
course its ruling on the merits created
a precedent binding in all lower federal
courts. Thus, he found it appropriate
to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a
summary judgment on the merits. But
he considered the issue of injunctive
relief more difficult. Although the state
argued that it was now complying with
Obergefell, Crabtree acknowledged
affidavits filed by the plaintiffs showing
that attempts post-Obergefell to get state
agencies to treat same-sex marriages
equally had not been successful. On
the other hand, acknowledging the
changing legal landscape, Crabtree
concluded it was premature to issue the
requested injunctive relief, since the
state was contending that it would be
in full compliance. Thus, while holding
that the failure by the state to comply
fully violates the 14th Amendment,
he gave the parties until September
15 to “supplement the undisputed
facts material to plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment on their claims for
injunctive relief,” gave each side up
to three weeks to respond to anything
filed by the other side, and indicated he
would then make a decision on issuing
injunctive relief.
MARYLAND – Marriage equality
means equal treatment of same-sex and
different-sex marriages for all purposes
of law. Such is the premise of Maryland
Attorney General Brian E. Frosh’s
formal opinion issued in response to
an inquiry from a member of the state’s
House of Delegates, Luke Clippinger,
asking whether the adultery laws would
be violated by sexual infidelity by a
spouse in a same-sex marriage. Family
Law – Divorce – Whether Same-Sex
Marital Infidelity Can Qualify as
Adultery for Purposes of Family Law
Provisions Governing Divorce, 100 Op.
Att’y Gen. 105, 2015 WL 4850421 (July
24, 2015). Assistant Attorney General
Patrick B. Hughes and Chief Counsel
Adam D. Snyder are also listed on the
written opinion. “Although the concept
of adultery has significance in both
criminal law and family law,” they wrote,
“the State’s criminal prohibition against
adultery has fallen into disuse, so we
will focus on the definition of adultery
for purposes of Maryland family law.
In our opinion, adultery, as that term is
used in the Family Law article, includes
a spouse’s extramarital sexual conduct
with someone of the same sex. We base
this conclusion in large part on the
purpose behind adultery laws in the
domestic relations context. The primary
purpose of adultery as a concept in
Maryland family law is to recognize
that sexual infidelity is a breach of
the marriage vow and causes damage
to the marriage, such that the injured
party should be allowed to dissolve
the marriage more easily than would
otherwise be the case. This purpose is
implicated to the same degree when
an unfaithful spouse has sex with a
man or a woman; extramarital sexual
activity with someone of the same sex
is just as damaging to a marriage as
sexual activity with someone of the
opposite sex. We accordingly believe
that Maryland courts would recognize
same-sex sexual infidelity as adultery.”
The opinion notes that Maryland courts
had in the past taken a broader view
than the traditional narrow common
law definition, treating as “adultery”
situations where a different-sex
spouse had engaged in sexual activity
with another person of the same sex.
“Adultery” is one of the recognized
“fault” grounds for divorce in Maryland,
making it possible for a couple to divorce
without living “separate and apart”
for a year as is required for a no-fault
divorce proceeding. “Adultery” is also
a factor in alimony and child custody
determinations. The lengthy opinion
provides a detailed history of adultery
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
as a legal concept, documenting how the
concept has evolved to the point where
the genders of the parties should not
make a difference. While the opinion
finds that the plain language of the
relevant statutory provisions is not
particularly helpful in answering this
question, the modern statutory purpose
of the concept supports applying it
equally to same-sex and different
sex marriages, even though a spouse
cheating with a member of the samesex doesn’t present the possibility of
pregnancy, a key concern in the early
history of the concept that was focused
on protecting a husband’s patrimony.
Noting the recent Obergefell decision,
the opinion comments, “The right to
civil marriage would ring hollow if
states could treat same-sex married
couples differently than opposite-sex
ones, providing special benefits to,
or imposing special burdens on, one
category but not the other. . . We think
an overly narrow definition of adultery
that excludes same-sex sexual activity,
and makes it more difficult for samesex couples to divorce, may raise similar
constitutional problems. We need not
decide, however, whether a court would
ultimately find a constitutional violation
if adultery were limited to sexual activity
between a man and a woman. Rather,
the point is that there is a legitimate
question as to the constitutionality of
defining adultery to exclude same-sex
sexual activity, and this makes it even
more likely that Maryland courts would
choose a broader definition.”
provision allowing married couples to
adopt children jointly. On August 12,
The Campaign for Southern Equality,
the Family Equality Council, and
several married same-sex couples filed
suit in the U.S. District Court, arguing
that the state’s continued application
of this provision violates the 14th
Amendment. Campaign for Southern
Equality v. Mississippi Department of
Human Services, complaint available
at 2015 WL 4757429. Local counsel
representing the plaintiffs from McDuff
& Byrd (Jackson, Mississippi) are
collaborating with lead counsel Roberta
Kaplan and a pro bono team from Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP (New York), and Meghann K. Burke
of Brazil & Burke (Asheville, NC). The
complaint assert that “Mississippi is the
last state that explicitly bans gay couples
from adopting without regard for their
qualifications as parents or the best
interests of the child,” noting that courts
in Arkansas and Florida had stricken
such bans even before Obergefell and
that the Louisiana Supreme Court had
recognized in Costanza v. Caldwell,
2015 WL 4094655 (July 7, 2015), that
Obergefell compelled striking down
a similar limitation in that state. In
addition, a state court in Nebraska had
recently struck down a similar ban in
Stewart v. Heineman, No. CI 13-3157
(Neb. Dist. Ct., Lancaster Co., Aug.
5, 2015) in response to the Obergefell
ruling (see above). Two of the plaintiff
couples filed a motion for summary
judgment on August 28.
MISSISSIPPI – In Obergefell, the
Supreme Court ruled that same-sex and
different-sex marriages are to be treated
equally by the states, but some states
have been resisting. In Mississippi,
for example, the state has insisted on
continuing to apply a provision in
its adoption laws stating, “Adoption
by couples of the same gender is
prohibited,” and refusing to incorporate
married same-sex couples under a
OHIO – The Ohio Supreme Court’s
Board of Professional Conduct issued
Opinion 2015-1 on August 7, 2015,
advising as to “Judicial Performance of
Civil Marriages of Same-Sex Couples.”
Questions arose after June 26, 2015,
when the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the 6th Circuit, thus affirming district
court decisions from Ohio holding that
same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry. Judges and a judicial
association (acting on behalf of its
members) asked the Board for guidance,
as some judges with objections to
same-sex marriage wanted particularly
to know whether and under what
circumstances they could decline to
perform such marriages. The Board first
noted the oath of office taken by judges,
swearing to support the Constitution of
the United States and to “faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all
of the duties incumbent upon me as a
judge.” Wrote the Board: “The oath is
a reflection of the self-evident principle
that the personal, moral, and religious
beliefs of a judicial officer should
never factor into the performance
of any judicial duty.” Continued the
Board, “A judge’s unilateral decision to
refuse to perform same-sex marriages
based on his or her own personal,
religious, or moral beliefs ignores the
holding in Obergefell and thus, directly
contravenes the oath of office.” The
Board reviewed various provisions
of the state’s Judicial Conduct Rules,
observing how they emphasize the
requirements of judicial impartiality
and avoidance of manifesting bias or
prejudice. The Board pointed out that
even though judges are not required
to perform marriages, a decision by a
judge to stop performing any marriages
after the Obergefell decision could be
seen as grounds for disqualifying the
judge “in matters where the sexual
orientation of the parties is at issue,”
since it would lead to inferences about
the biases of the judge. “For example,”
wrote the Board, “if a judge who
has declined to perform same-sex
marriages is later assigned to hear a
misdemeanor domestic violence charge
involving a same-sex couple, the judge’s
ability to follow the law and impartially
apply the domestic violence laws could
reasonably be questioned. This same
result obtains if a judge has maintained
a position that he or she will perform
only opposite-sex marriages. Under
either scenario, if the judge’s refusal
to marry same-sex couples equates to
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
the judge possessing or appearing to
possess a personal bias or prejudice
towards persons based on sexual
orientation, he or she is required under
Jud. Cond. R. 2.11 to disqualify himself
or herself from the proceeding. As such,
a judge’s decision to decline to perform
some or all marriage ceremonies,
when grounded on the judge’s personal
beliefs, may reflect adversely on
perceptions regarding the judge’s
performance of other judicial functions
and duties.” The Board also noted that
judicial refusals to perform same-sex
marriages could adversely affect the
public’s opinion of the judiciary. The
Board’s ultimate conclusion: “A judge
who performs civil marriages may not
refuse to perform same-sex marriages
while continuing to perform oppositesex marriages, based upon his or her
personal, moral, and religious beliefs,
as acts contrary to the oath of office
and Jud. Cond. R. 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 2.3,
2.4, 2.11, and Prof. Cond. R. 8.4(g). A
judge who takes the position that he
or she will discontinue performing all
marriages, in order to avoid marrying
same-sex couples based on his or her
personal, moral, or religious beliefs,
may be interpreted as manifesting an
improper bias or prejudice toward a
particular class. The judge’s decision
also may raise reasonable questions
about his or her impartiality in legal
proceedings where sexual orientation
is at issue and consequently would
require disqualification under Jud.
Cond. R. 2.11.”
PENNSYLVANIA – James D. Schneller,
a determined foe of same-sex marriage
who tried more than once to intervene
in the Whitewood case challenging the
state’s same-sex marriage ban, was
rebuffed by the 3rd Circuit when he
appealed from District Judge John E.
Jones’s refusal to let him intervene.
Schneller was also seeking review of
the district court’s merits decision,
which was not appeal by the state.
In Whitewood v. Petrille, 2015 WL
4547750 (3rd Cir., July 29, 2015), the
court of appeals rejected all but one
of his claims on appeal, affirming the
district court’s denial of Schneller’s
intervention motions and holding
that he lacked standing to appeal the
district court’s ruling striking down
the marriage ban. However, the court
of appeals, ruling per curiam, said it
was inappropriate for the district judge
to have instructed the clerk to refuse
to accept any further filings from
Schneller. Wrote the court, “A district
court is permitted to issue a filing
injunction against vexatious litigants
under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1651(a) when it
believes that the abusive conduct will
continue if not restrained. However, this
is an ‘extreme remedy which must be
narrowly tailored and sparingly used.’
Before issuing such an order, the district
court must provide the litigant with
notice and an opportunity to respond.”
Thus, the district court should not have
instructed the clerk without first letting
Schneller know that his right to file
cases in the future was being challenged
and giving him an opportunity to
be heard on the question. “Although
Schneller has filed numerous meritless
actions and has attempted to intervene
in many cases (and may very well
constitute a vexatious litigant),” wrote
the court, “the District Court offered
no explanation for its imposition of the
order.” Thus, it was vacated, leaving
Schneller free to file future vexatious
motions and petitions with the district
court until his due process rights are
respected!
PENNSYLVANIA – Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas Judges C.
Theodore Fritsch, Jr., has granted a
petition by Sabrina Maurer to have
her 2001 commitment ceremony to
Kimberly Underwood, which was
followed 12 years of cohabitation,
declared a common law marriage, by
retroactive application of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges. Underwood passed away from
heart disease in 2013, before a federal
district court ruling in 2014 made samesex marriage legal in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania abolished common law
marriage prospectively in 2004, but
grandfathers common law marriages
already in existence as of that date.
Maurer sought the judicial declaration
so that she could claim the legal status
of a surviving spouse, such as exemption
from inheritance taxes. According to
her petition, “They always hoped that
someday they could be married in a
ceremony that Pennsylvania law would
license and recognize, but unfortunately,
the
discriminatory
aspects
of
Pennsylvania’s marriage laws were
not addressed in time for their homes
to become a reality.” The court found
that the common-law marriage began
on September 2, 2001, the date of their
commitment ceremony held in New
Jersey, and ended with Underwood’s
death. In a brief written order, Judge
Fritsch wrote, “Their marriage is valid
and enforceable, and they are entitled
to all rights and privileges of validly
licensed, married spouses in all respects
under the laws of the commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.” This should also
extend to federal recognition, since in
light of Obergefell and Windsor the
federal government recognizes samesex marriages that are valid under state
law. Maurer is represented pro bono by
Mary Hackett of the law firm of Reed
Smith. Hackett told Legal Intelligencer,
which reported on the ruling on July 29,
that there were past cases invalidating
opposite-sex common law marriages
in Pennsylvania, providing a precedent
for this action, but this may be the first
judicial ruling to take such a step in a
same-sex case. In light of Obergefell,
refusing to extend the same reasoning
to a same-sex marriage would raise
equal protection issues. It is relatively
well established that a U.S. Supreme
Court declaration of a constitutional
right is generally considered to have
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
retroactive application. The Bucks
County Courier Times also provided a
detailed report about the ruling on July
30. The newspaper reported that Maurer
has filed suit against United of Omaha
and Dearborn National Insurance Co.,
which had refused to recognize her
as a surviving spouse for purposes
of a spousal survivor benefit under a
disability insurance policy.
SOUTH CAROLINA – U.S. District
Judge J. Michelle Childs, determining
that any controversy between the parties
was moot due to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, granted
the state’s motion for summary judgment
in Haas v. South Carolina Department
of Motor Vehicles, 2015 WL 4879268,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106415 (D. S.
C., Aug. 13, 2015), an action that was
filed in October 2014 by three samesex spouses who were married outside
of South Carolina and whose requests
to have new drivers licenses issued
showing their married names had been
denied by state officials, even though the
Supreme Court had on October 6 denied
certiorari in the Virginia marriage
equality case. A few weeks after this
case was filed, the U.S. District Court
declared South Carolina’s same-sex
marriage ban unconstitutional and the
state filed an appeal to the 4th Circuit,
despite the adverse Virginia precedent.
However, the South Carolina DMV did
alter its policy in response to the federal
district court’s ruling (and denial of a
stay pending appeal) and granted new
drivers licenses to the plaintiffs. In
February 2015 the state filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that
its change of policy and issuance of
the requested licenses to the plaintiffs
rendered their action for declaratory and
injunctive relief moot, and arguing that
any claim for damages would be barred
by the 11th Amendment. The plaintiffs,
conceding the 11th Amendment
point, responded that the claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief were
not moot, pointing out that as of then
the state had an appeal on file with the
4th Circuit and was seeking to be able to
reinstate its marriage ban. Judge Childs,
undoubtedly aware that the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari in the 6th
Circuit marriage equality case in Jan.
2015, sat on the motion awaiting the
Supreme Court’s ruling. In her view,
Obergefell, announced on June 26,
mooted this case. “This decision not
only established the right of same-sex
couples to be legally married in all
states,” she wrote, “but stated ‘there is
no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another State on the
ground of its same-sex character.’ With
the right to marry comes access to the
benefits and obligations of the institution
– such as the right to have one’s married
name recognized by the state in which
one lives – as well. In light of Plaintiffs’
concession that their claim for damages
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
all that is left for the court to grant is
declaratory and injunctive relief. With
Obergefell foreclosing the possibility
that South Carolina’s same-sex marriage
ban will be reinstated, there is no longer
a pending issue regarding Plaintiffs’
claim, and thus ‘it is impossible for
the court to grant any effectual relief.’
This issue is therefore moot, and
summary judgment is appropriate.”
The plaintiffs are represented by Mary
Malissa Burnette, Nekki Shutt, Callison
Tighe and Robinson, Victoria Lamonte
Eslinger, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs and
Pollard, and Susan King Dunn. * * *
Meanwhile, the District Judge Richard
Gergel ordered South Carolina Attorney
General Alan Wilson on August 10 to
pay more than $135,000 in fees and
costs to the plaintiffs who had sued in
October 2014 to get a marriage license,
Colleen Condon and Nichols Bleckley.
Wilson had responded to the fee request
by arguing it was excessive, noting
that the issue had been fully litigated
resulting in a 4th Circuit decision in the
Virginia case. If that was so, responded
Judge Gergel, why did the state file a
57-page brief seeking to get the case
thrown out? He insisted that the attorney
general “cannot engage in a no holds
barred defense and then complaint”
that opposing counsel spent lots of time
working on a response. startribune,
Aug. 10.
TEXAS – Attorney General Ken Paxton
has requested U.S. District Judge
Orlando Garcia to cancel a contempt
hearing scheduled for September
10, representing that the state is now
in compliance with constitutional
requirements in light of Obergefell v.
Hodges. Judge Garcia ruled in 2014 in
De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632
(W.D. Tex.), that the Texas same-sex
marriage ban was unconstitutional.
The state’s appeal was heard by the
5th Circuit in January 2015, and
shortly after the Obergefell ruling, the
5th Circuit issued an order affirming
Judge Garcia’s decision on July 1. See
De Leon v. Abbott, 2015 WL 4032161,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11505. But
Attorney General Paxton appeared
to be encouraging defiance or noncompliance with the constitutional
requirements to treat same-sex couples
the same as different-sex couples in
all respects concerning marriage, and
responding to new motions detailing
specific instances filed with the court,
Judge Garcia threatened to hold Paxton
in contempt, but delayed a hearing
originally scheduled for August 12 in
order to give Paxton and Department
of State Health Services Interim
Commissioner Kirk Cole time to bring
state policies into compliance. On August
24, the AG’s office filed a document
with the court asserting that the state
was in full compliance, referencing
new written policies posted on the
Office’s website spelling out procedures
governing birth and death certificates,
the issues that had particularly been
contested. * * * In Matter of the
Marriage of A.L.F.L. and K.L.L. and
MARRIAGE / CIVIL LITIGATION
In the Interest of K.A.F.L., A Child,
2015 WL 4561231 (Tex. Ct. App., San
Antonio, July 29, 2015)(not published in
S.W.3d), the court of appeals dismissed
as moot an appeal from a 2014 ruling
by Bexar County District Judge Barbara
Nellermoe (now retired), denying a
plea to the jurisdiction of the court in
a same-sex divorce case. The court
had issued an order on June 30, 2015,
asking the appellant to show cause the
appeal should not be dismissed as moot
in light of Obergefell, and the appellant
responded with a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Clearly, Texas trial courts, now
under an obligation to recognize samesex marriages contracted elsewhere
as well as in Texas, has jurisdiction
over divorce cases involving same-sex
spouses.
WEST VIRGINIA – In McGee v. Cole,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92315, 2015 WL
4366161 (S.D. W. Va., July 16, 2015), U.S.
District Judge Robert C. Chambers ruled
on the request for attorneys’ fees and
costs on behalf of plaintiffs, prevailing
parties in a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of West Virginia’s ban
on same-sex marriage. The court was
considering pre-trial motions when
the 4th Circuit issued its decision in
Bostic v. Schaefer, affirming a ruling
holding Virginia’s ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional. Thereafter,
the court granted summary judgment
to plaintiffs in reliance on Bostic and
enjoined defendant county clerks from
enforcing the state’s ban. Plaintiffs
sought $342,576.25 in attorneys’ fees.
Defendants argued that no fees should
be awarded, asserting that the requested
amount was shockingly high and that
actually this case was expeditiously
decided as an application of the Bostic
ruling without the need for prolonged
litigation. “An impressive battalion of
lawyers, eleven attorneys from three
firms, ably represented Plaintiffs to
successfully prosecute an important
civil rights claim, for their benefit and
that of many other West Virginians,”
wrote Chambers, rejecting the idea
that there should be no fee award.
However, the judge substantially cut
down the amount awarded, ruling out
compensation for attorney time spent
on non-legal matters and reducing the
claimed hourly rates. At the end of the
process, the fee award was $92,125.00,
and the award for costs and expenses was
$7,679.64. Plaintiffs were represented
by lawyers from Lambda Legal, Jenner
& Block (as cooperating attorneys with
Lambda Legal), and The Tinney Law
Firm in Charleston, WV, local counsel.
COMMONWEALTH
OF
THE
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
– Conceding that the Supreme Court’s
Obergefell decision is binding on U.S.
territories, Attorney General Edward
Manibusan issued a memorandum
on June 30 revising the marriage
application and record of marriage
rules, and on July 22, the mayor of
Saipan, David M. Apatang, officiated at
a marriage of a Chinese lesbian couple
in his office. Apatang, described as a
“devoted Catholic,” said that his religion
requires him to abide by the law of the
land. “I cannot deny them because that’s
my legal obligation to perform,” he
announced. Somebody should arrange
for Apatang to get together with Rowan
County (KY) Clerk Kim Davis, who
needs a lesson on the obligations of
public servants to perform their official
duties regardless of their personal
religious beliefs. mvariety.com, July 27.
GUAM – The legislature approved
Bill 119, which creates equality in
civil marriage, and the Employment
Nondiscrimination Act of 2015, which
forbids discrimination because of sexual
orientation or gender identity, on August
12. Governor Eddie Calvo exercised
his prerogative to allow the marriage
bill to go into law without his signature,
indicating that his Roman Catholic
religious views kept him from signing
it. The local marriage statute will now
read: “Marriage means the legal union
between two persons without regard to
gender.” guampdn.com, Aug. 26.
VIRGIN ISLANDS – On July 27 Lt. Gov.
Osbert Potter countersigned Governor
Kenneth Mapp’s executive order
implementing the Obergefell decision,
thus allowing same-sex couples to
marry in the U.S. territory of the Virgin
Islands. All territorial government
agencies were ordered to “review all of
their respective rules and regulations
and bring them into compliance with
the ruling,” and to report on compliance
to the governor within 15 days. Under
local law, the order would be forwarded
to the Legislature for review, which was
expected to be merely a formality since
the Revised Organic Act of 1954 makes
the U.S. Constitution, as construed by
the Supreme Court, part of the law of
the Virgin Islands. Virgin Islands Daily
News, July 29.
CIVIL LITIGATION NOTES
SUPREME COURT –
Mathew
D. Staver of Liberty Counsel, the
“religious freedom” litigation group,
filed a petition for certiorari seeking
review of Doe v. Christie, 783 F.3d
150 (3rd Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed, No. 15-195 (Aug. 13, 2015), in
which the 3rd Circuit rejected a 1st
Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s
statute prohibiting licensed health care
professionals from treating minors
using sexual orientation change efforts.
The 3rd Circuit’s opinion followed on
its prior ruling in King v. Governor of
the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216
(3rd Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2048 (May 4, 2015), ruling similarly.
These 3rd Circuit decision reached the
same result as the 9th Circuit in Pickup
v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
CIVIL LITIGATION
cert. denied, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4636
(2014), but on different grounds. The 9th
Circuit held that the state’s prohibition
was of conduct, not speech, and thus the
1st Amendment rights of practitioners
were not abridged by the ban. The
3rd Circuit, disagreeing, found that
regulation of talk therapy necessarily
implicated speech, but that the rational
basis standard of review applied, and
that the legislative record showed a
rational basis for the regulation. One
would think that the Supreme Court’s
refusal to review King v. Governor
would dissuade the plaintiffs from
seeking review in Doe v. Christie, but an
intervening event may give them hope:
the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (June
18, 2015), which some lower courts
have quickly construed to have greatly
broadened 1st Amendment protection
against content-based regulations of
expressive or communicative activity.
Dissents by Justices Breyer and Kagan
from the broadly-written opinion for the
Court by Justice Thomas raised concern
that the Court’s categorical approach
automatically applies strict scrutiny
to every state regulation that could
be characterized as a content-based
regulation of expression and could put in
danger a wide range of zoning rules and
other regulations of conduct that have
been presumed constitutional in the
past. Whether the court grants review in
Doe v. Christie may signal whether at
least four members of the Court believe
that the 3rd Circuit should have applied
strict scrutiny to the New Jersey law.
4TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
– The 4th Circuit ruled in Liberty
University, Inc. v. Citizens Insurance
Company of America, 792 F.3d 520 (4th
Cir., July 10, 2015), that the liability
insurer for Liberty University was not
obligated to provide a defense for the
University in a lawsuit brought against
it by Janet Jenkins, who alleges that the
University through its employees and
agents had participated in a scheme to
kidnap Jenkins’ daughter in order to
disrupt their parent-child relationship.
Jenkins is the former civil union
partner of Lisa Miller, the child’s birth
mother. The child was born while the
women were civilly united and, under
Vermont law, would be considered the
legal daughter of both women. In the
course of an action instigated in the
Vermont courts by Miller to dissolve
the civil union, Jenkins was awarded
visitation rights with their daughter.
Miller resisted the visitation and, with
the assistance of Liberty University
Dean Mat Staver, head of Liberty
Counsel (a so-called Christian law
firm), sought to block visitation in the
Virginia courts without success, as the
Virginia Supreme Court concluded that
the Vermont courts had sole jurisdiction
in the matter. Subsequently the Vermont
courts confirmed that Jenkins was
entitled to visitation and, taking into
account Miller’s conduct, to custody.
As the case worked its way through
the courts of both states, however,
Miller fled the U.S. with the daughter,
settling in Nicaragua. In her subsequent
lawsuit against Liberty, Jenkins alleges
a detailed plot in which Liberty
and its employees were implicated
with assisting Miller in fleeing the
jurisdiction with her daughter and
encouraging Miller to refuse to comply
with court orders. Liberty turned to its
insurer, Citizens Insurance, to provide a
defense, and Citizens refused. Liberty
then sued Citizens in this action. U.S.
District Judge Norman K. Moon (W.D.
Va.) granted summary judgment to
Liberty, concluding that this action
was not excluded from coverage under
the liability insurance policy. The 4th
Circuit reversed, finding that it was
excluded. The court of appeals found
that the Jenkins complaint, “which
only alleges Appellee’s liability for
intentional conduct, does not plead an
‘occurrence,’” which is defined in terms
of accidents, unanticipated events,
and is part of the insurance policy’s
coverage requirement. Liberty is on the
hook for its own defense against the
Jenkins lawsuit.
– Affirming the district court’s dismissal
of a Title VII retaliation claim in a brief
unpublished opinion in Murray v. North
Carolina Department of Public Safety,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14106, 2015 WL
4747193 (Aug. 12, 2015), the court found
no reversible error, limiting explication
to a footnote reference to two prior 4th
Circuit cases, one holding that a hostile
work environment claim could be based
on an isolated incident if the harassment
is physically threatening or humiliating,
the other that Title VII “does not
protect against sexual orientation
discrimination.” It is worrying that
so soon after the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ruled that
Title VII does protect against sexual
orientation discrimination (see above),
a 4th Circuit panel would automatically
rule out such a claim without any
written explanation other than citing
a 1996 circuit case that itself relied on
archaic precedents. The court mentions
none of the factual allegations, but from
these two citations one imagines that
the alleged retaliation might have been
in response to the plaintiff’s protest of
some kind of adverse treatment because
of his actual or perceived sexual
orientation.
3RD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
– The 3rd Circuit ruled on July 16 that
the Delaware Elections Disclosure Act
does not violate the 1st Amendment
as applied to an organization called
Delaware Strong Families, which raised
money to distribute “voter guides” prior
to the 2014 general election. Delaware
Strong Families v. Attorney General,
793 F.3d 304. The organization did not
want to disclose the identity of its donors
in a filing that would be accessible
to the public, arguing that this would
CIVIL LITIGATION
deter donations and chill political
speech. Although they convinced
the district court, which granted the
organization a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the disclosure
requirement, they failed before the Court
of Appeals, which issued an opinion
consistent with rulings by other courts
about state disclosure requirements
applied to organizations seeking to
influence the outcome of elections.
DSF claimed to be a “neutral” and
“non-partisan” organization performing
a purely educational function, citing
the grant them of tax-exempt, taxdeductible status under section 510(c)
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, but
the court held that such tax designation
was not preclusion in analyzing the
constitutional issues or construing the
requirements of the Delaware law.
– The Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(June 26, 2015), is salient not only to
the question whether same-sex couples
have a right to marry but also to the
broader question of what restrictions, if
any, the states can put on any couple’s
right to marry. This was brought
home in an August 14 ruling by the
7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Riker
v. Lemmon, 2015 WL 4863586, in
which the court, reversing a grant of
summary judgment to the defendant
by U.S. District Judge Tanya Walton
Pratt (S.D. Indiana), held that a woman
formerly employed at a state prison
could invoke the constitutional right
to marry against a decision by prison
authorities denying her right to marry
an inmate. Rebecca Riker had been
employed by a contractor in the food
services department at Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility. While employed
there, she entered into a romantic
relationship with a male inmate (serving
a fifty-year sentence for robbery). The
relationship included sexual intercourse
in a “walk-in cooler” in the facility.
Another employer saw Riker kissing
the inmate and reported this to prison
authorities, leading Riker to quit her job.
The inmate then proposed marriage to
her, she accepted, but prison authorities
refused to give permission to her to come
to the prison for a marriage ceremony,
claiming security concerns and citing
its general rule against allowing former
prison employees to visit prisoners.
They argued that contractor employees
are briefed on prison security policies
and that allowing such visits would
endanger prison security as a result.
Judge Pratt accepted the Department’s
argument. Citing Obergefell, Circuit
Judge Ripple wrote for the court, “The
right to marry includes the right to
select one’s spouse,” so the Department
could withhold permission only if its
decision “was reasonably related to
its legitimate penological interests.
The fundamental infirmity with the
Department’s position,” continued
Ripple, “is that it equates Ms. Riker’s
one-time request to enter the prison
to participate in a marriage ceremony
with a request for general visitation
rights. The Department’s decision to
forbid Ms. Riker’s marriage is premised
entirely on its ex-employee visitation
policy and the security justifications
that support that policy. At bottom, it
maintains that any effect on Ms. Riker’s
right to marry simply is incidental to
the application of its visitation policy.
Nothing in the record, however, supports
equating general visitation with a single
marriage ceremony, and we previously
have indicated that a prison’s visitation
policy, on its own, does not justify
prohibiting an inmate’s marriage.”
The court found that “invocation of
a general security interest” was not
sufficient, standing alone, to support
the Department’s decision in this case.
The court concluded that the grant of
summary judgment to the Department
was erroneous and that the case should
be remanded for fact-finding and a
determination whether the Department’s
security concerns could be shown to be
sufficient in this case to preclude Ms.
Riker’s “request for a brief, one-time
visit in order to participate in a marriage
ceremony.”
– In Voss v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 2015 WL 4664437, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13827 (Aug. 7, 2015),
the 9th Circuit, disagreeing with the
Internal Revenue Service, reversed
a ruling by the Tax Court which had
upheld the agency’s determination that
an unmarried same-sex couple who were
co-owners of real property were subject
to the same tax-deduction ceiling that
applied to married couples. The dispute
involves tax years 2006 and 2007. Bruce
Voss and Charles Sophy, then registered
domestic partners in California, coowned two homes as joint tenants, in
Rancho Mirage and in Beverly Hills.
They purchased the Rancho Mirage
home in 2000, taking out a $486,300
mortgage. They refinanced two years
later to a $500,000 mortgage, for which
they are jointly and severally liable.
They bought their Beverly Hills home
in 2002 with a $2,240,000 mortgage,
which was later refinanced with a new
loan in the amount of $2,000,000. They
also obtained a home equity line of
credit at the same time for $300,000.
The total average balance of the two
mortgages and the line of credit was
about $2.7 million, so the question
whether the statutory debt limits applied
per taxpayer (so they could deduct
interest on up to $2.2 million of debt)
or jointly (limiting their deduction to
interest on $1.1 million of debt) was at
issue. They filed separately in 2006 and
2007, since the federal government did
not recognize their relationship, each
claiming mortgage interest deductions.
The IRS audited them and issued
deficiency notices, claiming that they
had exceeded the limits. The Tax Court
ruled in IRS’s favor, ruling that the $1.1
million ceiling applied per property,
not per taxpayer. Disagreeing on what
CIVIL LITIGATION
it characterized as a question of first
impression, the 9th Circuit held that the
debt limits apply per taxpayer. Thus,
for unmarried same-sex couples, the
9th Circuit says that each taxpayer can
claim the mortgage interest deduction
based on their share of the mortgage
debt obligation on each of their coowned properties, up to $1.1 million
of debt for each of them. The opinion
by Circuit Judge Bybee is long and
detailed, and drew a detailed dissent
from Circuit Judge Ikuta. Tax mavens
will undoubtedly want to read this.
Unmarried same-sex couples who own
mortgaged property together will want
to recommend the opinion to their
tax counsel and/or accountant. Samesex couples who jointly own lots of
expensive real property with associated
mortgages might think twice about
getting married in light of this decision
and their overall tax situation.
ALABAMA – The Birmingham News
(Aug. 19) reported that a Jefferson
County probate judge had approved the
dual adoption of a girl by a same-sex
couple on April 28, 2015, according to
a copy of an adoption certificate that
has been filed as evidence in a pending
federal lawsuit seeking the right to dual
adoption by same-sex couples. The
document was redacted before being
submitted in evidence to cover the name
of the judge, and requests by reporters to
the two Jefferson County probate judges
brought a response from one of them
that since adoptions are confidential and
the records sealed, the judges couldn’t
comment on them. Attorneys for the
adoptive parents also refused to identify
the judge. Their attorney pointed out
to the newspaper that the adoption was
approved after the federal district court
in Alabama had ruled that the state’s
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages
was unconstitutional, and the adoptive
parents had been married elsewhere.
Adoptions by married same-sex couples
have been approved by several probate
judges since the Supreme Court’s
opinion was announced in Obergefell
on June 26.
ALASKA – A gay African-American
man who was employed by Delta Airlines
in Alaska didn’t have the option of suing
for sexual orientation discrimination
because Alaska law doesn’t forbid
discrimination on that basis, so he
brought a race discrimination claim.
The problem, as the Alaska Supreme
Court pointed out in Rodriguez v.
Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights, 2015 WL 4774430, 2015 Alas.
LEXIS 91 (Aug. 14, 2015), is that he did
not, in the opinion of the Human Rights
Commission as affirmed by the court,
present enough evidence to substantiate a
race discrimination claim. “Rodriguez’s
arguments throughout this case focused
on seniority, his sexual orientation,
and Nash’s extremely inappropriate
behavior, but Rodriguez’s complaint
to the Commission alleged race
discrimination,” wrote Justice Winfree
for the court. “The superior court
repeatedly encouraged Rodriguez,”
who was pro se, “to point to any
evidence of race-based discrimination,
but he was unable to do so. And in
his brief to us Rodriguez implies that
he was furloughed and not rehired in
retaliation for providing information
about Nash, but this does not establish
a reasonable possibility of race-based
discrimination.” (Nash, his supervisor
at Delta, allegedly constantly harassed
Rodriguez, calling him “faggot” and
other names. Rodriguez informed
Delta about Nash’s conduct, and Nash
was eventually terminated.) This case
helps to show why the lack of express
protection
against
discrimination
because of sexual orientation is needed.
ARIZONA – The Court of Appeals of
Arizona, Division 1, ruled in Sheets
v. Mead, 2015 WL 5024960 (Aug. 25,
2015), that Maricopa County Superior
Court Judge Kathleen Mead erred when
she awarded substantial child visitation
rights to Bonny Jean Reynolds, former
same-sex partner of Lori Lee Sheets,
the child’s adoptive parent. Sheets
and Reynolds began their relationship
in 2000. In 2009, they were approved
as foster parents to a 2-year-old child
under an adoption plan. Since Arizona
did not allow adoption by same-sex
couples, they agreed that Sheets would
be the adoptive parent. Sheets adopted
the child in 2010, but her relationship
with Reynolds soon ended. Reynolds
maintained a relationship with the child
until Sheets “suddenly and arbitrarily”
(according to Reynolds) stopped
allowing Reynolds to contact or see the
child. Reynolds petitioned the Superior
Court for equal-time visitation. Judge
Mead granted substantial visitation,
finding that, as required by Arizona
statute, the child was “born or adopted
out of wedlock; the Child’s legal
parents were not married to each other;
and petitioner has a long term in loco
parentis relationship with the child.”
Judge Mead concluded that visitation
was in the best interest of the child.
Sheets unsuccessfully moved for a new
trial, then sought “relief by special
action” from the court of appeals,
arguing that a speedy disposition was
necessary to settle the issues for the
child. Writing for the court of appeals,
Judge Peter B. Swann concluded that
the trial court’s decision was precluded
by statute. Once a child has been
adopted, Swann wrote, the child takes
on a new legal status and is no longer
considered to be “born out of wedlock.”
Under the Arizona adoption law, after
an adoption takes place the adoptive
parent(s) and child will have the same
relationship under the law “as though
the child were born to the adoptive
parent in lawful wedlock.” Thus the
statute authorizing non-parent child
visitation would not apply, because such
a petition only applies to a child that
“was born out of wedlock.” The court
pointed out that had Reynolds sought
CIVIL LITIGATION
non-parent visitation before Sheets
adopted the child, the court could
have ordered it. But the legislature’s
overriding policy goal in the adoption
statute was to assure that adopted
children would not be considered as
having been born “out of wedlock,” and
this must be construed in light of the
legislature’s determination to limit nonparent visitation petitions to situations
where a child is “born out of wedlock.”
The court does not explain the
reasoning for this anomaly, and rejects
Reynold’s contention that the adoption
provision was limited to inheritance
issues. Judge Swann wrote that the
court recognizes that the visitation
statute’s “requirements may lead to
counterintuitive results.” “Nonetheless,”
he wrote, “the Legislature has decided
to ascribe importance to the marital
status of a child’s biological parents
at the time of birth, and we are bound
by the statutes it enacts. Similarly, the
Legislature has made an understandable
decision to ensure that adoptive parents
enjoy a status equal to that of biological
parents.” And, in many states, a
biological parent who is deemed fit has
a constitutional right to control who has
contact with her minor children in the
absence of exceptional circumstances
justifying overriding such right, as the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals
held the day after this Arizona case was
decided (see above). Courts generally
do not see same-sex co-parent claims as
presenting exceptional circumstances.
ARKANSAS – On August 31, a group
calling itself Protect Fayetteville filed
a lawsuit in state court challenging the
city’s recently enacted Uniform Civil
Rights Protection Ordinance 5781,
which is the subject of a referendum
scheduled to take place during
September. The plaintiffs contend
that coverage of sexual orientation
and gender identity violates the state’s
Intrastate Commerce Improvement
Act, the euphemistically-titled law
intended to prohibit localities from
passing laws forbidding discrimination
against gay and transgender people. The
purported policy reason for the law is
the argument that allowing localities
to forbid discrimination on grounds
not covered by state law creates a
patchwork of regulation that is inimical
to commerce within the state. The
lawsuit also contends that the Ordinance
violates the 1st Amendment rights of
employers, businesses and other entities
whose practices are regulated. Religion
Clause, Sept. 1, 2015 WLNR 25893555.
CALIFORNIA – Is this the end of the
road for challenges to California’s law
against conversion therapy for minors?
On July 21, 2015, U.S. District Judge
William B. Shubb signed an order
granting the state’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings in the challenge
brought by plaintiffs Donald Welch,
Anthony Duk, and Aaron Bitzer, in
Welch v. Brown, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94985 (E.D. Cal.). Wrote Shubb,
“Plaintiffs appear to recognize that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
forecloses plaintiffs’ challenges to SB
1172 based on free speech rights under
the First Amendment and substantive
due process protections. For the reasons
the court previously concluded that
plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail
on their remaining challenges under
the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses and privacy rights of third
parties, the court now finds that those
claims fail as a matter of law. See Welch
v. Brown, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1084-91
(E.D. Cal. 2014).”
CALIFORNIA – In Schuett v. FedEx
Corporation
Retirement
Appeals
Committee, 2015 WL 4484153 (N.D.
Cal., July 22, 2015), U.S. District Judge
Phyllis J. Hamilton denied a motion
by the defendant to transfer the case
to the Western District of Tennessee
“for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses.” The case concerns a claim
by the surviving same-sex spouse of a
FedEx employee to benefits due under
the retirement plan. The timing of
events is unfortunate and ironic. Stacey
Schuett, the plaintiff, married Lesly
Taboada-Hall, a FedEx employee, in
Sonoma County, California, on June
19, 2013. They had lived together for
many years, were raising two children
together, and were registered domestic
partners in California since 2003.
Taboada-Hall had worked for FedEx
for 26 years and was fully-vested for a
pension. She was diagnosed with cancer
in February 2010, and by November
was on medical leave. In February
2013 Taboada-Hall and Schuett phoned
a FedEx HR representative based in
Sacramento to find out about Schuett’s
rights to benefits if Taboada-Hall died.
He told them he didn’t know whether the
defined pension benefit would pass to
“a partner,” and discouraged TaboadaHall from taking early retirement at
that point. He advised that she list
Schuett as solo beneficiary for the life
insurance and 401(k) plan. On June
3, 2013, the doctor advised TaboadaHall that her condition was terminal.
Schuett alleges that they reviewed the
terms of the pension plan and saw that
it incorporated the definition of spouse
from the Defense of Marriage Act, and
they called FedEX HR personnel to try
to determine whether Schuett would
be eligible for the pension benefit if
they married. On June 13, 2013, they
were told that “spouse” under the
survivorship provision applied only to
opposite-sex partners. They married
on June 19. Taboada-Hall died the
next day, June 20. Six days later, the
Supreme Court declared the Defense of
Marriage Act unconstitutional in U.S. v.
Windsor. Schuett applied for the benefit
and was turned down. She appealed
to the Retirement Appeals Committee
under the plan, and was turned down
again, leading to this law suit, filed
in the Northern District of California.
CIVIL LITIGATION
In this motion, FedEx, which is
incorporated and has its headquarters in
Memphis, argued that the case should
be transferred to Tennessee, contending
that most of its witnesses (including
the three members of the RAC panel
who voted down the appeal) and the
relevant documents are in that general
vicinity. Schuett countered that she had
dealt with the HR staff in Sacramento,
that her late spouse had lived and
worked for FedEx in California, where
she earned the pension benefits, and
it was where the plaintiff resided.
Judge Hamilton reviewed these and
other factors specified under ERISA’s
enforcement provisions, and concluded
that “defendants have not met their
high burden of showing that a transfer
of venue to the Western District of
Tennessee is warranted.” To this writer,
it sounds like typical corporate hardball
litigation intended to make it much
more burdensome for the plaintiff to
pursue her claim, as she would have to
obtain counsel admitted in Tennessee
and personally travel there if a trial
was held, whereas FedEx, which does
business everywhere, undoubtedly
has relationships with counsel in the
Northern District of California, where
(as the evidence shows) it has an HR
operation that was the contact point
with Schuett prior to her spouse’s death.
Schuett had also noted that the relevant
documents in the case could easily
be shipped to the coast; after all, the
defendant is FedEx, for heaven’s sake!!
CALIFORNIA – U.S. District Judge
Kimberly J. Mueller ruled on Aug. 11
that Nadia Perez-Juarez was entitled
to an order dismissing a deportation
case against her, due to ineffective
assistance of counsel in the underlying
deportation proceeding. United States
v. Perez-Jaurezk, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105517, 2015 WL 4751148 (E.D.
Calif., Aug. 11, 2015). Perez-Juarez, a
native and citizen of Mexico, had lived
in the U.S. since infancy. She pled
guilty in state court in 2007 to a charge
of voluntary manslaughter, and the
federal government initiated removal
proceedings against her. Her counsel
conceded at the hearing that she was
removable, but argued that she was
entitled to protection from deportation
under the Convention Against Torture.
This was a mistake; 9th Circuit
precedents hold that a person is not
automatically deportable because of a
guilty plea to a voluntary manslaughter
charge, and there was ground to argue
in her case that the conviction should
not cause her deportation. Taking
the defense counsel’s concession, the
immigration ordered removal, denying
relief under the Convention against
Torture. After being deported, PerezJuarez managed to reenter the U.S. again,
but was quickly apprehended and put
in these new deportation proceedings.
This time, her argument was that her
prior representation was incompetent in
conceding deportability. Judge Mueller
agreed, granting defendant’s motion
to dismiss the deportation act. She
found that “a competent immigration
attorney would have been aware of
Purohit v. Holder, 441 Fed. App’x 458
(9th Circ., 2011)), a binding circuit
precedent holding that voluntary
manslaughter under California law is
not categorically a crime of violence for
purposes of deportation. The attorney’s
concession adversely affected PerezJuarez’s case, precluding a range of
potential arguments for avoiding
deportation. “In sum,” wrote Judge
Mueller, “the decision to concede
defendant’s removability was not a
tactical one. Instead, it was the result of
a lack of detailed independent research
and blind reliance on a prior counsel’s
assurances and brief reviews of a
quick reference chart. The conduct of
defendant’s counsel not only ‘prevented
her from reasonably presenting her
case,’ but rendered the proceedings
fundamentally unfair.” That being
so, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the indictment.
CALIFORNIA – We mention Marks v.
LaSalle, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
6227, 2015 WL 5066883 (Cal. Ct. App.,
4th Dist., Aug. 27, 2015) not because it
has any significance in terms of LGBT
rights, but because, as Judge Bedsworth
writes for the court, “This case has the
makings of a classic film noir story,
though thankfully, despite animosity
so thick between two of the parties the
trial judge made a specific finding on it,
no one has been murdered. The plaintiff
is an actor. The actor has a fiancée.
The fiancée has a younger sister. The
younger sister has a bad gambling habit.
She used to have a domestic partner
[same-sex] who enabled that habit. In
better days the two were high rollers.
They would get free rides on private
jets. They owned a fabled black credit
card. They drove a Range Rover. The
partner owned a Bentley. They lived in
a house in Huntington Beach.” And the
story goes on, implicating the younger
sister’s lesbian partner, Angele LaSalle,
in a scheme to steal from the actor by
apparently selling him her Bentley, then
hiring a Repo Man to take it back….
Anyway, it’s a neat story and a lesbian
couple is embedded in it, so we thought
it was worth mentioning. Nothing about
the lawsuit turns on the defendant’s
sexual orientation as such.
CALIFORNIA – Reversing a summary
judgment awarded to the employer,
a panel of the California 4th District
Court of Appeal ruled in Felton v. HiTech Electronic Manufacturing Co.,
2015 WL 4537459, 2015 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 5266 (July 28, 2015),
that even before California amended its
anti-discrimination law to make clear
that a plaintiff need not prove that a
harasser was acting out of sexual desire
in a same-sex harassment case, such was
the law in California, the amendment
merely making explicit prior appellate
rulings construing the state’s law. In
this case, a janitorial employee claimed
to have been sexually harassed by
CIVIL LITIGATION
the CEO of the company, who would
regularly make lewd, sexually-oriented
remarks and tell gay jokes in his
presence. The proverbial “straw that
broke the camel’s back” was an incident
on March 6, 2012, when the employee,
Norman Felton, entered the restroom to
find the CEO, Thai Nguyen, and several
other Vietnamese employees present.
According to Felton’s allegations, as
related in the court of appeals opinion
by Judge Gilbert Nares, “Nguyen turned
to Felton and said, ‘Norman, do you
want to make $50?’ Felton replied, “Yes,
what do you want me to do?’ Nguyen
responded, ‘Pull your pants down, bend
over, and let me stick my dick in your
ass.’ Nguyen and the other men in the
restroom laughed, and as Nguyen left
the restroom, he walked past Felton and
said, ‘I am the CEO of the company.
Don’t you know you do what the CEO
tells you to do?’ Felton said, ‘I sure did
walk into that, didn’t I?’ He testified
that he felt threatened because Nguyen
and the other men in the restroom
were speaking in Vietnamese, and he
did not know what they were saying
or what they might be planning to do
to him.” Felton testified that he was
greatly offended by this incident, was
sick to his stomach, and felt “dizzy”
and “woozy” afterwards. He didn’t
report the incident to anybody else at
the company because he was unaware
that they had an HR department or any
policy against harassment. The next
day, he filed a report with the EEOC,
and by March 15 had decided to quit
his job, testifying as to his reason: “Just
me as a person and my dignity and my
manhood and to have a statement like
that directed to you knowing that people
don’t say that to people.” Superior Court
Judge Richard E. L. Strauss granted
summary judgement for the company
on Felton’s sex discrimination claim
(and all other claims asserted in the
complaint), asserting that “proof of
sexual motivation or desire is required
in order to allege a same-sex sexual
harassment claim.” The court of appeal
found this erroneous under case law
at the time this motion was decided,
quoting earlier decisions stating, for
example: “Harassing conduct need not
be motivated by sexual desire to support
an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex. Sexual harassment occurs
when, as is alleged in this case, sex is
used as a weapon to create a hostile
work environment.” Nares wrote, “We
evaluate the objective severity of the
March 6 incident from the perspective of
a reasonable person in Felton’s position,
considering all of the circumstances,
including the social context in which the
incident occurred and was experienced
by Felton.” Felton was then 70 years old
and identified as heterosexual. “Felton’s
testimony supports a reasonable
inference that Nguyen’s comment about
engaging in anal sex with Felton caused
Felton to fear that Nguyen and the other
men might sexually assault him,” wrote
Judge Nares. “A reasonable person in his
position could reasonably feel shocked,
humiliated, and physically threatened
by Nguyen’s lewd proposition and the
fact that the other men in the restroom
reacted to it by laughing and speaking
in a foreign language. Thus, a trier of
fact could reasonably find that Nguyen’s
conduct was sufficiently severe to alter
the conditions of employment and
create a work environment that was
objectively hostile or abuse to Felton.
The requirement that the alleged
harassment must be ‘because of sex’ is
satisfied because the trier of fact could
reasonably find that Nguyen attacked
Felton’s identity as a heterosexual male
as a tool of harassment.” The court
upheld the trial court’s judgment on race
discrimination and harassment charges,
but reversed as to sexual harassment and
related claims, remanding for further
proceedings.
COLORADO – In Lafont v. Colorado
Athletic Club, 2015 WL 5031981, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113136 (D. Colo.,
Aug. 26, 2015), the court granted
summary judgment to the employer on
sex, sexual orientation and retaliation
claims brought by a lesbian former
employee, Camille Lafont, finding that
the factual allegations of the complaint
were insufficient to meet the pleading
requirements to avoid pretrial judgment.
Chief Judge Marcia S. Krieger,
reflecting the heavy predisposition of
federal trial judges to find reasons to toss
out employment discrimination claims,
minimized the seriousness of Lafont’s
allegations, implicitly finding credible
all of the employer’s explanations for
its actions while criticizing Lafont’s
allegations as inadequately specific.
This case was originally filed in state
court and removed to federal court by the
defendant, following the usual strategy
of employers seeking the more employerfriendly federal forum. The complaint
alleged violations of the sex and sexual
orientation discrimination provisions
of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Act, the sex discrimination provision
of Title VII, and retaliation provisions
of both statutes. The opinions available
on line as of Aug. 27 did not identify
counsel, and it is unclear whether
Lafont was representing herself, but the
court does not identify her as pro se.
Lafont’s complaint, as summarized by
the court, alleges a hostile environment
for women and gay people, with
particular emphasis on the behavior
towards Lafont of one male supervisor
which led her to file complaints within
the company. Ultimately she was
discharged when she got into a physical
altercation with another employee, with
Lafont’s girlfriend – a fellow employee
– also involved and also discharged as
well as the other employee for violating
the company’s rule against fighting on
the premises. She sought to connect the
discharge back to the alleged harassing
conduct and the company’s reaction
to her complaints (which had been
determined by an investigator retained
by the employer to be unsubstantiated).
It is difficult from reading the court’s
description of the allegations submitted
CIVIL LITIGATION
by the parties in support and opposition
to the summary judgment motion to
reach any conclusions, since so much
depends on how the court characterizes
the evidence. Federal civil pleading
requirements erect a high barrier for
discrimination plaintiffs, and this
case may be a prime example of how
potentially meritorious cases are easily
flushed out of the system on pre-trial
motions.
CONNECTICUT – U.S. District Judge
Victor Bolden has ruled that a lawsuit
by a lesbian employee of a health care
institution, seeking an order that the
employer provide dental and medical
coverage for her same-sex spouse,
must be dismissed because it may
be subject to arbitration under an
agreement signed by the employee as
a condition of employment. Considine
v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110561, 2015 WL
4999897 (D. Conn., Aug. 21, 2015).
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
represents Kerry Considine, who
asserted that Brookdale Senior Living
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and
the Connecticut Fair Employment
Practices Act (which expressly forbids
sexual orientation discrimination) by
rejecting her application for the benefits
for her spouse. She seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief, attorney’s fees
and costs, although she agreed at oral
argument that she would drop any
monetary claims in order to maintain
her suit in court as seeking purely
equitable relief. Brookdale argued that
this was the kind of claim covered by
the arbitration agreement she signed,
which expressly extends to claims of
discrimination. Considine responded
that her claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief is deemed as “not
covered” by the arbitration provision,
which expressly excludes any claim by
an employee “for injunctive or other
equitable relief.” Brookdale countered
that the arbitration agreement provides
that any dispute about whether a
claim is subject to arbitration must be
submitted to an arbitrator. Catch-22!
Judge Bolden agreed that under the
Federal Arbitration Act, if an arbitration
agreement reserves questions of
arbitrability for the arbitrator, they are
not to be decided by the court. “The
Supreme Court has indicated that the
question of whom – the arbitrator or
the Court – has the power to decide the
threshold issue of arbitrability depends
on what the parties have agreed about
that particular matter,” he wrote.
“Because the parties’ dispute focuses on
the scope of the arbitration agreement,
it is squarely one of arbitrability.” The
court rejected Considine’s argument
that Brookdale sought to avoid litigation
by raising a “mere ‘flicker of doubt’
or a ‘wholly groundless’ dispute as to
whether the dispute may be arbitrated.”
Bolden observed that Considine had
failed to cite any 2nd Circuit precedent
“indicating that courts in this jurisdiction
engage in this inquiry. Even if these tests
do apply,” wrote Bolden, “the Court is
satisfied that Brookdale has raised more
than a so-called ‘flicker of doubt’ about
the arbitrability of the dispute. Both
sides rely on separate provisions of the
agreement that, in this Court’s view, do
seem to compel opposite results. Because
the parties have delegated the issue of
arbitrability to an arbitrator, the Court
can say no more on the matter.” The case
exemplifies the extreme deference to the
arbitral process that the Supreme Court
has embraced, even in cases where it
is clear that the arbitration agreement
signed by rank-and-file employees as
a condition of employment is, in every
instance, a contract of adhesion that
throws the employee into a forum with
built-in headwinds against an employee
victory. Since arbitrators are paid by the
parties to decide their disputes, they have
every incentive to resolve such issues in
favor of arbitrability and then to proceed
to rule on the merits, since the usual
consequence in this situation is that
both arbitrability and the merits dispute
will be presented to the arbitrator in
the same proceeding unless the parties
agree to a bifurcated process, which will
be more expensive since arbitrators are
normally compensated on a per diem
basis. Proposals have been floating in
Congress to cut back on the Federal
Arbitration Act, which many argue was
never intended to apply to the individual
employee context when it was enacted
in the 1920s, as such agreements
were virtually unknown at the time
and the context of enactment shows
that the main concern was to render
commercial arbitration agreements
between companies enforceable in
federal court. Only decades later did the
Supreme Court, eager to lighten federal
trial court dockets, “discover” that the
FAA also endowed federal courts with
authority to dismiss federal statutory
claims under such circumstances, even
though language in the FAA appears
expressly to exclude such agreements!
FLORIDA – An attempt by students at
a Florida middle school (grades 6-8)
to form an officially-recognized Gay
Straight Alliance (GSA) foundered on
U.S. District Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges’s
conclusion that Florida law does not
regard middle schools as “secondary
schools” and thus they are not covered
under the federal Equal Access Act, a
statute that has served as a vehicle in the
past for federal courts to order school
districts to authorize the formation of
Gay Straight Alliances at public high
schools. Carver Middle School GayStraight Alliance v. School Board of
Lake County, Florida, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109489, 2015 WL 4999162
(M.D. Fla., Aug. 19, 2015). Actually,
Judge Hodges didn’t even have to get
this far into the statutory claim, having
ruled that the dispute was not justiciable
on grounds that it was not “ripe for
decision” and could be characterized
as “moot.” Hodges pointed out that at
the time the suit was filed, “resolution
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of the challenge was not ‘fit’ for
adjudication because it depended
upon facts that were not sufficiently
developed,” which was “attributable to
a deliberate choice made by the GSA to
proceed with litigation that might well
have been avoided through the simple
process of resubmitting an enhanced
application.” The judge pointed out
that the GSA sponsor had agreed that
resubmission of the application was “an
option,” so litigation was premature.
Furthermore, the judge said, the dispute
was moot because “it is stipulated that
the GSA made no application at all for
the now concluded 2014-2015 school
year. The net result is that there is
nothing to enjoin the School Board to
do or not to do. The last submission
of an application to the School Board
by the Carver Middle School GSA
occurred in early December 2013, over
a year and a half ago, for 2013-2014. A
curious election was made at that time
to eschew an amended application in
favor of an immediate lawsuit (this
case), but there is no explanation at
all for not filing an application for the
ensuing 2014-2015 school year.” But
even had these jurisdictional problems
been overcome, the court found the
Equal Access Act inapplicable, because
it applies to “secondary public schools”
and Florida law does not classify
middle schools as coming within that
category. The court also rejected the
GSA’s 1st and 14th Amendment claim.
While the court found that denial of
the original application did implicate
1st Amendment expressive activity or
associational rights, the claim was to
be evaluated as pertaining to a “limited
open forum” in public schools, so it
was not a strict scrutiny case. The court
found that the school board was “well
within its rights” to “draw distinctions
based on differences in maturity levels
between elementary schools, middle
school, and high schools.” Attorneys for
the ACLU of Florida and the ACLU’s
national LGBT Rights Project represent
the GSA.
ILLINOIS – The Appellate Court of
Illinois took up the vexing question of
how to deal with disposition of assets
upon dissolution of a civil union in
Hamlin v. Vasconcellos, 2015 IL App.
(2d) 140231 (July 17, 2015). The most
significant legal dispute that had to be
resolved was whether a court acting to
dissolve a civil union pursuant to the
Illinois Religious Freedom Protection
and Civil Union Act, which went into
effect on June 1, 2011, should treat
as “civil union property” only that
acquired from the date the statute went
into effect, or also that acquired from
the date the parties contracted their
civil union in Vermont, July 20, 2002.
There was also an important looming
question about attribution of property
ownership in a successful business
started by one of the civil union
partners. The details of the court’s
review of the trial court’s disposition
of the property are too complicated
and drawn out to be dealt with in this
brief summary, but the determination
of the legal issue is significant beyond
the particular property dispute and
thus worth recounting. Judge Joseph
E. Birkett began his analysis by noting
that the Illinois statute specifically
provides for reciprocity with other
jurisdictions. In this case, in addition
to forming a civil union in Vermont in
2002, the parties had gone to Toronto
the following year when same-sex
marriages became available in Canada
and tied the knot again. The Illinois
civil union law (since superseded by
the new Marriage Equality law enacted
in 2013) provided that civil unions and
same-sex marriages “legally entered
into in another jurisdiction” would be
treated as civil unions in Illinois, and
provided instructions on division of
property for dissolution of civil unions.
The dissolution action in this case
was initiated shortly after the 2011
law went into effect. After inquiring
into the statutory language and the
Illinois decisions on prospective and
retrospective application of statutes, the
court said that “the civil union could
predate the effective date of the Act,
match the effective date of the Act, or
postdate the effective date of the Act,”
so the Act “operates to recognize, as of
the Act’s effective date, any civil union
that was, at any time, legally entered into
in a foreign jurisdiction.” Furthermore,
wrote Birkett, “The Act does not limit
the effect of a foreign civil union to the
effective date of the Act and thereafter.
. . Respondent argues that recognizing
their civil union as commencing in 2002
means that we are giving retroactive
application to the Act. We disagree. As
we have determined, the Act operates
only as of its effective date. Thus, it
is prospective. However, the Act may
operate upon antecedent facts, such as
the fact that a civil union was entered
into before the Act’s effective date.”
Thus, all property acquired subsequent
to July 20, 2002, would be considered
civil union property for purposes of
distribution of assets to the extent
appropriate under established rules for
assigning ownership rights to property
acquired during the course of a legally
recognized
spousal
relationship.
Ultimately, the court concluded that
the trial court’s disposition of property
disputes was not entirely appropriate,
and remanded for reconsideration in
light of various comments the court
made about the trial court’s evaluation
of the evidence.
ILLINOIS – In Yap v. Northwestern
University, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103009, 2015 WL 4692492 (N.D. Ill.,
Aug. 6, 2015), U.S. District Judge Sara
L. Ellis sets out in detail the factual
allegations of Jonathan Woon Teck
Yap, a graduate student, who sues under
Title IX of the Education Act of 1972,
alleging sex discrimination, hostile
educational environment and retaliation.
Mr. Yap alleges that he was the object
of unwanted flirtation from Dr. David
Engman, then director of the Medical
Scientist Training Program in which he
CIVIL LITIGATION
was enrolled to earn a combined M.D.
and Ph.D. The program is supported
by federal funding, bringing Title IX
into play. Yap contends that when he
complained to university officials, there
was a delayed response and incomplete
investigation that did not end to his
satisfaction, and that ultimately he was
the target of various kinds of retaliation
that seriously affected the course of his
professional studies, including the loss
of valuable placement opportunities
and delay of his graduation. Among
his contentions is that his complaints
would have been taken more seriously
had he been a female student alleging
harassment by a male professor, and
in support of his retaliation claim that
he was denied certain requests that
were granted for other students in the
program. The entire story is too long
and detailed to be recounted here, but it
is difficult to read it without concluding
that if Northwestern does not bear
some liability for this scenario, then the
prohibition of sex discrimination under
Title IX by higher education institutions
is not particularly meaningful – at least
if one takes Mr. Yap’s allegations at
face value, as the court was required
to do in deciding on the university’s
motion to dismiss. Judge Ellis rejected
the university’s claim that Yap’s hostile
environment sexual harassment claim
was time-barred, but concluded that
his claim for sexual harassment against
Northwestern fell short because he did
not allege any incidents of harassment
occurring after he reported his complaint
to Northwestern. Thus, the case devolves
to the question whether Northwestern
violated his rights because of the
way they responded to his complaint,
including claims of retaliation. As to
that, Judge Ellis concluded that the
complaint was sufficient to maintain
an action for sex discrimination due to
the lack of a prompt investigation of the
claim, and that Mr. Yap had adequately
alleged facts to support a claim that he
suffered retaliation in tangible ways
for having pursued his complaints.
Given the thoroughness of Judge Ellis’s
analysis, this opinion should signal an
earnest attempt by the university to
settle the case, as most of the economic
value of Mr. Yap’s claims relate to the
disadvantages and delays he suffered
in his education after he reported his
harassment claim to university officials.
MARYLAND – U.S. District Judge
Ellen Lipton Hollander rejected
summary judgment motions filed by
defendants in Tyndall v. Berlin Fire
Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92999, 2015
WL 4396529 (D. Md., July 16, 2015),
in which a straight fire-fighter alleged
that he had been subjected to a hostile
environment because of his sex in
violation of Title VII, and that two coworkers in particular had subject him
to intentional infliction of emotional
distress. At his deposition, Mr. Tyndall
testified that the problem stemmed from
an incident when he was in high school.
“There was a woman that offered to have
sex with me after the prom, and she was
intoxicated, and I did not have sex with
her. And they had the assumption that I
was gay because I did not have sex with
her.” From then on, these individuals,
who ultimately became members of
the Berlin Fire Company along with
Tyndall, started to call him names
such as “gay boy,” “homo,” “queer”
and “faggot,” and this escalated over
the years. Tyndall testified that it went
beyond teasing to unwanted touching,
games and pranks, escalating from
“being occasional to being an everyday
occurrence,” and his attempts to get
them to stop only seemed to aggravate it
until it became intolerable, leading him
to complain formally to management.
That just seemed to make it worse. BFC
raised various ineffective jurisdictional
and procedural arguments that Judge
Hollander found insufficient to justify
summary judgment, and argued that
because the essence of Tyndall’s
claim was that he was subject to
homophobic comments, this was a non-
actionable claim of sexual orientation
discrimination. Judge Hollander found
sufficient factual allegations suggesting
gender-stereotyping to come within
the consensus of federal case law
under Title VII stemming from the
seminal 1989 Supreme Court decision
in PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, and
that the specific factual allegations
suggested that Zackery Tyndall might
be able to persuade a fact-finder that
the alleged behavior of co-workers and
supervisors was sufficiently severe and
pervasive to meet the test for a hostile
environment sex discrimination case.
She also found that Tyndall’s allegations
were sufficient to keep the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim in
play as well. “Considering the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-movant,”
wrote Judge Hollander, “a reasonable
juror could find that such conduct was
deliberate, intentional, and outrageous.
And, in light of its continuous nature
over the course of multiple years and
environments, a reasonable juror could
determine that it was extreme, beyond
any typical workplace offenses or
indiscretions, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” If BFC’s liability
insurer has any sense, they will offer a
substantial settlement rather than go to
trial in light of the detailed deposition
testimony quoted by Judge Hollander in
the opinion.
MASSACHUSETTS – In Sexual
Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104636, 2015 WL
4750931 (D. Mass., Aug. 10, 2015),
U.S. Magistrate Judge Katherine A.
Robertson ruled on motions concerning
discovery in the ongoing litigation under
the Alien Tort Statute by an umbrella
organization based in Kampala,
Uganda, representing the interests of
member organizations advocating for
LGBTI rights in that county, against
Rev. Scott Lively and his ministry,
accused in this case of having worked
to promote anti-gay activities and
CIVIL LITIGATION
legislation in that country. The central
focus of the discovery dispute concerns
information in documents demanded
by the defendants that the plaintiffs
want to shelter from disclosure – most
importantly the identities of individual
LGBTI persons in Uganda supporting
efforts for LGBTI right and information
pertinent to strategies by the plaintiff
organizations to obtain repeal of antigay legislation there. The defendant
argues that documents produced thus
far in discovery have been excessively
redacted. Plaintiffs sought in these
motions, among other things, to limit
disclosure of sensitive information even
further than already has been done by
having the court go beyond an existing
protective order to mark selected
documents as “attorneys eyes only,” so
that the information is not revealed to
Lively and his organization, with the
fear that it would be communicated
further to Ugandan authorities and
used to locate and persecute LGBTI
people in Uganda. Judge Robertson
was amenable to allowing redactions
of
personal
information
about
organizational members, finding that
plaintiffs had made a prima facie
showing. “It is uncontroverted that ‘on
past occasions, revelation of the identity
of [LGBTI individuals in Uganda] has
exposed these [individuals] to economic
reprisal, . . . threat of physical coercion
[and arrest], and other manifestations of
public [and official] hostility,” she wrote,
adapting language from the leading
U.S. Supreme Court ruling protecting
the identity of organizational members
in discovery, NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). “Defendant claims
in conclusory fashion that Plaintiff’s
redactions require action by this court
to preserve his ability to investigate,
develop and mount his defense,” she
continued. “He has not demonstrated
that the previously undisclosed
identities of donors, supporters, and
affiliates of Plaintiff are crucial to
his defense; nor has he made such a
showing with respect to email addresses
for list-serves used by Plaintiff and
its associates; or personal telephone
numbers of potential witnesses for
whom business telephone numbers have
been provided. It follows that Plaintiff
is entitled to redact this information
from its document production.”
However, the court did not see the
necessity for placing an “attorneys eyes
only” limitation on documents that
were already subject to a protective
order restricting their use to litigation
purposes, and of course already heavily
redacted. While the court concluded that
plaintiffs could also redact or withhold
anything that clearly fell within the
category of attorney client privilege,
it also pointed out that redaction or
omission on grounds of “relevance”
had been construed too broadly by the
plaintiffs in prior tussles in this case
over document production. “Redaction
of documents that are responsive and
contain some relevant information
should be limited to redactions of
privileged information when, as in
this case, there is a protective order
restricting and use and dissemination of
other sensitive information,” she wrote,
ordering that “to the extent that Plaintiff
has made redactions from documents
it produced on the grounds that the
redacted information was not, in its
view, relevant, those documents will be
produced without redactions except to
the extent that those documents contain
privileged material.” The action was
filed on March 14, 2012, withstood
early motions for dismissal, and has
become bogged down in discovery.
MICHIGAN – U.S. District Judge
Patrick J. Duggan denied a motion
to stay enforcement of an arbitration
award concerning a domestic partner
benefits dispute at Spirit Airlines while
the employer goes to the 6th Circuit
seeking reversal of the district court’s
order enforcing the arbitration award.
Spirit Airlines v. Associate of Flight
Attendants, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105743, 2015 WL 4757106 (E.D. Mich.,
Aug. 12, 2015). Spirit offered a domestic
partnership benefit plan for healthcare
to its flight attendants. Married flight
attendants could select from among four
different plans, but only one plan was
offered for partnered flight attendants.
The union challenged the disparity and
won a ruling from the arbitrators that
Spirit was required to offer the same
choices to partnered flight attendants as
married flight attendants. Spirit sought
judicial review, but lost when Judge
Duggan issued an order on June 17,
2015, enforcing the arbitration award.
In seeking a stay pending appeal, Spirit
argued that it would incur significant
cost and inconvenience if it had to
comply and then the 6th Circuit ruled
in its favor, allowing it to go back to
the challenged benefits program. Judge
Duggan found that this did not constitute
irreparable injury, since the losses
could be monetized. He also found that
although Spirit’s appeal on the merits
was not hopeless, it failed to meet the
standard necessary for a stay, as it had
not shown that the likelihood of success
on appeal was great. After all, federal
courts are generally very deferential to
arbitral rulings, as commanded by the
Supreme Court in its cases establishing
the legal framework for judicial review
of labor arbitration awards. The court
rejected Spirit’s argument that a delay
in implementation of the award would
cause slight harm to the union, noting
that a stay would mean that partnered
flight attendants would be limited
to one plan choice during the annual
open enrollment period in November
2015. “The elimination of a choice of
employer-sponsored health care plans
during the next open enrollment period,
regardless of whether a choice of plans
was historically offered, constitutes
clear harm,” wrote Duggan. He also
noted Spirit’s concession that the public
interest factor in this case “does not
weigh heavily in either direction.” Thus,
on balance, the four factors prescribed
by the Supreme Court for deciding stay
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applications cut against Spirit’s request,
and the arbitration award will go into
effect without delay.
MICHIGAN – A three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals of Michigan rejected a
petition by relatives to block the adoption
of twin infants by a gay male couple
who had been serving as their foster
parents. In re KJP-D, KFP-D, Minors,
2015 WL 4746307 (Aug. 11, 2015). The
court of appeals found that the decision
by the respondent, superintendent of the
Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI),
denying consent to the petitioners to
adopt the child, was neither arbitrary
nor capricious. The twins were born 8
weeks premature, having been exposed
to illegal drugs in utero, and exhibited
significant developmental delays. They
were removed from their parents’
home and placed in foster care due
to the mother’s emotional instability
and substance abuse. They were
subsequently placed with their paternal
grandmother, and the parental rights of
the parents were terminated. Soon they
were removed from the grandmother’s
custody after Protective Services
discovered that she had released the
twins back to their parents. This time,
these African- American infants were
placed with a gay male Caucasian
couple, who provided a supportive
environment, got them therapy for their
developmental delays, and bonded with
them, applying to adopt. A competing
adoption petition came from the twin’s
paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who
urged that the twins should be raised
by family members. A social worker
from Lutheran Adoption Services
recommended granting their petition,
but the foster care agency endorsed the
adoption petition by the gay couple, and
the MCI superintendent went with the
foster care agency’s recommendation.
The great-aunt and great-uncle, Anitra
and Robert Baker, appealed to the trial
court. At the time, Anitra was 50 and
Robert was 69, already retired from full-
time employment. Their adult sons were
incarcerated due to their conviction of
attempted robbery of a former girlfriend
during which they pistol-whipped her
friend. The trial judge found that the
decision to prefer the gay couple was
not arbitrary or capricious, in light of
the good job they were doing with the
twins, who had improved substantially
with therapy and with whom the gay
couple had bonded psychologically, and
in light of the drawbacks presented by
the relatives’ petition. On appeal to the
court of appeals, the Bakers for the first
time pressed the argument of racial/
ethnic competency and a statutory
preference that children be raised
by relatives, but the court of appeals
pointed out that under the arbitrary and
capricious standard it should defer to
the decision by the superintendent of
MCI. “The trial court was only required
to find that Johnson had one good
reason to withhold consent in order to
deny petitioners’ Section 45 motion,”
wrote the court. “Therefore, because
we find that the first reason advanced
by respondent was not arbitrary and
capricious, we need not consider the
additional reasons supporting his
decision.” The MCI superintendent had
also referred to the advanced age of the
petitioners, pointing out that by the time
the twins reached their teens, Mr. Baker
would be over 80, and also expressing
reservations about Mrs. Baker’s attitude
toward the criminal convictions
of her sons. The court of appeals,
characterizing these as secondary
reasons, said it had reviewed all the
reasons given by the superintendent,
not just the first, and still found no clear
error in the trial court’s determination.
The court found that the family
preference doctrine did not apply to this
sort of proceeding, that the best interest
of the child standard under the Child
Custody Act was not applicable, and
that the “ethnic and cultural interest”
argument could not be first raised on
appeal and was not accompanied by any
evidence “upon which the trial court
could make a factual finding.” The
court ended its decision was a paragraph
expressing empathy for the petitioners,
and expressing a non-binding wish that
“the petitioners are able to remain a part
of the twins’ lives in some capacity as
they move forward in life.”
MISSISSIPPI – U.S. District Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr., dismissed a pro
se complaint filed by Cedric Jerome
McCullum, an inmate at the Jackson
County Adult Detention Center, who
claimed his rights had been violated
when he was incorrectly diagnosed
HIV positive at Singing River Hospital
Center in 2007. During his current
incarceration at Jackson County Adult
Detention Center, he was administered
a new blood test and was negative for
HIV. He filed a federal constitutional
claim accompanied by state tort claims.
The court dismissed sua sponte, finding
that a misdiagnosis that somebody
was HIV-positive did not state a
constitutional claim. McCullum claimed
that the misdiagnosis was harmful
to his reputation, but the court found
that “there is no constitutional right to
be free from defamation or slander.”
The court dismissed the federal
constitutional claim with prejudice, but
the state law claims without prejudice,
so that McCullum could refile them in
state court. McCullum v. Singing River
Hospital System, 2015 WL 4899750
(S.D. Miss., Aug. 17, 2015).
MISSOURI – Ruling in a dispute
between lesbian co-parents over child
custody long predating the recent round
of marriage equality litigation, a threejudge panel of the Court of Appeals of
Missouri, Western District, affirmed
a ruling by Clay County Circuit Judge
Kathryn E. Davis dismissing Melissa
McGaw’s motion “to determine
parent-child relationship, custody, and
visitation” with the twins who were born
in 2004 to Angela McGaw. McGaw v.
CIVIL LITIGATION
McGaw, 2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 824,
2015 WL 4910657 (Aug. 18, 2015). The
fact pattern is typical of such cases; the
women lived as couple for several years,
had a commitment ceremony, agreed
to raise children together, conceived
twins borne by Angela through donor
insemination, separated a few years later,
at first amicably enough that Melissa
continued parental contact with the
twins, but Angela eventually sought to
end the relationship and denied contact.
The opinion for the court by Judge Alok
Ahuja explained the transitional nature
of the case: “At the outset, we note
that the McGaws’ relationship began,
and ended, at a time when the right of
same-sex couples to marry had not been
recognized in Missouri. Despite their
inability to marry, Melissa’s motion
alleges that she and Angela took multiple
steps to formalize their relationship;
they participated in a commitment
ceremony; changed Angela’s surname
to match Melissa’s; purchased a home
together; jointly chose to conceive
the children and raised the children
together; and entered an agreement
to govern the termination of their
relationships. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that Melissa and Angela were
never married, and – as our decision in
[White v. White] recognized – Melissa’s
claims must therefore be addressed
under the legal rules applicable to
unmarried couples (heterosexual or
homosexual). Following the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015) (which was decided
after this case was submitted), couples
like Melissa and Angela are now able
to marry if they choose. We anticipate
that in the wake of Obergefell, situations
like this one, in which important issues
involving children must be decided
outside the established legal framework
applicable to married couples, will occur
less frequently.” But, of course, that does
not mean they will never occur, so this
decision, rejecting various common law
causes of action asserted by Melissa, is
consequential for same-sex couples in
Missouri. The court found that Melissa’s
complaint fell short in terms of alleging
a breach of conflict claim, lacking the
necessary specificity to provide the
court with a basis for determining the
terms of the parties’ alleged agreement.
(Melissa had argued that such an
agreement could be enforced if the court
found that it was in the best interest of
the children.) The court noted that it was
bound by existing Missouri case law
from applying theories such as in loco
parentis, equitable estoppel or equitable
parentage in this case. The court
explained that there is a Missouri statute
under which Melissa could pursue
a separate third-party parent claim,
Section 452.375.5(5), but that she had
not asserted a claim under the statute in
the case before the court. Concurring in
part and dissenting in part, Judge Robert
M. Clayton III agreed that Melissa had
a right to pursue an independent action
under the statute if she could prove the
necessary facts, but argued that the trial
court’s dismissal should be reversed and
the case remanded for a full hearing on
the merits, asserting that “in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Obergefell, I believe this matter
should be transferred to the Missouri
Supreme Court to determine whether,
under the circumstances of this case,
the above-referenced statutory scheme
is ‘plainly inadequate,’ in accordance
with Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 264,
264 (Mo. banc 1998), demonstrating a
need for the court to exercise its equity
powers.”
NEW YORK – We reported in the
Summer issue of Law Notes that U.S.
District Judge Jed S. Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.)
had issued a bench ruling on June 26
refusing to dismiss a lawsuit challenging
New York’s refusal to provide Medicaid
coverage for many medical procedures
associated with gender reassignment
on grounds that they were merely
“cosmetic” and thus not “medically
necessary.” On July 29, Judge Rakoff
issued a substantial written opinion
explaining his ruling, Cruz v. Zucker,
2015 WL 4548162, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99323. The state’s motion to
dismiss had argued that the court did
not have jurisdiction over the claims
asserted for a variety of reasons, and
Judge Rakoff’s opinion was devoted to
refuting this contention, particularly in
finding that individual have a right to
sue in federal court for a determination
that a state Medicaid program’s refusal
to cover a particular medical procedure
violated the state’s obligations under
the Medicaid statute. The introductory
paragraph of the court’s opinion nicely
summarizes what was at stake in ruling
on the motion. “The intersection of our
cognition with our emotions is both
the essence of our humanity and the
source of our anxiety,” wrote Rakoff.
“According to the plaintiffs in this
class action, someone who is born with
the physical equipment of one sex but
emotionally identifies as someone of the
opposite sex suffers severe anxiety and
emotional distress that may, however,
be materially alleviated by available
medical procedures. Plaintiffs further
contend that New York wrongly denies
Medicaid coverage for many such
procedures, regarding them as merely
‘cosmetic’ or the like. The immediate
question before the Court is whether
the plaintiffs here can sue for redress of
this alleged wrong. The Court concludes
that they can.” The dispute is not about
whether New York must fund the central
elements of sex reassignment surgery, as
the state has recently ended its long-time
refusal to do so, in response in part of the
initial filing of this lawsuit. The issue is
whether the state can limit its coverage
to breast and genital removal surgery,
or is also required to fund various
other procedures intended to conform
the individual’s physical appearance to
their preferred gender. According to the
court’s opinion, the disputed procedures
include “breast augmentation, facial
feminizing surgery, chondrolarngoplasty
CIVIL LITIGATION
(commonly referred to as ‘tracheal
shave’), body sculpting procedures,
and electrolysis.” The plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint shortly
after the state published the list of
procedures it would cover, contending
that the exclusions violated numerous
requirements under the federal
Medicaid regulations. The state was
arguing, in effect, that plaintiffs’ only
recourse was to pursue administrative
remedies through the Medicaid system,
but Judge Rakoff disagreed, finding
that the statute and regulations arguably
conferred treatment rights upon eligible
individuals that could be pursued
through litigation.
NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge
Joanna Seybert granted a motion to
dismiss a Title VII/NYS Human Rights
Law complaint against a hospital for
refusal to hire a transgender woman, but
gave leave to file an amended complaint
with more factual detail. Carr v. North
Shore-Long Island Jewish Health
Systems, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99792,
2015 WL 4603389 (E.D.N.Y., July
30, 2015). The plaintiff, a transgender
woman and a member of the Unitarian
Universalist Church, was a student at
Sanford Brown Institute studying for an
Associates degree in Applied Sciences
to qualify as a medical assistant. In
the summer of 2012, she was one of a
group of students serving in a medical
assistant extern position at the hospital,
and she was informed that students who
successfully completed the externship
were normally offered employment
after graduation. She alleges that she
was dropped from the program due to
her sex and religion, claiming that she
“sometimes heard ‘chatter,’ or sometimes
received ‘stares’ from other employees
when she attempted to use the female
employee restroom” but, wrote Judge
Seybert, “Plaintiff does not describe the
contents of this chatter, its speakers, or
which employees inappropriately stared
at her.” She did relate one incident in
support of her claim; overhearing her
extern supervisor (whom she accuses,
without any specifics, of “routinely”
disparaging her in the presence of
others) telling a patient’s mother “that
Unitarian Universalist is not a religion
that is recognized by Jesus, and the heshes . . . and the gays will need to answer
to Jesus someday.” This was offered as
evidence of discriminatory animus by
the supervisor, whom plaintiff alleged
“executed a systematic attack against
Plaintiff by shaming her and then
privately being nice to her, with the
objective of Plaintiff being terminated
before the externship concluded in
order to preempt her employment
with Defendant.” Plaintiff received an
email on September 25, 2012, from the
employee who had initially interviewed
her for the externship, telling her not
to return to the externship, to which
she responded the next day, raising
the issue of her supervisor’s alleged
mistreatment of her, to which she did
not receive a response until she received
a copy of the supervisor’s evaluation of
her dated October 3. One defense raised
by the hospital was that it could not
be accused of a discriminatory refusal
to hire when the plaintiff had never
applied for a job, but the court accepted
the allegations about the externship
program being a channel to employment
as sufficient to bring this case within
the ambit of a refusal to hire. However,
Judge Seybert agreed with the hospital
that the complaint was deficient in
factual specifics in light of the pleading
requirements under Title VII. Apart
from the overheard “stray remark,”
the plaintiff hadn’t made specific
allegations about specific statements
by specific employees, and the one
overheard remark was not deemed by
Judge Seybert as sufficient to ground
a Title VII claim. However, Judge
Seybert noted, the court had discretion
to grant leave to amend the complaint,
and “the Court finds that there is at
least some indication that a valid claim
might be stated,” so such permission
was granted in this case. Plaintiff Tina
Carr is represented by Lance D. Simon
of Simon Law Group in Riverhead, N.Y.
The question now is whether Carr can
recall enough specifics to flesh out the
factual allegations sufficiently to state a
Title VII claim up to the “plausibility”
standard.
NEW YORK – Despite the EEOC’s
recent holding that sexual orientation
discrimination claims are cognizable
under Title VII, federal district courts
routinely cite earlier decisions holding
to the contrary in dismissing Title VII
claims. In Harder v. New York State
Office of Children & Family Services,
2015 WL 4614233 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 3,
2015), U.S. District Judge David N.
Hurd followed this path. The plaintiff,
Harry A. Harder, a former employee of
OCFS (Youth Division Aid), alleged
that various comments made by a
fellow trainee and then staff member
who had initially been assigned as his
roommate during the training course
had created the false impression among
co-workers and clients that Harder
was gay, leading to various incidents
and confrontations on which he based
his discrimination claim. After he
complained to supervision about the
co-worker’s comments, Harder claimed
that he suffered retaliation in the form
of adverse job assignments. He left the
agency to take a position in another state
agency, but also apparently to escape his
deteriorating situation at OCFS. Harder
filed discrimination claims with the NY
State Division of Human Rights and the
EEOC, neither of which panned out for
him, but he followed up by filing a pro
se federal lawsuit against the agency
and the co-worker under Title VII,
alleging discrimination on the basis of
misperceived sexual orientation and
retaliation for filing complaints with
management. After dismissing the case
against the co-worker on the ground
that only employers can incur Title VII
liability, Judge Hurd turned to Harder’s
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allegation of unlawful discrimination.
He found that Harder had failed the
first step of pleading a prima facie
case, protected class membership. Hurd
wrote that “Harder cannot satisfy the
first prong of this test, since Title VII
‘provides no remedy for discrimination
based upon sexual orientation,’” citing
decisions by other federal district
courts from 2011 and 2014. “This same
‘protected class’ limitation also applies
to Title VII claims brought under
theories of a hostile work environment
and constructive discharge,” Hurd
continued. “Accordingly, defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
these claims.” Turning to the retaliation
claim, Hurd was willing to accept the
argument that Harder’s good faith
belief that he was complaining about
unlawful conduct could be sufficient
to ground a retaliation claim, but
found that Harder’s factual allegations
were insufficient to show that the job
assignments he was protesting were
a response to the complaints he filed,
so this claim also had to be dismissed.
The employer credibly showed that they
were just luck-of-the-draw assignments
based on staff availability and coverage
needs at the particular time. Had Harder
been represented by competent counsel,
perhaps the court would have been
presented with the handful of federal
district court rulings finding sexual
orientation claims actionable under Title
VII, leading to a different outcome on the
discrimination claim, but in the current
state of legal developments, a pro se
plaintiff without access to information
about these new developments is not
well positioned to survive a dismissal
motion. General public opinion polls
show that a substantial majority of the
general public mistakenly believes that
sexual orientation discrimination is
already against federal law, so it is not
surprising that pro se plaintiffs bring
such claims in federal court. The EEOC
has launched an undertaking to bring
cases in federal court to establish useful
precedents supporting its view of Title
VII coverage, but generating appellate
precedents will undoubtedly take some
time, and then ensuring that district
courts are aware of them in the context
of pro se cases needs to be part of the
campaign.
NEW YORK – U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Stuart M. Bernstein has dismissed a
bankruptcy petition filed by David
Frances Charles Reyes, the surviving
same-sex partner of Gerald Arthur,
who died in February 2011 leaving
a rather complicated situation with
regard to the ownership of his real
property, located at 149 East 29 Street
in Manhattan, and other assets. In re
Reyes, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2575, 2015
WL 4624156 (U.S.B.C., S.D.N.Y., Aug.
4, 2015). According to Judge Bernstein’s
summary of the facts, Arthur executed
a will in 2002, leaving the property to
one Abraham Pelotin, and designating
David Caraway as executor. After
the will was executed, Reyes became
Arthur’s domestic partner. Reyes claims
that Arthur decided to make a new will
in 2007, leaving the property and other
assets to him. Instead, however, the
lawyer he retained, Jo Anne Simon (now
a NY State Assemblymember), drafted
a Trust document, naming herself as
trustee, giving the trust title to Arthur’s
property and other assets with the
mandate to pay Arthur’s expenses during
his lifetime. Reyes claims that Arthur
had not requested this arrangement, and
was hospitalized, in pain and taking
medication, when he executed the Trust
and a power of attorney naming Simon
on October 6, 2008. The next day,
Simon exercised the power of attorney
to deed the Property from Arthur to
herself as trustee, and recorded the deed
on November 21, making the Trust the
owner of the property. (Reyes claims
that the Trust, the Power of Attorney
and the deed were all back-dated.)
Reyes claims that Arthur tried to revoke
the Trust in writing in August 2009,
but that Simon ignored his attempt.
After Arthur died controversy ensued,
of course. Reyes claimed the Trust was
invalid or had been revoked, and that he
had an equitable interest in the Property
because Simon had not drafted the will
that Reyes claims Arthur intended to
execute, leaving the property to Reyes.
Caraway presented the 2002 will for
probate and was appointed temporary
administrator of Arthur’s estate. Pamela
Green, claiming to be an intestate heir
of Arthur, claimed (as did Reyes) that
the 2002 will had been revoked, and she
asserted a claim to Arthur’s property in
default of a valid will. While the various
claims were pending in Surrogate’s
Court, Green and Reyes filed a separate
action in Supreme Court, NY County,
joining all the claimants, seeking a
judgment that Green owned the property
or, alternatively, that Reyes was the
beneficiary of a constructive trust over
the property. Reyes also sought damages
from Simon and sought an injunction
against New York City to delay a possible
tax sale of the Property. The Supreme
Court action was then transferred to
Surrogate’s Court, which tried to move
things forward by scheduling a hearing
on Simon’s proposal as trustee to sell
the Property. Reyes filed a bankruptcy
petition (Chapter 11) on November 24,
2014, for the purpose of staying the
scheduled hearing in the Surrogate
Court. Reyes claimed substantial debt
(mainly accumulated real estate taxes
on the property as well as money he
owned to Medicaid) exceeding his
stated income of $800 a month, which
he claimed just met his living costs, and
the Property was the main asset whose
sale could be used to settle his debts. Of
course, if he didn’t own the Property, he
would not be liable for the real estate
property taxes, which were the lion’s
share of his claimed debt. In dismissing
the bankruptcy petition, Judge Bernstein
found that it was premature for Reyes
to have filed it, and concluded that it
was filed by Reyes and his attorney
for strategic purposes; they professed
concern that because of Simon’s
CIVIL LITIGATION
political office (and her committee
assignment, which gave her some sway
over the Surrogate Court’s budget)
they could not expect the Surrogate’s
Court to render an unbiased decision
on Reyes’ pending claims. However,
the judge refused to sanction Reyes and
his attorney, Brian M. DeLaurentis, for
bad faith, or to award attorneys’ fees
to Simon on her successful motion to
get the bankruptcy petition dismissed.
The entire thing is quite tangled up,
and cannot be fully explained within
the space constraints of this newsletter,
but Bernstein’s opinion is published for
anybody interested in the details.
NEW YORK – The New York Post
reported on August 21 about a case of
“gay family planning” with interesting
consequences. According to the article,
a lesbian actress, Gigi Carrier, was
adopted by her girlfriend, Shirley
Cowell, in 1979. Cowell, then 57, became
the legal mother of Carrier, then 41.
Cowell, who had substantial assets from
a family business, died intestate in 1979.
Carrier survived her, inheriting her
fortune as her legal daughter, living in
their expensive River House apartment
and driving a fancy European sports
car. According to the article, Carrier’s
biological brother Leonard Carrier and
his wife Claire remained close to Gigi
Carrier, who passed away in 2009, also
intestate and leaving no legal heirs.
Claire, now 79, alleges that Carrier,
who had socialized with Leonard
and Claire extensively and gave them
expensive gifts during her lifetime,
would have wanted her to inherit the
money. Leonard died in 2014 and Claire
has filed a claim in New York County
Surrogate’s Court seeking the assets
left by Gigi, a process that Leonard
had initiated prior to his death with a
demand on the public administrator
appointed for her estate, attorney Peter
Schram. The administrator rests on
a New York statute providing that the
biological family members of a person
who is adopted may not inherit as
legal heirs, since adoption terminates
the legal family ties. The Post quotes
from a filing in the case by a courtappointed attorney, Linda Kordes,
stating: “Leonard claimed his right to
inherit survived the adoption because
the basis of the adoption was to create
a non-traditional family comprised of
Shirley and the decedent at a time in our
history when same-sex couples could
not marry.” Kordes was appointed to
search for living relatives Cowell may
have had who would be entitled to
inherit from the $25 million estate, but
Kordes has found nobody thus far and
recommended that the funds be paid
over to the New York City Commissioner
of Finance, who oversees an unclaimed
funds account, as the search continues;
alternatively, if Surrogate Judge Rita
Mella rules in favor of Claire Carrier,
the Commissioner could pay out the
funds to her. Public Administrator
Schram argues that the funds should
not go to Claire. In a filing opposing her
claim, he stated, “The right to inherit
under New York law does not depend
upon one’s personal relationship to the
decedent,” only to a legal relationship.
A decision was expected soon from the
Surrogate.
MAINE – The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine has rejected an argument by
the National Organization for Marriage
that it should not have to comply with
Maine’s financial campaign disclosure
requirements while NOM appeals an
administrative ruling finding that it
is required to disclose the identities
of individuals and organizations
that donated funds through NOM to
influence the outcome of a 2009 ballot
question concerning marriage equality.
National Organization for Marriage v.
Commission on Governmental Ethics
and Elections Practices, 2015 ME
103, 2015 WL 4622818 (Aug. 4, 2015).
The Commission had concluded that
NOM is a “ballot question committee”
within the meaning of the state’s
campaign disclosure law, and that
NOM had violated the registration and
reporting requirements in connection
with a November 2009 people’s veto
referendum. The referendum prevented
a marriage equality bill approved by
the legislature from going into effect.
(Subsequently a 2012 referendum
resulted in the affirmative enactment
of a marriage equality law by the
voters of Maine.) NOM argued that
the Commission’s decision was
“automatically stayed” pending its
appeal to the courts and, if not, that
the court should grant a stay under its
equitable authority, because denying
a stay pending appeal would render
the appeal superfluous, inasmuch
as it would result in disclosure of
the identities of NOM’s donors. The
court pointed out that a provision of
the relevant statute specifically states
that “the filing of a petition for review
shall not operate as a stay of the final
agency action pending judicial review.”
While finding that NOM had indeed
demonstrated that denying its request
for a stay would impose an irreparable
injury by, in effect, letting the cat out of
the bag, the court nonetheless found it
inappropriate to stay the Commission’s
ruling because it was highly unlikely
that NOM could prevail on the merits
of its appeal. NOM has been litigating
about this issue since 2009 and has
lost a constitutional challenge to the
disclosure requirements before the
1st Circuit Court of Appeals, with the
Supreme Court refusing to inject itself
into the case. “Because NOM has not
advanced any persuasive constitutional
challenges to section 1056-B [the
pertinent provision at issue here] or
any convincing arguments regarding
errors of law or fact committed by the
Commission in reaching its decision,”
wrote the court per curiam, “it has
not met its burden of demonstrating a
likelihood of success on the merits.”
The court found that the public “has
an interest in the release of information
CIVIL LITIGATION
about the donors behind ballot
initiatives,” but that so much time has
gone by since the 2009 referendum that
a stay would not harm the public interest
at this point. The court found that “the
sine qua non” of the stay request was
a showing that it was possible NOM
would prevail on its appeal. As far as
the court was concerned, “there clearly
is no substantial probability that NOM
will succeed on the merits of its claims.”
“The circumstances underlying the
Commission’s decision occurred almost
six years ago,” the court continued, “and
the decision has successfully withstood
federal and state court challenges
during that time. NOM now asks us
to decide many of the same issues and
has failed to sufficiently show that it
has a likelihood of succeeding on the
merits. Accordingly, we deny NOM’s
motion for a stay pending appeal.” * *
* The Portland Herald Press reported
the identity of NOM’s donors on August
24 when its filing was made public:
Among them were Richard Kurtz,
Sean Fieler (the largest single donor,
who is helping to underwrite a national
campaign against transgender rights),
John Templeton, Terrence Caster, the
Knights of Columbus. The only donor
resident in Maine was Mr. Kurtz, a
major contributor to the Republican
Party in Maine who also sent a donation
to the 2008 California Proposition 8
campaign. The article said that seven
major donors gave more than $2 million
to NOM, which funneled the donations
to “Stand for Marriage Maine,” the local
PAC that was the “public face” of the
campaign.
PENNSYLVANIA – With two members
of the seven-member court dissenting,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
(an intermediate appellate court) ruled
on August 7, 2015, that the public transit
agency for the Philadelphia metropolitan
area was entitled to a declaratory
judgment that it is not subject to the City
of Philadelphia’s anti-discrimination
ordinance, only to the state’s
Human Relations Act. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
v. City of Philadelphia, 2015 WL
4680775, 2015 PA Commw. LEXIS 361.
The majority of the court concluded that
in chartering SEPTA, the legislature
did not intend to subject it to various
differing local human rights ordinances,
which would place an inappropriate
burden on the agency. SEPTA was
formed out of a consolidation of
local transportation companies in
southeastern Pennsylvania in 1963. This
litigation was sparked by the filing of
discrimination claims against SEPTA
with the Philadelphia Human Rights
Commission, some of which asserted
claims of sexual orientation or gender
identity discrimination. Such claims
would be viable under the city ordinance,
which expressly covers these grounds,
but not under the state’s law, which
omits them. This case had previously
gone to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, which ruled in 2014 that although
SEPTA is a Commonwealth rather than
a local agency, it was necessary for the
Commonwealth Court to resolve the
issue of legislative intent as to whether
it enjoyed immunity from local laws.
The Commonwealth Court noted that
the legislature had expressly waived
SEPTA’s sovereign immunity as against
claims brought under the state human
rights law. “In order to make SEPTA
also subject to the [Philadelphia]
Fair Practices Ordinance,” wrote the
court, “the legislature would have
had to ‘specifically’ waive SEPTA’s
immunity from actions brought under
local anti-discrimination ordinances.
It did not do so.” President Judge Dan
Pellegrini, dissenting, rejected the
contention that SEPTA, a provider of
transportation services, is performing
traditional governmental functions
such that its employment policies
should be exempt from regulation by
the communities it serves. “SEPTA
is subject to charges of discrimination
brought under Philadelphia’s anti-
discrimination ordinances because it
is clear under the Constitution and the
legislative scheme that Philadelphia’s
interests in eliminating discrimination
are paramount under the grants of
power given to it as compared to the
powers given to SEPTA by the General
Assembly,” he wrote. Also dissenting,
Judge Robert Simpson argued that the
case should have been remanded to the
Common Pleas court for the receipt of
evidence and initial fact-finding, rather
than being decided on remand by the
Commonwealth Court, inasmuch as the
trial court had never conducted such
procedures, having disposed of the case
with pretrial motions. He pointed out
that the Supreme Court, in its remand,
had “clarified the analysis which is to be
undertaken in resolving the preliminary
objections. That analysis includes a
consideration of the consequences of
subjecting SEPTA to the City’s antidiscrimination ordinance,” which he
argued could not be resolved “by an
examination of the current complaint.”
PENNSYLVANIA – In Downs v.
Schwartz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106147, 2015 WL 4770711 (E.D. Pa.,
Aug. 12, 2015), U.S. District Judge
L. Felipe Restrepo responded to
summary judgment motions in a case
brought by a gay attorney against two
law firms alleging sexual orientation
discrimination,
defamation,
and
retaliation. The court granted the
motions in part, eliminating from the
case Jeffrey S. Downs’ discrimination
and defamation claims, but ruling that
Downs was entitled to jury consideration
of his retaliation claims against both
firms. Downs was an associate at
Anapol Schwartz, P.C. from July 2008
through March 2012, and his gay sexual
orientation became known to the firm
during the course of his employment.
He claims, and the firm denies, that
there was a hostile environment
affecting his employment, leading him
to make internal complaints about
CIVIL LITIGATION
some comments made by members of
the firm. Downs did most of his work
at the firm for a partner named Mark
LeWinter. LeWinter decided to leave
Anapol Schwartz to join the firm of
Raynes McCarty, P.C., and suggested to
the Raynes firm that they hire Downs as
well. Downs was offered and accepted
a position with the Raynes firm,
anticipating joining them when LeWinter
made his move. During his interview
at Raynes McCarty, Downs was told
that they knew he was gay but that this
“didn’t matter.” Raynes McCarty took
various tangible steps in anticipation
of hiring Downs. A few days before he
was to leave Anapol, Downs went to the
lead name partner of the Anapol firm
seeking to negotiate an exit package
including a substantial severance
payment, asserting in particular his
right to be bought out on client business
he had procured for the firm. During
the course of that conversation, the
content of which is disputed between
the parties, Mr. Anapol concluded
that Downs was threatening to charge
the firm with a hostile environment
claim in order to extract the severance
payment. Downs denies he had that
intention. Downs asked Mr. Anapol not
to tell LeWinter about their meeting,
but the word got back to LeWinter,
who says his confidence in Downs
was shaken. LeWinter’s concerns were
communicated to the Raynes firm,
which subsequently withdrew its offer
of employment from Downs. Downs
filed a state court action against the
firms, but a jury ruled against his claim
that the Anapol firm and LeWinter
had “engaged in an intentional action
with the specific intent to cause the
prospective contractual relationship
between Plaintiff and Raynes McCarty
from being entered into.” Articles
about Downs’ litigation with both
firms surfaced in the legal press in
Philadelphia, including a letter from
the Anapol firm that Downs considered
defamatory. Downs, a New Jersey
resident, filed a diversity case against
both firms in federal court, alleging
sexual
orientation
discrimination,
defamation and retaliation. Ultimately,
the judge concluded that Downs’
allegations of sexual orientation
discrimination and defamation could not
survive the summary judgment motions,
but that there remained plausible
retaliation claims, as it was possible
that a jury could conclude that adverse
actions against Downs by both firms
were caused by his raising allegations of
hostile environment at Anapol because
of his sexual orientation and their belief
that he intended to take legal action on
such allegations. We’ve undoubtedly
oversimplified the facts in order to be
brief; those interested in the full details
should consult the court’s opinion,
which is long and detailed.
PENNSYLVANIA – Dismissing a claim
of hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title VII and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act in Betz v. Temple
Health Systems, 2015 WL 4713661
(E.D. Pa., Aug. 7, 2015), U.S. District
Judge Jerry Pappert found that “an
uncouth, unprofessional, and offensive
workplace” by itself could not serve as
the basis for a sex discrimination claim.
Ellen Betz, a registered nurse employed
by Temple Health Systems, was doing
just fine her first six years on the job, but
then was transferred to a different floor
at Jeanes Hospital where her female coworkers “regularly engaged in offensive
and inappropriate conduct. Other nurses
would regularly ‘joke’ with each other
by ‘licking, groping, making gestures
or pretending to grope each other’s
breasts and genitals.’ This behavior
occurred ‘on nearly a daily basis.’ For
example, one day a nurse complained
about having been stopped for a traffic
violation. The other nurses made
suggestions about how the nurse could
have avoided a ticket, such as ‘show
him some cleavage’ and ‘blow him.’ In
another instance, a coworker displayed
photos ‘exemplifying the sexually
offensive behavior of touching each
other’s breasts and genitals’ that was
regularly on display at Jeanes. Betz was
also offended that two nurses named
Helene and Anthony would ‘passionately
and openly kiss each other and rub each
other’s genitals’ in Betz’s presence.”
She complained about this continuing
conduct and refused to join it, earning
a reputation as a “rat” and “snitch.”
Management seemed unconcerned,
never addressing her complaints and
she was eventually discharged “for a
reason that she alleges was pretextual.”
In her lawsuit, she pushed the hostile
environment claim, but the judge found
no grounds for it, because she failed
to show that she was discriminated
against because of her sex. “Betz asks
the court to go too far,” wrote Pappert,
finding that she did not allege facts
that would support an inference that
she was being discriminated against
in any way, much less because of her
sex. “Betz does no more than allege
that her female coworkers engaged in
sexually explicit behavior that she found
offensive and refused to participate
in. This bare allegation is insufficient
to allow the Court to infer that Betz’s
female coworkers believed that Betz did
not conform to a gender stereotype.”
The court cited Justice Scalia’s famous
dictum in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)
that Title VII is not a “general civility
code for the American workplace,”
probably the most cited phrase from that
opinion. * * * To similar effect is the
U.S. District Court decision in Eckert v.
Quality Associates, 2015 WL 5083329
(D. Md., Aug. 26, 2015).
PENNSYLVANIA – Ruling in a dispute
between a decedent’s former domestic
partner and surviving relatives over
the right to life insurance proceeds, a
unanimous panel of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court reversed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment to the
surviving relatives, holding that there
CIVIL LITIGATION
were material issues of fact that could
not be resolved on summary judgment.
Estate of Gallagher, 2015 Pa. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 2313 (July 23, 2015).
Stephen T. Gallagher was an employee
of the University of Pennsylvania
who was covered by group health
and life insurance plans at the time
of his death on May 27, 2011. Joseph
Hallman began to live with Gallagher
early in 2005, and in May 2005 they
executed a document adding Hallman
to Gallagher’s residential lease. They
later purchased a home jointly, taking
out a mortgage to finance the purchase.
They registered as same-sex domestic
partners with the University in 2006,
after which Gallagher added Hallman to
his medical insurance. They separated in
late 2008 or early 2009, but apparently
remained friends, as Hallman testified
that he cared for Gallagher’s dogs
while Gallagher was away on business
and he drove Gallagher home from the
hospital after Gallagher had surgery.
However, after Hallman moved out
Gallagher went into the electronic
system that administered the Penn
benefits plans and removed Hallman
from the medical insurance coverage.
On the same date, he added his mother
as a contingent beneficiary on his life
insurance plan, but made no change on
his primary beneficiary designation.
At the time of his death, the system
showed that Hallman was his primary
beneficiary, and Hallman submitted
a claim. However, surviving relatives
of Gallagher, including his brother
Michael, who is executor on the will
(which does not cast light on this dispute)
made inquiries about the life insurance
proceeds, and a contest developed.
Although the computer showed Hallman
as the primary beneficiary, there was
no indication in the computer (and no
written record) showing when Gallagher
made such a designation. The Gallagher
claimants, who sought to claim the
proceeds for Gallagher’s surviving
parents, hypothesized that the computer
program had automatically listed
Hallman as the primary beneficiary
at the time Gallagher add him to the
medical insurance policy, and that this
was not intended by Gallagher. Hallman
rested on the fact that the computer
system listed him as the beneficiary
and that when Gallagher changed the
medical designation and add his mother
as contingent, he made no change on
the primary designation. Indeed, a
screen capture showed Hallman as the
designated beneficiary in 2007, prior
to the time when Gallagher made the
other changes in 2008. Aetna decided
not to pay out the benefits to anybody
without court authorization, filing an
interpleader action. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Gallagher family
claimants on a summary judgement
motion last year. The Superior Court
concluded that this was error; there
are central disputed material facts that
require trial. The court noted the fact
that Hallman remained co-obligor on
the mortgage, with a substantial balance
outstanding, and presumably the life
insurance proceeds would be crucial
to his ability to meet this obligation.
(Although the issue is not surfaced
in the opinion, it may be logical to
hypothesize that Gallagher retained
Hallman as primary beneficiary in light
of the outstanding mortgage obligation,
particularly if the termination of their
domestic partnership was, as Hallman’s
testimony implies, amicable and there
was no desire to sell the home, pay off
the mortgage, and share any proceeds at
that time.) The court rejected Hallman’s
argument that Aetna had violated its
fiduciary duty under ERISA by not
paying out the proceeds to him in light
of their computer records showing him
as the primary beneficiary, finding that
Aetna had acted reasonably in light of the
dispute in seeking a court order before
disbursing the funds. The Gallaghers
contacted Aetna to inquire about the
insurance proceeds before Hallman had
supplied the necessary documentation
about Stephen Gallagher’s death. This
brief summary drastically generalizes
about a procedurally complicated case
that has been going on for several years.
The bottom line is that the case gets
remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
TENNESSEE – American National
Property and Casualty Company
(ANPAC) is seeking a declaratory
judgment that it is not liable to its
insureds, the Stuttes, a lesbian couple,
after their house burned down. ANPAC
claims that the Stuttes intentionally set
the fire. The Stuttes deny this and argue
that a neighbor, Janice Millsaps, or
somebody else, set the fire. They claim
to have received homophobic threats
prior to the fire. Ruling on evidentiary
motions in American National Property
and Casualty Co. v. Stutte, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96969, 2015 WL 4487997
(E.D. Tenn., July 23, 2015), U.S. District
Judge granted in part and denied in part
ANPAC’s motion in limine to exclude
from evidence the deposition testimony
of a proposed witness, Chelsea Walle.
The fire took place in 2010. “In or
around April 2015,” wrote U.S. District
Judge Leon Jordan, “the Stuttes learned
of a witness, Chelsea Walle, with
purported knowledge of who burned
their house,” and a deposition of her
was taken on June 18, 2015, in which
she testified that she lived in the area
from December 2012 to October 2014,
during which time she became friends
with Katie Millsaps, who she thought
was a relative of Janice Millsaps. Walle
testified that Ktie referred to Janice as a
“bad Millsaps” who “does things on her
own terms” and that the Millsaps family
had a bad reputation. Walle also testified
that she heard Janice made “derogatory
comments about homosexuals,” and that
Katie Millsaps had shown her the site of
a burned house and related a story about
a fire being deliberately started there
after a party. It is uncertain whether the
site visited by Walle and Katie Millsaps
was the site of the Stutte house. The
Stuttes were planning to present Katie
CIVIL LITIGATION
Millsaps as a witness at trial, and to use
portions of Chelsea Walle’s deposition
for impeachment purposes. Judge
Jordan held that certain parts of the
deposition concerning the reputation of
the Millsaps family and Janice Millsaps
would be inadmissible under the federal
rules, but that deposition statements
about Janice’s views on homosexuals
would be admissible. He ruled that it was
up to the jury to determine the relevance
of Walle’s deposition testimony about
the visit to the burn site with Katie
Millsaps, and that it was premature to
determine the admissibility of Walle’s
testimony about Katie Millsaps’
statements concerning who burned the
house and how the fire was started.
TEXAS – In Arredondo v. Estrada,
2015 WL 4523545 (S.D. Texas, July
27, 2015), U.S. District Judge Nela
Gonzales Ramos refused to grant
summary judgment to the employer on
a Title VII sex discrimination claim
brought by three male former employees
from an all-male worksite, asserting
sexual harassment charges against a
male supervisor, Joey Estrada and the
employer. The three men were subjected
to physically harassing conduct. They
didn’t file formal complaints with
the company because they feared
retaliation. After two of the men had
left their jobs, an anonymous complaint
was submitted about the conduct, and
a subsequent company investigation
led to the discharge of Estrada and
other employees who assisted him in
his assaults of a sexual nature on the
plaintiffs. There was also retaliatory
conduct against the plaintiff who was
still employed at that time, and who
eventually was effectively forced to leave
the company. There was evidence that
various supervisors witnessed some of
the physical attacks launched by Estrada
and just laughed them off. The company
asserted that none of Estrada’s actions
were actionable against the company as
sex discrimination because there was
no evidence that Estrada was gay or
motivated by sexual desire or general
hostility toward male employees. Judge
Ramos agreed with the plaintiffs that
the typical fact patterns for same-sex
harassment spelled out by the Supreme
Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), were not
exclusive ,and that the plaintiffs were
entitled to advance “alternative theories
by which Estrada’s admittedly sexual,
vulgar, abusive, and even assaultive
acts are discriminatory.” “Plaintiffs’
deposition testimony paints a picture of
Estrada and other employees targeting
them as weaker crew members and
using male domination techniques
to have Plaintiffs perceived as less
manly and thus less worthy as crew
members,” wrote the judge. “They did
this by referring to them as ‘bitches,’
restraining them in passive sexual
positions, and Estrada placing his nub in
or near their orifices in a symbolically
phallic manner that Plaintiffs found
humiliating and threatening to their
masculinity.” (Estrada was missing
part of a finger, and allegedly used the
remaining “nub” of his finger as an
assault weapon in a procedure he called
“nubbing.”) “Vulgar words, physical
acts with sexual connotations, horseplay,
and ‘locker room’ behavior with explicit
sexual components do not necessarily
state a Title VII gender discrimination
claim,” the judge continued. “More
commonly, sexual harassment involves
humiliation related to sexual desire.
However, humiliation based on gender
stereotyping meant to separate those
who are deemed less manly from the
rest of a crew is actionable.” The court
found that the other elements of a
Title VII sex discrimination claim had
been sufficiently pleaded to present
jury questions precluding summary
judgment. Judge Ramos held that
plaintiffs could also maintain their
assault claim against the employer
under a vicarious liability theory for
the actions of Estrada, but not their
intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, because damages for
emotional distress were alternatively
recoverable under the other viable
causes of action. The court dismissed
various negligence claims against the
company, finding them barred by the
Workers Compensation Act.
VERMONT – In a case whose facts
could serve as a first-year Contracts
exam question, U.S. District Judge
William K. Sessions III ruled on August
6 in Cressy v. Proctor, 2015 WL 4665533,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102956 (D. Vt.)
(not reported in F. Supp. 3d), a dispute
incident to the break-up of the nineteenyear relationship between Ronald
Cressy and Kevin Proctor. Cressy was
married to a woman from 1988 through
1993, when he came out as gay to his
wife and she filed for divorce. At around
that time he met Kevin Proctor. Cressy
moved into Proctor’s home in Long
Beach, California, in mid-1993, and
soon after took mental health leave
from his job as a warehouse manager
with a women’s clothing company, a
job he eventually quit in 1994. Proctor
owned a small advertising business
operated out of his home with a few
employees, and Cressy began working
in the business, initially as a volunteer,
but after the woman who was, in effect,
the main administrative employee left
in 1994, Cressy gradually took over that
role, essentially working full-time. He
was never paid a salary by Proctor, but
Proctor supported the two of them out
of the proceeds of the business, which
grew to be quite substantial, with about
$300,000 net annual income at a high
point. Proctor decided in 1996 that he
wanted to relocate to the northeast for
a variety of reasons, and he and Cressy
made several trips to Vermont looking
over potential property purchases. The
real estate agent who dealt with them
testified that Proctor was her client,
and Proctor was the sole legal owner of
the real estate that was purchased over
the ensuing years. Cressy and Proctor
CIVIL / CRIMINAL LITIGATION
also enjoyed collecting antiques (which
Proctor paid for), accumulating a large
collection which they spoke about
providing the basis for a retirement
business. Cressy continued to work
in the business after they relocated to
Vermont, and also helped with chores
on the farm that Proctor had purchased
(out of proceeds and savings from the
business). All kinds of interesting
gay family law developments were
happening in Vermont over the ensuring
years, but Proctor and Cressy never
formed a civil union or entered into any
kind of domestic partnership agreement,
although Cressy suggested they marry
after Vermont legislated in favor of same
sex marriage. They did not produce any
of the documents that lawyers were
then recommending for partners, such
as powers of attorney, living wills or
living-together agreements. Proctor
wound down his advertising business
in 2008, and thereafter they lived off
Proctor’s savings and remaining funds
from the business, which were depleted
in 2012. By then they were coming to a
parting of the ways, with Proctor asking
Cressy to being contributing to pay
household bills out of his own savings.
Cressy left and the relationship ended.
Judge Sessions estimated that Proctor’s
total assets exceed $1 million, and a
substantial portion of his personal and
real property was purchased out of the
funds of his business. When Cressy
left, wrote Sessions, “he had less than
$500 in his bank account and no assets.”
Cressy sued on theories of implied
contract, promissory estoppel and
quantum meruit, claiming that he was
entitled to a substantial payment from
Proctor as a settlement upon dissolution
of their relationship. Sessions found
that there was no express or implied
contract between the men, and no
express promise upon which Cressy
could base a promissory estoppel claim.
However, he concluded that this was an
appropriate case for application of the
equitable doctrine of quasi-contract,
quantum meruit. He found that Cressy
had worked full-time in the business for
many years without receiving a salary,
had provided significant services on the
farm without compensation, and had
participated in the acquisition of the
antiques collection, which Proctor had
told him were “our retirement.” Crediting
Proctor for the value of Cressy’s room
and board, Sessions calculated what
Cressy would have earned in salary,
comparing to what Proctor had been
paying other employees, and also seems
to have taken the value of the antiques
collection into account. Judge Sessions
concluded that Cressy was entitled to
receive $173,685, and, based on his
factual findings, ruled against Proctor
on various counterclaims involving
relatively small amounts. Cressy is
represented by Davin McLaughlin
of Langrock, Sperry & Wool LLP,
Middlebury (the firm that litigated the
Vermont case that resulted in passage of
the Civil Union Law in 2000). Proctor
is represented by Richard T. Cassidy of
Hoff Curtis, Burlington.
CRIMINAL LITIGATION NOTES
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH
CIRCUIT – A unanimous three-judge
panel of the 4th Circuit rejected a
claim that a federal statute making it a
crime for a U.S. national to engage in
an illicit non-commercial sexual act
with a minor after traveling in foreign
commerce was unconstitutional. Ruling
in United States v. Bollinger, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14542 (Aug. 19, 2015),
the court upheld the conviction and
25 year prison sentence imposed on
Larry Michael Bollinger, a Lutheran
minister who admitted engaging in
sexual activity with teenage girls
(some as young as 11 years old) while
administering a large ministry outside
of Port Au Prince, Haiti. Bollinger
claimed that the girls “came on” to
him and there was testimony that poor
children would offer to provide sexual
services in Haiti in exchange for food
and shelter. Bollinger’s acts came to
light when, after returning to the U.S., he
and his wife sought marital counseling
and he told the counselor about his
sexual activities in Haiti. The counselor
reported Bollinger’s admissions to
law enforcement authorities, and the
government instituted a prosecution,
seeking a 60 year prison term for the
68 year old minister in response to his
conditional guilty plea to two counts
under the statute. Bollinger pled guilty
after the court had denied a pretrial
motion to dismiss the case against
him. The judge’s sentence of 25 years
was a substantial downward departure
from the maximum authorized under
sentencing guidelines of 60 years (up
to 30 years on each of the two counts),
which the government had sought. Most
of the opinion by Circuit Judge Roger
Gregory was devoted to countering
Bollinger’s argument that the statute
is unconstitutional. The court found
that Congress has authority under the
“foreign commerce clause” to enact
such legislation. “Instead of requiring
that an activity have a substantial effect
on foreign commerce,” wrote Gregory,
“we hold that the Foreign Commerce
Clause allows Congress to regulate
activities that demonstrably affect
such commerce.” The court concluded,
“It is eminently rational to believe
that prohibiting the non-commercial
sexual abuse of children by Americans
abroad has a demonstrable effect on
sex tourism and the commercial sex
industry,” and he noted international
treaties and conventions dealing
with sexual exploitation of children
to support the point. “In that light,”
wrote Gregory, “it is reasonable for
governments to determine that the
non-commercial abuse of children is a
factor that contributes to commercial
sexual exploitation, and to regulate
non-commercial conduct accordingly.”
The court also deemed significant “the
consequence of a contrary holding.” “In
that case,” wrote Gregory, “a citizen
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
could effectively avoid all police power
by leaving U.S. soil and traveling to
a nation with weak or non-existent
sexual abuse laws. The citizen would
be free to act with impunity – a reality
that could undoubtedly have broad
ramifications on our standing in the
world, potentially disrupting diplomatic
and even commercial relationships. Of
course, the Tenth Amendment reserves
unenumerated powers to the states and
the people. But the Constitution does
not envision or condone a vacuum of
all police power, state and federal,
within which citizens may commit
acts abroad that would clearly be
crimes if committed at home.” The
court rejected Bollinger’s argument
that the sentence was excessive in light
of his age, constituting a virtual life
sentence. “Here, the sentence imposed
by the district court – representing a
60% downward variance – was not
unreasonable when considered in light
of our deferential standard of review,”
wrote Gregory, “the heartrending
victim-impact statements in the record,
the powerlessness of the victims, and the
minister’s heinous abuse of authority.
Notably, Bollinger cites no authority
for the proposition that a defendant’s
advanced age renders unreasonable
a sentence that would otherwise be
reasonable. Nonetheless, the district
court expressly considered Bollinger’s
age in imposing a sentence well below
the 6-year Guidelines. That sentence
should stand.”
U.S. NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS – In light of
Lawrence v. Texas and its application
in military sodomy prosecutions as
explicated in United States v. Marcum,
60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), a military
judge erred in charging the court
martial panel that consensual sodomy
was a lesser-included offense on a
forcible sodomy charge, held the U.S.
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals in United States v. Bass,
2015 WL 4910958 (Aug. 28, 2015).
In Marcum, a military appeals court
established that the military could
continue to criminalize consensual
sodomy when particular factors from
the military environment justified
distinguishing it from civilian life,
in which the Supreme Court had
ruled in Lawrence that consensual
sodomy between adults could not be
criminalized absent certain aggravating
factors (conduct in public, conduct
involving minors, conduct where
consent was questionable). In this case,
the male defendant was charged with
sexual harassment, wrongful sexual
conduct and sodomy in his relations
with two female military members,
including sexual conduct on board a
military ship. Pursuant to the military
judge’s instruction, the court martial
panel refused to convict on a forcible
sodomy charge, but convicted on the
“lesser included offense” of consensual
sodomy. The defendant objected that
the charge was defective in failing to
require the prosecutor to show that one
or more Marcum factors existed in the
case. Failing such proof, the conviction
would be unconstitutional under
Lawrence and Marcum. The appeals
court agreed, and vacated the sodomy
conviction on this ground. Defendant
was also convicted on other charges.
The court concluded that vacating the
sodomy charge substantially reduced
the maximum penalty that could be
applied in the case, and remanded for
a rehearing on sentencing. The court
had previously issued an opinion in this
case, U.S. v. Bass, 2015 CCA LEXIS
221 (May 27, 2015), but granted panel
reconsideration and substituted the
opinion issued on August 28, which the
court said did not change the outcome
of the case, merely some wording in the
explanation of the court’s result.
U.S. NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS – Cutting
short what may have been a promising
career as a Naval officer, the court
upheld the dismissal of a recent Naval
Academy graduate, a lieutenant junior
grade, who exhibited the poor judgment
of kissing a handsome young man from
his unit on the lips while on shore leave,
and following up by performing oral
sex on the guy in a secluded area. Lt.
Hernandez noticed that another enlisted
man had seen the kissing, and asked this
person not to “report him,” appealing to
ethnic solidarity. But evidently the report
was made, and the young sailor testified
that as a result of what happened, he
felt “alone and isolated, that he lost
trust in others, that he was wary of
officers, that he suffers flashbacks to
the night of the offenses, and that his
parents and sister also experienced
stress.” The court martial convicted
Hernandez of one specification of
fraternization (inappropriate conduct
with a person of lesser military rank)
and one specification of obstruction of
justice (for asking the other sailor not
to “report” what he had seen). He was
sentenced to a formal reprimand, total
forfeiture of pay and allowance, and
dismissal from the service. The appeals
court, after summarizing the evidence,
wrote that “in light of the circumstances
of this case we find the sentence, and
in particular the imposed dismissal, to
be fair and just.” The court also noted
that Hernandez had not affirmatively
raised sentence disparity as an issue,
although his brief quoted a retired
officer’s good military character letter
opining “that similar heterosexual
episodes of fraternization were
resolved via Captain’s or Admiral’s
Mast.” (That is, by the commanding
officer exercising discretion to impose
a minor punishment.) The court said
that Hernandez “had not met his
burden of demonstrating that any cited
cases are ‘closely related’ to his case
and that his sentence, therefore was
‘highly disparate’.” After all, prior to
Lawrence v. Texas and its explication
in the military context in U.S. v.
Marcum by a military appeals court,
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
Hernandez would have been prosecuted
for sodomy under Article 125 and most
likely sentenced to serious prison time
for kissing an enlisted man on the lips.
United States v. Hernandez, 2015 WL
5060610 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App., Aug 27,
2015)(not reported in M.J.).
U.S. AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS – The court
affirmed the conviction of Airman
First Class Justin M. Davis on charges
of sexual assault and abusive sexual
contact arising from an incident at the
townhouse he and a fellow Air Force
member rented off the military base,
during which Davis performed oral
sex on the other man. United States v.
Davis, 2015 CCA LEXIS 298 (July 21,
2015). The “victim” professed to be
straight. He had gone out with friends to
celebrate his birthday and arrived back
at the townhouse significantly drunk.
Other friends were at the townhouse
but eventually things quieted down and
Davis and others helped the victim up
to his bedroom. After awakening the
next morning, the victim had vague
recollections of things happening
during the night, including somebody
performing oral sex on him, and called
a friend for help. They went to a local
hospital where a sexual assault exam
was performed, and DNA was found
on the victim’s penis. Davis could not
be ruled out as the source of the DNA,
and ultimately he testified that he did
perform oral sex on the victim, but
claimed that it was consensual. Among
other things, Davis testified that he and
the victim had shared a bed on one prior
occasion (although he did not testify that
sex took place), and various other things
had led him to believe that the victim
might be gay. Davis presented a story that
included the victim stating “I want to do
it” in Spanish. According to Davis, the
sexual conduct occurred while both men
were intoxicated, but while the victim
was competent to consent to the activity.
Under current military interpretation of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice
sodomy provision, criminal liability
would not attach to consensual gay
sex between military members of the
same rank in private. However, the
court martial evidently concluded that
the victim was not sufficiently sober to
consent, and that it was irrelevant to the
charges on which they convicted him as
to whether Davis was mistaken about
the victim’s competency and/or interest
in having sex. If he was actually not
capable of consenting at the time, then
the sex was non-consensual, violating
the military code. Much of the opinion
by the court of appeals is devoted to
Davis’s argument about evidentiary
rulings and challenges to the arguments
made by the prosecutor. As to the
latter, it seems that Davis’s defense
counsel was not sufficiently aggressive
in raising objections. The court wrote:
“Trial counsel’s argument did, at
times, interject his personal beliefs
and opinions into the case and appears
to vouch for the credibility of some of
the government’s evidence. Similarly,
his references to the appellant’s
testimony and veracity do stray close
to being a personal attack. However,
even if trial counsel’s comments here
crossed the exceedingly fine line which
distinguishes permissible advocacy
from improper excess, the comments
were not so obviously improper as to
merit relief in the absence of an objection
from counsel when considered within
the context of the trial as a whole. The
panel clearly was not swayed by trial
counsel’s argument as the appellant was
acquitted of multiple offenses that were
implicated by the challenged portions
of trial counsel’s findings argument.
Lastly, in addition to not objecting,
trial counsel raised the possibility of
asking for an instruction on certain
aspects of trial counsel’s argument
but then expressly chose not to ask for
the instruction. The lack of a defense
objection to trial counsel’s argument is
some measure of the minimal impact of
the argument.”
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT
OF APPEALS – The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of Girma Aboye of “making
bias-related threats to do bodily harm
after he confronted a gay couple with
homophobic slurs and threatened to
kill them with his dog,” wrote Judge
Glickman for the panel in Aboye v.
United States, 2015 WL 4717153, 2015
D.C. App. LEXIS 360 (Aug. 6, 2015).
The appeal called for the court to
address a question of first impression:
whether the District’s Bias-Related
Crime Act extended to threats. In this
case, the victims, Michael Eichler and
Zachary Rosen, a gay couple, would
walk their dog small dog Nico in the
Adams Morgan neighborhood where
they lived. Aboye, who owned a store
in the neighborhood, would walk his
dog, Tarzan, a “brindled pit bull mix.”
When the dog walkers would encounter
each other, Tarzan “usually was rather
unsociable and even hostile to Nico.”
On one such encounter in the fall of
2012, when Eichler perceived Tarzan to
be friendly, he attempted to lead Nico
forward so the dogs could interact, but
Aboye jerked Tarzan back, declaring,
“My dog doesn’t like homosexuals. You
are a homosexual, right?” When Eichler
answered affirmatively, Aboye repeated,
“My dog doesn’t like homosexuals;
my dog doesn’t like faggots.” On the
evening of March 11, 2013, Eicher,
Rosen and Nico were sitting on the patio
outside a restaurant adjacent to Aboye’s
store. Aboye came outside to speak to
somebody on the sidewalk and although
Eichler and Rose couldn’t hear the
conversation clearly, they heard the word
“faggot” several times and Rosen said,
“You know we can hear you.” Aboye
heatedly yelled, “Shut up you faggots;
I’m going to kill you with my dog. I’m
going to have my dog kill you.” Eichler
called 911 on his cell phone, as Aboye
went back into his store and returned
with Tarzan on a leash. The dogs barked
at each other as Aboye walked Tarzan
down the street. Before he returned, a
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
police officer arrived in response to the
911 call and detained Aboye for having
threatened Eichler and Rosen. Eichler,
Rosen and the officer all testified that
Tarzan was not acting aggressively at
the time. At trial, Aboye was convicted
of bias-related threats to do bodily
harm. He appealed, pointing out that
threats were not specifically listed in
the Bias-Related Crime Act. The court
of appeals rejected this argument,
pointing out that the list of “designated
acts” subject to bias enhancement
was defined to mean “a criminal act,
including….,” followed by a long list of
substantive crimes. The court opined
that “including” meant, as elsewhere
explicated in the D.C. Code, including
but not limited to, and that a threat to
assault could be subsumed into the list.
“Underscoring the immateriality of the
particular type of offense to the Act’s
coverage of hate crimes,” wrote Judge
Glickman, “the [legislative] Committee
explained the terms ‘bias-related crime’
and ‘designated act’ as referring simply
to ‘a criminal act’ without substantive
qualification.” The court also found
that the facts adduced in the trial record
were sufficient to support the conviction.
“An ordinary hearer in this situation
reasonably could fear that Tarzan might
become vicious and attack if directed
by his master to do so,” wrote the court.
“And even if Tarzan was friendly and
tame, appellant’s death threat was not.
Appellant’s words and demeanor could
cause a reasonable hearer to fear that
appellant imperiled his physical safety
even if appellant’s dog did not.”
CALIFORNIA – The California 4th
District Court of Appeals held that
Superior Court Judge Margie G.
Woods did not err while instructing the
jury in connection with a defendant’s
argument that his girlfriend had consent
to his physical assaults and threats
in connection with BDSM activities.
People v. Davidson, 2015 WL 4751166
(Aug. 12, 2015) (unpublished opinion).
Ryan Davidson’s former girlfriend (now
wife), C.C., fled from their apartment
and reported domestic violence to a
neighbor, her family, emergency room
personnel, and police, but by the time of
trial, she had recanted these statements,
testifying that she had consented to
the infliction of injuries as part of a
consensual BDSM relationship. Judge
Woods instructed the jury on the defense
of reasonable belief in consent, stating:
“The defendant is not guilty of torture,
corporal injury to spouse or criminal
threats if he did not have the intent or
mental state required to commit the
crime because he reasonably did not
know a fact or reasonably and mistakenly
believes a fact. If the defendant’s conduct
would have been lawful under the facts
as he reasonably believed them to be, he
did not commit [the charged offenses]. If
you find that the defendant believed that
[CC] consented to being battered and
threatened if you find that belief was
reasonable, he did not have the specific
intent or mental state required for [the
charged offenses].” Thus charged, the
jury convicted Davidson of torture,
corporal injury to a cohabitant, and
criminal threats. On appeal, Davidson
argued that the consent instructions
fell short; he asserted that the court
had a duty to instruct that there was no
crime if CC actually contended to being
battered, tortured or threatened and that
the absence of consent was an element
of the offenses that the prosecution had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court of appeals rejected these
arguments, and particularly rejected
Davidson’s argument that the conduct
for which he was charged, if consensual,
was constitutionally protected under
Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court’s
2003 sodomy decision. Wrote Acting
Presiding Justice Haller, “To support his
position that broad consent principles
apply here, defendant contends he
and the victim ‘had a constitutionally
protected interest in participating in
BDSM, which by its nature involves
consent to being battered, tortured or
threatened,’ citing Lawrence v. Texas
(2003) 539 U.S. 558. In Lawrence,
the court recognized a constitutional
right to engage in consensual adult
homosexual activity, and accordingly
invalidated a state statute criminalizing
this behavior. The Lawrence court
reasoned the government should not set
boundaries on consensual adult intimate
relationships “absent injury to a person,”
and underscored that the case before it
did not “involve persons who might be
injured.” Unlike the circumstances in
Lawrence, the conduct at issue in this
case involves serious physical injury and
terrorizing behavior. Lawrence does
not provide authority for defendant’s
position. (State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d
at p. 615 [Lawrence did not extend
constitutional protection to physically
injurious sexual activity].) Defendant
has presented no persuasive argument
to support that voluntary participation
in sadomasochistic behavior warrants
allowing seriously injurious and
criminally threatening conduct to be
broadly subject to a consent defense
akin to offenses that involve no such
injurious or threatening behavior. As
stated, public policy dictates otherwise.”
In this case, CC had showed up at the
emergency room with serious injuries.
The court’s opinion apparently leaves
open the possibility that consensual
BDSM activities that do not involve
infliction of serious injury would be
constitutionally protected. Davidson
also argued that the verdict should
be set aside because defense counsel
had “abandoned” him, premising
his argument on statements made by
defense counsel during the trial that
Davidson argued were insufficiently
supportive of his position. The court
rejected this argument, stating that
“even if the portion of defense counsel’s
closing argument cited by defendant
is deemed an unreasonable tactical
approach, it did not rise to a complete
failure to subject the case to meaningful
adversarial testing so as to constitute
abandonment.”
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
CALIFORNIA
–
Recommending
against the grant of a habeas corpus
petition, U.S. Magistrate Judge Alka
Sagar rejected 8th and 14th Amendment
claims asserted by a man who was
sentenced to 30-year-to-life for conduct
committed when he was 16 years old
after conviction by an Orange County
Superior Court jury on one count of
sexual penetration with a foreign object
by force, one count of aggravated assault
on a child, and two counts of forcible
lewd act on a child under 14 years of
age. His victims were all within a few
years of his age. He was sentenced under
California’s “one strike” law, which
mandates such a prison sentence for
anyone tried as an adult who is convicted
of the specified offense, regardless of
the lack of any past criminal record.
The petitioner suggested that this
mandatory sentencing scheme violated
the 8th Amendment (cruel and unusual
punishment) and the 14th Amendment
(equal protection) because it precluded
the trial judge from taking his age and
immaturity into account in deciding
on sentencing, but Judge Sagar found
that under federal statutes governing
habeas proceedings the court had
to recommend against granting the
petition because there was no U.S.
Supreme Court decision establishing
that this sentencing scheme violates the
constitution as applied to sentencing
a minor for criminal acts. Perez v.
McDowell, 2015 WL 4698431 (C.D.
Cal., Aug. 5, 2015).
CALIFORNIA – California trial judges
continue to overuse their statutory
authority to order HIV testing in
criminal cases, to judge by the latest
in a long line of cases questioning such
testing orders: People v. Barajas, 2015
WL 4642510 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.,
Aug. 5, 2015) (not officially published).
The defendant was found guilty in
Alameda Superior Court on several
counts of “lewd conduct” with a child
under 14. None of the charges alleged
oral or anal sex. One count concerned
kissing, and Barajas was not convicted
on that count, so it is not established
as fact that the alleged kiss took place.
Nonetheless, the trial judge, evidently
blissfully ignorant about the mechanics
of HIV transmission, premised an HIV
testing order on the kiss. Barajas did not
challenge his convictions on appeal, but
did challenge the HIV test and various
aspects of the sentencing. Amazingly,
the Attorney General defended the
HIV testing order based on the kiss,
citing a 1990 California case, Johnetta
J. v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d
1255, to support the contention that the
possibility of HIV being transmitted in
saliva is sufficient to justify HIV testing
of sex crime defendants. That was a
case in which the defendant inflicted a
deep bite that drew blood from a deputy
sheriff’s arm. “In the present case,”
wrote the court, “the slight evidence
of a ‘kiss’ provides no reason” for a
belief that transmission was possible.
“There is no indication that defendant
kissed Jane Doe on the mouth, and
the context of her testimony seems to
suggest that the kiss, which she resisted,
was brief, possibly on her cheek, and
was unlikely to have transferred any
saliva. This is not substantial evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause
that bodily fluid was transferred to
Jane Doe.” The court agreed with the
Attorney General, however, that the
proper remedy here was to remand the
case to the trial court, quoting from a
prior decision: “Given the significant
public policy considerations at issue,
we conclude it would be inappropriate
simply to strike the testing order without
remanding for further proceedings to
determine whether the prosecution has
additional evidence that may establish
the requisite probable cause.” Given
the amount of time that has passed
since the misconduct occurred in 2010
through 2012, there is no need to test
the defendant if Jane Doe has not
seroconverted; why not just test her to
put her mind at ease? Indeed, if she
has been waiting for years to get the
defendant’s test results, she is being
poorly advised by her doctor.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA – The
Washington Blade (July 22) reported
that D.C. Superior Court Judge Yvonne
Williams called a special hearing on
July 15 to explain her reasoning in
reducing the sentence of a woman
convicted by a jury in her court of an
anti-gay hate crime. People v. Lucas.
The case involved a violent assault
on a gay man by a group of young
people, including 22-year-old twins,
a straight man and his lesbian sister.
Trial testimony supported a finding that
“Christina Lucas slashed the victim’s
face with a sharp object while he was
lying on the ground, causing him to
suffer a permanent facial scar just
below his eye, after she called him a
‘faggot motherfucker.’” The victim is
related to the defendants through his
uncle. Although the jury convicted the
twins on hate crime charges, the judge
sentenced them far below the level
recommended by the prosecutor, four
years, and then after imposing sentence
issued an order reducing the prison
time to one year for the brother and
six months for Christina, suspending
the remaining sentences. At the July
15 hearing, she explained that in her
view there were different levels of hate
crimes, and compared to the injuries she
had seen in other cases, this appeared
minor. Furthermore, she felt that there
was a domestic element in this case,
while in her view the hate crime law was
really aimed at people being injured at
random because of their race or sexual
orientation, not family disputes. Finally,
she felt that since Lucas was a lesbian,
it was unlikely that she would be going
out and attacking people because of
their sexual orientation, and similarly
her brother, due to his close relationship
to her, was unlikely to target gay people
at random. One lawyer who attended
the hearing told the reporter for the
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
Blade that this was a case of judicial
nullification of a jury verdict. Another
lawyer, disagreeing, said it was up to the
judge to exercise discretion in setting an
appropriate sentence.
KANSAS – The Court of Appeals of
Kansas ruled on August 21 that a man
serving two concurrent life sentences
with no possibility of parole before
25 years, after being convicted on two
counts of aggravated indecent liberties
with a child under age 14, is entitled to
obtain post-conviction DNA testing in
his attempt to challenge his sentence.
State v. Kelsey, 2015 WL 4965898. A
Kansas statute affords a right to postconviction DNA testing for anybody
convicted of murder or rape, but does
not authorize it for other offenses. A
trial judge denied Kelsey’s motion for
DNA testing, since Kelsey had not
been convicted of either of the crimes
specified in the statute. Appealing
the ruling, Kelsey pointed out that
he is a “similarly situated offender”
with persons convicted of those two
crimes, as the statutes authorize the
same sentences upon conviction.
Consequently, he argued, denying
him the opportunity for DNA testing
violated his right to Equal Protection.
The court of appeals agreed with
Kelsey. Although it found that Kelsey’s
challenge to the statute should be
evaluated using the rational basis test,
it could hypothesize no rational basis
for denying DNA testing to Kelsey,
inasmuch as the penalty imposed on
him was the same penalty that would
be imposed on a person convicted of
murder or rape, so the interest at stake
for Kelsey was identical. A concurring
judge criticized the majority’s focus on
whether Kelsey was “similarly situated”
to persons convicted of murder or rape,
arguing that the “similarly situated”
concept had somehow crept into Kansas
equal protection jurisprudence, but that
such a finding was not necessary to a
valid equal protection challenge.
KANSAS – A prison disciplinary
board convicted Chelsea Manning, a
transgender woman serving a 35-year
espionage sentence at Ft. Leavenworth,
for violating various prison regulations
and sentenced her to be deprived of
recreational activity for three weeks.
She had faced a maximum sentence of
indefinite solitary confinement. Enlisted
in the Army as Bradley Manning, she had
leaked classified information about the
war in Iraq, leading to her prosecution.
During that process she came out as
transgender, and is serving her time
in Ft. Leavenworth as a transgender
woman after a bit of a struggle with
the Defense Department about how she
would be treated in prison. Among her
offenses: possessing a copy of Vanity
Fair with the cover and feature story
about Caitlyn Jenner, formerly known
as Olympic athlete Bruce Jenner, and
having an expired tube of toothpaste,
in violation of drug possession rules.
(This story is bound to have people
looking for a “high” carefully studying
the expiration dates of toothpaste tubes
in their local drugstore; evidently the
military sees serious security problems
when inmates use expired toothpaste,
but we can’t imagine what they are.)
Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 19;
Boston Globe, Aug. 20.
MASSACHUSETTS – On August 28,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed a ruling by Superior
Court Judge Timothy Q. Feeley that the
City of Lynn’s residential restrictions
on registered sex offenders exceeded
the city’s home rule powers, finding
the restrictions invalid. Doe v. City of
Lynn, SJC-11822. Judge Feeley found
that the restrictions on second and thirddegree offenders extended to 95% of the
city’s housing stock, so it was really a
virtual exclusion of all registered sex
offenders in those categories from
residing in the city, clearly raising
serious constitutional issues. But Judge
Feeley avoided constitutional issues, as
did the SJC, by finding that the state’s
comprehensive regulatory scheme for
dealing with registered sex offenders
had occupied the field in Massachusetts,
leaving no room for cities to impose
additional restrictions. Wrote the court,
the statutory scheme “evinces the
Legislature’s intent to have the first and
final word on the subject of residency
of sex offenders. In addition, insofar
as the ordinance effects a wholesale
displacement of sex offenders form their
residences, it frustrates the purpose
of the registry law and, therefore, is
inconsistent and invalid under the home
rule provisions.” The case was started
when the city began to implement its
law by mailing 30-day-vacate letters
to all the registered sex offenders
living in the city. The court noted that
40 municipalities in Massachusetts
had legislated additional residential
restrictions on sex offenders, and that
the state Attorney General’s office has
been approving them, apparently in a
pro forma sort of way, so the opinion is
likely to run shock-waves through the
law enforcement establishment in the
state.
MONTANA – In Marble v. State, 2015
MT 242, 2015 Mont. LEXIS 414 (Aug.
14, 2015), the Montana Supreme Court
ruled that the 4th District Court erred in
denying Cody Marble’s petition for postconviction relief. Marble was convicted
in 2002 of sexual intercourse without
consent with another boy when both
were inmates at the Missoula County
Detention Center for juvenile offenses.
The victim, then 13 years old, testified
at Marble’s trial that Marble, then 17,
forced him to submit to anal intercourse
in the shower room. The victim had
not gone to the police; other inmates
reported to Detention Center authorities
that Marble had raped the victim in the
shower, and they and the victim testified
against Marble at the trial. Marble
claimed that he was the victim of a “setup” by the other inmates, and that the
CRIMINAL LITIGATION
incident never occurred. A jury found
Marble guilty, and he was sentenced to
20 years, 15 suspended. He consistently
maintained his innocence and has
sought post-conviction relief numerous
times. In late fall of 2009, he contacted
the Montana Innocence Project with
rumors he had heard that the victim
had told others that Marble hadn’t raped
him. The Innocence Project contacted
the victim, then incarcerated, who
verbally recanted in several interviews
but balked at doing so in writing.
Finally, he hand-wrote a recantation
statement in July 2010, saying that other
inmates had told him to say Marble
raped him. A Project attorney typed it
up, incorporating various statements
the victim had made in interviews with
the attorneys, and the victim signed
the typed version after making some
hand-written changes. He said in the
statement, “I’m coming forward now
because I’m in prison on a sex crime and
know what it is like. So I don’t want him
to be charged with one when innocent.
When I was in jail, I was the youngest &
smallest and I was pressured into going
along with it.” Marble sought to use the
written recantation to reopen his case for
a new trial, but the District Court denied
his petition for post-conviction release
after the victim testified in a deposition
that the rape did occur and that he was
just telling Innocence Project lawyers
what they wanted to hear in hopes that
they would help him with his legal
problems. The District Court’s denial
was predicated on its conclusion that the
recantation did not “affirmatively and
unquestionably establish” that Marble
was innocent. The victim then got into
an encounter with the police while
out on parole and committed suicide
on April 7, 2014, so he would not be
available to testify at a new trial. The
Supreme Court concluded that a district
court presented with a post-conviction
petition based upon newly discovered
evidence shall determine whether the
“newly discovered evidence, if proved
and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole would establish that the petitioner
did not engage in the criminal conduct”
for which he was convicted. It would be
up the district court to decide “whether
the proof and evidence will be weighed
by the court itself, whether discovery
and a hearing should be conducted,
whether the matter should be remanded
for a new trial, and even whether the
defendant should be released on bail or
discharged.” However the district court
disposes of the petition, the court should
“issue an order setting forth the facts and
legal rationale supporting its decision,”
which is necessary in case the petitioner
seeks judicial review of denial of the
petition. The case was remanded for
reconsideration of Marble’s petition.
NEW YORK – New York City Criminal
Court Judge Armando Montano
denied a motion to dismiss criminal
charges in the interest of justice by
Serge Mathurin, a transgender woman
who was arrested after a dust-up with
police officers in the Bronx. People v.
Mathurin, 2015 WL 4509539, 2015 N.Y.
Slip Op. 51110(U)(Bronx Co. Crim.
Ct., July 13, 2015) (published in the
New York Law Journal on August 3,
2015). The facts are heavily contested.
Mathurin, claiming to be the victim of
a hate crime, says that she entered a
bogeda to shop when store employees
referred to her as a “batiman” (identified
by the court as Jamaican slang for
“homosexual’) and ridiculed for
dressing as a female. Mathurin claims
that store employees assaulted her with
a baseball bat and chased her out of
the store. While running away she was
pursued by people who turned out to be
police officers, who jumped on her and
arrested her. She had a pair of scissors,
which she was charged with possessing
and using as a weapon. According to the
arresting police officer who would be
the witness in the case against her, she
was wielding the scissors and resisting
arrest; the officer did not see anybody
chasing Mathurin with baseball bats.
Mathurin pointed out that the D.A.
had offered a plea bargain, which she
had turned down, preferring to seek
a motion to dismiss in the interest of
justice and reciting the difficulties of
her life. She pointed out that the state
had lost contact with various potential
witnesses, so the case would come
down to the police officer’s testimony.
The court reviewed the factors that
are normally examined in determining
whether to dismiss criminal charges in
the interest of justice, and found that
they did not support Mathurin’s motion.
“Here, defendant essentially asks to
receive preferential treatment from this
Court because she is a transgendered
[sic] woman who has suffered a lifetime
of abuse and vitriol from society. This
Court does not doubt that defendant has
faced numerous hardships through her
life. However, due to the serious nature
of the offenses charged, this Court
cannot justify an outright dismissal”
which, wrote Montano, “would only
serve to demonstrate to defendant
that she is deserving of preferential
treatment in the eyes of the law.”
Montano continued, “The importance
of the even-handed dispensing of
justice cannot be overstated,” wrote
Judge Montano. “The fairness of the
criminal justice system is part of the
bedrock upon which our government
was founded. Consistent application of
the law not only reinforces the notions
of fairness and order, but also sends a
clear message to the public as to what
conduct is deemed acceptable in our
society. In short, dismissal of the instant
case would only serve to undermine
the public’s confidence in the criminal
justice system. . . In rendering this
decision, this Court in no way seeks to
diminish the hardships defendant has
undoubtedly faced as a transgendered
[sic] woman. However, after considering
the enumerated factors set forth in CPL
Sec. 170.40, it cannot be said that this
case ‘cries out for fundamental justice
beyond the confines of conventional
considerations.’
CRIMINAL / PRISONER LITIGATION
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
dismiss the instant action in the interest
of justice is denied.” Mathurin is
represented by Vanessa Burdick of the
Legal Aid Society.
NEW YORK – New York County
Criminal Court Judge Steven M.
Statsinger ruled in People v. Marian,
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 25231 (N.Y. County,
July 13, 2015), that a barrage of emails
sent to a woman at her office email
address by her former girlfriend did
not come within the prohibiting of N.Y.
Penal Law Section 120.45(3), which
provides that “A person is guilty of
stalking in the fourth degree when
he or she intentionally, and for no
legitimate purpose, engages in a course
of conduct directed at a specific person,
and knows or reasonably should know
that such conduct (3) is likely to cause
such person to reasonably fear that his
or her employment, business or career
is threatened, where such conduct
consists of appearing, telephoning or
initiating communication or contact at
such person’s place of employment or
business, and the actor was previously
clearly informed to cease that conduct.”
The court found that the phrase “place
of business” refers only to a “physical
location.” “It would stretch the ‘fair
import’ of the phrase beyond all
recognition to consider a complainant’s
work email address as her ‘place of
employment or business’” for purposes
of the stalking statute, wrote the judge.
However, he refused to dismiss other
counts against the defendant, including
for her false report that the victim
had assaulted her and a claim under
subsection (2) of the stalking statute,
which concerns situations where the
defendant “causes material harm to
the mental or emotional health of such
person, where such conduct consists
of following, telephoning or initiating
communication or contact with such
person, a member of such person’s
immediate family or a third party
with whom such person is acquainted,
and the actor was previously clearly
informed to cease that conduct.” The
defendant, in addition to the barrage of
communications, also lingered outside
the victim’s home and showed up at
various public places where the victim
was present, stating “I won’t leave you
alone. I’ll never stop.”
TENNESSEE – The Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals backed up the
refusal of Sevier County Circuit
Judge Rex Henry Ogle to allow Allen
Anthony Hammett to withdraw his
“best interest” guilty plea to charges
of aggravated sexual battery, and
violating the sex offender registry. State
v. Hammett, 2015 WL 5015790 (Aug.
25, 2015). Hammett, a convicted sex
offender who was HIV-positive, was
charged with violating the sex offender
registry and committing aggravated
sexual battery when he rented hotel
room together with a female minor and
engaged in activity that involved contact
with her genitals. He complained that
he was deprived of HIV meds while
incarcerated awaiting trial on these
new charges. He pled guilty in a welldocumented hearing during which he
was recorded as saying that his plea
was voluntary and he was afforded an
opportunity to ask questions. Seeking
approval from the court to withdraw
his plea and go to trial, Hammett
claimed that his plea was not voluntary
and was affected by deprivation of
his medications. He also believed
that newly-discovered exculpatory
evidence made it appropriate for
him to go to trial. The appeals court
rejected his arguments, finding that the
transcript of the plea hearing was quite
regular and documented his voluntary
plea. The court also found that the
testimony given by his defense counsel
in this proceeding showed that he had
received adequate representation and
was well-advised of the consequences
of a guilty plea.
WASHINGTON – A Spokane County
jury acquitted Derrick G. Moore, a
local minister, of an anti-gay hate crime
charge, apparently accepted his selfdefense plea. Antonio Moore, who
turned 21 in April, had “come out” to
his parents, was told not to come back
to the house. A few days later, Rev.
Moore’s wife (Antonio’s stepmother),
awoke to the sound of the shower and
told her husband that she suspected
Antonino had brought a friend home,
according to Moore’s attorney, Tim
Note. Moore listened at the bathroom
door, where Antonio and a friend were
allegedly engaged in sex, then broke
in, a scuffle ensued, during which
Antonio’s friend was punched by Moore
and pushed into the wall, and both men
were roughly expelled from the house.
They both claimed that Moore had
used an anti-gay slur while dragging
them out of the house. Antonio’s friend
contacted the police and requested that
charges be filed. Moore was prosecuted
for a hate crime, arguing in defense that
the men had been trespassing and he
didn’t “remember” saying what he was
alleged to have said. The 12 member
jury acquitted Moore, who could
end up filing a substantial motion for
compensation for wrongful prosecution.
Spokane Spokesman-Review, Aug. 12.
PRISONER LITIGATION NOTES
ARKANSAS – This is another
of what might be called a “verbal
harassment plus” case, implicating the
Eighth Amendment when prisoners
are harassed because of their sexual
orientation. U.S. District Judge Susan
O. Hickey adopted the Report and
Recommendation [R & R] of U.S.
Magistrate Judge Barry A. Bryant in
Baker v. Tallant, 2015 WL 4716311
(W.D. Ark., August 7, 2015), which
denied motions to dismiss by multiple
defendants (not clearly identified) in
Lee Baker’s pro se lawsuit arising in an
PRISONER LITIGATION
Arkansas jail. Except for one time when
a guard joined in verbal harassment,
all of the incidents were perpetrated
by other inmates, albeit with staff
knowledge on multiple occasions. The R
& R put the claim succinctly: “Plaintiff
alleges he was verbally harassed and
sexually assaulted by other inmates
due to his sexual orientation, and the
Defendants allowed this conduct to
happen.” While in general population,
Baker was bullied, “made fun of,”
verbally assaulted, propositioned for
oral sex and other “sexual favors,”
had his “pants pulled down in front of
other inmates and [jailors],” had his
“ass smacked by inmates,” was called
“faggott” [sic] and “lil mama,” and
was “dry humped.” Baker alleged that
defendants witnessed the conduct, that
he filed multiple grievances that were
ignored, and that he remained in general
population at the jail. Defendants
argued that verbal threats are not
actionable and that “sexually suggestive
acts” cannot support a constitutional
violation. Judge Bryant recognized
that inmates have a constitutional
right to be protected against violence
at the hands of other prisoners, citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994), but, he wrote, “name calling
and verbal threats regarding his sexual
orientation, while offensive, do not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation
in the context of a prison setting.” Here,
however, the verbal harassment was
“accompanied” by acts, including mock
sexual intercourse, slaps, and disrobing
that “clearly surpass verbal harassment”
and “these physical interactions coupled
with the verbal sexual harassment do
implicate the constitution.” The R & R
relied on two Eighth Circuit cases and
distinguished a third one. See Seltzer–
Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 962–63 (8th
Cir.1995) (a prison guard’s sexual
comments coupled with daily strip
searches and rubbing of the prisoner’s
buttocks with his night stick implicated
the Eighth Amendment); and Watson
v. Jones, 980 F.2d 1165, 1165–66 (8th
Cir.1992) (guards daily pat-down
searches, tickling, and deliberately
examining genital area implicated the
Eighth Amendment); and compare
Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073,
1076 (8th Cir.1998) (one brief unwanted
staff touching with no sexual comments
or banter not actionable). Here, Baker
endured “multiple physical altercations
of a sexual nature all accompanied
by continuous sexual comments,
threats, taunts, and name calling.”
Unfortunately, the R & R confuses two
lines of cases: Farmer and its progeny,
which involve protection against
inmate-on-inmate assault; and assaults
against inmates by staff, which were
the subject of all of the Eighth Circuit
cases cited in the R & R. Baker’s
case involved the former, but it was
essentially allowed to proceed under the
latter. The analysis will diverge as the
case proceeds and discovery addresses
notice, state of mind, supervisory
liability, and legitimate penological
interests. For a new federal appellate
decision relaxing standards for liability
for staff homophobic assaults, see
(2d Cir., August 11, 2015), in this issue
of Law Notes. William J. Rold
ARKANSAS – Pro se prisoner Alan
Doering sued for damages for violation
of his civil rights during a two-week
period of incarceration in a county jail,
during which he was allegedly denied
HIV medication, placed in solitary
confinement in a strip cell without
clothing or a mattress, a blanket, or
adequate food, denied mental health
services, and endured a rape from
which he contracted hepatitis C. United
States Magistrate Judge Mark E. Ford’s
Report and Recommendation [R & R]
granted summary judgment to a mental
health paraprofessional under contract
with the jail because of inadequate
personal involvement or causation in the
deprivation of civil rights under Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976),
because: he saw Doering only once; he
had no authority to make health care
orders beyond recommendations; and he
displayed lack of deliberate indifference
to Doering by helping him contact his
mother to obtain HIV medication from
home. Judge Ford’s R & R in Doering
v. Hollenbeck, 2015 WL 4940622
(W.D. Ark., 2015 WL 4940622), said:
“Defendant… could have recommended
he be released [from isolation], he
did not have the authority to require
that release. Plaintiff’s argument is
essentially that he should be held liable
for not making a recommendation
which [the jail] was not bound to follow.
This does not demonstrate a causal
link.” The sweep of this dicta is plainly
wrong, since lower-level practitioners
can be found to be deliberately
indifferent in failing to refer patients
needing higher-level intervention.
Long-standing applications of Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976),
have addressed systemic issues
and the medical staff whose role is
complaint screening and referral. See,
e.g., DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F,.2d 525,
529 (8th Cir. 1990) (organization and
control in administration of health
services); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48,
51-2 (2d Cir. 1977) (communication of
medical needs of inmates in isolation).
Presumably, these systemic claims
can still be raised in Doering’s case,
since the other defendants – the county
sheriff, the jail physician, the nurse
administrator, and others – apparently
remain in the case. According to
Justicia, United States District Judge P.
L. Holmes, III, approved the R & R on
August 19, 2015. William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Transgender prisoner
Ramon Murillo filed a pro se lawsuit
in 2012 about a five month odyssey of
transphobic beatings, mistreatment, and
harassment by some sixteen California
corrections officers in the Donovan
Correctional Facility. United States
District Judge William Q. Hayes found
PRISONER LITIGATION
that Murillo stated a claim in Murillo v.
Rucker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149135;
2013 WL 5670952 (S.D. Cal., October
15, 2013), reported in Law Notes
(December 2013) at page 432. The case
also alleged retaliation and prevention
of Murillo from filing grievances;
but, later, Judge Hayes dismissed the
claims without prejudice for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
[PLRA], which Murillo appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. Less than a month later,
Murillo started another initial action in
the Southern District of California, with
a different defendant as lead party and
naming a new defendant, but making
the same allegations about dates, events,
and the other defendants. Although the
court originally allowed Murillo to start
the new action in forma pauperis, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
case as duplicative of the first action still
pending on appeal. Judge Hayes granted
the motion with prejudice in Murillo v.
Taylor, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96371,
2015 WL 4488060 (S.D. Calif., July 22,
2015). In so doing, Judge Hayes repeats
the egregious facts alleged in both
complaints, which include beatings
accompanied by slurs, denial of medical
care, threats, retaliation, and in-yourface transphobic bias. Nevertheless, all
of this was apparently in the first case;
and its dismissal under the PLRA was
appealed. It is basic civil procedure that
a plaintiff cannot circumvent an adverse
ruling on appeal by starting over with
a new case founded on the same facts.
Changing the case name by flipping
party defendants in the caption changed
nothing, and the new defendant was
sufficiently “in interest” with the other
sixteen that for civil procedure purposes
his presence did not alter the finding of
duplication. William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Pro se prisoner Garland
Aaron Jones sued after a corrections
officer labeled him “a predator and
stalker because he is gay and he argued
with a heterosexual,” alleging that this
conduct “landed him in the hospital.”
Screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), United States Magistrate
Judge Michael J. Seng dismissed the
case in Jones v. Tolson, 2015 WL
4716409 (E.D. Calif., Aug. 7, 2015),
because “mere verbal harassment”
does not generally violate the Eighth
Amendment, citing Austin v. Terhune,
367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.2004); and
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th
Cir.1996). Judge Seng noted that verbal
harassment “calculated to… cause [the
prisoner] psychological damage” might
state an Eighth Amendment claim,
citing Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830
F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir.1987)), amended
by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1998). He
granted Jones leave to amend to show
that “these statements were unusually
harsh even for the prison setting or
that they were made with the intent to
cause him psychological damage.” He
also allowed Jones to replead an Equal
Protection Claim, if he could show
suspect class or intentionally disparate
treatment without rational basis, without
discussing heightened scrutiny of sexual
orientation discrimination claims under
Smithkline Beecham Corporation v.
Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471,
480-81 (9th Cir. 2014), which would be
a binding precedent in his district. See
(2d Cir., August 11, 2015), in this issue
of Law Notes, for a discussion of a new
2nd Circuit decision expanding claims
arising from verbal abuse of prisoners,
when they are accompanied by actions
motivated by sexual harassment.
William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Sometimes a case is
more interesting not for what it does
but for what it chooses to reserve. In
Marquette v. Negouchi, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99199 (E.D. Calif., July 29, 2015),
pro se prisoner Robert Marquette, suing
about retaliation against him and his
same-sex prisoner partner based on their
sexual orientation, sought an injunction
preventing the transfer of either during
the pendency of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
case. United States Magistrate Judge
Dale A. Drozd denied the request for the
injunction as moot because Marquette
has been paroled. Although Judge
Drozd recited boilerplate language
about the standards for a preliminary
injunction (likely to succeed on the
merits, irreparable injury, balance of
equities, and public interest), he did
not include language about deference
to correctional administration and lack
of due process protections regarding
inmate transfers – see Sandin v.
Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); and
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 22425 (1976). He did note that a court has
authority under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), to enter orders “in aid
of its own jurisdiction” and to “prevent
threatened injury that would impair the
court’s ability to grant effective relief
in a pending action.” After denying
the injunctive request as moot, Judge
Drozd wrote: “Therefore, the court
makes no finding and expresses no
opinion as to whether plaintiff can
state a cognizable, valid legal claim
based on the threatened transfer of his
same-sex partner to another prison.”
While plainly dicta, this reservation
may be helpful in future cases raising
First Amendment associational claims
for LGBT prisoners or seeking relief
against phobic retaliation. William J.
Rold
CALIFORNIA – In Singletary v. Duffy,
2015 WL 4751164 (E.D. Calif., Aug. 11,
2015), United States Magistrate Judge
Kendall J. Newman dismissed HIV+
inmate Gondee Charles Singletary’s
pro se complaint upon initial screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), because
it failed to show how the named
defendants were responsible under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the challenged
policy – to wit: denying HIV+ inmates
placement on a kidney transplant
PRISONER LITIGATION
list. Singletary sued the warden, the
chief medical officer, and the receiver
appointed to oversee California’s prison
medical care, seeking damages and an
injunction. After extensive discussion
about the receiver’s amenability to suit,
Judge Newman found him entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity as an appointee
of the court. He granted Singletary
leave to file an amended complaint
about the warden and the chief medical
officer, with instructions to show an
“actual connection or link” between the
constitutional violation and the acts of
the defendants, citing Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976). Judge Newman
wrote: “Plaintiff has not alleged that
defendants were personally involved
in the constitutional deprivation or that
they instituted the allegedly deficient
policy. Plaintiff will be given leave to
cure this deficiency.” Although the case
would seem to present such issues, there
is no discussion of the Americans with
Disabilities or Rehabilitation Acts; and
Judge Newman did not appoint counsel.
William J. Rold
GEORGIA – Plaintiff Samson Eugene
James, an “openly gay” prisoner, filed
pro se papers alleging various claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including
complaints of denial of appropriate
medical care, retaliation, and excessive
force in James v. Masse, 2015 WL
4249370 (M.D. Ga., July 13, 2015).
He also requested an order that he
be transferred for his safety. United
States Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles
reviewed the claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). He found claims against
a doctor and a nurse, occurring in a
hospital in Gainesville, were unrelated
to James’ claims in the Baldwin County
Jail, and hence improperly joined under
F.R.C.P. 20(a). He recommended that
they be transferred to the Northern
District of Georgia, since 42 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) allows such transfer in the
“interest of justice,” and they might
otherwise be time-barred, if dismissed.
The Baldwin County Jail claims arose
when two sergeants locked him in
segregation for complaining about
past police misconduct, denied him
food, and doused him with pepper
spray without cause. Judge Hyles
allowed these claims to go forward for
“further factual development” under
the First and Eighth Amendments. He
recommended that claims against the
Baldwin County Sheriff be dismissed
for lack of specific allegations against
him. Although James alleged that he
was gang raped in the past and that he
was beaten recently for “talking about
who raped and molested him,” he does
not identify the attackers or plead any
failure-to-protect claims. Judge Hyles
held that transfer relief “is not available
in a § 1983 action,” citing the preEleventh Circuit case of Moye v. Clerk,
DeKalb County Superior Court, 474
F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973), and the
deference to prison classification under
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976),
writing: “If Plaintiff feels as though
he is in danger of serious physical
injury, he should follow administrative
procedures available to him and may
file a writ seeking such relief in the state
courts. Plaintiff’s Motion in this Court,
however, must be DENIED.” [Injunctive
relief is available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. It would have been perhaps
more accurate to say that James failed
to plead the elements of a protectionfrom-harm case or the prerequisites for
a preliminary injunction arising from
those facts. Judge Hyles did not explain
the protection from harm cause of
action or how it might apply to James’
situation, although he issued various
housekeeping orders, including service,
discovery, and the consequences of
failure to adhere to rules.] William J.
Rold
confinement, most recently seeking
hormone treatments and safer housing.
On August 31, the state rid itself of
this problem releasing her! The parole
board decision was made on August
1 to discharge her early, even though
Diamond’s next scheduled parole
hearing was to be held in November.
Southern Poverty Law Center was
providing support and representation
for Diamond’s latest suit against the
Georgia prison system, and the U.S.
Justice Department has also weighed in,
claiming that Georgia prison policies
for transgender inmates violate the
federal constitution. Perhaps Georgia
officials were inspired by the example
of California, which decided to avoid
paying for an inmate’s sex-reassignment
surgery that had been ordered by a
federal judge (with the 9th Circuit
denying a stay motion) by paroling the
inmate. A spokesperson for the State
Board of Pardons and Paroles denied
that the early release had anything
to do with the most recent pending
lawsuit, stating that the board had
decided that her release is “compatible
with the welfare of society and public
safety.” Diamond’s allegations in the
pending lawsuit included that she had
been sexually assaulted eight times in
male prisons and was denied hormone
treatments that she had been receiving
for 17 years prior to her incarceration.
She claimed that prison officials
retaliated against her for filing suit by
transferring her to a maximum security
prison with “more dangerous inmates,”
increasing the risk that she would be
assaulted and seriously injured. In a
recent ruling, a federal judge had ordered
prison officials to take additional steps
to ensure her protection, according to
a September 1 report in the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution.
GEORGIA – Law Notes has reported
several times on litigation brought by
Ashley Diamond, a transgender Georgia
prisoner, concerning her conditions of
ILLINOIS – A gay prisoner lost on
summary judgment in Foster v. Broward,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100457 S.D. Ill.,
July 31, 2015), after he failed to show
PRISONER LITIGATION
in his deposition or otherwise that the
defendant correctional lieutenant knew
of a substantial risk to his safety, the first
prong of a protection from harm claim
under Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 833 (1994). In an earlier screening
decision United States District Judge
J. Phil Gilbert allowed pro se plaintiff
Sidney Foster to proceed against the
lieutenant (but not against the warden)
on the face of his complaint of failure
to protect. See Foster v. Roeckman,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12725 (S.D. Ill.,
Feb. 3, 2014). Now, after discovery,
United States District Judge Nancy J.
Rosenstengel found that Foster failed
to present a triable issue on the claim,
because there was no evidence that
the lieutenant knew in advance that
Foster was at risk of assault. Foster
approached the lieutenant requesting
cell reassignment after Foster’s cellmate
told him he did not want to share a cell
with a gay man. The lieutenant agreed
to move Foster “in three days,” but he
did not do so for several weeks. In the
meantime, the cellmate assaulted Foster
on several occasions, allegedly choking
and beating him while he was recovering
from heart surgery (although Foster
failed to offer medical substantiation of
these details). Foster said he told “all the
officers” on his unit about the assaults,
but Judge Rosenstengel found that the
claims against the lieutenant boiled
down to a single conversation involving
the lieutenant that occurred prior to
any assaults, in which Foster did not
express fear for his safety. “There is
no evidence that Defendant had any
knowledge that Plaintiff’s cellmate
was violent or that he was particularly
violent towards gay persons,” wrote the
judge. The opinion repeatedly mentions
that the lieutenant was “told” that Foster
was trying to be moved to be nearer his
“lover.” Although Judge Rosenstengel’s
summary judgment decision did
not rely on this tiresome chestnut in
LGBT protection from harm cases, its
appearance nevertheless reinforces the
notion that somehow LGBT plaintiffs’
genuine fears are less worthy of belief
if they have a mixed motive: to escape
danger and to be near someone who
cares about them. William J. Rold
LOUISIANA – United States District
Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle approved the
Report and Recommendation [R &
R] of United States Magistrate Judge
Karen Wells Roby dismissing pro se
inmate Michael M. Shelton’s complaint
alleging denial of HIV medication for
some five months because Shelton failed
to exhaust administrative remedies
under the under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U .S.C. § 1997e(a)
[PLRA], before starting a federal suit.
Shelton v. Gusman, 2015 WL 5060980
(E.D. La., Aug. 18, 2015). After an
answer and a “Spears hearing” – Fifth
Circuit proceeding to determine “legal
basis” for prisoner claims under Spears
v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985)
– Judge Roby found that Shelton failed
to exhaust because he filed more than
ten repeated grievances to the parish
sheriff, when he should have started at
a lower level and then appealed through
the three-tiered grievance system for
the parish jail (which ended with the
sheriff), the existence of which Judge
Roby judicially noticed from other
Eastern District of Louisiana cases. It
was immaterial that defendants did not
answer any of the grievances; that all
defendants in fact knew about Shelton’s
HIV medication needs; or that Shelton’s
state sentencing judge had ordered the
sheriff to appear and explain to her
the denial of Shelton’s medications (or
that the sheriff had Shelton transferred
to a different parish to avoid the
order). The R & R makes no new
PLRA law, but the teaching moment
bears repeating: inmates must follow
the institutional grievance system as
prescribed, appealing denials or failures
to respond to the next level, until there
is nothing left to exhaust, prior to filing
a federal case. Judge Roby’s dismissal
was without prejudice, but it is unclear
whether Shelton, who is no longer at the
jail, can “exhaust” at this point. William
J. Rold
MISSISSIPPI – U.S. Magistrate Judge
F. Keith Ball held that for pre-trial
detainee Timothy Allen McCoy had
potentially valid claims to have been
subjected to unconstitutional conditions
while detailed at Newton County Jail,
refusing to grant summary judgment to
the defendants on some of the claims.
McCoy v. Newton County, 2015 WL
4726977 (S.D. Miss., Aug. 10, 2015).
McCoy was arrested on sexual battery
charges and detained in the county
jail while awaiting trial. He informed
jail officials that he was HIV positive
and was taking prescription drugs, but
pursuant to the usual policy followed
by correctional institutions, they did
not allow him to bring medication into
the facility. He alleges that during the
first six months of his detention, he
was denied HIV meds and placed into
segregation, denied any out-of-cell
recreational activity. He was allowed
to shower only once or twice every
two weeks, he claims, and denied soap,
deodorant, a toothbrush or toothpaste.
He alleges there was no intercom in
his cell, guards only checked on him
every eight hours on shift changes, and
that he was not allowed to use a phone
except to call his lawyer. Magistrate
Ball found that it was legitimate for
the prison to place an HIV-positive
detainee who had been arrested for
sexual battery into segregation in
order to protect other inmates and
prevent the spread of HIV, and that the
denial of out-of-cell recreation was not
unconstitutional. However, he found
that denying medication to an inmate
with a serious medical condition could
state a claim, as could denying various
hygienic necessities, in the absence of
any legitimate, non-punitive purpose
for failing to meet adequate personal
hygiene requirements. However, the
court rejected McCoy’s statutory claim
PRISONER LITIGATION
under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, finding that McCoy had not
alleged “that his HIV status was the
reason for the conditions under which
he was housed or Defendant’s failure to
provide him with his medication.” The
court dismissed as against certain of the
individual defendants on the grounds that
they did not bear personal responsibility
for McCoy’s mistreatment, but refused
to dismiss as against the sheriff and the
jail administrator. Since the sheriff is
the final policymaker on administration
of the county jail, the court found that
if the sheriff is ultimately held to have
violated McCoy’s constitutional rights,
the county would be liable as well.
The court also rejected an attempt
by the defendants to assert qualified
immunity, finding that they had not
made any argument that they are
entitled to qualified immunity because
the right claimed by McCoy was not
clearly established.
NORTH CAROLINA – A gay state
prison inmate who was pressured by a
Case Manager at the prison to have sex
with him may maintain an action for
sexual assault against the Case Manager,
but not against the superintendent of the
prison or other management officials,
ruled Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney in
Karrick v. North Carolina Department
of Public Safety, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106123, 2015 WL 4756963 (W.D. N.C.,
Aug. 12, 2015). According to Jesse Lee
Karrick’s allegations, he was sexually
assaulted after certain correctional staff
and inmates informed the case manager,
Christopher Nivens, that Karrick was
gay. Karrick says that Nivens threatened
to ship him to a different institution if
he did not engage in sexual activity with
Nivens. The activity began in April
2012 and continued into August, when
Karrick told Nivens “that things were
getting out of control and that they were
going to get caught.” Nivens assured
him they wouldn’t be caught and offered
him contraband tobacco in exchange for
more sex. But Karrick felt that “pressure
was getting to” him, and he decided to
tell Superintendent Susan White, who
he alleges didn’t believe his allegations.
He was then placed in segregation and
two investigators spoke with him about
his allegations. He was then transferred
to a different prison, where his new
case manager read him the confession
that had been signed by Nivens, who
was apparently convicted subsequently
on the charge of sexual offense by a
custodian and sentenced to serve seven
years, but whose projected release
date was sooner. Judge Whitney noted
that Nivens was incarcerated as of the
writing of this opinion. Judge Whitney
found that Karrick’s allegations against
Nivens “are substantial when accepted
as true at this stage of the proceedings,”
and would state a claim against Nivens.
However, Whitney found no valid claim
against Superintendent White, pointing
out that it was appropriate in light
of Karrick’s own safety concerns for
White to have him placed in segregation
after he reported the sexual activity
to her. Since there was a subsequent
investigation, Nivens was discharged
and prosecuted, and Karrick was sent
to a different prison where this history
would not dog him with fellow inmates
and staff, Karrick had no valid claim
against White or other prison officials
whom he named in the complaint
as defendants, and as to whom he
presented no evidence concerning their
knowledge about any of this. Prison
officials are generally not subject to
respondeat superior liability in prisoner
tort suits.
TENNESSEE – Gay pro se prisoner
Justin Keith Hill sued (among other
things) for lack of medical attention
and threats of sexual assault at the
Hickman County Jail, naming the Jail
and its contractual health provider,
Southern Health Partners, but no
individual defendants. United States
Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp dismissed
the case – Hill v. Hickman County
Jail, 2015 WL 5009301, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 110865 (M.D. Tenn., Aug.
21, 2015) – on initial screening under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to state a
claim. Hill had attempted suicide with a
razor, after which he was given a paper
gown and placed in a “holding cell.” An
officer bandaged his wound and gave
him band-aids for a dressing change.
Hill remained in the cell for five days,
during which time he alleges denial of
adequate food, clothing, phone calls,
showers, and a blanket. Judge Sharp
wrote: (1) that Hill “never saw a nurse
or other medical professional for a
physical- or mental-health assessment
despite the wound, the plaintiff’s
long history of suicide attempts and
hospitalizations, and his documented
diagnoses of Borderline Personality
Disorder and Bipolar Disorder”; but (2)
that he does not allege “any detriment to
his health.” On what Judge Sharp calls
“a different occasion,” Hill complained
that another inmate was touching
him inappropriately, threatening him
sexually, and telling him he would
be moved to share a cell with him,
whereupon he would force sex. Hill
said jailers responded by saying his
“sexual preference is of no concern”;
that he should “keep it to yourself”;
and that, “if you weren’t so openly
gay, you wouldn’t have those issues.”
Judge Sharp noted that the threats were
verbal only and that Hill said the other
inmate was “not moved until 2 or 3
days later.” Judge Sharp wrote: “This
ambiguous statement does not indicate
that the other inmate was moved into
the plaintiff’s cell, nor does the plaintiff
suggest that he actually suffered a
sexual assault by the other inmate that
jail officials could have but failed to
prevent.” Judge Sharp first holds that
neither defendant is a proper civil rights
party: the jail, because it is a building
not a person; and Southern Health
Partners, because it is a corporation,
whose liability must be premised on a
PRISONER / LEGISLATIVE
pattern or practice of misconduct, not
respondeat superior. [Note: On this
last point, as Judge Sharp mentions in
a footnote, the widespread requirement
of pattern and practice allegations
for privatized correctional providers’
liability under Section 1983 has been
questioned in lengthy dicta in Shields v.
Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 746 F.3d 782, 789
(7th Cir.2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct.
1024 (2015).] Judge Sharp dismissed
the case in its “entirety,” denying leave
to amend to allege proper defendants or
pattern and practice, because the facts
did not state a constitutional violation
in any event. The medical/mental health
issues were not “sufficiently serious”
in presentation or outcome (the wound
did not become infected, and placement
in the holding cell “arguably” was
“treatment”), and the sexual threats never
materialized. Judge Sharp’s disregard
(read: ratification) of the dangerous
practices in this jail is shocking. The
total denial of medical and mental
screening of prisoners attempting
suicide and placed in isolation violates
every standard for suicide prevention
of which this writer is aware. See, e.g.,
National Commission on Correctional
Health Care, Essential Standard J-G05, requiring “prompt evaluation by
health personnel” of risk determination
and documented monitoring of suicidal
inmates every 15 minutes. The absence
of same would surely constitute a
“pattern and practice” of either the
jail administration or Southern Health
Partners. As to the assault, it is unclear
because of the unresolved “ambiguities,”
but it appears that Hill and the potential
defendants were just lucky there was no
escalation. In either case, Judge Sharp’s
judicial gauze is sufficiently thick to be
similar to that of a person who insists to
a safety inspector that she always stored
turpentine and paint rags by the furnace
but has never had a fire. William J. Rold
TEXAS – Pro se federal prisoner
Jeremy Pinson has filed over 100
lawsuits. While some cases have
survived screening, Pinson has
accumulated more than the “three
strikes” from prior “failure to state a
claim” dismissals to preclude future
filings in forma pauperis under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act [PLRA].
In Pinson v. Samuels, 2014 U. S. App.
LEXIS 15000 (D.C. Cir., August
5, 2014), as reported in Law Notes
(September 2014) at 391-2, Pinson tried
to prevent transfer to a federal “Special
Management Unit” prison in Alabama,
arguing that it posed a risk because he
was homosexual and a former gang
member. The court denied in forma
pauperis status, hold that the exception
to three strikes (“imminent danger”) –
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) – based on a
facility’s “reputation,” was insufficient
to trigger the exception. Now, Pinson,
identifying as transgender, in Pinson v.
Santana, 2015 WL 4270022 (N.D. Tex.,
July 14, 2015), fails to convince a Texas
federal court to prevent transfer to the
“Super-Max” federal institution in
Florence, Colorado, despite arguments
that the institution has no history of
treating transgender people and that it
houses inmates hostile to her. United
States District Judge Barbara M. G.
Lynn accepted the Recommendation of
United States Magistrate Judge David
L. Horan that the PLRA “imminent
danger” exception be denied and the
case “summarily dismiss[ed]” under the
“three strikes” bar because Pinson failed
to allege “specific facts” or to show that
the harm was “imminent or occurring at
the time the complaint is filed.” Pinson
also failed to sue the proper defendants:
officials at Florence, responsible for
safety; rather than administrators
in Texas, responsible for placement.
Earlier, Pinson had succeeded pro se
in moving claims to trial (involving a
correctional counselor, a lieutenant,
and a warden), for failure to protect him
from assault in Pinson v. Prieto, 2014
WL 7339203 (C.D. Calif., December 9,
2014), reported in Law Notes (February
2015) at page 53. William J. Rold
LEGISL ATIVE NOTES
FEDERAL – The Republican National
Committee voted to endorse the First
Amendment Defense Act, S. 1598, a
measure introduced by Senator Mike
Lee of Utah, holding individuals or
organizations with religious beliefs
against same-sex marriages harmless
against any adverse action by the
federal government for refusing to
recognize or deal with such marriages.
The measure would specifically protect
the tax exempt status of entities holding
and effectuating such views, as well
as benefits eligibility under federal
programs, and would require the
federal government to ignore any action
depriving a person of professional
certification or credentials because
of their view that marriage should be
limited to different-sex couples or “that
sexual relations are properly reserved
to such a marriage.” The bill calls
for broad construction to protect free
exercise of religious beliefs and moral
convictions “to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this Act
and the Constitution.” In other words,
the statute would create a broadlysweeping religious exemption from
any adverse consequence under federal
law for any individual or entity that
suffer such consequence because of
their opposition to same-sex marriage
or sexual activity occurring other than
between married different-sex couples.
As such, it is totally out of touch with
the sexual morality of an overwhelming
majority of the public in the United
States and an embarrassment to our
country that such a measure would be
introduced as proposed legislation.
FLORIDA – Osceola has become
the 11th county in Florida to prohibit
discrimination because of sexual
orientation or gender identity. County
Commissioners voted unanimously
LEGISLATIVE
to adopt the proposed new Human
Rights Ordinance on August 17. The
ordinance covers housing, employment
and public accommodations. The
measure exempt religious groups from
its ban on discrimination because of
religion, but was opposed by some
members of the public who argued
that religious organizations should be
allowed to discriminate because of
sexual orientation and that individuals
should be free to refrain from providing
services based on their religious
beliefs. A doctor testified against the
measure, stating that he would refuse
to provide Viagra or fertility assistance
or adoption assistance to gay couples.
Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 17.
ILLINOIS – Chicago Mayor Rahm
Emanuel announced on August 5
that the City of Chicago will remove
the existing exclusion of gender
reassignment services from the city’s
health care benefits program. The
change will be unilateral for non-union
employees, and will be proposed to
municipal unions. The change would
go into effect on October 1, 2015.
windycitymediagroup.com, Aug. 5.
INDIANA – In the wake of the state’s
RFRA debacle earlier this year,
proposals to amend local ordinances
to
provide
protection
against
discrimination due to gender identity
or sexual orientation have been debated
in several municipalities. In Elkhart, a
measure originally proposed by Mayor
Dick Moore was withdrawn at his
request in a letter he sent to the City
Council members on July 27. Moore
said he was asking city staff to propose
a comprehensive overhaul of the city’s
human relations ordinance rather than
just the narrowly-focused measure he
had previously introduced. He said
that the proposed overhaul should
include sexual orientation and gender
identity protection, but did not suggest
when the revised proposal would be
unveiled. The Elkhart Truth, July 28.
* * * Similarly, in Goshen, a proposed
amendment to the city’s civil rights
ordinance was tabled at the proposal
of Mayor Allan Kauffman, who said
that there was “much misinformation
and confusion about what will be the
consequence of amending the civil
rights ordinance.” Kauffman said that
there was a lack of “good consensus”
on the proposal, and did not indicate
when it would be reintroduced or in
what form. Kauffman’s statement said
more time was needed to get “good
information to replace bad information,
and how these civil rights protections
have worked in other cities/states.”
Indianapolis Star, Aug. 5. * * * What
is odd in reading press accounts about
the public hearings on these kinds of
proposals is that every legislative body
acts as if it is reinventing the wheel,
proceeding in blatant ignorance of
the experience of other jurisdictions
under such laws. For example, even
though many municipalities and
states have banned gender identity
discrimination in employment and
public accommodations for many years,
opponents of the measures still raise
scare arguments about the possibility
that men masquerading as women
will take advantage of the ordinances
to invade restroom facilities to attack
women or invade their privacy, even
though jurisdictions that have adopted
such laws have not experienced such
repercussions.
KENTUCKY – The Jefferson County
Public School Board in Louisville
voted 6-1 on August 24 to approve
a non-discrimination policy for the
school district that forbids gender
identity discrimination against students
and staff. This was similar to a policy
that was approved by the Fayette
County Public School Board in 2012.
A similar proposal had been defeated
in 2007, at the time the Jefferson board
voted to add “sexual orientation” to its
non-discrimination policy. Fairness
Campaign News Release, Aug. 24.
MARYLAND – On August 25,
Attorney General Brian E. Frosh issued
a memorandum to law enforcement
officials on the subject of profiling,
stating that law enforcement officers
“may not consider race, ethnicity,
gender, national origin, religion,
sexual orientation, disability or
gender identity to any degree during
routine police operations.” In a press
release, the A.G.’s office stated, “The
memorandum we are issuing today is
meant to put an end to profiling of all
kinds, which will help repair the frayed
relationships between police and many
in the community by making mutual
respect the norm in everyday police
encounters.” Carroll County Times,
Aug. 26.
MICHIGAN – Saginaw Valley
State University has updated its
nondiscrimination policy to add gender
identity and genetic information as
prohibited grounds for discrimination.
The university’s public relations
spokesperson
stated
that
“The
gender identity protection applies to
transgender individuals and those
seeking to change their gender.” The
policy applies to faculty, staff and
students. Saginaw News, July 25.
MONTANA – The Kalispell Public
Schools Board of Trustees voted to
add “gender identity, sexual orientation
or gender expression” to the list of
forbidden grounds of discrimination as
part of the district’s Equal Education,
Nondiscrimination and Sex Equity
Policy on August 11. The policy
change followed months of debate and
public discussion, and was addressed
in response to a recommendation to
Montana public school boards by the
LEGISLATIVE
Montana School Boards Association in
January. Daily Inter Lake, Aug. 13.
NEW JERSEY – Governor Chris
Christie has for a second time vetoed a
bill that would make easier the ability
of transgender people to change the
sex marker on their birth certificates.
Christie’s veto statement asserted:
“Birth Certificates unlock access
to many of our nation and State’s
critical and protected benefits such as
passports, driver’s licenses, and social
services, as well as other important
security-dependent
allowances.
Accordingly, I remain committed to the
principle that efforts to significantly
alter State law concerning the issuance
of vital records that have the potential
to create legal uncertainties should
be closely scrutinized and sparingly
approved. Unlike many other states that
require court intervention, which can be
prolonged and expensive, New Jersey
already affords applicants an expedited
administrative route to process requests
for changes to birth certificates based
on gender. To appropriately balance that
streamlined practice, further changes
to current standards must also include
safeguards to prevent against fraud,
deception, and abuse.” Christie objects
to individuals being able to secure these
changes without proving that medical
gender reassignment procedures have
been followed. The measure had
received overwhelming approval in
both houses of the legislature in June.
Huffington Post, Aug. 10.
NEW YORK – The Troy City Council
voted unanimously on July 23
to amend the city code to ban
discrimination because of gender
identity or expression, ancestry,
military status, sexual orientation,
LGB, transgender, and military and/
or veteran status. Troy is following the
lead of Albany County and the city
of Albany in adding these categories
of protection against discrimination.
The council also voted to ask the
Rensselaer County Legislature to
add these categories to its policy,
and called on the state legislature to
approve GENDA, the pending gender
identity and expression amendment to
the state Human Rights Law, which
has been approved several times in the
Assembly but is stalled in the Senate.
Albany Times Union, July 24.
OHIO – State legislators are considering
a bill, H.B. 296, which would shelter
from liability businesses that refuse to
provide goods or services for same-sex
weddings. The bill’s sponsor, Rep. Ron
Young, Leroy Township Republican,
stated that it is intended to “let people
who sincerely feel that participating
in a same-sex ceremony hurts their
conscience to opt out.” He opined that
few businesses would select this option,
since their goal was to make money,
but he wanted to protect religious
freedom. Critics observed that this
measure was expressly targeted at
allowing discrimination against gay
people, unlike the Indiana RFRA that
generated so much dissension because
it would have that effect but was not
so expressly targeted. Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Aug. 7. Of course, the proposal
is clearly unconstitutional.
PENNSYLVANIA – As past attempts
to enact a statewide ban on sexual
orientation and gender identity
discrimination
have
fallen
to
obstructionist tactics in the legislature,
34 municipalities in the state have
adopted
ordinances
forbidding
discrimination, including all the
largest municipalities (Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Lancaster, Erie, Harrisburg,
Scranton), and the overwhelming
majority of Pennsylvanians tell pollsters
that they support passage of such a
measure. Hope springs eternal. On
August 27 a bi-partisan coalition of state
legislators introduced the Pennsylvania
Fairness Act in the General Assembly,
which would add sexual orientation and
gender identity to the forbidden grounds
of discrimination in employment,
housing and public accommodations.
With both Republican and Democratic
co-sponsors in each house and the
momentum of marriage equality
and the passage of local ordinances,
proponents hope that in this session the
obstructionist games will cease and the
measure can be enacted.
TENNESSEE – On July 21 the
Chattanooga City Council gave final
approval to a resolution adding sexual
orientation and gender identity to the
city’s anti-discrimination ordinance,
voting 5-2. The majority rejected
an attempt by two members to have
the final vote delayed because of an
analysis provided by the University
of Tennessee’s Municipal Technical
Advisory Service, contending that
the ordinance “might be difficult to
enforce and too vague,” according to
a July 22 report in the Chattanooga
Times. Deputy City Attorney Phil
Noblett countered this by pointing
out that the language of the ordinance
was taken from a similar measure
passed in Knoxville in 2012, and,
said Noblett, “That ordinance has not
been held to be vague or improper in
any way.” The original version of the
ordinance had also included “gender
expression,” but this was removed in
response to arguments that it was “too
broad.” The ordinance was to go into
effect two weeks after passage. The
overall ordinance was approved on
July 22, after it had been amended to
protect “religious freedom,” according
to an August 19 report in the same
newspaper.
WASHINGTON – The Seattle City
Council voted on August 10 to require
all city-controlled and privately
LEGISLATIVE / LAW & SOCIETY
occupied public accommodations
to designate existing and future
single-stall bathrooms as all-gender
facilities, according to a report by the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Aug. 10).
The legislation applies to restaurants,
coffee shops, hotels and stores as
well as to government facilities. The
single-occupancy facility must have
signage that is not gender-exclusive.
It amends the Municipal Code so
that single occupancy restrooms will
not be restricted by sex or gender.
Proponents of the measure pointed out
that Philadelphia had adopted a similar
requirement last year.
LAW & SOCIETY NOTES
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA – The
Boy Scouts of America announced
on July 28 that member organizations
had approved the Executive Council’s
decision to end the ban on openly
gay adult members and leaders, while
preserving a religious exemption for
those church-sponsored Boy Scout
troops that held religiously-based
exemptions to allowing openly gay
persons in leadership positions. The
announcement sparked particular
concerns for the Mormon Church and
the Roman Catholic Church, both major
sponsors of Scout troops, but ultimately
the concerns were resolved in favor of
continuing sponsorship of Scout troops.
The Mormon Church issued a press
release on August 26 affirming the
organization’s decision not to pull out.
However, the Church also announced
that it would continue to evaluate
possible alternatives to Scouting for
Mormon youth that would “better suit
the increasingly global membership of
the religion.” Some other church groups
announced that they were cutting all
ties with the BSA, despite the religious
exemption, including some Catholic
Archdioceses and more conservative
Protestant denominations.
FEDERAL CONTRACTOR RULES – A
coalition of 130 organizations sent a joint
letter to President Obama on August
20, requesting that the administration
undertake review and reconsideration
of a Memorandum issued on June 29,
2007, by the Office of Legal Counsel,
opining
that
religiously-affiliated
organizations receiving grants under
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act could claim a religious
exemption from the non-discrimination
requirements under that Act as an
application of the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. The letter
points out that the OLC Memorandum
has been relief upon by various
federal agencies to exempt religiouslyaffiliated or identified contractors from
complying with non-discrimination
provisions, and that this interpretation
takes on particular salience in light
of the President’s action a year ago
amending EO11246 to require that
federal contractors not discriminate
because of sexual orientation or gender
identity. The OLC Memorandum was
issued late in the Bush Administration,
articulating
that
administration’s
general approach of extending broad
leeway to religious organizations that
provide services to the public under
federal contracts. The letter points out
that the President’s campaign platform
in 2008 specifically promised to put
an end to federally-funded hiring
discrimination, and argues that the
2007 memo has undermined this goal.
Copies of the letter are available on
the websites of many of the signatory
organizations, which include the
ACLU, Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders, Lambda Legal, the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, and the
National Center for Transgender
Equality.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
– The American Bar Association’s
House of Delegates, meeting on August
3-4, approved a resolution urging
governments “to enact laws that prohibit
state-licensed professionals from using
conversion therapy on minors and to
protect minors, particularly minors
in their care, from being subjected to
conversion therapy by state-licensed
professionals.” The resolution puts
the House on record as recognizing
that “LGBTQ people have the right to
be free from attempts to change their
sexual orientation and gender identity.”
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT – Press
reports on August 26 described a
leaked internal Defense Department
memorandum setting out a “draft plan”
to end the ban on military service by
transgender individuals by May 27,
2016. The plan would include a “pilot
program” to provide leaves of absence
for members being treated with
hormones undergoing sex reassignment
surgery. One Defense Department
official told a reporter for USA Today
that Army and Air Force leaders knew
of about twenty transgender members
in each of those services. The Pentagon
was also reportedly considering looking
into past discharges of transgender
members. The Williams Institute
estimates that there are more than
15,000 transgender individuals serving
either on active duty or in the National
Guard and Reserves. Huffington Post,
Aug. 26.
CATHOLIC SCHOOL HIRING –
Catholic schools have been relying
on the ministerial exemption and free
exercise of religion claims over the
past few years as they fired LGBT
staff members upon learning that the
individual was marrying a same-sex
partner. One such school, St. Mary’s
Academy in Portland, Oregon, received
so much negative blowback when it was
announced that the school withdrew
a job offer from a lesbian applicant
because she was planning to marry
her partner that the board of the school
LAW & SOCIETY / INTERNATIONAL
voted to change its position, adding
sexual orientation to its EEO policy.
The applicant in question, Lauren
Brown, had been offered a counseling
position at the school; details are fuzzy
whether she had actually signed and
returned a written contract order before
the job was “rescinded.” However, it
was reported that she had verbally
accepted a job offer. Major donors
who carried significant weight with
the school administration apparently
stepped in to express their displeasure
about the withdrawal of the job offer
and the ensuing bad publicity about
the school, and students mounted a
rare summertime protest. Oregonian,
Portland Aug. 26. * * * Two Christian
colleges
–
Eastern
Mennonite
University and Goshen College – caused
consternation in the world of religious
educational institutions by announced
on July 20 that they would change their
hiring procedures to permit hiring
faculty members who are in same-sex
marriages, reported InsideHigherEd.
com (July 21). Some other members of
the Council of Christian Colleges and
Universities have maintained policies
under which all faculty members who
are not in different-sex marriages are
expected to maintain celibacy in accord
with Biblical sexual morality rules.
In a twist that seems to defy logic,
Eastern Mennonite and Goshen will
still insist that faculty members who
are not married be celibate, regardless
of their sexual orientation. The
announcement came shortly after the
Mennonite Church USA, while voting
down a proposal to authorize same-sex
marriages, approved a “forbearance
resolution” calling for tolerance, calling
on “those in Mennonite Church USA
to offer grace, love and forbearance
toward conferences, congregations and
pastors in our body who, in different
ways, seek to be faithful to our Lord
Jesus Christ on matters related to
same-sex covenanted unions.” It strikes
us that Jesus Christ said nothing one
way or the other about “same-sex
covenanted unions.” A local newspaper,
The Elkhart Truth, reported on July 21
that Goshen College has also added
sexual orientation and gender identity
to the school’s non-discrimination
policy, and indicated that it would offer
spousal benefits to individuals in samesex marriages.
HIGHER EDUCATION –
The
University of Oklahoma at Norman
has changed its Equal Opportunity
Statement to add “gender identity”
and “gender expression” to the list of
forbidden grounds of discrimination.
The policy extends to employment,
admission,
financial
aid,
and
educational assistance. University
Wire, Aug. 26.
HOW TIMES CHANGE – The New
England Journal of Medicine published
an article by Doctors Caren G. Solomon
and Timothy Wilkin, titled “Primary
Care for Men Who Have Sex with Men,”
in its August 27, 2015, issue (Vol. 373,
Issue 9). It would be difficult imagining
such an article being published in this
venue a generation ago.
HIV TREATMENT – Researchers
from the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill reported at the 8th
International AIDS Society Conference
in Vancouver, Canada, that the most
up-to-date medications, if faithfully
used, virtually halt the transmission
of HIV. Said AIDS researcher Myron
Cohen, “If people are taking their pills
reliably and they’re taking them for
some period of time, the probability of
transmission in this study is actually
zero.” The study involved more than
1700 sero-discordant couples who were
studied over a decade to determine the
level of transmission when the infect
member of the couples was faithfully
taken
anti-retroviral
medication.
newsobserver.com, July 20.
TRANSGENDER IN THE WHITE
HOUSE – The White House has
hired an openly transgender person
for its full-time staff for the first
time. On August 18, Raffi FreedmanGurspan, previously employed as a
policy advisor at the National Center
for Transgender Equality, became
outreach and recruitment director in
the Presidential Personnel Office. This
office oversees the selection process
for presidential appointees and recruits
candidates for service in the executive
branch departments in positions
requiring presidential appointments.
The president has appointed several
openly-transgender people to positions
in the administration, but FreedmanGurspan is the first in history to
receive a full-time White House staff
appointment. WashingtonBlade.com,
Aug. 18.
INTERNATIONAL NOTES
UNITED NATIONS – The United
Nations Security Council held its
first ever meeting on the issue of
violence and discrimination against
LGBT people on August 24 at UN
headquarters in New York. It was
reported that 13 out of the 15 member
nations had representatives at the
meeting, including all of the permanent
members. Those absent were Chad
and Angola. The event was organized
by representatives from Chile and the
United States. It included testimony
by gay refugees from the Middle East,
who spoke about anti-gay campaigns
initiated both by the governments and
by dissident Islamic groups such as
The Islamic State (ISIS). Based on its
own reports and claims, ISIS appears
to have executed at least thirty people
on grounds of engaging in homosexual
sodomy, with some of those executions
having been filmed and posted on
youtube.com and other internet
platforms.
INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATHLETICS FEDERATIONS – On July
27, a three-member panel on the Court
of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne,
Switzerland, ruled that a 19-year-old
Indian sprinter, Dutee Chand, could
compete as a woman despite have
a testosterone level higher than that
authorized for female competitions by
the IAAF. She had been banned from
competing as a woman the previous year
after having won two gold medals at the
Asian Junior Athletics Championship,
even though she had tested negative for
doping. Tests show that she has a high
level of natural testosterone. The Court
of Arbitration ruled that limiting female
competitors based on testosterone
levels had not be shown as necessary
to ensure fair competition, reported
buzzfeed.com on July 27. The Court
gave the IAAF two years to attempt to
prove this wrong, but in the meantime
women will be allowed to compete as
women despite high testosterone levels
that are not attributable to doping.
AUSTRALIA – Same-sex marriage was
a much-discussed topic in the media and
by political figures during the summer,
with high drama as Prime Minister Tony
Abbott faced defections from party
discipline as he maintained a strong
stance against taking any action on the
subject until after the next parliamentary
elections. Abbott warned of retribution
if any front bench members (people in
leadership positions) were to buck the
party line, and there was speculation
about him losing his position with
several front benchers having publicly
come out in support of marriage
equality. There was strong pressure
from many sides to allow a free vote in
the Parliament on a bill sponsored or
endorsed by members of several parties,
including Abbott’s own, but there was
strong resistance from the P.M., who
insisted that this issue should be given
to the people in a national referendum,
preferably to be held after the next
elections. Pros and cons of holding a
plebiscite as opposed to straight-forward
legislating dominated the debate, with
many references to Australia having
fallen behind other countries with
comparable democratic heritages and
regard for individual liberty, such as
the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, South
Africa and, as a result of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision, the United
States. Public opinion polls showed
substantial majorities in support of
marriage equality, suggesting that
a national referendum vote might
give the government “cover” to move
forward on the issue, but it was unclear
as August ended whether there was
enough dissension within Abbott’s
party to move things forward prior to
the next election. Abbott’s “promise”
at this point is to hold a national vote
after the election, without specifying
exactly when.
BOTSWANA – The Court of Appeal in
Gabarone ruled on August 26 that the
government must provide anti-retroviral
therapy (ARV) to foreign prison inmates,
overturning a government policy that
limits availability of the medication to
inmates who are Botswana nationals.
The court dismissed an appeal by
the government from a 2014 order by
the High Court. Under the ruling, the
medication must be provided to all
HIV-positive prisoners regardless of
nationality at the government’s expense.
The case had been argued on July 23.
Africa Review, Aug. 26.
CANADA – Calgary Transit decided
for the first time to get in the spirit with
a forthcoming Gay Pride parade by
decorating a bus with rainbow signs and
a Ride with Pride slogan, but one of their
bus drivers, an anti-gay fellow named
Jesse Rau, has raised objections, stating
it violates his religious freedom to be
assigned to drive a bus bearing such
a message. Wedding photographers?
Florists? Bakers? Celebration sites?
What’s next? Rau publicly declared that
he would refuse to drive the “rainbowbedecked” bus, even if it meant he had
to quit his job. This was reported right
at the end of August, which parade
coming up early in September. Great
suspense at how this will turn out….
Postmedia News, Sept. 1.
CAYMAN ISLANDS – The Cayman
Islands constitution and statutes
expressly forbid same-sex marriages,
and the Legislative Assembly agreed
unanimously to keep it that way during
a meeting in August, approving a
motion for “Preservation of Traditional
Marriages.” The sponsor of the measure
invoked the nation’s tradition of
Christianity, and a supporter seconding
the motion said that he “shouldn’t
be expected to support legislation
that would allow sin.” The Cayman
Reporter, August 18. The Cayman
Islands is a British crown colony, but
enjoys local government autonomy and
is not bound by England’s marriage
equality statute.
CHINA – A female college student, using
the alias Qiu Bai, filed a lawsuit against
the Education Ministry for describing
homosexuality in educational materials
as a “disorder that should be treated.”
On May 14, she wrote to the Ministry
complaining about statements she found
in books in the library when she sought
answers to her doubts about her sexual
orientation. She found that almost
every book she consulted categorized
homosexuality as a “mental disorder,”
and some suggested using electroshock
therapy as a cure. When the Ministry
did not respond to her letter, she filed
the lawsuit in the Beijing Municipal
No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. He
complaint states, according to a report
posted on August 20 by Indo Asian News
Service, “Homosexuals are already
under great pressure. Additional stigma
INTERNATIONAL
from textbooks will cause direct harm.
The [Ministry of Education] should
bear the duty to monitor and supervise
such content.”
GAMBIA – The Banjul High Court
granted the defense’s request of “no
case to answer” in multiple counts of
‘homosexual acts’ on July 28, according
to an August 3 report on AllAfrica.
com. The case against two men charged
with engaging in homosexual acts fell
apart as prosecution witnesses could
not provide direct evidence from any
witnesses other than the defendants.
“It is clear that PW1 did not have
any evidence stating that the accused
did the act and all other prosecution
witnesses did not state that the accused
was involved in the act. The prosecution
fails to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and therefore the accused is
acquitted and discharged,” wrote
Justice Simeon Ateh Abi. The trial had
been held in chambers behind closed
doors, as the prosecution argued that
its witnesses were security personnel
whose identity needed to be protected
from public knowledge.
INDIA – The Calcutta High Court
issued an order in the case of Kumari v.
The State of West Bengal, WP 8911 (W)
of 2015, concerning a claim of unlawful
discrimination by a transgender man
whose application for employment
as an ASHA Karmees (worker) was
denied. ASHA Karmees (workers) are
female public health workers employed
in villages as part of the national public
health effort to assist women with their
health issues. The court wrote that
“only female members of the human
species are entitled to apply for being
engaged as ASHA Karmees (workers).
However, even that eligibility criterion
is qualified; only a married or divorced
or widowed woman is eligible to apply,
provided, of course, the other criteria
are fulfilled. Male members of the
human species are not at all eligible for
being considered as eligible for being
engaged as ASHA Karmees (workers).”
Since the engagement criteria were
gender-specific, the petitioner, who
did not identify as female despite
being identified as such at birth, was
not qualified. Implicitly, the court was
holding that if a transgender individual
no longer identifies as having the gender
assigned them at birth, they cannot seek
employment in a job that requires them
to be a member of that gender. 2015
WLNR 24794589 (Aug. 20, 2015).
IRELAND – Ireland has moved to
join Argentina, Denmark, Colombia
and Malta as the only countries
with gender identity laws that allow
people to change their legal gender
through a self-declaration under
oath without presenting evidence of
surgical alteration. The willingness
of the Irish government to undertake
this change was attributed to the
positive response both internally and
among the international community
to the referendum vote several months
ago in support of marriage equality.
This was seen as strongly signaling
public support for measures to assure
the legal rights of sexual minorities.
Ironically, implementation of that
referendum vote has been delayed due
to litigation challenging the fairness of
the referendum process by opponents
of marriage equality, who have alleged
improper support for passage by the
government. Buzzfeed.com, July 15. *
* * Legal Monitor Worldwide reported
on August 2 that the Court of Appeal
had ruled against two challenges that
were filed challenging the results of
the marriage equality referendum. The
petitioners alleged that public money was
improperly spent promoting approval
of the measure, that the government
had failed to provide voters with the
opposing views, and they argued,
unsuccessfully, that a referendum could
not be adopted that contradicted other
language in the Constitution of the
Republic. The court’s decision cleared
the way for the “referendum returning
officer” to certify the results. However,
the appellants, Maurice Lyons of
Callan, Co Kilkenny and Gerry Walshe
of Lisdeen, Co Clare, filed papers in
the Supreme Court of Ireland, seeking
further review. The Supreme Court
is not required to grant review. * * *
On August 29 President Michael D.
Higgins signed the certified referendum
result, making it the 34th Amendment
to the Constitution. The next step is
for the government to present enabling
legislation that must be enacted before
same-sex marriages can begin. The
measure is expected to be introduced in
the legislature during September, with
the expectation that the process will
conclude before the end of the year.
IrishTimes.com, Aug. 29.
ISRAEL – During the Jerusalem Pride
March on July 30, Yishai Schlissel,
a fervent religious opponent of
homosexuality who had recently been
released from prison after serving a ten
year term for stabbing people during
the 2005 Jerusalem Pride March, broke
into the March and started stabbing
people again. A 16-year-old girl, Shira
Banki, subsequently died from her
wounds, and several other people were
injured before Schlissel was subdued
and arrested. The incident set off
recriminations and criticisms of the
police for failing to take steps after
Schlissel’s release to keep him away
from the parade route. On August 24,
the authorities announced that Schlissel
was being charged with murder in the
death of Banki, as well as aggravated
assault and the attempted murder of
other marchers. Schlissel, unrepentant,
has refused legal counsel and disputes
the authority of the court, claiming
that he was carrying out the will of
God. One press report quoted him as
saying: “The gay pride parade should
be stopped in Jerusalem and throughout
INTERNATIONAL
the Land of Israel. Stop this provocation
and abuse against the Holy One, Blessed
be He.” Agence France Presse, dpa
international, Aug. 24.
ITALY – On August 24 Transport
Minister Graziano Delrio told a meeting
of Comunione e Liberazione, a lay
Catholic group, that the government
has agreed to move forward on a civil
union bill that was introduced in the
parliament, with a vote expected soon.
The bill is intended to satisfy the
standard announced in decisions by
the European Court of Human Rights
holding that denying a legal status
substantially equivalent to marriage in
terms of rights and obligations violates
European Human Rights law. ANSA
English Media Service, Aug. 24.
JAPAN – A second local government
unit in Tokyo will begin recognizing
same-sex marriages. According to
Japan Economic Newswire (July 29),
Setagaya Ward (the largest ward by
population) announced on July 29
that it will start issuing certificates
recognizing same-sex partnerships.
Shibuya Ward in Tokyo was the first,
last March.
MALAYSIA – Prime Minister Najob
Razak, speaking at an Islamic seminar,
stated that the government would reject
requests to defend LGBT rights as not
being within the context of traditional
Islamic teaching. Malaysia identifies
as a Muslim nation. The government is
appealing a ruling last November by a
judge of the Malaysian Court of Appeals
that declared unconstitutional a law that
bans Muslim men from cross-dressing
in public. The Malaysia Federal Court
heard the appeal on August 13.
MEXICO – Mexico’s Federal Congress
has called on state legislatures to
amend their civil or family legislation
so as to comply with the mandate of
the Supreme Court of Mexico to allow
and recognize same-sex marriages.
The Supreme Court’s decision was
designated as “jurisprudential,” making
it binding on lower courts, but it is still
complicated for same-sex couples to
get marriage licenses in most of the
Mexican states, where they have to
incur the expense of filing a lawsuit to
get a court to compel local authorities
to issue the license. Thus, the Congress
called on the reluctant state legislatures
to get to work in order to implement
the constitutional rights of same-sex
couples in Mexico. Meantime, over
the course of the summer same-sex
marriages were performed in several
more states as marriage equality steadily
spread across the country. * * * The
Supreme Court of Mexico has ruled that
a ban on adoption by same-sex couples
is unconstitutional. The 9-1 ruling
mentioned a prior decision holding that
denial of the right to marry to same-sex
couples is unconstitutional, but did not
premise this new ruling on that holding
alone. The case arose from the state
of Campeche, which passed a statute
setting up civil unions but expressly
excluded the right of adoption by civil
union couples. The law was challenged
in a case brought by the Human Rights
Commission of Campeche. The court
noted the superior interest of the child
and the right to form a family, and
indicated that a full opinion will be
issued in the future. In the meantime,
in Campeche the denial of an adoption
petition from a same-sex couple is
a violation of constitutional rights,
according to a posting distributed online
by Internet journalist Rex Wockner on
August 11, and an August 12 online
report from EFE News Service.
NEPAL – On August 10 Nepal issued
its first passport using the new thirdgender category for sexual minorities.
“Manoj Shahi, an activist who identifies
as transgender and prefers to be called
Monica,” according to a reported posted
on line by Huffington Post Canada,
received the first category “O” (for
Other”) passport. Shahi told the press,
“My country has recognized and
respected my identity.” The government
made this change in response to a 2007
ruling by Nepal’s Supreme Court,
ordering authorities to amend existing
legislation to include a third gender for
those who do not identify as male or
female. Australia and New Zealand also
issued passports with a third-gender
designation.
NIGERIA – AllAfrica.com (Aug.
20) reported that a Magistrate Court
in Minna, Niger State, has imposed
6-month prison terms on two men,
Mohammed Kabir and Abubakar
Shehu, for “attempting to commit
homosexuality” which was described as
an “unnatural act of gross indecency.” A
police officer testified that “Kabir was
seen romancing Shehu and both were in
the process of committing the actual act
before they were caught.” Their conduct,
according to the testimony, contravened
Sections 95 and 285 of the Penal
Code, and they both pleaded guilty to
the offence. * * * The Nigerian Bar
Association issued a statement through
its president, Augustine Alegeh, at a
news conference, that it did not consider
the prohibition of same-sex marriage
to be a violation of any person’s human
rights. Alegeh pointed out that South
Africa was the only county in Africa
that allows same-sex marriage, and
apart from them, “Africa is holding
firm because most of our beliefs are
based on our traditions and also on our
religious beliefs.” AllAfrica.com, Aug.
31. The interesting thing about this is
observation is how ahistorical it is, as
the anti-gay legal heritage in Africa is
the handiwork of European colonial
forces whose statutes lived on after their
former colonies became independent, as
is also the case in Asia.
INTERNATIONAL
POLAND – On July 23 the lower
chamber of the Parliament (Sejm) voted
to approve the Gender Accordance
Act, which if ultimately approved in
the Senate and signed by the President
would codify for the first time in
Poland the right of transgender people
to have their gender identity recognized
and officially noted through a new
birth certificate and conformance of
educational and employment records.
At present, individuals must apply to
the courts and go through a hearing
process involving their parents and
children, bringing expert witnesses
and waiting months or even years for
a decision, and even then not receiving
a new birth certificate or achieving
conformance of their educational and
employment records. The new measure
was submitted by Anna Grodzka,
Poland’s for openly transgender
member of the Parliament. The new
law would not involve participation by
the applicant’s parents or children. Any
Polish citizen who is unmarried could
apply by providing two independent
confirmations, obtained within the
previous 12 months, of “being a person
of a different gender identity than the
gender legally assigned,” prepared
either by a clinical psychologist who
is also a sexologist, a psychiatrist, or a
sexologist who is also a medical doctor.
All applications would be channeled
through the regional court in Lodz
within three months of submission,
and no medical interventions would
be required. New birth certificates
would be issued, as well as new
documentation for past education and
employment using the individual’s new
name and gender identification. If the
measure wins approval from Senate
and President, it would go into effect in
January 2016. Trans-Fuzja Foundation
media release, July 23.
RUSSIA – Despite an unofficial
expression of approval, the mayor
of Arkhangelsk denied permission
for a Gay Pride march to take place
on Paratroopers Day, described in a
BBC news report as “a day notorious
for drunken fistfights and displays of
macho aggression.” According to a
local radio station, the request was
denied because allowing such a parade
would violate the anti-gay propaganda
law, by presenting positive images
of gay people to children. The mayor
had previously stated that he would
allow the parade to “let off steam.”
BBC International Reports, July 25.
* * * The U.S. Embassy in Moscow
has added the film “I Am Michael” to
the schedule of movies to be shown at
Amfest, an Embassy-sponsored film
festival to be presented on September
16-27 in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The event highlights new American
independent cinema. The film stars
James Franco and Zachary Quinto,
portraying a gay couple who break
up when Franco’s character, after a
health scare, is “saved” and becomes
a Christian pastor with a boyfriend.
There is some question whether the
film may run afoul of Russia’s antigay “propaganda law,” which bans the
depiction of a homosexual lifestyle to
minors.
SINGAPORE – Singapore has eased its
absolute ban on entry into the country
by anybody infected with HIV. On
April 1, the rules were modified to
allow HIV-infected people to enter
the country on visitor’s visas for up
to three months. The ban remains in
effect for those who want to come for
longer stays, such as people looking for
employment or seeking to accompany
a child to study in a Singapore
educational institution. According to
a spokesperson for the Ministry of
Health, the total ban was adopted in
the 1980s “when the disease was new,
fatal, and no effective treatment was
available.” The partial lifting of the
ban reflects “the current context with
more than 5,000 Singapore residents
living with HIV and the availability
of effective treatment for the disease.”
Foreigners in Singapore, excluding
permanent residents or spouses of
Singaporeans – who are found to be
HIV-positive will be deported and
place on a permanent “blacklist.”
Singapore claimed the new rule was
similar to immigration rules in effect
in Australia and New Zealand. Straits
Times, Aug. 31.
SOUTH KOREA – A same-sex couple
who had a wedding ceremony in Seoul
in 2013 is suing to compel the local
authority to accept their marriage
registration. Kim Jho Gwang-Soo and
Kim Seung-Hwan are seeking legal
status as a married couple. Reporting
on the lawsuit, Agence France Presse
English Wire (July 28) said, “Legal
analysts say a suit with such potentially
profound consequences is unlikely to
be granted by the district court, but
suggest a sympathetic judge could
insert some encouraging wording in
his ruling that might provide support
for future cases or appeals.” There
was speculation that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Obergefell decision might
be helpful in trying to persuade the
court to adopt an expansive view of
individual liberty under South Korea’s
constitution, which is modeled in some
respects on the U.S. Constitution in
protecting individual rights.
TAIWAN – The Global Times reported
that judicial authorities drafted a samesex partnership law for reference to
the legislature. Hundreds of people
marched in Taipei on July 11 in support
of same-sex marriage, and a 2013 poll
conducted by judicial authorities found
53% support of the public for same-sex
marriage. Optimism was expressed
that the legislature, which rejected a
similar proposal in 2003, might act
favorably on this one. Meanwhile, on
July 24, according to a report in China
INTERNATIONAL / PROFESSIONAL
Post, the Taipei City Government
Department of Civil Affairs announced
that it will petition the Constitutional
Court to make a decision about
marriage equality, specifically asking
whether the Constitution as it now
stands forbids the government from
denying the right to marry to same-sex
couples. The Taipei city government
has been offering registration of samesex partnerships since June 17, but the
registration does not bestow the full
rights of marriage, which would require
a change of national law. Registration
certificates are recognized, however,
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare
based on the Medical Care Act,
which means that hospitals should be
recognizing same-sex relationships of
their patients.
THAILAND – A law banning
commercial surrogacy went into effect
on July 30. The measure was passed
in reaction to several “surrogacy
scandals,” including reports of a
Japanese man who had father at least
a dozen babies in Thailand through
surrogacy and an Australian couple
who abandoned a surrogate-born baby
with Down’s syndrome, taking home
just his healthy twin sister, according
to a July 30 article posted by Japanese
Economic Newswire. The law outlaws
payment for surrogacy. Only married
couples, of whom at least one is a Thai
citizen, can make an arrangement with
a woman to be their surrogate, and
same-sex married couples are denied
access to this mechanism. Violations
of the law are punishable by up to
ten years in prison and fine equal to
about $5,723US. Previously many male
same-sex couples from other countries
had come to Thailand for surrogacy
services, especially after India shut
down a thriving surrogacy “industry”
in that country.
UGANDA – Another round of political
gay-bashing is ahead for Uganda,
as an emergency session of the
legislature in September will take
up the government’s proposed NonGovernmental Organization (NGO)
bill, which will make it illegal for
NGO’s to operate in the country
without the approval of the NGO
Board. The measure would reportedly
allow the NGO Board to ban NOG’s
for “essentially any reason,” reported
Buzzfeed on Aug. 28, including “when
a group’s goals are ‘in contravention of
the law’ or if it is ‘in the public interest
to refuse to register the organization.”
LGBT groups in Uganda attempt to fly
under the radar due to the intensely
homophobic views of many residents
as well as government officials. This
measure would outlaw them. LGBT
activists in the country contend that the
government is able to generate support
for the bill because it will allow
the closure of LGBT organizations
without specifically mentioning them,
thus potentially blunting any foreign
criticism or cut-off of foreign aid.
LGBT activists are determined to
prevent enactment of the measure by
heavily publicizing the ulterior motive
behind the government’s proposal.
hooligans in Ukraine have an effect
heckler’s veto with the approbation
of the courts. In the U.S., LGBT
rights advocates gathered outside the
Ukrainian Embassy in Washington,
D.C., on August 14 to protest the
ruling, which had also been criticized
in a public statement released by U.S.
Embassy in Kiev Charge d’Affaires
Bruce Dona. Washington Blade,
August 18.
UKRAINE – The Odessa District
Administrative Court ruled, in
response to a petition from city
lawmakers, that an LGBT Pride March
that had been scheduled to take place
on August 15 could not be held because
of the potential of danger and threats
to public order and the health and lives
of participants and other citizens. The
event was to be held around the same
time as two major soccer matches that
were expected to draw large numbers
of people into the city, who might
predictably become unruly. An LGBT
Pride March held two months ago in
Kiev had turned nasty when members
of a Ukrainian nationalist group
attacked police officers providing
security for the event. Thus, anti-gay
The New York Times published
a lengthy biographical article by
Deborah Sontag about Judge PHYLLIS
R. FRYE in its Sunday, August 30,
issue (posted to the website on August
29). Phyllis Frye is a pioneer of the
transgender rights movement, and
an important leader in the overall
LGBT rights movement, having
served on the board of the National
LGBT Bar Association and played
a prominent role in promoting the
visibility of transgender issues at the
annual Lavender Law Conferences
sponsored by that association. Frye
organized the first national conference
on transgender law early in the 1990s
and also played an important role in
organizing LGBT lawyers in Texas
VIETNAM – The National Assembly
Law Committee, considering an
amended Civil Code, has devoted
discussion to the issue of recognizing
gender identity, but decided the issue
was too complicated because of a “lack
of legal framework” and concerns about
the impact on marriage and family law.
According to a report by Thai News
Service (Aug. 25), it is estimated that
there are 500,000 transgender people
in Vietnam, of whom about 600 have
had sex reassignment surgery. (The
population of Vietnam is approximately
94 million.)
PROFESSIONAL NOTES
PROFESSIONAL
to obtain official recognition from
the Texas State Bar. She also led
lobbying efforts to win Congressional
support for a trans-inclusive antidiscrimination bill. When she was
sworn in as a Houston municipal court
judge in 2010, she became the first
openly transgender judge in the United
States. She received the National
LGBT Law Association’s Dan Bradley
Award for lifetime achievement in the
movement for LGBT rights in 2001.
particularly involved in the successful
campaign for marriage equality and in
the debates surrounding the prosecution
of Dharun Ravi in connection with the
suicide of Rutgers University student
Tyler Clementi. Poirier was opposed
to the use of the NJ Hate Crimes
Law in the Ravi prosecution. He was
a noted scholar in environmental and
land use law, and managed to find an
intersection between that area of the
law and LGBT rights.
The Williams Institute at UCLA Law
School has announced the appointment
of Professor DOUGLAS N E JAIME as
faculty director and professor of law
at UCLA. NeJaime was previously
a visiting professor at UCLA and a
professor at UC Irvine School of Law
and Loyola Law School. He had been
a Sears Law Teaching Fellow at the
Williams Institute in 2007-2009, and
did pro bono work for the Institute
as early as 2005. Prof. NeJaime is a
graduate of Harvard Law School, coauthor of the most recent edition of
West’s Sexual Orientation and the
Law casebook, and a prolific author
of law review articles on LGBT issues,
many focused on the campaign for
marriage equality. He has been twice
recognized by the Institute for the
Dukeminier Award, which recognized
the best sexual orientation legal
scholarship.
Among those being honored by The
New York Law Journal with Lifetime
Achievement Awards as “Lawyers
Who Lead by Example” are ROBERTA
KAPLAN of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, and Kathleen
Sullivan of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan. The awards will be
conferred at a dinner sponsored by
the Law Journal on October 14, 2015.
Kaplan served as lead counsel for
Edith Windsor in U.S. v. Windsor,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court
declared Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act unconstitutional, and as
lead counsel in litigation challenging
the ban on same-sex marriage in
Mississippi; she is currently lead
counsel in a challenge to Mississippi’s
continuing ban on adoptions of children
by same-sex couples. KATHLEEN
SULLIVAN co-authored a brief
challenging the Georgia sodomy law in
Bowers v. Hardwick and has since been
involved as amicus author, co-counsel
and strategist in numerous cases
involving LGBT rights. Others being
honored with Lifetime Achievement
awards at the same dinner include
N.Y. Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman,
retired N.Y Court of Appeals Judge
Howard Levine, and Kenneth Standard
of Epstein, Becker & Green. The Law
Journal will also confer public service
and pro bono service awards on 22
other lawyers and two law firms (one
of them Kaplan’s firm, Paul Weiss) at
the October 14 dinner.
We sadly note the passing of Seton Hall
University Professor MARC POIRIER,
who provided a striking example
of what an openly-gay legal scholar
can accomplish while embedded in
a Catholic law school faculty. Prof.
Poirier was faculty advisor to the
Seton Hall LGBT law student group,
brought a variety of provocative
speakers to the campus, participated
actively in the LGBT rights struggle in
New Jersey, including writing amicus
briefs in significant cases, and became
President Obama has nominated
MICHAEL MICHAUD, a former
Congressman who was defeated in his
race for Governor of Maine last year,
to be Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Veterans’ Employment and Training
Services. Michaud came out as gay
at the beginning of his gubernatorial
campaign, seeking to stem rumors
that were circulating about his sexual
orientation. He was elected to the
House in 2003, and gave up his seat to
run for governor in 2014. During his last
term in the House he served as ranking
Democratic member on the House
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and
was part of a bipartisan group of House
members who proposed extending
veteran job training programs during
2014. Before serving in the House,
Michaud served in the Maine Senate
and, earlier, in the Maine House of
Representatives. Maine legislators are
not employed full time. During his
state legislative service, Michaud was
also an employee of Great Northern
Paper Company, and served as vice
president of Local 152 of the United
Paperworkers International Union.
BloombergBNA Daily Labor Report,
146 DLR A-17 (7/30/2015).
The NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION,
in
collaboration
with the LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION
OF GREATER NEW YORK and the
NY CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY
OF
MATRIMONIAL
LAWYERS, will present a 4-hour CLE
program on Sept. 11, 2015, at the CUNY
Graduate Center titled “Representing
LGBT Clients after Obergefell.”
The program will also be webcast to
registrants. Details about registration
and the full program schedule can be
found on the NY State Bar’s website:
www.nysba.org.
Several
LeGaL
members are among the panelists. The
program will include a session on Estate
Planning after Obergefell and a session
on representing transgender clients.
PUBLICATIONS NOTED
1. Ahdar, Rex, Solemnisation of Same-Sex
Marriage and Religious Freedom, 16
Ecclesiastical L. J. 283 (Sept. 2014).
2. Appleton, Susan Frelich, Between the
Binaries: Exploring the Legal Boundaries
of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49
Fam. L.Q. 93 (Spring 2015).
3. Austin, David W., Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, 48 Int’l Law. 489 (2014)
(survey of 2013 developments from an
international perspective).
4. Avirama, Hadar, and Gwendolyn M.
Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous
Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage
Equality Struggle, 38 Harv. J. L. &
Gender 269 (Summer 2015).
5. Belavusau, Uladzislau, A Penalty
Card for Homophobia from EU NonDiscrimination Law: Comment on
Asociaţia Accept (C-81/12), 21 Colum. J.
European L. 237 (2015).
6. Berman, Mitchell N., Judge Posner’s
Simple Law, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 777
(April 2015) (Author discusses Posner’s
critique of how Scalia & Garner treat the
NY family recognition case of Braschi
v. Stahl Associates in their treatise on
statutory interpretation).
7. Breen, Dr. Oonagh, Allies or Adversaries?
Foundation Responses to Government
Policing of Cross-Border Charity, 17 Int’l
J. Not-for-Profit L. 45 (March 2015).
8. Carlson, Allan, “Family Cycles” and the
Future of Family Law, 29 BYU J. Pub. L.
431 (2015) (sour grapes from an “expert
witness” in the Iowa Supreme Court’s
marriage equality case whose testimony
was discounted by the court in its
unanimous pro-marriage equality ruling;
historian purported to demonstrate
that the sole justification for the state
intervening in the marriage relations was
to protected the biological offspring of
different-sex married couples).
9. Case, Mary Anne, Why “Live-andLet-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to
the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual
Civil Rights, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 463
(March 2015).
10. Chambers, Henry L., Jr., The Problems
Inherent in Litigating Employer Free
Exercise Rights, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1141
(Fall 2015).
11. Clarke, Jessica A., Identity and Form,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
103 Cal. L. Rev. 747 (August 2015)
(interrogates the concept of legal identity,
with reference, among other things, to
gender identity).
Collins, Kristin A., Federalism, Marriage,
and Heather Gerken’s Mad Genius, 95
B.U. L. Rev. 615 (March 2015) (response
to Heather Gerken’s article about U.S. v.
Windsor, see below).
Donald, David C., Law in Regression?
Impacts of Quantitative Research on Law
and Regulation, 2015 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
520 (2015) (notes disputes about validity
of “studies” on LGBT parenting; calls for
the establishment of ethical standards to
govern use of quantitative research for
legal arguments).
Dondoli, Giulia, LGBTI Activism
Influencing Foreign Legislation, 16 Melb.
J. Int’l L. 124 (Aug. 2015).
Dworkin, Ronald, The Arduous Virtue
of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe,
and Nerve, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2221
(April 2015) (reprint of 1996 lecture;
interesting to conjecture what Dworkin
would say in response to Lawrence v.
Texas, U.S. v. Windsor, and Obergefell v.
Hodges, in light of his views expressed
here about Romer v. Evans and Bowers v.
Hardwick as examples of constitutional
interpretation).
Ertman, Martha, Marital Contracting in
a Post-Windsor World, 42 Fla. State U. L.
Rev. 479 (2015).
Faucon, Casey E., Polygamy After
Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do
With It?, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 471
(Summer 2015).
Flake, Dallan F., Bearing Burdens:
Religious
Accommodations
That
Adversely Affect Coworker Morale,
76 Ohio St. L.J. 169 (2015) (Should
employers have to tolerate homophobic
expression in the workplace? One
example of the issue dealt with by this
author).
Gelmann, Emily B., What About Susan?
Three’s Company, Not a Crowd: The
Importance of Allowing Third Parent
Adoptions When Both Legal Parents
Consent, 30 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 57
(Spring 2015).
Gerken, Heather K., Windsor’s Mad
Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights
and Structure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 587 (March
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
2015) (an interesting and provocation
read, as the introduction suggests it will
be: “While Windsor flouts just about
everything we teach our students about
constitutional law, it is right to do so.
Its author, Justice Kennedy, blurs the
lines between federalism, liberty, and
equality, and he blurs the lines between
structure and rights. The genius of the
opinion is that it recognizes that rights
and structure are like two interlocking
gears, moving the grand constitutional
project of integration forward. While the
doctrine isn’t built to recognizing that
reality, that’s the doctrine’s problem, not
Windsor’s.”).
Ghachem, Malick W., Accommodating
Empire:
Comparing
French
and
American Paths to the Legalization of
Gay Marriage, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 511
(March 2015).
Gilreath, Shannon, Examining Critical
Race Theory: Outsider Jurisprudence
and HIV/AIDS – A Perspective on Desire
and Power, 33 Law & Ineq. 371 (Summer
2015).
Kaufman, Zachary D., From the Aztecs
to the Kalahari Bushmen: Conservative
Justices’ Citation of Foreign Sources:
Consistency, Inconsistency, or Evolution,
41 Yale J. Int’l L. Online1 (Fall 2015)
(All the dissenters in Obergefell invoked
foreign law in opposition to the majority’s
marriage equality holding, contrary
to their professed opposition to citing
foreign law in American court opinions;
does this portend a new trend, or is it
just opportunistic cherry-picking?). 2015
Colo. App. LEXIS 1217
Kelly, Linda, The New Particulars of
Asylum’s “Particular Social Group”,
36 Whittier L. Rev. 219 (2015) (the
“particular social group” rubric is the way
LGBT asylum applications are handled).
Kelly, William F., Reassessing Standing in
Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Shareholder
Derivative Suit as a Model for Public
Interest Litigation, 18 Chap. L. Rev.
895 (Summer 2015) (author is unhappy
with standing ruling in Hollingsworth v.
Perry).
Khaitain,
Tarunabh,
Koushal
V.
Naz: Judges Vote to Recriminalise
Homosexuality 78 The Modern L. Rev.
672 (2015).
PUBLICATIONS NOTED
27. Konnoth, Craig J., Revoking Rights, 66
Hastings L.J. 1365 (June 2015) (discusses
constitutional issues raised by attempts to
revoke rights previously recognized; e.g.,
marriage rights).
28. Koppelman, Andrew, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations, and the
Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88
S. Cal. L. Rev. 619 (March 2015).
29. Langnerd, Bailey J., Unprotected:
Condoms, Bareback Porn, and the First
Amendment, 30 Berkeley J. Gender L.
& Just. 199 (Summer 2015) (criticizes
litigation strategy of porn producers in
challenging local law requiring porn
performers to use condoms; claims that
including gay male porn in the lawsuit
could have led courts to adopt higher
standard of review).
30. LaPiana, William P., Married SameSex Couples Living in Non-Recognition
States: A Primer, 7 Estate Planning and
Community Property Law Journal 471
(2015).
31. LaPiana, William P., Same-Sex Marriage
and Offsprings’ Parentage, 42 Est. Plan.
34 (Sept. 2015).
32. Lenhardt, R.A., Integrating Equal
Marriage, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 781 (2015).
33. Lunsford, Jennifer, and R. Zachary
Sanzone, Outing the New Jim Crow:
Ending Segregation of LGBTQ Students
by Creating Barriers to 501(c)(3) TaxExemption Status, 23 Am. U. J. Gender
Soc. Pol’y & L. 435 (2015).
34. Mank, Bradford C., Does United States
v. Windsor (The DOMA Case) Open the
Door to Congressional Standing Rights?,
76 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (Fall 2014).
35. Moore, Amy, Rife With Latent Power:
Exploring the Reach of the IRS to
Determine Tax-Exempt Status According
to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of
Judicial Deference, 56 S. Tex. L. Rev.
117 (Fall 2014) (a question that takes on
increased salience in light of Obergefell
v. Hodges).
36. Morrison, Mathew L., Bad Blood: An
Examination of the Constitutional
Deficiencies of the FDA’s “Gay Blood
Ban”, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 2363 (June 2015).
37. Murray,
Melissa,
Accommodating
Nonmarriage, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev.
661 (March 2015) (The author uses
“nonmarriage” to mean intimate
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
relationships not recognized by the state
as marriage).
Mutcherson, Kimberly M., Blood and
Water in a Post-Coital World, 49 Fam.
L.Q. 117 (Spring 2015) (impact of assisted
reproductive technology on kinship).
Nadworny, Bari, Homosexuality in High
School: Recognizing a Student’s Right
to Privacy, 88 St. John’s L. Rev. 1103
(Winter 2014).
Nicholas, Peter, Gayffirmative Action:
The
Constitutionality
of
Sexual
Orientation-Based Affirmative Action
Policies, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 733 (2015).
Rains, Robert E., The Future of Justice
Scalia’s Predictions of Family Law
Doom, 29 BYU J. Pub. L. 353 (2015)
(What hath Scalia wrought??).
Roberts, Dorothy E., Loving v. Virginia as
a Civil Rights Decision, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 175 (2014/15).
Robson, Ruthann, Enhancing Reciprocal
Synergies Between Teaching and
Scholarship, 64 J. Legal Educ. 480
(February 2015).
Rutzen, Douglas, Aid Barriers and the
Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, 17
Int’l J. Not-for-Profit L. 5 (March 2015).
Sabbeth, Kathryn A., Zeal on Behalf of
Vulnerable Clients, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1475
(June 2015).
Samaha, Adam M., and Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell – And
Other Combinations, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 919
(August 2015).
Schafer, Aisha, Quiet Sabotage of the
Queer Child: Why the Law Must Be
Reframed to Appreciate the Dangers
of Outing Gay Youth, 58 How. L.J. 597
(Winter 2015).
Schmid,
Samantha,
Income
Tax
Treatment of Same-Sex Couples: Windsor
vs State Marriage Bans, 98 Marq. L. Rev.
1805 (Summer 2015).
Seidman,
Louis
Michael,
The
Triumph of Gay Marriage and the
Failure of Constitutional Law, article
forthcoming in Sup. Ct. Rev., available
at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.
edu/facpub/1499
&
http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2636386 (while agreeing with
the result, author considers Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell to be
“dreadful” as “exclusionary, reactionary
and authoritarian”).
50. Shakargy, Sharon, What Do You Do
When They Don’t Say “I Do”? CrossBorder Regulation for Alternative
Spousal Relationships, 48 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 427 (March 2015).
51. Smith, Brenda V., Boys, Rape, and
Masculinity: Reclaiming Boys’ Narratives
of Sexual Violence in Custody, 93 N.C. L.
Rev. 1559 (June 2015) (Symposium on
Vulnerable Defendants).
52. Smith, Steven D., Die and Let Live? The
Asymmetry of Accommodation, 88 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 703 (March 2015).
53. Strasser, Mark, Traditional Surrogacy
Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the
Challenge for Family Law, 18 J. Health
Care L. & Pol’y 85 (2015).
54. Strong, S.I., Religious Rights in Historical,
Theoretical , and International Context:
Hobby Lobby as a Jurisprudential
Anomaly?, 48 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 813
(May 2015) (explains why affording a
religious exemption to a commercial
corporation is objectively improper).
55. Swisher, Peter Nash, “I Now Pronounce
You Husband and Wives”: The Case for
Polygamous Marriage after United States
v. Windsor and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, 29 BYU J. Pub. L. 299 (2015).
56. Tomback, Michael S., “I Pronounce
You Man and Man. You May Now
File Jointly for Bankruptcy”: DOMA’s
Unconstitutionality and Its Effect on
Joint Bankruptcy Filings for Same-Sex
Couples, 31 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 375
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57. Traylor, Elizabeth, Protecting the Rights
of Children of Same-Sex Parents in
Indiana by Adopting a Version of the
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58. Upchurch, Charles, Book Review, David
A. Richards, The Rise of Gay Rights and
the Fall of the British Empire: Liberal
Resistance and the Bloomsbury Group,
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2015).
59. Washington, Tanya, Susannah Pollvogt,
Catherine Smith and Lauren Fontana,
Children’s Rights in the Midst of Marriage
Equality: Amicus Brief in Obergefell v.
Hodges by Scholars of the Constitutional
Rights of Children, 14 Whittier J. Child &
Fam. Advoc. 1 (Spring 2015).
Law Notes
sbian/GayLesbian/Gay
Law Notes
Podcast
Podcast
60. Wasserman, Howard M., Crazy in
Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last
Stand Against Marriage Equality in
the Land of George Wallace, 110 Nw.
U. L. Rev. Online 201 (July 12, 2015)
(untangling the procedural morass in
Alabama prior to and after the Obergefell
decision).
61. Watts, Tom, From Windsor to Obergefell:
The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. S52
(2015) (well-told history and accurate
prediction).
62. Williams, Joseph R., “I Don’t Like
Gays, Okay?” – Use of the “Gay Panic”
Murder Defense in Modern American
Courtrooms: The Ultimate Miscarriage
of Justice, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 1129 (20142015).
63. Wodda, Aimee, and Vanessa R. Panfil,
“Don’t Talk to Me About Deception”: The
Necessary Erosion of the Trans* Panic
Defense, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 927 (2014-2015).
64. Yackle, Larry, A Friendly Amendment, 95
B.U. L. Rev. 641 (March 2015) (response
to Heather Gerken’s article about U.S. v.
Windsor, see above).
EDITOR’S NOTES
This proud, monthly publication
is edited and chiefly written by
Professor Arthur Leonard of
New York Law School, with
a staff of volunteer writers
consisting of lawyers, law school
graduates, current law students,
and legal workers.
All points of view expressed in
Lesbian/Gay Law Notes are those
of the author, and are not official
positions of LeGaL – The LGBT
Bar Association of Greater New
York or the LeGaL Foundation.
All comments in Publications
Noted are attributable to
the Editor. Correspondence
pertinent to issues covered
in Lesbian/Gay Law Notes is
welcome and will be published
subject to editing. Please submit
all correspondence to info@legal.org.
Check out the Lesbian/Gay
Law Notes Podcast each month
to hear our Editor-In-Chief New
York Law School Professor Art
Leonard and Matthew Skinner,
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