Smartphone Encryption Impact on Crime Victims
Transcription
Smartphone Encryption Impact on Crime Victims
Smartphone Encryption - and the - Impact on Crime Victims Presented by the New York County District Attorney’s Office T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Accessing Evidence Nearly every criminal case has a digital component. The evidence required to identify, locate and prosecute criminals used to reside in file cabinets, closets, and safes; today, much of it is stored on smartphones. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution authorizes “reasonable” searches and seizures, providing law enforcement agencies access to places where criminals store and conceal evidence – from car trunks, to storage facilities, to safety deposit boxes, to computers, mobile devices, and digital networks. In order to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, searches are conducted pursuant to judicial warrants, based on a neutral judge’s finding of probable cause. 2 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Accessing Evidence Previously, when law enforcement seized a criminal suspect’s smartphone pursuant to court-authorized warrant, Apple and Google would comply with the judge’s orders by extracting evidence from the device, and sending the evidence to prosecutors. In 2014, the companies announced that they had reengineered their operating systems with default device encryption, and could no longer access their own products as a result. 3 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Source: https://www.apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests In September 2014, Apple engineered its new mobile operating system, iOS 8, so that it can no longer assist law enforcement with search warrants written for locked devices. Google, maker of the Android operating system, quickly announced plans to follow suit. Apple and Google’s operating systems run a combined 96.7% of smartphones worldwide. Source: https://www.apple.com/privacy/ government-information-requests Source: http://officialandroid.blogspot.c om/2014/10/a-sweet-lollipopwith-kevlar-wrapping.html Source: http://www.idc.com/prodserv/ smartphone-os-market-share.jsp 4 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Apple estimates that 94% of all Apple devices are running iOS 8 or newer as of February 2016 Source: https://developer.apple.com/support/app-store This means that Apple is unable to access data on 94% of its devices. Law enforcement agencies are unable to decrypt data on Apple devices running iOS 8 or 9. Apple says that they can’t either. Smartphone device encryption keeps digital evidence beyond the reach of law enforcement agencies with valid search warrants, making it difficult to build cases against perpetrators and deliver justice for crime victims. 5 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Apple Smartphone Evidence Supports Wide Variety of Office’s Cases October 2014 – January 2016 Larceny, forgery, cybercrime, and identity theft 36.42% Drugs and narcotics 18.06% Other 4.03% Sex Crimes 15.97% Assault, robbery, and burglary 13.88% Homicide and attempted murder 7.01% Weapons charge 4.63% Source: District Attorney’s Office’s High Tech Analysis Unit. Listed by top charge. 6 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e In November 2015, the District Attorney’s Office released a comprehensive white paper detailing the investigative challenges posed by smartphone encryption. The DA’s Report: Summarizes the smartphone encryption debate and relevant technology Demonstrates the importance of smartphone evidence Dispels misconceptions about law enforcement’s position, including the myth that we support a “backdoor” or government-held “key” Encourages an open discussion with technology companies, privacy advocates, and lawmakers, and Proposes a solution: Require mobile operating system designers to access data on their devices when served with a warrant. 7 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS New smartphone technology is rendering our laws insufficient to protect public safety. Last year, Apple and Google, whose software runs 96.7 percent of the world’s smartphones, announced they had re-engineered their operating systems with “full-disk” encryption — expressly so that they could no longer unlock their own products. In effect, the companies are now able to say: “We will no longer comply with judges’ orders to unlock passcode-protected phones, because we no longer can. ” The Manhattan District Attorney’s office immediately and repeatedly engaged the companies, Congress and the public in a dialogue about how this new level of encryption inhibits the investigation and prosecution of everyday crimes. … In a recently published report, my office — in consultation with cryptologists, technologists and law enforcement partners — has proposed a solution that we believe is both technologically and politically feasible: Keep the operating systems of smartphones encrypted, but still answerable to locally issued search warrants. … MYTH 1: We want to ban encryption. MYTH 2: We want to weaken smartphone security. MYTH 3: We want a backdoor. MYTH 4: We want “surveillance” of smartphone communications. MYTH 5: We want warrantless searches. 8 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS Myth #1: We want to ban encryption and weaken smartphone security. We don’t. We support encryption. We want smartphone makers to offer the same strong encryption that Apple employed before iOS 8. Previous mobile operating systems allowed the companies to access data on a seized device with a valid court order. Apple and Google have never explained why the prior systems lacked security or were vulnerable to hackers and thus needed to be changed. Apple offered strong encryption in iOS 7, yet maintained the ability to help – in Apple’s own words: “police investigating robberies and other crimes, searching for missing children, trying to locate a patient with Alzheimer’s disease, or hoping to prevent a suicide.” 9 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS Myth #2: Law enforcement wants to be able to conduct warrantless searches of these devices, just like the NSA did for years. Lawful access to criminal evidence on smartphones has nothing to do with the kind of mass surveillance or bulk data collection disclosed by Edward Snowden. That is not the access that local law enforcement seeks or expects. We do not want a “backdoor” for the government to access your information. We don’t want a “key” held by the government. Rather than finding ways around the Fourth Amendment, we want neutral, local judges to determine whether searches are lawful — not law enforcement, and not Silicon Valley. 10 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS Myth #3: Certain places have always been off limits to law enforcement. They just want to make their job easier. Centuries of law hold that no item – not a home, a file cabinet, a safe, or a smartphone – is beyond the reach of a court-authorized search warrant. Law enforcement can even exhume a body with a search warrant, when necessary for a criminal investigation. iPhones are the first warrant-proof consumer products in American history. With default device encryption, Apple and Google are providing criminals with unprecedented, evidence-free zones. 11 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS Myth #4: Data stored on smartphones can be obtained elsewhere. In most cases, law enforcement cannot obtain the entirety of an iPhone’s data by obtaining the contents of the associated iCloud account. • Apple users are not required to set up iCloud accounts or to back-up data to iCloud accounts. • Only 5 gigabytes of free storage space on iCloud are given to users. The iPhone 6 comes with greater storage space on the device itself. • Users can choose which types of data they want to back up. In our experience, criminals are careful to avoid backing up evidence. • iMessages and text messages are not available from iCloud. • Data is not backed up to the cloud until the iPhone is connected to WiFi. 12 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e SMARTPHONE ENCRYPTION MYTHS Myth #5: Police and prosecutors don’t really need smartphone data to keep us safe. Many perpetrators, particularly those who commit sexual offenses, take photos and videos of their acts. Smartphone evidence can mean the difference between catching them and letting them go free. These examples – and hundreds like them – demonstrate the power of smartphone evidence in criminal cases, before iOS 8. Homicide: People v. Hayes Indictment 04451/2012, New York State Supreme Court An individual was recording a video on an iPhone when the defendant fatally shot him. The video was used at trial to corroborate eyewitness testimony. The shooter was convicted of murder at trial and sentenced to 35years-to-life in state prison. If the phone had been encrypted and no one alive knew the passcode, the evidence would be lost. Sex Offense: People v. Visoso Indictment 02159/2014, New York State Supreme Court Smartphone photos were vital to the prosecution of an “upskirter” who secretly took pictures violating women’s privacy with an iPhone. 13 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e iPhone Evidence Used To Exonerate Innocent Individuals (Before iOS 8) Manslaughter: People v. Rosario Indictment 01859/2010, New York State Supreme Court • Police discovered the victim dead in his apartment from a gunshot wound to the head. Based on surveillance and other records, the police arrested an individual. • Several phones were recovered in close proximity to the decedent, including a locked iPhone 3GS running iOS 3.X (pre-iOS 8). Prosecutors flew the phone to Apple with a judge’s unlocking order. • A few days before the case was to be presented to a grand jury, call detail records linked to the decedent showed that outgoing communications from his phone were inconsistent with the estimated time of death and timeline of events. The individual held in custody was released. • Once unlocked by Apple, contact information in the victim’s phone led investigators to another individual, who confessed to the killing. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 17 years in prison. 14 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Despite Search Warrants, More Than 205 iPhones Remain Inaccessible to the DA’s Office October 2014 – February 2016 These devices represent investigations into all manner of crime, including: • The attempted murder of 3 individuals • Repeated sexual abuse of a child • Sex trafficking • Assault and robbery 15 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Crime Victims Await Justice “They’re looking into the future (and at) privacy but what about the victims? (Brittney) can’t speak for herself. I don’t have any rights and I want law enforcement to be able to access that phone” - Barbara Mills, mother of Brittney Mills, who was killed in April 2015 in Baton Rouge, LA 16 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e The Homicide of Brittney Mills Brittney Mills was eight months pregnant when she was gunned down inside her Baton Rouge, LA, home in April 2015. Her unborn baby died a week later. There were no witnesses or surveillance cameras, but police believe the shooter was likely someone she knew. Brittney was on her phone in the hours leading up to the shooting, and her family gave permission for the phone to be searched but did not know her passcode. Investigators obtained a search warrant for iCloud data, but Brittney did not own a computer and had not backed up her phone for three months. Prosecutors obtained another search warrant, asking Apple to help them gain access to the encrypted device, but the company said there was nothing it could do. The case remains unsolved. Brittney’s killer remains on the loose. 17 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Apple v.s. FBI Source: Joe Raedle/Getty Images Source: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images "They were targeted by terrorists, and they need to know why, how this could happen.” - Stephen Larson, lawyer representing San Bernardino families 18 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e On February 16, 2016, a U.S. magistrate judge in California ordered Apple to help the FBI gain access to the phone of one of the shooters in the San Bernardino terrorist attack. Apple CEO Tim Cook responded with a 1,100-word open letter to customers vowing to fight the order and defending the company’s unilateral decision to make its devices warrant-proof. 19 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e District Attorney Vance and NYPD Commissioner Bill Bratton held a media availability to discuss the impact of smartphone encryption on crime victims across the country. Source: Jefferson Siegel/New York Daily News February 18, 2016 • “This has become the wild west in technology. Apple and Google are their own sheriffs, and there are no rules.” • “Local law enforcement agencies around the country are grappling with the same problem of explaining to crime victims and surviving family members that we have hit an investigative roadblock or dead end, because Apple and Google no longer comply with warrants issued by judges.” • “Apple and Google have created the first warrant-proof consumer products in American history, and the result is that crimes are going unsolved and victims are being left beyond the protection of the law.” 20 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Recent Statements “I think the companies do owe it to the nation to come up with a procedure for providing that information for law enforcement… If law enforcement doesn’t have appropriate information to pursue terror threats and other violent crime, of course, literally people would be physically endangered.” - Mayor Bill de Blasio, House Homeland Security Committee Hearing, March 16 “We should understand as we talk about the Constitution that it guarantees no absolute right to privacy. It guards against unreasonable search and seizure. But how is what we are talking about at all unreasonable?” - Commissioner Bill Bratton, New York Times, February 22 “Simply put, if criminal wrongdoers can hide the evidence of their crimes on their smartphones and if that evidence is forever beyond the reach of law enforcement, then crimes will go unsolved, criminals will go free and the safety of all of our citizens will be diminished. In the arms race between criminals and law enforcement the criminals will have won.” - Los Angeles County District Attorney Jackie Lacey, Letter to Senate Judiciary Committee, July 2015 21 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e President Barack Obama Source: Neilson Barnard/Getty Images March 11, 2016 “Before smartphones were invented and to this day, if there is probable cause to think that you have abducted a child, or that you are engaging in a terrorist plot, or you are guilty of some serious crime, law enforcement can appear at your doorstep and say we have a warrant to search your home and can go into your bedroom and bedroom drawers to rifle through your drawers to see if there’s any evidence of wrongdoing.” “It's fetishizing our phones above every other value, and that can't be the right answer... If [the government] can't get in, then everyone is walking around with a Swiss bank account in their pocket.” 22 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e What Victims’ Advocates Can Do • Provide case examples from your work that can be used to show the effect these policies have on your clients and stakeholders. • Call on Apple to reconsider its approach in light of the impact on crime victims. • Write op-eds or open letters to your local media. • Discuss this issue with your elected officials and community leaders. 23 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e Example: Safe Horizon Op-Ed The battle to gain access to a passcode-protected phone of one of the assailants in last year’s San Bernardino attack is pitting the need for data security against the need to fight terrorism. Lost in the debate: This fight is not just about stopping terrorists. It’s about protecting children and others from abusers. With current smartphone encryption, and even stronger encryption that Apple and other tech companies are developing, evidence of some of these most abhorrent and hard-to-prove crimes is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Staff at Safe Horizon saw such evidence all too often — until the new operating systems started rolling out in 2014. These images were key factors leading to the arrest and prosecution of several offenders. What does one of these cases look like? In 2014, a mother noticed that her 12-year-old daughter was depressed, and spotted some troubling posts on her Facebook page. The mother checked in with her daughter — who tearfully recounted being raped by a stranger. … The young girl disclosed to police that her rapist had taken cell-phone images of her performing sexual acts — and so, the police obtained a warrant to search his device. What they found was horrific. To start, the screen saver image on the suspect’s phone was of him sexually assaulting this young girl. Then police found images of other children on the phone. They later learned that the abuser was a recruiter for a large human trafficking ring that involved many young victims. Such evidence is absolutely crucial in prosecuting crimes that can otherwise be daunting to prove. Yet if this same case were to happen today, with current smartphone encryption in place, those images of childhood sexual abuse could never have been found. And it was only because of the search of the suspect’s phone that another critical piece of evidence tying the initial defendant to the larger trafficking ring was uncovered. That enabled officials to apprehend additional suspects before any additional children were harmed. … Apple wants its customers to feel secure, that by purchasing an Apple product their personal information will be safe and protected. But parents — who also purchase Apple products — want their children to be safe and protected. Today, one in five girls and one in 20 boys are victims of child sexual abuse. We shouldn’t give their abusers the ability to dispose of evidence with impunity. … We recognize and deeply respect the right to privacy, and oppose unwarranted intrusion. But when police have a search warrant and need to get at evidence that’s locked away, they also have a right — and a duty — to protect the public. Including, and perhaps especially, young children. 24 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e #UnlockJustice On April 18, DA Vance and a coalition of crime victims and victim assistance organizations called on Congress to ensure lawful access to smartphone evidence in criminal investigations. Barbara and Tia Mills, mother and sister of Brittney Mills 25 T h e N e w Yo r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ’s O f f i c e manhattanda.org/smartphone-encryption • Sign up to receive updates and news alerts • Read the latest: • Published articles • Congressional testimony • “Report on Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety” • “Smartphone Encryption and the Impact on Law Enforcement” presentation • Find contact information for members of Congress 26