TCDLA Members - Voice For The Defense Online
Transcription
TCDLA Members - Voice For The Defense Online
YOUR COST $25 TCDLA MEMBERS $100 TCDLA NON-MEMBERS "Sales Tax and Shipping cost need to be added I NAME: Ow - ow - TOTAL aAmerican Express a VISA Master Card ADDRESS: CITY, STATE, ZIP Sub Total Shipping $5.95 PHONE: I Sales Tax (add 8.25~11 E-MAIL CARD #: exp. Date Total I Name on Card: Authorized Signature Mabrink wll be moiled firrl class unless ofhenvise sFifiiac; avernight charges exfro. CDLP, 600 West 1 3 t h Street, Ausiin, Texas 7 8 7 0 1 512/478-2514 F- 5 1 2/469-9107 COLUMNS President's Message Editor's Comment Director's Perspective Capitol Corner Federal Corner FWURES The Rule: A Historical Perspective By:John i%Stickds The Knock and Announce Rule in Texas - Don't Knock, Don't Announce, Don't Wony. BY: R. K (%is) Renoer A Jury Of Your Peers? By hficBMickelsen The 14th Annual RusfyDuncan Seminar Agenda DEPARTME,NTS New ernb be& List Member News Lefter to the Editor Criminal Justice News Motion of the Month Significant Decisions Report Schedule o f Events Charter Member Quiz - - - - THE PURPOSES OF T C u d The purposesforwhich the corporation is organized are:To protectand ensure by rule of law those indiv~dualrights guaranteed by the Texas and Federal Constitutions in criminal cases;to resistthe constant efforts which are now being madeto curtarl such rightqto encourage cooperationbetween lawyers engaged inthefurtherance of such objectives through educational programs and other assistance; and through . such cooperation, education and assistance to promote justice and the common good. OFFICERS STATEMENT Voice for the Defense (ISSN 0364-2232) is published monthly, except for Janoa~y/Pebmaryand JulyIA~igust,wluch are bimonthly, by the Tevas Crhiiml Defense IawyasAssociation Inc., 600 V e t 13th Street, hstin, Texas 78701. Printed in h e USA. Basic sobscription rate $40 per y a r when received as a belief3 of TGDLA nlen~bmhip.Nonmember sobscriptlons: $75 m ~ ~ n l lPeriodic& y. Postage Paid at Austin, Tarn. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Voice for the Defense, 600 west 13111Street, Austiu, Texas 78701. Voice for the Defense is published to edocate, twin and support aftoixeys in the practice of c1%11inaldefense law, Please send aJl feature avticles to Greg Westfdl, 500 IT Tlirochorto~~, #1801, Folt Worth, Texas 76102-7414, 8171336 5600. Please send all other materials for publicntions to John Carroll or D'AIII Jollnson at the TCDU honie office, 51W478-2514, fx 5121469-9107 or e m d at djoli~ison@tullacam. Stakmem and opinions publislred in the Voice are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the positloll of TCDU No ~natedal may be reprinted without prior a p p m d and proper credit to the magazine @2000 Texas Criminal Defense lawyers AssociaUon. PRESIDENT Robert C. "Bob" Hinton, Jr, Dallas CRESIDENT-ELECT Betty Blackwell, Aust~n 1st VICE-PRESIDENT Mark Danie!, Folt Worth 2nd VICE-PRESIDENT Cynthia Hujar Orr. San Antonlo EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR D'Ann Johnson, Austm TREASURER D a n Hurley, lubbock SECRETARY Randy Wilson, Ab~lene EDITOR Voice for the D d m s e John Carroll, San Anton10 EDITOR M g n l l i c m # Decisions Report Cynthia Hampton, Aust~n IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT Michael P. Heiskell, Fortwofih DIRECTORS ERIC M. ALBRIlTON lqpw G. PATRICK BLACK T y b WES BALL Mmgbn LANCE EVANS Ft V&h MlKE R. GIBSON El Poso DAVID GUINN, JR. Lddxck RONALD P. GUYER San A n b n ~ , KEITH S. HAMPION Aurhn WILLIAM S. m S R V&h RODERIQUE S. HOBSON, JR. lubbod; CHRISTOPHER N. HOOVER pbro W.H. "BENNIE" HOUSE, JR. t h d a J. CRAIG JETI Dalbs JEANKIWRD Ausbn MARTIN LENOIR DaAos ROBEW LERMA &cmmile H.W. "WOODY" LEVEREW, JR. Mdbrd JESSE MENDU Lubbock GEORGE MILNER, Ill bibs TYRONE MONCRIFFE Hwrlon WALTER "SKIP" REAVES Wesf RICHARD RODRIGUEZ Horl~ngen KARLA J.M. ROGERS V& KATHERINE SCARDINO b t a n GEORGE SCHARMEN S o n A n m STANLEY G. SCHNEIDER Haurbn RICHARD SEGURA, JR. Aurhn RONALD SPRIGGS Amanlb MARY STILLINGER El Pam J. GAftY TRICHTER Hwr~on MANDY WELCH H o u h GREG WESTFALL FI M DON WILSON Abrlene PHILLIP WISCHKAEMPER Lubbock ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS WILLIAM CARTER Modlsonv~lle MIKE CHARLTON Houston CAROLYN DENERO Austm ALBERT0 GARCIA Austm MICHAEL C. GROSS Son Antonto KNOX FITZPATRICK Dollos DIANNA HOERMANN Son Antonlo LOUIS ELIAS LOPEZ El Paso LARRY MOORE Ft Wor~h ANDY NOGUERAS McAllen JOE SPENCER Ei Poro JOHN YOUNG SweeWafer AMICUS CURIAE Ron Goranson 214.65 1-1121 / 2 14953.1366 (fax) Bill Harris 8173325575 / 817335.6060(fax) leff Blackburn 806371-8333 / 8063724652 fax ~obertC. Owen 5123200334 / 512-3208072 fax RURAL AND S M A U TOWN John Smith 409-598.277.1 CONTINUINO LEOAL EDUCATION SPECIAL W O N / PRISON WATCH David OnNed 936294-1663 / 409-4375293 [fox) Tim Evans 8173323822 / 814332-2763 lfoxl Gerry Morris 512-47986kl / 512479.6035 fbxJ DUIA C W I L W Cynthia Hujor Orr 2102241463 / 2102248367 (fm) DTRllU INVESIIOUION Mike A Ward 2813480884 / 281-7360562(fox] Philip Wixhkaemper 804763-9900 / 804763-9904 (fax] LULL OF C A M € FmnkJadcan 214871-1122 /214880&243 (fox) Chfkm "Scrapw" H d s 9057582203 /' 903-7587864 (fcuJ SPICIAL LIAISON / COIRlCTlONS Bill Habern 409-594.2 123 / 409594-9100[fox) W O M l N & MINORITY DEFENDERS WOMEN Katherine Scardino 7135205223 / 713-5205455(fax) MINORITIES Lydia ClayJackson 4093241171 / 409-7560901 (fa4 aorn ANN~VERSARY Craig Jew 214871-7676 John Carroll 2108297183 Hon. Frank Malone 5124744306 Weldon Holcomb $03597.5595 George Gilkerson 806-763-7373 IMMIOMTION Simon Azar-Farr 2107364143 Robart Lerma 9565441910 / 9545444013 (fax) INMOINY RRU-ON Paul Looney 281597-8818 / 281547-8284 [faxJ LIYYlERS ASSISTANCE MANAOINO EDITOR: D'Ann Johnson IPOISLNIVE Keith S. Hampton 5124748484 / 512-4749309 (foxj FEATURE ARTICLIS EDITOR: Greg Westfall Wesfall & Plon One Summit Ave., Suite 910 Fort Worth, TX 76102 Rick Ha en 9405661001 / 940757-9878 (fax) Dan H U % ~ 8047700700 / 804763-8199(fox) Stonley G. Schneider 713-951-9555 / 713-951-9854 (fax] MEMBERSHIP Randy Wilson 8005884678 / 91547'6 129 (fax] Bennie House 713.6883398 / 7136800804 (fax) Lydia Cloy-Jackson 409-7602889 / 409-756-0901 (fax) Verse1Rush 940767-7567 / 940723-9972 lbxl Sheldon Weisfield 956-546-2727 / 9565443426 (fax) MElCmR Carcdyn Denera 51242-1353 / 512-472-1316 (fax) IIOMlNATlW Betty Blackwell 5 12.4790149 / 512-3208743 (fox] CAROLE AND SENTENCING Gary Cohen 51247&6201 / 512-477-5778(fox) PUBUC DE-DIR CIDERAL Marjorie Meyers 713-718.4600 Patrick Block 903-531-9233 STATE Jane Roden 2144533550 Doug Schropmeyer 2144533550 PIeDucTIOW a s r W U N l t Susan Vela Rice TCDLA/Home Ofice 512-478-2514 DISlON . IPRODUCROtb Noel MacDonald MCD Digital 5 12-656-8299 PrnNIIRel MPRESS 512389CJ140 ASSllrrAm FIATWM ARnCLIS RDRour Cynthia H. Orr 2 10/2241463 huiaror@aol.com 2900 Tower Life Bldg. Son Antonio, Texas 78205 W. Regon Wynn 817/3365600 120 W. 3rd Ste, 300 Fort Wor~h,Texas 76102 APRIL 2001 I m.TCDLA.COM ( VOICE FOR THE DECENSE ( 6 I ~ p ~ p p presidentialPilgrimage hfichaal Heiskell started his whole tbing in Pebn~ary,2000. His President's IVinter Tk@ to Banff was incredible! Befo~zit was mer, I was "Ordered to prod~~ce a repeat performance $1 waited to be President this yar. Well, I did as I was "Ordered", and I am happy to say that, as far as I could teU, a great time was had by aU. Ow #Z son, Jeff,turned 18 the day we h d e d in Ca1g;uy. NatunUy, some on our bus from the &port to Bmfffelt obliged to cause the driver to stop at the ticst refreshment retailer to stock up forthe 90 minute ride. I was not aware that the legal age in Canada m 18 until I sawJeff return the trip, Mike Heiskell, Dan Hurley, David to the bus with his own hag of goodies. Thro~~ghout Botsford, Gerry Goldstein, Tim hhns and otliers made sure JeE adequately celeb~ztedhis Canadian "coming of age". Tlianks guys for all your thoughtful efforts! During om stay at the incredible B d Springs llotel we enjoyed excellent early morning C.L E, before launclling out into the mestneri7ingly awesonlesceoely for incomparable snow activi- ties. Iu tlie evening wew0111dconvene in the outdoor hated pool to saniple exotic delicacies of bh~e agave aid single malt, as we were entertained by liurley, Goldstein, Botsford, Wynne and otlte~s,ns they rolled in the snow in their Speedo's, like a bu~ithof point bears. Bob Hinton MESSAGE Betty Blachrell has served notice that her Presidential Wiiiter T~ipwill be to the beach. I sliaU be #I on her trip list for d ~ aI tknow will he a spectacular experience. h'e~rtheless,the Evans, Goldsteins, Hnrteys, Botsfofds, Cooks, Heiskells,Jetts, Wynns, Rays, Vitv,Villi~11~011~, Lmbxights, Hintons, Lydia Clay-Jackson and n~anyothers have dec~redthat we have a perpetual winter appointment with Ban@ I lovethisorg~kzation.Itsine~ubersaretl~ehestpeople on arih. Retreats of tlus natwe provide the rich opporhmiry to spend quality leisue h e together, developing relationships which retuun Imnieasutzble dividends, both personal and professional. I urge more n~embersto partiupate in fuh~reoutings. I extend niy most sumre appreciation to niy brothers and sisters who were a part of this one! Sincerely, Bob What a szlccess?Above left, are attendees enjoying "%Prm'dents R~~ptiooa" Friday, March 16th, 2001. Above right, Randy McClnmmy, Program Coordinator for TCDLA, enjoys the great outdoors wlth her daughter Rachel. We are dl watcl@ the legislature to see \ h i t happens to indigent defense refonii, life witl~oi~t parole and proposed clmges in tl~eD\Vllaw But a n~ultihldeof other criniind llavand procedure legislationlias been introduced Illis year, some of aliich may acludly becon~elaw This column will lugldigl~ta few of t l ~ epmposals tlmt have been made ill 77t1' Regular Session of the Texas Legislalure. KINDER GENTLER JUDGES. HB 546 mould require Texas judges to take four hours of racial sensiti~ttyIcli~iingas part of their continuing educalion reqliirenient. The trining ivoukl include clllhlrd d8erences anlong etluiic or m i d ininorities in a progranl adnIinislered by the Coiu.t of Criminal Appeals. AN END TO CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS. HB 589 wo11ld mandate rl~erecosnl of a judge in a crii~inalcase if the judge had recei\,ed more illan $500.00 dollars in political contributions from a party or an attonley of record, or the attorney's law firm in the preceding hvo years. Recusnl could be waived \\liere but11 parties agree. ARMING THE JUDICIARY. SB 118 woi~ldallowTexas judges lo can)yhaadguns at any lime wit11out requiring a concenled l~antlgunlicense. RACE BASED SENTENCING. SR 133 n~ouldprohibit proseci~to~s from n~entioninga defenrlant's m e as a factor in determining filhlre daogeroi~snessin capital nnlurdcr czses. RACIAL PROFILING. Sn 1074 would impose nleaslires designed to stop racial profiling by police. I,aw enforcement qencies would be required to adopt written policies to address racial profiig and aoilld be required to collect data on tra[lic stops for enilualion to re~~iew tile agencies' perforlnance. In co~nmentingon llle bill, the assistant cl~iefof the D a l h Police Deparlment ~ n q~~otetl s b g M a sayi~ig"1 think anyone would Iiae to be naive to say we don't have racial profiling" COMMENT IAWYER PROFILING. W 1712 mould require h e state bar to nmintain an online databsse for public access wilh profiles of all lawyers in Texeras. The profile \vaul11d include details about a layer's education, lengtl~of p~.aclice,:inyspecialty certifications and disciplioarj and c r i i ~ ~ irecord n l infornialion. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM CROSS EXAMINATION. HH 1167 TYOIII~ add an article 38.09 lo h e Code of Crioinal Procedure tbat would providc: In any criminal proceeding in wlucl~a child yoanger than 13 years of age is a witness, t l ~ ecourt sl~allrequire that qi~eslionsdirected to the cl~ildbe i n a form re;uonebly appropriate to the age and undersraoding of the cluld and s l i d limit the uonecessaq repetition of queslioos directed to the child. PROTECTION OF PREGNANT WOMEN. IlLl 1405 wui~ldenl~ancea ii~isden~eanor assaid1 of a pregnant wonlan to a third degree felony. There woi~ldhe an dfirn~ativedefense in the case of a law $1 aborlion(wl~atabout a C section?). PROTECTION OF THE ELDERLY. HB 1550 ~ o u l enl~illlce d the punisli~~ient for lllefi conmiitted against an elderly person. PROTECTION OF THE HOTEL INDUSTRY. HB 878 specifies that the offense of cruiklal trespass includes staying at a hotel loo long past checkout time. PROTECTION OF THE QUICKIE MART. HB's 1563 and 2216 a ~ SH ~ 968 d provide for class C n~isdemeanorp~~nisl~nient for driving away from a retail establish~lw~t's gas p u n p withoot py4ng and requires a driw's license si~spensionfor subseq~lentotieoders. PROTECTION FROM THOSE PESKY LASER POINTERS. HB 319 would make it a class C nusdemeanor to direct a laser pointer at a lmifonned public sdety officer. 39.14 to make witness statenlents and police repols discoverable. HB 77 would amend article 39.14 to make it more Like the federal crimind discove~y~ille including granting discovely lights to the state. REGISTRATION AROUND THE CORNER? Hn 195 would establish a central database for tire collection of inforn~ation regarding persons suspected or convicted of propelty crimes against the elderly . . ROAD RAGE PROSECUTION. SB 977 niakes road rage, aggressive, driving, a class B misdemeanor; a second degree felony in the event of serious bod$ inj~nyor death. SEALING WARRANT AFFIDAVITS. iiL~2044 would d o w the sealing of search wvamnt &davits upon request of the state to protect informiu~ts,ongoing investigations and wiretaps. PUNISHMENT I N DRUG CASES INVOLVING MINORS. HB 156 increases the penalty for certain controlled substance offenses in cases where a cldd younger than 18 is used to commit or assist in llle con~missio~~ of the offense. It also requires the sentence for such an offense to 11111 consecutively to any other sentence imposed. Snch an offense would also be included in ArUcle 42.12, g 3(g)'s probation eligibility restriction. The original wording of this bill appeals to violate Apprendi in that it alloms the enhancement of p e d ty if tile aggravating factor is "shown at the pnnislm~entphase of the tlial." NO DRMNG FOR DRUG OFFENDERS. HB 1146 would require permanent revocatio~~ of driver's licenses for certain repeat dmg otienden. EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE. rrrl 2352 wonld add alticle 38.02 to the code of criminal procedure which would provide: Evidence which tends to prove that the accused is hmocent of the offense for which he is charged is relevant and shall not be excluded on h e basis that such evidence prejudices the State's case. UNDERCOVER OFFICER TREATED LIKE ACCOMPLICE. HB 2351 would prohibit a cdlninal conviction based on the uncorrobolated testimony of an undercover law enforcement ofiicec MEDICINAL USE. HE 513 would establish medicinal use as an affirnrative defe~~se to prosecution for possession of marijuana. By the time you read tllis, some of the bills llighlighted in this colunm niay have become law, or been rejected, to keep up with what is going on in Austin, watch yonr TCDU One List e-mNI. at& this year, wivllen all the dust clars, the Voice niU review the criminal law and pmcedure enactments of the 77th Legislative Session. NO DEFERRED FOR SELLING DRUGS TO MINORS. HB 2010 wor~ldmake persons charged with delivering certain controlled substances or marilmana to n k ~ o r siueligible for deferred adjudication (big deal). N O GUNS FOR CHILDREN. HB 209 crhinalizes tile possession of firearms by a n~inor(aperson under 17 y m of age) unless the person is eugaged in lawful hunting or sporling activities or is accomnpanied by a parent or guardion. N O GUNS FOR CHILDREN 11. NB 1796wouldmake the offense of making ahearni accessible to a cldd a state jail felony, a third degree felony if the child causes death or selious bodily injn~y. Currently, the offensesare punished as class C and A nlisden~eanors, rapectively. . B M V A FELONY AGAIN. EtlB 31 becomeslaw, bw&y of a d u d e , once a felony, the11 a ~ilisdaneanor,will a w l be a tl&d dqr?efelony, a second dqtpc felony if h e wllicle is a lail ciu: If a mnlx!hg bfl, HB 504, p ~ a i l ssuch , a bu~&uyd lonly k a shk jail felony EXPOSURE CAN BE A FELONY. s B 138 would increase the punishment for subsequent indecent exposure and public lewdness offenden up to that for a state jail felony. RESTITUTION, WITH INTEREST. HB 355 would allow courts to require restihition orders to bear ulterest. RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY. SB 582 would amend article Ken(AblM##er H o u h n (19981999) E.G. "Geny" Mont Ausp'n (1597-19981 DavldLBokfuKl Ausbn (19961991) -=-=w= Lubbock 11995-1996) RmDddLeoNmsaI DallasIlW-1%) David R Birsr Houston 11993-1994) Cadd n. Ckkkkin San Antonio (1992.1993) kdgeRUD.hnes Austin (1980-1981) V d Waker Perid Dallas119191S3Yi Houston (1978-19191 ~~ Faifield.VA(1971-1918) RidwnlAlmAndacon Dallas11591-1W w e f d o l l ~ Tyler(19761977) limhmn Forth Worth (IS%lS3t) rudge. J A "Jim" Bob0 San Antonio (1975-19761 oaolge E. G i k e ~ ~ Odessa (1989-19901 khmrdA.Ml%eH Houston 11988-1989) aadm D. kdts San Antonio 11987-1588) - Knox lorn' McAllen (1986-1981) DurprDurpr *. CDavklhms' Lubbock(1974-1975) PhilBulesDD* Dallas 11973-1974 CAnlhonyRiloux,Jr.' Houston(1972-19731 Han.RakMd#Py Austinl1971-19721 Orange (1985-1%) APRIL 2001 ( \HYYW-TCOU.COM ( V o l e FOR ME DEFENSE ( 9 I WILL THE REAL PLEASE STAND UP? nie dispute beheen the district anornqs and tlie Texas Attorney Geneid went public last month in the Court of Appeals srgument in the capitalniurder case of Victor S;tklano. While defense attorneys snickered at the controversy, lo& prosecutors ard o t h s are sounding an d a m that Genenl Comyn's expandingintermin tlie criminal jwtice arena nriglitnot be to the long-term benetit of defense anmnep. last June, Gwenl Cornyn surprised almost everyone when, contuxuy to the wishes of tlie local D A , lie adtililtedtothe UnitcdStates Supieme Coo11that tlre state had erred ahwingthe testimony of Dr. Quijano in the ponislment phase of Saldano's trial rn that testinloruy, Dr. Quijano stated that thehgentiuian defendant was r filture danger, and, as one of the factors iea~lingto that conclu~ion,that d~ defendant u u Hispanic. The defense attorney did not object to the testinmy Sddano appealed theissue. The Conrt of C r i n ~ Appeals d denied the request for a new sentencing h a g because there was no objection. But, a h the eonfwion of error by the Attolney General, the Supren~eCo111%ordered the Court of Crimind Appeals to reconsider its decision. In response, tlre Court of Criminal Appals asked the httorney Gellad to brief the court on his authority d State's ProsecutingAttorney conto represent the State. At oral argument, the Collin Couity D.A. ~ l l the ceded drat the Attorney General had the authoxity to represent the state. But, so did fhey And the questin11 reniained-whenthe stare disagrees witb itself, uhich one t ~ ~ ~the n ~other? ps PERSPECTIVE The answer is not only not clm, but not likely to go amay when ibis caseis ove' Rob Keppfc of the Texas District and CounfyAttorncysAssociation sad the Mdailo case is only olie example of the increasing tension bemeen local p~nsmtorsand the state agency Cornyn has bypwed local D.A.5 for investigations, seinlres, and grand j11lypresenta8otls.R11sIy Hardin, a former Harris County prosecutor now in private pmctice, sap U~atCo~nyais the nuost political Attorney Geneml lie 11% ever seen. Next to him, Jim Milftox looks neutral. He uram tlunt Camp is using the criminal justice system for political reasons. Senator Royce West introd~icedBiU 1192, wltich ssp the Attorney General will represent the State in an matters before tlie Supreme Court This may resohe !he thorny problem ui Sddano, but the turf battle could eayaud in other areas. Note the ways that Counyi has expanded his criniinal jodsdiction. In the last legislative session, the cap otl the antholily of the AG to hire 5 police officen changed. Accordiog to recent infoinlation, Geuia'd Corny1 now 11% 41 liceiised peace oflicers on st&. I look at the website. Tbe most visible icons on the hon~epage are for Texas Exile and the Texas b~terxetBurmu. Accoldu~gto the site, "Tem Bxile is a crime-conhol hitialive that utilizes existing state and federal gun laws designed to get to the root cause of gun violence-cdoliuds who illegally uuse and carry weapons." The Intemet bureau helps chsc on -line criminnls. Says Gencral Gornyn, '*Iintend to get tl~esecriminals from behind their conlputels and put them behind priso11bars Tbe AG pubbhes a Criminal Law Update, adwcatcs for crime victims, protects against identity theft, and keeps tabson gangmerube~s.By the way, there is informttion on getti~~g ynur tattoos removed on the website xs wen Other useful i~lfonuatiol~ under the Publications link is: ~ilagistrnfe's Guide to the I'ieiina Conuemtion on Cons~clarA'ot$cations, Capital Ptmis61nmt Appelhte Guide Book, Peimnl Code Offenses b~l Punishment Range: npractiurl reference guide to TCYUShco, and an Index t o p ~ n i l e - ropinions e oftheAttornq~Gene~uLYou caul find tlus i~lformationat \~w~.oa~.shte.th.us " But For Books, We Could Not mow Ri@t It is worth making a note of the activities of the Attorney General- 111s next appeatance is more likely to bc in favor of a new indictment illan a new sentencing hwing. And you might miss your local D.A when its OVCL join 50 and Texas ~ou16uomPublications among others. l k c delivery and same clajvshipl)ing TCDLA Members on a~ o~xie~s Call 210.225.1107 at the United States Supreme Courl October 1 5th, Bookstore 11 07 Sari Patlro Ave., San Antooio, T v n s 7821 1 Tclephone:210.225.1107 Fax:210. 1478 2001 for a group Induction. Go to w.supremecourts.gov. for an application. Send applications to TCDLA. For information call (5121478.251 4 W R I L 2.001 I m - T C D U . C O M I VOICE F O R THE DEFENSE 1 11 I I r CCDLA MEMBERS NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT MEMBER New Arrival! to Greg G Mollee Westfall. NEWS Congratulations Westfall lbt", 250 Gregory Bennett arrived on Februaly at He weighed 71bs 5 ozs. Baby & Mom are doing fine. p.m. LCOMES NEW Jack b McGowen Yon know about o w training programs. You h~o\\rabout the Voicefor the Defeilse. You !mow about our legislative efforts. But, do yon know about the group rates for long distance, credit card processing, and malpractice u ~ s u m c e ?Accordi~~g to our recent su~ve):less than 11df of the lnen~berswho responded lu~omabout these perks. Because it is one of our goals to provide tangible mernberslup benefits, we are now actively seeking new opporhlnities for group discounts. As new relationships are established with widors, we will update a "Membership Perks" sectiori in the laice and at TCDJA~OIII.As it curre~itlystands, the following ve~~dors have made discount offers to TCDLA mcmbers. LegalEdge Case Management Software is offering a group rate to our mernbe~sbased upon the ~iutuberof people purcl~asulg.The company will also personalize the system to hslude the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other biograph~cd itlformatio~lof every Judge, Court and investigating agency in tlie State of Texas for the database. Cnll Sem Kendorshi 610-975-5888 s 214. I Loislaw is offeri~~g a 10% discount to our members. Cull Ciid]~IVillinnrs nt 1-877-471-5634.~ 2470. R & R Bookstore in sat1 htonio is offering a "match or beat" the lowest price OII alllegal materials. It will not cliarge for shipping and has EVERY legal publication imaginable. C d Robot Do~iflldsorrn t 210-225-1107. - Bestline long distance se~viceis offering a fiat 8t per ilklute for iatra and interstate callitig to our members. There is no n~ontlllyfee, no time restrictions, and the bill is cdculated by the 6 second inte~~als. Cdl Srisie Pnge a/ 1-800-365-0038. HLLS IT'S BENEFerS MIinsurance company olfers low rates for our members on ~nalpracticeins~nra~~cc. Cnll Bnrbfirn IVbidderi nt 361-576-2186. Brennes-Jones Group offers 0111. members the ability to accept credit card palments at wl~olesalecredit card processing mtes tliro~~gl~ tlie TCDIA Bankcard Program. C d A ~ tRogers i NI1-800-970-2592~1016. HAS High Speed Access is offering our 111embersfree installation, bee equipment, no deposit, hee 100 MB of web hosting, and the first month of service free for DSL internet co~mections.CnllBimh~uEspimo n/ 1-877-743-4776. DELL.COM is offering TCDIA referral fees for Dell hardware purcl~asedonline through the TCDLA website. Go to TCDU.com for the Dell link. Subscription Services Inc. is offering 111)to a 50% discount off the cover price of ~learlyevery magwine printed for our inembers. CdilImif'w fit I-800-289.624% Please call, write or e m d Kellie Bailey at kbailev@tcdla.comwith any illput. To join see membership application on page 2 1 BEING A MEMBEROF I The important Fair Defense Act (SB 7 & HB 1745) was heud in both the House and Senate committees. Other than Representative Terry Keel, the bill met little opposition from legislators on the committees, and no one testified or signed up the bill. HoweIzer,judges from across the state (pauficularly from . against . Harris Counly) are eitl~erloke-wamm or vigorously hostile to i ~ bill. e Bill Beardall of the Fair Defense Project, Professor Bob Dawson, and Allen Van Fleet gave ooutstmding presentations to legislators s b o ~ ~ t the necessity for (and details 09 the biWs regulation of and help for court-appointed attorneys. Key feah~resof the bill include an Indigent Defense Comcil, state funding for procetluresfor appointment that are fair, neutral and objectively-based, as weU as standards for appointment. The current battleground concerns who approves paplent (judge or auditor), the rate of pay, how disputes about pay 114l be resolwd, and how those on b.aA should be treated. "Plea mills," "lan~ersfor the day," and other similar prnctices appear to be eodangeted- by TCDIA, \T1e intend for there to be zealous advocacy for the poor person accused of a crime. We dso intend for the conmnutted lawyer to have the resources from which to tmlyh~ffill her role in this lopsided ad~re~sa~y system. We intend to make the system as we currently know it to he fair. This endeavor is s difficult as you might in~agine,b111 we are doing our best, md at the moment of this writing, succeetlu~g. The DNA bill is in the Senate, after having been amended with four fawari~blean~endnlentsin the House. SR 89 and HH 6, the ugly DWI bills are well on their way to h e c o n ~ ~Ian: g George Scliarmen courageously got in the way Under these bills, a person con~niitsan o f h e (class C) if the person knowingly possesses an open container in s passenger area of n motor vehicle that is located on a public hi hway, regaldless of wl~etberthe vehicle is being operated or is stopped or parked. Those who get a 2" fi D\VI nithi~l5 years get their license suspended for a year (no occnpationd license). Tews' enthusiasm for these bills can be gleaned from the bills themselves, w11ich state: c4m"oL CORNER I Capitol Corner Cuntittrred 1 I 1 I alcoholic heuernge in thepnssengerarea of any a p b k high~uayor the motor mhiclel~~atedon right-of-way of a public highway, is repenled w has m i r e 4 (2) a UnNsdStataconrtofappeah or the United State8 Supreme Coart has entered apnal order holding that 23 U S 6 Section 154, or afederal r?gulation iinplemzting that section, is unconstitnfionalor otherwise inualid, in whok or in @I?; or (3) a subsequent@ enacted act of congress has the effect of abrogatirg the sanctions required by 23 U.S.C. Section 154. Dear BoardNemhers &%a# Thank you for the scholarsllip to anend tbe DWI 2001 Trial Notebook Seminar in Austin. 1 cef!ainly tea you !hat as a new lawyer, and in partic~dar,a new l a w y practicing criminal defense, I found the seniinx invaluable. I am just starting to get my h t few DWI mses, and now at least I have some idea wbat to teU and ask my clients, wbat to do about the ALR hear, and what to look for in the offense report. 111addition,1 have been given tools, ideas and guidelinesfor trial. Also, HB 63 flew out of comnlittee; it enpowers police to yank tbe license from the dri~~er upon arrest for DWI. It was sponsored and enthusiastically championed by Rep. Steve Wolens of Dallas. Tl~eTCDU has been, and continues to be a tremendous resource for me; Ilook fonmd to the day when I can return the favor with my financialsupport Iu the meanrime, you have my professionaland personal conimitment. Again, thank you. And the census figures are in. This is a redistrictingsession, Attention spans are di~i~inisbing rapidly, and wl~ilethe session is not officiallyover until May, much proposed legislation is already falling by the wayside. Sincere& ~ o U E. y Odom Attorney At la\r Psvcholonicd Evaluations BASSETT JOINS FIRM Minton, Bu~lon,Foster & Collins is pleased to mlounce hat h l l u e l F. Bassett has joined ihe firm. Sam is b o d certiJied in crinmnl law aid IS presently the chairn~anof tl~e Crimind h w Section of tbe Travis Cou~lty Bar Assocmation. Sam has pmcticed criniinal law (fede~dand M e ) as weU as family law since 1988. He is an active menlbcr of the Texas Criminal DeIense lawyers' Association, the National Criminal Defense Imps' Association, tlie Vfliamson County Bar Association, tbe Tnvis County Bar Association (criminal K family law sectio~~s) and the Robert Cdvert Chapter of tbe An~erica~~ h l s of Court. %n,lais a g~xduateof the U~uversityof Texas (B.B-4 whonors - 1985;J.D. - 1988). A STRONGER BOND Doug Tinker, Cbarter member of TCDLA, and his son, Andy S I I I W C ~ three roaring storms, one with 65 n~pbwinds and 30 foot seas, in their 40 foot sadboat. Tlle last storm nwly capsifed hem repeatedly and numbed them with h)~othcrnua.Tl~cboat's boon1 broke and tbe main sail ripped. Then their tmismission gave out. The boat lay dead, tossed by 30 foot swells Andy had bis hluncss on ttying to tie a line hom a ~1%form boat to tbe sailboat. He slammed into h e boat agdn and agdn, getting ducked about every second wave. The ordeal helped forge a strong bond behvcen fatber and so11 Doug Tinker, 66, represented Yolanda Saldivar, who wm convicted of kilhg Tepmo stxr Selena. Video &Audio Critiques OffeuderTopology Determination False AUegatio~~s Seve~ityoff Offense Jury Science Parental Alienation Assessment AlcohoVDmg Assessme~lts Child Suggestibility Adoptiot~Home Studies AddictiotvDependencece Determination Assessments if Suitability for Community Supervisiou Refereme Appoint~ne~~ts Accepted David 0. Navarre, LMS\V-ACP, DABPE Navarre & Associates - .. 313 E. Ruudberg Lme, Suite 103, AIIS~~II, Texas 78753 Telephone: (512) 836-4567 APRIL 2001 ( \N\HW.TCDLA.COM I VOlCI .OR THE DEFENSE 1 16 1 On Eebrua~y20,2001, the Supren~eCourt held that a poIice officer's refusal to allow a defendant to enter Ids own residence --unless accompanied by a police officer -- until a search uarrant was obtained uBas a "reasonable sein~re"that did not violate the 6ouih hiendment. lllinois v hlcArthur, -U.S. -, ZOO1 WI. 137449 (U.S.). The case began when Tern i\l&d~ur asked two police officers to go with her to the tniler where slie resided with her husband, Charles, so that they could keep the peace while she went inside OI retrieve her belo~igings. The two officers went to the t d e r hut rmnajned outside uhile Ten went in. When Tera came out, she told the officersthat they sl~ouldcheck the t~ailerbecanse "Chuck had the coach." One dope m the^." She went on to say tha~she had seen Chuck "sIid[el some dope umde~tiea~I~ of the office~s writ to the door, told Mcl\l.thnrwhat his wife had said and requested permission to search the tmiler. When hlcArthur refused to co~~sent to such a searcli, the other officer left w~thTe~ato obtain a searcli wamnt. hlckthur, who was by theti on the front porch, was instn~ctedthat he could not reenter his trailer unless a police officer accompanied him. On two or three occasions, MCAIZ~II~ did go inside tlie h d e r to get cigarettes and to make phone calls. Each time, an officer stood just inside the door to obse~vewhat he did. After about two houts, the officerurliohad obtained the wanant returned to the tmiler and, along with other officers, searched it. Under the soh, they found a marijuana pipe, a box for marijoana, and less than 2.5 grams of ma~~junna 41KR. "Br~ck"Files, Jt: FEDERAL CORNER in the trid comt, i\fchtlmr filed s motion to suppress tl~eevidence seized by tlie officers His motion uras granted ant1 the Appellate Com of llllnois affir~nedthe trial comt's o r d e ~The lllinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for l w e to appeal The Supreme Court granted ce~tiomito determine whether the b'ooulth Amendment prohibits tlus kitid of tempomy semre It was absol~~tcly no st~yriseto see that the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lllinois Appellate Co111t The exceqts fiom tlle opinion reflect the logic of the court's decision: In tl~ecirc.cunis@ncesof the case before us, we cannot say that the warmtless seizure was per se unreasonable. It iwol\~esa plausible claim of specially pressug or urgent law enforccn~ent need, i.e., 'exigent circunistances ' Moreover, the resh%int at issue w s tailored to that need, bclng huted in time and scope, cf. Teny Y. Ohio, sup*, at 29-30, 88S.Ct. 1868, andavoidiugsignificantintrusion into the home itself, cf. Paytan v Nm York, 445 U.S 573, 585, 100 S.Ct 1371, 63 L.l?d.Zd 639 (1980). Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of uereasonableness, urebalance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concellis to determine if the int~wionwas reasonable. We conch~dethat the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawF111,in light of the foUowi~~g circumstances, wluc11ure consider in combi~lation.Fust, the police had probable cause to believe that hlckthur's hxiler home contahed evidence of a crinie and conttxband, namely, unlawful dn~gs.The police had had an opporh~nilyto spmk with Tera McArthur aud make at l a s t a ve~yro~ighassessn~entof her reliabiliiy They knev she had had a Brstl~and oppoaunity to observe her husband's behavior, in particlilar with respect to the dmgs at issue. And they thought, with good reason, that her repoll to them reflected that opporhlnir)! [Note: This is the wakest paragraph ~ I the I opinion. It ignores the obvious: Tern obviously had both a motive and the oppoF tunity to "plant" the marijuana and the pa~qd~ernalia -- and the o f k e n could not have known whether sllc did that or not.] Second, tl~epolice had good r m o n to fear that, unless restrained, McAlIlmr would destroy the drugs before they could return with awvarraut. Tlley reasonably could have concluded that hlcA~tIm~ co~lsequentlysuspecting an i~uminentsearch, would, if gjven the chance, get rid of the dugs f s t . T l ~ dthe , police nlade reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enfo~wmentneeds wit11the d e ~ e u ~of d sperson4 privacy. They neither searched the trailer nor arrested h l k t h u r before obtaiuing a warrant. Ralllei; they i~uposeda sig~lificmtlyless restrictive resf12i11, pre. veuting h1kll1ur ouly fro111 entering the trailer unaccompanied. They left Itis home and his belongings intact -- tir~tila n e n t d Magistrxte, fi~dingprobable cause, isswd a warrant. Fourth, tl~epolice iniposcd the restmint for a limited period of time, naniely, h\,o hou~s.Cf. Ter~yv. Ohio, supra, at 28,88 S.Ct. 1868 (~uannerinwhich police act is 'Vital pad of ... inquiry'). As far as the record reveals, this time period was no longer than reasonably necesmy for the police, a c h g %withdiligence, to obtain the wauxnt. ... In various other circonistances, this Court has upheld tenlpomy rest~vhtswhere needed to p r c s e ~ eeviclcnce until police co111d obtain a waumt. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 US., at 706, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (reasonable suspicion justitlcs brief detention of lugggagependiug h~rtheri~vesligation);Uuited States Van Leeuwen, supw, at 253,90 S.Ct. 1029 (reasonable suspicio~lj~lstiEesdetaining package deliwed for n~ailing).Cf. Richards r! Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (no need to ' h ~ o c k and announce' when execiiting a search chw~xntwhere officers reasonably suspect that endence might be destroyed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153,45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless search of auton~obilecoustitutiondy pernussible). I AN UNHAPPY WIFE CAN PREC4PllXlE AN EXIGENT QRCUMSCANCE We hme found no case in wvhicl~this Comt has held unlawful a tempomy seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent tile loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a wvamt in a reasonable period of time. The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the police could not order McAhur to stay omide his lmne becauseM&~h~~Psporch, where he stood at the time, v 'amounted to a constructive eviction' of McArthur was part of his home; Ilene the order from his residence. Tlus Court 11asheld, howe er, that a petson standingin the doonvay of a house is 'in a 'public' place,' and hence subject to arrest without a m r a n t pernutting ently of the home. United States v. SanMna, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Q. 2406, 49 LEd 2d 300 (1976). Regardless, w e do not believe the differenceto which the Appellate Court pob~ts --parch versus, e.g., front \vaIk-- co~ddn~akea sigmficant differencehere as to the rmson;lbleness of the police restmint; and tlrt, konr ihe Fourth Anla~dment'sperspective, is what mattels. The Appellate Court also found i~egativelysignifiunt the fact that Chief Love, consent, stepped inside the trailer's donmay to obsewe hlcllrhur when with McArtl~~~r's hluhthur reentered the t~xileron two or 1111~occt~doiions.304 IApp.3d, at 402-403, 238 IILDec 847, 713 N.E 26, at 98.McArthur, I~owever,reeutercd simply for Ms own conuenia~ce,to make phme calls and to obtah~cigwettes. Under these circumstmces, the reaso~~ahleaess of the greater restriction (pr&nting rcmhy) implies the r a m ablencss of tlle lesser (pemitting reently conditioned on obseivation). In sum, the police omcers in this case had probable cause to beheve t11a a hon~econtained contraband, wluch was evidence of a crime. They raonnhly believed that the hrrme's resitlent, if left free of any rest~xint,would desttoy that evidence, And they imposed a restraint Ilkat wa.s both limited and tailoied reasonably to secue law enforcement needs while protecthg privncy interests. 111our vim; the restraint met the Fourth Amendment's demauis. I suypose Illat the lcssm from this case is that a doper in an 111d1ilppynlatriage sho~tldlave Ids wife's belongings OII t11c front porch. He might \\ri~~d up with a problen~in a family law court -- but that beats being the defendant 111a cdminal case. I -- GEORGE ROLAND MEMORIAL SCHOUR!SHIP The CoUin County Criminal Defenselawyer's Asoc~ationmd the Roland fanrily have establisl~eda sd~olnrshinto award to a Collin Countv .$2.000 , , Hie11School senior with asdrations of a caseer in law. CCCDLA would gladly accept any donations from TCDUmembers in ntemory of George Roland. Donations should be made to the "George Roland Memorial Scl~olarsllip"and n d e d to Ms Darlina Cmwder, Treasurer, CCCDLA, 1415 Harroun Street, McRinney, Texas 75069. - SELLING CRACK ON A PALM PILOT A new dmg-rclaled compute1 @me isDope Wars for the Palm. The game allows the player to become an urban drug deales buying and selling a wide array of narcotics Law enfoscement officials say it glamorizes violence and the drug tnde. Since it was released in February 1999, more tl~an180,000 people have down-loaded it far free from www.donewars.db.net - MCKINNEY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE GOES WORLDWIDE The Justice Court in Precinct One now has a web site at www.tehasiudee.com Exanunhg trials and bond reductions can be fled by dowdoadiug a forn~and faxing if to the office. Attorneys can a h send email messages to the Cl~lefClerk And the clwk can send court dates, codrmatlo~~s, and delays backto the attorneys by email. FATHERS SHAKE BABIES M O S T An eight yw study on Shake11Baby S ~ d m mfomd e tllwt fathers aremosl oftcn the perpelntors (35%), followed by the mother's bovfrieud (15%). In 35% of the mes, the pelpetlator was never found. For more ~nfor~nation, see wwwshakeubabvcom JUDGES CANNOT ETHICALLY SERVE ON JUDICIAL COUNCIL O F VICTIM'S RIGHTS COUNCIL Etllics Opiniou 270 (2001), issued by lhe Committee on JudicialEthics, states tbat it is a violallon of tbe Judicial Cannus of Etlucs for a judge to serve on a couucil whose missiou is to prwvide a professional, comp;lssionate a d coordinated approach to the t~eahnentof sehually abused childre11and their fanlilies and to serve as ; u ~advocate for all such children in the communiW. The p~acficewas questioned d c r jurors were solicited for donatious by a judge for such a com~cil. UNUSUAL PHOTOCOPIES A man was clmrged with dtsturbing the peace dter be allegedly pulled down his pants in tile first floor lobby of a busy courtl~ooseand photocopied his buttocks. He made two copies and w w working on the tllird w&u the police officers arrested h n . HIS attorney is still working on the theoly of tlw defel~se. PUBLICATIONS SALE TCDLA Sfate Forms and "Search Easy" Diskeffes O "Search Easy" State Forms in Wordperfect O r Microsoft Word 0 Triol Notebook Tabs [set of 15 tabs) TCDLA Members NON-Members VIDEOS 0 Ethics - 2.0 CLE Credit A Primer for Criminal Defense Trial Practice (CDLP) (set of 7 Videos) TAPES O 0 0 O DWI 2001 TRIAL NOTEBOOK, Jonuary 2001 Federal Law Short Course, September 2000 Rusv Duncan, June 2000 Racehorse Haynes [Rusty Duncan - Keynote Speaker) TCDLA PUBLICATIONS 0 DWI 2001 TRIAL NOTEBOOK, January 2001 U Federal Law Short Course, September 2000 0 Rusty Duncan June 2000 0 C a ~ i t aMurder l Trials. March 2000 - - - - MAGAZINE 0 Voice for ihe Defense I yr. Nonmember subscription 1 yr. State Prisoner Rate CDLP PUBLICATIONS U Occupational License Manual, November 2000 U The Essential Trial Notebook. October 2000 O Step By Step GuideTo ~ e ~ r e s e &lndigenthents g In Criminal Molters, 2000 0 2000 Death Penalty Low & Practice in Texas (by Steven Losch) Members U South Padre - CDLP Hits the Beach., lulv , 2000 U El Paso Skills Course, M a y 2000 C! Wichita Falls Skills Course, January 2000 U 1999 Capital Murder Manual (by Steven Loschj 0 CDLP Hits The Beach, July 1999 0 Practice Tips From the Plains, January 1999 O 1998 Capital Murder Manual [by Steven Losch] 0 Forensics and Habeas Skills Course, 1997 *Sales Tax and Shipping cost need to be added 1 ADDRESS: CITY, STATE, ZIP Sub Total PHONE: Shipping $7.50 CARD #: exp. Date Sales Tax (add 8.25%) Name on Cord: Total Authorized Signature 120)VOlw FOR THE DECENSf I W.TC0LP.COM I APRIL PO01 cl New Member Application U Renewal Are you also a member of the NACDL? UYes U N o State whether a certificate is desired D y e s Uno u Mr. 0 Ms. Name Law Firm Mailing Address State- City Zip Telephone Fax Email County Bar Card Number Bar Card Date TCDLA M E M B E R S H I P BENEFITS Month Year Date of Birth V O I C E forthe Defense Your membership includes a l0.issue subscription to TCDLA's oflicial journal. It is packed with detailed articles and motions, written by and for defense lawyers. EDUCATION Receive timely updates about developments in Texas criminal law, through the Significant Decisions Report, our web site, list sewice, and at TCDLA seminars. DISCOUNT P R O G R A M S Only ourmembers receive discounts on seminars and publications. STRIKE FORCE Whenever zealous advocacy results in threats of contempt against you, the best criminal defense attorneys in the state will come to your defense. MOTIONS DISK Your membership included a motions disk containing 50 commonly needed motion to make your practice easier. DIRECTORY When you become a member, you will be included in the annual membership directory, a valuable resource to locate defense lawyers throughout the state. Signature Date Amount Enclosed $ J O I N OVER 2,000 TEXAS DEFENDERS N O W ! TCDLA NEEDS YOU! Add your name to the TCDLArolls to support its programs as it educates the legislature, public and criminal defense bar! GET INVOLVED! We need your help to suppottihe only voice for the defense in Texas on key constitut~onaland criminal justice policy questions. Contribute to a committee such as the Amicus Curiae Committee and let us know who you know in the legislature. ELIGIBILITY: A member in good standing of the State Bar of Texas (student and affiliate applicants excepted) who is engaged in the defense of criminal cases is eligible for membership upon approval of application and receipt of annual membership dues. An application must be endorsed by a member in good standing. Members of the judiciary (except honorary members) and those regularly employed in a prosecutorial office are not eligible. U Am Ex U Visa UMastercard Expiration Date Card # Name on Card Authorized Signature NOMINATING ENDORSEMENT As a current member of TCDLA, I believe this applicantto be a person of professional competency, integrity, and good moral character. The applicant is licensed to practice law in Texas and is engaged in the defense of criminal cases, unless a student or an affiliate applicant. Signature of Member Member's Name NO. 33795 STATE OF TEXAS IN THB D I m m COURT OP VS. FORT BEND C o r n , DAVID HOYT TUCKER 240TH DISTRICT COURT DEBENDANT'S MOTiON TO EXCLUDE USE OF PREJUDICIALTERMS TO THE HONORABIBJUDGE OF SAID GOURI! Defendantstands charged by indictment with the crime of aggrnmted sexual assault, which crime is alleged to have occurred inore d~anten years ago. The compL?inant is Defendant's sixtecn-year-old daughter who didnot make Ihe allegation againstDefendantunlil &rDefendantbs daughter had been subjected to h o s t a year of "camseling",together with the administration of psychotropicmedications. There is no evidence in the contempomneoos n~edicalrecords relating to tlus child which would corrobo~teher allegation of having been raped when she was 4 or 5 yeas old. Defendant therefore moves that the prosecution be prohibited from the use of prejudicial terms at terms include the use of the word trial, du~fngjury selection, or in the presence of uritnesses. These prej~~diclnl "victWin refa~ingto the witness agdnst whom the cmne of criminal sexual conduct was allegedly committed The purpose of this motio~~ is to prevent the prosecution front ignoring its duty to prove beyond a r a sonable doubt that the cmne of criminal sexual cond~ictUI the h t degree was actuaEy conin~ittedand that Defendant corm~littedthe crime as cliafged. The purpose of this n~otiouis also to prevent the pprsecutinn from interjecting the prosecutor's pe~wnalopinion that a crime has in fact occ~ured,or that the uifnessactually suffered an attack as alleged in h e indictment. In support of this n~otion,Defendant relies upon the wgunlent set forth UI the mem0mIdu~accqmpanylng this motion. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Due process requires nkrimd injection of enor or prejudice into these proceedings. Use of terms such as "victim" allows the focus to shjft to the accused rather than remain on the proof of evely element of the crime alleged by the conipldnant. As a tlireshold inquiry, the prosecution nlnst first offer aiough evidence for a courtto conclude that arational trier offactcould find that the essen&d ele~nentsof the crinie have been established In re Wiuslup, 397 US. 358 (1970); Jackson v. Virgiaia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed 2d 560 (1979); Iepert v. Shte, 908 S.X!2d 217,219 (Tex. Crin~.App. 1995) (en banc); Short v. State, 874 S.W.2d 666, ~ 1994) (en banc); Article 38.03, Tex. Code Crm Proc.. 667 (Tex. C I App. The suficient evidence requirement is a pad of e w y criminal defendant's due process rights. It is an attenlpt to give "concrete substance" to those rigl~ts,by precluding inxtiod ju~yverdicts. Jackson, 443 US. at 315,19 S.Ct at 2786. As the Jackson cou11 explained: "The [In re Winship, 397 US.358 (1970)l doctrine [requiiingproof of guilt bepnd a r a sonable doubt] requires niorc than simply a tiial ~itual.A doctrine esrablishingso fundamental a subshntive constitutional sfandwdnmust also require that the factfinder d lmtionally apply that standard to the facts in evidence. A 'reasonable doubt' at a minimum, is one based upon 'reason.' Yet a properk insh'ncted july may occasionally convict even a l of fact could find guilt beyond areasonable doubt. when it can be saidthat oo n t i o ~ ~trier 443 US. at 316-317, 99 S.Ct. at 2788. Defendant is presumed to beinnocent of the chaqes @nst hiru Bluev State, -S . W M , 2000 WL 1827705 @ex. Cdm. App. 2000) 'The presumption of innocence, althot~ghnot actindated in the Constitution, is a basic conlponent of a fnir trial under our s)steni of uin&al justice!' Fstelle v. Willim, 425 US. 501,503 (1970. Working &omthe premise k 7 t an accwed is innocent until proven guilv, it is the prosecution's burdm to prove beyoi~daimanahle doubt the essential elementsof the clime alleged. Thispresun~ptmncontimues thoughout the hid and h~todelibcmtions. Defendmt denies illat crinlinal sexual conduct occurred in this case. The burden of the prosecution should not be allc\iated, nuoimi~edor diminished by the use of loaded wonls w11icl1imply that the prosecution l ~ a met s its burden of proof illat the crime alleged lm actually been conmutted. The use of the word victim by the prosecutiol~is an altempt by the prosecution to imply, fro111the outset of the case in eoir dire, and tl~rougl~out the trial, that the State l ~ a met s its burden of proof that the alleged cri~ne11% in fact heen con~n~itted. Respectfully sublritted, L.T. BRADT, PC. L.T. "Butch" Bradt #02841600 6303 Feldspar IIouston, Texas 77092-4716 (713) 681-2696 Pas: (713) 688-8212 Attorney for Defendant, David Ho)t Tucker CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the uodevsigned attorney, certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing w w l~and-delivered/ faxed / oldled, proper postage &xed wrapper addressed to: J o h Healey Fort Bend County District Attorney 309 South 4th Streel, 2nd Floor Richn~ond,Texas 77469 ~ I Ia on this 19th day of Febsoa~):2001 L.T. Bmdt NO. 33597 STATE OF T W N THE DISTRICT COURT OP VS. FORT BEAT7 COUN'IY, TEAS DAVID HOlT TUCKER 240TH DISTRICT COURT ORDER ON DBWNDANT'S MOTION M EXCLUDE USE OF PREJUDICIAL TERMS Defendant, Dayid Hoyt lhcker's Motion to Exclude Use of Prejudicial Tern~shaving been presented to the Court, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion SHOULD be g ~ ~ n t e dIt.is, therefore, its District Attorney and thraugl~its Dishict Attorney, all witnesses c d e d on behalf of the State, shall be ORDERED that t l ~ cState of Texas, tl~rougl~ prohibited Iron1 the use of prejudicial term at trial, du~ingju~yselection, or in the presence of witnesses, including, lg,'ithout Iinlitation, the use of the word "victim" in referring to t l ~ cwitness against U ~ O I I Ithe crin~eof crin~inalsexllal co~~duct was allegedly committed. day of Febma~y,2001. SIGNED illis EARN 2.0 HOURS OF CLE CREDIT WITHOUT LEAVING YOUR OFFICE CHAIR Tuesday, June 28th, 2001 4:OO-6:OOpm 0 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE Speakers: Keith Hampton, Allen Place Seminar Number: TCD5890-0 Need a scholarship? Have questions about content? Call Randy at 512/478-2514. Have a technical concern8 Call KRM, our service provider at 800-775-7654. THREE WAYS TO REGISTER OR ORDER: ALL REGISTRATIONS/ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID. Payment must be made in U.S. dollars. ad to: KRM Information Services, Inc. P.O. Box 1187 Eau Claire, WI 54702-1187 Make check payable to: KRM (2 Fax:' With credit card information to KRM at 800-676-0734 (3) Call: KRM's customer service line with your credit card info: Call 800-775-7654 Can't Attend? 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You must be licensed less than 5 yeass or have less than 5 felot~yjuly trials. Name: Address: County: Telephone #: e-mail: NAME: American Express ADDRESS: a VISA $10.00 for 3 sets /$5 for one set CITY, STATE, ZIP Total Qty PHONE: Sub Total E-MAIL CARD #: Master Card Shipping $1.50 Per Set Sales Tax (add 8.25%) exp. Date Total Nome on Card: Authorized Signature Materials will be moiled h t class vnlers otherwise specified; overnight charger exfra. CDLP, 600 West 13th Street, Ausiin, Texas 78701 512/478-2514 F m 51 2/469-9107 I THERULE:( A HlsToRlcAL PERSPECTIVE B y : J o h n W. S t i c k e l s John K Stlckels attended ~ e w s Tech L m s Schoolgrfldrr~~ted with inrn degree iin 1983. PhD e.~pectedfiomthe LBJSchool of iJrrDlicA~iirs in ~Iiq~ 2002. Por111er143rdDislrictAttor11~~'. Formr 1PflrdCorr11!1, Attor~~ejz. Bierrrber TDCU. Professor in the CrirrrirrnlJ~rstice Depwtn~errtflt Sofrt1111:esl T e . w Stflte Urriu. Bonrd Certified in C r i r ~ ~ i n f l l ~ r ~ ~ ~ . 7Wds"I'olrrnre32, Book lir:o - Te.m Tech LNIU Keuietfl. Actic,e!l,e~rgflgedirr the prflctice of o i ~ ~ ~ id&rse r r d lflru One of the first tl~ings111:slaw sh~dents\vho participate in hlock Trial learu to do is invoke "The Rule" at the start oE a trial. As \sve all knoq '"he Rule" is the requirement that witnesses IIIIN be excluded from the court~ O O I I ISO they camot hear the testinmy of o t l w witnesses so the vitness's testimosy wiU mt be influenced by h e testi~nonyof o t l w witnesses. IIITexas, the authorit). for "The Rule" is Rule 614 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. \Ve dl !u~o\v\\.l1:11 "Tl~eRule" is and h o v lo invoke it. But, sometimes we forget its true purpose and ho\v we c:le effectively use it at trial. One of tile best exal~~ples of the effectiveuse of "The Rule" is Io~indin "The Histo17 of Susan~~a" located in the i \ p o c ~ ~ ~Sosatma, l ~ a . ~ written by the Propl~et Ih~uel,is one of the ~ ~ ~artistic o s t and lbeautifully rvritte~~ short stories in the \vorld. This sto17is based on the age old tl~elneof the lriumph of good over erril,firludes the narrow escape f r o e ~death of an i n t ~ o c e victim, ~ ~ t explains how ',The Rule" came into being, and I~o\vseparating witnesses swed the life of an iunocent young \ \ z ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ . This is the st017 of S I I S ~ I Iaccording III to Daniel: Am1 he Uonkiml took a wife I I ~ I I Susm~na, I ~ ~ the daughter of llilkiah, a very bcautihd woman a ~ olle d w11u feared the 1.ord. Her parents \ w e righteous, and l~atl taugilt their daughter :scordiog to the law of hloses. ]oakim TW re17 rich, and 11ad a sp:sions gardell adjoining his Louse; and the Je\\s ilsed to come to hiin because he nas the most honored of t1le111dl. III that ye:a hvo elders irorn the people were appointed as judges. C o ~ ~ c e n ~ itnl ~g e nthe ~ Lord 11ad said "Iniqoity came forth from Babylon, from elders w l ~ owere judges, wllo were supposctl to govern the people." Tllese I I I ~ I Iwere freq~~ently at Joakinl's house, and :dl nrho lutl suits at law came to then^. \\'l~en the people departed at noot~,Susmoa \vookl go into her 1111sband'sgarden to ~valk. The hvo eltlers used to see her every d a going ~ i s a d wtlking about, and t l q begau to desire hel: h d they pcnrrtetl their minds and tun~etlaway their eyes ~ O I I looking I to Heaven or ren~emberil~g rigl~teousj~dgments.Both were o \ * e ~ w l ~ e hwit11 ~ ~ e passion d for her, but they did not tell each other of tl~eirdistress, for they were xsllamed to disclose tlleir lustful d e s k to possess llec And they watched eager1~day after day, to see l~el: They said to each othel; "Let us go Lome, for it is n~ealtime." And when they rne~~t out, they p m e d from each other. But turning back, they met again; and \\hen each pressed the other for the renson, they co~~fessetl their lust. And the11 together they arranged for a time when they could find her alone. Once, wide they were wtclung for an opportune da): she nent in as hefore nit11 only hvo nlaids, and wisl~edto t h e ~ I the I garden, for i t m s ve17hot. h d no one \\'as there except the two elden, \v110 had hid themselves and were ~vatchingher. She said to her maids, "Bring me oil and ointmeats, and sl~utthe garden doors so Illat 1 may bathe." They did as she said, slut the garden doors, and nrnt o ~ byt the sitle doors to bri11g ~v11at they 11ad been commanded; and tl~eydid not see the elders, because they were hidden. \\'hen the e:lids l ~ a dgone out, t l ~ chvo elders rose a ~ rau d to her, and said: "Look, the gartiell tloors are shut, no one sees us, and \ve are iin love \vith )nu; so give your consent, and lie with us. If yo11 refuse, wc will testify against yo11 ll~ata ~ O I I IIII ~I ~ Iwas I with you, and this \\as why you sell1 y011r lnaitls a\\a)!" Susanna siglled deeply, and said, "I at11 11etl11nedit1 on e v q side. For if l (lo tlus thing, it is dm11 for me; and if I do not, 1 sl~all11ot escape your 11nnds. I cl~oosenot to do it and to [all into your hands, ratl~ertl1a11 to sin ill h e sight of the Lord." T11et1 S r ~ s a ~ cried ~ n a out with s loud voice, and the h\.o cltlers shouted against her. Anti one of them ran and opened the gardell doors. \\'Ilea the I~ouseholdsetwnts I m r d tile shouting in the garden, they mshed in at the sitle door to see what 11ad happened to l m h i ml~ellthe elders told their tale, the s e l w t s were greatly asl~amed,for l~otl~ing like flus had ever heen said about Susatma. The itch1 (la): when the people gathered at the lluuse of her lh~~sband Joakim, the hvo elders came, fi~U of tlleir wicked plot to h:we Snsanna pot to death They said before the people, "Send for Sr~sanoa,the d ; o ~ & t r of Ililkiah, who is the wife of Joaki~ll." So t l ~ sent y for her. i h d she came, with 11er parents, lher cl~iltlren,and ;lU lher kindred. U.S.' SUPREME COURT PREWhTlNG DEPBNDAiW FROM BhTElUh'G HIS H O W WHILE COPS GOT SEARCH WARMKT WAS NOT hTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION: IIhWOIS v. McMZHZR,No. 99-1132, Celt. to Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District (304 111. App. 3d 395, 713 N. E. 2d 93), Reversed &Remanded, 2120101;Opinion: Breyer; Dissent: Stwens Bemuse cops had probable muse to believe that MeArthur had marijuana hidden in his home (his wife told them that he "had dope UI there"), they prevented hfrom entering unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours wide they got a search warlint. Inside they found d n ~ gparaphernalia and marijuana Oess than 2.5 gas, a Class "C3).McArthur was arrested and charged wit11 misdemeanor possession of those items. He moved to suppress on gronnd the evidence was the "hit" of an unlawful police seizure, naiuely, tbe refusal to let him reenter his home unacconlpanied. State trial couf agreed ;u~dgranted the motion, aud the state appellate c o ~ ~ r t afEnued. DECISIONS REPORT SDR for April 2001 Held: Given the natnre of the intrusion add the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizore of the premises was permissihle under the Powtb Amendment. 4(11 Amendment's centr;ll requirement is one of reasonableness. Altho~igh,h the ordina~ycase, persoltll propeft).seizures are unreasonable unless by warrant, there are exceptions to this rule im~olvingspecial law enforcement needs, dimimshed expectations of privzcy, minimal k~trusions,and the like. The circumstances hen involve a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcenleut need. Moreover, the restmiit at issue was tailored to that need, bekg limited in fine and scope, and avoiding sign~ficmtintrusioi~iuto the home itselt Conscqnenily, nther than employing a per se ivle of unreasooahlcness, Conrt nmst balance the pfivaq-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if tbe intimion here was reasonable. In light of the following circumstances, considered in combination, Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and hence lawful. Pmt, police had probable canse to believe that McArthor's home contained cvideace of a crime and unlawful dnigs. Second, they had good reason to fear hat, unless mtrained, he would destroy the drugs before they could retu~nwit11 a wvarrant. Third, they made reasonable elIorts to reconcile their law enforcement needs wit11 the demands of personal pdvacy by avoidmg a warmtless ently or arrest md preveotiug h1cArthur only kom cnteriug his home unaccompanied. Fou~fh,they imposed tl~erestmint for a lin~ited period, wliicl~w~as no longer thai reasonably necessa~yfor tbem, actingwith diligence, to obtain the warrant Court points out that in no case 11% it ever held unlawfula temporal). seizure that was supported by probable cause and \wm designed to prevent the loss of e\ideuce while police diligently obtained amantnt in a reasonable period. Stevens Dissent: The offense here was a class "G" nusdemea~or,which it~dicatesthat the state of IUi~toisdoesn't con side^ it a nuljor public policy concern. "Becaose the govelnmental interest implicated by the particular criminal prohibition at issue in this case is so slight, Illis IS a poor vehicle for probing the boundaries of tbe governmeut's power to limit an individual's possessory interest in his or her home pendmg the atiival of a searchwarrant," The wit of cert. should be either dismissed as i~nprovidentlygranted, or illinos court's decision grautii~gsuppression motion should be &rmcd. %ARCH: JONBS K UNITED flXilB, No. 99-11235,1/22/01 Officers had infonnatioa that drugs were being sold at a particular apartment. After observing someone kviug the apaaiuent, MIIOadmitted she went there to by drugs, cops went to the apartment to ideutify thcoccupants. As they approached the door, they obsened a handgun resting on a kitchen table. The gun was secured, and one of the occupants was asked whetl~erhe had a felony conviction. After he ad~luttedhe did, he was placed under arrest. hl a motion to suppress, defendant argued ofice~screated the exigent ciscmnstallces by approaching the apartment. Court l~oldsofficers have a right to lu~ockmd talk. They were justitied in doing so becn~rsethey ~vere not certah at the time that occupants wese engaged in cdninal activity Since they had a right to be tl~ere,and the gcm was in plain view the search was propel: As for the questioning, Court 6nds any error was l~aln~less because defendant's crinunal record mould 11avc been disco\,ered anyway NOTICE OF APPEAL: UNITED S T m S I! I W , NO. 00-500609, 01/26/01 This is a unique case, wl~ichdemonstrates why yo11 must be famil~trwith the rules of appellate procedure. Defendant was tried and filed an appliconvicted, and her appeal \\#asai3rmed. She s~~bsequently cation for writ of habeas c o q ~ ~alleging s, in part that her lawyer was ineffective i n not raising cermin clain~s.District court granted that portion of the application, m d allowed her an out of time appeal. She Gled a notice of appeal, and the qoestion is whether it was premature: what must tile district court do ml~enon out of lisle appeal is g~xnted.Court l~oldsthe original judgment and sentence should be reinstated, and notice of appeal is dtre wittin 10 days of the dale tlm is done. Since district court had not done that the appeal was premature, Court also found the notice was not effective to apped the portion of the judgment denying the application for writ of habeas co~pusbecause tile notice of appeal indicated it nrasfrom the j~~tlgrnm and senteace, and not fron~tl~ecourt order on the writ application. lower court decision. The focus is on wl~etherthe decision is reasonable. CONCURRENT SENTBNCES: UNIZELJ S l M B S I! J I c D O W , No. 00-20045, 2/12/01 the11 Defendant wzs contacted by a co~lfidentialinforn~a~~t, agreed to sell her drugs. She walked across the street, and rehnrled with 12 gnnls of crack cocaine which were delivered to undercover officen. She was subsequently convicted for both possessio~lwith intent to distribute crack cocdne, and distribution of crack cocaine. Concurrent sentences were imposed, wl~ichCourt holds was error because the offenses merged. Court also finds it has jurisdiction to consider the claim, c w though no objection was n~atle.There \va additional punishment by way of the mandato~ymessment in the second conviction. TRAFFIC SI'OPS: ONITeO S T m S I! R F W T E , No. 99-60684, 1/17/01 narcotics, Officers suspected the defeedmt was tra~~spo~ling and pulled in to follom kim. While they were belh~dhini, because they noticed defendant looking UI his rear view mirror sererd limes and weaving across the divider line, cops stopped Iiim for c~relessdriviq. Court npholds conslitutioodity of the Mississippi careless driving statute. Court also holds the stop was lawful, s u r e there \asan objective basis for doing so. They note that the case is a close one, since it is possible Illat officers actions caused defendant to commit the traffic offense. Iu a dissent by Judge Stewart, he holds that the State cannot create probable cause by tailgating a motorist, m d that is \\hat he felt happened in this case. GROUPING: UNITED S T m S T! SAtTER, No. 99-40245,2/02/01 INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE - STANDARD OF REVIEW: NEAL I! P U C W , No. 99-60511, 1/18/01 This is a significant case both for \\hit the Cowl holds as to the ineffective assistance claim, as well as the standard of reriew. The claim was tbat counsel was ineffective in fading to dexlop and present nutigating evidence. At trial, the defendant's moth~rtestified about his i~pbringing and difficulties. A psyclliatrist also testified that he was mildly retarded, suffered from an organic bnvio syvhome, ;tnd suffered tiom psycltosexual confi~sion llabeas counsel developed additional evidence concerrurlg defei~d:mt'saphrieging, 1vhic11essentislly est:tblisl~erll ~ mts e an abandoned cllild. They also presented evidence regartling his stay in :I l~omefor set;~rded child re^^ :led a ~ ~ ~ r ninstih~tion, ~ral which included statements from employees \she had beMendet1 the defendwt. Evidence ~ gstay in prison establisl~edhe was systematically presented c o n c m ~ his aimset1 because of lus condition. Comt finds the f d u r e to present this additional evidence was ineffective assistance. Court ernpl~asizedthat most of tile evidence was easily attainable, either tllrough records or phone calls. Ho\rre\,er,that was not sufficieot to cntitle the defendant to relief. Court esanh~esthe recent Supreme Court decision in IVillinn?sos. ql'lor, aud stresses tl~ata Court must do Inlore than find the lows court decision was incorrect. Here Court makes that deternunation but does not find llle decision unreasonable. The lower court relied on other evidence establislung essentially the same facts, and concludetl tl~eadditional evidence would not have changed the outcome. In addressing tl~c standard of revie\\: the Court also atldl~sseswhat deferem should he given to his state court decision which is lacking in reasoning. Disagreeing wit11 the se1mt11circuit, the coclrt finds tlmt is not controlling. The same standard of reriew is applied no matter 11om extensive the Defendant was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy The goideline range for the to possess nith intent to distribute nla~ij~mt~a. v because the h~ndswere the pronloney laundering offenseIRIS increased ceeds of illegal activity Court holds tlint s i ~ ~ tile c e drug trafficking offense was considered a specific offense cl~aracteristicforthe money laundering ch;~rge,they sl~ouldl l a ~ cbeen gro~~ped. Coml also addresses whether a cowiction for tas evasion sho111d ha e been counted separately tiom a comiction forpossessjon with intent to distribute. Court holds the offeases should have been considered ;LF part of a conmon scheme or p1a11 b e c a w defendant would not have had the funds l~adit not been for his drug trntficking activit). INVESTIGATORY STOPS: UNITED STATBS I! GUERR.?RO-BAR4lAS, No. 99-41208 1/19/01 Border patrol agents vere contlucting a rovins border p;drol. They obsewetl the defenda~t'scar pass by t~~veling at a norn~alrate of speed. The car mas riding low in the back and had benvily tinted V ~ I dows \\Vl~enthey h~rnedto follo~r~ them the car slowed down and began to wave from side to side, They the11 made an iwcstigatol)' stop and and a number of illegal aliens as they attempted apprehended defentla~~t to flee. Defendat11 cl~allengedthe search, arguing that otiicers had no probable cause to stop him. Court recognizes Illat since the stop was will~onta \vanant, tile govermilent had the burden of proving it \\,as constitutional. They opl~oldthe stop based on totality of circun~stances,mluch included these factom: (1) it was late at night; (2) near the border; and (3) agents had arrested persons tnnsporting illegal aliens in that area before following stop of low riding vehicles. Judge Dennis dissents, did not support a stop. The niere facl believing tliat the circunista~~ces they were on a road frequenlly used for illegal activity was not sofficient. Also, here was no support for testimony that lawful travel at the tinie and place was infrequent. He fuaher rejected reliance on the fact that the vehicle was riding low As for the vehicle weaving, that could be nothing more tl!an cliecking on whoever was behind him. PUBLISHED ORDER STATE PROSECLTJNG A'ITORNEY AND DISTRICT A'ITORNBY MAY NOT BOTH FILE PDRS: EX PARTB PHILIP DANIEL TAYLOR,No. 0652-00, on SPA'S & DA's PDR's tiom Brazos County; Disposition: DXs PDR ordered received as amicus brief only, 2/28/01; Published Order: Per Cu~iam(plurdity decision); Dissent: Keller, joined by Keasler & Holcomb;Jolmson & Henry not participating. SPA and Bmos County DA both filed PDR's challenging COXs decision versing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. On its own motion, CCA ordered briefing from the parties on the question of wliether both the SPA and the Dl\ should be allowed to file PDR's on behalf of the State. Held: Controlling statutes permit only one petition for discretionary review to b e filed by the State, a PDR filed by the state prosecuting altorrley is the petition of the State, and submissions front other officials will be receirwl in assistance of the SPA'S PDR. CGI relies primarily on TU: Govt Con6 $9 42.001 and 42.005, which provide not ody that the SPA has the duty to represent the State in all proceedings before the CCA, it also establishes the authority of DKs and county attorneys. "A district attorney or county attorlicy may assist the state ptosecuting attorney m representing the state before the court of crinunal appeals." Mer a brief analysis, CCArejects all the DXs arguments and holds that w h e ~the~ SPA files a PDR, the elected DA may not also He one. On the other hand. if the SPA decides not to file a PDR. then the DA niayfile one. CCA notes that bec;u~scAppellmtsmay not have "hybrid" representation ou appeal (Appellant and counsel may not both -present independent points tom appellate court)), 11"s rule must also apply to the Stale. Because the SPA has filed a PDR in this cause, the DXs ody authority is to assist the SPA, and have his coasidered as an micus curiae brief. [***Note: Xeither PDR has been gnntedin this case.] Keller Dissent: TCCP 2.10 authorizes theDAto represent the State on appeal, which extends to PDRB, regardless of what the SPA does. Also, "dual" represenlalion has been the practice for many yean, and the kgi~hhwehasn't done anything to change it. PDR OPINIONS TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PROSECUTION "IVITH PRFJUDICE" 7VAS A VOID ORDER: State u. CILU(LES SEDEL, JR,No. 1790-99, State's PDR Gvn~Guadalupc County; Reversed, 2/28/01; Offense: D\W, Trial Court Disposition: Disnussed; COk ARivmed (2///524 - S ~ Ihitosio I 1999); Opinion: Holland, joined by Price, Keasler, HenZey 8rHolcon1b; Dissent: Wonlack, joined by Keller & hleyers; Dissent: Johnson Appellee was arrested for felony DW and released on a felony bond, but because tlieDA did not indict or fileanidormation, the district court g~mtedhis motion to disnuss uader TCCP 32.10 (the "Speedy Mal Act"). The prosecution and bail were dismissed with prejudice. The State d ~ dnot appeal, but uistead, the County Attorney Hed a con~plaint and informatine charging Appellee with nusdenieanor D\Vl. Appellee fled a special plea of collateral estoppel, and a pret~ialhabeas application, which was gmited. County court held that because the prosecution was dmissed with prejudice, the State could not refile a lesser charge stenming horn the sane transaction, The State appealed, asserting the countycourt abusedih discretion in gmting habeas relief. COA agreed, but because the State did not a p p d the d~stdctcourt's disn~issalof the felony, this complamt was waived. State's PDR was gmited to determine whether the State had lo appeal, or wliether the trial court's order was void, thereby subjectingit to attack at any time. Held: The trial court's dismissal of the prosecution with prejudice was not authorized by law and was, therefore, void. CCA agrees with Cot\ that trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss the felony w "lield to bail for his appearance under Art. 32.01 bemuse Appellee w to answer any c~iminalaccusation before the district court." Moreover, the trial court had authority to dismiss the prosecution beuuse under kt. 32.01, if an indictment or inforn~ationis not presented against the accused withli the presc~ibedtime, the stahlte perniits the judge to disnuss the case without the State's consent. Howwe$ TCCP 28.061, which fornmly authorized dismissal with prejudice, was amended effective 5/6/97, and no Longer applies to a dischacge under Art. 32.01. Tlns, even if the defendant was entitled to a discharge under 32.01, he is not free from subsequent prosecution. Because Appellee was arrested after this arnendnlent beca~neeffective, it applies to him, making the trial CCA goes on to hold that court's dismissal with prejudice unautl~o~ized. the order of dis~nissalwith prejudice is void, and cat1 be atlacked on direct appeal or collaterally attacked. Therefore, the State's failure to a p p d the district courl's disnussal did not conslihte a wiver. Judgnient is reversed, and case is remanded to COA for "proceedings consistent with this opinion." Worsack Dissent: The precedent relied on by the m3jority does not support its holding tliat the judgment was rendered void. J x k of authority does not render a judgment void, dthough CCI has niistakenly said so more than once. The order of dis~~lissal was lint made witliout jurisdicaon, snd there is no other reason to regard it as void. Hid the State ircised the ermr on appeal, it luiglit h a x won. Ilowe~~er, its failure to appeal was a waiwr, and CO& decision was correct. Johnson Dissent: \Vllen the trial court exceeds its authority by dismissing with prejudice (but still having jurisdiction), the dismissal is not void, but voidable. Tlius, tile State should haw appealed the dismissal and should not now be allowed to attackit i n cou~itycouut. HAZING STATUTE HELD CONSI?WTtONAL: State u. DUSTYHUGH BOYD G.JAWER ChWA, Nos. 2043-99 & 2044-99, State3sPDRs fro111 Brw.os Co1111ty;Reversed, 2/7/01; Offense: Faiiure to Repolt Hazing; Trial Courl Disposition: Disnussed; COk tUfirnled (2///752 - Houston 1 1 4 ~1999); ~ 1 Opinion: Hervey (unaninious) Appellees were charged with a Clm B niisderuea~~or under /I , Te\ E D C ~ O m N ~$ ,37 152(a)(4), the sfatute that penalizes ffaiure to report a hazing incident, and hazing and assault. Charges arose from a single incident occurring on the Texas A&M campus. The Wid court dismissed the prosecution on motion that the statute was unconstihltiona~as applied to Appellees. COA dllrnled, holding that the statute required Appellees, on tbreat of prosecullon, to repol? informallon about activity that they could leasonably believe would become available to prosecution authorities, which would help establish their own guilt in the offenses of hamg and assault. COA, relying on Marchefti, 390 U.S. 39,88 S.Ct. 697 (1968), held that compelled disclosureof such informationcreates a real s l ~ dappreciable lisk of self-incrimination. State's PDR was granted to determine whether the stah~teis unconstitutional as applied for violating the 51' 1 Anlendnlent's pridege against self-incrimination. Held: The statute is constitutional because its inununityprovlsion, TBx.Enumos CODE$37.155, is sufficient to remove any real o r appreciable hazard of self-incrimination and to cnmpel reporting over a claim of privilege. Said provision provides Unt immunity from prosecution may be grantedat discretion of the bid court to anyoae who is subpoenaed to testify and who does teslifor the prosecution. It additionally provides that my person who repolts a specfic hazing incident to the appropriate official of the Ulstih~tltionis inunune fivnt civil or criminal liability that may othe~wisebe incurred as a result extends to participation in any judicial proof the report. Also, i~nn~unity ceeding resulting from the repoll, except tl~alaa)aae ic'ho reports in bad faith is not protected by this section. Here, Appellees would have been entitled to both use and deriv;\tive use immunity from civil and crinlinal liability. Becal~ethe stah~te'sininnu~ityprovision removes any red risk of self-incrimination to Appellees, COA's judgment is reversed and case is remanded to trial court so h t they may answer the charges against them. S T A W OF LIMITATIONS QUESTION NOT RIPE FOR REMEW: EX ?EVA DMW TMIEZ,Nos. 1857162-19, Appellant's PDR from P Port Bend County; Affirmed, 2114101; Offeuse: Perjury (6); Trial Court Disposition: Relief Denied; COk A h ~ c d(41N854 - Houston [lstl 1999); Opinion: Johuson; Mele)ersconcurred d o opi~uon. After being indicted for aggramtetl perjury ~ u ~ dTPC e r g 37.03, Appellant filed s h pretrial writ applications asserting the prosecutions were barred by lii~tations.Specifically Appellant argued that the State's reliance 011 TPC $ 17.06, wluch does not require the State to prove wluch of the inconsistent statements she made were false, bwred prosecution. made 011 Her $st statement, which she claims is the false one, December 5, 1995, and was outside the Z-JT slah~tcof limhtions, 11111s preventi~lgit from being an element of thc prosecution for the second statement, made onDecen~ber2, 1997. COA first held it had iunsdictio~~ to address the claim under EI' Pff~teilfatll,eri~s, 873//40 (CCA 1994). COA hen decided that the charges of agg~avatedperju~ywere witlhm the 2-pr stahlte even if the first inco~aislentslatement was not CCAgmnted PDR to determine wl~etherCOA "erred in (Ic~~ying appellant's writ of habeas corpus 011the ggronds thxt prosecution is barred by [the] applicable stah~teof limitations." Held: The issue of lin~itationsimplicated by this case is not jet ripe for consideration CG\ first agees that Appellant could raise tins clalm on a pretrid writ becac~seshe zmerts the ~ndictmeut,on its face shows the offe~isemas barred by hn~itationsEx Parte Dickson, 54911202 (CU 1977). Honever, once COA had deternk~edthat the applicable statute for agg~avatedpej u ~ ywas 2 yn, and that the second cl~argeddate was within tl~estatute, it was appropriate to go no forther. Only the face of the pleading is considered to determine whether relief should be granted, and here, the varions indictments show the date of offe~~se as December 2, 1997. Because the indictment was rehlrned on September 14, 1998, a date less than two years after the alleged date of the offense, the pleading on 16 face, docs not show thm the charged offense was barred by limihtions T~IIS,Appellant is not entitled to relief, and COA's judgment is atfirmed [***in a footnote, CU expressed a wlh~gnessto address this issue in the futule: "How the limitations periods for perjuly and aggw vated p e ~ j u ~interact y with g 37.06 is an open question, a11d one hat desems consideration at the appropriate time However, given the procedural posture of the instant case (i.e., a pretrial application h r writ of habeas corpus), aud the dates alleged on the face of the indictment, it is not yet time to decide thal issue UI this case, md denial of habeas corpus relief 1s appropriate."] CASE RBhfANDED TO RECONSIDER DEADLY WEAPON ISSUE:'&?a A N / E O Y BAILBY u. State, No. 370-00, State's PDR from Wba'lon County; Vacated & Remanded, 2/14/01; Offense:Assault; Seutm~ce. (not in opinion); COA. AfFrn~edas Reformed, and Remanded for New Punislm~entIlearing (7/1/721 - Corpus Cl~risti,1999); Opimon: Per Cu~ian~ (wmimous) Appellant was convicted of aggramted assault with a deadly weapon by a jury, wI1ic11found he had threatened and repeatedly beaten described as a "board or a "stick." On his wife with a piece of appeal, he a ~ ~ a ethed evidence nns insufticient to support the deadly weapon hdimg. COA agreed, holding that because there was no evidence Appellant intended to muse serious bodily inju~yasdefined by tl~esmtute, therewas no evidence that, as used, the object was capable of inflicting se~iousbodily inju~ynecessaLy to suppoi? a dmdly wapon finding and on aggnvated assault coeviction. Held: Judgment is vacated, and w e is remanded to COA for reconsideration of the deadly weapon question in light of McCnin, 22///497 (CCA 2000). Here, CONS fococtrs was on TPC $ 1 07(a) (17) (B), which dcfines a deadly weapon as "aqthing that in the manner ofits use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury" COA reasoned that bemnse the evideuce showed that Appellant's intended use was to beat tl~evictim on one side of her body to w extellt capable of ~ I I I S Uonly I ~ bruising, It was not lus intent to cause anything other than the injuries ach~allyinflicted. In ilIcC2ri11, CCA explahed U~atsaid statute's p1a1 lmguage does not require the actor to actually intend death or serious bodily injury Because the statute cantmv the word "mpable" its placement there enables the stmute to c o w conduct that threatens deadly force, even if the actor has no intention of achlally using deadly force. In 11lcCai11.CW also e\plained its rationde in T~OIII~S, 82111616 (CCA 1991) (~eliedon by COA), which it chamterizes as a bit misleading because &st glance it appew as thou~ghCCA agrees that the statute's focus is on the actor's intent when it said that "objects are not dmdllly n7exponsunles'~actually used or intended to bc used m such a way as to muse death or serious bodily inju~y[.l" Ilowever, in illcCuin CCA also sajs that a closer rmding of Tho~nos revals that it did d~scussthe Stahlte's inclusion of "capable." Because COA did not h a ~ the e bene8t ofdlcCdin w11en it banded down its deasion, judgment is vacated and case is remanded to tl~atcourt for reconsidemlion in light ofMcCriin. [****Note: Recall that U~~lfcCairt, the defendant had a butcher knife sticking out of his pocket wlule he was bmling up the \<ctim. He 1 WWW.TCDbA.COM I VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE 1 311 D m - DRlYEWAY NOT PUBLIC PLACE FOIYLBR F? SZATE,No. 0700-0081-CR,1/3/01 juvenile upon arrest. Issue is currently pending in the CCA in a case styled Gonzales v. State. d COA declines to hold that an unpaved driveway of a l u ~ residence located one fou1~11of a mile from a county road in an isolated and secluded area of a county as a public place and orders an acquittal in a DWl case. Closest people u'ere 8 miles away COA holds that a private driveway of a residence is not a public place. Further, entrance to tllis driveway was gated and thus, not accessible to public. PRETRIAL WAIVBR OF M E & . I W W S V STATB, No. 04-00. COU4TERAI. ESTOPPEL: WAPBR Y: STATE, No. 07-00-0265-CR, 1/3/01 00405-CR,1/10/01 A pretdal waiver of the light to a p p d will be held d i d if: (I) the right to a p p d has not yet mah~red;(2) the defendant h o w s with certainty the punishment he is to receive, md;(3) he could anticipate the type of errors that might occur during fbe proceedings. \%at is essential to this holding is hat the waiver be made part of the plea bargah. IN\71NTORY SEARCH: YAWS i! SZWE, No. 06-99-00139-CR, 1/9/01 Defendant wins on a motion to revoke; trial court Elnds evidence of new offense allegation insufficient.This finding triggers collateral estoppel a i d state is precluded from litigating indictment alleging that sanie offense. Uh'KNOWN MANNER & MEANS: IVHEELBR Y: $CAI& NO. 06-9900057-CR,12/5/00 COA notes, without deciding, that State may not any longer need to prove, when alleging that the mmmer and means of XI offense are unknown, that the grand july did. not in fact h ~ o wthe manner and menns a i d yet exercised due diligence to ascertain the correct facts. COA resolves issue nithout addressing this problen~. DISABLED JUROR: Clt4VEZ I!flATE,No. 07-99-0379-CR, 12/7/00 COA holds that TCCP 36.29(c) is mandato~y;the ju~ymust be discha~gedif, after the ju~yinstmctions are read, a juror becomes too ill to continue and the parties do not agree to proceed with eleven jurors. COA rejects trial court lationale which argued that, because jurors had decided an a verdict, one had thus heell rendered, wliclb would have allowed the w'erdict to be accepted if all eleven remdning juro~shad signed it. Vefdict is not rendered until 11mided down in open cou~z. MANDATORY LIFE SBhTENCE FOR CERTAIN SEX OFFENDERS: PRICB K flATB, No. 10-99-181-CR, 12/6/00 As of 1998, anyone convicted of certain enun~e~ated sexual offe~~ses, sexual assault, agg. sexual assault, kidnapping with Intent to conu~utsexual assault, etc., and wbo has two priors for either sexual assault or a g p w t e d sexual assault, or s o m e t l ~ ~very g similar from another state, faces a1 atitonlatic Me sentence, even if the hvo p i o n are , 1011s. not h a [ convictions, 1.e. deferred adjud~mt' COMMERCIAL BRIBERY: ADBGBeNRO Y: flATE,No. 01-00-00419. Before there slay be a lawful inveato~ythere n~ustbe a lawful impoundnient of the vehicle. Though CCA has held that an impoundment is not la\\hl merely because the defendant is under wrest and there is no one inmediately avaitable to take control of the car, see Stephen, 677//42,COA here upl~oldsthe impoundment because there was no OIE immediatelyavailable to take control o w the car, APPEAL APIlIR REVOCATION OF DEFERRED: l&4MIRBZV SZHE, No. 10-98-349-CR, 1/10/01 This is a complicated opinion dealing with the COA's judsdiclion to hear appeals &er revocation of a deferred adjudication. Under illnr~rml,994//658,defendants nwust appeal aU iss11es after deferred is assessed or issue is wvaiwd COA here acknowledges problen~swith such a broad holding nlien faced with so-called jurisdictional isues but decides snch issues must be 1;u'sed by ~aeansof a writ of habeas co~pus. See also Sflkndo,No. 01-00-00861-CR, 1/25/01 where COA holds it has no jurisdiction to hear a p p d and cites to Dadel, 30///407 which refused to hear a p p d where court reporter's notes were nussuig and migbt have suppo~zcda challenge to orighd plea's voluntarh~ess, ['**Editor's note: illflr~~~al, when it was decided, cited to TVhetstone, 786//361,363(CCA 1990) ubich held that the issue was not one of jurisdiction but one of justiciability. There z e celtain issues, normally considered jurisdictional but in realility considered to be of basic fundan~entalhnpo~Tance,that were not \vaived if not raised on a p p d fro111 the assessnlent of probation. nlis same stmdard should apply to dcfei~edsas well but may not. Basically, if the issue is one that can he irrised in a post conviction wit, it is one that can be raised on an appeal from a motion to revoke. DEADLY WEAPON FINDING: ADMZE K S T i , No. 10-99-139-CR, 1/10/01 For aBB gun to be considereda deadly xrapon,evidence must show it was loaded at tin~eof offense. CR,1/4/01 Defendant convicted of conmercid bribeq Because 11e was charged with agreeing to confer a benefit, the indictn~entneed not allege an agreement to commit the offense. The Mentioned above ere synopses of opinions ofthe appeals courts listed JLIVBN1J.E CONFESSION SUPPRESSED: PIIAiN K SX'B, No. 01-99. 00631-CR,12/28/00 We inviteall comments end consiruc6ve ci~cismfromourmembersandVOlCEofthedefensereadars Confession ordered suppressed because police failed to notitj defendant's parents of their son's arrest pron~ptlywhere defendant was a Significant Decisions Reportwas reported by Cynlhia LHamplon. Editor- Mike Chariton,Assistant Editor ". PLEASE EMAIL OR FAX D' Ann Johnson -TCOLAExecubve Director# djohnson@tcdlacam -512.469.9101 ", John Canoll- VOlCEEdhor~jcerrol~nlemail.com~210-829-0134 The SPRb printing cost is funded byThe Judicial & CourlTraining Fund end administered bytheTexas Court of Criminal Appeals Like thc storied Pirates of Penlance, modern police often feel the need to approach a suspect's residence nithout m~ouncu~g their presence or intentions. Wllile the United States Supreme Comt has not yet held that the officers m s t cty out "la1~1taiil,tamntalx?' 2 befofe bashii~gUI doors to execute mrmnts, it 11s held that the comnloll law requirenlent to knock on the suspect's door ~vivitl~ somelhing less than a sledge l~anuuerand announce their presence and autho~ityis pan of the question of whether they have reasonably exercised their rights to search the suspect's Imne pursoant to awvarmt. So far, no defendant has had a conviction overhnned in Texas due to t11e fdure of the police to comply with the "knock a ~ annou~~ce"mle. d Nationally the results are hardlyany beltel: Wl~llethere is an argument that tlus is due to the mherent reloctame af judges to enforce the lule, it is also probably as n~uchIhe fault of trialattorneysto properly present the issne to the trial court. The purpose of this article is to renew the u~lde~piunings of the "knock and announce" rule as articulated by the United States Supreme Conrt, its Texas md federal stah~lo~y corollaries, and the Texas rules ofprese~~ation of error on appeal with an eye towards assisting trial attorney; in clearly presenting the issue to the appellate cou~Ts. The Common Law Knock and Announce Rule v " tie" 3, Plior to breaking open any door, the common lam, as de eloped in England before the h m h g of the United States Constitution, demanded that an officer of the law kt announce his presence and autl~ority*. \Vllile this doctrlne found xceptmce inhnerican jurispi~~dence 5, it was nut until the 1W s tl~cL'nitel Scates Supren~cCt~urtr ~ c o g ~ ~tl~at i ~ cthe d kluw of RII i~lli~t'r to "knoch :ud an~~uunce" n ~"i r ? in~s;tct l ~ ~ a "I~CWIIableness" inqniiy under the search and seiznre plwisions of the Fouilh Amendment to United States ~anstih~holl~ In 1ViIsm v. Arkansas 7 police officels, who werc executing search and arrest warrants for drugs, did not announce their presence before opening =I unlocked screen door and entering the premises The United States Supreme Court held that the conunon law "knock aid announce7'piinciple - i e., announcing the police preseilce before ently -was pall of tlw reasonableness mqui~yunder the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seidures. The Court recognired, however, that the conlmon law principle had not been extended conclusively to felonies andleft it to the lower cou~fsto determine the circumstances under which an una~~nouuced entiy was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 8 L Subsequently, in R~CIKIMS u 1Visco11sirr9, the Supre~neCou~t recognized that several state cou& had tmdiuortally petmttted police searching a home for narcotics to enter wthout adhering to the knock and mnounce principle W~sconsfilhad a statute permitting wannounced "hard" entries in all d~ugcases. The Court held that the Poultl~ Amendment did not allow a blanket exception lo the knockand mounce princ~plefor felauydrug investigations.The reasonableness of IIICfailure of the police to enter without annou~~cing tl~en~sclves would be determined on a case by case basis. In order to justify a no knock entiy, police ruust hme reasonable susp~cionfrom the pnrticular ciicu~~~stances that knocking aud mounch~gtheir presence woultl be dangerous or h~l~lc, or that it would inhibit the elfectise inwtigation of the crime, such as by allo~vingdestruction of evidence. " A higher standard does not apply where the no knock cntq justified by rcasonnble suspicion, results io the destiuction of propertyJ2 This is not a new concept. The Supiwe Court has long held tlrnt a search wlucl~is reasonable at incepli~~ may violate Foinlh Amendment by its intensity and/or scope. '3 Tem court's have reacted suuilarly l4 Further, there have been botbfedcid and Texas statutes wl~ich purport to control "harcl" entries to euecite a warlmt. I5 Given this long histo~yof consiitutional, conunon law and stanltory protection, coupled with a clear preference by law eniorcenmt office13 for hard entries, are there so few instances of convictions being reversed where there are so many \varrants being executed without benefit of knocka~d;mnounce? The essence of the protections against law euforcernent nusconduct is based upon the principle tl~atthe fede~aland slate constitutions protect one against unreasonable searcl~esmd seizures. That being the case, the issue at trial and on a p p d must be whether the conduct of the oflcen was utrremahle. mile a bard entry without any prior amouncenleutmay well beunr~wnablcto some, it appeals that it is not geneldy considered ul1peasonable to tl~ejudges on the various appellate courts. In order to prevail on these claims it is incumbent upon hid counsel to articulate why the prticular h a d entry at issue was rinreasona6le. This, it appears, is significantly haider that it would first appear. nveu when it is established that the actions of law enfo~cementofficersin ~nakinga hard entty was unreasoi~able,r e v e d i s anytl~iugbut assured. Texas Cases Long before the Sup~en~e Coint handed down eill~erWilson or Richards, the Texas Coud of Criminal Appeals held that the failure to knock aud amounce was p a t of the reeaonable~~ess i~~quhy as a nlancr of Texas law yet tbat conlt has ne'er rewsed a conviction for a faiiure to knock and announce. AU analysis by the Court of Criminal Appds has concluded that the foiced enhy under review was 'reasonable" under the facts presented. In AfcCown u Stale '4 the Coun rejected a challenge to the reasonahlencss of an officers forced entry to executed a \\ilmnt noting as follo\s: Officer Hightower of the Houston police testified that, wide avn~edwith a search wmt and in canlpanywith other ofken, he weld to a certain address in the city; that the other office~swaited at the front wlule he walked down the sldcw& at the side of the apartment house, kom where he was announcement, and that a reviewing court must consider counte~ailing law enforcement interests in determining whether an entry was reasonable. Specifically, the Court Iield that an unmiouuced ently niay be justified if officeshave reason to believe evidence will likely be destroyed if advance notice is given. Fustlier, an unannounced entry may likewise be justitled if a suspect's awareness of the search would increase the danger to police officers or othen, citing a Seventh Circuit opinion. 34 In the case before the Dallas court, it found the actions of the officers reasonable on tlie basis of trial testin~onythat the police office~s entered he house to execute a searcli warlnnt for cocaine. Nthougli the officers broke down the dooq they shouted "police" as they did so. Trial testimony provided hroreasons for the "uiiannounced" enty Fist, sucli an enhy was necessary for the police officers' own protection. Second, the manlier of entry wvm necessary to secure the illegal drugs that are the subject of the search warmnt. Officers testified that if they knocked and announced, it would iiot only be very dangerous, but it would also give the suspects an opportunity to secrete the drugs or flush them dowm the toilet. 35 This testimony was deemed to establish the "reasonableness"of the officer's actions. In auother case the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to the reasonableness of the forced eutly into an apallment because the Court found that tlie evidence siniply showed appellant was present at the apartment when the cocaine was found and seized 36. There was no proof that the defendant lived at the apactment or proof othe~wiseshowing the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy iu the preudses that society was prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the h i d court was held to have propexly overruled the defendiu~t'?111ntin11to S I I P ~ W S S'I'i~cr~. . \\:Ls no pauticulnr dizcuwinn or :cl~:tlysis ultl~eknuck R I I ~~ I ~ I O I I I I ~CI ~I I' P 1'11~ Cull11,irn~>l\,r ~ l w tl~c d :!nncd on the basis of established expectation of privacy concepts. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered tlie knock aid announce l?de in the context of a 42 U.S.C. g 1983 civil ~iglitsaction against police officer 37. The conipldnant in that case alleged that the arresting officer used excessive force in entering resideuce illegally aid in shooting the arrestee after the arrestee failed to comply with officer's order to get onto floox, and instead pointed handgun at officer's chest. The trial court 38 denied the officer's motion for partial sunmaly judgment based upon Ius assertion of quaJi!ied inimunity. The police officer appealed. The Cou~lof Appeals held tliat: (1) fede~d,lather than state, law governed the case, and (2) it was objectively reasonable for an officer to assume that occupants of house wexe sufficiently app~isedof his identity a i d pulyose for ently. The coniplaiuaut contended that the "custom inipleniented by the City of \Vicl~itaFdls is for officers to break dowu tl~edoor upon their arrival", relying upon the testimony of a police officer at Carlisle's criniinal trial. \ V h asked why police nsed battering mns, the officer responded as follows: "hwith most places that I've lmd dealings wih where illegal drugs are dealt, the people in there are a h i d that the police are going to catch B~eni,a i d they constantly niake plans on how to keep from being caught. One of them being using lookouts. One of them being grab the stash aid flush it if you see the police coming. And time is of the essence to not ody obtain the evidence, but it's also i~npo~tant to us on sonie places to use the element of surprise in order to sdeguard the officers and the evidence that would be there." & , A L The officer tlien stated that the police didn't "just go up aid hiock 011 the door" to prarent the dcstruct~onof evidence and to safeguard tl~emselves. While recoguizing the United States Supreme Court has held tliat the comnlon law "knock and amounce" principle form p a ~of t tlie reasonableness inqui~y,citing IWson u, Brkfoism, the Court held that since the officer had beeu warned that the occupauts of the house could pose a serious danger to police officers and that the office~sfeared destruction of the evidence, the policy described by Wicbita Falls police officials and followed by the officer in flus instance was objectively reasonable. Texas Knock and Announce Statute It should be noted that Wisconsin was not the only state to authorize for law enforcement officers to make unanuounced "hard" entries 39. While the Wisconsin legislature sought to create a blanket exception to the requirement to kuock and miounce before making forced enhies ui drug cases, tlie Texas Legislature took a different approach: lather than grant a blanket exception to the mle, it created a blanket prohibition to onamiounced entries unless tl~ereare exceptional circun~stances. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 40 provides express autliority for an officer to break down a door to make a felony arrest "if he be refused admittance after givingnotice of Ids autho~ityaid purpose." A plah reading of this stahlte would give the casual reader the mipression that an officer in Texas can onb break down a door to niake an arest alter kuocking a ~ mnou~ichig d his "authority and puqose" A casual reader would, howe\~er,be wrong as this provision was read out of existence by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1978 in the case of Jones u. State 41, when tlie Court lield as follou~s 'are can percei\,e of no reason why lioncompliance with the formal requisites of an arrest ' should render illegal that arrest wlien non-con~pliance with the fornial requisites of a searcliOdoesnot render illegal that search. We therefore hold that the non-complianceDdoes not render an arrest illegal." Nohvitl~standingtlie clear intent of the Texas legislature, law enforcenient oficem are apparently fsee to ignore lids statutoq pmlubition without fear that the subsequent arrest will be held illegal 42. Application of Exclusionary Rule Tliere is still, howeve5 tlie question ofwl~atto do with any evidence seized during a hard enhy and subsequent search \v11icl1does not coniply with Art. 15.25. Texas 11as codified the esclusionay rule as Tes. Code Cri~i.Proc. Ann. art. 38.23, wluch provides as followvs: (a) No evidence obtained by an oficer or other pesson in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constih~tionor laws of the United States of An~erica, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the h i d of my cCLi~idcase. hi any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the ju~y shall be h~shnctedthat ii it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of ills Article, then and in suc11 event, the juiy shall disregard any such evidence so obtained. (b) It is a11esception to tlie provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article Illat the exidence was obtained by a law enforcen~entofficer acting in objective good faith relia~ceupon a war~antissued by a u e u t ~ dmagistmte based on probable cause. The Texas Court of C d n ~ i aAppeals l 11s held Illat "[Tlhe terms of [CCP alt. 38.231 are n~andato~y .... \'iolation of a State statute or co~~stih~tional provision in obtaining evidence requi~essuppression of that evidence under tht. 38.23, supra; a judge has no discretion in n~lingon the excln- sion of that evidence." 43 Presun~ably,\\Me the arrest \vould not be considered "illegal' \here Art. 15.25 is violated, ally euidence seized as a result of such an ently woould be obtined in violation of Art. 15.25 and tluus subject to esch~sionbased upon the pro\risionsof Art 38.23. 44 So fal; only one Texas interuediate appellate court has square1 addressed this issue, albeit in unpublished opinions. InNoses u. St& t11e Houston's 14~"Court of Appeals opined that "I1111 Jones, however, h e court of c r i ~ ~appeals ~ ~ a l~eld l that the failure to comply wit11 articles 15.25 and 15.26 of the Code of C ~ i n ~Procedure ~al did not render the defendant's arrest illegal. Id. at 848. Therefore, the failure of the officers to awlounce their perpose before entering the habitntion n w l d not render my evidence seized inadnlissible." Obviously tile Court is cornparing apples to oranges, i.e., the legality of the arrest vs. legalit). of the search. That Cou~talso totdy fdled to factor iu the provisions of art. 38.23. This case demonstntes the relative difficult). in establisl~ing resersible e r a r on the basis of a violation of art. 15.25. Perl~apsAloses can be expldned on the basis of an earlier ~rnpnblislred case from h e sanle court, Pifts n State 4 wilere the IIouston Court held that Article 15.25 refers to tl~eexecution of an arrest \varw~tand has no application to the esecntion of a search cl,\rwr:~nt. The court opined that hticle 18.06(b) 47 controls the execution of search waruaots and that as it rnakes no reference in any \my or alanner to wl~etherpolice need to knock or ;u~~~oonce tlleir presence in the execution of a search warm1 a violation of that pro\rision does not necessitate esclusio~~ of the evidence seized duru~ga hard entq for purposes of execllting a search vrarrant. UlIforh~llate~yfor the Houston Court's analysis, the article 15.25 doesn't n~entiol~ ii~nrrn~ifs at all. Specifically art. 15.25 provides i n its totalit).tlrat "[Iln c;w of felon): tlre officer may brez~kdown the door of any house for the purpose of 1nm1~1g an arrest, if he be reh~sedadmittance after giving llotice of his authority m d purpose." It appeals that art. 15.25 ~ o u l dapply lo any effort lo effechlale an arrest, regartlless of wl~etherthe arrest is hued on a wurant or on one of tlle immerous exceptio~~s to the \irarmnt requirement. One o~ustalso wonder \\hat the outcon~ewould be for a combined search and arrest ~ ~ a r r a na tcolnmoll , pmctice ill Texas? In ~leill~er case did ll~eHouston Court of Appeals consider the hohliogs ofKichr(1s or IYilsorr, perhaps because the issue sin~plyn;lst~'t raised $ trial or appellate counsel \v110 apparently chose to rely on the Texas statuto~-yprovision iaslead of the federal connnon ILW rule. At least i n Houston's 14l1l Court of i\ppeals, article 15.25 appean to be a dead letter As for tl~eotl~er13 Texas intemlediate appel1:ne courts, the authors would respecth~llysuggest th:a standard rules of code co~~struction 49 mould seem to imply that tl~eplaiu language of article 38.23b) \irouldapply \&re article 15.25 is violated To 4; Federal Knock and Announce Statute Like Texas, the federal govenlment long ago enacted a statute :tinred 211 regul:cting forced e11t1-yto execute a rrarl:mt. Specific;tll): 18 U.S.C.A. 3 3109 provides as follo~vs: 3 3109. Breaking doors or windo\vs for entry or exit. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or windo\\' of a house, or any part of :I house, or a~qll~ing therein, to esecute a smrcli warrant, if, after~roticeof Iris aothosi~yand purpose, l ~ ise reh~sedadnuaa~~ce or \\.hen necessaq to liberate l~in~self or a person aiding 11in1ill the eseclltion of the warrant. In tile years this statute has been i n force, there llave been numerous instances \v11ere defendants l~aveclrauenged the \~iolalionof this stahlle. Few l~avesucceeded. In construing tl~isstatute, however, the federd courts haw interpreted it as having an exigent circl~~ustances prong and, as long as tl~eactions of the officer \\we reciso~mblemder tile particl~lw circr~msl?nces,they have upl~eldconvictions where violations of tl~e stntute have been foltnd. The si~nilarit).re%o~rable~~ess p r o q of the federal ssr;ltute to tl~econmon law knock and announce rule articulated in Richards and IVilsov makes consideration of these holdings instmctive for any attorney seeking to show that a violation of the common law knock and announce rule was "unreasonable" under the ci~'cumsrances presented. The following is a circuit-by-circuitlist of cases decided under this statute wl~icl~ den~o~~strates how little evidence is apparently required to cstablisl~that the officers acted "reasonabl)?' wllcn they perfor~neda hard ently for purposes of executing a warrant: DC Circuit Uizited Stntes u. Sprigs 5'. Drug Enforcen~entAgency (DEA) agents did not ict unreasonably in entering ap:~rtmentafter knocking and announcing tl~en~selves only once in slightly above normal tone of voice at 7:45 a.m. on weekrhy Agents esecutu~gsearcli w;lrmt were justified in concluding tlrat they had been constructively ref~~serl adnrittmce when occupants of d\veh~gfailed to respond witl~in15 seconds of mnouncen~ent. United Stcites 11, Ro~rrze~. 5=. Eleven to hvelve-second intend behveen time police officers announced their presence and tin~ethey rantsled door do~\~n l d d to be reasonable. Court Ileld that wl~ereofficers could reasonably have expected that they were entering into a den of drxg tmfficke~s,w11ere officers twice gave clear notice of tl~eira~~thorit). and purpose, and where officers heard sounds consistent with destn~ctionof evidence. Uni1t.n'States 11.James 53. Tlre E1i1ur.eof police to stale putpose before entering defendant's l~ousedid not invalidate search and subseqt~ent seizure of cocaine. Police testied tl~atafter knocking and announcing their m~tl~ority repmtedly witl~out eliciting any response, they llearil sonleone nlnning down back stairs and reasonably inte~yretedsuch sounds as indication tllat inhabitants were ;wwof purpose of police visit and were moring to destroy evidence. Requirenlent of f e d e ~ dknock-andaonounce statute for police officer in executing se;tsch ~~~asrallt to state his al~tl~ority and purpose was satisfied by o£ficer w11o merely stated "police, nlrcotics," since, by s q i t ~ g"narcotics," oHicer made l u ~ o w ~ pulyose of his visit in lnlanner understandable to i~lhabitants. First Circuit U~~itedStates u. O m Pflrcel ofRefllPro)ert~l5*. Officer w110 knocked at back door waited only five to ten seconds hefore entering was acting reasonably where other officc~smere banging on front door and shouting "police" before the ofiicer reaclled back door and the officer llad probable cause to belieire tl~atoccuparrts possessed coc;dne. Second Circuit U~zitedStafesu. .pimlli 55. Police officers' failr~reto follow !mock and announceslahtte iq esecoting search warrant for llarcotics defendant's 11on1c was justified by exigent circumstances. The office~s'belief that the defenda~~t rvas armed and cl;~ogerous,supported by the rlefeirdant:~pre~ ~ i o \wapons us co~lviction,as \veU 2 s the flammable and dolent llahlre of ~ ~ ~ e t l ~ a ~ ~ ~ pwl~ich l ~ e rthe a orlefe~~dant ~ i ~ ~ e , was believed to 11ave been producing in tile home, justified tl~enonco~opli:o~ce,even tl~ougllofficers mere unn\vare ol lurock and annouoce stahlle. Third Circuit I UnitedStutes u. StiwJ6. State police officers executing search wamnt acted reasonably, as required by Fourth Amend~nent,when they broke dowu door of defendant's apartment after knocking and announcing theit presence. The officers reasonably believed that the defendant was involved in the drug trade and drugs or other evidence could be readily destroyed if entry was delayed. Additionally, the officers testified that they heard heavy and hurried foot steps leading away from door when they announced their presence. UnitedStates u. &ne57. Officers who had leanled that an extensivedrug manufacturing opention was taking place in a house, that there were at least four people in house and that they had a number of weapons, had reason to believe that an announcement would place them in unwarranted peril. The officels' noncon~pliancewith knock and announce statute was justiEed by exigent circumstances United States u. Singleton J? A detective knocked on the defendant's door and was obsenzed by one defendant who knew detective to be state narcotics officer. There was refusal to open the dool; followed by "shuffling of feet" inside the apartment. The court held that an announcement of purpose and autholitywould have been a useless gesture and may have enllanced possibility of destmction of contraband heroin suspected to be in the apartment. eels to \rail before entering drug a defendant's apartment after lu~ockiug and m~ouncingtheir presence. The Court concluded (without evident i a l ~support) that a longer wait might well have resulted in destruction of evidence. United Stntes u. Cfn'ter a. Exigent circurustances justiGed dmg agent's failure to cornply with statute authorizingforced ently to execute a search uTIarrantif the officer is denied adnuttance after notice of authority and purpose where an individual jumped off t~ailerdoorstep when he saw officers approach Additiotlally, when an agent, who yelled "She~itrs Department with awawnt," reached trailer don$ which was slightly ajar, he heard someone inside yell, "It's the cops," and heard people running from the door. The agent again announced that he had a warrant. The agent testified he was concer~~ed about possible destruction of evidence, namely heroin. United States u. SqnelIa-Auendnno 64. Seizure of narcotics was not invalidated when an agent opened an unlocked door after announcing "Police. Open the door." The Court held that the agents had not properly announced their purpose in demanding adnkion, but that they were justified ie being virtually certain that the occupants knew their purpose in that, inter aliu, the agents knew that violation of the narcotics laws was being perpetrated inside in the dwelling, that theit sun~eillancehad been detected, and, following knock, hurried movement and the sound of Fourth Circuit .. " their presence and purpose uz11e11 attempting forcible ently of Cauhl's home.) UnitedStates u. ward59. Finding that 60-second ~ e r i o dthat officers executing search warrant waited after knocking a n d ~ a ~ n o u a ctheir in~ p m e m at defendaut's residence and forcibly entering home was reasonable. Sixth Circuit Unitedsfdm u. Grogins 64 Police had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcu~gtheir presence prior to enteriug suspected "stash house" for executiou of search w a r w t would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit their investigation. The Court's holding was based on evidence that suspected drug dealer who frequented dwelling and used it as stash house would visit dwelling that night and that police could not locate suspected dealer elsewhere. The court held that police officers could folm reasonable suspicion that knocking and annouacing their presence prior to entering suspected "stash house" for execution of search warrmt would be dangerous, be futile, o r inhibit investigation, regardless of likelihood of presence of the suspected drug d d e r at preconnection between illegal drug operations a d guns. UnitedStates u. Kennedy 61. Office~s'failed to wait for explicit refusal of admittance or lapse of significant amount of time before breakinginto the premises. The Court relied on exigent and dangerous circumstances, namely that the officers needed to act quickly to prevent destruction of dmgs and the officers had reason to fear that people inside house would be armed and dangerous. The Court held that strict con~pliance the statute \'auld be imprudent and officers satisfied principal values embodied in the statute by knocking on door and iuforiuiug occupauts of their authority by yelling "police" seve~dtin~esbefore they broke d o w ~the door. Fifth Circuit UtritedStates u. Jones 62. Under common law "knock and announce" ride, 15 to 20 seconds was reasonable length of tune for state police offi- UnitedStates u. Spikes 6 Aperiod of 15 to 30 seconds from the initial use of a police bulhom to announce their prese~~ce with a search warrant until the office~sentered the home wa a reasonableanlount of time, so as to comply with "knock m d announce" rule under the Fourth hendn~ent.The officers were searching for dmgs and were a w m that there were persons ingde the residence that might destroy such evidence. The officers were w m e d that uelsolls inside might " have uolice scamine equipment, guns and armed guards. The officers executed the warmt during the n~iddleof the morning when most people are awake, and use of buUhorn was so effective at alerting people inside that neighbors had already exited their homes to obsewe the execution of the warrant before the police entered. While the Court held that the sin~plepresence of dmgs alone does not justify abandoning the "knock and announce" rule for execution of a search wvarlmt, or so diluting its i-equirements that it becomes a meaningless gesture. The Court also held that presence of dmgs in the place to be searched, while not a conclusive factor, lessens the length of time law enforceruent mmt ordinarily wait outside before entering a residence. - agents' forced ently of United States u. i\'Rbors 64 Jaw e~lforcen~ent defendant's apartnlent seconds after aru~ouncingtheir presence was reasonable there \pas a threat to their own safety due to fact that the defendant was afelon in possession of array of fireanus, the officen were worried about the safety of those in apartment, aud there was a need to present ~larcoticsevidence. " UnitedStates u. Ciainrnitti Agents were justi6ed h concludi~~g that a SIIII~III~IISwas being ignored, when, after they pounded on front door of house and announced the^ authorityand p u p s e for executing search warrant, they heard no response f m n ~within house for 30 seconds, at least under circumstances where oallly facts known to the agents who began to break door down were that two males had been seen carrying chemicals and equipment into Iiouse, lights were on in basement h o n ~ wl~ichdmg-related odors l~ademanated on previous lughts, and the agents heard sound of breaking glass at side of house. Seventh Circuit U~~itedStntes u. illnttiso~~ 68. Exigent circon~sl;usesjustified issu~nceof no-knock search \\'arrant, authorizing searcl~of defendant's house. A n informant had told police that the defendm nas UI possessio~~ of crack cocaine and 11adstated 11e was in possession of a \\'npos and tllreatened to kill anyone mho inte~feredwith lus d ~ x gsales. The police 11ad been Informed h a t other occupants of house were gmg nlembers, were armed, m d had a Iustoly of violence. United Stntes u. Xniiq 69. Police officels had a reasonable belief that evidence \vould be destroyed by tlw occupa~~ls of a residence wluch escused !mock-and-an~ouncerequirement for executing search \ ~ m " n t at the residence. Tl~e11oldi11g w s baed on inoeement the office~sheard coming from inside l~omeand the officers' prior lu~owledgethat occupants kept drugs in their mou111in order to s\r~do\vt11en1if approached by police. U~ritedS t ~ ~ t11. e sS t o w 70. Esigent circu~l~stances edst when the defendant's anareness of a smrch would increase danger to police officers or othels, \ h e n d111gs or firearms are regularly obse~vedillside a tlefeildant's rerirlence, or when inloomation Imds police to reaonably conclude tint defendant is arnled, dangerous, and possesses large amou~~ls of cocaine. U~literlStotes u B~~lrcklel7.' E ~ if police I officers did not knock and announce their presence prior to entering the defe~~(lants' mobile Ilo~re \vide esccuting mar~antauthorizing search for drugs, exigent circumstances justified no-knock ent~l:\&re the officers knew hat the defendants possessed a pit-bull and firearms. U~~itedSffltes u. Sorin 7'. Police officer's breaking do\w of a dnlg suspect's front door wit11 sletlge hanullel; siniultaoeous wit1 an announcement of "police officers, search rrarrant" did not ~~iolate Fourll~ Amendn~cnlknock and aulounce rule. I1 could be seen tl~rougl~ pulled drapery that house was occupied, there 11ad been 110response to lalocking on side door of l~ouse,and there was reason to believe suspect \\'as arn~ed. Ur~iterlSt~~tes u. Honnrd 73. Exigent circr~mstancesjustified execution of search \varraot with forced entq and in disregard of federal stahltoly "knock and announce" requirement, wllere the officer h w d n~o\~en~ent in apartment at tinie oflus knock, and the oKicer [lad prior lu~owledgeof the defendant's s d e of illegd drugs and possession and use of firearm The Cowl l~eldtl~attile movement the ol6ce1xl~eardcould 11aveindicated either tllat police were in persond danger or hat illegd dregs were being destroyed. OitiledStntes u. Si~tger 74. E~&cnt circumstm~cesi~atifiedpolice 01% celr;' no-knock ent~fofa narcotics suspect's residen& to ese& searcl~ \varmnt. In seekine no-lalock nen~ussionfrom a state i n k the officen had testified abouitl~epossibiity Illat drngs would be'de&yed if ent~y \\'as delayed. They dso teslified about frequent use of \\,capons by drug dealers in geneml, and, although it predated seizure hy sonle sis months, tlie anonymous tip tl~atIrad led to the searcl~l~adindicated that the suspect was involved witl~guns and 11admade threats. The agents waited for tiye to ten seconds after knocking before breaking down the dool: Tl~e Court l~eldtllat their actions were reasonable inasmuch a agents atleq~filtelynotified the occupants of agem' authoritg and pulpose, tl~e agents 11eard movenlent bel~inddaor after knocking, ~ n dtile agents feared for their safety because of the highly flanunable a d tosic chenucals inr.olve11i n rnetlmn~pl~etanrine production. U. S. u. A'oreikis 75. Specid agents of Bureau of Karcotics and Dangerous Drugs arriwl at the defendant's IIOIIIC with smrch \varrant at approsimately 11:30p. nl. Vken the agents arrived, the defendants were still up, so the agents waited outside until house became completely dark at about nidnigl~t.Once the house was qniet, the agents knocked on door, ~ n d ud1e11 door was uot answered within minute kicked door in. Tl~ecoul't l~eldthat the agents reasonably concluded that they Ilad been "refused adnuttam" w l m they broke down doors Eighth Circuit Uuitetl Stotes u Ontes '7 Tl~edefendant's actions, such as breaking bedroom window and tl~rowingbag of crack cocine outside, col~firn~ed his awareness that the police had entered the residence, and the police, having been informed that defendant m d xcon~plicepossessed firearms, kicked ill bedroo111door only after seeing a light under door and Ilearing n~ovemeutinside. UuitedSlntes u. Goodson 77. Forcible entry into a house did not violate the conmo~~-law knock-and-announce requirement w11ere the officers waited 20 seconds after !mocking 1011dly and announcing the officers' presence and purpose. The actions were considered reasamble, considering the size of the house, wl~icll\\.;tsa o n e - s t o ~ ~ ~ xhouse, n c h the potelltid tllat the residents could nus11 crack cocai~edown a toilet, and fact that a resident had a record for ;lssault with a deadly weapon. United States u. Ilon~kirrs 74 No-knock entry to esecnte warrant to search drug suspect's home was reasonable in ligla of the undisputed testimony that the house WIS barricaded by barred security doors and windows. U~ritedSt&s I , 111cht 79 Officers were const~~~ctirely refused admittam at homes of a dtxg defendants, since the possibility \\,as slight tlmt the defendants did not hear the officers or could not haw responded promptly if they had desired to do so. Tile defendants' 11011seswere small, tile defe~~dants were awake, tl~erewas probable cause to helieye that the defendants possessed inarcotics, and tlie officers mailed 20 seconds for response. Additiorally, the officers knew that the defendant 11ad completed a drug transaction witl~inhours before the search, he llnd a Iuding place for drugs wluch 11e considered undetectable, he liked the elemted locatioli of his l~omeso he could suwey the sorrountlings, weapons llad been f o ~ u ~indllis hotre on two pre\Sous searches, and he 11ad nlotion detector outside Ilonle. United Stntes u. Bflker 80. lo\n la\\'permits no-knock search warrants. The officers 11ad encountered a barricaded front door \\'hen executing a prior \\.arrant, a ~ l dtile i~lformantsw11o made co~~trolled buys leadu~glo the warrant reported that the front daor had been rebarricaded and tlm two dogs were inside. It is reasol~ablefor police officers to assume U~ritedStfltesI , dfoore that sospects selling illegd drugs UI ssmd quantities from a residence tl~at Itas eorlnal plun~bingfacilities will attenlpl to destroy those drugs if officers knock before searcl~narrant is executed. UnitedSfnfes 11. Troq a? Oficers esecuting warrant to search duplex for d q s mere justified in failing to annollnce tl~eirpulyose after Iu~ocking and identit)ing tl~eniselvesand before breaking do\w doors by the fact that announcing their purpose would llave been a useless geshlre where officershiew that the duplex 11adbeen referred to as drug house, the officers believed that the duplex WLSfortified and tl~arthe defendants were nionitoring the area around the duplex, and tile oaice~sknew that an undercover drug transaction 11ad occurred that day ii~volvingcocaine from the duples. tion of evidence or escape may u,eU demonstrate an exigency, mere unspecific fears about those possibilities wlll not. Were they enough, the knock and announce statute would have been judicially amended to exclude virtually all narcotics-based cases. It has not been. Yet each of the concerns alleged in this case is of just that nature For example, the police had no information that methamphekmh~elaboratoly was then being opeIraledon Becker's premises. Indeed, given the fact that his associates' homes had been searched two months ea~.lierand that he had been questioned by p'olice, hewonld have been exceedingly foolhardy if h~ had still bee11 operating a laborxtory at that site at that time. The police had been on the premises but hadnever seen or smelled one there, and the last cook they knew about had taken place at Becker's home in November, 1988. Yet, one of the expressed fears was that Becker might have an active laboratory and that those wen! sometimes boobpapped. As it turned out, life followed logic; Becker had no operating methamphetamine lab. Rather, he had, if anything, attempted to destroy all'evideuce of the lab long before the raid ever took place. Of cou e, we recognize that what was dis~o\~aed later is not relevant to assessing police activity at the time of the ently. We mention it only to empilasize the fact that the clahned f m was simply a generalized and non- specific one 4 i Also, although there was no specificinformalion that Becker IanseII was armed or &mgerom, the oRlcns decided that he might be. l\vo v month earlier the police had se~vedwarrants at lus associates' homes. Proper knock and announce notice was given and the searches took place without incident Howe er,guns were found. That is far from showing an exigency regardi~igMc Bccker, a person who was then 42 years of age and had, to all appearances, led alau- abiding, even exemplary, life up until this series of incidents. None of this describes even a mild exigu~cy,much l e s a11exigency juMyii~ghrcaking into a f m i l y home twly one nlonling wi~huutcompl)ing dl11 lhe simple :hd ancient requirenlem 1 I ~ the t t~llic~r "oud~t " to sienikti~e " , ~ o s ofc his comine. " anti tonlake request to open doors" before he breaks in. 114, In another case, OizifedStrifes u. FIuk~~er '15, a substa~~tid poriion of the gnvenlnlwl's w c consislerl of tiidence arcll~iretl~ i ~ ~ rai n g seardl of lhe ailartnvnts of aoorllanls Y O I I I I :ud ~ Mukec I'rior lo irial. the district co& denied appEiants' motions to snppress the evidence obtained dndngthe searches 116.The defendant appealed~ru'inga 11un1ber of issues involving the correctnessof the district court's ruling on the motions to suppress. SpeciGcally they a p e d that the n~etl~od ie which thc search warmt was executedviohted 18 U.S.C 8 3109 "7. llte evidence at trial showed that federal agents obtained a senucl~w a r ~ non t the basis of info~mationgiven to them by an u~fo~mant "8. The agents approached the conlmon doorway at flie bottom of the staus and forced it openwithoutany annomlcement '9. After kicldng the conlmon doomy in, thc agents were at the door to Young's apattment, which the district contt found was at least pattially open '20. The agenls then announced themselves and ordered the occupants of the apartment to fi.eezevirhlally~imllltan~ou~ly with their enhyinto tlie a p d e n t itself lZ1.Dndng the searcll, a quantity of narcotics was found Iz2. The Ninth Circuit held that no evidence had been cded to the Court's attention wluch would support a suspicion that the narcotics allegedlyin the apartment were in the process of being destroyed; on the contraty, the informant's report was that the inhabitants were in the process of cuning the heroin and prqa~ingit for distribution, and there was no indicatio~that they were expecting the anid of h g enforcement agents 123, Nor d ~ da ~ ofy the searching officers testify that they heard any sounds of running feet or other suspicious activityfrom d u n Young's apartment, beyond the door The government also contended that under Ninth Circuit law compliance wit11 5 3109 is excused when that complimlce might alert a suspect and incrme the officer's peril, citing Gilbert u. United Stnta~ 125.111reviewing this contention the Court concluded that the suspect in Gilbert sought by the police du~ingtheir search was beheved to have shot and N e d a police oacer dul.inga bank robbery that same mortllng Iz6. Here, by contrwt, the evidence revealed at ttllal that one of the persons suspected by theDEA agents to bc in Young's apartment on the day of the search owned a gun was simply not suftlcient; it was clew that Stone had apermit for the meapon and there was no evidence thathe had ever been convicted of illegal possession of firearms or of use of kkear.n~slu the conunissionof a crime 127. The Court held that file mere fact that he possessed a guu camlot bemd to have reasonably supported a belief that he was armed at the time of the search ox that he constih~teda threat to the office~s'safety '28. In Unitedstates u. Lucht 129 several men~be~s of the Omha Chapter of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club were convicted in the United States District Court for the Dist~ictof Ncbmska of consphq to dist~ibute methan~phetanline'so. Search warmlts uwe executed sinn~ltaneously at owly all of the defendants' homes at 7 00 a.m., October 17, 1990. On appeal seven of the defe~~dants challenge the district court's denid of their n~otionsto suppress evidence seized in the searches '3l. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the disttict court's findings supporled the court's conclnsio~~ that officers had been constructively refused admittance at the homes of defei~dmtsRodney Rumsey,Kemethlucht, and Sandra Volkir '32. With respect toVolldr ald Rmnsey, the court fouud that theirlmnses were small, fhc occupants were awake, there was probable cause to believeVokir a11d Rulnsey possessed narcotics, and the officer% waited hvcn.cntyseconds for a response after knocking and annouucing their p ~ w e ~and ~ c epurpose 133. The Court of Appeds held that in these circl~mshncesthe possibili~ywas slight that the defendants did not hear or could not have responded promptly, if iu fact they had desired to do so 134. I11 Lucht's case, the court fonnd that his house urassmall, the officers knocked loudly on the door and announced their presence and purpose '35, The officers bad probable cause to believe 1.ucht possessed narcotics, and the office~swaited hventy-he to sixty seco~~ds for a response 136. Altllough the officers heard nothing to indicate Lncht was awake, they testified that they were aware that he was on parole and, therefore, especially sensitive to a knock aud amom~cementfor a search 3 Althoough Lucl~targues that mere silence m o t be construed as access denied, The court of Appeals ejected that augc~mentnoting that mxly if ever is there an afBrmafive refusal. "More oiten the officers meet with silence as the occupants seek to destroy evidence or escape." The court, therefore, concluded that the officers' condwt con~pliedwith $ 3109 '39. The district court found that, although office~sannounced their presence and purpose at the homes of defendantsApkes Dale Ray Haley, and Maiyke, tlqdid not wait long enough to ulferrefusal ofadmittance I4O. Thc district court concluded, hourever, that exigent circumstances excc~sedthe othenvise improper ent~iesand refi~sedto suppress the seized evidence 141. cun~sla~ces to obviate the obligation to respect the federal knock and amounce statute .@ ' I Holding that tl~eactions of tI~eoffice~sin failing to follow the dictates of § 3109 were unreasonable, the Court reversed aud remanded tl~ecause '81. take a concerted effort and diligent advocacy at the trial level to establish that a defendant's home or dwelling, 5 which he has both a property interest and a light of privacy, has been the subject of an u~easonable "no knock" ently in violation of the defendant's constin~tiondand stahltory rights before any question of a remedy is even reached. Burden of Proof and Persuasion Application of the Exclusionary Rule A challenge to the reasonableness of a no knock ently to exe- cute a warmlt is not a hopeless cause. Thc success or failure of such a challenge ltinges on the development of the facts in the tlid court to show that the action of the office~sin executing a no-knock forcible ently was unreasonable under the unique facts and circumsta~~ces of each case. This places the burden on trial counsel to make a sufficient showing of unrmonableness to entitle tl~eaccused to relief. Clearly, the question ofmho has the burden of proof, and what that burden is, will be of pa~xn~ount importance. While traditional 1111es suggest that where the Statdgovernn~entis relying on exigent circumstances to support their actio~~s they haw the burden of proof ISL. Yet where an accused challenges the reaso~~ahleness of any action by a law enforceme~~t officer i implenenting andlor execuling a smcl~krrest Does the sl~owu~g of an unreasonable enfly into tl~ehome invoke the exclusioncuy rule? R is by now well established that all evidence seized in violation of the federal constitution is inadmissible. I97 How this doctrb~eimpacts OII ently without a prior knock and a~~nouncements is by no means cleal: In I V h the argument was made that the remedy of suppression should not be imposed because the evidence seized nsascasually disconnected h o n ~any constihltiollal violation The Com't noted that this argument nras of an una~ouncedentq! made in the mnici briefs, but the Court declined to address it. '99 In a pre- 1~lsou/Richflrdscase, U~ritedStlrtes u. Rnmierez *@J, the Supreme Court again noted that there was an issue as to wl~ether "there was sufficientcasual relationship behveen the braking of the wln- seeks lo exclude evidence on the basis of a Fou~ll~ hnendme~~t ~iolation, the burden of proof is on the defendant. Is4 The defendant nmst produce evidence that defeats the presumption of proper police co~~duct and thereby shift the burden of shoving that the ofice~sacted reasonably uuder the ckcomstalms to the State. '85 Atst, of course, the accused mllst show that the police failed to knock and amounce their preseoce and pulpose before making their ently Proof of UI unannounced hard enhywiu probably not shift the burden to the prosect~tionin Texas state courts 186. Counsel must be prepared to go fonvard nil11 additional evidence and a~gu~nents concer~ting the piu.ticular ci'cumsla~lcesof the case at issue. Next, counsel must be prepared to show that the actions of the office~s\\ere, m~derthe particular circumstaoces, "unrmonable". Tlus means that the defendant will bear the burden of presellting evidence that there xerc no exige~gelttcircumst;u~cesthat would support a deviation bom the conlmon law requirement that an officer knock and annomlce his authority and intc~~tions before bashiug down the door Specific attentiall should be addressed to the gene~xllizeedargunletlts ad\anced and rejected in Ut~itedStafesv. &/a, and U~zitedStatau. Becker. I87 Com~selsbould also be mindful of the specific presewation of error 1r11esin Tesas. To present any complai~~t for appellate revien: an objection at tiial or 011 a motion to suppress must not only identify what is objected to, but must also set forth s~ecificg r o . ~ ~ ~ ~ dFor s . an issw to be presenwl for re~iewupon appeal, the specific ground identified at trial md presented to the trial judge for a ruling must be the same as the ground alleged in a point of emor 011 appeal. this regard, com~sel lation of either the Fourd~Amendment or 18 U.S.C. $3109, the Coml found no reason to consider the application of tlw esclusio~~a~y rule. Texas has a long Msto~yof applying its own statutoly exclusio118q 111le. Yet the G m t of Criminal Appeals has never excluded evidence on a violation of the knock and announce rule. In Johnson u. Stflte,2" the Texas Court of C~imiualAppeals held that "the attenuation doctru~eis appliplicable to hlicle 38.23's prohibition agai~steevidence 'obtained' in violatio~~ of the law because evidence sufficiently aftelmated from theviolation of the law is not considered 'obtainec? therefrom." It is reasooable to co~~clude that in order to have the courts apply the exclusionaly mle to evide~~ce seized after m~ u ~ r ~ s o n athe b l failure e to knock and announce it wouldfkst be necessary to shon~tl~at evidence was seized as a result of that violation. 111 order to premil, com~selshould be prepared to show how tile violatio~~ of the common law ktlock and amounce rule, or for that nlatter art. 15.25, C.C.P., resulted in the office~s"obtaining" eridence illegally Otllenvise it may not matter if the police officers executing a n7ar~xnt crash the door down, kick the door down, shoot the door down or bum the door don^^. '91, 15.25 and 38.23 bIt11e exa as Code of ~rin~in;tl procedure in addition to presenlillg sufficient facts to shon' that the failure of the officcn to knock and a ~ u ~ o u md ~ ~ cthat e tltis fdure was uorezsonable under the C~~CIIIIIS~~IIC~S. y Coutlsel n~ustbe prepared to establish "standing" to contest the officers' actions. 'g2 Stmdlding is based on property interest andreasonable expectation ofprivac '93 WWle inqui~yinto"stasding" has been officially abandoned 194,the inquily now is whether defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, nluch is functionally the same as determining if the defendant has standing. h order to nrevd. the accused has burden of shonu~ethat he had an iinterest in theprope~~ty sufficient to ellable him to compku of the law enforcen~ent officer's inwsion of tl~atproperty '95. Counsel must be prepared to show that the accused had a reasonable eqectatioa of privacy in tl~eplace entered to complai~~ of whether enflywas reasonable I s . In short, it will Conclusion The knock and annoullce rule currently appears to be a right without a remedy The U~utedStates Supreme Court has been unequivocal in blessing the knock and anloonce rule in theo~ywhile nt the same time refusing to specify wl~at,if any, relief a defendaut might apect under the Fourth Amendment for aviolation of that mle. Texas law is uncharged territoq largely resulting form a dearth of published case law and an UICOIIsistent aonroach in addresine" these issnes hv theTexas Court of Criminal Appeals. The plethora of drug cases in tl~ecrin~mdjustice s)Wm furtl~er complicates the issue, since cou~lsappear to be w i h ~ to g go to any length to uphold a co~~victio~~ where drugs are involved. Firearms present even Inore complicalio~~s, since the presence of guns \\dldmost surely justify a "hard" emly 011 the basis of presenPationof the officer's sdety h short, courts appear predisposed to find either 110Fourth Amendment violatiot~ on the basis of "reasonableness" of the elltly or no h a m based on evdence discovered after the e r t Any ~ ~application of the esclusiona~yride, either by the United States Supreme Co~~rt or Texas courts, is a matter suit Z O cold ~ , comfort to nu inmate doing 99"to life.' " Footnotes 191 (1998). * '3 See, e.g: Terry u. Olno, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 C.Ed.2d 889 B.A., University of Tesas at Anstin,J.D., 1977, University of Texas School of Law. Mr. \Veaver is currently an Adjunct Professor of Law at Texas Weslepi U~uversitySchool of Law, and also a Consulhg Attorney in LhlIas, Tesas. He is a n~emberof the State Bars of illisso~~ri and Te.~as,as well as immerous federal district and appellate courts, ihcluding the United States Supreme Court, mid has been Board Ce~lifiedin Criminal Law by tlie StateBar of Tesas since 1983. Mr. Weaver is a fonner Assistant Atto~ueyGenecxl (Enfo~~ement Division), a former Assistant District Attorney for Ddas County, and is retired from the U. S. Navy JAGC. Pirates of Penzance, Sir \V. S. Gilbert, Act I1 (1879) 2 See Id 3 See 3 W. Blackstone, Con~mentaries288 (a man's liouse is "his castle of defense and asylun~");Coke, third Institute, cap. 73 ('For a Alan's h o w is his castle, e t dotnus sua cuique est tritissirrtrin~refrririm") See Se)vr?a)~tle's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eiig. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603), wluch held tliat "when the King is a palv, the sheriff (if tlie do015 be not open) may break h e parly's house, either to a l m t him, or * to rake request to open doon ..., for the law without a default in the owner abhors the dest~uctionor breaking of any liouse (which is for the habitation and safety of mm) by which great damage .and incotnwience rnigl~tensue to the party, when no default is in lum; for perhaps he did not !sow of the process, of wllich, if Ile had notice, it is to be presumed tliat he would obey it ...." Id., 77 Eng. Rpt. at 195-196 5 Some states simply adopted English conuuon law in t l ~ absence e of specific statutes to the contlmy See N. J. Const. of 1776, $22, in 5 Federal and State Co~istih~tiO~l~ 2598 (E Thorpe ed. 1909) ("The common law of England...sllall still ren~ai~i in force, until lit1 s l ~ be d altel-ed by afuture law of h e Legislahlre"); N. Y. Const. of 1777, Art. 35, in id., at 2635 ("ssc11 parts of the con~nron-lawof England... as... did form the law of [New York 011 April 19,17751 sl~aUbe and contime the law of this state, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of flus State shall, froni time to time, make concerning the same"); Ordinances of May 1776, ch. 5, $6, in 9 Statutes at Large of Vbginia 127 (W. Hening ed. 1821) ("the common law of England... shall be the 1111e of decision, and s l ~ dbe l c o n s t ~ ~ as ~ ehi d full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colon^'). Other states enacted specific statutes dealing with ently by police office13illto prlmte dnrehgs. See, for esample, Act ofNoK8,1782, c11.15, P6, in Acts and Laws of Alassaclnrsetts 193 (1872); Act of Apc 13, 1872, ch. 39, $3, in:1 Laws of the State of New York 480 (1886); Act of June 24, 1782, ch. 317, $18, in Acts of the General Assembly of New Jersey (1784) (reprinted in The Pint Iaws of the State of New Jersey 293-294 0.Cushing, comp. 1981)); Act. of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 925,S5, in 10 Statutes at large of Penns)hnia 255 0. Micliwl and H. Flande~s,conip. 1904). Early court decisions dso recognized ihe c o t m o ~law i knock and announce principle. Iltdker u. Fo.Y, 32 Ky 404, 405 (1834); Ri~rtonu. Wilkirrso~t,18 Vt.186,189 (1846); fhe/l a KrtNe~PeId,58 hIm.302,305 (1849). Seege~~eml!~:Blakey, The Ruie of Armoance~ne~tt firid Un/arrfrrl Entry, 112 Un. Pa. I.. He! 499,504-508 (1964) (collecting cases) U.S. CONST. AbLhEhTD. 4: Tlle right of the people to be secnre in their pelsons, houses, papers, and effects, against tr~treaso~mble searches and seinwes, shall not be violated, and no Warrants s11d issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, m d the pelsons or tlungs to be seized. (Eniphasis added) 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) 1Vilso~u. Arkaltsas, 131 L.Ed. 2d at 983-984. 9550 US. 385,117S.Ct. 1416,137 Z.Ed2d615 (1997) lo137L.EdZd 622, 1,. 1. I' Richards u. IVisconsir?, 137 L.Ed.2d at 624. l2UrritedStates 11. Rmneriz, 523 U.S. 65, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed. 2d ' (1968) (Stop mid frisk); GO-BartI,r@orting u. UnitedStates, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (Jntensive and extensive search of office.); Kre~rrertu. United Stntes, 353 US. 346, 77 S.Ct. 828, 1 hEd 2d 876 (1957) (Search of entire 11o11seincident to wrest.); Chime1 u. Colijbrxia, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct, 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) 61 &ed &tes, 331 U.S. 145, 67 s i t . i098, L . E ~ 1$$9 . (1947) (Search in envelope for forged checks not too intense.); 1'6arrfl u. Ilii~~ois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338,62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (Valid search wanxnt to search premiscs and one named individual docs not autlioriac the searcli of other persons on the prcnlises. Valid pat down under T ~ J , u. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), n m t be based on a reasonable belief that the person is armed and presently dangerous.); Michigan u. Srirmers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587,69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (Avalid searchwarrant to search for contmband carries with it by in~plicationthe right to detain occupants of the prenlises w11ile a proper search is conducted even iftl~ey are outside the home. WIietlier same rule applies in searcli for evidence not decided.); Arizona u. Hick, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (Officer propedy searching for one who fired a sliot in a building, for vjctims and for weapmls, may not under tlie pplain view doctrine mow stereo components, wlucl~tliey ody suspected to be stolen, in order to read and record serid nnuibe~s.This constih~tedan intnlsion not justified by the esigency authorizing the enty Could read numbels if not necessay to move the i t e m Immediately apparent requirement of the plain view doctrine to a111horir.e sein~rerequires probable cause. Reasonable suspicion not enoug11.). 14Joseph u. State, 807 S.W.2d 303 (Tes. Crini. App. 1991) 5 ' See I8 U.S.C. $3109 and Tex. Code Crim. Pmc. Ann. art. 15.25 (Vernon's 1967) 16338ST2d 732, 170 Tar. Crirn 142 (Te.v. Crim. App. 1960) 17Al~itezu.State, 461 S.\V.Zd 609 (Tea. Crim. App. 1970) l8 Tes. Health & Safety Code $481.104 '9 See Id. at 612 20 See Id. at 612. Article 18.18, Verno~l'sAII~.C.C.~ was the predecessor to the current Tes. Code Crim. Proc. h i , art. 15.25 (Vernon 1967) discussed i~fra 21~1fc~a~y U. State, 477 S.K2d 624 (Tes. Crim. App. 1972) 22 See Id at 626 23 Ellerhee u. State, 631 S.Wd 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The holding in Elierhee regarding amending indictment superseded by constihltional aniendment, 1Vnrd u. Stnte, 804 S.\V.Zd 204 (Tes. App.-Tesarkana 1991), petition for discretionay revie\\, refused (Apr 24, 1991), review witlidrawn (May 01, 1991), petition for discretionmy review gnnted (May 01,1991), Judgmenrreversed, Wirdu. State, 829 S.\V.Zd 787 (Tes. Crim. App. 19921, rehearing on petition for discretiona~yreview denied (May 20, 1992) Civil cases are deerl~edinstructive, bill 11ot binding in critnind cases. See, e.g.:Aiuarez ir State, 605 S.K2d 615,617 (Tes. Crim. App. [Panel Op.1 1980) 978 S.W.2d 674,677 (Tea. App. Eastland, 1998 pet refd.) see Id at 676 Z7SeeId at 676 28 See Id. at 676 "See Id at 676 3O Seeld. at 676-677 .''See Id at 677 32See Id. at 677 33 19ickvare u. Slate, 1998 \Vl 315620, *4 (Ten. App.-Dallas Jun 17, 1998) (NO. 05-95-01767-CHI, petition for discretiona~yreviewgw~~ted Ua1113, 19991, judgment vacated Om1 13, 1999) in uorepo~tedopinion 34 UnitedStatcs u. Sings,; 943 E2d 758, 762 (7111 Cb. 191) " I APRIL 200% W . T C D I . A . C O M VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE I 147 35See Id at *4 36 TVi'IIian~su. Skite, 1999 WL 170813, *2 (Tex. App: Dallas, 1999) (unpublished) u. Carlisle, 928 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Port Worth Jun 27, 1996) reheariu~overruledIAua . 15.,1996). . . .' writ denied IDec 11. -. 1996) -., cert. denied &isle Robinett, 118 S.Ct. 74, 139 L . E ~ . z33,65 ~ USLW 3840, 66 USLW 3225,66 US1.W 3255 (U.S. Tex. Oct 06, 1997) (NO. 96.~ 1993) 89111 District Court, Wichita County, J u h t a Pavlick, J. 39 Colorado: People u. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554,484 P.2d 1238,1241 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); Ma~ylandHenson u. State, 236 hm. 518, 523-524, 204 A.2d 516, 519-520 (1964); North Dakota: State u. hmk,209 N.VT2d 772, 777-778 (N.D. 1973); New York: People u. De ,%go, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 213 N.E.Zd 659, 661,266 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1966) (similar rule for searches related to gaiibling operations), cert. denied, 383 U S 963 (1966) 40 Tex. Code Crini. Proc. Am. Art. 15.25 (Vernon 1967) u. State, 568 S.W.2d 847, 858 (Tex. Crim. App.), .. cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978) 42 The Court of Criminal Appeals did not discus the conmon law knock and announce rule hi its decision in Jones $3 Pork u. Stale, 738 S.W.2d 274,276 (Tex. Crin~.App. 1987) 4*Ifo~~eueu, see a n d cornparve: 0owens.u. State, 861 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. App. -Dallas 1993, no pet.). ("The exclusiona~ylanguage of article 38.23 applies only if an officer or other person obtains evidence in violation of either tlie constitutio~~s or laws of the United States or tl~eState of Texas. Therefore, for an accused to obtain the protection of article 38.23, the policeniust haveviolated either the constitutionsor laws of the United States of the State of Texas .... [Wle conclude under the specac facts of this case that article 38.23 do& not provide [the defendant] greater protection than either the Fou~ihAmendment of the U~utedStates Constitution or article I, sectiou 9 of the Texas Constitution." U. stnle, 1997 WL 111068 (T~x.~pp.-HOUS.(14~lD1st.)NO. 14-93-00994-CR delivered March 13, 1997) PDR rePd 46Pifts u. State, 1992 WL 91283 (Tex. App: Hous. (14 Disl.) C14-9100348-CR delivered hiay 7, 1992) no PDK 47 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.06(b) (Verlion 1981) provides as FoUows: "(b) On searclkig the place ordered to be searched, the officer executing the warrant shall present a q y of the warmt to the owner of the plnce, if he is present. If the owner of the place is not pmeat but a person who is present is in possessiw of the place, the officer shaU present a copy of the warnit to the person. Before the officer takes property from the place, he shall prepare a written invento~yof the propeiiy to be taken. IIe shall legibly endorse his naue on tl~einventory and present a copy of the invento~yto the owner or other person in possession of the property. If neither the owner nor a personhi possession of the property is present when the ofticer executes the warrant, the oficer shall leave a copy of the warrant and the uiventoiy al the place." 48 The validity of a combination searcl~and arrest wa~&~ut was upheld in Pecintr u Stnte, 516 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crini. App. 1974). See also: Willtnn~su. State, 965 S.W.Zd 506 (Tex. CIUUApp. 1998); Bradlejl u. State, 960 s.\v.z~791 (~ex.App.-~l Paso, Aug 29, 1997); IVooldridge u. State, 1993 WL 438187, (Tex. App.-Dallas, Oct 25, 1993, NO. 05-9201256-CR, 05-92-01257-CR,u~ipublished);Blnck~iioiiu. State, 786 S.VT2d 467 (Tex. App: Hous. (1 Dist.) 1990);Adkins u. State, 1990 WL 2980 (Tex. App: IIous. (1 Dist.), Jan 11, 1990, NO. 01-89-00005-CR, unpublished). $9'9 interpreting statutes, the reviewing court nlust seek to effectuate the collective intent and purpose of tlie legidahlre. SeoBojkiii u. State, 818 S.W.2d 782,785 (Tex. Cruii. App. 1991); Tex. Gov't. Codehm. $311.003 (Vemon 1998). Thecour? must presume "the entire statute isintended to be effective." Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. 5 311.021(2). To do so, the court must focus on the text of tlie statutes aid interpret them in a literal manller attempting to discern the fair, objective meathig of the text. Id. It is the court's duty in intelpreting the statutes to give the ordinary aud p h i 37 Robinett ' -~ ones 1 . meaniug to the language wed by the legislature. See I d ; Sinith u. Sin@ 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. C~iiu.App. 1990); Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. $311.011. Where the stahltoly language is clear and unambiguous, the cou~lniust presume that the legislature meant what it expressed in the statute. See Coit u. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. C~im.App. 1991). Only when the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, or literal application of the language would lead to absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have uite~~ded, is tl~ecourt permitted to consider exlratemalfactors SeeBoj~kin,818 S.W2d at 785-86. 5O Whether failure of the trial court to exclude the evidence would be viewed as "harmless", of course, is a completely different matter. It is beyond the scope of his article to exhaustively deal with the Texas courts' application of the harniless error rule, however, counsel sllo~lldbe aware that the failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of arts. 15.25 and 38.23 would constitute a violation of a State statutes and not a constitutional provisions, hvoking the limited provisions of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2 (Reve~sibleError in Criminal Cases) which provides as fouows: Constitutional error. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error Uiat is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals nlust reverse a judgmeut of conviction or punishment unless the cou~ldetermines beyond a reasonable doubt Uiat the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishn~ent. As an "other error", an accusedu~ouldhave the burden to establish that the violation of this statutoly provision violated a "substa~itialright". v probably inipossible as t l ~ e Recent history suggests that such ashowingis current crop of appellate cou16 rarely if e er find a violation of a state statute to uivolve "substantial rights". Given the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling in jones, such a challenge would probably result in a Ending that the violatioil of the article w o ~ ~be l d harniless. 5l 996 E2d 320 (DC C t i 1993) s2 874 E2d 822 (DC Cir. 1989) 53 764 E2d 885 (DC Cir. 1985) 54 873E2d 7 (lSt01: (RI) 1989) 5s 848 E M 2 6 (211d Cir: (AY) 1988) F69 E3d 298 (3rdcir: (Pa.) 1993) 637R2d974 ~ i i(Pa.) : 1981) 58 439 EZd38l ( 3Ci,: ~ (Pa) ~ 1971) 59171 83d188 (4th Cir 1999) 163E3d 795 (dth Cir. (Ik) 1998) I' 3 2 f3d 876 (qfh C~I:(ilfd,) 1994) 5Z 133 E3d 358 (5111 Ci, (Tex.) 1998) 556 E2d 1265 (5b Cir. (Fla.) 1978) 447R2d575 (5lh Ci,: (Ila,) 1971) 55 158E3d913 (dh Ci,: (Ohio) 1998) 56901E2d 1351 (dhCir: (iWich.) 1990) 720 f 2 d 9 2 7 (8C~I:(ilfich.) 1983) 153 E3d 406 (7lh Cir. (111.) 1998) ;9 136 E3d 1160 (71h Cir (lU.) 1998) 100 E3d 494 ?.bI ' j$, (!I/.) 199Q 4 E3d552 (7 Cn. (Ins) 1993) l2 965 E2d 436 (71h Cir (Wis.) 1992) 3961E2d I265 (7th Ci,: (lVis.).l992) '$943 E2d 758 (7th 01: (Wk)199) '5 481 E2d 1177 (7l1l Cir. (Ill.) 1973) I6 173R3d 651 (8th Ci,: 1999) 77165 R3d 610 (& Ci,: (Iotutr) 1999) 102 R3d973 (dhCii: (Ark.) 1996) '9 I8 R3d54l (dhCi,: (i\bh.) 1994) ord " "" (sfl, Cir: (Iowa) 1994) 80 1 6 f 3 d 8 j 4 81 956 f2d 843 82 83 j f 2 d 1267 (@ Cir: (Xeb.) 1992) 37 See Id at 548 (dhCil: @lo) I988) (@ Cil: fiIIoJI972) (@ Cir: (Cd) 1997) 8559 f3d92Z (gtll Cir: (Ark) I9951 86 4 Z f ~ 16 d (yfl' Cir: (Cal.) 1970) 87 332 f 2 d I 9 (gf/, Cir: ( C d ) 1964) 88 106 E3d 936 (10~"Cic (Ran.) 1997) 89 713 f2d 623 (1ltl1 Cir (Pla) 1983) 90 UnitedStates u. Ronner, 874 4.2d 822 (DC Cic 1989) 91 Stokes u. State, 978 S.W.2d at 677 92 U n i t e d S i R u. Bates, 84 E3d 790 (6tL Cic (Tetu~.)1996) 93 See Id. at 792 94 See Id. at 795 95Seeld at 794.Seedso: Unitedsfntesu.Fike, 82E3d 1315, 132. (5t11 .. Cir IW6) ,,., and United Stntes u. 111Nello: 902 E2d 336. 344 (5 C I ~ . 1990) holding that the burden is on the jefendant to sh& by some evidence that an una~u~out~cetl ent~yactually occmred. Only dter the defendmt makes a prime facie c a e that the &eged unannounced entry actually occurred does the gwerlunent have a burden to justify their actions by showing that the unannounced eutly ma, under the circnmstances, re;\sonable 96 See Id at 795 97 See Id. at 796 98 See Id. at 796 99 see i d at 796-7 LoOSee Id at 795 '0' See Id at 795 lo2 UnitedStrrtesU. B ~ c k l '23 , E3d 1537 (91h Ck. (Ore.) 1994) '0.3 See Id. at 1538 104 See 111. at 1 538 '05 See Id at 1539 106~eeId, at 1539 '07 See Id. at 1539 108 See Id. at 1539 109 See Id. at 1539 " 0 See Id. at 1538 111 Seeld at 1539 See Id at 1543 " 3 See Id at 1540 " 4 Seeld at 1539-1541 (iaternd cilatiolts omitted) 115 543 E2d 709 (9Ih Cic (Alaska) 1976) 116~eeIdat 711 "'Seeld. at 711 " 8 See Id. at 712 119Seeld at 712 IzOSeeld at 712 121 Sea Id at 712 lZ2Seeldat 712 '23 See Id at 717 lZ4 See Id, at 712; Cf. United States u. ~IIf~nning, on r e l ~ ~ r i terr l g hallc, 448 E2d 992 (211 Cix 1971), cer%denied, 404 U.S. 995,92 S.Ct. 541,30 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971) 125 366 EZd 923 (9th Cix 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922, 87 S.Ct. 2123, 18 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1967) 1 2 6 ~ e e latd 717 "27See Id. at 717 83 462 F2cI 1293 84 IIOE3d716 tl, 3aSeeld at 548 citing L7nitedStatesu. Ortiz, 445 E2d 1100, 1102 n. 2 :I0111 Cir.), cert. denied, 404 4,s. 993, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 1..~d;Zd545 11971) 39SeeId at 548 40 See Id at 548 See Id at 548 42 See Id at 549 43 See Id at 549 4 4 ~ e led at 549 *5 See Id at 549 4 6 ~ e e l dat 550 47Seeld at 550 48SeeId at 550 ' 4 9 ~ eId e at 550 I5oSee Id at 550 151Seeld at 550 152Seeldat 550 15SSeeId at 550 154See ~ dat, 550 I55 See Id. at 550 156~eeld.at 550 157Seeld at 550 I58Seeld at 550 I59 See Id at 550 I a ~ c c l dat 550 161 See Id at 550 162 See Id. at 551 163 see Id at 551 See Id. at 228 167 see ld. at 228 168See Id. at 229 '69 see Id at 229 170 See Id, at 229 17' See Id. at 229 172 See Id. at 229 173SeeId. at 232 174 See Id at 231 175 See 1d. at 231 176 see Id. at 231 177SeeId at 231 '78Seeld. at 231 179 See Id. at 231 180Seeld at 231 Ia1 See Id at 233 182 Unitedstates u. Bntes, 84 E3d 790 (601Cir. (Term) 1996) '83 \Vim a defendant seeks to exclude evidence on the bais of a Fourth hendn~cntviolation, the burden of proof Is on the defendant. R~rssellu. St&, 717 S.R2d 7,9 (Ter. Crint. App. 1986) 184 Id. 185 Id ~ ~ A l t l ~ o ucounsel g h should be prepared to ar@wthat it does, citing to United Stales v. Bates, 84 E3d 790 (61h Cir. (Te~m.)1996), United States u. Fike, 82 E3d 1315, 1 23 (5th Cic 1996) md Ut~itedStatesa .. 1990) ilinelle,.. 902 E2d 336.344 (5t1 CII. '87 25,27, snpra 188Jackson u. Stnte, 745 S.W.2d 4, 5 at 11. 2 (Tex. Crim. App 1988); Thotnns u. State, 723 S.\Wd 696, 700-701, 705-706 (Tex. Cliul. r\pp. 1986); Cisneros u. State, 692 S.Wd 78,83 (TXA 1986); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 189 D e B h c u. State, 799 S.m2d 701, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); siip 'JoSeelrl.at 541,545 131 See Id. at 548 132 See lrl. at 548 133See Id at 548 '34 See Id. at 548 1 fbot~ns~r Skrfe,723 S.Wd at 705-705;Goodmanu. State, 701 S.W;3d 850,862563 (Tex. Mm. App. 1985);TEX.R APP. !l 33.1; TEX. R CR. WD. 103 1%ARTICLE I, Sec. 9, TEX.CONS. "The people sM be secure in thdr perso~ls,houses, papers and possessions, fmm all nnremnable seimres or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to 6ett.e any person or thing, shalI issuewithoutdescribing thorn as near as maybe, norwithout probable cause, supported by oalh or &ation." See also: G&g u St&, 640 S.W.2d 899,900-01 (Tex. Ct%.App. 1982)."Article Iz89 of our Bill of Rights guarantees security of the people 'in their persons, houses, papers and possessions' against unreasonable seizi~lrsaud s m h e s , and it mandates that 'no wmank... to soleeany person or thin^ shdl issue uivill~outdwribing illem ac near as may be, nor withuut pnrh: able cmse...'Article 1.06, I(:CPI provides the s:mie slmtoly protcrtion." An interesting question, beyond the smpe of this arfice, is whether the T m ConstihNion would peovide greater protection in this area 161m the United Sates Comtihctioa. InHeit~nflnU. W , 8 1 5 S.W;2d 681 (Tcx. W.App 1990), the Court of Cdminnl Appeals held that, in solue situations, Tmc. COINST. Art. I, 49 may provide greater proteetion than the Fourth Amendment. See, Affran u. Sfate, 887 S.X2d 31, 36 (Tex. Grim. App. 1994) (greater protection in someeantninecseatches); see also Dmnporr u Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 47-10 (Tm. 1992) (Tmas Supreme Court aclmowledging thq theTexas consiitutionextends greater freed on^ thm the Federal Comtih~tion) TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN M. 1.06, " S w c l and ~ ~ Seizures. The people shall be secue in theic persons, houses, papen m l pmessio~~s from all weasonable seizures or searches No warm111to sead~any place or to seize any p s o o or thing shall issue without describimg tlle~n as near as may be, norwWout probable causesupported by oath or errmation." W & m u State. 1999 \m. 170813., "2 .(Tex. Am- Ddas.. 1909) ., (unpublished) '3United Stat@ U. PdJIia, 508 U.S. 77, 113 S.Ct 1936, 123 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993) bar curim 1 9 P ~ i l i gu.i Kenfudk, 4 8 US 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 LEd.2d 633 (lgso).See also: ~WSOII u, Sfatel692 S.Ezd661,667 (Tex. Crlm. App. 1984) (citi~gRawfingsu. Kvnfucky) '95 Id. ; Goehring u. 8tflatL:627 S.W.2d 159,164-165 (Tex. Crh. App. 1982) l~~easo~blenessofexec~~tion o f w ~ z seems h to depend upon theleason for and object of the search. O'Conno~u. Or@a, 480 U.S. 709,107 S.Q. 1492.94 L,Ed.Zd 714 (1987) Vdidityis ~iotdependent upon probable cause but on a gene~tdstandardsf renrolrableness I97 Dauis u. Missfss@pi, 394 US 721, 89 S.Ct 1394, 22 LEd.2d 676 (1969).ACGorA Crittmdm u. St&, 899 S.W.24 668 (Tar. Crhn. App. L . 1€lo<) > ,,,- '98 IblIm u.Arknmsr8,514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 LMAi 984 n. 4 (1995) 'PM.The Court co~~cl~~dod that the pdice action was teasonable mder the clrc~unstmesthus t h a t was no need to address whether the exclusionaryrule should apply 2oo%'3KS. 65,118S.Ct 992,140LM2d191 nt l98-fJ9,n. 3 (199@ 20' Seeld. at 199, n.3. The Supreme Couourt fouiod in Knrneria that there was no Pou17h Amendment violalion, thus no need m consldec mhether the edusclusiona~yn~Ie applied, cfting1Vi3u. WIItirm,467 US. 431,104 SCt. 2501,81 LEd. 377 (1984) and WmgSnnu. Unitedstnles,371 US. 471,83 s.n.407~9L,E~.;M441 (1963) 2 0 Z ~ o h ou.nState, 871 S.X2d 744,750-751 (Tw. Qim. App, 1994) zo3 Where aclions of law enforcement tmreason,?ble, Pour111Amendment psotecb property as well as privacy and applies in the civil as wen as crimiml context Se*mres are cwered even if there is no search. Reaso~mhIenessof the se&~rurehere, SoIddu. Cook Couufy, SO6 6.8.56, 113 S.Q. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1993),not before the Court, but if not i ~ a m ~ ~ a28 b lU. e S.C. $1983 cM1rights action is a proper remedy. G.1U. Leusing Cot$. u. i7niredStatm, 429 US. 338,97 SXt. 619,50 L.Ed 2d 530 (1977) (1.R.S. agents may be liable for n l o q damages for umeasunable search.) to theu numbers in the comn~~uuty~ In all h k ~ o o d il, any County Conm~issioner'sCo~irtis approached about mcreasiug ju~ypay, all objechons will be based solely on fi~~anc~al grounds if a county, hke Daas Countv, has m under reoresenfedmmnntvmnm and reh~sesto ,increase jllry pay, the question remains whether tl~ereis any remedy under the United States Constitution. JURY ~~hckDIic~Ise~~g~fld~~aIPn fmm G80rgettounr U"il~~,$Lmtl C8,tter in 19% H e r ~ m f kb~wdbydIicI~eIS n Pnuer lo ask1 in lh3 reprwentatiot~sf rt~hite-collnrd~fett&t~Is Afw hroypnrs wirbMr Fmw~I ~ j o i f ~ e d f k F e d ~ ~ a I Public &?fender'sd o i c e in &I/m. Ajer SIX find me Lw~jem in fhFdernl PnbIicDejeder's OQm, be@rmed Brdett &dlrcPdre# ioiib WirrfBreden, also ~famtar&irfo~~tFedemIR~dIrc Defedrr Tl~eirpmericeis dewfedfa crimhmflidefa~~sa This article is mptfnnted withfootnotes. Apreuious wrsion npptnrd lust ~ t ~ o nroifhout th them. Apologies to (heAuthor and tk~nks for his contribution. On October 22, 2000, the Dallas Morning Xews published a statistical analysis of the conlpositionof juries in Dallas County. This analysis established, that m relation to their population in the county, HHispanics dramatidy under report for jnry duty. Tile study also showed that wlute residents are over represented anong jurors that report. Moreover, the study showed that the poor are under represented and the nc11 are over j u ~ ~The results of this sh~dyprobrepresented in Dallas ~ o ~ m t ypools.1 ably come as no snrprise to someone who rlrcgularly tries cases in Dallas County. %at is sigdcant about the study is now, for the first time, more than anecdotal evidence exists to establish tl~isunder representntioo of a minority group and lower income residents from the july poolz In addition, the Dallas Morning News survey established that those individuals who failed to report ovemheln~gdid so simply because they could 1101afford to report for jury setvice. Tl~estudy s t a b fished that individuals slm~n~oned who bave homehold incomes under $35,000 were disproportionately Hispanic. Dallas County pays jurors only $6.00 per day and State law does not require employers to pay many employees who are absent as a result of jwy semice. As a res~~lt, are conbonted with the clmice of foregoHispanic individual st~mmo~~ed ing the earnings necessary to meet niinimal household expenses or reporffi~g for jury service.3 Undoubtedly, the sihtation in Dallas County is nlirrored in many other counties tluo~~ghout the state of Texas As a matter of basic fairness, it is clear that people should not have to forego putting food on the table in order to exercise their ri&t to selve on a jury Most peoplc would also agree that as a matter of baic fairness, aHispanic defendant ought to have the opporh~nityto select a ju~yfrom apool of jurors that renects the proportion of Hispauics in the con~munityMdence exists hat if jurors were paid $40.00 per day for their smice, tiley would show up for ju~yduty in numbers proportionate A The Sixth Amendment of the United Slates Constilution g ~ m tees that a criminal defendant has the right to a speedy and public Nial by an impartial juty The Supren~eCourt has interpreted the Sixth Amendment's impartiality requirement to mean that a jury must represent a & cross-section of the commu~ity.~ The notion of an impartialpry is symbolized by a group composed of people representing the v experiences of a particular commmivarious values, viewpoints, and ty. To satisfy the representati e requirement of tile Sixth Amend ent, however, juries must be nadomly selected from the con~munity. b The fair cross-section requirement does not eatitlea defendant to a j~nythat mirros the conim~~nity and reflects the numerous distinclive groups present LI tile population Rather, the Sixth Amendment gz~mnteesa defendant the opportunity for a representative jury by requiring that jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or veniresfron~which 'ial courts dmw juries must not systematically exclude distinctiw groups in the community. If a j~ywheel, pool, panel, or venire systematically excludes distinctive goups, d~enthe resulting jury fails !a constihlte a fair em-section of the ~ommunity.~ ' Inhretl u. hlissourf, theSupremeCourt set forth a clear three part test to establish a prima facie case of the violation of die fair crosssection reqeqoirement: (1) tltat the group dleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the comnumnitr, (2) &at the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and rmsonable in relation to tlie nun~berof such pemns in the comuunily; and (3) that tllls under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. If a defenda~tsuccessfully proves that a p~inlafaciefair cross-section violation has occurred, the burden shifts to tl~eg o v m c n t to show that "those aspects of the jury selection process . . that r e d in the disproportioyte exclusion of a distinctive group" advance a signiGGmtstate interest. . There is no doubt that the group identi6cd in DaUas County, nmdy Hispanics, is a "distinctive" group in the community. MexbnAmerica~swith Spanish surnarues are a clearly identifiable class with a histoly of subjugation to discriminato~y There is also no doubt that an absolute statistid disparity of 18%between the percentage of Hispanics in the county and the percentage of Hispanics reporling csl;1bli41c>tIw 1lisp:tnirs are ~~ntlcr represe~~cd.(harts hare rouli~~ely mwdccl ll~rlan al)solutest:!t]stical dispari~yui o w IOX pcrrcllt meels the second prong of the test." Tl~ered issue iu Dallas Connty is whether this under representation is d ~ to~systematic e exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. On first consideration, one might tlliuk systematic exclusion to be s)nonymouswith a jury selection process which engages in intentional discrinhtion. This notio~~, however, would be mistaken. A defendant need not show puqoseful discriruiuaion; 11e "need only show that the jury selection procedure 'syste~~tically exchde[sl disiinctive groups in the community and thereby fail[s] to be a reasonable representation therwf."12 It nevertheless remains to be seen whether any court will cons~de?either failure to adequately pay jurors to caustihlte "systematic exch~sion." With respect to tlds issue, an imresting comparison may be made between the two grand ju~ycases, Cerrfu u. Texas and Hernandez Texas pmvides her with a "jury pool" for Dallas Count): This "jury pool" is computer data "downloaded" on a "c.d. ro~n"hat contains a list of Dallas County residents on the basis of voter registlntion information compiled by the State, and driver'slicense records compiled by the Texas Departmwrt of Public Safety,who are believed to be qualified joro~s.This database ofnames is pmgr;uurued to randomlygenerate the names which will comprise the ju~ysummons issued for my given week. The Dallas Moini~~g News tmcked tbe issuance of 13,612 sununons for the tint weekiu Mxch, 2000. It then ~andomlyprovideda qnestionndre to 400 and reported for jury of those people who responded to the sununons ma duty, tmd 400 people who failed to respond. The resdts of its analysis were bmed on this survey other articles fmm the M a s Morning News addressed this issue. One entitled "Duty Calls, Few Answr,'' published on October 23, 2000, reflected some of the infor tion gathered by the DaUas Morning News concerning the lintmcid dilemma many hdividuals are placed in when summoned for jury duty. The otl~erarticle, entitled "No Excuses," publisl~edOctober 24, 2000, reklected the New York experience in which j~ypay was increased md the sllmmons were enforced. In New York this grcatty increased the representation of minorities on juries and insured tbat defendants received a jiny pool reflectinga "fair cross-section" of tbe commutit): tomposition of the ju~ypool under the SMh Amendment There are two reason for tbis. First, a pFima facie showings under an "equdprotection" challenge may be rebutred by proof of an 8bsence to discriminate \'hereas under a Sixtl~Ame~~dnlent challenge once "sy6tematic exclusion" is shown, the stab must sbow "adequate justiscation" for the systemac excl~~sim. S#eJ~lsticeRehnq~Iist'sdissent in Dzwn. Because ''q3IematI on, one ic excl~~sion" does not necessarily m t d intentional discriminlf' avoids the problem of the State simply having the individ~~als respo~~sible for compiling the jwy pool testify that they do not intentio~~dly discriminate and thereby p r d Second, a Sixth Amendment challenge doesnot requhe that the defendant be a member of the under represented group. See Tqyior u b~dsisna,(n~aledefendant succcssh~lly challenges law that pamits the exclusion of women); and Peters u. Ki@ 407 U.S. 493 ( 1972) (case in wbicl~a white man was permitted to raise a challenge concerning tlte excIusion of blacks). ~ccordingto the Dallas Morning News xflcle, "Ehtra hioney Helps EL Paso Lure More Plospect~veJurols," publisl~edOctober 24, 2000, jury pay was increased to $40.00 per day, and the percentage of s from 22% to 46%. people responding to the s ~ m o n rose &g., Smith u. Taws, 311 US.128, 130 (1940). 61ki,'lor e. hisiana,419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 10 SeeHernandez u. Te.uws, 347 US. 475 (1954). 11 See United States u. Rodr&ue& 776 E2d 1509, 1511, (11th Cir. 1985); Urzitedstafes u. Clflord, 640 E2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981); UnifedStntesu. Tesf,550 E2d 577,587 (10tl1 Cie 1976). 12 See Duren, 439 US. at 363-64 n.26. I3644 S.W.Zd875 (Tx Ct. App - Am;ll.Illo 1982); NO. 08-17. 00503-Cr (Tx. Ct App. -El Paso 2000) 14fie "key man" system used in Texas at the time consisted of tbe state district judge appoint tl~reeto five pelsons to s e w as jury cornmissionels. These jury comrnissio~terswould t11cn select prospective juro~sfrom the community w110 fi1l0Ued tbe vaitous shh~totyrequirements for being a g m d juror See Ci~cdn~Ianos Unidosde Sfln Jmnu. Ifiidago Connp Grfnzdp~tyconmzissioners, 622 f.2d 807,810-11 (5th Cir. 1980). Tlus system of selection stands in contrast to a 'ply wheel" system by wbich the jurms are curdonfly selected. 1 5 ~ e n aecriminal ~ ~ defendant is better off challenging the APRIL 2001 ~WWW.TCDLA.COM ~ O I C EFOR THE DEFENSE 1 53 1 14TH ANNUAL RUSWDUNCANSEMINAR AGENDA JUNE 7-9 I N E 6,2001 6:OOPM EARLY RE6IStRAtION - BEAT THE M O R N I N G RUSH! PICK UP Y O U R MATERIALS EARLY! BALLROOM FOYER rnummnm, JUNE 7,2001 WELCOME C . 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