Freedom and Control in the Unified Germany: Governmental

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Sociology of Religion 2003, 64:3367-37
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
S. 2001. Cerkev/driava: loo.tev ali razlodtev. In Dr illla in cerkev: laiena dr;izva kor jamswo,
1. Hvala, 41-55. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za dnabene vede. [Church/State: divorce or
:tinction. In StaU and Chun:n: Sec:ular StaU as guararnee]
is, I. 2001. New religious phenomena and me Camolic Church in me postcommunist
unuies.
I!l, M. 1999. Evropejci jutri: kristjani brez cerk.ve Ijudje brez vere? Revija 2000 117-118:
-105. [Europeans tomorrow: Christians without church - People without faim?]
3. 2COO. Odnosi med cerk.vijo in dr !avo - znamenje urejenosti ali neurejenosri neke
:lobne demokratl:ne dru !be. ZRNO SKI 2 (4): 11-23. [Relationships between Church and
ate - a sign of order and disorder in a mooern democratic society]
: o? N. 2001. Pravni polciaj verskih skupnosti v Republiki Sloveniji. In Drt ava in cerkev: laiC
driIva kot jamstvo, edited by I. Hvala, 66-69. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za druzDene vede. [Legal
5itjon of religious communities in ehe Republic of Slo'ienia. In StaU and Church: Secular
i ted by
Ile
~,
as guararnee]
V. 1999. Katolfika cerkev in wstjan v zavesti danamjih Slovencev. In Podobe 0 cerkvi in
19iji (na Slovms!<em v 9O-ih) , edited by N. To~. 81-108. Ljuhljana: FDV - IDV. [The
ltholic Church and a Christian in me perception of a presem-day Slovene. In Church and
19ion (in Slovenia in ehe '90s)]
.S. P. 1998. Nihi! Ob=: Religion, poJir:ic.s and social change in East-CentTal Europe and Russia.
~rham and London: Duke University Press.
dson, J. T. 1997. New Religions and religious freedom in Eastern and Central Europe: A
ciological anal)'5is. In New religious phenomena in Central and Eastem Europe, edited by I.
lrowik and G. Babü\ski, 257-282. Krak6w: Nomos.
Z. 1993. Tne Church and me comemporary Slovene history. Nationaliries papers, Vol.
KI/l,71-81.
M. 1999. Proselytism in post-socialist Slovenia. The Journal of Ecumenical Studies 36:1-2,
'inter-Spring, 202-220.
\.. 1998. CeTkev in dTZflua. Ljubljana: Dnmna. [Churcn and Swr.e]
. 1999. (Ne)religiomost Slovencev v primerjavi z drugimi sn:dnje- in vzhodnoevropskimi
lrooi. In Podobe 0 cerkvi in religiji (na Slovenskem v 9O-ih) , edited by N. Tal 11-80. Ljubljana:
JY - IDV. [(Non)religiosiry among Slovenes in comparison with other Cenrral and
1Stern European nations. In Church and religion (in Slovenia in ehe '90s)]
-. 1999a. Cornparisons of religiousness in Slovenia over time. In Modem sociec-y anti values: A
mparative anal:tsis based on rite ISSP projecr, edited by N. To~ P. Ph. Mahler and B. },.1alnar,
;7-290. Ljubljana and Manheim: FSS and ZUMA.
nja, M. 2003. Religious separation and political inwlerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. College
:atien: Texas A&M University Press.
Freedom and Control in the Unified
Germany: Governmental Approaches to
Alternative Religions Since 1989
Hubert Sei wert *
Univers;r, of Leipzig
This artick describes German govemmenUIl reaaions tO anti-eul.t fears during rite decade after
rite unifiauion af ehe [WO German staUS in 1990. The govemmeru: and porliament reaaed tO a lntblic
panic when in 1996 a Commission of lnquiry into so-caIled sects was instigat.ed. While ehe working
of ws commission contributed tO the cooling down of public emotions, ir did not fundamernalb
change ehe negative view of new religious movemenrs (NRMs) in Gmnan sociec-y. Federal ,md s
administrations stiU atrempt tO re5rnct dU' propagation 01 altemalive religions. The limits set /ry die
Constirution and decisions of rite Federal Constitutional Court protea religious minorities against
excessive discriminolian. However, officials and poliridans usual/:t sho.re the common perceprion af
NRMs as potentiaU:t dangerous and eherefore und.esirab/e grvups. Iris argued rlUIt discrimirulrion af
religious minorities ls due not tO deficiencies of the consritutianal order, bur to cu/rural val~
disTespecring religious commitmenr.
Until 1989, East Germany, that is, the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), was part of the socialist world system and under Soviet contra!. Unlike
other East European countries, however, the end of communist rule in East
Germany did not bring about a long and tentative search for new modes of
church-state relations or a new policy in response to a rapidly changing religious
landscape. The process of unification of the two German states did not leave
much room for experiments. Ir led to an almost complete transfer of the West
German legal system to East Germany. After a very shon period in 1990 there
were few options for new institutional arrangements for religions thac differed
from what had been already established in West Germany.
While the legal position of religions in East Germany could be changed and
adapted to the Western legal system by a mere strake of the pen - the
Unification Treaty - the actual role of religions remained significantly
different. Half a century of communist religious policy had left a legacy that was
not easily obliterated. Most conspicuous were the differences in church member­
ship rates. Whiie in West Germany church membership in 1990 was about 85
• Direcl corre.sporu1ence
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368
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGiON
FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN THE UNIFiED GERMANY
percent, in East Germany it was only 30 percent (Pollack 2()(X):19). Since hoth
parts of Germany had started with a roughly equal membership of more L~ 90
percent in 1949, this shows the impact of the Communist religious policy. Over
fifty years, the churches in East Germany had lost two thirds of their mernbers,
and those declaring themselves to be Christians had become a minority in the
country of Luther (Schmidt and Wohlrab-Sahr 2003).
Ir should be observed that such a marked drop in church membership is
exceptional when compared to most other East European states under com­
munist mle. Similar rates are found only in Russia, Estonia and the Czech
Republic, while in countries like Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria religious affilia­
tion was still atove 90 percent after fifty years of Communism (Pollack 1998:18,
table 7). This shows the intensity and, of course, the success of the religious
repression and anti-religious propaganda of the GDR govemment.
Since the political unific8tion in 1990, Germany is a religiously divided
country. In the West, the overwhelming majoriry of the population are members
of eicher the Catholic or the Protestant Churches, and the Churches are rich
and influential institutions. In the East, however, the large majority does not
confess any religion, and the influence of the Christian Churches is low. Ir does
not look as though this situation will change in the near future, as in both parts
of Germany the churches are continuing to lose members.
Not only is church membership low in East Germany, but by 1991 less than
20 percent of the population said they believed in God, compared to almost 50
percent in West Germany. Ir can, therefore, be said that East Germany is to a
high degree deChristianized. Ir is against this background that, shonly after the
breakdown of communist rule, some so-ca11ed experts staned to ring alann behls
by predicting the invasion of new religious movements, sects and cults into East
Germany (e.g. Gandow 1990; for a sociological analysis see Usarski 1999). The
line of thought was simple and at first sight convincing. It was assumed that
communist ideology, having lost its plausibility, had thereby left an ideological
vacuum; and, it was argued, since rapid social change would produce insecuriry,
many East Germans would turn to alternative ideologies. Given the weak posi­
tion of traditional Christianity, this would be an ideal seedbed for new religious
movements spreading into East Germany. Indeed, after the end of communist
rule many minority religions and new religious movemer:ts were eager to send
missionaries to the former socialist countries, including EaSt Germany. At the
same time the West European anti-cult movement extended its activities to
these eastern countries in an attempt to Counter the expamion of seers and cults.
While religions newly arrived hom the West had at least same initial success
in some post-communist counuies, in East Germany they completely failed. The
EaSt German population proved to be remarkably resistant to new religions, and
convens numbered at best in the tens. This, however, was ignored by anti-cult
iobbyists who continued their warnings against the invasion of the East by seets
8nd cults. Tnis may have been one of the reasons wh y anti-cult lobbying was
369
amazingly suceessful in the first half of the 19905. Once the idea of L'r,e dangers
imposed by sects and cults had been raken up by the media, the meme became a
matter of increasing public concern. The original concern (that is, the invasion
of East Germany) soon dropped into the background and was replaced by the
Church of Scientology. By the middle of the 19905, the anti-cult climate had
gained a dynamism mat almost turned into a hysteria of co11ective fear. Scien­
tology was perceived as a serious threat to internal security and as a weird but
powerful organization that tumed its victims into remote-controlied zombies.
And, along with Scientology, a11 other seets and cults came to be regarded as
dangerous groups luring their victims into psychological dependency and
exploiting them financia11y.
lt is hardly possible today to irnagine me extent of public fear of cults during
these years. Almest daily the media reponed on the subject and even serious
newspapers only rnarginally escaped the general hysteria. It was a time when it
was seriously debated whether Scientology and the other new religious move­
ments were about to take over power. Absurd as these allegations appear today,
they had a marked influence on public opinion. And since politicians are sensi­
tive to public opinion, some of mem became spokespersons of the anti-cult
sentiments. There were federal and state ministers who publicly dedared
Scientology an evil organisation; some governmenr offices published booklets
exposing the alleged totaiitarian character of Scientology and the Unification
Church. Most state govemments published leaflets with general warnings
against cults, and teachers were (and still are) expected to deal wit...1-t me subject
in schooL The few voices that publidy criticized the anti-cult hysteria were
denounced as being eimer ignorant or corrupted.
From a sociological point of view, these were fascinating developmems.
Apparently out of noming, a societal problem had emerged, demanding govern­
ment action. But almough many of me movements were publicly accused of alt
manner of sins, there was not a single case in which one of the so-called sects or
cults was convicted of any criminal act. A small number of anti-eult activists
had succeeded in presenting their personal concerns as a question of public
concern. The success of this campaign should turn any public relations manager
green with envy, and it certainly deserves a more detailed analysis. Whatever
the reasons may have been, the consequence was that the government found
itself under pressure to respond to the public fear.
There was, however, no possibility that me government CDuid do -.vhat
public opinion expected. The Constitution protects me freedom of religious
beliefs ana activities anJ, since no laws were broken by any of u~e llew reltgious
movements, there was no legal basis for government intervention. In the past
the federal government had supported some anti-cult organizations financially,
but this policy had been dedared unlawful in 1992 by me Federal Admini­
strative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht 1992). The federal administration was
we11 aware of these legal restrictions and was, therefore, reluctant to take any
370 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
further measures. In the Bundestag (the federal parliament) however, the oppo­
sition party made itself the mouthpiece of public opinion and acclised the
government of inaction. lt demanded the establishment of a Parliamentary
Commission of lnquiry to analyse the dangers imposed by sects and cults, and to
make recommendations for administrative and legislative meo.sures. The
govemment parties had no other choice than to support this motion, lest they
should be accused of neglecting a major social problem.
The Commission of Inquiry was composed of twelve Members of Parliament
and an equal number of external expens. It was dominated by anti-cult activists
and representatives of the two major Churches, Lutheran and Catholic. After
two years of work it presented its Final Report in 1998, a book of nearly 500
pages (Deutscher Bundestag 1998a; 1998b).
There is no need to describe in detail the working of this Commissilln,
which I have done elsewhere (Seiwert 1999). Although the majority of its
members bad avested interest in paving the way für govemment measures to
control and restriet the activities of new religious movements, the Report did
not provide any evidence that supported the general perception of seers and
cults as being a significant social problem. The commission had to face the
results of empirical research that had been commissioned by itself and could,
therefore, not be simply ignored. While the report attempted to veil the implica­
tions of these findings, it had to admit that alternative religious movements were
no danger to either the state or to the society. Ir nevertheless recommends a
considerable amount of legislation to protect individuals from cults, human
potential groups and certain commercial practices. There was also a Minority
Report by two members of the Commission, including myself, that did not
support the alarmist tendencies of the majority.
The effects of the Report were surprising and devastating for the anti-cult
lobby, which had pursued the matter in the hope of gaining further public
support and aeeess to public funds. Instead, publie interest in sects and cults
disappeared almost immediately after the publication of the Report. The media
rightly understood the main message that the earlier horror scenarios had no
faetual basis, and they accordingly lost interest in the subject. A few months
later a new federal govemment was elected and there was, as a result, plenty of
other material to fill the papers.
The new government was and still is lead by the former opposition party, the
Social Democra(S, whose ami-cult lobbyists bad been the driving force behind
the Commission of Inquiry. They could, therefore, expeet that the new govern­
ment would be less reluctant in promoting an anti-cult policy than the former
one. However, the federal administration showed no intention of implementing
any of the legislative measures reeommended by the Commission. All it did was
to make available the equivalent of something ol/er one million dollars fOF a
pilot projeet to provide training for social and psychological cOlllL-elling centres.
This allowed the administration to refer at least to same activities when
FREEOOM AND CONTROL IN THE UNIFiED GERMANY
371
Members of Parliament asked what the government was doing abaut the aangers
of cults.
Both the Commission of Inquiry and the ensuing measures may be called
symbolic politics. They showed the concern of the authorities without making
any concrete changes. This does not mean that they have been without effect.
Quite the contrary! Although they did not result in any substantial government
measures or new legislation, the cult issue was no longer perceived as a major
social problem. lt had been defmed as a social problem by PUhllC opinion, and it
ceased to he a social problem when public attention turned away Trom it. The
problem disappeared not because the alleged dangers posed by sects and cults
had been removed but as a result of symbolic measures displaying activities of
the government. During the mid-l99Os the anti-cult hysteria had been virtually
Out of contral, public emotions were high, and the governmem was under
pressure for some kind of action. The Constitution. however, did not permit
what anti-cult sentiments demanded. In this situation the Commission of
Inquiry reduced public pressure coIl5iderably. The government gained two yeaIS,
which was long enough to exhaust public emotions; and, since the Commission
did not provide any new facts to refuel them, the issue simply disappeared from
public attention. This is not to say that the underlying conflict has been solved.
There still are alternative religions, and there still are anti-cult lobbyists who
fight against them. But this is merely one of the many conflicts that exist in any
society and certainly not a major one.
Four years have passed since the publieation of the Final Report of the
Commission of Inquiry and the anti-cult wave of the 1990s. This gives us
sufficient distance to make some observations about freedom and government
contral of religions in the unified Germany. There are, of course, various
approaches for dealing with this issue: juridical, political, and sociological. These
different perspectives should not be confused, sinee they imply different ques­
tions and methodologies.
Let me begin with same remarks about the legal and political system. In
Germany, there is a delicate balance between freedom and control of religion,
""hich in many ways is different from the situation io the United States. The
freedom of religious and ooo-religious beliefs and the free exercise of religion afe
protected by artide 4 of the German CoIl5titution. In the interpretation of the
Federal Constitutional ~urt, this basic right protects not ooly individuals bur
also religiolls communities against government in terference. And there is no
doubt that this proteetion appiies also to minority religioIl5, to sects and cults, Of
whatever you caU them. Religious freedom is, mus, guaranteed by the text of the
Constitution as well as by many decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court.
While the freedom of religion is a constitutional right, it is not, however,
the only constitutional right. There are others that in same cases may conflict.
To name just a few: the freedom of expression (arricle 5); the right to the free
development of one's personaliry; the right to life; and to inviolabilitv of one's
3
n
S<XIOLOGY OF RELIGION
person (artiele 2). These rights, ineluding the freedom of religion, cannot be
restricted by other laws, but only by other constitutional rights. Although there
is no explicit hierarchy, it is obvious that the right to life and to the inviolability
of one's person are higher than religious heedom. Human sacrifices or torture
could not be justified as the free exercise of a given religion. In other words, the
freedorn of religion is not unlimited.
This hne of thinking opens the way to a cenain degree of government
contral of religions. As the Federal Constitutional Court stressed in arecent
deClsion, the government is not obliged to ignore completely what religious
communities and their members do, even if their actions have religious motives.
Furthermere, the administration is entitled to inform the public about certain
religious communities if it thinks the information is in the public interest. lt
roust do so, however, in a religiously neutral way and not deprecate religious
beliefs (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2002).
This is the constitutional situation according to the interpretation of the
highest German court. Of course, the actual situation does not always corre­
spond to the text and spirit of the Constitution. Thar is why sometimes the
courts are appealed to. In the above-mentioned decision, the Federal Consti­
tutional Court accused the administration of having called the Osho movement
"pseudo-religious" and "destructive" and having stated that it "manipulates its
members." Since these were deprecating express ions without any factual basis,
the govemment violated the Constitution when applying them to a religious
comrounity. Thus, hom a purely juridical point of view, freedom of religion is
protected not only by the text of the Constitution, but also by the working of
the legal system and the courts. Admittedly, the courts sometimes work slowly.
In the present case the Federal Constitutional Court needed eleven years. There
is no reason, however, to doubt that the freedom of religion is guaranteed by the
German legal system.
From a political point of view, however, there are some reasons for concern.
Both the federal and state administrations introduced policies during the 19905
that undoubtedly attempted to inhibit me activities of new re1igious movements
(NRMs), and mey sometimes exceeded the limits defined by the Constitution.
That they did not do so more often and more radically was due primarily to the
risk of being ccndernned by the COurts. Senior officials in the administration
were weH aware of this risk'- much more so than many politicians who wanted
more radical measures.
While It may be justified to Cfiticize govemment policy towards the NRMs
at the politicallevel, I nevertheless think that the experience of the past decade
has attested to the functioning of the legal and political system and its mechan­
ism of checks and balances. The proper working of a constitutional system does
not mean that there will be no disruptions, but that there are mechanisms of
self-regulation that correct temporary malfunction. We cannot expect politi­
cians and officials to be more enlightened than me rest of society and to make
FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN THE UNIF1ED GERMANY
373
no mistakes, whether they are dealing with religions or with any oü~er matter.
There are many cases where politicians would like ta da things that they cannGt
do because of the Constitution or other laws. They can be blamed for their
intentions, but that is a moralist attitude. There would be a real problem,
however, if they did away with the Constitution or if me courts were not able to
COHect violations. Since this is not the case, Germany's governmental
appraaches to alternative religions are the example of a bad policy, but not oi a
bad polity. The self-regulating mechanisms of the legal and political institut ions
worked slowly, but they finally readjusted the excessive developments.
While the Constitutions and decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court
present a barrier restricting excessive measures, it cannot be ignored mat federal
and state administrations are still far hom following a policy that actively
rOtects the rights of so-called seets and cults. Many officials and even judges
share the common perception of NRMs as dangerous and undesirable organiza­
tions. Even if the therne has disappeared tram the front pages of the newspapers,
there rem.ains a latent discrimination against certain religious minorities. There
still are leaflets published by state governments warning against sects and Clltt>,
and schoolteachers are expected to enlighten their pupils on the sinister
machinations of these groups (Krenzer 2002). The Federal Government still
insists on denying Sun Myung Moon, the head of the Unification Church,
entrance inta Germany with the argument that the propagation of this fa;th
should be restricted and violent reactions of the public prevented. This measure
has recently been approved by a court (Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz
2002). One of the underlying problems is that the various administrations make
few attempts to gain reliable information about the NRMs. Although the
Commission of Inquiry strangly recommended the promotion of academic
research in this field, ncthing is being done to allow a rational poliey based on
confirmed knowledge rather than uninformed or misinformed assumptiorls.
There is no way, therefore, to COHeet prejudices and to give teachers the
info!"mation mey ned to further tolerance towards religious minorities. Sinee it
is not to be expected that this situation will change in me near future, it may be
only a matter of time before the next wave of anti-cult sentiments surfaces.
Let me elose with some sociological observations. We may ask why the
German administration and the German public reacted excessively in the first
place. How could politicians, respectable newspapers, journals, and intellecwals
aHaw themselves tO be so affected by the general hysteria? There is no simple
answer tO these questions. I doubt that one can credit these developments to the
influence of anti-cult activists and their skills of public relations alone. Even less
convincing is it t0 suppose ü~at the administration acted in bad faith when it
warned against the alleged dangers of sects and cults; there was (and still is) a
high degree of consensus wiü~in German society that NRMs are a threat. This
view was partly due to the lack of reliable information, which allowed rumours
and erroneous allegations to spread. However, this misinforrnation obviously
374
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
reaehed a soeiety that was highly reeeptive to anti-eult arguments. lt is this
reeeptivity that aecounted for the diffieulties in adopting a more rational poliey.
PoLitieians, offieials and - neeclless to say - even intellectuals are pan of the
society and prane to perceptions similar to those of the rest of it. Their reactions
cannot be attributed w r...1ce structure of the pclitical and legal system alone, but
must be understood as being equally conditioned by the cultural system.
The commonly aceepted values and eonvietions of Gem1an society must be
taken into aceount if we are to understand societal and governmental reaetions
to alternative religions. Same scholars have argued that there is a long historical
tradition of religious persecution in Germany (Davis 2000) or [hat the e)'per­
ience of Nazi totalitarianism is responsible for specifically German reactions
towards NRMs (Hexham and Poewe 1999; for a comment see Seiwert 2002).
Historical considerations may be he1pful, but there is also a need for more
thorough sociological analyses of the values and attitudes of conremporary
Gerrnan society. This is, however, a new theme that exceeds the scope of the
present paper
I would, however, like to mention one final point. Present Gern1al1 culrure is
highly secularised. Although in West Germany church membership rates are
high, religious commitment and participation rates are very low; religion is
regarded as a purely private affair. There is a deep mistrust of c10sed religious
communities and religions that demand a high level cf commitment from their
mernbers. Despite political traditions that promoted ideologies of collectivism,
present-day German culture is domina ted by an ideology of individualism. In its
extreme form, individualism i5 understood not only as the autonomy of the
individual but also as a rejection of any dependency and hierarchy. This is, of
course, an ideology and not the actual situation in Gennan society. But it is a
powerful ideology. Against this background, strict religions, in which individuaLs
freeLy submit to religious authorities and are committed to moral rules no longer
accepted in secular society, appear as achallenge. They put into quest ion the
ideology of individualism. It is, therefore, not only NRMs mat are criticized and
denounced in the media. The Catholic Church, and evangelical and charismatic
Protestant Churches are, likewise, targets of criticism. In mainstream German
culture mere is linie understanding of religious commitment. This may be one of
the reasons why even Liberal intellecmals did not oppose a govemmental policy
to control NRMs. Those who are concerned about the limitations of religious
freedom in Gennany should, therefore, consider not only the structure of the
legal and pol1tical system; it is also necessary to pay attention to the cultural
dimensions of sociery, and to the attitudes and moods that affect social action
and the working of the institutions.
FREEOOM AND CONTROL IN THE UNlFiED GERMANY
375
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