Colombia - Country Watch
Transcription
Colombia - Country Watch
Colombia 2016 Country Review http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 3 Colombia 4 South America 5 Chapter 2 7 Political Overview 7 History 8 Political Conditions 48 Political Risk Index 93 Political Stability 107 Freedom Rankings 123 Human Rights 134 Government Functions 137 Government Structure 139 Principal Government Officials 144 Leader Biography 145 Leader Biography 145 Foreign Relations 152 National Security 163 Defense Forces 167 Chapter 3 169 Economic Overview 169 Economic Overview 170 Nominal GDP and Components 173 Population and GDP Per Capita 175 Real GDP and Inflation 176 Government Spending and Taxation 177 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 179 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 180 Data in US Dollars 181 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 182 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 184 World Energy Price Summary 185 CO2 Emissions 186 Agriculture Consumption and Production 187 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 190 Metals Consumption and Production 191 World Metals Pricing Summary 194 Economic Performance Index 195 Chapter 4 207 Investment Overview 207 Foreign Investment Climate 208 Foreign Investment Index 213 Corruption Perceptions Index 226 Competitiveness Ranking 237 Taxation 246 Stock Market 247 Partner Links 248 Chapter 5 249 Social Overview 249 People 250 Human Development Index 255 Life Satisfaction Index 259 Happy Planet Index 270 Status of Women 279 Global Gender Gap Index 283 Culture and Arts 292 Etiquette 292 Travel Information 301 Diseases/Health Data 312 Chapter 6 318 Environmental Overview 318 Environmental Issues 319 Environmental Policy 321 Greenhouse Gas Ranking 322 Global Environmental Snapshot 333 Global Environmental Concepts 345 International Environmental Agreements and Associations Appendices Bibliography 359 383 384 Colombia Chapter 1 Country Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 1 of 396 pages Colombia Country Overview COLOMBIA The Spaniards arrived in the area in the early 16th century. In 1717 the Spanish crown established the Viceroyalty of New Granada, made up of the present-day states of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador. Following independence in 1813, the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed in 1819 and included all the former members of the Spanish Viceroyalty. By 1830 Ecuador and Venezuela had seceded from the republic, followed by Panama in 1903. Despite Colombia's commitment to democratic institutions, periods of widespread and violent conflict have been common in the nation's history. A four-decade long conflict between government forces and anti-government insurgent groups, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) heavily funded by the drug trade, escalated during the 1990s. The insurgents lack the military or popular support necessary to overthrow the government and violence has decreased since about 2002. But insurgents continued attacks against civilians and large areas of the countryside are under guerrilla influence or are contested by security forces. Note that as of 2015, a peace process is on the agenda and undergoing negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC. With a population of more than 45 million, Colombia is one of the largest countries in South America, and is endowed with significant natural resources. It has substantial oil reserves and is a major producer of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum and coal. But decades-long violent conflict has had an adverse impact on the economy. Despite strong growth in recent years, about half of the population still lives below the poverty line. Colombia Review 2016 Page 2 of 396 pages Colombia Key Data Key Data Region: South America Population: 46736728 Climate: Tropical along coast and eastern plains; cooler in highlands. Languages: Spanish Currency: 1 Colombian peso (Col$) = 100 centavos Holiday: Independence Day is 20 July (1810), Boyaca Day is 7 August (1819) Area Total: 1138910 Area Land: 1038700 Coast Line: 3208 Colombia Review 2016 Page 3 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Country Map Colombia Review 2016 Page 4 of 396 pages Colombia South America Regional Map Colombia Review 2016 Page 5 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Page 6 of 396 pages Colombia Chapter 2 Political Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 7 of 396 pages Colombia History EDITOR'S NOTE The history of Colombia is divided into two sections. First, "Colombia's History in Brief" is provided to give the reader a concise and comprehensive understanding of the country's main historic events and influences. Second, "Colombia's History in Detail" is provided to offer the reader a more detailed and complex examination of the country's historical legacy. 1. COLOMBIA'S HISTORY IN BRIEF The first inhabitants of the area that is now Colombia arrived from Mesoamerica around 1200 before the common era, or B.C.E. Centuries later, other indigenous groups arrived from Mesoamerica, southeastern South America and the Caribbean Islands. When the Spaniards arrived in the early 16th century, the region was dominated by a group called the Chibchas, which was divided into two major confederations, the Muisca of the Bogotá region, and the Tairona of the northern Sierra Nevada de Santa Maria region. The social organization of the Muisca and the Tairona was centered around the cultivation of corn and potatoes and a matrilineal hereditary tradition, but primitive hunting and nomadic farming were the livelihood of many of the region's peoples. Alonso de Ojeda and Rodrigo de Bastidas were the first Spaniards to explore the northern coast of the Colombian region in 1499 and 1500, respectively. In 1525, Ba stidas established the first permanent settlement at Santa Maria, and in 1533, explorer Pedro de Heredia established the coastal settlement of Cartagena, which became a major port for intercontinental travel. Explorer Jiménez de Quesada founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá while searching the interior for a path to Peru. The entire area was established as a colony of the Spanish Empire in 1549 with Santa Fe de Bogotá as its capital. The colonial economy was based on a system in which the colony was the provider to Spain of primary materials and the consumer of manufactured goods sent from Spain. In the 1500s, the basis of the export economy was metals and jewels mining. As precious metals became scarce in the 1600s, agriculture became more lucrative for the colony, so that by the 1700s, sugar and Colombia Review 2016 Page 8 of 396 pages Colombia tobacco were the main export commodities. Social hierarchy in the colony was rigid, with the Spanish-born "penisulares" occu pying the highest government positions, and the criollos (those of Spanish ancestry born in the colonies) holding the second-tier positions in government and trade. The "mestizo" majority was limited to positions of low prestige, and African slaves and "zambo" slaves (those of mixed African and Native American descent) made up the underclass. The Roman Catholic Church brought Christianity to the inhabitants of the colony and was responsible for the establishment of Western ideas and institutions, especially schools and universities. In 1717, the Spanish crown established the Viceroyalty of New Granada, made up of the presentday states of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador; in 1739 Bogotá was named its capital. Along with Lima and Mexico City, Bogotá became one of the principal administrative centers of the Spanish Empire in the New World. Spain began allowing trade between the colonies, in turn gaining control over markets that had previously e xisted in contraband. Criollo discontent with royal rule arose and grew throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries due to heavy taxation by the crown, and ideas of the Enlightenment and the political changes due to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain led to increasing desires for self-rule. On July 20, 1810, the citizens of Bogotá created the first representative council made up of only criollos. Shortly thereafter, other smaller criollo-run councils emerged. The new leaders reduced economic restrictions on the colony and promoted power sharing among the criollos and the peninsulares. Soon, individual provinces began declaring independence from Spain. Total independence was proclaimed in 1813, and as the Spanish army moved to re-conquer the territory lost, Simón Bolivar emerged as a leader in the War for Independence. In 1819, the Spanish army was ultimately defeated, and the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed. The Republic was made up of all of the territory of the former viceroyalty with Simón Bolivar and Francisco de Paula Santander elected its first president and vice president. Prepared by CountryWatch Inc. 2. HISTORY OF COLOMBIA IN DETAIL THE SPANISH CONQUEST The Pre-Columbian Era Colombia Review 2016 Page 9 of 396 pages Colombia Long before the arrival of the first Spanish explorers, Indian groups had settled in the area of present-day Colombia. The Mesoamericans (Indians originally inhabiting Central America), who arrived in approximately 1200 before the common era (B.C.E.), introduced the cultivation of corn. They were followed by a second wave of Mesoamericans in 500 B.C.E. Artifacts from a number of distinct cultures, such as those in the areas around San Agustín (in present-day Huila Department), Tierra Dentro (Cauca Department), and Tumaco (Nariño Department), are believed to date from this period. Between 400 and 300 B.C.E., the Chibchas traveled from Nicaragua and Honduras and reached Colombia, shortly before the Arawaks arrived from other parts of South America, such as Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Near the end of the first millennium in the common era (C.E.), the Caribs migrated from the Caribbean islands. These warlike newcomers supplanted the Chibchas in the lowlands and forced them to move to higher elevations. By the 1500s, the most advanced of the indigenous peoples were the Chibchas, who were divided into two principal tribes: the Muisca, located in the plateaus of Cundinamarca and Boyacá, and the Tairona, who settled along the northern spur of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (in present-day La Guajira Department). The Muisca were the more prominent of the two groups and based their economy on agriculture, especially the cultivation of corn and potatoes. The Muisca centered their social organization on the cacicazgo, a hereditary form of leadership following matrilineal succession. Two large Muisca confederations existed at the time of the Spanish conquest: Bacatá/Bogotá and Hunsa/Tunja. A chieftain known as a zipa headed Bacatá/Bogotá, whereas a zaque governed Hunsa/Tunja. The Tairona formed two groups, one in the Caribbean lowlands and the other in the Andean highlands. The lowlands Tairona fished and produced salt, which they traded for cotton cloth and blankets with their counterparts in the highlands. The Tairona of both groups lived in numerous, well-organized towns connected by stone roads. Exploration and Conquest The group of Spaniards that first came to the New World consisted of conquistadors, administrators, and Roman Catholic clergy. The adventurous conquistadors were risk-taking entrepreneurs, financing their own expeditions in the expectation of being able to get rich quick. The administrators were appointed by and represented the crown in the colonies and sought to maintain the New World colonies as a source of wealth and prestige for the Spanish Empire. The clergy sought to save the souls of the native Indians, and in the process they acquired land and wealth for the church. The conquistadors, who felt they owed nothing to the crown, often came into conflict with the latter's attempts to centralize and strengthen its authority over the colonies. Colombia Review 2016 Page 10 of 396 pages Colombia In what became present-day Colombia, the conquistadors explored and began to settle the coastal areas. The first explorers to round the coast of the Guajira Peninsula and enter Colombian territory were Alonso de Ojeda in 1499 and Rodrigo de Bastidas in 1500. In 1510 Ojeda founded Santa María la Antigua de Darién (present-day Acandí) on the western side of the Golfo de Urabá. Bastidas established Santa Marta in 1525 (see fig. 1). In 1533 another explorer, Pedro de Heredia, organized Cartagena after pacifying the Indians in the area. These coastal cities served as havens from Indian attacks and as bases for exploratory expeditions into the interior. In addition, Cartagena linked the colonies with the motherland and became a focal point of intercontinental travel. Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, Nikolaus Federmann, and Sebastián de Belalcázar figured prominently in the exploration of the interior. In 1536 Jiménez de Quesada set out in search of a path to Peru. During the course of his journey, he encountered the Muisca in the Sabana de Bogotá and in 1538 founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá (present-day Bogotá)--the eventual power center for the colony of New Granada. Federmann explored the eastern plains, crossed the Cordillera Oriental, and arrived at Bogotá in 1539. Traveling northward from Peru, Belalcázar established the cities of Popayán and Santiago de Cali (present-day Cali). Other members of his group traveled northward and founded Cartago and Anserma. In 1539 Belalcázar arrived in Bogotá, where the three conquistadors negotiated the division of the newly explored territory. The expeditions that these men led provided the basis for the settlement of the highlands interior that played a significant role in the future life of the colony. To an even greater extent than in Peru and New Spain (present-day Mexico), many of the population centers established during the conquest were located in remote intermontane valleys and plateaus. This contributed to New Granada's becoming one of the most isolated of all the colonies of the Spanish Empire in the New World. COLONIAL SOCIETY, 1550-1810 Colonial society relied on "purity of blood" as a basis for stratification. The elites at the top of the social pyramid were peninsulares, persons of Spanish descent born in Spain. Peninsulares held political power and social prestige in the society. Below them were the criollos, those of Spanish descent born in the colonies. This group had limited access to the higher circles of power and status. For generations the criollos accepted a position of inferiority to the peninsulares, but in the late eighteenth century their acquiescence was transformed into a resentment that ultimately led to their fight for independence. Next in importance and the most numerous were the mestizos, persons of mixed Spanish and Indian descent who were free but relegated to positions of low prestige. Most Indians gradually became absorbed linguistically or lost their identity through mixture with other peoples; by the late 1980s, Indians constituted only 1 percent of the Colombian population. Black African slaves and zambos, persons of mixed African and Indian descent, were Colombia Review 2016 Page 11 of 396 pages Colombia at the bottom of the social scale and were important only as a source of labor. Colonial Administration The administrative structure paralleled the social pyramid in that peninsulares appointed by the crown generally controlled the higher jurisdictional levels, and criollos could compete only for the lower posts. Two councils in Spain presided over the colonies. The House of Trade (Casa de Contratación) controlled all overseas trade. The Supreme Council of the Indies (Consejo Supremo de las Indias) centralized the administration of the colonies and had legislative, executive, and judicial functions. As the king delegated increasingly more authority to this council, it effectively became the ruler of the colonies. The viceroyalty, headed by a viceroy, was the highest authority in the colonies. The next level of jurisdiction was the audiencia, a regional court consisting of various judges and a president. The Real Audiencia de Santa Fe, which presided over present-day Colombia, was instituted in 1550. The audiencia had jurisdiction over the governorships, which in turn controlled the cities. Governors, appointed by the crown, had administrative and judicial functions and, in areas considered dangerous, military duties. Cities, the lowest jurisdictional level, were run by city councils, or cabildos. Cabildos initially were elected by popular vote, but later seats were sold by the crown, and positions on the council thus lost their democratic character. Despite their low position on the administrative pyramid, cabildos had the greatest impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens in the local municipalities. The cabildos became the first effective agency of civil government, regularizing the processes of government and tempering the authority of the governor, even though their membership was composed of his subordinates. They included a varying number of magistrates or aldermen, depending on the size of the community, and two mayors. The mayors on the cabildo were elected annually and initially acted as judges in courts of first instance with criminal and civil jurisdiction. Appeals from their decisions could be taken to the local governor or to a person functioning as his deputy and finally to the royal court of jurisdiction. During times of crisis, the town citizens of importance might be invited to sit with the cabildo in what was called the open council. By increasing criollo participation in government, the open council contributed to the movement leading to the war for independence. The royal courts in the colonies, unlike their counterparts in Spain, performed administrative and political as well as judicial functions. The courts were empowered to limit the arbitrary use of power by the viceroy or any subordinate official in the New World. Major courts existed in the higher jurisdictions, such as the viceroyalty; subordinate courts existed at lesser administrative levels. Under the Supreme Council of the Indies, the viceroys, as the direct representatives of the sovereign, exercised royal authority in all civil and military affairs, in the secular aspects of church Colombia Review 2016 Page 12 of 396 pages Colombia affairs, and in the supervision of the administration of justice. Subject to the overall supervision of peninsular authorities, the executive officers also exercised a degree of legislative power. Two additional governmental practices designed to oversee the colonial authorities were the residencia (public judicial inquiry) and the visita (secret investigation). The residencia was performed at the end of an official's term of office by a judge who went to the chief seat of the jurisdiction of the official in question to hear anyone who wished to make charges or to offer testimony concerning the official's performance in office. The visita could take place at any time without warning during an official's tenure and was performed by an inspector who might, in the performance of his task, sit with a court in public hearings. The Colonial Economy The Spanish system encompassing the audiencia was extractive and exploitative, relying heavily on cheap native labor. Domestic industry was constrained during the colonial period because the audiencia was bound to Spain as part of a mercantile system. Under this arrangement, the colony functioned as the source of primary materials and the consumer of manufactured goods, a trade pattern that tended to enrich the metropolitan power at the expense of the colony. Because Spaniards came to the New World in search of quick riches in the form of precious metals and jewels, mining for these items became the pillar of the economy for much of the colonial period. Indeed, the extraction of precious metals--such as gold and copper--in the American colonies formed the basis of the crown's economy. Spain monopolized trade with the colonies. The crown limited authorization for intercontinental trade to Veracruz (in present day Mexico), Nombre de Dios (in present-day Panama), and Cartagena. Direct trade with other colonies was prohibited; as a result, items from one colony had to be sent to Spain for reshipment to another colony. The crown also established the routes of transport and the number of ships allowed to trade in the colonies. Merchants involved in intercontinental trade had to be Spanish nationals. Finally, the crown circumscribed the type of merchandise that could be traded. The colony could export to Spain only precious metals, gold in particular, and some agricultural products. In return, Spain exported to the colonies most of the agricultural and manufactured goods that the colonies needed for survival. Domestic products supplemented these items only to a minor degree. Agriculture, which was limited in the 1500s to providing subsistence for colonial settlements and immediate consumption for workers in the mines, became a dynamic enterprise in the 1600s and replaced mining as the core of the Colombian economy by the 1700s. By the end of the 1700s, sugar and tobacco had become important export commodities. The growth in agriculture resulted in part from the increasing exhaustion of mineral and metal resources in the seventeenth century, which caused the crown to reorient its economic policy to stimulate the agricultural sector. Colombia Review 2016 Page 13 of 396 pages Colombia As commercial agriculture became the foundation of the Colombian economy, two dominant forms of agricultural landholdings emerged--the encomienda and the hacienda. These landholdings were distinguishable by the manner in which the landholders obtained labor. The encomienda was a grant of the right to receive the tribute of Indians within a certain boundary. In contrast, the hacienda functioned through a contract arrangement involving the owner--the hacendado--and Indian laborers. Under a typical arrangement, Indians tilled the land a specified number of days per week or per year in exchange for small plots of land. The encomendero, or recipient of the encomienda, extended privileges to de facto control of the land designated in his grant. In effect, the encomendero was a deputy charged by the crown with responsibility for the support of the Indians and their moral and religious welfare. Assuming that the land and its inhabitants were entirely at its disposal, the monarchy envisioned the encomiendas as a means of administering humane and constructive policies of the government of Spain and protecting the welfare of the Indians. The encomenderos, however, sought to employ the Indians for their own purposes and to maintain their land as hereditary property to be held in perpetuity. Most encomenderos were private adventurers rather than agents of the empire. The remoteness of the encomiendas from the center of government made it possible for the encomenderos to do as they pleased. Under the influence of church figures such as Bartolomé de las Casas, the crown promulgated the New Laws in 1542 for the administration of the Spanish Empire in America. Designed to remove the abuses connected with encomiendas and to improve the general treatment of Indians, the laws called for strict enforcement of the existing regulations and freedom for the enslaved Indians, who were placed in the category of free subjects of the crown. They further provided that encomiendas would be forfeited if the Indians concerned were mistreated; that the tribute paid by Indians being instructed in religion should be fixed and in no case required in the form of personal service; and that public officials, congregations, hospitals, and monasteries could not hold encomiendas. Additional provisions-- especially resented by the encomenderos--prohibited the employment of Indians in the mines, prevented encomenderos from requiring Indians to carry heavy loads, forbade the granting of any future encomiendas, ordered a reduction in size of existing encomiendas, and terminated the rights of wives and children to inherit encomiendas. Encomenderos opposed the royal government's attempts to enforce these regulations. A formula was adopted according to which the laws would be "obeyed but not executed." The encomenderos also had the opportunity to send representatives to Spain to seek modifications of the laws-modifications that the crown eventually granted. The tensions between the royal authority and the colonists in the new empire were never entirely removed. The institution of the hacienda with its associated mita (ancient tribute) system of labor began in the late sixteenth century. After 1590 the crown started to grant titles of landownership to colonists Colombia Review 2016 Page 14 of 396 pages Colombia who paid the crown for the land and reserved the right to use Indian labor on their haciendas. Under an agrarian reform in 1592, the crown established resguardos, or reservations, for the Indians to provide for their subsistence; the resulting concentration of Indians freed up land to be sold to hacendados. The purchase of land as private real estate from the crown led to the development of latifundios. The new hacendados soon came into conflict with the encomenderos because of the ability of the latter to monopolize Indian labor. The Spanish authorities instituted the mita to resolve this conflict. After 1595 the crown obliged resguardo Indians to contract themselves to neighboring hacendados for a maximum of fifteen days per year. The mitayos (Indians contracted to work) also were contracted for labor as miners in Antioquia, as navigational aides on the Río Magdalena, and as industrial workers in a few rare cases. Although the mitayos were considered free because they were paid a nominal salary, the landowners and other employers overworked them to such an extent that many became seriously ill or died. Because the mitayos could not survive their working conditions, the crown sought an alternate source of cheap labor through the African slave trade. The crown sold licenses to individuals allowing them to import slaves, primarily through the port at Cartagena. Although the crown initially restricted licenses to Spanish merchants, it eventually opened up the slave trade to foreigners as demand outstripped supply. The mining industry was the first to rely on black slaves, who by the seventeenth century had replaced mitayos in the mines. The mining industry continued to depend on slave labor into the eighteenth century. Despite the decline of the mining industry, slavery remained the key form of labor; from the second half of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, plantation-style agriculture rose in prominence and raised the demand for slave labor on sugar plantations and ranches. Minor segments of the economy also supported slavery and used slaves as artisans, domestic servants, and navigational aides. Slaves had no legal rights in the colonial system. The crown enacted laws to separate the slaves from the Indians so that the two groups would not join against the Spanish and criollo ruling classes. Slaves, however, often revolted against their subhuman living conditions, and many escaped to form palenques (towns) high in the mountains where they could maintain their African customs. These palenques separated themselves from colonial society and thus were among the first towns in Spanish America to be free of Spanish authority. The palenque movement was strongest in the eighteenth century. At this time, there was a crisis in the institution of slavery as it existed in the Spanish colonies. By the end of the 1700s, the high price of slaves along with increasing antislavery sentiment in the colony caused many to view the system as anachronistic; nonetheless, it was not abolished until after independence was achieved. The Colonial Church Colombia Review 2016 Page 15 of 396 pages Colombia The Roman Catholic Church served as both agent and opponent of the colonial government. The church desired a system, supported by the state, within which it might proselytize; at the same time, it opposed many of the secular aims of government that appeared to be in conflict with Christian morality. The church acted to restrain secular excesses and despotism, particularly those of the early conquistadors. From the outset, the clergy became a vital element of colonial life. Missionaries and conquistadors arrived simultaneously in the New World during the late 1400s. From 1520 to 1550, the church began methodical evangelization among the Indians. The Franciscans, Dominicans, Capuchins (members of the Order of Mercy), and later the Jesuits and Augustinians were all important in the country's colonial history. The first two orders arrived in Bogotá with the first judges: the Franciscans established monasteries in Vélez and Cartagena, and the Dominicans established them in Bogotá, Pamplona, and Popayán. In 1534 the church established the dioceses of Santa Marta and Cartagena, and in 1546 it established the diocese of Popayán--the first such dioceses in the New World. The church organized further between 1550 and 1620, creating the diocese of Bogotá in 1562. The Tribunal of the Inquisition, installed in Cartagena in 1611, sought to ensure that African culture did not contaminate Spanish culture in the colonies as a result of the importation of African slaves. The Jesuits, who formally were allowed to enter the colonies in 1604, sought to improve the economic standing of the Indians with whom they worked and established selfsufficient villages for Indians in the eastern plains. In addition to bringing the Christian religion to the Indians, the church spread the ideas and institutions of Western civilization and had responsibility for establishing and maintaining almost all of the schools of the colonial period. In 1580 a monastery founded the University of General Studies, the first in the territory. The Jesuits established two additional universities in 1622 and 1653. In its role as the patron of education, the church made an unintended but significant contribution to developing a local spirit of independence among the colonists. Church and state attempted to control the intellectual life of the New World. Throughout the eighteenth century, the church engaged in controversy with the country's leading intellectuals, who were influenced by the political ideas of the Enlightenment in Europe and by the concepts of positivism and empirical scientific investigation. The education system also fostered opposition to Spain's sovereignty over its American empire and provided the groundwork for the intellectuals whose activities the church opposed. Although the Roman Catholic Church influenced educational and intellectual development in the colonies, the crown ensured its own influence over the colonial church. Several papal bulls in the 1490s and in the first decade of the 1500s strengthened the ability of the Spanish kings to influence church affairs in the New World. In addition, the Holy See granted to the Spanish state the papal rights governing the administration and the personnel of the church and of bishoprics being created Colombia Review 2016 Page 16 of 396 pages Colombia in the New World. In addition to common economic interests, this closely bound the church to the state during the colonial period. Developments Leading to Independence Throughout the colonial period, events in Spain affected the political, economic, and intellectual state of the colonies. One such event was the ascension of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne in 1700. Upon the death of Charles II--the last in the line of the Spanish Hapsburgs--the Austrian Hapsburgs and Charles's nephew Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon and the grandson of French king Louis XIV as well the designated heir to the Spanish throne, contended for the Spanish throne. The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14) ended in the triumph of the Bourbons over the Austrians, and the Treaty of Utrecht recognized the Bourbon succession in Spain on the condition that Spain and France would never be united under one crown. Beginning with Philip of Anjou, now known as King Philip V (reigned 1700-46), the Bourbon kings placed themselves in more direct control of their colonies, reducing the power of the Supreme Council of the Indies and abolishing the House of Trade. In 1717 Philip V established the Viceroyalty of New Granada (present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador), and in 1739 Bogotá became its capital. Other Bourbon kings, particularly Charles III (reigned 1759-88), tried to improve the profitability of the American colonies by removing restrictions that had hindered Spain's economic development in the 1500s and 1600s. Such measures included the liberalization of commerce with the colonies and the establishment of additional authorized ports. In 1774 the crown allowed free exchange among the colonies of Peru, New Spain, New Granada, and Guatemala. These reforms allowed the crown control over the de facto trade among the colonies that previously had been illicit. When Charles III declared war on Britain in 1778, he levied taxes on the colonies to fund the war. These fiscal decrees affected imports and exports, the sale of general items--especially tobacco and alcohol--and the production of silver and gold. The crown demanded tribute from Indians and the church and expected the general population to fund the naval fleet that patrolled the Spanish American coast. Excessive and increasing taxation in the late 1700s contributed to the discontent of the criollos with the Spanish administration, which manifested itself in the Comunero Revolt of 1781, the most serious revolt against Spanish authority before the war for independence. The rebellion was a spontaneous but diffuse movement involving many towns. The most important uprising began among artisans and peasants in Socorro (in present day Santander Department). The imposition of new taxes by the viceroy stimulated the revolt further. Almost without exception, the rebels expressed their loyalty to the king and the church while calling for a repeal of new taxes and a modification of government monopolies. The rebels succeeded in getting government representatives to abolish the war tax, taxes for the maintenance of the fleet, customhouse permits, and tobacco and playing-card monopolies; to reduce the tribute paid by the Indians and the taxes on liquor, commercial transactions, and salt; and to give preference to those Colombia Review 2016 Page 17 of 396 pages Colombia born in the New World for appointments to certain posts. Later, however, government negotiators declared that they had acted under duress and that the viceroy would not honor the agreements. The leaders of the rebellion were subjected to severe punishments, including death for the more prominent among them. The rebels had not sought independence from Spain, but their revolt against the king's administration and administrators, despite protestations of loyalty to the king himself, was not far removed from a fight for independence. In this light, the rebellion was a prelude to the struggle for freedom. In the late 1700s, the Enlightenment served as a second major influence in the struggle for independence. After the Comunero Revolt, the outlook of the local upper-class and middle-class criollos changed as the ideas of the Enlightenment strengthened their desire to control their own destiny. This movement criticized the traditional patterns of political, economic, and religious institutions and as such was a threat to both the central state and the religious authorities. The North American and French revolutions also contributed intellectual foundations for a new society, as well as examples of the possibilities for change. A third major event of the late colonial period that may have led to the struggle for independence was the Napoleonic invasion of the early 1800s. In 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte made his brother Joseph the king of Spain, forcing Charles IV to abdicate and his son Ferdinand VII to renounce the throne. In exile, Ferdinand VII organized royalist supporters under the Central Council Junta Central) of Seville, later called the Council of the Regency (Consejo de Regencia). This council constituted a provisional government for Spain and the colonies. Both Napoleon and the royalists competed for support of Spain's colonists in the New World. Napoleon wrote a liberal constitution for Spain in which he recognized the colonies as having rights equal to those of Spain. In competition for the colonies' loyalties, the Central Council offered them certain privileges, such as participation in Spanish courts. Colonists, however, were not satisfied with the council's measure because of the larger representation accorded the representatives from Spain. Despite conflict with the peninsulares holding colonial authority in the viceroyalty, additional concessions to criollos to win their support resulted in the creation of a criollo governing council in Bogotá on July 20, 1810. The new local government passed reforms favoring power-sharing by the criollos and peninsulares and loosened the economic restrictions previously placed on the colony. Most of the old Spanish laws remained in effect, however. The establishment of other criollo governing councils laid the basis for the first attempts at independence from Spain. THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION, 1810-1903 Even with the initial steps to unify against Spanish authority, the colonial elites argued among themselves. Both before and after the granting of independence, elites disagreed as to whether the national structure should be federalist or centralist. This crucial disagreement, exacerbated by Colombia Review 2016 Page 18 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia's extreme regional differences, was the first to separate the political elites into rival groups. The differing opinions of these groups concerning the appropriate relationship between the church and state further emphasized the disagreement. The separate groups followed leaders representing their views and identified with the individuals as much as with the ideologies. By the time of the new nation's foundation, these two groups had become clearly divided and dominated the political scene, excluding others from their competition for control of the country. The force of their ideals carried the nation back and forth between political extremes-- absolute liberty and repression. The Independence Movement Leaders in the various localities that had formed criollo councils sought to unite the colony of New Granada. From the beginning of their attempts, however, conflict emerged over the form the new government should take. The provincial councils did not want the centralist, authoritarian type of government advocated by the Bogotá council, preferring a federal type of government more in keeping with the liberal principles of the Enlightenment and the example of the North American revolution. This represented the first ideological split between groups of leading criollos. Federalists rallied behind Camilo Torres; Centralists rallied behind Antonio Nariño. To avoid a civil war between the two factions, the provincial councils sent representatives to Bogotá in 1811 to draft a constitution for the territory. In November 1811, a congress was installed, and the provinces formed the United Provinces of New Granada. The federal union consisted of autonomous provinces joined only in common interest; the national army was subordinate to Bogotá. Starting in 1812, individual provinces began declaring absolute independence from Spain. That year, Simón Bolívar Palacio, considered the liberator of South America, tried for the first time to gain independence for New Granada. The absence of united support from the various provinces, however, frustrated him. Bolívar left New Granada in 1815 and went to Jamaica. The continuing tension between federalist and centralist forces led to a conflict that left New Granada weak and vulnerable to Spain's attempts to reconquer the provinces. At the time of Bolívar's departure, the independence cause in New Granada was desperate. Ferdinand VII had been restored to the Spanish throne, and Napoleon's forces had withdrawn from Spain. A pacification expedition led by Pablo Morillo on behalf of the king proceeded from presentday Venezuela to Bogotá, and those who laid down their arms and reaffirmed their loyalty to the Spanish crown were pardoned. Morillo also granted freedom to slaves who helped in the reconquest of the colonies. Because of dissension between the upper class and the masses and inept military leadership, Cartagena fell to the royalists by the end of 1815. In early 1816, Morillo moved to reconquer New Granada and changed his tactics from pardons to terror; Bogotá fell within a few months. Morillo repressed antiroyalists (including executing leaders such as Torres) and installed the Tribunal of Purification, responsible for exiles and prisoners, and Colombia Review 2016 Page 19 of 396 pages Colombia the Board of Confiscations. The Ecclesiastical Tribunal, in charge of government relations with the church, imposed military law on priests who were implicated in the subversion. The Spanish reconquest installed a military regime that ruled with violent repression. Rising discontent contributed to a greater radicalization of the independence movement, spreading to sectors of the society, such as the lower classes and slaves, that had not supported the previous attempt at independence. Thus the ground was laid for Bolívar's return and ultimate triumph. At the end of 1816, Bolívar returned to New Granada, convinced that the war for independence was winnable only with the support of the masses. In the earlier attempt at independence, large segments of the population had been lured to the royalist side by promises such as repartition of land and abolition of slavery. When the masses saw that the promises were unfulfilled, however, they changed their allegiance from Spain to the independence movement. Two significant military encounters led to the movement's success. After having won a number of victories in a drive from the present-day Venezuelan coast to present-day eastern Colombia via the Río Orinoco, Bolívar gave Francisco de Paula Santander the mission of liberating the Casanare region, where he defeated royalist forces in April 1819. After the decisive defeat of royalist forces at the Battle of Boyacá in August 1819, independence forces entered Bogotá without resistance. The merchants and landowners who fought against Spain now held political, economic, and social control over the new country that encompassed present-day Venezuelan, Colombia, and Panana. The first economic reforms that they passed consolidated their position by liberalizing trade, thereby allowing merchandise from Britain (New Granada's major trading partner after Spain) freer entry into the area. As a result, the artisan class and the emerging manufacturing sector, who previously had held only slight economic and political power, now lost stature. Gran Colombia As victory over Spain became increasingly apparent, leaders from present-day Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama convened a congress in February 1819 in Angostura (present-day Ciudad Bolívar, Venezuela) and agreed to unite in a republic to be known as Gran Colombia. After Bolívar was ratified as president in August 1819, he left Santander, his vice president, in charge of Gran Colombia and traveled south to liberate present-day Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. When present-day Ecuador was liberated in 1822, it also joined Gran Colombia. In 1821 the Cúcuta Congress wrote a constitution for the new republic. The Cúcuta political arrangement was highly centralized and provided for a government based on popular representation with a bicameral Congress, a president, and a Supreme Court consisting of five magistrates. The constitution also guaranteed freedom for the children of slaves; freedom of the press; the inviolability of homes, persons, and correspondence; the codification of taxes; protectionist policies toward industry and agriculture; and the abolition of the mita system of labor. Nonetheless, political rivalries and regional jealousies progressively weakened the authority of the Colombia Review 2016 Page 20 of 396 pages Colombia new central state. Venezuelan leaders especially were resentful of being ruled by Santander, a native of present-day Colombia, in the absence of their president and fellow Venezuelan, Bolívar. In 1826 General José Antonio Páez led a Venezuelan revolt against Gran Colombia. Outbreaks and disturbances also occurred elsewhere. On his return from Peru in 1827, Bolívar was barely able to maintain his personal authority. In April 1828, a general convention was convened in Ocaña to reform the constitution of Cúcuta, but the convention broke up as a result of conflicting positions taken by the followers of Santander and Bolívar. Those backing Santander believed in a liberal, federalist form of government. Bolívar's followers supported a more authoritarian and centralized government, and many, especially those in Bogotá, called on Bolívar to assume national authority until he deemed it wise to convoke a new legislative body to replace Congress. In August 1828, Bolívar assumed dictatorial powers and attempted to install a constitution that he had developed for Bolivia and Peru. Unpopular with a large portion of the New Grenadine populace, this constitution called for increased central authority and a president-for-life who could also name his own successor. During a constitutional convention held in January 1830, Bolívar resigned as president, naming José Domingo Caicedo as his successor. That same year, the divisive forces at work within the republic achieved a major triumph as the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian portions of the republic seceded. New Granada New Granada lay in a depressed state after the dissolution of Gran Colombia. None of the country's three principal economic bases--agriculture, ranching, and mining--was healthy. The import trade was limited to a small group, the banking industry was inadequate, and craftsmen and small manufacturers could supply only enough for local consumption. Despite the desire and need for change, New Granada retained slavery, the sales tax, and a state monopoly on the production and trade of tobacco and alcohol. The problems facing the country, the discontent of liberal groups who saw the constitution as being monarchical, and the military's desire for power culminated in the fall of the constitutional order and the installation in 1830 of the eight-month dictatorship of General Rafael Urdaneta. After Bolívar's death in December 1830, however, civilian and military leaders called for the restoration of legitimate authority. Urdaneta was forced to cede power to Caicedo as the legitimate president. In October 1831, Caicedo convened a commission to write a new constitution for New Granada. Finished in 1832, the new constitution restricted the power of the presidency and expanded the autonomy of the regional administrative subdivisions known as departments (departamentos). Santander assumed the presidency in 1832 and was succeeded in 1837 by his vice president, José Ignacio de Márquez. Personalism and regionalism remained key elements in national politics in a country with small cities, a weak state, and a semi-feudal population that was bound to the large Colombia Review 2016 Page 21 of 396 pages Colombia landowners in patron-client relationships. During the Márquez administration, the political divisions in the country reached a breaking point. In 1840 the political ambitions of some department governors, the constitutional weakness of the president, and the suppression of some Roman Catholic monasteries in Pasto combined to ignite a civil war that ended with the victory of the government forces led by General Pedro Alcántara Herrán. This triumph brought Herrán to the presidency with the next election in 1841. In 1843 his administration instituted a new constitution, which stipulated a greater centralization of power. In 1845 Tomás Ciprianode Mosquera succeeded Herrán. Personalism as an important element in politics abated during his administration. The Mosquera government also saw the economic and political ascendancy of merchants, artisans, and small property owners. Mosquera liberalized trade and set New Granada on the path of exporting primary goods. The election of General José Hilario López as president in 1849 marked a turning point for Colombia both economically and politically. Capitalism began to replace the old colonial structure, and the ideological differences between the established political parties overshadowed the previous emphasis on personalism. In 1850 the López administration instituted a so called agrarian reform program and abolished slavery. In order to allow landowners access to more land, the agrarian reform program lifted the restrictions on the sale of resguardo lands; as a result, Indians became displaced from the countryside and moved to the cities, where they provided excess labor. In 1851 the government ended the state monopoly on tobacco cultivation and trade and declared an official separation of church and state. In addition, López took the education system from the hands of the church and subjected parish priests to popular elections. Consolidation of Political Divisions The ideological split dividing the political elite began in 1810 and became solidified by 1850 after the official establishment of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL) and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador--PC), the two parties that continued to dominate Colombian politics in the 1980s. The Liberals were anti-colonial and wanted to transform New Granada into a modern nation. Those joining the PL primarily came from the more recently created and ascending classes and included merchants advocating free trade, manufacturers and artisans anxious to increase demand for their products, some small landowners and agriculturists endorsing a liberalization of state monopolies on crops such as tobacco, and slaves seeking their freedom. The Liberals also sought lessened executive power; separation of church and state; freedom of press, education, religion, and business; and elimination of the death penalty. The Conservatives wanted to preserve the Spanish colonial legacy of Roman Catholicism and authoritarianism. They favored prolonging colonial structures and institutions, upholding the alliance between church and state, continuing slavery, and defending the authoritarian form of government that would eliminate what they saw as excesses of freedom. The PC grouped together Colombia Review 2016 Page 22 of 396 pages Colombia slave owners, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and large landholders. Campesinos were divided between the two parties, their loyalties following those of their employers or patrons--often the PC. In contrast to the unity demonstrated by the PC, the PL developed factions from the start. Although they had most interests in common, the merchants differed from the artisans and manufacturers on the question of trade. Merchants favored free trade of imports and were called golgotas, whereas artisans and manufacturers demanded protectionism to support domestic industry and were known as draconianos. The Federalists Although divided, the PL soon achieved electoral victories. In the election of 1853, General José María Obando, who had led the revolutionary forces in the 1840 civil war and who was supported by the draconianos and the army, was elected and inaugurated as president. Congress remained in the hands of the golgotas. In May of the same year, Congress adopted the constitution of 1853, which had been written under López. A liberal document, it had significant provisions defining the separation of church and state and freedom of worship and establishing male suffrage. The new constitution also mandated the direct election of the president, members of Congress, magistrates, and governors, and it granted extensive autonomy to the departments. Despite the victory that the constitution represented for the Liberals, tensions grew between golgota and draconiano forces. When the draconianos found Obando to be compromising with the golgotas, General José María Melo led a coup d'état in April 1854, declared himself dictator, and dissolved Congress. Melo's rule, the only military dictatorship in the nineteenth century, lasted only eight months because he proved unable to consolidate the interests of the draconianos; he was deposed by an alliance of golgotas and Conservatives. In 1857 PC candidate Mariano Ospina Rodríguez was elected president. The next year, his administration adopted a new constitution, which renamed the country the Grenadine Confederation, replaced the vice president with three designates elected by Congress, and set the presidential term at four years. With the draconiano faction disappearing as a political force, the golgotas took over the PL in opposition to the Conservative Ospina. General Mosquera, the former president and the governor of the department of Cauca, emerged as the most important Liberal figure. A strong advocate of federalism, Mosquera threatened the secession of Cauca in the face of the centralization undertaken by the Conservatives. Mosquera, the golgotas, and their supporters declared a civil war in 1860, resulting in an almost complete obstruction of government. Because civil disorder prevented elections from being held as scheduled in 1861, Bartolomé Calvo, a Conservative in line for the presidency, assumed the office. In July 1861, Mosquera captured Bogotá, deposed Calvo, and took the title of provisional president of the United States of New Granada and supreme commander of war. A congress of plenipotentiaries chosen by the civil and Colombia Review 2016 Page 23 of 396 pages Colombia military leaders of each department met in the capital in September 1861 in response to a call by the provisional government. Meanwhile, the war continued until Mosquera defeated the Conservatives and finally subdued the opposition in Antioquia in October 1862. Shortly after taking power, Mosquera put the church under secular control and expropriated church lands. The property was not redistributed to the landless, however, but was sold to merchants and landholders in an effort to improve the national fiscal situation, which had been ruined by the war. As a result, the amount of land held under latifundios increased. In February 1863, a Liberal-only government convention met in Rionegro and enacted the constitution of 1863, which was to last until 1886. The Rionegro constitution renamed the nation the United States of Colombia. All powers not given to the central government were reserved for the states, including the right to engage in the commerce of arms and ammunition. The constitution contained fully defined individual liberties and guarantees as nearly absolute as possible, leaving the federal authority with little room to regulate society. The constitution also guaranteed Colombians the right to profess any religion. The Rionegro constitution brought little peace to the country. After its enactment and before the next constitutional change, Liberals and Conservatives engaged in some forty local conflicts and several major military struggles. Contention persisted, moreover, between the moderate Liberals in the executive branch and the radical Liberals in the legislature; the latter went so far as to enact a measure prohibiting the central authority from suppressing a revolt against the government of any state or in any way interfering in state affairs. In 1867 the radical Liberals also executed a coup against Mosquera, leading to his imprisonment, trial before the Senate, and exile from the country. With the fall of Mosquera and the entrenchment of radical Liberals in power, Conservatives found it increasingly difficult to accept the Rionegro constitution. Eventually Conservatives in Tolima and Antioquia took up arms, initiating another civil conflict in 1876. The Liberal national government put down the rebellion, but only with difficulty. Golgotas controlled the presidency until 1884 and defended the Rionegro constitution's provisions for federalism, absolute liberties, separation of church and state, and the nonintervention of the state in the economy. Their economic policies emphasized the construction of lines of communication, especially railroads and improved roads. These projects did not unify the country and increase internal trade but instead linked the interior with export centers, connecting important cities with river and maritime ports. By allowing easier access to imports, the projects thus favored the merchant class over the national industrialists. Under the golgota policy of completely free trade, exports became a major element of the country's economy. Three main agricultural exports--tobacco, quinine, and coffee--developed, especially after 1850 when international markets were more favorable and accessible. Nonetheless, all three crops suffered from cyclical periods of high and low demand. By the 1880s, it was clear that Colombia Review 2016 Page 24 of 396 pages Colombia tobacco and quinine would not be reliable exports in the long term because of stiff international competition. Coffee also faced competition but nevertheless succeeded in dominating the economy after the 1870s. The coffee merchants used their profits as middlemen to invest in domestic industries, producing goods such as textiles for domestic consumption, particularly in the Medellín area. The emergence of coffee as an important export crop and the investment of profits from the coffee trade into domestic industry were significant steps in the economic development of the country. The Nationalists It became obvious to many Liberals and Conservatives that the lack of governmental authority stipulated in the Rionegro constitution was allowing the country to run a chaotic course and that the situation needed to be corrected. The Regeneration movement sought a basic shift in Colombia's direction. A key leader of the movement was Rafael Núñez, who was elected president in 1879 and held the office until 1882. Liberals and Conservatives who were disenchanted with the golgota governments joined to form the National Party, a coalition that in February 1884 brought Núñez to the presidency for a second term. The Nationalists authorized Núñez to take steps urgently required to improve economic conditions. As leader of the Regeneration movement, he attempted to reform the constitution with the agreement of all groups. The golgotas, however, were afraid that constitutional change would favor the Conservatives and dissident Liberals at their expense. In 1884 the golgotas in Santander started an armed rebellion, which spread throughout the country. Nationalist forces suppressed the revolution by August 1885, at which time Núñez also declared that the Rionegro constitution had expired. The most important result of the conflict was the adoption of the Constitution of 1886 by a national council made up of two delegates from each state. The Nationalist leaders believed that ultra-liberalism as practiced under the Rionegro constitution was not appropriate to the needs of the country and that a balance was needed between individual liberties and national order. Based on this philosophy, the Constitution of 1886 reversed the federalist trend and brought the country under strong centralist control. The Constitution renamed the country the Republic of Colombia and, with amendments, remained in effect in the late 1980s. The Constitution provides for a national rather than confederate system of government in which the president has more power than the governors, who head departments or two types of national territories known as intendencies (intendencias) and commissaryships (comisarias). In 1887 Núñez consolidated the position of the church in the country by signing the Concordat of 1887 with the Holy See. Through the concordat, the church regained its autonomy and its previous preferential relationship with the republic. The agreement stipulated the obligatory teaching of Roman Catholicism as part of a child's education and recognized Roman Catholic marriages as the only valid marriages in the country. It also acknowledged Colombia's debt to the Holy See brought on by the uncompensated confiscation of church assets under Mosquera in the 1860s. Colombia Review 2016 Page 25 of 396 pages Colombia Political disorder did not cease with the adoption of the Constitution of 1886. The Nationalists, who had become an extremist branch of the PC after Núñez was elected, were opposed by the Historical Conservatives, the moderate faction of the PC that did not agree with the extent of antiliberalism taken by the new government. The bipartisan opposition of Liberals and Historical Conservatives sought to reform Nationalist economic and political policies through peaceful means. The Nationalists, however, denied the civil rights and political representation of the Liberals because differences of opinion concerning trade policy and the role of the state in society created a gulf between the Nationalists and their opponents. The PL split into Peace and War factions, the former seeking peaceful reform of economic policies and the latter advocating revolution as the only way to win political rights. The Peace faction controlled the party in the capital, whereas the War faction dominated the party in the departments--a response to the violent political exclusion that was characteristic of rural areas and small towns. The War faction staged unsuccessful revolts in 1893 and 1895. In 1898 Nationalist candidate Manuel Antonio Sanclemente was elected president. In ill health, Sanclemente left much of the governing to his vice president, José Manuel Marroquín. The Sanclemente/Marroquín presidency faced increasing problems as the world price of coffee fell, which, because of reduced customs revenues, left the government bankrupt. The fiscal policy of issuing nonredeemable paper money, which had replaced the gold standard under Núñez, added to the increasing lack of confidence in the government. In July 1899, in Santander, Liberals again attempted a revolution, known as the War of a Thousand Days. Historical Conservatives eventually cast their allegiance with the Nationalists, whereas the Peace and War factions of the PL remained split, thereby weakening the rebellion. Despite an initial victory in December 1899, the Liberal forces were outnumbered at Palonegro five months later. The defeat left the Liberal army decimated and demoralized and with little chance to succeed. The Liberal army changed its strategy from conventional tactics to guerrilla warfare, thus transforming the war into a desperate struggle that lasted for two more years. In July 1900, Historical Conservatives, seeking a political solution to the war, supported Marroquín in a coup against Sanclemente. Contrary to what his supporters had expected, Marroquín adopted a hard line against the rebels and refused to negotiate a settlement. In November 1902, the defeated Liberal army negotiated a peace agreement with the government. The war took more than 100,000 lives and left the country devastated. The War of a Thousand Days left the country too weak to prevent Panama's secession from the republic in 1903. The events leading up to Panama's secession were as much international as domestic. At the turn of the century, the United States recognized the strategic need to have access to a naval route connecting the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, such as a canal in the isthmus. The HayHerrán Treaty of January 1903, which was to have been the basis for allowing Colombia Review 2016 Page 26 of 396 pages Colombia the United States canal project to proceed, was rejected by the Colombian Congress. Because the proposed Panamanian route was preferred over the Nicaraguan alternative, the United States encouraged the Panamanian separatist movement, militarily assisted Panama in its movement for independence, and immediately recognized the independent Republic of Panama. THE PERIOD OF RECONCILIATION, 1903-30 The Reyes Presidency The devastation that resulted from the War of a Thousand Days discredited the factions of each party that had instigated the conflict. The moderates who assumed power in each party had similar economic interests; they recognized the need for the two parties to reconcile their differences and rule together in peaceful coexistence to ensure the survival of the country and the economy. For the first time in Colombian history, the Liberals and the Conservatives sought to share power rather than exclude the opposition party from it. Although Conservatives were nominally in control during this period, they formed coalition governments incorporating minority Liberals into the cabinet and other important political bodies. Rejecting the practice of excluding the Liberals from political participation, as had been done by the Nationalists, the moderate Conservatives removed the key element that had prompted so much political violence in the past and laid the foundation for economic progress in the country. At the end of the civil war, the country needed a leader who was strong enough to rebuild the nation after the loss of Panama and the ravages of civil strife. General Rafael Reyes, elected president in 1904 with the support of moderate Conservatives, showed a determination to unify the republic, renew the nation's economy, and prevent any obstacle--constitutional or otherwise-- from standing in his way. Reyes's policies were a contradictory combination of political reconciliation and authoritarianism, which forced minority Liberal representation in government on the elected Conservative majority in Congress. His economic programs included a protectionist trade policy, which represented a major intervention of the state into economic activity. This trade policy encouraged domestic industrial growth, which in turn led to the growth of cities and the need to develop an urban infrastructure. To ensure the passage of his economic reforms, Reyes greatly strengthened the executive and thereby centralized power. He abolished Congress and replaced it with a National Assembly composed of three representatives from each department, selected by department officials appointed by Reyes. This action ensured the adequate representation of the Liberal support he needed in the legislative branch. This extra-constitutional body was designed to approve his decrees and to pass constitutional amendments. The National Assembly allowed Reyes to implement policies that sometimes were at odds with orthodox economic theory and therefore would not have been tolerated by a Conservative Congress. Through these measures, Reyes established a sound Colombia Review 2016 Page 27 of 396 pages Colombia fiscal administration, stabilized the monetary system, initiated a return to the gold standard, restored Colombian credit abroad, attracted foreign capital, improved transportation, encouraged export agriculture, and aided domestic industry. At the same time, however, he aroused a great deal of political opposition. Reyes realized that the soundest path to economic development-- based on trade and foreign investment--required normalized relations with the United States, an unpopular idea at that time. In 1909 Reyes unsuccessfully tried to force legislative approval of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty with the United States, which was to reestablish relations with that country and recognize the independence of Panama. The issue of the treaty's ratification, however, provided a focal point for opposition against Reyes, even though the treaty was ratified under a subsequent administration. In June 1909, the Republican Union, a bipartisan group of Liberals and Historical Conservatives who opposed Reyes, won a majority in the congressional elections held to reestablish the Colombian Cngress. In acknowledgment of the political current against him, Reyes secretly resigned later that month and left the country. Carlos E. Restrepo, a Conservative who had been instrumental in founding the Republican Union, assumed the presidency after Reyes. The Republican Union represented a transformation in Colombian politics. The Liberal merchants and Conservative agriculturists found a common interest in coffee exports, which was quickly beginning to dominate the Colombian economy. Their mutual economic interest allowed the moderate factions of each party to join in a bipartisan coalition that gained political control at the end of the civil war. Although Conservatives retained nominal control of political institutions until 1930, they accepted and applied the principle of Liberal representation and participation in government. Conservative presidents appointed Liberals to their bipartisan cabinets and thus included them in political decision making. Although party conflict and rural unrest remained, the coalitions that the two parties formed provided a basis for political stability. Economic and Social Change As a result of domestic policies and the international situation, the Colombian economy diversified and developed at the turn of the century. In the early 1900s, the industrial sector became an increasingly important part of the economy. Between 1900 and 1910, textile industries developed in Bello and Medellín, pottery plants in Caldas, and breweries in Itagüi and Bogotá. New economic groups emerged with the development of import substitution industrialization (see Glossary) and of a larger financial sector. During the 1910s and 1920s, the Colombian economy became more integrated into the global financial and commercial markets. Renewed relations with the United States during the administration of Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-21) opened the door for foreign exchange and investment. The United States replaced Britain as Colombia's key financial and commercial Colombia Review 2016 Page 28 of 396 pages Colombia partner. Most of the foreign exchange came from the coffee trade, which at this time represented nearly 80 percent of exports. Foreign exchange also came in the form of loans and an indemnity paid by the United States for Colombia's loss of Panama. Money coming into the country was invested in industry, consumption goods, and public works and enterprises. Public works, such as building communication networks, accelerated under the Conservative Pedro Nel Ospina administration (1922-26). Investment in industry came primarily from the private sector, including foreign interests. By 1929 private foreign investment totaled US$400 million, with some US$45 million having been invested by oil companies. The Nel Ospina administration also oversaw the reorganization of the banking and financial sectors, creating the Bank of the Republic (Banco de la República). The growth in industry and construction, supported by both public and private funds, led to the emergence of a genuine working class that soon learned to unionize. In 1918 Colombia experienced its first major strikes. The union movement also came to be influenced by European syndicalism and socialism; in 1919 the first workers' conference, which was fostered by socialist ideas, was held. These activities were a backdrop to the launching of the Colombian Socialist Party. During the 1920s, the union movement expanded and stimulated the growth of socialist-oriented groups. In 1928 a strike against the United Fruit Company was put down violently by armed forces. In the following year, Congressman Jorge Eliécer Gaitán criticized the rough handling of the strike and became a prominent speaker for the working class. Growing popular discontent with the Conservative governments and divisions within Conservative ranks eventually resulted in the rise of the PL to power. The growth in the industrial and construction sectors that fueled the union movement also drained the countryside of agricultural workers, encouraging rural workers to petition for higher wages. In 1928 the government began importing food and as a result drew protests from agriculturists. Workers and artisans protested the rise in inflation that resulted from the influx of foreign loans and protectionist trade policies. Social tensions increased throughout the Conservative administration of Abadia Méndez (1926-30) and ultimately led to the fall of the PC after its forty-five years in power. The Liberals gained the upper hand in the political arena and retained it during the fifteen years (1930-45) of global crisis. THE REFORMIST PERIOD, 1930-45 The economic modernization of the early 1900s unleashed social forces that resulted in the emergence of new urban classes. As the traditional elites failed to address the demands made by the new groups, tension was generated. The growing urban electorate tended to favor those politicians who advocated social reforms. The Liberals were better able than the Conservatives to benefit from this development, especially during the first administration of Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-38). The populist movement of the 1940s, represented by the progressive faction of the PL, attracted the most support, however, and represented a threat to the more conservative Colombia Review 2016 Page 29 of 396 pages Colombia traditional elites. For the first time, non-elites had a voice with which to express their interests. Although a split in the PC over candidates for the 1930 presidential election aided in the ascension of the PL to power, both parties were divided into factions. The PC consisted of moderates (led by Mariano Ospina Pérez and known as ospinistas) who wanted to maintain the status quo and reactionary conservatives (led by Laureano Gómez Castro and known as laureanistas) who favored a restructuring of the state along corporatist (see Glossary) lines. The PL also had its moderates who supported the status quo. The second faction of the PL consisted of reformists, who favored controlled social change. These factions represented different socioeconomic groups. In general, reformists included the new financial and capitalist groups. Reactionaries primarily were traditional latifundistas (owners of latifundios). Moderates of both parties tended to have interests that incorporated several economic activities and included groups such as export-oriented latifundistas. As a result of the Liberal victory, many of the privileges that had been afforded to Conservatives through patronage politics were now denied. Because the president appointed the governors, who in turn appointed the municipal mayors, the transfer of power from the PC to the PL at the presidential level was felt at the municipal level. Because of the change in the political affiliation of the police force, the stricter application of the law was transferred to members of the opposition party. Clashes resulted between partisan groups among the lower classes, who sought either to gain or to maintain their privileges. One such clash involved the peasants, who, amidst the confusion, tried to attain greater control over small plots of land at the expense of members of the opposing party. The first Liberal president of the twentieth century, Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-34), was elected at a time when the price of coffee had dropped to about one-third of the 1928 price, loans from United States banks had stopped, and the country was gripped by an economic depression. Olaya endeavored to hold together the moderate Liberals and the moderate Conservatives, some of whom had worked for his election. Although Conservative control of the legislature and concern over the economy constrained Olaya's ability to enact a comprehensive Liberal agenda, he succeeded in carrying out some reforms, notably in education. Nonetheless, some Liberals, disappointed by their party's failure to carry out a "revolution," in 1932 organized a movement called the Revolutionary Leftist National Union (Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria-UNIR). The movement came to an end after Gaitán, its leader, returned to the PL in 1935 when the party adopted many of his proposed reforms and offered him a congressional seat. International disputes also confronted the Olaya administration, one of the most prominent being a boundary conflict with Peru. In 1932 Peruvians occupied Leticia, a Colombian outpost on the Amazon, and hand-to-hand combat ensued between small Colombian and Peruvian forces. The dispute was settled by direct negotiation in 1934, when Peru recognized Colombian sovereignty over the port. Colombia Review 2016 Page 30 of 396 pages Colombia The most important president in the reformist period was Olaya's successor, López Pumarejo. Believing that the reformist faction of the PL had become strong enough to carry out its program, the López Pumarejo administration implemented extensive reforms, principally in agriculture, education, and the tax system. Known as the "Revolution on the March," these reforms included constitutional amendments that guaranteed the state's role in developing the economy of the country and diversifying its exports, authorized the national government to expropriate property for the common good, provided special state protection for labor and the right for labor unions to strike, and stipulated that public assistance was a function of the state. Additional reforms included the strict enforcement of progressive income and inheritance taxes, the guarantee of rights granted to squatters on public and private lands, the reinforcement of credit institutions, and the renewed separation of church and state. The reforms put in place by the López Pumarejo administration, combined with import substitution policies, helped to accelerate the capitalist development of Colombia. During the López Pumarejo administration, coffee prices and the volume of exports increased. Protectionist measures helped to increase domestic production and enlarge the domestic market. A surge in industrialization began in the 1930s, aided by various external and internal factors. The key external factor was the world economic crisis of the 1930s, which limited the availability of goods to be imported and limited markets for exports. Internal factors included domestic capital accumulation via the tobacco, gold, and coffee trade; the increased buying power of large groups, especially coffee growers; the construction of transportation and communication facilities that unified the internal market; and a continuation of protectionist policies begun by President Reyes in 1904. The increasing emphasis on growing and exporting coffee fostered industrial development and allowed a more equitable distribution of income because more skilled laborers were employed and received higher wages. As a result, the demand for domestically produced consumer goods increased further. Reforms instituted under López Pumarejo reflected a variety of influences: the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which had set forth provisions relating to social welfare, labor, and government responsibility in education and economics; ideas of change favored by the Peruvian apristas--members of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana-- APRA); and the New Deal policies of United States president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-45). Some Colombian intellectuals had become interested in socialist thought, and the establishment of a liberal republic in Spain during the early 1930s inspired Colombian Liberals. The Liberals, recognizing the social changes that were under way, identified themselves with the growing demands of the masses. In contrast, the Conservatives favored a minimum of concessions, the greatest possible influence of the church, and continued control of the country by a small upper class; they saw López Pumarejo's policies as communistic. Meanwhile, disagreement over the extent to which Liberal ideology should be applied led to a split between the pro-reform supporters of López Pumarejo and the pro-status quo followers of fellow Liberal Eduardo Santos, Colombia Review 2016 Page 31 of 396 pages Colombia owner of the national daily El Tiempo. In 1938 Santos became president with the support of moderate Liberals and of Conservatives opposed to López Pumarejo's Revolution on the March. Santos retained some of his predecessor's policies, such as protectionism, and oriented his policies toward capitalist industrial and agricultural development. The Santos administration improved the economic capabilities of the country to invest in industry. It also stimulated capital-intensive agriculture to convert traditional latifundios, which relied on cheap labor, into capitalist haciendas, which used advanced technology. The reduced demand for manual labor in the countryside caused many campesinos to migrate to the cities. This urban growth increased both the supply of labor and the demand for consumer goods, further contributing to industrial expansion. Santos also reduced taxes on machinery imports that were needed for industry. In the later years of his administration, Santos turned his attention to relations with the church and the United States. In 1942 Santos reformed education by removing it from the control of the church. In the same year, he concluded a new agreement with the Vatican, requiring that bishops be Colombian citizens. During World War II, he cooperated with the United States in the defense of the Panama Canal, ousted German nationals from control of Colombia's national airline, and broke diplomatic relations with the Axis governments. His administration also strengthened economic, commercial, and cultural relations with the United States. Despite opposition from Conservatives, moderate Liberals, and a more progressive Liberal group led by Gaitán, López Pumarejo was elected president for a second term in 1942. He was not as successful in the second term in implementing reform, however, because of strong Conservative opposition and a split in the Liberal organization in Congress. Laureano Gómez exploited the Liberal division by attacking López Pumarejo's foreign policy, including the declaration of war on the Axis Powers in 1943. Other effects of World War II were being felt at this time, including an unbalanced budget, unstable foreign trade, a decline in coffee prices, and an increase in import prices. Discontent with López Pumarejo increased. Gómez made personal attacks on López Pumarejo and his family that were so inflammatory that Gómez was imprisoned in 1944. This triggered demonstrations and street fighting in Bogotá. In July 1944, during army maneuvers, López Pumarejo and some of his cabinet members were held prisoner for a few days by officers staging an abortive military coup in Pasto. Although most of the military supported the constitutional order, López Pumarejo lost prestige and power. In July 1945, he resigned in favor of his first presidential designate, Alberto Lleras Camargo, a Liberal who had distinguished himself as a writer and government official. López Pumarejo's resignation resulted in part from pressure by the political and economic forces that he had helped to strengthen through the reforms of his first term. By 1942 a new group of Colombia Review 2016 Page 32 of 396 pages Colombia industrialists wished to perpetuate their gains and believed that reform should cease. During López Pumarejo's first term, the interests of industrialists and those of other urban elements frequently coincided--for example, in reducing the power of the church and large landowners and in stimulating economic growth. In his second term, however, critics contended that the social reforms and development policies of the first term no longer were appropriate. Thus, the industrialists, looking for favorable tax policies and protection against the demands of labor, joined with the landowners in resisting reforms. Both groups helped block important portions of López Pumarejo's legislative program, and the reformist trend of the PL was negated by more moderate elements within the party. Lleras Camargo, who served as provisional president until August 1946, appointed representatives of all parties to his cabinet in an effort to establish a "national union." Nonetheless, his coalition policy was attacked by Gaitán, who had gained considerable support among the masses and among some intellectuals and industrialists. When Gabriel Turbay, a moderate Liberal, won the party's nomination for the 1946 presidential election, Gaitán decided to run independently, and his forces shifted to a more militant stance. This serious split among Liberals resulted in the election of the Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez, by a plurality of 42 percent of the electorate. COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, 1946-58 The transfer of power in 1946 ignited tensions between the two parties, resulting in violent political conflict, particularly in rural areas. The loss of peace foreboded the return to competitive and exclusionary politics, similar to the situation preceding the War of a Thousand Days. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, violence and exclusion more than threatened the political system; they ruptured it. A democratically elected administration became repressive and dictatorial, which led to its overthrow by the sole military coup in the twentieth century. Only by having the reins of power taken from both of their hands did the traditional elites recognize that the most effective way to avoid interparty civil wars and possible military dictatorships was to join forces and restrain their competitive tendencies. In 1946 Ospina assumed office and was faced with the difficult task of ruling from a minority position, as Liberals had received the majority of all presidential votes and continued to control Congress. Ospina tried to confront this situation by incorporating Liberals into a coalition government. Meanwhile, the level of political rivalry intensified in the countryside, where Conservatives pursued a course of violence in an attempt to consolidate power after sixteen years out of office. Liberals retaliated and, under Gaitán's leadership, became highly mobilized in their demands that the Ospina government confront the social needs of the modernizing and urbanizing nation. Gaitanism, the populist social movement led by Gaitán as a faction of the PL, increased Colombia Review 2016 Page 33 of 396 pages Colombia dramatically between 1946 and 1948. Gaitán supported the democratic rather than the revolutionary path to reforms. By advocating the passage of more socially liberal policies, he appealed to the masses and he united urban workers and campesinos. As the movement grew, observers believed that Gaitán would be elected president, which may have happened had he lived to see the next election. Liberal victories in the 1947 congressional elections demonstrated the party's strength among the electorate. Ospina became increasingly concerned with retaining Conservative control and provoked Liberals further by resorting frequently to police enforcement of Conservative privileges in the rural areas. The Liberal appointees in his government resigned in protest in March 1948. La Violencia The following month, the inevitable explosion occurred in the form of the most violent and destructive riot in the country's long history of conflict. On April 9, Gaitán was assassinated at midday in the heart of Bogotá. An angry mob immediately seized and killed the assassin. In the ensuing riot, some 2,000 people were killed, and a large portion of downtown Bogotá was destroyed. The Bogotazo, as the episode came to be called, was an expression of mass social frustration and grief by a people who had lost the man who represented their only potential link to the decision-making process. Although order was restored in Bogotá and Ospina remained in control, the tempo of rural violence quickened to a state of undeclared civil war, known as la violencia. This phenomenon -- la violencia -- claimed over 200,000 lives during the next eighteen years, with the bloodiest period occurring between 1948 and 1958. La violencia spread throughout the country, especially in the Andes and the llanos (plains), sparing only the southernmost portion of Nariño and parts of the Caribbean coastal area. An extremely complex phenomenon, la violencia was characterized by both partisan political rivalry and sheer rural banditry. The basic cause of this protracted period of internal disorder, however, was the refusal of successive governments to accede to the people's demands for socioeconomic change. After the Bogotazo, the Ospina government became more repressive. Ospina banned public meetings in March 1949 and fired all Liberal governors in May. In November of that year, Ospina ordered the army to forcibly close Congress. Rural police forces heightened the effort against belligerents and Liberals, and eventually all Liberals, from the ministerial to the local level, resigned their posts in protest. In the 1949 presidential election, the Liberals refused to present a candidate; as a result, Gómez, the only Conservative candidate, took office in 1950. Gómez, who had opposed the Ospina administration for its initial complicity with the Liberals, was firmly in control of the party. As leader of the reactionary faction, he preferred authority, hierarchy, and order and was Colombia Review 2016 Page 34 of 396 pages Colombia contemptuous of universal suffrage and majority rule. Gómez offered a program that combined traditional Conservative republicanism with the European corporatism of the time. A neo-fascist constitution drafted under his guidance in 1953 would have enhanced the autonomy of the presidency, expanded the powers of departmental governors, and strengthened the official role of the church in the political system. Gómez acquired broad powers and curtailed civil liberties in an attempt to confront the mounting violence and the possibility that the Liberals might regain power. Pro-labor laws passed in the 1930s were canceled by executive decree, independent labor unions were struck down, congressional elections were held without opposition, the press was censored, courts were controlled by the executive, and freedom of worship was challenged as mobs attacked Protestant chapels. Gómez directed his repression in particular against the Liberal opposition, which he branded as communist. At the height of the violence, the number of deaths reportedly reached 1,000 per month. Despite the relative prosperity of the economy--owing largely to expansion of the country's export markets and increased levels of foreign investment--Gómez lost support because of protracted violence and his attacks on moderate Conservatives and on the military establishment. Because of illness, in November 1951 Gómez allowed his first presidential designate, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, to become acting president until Gómez could reassume the presidency. Although Urdaneta followed Gómez's policies, he refused to dismiss General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whom Gómez suspected of conspiring against the government. When Gómez tried to return to office in June 1953, a coalition consisting of moderate Conservatives who supported Ospina, the PL, and the armed forces deposed him and installed a military government. They viewed such action as the only way to end the violence. Rojas Pinilla, who had led the coup d'état, assumed the presidency. The Rojas Pinilla Dictatorship Initial response to the coup was enthusiastic and widespread; only the elements at the two extremes of the political spectrum protested the action. Rojas Pinilla's first goal was to end the violence, and to that end he offered amnesty and government aid to those belligerents who would lay down their arms. Thousands complied with the offer, and there was relative calm for several months after the coup. Other immediate steps taken by Rojas Pinilla included the transfer of the National Police to the armed forces in an effort to depoliticize the police, relaxation of press censorship, and release of political prisoners. The government also started an extensive series of public works projects to construct transportation networks and hospitals and improved the system of credit for small farmers. Rojas Pinilla attempted to respond to demands for social reform through populist measures patterned after the policies of General Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55) in Argentina. The National Social Welfare Service, under the direction of his daughter María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Díaz, was Colombia Review 2016 Page 35 of 396 pages Colombia created to meet the most pressing needs of the poor, and the public works projects began to provide jobs for the masses of urban unemployed. The tax system was restructured to place more of the burden on the elite. Poorly administered, however, these reform programs met with little success. Rojas Pinilla was unable to restructure Colombian society. Rojas Pinilla attempted to recruit political support from nontraditional sources. He courted the military by raising salaries and constructing lavish officers' clubs, and he counted the church by espousing a "Christian" doctrine as the foundation of his government. Through the creation of a "third force," Rojas Pinilla attempted to fuse the masses of peasants and urban workers into a movement that would counter the elite's traditional domination of the country's politics; however, this served more to anger the elite than to create a populist political base. Support for the Rojas Pinilla regime faded within the first year. Toward the end of 1953, rural violence was renewed, and Rojas Pinilla undertook strict measures to counter it. Following a substantial increase in police and military budgets, the government assumed a dictatorial and demagogic character. The government reversed its initial social reform measures and relied instead on repression. It tightened press censorship and closed a number of the country's leading newspapers, both Liberal and Conservative. Under a new law, anyone who spoke disrespectfully of the president could be jailed or fined. Many were killed or wounded at the so called Bull Ring Massacre in February 1956 for failing to cheer Rojas Pinilla sufficiently. The administration became increasingly corrupt, and graft in government circles was rampant. In addition, economic deterioration, triggered by a drop in coffee prices and exacerbated by inflationary government policies, seriously threatened the gains made since World War II. Efforts of government troops to suppress the widespread violence degenerated into an enforcement of the president's tenuous hold on power, and their methods became more brutal. Scorched-earth policies were introduced to confront the 20,000 belligerents estimated to be active in rural areas. Rojas Pinilla tried to provide a legal facade for his dictatorship. A new constitution (the Constitution of 1886 was abolished in 1954) created a Legislative Assembly composed of fifty-nine Conservatives and thirty-three Liberals, twenty of whom were nominated by the president. The assembly elected Rojas Pinilla to the presidency in 1954 for four years; in 1957 it confirmed him as president until 1962, an action that consolidated mounting opposition to Rojas Pinilla and precipitated his subsequent fall from power. By early 1957, most organized groups opposed Rojas Pinilla. Liberal and Conservative elites, to whom the populist and demagogic Rojas Pinilla had become a greater threat than their traditional party adversaries, decided to stop feuding and to join forces against the president under the banner of the National Front. Conservative and Liberal leaders had been negotiating an alliance since early 1956. In July 1956, Gómez--in exile in Spain--and Lleras Camargo signed the Declaration of Benidorm, a document that laid the foundation for the future institutionalization of a coalition government. The moderate Conservatives, supporting Rojas Pinilla until 1957, did not join in negotiations with the Colombia Review 2016 Page 36 of 396 pages Colombia Liberals until that time. Although factionalism between moderates and reactionaries slowed the process, all concerned parties signed a final agreement in San Carlos in 1957. Based on the Sitges Agreement signed between the reactionaries and the Liberals in Sitges, Spain, in 1957, the San Carlos Agreement stipulated that a Conservative, either moderate or reactionary, would be the first president under a National Front and that he would be elected by a National Congress previously elected by popular vote. The Sitges and San Carlos agreements, which sought to reduce interparty tensions and provide a basis for power-sharing between the parties, also called for the following: restoration of the Constitution of 1886, which had been abolished by Rojas Pinilla; the alternation of the presidency between the two parties every four years; parity between parties in all legislative bodies; a required two-thirds majority vote for the passage of legislation; the establishment of an administrative career service of neutral parties not subject to partisan appointment; women's suffrage and equal political rights for women; and the devotion of at least 10 percent of the national budget to education. As the party leaders laid the basis for a coalition government, the tides of discontent turned against Rojas Pinilla. When Rojas Pinilla ordered the arrest of Guillermo León Valencia, a Conservative leader involved in the formation of the National Front, Rojas Pinilla was confronted with student demonstrations, massive strikes, riots, and finally the declared opposition of the church and the defection of top-ranking military officers. In May 1957, faced with a multitude of protesters and top military leaders requesting his resignation, Rojas Pinilla resigned and went into temporary exile in Spain. Power reverted to a five-man junta led by General Gabriel París, who promised the free election of a civilian president in August 1958. In December 1957, Colombians voted overwhelmingly in a national plebiscite to approve the Sitges and San Carlos agreements as amendments to the Constitution of 1886. Congressional elections were held soon thereafter, with the result that the reactionary Conservatives emerged as the largest faction of the Conservative half of Congress. Gómez vetoed the proposed presidential candidacy of Valencia, who until then had been the strongest Conservative candidate. As a result of this division within the PC, faction leaders agreed to allow a Liberal to be the first president under the National Front and to extend the provision of the coalition government from twelve to sixteen years. These agreements were ratified by Congress as constitutional amendments in 1958. In August of that year, Lleras Camargo, a Liberal, was elected as the first president under the National Front. THE NATIONAL FRONT, 1958-74 The National Front agreement to share power between Liberals and Conservatives was a constructive effort to assuage the interparty strife and distrust that had contributed to both the violence and the collapse of the democratic system. Its inauguration marked the beginning of a Colombia Review 2016 Page 37 of 396 pages Colombia gradual decline in the level of confrontation. Nevertheless, the necessity of securing bipartisan support for any policy or action produced several difficulties--most notably, stalemate and inaction in the governmental process, voter apathy, and the exacerbation of factionalism within the two parties--that were to plague National Front administrations. Instituting the Coalition Government When Lleras Camargo took office in August 1958, he faced not only the problems of rivalry between Liberals and Conservatives but also factional controversies within the two parties. He succeeded, however, in demonstrating that the National Front program could point the way to a restoration of constitutional government. His administration adopted vigorous measures to reduce banditry and rural violence. Lleras Camargo introduced an austerity program to improve economic conditions, with the result that in 1958 Colombia recorded its most favorable balance of trade in twenty years. The government cut imports, stabilized the peso (for value of the peso--see Glossary), and established the National Planning Department. It handled labor troubles with firmness. The Lleras Camargo government also instituted a series of programs to improve the living conditions of the masses, including expansion of the water supply, sewers, housing, and education. An agrarian reform law passed in 1961 provided for a new agency, the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria--Incora). Lleras Camargo's government made only limited progress in land reform, however, in the face of opposition from Liberals, who denounced the plan as inadequate, and from Conservatives, who called it communistic and revolutionary. Nevertheless, at the end of his term in 1962, despite a difficult political situation, Lleras Camargo had done much to stabilize the economy, stimulate increased output of industrial and agricultural products, and bring the people a renewed confidence in the future. Although he was strongly opposed by Gómez and his supporters among the reactionary Conservatives, Valencia became the next official Conservative candidate of the National Front and was elected for the 1962-66 presidential term. Only half the eligible citizens voted, but Valencia received more than 62 percent of the votes, which perhaps confirmed the voters' belief in the principle of alternating the presidency between the two leading parties. Valencia took only modest steps to continue the programs initiated by his predecessor. He ignored, for example, the National Planning Department and failed to fill vacancies as they occurred. Incora's land reform program also ran into opposition from large landholders. In addition, Valencia's finance minister, Carlos Sanz, devalued the peso and proposed new taxes, thereby arousing the hostility of Congress. Declining economic conditions contributed to growing social unrest. Increasing prices, the printing of growing quantities of paper money, and a drop in the price of coffee affected the economy adversely and contributed to increased inflation. Drains on the economy were generated by contraband trade with neighboring countries. The equivalent of some US$64 million in foreign Colombia Review 2016 Page 38 of 396 pages Colombia loans promised in 1964 had been withheld, and the government was faced with a serious deficit. Rumors of plots against the government circulated, students protesting high prices rioted in Bogotá, and kidnappings occurred frequently. Valencia declared a state of siege in May 1965 and, having lost additional congressional support, was forced to rule by decree. The war minister, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, succeeded in reducing civil disorders; Ruiz was dismissed in January 1965, however, after he openly criticized the president and made it known that he considered himself a leader who might bring order out of the confusion that plagued the nation. In mid-1965 the state of siege enabled Valencia and his new finance minister, Joaquín Vallejo, to enact reforms by decree. They raised taxes, collected delinquent taxes, limited imports, and applied other austerity measures. The United States and international lending agencies then agreed to make loans to Colombia with the understanding that the government would take vigorous action to improve its financial situation. Inflation leveled off, and rumors of plots to remove the president died down. Opposition to the National Front Despite the constitutional amendment stipulating that only the PL and PC were authorized to participate in elections, dissident groups opposing the National Front arrangement formed "movements" to challenge the establishment by presenting candidates under the Liberal and Conservative labels. In 1959 Liberal dissidents formed the Liberal Recovery Movement (Movimiento de Recuperación Liberal)- -subsequently renamed the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal--MRL)--under the leadership of Alfonso López Michelsen, son of ex-President López Pumarejo. The more serious challenge to the National Front arrangement came from the populist National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular-Anapo), which was founded in 1961 by Rojas Pinilla after his return from exile. The potential popular support for these dissident movements was manifest in the congressional elections of 1964, when 70 percent of the voters failed to cast ballots and 10 percent voted against Valencia's candidates. Congressional victories by Anapo and MRL reduced Valencia's support in the legislature to a narrow majority. During the mid-1960s, the embers of la violencia were dying out, but guerrilla activity was increasing. In 1964, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional--ELN) was formed by students who were disenchanted with the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia--PCC) and inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The ELN gained its greatest notoriety when Father Camilo Torres, a Roman Catholic priest, joined the guerrilla group in 1966 and was killed in an armed conflict with government forces shortly thereafter. In 1966 another guerrilla movement--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC)--began operating and was officially designated as a branch of the PCC. Colombia Review 2016 Page 39 of 396 pages Colombia Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the third president under the National Front, proved to be an effective leader. He was opposed in the 1966 election by the Liberal Anapo candidate, who won almost 30 percent of the vote. Aided by an especially competent group of cabinet members, Lleras Restrepo enacted a number of reforms during his tenure in office. He swiftly announced the creation of a series of presidential task forces to draw up national development plans, which included the establishment of exchange controls to combat the mounting foreign exchange difficulties; an increased state role in economic development; and funding for new housing, infrastructure, and industrial development projects. These proposals drew support from international lending agencies, which helped ease the fiscal problems that had beset the Valencia administration. The effectiveness of the government was increased by the sweeping constitutional reforms of December 1968, which abolished the requirement of a two-thirds majority for Congress to pass major bills and gave greater authority to the executive in economic decision making. In addition, the reforms provided for the gradual phasing out of the National Front arrangement during the coming decade. Having discarded major obstacles that had stalemated previous National Front administrations, Lleras Restrepo built on the efforts of Lleras Camargo in economic and social reform. The government revised tax laws and rationalized tax collection through more rigid enforcement. Wage and price controls helped stabilize the currency, and inflation was held to a moderate 7 percent per year. The Lleras Restrepo administration improved the balance of payments situation through a program of export diversification, through which exports other than coffee more than doubled between 1966 and 1970. The government reorganized the Ministry of Agriculture and gave it increased resources to finance investments in the agricultural sector. Incora intensified agrarian reform efforts and issued more than 60,000 land titles to tenants and sharecroppers in 1968 and 1969 alone. The creation of the Andean Common Market in 1969 further stimulated economic expansion through the integration of the economies of Colombia and its neighbors. The policies of the Lleras Restrepo administration resulted in an increased rate of economic growth. Nevertheless, an explosive population increase continued to add some 200,000 young Colombians to the labor force each year, and the problems of poverty and unemployment persisted. A system of family planning was launched, in spite of considerable church opposition, in an attempt to slow the population growth that was largely nullifying the economic gains. Unrest in the late 1960s assumed a more urban and more nearly class-oriented base as rural and interparty violence receded. Rural disorders declined markedly as a consequence of optimism on the economic front and the capture of some of the most prominent guerrilla leaders. In 1968, however, a new guerrilla group--the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación-EPL)--was formed as the armed branch of the Communist Party of Colombia-- Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista de Colombia--MarxistaLeninista --PCC-ML), a pro-Chinese group. In December 1968 Lleras Restrepo lifted the state of siege that had been imposed under Valencia in 1965. Sporadic incidents of violence occurred, however, especially among dissident students and labor union members, and the government reinstated its emergency powers on several occasions. Colombia Review 2016 Page 40 of 396 pages Colombia Dissidence within the PL was lessened through the reintegration of the MRL and its leader, López Michelsen, who came to play a valuable role in the Lleras Restrepo government. In the 1968, congressional elections, those elements of both the PL and PC that supported the National Front arrangement gained a strong majority in the legislature. Voter apathy persisted, however, and less than 40 percent of eligible voters participated. Under the banner of Anapo, Rojas Pinilla continued his appeal to the urban masses and the peasantry, promising solutions to the problems of unemployment and inflation and advocating free education and health care for the poor. Anapo challenged the National Front by presenting Rojas Pinilla as a Conservative candidate for the presidency in 1970. The election took place in an atmosphere of escalating violence, and the public received with widespread skepticism the official announcement that the Conservative candidate of the National Front, Misael Pastrana Borrero, had won by a narrow margin of 65,000 votes. The outpouring of support for Rojas Pinilla indicated significant voter dissatisfaction with the National Front's response to Colombia's persistent social and economic problems. Dismantling the Coalition Apparatus Pastrana was the last president to be elected under the provisions of the National Front. In 1970 the government began to dismantle the structure of the National Front in accordance with the 1968 constitutional amendments. The parity provision for elective legislative bodies and the exclusion of nontraditional parties from participation in elections no longer applied on the local level. These changes also went into effect on the national level in 1974, in time for the election of Pastrana's successor. The liberalization of the political system in effect undercut support for the bipartisan movements that had challenged the traditional parties during the National Front. Although Anapo declared itself an official party in 1971, it declined in popularity and electoral strength. María Eugenia Rojas--the Anapo candidate in the 1974 presidential election--received less than 10 percent of the vote. After General Rojas Pinilla's death in 1975, the party continued to lose strength, eventually allying itself with other marginal movements that, by themselves, drew insignificant results at the polls. Pastrana termed his administration the "Social Front" and followed most of the policies of his predecessor. In two areas of economic policy, however, he differed: land reform and the status of the construction sector. Pastrana's proposals for land reform included promises of redistribution; however, the large landowners objected to the government's proposal to base taxation on potential rather than actual income from the land. In the course of negotiations between the agricultural interests and the different party factions, productivity replaced redistribution as a priority. The government granted major concessions to the large agriculturists concerning the bases for assessing income and real estate taxes. It also guaranteed that new sources of credit be made available for Colombia Review 2016 Page 41 of 396 pages Colombia modernizing the agricultural sector along capital intensive lines. In industrial policy, Pastrana selected construction as the "leading sector." The administration advocated public investment in construction projects as the engine of growth for the economy because it created employment and increased income and, by extension, increased demand for domestically produced items. Pastrana also encouraged private investment in the leading sector through the establishment of the Units of Constant Purchasing Power (Unidades de Poder Adquisitivo Constante--UPAC), a system by which an investment not only accrued interest but also was adjusted for inflation. The UPAC system of adjusting for inflation extended to many elements of the economy, including life insurance, wages, and prices. The combination of the UPAC system and the huge investment in construction over-stimulated the economy and fueled inflation, which reached 27 percent by 1974. Guerrilla activity continued during the Pastrana administration. In 1972 another guerrilla group--the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril--M-19)--emerged. The M-19 took its name from the date on which Rojas Pinilla was narrowly and, in their minds, fraudulently, defeated by Pastrana. Although the M-19 claimed to be the armed branch of Anapo, the Rojas Pinilla organization disavowed any connection to the guerrilla group. THE POST-NATIONAL FRONT PERIOD, 1974-82 The Erosion of Partisan Affiliations The PL and PC were weak, divided into factions, and inadequately organized at the end of the existence of the National Front. Because the political parties were not eager to engage in intense competition, Colombia achieved a peaceful transition to an open system. The principle of powersharing was retained, although a president was allowed to select appointees from whatever sources he chose if the opposition refused to participate in his government. The experience of the National Front, the lack of organizational efforts by the parties, and the massive migrations from rural to urban areas weakened party affiliations, which also decreased the likelihood of interparty violence. This weakening of party identification emerged as an unforeseen consequence of the nonpartisan structure of the National Front, in which party loyalty was less important than support for a particular faction. In addition, rapid urbanization and industrialization eroded the traditional bases of partisan support because Liberal supporters were transplanted to Conservative communities. The period after the National Front also reflected a growing gap between the issues and agendas of the political elite and the demands, concerns, and expectations of the populace. The erosion of the bond between the elites and the masses also was manifested in the high rates of Colombia Review 2016 Page 42 of 396 pages Colombia electoral abstentionism, rising levels of mass political apathy and cynicism, the emergence of an urban swing vote, and widespread distrust of the nation's political institutions and leadership. The image the masses held of the elite was tarnished by the failure of the elite as a whole to institute promised reforms and by suspected links between some leaders and the drug trade. The traditional mechanisms of political control, such as inherited party affiliation, patrimonialism, and clientelism, lost their effectiveness, especially in the growing urban areas. The government's failure to accommodate the new social groups and classes that had emerged during Colombia's modernization generated the increasing alienation of the masses from the political leadership and caused some elements among the masses to resort to militancy. Thus, Colombia experienced a radicalization of peasant movements, an increase in urban protests, a growing restlessness within the urban labor movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla activity. Popular discontent with the government's management of the economy continued despite steady economic growth and high primary export revenues in the mid-1970s. The post-National Front period began in the midst of inflation and unemployment that fueled social unrest and prompted the government to institute unpopular anti-inflationary austerity measures. Subsequent moves to increase employment by raising public spending on construction and infrastructure projects did more to augment the national debt than to alleviate the unemployment problem. As the coffee boom receded, growth rates declined steadily through the 1978-82 period. The massive underground economy, fueled by drug trafficking and marijuana cultivation, undermined the government's efforts to control inflation and contributed to the rise of a parallel financial market, placing a large part of the national economy beyond the control of legitimate authority. The Liberal Tenure The first president elected in the post-National Front period, López Michelsen (1974-78), faced difficult situations in three areas: the economy, the guerrilla movement, and the drug trade. Subsequent governments inherited these same problems. The influx of foreign exchange from the coffee boom and the illicit drug trade created a glut of money in the financial sector that increased the rate of inflation. To counteract this, López Michelsen immediately instituted a stabilization program that included austere measures, such as cutting back on public investment and social welfare programs and tightening credit and raising the interest rate. By declaring a state of economic emergency, López Michelsen was able to pass unpopular yet necessary economic measures without legislative action. Another key component of López Michelsen's economic policy was designed to improve income distribution. The cornerstone of this effort was the "To Close the Gap" program. This program addressed the rural sector by proposing to increase productivity and employment in the countryside and integrate the rural sector into the monetary market with the support of the Integrated Rural Colombia Review 2016 Page 43 of 396 pages Colombia Development program. The "To Close the Gap" plan had its greatest impact, however temporary, in the tax reform of 1974. The tax reform, instituted two months after López Michelsen took office, made changes in the sales tax, export taxes and incentives, import surcharges, the tax treatment of government agencies, and personal and corporate income taxes. The reform had four general goals: to make the tax system more progressive, to reduce the distorting effects of the tax system on resource allocation, to promote economic stability by increasing revenues on a one-time basis and by enhancing the built- in response of the tax system to growth in the national income, and to simplify tax administration and compliance and thereby reduce evasion and increase yields. The government recorded a short-term fiscal improvement; nevertheless, inflation and a failure to improve administrative procedures allowed for continued large-scale tax evasion and an ultimate drop in revenues. The austerity that the López Michelsen administration forced on the country had unpopular consequences. Inflation outstripped wage increases, nontraditional exports faced unfavorable trade conditions, and the industrial sector entered into a slump. Students and labor groups engaged in periodic protests and strikes. In October 1976, López Michelsen imposed a state of siege following two months of strikes by social security employees. The continuing discontent with the government erupted again in September 1977 when the four major labor unions joined in a strike to protest the high cost of living. Under the state of siege measures still in effect, the administration declared the strike illegal. Riots following the government's attempt to suppress the strike resulted in twenty deaths. Several cabinet ministers resigned in protest over the way the strike had been handled. Guerrilla activity resurged during the López Michelsen administration, although some groups actually became less active. The FARC was the most active, operating in rural areas in the departments of Antioquia, Tolima, Magdalena, Boyacá, Caquetá, and Meta. The M-19 kidnapped and held more than 400 people for ransom. The ELN, especially active in southern Bolívar Department, kidnapped several prominent people and ambushed army patrols. The EPL, however, declined in importance after the death of its founder, Pedro León Arboleda, in 1975. Although López Michelsen did not view drug trafficking as a serious threat at the beginning of his administration, by 1978 he recognized the ruinous impact that the drug industry was having on the political and economic structure of Colombian society. Corruption financed by the drug rings permeated all levels of the political system. Those in office or campaigning for office who spoke out against the major drug traffickers rightfully feared for their lives. In some areas, prominent drug traffickers were so powerful that they were able to get themselves elected to local or state offices. Although the narcotics industry contributed to a foreign exchange surplus and generated Colombia Review 2016 Page 44 of 396 pages Colombia employment, its overall impact was detrimental to the national economy. The influx of dollars contributed to the increase in the money supply and the creation of a parallel economy that competed with the official economy for financial resources. The industry created "boom towns" in rural Colombia that rose and fell within short periods of time. The income provided by the drug industry was used primarily for conspicuous consumption rather than for productive investment. The slash-and-burn method of cultivating marijuana destroyed fertile land that could have been used for legal food production, resulting in both a damaged environment and a national need to import food. The parallel economy contaminated the official economy through the laundering of narco-dollars, often through the "side windows" of government banks and the real estate industry. Drug traffickers also purchased legitimate businesses, such as banks, textile mills, and sports teams. The drug traffickers' control over a large portion of the illicit economy and a significant amount of the official economy undercut government efforts at national economic planning. In addition, government efforts to combat drug trafficking drained funds, which could have been used more productively elsewhere. In late 1977, observers mistakenly predicted that the Conservative Belisario Betancur Cuartas would win the 1978 presidential election because of the division of the PL into rival factions that supported Lleras Restrepo and Julio César Turbay Ayala. Turbay became the nominee of the PL after his faction won the most seats in the February 1978 congressional elections. The presidential campaign was largely personalistic in that neither candidate took specific positions on major issues. The candidates differed, however, in their reliance on partisan machinery. Turbay stressed the party connection, whereas Betancur, representing the minority party, claimed to be a candidate of its National Movement (Movimiento Nacional), which joined together Conservatives, dissident Liberals, remnants of Anapo, and members of the Christian Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrática Cristiano-- PSDC). Turbay won the presidential election by a narrow margin; approximately 60 percent of all voters abstained. The Turbay administration (1978-82) inherited a slightly improved financial situation because the austerity measures instituted under López Michelsen and declining coffee revenues had produced a lower rate of inflation by 1978. Turbay focused his economic policy on reducing unemployment and avoiding an impending recession. A main goal was the decentralization of fiscal resources and the promotion of regional autonomy, which made public investment in infrastructure a priority. His National Integration Plan (Plan de Integración Nacional--PIN) of 1979-82 foresaw growth in public investment to reach 19 percent in real terms. Because government revenues from coffee exports were declining at this time, Turbay had to finance the growth in public spending by turning to foreign loans. The increased public spending thus contributed both to a renewed rise in inflation and to a massive increase in foreign debt. Attempting to avoid a recession, Turbay also encouraged foreign investment in Colombia and promoted domestic investment in labor-intensive industries to reduce high urban unemployment. In spite of increased government spending, Colombia experienced a recession caused by tight credit and high interest rates, a reduction in protectionist tariffs, grants of import licenses for industrial goods, smuggled imports, and a decreased world Colombia Review 2016 Page 45 of 396 pages Colombia demand for industrial goods produced in Colombia. Shortly after taking office, Turbay gave top priority to combating guerrilla activity and narcotics trafficking. Although designed ostensibly to counteract drug trafficking, the institution of a state of siege and the National Security Statute of 1978 substantially enhanced the government's ability to act against guerrillas. Critics charged that the military and police forces used the security statute to detain indiscriminately "cultural subversives"- -including prominent journalists, artists, and scholars--who were suspected of being associated with left-wing elements. Threats to invoke the security statute in nonpolitical cases, such as protests for a better water supply, suppressed popular unrest. Persons arrested on political charges alleged that the armed forces had resorted to torture during interrogation. Although the government claimed that tough measures were needed to counter leftist subversion, critics asserted that repression resulted from the worsening economic situation. The deteriorating human rights situation drew criticism from leaders of both parties and from international organizations such as Amnesty International. Turbay lifted the state of siege and nullified the security statute in June 1982, shortly before leaving office. Despite the severe measures taken against leftist subversion, guerrilla activity increased and reached a peak during the Turbay administration. Although the ELN was less active than during the López Michelsen administration, the FARC expanded its operations, especially in Cauca and Caldas departments. The M-19 emerged as the most active guerrilla group during this period. In January 1979, members of the M-19 tunneled into a military arsenal in Bogotá and took 5,000 guns. Within a few weeks, however, most of the weapons were recovered, and many of the participants were arrested. In October 1979, more than 200 accused M-19 members were brought to trial in Bogotá. The delay of other military trials of M-19 members probably led to the movement's takeover of the embassy of the Dominican Republic in February 1980, in which fourteen diplomats, including the ambassador of the United States, were held hostage. The seizure ended peacefully when the kidnappers received safe conduct out of the city and a promise that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission would be permitted to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. By the end of 1981, the M-19 had shifted from purely urban to mostly rural operations and had formed a tenuous union with the other three guerrilla groups. In March of that year, Turbay proposed--and the Senate approved--a limited four-month amnesty for those guerrillas already detained if a sufficient number in the field were to lay down their arms. A second limited amnesty for those guerrillas who surrendered peacefully was approved for the period from February to June 1982. Turbay also took a strong stance against drug traffickers. In 1978 the president gave the army a key role in the main operation to control drug trafficking and marijuana cultivation in the Colombia Review 2016 Page 46 of 396 pages Colombia department of La Guajira, including allowing a military occupation of the region. Two years later, the government transferred responsibility for the antidrug campaign in La Guajira to units of the National Police. Combined efforts with the United States produced some success; for example, the joint Operation Tiburón, which began in December 1980, resulted in the seizure of more than 2,700 tons of marijuana. Despite some impressive victories, however, the drug traffickers continued to wield increasing economic and political power in the country. In the early 1980s, evidence came to the fore linking some Colombian drug traffickers with both Cuba and the M-19. In 1982 a federal grand jury in Miami indicted four close aides of Cuban president Fidel Castro Ruz on charges of smuggling narcotics into the United States. According to the indictment, the aides assisted the operations of Colombia drug trafficker Jaime Guillot Lara, who, in turn, funneled arms and money on Cuba's behalf to the M-19. A contradictory episode in the relationship between the guerrillas and the drug trade was the December 1981 founding of the right-wing "paramilitary" group Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores--MAS) by prominent drug lords Carlos Ledher Rivas and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez. MAS apparently was established to intimidate and punish those guerrilla groups, especially the M-19, that had engaged in the ransom of key members of the drug community in order to finance their operations. MAS subsequently became a death squad, targeting left-wing politicians, students, and party members. The post-National Front Liberal presidencies proved unable to stem the growth in guerrilla activity and narcotics trafficking. A divided PL thus lost support and the presidency to the PC, effecting a peaceful alternation of power between the two parties. In 1982 the PL presented López Michelsen for reelection, supported by the Turbay faction of the party. Opposing him from the LP was Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento, a member of the Lleras Restrepo faction. In 1979 Galán had formed the New Liberalism Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Liberalismo--MNL) and accused the TurbayLópez Michelsen forces of opportunism, clientelism, and corruption. The PC coalesced again behind Betancur and his National Movement. López Michelsen employed the partisan campaign style that Turbay had used in the previous election, counting on the Liberal majority to remain loyal to the party. Betancur retained his minority strategy of stressing coalition over party affiliation and received endorsements from Gloria Eliécer Gaitán, daughter of Jorge Gaitán, and from María Eugenia Rojas. With the voter abstention rate reduced to 54 percent, Betancur won a decisive victory, receiving support from some traditionally Liberal areas. The election represented the first peaceful exchange of power between the two parties since the end of the National Front. Upon taking office, Betancur confronted the economic and social conditions bequeathed by his predecessors: economic recession, fiscal deficit, foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment. The parallel economy remained a major concern, as did the growing strength of drug traffickers. On the social front, Betancur sought to negotiate a peace with the guerrillas, offering them unconditional amnesty and legitimate participation in the political system. Colombia Review 2016 Page 47 of 396 pages Colombia SOURCE: Library of Congress: Country Studies Series -- Colombia Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the Bibliography. Political Conditions Post-Independence In 1819, following the establishment of the Republic of Greater Colombia, Simón Bolivar and Francisco de Paula Santander were elected as president and vice president. The two leaders, Bolivar and Santander, had conflicting political views and therefore gained the support of different followers. While Bolivar promoted a strong central government, limited franchise and an alliance between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, Santander advocated a decentralized government, widened suffrage, and state control over education and other civil institutions, without the involvement of the church. Conflicts between the followers of Bolivar and Santander led to the development of the two political parties that have since dominated Colombian politics, namely the "Partido Conservativo," also known as the PC, or Conservative Party and the "Partido Liberal," also called the PL, or Liberal Party. The "Partido Conservativo" and the "Partido Liberal" held the presidency for roughly equal periods of time throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and, unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia maintained a seldom-interrupted tradition of civilian government with regular, free elections. In 1830, Venezuela and Ecuador seceded from the republic and the military assumed power, but civilian rule was restored within a year. In 1854, PL president José María Obando was overthrown in a coup d'état led by Gen. José María Melo, who represented an opposing faction of Obando's own "Partido Liberal." Melo declared himself dictator, but proved unable to consolidate the interests of his faction and was overthrown and replaced by a civilian president after only eight months in power. Colombia Review 2016 Page 48 of 396 pages Colombia Despite Colombia's commitment to democratic institutions, periods of widespread, violent conflict have been common in the nation's history. Bitter rivalry between the "Partid o Conservativo" and the "Partido Liberal" led to two civil wars, the War of a Thousand Day and "La Violencia," during which up to 300,000 lives were lost. A lead actor in reducing the conflict during "La Violencia" was Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who subsequently acquired a great deal of popular support. In 1953, Rojas Pinilla came to power via military coup. His populist rule eventually triggered the PC and PL elites to unite and form an alliance against him, which they called the National Front. When Pinilla failed to restore democratic rule after four years, the military overthrew him with the backing of the PC, the PL and most organized groups. A provisional government was subsequently installed. In July 1957, the National Front, led by Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, who held the presidency from 1945-46, and Conservative Laureano Gomez, who served as president from 1950-53, issued the Declaration of Sitges. In it, they laid the foundations for a coalition government, whereby the presidency would alternate between the two parties every four years through regular elections. The parties would also have parity in all other elective and appointive offices. The agreement was a constructive effort to pacify the inter-party strife and distrust that had contributed to violence and the collapse of the democratic system. In the end, the National Front did bring "La Violencia" to an end, in addition to instituting farreaching economic and social reforms. From 1961 to 1974, Colombia received funding for reforms through an inter-American program of economic assistance called the Alliance for Progress, which had major financial backing by the United States. The Alliance for Progress made strides in cutting government expenses, while simultaneously working to resolve problems of inflation, unemployment and inequitable income distribution. The Emergence of Insurgent Groups The National Front broke up in 1974. By that time, its nonpartisan structure, in addition to massive rural to urban migration, had weakened party affiliations. Political parties had become fragile, divided into factions, and reluctant to engage in competition. Nevertheless, the National Front period reflected a growing gap between the issues and agendas of the political elite and the demands, concerns and expectations of the general population. As a result of the "Partido Conservativo" and "Partido Liberal" political dominance, social and economic policies favored a small segment of the population. (One-third of the Colombian population earned 70 percent of the income and only two percent of the population owned 70 percent of the land.) With the process of modernization, new social groups and classes had emerged, which the government failed to accommodate. Political parties other than the PL and the PC were excluded from the government, and the populace became increasingly cynic al and distrustful of political institutions and leadership. Colombia Review 2016 Page 49 of 396 pages Colombia This prompted the emergence of various armed groups, influenced by several forms of communism. These insurgents were forced to the periphery in the 1950s during "La Violencia," but by 1964, the "liberals comunes" and the communists joined forces to form the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia , also known as FARC. In 1965, the National Liberation Army, or ELN, a guerrilla group based on the Cuban model, was formed. This was followed by the 1966 formation of the Maoist-inspired Popular Liberation Army, also called EPL. These three groups occasionally worked in conjunction with one another (Note: In 1987 they organized the Simón Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination.) Thus, Colombia experienced a radicalization of peasant movements, an increase in urban protests, a growing restlessness within the urban labor movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla activity. The country became immersed in a violent civil war that would last into the 21st century. Colombians were extremely dissatisfied with the government's mismanagement of the economy, and a massive underground economy emerged, fueled by drug trafficking and marijuana and cultivation. The rise of this parallel financial market placed a large portion of the national economy beyond the control of legitimate authority. To date, the major threats to regional integration and security in Colombia have been the guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In order to fully understand the present guerrilla and paramilitary situation, it is necessary to examine the various players involved: 1. The FARC is the oldest, largest and most organized insurgent group in Colombia and in the Americas. It has widespread operations throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of neighboring countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. The FARC's main leaders, Manuel Marulanda and Jose Briceño , receive support from all segments of the population, but mostly at the rural level. The FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. It is estimated that 60 percent of its income is derived from taxing the drug trade. Drug cultivation and production occur in southern Colombia where the FARC is based, and drug traffickers essentially control the industry while the FARC protects it. The two groups are separate and strive to attain different goals. The FARC ultimately seeks to gain political power and thereby revise the government's current economic, social and political policies to suit their ideology. They advocate democracy, agrarian reform and state control. Methods of retaliation against the government (security forces and politicians) and foreigners include bombing and killing. The FARC is well equipped and trained to fight the Colombian army. 2. The ELN is a pro-Soviet group of rebels led by Nicolas Rodriguez. They are mostly rurally based, with a primary concentration in the northeast bordering Venezuela. The ELN employs similar tactics as the FARC, such as kidnapping for ransom money, to sustain their operations. They are opposed to privatization and foreign investment, as exemplified by the bombing of Colombia Review 2016 Page 50 of 396 pages Colombia electricity pylons and oil pipelines. Essentially, the ELN activities are aimed at achieving political status; the group ultimately envisions a socialist government. 3. Originally a Maoist group of rebels, the EPL traditionally resorted to violence for political achievement but they now use peaceful methods. Since making peace with the government they have enjoyed some political representation. They are often subject to attacks from other guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups. 4. The primary paramilitary group, is the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, or AUC. The group originated in northern Colombia with operations currently spanning 550 municipalities. Paramilitary groups were originally created in the 1980s by the government to combat guerrilla activities. However, due to rampant activities that the AUC performed against the civilian population, the government declared the group illegal in 1989. The AUC is often criticized for indiscriminate sprees that kill guerrilla sympathizers. Although the government formally severed its ties with the paramilitaries, it is widely known that certain army members and politicians are actively involved in AUC operations. In addition, the AUC receives most of its funding and support from drug barons, right-wing landowners and businessmen. Carlos Castaño, leader of the AUC, publicly admitted to receiving funds from drug traffickers. Events in the 1980s In 1984, President Belisario Betancur, a conservative who won 47 percent of the popular vote, negotiated a cease-fire that included the release of many guerrillas imprisoned during the effort to overpower the insurgents. The cease-fire began to unravel when Democratic Alliance/M-19 (AD/M-19) guerrillas resumed fighting in 1985. A vicious attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogotá by the AD/M-19 on Nov. 6-7, 1985, shocked Colombia and the entire world. Of the 115 people killed, 11 were Supreme Court justices. Although the government and the FARC, the largest guerrilla group, renewed their truce in March 1986, peace with the AD/M-19 and dissident factions of other guerrilla groups seemed remote as Betancur left office. The next administrations had to contend with both guerrillas and narcotics traffickers, who operated with relative impunity within Colombia. Narco-terrorists assassinated three presidential candidates before Cesar Gaviria Trujillo was elected in 1990. With the death of the Medellín drug cartel leader, Pablo Escobar, in December 1993, indiscriminate acts of violence associated with that organization abated. Events in the 1990s Colombia Review 2016 Page 51 of 396 pages Colombia President Ernesto Samper assumed office in August 1994. Samper vowed to continue many of the economic and foreign policy goals of the Gaviria administration, while also placing greater emphasis on addressing social inequities and eliminating poverty. Samper's political crisis (relating to contributions from drug traffickers to his 1994 presidential campaign) diverted attention away from these social programs, however, thus slowing, and in some cases, halting progress. His vice president, Humberto de la Calle Lombana, resigned in September 1996 in protest of the president's mismanagement of the government and narco-links. De la Calle was replaced by Carlos Lemos Simmonds. By 1996, economic growth had slowed and unemployment increased in Colombia as a result of an overvalued currency, excessive public spending, and the impact of global financial instability. Presidential elections were held once again in 1998, and constitutional law prohibited Samper from seeking re-election. The main candidates were Andrés Pastrana of the Social Conservative Party, Horacio Serpa of the "Partido Liberal," and independents Noemi Sanin and Harold Bedoya. In the first round, held on May 31, Pastrana received 34.4 percent of the vote, Serpa took 34.6 percent, Sanin received 26.9 percent, and Bedoya gained 1.9 percent. Sanin's record gain jolted Colombia's two-party system, as hers was the first independent candidacy to seriously challenge the Liberal and Conservative parties' power monopoly. In the run-off election, held on June 18, Pastrana defeated Serpa with 52 percent of the vote to Serpa's 48 percent. On Aug. 7, 1998, Andrés Pastrana was sworn in as president of Colombia. He inherited a host of problems centered around the ongoing 34-year civil war between guerrilla operations by leftist rebel groups and right-wing paramilitary groups, as well as the ever-growing illicit drug trade and a failing economy. The Pastrana administration concentrated its resources in four areas: promoting regional integration and security, expanding economic growth, strengthening counter-narcotics operations and restoring damaged relations with the United States. At the time of Pastrana's administration, the government's security forces nvolved in the fighting were the army and police; they cooperated to form a drug-fighting unit. The air force and navy also assisted, but their role was limited. However, all security force divisions were revised and trained, especially the army, which has been known to sympathize with the AUC. In several reported instances, the army sent troops to help the paramilitary combat guerrilla forces. An average of 3,000 people per year are killed in Colombia as a result of the civil war. When he was functioning as president-elect, Andrés Pastrana took several steps toward addressing the guerrilla issues. Following a historic secret meeting with FARC head Manuel Marulanda in July 1998, Pastrana announced plans to begin peace talks within 90 days of his inauguration. The announcement came just before a meeting in Germany between Colombian delegates and leaders of the FARC. While committed to strengthening his security forces, Pastrana was determined to Colombia Review 2016 Page 52 of 396 pages Colombia solve the guerrilla problem via peace talks. The Center for Strategic Studies was created to facilitate dialogue between civilians and the military. In the weeks after his Aug. 7, 1998, inauguration, President Pastrana visited United States President Bill Clinton. He expressed his hopes for bringing about a peaceful resolution to Colombia's long-standing civil conflict and conveyed his commitment to cooperating fully with the United States in combating trafficking in illegal drugs. Severe countrywide guerrilla attacks carried out on Aug. 3, 4 and 5, 1998, by the FARC and ELN, which left at least 135 dead and more than 180 soldiers and police taken prisoner, highlighted the difficulties faced by President Pastrana. In November 1998, President Pastrana complied with FARC demands to pull government troops out of a so-called demilitarized zone in southern Colombia. The FARC had insisted on the withdrawal as a prerequisite to peace talks with the government. Despite the military withdrawal, formal peace talks set for Jan. 7, 1999, were postponed until April 2 because the FARC alleged the government was involved in a surge of paramilitary attacks. During the ensuing months, the FARC retained full control of the demilitarized zone and created a Marxist mini-state the size of Switzerland. Peace talks commenced in January 1999, but a cease-fire was not reached. In February 1999, the government extended the FARC's right to their stronghold. In a speech given at Rice University's Baker Institute in the United States, President Pastrana suggested that these concessions were all part of a peace process that would require time and patience. Nevertheless, the ramifications of this decision were significant in three ways: several government officials resigned, the ELN increased their activities, and the AUC retaliated. The ELN convened with government officials to discuss peace, but talks were short-lived as the government refused to grant ELN their own demilitarized zone. In April and May 1999, ELN kidnappings, which were meant to pressure the government into creating an ELN stronghold, significantly increased. The first event in this series of kidnappings was the hijacking of a plane, followed by the kidnapping of church worshippers and the kidnapping of fishermen. Throughout the year, the ELN also bombed oil pipelines and electricity pylons. Despite the Pastrana administration's efforts to curb insurgent groups and narcotics trafficking, and despite meetings between Pastrana and FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, FARC-related activities continued to spread throughout Colombia, causing concern amongst the population at large. Municipalities that surround FARC headquarters were slowly succumbing to FARC control, and police forces in the area were frequently invaded. Mayors in the area had been slain, and the FARC continued to threaten politicians who opposed their political agenda. Colombia Review 2016 Page 53 of 396 pages Colombia On May 26, 1999, a key member of the Pastrana government, Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda, resigned, citing his disagreement with the withdrawal and asserting that the president was making too many concessions to the rebels while getting nothing in return. Nearly half of Colombia's generals and some 200 other officers also resigned. The sentiment of "too many concessions, not enough in return" was widely felt by Colombians. Economic Woes The security crisis notwithstanding, Colombia was also suffering from an economic crisis. The severity of Colombia's economic crisis was comparable to the economic slump of the 1930s. While some improvements were realized, the Pastrana administration was faced with significant unemployment (20 percent in urban areas), a fiscal deficit, public spending of US$4.4 billion. It also faced a five percent contraction in GDP, a price slump in coffee and oil exports, and a crisis in the banking system. In an effort to help the export sector, the government devalued the peso. In late May 1999, President Pastrana launched a plan to increase foreign investment in Colombia and pull the country out of its worst recession in 50 years. The president promised to allow some private investment in infrastructure projects and fully privatize state-owned mining, telephone and utility companies. The Pastrana administration also created Plan Colombia to address the following issues: the economy, democracy, the peace process, drug trafficking and social reform. The cost of the plan was US$7 billion, of which Colombia would contribute US$4 billion and the international community was expected to fund the remaining US$3 billion. President Pastrana spent several weeks in the latter part of 1999 visiting with heads of state in North America and Europe to promote funding for Plan Colombia. In September 1999, the United States Congress formulated a US$1.7 billion assistance package for Colombia. The Clinton administration publicly supported Plan Colombia, which would make the country the third largest recipient of United States aid. Funding would span two years in the form of goods and services such as the creation of counter-drug units and the supply of weapons and helicopters. The premise of the package was to eradicate drug production, mostly in Colombia but also in other Andean countries. Meanwhile, several members of the Colombia's two houses of Congress were charged with fraud. Throughout 1999, more than US$3 million worth of contracts were approved, the majority of which were for "maintenance" purposes. A closer investigation of the accounts revealed that only 20 percent of the funds were actually used for repairs, leaving the remaining 80 percent unaccounted for. This prompted President Pastrana to dismiss several key Congress members. In addition, two senior officials were arrested on corruption charges. Shortly afterwards, President Colombia Review 2016 Page 54 of 396 pages Colombia Pastrana proposed an anti-corruption referendum, which would replace the current Congress. The minister of the interior resigned, citing his disapproval of the president's request to revoke the Congress. As well, Congress members reacted to the proposed referendum by blocking the government's key economic legislation required to comply with an economic plan proposed by the International Monetary Fund. Amid growing political uncertainty, President Pastrana canceled the referendum on May 26, 2000. He appointed Humberto de la Calle, a Pastrana sympathizer, to the Ministry of the Interior, and proceeded in modifying ministerial positions in an effort to obtain more support. By January 2000, Colombia witnessed a significant increase in oil contracts with Canadian, Brazilian and American companies. Still, foreign investment in the form of oil pipelines and electricity pylons began to decrease given the deteriorating security. Events in 2000 In March 2000, the United States House of Representatives approved a bill that included the US$1.7 billion aid package. Release of the funds, however, was contingent on the approval of the United States Senate, and was stalled for several months. Advocates of the aid package utilized Bolivia and Peru as examples of countries where drug eradication had successfully decreased drug production, while opponents of the plan noted that the drug production had just shifted from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. In 2000, Colombia supplied 75 percent of the world's cocaine and was becoming a leading supplier of heroin. Many view the drug trade as inherent with the guerrilla and paramilitary, since both groups derive the bulk of their income by taxing drug operations. Consequently, United States funding was inevitably expected to go towards fighting insurgent groups, leading many to believe that the United States would be mired in an ongoing civil war that had already claimed thousands of lives. In retaliation for the pending United States aid package, the FARC revealed plans on April 25, 2000, to levy a peace tax on all Colombians and or businesses with assets worth US$1 million or more. In addition, the FARC intended to administer justice throughout the 130 FARC-controlled municipalities. Shortly afterwards, the FARC announced the formation of its political party known as the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia. These activities left many Colombians doubting the possibility of an imminent cease-fire. Colombia's principal peace negotiator resigned and was replaced. President Pastrana abruptly cancelled peace talks scheduled for May 29, 2000, in reaction to the brutal slaying of 53-year-old Elvia Cortés, a rancher and mother of four. A bomb placed around her neck detonated when she failed to pay US$7,000 worth of ransom money. International observers were appalled by the incident. The government blamed the FARC, who in turn denied Colombia Review 2016 Page 55 of 396 pages Colombia responsibility. Later evidence, indeed, suggested that the FARC was not involved. Regardless of the true identity of those responsible, at the time, Colombia had a higher rate of kidnapping incidents than any other nation in the world. While peace talks between FARC and the government progressed slowly, peace talks with the ELN were advancing at a more rapid pace. In April 2000, the ELN began releasing hostages, and the government agreed to peace talks. The government stated the possibility of creating a 2,900-square-kilometer demilitarized zone for the ELN in the northeastern state of Bolivar, if, in return, the ELN will permit international observers and allow government officials, such as judges and police, to continue working. These concessions provoked the paramilitaries and the people living in the area to set up roadblocks. On June 22, 2000, the United States Senate finally approved a modified version of an aid package worth just under $US1 billion for Plan Colombia, about $US700 million less than the package the United States lower house approved in March, and additional United States funds for Plan Colombia were approved in the following weeks. Human rights activists around the world were skeptical of the aid package, contending that its militaristic approach would result in the death of more innocent civilians and prolong the armed conflict. Still, President Pastrana and former United States President Bill Clinton were pleased that the package was approved. Another round of peace talks between the government and the FARC were held on July 3, 2000, but the United States aid package provided another obstacle to a cease-fire being reached. Peace talks between FARC and the government were then suspended in November 2000. The FARC said that the government should take more aggressive action against right-wing paramilitary groups, which it claims to be an organ of the state used to terrorize civilians. The government refused to admit the AUC to the peace talks, but many officials said its inclusion would be essential for the achievement of peace. Events in 2001 Talks resumed in February 2001, when President Pastrana paid a visit to the demilitarized zone to meet with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. Pastrana and Marulanda composed a new agreement called the "Los Pozos Accord" in which they proposed to accelerate the talks, hold regular meetings between FARC leaders and foreign diplomats, begin organizing a ceasefire, establish a committee dedicated to easing the intensity of the conflict, and create a mechanism for the government to check that the demilitarized zone was not being abused. The FARC demanded a stop to military attacks and neo-liberal politics, and the government called for an end to FARC's practices of kidnapping and blackmail. The general Colombian public continued to distrust the process, however, and the FARC's aims remained completely unaligned with those of the government. FARC leaders continued to profess that their goal was to do away with the current state, and if political means did not work, they would continue using force. Violence persisted in Colombia Review 2016 Page 56 of 396 pages Colombia the following months. As if to create more distance between the gove rnment and FARC, the AUC and other paramilitaries embarked on the killing of hundreds of people in dozens of incidents in the early months of 2001. One of the main focuses of their attacks was the ELN, with the aim of preventing the creation of the demilitarized zone for the second-largest guerrilla group. The ELN suspended talks on March 8, 2001, but negotiations were resumed later that month. Whether the plan for the demilitarized zone would come to fruition remained to be seen. Pastrana visited Washington D.C. in February 2001 to meet with newly-inaugurated United States President George W. Bush. The Colombian president was successful in obtaining United States support for the implementation of Plan Colombia and the increase of bilateral trade, but he failed to convince the United States to act as an observer in peace talks with guerrilla groups. In May 2001, both the government and civilians were alarmed when bombs were set off in the cities of Bogota, Cali, and a suburb of Medillin, killing and injuring hundreds. Prior to these events most of the country's violence had taken place in rural areas, not in the cities where 70 percent of the population resides, so the urban attacks were seen as an escalation in the level of gravity of the guerrilla violence. FARC was suspected of being the perpetrator of the Bogota and Cali bombings, and the AUC of the Medillin bombing. The right and left rebel armies, had been divided up a great deal of the countryside between them, were now threatening to take their war to the cities. Also in mid-2001, under foreign pressure and following several brutal civilian massacres by the AUC, the government initiated firmer action against the right-wing paramilitaries. Officials arrested dozens of AUC members and leaders, and investigated several ranch homes in the AUC's stronghold in the department of Cordoba. With this and the fact that the FARC had re-entered AUC-controlled areas of Cordoba in early and mid-2001, committing attacks, it appeared that the AUC was faltering somewhat. In late May, its leader Carlos Castaño resigned. On June 2, 2001, after weeks of deadlock due to legal concerns of the armed forces and political sectors, the government and FARC reached a humanitarian accord through which FARC released 42 imprisoned police officers and soldiers in exchange for the government's release of 15 ill guerilla prisoners. Although it was only a minor step in the grand scheme of things, the accord was the first tangible result reached through the peace talks. The government saw it as an exhibition of the validity of the peace talks, since FARC had backed down considerably on its demands for the exchange. FARC claimed that the exchange was a display of its aim for peace. However, three weeks later, FARC bombings and attacks in southern Bogota produced the heaviest casualties on the armed forces in years. In fact, a factor that FARC leaders had probably take n into consideration while negotiating the agreement was that freeing prisoners would free up more of its own soldiers for combat. According to the authorities, over 500 troops and policemen are in the hands of the FARC. Colombia Review 2016 Page 57 of 396 pages Colombia Meanwhile, Plan Colombia was up and running, and opposition to its measures involving the spraying of weed-killers on coca fields mounted in 2001. On July 27, a judge ruled in favor of a group of Amazonian Indians who complained of the government's failure to examine the effect of the chemicals on health and the environment. The judge later modified his ruling so that it applied only to certain indigenous reserves, and the police continued to spray in all other areas. Opponents to the spraying, including six department governors, claimed that the spraying was extremely hazardous to human health. Some of them lobbied to the United States Congress, and the United Nations Drug-Control Program called for international monitoring of the spraying. As time passed, the probability that peace talks would produce an accord looked bleak, an all-out war seemed more and more likely. In June, FARC rejected suggestions that a constituent assembly be formed to reform Colombia's constitution, reiterating that its demand was for a direct role in government. In July, FARC guerrillas kidnapped three German aid workers and seized a provincial governor from a United Nations car, thus antagonizing European governments who had supported the peace talks. In August, the government broke off talks with the ELN about arranging for peace talks between the two entities. It was expected that the FARC and ELN would increase their use of military force in the months preceding the May 2002 presidential elections. In 2001, reforms that would serve to boost the economy were pending in the arenas of proposed pension restructuring, tax increases, and cuts to public-sector wages and local government running costs. Many feared that in the face of internal war, high unemployment, a weak financial system, and Colombia's credit shortage, fiscal austerity would be difficult to implement, and the fiscal deficit would be uncontrollable. Oil, coffee, and coal were Colombia's three highest foreign exchange earners, and their prospects looked good, but private foreign investment was slow in picking up after the deep 1999 recession. The violence and disorder that remained rampant in Colombia were a severe detriment to investors' confidence in the country's future. President Pastrana's goal had been to enter a peace agreement with FARC before the end of his term in 2002. At the very least, he hoped to advance in the process to the point that it became irreversible, so that the talks and the forging of ties between FARC and foreign diplomats would convince the FARC to demand less, accept representative democracy, and account for its actions. By September 2001, however, popular support for the armed forces was on the rise. With the aid of Plan Colombia, the armed forces were gaining a great deal of strength, having benefited from the training of troops, more sophisticated American equipment, and better intelligence. While Pastrana and the United Nations continued to advocate for peace talks, and the United States continued its strategy of coca eradication, the Colombian army was engaged in a great deal of combat and apparently believed itself to be capable of defeating its opponents. Many Colombians believed that it would take being devastated on the battlefield for the guerillas to begin negotiating seriously for peace. Colombia Review 2016 Page 58 of 396 pages Colombia Events in 2002 On Sunday, Jan. 13, 2002, Colombia's President, Andres Pastrana, and leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) called off their three-year peace negotiations. FARC was instructed to evacuate the demilitarized zone in the south of the country by the afternoon of January 15. While FARC agreed to evacuate five towns in this region, the Colombian military was prepared to use force to evacuate FARC members that remained in the jungle. FARC threatened retaliatory action against the government. On Monday, Jan. 14, 2002, with the intervention of international diplomats from a special United Nations convoy, last-minute peace talks were resumed between Colombian President Andres Pastrana, and the rebel militant group, FARC. As a result, FARC continued to maintain the demilitarized zone while peace negotiations were being discussed. On Feb. 21, 2002, the Colombian government broke off peace talks with FARC and began bombing the country's southern rebel-held demilitarized zone. President Pastrana declared an end to the peace process after FARC militants hijacked an airplane carrying Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay, the president of the Colombian Senate's peace commission. When the plan landed in the southern Colombia, rebels took the Senator to an unknown location, but freed the remaining passengers who were left unharmed. A few years prior, Turbay's cousin, a congressman, was also kidnapped and subsequently murdered. Several government officials in Colombia have been kidnapped and murdered by either FARC or paramilitary groups. In early March 2002, parliamentary elections were held. Results showed that despite some rather heavy electoral losses, the Colombian Liberal Party (54 of 161 seats) and the Colombian Conservative Party (21 of 161 seats) remained the two largest parties in the country. Two months later, the presidential election ensued in Colombia. The election was free of violence and chaos, thanks to the presence of over 200,000 police and soldiers at polling stations throughout the country. There was, however, relatively low turnout. Alvaro Uribe, an independent candidate and lawyer aligned with outgoing President Pastrana, won the first round of the presidential election. His victory was won with 53 percent of the votes cast. In this way, Uribe secured a definite majority of the votes cast against the other 10 candidates and precluded the need for a second round of voting. Uribe's closest opponent, Horacio Serpa, the leader of the Liberal Party, garnered 31percent of the vote. Serpa promptly resigned as leader of the Liberal Party following the election. Outgoing President Pastrana was constitutionally barred from running for an additional term and his Conservative Party was ensconced in such turmoil that it did not offer a Conservative candidate to contest the election. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the primary left-wing rebel group, boycotted the election. Colombia Review 2016 Page 59 of 396 pages Colombia The newly-elected president called upon both the United States and the United Nations to offer assistance to Colombia in dealing with its ongoing civil war. Specifically, Uribe asked for military aid to combat narcotics trafficking and to prevent the transference of arms to rebel groups. Assistance in negotiating with left-wing rebels, such as FARC, as well as right-wing paramilitaries, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was also requested. Uribe's landslide victory was viewed as a tremendous show of support for increased military spending. Although Uribe promised an agenda of peace and security, critics suggested that he would give preferentiality to right-wing paramilitaries, in contrast to left-wing rebels. However, Uribe asserted his intent to take a hard-line approach with both groups. Despite this assertion, the AUC conveyed its congratulations to Uribe. Uribe's proposed policies and programs included a plan to return Colombia's extensive coca fields back to their natural tropical forest, commercial loans for the unemployed to establish new businesses, and the reduction of the number of parliamentarians by half, as well as a salary cut for remai ning parliamentarians. Meanwhile, the death toll in Colombia's ongoing political farrago continued to mount with no decisive or absolute guarantee of peace in the near future. Indeed, by August 2002, Colombia's new president declared a national state of emergency following several days of violence that came on the heels of his inauguration. Using the powers provided by the constitution of Colombia, Uribe led an emergency cabinet meeting that resulted in the suspension of civil liberties in the face of threats to the country's security. The wave of violence began with attacks at a military barracks and at the presidential palace. The violence continued with a death toll exceeding 100 people in a short period of time. In accordance with the constitution, the state of emergency could endure for as many as 90 days and if required, it could be extended for two 90-day periods. In addition to the state of emergency, Uribe also established an emergency tax which would allow the government to direct approximately $778 million toward military expenditures. Intensified military action was deemed necessary to deal with FARC, the left-wing guerrilla group reportedly responsible for the spate of violence. Events in 2003 Another spate of violence plagued Colombia in early 2003. A plane with four Americans and one Colombian crashed in a part of Colombia controlled by FARC. Two of the survivors -- one of the Americans and the sole Colombian -- were assassinated "execution style," presumably by the leftist rebels. The remaining three individuals were seemingly taken hostage. The crash followed just after another plane crash in which Juan Luis Londono, a Colombian cabinet minister, was one of Colombia Review 2016 Page 60 of 396 pages Colombia the victims. That plane also went down in rebel-held territory but no cause of the crash has yet been determined. Efforts to retrieve the bodies of government personnel on the aircraft were hampered by gunfire from FARC activists in the region. In addition to the plane crashes, two car bombs exploded at an exclusive club in Bogota frequented by diplomatic staff and the country's elite. The blasts killed 35 people, including six children. The rebel group FARC was again implicated in these incidences. Only a few days prior, another bomb exploded. That time, the blast took place in a western town called Neiva. Seventeen people died and over 30 people were injured in the bomb blast, which appeared to have originated in a house that was planted with explosives. Once again, the primary suspects were the members of FARC. In August 2003, a year after President Uribe was inaugurated, three separate bomb attacks took place, killing six people and injuring several others. One attack took place in San Martin, about 125 miles (200 kilometers) south of the Colombian capital of Bogota. An earlier car bomb exploded on a highway just sou th of Bogota, while the first in the spate of bombings took place in Arauca. FARC was reported to have been responsible for the latest attacks. Then, in October 2003, Marco Aurelio Buendia, of the Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC), was killed in fighting just north-east of the Colombian capital city of Bogota. The Colombian army stated that the senior rebel commander, as well as nine other guerillas, had been killed in the violent clashes. The army also declared the death of Buendia to be one of the most important victories in the fight against the rebel insurgency movement since President Alvaro Uribe came to power in 2002. Since coming to power, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe promised to deal with the leftist rebels, as well as the right-wing paramilitaries, in order to bring some semblance of peace to the country. Uribe had campaigned on a platform of tough and unrelenting action against all rebel forces, however, a year into his presidency, it was apparent that his efforts had garnered little results. Some analysts said that the tough stances by Uribe to crush the rebels seemed to compel them to take stronger actions against the government. Still, Uribe successfully managed to survive more than half a dozen assassination attempts. With pressure mounting, President Uribe revealed his plan to end his country's state of civil war in June 2003. The plan included measures to resist the country's narcotics trading industry, which fueled the war between the government, Marxist rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, for close to four decades. Part of the program included the systematic destruction of all drug crops across the country. The aggressive plan was not intended to lessen the violent conflict, but rather, to end the war completely. As such, the plan was focused on achieving the permanent presence of democratic authority across the country, 40 percent of which was controlled by either Marxist rebels or paramilitaries. Its provisions included strikes against these two factions and the establishment of security presences throughout Colombia, particularly in areas currently controlled by nonColombia Review 2016 Page 61 of 396 pages Colombia government forces. One of the objectives of the security impetus was the cessation of kidnappings. In 2003, there was approximately one abduction reported every four hours. Although President Uribe's approach was supported by 60 percent of the public, it remained challenged by a lack of funding, and the fact that Uribe's presidential mandate would last only until 2006. Uribe was constitutionally barred from running for office for another term. Over the course of 40 years, rebels and paramilitaries had seen several presidents come and go. As such, some skeptics suggested that although they would be stymied by Uribe's efforts in the remaining years of his time in office, they would likely wait out the duration of his tenure and reconstitute their efforts when he was gone from office. President Uribe faced a political setback in October 2003 when a referendum aimed at garnering support for a number of structural reforms to the political system failed. The inability to secure sufficient support for the 15 reforms - ranging from congressional voting to funding for government projects - was blamed on poor voter turnout, confusion caused by the questions and fears of violence. In November 2003, Fernando Londono, who held both the justice and interior portfolios in President Alvaro Uribe's government, stepped down. Relations between the minister and the president had been tense as a result of Londono's criticism of Uribe for failing to make progress of political reforms. Soon thereafter, Defense Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez resigned. No reason was given for the sudden decision on her part. Also in November 2003, explosions at two nightclubs in the Colombian capit al city of Bogota left one person dead and at least 72 injured. The attacks occurred within seconds of each other in the Zona Rosa district, which is the venue of several popular nightclubs and bars, and is often frequented by foreigners. According to police reports, the explosions were caused by either bombs or grenades and one suspect was arrested. Early reports suggested that FARC may be responsible. Such incidences suggested that FARC was expanding its campaign of attacks to metropolitan areas. Events in 2004 In 2004, Colombia took an extraordinary step toward mitigating the four-decade civil war in its country. It offered a prisoner exchange to major rebel groups. The government would go on to try to carve out amnesty and peace plans with rebel groups, particularly right-wing paramilitaries, in order to deal with the security situation ravaging parts of the country. The year 2004 marked several advances for the government in its war against the paramilitaries and rebels. In May 2004, Ricardo Palmera, a senior member of FARC was captured and subsequently imprisoned for 35 years. In July 2004, the government commenced talks with the Colombia Review 2016 Page 62 of 396 pages Colombia right-wing paramilitary group, AUC, even leading to an address by AUC leaders in Congress. By the close of 2004, based on progress of the peace process, the AUC agreed to demobilize 450 of its fighters. Events in 2005 In early 2005 bilateral relations took center stage. Venezuelans demonstrated in the streets of their capital city of Caracas to reaffirm the country's sovereignty and to protest Colombia's alleged encroachment into its territory. The demonstration was the latest development in a growing diplomatic crisis. The imbroglio between the two countries was spurred by the arrest of a leading member of the leftist rebel group FARC. Venezuela charged that the arrest allegedly took place in its territory and as such, there was a violation of its sovereign space. In this regard, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez demanded an apology from Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. For its part, however, Colombia denied that the incident took place in Venezuelan territory and no apology from Colombia was forthcoming. Venezuela thusly recalled its ambassador from Colombia in order to register its displeasure with the situation. While Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has had to deal with accusations that he has been sympathetic to Colombia's leftist rebels, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has had to contend with the revelation that his government allegedly paid Venezuelan police for assistance in the arrest of the FARC rebel member. The diplomatic crisis between Venezuela and Colombia eventually came to an end after six weeks of bilateral tension. Rapprochement was reached when Colombia submitted a statement stating that such incidences would not be repeated. In April 2005, the peace process between the Colombian government and the leadership of the right-wing paramilitaries was disintegrating due to opposition to the terms of a proposed amnesty law. For its part, the leaders of AUC said that the legislative framework of the proposed law was too severe because it would leave them vulnerable to extradition to other countries on drug trafficking charges. Meanwhile, countries such as the United States, and international bodies like the United Nations, took the opposite view and criticized the law for being far too lenient. Also in April 2005, conflict within the Colombian military over reforms led to the decision by President Uribe to sack four top army generals. The decision came at a time when Marxist FARC rebels increased attacks in the south-west of the country. Still, soldiers were able to seize control of the town Tacueyo where some FARC rebels had been camping. The town, largely inhabited by indigenous people, was being used as a command center for attacks on other towns close by. In May 2005, Colombian army chief said that recent attacks by Colombia's Marxist rebels (FARC), Colombia Review 2016 Page 63 of 396 pages Colombia was using techniques acquired through training by Irish militants, specifically the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Earlier, in late 2004, three men of Irish descent were convicted and sentenced to 17 years imprisonment for assisting FARC rebels in training on explosives techniques. Their verdict and sentences came after an appeal court reversed their earlier acquittal. The men, however, were not in custody; it was believed that they had fled the country while out on bail. Grenades that were similar to those manufactured by the Provisional IRA had been uncovered by the military. Also in May 2005, Diego Murillo, a leader from AUC, turned himself in following a three-day manhunt in Colombia. Murillo, who also used the name Don Berna, was arrested for suspected involvement in the murder of a politician. Colombian and United States experts believe that he has also been involved in drug trafficking. In June 2005, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe flew to a south-western province to meet military officials for crisis talks. The meeting on June 27, 2005, was with army commanders who were launching a massive counterattack against leftist FARC rebels. The trip came just after two attacks by rebels which left 25 Colombian soldiers dead – the worst losses suffered by the military since Uribe had been in office. The Colombian leader promised no compromise in the aftermath of the attacks. In late November 2005, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe officially announced that he would contest the next presidential elections, scheduled for May 2006, in a bid to secure another term in office. His announcement came after a ruling by the country's constitutional court, which stated that presidents were able to seek a second consecutive term in office. Uribe's campaign platform was to focus on poverty alleviation and stamping out corruption. He had already staked out ground as a hard-liner on security issues. Uribe's high approval ratings placed him in a position of being a favorite to win in 2006. Developments in Early 2006 In early 2006, Colombia's main rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dismissed the idea of an exchange of prisoners with the government of President Alvaro Uribe. A statement on the group's website stated that President Uribe lacked the political will to agree such an arrangement. The statement also acknowledged the "good offices" of France, Spain and Switzerland, which had collectively put forward the idea of establishing a demilitarized zone where the two sides could negotiate the terms of a prisoner exchange program. It has been estimated that FARC has about 60 hostages, including a former politician and foreigners. There was no immediate response from President Uribe's government. That said, in a New Year's Eve speech, the Colombian leader said that such an exchange program was unlikely to occur in the immediate future. In the speech, he also condemned FARC for its attack on a military camp in Colombia Review 2016 Page 64 of 396 pages Colombia southern Colombia, which left about 30 soldiers dead. The assault was regarded as the bloodiest attack by rebels on the army since Uribe had come to office. Authorities also blamed FARC for the destruction of several oil wells and an electricity pylon, which had also occurred around the same period of late 2005 and early 2006. For his part, President Uribe had taken a hardline stance against rebels. Still, in anticipation of presidential and congressional elections set to take place later in 2006, some analysts predicted that he might be interested in securing the release of some hostages in order to build on his political capital. Congressional elections in Colombia ensued in March 2006 amidst fears that Marxist guerrillas might disrupt voting while right-wing paramilitaries intimidated voters. These anxieties increased following a spate of violence carried out by Marxist guerillas in early 2006. Meanwhile, although the paramilitaries were officially demobilized, they warned of their intention to increase their political influence. The congressional elections were expected to function as something of a forecast for the presidential election scheduled for May 2006. If President Uribe could command a majority in the Colombian Congress, then it was believed he could be victorious at the executive level as well. Certainly, a congressional win would advance Uribe's agenda by allowing him to have a working majority for the first time. In the background was the political reality: Political groups on the left were hampered by infighting and a lack of unity, while conservatives linked their political survival with Uribe and, as such, moved to support him. After the votes were counted, election results showed that the political parties aligned with President Uribe won an overwhelming victory. In the Senate, the governing coalition won control of 61 of the 102 seats contested, while in the lower house, those aligned with Uribe took 91 of 166 seats contested. As intimated above, the congressional win foreshadowed a pending victory for Uribe in the upcoming presidential elections. Meanwhile, the Liberal Party's candidate for the presidential election, Horacio Serpa, was also selected at the time of the congressional elections. Serpa, who unsuccessfully contested two previous presidential contests, was expected to be Uribe's main challenger. In April 2006, left-wing Colombian rebels ambushed a team of security forces. The incident left 17 soldiers and secret police officers dead in what was called one of the most violent attacks in the first half of the year. The incident occurred when the rebels opened fire and detonated bombs just as the security forces drove through a mountainous area close to the border with Venezuela. The commander of the Colombian army, Mario Montoya, placed the blame for the attacks on two groups -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the People's Liberation Army. There were fears that rebel groups would increase such attacks ahead of the presidential election Colombia Review 2016 Page 65 of 396 pages Colombia set for May 2006. In May 2006, Colombia was getting ready for its presidential elections in which center-right President Alvaro Uribe was expected to win a second term in office. Elections of 2006 Presidential elections were held in Colombia on May 28, 2006. Hundreds of thousands of security forces were stationed across the country to ensure that the election took place without incident. Generally-speaking, there were few anxieties regarding the security situation since Marxist FARC rebels had already said that they would not cause problems on election day. Sticking with this commitment, FARC was not a factor and election day in Colombia ensued peacefully, without incident, including any known polling irregularities, for the first time in over a decade. Once the polls closed and ballots were counted, incumbent President Alvaro Uribe had been reelected in a landslide election victory with 62 percent of the votes cast. According to the results of Colombia's Electoral Commission, Uribe's wide margin of victory -- handily over the 50 percent threshold -- avoided the need for a runoff election. His closest challenger, left-leaning Senator Carlos Gaviria, garnered 22 percent of the vote share. There were four other candidates contesting the election. Known for his hard-line stance against both left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, his tough policies aimed at combating narcotics production and trafficking, as well as his good relationship with the United States, President Uribe had been favored to win another term in office (as discussed above). His new term in office offered him the opportunity to follow up with his proposal to hold peace talks with rebels, so long as they moved forward with good faith. For decades, the Colombian government has been ensconced in a bloody war with Marxist rebels. For his part, the second-place presidential candidate, Senator Gaviria, graciously accepted his defeat saying, "We're very happy with the results. For the first time in the country's history the main opposition party will be comprised of the democratic left." Senator Gaviria also said resolving Colombia's state of instability and climate of rampant violence had to involve alleviating poverty and inequality. Overall, Uribe's victory was a validation of his record and policies, which have not easily fit into the traditional liberal/conservative dichotomy. His approach to dealing with Colombia's incidence of violence successfully cut the country's high murder and kidnapping rates significantly. His disarmament pact with the right-wing paramilitaries, and his pledge to forge a similar agreement with left-wing rebels have made his goals of peace clear. Nevertheless, his critics have argued that in his efforts to curb violence and drugs, he neglected socio-economic considerations. Colombia Review 2016 Page 66 of 396 pages Colombia Other Developments in 2006 Rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) said in June 2006 that it was declaring war on the smaller guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). To this end, FARC released a statement that said, "We have tried on several occasions to give them the benefit of the doubt as fellow revolutionaries, but we have not received a response that helped to build fraternal relations, and for this reason have decided to punish those responsible." At issue was the territory in the province of Arauca, located close to the Venezuelan border, where FARC and the ELN have been ensconced in a conflict over sources of income. While they have not expressly worked together, the two groups have typically been thought of as being somewhat allied. The competition for resources at Arauca, where the ELN has normally operated, led to attacks by that group on FARC's eastern bloc. The result has been this declaration of war by FARC. In late June 2006, Colombia's left-wing guerrillas, FARC said that they wanted to negotiate with the government. It was a sharp reversal from previous statements by the left-wing rebels in which they rejected any suggestions of formal negotiations. That said, the overture was not without qualifications. FARC said that it would engage in talks with President Alvaro Uribe only if he ended United States-backed operations against them. The group also demanded the demilitarization of jungle areas that they traverse. For its part, the group said that it was prepared to carry out a prisoner exchange. To date, FARC has held about 60 hostages captive. Among those kidnapped has been former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, as well as several other politicians, soldiers and police. Three Americans were also thought to be among the hostages held by the left-wing rebels. FARC spokesman, Raul Reyes, said in a media interview that his group had "the political will" to allow an exchange of hostages, however, sitting at the negotiating table could only occur on its own terms. In response, President Uribe emphasized that he would not agree to FARC's terms. In the same period, he also repeatedly said that he would not stop operations against rebels and narcotics traffickers. He additionally warned that he no intention to withdraw security forces from rebeldominated areas. A government spokesman noted that the president's position remained unchanged. In the backdrop of that development, Colombia's other main armed group, the ELN, was reportedly engaging in preliminary peace talks with the Colombian government. Violence marked the start of August 2006 when fifteen soldiers were killed in an ambush in northColombia Review 2016 Page 67 of 396 pages Colombia eastern Colombia. No claim of responsibility was made, however, the ambush occurred in Norte de Santander where FARC has been known to operate. On the same day, a bomb explosion in Bogota left one individual dead. Developments in 2007 The year 2007 began with the escape of a former Development Minister in the Colombian cabinet after six years in captivity. Fernando Araujo had been kidnapped by the left-wing guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in December 2000. At the time, he had been serving in the administration of former President Andres Pastrana. Araujo was one of many well-known hostages abducted and held by FARC over the years. Such hostages were often used to negotiate prisoner exchanges with the government. In Araujo's case, the government orchestrated a military operation aimed at releasing him from captivity. While the military battled FARC rebels at a camp in the northern part of the country, Araujo was able to flee the site. The government said that Araujo was in good health and was set to be re-united with family and friends in his home town of Cartegena. The military said that the offensive in the department of Bolivar was ongoing. On February 19, 2007, Colombia's Foreign Minister Maria Consuelo Araujo (no relation to former hostage Fernando Araujo discussed just above) announced her resignation from office. Her resignation came after the country's Supreme Court ordered the arrest of five legislators, including Araujo's brother, Senator Alvaro Araujo. All five legislators were said to be under investigation for alleged links with the right-wing paramilitary group, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). As well, prosecutors requested that an investigation be launched against Araujo's father, a former agriculture minister and governor of Cesar state, for his alleged role in a kidnapping by the AUC. A day later, President Alvaro Uribe named Fernando Araujo (no relation to Maria Consuelo Araujo) as the new foreign minister. The new position for Fernando Araujo came only weeks following his escape from the hands of the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as discussed above. In the wake of the resignation of the Colombian foreign minister for her family's ties to right-wing militias, the country's former intelligence chief was arrested and charged with murder and collaboration with right-wing militias. Jorge Noguera, the head of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), had resigned in the fall Colombia Review 2016 Page 68 of 396 pages Colombia of 2006 even as he denied charges. Nevertheless, months later at the close of February 2007, he was questioned about supplying the names of unionists and human rights workers to right-wing militias. Those names appeared to be consistent with an alleged "hit list" of individuals who were later murdered. Of particular interest was the murder of a university professor who was scrutinizing the displacement of peasants. On the basis of this evidence, as well as testimony from a former Noguera aide, Rafael Garcia, and some data found on a laptop linked to a top paramilitary operative, he was arrested and charged as noted just above. In the background of these developments was the jailing of several members of President Alvaro Uribe's coalition on the basis of their support for drug-running militias. In April 2007, FARC released a videotape showing a number of hostages, including 12 politicians -all former members of a provincial assembly, who had been abducted in 2002 in Cali to the southwest of Bogota. Among the hostages was the former assembly president, Juan Carlos Narvaez, who warned against the government's strategy of staging a rescue mission. He said that such action would inevitably end in bloodshed. In mid-2007, one month after 11 kidnapped politicians were reported to have died in captivity, Colombian authorities said that their deaths appeared to be accidental. The politicians had been abducted by the Rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and were apparently shot only after FARC commanders mistakenly believed that security forces were approaching and, thus, ordered the hostages be killed rather than be rescued. For its part, FARC has maintained that the politicians were killed in the crossfire of bullets between their own forces and another rebel group. November 2007 marked the freezing of bilateral ties between Venezuela and Colombia over disagreements in dealing with the ongoing hostage crisis. At issue was Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' role in freeing the many hostages kidnapped by Colombia's Marxist terror group, FARC, during the years of civil war between that group and the Colombian authorities. President Chavez said that he would place his country's bilateral ties with neighboring Colombia on hold in response to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s decision to end Chavez's role as a hostage negotiator with Colombia's Farc rebels. There have been several attempts over the years to free the many hostages held in captivity by FARC in Colombia, but the situation moved in a productive direction when Chavez offered to act as a mediator between the leftist extremist rebels and the hard line government of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. That productive direction stalled when a proposal was put forth for FARC to release 45 hostages in exchange for the release of 500 FARC members imprisoned by the Colombian authorities. Uribe first expressed skepticism about the plan, saying that in trying to forge an agreement with FARC, that group could also advance its own interests. As well, Uribe was reported to have been upset Colombia Review 2016 Page 69 of 396 pages Colombia with Chavez for flaunting the proprieties of diplomacy by appearing in a photograph with a FARC commander, and also revealing what Uribe said was a confidential conversation about a possible meeting with FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda. Uribe then decided to end Chavez' mediator role in the hostage crisis, charging that Venezuela's president wanted Colombia to be victimized by FARC. On the other side of the equation, Chavez reacted to the decision by calling it "a spit in the face" and accusing Uribe of being a liar. Relatives of hostages held by FARC reacted to the news with shock and dismay and began to protest outside the presidential palace. They appeared to have held out hopes that Chavez' role as mediator would have eventually yielded positive results, pointing to the fact that Chavez had made significant progress in his mediating role. To that end, one man whose nephew was abducted by FARC, Jose Uriel Perez, said in an interview with Associated Press, "We thought it was very brave what President Chavez did in three months compared to what the government has failed to do in 10 years." Reactions were strong outside South America as well. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy called on Uribe to reconsider his decision, saying that Chavez was the best person to negotiate the release of the hostages. The French government entered into the fray because one of the most well-known hostages held by FARC had been Ingrid Betancourt, who holds dual Colombian and French citizenship. Developments in 2008 In early 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez returned to the objective of brokering the release of hostages held by FARC rebels in Colombia. This mission saw some success with the release of two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. Up to 700 people remained in captivity -- among them close to 50 high profile individuals including French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt. Chavez called on the international community to stop referring to FARC as a terrorist enclave, but at the same time noting that he did not support the group's tactics. To that end, he called on FARC to stop opposing the Colombian government by taking hostages, saying, "I don't believe in kidnapping and I don't believe in armed struggle." His Colombian counterpart, President Alvaro Uribe, stayed distant from the hostage release efforts. Uribe also criticized Chavez for holding talks with FARC, and emphatically stated that he viewed FARC rebels as terrorists. The start of March 2008 saw relations devolve between Colombia and two of its neighbors -Venezuela and Ecuador. A Colombian military offensive aimed against Marxist rebels, FARC, resulted in an incursion into Ecuadorian territory. The operation left more than 20 people dead and recriminations from Colombia's two neighbors -- Ecuador and Venezuela -- about Colombia Review 2016 Page 70 of 396 pages Colombia overzealous military actions that infringed upon their sovereignty. While Colombian authorities hailed this action as a success due to the death of a leading FARC rebel, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa condemned the Colombian government in Bogota for violating its sovereignty and lodged a formal protest. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who had been negotiating with FARC for the release of hostages held by the leftist rebels (as discussed above), railed against Colombian President Alvaro Uribe for invading Ecuador, even going so far as to characterize him as "a criminal." Chavez also called for the Venezuelan embassy in Bogota to be closed and withdrew embassy personnel from Colombia. Moreover, he ordered Venezuela's military to take up positions along the border with Colombia, presumably as a warning to its neighbor that it would not tolerate a similar violation of its own sovereignty. The move marked a significant escalation of tensions in the region. But a week later, relations between Venezuela and Colombia were somewhat soothed after a summit between the leaders of those two countries. At the summit, the leaders of both the countries agreed to a 20-point declaration forged by the Organization of American States (OAS), which included a commitment by Colombian President Uribe ensuring that his military forces would not violate borders with neighbors in the future. Venezuela then said it would restore its diplomatic relations with Colombia. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry issued a statement noting that the meeting was "a victory for peace and sovereignty... and demonstrated the importance of Latin American unity in overcoming conflicts." Colombia's relations with Ecuador remained strained, with Ecuador noting that more time was needed to resolve the situation, which involved a violation of its sovereignty. The ongoing diplomatic imbroglio between Colombia and Ecuador re-ignited in late March 2008. At issue was Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty in an anti-terrorism offensive, as discussed above. To recapitulate -- that action ultimately led both Quito and Caracas to break off diplomatic contact with Bogota. Tensions with Caracas were somewhat assuaged when Colombian President Alvarao Uribe issued an apology about the matter. However, relations with Quito continued to be terribly strained and were further exacerbated in the latter part of the month when it was confirmed that an Ecuadorean was killed by Colombian troops in the aforementioned antiterrorism raid on the FARC camp. In June 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels to end their four-decade struggle and release all their hostages. The Venezuelan leader, who had negotiated controversial talks with FARC aimed at releasing its hostages, characterized the extremist leftist militants as "out of step." Chavez also said, "The guerrilla war is history. At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place." The call came a month after long-serving FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, died and Colombia Review 2016 Page 71 of 396 pages Colombia Alfonso Cano was named as his replacement. Perhaps believing that he might have an impact on the new leadership, Chavez said in his televised address, "This is my message for you, Cano: 'Come on, let all these people go.' There are old folk, women, sick people, soldiers who have been prisoners in the mountain for 10 years." As noted above, Chavez' role in mediating the release of hostages has been regarded as controversial by some interests. Indeed, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe terminated his official role in these negotiations. But many of the Colombian victims' families welcomed Chavez' interest in the matter, and applauded his efforts when he successfully negotiated the release of two hostages, Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. Special Entry: Colombian military successfully carries out rescue mission; Betancourt, three U.S. defense contractors, and 11 others freed from FARC captivity In late March 2008, a French aircraft and medical personnel were placed on stand by in French Guiana, in the event that kidnapped politician Ingrid Betancourt was released. For several years, Betancourt, who holds dual citizenship in Colombia and France, has been held hostage by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. While there was no conclusive evidence that FARC intended to free Betancourt, the French government, led by President Nicolas Sarkozy, noted it had decided to be prepared in case her release was secured. Betancourt was only one of many hostages held by FARC, although she has been one of the most well-known. A fellow hostage who had been recently released said that Betancourt was gravely ill and had urged the Colombian government to work toward her release. The development came at a time when the Colombian government put forth a deal by which it would offer prisoner amnesties in exchange for the release of hostages; the deal also involved sending the FARC prisoners into exile in France. By April 2008, Betancourt had not been released. The French government was demanding that she be freed while people took to the streets in France to call for her release. But the period was also marked by the French government's decision to call off the medical mission. On July 2, 2008, French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt, along with three United States defense contractors -- Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell -- and 11 Colombian security officers, were rescued by the Colombian military after several years in captivity. All of the rescued hostages had been held by the Colombian rebel group, known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC. The rescue took place in the southern province of Guaviare and military coordinators said that all Colombia Review 2016 Page 72 of 396 pages Colombia of the released hostages were released were in good shape. Colombian media reported that the rescue mission had been set in motion several weeks prior. Reports stated that intelligence agents had infiltrated the FARC ranks and managed to convince the local commander in charge of the hostages of fictitious plans in the offing. As such, military personnel masquerading as members of a non-governmental organization were able to carry out a ruse and get the hostages onto a helicopter. Once airborne, they subdued the FARC leader who accompanied the hostages, announced that the helicopter was under the control of the Colombian military, and explained that the captives were now free. Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos explained, "The helicopters, which in reality were from the army, picked up the hostages in Guaviare and flew them to freedom." Colombian authorities were especially pleased that the mission was executed successfully and without one shot being fired. Betancourt, as a politician with dual citizenship, had been the highest profile hostage; her apparent poor health contributed to the fact that the French government was actively seeking her release. Indeed, a previous French medical evacuation mission ended unsuccessfully some months earlier, as noted above. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had also been active in negotiations to free hostages held by FARC, as aforementioned. To that end, two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez -- were released by FARC in early 2008. However, zealous efforts by the Colombian government to squash FARC has, at times, led to tensions with its neighbors, Venezuela and Ecuador over violations of sovereign borders. See above for details. In the afternoon of July 2, 2008, only moments after disembarking from the aircraft that carried her from captivity, Betancourt made a public address, thanking the authorities for their assistance in carrying out "a miracle." She said, "God, this is a miracle... There is no historical precedent for such a perfect operation." Betancourt also urged that those who had died in captivity be remembered and called for the possibility of peace. Betancourt's children reacted joyfully to the news of their mother's release and were said to be flying from France to Colombia to be reunited with their mother. At 11:19 pm CST, a United States military aircraft touched down on American soil at Lackland Air force Base carrying the three former hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell. All three were then transported to Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, for treatment. Media reports noted that they were likely to be reunited with their families in the following days, although they were also expected to go through medical treatment and possible reintegration counseling. A week after the rescue, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, broke its silence on the matter. In a communique dated July 5, 2008, FARC said that two of its own rebel fighters had betrayed their "revolutionary principles," thus leading to the successful rescue by the Colombian military forces. Those two rebels were themselves captured by Colombian soldiers during the dramatic rescue mission and were expected to face trial, as well as possible extradition to Colombia Review 2016 Page 73 of 396 pages Colombia the United States. FARC also said it intended to go forward with negotiations oriented toward the release of other captives. FARC says that it will release some hostages The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) said in December 2008 that it would soon release six hostages. Those to be released included two politicians (a former governor and a former congressman), three police officers and one soldier, who were held hostage by FARC for several years. In a statement, FARC said that its actions were intended to be an overture aimed at opening up a prisoner exchange program with the Colombian government. Note: In mid-2008, five hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, were freed in a military operation. In October 2008, former-Congressman Oscar Tulio Lizcano escaped captivity after being held hostage for eight years. After being held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for two years, four hostages were released and collected by Colombian security forces at a pre-arranged location at the start of 2009. The release had been brokered by left-wing politician, Senator Piedad Cordoba. FARC also announced that it would soon release two high profile political hostages as well. These two hostages have been identified as former parliamentarian Sigifredo Lopez and former Governor Alan Jara. Analysts have speculated that these moves by FARC may be oriented towards reopening negotiations with Colombian government. Recent Developments (2009 - 2010) In the third week of July 2009, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denied that the Colombian insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), contributed funds to his 2006 presidential campaign. President Correa also called on the country's civil commission to investigate the allegation, saying that the inquiry would make his innocence clear. Correa recalled accusations from his political opponents claiming that he had received money from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as well as the drug cartels. "They just don't know what else to say," Correa said. "It is up to you to decide who to believe: the same people as usual or those who endanger their lives to save the country." At issue was a Colombian media broadcast, apparently showing FARC leader, Víctor Julio Suarez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy, saying that his group donated money to Correa's campaign. The situation was expected to raise already-strained relations between Colombia and Ecuador. In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for Colombia Review 2016 Page 74 of 396 pages Colombia the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region. Responding to this plan for a sustained United States military presence in Colombia, Venezuela announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with Colombia. Francisco Arias Cardenas, Venezuelan Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, said that the plan was part of Venezuela's initiative to promote peace and prevent conflict. But it was clear that the move was a defensive one, aimed at responding to the presence of United States troops in a neighboring country, when Foreign Minister Arias explained at a news conference, "Each Venezuelan has to be a soldier to defend Venezuela." The agreement between the United States and Colombia has already caused a diplomatic contretemps in the region, resulting in late July 2009 with indications from Venezuela that it would freeze its diplomatic ties with Colombia. Then, on September 1, 2009, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez confirmed his country would end formal diplomatic relations with Colombia. President Chavez said the move was being made in response to Colombia's decision to allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases. Both Colombia and the United States have insisted that the deal would pose no threat to neighboring countries, and had been forged simply to improve efforts against anti-narcotics trafficking. However, regional powers, including Venezuela , have reacted with concern to the move. Tense relations between Colombia and Venezuela devolved in November 2009 when Colombia detained four members of the Venezuelan national guard on Colombian territory. Colombian authorities said the four were detained along a river in the border province of Vichada. The situation was not expected to last long since Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said they would be released and returned to Venezuela. Perhaps with an eye on calming the heightened tensions between the two countries, President Uribe said there was "unbreakable affection" between his country of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela. The incident came a week after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez sent troops to the border region in an apparent response to an agreement forged between Colombia and the United States that would allow the American military to use Colombian bases in its anti-narcotics trafficking efforts. Venezuelan President Chavez has decried the move, charging that the agreement was part of the United States' agenda to ultimately invade his country. This claim has been strongly denied by the United States. Meanwhile, on the domestic front,Colombia's lower house of Congress passed legislation that could pave the way for President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term. Legislators overwhelmingly voted in favor of a referendum on whether to make constitutional changes that would allow presidents to contest re-election twice. The legislation had already passed the Senate and its fate was now in the hands of Colombia's Constitutional Court. The constitution was already modified once to let Uribe run for a second four-year term in 2006, and so, if the new constitutional changes are made, Uribe could theoretically contest another election battle in 2010. While Uribe has enjoyed strong popularity at home thanks to a mixture of conservative security and economic Colombia Review 2016 Page 75 of 396 pages Colombia policies, this move to allow his three consecutive terms has been met with some resistance. Indeed, other attempts to make constitutional changes that would facilitate extended power in the region have resulted in condemnation about the erosion of democracy. See below for more information related to the constitutional change and the 2010 presidential election. At the start of 2010, Colombian forces carried out an offensive against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The government reportedly moved to carry out the offensive after Luis Francisco Cuellar -- the governor of the southern province of Caqueta who had been taken hostage -- was found dead. He had apparently been assassinated. The air strike killed at least 18 FARC rebels while they were celebrating the New Year at a jungle camp. Another 13 FARC rebels surrendered when Colombian forces raided a jungle base in Meta province, which is known to be a center in the production of cocaine. On July 11, 2010, Colombian army commandos launched a surprise raid on a rebel base of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to reports from the ground, 12 bodyguards of FARC rebel leader Guillermo Saenz died in the assault in the Tolima mountains in the central region of the country. Colombian authorities said that the operation dealt a deadly blow to the FARC rebel movement. For his part, outgoing Colombian President Alvaro Uribe congratulated the commandos for their efforts. He also confirmed reports that Magaly Grannobles -- a female confidante to a FARC leader, Saenz -- was among those killed saying, "I can confirm that one of the guerrillas killed in the operation was a woman named Magaly. She was responsible for the deaths of at least 70 soldiers and police officers." However, in news less positive for the Colombian authorities, six soldiers died during clashes with FARC rebels on the same day in the northeastern part of the country. Briefing on 2010 Presidential Election in Colombia In February 2010, the Colombian constitutional court voted 7-2 against a parliamentary proposal to convene a referendum, which could have potentially changed the constitution to allow President Alvaro Uribe to contest the presidency for a third term. Lead justice Mauricio Gonzalez explained the ruling by observing that the proposed referendum included "substantial violations to the democratic principle." The ruling was not subject to appeal. For his part, President Uribe said he respected the court's decision. Nevertheless, he made clear that any future successor should continue his security policies against the Marxist rebel group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), saying, "Those policies have to be re-elected whatever the decision of the court. We cannot change direction, we cannot have a change of guard." With Uribe now unable to stand for the presidency for a third term, former Defense Minister Juan Colombia Review 2016 Page 76 of 396 pages Colombia Manuel Santos said that he would run for the presidency, in order to ensure that gains made against FARC under Uribe's tenure were not reversed. To this end, Santos said, "What we need to do now is work to ensure his [Uribe's] legacy of security and progress is not lost." Santos appeared to be an early favorite for the presidential election to be held on May 30, 2010. However, independent candidate Sergio Fajardo was gaining strength thanks to his reputation as mayor of Medellin. It should be noted that despite President Uribe's strong public approval ratings, his tenure has had to deal with criticisms in recent years over human rights abuses by troops, as well as the illegal wiretapping of political opponents by the national intelligence agency. Adding to these criticisms was the arrest of former senator Mario Uribe Escobar -- the cousin and political ally of President Uribe -- in an ongoing investigation into alleged connections between politicians and right-wing paramilitary groups. Colombia held elections to both houses of the Congress on March 14, 2010. Results showed that the parties aligned with President Alvaro Uribe -- the Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Conservative Party or PC and the Social National Unity Party or U Party -- captured the most seats and held on to their dominance in the legislative body. The main opposition party, the Liberal Party, retained its vote share and number of seats. Radical Change, which was once supportive of President Uribe before moving against him, lost seats in the Senate. Likewise, the Alternative Democratic Pole, suffered some loss of seats in the Senate. As of May 2010, with the presidential election set for the close of the month (May 30, 2010), measures were being taken to ensure the secure conduct of the vote. To that end, 350,000 military and police personnel were deployed across the country. The main presidential candidates were as follows: Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, an Uribist from the outgoing president's party, Germán Vargas Lleras of the Radical Change party, Noemí Sanín of the Conservative Party, Rafael Pardo of Liberal Party, Gustavo Petro of the Alternative Democratic Pole and Antanas Mockus of the newly-formed Green Party. As well, Álvaro Leyva Durán was seeking the presidential nomination by the Conservative Party. Apart from Santos who promised to follow the Uribe mold, Lleras and Sanin have been cast as pro-Uribist in orientation as well. On the other side of the equation, Pardo, Petro, were viewed as alternate options, while Duran and Mockus were viewed as anti-Uribist in orientation. A month ahead of the election, there appeared to be a clear ideological "right versus left" battle at stake in Colombia with polls showing Santos and Mockus running neck and neck against one another, possibly headed for a run-off election. On election day, after the votes were counted, Santos had won the first round of Colombia's presidential election with 47 percent of the vote -- just short of an outright majority. His main rival, Mockus, garnered 21 percent. Santos' clear domination at the polls was something of a surprise since polling data indicated a far closer race. That said, both men would contest the run-off election set for June 20, 2010. Colombia Review 2016 Page 77 of 396 pages Colombia Until then, Santos was expected to continue to highlight his national security-dominated campaign platform, and would tout his desire to continue the policies of highly popular outgoing President Uribe. Mockus was expected to draw attention to his campaign agenda issues of anti-corruption and education, as well as his record of improved quality of life and successful public works projects during his time as mayor of Bogota. That said, with third place candidate Lleras saying that he would back Santos in the second round, the advantage would certainly reside with the proUribe former defense minister on June 20, 2010. On the day of the second round -- June 20, 2010, as expected, Santos won an overwhelming 69 percent of the vote, propelling him into position of President-elect of Colombia. With a clear sign that he would continue outgoing President Uribe's hardline security policies, President-Elect Santos said during his victory speech that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC's) "time had run out" and foreclosed the possibility of negotiations. He also declared that he would not rest until they had secured every inch of the country. Ironically, the election was itself marked by violence between government forces and FARC; clashes led to the deaths of at least 10 policemen and soldiers from the Army of Colombia, and six FARC guerrillas. Still Colombian authorities hailed a more positive development in the days ahead of the election when three police officers and a soldier who had been held captive by FARC for 12 years were rescued. On the other end of the equation, however, two soldiers were sentenced to 28 years in jail for extrajudicial killings. Those two cases were examples of the security challenge posed by right-wing militants in Colombia. In the first week of August 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was sworn into office as Colombia's new president. During his inaugural speech, President Santos noted that among his priorities would be improved relations with neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela. As well, he aimed to decrease the unemployment rate, reduce poverty, and deal with corruption. President Santos also said he would continue the efforts against militant rebel and terror groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); however, he also said that he would not foreclose the possibility of dialogue with FARC if they renounced their campaign of violence. Post-Election Update; Relations with FARC (2010-2012) On September 23, 2010, the Colombian military announced that it had eliminated the deputy leader and top military strategist from Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. The news of the death of Jorge Briceno, also known as Mono Jojoy, was a significant setback for FARC, which has seen in insurgency weakened in recent times due to a relentless offensive by government forces. Newly-elected President Juan Manuel Santos characterized the killing of Briceno as "the most crushing blow against the FARC in its entire history." In addition to Briceno, Colombia Review 2016 Page 78 of 396 pages Colombia 20 other rebels were also killed, including a number of other senior insurgents. The operation by the Colombian military commenced on September 20, 2010 with bombing raids using warplanes and helicopters. On May 12, 2011, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa rejected prevailing accusations of a connection to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC). During a news conference, President Correa insisted that he did not accept any funds from FARC, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Colombia, saying: "My hands are clean." He also asserted that he was ready to prove his innocence saying, "I'll take a lie detector test to prove I never received funds from the FARC." At issue have been allegations that the left-wing Ecuadorean leader's election campaign received financing from the Marxist guerrilla enclave. These allegations have been based on an extensive report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which carried out a two-year long study and relied on communication uncovered during a raid by Colombian forces on a FARC encampment in Ecuador in 2008. On Nov. 5, 2011, the government of Colombian announced that military troops had killed the top commander of the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, also known by the alias Alfonso Cano. According to officials, police and army troops bombed a FARC hideout in the jungles near Suarez city of the southwestern Cauca province, and then carried out a ground operation, which left Cano dead in the ensuing gun battle. Cano became the leader of FARC in 2008 after the death of former FARC's commander and founder Pedro Nel Marin, alias "Manuel Marulanda." Cano was then elevated to being the highest value target of Colombia's military and police forces. After news of Cano's death broke, Colombian authorities released photograph's of the country's most wanted man, presumably in an effort to foreclose doubt about his death. To that end, Cano's corpse reported underwent several fingerprints tests, which allowed the complete identification. Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon hailed the death of Cano as "very important news for Colombia and its people" during a news conference. Only a month prior, another key member of FARC, Jose Neftali Umenza, died in an explosion in the Buenaventura port city in southwestern Colombia. Umenza was responsible for most of the FARC's drug-trafficking business in the Pacific region. In a speech broadcast nationally in Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos described Cano's death as "the most devastating blow that this group has suffered in its history." The Colombian leader also urged other militant entities to lay down their arms before they end up "in jails or in tombs." President Santos additionally called on his government and the military to turn their attention toward achieving a peaceful and prosperous future for Colombia. On Feb. 26, 2012, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- the country's largest rebel group -- said that it intended release 10 remaining military hostages. FARC also said that it Colombia Review 2016 Page 79 of 396 pages Colombia intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. The announcement was made via the Anncol news website. In its statement, FARC declared, "From today on we ban the practice" of "the retention of people ... in order to finance our struggle." FARC stopped just short of ending its armed war with the Colombian government, promising instead to utilize "other forms of funding and political pressure." Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos responded via the social media mechanism, Twitter, to note that FARC's move was "a step in the right direction." On April 3, 2012, the Colombian rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by the acronym, FARC), released 10 government officials that had been held hostage for more than a decade. International Red Cross representatives confirmed that FARC turned the ten individuals over to the care of the humanitarian agency, in keeping with a vow made two months prior. Once in the care of the Red Cross, the hostages were reunited with family members in the city of Villavicencia. In February 2012, the country's largest rebel group said it intended release 10 remaining hostages. FARC also said at that time that it intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. The announcement in February 2012 was made via the Anncol news website. In its statement, FARC declared, "From today on we ban the practice" of "the retention of people ... in order to finance our struggle." FARC stopped just short of ending its armed war with the Colombian government, promising instead to utilize "other forms of funding and political pressure." At the time, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos responded via the social media mechanism, Twitter, to note that FARC's move was "a step in the right direction." In April 2012, with the release of these ten remaining government hostages, only civilians remain held by FARC. There were suggestions that the recent moves by FARC were oriented toward revitalizing peace talks. On May 22, 2012, an explosives device was discovered at the Gran Rex Theatre in the Argentine capital of Buenos Aires -- the venue where former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was expected to offer a speech the next day. According to Argentine authorities, the bomb was hidden in a lamp and was intended to be detonated by a mobile phone. It was discovered during a routine security sweep. Police evacuated the building and cordoned off the streets around the venue after finding the bomb. It should be noted that a week earlier, a bomb attack in Bogota (the Colombian capital) targeted Fernando Londono, a former justice and interior minister who served in the previous Uribe administration. Londono's security guard and driver both died in that attack. Taken together, the two incidents suggest that the former Uribe administration may be in the crosshairs of some entity. Whether or not that entity was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was yet to be seen. Around the same period, FARC reportedly killed about a dozen Colombian soldiers in an ambush close to the border with neighboring Venezuela. According to military officials, the troops were Colombia Review 2016 Page 80 of 396 pages Colombia attacked during a routine patrol in a remote part of the country inhabited mostly by indigenous people. On the Venezuelan side of the border, the Chavez government said that it would increase security in the region and urged that its territory not be used in the fight between the Colombian government and FARC. President Hugo Chavez himself said on state television: "We maintain our position, that we will no permit incursions of any armed force, whatever its type might be, into Venezuelan territory...This conflict is not ours. We defend peace and insist that our territory is not used by either side in the conflict." Primer on Colombia's 2014 parliamentary elections Parliamentary elections were set to be held in Colombia on March 9, 2014. At stake was the composition of the bicameral "Congreso" (Congress), which consists of the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives). In the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic), there are 102 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. In the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives), there are 166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. The last elections were held in March 2010 and were won by the parties aligned with thenPresident Alvaro Uribe. Indeed, the Party of U and the Conservative Party or PC won the most seats. It was to be seen if they would see that level of success in 2014. Other parties likely to contest these elections included the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, the Green Party, and Radical Change or CR. These 2014 elections were being viewed as a referendum on the ongoing peace process between the government and the Marxist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In the Senate, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) garnered 16 percent and 21 seats; the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) had 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) secured 16 percent and 17 seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) acquired eight percent and nine seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four percent and five seats; the rest of the Senate went to other parties, In the Chamber of Representatives, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) won 16 percent and 39 seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) garnered 14 percent and 37 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 13 percent and 27 seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) carried 8 percent and 15 seats; Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) acquired 9.5 percent and 12 seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four percent and six seats; the rest of the seats were won by other parties. Colombia Review 2016 Page 81 of 396 pages Colombia Primer on 2014 presidential election A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He would be up for re-election in 2014. Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5 percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos. According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take 19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34 to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support. Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them. Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. CenterColombia Review 2016 Page 82 of 396 pages Colombia left Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace with FARC. After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29 percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos. Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC. Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously indicated. At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish. Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers. Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51 percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open. For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war. He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia." Colombia Review 2016 Page 83 of 396 pages Colombia Special Report The Push for a Peace Agreement In September 2015, a major breakthrough was announced in the Cuban-brokered peace talks between the Colombian government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) regarding justice and accountability for those who committed human right abuses during the many years of the conflict. With the human rights abuses issue presenting the most significant obstacle to successful peace negotiations between the two sides, the concurrence on justice and accountability was regarded as a breakthrough. Indeed, with that hurdle cleared, the two sides were announcing a March 2016 deadline for the promulgation of a final peace accord. Going back to 2011, the leadership of FARC suggested that it was ready to enter peace negotiations with the Colombian government. By the start of 2012, FARC said it intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. However, FARC was simultaneously carrying out attacks in Colombia, including the violent ambush of a dozen Colombian soldiers close to the border with neighboring Venezuela in mid-2012. Meanwhile, the Colombian military continued its efforts against FARC, and enjoyed significant successes including the death of a top FARC commander -- Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas, also known by the alias Alfonso Cano. In 2012, with most of its leadership eliminated or detained, FARC said it was abandoning some of its practices, such as abductions. Recent events (discussed here) would indicate that FARC had not actually rejected the use of violence in achieving its agenda. By late August 2012, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced that his government was convening exploratory talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- the country's oldest, largest, and most organized insurgent group. In a national address, President Santos said that it was his "duty to seek peace." Media reports indicated that the two sides -- the Colombian government and FARC -- signed a preliminary agreement in Cuba, and a first round of negotiations was expected to be held in October in Norway. In the latter part of November 2012, peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were renewed in the Cuban capital city of Havana. Delegates from both the Colombian government and FARC were at the negotiating table in Cuba. The meeting was aimed at ending five decades of conflict between the two sides and forging a sustainable peace deal. The discussions ensued in closed door meetings at the Palace of Conventions in Havana, making it difficult to determine the level of progress. That being said, the stated agenda for the meetings included issues as diverse as political participation, narcotics trafficking, agricultural development, the care of war victims, and an end to the war. Colombia Review 2016 Page 84 of 396 pages Colombia In mid-January 2013, a new round of peace talks commenced in Cuba between a delegation from the Colombian government and representatives of FARC. This time, there was some indication of the progress with the chief government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, saying that the government had "all the will to advance" but that peace talks and negotiations "could not be prolonged indefinitely in time." To that latter end, the government said it hoped to forge a peace deal by a deadline of November 2013. For its part, negotiators from FARC seemed to have a more fluid understanding of the process. In a statement, FARC said: "We cannot allow ... the electoral hurry of the [government to go] above the interests of all the Colombians. Putting a deadline is not only unrealistic, it is a criminal behavior." Political observers hoped that the rhetoric of "criminal behavior" did not taint the peace process. Still, as January 2013 entered its final week, it was clear that peace talks were not seeing much progress as both sides were taking increasingly concretized positions. One major issue of contention between the two sides has been land rights. FARC has called for increased land rights for the country's poor and working class population; the Santos government, on the other hand, was interested in currying favor with Colombia's wealthy land owners and business class. It was clear that they were on a collision course ideologically on this issue, making the matter of war and peace appear all the more illusive. To that latter end, FARC was now announcing an end to its unilateral cease-fire and continuing to dismiss the government's call for a deadline to negotiations. Meanwhile, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos was making it clear that the ceasefire was never really in effect as FARC kept attacking government and public targets throughout. The president himself entered the fray saying that if a peace deal was reached, it would have to be ratified in a public referendum; he also foreclosed an end to military operations against FARC until a peace deal was signed. These two conditions suggested that the security landscape in Colombia continued on as before, even as these peace negotiations were ongoing. As May 2013 came to a close, the peace process saw some progress as the Colombian government and FARC were able to forge a land reform agreement -- a central issue in the peace negotiations, as noted above. Provisions of the deal included an economic and social development plan for rural areas, the establishment of a land bank responsible for the reallocation of land, and the disbursement of plots of land to poor farmers. A joint statement on the deal read as follows: "This agreement will be the start of a radical transformation of rural Colombia." The practical aspect of the rural development plan aside, the land reform agreement effectively breathed new life into the peace process between Colombian government and FARC. As stated by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos via the social media venue, Twitter: "We celebrate, really, this fundamental step ... to end half a century of conflict." The peace talks were set to resume in June 2013 -- this time with a focus on including FARC rebels in the political life of Colombia. Progress on this front has been cautious but relatively Colombia Review 2016 Page 85 of 396 pages Colombia productive with the latest meetings focused on how FARC could enter the mainstream political field in Colombia. The elimination of the major leaders of the leftist extremist movement helped persuade FARC that continuing its insurgent campaign might not be the most practical endeavor. It should be noted that another leftist insurgent entity -- the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional in Spanish, or ELN) -- was not part of the peace process, but has indicated an interest in also entering the new social and political terrain that might characterize Colombia in the future. Accordingly, at the start of July 2013, FARC and ELN were considering joining forces and engaging in a "unification process." By mid-July 2013, the ELN had actually surrendered and agreed to lay down its arms following a meeting with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. The president hailed the development, calling it "a great step towards peace." He said, "This is what the [peace] process is about. So every member of the ELN and the FARC follows their path fighting for their ideals, but without violence and without arms." Earlier, on July 10, 2013, FARC's political party -- the Patriotic Union -- regained its legal status. Accordingly, it would be positioned to contest the 2014 elections. The Patriotic Union lost its status when it failed to put forth candidates in the 2002 elections. However, a Colombian court ruled there were extenuating circumstances at play in 2002 that severely affected the Patriotic Union's ability to contest those polls. Indeed, the court noted that as many as 3,000 of its members, including several presidential candidates, had been murdered by right-wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Analysts have drawn attention to the fact that the government acted in complicity with those paramilitaries, thus reinforcing the message to FARC rebels that they were not welcome on Colombia's political field and thus, essentially pushing them along the path of rebellion. Meanwhile, the peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC were ongoing, although the two sides were unable to reach an agreement on the issue of political participation. Further negotiations on this matter were in the offing between the government and FARC later in July 2013, with the government hoping that a peace deal could be signed by a deadline of November 2013. The chief negotiator for FARC, Ivan Marquez, noted that the five-year long conflict with the government was coming to an end. However, in response to the government's goal of signing a peace accord by November 2013, he warned against rushing through an agreement. In an interview with Colombia media, Marquez said, "It is possible [to reach an agreement by November]. But to achieve peace you need time. A bad peace deal is worse than war." It should be noted that even amidst the peace negotiations, the conflict between FARC and the Colombian government was ongoing. An ambush by more than 70 FARC rebels on two dozen Colombia Review 2016 Page 86 of 396 pages Colombia soldiers at an oil pipeline in Arauca left 15 soldiers and six militants dead. A separate attack in southwestern Colombia left four soldiers and several FARC militants dead. President Santos made clear that the military would continue its offensive operations against FARC, even as the peace process was ongoing, and despite FARC's call for a ceasefire. In August 2013, negotiators for the Colombian government and FARC reported progress in their ongoing peace talks, and specifically on the matter of FARC's future participation in the political process in Colombia. The level of progress was hitherto unseen and so there were high hopes that a peace deal could, actually, be reached by the target date of November 2013. The government and FARC went so far as to issue a joint statement in which they noted that both sides "started working on agreements" dealing with FARC's future participation in the political process in Colombia. The issuance of the statement, along with the substance contained within it, marked an unprecedented development in Colombia after decades of insurgency. As noted by a government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, peace negotiations with FARC in the past "have never come this far." He continued by saying that he hoped that FARC would indeed integrate into mainstream Colombian society -- including the political sphere. To this end, De La Calle said, "This isn't just about guarantees because we hope that, at the signing of the pact, they lay down their weapons, demobilize and incorporate themselves in society." It should be noted that as August 2013 entered its final week, the peace process hit a snag. At issue was the decision by FARC to announce a "pause" in the negotiating process. At issue for FARC was the proposal that the emerging peace deal be ratified via a referendum in 2014. FARC representatives determined that this notion deserved further study, with a leading FARC negotiator, Pablo Catatumbo, saying: "Under the new circumstances… the FARC's peace delegation has decided to make a pause in the discussions to focus exclusively on the analysis of the government proposal." Colombian authorities immediately responded by recalling government negotiators while President Juan Manuel Santos saying that talks would resume only "when we deem it appropriate." The president continued, "In this process it is not FARC who will dictate pauses and impose conditions. That negotiating "pause" was temporary and negotiations resumed with further rounds of talks in Cuba. By November 2013, the government and FARC reached an agreement on yet another key sticking point -- the integration of FARC in the future political structure of Colombia. According to a key FARC leader and negotiator, Ivan Marquez, in an interview with Reuters News: "We are completely satisfied with what we have agreed on the point of political participation. We are doing well; in no other peace process have we advanced as much as we have here in Havana. We have taken an important step in the right direction to end the conflict and to achieve a real democracy in Colombia." In mid-November 2013, the government of Colombia said it had uncovered a plot by FARC to assassinate former President Alvaro Uribe. Colombia Review 2016 Page 87 of 396 pages Colombia According to Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon, the assassination was intended to be executed by a rebel faction with a stronghold in central Colombia. Defense Minister Pinzon said that the assassination plot was orchestrated by FARC's Teofilo Forero Mobile Column, led by a commander commonly known as Paisa. Defense Minister Pizon -- a known critic of the unfolding peace agreement with FARC -- assured the Colombian people that the authorities were doing their best to ensure the safety of the country's former head of state. Pinzon noted he had personally met with former President Uribe to let him know of the threat against his life; Pinzon added that security had been increased for the former head of state. It should be noted that President Uribe was likely viewed by FARC as a particularly attractive target. During his time in office from 2002 to 2010, some of the most significant assaults against FARC took place, ultimately resulting in the weakening of Colombia's oldest, largest, and most organized insurgent group. Also of note was the face that former President Uribe's own father was killed by FARC in 1983 during a failed kidnapping attempt. Clearly, for both Uribe and FARC, there was a history of acrimony. At the broader level, this revelation about a plot to kill former President Uribe was certain to have national implications. Peace negotiations between the government and FARC have been going on since late 2012, with significant peace negotiations taking place in the Cuban capital city of Havana. They have, at times, been met with snags but have issues have been largely resolved over time, with significant agreements made on controversial issues from land reformation to the integration of FARC into the mainstream political process. As noted by a government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, peace negotiations with FARC in the past "have never come this far." That being said, the citizenry of Colombia has been largely ambivalent about the peace process and have accused the government of acceding too much to the demands of a group that terrorized the country for decades. While the peace process could very well pave the way for the hoped-for peace agreement, there was also a climate of suspicion about FARC's real agenda. Throughout the negotiations process, FARC has not consistently relinquished its campaign of violence. Many Colombians expressed outrage over photographs surfaced depicting FARC leaders on a boat in Cuba enjoying cigars even as their militant wing continued to carry out violent attacks in the homeland. The contrast between the FARC leadership in a "holiday" mode as they negotiated a peace deal on the one hand, and a continuing campaign of violence in real practice on the other hand, raised the ire of ordinary Colombians. As such, public support for the protracted peace process was waning, with people wondering about the price the Colombian government was willing to pay for peace with FARC. The agreement on political integration, for example, provided fodder for speculation. Ordinary citizens wanted FARC to pay some price for their acts of terror, rather than be rewarded with representation and offices in a branch of government. The news of a plot to assassinate former President Uribe was sure to exacerbate suspicions and possibly derail the Colombia Review 2016 Page 88 of 396 pages Colombia peace process entirely. By the first week of December 2013, FARC announced a 30-day-long ceasefire starting on Dec. 15, 2013. The announcement was regarded with skepticism from the government of Colombia since in the same period, FARC carried out a car bombing at a police station. That attack left five soldiers, one police officer, and three civilians dead. That skepticism was bolstered by the knowledge that FARC has announced such ceasefire moves in the past, only to abandon them a short while later. For its part, the government of Colombia made it clear that it would not ease up on its offensive against FARC rebels until a final peace agreement is signed into existence. Note that as of 2014, when parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled to take place, the peace process quickly became the core election issue. The re-election of Santos as president (as discussed above) was regarded as a public ratification of the push for peace. In late November 2014, Colombian General Ruben Dario Alzate was released from abduction by rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC). Weeks earlier, General Alzate and two other individuals -- Corporal Jorge Rodriguez and a lawyer identified as Gloria Urregowere -- were kidnapped by FARC rebels. The abduction of the three individuals spurred Colombia President Juan Manuel Santos to suspend peace talks with the leftist rebel movement that has been ongoing since 2013. But as the month of November 2014 drew to a close, FARC rebels handed over the three captives to an International Red Cross humanitarian mission in an isolated area of the Choco province; Alzate, Rodriguez, and Urregowere were then transferred to a military base. Representatives of FARC said they took the action because President Santos had continued military operations against them even as peace talks were ongoing in Cuba. However, the abductions only served to derail the peace process. While there was no date set for the resumption of peace negotiations, President Santos issued an encouraging statement following the release of Alzate, Rodriguez, and Urregowere in which he said, "It is obvious that this decision helps to create a favorable atmosphere for the continuation of the talks." In December 2014, the government of Colombia and FARC agreed to resume the suspended peace talks. As the year 2014 drew to a close, FARC announced an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. A statement by FARC read as follows: "We have resolved to declare a unilateral ceasefire and to end hostilities for an indefinite time." FARC noted it would resume hostilities if Colombian forces attacked them. By the first part of 2015, peace talks between the Colombian authorities and FARC had resumed, and in March 2015, the two sides reached a significant milestone when high-ranking Colombian Colombia Review 2016 Page 89 of 396 pages Colombia military officers sat at the negotiating table across from leftist rebel commanders. The historic meeting took place in the Cuban capital of Havana where peace talks have been ongoing for some time. The meetings appeared to have seen success with agreements being reached on matters such as political participation, land reform, and an end to the illegal drugs trade. The latest issues items on the agenda have resulted in an agreement between both sides to dismantle land mines and explosive traps laid in rural parts of the country. The chief negotiator for the Colombian government, Humberto de la Calle, hailed the latest development, saying, "The proposal for de-mining is a first step, but a giant step toward making peace." For his part, President Juan Manuel Santos lauded the progress in the peace process, declaring, "I would like to congratulate our negotiating team and acknowledge FARC... because this is bringing us closer to the shared objective of reaching peace in Colombia." A new step in the direction of peace was achieved in the second week of March 2015 when the Colombian military said it would temporarily halt its bombing campaign against FARC for a period of one month. The cessation in hostilities, according to President Santos, was because (1) FARC had demonstrated its commitment to its self-declared ceasefire, and (2) the ceasefire was clearly holding. For these two reasons, his government was responding with its own good faith move. In a national address, President Santos said, "In regards to the indefinite, unilateral ceasefire declared by the Farc on December 18, we must recognize that they have fulfilled it." He continued, "In order to start the de-escalation of the conflict, I have decided to order the minister of defense and armed forces commanders to stop bombing raids on FARC camps for a month." In April 2015, the peace process was challenged when FARC rebels attacked and killed approximately a dozen Colombian soldiers and injured 20 others. Both sides had different explanations for the incident. The leadership of FARC said that the outbreak of violence was for self-defense purposes when government troops advanced on its positions. On the other side of the equation, the government of Colombia accused FARC of carrying out the attack against government troops as they were conducting an anti-narcotics operation. In the aftermath of the fracas, FARC called for an independent investigation into the incident, recommitted itself to the self-declared unilateral ceasefire, and insisted that peace negotiations should carry on. For his part, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos responded by saying that the peace process should continue even as certain rival political factions demanded an end to the peace process. Speaking on behalf of President Santos, chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle observed that FARC had lost credibility as a result of the outbreak of violence, but emphasized the priority of ending the long-running war once and for all. De la Calle excoriated FARC's credibility, declaring, "The greatest damage as been to the FARC's credibility. A ceasefire of this type must be serious, it must be verifiable and it has to be agreed at the table as part of the general agreement." Nevertheless, he emphasized the importance of the diplomatic process, as he said, "Ending the war is more imperative than ever." Colombia Review 2016 Page 90 of 396 pages Colombia In July 2015, after months marked by unfortunate eruptions of violence, the peace process saw a boost as both sides took measures to de-escalate tensions and accentuate good faith. On one side of the equation, FARC announced a month-long ceasefire. Ivan Marquez, FARC's chief negotiator, said he hoped the ceasefire would set the path for an official truce. On the other side of the equation, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos ordered the government's military forces to suspend air strikes on FARC camps in non-urban areas. Speaking from the Colombian city of Cartagena, President Santos said, "I have issued the order to stop, as of today, bombing raids against camps where there are members of that group." He added, "From now on, this type of bombing will only be done by explicit order of the president." In September 2015, a major breakthrough was announced in the Cuban-brokered peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC regarding justice and accountability for those who committed human right abuses during the many years of the conflict. Specifically, special courts and peace tribunals would be established to address alleged abuses committed during the conflict. Those courts and tribunals would be administered by Colombian magistrates and foreign jurists. All relevant participants in the conflict -- from members of FARC to members of the security forces -- would face justice for their crimes although there would be some provisions of amnesty for acts committed during combat. The real focus would be on war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile punitive measures would range from conventional jailing to public service, reparations, and special detainment. With the human rights abuses issue presenting the most significant obstacle to successful peace negotiations between the two sides, the concurrence on justice and accountability was regarded as a breakthrough. Indeed, with that hurdle cleared, the two sides were announcing a March 2016 deadline for the promulgation of a final peace accord. Critics of the deal have condemned the proposed measures to address human rights abuses as an affront to the notion of justice, and have said that perpetrators will be gifted with impunity. Former President Alvaro Uribe, a strident opponent of the peace process, said via the social media outlet, Twitter, "It's not peace that's near, it's the surrender to FARC!" For his part, President Santos acknowledged that the justice and accountability provisions would not please everyone. Nevertheless, he insisted that the focus should be on the goals of peace and stability for Colombia. Heralding the peace process as a success, Colombian President Santos said, "We're not going to fail! This is the chance for peace!." He added, "On 23 March 2016 we will be bidding farewell to the longest-running conflict in the Americas." Via the social media outlet, Twitter, FARC leader, Timochenko, urged sympathizers to support the peace deal as follows: "Let's join efforts to achieve peace." At the start of October 2015, it was clear that the push for peace was yielding results as the leader Colombia Review 2016 Page 91 of 396 pages Colombia of FARC rebels ordered a halt to combat training of the group's fighters. Rodrigo Londono called for FARC's fighters to end their military activities and turn their attention to political and cultural pursuits instead. Via the social media outlet, Twitter, Londono (known as Timochenko) also declared: "Let's go for peace." Colombian President Santos applauded the move and noted that it would facilitate the kind of lasting ceasefire that would be needed to complete the peace negotiations process. Editor's Note on FARC: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) is the oldest, largest, and most organized insurgent group in Colombia. It has widespread operations throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of neighboring countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. A leftist military organization seeking political power and economic reform, FARC receives support from all segments of the population, but mostly at the rural level. FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. FARC is only one of a number of left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, which have been in conflict with the Colombian authorities for decades. The July 2, 2008, rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three United States defense contractors meant that FARC had lost its most highprofile hostages and indicated possible fractures in its operations, perhaps partially due to the deaths of key leaders of the rebel group. The October 2008 escape of a former congressman only served to reinforce this perception. Since then, the elimination of key members of the FARC leadership has suggested a further weakening of FARC. Nevertheless, hundreds of people remain in captivity at the hands of FARC. In more recent times, FARC said it was releasing its hostages and abandoning its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. However, even with most of its leadership eliminated or detained, there was not a clear indication that FARC had rejected the use of violence in achieving its agenda. Since 2013, there were cautious hopes for a peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC as delegates from both sides convened peace negotiations in Cuba. The news in November 2013 of a plot by FARC to assassinate former President Uribe, as well as the abduction of three individuals including a general in November 2014 by FARC, together placed the peace process in peril. Indeed, President Santos moved to suspend peace negotiations with FARC following the 2014 abductions. The release of the hostages, however, followed by the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by FARC in late 2014 eased tensions. As such, the government of Colombia and FARC soon announced that they would resume peace talks. To that end, progress in negotiations was reported in 2015, with the goal of a final peace accord set for 2016. -- October 2015 Colombia Review 2016 Page 92 of 396 pages Colombia Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com. Research sources listed in Bibliography. Political Risk Index Political Risk Index The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments, corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater risk. Colombia Review 2016 Country Assessment Afghanistan 2 Page 93 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Albania 4 Algeria 6 Andorra 9 Angola 4 Antigua 8 Argentina 4 Armenia 4-5 Australia 9.5 Austria 9.5 Azerbaijan 4 Bahamas 8.5 Bahrain 6 Bangladesh 3.5 Barbados 8.5-9 Belarus 3 Belgium 9 Belize 8 Benin 5 Page 94 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Bhutan 5 Bolivia 5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4 Botswana 7 Brazil 7 Brunei 7 Bulgaria 6 Burkina Faso 4 Burma (Myanmar) 4.5 Burundi 3 Cambodia 4 Cameroon 5 Canada 9.5 Cape Verde 6 Central African Republic 3 Chad 4 Chile 9 China 7 Page 95 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 China: Hong Kong 8 China: Taiwan 8 Colombia 7 Comoros 5 Congo DRC 3 Congo RC 4 Costa Rica 8 Cote d'Ivoire 4.5 Croatia 7 Cuba 4-4.5 Cyprus 5 Czech Republic 8 Denmark 9.5 Djibouti 4.5 Dominica 7 Dominican Republic 6 East Timor 5 Ecuador 6 Page 96 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Egypt 5 El Salvador 7 Equatorial Guinea 4 Eritrea 3 Estonia 8 Ethiopia 4 Fiji 5 Finland 9 Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 5 France 9 Gabon 5 Gambia 4 Georgia 5 Germany 9.5 Ghana 6 Greece 4.5-5 Grenada 8 Guatemala 6 Page 97 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Guinea 3.5 Guinea-Bissau 3.5 Guyana 4.5 Haiti 3.5 Holy See (Vatican) 9 Honduras 4.5-5 Hungary 7 Iceland 8.5-9 India 7.5-8 Indonesia 6 Iran 3.5-4 Iraq 2.5-3 Ireland 8-8.5 Israel 8 Italy 7.5 Jamaica 6.5-7 Japan 9 Jordan 6.5 Page 98 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Kazakhstan 6 Kenya 5 Kiribati 7 Korea, North 1 Korea, South 8 Kosovo 4 Kuwait 7 Kyrgyzstan 4.5 Laos 4.5 Latvia 7 Lebanon 5.5 Lesotho 6 Liberia 3.5 Libya 2 Liechtenstein 9 Lithuania 7.5 Luxembourg 9 Madagascar 4 Page 99 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Malawi 4 Malaysia 8 Maldives 4.5 Mali 4 Malta 8 Marshall Islands 6 Mauritania 4.5-5 Mauritius 7 Mexico 6.5 Micronesia 7 Moldova 5 Monaco 9 Mongolia 5 Montenegro 6 Morocco 6.5 Mozambique 4.5-5 Namibia 6.5-7 Nauru 6 Page 100 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Nepal 4 Netherlands 9.5 New Zealand 9.5 Nicaragua 5 Niger 4 Nigeria 4.5 Norway 9.5 Oman 7 Pakistan 3.5 Palau 7 Panama 7.5 Papua New Guinea 5 Paraguay 6.5-7 Peru 7 Philippines 6 Poland 8 Portugal 7.5 Qatar 7.5 Page 101 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Romania 5.5 Russia 5.5 Rwanda 5 Saint Kitts and Nevis 8 Saint Lucia 8 Saint Vincent and Grenadines 8 Samoa 7 San Marino 9 Sao Tome and Principe 5.5 Saudi Arabia 6 Senegal 6 Serbia 5 Seychelles 7 Sierra Leone 4.5 Singapore 9 Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8 Slovenia 8 Solomon Islands 6 Page 102 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Somalia 2 South Africa 7 Spain 7.5 Sri Lanka 5 Sudan 3.5 Suriname 5 Swaziland 5 Sweden 9.5 Switzerland 9.5 Syria 2 Tajikistan 4.5 Tanzania 6 Thailand 6.5 Togo 4.5 Tonga 7 Trinidad and Tobago 8 Tunisia 6 Turkey 7 Page 103 of 396 pages Colombia Turkmenistan 4.5 Tuvalu 7 Uganda 6 Ukraine 3.5-4 United Arab Emirates 7 United Kingdom 9 United States 9.5 Uruguay 8 Uzbekistan 4 Vanuatu 7 Venezuela 4 Vietnam 5 Yemen 3 Zambia 4.5 Zimbabwe 3 *Methodology The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -- Colombia Review 2016 Page 104 of 396 pages Colombia 1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse) 2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and influence of foreign powers) 3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties, backed by constitutional protections) 4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express political opposition, backed by constitutional protections) 5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures) 6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war; threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies) 7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic concern for the status of women and children) 8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure) 9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of industries, property rights, labor force development) 10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address graft and other irregularities) Editor's Note: As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe -- retain their low rankings. Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of Colombia Review 2016 Page 105 of 396 pages Colombia unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels, secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize. In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis. In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions. Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case. In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional Colombia Review 2016 Page 106 of 396 pages Colombia crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability. In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Source: Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com Updated: 2015 Political Stability Political Stability The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability, standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology* by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an Colombia Review 2016 Page 107 of 396 pages Colombia ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater stability. Colombia Review 2016 Country Assessment Afghanistan 2 Albania 4.5-5 Algeria 5 Andorra 9.5 Angola 4.5-5 Antigua 8.5-9 Argentina 7 Armenia 5.5 Australia 9.5 Austria 9.5 Azerbaijan 5 Bahamas 9 Bahrain 6 Page 108 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Bangladesh 4.5 Barbados 9 Belarus 4 Belgium 9 Belize 8 Benin 5 Bhutan 5 Bolivia 6 Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 Botswana 8.5 Brazil 7 Brunei 8 Bulgaria 7.5 Burkina Faso 4 Burma (Myanmar) 4.5 Burundi 4 Cambodia 4.5-5 Cameroon 6 Page 109 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Canada 9.5 Cape Verde 6 Central African Republic 3 Chad 4.5 Chile 9 China 7 China: Hong Kong 8 China: Taiwan 8 Colombia 7.5 Comoros 5 Congo DRC 3 Congo RC 5 Costa Rica 9.5 Cote d'Ivoire 3.5 Croatia 7.5 Cuba 4.5 Cyprus 8 Czech Republic 8.5 Page 110 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Denmark 9.5 Djibouti 5 Dominica 8.5 Dominican Republic 7 East Timor 5 Ecuador 7 Egypt 4.5-5 El Salvador 7.5-8 Equatorial Guinea 4.5 Eritrea 4 Estonia 9 Ethiopia 4.5 Fiji 5 Finland 9 Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia 6.5 France 9 Gabon 5 Gambia 4.5 Page 111 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Georgia 5 Germany 9.5 Ghana 7 Greece 6 Grenada 8.5 Guatemala 7 Guinea 3.5-4 Guinea-Bissau 4 Guyana 6 Haiti 3.5-4 Holy See (Vatican) 9.5 Honduras 6 Hungary 7.5 Iceland 9 India 8 Indonesia 7 Iran 3.5 Iraq 2.5 Page 112 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Ireland 9.5 Israel 8 Italy 8.5-9 Jamaica 8 Japan 9 Jordan 6 Kazakhstan 6 Kenya 5 Kiribati 8 Korea, North 2 Korea, South 8.5 Kosovo 5.5 Kuwait 7 Kyrgyzstan 5 Laos 5 Latvia 8.5 Lebanon 5.5 Lesotho 5 Page 113 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Liberia 3.5-4 Libya 2 Liechtenstein 9 Lithuania 9 Luxembourg 9.5 Madagascar 4 Malawi 5 Malaysia 8 Maldives 4.5-5 Mali 4.5-5 Malta 9 Marshall Islands 8 Mauritania 6 Mauritius 8 Mexico 6.5-7 Micronesia 8 Moldova 5.5 Monaco 9.5 Page 114 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Mongolia 6.5-7 Montenegro 8 Morocco 7 Mozambique 5 Namibia 8.5 Nauru 8 Nepal 4.5 Netherlands 9.5 New Zealand 9.5 Nicaragua 6 Niger 4.5 Nigeria 4.5 Norway 9.5 Oman 7 Pakistan 3 Palau 8 Panama 8.5 Papua New Guinea 6 Page 115 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Paraguay 8 Peru 7.5 Philippines 6 Poland 9 Portugal 9 Qatar 7 Romania 7 Russia 6 Rwanda 5 Saint Kitts and Nevis 9 Saint Lucia 9 Saint Vincent and Grenadines 9 Samoa 8 San Marino 9.5 Sao Tome and Principe 7 Saudi Arabia 6 Senegal 7.5 Serbia 6.5 Page 116 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Seychelles 8 Sierra Leone 4.5 Singapore 9.5 Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5 Slovenia 9 Solomon Islands 6.5-7 Somalia 2 South Africa 7.5 Spain 9 Sri Lanka 5 Sudan 3 Suriname 5 Swaziland 5 Sweden 9.5 Switzerland 9.5 Syria 2 Tajikistan 4.5 Tanzania 6 Page 117 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Thailand 6 Togo 5 Tonga 7 Trinidad and Tobago 8 Tunisia 5 Turkey 7.5 Turkmenistan 5 Tuvalu 8.5 Uganda 6 Ukraine 3.5-4 United Arab Emirates 7 United Kingdom 9 United States 9 Uruguay 8.5 Uzbekistan 4 Vanuatu 8.5 Venezuela 4.5-5 Vietnam 4.5 Page 118 of 396 pages Colombia Yemen 2.5 Zambia 5 Zimbabwe 3 *Methodology The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords) 2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic accountability 3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights 4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance 5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable") 6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection 7. level of unchecked crime and corruption 8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security 9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral cooperation 10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges) Editor's Note: As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -Colombia Review 2016 Page 119 of 396 pages Colombia has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea, Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, alQaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths of Iraqi territory. Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize. In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the Colombia Review 2016 Page 120 of 396 pages Colombia dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result. It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola heath crisis. In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Serbia and Albania were slightly downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while Romania was slightly downgraded on the basis of corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone. Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power. In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government Colombia Review 2016 Page 121 of 396 pages Colombia remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for this country's already low rating. In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes. Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections. Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power. In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the holding of the first elections in eight years. In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed. Source: Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com Updated: 2015 Colombia Review 2016 Page 122 of 396 pages Colombia Freedom Rankings Freedom Rankings Freedom in the World Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR" and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results. Country Afghanistan PR 6? CL Freedom Status 6 Not Free Albania* 3 3 Partly Free Algeria 6 5 Not Free Andorra* 1 1 Free Angola 6 5 Not Free 2 Free Antigua and Barbuda* 3? Argentina* 2 2 Free Armenia 6 4 Partly Free Australia* 1 1 Free Austria* 1 1 Free Colombia Review 2016 Trend Arrow Page 123 of 396 pages Colombia Azerbaijan 6 5 Not Free Bahamas* 1 1 Free Bahrain 6? 5 Not Free ? Bangladesh* 3? 4 Partly Free Barbados* 1 1 Free Belarus 7 6 Not Free Belgium* 1 1 Free Belize* 1 2 Free Benin* 2 2 Free Bhutan 4 5 Partly Free Bolivia* 3 3 Partly Free Bosnia-Herzegovina* 4 3 Partly Free 2 Free Botswana* 3? Brazil* 2 2 Free Brunei 6 5 Not Free Bulgaria* 2 2 Free Burkina Faso 5 3 Partly Free Burma 7 7 Not Free Colombia Review 2016 Page 124 of 396 pages Colombia Burundi* 4 5 Partly Free ⇑ Cambodia 6 5 Not Free ⇓ Cameroon 6 6 Not Free Canada* 1 1 Free Cape Verde* 1 1 Free Central African Republic 5 5 Partly Free Chad 7 6 Not Free Chile* 1 1 Free China 7 6 Not Free Colombia* 3 4 Partly Free Comoros* 3 4 Partly Free Congo (Brazzaville ) 6 5 Not Free ⇓ Congo (Kinshasa) 6 6 Not Free ⇓ Costa Rica* 1 1 Free Cote d’Ivoire 6 5 Not Free 2 Free Croatia* 1? Cuba 7 6 Not Free Cyprus* 1 1 Free Colombia Review 2016 Page 125 of 396 pages Colombia Czech Republic* 1 1 Free Denmark* 1 1 Free Djibouti 5 5 Partly Free Dominica* 1 1 Free Dominican Republic* 2 2 Free East Timor* 3 4 Partly Free Ecuador* 3 3 Partly Free Egypt 6 5 Not Free El Salvador* 2 3 Free Equatorial Guinea 7 7 Not Free Eritrea 7 7? Not Free Estonia* 1 1 Free Ethiopia 5 5 Partly Free Fiji 6 4 Partly Free Finland* 1 1 Free France* 1 1 Free Gabon 6 5? The Gambia 5 5? Colombia Review 2016 ⇓ ⇓ Not Free ? Partly Free Page 126 of 396 pages Colombia Georgia 4 4 Partly Free Germany* 1 1 Free Ghana* 1 2 Free Greece* 1 2 Free Grenada* 1 2 Free 4? 4 Partly Free Guinea 7 6? Guinea-Bissau* 4 4 Partly Free Guyana* 2 3 Free Haiti* 4 5 Partly Free Honduras 4? 4? Partly Free Hungary* 1 1 Free Iceland* 1 1 Free India* 2 3 Free Indonesia* 2 3 Free Iran 6 6 Not Free Iraq 5? 6 Not Free 1 1 Free Guatemala* Ireland* Colombia Review 2016 Not Free ⇓ Page 127 of 396 pages Colombia Israel* 1 2 Free Italy* 1 2 Free Jamaica* 2 3 Free Japan* 1 2 Free Jordan 6? 5 Not Free ? Kazakhstan 6 5 Not Free Kenya 4 4? Kiribati* 1 1 Kosovo 5? 4? Partly Free ? Kuwait 4 4 Partly Free 6? 5? Not Free ? Laos 7 6 Not Free Latvia* 2 1 Free Lebanon 5 3? Partly Free Lesotho* 3? 3 Partly Free ? Liberia* 3 4 Partly Free Libya 7 7 Not Free Liechtenstein* 1 1 Free Kyrgyzstan Colombia Review 2016 ⇓ Partly Free Free Page 128 of 396 pages Colombia Lithuania* 1 1 Free Luxembourg* 1 1 Free Macedonia* 3 3 Partly Free Madagascar 6? 4? Partly Free Malawi* 3? 4 Partly Free Malaysia 4 4 Partly Free Maldives* 3? 4 Partly Free Mali* 2 3 Free Malta* 1 1 Free Marshall Islands* 1 1 Free Mauritania 6 5 Not Free Mauritius* 1 2 Free Mexico* 2 3 Free Micronesia* 1 1 Free Moldova* 3? 4 Partly Free Monaco* 2 1 Free Mongolia* 2 2 Free Montenegro* 3 2? Free ? Colombia Review 2016 ⇑ ⇓ ⇑ Page 129 of 396 pages Colombia Morocco ⇓ 5 4 Partly Free 4? 3 Partly Free Namibia* 2 2 Free Nauru* 1 1 Free Nepal 4 4 Partly Free Netherlands* 1 1 Free New Zealand* 1 1 Free Nicaragua* 4 4? Partly Free 5? 4 Partly Free Nigeria 5 4 Partly Free ⇓ North Korea 7 7 Not Free ⇓ Norway* 1 1 Free Oman 6 5 Not Free Pakistan 4 5 Partly Free Palau* 1 1 Free Panama* 1 2 Free Papua New Guinea* 4 3 Partly Free Paraguay* 3 3 Partly Free Mozambique Niger Colombia Review 2016 Page 130 of 396 pages Colombia Peru* 2 3 Free Philippines 4 3 Partly Free Poland* 1 1 Free Portugal* 1 1 Free Qatar 6 5 Not Free Romania* 2 2 Free Russia 6 5 Not Free Rwanda 6 5 Not Free Saint Kitts and Nevis* 1 1 Free Saint Lucia* 1 1 Free Saint Vincent and Grenadines* 2 1 Free Samoa* 2 2 Free San Marino* 1 1 Free Sao Tome and Principe* 2 2 Free Saudi Arabia 7 6 Not Free Senegal* 3 3 Partly Free Serbia* 2? 2 Free 3 3 Partly Free Seychelles* Colombia Review 2016 ⇓ ⇓ Page 131 of 396 pages Colombia Sierra Leone* 3 3 Partly Free Singapore 5 4 Partly Free Slovakia* 1 1 Free Slovenia* 1 1 Free Solomon Islands 4 3 Partly Free Somalia 7 7 Not Free South Africa* 2 2 Free South Korea* 1 2 Free Spain* 1 1 Free Sri Lanka* 4 4 Partly Free Sudan 7 7 Not Free Suriname* 2 2 Free Swaziland 7 5 Not Free Sweden* 1 1 Free Switzerland* 1 1 Free Syria 7 6 Not Free Taiwan* 1? 2? Tajikistan 6 5 Colombia Review 2016 ⇓ ⇓ Free Not Free Page 132 of 396 pages Colombia Tanzania 4 3 Partly Free Thailand 5 4 Partly Free Togo 5 4? Partly Free Tonga 5 3 Partly Free Trinidad and Tobago* 2 2 Free Tunisia 7 5 Not Free Turkey* 3 3 Partly Free Turkmenistan 7 7 Not Free Tuvalu* 1 1 Free Uganda 5 4 Partly Free Ukraine* 3 2 Free United Arab Emirates 6 5 Not Free United Kingdom* 1 1 Free United States* 1 1 Free Uruguay* 1 1 Free Uzbekistan 7 7 Not Free Vanuatu* 2 2 Free Venezuela 5? 4 Partly Free Colombia Review 2016 ⇓ Page 133 of 396 pages Colombia Vietnam 7 5 Not Free Yemen 6? 5 Not Free ? 3 4? 6? 6 Zambia* Zimbabwe ⇓ Partly Free Not Free Methodology: PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results. ? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey. ⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7. * indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy. Source: This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010 edition. Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org Updated: Reviewed in 2015 Human Rights Overview of Human Rights in Colombia Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy. Serious human rights problems remain although the government is working to improve its record. However, there are still major obstacles Colombia Review 2016 Page 134 of 396 pages Colombia although the government is working to improve its record. However, there are still major obstacles hindering their ability to do so. A forty year armed conflict continues between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and certain parts of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). This situation does not allow for high levels of certainty and security in and about the nation. While the government is responsible for some of the human rights violations, the majority are being committed by FARC, AUC and ELN. Political killings, killings of teachers and union leaders, torture, forced displacement, intimidation of judges, witnesses and lawyers, recruitment of child soldiers, and restrictions on the freedom of movement, are among the abuses being committed on a daily basis by the paramilitary groups. For those persons who are internally displaced, there are concerns about unhygienic conditions at displacement camps, and limited access to the basic necessities of life. Child abuse, labor, prostitution and trafficking for the purpose of forced sexual labor are also areas of concern. Corruption, harassment of journalists, arbitrary arrest, and societal discrimination against minorities and indigenous people are also daily problems in Colombia. Note: See Political Conditions of this Country Review for more details about the political battle between the government and militants in Colombia. Human Development Index (HDI) Rank: See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for this country's current rank. Human Poverty Index Rank: 8th out of 103 Gini Index: 53.8 Life Expectancy at Birth (years): 72.27 years Unemployment Rate: Colombia Review 2016 Page 135 of 396 pages Colombia 10.2% Population living on $1 a day (%): 8.2% Population living on $2 a day (%): 22.6% Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%): 49.2% Internally Displaced People: 1,575,000-3,410,000 Note-38,000 refugees currently seeking asylum in Colombia Total Crime Rate (%): 54.6% Health Expenditure (% of GDP): Public: 5.7% % of GDP Spent on Education: 5.2% Human Rights Conventions Party to: • International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women • Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment • Conventions on the Rights of the Child Colombia Review 2016 Page 136 of 396 pages Colombia • Convention relating to the Status of Refugees • International Convention on the Protection of All Migrants and Members of Their Families • Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court *Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in 177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation. It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993. *Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the indicators assessed in this measure. *The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect inequality (income all going to one individual). *The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences. Government Functions Constitution Colombia's constitution, enacted on July 5, 1991, strengthened the administration of justice with the introduction of an accusatorial system that replaced the previous Napoleonic Code system. Other significant reforms under the new constitution provide for civil divorce, dual nationality, the election of a vice president and the election of departmental governors. The constitution expanded Colombia Review 2016 Page 137 of 396 pages Colombia citizens' basic rights, including that of "tutela," under which an immediate court action can be requested by an individual if he feels his constitutional rights are being violated and if there is no other legal recourse. Note: The national government has separate executive, legislative and judicial branches as discussed following. Executive Authority The president is both the chief of state and head of government. The president is elected for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term.* The 1991 constitution re-established the position of vice-president, elected on the same ticket as the president. By law, the vice-president will succeed in the event of the president's resignation, illness or death. Legislative Authority Colombia's bicameral Congress or Congreso consists of the Senate or Senado (102 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) and the House of Representatives or Camara de Representantes (166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms). Judicial Authority At the judicial level, there are four roughly coequal, supreme judicial organs; Supreme Court of Justice or Corte Suprema de Justicia (highest court of criminal law; judges are selected by their peers from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Council of State (highest court of administrative law; judges are selected from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Constitutional Court (guards integrity and supremacy of the constitu tion; rules on constitutionality of laws, amendments to the constitution, and international treaties); Superior Judicial Council (administers and disciplines the civilian judiciary; resolves jurisdictional conflicts arising between other courts; members are elected by three sister courts and Congress for eight-year terms). Legal System The legal system is based on Spanish law. A new criminal code modeled after United States procedures was enacted into law in 2004 and is gradually being implemented. Colombia Review 2016 Page 138 of 396 pages Colombia *** * In 2009, Colombia's lower house of Congress passed legislation that could pave the way for President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term. Legislators overwhelmingly voted in favor of a referendum on whether to make constitutional changes that would allow presidents to contest reelection twice. The legislation had already passed the Senate and its fate was now in the hands of Colombia's Constitutional Court. The constitution was already modified once to let Uribe run for a second four-year term in 2006, and so, if the new constitutional changes are made, Uribe could theoretically contest another election battle in 2010. While Uribe has enjoyed strong popularity at home thanks to a mixture of conservative security and economic policies, this move to allow his three consecutive terms has been met with some resistance. Indeed, other attempts to make constitutional changes that would facilitate extended power in the region have resulted in condemnation about the erosion of democracy. Government Structure Names: conventional long form: Republic of Colombia conventional short form: Colombia local long form: Republica de Colombia local short form: Colombia Type: Republic; executive branch dominates government Colombia Review 2016 Page 139 of 396 pages Colombia Executive Branch: Chief of state and head of government: President Juan Manuel SANTOS Calderon (since August 7, 2010 -- see 2010 Elections Note; fresh elections held in 2014 resulting in re-election for Santos-- see 2014 Elections Primer); the president is both the chief of state and head of government; elected by popular vote for a four-year term (eligible for a second term) Note on chief of state and head of government: President Juan Manuel Santos won the elections after two polling rounds. Primer on 2014 presidential election: First round May 25, 2014; second round in June 2014 -A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He would be up for re-election in 2014. Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5 percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos. According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According Colombia Review 2016 Page 140 of 396 pages Colombia to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take 19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34 to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support. Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them. Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. Centerleft Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace with FARC. After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29 percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos. Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC. Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously indicated. At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish. Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian Colombia Review 2016 Page 141 of 396 pages Colombia national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers. Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51 percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open. For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war. He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia." Cabinet: Chosen by the president Legislative Branch: Bicameral "Congreso" (Congress): Consists of the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives) "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic): 102 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives): 166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year term Primer on Colombia's 2014 parliamentary elections March 9, 2014 -Parliamentary elections were set to be held in Colombia on March 9, 2014. At stake was the composition of the bicameral "Congreso" (Congress), which consists of the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives). In the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic), there are 102 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. In the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives), there are 166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. The last elections were held in March 2010 and were won by the parties aligned with thenPresident Alvaro Uribe. Indeed, the Party of U and the Conservative Party or PC won the most seats. It was to be seen if they would see that level of success in 2014. Other parties likely to Colombia Review 2016 Page 142 of 396 pages Colombia contest these elections included the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, the Green Party, and Radical Change or CR. These 2014 elections were being viewed as a referendum on the ongoing peace process between the government and the Marxist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In the Senate, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) garnered 16 percent and 21 seats; the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) had 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) secured 16 percent and 17 seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) acquired eight percent and nine seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four percent and five seats; the rest of the Senate went to other parties, In the Chamber of Representatives, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) won 16 percent and 39 seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) garnered 14 percent and 37 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 13 percent and 27 seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) carried 8 percent and 15 seats; Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) acquired 9.5 percent and 12 seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four percent and six seats; the rest of the seats were won by other parties. Judicial Branch: Four roughly coequal, supreme judicial organs; Supreme Court of Justice or Corte Suprema de Justicia (highest court of criminal law; judges are selected by their peers from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Council of State (highest court of administrative law; judges are selected from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Constitutional Court (guards integrity and supremacy of the constitution; rules on constitutionality of laws, amendments to the constitution, and international treaties); Superior Judicial Council (administers and disciplines the civilian judiciary; resolves jurisdictional conflicts arising between other courts; members are elected by three sister courts and Congress for eight-year terms) Constitution: July 5, 1991; amended many times Legal System: Based on Spanish law; a new criminal code modeled after U.S. procedures was enacted in 199293; judicial review of executive and legislative acts; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations. Colombia Review 2016 Page 143 of 396 pages Colombia Political Parties and Leaders: Alternative Democratic Pole or PDA [Clara LOPEZ] Conservative Party or PC [David BARGUIL] Democratic Center Party or CD [Alvaro URIBE Velez, Oscar Ivan ZULUAGA] Green Alliance [Jorge LONDONO, Antonio SANGUINO, Luis AVELLANEDA, Camilo ROMERO] Liberal Party or PL [Horacio SERPA] Citizens Option (Opcion Ciudadana) or OC (formerly known as the National Integration Party or PIN) [Angel ALIRIO Moreno] Radical Change or CR [Carlos Fernando GALAN] Social National Unity Party or U Party [Roy BARRERAS, Jose David NAME] Note: Colombia has eight major political parties, and numerous smaller movements Political Pressure Groups: The two largest insurgent groups active in Colombia are Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC and National Liberation Army or ELN Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory Administrative Divisions: 32 departments (departamentos, singular - departamento) and 1 capital district* (distrito capital); Amazonas, Antioquia, Arauca, Atlantico, Distrito Capital de Bogota*, Bolivar, Boyaca, Caldas, Caqueta, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Choco, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Guainia, Guaviare, Huila, La Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Narino, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Quindio, Risaralda, San Andres y Providencia, Santander, Sucre, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Vaupes, Vichada Principal Government Officials Colombia Review 2016 Page 144 of 396 pages Colombia Government of Colombia Pres. Juan Manuel SANTOS Calderon Vice Pres. German VARGAS Lleras Min. of Agriculture & Rural Development Aurelio IRAGORRI Valencia Min. of Commerce, Industry, & Tourism Cecilia ALVAREZ-CORREA Glen Min. of Culture Mariana GARCES Cordoba Min. of Defense Luis Carlos VILLEGAS Echeverri Min. of Education Gina Maria PARODY Min. of Energy & Mines Tomas GONZALEZ Estrada Min. of the Environment & Sustainable Development Gabriel VALLEJO Lopez Min. of Finance & Public Credit Mauricio CARDENAS Santa Maria Min. of Foreign Relations Maria Angela HOLGUIN Cuellar Min. of Health & Social Protection Alejandro GAVIRIA Uribe Min. of Housing & Territorial Development Luis Felipe HENAO Cardona Min. of Information Technology & Communication David LUNA Min. of Interior Juan Fernando CRISTO Bustos Min. of Justice & Law Yesid REYES Alvarado Min. of Labor Luis Eduardo GARZON Min. of Transportation Natalie ABELLO Dir., Dept. of National Planning Simon GAVIRIA Munoz Prosecutor Gen. Eduardo MONTEALEGRE Lynett Pres., Bank of the Republic Jose Dario URIBE Escobar Ambassador to the US Juan Carlos PINZON Bueno Permanent Representative to the UN, New York Maria Emma MEJIA Velez -- as of 2015 Leader Biography Leader Biography Colombia Review 2016 Page 145 of 396 pages Colombia President of Colombia Santos comes to power -- The presidential election in Colombia was scheduled for May 30, 2010. The main presidential candidates contesting the election to succeed outgoing President Alvaro Uribe were as follows: Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, an Uribist from the outgoing president's party, Germán Vargas Lleras of the Radical Change party, Noemí Sanín of the Conservative Party, Rafael Pardo of Liberal Party, Gustavo Petro of the Alternative Democratic Pole and Antanas Mockus of the newly-formed Green Party. As well, Álvaro Leyva Durán was seeking the presidential nomination by the Conservative Party. Apart from Santos who promised to follow the Uribe mold, Lleras and Sanin have been cast as pro-Uribist in orientation as well. On the other side of the equation, Pardo, Petro, were viewed as alternate options, while Duran and Mockus were viewed as anti-Uribist in orientation. A month ahead of the election, there appeared to be a clear ideological "right versus left" battle at stake in Colombia with polls showing Santos and Mockus running neck and neck against one another, possibly headed for a run-off election. On election day, after the votes were counted, Santos had won the first round of Colombia's presidential election with 47 percent of the vote -- just short of an outright majority. His main rival, Mockus, garnered 21 percent. Santos' clear domination at the polls was something of a surprise since polling data indicated a far closer race. That said, both men would contest the run-off election set for June 20, 2010. Until then, Santos was expected to continue to highlight his national security-dominated campaign platform, and would tout his desire to continue the policies of highly popular outgoing President Uribe. Mockus was expected to draw attention to his campaign agenda issues of anti-corruption and education, as well as his record of improved quality of life and successful public works projects during his time as mayor of Bogota. That said, with third place candidate Lleras saying that he would back Santos in the second round, the advantage would certainly reside with the proUribe former defense minister on June 20, 2010. Colombia Review 2016 Page 146 of 396 pages Colombia On the day of the second round -- June 20, 2010, as expected, Santos won an overwhelming 69 percent of the vote, propelling him into position of President-elect of Colombia. With a clear sign that he would continue outgoing President Uribe's hardline security policies, President-Elect Santos said during his victory speech that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC's) "time had run out" and foreclosed the possibility of negotiations. He also declared that he would not rest until they had secured every inch of the country. In the first week of August 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was sworn into office as Colombia's new president. During his inaugural speech, President Santos noted that among his priorities would be improved relations with neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela. As well, he aimed to decrease the unemployment rate, reduce poverty, and deal with corruption. President Santos also said he would continue the efforts against militant rebel and terror groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); however, he also said that he would not foreclose the possibility of dialogue with FARC if they renounced their campaign of violence. CountryWatch News Wire Biography on Incoming President Santos -BOGOTA, May 28 (Xinhua) -- Juan Manuel Santos, a former defense minister, is the frontrunner in the 2010 Colombian presidential election slated for Sunday. A staunch ally of Alvaro Uribe, Colombia's immensely popular outgoing president, Santos is the presidential candidate of the ruling Social National Unity Party. During his campaign, Santos has pledged to continue and improve Uribe's security- and market-friendly policies. He vows to make continuous efforts to strengthen security, Colombia Review 2016 Page 147 of 396 pages Colombia eradicate poverty and fight drug trafficking and illegal armed groups in the country. He plans to boost foreign investment through more trade agreements and diversifying exports to Latin America, Europe and Asia. Santos also promises to encourage the return of 3.3 million Colombians displaced due to armed conflicts to their places of origin, and to make Colombia an internationally renowned tourist destination. Santos, 58, comes from a family of influential politicians and journalists. His great-uncle Eduardo Santos was Colombia's president during 1938-1942 and the owner of El Tiempo, the most influential newspaper in the country. He started his university education at the University of Kansas in the United States, where he studied economy and business administration. Later, Santos got a master's degree in the same field at the London School of Economics and at Harvard University. Santos worked in the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia and was the sub-director of El Tiempo until 1991, when he launched his political career as Colombia's minister of foreign trade and then treasury minister. He also founded the Social National Unity Party. Colombia Review 2016 Page 148 of 396 pages Colombia In July 2006, Santos became Colombia's minister of defense. During his tenure, Santos dealt a harsh blow to guerillas and paramilitaries in the country. His efforts led to the capture of "Simon Trinidad," one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the death of "Raul Reyes," FARC's No.2 commander, and the rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 14 other hostages. Primer on 2014 Presidential Elections First round May 25, 2014; second round in June 2014 -- A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He would be up for re-election in 2014. Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5 percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos. According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to Colombia Review 2016 Page 149 of 396 pages Colombia beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take 19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34 to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support. Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them. Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. Centerleft Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace with FARC. After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29 Colombia Review 2016 Page 150 of 396 pages Colombia percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos. Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC. Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously indicated. At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish. Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers. Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51 percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open. For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos Colombia Review 2016 Page 151 of 396 pages Colombia also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war. He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia." Foreign Relations General Relations Colombia seeks diplomatic and commercial relations with all countries, regardless of their ideologies or political or economic systems. In 1969, it formed what is now the Andean Community along with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru (Venezuela joined in 1973 and Chile left in 1976). In the 1980s, Colombia broadened its bilateral and multilateral relations, joining the Contadora Group, the Group of Eight (now the Rio Group), and the Non-Aligned Movement, which it chaired from 1994 until September 1998. In addition, it has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Colombia has traditionally played an active role in the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) and their subsidiary agencies. Former President Gaviria became Secretary General of the OAS in September 1994. Colombia was a participant in the December 1994 and April 1998 Summits of the Americas and followed up on initiatives developed at the summit by hosting two post-summit, ministerial-level meetings on trade and science and technology. Regional Relations Colombia regularly participates in international forums, including CICAD, the Organization of American States' body on money laundering, chemical controls and drug abuse prevention. Although the Colombian government ratified the 1988 U.N. convention on narcotics in 1994 -- the last of the Andean governments to do so -- it did so with important reservations, notably to the anti-money laundering measures, asset forfeiture and confiscation provisions, maritime interdiction and extradition clauses. Colombia subsequently withdrew some of these reservations, most notably that on extradition. Colombia is the world's leading supplier of refined cocaine and a growing supplier of heroin, Colombia Review 2016 Page 152 of 396 pages Colombia especially to the United States. Colombia also has the largest area under coca cultivation. Despite the death of Medellín cartel drug lord Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the arrests of major Cali cartel kingpins in 1995 and 1996, the Colombian drug cartels remain among the most sophisticated criminal organizations in the world. They control cocaine processing, international wholesale distribution chains and markets. Corruption and intimidation by traffickers complicate the drug-control efforts of many institutions of government. Colombia passed a revised criminal procedure code in 1993, which permits traffickers to surrender and negotiate lenient sentences in return for cooperating with prosecutors. In December 1996 and February 1997, however, the Colombian Congress passed legislation to toughen sentencing, with money laundering penalties and provisions for asset forfeiture. Implementation, however, is still lagging. In November 1997, the Colombian Congress amended the constitution to permit the extradition of Colombian nationals, albeit not retroactively, which could have the effect of shielding major traffickers from justice in the United States (U.S.) and other countries where they committed their crimes. (The Colombian government permits extradition of foreigners resident in Colombia). The amendment was under review until Oct. 5, 1998, when the Constitutional Court ruled that a proposed constitutional amendment permitting extradition without retroactivity was valid. Colombia is currently engaged in a broad range of narcotics control activities. Through aerial spraying of herbicide and manual eradication, Colombia has attempted to keep coca, opium poppy and cannabis cultivation from expanding. The government has committed itself to the eradication of all illicit crops, interdiction of drug shipments, and financial controls to prevent money laundering. However, these have proved to be daunting tasks given th at rebel and paramilitary groups protect the majority of drug operations. In general regional relations have suffered due to the increased guerrilla and paramilitary activity along Colombia's borders. In light of the circumstances, many neighboring countries such as Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru have expressed concerns over the region's overall stability. In November 1999, Honduras ratified the Caribbean Sea Maritime Limits Treaty with Colombia. According to Nicaragua, the treaty deprived Nicaragua of 130,000 square kilometers of maritime space in the Caribbean Sea and dishonored a Central American Court of Justice verdict. Consequently relations between Colombia and Nicaragua suffered. In March 2000, Colombia met with Venezuela to discuss increasing bilateral trade and investments. On May 29, 2000, Costa Rica and Colombia agreed to combat illicit sea trading. The 12th Andean Presidential Summit, held June 9-10, 2000, discussed ways to increase regional integration. The Andean community strives to promote a common foreign and economic policy. Colombia Review 2016 Page 153 of 396 pages Colombia Presidents from all five Andean nations signed the Lima Agreement to promote democracy and human rights. In 2002, Colombian President-elect Alvaro Uribe called upon Ecuador to seal its border with Colombia, in order to prevent incursions by Colombian rebel groups. In the fight against guerilla and paramilitary groups, Uribe also noted that the Manta air base in western Ecuador, site of a U.S. operations center for fighting drug trafficking, could be a strategic location for operations. As such, it was anticipated that relations between the two countries would become increasingly collaborative in this regard. In 2005, Colombia and Venezuela were embroiled in a diplomatic imbroglio over the arrest of a leading member of a leftist rebel group. Venezuela charged that the arrest allegedly took place in its territory and as such, there was a violation of its sovereign space. For its part, however, Colombia denied that the incident took place in Venezuelan territory. The incident set off a a diplomatic crisis which eventually came to an end after six weeks of bilateral tension. Rapprochement was reached when Colombia submitted a statement stating that such incidences would not be repeated. November 2007 marked the freezing of bilateral ties between Venezuela and Colombia over disagreements in dealing with the ongoing hostage crisis. At issue was Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' role in freeing the many hostages kidnapped by Colombia's Marxist terror group, known as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, during the years of civil war between that group and the Colombian authorities. President Chavez said he would place his country's bilateral ties with neighboring Colombia on hold in response to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s decision to end Chavez's role as a hostage negotiator with Colombia's FARC rebels. There have been several attempts over the years to free the many hostages held in captivity by FARC in Colombia, but the situation moved in a productive direction when Chavez offered to act as a mediator between the leftist extremist rebels and the hard line government of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. That productive direction stalled when a proposal was put forth for FARC to release 45 hostages in exchange for the release of 500 FARC members imprisoned by the Colombian authorities. Uribe first expressed skepticism about the plan, saying that in trying to forge an agreement with FARC, that group could also advance its interests. As well, Uribe was reported to have been upset with Chavez for flaunting the proprieties of diplomacy by appearing in a photograph with a FARC commander, and also revealing what Uribe said was a confidential conversation about a possible meeting with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. Uribe then decided to end Chavez' mediator role in the hostage crisis, charging Venezuela's president wanted Colombia to be victimized by FARC. On the other side of the equation, Chavez reacted to the decision by calling it "a spit in the face" and accusing Uribe of being a liar. Colombia Review 2016 Page 154 of 396 pages Colombia Relatives of hostages held by FARC reacted to the news with shock and dismay and began to protest outside the presidential palace. They appeared to have held out hopes that Chavez' role as mediator would have eventually yielded positive results, pointing to the fact that Chavez had made significant progress in his mediating role. To that end, one man whose nephew was abducted by FARC, Jose Uriel Perez, said in an interview with Associated Press, "We thought it was very brave what President Chavez did in three months compared to what the government has failed to do in 10 years." Reactions were strong outside South America as well. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy called on Uribe to reconsider his decision, saying that Chavez was the best person to negotiate the release of the hostages. The French government entered into the fray because one of the most well-known hostages held by FARC has been the famed politician, Ingrid Betancourt, who holds joint Colombian and French citizenship. In early 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez returned to the objective of brokering the release of hostages held by FARC rebels in Colombia. This mission saw some success with the release of two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. Up to 700 people remained in captivity -- among them, close to 50 high-profile individuals including the French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt. Chavez called on the international community to stop referring to FARC as a terrorist enclave, but at the same time noting that he did not support their tactics. To that end, he called on FARC to stop opposing the Colombian government by taking hostages, saying, "I don't believe in kidnapping and I don't believe in armed struggle." His Colombian counterpart, President Alvaro Uribe, had stayed distant from the hostage release efforts. Uribe also criticized Chavez for holding talks with FARC, and emphatically stated that he viewed FARC rebels as terrorists. The start of March 2008 saw relations devolve between Colombia and two of its neighbors -Venezuela and Ecuador. A Colombian military offensive aimed against Marxist rebels, FARC, resulted in an incursion into Ecuadorian territory. The operation left more than 20 people dead and recriminations from Colombia's two neighbors -- Ecuador and Venezuela -- about overzealous military actions that infringed upon their sovereignty. While Colombian authorities hailed the action as a success due to the death of a leading FARC rebel, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa condemned the Colombian government in Bogota for violating its sovereignty and lodged a formal protest. Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who had been negotiating with FARC for the release of hostages held by the leftist rebels (as discussed above), railed against Colombian President Alvarao Uribe for invading Ecuador, even going so far as to characterize him as "a criminal." Chavez also called for the Venezuelan embassy in Bogota to be closed and withdrew embassy personnel from Colombia. Moreover, he ordered Venezuela's military to take up positions Colombia Review 2016 Page 155 of 396 pages Colombia along the border with Colombia, presumably as a warning to its neighbor that it would not tolerate a similar violation of its own sovereignty. The move marked a significant escalation of tensions in the region. But a week later, relations between Venezuela and Colombia were somewhat soothed after a summit between the leaders of those two countries. At the summit, the leaders of both the countries agreed to a 20-point declaration forged by the Organization of American States (OAS), which included a commitment by Colombian President Uribe ensuring that his military forces would not violate borders with neighbors in the future. Venezuela then said that it would restore its diplomatic relations with Colombia. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry issued a statement noting that the meeting was "a victory for peace and sovereignty... and demonstrated the importance of Latin American unity in overcoming conflicts." In June 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels to end their four-decade struggle and release all their hostages. The Venezuelan leader, who had negotiated controversial talks with FARC aimed at releasing its hostages, characterized the extremist leftist militants as "out of step." Chavez also said, "The guerrilla war is history. At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place." The call came a month after long-serving FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, died and Alfonso Cano was named as his replacement. Perhaps believing that he might have an impact on the new leadership, Chavez said in his televised address, "This is my message for you, Cano: 'Come on, let all these people go.' There are old folk, women, sick people, soldiers who have been prisoners in the mountain for 10 years." As noted above, Chavez' role in mediating the release of hostages has been regarded as controversial by some interests. Indeed, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe terminated his official role in these negotiations. But many of the Colombian victims' families welcomed Chavez' interest in the matter, and applauded his efforts when he successfully negotiated the release of two hostages, Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region. Venezuela announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with Colombia in response. The agreement between the United States and Colombia had already caused a problematic diplomatic consideration for the region in late July 2009 when Venezuela threated to freeze its diplomatic ties with Colombia. Months later, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez confirmed his country intended to end formal diplomatic relations with Colombia due to that country's decision to allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases. Colombia Review 2016 Page 156 of 396 pages Colombia Bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela devolved further in November 2009 when Colombia detained four members of the Venezuelan national guard along a river in the border province of Vichada. The situation was not expected to last long since Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said they would be released and returned to Venezuela. Perhaps with an eye on calming the heightened tensions between the two countries, President Uribe said there was "unbreakable affection" between his country of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela. The incident came a week after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez sent troops to the border region in an apparent response to an agreement forged between Colombia and the United States that would allow the American military to use Colombian bases in its anti-narcotics trafficking efforts. Venezuelan President Chavez has decried the move, charging that the agreement was part of the United States' agenda to ultimately invade his country. This claim has been strongly denied by the United States. Meanwhile, Colombia's relations with Ecuador remained strained, with Ecuador noting that more time was needed to resolve the situation, which involved a violation of its sovereignty. The ongoing diplomatic imbroglio between Colombia and Ecuador re-ignited in late March 2008. At issue was Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty in an anti-terrorism offensive, as discussed above. To recapitulate -- that action ultimately led both Quito and Caracas to break off diplomatic contact with Bogota. Tensions with Caracas were somewhat assuaged when Colombian President Alvaro Uribe issued an apology on the matter. However, relations with Quito continued to be terribly strained and were further exacerbated in the latter part of the month when it was confirmed that an Ecuadorean was killed by Colombian troops in the aforementioned antiterrorism raid on the FARC camp. In July 2009, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denied that the Colombian insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), contributed funds to his 2006 presidential campaign. President Correa also called on the country's civil commission to investigate the allegation, saying that the inquiry would make his innocence clear. Correa recalled accusations from his political opponents claiming that he had received money from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as well as the drug cartels. "They just don't know what else to say," Correa said. "It is up to you to decide who to believe: the same people as usual or those who endanger their lives to save the country." At issue was a Colombian media broadcast, apparently showing FARC leader, Víctor Julio Suarez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy, saying that his group donated money to Correa's campaign. In May 2011, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa rejected prevailing accusations of a connection to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC). During a news conference, President Correa insisted that he did not accept any funds from FARC, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Colombia, saying: "My hands are clean." He also asserted that he was ready to prove his innocence saying, "I'll take Colombia Review 2016 Page 157 of 396 pages Colombia a lie detector test to prove I never received funds from the FARC." At issue have been allegations that the left-wing Ecuadorean leader's election campaign received financing from the Marxist guerrilla enclave. These allegations have been based on an extensive report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which carried out a two-year long study and relied on communication uncovered during a raid by Colombian forces on a FARC encampment in Ecuador in 2008. Note: Earlier in 2007, Uribe accompanied his Peruvian counterpart, President Garcia, to survey the damage done by a devastating earthquake. Note that in 2014, as unrest rocked Venezuela, newly-elected President Nicolas Maduro placed the blame on external players, including the United States and Colombia, while blaming Panama and the Organization of American States for intervening into sovereign affairs by trying to help resolve the chaos. Other Significant Relations In 1822, the United States became one of the first countries to recognize the new republic and to establish a resident diplomatic mission. Today, about 25,000 United States citizens live in Colombia, most of them dual nationals. From October 1997 to September 1998, more than 158,000 Americans visited Colombia. Currently 250 private American businesses are registered in Colombia. In 1996 and a gain in 1997, President Clinton decided that Colombia was not fully cooperating with the United States or taking adequate steps on its own to meet the objective of the 1988 United Nations convention on drugs. The de-certification of Colombia's international drug control program resulted in the denial of most United States aid, including new funding commitments from the United States Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade Development Agency. The de-certification announcement on March 1, 1996, occurred during the midst of a major political scandal in Colombia, linking President Samper with contributions by drug traffickers to his 1994 presidential campaign. The United States concluded that President Samper had undermined Colombian counter-narcotics efforts, and revoked Samper's United States tourist visa on July 11, 1996, in accordance with U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act provisions on narcotics trafficking. President Samper retained his diplomatic visa, which is not subject to the same INA regulations. Despite the strain that de-certification and related issues placed on bilateral relations during the Samper Administration, the U.S. and Colombian governments continued to cooperate and consult. Colombia Review 2016 Page 158 of 396 pages Colombia In 1995 and 1996, the United States and Colombia signed important agreements on environmental protection and civil aviation. The two countries have signed agreements on asset sharing and chemical control. In 1997, the United States and Colombia signed an important maritime shipboarding agreement to allow for search of suspected drug-running vessels. During the period 19881996, the United States provided approximately US$765 million in assistance to Colombia. In 1998, U.S. assistance was in excess of US$100 million. This funding supports Colombia's counternarcotics efforts, such as arresting drug traffickers, seizing drugs and illegal processing faciliti es, and eradicating coca and opium poppy. On Feb. 26, 1998, President Clinton determined that the vital national interests of the United States require United States assistance to Colombia to meet the increasing challenges posed to counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The president granted Colombia a national interests certification (a partial certification), which waives the restrictions of de-certification and allows for broader United States engagement with Colombia in the fight against illegal narcotics. Suspended United States programs resumed operations as of April 1, 1998. Colombia and other drug producing and drug transit countries will be reviewed annually by March 1 for counter-narcotics performance. In May 1998, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation announced it was helping United States companies initiate projects in Colombia worth about US$830 million (including some electricity and petrochemical companies). The inauguration of President Pastrana in August 1998 raised expectations of continued improved relations with the United States, Colombia's largest trading partner and foreign investor. The advent of President Pastrana has produced a transformation toward better relations with the United States after four years of strain during the Samper administration. Bilateral relations reached a new high with President Pastrana's October 1998 state visit to Washington and full United States certification of Colombia for narcotics cooperation in March 1999. Pastrana has actively sought United States support for the fight against drugs. On Jan. 11, 1999, the Clinton administration announced an aid package worth US$1.7 billion that would help fuel Pastrana's Plan Colombia. Colombia currently supplies the United States with an estimated 90 percent of its cocaine supply and 65 percent of its heroin. Therefore, Pla n Colombia's premise is to eradicate drug production by destroying the crop and fighting drug traffickers and guerrillas. Skeptics argued that such a package would inevitably draw the United States into the Colombian civil war, and further that the plan is too narrow in its approach, failing to fully address intrinsically related issues such as human rights or the ailing Colombian economy. The United States House of Representatives approved the package in March 2000, but the package was stalled for several months in the United States Senate. On June 23, 2000, the United States Senate approved a modified aid package worth nearly US$1 billion. The two-year package will primarily focus on strengthening the security forces by providing Colombia Review 2016 Page 159 of 396 pages Colombia special counter-narcotics training and equipment: counter-narcotic battalions, radar, aircraft (30 Black Hawks and 33 Huey helicopters), and improved intelligence. In addition a smaller portion of this package will b e distributed to other Andean nations. The United States Congress was pressing for additional funds to be released. President Pastrana visited Washington D.C. in February 2001 to meet with United States President George W. Bush. The Colombian was successful in obtaining United States support for the implementation of Plan Colombia and the increase of bilateral trade, but he failed to convince the United States to act as an observer in peace talks with guerrilla groups. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the New York and Washington D.C. hurt Colombian exports, as the United States is the primary consumer of Colombian products. The consequences for Colombia of a potential armed international conflict remain unpredictable. In 2007, Colombia and the United States were working together to deal with coca production and drug trafficking; they were also cooperating in the global war against the threat of terrorism. Note on free trade with the United States In 2006, the United States (U.S.) and Colombia signed a trade deal following two year's of negotiations. The agreement was one of the most significant in the Western Hemisphere since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in 1994. It was hailed by Colombia as a potential boon to that country's economy and overall security. The Bush administration in the U.S. viewed the agreement an an opportunity for U.S. businesses, manufacturers, farmers and other exporters. For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush was hoping to have the free trade deal quickly approved by Congress. But the now-Democratic led Congress in the U.S. (as of November 2006) was deeply skeptical of the deal and warned that its passage would not be easily achieved. At issue for the Democratic-led Congress has been the fact that the free trade agreement did not protect internationally agreed worker rights, such as the abolition of child labor, protection against discrimination, as well as freedom and protection for unions. Compounding the matter was also the claim that the free trade deal would leave U.S. companies vulnerable to unfair trade practices. In 2008, Colombian President Uribe thanked U.S. President Bush for sending the free trade agreement to the U.S. Congress for passage, and anxiously awaited ratification. Such an end, however, was not expected to be easily reached. Indeed, the matter had become a key consideration in the presidential race in the U.S. since an advisor to Hillary Clinton -- who was a Democratic presidential contender at the time -- was found to be lobbying for the Colombian government in favor of the deal, even as Clinton expressed criticism about free trade. The matter Colombia Review 2016 Page 160 of 396 pages Colombia led to a deepening of the free trade debate in the U.S., and hinted at the posisbility that ratification was even further off than before. The situation took a more dramatic turn when in April of that year, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi moved to change procedural rules in Congress, which would ultimately block the deal from being addresed in the immediate future. Note on relations with France, as regards the case of Ingrid Betancourt In 2008, a French aircraft and medical personnel were placed on stand by in French Guiana, in the event that kidnapped politician Ingrid Betancourt was released. For several years, Betancourt, who holds dual citizenship in Colombia and France, has been held hostage by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. While there was no conclusive evidence that FARC intended to free Betancourt, the French government, led by President Nicolas Sarkozy, noted that it had decided to be prepared in case her release was secured. Betancourt was only one of many hostages held by FARC, although she has been one of the most well-known. A fellow hostage who was recently released said that Betancourt was gravely ill and had urged the Colombian government to work toward her release. The development came at a time when the Colombian government put forth a deal by which it would offer prisoner amnesties in exchange for the release of hostages; the deal also involved sending the FARC prisoners into exile in France. By early April 2008, Betancourt had not been released. The French government was demanding that she be freed while people took to the streets in France to call for her release. But the period was also marked by the French government's decision to call off the medical mission. Special Entry on release of Ingrid Betancourt: On July 2, 2008, French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt, along with three United States defense contractors -- Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell -- and 11 Colombian security officers, were rescued by the Colombian military after several years in captivity. All of the rescued hostages had been held by the Colombian rebel group, known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC. The rescue took place in the southern province of Guaviare and military coordinators said that all of the released hostages were released were in good shape. Colombian media reported that the rescue mission had been set in motion several weeks prior. Reports stated that intelligence agents had infiltrated the FARC ranks and managed to convince the local commander in charge of the hostages of fictitious plans in the offing. As such, military personnel masquerading as members of a non-governmental organization were able to carry out a ruse and get the hostages onto a helicopter. Once airborne, they subdued the FARC leader who accompanied the hostages, announced that the helicopter was under the control of the Colombian military, and explained that Colombia Review 2016 Page 161 of 396 pages Colombia the captives were now free. Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos explained, "The helicopters, which in reality were from the army, picked up the hostages in Guaviare and flew them to freedom." Colombian authorities were especially pleased that the mission was executed successfully and without one shot being fired. Betancourt, as a politician with dual citizenship, had been the highest profile hostage; her apparent poor health contributed to the fact that the French government was actively seeking her release. Indeed, a previous French medical evacuation mission ended unsuccessfully some months earlier, as noted above. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had also been active in negotiations to free hostages held by FARC, as aforementioned. To that end, two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez -- were released by FARC in early 2008. However, zealous efforts by the Colombian government to squash FARC has, at times, led to tensions with its neighbors, Venezuela and Ecuador over violations of sovereign borders. See above for details. In the afternoon of July 2, 2008, only moments after disembarking from the aircraft that carried her from captivity, Betancourt made a public address, thanking the authorities for their assistance in carrying out "a miracle." She said, "God, this is a miracle... There is no historical precedent for such a perfect operation." Betancourt also urged that those who had died in captivity be remembered and called for the possibility of peace. Betancourt's children reacted joyfully to the news of their mother's release and were said to be flying from France to Colombia to be reunited with their mother. At 11:19 pm CST, a United States military aircraft touched down on American soil at Lackland Air force Base carrying the three former hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell. All three were then transported to Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, for treatment. Media reports noted that they were likely to be reunited with their families in the following days, although they were also expected to go through medical treatment and possible reintegration counseling. Note on U.S.-Colombian military cooperation deal and regional consequences In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region. Responding to this plan for a sustained United States military presence in Colombia, Venezuela announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with Colombia. Francisco Arias Cardenas, Venezuelan Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, said that the plan was part of Venezuela's initiative to promote peace and prevent conflict. But it was clear that the move was a defensive one, aimed at responding to the presence Colombia Review 2016 Page 162 of 396 pages Colombia of United States troops in a neighboring country, when Foreign Minister Arias explained at a news conference, "Each Venezuelan has to be a soldier to defend Venezuela." The agreement between the United States and Colombia has already caused a diplomatic contretemps in the region, resulting in late July 2009 with indications from Venezuela that it would freeze its diplomatic ties with Colombia. Then, on September 1, 2009, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez confirmed his country would end formal diplomatic relations with Colombia. President Chavez said the move was being made in response to Colombia's decision to allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases. Both Colombia and the United States have insisted that the deal would pose no threat to neighboring countries, and had been forged simply to improve efforts against anti-narcotics trafficking. However, regional powers, including Venezuela , have reacted with concern to the move. Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. See Bibliography for general research sources. National Security External Threats While no foreign nation poses an immediate threat to Colombia, it is involved in several territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Nicaragua, Honduras, and Venezuela dispute their maritime boundaries with Colombia. Another source of concern forColombiais their organized illegal narcotics, guerrilla, and paramilitary activities. These actions have crossed into their neighbor’s borders and have created a huge refugee endemic. In recent years, over 300,000 persons have fledColombiagoing into her neighboring states. This is causing some tensions between the nations involved. Crime Colombia Review 2016 Page 163 of 396 pages Colombia Criminal activity is rampant in Colombia. In addition to globally-linked criminal organizations, Colombiaplays host to two major insurgent movements. Both entities are involved in range of illicit activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion. Colombiaranks as the largest exporter in the world of cocaine. It also has the highest incidence of abductions. Based upon statistics compiled by the Colombian government in recent years, the murder rate there was roughly nine times as high as that of the United States. Criminal and guerilla elements contribute heavily to a Colombia's culture of violence. Common criminals are responsible for approximately 75 percent of the homicides there, however. Rampant corruption and a generally weak judicial system have served to exacerbate unlawful behavior there. Insurgencies Two domestic insurgent organizations continue to pose a major threat to Colombia: the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Both emerged in the 1960s as Marxist-oriented guerilla movements aimed at the overthrow of Colombia's central government. Both have become progressively less driven by communist ideology, and more so by financial gain. In addition to doing battle with regular Colombian forces, FARC and ELN are heavily involved in drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping for ransom. Both organizations have made liberal use of terrorism to further their political agendas and to facilitate their range of illicit enterprises. The United States (U.S.) Department of State estimates FARC's total membership at between 9,000 and 12,000 combatants and several thousand more supporters, located predominately in rural zones of the country. ELN is believed to be comparatively smaller, with approximately 3,000 active combatants and an unknown quantity of supporters, also based predominately in rural areas. *See "Editor's Update" below for latest details as regards insurgent organizations. Terrorism Colombia's two major domestic insurgent organizations - the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - have used terrorism as a means to further their political agendas and to facilitate their range of illicit enterprises. The United Statesgovernment has declared ELN and FARC Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Colombiahas been active in the fight against global and domestic terrorism. Its partners in this fight include the U.S., Spain, Venezuela, and other nations in Latin America. In 2000, The United States (U.S.) and Colombia embarked on Plan Colombia, a U.S.-backed regional anti-drug and antiterrorism initiative but this is expected to soon end. Washingtonhad funded $3.3 billion since 2000 in order to advance this initiative. The Colombian government is still an active ally in the war against terror. Colombia Review 2016 Page 164 of 396 pages Colombia Note on Narcotics and Terrorism The United States Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that more than 80 percent of the worldwide cocaine supply and as much as 90 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States is produced in Colombia. The Colombian Government is committed to the eradication of all illicit crops, interdiction of illegal drug shipments and financial controls to prevent money laundering. Between 2004 and 2007, Colombian security forces interdicted almost 700 metric tons of cocaine, coca base, and heroin. Coca cultivation decreased by 10% from 2001 to 2007, while opium poppy cultivation decreased by 67 percent from 2001 to 2007. Terrorist groups in Colombia are actively engaged in narcotics production and trafficking. The FARC is believed responsible for more than half of the cocaine entering the United States. *Editor's Update From late 2012 through the first part of 2013, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) -- the largest and most organized insurgent group in Colombia -- has been in peace negotiations with the government of Colombia. Progress on this front has been cautious but relatively productive with the latest meetings focused on land reform and how FARC could enter the mainstream political field in Colombia. The elimination of the major leaders of the leftist extremist movement helped persuade FARC that continuing its insurgent campaign might not be the most practical endeavor. It should be noted that another leftist insurgent entity -- the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional in Spanish, or ELN) -- was not part of the peace process, but has indicated an interest in also entering the new social and political terrain that might characterize Colombia in the future. Accordingly, at the start of July 2013, FARC and ELN were considering joining forces and engaging in a "unification process." By mid-July 2013, the ELN had actually surrendered and agreed to lay down its arms following a meeting with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. The president hailed the development, calling it "a great step towards peace." He said, "This is what the [peace] process is about. So every member of the ELN and the FARC follows their path fighting for their ideals, but without violence and without arms." Meanwhile, on July 10, 2013, FARC's political party -- the Patriotic Union -- regained its legal status. Accordingly, it would be positioned to contest the 2014 elections. The Patriotic Union lost Colombia Review 2016 Page 165 of 396 pages Colombia its status when it failed to put forth candidates in the 2002 elections. However, a Colombian court ruled there were extenuating circumstances at play in 2002 that severely affected the Patriotic Union's ability to contest those polls. Indeed, the court noted that as many as 3,000 of its members, including several presidential candidates, had been murdered by right-wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Analysts have drawn attention to the fact that the government acted in complicity with those paramilitaries, thus reinforcing the message to FARC rebels that they were not welcome on Colombia's political field and thus, essentially pushing them along the path of rebellion. Meanwhile, the peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC were ongoing, although the two sides were unable to reach an agreement on the issue of political participation. Further negotiations on this matter were in the offing between the government and FARC later in July 2013, with the government hoping that a peace deal could be signed by a deadline of November 2013. The chief negotiator for FARC, Ivan Marquez, noted that the five-year long conflict with the government was coming to an end. However, in response to the government's goal of signing a peace accord by November 2013, he warned against rushing through an agreement. In an interview with Colombia media, Marquez said, "It is possible [to reach an agreement by November]. But to achieve peace you need time. A bad peace deal is worse than war." It should be noted that even amidst the peace negotiations, the conflict between FARC and the Colombian government was ongoing. An ambush by more than 70 FARC rebels on two dozen soldiers at an oil pipeline in Arauca left 15 soldiers and six militants dead. A separate attack in southwestern Colombia left four soldiers and several FARC militants dead. President Santos made clear that the military would continue its offensive operations against FARC, even as the peace process was ongoing, and despite FARC's call for a ceasefire. Editor's Note on FARC: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) is the oldest, largest, and most organized insurgent group in Colombia. It has widespread operations throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of neighboring countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. A leftist military organization seeking political power and economic reform, FARC receives support from all segments of the population, but mostly at the rural level. FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. FARC is only one of a number of left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, which have been in conflict with the Colombian authorities for decades. The July 2, 2008, rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three United States defense contractors meant that FARC had lost its most highprofile hostages and indicated possible fractures in its operations, perhaps partially due to the Colombia Review 2016 Page 166 of 396 pages Colombia deaths of key leaders of the rebel group. The October 2008 escape of a former congressman only served to reinforce this perception. Since then, the elimination of key members of the FARC leadership has suggested a further weakening of FARC. Nevertheless, hundreds of people remain in captivity at the hands of FARC. In more recent times, FARC said it was releasing its hostages and abandoning its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. However, even with most of its leadership eliminated or detained, there was not a clear indication that FARC had rejected the use of violence in achieving its agenda. Since 2013, there were cautious hopes for a peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC as delegates from both sides convened peace negotiations in Cuba. The news in November 2013 of a plot by FARC to assassinate former President Uribe, as well as the abduction of three individuals including a general in November 2014 by FARC, together placed the peace process in peril. Indeed, President Santos moved to suspend peace negotiations with FARC following the 2014 abductions. The release of the hostages, however, eased tensions and the government of Colombia and FARC soon announced that they would resume peace talks. See "Political Conditions" for more detailed information related to FARC's activities. Defense Forces Military Branches: National Army (Ejercito Nacional), Republic of Colombia Navy (Armada Republica de Colombia, ARC, includes Naval Aviation, Naval Infantry (Infanteria de Marina, IM), and Coast Guard), Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Colombia, FAC) Eligible age to enter service: 18 Mandatory Service Terms: Colombia Review 2016 Page 167 of 396 pages Colombia 18 months Manpower in general population-fit for military service: males age 16-49: 9,150,400 females age 16-49: 9,861,760 Manpower reaching eligible age annually: males: 430,634 females: 413,974 Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP: 3.28% Colombia Review 2016 Page 168 of 396 pages Colombia Chapter 3 Economic Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 169 of 396 pages Colombia Economic Overview Overview One of the largest countries in South America, Colombia is endowed with significant natural resources. It has substantial oil reserves and is a major producer of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum and coal. While coffee has been a mainstay of Colombia's export sector for nearly a century, the country is also a large oil producer and its newly privatized coal industry remains a major exporter as well. Colombia’s advantageous geographical location facing both the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean has also helped by providing low cost sea access to North and South American markets. But it has also been ravaged by a decades-long violent conflict involving outlawed armed groups, drug cartels and violations of human rights. Despite strong growth in recent years, about half of the population still lives below the poverty line. In 1998, a weakening Colombian economy, struggling with a growing fiscal deficit and political instability associated with the civil war and a weak peso, was hit by turmoil in the international financial markets. A tight monetary policy resulting from an attempt to keep the peso within its targeted peg range also contributed to the weakening economy. These factors were compounded by the Asian and Russian financial crises and collapsing world commodity prices, which affected coffee and oil -- both important Colombian exports. As a result, economic growth suffered stagnation from 1999 to 2002. Since 1999, with support of the IMF, Colombia's economic policies aimed to place the country on a path of sustainable growth, with a strategy focusing on fiscal reforms and consolidation, policies to reduce inflation, and measures to strengthen the financial system. In September 1999, Colombia abandoned its policy of pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar and allowed it to float, which resulted in a substantial reduction in interest rates. During the last decade, Colombia has achieved very strong macroeconomic performance, underpinned by solid institutional and policy frameworks, including its flexible exchange rate, the inflation-targeting regime, medium-term fiscal framework, and prudent debt management. All these have helped reduce balance sheet vulnerabilities, while strong supervision and regulation have kept the financial system sound. As of late, Colombia’s economy has been adversely affected by the global economic crisis as weak external demand has led to a contraction of exports and a considerable slowdown in economic activity. But the country’s very strong economic fundamentals have allowed the government to adopt prudently expansionary macroeconomic policies to support domestic demand and mitigate the impact of the crisis. With the countercyclical policies taking effect along with improved external conditions, economic growth was expected to pick up moderately in 2010 following a sharp slowdown in 2008-2009. In late 2010, Colombia saw its Colombia Review 2016 Page 170 of 396 pages Colombia most severe flooding in decades, with damages topping an estimated $6 billion. In 2011, Colombia’s central bank purchased billions of dollars in the foreign exchange market through its pre-announced intervention program of purchasing at least US$20 million per day over a specified time horizon. Then, in October 2011, the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement was ratified by the U.S. Congress and pending implementation in 2012. Colombia also approved the export of natural gas to Panama and other countries in the Caribbean, expanding an export market that had been limited to Venezuela and the United States in order to ensure domestic supply. Colombia has signed or is negotiating FTAs with a number of other countries, including Canada, Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, the EU, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Israel. Foreign direct investment - notably in the oil sector - reached a record $10 billion in 2008 but dropped to $7.2 billion in 2009, before beginning to recover in 2010, and appearing to have reached a record high $13 billion in 2011. Colombia's oil and coal production has boomed in recent years, thanks to increased security and an economy left relatively undamaged by the global financial crisis. But the country’s major oil companies were hit with protests in 2011 - by citizens demanding more local jobs and social investment - which the industry saw as more of a threat than the rebels still plaguing the Andean nation. The unemployment rate of 10.8 percent in 2011 remained one of Latin America's highest. Still, real GDP grew nearly 6 percent in 2011 and inflation ended 2011 at 3.7 percent, continuing almost a decade of strong economic performance. All three major ratings agencies had upgraded Colombia's investment grade. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate of 10.3 percent in 2012 remained one of Latin America's highest. The Santos administration's foreign policy has focused on bolstering Colombia's commercial ties and boosting investment at home. The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was ratified by the US Congress in October 2011 and implemented in 2012. Colombia has signed or is negotiating FTAs with a number of other countries, including Canada, Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, the EU, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, China, Costa Rica, Panama, and Israel. Foreign direct investment - notably in the oil and gas sectors - reached a record $10 billion in 2008 but dropped to $7.2 billion in 2009, before beginning to recover in 2010, and reached a record high of nearly $16 billion in 2012. Colombia is the third largest Latin American exporter of oil to the United States, and the United States' largest source of imported coal. Inequality, underemployment, and narcotrafficking remain significant challenges, and Colombia's infrastructure requires major improvements to sustain economic expansion. In October 2013, the board of Colombia’s central bank voted to hold the lending rate at 3.25 percent for a seventh straight month to stimulate the economy as consumer prices remained at the bottom end of the bank’s target range of 2 percent to 4 percent. Then, in November 2013, Carlos Gustavo Cano - Colombia's central bank board member - said he expected to hold its benchmark lending rate steady through at least mid-2014 as prolonged low inflation prompted concerns about installed capacity. The country's unemployment rate of 9.7 percent in 2013 was still one of Latin Colombia Review 2016 Page 171 of 396 pages Colombia America's highest. In 2013, Colombia began its ascension process to the OECD. The annual level of foreign direct investment - notably in the oil and gas sectors - reached a record high of $16.8 billion in 2013, an increase of 7 percent over 2012. Overall, Colombia’s economic performance in 2013 was robust with low inflation. Real GDP growth was projected to converge to potential (about 4.5 percent) in 2014, with inflation remaining within the 2 to 4 percent target range. Economic growth remained unexpectedly strong in the first quarter of 2014 followed by a period of monetary tightening to ward off inflationary pressure. But things slowed down in the second quarter. The country’s central bank began a tightening cycle in April 2014, lifting the benchmark interest rate from 3.25 percent, where it had remained for nearly one year. The rate was held steady at 4.5 percent for a second month in September 2014. Meanwhile, policymakers were worried about Colombia's revenue stream as crude output began to decline and the oil boom waned. With a drop and global oil prices and damaged pipelines as a result of attacks by Marxist rebels, the Colombian government in October 2014 unveiled tax reform in an effort to bolster revenue. All three major ratings agencies have upgraded Colombia's government debt to investment grade, which helped to attract record levels of investment in 2013 and 2014, mostly in the hydrocarbons sector. The unemployment rate of 9.2 percent in 2014, however, was still one of Latin America's highest. In 2014, Colombia passed a tax reform bill to offset the lost revenue from the global drop in oil prices. The Santos administration was also using tax reform to help finance implementation of a peace deal, in the event FARC and the government reached an agreement in 2015. Colombian officials estimated that a peace deal may bolster economic growth by almost 2 percent. In June 2015, it was reported that the Colombian economy had grown 2.8 percent in the first quarter compared to a year earlier. While the performance was in line with analysts' expectations, it represented the slowest quarterly growth in two and a half years mainly due to lower oil prices. Then in late September 2015, Colombia's central bank increased its benchmark interest rate by a quarter point for the first time in a year. The move was an effort to stem inflation, which had picked up as drought and persistent currency devaluation boosted prices despite the slowing economy, according to Reuters. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas, who represents the government on the board, revised down the economic growth forecast for 2015 to 3.3 percent, from 3.6 percent previously. The peso was down 56 percent over the past year. Economic Performance Following several years of very strong GDP growth averaging 6.7 percent annually from 2005 to 2007, the economy slowed sharply in 2008 and barely grew in 2009, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis. By 2010 and 2011, growth had recovered. Colombia Review 2016 Page 172 of 396 pages Colombia According to CountryWatch estimated calculations for 2014: Real GDP growth rate was: 4.3 percent Inflation was measured at: 4.9 percent The fiscal deficit/surplus as percent of GDP (%) was: 2.6 percent Updated in 2015 *Please note that the figures in our Economic Performance section are estimates or forecasts based on IMF-based data that are formulated using CountryWatch models of analysis. Supplementary Sources: International Monetary Fund and Reuters Nominal GDP and Components Nominal GDP and Components 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Nominal GDP (LCU billions) 619,894.00 664,240.00 710,257.00 756,152.00 782,979.90 Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%) 13.758 7.154 6.928 6.462 3.548 Consumption (LCU billions) 379,532.00 406,842.00 431,372.00 462,679.00 474,848.69 Government Expenditure (LCU billions) 99,772.00 110,774.00 125,732.00 138,068.00 141,699.56 Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions) 148,008.00 158,438.00 171,659.00 196,648.00 188,009.13 Colombia Review 2016 Page 173 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Exports of Goods & Services (LCU billions) 116,144.00 121,282.00 125,114.00 121,274.00 125,729.78 Imports of Goods & Services (LCU billions) 123,562.00 133,096.00 143,620.00 162,517.00 147,307.27 Colombia Review 2016 Page 174 of 396 pages Colombia Population and GDP Per Capita Population and GDP Per Capita 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Population, total (million) 46.045 46.582 47.121 47.662 48.209 Population growth (%) 1.176 1.166 1.157 1.148 1.148 Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s) 13,462,786.40 14,259,585.25 15,073,045.99 15,864,881.88 16,241,363.54 Colombia Review 2016 Page 175 of 396 pages Colombia Real GDP and Inflation Real GDP and Inflation 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005 base) 451,324.35 470,714.96 494,122.76 516,617.25 529,523.48 Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 6.295 4.296 4.973 4.552 2.498 GDP Deflator (2005=100.0) 137.350 141.113 143.741 146.366 147.865 Inflation, GDP Deflator (%) 7.021 2.740 1.862 1.826 1.024 Colombia Review 2016 Page 176 of 396 pages Colombia Government Spending and Taxation Government Spending and Taxation 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Government Fiscal Budget (billions) 178,027.12 187,773.26 205,972.42 222,718.84 234,255.08 Fiscal Budget Growth Rate (percentage) 11.143 5.475 9.692 8.130 5.180 National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%) 26.729 28.350 28.140 27.696 26.779 Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU billions) 165,690.18 188,311.73 199,864.48 209,423.23 209,677.52 Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions) -12336.9410 538.475 -6107.9360 -13295.6090 -24577.5690 Government Colombia Review 2016 Page 177 of 396 pages Colombia Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP) Colombia Review 2016 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 -1.9902 0.0811 -0.8600 -1.7583 -3.1390 Page 178 of 396 pages Colombia Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions) 245,457.92 284,906.95 324,038.34 353,820.37 366,373.73 Money Supply Growth Rate (%) 18.924 16.072 13.735 9.191 3.548 Lending Interest Rate (%) 11.220 12.585 10.986 10.867 10.264 Unemployment Rate (%) 10.850 10.392 9.658 9.108 8.992 Colombia Review 2016 Page 179 of 396 pages Colombia Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US) 1,842.90 1,797.38 1,868.90 2,001.11 2,855.62 Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions) -4.0252 -6.5729 -9.9021 -20.6101 -7.5561 Trade Balance % of GDP -1.1967 -1.7786 -2.6055 -5.4543 -2.7558 Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions) 31.896 36.998 43.159 46.809 27.327 Colombia Review 2016 Page 180 of 396 pages Colombia Data in US Dollars Data in US Dollars 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Nominal GDP ($US billions) 336.369 369.560 380.041 377.867 274.189 Exports ($US billions) 63.022 67.477 66.945 60.603 44.029 Imports ($US billions) 67.048 74.050 76.848 81.214 51.585 Colombia Review 2016 Page 181 of 396 pages Colombia Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Petroleum Consumption (TBPD) 294.273 320.726 323.503 289.447 287.027 Petroleum Production (TBPD) 938.277 961.980 1,024.64 993.064 1,027.61 Petroleum Net Exports (TBPD) 644.005 641.254 701.133 703.617 740.584 Natural Gas Consumption (bcf) 312.185 270.513 268.712 268.895 273.087 Natural Gas Production (bcf) 387.076 361.386 360.953 412.140 445.085 Natural Gas Net Exports (bcf) 74.892 90.873 92.241 143.245 171.998 Coal Consumption (1000s st) 5,532.06 6,370.26 7,404.67 7,176.09 7,192.53 Coal Production (1000s st) 92,775.53 92,891.66 90,076.38 98,108.49 96,186.97 Coal Net Exports (1000s st) 87,243.47 86,521.41 82,671.71 90,932.40 88,994.44 Nuclear Production (bil kwh) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Colombia Review 2016 Page 182 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Hydroelectric Production (bil kwh) 48.389 47.106 43.923 44.253 42.954 Renewables Production (bil kwh) 0.5590 0.5550 0.5651 0.5837 0.5921 Colombia Review 2016 Page 183 of 396 pages Colombia Energy Consumption and Production QUADS Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Petroleum Consumption (Quads) 0.6283 0.6848 0.6908 0.6180 0.6129 Petroleum Production (Quads) 2.003 2.068 2.195 2.169 1.754 Petroleum Net Exports (Quads) 1.375 1.383 1.504 1.551 1.141 Natural Gas Consumption (Quads) 0.3184 0.2759 0.2741 0.2743 0.2785 Natural Gas Production (Quads) 0.3944 0.3674 0.3674 0.4264 0.3886 Natural Gas Net Exports (Quads) 0.0760 0.0915 0.0933 0.1521 0.1100 Coal Consumption (Quads) 0.1106 0.1274 0.1481 0.1435 0.1438 Coal Production (Quads) 1.892 1.972 1.894 1.962 1.735 Coal Net Exports (Quads) 1.781 1.845 1.746 1.819 1.591 Nuclear Production (Quads) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Hydroelectric Production (Quads) 0.4839 0.4711 0.4392 0.4425 0.4295 Renewables Production (Quads) 0.0056 0.0056 0.0057 0.0058 0.0059 Colombia Review 2016 Page 184 of 396 pages Colombia World Energy Price Summary World Energy Price Summary 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Petroleum-WTI ($/bbl) 95.054 94.159 97.943 93.112 48.709 Natural Gas-Henry Hub ($/mmbtu) 3.999 2.752 3.729 4.369 2.614 Coal Thermal-Australian ($/mt) 121.448 96.364 84.562 70.130 57.511 Colombia Review 2016 Page 185 of 396 pages Colombia CO2 Emissions CO2 Emissions 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Petroleum Based (mm mt C) 14.038 15.300 15.432 13.808 13.692 Natural Gas Based (mm mt C) 5.065 4.389 4.360 4.363 4.431 Coal Based (mm mt C) 3.170 3.651 4.244 4.113 4.122 Total CO2 Emissions (mm mt C) 22.273 23.339 24.035 22.283 22.245 Colombia Review 2016 Page 186 of 396 pages Colombia Agriculture Consumption and Production Agriculture Consumption and Production 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Corn Total Consumption (1000 metric tons) 4,942.87 5,321.98 5,412.48 5,521.90 4,614.38 Corn Production (1000 metric tons) 1,716.61 1,867.16 1,771.82 1,910.44 1,780.54 Corn Net Exports (1000 metric tons) -3226.2617 -3454.8217 -3640.6644 -3611.4660 -2833.8425 Soybeans Total Consumption (1000 metric tons) 350.997 371.644 446.253 461.514 377.008 Soybeans Production (1000 metric tons) 75.535 86.477 85.421 97.185 91.559 Soybeans Net Exports (1000 metric tons) -275.4621 -285.1671 -360.8322 -364.3288 -285.4482 Rice Total Colombia Review 2016 Page 187 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2,010.32 2,340.48 2,005.08 1,841.56 1,496.96 Rice Production (1000 metric tons) 2,011.30 2,317.67 1,995.70 1,827.54 1,724.34 Rice Net Exports (1000 metric tons) 0.9820 -22.8090 -9.3721 -14.0221 227.375 Coffee Total Consumption (metric tons) 90,045.00 128,652.00 135,057.00 124,385.64 106,914.73 Coffee Production (metric tons) 453,357.77 446,632.30 639,618.40 691,022.60 662,429.45 Coffee Net Exports (metric tons) 363,312.77 317,980.30 504,561.40 566,636.95 555,514.72 Cocoa Beans Total Consumption (metric tons) 43,579.00 39,309.00 41,362.00 41,850.27 41,999.74 Cocoa Beans Production (metric tons) 37,615.08 43,253.37 49,583.92 51,547.52 52,228.67 Cocoa Beans Net Exports (metric tons) -5963.9155 3,944.37 8,221.92 9,697.25 10,228.93 Consumption (1000 metric tons) Colombia Review 2016 Page 188 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Wheat Total Consumption (1000 metric tons) 1,547.84 1,508.60 1,422.20 1,420.87 1,096.26 Wheat Production (1000 metric tons) 12.726 9.038 8.394 9.750 8.115 Wheat Net Exports (1000 metric tons) -1535.1163 -1499.5594 -1413.8022 -1411.1235 -1088.1503 Colombia Review 2016 Page 189 of 396 pages Colombia World Agriculture Pricing Summary World Agriculture Pricing Summary 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Corn Pricing Summary ($/metric ton) 291.684 298.417 259.389 192.881 169.750 Soybeans Pricing Summary ($/metric ton) 540.667 591.417 538.417 491.771 390.417 Rice Pricing Summary ($/metric ton) 458.558 525.071 473.989 425.148 386.033 Coffee Pricing Summary ($/kilogram) 5.976 4.111 3.076 4.424 3.526 Cocoa Beans Pricing Summary ($/kilogram) 2.980 2.392 2.439 3.062 3.135 Wheat Pricing Summary ($/metric ton) 316.264 313.242 312.248 284.895 203.177 Colombia Review 2016 Page 190 of 396 pages Colombia Metals Consumption and Production Metals Consumption and Production 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Copper Consumption (1000 mt) 7,673.71 4,737.54 10,806.27 3,274.52 2,609.16 Copper Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Copper Net Exports (1000 mt) -7673.7100 -4737.5440 -10806.2670 -3274.5250 -2609.1554 Zinc Consumption (1000 mt) 25,036.02 25,204.15 22,680.66 23,602.94 19,349.68 Zinc Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Zinc Exports (1000 mt) -25036.0230 -25204.1520 -22680.6610 -23602.9350 -19349.6771 Lead Consumption (1000 mt) 5,797.56 5,684.33 7,355.34 9,026.35 6,939.51 Lead Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Colombia Review 2016 Page 191 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Lead Exports (1000 mt) -5797.5580 -5684.3310 -7355.3396 -9026.3482 -6939.5116 Tin Consumption (1000 mt) 400.600 319.591 347.024 409.037 348.192 Tin Production (1000 mt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Tin Exports (1000 mt) -400.6000 -319.5910 -347.0240 -409.0374 -348.1917 Nickel Consumption (1000 mt) 38,098.66 47,769.32 46,559.84 45,806.55 33,836.38 Nickel Production (1000 mt) 37,525.64 46,960.99 46,166.69 44,974.97 43,492.37 Nickel Exports (1000 mt) -573.0246 -808.3331 -393.1583 -831.5783 9,656.00 Gold Consumption (kg) 8,099.74 8,099.74 8,099.74 8,991.38 7,208.09 Gold Production (kg) 60,606.14 70,842.32 60,900.35 62,147.51 60,931.08 Gold Exports (kg) 52,506.40 62,742.58 52,800.62 53,156.13 53,722.99 Colombia Review 2016 Page 192 of 396 pages Colombia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Silver Consumption (mt) 27,237.25 27,755.00 31,298.00 27,320.62 20,618.03 Silver Production (mt) 26,247.33 21,690.60 16,468.68 16,082.13 14,424.67 Silver Exports (mt) -989.9157 -6064.4029 -14829.3164 -11238.4847 -6193.3678 Colombia Review 2016 Page 193 of 396 pages Colombia World Metals Pricing Summary World Metals Pricing Summary 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Copper ($/mt) 8,828.19 7,962.35 7,332.10 6,863.40 5,510.46 Zinc ($/mt) 2,193.90 1,950.41 1,910.26 2,160.97 1,931.68 Tin ($/mt) 26,053.68 21,125.99 22,282.80 21,898.87 16,066.63 Lead ($/mt) 2,400.81 2,064.64 2,139.79 2,095.46 1,787.82 Nickel ($/mt) 22,910.36 17,547.55 15,031.80 16,893.38 11,862.64 Gold ($/oz) 1,569.21 1,669.52 1,411.46 1,265.58 1,160.66 Silver ($/oz) 35.224 31.137 23.850 19.071 15.721 Colombia Review 2016 Page 194 of 396 pages Colombia Economic Performance Index Economic Performance Index The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and models. Bank stability risk Monetary/ Currency stability Government Finances Empl./ Unempl. Econ.GNP growth or decline/ forecast 0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 0 - 100 % North Americas Canada 92 69 35 38 3.14% United States 94 76 4 29 3.01% Austria 90 27 30 63 1.33% Belgium 88 27 19 23 1.15% Cyprus 81 91 16 80 -0.69% Denmark 97 70 45 78 1.20% Finland 89 27 41 33 1.25% Western Europe Colombia Review 2016 Page 195 of 396 pages Colombia France 87 27 18 27 1.52% Germany 86 27 22 21 1.25% Greece 79 27 5 24 -2.00% Iceland 90 17 2 34 -3.04% Italy 85 27 37 24 0.84% Ireland 92 27 11 10 -1.55% Luxembourg 99 27 28 66 2.08% Malta 77 27 41 51 0.54% Netherlands 91 27 26 74 1.30% Norway 98 44 10 76 1.08% Portugal 77 27 13 20 0.29% Spain 83 27 9 3 -0.41% Sweden 94 72 54 32 1.23% Switzerland 97 86 55 77 1.53% United Kingdom 85 12 9 37 1.34% Albania 44 60 33 6 2.30% Armenia 45 59 49 30 1.80% Central and Eastern Europe Colombia Review 2016 Page 196 of 396 pages Colombia Azerbaijan 56 4 84 99 2.68% Belarus 59 21 83 98 2.41% Bosnia and Herzegovina 34 68 69 N/A 0.50% Bulgaria 58 75 88 49 0.20% Croatia 69 68 94 9 0.18% Czech Republic 80 89 29 70 1.67% Estonia 72 90 66 92 0.80% Georgia 36 60 53 56 2.00% Hungary 70 66 26 54 -0.16% Latvia 67 100 65 44 -3.97% Lithuania 65 91 87 79 -1.65% Macedonia (FYR) 53 69 56 2 2.03% Moldova 23 36 81 67 2.50% Poland 74 74 38 12 2.72% Romania 62 56 70 62 0.75% Russia 73 18 90 8 4.00% Serbia 48 49 52 5 1.97% Colombia Review 2016 Page 197 of 396 pages Colombia Montenegro 39 27 73 1 -1.70% Slovak Republic 80 62 30 14 4.06% Slovenia 81 27 36 65 1.12% Ukraine 41 11 57 N/A 3.68% Algeria 57 18 96 7 4.55% Angola 49 1 97 N/A 7.05% Benin 19 91 20 N/A 3.22% Botswana 68 58 76 N/A 6.33% Burkina Faso 16 91 13 N/A 4.41% Burundi 2 91 6 N/A 3.85% Cameroon 26 91 91 N/A 2.58% Cape Verde 52 87 4 N/A 4.96% Central African Republic 9 91 32 N/A 3.18% Chad 22 91 89 N/A 4.42% Congo 52 87 87 N/A 12.13% Côte d’Ivoire 25 91 82 28 2.98% Africa Dem. Republic Colombia Review 2016 Page 198 of 396 pages Colombia Congo 4 91 47 N/A 5.44% Djibouti 31 76 50 N/A 4.47% Egypt 37 20 24 69 5.01% Equatorial Guinea 82 91 85 N/A 0.94% Eritrea 1 3 1 18 1.81% Ethiopia 6 45 8 N/A 6.96% Gabon 64 91 96 N/A 5.36% Gambia 8 48 86 N/A 4.82% Ghana 9 11 69 N/A 4.50% Guinea 10 7 91 N/A 3.03% Guinea-Bissau 5 91 46 N/A 3.47% Kenya 20 41 59 N/A 4.11% Lesotho 13 40 12 N/A 2.98% Liberia 12 73 74 N/A 5.92% Libya 73 2 94 N/A 5.22% Madagascar 4 22 24 N/A -1.02% Malawi 7 25 55 N/A 5.96% Mali 20 91 82 N/A 5.12% Colombia Review 2016 Page 199 of 396 pages Colombia Mauritania 15 13 93 N/A 4.58% Mauritius 65 52 56 55 4.10% Morocco 37 72 48 26 3.23% Mozambique 12 23 71 N/A 6.45% Namibia 40 39 62 N/A 1.70% Niger 10 91 21 N/A 4.41% Nigeria 30 6 61 N/A 6.98% Rwanda 21 40 68 N/A 5.39% Sao Tome & Principe 1 61 100 N/A 3.40% Senegal 24 91 63 N/A 3.44% Seychelles 60 67 97 N/A 4.01% Sierra Leone 5 10 39 N/A 4.77% Somalia 2 38 59 N/A 3.19% South Africa 61 37 70 N/A 2.59% Sudan 16 5 73 N/A 5.52% Swaziland 32 44 79 N/A 1.09% Tanzania 15 45 32 N/A 6.17% Togo 8 91 92 N/A 2.56% Colombia Review 2016 Page 200 of 396 pages Colombia Tunisia 50 61 44 39 4.00% Uganda 11 17 54 N/A 5.59% Zambia 29 20 49 N/A 5.84% Zimbabwe 0 8 16 N/A 2.24% Argentina 66 3 80 36 3.50% Belize 47 76 80 N/A 1.00% Bolivia 32 51 61 81 3.99% Brazil 71 47 78 11 5.50% Chile 78 25 92 73 4.72% Columbia 47 52 34 47 2.25% Costa Rica 60 42 39 57 3.45% Ecuador 43 76 75 64 2.51% El Salvador 35 76 67 N/A 1.04% Guatemala 46 59 58 N/A 2.52% Honduras 27 47 58 N/A 2.00% Mexico 69 42 52 61 4.07% Nicaragua 23 49 42 N/A 1.75% South and Central America Colombia Review 2016 Page 201 of 396 pages Colombia Panama 66 76 72 45 5.00% Paraguay 35 46 66 16 5.27% Peru 59 66 75 22 6.33% Suriname 58 26 81 59 4.02% Uruguay 70 26 27 N/A 5.71% Venezuela 55 1 28 13 -2.63% Antigua & Barbuda 72 76 15 N/A -2.01% Bahamas 74 76 45 87 -0.50% Barbados 67 76 33 15 -0.50% Caribbean Bermuda N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Cuba 45 76 18 95 0.25% Dominica 53 76 65 N/A 1.40% Dominican Republic 54 39 43 4 3.50% Grenada 63 76 48 N/A 0.80% Guyana 28 56 17 N/A 4.36% Haiti 11 27 89 N/A -8.50% Jamaica 42 9 85 19 -0.28% Colombia Review 2016 Page 202 of 396 pages Colombia St Lucia 55 76 67 N/A 1.14% St Vincent & Grenadines 49 76 95 N/A 0.50% Trinidad & Tobago 82 37 77 72 2.13% Bahrain 84 76 62 91 3.48% Iran 51 19 40 58 3.01% Iraq 48 9 8 N/A 7.27% Israel 87 62 12 48 3.20% Jordan 41 51 3 N/A 4.10% Kuwait 96 4 99 N/A 3.10% Lebanon 63 54 2 N/A 6.00% Oman 76 16 88 N/A 4.71% Qatar 99 16 83 N/A 18.54% Saudi Arabia 76 8 98 N/A 3.70% Syria 61 24 40 N/A 5.00% Turkey 75 23 27 60 5.20% United Arab Emirates 96 24 98 94 1.29% Middle East Colombia Review 2016 Page 203 of 396 pages Colombia Yemen 28 2 78 N/A 7.78% Afghanistan 17 70 74 N/A 8.64% Bangladesh 13 43 25 N/A 5.38% Bhutan 24 55 5 N/A 6.85% Brunei 78 19 99 75 0.48% Cambodia 18 67 42 N/A 4.77% China 54 90 19 68 11.03% Hong Kong 89 76 14 82 5.02% India 31 38 34 35 8.78% Indonesia 42 46 37 31 6.00% Japan 88 89 6 71 1.90% Kazakhstan 62 13 76 42 2.40% Korea North 18 65 23 N/A 1.50% Korea South 83 63 22 85 4.44% Kyrgyz Republic 24 15 84 88 4.61% Laos 17 54 7 N/A 7.22% Macao 91 76 14 82 3.00% Asia Colombia Review 2016 Page 204 of 396 pages Colombia Malaysia 68 65 44 90 4.72% Maldives 44 55 17 N/A 3.45% Mongolia 33 5 77 93 7.22% Myanmar 3 41 72 N/A 5.26% Nepal 3 14 25 N/A 2.97% Pakistan 19 15 31 41 3.00% Papua New Guinea 75 50 11 N/A 7.96% Philippines 30 48 53 43 3.63% Singapore 93 75 63 40 5.68% Sri Lanka 38 22 10 N/A 5.50% Taiwan 84 88 35 89 6.50% Tajikistan 6 6 60 97 4.00% Thailand 56 64 90 96 5.46% Turkmenistan 51 53 68 N/A 12.00% Uzbekistan 40 10 60 100 8.00% Vietnam 25 12 20 N/A 6.04% 96 63 31 46 2.96% Pacific Australia Colombia Review 2016 Page 205 of 396 pages Colombia Fiji 46 53 3 N/A 2.06% Marshall Islands 27 76 46 N/A 1.08% Micronesia (Fed. States) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A New Caledonia 96 73 51 52 2.00% New Zealand 98 73 51 52 2.00% Samoa 34 88 64 N/A -2.77% Solomon Islands 14 71 1 N/A 3.36% Tonga 26 57 38 N/A 0.60% Vanuatu 33 58 47 N/A 3.80% Source: CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com Updated: This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012. Colombia Review 2016 Page 206 of 396 pages Colombia div style='margin-top:40%;padding-top:40%'> Chapter 4 Investment Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 207 of 396 pages Colombia Foreign Investment Climate Infrastructure Ports and Harbors Bahia de Portete, Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, Leticia, Puerto Bolivar, San Andres, Santa Marta, Tumaco, Turbo Telephone System modern system in many respects; country code: 57 Internet Use 2,732,200 Labor Force 20.34 million; agriculture 30%, industry 24%, services 46% Judicial System Based on Spanish law, Colombia’s legal system is generally weak. Background Colombia's economy has experienced positive growth over the last few years years, in part, due to an improving security situation. The economy continues to improve in part because of austere government budgets, focused efforts to reduce public debt levels, an export-oriented growth strategy, rising commodity prices, and to the government's pro-market economic policies. These pro-business reforms have included the oil and gas sectors with export-led growth fueled mainly by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. Inequality, underemployment, and narcotrafficking remain significant challenges, and Colombia's infrastructure requires major improvements to sustain economic expansion. Colombia Review 2016 Page 208 of 396 pages Colombia Because of the global financial crisis of 2008 and weakening demand for Colombia's exports, Colombia's economy saw limited growth that year and even some minor contraction into 2009. In response, the governmentcut capital controls, arranged for emergency credit lines from multilateral institutions, and promoted investment incentives, such as Colombia's modernized free trade zone mechanism, legal stability contracts, and new bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements. The government also encouraged exporters to diversify their customer base beyond the United States and Venezuela, traditionally Colombia's largest trading partners. Today, the government is pursuing free trade agreements with European and Asian partners and awaits the approval of a Canadian trade accord by Canada's parliament. In 2009, China replaced Venezuela as Colombia's number two trading partner, largely because of Venezuela's decision to limit the entry of Colombian products. Overall, the security strategy implemented by the Colombian government and the signing of a free trade agreement with the United States have engendered a growing sense of confidence in the economy, particularly within the business sector. Economy and Investment Colombia is a free market economy with major commercial and investment ties to the United States (U.S.). Transition from a highly regulated economy has been underway for more than 15 years. In 1990, the administration of President Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) initiated economic liberalization or "apertura," with tariff reductions, financial deregulation, privatization of stateowned enterprises and adoption of a more liberal foreign exchange rate. These policies eased import restrictions and opened most sectors to foreign investment, although agricultural products remained protected. The Uribe administration seeks to maintain prudent fiscal policies and has pursued tough economic reforms including tax, pension and budget reforms. A U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) study shows that Colombian tax rates (both personal and corporate) are among the highest in Latin America. The sustained growth of the Colombian economy can be attributed to an increase in domestic security, the policies of keeping inflation low and maintaining a stable currency (the Colombian peso), petroleum price increases and an increase in exports to neighboring countries and the United States (Y.S.) as a result of trade liberalization. The Andean Trade Preference Act, which was extended recently, also plays a pivotal role in Colombia's economic growth. The signing of a trade promotion agreement with the U.S. provides further opportunity for growth once it is approved by the U.S. Congress and implemented. Colombia Review 2016 Page 209 of 396 pages Colombia Trade In 2006, Colombia was the United States' fifth-largest export market in the Western Hemisphere behind Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela and the largest agricultural export market in the hemisphere after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. U.S. exports to Colombia in 2006 were U.S. $6.9 billion, up 13.2% from the previous year. U.S. imports from Colombia were U.S. $9.6 billion, up 4%. Colombia's major exports are petroleum, coffee, coal, nickel, and nontraditional exports (e.g., cut flowers, gold, bananas, semiprecious stones, sugar, and tropical fruits). The United States is Colombia's largest trading partner, representing about 40% of Colombia's exports and 26.6% of its imports. Colombia has improved protection of intellectual property rights overall, but the United States remains concerned over deficiencies in licensing and copyright protection. Imports and Exports Import Climate: Colombia has signed several multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements. According to BuyUSA's report for Colombia, the most important of these are: a) the Andean Community (ANCOM) with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia (Peru withdrew in April 1997); b) the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Cuba, which was later renegotiated country by country on a bilateral basis; c) the G-3 (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela); and d) the Colombia-Chile bilateral agreements. Full implementation of these agreemements is not expected for several years. Once achieved, though, they would give Colombia access to a free market of over 200 million people. Colombia has also requested admission to NAFTA. Import Commodities industrial equipment, transportation equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, paper products, fuels, electricity Import Partners US 29.6%, Brazil 5.5%, Mexico 5.4%, Venezuela 5.2%, China 5%, Japan 4.6%, Germany 4.4% Export Commodities Colombia Review 2016 Page 210 of 396 pages Colombia petroleum, coffee, coal, apparel, bananas, cut flowers Export Partners US 47.1%, Ecuador 6%, Venezuela 5.3% Key Sectors Industries textiles, food processing, oil, clothing and footwear, beverages, chemicals, cement; gold, coal, emeralds Note on Industry and Agriculture The most industrially diverse member of the five-nation Andean Community, Colombia has four major industrial centers--Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla--each located in a distinct geographical region. Colombia's industries include textiles and clothing, leather products, processed foods and beverages, paper and paper products, chemicals and petrochemicals, cement, construction, iron and steel products and metalworking. Colombia's diverse climate and topography permit the cultivation of a wide variety of crops. In addition, all regions yield forest products, ranging from tropical hardwoods in the lowlands, to pine and eucalyptus in the colder areas. Cacao, sugarcane, coconuts, bananas, plantains, rice, cotton, tobacco, cassava and most of the nation's beef cattle are produced in the hot regions from sea level to 1,000 meters elevation. The temperate regions--between 1,000 and 2,000 meters--are better suited for coffee, flowers, corn and other vegetables, pears, pineapples, and tomatoes. The cooler elevations--between 2,000 and 3,000 meters--produce wheat, barley, potatoes, cold-climate vegetables, flowers, dairy cattle and poultry. Mining and Energy Colombia has considerable mineral and energy resources, especially coal and natural gas reserves. New security measures and increased drilling activity have slowed the drop in petroleum production, allowing Colombia to continue to export through 2011, given current production estimates. In 2006, gas reserves totaled 7,349 billion cubic feet. Gas production totaled 680 million cubic feet per day. The country's current refining capacity is 299,200 barrels per day. Mining and energy related investments have grown because of higher oil prices, increased demand and improved output. Colombia has significantly liberalized its petroleum sector, leading to an increase in exploration and production contracts from both large and small hydrocarbon industries. Colombia Review 2016 Page 211 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia is presently the 16th-greatest coal producing country, accounting for about 1% of the world's total annual coal production, and the largest producer in Latin America (65.8 million tons in 2006). Colombia has proven recoverable coal reserves of about 7.4 billion short tons, the majority of which are located in the north of the country. Colombia historically has been the world's leading producer of emeralds, although production has fallen in recent years. Emerald production fell from 116.3 million carats in 2005 to 112.7 million carats in 2006. Colombia is also a significant producer of gold, silver, and platinum. Foreign Investment Note on Foreign Investment The United States is the largest source of new foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia, particularly in the areas of coal and petroleum. In 2007, new FDI totaled U.S. $7.5 billion, more than triple the amount in 2002. The bulk of the new investment is in the manufacturing, mining, and energy sectors. The only activities closed to foreign direct investment are defense and national security, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Capital controls have been implemented to reduce currency speculation and to keep foreign investment in-country for at least a year. In order to encourage investment in Colombia, Congress approved a law in 2005 to protect FDI. Foreign Investment Assessment While Colombia’s government generally encourages foreign investment, rampant instability serves as a major deterrent. Other Investment Considerations Corruption Perception Ranking See full list, as reported by Transparency International, elsewhere in this Country Review. Cultural Considerations Colombian society is governed by the same basic rules of etiquette that apply throughout the rest of South America. For More Information Country Website Colombia Review 2016 Page 212 of 396 pages Colombia www.colombiaemb.org Foreign Investment Index Foreign Investment Index The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws, regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index. Colombia Review 2016 Country Assessment Afghanistan 2 Albania 4.5 Algeria 6 Andorra 9 Angola 4.5-5 Page 213 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Antigua 8.5 Argentina 5 Armenia 5 Australia 9.5 Austria 9-9.5 Azerbaijan 5 Bahamas 9 Bahrain 7.5 Bangladesh 4.5 Barbados 9 Belarus 4 Belgium 9 Belize 7.5 Benin 5.5 Bhutan 4.5 Bolivia 4.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 Botswana 7.5-8 Page 214 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Brazil 8 Brunei 7 Bulgaria 5.5 Burkina Faso 4 Burma (Myanmar) 4.5 Burundi 4 Cambodia 4.5 Cameroon 5 Canada 9.5 Cape Verde 6 Central African Republic 3 Chad 4 Chile 9 China 7.5 China: Hong Kong 8.5 China: Taiwan 8.5 Colombia 7 Comoros 4 Page 215 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Congo DRC 4 Congo RC 5 Costa Rica 8 Cote d'Ivoire 4.5 Croatia 7 Cuba 4.5 Cyprus 7 Czech Republic 8.5 Denmark 9.5 Djibouti 4.5 Dominica 6 Dominican Republic 6.5 East Timor 4.5 Ecuador 5.5 Egypt 4.5-5 El Salvador 6 Equatorial Guinea 4.5 Eritrea 3.5 Estonia 8 Page 216 of 396 pages Colombia Estonia 8 Ethiopia 4.5 Fiji 5 Finland 9 Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia 5 France 9-9.5 Gabon 5.5 Gambia 5 Georgia 5 Germany 9-9.5 Ghana 5.5 Greece 5 Grenada 7.5 Guatemala 5.5 Guinea 3.5 Guinea-Bissau 3.5 Guyana 4.5 Haiti 4 Colombia Review 2016 Page 217 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Holy See (Vatican) n/a Hong Kong (China) 8.5 Honduras 5.5 Hungary 8 Iceland 8-8.5 India 8 Indonesia 5.5 Iran 4 Iraq 3 Ireland 8 Israel 8.5 Italy 8 Jamaica 5.5 Japan 9.5 Jordan 6 Kazakhstan 6 Kenya 5 Kiribati 5.5 Page 218 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Korea, North 1 Korea, South 9 Kosovo 4.5 Kuwait 8.5 Kyrgyzstan 4.5 Laos 4 Latvia 7 Lebanon 5 Lesotho 5.5 Liberia 3.5 Libya 3 Liechtenstein 9 Lithuania 7.5 Luxembourg 9-9.5 Madagascar 4.5 Malawi 4.5 Malaysia 8.5 Maldives 6.5 Page 219 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Mali 5 Malta 9 Marshall Islands 5 Mauritania 4.5 Mauritius 7.5-8 Mexico 6.5-7 Micronesia 5 Moldova 4.5-5 Monaco 9 Mongolia 5 Montenegro 5.5 Morocco 7.5 Mozambique 5 Namibia 7.5 Nauru 4.5 Nepal 4 Netherlands 9-9.5 New Zealand 9.5 Nicaragua 5 Page 220 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Nicaragua 5 Niger 4.5 Nigeria 4.5 Norway 9-9.5 Oman 8 Pakistan 4 Palau 4.5-5 Panama 7 Papua New Guinea 5 Paraguay 6 Peru 6 Philippines 6 Poland 8 Portugal 7.5-8 Qatar 9 Romania 6-6.5 Russia 6 Rwanda 4 Page 221 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Saint Kitts and Nevis 8 Saint Lucia 8 Saint Vincent and Grenadines 7 Samoa 7 San Marino 8.5 Sao Tome and Principe 4.5-5 Saudi Arabia 7 Senegal 6 Serbia 6 Seychelles 5 Sierra Leone 4 Singapore 9.5 Slovak Republic (Slovakia) 8.5 Slovenia 8.5-9 Solomon Islands 5 Somalia 2 South Africa 8 Spain 7.5-8 Page 222 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia Review 2016 Sri Lanka 5.5 Sudan 4 Suriname 5 Swaziland 4.5 Sweden 9.5 Switzerland 9.5 Syria 2.5 Tajikistan 4 Taiwan (China) 8.5 Tanzania 5 Thailand 7.5-8 Togo 4.5-5 Tonga 5.5-6 Trinidad and Tobago 8-8.5 Tunisia 6 Turkey 6.5-7 Turkmenistan 4 Tuvalu 7 Page 223 of 396 pages Colombia Uganda 5 Ukraine 4.5-5 United Arab Emirates 8.5 United Kingdom 9 United States 9 Uruguay 6.5-7 Uzbekistan 4 Vanuatu 6 Venezuela 5 Vietnam 5.5 Yemen 3 Zambia 4.5-5 Zimbabwe 3.5 Editor's Note: As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier economies, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. However, in all these cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have eased. Other top tier countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, suffered some effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the Colombia Review 2016 Page 224 of 396 pages Colombia precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and Latvia have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in eastern Ukraine fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring Russia. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and accountability. There were shifts in opposite directions for Mali and Nigeria versus the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and Burundi. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a new government in Nigeria generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of Burundi and Burkina Faso to hold onto power by by-passing the constitution raised eybrows and resulted in downgrades. Political unrest in Libya and Algeria have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these countries as well. Syria incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. Iraq saw a similar downgrade as a result of the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist terrorists. Yemen, likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, Egypt and Tunisia saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize. At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe maintaining their low ratings. The United States continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate. In the case of Mexico, there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security situation in that country and the government’s ability to contain it. In Argentina, a default to bond holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Colombia Review 2016 Page 225 of 396 pages Colombia Source: CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com Updated: 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index Editor's Note: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index which ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials. This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers. Rank Country/Territory CPI 2009 Score Surveys Used Confidence Range 1 New Zealand 9.4 6 9.1 - 9.5 2 Denmark 9.3 6 9.1 - 9.5 3 Singapore 9.2 9 9.0 - 9.4 3 Sweden 9.2 6 9.0 - 9.3 5 Switzerland 9.0 6 8.9 - 9.1 Colombia Review 2016 Page 226 of 396 pages Colombia 6 Finland 8.9 6 8.4 - 9.4 6 Netherlands 8.9 6 8.7 - 9.0 8 Australia 8.7 8 8.3 - 9.0 8 Canada 8.7 6 8.5 - 9.0 8 Iceland 8.7 4 7.5 - 9.4 11 Norway 8.6 6 8.2 - 9.1 12 Hong Kong 8.2 8 7.9 - 8.5 12 Luxembourg 8.2 6 7.6 - 8.8 14 Germany 8.0 6 7.7 - 8.3 14 Ireland 8.0 6 7.8 - 8.4 16 Austria 7.9 6 7.4 - 8.3 17 Japan 7.7 8 7.4 - 8.0 17 United Kingdom 7.7 6 7.3 - 8.2 19 United States 7.5 8 6.9 - 8.0 20 Barbados 7.4 4 6.6 - 8.2 21 Belgium 7.1 6 6.9 - 7.3 22 Qatar 7.0 6 5.8 - 8.1 22 Saint Lucia 7.0 3 6.7 - 7.5 Colombia Review 2016 Page 227 of 396 pages Colombia 24 France 6.9 6 6.5 - 7.3 25 Chile 6.7 7 6.5 - 6.9 25 Uruguay 6.7 5 6.4 - 7.1 27 Cyprus 6.6 4 6.1 - 7.1 27 Estonia 6.6 8 6.1 - 6.9 27 Slovenia 6.6 8 6.3 - 6.9 30 United Arab Emirates 6.5 5 5.5 - 7.5 31 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 6.4 3 4.9 - 7.5 32 Israel 6.1 6 5.4 - 6.7 32 Spain 6.1 6 5.5 - 6.6 34 Dominica 5.9 3 4.9 - 6.7 35 Portugal 5.8 6 5.5 - 6.2 35 Puerto Rico 5.8 4 5.2 - 6.3 37 Botswana 5.6 6 5.1 - 6.3 37 Taiwan 5.6 9 5.4 - 5.9 39 Brunei Darussalam 5.5 4 4.7 - 6.4 39 Oman 5.5 5 4.4 - 6.5 39 Korea (South) 5.5 9 5.3 - 5.7 Colombia Review 2016 Page 228 of 396 pages Colombia 42 Mauritius 5.4 6 5.0 - 5.9 43 Costa Rica 5.3 5 4.7 - 5.9 43 Macau 5.3 3 3.3 - 6.9 45 Malta 5.2 4 4.0 - 6.2 46 Bahrain 5.1 5 4.2 - 5.8 46 Cape Verde 5.1 3 3.3 - 7.0 46 Hungary 5.1 8 4.6 - 5.7 49 Bhutan 5.0 4 4.3 - 5.6 49 Jordan 5.0 7 3.9 - 6.1 49 Poland 5.0 8 4.5 - 5.5 52 Czech Republic 4.9 8 4.3 - 5.6 52 Lithuania 4.9 8 4.4 - 5.4 54 Seychelles 4.8 3 3.0 - 6.7 55 South Africa 4.7 8 4.3 - 4.9 56 Latvia 4.5 6 4.1 - 4.9 56 Malaysia 4.5 9 4.0 - 5.1 56 Namibia 4.5 6 3.9 - 5.1 56 Samoa 4.5 3 3.3 - 5.3 Colombia Review 2016 Page 229 of 396 pages Colombia 56 Slovakia 4.5 8 4.1 - 4.9 61 Cuba 4.4 3 3.5 - 5.1 61 Turkey 4.4 7 3.9 - 4.9 63 Italy 4.3 6 3.8 - 4.9 63 Saudi Arabia 4.3 5 3.1 - 5.3 65 Tunisia 4.2 6 3.0 - 5.5 66 Croatia 4.1 8 3.7 - 4.5 66 Georgia 4.1 7 3.4 - 4.7 66 Kuwait 4.1 5 3.2 - 5.1 69 Ghana 3.9 7 3.2 - 4.6 69 Montenegro 3.9 5 3.5 - 4.4 71 Bulgaria 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.5 71 FYR Macedonia 3.8 6 3.4 - 4.2 71 Greece 3.8 6 3.2 - 4.3 71 Romania 3.8 8 3.2 - 4.3 75 Brazil 3.7 7 3.3 - 4.3 75 Colombia 3.7 7 3.1 - 4.3 75 Peru 3.7 7 3.4 - 4.1 Colombia Review 2016 Page 230 of 396 pages Colombia 75 Suriname 3.7 3 3.0 - 4.7 79 Burkina Faso 3.6 7 2.8 - 4.4 79 China 3.6 9 3.0 - 4.2 79 Swaziland 3.6 3 3.0 - 4.7 79 Trinidad and Tobago 3.6 4 3.0 - 4.3 83 Serbia 3.5 6 3.3 - 3.9 84 El Salvador 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.8 84 Guatemala 3.4 5 3.0 - 3.9 84 India 3.4 10 3.2 - 3.6 84 Panama 3.4 5 3.1 - 3.7 84 Thailand 3.4 9 3.0 - 3.8 89 Lesotho 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.8 89 Malawi 3.3 7 2.7 - 3.9 89 Mexico 3.3 7 3.2 - 3.5 89 Moldova 3.3 6 2.7 - 4.0 89 Morocco 3.3 6 2.8 - 3.9 89 Rwanda 3.3 4 2.9 - 3.7 95 Albania 3.2 6 3.0 - 3.3 95 Vanuatu 3.2 3 2.3 - 4.7 Colombia Review 2016 Page 231 of 396 pages Colombia 95 Vanuatu 3.2 3 2.3 - 4.7 97 Liberia 3.1 3 1.9 - 3.8 97 Sri Lanka 3.1 7 2.8 - 3.4 99 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.0 7 2.6 - 3.4 99 Dominican Republic 3.0 5 2.9 - 3.2 99 Jamaica 3.0 5 2.8 - 3.3 99 Madagascar 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2 99 Senegal 3.0 7 2.5 - 3.6 99 Tonga 3.0 3 2.6 - 3.3 99 Zambia 3.0 7 2.8 - 3.2 106 Argentina 2.9 7 2.6 - 3.1 106 Benin 2.9 6 2.3 - 3.4 106 Gabon 2.9 3 2.6 - 3.1 106 Gambia 2.9 5 1.6 - 4.0 106 Niger 2.9 5 2.7 - 3.0 111 Algeria 2.8 6 2.5 - 3.1 111 Djibouti 2.8 4 2.3 - 3.2 111 Egypt 2.8 6 2.6 - 3.1 Colombia Review 2016 Page 232 of 396 pages Colombia 111 Indonesia 2.8 9 2.4 - 3.2 111 Kiribati 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3 111 Mali 2.8 6 2.4 - 3.2 111 Sao Tome and Principe 2.8 3 2.4 - 3.3 111 Solomon Islands 2.8 3 2.3 - 3.3 111 Togo 2.8 5 1.9 - 3.9 120 Armenia 2.7 7 2.6 - 2.8 120 Bolivia 2.7 6 2.4 - 3.1 120 Ethiopia 2.7 7 2.4 - 2.9 120 Kazakhstan 2.7 7 2.1 - 3.3 120 Mongolia 2.7 7 2.4 - 3.0 120 Vietnam 2.7 9 2.4 - 3.1 126 Eritrea 2.6 4 1.6 - 3.8 126 Guyana 2.6 4 2.5 - 2.7 126 Syria 2.6 5 2.2 - 2.9 126 Tanzania 2.6 7 2.4 - 2.9 130 Honduras 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8 130 Lebanon 2.5 3 1.9 - 3.1 Colombia Review 2016 Page 233 of 396 pages Colombia 130 Libya 2.5 6 2.2 - 2.8 130 Maldives 2.5 4 1.8 - 3.2 130 Mauritania 2.5 7 2.0 - 3.3 130 Mozambique 2.5 7 2.3 - 2.8 130 Nicaragua 2.5 6 2.3 - 2.7 130 Nigeria 2.5 7 2.2 - 2.7 130 Uganda 2.5 7 2.1 - 2.8 139 Bangladesh 2.4 7 2.0 - 2.8 139 Belarus 2.4 4 2.0 - 2.8 139 Pakistan 2.4 7 2.1 - 2.7 139 Philippines 2.4 9 2.1 - 2.7 143 Azerbaijan 2.3 7 2.0 - 2.6 143 Comoros 2.3 3 1.6 - 3.3 143 Nepal 2.3 6 2.0 - 2.6 146 Cameroon 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.6 146 Ecuador 2.2 5 2.0 - 2.5 146 Kenya 2.2 7 1.9 - 2.5 146 Russia 2.2 8 1.9 - 2.4 Colombia Review 2016 Page 234 of 396 pages Colombia 146 Sierra Leone 2.2 5 1.9 - 2.4 146 Timor-Leste 2.2 5 1.8 - 2.6 146 Ukraine 2.2 8 2.0 - 2.6 146 Zimbabwe 2.2 7 1.7 - 2.8 154 Côte d´Ivoire 2.1 7 1.8 - 2.4 154 Papua New Guinea 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5 154 Paraguay 2.1 5 1.7 - 2.5 154 Yemen 2.1 4 1.6 - 2.5 158 Cambodia 2.0 8 1.8 - 2.2 158 Central African Republic 2.0 4 1.9 - 2.2 158 Laos 2.0 4 1.6 - 2.6 158 Tajikistan 2.0 8 1.6 - 2.5 162 Angola 1.9 5 1.8 - 1.9 162 Congo Brazzaville 1.9 5 1.6 - 2.1 162 Democratic Republic of Congo 1.9 5 1.7 - 2.1 162 Guinea-Bissau 1.9 3 1.8 - 2.0 162 Kyrgyzstan 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.1 162 Venezuela 1.9 7 1.8 - 2.0 Colombia Review 2016 Page 235 of 396 pages Colombia 168 Burundi 1.8 6 1.6 - 2.0 168 Equatorial Guinea 1.8 3 1.6 - 1.9 168 Guinea 1.8 5 1.7 - 1.8 168 Haiti 1.8 3 1.4 - 2.3 168 Iran 1.8 3 1.7 - 1.9 168 Turkmenistan 1.8 4 1.7 - 1.9 174 Uzbekistan 1.7 6 1.5 - 1.8 175 Chad 1.6 6 1.5 - 1.7 176 Iraq 1.5 3 1.2 - 1.8 176 Sudan 1.5 5 1.4 - 1.7 178 Myanmar 1.4 3 0.9 - 1.8 179 Afghanistan 1.3 4 1.0 - 1.5 180 Somalia 1.1 3 0.9 - 1.4 Methodology: As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers. According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the confidence range of the scoring. Colombia Review 2016 Page 236 of 396 pages Colombia The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory. The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country. The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range. Note: Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of Serbia, is not listed above. No calculation is available for Kosovo at this time, however, a future corruption index by Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, China claims ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a United States domain, is also included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous status of their economies. Source: Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL: http://www.transparency.org Updated: Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015. Competitiveness Ranking Competitiveness Ranking Editor's Note: The Global Competitiveness Report’s competitiveness ranking is based on the Global Colombia Review 2016 Page 237 of 396 pages Colombia Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey. Country/Economy GCI 2010 Rank GCI 2010 Score GCI 2009 Rank Change 2009-2010 Switzerland 1 5.63 1 0 Sweden 2 5.56 4 2 Singapore 3 5.48 3 0 United States 4 5.43 2 -2 Germany 5 5.39 7 2 Japan 6 5.37 8 2 Finland 7 5.37 6 -1 Netherlands 8 5.33 10 2 Denmark 9 5.32 5 -4 Canada 10 5.30 9 -1 Hong Kong SAR 11 5.30 11 0 United Kingdom 12 5.25 13 1 Taiwan, China 13 5.21 12 -1 Colombia Review 2016 Page 238 of 396 pages Colombia Norway 14 5.14 14 0 France 15 5.13 16 1 Australia 16 5.11 15 -1 Qatar 17 5.10 22 5 Austria 18 5.09 17 -1 Belgium 19 5.07 18 -1 Luxembourg 20 5.05 21 1 Saudi Arabia 21 4.95 28 7 Korea, Rep. 22 4.93 19 -3 New Zealand 23 4.92 20 -3 Israel 24 4.91 27 3 United Arab Emirates 25 4.89 23 -2 Malaysia 26 4.88 24 -2 China 27 4.84 29 2 Brunei Darussalam 28 4.75 32 4 Ireland 29 4.74 25 -4 Chile 30 4.69 30 0 Iceland 31 4.68 26 -5 Colombia Review 2016 Page 239 of 396 pages Colombia Tunisia 32 4.65 40 8 Estonia 33 4.61 35 2 Oman 34 4.61 41 7 Kuwait 35 4.59 39 4 Czech Republic 36 4.57 31 -5 Bahrain 37 4.54 38 1 Thailand 38 4.51 36 -2 Poland 39 4.51 46 7 Cyprus 40 4.50 34 -6 Puerto Rico 41 4.49 42 1 Spain 42 4.49 33 -9 Barbados 43 4.45 44 1 Indonesia 44 4.43 54 10 Slovenia 45 4.42 37 -8 Portugal 46 4.38 43 -3 Lithuania 47 4.38 53 6 Italy 48 4.37 48 0 Montenegro 49 4.36 62 13 Colombia Review 2016 Page 240 of 396 pages Colombia Malta 50 4.34 52 2 India 51 4.33 49 -2 Hungary 52 4.33 58 6 Panama 53 4.33 59 6 South Africa 54 4.32 45 -9 Mauritius 55 4.32 57 2 Costa Rica 56 4.31 55 -1 Azerbaijan 57 4.29 51 -6 Brazil 58 4.28 56 -2 Vietnam 59 4.27 75 16 Slovak Republic 60 4.25 47 -13 Turkey 61 4.25 61 0 Sri Lanka 62 4.25 79 17 Russian Federation 63 4.24 63 0 Uruguay 64 4.23 65 1 Jordan 65 4.21 50 -15 Mexico 66 4.19 60 -6 Romania 67 4.16 64 -3 Colombia Review 2016 Page 241 of 396 pages Colombia Colombia 68 4.14 69 1 Iran 69 4.14 n/a n/a Latvia 70 4.14 68 -2 Bulgaria 71 4.13 76 5 Kazakhstan 72 4.12 67 -5 Peru 73 4.11 78 5 Namibia 74 4.09 74 0 Morocco 75 4.08 73 -2 Botswana 76 4.05 66 -10 Croatia 77 4.04 72 -5 Guatemala 78 4.04 80 2 Macedonia, FYR 79 4.02 84 5 Rwanda 80 4.00 n/a n/a Egypt 81 4.00 70 -11 El Salvador 82 3.99 77 -5 Greece 83 3.99 71 -12 Trinidad and Tobago 84 3.97 86 2 Philippines 85 3.96 87 2 Colombia Review 2016 Page 242 of 396 pages Colombia Algeria 86 3.96 83 -3 Argentina 87 3.95 85 -2 Albania 88 3.94 96 8 Ukraine 89 3.90 82 -7 Gambia, The 90 3.90 81 -9 Honduras 91 3.89 89 -2 Lebanon 92 3.89 n/a n/a Georgia 93 3.86 90 -3 Moldova 94 3.86 n/a n/a Jamaica 95 3.85 91 -4 Serbia 96 3.84 93 -3 Syria 97 3.79 94 -3 Armenia 98 3.76 97 -1 Mongolia 99 3.75 117 18 Libya 100 3.74 88 -12 Dominican Republic 101 3.72 95 -6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 102 3.70 109 7 Benin 103 3.69 103 0 Colombia Review 2016 Page 243 of 396 pages Colombia Senegal 104 3.67 92 -12 Ecuador 105 3.65 105 0 Kenya 106 3.65 98 -8 Bangladesh 107 3.64 106 -1 Bolivia 108 3.64 120 12 Cambodia 109 3.63 110 1 Guyana 110 3.62 104 -6 Cameroon 111 3.58 111 0 Nicaragua 112 3.57 115 3 Tanzania 113 3.56 100 -13 Ghana 114 3.56 114 0 Zambia 115 3.55 112 -3 Tajikistan 116 3.53 122 6 Cape Verde 117 3.51 n/a n/a Uganda 118 3.51 108 -10 Ethiopia 119 3.51 118 -1 Paraguay 120 3.49 124 4 Kyrgyz Republic 121 3.49 123 2 Colombia Review 2016 Page 244 of 396 pages Colombia Venezuela 122 3.48 113 -9 Pakistan 123 3.48 101 -22 Madagascar 124 3.46 121 -3 Malawi 125 3.45 119 -6 Swaziland 126 3.40 n/a n/a Nigeria 127 3.38 99 -28 Lesotho 128 3.36 107 -21 Côte d'Ivoire 129 3.35 116 -13 Nepal 130 3.34 125 -5 Mozambique 131 3.32 129 -2 Mali 132 3.28 130 -2 Timor-Leste 133 3.23 126 -7 Burkina Faso 134 3.20 128 -6 Mauritania 135 3.14 127 -8 Zimbabwe 136 3.03 132 -4 Burundi 137 2.96 133 -4 Angola 138 2.93 n/a n/a Chad 139 2.73 131 -8 Colombia Review 2016 Page 245 of 396 pages Colombia Methodology: The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business organizations) in the countries covered by the Report. Highlights according to WEF -- The United States falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by Sweden and Singapore in the rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 - The People’s Republic of China continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements in several other Asian countries - Germany moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries - Switzerland tops the rankings Source: World Economic Forum; available at URL: http://www.weforum.org Updated: 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015. Taxation Corporate tax The standard rate of corporate tax is 34 percent Individual tax Colombia Review 2016 Page 246 of 396 pages Colombia Individual tax rates are progressive rates and are as high as 34 percent. Capital gains Typically, capital gains are taxed as income. Indirect tax There is a value-added tax (VAT), which applies to most transactions, at a rate of 16 percent. Stock Market Colombia has three stock exchanges: the Bogota Stock Exchange, the Medellin Stock Exchange, and the Occidente Stock Exchange in Cali, Colombia. Colombia's exchanges at the end of the 1990's had 145 listed companies. Foreign investors can invest directly or through a mutual fund only by working with a local manager. All investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreign institutional investment funds are allowed no more than 10 percent of outstanding voting shares. The combined foreign funds of a single local manager cannot represent more than 40 percent of the outstanding voting shares of a company. National defense, real estate and toxic waste disposal and related sectors are not available for foreign investment. Foreign investment in the public services and communications sectors, and in natural resource exploitation, require approval from the National Planning Department. This requirement applies as well to investments in financial institutions of more than 10 percent. The acquisition of new electronic trading systems brought promise of linking the trading of the three exchanges. There is no foreign investment ceiling for listed stocks. For more information on Colombia's stock exchanges, see the URLs: • The Bogota Stock Exchange: http://www.bolsabogota.com.co/ Colombia Review 2016 Page 247 of 396 pages Colombia • The Occidente Stock Exchange: http://www.bolsadeoccidente.com.co/ • The Medellin Stock Exchange: http://www.bolsamed.com.co/DEFAULT.HTM Partner Links Partner Links Colombia Review 2016 Page 248 of 396 pages Colombia Chapter 5 Social Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 249 of 396 pages Colombia People Demography Colombia is the third-most populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico with a population of approximately 46 million. Movement from rural to urban areas has been heavy. The urban populations increased from 57 percent of the total population in 1951 to about 74 percent by 1994, and 30 cities have a population of 100,000 or more. The nine eastern lowlands departments, constituting about 54 percent of Colombia's area, have less than three percent of the population and a density of less than one person per square kilometer (two people per square mile). Ethnicity Colombia's ethnic diversity is a result of the intermingling of indigenous peoples, Spanish colonists and African slaves. Its ethnic groupings are as follows: 58 percent mestizo, 20 percent white, 14 percent mulatto, four percent black and three percent mixed black-Amerindian. Today, only about one percent of the populat ion can be identified as fully Indian on the basis of language and customs. Meanwhile, few foreigners have immigrated to Colombia, especially when compared to the immigration records of several other South American countries. Language The country's official language is Spanish. Indigenous people differed from the rest of the nation in major cultural aspects. Although some continued to speak indigenous languages, Spanish, introduced by missionaries, was the predominant language among all but the most isolated groups. Religion An estimated 90 percent of Colombians are Roman Catholics, while the remaining 10 percent belong to other Christian denominations or other religions. Colombia Review 2016 Page 250 of 396 pages Colombia Health and Welfare Today, in terms of health and welfare, the infant mortality rate is 20.13 deaths per 1,000 live births. The life expectancy at birth is 72.27 years of age, according to recent estimates. The literacy rate was estimated to be 92.8 percent of the total population age 15 and over. Human Development One notable measure used to determine a country's quality of life is the Human Development Index (HDI), which has been compiled annually since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, knowledge and education, as well as economic standard of living. In a recent ranking of 169 countries, the HDI placed Colombia in the high human development category, at 79th place. Note: Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. ********* Special Note on Ethnicity: Recognizing the impossibility of objective ethnic classification and not wishing to emphasize ethnic differences, the national census dropped references to race after 1918. Nevertheless, most Colombians continued to identify themselves and others according to ancestry, physical appearance, and sociocultural status. Social relations reflected the importance attached to certain characteristics associated with a given racial group. Although these characteristics no longer accurately demarcated distinct social categories, they still helped determine rank in the social hierarchy. The various groups were found in differing concentrations throughout the nation, largely reflecting the colonial social system. The whites tended to live mainly in the urban centers, particularly in Bogotá and the burgeoning highland cities. The large mestizo population was predominantly a peasant group, concentrated in the highlands where the Spanish conquerors had mixed with the women of Indian chiefdoms. After the 1940s, however, mestizos began moving to the cities, where they became part of the urban working class or urban poor. The black and mulatto populations Colombia Review 2016 Page 251 of 396 pages Colombia were also part of this trend but lived mainly along the coasts and in the lowlands. Descendants of indigenous people who survived the Spanish conquest were found in scattered groups in remote areas largely outside the national society, such as the higher elevations of the southern highlands, the forests north and west of the cordilleras, the arid Guajira Peninsula, and the vast eastern plains and Amazonian jungles, which had only begun to be penetrated by other groups in the twentieth century. Special Note on Family Life In the last decades, there were continued signs of change in the traditional norms and patterns of family life, resulting from the high rate of rural-to-urban migration, the growth of urban industrial centers, and accompanying socioeconomic developments. The decline of the patriarchal extendedfamily structure was apparent in urban society, as increased geographic and social mobility weakened kinship ties and extended greater independence to young people. Families at the bottom of the social ladder were adversely affected by geographic dislocation and were increasingly less cohesive. They continued to be characterized by a large number of consensual unions and mothercentered households. Traditional elements of trust and mutual dependence among relatives, no matter how distant the relationship, were still strong. The already large circle of kin relationships was extended through the institution of compadrazgo -- a complex form of ritual kinship. Ties with relatives and compadres (godparents) continued to be important in political and business activities and provided the lowstatus person with a wide circle of mutual assistance. The nuclear family unit continued to be authoritarian, patriarchal, and patrilineal. Legal reforms had extended equal civil and property rights to women, but tradition dominated malefemale relations, and roles and responsibilities in marriage were still relatively clear-cut. In the lower class, in which the father was frequently not a permanent member of the household, the mother often assumed the role of chief authority and family head, but in all other cases the father unquestionably occupied this position. Within the household, the wife was considered the father's deputy and the chief administrator of domestic activities. Her first duty was to bear and raise children. She was also expected to keep the household running smoothly and efficiently. In her relations with her husband, she traditionally was supposed to be deferential, thinking of his wishes and needs before considering her own. Men of the upper and middle class had always been paternal and protective toward their dependents and tried to shelter their wives and children from undesirable outside influences. The activities of women were severely circumscribed because of the male concern with protecting the honor and virtue of the wife and unmarried daughters. Women in the upper and middle classes Colombia Review 2016 Page 252 of 396 pages Colombia traditionally were not permitted to do work outside the home except for volunteer work. The social life of women in the upper and middle classes, particularly of unmarried girls, was limited to the home, the school, the church, and well-chaperoned parties and dances. The lower-class or lower-middle-class woman was under far fewer restrictions than her upper-class counterpart. Formal chaperonage had always been impossible to maintain because of family instability, economic need, and the frequent absence of the husband and father and because moral standards differed somewhat from those of the upper social levels. The lower-class woman usually had to be employed and contribute her salary to the family's subsistence or work in the fields beside her male relatives. Her economic contribution gave her a degree of equality and, combined with the matrilocality of lower-class life, i.e., the fact that a husband tended to live with his wife's family, limited the husband's and father's control over her. There were increasing exceptions in urban society to the traditional concept of a woman's role. Many women in the upper social levels were well educated, and some pursued careers in such fields as the arts, social welfare, and education. Colombian women were also considered among the most politically active in Latin America. Many of them held high elective or appointive offices. At the same time, women who engaged in these activities were considered exceptional. Most upper-class and upper-middle-class women did not work after marriage but devoted themselves to their homes, families, and church groups. The Roman Catholic Church was the single most important force affecting marriage and family life. Nearly all formal marriages took place within the church, and most other turning points in the life of the individual family member were marked by religious rites. The Concordat of 1887 with the Holy See was replaced in 1973 by a new agreement, which opened the way for increased acceptance of civil marriages. After decades of debate, a divorce law permitting the dissolution of civil marriages was passed in the mid-1970s. In the late 1980s, however, the debate over divorce for Catholic marriages continued unresolved. Moreover, regardless of the increasing acceptability of civil weddings, most middle-class and upper-class families still tried to provide their children with the most elaborate church wedding they could afford. In the lower class, consensual union, in which both the religious and the civil marriage ceremonies are foregone, was common. In rural communities with traditional lower-class standards, formal marriage was regarded as neither important nor essential. Despite the efforts of the church to encourage legal marriage within the lower class, people in this group generally regarded Catholic marriage as a heavy social and economic burden. At the same time, however, Catholic marriage was recognized as the ideal and the preferred legal, social, and sexual basis of the family. Although other kinds of union were more prevalent within the lower class, Catholic marriage often connoted superior social status and prestige. In contemplating religious marriage, both men and women might consider carefully the heavy costs involved against the prestige that would be gained. Colombia Review 2016 Page 253 of 396 pages Colombia Some Colombians, especially those in the middle class, regarded marriage as one of the best means of facilitating upward social mobility. At the same time, however, members of the upper class were generally reluctant to marry persons of lower social position. With the increasing independence of young people and the declining authority of the family, marriages between relatives had become less common, but intermarriage between families of similar aristocratic background was a custom that few young people chose to disregard. Special Note on Class The structure of Colombian society in recent years--strongly influenced by traditions inherited from sixteenth-century Spain-- was highly stratified, having well-defined class membership, pronounced status differences, and limited vertical social mobility. The urban sector was characterized by a more flexible social system, a growing middle class, and greater participation of the population in national politics. Rural society in all but a few regions was organized in rigidly hierarchical structures in which change of status was very difficult. Only in the coffee-growing departments of Caldas and Antioquia were there sizable segments of the population exhibiting the traits of a rural middle class. Social scientists continued to disagree about the definition of class in Colombia, the composition and relative importance of the middle class, the role of the upper class in the larger society, and the degree to which the society was evolving into a more open system. It was difficult to speak of social class per se because class implied feelings of cohesion and exclusiveness vis-à-vis other classes--characteristics that did not uniformly apply to status groups in Colombia. This class consciousness among persons with similar economic, occupational, and sociological interests was found only at the highest stratum of society in Colombia. Four classes and their relative proportions could be distinguished in recent years: upper class, 5 percent; middle class, 20 percent; lower class, 50 percent; and the masses, 25 percent. There were also two important transitional subdivisions: the new rich, who constituted perhaps 3 percent of the total and were tenuously members of the upper class; and the upper lower class, organized bluecollar workers, and poorer white-collar workers, who made up about 15 percent of the total. Classes were distinguished by occupation, life-style, income, family background, education, and power. Within each of the classes, there were numerous subtle gradations in status. Colombians tended to be extremely status-conscious, and class membership was an important aspect of social life because it regulated the interaction of groups and individuals. Social class boundaries were far more flexible in the city than in the countryside, but consciousness of status and class distinctions continued to permeate social life in both sectors. Special Note on Health and Welfare Colombia Review 2016 Page 254 of 396 pages Colombia Today, most Colombians enjoyed significantly better health care and nutrition than previous generations. The country had risen from the ranks of the poorest nations in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s to an intermediate status from the 1980s to the present, according to health indicators. These improvements were the result of rapid socio-economic modernization, which was accompanied by improvements in education and working conditions; greater access to urban health care facilities, running water, and sewerage systems; and more modern attitudes toward sexuality, medicine, disease prevention, nutrition, and exercise. There were also explicit state policies designed to improve access to and availability of health care and medical services. In the 1970s and 1980s, Colombia developed a public and private infrastructure of hospitals and other health care facilities, a widespread network of medical schools, and a specialized set of institutions responsible for formulating and handling public policy in the health sector. Despite general improvement by the early 1990s, the benefits of better health care is not evenly distributed among the different strata and regions of Colombian society. Urban areas, the upper and middle classes, blue-collar workers, and the central Andean region enjoy above-average health conditions. In contrast, the rural and urban poor suffer from higher mortality and morbidity rates because of inadequate or inaccessible medical services, housing, and food. As such, Colombian health policy makers were faced with the task of improving services to the least-favored segments of society, while improving the quality and overall performance of the national health care system. Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. See Bibliography for general research sources. Human Development Index Human Development Index Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically) The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and Colombia Review 2016 Page 255 of 396 pages Colombia cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this review. Very High Human Development High Human Development Medium Human Development Low Human Development 1. Norway 43. Bahamas 86. Fiji 128. Kenya 2. Australia 44. Lithuania 87. Turkmenistan 129. Bangladesh 3. New Zealand 45. Chile 88. Dominican Republic 130. Ghana 4. United States 46. Argentina 89. China 131. Cameroon 5. Ireland 47. Kuwait 90. El Salvador 132. Myanmar (Burma) 6. Liechtenstein 48. Latvia 91. Sri Lanka 133. Yemen 7. Netherlands 49. Montenegro 92. Thailand 134. Benin 8. Canada 50. Romania 93. Gabon 135. Madagascar 9. Sweden 51. Croatia 94. Surname 136. Mauritania 10. Germany 52. Uruguay 95. Bolivia 137. Papua New Guinea 11. Japan 53. Libya 96. Paraguay 138. Nepal 12. South Korea 54. Panama 97. Philippines 139. Togo Colombia Review 2016 Page 256 of 396 pages Colombia 13. Switzerland 55. Saudi Arabia 98. Botswana 140. Comoros 14. France 56. Mexico 99. Moldova 141. Lesotho 15. Israel 57. Malaysia 100. Mongolia 142. Nigeria 16. Finland 58. Bulgaria 101. Egypt 143. Uganda 17. Iceland 59. Trinidad and Tobago 102. Uzbekistan 144. Senegal 18. Belgium 60. Serbia 103. Micronesia 145. Haiti 19. Denmark 61. Belarus 104. Guyana 146. Angola 20. Spain 62. Costa Rica 105. Namibia 147. Djibouti 21. Hong King 63. Peru 106. Honduras 148. Tanzania 22. Greece 64. Albania 107. Maldives 149. Cote d'Ivoire 23. Italy 65. Russian Federation 108. Indonesia 150. Zambia 24. Luxembourg 66. Kazakhstan 109. Kyrgyzstan 151. Gambia 25. Austria 67. Azerbaijan 110. South Africa 152. Rwanda 26. United Kingdom 68. Bosnia and Herzegovina 111. Syria 153. Malawi 27. Singapore 69. Ukraine 112. Tajikistan 154. Sudan 28. Czech Republic 70. Iran 113. Vietnam 155. Afghanistan 29. Slovenia 71. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 114. Morocco 156. Guinea Colombia Review 2016 Page 257 of 396 pages Colombia 30. Andorra 31. Slovakia 72. Mauritius 73. Brazil 115. Nicaragua 157. Ethiopia 116. Guatemala 158. Sierra Leone 159. Central African Republic 32. United Arab Emirates 74. Georgia 117. Equatorial Guinea 33. Malta 75. Venezuela 118. Cape Verde 160. Mali 34. Estonia 76. Armenia 119. India 161. Burkina Faso 35. Cyprus 77. Ecuador 120. East Timor 162. Liberia 36. Hungary 78. Belize 121. Swaziland 163. Chad 37. Brunei 79. Colombia 122. Laos 164. GuineaBissau 38. Qatar 80. Jamaica 123. Solomon Islands 165. Mozambique 39. Bahrain 81. Tunisia 124. Cambodia 166. Burundi 40. Portugal 82. Jordan 125. Pakistan 167. Niger 41. Poland 83. Turkey 126. Congo RC 168. Congo DRC 84. Algeria 127. Sao Tome and Principe 169. Zimbabwe 42. Barbados 85. Tonga Colombia Review 2016 Page 258 of 396 pages Colombia Methodology: For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review. Reference: As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010. Source: United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index available at URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ Updated: Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015 Life Satisfaction Index Life Satisfaction Index Life Satisfaction Index Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the "Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP. The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe. Rank Colombia Review 2016 Country Score Page 259 of 396 pages Colombia 1 Denmark 273.4 2 Switzerland 273.33 3 Austria 260 4 Iceland 260 5 The Bahamas 256.67 6 Finland 256.67 7 Sweden 256.67 8 Iran 253.33 9 Brunei 253.33 10 Canada 253.33 11 Ireland 253.33 12 Luxembourg 253.33 13 Costa Rica 250 14 Malta 250 15 Netherlands 250 16 Antiguaand Barbuda 246.67 17 Malaysia 246.67 18 New Zealand 246.67 Colombia Review 2016 Page 260 of 396 pages Colombia 19 Norway 246.67 20 Seychelles 246.67 21 Saint Kitts and Nevis 246.67 22 United Arab Emirates 246.67 23 United States 246.67 24 Vanuatu 246.67 25 Venezuela 246.67 26 Australia 243.33 27 Barbados 243.33 28 Belgium 243.33 29 Dominica 243.33 30 Oman 243.33 31 Saudi Arabia 243.33 32 Suriname 243.33 33 Bahrain 240 34 Colombia 240 35 Germany 240 36 Guyana 240 37 Honduras 240 Colombia Review 2016 Page 261 of 396 pages Colombia 37 Honduras 240 38 Kuwait 240 39 Panama 240 40 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 240 41 United Kingdom 236.67 42 Dominican Republic 233.33 43 Guatemala 233.33 44 Jamaica 233.33 45 Qatar 233.33 46 Spain 233.33 47 Saint Lucia 233.33 48 Belize 230 49 Cyprus 230 50 Italy 230 51 Mexico 230 52 Samoa 230 53 Singapore 230 54 Solomon Islands 230 Colombia Review 2016 Page 262 of 396 pages Colombia 55 Trinidad and Tobago 230 56 Argentina 226.67 57 Fiji 223.33 58 Israel 223.33 59 Mongolia 223.33 60 São Tomé and Príncipe 223.33 61 El Salvador 220 62 France 220 63 Hong Kong 220 64 Indonesia 220 65 Kyrgyzstan 220 66 Maldives 220 67 Slovenia 220 68 Taiwan 220 69 East Timor 220 70 Tonga 220 71 Chile 216.67 72 Grenada 216.67 Colombia Review 2016 Page 263 of 396 pages Colombia 73 Mauritius 216.67 74 Namibia 216.67 75 Paraguay 216.67 76 Thailand 216.67 77 Czech Republic 213.33 78 Philippines 213.33 79 Tunisia 213.33 80 Uzbekistan 213.33 81 Brazil 210 82 China 210 83 Cuba 210 84 Greece 210 85 Nicaragua 210 86 Papua New Guinea 210 87 Uruguay 210 88 Gabon 206.67 89 Ghana 206.67 90 Japan 206.67 Colombia Review 2016 Page 264 of 396 pages Colombia 91 Yemen 206.67 92 Portugal 203.33 93 Sri Lanka 203.33 94 Tajikistan 203.33 95 Vietnam 203.33 96 Bhutan 200 97 Comoros 196.67 98 Croatia 196.67 99 Poland 196.67 100 Cape Verde 193.33 101 Kazakhstan 193.33 102 South Korea 193.33 103 Madagascar 193.33 104 Bangladesh 190 105 Republic of the Congo 190 106 The Gambia 190 107 Hungary 190 108 Libya 190 109 South Africa 190 Colombia Review 2016 Page 265 of 396 pages Colombia 109 South Africa 190 110 Cambodia 186.67 111 Ecuador 186.67 112 Kenya 186.67 113 Lebanon 186.67 114 Morocco 186.67 115 Peru 186.67 116 Senegal 186.67 117 Bolivia 183.33 118 Haiti 183.33 119 Nepal 183.33 120 Nigeria 183.33 121 Tanzania 183.33 122 Benin 180 123 Botswana 180 124 Guinea-Bissau 180 125 India 180 126 Laos 180 Colombia Review 2016 Page 266 of 396 pages Colombia 127 Mozambique 180 128 Palestinian Authority 180 129 Slovakia 180 130 Myanmar 176.67 131 Mali 176.67 132 Mauritania 176.67 133 Turkey 176.67 134 Algeria 173.33 135 Equatorial Guinea 173.33 136 Romania 173.33 137 Bosnia and Herzegovina 170 138 Cameroon 170 139 Estonia 170 140 Guinea 170 141 Jordan 170 142 Syria 170 143 Sierra Leone 166.67 144 Azerbaijan 163.33 Colombia Review 2016 Page 267 of 396 pages Colombia 145 Central African Republic 163.33 146 Republic of Macedonia 163.33 147 Togo 163.33 148 Zambia 163.33 149 Angola 160 150 Djibouti 160 151 Egypt 160 152 Burkina Faso 156.67 153 Ethiopia 156.67 154 Latvia 156.67 155 Lithuania 156.67 156 Uganda 156.67 157 Albania 153.33 158 Malawi 153.33 159 Chad 150 160 Côte d'Ivoire 150 161 Niger 150 162 Eritrea 146.67 Colombia Review 2016 Page 268 of 396 pages Colombia 163 Rwanda 146.67 164 Bulgaria 143.33 165 Lesotho 143.33 166 Pakistan 143.33 167 Russia 143.33 168 Swaziland 140 169 Georgia 136.67 170 Belarus 133.33 171 Turkmenistan 133.33 172 Armenia 123.33 173 Sudan 120 174 Ukraine 120 175 Moldova 116.67 176 Democratic Republic of the Congo 110 177 Zimbabwe 110 178 Burundi 100 Commentary: European countries, such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria resided at Colombia Review 2016 Page 269 of 396 pages Colombia the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine ranked low on the index. African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe a n d Burundi found themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be found in the top 100. Japan was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian countries such as Brunei and Malaysia were in the top tier, while Pakistan was close to the bottom with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed bad with Saudi Arabians reporing healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education. Source: White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive Psychology? Psychtalk 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks, Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006). Uploaded: Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015 Happy Planet Index Happy Planet Index The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita. As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives. The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively Colombia Review 2016 Page 270 of 396 pages Colombia impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly, a country like the United States will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage. It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes sustainability as a key indicator. Rank Country HPI 1 Costa Rica 76.1 2 Dominican Republic 71.8 3 Jamaica 70.1 4 Guatemala 68.4 5 Vietnam 66.5 6 Colombia 66.1 7 Cuba 65.7 8 El Salvador 61.5 9 Brazil 61.0 10 Honduras 61.0 11 Nicaragua 60.5 Colombia Review 2016 Page 271 of 396 pages Colombia 12 Egypt 60.3 13 Saudi Arabia 59.7 14 Philippines 59.0 15 Argentina 59.0 16 Indonesia 58.9 17 Bhutan 58.5 18 Panama 57.4 19 Laos 57.3 20 China 57.1 21 Morocco 56.8 22 Sri Lanka 56.5 23 Mexico 55.6 24 Pakistan 55.6 25 Ecuador 55.5 26 Jordan 54.6 27 Belize 54.5 28 Peru 54.4 29 Tunisia 54.3 Colombia Review 2016 Page 272 of 396 pages Colombia 30 Trinidad and Tobago 54.2 31 Bangladesh 54.1 32 Moldova 54.1 33 Malaysia 54.0 34 Tajikistan 53.5 35 India 53.0 36 Venezuela 52.5 37 Nepal 51.9 38 Syria 51.3 39 Burma 51.2 40 Algeria 51.2 41 Thailand 50.9 42 Haiti 50.8 43 Netherlands 50.6 44 Malta 50.4 45 Uzbekistan 50.1 46 Chile 49.7 47 Bolivia 49.3 Colombia Review 2016 Page 273 of 396 pages Colombia 48 Armenia 48.3 49 Singapore 48.2 50 Yemen 48.1 51 Germany 48.1 52 Switzerland 48.1 53 Sweden 48.0 54 Albania 47.9 55 Paraguay 47.8 56 Palestinian Authority 47.7 57 Austria 47.7 58 Serbia 47.6 59 Finland 47.2 60 Croatia 47.2 61 Kyrgyzstan 47.1 62 Cyprus 46.2 63 Guyana 45.6 64 Belgium 45.4 65 Bosnia and Herzegovina 45.0 Colombia Review 2016 Page 274 of 396 pages Colombia 66 Slovenia 44.5 67 Israel 44.5 68 South Korea 44.4 69 Italy 44.0 70 Romania 43.9 71 France 43.9 72 Georgia 43.6 73 Slovakia 43.5 74 United Kingdom 43.3 75 Japan 43.3 76 Spain 43.2 77 Poland 42.8 78 Ireland 42.6 79 Iraq 42.6 80 Cambodia 42.3 81 Iran 42.1 82 Bulgaria 42.0 83 Turkey 41.7 Colombia Review 2016 Page 275 of 396 pages Colombia 84 Hong Kong 41.6 85 Azerbaijan 41.2 86 Lithuania 40.9 87 Djibouti 40.4 88 Norway 40.4 89 Canada 39.4 90 Hungary 38.9 91 Kazakhstan 38.5 92 Czech Republic 38.3 93 Mauritania 38.2 94 Iceland 38.1 95 Ukraine 38.1 96 Senegal 38.0 97 Greece 37.6 98 Portugal 37.5 99 Uruguay 37.2 100 Ghana 37.1 101 Latvia 36.7 Colombia Review 2016 Page 276 of 396 pages Colombia 102 Australia 36.6 103 New Zealand 36.2 104 Belarus 35.7 105 Denmark 35.5 106 Mongolia 35.0 107 Malawi 34.5 108 Russia 34.5 109 Chad 34.3 110 Lebanon 33.6 111 Macedonia 32.7 112 Republic of the Congo 32.4 113 Madagascar 31.5 114 United States 30.7 115 Nigeria 30.3 116 Guinea 30.3 117 Uganda 30.2 118 South Africa 29.7 119 Rwanda 29.6 Colombia Review 2016 Page 277 of 396 pages Colombia 120 Democratic Republic of the Congo 29.0 121 Sudan 28.5 122 Luxembourg 28.5 123 United Arab Emirates 28.2 124 Ethiopia 28.1 125 Kenya 27.8 126 Cameroon 27.2 127 Zambia 27.2 128 Kuwait 27.0 129 Niger 26.9 130 Angola 26.8 131 Estonia 26.4 132 Mali 25.8 133 Mozambique 24.6 134 Benin 24.6 135 Togo 23.3 136 Sierra Leone 23.1 137 Central African Republic 22.9 Colombia Review 2016 Page 278 of 396 pages Colombia 138 Burkina Faso 22.4 139 Burundi 21.8 140 Namibia 21.1 141 Botswana 20.9 142 Tanzania 17.8 143 Zimbabwe 16.6 Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics Foundation (NEF). Methodology: T h e m e t h o d o l o g y f o r t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s c a n b e f o u n d a t U R L : http://www.happyplanetindex.org/ Status of Women Overview For over 50 years, numerous violent conflicts have plagued Columbia. Of the three million people displaced by these conflicts in recent years, 58 percent are women. While Colombia is one of the few countries with laws designated to protect the internally displaced, victims still contend with the lack of access to healthcare, employment, humanitarian aid and educational opportunities. Displaced women are also at a significant risk of domestic violence. Women in Colombia also face the additional risk of being vulnerable to violence by the armed forces. Rape and sexual slavery are often used as tools of repression and fear by paramilitary and guerilla forces. Finally, discrimination against women is also a prevalent problem throughout the country. Women are a disproportionately higher percentage of those unemployed due to discriminatory hiring practices. Colombia Review 2016 Page 279 of 396 pages Colombia Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank: 55th out of 140 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank: 52nd out of 80 Female Population: 23.1 million Female Life Expectancy at birth: 75.4 years Total Fertility Rate: 2.6 Maternal Mortality Ratio: 130 Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS: 24,000-95,000 Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%): 18% Colombia Review 2016 Page 280 of 396 pages Colombia Mean Age at Time of Marriage: 23 Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%): 76% Female Adult Literacy Rate: 92.8% for overall population with little variance for gender Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools: 72% Female-Headed Households (%): 28% Economically Active Females (%): 49.3% Female Contributing Family Workers (%): 58% Female Estimated Earned Income: $4,557 Seats in Parliament held by women (%): Colombia Review 2016 Page 281 of 396 pages Colombia Lower or Single House: 12.0% Upper House or Senate: 8.8% Year Women Received the Right to Vote: 1954 Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election: 1954 *The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between males and females. *The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources. *Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place. When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take years before a low TFR is translated into lower population. *Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications. *Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services. *Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household. *Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US dollars. Colombia Review 2016 Page 282 of 396 pages Colombia Global Gender Gap Index Global Gender Gap Index Editor's Note: The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas: 1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation levels) 2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education) 3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures) 4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio) 2010 rank 2010 score 2010 rank among 2009 countries Iceland 1 0.8496 1 1 0.8276 4 0.7999 4 Norway 2 0.8404 2 3 0.8227 1 0.8239 2 Finland 3 0.8260 3 2 0.8252 2 0.8195 3 Sweden 4 0.8024 4 4 0.8139 3 0.8139 1 2009 rank 2009 score 2008 rank 2008 score 2007 rank Country Colombia Review 2016 Page 283 of 396 pages Colombia New Zealand 5 0.7808 5 5 0.7880 5 0.7859 5 Ireland 6 0.7773 6 8 0.7597 8 0.7518 9 Denmark 7 0.7719 7 7 0.7628 7 0.7538 8 Lesotho 8 0.7678 8 10 0.7495 16 0.7320 26 Philippines 9 0.7654 9 9 0.7579 6 0.7568 6 Switzerland 10 0.7562 10 13 0.7426 14 0.7360 40 Spain 11 0.7554 11 17 0.7345 17 0.7281 10 South Africa 12 0.7535 12 6 0.7709 22 0.7232 20 Germany 13 0.7530 13 12 0.7449 11 0.7394 7 Belgium 14 0.7509 14 33 0.7165 28 0.7163 19 United Kingdom 15 0.7460 15 15 0.7402 13 0.7366 11 Sri Lanka 16 0.7458 16 16 0.7402 12 0.7371 15 Netherlands 17 0.7444 17 11 0.7490 9 0.7399 12 Latvia 18 0.7429 18 14 0.7416 10 0.7397 13 United States 19 0.7411 19 31 0.7173 27 0.7179 31 Canada 20 0.7372 20 25 0.7196 31 0.7136 18 Trinidad and Tobago 21 0.7353 21 19 0.7298 19 0.7245 46 Colombia Review 2016 Page 284 of 396 pages Colombia Mozambique 22 0.7329 22 26 0.7195 18 0.7266 43 Australia 23 0.7271 23 20 0.7282 21 0.7241 17 Cuba 24 0.7253 24 29 0.7176 25 0.7195 22 Namibia 25 0.7238 25 32 0.7167 30 0.7141 29 Luxembourg 26 0.7231 26 63 0.6889 66 0.6802 58 Mongolia 27 0.7194 27 22 0.7221 40 0.7049 62 Costa Rica 28 0.7194 28 27 0.7180 32 0.7111 28 Argentina 29 0.7187 29 24 0.7211 24 0.7209 33 Nicaragua 30 0.7176 30 49 0.7002 71 0.6747 90 Barbados 31 0.7176 31 21 0.7236 26 0.7188 n/a Portugal 32 0.7171 32 46 0.7013 39 0.7051 37 Uganda 33 0.7169 33 40 0.7067 43 0.6981 50 Moldova 34 0.7160 34 36 0.7104 20 0.7244 21 Lithuania 35 0.7132 35 30 0.7175 23 0.7222 14 Bahamas 36 0.7128 36 28 0.7179 n/a n/a n/a Austria 37 0.7091 37 42 0.7031 29 0.7153 27 Guyana 38 0.7090 38 35 0.7108 n/a n/a n/a Panama 39 0.7072 39 43 0.7024 34 0.7095 38 Colombia Review 2016 Page 285 of 396 pages Colombia Ecuador 40 0.7072 40 23 0.7220 35 0.7091 44 Kazakhstan 41 0.7055 41 47 0.7013 45 0.6976 32 Slovenia 42 0.7047 42 52 0.6982 51 0.6937 49 Poland 43 0.7037 43 50 0.6998 49 0.6951 60 Jamaica 44 0.7037 44 48 0.7013 44 0.6980 39 Russian Federation 45 0.7036 45 51 0.6987 42 0.6994 45 France 46 0.7025 46 18 0.7331 15 0.7341 51 Estonia 47 0.7018 47 37 0.7094 37 0.7076 30 Chile 48 0.7013 48 64 0.6884 65 0.6818 86 Macedonia, FYR 49 0.6996 49 53 0.6950 53 0.6914 35 Bulgaria 50 0.6983 50 38 0.7072 36 0.7077 25 Kyrgyz Republic 51 0.6973 51 41 0.7058 41 0.7045 70 Israel 52 0.6957 52 45 0.7019 56 0.6900 36 Croatia 53 0.6939 53 54 0.6944 46 0.6967 16 Honduras 54 0.6927 54 62 0.6893 47 0.6960 68 Colombia 55 0.6927 55 56 0.6939 50 0.6944 24 Singapore 56 0.6914 56 84 0.6664 84 0.6625 77 Colombia Review 2016 Page 286 of 396 pages Colombia Thailand 57 0.6910 57 59 0.6907 52 0.6917 52 Greece 58 0.6908 58 85 0.6662 75 0.6727 72 Uruguay 59 0.6897 59 57 0.6936 54 0.6907 78 Peru 60 0.6895 60 44 0.7024 48 0.6959 75 China 61 0.6881 61 60 0.6907 57 0.6878 73 Botswana 62 0.6876 62 39 0.7071 63 0.6839 53 Ukraine 63 0.6869 63 61 0.6896 62 0.6856 57 Venezuela 64 0.6863 64 69 0.6839 59 0.6875 55 Czech Republic 65 0.6850 65 74 0.6789 69 0.6770 64 Tanzania 66 0.6829 66 73 0.6797 38 0.7068 34 Romania 67 0.6826 67 70 0.6805 70 0.6763 47 Malawi 68 0.6824 68 76 0.6738 81 0.6664 87 Paraguay 69 0.6804 69 66 0.6868 100 0.6379 69 Ghana 70 0.6782 70 80 0.6704 77 0.6679 63 Slovak Republic 71 0.6778 71 68 0.6845 64 0.6824 54 Vietnam 72 0.6776 72 71 0.6802 68 0.6778 42 Dominican Republic 73 0.6774 73 67 0.6859 72 0.6744 65 Colombia Review 2016 Page 287 of 396 pages Colombia Italy 74 0.6765 74 72 0.6798 67 0.6788 84 Gambia, The 75 0.6762 75 75 0.6752 85 0.6622 95 Bolivia 76 0.6751 76 82 0.6693 80 0.6667 80 Brueni Darussalem 77 0.6748 77 94 0.6524 99 0.6392 n/a Albania 78 0.6726 78 91 0.6601 87 0.6591 66 Hungary 79 0.6720 79 65 0.6879 60 0.6867 61 Madagascar 80 0.6713 80 77 0.6732 74 0.6736 89 Angola 81 0.6712 81 106 0.6353 114 0.6032 110 Bangladesh 82 0.6702 82 93 0.6526 90 0.6531 100 Malta 83 0.6695 83 88 0.6635 83 0.6634 76 Armenia 84 0.6669 84 90 0.6619 78 0.6677 71 Brazil 85 0.6655 85 81 0.6695 73 0.6737 74 Cyprus 86 0.6642 86 79 0.6706 76 0.6694 82 Indonesia 87 0.6615 87 92 0.6580 93 0.6473 81 Georgia 88 0.6598 88 83 0.6680 82 0.6654 67 Tajikistan 89 0.6598 89 86 0.6661 89 0.6541 79 El Salvador 90 0.6596 90 55 0.6939 58 0.6875 48 Colombia Review 2016 Page 288 of 396 pages Colombia Mexico 91 0.6577 91 98 0.6503 97 0.6441 93 Zimbabwe 92 0.6574 92 95 0.6518 92 0.6485 88 Belize 93 0.6536 93 87 0.6636 86 0.6610 94 Japan 94 0.6524 94 101 0.6447 98 0.6434 91 Mauritius 95 0.6520 95 96 0.6513 95 0.6466 85 Kenya 96 0.6499 96 97 0.6512 88 0.6547 83 Cambodia 97 0.6482 97 104 0.6410 94 0.6469 98 Malaysia 98 0.6479 98 100 0.6467 96 0.6442 92 Maldives 99 0.6452 99 99 0.6482 91 0.6501 99 Azerbaijan 100 0.6446 100 89 0.6626 61 0.6856 59 Senegal 101 0.6414 101 102 0.6427 n/a n/a n/a Suriname 102 0.6407 102 78 0.6726 79 0.6674 56 United Arab Emirates 103 0.6397 103 112 0.6198 105 0.6220 105 Korea, Rep. 104 0.6342 104 115 0.6146 108 0.6154 97 Kuwait 105 0.6318 105 105 0.6356 101 0.6358 96 Zambia 106 0.6293 106 107 0.6310 106 0.6205 101 Tunisia 107 0.6266 107 109 0.6233 103 0.6295 102 Fiji 108 0.6256 108 103 0.6414 n/a n/a n/a Colombia Review 2016 Page 289 of 396 pages Colombia Guatemala 109 0.6238 109 111 0.6209 112 0.6072 106 Bahrain 110 0.6217 110 116 0.6136 121 0.5927 115 Burkina Faso 111 0.6162 111 120 0.6081 115 0.6029 117 India 112 0.6155 112 114 0.6151 113 0.6060 114 Mauritania 113 0.6152 113 119 0.6103 110 0.6117 111 Cameroon 114 0.6110 114 118 0.6108 117 0.6017 116 Nepal 115 0.6084 115 110 0.6213 120 0.5942 125 Lebanon* 116 0.6084 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Qatar 117 0.6059 116 125 0.5907 119 0.5948 109 Nigeria 118 0.6055 117 108 0.6280 102 0.6339 107 Algeria 119 0.6052 118 117 0.6119 111 0.6111 108 Jordan 120 0.6048 119 113 0.6182 104 0.6275 104 Ethiopia 121 0.6019 120 122 0.5948 122 0.5867 113 Oman 122 0.5950 121 123 0.5938 118 0.5960 119 Iran 123 0.5933 122 128 0.5839 116 0.6021 118 Syria 124 0.5926 123 121 0.6072 107 0.6181 103 Egypt 125 0.5899 124 126 0.5862 124 0.5832 120 Turkey 126 0.5876 125 129 0.5828 123 0.5853 121 Colombia Review 2016 Page 290 of 396 pages Colombia Morocco 127 0.5767 126 124 0.5926 125 0.5757 122 Benin 128 0.5719 127 131 0.5643 126 0.5582 123 Saudi Arabia 129 0.5713 128 130 0.5651 128 0.5537 124 Côte d'Ivoire* 130 0.5691 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Mali 131 0.5680 129 127 0.5860 109 0.6117 112 Pakistan 132 0.5465 130 132 0.5458 127 0.5549 126 Chad 133 0.5330 131 133 0.5417 129 0.5290 127 Yemen 134 0.4603 132 134 0.4609 130 0.4664 128 Belarus n/a n/a n/a 34 0.7141 33 0.7099 23 Uzbekistan n/a n/a n/a 58 0.6913 55 0.6906 41 *new country 2010 Commentary: According to the report’s index, Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, France has seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the United States has risen in the ranking to top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. Canada has continued to remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island Colombia Review 2016 Page 291 of 396 pages Colombia nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of the Americans in the realm of gender equality. Lesotho and South African ranked highly in the index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite Lesotho still lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female participation in the labor force and female literacy. The Philippines and Sri Lanka were the top ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The Philippines has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes to the matter of gender equality in global scope. Source: This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum. Available at URL: http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetw Updated: Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014 Culture and Arts Etiquette Colombia Review 2016 Page 292 of 396 pages Colombia BUSINESS AND CULTURE IN COLOMBIA EDITOR'S NOTE: This section is divided into three main portions, with the objective of informing travelers of conveying a general notion of “in country” values and understanding, examining cultural etiquette, and explicating typical business practices in Colombia. The first sub-section is titled “Cultural Orientation in Colombia,” the second sub-section is titled "Cultural Etiquette in Colombia," and the third sub-section is titled 'Business Practices Cultural Context." 1. CULTURAL ORIENTATION IN COLOMBIA Introduction Every culture has its own unique traits. Understanding a little about the cultural orientation of the people in a country or a given society can be helpful in navigating the often-difficult waters of international travel. Cultural orientation involves three key considerations: cognitive style, understandings of truth, and value systems. Cognitive Style People in different cultures process and organize information differently. There is no standard global manner of acquiring and internalizing knowledge. In general, non-Western cultures tend to eschew analytical processes and deal more in terms of concrete though. Western cultures tend to involve more analyzing in information acquisition and organization. Its position as a developing country in the globalized world means that Colombia does not fit neatly on either side of this dichotomy. That said, one can expect Colombians to generally process and organize information in a subjective and associative manner. Each situation tends to be understood in concrete and unique terms, although there is some room for abstraction to the level of higher principles and tenets. In practice: One might say, "My mother worked hard to provide me with a good life" in Colombia, but an American might say, "My mother was a wonderful person." The first case is stated in concrete and unique terms; the second case is an abstraction of the subject's being. Understandings of Truth Colombia Review 2016 Page 293 of 396 pages Colombia Factual, impersonal and evidentiary knowledge tends to be the basis of truth in Western cultures influenced by the rationalism of the Enlightenment Era. Again, Colombia does not fit precisely into this mold. While cold, hard facts are viewed as evidence in determining that which is deemed true or false, feelings -- or subjective knowledge --also factor highly into typical Colombian notions of truth. In this way, facts can be nebulous and malleable in the context of reality. In practice: One might say, "Yes, the project will be done next week" in Colombia, but the same situation might be presented by an American as such, "If we're lucky and everything goes without complications, the project will be done next week." The first case describes the situation as he/she would like it to be (ideally); the second case describes the situation in the context of difficult realities. Value Systems The underlying value systems in varying cultures form the bases for culturally and socially distinct behaviors. Whereas in Western cultures, particularly in the case of American culture, the individual is the basis of defining selfhood. In other cultures, selfhood is to be understood within the context of a larger group. In the United States, the individual seeks to distinguish himself or herself in the work place. By extension, his or her family is understood in individual -- that is, nuclear family -- terms. In other countries, such as Colombia, the person is part of a larger group. In the familial context, the person is part of an extended family network with obligations and connections that stretch far and wide. Indeed, those connections can also extend into the business arena where helping a family member get a job or contract would not be regarded as nepotism, but expected practice in a country where kinship is a core value. Family aside, even within organizations (business, government etc.), decision making is done with the broader group in mind. In fact, there is even a word for decision-making groups: -- roscas. People tend to make decisions while being influenced by the group -- in some cases, even seeking to satisfy the group. To this end, the phrase "Que diran?" is commonplace in Colombia. The phrase translates into "What will people say?" and illustrates the the intensity of group pressures and maintaining social stability. In practice: In Colombia, trust and mutual dependence form the basis of selfhood and one's interactions; in the United States, independence is paramount and determines one's actions. 2. CULTURAL ETIQUETTE IN COLOMBIA Colombia Review 2016 Page 294 of 396 pages Colombia Greetings Social Greetings -A firm handshake with direct eye contact is the customary form of greeting. Men will need to wait for a woman to extend her hand first if she wants her hand shaken. Friends and relatives will often greet each other with a kiss and/or a hug -- called the abrazo in Spanish. A pat on the shoulder is a sign of friendship. Generally, greetings among Colombians are lengthy endeavors involving both greetings and many inquiries about health, travels, relatives, friends or acquaintances. Quick greetings are interpreted as disrespectful and thoughtless. While Westerners, and particularly Americans, tend to progress quickly past the initial greeting into business, Colombians like to ease into a conversation. They like to inquire about one's health, one's trip, as well as relatives and friends. Brushing past this initial phase of interaction is not wellregarded in Colombia, and, indeed, may be viewed as disrespectful. In business -Use first names only when invited to address someone in this way. Handshakes are the most common form of greeting. Handshakes upon arrival and at the time of departure are crucially important in Colombian culture. It should also be noted that people who are very familiar with one may greet each other with an embrace, as noted above. As noted just above, after the initial greeting, one should ease into conversation, and spend much time asking and answering questions, indulging in "small talk," before getting down to business. Formality: Forms of Address, Titles As in all parts of Latin America, formality is the norm. Colombian culture is no different. One should always address people by their title and last name until invited to do otherwise. Indeed, titles are of grave importance and convey respect to those with authority, especially elder and more senior members of a given working group. One should also note that. courtesy titles, such as “Mr” (Señor), “Mrs”(Señora), or “Miss” (Señorita), as well as professional titles (i.e. “Licenciado”, “Doctor”, “Profesor”) should be adhered to, followed by a surname. Colombia Review 2016 Page 295 of 396 pages Colombia Names Note that many Latin Americans have two surnames -- one from the father, which is listed first, followed by the surname of the mother. When addressing someone, however, one can use the courtesy tile followed by the first surname. That is to say, Ms. Maria Theresa Aznar Rodriguez may be addressed as Señorita Aznar. But if Ms. Aznar married Mr. Rodrigo Gutierrez Torres, then she would change her name to Ms. Maria Theresa Aznar Rodriguez de Gutierrez, and she would be addressed as Señora Gutierrez. Dress Latin Americans are very conscious of self-presentation. Business attire is somewhat more orthodox, including suits for both men and women. However, Colombian men may wear the guayabera shirt to the office, and Colombian women may wear sleeveless dresses. Most social occasions would generally require suits for men and cocktail dresses for women. Outside of special occasions, dress is generally casual but fashionable and one should always dress with good taste. Shorts should be confined to private homes and are not generally worn on the street. That said, resort-wear, including shorts, are permissible in coastal regions. Notions of Time Time is flexible in Colombia. An invitation to dinner at six may result in a meal being served at nine. A business lunch hour may extend for several hours. Being late for a social occasion would not be regarded as a sign of disrespect. Deadlines may not be met, negotiations are lengthy, and getting mundane things done in this country also takes time. What would normally take two days to do in the United States (i.e. acquiring a permit or having a telephone line installed) might take a week or more to accomplish in Colombia. Class Consciousness Colombia is a class conscious and hierarchical society. In business, this means that decisions are made in a top-down manner, typical of a vertical integration model. In private life, this means that one of a higher class does not get one's hands dirty. Notions of egalitarianism, of which Americans are especially proud, do not translate culturally to Colombia. The manual laborer is not viewed as an equal to the business person in the office, and treating them in the same manner will result in discomfort for all involved. Colombia Review 2016 Page 296 of 396 pages Colombia Cultural Dos and Taboos Spatial differences are to be observed. Colombians tend to leave less bodily space between themselves than do Americans. That said, Colombians are not quite as likely to touch one another during conversation as do other Latin Americans. As well, Colombians do not tend to be as effusive and animated in their gestures as are other Latin Americans or even Italians and Spaniards. Yawning or coughing in public, especially while in conversation, is very rude. Always cover the mouth if you must yawn or cough. Eating in public is also not advised. Note also that pointing one's fingers may be perceived as an obscene gesture. Never stand with your hands on your hips, as this will be perceived as a sign you are angry. While such aggressive stances are normal in North America, they do not translate well elsewhere. Colombians indicate length by extending their right arm and placing their left hand at the point on the arm where the distance from the fingertips on the right hand to the point marked by the left hand is equal to the length being indicated. The American gesture for "okay' does not translate the same way in other parts of the world. It is ill-advised to use the gesture when traveling internationally. Social Etiquette Sports (especially soccer which is called "futball" locally), culture, literature, dance, music, family and travel make excellent topics of conversation. Try to be informed about the local cultural life in this regard. Avoid discussing politics, terrorism, or illegal drugs in Colombia; Colombians are very proud of their nation, their cultural and artistic achievements and do not enjoy listening to criticisms of their country. Like other Latin Americans, Colombians have a tradition of hospitality and may invite guests to their homes. Dinner is normally eaten between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M., but a dinner party will begin and end later. A dinner party will end soon after the meal, but a cocktail party (with dancing) may go until 5:00 A.M. Expect formal or semi-formal dress for either event. Dining is formal with diners keeping wrists on the table and elbows off the table. The fork should remain consistently in the left hand and the knife should be used in the right hand. The "fork flipover" from left-to-right, common in North American usage, is inappropriate in Latin America. Colombia Review 2016 Page 297 of 396 pages Colombia If you are invited to dinner, it is appropriate to bring a gift for the host or hostess. Exotic flowers, expensive and imported chocolates, pastries, cognacs, whiskey and other upper tier brands of liquor make fine gifts. Inappropriate gifts include knives (they symbolize the dissolution of a friendship) or flowers (such as lilies and marigolds) which are used at funerals. A wrapped gift may not be opened in the presence of the giver for fear of appearing greedy, but if you are the recipient of a gift, profuse appreciation is expected. Note on Business Etiquette Note that business is not usually discussed at social dinners, although business dinners at restaurants do occur frequently. See section below on business and culture for more details. 3. BUSINESS PRACTICES IN CULTURAL CONTEXT Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers There is a very vigorous international business community in Colombia, with hundreds of wellestablished companies committed to their long-term presence in the country. Colombia, in terms of natural and human resources, offers a strategic location, a well-developed industrial and infrastructure capacity, and a modern business environment. In spite of the negative perceptions reflected through the often-distorted prism of international news reporting about Colombia's security problems, first-time business visitors are usually pleasantly surprised at the high level of development and sophistication of the Colombian private sector. Colombian business people tend to be well educated (often with some training in North America) and professional. They are serious, hardworking, and share many of the same work habits and ethics as business people in the North America and Europe. This is one of the many reasons that, despite Colombia's political and social problems, knowledgeable business people have for many years come to Colombia to do business. Colombians tend to be friendly, straightforward and direct in their business dealings. They understand the give-and-take of business, and look to negotiate business arrangements that will be of mutual advantage to both parties. Colombian business people are generally punctual, yet flexible, and expect the same of their business associates. Most business customs are similar to those in North America. Given the proximity of the two countries and the long-term presence of U.S. firms in the market, Colombians are used to doing business with the U.S. Many of them have traveled or studied in the Colombia Review 2016 Page 298 of 396 pages Colombia United States and have family members or friends there. Colombian executives and technicians, as well as government officials, travel frequently to the U.S. for meetings, conferences, trade fairs, training and tourism. Working breakfasts and lunches at hotels and private clubs have become common practice in most Colombian cities. Dinner meetings tend to be less formal. Business cocktails and official receptions are common events and are used as opportunities to make contacts and discuss outstanding business. Colombian trade associations, government entities, and private firms are hosting an increasing number of national and regional conventions, conferences, and seminars in the country. These events present excellent opportunities for meeting Colombian business people and key government officials as well as for assessing market potential. Working practices in Colombia In most urban centers in Colombia, business hours are generally 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., however, hours may extend as late as 7.00 p.m. during the work week. Banking hours are shorter than business hours -- generally, 9:00 am to 3:00 p.m. Business is infrequently conducted on weekends. In fact, weekends tend to be oriented toward family time. Impromptu business meetings are rare. In fact, one should schedule business appointments at least two to three weeks in advance, and also confirm them again prior to the date of the scheduled meeting. Such meetings tend to run late and, as such, one should allow extra time after the scheduled end of the meeting. A consideration of the structure and hierarchy of a given company is of paramount importance, Generally, Colombian companies conform to vertical hierarchies and this reality must be respected. As such, decisions are made in a top-down manner -- from the senior management and in a downstream manner, although there are inclusive and consensus-driven dynamics with subordinates that cross-cut the hierarchies. Negotiating styles and interactions tend to be formal, although a more relaxed attitude prevails in coastal parts of Colombia. Business lunches are popular venues conducting business in Colombia and often extend onward for several hours. A flexible understanding of time must be appreciated. As well, business lunches are not always about business. Expect to accept invitations from your Colombian business cohorts at other business or social occasions. Spending time getting to know one's cohorts is also part of doing business. Crafting close working relationships in Colombian business culture is the norm. That is to say, a Colombia Review 2016 Page 299 of 396 pages Colombia productive working climate will require that one spend time cultivating personal relationships and building trust. This is not a "soft" consideration. Colombians generally prefer to do business with people whom they know and trust. To this end, several family members working in the same business in Colombia is quite typical. Because the relational aspect is important, it is ill-advised to change the negotiating team midstream. Colombians tend to negotiate with the person(s) and not the corporation. In general, crafting business relationships, going through negotiations, as well as getting deals closed, are long processes. This is due partially to the trust and relational issues aforementioned, but also reflect the high level of formality of Colombian business culture. Be patient and do not rush the process. In particular, do not rush or press for final decisions. Along a similar vein, do not be overly aggressive in negotiations. Such behavior is regarded as arrogant and rude, rather than admirable as per Western culture. Time is understood in flexible terms. As such, deadlines can become problematic across cultural lines. If a deadline must be met, non-Colombians working with Colombians are urged to stay in close contact for the duration of the project to ensure that completion is achieved in a timely manner. Other practical considerations Unless you expect to remain in the coastal lowlands, you should anticipate your body having to adjust to higher altitudes. For example, the capital of Bogota is 2,600 meters (8.600 feet) above sea level. Unless you speak Spanish, it you plan to do business in Colombia, it is advisable to take an interpreter with you. Be sure to translate all your marketing literature, business cards and any other documents you present in your business dealings into Spanish. Failure to do so may jeopardize your business potential. Note that dates may be written differently in Latin America. Whereas the date in the United States is written first with the month, then day, then year [ April 10, 2008 ], in Colombia, it may be written first with the day, then month, and then year [ 10th April, 2008 ]. Colombia is five hours behind Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), which means that it is the same time as Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the United States. Colombia Review 2016 Page 300 of 396 pages Colombia Do not be fully reliant on the mail for transmitting correspondence; follow up with telephone calls and emails. Travel Information Please Note: This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several resources, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations. For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings available at URL: http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza, Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen. *** Please note: Security in Colombia has improved significantly in recent years, including in tourist and business travel destinations such as Bogota, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Medellin, and Cali. However, violence linked to narco-trafficking continues to affect some rural and urban areas. Colombia Review 2016 Page 301 of 396 pages Colombia *** International Travel Guide Entry Requirement for Travelers to Colombia All United States (U.S.) citizens who are not also Colombian citizens must present a valid U.S. passport to enter and depart Colombia, and to return to the United States. Dual U.S-Colombian citizens must present a Colombian passport to enter and exit Colombia, and must have a U.S. passport to return to the United States. Be aware that any person born in Colombia may be considered a Colombian citizen, even if never documented as such. If you are an American citizen who was born in Colombia or who otherwise has Colombian citizenship, you will need both a Colombian passport and a U.S. passport for your trip. U.S. passports issued in Colombia generally take at least eight days for processing and in some cases considerably longer. To avoid delays in your return to the United States, it is recommended that you obtain your U.S. passport before departing the United States. Instructions for obtaining a passport in the United States can be found at www.travel.state.gov. U.S. citizens do not need a Colombian visa for a tourist stay of 60 days or less. Tourists entering Colombia may be asked for evidence of return or onward travel, usually in the form of a round-trip ticket. Americans traveling overland must enter Colombia at an official border crossing. Travelers arriving by bus should ensure, prior to boarding, that their bus will cross the border at an official entry point. Entering Colombia at unauthorized crossings may result in fines or incarceration. The length of stay granted to travelers will be determined by the Colombian immigration officer at the point of entry and will be stamped in your passport. Extensions may be requested by visiting an office of the Colombian immigration authority, known as DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad) Extranjeria, after arrival in Colombia. Fines are levied if a traveler remains in Colombia longer than authorized. Any foreigner who possesses a Colombian visa with more than three months’ validity must register the visa at an office of DAS Extranjeria within 15 days of arrival in Colombia, or face fines. There is no arrival tax collected upon entry into Colombia, but travelers leaving by plane must pay an exit tax of approximately $56 at the airport. Some airlines include a portion of this tax in the cost of your airline ticket; check with your airline to find out how much of the tax you will have to pay at the airport. U.S. citizens whose U.S. passports are lost or stolen in Colombia must obtain a new U.S. passport before departing. They must then present the passport, along with a police report describing the Colombia Review 2016 Page 302 of 396 pages Colombia loss or theft, to an office of DAS Extranjeria. Information about obtaining a replacement U.S. passport in Colombia is available on the U.S. Embassy’s website at http://Bogota.usembassy.gov. Contact information for DAS Extranjeria is available in Spanish at www.das.gov.co. The Embassy in Bogotá or the U.S. Consular Agency in Barranquilla can provide you with additional guidance when you apply for your replacement passport. See the United States Department of State's Foreign Entry Requirements brochure for more information on Colombia and other countries. See Entry and Exit Requirements for more information pertaining to dual nationality and the prevention of international child abduction. Please refer to our Customs Information to learn more about customs regulations. For further information regarding entry and customs requirements, travelers should contact the Colombian Embassy at 2118 Leroy Place, N.W., Washington, DC 20008 ; telephone (202) 3878338; Internet website - http://www.colombiaemb.org; or a Colombian consulate. Consulates are located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, San Francisco and San Juan. Source: United States Department of State Checklist for Travelers 1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about "reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer. 2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances. 3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below. 4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements are noted below. 5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure to leave a travel itinerary. Colombia Review 2016 Page 303 of 396 pages Colombia 6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy, travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended. 7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, antiinflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication. 8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the countries you plan to visit. 9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these complexities and subtleties before you travel. 10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of citizenship. 11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women, including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations. 12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or toddlers. Note also that whether one is male of female, traveling with children means that one's hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime. 13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the enjoyment of one's trip. Colombia Review 2016 Page 304 of 396 pages Colombia 14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse. 15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is suggested. Tips for Travelers • Check your embassy, consulate, or appropriate government institution related to travel before traveling. • Get travel and medical insurance before you leave. • Bring enough money, in the form of dollars or dollar travelers' checks. • Keep belongings, especially your passport, in a safe place. Carry a photocopy of your passport at all times. • Respect local laws and customs: do not overstay your visa (given on entry). • Beware of pickpockets, street robbery and approaches by strangers in bars and clubs: drinks can be spiked or drugs administered by needles. • Enter next of kin details into the back of your passport. • Don't carry drugs: Colombian justice is slow and the prisons harsh. • Do not travel overland without taking Embassy advice: air travel is usually the only safe option. If you cannot avoid traveling overland, do not accept any food, sweets or drinks offered by fellow travelers: they may be drugged. • Do not enter Colombia overland: the border with Panama is particularly dangerous. • Do not flag down taxis on the street. Always phone for a taxi: you will be given a code to give to the designated driver. Colombia Review 2016 Page 305 of 396 pages Colombia Note: This information is directly quoted from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers There is a very vigorous international business community in Colombia, with hundreds of wellestablished companies committed to their long-term presence in the country. Colombia, in terms of natural and human resources, offers a strategic location, a well-developed industrial and infrastructure capacity, and a modern business environment. In spite of the negative perceptions reflected through the often-distorted prism of international news reporting about Colombia's security problems, first-time business visitors are usually pleasantly surprised at the high level of development and sophistication of the Colombian private sector. Colombian business people tend to be well educated (often with some training in North America) and professional. They are serious, hardworking, and share many of the same work habits and ethics as business people in the North America and Europe. This is one of the many reasons that, despite Colombia's political and social problems, knowledgeable business people have for many years come to Colombia to do business. Colombians tend to be friendly, straightforward and direct in their business dealings. They understand the give-and-take of business, and look to negotiate business arrangements that will be of mutual advantage to both parties. Colombian business people are generally punctual, yet flexible, and expect the same of their business associates. Most business customs are similar to those in North America. Given the proximity of the two countries and the long-term presence of U.S. firms in the market, Colombians are used to doing business with the U.S. Many of them have traveled or studied in the United States and have family members or friends there. Colombian executives and technicians, as well as government officials, travel frequently to the U.S. for meetings, conferences, trade fairs, training and tourism. Working breakfasts and lunches at hotels and private clubs have become common practice in most Colombian cities. Dinner meetings tend to be less formal. Business cocktails and official receptions are common events and are used as opportunities to make contacts and discuss outstanding business. Colombian trade associations, government entities, and private firms are hosting an increasing number of national and regional conventions, conferences, and seminars in the country. These events present excellent opportunities for meeting Colombian business people and key Colombia Review 2016 Page 306 of 396 pages Colombia government officials as well as for assessing market potential. Sources: United States Department of State Commercial Guides Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/ Visa Information from the Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html Passport Information from the Government of Australia https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx Passport Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp Visa Information from the Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro http://www.visapro.com Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada Colombia Review 2016 Page 307 of 396 pages Colombia Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Useful Online Resources for Travelers Country-Specific Travel Information from United States http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/ General Travel Advice from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/ Travel Tips from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html Travel Checklist by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist Your trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html Tips for students from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/broc Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html Colombia Review 2016 Page 308 of 396 pages Colombia US Customs Travel information http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/ Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia; Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers http://www.travlang.com/languages/ http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm World Weather Forecasts http://www.intellicast.com/ http://www.wunderground.com/ http://www.worldweather.org/ Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock http://www.timeanddate.com/ http://www.worldtimezone.com/ International Airport Codes http://www.world-airport-codes.com/ International Dialing Codes http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/ International Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm International Mobile Phone Guide http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm International Internet Café Search Engine http://cybercaptive.com/ Global Internet Roaming http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm Colombia Review 2016 Page 309 of 396 pages Colombia World Electric Power Guide http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm World Television Standards and Codes http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm International Currency Exchange Rates http://www.xe.com/ucc/ Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/ http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html International Chambers of Commerce http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html World Tourism Websites http://123world.com/tourism/ Diplomatic and Consular Information United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.usembassy.gov/ United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/ Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/ http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html Canada's Embassies and High Commissions http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm Colombia Review 2016 Page 310 of 396 pages Colombia Safety and Security Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/ Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/ http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/? action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers United States Department of State Information on Terrorism http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front? pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926 Government of Canada Terrorism Guide http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html FAA Resource on Aviation Safety http://www.faasafety.gov/ Colombia Review 2016 Page 311 of 396 pages Colombia In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman) http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp Information on Human Rights http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk Information Diseases/Health Data Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution: Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) -Guinea - Ebola Liberia - Ebola Colombia Review 2016 Page 312 of 396 pages Colombia Nepal - Eathquake zone Sierra Leone - Ebola Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) -Cameroon - Polio Somalia - Polio Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) Australia - Ross River disease Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles Brazil - Dengue Fever Brazil - Malaria Brazil - Zika China - H7N9 Avian flu Cuba - Cholera Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu Ethiopia - Measles Germany - Measles Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) Kyrgyzstan - Measles Malaysia -Dengue Fever Mexico - Chikungunya Mexico - Hepatitis A Nigeria - Meningitis Philippines - Measles Scotland - Mumps Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD) South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya Throughout Central America - Chikungunya Throughout South America - Chikungunya Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's listing available at URL: http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices Colombia Review 2016 Page 313 of 396 pages Colombia Health Information for Travelers to Colombia Recently, there has been increased yellow fever activity in Brazil in the states of Minas Gerais, Rondonia, Goias, and Bahia. For more information and recommendations, see the following websites: Yellow Fever Disease and Vaccine Information (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yfever.htm) World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News (http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/) Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in travelers. Travelers' diarrhea can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which are found universally throughout the region and can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E. coli, Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage (hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe (see below). Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). Malaria risk in this region exists in some urban and many rural areas, depending on elevation. For specific locations, see Malaria Information for Travelers to Tropical South America (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/tropsam.htm). A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for entry into certain of these countries. For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm). If you visit the Andes Mountains, ascend gradually to allow time for your body to adjust to the high altitude, which can cause insomnia, headaches, nausea, and altitude sickness. In addition, use sunblock rated at least 15 SPF, because the risk of sunburn is greater at high altitudes. Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and American trypanosomiasis (Chagas disease) are other diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases. Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive defensively. Avoid nighttime travel if possible and always use seat belts. Colombia Review 2016 Page 314 of 396 pages Colombia CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age): See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for immunizations to take effect. • Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG). • Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual contact with the local population, stay >6 months in the region, or be exposed through medical treatment. • Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation. • Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region. • Yellow fever vaccination, if you will be traveling outside urban areas. • As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles. Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who did not complete the series as infants. To Stay Healthy, Do: • Wash hands frequently with soap and water. • Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water. "Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores. • Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember: boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it. • If you will be visiting an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.) • Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied sparingly at >4-hour intervals) and permethrin-impregnated mosquito nets, and wearing longsleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn. • To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot. • Always use condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. To Avoid Getting Sick: • Don't eat food purchased from street vendors. • Don't drink beverages with ice. • Don't eat dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized. • Don't share needles with anyone. • Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases (including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on the Making Travel Safe page at URL http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm.) Colombia Review 2016 Page 315 of 396 pages Colombia • Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.) What You Need To Bring with You: • Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis). • Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and 6%-10% for children, as well as a bed net impregnated with the insecticide permethrin. (Bed nets can be purchased in camping or military supply stores.) Bed nets may also protect against insect bites that transmit Chagas disease. • Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea. • Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for more detailed information about water filters. • Sunblock, sunglasses, hat. • Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the prescription(s). After You Return Home: If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area. If you become ill with a fever-even as long as a year after your trip-tell your doctor that you traveled to a malaria-infected area. For More Information: Ask your doctor or check the CDC web for more information about how to protect yourself against diseases that occur in Tropical South America, such as: For information about diseasesCarried by Insects Dengue, Malaria, Yellow Fever Carried in Food or Water Cholera, Escherichia coli, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever Person-to-Person Contact Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases Colombia Review 2016 Page 316 of 396 pages Colombia (http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm) s e c t i o n a n d t h e H e a l t h T o p i c s A - Z (http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm). Note: Colombia is located in the tropical South American health region. Sources: The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website: http://www.cdc.gov/travel/destinat.htm Colombia Review 2016 Page 317 of 396 pages Colombia Chapter 6 Environmental Overview Colombia Review 2016 Page 318 of 396 pages Colombia Environmental Issues GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENT Editor's Note: This section is divided between the Geography and the Environment of Colombia. Geographic Considerations: Terrain: flat coastal lowlands, central highlands, high Andes Mountains, eastern lowland plains Elevation extremes: lowest point: Pacific Ocean 0 m highest point: Pico Cristobal Colon 5,775 m note: nearby Pico Simon Bolivar also has the same elevation Geography -- Resources: Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, hydropower Land use: arable land: 2.01% permanent crops: 1.37% other: 96.62% Irrigated land: 9,000 sq km Colombia Review 2016 Page 319 of 396 pages Colombia Total renewable water resources: 2,132 cu km Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural): total: 10.71 cu km/yr (50%/4%/46%) per capita: 235 cu m/yr Geography -- Natural Hazards: -Volcanic eruptions -occasional earthquakes -periodic droughts Environment -- General Overview of Colombia's Environment: Colombia's climate varies from tropical to temperate, resulting in a diverse environmental system. As well, Colombiais a highly populous country, with up to a quarter of the entire population living in urban centers. This concentration of people in cities results in a collection of urban-oriented environmental problems, the most significant of which is air pollution. In non-urban areas, coffee production, mining activities, and clearing of land for cattle grazing all contribute to deforestation and the concomitant problem of soil erosion. In the Choco region of Colombia, there are marked threats to biodiversity, specifically to wildlife and plant species. The exploitation of forests for timber and the prevalence of cocaine trafficking intensify these threats. Environment -- Current Issues in Colombia: -Deforestation, largely as a result of agricultural activities, and misuse of timber resources -Loss of biodiversity, particularly of rare flora and fauna -Soil damage, as a result of pesticide overuse -Air pollution, especially in Bogota, from vehicle emissions Environment --Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc): Colombia Review 2016 Page 320 of 396 pages Colombia 43.9 Environment -- Country Rank (GHG output): 35th Environmental Policy Regulation and Jurisdiction: The regulation and protection of the environment in Colombia is under the jurisdiction of the following: Ministry of the Environment Ministry of Agriculture The National Institute of Renewable Natural Resources and the Environment Major Non-Governmental Organizations: The "Fundación Herencia Verde" (FHV) or Green Heritage Foundation The "Fundación Jardín Botánico 'Leandro Agreda' " or Botanical Garden Foundation The "Fundación Natura" or Nature Foundation The International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). International Environmental Accords: Party to: Antarctic Treaty Biodiversity Climate Change Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol Colombia Review 2016 Page 321 of 396 pages Colombia Desertification Endangered Species Hazardous Wastes Marine Life Conservation Nuclear Test Ban Ozone Layer Protection Ship Pollution Tropical Timber 83 Tropical Timber 94 Wetlands Signed but not ratified: Law of the Sea Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified): 2001 Greenhouse Gas Ranking Greenhouse Gas Ranking GHG Emissions Rankings Country Rank Colombia Review 2016 Country Page 322 of 396 pages Colombia 1 United States 2 China 4 Russia 5 Japan 6 India 7 Germany 8 United Kingdom 9 Canada 10 Korea, South 11 Italy 12 Mexico 13 France 14 South Africa 15 Iran 16 Indonesia 17 Australia 18 Spain 19 Brazil Colombia Review 2016 Page 323 of 396 pages Colombia 20 Saudi Arabia 21 Ukraine 22 Poland 23 Taiwan 24 Turkey 25 Thailand 26 Netherlands 27 Kazakhstan 28 Malaysia 29 Egypt 30 Venezuela 31 Argentina 32 Uzbekistan 33 Czech Republic 34 Belgium 35 Pakistan 36 Romania 37 Greece Colombia Review 2016 Page 324 of 396 pages Colombia 38 United Arab Emirates 39 Algeria 40 Nigeria 41 Austria 42 Iraq 43 Finland 44 Philippines 45 Vietnam 46 Korea, North 47 Israel 48 Portugal 49 Colombia 50 Belarus 51 Kuwait 52 Hungary 53 Chile 54 Denmark 55 Serbia & Montenegro Colombia Review 2016 Page 325 of 396 pages Colombia 56 Sweden 57 Syria 58 Libya 59 Bulgaria 60 Singapore 61 Switzerland 62 Ireland 63 Turkmenistan 64 Slovakia 65 Bangladesh 66 Morocco 67 New Zealand 68 Oman 69 Qatar 70 Azerbaijan 71 Norway 72 Peru 73 Cuba Colombia Review 2016 Page 326 of 396 pages Colombia 74 Ecuador 75 Trinidad & Tobago 76 Croatia 77 Tunisia 78 Dominican Republic 79 Lebanon 80 Estonia 81 Yemen 82 Jordan 83 Slovenia 84 Bahrain 85 Angola 86 Bosnia & Herzegovina 87 Lithuania 88 Sri Lanka 89 Zimbabwe 90 Bolivia 91 Jamaica Colombia Review 2016 Page 327 of 396 pages Colombia 92 Guatemala 93 Luxembourg 94 Myanmar 95 Sudan 96 Kenya 97 Macedonia 98 Mongolia 99 Ghana 100 Cyprus 101 Moldova 102 Latvia 103 El Salvador 104 Brunei 105 Honduras 106 Cameroon 107 Panama 108 Costa Rica 109 Cote d'Ivoire Colombia Review 2016 Page 328 of 396 pages Colombia 110 Kyrgyzstan 111 Tajikistan 112 Ethiopia 113 Senegal 114 Uruguay 115 Gabon 116 Albania 117 Nicaragua 118 Botswana 119 Paraguay 120 Tanzania 121 Georgia 122 Armenia 123 Congo, RC 124 Mauritius 125 Nepal 126 Mauritius 127 Nepal Colombia Review 2016 Page 329 of 396 pages Colombia 128 Mauritania 129 Malta 130 Papua New Guinea 131 Zambia 132 Suriname 133 Iceland 134 Togo 135 Benin 136 Uganda 137 Bahamas 138 Haiti 139 Congo, DRC 140 Guyana 141 Mozambique 142 Guinea 143 Equatorial Guinea 144 Laos 145 Barbados Colombia Review 2016 Page 330 of 396 pages Colombia 146 Niger 147 Fiji 148 Burkina Faso 149 Malawi 150 Swaziland 151 Belize 152 Afghanistan 153 Sierra Leone 154 Eritrea 155 Rwanda 156 Mali 157 Seychelles 158 Cambodia 159 Liberia 160 Bhutan 161 Maldives 162 Antigua & Barbuda 163 Djibouti Colombia Review 2016 Page 331 of 396 pages Colombia 164 Saint Lucia 165 Gambia 166 Guinea-Bissau 167 Central African Republic 168 Palau 169 Burundi 170 Grenada 171 Lesotho 172 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 173 Solomon Islands 174 Samoa 175 Cape Verde 176 Nauru 177 Dominica 178 Saint Kitts & Nevis 179 Chad 180 Tonga 181 Sao Tome & Principe Colombia Review 2016 Page 332 of 396 pages Colombia 182 Comoros 183 Vanuatu 185 Kiribati Not Ranked Andorra Not Ranked East Timor Not Ranked Holy See Not Ranked Hong Kong Not Ranked Liechtenstein Not Ranked Marshall Islands Not Ranked Micronesia Not Ranked Monaco Not Ranked San Marino Not Ranked Somalia Not Ranked Tuvalu * European Union is ranked 3rd Cook Islands are ranked 184th Niue is ranked 186th Global Environmental Snapshot Colombia Review 2016 Page 333 of 396 pages Colombia Introduction The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality. Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation. Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments, environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe. Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike, are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries, activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such activities provide incomes and livelihoods. Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth, themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and political challenges. First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to Colombia Review 2016 Page 334 of 396 pages Colombia developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries. A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows: Regional Synopsis: Africa The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the earth's richest and most diverse biological zones. Key Points: Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent droughts. Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar suffer from serious soil degradation as well. Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent showing some degree of degradation. Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed. Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying. By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a Colombia Review 2016 Page 335 of 396 pages Colombia substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies. Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under threat. With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated. Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies. Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking. Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is also included in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an anticipated increase in cyclones. Key Points: Colombia Review 2016 Page 336 of 396 pages Colombia Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion of the resulting land degradation. Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region. Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by 2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators. Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density. The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil degradation. The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion. The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century. The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as marine pollution from oil spills and other activities. With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated. Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these countries currently under threat. Colombia Review 2016 Page 337 of 396 pages Colombia Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent. Regional Synopsis: Central Asia The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges. Key Points: The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region. Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty irrigation practices. Significant desertification is also a problem in the region. Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel. Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water. One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia. Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water. Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive contamination. While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy sources, especially coal. Colombia Review 2016 Page 338 of 396 pages Colombia By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards. Regional Synopsis: Europe Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating largescale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests. Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer. Key Points: Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern Europe's deforestation. Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts of Western Europe. Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and urban areas. With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000 metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life, should this trend continue unabated. Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe. Colombia Review 2016 Page 339 of 396 pages Colombia A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch. Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative methods of waste disposal, including recycling. The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases. On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient energy use takes place. Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region. Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the environment. Key Points: Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of, and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third Colombia Review 2016 Page 340 of 396 pages Colombia from its original surface area, with further declines expected. The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a prolonged period. The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism (such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage. Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened. Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted. Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades. The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70 percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half (48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources. Key Points: Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000 species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area, although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may become extinct before they are discovered and identified. Colombia Review 2016 Page 341 of 396 pages Colombia Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion, salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing. The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks, contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions. Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the Caribbean suffer from tar deposits. Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services. The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation, which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of rainforest being destroyed annually. Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion. Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation. The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone depletion in the southern hemisphere. Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South America. Regional Synopsis: North America North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems, but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the Colombia Review 2016 Page 342 of 396 pages Colombia environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger vehicles have offset these advances. Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration, indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources. Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure. Key Points: Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population. Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the border with Canada. Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared to analogous regulations in the U.S. The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades. Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline. Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century. Colombia Review 2016 Page 343 of 396 pages Colombia Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil erosion and concomitant landslides. Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways, and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement. A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with decreasing trends in marine fish catch. Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation, nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in particular. Polar Regions Key Points: The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming. The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050. Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of Colombia Review 2016 Page 344 of 396 pages Colombia contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest of the world. Global Environmental Concepts 1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases The Greenhouse Effect: In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth. In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the "greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns. That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems, as well as the life forms that inhabit them. Colombia Review 2016 Page 345 of 396 pages Colombia The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases: A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth warmest on record since 1880. In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures, it was apparent that global warming exists. In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the United States, the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5 degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities. Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events, such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere. The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps, which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"), destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life. Colombia Review 2016 Page 346 of 396 pages Colombia International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming: Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations. In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives: 1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate. 2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale. *** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. *** 2. Air Pollution Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the respiratory systems of persons breathing such air. In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the United States. It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog Colombia Review 2016 Page 347 of 396 pages Colombia may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief, these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures. The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately. 3. Ozone Depletion The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth. Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity. Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to nonparticipant countries. In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by 1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the 1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated Colombia Review 2016 Page 348 of 396 pages Colombia from use by 2010. 4. Land Degradation In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing, and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term. Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue. Desertification and Devegetation: "Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation." As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest subsistence from it has inexorably risen. In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for directing and advancing international action. To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in scientific research in this regard. Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human Colombia Review 2016 Page 349 of 396 pages Colombia challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well. Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies, are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated research efforts and joint action. Deforestation: Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem. The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted, thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and deteriorates further. Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that supports such life forms. At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their Colombia Review 2016 Page 350 of 396 pages Colombia loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases. Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogenenriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical benefits, for instance as medicines. As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas. In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the floodwaters rise. Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development. This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation, without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance of protecting tropical forest ecosystems. 5. Water Resources Colombia Review 2016 Page 351 of 396 pages Colombia For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation. Freshwater: In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western United States, current withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots. Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions. Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall patterns adds further uncertainty. Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broadscale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for farming and must be abandoned. Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other "point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farmcaused water pollution takes the following main forms: - Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal condition. Colombia Review 2016 Page 352 of 396 pages Colombia - Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other desirable aquatic life. - Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some aquifers and waterways. In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives, dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionucleides have all been found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative. In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly underreported. Marine Resources: Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas, forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future. Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of currently valuable coastal property. Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the Colombia Review 2016 Page 353 of 396 pages Colombia smaller organisms they feed on. 6. Environmental Toxins Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem. While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment. Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as much as possible with nontoxic controls. While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in accidents with adverse environmental consequences. 7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend. In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation. Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable Colombia Review 2016 Page 354 of 396 pages Colombia challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been "tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability. As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have considerable support in the United States, how precisely such a program would be instituted, especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result. The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in China, elephants in Africa. Instead, the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire ecosystems, and all the living things within. More About Biodiversity Issues: This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "Biodiversity Assessment" The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13 million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for urgent action to reverse these trends. Colombia Review 2016 Page 355 of 396 pages Colombia There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity. The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase. Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the auspices of UNEP/GEF. The United Kingdom identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement. There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of information for sustainable farming. Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention. ****** Specific sources used for this section: Bendall, Roger. 1996. "Biodiversity: the follow up to Rio". The Globe 30:4-5, April 1996. Colombia Review 2016 Page 356 of 396 pages Colombia Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Implications. 1995. Special issue on "People, Land Management and Environmental Change", Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1995. Golubev, Genady N. (Moscow University) In litt. 29 June 1996. Heywood, V.H. (ed.). 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. United Nations Environment Programme. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Heywood, V.H. 1996. "The Global Biodiversity Assessment". The Globe, 30:2-4, April 1996. Reaka-Kudla, Marjorie. 1996. Paper presented at American Association for Advancement of Science, February 1996. Quoted in Pain, Stephanie. "Treasures lost in reef madness". New Scientist, 17 February 1996. Uitto, Juha I., and Akiko Ono (eds). 1996. Population, Land Management and Environmental Change. The United Nations University, Tokyo. USFWS. 1994. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report to Congress, cited in news release 21 July 1994. Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview: Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/ Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org U n i t e d N a t i o n s Colombia Review 2016 E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o g r a m . U R L : Page 357 of 396 pages Colombia http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/ United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/ Note on Edition Dates: The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed. Information Resources For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following resources: The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles) <http://www.unep.net/> The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change <http://climatechange.unep.net/> The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans <http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm> The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux" <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm> FAO "State of the World's Forests" <http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm> World Resources Institute. <http://www.wri.org/> Colombia Review 2016 Page 358 of 396 pages Colombia Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment <http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html> The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/ International Environmental Agreements and Associations International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming: Introduction Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations. In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stipulated the following objectives: 1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to changes in climate. 2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale. Following are two discusssions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by listings of international accords. Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol Colombia Review 2016 Page 359 of 396 pages Colombia The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over 175 parties were official participants. Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions' reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries. The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane. The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990 levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as the United States (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and Japan, are to reduce emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show "demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - with the obvious exceptions of India and China -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the process of economic development. Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries. Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming. As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this Colombia Review 2016 Page 360 of 396 pages Colombia model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets could still be met. In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and Japan, are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S., international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gases. In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US, overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place. In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement. Nevertheless, in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies. In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in Colombia Review 2016 Page 361 of 396 pages Colombia Marrakesh, Morocco, to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational. Although the UNFCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of environmental concerns. The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as Russia, Japan and Canada agreed to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers. By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan. Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action needed to tackle problem." Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2010. In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs. Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol. Colombia Review 2016 Page 362 of 396 pages Colombia Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the protocol were to be discussed, Australia 's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time. Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto , Australia was expected to meet its emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to statebased regulations on land clearing. Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent of 1990 levels by 2012. Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) -In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than 190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama, were expected to participate. At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in Mexico City, negotiators were now reporting that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as South Africa, had pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate change. On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway - presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a "green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea level. Bangladesh identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Colombia Review 2016 Page 363 of 396 pages Colombia Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries. The United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway also called for the creation of a new legal treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012, would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But Australia went even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant developing nation states, such as China and India. Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of emerging economies like China and India, with its focus on the developed economies. Now, in 2009, China -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, China had announced it would reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005 levels. With that new commitment at hand, China was now accusing the United States and the European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the United States -- as "not notable," and the European Union's target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with Japan for setting implausible preconditions. On Dec. 11, 2009, China demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the most vulnerable ones." China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival" for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and Colombia Review 2016 Page 364 of 396 pages Colombia the concomitant rise in sea level. China aside, attention was also on India -- another major player in the developing world and a country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in India, who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the policy. But the political pressure at home in India was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance. China and India were joined by Brazil and South Africa in the crafting of a draft document calling for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in Denmark would be classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science, economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts everyone on the planet." Likewise, Tuvalu demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and subSaharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their citizens. Tuvalu also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992 agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from Kiribati joined the call by drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned that the people of Kiribati could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as Tuvalu and Kiribati in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant Saudi Arabia was able to block this move. Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 30 percent if the United States demonstrated that it would do more to Colombia Review 2016 Page 365 of 396 pages Colombia reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. United States President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the United States Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the United States Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits. Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this proengagement assertion yield actual results? By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the United States was likely to accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17 percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged, despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue. In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009. The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to 2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of Sweden -- the country that holds the rotating presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official, focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying, "Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the day the conference ends." The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on Colombia Review 2016 Page 366 of 396 pages Colombia Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by China and India, appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the boycott. Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city. There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were arrested. Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to shore up support for a new climate change, United States President Barack Obama joined other world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the United States and China. At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States argued that China's opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker. By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being cultivated. A draft text called for $100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. Editor's Note In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken Colombia Review 2016 Page 367 of 396 pages Colombia by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009. Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails derived in an illicit manner from a British University. Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in Qatar extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012) December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change. In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of Nauru, a leading negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: “We are trying to say that if you pollute you must help us.” This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with United States President Barack Obama's request for $60 billion from Congress to deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the United States and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more to reduce emissions. To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming, which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around $10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see Colombia Review 2016 Page 368 of 396 pages Colombia the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance (for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will live, but whether our people will live." Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change, according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa and Tonga, and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: “The findings... emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the region's environmental needs at all levels." Regardless of the failures of the summit in Qatar (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the central causes of climate change. For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small Island States available online at the URL: http://aosis.org/ Colombia Review 2016 Page 369 of 396 pages Colombia Special Report COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) -In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP) in Paris, France, ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming, and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate change. The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it. On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document. Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers as well as thunderous applause. In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent us from marching historical steps forward." Colombia Review 2016 Page 370 of 396 pages Colombia United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible when the world stands as one." The United States leader acknowledged that the accord was not "perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. " Former United States Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accompishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement. He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework of this agreement." The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items: - Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century - Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold - Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years - $100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009. In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as China and India, objected to conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine, a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological Colombia Review 2016 Page 371 of 396 pages Colombia sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring the end of the fossil fuel age." A particular sticking point in the agreement was the $100 billion earmarked for climate financing for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of that transition would actually be around $44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would render the $100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the United States, which would have to ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of climate change. A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries. Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement. Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto, China and India were not held to the same standards as the United States and European countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the globe. Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Centrigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in seal level. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future … is already bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of Tuvalu. No leader in this room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries of the world could find cnsensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees. A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal Colombia Review 2016 Page 372 of 396 pages Colombia zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be destroyed along with their way of life. With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the United States and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as Russia, China and India, there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future. The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, and the Marshall Islands, called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition, and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across the world. As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an adviser to the government of Kiribati, “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your home away." He added, “It’s a disaster we know is going to happen.” Meanwhile, the intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as Kiribati. Stone explained, “For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like Kiribati could become the first aqueous nation. possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from elsewhere.” Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the Marshall Islands emerged as the champion advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from Colombia Review 2016 Page 373 of 396 pages Colombia the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the United States. He addressed the comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk. In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon era.” Debrum of the Marshall Islands espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.” Editor's Entry on Environmental Policy: The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and cimate change, derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the deleterious effects of climate change. Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover, because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the terrain of these countries being unihabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms, these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is the existential crisis of the contemporary era. Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The Colombia Review 2016 Page 374 of 396 pages Colombia success of the COP 21 talks in France, with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human beings across the world. 1. Major International Environmental Accords: General Environmental Concerns Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991. Accords Regarding Atmosphere Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1079 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1002 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987 Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention), Basel, 1989 Colombia Review 2016 Page 375 of 396 pages Colombia Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992 Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995 European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), Geneva 1957 FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985 2. Major International Marine Accords: Global Conventions Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972), London, 1972 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels, 1969, 1976, and 1984 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971 Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC), London, 1990 International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982 Regional Conventions Colombia Review 2016 Page 376 of 396 pages Colombia Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Oslo, 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention), Paris, 1974 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1974 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention), Helsinki 1992 Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983 Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, Kuwait, 1978 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Noumea, 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima, 1981 Colombia Review 2016 Page 377 of 396 pages Colombia Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981 3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources: Marine Living Resources Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra, 1980 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946 Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), Paris, 1972 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Washington, D.C., 1973 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Ramsar, 1971 Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994 FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994 Freshwater Resources Colombia Review 2016 Page 378 of 396 pages Colombia Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, 1992 4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety: Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986 Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963 5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) European Union (EU): Environment Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Global Environment Facility (GEF) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) International Labour Organization (ILO) International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) Colombia Review 2016 Page 379 of 396 pages Colombia Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy Committee (EPOC) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) World Bank World Food Programme (WFP) World Health Organization (WHO) World Meteorological Organization (WMO) World Trade Organization (WTO) 6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANEA) Climate Action Network (CAN) Consumers International (CI) Earth Council Earthwatch Institute Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI) European Environmental Bureau (EEB) Colombia Review 2016 Page 380 of 396 pages Colombia Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) Greenpeace International International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) International Solar Energy Society (ISES) IUCN-The World Conservation Union Pesticide Action Network (PAN) Sierra Club Society for International Development (SID) Third World Network (TWN) Water Environment Federation (WEF) Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) World Federalist Movement (WFM) World Resources Institute (WRI) World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) 7. Other Networking Instruments Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED) Colombia Review 2016 Page 381 of 396 pages Colombia Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS) Colombia Review 2016 Page 382 of 396 pages Colombia Appendices Colombia Review 2016 Page 383 of 396 pages Colombia Bibliography BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources: Key Data Altapedia. URL: http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com Geobase Global Statistics. URL: http://www.geoba.se Infoplease: URL: http://www.infoplease.com The Statesman's Year Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press. United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L : http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.htm United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html World Bank. URL: http://www.worldbank.org/ World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com Methodology Note for Demographic Data: The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available estimates. The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is Colombia Review 2016 Page 384 of 396 pages Colombia derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes. Sources: Political Overview Agence France Presse. URL: http://www.afp.com/en/ BBC International News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews) Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Britannica Online URL :http://www.eb.com Britannica Year in Review. URL: http://www.britannica.com/browse/year Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html Christian Science Monitor. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews) CNN International News. URL:http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews) Current Leaders of Nations. 1997. Jennifer Mossman, ed. Detroit: Gale Research The Economist Magazine. (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews) The Economist Country Briefings. URL: http://www.economist.com/countries/ Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm Elections Around the World. 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URL: http://www.nytimes.com (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews) Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. United States Department of State. Washington D.C.: United States Department of State Publications. Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications. Political Reference Almanac Online. URL: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm Reuters News. URL: http://www.reuters.com/ Rulers. URL: http://rulers.org/ The Guardian Online. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ particular reviews) (Various editions and dates as cited in The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press. Colombia Review 2016 Page 386 of 396 pages Colombia United Nations Development Programme. URL: http://hdr.undp.org United Nations Refugee Agency. URL: http://www.unhcr.org United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html United States Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. URL: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L : http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance -- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. -Note on Edition Dates: The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research. Sources: Economic Overview BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do? categoryId=92&contentId=7005893 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1998. 1998 to present. Page 1.C. London: The British Petroleum Company. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services. Colombia Review 2016 Page 387 of 396 pages Colombia International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1998 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services. International Labour Office, World Employment Report, 1998-99. 1998 to present. Geneva: International Labour Office. United Nations Statistical Division Online. URL: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS On Line), November 1999 Edition. 1999 to present. New York: United Nations. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 43rd Issue. 1999. 1999 to present New York: United Nations. United Nations, Food & Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT Database. URL : http://apps.fao.org/ United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, http://comtrade.un.org/ United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database United States Geological Service, Mineral Information United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. United States of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Country Tables. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World Tourism Organization. Colombia Review 2016 Page 388 of 396 pages Colombia Note on Edition Dates: The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research. Methodology Notes for Economic Data: Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator. Exceptions to this method were used for: • Bosnia-Herzegovina • Nauru • Cuba • Palau • Holy See • San Marino • Korea, North • Serbia & Montenegro • Liberia • Somalia • Liechtenstein • Tonga • Monaco • Tuvalu In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized. Investment Overview C o r r u p t i o n a n d T r a n s p a r e n c y http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi <http://www.transparency.org/documents/ I n d e x . U R L : Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: http://www.deloittetaxguides.com Colombia Review 2016 Page 389 of 396 pages Colombia Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization . http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry URL: United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L : http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C. U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a . U R L : http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html World Bank: Doing Business. URL: http://www.doingbusiness.org World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance Social Overview Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do Business in Sixty Countries. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994. Center for Disease Control. URL: http://www.cdc.gov Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/ Government of Australia D e p a r t m e n t o f F o r e i g n A f f i a r s a n d T r a d e . U R L : http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo Government of Canada F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e . U R L : http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html Lonely Planet. URL: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/ Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: http://www.kropla.com/ Colombia Review 2016 Page 390 of 396 pages Colombia United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/ United Nations Human Development Report. URL: http://www.undp.org/hdro UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: http://travel.state.gov/ World Health Organization. URL: http://www.who.int/home-page/ World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA. Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ Note on Edition Dates: The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research. Methodology Notes for the HDI: Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the globe, has produced the Human Development Index (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean Colombia Review 2016 Page 391 of 396 pages Colombia years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita (in constant US$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country. Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators are then averaged into the overall index. For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each participating country, please visit: http://www.undp.org Note on History sections In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department Background Notes and Country Guides have been used. Environmental Overview Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing. The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa. Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/ Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen. Colombia Review 2016 Page 392 of 396 pages Colombia London: Routledge. Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change. http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/ P r o g r a m . URL: U R L : United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/ United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute. World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography Group. 1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute. May, 1998. 1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998. London: Earthscan Publications. Note on Edition Dates: The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above) contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research. Other Sources: General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of governmental agencies from this country. News Services: Colombia Review 2016 Page 393 of 396 pages Colombia CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, Barbados. Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa. Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal. PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, Fiji. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA. Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA. Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa. Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C. West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999 Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country Review. USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE: MLA STYLE OF CITATION Commentary For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended patterns forindentation given in the MLA Handbook, 4th edition. Individual Works Basic form, using an Internet protocol: Colombia Review 2016 Page 394 of 396 pages Colombia Author/editor. Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. Available Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date. Examples: Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. Country Review: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. C o u n t r y R e v i e w : F r a n c e. O n l i n e . A v a i l a b l e U R L : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003. Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference. Parts of Works Basic form, using an Internet protocol: Author/editor. "Part title." Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date. Examples: Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." CountryWatch.com: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch Publications, 2003. CountryWatch.com: France. Online. Available URL : http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp? vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003. Note: This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference. For further source citation information, please email: editor@countrywatch.com or education@countrywatch.com. Colombia Review 2016 Page 395 of 396 pages CountryWatch CountryWatch is an information provider for public and private sector organizations that operate globally. The management of CountryWatch has extensive international experience and has utilized this experience to provide a concise and useful set of political, economic, and business information for its clients in the form of Country Reviews, the Country Wire, CountryWatch Data, Elections Central, CountryWatch Videos and CountryWatch Forecast. This Country Review is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information on the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publication is not intended to provide legal, accounting, investment, or other professional advice. CountryWatch believes that the information and opinions contained here in are reliable, but does not make any warranties, express or implied, and assumes no liability for reliance on or use of the information or opinions contained herein. The offices of CountryWatch are located at: CountryWatch, Inc. 5005 Riverway Suite 220 Houston, Texas 77056 U.S.A. Tel: 800-879-3885 Fax: 713-355-3770 Web address: http://www.countrywatch.com Email: support@countrywatch.com ISBN: 1- 60523- 651-9 ISSN: 1- 60523- 893-5 Printed in the United States of America Colombia Country Review 2016