post war australia and the fifties - The Home of the RAAOC Association

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Chapter 14
POST WAR AUSTRALIA AND THE FIFTIES
At the wars end with victory in the Pacific being declared on 15 August 1945 there
was still much to be done as far as the armed forces of Australia were concerned as will be
discussed in this chapter.
The Statistics
The defence of the Australian continent during WW2 cost the Australian services
dearly, with a total of 59,373 casualties, of which 52,487 of this number were Army
casualties.
When Japan struck into the Pacific, Australia had three AIF divisions serving in the
Middle East which comprised 102,000 of its best trained troops. In Malaya was the greater
part of a fourth division, numbering 18,000 men, plus three Royal Australian Air Force
Squadrons. In addition, another 10,000 men of the Royal Australian Air Force were serving in
Britain. In Australia, the Militia force which was originally based on only 80,000 men at the
outbreak of WW2, was still only partly trained, and was very short of modern equipment. Yet,
by mid 1943, Australia’s total armed strength had grown to a peak of some 633,400
personnel. From a population of only 7,300,000, Australia had enlisted nearly one million
men for full time service in the fighting forces and a further 66,000 women in the Women’s
Auxiliary Services.
By August 1945, when Japan surrendered, our Army strength totalled 554,700 men, of
whom some 224,000 were fighting in the South-West Pacific area. Six Australian infantry
divisions were in action when the cease-fire with Japan sounded, and the equivalent of 10
divisions had been committed cumulatively during the long and arduous New Guinea and SW
Pacific campaigns. At the end of war, the Royal Australian Air Force had 5,620 aircraft in
hand and was operating 34 squadrons. It had sunk 66 Japanese ships (and listed 155 as
probably sunk). Working together, the RAAF and the United States Air Force destroyed
13,429 Japanese planes in the Pacific area, with 1,808 additional probables.
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TO THE WARRIOR HIS ARMS
Logistics
The Australian aircraft industry, which at its peak in June 1944 employed 44,102 men
and women, had delivered to the RAAF 3,488 aircraft by August 1945. They included 1,000
Beauforts and Beaufighters and such modern combat planes as the Mosquito fighter bomber
and Mustang fighter.
Australia’s 48 munition plants absorbed the labour of 156,421 munition operatives,
who produced munitions costing £271,000,000. They provided the Army with 1,850 25-Pdr
field guns and more than 10 million rounds of gun ammunition up to 4.5-inch calibre. They
also produced quantities of 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns, 4 inch naval guns and anti-tank guns.
In the area of small arms production our munition factories supplied the three services with
45,000 sub machine guns (both Owen and Austen), 17,000 Bren Guns and 11,000 Vickers
machine guns. The output of .303 Lee Enfield rifles reached almost half a million and the
munitions factories also produced more than three quarters of a million land mines and
150,000 aircraft bombs. In total, the Australian government spent approximately five
thousand million pounds on defence equipment and munitions during WW2. Indeed a hefty
burden for the taxpayers of a nation of only 7 million people.
During WW2 the AAOC was forced to expand rapidly from several small Militia units
to viable field depots and workshops in order to meet the immediate expansion of the Army
and the initial overseas deployment of the 2 AIF. Although the ordnance services in WW2
were initially founded upon the civilian staffed AAOD and the energies and personal
dedication of approximately 400 AAOC Militia members (who were predominately drawn
from Melbourne and Sydney AAOC Militia units for 2 AIF service), by the end of 1945 the
number of uniformed AAOC members swelled to more than 24,000 personnel (including
AWAS). This expanded logistic organisation was necessary to provide for the needs of a large
Army at war.
As mentioned earlier, when Japan surrendered, Australia had an Army totalling more
than 554,700, of which some 224,000 were fighting overseas in the South West Pacific Area.
Whilst the war had come to an abrupt end, the ordnance services and other agencies were
faced with the monumental tasks of winding down war industries, de-equipping the Army, the
disposal of war surpluses, the return of equipments and materiel to Australia from overseas,
the destruction of surplus and unserviceable weapons and ammunition, the closure of many
dozens of ordnance units throughout Australia and the Pacific and the preparation of scalings
for the Australian contingent to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) Japan.
This force was part of the Allied Occupation of post war Japan to return that country to a
peace footing on terms suitable to all Allies.
Termination of War
Contracts After the defeat of Germany, the Allies were naturally confident of the
outcome with Japan, but it was generally recognised that if Japan had to be overcome by a
final all-out assault on their home islands it was going to be a grim business.
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Ordnance Corps Contingent - ANZAC Day march, Sydney - 1947. This huge contingent was
led by LTCOL Jefferys, former COMD 2 MD AAOC Militia (Photo Mrs Joan Woolley).
During WW2 forward provision planning included lead-times of 18 months and more.
In the case of Lend Lease Supply from the USA, the forward planning period was 24 months
before delivery. Although LHQ had commenced certain post war planning studies after the
end of the war in Europe, at no stage up to the sudden capitulation of Japan had it been
possible to think in terms of a specific forecast for the end of the war in the Pacific. Naturally
the sudden end of the war found ordnance with current orders and contracts in Australia and
overseas across the whole of the inventory based on lead times of up to 2 years ahead.
In those days there was no such thing as electronic or even mechanical dataprocessing. Every single accounting transaction at every level in the logistic system had to be
executed by manual clerical effort. (Hence the CPO had a provision staff of approx 300 at the
wars end).
Clearly, in order to restrict further expenditure to the essential minimum it was
necessary for LHQ Melbourne to decide very quickly on a plan for the termination of war
contracts and to implement such plan speedily. When it is remembered that the staffing of the
CPO was based on the manual provision review of each item in the inventory (approx
400,000 line items) once per year, there could be no question of there being anything like a
detailed examination
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of all items to develop the contract cancellation plan. It was recognised that the plan had to be
in broad and simple terms that would allow firm instructions to be given to the contracting
agencies in a matter of days. These agencies were:
•
•
•
•
•
Australian Department of Munitions
Australian Department of Supply
Australian Army Staff - London
Australian Army Reps - Washington
Ordnance Local Purchase Officers in each Australian Capital City.
Although the guns were silent, the fact remained that the Army still existed and no real
forecast of the rate of demobilisation was available. It was realised by the CPO that as the
Army ran down in numbers, its ability ‘to live on the fat’ of material in the system would
increase - but it was recognised that for those items where supply had been provided on a
‘hand to mouth’ basis there would be a continuing need for further production and indeed
further orders. The provision staffs at the CPO Melbourne were able to identify this short
supply category fairly readily and within 24 hours it had been decided to work to a plan of
giving the contracting agencies a blanket authority to terminate all contracts and orders except
those specifically listed for continuation. In compiling the exception list the following general
principles were observed:
•
•
•
A specific contract had to be totally in or totally out of the exception list.
The exception list was to include contracts for items known to be in short supply
throughout the Army, and which were deemed essential to the Army during its
demobilisation phase.
Special attention was given to items in the following categories:
Orders for ammunition and spare parts where the weapons were already held, but
were awaiting delivery of ammunition and spare parts.
Orders for equipments related to the standardisation and re-equipment program
(such as new signal equipment where phasing out of superseded equipment was in
progress, and the Army could not be left with imbalanced or mismatching
communication equipment).
The general rule used by provisioning officers was that any doubtful items, including
those whose continuation would require a deeper Staff study, and where appropriate approval
at higher levels would be required were to be included in the exception lists.
It is a matter of record that the Official Army instructions for termination of war
contracts and orders were given to the supply agencies in clear cut terms within a few days of
the cessation of hostilities.
Disposal of War Surplus Assets
Following the wars end all war surpluses were required to be disposed of under the
overall supervision of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission. While it
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was understood that the disposal of large surpluses of unserviceable and part worn equipment,
vehicles, stores, clothing and aircraft, smallcraft and a multitude of other items was justified,
there was a reluctance on the part of the three Services to dispose of all of its acquired assets.
Agreement was obtained from Treasury to a document known as the ‘Basis for Retention’
which allowed the respective Services to retain quantities of stores, equipments and arms well
above authorised levels and estimated usage rates. Obviously the AAOC did not wish to
dispose of valued assets and thus return the ordnance services (and the Army’s war reserves)
to the pathetic state that existed at the outbreak of the war. For this reason every contingency
was cited as justification for retaining existing stock levels and incorporated into the ‘Basis of
Retention’ which was approved by Treasury.
It was a relatively straight forward matter to turn the defence production tap off as
previously explained above, but the end of the war faced the AAOC and her sister corps
AEME with an enormous task that was to take some years to complete in the most difficult
circumstances. As the demobilisation plan went into effect, both the AAOC and AEME were
swamped by the sheer weight of material having to be received, inspected, classified,
evacuated and either disposed of or preserved for long term storage. This pressure was felt
both in the overseas theatres (South West Pacific Areas) and on the mainland. Understandably
the government wanted speedy demobilisation and individual servicemen and women were
eager to depart the Army and return to their homes.
The tasks facing the AAOC and AEME were no less technical simply because
hostilities had ceased, but even so, both corps were to be steadily drained of the skilled and
experienced personnel needed to handle the big cleaning up job. In addition to the
demobilisation aspect, the government also understandably wanted the Services, and
especially the Army to press ahead expeditiously with releasing war/surplus stocks of material
with civil applications which would assist the civil economy. To this end the government
established a Commonwealth Disposal Commission to co-ordinate the orderly sale and
disposal of surpluses in conjunction with the Army and other holding departments.
The general procedure was that, having identified a surplus in any item, it was to be
declared formally to the Commonwealth Disposals Communication (CDC). Stocks of broken
packs and unserviceable (or of doubtful classification) were declared regionally to the CDC
and subsequently sold by auction to the general public in a section of local AAOC depots set
aside for the purpose.
As a general rule the CDC, in conjunction with the Department of Supply, called
public tenders for the purchase of centrally declared lists of stocks. The stocks thus declared
remained in the custody of the AAOC depot concerned until the purchases presented
appropriate ‘Certified’ purchase documents and took delivery of their stores. All proceeds
from the disposal of Army stocks and assets were paid directly into commonwealth
consolidated revenue and the Army was not able to use any portion of such proceeds to
procure required items in short supply.
The most difficult point in this whole program was the actual determination
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of retention and disposal figures. The government’s proposed policy and decisions as to the
size and role of the post-war Army, and the nature and scope of maintenance stocks and war
reserves to be held, were all very much in the future. Even though the public and many
government departments were pressing the Army to dispose of its surpluses, it was
unreasonable to expect the government to commit itself to anything approaching a definition
of the size and shape of Army to be used in the calculations so soon after the cessation of
hostilities and with certain instability still evident in many parts of the globe. The initiative for
stockholding policy really had to come from the Army, meaning that the MGO was required
to determine what stock levels had to be retained, as advised by his three maintenance
division directors, namely the DOS, DEME and CPO.
As an interim policy until defence policy decisions affecting the Army were known it
was proposed that all stocks of purely military pattern would be retained, unless there was a
specific reason for partial or total disposal of an item in this category. In such cases a special
review would be made to determine disposal action. For items common to civil use it was
proposed by the CPO that stocks in excess of two years maintenance requirements be declared
for disposal. This took account of the fact that it would take an average of six months to
complete the disposal transaction and any subsequent re-provision would require at least six
months lead time for resupply. Any basis of retention less than two years holding of
maintenance stocks would inevitably result in the Army wanting to buy back some of the
stocks it had just sold.
On the other hand the civil economy had been stripped of practically anything that the
Services could use during the past six years and there was a desperate need for releasing the
maximum amount of material that would help repair the civil economy. As a result of this
situation the Army was forced to adopt a retention level of stock to 18 months holdings (used
in special cases) and six months holdings for certain commercial type items. As a result the
Army did have to buy back certain stores and in some instances the very same stocks it had
sold at disposal. The AAOC absorbed the associated righteous criticism and media attention
but got on with the job.
Perhaps the largest and most difficult disposal task was in the area of motor vehicles
and spare parts. The Army’s fleet of load and passenger carrying vehicles stood at
approximately 68,000 at the wars end. There was a wide variety of makes and models of both
conventional (4 x 2) and war department design vehicles (4 x 4) and (6 x 6). An initial
retention list of both conventional and WD design vehicles was drawn up and approved by the
Military Board. Although this first vehicle retention list was subsequently varied to some
degree, it enabled the AAOC to proceed with the very large vehicle disposal program
Australian wide. The CPO then drew up spare parts retention lists based upon the expected
life in the service of the vehicles being retained.
The civil economy was starved for load carrying vehicles and their progressive release
through disposals brought a heavy demand for their related spare parts. The main AAOC
holdings of MT spare parts were located at 1 AUST BOD Bandiana
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(later in July 1948 to become part of 1 COD). This was a vast stockholding representing the
spare parts support for a fleet of 68,000 vehicles. Throughout the war the Bandiana depot had
battled with immense difficulties. In some cases full trainloads of automaint spares would
arrive in the depot completely devoid of any documentation. With all storehouses already
stacked to the roof, huge consignments like this had to be stored on dunnage on the open
ground, and eventually there was something like 30 acres of open storage stacks of MT
spares, each nearly 12 feet high, without proper hard standing for all weather vehicular or
forklift access.
Parts documentation, identification aids and physical handling facilities in the AAOC
at that time were still primitive and skilled military manpower was being drained away by
demobilisation. Naturally, the depot could not match the disposal of spare parts to the rate
being achieved for the disposal of the vehicles. This led to a further storm of criticism against
the Army, the AAOC and 1 AUST BOD Bandiana.
AHQ restored the ordnance manpower situation to a certain extent by designating
Bandiana as a holding area for BCOF reinforcements awaiting call- forward to Japan. The
drain away of experienced AIF personnel was so great that it was necessary to employ locally
engaged temporary civilian staff with all the problems of militant unions, so much in vogue at
that time. At a critical period of manpower shortage during the MT spares disposal program,
the Bonegilla migrant centre was being established. The Department of Immigration needed
local employment for migrants who had been held at Bonegilla awaiting absorption into
housing and jobs around Australia. To ease the pressure of this problem at the migrant centre,
the Immigration Department allotted substantial numbers of migrants for daily work at the
Bandiana Depot. The majority of these migrants were employed on the MT spares disposal
program. The migrant workforce made a significant contribution to this task and to certain
beautification projects in the Army area at Bandiana which remain today as a memorial to
their early working life in Australia. Notwithstanding, the significant contribution from this
source of labour was mostly unskilled. Expert supervision was still the main problem and the
depot felt the loss of experienced AAOC non commissioned officers (NCOs) most of all as
demobilisation proceeded during 1946 and 1947. This was perhaps the key factor in the MT
spares disposal program at Bandiana being so long and drawn out. The back of the task was
not broken until well into 1949, and it was not to be finalised until the early 1950s.
As the equipment retention policy became clearer, the DOS and DEME established the
long term storage programs that were put into effect at all the main AAOC Depots. AEME
developed for each type of vehicle or equipment concerned a technical instruction for their
preservation during long term storage. This involved the blocking up of vehicles, removal of
tyres and batteries, inhibition of motors and application of a metal preservative. The work was
carried out by AAOC depot and vehicle park staff under AEME technical supervision.
The effectiveness of this program was evident when a fleet of Studebaker 6x6
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trucks, which had been placed into long term storage at Bandiana in 1947, were put into
commission for the Army’s involvement in the NSW coal fields crises in 1949. These
vehicles needed only batteries and tyres and were ready for service.
The war surplus disposal program has been highlighted as it affected MT vehicles and
MT spares and the main depots at Bandiana. However, similar programs were undertaken by
the main depots in every command (State) for all commodities. Disposals action in Brisbane,
Sydney and Melbourne was carried out in vast proportions and these activities demanded
most of the resources of the AAOC until the mammoth task was all but completed.
Disposal of Ammunition
For a period of some 18 months after the wars end, the IOO and AE of the AAOC
were employed fully in the disposal, destruction and clearing up of Australian, Allied and
Japanese ammunition sites. Unfortunately much haste in the evacuation of some depot sites
was clearly evident and ammunition working parties had to be employed for months on end to
render areas safe. Two of the worst effected areas were discovered in 1948 at the former
ammunition depot sites at Mataranka and Adelaide River. Absolute negligence and
malpractice in the disposal of ammunition by demolition was evident as reported by BRIG
J.A. Munro, who as an IOO CAPT in 1949, was involved in the clearing tasks in the Northern
Territory. At these two sites attempts had been made to destroy boxed ammunition still in
their stacks. Stacks of steel boxed 3.7 in HE Shells were found abandoned, with detonators,
fuzes and gun cotton still attached which had failed to explode and had gone undetected.
Stacks that did explode succeeded in scattering boxes containing ammunition and as a result
live and dangerous ammunition abounded in unmarked areas.
Throughout 1946, CAPT (later BRIG and Corps director) Jim Munro was employed
with other IOO and AE staff in New Guinea and the SW Pacific islands disposing of
unserviceable and surplus Allied and Japanese ammunition. The largest tasks for dumping by
sea or by demolition occurred at Jacquinot Bay and at Rabaul. The most eventful exercises
took place at Rabaul where thousands of tons of ammunition were collected and disposed of
by Army barge into Rabaul harbour (out of sight, out of mind). The AAOC Ammunition
Clearing Teams were assisted by Japanese labour forces made up of POWs who were retained
in the region to dismantle military installations and for the recovery of ammunition, weapons
and material to ordnance collection points adjacent to port facilities. One ammunition incident
led to the loss of twenty Japanese lives when POW labour was being used to transfer Japanese
hand grenades from wooden crates to steel boxes for sea dumping (as wooden boxes tended to
float). The lids of the wooden boxes had to be levered open which took considerable effort
and as the Japanese were keen to complete all tasks so they could be repatriated home, they
adopted practices to speed up the process. In his enthusiasm to complete this task one
Japanese worker began to use a pick to lever and smash open boxes. Whilst standing on top of
a stack of hand grenades one misdirected blow into
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the grenades ended the lives of twenty Japanese, but saved the Army barges employed in sea
dumping at least one trip. Prior to the fall of Rabaul, the Japanese wired 5001bs aerial bombs
as booby traps in all parts of the island. CAPT Jim Munro and LT Stan O’Neill, RAE were
employed in disarming these bombs and recovering them to Rabaul harbour for sea dumping.
Munro recalls working together with O’Neill on one such bomb in Rabaul and with the task
half completed they decided to complete the job next day due to failing light. Walking away
from the bomb it exploded with devastating effect - their decision to cease work three minutes
earlier saved their lives, as unknowingly, they had activated an anti-tampering device on the
bomb.
The task of disposing of all types of ammunition was undertaken at all ammunition
depots leading up to, in most cases, the closure of these depots - as there was a surplus of
AAOC units to meet the peacetime needs of the Army. The enormity of the tasks can be
drawn from the fact that some ammunition break-down programs at the larger depots to be
closed down took fifteen years to complete.
LTCOL R.A. Young, (RL) recalls that in 1945 he was sent to 1 Base Ammunition
Depot (2 Sub Depot) at Tocumwal (as an Ammunition Examiner) to assist in the
Sea dumping of hazardous and surplus Army ammunition. The hulk ‘The Bantam’ at anchor
off Port Pirie away from the public being loaded with condemned ammunition. The loading
was undertaken by barges, utilising a Coles crane which had earlier been loaded aboard the
hulk - 1948 (R.AAOC Historian)
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big break down task. LTCOL George Baker, the COO 1 BAD told (the then) WO1 Bob
Young to remain at Tocumwal until the job was completed. Young left Tocumwal in 1957,
having played a large part in disposing of 33,300 tons of all types of ammunition and
explosives - yet the task still had not been completed. The main items held for destruction
were the surpluses of 25 pdr shells, 3.7in anti-aircraft, 3in 20 CWT AA, 18 pdr shells, 4.5in
howitzer, 6in shells, anti-tank mines and small arms ammunition.
Tocumwal, apart from having the largest RAAF station, also boasted our corps largest
ammunition depot. The depot comprised 164 storehouses, 28 miles of internal roadways and
had a perimeter of more than 11 miles. During the war years, the strength of the depot
numbered some 300 personnel, consisting of ordnance, POW employment companies, AASC
supply and transport units. When the majority of these personnel left the area, Italian and
German prisoners of war were used as labour in the depot. Care was taken not to have the
Italian and German POWs working in the area at the same time as they were not too friendly
towards each other. The Italians blamed the Germans for starting the war and the Germans
blamed the Italians for losing it! Due credit must be paid to the POW labour force, who
generally worked well without a great deal of supervision - and following their return home in
1946, civilian staff from nearby towns were recruited for employment in the depot.
LTCOL R.A. Young recalls that the breaking down and disposal of ammunition stocks
was at all times a dangerous operation. The fixed rounds (eg projectile and cartridge case
complete) such as the 3.7in AA, 3in 20 CWT AA and 18 pdr were all broken down using the
post hole method. This consisted of a heavy solid piece of timber (a railway sleeper was ideal)
firmly sunk into the ground. A hole measuring the same calibre as the rounds to be broken
down was drilled about 12 inches from the top of the timber post. The projectile was placed
into the hole and heavy leverage was applied to the cartridge case in order to break the fixed
round into two pieces (the case and projectile). The projectile was removed from the timber
and packed for sea dumping or demolition. The cartridge case was emptied of propellant by
tipping the contents into large containers which were removed to a safe distance at regular
intervals to prevent a build up of the highly dangerous explosive in the work area. The case
was then inspected by two AEs to ensure that it was completely free of propellant before
being passed to the primer firing bench. This bench was a long heavy wooden board, with 10
holes to hold the cartridge cases for firing of primers. The bench was covered in at the front
with planks to prevent any scorching of the firers legs. The firer would cover each primer with
a local pattern device which fitted over the base of the case. This gadget contained a firing pin
made from a car engine valve, and when struck with a heavy wooden mallet the primer was
fired. The fired cases were then stored for disposal at public auction as scrap brass.
The projectiles for sea dumping were packed into perforated metal ammunition
packages which were tightly wired to prevent accidental opening. The criteria
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‘The Bantam’ with her load of condemned ammunition scaled in her holds under tow by a
RAN corvette to be scuttled in deep water off the continental shelf in the Great Australian
Bight. Due to its dangerous cargo the Coles crane was left aboard as the ‘hulk’ was not
permitted to return to the wharf to salvage the crane (RAAOC Historian).
for packing ammunition was that each package was required to weigh at least 85lbs per cubic
foot and was required to sink within 10 seconds of hitting the water. The heavier projectiles
such as the 4.5in howitzer and 6in shells were handled and loaded individually into rail trucks
and transported to the dockside for transfer to the sea dumping vessels. The majority of
dumping at sea was carried out in deep water off Sydney Heads, off the NW coast of
Tasmania, in the Great Australian Bight and in deep waters off the coast of southern
Queensland.
Small arms ammunition was emptied out into long open trenches and burnt. After a
prescribed period the contents were hosed down, and the metal residue was inspected for live,
unburnt rounds, and then was packed into sand bags for disposal as scrap metal.
The propellant burning was carried out at demolition ranges when the weather
conditions permitted. The propellant was laid out in long lines and always ignited into the
wind to prevent the flame flashing along the lines. On one occasion the propellant burn at
Tocumwal was carried out at night, thus lighting up the night sky of the surrounding
countryside with a roar.
The destruction of the anti-tank mines was perhaps the dirtiest job of all. Each mine
contained 8lbs of TNT and resembled a round cake tin (approximately 8 inches in diameter
and 3 inches height), except that they were constructed of heavy metal and suitably painted
and marked. The procedure involved the burning of the TNT explosive. The anti-tank mines
were placed on their edges
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in long lines packed with kerosene soaked cotton waste which was ignited. The TNT in the
mines would melt and burn sending thick palls of black foul smelling smoke into the air. The
Tocumwal depot received complaints about the smoke from the town of Shepparton, 45 miles
away. Fortunately air pollution controls did not exist in those days - otherwise the disposal of
such large quantities of propellant, small arms and TNT would have posed immense
difficulties. The metal cases from the burned anti-tank mines were dumped into deep pits and
buried.
When LTCOL R.A. Young left Tocumwal in 1957, the depot still held 100,000 mines,
all in a serviceable condition. When Tocumwal closed, the ammunition was transferred to
Ettamogah (which subsequently closed in 1982). The Tocumwal depot was disposed of by
government and is now used by ICI Australia for the storage of bulk explosives.
An effective method of sea dumping ammunition was to pack ammunition into ships
hulks, which were towed to sea and scuttled in deep water. One such operation took place in
South Australia during 1948 when a large quantity of condemned ammunition was loaded
aboard the hulk The Bantam and sunk off the continental shelf in the Great Australian Bight.
On this occasion a tracked
All hands leave ‘The Bantam’ after completion of her tow and preparation for scuttling off the
Great Australian Bight (RAAOC Historian).
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‘The Bantam’ loaded with condemned ammunition being scuttled in the deep-water dumping
operation off the Great Australian Bight in 1948. The spray from the fall of shot from the RAN
corvette can be seen. The ‘hulk’ was ‘holed’ in both the bow and the stern by several 4.5 inch
armour piercing rounds to ensure the speedy sinking of the hulk (RAAOC Historian).
Coles Crane was loaded aboard The Bantam at Port Pirie and the hulk towed to the centre of
the gulf away from populated areas where dangerous ammunition was loaded aboard from
Army barges and sealed in the holds. The hulk was then towed out to sea by an RAN corvette,
where it was scuttled at a safe distance by naval armour piecing 4.5in gunfire which was
directed at the ships bow and stern. The sensitivity of the cargo was indicated by the fact that
no attempt was made to recover the Coles Crane, which was disposed of together with the
ship.
Chemical Weapons
The Australian Army’s involvement in preparations for offensive chemical warfare is
conspicuously absent from documents available to the public ‘Australia in the War of 19391945’ records. Details still remain defence secrets, suffice to say that experimental firings of
chemical weapons (4.2 in mortar and 2 5 pdr BE filled with blistering, choking nerve gases)
took place in the period 1942-1945 at Kapooka, Albury, Heathfield and Cape Cleveland (near
Townsville), Singleton, Forbes, Lake Hiawatha (Grafton); Coloundra, Innisfail, North Brool
Island and Proserpine. Chemical weapons, which were all of British manufacture, were
largely stored at 1 BAD Albury (Wirlinga) NSW and in Clarence Tunnel NSW. Japanese
chemical weapons were discovered at Milne Bay, Soputa, Lae, Finschhaffen, Torokina,
Bougainville and in the Solomons. The Japanese weapons comprised toxic smoke generators
(diphenyl cyanarsine or vomiting gas), mustard
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and lewesite gas and glass grenades containing hydrocyanic (prussic) acid. The Australian
weapons were known to have comprised blistering agents such as mustard gas and lewesite
choking gases such as phosgene and nerve gas (bromide benzel cyanide). Following the
surrender of the Japanese, a concerted effort was made to quickly dispose of all Japanese
chemical ammunition throughout New Guinea and the Pacific Islands and all Australian
chemical weapons in mainland Australia. In most cases the weapons were disposed of by deep
sea dumping at undisclosed sites using RAE, AAOC and RAN resources.
AAOC School
The surrender of the Japanese on 15 August 1945 had no immediate effect on the
courses being conducted at the AAOC School, apart from the fact that all AAOC personnel
and students that were not rostered for duty were granted two days local leave to celebrate the
victory. Following the war’s end AAOC intakes and courses continued at the AAOC School,
which was commanded at the time by the CO/CI, LTCOL L.T. Reid. (Reid had been a stores
instructor at the first AAOC School established in the Barbara depot in the Middle East in
1941).
Although the majority of students that attended courses at the AAOC School during
WW2 and the immediate post war period were comprised of AAOC officers, soldiers and
AWAS; a number of American and Dutch officers also undertook the ordnance stores and
IOO courses. In particular the American students with previous ammunition experience in the
US Army rated the AAOC conducted IOO courses very highly.
As could be expected the enthusiasm of some students toward Army life quickly
waned following the wars end and in response to one examination it is recorded that one
student wrote across his paper... ‘As the war is over I can see no point in answering this!!’
The last course to be conducted at the AAOC School Broadmeadows in 1945 was the No 25
AWAS Course which held their march out parade on 14 December 1945.
On 28 January 1946 the AAOC School War Diary for the day read:
‘little staff
movement and consequently the unit has settled down to work in admirable style’. Such was
not the case for long however. During February 1946, 20 percent of the male staff were
discharged on request, with a further 20 percent taking discharge in March.
The year 1946 saw the number of courses at the AAOC School decreasing. Eleven
were conducted in the first six months compared with nineteen in 1945 and twenty four in
1944. However, on 9 September 1946, a new type of course was introduced, the No 1 MT
Clerks Course which was run by the Stores Wing. The new unit establishment in 1946
(WE/V/13/3) provided for 10 officers, 43 other ranks and 4 attached. This allowed for three
wings to operate - Ammunition, Regimental and Stores (with the usual administrative staff).
MAJ J. McD. Aitken took over command of the AAOC School from LTCOL Reid on
26 August 1946 and four months later LTCOL J.G. Webber took over from MAJ Aitken
when John Aitken returned to the civil service.
439
During 1947, a syndicate control system was introduced into the stores wing for other
rank students with the object of enabling observations to be made in respect of a student’s
ability to control personnel and to implement instructions and orders. Students were divided
into groups and each took turns as the syndicate leader. Each student was allotted 100 marks
at the commencement of the course and marks were subtracted for failure to carry out duties.
The student with the highest score was deemed to be top student for leadership.
On 15 September 1947, the No 1 Ordnance Officers Planning Course was introduced.
Thirteen students attended the course which lasted for five weeks; comprised of four weeks
instruction and one week visiting with industrial firms. This course was introduced with a
view to increasing efficiency in ordnance installations. Selected AAOC officers were trained
in the most up-to-date methods of organisation and administration and then posted as
Planning Officers in depots. Essentially their duties were to advise the COO (depot
commander) on the most economical use of manpower, equipment and storage space. The
syllabus was adapted from a similar course instituted by the RAOC in Britain early in 1947
and was the forerunner for more detailed courses on management subjects which were
conducted later. Those subjects in the curriculum which were predominantly of an Army
nature were dealt with by Army officers, whilst matters which had more industrial and
commercial application were handled by instructors from civilian organisations.
A summary of personnel who had attended courses at the AAOC School between
January 1943 and June 1947 was published in the AAOC Information Bulletin of September
1947. The total number of male students was 2,361 and AWAS 812. This number represented
only some 20 percent of the corps strength during WW2 (which peaked at 24,000). The
majority of students who undertook formal courses were officers and senior NCOs who
required the necessary expertise to perform, supervise or teach other AAOC subordinates. The
break- up by ranks was as follows:
Lieutenant Colonels
Majors
Captains
Lieutenants
Warrant Officers Class 1
Warrant Officers Class 2
Staff Sergeants
Sergeants
Corporals
Lance Corporals
Privates
Totals
Male students
8
35
240
537
210
250
262
230
272
43
274
2,361
AWAS
3
22
1
5
4
38
189
78
442
812
440
Arguably the most important event of 1947, at least as far as the AAOC officers were
concerned, was the motion passed at the Broadmeadows mess meeting on 10 December 1947,
when the price of a 7-oz glass of beer was raised to sixpence.
On 19 December 1947 LTCOL J.G. Webber was instructed to inspect ‘B’ Camp Area
at Bandiana to ascertain its suitability as a future site for the AAOC School. The favourable
report which he submitted included the fact that the necessary repairs and modifications to
existing buildings would cost in the region of £9,200 ($18,400). It also pointed out that certain
facilities for instruction in ammunition subjects were lacking at the Bandiana site. The
absence of an ammunition laboratory, ammunition workshops and the distant location of
Southern Command Test House facilities at Broadmeadows would mean considerable
travelling by students to Wirlinga and/or Melbourne for IOO and AE training. The Webber
Report was accepted in principle, although the estimated cost for upgrading the facilities was
considered to be too high and therefore necessary means of reducing costs had to be found.
The year 1948 saw no significant changes in courses conducted at the School and,
indeed, no major events. The Webber Report on the move to Bandiana was amended several
times with different buildings being presented as suitable alternatives in an attempt to cut
costs. No suitable alternative was found however, and on 26 September 1949 it was decided
to abandon the scheme to move to Bandiana. One consideration was the fact that the proposed
existing buildings were ‘sub-standard’ and I am sure that the RAAOC planners in 1949 would
react in total disbelief if they had been told that not only would the Ordnance School
eventually move to the rejected site in 1960, but in fact the RAAOC Centre would still be
occupying the same proposed sub-standard accommodation more than 40 years later. Perhaps
they had higher ideals and aspirations for accommodation in the post war period.
As a result of a lack of accommodation experienced in 1959 for the number of courses
that the RAAOC School was required to conduct annually, discussion was again raised on the
plan to move to Bandiana. There was ample accommodation available in the three messes at
Bandiana, all of a higher standard than at Broadmeadows and better recreational and canteen
facilities. 1 COD agreed to accept much of the administrative load thus resulting in a saving
of personnel. The decision was taken to move the RAAOC School to Bandiana, provided
alterations were made to buildings and that two new brick OR barrack blocks were
constructed, this work was completed in 1960.
Staffing of the Ordnance Service Post WW2 Developments
At the outbreak of the 1939/45 war the ordnance service was entirely manned by
civilians. The experiences of the AAOD between the period 1939/42 proved the wholly
civilian structure of the AAOD to be totally inflexible and inadequate, especially in war and
eventually on 29 May 1942 a wholly military organisation was established. Full reasons for
the 1942 militarisation of the ordnance service
441
were expressed in a letter (B115 dated 5 January 1948) from the MGO to the Secretary of the
Army in response to a request from the Minister for Information on this specific action and
other matters connected with the staffing of the ordnance service (such a request being
sponsored by the defunct AAOD staffs caught up in a militarised environment).
In about mid 1946, due to the progress of the demobilisation of the Army and
subsequent losses of large numbers of experienced AAOC personnel, it became apparent that
the re-introduction of some civilians into ordnance depots to supplement depleted military
staffs would need to be considered. Obviously, the former AAOD personnel wished to return
to their former organisation which existed prior to ‘militarisation’, particularly now that the
war had ended. The shortfalls of the AAOD organisation at the outbreak of WW2 were
addressed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 10, which explains the Army’s reluctance to hand back
the ordnance services to the AAOD. The following six years saw the question of
military/civilian integration in the ordnance service dealt with, by various individuals and
bodies whose activities and recommendations are outlined below under the following
headings:
•
•
•
•
•
The Kitchen Report
The Ordnance Staffing Committee
The Defence Forces Establishment Committee
The Military Board reply to the Report of the Defence Forces Establishment
Committee; and
The OKE Committee.
The Kitchen Report. In August 1946, the Minister for the Army approved a suggestion
that the services of an independent officer of the British Ordnance Service (RAOC), familiar
with the problems of ordnance manpower and the administration of both military and civil
ordnance personnel be brought to Australia to survey and report on ordnance conditions here.
The MGO was at that time in England and therefore arranged with the War Office for LTCOL
J. Kitchen, RAOC, an officer particularly suitable for this work, to be seconded to the
Australian Army to complete the study. (Readers will recall that in 1913 a COL J.G. Austin
was seconded from the British Army Ordnance Corps to report on the same matters, but
despite acceptance, his recommendations were not implemented due to the outbreak of WW1
and the countering strong influence that the AAOD had on the Minister and Secretary at that
time). After a thorough survey of conditions prevailing in all Australian ordnance depots
(which was interpreted in the light of the British Army’s experience and the report of Lord
Cozen-Hardy’s Committee to the Army Council on staffing problems in mixed establishments
in the UK) LTCOL J. Kitchen submitted a report which was the subject of MB Agendum No.
27/1947. The report set out the background and the method of approach to similar problems in
comparable ordnance installations in the UK for which the Lord Cozen-Hardy Committee
defined the following important principles:
442
•
•
•
That the ordnance depots and its officers and staff concerned with supply are all part
of the essential military organization of the country and each have a definite role to
play in support of the fighting army. The failure of the ordnance services or any
serious inefficiency would have serious repercussions on the efficiency or contentment
of the Army as a whole. That the discharge of allotted ordnance functions to the
satisfaction of the Army is fundamental to operations and that, for that reason alone,
the Army can properly claim that the control of the ordnance services must be under
military direction, with sufficient military staff to ensure that all Army needs are fully
comprehended and met.
That the composition of the staff of ordnance and similar outstations in peace should
be decided solely with reference to the experiences and the requirements of the Army
in war.
That the over-riding consideration must be the fulfilment of military requirements.
The best use of military manpower and the availability of suitable civilians must
determine the composition of the remainder of the staff.
The Kitchen Report emphasised that the above principles had even greater force in
Australia in 1947 than in the UK, because of Australia’s problems of geography and
population. The principal recommendation of the Kitchen Report was:
‘That, as in the UK, Ordnance Depots in Australia should be staffed on a military
basis, with military control and a sufficient military staff to cover the minimum
military requirements. So far as minimum military numbers so determined fall short of
those needed to carry the full workload, the military staff would require to be
supplemented with a considerable civilian staff’ (it was determined that the optimum
ratio was 55% military staff to 45% civilian staff.
The Military Board endorsed the Kitchen recommendations in principle and agreed
that a Committee (to be known as Ordnance Staffing Committee) comprising representatives
of the Secretary and all Military Board Members (except the QMG) should be appointed to
follow up LTCOL J. Kitchen’s recommendations. However the Minister for the Army, (in a
minute dated 21 March 1947,) stated that he did not feel disposed to approve of the Military
Board’s endorsement of the recommendations and wished to give the matter ‘very mature
consideration’ before arriving at any decision which would result in the permanent
militarisation of the ordnance organisation which, prior to the war, was on a completely civil
basis. It is known that the Minister’s view had been jaundiced by the representation made by
former AAOD executive officers, who had served in the AAOC during wartime - and were
keen to return to their former public service careers in the ordnance services without any
military control or interference.
The fact that the Minister found himself unable or unwilling to accept the Military
Board’s endorsement of the recommendations, (even though they had
443
been clearly substantiated in war) clearly emphasised the need for a formal statement of the
planned post war ordnance organisation, which until then had only been broadly outlined. The
proposed new ordnance organisation for the Australian Regular Army (ARA) was submitted
in June 1947 (Agendum 74/1947) to the Military Board for endorsement and then was
submitted to the Minister for approval. (The ARA was not formally established until 2 June
1949).
The Secretary of the Army advised on 9th July 1947, that the Minister had approved
of the outline of the post war interim army which was to operate until the structure of the
ARA was decided. The ordnance organisation was given in Agendum 74/1947, but had stated
that the detailed staffing and other matters would still require to be dealt with by the
establishment committee and other committees. The Secretary suggested that when details of
staffing had been determined they should be discussed with the Public Service Clerical
Association and the Storemen and Packers’ Union for concurrence. If a scheme could then be
arrived at which would be acceptable to both the department and union bodies, he thought that
there was a good prospect of receiving the Minister’s approval.
The Ordnance Staffing Committee. Military Board Circular (SM721 of 22 August
1947) appointed the Ordnance Staffing Committee. This Committee, having accepted the
principles and the basis of the staffing of the ordnance service contained in the Kitchen report,
examined in detail the proposed establishment of ordnance units and installations for the
permanent Army, and negotiated on the question of military/civilian posts with:
•
•
•
•
The Public Service Board;
The Public Service Clerical Association;
The Storemen and Packers’ Union; and
Recommended an integrated military/civilian structure for the Australian Army
Ordnance Corps and Ordnance Services.
In the course of its deliberations, the Ordnance Staffing Committee on the subject of
integration of military and civilian personnel stated the following:
‘within overall numbers concerned, equal promotion prospects for both civilians and
military shall exist up to the equivalent of commissioned rank. Promotion beyond that
level will involve, as an immediate problem, the consideration of availability of
suitable men, while military requirements for the overall control of the Ordnance
Services and the needs of the organisation for immediate expansion in an emergency
will require a preponderance of military officers in the rank of captain and above.
Civilian officers will be afforded opportunities of promotion to the equivalent of
captain consistent with these requirements and, in some exceptional cases, above that
rank’.
The Military Board concurred with the recommendations of the Ordnance Staffing
Committee (MBA 68148). On 11 February 1949, the Minister approved, in principle,
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the permanent creation of the Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps into the Australian
Regular Army (ARA) but, at that juncture, was not prepared to agree, to a fixed establishment
for Army and civil personnel until he had been given the opportunity of examining the overall
position to determine the number of senior positions that would be available for the civil staff
proposed to be retained on the formation of the corps. Following this decision, the MGO
submitted to the Secretary of the Army the detailed schedules of the proposed postings of all
RAAOC officers (both military and civilian).
On 2 June 1949, the Minister gave his consent to the formation of the Royal
Australian Army Ordnance Corps on a permanent basis in the Australian Regular Army
(ARA) and agreed to the schedules of provisional military and civil appointments submitted
by the MGO.
The Defence Forces Establishment Committee. In 1951 this Committee (DFEC) was
appointed with the following terms of reference:
•
•
•
To review the current and proposed personnel establishments of the Navy, Army and
Air Force with a view to ensuring that the rankings (commissioned and noncommissioned) were reasonable and justifiable in the light of the nature of the duties
thereof and the responsibilities attaching thereto.
To advise whether current methods of control and administration in relation to military
establishments were satisfactory and whether the numbers employed on administrative
duties were reasonable.
To furnish reports to the Minister for the Army in respect of any conclusions and
recommendations affecting numbers or ranking.
In dealing with the employment of civilians in the Defence Department, the
Committee recommended that the Army (and Air Force) be required to adopt a policy of
maximum civilianisation of headquarters, base and other static installations compatible with
the following limitations:
•
•
•
•
That sufficient servicemen must be trained and available for posting overseas, tropical
and outlying areas.
That a sufficient reserve of servicemen must be trained and available.
To enable regular relief of those military personnel military personnel posted overseas,
etc.
To provide a hard core on which to raise the additional administrative units which
would be required in the event of mobilisation.
In a reply to the Report of the DFEC, the Military Board pointed out that the Army
had always pursued a policy of maximum civilianisation of headquarters, base and other static
installations consistent with the needs for overall efficiency and that this policy was based on
substantially the same lines as those recommended by the DFEC but that, additionally, it took
into account:
445
•
•
the need to retain a proportion of specific appointments in non-field type units for
servicemen who, having reached an age or a medical standard which precluded further
service in the field, still had some years to serve before reaching the age for
retirement; and
the relative immobility of most civilian personnel and associated unavailability to
attend or serve in isolated areas or hostile areas.
Based on the findings of the DFEC all RAAOC field force units and Citizen Military
Forces (CMF) units (now Army Reserve) were entirely manned by uniformed military
personnel, whereas dependant upon the specific unit roles ASA units, depots and headquarters
were permitted the minimum ratio of 55 percent military and 45 percent civilian in unit
establishments. This situation was to remain extant until the review of the OKE Committee in
1962. It is interesting to note that in 1988 the current ratio of established personnel for
integrated RAAOC ASA units has arbitrarily been reduced to the unbalanced level of a ratio
of 32 percent military and 68 percent civilian (eg 31st Supply Battalion, Bandiana). This
unworkable level of manning was imposed by the staff of HQ Logistic Command and
Department of Defence (Army Office) and the detrimental effects of these so called
economies of staffing will ensure that in terms of unpreparedness for war from a logistics
perspective, our Army’s history is destined to repeat itself Unfortunately the next time
Australia is required to mobilise, its logistic services will not be given the two years period of
grace we were fortunate enough to enjoy following the declaration of WW2. The 1942
solution of militarising civilian positions in ordnance depots and giving civil occupants
equivalent rank should not even be considered as our last resort, as it is likely to fail due to the
complexities of field supply in the 1990s.
British Commonwealth Policy Regarding Occupation of Japan
Following WW2, Japan was the centre of attraction for powers wanting to play a role
in the Far East. The British Commonwealth could not therefore neglect the developments
there. For Australia and New Zealand particularly and India and the United Kingdom
generally, the future of Japan and the situation in the Pacific were of concern. The perilous
events of WW2 were still fresh in their memory and Australia could not afford to take any
risks with her own security. Australia’s keenness for an effective position in the Pacific and
her sense of obligation for the assistance derived from the United States also prompted the
governments decision to actively participate in the occupation of Japan. The interests of the
other members of the Commonwealth did not materially differ from those of Australia. It was
therefore considered necessary to have Commonwealth forces in Japan, so as to be able to
influence the future course of the peace treaty (which was signed in 1951) and to control
Japan’s economic resources and war potential.
In addition to the strategic considerations, there were also important political
considerations which prompted British participation in the occupation of Japan.
446
it was believed that the British Commonwealth occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan would:
•
•
•
•
increase British prestige in the eyes of the Japanese people, as a power to be reckoned
with in the future;
raise in the eyes of the Allies, and other countries in the Pacific, the prestige of the
British Commonwealth of Nations and its potentialities as a world power;
demonstrate to the world that Australia had attained political maturity and was
prepared to play her part in the councils of the world; and
ensure for Australia the position of a participant in the peace settlement (which was
eventually signed with Japan in 1951).
The main political factor was prestige. It was felt that BCOF Japan would impress on
the Japanese people that they were not defeated by the United States alone, but by a
combination of both British and American Forces. One of the objects of occupation was the
economic exploitation of Japan. These economic motives were not direct, but were aimed at
making contacts with influential sections of the Japanese community to develop future trade
with the British Commonwealth and the securing of suitable ports of entry for goods. It was
also hoped that BCOF member countries could grab a share of Japanese shipping tonnages for
overseas trade, as all goods had to be carried on Allied shipping. This was due to the ban on
the existence of any Japanese mercantile marine shipping as dictated by the Japanese/Allied
surrender document.
The military objectives outlined to BCOF Japan were the same as those given by the
President of the United States to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan
(General Douglas MacArthur). They were:
•
•
•
•
to assist in the demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese war installations and
armaments;
to safeguard the Allied installations and equipment in occupied Japan;
to give military protection to British Commonwealth Civil Missions engaged in
selecting goods, valuables and equipment for reparation war payments; to maintain
internal security and law and order in Japan; and
to provide military backing to the US military Government agencies located in the
BCOF areas of responsibility.
BCOF Japan
Following VJ Day, the Allied commanders and governments determined the
conditions for an Allied occupation force to establish law and order in and around Japan and
to repatriate members of the defeated Imperial Japanese Forces so that they could be
integrated back into society. The overall responsibility for the post war administration and
settlement was vested in General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of Allied
Powers in Japan.
447
The British, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and Indian contribution to affect a
peaceful transition of post war Japan was known as the British Commonwealth Occupation
Forces Japan (or BCOF). The BCOF Japan contingent was raised in October 1945 and
remained in Japan for more than 10 years.
The initial Australian contribution to BCOF was assembled at Morotai, immediately
following the victorious completion of the Borneo campaigns by 7 AUST DIV and 9 AUST
DIV. Volunteers were sought from Australian troops serving in the SW Pacific Area (6, 7 and
9 AUST DIVs), to join the force to occupy Japan and surprisingly the number of volunteers
exceeded all expectations. Scalings of stores and equipments were determined and as far as
possible were drawn from AAOC forward ordnance depots located at Labuan, Tarakan,
Balikpapan and from Morotai itself. The first Australian ordnance contingent, known as 21
AAOD, under the command of MAJ S. Rout sailed directly from Morotai to Japan and arrived
at Kure on 13 February 1946.
The organisation and manning levels of BCOF Japan in its years of existence
constantly fluctuated depending upon the Allied commitments and activities in the region. At
its peak BCOF boasted some 40,000 British, Australian, Indian and New Zealand Service
personnel - and at its lowest ebb just prior to the outbreak of the Korean war the force totalled
only 2,000 service personnel. The logistic infrastructure established in Japan by both the
British and American Forces was to become invaluable in supporting Allies during the
Korean war which was fought in the period 1950/53.
BCOF BOD Vehicle and Smallcraft Park building on Kure dockside – 1949
(COL H.M. Pickering).
448
Ordnance in BCOF
The governments of the participating Commonwealth countries agreed that the
Australian Defence Organisation would be responsible for the political and military control
and administration of the British force. Accordingly, within the framework of the higher
defence machinery (then located in Melbourne) a committee at deputy chief of staff level
(including British and other Commonwealth representation) was established. It transpired that
the administration of the force (BCOF) devolved upon Army Headquarters Melbourne.
Once the force settled into its allotted occupation area in Japan it became very clear
that Australia would have problems of the first magnitude in providing ordnance support.
Each contingent of BCOF went to Japan carrying the flag for their country. They
naturally each wore their own distinctive uniforms, but each contingent had its own range of
vehicles and equipment which consisted largely of the types that the units were using in action
against the enemy at the wars end. The only real standardisation of hardware between the
various elements of the force was in the sphere of weapons and ammunition.
In August 1946, the then Chief Provision Officer AHQ (COL E.C. Lord) went to
Japan accompanied by the senior MT spares provision officer from AHQ and a clothing and
general stores specialist (MAJs J. Kerrigan and Thrum). This group spent six weeks with HQ
BCOF and with the BCOF BOD at Kure assisting in organising the depot provision operation
and in classifying the whole range of vehicles and equipment for the force by its country of
origin and source of supply.
A special census of vehicles and equipments was taken and this confirmed the nature
of the problem. To illustrate this the BCOF B vehicle fleet was found to include:
British & Indian Contingent
The very newest and latest WD vehicles from British production.
Canadian Contingent
The latest available from Canadian production.
Australian Contingent
Mostly 1943/44 vintage WD vehicles of North American/Canadian Origin (and
Australian body assembly).
New Zealand Contingent
Mostly vehicles in poor condition from the Middle East (active service) and nonstandard with any of the others in BCOF.
A source of supply was identified for all non-common spare parts and the extent of
commonality such as in electricals, batteries, tyres etc were identified.
Apart from weapons, this same diversity of types of stores and equipment applied
throughout the force. With Australia designated as the main support area,
449
it was possible to introduce gradually by resupply, certain levels of standardisation in the
general stores range of items, but for vehicles and equipments the provision and resupply
management had to cater for this complex array of non standard inventory.
After providing the BCOF BOD Staff with guidance and assistance, the CPO in
collaboration with the DDOS BCOF prepared a provision directive which was to regulate the
placement of demands on the designated sources of supply. There was no problem in
designating the supply sources for Canadian, Australian and New Zealand national items, but
there was much debate as to whether peculiarly British/Indian items would be demanded from
RAOC UK Depots, or from ordnance depots in India or Singapore. Initially agreement was
obtained for these demands to be processed by RAOC depots in Singapore and detailed
arrangements were put in place after the CPO visited DOS FARELF en route to Australia.
There was some difficulty experienced in this arrangement for RAOC in Singapore and the
system was subsequently modified to some extent.
By the very nature of the occupation force and the fact that WW2 pressures demanded
the proliferation of the types of vehicles and equipments in existence, it was to be expected
that this complex non-standard problem would occur.
There were severe provision and supply difficulties during the life of BCOF but it says
much for the generally common doctrines in the British Commonwealth Armies and for the
esprit de corps throughout the ordnance elements of the whole force, that these difficulties
were overcome.
BCOF BOD Vehicle and Smallcraft Park, Kure - 1948. The area was also occupied by the
BOD RAEME Attached (COL H.M. Pickering).
450
The BCOF Japan Ordnance units were largely composite integrated units, but there
were several RAAOC independent units which dealt with laundry and salvage services. Apart
from the DADOS (AUST) appointment at HQ BCOF, the ordnance units in Japan were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
BRITCOM Base Ordnance Depot (composite BCOF Unit) located in Kure
BRITCOM BOD Vehicle Park (composite BCOF Unit) located in Hiro
BRITCOM Base Heavy Laundry (RAAOC Unit) located in Hiro
BRITCOM Base Salvage Unit (RAAOC Unit) located in Hiro
BRITCOM Laundry Detachments (RAAOC Manned) located in Iwakuni and Tokyo
BRITCOM Base Ordnance Office (RAAOC Manned) located in Kure.
The original DDOS, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) in Japan was
COL Toby Reynolds, RAOC (an Australian) and the COO 221 AOD was LTCOL Roy
Horne. The Australian representatives were COL F.B. Robertson, AAOC as COMDT BCOF
BOD, MAJ E.E. Demmler, (pre-war CPL AAOC(M)) as DADOS HQ BASE Sub Area BCOF
from 11 January 1946 and LTCOL N.F. Ransom, DADOS HQ BCOF from 31 January 1946.
COL J.T. Simpson, OBE (former DOS) was the COO HQ BCOF from 1 April 1946 to 3 June
1948. Simpson then became COMD BCOF BOD until 23 July 1948 and following the return
of COL T. Reynolds to the UK, COL Simpson became DDOS HQ BCOF and LTCOL A.R.
Long became COO BCOF BOD.
BCOF BOD, Ammunition sub depot, Kure - 1948 (Photo COL H.M. Pickering).
451
Originally HQ BCOF together with the main section of the BCOF 130 AUST General
Hospital occupied the Japanese Naval College on Eta Jima some twenty minutes by sea ferry
from Kure. Kure was a city approximately the size of Geelong or Newcastle and was
supported by major ship building facilities and naval maintenance. At this time, most of these
facilities were fully occupied with wrecking the remains of the Japanese Navy. Kure, which
was situated mainly along the water front, was the location of HQ British Commonwealth
Base (HQ BRITCOM Base), the Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC), together with Engineers,
Signal Regt, Kure Wing BCOF General Hospital, Army Service Corps, Provost, BCOF BOD,
BCOF Wkshops, BCOF Officers’ Shop, chapels, messes and amenities services.
Japan had been divided into areas of responsibility by the American Military
Government, which retained responsibility for policy and all matters affecting the civilian
population. Areas were allotted to each of the commonwealth member nations and their units
were posted in the allocated area.
Communication between all areas was by rail and this movement was under the
control of the American Forces with travel restricted to the trains directly supervised by them
and all the coaches in use by the Allies were identified by a yellow disc painted on their sides.
Kure was the supply and maintenance base for all of the commonwealth units, with the
costs of indigenous supplies and facilities being charged against war reparations from Japan.
Initially each component of BCOF was fully equipped by its country of origin and then
maintained in Japan by ordnance for items
Working inspecting line, Ammunition sub depot, BCOF BOD. (MAJ F.H. Perkins).
452
peculiar to the force. Supply of common user items was provided from the most suitable
source.
The BCOF BOD was located in warehouses adjacent to the dockyards opposite the
main wharf. This area housed the bulk of stores for 1, 2 and 3 Sub Depots. North towards
Hiroshima, at Kaitachi, CAPT J. Wakeman was responsible for procurement, accommodation
and return stores.
Five miles to the east, at Hiro, CAPT A.H. Thistleton operated the vehicle park, and
close by was situated the British Commonwealth (BRITCOM) Salvage and Disposals Unit,
administered by CAPT A.A. Coleman. Across the river was the BCOF Base Laundry and dry
cleaning facilities for the entire area. In a central location at Kure, CAPT Sue Rodford
managed the Officers Shop and its tailoring workroom. At regular intervals, the shop became
mobile by transferring stocks to a rail coach which travelled to Tokyo and all areas occupied
by BCOF installations.
CAPT C.W. Steele held the ammunition and associate stores sub depot in the former
Japanese naval magazines situated on the eastern shore of Eta Jima, opposite Kure.
HQ 34 Aust Inf Bde, the armoured squadron and one infantry battalion were located at
the eastern end of Hiro. Each of the 65, 66 and 67 Battalions rotated between these areas and
outlying stations, as well as providing a guard company in Tokyo. The RAAF manned the
airport at Iwakuni, west of Kure.
The BCOF BOD at Kure was located on the waterfront in what had been the
Mobile Officers shop at Okayama Railway Station, June 1948. L to R PTE Pettit AAOC
(Picquet); LT Sue Rodford and SGT Colin Purnell AAOC. The NAAFI also ran similar
‘supermarket trains’ to serve servicemen and families in remote locations away from the
large canteen facilities (Photo CAPT S. Pickering (nee Rodford).
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Japanese naval barracks. The buildings used as storehouses were two and three storey
buildings of concrete construction and were adequate for ordnance activity. The area
surrounding the depot had been ship building yards and a steel mill, but these facilities had
been devastated by American bombing raids leading up to the surrender. As mentioned earlier
the nearby naval dry docks were busily engaged in breaking up shipping ranging from
destroyers to battleships. Some of the naval and mercantile shipping had been raised from the
sea bed and part of the process included the removal of decomposed remains.
Families of local workers lived in housing on a hill at the rear of the BCOF BOD.
Tunnels were discovered cut into the mountain itself between the houses and had been used
for storage areas and underground machine shops during the war.
Although fraternisation with local indigenous Japanese was frowned upon by the
Allied powers in occupied Japan the depot staff did participate in some community aid work.
This work included assistance to the local school and in gratitude unit members were invited
to the annual children’s days. On these occasions the children provided the guests with local
foods and entertained them with traditional dancing which everyone seemed to enjoy.
The respective messes and canteens at Kure and indeed at other locations in Japan,
were the social centres for the military and their dependants serving in occupied Japan. MAJ
Tom Short recalls that the BCOF BOD Sergeants Mess was well run and all ‘batting’ services
were provided by local ‘housegirls’ who tended to the requirements of four sergeants. Beer
cost sixpence a bottle or twopence a glass, so sore heads were commonplace. Being located
on the docks the depot mess became the mecca for visiting Allied naval ships calling at Kure.
Between mess functions, shipboard parties in the Petty Officers messes and visits to the Fleet
canteen, the off duty hours were seldom dull. The acquisition of souvenir life belts from
various ships for mess decoration became an art amongst mess members. Having acquired the
personal lifebelt of ‘Captain D’ (Commander of the destroyer flotilla) things became a little
hot. The Commander sent a shore patrol ashore under an officer to locate and return the life
belt, with the order not to return without it. No one knows the fate of the shore patrol, as when
the flotilla sailed the mess still exhibited the life belt.
Former BCOF members still boast that they were the best turned out regimental
soldiers that were ever sent overseas. Guards were continuous and as an incentive to soldiers
on a good turn out for guards, a system involving stick orderlies was employed. Each evening
two ‘stick picquets’ were selected. The ‘stick picquets’ enjoyed certain privileges and
completed their duty at 2200 hrs. Obviously all guard members vied for selection as a ‘stick
picquet’ and each turned out with immaculate attire, webbing, brass and rifle. Any fault meant
immediate disqualification and as dress and bearing was difficult to fault, often the
elimination was determined by a period of drill. This ritual required perfection not only on the
part of the troops, but also the guard sergeant and orderly officer who had to make a fair
selection. This form of general discipline seems to have slipped
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BCOF BOD Sergeants’ Mess Kure displaying their collection of naval prizes ‘nicked’ from
visiting ships - late 1950 (Photo MAJ J.T. Kane).
into oblivion. A number of RAAOC members were selected to form part of the guard on the
Imperial Palace in Tokyo. MAJ Tom Short who witnessed this Palace Guard, boasts that
despite the chromed steel helmets, the colourful cravats and other gimmickry, the Americans
never came up to the high standard of the Australians on these guards.
The BRITCOM Base Heavy Laundry Unit at Hiro was staffed by 2 officers, 8 senior
non-commissioned officers and 14 rank and file together with almost 400 local indigenous
workers. During the height of the Korean War in 1952, the RAAOC operated laundries were
working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (in addition to the working of the RAAOC FOD
laundries and detachments at Pusan and Seoul in Korea). British, Australian, Indian and New
Zealand regiments arriving in theatre to serve in Korea handed in their battledress and
greatcoats in exchange for field dress (summer or winter). Returned clothing was forwarded
to the BRITCOM Base Heavy Laundry for processing (dry cleaning and minor repair). These
items were then returned to depot stock for subsequent re-issue to a unit preparing to return
home, or to serve in cold climates. Garments unsuitable for re-issue
455
ANZAC Parade Japan 1951. Parade reviewed by C-in-C LTGEN Sir Horace Robertson. BOD
component commanded by MAJ S.W. Hosking, RSM WO1 Boyd, COY COMDS were CAPT
E.H. Spence, CAPT H.M. Pickering and LT V. Olrick (Photo COL H.M. Pickering).
were condemned for destruction, or for dyeing and issue to indigenous workers. The base
laundry also laundered the sleeping bags and blankets of both incoming and outgoing
battalions of BRITCOM troops. In addition the BRITCOM Base Heavy Laundry Unit served
all BCOF units, hospitals and messes in Japan and provided a versatile laundry, ironing,
dyeing and mending service.
BRITCOM Base Ordnance Depot in Kure was an integrated unit consisting of RAOC,
RAAOC, RIAOC and RNZOC elements. The unit was commanded by a RAOC LTCOL,
whereas the Australian component had a RAAOC CAPT in the stores depot with another
RAAOC CAPT at the vehicle park in Hiro. The vehicle park handled both A and B vehicles,
and also had a forward detachment at Inchon (the port of Seoul) in Korea.
BRITCOM Base Salvage Unit was a fully Australian unit which was manned by 2
officers, 5 SNCOs and 10 ORs (all RAAOC personnel). This unit serviced the whole of the
Japan area, including South Korea. Its function encompassed the recovery and processing of
all surplus or damaged material, equipment, vehicles, weapons, smallcraft and expended
ammunition cases, either for disposal, return to service or for destruction.
The BRITCOM Base Ordnance Office in Kure was Comprised of a RAAOC CAPT,
WO1 and a CPL with several indigenous personnel. The duties of this office included liaison
with supported units and superior HQ, both in Japan and
456
Australia, the vetting of indents and the holding of a small clothing cell for Australian
national items of uniform.
The BCOF BOD also had the task of providing barrack services to the 600 dependant
families that moved to Japan with their servicemen husbands. Families were usually housed in
rudimentary 2 bedroom bungalows. The furniture items, utensils and household furnishings
were provided by ordnance by the barrack services section. Furnishings were usually locally
procured - with varying standards according to rank.
As normal household articles for general European use were not readily available from
Japanese shops, the British Services Canteens Organisation (or NAAFI) catered for all
dependants requirements for groceries, confectionery, general haberdashery, clothing
materials, household soft furnishings, hardware, medicines, special foods, stationery, watch,
radio and electrical repairs and even beauty parlour facilities. The Japanese made articles that
were available to the public were of poor quality (or artistic value) - and usually cost ten times
more than the cost of similar items marketed by the NAAFI canteens. Needless to say the
canteens were well patronised. A special train, fitted out as a mobile NAAFI department store
made a scheduled visit each fortnight to families in isolated areas which were only served by
limited canteen issue point facilities. Inflation in post war Japan ran riot and at one point the
exchange rate was 1,100 Yen to one pound sterling. To go souvenir shopping in the local
marketplace it was necessary to go out shopping with a ‘wogging bag’ containing, say
100,000 Yen (about nine pounds) just to do routine shopping.
MAJ Tom Short (then a SGT) recalls that when his contingent destined for Japan had
boarded the MV Kanimbla in 1947 there was a panic when the hierarchy realised that the
wartime provisions for overseas service had now been superseded by the advent of the Interim
Army (which remained until the ARA was formed on 2 June 1949). As such all members had
to volunteer for overseas service, therefore each member was paraded individually before two
officers from HQ E COMD and asked if they were willing to go. If they refused to serve in
Japan they were returned to their old units. There had been rumours that families would be
prevented from joining the married men in Japan and when assured by the two officers that
the wives and dependants would be on the next available ship most married men volunteered
to embark for BCOF Japan. Upon the arrival of these same troops in Japan the Australian
government announced that no more families would be going to the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’.
This resulted in a drop in morale and compassionate problems amongst the unaccompanied
married members of BCOF. After the situation became a political ‘hot potato’ the Chaplains
General visited the region and the unaccompanied married members were given the option of
remaining in Japan or going home - and of course the majority chose to return to Australia.
The lesson here was never volunteer and the Army and governments have not changed!
By late 1949, the majority of the Commonwealth countries had withdrawn their forces
and BCOF virtually consisted of the Australian component, with
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British Army and RAF officers filling some of the HQ Staff positions, reducing the size of the
force to approximately 2,000.
The withdrawal of the various BCOF components had been carried out accompanied
by all unit equipment which ran down stock levels in the depot. The Australian Services
Canteens Organisation (ASCO) and the amenities service took over the functions vacated by
the NAAFI, (including the Lord Nuffield free ration of Woodbine cigarettes).
The AAOC continued in its role of maintaining the BCOF establishment, but now had
the task of re-assessing the requirements for the continued support of the Australian
component and the disposal of the theatre surpluses. The initial arrangement for the support of
BCOF provided that the country supplying the item should have first refusal in the disposal of
surplus stores and equipment. Much effort was required to ensure the correct place of origin
was established before items were offered. Where an offer was refused then all other
component countries of BCOF were given the opportunity to bid. Items for which no bid was
received were then assessed for destruction (as a matter of security) or for disposal through
the RAAOC manned BRITCOM salvage and disposals unit. The run down of the force made
redundant much of the administration. This resulted in the closure of Eta Jima and the
movement of HQ BCOF to Kure to completely absorb HQ BRITCOM base and its units. The
signing of the peace treaty with Japan in 1951 saw preparations for the final run down of
BCOF. With the decision to send British troops to Korea, a new lease of life for ordnance was
generated in Japan. The remaining Australian battalion (3RAR) had to be re-equipped and
reserves built up. Australia had to be asked for the urgent supply of equipment discrepancies
and a rapid build up of logistic support. Fortunately, the RAAOC staff and facilities in Japan
were capable of handling the local situation.
Korea
On 25 June 1950, the North Korean Communist Army crossed the 38th Parallel
without warning. The outnumbered and lightly armed South Korean defenders could not
withstand the tank led thrusts and Seoul fell to the invaders. An emergency session of the UN
Security Council condemned the North Korean action and called on them to withdraw. When
the UN appeal was ignored, US President Harry S. Truman ordered US Forces into combat in
aid of the South Koreans and the British took similar action.
The UN Command (South Korea) which comprised the armed forces of South Korea,
United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France and other troops, mounted a counter
offensive and by November 1950 had reached the Yalu River. The Communist Chinese
Forces then entered the war on the side of North Korea and again the UN Forces were pushed
south of Seoul. In spring 1951 the battle line was finally stabilised very nearly along the 38th
Parallel which separated the two opposing countries. Here the two forces remained in a
deadlock for nearly two years with considerable heavy fighting, with little change in
positions, while a cease-fire was negotiated. Truce talks commenced in July 1951 but
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Some of the BCOF BOD personnel signing an undertaking to serve on active service with the
UN Forces in Korea. Seated are MAJ John Archer and SGT Les Miller (signing). Standing L
to R are WO2 R.V. Tonkin; SSGT J.T. Kane and WO1 J.C. Hawkins - late 1950
(Photo MAJ J.T. Kane).
floundered. Finally in June 1953, agreement was achieved and on 27 July 1953 the armistice
between the opposing forces was signed.
The Korean War brought incalculable destruction. Nearly all of South Korea was a
battleground, while North Korea suffered from continuous heavy aerial bombardments. In
addition to the staggering civilian losses, the UN Command reported nearly 142,000 military
casualties, while North Korean and Chinese casualties were estimated at over 1 million killed
or wounded.
On 2 August 1950 the Australian government announced its decision to despatch one
infantry battalion as Australia’s military assistance to the United Nations. The 3rd Battalion,
the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) which was already in Japan as part of BCOF Japan,
was brought up to strength by special volunteers flown to Japan from Australia and became
part of the Special Korean Force. 3 RAR joined the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade in
Korea on 27 September 1950. As a result of heavy fighting which took place on the night
459
Mr Oh Sung Kun (a respected elderly Korean professor who introduced the first
Korean/English dictionary pre WW2) visited the laundry unit to sip tea, smoke his pipe and
fascinate unit members and visiting dignitaries with his exceptional knowledge of the orient
(Photo MAJ F. Perkins).
24/25 April 1951 (ANZAC DAY) 3 RAR was awarded the US Presidential Citation for
Gallantry, the emblem of which the unit carries proudly today. 1 RAR which was re-equipped
by ordnance at Ingleburn NSW, moved to Japan in 1951 and replaced 3 RAR on 4 October
1951, which by that time was operating under the 28th British Commonwealth Infantry
Brigade (which was later to see service against the communists in Malaya). Over the next two
years 2 RAR and 3 RAR (2nd tour) served in Korea and following the end of hostilities 3
RAR returned to Australia in November 1954, again being replaced in Korea by 1 RAR.
Upon the arrival of 3 RAR back in Australia there was great jubilation, with the catch cry
amongst the school children ‘we won the war in 1954’. Following the reduction of the police
role of the United Nations in Korea and the decision to close the British Commonwealth
Bases in Japan (which provided the necessary ordnance and other support to Korea), 1 RAR
was withdrawn from Korea on 24 March 1956 and the Australian Army contribution to that
theatre was reduced to 90 all ranks (UN observers). During 1956 all Australian military
personnel, vehicles, aircraft and equipment were withdrawn progressively from Korea, thus
ending Australia’s direct involvement in that conflict.
460
Supply and support for BCFK (British Commonwealth Forces Korea) was provided
by ordnance units based in Japan described earlier in this chapter, albeit some minor ordnance
units were based in Korea. These units were:
•
•
•
•
BRITCOM Forward Ordnance Laundry (a RAAOC unit) located at Seoul
BRITCOM BOD Vehicle Park Detach (composite BCFK unit) located at Inchon (the
port for Seoul)
BRITCOM Base Laundry Detach (a RAAOC unit) located at Pusan
BRITCOM Salvage Depot (a RAAOC unit) located at Pusan.
Soon after its arrival in Korea 3RAR requested the replacement of the WW2 issue
winter service dress uniform by the new pattern woollen battle dress (BD). Because of the
intense cold it was necessary for the trousers to be half lined with worsted shirting and this
requirement was urgently met from Australia. The old pattern service dress (SD) was
withdrawn from Australians in Korea and immediately shipped back to Australia. However,
hardly had the shipment reached Australia -when 3RAR reported that the battle dress did not
provide the same warmth as the old uniform and requested the re-issue of its former service
dress uniform. This was not possible in the time available and arrangements were then
BRITCOM Forward Ordnance Laundry Unit (RAAOC unit). Main laundry building, located
at Pusan, Korea - 1952 (Photo MAJ G. Mellor).
461
effected to provide wet/cold clothing from Allied sources. Because of the nature of the
conflict and the proximity of the BCOF Japan theatre, BCFK continued to be maintained
directly from the ordnance base at Kure. Maintenance and recovery of equipment, stores and
supplies was provided by LSTs and virtually went from door to door (or shore to shore).
The BRITCOM forward laundry units, which were established at Pusan and Seoul and
operated by RAAOC personnel and indigenous workers, provided an essential service to the
comfort and health of BCFK personnel who were fighting under atrocious conditions. The
tireless work of the laundries was recognised with the award of the MBE to successive unit
Officers Commanding, Major Albert Smith and LT Bert Schmidt. The BRITCOM forward
laundry unit deployed at Seoul used trailer mounted equipment and was to be replaced by a
heavy laundry unit from the United Kingdom, however, this never transpired. The forward
laundry unit at Seoul set up operations in a bombed out school, and utilised the existing
structures to afford protection to their operations from the intense heat in summer and
freezing conditions in winter. Laundered linen and uniforms were ironed by a team of twenty
female Korean ‘ironers’ who used charcoal fired irons to carry out their difficult task. These
workers sprayed water from their mouths to dampen down the linen as they ironed and had to
take care that the
BRITCOM Forward Ordnance Laundry Unit at Pusan, Korea 1952. End view of each row of
drying lines (Photo: MAJ G. Meilor).
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BCFK Forward Mobile Laundry and Decontamination Unit ablaze following an explosion of
a loaned US Army diesel fired heating unit which totally destroyed the operations - 1953.
(Photo LT B. Schmidt).
charcoal fired irons did not leave black marks or scorches on the items being handled.
The greatest problem facing these RAAOC field laundries was to accurately maintain
‘tabs’ on the ownership of laundry being handled through the various phases of the laundry
process in unit lots. These phases included the inspection, repair, dyeing, laundry, starching,
drying, ironing and packing of unit lots for collection under a 24 hour service arrangement.
The LEC laundry staff were required to work to a roster to allow the laundry to operate
continuously, 24 hours a day. Each employee was required to work six days a week - and for
this was paid four pounds sterling per month. During winter the temperature would often be
10 degrees below zero and water would freeze in the pipes and halt the laundry’s operation.
To overcome this a diesel fired hot air blower unit was borrowed from the US Army to keep
the unit functioning. However on the night of the 29 January 1953 this US Army water heater
unit exploded and as a result the whole laundry was destroyed in the ensuring fierce fire.
Although injured in the fire LT Bert Schmidt and his fellow RAAOC unit members worked
tirelessly and with salvaged equipment and other equipment loaned from the BRITCOM Base
Heavy Laundry at Hiro, the forward laundry unit at Seoul was
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A piece of the trailer mounted laundry equipment which was destroyed by the fire - 1953. LT
Bert Schmidt was awarded the MBE for his efforts in re-building the unit and recommencing
operation within 48 hours of the fire which totally destroyed all unit equipment and facilities
(Photo Lt B. Schmidt).
back in operation, only 48 hours after the huge fire had totally destroyed their operation. For
his indefatigable efforts LT Bert Schmidt was awarded the MBE.
The RAAOC Salvage Unit at Pusan was also commended for valuable work carried
out in Korea and WO1 Ern Harding was awarded a BEM for his tireless efforts in salvaging
and back loading materiel from the war zone.
National Service Scheme
As a consequence of Australia’s commitment to the Korean War in September 1950
and in view of the threat posed to world peace and stability at that time (perceived to be the
possible nuclear threat from the Soviets and the aggressive communist movement generally)
the Australian government introduced a National Service Training Scheme.
This scheme commenced in August 1951 and remained in force until November 1959.
It required all male persons of the prescribed age group to register for National Service and if
selected they were required to undergo 77 days continuous training at a National Service
Training Battalion, followed by 21 days part-time in each of the ensuing three years - and a
requirement to remain on the Citizen
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Military Forces Reserve for a total period of five years following the initial date of enlistment.
This mean that a conscript was required to complete his initial training, attend an annual CMF
camp each year for the first three years and for the final two years of his obligation his name
was placed on the Reserve List which only required the conscript to notify the Army of his
change of address for record purposes.
In this eight year period a total of 197,787 National Service soldiers were trained by
the Army (or some 24,000 per year). This sheer volume of manpower placed a tremendous
strain on the ordnance services, but due to the hard won wartime experiences of mobilisation
the RAAOC coped with the on-going demands and huge demand on resources. Although
every measure was taken to conserve assets of clothing and personal equipment, such as
recycling and re-issuing items after repair, laundry and drycleaning - the large stocks of
clothing and equipment items which had been won vide the ‘Basis of Retention’ document
from the WW2 surpluses approved by Treasury were quickly wasted - and again the Army’s
stocks and war reserves were at minimum levels. The RAAOC provided the necessary supply
and support from its depots, but in addition to its traditional support, RAAOC also had to
provide the National Service Training Battalions in each State with appropriate numbers of
supply staff. As was the case with all other corps, RAAOC also had to provide the arbitrary
number of regimental and instructional staff, platoon commanders and company commanders.
Although the RAAOC survived this vigorous period of demand, the financial
constraints imposed on the ordnance services meant that during the 1950s the Army was
living on the ‘fat’ (surplus stockholding levels). This ‘fat’ was the legacy of WW2 which was
the result of labours of the CPO and AAOC, which had the foresight to fight to retain these
stocks of mobilisation items. To continue the scheme significant defence expenditure would
be required to replace equipment to support the program. The scheme was abandoned in
November 1959 and when the National Service Training Scheme was re-introduced in 1965,
registrants called up were required to serve a two year period of continuous military service.
At the end of the National Service Training Scheme in 1959 the Army’s stocks of
mobilisation items were both low and outdated. The government’s belief that it could
maintain a post war Army without a large budget (as was tried in pre- war Australia) was
again proved to be totally ill-founded.
Retrenchments and Closure of Depots
Due to economic constraints which were being experienced by the Army during the
mid 1950s, action was taken by the Military Board to reduce the size and structure of its
forces. The required savings were achieved through the retrenchment of officers and soldiers
considered to be surplus to requirements as a result of the planned closure of a number of
regular units. It is said (by those that were not retrenched) that the exercise was good for the
Army, as the opportunity arose to dispose of some ‘dead wood’ and the fact that there was a
general surplus of manpower for the actual tasks at hand. Unfortunately some
465
unit commanders did not ‘play the game’ as intended and in many cases good soldiers were
retrenched and ‘dead heads’ retained on the personal whims of the CO. It was unfortunate that
many RAAOC personnel with years of ordnance depot experience (in peace and war) were
retrenched compared to the ‘long timers and non movers’ at AHQ or COMD HQ who were
retained. No doubt this was another victory of the ‘thinkers’ over the ‘doers’. In line with
other corps the RAAOC was required to conduct a study of its own functions and determine
the number of depots and the required manpower considered to be essential to provide the
necessary level of supply support to the Army. As a consequence of this exercise a series of
depots, including depots such as Nungarin, Boronta, Somerton, Keilor, Branxton, Tocumwal
(to mention a few), were closed for reasons of economy. Other depots such as Bathurst,
Northam, Charters Towers and Mob Siding were downgraded to fulfil relatively minor roles.
Depots offering the best strategic and geographic locations, adequacy of facilities, efficient
layout and potential for future expansion were usually retained. For example
Bandiana/Albury, Wallangarra and Bogan Gate met this criteria - particularly because of the
(then)
Vehicle Park at 5 BOD Midland WA - 1951. The old railway fettlers homes in the background
were used as officers and soldiers married quarters. MAJ T. Boyce was responsible for
having the standard of MQ upgraded in WA during the 1950s.
(MAJ T. Boyce).
466
break in the railway gauges between the various States and the need to tranship stores in rail
transit at these depot sites. On the closure of the depot at Nungarin in 1958 the now famous
etched glass doors (with RAAOC badges) were removed from the Nungarin officers mess and
transferred to the 3 BOD Officers Mess at South Kensington. In turn, on the closure of that
mess the doors were passed to the Corps Officers Mess at Bandiana where they presently
grace the entrance to the mess.
Malaya
The Malayan Emergency 1955-60 was a conflict about which very little has been
written. The duration of this communist activity lasted some 5 yrs and saw the combined
forces of the Commonwealth countries of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand join
together in an integrated force which was known as the 28th Commonwealth Infantry
Brigade. Some may recognise this force as the same force which had earlier served in Korea
and this is quite correct. This force was first deployed in Korea and was relocated to Malaya
at the beginning of the Emergency which fortuitously coincided with the end of the hostilities
in Korea. The Emergency situation had been brought about by the aggressive actions of the
Communist terrorists under the command of Chin Ping.
As Malaya was a British colony the British authorities were in full control of the
emergency situation and all forces allotted to 28th Commonwealth Brigade (Australian and
New Zealand) were under overall British command.
Australia participated for the duration of the Emergency as part of the British
Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (BCFESR). The RAAOC was represented by a
small group of personnel posted to 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Ordnance Field
Park (28 OFP) located at Taiping (and later moved to a new camp at Malacca). The RAAOC
element in 28 OFP consisted of 14 personnel, which was headed by a RAAOC Officer
(CAPT). The preparation for overseas service that the RAAOC personnel received prior to
departure from Australia was virtually nil, with no specialist training, other than the trade
training normal to the employment. Therefore, the transition to operations in the tropics had to
be learned on arrival in country, as on-the-job training.
The RAAOC members posted to the 28 OFP were given full maintenance and
personnel support by the force host, Great Britain, which included all administration and
uniform maintenance. It was found that the UK type Jungle Green uniform was far more
sensible to wear and this uniform was adopted for all members of the 28 BDE irrespective of
nationality. The traditional headgear and embellishments of the Australian troops were not
abandoned in any way, and the slouch hat was a practical and much sought after prize in
Malaya.
28 OFP was capable of fully mobile operations and functions and operated in this role
quite often depending on conditions and level of support required for brigade operations.
Most of the vehicles employed in the force were Ford Thames Binned vehicles and wagons,
fully equipped and stocked with spares to support the brigade in the field. Stores
replenishment runs to 3 BOD Singapore
467
were made each week, using unit trucks and bulk carrying trailers. These trailers were also
used in field operations to carry bulk stocks behind the binned vehicles. It was found that the
majority of stores vehicles that plied the Taiping/Singapore route could be relied upon to
breakdown in Singapore!
The RAAOC staff posted to the 28 OFP occupied some of the key appointments in the
control office and stores area and to a man each RAAOC member was allocated a vehicle (eg:
a control office vehicle or binned vehicle and trailer).
The training and supply operations experience gained by the RAAOC personnel was
to be of great value to them in the years to come, particularly those who later served in
Vietnam. Over the years of the Emergency the OFP was to see a number of RAAOC
personnel serve in the unit on a two year posting. Many of these RAAOC members were to
achieve quite high rank and one officer later was to become the Head of Corps, (CAPT J.G.
Cosson), and others to senior positions within the corps, with all having gained by their
experience with the British Forces in Malaya.
When 28 OFP was established at Taiping it took up residence in the abandoned local
Catholic convent. This building itself was full of stories of ghosts, as the building and
occupants had been captured by the Japanese and many atrocities were known to have taken
place within its walls. The ‘Basha’ (sleeping quarters) were situated upstairs and the stores
and work areas downstairs. The unit messes were fitted in around the building wherever there
was room to spare.
One thing which stood out more than anything else during a tour of duty in Malaya
was the British ration scales which the Australians were required to use. Consequently all
Australian troops posted to Malaya were paid an allowance of ten shillings per day to
subsidise the variation in their diet (lower standard) as monetary compensation for what was
not being provided for by the British which the troops would normally receive under entitled
Australian ration scales. Many of the RAAOC members were in receipt of food parcels from
home which helped overcome the shortage of some vital condiments (vegemite?) which was
needed to sweeten or disguise the plain cooked meals offered.
To provide harmony in the unit the Australians would receive the same rates of pay as
the British soldiers on the unit pay parade, but following the parade the RAAOC members
would report to the RAAOC officer in a ‘back room’ for payment of the ‘supplementary
ration allowance’. Whilst in Malaya the Australians also continued to receive their entitled
issue of soap and razor blades, which the British also did not receive. This could not have
bothered the British members too much as they were not renowned as water babies - to the
extent that under supervision they had to sign the unit ‘Shower Book’, which was religiously
checked each week by the unit 2IC to ensure that an acceptable level of personal hygiene was
being maintained.
The RAAOC members who served in 28OFP adapted quite quickly into the British
Army way of life, but still managed to make some significant input into the units social and
ordnance technical roles. Many a good operation or social evening was partly due to the
efforts or talents of RAAOC personalities
468
who assisted in the planning, organising and execution of activities. The 28th Commonwealth
Infantry Brigade, in 1970, was to be re-organised and renamed the 28th ANZUK Brigade
which will be discussed in Chapter 17.
The Malayan Emergency was never described as a war from its beginning in 1945 to
mid 1954, even though it was during this time that the major communist offensive took on
some pace and visibility in the region. It should be remembered here that whilst it was an
operation run by the British defence authorities, many civilians and planters were more
directly involved in the day to day incidents, to a point where some planters and civilians
were required to protect themselves and were even involved in the shooting of CT
(Communist Terrorists) who were attacking their properties.
The war, which was won after some 11 years of constant pressure and dedication of
thousands of soldiers from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, East Africa, Fiji, Malayan police
and home guard, had been forgotten, overshadowed by Vietnam, which opened as Malaya
closed. The Malaya war was the first military defeat for world communism, but was played
down.
Defence Equipment Program
Following the end of the National Service Training Scheme in 1959, the plan for the
Australian Army was aimed at providing a regular army of 21,000 personnel, supported by
4,700 civilians and voluntary Civilian Military Forces (CMF) numbering 30,000. The ARA
order of battle was based on one infantry brigade group and its logistic support force. A
further battalion group was serving in Malaya, a battalion in the Pacific Islands Regiment in
Papua New Guinea and appropriate headquarters and administrative staff, maintenance and
training units, which were generally located along the eastern seaboard. A review of defence
equipment was conducted in order to determine how our reduced military strength could be
best equipped to carry out their role.
It was determined that equipment to be used by the Australian forces should be
standard or compatible with that of the United States forces, with whom Australia was bound
by certain defence arrangements (such as ANZUS and SEATO). It was considered that the
greatest threat to Australia was from nuclear war, or from communist expansion in the South
East Asian area. As South East Asia was seen as Australia’s first line of defence, in particular
Malaya, it was determined that our Army would be organised on a new Pentropic Division (in
line with US Army organisation), which would give greater flexibility and mobility to meet
modern war conditions in tropical areas.
In the late 1950s a loan for some $US 500 million was negotiated with the US
Government to allow Australia to re-equip its Army with state of the art military technology
and equipment. Items procured under the loan included personal field equipments, lightweight
tentage, general purpose 7.62mm machine gun (GPMG M60), 105mm howitzer field guns,
the recoilless rifle, LARC 5 amphibious vehicles, signalling and field radio equipments and
the M113 armoured vehicle range. In addition to the American equipments a decision was
made to replace
469
the outmoded .303 Lee Enfield rifle with the United Kingdom pattern FN Rifle (or 7.62mm
Self Loading Rifle) and Fl sub machine gun which were both manufactured under license in
Australia at the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow. The introduction of these new items, and the
extension of the Army light aircraft capability (fixed and rotary) to modernise the Army
created considerable work for the RAAOC, which was undertaken by the corps with
enthusiasm.
Non-Corps Postings
Following the war years there was a tendency by Head of Corps not to nominate
RAAOC officers for non-corps postings and for a time the view was also put that because of
the nature of their perceived employment, RAAOC officers should be exempted from the
same level of training undertaken by the general stream officers. This attitude changed with
the appointment of BRIG J.W. Lawson, OBE as the Director of Ordnance Services. During
his period of office from 1955 until 1967 Lawson advocated that RAAOC officers should
undergo the same level of training and obtain the same levels of qualifications extant for all
arms and corps. At the outset this approach met with considerable opposition, both from
within and outside of the corps. An example being that when BRIG Lawson was acting in the
absence of the DMGO, he could perform all duties, but not attend meetings of the Military
Board or P&S Committees, as logistic stream officers were restricted from such forums.
The above attitudinal problems eventually passed and by 1960 RAAOC officers were
well represented at Command and Staff College (both in Australia and overseas) and
following on RAAOC officers and SNCO were selected for non- corps and representational
appointments in Australia and overseas - bringing credit not only to themselves, but to the
Army as a whole.

post war australia and the fifties - The Home of the RAAOC Association

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