Mexican Prior Socialization

Transcription

Mexican Prior Socialization
 The Prior Socialization of Immigrants And Their Political Participation in the United States Michael Jones‐Correa Cornell University ABSTRACT This paper seeks to explore one aspect of the political socialization debate—whether or not immigrants’ experiences with politics in their country of origin leads to persistent political learning that carries over into new contexts despite the changes brought about in the course of immigration. To address this question, this paper examines individual and contextual effects in both Mexico (pre‐immigration) and the U.S. (post‐immigration) as determinants of Mexican immigrants’ political behavior in the U.S., using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), which asked respondents about their actions both prior to and after migration, and placing these data in the context of immigrants’ experience of political institutions in both Mexico and the United States. 1 The Prior Socialization of Immigrants And Their Political Participation in the United States INTRODUCTION When immigrants arrive to the U.S., do they learn new political orientations and behaviors, or do their prior political socialization continue to shape their attitudes and behavior even in their new setting? If prior socialization continues in new settings, then how much does it matter if immigrants arrive from more or less authoritarian or democratic contexts in their in their countries of origin? Are individuals with less experience with the functioning of democracy in their countries of birth also less likely to be participants in the democratic process in the United States? The broader political socialization literature revolves around two debates: persistence in political learning versus change through adulthood, and, if change is taking place, whether this is primarily in response to exogenous events (wars, recessions) or to changes in individuals’ life courses (marriage, divorce, child rearing) (for a review of this literature see Ajinkya and Jones‐
Correa 2007; Sigel 1989). It is unlikely to be the case either that political orientations are immutable, or, on the other hand, that they are infinitely changeable. As Jennings and Niemi note: Established patterns are customarily not easily displaced even in the face of consummate failure. Yet new ways of doing things, new perspectives, and new ideologies go searching for ostensible malfunctions in the political world.... Old patterns rarely endure without alteration. Modification, adaptation, and more extreme change may even be essential for maintenance or survival. Similarly, of all proposed or possible changes, most go unrealized. Only occasionally are there drastic breaches with the past (1981:3). The question is, rather, one of degree, or as Jennings and Niemi write, to what extent do political orientations either persist or shift in response to changes in the political environment, and why. 2 The immigration experience provides a unique opportunity to test hypotheses about political socialization. The immigration experience itself serves as a distinct break in socialization contexts for an identifiable, delimited adult population. Immigrant populations allow researchers to gauge the effects of both recent and prior socialization for adults operating in new social and political contexts. Are there breaks or continuities with previous patterns of socialization and participation? Despite providing an arena for a natural experiment of sorts for adult political socialization, the literature on immigrant socialization is rather thin, and systematic evidence of patterns of immigrant socialization rare. The previous literature on immigrant socialization is split, with some researchers emphasizing the continuity of political socialization with immigration and other seeing immigration as a break leading to re‐socialization into a new political context (Hoskin 1989). Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner (1991) argue that immigrant groups—in their analysis, Asians and Latinos in California—acquire partisanship over time in the US, with greater partisanship exhibited over generations. This is not the result of the effects of age, they write, but rather of experiential learning though time (pp. 398‐399). Black et al. (1987) make a nearly identical argument for immigrants in Canada—they point to socialization through time rather than simply aging as the explanation for the behavioral differences they find between recent and more established immigrants. A number of studies find that acquisition of English language and US citizenship—
both correlated with time in the US—are associated with greater participation in electoral and non‐electoral politics in the receiving country (Junn 1997; Jones‐Correa 1998; Tam Cho 1999; Wong 2000; Ramakrishnan 2005), again suggesting a process of adult re‐socialization among immigrants. However, a number of scholars emphasize continuities rather than breaks in socialization (Finifter and Finifter 1989; Black et al. 1987; Black 1987). Two earlier works, for example, Wilson (1973) and Gitelman (1982), examine immigrant political behavior in Australia and Israel, respectively, noting the prevalent continuities in political orientations among immigrants in both countries, but also the differences in adaptation to the new political context among immigrants of distinct countries of origin. Yang (1994) finds, among other things, that 3 naturalization in the receiving country varies by the degree of political freedom in the sending country. In short, the existing literature finds that immigrants do acclimate themselves to their new political contexts over time, but that prior socialization also carries through to immigrants’ new political context, and that this process may vary by country of origin. The literature on immigrant political participation focuses, on the whole, on immigrant political behavior once immigrants are in their new country of residence, and pays little or no attention to individuals’ political behavior prior to immigration.1 A good deal of this reticence has to do with the absence of data— studies have not tracked immigrants’ political behavior before and after migration, and in general surveys including immigrant respondents have asked very little about immigrants’ life prior to immigration. This paper seeks to explore one aspect of the political socialization debate—whether or not immigrants’ experiences with politics in their country of origin leads to persistent political learning that carries over into new contexts despite the changes brought about in the course of immigration. To address this question, this paper examines individual and contextual effects in both Mexico (pre‐immigration) and the U.S. (post‐immigration) as determinants of Mexican immigrants’ political behavior in the U.S., using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), which asked respondents about their actions both prior to and after migration, and placing these data in the context of immigrants’ experience of political institutions in both Mexico and the United States. DATA AND METHODOLOGY To explore the determinants of continuities in immigrant country of origin socialization and its effects on immigrant political participation in the United States we turn to the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), a state‐stratified random sample of Latinos in 15 states and metro DC, 1
Though see Wals 2008, 2006; some of the discussion in Ramakrishnan 2005 re: dual nationality; Lien 2001 re: transnationalism; and Jones‐Correa 1998 also touches on pre‐immigration socialization. 4 representing 90 percent of Latinos in the US.2 The LNS contains 8634 completed interviews of self‐identified Latino/Hispanic residents of the United States. Respondents were selected from a random sample of Latino households in the jurisdictions covered. The sample was drawn from a marketing database of approximately 11 million households in the United States identified as Latino or Hispanic. The survey, conducted by Interviewing Service of America in both English and Spanish, contains approximately 165 distinct items ranging from demographic descriptions to political attitudes and policy preferences, as well as a variety of social indicators and experiences. The Latino National Survey is state‐stratified and includes 15 states and the Washington D.C. metropolitan area (including counties and municipalities in Virginia and Maryland), with the universe of the analysis representing approximately 90 percent of the US Hispanic population. The national margin of error is approximately ± 1.05%. One strategy to approach questions around immigrant political socialization would be, as other scholars have done, to compare the political attitudes and behavior of immigrants from across a range of countries; However, past work has relied on somewhat problematic measures assigning rankings to countries from most to least authoritarian, using a scale like the one developed by Freedom House or Polity IV Scores (e.g. Yang 1994; or Wals 2006, 2008 citing Elkins 2000), or clustering quite disparate countries together in categories like ‘advanced industrial’ and ‘other’ (White et al. 2007), or, even in cases where immigrants are analyzed by country of origin, paying little attention to the timing of their migration – that is to events in their countries of origin that might have shaped or occasioned their migration (Black 1982, 1987). In the case of the LNS, this approach would have entailed comparisons of immigrants from across Latin America to the United States, which, although the respondent sample is restricted to a single region, still covers a great deal of historical and institutional variation among these nation‐states. This paper follows a different strategy, focusing instead only on immigrants from a single country, Mexico. The advantage of focusing on Mexican immigrants alone is that it keeps country of origin constant minimizing a wide range of institutional and 2
For a detailed description of the LNS and its methods, see http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/LNS.shtml. The data are publicly available at: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/MDRC/STUDY/20862.xml 5 historical variance deriving from unique country of origin characteristics, while at the same time allowing analysis of variation within Mexico. Beginning in the 1980s, Mexico underwent a transition from a one‐party regime to a multi‐
party democracy with competitive elections. This transition was not uniform, but took place in Mexico’s 31 states at different times during the period from 1980 to 2000, with some states transitioning to competitive elections and shifts in party control before others (see Lackey 2007), so that there is considerable variation in experience with democracy at the subnational level (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Beer and Mitchell 2004). Cleary and Stokes (2006) point out that in some Mexican states political clientelism dominates (e.g., Michoacán and Puebla), while in other states open elections and a high level of electoral participation are common (e.g., Baja California and Chihuahua). However, because the LNS data has information on Mexican immigrants’ state of origin within Mexico, and the LNS has data on both immigrants’ age and year of arrival to the US, rather than use a scale or dummy variable as a measure of democratization across Mexican states (like that used by Lackey 2007; Cleary and Stokes 2006; or Hernández‐Valdez 2000), we model the effects of individual variables indicating state‐level democratic transitions on immigrants’ political experience prior to immigration to the U.S, which offers a more precise indication of the effects of this contextual variance on individual attitudes and behavior.3 For this reason the focus of the analysis here are the foreign born, specifically those from Mexico. Two‐thirds of the respondents in the LNS are immigrants; Mexican origin respondents make up 66.1 percent of the foreign‐born sample in the LNS; put another way, of the sub‐
sample of Mexican‐origin respondents, more than two thirds are born in Mexico and immigrated to the United States. The focus of the analysis is Mexican‐born immigrants, limited to those who were 19 years or older when arrived to the U.S. and who immigrated into the U.S. 3
The analysis here examines outcomes for migrants from all 31 states. 12 Mexican states that have samples sizes greater than 100 (i.e., Chihuahua, Districto Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacán, Puebla, San Luis Potosi, Sonora, Veracruz, and Zacatecas) and could theoretically be analyzed state by state. 6 after 1970. We exclude people who were 18 years or younger when entered the U.S because we are interested in respondents’ political participation prior to arrival in the United States, and Mexicans can participate in elections only when they turn 18. Individuals who arrived to the U.S. before 1970 are also excluded from the analysis because contextual data for Mexico is simply non‐existent before the 1970s. Sample sizes for the regression models vary somewhat with the dependent variable in the models. The potential sample—limited to Mexican immigrants arriving at the age of nineteen or over after 1970—consists of 1867 individuals. After restricting the sample to observations with non‐missing values in all relevant variables, the sample size drops to 1547 observations. Dependent Variables The purpose of this piece, again, is to gauge the effect of prior socialization—immigrants’ political behavior and political context prior to migration—on their attitudes and behavior as political actors in their new country of residence, the United States. The LNS has a variety of measures of political participation and attitudes about government. Table A (see the Appendix) describes the coding of the dependent variables and provides sample means of the five variables in which we focus our attention in this paper. In Table A (and the results that are presented in the tables and figures that follow) the dependent variable are arrayed from that requiring the least commitment and participation in the U.S. political context (whether people are better off simply avoiding government) to that requiring the most commitment for immigrant arrivals the United States – the decision to naturalize as a US citizen. Registration and voting—the focus of much of the literature on political participation—were not included here because relatively few Mexican immigrants have both become citizens and active voters in the US. The first variable described in Table A is an attitudinal variable in which subjects answered whether they (strongly) agree or disagree with the statement “People are better off avoiding 7 contact with government”. This avoid contact with government variable is a four‐level Likert item variable. About 45 percent of the observations agree that avoiding contact with government makes them better off. The rest of the variables reflect non‐electoral political participation. Get attention is a dummy variable coded as one if respondents reported to have ever tried to get government officials to pay attention to something that concerned him/her. 19.5 percent of the sample reported having tried to contact government officials in the U.S. Participation in activities is also a dichotomous variable, coded as one if the individual responded that they participate in the activities of a voluntary club, association or community organization; about 9.5% of the respondents participate in these types of activities. Union membership is coded as one if the respondent or any other household member belongs to a labor union; 5% of the sample indicates this kind of connection to a labor union. The last variable listed in the table, naturalization, is coded as one if the individual indicated they were naturalized as an American citizen. Since naturalization is available only to individuals who entered the country legally, those who reported to be in the US without legal documents were excluded from the analysis. We also dropped from the sample the people who arrived to the US after 2001 who would be ineligible to be naturalized at the time of the interview even if legal. 20.8 percent of the sample are naturalized Americans. Independent Variables Table B describes the coding and means of the independent variables (see Table B, Appendix). Independent variables in the models include the standard set of socioeconomic (SES) variables such as gender, age, educational attainment, house ownership in the US (as a proxy for wealth), religion and religious service attendance. Age of respondent captures possible ‘life cycle’ effects with respect to civic engagement. That is, this variable aims to control for the fact that Mexican immigrants might be more likely to engage in political activities at certain times of their lives—when married, for instance, or when their children are grown. Respondents’ level of education has been shown to increase the set 8 of skills and information individuals can apply to political behavior (Verba et al. 1995). We use a set of dummy variables based on a single categorical measure for schooling in this paper. Elementary schooling is the unexpressed category in the regression and ‘some high school’ and ‘some college’ are the included variables. Ownership—whether a respondent is a homeowner—
is both an indicator of rootedness in their community of residence and a proxy for wealth in these regressions. Contrary to what Verba et al. (1995) hypothesize, Jones‐Correa and Leal (2001) provide evidence that the lower levels of participation of Latinos in American politics is not straightforwardly related to Catholic affiliation. In an attempt to control for the possible relationship between religious denomination and civic engagement, this paper includes a dummy variable coded as one when the individual is catholic. Regular attendance to church services is also included as a proxy for non‐political associational membership. The percentage of life spent in the US is a proxy measure of assimilation. The greater relative amount of time people spend in the receiving country, the more likely is that people would assimilate and that the strength of ties to sending countries will decrease. Therefore, we expect that the percentage of life spent in the US would be positively related to political participation. Previous research has found that the propensity of immigrants to believe that they will eventually return to stay in the country of origin is a drag on their attachment and incorporation into the U.S. political system (Jones‐Correa 1998). This variable was coded as one if the individual answered that (s)he wanted to remain the US ‘as long as (s)he could’, ‘until retirement’ or ‘all her/his life’. Other responses were coded as zero. We thus expect to find a positive relationship between the variable remain in US and all forms of political participation. Finally, not having legal documents is expected to be negatively associated with political participation. In addition to these individual‐level variables, the models include a number of contextual variables describing immigrants’ pre‐migration socio‐economic and political context in Mexico 9 and their current context in the United States. We expect that the political attitudes and behavior of Mexican immigrants will be shaped to some extent by their current environment. Varying socioeconomic, political and social contexts might make immigrants more (or less) prone to participation. To account for this possibility, a number of state‐level characteristics were merged to the individual‐level data in the LNS. These variables, all measured at the state level, include average education level, registration and turnout for all voters and among Latinos, vote margins by political party, percentage of residents with union membership and non‐governmental organizations per capita. The focus of this article, however, is that behaviors and political contexts Mexican immigrants experienced before they arrived to the US might also be important predictors of their current political choices. The regressions thus control for respondents’ participation in elections and in political, labor, student or paramilitary organizations before immigration. In addition, contextual state‐level political variables indicating political conditions in each respondent’s state of birth just before their migration to the United States were merged with individual‐level data. The Mexican state‐level contextual variables include education (measured as the percent of those literate), the percentage of people eligible to participate in electoral elections, electoral turnout in the election prior to the migrant’s departure for the U.S., ‘alternancia’ or turnover in party control of the state governorship and legislature, and the percentage of seats occupied by the majority party in the local Congress.4 Econometric Specification Since all the dependent variables are dummies, the behaviors are modeled with logistic regressions. An exception is the avoid contact with government variable. Because this variable is measured using a Likert scale a more appropriate framework for the statistical analysis is an 4
We also included a variable measuring the percentage of violations to human rights at a state‐level. Data to construct this variable is available starting in 2000. The substantive results presented in this paper did not change when this variable was included in regressions similar to the ones presented here using a sub‐sample of individuals who arrived to US after 2000. Results are available upon request. 10 ordinal model (Daykin and Moffat, 2002). We use an ordered logit model here. All regressions account for the complex stratified design of the LNS. In addition, because Mexican immigrants residing in the same US state who immigrated in the same year from the same Mexican state are assigned identical values of state‐level variables we report robust standard errors that account for clustering at the U.S.‐Mexican state level. RESULTS Coefficients Table C shows the logit coefficients of the variables explaining political behaviors of Mexican Immigrants in the US. There are three differences across the models. First, as already noted, the naturalization model excludes those that were not eligible to be naturalized. In consequence, the model does not include the variable specifying whether respondents had documentation allowing them in the US as legal residents. Second, again as already noted above, contextual variables in the sending country may be relevant in explaining current political behaviors of immigrants. Among these contextual variables are indicators of Mexico’s transition to a competitive democracy. While individual Mexican states transitioned to contested elections in the 1980s, opposition parties began succeeding the previously hegemonic Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in control of state governorships and state legislatures only in 1989,5 which, along with other factors ultimately paved the way for Fox's election in 2000 running on the ticket of the opposition center‐right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). As a measure of this national democratic transition, we added a dummy variable coded one if a respondent immigrated after 1990 (that is, after the transition to some significant state‐level democratic competitiveness was underway). The results for interaction effects are presented only for the model contact government officials, because it was the only model in which they were significant. Lastly, in the model for the dependent variable union membership we 5
The PAN elected its first governor in 1989 in Baja California, and elected governors subsequently from 1992 to 2000 in Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Jalisco, Querétaro, Nuevo León, Aguascalientes, and Morelos. 11 included a dummy variable controlling for immigrants’ residence in a ‘right to work’ state, that is a state restricting union organizing by law. [insert Table C about here] The results of Table C suggest that each indicator of immigrants’ political attitudes and participation in the U.S. is correlated with somewhat different factors. The only variable that is significant in each of the models is respondents’ level of education; all else being equal, being more educated increases immigrants’ likelihood of political participation, a finding reflected in much of the literature on political participation (see Verba et al. 1994). Some of the variables are not significant in any of the models: gender, property ownership in Mexico, church attendance, aggregate level of education in the current state of residence in the U.S., percentage of union membership in the state and number of NGOs per capita. Some variables serving as indicators of state political contexts in Mexico—voter registration and voter turnout—were also never significant. However, ceteris paribus the percentage of a respondent’s life spent in the United States is positively associated with both the naturalization and contact models. People who would like to remain in the U.S. were more likely to have tried to contact government officials. Given this paper’s focus on prior socialization, the variables indicating respondents’ political activity in Mexico and the political context of their home state are of particular interest. These were important predictors of some, but not all, of the dependent variables examined here. In particular, none of these variables were significant predictors of either participation in voluntary organizations or union membership (note that U.S. contextual variables worked best at predicting union membership). Having voted in Mexico was significant in both the model for ‘avoiding government’ and for naturalization in the U.S., however, while experience with voting in Mexico was correlated with less skepticism about government, it was negatively correlated with naturalizing in the U.S., perhaps suggesting that those with commitments to politics in Mexico may have difficulties transferring those commitments to politics in the U.S. However, 12 note that engaging in broader forms of political activity in Mexico—including participation in political party or labor organizations—is significantly and positively correlated with naturalization as a U.S. citizen. The variables measuring aspects of state contexts in Mexico were likewise only sometimes significant in the models. Respondents born in states with lower levels of literacy in Mexico are also more likely to report wanting to keep their distance from government in general. ‘Alternancia’—whether respondents’ home states experienced turnover in party control (with the opposition elected to the governorship)—is significantly and positively correlated with contacting officials as immigrants in the U.S., but, as with voting in Mexico, is significantly and negatively correlated with naturalizing as a U.S. citizen. Contrarily, immigrants from states in which larger percentages of state legislatures are controlled by a single party are less likely to contact government officials once in the U.S. (Note that the interaction of the dummy for pre/post 1990—when contested democracy began to take hold in Mexico—with the percentage of seats controlled by a single party in respondents’ state of birth state legislatures is significant and positively associated with respondent contact with government once in the U.S.) In sum, experience with contested democratic politics in Mexico seems to have a positive effect on individuals’ initiative to make contact with government once in the U.S., but a negative effect on the decision to naturalize: in either case, there is some evidence for the effect of prior political socialization on immigrants’ decisions to participate in their new country of residence. Predicted Probabilities Since the estimated parameters of binary (or categorical) outcomes do not provide directly useful information for understanding the relationship between the independent variables and the outcomes, in Figures A through E (presented below) we plot changes in predicted probabilities for the statistically significant variables. Results are presented separately for men and women and for other characteristics that might be relevant for the specific variable in 13 question. Presented in this way, it is easier to see what the important predictors of the behaviors are, and what the relative magnitude of the impact is. Because binary outcomes are non‐linear, changes in predicted probabilities not only depend on the value of the independent variable of interest but on the values of all the predictors of the model (Long, 1997). For that reason, changes in predicted probabilities are computed with a reference point, an individual representing the plurality of the sample for the following characteristics: elementary schooling or less, Catholic, usually attending church, having no property in Mexico or the U.S., voting in Mexico before coming to the US, and planning to remain in the U.S. if possible (these are dummies for which calculating a mean is not possible). The rest of the variables were evaluated at their sample means (presented in Table B). [insert Figure A about here] Figure A indicates the predicted probabilities for those independent variables with significant results in the model with the dependent variable asking people whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that ‘people are better off avoiding contact with government.’ The figure charts predicted probabilities for the ‘strongly disagree response’ only, taking into account respondents’ gender and legal documentation. If a respondent is male and undocumented, the greater their education, the more likely they are to disagree with the statement that ‘people are better off avoiding government.’ Respondents with a college education are 13 percentage points more likely to disagree with that statement than the ‘point of reference’ respondent described above; those with a high school education are 6 percentage points more likely to disagree. A respondent having engaged in political or organizational activity in Mexico is 5 percentage points more likely to disagree with the idea that individuals are better off avoiding government. These predicted probabilities barely shift when looking at women rather than men, or for those immigrants who have documents rather than those who do not. Respondents’ education is the primary factor predicting differences in their attitudes toward government. 14 [insert Figure B about here] Figure B presents the predicted probabilities for the model on ‘calling, writing or going to a meeting’ regarding an issue of concern once in the U.S. The figure here presents results broken out by gender and pre‐migration political activity, and for immigrants arriving before and after 1990.6 As in Figure A, respondents’ education has the greatest effect on the dependent variable. Respondents arriving after 1990 with some college education are 12 percentage points more likely to call, write a letter or go to a meeting once in the U.S.; those with a high school education are 6 percentage points more likely. Migrants planning on staying in the U.S. are 5 percentage points more likely to participate in these activities; interestingly the proportion of immigrants’ lives spent in the U.S., while significant, has little effect on their participation in calling, writing or meeting to address an issue of concern to them. Having participated in elections in Mexico increases the chances of contacting government officials in the U.S. for females and males by about 3.5 percentage points. The effect in the predicted probability of the percentage of seats of the majority party in the local Congress on this political behavioral is interesting and not negligible. Increasing the percentage of seats held by the majority party by 10 percent increases the probability of trying to get attention from government officials in the US by about 1 percent. A higher number of seats for the majority party suggests less competition among parties. The coefficient may suggest, counter‐
intuitively, that more recent immigrants migrating from states engaged in democratic competition (reflected by a lower number of seats of the majority party) will be less likely to contact government officials to try to get them to pay attention to something of interest to them. An alternative explanation might be that fragmented state government is likely to be ineffective state government, and that individuals with the experience of ineffective state governments are less likely to see the value of contacting government officials to try and influence outcomes of concern to them. Note there are little or no differences by gender or by 6
Results for those who immigrated before 1990 are very similar. The predicted probabilities for all variables are, on average, half a point lower with respect to those presented here. These results are available from the author upon request. 15 whether respondents voted in Mexico for post‐1990 respondents. Results for pre‐1990 migrants look basically the same as for those after 1990, implying that experience with recent democratization in Mexico has little effect on immigrants’ likelihood to attempt to sway the views of government officials. [insert Figure C about here] Figure C shows predicted probabilities for participation in voluntary organizations. These results are presented broken out by respondents’ gender and possession of legal documents to stay in the United States. Having legal documents increases the probability of participating in social, cultural, civic or political activities by 2.6 percentage points for men and 3.3 percentage points for women. However, other variables of significance in the model have a larger effect on the participation of the undocumented in voluntary organizations than they do on those with documents. For example, having some college increases the probability of participation in voluntary associations for males with no legal documents by 14.63 percentage points (compared to respondents with only elementary schooling), but by only 9.56 percentage points for males with legal documents. Home ownership increases the likelihood of participation by 2 percentage points for those with documents, but the likelihood of participation increases by 3 percentage points for homeowners without documents. The Catholic religion coefficient is negative and its magnitude not negligible, ranging from 3 to 7 percentage points depending on the possession of documents and gender. Finally, residence in a state with a ten point advantage in the percentage of registered Latinos voting in 2004 decreases the probability of participation by 1 percentage point. [insert Figure D here] The predicted probabilities of union membership by gender and legal status in the U.S. are presented in Figure D. Contrary to the effects just discussed for group participation, having legal documents decreases the probability of being a union member by about 2.5 percentage points. 16 However, the effects of variables that were significant in the model are higher for respondents with legal documents. As in other models, higher educational attainment is associated with a higher probability of political participation—in this case, union membership. But while college education increases the likelihood of union membership among men by 5 percentage points, for those with documents it increases the likelihood of union membership among men by 11 percentage points. Home ownership in the US increases the likelihood of union membership by about 1 percentage point for those without documents, and by about 2 percentage points for those that have the documentation to stay in the U.S. Unlike the other models presented here, both the overall and Latino political environment in the person’s state of residence is an important predictor of union membership. In particular, increasing the percentage of people registered to vote from its mean to it maximum decreases the likeliness of participating in a union by 2 percent for those without documents and by 6 percent for those with documents (both men and women). The magnitude of decrease due to a 10 percent increase in Latino registration, while significant, is much lower: only 1 percentage point. One interesting contrast is the negative and positive effect overall turnout and Latino turnout, respectively. It is also interesting that the overall turnout has a much higher (negative) effect on union membership than the Latino turnout. While a ten‐point increase in the overall turnout decreases the probability of being a union member by 5 to 13 percentage points, a ten‐
point increase in Latino turnout increases the probability of union membership in 1 to 4 percentage points. As expected, Mexican immigrants residing in states with so‐called ‘right to work’ laws, which restrict union organizing, are anywhere from 1 to 4 percentage points less likely to be union members. [insert Figure E about here] The last set of results reports the predicted probabilities of significant variables in the naturalization model. The predicted probabilities are presented first for men only, then for women. The first chart in Figure E indicates the predicted probabilities for naturalization, with 17 breakouts by political participation in a group and party switching.7 Panel A shows the predicted probabilities for those who had some experience voting in Mexico prior U.S. arrival and panel B indicates these probabilities for those who had never voted. There are two patterns evident from Figure E, Panel A; the first is that individuals who participated in organizational and political life in Mexico—whether by voting or volunteering—
and who lived in a state where there was ‘alternancia’ or turnover in the governing party (that this, where state elections were truly competitive)—were more likely to naturalize in the United States than those who did not. The second is that participation magnifies the effects of the other significant variables in the model. For instance, if a man had voted in Mexican elections, but never participated in any voluntary activity in Mexico and lived in a state which had never experienced any turnover in the governing party, being college educated increases the probability of his being a naturalized citizen in the U.S. by 9 percentage points. However, if a man with experience voting in Mexico had also participated in a voluntary organization in Mexico and lived in a state experiencing ‘alternancia’, then the effect of being college educated increases the probability of his being a naturalized citizen in the U.S. by 24 percentage points (see bottom right hand corner of Figure E, Panel A)! The effects of participation are felt separately—both participation in a voluntary organization and living in a state that has had ‘alternancia’ increase the predicted probability of naturalizing in the U.S.—but are also cumulative—the probability of naturalizing increases dramatically with both. Interestingly, although the predicted probabilities of naturalizing for variables in the model increase with alternancia, experiencing turnover in party governance and voting in Mexico both actually decrease the probability of naturalizing in the U.S. For a man who had voted in Mexico previously, living in a state with alternancia, that experience voting lowers the probability of naturalizing in the U.S. by 3 percentage points (top right corner of Figure E, Panel A). Living in a state that had undergone alternancia, a shift in state party control, lowers the probability of 7
The results for women are very similar. The predicted probabilities for all variables are on average half percent lower compared to those for males. The only exception is educational attainment were the predicted probabilities for females are about one percent lower. The results for women are available from the author upon request. 18 naturalization in the U.S. by almost 11 percentage points (again, top right corner of Figure E, panel A). Respondents who had experienced and participated in democratic practices in Mexico—indicated by voting and alternancia in their home state in Mexico—were less likely to naturalize in the U.S., suggesting that a permanent shift of political allegiance to U.S. citizenship is more desirable to those who have not experienced democracy than to those who have. This observation is reinforced by the charts presented in Figure E, Panel B, which, presenting the results for those respondents who had never voter, indicates similar predicted probabilities to those reported in Panel A, but with slightly larger effects. Not voting in Mexico, it seems, leads to a higher likelihood of naturalization in the U.S.—again, inexperience with democracy translates a greater willingness to take on a permanent shift in allegiances, perhaps with democratic participation in the United States as part of the attraction. CONCLUSIONS This paper examines the evidence for the effects of immigrants’ prior socialization on a range of attitudes and behaviors in the receiving country, focusing on the varying experiences Mexican immigrants have in their home states, and how these help shape their decisions to engage in political life In the United States. The evidence from the LNS suggests that Mexican immigrants’ experience of politics in Mexico does influence their approach to, and engagement with, American politics. There are two ways in which prior socialization is indicated by the data: directly, reflecting individuals’ own political behavior in Mexico (their experience voting; and with volunteering in party, labor and other organizations), and indirectly, as a function of the contexts of the states in Mexico in which they were born and lived in (measured by turnover in governing party control, percent of seats controlled by any one party in the state legislature). Both direct and indirect prior socialization have effects on immigrants’ political attitudes and behavior in the U.S. These are seen in the three of the five models presented in Table C: gauging avoidance of government as a strategy; asking whether the respondent has tried to contact government officials to address an issue of concern; and asking whether the 19 respondent has naturalized as a U.S. citizen. The results of two of the models—on voluntary activities in the U.S. and union membership—are unaffected by immigrants’ prior political experience. As discussed above, the evidence presented above from both the coefficients presented in Table C and the predicted probabilities presented in Figures A‐E, suggest that for the three models in which some form of prior political experience or socialization is significant, that the effect of this prior socialization is not always necessarily to reinforce participation in the U.S. In some cases, rather, experience with contested democracy in Mexico seems to lead to some reticence on the part of immigrants to commit fully to politics in the United States—
perhaps because immigrants with a positive experience of Mexican politics are precisely those who see a system in Mexico which holds some promise, and to which they can see themselves returning to. In any case, the findings here do indicate that the effects of prior political experience are real, if not significant for every form of political activity in the receiving country; and that it may be precisely those with more negative experiences of politics in their countries of origin—
illustrated here by Mexican immigrants migrating from less democratic states in Mexico—that see the greatest promise in adopting political practices in the U.S. 20 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ajinkya, Julie and Michael Jones‐Correa. 2007. “Gender, Immigration and Political Socialization,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Beer, Caroline and Neil J. Mitchell. 2004. “Democracy and human rights in Mexican states: Elections or social capital?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, pp. 293‐312. Bilodeau, A. 2004. Learning Democracy: the Political Re‐socialization of Immigrants from Authoritarian Regimes in Canada. PhD Thesis, University of Toronto. Black, J.H. 1982. "Immigrant Political Adaptation in Canada: Some Tentative Findings." Canadian Journal of Political Science 15: 3‐28. Black, J.H. 1987. "The Practice of Politics in Two Settings: Political Transferability Among Recent Immigrants to Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 20: 731‐54. Black, J.H., R.G. Niemi, and G.B. Powell Jr. 1987. "Age, Resistance, and Political Learning in a New Environment: The Case of Canadian Immigrants." Comparative Politics 20: 73‐84. Bueker, C. Simpson. 2005. "Political Incorporation Among Immigrants From Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects." International Migration Review 39: 103‐140. Cho, Wendy K. Tam. “Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and (Non) Voting”. Journal of Politics. 61(4): 1140‐1155. Cleary, Matthew R. and Susan C. Stokes. 2006. Democracy and The Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Daykin, Anne R. and Peter G. Moffatt. 2002. “Analyzing Ordered Responses: A Review of the Ordered Probit Model,” Understanding Statistics, I (3) 157‐166. Elkins, Zach. 2000. “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations.” American Journal of Political Science. 44(2):293‐300. Finifter, Ada W. and Bernard M. Finifter. 1989. “Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia”. Journal of Politics. 51(3): 599‐630. Gitelman, Zvi. 1982. Becoming Israelis: The Political Resocialization of Soviet and American Immigrants. New York: Praeger. Hernández‐Valdez, Alfonso. 2000. “Las causas estructurales de la democracia local en México, 1989‐1998.” Política y Gobierno 7(1): 101‐144. 21 Hoskin, Marilyn. 1989. “Socialization and Anti‐Socialization: The Case of Immigrants” in Roberta Sigel ed. Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jennings, M. Kent and Richard Niemi. 1974. The Political Character of Adolescence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. _____ 1981. Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jones‐Correa, Michael. 1998. Between Two Nations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Jones‐Correa, Michael and David Leal. 2001. “Political Participation: Does Religion Matter?” Political Research Quarterly December pp. 751‐770. Junn, Jane. 1997. “Assimilating or Coloring Participation? Gender, Race and Democratic Political Participation,” in Cathy Cohen, Kathleen B. Jones and Joan Tronto eds. Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader. New York: New York University Press. pp. 387‐397. Junn, Jane. 1999. "Participation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the United States." American Behavioral Scientist 42: 1417‐
1438. Lackey, Gerald. 2007. “’Trust in Context’: A Study of Political Trust among Mexican Immigrants.” Paper presented at the Latino National Survey workshop for Young Scholars, Cornell University, November 2007. Lien, Pei‐te. 2001. The Making of Asian America Through Political Participation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Ramakrishnan, Karthick. 2005. Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Ramakrishnan, S.K., and T.J. Espenshade. 2001. "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States." International Migration Review 35: 870‐909. Sigel, Roberta ed. 1989a. Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22 _____ 1989b. “Introduction: Persistence and Change” in Roberta Sigel ed. Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tam Cho, Wendy K. 1999. “Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and Non‐
Voting.” Journal of Politics. 61:4 (November) pp. 1140‐1155. Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehmann Schlozman and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Wals, Sergio. 2008. “Traveling Light? The Role of Latino Immigrants’ Imported Socialization on the Intensity of Political Engagement.” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, April. ______ 2006. “Latino Immigrants’ Political Participation and Partisanship: A Theory of Imported Socialization.” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, IL, April 20. White, Stephen, Neil Nevitte, Andre Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Patrick Founier. 2007. “The Political Re‐socialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Life‐long Learning?” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12‐
15, 2007. Wilson, Paul. 1983. Immigrants and Politics. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Wong, Janelle S. 2000. “The Effects of Age and Political Exposure on the Development of Party Identification among Asian American and Latino Immigrants in the United States.” Political Behavior 22 (4): 341‐71. Yang, Philip Q. 1994. “Explaining Immigrant Naturalization” International Migration Review 28:3 pp. 449‐477. FIGURE
A
Probability
change,
Avoid
Contact
with
Government,
by
Gender
and
Legal
Documentation
DV:
Please
tell
me
how
strongly
you
agree
or
disagree
with
the
statement:
"People
are
better
off
avoiding
contact
with
government”
‐
People
who
strongly
disagree
‐
Gender
Legal
docs
men
women
no
yes
FIGURE
B
Probability
change,
Call,
Write
a
Letter
or
Go
to
a
Meeting,
by
Gender
and
Vote
in
Mexico,
For
Immigrants
Arriving
before/after
1990
DV:
Have
you
ever
tried
to
get
government
officials
to
pay
attention
to
something
that
concerned
you,
either
by
calling,
writing
a
letter,
or
going
to
a
meeting?
After
1990
Gender
Voted
in
MX
men
women
yes
no
FIGURE
B
(continued).
Probability
change,
Call,
Write
a
Letter
or
Go
to
a
Meeting,
by
Gender
and
Vote
in
Mexico,
For
Immigrants
Arriving
before
1990
DV:
Have
you
ever
tried
to
get
government
officials
to
pay
attention
to
something
that
concerned
you,
either
by
calling,
writing
a
letter,
or
going
to
a
meeting?
Before
1990
Gender
Voted
in
MX
men
women
yes
no
FIGURE
C
Probability
change,
Participation
in
Voluntary
Organizations,
by
Gender
and
Legal
Documentation
DV:
Do
you
participate
in
the
activities
of
one
social,
cultural,
civic
or
political
group,
more
than
one
such
group,
or
do
you
not
participate
in
the
activities
of
any
such
groups?
Gender
Legal
docs
men
women
no
yes
FIGURE
D
Probability
change,
Union
Membership,
by
Gender
and
Legal
Documentation
DV:
Are
you
or
anyone
in
your
household
a
member
of
a
union?
Gender
Legal
docs
men
women
no
yes
FIGURE
E,
PANEL
A:
Probability
Change
of
Being
a
Naturalized
U.S.
Citizen,
for
Men,
by
Vote
in
Mexico,
Political
Activity
in
Mexico,
and
‘Alternancia’:
Change
in
State
Governing
Party
in
Mexican
State
of
Origin
DV:
Are
you
a
naturalized
American
citizen?
MEN
Voted
in
Mexico=
yes
Political
Activity
in
MX
Alternancia
no
yes
no
yes
FIGURE
E
(cont.):
PANEL
B
Probability
Change
of
Being
a
Naturalized
U.S.
Citizen
for
Men,
by
Vote
in
Mexico,
Political
Activity
in
Mexico,
and
‘Alternancia’:
Change
in
State
Governing
Party
in
Mexican
State
of
Origin
DV:
Are
you
a
naturalized
American
citizen?
MEN
Voted
in
Mexico=
no
Political
Activity
in
MX
Alternancia
no
yes
no
yes
TABLE
A:
Dependent
variables
defini6on
and
means
Ques6on
Variable
name
Measurement
Mean
1:
32.5
2:
25.2
3:
22.2
4:
20.0
Agree
or
disagree:
People
are
be0er
off
avoiding
contact
with
government
"avoid
contact"
categorical
variable
1=disagree
strongly,
2=disagree
somewhat,
3=agree
somewhat,
4=agree
strongly
Have
you
ever
tried
to
get
government
officials
to
pay
a0enGon
to
something
that
concerned
you,
either
by
calling,
wriGng
a
le0er,
or
going
to
a
meeGng?
"get
a0enGon"
1=yes,
has
tried
0=no
Do
you
parGcipate
in
the
acGviGes
of
one
social,
cultural,
civic
or
poliGcal
group,
more
than
one
1=yes
(parGcipate
in
one
"group
parGcipaGon"
such
group,
or
do
you
not
parGcipate
in
the
acGviGes
of
any
such
groups?
or
more),
0=no
Are
you
or
anyone
in
your
household
a
member
of
a
union?
Are
you
naturalized
American
"union
membership"
"naturalizaGon"
1=member
of
a
union
0=not
member
1=naturalized
0=not
naturalized
19.5
9.3
5.0
20.8
TABLE
B.
Independent
variables
defini6on
and
means
Name
Defini6on
Mean
Individual
Variables
male
1=male,
0=female
0.45
age
number
of
years
37.79
elementary
1=
8th
grade
or
below,
0=else
0.38
some
hs
1=
at
least
some
hight
school,
0=else
0.45
some
college
1=at
least
some
college
0.18
owns
property
MX
1=
owns
land,
house
or
business
in
Mexico,
0=
does
not
own
0.40
owns
house
US
1=owns
house
in
US,
0=does
not
own
house
0.35
catholic
1=catholic,
0=else
0.79
relig
aFend.
1=aFends
religious
services,
0=
never
aFends
0.90
%
life
in
US
years
in
US/age
28.38
no
legal
docs
1=withouth
legal
documents,
0=else
0.22
remain
in
US
1=plans
to
stay
all
life/unKl
reKrement
0=less
than
5
years
or
other
0.76
%
people
w.
HS
or
more
%
of
populaKon
25
years
and
over
with
high
school
or
higher
84.04
%
registraKon
total
registered/total
populaKon
18
years
or
over
70.89
%
laKno
registraKon
laKno
registered/laKno
populaKon
18
years
and
over
27.28
%
turnout
total
voters/
total
populaKon
registered
88.08
%
laKno
turnout
laKno
voters/laKno
registered
79.54
vote
difference
diference
votes
winner
and
loser
party/total
votes
20.56
%
union
members
workers
who
are
in
union
members/number
of
employed
workers
10.67
NGO
density
number
of
NGO
per
1
million
inhabitants
4676
rtw&
1=
If
state
has
Right‐to‐work
Laws
0=if
not
0.54
voted
MX
1=
voted
in
Mexico,
0=did
not
vote
0.57
poliKcal
acKvity
1=joined/parKcipate
in
poliKcal
organizaKon,
0=else
0.15
%
literate
people
15
and
over
who
are
literate/total
populaKon
15
years
and
over
85.95
%
registered
registered/populaKon
18
and
over
93.42
%
turnout
voters/registered
57.76
Kmes
party
switching
cumulaKve
number
of
party
switching
0.27
%
seats
majority
party
MX
number
of
seats
in
local
Congress
held
by
majority
party/total
number
of
seats
64.59
Contextual
variables
US
Poli6cal
par6cipa6on
before
migra6on
Contextual
Variables
Mexico
N
1547
Notes: & is based on the union membership sample (n=1546)
Source: Current and pre-migration Individual data: LNS; US data: CPS, US. Department of Labor, NCCS; Mexican data: CENSUS 1970, 1980,
1990, 2000, 2005, local Congress Webpages, BANAMEX-ACCIVAL
Table
C:
Coefficients
Dependent
Variable
Model
fi1ed
Current
individual
characteris8cs
male
age
some
hs
some
college
owns
property
MX
owns
house
US
catholic
relig
aEend.
%
life
in
US
no
legal
docs
remain
in
US
Characteris8cs
of
the
current
US
state
of
residence
%
people
w.
HS
or
more
%
registraIon
%
laIno
registraIon
%
turnout
%
laIno
turnout
vote
difference
%
union
members
NGO
density
right
to
work
US
Individual
characteris8cs
before
person
arrived
to
the
US
voted
MX
poliIcal
acIvity
Characteris8cs
of
the
former
state
of
residence
in
Mexico
%
literate
%
registered
%
turnout
Imes
party
alternance
%
seats
largest
party
MX
year
Agree
or
disagree:
People
are
be1er
off
avoiding
contact
with
government
ordered
logit
‐0.02366
0.041
‐0.00258
0.041
‐0.02356 *
0.011
0.02893
0.069
0.00375
0.024
0.02246
0.013
0.02682
0.022
‐0.00001
0.000
0.05419
0.057
‐0.15017
0.067
‐0.04437
0.018
‐0.33632
0.147
0.11351
0.037
‐0.06227
0.036
‐0.07167
0.039
0.00003
0.000
‐2.26603
0.77
‐0.24621 *
0.114
‐0.08459
0.152
0.28133
0.155
0.11821
0.184
0.39697
0.218
0.2549
0.251
‐0.33484
0.303
0.60602
0.346
‐0.38202 *
0.175
0.60454 *
0.253
‐0.01785 *
0.008
0.01134
0.007
‐0.00695
0.004
0.07094
0.124
‐0.00788
0.006
0.01015
0.011
0.01873
0.017
‐0.00879
0.011
0.38724 *
0.188
‐0.02254 *
0.011
‐1.19884
2.381
0.00297
0.013
0.03288 *
0.014
‐0.01218
0.022
0.00233
0.013
‐0.00312
0.013
0.00132
0.008
0.14725
0.229
0.01538
0.01
‐0.0074
0.018
‐0.00514
0.015
‐0.00649
0.011
‐0.22046
0.407
‐0.01762
0.014
‐0.00347
0.011
0.00419
0.011
0.00091
0.007
‐0.80172 *
0.383
‐0.01476
0.010
Constant
‐2.13446
4.146
‐5.34502
5.309
28.2242 *
13.35
N
1544
1547
*
p<0.05,
**
p<0.01,
***
p<0.001
‐7.87529 **
2.781
‐6.7993 *
2.782
‐5.69511 *
2.779
1416
***
***
*
***
*
**
*
0.12748
0.254
0.0251
0.017
1.09221
0.322
1.43311
0.371
0.04994
0.268
0.56453
0.259
0.07131
0.313
‐0.22224
0.506
0.02288
0.015
‐0.91323
0.426
‐0.20319
0.326
logit
0.00466
0.031
‐0.00997
0.029
‐0.01247
0.008
‐0.01747
0.048
‐0.00592
0.017
‐0.00335
0.011
0.02786
0.016
0.00001
0.000
*
‐0.23552
0.204
0.00263
0.012
0.42001
0.266
1.35456
0.274
‐0.16872
0.198
0.41283
0.196
‐0.70891
0.215
0.64574
0.384
0.00078
0.01
0.54591
0.224
0.18232
0.28
logit
Are
you
naturalized
American
‐0.02279
0.024
0.00681
0.022
‐0.00331
0.006
‐0.04806
0.037
0.0021
0.013
‐0.01501 *
0.007
0.01113
0.012
0.00002
0.000
year
*
%
registered
cut
3:
agree
strongly
logit
Are
you
or
anyone
in
your
household
a
member
of
a
union?
0.06352
0.146
0.01517
0.01
0.34092
0.166
0.66774
0.202
0.20065
0.147
0.12438
0.144
‐0.15842
0.188
‐0.03665
0.252
0.03792
0.011
‐0.1213
0.183
0.43498
0.187
year
*
%
seats
largest
party
cut
2:
agree
somewhat
logit
Do
you
par8cipate
in
the
ac8vi8es
of
one
social,
cultural,
civic
or
poli8cal
group…?
‐0.00117
0.116
0.01536 *
0.006
‐0.27459 *
0.122
‐0.58496 ***
0.171
‐0.07333
0.112
‐0.07122
0.12
0.1089
0.139
‐0.31452
0.226
0.00022
0.006
0.08987
0.131
‐0.06264
0.135
year
*
%
turnout
cut
1:
disagree
somewhat
Have
you
ever
tried
to
get
government
officials
to
pay
a1en8on
to
something
that
concerned
you…?
1546
***
***
*
*
0.11947
0.174
0.05339
0.012
0.54265
0.197
1.23236
0.227
‐0.28272
0.187
0.40508
0.181
0.03718
0.189
‐0.07792
0.307
0.06132
0.011
***
**
***
*
***
0.32058
0.267
*
*
*
**
**
‐0.05914
0.039
0.04283
0.035
‐0.00776
0.01
0.01281
0.064
0.00901
0.021
‐0.02982
0.019
‐0.00082
0.021
‐0.00005
0.000
‐4.5567
5.558
1150