do we need a new service rifle cartridge?

DO WE NEED A NEW
SERVICE RIFLE CARTRIDGE?
END USER PERSPECTIVE AND LESSONS LEARNED // JIM SCHATZ
D
o we need a new service rifle
cartridge? Another way of
asking this question is “Is
there a problem with the lethality of the 5.56mm NATO
caliber?” These questions are two of the
most controversial in the military/defense industry today. It pervades the trade
shows and is constantly discussed by the
end users as well as those on the sidelines.
The current wars are giving a lot of feedback to the suppliers and designers, and
perhaps the best way to address this is to
look at the evidence we can see from recent developments and new programs and
trends in the U.S., within the NATO alliance and in threat countries.
There are various key caliber-related
topics that we should consider before trying
to gain an answer to this question, such as:
5.56X45MM HISTORY
The 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge
was developed in 1959 from the commercial .222 Remington cartridge for
hunting varmints (weighing up to 40
pounds) out to 200-250 yards. The current U.S. 5.56x45mm NATO SS109-style
M855 round loaded with a 62 grain “penetrator” projectile was developed not for
improved terminal performance on soft
tissue but for long range helmet penetration from machine guns (the FN Minimi),
NOT specifically for rifles or carbines. Its
effect on soft tissue and the human target is greatly dependent upon bullet fragmentation and/or yawing at striking velocities above 2,500 feet per second (fps)
and was developed to be fired from 18-20
inch barreled weapons like the M16 rifle
and M249 SAW. The “lethality” (more accurately described as “terminal effectiveness” as there are no varying degrees of
lethality. If an opponent is fatally shot,
but manages to wipe out an entire squad
of friendly personnel before succumbing
to the wound, the projectile demonstrated
100% lethality but was utterly ineffective
at stopping the enemy from continuing
the attack) of the M855 round is severely
degraded beyond 150 meters when fired
from a 14.5 inch barreled M4 Carbine or
at any range (0 meters and out) from the
10 inch barreled MK18 CQBR due to the
insufficient striking velocities at these
ranges. The unique physical stature (narrow torso) of many of the malnourished
Middle Eastern combatants when struck
by the M855 projectile often produces
insignificant wounds similar to those
produced by .22 Long Rifle ammunition.
Unless the M855 projectile yaws in the
target, through and through shots is the
norm and yaw from weapon to weapon
(fleet yaw) and round to round is unpredictable at best. This is fact based on
numerous official U.S. wound ballistic
studies conducted and user accounts collected, some of which are presented below
as evidence to the point.
WOUND BALLISTICS EXPERTS SUPPORT
END USER ACCOUNTS
The disturbing failure of the
5.56x45mm caliber to consistently offer
adequate incapacitation has been known
for nearly 20 years. Dr. Martin Fackler’s
seminal research at the Letterman Army
Institute of Research Wound Ballistic
Laboratory during the 1980s illuminated
the yaw and fragmentation mechanism
by which 5.56x45mm FMJ bullets create wounds in tissue. “If 5.56mm bullets
fail to upset (yaw, fragment, or deform)
within tissue, the results are relatively
insignificant wounds, similar to those
produced by .22 long rifle bullets – this
is true for all 5.56x45mm bullets, including both military FMJ and OTM (open
tip match) and civilian JHP/JSP designs
used in law enforcement. As expected,
with decreased wounding effects, rapid
incapacitation is unlikely: enemy soldiers may continue to pose a threat to
friendly forces and violent suspects can
remain a danger to law enforcement
personnel and the public. This failure of
5.56x45mm bullets to yaw and fragment
can be caused by reduced impact velocities as when fired from short-barreled
weapons or when the range to the target
increases. Failure to yaw and fragment
can also occur when the bullets pass
through only minimal tissue, such as a
limb or the chest of a thin, small statured individual, as the bullet may exit
the body before it has a chance to yaw
and fragment. Two other yaw issues:
Angle-of-Attack (AOA) variations between different projectiles, even within
the same lot of ammo, as well as Fleet
Yaw variations between different rifles,
were elucidated in 2006 by the Joint Service Wound Ballistic Integrated Product
Team (JSWB-IPT), which included experts from the military law enforcement
user community, trauma surgeons, aero
ballisticians, weapon and munitions engineers, and other scientific specialists.
These yaw issues were most noticeable
at close ranges and were more prevalent
with certain calibers and bullet styles —
the most susceptible being 5.56x45mm
FMJ ammunition like M855 and M193.”
TERMINAL PERFORMANCE, WOUND BALLISTICS AND BALLISTIC GELATIN TEST
COMPARISON DATA
We need to compare the various calibers using more than just exterior ballistics data such as muzzle velocity, muzzle
energy, and time of flight. Any comparison or assessment of ammunition effectiveness is incomplete without a detailed
measure of the projectile’s effect on target
U.S. Marine Cpl. Ian. E. Peterson, with 1st Marine Logistics Group’s personal security detail (PSD), fires his M4 assault rifles to align their advanced combat
optical gunsight for their battle sight zero at Joe Foss Range aboard Camp Al Taqaddum, Al Anbar, Iraq, Feb. 10, 2008. The PSD provides security for the
commanding general of 1st MLG as well as other high priority personnel within the 1st MLG. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jason W. Fudge)
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and through intermediate barriers common in modern shooting encounters. The
effects of the projectile on the human target cannot be measured by exterior ballistics alone and any comparison or claims
made without terminal performance data
are both inconclusive and perplexing to
the uninformed.
TARGET SUPPRESSION
There was a very thoughtful “Suppression Study” briefing conducted
by the UK MoD at the 2009 European
Small Arms and Cannons Symposium
in Shrivenham, England, which clearly
showed the vast differences in the effectiveness of personnel target suppression between 5.56x45mm, 7.62x51mm
and .50 BMG. The U.S. experience has
echoed this as well. Clearly larger is better in this case. The Taliban, it has been
said, “Ignore 5.56mm, respect 7.62mm
and fear .50 BMG.” Our enemies today
practice the art of standoff shooting, stay-
ing just outside the effective range of our
5.56x45mm weapon systems and in turn
engage the friendlies with 7.62x54mm
Russian caliber weapons like the SVD
and PKM. This is why there is a resurgence of many more 7.62x51mm weapons
within the maneuvering frontline units
with those NATO countries still fighting
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our troops on
the receiving end have learned this lesson
well, and often at a tremendous cost.
TRAINING
Training is an undeniable factor in
weapon and ammunition effectiveness in
battle. That goes without saying. However even the very best and most realistic
marksmanship training cannot make up
for the many factors outside the control of
the riflemen. Even the very best trained
marksman cannot achieve well placed hits
on fleeting or partially exposed targets,
those at long range or protected by intermediate barriers, especially when firing
under poorly supported field conditions
and while taking incoming fire. Thus we
must demand that the effectiveness of the
rifle cartridge, more specifically the projectile, deliver the greatest possible terminal effects even when the small, hard to
hit vital areas on the tough human target
like the central nervous system (brain and
brain stem) are not struck. Kinetic energy
projectiles (bullets, fragments) kill in only
two ways – through hits on the central
nervous system resulting in near instantaneous death or through tissue destruction
and the resulting loss of blood which can
take a significant amount of time, up to 50
seconds in fact, an absolute lifetime in the
life and death millisecond world of armed
combat. Hits to the head and brain stem
are nearly impossible to obtain in anything
but the very best circumstances and those
conditions seldom exist on the battlefield.
ANGLE SHOOTING
Engaging targets at high or low angles
A French military service member assigned to an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit fires an HK416 rifle during a three-day joint operation with U.S. Sailors
assigned to the EOD Mobile Unit 11 and U.S. Marines with the EOD Detachment, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Djibouti June 13, 2010. The operation included
equipment familiarization, scenario-driven events, small arm live fire and a demolition range. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. James Frank/Released)
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as is the case in a mountainous environment like Afghanistan, as any good sniper
or marksman can tell you, is a great determining factor on accurate target engagement based on the effects of gravity and
drag on rifle projectiles.
THE END USER EXPERIENCE
Then, we should carefully consider
the actions of the end user community
and the effects of their requests on their
chain of supply. Perhaps the best indication of whether the current weapons and
calibers are doing the job in the eyes of
the people out front doing the fighting
is the feedback from those people. Sort
of looking for columns of smoke, to find
where there is fire. We should consider
what those nations and units who are
carrying the heavy load and doing most
of the hard fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq
and other hot spots in the world are carrying, developing and fielding. The U.S.
has clearly carried the ball for more than
a decade having as of June 2010 in excess
of 78,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan
alone with ISAF, 66% of the total troop
numbers there. America has also lost
nearly 1,100 brave souls there to war and
the numbers are rising. Other countries
like the UK have real hands on experience
outside the wire and as such deserve our
respect and examination of their lessons
learned and resulting new material developments. We must watch what they do
and not be distracted by the claims and
actions of those who are not making the
same contributions and sacrifices in the
ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT).
One must look at what the major combatants are doing in terms of small arms and
ammunition programs, especially within
their special operations units as their experiences result in rather rapid changes in
tactics and equipment. These choices are
often emulated by larger, conventional
military and other government organization (OGAs) but as in the case with SS109style 5.56x45mm cartridge improvements
or replacement, the larger the organization it seems the slower it embraces
change, if things there ever change at all.
EVIDENCE ALL AROUND US THROUGH
LESSONS LEARNED
The following are just a few recent
JIM SCHATZ
and/or ongoing official examples of serious moves to improve or outright replace
5.56x45mm as both assault rifle and light
machine gun cartridge that are happening today. These initiatives and trends in
most cases are a direct result of the urgent
user requests coming back from the various combat theaters the U.S. and NATO as
well as our non-NATO allies are engaged
in when the repeated and documented
failures of 5.56x45mm SS109-style ammunition results in lives lost and missions
jeopardized. The fact is that many countries in NATO have found the 5.56x45mm
round seriously lacking in modern combat, both at short range and long range.
Thus is the reason why:
1. The UK, the U.S., and now Germany
and most recently the French military are
urgently fielding thousands of 7.62x51mm
NATO rifles for troop use Afghanistan.
2. By choice and based on extensive
combat experience and independent
comparative testing, U.S. Special Mission Units for the most part do not use
standard 5.56x45mm M855/SS109-type
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JIM SCHATZ
ammo and instead use the 70 grain Optimal “Brown Tip,” 77 grain MK262 MOD
1, 62 grain MK255 MOD 1 R2LP, and 62
grain MK318 MOD 0 SOST ammunition
because of their vastly improved terminal performance against both unprotected and protected human targets and
continue to develop and field compact
7.62x51mm carbines (HK417, KAC SR25K Carbine, LMT MRP/L129A1, LaRue
OBR or FN SCAR Heavies).
3. The U.S. Army has spent 15+ years and
over $120M developing NLT three iterations of an improved 5.56x45mm M855A1
round to address numerous terminal effectiveness complaints and combat failure
reports (at all engagement ranges from
CQB to over 500 meters) from at least
as far back as U.S. combat operations in
Somalia in the early 1990s and certainly
post 9/11. The U.S. Army fired more than
1M rounds during the development of the
radically new M855A1 round as part of a
concerted and focused major effort to replace the SS109-type M855 “penetrator”
round deemed ineffective in modern combat. The projectile design of the M855A1
is radically different that that of all other
SS109-type ammunition used throughout
NATO, and for very good reason.
4. USSOCOM/NSWC Crane/ATK-Federal jointly developed the highly effective
5.56x45mm MK318 MOD 0 SOST round
to specifically replace the M855 round
based on documented combat failures
and its larger SOST cousin the 7.62x51mm
MK319 MOD 0 round. These rounds have
been fielded within USSOCOM and the
USMC (5.56x45mm) with excellent results to date, and are highly sought after
by other NATO SOF units and federal law
enforcement agencies.
5. BAE Systems is developing and the UK
MoD is testing a new 5.56x45mm “High
Performance” projectile/round to improve
long range performance and lethality on
unprotected and light skinned vehicle targets as a possible replacement to the current
5.56x45mm L2A2 Ball round sometime
after planned 2011 trials are completed.
There is also an independent ongoing effort
in the UK in 2010 to revisit and evaluate the
medium-caliber .280 British round (and
other medium-caliber options) as a possible replacement to the 5.56x45mm and
possibly 7.62x51mm cartridge(s) in a modern assault rifle platform.
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6. At time of writing at least one NATO
SOF unit is still developing a mediumcaliber cartridge/platform to increase the
terminal performance of a compact M4style platform based upon combat failures
of 5.56x45mm SS109-style ammunition
during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
7. The German Bundeswehr has written
a classified report detailing the repeated combat failures of their SS109-style
5.56x45mm NATO DM11 round and have
as a result (like the UK) issued an Urgent
Requirement for 7.62x51mm semiautomatic rifles for use by German troops in
Afghanistan. They have also initiated
the design of a new modular, non-caliber
specific assault rifle and will soon field a
lightweight 7.62x51mm general-purpose
machine gun (GPMG) to replace the MG3
GPMG and some 5.56x45mm MG4 light
machine guns to deal with long range and
protected targets that the 5.56x45mm
round is not defeating.
8. The very latest new assault rifle platforms (Beretta ARX-160, Czech Republic
CZ 805 A, Taiwan T97 and SCAR Common
Receiver) exist after the costs of millions
in R&D and are caliber- convertible by the
operator beyond just 5.56x45mm NATO.
9. USSOCOM and FN are developing
a single, “Common” or universal SCAR
rifle receiver that can be converted into
other calibers to include 7.62x51mm
NATO, medium-calibers (6.8x43mm
Rem. SPC and 7.62x39mm Russian) and
5.56x45mm NATO.
10. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy continue to pull from Anniston Army Depot
and the NSWC in Crane, Indiana and then
modify and field additional mothballed
7.62x51mm NATO M14 rifles to be fielded
to front line units as Squad Designated
Marksman’s Rifles (SDMRs) to better deal
with long range and protected targets not
defeated by current 5.56x45mm platforms.
11. The Canadian military is open to and
investigating the merits of a new caliber
and/or projectile in their ongoing SARP
(Small Arms Replacement Program) effort for the future Canadian DoD family of
small arms to be fielded through 2022.
12. Many experienced law enforcement
snipers/counter snipers no longer employ 5.56x45mm/.223 Remington caliber
sniper rifles even though they can employ
superior non-Hague compliant expanding hollow-point, polytip-style projectiles because this cartridge is simply not
considered an effective “one-shot manstopper”. (The author personally knows
of one such failure that resulted in the
tragic death of an Arlington County Virginia SWAT officer killed when the assailant killed him with a shotgun after being
drilled dead center mass in the torso with
a 55 grain M193 FMJ 5.56x45mm round
at less than 100 yards.)
An M16 rifle sets in a Vnotch stake with a target
in the background, as a
reminder of the annual
weapons qualifications
the Army Reserve
units are required to go
through, at Fort Pickett,
Va., Nov. 21, 2009. (U.S.
Army photo by Spc. Jeff
Daniel/Released)
13. A June 2009 report compiled for elements of the Canadian DoD concluded that
to enhance their ammunition effectiveness
it must “abandon the C77 FMJ (SS109style) cartridge and replace it with a round
loaded with a SOST/TOTM projectile,” or
field a 6.8x43mm Rem. SPC round or a
7.62x51mm platform as a third option.
14. U.S. troops in Afghanistan are calling
for additional 7.62x51mm MK48 light machine guns to augment and/or outright replace 5.56x45mm M249 SAW to effectively
deal with longer range, protected targets
and suppression deficiencies encountered
with 5.56x45mm platforms.
15. The U.S. Army has left caliber or projectile style open in the requirements for
the pending new “Individual Carbine” full
and open competition and is investigating/
modeling other projectiles and calibers in
support of this and other new Army small
arms initiatives.
16. The 2006 U.S. Joint Service Wound
Ballistics Integrated Product Team
(JSWB-IPT) report recommended, and
data developed from more than 10,000
test shots from 3–300 meters, to include
those taken with M855, MK262 MOD 1,
6.8x43mm Rem. SPC, 7.62x39mm and
7.62x51mm NATO, supported the conclusion that in terms of terminal performance the optimum caliber for assault rifle use was not 5.56x45mm NATO nor the
M855/SS109-style projectile. In fact, the
331 page draft (interim) report dated 12
April 2006 stated, “The best performing
systems emphasizing tissue damage, on
the average, in this study were of larger
caliber than 5.56mm” and, “The 6.8mm
performance observed in this test suggests that an intermediate caliber is the
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answer to the trade-off balance issue.”
The report goes on to state that, “The 6.8
mm projectile had a near optimum balance of MASS, VELOCITY, and CONFIGURATION to maintain its effectiveness,
even at lower impact velocity.” “The
clear and unequivocal best performing
cartridge in the JSWB-IPT was 6.8mm”
which was also validated by the 11 August
2006 USMC Test Evaluation Report for
the Alternate, Phase I. Ironically, these
statements and recommendations from
the expert panel were omitted from the
final U.S. Army report.
17. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) with concurrence from U.S. Army
Special Forces Command (Airborne) leadership developed the 6.8x43mm Remington Special Purpose Cartridge and MURG
(Modular Upper Receiver Group) concept
to enhance the terminal effectiveness of
5.56x45mm carbine platforms (MK12
SPR, M4A1 Carbine, MK18 CQBR) to deal
with combat failures of short-barreled
5.56x45mm weapons in common use today. Documented accounts of enemy personnel being hit as many as 15 times with
M855 drove the 5th SFG (A) to take action
to address these ammunition failures. One
well known and documented example of
these M855 failures is provided by MSG
Anthony Pryor – 5th SFG (ABN) – Silver
Star recipient - Afghanistan mountains
– 23 January 2002. “…Pryor snapped
his gun around and shot the terrorist at
point blank range with two rounds of
5.56. “The man crumpled. So I went left
to right, indexed down and shot those
(two more) guys.” “What he thought were
their corpses sagged lifelessly to the floor.
“I realized that I was halfway through
my magazine, so I started to change
magazines. Then I felt something behind
me, and thought it was one of my teammates…” The blow came suddenly. With
stunning power.” He heard a noise, looked
over and saw the ghostly apparition of the
two men he had shot clamber back to their
feet, fumbling for their weapons.
Or the account of U.S. Army SFC Bill
Bennett, briefed to the U.S. Congress in
November of 2007, a Special Forces medic
who was killed by an insurgent in Iraq after that individual was shot 7-9 times in
Member of the Polish Army CIMIC (CivilianMilitary Co-Operation) team emerging from an
armored Hummvee with his wz.96 Beryl assault
rifle undergoing intensive ‘in-theater’ tuning.
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the torso. The same bad guy then gets up
and comes over a wall and reengages the
other team members, gets shot another
6-8 times from about 20-30 yards and is
finally killed by SFC Bennett’s fellow team
member SSG Springer who shoots and finally kills him with a M1911 .45 ACP.
These are just a few of the documented accounts on this subject. One need not
go too far to find other examples, though
there are those who seemingly would prefer not to explore the known short comings
of the 5.56x45mm cartridge for political or
competing commercial or economic reasons, maybe as a result of entrenched institutional resistance to change or maybe
they are operating under the flawed concept of “good enough.” Combat equipment should never be just good enough.
Failures of 5.56x45mm round in combat
are not new nor are they a unique occurrence in the current long range war in Afghanistan. They have been occurring for
years at even CQB ranges throughout the
theater of operations we are engaged in at
the cost of brave U.S. and foreign friendly
war fighters.
18. The USMC and the U.S. Army are putting retractable butt stocks on 20 inch barreled M16’s to retain range, penetration
and accuracy in shorter, more portable
5.56x45mm weapons to provide terminal
effects not available from carbine length
14.5 inch barreled platforms.
19. The U.S. Army PM-MAS (Product
Manager – Maneuver Ammunition Systems) and ARL (Army Research Laboratory) developed the M855A1 EPR
(Enhanced Performance Round) with a
non-SS109-style projectile to increase the
terminal performance and penetration of
the standard issue 5.56x45mm cartridge
from short-barreled M4 carbines based on
failure reports from U.S. troops in combat
and confirmed in a 2006 Lethality Study
conducted by the U.S. Army.
20. In the December 2006, CNA “Soldier Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat” survey commissioned by the U.S.
Army (PM Soldier Weapons) of 2600
OIF/OEF combat troops stated on Page
29: “Twenty-six percent of M9 users requested higher caliber ammunition and
increased stopping power. M4 and M16
users echoed this recommendation. When
speaking to experts and soldiers on site,
many commented on the limited ability to
effectively stop targets, saying that those
personnel targets who were shot multiple
times were still able to continue pursuit.
M249 users also expressed a desire for
increased ammunition caliber, but to a
much lesser degree than other weapon users. Twenty percent of M9 users called for
a replacement. 20% of M4 users Recommend larger caliber bullet and increase
stoppage - lethality”
21. The South Korean Army is fielding
this year the K11 - a 20mm shoulder-fired
multi-shot air-bursting grenade launcher
with a maximum effective range of 500
meters (the maximum range for a point
target for even accomplished Marine Corps
riflemen armed with the 20 inch barrel
5.56x45mm M16A2/A4). How long will it
be before this unique technology is in the
hands of unfriendly states? (South Korea
is actively offering the K11 for export sale
now and has reportedly already delivered
some K11s to a “friendly” Middle Eastern
nation). The stand-off range of their new
K11 individual weapon matches that of our
issue M16 rifle (500 meters) and exceeds
that of the Army’s pure-fleeted 14.5 inch
barreled M4 carbine (460 meters). As
an air-bursting grenade launcher it does
not rely solely on well-placed single rifle
or machine gun rounds from a trained
marksman while under combat stress to
induce casualties on the enemy.
22. During the 2010 NDIA Joint Armaments Conference in Dallas then MARCOSYSCOM Commanding General BG Brogan
spoke about the need to conduct a “Trade
Study to compare new projectile technology in other than 5.56mm and 7.62mm”
rounds for the next USMC service rifle.
23. Last year USMC 4-star General James
N. Mattis, nominated for CENTCOM Commander at the time of writing, emailed his
3 and 2-star command CGs about his serious concerns over the failures of USMCissue 5.56x45mm rounds in combat with
USMC troops (after a visit to Walter Reed
Hospital and hearing accounts of multiple 5.56x45mm failures that resulted
in friendly casualties with USMC Lt.
David Borden who, “lost a leg to a suicide bomber when he and other Marines
emptied a magazine (5.56x45mm) into
the man charging them, at close range.”.
GEN Mattis wrote in his email about his/
the “USMC interest in shifting to a higher
caliber assault rifle,” and “Physics say that
the best advances in bullet technology will
JIM SCHATZ
not give us the increased stopping power/
energy in the 5.56, since any improved
5.56mm ammunition could only be more
effective if adopted in a 6.8mm or other
heavier round.”
24. The USMC earlier this decade conducted an extensive joint USMC/FBI Test
Evaluation Report for the Alternate Ammunition Study, Phase 1 dated 11 August
2006 that clearly showed that various medium-caliber cartridges/projectiles tested
(6.8x43mm Rem. SPC, 6.5mm Grendel)
were superior in terminal performance
when evaluated against comparable cartridges in caliber 5.56x45mm NATO
(M855, M995, MK262 MOD 1 and then
FBI-issue Federal LE223T3 with 62 grain
Bonded projectile). The Conclusions and
Recommendations from that evaluation
test report were:
1.2 Conclusions:
1. At this time, identification of a projectile
that is less susceptible to intervening barriers appears to be of substantially greater importance than the identification of
an optimal cartridge size.
2. The capability of the current issue
M995, Mk262 Mod1 and M855 could be
improved upon by substituting a “purpose-built projectile” — a projectile whose
terminal ballistics are less affected by intervening barriers than current service
rifle ammunition, thus providing a more
consistent capability for our Marines.
3. Improved performance could be realized through the development of a cartridge with a caliber other than 5.56mm.
4. If an alternate cartridge is identified,
the “purpose-built projectile” technology
could be developed in the caliber of that
cartridge, thus merging these two efforts
and realizing an optimal ammunition.
1.3 Recommendations:
1. Commencement of phase II is recommended. The objectives of phase II would
be:
a. Expeditious pursuit of an improved
purpose-built projectile for the 5.56mm
NATO cartridge that is “blind to barriers”,
i.e. a projectile whose terminal ballistics
are not affected by intervening barriers.
b. Continued study to determine the optimal cartridge size that satisfies current
requirements and to aid in the development of future requirements.”
25. At the 2010 NDIA Joint Armaments
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JIM SCHATZ
Conference in Dallas U.S. Army PM-Soldier Weapons Majors Shawn Murray and
Elliot Caggins briefed the results of a survey conducted during 2 weeks in Afghanistan in 2010 wherein combat troops stated, “One of 8 key focus areas the troops
stated needed urgent effort on was 5 - increased firepower (caliber) at extended
ranges,” and wanted more 7.62x51mm
MK48 LMG’s to replace 5.56x45mm
M249 SAWs to deal with both protected
and long range targets.
26. At this same May 2010 NDIA conference the U.S. Army ARDEC (Armaments
Research, Development and Engineering
Center headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ) Program Manager for the LSAT
(Lightweight Small Arms Technologies)
program once again briefed that the current LSAT ammunition, LMG and new
LSAT Carbine system architecture was
a “scalable design” and open to and had
been modeled for a “larger caliber” alternative to the current 5.56x45mm prototypes (6.5mm had been discussed in public the forum previously).
27. A confidential unreleased study and
test report prepared by the U.S. Army ARDEC on an optimum assault rifle cartridge
identified not 5.56x45mm as the optimum
assault rifle cartridge but one within the
6.5mm-6.8mm range.
28. The majority of states in America do
not allow cartridges under .25 caliber to
be used for deer hunting, to include .223
Remington and 5.56x45mm rounds even
with enhanced non-Hague compliant
hunting-style (deforming) projectiles.
29. The Communist Chinese developed
and have since fielded an entire family of
5.8mm ammunition (specifically to outperform the 5.56x45mm NATO round) and
weapons versus the traditional Chinese
Communist practice of fielding the service
rifle cartridge of Russia, e.g. the inferior
5.45x39mm round. The Chinese consider
the 5.8mm caliber family of weapons to
be so effective and superior to the weapons chambered in the 5.56x45mm NATO
round that they do not export this technology to other customer states.
30. One of the prime conclusions of the
December 2009 NSWC Crane-compiled
test report entitled Comparison of Terminal Ballistic Performance of M855,
MK318, 115 gr. 6.8 SPC and MK319 concluded that the M855 in its current NATO
SS109-style loading was inferior in many
important regards to include accuracy,
short range (CQC) and 100 yard terminal effects, a tendency for through and
through over penetration and inferior
barrier penetration. It is worth noting
that the medium-caliber 6.8x43mm Rem.
SPC round included in this test report was
tested not with the BTB (Blind to Barrier)
SOST projectiles used in the MK318 and
MK319 SOST rounds tested but with a
conventional OTM (Open Tip Match) bullet and thus would likely have performed
far better with the SOST projectile when
compared to the 5.56x45mm SOST and
M855 rounds tested.
31. The factual contents of the excellent
monograph written by U.S. Army Major
Thomas P. Ehrhart entitled Increasing
Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan;
Taking back the Infantry Half-Kilometer
discusses the unsuitability of the SS109style 5.56x45mm cartridge in modern
warfare, in particular in the long-range
war in Afghanistan. Key observations
and conclusions in this excellent study
include, “Small caliber high velocity
rounds are especially dependent on this
instability (yawing) for their lethality.
For the M855 cartridge, maximum stability is from 150 meters out to 350 meters and it is therefore potentially less
lethal between these two ranges.” Major
Ehrhart goes on to state, “With the recent
halt in production of the M855A1 cartridge (2nd iteration M855A1 ‘Lead Free
Slug’ {LFS} variant), which designers
promised would deliver this effectiveness (enhanced terminal effectiveness),
it appears all options within this caliber
have been exhausted.” On the subject
of training as it relates to hit probability of the rifleman, Major Ehrhart states
that, “The limited capability of the current M855 cartridge combined with the
extended distances of engagements in
Afghanistan requires that shot placement on target is more critical than ever
before.” And on page 28 of this document Major Ehrhart recounts the factual
report about when, “Lieutenant Colonel
David H. Petraeus (then current 4-star
Commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces
in Afghanistan) was shot in the chest by
an M855 round from an M249 squad automatic weapon. He walked out of the
hospital several days after the accident.”
Major Ehrhart also provides more than
100 references and documents, official
and otherwise to support of the conclusions and statements on this subject as
contained in this monograph.
32. From December 2006 through May
2007 the U.S. DoD Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) conducted an
interagency/international assessment of
various medium-caliber MURG upper
receivers to improve the terminal effects
of 5.56x45mm M4-style platforms. These
extensive user tests documented that such
a drop-on medium-caliber conversion
was feasible and effective in nearly doubling the terminal effects of the short-barrel 10-14.5 inch barreled carbine. It was
also discovered that operators were able
to engage targets with equal or better accuracy when compared with 5.56x45mm
platforms. The additional recoil impulse
of the more powerful 6.8x43mm Rem.
SPC cartridge when compared to identical
platforms in 5.56x45mm did not degrade
the ability of the test personnel to rapidly engage multiple targets – in practice
both calibers were identical contrary to
common myth. From a compact carbine
a medium-caliber COTS MURG option
delivers 56-77% heavier and 24% larger
frontal surface area projectiles and two
times the projectile mass to the target,
as well as a 33% increase in muzzle energy when compared to even the very best
5.56x45mm cartridges, and at no degradation of hit probability even in rapid fire.
To no ones surprise ballistic gelatin testing performed by the FBI, the USMC, and
other agencies within the U.S. DoD with
both calibers employing similar projectile
designs reveal far greater permanent and
temporary wound cavities for the larger,
heavier projectiles.
33. Recommendations to the troops from
the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School
at Fort Benning (recently combined with
Colombian marines armed with 5.56 mm Galil assault rifles raid a building while participating in amphibious beach assault training during Southern Exchange
and Partnership of the Americas 2010 in Ancon, Peru, July 24, 2010. The exercise is designed to enhance cooperative partnerships with maritime forces
from Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia and the United States. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Brian J. Slaght/Released)
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5.56 NATO ROUNDTABLE
JIM SCHATZ
the Armor Center from Fort Knox as the
“Maneuver Center of Excellence”), as taken from the September/ October 2006 article in Infantry magazine, addresses the
reports and causes of combat failures of
5.56x45mm NATO ammunition and the
results of the 2006 JSWB-IPT study into
the issue, and offers this advice below to
the troops fighting with 5.56x45mm NATO
caliber weapons.
4. “There are doctrinal and training
techniques that can increase Soldier effectiveness. The analysis tools used in
this study were used to evaluate some
alternative engagement techniques. The
technique of engaging CQB targets with
controlled pairs — two aimed, rapid shots
as described in Chapter 7 of FM 3-22.9 —
was shown to be significantly better than
single aimed shots. While that should
certainly not be surprising to those who
have been using this technique for some
time, we now know why. Not only are
two hits better than one, but controlled
pairs help to average out striking yaw;
on average, the Soldier is more likely to
see a hit where the bullet’s yaw behavior
works in his favor.”
Is this not a direct admission by the
U.S. Army organization responsible for developing new infantry and close quarters
combat material requirements and training methods our soldiers in close combat
and marksmanship that the terminal effectiveness of a single 5.56x45mm NATO
round and the ability of even our well
trained rifleman to accurate engage the
target is questionable under realistic com128
SPRING 2011
bat scenarios? Then certainly the 3rd such
Finding in this same report is very telling
and acknowledges the shortcomings of the
U.S. M855 5.56x45mm NATO round.
SOST round fired from a MK17 MOD 0
rifle after penetrating both the exterior
and seat of a passenger vehicle.
35. In a May 2010 briefing on development and fielding status of the U.S.
M855A1 EPR round the U.S. Army reports that in “Baselining surveys initiated (current Soldier/Public perception
of the M855A1) 2/3 of 2,200 Soldiers do
not think the Army is providing the best
5.56mm ammunition.”
Some of America’s very best trained
34. The 2005 USSOCOM Joint Operaand most combat hardened SOF warriors
tional Requirements Document (JORD)
elect to carry the additional weight of a
for the SCAR family of modular weapons
7.62x51mm rifle and ammunition in the
included a family of “Enhanced Ammunibrutal mountainous terrain of Afghanition” required directly as a result of varistan. Could it be they know something we
ous “post 9/11 failures of the M4A1 and
don’t? Maybe we should listen to them.
Having considered the above
A soldier with the Indian army
situations and acshows U.S. Army Sgt. Luke
counts, and all the
Hoffman, with 2nd Squadmoney and effort
ron, 14th Cavalry Regiment,
that has been ex2nd Stryker Brigade Combat
pended in recent
Team, 25th Infantry Division,
years to improve
the 5.56 Insas sniper rifle
or outright replace
during the static display porthe
5.56x45mm
tion of the opening ceremony
NATO
round
for exercise Yudh Abhyas
throughout
the
2009 at Camp Bundela,
U.S. and NATO,
India, Oct. 12, 2009. Yudh
this author is led to
Abhyas is a bilateral exercise
conclude that withinvolving the armies of India
out a doubt, “Yes,
and the United States. (U.S.
there is a problem
Army photo by Staff Sgt.
with the current
Crista Yazzie/Released)
rifle caliber and
cartridge in service
today.”
M855 round.” Millions have been spent
on this program to both improve the perDON’T ALLOW THE “LOGISTICAL TAIL TO
formance of the weapon system and the
WAG THE DOG”
ammunition fired from it. It is indeed
It’s not just from the above situations
interesting to note that recently USSOand reports that we should consider the
COM announced that the command no
need for a new system and caliber. There
longer planned to purchase 5.56x45mm
are many factors to be weighed into these
NATO caliber SCAR Light (MK16 MOD
decisions. It’s expensive and time con0) rifles due to lackluster reports from
suming to change out a caliber and related
the SOF operators, even when employing
weapon systems with all of the incumbent
the vastly improved 5.56x45mm MK318
training issues, logistical concerns, etc.
MOD 0 Barrier (SOST) round. However,
Frequently we hear social issue solutions of
USSOCOM still plans to procure and field
great financial magnitude being touted bemultiple variants of the 7.62x51mm NATO
cause, “If it saves one child’s life, it’s worth
SCAR Heavy (MK17 MOD 0) rifle based on
it.” In the case of weapon systems, we
positive field reports of its superior perforshould not be looking at only the expense,
mance against both short range and long
we should be looking at whether it will conrange unprotected and protected threat
sistently save the lives of our soldiers and
targets to include one account of two inenhance their ability to incapacitate and
surgents killed with a single 7.62x51mm
kill our enemies. Many of the symptoms we
3. “Field reports are accurate and can
be explained by the phenomenon of bullet yaw. Shot placement aside, why is it
that some Soldiers report “through-andthrough” hits while others report no such
problems, despite using the same weapons and ammunition?”
can see in the above list indicate that lives
are being lost, enemies not being effectively
countered in the current theatres of operation due to the rifle caliber currently in use.
The symptoms are not only the requests for
a new or enhanced cartridge but the massive removal of other legacy systems like
the M14 from mothballs in order to address
the current environment.
A SIMPLE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH IS NEEDED
There is a relatively small cost to develop or procure various cartridges and
platforms and conduct a detailed assessment of the trade-offs on medium-caliber,
intermediate calibers or non-traditional
small caliber projectiles. The success of
rounds such as the USSOCOM SOST ammunition are excellent examples of how
this can be done cheaply for the overall
good of our war fighters. We can only
know where we stand as far as the true
effectiveness of our current issue rifle ammunition if we are wiling to openly and
fairly assess it against more modern alternatives. Then once developed, tested
and safety certified we should field small
batches in combat and let the troops report
back on their effectiveness. Let the troops
decide for a change what works best – they
are the ones fighting and in some cases
sadly dying with what the supply system
issues them. Keep the enemy off guard
by fielding incremental improvements in
small arms and ammunition more often.
Spend some money, do the assessment,
don’t limit the choices and give the troops
an equal seat at the decision making table.
The fact that these boots-on-theground warriors are choosing (or would
choose if given an option) other than the
current issue 5.56x45mm NATO caliber
weapons for their current combat needs
is not an indictment of how that family
of weapons has served in other conflicts,
other environments, but it does clearly
show that the people who have their lives
at risk and a job to do would choose something different if the option is open.
The U.S. should lead this effort if
NATO will not. If the U.S. Army will not
then call in the Marines to do it – they’ll
get it done. If they will not then we can
rely on our special operators as they have
already addressed this capability gap with
new weapons and more effective ammunition. What are we afraid of? That we
might put the fear of the American rifleman
back in our adversaries?
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jim Schatz is a life long student of
military and modern small arms and
ammunition and their use. A former
U.S. Army Airborne infantryman with
the famed 82nd Airborne Division and
advanced marksmanship instructor/
shooter with the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit, Jim has spent more than 3
decades performing in the field of small
arms use and training, development,
testing and user support. Presently he
is an independent consultant in the field
of modern small arms and ammunition
and has been a strong proponent for the
rapid fielding of incrementally superior
enhanced small arms and ammunition to
better serve our dedicated frontline war
fighters through the regular assessment
of proven new and off-the-shelf technologies and materials.
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