Salmon, Skinner

ISSUE 16
Should Anthropologists Work
to Eliminate the Practice of
FemaleCircumcision?
~:
Merrilee H. Salmon, from "Ethical Considerations in Anthropology and Archaeology, or Relativism and Justice for All," Journal of AnthropologicalResearch(Spring 1997)
NO: Elliott P. Skinner, from "Female Circumcision in Africa: The
Dialectics of Equality," in Richard R. Randolph, David M. Schneider, and May N. Diaz, eds., Dialectics and Gender:Anthropological
Approaches(Westview Press,1988)
ISSUESUMMARY
~:
Professor of the history and philosophy of scienceMerrilee H.
Salmon argues that clitoridectomy (female genital mutilation) violates the rights of the women on whom it is performed. Sheasserts
that this operation is a way for men to control women and keepthem
unequal.
NO: Professor of anthropology Elliott P. Skinner accusesfeminists
who want to abolish clitoridectomy of being ethnocentric. He states
that African women themselveswant to participate in the practice,
which functions like male initiation, transforming girls into adult
women.
F or more than a century anthropologists have seencultural relativism as an
essential antidote to ethnocentrism, a perspective that evaluatesand judgesthe
practices of other peoples according to the standards and sensitivities of one's
own culture. This issue raisesquestions about the boundaries and limits of the
anthropologist's cultural relativism. By evaluating cultural practices in a culture's own terms, anthropologists have long defended cultural diversity and the
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general principle that dominant cultures should not force members of weaker
cultures to abandon traditional customs and practices, simply because practices appear peculiar, bizarre, or wrong to those in power. But today the world
is increasingly integrated, and a number of international organizations have;
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emergedwhosepurposeis to defenda singleuniversalvision of human rights.
Fewanthropologistswould object in principle to the notion that human rights
shouldbe defendedfor all people,but universalmoral codesalsochallengethe
rights of cultural groupsto be different.
In this issuetwo scholarsdebatewhetheror not anthropologistsshouldinterferewith the cultural practice,found in manypartsof Africa and the Middle
East,of clitoridectomy and infibulation, variously called femalecircumcision
or femalegenital mutilation. The practiceis typically part of femaleinitiation
ceremoniesand takesdifferent forms in different ethnic groups,varying from
relativelyminor surgeryto the clitoris (clitoridectomy)to the completesurgical
removalof the clitoris and much of the woman'sexternal sexualorgans,after
which the vaginais sewnup, leavingonly a small opening (infibulation).
MerrileeH. Salmonrefersto this practiceasfemalegenital mutilation and
arguesthat it is fundamentallywrong, a violation of a woman'shuman rights.
Shecontendsthat the practiceis part of a male-centered
powerstructure,which
allows men to control women. Although Salmon acknowledgesthat women
often control the ritual and eventhe surgery,the practiceof femalecircumcision nevertheless
supportsmaledominancewithin the community. In her view
this cultural practice is an immoral one, and anthropologicalcalls for moral
relativism in this caseare fundamentallyill-founded.
Elliott P. Skinner counters that female circumcision is only found in
African societieswheremale circumcisionis also practiced.Both practicesinvolve mutilation of the genitalsand are the meansof transforming male and
female children into adult men and women, respectively.Skinner maintains
that not only are the femalerituals entirely in the handsof other women,but
that the practicesempowerwomen within a society where men might otherwise dominatethem. Feministswho arguethat this practice is an exampleof
male powerover women,in his view, havegot it wrong. Calls for the abolition
of femalecircumcision beganwith Westernmissionarieswho found the practice repugnant.He statesthat Africanssupportedfemalecircumcisionasa form
of resistanceto white domination, and in Skinner'sview current calls from
Westernpeoplefor the abolition of this practiceis anotherexampleof Western
domination of African societies.
At issuehere are severalkey questions:Is female circumcision morally
repugnant?Should anthropologistsdefendit or work to stop it? How should
anthropologistsdealwith suchpracticeswhen they seethem occurringin their
village communitieswherethey work?
Although this issueseemsvery narrowly focusedon a particular traditional
custom in only one part of the world, it hasimportant generalimplicationsfor
cultural relativism and universalhuman rights. Shouldanthropologistsdefend
cultural practicessimply becausethey aretraditional?Do anthropologistshave
a responsibility to help end practicesthat they find morally abhorrent?If so,
whosemoral notions should be followed?Is moral relativism fundamentally
flawed,asSalmonasserts?
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Merrilee H. Salmon
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YES
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Ethical Considerations
and Archaeology,
and
Cultural
Relativism
justice
in Anthropology
or Relativism
for
and Ethical
All
Relativism
Respectfor the beliefs,practices,and valuesof other cultures,no matter how
different from one'sown, is a hallmark of anthropologicalwisdom.FranzBoas,
the fatherof Americanacademicanthropology,rejectedinvidiouscomparisons
betweenEuropean"high culture" and indigenousAmericanlanguages,
myths,
art forms, and religions. Boas,dismissing absolute scalesof cultural development such as those proposedby Condorcetand L. H. Morgan,insistedon
studying the culture of eachgroup in the context of its own historical development.Boas'swork forms the historical basisfor the anthropologicaldoctrine
known ascultural relativism.
Many anthropologistsregardethicalrelativismasan easycorollary of cultural relativism.I showthat this view is incorrect. Cultural relativismdoesnot
entail ethical relativism; an anthropologist can consistentlyembracecultural
relativism while rejecting ethical relativism. As most anthropologistsunderstandit, ethical relativism identifiesthe conceptsof goodandevil, or right and
wrong,with what a particular culture approvesor disapproves.Because
ethical
standardsarisewithin particular cultures andvary from culture to culture,ethical relativistsdeny any extracultural standardof moral judgments.According
to them, moral judgmentsof good or bad are possibleonly within a givenculture, becausesuchjudgmentsrefer only to complianceor noncompliancewith
that culture's norms.
The fact that a belief ariseswithin a cultural context,however,doesnot
imply that it can haveno other basis.Although moral beliefs,like all otherbeliefs, arisewithin a given cultural setting, someof thosebeliefsmaytranscend
the cultures in which they arise.Condemnationof murder and recognitionof
obligationsto help otherswho are in extremeneed,for example,arecommon
to many cultures.Moreover,societiesthat differ in derivativemoral judgments
aboutmarriagebetweendose relativesfrequently agreeaboutmorefundamental moral judgments,suchasthe immorality of incest.This modicumof moral
From Merrilee H. Salmon,"Ethical Considerationsin Anthropology and Archaeology,or Relativism
andJusticefor All," .Journalof AnthropologicalResearch,vol. 53, no. 1 (Spring1997).Copyright@
1997by The University of New Mexico. Reprintedby permission of the publisher and the author.
Notesand somereferencesomitted.
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YFS / MerrileeH. Salmon
327
consensus has encouraged some critics to try to refute ethical relativism by
identifying a set of universally acceptablemoral principles.
Whether universal agreementexists on any specific basic moral judgment
is partly an empirical matter and partly dependent on how such terms as "murder," "cruelty," and "incest" are defined. Colin Turnbull's (1962) admittedly
controversial studies suggestthat the Ik do not embrace the most likely candidates for fundamental moral principles, on any reasonable definition of such
principles. In Turnbull's account, the Ik provide a striking counterexample to
general views that cruelty to children, for example, is universally condemned.
Even if Turnbull's account is rejected, the search for moral principles that are
both reasonably specific and universally acceptableis problematic.
The lack of agreement about principles, however, is not sufficient to
demonstrate the truth of ethical relativism. What a culture regards as right or
wrong conduct depends to some degree on both the members' factual beliefs
about the state of the world and their beliefs about the likely consequencesof
their conduct. The absenceof any universally acceptedstandardswould support
ethical relativism only if cultures that shared all the same factual beliefs and
agreed about the consequencesof particular behavior nevertheless disagreed
in their ethical judgments. This situation has not been demonstrated. In fact,
many apparent differences in ethical matters are resolved by bringing forth
pertinent facts about the conditions under which moral choices are made. Even
Turnbull (1962) goes to considerable trouble to show that severehardship and
deprivation of material resourcesin Ik society have altered their perceptions of
reality. Whereas lack of universally accepted moral principles does not prove
ethical relativism, however, neither would the universal acceptanceof some
specific moral principles disprove ethical relativism. The agreement could be
accidental instead of arising from some feature of the human condition. Berlin
and Kay's (1969) refutation of the relativism of color classification was convincing only becausethey were able to demonstrate the physiological-and thus
cross-cultural-basis for color classification.
Ethical relativism apparently accordswith anthropologists' determination
to reject ethnocentrism and maintain a nonjudgmental stancetowards alien cultural practices. Nevertheless,both anthropologists and philosophers have noted
a serious problem with relativistic ethics: it seemsto rule out condemning even
such obviously immoral acts as genocide so long as they do not conflict with
prevailing cultural norms. Ethical theories about what constitutes right and
wrong behavior are severelytested when they go against our deepest moral intuition in this manner; in such casesone naturally questions the theory rather
than giving up the intuition. H. Russell Bernard (1988:117),for example, says
that
cultural and ethical relativism is an excellentantidote for overdeveloped
ethnocentrism.But cultural relativismis a poor philosophyto live by, or on
which to makejudgmentsaboutwhetherto participatein particularresearch
projects.Canyou imagineany anthropologisttoday defendingthe human
rightsviolationsof NaziGermanyasjust anotherexpressionof the richness
of culture?
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ISSUE16 / Should AntbropologisU Eliminate FemaleCircumcision?
Bernard's use of "is" in the first sentence shows that he does not distinguish cultural from ethical relativism. If he had done so, his point would
be less confusing. Cultural relativism, in Boas's senseof trying to understand
and evaluate the practices of other cultures in their own historical context,
is a good antidote for ethnocentrism. Identifying the practices of any culture
as the ultimate moral standard for that culture, however, is a different matter
and rightly raisesproblems for a reflective anthropologist. Bernard in mentioning Nazi Germany has offered the standard counterexample to the claim that
morality recognizes no extracultural authority.
Despite its fatal flaw, however, ethical relativism still enjoys wide acceptance among practicing anthropologists. Ethical relativism, for example,played
a role in testimony by a French ethnologist in the trial of Bintou Fofana Diarra for complicity in the genital mutilation of her infant daughter. As reported
in the New York Times (Weil-Curiel 1993), the unnamed ethnologist testified
that II Africans should not be punished [for genital mutilation of infant girls]
because they act under social pressure." The principle implicit in this statement-that one should not be punished for acts done under social pressure-is
uncomfortably similar to the defense offered by Nazi war criminals.
A second problem with making cultural standards the final arbiter of
morality is that this practice presumes a uniformity in cultures that current
researchdenies, even for small, isolated, and tightly knit societies, or it gives a
privileged moral position to powerful subgroups within the society. In the latter case,for example, the power to set cultural norms may belong to a minority
whose control of valuable resourcesenablesit to force others to follow its standards. Conversely,the power to set norms may accrueto those who are members
of the majority, while significant minorities have no voice. In either case,one
can only refer to the norms of "the culture" by ignoring ethical disagreement
within the culture.
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Some anthropologists believe that relativism is the only ethical stance
that is compatible with a scientific investigation of other cultures. A scientific
anthropologist presumably formulates IIneutral" descriptions of the culture,
reporting such quantifiable information as the frequency of occurrence of behaviors and perhaps the observedattitudes (approval, disapproval) of members
of the society, while refraining from judging the culture or interfering with it
in any way. Whether such detachment is required to maintain scientific integrity and whether such detachment is even possible are points raised by
0' Andrade (1995) and Scheper-Hughes(1995). D' Andrade (1995:399)points to
the alleged subjectivity of ethical judgments and contrasts these with the objectivity of scientific judgments. Scheper-Hughes(1995), however, objects to a
scientific detachment that would prevent anthropologists from taking an active
role in alleviating suffering among their researchsubjects.This debateis somewhat at cross-purposesbecause D' Andrade's main concern seemsto be with
an epistemic relativism that claims that such notions as knowledge and truth
have no extracultural basis
Scheper-Hughes,in contrast, is worried about
the behavioral implications of a relativist ethics that takes the existing social
arrangementsin a culture as the ultimate moral authority.
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329
Thestrict separationof scienceand values,a cherishedprinciple of logical
positivism, is increasinglydifficult to defend in the face of ethical problems
raised by scientific advancesin many fields. In particular, current biomedical techniquesfor genetic engineeringand researchon human embryosraise
important problemsthat tend to blur lines betweenscientific and value judgments. Bernard(1988)notes that when resourcesare limited, the very choice
of anthropological researchtopics is value laden. The possibility of an ethically neutral or completelyvalue-freescienceof human behaviornow seemsto
many scientistsboth unattainableand undesirable,but recognition of the interrelationshipsbetweenscienceand valuesneednot preventthe limited type
of objectivity that D'Andradearguesis possiblefor anthropologicalresearch.
Anthropologistsmay continue to avow ethical relativism despiteits difficulties becausethey havenot articulatedan alternativeethical theory that is
consistentwith their distastefor ethnocentrismand their respectfor cultural
diversity. Nevertheless,maintaining a consistentform of ethical relativism is
highly problematic in the presentresearchclimate. Facingthe loss of valuable anthropological and archaeologicalresources,anthropologistshave reexaminedtraditional relationshipswith their subjects,their colleagues,and
the generalpublic. To resolveproblemsand achieveclarity, they are currently
debating and revising professionalethical standards.Despitethe traditional
commitment of anthropologiststo relativism,the ethical principlesthat underlie their professionalcodesare not relativistic. The codesrefer to their duties
and responsibilities,and-by implication at least-to the correspondingrights of
their researchsubjects,colleagues,and the generalpublic. The conflict, often
unacknowledged,betweenthe avowedrelativism of anthropologistsand their
sincereconcernwith justice and rights can leadto confusion and ineffectivenessin achievingthe important goalsof preservinganthropologicalresources
An Anthropological
and
protecting
cultural
minorities
Example-Female
Genital Mutilation
The argumentsof feminist anthropologistsfor alteringdiscriminatorypractices
of other cultures similarly compromisea commitment to ethical relativism.In
somecultures,all femalesaresubjectedto genitalmutilation. In its severeform,
this involvescutting awaymost or all of the externalsexorgans(euphemistically called "circumcision") and sewingor sealing(infibulating) the vaginaso
asto leaveonly a pinhole openingfor urination and menstruation.Thepractice
affectsan estimatedninety-five million or more women in at leasttwenty-five
countries,mostly,but not all, in Africa (Lightfoot-Klein 1989).Within the cultures that practicegenital mutilation, little disagreementexistsabout its value,
though different groupsoffer various justifications for the practice.Most, but
not all, of the countries that engagein the practice are predominantly Muslim, but it is absentin many other Muslim countries.The operationtypically
is performedon girls from six to nine yearsold but also on youngergirls and
infants. Sometimeswhen a bride is an "outsider," sheis infibulated just before
shemarriesinto a group that follows the custom.
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ISSUE16 / Should AnthropologistsEliminate FemaleCircumcision?
Anthropologists have attemptedto document, understand,and explain
this practice,which, asidefrom its harshness,strikesmost Westernersas extremely bizarre. Why do they do it? What possiblebenefit do they seefrom
it? How could it be so widespread?In contrastto most accountsin the contemporary presswhich dismiss the practice simply as a way of oppressing
women, anthropologists' explanationsare appropriatelycomplex. They refer
to the cult of virginity, the cultural associationbetweenfemalepurity and the
society'shonor, and the antiquity of the tradition-Herodotus, writing in the
fifth century B.C., obliquely refers to its practice in Egypt, and some mummiesshowevidenceof infibulation. Anthropologistsalsocite the symbolicrole
femalecircumcision playsin distinguishing the Arab-MuslimAfrican societies
that practiceit from their culturally distinct neighbors.
In placessuch as the Sudan,where the practice is nearly universal, anthropologistsdiscussgenital mutilation in the context of social practicesthat
involve other forms of mutilation practicedupon both malesand females,such
as tribal scarringof the face and piercing of body parts.Anthropologistsalso
emphasizethe cultural value of enduring pain without complaint. Economic
explanationsare also proposed.Midwiveswho perform the operationsare sustained by the feesnot only from the original circumcisionand infibulation but
also from treatment of the inevitable medicalproblemsthat result. Other explanationsare psychological,such as thosethat refer to the attitudes of older
women who saythat they havegonethrough the experienceand thereforedo
not seewhy the youngeronesshouldbe spared.
Besidesoffering their own historical andcultural explanations,anthropologistsreport the explanationsof the peoplewho engagein the practice.These
include suchclaims aswe havealwaysdone it, our religion requiresit, no one
will marry an uncircumcisedwoman,it makesus clean,it makesus morebeautiful, it improves health, it limits the sex drive, it is good for fertility, andreferring to reinfibulation after childbirth-it detersa husbandfrom seeking
additional wives.
Some-relativelyfew-women and men in suchsocietiesdo question the
practiceor its supposedbenefits,particularly if they havebeenexposedto modern Westernculture. But when askedwhy they nevertheless
havetheir daughters
circumcised,they refer to tradition, or saythat their femalerelativesinsisted,or
insist that no one would marry the girl unlessshewerecircumcised.Most explanationsof femalegenital mutilation comefrom women,sincefew men can
be persuadedto discussthe issue,claiming for the most part that it is women's
business.Jomo Kenyatta,the reveredformer leaderof Kenyaand member of
the Kikuyu tribe, who earneda Ph.D.in anthropologyunder [Bronislaw]Malinowski,however,said,"No proper Kikuyu would dreamof marrying a girl who
hasnot beencircumcised"(Kenyatta1938,quotedin Lightfoot-Klein1989:71).
Women in cultures that practicegenital mutilation claim that it is done
for the benefit of the men, but women aloneare responsiblefor arrangingand
performing the operations.Eventhe questionof the acceptabilityof bridal candidatesis largelyunder control of the women sincearrangedmarriagesare the
rule, with the groom's mother having a prominent voice. (Recentlya young
womanfrom Togosoughtandwasgrantedasylumin the United Statesto avoid
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331
genital mutilation. The woman becameendangered,however,only after her
father had died. Her guardianshipthen passedto her aunt, who attemptedto
commit the womanto an arrangedmarriage.)Thusthe practiceis unusualinasmuch asit is intendedto control women,it affectsthem almostuniversally,and
they suffer the greatestharm from it; but they manageand control it almost
exclusively.
Thepresencein Europeancitiesof sizableAfrican communitiesthat maintain the practice-despitelocal lawsthat prohibit it-has brought femalegenital
mutilation to the attention both of the courts and of feminists who seeit as
"butcheryintendedto control women" (Weil-CurieI1993).
Anthropologistswho
claim to be relativists facethe ethical dilemma of whethertheir responsibility
endswith describingthe practiceand placing it in a cultural context,whether
they areobligatedto protect the practicefrom outsideinterference,or whether
they should help to end the practice.Relativismmight suggestthat they have
a further responsibility to protect, or at leastnot interferewith, this culturally
sanctionedpractice.At the sametime, as relativists, they must also consider
their responsibility to cooperatewith membersof their own culture who are
trying to end the practiceon the groundsthat human rights arebeing violated.
Although relativistic anthropologistsarereluctantto try to alter the values
of other cultures, many think it appropriateto try to correct mistakenfactual
beliefswhen this would benefit the welfare of membersof the culture. Value
judgmentsthat are basedon mistakenfactual beliefs may be revisedwithout
undermining the valuesthemselves.Clearlysomebeliefsof cultures that practice genital mutilation are factually mistaken.Contrary to thosewho saythe
practiceis beneficial to sanitation or health, mutilation causesseveremedical
damagein many cases.The operationcan causeimmediateinfection, excessive
bleeding,and evendeath.Delayedcommon effectsof the operation are infections of the urinary tract, menstrualproblems,painful intercourse,reduction
in fertility, andcomplicationsin childbirth. Nor doesthe Muslim religion command infibulation, as somebelieve.The practicedoesnot guaranteevirginity,
sincereinfibulation, which simulatesthe virginal state,is widely practiced.Be. causesexdrive is more a matter of endocrinologythan external organs,the
claim that infibulation limits sexdrive is likewisequestionable.
Insofarasgenital mutilation is motivatedby sanitaryor medicalconsiderations,therefore,knowledgeof the factswould tend to underminethe practice
without reducingthe cultural commitment to the valuesof purity, fertility, or
health.Insofarasgenital mutilation is motivatedby other factors,suchasmaintenanceof cultural distinctivenessandincreasingthe ability to endurepain, its
medical harm could be alleviatedby practicing lesssevereforms of circumcision without infibulation and by performing the operation only in a sterile
clinical setting.
Sucha medical solution, while it would savelives and preservehealth,
doesnot addressthe ethical question,raisedby feminists,of the right to control
one'sbody and whetheror to what extentthis right is inalienable.Sincegenital mutilation is usually performedon children, an important issueis whether
parentshavethe right to harm the child in this way.Parentsand guardianscannot violate inalienablerights of their children evenfor somesupposedbenefit.
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333
outlets for publication. Anthropologistsdo not betray secretsor violate confidenceswhen they describea customthat is almost universallypracticedin the
culture. By calling attention to an unjust practice, however,anthropologists
at leastimplicitly invite groups devotedto the protection of rights to take action. Bypresentingthe offensivepracticein its full cultural context,which may
involve revealingits latent functions in addition to its manifestor statedfunctions, anthropologistsalso provide valuableinformation about how to control
or preventthe practice.
After the anthropologistactsto presentinformation in an appropriateway
to a suitableaudience,his or her responsibilityto try to alleviatethe injustice
seemsto me neithergreaternor lessthan that of any personwho is in a position
to help the victims of an unjust practice.Evenif no further action is taken, I
think that the anthropologistwho refusesto recognizethat the value of cultural diversity is morally subordinateto that of protecting rights is on shaky
moral ground. The anthropologistwho retreatsinto ethical relativismin such
situations, as did the ethnologist at the trial of Bintou FofanaDiana,doesnot
demonstratetoleranceby appealingto socialpressuresin anotherculture but
insteadrisks being committed to the samemorally untenableposition as the
"Nazi defense."
Conclusion
I have reiteratedsomecriticisms of ethical relativism, a position which once
seemedto offer anthropologistsa wayto professtoleranceand avoidcriticizing
the morality of somepracticesof other cultures. My argumentstry to show
not so much that ethical relativism is "false" but that its consequences
conflict
with our deepestheld moral intuitions and that it cannot be held consistently
while embracingthose intuitions. I havetried to show also that anthropologistsneednot foregotoleranceif they abandonrelativismin favorof a morality
basedon principlesof justice and fairness.The concernwith justicethat guides
anthropologists'codesof professionalconductcan provide the starting point
for a more sophisticatedanalysisof rights, which can be usedto analyzecultural practices.(Thephilosophicalliterature on rights is vast,but a useful entry
for anthropologistsis availablein Baker1994.)Ethical judgmentsof another
culture's practices,especiallywhen basedon deepunderstandingof their life,
customs,and tradition, are indicative neither of ethnocentrismnor of intolerance.Instead,they show respectfor the basic anthroplogicalbelief in "the
psychicunity of humans" and a commitmentto justice and fairnessfor all.
References
Baker,J., ed., 1994,Group Rights, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Berlin, B., and P. Kay, 1969, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution.
Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University of California Press.
Bernard, H. R., 1998, ResearchMethods in Cultural Anthropology. Newbury Park,
N.J.: SagePublications.
D' Andrade, R., 1995, Moral Models in Anthropology. Current Anthropology
36(3):399-408.
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ISSUE16 / Should Anthropologists Eliminate Female Circumcision?
Kenyatta,J., 1938,Facing Mount Kenya.London: Seckerand Warburg.
Lightfoot-Klein, H., 1989,Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into FemaleGenital Circumcision in Africa. Binghampton, N.Y.: Haworth Press.
Scheper-Hughes,N., 1995, The Primacy of the Ethical. Current Anthropology
36(3):409-20.
Turnbull, C., 1%2, The ForestPeople.New York: Simon and Schuster.
Weil-Curiel, L., 1993,Mutilation of Girls' Genitals: Ethnic Gulf in French Court. New
York Times, November 23.
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Elliott P. Skinner
FemaleCircumcision in Africa:
The Dialectics of Equality
Culture and societymust, of course,always take account of human biology, but they do so in complexways. The distinctive characteristicsof
culture is that it transcendsnature; but this doesnot mean that it has
left it behind-rather; it has turned it upsidedown.
-
Robert F.Murphy (1977)
Femalecircumcisionor clitoridectomy,called by the Mossi,the Bongo,is
[a] not too subtlemechanismof Mossiwomen to challengethe superiority of
men. This wasthe thought that flashedthrough my mind, as I watchedwith
amazement,the quiet pride of the women and girls performing the rituals of
the graduationceremoniesof their own Bongo.Herewerewomendoing things
that they usually never did, and more importantly, should not havebeen doing. They had procured the drums from men and, much to my surpriseand
their amusement,were beating them. Where had they learned?Oh yes! They
must havepracticedtheserhythms while pounding millet and sorghumin their
mortars.Inexplicablewasthe sourceof their knowledgeof the songsand dances
of the Bongowhich were allegedlythe soleprovince of males,but which they
performedequally well. True, I had learnedboth the dancesand songsof the
Bongoduring my numerousvisits to the circumcision lodge,but thesefemale
graduatesdid them better than I ever did. Surelysome Delilah had tricked a
Samsonwho had then revealedthe secretsof arrogantmen. During the Bongo
ceremony,Mossi women were showing to the men publicly, that they knew
malesecrets,and moreover,thesewerenot important after all. . . .
The subjectof malecircumcisionand femaleclitoridectomyand infibulation in African societieshas been the sourceof greatspeculationand controversy,primarily becauseit involves the "fundamental ontological differences
between the sexes-conditionsof simple being-basedin the first instanceon
anatomical distinctions" and what flows from these.Questionsraised have
been: 1. Are theseoperationscruel?2. Do they haveanything to do with sex?
3. Do they revealanything about the relativemerits of variouscultures' sexual
sensibilities?and 4. Do male and femaleversionsof the operationsdiffer with
From Elliott P.Skinner, "FemaleCircumcision in Mrica: The Dialectics of Equality," in Richard R.
Randolph, David M. Schneider,and May N. Diaz, eds., Dialecticsand Gender:AnthropologicalApproaches(WestviewPress,1988).Copyright @ 1988by WestviewPress,Inc. Reprintedby permission
of the author. Notesand somereferencesomitted.
335
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ISSUE16 / Should Anthropologists Eliminate FemaleCircumcision?
regardto the answersto questions 1 and 2? Someanthropologistsand some
non-anthropologistshavealreadystrongviewson thesequestions.
Fran P. Hoskendiscussing"Genital Mutilation in Africa," severelycriticizedthose"Anthropologists(mostly men)who havestudiedAfrican traditions
havedone no serviceto women by utterly disregardingwomen'shealth while
they attribute 'cultural values' to such damagingtraditions as excision and
infibulation." Consideringthesepractices"deleterious to health and indeed
dangerous,"Hoskenlamentedthat many African groups "subjecttheir female
children to genital mutilation for a multitude of 'reasons,'manyof which conflict and all of which are basedon total ignoranceconcerningreproduction."
Shewonderedaloud whether it wasreally in the interest of suchpopulations
"that suchdamagingmyths areperpetuatedunder the cloak of silenceand are
praisedas'culture' in the literature?I think not. The time hascometo facethe
facts."(Hoskin 1976:6)Hoskenis tired of, andangry aboutthose"explanations"
of men and of what she calls "brain-washedwomen" who attribute clitoridectomy "to the fear of female sexuality," and the need to "prevent adultery."
(Ibid.)
Simon D. Messing,an applied anthropologist, feels that he and his colleagues"cannot evadethe issueof such a seriousand widespreadproblem as
genital mutilation of females,if they are concernedwith public health. . . they
should not leavethe burden of this task entirely on the shouldersof radical
feminists-and the latter in turn should welcomeour cooperation."(Messing
1980:296)
Neitherthe radical feministsnor the anthropologistshaveconsideredthe
possibility that in the frequent dialecticsthat we find in sociallife, femalecircumcisionmight well be one of the numerouswaysin which womenchallenge
the vauntedsuperiority of men.. . .
Given the contemporarycontroversysurrounding "female" circumcision
(really an interesting misnomer), it is generallyignored that circumcision is
predominantly a "male" ritual. Many well-known ancientpeoples,suchasthe
Hebrews(who probably adoptedthis ritual in ancient Egypt asthey borrowed
other interesting aspectsof that culture) limited circumcision to males.The
samething is true for manyAfrican populations.As far asI can ascertain,there
is not a singleAfrican societyin which femalecircumcisionexistswithout its
male counterpart.The reasonsfor this are asintriguing asthey are germaneto
this article
Initiation ceremoniespreparatoryto marriage,sexualrelations,and the
creation of families, are widespreadin Mrican societies,but are not necessarily linked to either circumcisionor clitoridectomy.. . . Characteristicof this rite
depassage
is the customarywithdrawal of the initiates from the world of people; their educationinto the knowledgeand lore of their societies;and their
subjectionto a greatdeal of physicalpain and other hardships.. . .
The Mossi initiated and subjectedtheir pre-pubescentyouth to both circumcision and clitoridectomy. In the Manga-Noberedistricts of Burkina Faso
(formerly Upper Volta) in southernMossi country, every three or four years,
during December,the coldestpart of the year, and dependingupon the food
supply,the Mossiopenedthe "Bongo" or the initiation ceremonyfor boys,in
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a secludedareain the woods.Hereweregatheredabout twenty to thirty boys,
agesevenor eight to twelve yearsold, from the surroundingvillagesand their
helpers.Known asBankousse,
theseyouths built a campcalledthe Keogo,placing barrierson the pathsleadingto it so asto warn off uncircumcisedchildren
and women.The mothersof the boysbrought food daily to the barrier,but did
not crossit.
The Mossiconsideredcircumcisionto be a simplesurgicalact which was
only incidental to the Bongo-a veritable initiation to life involving a great
many hardships.Almost immediatelyafter arriving at the Keogothe boys were
circumcisedby the headof the camp,known asthe Nanewho useda sharprazor for the operation.As in other partsof Africa, the initiateswerenot expected
to cry, and their wounds were cared for by the Nane.Then camethe important post operation period called komtogoor "bitter water" by the Bankousse
becauseof the pain involved. Despitethe cold nights, they had useof only a
small fire and were not permitted to useany covers.Everymorning they were
forced to bathe in a cold pool, and when they returned, they had lessonsto
learn involving history, nature study,and life.
The Bongo had its own mystery languagewhosewords turned out on
analysisto be synonymsfor ordinary More (the languageof the Mossi)with the
prefix I'na." The camphad its own ruleson which rank wasbased,not on those
on the outside,but on the order in which the youths were circumcised.What
the Nane attemptedto do wasto forge a link betweenthe boys in opposition
to himself,who actedlike a veritableogre.Walking aboutthe campwith a long
stick, he whipped the youngstersinto line, threw sandin the food brought by
the women,and madethe Bankousse
danceand singuntil they wereexhausted.
Graduationceremoniesof the Bongoinvolved going into the woods,cutting grassfor the horsesof the chiefs, and wood for their fires. Then on the
appointed day, the mothers brought new clothes for their sons,hoping that
none of them had died during the ordealof the Bongo.Thenon the appointed
day the graduatesdressedin their new clothing marchedthrough the market
place,and visited the chief. Then they engagedin dancing and singing at a
public placejust outsidethe marketplace.
As usual in almost all parts of Africa, the Mossiwomenwerein complete
chargeof their Bongofrom which they excludedall men. Their Keogowasnot
in the woods,but wasin the compoundof a womanwho lived by herself.But as
usual for males,I could find out nothing about the nature of the excisionthat
took place.I did hearthe drumming and singing that took placethereall night
until the wee hours of the morning, and did observethe young girls going
backwardand forward to their homes.Invariably they carried a tufted staff,
said to havebeen given to them by their prospectivehusbands.The women
would saynothing about the symbolisminvolved, consideringthe information
specificto women alone.The most that they would sayaboutwhat went on in
the femaleBongowasthat the maleshavetheir secretsand so did the women.
Like the graduationexercisesof the maleBankousse,
the femaleritual was
a village-wideaffair, but strictly within the provinceof the women.Marketdays
before,the relativesand prospectivehusbandsof the graduates,
shoppedfor the
clothesand headties, and makeupfor them. Then on the day of the exercise,the
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ISSUE16 / Should Anthropologists Eliminate FemaleCircumcision?
young girls went to the home of the femaleNane and accompaniedby their
mothersand sisterswho were beating drums and singing, went to the village
squarewherethe Bankoussedancedand sangthe traditional airs of the Bongo.
Fromtime to time, malerelativesand husbandswould detachthemselvesfrom
the line of spectatorsand approachthe dancers,giving them presentsof money.
To all intents and purposes,the femaleBongowasstructurally and functionally quite similar to that of the males.This ceremonydemonstratedto all that
the Mossiwomen were just as capableas the men in performing an initiation
ceremonywhosefunction wasto transform girls into women,asthe maleversion transformedboysinto men. Moreover,they had more effectivelykept men
from knowingtheir secretsthan did the males,whosesecretstheyhadobviously
shared. . . .
What is important about the puberty rituals in African societies,whether
they involvedpainful initiation, and whetherthey involved genital mutilation
with recognizablepain, are the emic and etic featuresinvolved. The Africans
do havetheir own viewsof their rituals eventhough othershaveignoredthese
views and insist upon their own interpretations.This is perhapspar for human beings involving as it does relative power. There is no doubt that had
they the requisite power,Mricans would insist that the world accepttheir interpretation of their own rituals, aswell as their views of the rituals of others.
Anthropologistswould do well to keepthis in mind.
The Mossi are not much given to speculatingon the imponderablesof
social life, or the world in general,judging such ratiocinations quixotic. To
them the Bongofor men and for womenhavethe samemeaningand servethe
samefunction for both men and women:preparationfor marriageand rearing
families. Indicative of this equality is that the two genderscontrol their own
initiation rituals, even though women haveto borrow drums from the males.
When badgeredabout the sexualfeaturesinvolved in genital mutilation, an admittedly chauvinistMossimalemight suggestthat sincefemalesareinferior to
malesthey are not permitted to touch the male organ during sexualcongress,
and that clitoridectomymakessexualcongresseasier.This maybe asgooda rationalization asany other,but flies in the faceof the anxiety of Mossimen over
the conductof their wives,and their statedaxiom: "Women are so important
that if a man receivesasa wife, either a blind womanor a leper,he shouldclose
his eyes,closehis mouth, and closehis ears,and keepher."
The equally malechauvinistDogonexplicitly associateboth circumcision
and clitoridectomy with elaboratemyths concerningcreation and cosmology.
Both operationsare said to have been instituted as punishmentsand are indicativeof the incompletestateof humanbeingsresulting from the primordial
crime of a godling. Thereis the removalof the oppositesexcomplementwith
which all human beings were originally intended to be equipped.Thus for
the Dogonthere is complementarityin the operation.Mary Daly criticizesthe
Dogonfor what sheconsideredan emic patriarchalobfuscationof the true purposesof the operation, namely the intimidation and humiliation of women.
What sheconvenientlyignoresis the fact that the Dogon forbid men to have
intercoursewith their wives againsttheir will and that the sexualresponses
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339
wives are in large part conditioned by the treatment they generally receive from
their husbands (Daly 1978).
Somewhat like the Dogon, both the Egyptians and the Northern Sudanese
stress the complementarity of circumcision and clitoridectomy. Referring
specifically to the Sudanese,Uanice] Boddy assertedthat
Through their own operation, performed at roughly the sameageas when
girls are circumcised (sic) (between five and ten years), boys become less
like women: while the female reproductive organs are covered, that of the
male is uncovered, or, as one Sudaneseauthor states,of a child's sex. . . by
removing physical characteristicsdeemedappropriate to his or her opposite:
the clitoris and other external genitalia, in the caseof females,the prepuce
of the penis, in the caseof males.This last is emphasizedby a custom now
lapsedin Hofriyat wherein one of the newly circumcised boys' grandmothers would wear his foreskin as a ring on the day of the operation (Boddy
1982:687-8).
Paying special attention to the widespread Mrican emic notion of comple-
mentarity in the rituals of circumcision and clitoridectomy, Boddy insists that
By removing their external genitalia, women are not so much preventing
their own sexual pleasure (though obviously this is an effect) as enhancing
their femininity. Circumcision as a symbolic act brings sharply into focus
the fertility potential of women by dramatically de-emphasizingtheir inherent sexuality. By insisting on circumcision for their daughters, women
asserttheir social indispensibility, an importance that is not as the sexual
partners of their husbands,nor in this highly segregated,male-authoritative
society,astheir servants,sexualor otherwise,but asthe mothers of men. The
ultimate socialgoal of a woman is to become,with her husband,the cofounder
of a lineagesection.As a respected
habobashe is «listenedto," shemay besent
on the hadj (pilgrimageto Mecca)by her husbandsor her sons,and her name
is rememberedin village genealogiesfor severalgenerations(italics supplied)
(Ibid.:687).
Although Boddy had her own etic views of female genital mutilation
amongthe Sudanese,
her ethnographicdata support the etic argumentof this
paper,namelythat in this instanceof the dialecticsof sociallife, clitoridectomy
ratherthan a ritual performedby women,to demeantheir alreadylow statusin
manyAfrican societies,is a declarationof equality. What is interestingis that
there are few, if any, casesin the ethnographicrecordwhereAfrican women
(as contrastedto the normally sexistMrican men) seethis ritual as reducing
their status.Feministsmay considerthe African womenwho defendthis practice as "brain-washed,"but should be awarethat manyAfrican women,aswell
asmen, takethe samejaundicedview of many rituals of WesternChristendom.
True,somecontemporaryMrican womenobjectto clitoridectomy,but few had
daredto confront their mothersand grandmothersoverthe issuefor fearof being taken for "black" white women.The implication hereis that thesewomen
havefailed to assertthat cultural equality for which Africanshavefought long
andhard.
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ISSUE16 / ShouldAnthropologistsEliminate FemaleCircumcision?
What is important about the controversy about clitoridectomy in Africa
is that African women were never part of it. The issue grew out of a JudeoChristian concern over human sexuality, involved Christian missionaries in
Africa, and was used by African men in their struggle for cultural autonomy
from Europeans,and ultimately for political independence.. . .
Missionary
opposition
to clitoridectomy
among the Kikuyu was very
much linked to their opposition to all aspects of African culture that could
frustrate their attempts to impose Western Christendom. We are told that
The missionariesrecognized the significance of the initiatory rites, of which
circumcision was the outward physical symbol, and they were appalled at
what t~ey saw in them. The physical operation they considered brutal and
unhygenic and in the caseof girls a barbaric mutilation with permanent illeffects. But the atmospherein which the ceremonieswerecarried out seemed
to them even more evil, with what they took to be the sexualinnuendo of the
dancesand songs,the licentiousnessof the old menand womenand the gloating
cruelty of the operatorsand their attendants. They taught against the practices and prayed that the peoplemight foregothem altogether(Italics added)
(Murray-Brown 1972:50-51).
. .. What had started out as an issue over clitoridectomy, and a practice which many Mrican Christians were prepared to change, became a cause
celebre over the issue of African cultural and political freedom. Much to the
alarm of the colonial government, it became known locally in October 1919 that
"John Uomo] Kenyatta" who had gone to Britain to protest settler colonialism,
had been to Moscow and was "in close touch with Communists and Communist Organizations." Songs praising Kenyatta and ridiculing the governor were
outlawed as seditious, creating anger among anti-mission Kikuyu. . . .
The problem now was that clitoridectomy had become inextricably linked
to the Kikuyu desire for equality in their homeland. The missionaries were
insisting that Kenyatta "should tell his people to obey government officers,
Kikuyu chiefs, and missions in control of schools. . . ."
Kenyatta's subsequent defense of clitoridectomy as an operation in which
the operator had "the dexterity of a Harley Street surgeon. . . with a stroke she
cuts off the tip of the clitoris. . . the girl hardly feels any pain" Oomo Kenyatta
1%2) is only understandable in light of the role that clitoridectomy had played
in the drive of the Kikuyu to achieve equality for their institutions in the face of
Europe's arrogance. Like Bob Murphy, Kenyatta was very aware of the dialectics
of social life. For him colonial tutelage was oppressive and alien. He wrote:
In our opinion, the African can only advanceto a 'higher level' if he is free to
expresshimself, to organize economically, politically, socially, and to take
part in the governmentof his own country. In this way he will be ableto
develophis creativemind, initiative, and personality,which hitherto have
beenhinderedby the multiplicity of incomprehensible
lawsandordinances
(Ibid.: 192).
What the conflict over clitoridectomy did was to bring to "an abrupt close
the paternalistic phase of missionary activity; henceforth the emphasis would
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341
be on the growth of native churches. The high noon of imperialism. . . [and the
attempt] to extend white dominion over all of EastMrica, was over." (Ibid.:151)
Kenyatta has been pilloried by many female scholars and feminists, for
defending a practice (which he was prepared to see abolished), in the greater
interest of political equality for Mricans. Few noted, as did Harriet Lyons, that
Kenyatta had suggested,perhaps as an after thought, that clitoridectomy may
have been practiced to prevent masturbation, a practice condemned in both
Kikuyu boys and girls, and that his major emphasiswas "largely on social structure." (1981:510)Moreover, he was fully prepared to use education to abolish
it. A more intemperate view of Kenyatta's action is that of Fran Hosken who
declared that
An international feminist observercannot help but wonderwhy the male
Mrican leadershipdoesnot speakout about the mutilation of women, a
customthat wasreinforcedby Kenyattain Kenyaand is alsosupportedby
the independencemovementunder his leadership.. .. It clearlyaffectsthe
statusof womenin political affairs(Hosken1976:6).
Understandably, there are some African feminists who agreewith Hosken.
Nevertheless,it should be noted that "the resistance of African feminists to
anti-clitoridectomy agitation-evident at the United Nations World Conference
on women held in Copenhagen in 1980" accords fully with the demand of
Kenyatta for Mrican cultural autonomy. Like him, these women realize that
Mrican practices must be brought into line with those characteristics of the
emerging global civilization. What they insist upon is respect, and the end of
European arrogance.
The problem with blaming Kenyatta and other Mrican men for clitoridectomy misses the important point that Mrican women have always been in
control of'this ritual (until now when male doctors may perform it in modern
hospitals), and probably used it, to declare their equality with men. Facedwith
discrimination for not possessingthose characteristics with which dominant
social strata have linked their dominance, African women, like other women,
and subordinate groups, have striven to acquire the traits viewed as valuable.
Thesepractices vary cross-culturally in time and space,and can be as different
asJapanesefemales surgically operating on their eyesto approximate those of
American males during the occupation of their country; to certain American femalesbobbing their noses;other Americans bleaching or darkening their skins;
and still others dressing like males, and creating female counterparts of such
organizations as Masonic lodges, veteran groups, and institutions of higher
learning. In many of these cases,the males or dominant groups whose characteristics were being imitated, were not awareof the attempts to achieveequality
with them, or to win their favor. That they were responsible for the behavior in
the first place may well have been true, but a dialectician like Robert Murphy,
whoseeyeswere probably opened by his wife, Yolanda,would smile at the irony
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References
Boddy,janice, 1982."Womb as oasis:the symbolic context of Pharaoniccircumcision
in rural Northern Sudan," AmericanEthnology,9: 682-698.
Daly, Mary, 1978. Gyn/Ecology:The Metaethicsof Radical Feminism,Boston: Beacon
Press.
Hosken, Fran P., 1976. "Genital Mutilation of Women in Mrica." Munger Africana
Library Notes,#36, October, p. 6.
Kenyatta,jomo, 1%2. FacingMount Kenya,New York, Vintage Brooks.
Lyons, Harriet, 1981. "Anthropologists, moralities, and relativities: the problem of
genital mutilations." CanadianReviewof Sociologyand Anthropology,18: 499-518.
Messing, Simon D., 1980. "The Problem of 'Operations Basedon Custom' in Applied Anthropology: The Challenge of the Hosken Report on Genital and Sexual
Mutilations of Females."Human Organizations,Vol. 39, No.3, p. 2%.
Murphy, Robert F., 1977."Man's Culture and Woman's Nature," Annals of the New
YorkAcademyof Sciences.Vol. 293, 15-24.
Murray-Brown, jeremy, 1980.Kenyatta.London, GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd.
I'ZJ~
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POSTSCRIPT
-
Should Anthropologists Work
to Eliminate the Practice of
FemaleCircumcision?
T he issue of female circumcision raisesimportant questions about whether
or not there are limits to cultural relativism. Critics of cultural relativism have
often pointed to the Nazi atrocities during the Second World War as examples
of immoral practices that can be understood in culturally relative terms but
should not be condoned. Cultural relativists in such casescounter that unlike
male or female circumcision in Mrica, genocide was never morally acceptable
in German society.
At issue here is whether or not an unhealthy practice should be suppressed
because it is unhealthy. If anthropologists work to abolish female circumcision, should they also work to prohibit use of alcohol, tobacco, and recreational
drugs in our own society becausesuch products are unhealthy? Are there limits
beyond which cultural relativism has no power? If anthropologists and international organizations are right to stop female circumcision, would they also
be justified in working to abolish male circumcision in Jewish and Muslim
communities on the same grounds?
Without dealing directly with issues of cultural and moral relativism,
Skinner argues that anthropologists should take seriously the concerns of both
African men and women, the majority of whom want to continue to practice clitoridectomy and resent Western attempts to suppressthe practice. For another
view from a similar perspective, seeEric Winkel's essay"A Muslim Perspective
on FemaleCircumcision," Women& Health (vol. 23, 1995).
There are many essaysby authors who wish to abolish female circumcision, and nearly all of them refer to the practice as female genital mutilation.
A lengthy bibliography can be found at http: //www. fgmnetwork. org/
reference/biblio.
html. Typical exampleswould include Harriet Lyons's
"Anthropologists, Moralities, and Relativities: The Problem of Genital Mutilations," Canadian Reviewof Sociologyand Anthropology (vol. 18, 1981)and Anke
van der Kwaak's "Female Circumcision and Gender Identity: A Questionable
Alliance?" SocialScienceand Medicine (vol. 35, 1992).
For a balanced anthropological view of female circumcision and cultural
relativism, see Carole Nagengast's"Women, Minorities, and Indigenous Peo-
ples:Universalismand Cultural Relativity,"Journal of Anthropological Research
(vol. 53, 1997).
For a discussion of issues dealing with cultural relativism and anthropological ethics, seeEthicsand the Profession of Anthropology, Carolyn FluehrLobban, ed. (University of PennsylvaniaPress,1991).
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