September 5: China Visit - Emerging Markets Illustrated

EMI 090514
“He who wishes to be rich in a day will be hanged in a year.” - Leonardo da Vinci
We are just back in the saddle from a two-week vacation deep into the ancient hill towns of Tuscany.
Despite having two small museum-hating children in tow, we spent several days in Florence, the
birthplace of the Renaissance. Built by the Medici, bankers to the Pope and the Goldman Sachs of their
day, the city was host to such incredible minds as those of Petrarch, Dante, Da Vinci, Michelangelo and
even Machiavelli, the patron saint of corporate intrigue. It being the month of August, all good Italians
had deserted the city for their vacation and left it to hapless, sweaty tourists, such as ourselves to figure
things out. Of the few shops open during the month I looked into Prada on Via de Tornabouni, which sits
easily and with panache next to neighbors Gucci and Dior.
PRADA – Don’t tell my wife
Hong Kong-listed Prada (1913 HK) is a storied brand with timeless appeal as we all know. However,
recent share price performance has not been so fashionable with the stock down 21% ytd,
underperforming the HSI by 27% and leaving shareholders feely rather poorly dressed. The company,
which gets as much as 30% of sales from China and Chinese tourists travelling overseas, is suffering a
double hammer blow from Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive as well as from a moribund European
economy flirting with deflation. Europe alone accounts for 38% of revenue, while Asia Pacific (excluding
Japan) is 36% and now is only growing at 2% (decreasing 2% at current exchange rates). Revenue growth
for Prada last year fell off a cliff to just 8.8%, compared to 29% growth the year before and SSSG was just
7%. Preliminary results for H1 2014 indicate the slowdown is continuing with revenues growing by 4% yy, (1% on constant exchange rates).
The sales slowdown, I believe is a temporary condition, and the stock is oversold. Q2 luxury spending, as
reported by Global Blue, the tax free shopping group, is down around the globe. Sales have dropped 3%
in value terms for the first time since the GFC in 2009. Spending by Russians plunged 18%
(understandable) and Japan fell by 16%. Chinese “globe shoppers,” as the company likes to call them,
however, managed to buck the trend and increase total spending by 9% during the period. While still far
below previously unsustainable spending growth rates of 30-50% witnessed earlier, the Chinese are
spending more, of which we will see further evidence later in this report.
Odd times in old Hong Kong
Andrew Riddick, of CLSA, reports in his latest eminently readable “ODD” note that Chinese tourist
arrivals to Hong Kong have dropped considerably as mainlanders don’t feel welcome there (join the
club, guys). June numbers show only single-digit mainland tourist arrival growth, the first time levels
have dropped this low in three years. Less free-spending cousins from across the border has a big
impact, as one can imagine, on HK retail sales which fell 3% in July. HK-based analysts are busy
downgrading HK retail names and the mood for that sector is “rather dour.” As many analysts who cover
Prada are based in Hong Kong, this may, I fear, color their view of the stock as well.
Last year, Prada devoted itself to building a bigger moat and increased capex by 75% to $611 mn –
almost equaling entire net income for the year of $627 mn. That is a phenomenal amount of investment
into the teeth of a systemic demand slowdown. Much of that was spent on opening 79 new Directly
Operated Stores (DOS). The DOS network has now reached 566 stylish places around the globe one can
buy leather.
What I don’t like
“Sometimes the best real estate deals are the ones you don’t make.” - Warren Buffet
However, almost a third of capex, or $182 mn, was spent on real estate. Prada has decided to purchase
two “prestigious retail premises in London and St. Petersburg.” London’s purchase is on Old Bond Street
and St. Petersburg’s brick and mortar investment can be found on Bolshaya Konyushennaya. While the
need to be seen in the right part of town is important to brand equity, owning significant commercial
real estate takes us away from core competencies of the Prada Group. This is dangerous and, well, we
have been here before.
In the late 1990s, CEO Patrizio Bertelli (husband of Co-CEO Miuccia Prada), acquired 9.5% of Gucci for
$260 mn in an effort to make Prada a stable of luxury brands, such as LVMH. Bertelli sold his shares at a
profit soon after when Gucci became a takeover target of LV Chairman Bernard Arnault and French
industrialist Francois Pinault. Encouraged by that foray into high finance, Prada then acquired majority
stakes in Teutonic brands Helmut Lang and Jill Sander for $140 mn. That same year saw the voracious
Prada then spend an additional $170 mn for an 83% stake in fuddy-duddy English shoe maker Church &
Company. And they weren’t done yet: shortly afterward Prada spent another $241 mn acquiring 25.5%
of debt-laden Fendi leaving Prada itself burdened up to the eyeballs in debt of $850 mn.
In 2001, Prada sold its Fendi stake (but then bought Italian brand Car Shoe). Five-years later the
company disposed of the Helmut Lang and Jil Sanders brands, both of which had proven expensive and
time-consuming disasters for the company. Today, Church’s accounts for less than 2% of revenues and
sales have been flat but this year turned positive. Car Shoe is smaller and was imploding nicely with sales
down 32% (2013) but this year has seen sales actually bounce a bit to achieve single digit growth. The
track record for Prada moving away from what they do best and acquiring other brands is less than
stellar and the recent asset-heavy move completely out of their area of expertise – fashion - and into
owning expensive buildings should be of some concern to shareholders.
It appears that real estate is not the only thing Prada hungers for. Apparently, the Group has a craving
that can only be satisfied by pastries. On March 14, 2014, Prada acquired 80% of Angelo Marchesi srl,
owner of an historic Milanese pastry shop. While I like cannoli as much as the next person, did we have
to buy a pastry shop? More importantly, what else is management looking at acquiring?
Interim results indicate a slight improvement in sales for Church’s and Car Shoe and shareholders hope
that continues as goodwill on the balance sheet still totals $504 mn. Given the frumpy performance of
these two entities, it is conceivable without a significant U-turn in sales impairment charges could be not
too far away.
What I do like
Miu Miu, the more youth-oriented sub-brand of Prada (taken from the nickname of CEO Miuccia Prada)
accounts for almost 15% of revenues and is a successful brand in its own right. Perhaps this is because
MM is an organic, in-house creation that works. I spoke to a fashion student from New York who is
entering the world of fashion forecasting about Miu Miu and how the brand is perceived amongst those
more fashion-conscious than myself (i.e. anybody). She respected the brand (“Awesome,” was her
description) and was surprised to hear it belonged to Prada. Unfortunately, no matter how “awesome”
Miu Miu may be, EBITDA margins of 17% are less than half that of Prada itself and sales last year were
flat (up 7% at constant exchange rates for H1).
Miu Miu opened 24 new stores last year and as greater scale is reached margins here could begin to
expand. Prada is really investing in this brand: Miu Miu stores total almost 30% of the DOS network vs.
revenue contribution of half that. As of yet, Miu Miu is not a growth driver for the company but this
could change. If we are seeing the first signs of demand recovery now with sales up 7% y-y, operational
leverage will begin to kick in and possible margin expansion may be something to look forward to.
Prada Armada growing nicely
There is a lot to like about Prada, despite recent misgivings and creeping acquisition lust. Gross margins
are an amazing 73.8% - and rising (2013), testament to the appeal and power of the brand. Prada is
moving away from a franchising model to owning more of their own stores. Directly owned stores now
account for 85% of net sales (2013), up from 82% in 2012. This will allow them to control the entire
customer experience and maintain more even quality across the board – the Prada Armada. In Asia
Prada has an enviable footprint and despite seeing weakness in Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea, Q2
sales for China “accelerated” and achieved 12% growth (constant exchange rates).
Prada still trades at a slight premium to the international luxury goods sector with a PE of 23.4x vs. an
average of 21.8x for the rest. ROE for Prada is slightly higher than peer group companies at 22.7% vs.
21.6%. While Prada has been pummeled it is enlightening to look at recent results for other luxury
brands with a similar cachet and global exposure and when we do it is clear to me the market is too
pessimistic.
Luxury jeweler Tiffany (TIF US) surprised the market with just reported better than expected results as
revenue climbed 7.2% last quarter. SSSG in the Americas jumped 8% and in Asia it climbed 7%. Europe,
as with Prada however, was weak with sales slumping 8%. Asia accounts for 25% of TIF’s total sales. TIF
is increasing capex by a fifth this year to $270 mn. Still, compared to Prada, TIF spent 65% of net income
on capex while Prada spent 100%. Tiffany has annual revenues of around $3.6 bn - almost the same as
Prada at $3.5 bn. Margins, however, are much lower, with GMs at TIF 58% compared to Prada’s
astounding 73% and net margins at Tiffany are as thin as their discounts: 4.5%, compared to 19% for
Prada. TIF trades at 23x PER, in line with Prada but with currently the same sales growth and much
lower margins. TIF is guiding for high single digit sales growth this year. Share price performance
between the two for the year is quite divergent as Prada has done a face plant while TIF is up 10%.
Hermes (RMS FP) is another interesting comparable. The company is exactly double the size of Prada in
market cap but only slightly higher in revenue terms. Prada beats Hermes on gross margins too: 73% vs.
69%. Due perhaps to a much longer trading history (20 years) and greater demand visibility thanks to
supply rationing, Hermes trades at a premium to Prada in PE terms at 32 x. First half interim results
released by the company show, “Asia excluding Japan is maintaining its dynamism in all countries,
notably China.” European sales grew 7%. Global revenue increased 12% at constant exchange rates. Asia
excluding Japan accounts for 35% of sales, the same ratio as for Europe. The stock is flat for the year.
For Prada, 63% of sales occur outside the Eurozone. A strong currency has negatively impacted results
for a company which uses the Euro as its functional currency. As Draghi embarks on greater monetary
easing that trend seems to be reversing, as the dramatic chart below illustrates.
Despite some bright spots in H1 interim results for Prada the overall trend for some remains
unconvincing and not enough to prevent analyst downgrades (four so far, this month). Full H1 results
are to be released September 19th along with an announcement on a planned cost cutting program. I
think the market begins to see through current headwinds and recognizes stronger luxury sales at peer
group companies. The weakening Euro and an aggressive cost cutting plan to protect margins coming
into a tangible sales recovery means Prada is oversold. Something I won’t say to my wife but I will say
here; buy Prada.
By the way, if you are worried those Prada glasses you bought in the night market might not be real
there is an easy way to tell. The logo on authentic Prada goods always has a notch missing from the top
of the forward leg in the “R” in “PRADA”. Yours doesn’t? Ooops.
In sharp contrast to spending time amongst the glorious ghosts of Renaissance artists and philosophers
past in Firenze, I also visited some companies in murky Beijing. Like Jabba the Hut, a now permanent
brown miasma sits heavily over China smothering the entire country, to which anyone who has flown
there in the last ten years can attest. Whenever possible, I always request a window seat and enjoyed
clear blue skies until entering Chinese airspace whereupon the ground completely disappeared and I felt
like an intestinal mite travelling down an interminably long, sludgy passage to some ignoble flatulent
end.
“You should have been here yesterday!”
I usually chat with the driver on the way to the city to get a sense of what people are thinking when I
arrive. Commenting to him in my now rusty Chinese about the rotten air, he told me yesterday was blue
skies, birds singing and that you could see for miles. It is funny how after perhaps 100 trips to China over
the years – and no matter where I go - I get that same line every time I mention their horrible pollution.
Changing the subject to one closer to his interests we discussed cars. Our conversation quickly turned to
girls:
“Beijing girls demand two things before they will marry: a house and a car.”
“And what about love?”
“Not necessary.”
Since he was about my age, I reminisced with him about my first trip to his city in 1985 when in the
winter the sidewalks of Beijing were stacked with white cabbage, often to shoulder height. This was
about the only vegetable available to the masses in the winters then. His response was illuminating.
“We didn’t have much food variety 30-years ago, it’s true. But at least what we had was real!”
Before my first meeting I went for a morning walk outside the Beijing Park Hyatt Hotel. When the doors
opened the sudden toxic blast of sulfur dioxide hit my face causing my lungs and eyes to reel in biologic
shock from the assault. The air quality index (AQI) that day was 200, “heavily polluted” according to
China’s measurement scale. Yet, nobody is up in arms about this. China has, what I call an “EBITDA
approach to economic growth.” Costs to achieve growth are simply not counted. That cost is real and
will be recognized whether the Chinese government wants it or not.
Indeed, while I have commented many times on the increasing number of Chinese who plan on leaving
China permanently, latest news from The WSJ indicates the fervor is still strong. This year, for the first
time, the US will run out of EB-5 immigrant-investor visas “because of a surge in Chinese participation.”
The program gives Green Cards to any investor and their family who invest at least $500,000 in US
development projects. Chinese investors have grabbed 85% of these visas this year and the State
Department, which manages the program, predicts “next fiscal year the visas will be claimed even more
quickly.” Senior government officials estimate a two-year wait for applicants to obtain a visa. All I can
say is…..YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN HERE YESTERDAY!
China is oversold and the market is cheap. Investors have to take a view of either one of two outcomes.
Does China hit the wall and experience a full-blown credit crisis – in which case you should not be buying
Chinese stocks at all? Or, my view, does the ballooning debt burden and increasing political intrigue act
as a medium to long-term brake on growth?
What about potential catalysts, such as SOE reform? On this trip we asked everyone what they thought
of the subject. If eventuated, true reform of the bloated state sector - where return on assets at 4.6% is
half that of the private sector (according to Gavekal Dragonomics) - could have a huge impact on equity
market valuations. But it does not seem like anything interesting will happen here for a long time. When
asked about the subject one director of an insurance company commented, “SOE reform in China is a
very broad concept.” While SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission)
released a reform plan last month, the plan only targeted two of the 115 largest SOEs. Furthermore, the
plan tepidly introduced the idea of “mixed ownership,” or privatization of some assets. There is not
much to get excited about. Trying to keep a lid on a burgeoning debt crisis and lack of SOE reform means
China remains a trading market for the time being.
“You’ve never been lost until you’ve been lost at Mach 3.” - Paul F. Crickmore,
test pilot
As China modernizes and becomes what western observers such as myself would recognize as a more
“normal country,” we try and look for investment opportunities that are longer term in nature. One of
these is the aviation sector. China is a big place and domestic aviation as an industry is still at the
amoeba stage of development. Part of this has to do with airspace ownership – all of it is owned by the
omnipotent Chinese military and they do not see any reason to give that up. When I was a resident of
Hong Kong many times my trips to China were delayed due to sudden airspace closures with no prior
notice and for no fathomable reason. Indeed, the week I was there on this trip all flights from Beijing to
Shanghai – the MOST important route in the country – were delayed from between three to five hours
due to military activity. Ridiculous.
To get a sense of the domestic aviation industry we visited AviChina (2357 HK). This H-share entity is a
holding company for several defense-related A-share companies. AviChina is part of the AVIC Group
(Aviation Industry Corporation of China, formerly known as the No. 3 Mechanical Industry Department),
itself under control of the State Council. AVIC Group has a JV with Brazilian aircraft maker Embraer and
is keen to develop 100 seat aircraft “to compete with Airbus and Boeing.” AviChina, the listed entity,
makes helicopters, aircraft trainers and avionics as well as turbo-prop propellers for Bombardier.
The company sees low double digit growth in helicopter and avionics revenues continuing but is less
positive on defense demand. Interim results just released for H1 reflect this with revenue up 12% to
Rmb 10.3 bn and net profit of Rmb 375 flat y-y. AviChina holds a 25% stake in unlisted COMAC
(Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China) which is developing a 100-150 seat passenger jet “to
compete with Airbus and Boeing.” COMAC has high hopes for the C919, a 158-174 seat narrow-body
airliner similar to the Airbus 320 and the Boeing 737, and which is expected to have its first flight next
year.
AviChina itself is a low growth listed holding company of a Chinese SOE that operates through minority
stakes in various subsidiaries living off a mixed bag of businesses, rendering it a less than attractive
investment. However, the idea of China transforming itself into an aviation export powerhouse is
interesting. China has a domestic market large enough in size where they should, or must, build their
own passenger jets. There is no reason (other than safety and lack of transparency of the supply chain)
why China cannot build a viable passenger jet for the domestic market. But what I learned during this
meeting is that while China is close to doing so, exports of said passenger jet will not happen for a long
time. The idea of “competing with Airbus and Boeing” is a long way from happening, not least because
to do this you really need one thing. This one indispensable requirement to export passenger aircraft is
FAA certification. Without such certification, the airplane in question will be prohibited from flying into
the US and probably other large markets such as Europe and LatAm.
AviChina themselves admitted that this could and probably would be a large stumbling block and
attributed it to “political reasons.” Safety considerations aside – and these should be worked out over
time – I think the US Federal Aviation Administration will find it rather incommodious to approve a
China made airliner and give away a large part of the market formerly controlled by Boeing. While it will
eventually happen, forecasts analysts may have of export orders beginning 2018 are, in my view, a tad
bit optimistic.
Despite the hand-wringing concerning China’s ballooning credit bubble and slowing growth there is one
area of the economy that is demonstrating multi-year secular growth. I refer to China’s internet
economy. We are just days away from AliBaba’s IPO which will focus more attention on this small but
important sector. China’s internet population is larger than the entire United States with e-commerce
enjoying a 25% CAGR reaching over Rmb 2 tn in size now, or about 8% of total consumer spending. In
the early stages to which we are now witness, such strong growth can mask problems that will
metastasize and surprise the unwary further down the road.
Jumei – beauty or beast?
I met recently US-listed Jumei (JMEI US), China’s largest online beauty products seller and while some of
China’s best businesses can be found in the internet space, Jumei is not one of them. I think investors
need not just throw money at the online retail sector in China as there are huge differences in business
models that many perhaps do not yet recognize.
Much like the makeup it flogs, Jumei on the outside is an attractive story. Per capita spend on beauty
products in China is incredibly low at $22.5 vs. $168 for fashion-obsessed Korea. The company notes in
its prospectus, “There is a growing awareness of personal appearance in China.” For this we can be
thankful.
It was not too long ago I remember listening to a BBC World Service report on selling toothpaste in
China. Proctor & Gamble was entering the market in a big way and part of their push was to educate
consumers on the need for oral hygiene. The reporter interviewed various random Chinese consumers
to see what they thought of this idea and one of them (a male) commented, “Why brush your teeth? It
just makes your breath smell nice.”
Beauty products are well suited to online retail given their high value to weight ratio and long product
life cycle. Jumei’s customers are rather predictably women, 27 years old and younger. Yet, while the
company promotes itself as an online beauty product retailer, they are moving aggressively into apparel
sales. Apparel sales have grown 200% from 14% of net GMV (Gross Merchandise Value) to 29% as of Q2
this year. This is odd and deserves some deep thinking. Apparel gross margins are 30% while beauty
products enjoy GMs of 40%. Why would a company push hard into a much lower margin product if there
were limitless growth – and confidence – in the original business model?
Unlike JD.com, Jumei does not own inventory. While this does free up a lot of capital in a place like
China this is also their greatest vulnerability. By being a beauty-product-slash-clothing-platform for third
party no-name sellers and not controlling the inventory you are an easy target for counterfeiters – the
bane of every business in China. Jumei has constantly had to remove sellers from its platform after it
was proven counterfeit goods were being sold. This lack of control over customer experience is going to
damage their reputation with customers in several ways.
First, if customers think the risk of getting a box of clothespins when they paid for high-end lipstick is
great, they will avoid the site. Second, the 11 mn active customers (mainly in Tier 3/4 cities) will confine
their purchase to inexpensive items. For anything that costs Rmb 500 or more it will be worth hiking
down to the department store and buying it there. At least in a physical store there is some comfort in
conducting your purchase where there may be some accountability and you get to see beforehand for
what you are paying. Indeed, while in Beijing, I spoke with some locals who confirmed just this. Rmb 500
seems to be the price point above which consumers would rather shop brick and mortar. Interestingly,
Jumei’s average order size is just 136 Rmb.
The big luxury beauty brands in China use TMall to reach customers. Or they invest in setting up their
own stores across the country. Jumei is confined to just 11% of sales from third party brands. In Q2 the
company enjoyed gross margin expansion due to an increase in private label and exclusive beauty
products sold which accounted for 20% of total beauty product GMV, up from 15%. (But they gave these
gains up on the operating side with higher marketing costs). The company admits it needs to keep some
recognized third party brands to drive traffic to the site but is relying more and more on its own (noname) brands.
Jumei is also not investing for the future. Capex was just $2.1 mn in 2012 and only $4.6 mn in 2013 –
and this for what is now a $4.6 bn market cap company. Capex spending must rise thus impacting net
profit.
Jumei is the polar opposite of JD.com (Disclosure: I own shares now in JD). Following a soup-to-nuts
strategy, JD owns the inventory and controls the customer experience from the moment of ordering to
delivery. This builds confidence with consumers and while a much more capital intensive model the
company is sure to be recognized over the long term as the most reliable online retailer in the market.
Alibaba has a similar asset-light model as Jumei and this is a problem for them. Jack Ma is teaming up
with Shen Guojun of Intime Retail (1833 HK) to invest $16 bn over the next 5-8 years to build an
integrated package delivery system across China. Doing so through a 48%-owned affiliate (Zhejiang
Cainiao Supply Chain Mgt.) will help Alibaba better control customer experience, something this action
illustrates they are clearly worried about.
I left the meeting feeling some dismay about Jumei.
I also had an interesting conference call with management of Want Want (151 HK). There are some
short term concerns about the company and it appears that 2014 is a “transition year.” Since my call,
Want Want released shocking interim results and the stock has fallen out of bed, down 15% in half as
many days. What’s going on?
The company had seen gross margin expansion last year due mainly to non-recurring raw material price
declines. The worry is the increasing reliance on a single product: “Hot Kid Flavored Milk.” Formerly a
rice cracker manufacturer from rural Ilan County in Taiwan, Want Want under Tsai Eng Meng, the son of
the founder, has morphed into a dairy, cracker and snack food colossus which reaps almost all of its
revenues now from China. Dairy and Beverage account for 53% of revenues and 56% of operating profit
and this is almost entirely flavored milk. Q2 saw sales drop for the segment perhaps 10% vs. mid-teen
growth Q1 resulting in a y-y OP drop of 11%. Rising competition is the big worry here for Want Want and
management admitted when releasing interim results they are seeing rising competition and growth
slowdown across all sectors.
Increased competition has meant Want Want is not able to pass along rising milk costs. Inventories have
blown out with Inventory Turnover Days jumping from 71 at the end of H1 2013 to 101 days at the end
of H1 2014. Correspondingly, the Cash Conversion Cycle has leapt from 50 days to 77 days over the
same period. While global raw milk prices have fallen since March and this will help margins somewhat
going forward, the company still has to slash prices and clear inventory first. Don’t expect any help to
margins here until next year. JPM estimates a 1% ASP fall overall hits EPS by 5.4%. The company is
slashing capex by a quarter to protect the bottom line as they realize 2014 is going to be tougher than
originally envisaged. Even in their original rice cracker segment ASP increases resulted in a significant
decline in sales volume, again demonstrating increasing competition.
Price cuts are likely to be accompanied by increased promotional spending adding insult to injury.
Wikipedia has a very short outline on the company but comments, “Note that many Want Want
products are well known in China for their bizarre advertisements.” I would expect more bizarreness to
continue. Outlook: vulnerable.
Courtesy of JPM Securities
Want Want does have an entrepreneurial approach and proven track record in three different food
segments in China. The company is much more profitable than Nestle, for example, boasting net profit
margins of 18% to Nestle’s 11% (2013 numbers). Want Want is more efficient with asset turnover as
well with ROA of 16% double Nestle’s 8%. But it appears the high growth days for Want Want are over.
Management commented they see labor costs in China still rising by double digits while productivity is
not. Furthermore, the high wage growth is not translating into higher consumption. Management
speculated on the call instead of greater discretionary income spend on snack foods money was going
into savings accounts and being used for travel. They also see sector consolidation continuing apace
with smaller, less efficient players being absorbed or squeezed out. Will Want Want consider acquiring
another company to boost growth or to enter a new segment? No, was the answer. “It is not in our
DNA.”
One continuing concern about Want Want is how generous they are to management. Last year, total
remuneration expenses jumped 24% y-y to $530 mn while net profits attributable to shareholders rose
19%. Payment to Directors reached $18.6mn, up 27% y-y. The dividend payout ratio is 67% and will stay
high as the CEO owns 48% of the company. 2014 is much more challenging and it will be interesting to
see if again management takes home a proportionally greater slice of the rice cracker than shareholders.
Trading at 23.5x PER, right in line with slow growing Nestle, Want Want is probably a Hold at these
levels.
The Last Page
A Harvard linguistics professor was lecturing his class the other day. “In English,” he said, “a double
negative forms a positive. However, in some languages, such as Russian, a double negative remains a
negative. But there isn’t a single language, not one, in which a double positive can express a negative.”
A voice from the back of the room piped up, “Yeah, right.”
Derek Hillen, CAIA
Mirae Asset Securities