EU as a global actor based on the wider Petersberg Tasks

Transcription

Foresight Security Scenarios –
Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles
Problem space report: EU as a global actor based on the wider Petersberg Tasks Deliverable 6.1 Centre for Security and Defence Management – CSDM Institute of Information and Communication Technologies Bulgarian Academy of Sciences January 2012 FOCUS is co-funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme, theme "security",
call FP7-SEC-2010-1, work programme topic 6.3-2 "Fore sighting the contribution of security research to
meet the future EU roles".
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D6.1 – Problem Space Report: EU as a global actor
FOCUS
FOCUS (“Foresight Security Scenarios – Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to
Exogenous EU Roles”) aims wide but with concrete policy guidance in mind: namely to define the
most plausible threat scenarios that affect the “borderline” between the EU’s external and internal
dimensions to security – and to derive guidance for the Union’s future possible security roles and
decisions to plan research in support of those roles.
The FOCUS project is co-funded under the Security Research theme of the EU’s 7th EU Framework Programme, for the period of April 2011 to March 2013. FOCUS brings together 13 partners
from 8 countries, including universities, industry, think tanks and security information providers. For
more information about FOCUS, and to download presentations and multi-lingual project flyers, as
well as to access the foresight platform with online questionnaires, please visit the project website
at http://www.focusproject.eu.
Imprint
Responsible project partner:
CSDM
Authors:
Valeri Ratchev, Todor Tagarev, Petya Ivanova and Venelin Georgiev, CSDM
Alexander Siedschlag, Andrea Jerkovic, Diana Silvestru, Florian Fritz, SFU-CEUSS
Uwe Nerlich, CESS
Rachel Suissa, U-HAIFA
Contact information:
Main point of contact:
Todor Tagarev, tagarev@bas.bg
E-mail addresses of other individual contributors:
Valeri Ratchev, ratchevv@yahoo.com
Petya Ivanova, entarch@gmail.com
Venelin Georgiev, georgiev@defencemanagement.org
Alexander Siedschlag, alexander.siedschlag@sfu.ac.at
Andrea Jerkovic, jerkovic@european-security.info
Diana Silvestru, diana.silvestru@sfu.ac.at
Florian Fritz, florian.fritz@sfu.ac.at
Uwe Nerlich, nerlich@cess-net.eu
Rachel Suissa, rswisa@univ.haifa.ac.il
FOCUS Website
http://www.focusproject.eu
FOCUS
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Version history
Version
Date
Change/Remark
Responsible
(person,
beneficiary/ function)
0.6
29/12/2011
Full draft submitted to WP6 partners
Todor Tagarev, CSDM
0.9
18/01/2012
Submitted for PMT review
Todor Tagarev, CSDM
1.0
27/01/2012
Submitted version
Todor Tagarev, CSDM
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CONTENTS
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................... 6
2
INTRODUCTION: FORESIGHTING EU ROLES IN A FLUID ENVIRONMENT ...................................... 8
2.1
METHODOLOGICAL INSTANTIATION OF THE FOCUS APPROACH ..................................................................... 8
2.2
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT ........................................................................................................................... 9
2.3
EMBARKING ON A FORESIGHT EXERCISE IN A FLUID ENVIRONMENT............................................................... 10
2.3.1 Major challenges in an uncertain environment ............................................................................ 11
2.3.2 Assumptions ................................................................................................................................ 12
2.4
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2.3.2.1
The world............................................................................................................................................ 12
2.3.2.2
The European Union........................................................................................................................... 13
FORESIGHT IN THE 2035 TIME HORIZON......................................................................................................... 15
PRECIS.................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.1
OVERVIEW OF THE EU EXPERIENCE AS A GLOBAL ACTOR BASED ON THE PETERSBERG TASKS ................. 18
3.2
PETERSBERG TASKS: DEFINITION, DOCUMENTATION, EVOLUTION ................................................................ 21
3.3
ANALYSIS OF THE LISBON TREATY, CSDP AND ESS.................................................................................... 25
4
PROBLEM SPACE FOR ANALYZING EU ROLES AS A GLOBAL ACTOR BASED ON THE WIDER
PETERSBERG TASKS................................................................................................................................... 28
4.1
PRINCIPAL DIMENSIONS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF EU ROLES AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PLAYER .................... 28
4.1.1 External ambitions ....................................................................................................................... 28
4.1.2 Comprehensiveness of EU power ............................................................................................... 28
4.1.3 Cohesion of the European Union as a global security actor ....................................................... 29
4.1.4 Degree of vital interaction ............................................................................................................ 29
4.1.5 Nature of EU security mission and operations ............................................................................ 30
4.2
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR EU DECISION-MAKING .................................................................................. 30
4.3
EXTERNALTHREATS AND CHALLENGES TO THE EU ........................................................................................ 33
4.3.1 Exogenous threats at a glance .................................................................................................... 34
4.3.2 Mapping vulnerabilities of the EU and its citizens ....................................................................... 36
4.3.3 Review of applicable risk assessment......................................................................................... 39
4.3.4 Risk assessment concepts and methods .................................................................................... 40
4.4
EXPECTED SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FOR THE EU GLOBAL ROLE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF 2035 ................... 42
4.5
RELEVANT RESEARCH PROGRAMMES ........................................................................................................... 44
Bulgaria................................................................................................................................................................ 44
Canada ................................................................................................................................................................ 44
Switzerland .......................................................................................................................................................... 45
The Netherlands................................................................................................................................................... 45
United Kingdom.................................................................................................................................................... 45
United States........................................................................................................................................................ 45
Initiatives at European level ................................................................................................................................. 45
Activities of interest in the framework of NATO .................................................................................................... 46
United Nations...................................................................................................................................................... 47
4.6
RELEVANT METHODS FOR EXPLORATION OF EU ROLES AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR ............................. 47
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TRENDS, DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS ........................................................... 50
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5.1
TRENDS IN THE 2035 TIME HORIZON............................................................................................................... 50
5.2
DRIVERS OF CHANGE ...................................................................................................................................... 58
5.3
POTENTIAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS...................................................................................................................... 63
FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING EU GLOBAL SECURITY ROLES................................................... 67
6.1
THE EXTERNAL-INTERNAL NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ................................ 68
6.2
THE CONCEPT OF THE GLOBAL EU POWER .................................................................................................... 70
REFERENCES IN THE MAIN TEXT OF THE REPORT ........................................................................ 73
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Dimensions in tracking ESDP developments so far......................................................................... 23
Figure 2: Population growth (in percentages), medium variant....................................................................... 53
Figure 3: Population aged 65+, medium variant (in percentages of total population)..................................... 54
Figure 4: Breakdown of likely energy sources................................................................................................. 55
Table 1: Summary of the main steps to CFSP. ............................................................................................... 24
Table 2: Four ideal-typical futures. .................................................................................................................. 33
Table 3: Overview of security threats. ............................................................................................................. 36
Table 4: Risk Levels Matrix and Interpretation. ............................................................................................... 41
Table 5: Estimated status of nuclear forces in 2011. ...................................................................................... 56
ANNEXES
1. Definitions
2. Abbreviations used in the main text of the report
3. Evolution of the security and defence dimension of the European integration process
4. CSDP Mission Reports and Analyses
5. Research projects
6. Specialised publications
7. Dedicated Web Resources
8. Organisations and Experts
9. Catalogue of questions for scenario foresight
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international system in the 2035 time horizon will be rather different from the current one. It will
be more heterogeneous and hybrid than can be anticipated by short-term extrapolation. The scope
of change will depend mostly on developments in several main domains and the interplay between
the external environment of the Member States and the European Union and their domestic social
and political demands. Key among them will be the enhanced political, social, ideological and environmental impact of globalisation, counterbalanced by the influence of parallel processes of fragmentation.
Adding to that the persistent financial crisis and frequent related discussions among leaders of EU
Member States, it becomes impossible to extrapolate current trends in EU involvement in global
security and predict what would be the Union roles in two to three decades. One cannot predict
even how the European Union will look like in that timeframe. A number of hypotheses and scenarios on the future of the EU were published during our study (cf. Leonard, 2011; Piris, forthcoming), bringing forward widely differing alternatives of the political and institutional framework in
which decisions on ‘widening’ the Petersberg tasks will be made.
Nevertheless, the findings presented in this report and its annexes set the ground for rigorous exploration of future security roles of the European Union in the tradition of Peter Schwartz (1991),
enhanced by accumulated results from recent studies. The study team adopted a top-down approach to presenting the problem space for exploration of future EU roles as a global security actor
based on the Petersberg tasks. This approach provides for a structured description of the problem
space, including elaboration of principal dimensions for presenting EU roles as global security
player and sets a holistic framework for examination of threats and vulnerabilities assessment, EU
decision-making, and conceptual considerations.
The report provides an overview of the EU experience as a global security actor with a focus on
the definition and the evolution of the understanding of what was once designated as Petersberg
Tasks. It offers an analysis of aspects of the Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy
relevant to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It then provides a comprehensive
analysis of the principal trends in global security and identifies essential drivers of change, examining also specific challenges and strategic shocks that may steer global developments to one or
another alternative future.1 Finally, it presents a framework for exploring EU global security roles,
incorporating a concept of the global EU power and examination of the external-internal nexus in
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The report is based on the understanding that the problem space description it provides naturally
addresses a variety of aspects, including policies and capabilities of different kind. This problem
space description provides an information background and indicative questions for subsequent
FOCUS work. FOCUS foresight work will fully take place in the context of civil security research as
defined in the 7th EU Framework Programme. Because FOCUS is not defined as a policy-related
project, it will not further address policies, and as a civilian security research project, it will not perform foresight related to defence and military aspects of security.
Additional information supporting the use of this report and follow up work in Work Package (WP) 6
and related ‘Big Themes’ of FOCUS is provided in nine annexes as follows:
1. WP6 specific definitions
1 Theme-specific definitions of terms like ‘driver,’ ‘strategic shock’ and others are provided in Annex 1.
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2. Abbreviations used in the main text of the report
3. Evolution of the security and defence dimension of the European integration process
4. CSDP mission reports and analyses of operational experience
5. Research projects
6. Specialised publications, including articles, studies, and books
7. A list of dedicated web resources
8. Lists of organizations and experts
9. A catalogue of questions for scenario foresight
Thus, this deliverable serves a ground for scenario foresight. The consequent research in WP6.2
will identify distinct future roles of the EU as a global security actor, while WP6.3 will deliver the respective security research scenarios.
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INTRODUCTION: FORESIGHTING EU ROLES IN A FLUID
ENVIRONMENT
The Problem Space Report for the EU roles as a global security actor is structured according to the
Common Framework for FOCUS Problem Space Reports, as detailed in Annex 7 of Deliverable
(D) 2.1 describing the project methodology. This deliverable has been produced as the main product of task WP6.1 Problem Space. This report will be used as input for WP6.2 “Scenarios for EU
Roles” and WP6.3 “Scenarios for Security Research,” as well as for the identification of cross-cutting issues amidst the FOCUS five ‘Big Themes.’
2.1
METHODOLOGICAL INSTANTIATION OF THE FOCUS APPROACH
The present report is based on the understanding that the description of the problem space
inevitably touches on a broad variety of aspects, including policies and capabilities of different kind.
This description will serve as an information background and indicative questions for subsequent
FOCUS work. FOCUS foresight work will fully take place in the context of civil security research as
defined in the 7th EU Framework Programme. FOCUS is not defined as a policy-related project,
and therefore further it will not address policies. As a civilian security research project, it will not
perform foresight related to defence and military aspects of security.
WP6 explores alternative paths for EU in the global domain of security. In comparison with other
‘Big Themes,’ the WP6 exploration is intrinsically more hypothetical, with few, if any, historical
precedents. A global perspective is necessary if the EU is to be understood as a global actor. But
at this stage of global affairs the world is at the brink of shifts that may bring fundamental restructuring in the international social system and its security domain. Their impact on the EU is both inevitable and profound. In reality, EU is a global actor in some areas of international relations but is
rarely perceived as a global security actor.
The specific questions are:
1. Under what conditions would EU need to become a global security actor?
2. What will this involve?
3. What will be the consequences for the EU and Europe if the Union fails to prepare for and
act as a global security actor?
WP6 thus requires primarily a top-down approach with a longer time horizon and a critically important need to specify exploratory scenarios.
In the implementation of such approach, WP6.1 resulted in this report providing a structured description of the problem space. WP6.2 will then identify distinct future roles of the EU as a global
security actor. These roles may be alternative or complementary.
Distinct roles of the EU will be described through the respective sets of values (choices) along
each of the principal dimensions in the decision space.
EU roles will evolve, and new distinct roles will emerge under the impact of a set of drivers, trends,
and, possibly, strategic shocks, or ‘wild cards.’
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The exploration of the decision space is not random; it is guided (and in some sense constrained)
by some overarching concepts on the global role of the EU and its evolution.
Threats and challenges, in their evolution, form one group of drivers, while the study of vulnerabilities of the European Union will serve primarily to enhance the understanding of transversal issues,
e.g. how internal security developments affect the EU’s choice of roles as a global actor, and vice
versa.
Hence, preparing the ground for WP6.2 and WP6.3 studies, this problem space report examines,
inter alia, dimensions, trends, drivers, strategic shocks, threats, vulnerabilities, structural constraints and transversal issues.
WP6.2 will result in ‘scenarios of EU roles’ (‘context scenarios’) to meet the challenges described
in the Problem Space Report. In particular, the exploration of the problem space of ‘EU as a global
actor based on wider Petersberg Tasks’ will address new threats that have not been dealt with and
could involve additional Petersberg Tasks. In addition, formal delivery of D6.2 will provide a ‘Table
of topics and necessary disciplines for a European research agenda for rapid response in crisis
management and civil protection.’
WP6.3 then will deliver security research scenarios that will be embedded in the FOCUS methodology and platform, thus providing for the study of transversal issues. The further analysis of the
embedded scenarios will result in the definition of security research requirements. These requirements may stem from:
•
the need to elaborate innovative strategies to resolve the issues described in the embedded scenario;
•
the search for adequate concepts of operation, organisational arrangements and procedures for interaction among EU players and partners in the implementation of the comprehensive approach;
•
definition of novel capability requirements, for which technologies do not yet exist;
•
identified opportunities to achieve comparative advantages through spin-in, i.e. opportunities to adapt and integrate existing or emerging commercial technologies for security purposes, etc.
2.2
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
According to the FOCUS framework and the project methodology defined in D2.1, this report presents the necessary additional information to facilitate implementation, especially for use by the
Future Groups. Towards that purpose Chapter 2 provides an overview of the EU experience as a
global actor based on the Petersberg tasks and analysis of the relevant provisions of the Lisbon
Treaty and the European security strategy.
Chapter 3 structures the problem space for analyzing EU roles as a global actor based on the
wider Petersberg tasks. It recommends principal dimensions for describing EU roles as a global
security player, provides analysis of the structural conditions for EU decision-making, review of exogenous challenges and threats to the EU, the vulnerabilities of the Union and its citizens related
to global security roles and applicable risk assessment, as well as risk assessment concepts and
methods. It then outlines expected specific challenges for the EU global role in the perspective of
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2035. The chapter presents also identified national, European and other programmes aiming to
enhance capabilities to meet relevant exogenous challenges through research. Finally, it provides
a brief overview of theme-specific methods for scenario foresight.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to theme specific trends and drivers that may lead to a particular context
scenario and emergence of a new global security role of the European Union. It further provides a
list of potential strategic shocks that may cause an abrupt change in patterns of evolution of the
security environment. Chapter 5 elaborates on the framework for exploring EU global security
roles.
The main text of the report includes a rich list of references, while the accompanying file includes
annexes with theme specific definitions; abbreviations; description of the evolution of the security
and defence dimension of the European integration process; CSDP mission reports and analyses
of operational experience; relevant research projects; lists of specialised publications, including articles, studies, and books; a list of dedicated web resources; lists of organizations and experts; and
a catalogue of questions for scenario foresight.
2.3
EMBARKING ON A FORESIGHT EXERCISE IN A FLUID ENVIRONMENT
The question is not about the EU having a global security role or not – the Union already has an
internationally recognised role. As two seasoned observers of Europe indicate, “the European Union, the world’s leading economic power in 2009, could constitute an appropriate level of economic
sovereignty within globalisation – the EU is too large to be ignored by any business, government or
regional bloc in the world – but the historical conditions in which it emerged as a political entity and
the institutional regime that ensued prevent it from assuming this role” (Fitoussi & Laurent, 2009).
The focus of this study is not on how to project the EU achievements in the future but to facilitate
the definition of plausible options describing the character and intensity of that role. Historically, the
process of elaboration of a political entity as a global security actor has included several principal
elements: the entity should have (or should be able to build) a significant expeditionary capacity,
ability to generate political will for this capacity to be exploited on the global security scene, to engage in solving critical international security disputes, and to be recognised by the others as a decisive global actor. From the perspective of the EU such development requires also a strong and
long lasting internal cohesion, an effective decision-making process, stable public support, and
systematic efforts in building comprehensive operational capabilities.
The exploration of options however takes place in a fluid environment. For one, it is not clear which
EU can be taken as a point of departure. The EU is currently in the centre of structural debates.
Different EU models are needed to reflect different environments—political, economic, and strategic—in different time frames to identify different global security roles. Already today the financial
pressures, but implicitly also e.g. the Libyan experience call for changes. The EU has already
moved beyond the Lisbon Treaty to what has become a ‘Lisbon +’ arrangement and, at the time of
writing this report, EU leaders suggest further changes almost daily.
To reflect this environment, before reflecting on historical experience, the report starts with a review of some overarching challenges and hypotheses.
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2.3.1
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Major challenges in an uncertain environment
In the beginning of the second decade of the Twenty first century Europe is confronted with fundamental challenges. The more or less common sense throughout European societies is that financial crises, growing unemployment, and related social difficulties come as a result of poor political leadership, unacceptable withdrawal of states from politico-economic affairs, and inefficiencies at the European scale of politics. Obviously, people feel that they do not have the capacity to
overcome the surge of complexity in their life while national governments face fundamental problems in dealing with the interdependence and total competitiveness of the contemporary world.
Europe as a whole is not secure (in comprehensive terms) and effective at home and has not got a
relevant influence (to say nothing about dominance) in its strategic environment.
One may see all these developments as collateral difficulties with a temporary effect. Others may
evaluate them as tectonic and anticipate a turning point in the realisation of the ‘European project.’
However, the current structural debate at EU level illustrates the way the political leadership is
looking for opportunities to cope with the growing challenges. Obviously, it is a political, but mostly
an analytical challenge to generate illustrative hypotheses on how the future of Europe might look
like and to discuss their relevance to the potential choices of EU roles as a global security actor. If
introduced, such hypotheses will help steer the debate on the EU future in different environments
(i.e. political, economic, and strategic) and in different timeframes.
Investigating potential future roles of the European Union on the global security scene involves a
discussion about leadership and choices. The aim of this study is not to affirm what is already
known about EU as an actor in the security domain of international relations. Rather, it is to explore
the many ways in which EU itself and the world as a whole could co-evolve in the future, and to
examine what those possible paths may imply for the EU security roles.
The role of the policy maker, whether in a domestic, European and/or an international system, is to
master the system: to be able to take actions now which will lead to desirable events, or to avoid in
the future undesirable events. Leadership and choices in the case of the EU’s CFSP and Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are shared responsibility – shared between people, nations,
states, and leaders. This imperative is at the core of the European project and will remain valid in
future.
As discussed further in detail in this FOCUS deliverable, in the coming decades the European
leadership will make choices in a fluid strategic environment with tectonic shifts in global distribution of power, world economic architecture, and regional geopolitics under the effects of globalisation on people mindsets, social constructs, market vitality, national politics, and international security architecture. The current analyses are mostly focused on the visible aspects of globalisation at
the strategic level as production and market redistribution, financial power and stability, and the redistribution of power. The next generation of studies may address issues like social turbulence, political ideology and religion as protection against the effects of globalisation, fragmentation of control over power, the role of individualism, etc. The equilibrium between strategic and social impacts
of globalisation presumably will determine the most significant security development in the next
decades: the rising of regional powers and their search for global roles.
The future European leadership in security will make choices in an environment characterised by
increased uncertainty and risk. Humanity has unique opportunity to manage poverty, to balance
political and ideological differences, and to find new purposes for co-operation and collaboration –
goals that form the backbone of the Millennium Development Goals and the CFSP paradigm.
However, the lack of progress in dealing with these issues may produce further distress within the
EU immediate environment and on the global scene.
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The main characteristic of globalisation is the simultaneous growth of integration and fragmentation
forces. Both integration and fragmentation have their benefits and costs. Integration and fragmentation will shape the world developments in the coming decades with consequences that can
hardly be predicted. The European Union itself is not secure from infiltration of negative influences.
The forces of integration such as business, finance, technology, anti-poverty, care for the planet,
and others are actually changing the world. They have their internal contradictions, such as the
ongoing relocation of jobs from developed to developing countries, establishment of the so called
technologically super-empowered groups and individuals, supply chain vulnerabilities, environmental costs, and the rising prospect of health pandemics. The EU as a global actor is expected to
cope with the ensuing challenges. The forces of fragmentation are rooted in nationalism maintaining the status quo, ambitious geopolitics, ethno-religious radicalism, and demographic disproportions (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2008). The former British Prime-minister Tony Blair
summed this up by underlining the stark and disturbing contrast between the growing integration of
global economies and the fragmented, dysfunctional global politics (cf. Blair, 2007).
Before embarking on foresight of future global roles of the EU, the FOCUS study will address what
by now already is a disturbing controversy: Which EU do we assume as a point of departure and
what are the structural options and what is the time frame? The EU is not locked to changes. The
Treaty of Lisbon has created a new external action system for the EU, but not a new external
common policy (Missiroli, 2010). Its effectiveness depends both on the political will to pursue a
common threat perception and positions and the capacity of the EU empowered leadership to build
and maintain consolidated CFSP and CSDP. Decisions on CFSP are often made as a sum of
Member States foreign policy interests and ambitions. To illustrate the challenge, Fitoussi &
Laurent (2009) argue that the EU presents in itself ‘a little globalisation.’ And its evolution is currently in the centre of structural and functional debates. FOCUS will go beyond this notion to relate
different hypotheses on future EU constructs to alternative future environments (at least in political,
economic, and strategic aspects) in different time frames to identify options for different global security roles.2
2.3.2
Assumptions
2.3.2.1 The world
Within the time horizon of 2035 we may expect two virtual periods of development in the global security domain. During the next ten to fifteen years the momentum still inspired by the end of the
Cold War and the wave of globalisation will shape the world political, economic, and security affairs. Divergence is the core characteristic of that period. Its defining features are accelerated redistribution of economic power towards Asia, changing regional dynamics in the Middle East and
the turbulence within the ‘West.’ A number of foresight studies (Möckli, 2011; Strategic Trends
Programme, 2010; National Intelligence Council, 2010) concur that the process of redistribution of
economic power, combined with the West’s insufficient political will to unilaterally provide global
stability, will result in a security vacuum. In addition, it may be assumed that during this time segment neither China nor India would be able to step into the shoes of the US as a globally dominant
security actor. On the other hand, emerging powers may be expected Experts expect to transform
gradually their growing economic potential into regional ambitions of influence and control. In such
perspective the FOCUS research will assess key trends that may lead to different pictures of future
conflicts, as explained in 4.1 of this report, suggesting as well a set of adequate EU security roles
that will reflect the transversal impact of structural and deterministic drivers and trends.
2 A list of possible constructs is presented in the next section of this report.
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Referring to the period after 2020-25, we will need to look beyond the space in which current
trends could be extrapolated. The main feature of the political world in that timeframe will most
probably be the absence of poles and the advent of multiple regional powers and non-governmental actors. The world is likely to be more “… interdependent, complex and unstable” (Gnesotto
& Grevi, 2006). A ‘non-polar world’ is a world dominated not by one, two or even several powerful
states, but rather a conglomerate of many states and non-state actors, each of which will have
some capacity to influence global affairs. This means a tectonic shift that counters the trend of the
past three centuries.
Further, the exploration of possible EU security roles has to account for those hidden factors that
are currently at the peak of their impact, such as globalisation, or about to grow quickly in importance, e.g. the spread of advanced technologies. For instance, changes in three key parameters—
trans-border trade, flow of private capitals, and movement of people—point to a tendency of slowing globalisation processes. With slowing trade, reduced capital mobility and fewer people crossing
borders, these three key elements of globalisation have been reversed. At the same time, the
spread of advanced technologies with multiple applications—from healthcare to deadly combat,
from ground to space, and from material to virtual—has the potential to grow quickly. The future
security environment will be shaped also by efforts to eradicate extreme poverty.
FOCUS will study those plausible developments that may lead to alternative futures in a dynamic
way, looking for gradual accumulation of arguments relevant to potential EU security missions, capabilities and operations.
2.3.2.2 The European Union
The global view portrayed in the preceding sub-chapter may serve as a platform for analyzing different hypotheses on the EU future. A significant number of reports analyse specific aspects of future developments in Europe and the EU such as climate, water, land, transportation, etc. Five of
them were identified and examined. They were written between 2001 and 2011 and discuss the
future of the EU overall construct in the time period between 2010 and 2040. Most of them are titled as scenarios or alternative futures but indeed the methodology of scenario building has been
applied with considerable limitations and interpretations (Ellis, 2001; Gnessoto, 2006; Fitoussi &
Laurent, 2009; Laursen, 2010, Leonard, 2011). Following the approach of The United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century (1999), it is important to distinguish descriptive from
prescriptive works, not to let the pressure of current concerns generate unwitting bias and selectivity, as well as to avoid any compartmentalisation on subject matters. Nevertheless, even when
written as essays, they bring important intellectual light on the future of the European project.
Focusing on EU structural perspectives, and not limiting analysis to current institutional difficulties,
the following hypotheses have been selected as most relevant to the specific theme:
•
The first hypothesis one could title as ‘implementation model.’ It is based on projection of
Lisbon Treaty legal and decision-making framework and implementation mechanism to find,
or actually waiting for, incremental solutions to hitherto unresolved problems within the institutional system, but without the capacities to deal with challenges from the international
environment (Leonard, 2011; Gnessoto, 2006). It assumes a combination of internal flexibility within the Lisbon Treaty frame and highly stable and predictable international environment in the long-run. Both preconditions are tested by recent developments as the financial crisis and the turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East.
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•
The second hypothesis one could designate as ‘reconstruction model.’ It is focussed on
finding selective solutions within the Lisbon Treaty system, e.g. a smaller Euro zone with
more integration. It could be realised in a relatively short-term, but would affect the EU at
large (Leonard, 2011). As Laursen (2010) depicts it: “Flexibility, multi-speed integration, in
various forms, have contributed to the integration process in the past, so why not in other
areas, including CFSP?” Instrument like Schengen, Eurozone, Eurocorps, etc., have been
established as products of flexibility within the treaties. The agreement, reached by the
leaders of France and United Kingdom (November 2010) to increase their cooperation in
security and defence illustrates another opportunity for variable geometry and speed of integration. However, development of external dimensions in several domains could reinforce—but also deflate—such a development, e.g. in addition to finance, energy, migration,
and communication.
•
A third hypothesis that is already under discussion is to keep the Lisbon-27 system, but
establish a more integrated smaller system based on new treaties, possibly as a political or
fiscal union (Leonard, 2011; Ellis, 2001). One could title this option as a ‘fence model’ because the goal here seems simple – to ring-fence the stronger nations within a tight fiscal
union in order to contain the crisis. As it was publicly discussed (Reuters, 28 November
2011) one approach is based on a smaller group of EU states that would agree on stricter
fiscal discipline, allowing others to join if they agreed to abide by the same principals. Another option is to have an agreement just between Germany and France, with others joining
later.
•
The fourth hypothesis envisages an intergovernmental treaty system outside the scope of
the Lisbon system which would call for more integration in critical domains like defence and
security. Marc Leonard (2010) titled this as “Federalism without the federalists,” while Fitoussi & Laurent (2009) prefer ‘Europe of public goods.’ The context of this hypothesis is
that institutionally the EU may evolve through reconciling two fundamental realities of the
European project – the nation state and pooled sovereignty. Actually, this pseudo-federal
system will focus on political and social goods like macroeconomic stability, employment,
advancement of knowledge, communications, environmental protection, mobility, energy to
be delivered to all Europeans and not only one or another member state (Fitoussi &
Laurent, 2009).
The distinctions between these models need more refined discussion, which is already happening
on the political arena and under the pressure of the financial crisis. Their focus is on the relation
between all Member States and the subset of those that are able and willing to move towards
deeper integration. Re-nationalisation and marginalisation of the EU in case of failing integration
efforts have also been spelled out.
The study will further discuss these models in relation to potential EU roles as a global security
actor based on the wider Petersberg Tasks. For that purpose the following inter-related conceptual
issues would need a theoretical clarification and illustration beforehand:
•
Europe as a collective action system;
•
The regional and global structures/environments the European action system is operating
within;
•
The role(s) of the European action system as a global security player; and
•
The timeframe within which the European action system is assumed to play what role within
a specified environments.
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15
These four issues provide a conceptual framework that allows treating each of the FOCUS five ‘Big
Themes’ in a systematic way. The study will investigate which of the models is relevant to particular environment in what time horizon and what roles the EU may assume as a global security actor.
2.4
FORESIGHT IN THE 2035 TIME HORIZON
In building and sustaining its global role, the EU has to find solutions to serious conceptual, normative, organisational, and capability issues. Holistic and long-term thinking should be a European
foreign and security policies imperative. The main problem with this approach comes from the fact
that mere extrapolation of current trends within the security domain is not applicable. Globalisation—indisputably the driving force for the coming decades—is a highly dynamic, complex phenomenon that may take a different course under any among a number of plausible shocks.
Remoteness of decisions over time defines the need for enduring policy planning that should be
based on foresight scenarios. In case of a considerable distance in a time perspective an appropriate method for policy planning is to create a set of foresight scenarios with contextual or alternative
future character. The foresight scenarios are broad views of how the future might turn out. They
are intended as tools for forward planning, rather than as predictions of what the future world will
be like. Explaining the space of plausible futures in which the future world may unfold the EU
global security role should be tied not to particular scenarios but to the space sketched by the scenarios.
In line with the theory of Peter Schwartz (1991), the process begins by identifying forces of change
in the world, and then combines those forces in different ways to create a set of diverse stories—or
scenarios—about how the future could evolve. Importantly, scenarios are not predictions. Rather,
they are thoughtful hypotheses that allow us to imagine, and then to rehearse different strategies
for how to become better prepared for the future; or more ambitiously – how to help shape better
futures ourselves.
The anticipated global role of the EU should be determined in a way adequate to global developments. In this line of reasoning the framework of the role, described by the Petersberg tasks,
should be seen mostly as a starting point, mainly for the purpose of planning the necessary operational capabilities.
An important element of dealing with fluid environments is the introduction of a system of horizons
of the EU’s role as a global actor. Selected for this project time horizon of year 2035 is dictated by
the specific objective to plan the necessary security research as an intellectual support for the policy of establishing an EU global role. Looking ahead to the next decade the EU will obviously focus
on the remedying the consequences of the financial crisis and implementing the necessary legislative and organisational changes to eradicate such occurrences or at least make them reliably controllable. During this period the EU will most likely be limited to the existing role, and will use the
available operational capabilities to implement the Petersberg Tasks. The focus of planning will be
put on better packaging of various capability components, their technological development and
functional maintenance, in a way possibly resembling NATO views and approaches to ‘Smart Defence.’
The EU will likely seek to enter the next stage of its development with a clear idea as to the architecture and norms, as well for its own role in global security relations. In a multipolar but interdependent world, the EU will likely seek an important role in resolving the major international security
issues. Since most likely during this period the system of international relations will be virtually un-
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recognizable when compared with the 2011 status quo, the Petersberg Tasks will probably be
specified based on lessons learned.
The international system in the 2035 time horizon will be rather different from the current one “owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth
and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors” (National
Intelligence Council, 2008). It will be more heterogeneous and hybrid than can be anticipated by
short-term extrapolation. The scope of change will depend mostly on developments in several main
domains, the interplay between the external environment of the countries and the Union and their
domestic social and political demands. Key among them will be the strong political, social, ideological and environmental impact of globalisation.
It is safe to assume that in the coming couple of decades most countries will experience the impact—positive or negative—of globalised economic relations. This will have, despite all others, a
major effect on social balances and will drive societies towards specific political demands regarding national and international security. These may produce a new equilibrium between public attitudes and relevant political will, between alignment and self-protection, and between international
engagement and isolation.
Globalised economic forces will deeply affect all other domains of world affairs: ideologies and beliefs and their political impact on governance, the global order and geopolitical ambitions that will
drive the political behaviour of states, the spread of weapon systems and technologies that may
permit transformation of economic power into ambitions for control, environmental developments
and their impact on all other domains.
In the horizon of 2035 EU will probably seek to achieve full internal consolidation in order to realize
its capacity of a comprehensive global power. The focus will be on the restructuring of the system
of international relations in a manner consistent with the settled redistribution of power. The EU
can be expected to seek global roles, supported by a new generation of capabilities and implemented within a new network of strategic partnerships.
The concept of security in the time horizon of 2035 will move further away from narrowly defined
defence, through a ‘spectrum of security’, towards societal and human security that will generate
significantly different conceptual views. One may expect that security will continue to derive from
national power, but at the same time nations will neither resemble what they did a century ago, nor
will power have the same well-known dimensions.
Globalisation of economy and politics inevitably will lead towards globalisation of geopolitics. Geopolitics is mostly about control of geographical space. In the coming decades ‘space’ will differ
profoundly from what is known now. The wide spread of technologies, knowledge, skills, and services will build a new geographic domain. Globalised business will be much more powerful than
governments in most of the developing areas of the world. It will create different social environments across borders, producing new roles for politics and politicians. In parallel, a new notion of
security—one related more to humanity issues, social justice, financial and economic stability than
to sovereignty of borders—will gradually win recognition.
In such an environment the range of security challenges will grow with new kinds of threats, which
will arise in new areas of the international-national security realm, and thus will significantly widen
the spectrum of conflict. But even with such expectations, war as it is known today will be of lesser
concern.
Consequently, the list of international security actors will undergo significant change. Within the
transition from ‘national’ to ‘international’ and ‘global,’ the core problem, with which the theory and
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practice of security should cope with, will be the constitution of legitimate security actors and objects of security policy. As a result, the security agencies also have to be reconsidered and redesigned.
In such an environment, the elaboration of a consolidated concept of global security, in which EU
specific roles may occur, would seem a serious research challenge. Even further, solving the conceptual problem of global security probably will require auxiliary elaboration of the theory of international relations – meaning that any post-liberal framing of security should overcome the limitations of state centrism and determine the character of ‘global’ in the security domain and the transition to it from ‘international’ and ‘national.’ As some researchers anticipate, the paradigm of security may be transformed into ‘management of insecurity’ in an environment of an unmanageable
number of subjects and objects of security (Stedman, Jones & Pascual, 2008; Peake, Scheve &
Hills, 2007).
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3
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PRECIS
This part of the report provides an overview of the EU experience as a global security actor with a
focus on the definition and the evolution of the understanding of the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”
that originated in 1992 and were widened subsequently. It then offers an analysis of aspects of the
Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy relevant to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy. Annex 3 provides further detail on the evolution of the security and defence dimension of
the European integration process.
3.1
OVERVIEW OF THE EU EXPERIENCE AS A GLOBAL ACTOR BASED ON
THE PETERSBERG TASKS
The capacity of the Union to address the external dimension of security is based on a state-centred
perspective dominated by a couple of leading Member States, and the national capabilities they
make available—or do not make available—for common EU action. This is mirrored in the Union’s
security strategies, which mainly represent lowest common denominators of, classically speaking,
“cultural selections of risk” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) by the Member States (Giegerich, 2006;
Kirchner & Sperling, 2007). The European Security Strategy, drafted in 2003 and reviewed in 2008
under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council (European Council, 2003, 2008) defines the main external threats facing the EU as a
whole, based on a Member States’ consensus. The Internal Security Strategy (European Commission, 2010) sets out commonly identified internal threats to the 27 EU Member States. Both strategies have converged on terrorism and organised crime, for example. This highlights the importance
of future research on the internal-external security nexus.
In June 1999, what was then called the “European Security and Defence Policy” (ESDP) was
adopted by the European Council (heads of EU Member States and government), meeting in Cologne. The ESDP was primarily intended to ensure the viability of EU crisis intervention, particularly
reflecting the Western Balkans experience, and was based on the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks.’
These tasks referred to civil missions as well as military operations in crisis management (with the
high end of the Petersberg Task spectrum stopping short of common defence), as first formulated
at the Ministerial Conference of the Western European Union (WEU) in Bonn in 1992 and then
adopted by the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The tasks comprised humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
The creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) independent from NATO decision-making—but to some extent depending on NATO making available some of its commonly
owned assets (“Berlin plus” agreement)—aimed to strengthen the external capacity of the European Union, including civil-military cooperation between the Member States in international crisis
management. ESDP has never been the only component of EU external security, which also includes political as well as economic and social components and financial mechanisms for international crisis assistance. However, ESDP at least theoretically aimed at the development of a common defence policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that had already been established in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The European Security Strategy (2003)
then set forth the objective of making the European Union “a credible and effective actor” that is
“ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”.
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19
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) has now formally established such a Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP), envisioning that the Petersberg Tasks are widened accordingly. Following Article
43 of the Treaty on European Union in the version of Lisbon, the wider (or ‘extended’) Petersberg
Tasks additionally include: joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance; operations to stabilise the post-conflict situations; and support to third countries in combating terrorism.
The main strategic context for this widening of the spectrum of tasks is again provided by the
European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 which, among other things, pointed out that preventive
engagement could avoid more serious problems and future external threats to the security of the
European Union and its citizens. It also concluded that the development of capabilities should consider a wider range of possible missions. The European Security Strategy as well acknowledged
that new threats—originating from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organised crime—can no longer be fought by military means alone, and require the provision of military and civilian capabilities as well as the cooperation of political and civilian organizations of the
international community. A strategic objective, according to ESS, should therefore be the creation
of a European strategic culture beyond the lowest common denominator of Member States’ national security cultures.
The implementation review of ESS (European Council, 2008) stresses that the Union now disposes of an unmatched repertory of instruments and activities to foster human security and address underlying causes of insecurity and conflict. Based on this, the EU should contribute to renewing multilateralism at the global level, which includes better cooperation with NATO in crisis
management.
The chief instrument is seen in the building of “stability in Europe and beyond,” and in 2008 it was
obviously believed not to be common and thus worth mentioning in the ESS review report that
“Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood” (European Council, 2008: 7).
These security interests were mainly associated with:
•
strengthening the security-development nexus;
•
fighting piracy by deterrence; and
•
combating illegal spread of small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and landmines.
The report also stresses the need to prioritize commitment and resources and concludes that the
framework of EU Battlegroups as well as Civilian Response Teams has already contributed to this,
whereas headquarters and command capabilities were assessed to need reinforcing in order to
more effectively combine civilian and military expertise in designing and conducting missions and
operations. Key operational capabilities such as strategic airlift and collaboration arrangements for
burden sharing between Member States were once more called for, as well as a strategy to maintain public support for global EU engagement.
The European Union continues to resort to the capabilities of its Member States. The European
Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that emanated from the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 consists of
national units which the relevant Member States earmark and which may only be used upon the
approval of the Member States. Based on the Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU should be able to
provide up to 60,000 troops within 60 days for primarily peacekeeping operations (such as the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by EUFOR Althea). The establishment of new political and
military bodies—including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee
(EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS)—provided new mechanisms for coordination among
Member States.
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In 2004, moreover, it was agreed that further improvement of capabilities was necessary and the
Headline Goal 2010 was agreed on because the original goal of a comprehensive operational capability had not been achieved by that time. The implementation of the improvement of military capabilities is still ongoing. The EU Battle Groups were established in this context. These highly flexible combat units (each consisting of approximately 1,500 soldiers in designated national units, expected to be available for crisis intervention within 5-10 days)3 can also be seen as a political
mechanism for closer cooperation, which should lead to an overall improvement of capabilities for
fast and effective cooperative efforts in crisis management.
The EU’s multi-level and organizational structure of policy making does not always portray a homogenous picture. The management of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which
also under the Lisbon regime forms an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), remains in the responsibility of the Member States, and within the limits of their interests
and the resources made—or not made—available by them. In other words, even if the European
Commission and the European Parliament are involved, the Member States determine the course
of the CFSP. There is no political consensus on the creation of integrated, commonly owned European capabilities that would allow to deal with the whole range of the widened Petersberg Tasks,
addressing the entire spectrum of the crisis management activities foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty
(Koutrakos, 2011; Reiter, Rummel & Schmidt, 2002).
Following analyses by the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (Biscop et al., 2010), the
aim of the Common Security and Defence Policy established by the Treaty of Lisbon is not only to
conduct the whole spectrum of the wider Petersberg Tasks, but also to give the EU more weight in
international security and international relations in general. The institute’s analyses also re-focus
the ambivalent relationship between security institutions such as EU and NATO:
[W]hile it would appear that the EU is taking a back seat as a strategic actor and that NATO is consolidating, it is important to realise another equally essential fact: European defence is not a project
of the past but a modern necessity. Various international developments – the relative decline of
military might, the deteriorating situation in Europe’s southern neighbourhood, America’s new priorities beyond Europe, NATO’s structural weakness – mean that an increase in the European Union’s
strategic responsibility is virtually inevitable. This is all the more the case given that the United
States will no longer be able or will no longer be willing to perform the full range of crisis management tasks in the world. America’s diminishing role in this respect will mean that Europe will increasingly be obliged to act. In many ways, even if current trends seem to point towards the EU relinquishing power, the rising tide of globalisation is ultimately bound to sweep the EU into a prominent position as a strategic actor. (Biscop et al., 2010:11-12)
To some (cf. National Intelligence Council 2008: 60-99), the solution appears to be a bundling of
military power in order to overcome the shrinking influence of “the West” in the context of global
power shifts. NATO has acted accordingly by establishing a military-strategic partnership with the
EU at its Lisbon Summit in 2010, where it was specified (NATO, 2010) that NATO should have access to civil-military capabilities of the EU (so-called “inverse Berlin plus”).
3 According to the “EU Battlegoups Factsheet,” EU Council Secretariat, EU BG 02, November 2006,
<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf>, the readiness of the
battle groups is “5-10 days”, i.e. battle group forces should be able to start implementing the mission on
the ground up to no later than ten days upon the Council decision to launch an operation (chart on p. 3).
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3.2
21
PETERSBERG TASKS: DEFINITION, DOCUMENTATION, EVOLUTION
This section examines the current state of the Petersberg Tasks in the broader context of the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union following the Lisbon Treaty.
The Treaty on European Union in its Lisbon Version defines CSDP and the Petersberg tasks in its
Articles 42-44 as follows:
•
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union but does not prejudice the character of Member States’ security and defence policy and common defence in NATO;
•
CSDP includes the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to
a common European defence upon unanimous decision of the European Council (heads of
state and government of the EU Member States);
•
Decisions relating to CSDP are adopted by unanimous decision of the Council, based on a
proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
or a Member State initiative;
•
CSDP gives the EU operational capacity based on both civilian and military assets, which
are provided by the Member States;
•
This civilian and military capacity is for use outside the Union for the purposes of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter. They are enshrined in the wider Petersberg
tasks;
•
These tasks include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat
forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All
these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third
countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Article 43, paragraph 1);
•
The Council may “entrust” the execution of such a task to a group of Member States;
•
The tasks will be performed using capabilities provided by the Member States;
•
Member States will progressively improve their military capabilities with the support of the
European Defence Agency (EDA). Member States which establish multinational forces may
make them available to the CSDP;
•
If a Member State suffers an armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States are
obliged to aid and assist it by all the means in their power (which does not necessarily include military means, so this is not commitment to collective defence).
In order to develop and assess alternative futures of the European Union as a global security actor,
it is necessary to take a look into the history of the development of the concept of Petersberg
Tasks and how it has been embedded into broader debates and developments of the EU as an
international actor (cf. Reynolds, 2010).
First, it is important to remember that the Petersberg Tasks are not a comprehensive description of
the fields of action and repertory of capabilities that the EU as a global actor may and will use. In
its Communication on conflict prevention, the European Commission (2001) emphasised that
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The list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments,
humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of
ESDP (including information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring
international agreements). Through these, the EU is already heavily engaged in conflict prevention.
But it can and must improve the focus and effectiveness of its action in this area. It must be able to
respond in a timely and tailor-made fashion, with an appropriate mix of instruments, to the specific
situations as they arise. Ultimately, this is not just a question of streamlined decision-making and
management procedures but, more fundamentally, of the common political will to respond. This
Communication summarises what the EU is already doing, the instruments it has at its disposal,
and suggests forthcoming possible activities in conflict prevention.
For relevant foresight, it is important to remember that the development of the Common Security
and Defence Policy that is mainly addressed by the Petersberg Tasks can be looked at from a
broader or from a narrower perspective.
The precedent quotation from the Commission represents the broader perspective. Judging CSDP
in terms of its self-proclaimed principles (such as “comprehensiveness” in conflict prevention and
management) also speaks for the broader analytical perspective (cf. Gourlay, 2004, 2005; Rummel
2004). Former High Representative Javier Solana (2000) portrayed the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy, including the Petersberg Tasks, as an essentially political approach:
CFSP is about Europe making a difference in international politics. It is about the European Union
being able to project its values and its interests – the core of its political identity – effectively beyond
its own borders. At the same time, the construction of CFSP is a political project itself. It is the product of continuing debate between the Member States, the European institutions, and the people of
Europe. Convergence has always been the goal, divergence was too often the reality. But this is
changing. There is now a serious commitment to presenting a single political will to the rest of the
world, a commitment to match Europe’s economic power with political influence.
‘Defence’ has thus become a potentially misleading term, for the development and functioning of
the EU as an international actor is guided by the principle of comprehensive crisis management,
e.g., including prevention. The EU’s security and defence policy does not only link military and civilian crisis management and conflict prevention but also the internal and external dimensions of
security (cf. Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 208-12). From this point of view, objectives and instruments of the EU as a global actor delivering security are widespread. They include the following:
•
encouragement of regional co-operation and integration;
•
promotion of human rights;
•
promotion of democracy and good governance;
•
prevention of violent conflicts;
•
fight against international crime.
Instruments and types of policies include:
•
all foreign policy of the Union;
•
Justice and Home Affairs;
•
external economic policy (tariffs, quota, etc.);
•
economic agreements, associations;
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•
economic aid, economic sanctions;
•
offering a membership perspective.
23
However, most national communication from the EU Member States represents a narrower perspective on CSDP. This perspective centres on a continuation of the inter-governmentalism (cooperation between states without any transfer of sovereignty) from the pre-Lisbon era, when CSDP
was known as ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and located in the so-called ‘second
pillar’ of the Union, which was marked by no transfer of sovereignty or capabilities from the Member State to the EU level. From this point of view, the question of “How will the EU look like as a
global actor in 20 years?” cannot be answered or broken down into alternative futures without addressing the question of “Will European integration be complete if it does not include common defence?” This question is perennial and has accompanied the development of what now is the
European Union from its very first days. It has also shown to be a driver of discussions about the
evolution of European integration and the EU’s international role.
Already from the narrower perspective, the state of play of the European Security and Defence
Policy, prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, and the possible alternative future main focuses, involved actors and decision-making procedures was quite diverse, as shown in the Figure 1.
Moreover, the discussion about future roles of the EU as a global actor, acting abroad to deliver
security to its citizens, has its history beyond the Petersberg Task thread. This history is rooted in
the pattern of a gradual transfer of powers that excludes the transfer of sovereignty from EU Member States to the EU as well as the development of own EU military capabilities, whereas civil capabilities for CSDP have been developed. This as a notable difference to NATO, where Member
States have contributed to the development of some commonly owned military assets, such as the
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
Figure 1: Dimensions in tracking ESDP developments so far (Siedschlag, 2006).
Legal institution according to title V of the EU treaty
as one of the instruments of CFSP
Capability initiatives of the European Council
Helsinki Headline Goal, Civilian Headline Goal
Common Defence Policy (article 17 of the EU treaty)
based on common bodies and capabilities; especially
civil-military coordination (CMCO)
“ESDP”
Common Defence Policy (article 17 of the EU treaty)
according to evolutionary clause; civil-military cell at
EUMS and battle groups as possible core
Component of pillar-overarching EU peace policy
in the sense of the European Commission
European Security Strategy (ESS)
principle- and norm-setting enterprise of the Secretary
General/ High Representative of ESDP
National and multinational actions of the Member States
as actors of EU’s second pillar; national constructions and
perceptions of ESDP
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Table 1 summarises the main steps in the development of what has now become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to identify so-far key drivers in the discussions and policies centred on the concept of the EU as a global actor, based on a broad spectrum of capabilities,
including military capabilities. Annex 3 to this report provides further detail on the evolution in threat
assessment, capability goals and targets, legislation and institutional arrangements, emphasizing
in particular the relations between the European Union and other Western intergovernmental organizations. For a comprehensive chronology, see Lindley-French (2007), as well as Grevi, Helly &
Keohane (2009).
Table 1. Summary of the main steps to CFSP.
Treaty (year)
Policy frame/objectives
Definition of Petersberg
Tasks
Instruments/capability
processes
Maastricht (1992)
The Maastricht treaty gave birth
to the CFSP, which in principle
included “the progressive framing
of a common defence policy,
which might lead to a common
defence” (Art. 17, TEU).
• Central tasks to strengthening the EU´s second pillar,
the CFSP
The WEU Member States
declared their readiness
to make available to the
WEU, but also to NATO
and the European Union,
military units from the
whole spectrum of their
conventional armed
forces.
• humanitarian and rescue
tasks;
• conflict prevention and
peace-keeping tasks;
• tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking.
Amsterdam (1997)
Nice (2000)
“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and
security policy covering all areas
of foreign and security policy, the
objectives of which shall be:
[…]
– to preserve peace and
strengthen international security,
in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter
[…]” (Article J.1, paragraph 1)
• Humanitarian and rescue
tasks
“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and
security policy covering all areas
of foreign and security policy”
(Article 11, paragraph 1);
“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the
Union, including the progressive
framing of a common defence
policy, which might lead to a
common defence, should the
European Council so decide.”
(Article 17, paragraph 1)
“The Member States shall support
the Union’s external and security
policy actively and unreservedly
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity.” (Article 11, paragraph
2)
The Union has the competence to operate within the
full range of the Petersberg
Tasks: “humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peacekeeping
tasks and tasks of combat
forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking” (Article 17, paragraph 2)
• Peacekeeping tasks
• Tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking
(Article J.7, paragraph 2)
WEU is “an integral part”
of the development of the
EU and provides it with
access to operational capabilities for fulfilling the
Petersberg Tasks
(Article J.7, paragraph 1)
The Treaty of Nice has
introduced the possibility
of establishing enhanced
cooperation within the
CFSP. Such enhanced
cooperation shall relate
only to the implementation of a joint action or a
common position, but not
to matters having military
or defence implications.
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Lisbon (2009)
“The Union’s competence in
matters of common foreign and
security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive
framing of a common defence
policy that might lead to a common defence. […]” (Article 24,
paragraph 1)
“Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a
common foreign and security
policy, based on the development
of mutual political solidarity
among Member States, the identification of questions of general
interest and the achievement of
an ever-increasing degree of
convergence of Member States’
actions.” (Article 24, paragraph 2)
“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral
part of the common foreign and
security policy. It shall provide the
Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets. The Union may use them
on missions outside the Union for
peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of
these tasks shall be undertaken
using capabilities provided by the
Member States.” (Article 42,
paragraph 1)
The CSDP shall be an integral part of the CFSP (Article
42, paragraph 1).
The Petersberg Tasks now
comprise:
• Traditional tasks plus
• joint disarmament operations
• military advice and assistance tasks
• conflict prevention
• post-conflict stabilisation
• “All these tasks may contribute to the fight against
terrorism, including by
supporting third countries
in combating terrorism in
their territories.”
(Article 43)
“The common security
and defence policy shall
include the progressive
framing of a common
Union defence policy.
This will lead to a common defence, when the
European Council, acting
unanimously, so decides.
It shall in that case recommend to the Member
States the adoption of
such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” (Article 42,
paragraph 2)
The next section explores the contributions of the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP, European Security Strategy and Petersberg Tasks in shaping the core of EU security problématique and policy.
3.3
ANALYSIS OF THE LISBON TREATY, CSDP AND ESS
Whereas the Lisbon Treaty uses the concept of the security of the Union as a whole:
“The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree
of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity […]” (Article
21, paragraph 2),
it foresees no role of the Union as a whole to realise this concept but rather sees it as the lowest
common denominator of Member States’ security interests and needs:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional
and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the ter-
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ritorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. (Article 4, paragraph
2).
While the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy based on the wider Petersberg Tasks has
been mainly associated with the development of corresponding national, Member State capabilities, the pooling and sharing of capabilities and common political will (Sánchez, 2011), it is also
important to appreciate the role of the internal—legal, structural, organisational—framework of the
EU (Koutrakos, 2011) for its alternative futures as a global actor. The following aspects of the
Treaty on European Union in the version of Lisbon (2009) are of particular relevance (cf. Assembly
of Western European Union, 2008):
•
•
•
Strict interpretation of institutional competences
o
preclusion of legislative acts in the domain of the Union’s external action;
o
emphasis on the prevalent role of the Member States (over the Union): “Under the
principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set
out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with
the Member States.” (Article 5, Emphasis added) The article was taken over from
the draft Constitutional Treaty, where it did not contain the word ‘only.’ It was then
added in the Lisbon version of the Treaty on European Union.
Introduction of innovations concerning the EU’s institutional architecture for external action
o
The Lisbon Treaty’s aim is to give better visibility and stability in the external representation of the Union on the CFSP issues;
o
The ‘High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’
will, among other things, conduct security and foreign policy on behalf of the Council
and will preside over the External Relations Council, and have the responsibility of
facilitating the harmonization of Member States’ views;
o
the European Parliament must be “duly taken into consideration” and it is to be informed of “the main aspects and the basic choices” of CFSP and/or CSDP;
CSDP now has its own section within the Lisbon Treaty
o
It is symbolically upgraded from a “European” to a “Common” Security and Defence
Policy (while still belonging to CFSP);
o
The Lisbon Treaty enshrines the following wider or “extended” Petersberg tasks
(based on military and civilian capabilities) in addition to the original tasks, that were
based on military capabilities: “joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance task, peace-making and post-conflict stabilization missions” and also contribute to combating terrorism “in supporting third countries in their territories.”
o
The often-cited Solidarity Clause—“The Union and its Member States shall act
jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or
the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the
Member States” (Article 222, paragraph 1)—does not relate to the Petersberg Tasks
and EU missions and operations abroad but to crisis response within the Union.
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The structure of CSDP and the Petersberg Tasks today leave a couple of questions open that have
been identified in policy analyses (e.g. Biscop & Coelmont, 2011; Martinez Arranz, Doyle & Winand, 2010; Missiroli 2008; Sánchez 2011; Vasconcelos, 2009) and should be addressed when
developing alternative futures for the EU as a global actor. These include:
•
The contribution of non-EU members to EU crisis management;
•
Future cooperation and transparency between EU and NATO in crisis management;
•
Further development of preventive diplomacy’s efforts to deter conflict(s);
•
Reflection and integration of tasks related to issues such as critical infrastructure protection;
•
Mechanism for the identification of priority tasks based on a common risk assessment
methodology.
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4
PROBLEM SPACE FOR ANALYZING EU ROLES AS A GLOBAL
ACTOR BASED ON THE WIDER PETERSBERG TASKS
4.1
PRINCIPAL DIMENSIONS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF EU ROLES AS A
GLOBAL SECURITY PLAYER
Several options for describing systematically potential future roles of the EU as a global actor were
analysed. Five dimensions are recommended to describe such roles in the horizon of 2035 in follow up FOCUS work – external ambitions; comprehensiveness of EU power; cohesion of the European Union as a global security actor; degree of vital interaction; and nature of EU security mission
and operations. Each of these principal dimensions is presented in detail below.
4.1.1 External ambitions
External ambitions will characterise eventual EU roles from the point of view of effective influence
and engagement at the global scene. It is a multiple and complex dimension that integrates political will and physical capabilities, reflects EU internal cohesion and external relations and illustrates
the interdependence between changing power structure and global ‘interconnectedness.’
Possible ‘values’ along this dimension may vary largely depending on which of the above mentioned characteristics dominates. As an illustration, the following ‘values’ may be considered,
starting from the least to the most ambitious:
•
No expeditionary roles, i.e. EU will be mainly and most of all focused on defending its territory within a reactive rather than projective role;
•
EU policy of containment in which EU acts as a regional power, capable effectively to influence its ‘immediate neighbourhood’ environment in a comprehensive and sustainable manner;
•
EU acting as a well armed regional policeman able to conduct high-intensity humanitarian
interventions (such as the one in Libya in 2011);
•
‘Global reach’ through projection of sufficient and sustainable power to permit decisive engagement in preventing or solving problems, vital for EU and the global order. Such power
projection may involve multiple capabilities, e.g. political, economic, military, informational,
financial, and cultural. It could be exercised independently or with strategic allies or partners. The latter case defines specific requirements to ‘interoperability’ in a broad sense, including compatible political values, shared threat perception, doctrine, technical, etc.
4.1.2 Comprehensiveness of EU power
This dimension characterises EU future roles from instrumental point of view. It illustrates how wide
the spectrum of EU capabilities might be, how comprehensive could be its ‘comprehensive approach’ indeed, while performing any type of global role, and where the EU will place its priorities.
As an illustration, the instruments of EU global roles may include as minimum the following:
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•
Security instruments like peace enforcement and peacekeeping, with significant contribution of ‘justice & law enforcement’ capabilities, intelligence, early warning systems, etc.;
•
Financial instruments in order to influence economic developments globally while providing
or controlling access to credits and hard currency;
•
Technological, productivity enhancing, and transportation instruments in order to maintain a
leading role in the most advanced areas of global economy;
•
Knowledge in modern governance and social engineering in order to be able to provide culturally sensitive support for the enhancement of good governance and institution building,
including in security and defence sectors.
•
Civil society and cultural instruments like NGOs, public information, media, social networks,
arts, and artists able to enhance and strengthen the other elements of the EU global role.
4.1.3 Cohesion of the European Union as a global security actor
This dimension illustrates the internal political and social ability to meet the requirements of any
type of a global role. It reflects both the level of actual concentration of power within the Union’s
governing bodies and the ability—and willingness—of nation states and societies to delegate to the
European Commission such power. As an illustration, possible ‘values’ along this dimension may
include as minimum the following:
•
Decline in coordination of foreign and security policies and return to a state-centric model,
with selective common approaches on ad-hoc basis;
•
Preservation of the ‘current status’ seen not so much as an instrument for exploring global
role but as a compromise;
•
EU developing as a security actor at two (or more) tiers, e.g. integration in selected functional areas and/or among a number of EU countries (cf. Piris, forthcoming);4
•
Enhanced security and defence cooperation and coordination in terms of production and
building security capabilities simultaneously with “communitarisation” of funding for security
missions;
•
Single European intervention forces for the full spectrum of ‘wider Petersberg tasks.’
4.1.4 Degree of vital interaction
The degree of vital interactions illustrates the ability of EU to have, generate and maintain allies
and partners, while exploring its global role. It comes from the expectation that the EU’s own internal capabilities, cohesion, and ‘communitarisation’ of instruments would not be sufficient to define
an essential global role. The core of this idea is that any EU global role is possible as the Union is
engaged in stable and sustainable interactions within the Western community and othe partner
4 This book was not yet available by the time this report was written. For the main ideas see “EU architect
calls for two-speed union,” Financial Times, 3 November 2011; and Jean-Claude Piris, “The future of
Europe: towards a two-speed European Union,” E!Sharp, December 2011, http://esharp.eu/essay/2-thefuture-of-europe-towards-a-two-speed-european-union.
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countries at the global scene. As an illustration, possible ‘values’ along this dimension would include the following as a minimum:
•
Weakening Western integration and poor international co-operation;
•
EU role as change-agent within a new world order;
•
Deepening Western integration and selective international co-operation;
•
Deepening Western integration and comprehensive international cooperation;
•
Global actors ‘concert’ (all work smoothly together) for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
4.1.5 Nature of EU security mission and operations
The nature of EU global security mission is determined mainly by how its roles are defined and the
set of operations potentially applicable to a variety of security related scenarios. They should be
understood on the basis of the Petersberg Tasks and the Lisbon Treaty.
The ‘wider Petersberg Tasks’ are not yet clearly defined or operationalised, while no respective
planning decisions have been taken so far. The Lisbon Treaty as well does not elaborate in depth
on independent global security roles for the EU.
Addressing such shortcomings, the European Defence Agency concluded in its long-term vision
report of October 2006 that “ESDP operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability more than ‘victory.’ Information will be critical,
whether informing the ‘war of ideas’ in cyberspace, or facilitating effective command decisions.
‘Asymmetry’ will apply not merely to an opponent’s tactics but also to his aims and values. In such
circumstances, the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve the campaign goals” (European Defence Agency, 2006).
To identify the future nature of EU security missions and operations it is necessary to determine
those Petersberg Tasks which have potential global dimensions and to consider them not as a basis for planning but, as originally intended, to outline the scope of autonomous actions (widely understood, i.e. implementing the comprehensive approach) with global relevance.
4.2
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR EU DECISION-MAKING
This section of the report reviews the structural conditions for EU decision-making addressing security strategy, institutional organisation, and decision-making procedures, as well as advances
and obstacles to an effective decision-making process.
From the academic point of view, states remain interested in immediate returns of co-operation,
seeking to exploit international institutions’ derivative functions, whereas at the same time limiting
their own investments and retaining the right and possibility of a self-interested policy. States may
be interested in pooling of capabilities in order to improve their national ability to act despite scarce
national resources and capabilities (cf. Gilpin, 1987; Grieco, 1988: 498-501).
In retrospective, political debates and evolution of the European legal framework appears to have
been largely based on the tension between the following principles (cf. Bindi, 2010):
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31
•
Supranationalism versus confederationalism;
•
Deepening versus widening of integration (either in terms of enlargement of policy areas or
of membership);
•
Creation of European capabilities or pooling of national capabilities versus sharing of Member States’ capabilities upon national decisions;
•
Transatlantic versus European context (collaboration versus decision-making autonomy);
•
Multilateralism with the EU as part of regional and global mission-centred networks of actors versus the EU as a (more self-reliant) global player.
Relevant alternative futures of the EU as discussed in academic and policy literature range from a
supranational future, where the EU acts as a unitary trans-boundary crisis manager, to one where
the EU is largely denied a role for carrying out a centralised response. The democratic legitimacy
of the EU’s identity as a security provider and crisis manager has so far not been so prominently
addressed by academic work on the subject.
Some (e.g. Laursen, 2009) argue that the European Union still is better equipped institutionally to
deal with economic, rather than political, security and military issues in global politics. Others (e.g.
Martinez Arranz, Doyle & Winand, 2010; Orbie, 2008) argue that the EU should not sacrifice its
soft-power tradition and CSDP aspirations but continue to follow a combined soft and hard power
approach in world politics. U.S. academic analyses (e.g. Papastathopoulos, 2004; Bindi, 2010)
typically identify the willingness and ability of EU Member States to improve their overall military
posture as the main key driver for the future of the EU also a global actor based on the expanded
Petersberg tasks, where the EU would be a credible organization based on high-end military capabilities made by big Member States or a group thereof (practicing permanent structured cooperation).
From the strategic studies point of view, the EU capacity to address the external dimension of security is based on a state-centred perspective dominated by a couple of leading Member States (cf.
Bretherton & Vogler 2006; Giegerich, 2006; Gnesotto & Grevi 2006). From this point of view, the
EU still needs to become a true global player able to effectively cope also with external threats.
The EU’s possible future capacity to do so would be embedded in a network of strategic partnerships based on EU-level policies and capabilities.
Boin et al. (2011) have analysed the role of European Union Agencies in the management of transboundary crises, which is an important contribution to looking beyond the often discussed CSDP
structure (including PSC, EUMC, and others). The growing role of multiple European Union agencies in the management of trans-boundary crises demonstrates that the EU’s crisis management
arrangements and structures are transforming and that this transformation is driven by factors beyond capabilities and common political will. Boin et al. (2011: 24-25) emphasise the role of the EU
agencies
in the enhancement of co-ordination and coherence of EU and member state crisis management:
this potential can be found in their capacity to pool and assess complex information from a multiplicity of sources and feeding back coherent, expert advice; the role in harmonizing national practices and building inter-operability through workshops and training programs; […] their powers to
intervene and compel national bodies to implement and live up to EU-wide measures and standards.
Analyses such as that by Korkisch & Müller-Elsigan (2011: 45-46) defined the following non-military obstacles to effective autonomous EU decision-making in CSDP in a 2025 time frame:
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•
unsafe and crisis-prone economy conditions, unsustainable aspects of growth and the
resulting economic-political movements, new political reorientation;
•
progressive deinstitutionalization;
•
increasing energy dependence;
•
increasing dependence on imports;
•
destabilization of the political systems and democracies through corruption and political
disenchantment by the citizens;
•
lacking political impartiality of Europe on specific crisis response actions;
•
human rights aspects of CSDP decisions, missions and operations.
Hynek (2011) focuses both on key issues and developments in the comprehensive crisis management planning of the EU, civil-military coordination and cooperation and the future of the EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ). He identifies effective decision-making and steady leadership as
the two crucial characteristics of the EU’s crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty. He also
points out the potential of the reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty to further integrate EU crisis
management structures for civilian and military planning and conduct of operations with the political
will of Member States being the most important factor in its future realization.
An indicative set of questions for scenario foresight to be undertaken in WP6.2 and WP6.3 can be
derived from exemplary studies on the future development of organizational contexts and EU decision-making structures and processes. Based on a literature review, Boin and Rinhard (2008) have
identified four different ideal-typical futures to which the EU might aspire (see Table 2). Then they
considered the likelihood of each option by assessing what capacities the EU currently has in
place.
In their final analysis, Boin and Rhinard (2008) see the future role of the EU as a global actor less
based on capabilities for full-spectrum Petersberg missions and operations, but rather based on its
unique system of supranational governance. The following possible futures from (Boin and Rhinard, 2008) merit further exploration in Work Packages 6.2 and 6.3:
•
‘Supranational Future’: EU crisis management responsibilities are centralised in a semiautonomous and flexible agency and existing primary law is adapted in order to extend supranationality;
•
‘Subsidiarity Future’: EU serves as a facilitator for localised response, based on its support
for enhancement of Member States capabilities and enabling the cooperation among international organizations.
However, none of the four scenarios of Boin and Rhinhard (2008) addresses the need to enhance
the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor vis-à-vis its citizens, which should be seen as an integral
part of its future identity as a security provider and crisis manager. So, an important additional
question is: how EU citizens are going to perceive the legitimacy of the EU to exert those possible
future roles?
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Table 2. Four ideal-typical futures.
33
Ideal-type
future/scenario
EU rationale of action
Possible implications of the
scenario
‘Supranational Future’
EU acting as a trans-boundary
crisis manager calls attention to
the demonstrated benefits of EU
institutions in solving common
problems
Centralization of EU crisis management responsibilities in a
semi-autonomous and flexible,
newly created agency
‘Subsidiarity Future’
(conventional wisdom)
Localization of crisis response:
Concentration on meeting the
challenges where they emerge,
with a subsidiary role for the EU
EU serves to enhance transboundary crisis management
capacity of Member States and
collaboration between international organizations. Maintenance of a division (of labour)
between national and EU-level
crisis management
‘Alternative Organization’ Trans-boundary threats may require trans-national coping capacity, but the EU is not where
that capacity should be developed. Crisis and security responsibilities are better placed in other
international organizations better
suited for such a role. NATO
might be a likely candidate for
this role
‘EU-Scepticism’
4.3
No perceived necessity of a centralized, supra-national response
structure
The EU abstains from developing its own coping capacity,
while cooperation with international organizations, in particular NATO and OPCW, is not
ruled out – especially when it
comes to certain types of threat,
for example, attacks with nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons
Emphasis on collaboration on
crisis management matters
between nation-states
EXTERNALTHREATS AND CHALLENGES TO THE EU
This section of the report presents current views on global and international external threats and
challenges EU may have to deal with by applying the Petersberg Tasks and instruments, as well
as concepts and methods of risk assessment, along with the limitations in applying them in planning security measures.
It starts with admitting that Europe is in crisis. Divergence is significant at both national and continental level delineating the borders between the stable core and heavily indebted southern periphery. Political differences at the Brussels scene on 8-9 December 2011 have reached their peak
with the opposition by the UK to the common approach to resolve the debt crisis. As a consequence, there has been identified the need to set an intergovernmental treaty to tighter budget
rules and strengthen economic coordination. Tackling the debt crisis and restoring market confidence is the most important element in the overall security problématique because the outcome
remains unclear. It affects both Member States and the Union. The study cannot entirely rule out
differentiation on a regional basis, an Europe at two or more speed, or a new monetary union.
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In this situation structural and non-structural aspects of the EU pose unique challenges resulting
from the interactive overlapping dimensions between external and internal threats. One thing is obvious: the financial crisis and its consequences represent the most serious current threat to the
European Union and its Member States. In comparison any other threat is seen as marginal. It is
obvious also that the recovery will take time during which the EU will have very limited opportunities to invest into and to explore its global role in the security domain.
4.3.1 Exogenous threats at a glance
The exogenous threats to Europe are already clearly explained by the European Security Strategy
(ESS) (2003). The elaboration of this document without doubt is one of the most exciting, but certainly also one of the most important projects the EU has undertaken in the broad field of foreign
and security policy. The Strategy not only fills a gap within the conceptualisation of the Union’s
common policies and provides a focus for CFSP and CSDP, but also establishes a ground for a
long term vision on planning and programming the development of EU security capabilities.
The ESS is based on the recognition that “large-scale aggression against any Member State is
now improbable,” and on the concept of comprehensive security. From this ground the document
emphasises five ‘key threats,’ all of which are closely interconnected. Sven Biscop (2004) describes them in the following way:
•
Terrorism, for which “Europe is both a target and a base”; the Strategy notes that terrorism
“arises out of complex causes,” including “the pressures of modernization, cultural, social
and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies”;
•
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – “potentially the greatest threat to our
security”; in “the most frightening scenario” WMD could fall in the hands of terrorists;
•
Regional conflicts, both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, which “impact on European interests directly and indirectly” and which “can lead to extremism, terrorism and state
failure”;
•
State failure, which “undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability” and
which “can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism”;
•
Organized crime, an internal threat with “an important external dimension,” such as “crossborder trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons” as well as gemstones
and timber; organized crime “can have links with terrorism” and is “often associated with
weak or failing states.”
Obviously, terrorism and proliferation of WMD are treated as the most important direct threats to
the EU under the presumption that any large-scale aggression is no longer probable. Accepting
those threats as direct is based on the presumption that the Member States, not the EU, may be
targeted by terrorists groups. So despite its external dimension, terrorism is viewed mainly as a
threat to individual states. The threat would indeed be increased if a terrorist group were to acquire
WMD. The US State department and experts raise an alarm that it is just a matter of time for this to
happen; nevertheless, the only parties that currently do possess WMD are states. The jihadist terror is losing ground and should be perceived as a manageable risk rather than a strategic threat to
the European soil.
Rather than terrorism or WMD, the most important threat emerging from the current security environment seems to be the growing social frustration that is rising up within those countries that have
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35
ignored the need for implementing democratic reforms and failed to cope with the challenges of
globalisation. In the Middle East and North Africa the public turmoil erupted mainly because globalisation and new information and communication channels exposed the inability of the corrupted
and criminalised authoritarian regimes to govern effectively and to provide social security.
The ESS does not elaborate much on the conflict regions where destabilisation and civil wars may
cause serious migration waves into Europe. The Western Balkans, South Caucasus and the
Mediterranean continue to generate internal tensions with possible European impact. As the
enlargement process is in ‘a strategic pause’ and the ability of the Union and the Member States to
provide political attention and resources to countries in those areas, the number of conflicting incidents are growing, for example in Kosovo.
Organised crime is again both an external and an internal threat. Its most serious impact is on new
Member States that are still working to consolidate their security institutions in order to be able to
cope with complex criminal threats. In unstable financial environment, transnational criminal networks are among the highest threats to the stability of countries while these struggle to stabilise
banks and markets.
In conclusion, the European Security Strategy is an important and valuable instrument both for
building a common threat perception and supporting long term planning. It does not provide though
all necessary answers that come from the new European security environment and perspectives.
However, it provides a solid point of departure for further EU efforts to enhance CFSP and CSDP.
In addition to threats, acknowledged in the ESS, academic analyses explain in detail threats in the
comprehensive security domain that may put European and Member States interests at risk. Table
3 provides a list of such threats.
Economic disparity and global governance failures serve as a transversal hub for most of the
global threats the EU will have to cope with as a global security actor. All active roles in shaping
the security environment will be inhibited by these two threats. They are common for all constructive players at the world scene and will require specific forms of partnership and cooperation (despite eventually differing interests). Such environment will make the cooperation rationale relevant
in the coming decades. It will affect the EU decision-making on CSFP, as well as the development
of respective capabilities.
In this context, Petersberg tasks are currently placed on a fragile economic, political and social
platform. Though only some of these vulnerabilities are directly relevant to Petersberg tasks, most
can be interpreted as pre-conditions for exercising these tasks. The evolving status of the EU as a
global actor should first address these vulnerabilities not only through the specific rationale of Petersberg tasks but within a general concept of global governance, preparing thus a resilient platform for EU Petersberg-specific tasks. Since current national governance frameworks will be unable to keep pace with looming global challenges unless extensive reforms are implemented (EU
ISS, 2010), the EU should first address these challenges. Increasingly, emerging economies feel
that they do not have sufficient influence in international institutions as currently designed, seeing
this as unfair. Yet there is uncertainty over the ability and willingness of rising powers to shoulder a
greater share of global responsibilities, as well as reluctance on the part of established powers to
recognize the limits of their own power. Petersberg tasks’ current relevance is within an evolving
balance among these trends.
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Table 3. Overview of security threats.
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Economic threats
Environmental threats
Geopolitical threats
Asset price collapse
Air pollution
Corruption
Extreme commodity price
volatility
Extreme consumer price
volatility
Extreme energy price volatility
Biodiversity loss
Fragile states
Climate change
Geopolitical conflict
Earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions
Flooding
Global governance failures
Illicit trade
Ocean governance
Organized crime
Storms and cyclones
Space security
Fiscal crises
Global imbalances and
currency volatility
Infrastructure fragility
Liquidity/credit crunch
Terrorism
Societal threats
Regulatory failures
Chronic diseases
Retrenchment from
globalisation
Slowing down Chinese and the
other emerging economies (as
a risk from EU point of view)
Demographic challenges
Economic disparity
Food security
Infectious diseases
Weapons of mass destruction
Technological threats
Critical information infrastructure breakdown
Online data and information
security
Threats from new technologies
Migration
Water security
4.3.2
Mapping vulnerabilities of the EU and its citizens
The section of report outlines vulnerabilities of the EU and its citizens that could be associated with
a global security role and implementation of the comprehensive approach. The purpose of mapping vulnerabilities is to improve the understanding and the awareness of asymmetric dependencies, as well as relevant communications about threats. Thus, the EU and its citizens may better be
informed about those values that may be at risk while implementing a global security role and applying a comprehensive approach in Petersberg-type operations. As a method, it is also relevant to
the responsibility of decision-makers to see where resources are most needed and what kind of
capabilities are required for collective protection and security.
Most security studies are focused on vulnerabilities related to hazards and industrial catastrophes,
climate change, critical chains of supply (as energy) as well as for the purposes of the critical infrastructure protection (cf. MOVE, 2011; World Energy Council, 2008; Metzger, 2005).
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37
The understanding of vulnerabilities related to the global scene of security is not so advanced. The
recent EU experience in this context is mainly within the US-driven ‘global war on terror’ and the
number of peace support operations in which the Union has been engaged. More complex is the
record of the Member States, especially those that have contributed to the operations in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. FOCUS will pay special attention to this issue analysing EU experience and the experience of Member States and other actors in an effort to provide thorough and
well argued map of eventual vulnerabilities of the EU and its citizens.
The mapping of vulnerabilities related to implementation of Petersberg Tasks will account for the
character of the role, the EU performance, and the complex internal preparedness to meet the
consequences of being globally engaged in security affairs. It is also a function of the capacity of
the opposing sides to react directly or in an asymmetric manner and to cause physical, material, financial, and psychological damages. At the level of assumptions the following elements of the vulnerability map may be considered from the perspective of EU global security roles and Petersberg
Tasks:
•
EU and its citizens will become increasingly vulnerable to attacks on their own soil
Such vulnerability will result from an active global role aiming to shape the strategic environment,
almost certainly alongside US and other traditional allies. It will be most probable during the first
half of the time horizon of this study when the capacity of the West to impose its political, economic
and security influence will continue to dominate the world scene. States, hybrid forces, terrorists,
and other groups under pressure will acquire different types of weapons, possibly including weapons of mass destruction, and some may attempt to use them. Eventual further decline in the military preparedness of EU and Member States may serve as a catalyst for such ambitions. In this
case vulnerabilities may result from the gap between the intensity and scale of the self imposed
role (where the comprehensive approach may not require use of dominant military power) and the
internal ability to meet a disruptive reaction (where military capabilities are essential).
•
Vulnerability may increase as a result of strategic ‘asymmetric dependence’
Europe exists within the historical centre of the world’s geopolitical space. Despite the end of the
Cold war its geopolitical context is a particularly difficult one. It is surrounded by Russia and a large
arc of lasting instability starting with Western Sahara, passing the Middle East, and including Central Asia. In this environment, there are a few stable and democratic countries, many others in a
process of transition, matured autocracies, and unpredictable rogue tyrannies. Demographic pressure from these countries is growing. Most sources of strategic raw materials and emerging markets for European goods are behind the arc of instability, i.e. Asian markets, Siberian gas, Central
African oil, South African rare earth row materials, etc. Nuclear proliferation is closer to Europe
than to any other major power. So far, US and Europe have a coordinated approach to the threat
of proliferation. But this factor may fade in importance, not just as American power recedes from
Europe under massive budgetary pressures, but because Europe is no longer central to Washington’ security. In the future, a situation may occur, in which a regional crisis may involve a European
country and while this may be a local tragedy, American security will not be dramatically influenced. This ‘asymmetric dependence’ is a strategic problem that may find its rational solutions. But
if not managed properly, it may lead to an increase in European security’s vulnerability.
•
EU and its citizens will be increasingly affected by transitional processes at the European
strategic neighbourhood
Transitional processes in North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia will continue in a mixture of opportunities for democratic development and threats to regional stability. If,
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as it is expected, such transition takes years, then the EU and Member States will become vulnerable to a complex of political, social, economic and internal security issues. On one hand, they will
arise of the necessity of being directly engaged (including the ‘responsibility to protect’) with comprehensive packages, for a relatively long time, and as a leading actor. On the other, the EU and
Member States have to cope with certain consequences like meeting a significant to mass migration. Unavoidably this will affect the social cohesion of European societies, especially in large urban areas. As the experience of the last couple of decade shows, such situations usually lead to a
deepening gap between CFSP ambitions at the EU level and their public support at national level.
•
Vulnerability will enhance as result of increasingly porous borders
Any global engagement—being collective or of a Member State, peace-making or humanitarian,
military or anti-terrorist—puts national borders under pressure. Certainly, the comprehensive approach is designed to cope exactly with such challenges. However, many countries will have difficulties keeping threats out of national soil and their governments will be politically committed to
uphold borders’ integrity. Presumably, this will be causa perduta as no border can be protected
against a combination of unhesitating migrants, communication abilities, transportation flexibility
and free flow of money. Taking into account that borders are most porous to the spread of religious
and ethnic ‘great ideas’ makes the scale of borders vulnerability clearer.
•
Global security roles will require more engagements in foreign crises
As mentioned earlier, the global role needs effective actions in crisis prevention and response. Interstate wars probably will continue to occur at least during the first half of the study period, but
most conflicts will be of internal nature. Even now it is very difficult to find any internal conflict that,
after passing through a civil war stage, has been completely and sustainably resolved. Examples
to the contrary abound, and there is no need to go further than the Western Balkans to see that the
long-term comprehensive international engagement is the rule rather than the exception.
Engagements will require more resources, multiple—including more specific—capabilities, political
will and considerable public support. Moreover, any military engagement, and even a good part of
the supply of raw materials could become reasons of asymmetric response by religiously or ethnically motivated radicals and terrorists. The experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that this
happened despite comprehensive programmes for stability and reconstruction. So, the balance
sheet between global role ambitions and their practical value could put the cohesion within the
Union under severe test and would certainly make national political environments very vulnerable.
•
Space will become a critical and competitive environment
In the long-term perspective the US-Russian hegemony in the space may come to an end. Several
other powers are investing systematically in civilian, communication, intelligence and military
space-based capabilities. The biggest threat to Western superiority would be the ability of any adversary power to destroy or block its space-based communications, navigation, surveillance and
intelligence grid.5
•
Vulnerability of the Member States and the Europeans will be under stronger influenced of
global economic shifts
Global economic changes in the coming decades will produce both opportunities and difficulties.
The expected picture is a combination of sustainable economic growth and uneven development,
5 The anti-satellite missile test conducted by China in 2007 provides a glimpse at what might happen in the
2035 time horizon.
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39
of integration into transnational business giants and fragmentation, of personal advance and failed
societies. As a result of the spread of technologies (even not hi-tech), many nations and governments will face problems to provide qualified labour to materialize the benefits of new technologies
and know-how. For many countries this may lead to a situation of being simultaneously wealthier
and less secure.
•
Vulnerability from EU asymmetric dependence on foreign sources of energy, raw and rare
earth materials
Within the time horizon of the study growth and energy will be profoundly connected. Energy will
preserve its strategic importance as the core of geopolitics and geo-strategy, including of emerging
powers. The European dependence of external sources of energy will grow further, especially if
stronger limitations on the use of nuclear power are introduced. A recent study indicates that the
“…fear of an eventual supply shortfall, and more importantly, the fear of losing grip on a longstanding and relatively privileged access to raw materials…” has forced governments and private
sector organizations to call upon EC “… to react and to take domestic and international policies to
address their concerns” (Ramdoo, 2011). Such perspectives create an environment of variety of
asymmetric industrial dependences of Europe.
4.3.3 Review of applicable risk assessment
Whereas there is little policy analysis and discussion on the specific impact of external threats on
Member States, the implementation review of ESS (European Council, 2008) reiterated some
common key risks and threats to the security of the Member States of the Union and included new
ones:
•
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, where the EU should continue its preventive
approach through multilateral fora;
•
Terrorism and organised crime, both within the Union and worldwide, where the EU should
focus on protecting its societies, including by partnerships with countries in the neighbourhood as well as ‘key partners’ and the UN;
•
Cyber security, where the EU should “explore a comprehensive approach” uniting its initiatives in European critical infrastructure protection, a secure information society as well as
countering attacks that have the potential impact of a ‘military weapon’;
•
Energy security, where the EU should combine a market-unification approach with “crisis
mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption of supply,” as well as greater diversification
and promotion of good governance in source countries, which shall be fostered through EU
partnership with relevant world regions;
•
Climate change, which the EU should reflect in its risk analysis as a ‘threat multiplier’ and
address though international cooperation with the UN and regional organisations.
The chief instrument is seen in the building of “stability in Europe and beyond,” and in 2008 it was
obviously still no common sense and thus worth mentioning in the ESS review report that “Europe
has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood” (ibid.: 7), which were mainly associated with:
•
strengthening the security-development nexus;
•
fighting piracy by deterrence; and
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•
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combating illegal spread of small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and landmines.
4.3.4 Risk assessment concepts and methods
The concept of ‘risk’ is defined as an arrangement of the ‘impact’ (summary of the expected results
and effects) and ‘likelihood’ (a forecast about the occurrence) (Bergmans, et al., 2009). As this approach is applicable mainly for threat assessment, Nancy Renfroe and Joseph Smith (2011) have
elaborated an additional dimension – vulnerability assessment. These two works are illustrative
enough for clarification of the mechanism of risk assessment.
Then in or outside the object assessed occurs a matter which, if not handled in a timely manner
could become a threat for the object itself. The escalation can emerge as politically, socially, and
naturally motivated process or as one related to productivity, i.e. the escalation can be directed,
uncontrolled, incidental, and in all these cases, gradual or sudden.
The level of risk for the object depends on the dimensions of threat and its vulnerability regarding
the specific forms of threat. These particular dimensions basically include scope, intensity, decisiveness, durability and the ability to cause secondary effects.
The level of vulnerability also depends on the type of the object – social or physical, and is identified after the assessment of the threat.
The question of vulnerability of social systems in the broader sense of security is very complex and
deals with vulnerability of populations, territory, critical infrastructure, urban areas, ecological systems, social stability (including ethnical and religious matters), etc. Hence, concrete impact criteria
depend on the purpose of the threat assessment.
This definition of risk delivers a precondition for taking countermeasures. Countermeasures are
subdivided into measures taken to counter the threat once it reaches the object (in stopping, reducing or blocking the escalation) and actions taken to reduce the vulnerability of the object. The
countermeasures do not always relate to the risk assessment because the security of the object,
especially when it comes to a social object (different from a physical one, e.g. a building), is a
question of a subjective estimation, called perceived threat (i.e. different leaders, governments and
nations perceive one and the same threat in different ways).
The whole process described above applies both to long-term planning and to introducing mechanisms for immediate reaction. In the former case the risk assessment is based on scenarios; in the
latter it is based of concrete data.
Within the frame of these considerations, a risk assessment approach proposed by Renfroe and
Smith (2011) has been adapted for the needs of theme specific analyses.
The EU common ‘assets’ (in terms of people, territory, interests, policies, facilities, freedoms) face
a certain level of risk associated with various threats. These threats may be a result of natural
events, industrial accidents, terrorist or intentional acts aiming to cause harm. Regardless of the
nature of the threat, the presumption is that EU has a responsibility to limit or manage risks from
these threats to the extent possible through risk management.
The first step in risk management is threat assessment. A threat assessment considers the full
spectrum of threats for a given common value or interest. The assessment should examine supporting information to evaluate the likelihood of occurrence for each threat. For natural threats such
as floods, fire, or earthquakes historical data regarding frequency of occurrence can be used to
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41
determine the credibility of a given threat. For terrorist and international threats, however, the likelihood of occurrence in given space and time cannot be quantified statistically.
Once credible threats are identified, a vulnerability assessment must be performed. The vulnerability assessment considers the potential impact of the loss from a successful attack in a broad sense
of this term. Impact of loss is the degree to which the core functions of the EU are impaired by the
given threat. A key component of vulnerability assessment is to properly define the ratings for impact of loss and vulnerability. These definitions may vary greatly from case to case. A sample set
of definitions for impact of loss may be developed through follow up research, e.g. considering
terms like ‘devastating,’ ‘severe,’ ‘noticeable’ and ‘minor.’
Vulnerability is defined as a combination of the attractiveness of EU ‘assets’ as a target and the
level of deterrence provided by existing countermeasures. Various definitions can be used to rate
vulnerability, e.g. ‘very high,’ ‘high,’ ‘moderate’ and ‘low.’
A combination of the impact of loss rating and the vulnerability rating can be used to evaluate the
potential risk to EU ‘assets.’ A sample risk matrix is depicted in Table 4. High risks are designated
by red, moderate risks by yellow, and low risks by green.
Further analysis aims to identify appropriate criteria for rating losses and vulnerabilities having the
EU as an object of security.6
A risk diagram is constructed on the basis of these assessments. It illustrates the specific risk environment (conditions) for decision making in regard to planning and implementation of the EU global
security role. In EU context, risk environment refers to what was noted as EU key assets: people,
inviolable territory, common values, freedom of having sovereign Common Foreign and Security
Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, and safe and secure critical infrastructure.
Table 4. Risk Levels Matrix and Interpretation.
Vulnerability to Threat
Impact of
Loss
Devastating
Very High
High
Moderate
Interpretation of the risk ratings
Low
These risks are high. Countermeasures recommended to mitigate these risks should be
implemented as soon as possible
Severe
These risks are moderate. Countermeasure
implementation should be planned in the near
future
Noticeable
These risks are low. Implementation of countermeasure will enhance security, and is less
urgent
Minor
6 Directive 114/2008 Critical Infrastructure Protection already provides an example of an EU wide
approach.
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Such risk management approach is finding ever wider application in security policy and strategy
making, as well as in decision-making on investments in security measures and capabilities. For
example, the approach is rigorously implemented by the US Department of Homeland Security
since 2005 (Department of Homeland Security, 2005), by The Netherlands (Rademaker, 2009) and
others.
Nevertheless, catastrophes such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster point clearly to the limitations
of risk analysis, both in estimating likelihood and its explanatory power (Hagmann, 2011). These
limitations become even more profound in attempts to address future security roles and missions,
when often we have, at best, just a few precedents. Therefore any attempt at estimating probabilities or likelihood would be arbitrary and highly subjective. The alternative approach—and the one
undertaken within the FOCUS project—is the foresight based on exploratory scenarios.
4.4
EXPECTED SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FOR THE EU GLOBAL ROLE IN
THE PERSPECTIVE OF 2035
The chosen time span covers nearly a quarter of a century. The global political, economic, strategic and natural environment and the critical infrastructures on which societies will depend are certain to be different from today’s and, more importantly, different from today’s expectations and
guiding objectives. This is especially true for Europe and its global role. The uncertainties in assessing Europe’s dependencies on external powers, markets and raw materials, its exposure to
unstable populations and unlikely prosperity in neighbouring populations, the dynamics of global
power structures, as well as uncertainties that beset the EU’s social and economic stability and political coherence render current previews at least as uncertain as respective expectations were
some 25 years ago. Yet security research should be able to reduce uncertainties. FOCUS results
are intended to support European security research during the next five-year Security Research
Programme (SRP) and results from the next SRP should support EU security decision-making in
the subsequent 15 years: 2035 seems an arbitrary date. But the span is only a few EU and national political terms away from 2020 – 2035.
Theoretically the CSDP sector has a political finality, described by the Article 42 of the consolidated Treaty of the European Union, which states:
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and
military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping,
conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the
adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
However, as a result of the insufficient achievements in the security policy domain the EU is in a
perennial process of change for as long as it serves the purposes of its members. In a world of
potentially increasing global changes, if not turmoil, it will be pivotal for the EU that its development
is guided by a concept of its global role that is shared by sufficient collective shaping power within
its membership. Such concepts will increasingly require more of a long-term orientation for ongoing
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43
processes. The Initial Long-Term Vision report for European Defence Capability and Capacity
Needs provided by the European Defence Agency (2006) was an ambitious and inspiring exercise
in comprehensive capability planning, and some follow-up steps have already been made.
Such concepts for a global security role for the EU will require that its security posture (strategic
orientation plus capabilities) and its internal structures for collective decision-making match. The
Petersberg Tasks do not so far provide a sufficient base, although they have been incorporated
into the Lisbon Treaty. They have never so far been used as the basis for decisions that define
global roles for the EU. The security posture is critical for the EU’s global role, but it has never
been specified and it is a subject of interpretation.
The Petersberg Tasks were originally intended to guide conventional force planning, and they are
relevant to the extent the EU’s conventional force planning has become a reality. They do not constitute a global security role. The debate on widening of the Petersberg Tasks would need to address roles with global consequences, as well as future strategic challenges that are different from
traditional. In particular, the debate would need to raise awareness of conventional capabilities toward which the EU can be exposed within the 2035 time horizon or in the longer run, including:
•
Capabilities that can impact from any distance (advanced drones, other advanced robotics
systems, strategic cyber capabilities, space capabilities, etc.);
•
Capabilities that can disrupt external EU lifelines (energy, communication, rare earth
materials, etc.);
•
Changing economic and financial leverage that can have negative or positive impacts on
security challenges to the EU, as the First Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU
Internal Security Strategy rightly observes (European Commission, 2011);
•
Challenges that result from differentials within the EU’s environment/wider neighbourhood
(population, age, employment, competence, etc.).
Depending on the type of challenge the distinction between internal and external security differs: it
gets blurred in all four categories of challenges: For the first category it does not exist except in
case of outdated definitions of responsibilities. For the other three it will depend on how the internal
structure and how the political, strategic, economic, etc. environment develops. It will be applicable
in the longer run in minor external crises that affect the EU and in case of internal insecurity.
Given the EU’s current economic clout and prevailing coalitions, any state of the EU can trigger
security consequences on a global scale:
•
Disintegration or failure to develop internal structures in line with emerging challenges will
have negative impacts – with repercussions on the EU and its relations with its preferred
partners and other countries;
•
Confining the EU’s security role to ‘islandised’ or mere neighbourhood-solutions would tend
to marginalize the EU, and it would still tend to have global security consequences
(emerging vacuum, changing coalitions, changing strategic dependencies). As in the first
category the EU’s viability would be at stake;
•
In the division of labour from the Cold War it is theoretically still conceivable that the EU
stay focused on non-military challenges and is protected by NATO or some substitute with
US involvement;
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•
A more active regional security role within some regional division of labour could have
consequences for global security, e.g. in the Middle East and North Africa. But at this stage
the EU’s posture as a security actor would not suffice except in case of supporting coalitions with the US and/or strong regional allies. Nevertheless, the case of supporting regime
change in Libya has indicated that there is a degree of strategic competiveness within the
EU and within the EU-US relations;
•
The EU could build up capabilities to become a credible coalition partner in major crises;
•
Depending on the global strategic environment EU could be a credible ‘broker’ –a strategic
partner between global competitors;
•
Even in the longer run it remains doubtful whether the EU will acquire the capabilities and
strategic orientation as an autonomous power as envisaged prior to the ESDP.
Subsequent scenario foresight and analysis will serve to weigh these potential global roles in the
2035 perspective chosen. Each will also depend on how the EU’s internal structures for collective
security decision-making will develop. As Kishore Mahbubani (2009), one of the most experienced
observers of global security has warned, “many in the rest of the world are astonished that EU
leaders and officials spend so much of their time on their internal arrangements when most of their
emerging challenges are coming from external sources. A deep structural flaw has developed in
the EU decision-making processes. Virtually no EU leader dares to suggest that the EU should
spend more time looking outside rather than inside the EU.” In brief, a global role for Europe would
require more than a strategic posture to secure survival in front of major challenges, and the ability,
will and resources to shape a sustainable global order to minimize external risks.
4.5
RELEVANT RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
This section of the report looks into national and European research programmes aimed to enhance policy making vis-à-vis relevant external challenges and to support the development of respective capabilities. It also refers to several activities of potential interest, conducted in the
framework of the United Nations and NATO with considerable involvement of European researchers. Since only a few are designated as ‘programmes,’ the section covers multi-year projects as
well as known sequences of smaller projects.
The following were identified during the WP6.1 research 7:
Bulgaria
•
A series of studies to create, adapt and support the introduction of foresight-based planning
in security and defence, conducted by what currently is Centre for Security and Defence
Management at the Institute of Information and Communication Technologies – Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences.
Canada
•
Canadian Army 2040, Defence Research and Development Canada
7 National programmes are presented in alphabetical order.
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Switzerland
•
The International Relations and Security Network, coordinated by the Centre for Security
Studies at ETH Zurich regularly addresses fundamental structural changes in the world
considered unique in terms of scope, reach and complexity. It covers the subject under
three broad narratives:
o
Structural factors (geopolitical, institutional, normative, economic, technological);
o
Shifting power dynamics;
o
Implications.
The Netherlands
•
A series of four foresight studies in support of security policy making, including the National
Security Strategy, were conducted recently with the Cabinet or a designated ministry as
lead sponsor;
•
The Comprehensive Security research programme of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; 23 reports have been published in its framework by the end of 2011.
United Kingdom
•
Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, publishing regular foresight reports under the title “Global Strategic Trends.”
United States
•
The Global Trends series of the National Intelligence Council.
•
Strategic reviews and visions of the US Defense Department (Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Transformation of War, etc.).
•
Global trends and the formulation of US Foreign policy studies of the US State Department.
•
The comprehensive studies on America’s security challenges conducted by RAND Corporation, etc.
Initiatives at European level
•
Reports and publications in the area of “Justice, Freedom and Security,” European Parliament;
•
Grant programme of the European Commission in the area of External relations and foreign
affairs covering the following topics:
•
o
Common Foreign Security Policy;
o
Cooperation;
o
Development;
o
Enlargement;
o
External trade;
o
Foreign policies;
o
Humanitarian aid;
An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, European Defence Agency;
46
•
•
•
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European Union Institute for Security Studies conducts research and regularly publishes
study reports on the following relevant themes:
o
EU Foreign Policy;
o
Common Security and Defence Policy;
o
Disarmament;
o
Global governance;
ISIS Europe—a Brussels based independent research and advisory organisation—maintains a database on CSDP and EU missions and “CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership.” In
addition, it runs the following programmes:
o
Responding to Conflict and Crisis Management;
o
Gender and Security;
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) has three research programmes of potential relevance:
o
Wider Europe;
o
China;
o
Middle East and North Africa.
Since 2010 ECFR publishes a “European Foreign Policy Scorecard” – an innovative
project that “will provide a systematic annual assessment of Europe’s performance in
dealing with the rest of the world”.
Relevant projects implemented within the EU security research programme are included in Annex 5.
Activities of interest in the framework of NATO
•
•
Allied Command Transformation:
o
Multiple Futures Project: Navigating towards 2030
o
Long Term Requirements Study (LTRS)
RTO System Analysis and Studies Panel
o
SAS-096, Key Performance Indicators in Measuring Military Outputs
o
SAS-094, Analytical Support to the Development and Experimentation of NLW Concepts of Operation and Employment
o
SAS-093, Risk-Based Planning
o
SAS-091, Allied Information Sharing Capability
o
SAS-090, Cost Efficiency Implications of International Cooperation
o
SAS-089, Operational Analysis Support to NATO Operations
o
SAS-088, Long Range Forecasting of the Security Environment
o
SAS-084, Planning, Decision Support, Systems Analysis and Knowledge Development: A Technology Roadmap
o
SAS-083, Power and Energy in NATO Operations
o
SAS-082, Disruptive Technology Assessment Game: Extension and Applications
o
SAS-075, Characteristics of Future Expeditionary Operations
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47
o
SAS-074, Integration of Psycho-Social Models and Methods in NATO's EffectsBased Approach to Operations
o
SAS-066, Joint Operations 2030
o
SAS-062, The Impact of Potentially Disruptive Technologies
United Nations
•
Millennium Project
The Millennium Project, founded in 1996 after a three-year feasibility study with the United Nations University (UNU), Smithsonian Institution, Futures Group International, and the American
Council for the UNU. By now it is an independent non-profit global participatory futures research think tank of futurists, scholars, business planners, and policy makers who work for international organizations, governments, corporations, NGOs, and universities. The Millennium
Project manages a coherent and cumulative process that collects and assesses judgments
from over 2,500 people since the beginning of the project selected by its 40 nodes around the
world. The work is distilled in its annual “State of the Future,” the “Futures Research Methodology” series, and special studies, including “Global Exploratory Scenarios - 2025” and “Global
Energy Scenarios - 2020.”
4.6
RELEVANT METHODS FOR EXPLORATION OF EU ROLES AS A
GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR
Compared to other FOCUS ‘Big Themes,’ historical evidence of CSDP/ESDP missions and other
relevant operations is scarce. In addition, decision making, operations planning and the actual
conduct of such operations is extremely context specific, on occasion depending on minute detail.
In addition, for certain types of operations that could be undertaken in the future there is only very
limited evidence, if any.
Hence, ‘hard’ quantitative models and methods rarely find use in foresight of future roles in international security. And while catalogues of lessons learned and codes of best practice are of utmost
importance for operations planning and ongoing capability development processes, the exploration
of EU roles as a global security actor in the time horizon of 2035 remains intrinsically subjective,
intuitive and dependant on the ability of the research team to extract and interpret expert knowledge.
The selection of methods briefly presented in this section of the report reflects the limited applicability of quantitative studies to the exploration of the theme of FOCUS working package 6.
The Delphi method is based on structured surveys. It is one of the widely used methods in exploring future developments, especially when it comes to looking 20-30 years into the future. It is intrinsically subjective and intuitive. Delphi involves a group of experts responding anonymously to
questionnaires and feedback to the group of participants by the moderator, offering an explanation
why certain judgements have been made. Then the cycle is repeated until study objectives are
met.
Morphological analysis is the most structured method applicable to the study of future EU roles as
a global security actor. Developed in the 1960s as a method for structuring and investigating the
totality of relationships in multidimensional, non-quantifiable problem complexes, it was initially applied for purposes such as classification of astrophysical objects and development of jet and rocket
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propulsion systems (Ritchey, 1998). Since the 1990s it is applied in policy analysis and futures
studies, benefiting from advanced computer support. It relies on judgemental processes and
strives to provide internal consistency, rather than trying to identify and explain all cause and effect
relationships. The method assists the discovery of new relationships or configurations in the design
of scenarios and sub-scenarios, which may be overlooked when less structured methods are applied. It also facilitates identification and investigation of boundary conditions in the problem space.
The Black Swan Theory has also been found useful as a metaphor, encouraging the exploration of
the ‘unknown,’ the ‘unknowable’ and the potential impact of highly improbable events (Taleb,
2007). It has been applied to the exploration of the future of conflict in order to avoid ‘presentist’
and other biases, as well as over reliance on preconceived categorizations based on the past and
the present that often prevent consideration of ‘unexpected’ events 8 (cf. De Spiegeleire, Sweijs, &
Zhao, 2011).
Another method used in foresight is known as back-casting. Its implementation starts with a definition of a ‘future’ and then tracking back to find out those factors (drivers), trends, policies or programmes, that would bring us to that ‘future.’ The method has been used primarily in environmental studies, but is considered applicable in validating assumptions and findings in security foresight.
The application of structured methods as Delphi and morphological analysis is often combined with
less structured ones such as:
•
Strategic culture analysis;
•
SWOT;
•
Case studies.
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is also relevant to WP6 research, in particular for comparative
assessment of alternatives, e.g. according to their contribution in meeting the requirements of a
certain role, and consequent prioritization.
Delphi, morphological analysis, Black Swan theory, strategic culture analysis, SWOT, case studies
and Analytical Hierarchy Process were analysed in WP2 and presented in Annex 6 to FOCUS deliverable 2.1.
All these methods can be seen as complementary to the so-called scenario method, when scenarios are designed and used to evaluate and compare alternatives (e.g. strategies) and identify
those factors, events, processes or trends that would have significant impact on the future and
policy choices.
Methodologically, most relevant foresight studies focus on the research process described originally by Peter Schwartz (1991). It includes a number of steps:
1. Determine the focal issue;
2. Identify trends and drivers;
3. Develop plausible futures;
4. Finalise drivers;
5. Flesh-out futures;
6. Derive key challenges and implications.
8 The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster is an example of such ‘unexpected’ event.
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Using this as baseline, applicable methods are used at various stages to meet the requirements of
the specific study (cf. Allied Command Transformation, 2009; Ratchev, 2009). For example, the
adaptation used in the Multiple Futures Project is called Multiple Futures Intellectual Framework
and described in detail in Annex A to its final report (Allied Command Transformation, 2009).
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5
TRENDS, DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS
5.1
TRENDS IN THE 2035 TIME HORIZON
FOCUS
The strategic community widely shares the understanding that the world’s future in the next couple
of decades will be determined by the interaction of two basic factors: a world order based on a new
distribution of power and interdependency among global forces and between them and the world
community. The growing interaction between de facto changing power structure and interdependency at the global scale is revolutionising the system of international relations. Both are simultaneously loaded with many positive opportunities and charged with serious risks. Depending on
which one dominates, one may expect different trends in the above mentioned key dimensions of
describing future global roles of the European Union.
In the time horizon of this analysis there is no reason to expect that any single driver or trend will
dominate the global developments. Drivers and trends are identified within the context of the specific theme; they are not for universal usage and may have various forms and impact on different
regions and even European countries. In principle the drivers and trends are expected to be mutually dependent but this is not a rule; in some cases, they will work at cross-purposes (National Intelligence Council, 2000).
This section of the report provides information on key trends structured in five domains, respectively ‘global order,’ ‘ideological,’ ‘globalised economic developments,’ ‘technological’ and the ‘environmental’ domain.
Within the global order domain:
•
Continuity of the strategic contractions of the U.S. unilateral role, while its global strategic
(comprehensive military) reach remains uncontested as a result of the lack of long-range
capacities within other competitors, combined with their insufficient political will and interests in global engagement and taking responsibility.
Shrinking economic developments and growing costs of international military engagements
may force the United States into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic versus foreign
policy priorities (National Intelligence Council, 2008). Nevertheless, the United States will
inevitably be engaged in international or multilateral arrangements to deal with growing
transnational problems as economic and financial volatility, migration, piracy, terrorism, cyber security, drug trafficking and weapons proliferation. However, US unilateral operations
in solving intra-state or interstate conflicts, especially out of the Western hemisphere, will
be of an extremely low probability.
•
Inter-polar world in which key players, EU included, create their own geopolitical spaces
and military alliances and co-operate with each other on particular issues of common interest as a result of dominant influence of the constructivist approach towards global (security)
affairs.
In order to be accepted as positive for the regional stability and prosperity, the creation of
geopolitical spaces of influence—and control—by growing regional leaders should be
based on the so called positive expansion. This means that the countries from the periphery
recognise the role of the leader as a contributor to their national aims and interests. This
usually requires that the leader provides investments, transfer of technology and management know-how, access to high quality education and research, free market and, not the
least, protection of the interest of the region on the global scene of political, economic, and
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security relations. When that is not the case, the process of building ‘own’ geopolitical domains by the new powers may bring instead regional instability and conflicts.
•
Decline of the role of international law as a result of ‘moral inadequacy’ of global players
and its replacement by a balance of interest.
The respect to international law is a specific characteristic of the EU as an international actor. The nature of the role the Union may decide to perform will depend very much on the
way other players respect the international norms and regulations.
Within the ideological domain:
•
Spread of religious and ethnic radicalism both between cultures and within societies as a
result of social diversification, political dissatisfaction and lack of modern education.
One of the most realistic explanations of the current turmoil in the Arab countries is that the
openness brought by the process of globalisation has displayed the crooked face of authoritarian and dictatorship regimes. Their complete inability to manage economic and social affairs in an open and competitive world leads to clashes and even civil wars for reforms. At the moment of change, when there is a lack of any serious political idea and attractive leaders, religious and ethnic radicalism are instruments to quickly and decisively
distinct oneself from the previous regime, showing at the same time ability to govern (which
as a rule actually does not exist). In countries that have to cope with serious social dissatisfaction (especially from the youth) and economic difficulties, radical religious or ethnic
based aspirations are likely to gain traction. The threat of radicalism could have interim
character if the process of transition is directed by democracy-oriented forces. Otherwise
the potential for conflict will increase.
•
Decline of the attractiveness of the post-national state as a result of fear for social status
and unpredictable future.
The attractiveness of any successful social model is an ideological factor. The role of the
EU at the global scene will depend basically on the attractiveness of the European integration model. This is the only one that connects the human rights and political values with
stability, non-violence, and social and individual prosperity. Any serious ambition of having
EU as a respected global security actor requires that Europe remains a largely prosperous
place. The probability that the people around world change their attitude in the coming decades and begin to look at EU in different context as dominant military power or empire-type
leader is relatively small.
•
Growing political nationalism that erodes the internal cohesion of the EU and feeds geopolitical rhetoric and ambitions.
Nationalism is the belief that the fate of a single person is bound up with the nation only and
he/she is indifferent to the fate of others (Friedman, 2011). The sources of nationalism in
Europe are well studied and explained but, if it succeeds in occupying an important place
within the European political domain, two dangerous developments may occur simultaneously: re-nationalisation of national defence and abandoning any ideas about collective actions on the global security scene. Moreover, nationalism is inseparable from geopolitics of
control. Sooner or later it will cross the border between raising another great national aim
and trying to achieve it at the expense of neighbours. Despite how low is the probability of
spreading nationalism to a politically important level, it has to be a permanent element in
future analysis of EU security roles.
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Globalised Economic Developments
•
A global shift in the relative wealth is underway; in terms of size and speed, this shift is
without precedent in history.
The global shift of wealth is mainly a result of the transfer of production activities from the
West to perspective markets countries. Some governments of developing countries were
clever to open their markets for investments and soon will enter the club of developed nations (estimated not only by GDP, but in GDP per capita as a criterion). Others, like Russia,
missed this opportunity and continue to rely on the income primarily from exporting raw
materials.
In the time horizon of the FOCUS study, this tendency may eventually lead to further economic difficulties in the EU and the United States and, in case of successful balancing of
economic and social developments in the rapidly growing powers, to preservation of levels
of productivity and efficiency of their economies. Some studies indicate that in the next 3040 years “the overall GDP of the BRIC countries will collectively match the original G-7’s
share of global GDP” (National Intelligence Council, 2008).
However, this is a linear forecast. Neither the quality nor the technological level of the new
powers’ GDP will be compatible to those of the Western countries. China and India depend
very much on the import of raw materials; Russia has huge reserves of natural resources
but the political economy and the governance are in a need of total reform; Brazil and South
Africa, as well as Iran, Turkey and Indonesia have the capacity to turn into regional powers.
In comparison with BRICs, the quality and capacity of the European economic base and its
integration with that of the United States, the intellectual capacity and mentality of the people, and the quality of governance are outstanding. The global shift of relative wealth may
happen indeed or fail in time, but it is not an obstacle to the EU global role in the security
domain.
•
Important features of social transformation processes within Europe and the United
States—and within the societies of emerging powers—under the impact of globalisation are
still unknown.
It can be expected that as a result of the global shift of wealth the middle classes in emerging global economic players will grow significantly. But serious political reforms are required
in order to turn more affluent people into a socially determined middle class. Despite the
huge income from the high prices of energy sources, there has been no growth of the middle class in countries like Russia. It is still not clear how the communist regime in China
may solve this problem, and even whether it would be willing to solve it. In most other
cases, the middle class is still more a sign of being different from the poor, than a social
status of having independent and secure life. As a rule, the main source for the middle
class are the state and local administration, the security forces, and people engaged in
government-provided services as education, health, postal services, communications and
transportation.
From this point of view the globalisation may have an unexpected effect on the social system of Europe (and the United States). It is already obvious, that giant corporations with
global operations are accumulating ever more power. However, their success and the
openness of the markets for global competition are putting the small and mid-sized businesses, which are the backbone of the ‘instant’ middle class, in a difficult perspective.
Eventual labourisation of the middle class could be a very serious shift that will affect di-
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53
rectly not only internal political process (in terms of feeding nationalism, protectionism, and
populism), but the decision-making at EU level.
In terms of social developments the giant international corporations will establish their own
social system in the regions of operations (often these are cross-border regions, especially
in South Asia). The package of social benefits in parallel with those provided by the governments would be relatively more attractive. This is well known from the history of capitalism and may be expected with high probability.
The continuing demographic decline in Europe will continue to parallel large migration. Fitoussi & Laurent (2009) visualise main trends using UN Population Division data (see
Figure 2 and Figure 3).
Figure 2: Population growth (in percentages), medium variant.
The problem with aging population is not only an economic and social problem. It has indirect and direct impact on the European decision-making process on external security actions. Older people, focussed on pensions, social and health service, are more conservative
towards the global affairs, more sensitive to potential loss of life in risky endeavours and
less susceptible to appeals to support engagement in risky and costly missions.
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Figure 3: Population aged 65+, medium variant (in percentages of total population).
Europe will continue to attract migrants from Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia and
Eastern Europe. The most serious analytical challenge in the 2035 time horizon is expected
to come from Africa, where the population is likely to double. The case of Libya exposed a
specific development within the Arabian nation – authoritarian governments prefer to invite
low-cost foreign workers than to hire national youth educated on public money. Instead of
jobs, they provide social help. The biggest food delivery social system in the world today is
in Iraq, where the largest employer is the government along with local administration.
•
Developments within global energy markets, especially the contradictions between tendencies of centralisation of control over resources and decentralisation of markets.
Within the time frame of 2035 the energy will continue to be the essence of the economic
strategy. In this time horizon the supply of energy resources (Figure 4) will inevitably continue to be in the focus of EU CFSP and CSDP. The industrialised world will be separated
in countries in which the demands of classical energy sources will grow up and countries
(mostly Western) that will be in the midst of energy transformation (National Intelligence
Council, 2008). From the point of view of the EU global security role two types of problems
emerge: first, the concentration of the production of oil in half a dozen of countries that will
form a specific international security actor and. second, the fact that in all of them the oil
business is completely state-owned or delivered through oligarchic structures. This means
that the security of energy supplies will be based more on political relations than on ‘business as usual.’
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Figure 4: Breakdown of likely energy sources.
Source: National Intelligence Council (2008), based on data from PFC Energy International,
www.pfcenergy.com.
Technological Domain
The following trends can be identified in the fourth domain – the technological domain:
•
Technological competitiveness will bring new levels of global interaction and competition,
especially in cyber, space, transportation, and extraction technologies, military and intelligence hardware and know-how, etc.
Technology was chosen as a principal trend because of its potentially transformative role—
in both positive and negative ways—in addressing a wide range of international security
challenges, related to the EU global role. While there is little doubt about the impact of
technology on social developments as well as on military and particularly on terrorism, the
key questions in the 2035 timeframe relate to the origins of technological innovations, who
will be the innovators and who will use the products of their work.
In the context of the EU global security role two principal uncertainties need further research (RF&GBN, 2010). The first one is related to the level of political and economic
alignment in the world, but mostly within the circle of global competitors. This aspect is decisive because it will determine the quest for and the readiness for sharing high tech products and technology. The second is about the level of adaptiveness of global partners of the
European Union. Adaptive capacity is not only about economy and use of technology but
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also about creating an environment of rules and procedures for technological exchange and
co-operation.
•
None of the other trends will be more important than the success or failure of efforts to prevent the spread of weapons for mass destruction and uncontrolled access to technologies
and materials for their production and delivery.
Arms and nuclear control are in decline and this is opening up space for the uncontrolled
spread of 20th century technologies to countries with regional leadership ambitions and to
non-state actors. Aligning proliferation of WMD with regional dominance ambitions and
strategic terror geopolitics of energy (and water), regional dominance ambitions and/or
strategic terror in neighbourhood regions constructs the only threat to EU’s vital security
interests.
Table 5. Estimated status of nuclear forces in 2011.
Country
Russia
United States
France
China
United Kingdom
Israel
Pakistan
India
North Korea
Total:
Strategic
Operational
2,430
1,950
290
0
160
0
0
0
Nonstrategic
Operational
0
200
n.a.
?
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Reserve
5,500
2,850
?
~180
65
80
90-110
80-100
Military
Stockpile
8,000
5,000
~300
240
225
80
90-110
80-100
Total Inventory
11,000
8,500
~300
240
225
80
90-110
80-100
0
n.a.
<10
<10
<10
~4,830
~200
~8,650
~14,000
~20,500
Source: Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/
nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
As the present situation indicates, the non-proliferation regime does not provide for optimism and further proliferation of nuclear weapons may be expected in the time horizon of
2035 (Strategic Trends Programme, 2007).
The core concern for EU will be the area between the Middle East and South Asia. The current status of South Asia, where the nuclear conundrum prevails, is a result of fluctuating
international non-proliferation policy towards the region. With nuclear India and Pakistan,
the prospect of nuclear weapons will embolden Iran, lead to greater instability, and trigger
shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East. That appears to be the key concern of the
Arab states in the region and may drive some to consider acquiring their own nuclear deterrent. According to the National Intelligence Council (2008) Turkey, the United Arab Emir-
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ates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the former regimes in Egypt and Libya are or have expressed interest in building new nuclear power facilities.
This is a complex challenge. Although there are several possible ways to address current
aspirations of Iran and concerns about its nuclear programme, the response will almost
certainly require revitalisation and reform of international control regimes on a global scale
– an extremely complicated mission in itself (Brookings, 2009).
From this point of view, in the time horizon of 2035 effective deterrence with symmetric and
asymmetric tools will be a compulsory element of the EU security capabilities and political
power.
•
Newly emerging characteristics of armed conflict
The Petersberg Tasks have been defined in a period of controversial policy on using armed
forces for peace enforcement, peace keeping, sustainability and reconstruction operations
held in different context, including the war on terror. The period between the first war
against Saddam Hussein (1991), the NATO intervention in Serbia (1999), the invasions in
Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Georgia (2008), and the operation in Libya (2011) presents almost the full spectrum of interventions at the level lower than ‘global.’
However, these interventions do not characterise the full spectrum of armed conflicts. Intrastate conflicts based on ethnic-religious divisions and those for control over territory illustrate that at the local level armed conflicts are characterised by “… the kind of ferocity that
was typical of ‘modern’ war, but overall casualty levels have been much lower” (Sheenan,
2010).
Most of the future armed conflict studies accept that in the perspective of the next two-three
decades any war between global powers—existing and emerging—will be ‘unlikely’ (National Intelligence Council, 2000; Gurzon, 2008; Strategic Trends Programme, 2010),
mainly because of the economic and financial interdependence, analysed above, loose
military alliances and, obviously, insufficient comprehensive capabilities to transfer any high
intensity military operation into sustainable political effect. Some analyses like the one in
the Strategic Trends Programme (2010) stipulate that in general “the risks of inter-state war
may increase beyond 2020 when intensifying competition for resources, particularly energy
and possibly food, and continued population growth result in heightened tension.”
However, the very nature of war probably will not change substantially in terms of ‘achieving political aims with military means,’ but the character of conflict and war will constantly
change and evolve. Dedicated studies identify the following main drivers of change:
o
Globalisation is changing the foundation of the modern era ‘war and defence issue’
– sovereignty of the national state. It is eroding not only the economic autonomy but
also the political, informational, and cultural (language, knowledge, education, media) aspects of sovereignty (Sheenan, 2010). In such tendency neither the centre of
gravity of a military operation, nor the strategy and the means could be decided
adequately in the application of known methods of contingency planning.
o
Increased number of states and non-state actors, equipped with various weapons of
mass destruction, will create a more difficult environment for interventions and will
affect the ability to undertake interventions. Operations that threaten personal or regime security of autocratic leaderships in nuclear-armed states will entail particular
risks (Strategic Trends Programme, 2007).
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o
Advances in information technology would enable new synergies in war fighting
through the combination of advanced precision weaponry, improved surveillance,
reconnaissance, targeting and enhanced command and control capabilities, and
expanding use of artificial intelligence and robotics.
o
Developments in cyber, nano, robotics, space, networking, and other technologies
may create in a period of two-three decades another level of asymmetry and introduce what some authors refer to as ‘fifth generation warfare’ (Hammes, 2007).
o
Hybrid-type conflicts will proliferate due to a mixture of state and non-state actors
and terrorist networks, expanding the possibilities for combining cyber attack capabilities with urban warfare assets. This type of conflict is closer to the specific theme
of the EU’s Petersberg tasks. Margaret Bond (2007) has argued that they will require “… a new approach to using our armed forces for a broader and more comprehensive war of scale, ranging from purely peaceful humanitarian missions as
preventive measures, to the development of hostile conditions, through traditional
war fighting operations employing traditional combat strategies, to post conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts, where security and peace derive from thriving
economic and political status.”
However, in the time horizon of 2035 an imaginary ‘virtual’ war where complicated robotics integrated by information systems using high precision weapons to achieve quick
‘victory’ with few casualties most probably will not realise. As a minimum, such a paradigm could not serve as the ground for planning capabilities for the Petersberg tasks.
Van Creveld (1991) and Kaldor (1999) examine in detail this issue.
Environmental Domain
The following trends are identified within the fifth domain – the environmental domain in the 2035
timeframe that may impact decisions on EU security roles (cf. Homer-Dixon, 1994):
•
Visible impact of the environmental degradation on vital natural resources such as water,
energy and food as a result of continuing industrial policies without parallel investments in
ecological preservation;
•
Increase in the immediate danger of raising sea levels, especially in the northern hemisphere, as a result of failure of comprehensive international efforts towards environmental
protection.
5.2
DRIVERS OF CHANGE
To understand the potential future global role of the EU in the security domain, it is necessary to
understand the factors that may drive change from the contemporary point of view. The drivers of
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change approach is applicable to both mid-term planning based on trend analyses and extrapolation and long-term planning based on foresight scenarios.9
In this approach change, similar to the term challenge, includes a negative as well as a positive
notion. Its dualism comes from the fact that one and the same development may be seen from one
point of view as a positive and as a negative from an opposing or a different point of view. However, the basic characteristic of change is that it closely affects core interests, values, or principles
of the specific subject under study – the EU global roles in the security domain. The discussion on
drivers of change in this case means a discussion on having or not such a role, of having leading,
supporting or marginal role, of having defensive or offensive behaviour while implementing the
role, of performing the role autonomously, within a formal alliance or in ad hoc format, etc. The
common dominator of all drivers of change identified within the specific theme is that as a whole
and independently they require hard decisions which are often connected with difficult political
choices, mobilisation and delivery of significant resources, and normative, institutional, and functional redesign.
While studying drivers of change with social and political character, available study results have
identified a number of components. For example, NATO’s Multiple Futures Project is based on
structural and deterministic drivers. Some of them, that have been very influential throughout history, are designated as structural:
•
Friction is a result from the distribution of power in international security affairs and is measured by the degree of ease with which decisions are made at the international level, ranging
from cooperation to confrontation;
•
Integration is derived from the economic aspect of globalisation;
•
Asymmetry reflects the relative difference between the capacity of states to influence international security affairs.
Deterministic drivers are those developments within the context of the structural drivers that will
have the greatest impact on security in the coming decades: changing state capacity, resource allocation, climate change, use of technology, demographics, and competing ideologies and world
views (Allied Command Transformation, 2009).
The UK Department for International Development uses three components in their analysis of drivers of change:
•
‘Agents’ refers to individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests, including the
political elite, civil servants, political parties, the military, etc.;
•
‘Structural features’ includes the history of state formation, natural and human resources,
economic and social structures, demographic change, regional influences and integration,
globalisation, trade and investment, and urbanisation;
•
‘Institutions’ includes the rules governing the behaviour of agents, such as political and public administration processes.
9 The concept of change as a driver (a major cause) of the new global security environment is based on the
works of authors like Alvin Toffler (Future Shock, 1970; The Third Wave, 1980; Powershift, 1990) that
have studied ‘waves of change’ from a historical perspective. The FOCUS research team accepts that in
the 2035 time horizon the system of international relations will be facing not only incremental, but also
radical developments and that will affect every aspect of the EU construct. The drivers of change are
elaborated here from the point of view of the specific theme – EU global security roles.
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While building scenarios for EU 2020, Bertrand, Michalski & Pench (2001) used a relatively large
number of drivers. This approach is also rational because it provides better grounds for building
relevant and plausible scenarios. As components of structural type they use technology/work organisation, culture/values, governance politics (public and administration), EU institutions, labour
market and social policies, other economic policies, globalisation, and regional security (Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, USA, Russia, and Asia).
The FORESEC Project in its Deliverable D4.5 identified the following drivers of change for European security: global power shift (the structure of the international system), growing complexity (the
nature of security and security risks), energy security, demographics, terrorism in Europe, nuclear
proliferation (threats to European security from a nuclear Iran), extreme environmental events, and
critical infrastructure vulnerability (Giegerich & Comolli, 2009).
One of the principal works exploring the American role in new strategic perspective (Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy, 2008) uses the following set of drivers of change: science and technology
(information, biology, genetics, and nanotechnology); global production networks; job outsourcing
from developed to developing countries; American consumers; Chinese suppliers; Asian commodity importers; developing country youth bulges; aging populations in developed countries; global
warming leading to soil erosion, species extinction, and climatic upheavals; scarcity of clean water
for growing urban populations; health pandemics; radical religious terrorists and other technologically empowered individuals; non-governmental organisations; religious revivalism; nationalism.
The UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its Global Security Trends – Out of 2040 is
using the concept of ‘ring road issues’ to explain the structural “key drivers of change that will affect
the lives of everyone on the planet over the next 30 years” (Strategic Trends Programme, 2010).
As structural components the authors recognise globalisation, climate change, global inequality,
and innovation. Within their context four key themes have been identified – the human environment, dynamics of global power, evolving defence and security challenges, and strategic shocks.
What these and many other works reflect is that a single blueprint approach to drivers of change
analysis is inappropriate. A conceptual model for the EU global role in security has to be developed
to incorporate and better understand the interaction between components affecting both positive
and negative change. Each component of structural or deterministic character can affect the others
and vice versa. However, the impact of one on the other is mediated through the role of the ‘institution European Union’ as an actor in the global security affairs.
As mentioned above, EU already has a global role, including in the area of external security. However, this role has been initiated and applied more or less within the Bretton Woods system with its
three pillars: the concentration of both political and economic power in the hands of a relatively
small number of Western states, the existence of a cluster of important economic and political interests shared by those states, and the presence of a dominant power ‘willing and able’ to assume
a leadership role (Spero, 1985).
As the global hypothesis explains, this system of conditions that forms the fundament of Western
dominance is under a gradual reconstruction in favour of the new economic, demographic, and
plausible military powers. Therefore, the set of drivers of change should be identified in the context
of those characteristics of the plausible future that have structural and deterministic impact on the
EU future security role. The determination of roles and missions on behalf of the EU is not trivial,
especially when EU roles on the global scene are under consideration. Difficulties stem from conceptual, legal, organizational, economic, political exigencies, capabilities, cultural, social and environmental considerations. In the exploration of these roles it is necessary to encompass different
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forms of EU action, i.e. as a unified player, as a normative actor, as a societal power, or other kind
of actor.
Following this set of considerations, one may identify those trends and drivers that could be regarded as likely to have an important impact on the future EU global security role. Therefore, it is
possible to distinguish between three types of drivers: structural, deterministic and institutional.
Structural drivers of change for the EU global role are the ongoing diversification of power, the interdependence in economic, political, and security aspects, and the governance as a main factor of
generating positive or negative decisions and action in the field of security.
•
Diversification of power is not a synonym of power sharing or distribution of power. Diversification is of a much more comprehensive character. The term refers to different kinds of
sources of power, different forms of power, and different ways of using power on the global
scene. Differentiation will come out from the tendency of distributing the traditionally stateowned power to the private national and international actors which in many cases are or
could be from the opposing side. The future forms of application of power will have much
more virtual, financial, and social character, than physical. The power will be used mainly
indirectly, using different open and covered channels of influence. The main reason for
such deep change is the character of the powers that will expectedly play crucial role at the
global scene. Countries like China, India, and Brazil, but also Russia, Iran, and the Arab
nation represent civilisations with specific values and traditions, quite different from those of
the West. Some of them completely lack experience on the global security scene and have
to learn what to do with their growing capacities. As a rule, they all believe that a split and
confrontation between the US and Europe is in their strategic interest. As a result, the diversification of power in the coming decades will be a much more complicated process than
the simple redistribution of power.
•
Interdependence in this case is an effect from economic globalisation and integration that
leads towards political and security commitments that may be formal or informal. Future security commitments will come not so much from the values and ideas (as was the case with
trans-Atlantic integration), but from geo-economic and geopolitical interests, access to
strategic raw materials and resources and routes of transportation, radical reforms in the
field of labour market, gaining access to research and technological capabilities, etc. In
many cases the interdependence will be driven by non-state actors – giant international
corporations, banks, transportation companies, and others will predetermine governmental
political decisions. From this perspective, interdependence differs from integration because
it is mostly of a compulsory nature. In order to be a source of stability, interdependence
should be based on a positive expansion from those that have more to others that have
less. Otherwise, it may turn into a source of resistance and search for compensatory solutions (e.g. military alliances).
•
Governance in terms of level of responsibility and commitment to the legal international
norms would be a structural driver in the coming decades. The above mentioned developments and the unpredictable consequences of furthering economic globalisation will create
a complex environment for any government. The pressure will come both from national societies and international environment. As a profound effect of globalisation, in some countries the middle class will grow rapidly, while in others, including in the developed world, it
may considerably decline due to the outsourcing of production capacities. The next generation of crises in advanced societies will not be a financial or economic, but one of jobs. The
pressure over the governments will come also from complex international relations in which
they have to deal not only with those neighbours that they know well but with governments
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of far away countries. The spread of information and the communication abilities of the
people will create specific atmosphere for the governing bodies where their effectiveness
and efficiency would be checked via increased transparency and accountability. Part of the
pressure on governance will come from new forms of identity politics centred on religious
convictions. In a rapidly globalising world experiencing population shifts, religious identities
provide followers with a ready-made community that serves as a social safety net in times
of need, which is particularly important to migrants (National Intelligence Council, 2004).
Last but not least, there is a tendency of growing importance of the national legislative
powers; this is a fact even now for countries like USA and Iraq, but also for the EU.
Deterministic drivers of change that will have decisive impact of the EU global role in security in
coming decades include:
•
Further effects of globalisation that may lead towards a global shift in relative wealth, revival
of geopolitics, enhancement of global disorder and a new form of multipolarity;
•
Evolving external threats and challenges to the vital aspects of EU security such as sovereignty of Member States, the functioning of its common market, unhindered access to
strategic resources, strategic terror, security of common cyber networks, security of other
critical infrastructure, energy security, etc.;
•
Any long-term significant change in the ‘average weather’ that may have an impact on international relations;
•
Relative economic power of the EU vis-à-vis other global centres of power;
•
European perception on own economic and financial conditions that will affect the ability
and willingness of the Member States to increase their collective efforts on the global scene
including the development of the Member States’ national security prerogatives (Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union) versus the concept of the security of the
Union as a whole (Article 21, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union);
•
EU internal political and social cohesion that will determine the sense of collectiveness and
readiness of taking responsibility and sharing the burdens of a global role including an increase in regional co-operation and integration versus global multilateralism;
•
The possible emergence of a two-tier Europe, by exclusion of smaller countries that may
have the will but not the human or financial resources to achieve stated objectives and
contribute to the wider Petersberg Tasks by making available respective national capabilities;
•
European demographics that may strongly influence public attitude and political will to act
at the global scene as an independent actor;
•
EU-US relations as an essence of the ‘West’ and ‘Western civilization’ and particularly the
common threat perception, burden sharing through NATO and Directorate-General for the
External Relations, as well as the relations between NATO and the EU’s CFSP and CSDP;
•
EU relations with other strategic partners in terms of avoiding violent competition and readiness to cooperate and share the burden of maintaining global peace and stability, respect
for human rights, enhancement and implementation of arms control and non-proliferation
regimes;
•
Dedication to the protection of human rights, globally, as a principal value of the EU;
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•
Mass migration and cultural co-existence on European soil in relation to other factors such
as European demography, economic stability, capacity to integrate, and public attitudes towards ‘the others’;
•
Consolidation of EU CFSP and CSDP as a set of principles and decision-making mechanisms, i.e. the interplay among European institutions and Member States;
•
The development of consensus for a common defence of the European Union and the idea
that European integration will be incomplete as long as it does not include ‘defence,’ whatever this term is going to denote in the future;
•
Alternative future interpretations of comprehensiveness and the policies, qualities and
capabilities of a truly “comprehensive” actor (related to Deliverables 3.1, 3.2 and related
scenario work).
Institutional drivers are important because if they are used properly they may soften the frictions
produced by the structural and deterministic drivers. Institutions include the rules governing the
behaviour of security actors, such as political and public administration processes, EU decisionmaking on foreign, security and defence issues and the international intergovernmental organizations. They include formal as well as informal rules. Specific actors are the non-governmental organisations and media with capacity to influence both national and EU level decisions. Institutions
can affect structural features and vice versa. Institutions are more susceptible to change in the
medium term than structural features. This leads to the conclusion that institutional performance is
important to understanding change processes and the impact they will have on the EU global security role. However, in the coming decades the institutions—both international and domestic—are
very likely to be an object of pressure for reforms. As Kerremans (1996) depicts it, “the new-institutionalism will not only point at the rules and traditions but also on routinisation and socialisation.”
For this reason further security research should address not only formal rules, but also informal
rules, power structures, vested interests and incentives within these institutions.
5.3
POTENTIAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS
The alternative futures of international security are not driven by distinguishable trends and recognisable drivers only. Events like the oil crisis of the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992,
terrorist attacks such as on 9/11 2001 or the financial crisis of 2008 have the capacity to deteriorate the impact of certain trends and to generate new drivers. They have multi dimensional effects
on different aspects of the international relations and the behaviour of global actors. One of the
specific effects may be the emergence of a new actor, like the case with OPEC in the 1980s, or
even a new type of actor, as was the case with Al-Qaeda. As a result from such specific developments or events (strategic shocks) the context of the security environment may change in some of
its principal dimensions.
The medium- to long-term effects of strategic shocks are difficult to forecast mainly because of
their unique character, high speed of occurrence, and the necessity of a-typical management responses. Strategic shocks in the security domain are characterised also with focussed effects on
international security relations, including on defence alliances. The 9/11 attacks on the US soil and
the consequent US war on terror put NATO and trans-Atlantic relations under an extraordinary
pressure.
Having in mind that the globalisation will inevitably lead to establishment of more interrelated systems, the effects of different shocks may generate systematic crises of a global security nature.
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Impacts are differently assessed from the distance of time; it may be therefore beneficial to evaluate them initially as potential challenges, at least for the EU. The breakdown of the Berlin wall was
a shock with a positive character for EU and USA, but at the same time seen as a negative challenge or even a source of threat by Moscow.
The selection of issues that may turn into strategic shocks in the future is based not so much on
historic associations but on facts that exist in contemporary reality in some form. The following developments may occur in the time horizon of 2035 as strategic shocks:
•
The death of the common currency after a cycle of crises that may lead to degradation of
the EU down to a common economic space.
Such development will have cascading effects for the EU, both internally and externally. It
will lead to a transformed economic, social, and security impact for the Member States and
the common construct that will probably totally undermine the ability of the EU to act on the
global security scene.
•
Prolonged difficulties of a major state, which could directly affect the European security in a
comprehensive manner. Several types of pivotal states are important for the functioning of
EU as well as for its global security impact:
Russia is both a strategic supplier of raw materials and the only nearby military power, proportional to EU capacity. EU is the major economic and political partner of Russia and its
main source of hard currency. In the estimated time horizon Russia will continue to be a
major energy supplier, especially if it changes its investment policy and attracts European
and US resources and technologies for drilling and up-streaming of oil and gas in the far
North. This interdependence will continue to drive the relations between the two entities. At
the same time Russia will continue to experience difficulties in restructuring its economy,
dealing with artificially established private monopolies, establishing the rule of law, fighting
the widely spread corruption and in the overall democratic performance. Special concern for
EU is not the ambition of Russia to build its own integration project but its aims and the way
Moscow tries to achieve them. From this point of view Russia is part of the principal EU
new security dilemma.
Collapse of any of the major energy suppliers such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq or the smaller Gulf
countries, Nigeria, Angola or Iran will have mainly a regional impact but will trigger domino
effects for the EU. These countries have significant currency reserves as a financial buffer,
but their mono-political economy, based on the income from hydrocarbons only, could not
be restructured in a short period of time. Having in mind that most of the oil reserves in
these countries, Russia included, are depleted to less than a half (with the exception of Iraq
and UAE), reforms during the next 20-30 years will be of dramatic importance not only for
them but for EU as well. Protracted difficulties in each of those countries or failure of reforms could be caused by different sources with political, ethno-religious or regional security
character. While they are extremely centralised and the dependence of people on the state
is dominant such reforms may produce tremendous social turmoil. As a result, the probability of a strategic shock from those countries, especially in the form of mass migration, is of a
‘medium+’ probability.
China is a major trade partner of EU and a source of financial resources for stabilisation
during the current crisis. The interest of China’s leadership and business of obtaining European production capacities and infrastructure may lead to a different situation in a mid-term
perspective. At the same time, the country will continue to exploit the complicated political
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and economic situation, contradictory internal politics and a regional security policy raising
serious questions. Having in mind the inter-connectedness of these major elements of Chinese realities, any protracted difficulties are of a ‘medium+’ probability.
Turkey is the ‘next door China’ for Europe. The similarity with the Asian giant is in the dynamic economic development (Turkey’s GDP is close to the Russian one, but with a completely different structure) and specific political system. The internal political vulnerability in
Turkey does not come precisely from the military but from the pendulum between islamisation and secularism. There is no solid evidence how powerful these two trends are. Islamism is grounded not so much into the religion itself but into the achievements the Ottoman
Empire had under the flag with the crescent. Secularism is in everything else, including into
the specific role of the military. The external sensitiveness of Turkey comes from the intensity of its ambitions to build its own space of influence that may lead towards a future integration project. This ambition is not new. It has started with the revival of Turkey’s economy
in the second half of the 1980’s and was explained by the then premier Turgut Özal as Turkey being the fatherland between the Adriatic Sea and the Great Chinese wall. However,
today’s Turkish strategy (explained by the foreign minister Davutoglu when he was a professor as ‘strategic depth’) is much more coherent and focused on concrete regions as the
Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa and on important global security issues like the Iranian nuclear programme and the Middle East Peace
Process. Turkey’s officially declared approach of having ‘zero problems’ with neighbours is
constructive and may be estimated as productive in some cases like the Western Balkans,
Iraq and North Africa, but in other cases like Israel and Palestine it has produced serious
international contradictions. As a result, any serious and protracted difficulties in Turkey or
eventual collapse of its internal stability may cause complex problem for EU in its immediate neighbourhood, waves of migration, including from other countries to which Turkey has
provided a visa free regime, and internal difficulties with about 10 million Turks living permanently in the EU. A strategic shock from Turkey is of medium probability.
The expected shift of the focus of the United States towards the Pacific should not be estimated as a potential strategic shock. The mutual interdependence between the two entities—the EU and the United States—is immense and vibrant and will survive during an
eventual transition. Ties in political, military, economic and research and development areas are vital for the functioning of both entities and either of them would have no substitutes
because this is and will probably continue to be the only complex alliance with global impact
based on values and ideas.
•
Identity based conflicts or territorial disputes on European soil or in the close neighbourhood.
Potential conflicts grounded in identity, ethnicity, and religious divisions are not yet fully
eliminated from the European perspective. They exists in the hеart of Europe – the Western
Balkans, in the close European neighbourhood – between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and
in an environment at a medium distance – in North Africa and the Middle East, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia.
Dangers may well persist as the impact of globalisation extends further, deeply dividing
countries in beneficiaries and losers. In the former case, aggressive nationalism will probably rise as a driving force aimed to find a solution of own difficulties with regard to ‘the others.’ In the latter case, questionable geopolitical ambitions may arise and drive regional
policies near European soil. Such events are of are ‘medium+’ probability.
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Other events that may act as strategic stressors and shocks on international security relations may
be found within the following:
•
Discovery of an efficient synthetic fuel or an advanced technology of up-streaming of shalegas and oil from sands that may have major global impact on international relations and
thus help to reduce the destabilising impact associated with the expected ‘resource wars’ in
the years ahead.
Such a discovery, if it is made globally available, will change completely the status of countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Nigeria, and especially Russia as resource-based actors
in international economic and security relations.
•
Nuclearisation of one or more countries in the Middle East that will require specific preventive, protective and defensive measures.
This opportunity is obviously realistic and should not be described as a shock, but the effect
for the EU and international community may come from the speed with which such development may turn into a threat.
•
Terrorist strategic attack against an EU Member State and major allies or terrorist attack
against any country with weapons of mass destruction.
•
Malicious attacks utilising electromagnetic pulse technologies or coordinated cyber attacks
and leading to the collapse of the European and US global communications and navigation
grids, and limiting as a consequence the global access of the West.
The experimental strike-down of a satellite by China in January 2007 opened the curtain of
an on-going arms race in space. In February 2008 the US launched its strike in order to
demonstrate advanced capabilities. Such developments confirm that the work on space war
capabilities is ongoing and show how vitally important for the global powers is the control
over space.
•
Emergence of unexpected serious and rapidly growing impact of climate change, e.g.
higher sea levels, or another natural catastrophe that may have a dramatic impact on European citizens and Member States’ territory.
Potential specific challenges and especially unexpected strategic shocks are issues that may be
identified and elaborated exclusively by systematic foresight work based on random monitoring of
variety of factors from social and ethno-religious, through climate and resources, to research and
technologic development.
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FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLORING EU GLOBAL SECURITY ROLES
Recently the EU emerged as one of the most unusual and wide-ranging political actors in the international system (Ginsberg & Smith, 2007). Historically, such a role has not been expected neither
by the fathers of the union nor among observers like H. Kissinger, E. Haas, S. Hoffman, D. Allen,
and others. As a compromise, some of them later have recognised the global economic role of the
EU but mostly continue to believe that EU will not engage in security affairs where the US will have
the role of the global policeman, as R. Kagan has argued. However, a recent report argues that the
institutional place of the EU in the international system “now becomes an urgent and inescapable
part of the strategic challenge that Europe faces in the world” (Emerson, et al., 2011).
The Union’s global security role is based on 1) self-declaration of the level of ambition, 2) actions,
undertaken at the international and global scene for solving important and ‘hot’ international issues,
and, as a result, 3) the fact of recognition of the EU achievements by other international actors –
mostly the other global allies and opponents. As Rami G. Khouri wrote recently in regard to the
United States’ position vis-à-vis the Palestinian bid for U.N. recognition, “… power is something
you generate by your actions, and credibility as an international political actor comes from harnessing your power and using it efficiently and wisely” (Khouri, 2011). Consequently, EU’s influence in the security domain has to be explored as an integral component of its global political role
together with the economic and cultural components. They all are reinforcing and supplementing
each other and are indivisible neither from analytical nor from a practical point of view. The EU is
already acting as a global actor, turning into:
•
A real and essential factor in global political relations based on institutionalised relations
with practically all intergovernmental organisations with global coverage, all major regional
organisations and strategic partnerships with the US and each of the emerging powers;
•
One of the main actors in solving global hot political and security issues like the Middle East
Peace Process, provision of security and stability in the Western Balkans, reconstruction
and development of Afghanistan, regime change in Libya, and the anti-authoritarian movement within the Arab people;
•
Leader or major contributor to variety of international peace-keeping and stability and
reconstruction operations in Africa, the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq;
•
Owner of the most attractive political and social project in history – the only one based on
commonality of values and norms, not on interests only;
•
The major exporter of novel practices in political performance, effective and efficient democratic governance with high degree of transparency and accountability, institution building, and regional co-operation;
•
Decisive economic power in production and delivery of high-tech goods that determine developments in practically all sectors of global business;
•
One of the major contributors to scientific and technical research and development, and engine of the global technological progress;
•
The second largest military capability in the world with a capacity to engage on a global
scale in up to mid-intensity operations.
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These recent achievements in each of the above mentioned components of the EU global role do
not undermine the need to apply inter-disciplinary analytical methods in addition to the traditionally
used realism and liberalism, institutionalism and functionalism, etc. In a study of the impact of the
Lisbon Treaty on the institutional balances within the foreign policy field, Wessels and Bopp (2008)
offer two alternative possible readings of the CFSP provisions: as a major step forward in developing the Union as more coherent and effective international actor with more supranational elements or as another demonstration of an ever-refined mode of ‘rationalised intergovernmentalism.’
In this context, in an earlier version of their work on literature reviews Ginsberg and Smith (2005)
identified six major debates:
•
Why does the EU need a foreign/security policy at all and why has this capacity grown over
the past three decades?
•
What impact on the outside world, if any, does the EU have?
•
What is the relationship between EU foreign policy and EU economic integration – two domains that used to be separate?
•
What are the unique institutional mechanisms of EU foreign/policy and how do they function?
•
What is the relationship between EU foreign policy and domestic politics?
•
What does the overall EU foreign policy system look like in terms of inputs, outputs, and
feedback mechanisms?
The authors have concluded that the wide variety of research questions surrounding European foreign policy signals the need for a transversal approach to the issue “… to include processes such
as (for example) delegation/agency, path dependency, task expansion, Europeanization, sources
of international systemic change, and of course the perennial pursuit of national interests within
and outside the EU context.” In this context several principal issues should be considered by the
research agenda.
6.1
THE EXTERNAL-INTERNAL NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
The recent achievements at the international arena are products of the union’s unique complexity
of internal and external dimension. What is foreign for the EU is deeply rooted in, effected by, and
have direct impact on internal relations between the Member States. At the same way, internal
conditions, intergovernmental relations and institutional decision-making affect the foreign and security policy positions and actions. The analyses of the internal dimension of EU foreign and security policy are often dominated by the view that it is most of all about the decision-making process
on external issues or action and about the character of the decisions as inter-governmental or institutional. Such a research approach would be correct if it does not ignore the fact that borders
between internal and external security have been virtualised during the last two decades. Member
States, while working on international security issues, have established a common threat perception that has an effect on mutual confidence and is the ground for collective security actions and
measures. It is also a way to establish a frame of reference on key issues especially on probably
the most important – the EU policy on enlargement. The latter integrates the external and internal
considerations in the EU CFSP to highest extent. As this specific characteristic is visible from the
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day-to-day CFSP process, analytical studies often focus on artificial separation between external
and internal conditions ignoring their transversal character.
A frame of reference for assessing CFSP
Wessels and Bopp (2008) underline that “… many scientific and political contributions have been
made to assess the ‘actorness’ of the Union and, more specifically, its role in the international
system” and point to the studies of Smith (2006), Bretherton & Vogler (2006), Wessels (2005),
Wessels & Regelsberger (2005), Tonra & Christiansen (2004), Knodt & Princen (2003), White
(2001) and Rhodes (1998). According to most of these studies, there are two principal issues to be
discussed while defining the frame of reference: how to define the EU itself as a global actor, and
whether to compare the EU to other powerful actors in world politics.
Concerning the formula of the EU global role, the authors have underlined the emergence within
the analytical works of two basic concepts: ‘actorness’ and ‘presence.’ Whereas the former sees
the EU on its way towards a full fledged, state-like international ‘actorness’ (cf. Sjöstedt, 1977), the
latter qualifies the Union as a growing and increasingly important ‘presence’ in the international
system (Allen & Smith, 1998). A third interpretation sees the Union itself as a ‘process,’ which
structures the EU internally and its external environment (Smith, 2006).
The principal options around which the research agenda of the EU global role in the security domain could be organised include:
•
EU evolving as ‘a state-like actor’ with a ‘superpower’ status (Galtung, 1973; Blair, 2000). In
this option CFSP and CSDP ought to be based on a shared threat perception and common
interests. This would suggest a level of integration higher than the Union may achieve
based on the Lisbon Treaty, or at least to see states surrendering national sovereignty regarding CFSP and CSDP. In such a case the EU global security role has to be based on
common vital security interests, the achievement of which would require a dominant coincidence of threat perceptions and shared risk assessment. In reality, such consolidation
could be generated in cases of emerging direct military threat to several Member States.
•
If the EU is analysed as ‘a normative actor’ (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Manners, 2006),
then the CFSP and CSDP should be based on values, i.e. the code of conduct on the international scene. The research question is whether normative principles such as democracy,
human rights, market economy, rule of law, and functional multilateral world order are globally applicable. To turn itself into a global actor, the EU must help shape the world order
(regarding norms and ‘normality’ in global interactions). And to participate in that process,
the EU must have the capacity, to be decisively active. This means sharing risks and the
burden of resolving important global issues (affairs) and to be recognized by other actors
(which would mean respect, willingness to interact and unavoidability of interaction).
Arguments against these options can be drawn from several analytical perspectives.
Morgenthau’s realpolitik accepts that in the international security relations there’s no clash
of interests and/or values, but merely one set of principles originating from one political reality, as pitched against another, coming from another political reality. Liberal constructivism
accepts that interests are (or have to be) based on values. Marxism accepts that the values
are a function of material reality.
Ginsberg and Smith (2007) have shared that “… it is unproductive to define EU solely as a
functional regime, an international organization, an alliance, a collective security arrangement, or as a ‘supranational state’.” They believe that EU is “… a highly institutionalized
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multilateral forum for encouraging regular international cooperation on foreign policy issues
among independent states”10 (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007:269).
The principle challenge here is that the European norms are already interpreted differently
by other centres of power: ‘democracy,’ ‘market economy’ and ‘human rights’ have a different value or interpretation across Russia, China, the Arab world or Africa, for example.
Furthermore, there is a contradiction between values and strategy (as the relations with
Libya prior to 2011 witnessed): values linked to democracy, political rights, peace, etc., are
subdued in the pursuit of strategic objectives such as energy security and migration control.
•
The third option is based on the presumption that the limiting factor for the above mentioned options is the sovereignty of the Member States. It brings the discussion back to the
state-centric discourse and the parameters of the national security. To avoid this, authors
from the Copenhagen school suggest examining the EU as a ‘regional international society’
(Buzan, 2008; Knudsen, 1999). If the EU is viewed as an ‘international society’ then the key
conceptual questions are what kinds of threats can be directed towards it and what threats
it would be able to cope with? These questions are reasonable as different normative bases
of ‘regional international societies’ lead to a different dynamics and internal cohesion and,
hence, their capacity to cope with threats (Whitman, 1998; Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972).
•
Another option for the EU, conceptualised by the Copenhagen school, is to use securitisation and to designate problems in different areas as security problems, thus setting them on
a ‘normal’ basis. And in reverse, through de-securitisation to treat security problems as
problems of other policies.
•
The EU can be examined also as a geopolitical system or ‘empire’ in the sense of the Watsonian Imperia of the English school (cf. Watson & Little, 2009). Geopolitically, the EU is
created on the basis of a nucleus that expands towards the periphery (positive expansion).
Geopolitics here is about control, i.e. for security and peace, not for sovereignty.
This is a control over the internal space of the European Union, its periphery and the
neighbourhood, and, in a global context, over the sources of risks and threats. The Empire
is focused more on security and stability, not on the sovereignty of constituent nations.
•
6.2
Several options, elaborated in other analytical works and policy papers, may be considered
within the general frame of reference. Ginsberg & Smith (2005) select the following among
them: ‘Soft power’ (Nye, 2004); ‘Peace power’ (Ehrhart, 2005); ‘l’Europe puissance’
/‘European power’/ (Lefebvre, 2004; Solana, 2001); ‘Model power’ (Miliband, 2007); and
‘Smart power’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008).
THE CONCEPT OF THE GLOBAL EU POWER
EU power has never been seen narrowly or primarily related to its military dimension, and most
likely this will be the case in the time horizon of 2035 as well. Military capabilities are important and
in some cases even decisive, but the EU has never had and probably will not have purely military
aims in any international engagement. The list of aims and objectives of the Union at the international security scene in the Lisbon Treaty and other related documents is quite extensive and covers all areas of both international and national foreign and security policy.
10 Emphasis in the original.
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In this context, the Union presents itself as an actor that is both ambitious and ambiguous. It is
historically confirmed—and may be confidently projected in the future—that military interventions
are destructive, while the transformation of military success into sustainable political results will be
just as complex, costly and risky. Nevertheless, building a concept of power based on elaborated
alternatives such as ‘soft,’ ‘civilian,’ ‘ethical’ or ‘normative’ power, while ignoring or neglecting the
military component or each of the mentioned concepts, is not advisable.
The concept of the global European power should address in a suitable way the basic EU characteristics in order to provide the most relevant package of power components to every particular
case of engagement. The extreme negative example could be when foreign and security policy
and actions are undertaken in a way that, while maximizing one type of effect, e.g. the military,
could damage the most positive one – the social attractiveness of EU. The application of the comprehensive approach should not be understood as a practice only, but also as a conceptual ground
for the EU global power.
In this context, of particular importance is the impact of the concept of power on the EU decisionmaking process. Keeping in mind the aim to make EU effective as a governing mechanism, it is
important to put under analytical scrutiny decision options, e.g. to emphasise a single but risky approach or to act in a comprehensive, but costly and prolonged way.
Measuring the impact of the EU’s external security actions and foreign policy
It is obvious from the above discussion that as narrow are the resources dedicated to the EU
global role, as limited would be its impact assessment. The most popular approach – to evaluate
the EU abilities to cope with concrete security threats greatly underestimates the EU’s external
power. Adopting a wider range of measures allows one to appreciate both direct and indirect types
of impact, the general roles played by the EU at the global level (Allen & Smith, 1996; Elgström &
Smith, 2006), and the EU’s impact on specific issues (Ginsberg, 2001).
In most of the ‘soft’ aspects of foreign policy like development aid, international economic and
trade relations, environmental protection, fight against poverty and illegal migration the impact of
the EU role is uncontested. The ability of ‘Brussels’ to influence the foreign policy of the Member
States is also well studied and recognised.
Regarding the measurement of the results and effects of the EU performance at the global scene
of comprehensive security it is ‘natural’ to compare EU to other global powers through their impact
– expected, virtual or real, on the global security affairs. As at moment this have been done mainly
in parallel to US global actions, political and analytical suggestions create the impression of ‘or/or’
evaluation. As a result, in many cases during the US ‘war on terror’ the comparison between the
two powers were explained as a zero sum – the achievements of one have been presented or explained as failure of the other.
However, when examining foreign security engagements, one has to account for a number of considerations. The dramatic expansion of the EU’s direct involvement in security affairs in recent
years is a case in point. Ginsberg and Bopp (2007) argue that when EU acts in international security its engagements have multiple impacts:
•
on the states who request EU security assistance;
•
on the EU itself in terms of confidence-building;
•
on other international security organizations (e.g. NATO, UN) when EU cooperates with
them or replaces their forces with EU forces and personnel;
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on non-EU members who participate in EU security actions on the basis of complimentary
interests and values.
All these effects can been seen when the EU endeavours to act across the range of the Petersberg
tasks.
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Foresight Security Scenarios –
Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles
Problem space report: EU as a global actor based on the wider Petersberg Tasks Deliverable 6.1 ANNEXES 1‐9 Centre for Security and Defence Management – CSDM Institute of Information and Communication Technologies Bulgarian Academy of Sciences January 2012 FOCUS
D6.1 – Problem Space Report: EU as a global actor. ANNEXES
Responsible project partner:
CSDM
Authors:
Todor Tagarev, Venelin Georgiev, Petya Ivanova, CSDM
Alexander Siedschlag, Andrea Jerkovic, Diana Silvestru, Florian Fritz, SFU-CEUSS
Uwe Nerlich, CESS
Contact information:
Main point of contact:
Todor Tagarev, tagarev@bas.bg
E-mail addresses of other individual contributors:
Venelin Georgiev, georgiev@defencemanagement.org
Petya Ivanova, entarch@gmail.com
Alexander Siedschlag, alexander.siedschlag@sfu.ac.at
Andrea Jerkovic, jerkovic@european-security.info
Diana Silvestru, diana.silvestru@sfu.ac.at
Florian Fritz, florian.fritz@sfu.ac.at
Uwe Nerlich, nerlich@cess-net.eu
FOCUS Website
http://www.focusproject.eu
2
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3
CONTENTS
ANNEX 1.
MAIN THEME-SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS .................................................................................... 5
ANNEX 2.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE MAIN TEXT OF THE REPORT ............................................ 7
ANNEX 3. EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN
PROCESS OF INTEGRATION ......................................................................................................................... 9
ANNEX 4.
CSDP MISSION REPORTS AND ANALYSES......................................................................... 15
EU’s ONGOING MISSIONS ...................................................................................................... 15
EU’s civil missions ................................................................................................................. 15
EU’s military missions ............................................................................................................ 16
EU’s COMPLETED MISSIONS ................................................................................................. 18
EU’s civil missions ................................................................................................................. 18
EU military missions............................................................................................................... 19
EU’s civilian-military missions ................................................................................................ 20
ANNEX 5.
RESEARCH PROJECTS .......................................................................................................... 22
Related Research Projects originally identified by FOCUS........................................................ 22
Other RElevant Research Projects Within the EU Framework Programme ............................... 24
Other Research Projects ........................................................................................................... 27
ANNEX 6.
SPECIALISED PUBLICATIONS ............................................................................................... 31
Seminal articles and Recent Advances ..................................................................................... 31
Studies ...................................................................................................................................... 35
Books ........................................................................................................................................ 37
ANNEX 7.
DEDICATED WEB RESOURCES............................................................................................. 43
ANNEX 8.
ORGANISATIONS AND EXPERTS .......................................................................................... 45
Organisations ............................................................................................................................ 45
Experts...................................................................................................................................... 48
ANNEX 9.
CATALOGUE OF QUESTIONS FOR SCENARIO FORESIGHT ............................................. 67
1.
Questions relating to future EU roles ................................................................................. 67
2.
Questions Relating to Future Security Research in Support of Future EU Roles ............... 69
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ANNEX 1. MAIN THEME-SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS
Actor
In international security relations ‘actor’ is a social subject that
takes security decisions and performs security related activities or
is an object of such decisions and activities. Every determined and
recognized actor within the international social system has duties,
obligations and privileges relevant to its role and legal status.
Based on them a global actor could be a systemic or incidental
one. Within the scenario method, the actor performs actions and/or
reacts to events, which in turn creates the storyline.
Role
In international security relations any role should be viewed from
internal and external point of view. From internal (EU) point of
view, it is the cluster of political, social, and economic essentials
that determine the Union’s political and operational behaviour in a
given security environment. From external point of view, the EU
role in international security affairs is the Union’s ability to influence
the most important problem issues in such a way that promotes its
common values and defends its common interests. For “the role to
happen,” both aspects should be relevant to the concrete issue –
the Union should have relevant capacity. The role, in the same way
as ‘the actor’, could be systemic or incidental.
Global
In international security relations the term should be understood as
the ability of an actor to exercise effectively its role (duties,
obligations and privileges) potentially worldwide. A global role also
presumes existence or ability to generate a comprehensive
capacity and apply a comprehensive approach in case of
engagement. In some cases an actor with regional or even local
role could produce a global effect on international security.
Capacity
Capacity to implement a global role is the complex of both material
(physical) instruments and actual functioning of EU governance.
Physical instruments are those like armed forces, foreign action
service, police, financial resources, materiel, etc., that may be
provided by the Union or the member states for use in EU global
affairs. The actual functioning of EU governance is the ability of the
EU Commission to take and effectively implement decisions, the
EU Parliament to exercise effective oversight, and member states
to provide funding that is adequate for the exercise of EU global
roles. In the theme specifics ‘capacity’ explains the overall ability of
the EU to perform a global role (capacity to succeed).
Capability
Capability (to perform a global role) is a set of integrated
procedures, skills and material resources sufficient to achieve a
measurable result in performing a particular task under specified
conditions. In the specific theme, the term ‘capabilities’ denotes
those physical, mental, and cognitive abilities and skills, available
or necessary to implement the global role in a particular situation.
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Scenario
The European Commission is using the following general
definition: “A scenario is a ‘story’ illustrating visions of a possible
future or aspects of a possible future. It is perhaps the most
emblematic Foresight or future studies method. Scenarios are not
predictions about the future but rather similar to simulations of
some possible futures. They are used both as an exploratory
method or a tool for decision-making, mainly to highlight the
discontinuities from the present and to reveal the choices available
and their potential consequences.”1
A ‘scenario’ in the exploration of international relations is used to
describe a plausible future.
For the purposes of exploring potential future security roles of the
EU, a scenario is “the set of choices along the principal dimensions
and the drivers, trends and shocks that, in combination, provide a
plausible explanation for the selection of a certain role and
describe the environment in which it would be implemented.”
Trend
A discernable and relatively stable in time direction of development
of a particular basic characteristic or element
Driver
A factor for each trend that directly influences its direction or
causes a change. In the theme context, drivers also may impact
the choice of certain behaviour
Dimension
A key area in which the issue under study is represented; it is used
to organise in depth research and analysis on the impact of trends
and drivers
Stressor
A change in a parameter of a point scenario that has a
considerable effect on one or more requirements
Vignette
A variation of the point scenario, differing from it by the introduction
of a stressor
Strategic Shock
A surprising, low-probability, high-impact event that may constitute
a turning point in the evolution of a certain trend or system or may
cause an abrupt alteration in the strategic context. The important
point is that it dislocates the strategic context from the trends that
have preceded it.
1
See <http://forlearn.jrc.ec.europa.eu/guide/2_scoping/meth_scenario.htm#Definition>.
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7
ANNEX 2. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE MAIN TEXT OF THE REPORT
AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System
BG
Battlegroup
BRIC
Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and China
BRICS
Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa
CBRN
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP
Security and Defence Policy
ECAP
European Capability Action Plan
EDA
European Defence Agency
EDC
European Defence Community
EPC
European Political Cooperation
ERRF
European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI
European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP
European Security and Defence Policy
ESS
European Security Strategy
EU
European Union
EU ISS
EU Institute for Security Studies
EUFOR
European Union Force
EUMC
EU Military Committee
EUMS
EU Military Staff
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
HG
Headline Goal
HPM
High Power Microwaves
ISS
[EU] Internal Security Strategy
LTRS
[NATO] Long Term Requirements Study
MS
[EU] Member State
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NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLW
Non-Lethal Weapons
OHQ
Operational Headquarters
OPCW
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PSC
Political and Security Committee
RSA
Republic of South Africa
SAS
[NATO RTO] System Analysis and Studies [panel]
SRP
[EU] Security Research Programme
UN
United Nations
WEU
Western European Union
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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9
ANNEX 3. EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIMENSION
OF THE EUROPEAN PROCESS OF INTEGRATION
1950
Pleven Plan
The plan aimed to create the European Defence Community (EDC), with an integrated European
army by the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (the precursor of the
European Economic Community that then evolved into the European Community by 1967) under a
joint command and with a common defence budget and parliamentary oversight. This plan was
then linked to a plan presented in 1953 to establish a European political confederation, a so-called
“European Political Community.” For political reasons, the plan was not realised and the Western
European Union (WEU) was created to establish a West European defence pillar associated with
the transatlantic security community of NATO.
1960s
Fouchet plans
The two plans took up on this plan in a changed scope, arguing for a union of states (a so-called
“European Political Union”) and with common foreign and defence policies. The pans fell into the
gap between Member States interest and the only faint development of a common European interest. Subsequent developments have been marked by the exclusion of common defence from the
catalogue of objectives and from the permissive consensus of European integration in the field of
external policy.
1973
Copenhagen Summit of the newly established European Council (meetings of the heads of
state and government of the EU Member States, plus the president of the European
Commission)
The Summit expanded the Framework of the “European Political Cooperation” (EPC) that was established between European Community Member States in the late 1960ies towards common security policy: EPC should now include “common positions” in times of crisis and “joint assessments
of crisis situations, with the aim of foreseeing them and taking measures needed to deal with
them.”
1981
Bonn-Rome initiative
The initiative called for full involvement of the European Commission in all EPC activities (later also
applicable to the European Security and Defence Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy).
Moreover, EPC should include efforts to strengthen the security of the Community as a whole.
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1987
Western European Union (WEU) Platform on European Security Interests
The Platform announced that “[t]he constitution of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as
long as it does not include security and defence” and declared the necessity to “develop a more
cohesive European defence identity”. NATO mainly absorbed the initiative by welcoming the platform as affirming “a positive identity in the field of European security within the framework of the
Atlantic alliance, conducive to the strengthening of the transatlantic partnership and of the alliance
as a whole.” This constituted the driving divide between a European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI) within NATO and the transatlantic context on the one hand and an European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) in the (then West) European context.
1991
Maastricht Treaty on European Union
The treaty established the responsibility of the EU in security matters within the framework of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which shall include the “eventual framing of a common defence policy”. Already the Maastricht Treaty emphasised the principles of identity, solidarity,
and the widening of the concept of security. It established (in its Article J.1) that “The Union and its
Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, […] covering all
areas of foreign and security policy” and that the objectives of the common foreign and security
policy should be “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the
Union”, “to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”, “to preserve
peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter”,
“to promote international co-operation” as well as “to develop and consolidate democracy and the
rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
1992
“Petersberg Declaration” at Western European Union (WEU) Foreign and Defence Ministers
Meeting
This gave – sparked by the Yugoslav war – birth to the Petersberg Tasks, later taken over by the
European Union in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Back then, the Petersberg Tasks invoked the
preparedness of the Member States to make available military units for humanitarian and rescue
tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement. Later, the Petersberg Tasks became also associated with capability development and
led to the development of the Helsinki Headline Goal for EU Member States’ military capabilities.
1996
NATO North Atlantic Council Meeting, Berlin
NATO formally decided to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Atlantic Alliance that should “permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of
operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.” The rationale was to de-
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velop transatlantic capabilities that could be made available to European security institutions as
opposed to increasing the capabilities of European security institutions.
1997
Amsterdam Treaty on European Union
The treaty emphasised the role of the European Council (i.e., the Member States governments) in
ESDP, anchoring it in the so-called “second” (intergovernmental) pillar of the European Union. The
treaty also framed ESDP as a part of the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
thus making it a legal duty of the member states to support it (based on the principle of loyalty enshrined in Article 11, paragraph 2). It at the same time created the post of the High Representative
for CSFP to promote its consistency, that was then assumed by former NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana. The treaty was also more outspoken on the objectives of CFSP/ESDP. Whereas the
Treaty of Maastricht had foreseen the “eventual framing”, now the “progressive” framing of a common defence policy” was the goal. Moreover, the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into CFSP.
1999
Cologne Council of the G8 countries
In the Declaration on “Strengthening the ESDP”, the EU Member States affirmed the objective of
reinforcing the CFSP by giving the EU the ability to respond to crises: “To this end, the Union must
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without
prejudice to actions by NATO.“ The declaration de facto linked the development of European capabilities for crisis management with the development of a European defence industry in a common political framework.
Helsinki Council
The Helsinki meeting of the European Council gave political clearance for institution-building in order to develop the European Union into a security actor based on capabilities for autonomous decision-making, such as the later creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Council (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and others. The
European Council also agreed on the Military Headline Goal (or Helsinki Headline Goal), that is the
establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force of up to 50,000-60,000 servicepersons, capable of carrying out the full range of the Petersberg Tasks. It was further noted by the Council that the mandate for the deployment would be provided in accordance with UN charter, which meant that a direct UN mandate was not being regarded mandatory.
2000
EU Foreign ministers meeting in Santa Maria de Feira
In addition to the Military Headline Goal of Helsinki, the first planning goal for civilian capabilities of
ESDP was agreed on.
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Nice Treaty
The treaty implemented some institutional adjustments, making the new bodies such as PSC,
EUMC and EUMS permanent elements of CFSP/ESDP. It also called for a strengthening of ESDP
to be able to conduct mission covering the whole spectrum of Petersberg Tasks. The WEU was
integrated into the EU and its ESDP, with the exception of its Article 5, providing for common military defence.
2001
European (military) Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)
The European Capability Action Plan was set up in 2002 (at the Laeken European Summit) by the
EU Council to develop other methods of dealing with capability deficiencies, or in other words to fill
EU capability shortfalls. It has been recognized by the EU officials that the improvement of military
capacities can only be achieved by rationalizing defence efforts as well as by increasing synergy
between national and multinational projects to fulfil the objectives.
Gothenburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy
Plans for co-ordinating civilian aspects of European crisis management were discussed and a new
goal set: The EU must be able to employ the full spectrum of available civil and military means for
crisis management in a coherent and co-ordinated way. The full spectrum of means usable in
ESDP was defined to comprise Community, Union and Member States instruments. Civil-military
co-ordination in crisis management was identified as a priority area for ESDP strategy and action.
The development of common capabilities/EU-level capabilities for civil protection, including the
creation of assessment and coordination teams and transport capabilities, was also called for. In
sum, the Gothenburg Council made a clear step towards comprehensiveness and multilateralism
in EU crisis management.
Laeken European Council
EU heads of state and government declared that the Union was now “capable of conducting some
crisis-management operations”. However, they emphasised that substantial progress still needs to
be made in the areas of balanced development of military and civilian capabilities within ESDP and
the finalization of the arrangements with NATO.
9/11 Effects on ESDP
9/11 entailed a depreciation of a total “civilian”-power approach for the EU as a global actor, at the
same time increasing consciousness of non-military aspects of crisis management (“winning hearts
and minds”). It also led to a further blurring of the border line between internal and external security, as well as to a step from crisis management to conflict management, especially prevention.
2002
EU Foreign Ministers Meeting in Luxemburg
It was confirmed that non-military costs of EU military operations would be financed from a common budget, while the military costs would be considered as individual costs and would be fi-
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nanced on a “costs lie where they fall” basis by those contributing EU Member States that had incurred them.
European Council in Seville
EU Member States’ heads of state and government agreed to broaden the scope of ESDP to include the fight against terrorism.
2003
European Council Brussels
•
EU Member States’ heads of state and government agreed on:
•
European Security Strategy (ESS) (see below)
•
“Action Plan” against the proliferation of WMD
•
Finalizing the liaison agreements with NATO („Berlin plus“)
European Security Strategy (2003): “A Secure Europe in a Better World”
•
The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats
•
Global Challenges
•
Key Threats
•
•
o
Terrorism
o
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
o
Regional Conflicts
o
State Failure
o
Organised Crime
Strategic Objectives
o
Addressing the Threats
o
Building Security in our Neighbourhood
o
An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism
Policy Implications for Europe
o
More Active
o
More Capable
o
More Coherent
o
Working with Partners
2004
Adoption of the Constitutional Treaty
EU heads of state and government approved the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union.
The treaty enshrines the ongoing establishment of a European Defence Agency, introduces a new
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14
mechanism called “structured co-operation” between a group of member-states and commits the
Union’s member-states to help each other in case of an armed aggression to one of them.
Military Headline Goal 2010
In 2004, the European Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010, which builds on the Helsinki
Headline Goal and recognises that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed. A key element of
the Headline Goal 2010 is the creation by 2007 of nine rapidly deployable battle groups, with 1'500
troops each, for deployment to international hotspots. The battle groups are to be ready to respond
to a UN request anywhere in the world within 15 days and should be able to secure an area for up
to 30 days, possibly three months. The plan also calls for the EU to coordinate strategic lift equipment by 2005, with fully efficient air, land, and sea strategic lift capabilities by 2010, and to make
available an aircraft carrier with an air wing and escort by 2008.
2009
Treaty of Lisbon
The European Council has the authority to identify the strategic interests of the EU, determine the
objectives of Common Foreign and Security Policy, including defence aspects, and define general
guidelines.
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union but does not prejudice the character of Member
States’ security and defence policy and common defence in NATO. CSDP gives the EU operational capacity based on both civilian and military assets, which are provided by the Member
States.
The current definition of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union in the version of
Lisbon is a follows:
•
Conflict prevention (early warning, confidence building, security reinforcing measures, e.g.
preventive deployment)
•
Common disarmament measures (destruction of weapons, arms control)
•
Military advice and support (co-operation with third-country armed forces or with a regional/sub-regional international organisation in order to build up democratic forces by exchanging best practices)
•
Post-conflict peace-building
•
Support for the fight against terrorism on the basis of invitation by a third country
2010 NATO Lisbon Summit
The Summit specified that NATO should have access to civil-military capabilities of the EU (socalled “inverse Berlin plus” arrangement).
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ANNEX 4. CSDP MISSION REPORTS AND ANALYSES
EU’S ONGOING MISSIONS
EU’s civil missions
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
The mission started on 1 January 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It followed on from the UN’s
International Police Task Force. EUPM was the first CSDP mission launched by the EU. On 8 December 2009, the Council of the EU decided to extend the operation until 31 December 2011.
www.eupm.org/
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)
It is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP. Its principal aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule-of-law area, specifically in police, judiciary and customs areas.
The mission is not in Kosovo to govern or rule. It is a technical mission, which aims to mentor, monitor
and advise whilst retaining a number of limited executive powers. EULEX works under the general
framework of United Nations Security Resolution 1244 and has a unified chain of command to Brussels.
www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
EUPOL COPPS was established by the Council on 14 November 2005, under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On 17 December 2010, the Council of the EU decided to extend the
mission’s mandate until 31 December 2011.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-copps.aspx
EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah crossing point, code-named EU BAM Rafah
On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an “Agreement on Movement
and Access,” including agreed principles for Rafah crossing (Gaza). On 21 November 2005, the
Council of the EU welcomed the Agreement and agreed that the EU should undertake the Third Party
role proposed in the Agreement. It therefore decided to launch the EU BAM Rafah, to monitor the operations of this border-crossing point. The operational phase of the mission began on 30 November
2005. The Rafah crossing point was last opened with the presence of EUBAM Rafah on 9 June 2007.
Since then, the mission has remained on standby, ready to re-engage in 24 hours and awaiting a political solution.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eubam-rafah?lang=en
EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) (“EUSEC RD CONGO”)
Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU decided to establish the EUSEC RD
CONGO. The mission was launched on 8 June 2005 and its mandate runs until 30 September 2012.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eusec-rd-congo?lang=en
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EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine
The mission was established in response to the joint letter from the Presidents of Moldova and
Ukraine dating from 2 June 2005, calling for additional EU support for capacity building for border
management, including customs, on the whole Moldova-Ukraine border, including the border between
Ukraine and the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, because the Moldovan
border authorities are unable to be present there.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/moldova-and-ukraine-bordermission?lang=en
The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
It is an autonomous mission in Georgia led by the EU under the EU Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP).
www.eumm.eu/
EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)
In the framework of its comprehensive approach towards Afghanistan, the EU has launched the
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN in mid-June 2007. On 18 May 2010, the Council has extended the mission for
a period of 3 years, until 31 may 2013.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-afghanistan?lang=en
European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq)
It is a civilian crisis management operation under the auspices of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eujust-lex?lang=en
EU’s military missions
EUFOR ALTHEA OPERATION
The Council of the European Union decided on 12 July 2004 (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of
12 July 2004) to conduct a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the framework of the
EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EUFOR ALTHEA operation was launched on
2 December 2004. This EU-led operation adds in a significant way to the EU’s political engagement,
its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions with a view to helping BiH
make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association
Process.
www.euforbih.org/
European Naval Force Somalia – Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA)
The European Union is concerned with the continuing impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea off
the coast of Somalia on international maritime security and on the economic activities and security of
countries in the region. As a result and as part of a comprehensive approach, the EU has launched
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EU NAVFOR-ATALANTA within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International
Law.
www.eunavfor.eu/
EUTM Somalia – European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali
security forces
On 25 January 2010, the Council agreed to set up a military mission to contribute to training of Somali
security forces. On 7 April 2010, the EU launched a military training mission in order to contribute to
strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. This support
takes place within the framework of EU’s comprehensive engagement in Somalia, with a view to responding to the priority needs of the Somali people and stabilising Somalia.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eu-somalia-training-mission
The information on EU’s ongoing missions is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. EU’s ongoing missions.
Region
Africa
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe
Military
EU NAVFOR
Somalia
EUFOR Althea BiH
EUPOL
RD Congo
EUPM BiH
EULEX Kosovo
Asia
Middle East
EUPOL
Afghanistan
EUPOL
COPPS
Palestine
Military coordination and support
Civil Police
EUJUST-LEX
Iraq
Civil Rule of Law
Civil-Military SSR
EUSEC RD Congo
EUTM Somalia
Civil Border
EUBAM Ukraine/
Moldova
Civilian Monitoring
EUMM Georgia
Planning
EU BA
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EU’S COMPLETED MISSIONS
EU’s civil missions
EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GuineaBissau)
The EU decided in February 2008 to establish an advice and assistance EU SSR Guinea-Bissau mission. The mission was undertaken in partnership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities. It was conducted
under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-ssrguinea-bissau?lang=en
EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)
The EU has launched the EUPAT in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in the framework of
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The launch of EUPAT follows the termination on
14 December 2005 of the mandate of the EU Police Mission PROXIMA, launched on 15 December
2003.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-euoperations/eupat?lang=en
Police mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo
Within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Union conducted the mission
from April 2005 to June 2007. This mission played a key role in helping the Congolese National Police
keep order during the DRC’s transition to democracy, particularly during the electoral period in 2006.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eupolkinshasa?lang=en
EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), EUPOL
PROXIMA
The European Union established the EUPOL PROXIMA in line with the objectives of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement of 2001 and in close partnership with the country’s authorities. The Mission,
code-named EUPOL PROXIMA, was launched on 15 December 2003 (Council Joint Action
2003/681/CFSP). EU police experts were monitoring, mentoring and advising the country’s police thus
helping to fight organised crime as well as promoting European policing standards.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-euoperations/proxima?lang=en
EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS)
The European Union (EU) launched on 16 July 2004 the EUJUST THEMIS (Council Joint Action
2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004). This was the first Rule of Law mission launched by the EU in the
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context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In the framework of EUJUST THEMIS,
senior and highly experienced personnel supported, mentored and advised Ministers, senior officials
and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eujustthemis?lang=en
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
The European Union, together with contributing countries from ASEAN, as well as with Norway and
Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia): Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This
mission was designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set
out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. The AMM became operational on 15 September 2005,
date on which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and
policy forces began.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/acehmonitoring-mission.aspx?lang=en
EU military missions
fYROM/CONCORDIA
The European Union launched a military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(fYROM/CONCORDIA) on 31 March 2003. The operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities,
which was made possible by the completion of work on EU-NATO arrangements. The core aim of
CONCORDIA was, at the explicit request of the fYROM government, to contribute further to a stable
secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.
The operation contributed to the efforts to achieve a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, as
part of a region of stable countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-euoperations/concordia?lang=en
EUFOR Tchad/RCA in eastern Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic
Launched on 28 January 2008, acting in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), the military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in eastern
Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic had the objectives to contribute to protecting
civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of
operations, to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own staff, UN staff and associated personnel.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufortchadrca?lang=en
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Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
On 12 June 2003, the Council adopted the Operation Plan and the Decision to launch the operation
with code-named ARTEMIS. The mission was conducted in accordance with the United Nations (UN)
Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) and the Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June
2003. It was aimed, inter alia, at contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Organization_Stabilization_Mission_in_the_Democratic_R
epublic_of_the_Congo
United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)
The EU launched a military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo during the election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo). On 25
April 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), authorising the temporary deployment of an EU force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in
the DR Congo. The military operation was conducted in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC
and in close coordination with them and MONUC. This autonomous EU-led operation was conducted
in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/
EU’s civilian-military missions
EU civilian-military action to support the African Union’s enhanced Mission to Sudan /
Darfur, AMIS
The European Union established the EU civilian-military action to support the African Union’s enhanced Mission to Sudan / Darfur, AMIS, at the request of the African Union (AU), on 18 July 2005
(Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, OJ L 188, 20.07.2005). The mandate for this supporting action
by the EU came to an end on 31 December 2007 when AMIS handed over to the African Union /
United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The purpose of the EU’s supporting action was
to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to the AU’s enhanced AMIS II mission. In providing this
support, the EU upheld the principle of African ownership and backed the AU and its political, military
and police efforts aimed at addressing the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-supportto-amis-%28darfur%29?lang=en
The information about EU’s completed missions is summarized in Table 2.
.
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Table 2. EU’s completed missions.
Region
Africa
Balkans/ Caucasus/
East Europe
Military
Artemis DRC
EUFOR RD Congo
EUFOR Tchad/RCA
CONCORDIA
fYR of Macedonia
Civil-Military assistance
/ Military coordination
and support
Support to AU
AMIS Sudan
EUNAVCO Somalia
Civil Police
EUPOL
Kinshasa
EUPOL
Proxima
(fYR of Macedonia)
EUPAT
(fYR of Macedonia)
EUJUST
THEMIS
(Georgia)
Civil Rule of Law
Civil-Military SSR
Asia
EU SSR
Guinea-Bissau
Civil Border
EUSR BST
Georgia
Civilian Monitoring
EUMM
Western
Balkans
Planning
EUPT
Kosovo
AMM
Monitoring Mission
21
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ANNEX 5. RESEARCH PROJECTS
RELATED RESEARCH PROJECTS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED BY FOCUS
CHANGING MULTILATERALISM: THE EU AS GLOBAL ACTOR IN PEACE AND SECURITY
ISSUES (EU-GRASP)
FP7 research projects such as EU-GRASP (“Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-Regional
Actor in Security and Peace”), investigating the future of global security governance, have provided a
comprehensive rationale that justifies the need to use the whole spectrum of the so-called wider Petersberg Tasks. EU-GRASP identifies multilateralism as the defining future context for the role of the
EU as a Global Actor, based on firm linkages of CSDP with regional integration and the United Nations System. What could be useful for FOCUS is that EU-GRASP work suggests to further explore
the following alternative futures of multilateralism as environmental scenarios for the EU as a global
actor (cf. Van Langenhove 2010):
• “Closed multilateralism” based on institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation between sover-
eign states in a global context of anarchy, limited to essential issues of common survival such as
peace, environment, energy, etc. This would be a scenario of the past as future.
• “Effective multilateralism” (as addressed in the European Security Strategy) as an own organising
principle of world politics, superseding or at least mitigating anarchy in the form of a common constraint (e.g. an overarching normative policy framework). This would be a common trend scenario
and represents a unity of effort approach between states and the international organisations that
they are members of. In practice, such a scenario would depict the environment for the EU as a
global actor as characterised by a couple of regional worlds, representing centers of gravitation of
interdependence and forming a world system of “interpolarity” (Grevi 2009) – as opposed to bi- or
multi-polarity.
• “Renewed multilateralism” beyond a system that rests on the involvement of states in a world where
the role of states is ever declining and different actors, including non-governmental actors and an
organised world society (among other things mediated though new social media). The future of
multilateralism would be characterised by a multi-polar world order, and institutionalised cooperation
would not only essentially involve different kinds of actors but also cut across themes and problem
areas, increasingly directly involving participation of global civil society.
FOCUS should mark that EU-GRASP does not foresee a European Union as a global actor but an internally complex Union—occupied with internally managing consistent external responses to crisis
situations—that will engage with institutions which have a global scope and elaborate on these multilateral frameworks to find and keep its place in addressing a limited number of global policy issues
(such as regional conflicts, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, energy and climate change, etc.)
(cf. Fanta 2010). www.eugrasp.eu
COORDINATION ACTION ON RISK, EVALUATION OT TREATHS AND CONTEXT ASSESSMENTS BY AN ENLARGED NETWORK FOR AN R&D ROADMAP (CRESCENDO)
On the basis of SeNTRE and STACCATO PASR supporting activities, CRESCENDO is focusing on
keeping this unique, results-driven, multi-sector public private network alive but also on expanding it,
so as to include as many as possible private sector security research requirement owners, operative
end-users and technology supply chain experts, including from the new MS in the enlarged EU-27 and
the Associated Countries. In order to achieve project objectives, CRESCENDO’s work plan is divided
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23
into six technical work packages—some of them are closely related to FOCUS work packages—such
as organisation and operation of the network, society security evolutions (threats and risks), policies,
regulation and standardisation, innovation process, R&D Roadmaps and consolidation and continuous
dialogue and recommendations for future programmes/projects. The results from the project that FOCUS should consider could be summarised as follows: the analysis of the future capability needs and
possible new threats scenario, the identification of technological solutions/priorities to address the capability needs leading to a technology-oriented research strategy, the continuous mapping of European competencies initiated in STACCATO, the continuous update of the list of national, regional,
European and international research programmes initiated in STACCATO, the identification of possible synergies and further cooperation opportunities leading to the elaboration of a comprehensive R&T
roadmap to guide, orient and underpin all these different research programmes, supporting the definition of new standards in strong cooperation with CEN and in line with its activities and processes.
www.crescendo-project.org
CONVERGIGNG AND CONFLICTING ETHICAL VALUES IN THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
SECURITY IN CONTINIUM IN EUROPE (INEX)
The main thesis of the project is that security and insecurity are social, cultural and political concepts.
The interdisciplinary project INEX is designed around two research axes: thematic and geopolitical.
On the thematic axis four fields of knowledge of high relevance to the question of the ethics and the
value-laden tensions arising along the continuum between internal and external security in Europe are
studied. The INEX programme is divided in work packages covering the different thematic orientation
of the project: ethical consequences of the proliferation of security technologies, legal dilemmas that
arise from trans-national security arrangements, ethical and value questions that stem from the shifting role of security professionals and consequences of the changing role of foreign security policy in
an era when the distinction between the external and internal borders grows less distinct. On the geopolitical axis recommendations are studied and produced relative to two geographical theatres of high
relevance for ethical issues of internal/external security: the Eastern European ‘neighbourhood’ including Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Mediterranean ‘neighbourhood’ including Morocco, Algeria
and Egypt. The project links directly with representatives of the security technology industry as well as
security provision services that implement concretely to the border security arrangements. The stateof-the-art research carried out by the project results in a variety of different outputs aimed primarily at
relevant policy-makers, researchers and educators. An analysis of current security challenges, which
could be useful for FOCUS, has been presented with particular attention to the human side of the security challenge, and on this basis remedial to the new challenges of the internal/external security.
www.inexproject.eu
EUROPE’S EVOLVING SECURITY: DRIVERS, TRENDS AND SCENARIOS (FORESEC)
The FORESEC project analyses European security both in its global context and at societal level in
European countries. The characteristics of the current security risks and challenges, as laid out in the
EU Security Strategy, are asymmetry, anonymity, the inability to limit them geographically, the connectedness of the threats, and the fact that they are blurring the boundaries between internal and external security. Geography has lost its function as security provider. High levels of interdependence
imply that the impact of contemporary threats cannot be geographically contained. At the same time,
the spread of information technology has greatly reduced the cost of exchanging information, while increasing the access to available knowledge.
Furthermore, the threats to European security are closely linked to one another. Internal and external
security is overlapping to an increasing degree. For example, terrorists are both targeting EU member
FOCUS
24
states and their interests within and beyond the borders of the union. At the same time, they use some
EU countries as a base to plan operations throughout the world. Global trends and threats have direct
impact on European societies through, for example, illegal immigration, regional instability that spills
across borders, or energy shortages causing economic vulnerability and instability, that can lead to
radicalisation or social marginalisation. Unless these issues and their root causes are understood in a
holistic manner it will be impossible for the EU and member state governments to properly address
them with targeted policies. Although the international security environment has diversified, the characteristics of the threats to European security should lead to a convergent response from EU member
states as adaptation pressures for cooperation mount. In essence, asymmetry, anonymity, de-territorialisation, and inter-connectedness could be translated as meaning that all EU member states are affected by the contemporary threats to European security in more or less the same way. States are becoming increasingly unable to provide security on a national basis because of the nature of the threats
and challenges they face, and the degree to which they find themselves inextricably bound with each
other.
These developments underline the need to intensify co-operation between different sectors of national
administrations and between different EU institutions and Directorate-Generals (DGs) within the European Commission. Traditionally, security policy has been the prerogative of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence but today justice and legal issues, environment, development co-operation, immigration, etc. also play a strong role in the security field. The objective of FORESEC is defined as tying
together the multiple threads of existing work on the future of European security in an attempt to provide a more cogent guidance, orientation and structure to all future security related research activities.
These project objectives are achieved by establishing the new norm for the field of forward looking assessments of European security issues; creating a systematic, participatory, medium-to-long-term vision-building process; analysing the political contexts, trends and drivers for European security issues;
initiating a public debate on security research and its implications; identifying potential future threats
and technological opportunities; identifying and examining ethical issues presented by security technologies; formulating and evaluating holistic scenarios on particular threats; linking human rights, cultural and ethical aspects with the security technologies utilised to confront them; prioritising what issues future efforts should concentrate upon; recommending a new holistic concept of European security that is inclusive of state, societal and human strands; linking this work to other European and national security foresight projects and other security research projects; making recommendations on
further action in the context of European Security Research.
www.foresec.eu
OTHER RELEVANT RESEARCH PROJECTS WITHIN THE EU
FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME
SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA (SANDERA)
The SANDERA project (Security and Defence in the European Research Area) has among other
things developed scenarios (in a 2030 time frame) for future interrelations of different policy areas
relevant to the EU as a global actor as well as of the civil and the defence sector. SANDERA (2010:4)
has proposed—based on desk research expanded by expert interviews and scenario workshops—the
following four alternative futures, which for FOCUS explorative use could be grouped in the following
way:
FOCUS
Restrictive policy goals
Expanded policy goals
Parallelism of policy areas
(e.g. foreign policy &
defence)
Interaction of policy areas
(e.g. foreign policy &
defence)
INDIFFERENCE
COOPERATION
“Developments of the properties in each policy area are perceived to be independent of
one another or are perceived to
have little impact upon one another.”
“activities in the different policy field would be coordinated, while retaining their
distinctive goals, regulations
and rules, and largely working
with separate funding
mechanisms.”
COMPETITION
INTEGRATION
“a situation where developments in one policy area are
perceived to be in competition
or actively antagonistic to one
another.”
“a situation in which formerly
distinct policy areas would
grow together at European
level and give up some aspects of their separate identities and processes in favour
of shared goals and processes in some discrete and
well defined aspects of policy.”
25
SANDERA (2010: 8-19) proposed—among other—the following scenario drivers that appear relevant
to FOCUS research:
•
General (or “contextual”) drivers that work across policy areas
o
“The shift of economic, political and scientific power towards Asia;”
o
“The changing nature of knowledge dynamics;”
o
“The economic environment and public spending.”
•
Advances and changes in defence technology with the emergence of new product and service
markets
•
Demands on research to deliver a new paradigm of global responsibility
•
Blurring of boundaries between “defence” and “security”
•
o
Cyberspace creates vulnerabilities as well as capabilities to provide security and wage war;
o
Humanitarian and rescue missions, the protection of borders and combat of international
terrorism and organised crime require common use of internal and external security capabilities;
o
The role of dual-use technologies—that are used with slight adaptations in both the civil and
the military sector—is increasing;
o
New technologies enable new (types) of threats (such as cybercrime) and lead to new
vulnerabilities (such as information technology infrastructure);
o
Security institutions have strong interfaces and international collaboration has been improved to counter threats such as terrorism, critical infrastructure failure or pandemics.
Role of the defence sector as a sponsor and lead-user of advanced technologies
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26
•
Dissemination of the open model of defence innovation, stressing access to globally available
technological knowledge
•
Growth and importance of dual-use technologies, leading to continued convergence of defence
and civilian technology.
•
Role of Europe in the world:
o
Balance between the EU as a civilian power and the EU as a military actor;
o
Willingness of EU Member States to integrate aspects of their defence and foreign policies;
o
Ability of EU Institutions and EU Member States to agree on common goals for Europe in the
world.
Based on the SANDERA research, the following questions of relevance to FOCUS foresight work
arise:
•
Will the legal possibilities provided by the Treaty on European Union in the mid-term lead to the
inclusion of defence research and innovation into the European Research Area concept?
•
Will defence research and innovation continue to be primarily based on bilateral relationships between Member States or defence research and innovation will be placed in the interaction context of EU institutions?
•
Will the distinction between civil security and defence remain in place in the horizon of 2020 and
will its successor programme be restricted to civil security?
•
Will the coordination between the European Commission and the European Defence Agency
(EDA) lead to the development of common goals and common use of funding mechanisms?
•
Will civil society actors, European scientists and some EU institutions raise concerns about the
“securitization” of European research?
http://sandera.portals.mbs.ac.uk/
EUROPEAN SECURITY RESEARCH AND INNOVATION FORUM (ESRIF)
The main thesis of the project is that today EU faces security challenges entirely different from those
at the time of its inception. These challenges range from money laundering and corruption to organised crime and violent terrorist acts to weapon of mass disruption to natural disasters and pandemic.
ESRIF strongly recommends that the EU and member states launch new measures to enhance the
security of its citizens. Some of ESRIF’s key messages that have to be considered in FOCUS research say that:
•
European security is inseparable from the social, cultural and political values that distinguish
European life in all its diversity;
•
Given the unpredictable nature of man-made and natural threats, security research and innovation should focus on strengthening Europe’s inherent resilience and ability to efficiently recover
from crises by enhancing the robustness of the societal system;
•
Security implies nurturing trust among people, institutions and technologies.
Relevant to the FOCUS research area are also ESRIF’s work groups, structured as follows: security of
the citizens; security of critical infrastructure, border security, crisis management, foresight and scenarios; CBRNE, situation awareness, identification people and assets, innovation issues, governance
and coordination, socio-economic and ethical issues.
In the field of foresights and scenarios, ESRIF emphasises some key trends in different areas:
•
Demography: migration; urbanisation; ageing population, disease, population growth.
•
Economy: economic globalisation; economic growth; emerging economic powers; social and income inequalities.
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27
•
Science and technologies: technological development; differences in access to technologies;
information flow and sources, proliferation of WMD.
•
Social values and identity: changing values; social cohesion.
•
Governance and order: organised crime and illicit trade; terrorisism; new conflicts; global governance; democratisation, role of the state.
FOCUS could benefit also from the research needs and priorities, defined in ESRIF:
•
Understanding and modelling complex inter-dependencies;
•
Systematic risk monitoring and assessment method;
•
Prioritising security investment (very close to the “smart defence” concept);
•
Handling high-quality societal foresight debate on security;
•
Enhancing creative capabilities in foresight;
•
Understanding human behaviour in the context of security.
http://circa.europa.eu/
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/esrif_final_report_en.pdf
OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS
THE EU AND SUB-REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM IN EUROPE’S SEA BASINS (EU4SEAS)
The main goal of the EU4SEAS project is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the sub-regional
multilateralism (notion and practice) in the four maritime basins (Mediterranean, Baltic, Black and
Caspian Seas) as a specific approach for the EU in handling relations with those spaces. EU4SEAS
examines the development of sub-regional cooperation in its specific contexts as well as the EU’s impact on it. In order to achieve its main goal, the project has examined issues such as what have been
the main achievements and failures of sub-regional multilateralism in each basin and which practices
can be transferred from one to other sea basin; how do EU membership and EU policies impact on
multilateral cooperation around the sea basins; does the EU reinforce or hamper the multilateral
framework; how can the EU and other multilateral organisations and initiatives cooperate in achieving
their shared objectives; what would be the benefits of a specific approach of the EU for each of the
four basins?
The research plan includes three main elements, all of them presented throughout the process, with
different intensity in each phase: a detailed theoretical framework to analyse the sub-regional dimension and the interaction with the EU; empirical research focused on four areas of study: Politics and
Security, Environmental and Maritime Policy, Energy and Transport, the Four Freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and people); a prescriptive element, based on findings of the first two
phases, including the drafting policy papers and the detection of best practices. The project is linked to
other research projects and transferability of knowledge. In particular, the EUPROX project conducted
by the Observatory for European Foreign Policy in Barcelona, which analyses the impact of a number
of EU policies on some of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, and the project on the
dimensions of ENP, based at Liverpool University, are important points of reference with which a permanent interaction has been established.
The project defines an analytical framework which combines different aspects of the following four approaches: International Relations, Policy Analysis, Comparative Approach, Normative Approach.
EU4SEAS is an interdisciplinary effort (political science, international relations, international political
economy) and its methodological thrust comprises theoretical, empirical, comparative and prescriptive
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28
aspects. Thus, EU4SEAS analysis of the effects of EU policies will bring together different approaches
in order to achieve a more holistic view. FOCUS will use this holistic view in order to elaborate foresight scenarios of future EU roles.
www.eu4seas.eu
MULTILATERALISM AND THE EU IN THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ORDER (MERCURY)
Multilateralism is defined in many ways, but common to all are the importance of rules, institutionalised
cooperation and inclusiveness. Demand for multilateralism increases as new international challenges
arise. Globalisation connects the world in ways both positive and negative. Trade, capital, ideas, people, technology, information, diseases and crime all flow more freely. Patterns of interaction between
world regions are changing. New powers are rising. Alternative development paths and models of
capitalism are being debated. International terrorist networks constitute a new and profound security
challenge. New sources of conflict, over global warming, migration and resource scarcity, are emerging. The EU itself has recognised the importance of multilateralism in (for example) the 2003 European Security Strategy and Lisbon Treaty. It claims actively to promote multilateralism in all of its policies, especially those with an external focus. MERCURY’s primary research questions that derive from
the EU’s commitment to multilateralism include how should we understand multilateralism, both historically and in contemporary terms; does the EU live up to its ambitions to contribute to effective multilateralism globally; what lessons can be drawn from Europe’s experience of promoting multilateralism? MERCURY is emphatically interdisciplinary, drawing on expertise in law, politics, economics, and
international relations. It advances a clear intellectual agenda to explore, explain, and evaluate different conceptions of multilateralism but also seeks maximum, practical policy relevance. www.mercuryfp7.net
GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD
As highlighted in the study “Global Trends 2025” (National Intelligence Council, 2008), the global players will only fulfil their roles by dedicating their united forces to the international security policy, or in
other words, to have the necessary capacity to start joint disarmament operations, military advice and
assistance, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and peacekeeping tasks. In the midst of current uncertainty and insecurity, it is essential to combine all these capabilities in order to deal with changing
strategic environments in future. The European Union would be able to play a more active role by acquiring military assets capable of responding to global insecurity threats and risks.
www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_ Report.pdf
THE NEW GLOBAL PUZZLES: WHAT WORLD FOR THE EU IN 2025?
The “New Global Puzzles” project conducted by the EU Institute for Security Studies identified the following challenges for the EU as a global actor (Gnesotto and Grevi, 2006:207-209):
•
Actively push change:
“This biggest strength of Europe is its own experience of continental integration and stabilisation,
and the new language of international relations that is has generated and spread worldwide. The
biggest weakness is that Europe falls short of embedding its unique experience and normative orientation into a solid bedrock of shared interests, consistently defined and pursued.” (ibid.: 207)
FOCUS
29
•
Work towards the convergence between a multi-polar and a multilateral global system:
“Promoting effective multilateralism does not mean, therefore, neglecting power and interests, but
challenging them trough stable institutional channels towards sustainable, shared solutions at the
international level. The solution to global problems lies in a new grammar of international relations,
where the traditional concepts of power, interest and sovereignty are not abolished but revisited.
The EU is a forerunner of this process and has therefore a comparative advantage in defining and
exporting the principles of institutionalised, norm-based multilateralism.” (ibid.: 208)
•
Adapt to the new global context based on a broad, forward-looking strategy dialogue:
“The ongoing debate on reforming the European policies and institutions must be reviewed in the
light of the future challenges the EU will have to face, and not only of past and present controversies. […] By thinking strategically of its own future and of its position in the world, the EU will be
better equipped to reform itself in order to shape a more secure and better world.” (ibid.: 209).
What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020? The European Union Institute for Security Studies
(Vasconcelos 2009) has conducted a study about normative visions for ESDP in a 2020 time frame.
From the conclusions of the study, the following foreseen main extreme developments can be derived:
Statist vision
Progressive vision
Expanded Petersberg tasks are anything but collective defence
Establishment of a “solidarity force” with a standard
doctrine and common rules of engagement
Reference to core values enshrined in the Treaty
on European Union
EU acts on a common standard of respect for human
rights and international justice, which is part of the
Union’s security doctrine
EU Peace Corps for crisis management, based on
transparent commitments under civilian and military
headline goals, which are met by harmonizing
modernization requirements
Common European forces
Common mission budget
European defence budget
Endurance of the “national security clause” in relation to defence procurement
Single, competitive European defence market with Europeanised procurement based on a common knowledge base for operations in complex environment,
provided by security research
Deepening and widening of existing political and
planning structures, such as Political and Security
Committee, CIVCOM, Military Committee and Military Staff
European civil-military Command, European Security
and Defence College and common open source intelligence
Common European perspective on the role of
NATO (“mini-defence” relying on most capable
member states)
Loss of politico-military character of NATO, making it
into a mere military alliance providing a pillar for EU
collective defence
Decision-making autonomy and mission-by-mission
cooperation
Open coherent ESDP with strategic partnerships
Source: www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NGP_01.pdf.
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30
Future Policy Modelling (FUPOL)
By generating and implementing innovations like multichannel social computing and crowd sourcing,
the project aims at a completely new approach to traditional politics in order to change the way politicians communicate with citizens and enterprises and take decisions. The outcomes of the project include a new governance model to engage all stakeholders in the whole policy design lifecycle, a policy
knowledge database, and a cloud computing based comprehensive ICT Framework. FOCUS will use
FUPOL’s results to account for the citizen’s impact of selecting future roles of the EU as a global security actor.
www.fupol.eu
Millennium Project
Commissioned by the United Nations Secretary-General in 2002, the Millennium Project aims to develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people. The mentioned goals include eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, achieve universal primary education, promote gender
equality, reduce child mortality, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop global partnership for
development.
www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm
Multiple Futures Project (MFP)
The findings and recommendations of this project, coordinated by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) resonated very positively with Alliance nations and its partners, as well as with other international actors and institutions. Three main lines of efforts will be moved forward within ACT: inform
and support a new strategic concept development (the main efforts and works are ongoing), support
policy forming processes (here, specific actions and coordination to strengthen interaction with NATO
HQ are initially the main focus) and align transformation work (this line focuses on building a common
transformation situational awareness and drives ACT transformational work). Despite potential interstate conflicts in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and East and South Asia, large-scale conventional
confrontation is unlikely. The Alliance will need to respond to a wide variety of security challenges that
are mainly a consequence of destabilisation and the absence of governance. The project forecasts
that these challenges will result from unbridled extremism, uncontrolled and illegal migration, and friction caused by resource scarcity.
www.act.nato.int/conferences-main/multiple-futures-homepage
EU Security Foresight 2030 (EUST 2030)
The goal of the EUST 2030 project is to define what factors determine the future geo-strategic global
role of the EU by 2030. FOCUS will use EUST 2030 results to elaborate foresight scenarios of future
EU roles.
http://www.stiftung-nv.de/THINK-TANK/Themenschwerpunkte/Publikationen/146960,1031,138710,1,146960,0,-1,0,0,0,0,-1,-1,-1.aspx
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31
ANNEX 6. SPECIALISED PUBLICATIONS
SEMINAL ARTICLES AND RECENT ADVANCES
Cavelty, Myriam. (2011).“From Threats to Risks in International Security – and Subsequent Challenges for "Knowing" the Future”. ETH Zürich, International relations and security network.
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Feature/Detail?lng=en&id=134110&contextid774=134110&contextid775=134111&tabid=1341
This article looks at what the move from a security environment characterised by knowable threats to
one largely comprised of diffuse risks means for our ability to anticipate future challenges. It also examines how public policy has reacted to this change.
Costigan, Sean, Fritschi, Vivian, & Pallaris, Chris. (2011). “Emerging Threats in the 21st Century –
Strategic Foresight and Warning – Final Report”. ETH Zürich, International relations and security
network.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=47160&lng=en
The article is focused on exploring new ways of thinking about strategic foresight in a significantly altered and still rapidly changing international environment. The authors emphasised that of crucial importance in the strategic warning debate is the need to create new organisational structures, workflows, processes and cultures. Most intelligence organisations focused on immediate results rather
than long-term gains. Organisational structures are often reinvented to solve yesterday’s problem
rather than tomorrow’s priorities.
De Spiegeleire, Stephan. (2011). “Innovative Methods & Trends in Defence Planning”. Keynote
Presentation to the RTO SAS specialist meeting on Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, Stockholm, 11-12 April 2011.
http://www.rto.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-SAS-088
Among the caveats of security and defence planning are the short-term focus, or ‘short-sightedness,’
the lack of proactive thinking due to ‘presentistism’ and ‘recentistism,’ poor validation methods for
foresight, and limited number of foresight practitioners. That can be alleviated if decision makers are
convinced to make foresight an organic part of strategic planning, while the foresight community backs
up its findings with expertise in the softer sciences, hindsight, ‘SideSight,’ balancing between identifying hazards and opportunities, and applying more rigour by delineating the boundaries on what foresight can actually provide. The paper also lists ten trends in foresight across the Western security and
defence planning communities.
Faber, Peter. (2011).“Idealized Versus Practical Future Forecasting: The Case of the US National
Security Strategy”. ETH Zürich, International relations and security network.
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/SpecialFeature/Detail?lng=en&id=134183&contextid774=134183&contextid775=134182&tabid=134182
In this article the author asks the question are a nation-state’s defense and national security policies
free from the perceived problems associated with future forecasting? He analyses the United States’
2010 National Security Strategy to demonstrate that practical futurology can be instrumentalised to reflect distinct political preferences.
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Glenn, Jerom, C., Gordon, & Theodor J. “The World in 2050: A Normative Scenario.”
www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1463-6689
The article presents a scenario based on the inputs of variety of specialists: futurists, scholars, business planners and policy advisers from around the world. Their views on global developments are distilled into a range of issues, opportunities and actions to address. These have been woven together
into a scenario based on achieving norms by 2050 that were identified and rated by Millennium Project
participants from around the world. This scenario describes how technological success, human development, and economic/political policies achieved a global economy that appears to be environmentally sustainable while providing nearly all people with the basic necessities of life and the majority with
a comfortable living. The resulting social stability has created a relatively peaceful world and allowed
the exploration of possible futures for the second half of the 21st century.
Glenny, Misha. (2011). “A page has turned in the Balkans.” Financial Times.
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d0da195c-8a27-11e0-beff-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Nohy05Ia
Three major constitutional problems that emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia continue to make
tension in the region: Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia. Two consequences of the global financial crisis
make solving these problems even more awkward. First, growing opposition among EU member
states to the continuing expansion of the union. Second, the Balkans have been badly hit by the crisis
– foreign investment has fallen precipitously across the region and unemployment rates are reaching
new highs. The author claims that micro-management, whether by the US in Kosovo or the EU in
Bosnia, is counter-productive. Instead, real incentives for good governance will move the region towards workable constitutional reform.
Gourlay, Catriona. (2011). “The politics of EU civilian interventions and the strategic deficit of
CSDP”. International Security Information Service, Europe.
www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/page-attachments/Gourlay%20%28UNIDIR%29%20%20politics%20of%20CSDP%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf
This paper provides an overview of CSDP decision-making relating to civilian CSDP missions to date,
focusing on the early political consultation and planning phases. The conclusions confirm the topdown nature of CSDP. Operations are typically reactive in so far as they require a request for assistance from a host state or International Organisation coupled with leadership from one or more member states – often those holding the EU Presidency. As a summary – civilian CSDP missions have required internal leadership by a member state in response to external demand.
Grienitz, Volker & André-Marcel Schmidt. (2011). “Development and Assessment of Future Scenarios in the Context of the Security Environment.” In Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, MP-SAS-088, Proceedings of the RTO SAS specialist meeting, Stockholm, 11-12 April
2011, pp. 5-1 – 5-19.
The paper outlines scenarios that describe thinkable future (security) environments and that can as
well constitute future options for action. It presents findings from applications of the scenario technique
and foresight in the context of future environments, emphasising how to account for most constraints
within the scenario development process. It also shows how to perform sensitivity analysis as regards
the robustness of the developed scenarios.
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Kaldor, Mary. (1999). “New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era.” Cambridge: Polity
Press. www.amazon.co.uk/New-Old-Wars-Organized-Violence/dp/0745638643
The main argument of the author is that, during the last decade of the twentieth century, a new type of
organised violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the
current globalisation era. The author describes this new type of violence as “new war.”
Naselli, Jason. (2011). “Goodbye to EU Prestige Thinking: Redefining the CSDP”. Atlantic Memos,
www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Goodbye_to_EU_Prestige_Thinking%3A_Redefining_the_CSDP
The main idea here is that EU must restructure its Common Security and Defence Policy based on
economic and operational realities. It should emphasise narrow, logistically feasible operations over
broad outlines, clearly delineate its partnership with NATO, and take a longer term view when developing operational strategies. Author’s opinion is that the CSDP as currently constituted is problematic
for the practical application of the agenda, duplicates to little effect some NATO structures and, with its
logistical issues, has failed at projecting the “prestige” of an independent Europe. The recommendations aim at redefining the CSDP to be a more effective and practical policy.
Rostek, Michael, Peter, Gizewski, & Regan, Reshke. (2011). “Futuring and Force Development: An
Interim Report on the Canadian Army 2040 Project.” In Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, MP-SAS-088, Proceedings of the RTO SAS specialist meeting, Stockholm, 11-12 April
2011, pp. 4-1 – 4-20.
The paper presents the approach to the “Canadian Army 2040” Project and interim results. The paper
provides and overview of the Environmental Scanning and Futures Wheel approaches chosen by the
project team to better understand possible outcomes. The study team selected seven focus areas:
Science and Technology, Social, Political, Economic, Legal, Physical Environment, and Security.
Twelve key drivers of change were identified as significant for the Army in the 2040 time frame: Impact
of age & demographics on military composition; Energy Security, Exponential Technology Growth;
Human/Social Response to Technology; Expansion of operating environments; Global Environmental
Change; Globalization; Conflicting/Shifting Identities; Shifting Power Balance; Resource Security; Distribution of Wealth, and Weapons Proliferation. Then the team identified and ranked critical uncertainties, developed alternative future frameworks depending on two global factors judged as ranking especially high in terms of impact and uncertainty—energy sustainability and global environmental
change—and described four alternative futures, designated respectively “High-Octane ‘Green’ World,”
“Global Quagmire,” “Materialism Gone Mad,” and “Recyclable Society.” A “seminar game” was used to
test and identify implications and options.
Tocher,Mark. (2011). “Improving Foresight to Facilitate Implementation.” In Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, MP-SAS-088, Proceedings of the RTO SAS specialist meeting,
Stockholm, 11-12 April 2011, pp. 7-1 – 7-14.
The paper presents best practices in incorporating foresight into long-term strategic planning and follow-on policy implementation. The author analyses the experience in implementing the recommendations of two recent studies—the Long Term Requirements Study and the Multiple Futures Project—
both organised by Allied Command Transformation, concluding that “both achieved a level of success
… in influencing follow-on policy development and implementation.” As factors contributing to success
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he outlines the accounting for the emerging complexity of the future security environment, the use of a
diverse and broad array of subject matter experts to assess and critique research products, etc. He
also suggests improvements in foresight projects, e.g. leadership intervention in some aspects of the
studies and provision of continuity in foresight activities.
Tocher, Mark, & Simon, Purton. (2011). “An Alternative to Alternate Futures.” In Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, MP-SAS-088, Proceedings of the RTO SAS specialist meeting, Stockholm, 11-12 April 2011, pp. 2-1 – 2-12.
The paper presents a method that could be used to supplement scenario-based foresight. It uses a
thematic approach developed on the basis of Delphi and other group methods to bypass the construction of scenarios and delve directly into the underlying ideas that might drive future requirements. The
paper presents 18 respective ‘Themes’ used to describe developments that could lead to or provoke
manifest changes in the ‘why’ (role and embedding), ‘what’ (missions and tasks) and ‘how’ (structures,
processes and concepts of operation) of future operations and organisations. The Themes were not
intended to specify a future and ultimately were not comprehensive in their coverage. Arguably, the
approach can be used to validate scenario-based findings.
Van der Lijn, Jaïr. (2011). “Recent Experiences in Foreseeing the Future Security Environment in
the Netherlands.” In Long-range Forecasting of the Security Environment, MP-SAS-088, Proceedings of the RTO SAS specialist meeting, Stockholm, 11-12 April 2011, pp. 11-1 – 11-19.
www.rto.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-SAS-088
The paper presents and compares the experience of four recent security-related foresight studies that
have been initiated by different quarters of the Dutch government, were conducted by different study
teams and used different methods. The conclusions are summed up around five themes: methods,
participants, time horizon, ‘fixations,’ and political dynamics. Among the identified lessons the author
points out that the foresight results greatly depend on the participants and the agenda of the sponsor,
results from implementing semi-automated processing tools were difficult to comprehend and as result
were met with some criticism and distrust, ‘out of the box’ thinking has to be actively sought, studies
easily fall in the trap of negative fixations, and at the end the efforts played a minor part in the political
decision making process. Hence, the main issue is how to make sure that the findings of foresight
studies are absorbed by decision makers.
Carta, Caterina (2011). “The EEAS: One for All, or One Among Many?” ISN Insights,
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISNInsights/Detail?lng=en&id=129522&contextid734=129522&contextid735=129521&tabid=12952112
9522
According to the author, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has had a turbulent launch and
even more, the transitional stage has not ended yet and many organisational details still need to be
defined. Significant in this regard is the level of antagonism and competitiveness that characterised
the attitude of all European actors in matters of competences. As this brief paper shows, although an
effort to unify diplomatic representation has been made, the EEAS is still only a quasi-diplomatic service, which represents ‘instances’ of foreign policy and relies on coordination among all European actors, who at times have conflicting interests and views of the EU international action.
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STUDIES
Bekkers, Frank, Korteweg, Rem & Teun van Dongen. (2011). Anticipation: A Strategic Function of
the Dutch Defence Organisation. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
www.hcss.nl/reports/anticipation-a-strategic-function-of-the-dutch-defense-organization/2/
This study addresses the question how a new strategic function Anticipation can be given shape. This
is done on the basis of a two-pronged research question: which existing and new instruments will enable security and defence organisations to better anticipate an uncertain future; and how should these
instruments be positioned within the organisation?
Biscop, Sven, & Coelmont, Jo (Eds.). (2011). Europe Deploys. Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for
CSDP, Egmont Paper 49. Brussels: Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. Retrieved from. www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep49.pdf
The study gives answer to the questions why does Europe develop the military and civilian capabilities
that it does; why does it undertake the military and civilian operations that it does; and why in other
cases does it refrain from action? The answering starts with analysis of the EU’s vital interests, an
analysis of the threats and challenges to these interests, and the EU’s foreign policy priorities, defining
the priority regions and issues for CSDP and, in function of the long-term political objectives and the
appropriate political roadmap for those regions and issues, scenarios in which launching an operation
could be appropriate.
Bloemendaal, Ritske, & Kars de Bruijne (Eds.). (2008). Peace Support Operations: The Past and
the Future. Papers of the Ankara Seminar. Groningen, The Netherlands: Centre of European
Security Studies. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch
The study gives the perspectives of the United Nations, NATO and EU in exploring and identifying the
relationship between security and development. The main conclusion is that the international organisations could cooperate more effectively in operations and that the experience of the past requires
more attention in order to implement the lessons learned.
Calestous, Juma & Cheong-Yee Lee (Lead auth.). (2005). “Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development”. Millennium Project. Paper, published by Earthscan.
www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/Science-complete.pdf
In this report lessons learned from the past five decades of development practices are shared. It is not
just a collection of recommendations of what countries should do but a source of ideas on how to approach development challenges. The report emphasises the need to create space for policy experimentation and learning in developing countries. Development is largely an expression of local initiative
and international partnership; it cannot be sustained without local ownership and champions.
De Vasconcelos, Álvaro (Ed.). (2009). What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020? 2nd ed.
Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved from
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What_ambitions_for_European_defence_in_2020.pdf
The study concludes that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has reached an important milestone in its development. Today the EU plays a crucial role in bringing stability to different
parts of the world. Over the past ten years ESDP has contributed to this through 22 missions in four of
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the world’s continents. Missions undertaken in the framework of ESDP are not based on a single
state’s interests, but on a collective and consensual ethos motivated by concern for the common good.
The logic underpinning ESDP—its unique and distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management—was ahead of its time when conceived. That logic has proved its validity and has been adopted
widely by others. It provides a sound basis on which to approach the coming ten and more years.
Gnesotto, Nicole & Giovanni, Grevi. (Eds.). (2006). The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU
in 2025. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Policy. Retrieved from
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NGP_01.pdf.
This study does not aim at predicting what the EU and the world will look like twenty years from now,
because it is impossible task. The goal is to identify the long-term trends, actors and factors that will
be shaping the global environment. The purpose consists in providing the European community and
decision-makers with a better understanding of variables influencing the evolution of the international
system in which the EU will have to act.
Grevi, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (Eds.). (2009). European Security and Defence Policy. The
First 10 Years (1999-2009). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Retrieved from
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf.
The study says that the most significant aspect of the first ten years of ESDP has been the large number of operations that EU governments have carried out in this framework, some 23 missions since the
first was launched in 2003. The paper covers analyses how ESDP decision-making has developed, for
both civil and military crisis management, ESDP resources, looks at the civil and military resources
available for ESDP operations, as well as the capability development plans that EU governments have
put in place and considers the important relationships between ESDP and the United Nations (UN),
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the African Union (AU).
Leonard, Mark. (2011). “Four Scenarios for the Reinvention of Europe”. European Council on Foreign Relations. http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/four_scenarios_reinvention
This study offers a new framework for understanding Europe’s efficiency and legitimacy crises, and
examines the political and legal obstacles to a solution in different member states, the new cultural divisions in Europe, and the rise of new populist forces (including a discussion of the new German and
British questions). The paper sets out different scenarios for solving the euro crisis without exacerbating the chronic crisis of declining European power.
Missiroli, A. (2008). Revisiting the European Security Strategy – Beyond 2008, Policy Brief. Brussels: European Policy Centre.
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=55186
This report presents an assessment of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). It argues that the
text stood the test of time remarkably well, but minor adjustments may be needed and new elements
added to ensure better implementation. The author suggests that the ESS should emphasise that the
EU’s growing presence in the world should also translate into increased influence. In conclusion, revisiting the ESS may entail some recalibration and minor adjustments, plus some new “elements” for
better implementation.
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Mökli, Daniel (Ed.). (2011). Strategic Trends 2011. Key Developments in Global Affairs. Zurich,
Center for Security Studies. www.css.ethz.ch/box_feeder/Strategic-Trends-2011.pdf
Here the focus is on the gradual emergence of a new multi-polar international order that is marked by
diversity, a lack of leadership, and potentially growing instability. As a result, managing changes and
finding solutions will not become any easier under such conditions. The future is defined by the accelerated redistribution of global power towards Asia and the changing regional dynamics in Europe and,
in particular, the Middle East. The study contains an overview of global power shifts and fractured
geopolitics, changing regional dynamics in the Middle East, terrorism and counterterrorism ten years
after 9/11, and narcotics as a growing security concern.
Global Strategic Trends – out to 2040, Fourth edition. (2010). Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine, UK.
www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/StrategicTrends+Programme
This report presents driver and trend analysis. The process identifies trends and drivers in the social,
science and technology, economic, resource and environment, and geopolitical dimensions. Within
each of these dimensions, key trends have been determined through detailed analysis with subject
matter experts. A cross-dimensional analysis then considers how these trends are likely to develop
and interact, in order to establish the key themes: The Human Environment; The Dynamics of Global
Power; and Evolving Defence and Security Challenges. The assessments are made to varying degrees of probability to reflect multiple alternative outcomes. The future outlined in Global Strategic
Trends is realistic, based on the most probable outcomes, although alternative futures are also explored.
BOOKS
Biscop, Sven. (2005). The European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
www.amazon.com/European-Security-Strategy-Global-Positive/ dp/0754644693
The book is focused on the following main themes: “Reinventing security”; “Comprehensive security”;
“A secure neighbourhood”; “A secure world”; “Securing the capabilities” and “Securing implementation.” What is interesting here is that the book is not only based on research, documents and academic publications, but it is also the result of impressions gained by listening to the people at conferences and seminars. The book will appeal to those interested in the EU as an international actor, foreign policy, security and defence. It is also suitable for policy makers in the EU institutions and the
Member States.
Bretherton, Charlotte, & Vogler, John. (2006). The European Union as a Global Actor, 2nd. ed.
London: Taylor & Francis.
http://books.google.bg/books/about/The_European_Union_as_a_global_actor.html?id=n_8vOfRqt
BUC&redir_esc=y
This book examines the full range of the EU’s external relations including the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. It looks at the increasingly important role that the EU plays in global politics. The authors argue that the EU’s significance cannot be grasped by making comparisons with traditional
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states. The book covers issues related to the status, coherence, consistency and roles of the EU as
an actor and what being an actor means in practice, how the field of trade relations forms the basis of
the EUs activities, the EU in global environmental diplomacy, North-South relations and in relation to
the Mediterranean and East/Central Europe, the EU’s controversial relationship to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and defence.
De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Sweijs, Tim, & Zhao, Tong. (2011). Contours of Conflict in the 21st Century: A Cross-Language Analysis of Arabic, Chinese, English and Russian Perspectives on the
Future Nature of Conflict (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies). – 256 pp.,
www.hcss.nl/reports/contours-of-conflict-in-the-21st-century/17
The aim of this report is to gain a better understanding of the bandwidth of views on the future nature
of conflict. These views are analysed along different dimensions, such as actors, aims, domains,
means – who, why, where, how?; as well as salience, length, extensiveness, distinctiveness – how
often, how long, how widespread, how distinct? The various definitions of conflict across the language
domains are also mapped. The book intends to better inform decision makers from government and
industry in preparing for the challenges of the future conflict environment.
Deughton, Anne, & Mauer, Victor (2006). Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security
Strategy. Zurcher Beitrage, Zur Sicherheitspolitik NR. 77.
www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108320
This book is based around two themes. The first theme relates to the policy priorities of the European
Union. It has been clear that the debate within Europe is increasingly focused upon what a Union foreign policy should actually now be trying to do in the world. The second theme is related to the effectiveness of the EU, and the development and implementation of its foreign and security policies. The
foreign policy does not consist of perfect plans elaborated and executed in optimal circumstances:
compromises, as well as confusion, are both inevitable in foreign policy decision-making. This is true
for individual states—even for large and self-confident states—but perhaps even more so for the EU.
Friedman, Thomas L. (2005). The World is Flat. A Brief History of Twenty-First Century. Farrar,
Straus & Giroux. www.thomaslfriedman.com/bookshelf/the-world-is-flat
The author explains how the flattening of the world happened at the dawn of the twenty-first century;
what it means to countries, companies, communities, and individuals; and how governments and societies can, and must, adapt. The book is considered as the timely and essential update on globalisation, its successes and discontents, powerfully illuminated by one of the most respected journalists.
Gilles, Andrean, Bertram, Christoph, & Grant, Charles (2001). Europe’s Military Revolution.
London: Centre for European Reform.
www.amazon.com/Europes-Military-Revolution-Gilles-Andreani/dp/190122922X
In authors’ opinion much of the history of the EU has been about its members getting together to
agree on common rules for economic policy-making. The principle challenges facing the EU in the
next few decades are likely to be external. The Europe’s politicians, officials and strategic thinkers will
have to expend large amount of energy on the development of the EU’s external policy. Despite the
progress, it is likely that many more years will pass before the EU can conduct significant military operations without the help of NATO or the US.
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Gross, Eva, & Juncos, Ana E. (Eds.). (2011). EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.
Roles, Institutions and Policies. London: Routledge.
www.amazon.es/Conflict-Prevention-Crisis-Management-ebook/dp/B004QM9OIC
The book offers a comprehensive analysis of long- and short-term EU conflict prevention and crisis
management policies undertaken in various theatres and policy domains, featuring case studies on
West Africa, Afghanistan and the Caucasus.
Halbach, Uwe, Zagorski, Andrei, Schultza, Peter, W. & Kogan, Eugene (2009). Machtpoker am
Kaukasus. Wien: International Institut Liberal Politik, www.iilp.at/index.php?download=121.pdf.
One of the main ideas in this book is that there is no guarantee for any success for the post-conflict
situation because of the lack of confidence building measures and mistrust of the parties involved.
Russia and its non-EU recognised entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and
Georgia on the other, have a good understanding that the Geneva talks are likely to drag on for a long
time and the outcome of these talks remains uncertain.
Hamilton, Daniel, & Volker, Kurt. “Transatlantic 2020: A Tale of Four Futures.” Center for Transatlantic Relations. http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/transatlantic-2020-a-tale-offour-futures.html
This book offers four futures for the transatlantic relationship, each exploring how trends evident today
could interact and evolve to shape the world that we live in tomorrow. The presented four tales each
provide a lively, but profoundly different trajectory for Europe, America, and the transatlantic partnership, as well as lessons for contemporary policy choices.
Kronenberger, V. & Wouters, J. (Eds.) (2004). The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy
and Legal Aspects. Den Haag: TMC Asser Press.
http://books.google.bg/books/about/The_European_Union_and_conflict_preventi.html?id=p8lpMC5
8avEC&redir_esc=y
The prevention of and reaction against violent conflicts is a priority of the EU’s external policy. In addition to new operational competences developed under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the
European Union is particularly suited to combat root-causes of conflicts throughout the world. The
Constitution for Europe explores and scrutinises the progress achieved by the European Union in the
definition of a concrete conflict prevention strategy, as well as the challenges it still faces. The focus is
on the definition of and indicators for conflict prevention; institutional and constitutional dimension of
conflict prevention; EU’s instruments for the prevention of violent conflicts; structural conflict prevention and mainstreaming conflict prevention into EU’s policies; and cooperation with other international
organisations and civil society.
Lindley-French, J. (2007). A Chronology of European Security & Defence 1945-2007. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Chronology-European-Security-Defence-19452007/dp/0199214328
The book is divided into seven parts. Each is introduced by a short essay that tells the story of the period covered: “The formative years,” “The long haul,” “The down of reason,” “The lukewarm peace,”
“Countdown the freedom,” “The strategic vacation,” and “A brave new century.”
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Martinez, Arranz, A., Doyle, N.J., & Winand, P. (Eds.). (2010): New Europe, New World? The
European Union, Europe and the Challenges of the 21st Century. Brussels: Peter Lang.
http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/collections/monash-authors/2010/9789052016047.html
This book focuses on the central role that EU has long played in promoting economic prosperity and
political stability in Europe. With twenty-seven countries, it is a powerful trade negotiator and is seen
by many as a growing force for global security and welfare. The book asks questions such as: does
the EU giant have feet of clay; is it recognised as a legitimate political and social project by its own
citizens; how well does it respond to global challenges, such as environmental degradation and terrorism; how successful is it in projecting its image as a promoter of human rights, of conflict prevention, social justice, development cooperation, environmental protection and multilateralism? This publication contributes to the debate on the changing face of Europe and the way it works not just internally, but also with the rest of the world. It first explores the merits of fostering inclusive multicultural
citizenship and religious pluralism in Europe, the necessity of reinventing the EU from below, and the
urgency of addressing EU internal migration problems. It then examines the new role of the EU in
world politics and how other countries view it in terms of hard and soft power.
Merlingen, Michael & Ostrauskaité, Rasa (Eds.). (2008). European Security and Defence Policy.
An Implementation Perspective. London: Routledge.
The authors claim that the European Security and Defence Policy, notably its conflict management
component, has been evolving at impressive speed. The EU’s vocation as a crisis manager remains
hampered by political, legal, financial, procedural, doctrinal and capability-related difficulties and
shortfalls as well as structural challenges faced by ESDP missions on the ground.
Noel, Pierre (2008). Beyond Dependencies: How to Deal with Russian Gas. Policy brief, European
Council of Foreign Relations. http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/russia_gas_policy_brief
Based on extensive original research, this paper shows that the current obsession over the EU’s dependence on Russian gas misses the point; instead, the problem is that Russia uses gas to divide and
weaken Europe politically. The author argues that the current EU approach to Russia’s energy diplomacy—championing alternative energy sources, encouraging non-Russian gas, and attempting to
bind Russia with energy treaties—will be ineffective without a single European market in natural gas.
Piris, Jean-Claude (2011). The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
www.cambridge.org/aus/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9781107662568&ss=fro
The current Euro-crisis has triggered various conceptual efforts to move beyond mere implementation
of the Lisbon Treaty to render it “more dynamic and effective, present and active in the external world
and more responsive to the needs of European in the decades to come” (Piris, p.148). Among the variety of essays, e.g. by Jürgen Haberman: Zur Verfassung Europas, Berlin 2011, the contribution by
the former legal Counsel of the Council of the EU and co-architect of the Lisbon Treaty, Jean-Claude
Piris, stands out in terms of both his experience and his problem-oriented and forward-looking approach.
He rules out both a status quo option that might result in stagnation and irrelevance and the “bestsuited option, that is a substantive revision of the treaties” which is “excluded politically.” Piris thus
considers, at least as a “temporary measure” options for “more differentiation between its Member
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States.” While driven by the search for solutions for the Euro crisis, Piris considers two additional and
possible feasible options:
•
a political process progressing towards a two-speed Europe, and
•
a legally binding two-speed Europe.
While the former is seen to be already under way, the advantages of an additional treaty are considered (pp. 122-142). Security and defensive policies are seen to be especially susceptible to such solutions (p. 110 and p. 124 f.). Under the second, “bolder” option, Member States could move beyond
OCCAR and the Letter-of-Intend/Framework Agreement. In fact, that is what the LOI Agreement did
call for in the first place without so far getting implemented.
Piris’ essay is relevant for FOCUS WP 6 and 7, but useful also throughout the whole project.
Rees, Wyn (2011). The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a
Global Agenda (The European Union Series). Palgrave Macmillan
www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?pid=320798
Rees—a Professor of International Security at the University of Nottingham, UK—presents a wideranging assessment on contemporary US-EU security relations. It systematically examines the
development of the relationship since the Cold War and considers how global and European issues
such as EU enlargement, international terrorism and the war on terror have affected security relations.
Sánchez, M.A. (2011). The EU’s Military Crisis Management Operations: Petersberg Tasks and
International Peace. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.
www.amazon.com/Military-Crisis-Management-Operations-International/dp/3843390614
The purpose of this book is to analyse the EU’s international crisis management capabilities, particularly its military dimension, using what are known as the Petersberg tasks. These capabilities’ legal
framework is part of Europe’s new security and defence context in international relations. The book
analyses the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) in the EU Treaty, and the relations between the EU and WEU and NATO; the conception, institutional structure and legal basis of so called Petersberg tasks; the practice of this kind of operations in international crisis management; the civilian crisis management tasks in order to identify
common points and divergences with regard to military actions, and finally the author describes the
Petersberg tasks’ future prospects, with special references to the EU’s military-civilian capabilities.
Costigan, Sean S., & Perry, Jake, eds. (2012). Cyberspaces and Global Affairs. Ashgate.
www.amazon.com/Cyberspaces-Global-Affairs-Sean-Costigan/dp/1409427544
This book explores such issues as networks and networked thinking, information ownership, censorship, neutrality, cyberwars, humanitarian needs, terrorism, privacy and rebellion, giving a comprehensive overview of the core issues in the field, complemented by real world examples.
Siedschlag, Alexander (Ed.). (2007-2010). Jahrbuch für europäische Sicherheitspolitik: 2006-2007,
2008, 2009-2010. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
http://www.nomos-shop.de/Siedschlag-Jahrbuch-europ%C3%A4ische-Sicherheitspolitik20092010/productview.aspx?product=11337
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This book deals mainly with the new roles and requirements of the European security policy under the
“comprehensive approach.” A special focus is placed on disaster management in order to contribute to
the discussion of the expanded concept of security. Food for thought is given to the legitimacy of security policies to prevent and police, and to climate change in the context of “human security.”
Weiss, Stefani. (2010). “From Global Payer to Global Player.” Spotlight Europe Special (Bertelsmann Stiftung). – 8 pp.
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/118880/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f89e
b609-d77a-42e9-bd1f-ff6139bdd083/en/2010_spotlight_special.pdf
At its last session before the summer recess, the European Parliament adopted the report on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External
Action Service. Thus the new diplomatic service becomes a reality. However it seems that a genuine
common EU foreign policy has receded even further into the distance.
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ANNEX 7. DEDICATED WEB RESOURCES
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/
Official web resource, maintained by the International Relations and Security Network. ISN is one of
the world’s leading open access information services for international relations and security professionals with mission to facilitate security-related dialogue and cooperation within a high-quality network of international relations organisations, professionals and experts, and to provide open-source
international relations and security-related tools and materials in accessible ways.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-news.aspx?lang=en&BID=80
Official web resource, maintained by the European Union External Action Service. It provides full text
documents and news on the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en
Official overview with links to detailed information on missions and operations of the European Union.
www.affaires-strategiques.info
A bi-lingual site on European strategic issues, maintained by the French research centre IRIS – the
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, Paris.
www.plausiblefutures.com
A newsletter for the future studies community, edited by Ole Peter Galaasen, based in Norway. Currently, the site covers diverse science and humanistic topics, including future studies, scenarios,
global risks, space, infowar, and military issues.
http://atlantische-initiative.org/engl/
The Atlantic Initiative (German: Atlantische Initiative e.V.) is a non-partisan, non-profit, and independent organisation founded in Berlin in 2004. It concentrates on building and strengthening a strategic
community and a culture of constructive foreign policy debate. It was launched in April 2007.
www.atlantic-community.org
It describes itself as the “first online foreign policy think tank” focusing specifically on issues affecting
transatlantic relations and the complex challenges of the twenty-first century.
www.csdpmap.eu
A CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership (MAP) established in 2008 and designed to provide one point of
access to work of think tanks, research institutes, NGOs, governments and EU institutions. CSDP
MAP collates the expanse of already existing information on CSDP missions and the regions where
missions are conducted, to contribute to better understanding of CSDP process and planning for civil
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society, NGOs, as well as the staff in EU institutions, EU delegations and governments – policy makers and policy making recipients.
www.bruxelles2.eu
A French language newsblog dedicated to the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy. The EU’s Common
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (CFSP, CSDP) decrypted: crisis management concepts, deployed missions, diplomatic service, European armed forces, industry, etc. Close to EU institutions,
Bruxelles 2 brings exclusive info, analysis, commentary and reporting. Edited by Nicolas Gros-Verheyde.
www.isis-europe.org
International Security Information Service, Europe (ISIS europe) is a Brussels based independent research and advisory organisation working on aspects of security, defence and peace policies of the
EU and NATO.
FOCUS
ANNEX 8. ORGANISATIONS AND EXPERTS
ORGANISATIONS
Berghof Conflict Research (BCR) Centre (Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict
Management)
www.berghof-conflictresearch.org
Bertelsmann Stiftung
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Centre for European Policy – CEP
www.cep.eu
Centre for European Policy Studies - CEPS
www.ceps.be
Centre for European Reform – CER
www.cer.org.uk
Centre for Liberal Strategies – CLS, Sofia, Bulgaria
www.cls-sofia.org/en
Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
www.css.ethz.ch
The Center for European Studies, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzlia
http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/main/research/ces/Pages/ces_gallery.aspx
Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society (CSEPS)
www.europebgu.org.il/?p=61
Chatham House,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/security
Conference Board of Canada
www.conferenceboard.ca
European Policies Initiative
www.eupi.eu
EGMONT Institute – Royal Institute for International Relations
www.egmontinstitute.be
ELIAMEP | Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy
www.eliamep.gr/en
EURISK Foundation, Bucharest, Romania
www.eurisc.org
45
FOCUS
46
European Council on Foreign Relations
www.ecfr.eu
European Institute for Asian Studies, EIAS (Brussels)
www.eias.org
European Policy Centre, Brussels
www.epc.eu
European Societal Security Research Group
www.societalsecurity.eu
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris
www.iss.europa.eu
European Security and Defence College
http://esdc.mil-edu.be/
European Forum at the Hebrew University
www.ef.huji.ac.il/
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
www.fdu.uni-lj.si
Forsvarets foskningsinstitutt, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
www.ffi.no/en
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik)
www.swp-berlin.org/en/
Haifa center for German and European Studies
hcges@univ.haifa.ac.il
Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS)
www.iris-france.org
Institute for International and European Policy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/
Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques – IRIS (Institute for International and Strategic
Relations)
www.iris-france.org/en/
Institute for Regional and International Studies – IRIS, Sofia, Bulgaria
www.iris-bg.org
Institute for Security and International Studies – ISIS, Sofia, Bulgaria
www.isis-bg.org
Institute of International and European Affairs – IIEA, Dublin, Ireland
www.iiea.com
FOCUS
47
Instituto Affari Internazionali
www.iai.it
International Institute for Strategic Studies – IISS, London
www.iiss.org
Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS - Poland), Kraków
www.iss.krakow.pl
King’s College London
www.kcl.ac.uk
Koninklijk Hoger Instituut voor Defensie / L'Institut Royal Supérieur de défense, Evere, Belgium
www.mil.be
London School of Economics and Political Science
www2.lse.ac.uk
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt – NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), Oslo, Norway
www.nupi.no
Notre Europe, A Paris-based independent think tank, devoted to European integration
www.notre-europe.eu
NATO Defence College, Rome
www.ndc.nato.int
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych – PISM (Polish Institute of International Affairs),
www.pism.pl
Rahvusvaheline Kaitseuuringute Keskus (International Centre for Defence Studies), Tallinn,
Estonia,
www.icds.ee
Royal College of Defence Studies, London
www.mod.uk/rcds
Royal Danish Defence College
http://forsvaret.dk
Royal High Institute for Defence, Belgium
http://www.mil.be
Royal Military Academy
www.rma.ac.be
Professional Forum in the UK for those concerned with National and International Defence and
Security (RUSI)
www.rusi.org
FOCUS
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI
www.sipri.se
Swedish National Defence College
www.fhs.se/en/
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut – FOI (Swedish Defence Research Agency), Stockholm
www.foi.se/FOI/templates/startpage96.aspx
Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, known also as Razumkov Centre
www.uceps.com.ua; www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/index.php
EXPERTS
This information is not part of the published version of the deliverable.
48
FOCUS
67
ANNEX 9. CATALOGUE OF QUESTIONS FOR SCENARIO FORESIGHT
The following first set of questions for take-up by scenario foresight undertaken in Work Package
6.2 and Work Package 6.3 can be derived from the work undertaken in this deliverable. FOCUS
will use this list in subsequent empirical foresight work in particular to develop scenario
questionnaires.
1. QUESTIONS RELATING TO FUTURE EU ROLES
1.1
Given the prospect that following the financial crisis, financial security may become one of
the most important components of security government, which related emerging roles of
the EU as a global actor do you foresee? Might we see the Petersberg Tasks formally
amended to include related aspects?
1.2
Can EU Member States’ national security prerogatives be expected to prevail, or are we
going to witness a Europeanization of the concept of security, with a focus on the security
of the Union as a whole, and related EU roles?
1.3
How can the EU effectively build and deepen a common threat perception among its
agencies, Member States, and citizens that has an effect on mutual confidence and is the
ground for a global security role of the Union?
1.4
What is going to be included in a possible further expansion of the treat definition in the
European Security Strategy (2003) and its review document (2008)?
1.5
How will vital EU security interests be defined and which institutions on the EU and
national levels are going to be involved? What role is a common risk assessment
methodology going to play in this regard?
1.6
How is the EU as a global actor, accepted by its citizens in that role, going to be
influenced by the tension between international engagement and isolation for selfprotection?
1.7
What is going to be the role of multiple European Union agencies in the management of
trans-boundary crises, and what coordination mechanisms will be in place?
1.8
Is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU going to remain a subset
of the overarching Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or is it going to develop
into a self-reliant policy area, in fact including the framing of a common Union defence
policy? In this context, also consider the following questions:
•
Will security and defence affairs thus act as an engine of enhanced European
integration, as they did in the past?
•
Will a common budget for military costs in EU operations be established or will the
established principle of “costs lie where they fall” be maintained?
•
Will rules and procedures for technological exchange and co-operation be
elaborated and established?
FOCUS
68
1.9
Will CSDP further consolidate and develop principles and institutions for common
decision-making, beyond the lowest common denominator of Member States interests?
Will CSDP retain its focus on short- to mid-term crisis reaction or will it develop a more
strategic/long-term horizon character and perspective?
1.10
Will the comprehensive approach to external security on the EU policy level (reflected in
bodies such as the Political and Security Committee) be matched by a more
comprehensive approach to missions and operations? – Please give your assessment of
the likelihood of the following possible alternative futures that imply distinct roles for the
EU as a global security provider:
•
Will CSDP retain its multi-functional character in the future or be rather based on
defence technology and military capabilities?
•
Will the EU/CSDP be focused on defending its territory within a reactive rather than
projective role?
•
Will the EU enhance effective deterrence with symmetric and asymmetric tools as a
compulsory element of the security capabilities and politic power?
1.11
Could the future EU act as a unitary trans-boundary crisis manager, with crisis
management responsibilities centralized in a dedicated agency and existing primary law
adapted in order to extend supranationality?
1.12
Or, in contrast, will the future EU mainly serve as a facilitator for localised response,
based on its support for enhancement of Member States capabilities and enabling of
cooperation between international organizations?
1.13
Will the EU be a builder of “stability in Europe and beyond and a manager of insecurity? –
In particular, please consider the likelihood, feasibility, and impact of the following possible
future EU roles:
•
Will the future EU dedicate itself to the global protection of human rights?
•
Will the future EU (be able/capable to) contribute to a balance of power in the
Middle East, including dealing with nuclearization of one or more countries in the
Middle East that will require specific preventive, protective and defensive
measures?
•
Will the future EU promote the contribution of non-EU members to EU military crisis
management?
•
Will the future EU enhance future cooperation and transparency between EU and
NATO?
•
Which further preventive diplomacy efforts will the future EU develop to prevent
conflicts?
•
Will the future EU act as a well-armed regional policeman able to conduct highintensity humanitarian interventions?
•
Will the future EU regulate competition for resources, particularly energy, and
possibly food, as well as address increased tension due to continued population
growth?
FOCUS
•
69
Will the future EU have a common approach to prevent the spread of weapons for
mass destruction and uncontrolled access to technologies and materials for their
production and delivery?
1.14
How are EU citizens going to perceive the legitimacy of the EU to exert those (Q1.13)
possible future roles?
1.15
Will the EU develop and implement an interoperability concept in order to effectuate the
use of resources made available by Member States?
1.16
Will commonly owned EU capabilities be developed?
1.17
(if “yes” to Q 1.16) Which kinds of new common EU capabilities (apart from the common
civil and military headline goal processes) for international crisis management do you
foresee?
•
Justice & law enforcement capabilities;
•
Intelligence capabilities;
•
Early warning capabilities;
•
Financial instruments;
•
Good governance and institution building capabilities, including those for security
and defence sector reform;
•
Civil society and cultural capabilities, such as public information networks and
systems, media and new social networks, etc.
2.
QUESTIONS RELATING TO FUTURE SECURITY RESEARCH IN
SUPPORT OF FUTURE EU ROLES
2.1
Are normative principles such as democracy, human rights, market economy, rule of law,
and functional multilateral world order globally applicable?
2.2
How will EU internal political and social cohesion determine the sense of community and
readiness of taking and sharing the burdens of undertaking a global role?
2.3
Which sectors should be included in the definition of future security research missions on
the European level? – including consideration of sovereignty of member states, the
functioning of the common market, access to strategic resources, cybersecurity, security
of emerging new types of critical infrastructure (which?), energy security, etc.
2.4
Which new synergies in using military capabilities for civil security purposes will future
advances in information technology enable?
2.5
Will developments in cyber, nano, robotics, space, networking, and other technologies
create a new level of asymmetry – both within the Union as well as between the Union
and “friend” and “foe” – in a period of two to three decades?
FOCUS
2.6
2.7
70
Please assess the relevance of the possible future general components of a European
security research agenda (as it relates to the FOCUS Big Theme addressed in this
deliverable), and add any further components that you anticipate:
•
EU and Member State security institutions (political science, public administration,
organizational, legal, etc. studies);
•
Continuous analysis of changing risks and gaps to be closed/resources to be
developed in order to address those risks;
•
Criteria for rating losses and vulnerabilities;
•
Identification of emerging security demands of the European citizen;
•
Rapid response in crisis management and civil protection;
•
Management of the blurring of risks, missions, and subjective demands;
•
A consolidated concept of global security, in which EU specific roles may occur;
•
The concept of the global EU power;
•
The external-internal nexus in the European foreign and security policy;
•
Evolving legal contexts.
Some experts believe that we are going to see not a concept of EU security in the future
but that the paradigm of security will be transformed into a paradigm of the management
of insecurity, in an environment of an unmanageable number of subjects and objects of
security. How do you assess the probability of such an outlook?

EU as a global actor based on the wider Petersberg Tasks

Transcription

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