RAID Demonstration Plan

Transcription

Document information
Project Title
RAID – RPAS ATM Integration Demonstration
Project Number
RPAS.03
Project Manager
CIRA
Deliverable Name
Edition
02.01.00
Abstract
This document aims at providing the Demonstration plan for RAID project.
It is organized around three demonstration exercises (one Real Time Simulation and
two Flight Trials), each foreseeing different test conditions.
Demonstration objectives targeting the assessment of SESAR Key Performance Areas
are defined starting from the high-level objectives described in the project proposal.
For these objectives associated success criteria, hypotheses, indicators and methods
that will be used during the assessment are identified. Effects on both Pilot and
Controller are considered. Differences in operating the aircraft On-Board and by the
means of the Remote Station is part of the demonstration plan objectives.
The document also provides the Communication Plan that will be used for the
dissemination of the RAID project matured experiences and results.
Project Number RPAS.03
Edition 02.01.00
Authoring & Approval
Prepared By - Authors of the document.
Name & Company
Date
Edoardo Filippone / CIRA
Position & Title
Leader of RAID Demonstration
Plan preparation task
RAID Project Manager
Barbara Mellini / Deep Blue
Human Performance Expert
15/11/2013
Jelena Dokic / Deep Blue
15/11/2013
Gianluca Gargiulo / NAIS
Human Performance Expert
Responsible for
Communication Plan
Communication Engineer
15/11/2013
Joe Degiorgio / MATS
Operational Expert
15/11/2013
David Zammit Mangion / UoM
Safety Expert
15/11/2013
Francesco Grimaccia / Nimbus
Engineer
15/11/2013
Name & Company
Position & Title
Date
Alberto Pasquini / Deep Blue
Safety Engineer
20/01/2014
Saverio Del Gatto / CIRA
Quality Manager
23/01/2014
Salvatore Palazzo / CIRA
Flight Engineer
23/01/2014
Carlo Valbonesi / Deep Blue
Safety Expert
13/12/2013
Damiano Taurino / Deep Blue
Marco Romani / NAIS
30/10/2013
15/11/2013
15/11/2013
Reviewed By - Reviewers internal to the project.
Reviewed By - Other SESAR projects, Airspace Users, staff association, military, Industrial Support, other organisations.
Name & Company
Position & Title
Date
<Name / Company>
<Position / Title>
<DD/MM/YYYY>
Approved for submission to the SJU By - Representatives of the company involved in the project.
Name & Company
Date
Joe Degiorgio / MATS
Position & Title
Leader of RAID Demonstration
Plan preparation task
RAID Project Manager
Responsible for Demonstration
Plan
Operational Expert
David Zammit Mangion / UoM
Safety Expert
29/01/2014
Francesco Grimaccia / Nimbus
Engineer
29/01/2014
Damiano Taurino / Deep Blue
Edoardo Filippone / CIRA
Marco Romani / NAIS
29/01/2014
29/01/2014
29/01/2014
29/01/2014
Rejected By - Representatives of the company involved in the project.
Name & Company
Position & Title
Date
None
Rational for rejection
None.
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©SESAR JOINT UNDERTAKING, 2011. Created by RAID Consortium for the SESAR Joint Undertaking within the frame of the
SESAR Programme co-financed by the EU and EUROCONTROL. Reprint with approval of publisher and the source properly
acknowledged.
Edition 02.01.00
Document History
Edition
Date
Status
Author
Justification
00.00.01
30/10/2013
Draft
Damiano Taurino
New Document
00.00.02
00.00.03
00.00.04
15/11/2013
23/12/2013
15/01/2014
Draft
Draft
Damiano Taurino,
Edoardo Filippone,
Joe Degiorgio,
David Zammit
Mangion, Gianluca
Gargiulo
Jelena Dokic,
Barbara Mellini,
David Zammit
Mangion, Gianluca
Gargiulo, Edoardo
Filippone,
Salvatore Palazzo,
Francesco
Grimaccia
Context of Demonstration,
Scenarios Definition
Definition of Demonstration
Objectives and Assumptions,
Design of Demonstration
exercises
Draft
Edoardo Filippone,
Marco Romani
Communication Plan, Project
Management,
Implementation
Considerations
Consolidation of the
document by partners,
Integration of reviews
Version delivered to SJU
00.00.05
24/01/2014
Draft
Damiano Taurino,
Jelena Dokic,
Barbara Mellini,
David Zammit
Mangion, Gianluca
Gargiulo, Marco
Romani, Edoardo
Filippone,
Salvatore Palazzo
01.00.00
29/01/2014
Final
Damiano Taurino
02.00.00
10/03/2014
Final
Damiano Taurino
02.01.00
10/03/2014
Final
Damiano Taurino
Version addressing
reviewers’ comments
Minor typo errors and the
lack of a reference document
corrected.
3 of 139
acknowledged.
Edition 02.01.00
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
2
PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT ................................................................................................................ 7
INTENDED READERSHIP .......................................................................................................................... 7
STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT ............................................................................................................ 7
GLOSSARY OF TERMS ............................................................................................................................. 7
ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 7
CONTEXT OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS............................................................................................. 10
2.1
SCOPE OF THE DEMONSTRATION AND COMPLEMENTARITY WITH THE SESAR PROGRAMME ............ 10
2.2
STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION, NEEDS AND INVOLVEMENT................................................................ 13
2.2.1
Regulatory context ..................................................................................................................... 16
3
PROJECT MANAGEMENT ..................................................................................................................... 18
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4
ORGANISATION ..................................................................................................................................... 18
W ORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................ 22
FORMAL DELIVERABLES ....................................................................................................................... 58
OTHER DELIVERABLES AND KEY PROJECT MILESTONES ...................................................................... 58
QUARTERLY REPORTING ...................................................................................................................... 58
RESOURCES BREAKDOWN ................................................................................................................... 58
PRE-FINANCING NEEDS ........................................................................................................................ 59
RISK MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................. 59
EXTRANET ACCESS RIGHTS .................................................................................................................. 61
DEMONSTRATION APPROACH ........................................................................................................... 62
4.1
DEMONSTRATION OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 62
4.2
STAKEHOLDERS DEMONSTRATION EXPECTATIONS............................................................................. 63
4.3
DEMONSTRATION OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 63
4.3.1
Human Performance.................................................................................................................. 64
4.3.2
Security ........................................................................................................................................ 67
4.3.3
Safety ........................................................................................................................................... 70
4.3.4
System Performance ................................................................................................................. 78
4.3.5
Capacity ....................................................................................................................................... 79
4.4
DEMONSTRATION SCENARIOS.............................................................................................................. 80
4.5
DEMONSTRATION ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................... 86
4.6
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISES LIST ...................................................................................................... 91
4.7
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISES PLANNING ............................................................................................ 92
5
DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 94
5.1
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE #1 PLAN ................................................................................................. 94
5.1.1
Exercise Scope and Justification ............................................................................................. 94
5.1.2
Exercises Planning and management .................................................................................... 99
5.1.3
Results Analysis Specification ............................................................................................... 104
5.1.4
Level of representativeness/limitations ................................................................................. 106
5.2
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE #2 PLAN ............................................................................................... 106
5.2.1
Exercise Scope and Justification ........................................................................................... 106
5.2.2
Exercises Planning and management .................................................................................. 113
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.3
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISE #3 PLAN ............................................................................................... 118
5.3.1
Exercise Scope and Justification ........................................................................................... 118
5.3.2
Exercises Planning and management .................................................................................. 122
5.3.3
5.3.4
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6
IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................... 129
7
COMMUNICATION PLAN ..................................................................................................................... 131
7.1
OBJECTIVES AND KEY MESSAGES ...................................................................................................... 131
7.2
TARGET AUDIENCE ............................................................................................................................. 132
7.3
COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................................. 133
7.3.1
Project Logo and Presentation template .............................................................................. 136
7.3.2
Kick-off meeting press release ............................................................................................... 137
8
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 138
8.1
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................. 138
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Executive summary
The overall context of the RAID project is the safe and seamless integration of RPAS with other
airspace users. Based on the stimulus resulting from the ERSG roadmap, the present project aims at
providing contribution in terms of operational procedures and technologies evaluation through the
completion of several demonstration activities including both simulations and flight trials.
The aim of the project is the evaluation of technological solutions and procedures to support the
integration of RPAS into the ATM environment.
This will be pursued by means of relevant demonstration activities, whose specific objectives are to:
• Assess the similarities of managing the RPAS flight in the unrestricted airspace, with respect to
the manned aircraft, from the ATM network and operators point of view;
• Provide evidences of the peculiarities and possible effects on RPAS operations in the
unrestricted airspace, due both to peculiar system architecture (pilot on ground) and to the
specific technologies enabling the RPAS to flight (DAA, C2L);
• Support the identification of possible incompatibilities of RPAS with the current ATM systems,
functions, and operational aspects, in terms of operations, technologies, procedures;
• Emulate and analyse malicious attacks on the communication/navigation radio links in order to
assess the impact on the system performances and on the controller and remote pilot
decisions;
• Provide some data and considerations to identify guidelines to manage peculiarities and
overcome incompatibilities for the RPAS integration in the unrestricted airspace.
These objectives will be achieved through a combination of Real-Time Simulations (EXE-RPAS.03001) and Flight Trials both in segregated (EXE-RPAS.03-002) and non-segregated (EXE-RPAS.03003) airspace. These objectives are detailed and broken down into low-level objectives associated to
relevant KPAs (safety, security, capacity and human performance). In addition, the objectives
identified also address the system performance measurements. The focus of these objectives will be
on both procedural issues and technological aspects, addressing primarily the management of
transitions between temporary segregated areas (TSAs) and non-segregated airspace and the
deployment of new DAA and C2L technologies.
Within this document, the foreseen demonstration activities and their supporting aspects both
technical (objectives, scenarios, hypothesis, indicators, data collection and analysis method) and
organizational (roles and responsibilities, time planning, resources) are further detailed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of the document
This document aims at providing the Demonstration plan for the RAID project. It describes how the
project demonstration exercises will be organised and executed. The Demonstration Plan is
organised around three exercises (one Real Time Simulation and two Flight Trials), each foreseeing
different test conditions. Demonstration objectives targeting the assessment of SESAR Key
Performance Areas are defined starting from the high-level objectives described in the project
proposal. For these objectives associated success criteria, hypotheses, indicators and methods that
will be used during the assessment are identified. Effects on both Pilot and Controller are considered.
To identify and assess differences in operating the aircraft On-Board and by the means of the Remote
Station is part of the demonstration plan objectives.
The document also provides the Communication Plan that will be used for the dissemination of the
RAID project matured experiences and results.
1.2 Intended readership
This document is primarily intended for the members of the RAID Consortium and the SESAR JU as a
mean to provide information about the planning and the execution of the RAID demonstration
activities.
1.3 Structure of the document
This document is structured as follows:
• Section 1 provides a brief introduction to the Demonstration Plan;
• Section 2 focuses on the context and scope of the demonstration;
• Section 3 addresses the project management relevant topics (organisation, work and
resources breakdowns, deliverables and key project milestones);
• Section 4 provides a detailed description of the demonstration approach, associated
objectives, scenarios, assumptions and the exercises through which they will be addressed;
• Section 5 describes the demonstration activities to be performed for each of the planned
demonstration exercises;
• Section 6 introduces relevant considerations to be addressed in the follow up work before the
implementation;
• Section 7 lists the Communication Plan objectives and key messages together with the
associated activities;
• Section 8 provides a list of the Applicable and Reference Documents.
1.4 Glossary of terms
The definitions of the terms that are not covered by the standard SESAR glossary are provided as
footnotes within the document.
1.5 Acronyms and Terminology
Term
AAMS
ACAS
ACC
ADS_B
AFM
AFUA
AIMS
ANSP
Definition
Advanced Airspace Management System
Airborne Collision Avoidance System
Area Control Centre
Automatic Dependent Surveillance_ Broadcast
Advanced Flight Management
Advanced Flexible Use of Airspace
Aeronautical Information Management System
Air Navigation Service Provider
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acknowledged.
APP
ATC
ATCo
ATM
ATS
ATCo
BLOS
BVLOS
C2L
C3L
CA
CAD
CONOPS
CP
CWP
DAA
DARD
DMA
DOE
E_OVCM
ENAV
ERSG
FDP
FHA
FIR
FL
GA
GBSAA
GPS
HF
HIL
HMI
ICAO
ICONUS
IFR
KPA
KPI
LDA
MATS
MRT
NIMS
NOTAM
OFA
OP
OPV
OV
PSR
PSSA
RF
RLOS
ROI
RP
RPA
RPAS
RPS
RTS
SAM
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Approach
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Controller
Air Traffic Management
Air Traffic Service
Air Traffic Controller
Beyond Line-of-Sight
Beyond Visual Line of Sight
Command and Control Link
Command, Control and Communication Link
Collision Avoidance
Civil Aviation Department of Malta Transportation Ministry
Concept of Operations
Communication Plan
Control Working Position
Detect and Avoid
Direct Access Radar Data
Dynamic Management of Airspace
Design of Experiment
European_Operational Concept Validation Methodology
Ente Nazionale per l’Assistenza al Volo
European RPAS Study Group
Flight Data Processing
Functional Hazards Assessment
Flight Information Region
Flight Level
General Aviation
Ground Based Sense and Avoid
Global Positioning System
Human Factor
Human-in-the-loop
Human Machine Interface
International Civil Aviation Organization
Initial CONOPS for UAS in SESAR
Instrument Flight Rules
Key Performance Area
Key Performance Index
Local Data Area
Malta Airspace Traffic Service
Multi radar Tracks
Network Information Management System
Notice to Air Men
Operational Focus Area
On-board Pilot
Optionally Piloted Vehicle
Operational Validation
Primary Radar
Preliminary System Safety Assessment
Radio Frequency
Radio Line-Of-Sight
Risks, Opportunities and Issues
Remote Pilot
Remote Piloted Aircraft
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
Remote Pilot Station
Real Time Simulation
Safety Assessment Methodology
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acknowledged.
SDA
SES
SESAR
SJU
SLDA
SSA
SSR
STOL
TIS_B
TSA
TWR
UAS
UASSG
VFR
VLA
VLOS
VTOL
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System Data Area
Single European Sky
SES ATM Research
SESAR Joint Undertaking
System Local Data Area
Spatial Situational Awareness
Secondary Radar
Short Take Off Landing
Traffic Information System_Broadcast
Temporary Segregated Area
Arriving/Departing Traffic
Unmanned Aircraft System
UAS Study Group
Visual Flight Rules
Very Light Aircraft
Visual Line-of-Sight
Vertical Take-off and Landing
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acknowledged.
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2 Context of the Demonstrations
The overall objective of RAID is the demonstration and evaluation of the impact of RPAS integration
into unrestricted airspace on the current and future (short-term) ATM environment, as it is defined by
the European RPAS Steering Group (ERSG) Roadmap [2].
2.1 Scope of the demonstration and complementarity with the
SESAR Programme
The Demonstration focuses on the following areas identified by the ERSG Roadmap:
•
Integration into ATM and Airspace environments;
•
Verification and Validation;
•
Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures;
•
Security issues;
•
Operational contingency procedures and systems.
Based on these areas of interest the RAID Consortium identified four high level objectives, as
following:
•OBJ-1. To quantify and demonstrate the level of maturity, performance, limitations and compatibility
with current infrastructures and procedures, of detect and avoid technology and of technologies for
secure C2L;
•OBJ-2. To assess the impact RPAS integration into un-segregated airspace could have on safety,
the RPAS pilot, Air Traffic Control Officers and ATM procedures and operations;
•OBJ-3. To identify the similarities between the operation of RPASs and manned aircraft in the ATM
environment, as well as specificities to RPAS operation in terms of constraints and new requirements
for the ATM operations;
•OBJ-4. To compare technological requirements between current (manned) flight operations and
RPAS operations within the flight and air traffic management environments.
These objectives are then broken down into 22 low level objectives referring to four KPAs (Human
Performance, Security, Safety and Capacity) and to Detect and Avoid System Performance, which
are addressed by means of three demonstration exercises:
Demonstration Exercise ID and Title
EXE-RPAS.03-001: On-ground and Human-in-the-Loop
Simulation
Leading organization
CIRA
Demonstration exercise objectives
High-level description of the Concept
of Operations
EXE-RPAS.03-001 addresses all the RAID demonstration
objectives. In fact RTS are meant to:
- identify and define the operational conditions that can be
safely and efficiently addressed in the following live trials;
- while at the same time providing a preliminary analysis
of relevant objective-related data and information to be readdresses and further investigated by the means of flight
trials in EXE-RPAS.03-002 and EXE-RPAS.03-003
A table mapping the low level objectives into the three
demonstration exercises is provided in Section 4.6.
The operational concept addressed in this exercise is the
RPAS integration in the ATM system, with a specific focus
on the en-route phase.
The standard existing ATC procedures will be applied in a
simulation platform. Any emerging need for modification to
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Applicable Operational Context
Expected results per KPA
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current procedures and operating methods or creation of
new ones will be investigated.
Simulated RPAS operations in en-route segregated and
non-segregated environment
Human Performance:
ATCOs’ performance remains as in today’s operations,
while the roles, responsibilities and tasks of remote pilots
are defined and assessed as within the scope of human
capabilities and limitations and contribute to the SESAR
expected performance benefits.
Safety, Security and Capacity levels are maintained, as in
current operations.
System Performance;
DAA performance is evaluated as satisfactory as with
respect to the deviation between actual and planned flight
time and path. The total number of infringement is
sufficiently low and the minimum separation distance
(traffic avoidance algorithm) is maintained.
Number of simulation runs
Related projects in the SESAR
Programme
OFA addressed
15
SESAR RPAS projects:
RPAS.01 DEMORPAS
RPAS.02 INSuRE
RPAS.03 RAID
RPAS.04 MedALE
RPAS.05 TEMPAERIS
RPAS.06 ODREA
RPAS.07 CLAIRE
RPAS.08 AIRICA
RPAS.09 ARIADNA
- OFA 03.01.08 System Interoperability with air and
ground data sharing;
- OFA03.03.01 Conflict Detection, Resolution and
Monitoring
- OFA03.03.03 Enhanced Decision Support Tools and
Performance Based Navigation;
- OFA03.04.01 Enhanced Ground Based Safety Nets
EXE-RPAS.03-002: Flight trials in segregated area
CIRA
of Operations
EXE-RPAS.03-002, flight trials in segregated area, mainly
addresses Human Performance, Security and Safety
related objectives.
A table mapping the demonstration objectives into the
three demonstration exercises is provided in Section 4.6.
•
The standard existing ATC procedures will be applied and
any emerging need for modification to current procedures
and operating methods or creation of new ones will be
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investigated.
RPAS operations in en-route segregated airspace
Human Performance
Safety and Security
The actual level as in current operations is maintained.
Number of flight trials
Programme
OFA addressed
4
RPAS.01 DEMORPAS
RPAS.02 INSuRE
RPAS.03 RAID
RPAS.04 MedALE
RPAS.05 TEMPAERIS
RPAS.06 ODREA
RPAS.07 CLAIRE
RPAS.08 AIRICA
RPAS.09 ARIADNA
Monitoring
EXE-RPAS.03-003: Flight trials in non-segregated area
CIRA
of Operations
EXE-RPAS.03-003, flight trials in non-segregated area,
aims at evaluating System Performance and Capacity
related objectives and at deepening the evaluation of
Human Performance and Safety related objectives.
A table mapping the demonstration objectives into the
three demonstration exercises is provided in Section 4.6.
The standard existing ATC procedures will be applied and
any emerging need for modification to current procedures
and operating methods or creation of new ones will be
investigated.
The RPAS supporting technology that will be addressed
within this demonstration exercise is the Detect and Avoid
technology, focusing on solutions specifically based on
the use of ADS-B and TIS-B technology, and on its
compatibility with the existing safety nets.
RPAS operations in en-route non-segregated environment
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Human Performance
Safety and Capacity
The actual level as in current operations is maintained.
System Performance
DAA performance is evaluated as satisfactory as with
respect to the deviation between actual and planned flight
time and path. The total number of infringement is low and
the minimum separation distance (traffic avoidance
algorithm) is maintained.
Number of flight trials
4
Programme
RPAS.01 DEMORPAS
RPAS.02 INSuRE
RPAS.03 RAID
RPAS.04 MedALE
RPAS.05 TEMPAERIS
RPAS.06 ODREA
RPAS.07 CLAIRE
RPAS.08 AIRICA
RPAS.09 ARIADNA
Monitoring
OFA addressed
2.2 Stakeholder identification, needs and involvement
In the following table are presented the identified stakeholders, their involvement in the Demonstration
and their expectations.
Stakeholder
CIRA
Deep Blue
External /
Internal
Internal
Internal
Involvement
Why it matters to stakeholder/
Performance expectations
Project
Coordinator.
RPAS
operator. DAA
System
Developer
Responsible for
Scenario
definition,
Demonstration
Plan definition,
Flight
Demonstration
CIRA expects to improve the level
of maturity of its DAA technology
and to qualify itself as an RPAS
operator able to provide all the
support in using a RPAS system for
experimental activities.
Exercise
Identifier
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
Deep Blue expects to consolidate
its knowledge in the field of
Validation and to increase its wellgrounded experience in the field of EXESafety by applying the methodology RPAS.03-002
of Safety Assessment to the RPAS
case.
EXE-
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acknowledged.
University of
Malta
MATS
Nimbus
NAIS
Academia
Internal
Internal
Internal
Internal
External
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Safety
Assessment.
Contributor to
Real Time
Simulations
and Flight
Trials as
Human
Performance,
Safety and
Operational
experts.
Design of
simulation and
flight test
campaigns,
support in their
execution,
coordination in
legal issues
relating to the
permit to fly
and results
evaluation.
Providing
simulation and
ATCO
involvement
RPAS.03-003
UOM expects to consolidate
capacity to carry out flight tests and
to evaluate results. Together with
MATS and the local authorities,
UoM will bring into Malta the RPAS
domain of such activities. It also
intends to exploit the effort of
establishing a legal and operational
framework in which to operate
RPAS testing in Malta in the future,
thus facilitating further involvement
in RPAS flight test in the country.
EXERPAS.03-001
Support the concept and improve
the idea that ATM procedures for
RPAS should be as those
applicable to manned aircraft, thus
the provision ATC service to such
craft should be transparent to ATC
controller.
EXERPAS.03-001
Collect experience in light UAS
segment integration in real traffic
scenarios in order to foster their
future development beside
traditional aircrafts with suitable
control technologies (e.g. automatic
dependent surveillance in broadcast).
Security
Extend its expertise to the RPAS
assessment of field and in particular the security
Communication aspects concerning communication
and Navigation and positioning technologies.
means
Improve the participation of
academic institution to deal with
technology problems.
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
Light UAS
manufacturer
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
The European
Commission
External
Results
Beneficiary
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
Collect new information to define
new advancements for the ERSG
activities. Improve understanding of
the gaps to be filled in order to allow EXERPAS insertion in unrestricted
RPAS.03-002
airspace, its feasibility in short term
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acknowledged.
SESAR
NEXTGEN
Regulatory
Bodies
External
External
External
ANSPs (other
External
than MATS),
EUROCONTROL
Military
Organisations,
EDA
The general
public
External
External
Edition 02.01.00
horizon, the resources required to
fill those gaps.
Results
Collect results, in terms of
Beneficiary
technologies (DAA, C2L) and
Financing Body operational aspects (use of TSA),
for the integration of RPAS in the
SESAR context.
Interested to
the results
Interested to
the results
Interested to
the results
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
Learn about SESAR state-of-the-art EXEactivities on RPAS integration, in
RPAS.03-001
order to develop interoperable
systems.
EXERPAS.03-002
Improve Safety Assessment
Procedures definition in order to
standardize the Certification
Process for RPAS to be allowed to
fly, with specific reference to
security of satellite and C2 links,
and DAA requirements.
Improve understanding of ATCo
involvement and evaluate the
effects in terms of peculiar
Controller performance and
workload deriving from the
introduction of RPAS in controlled
airspace.
Improve the integration between
military and civil operation, as
expected by the SESAR Concept.
Evaluate mature technologies
developed in civil R&D activities for
application to military operations
and means.
Improve levels of confidence
and trust in RPAS
unrestricted operations.
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
Civil Aviation
Authorities, at
National and
European Level
(CAD, ENAC,
EASA)
RPAS Operators
and End Users
Associations,
External
External
Improve Safety Assessment
Procedures definition in order to
standardize the Certification
Process for RPAS to be allowed to
fly in unrestricted airspace.
Evaluate the possibility to perform
first unrestricted operations and
limitations to the wide use of RPAS
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
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e.g., .UVS
International,
Assorpas, etc.
RPAS
Manufacturers,
e.g. Alenia
Aermacchi,
Aermatica, etc.
Pilots
Associations,
e.g., AOPA,
Air
Traffic
Controllers
Associations,
e.g.,
ANACNA,
IFATCA
Edition 02.01.00
in short term.
External
External
Manufacturers can better evaluate
gaps still existing to RPAS
extensive use in civil/commercial
operations and aspects still to be
addressed.
Identify differences in using the
DAA system from the RPS,
executing emergency operations in
case of threats to the satellite or
communication links. Derive
possible specific improvements to
training procedures.
External
Identify differences in controlling
RPAS, namely in performing
separation assurance with DAA
system supported RPAS, and
supporting remote pilot in managing
emergency operations in case of
threats to the satellite or
communication links. Derive
possible specific improvements to
training procedures.
Table 1: Stakeholders identification and expectations
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
EXERPAS.03-001
EXERPAS.03-002
EXERPAS.03-003
2.2.1 Regulatory context
The project relevant task is the execution of in-flight tests with a RPAS vehicle. The vehicle which will
be used, named FLARE, is a VLA class aircraft suitably modified for the execution of operations in
remotely piloted conditions, while an on-board pilot can anytime act as a safety pilot, taking the
control of the airplane if an emergency condition should arose. In this way, the FLARE vehicle can be
recognized as an Optionally Piloted Vehicle.
The FLARE vehicle has extensively been used in the Italian aerospace, under Permit-to-Fly rules, as
1
they are prescribed by ENAC (Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile), the Italian CAA .
For the scope of the RAID project, the FLARE vehicle will fly inside the Malta airspace and under the
MALTA CAA (CAD).
A specific Permit-to-Fly in order to operate FLARE has to be required to CAD, following the procedure
here under presented.
It is anyway highlighted that CAD has expressed its endorsement to the project, endorsement that
has been submitted to SJU as an attachment of the RAID proposal.
Short description of Malta applicable regulation to obtain the Permit-to-Fly
An Aerial Work Permit issued by the Maltese Civil Aviation Directorate (CAD) needs to be obtained to
allow the RAID flight trials to be carried out as planned within Maltese Airspace.
1
ENAC has issued, last December 2013, the applicable regulation to RPAS flying inside the Italian airspace and under ENAC
responsibility (RPAS with MTOW less than to 150Kg). The regulation is expected to become effective since 30 April 2014.
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The procedure for obtaining such an Aerial Work Permit already exists and it involves the following
steps:
• An initial, pre-operations meeting is held with the CAD to present the operational case and
brief the Directorate on matter such as intent, scope, final goals, operational boundaries,
general flight plan details etc.
• The CAD will provide a step-by-step checklist of items required for the issue of the permit and
the operators need to then create a manual for the intended RPAS operations and present it
to the CAD. Guidelines for preparation of the manual will be provided by the CAD and the
manual typically needs to be 20-60 pages long.
• The Authority will review the document and call the operator for a meeting to clarify any
outstanding matters, possibly leading to its modification.
• Once the operations manual is approved, the aircraft, associated equipment (such as ground
station equipment), flight and operational crew are inspected by CAD or a qualified entity
representing it, upon which, a licence of competency will be issued. The CAD inspector will
need to meet the crew in person and physically assess all relevant equipment.
• Finally, a flight test needs to be carried out in the presence of CAD personnel and, based on
the outcome, the Aerial Work Permit is issued. It is possible for the flight test to be carried out
the day before the start of the flight test campaign (provided the test is completed
successfully).
Costs depend on the extent of complexity of the assessment that needs to be carried out and should
be complete in a period of 8-16 weeks. It is understood that the duration and cost reflect the
complexity of assessment.
The CAD is currently preparing the regulatory framework to fully accommodate RPAS operations in
Malta by the end of 2014. The first request for such operations was made in 2011, when no structure
or legislation exited. In the last 12 months, there has been a substantial demand for RPAS operations
and the CAD has been given the instruction by the relevant ministry to facilitate such operations in
Malta. To date, the CAD has accommodated requests on a case-by-case basis and RPAs have
already flown in Malta.
Following brief discussion with the CAD, it may be possible that an RPAS with a safety pilot on board
who will also manually fly it in and out of the terminal area be considered as a manned aircraft, but
this is yet to be determined.
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3 Project Management
3.1 Organisation
The RAID project is managed by the RAID Consortium.
The RAID Consortium consists of 7 partners from Italy and Malta:
•
•
•
•
•
•
CIRA Aeronautical research center (IT) - Project Coordinator;
Deep Blue (IT);
NAIS (IT);
NIMBUS (IT);
University of Malta (M);
MATS, Malta ANSP (M).
Each partner will contribute to the achievement of the demonstration objectives by taking part to the
project activities providing the needed competence and expertise. RAID Consortium composition and
expertise is summarized in the table below.
Name of Organization
Nature of Organization
Applicable expertise
CIRA (Coordinator)
Research Centre
DAA system development and prototyping;
Real-Time Simulations and In-Flight Tests
execution;
RPAS Operator.
Deep Blue
SME
Support to RTS and Flight Trials
preparation, organization and conduction;
Human
Performance,
Operational Validation;
Safety
and
RPAS introduction in non-segregated
airspace: procedural, organizational and
legal aspects analysis;
Dissemination and Communication
project results to SESAR stakeholders.
NAIS
SME
of
C2L and GPS security, including the
emulation of C2L and GPS navigation
security attacks (Jamming & Spoofing)
during the demonstration campaign;
Dissemination and communication of project
results to SESAR stakeholders.
MATS
Air Navigation
Provider
Service
Service Provision, ATM expertise
experience in UAS operations;
with
ATC procedures and systems development;
In-depth knowledge of the European ATM
context;
Dissemination in industrial fora;
Safety assessments for areas concerning
the provision of air traffic services.
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Univ. of Malta
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Academia
Academic studies;
Support for simulations and flight tests;
Design of
evaluation;
experiments
and
results
Dissemination in academic fora.
NIMBUS
SME
Provider of an innovative hybrid light UAV
platform which has already obtained Permit
to Fly from ENAC Authority;
Participation to the flight tests that aim at
achieving a safe integration of multiple
RPAs into a non-segregated Air Traffic area.
Table 2: Organizations and their expertise
Key roles and corresponding responsibilities will be entrusted to RAID partners’ representatives in
order to efficiently manage the project.
The RAID Steering Committee (RAID SC) is formed by the key representatives of the RAID
Consortium partners and it is chaired by the Consortium coordinator (CIRA). The RAID SC meets at
least once a year, in conjunction with one of the Main Project Meetings.
The RAID SC will be responsible to monitor all the project activities, their progress, the milestones
achievement, the effort spent and the effort required in future activities. In case of raised issues it will
be also responsible to define mitigation actions or contingency plans to be applied.
The RAID SC is composed of the following members.
Edoardo Filippone
CIRA
Antonio Monteleone
NAIS
Damiano Taurino
Paolo Bellezza
Quater
David ZammitMangion
Robert Saint
DEEPBLUE
NIMBUS
UNIVERSITY of
MALTA
MATS
The Project Manager (RAID PM) manages and supervises the project “daily operations”. He
coordinates the different work packages and implements the RAID SG directives. He is responsible
for the overall risk management, ensuring that the risks identified are properly mitigated, the concerns
are properly addressed and the emerging opportunities are exploited. He will chair the Main Project
Meetings and participate in the RAID SG.
The PM of the RAID project is Edoardo Filippone (CIRA).
The Quality Manager (RAID QM) is responsible to ensure that the project and its deliverables are
compliant with the SESAR JU standards and templates and that they fulfil the expected quality levels.
The RAID QM is Saverio Del Gatto (CIRA).
The Communication Manager (RAID CM) is responsible for the plan and execution of the project
communication activities. His main objective is to ensure a high visibility to the RAID Project and to
promote its results. In addition, the CM coordinates the organisation of the Project Meetings and of
any project related event.
The RAID Communication Manager is Marco Romani (NAIS).
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The Work Package Leaders (WPLs) are responsible for the progress and accomplishment of the
activities pertaining to their Work Packages. They coordinate the WP activities and report on their
status to the PM. WPLs are chosen among the WP task leaders in order to keep the management
effort and its overhead as small as possible. The WPL is the connecting link between the PM and the
Task Leaders.
The Task Leader (TL) is responsible for organising the work at a task level. He convenes for the
appropriate task meetings (mostly done through webex), co-ordinates the available resources and
distributes sub-task activities to the partners in order to comply with the task schedule and budget.
Work Packages leaders (WPL), Tasks leaders (TL) and contributors (C) for the RAID project activities
are identified as follows:
WP/Task
#
WP 1
Task 1.1
Task 1.2
WP 2
Task 2.1
Task 2.2
Task 2.3
Task 2.4
WP 3
Task 3.1
Task 3.2
Task 3.3
Task 3.4
Task 3.5
WP 4
Task 4.1
Task 4.2
Task 4.3
Task 4.4
WP 5
Task 5.1
Task 5.2
Task 5.3
CIRA
NAIS
DBLUE
MATS
UNI
MALTA
NIMBUS
WPL
TL
TL
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
WPL
TL
C
TL
TL
TL
C
TL
C
C
C
TL
C
C
C
TL
C
WPL
TL
C
TL
TL
C
WPL
TL
C
TL
TL
C
C
C
WPL
C
C
C
TL
C
C
TL
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
TL
C
C
C
C
C
Table 3: Work Packages and Tasks leaders and contributors
Project Reports
The RAID project will issue two formal deliverables:
•
Demonstration Plan (Deliverable D_A1).
•
Demonstration Report (Deliverable D_B1).
The present Demonstration Plan document is organized following the recommendations provided
during the KOM and using the D_A1 template provided by SJU.
Furthermore, the RAID project will update SJU on the project advancements by issuing Quarterly
Progress Reports.
All the reports will be delivered to SJU in plain English.
Project formal deliverables will be issued both in Electronic (Microsoft Word editable document) and
paper format (n. 1 copy) according to their scheduled deadlines (as detailed in section 3.3).
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Quarterly reports summarizing RAID advancements and achievements for the current reporting period
as well as the outcomes expected for the subsequent one, will be delivered according to their due
dates (see section 3.5).
Project meetings
The project Consortium has set a minimum number of meetings in order to assure the coordinated,
cooperative, consistent and collaborative progress of the RAID project.
Three project meetings are strictly required by the project guidelines: the Kick-Off Meeting, the first
year Critical Review Meeting, the final meeting (which will match with the second year Critical Review
Meeting).Two additional meetings will be arranged in correspondence to the formal deliverables
submission (see section 3.3), in order to comply with the internal revision procedure.
Moreover, dedicated meetings will be organized in correspondence of the RAID milestones and of the
Quarterly Progress Reports (see sections 3.4 and 3.5).
In addition, two planned meetings per year will be organized by the Steering Committee in
correspondence of the preparation of the second and the fourth of the quarterly progress reports.
While the three meetings with the SJU (the KOM and the two Critical Review Meetings) will be in
presence meetings (to be held at SJU or RAID coordinator premises), the format of other meetings (in
presence or via web conference) will be agreed from time to time by the consortium, depending on
the issues to be discussed.
Additional meetings will be arranged by partners involved in specific activities, if needed.
Minutes will be prepared for each project meeting. The MoM for the face-to-face meetings held with
the SJU will be distributed as official project notes. For all other meetings, a synthesis of the main
topics discussed will be provided within the progress reports.
Management Style
RAID management is based on situated leadership. Responsibilities are distributed among partners
basing on their expertise on the single tasks and work packages. Due to the intertwining of expertise
and competences required by the RAID project and provided by the Consortium as a whole,
leadership and responsibilities are well balanced among partners, according to the project proposal.
Moreover, RAID management envisions a collaborative and shared approach to decision making,
pursued by means of the Steering Committee,
Technical and Administrative PoC
Technical and administrative points of contact (PoC) for each partner are listed in the table below.
Legal
Entity
Technical PoC
Administrative PoC
Name
Phone/E-mail
Name
Phone/E-mail
CIRA
ScpA
Deep
Blue Srl
Edoardo
Filippone
Damiano Taurino
Monica Menzani
NAIS Srl
Antonio
Monteleone
Nimbus
Srl
Mario Faletto
+39-0823-623322
e.filippone@cira.it
0039 -06-8555208
Damiano.taurino@d
blue.it
+39 06 91139009
antonio.monteleone
@nais-solutions.it
+39 329 6543905
(mobile)
m.faletto@nimbus.a
ero
+39-0823-623599
m.menzani@cira.it
0039 -06-8555208
Francesca.margiotta
@dblue.it
+39 06 91139005
daria.morbidelli@nai
s-solutions.it
info@nimbus.to.it,
011.9956.481
(011.9956.316)
Francesca
Margiotta
Daria Morbidelli
Silvia Bellezza
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Malta Air
Traffic
Services
Ltd
(MATS)
University
of Malta
(UoM)
Joseph Degiorgio
David ZammitMangion
Edition 02.01.00
0035699015644
joe.degiorgio@malta
ts.com
Mario J.
Azzopardi
35 6 79058533
Rodianne
(mobile)
Buhagiar
david.zammitmangion@um.edu.m
t
Table 4: Partners’ points of contact
00356 99293000
mario.j.azzopardi@
maltats.com
+356 2340 4937
Rodianne.buhagiar
@um.edu.mt
3.2 Work Breakdown Structure
The RAID Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) consists of five work packages that cover both the preoperational validation of the RAID concept (preparation, demonstration and validation) and the
transversal activities related to project management and communication. This WBS also allows a
clear identification of the competences to be provided by each Consortium partner.
In particular three Work Packages are considered “executive” and are associated to the three logically
sequential phases representing the natural roadmap for a pre-operational validation project:
•
•
•
WP 2: Preparation activities;
WP 3: Demonstration;
WP 4: Results analysis and Reporting.
The WBS is completed by two “transversal” WPs that cover the whole duration of the project:
•
•
WP1: Project Management
WP5: Media Communication
Each task is assigned to a single partner, which is responsible for the quality and timeliness of those
task activities, as well as for the distribution of the task related work among partners, basing on their
competences. The figure below pictures the Pert Diagram for RAID project activities.
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Figure 1: Project activities Pert diagram
A detailed description of the RAID work packages is provided below. It shows for each WP, the
related objectives, the main activities and the core outputs, as well as leadership and effort
distribution among partners.
WP 1: Project Management
WP1 aims at providing the RAID project with all the required management support for its timely and
efficient execution, within budget constraints and with the expected level of quality.
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Task 1.1
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Title:
WP 1
Coordination, Monitoring & Controlling, Risk mgt
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
NIMBUS
L
C
C
C
C
C
Task 1.1
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
This Task is dedicated to ensure a proper project management.
Internal Consortium coordination as well as coordination with SESAR JU members will be conducted by
organising “physical” meetings, Webex meetings and offline coordination conducted by phone and email as
needed.
It will provide the activities needed for the proper administration of the project, such as:
-
Assure that the project reports are delivered on time;
-
Provide support to finance administrations (with special attention to timely and correct presentation of
Eligible Costs);
-
Identify and prevent risks and mitigate their potential effect;
-
Identify and take advantage of any opportunity related to the project exploitation;
-
Address coordination issues.
This task will be allocated to the RAID Project Manager together with the RAID Steering Committee.
List of main Activities/deliverables
Project Management Plan, Six monthly reports, Risk Management Reports, Eligible Cost statements,
Project Executive Summary.
•
Expected inputs
Risks Board updates, Reports from WP Leaders, minutes from Technical Board, directives and
guidelines from AFD SG
•
Expected Outputs
Efficient Project Management
•
Facilities/Services
Special facilities and services to be used
Facilities: N.A.
Services: N.A.
Partners contribution
Organisation
CIRA
Description of its contribution to this task
Will conduct this task by RAID PM.
Will ensure proper Project Management skills, by assigning a dedicated adequate person
to this task.
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Will participate to coordination activities at adequate management level. They will
facilitate RAID SC decisions by providing their contribution in the project coordination,
putting in place corrective actions and ensuring prompt responses when needed.
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Task 1.2
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Title:
WP 1
CIRA
Task 1.2
Quality Assurance & Configuration Management
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
NIMBUS
L
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
The Task will ensure that the Project complies with quality standards by:
-
providing templates;
-
ensuring document archiving, versioning and sharing.
This task will be allocated to the RAID Quality Manager.
Quality Management Plan and procedures, Templates (in accordance with the one’s provided by the SJU by the
date of the Kick-Off meeting), etc.
Expected inputs
Standards and best practices
•
Expected Outputs
A project compliant with the expected and appropriate quality level,
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: tool for document management and collaborative work
Services: n.a.
Organisation
CIRA
CIRA will conduct this task by RAID QM
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WP 2: Preparation Activities
Two main outcomes will be expected from the Preparation Work Package:
•
The design of the demonstration experiment (DOE)
•
The development of a Communication Plan (CP).
The DOE will focus on developing a Demonstration Plan that will enable the successful demonstration
of the effective integration of RPA operation in non-segregated airspace. This will be performed
through the use of appropriately challenging and representative scenarios, that will highlight
effectiveness and limitations of the state-of-the-art technologies and procedures to be adopted. This
objective will be achieved through representative simulations as well as real flight tests, and will be
accompanied by post-demonstration assessment and evaluation to extend the value of the activity.
Relevant KPAs that might be impacted by the RPAS introduction in non-segregated airspace will be
identified in order to fully exploit the outcomes of the demonstration in terms of scientific results and
lessons learnt to be disseminated to the project audiences.
The DOE will also define the number of test cases to be run to provide statistical significance as well
as the parameters to be monitored. Methodologies for data gathering and indicators for data analysis
will be provided too. The E-OVCM will be adopted as reference process for the concept validation.
Because the nature and expected results of the RAID demonstration activity, the project will focus on
stage V3 of the process.
ATM Needs
Scope
Feasibility
Pre-industrial
development &
integration
Industrialisation
Deployment
Operations
Decommissioning
V0
V1
V2
V3
V4
V5
V6
V7
Concept Validation (E-OCVM)
Requirements development
Concept development
Technical development and Verification
Integration
Examples of other key
ATM system development
activities
Figure 2 – E-OVCM’s Concept Lifecycle Model
Tests and assessment of results in pre-operational environment will be carried out, according to V3
stage of the model.
The dissemination strategy, together with the means and methodologies to be used, is provided in
Section 7: Communication Plan.
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Task 2.1
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Title:
WP 2
Task 2.1
SCENARIO DEFINITION
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
C
L
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
C
NIMBUS
C
Leading Partner
DEEP BLUE
Task Description
This task will detail the scope of the demonstration by defining and describing the target Operational Scenarios
that will be used as reference during demonstration activities.
For each Scenario the following characteristics will be identified and listed:
-
Involved actors;
-
RPAS Mission Trajectory;
-
On-board technologies;
-
Weather conditions;
-
Surrounding traffic complexity (type and number of intruding traffic);
-
Radio coverage and signal latency.
Moreover, specific high-level validation objectives as with respect to technological and procedural aspects will
be highlighted for each scenario.
•
•
Preliminary State of the Art about RPAS relevant documents issued by international committees and
organizations, SESAR JU as well as European and National Projects, to derive baseline concepts and
technologies for RPAS introduction in non-segregated airspace.
In order to refine relevant and realistic scenarios and to better understand stakeholders needs,
interviews, focus groups and game-based simulations will be organised both with front end operators
(i.e., Air Traffic Controllers, Remote Crews, Pilots) and other relevant stakeholders (e.g., Civil Aviation
Authorities representatives, European Regulators, Safety experts, Technology providers, etc.).
Expected Inputs
•
Reports and indications from relevant SJU Projects and other international RPAS initiatives.
Expected Outputs
•
Narrative description of target operational scenarios for Demonstration Activities.
•
For each Scenario high-level validation objectives will be also defined.
Facilities/Services
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Facilities: N/A
Services: N/A
Organisation
DEEP BLUE
Deep Blue will contribute to the definition of target operational scenarios for the
demonstration activities, gathering operational inputs and requirements from RPAS
stakeholders through the organisation of ‘ad hoc’ interviews, focus groups and gamebased envisioning. Deep Blue will contribute with its Safety and Human Factors expertise
to identify relevant Human Performance and Safety issues for each scenario.
CIRA
University
Malta
NIMBUS
CIRA will support Operational Scenarios definition under the following two main aspects:
of
•
Provide details for operational scenarios, both under RTS and In-Flight Trials,
aimed to demonstrate DAA system accuracy and usability;
•
Provide details of both RTS facilities and vehicle specifications, in order to assure
scenarios reproducibility.
Contribution to the design of experiment with particular attention to the definition of
specific objectives of the experiment, and the integration and operational aspects of
simulation/flight test campaign. The University of Malta will contribute to the design of
specific scenarios to ensure that they can be performed successfully to meet
objectives of the project.
the
the
the
the
Nimbus will contribute to the definition of operational scenarios especially for light-UAS
segment for the demonstration activities gathering operational inputs and requirements
from the other RPAS.
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Task 2.2
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Title:
WP 2
CIRA
Task 2.2
TSA MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES DEFINITION
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
C
Leading Partner
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
L
NIMBUS
C
MATS
Task Description
-
Management of RPAS entering / exiting TSA;
-
Management of RPAS in controlled aerodromes.
•
ATC procedure & system support required to enable RPAS operations in TSA and controlled airports;
•
Preliminary safety assessment.
Expected inputs
•
Expected Outputs
ATC procedure definition
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: Radar Services
Services: Air Traffic Control
Organisation
MATS
DEEP BLUE
NIMBUS
MATS will assist in stipulating the TSA as well as providing air traffic control services for
simulations and inflight trials.
Deep Blue will contribute with its Human Factors and Safety expertise to the analysis and
review of proposed TSA management procedures definition.
Nimbus will support procedure definition by providing details of its platform specifications,
in order to assure scenarios feasibility.
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Task 2.3
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Title:
WP 2
Task 2.3
DEMONSTRATION PLAN DEFINITION
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
C
L
C
UNIV.
MALTA
C
MATS
NIMBUS
C
Leading Partner
DEEP BLUE
Task Description
This task will consolidate all collected requirements for the RPAS technologies to be used in the demonstration
activities (identified operational scenarios, actors’ roles and responsibilities, use cases and related methods for
managing operations in nominal and non-nominal cases. The task will produce the consolidated Demonstration
Plan with explicit Validation and Demonstration objectives, data collection methods and a detailed planning of
the demonstration activities.
Consolidated Demonstration Plan
•
Expected Inputs
•
Operational Scenarios and High-level Validation objectives identified in Task 2.1;
•
Temporary Segregated Areas management procedures as defined in Task 2.2.
Expected Outputs
Consolidated Demonstration Plan with recommendations and final indications for the end-to-end system
adaptation to support the demonstration activities, including all means for measuring the validation
indicators.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N/A
Services: N/A
Organisation
DEEP BLUE
Deep Blue will responsible to collect and properly summarize all the work carried out in
previous Tasks and to integrate the final
demonstration Concept, the detailed
demonstration operational scenarios and all related validation data gathering activities,
CIRA
University
CIRA will provide support in the detailed Demonstration Plan definition, by contributing to
detailed design of Real-Time Simulation schedule and by contributing to the planning of
the Flight Trails, helping to synchronize general plan with vehicle availability.
of
University of Malta will contribute to the detailed design of experiment and will thus
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contribute to the definition of the detailed demonstration plan.
NAIS will provide support in the definition of detailed demonstration activities, specifically
focusing on C2L aspects of the flight trial demonstration campaign.
NIMBUS
Nimbus will contribute to the demo plan providing details about operational procedures
and technical specifications of its hybrid platform.
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Task 2.4
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Title:
WP 2
CIRA
Task 2.4
C
COMMUNICATION PLAN DEFINITION
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
L
C
Leading Partner
MATS
NIMBUS
NAIS
Task Description
This task will consolidate the Communication plan addressing both internal (Consortium and stakeholders) and
external audiences (ATM and RPAS communities, including the widest general public and scientific targets).
Consolidated Communication Plan
•
Expected inputs
Project Management Plan – Task 1.1
Stakeholders interviews (i.e. Air Traffic Controllers, Remote Crews, Pilots, Technology and Scientific
opinion leaders, Civil Aviation Authorities representatives, European Regulators representatives, Safety
experts, etc. – Task 2.1
Demonstration Plan – Task 2.3
•
•
•
Expected Outputs
The consolidated Communication Plan providing- target audiences, necessary resources; key
messages; communication channels and means, evaluation methods for the dissemination impact
assessment.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N/A
Services: N/A
Organisation
NAIS
NAIS is responsible to collect the input documents from previous tasks and properly
summarize all of it. Provide the Communication Plan on the base of project goals.
CIRA
University
Malta
CIRA will support the Communication Plan definition by contributing in the definition of the
schedule of workshops and other dissemination events, identifying the suitable topics and
stakeholders list to be involved in each of the planned events
of
University of Malta will contribute to the definition of the communication plan to ensure
appropriate exploitation of communication in academic for a.
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WP 3: Demonstration
To perform the demonstration campaigns, as they are described in the Demonstration Plan. The
demonstration activities will be forerun by the set-up of the facilities to be used in the demonstration
tests. They will support both real-time simulation with Human-in-the-loop and in-flight trials.
Within this WP also the supporting activities related to the acquisition of the required authorization to
perform the flight trials will be carried out.
Test reports for each foreseen demonstration campaign will be issued.
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Task 3.1
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Title:
WP 3
CIRA
Task 3.1
DEMONSTRATION PLATFORM PREPARATION
DEEP
BLUE
L
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
C
C
C
Leading Partner
NIMBUS
CIRA
Task Description
The Task will set-up all the platforms to be used for the execution of the demonstration plan, both for Real-Time
Simulations and for in-Flight Trials. All the integration activities between different simulation and emulation
platforms will be carried out. Regulatory and legal aspects to fly the vehicle in the segregated area and in
presence of manned and unmanned conflicting air traffic will be addressed too.
•
Real-Time facility set-up and integration
•
RPAS set-up
•
Permit to fly and NOTAM achievements
Expected inputs
Test scenarios and procedures.
•
Expected Outputs
•
Demonstration platform ready to activities.
•
Permit to fly and NOTAMs.
Facilities/Services
Facilities: Real-Time Test Bed for RPAS. Air Traffic Generator. ATCo Control Station Simulators. FLARE vehicle
for RPAS In-flight Trials.
Services: Permit-to-fly request and acquisition. NOTAMs request and acquisition.
Organisation
CIRA
Within this Task CIRA will collect all the scenarios and procedures details to be
reproduced, both in RTS and in Flight Trials. Starting from these details and emerging
requirements, the RT test-bed will be set-up. The RTS will be characterized by the
integration of Pilot and Air Traffic Controllers. The RPAS RT test-bed will be integrated
with ATCos Control Station simulators and simulated Air Traffic Generator, for realistic
RTS with HIL.
The OPV (FLARE) which will be used in the in-flight demonstration campaigns, and the
RPS which will support the RPAS type operations will be set-up and preliminary tested on
the in-flight trials location. Safety equipment, to allow safety pilot to acquire vehicle control
in the case of extremely emergency conditions will be tested.
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CIRA will support MATS in all the activities require to achieve the required authorization to
fly in the Maltese airspace.
NAIS
Within this Task NAIS will contribute to the set-up of the in-flight demonstration platform
by the integration and configuration of equipment aimed at emulating C2L and GNSS
security attacks.
University
Malta
of
University of Malta contribution will focus on the customization of its simulation facilities
(air traffic simulator, tools and appropriate HMI) for the real-time simulations as well as
their integration with CIRA’s equipment to ensure correction functioning of the overall
simulation facility.
University of Malta will also provide coordination and logistical support for CIRA’s
operation of the FLARE aircraft in Malta and the provision and operation of the intruder
aircraft.
MATS
Will support the integration of the ATCO workstation with the real time simulation facilities
and with flight experimental platform.
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acknowledged.
Task 3.2
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Title:
WP 3
Task 3.2
FLIGHT DEMONSTRATION SAFETY ASSSESSMENT
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
C
L
Leading Partner
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
C
C
NIMBUS
Deep Blue
Task Description
Before each RPAS flight demonstration campaign a dedicated Safety Assessment will be carried out. Standard
safety methods, e.g. the Eurocontrol Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM), will be tailored to the specific
maturity level of the different operational scenarios, remaining at a high level of abstraction when required, and
detailing the findings when the RPAS scenarios are better refined.
The expected outcomes of this task include:
-
a list of safety issues and safety benefits;
-
a safety analysis including a qualitative and quantitative assessment of their impact (e.g. severity and
frequency);
-
a list with possible mitigations;
-
eventual needs for further studies and analyses with respect to the analysed RPAS technologies and
procedures.
The safety assessment will be carried out by safety experts during dedicated modelling and analysis sessions
as well as during workshops with RAID partners (in particular RPAS Operators and Air Navigation Service
Providers) and external stakeholders (if needed).
•
RPAS and ATM Systems Description and Analysis, Identification of Potential Hazards, Identification of
Hazard Effects, Assessment of Hazard Effects Severity, Specification of Safety Objectives (frequency),
Mitigation actions.
Expected inputs
•
RPAS and ATM systems involved in the Demonstration Activities Architectural and Functional
Description, Target Operational Scenarios Description.
Expected Outputs
•
Identification of safety issues and safety benefits, a safety analysis including a qualitative and
quantitative assessment of impact (e.g. severity and frequency), mitigations proposed.
Facilities/Services
Facilities: SAM theoretical framework and toolbox, containing methods and techniques to perform: FHA (identify
hazards, assess their effects and the related severity), PSSA (fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, common
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cause analysis …), SSA (documentation of the evidence, collecting data, test and validation…).
Services: N/A
Organisation
Deep Blue
University
Malta
MATS
CIRA
Deep Blue will lead the RPAS flight demonstration safety assessment and will be
responsible of documenting all the collected evidences building a complete Safety Case
to obtain the ‘permit to fly’ and also feed the validation of demonstration activities.
of
University of Malta will contribute to the safety assessment, focussing on technologyrelated matters and will coordinate the outcomes that may affect the precise definition of
the real-time simulations and flight tests.
MATS will be involved in the scoping of the safety activities. The safety assessment will
be directly related to the following aspects:
•
An FHA on the operational impact covering all the ATM system (mainly people,
equipment and procedures)
•
Assessment of all the changes implemented during the trails
•
MATS safety case will follow the GSN model (Globe Structured Notation)
•
Architecture and System safety assessment being prepared by DB using the
SAM methodology will be taken on board as backing evidence for the MATS
safety case.
Will contribute to the activities by providing all necessary information about FLARE
performance and characteristics
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acknowledged.
Task 3.3
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Title:
WP 3
ON-GROUND & HUMAN-IN –THE-LOOP SIMULATION
CAMPAIGNS
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
L
C
Task 3.3
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
C
C
Leading Partner
NIMBUS
CIRA
Task Description
To carry out real-time simulations, integrating both a simulated remote pilot station and simulated Air Traffic
Control Station. The test procedures aiming at the evaluation of both operational (operations for the use of TSA)
and technological (DAA and C2L) issues related to the ATM system when an RPAS is integrated, will be tested
on-ground. Relevant data and measures will be recorded.
The simulation campaign results will support the validation, by helping in the identification of the required
changes in the current procedures, before to execute the in-flight trials.
Real-time simulations with Human-in-the-Loop. A test report of the simulation campaigns will be issued.
•
Expected inputs
Demonstration Plan.
•
Expected Outputs
•
Simulations results and Data.
•
Procedures validations and/or updates in view of the in-flight trials.
Facilities/Services
Facilities: RPAS Real-time simulation test-bed (including RPS). Air Traffic Generator. Air Traffic Control Station
simulators. RTS data gathering and analysis framework.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
CIRA
DEEP BLUE
CIRA will manage the entire real-time simulation campaigns. CIRA personnel will assure
the RPAS simulation set-up will properly work and reproduce the scenarios as foreseen
by the demonstration plan, both for nominal and non-nominal conditions. A CIRA RPAS
pilot will support the simulation campaigns. CIRA will contribute to analyse simulations
results.
Deep Blue will support the organization and conduction of real-time simulation campaigns
and will be responsible of Human Factors analyses during RTS by means of operators’
direct observations, debriefings and questionnaires. Deep Blue will contribute to the RTS
test report with Human Performance, Safety and operational considerations.
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acknowledged.
University
Malta
MATS
of
Edition 02.01.00
University of Malta will contribute to the conduction of real-time simulation by providing
technical support as well as operational support and will contribute to the direct
observation of events during real-time simulations.
Will assure the participation of the ATCO to the demonstration activities
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Task 3.4
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Title:
WP 3
Task 3.4
FLIGHT TRIALS IN SEGREGATED AREA CAMPAIGN
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
L
C
C
C
C
NIMBUS
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
The in-flight trials with the RPAS in a segregated area will be executed. The OPV (FLARE) will be flown as
RPAS. The RPAS will be connected to Air Traffic Control station for the ATC managed operations under test.
Entering and exiting a TSA towards unrestricted airspace will be tested. Actual communication performance
between Remote Pilot and ATCo will be tested and evaluated. The impact of malicious attacks to the C2L
subsystem on security will be tested (e.g. availability and integrity of the Command and Control information
evaluated as well.
Flight Trials in a restricted area with the RPAS (only) actually flying, and ATCos managing the flight. A
Test Report will be issued as part of the Demonstration Report.
•
Expected inputs
Demonstration plan.
Revised Procedures, as emerged from RTS demonstration campaign results.
•
•
Expected Outputs
Flight trails data and results with reference to operations in segregated area.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: OPV (FLARE), Simulated Air Traffic Generator. Air Traffic Control Stations.
Services: Air Traffic Control operations.
Organisation
CIRA
CIRA will lead this task by providing the required technical expertise and offering the
aircraft system for the testing.
Demonstration activities will be managed in conformance to the Demonstration Plan, as
revised on the base of RTS results.
CIRA will take care of collect and record relevant flight data C2L data and PilotControllers communication.
CIRA will issue a test report for the in-flight trials in a segregated area.
DEEP BLUE
and will be responsible of Human Factors analyses during FT in S-A by means of
operators direct observations, debriefings and questionnaires. Deep Blue will contribute to
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the FT in S-A test report with Human Performance, Safety and operational considerations
NAIS
NAIS will support the organization and conduction of flight trial demonstration campaign in
a segregated area by focusing on C2L aspects. Malicious attacks on the RPAS data
communication (C2L) link will be emulated by using equipment and assets provided by
the team. Spoofing attacks to the C2L will be triggered in order to induce fake RPAS
positioning coordinates within the system and inject fake telemetry at the ground remote
piloting station.
University
Malta
MATS
of
University of Malta will contribute to the conduction of real-time simulation and flight test
campaigns by providing logistic support as well as contributing to the direct observation of
events during the flight test campaign.
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Task 3.5
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Title:
WP 3
Task 3.5
FULL FLIGHT DEMONSTRATION CAMPAIGN
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
NIMBUS
L
C
C
C
C
C
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
In-flight trials with RPAS and potentially conflicting air traffic will be executed. Both manned and unmanned
aircraft will be used as air traffic. Different DAA modes will be tested: execution of separation recovery under
ATCO responsibility, interoperability of Collision Avoidance operations with existing safety nets.
In-Flight Trials with air traffic and ATCos. A Test Report will be issued as part of the Demonstration
Report.
•
Expected inputs
Demonstration plan.
Revised Procedures, as emerged from RTS demonstration campaign results.
•
•
Expected Outputs
Flight trials data and results on operations with actual air traffic.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: OPV (FLARE), Air Traffic Control Stations, Manned GA / VLA aircrafts and unmanned aircrafts acting
as potentially conflicting air traffic. NIMBUS UAS platform
Services: Air Traffic Control operations.
Organisation
CIRA
CIRA will lead this task by providing the required technical expertise and offering the
aircraft system for the testing.
Demonstration activities will be managed in conformance to the Demonstration Plan, as
revised on the base of RTS results.
CIRA will provide a proprietary DAA system, to support all the expected analysis and
tests.
All the flight data, communication reports will be recorded for post-flight analysis and
measures.
A test report will be prepared and issued.
DEEP BLUE
and will be responsible of Human Factors analyses during FT in NS-A by means of
operators direct observations, debriefings and questionnaires. Deep Blue will contribute to
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the FT in NS-A test report with Human Performance, Safety and operational
considerations.
NAIS
NAIS will support the organization and conduction of flight trial demonstration campaign
by focusing on C2L aspects. Malicious attacks on the RPAS communication (C2L) link of
the RPAS will be emulated by using equipment and assets provided by the team.
Spoofing attacks will be triggered in order to induce fake RPAS positioning coordinates
within the system and inject fake telemetry at the ground remote piloting station.
University
Malta
MATS
NIMBUS
of
University of Malta will contribute to the conduction of flight test campaigns by providing
logistic support as well as contributing to the direct observation of events during the flight
test campaign.
Nimbus will provide its technical experience and know how offering its hybrid UAS for the
testing phase. Demonstration activities will be managed in conformance to the
Demonstration Plan in order to verify feasibility of light UAV integration Air Traffic Control
operation.
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WP 4: Results Analysis and Reporting
In line with the Demonstration Plan, the demonstration activities data and reports will be analysed to
draw final results. KPIs, as identified in the Demonstration Plan, will be appraised in order to measure
the effects on ATM system safety, security, capacity and efficiency deriving from the RPAS
integration.
Both Operational procedures and technologies under test will be specifically analysed by using the
methodological approach assumed in the Demonstration Plan as relevant peculiarity of the project.
The Final Report that will encompass the Communication report, will be issued.
45 of 139
acknowledged.
Task 4.1
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Title:
WP 4
RESULTS ANALYSIS: DAA
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
L
C
Task 4.1.
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
NIMBUS
C
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
The results of the Detect and Avoid demonstration trials will be analysed. Different DAA operational modes will
be analysed. Measures of the ATCos and pilot performance as with respect to the use of the DAA system will be
provided. Collision Avoidance capability of the DA system will be specifically verified in terms of compatibility
with the existing safety nets.
Full Flight demonstration results analysis.
•
Expected inputs
•
Simulations results and Data.
•
Flight trails data and results with reference to operations with actual air traffic.
Expected Outputs
•
Measures of the effects of RPAS DAA system on Air Traffic Management operations.
•
DAA system compatibility with existing safety nets.
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N.A.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
CIRA
DEEP BLUE
CIRA will guide the review of flight trials results aiming to analyse the DAA system
performances, the compatibility of the system on ATM procedures and the effects of DAA
system on human performances. The DAA system, strictly required to operate a RPAS in
non-segregated area, will be analysed with respect to relevant and expected project
outcomes. CIRA will support the analysis of the procedures proposed to operate the
RPAS equipped with proprietary DAA system in the unrestricted airspace, and measure
the impact the system will have on humans (Controllers, pilots) in all expected operational
mode. CIRA will measures compatibility with existing safety nets
CIRA will provide guidelines for system specifications and operational modes to be
implemented in order to minimize the DAA system impact on the ATM system and its
components performances..
Deep Blue will be responsible of the Human Performance and Safety Analysis of the
demonstration results concerning DAA system.
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University
Malta
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University of Malta will contribute to the analysis of the DAA performance in the
demonstration campaign by conducting theoretical and statistical studies associated with
the observed results.
47 of 139
acknowledged.
Task 4.2
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Title:
WP 4
CIRA
Task 4.2
RESULTS ANALYSIS: TSA MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
C
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
L
C
Leading Partner
NIMBUS
MATS
Task Description
This task is associated with the analysis of the results of the TSA-related demonstrations and trails. The
analysis will focus on:
•
a review of the experience (lessons learnt) to provide feedback;
•
assessment of the effectiveness of the procedures in terms of safety and stakeholder (pilot and ATCo)
workload;
•
recommendations, based on the above review and assessment, for the introduction of operations of
RPAS within TSAs and transiting TSAs.
Results Analysis
•
Expected inputs
Recordings and de-briefing/questionnaire forms
•
Expected Outputs
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N.A.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
MATS
University
Malta
DEEP BLUE
of
As the ANSP and the expert in TSA procedures, will contribute to the analysis of the
results and outcomes of the demonstration activities (WP3).
Will lead to the assessment of the results.
demonstration results concerning TSA Management Procedures.
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acknowledged.
Task 4.3
Edition 02.01.00
Title:
WP 4
Task 4.3
RESULTS ANALYSIS: C2L
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
C
C
L
C
Leading Partner
MATS
NIMBUS
NAIS
Task Description
The results of the trials will be analysed from the C2L security point of view. Specifically the effects of intentional
attacks to the RPAS data communication link (C2L) (e.g. in terms of availability and integrity of the Command
and Control information) will be evaluated to assess the robustness of the whole system (equipment + people
(ATCo + remote pilot) + procedures) against intentional interferences on the C2L itself.
Countermeasures (in terms of both technologies and procedures) aimed at increasing the robustness of the
Command and Control Link (C2L) against malicious attacks will be analysed as well.
•
Full Flight demonstration results analysis
Expected inputs
•
Flight trials data and results
Expected Outputs
•
Measures of the effects of intentional attacks to the RPAS Command and Control Link (C2L) on Air
Traffic Management operations.
•
Countermeasures (in terms of both technologies and procedures) aimed at increasing the robustness of
the Command and Control Link (C2L) against malicious attacks and minimize the impact on Air Traffic
Management operations.
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N.A.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
NAIS
NAIS will guide the review of flight trials results aiming to analyse the effects of intentional
attacks to the RPAS Command and Control Link. Specifically the C2L link will be carefully
analysed in respect to its possible vulnerabilities and their effects on Air Traffic
Management operations. Effects of countermeasures aimed at increasing the robustness
of the Command and Control Link (C2L) against malicious attacks will be analysed as
well.
NAIS will provide guidelines for system specifications to be implemented in order to
minimize the impact of malicious attacks to the C2L on the ATM system.
49 of 139
acknowledged.
DEEP BLUE
University
Malta
CIRA
of
Edition 02.01.00
demonstration results concerning C2L.
University of Malta will contribute to the analysis of the DAA performance in the
demonstration campaign by conducting theoretical and statistical studies associated with
the observed results.
CIRA will provide the required support to analyse the effects of intentional disturbances
on the C2 Link, by analysing, comparing and reporting the C2L performances, in nominal
and disturbed conditions.
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Task 4.4
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Title:
WP 4
Task 4.4
OPERATIONAL VALIDATION AND LESSONS LEARNT
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
C
L
C
C
Leading Partner
MATS
NIMBUS
C
DEEP BLUE
Task Description
After the three demonstration campaigns, evaluation results will be collected and mapped onto stakeholders
needs and validation objectives. The evaluation of a given high-level validation objective may be based on a
number of results from a number of different demonstration exercises (both in real-time simulations and flight
trials). These results should be aggregated and used to evaluate the different levels of the detailed validation
indicators up to the high-level validation objectives, with a bottom-up approach. The qualitative and quantitative
results will be analysed and discussed to provide lessons learnt and recommendations for future SESAR
development and RPAS market exploitation.
•
•
•
•
•
Integration of all demonstration results and their mapping with validation and demonstration high-level
objectives.
Particular focus on operational, Human Performance and Safety aspects as well as with SESAR
CONOPS.
Presentation and discussion of results with RPAS stakeholders to gather further inputs.
lessons learnt and recommendations for future SESAR development and RPAS market exploitation
Validation Report
Expected inputs
•
Tasks 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 results.
Expected Outputs
•
All the activities will feed the RAID Final Report (Deliverable B3).
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N/A.
Services: N/A.
Organisation
DEEP BLUE
Deep Blue will be in charge of all the Operational Validation of RAID results by following
the E-OCVM Methodology and will contribute to D-B with the final integrated Validation
Report including recommendations and lessons learnt.
51 of 139
acknowledged.
CIRA
University
Malta
Edition 02.01.00
CIRA will make available all the recorded data, both from RTS campaigns and from the
In-flight trials data recording. Technical evaluation and performance verification of system
and equipment will be provided, in order to grant that human behaviour evaluation shall
be based on a coherent and reliable base of data.
of
University of Malta will contribute to the operational analysis and lessons learnt.
NAIS
NAIS will contribute to the Operational Validation of RAID results with the outcomes of
their analysis of the effects of intentional attacks to the RPAS Command and Control Link
(C2L). The intent is to contribute to the analysis of operational, Human Performance and
Safety aspects related to C2L security (e.g. in terms of availability and integrity of the
Command and Control information).
NIMBUS
Nimbus will made available all the flight reports from the trials in order to perform a final
operational validation from the light RPA segment integration perspective.
52 of 139
acknowledged.
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WP 5: Communication
The Communication WP has the main objective to disseminate relevant results of the demonstration
activities to the relevant audience and stakeholders.
The project audience will include the widest general public and scientific targets in documenting the
ATM system capability to manage RPAS flights.
The Communication Plan will setup the criteria to measure the efficacy of communication and
dissemination activities to reach the communication goals.
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acknowledged.
Task 5.1
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Title:
WP 5
Task 5.1
MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
C
C
L
C
MATS
NIMBUS
Leading Partner
NAIS
Task Description
This task will be carried out on the base of the Communication Plan, by developing diversified media
technologies to disseminate relevant contents on the project to the selected audiences.
•
•
Communication Plan Execution through the following communication media activities:
Media printing, such as newspaper, magazine and brochures;
Public speaking in the scheduled events and exhibitions;
Digital media dissemination through mailing lists, the project website and blog services .
These standard media will deliver information easily, by simultaneously and cost-efficiently broadcasting
different regions of the world with the aim of contributing to the creation of a project community,
interested on RPAS system and applications in the ATM domain.
Expected inputs
•
Communication Plan – Task 2.4
Expected Outputs
•
Content delivery and message issued by means of the communication media
•
Evaluation reports of media communication channels effectiveness
Facilities/Services
Facilities: media communication tools such as website, press and exhibition.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
NAIS
NAIS will be in charge of media communication in order to disseminate contents and
messages to the audience the RAID project steps results up to final report.
DEEP BLUE
Deep Blue will contribute to media communication activities by designing and realising the
RAID project Coordinated Image, including project Logo, project document templates,
poster and leaflets,
University
Malta
of
University of Malta will contribute to media communications by focusing on disseminating
the activities and outcomes of the project primarily in Maltese media for the general public
and will contribute to dissemination in international media such as Flight International and
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Aviation Week.
CIRA
Will contribute to dissemination activities by providing
communication channel (i.e. web site, newsletters, papers, etc.)
its
own
media
55 of 139
acknowledged.
Task 5.2
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Title:
WP 5
Task 5.2
WORKSHOPS AND EVENTS
CIRA
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
L
C
C
C
MATS
NIMBUS
Leading Partner
CIRA
Task Description
Workshops and dissemination events addressed to involve and inform stakeholders will be arranged and
managed. Efficacy of dissemination activities will be monitored.
Execute the Communication plan in terms of workshops and stakeholders oriented events. Monitoring of
communication efficacy.
•
Expected inputs
Communication Plan
•
Expected Outputs
Workshops outcomes. Evaluation reports of dissemination events.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities:
Services:
Organisation
CIRA will cooperate with the Leader of the Work Package in assure the Communication
Plan execution, by managing the contact with stakeholders to favour the widest
participation to workshops and dissemination events.
CIRA
DEEP BLUE
University
Malta
NAIS
Deep Blue will support in the organisation and management of RAID workshops and
events. Moreover, Deep Blue will disseminate RAID results in ATM and Aviation related
conferences.
of
University of Malta will contribute to the organization and participate in the workshops and
related events.
NAIS will support in the event organization and content development and management in
the RAID workshops.
MATS
Will participate to the workshop and events providing its own expertise.
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Task 5.3
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Title:
WP 5
CIRA
Task 5.3
C
COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT AND RESULTS
DEEP
BLUE
NAIS
UNIV.
MALTA
MATS
NIMBUS
CAD
L
Leading Partner
NAIS
Task Description
On the base of the Communication Plan, this task aims at managing and evaluating the results of this WP. A
final communication report will be developed. It will provide a feedback on the effectiveness of goals
achievement and the impact assessment of the communication strategy.
•
Analysis of task 5.1 output - evaluation reports of media communication channels.
•
Analysis of task 5.2 output - evaluation reports of dissemination events.
•
Execute of Communication Plan, producing the Final Report on Communication effectiveness
Expected inputs
Communication Plan – Task 2.4
•
Expected Outputs
Final Communication Report that will include the evaluation of media communication channels
effectiveness, the workshops and exhibition speeches feedback and the impact assessment on the
audience of the communication plan.
•
Facilities/Services
Facilities: N.A.
Services: N.A.
Organisation
NAIS
CIRA
NAIS will be in charge of Final Communication Report issues. It will manage the
contribution, suggestion and elaboration from the project partners involved in the task, in
order to develop a common view of report.
CIRA will cooperate to the issue of the final Communication Report by providing results
and synthesis of the workshops and stakeholders involvement activities carried out during
the project.
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3.3 Formal Deliverables
Deliverable name
Date
29 January 2014
Demonstration Plan (A1)
30 September 2015
Demonstration Report (B1)
3.4 Other deliverables and key project milestones
Deliverable/Milestone name
Date
29 October 2013
Kick-Off Meeting
Simulations test-bed completion
30 July 2014
31 October 2014
st
1 Year Critical Review Meeting
In-Flight Full Test Bed Architecture
Ready to tests execution
31 January 2015
30 September 2015
Final Meeting
3.5 Quarterly reporting
Deadlines
11 April 2014
11 July 2014
10 October 2014
9 January 2015
10 April 2015
10 July 2015
30 September 2015
Quarterly Progress Reports will be filled on-line, in the RAID project dedicated webpage of the SJU
Extranet.
3.6 Resources Breakdown
The table below summarizes the effort required to partners (in man days) for each Work Package. In
order to be coherent with the proposal and the co-financing agreement, a man-month corresponds to
140 man-hours, and each working month has 17.5 working days on average.
CIRA
NAIS
Resources (Man Days)
DBLUE
MATS
UNI
NIMBUS
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Resources (Man Days)
MALTA
WP 1
WP 2
WP 3
WP 4
WP 5
61
53
210
52
44
16
18
140
44
52
10
96
122
88
36
18
36
96
52
10
9
78
130
120
53
9
26
34
14
Resources (Personnel, including overheads, in kEuro)
UNI
CIRA
NAIS
DBLUE
MATS
NIMBUS
MALTA
WP 1
WP 2
WP 3
WP 4
WP 5
48
42
165
41
35
5
6
48
15
18
4
39
49
35
14
6
12
31
17
4
2
16
26
24
10
2
6
8
3
Resources (Equipment, Subcontracting, Consumables, excluding
Travelling, in kEuro)
UNI
CIRA
NAIS
DBLUE
MATS
NIMBUS
MALTA
WP 3
67
12
5
8
Table 5: Project Resources Allocation
3.7 Pre-financing needs
Pre-financing need (EURO)
Planned date for the submission of the request to the
SJU
17 December 2013
135000
15 March 2015
135000
3.8 Risk Management
Risk description
Probability Severity
assessmen assessm
t
ent
(Low/Mediu (Low/Me
m/High/Ver dium/Hig
y high)
h/Very
high)
Safety issues
3
4
Regulatory
constraint and
Permit to Fly
2
4
Mitigation actions
Owne
r
In order to mitigate the risk, safety
assessment is a pre-requisite that will
be performed during flight trials
preparation. A dedicated task is
foreseen for flight Demonstration Safety
assessment (task 3.2), that will be
performed by both ANSPs and RPAS
operator.
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAD) for
the flight trials inside the regulated
airspace (MALTA airspace) has been
informed and endorsed the project;
cooperative attitude is granted by the
authority.
Deep
Blue,
CIRA,
MATS
MATS
, Univ.
of
Malta
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Critical
Environmental
Conditions
Edition 02.01.00
3
2
Simulation test
1
rigs difficult to
integrate.
A Real-time data
link has to be
realized between
CIRA simulation
facilities, located in
Capua, south of
Italy, and Malta Air
Traffic Control
Center. Data
protocol and
connection
limitations could limit
the RT performance.
SW Adaptation to
1
RAID tests
execution
Activities are
required to
customize the
software modules
which equip the
RPAS vehicle to the
specificity of the
RAID project.
3
Flying test beds
2
(other than RPAS)
not available.
Both manned and
unmanned
cooperative aircrafts
have to be included
in-flight tests.
Lack of resources 1
3
Equip manned and 1
3
2
3
The time window for flight trials have
been planned taking into account yearly
meteorological behaviour on the
interested areas. The time windows
length has been set to allow multiple
trial periods.
As far as Data Communication protocol
is concerned, standard links and
protocols (ASTERIX) are expected to
be used in the simulation test rigs
integration.
In order to obtain the datalink
performance required, alternative
solutions have been considered: Simple
Internet Connection using UDP
protocol, implement a Virtual Private
Network, establish a Point-to-Point
connection. Test on alternative network
performance are undergoing.
CIRA,
MATS
,
NIMB
US
The SW modules implementing TA and
HMI functionalities don’t need further
development but only adaptation to the
RAID demonstration environment. This
reduces the risk severity. The risk
probability is judged low since CIRA
has successfully managed similar
processes in several previous project
activities.
CIRA will provide additional resources
on this task, with no effect on RAID
budget, if needed.
Different vehicles and solutions have
been considered as suitable alternative
solutions to realize “actual” air traffic.
CIRA
CIRA,
MATS
Univ.
Malta,
NIMB
US
All partners already possess the
All
required resources and expertise for
the project realization. Three key
figures are strictly required for the text
execution: licensed safety Pilot, RPAS
pilot and Air Traffic Controller. The
unavailability of these resources can
affect the scheduling of the tests.
The scheduling of the demonstration
activities will be agreed in advance with
pilots and ATCo in order to mitigate the
afore mentioned risk. The length of
scheduled time slots for the
demonstration activities is set to leave
enough time for managing eventual
unforeseen difficulties.
The unmanned systems acting as
CIRA,
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unmanned
cooperative traffic
with ADS_B OUT
transmitter
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cooperative traffic are provided by a
partner of the Consortium, and it
already granted the ADS_B OUT
availability. CIRA has already matured
experience in equipping manned GA
and VLA aircraft with ADS_B OUT
transmitter. Various type of manned
aircrafts are furthermore available for
the test.
Table 6: Project risks
Nimb
us,
MATS
3.9 Extranet access rights
Name
Email
Edoardo Filippone
e.filippone@cira.it
Damiano Taurino
damiano.taurino@dblue.it
Antonio Monteleone
antonio.monteleone@nais-solutions.it
Marco Faletto
m.faletto@nimbus.aero
Joseph Degiorgio
joe.degiorgio@maltats.com
David Zammit-Mangion
david.zammit-mangion@um.edu.mt
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4 Demonstration Approach
4.1 Demonstration Overview
The overall context of the project is the safe and seamless integration of RPAS with other airspace
users. In this global framework, several activities are on-going under ICAO coordination, based on the
need of having coherent development of worldwide activities.
As a consequence, ICAO constituted a specific UAS Study Group (UASSG) to coordinate and
propose references to all other stakeholders acting in view of UAS integration in the civil airspace.
The UASSG was established in 2008 with the aim to develop a regulatory concept, coordinating the
development of SARPs (Standard and Recommended Practices) and assisting other bodies to the
development of technical specifications addressed to the UAS integration in the non-segregated
airspace and at aerodromes. The UASSG has published its first document, the ICAO Circular 328UAS, in March 2011. The main purpose of the Circular was the definition of the ICAO perspectives on
the integration of UAS in the non-segregated airspace, while emphasizing the differences from
manned aviation that such integration will involve. Following the UASSG indications, ICAO upgraded
on March 2012 the Standards for Annex 2-Rules of the Air, and Annex 7- Aircraft Nationality and
Registration Marks, specifically referring to RPAS applicable standards. It became effective from the
following November.
By the end of 2012 the Study Group is expected to finalize a roadmap to be used for guiding the
upcoming integration activities for several years, aiming to define standards for Annexes 1, 6 8 and
10. Relevantly, by the early 2014 ICAO UASSG will issue the Guidance Material document for
authorities and operators, and an ICAO RPAS Symposium is expected to be organized in April 2014
to openly discuss the guidance material.
In the EU context, relevant activities are on-going in the SESAR framework. The first approach of the
SESAR JU to the RPAS integration was the inclusion as Associate Partner of the SJU of the ATMFusion Consortium, as resulting from the specific Call (SJU/LC/0055) with reference to the “Lot 6 –
UAV/UAS Integration in SESAR”. The Consortium was committed by the SJU to carry out the study
ICONUS (Initial CONOPS for UAS in SESAR)[3]. Furthermore, the European Commission established
the European RPAS Steering Group (ERSG), “aiming to identify, plan, coordinate and monitor the
activities needed to achieve the safe integration of RAPS into the non-segregated ATM environment”.
In compliance with the assigned aim, the ERSG issued in 2013 the European RPAS roadmap, aiming
at an initial RPAS integration by 2016[2].
Based on the stimulus resulting from the ERSG roadmap, the present project aims to provide a
contribution in terms of operational procedures and technologies evaluation through the completion of
several demonstration activities involving different levels of testing (simulations and flight trials).
The overall aim of the project is the evaluation of proposed available technological solutions and
procedures to support the integration of RPAS into the non-segregated ATM environment.
This will be pursued by means of relevant demonstration activities, whose specific objectives will be:
• Assess the similarities of managing the RPAS flight in the unrestricted airspace, with respect
to the manned aircrafts, from the ATM network and operators point of view;
• Provide evidences of the peculiarities and possible effects on RPAS operations in the
unrestricted airspace, due both to peculiar system architecture (pilot on ground) and to the
specific technologies enabling the RPAS to flight (DAA, C2L);
• Support the identification of possible incompatibilities of RPAS with the current ATM systems,
functions, and operational aspects, in terms of operations, technologies, procedures;
• Emulate and analyse malicious attacks on the communication/navigation radio links in order
to assess the impact on the system performances and on the controller and remote pilot
decisions;
• Provide some data and considerations to identify guidelines to manage peculiarities and
overcome incompatibilities for the RPAS integration in the unrestricted airspace.
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These objectives will be achieved through a combination of Real-Time Simulations and Flight Trials
with both simulated and real traffic. The focus of this objective will be on both procedural issues and
technological aspects, addressing primarily the management of transitions between temporary
segregated areas (TSAs) and non-segregated airspace together with the deployment of new detect
and avoid and C2L technologies.
4.2 Stakeholders Demonstration Expectations
The list of stakeholders and their demonstration expectations is provided in Section 2.2.
4.3 Demonstration Objectives
In order to successfully and safely fly an RPAS in un-segregated airspace with a multi-aircraft and
manned flight environment, within the procedural, regulatory and legal frameworks and existent air
traffic control environment, the proposal addresses four main high level Demonstration Objectives:
•
•
•
•
OBJ-1. To quantify and demonstrate the level of maturity, performance, limitations and
compatibility with current infrastructures and procedures, of detect and avoid technology and
of technologies for secure C2L;
OBJ-2. To assess the impact RPAS integration into un-segregated airspace could have on
safety, the RPAS pilot, Air Traffic Control Officers and ATM procedures and operations;
OBJ-3.To identify the similarities between the operation of RPASs and manned aircraft in the
ATM environment, as well as specificities to RPAS operation in terms of constraints and new
requirements for the ATM operations;
OBJ-4. To compare technological requirements between current (manned) flight operations
and RPAS operations within the flight and air traffic management environments.
Furthermore, to define the success criterion and to relate the high level objectives of the proposal with
the current standards in literature, the previous mentioned four high level objectives have been
broken down as with respect to 4 relevant Key Performance Areas- KPAs, draw out from the 12 KPAs
addressed within SESAR (11 Standard KPA coming from ICAO Doc 9883, plus an additional one,
Human Performance).
The KPAs addressed in the project are:
•
Human Performance
•
Security
•
Safety
•
Capacity
In addition to these KPAs, given the nature of the demonstration objectives, system performance
related to DAA Technology and its impact on the feasibility of the project has also been considered.
Criteria to measure each of these objectives will be:
•
•
•
Remote Pilots and Controllers satisfaction Vs expectations, to be collected through interviews
and questionnaire, pre and post flight briefings. The questionnaires, which will be developed
by Human Factors experts will aim also to measure their level of stress perceived along the
flight, and their workload.
As far as the security area is concerned, we will evaluate the risk of unintended or malicious
interference that could affect command and data transmitted from the RPS to RPA providing
measures of the data-link security and measures of the robustness of candidate solution to
the spoofing threats.
Impact of RPAS integration in terms safety and security. As stated in the ICONUS study [3]:
“Safety issues cover the risks and failure modes of integrated Separation Assurance, SelfSeparation and Collision Avoidance functions, and the performance of human / machine roles
and responsibilities”.
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•
•
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Impact of RPAS integration on the en-route throughput in terms of number of movements per
volume of the considered airspace.
As far as the Detect And Avoid area is concerned, both the system requirements evaluation
and the usability of the system from the pilot and controllers point of view will be in the
assessed.
4.3.1 Human Performance
The Human Performance of both the controller and the remote pilot will be assessed.
The Human Performance KPA has been analysed based on the SESAR HP Assessment Process
developed within the project 16.04.01, addressing the standard HP argument branches (1. Human
Roles; 2. Human & System; Team Structure and Communication; 4. Implementation Impediments),
broken down into the related areas of interest (as defined in the section below).
1. Human roles
Roles and responsibilities – for ATCOs and pilots no changes in the roles and responsibilities are
envisaged. No new roles are introduced on both sides and their high level tasks are equal to the
current ones. Therefore, the responsibilities remain the same.
Operating methods – Although overall task of controller and pilot remains the same, the operating
methods and procedures applied when the RPAS is introduced might change in respect to the current
one (applied for non-RPAS aircraft) when controller is working directly with the pilot on-board, as well
as depending on the operating conditions (normal, abnormal and degraded). Thus, it is important to
identify possible changes in the operating methods and to assess their feasibility, compliance and
consistency with other existing procedures within the overall context.
Identifier
OBJ-RPAS.03-HP001
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the operating methods by identifying
the changes imposed on the existing ones, feasibility of these changes and their
compliance and consistency within the overall context (normal, abnormal and
degraded conditions).
Success Criterion
The changes of the current operating methods with the introduction of the new
concept are identified and these changes are assessed as feasible, consistent
and compliant with other existing operating methods in relation to the overall
environment (normal, abnormal and degraded conditions).
Tasks & task performance - even though it is assumed that the tasks of the controllers would not
change with the introduction of RPAS in comparison with the tasks associated to the non-RPAS
flights, the assessment of the impact of the introduction should be performed to assure that no
negative impact is induced on the controllers (error propensity, workload, situational awareness).
Remote pilots’ tasks and task performance are supposed to change as with respect to those of the
pilot on board. The assessment of the impact of remote piloting will be performed to assure that no
negative impact is induced on the pilot (error propensity, workload, situational awareness) and to
assess the main differences when compared to board piloting.
Identifier
OBJ-RPAS.03-HP002
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the controllers’ and pilots’ task
performance (error propensity, workload, situational awareness, timeliness of
actions).
Success Criterion
The errors and untimely actions related to the new concept are identified, and the
level of workload and situational awareness are assessed as within acceptable
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margins.
2. Human and System
Task allocation Human & Machine – Since on the controllers’ side there is no new technology and no
changes on the existing technologies are introduced, it is assumed that the task allocation between
the human and the machine will remain as in the current operating conditions for what concerns the
controllers. Differently, on the pilots’ side changes in the existing technologies are introduced and the
impact of these changes will be evaluated especially regarding the consistency of the new system
with automation principles, pilots’ workload and the trust in the system.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP003
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the pilots’ interaction with the system
(system’s consistency with automation principles, pilots’ workload and the trust in
the system).
Success Criterion
The problems and untimely actions related to the introduction of a new concept
are identified, and the task allocation between the pilot and the system is
assessed and evaluated as consistent with automation principles, not having
negative impact on pilots’ workload and the trust in the system.
Performance of technical systems – Surveillance and the monitoring of the RPAS aircraft will be done
in the same way as for the non-RPAS flights, no changes are foreseen for the system performance
(on the controllers’ side). On the remote pilots’ side, the performance of the technical systems in use
in RPAS (DAA and C2L) will be tested with a special attention to the assessment of the accuracy and
timeliness of system information.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP004
Objective
To assess the performance of the technical systems in use (DAA and C2L) in
terms of accuracy and timeliness of system information.
Success Criterion
The performance of the technical systems in use is assessed. Problems related
to accuracy and timeliness of system information are identified and evaluated as
within acceptable margins.
Design of the HMI – On the controllers’ side, the HMI design as currently in use is planned to be
applied to a new concept. However, the impact of the introduction of the new concept without
changes to the HMI has to be assessed for identification of any negative effects on the controller’s
work (HMI usability, error propensity, situational awareness, and workload). On the remote pilots’
side, changes in the HMI are foreseen and have to be assessed for identification of any negative
effects on the pilot’s performance (HMI usability, error propensity, situational awareness, and
workload).
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP005
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the controllers’ interaction with the
existing system (more specifically HMI). To assess the impact of the new HMI on
the pilots’ interaction with the system.
Success Criterion
The potential discrepancies between system-provided information and userrequired information are identified. Recommendations to address them are
provided in order to avoid negative impact on HMI usability, error propensity,
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situational awareness and workload.
3. Team Structure & Communication
Team composition – there are no changes in the team composition. The controllers’ team remains as
in today’s operational environment (TC and PC). On the other side, even though on ground, there is a
pilot flying the aircraft with whom the controller communicates.
Task allocation between human actors – the tasks as allocated in today’s operations remain the
same. Namely, the controller is not taking/handing over the tasks of/to the pilot, and vice versa.
Additionally, within the controllers’ team, there is no modification in the current task allocation
introduced.
Team Communication – The communication that might be the subject of changes is the one between
the controller and the remote pilot. The possible changes are related to the information needed on
both sides, communication modalities and means, communication load (that can affect the workload
of the controller) and team situational awareness (not using the R/T channels but phone
communication can lead to loss of situational awareness for both the remote pilot and the other nonRPAS pilots).
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP006
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the communication modalities and
means, communication load and team situational awareness between the
controller and the remote pilot.
Success Criterion
The potential discrepancies between current and user-required communication
modalities and means imposed by the new concept are identified.
Recommendations to address them are provided in order to avoid negative
impact on communication load and team situational awareness between the
controller and the remote pilot.
4. Implementation impediments
Roles and responsibilities – Since with the introduction of RPAS flights there are foreseen impacts on
the working methods both of the controller and the pilot, their acceptance of the new concept should
be assessed.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP007
Objective
To assess the controllers’ and pilots’ acceptance of the new concept and the
changes it brings to the current way of working.
Success Criterion
The controllers’ and pilots’ positive judgment on the acceptability of the new
concept has been obtained.
Competence requirements - Since with the introduction of RPAS flights there are foreseen impacts on
the working methods of the controller and the pilot, the needs related to skills, experience, knowledge,
as well as training needs should be identified.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP008
Objective
To assess the impact of the new concept on the needs related to skills,
experience, knowledge and training for both the controllers and the pilots.
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Based on the judgment of the controllers and of the pilots the needs for the
additional training, skills, experience and knowledge are identified.
Staffing requirements & staffing Levels – Taking into the consideration the phase of the concept
lifecycle addressed with this demonstration, these issues are not applicable and could not be
assessed with the planned exercises.
The table below summarizes how the Human Performance KPA objectives are distributed in their
assessment between the two main actors involved in the demonstration: the controller and the remote
pilot.
OBJECTIVE
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP001
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP002
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP003
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP004
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP005
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP006
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP007
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP008
CONTROLLER
X
X
REMOTE PILOT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 7: HP objectives for different actors
4.3.2 Security
The impact the most probable security threats will be assessed during the demonstration campaign in
order to highlight RPAS vulnerabilities.
The impact is assessed according to the SESAR methodology for risk and security assessment that
leads to the assessment of the impact on “primary assets” and in particular of the threat on their
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
Figure 3 Impact and Threat Scenarios
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As suggested by ISO 27005 [4], the methodology focuses on two types of assets: primary assets and
supporting assets.
Within the RAID project the impact on the primary assets of the most probable threats exploiting
RPAS vulnerabilities will be assessed during the demonstration campaign.
Within the RAID project the following primary assets have been identified:
1. Emergency Management (the set of automatic actions performed when the remote
pilot loses the control of the aircraft)
2. Human (remote) piloting
3. Collision avoidance (not foreseen in flight trials due to the related safety risks)
For each of the above mentioned primary assets, the project is considering the following SESAR
Impact Areas with the related metrics for the impact:
5
Catastrophic
IMPACT AREAS
IA1:PERSONNEL
Fatalities
IA2:CAPACITY
Loss of 60%100% capacity
IA3:PERFORMANCE
Major quality
abuse that
makes
multiple
major systems
inoperable
IA6:REGULATORY
4
Critical
3
Severe
2
Minor
Multiple
Severe
injuries
Severe
injuries
Minor injuries
1
No impact /
NA
No injuries
Loss of up to
10% capacity
No capacity
loss
Major quality
abuse that
makes major
system
inoperable
Severe quality
abuse that
makes
systems
partially
inoperable
Minor system
quality abuse
No quality
abuse
Multiple
Major
Multiple
Minor
major
regulatory
minor
regulatory
regulatory
infraction
regulatory
infraction
infractions
infractions
Table 8: SESAR Security Impact Areas
No impact
For each of the identified Primary Asset and Impact Area, our preliminary assessment in case of loss
of integrity and/or availability according to the previous metrics is provided in the next table.
IA6:REGULATORY
IA3:PERFORMANCE
IA2:CAPACITY
IA1:PERSONNEL
Emergency
management
Loss of Integrity
Remote piloting
Loss of integrity
Remote piloting
Loss of availability
Collision
Avoidance
Loss of Integrity
Overall impact
1
5
5
5
5
1
3
3
3
3
1
5
5
5
5
5
NA
5
5
5
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Table 9: Degradation of primary assets and related severity on Impact areas
By its demonstration activities RAID aims at refining such preliminary impact assessment on the
Impact Areas so far identified.
2
Next table identifies the supporting assets and their relation with the above mentioned primary assets
Emergency
Management
X
Remote piloting
Collision avoidance
Satellite Positioning
X
Air to Ground data link
X
Table 10: Applicability of supporting assets on primary assets
X
The high level objective OBJ-1 of RAID is mapped to the four low level objectives described hereafter
related to the assessment of security threats that can lead to safety degradation (these four objectives
are strictly related to the safety objective OBJ-SAFETY-005 disclosed in the next paragraph).
Identifier
OBJ-RPAS.03-SEC001
Objective
To assess the impact of malicious attacks on the Emergency Management
functions primary asset in terms of Loss of Integrity.
Malicious attacks can in fact rely on known vulnerabilities that can be easily
exploited with off the shelf/cheap technologies. In particular the RAID project is
focusing on the two following threats:
1.
GNSS spoofing
2.
Telemetry (including video) communication jamming
Success Criterion
The impact of the Loss of Integrity on the Emergency Management functions of
the RAID RPAS system is evaluated as within acceptable margins based on the
SESAR methodology for risk and security assessment.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC002
Objective
To assess the impact of malicious attacks on the Remote Piloting primary asset
in terms of Loss of Integrity.
1.
GNSS spoofing
2.
2
The supporting assets are those which possess the vulnerabilities that are exploitable by threats aiming to impair the primary
assets within scope.
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Success Criterion
The impact of the Loss of Integrity on the Remote Piloting functions of the RAID
RPAS system is evaluated as acceptable applying the SESAR methodology for
risk and security assessment.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC003
Objective
To assess the impact of malicious attacks on the Remote Piloting primary asset
in terms of Loss of Availability.
1.
GNSS spoofing
2.
Success Criterion
The impact of the Loss of Integrity on the Remote Piloting of the RAID RPAS
system is evaluated as acceptable applying the SESAR methodology for risk and
security assessment.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC004
Objective
To assess the impact of malicious attacks on the Collision Avoidance primary
asset in terms of Loss of Availability.
Success Criterion
1.
GNSS spoofing
2.
The impact of the Loss of Integrity on the Collision Avoidance of the RAID RPAS
system is evaluated as acceptable according to the SESAR methodology for risk
and security assessment.
4.3.3 Safety
Safety can be defined as the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is
reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level [8]. Today it is engineered through a
continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management.
Hazards are conditions or objects with the potential of causing injuries to personnel, damage to
equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function cause
and consequences. Once hazards are identified, their consequences (i.e.: the potential outcome of
the hazard) are listed and the risk of each consequence occurring estimated, using techniques that
may involve historical evidence, statistical analysis and engineering judgement. Safety can then be
achieved if the combined risk associated with the identified hazards is maintained at, or below a
selected level. The level chosen is a function of the particular operation (e.g. large transport aircraft,
general aviation, etc.)., which for the RAID project, involves RPAS operations.
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RPAS safety levels are still being developed. For this reason, general aviation levels, adapted as
may be required, will be used in this work. The safety concept in general aviation revolves primarily
around protecting the small number of occupants who are not flying for commercial purposes and
people on the ground. The concept is therefore very close to RPAS requirements with the additional
consideration of the occupants and needs to be extended to remove the consideration of occupants.
The method within RAID that will be used to estimate the risk of a consequence occurring will be in
line with SAE ARP 4761[9], which provides appropriate guidelines for conducting a safety assessment
for civil airborne systems and equipment. That document is primarily used as a means of compliance
to EASA CS25.1309 [10] and is therefore also applicable to RPAS applications.
In the context of RAID, the safety related to the detect-and-avoid and C2L systems will be considered.
Furthermore, the study will be focus primarily on the risk of collision with other aircraft (which will be
considered as potentially catastrophic for both aircraft), causation of fatalities on the ground and
damage to third party property (primarily through accident/loss of RPAS).
Whilst loss of the RPAS can be considered loss of property and therefore may be included in the
safety case (as is done in other category of aircraft such as the large transport category [11]), third
party loss will not be considered in this study.
Four hazard classes are identified, namely:
• System failure
• Human error
• external factors in the operating environment (weather, terrain, traffic)
• malicious actions
4.3.3.1 Safety Assessment
The general safety assessment process will follow the guidelines of the SESAR Safety Reference
Material (SRM) [7].
Whilst the SRM recommends considering safety from two perspectives, namely:
•
A success approach, in which the effectiveness of new concepts and technologies when
working as intended is assessed
•
A failure approach, in which the risks generated by new systems is assessed,
RAID will focus more on the failure approach, since this is more appropriate in the project context,
since RAID is involved with the introduction of new systems (RPAS) in the ATM environment.
Within the failure approach, the Risk Classification Scheme that will be used is based on the AIM
accident framework defined by a set of accident risk models (Mid-Air Collisions (MAC), Runway
Incursions (RInc), Taxiway Accidents (TAcc), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and Wake
Accidents). For the project only MAC and CFIT models are considered, due to the limited scope of the
project. The respective Risk Classification Schemes are defined by Severity Classification/Probability
Classification relationship matrices depicted in the following tables, as defined in the SRM.
Severity
Class
AIM Safety
Precursor
MF3
MAC-SC1
MAC
Failure Description
A situation where conflict
geometry has not prevented
physical contact
Operational Effect of
Failure
Accident
Maximum
Tolerable
Frequency of
Occurrence
1 e-9
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MF3a
MAC-SC2a
MAC-SC2b
All ATM
failed
MF4
All ATC
failed
MF5-9
Tactical
MAC-SC3
MAC-SC4
Management
failed
MF5.1
Planning/
Sequencing
Failed
MF6.1-9.1
Induced
MAC-SC5
MF5.2
Pre-Tactical
Traffic
Management
Failed
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A
situation
where
an
imminent collision was not
mitigated by an airborne
collision avoidance
Near collision
A situation where an loss of
separation was not mitigated
by ATC collision avoidance:
STCA, expedite, etc
Imminent collision
A situation where a tactical
conflict
(coming
from
planned conflicts or induced
conflicts) was not mitigated
by ATC conflict management
– within the sector (this
encompassess
situations
where a tactical conflict is
created by either ATC or
crew/aircraft e.g. level bust,
bad instructions)
A situation where a potential
conflict, (prior to entering the
sector), was not mitigated by
traffic
planning
and
synchronisation
A situation where, on the day
of operations, a strategic
conflict was not mitigated by
airspace managent & DCB.
A strategic conflict is typically
be a conflict identified 20
mins to 3 hours prior to
sector entry.
1 e-6
1 e-5
1 e-4
Loss of separation
Tactical Conflict
1 e-2
(planned or induced)
1 e-1
Pre tactical conflict
Table 11 Mid-Air Collision Risk Classification Scheme
Severity
Class
AIM Safety
Precursor
CF1
CFIT-SC1
CFIT
CF2
CFIT-SC2(a)
CFIT-SC2(b)
CFIT barrier
failure
CF3
Imminent
Failure Description
Operational Effect of
Failure
An accident where impact
with terrain/water obstacle
Accident
A situation where
impact
with terrain/water obstacle
was not mitigated by pilot or
aircraft
system
terrain
avoidance – TAWS GPWS
Near Collision with
terrain/water
A situation where the threat
of impact with terrain/water
Aircraft below MSA
Maximum
Tolerable
Frequency of
Occurrence
1 e-8
1 e-8
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CFIT
CF4
CFIT-SC3
Controlled
flight
towards
terrain
CF5 – 7
CFIT-SC4
Flight
towards
terrain
commanded
(ATC, Pilot
or systems)
CF8
CFIT-SC5
Airspace/
procedure
design and
routing
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or an obstacle was
mitigated
by
ATC
Vigilance, MSAW etc.
not
eg,
and or MOC
A
situation
where
a
commanded flight towards
terrain is not recognised by
the crew and corrected. (This
is prior to any CFIT
preventing ATC intervention)
Aircraft directed below
MSA & or MOC
A situation where the threat
of impact with terrain/water
or an obstacle is created as a
result of diverging from a
terrain clear trajectory which
is commanded by either pilot
or atc.
Aircraft will iminently
infringe MSA & or
MOC
A situation where procedure
design can strongly influence
Flight Toward Terrain
(increase the likelihood of)
Note: This is not in a strict
sense a failure since the risk
involved was an operational
choice.
Greater opportunity for
FTT
1 e-6
1 e-5
1 e-5
1 e-3
Table 12 Controlled Flight Into Traffic Risk Classification Scheme
The severity classes of failures are defined by number of hazards per accident type:
Number of hazards per Severity Class per Accident Type
Severity Class
MAC
CFIT
SC1
1
1
SC2 (a)
5
5
SC2 (b)
10
10
SC3
25
50
SC4
50
100
SC5
100
200
Table 13 Maximum Hazard Numbers per Severity Class
4.3.3.2 System Failure
System failure can be categorized in three types, namely:
1. complete failure – in which the system function is completely unavailable
2. partial failure – in which some of the systems are unavailable, often leading to degraded
operation / performance
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3. loss of integrity – in which the system continues to function but its performance is out of
tolerance.
System failure can be announced or un-announced, and this may have significant impact on the
outcome of a given system failure. Consequently, the study will consider the effect of alerting on
safety.
The consideration of the consequences of detect-and-avoid and C2L system failure on safety is of
interest to the RAID project, as identified in OBJ-2. Such consideration is also of relevance to OBJ-1,
leading to the following lower-level objectives:
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF001
Objective
To assess the effect of detect-and-avoid system failure on operational safety,
considering:
1. complete system failure
2. partial system failure
3. loss of integrity
Announced and unannounced failures will be considered.
Success Criterion
The implications of detect-and-avoid system failure on safety are estimated within
acceptable margins and no major limitations are identified.
Identifier
OBJ-RPAS.03-SAF002
Objective
To assess the effect of C2L failure on operational safety, considering:
1. complete system failure
2. partial system failure
3. loss of integrity
Announced and unannounced failures will be considered.
Success Criterion
The implications of C2L failure on safety is estimated within acceptable margins
and no major limitations are identified.
4.3.3.3 Human Error
Human error in operation is identified as a major potential risk to operational safety and is
consequently of major relevance to the RAID project.
As RAID is concerned with the study of the implications of RPAS operation in non-segregated
airspace, human error associated with other factors (such as, for example piloting error or ATCO error
as would be encountered in ‘normal’ (manned) operations) are not considered. Work will therefore be
specifically concerned with the safety implications of changes in current procedures, of the
introduction of new procedures and on the human element. In this address there is significant overlap
in the KPAs of Safety and Human Performance. The Human Performance aspect in RAID (Section
4.3.1) will focus on identifying issues such as training needs, human workload, etc. The Safety KPA
within RAID will build on the analysis of the Human Performance KPA to extract the consequences of
human performance in the new operational procedures proposed and, through the use of the
guidelines in ICAO Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual) [8], attempt to quantify risk of accident
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(i.e.: an event leading to damage to third party property or human injury, including death). The results
will then be used in the failure approach following the SESAR safety assessment process in parallel
with the risk classifications and are aimed at providing a complementary view to safety classification.
The tables below will be used.
Probability of Occurrence
Qualitative
Description
Frequent
Meaning
Value
Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)
5
Occasional
Likely to occur some times (has occurred infrequently)
4
Remote
Unlikely, but possible to occur (has occurred rarely)
3
Improbable
Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)
2
Extremely
improbable
Almost inconceivable that the event will occur
1
Severity of Occurrence
Aviation
Definition
Catastrophic
Hazardous
Major
Minor
Negligible
Meaning
Value
Equipment destroyed
Multiple deaths
A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a
workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to
perform their tasks accurately or completely
Serious injury
Major equipment damage
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the
ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating
conditions as a result of increase in workload or as a result
of conditions impairing their efficiency
Serious incident
injury to persons
Nuisance
Operational limitations
Use of emergency procedures
Minor incident
A
Little consequences
B
C
D
E
Risk severity
Risk
Probability
Catastrophic
A
Hazardous
B
Major
C
Minor
D
Negligible
E
Frequent 5
5A
5B
5C
5D
5E
Occasional 4
4A
4B
4C
4D
4E
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3
3A
3B
3C
3D
3E
Improbable 2
2A
2B
2C
2D
2E
Extremely
Improbable 1
1A
1B
1C
1D
1E
Table 14: Probability and risk of occurrence, risk severity [8]
Accordingly, and in line with the Human Performance section of this study, the following aspects of
human performance will be considered:
1. Operator (all stakeholders) tasks and roles
2
2. Human Machine Interface and Interaction (HMI ) issues
3. Organisational issues (team structure and communication, etc.)
4. Skills and training needs
Operator tasks and roles issues will focus on the ‘intrinsic’ human abilities and limitations, such as
2
workload. HMI issues will focus on the specific characteristics of the interface and interaction
mechanisms.
Organisational issues will address factors that emerge from the operational
organization, including operational (company) philosophy, definition of roles, etc. etc. Skills and
training issues will address the relevance and extent of the need of training in the light of potential risk
of accident.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF003
Objective
To assess the effect of limitations in human performance on safety, considering:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Success Criterion
Operator tasks and roles
The Human-Machine Interface and Interaction
Organisational issues
Skills and training needs
This objective will be addressed together with related HP objectives.
The effect of the limitations of human performance on safety is assessed,
focussing on the 4 identified areas, and no major risks to safety are identified.
4.3.3.4 External factors
Traditionally, external factors that are considered to be a potential threat to safety are:
1. Traffic
2. Terrain
3. Weather
In the context of RAID, the three threats need to be considered in the context of the detect-and-avoid
and C2L technologies.
Traffic is considered part of the detect-and-avoid technologies and its effect on C2L operation focus
on the effect of other aircraft transmissions, which falls under system failure. Consequently, Traffic as
an external factor is not addressed within RAID.
The hazards of terrain and weather have an effect on C2L integrity and availability. Terrain can cause
phenomena such as excessive attenuation, noise injection, shadowing and multi-path interference,
with effects potentially impacting primarily C2L performance, although there are cases where the
effect on the performance of the wireless component of the detect-and-avoid function can also affect
system performance (e.g. when the RPAS is operating at low altitude in mountainous terrain).
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The presence of terrain and weather also have an impact on the detect-and-avoid function, as
strategies for avoidance that do not take into account these factors can vector aircraft towards the
relevant threats. However, present day safety-net technologies (such as TCAS and EGPWS) do not
fuse weather, terrain and traffic avoidance functionalities, with only emerging technologies not yet
available on large transports addressing the subject. Consequently, the independent operation of
safety-net functions is considered adequate to mitigate the risks associated with the said hazards in
current large transport operations. In this context, therefore, this adequacy can be extended to RPAS
operation and, therefore, also for the scope of RAID. In other words, RAID will neither address the
fusion of safety-net functions nor the combination of threats.
As all RAID activities assume IFR operation, only IFR-related manoeuvers and hazard conditions are
considered.
The threat of weather and terrain is also a function of the operational model, primarily on the selection
of routes and areas of operation, operational bases and the mission itself. Within the scope of RAID,
these hazards are considered in view of the risk of third party property damage and human injury,
including death. Consequently, it is a function of population density and development. The business
case for the particular RPAS operation and to what extent weather and developed terrain is avoided
have a significant impact on safety. Such considerations are beyond the scope of RAID and
consequently specific operational scenarios will need to be developed to demonstrate the potential
effect of weather and terrain on safety.
It is not the purpose of RAID to carry out detailed simulations of weather and terrain effects and to
study their effect on wireless technologies. Within the project, generic threats such as the presence
of mountainous terrain will be considered and known effects on integrity of systems such as GPS will
be used to address the effects of the relevant hazards on the C2L and detect-and-avoid technologies.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF004
Objective
To assess the potential effect of weather and terrain on the performance of
wireless technologies associated with the detect-and-avoid and C2L
technologies, addressing:
1. GNSS performance
2. C2L performance
3. detect-and-avoid wireless component performance
Success Criterion
The implications weather and terrain on C2L and detect-and-avoid system loss of
integrity/availability and their effect on safety are assessed and evaluated as
within acceptable margins. No major limitations that can preclude operations in
certain conditions are identified.
4.3.3.5 Malicious actions
Malicious actions associated with the functions considered by RAID are identified to be:
1. Wilful intent of other entities (aircraft) to collide with the RPAS
2. Intentional transmission of inappropriate data over the C2L link
3. Cyber attack
The first two (collision and transmission of inappropriate data) are considered outside the scope of the
RAID assessment. Detect-and-avoid technology is considered to provide adequate protection against
collision in other, more stringent, categories of operation (such as large passenger transport) and
intentional collision is significantly affected by vehicle manoeuvrability, which is beyond the scope of
RAID. Furthermore, it is extremely improbable that, for most applications, other aircraft would be
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used to cause damage to the RPAS ownership and if this were to occur, other technologies would be
required for protection, further justifying the address of such an event as being out of scope of RAID.
Transmission of inappropriate data is also outside the scope of RAID, as safety mechanisms focus on
procedure and other technologies (such as operator identification at the ground station) that are
strictly not associated with the integrity of the C2L technology.
The effect of cyber-attacks on safety is, in contrast, of direct relevance to the project. In this case,
there is significant overlap between the KPAs of Security and Safety. The former is addressed in
Section 4.3.2 of this text. Consequently, the impact of loss of integrity/availability, identified through
OBJ-RPAS.03-SEC001 to OBJ-RPAS.03-SEC004, will be used to identify the impact on safety.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF005
Objective
To assess the effect on safety of the loss of integrity and availability of the C2L
link, the GNSS system and detect-and-avoid system, considering:
1. the Emergency Management primary asset
2. the Remote Piloting primary asset
3. Detect-and-Avoid technology (Collision Avoidance primary asset)
Detected and undetected attacks will be considered.
Success Criterion
The implications of cyber-attacks on safety are assessed and evaluated as
acceptable. No major limitations that can compromise safety are identified.
4.3.4 System Performance
The performances of the Detect and Avoid (Traffic Avoidance and Collision Avoidance) algorithms
implemented on-board the RPAS will be assessed by evaluating some performance indicators, as
detailed in the following.
The indicators cover four aspects of the performances associated with the execution of the resolution
manoeuvre and they are specific for each of the considered functionalities (Traffic Avoidance and
Collision Avoidance).
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER001
Objective
With reference to each specific test case performed, the minimum distance
between RPAS trajectory and the separation volume set around the intruder is
considered in order to assess the performance of the Traffic Avoidance algorithm
in the performed test.
Success Criterion
The distance at the CPA is recorded and evaluated as sufficient for each
encounter.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER002
Objective
To evaluate the total number of cases where the separation volume set around
the considered intruder is infringed (based on the value of the index indicated in
the previous OBJ-PERFORMANCE-001 for each specific test case). This is used
as global traffic avoidance algorithm success rate.
Success Criterion
The total number of infringements is recorded, assessed and evaluated as within
acceptable margins according to the global traffic avoidance algorithm success
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rate.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER003
Objective
With reference to each specific test case performed, the maximum deviation (3D
distance) from the nominal flight path is considered in order to assess the
nuisance caused on the original path execution due to the implementation of the
traffic avoidance manoeuvre.
Success Criterion
The deviation from the optimal flight path (calculated in function of the traffic
present in the considered airspace) is recorded and evaluated as within
acceptable margins.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER004
Objective
With reference to each specific test case performed, the delay time in capturing
the destination waypoint (4D waypoint) due to the execution of the traffic
avoidance manoeuvre is considered in order to assess the nuisance caused on
the time constraint compliance due to the implementation of the manoeuvre.
Success Criterion
The difference in actual and planned time to reach the destination waypoint is
calculated and evaluated as within acceptable margins. Causes are also
assessed and recommendations for their avoidance provided.
4.3.5 Capacity
Capacity is defined as the KPA that addresses “the ability of the ATM System to cope with air traffic
demand (in number and distribution through time and space)”
Three main focus areas are associated to Capacity KPA:
-
Airspace Capacity;
-
Airport Capacity;
-
Network Capacity.
Taking into consideration the concept addressed by the RAID demonstration activities, capacity
impact can only be assessed in terms of airspace capacity, since only en-route phases of flight are
foreseen (OPV take-off and landing are performed by the safety pilot on board).
The impact that the introduction of RPAS has on capacity can be assessed only through exercise
activities where other traffic is present.
Identifier
OBJ- RPAS.03-CAP001
Objective
To assess the impact of the introduction of RPAS on en-route throughput in terms
of number of movements per volume of the considered airspace.
Success Criterion
Number of movements per volume of considered en-route airspace per hour does
not decrease with the introduction of RPAS.
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4.4 Demonstration Scenarios
The scenario which is intended to be used as basis for the definition of the scenarios to be addressed
within RAID project is derived from the ICONUS study (Initial CON OPS for UAS in SESAR – the
study on the integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace [3]). Specifically the project refers to the
ICONUS scenario that foresees the short term integration of RPAS in the SESAR context.
This scenario is adapted to the requirements and assumptions of the RAID project considering the
specific characteristics of the RPAS under consideration, type of mission envisaged under relevant
operational conditions.
RPAS characteristics
Vehicle category
Remotely Piloted Turboprop aircraft
Working Altitude:
Medium altitude: max 3000ft (~1000m)
RPAS category:
Medium altitude 1000m; Short range ~ 10km
Weight category:
>250kg
Altitude and endurance:
medium altitude, medium endurance
Type of mission
The Remote Piloted Aircraft will perform patrolling activities in the area of predefined dimensions. The
trajectory of the flight will be a point to point route between take-off and the mission area. Within the
mission area the RPA will follow a systematic target seeking pattern until the target is identified. The
RPA follows the target for the period of time that is previously defined after which it will proceed to a
predefined return flight route towards the landing airport.
Operational conditions
In particular, the reference scenario considers an RPAS flying at medium level altitude, under IFR
conditions, with 5nm separation minima, departing and landing on standard civil airport or local area
for VTOL where no other civil air traffic will be present during the live trials. Operations will be
conducted in RLOS (both in the VLOS and BVLOS).
Communication between RP and ATC will be performed by telephone, while communication between
OP and ATC will be based on RT.
The mission (seeking) area, as foreseen also in the short term ICONUS scenario, could be managed
as a Temporary Segregated Area (TSA). This TSA envisaged for the mission area (in further text
referred to as TSA1) is situated 6KM (about 3.1NM) south east of Luqa aerodrome. The TSA1
comprises of an area having a square shape with 2NM sides. The vertical limits of the TSA1 are from
Mean Sea Level (MSL) to an altitude of 3000FT. The TSA1 will be activated on a tactical basis for an
agreed duration depending on the type of exercise/scenario. The only vehicle admitted to fly into
TSA1 is the Flare OPV.
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Figure 4: Identified departure and arrival airport and TSA1 in Malta
Figure 5: Detail of the TSA1
On the other hand, as the current demonstration activities also address the Detect and Avoid
algorithms (Conflict and Traffic Avoidance functions), the TSA1 with its dimension does not comply
with the area required to test this algorithm. Therefore, for the demonstration scenarios where DAA
algorithm is deployed and its functions tested, another TSA with bigger dimensions is defined (in
further text referred to as TSA2).
TSA2 is situated 6KM (about 3.1NM) south east of Luqa aerodrome. The TSA2 comprises of an area
having a square shape with 10NM sides. The vertical limits of the TSA2 are from Mean Sea Level
(MSL) to an altitude of 5000FT. The TSA2 will be activated on a tactical basis for an agreed duration
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depending on the type of exercise/scenario. The only vehicles admitted to fly into TSA2 are the Flare
OPV and collaborative vehicles equipped with ADS-B Out. TSA2 is managed by the ATC as a class A
airspace with mandatory ADS-B out equipment.
Figure 6: Identified departure and arrival airport and TSA2 in Malta
Based on these preconditions, following scenarios are defined to be addressed through the
demonstration activities. It should be noted that these scenarios address only the RPAS integration
while the reference scenarios that refer to current operations (with pilot on-board) are not specifically
detailed and provided here below.
Identifier
Scenario
SCN-RPAS.03-001
En-Route Operations of the RPAS, entering and leaving a Temporary
Segregated Area from/to an unrestricted managed airspace.
TSA1 is set-up by the ATC.
After departure the RPAS proceeds to the mission area, which is within the TSA1. The remote pilot
asks for the clearance to enter the TSA1. During the in-flight tests, the safety pilot executes the takeoff and climb phases of flight. Once the aircraft achieved its level flight condition, the control of the
aircraft is handed over by the safety pilot to the remote pilot.
The controller evaluates the request (depending on surrounding traffic, weather conditions, adjacent
sectors, etc.) and decides how to proceed. If unable to grant clearance to enter the TSA1
immediately, the controller will clear the pilot to hold at a specific location for a limited time. After
ensuring that no conflict with other non-participating traffic exists, the controller will clear the RPAS to
proceed to the TSA1.
The RPAS enters the TSA1 and performs the mission. During this time the ATC constantly supervise
the TSA in order to avoid an infringement by other traffic and to monitor the RPAS flight.
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When the mission is accomplished, the remote pilot asks the controller the clearance to leave TSA1
and enters the unrestricted managed airspace. The controller evaluates the request (depending on
surrounding traffic) and decides how to proceed. If unable to grant clearance to exit the TSA1
immediately, the controller will clear the pilot to hold within the TSA1 for a limited time. After ensuring
that no conflict with other non-participating traffic exists, the controller will clear the RPAS to exit the
TSA1.
If for any reason during the mission an unexpected event jeopardizing the mission occurs (such as an
emergency situation by other non-participating aircraft), the temporary segregated area will be
dismissed. Appropriate communication and procedures will be performed by controller and remote
pilot. Such a procedure may be for the RPAS to leave the TSA1 and proceed to a position to hold until
the controller clears the RPAS for the approach and landing.
Identifier
Scenario
SCN-RPAS.03-002
En-Route Operations of the RPAS in presence of potentially conflicting manned
traffic
TSA2 is set-up by the ATC.
The RPAS enters the TSA and performs its mission following the procedures described in SCNRPAS.03-001. Other IFR ADS-B equipped traffic involved in the scenario asks clearance to the ATC
to cross the TSA. Once the ATC provides the clearance, the traffic crosses the TSA. The controller is
in charge of maintaining separation between the RPAS and the other traffic within the TSA. The
controller continuously verifies separation condition between RPAS and other relevant traffic on its
CWP. As far as the occurrence of a possible loss of separation condition is recognized, the controller
communicates to the remote pilot the instructions to safely recover the separation conditions.
The RPAS is equipped with ADS_B IN for autonomous surveillance capability, in order to allow
complete functionality of the Detect and Avoid system that will be here used as a safety net.
Once the mission is accomplished the remote pilot asks the ATC the clearance to exit the TSA
following the procedures described in SCN-RPAS.03-001.
Identifier
Scenario
SCN-RPAS.03-003
Detect and Avoid (Collision Avoidance Function)
TSA2 is set up by the ATC.
The baseline of this scenario is SCN-RPAS.03-002.
During the execution of SCN-RPAS.03-002 ATC misses a separation between RPAS and the
conflicting aircraft, then the RPAS applies collision avoidance safety measures.
The RPAS, by means of the ADS-B IN surveillance system, detects the Collision Avoidance (CA)
condition and automatically performs the manoeuvre for recovering the safe distance conditions.
The safety bubble considered by the DAA system for the Collision Avoidance function is nominally set
to a sphere of 500 feet radius, possibly incremented depending on uncertainties affecting surveillance
data. The distance threshold for the activation of the escape manoeuvres is variable as a function of
the conflict scenario. The conflicting vehicles will not perform any concurrent manoeuvre while RPAS
executes CA operations. The RP monitors the CA manoeuvre execution and he can anytime
intervene to assume the full control of the flight.
Compatibility check of the DAA system with ACAS functions will be also carried out.
The DAA system compatibility check with the airborne safety net, that is ACAS system in its TCAS
implementation, will be in agreement with the MIDCAS high level requirements [13], which cite:
From the UAS (RPAS) equipped with a S&A (DAA) system point of view, meaning of
<<Compatibility>> is:
• Let the intruder identify UAS presence (TA level)
• Let intruder determine own safe manoeuvre to be executed according to ACAS rules
• Do not engage a UAS manoeuvre which might endanger intruder (“incompatible manoeuvre”)
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The RPAS fully satisfies the first requirement, being equipped with a Mode-S transponder. The
compliance with other requirements is addressed as in the following:
RPAS will continuously check if it is triggering the Alert function of the intruder TCAS. If it recognize
the need to execute a manoeuvre before to alert TCAS, manoeuvre is started, and the Alert check is
maintained as active. In the case the DAA system recognize that the intruder TCAS is being alerted,
both in normal flight or during avoidance manoeuvre, it stops to perform any other actions, leaving the
intruder TCAS to manoeuvre without other endangers. The DAA system will not determine an own
manoeuvre cooperatively and non-endangering TCAS operations; this is still partly in line with
MIDCAS guidelines, which foresee that no action have to be taken by the DAA system if the intruder
TCAS has been alerted, until only 15 seconds remain to a potential conflict.
Once the collision avoidance manoeuvre is completed, the remote pilot asks the ATC the clearance to
exit the TSA following the procedures described in SCN-RPAS.03-002.
Due to safety issues (DAA is not yet certified) this scenario will be performed during RTS only.
Identifier
Scenario
SCN-RPAS.03-004
Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – One manned vehicle involved
The vehicle representing the traffic in the TSA2 is equipped with ADS_B OUT, therefore it is able to
broadcast its status in a Mode-S Extended Squitter standard message.
Although the separation provision is performed by the ATC, the RPAS DAA (Traffic Avoidance
function) is configured with increased separation minima (7NM) as with respect to the reference
separation provision (5NM).This set up of increased minima allows the DAA to alert the RP on a
potential loss of separation with the other vehicle and therefore to test DAA performance on traffic
avoidance while the ATC separation provision is maintained.
The scenario is a step forward the complete integration of RPAS also in airspace of Class D and E,
following what is described in ICAO Manual [12]. The complete integration in these classes of
airspace also requires high detect capacity, which are not under test in the project, but the capability
of generate safe manoeuvres to recover the required separation minima is the function under
evaluation, and its suitability to support pilot decision, too.
The test aims at evaluating the performance of the proposed system in terms of supporting the
remote pilot in recovery the separation minima, as expected in the future SESAR Conops full
deployment (delegation of Self-Separation to the flight, or remote pilot, segment).
This is furthermore compliant with the extension of use of CDM approach in ATM.
The Remote Pilot (RP) still sees on its Remote Pilot Station (RPS) instrumentation the air traffic in the
area (flying into the ADS_B standard coverage area) and uses the DAA system in order to maintain
the foreseen increased separation with the vehicle (7NM).
Since the DAA system monitors the separation conditions at these increased minima, it is able to alert
the RP on possible risks of loss of separation and to provide him with the manoeuvre for separation
recovery before the separation is requested by the ATC.
The RP requires from the ATC the clearance for the suggested manoeuvre, executing it if clearance is
given. If clearance for the proposed manoeuvre is denied, the ATC communicates to the RP the
proper manoeuvre to be executed in order to recover separation in the case of a loss of 5NM
separation.
Once the traffic avoidance manoeuvre is performed, the scenario concludes following the procedures
described in SCN-RPAS.03-002.
Identifier
Scenario
SCN-RPAS.03-005
Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – Multiple manned vehicles involved
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All the air vehicles representing the traffic in the area are equipped with ADS_B OUT, therefore they
are able to broadcast their status in a Mode-S Extended Squitter standard message.
Although the separation provision is performed by the ATC, the RPAS DAA (Traffic Avoidance
function) is configured with increased separation minima (7NM) as with respect to the reference
separation provision (5NM).
This set up of increased minima allows the DAA to alert the RP on a potential loss of separation with
other vehicles and therefore to test DAA performance on traffic avoidance while the ATC separation
provision is maintained.
The pilot (RP) sees on its Remote Pilot Station (RPS) instrumentation the air traffic in the area (flying
into the ADS_B standard coverage area) and uses the DAA system in order to maintain the foreseen
increased separation with other vehicles (7NM).
Since the DAA system monitors the separation conditions at these increased minima, it is able to alert
the RP on possible risks of loss of separation and it to suggest him the manoeuvre for separation
recovery before the separation is requested by the ATC.
The RP requires the ATC the clearance for the suggested manoeuvre, executing it if clearance is
given. If clearance for the proposed manoeuvre is denied, the ATC communicates to the RP the
proper manoeuvre to be executed in order to recover separation in the case of a loss of 5NM
separation.
Once the traffic avoidance manoeuvre is performed, the scenario concludes following the procedures
instituted for SCN-RPAS.03-002.
SCN-RPAS.03-006
Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – Unmanned vehicle involved
Identifier
Scenario
In this scenario the activities described in SCN-RPAS.03-002 and SCN-RPAS.03-004 are performed
with unmanned traffic involved.
The vehicle representing the traffic in the TSA2 is Nimbus PRP70 RPA, equipped by Mode S
Transponder with ASS-B out and a portable GCS.
Once the mission is accomplished, the scenario concludes following the procedures described in
SCN-RPAS.03-002.
SCN-RPAS.03-007
En-Route Operations of the RPAS, under C3L security threats (spoofing,
jamming)
Identifier
Scenario
3
A jamming attack to the C3L is simulated by nulling the data link generated by the RPA toward the
RPS. The channel from the RPS toward the RPA is still available. The behaviour of the RP, who is
receiving no information from the RPAS, is assessed.
4
A simulated GNSS spoofing attack is added on top of the jamming attack. The automatic
(emergency) manoeuvres that the RP has probably triggered following the jamming attack, are
affected by the spoofing attack possibly leading to a catastrophic (simulated) scenario.
3 A radio jamming attack on a specific communication link consists in superimposing, in the relevant
frequency range, a malicious stronger dummy signal on the useful signal thus critically decreasing the
signal to noise ratio eventually not allowing the reception of the useful signal at the receiver side.
4 A GNSS spoofing attack consists in emulating and direct a fake GNSS signal with sufficient power
in order to over-ride the legitimate space-based GNSS signals and thus forcing any attacked receiver
to compute the position decided by the attacker (and not the actual position of the receiver).
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Furthermore the detect and avoid technology is expected to be jeopardised by the wrong positioning
due to the GNSS spoofing attack.
These degraded conditions will be tested in the en-route phase within the TSA in the following
scenarios: SCN-RPAS.03-001, SCN-RPAS.03-002, SCN-RPAS.03-003, SCN-RPAS.03-004 and
SCN-RPAS.03-005.
4.5 Demonstration Assumptions
Following a table presenting the list of the general RAID demonstration assumptions is depicted. It will
be used as a reference for describing the assumptions related in the single exercises to be provided
in sections 5.1.1.6, 5.2.1.6 and 5.3.1.6.
Assumption Identifier
Assumption Title
ASS-RPAS.03-001
FLARE Permit to fly
ASS-RPAS.03-002
Adequate time availability and volumes of TSAs
ASS-RPAS.03-003
Communication between remote pilot and ATCOs
ASS-RPAS.03-004
Communication between RPAS simulator and ATC simulator
ASS-RPAS.03-005
Weather conditions (FLARE)
ASS-RPAS.03-006
Weather conditions (Nimbus UAS)
ASS-RPAS.03-007
Nimbus UAS Permit to fly
Surveillance – availability of ADS-B
ASS-RPAS.03-008
Departure and arrival operations performed by the OP
ASS-RPAS.03-009
Use of cooperative traffic in Flight Trials for Traffic Scenario Avoidance.
ASS-RPAS.03-010
Table 15: General Demonstration Assumptions list
In the following tables a description of the assumptions is provided.
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-001
Title
FLARE Permit to fly
Type of
Assumption
Demonstration Enabler
Description
The FLARE system must obtain a permit to fly by Malta CAA in both
modalities: experimental vehicle (when automatically flown by an on-board
computer) or RPAS (when flown by a remote pilot). Both modalities include a
safety pilot on-board.
Justification
The modifications made to the original vehicle require to be certified or
authorized by the authorities.
Flight Phase
All
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KPA Impacted
Safety
Source
European and Maltese aviation regulation
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
CIRA
Impact on
Assessment
Feasibility of flight trials
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-002
Title
Type of
Assumption
Demonstration enabler
Description
The TSAs will be set up on a tactical basis and it will be configured for each
exercise on the basis of the operational conditions and decided by MATS.
Justification
In order to perform necessary flight tests the TSAs must be available for an
adequate time frame and volume.
Flight Phase
En-route
KPA Impacted
Safety, System Performance
Source
MATS
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
MATS
Impact on
Assessment
Feasibility of flight trials
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-003
Title
Type of
Assumption
Description
The remote pilot is able to use RF to communicate with the Controller (as any
on-board pilot)
Justification
The communication by different means (not RF) may impact on the workload
and operating methods of the Controller
Flight Phase
All
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KPA Impacted
Safety, HP
Source
Project Team
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
CIRA/MATS
Impact on
Assessment
Effectiveness of the Demonstration
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-004
Title
Type of
Assumption
Communication Assumption
Description
The real-time communication between RPAS simulator and ATC simulator is
available.
Justification
Communication and integration between the simulators is essential to perform
RTS.
Flight Phase
All
KPA Impacted
All
Source
MATS/CIRA
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
MATS/CIRA
Impact on
Assessment
Real Time Simulations enabler
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-005
Title
Type of
Assumption
Flight Trials enabler
Description
VMC are met and wind conditions are compatible with performance limitations
of the RPAS.
Justification
Safety pilot has to be able to keep the control of the aircraft and maintain
separation with traffic and terrain by visual means.
Flight Phase
All
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All
Source
Project Team
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
N/A
Impact on
Assessment
Flight Trials feasibility
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-006
Title
Type of
Assumption
Flight Trials with other unmanned traffic enabler
Description
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Standard weather conditions which can be considered acceptable for Nimbus
PRP70 are a max wind speed of 15 knots and light rain. Some preliminary
flight tests in Malta can restrict this limitation under particular high wind gust
conditions.
Justification
Performance limitations of Nimbus UAS have to be considered during the
flight trials
Flight Phase
All
KPA Impacted
All
Source
Project Team
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
Nimbus
Impact on
Assessment
Feasibility of Nimbus UAS insertion as unmanned traffic into the flight trials.
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-007
Title
Type of
Assumption
Flight trials with other unmanned traffic enabler
Description
The Nimbus system must obtain a permit to fly by Malta CAA. Nimbus expects
an authorized VFR VMC and EVLOS up to 1 km distance for GCS.
Justification
The Nimbus system is involved into Exercise 3, thus an authorization is
needed
Flight Phase
All
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KPA Impacted
Safety
Source
European and Maltese aviation regulation
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
Nimbus
Impact on
Assessment
Feasibility of other unmanned traffic insertion in flight trials
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-008
Title
Type of
Assumption
DAA enabler
Description
All the involved traffic has to be equipped with ADS-B out
Justification
DAA technology is based on ADS-B communication protocol
Flight Phase
All
KPA Impacted
Safety, System Performance
Source
DAA specification
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
CIRA/MATS/NIMBUS
Impact on
Assessment
DAA assessment
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-009
Title
Type of
Assumption
Flight Trials enabler
Description
The departure and arrival operations have to be performed by the Optional
Pilot on board the FLARE.
Justification
Automatic take-off and landing operations are not covered by the
demonstration. This assumption is strictly related to ASS-RPAS.03-001, since
the presence of the pilot on-board for terminal operations will facilitate the
obtainment of the permit to fly.
Flight Phase
Departure and arrival
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KPA Impacted
Safety, Human Performance
Source
Maltese and EU aviation regulation
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
CIRA
Impact on
Assessment
Flight trials feasibility
Identifier
ASS-RPAS.03-010
Title
Type of
Assumption
Description
The in-flight tests with actual traffic will make the assumption that the whole air
traffic (including Nimbus UAS) is able to broadcast ADS-B data (ADS_B OUT)
in order to allow the proper execution of the Traffic avoidance test.
Justification
DAA System is based on ADS-B.
Flight Phase
En-Route. Traffic Avoidance
KPA Impacted
Safety
Source
Project Team
Value(s)
N/A
Owner
CIRA-MATS-Nimbus
Impact on
Assessment
Feasibility of DAA assessment
4.6 Demonstration Exercises List
This demonstration is planned to be performed through three consecutive exercises:
•
•
•
EXE-RPAS.03-001
EXE-RPAS.03-002
EXE-RPAS.03-003
The outputs of each exercise present at the same time input for the following exercise. In addition, the
fulfilment of one exercise is considered as stringent requirement for the execution of the subsequent
one.
EXE-RPAS.03-001 is foreseen as a real-time simulation, while EXE-RPAS.03-002 and EXERPAS.03-003 are planned as live trials to be performed within Malta airspace.
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Technical
Instances
Safety
Security
Human
Performance
Objectives per KPA
Capacity
EXE- RPAS.03EXE- RPAS.03EXE RPAS.03001 RTS
002 LT1
003 LT2
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP001
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP002
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP003
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP004
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP005
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP006
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP007
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-HP008
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC001
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC002
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC003
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SEC004
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF001
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF002
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF003
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF004
X
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-SAF005
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER001
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER002
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER003
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-PER004
X
X
OBJ- RPAS.03-CAP001
X
X
Table 16: Mapping of Demonstration Objectives per KPA and Exercise
4.7 Demonstration Exercises Planning
In the picture below a GANNT providing an overview of the exercises scheduling and planning is
provided.
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5 Demonstration Activities
5.1 Demonstration Exercise #1 Plan
5.1.1 Exercise Scope and Justification
This exercise addresses the introduction of the RPAS in en-route operations in both segregated and
non-segregated airspace by means of real time simulations.
In this phase of the demonstration, real time simulations are also advantageous as they provide a
possibility to investigate into the safety and security aspects. At the same time this exercise will
enable the identification of the adequate operating procedures and working methods to be applied
and tested during the following live flight trials.
5.1.1.1 Exercise Level
Real-Time Simulation.
5.1.1.2 Description of the Operational concept being addressed
The operational concept addressed in this exercise is the RPAS integration in the ATM system, with a
specific focus on the en-route phase.
The standard existing ATC procedures will be tested in a simulation platform and any emerging need
for modification to current procedures and operating methods or creation of new ones will be
investigated.
In order to address the demonstration objectives some RPAS supporting technologies will be put in
place. The RPAS supporting technologies that will be addressed within this demonstration exercise
are:
• The Detect and Avoid technology, focusing on solutions specifically based on the use of ADSB and TIS-B technology, and are compatible with the existing safety nets;
• The C2L (and Communication or C3L) security technologies, focusing on the ability to support
the identification of data-link and communications errors due to spoofing, and on improving
the general C2L robustness and integrity.
5.1.1.3 Stakeholders and their expectations
Stakeholder
External
/ Internal
CIRA
Internal
Deep Blue
Internal
University of
Malta
Internal
Involvement
Project Coordinator. CIRA expects to improve the level of maturity of its
RPAS operator. DAA DAA technology. Furthermore, CIRA can also
System Developer
qualify itself as an RPAS operator able to provide
all the support in using a RPAS system for
Responsible for
Deep Blue expects to consolidate its knowledge in
Scenario definition,
the field of Validation. Deep Blue expects to
Demonstration Plan increase its well-grounded experience in the field of
definition, Flight
Safety by applying the methodology of Safety
Demonstration
Assessment to the RPAS case.
Safety Assessment.
Contributor to Real
Time Simulations
and Flight Trials as
Human Performance,
Safety and
Operational experts.
Design of simulation UOM expects to consolidate capacity to carry out
campaign supporting simulations and evaluate results.
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NAIS
Internal
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its execution.
Providing simulation
and ATCO
involvement
Support the concept and improve the idea that ATM
procedures for RPAS should be as those applicable
to manned aircraft, thus the provision ATC service
to such craft should be transparent to ATC
controller.
Support to definition NAIS expects to improve its knowledge in failure
of security threats to propagation due to security threat in RPAS and
be introduced at
ATM domain.
simulation level,
Security Assessment
Table 17: Stakeholders' expectations
5.1.1.4 Demonstration objectives and hypothesis
Obj.
Identifier
Hypothesis
Indicators/Metrics
OBJRPAS.03HP001
The changes of operating methods and
procedures emerging from the introduction
of the RPAS are feasible and consistent
within the overall context.
Remote
Pilot’s
and
acceptability of the changes
OBJRPAS.03HP002
The introduction of the RPAS has no
negative impact on the pilots’ and
controllers’ task performance.
OBJRPAS.03HP003
The changes in the task allocation will not
have a negative impact on interaction
between the pilot and the system.
OBJRPAS.03HP004
The accuracy and timeliness of information
of the assessed technologies (C2L and
DAA) is sufficient to support pilot’s task
performance.
OBJRPAS.03HP005
The introduction of the RPAS in managed
airspace
does
not
require
major
modifications of the existing HMI (both for
the controller and the remote pilot).
OBJRPAS.03HP006
negative impact on the pilots’ and
controllers’ communication.
OBJRPAS.03HP007
The new concept and changes it brings to
the current way of working are considered
acceptable by involved human actors (pilots
and controllers).
Pilots’ and controllers’ acceptability of
the new concept
OBJRPAS.03-
The introduction of the RPAS will imply the
need for additional training, skills and
Discrepancies between current and
RPAS required knowledge, skills and
ATCO’s
Situational awareness
Error propensity
Workload
Actions’ timeliness
Consistency with automation principles
Pilot’s workload
Trust in the system
Accuracy, effectiveness and timeliness
of information provided by the
technology
HMI usability and suitability
Discrepancies
between
systemprovided
and
human-required
information
Error propensity
Workload
Communication load
Effectiveness and timeliness of the
communication (means, modalities,
phraseology, etc.)
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HP008
expertise.
expertise
OBJRPAS.03SEC001
Emergency management is jeopardised by
GNSS spoofing attacks
Impact will be assessed following the
metrics identified in 4.3.2
OBJRPAS.03SEC002
Spoofing attack deteriorates the Remote
Piloting capability
OBJRPAS.03SEC003
Jamming on the telemetry jeopardises the
Remote Piloting capability
OBJRPAS.03SEC004
Collision
avoidance
technology
jeopardised by a GNSS spoofing attack
is
OBJRPAS.03SAF001
The normal operation of procedures
associated with the DAA technologies do not
compromise the continued safety of
operation
Stakeholder workload, risk of error, risk
of accident resulting from expected
response to D&A function outputs.
OBJRPAS.03SAF002
associated with the C2L link do not
operation
Stakeholder workload, risk of continued
traffic conflict, risk of error.
OBJRPAS.03SAF003
The human performance do not compromise
the continued safety of operation
Stakeholder workload, risk of error.
OBJRPAS.03SAF004
The failure (complete/partial/loss of integrity)
of the DAA technologies and C2L link do not
operation
Impact of emergency / recovery
procedures & manoeuvres on continued
safety, including effects of stakeholder
workload and implication of resulting
vehicle manoeuvre.
OBJRPAS.03SAF005
The jamming and spoofing of the DAA
technologies and C2L link do not
operation.
The impact of the resulting RPAS
manoeuvre and stakeholder workload
on continued safety.
OBJRPAS.03PER001
The minimum distance value (i.e. the
distance at the Closest Point of Approach) is
expected to be not lower than the allowed
one. In other words, the separation volume
set for other traffic shall not be infringed in
the considered test case.
The distance between RPAS and air
traffic at the CPA.
OBJRPAS.03PER002
It is expected that the total number of cases
where the self-separation algorithm has not
been able to avoid the separation volume
breach is lower than a percent threshold (to
be set during the project development).
The total number of infringements
OBJRPAS.03PER003
It is expected that the maximum deviation is
compatible with the needs of assuring the
safe execution of the separation manoeuver
while at the same time reducing the
nuisance as much as possible (these two
The deviation from the optimal flight
path.
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aims are in trade-off).
OBJRPAS.03PER004
It is expected that the time delay deviation is
while at the same time reducing the
nuisance as much as possible (these two
aims are in trade-off).
The difference in actual and planned
time to reach the destination waypoint
OBJRPAS.03CAP001
The introduction of RPAS has no negative
impact on en-route throughput in terms of
number of movements per volume of the
considered airspace.
Number of movements per volume of
considered en-route airspace per hour
does not decrease with the introduction
of RPAS.
Table 18: Exercise specific Demonstration Objectives and related hypotheses
5.1.1.5 Demonstration scenarios
SCN–RPAS.03-001 En-Route Operations of the RPAS, entering and leaving a Temporary
Segregated Area from/to an unrestricted managed airspace;
SCN–RPAS.03-002 En-Route Operations of the RPAS in presence of potentially conflicting manned
traffic;
SCN–RPAS.03-003 Detect and Avoid (Collision Avoidance Function);
SCN–RPAS.03-004 Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – One manned vehicle involved;
SCN–RPAS.03-005 Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – Multiple manned vehicles
involved;
SCN–RPAS.03-007 En-Route Operations of the RPAS, under C3L security threats (spoofing,
jamming).
5.1.1.5.1 Reference & Solution Scenarios
To allow for the assessment of the impact that RPAS integration will have on the current ATC
environment, it is necessary to have a baseline against which the comparison of the obtained results
can be performed. This baseline is the current ATC environment (managed airspace) with realistic
traffic load and existing procedures (i.e. TSA management).
The solution scenarios address both the feasibility of RPAS flying in a simulated managed airspace
and performing a mission in a TSA as well as application of DAA functionalities to ensure traffic and
conflict avoidance.
The degraded scenario will also be addressed through the introduction of security threats such as
spoofing and jamming.
5.1.1.5.2 Additional Information
N/A
5.1.1.6 Exercise Assumptions
In the following table the exercise related assumptions are listed. A detailed description of the
assumptions is provided in section 4.5.
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Assumption Title
ASS-RPAS.03-002
ASS-RPAS.03-003
ASS-RPAS.03-004
ASS-RPAS.03-008
Table 19: Exercise 1 assumptions
5.1.1.7 Exercise Tool, Demonstration Technique
The demonstration technique for the Exercise #1 is based on real time simulations with human in the
loop.
To accomplish this exercise, a complete simulation environment will be provided by CIRA and MATS,
which is composed of ATC, UAS and traffic simulation tools.
Figure 7 presents at high level the simulation environment, which will be put in place for the exercise.
Figure 7 – Simulation Environment
The UAS simulator is composed by the following modules:
• UAV Real-Time simulator which simulates the UAV dynamical model and performances and
emulates the on-board software. The simulator runs on DSPACE Hardware.
• Actual Remote Piloting Station (RPS) with pilot in the loop. The human machine interface
reproduces a typical cockpit instrumentations developed in VAPS-XT environment, whereas
the out of window is simulated through Flight Gear.
• Ground Control Station (GCS) which allows
• managing the simulation through SW application generated by using DSPACE
Control Desk environment;
• sending to and receiving from the on-board software information related to the flight
status
• Ethernet LAN for C2L internal exchange.
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Audio communication by telephone between UAS pilot and ATCOs.
The simulated Traffic is reproduced through pre-fixed trajectories, which are generated in VsTasker or
Matlab/Simulink environment. Traffic data, together with the UAS data, are sent on the ATN through
the Ethernet using the Eurocontrol ASTERIX protocol.
The MATS ATC radar simulator is based on the actual radar system used to provide Air traffic Control
by MATS. It is used to train radar controllers in approach and ACC environment with the ability to
combine both ACC and APP exercises simultaneously. It can generate any kind of traffic and it is
managed through two pseudo pilot positions. All safety parameters and tools available on the actual
radar system are also available on this simulator such as STCA, APW, MSAW etc. Danger, Restricted
and Segregated areas of any shape and with any lateral and vertical limits can be generated. The
technique used to run this simulator is based on the same technique radar controllers use in the real
environment.
The ATC simulator presents the following constraints: currently this simulator is unable to connect
with external sources like simulated traffic generators since MATS did not need this requirement when
such a simulator was purchased. However, a software and hardware intervention by the manufacturer
(at a cost) will make this simulator capable of connecting with other sources.
In order to avoid problems that may arise from the data exchange between the different components
of the test beds which are deployed in CIRA and MATS premises, the ASTERIX standard has been
selected to be the data format within simulation rig.
The ATC Radar facility that will be used for RT-simulations, can be either connected to actual radar
equipment or to another traffic simulator from which can receive data through the network. It can also
generate internally simulated data.
A preliminary assessment of the connection between the simulation rig and the ATC Radar simulator
has been performed and its feasibility has been confirmed.
5.1.2 Exercises Planning and management
5.1.2.1 Activities
General activities to be performed for the demonstration exercise within the preparatory, execution
and post-execution phase are explained below.
5.1.2.1.1 Preparatory activities
For the preparation of this demonstration exercise, the following activities are performed:
• Identification of low-level objectives to be addressed within this exercise in support to
demonstration high-level project objectives
• Definition of the scenarios that will allow for the collection of the required data (for nominal, nonnominal and degraded operations)
• Preparation of the Demonstration Plan
• Preparation of a detailed experimental plan
• ATC simulator setup and configuration
• RPAS simulator setup and configuration
• Preparation of the systems logs (for the quantitative data collection)
• Preparation of the supporting material (for the qualitative data collection)
• Familiarisation of the controllers with appropriate knowledge of RPAS concepts, operational
settings and procedures under analysis
• Training of the remote pilots
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• Hands-on sessions to allow pilots to familiarise with operational environment. Technical experts
will provide coaching during this activity.
• Q&A sessions to address cases encountered during the hands-on activities; alternatively
standard training exercises will be reviewed and discussed in group sessions.
5.1.2.1.2 Execution activities
Following execution activities are foreseen for this exercise:
•
Performance of the exercise runs in support to the identified scenarios (nominal, non-nominal
and degraded)
•
Observations of actions of the involved actors during the runs
•
Monitoring of the systems (RPAS simulator and ATC simulator, with the special attention to
the C2L and DAA technologies)
•
Collection of the data for the further analyses (both qualitative and quantitative)
•
De-briefings (post-run and post-exercises) and collection of feedback of the participants
5.1.2.1.3 Post execution activities
All simulations are recorded and can be replayed as required and could be stored for future need. The
air traffic controllers used to perform the exercise would be available for a post exercise brief.
When the exercise is finalised, the following activities will be carried out:
• Analyses of the quantitative and qualitative data in relation to the demonstration objectives
(hypothesis, success criteria, low-level and high-level objectives)
• Exercise reporting (to be incorporated into overall Demonstration Report)
• Review of the exercise results and accordingly adaptations of the experimental plan and inputs
for the following exercises (live trials).
5.1.2.2 Roles & Responsibilities in the exercise
The following actors will participate in the exercise, with the following responsibilities:
Role
Responsibilities
Senior HF Expert
Experimental framework set up Coordination of
HF activities;
Coordination of results analysis
Junior HF Expert
Preparation of supporting material;
Observations;
Qualitative data collection;
Qualitative data analysis
Information collection about quantitative data
format;
Monitoring of the data collection;
Quantitative data analysis
Identify likely security threats. Specify simulation
requirements. Assess impact on impact areas
(see par. 4.3.2)
Definition of safety related activities;
Coordination of safety related activities;
Data Analyst for HP and Safety
aspects
Security Expert
Senior Safety Expert
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Role
Responsibilities
Coordination of safety related data analysis
Junior Safety Expert
data collection; data analysis
Operations as Remote Pilot in RT-Simulation;
Interaction with ATCo in IFR type of operations.
Prepare the Real-Time simulation facilities and
Integration for simulated tests
Implementation and integration in RT Simulation
test-beds
Integration of DAA system in RT simulation
facilities;
Definition of test scenarios and metrics;
Results Analysis for Simulated tests on DAA
system.
Collect and analyse simulated data for DAA
system performance evaluation.
Simulation environment customisation &
integration
Define, activate and deactivate the TSA;
Define standard operating procedures;
Coordinate simulations and operational activities
Provide air traffic control activities to both
simulations and real operations
Coordinate ATC simulator activities with ATC
operational expert
Operate the ATC simulator
RPAS Pilot
Modelling & Simulation Engineers
Control Engineers
Decision Support System
Development Engineers
Data Analysis Experts for DAA
Simulation engineer
ATC Operations Expert
Air Traffic Control Officers
ATC Simulator Expert
Pseudo ATC Simulator Pilots
MATS Safety Expert
Conduct safety assessments with regard to TSA
activation and operations
Table 20: Roles and Responsibilities
5.1.2.3 Human Resources
Following a table resuming the human resources distribution in Person/Month for each partner is
presented.
Effort (Person/Month)
Activities
Preparatory
Execution
PostExercise
TOTAL by
resource
provider
(units)
TOTAL
CIRA
DBLUE
MATS
NAIS
UoM
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
3
6
6
4
6
6
28
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Activities
CIRA
DBLUE
MATS
NAIS
UoM
(units)
Table 21: Human Resources distribution for Exercise 1
5.1.2.4 Procedure development
MATS will use the current procedures as used in the real environment in accordance with ICAO,
EUROCONTROL, EASA recommendations and local regulations. Examples of procedures used in
such scenarios are:
• traffic information
• information regarding unidentified traffic
• conflicting traffic avoidance procedures
• area infringement warning procedures
• level bust procedures
• lack or unreliable transponder mode A and Mode C.
• creation, dismissal and use (clearance to entrance and exit) of a Temporary Segregated Area.
A number of dedicated operating procedures are foreseen to be developed for operating the RPAS in
the non-segregated traffic environment:
• ATC handling procedures for RPAS (in nominal, non-nominal and degraded conditions);
Any adaptation or modification needs to standard procedures that are identified during the Real Time
Simulation may be eventually implemented in the exercises that follow.
5.1.2.5 System modifications
As mentioned in 5.1.1.7 a modification to the current MATS radar simulator is required to enable it to
receive data from external sources in ASTERIX protocol.
Adaptations to the SW modules implementing DAA functionalities and HMI are not needed, since they
have been previously tested by CIRA in different application environments.
The foreseen system modifications aim at providing integration between the CIRA SW and the RTSimulator with Human-in-the-Loop. Since the DAA software modules and HMI have been completely
developed in-house by CIRA and are continuously maintained and improved as main assets of the
organization, the technical risks associated to software adaptation are considered low. The Risk
Table in §3.8 includes this element.
The effort charged on the RAID project specifically refers only to the activities required for the fine
adaptation of the SW modules to the scenarios/requirements specific to the RAID project.
The following adaptations of the RPAS simulator are required for this exercise:
•
Integration of the Traffic Avoidance algorithm in the Flight Control SW and related interfaces
updating
•
Integration of the Traffic Avoidance HMI in the RPS cockpit,
These activities mainly affect the Flight Control SW and the RPS HMI. Precisely:
•
The modification of the current Flight Control SW revision by means of integration of the
available Separation algorithm for manned application. This activity shall also identify the
interface changes necessary to correctly provide input data to the Separation functionality and
to interact with the RP by means of a dedicated HMI in the RPS cockpit (see next point)
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the HMI in the RPS cockpit that shall include a dedicated instrument with the aim to visualize
the traffic around the vehicle and to provide information to the RP about possible conflicts and
the relative resolution manoeuvres
The Flight Control SW and the RPS HMI modifications need to be verified before the Exercise
demonstration, so a specific set of preliminary test shall be performed.
Furthermore, also the following preparatory activities will be performed:
•
Adaptation of the FDR of the UAS simulator: the current simulator’s FDR should be modified
in order to include all the information required for the demonstration assessment;
•
Protocol adaptation: the UAS and Traffic simulators currently send their outputs on the
Ethernet through UDP protocol where the information are encoded using a proprietary CIRA
standard. This protocol should be replaced by the Eurocontrol ASTERIX one, in order to be
compliant with the ATC simulator;
•
Integration of the Traffic Avoidance Technology into the emulated on-board software.
5.1.2.6 Flight trials
N/A
5.1.2.7 Training
• Familiarisation of the controllers with appropriate knowledge of RPAS concepts, operational
settings and procedures under analysis
• Training of the remote pilots
5.1.2.8 Time planning
Activity
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Preparatory
Scenario 1
and 2
Preparatory
Scenario 3, 4
and 5 6
Preparatory
Scenario 7
Execution
Scenario 1
and 2
Execution
Scenario 3, 4
and 5 6
Execution
Scenario 7
Post-
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Activity
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Exercise
Scenario 1
and 2
PostExercise
Scenario 3, 4
and 5 6
Post
Exercise
Scenario 7
Table 22: Detailed time planning
The planned starting date for the Exercise 1 preparatory activities has been set in end of July 2014
and the closing date of the Post-exercise activities is foreseen in the first decade of December 2014.
5.1.3 Results Analysis Specification
5.1.3.1 Data collection methods
Data collected during the exercise will be both qualitative and quantitative.
Qualitative data will be collected by Human Factors experts and Safety experts and will consist of:
•
Direct “over the shoulder” observation of ATCOs and remote pilots;
•
ATCOs and remote pilots’ descriptive feedback collection during de-briefing (after each run
and at the end of the exercise);
•
Interviews
Questionnaires used for the subjective assessment of both ATCOs and pilots on the validated
concept specifically tailored for the exercise.
Qualitative data will be collected by means of paper and electronic support tools (spreadsheets,
worksheets, checklists, questionnaires) and multimedia (photos, audio and video recording).
What is important to notice is that interviews, debriefings, questionnaires and over-the-shoulders
observations are deeply interconnected techniques. This means that on one hand, data collected
though the observations and the questionnaires are then verified and discussed during the debriefings
and interviews, and on the other hand insights that emerge during the debriefings are then used to
guide the next observations. The triangulation of results coming from different techniques ensures
validity and reliability of the validation results.
•
Quantitative data will be collected by Simulator Engineers, Human Factors experts, Safety experts,
Security experts and will consist of:
•
ATCOs and remote pilots’ feedback collection by means of electronic standard questionnaires
(those that incorporate rating scales or predefined sets of standard values for assessment of
performance);
•
RPAS simulator (provided by the FDR) and ATC simulator’s logs;
•
Safety nets related logs;
•
DAA and C2L related logs;
•
Security related logs.
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5.1.3.2 Analysis method
The analysis of the data obtained during the RTS (quantitative data logs and subjective assessments
of the exercise participants collected through questionnaires, interviews and debriefings) will be
performed against the objectives of the simulation and the associated hypotheses and indicators.
Given that the number of runs will provide a limited set of data possibly not sufficient for the statistical
analysis, it is anticipated that the results will mostly rely on the qualitative assessment.
5.1.3.3 Data logging requirements
ATC simulator and RPAS simulator will produce logs in Asterix format.
The following RPAS state variables as function of simulation time can be recorded:
•
Position
•
Barometric Altitude
•
Attitude
•
Track angle
•
IAS speed
•
TAS speed
•
Ground Speed
•
Vertical Speed
•
Wind speed
•
Wind direction
Additional variables to be recorder (always as time histories) are:
Other traffic
For each target indicated by the ADS-B IN Surveillance System on-board the ownship (RPAS)
vehicle:
•
position data
•
velocity data
•
target identifier
•
TCAS equipment
Traffic Avoidance System
•
diagnostic signal of the traffic avoidance algorithm
•
logical state signal of the traffic avoidance algorithm
•
conflict flag associated to each considered intruder
•
predicted time to Closest Point of Approach associated to each considered intruder
•
predicted time to First Loss of Separation associated to each considered intruder
•
planar dimension of the separation volume associated to each considered intruder
•
vertical dimension of the separation volume associated to each considered intruder
•
longitudinal reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm
•
lateral reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm
•
speed reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm
Collision Avoidance System
•
diagnostic signal of the collision avoidance algorithm
•
logical state signal of the collision avoidance algorithm
•
collision flag associated to each considered intruder
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•
predicted time to Closest Point of Approach associated to each considered intruder
•
predicted time to collision volume breach associated to each considered intruder
•
radius of the collision avoidance volume associated to each considered intruder
•
longitudinal reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm
•
lateral reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm
•
speed reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm.
5.1.4 Level of representativeness/limitations
Representativeness:
•
All the ATC procedures are covered;
•
Emergency procedures are addressed;
•
DAA is tested in all the foreseen traffic conditions;
•
Security threats are addressed.
Limitations (related to RTS methodology):
•
Mathematical model of the flight;
•
Mathematical model of the traffic;
•
Limited amount of collaborative manned traffic (pseudo-pilots).
This exercise addresses the introduction of the RPAS in en-route operations in segregated airspace
through the means of flight trials.
In this phase of the demonstration, flight trials in segregated airspace will also provide an input for the
further investigation into the feasibility of following flight trial in non-segregated airspace (Exercise #3).
Furthermore in the segregated airspace, a GNSS spoofing attack will be emulated to assess the
impact on the RPAS and in particular on the Remote Pilot behaviour.
Flight trial (segregated area).
The RPAS supporting technology that will be addressed within this demonstration exercise is the C2L
(and Communication or C3L) security technologies, focusing on the safety risks related to security
breaches such as GNSS spoofing.
The TSA1 related procedures will be addressed within this demonstration exercise.
Stakeholder
External Involvement
/ Internal
CIRA
Internal
System Developer
Deep Blue
Internal
Responsible
for Deep Blue expects to consolidate its knowledge in
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Demonstration Plan
definition,
Flight
Demonstration
Safety Assessment.
Contributor to Real
Time
Simulations
Human Performance,
Safety
and
increase its well-grounded experience in the field of
University of Internal
Malta
Design of simulation
and
flight
test
campaigns, support
in their execution,
coordination in legal
issues relating to the
permit to fly and
results evaluation.
UOM expects to consolidate capacity to carry out
flight tests and evaluate results and will, with MATS
and the local authorities, bring into Malta the RPAS
domain of such activities. It also intends to exploit
the effort of establishing a legal and operational
framework in which to operate RPAS testing in
Malta in the future, thus facilitating further
involvement in RPAS flight test in the country.
MATS
Internal
Providing simulation Support the concept and improve the idea that ATM
and
ATCO procedures for RPAS should be as those applicable
involvement
controller.
NAIS
Internal
Support to definition Improved knowledge of GNSS security threats, their
of security threats to related scenario and actual system impact
be introduced.
Supplier
and
manager
of
the
technology for the
security
threat
emulation
Obj.
Identifier
Hypothesis
Indicators/Metrics
OBJRPAS.03
-HP001
procedures emerging from the introduction of
the RPAS are feasible and consistent within
the overall context.
Remote Pilot’s and ATCO’s acceptability
of the changes
OBJRPAS.03
-HP002
negative impact on the pilots’ and controllers’
task performance.
Error propensity
Workload
OBJRPAS.03
-HP003
Pilot’s workload
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Trust in the system
OBJRPAS.03
-HP004
The accuracy and timeliness of information of
the assessed technologies (C2L and DAA) is
sufficient to support pilot’s task performance.
of
information
provided
by the
technology
OBJRPAS.03
-HP005
airspace does not require major modifications
of the existing HMI (both for the controller
and the remote pilot).
Discrepancies between system-provided
and human-required information
Error propensity
Workload
OBJRPAS.03
-HP006
communication.
Communication load
phraseology, etc.)
OBJRPAS.03
-HP007
The new concept and changes it brings to the
current way of working are considered
and controllers).
the new concept
OBJRPAS.03
-HP008
expertise.
expertise
OBJRPAS.03SEC001
Emergency management is jeopardised by
GNSS spoofing attacks
OBJRPAS.03SEC002
Spoofing attack deteriorates the Remote
Piloting capability
OBJRPAS.03SEC003
Jamming on the telemetry jeopardises the
Remote Piloting capability
OBJRPAS.03SEC004
Collision
avoidance
technology
jeopardised by a GNSS spoofing attack
is
OBJRPAS.03
-SAF002
associated with the C2L link do not
operation
Stakeholder workload, risk of continued
traffic conflict, risk of error.
OBJRPAS.03
- SAF003
OBJRPAS.03
- SAF004
operation
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vehicle manoeuvre.
OBJRPAS.03
- SAF005
The jamming and spoofing of the DAA The impact of the resulting RPAS
technologies and C2L link do not manoeuvre and stakeholder workload
compromise the continued safety of on continued safety.
operation.
Table 24: Exercise Objectives and related hypotheses
SCN–RPAS.03-001 En-Route Operations of the RPAS, entering and leaving a Temporary
Segregated Area from/to an unrestricted managed airspace;
SCN–RPAS.03-007 En-Route Operations of the RPAS, under C3L security threats (spoofing,
jamming).
To allow for the assessment of the impact that RPAS integration will have on the current procedures,
it is necessary to have a baseline against which the comparison of the obtained results can be
performed. This baseline therefore refers to the current procedures with the pilot on-board, while the
solution scenario investigates into the feasibility of RPAS flying procedures (remote piloting entering
and performing a mission in a TSA).
The degraded scenario will also be addressed through the introduction of security threats such as
spoofing and jamming.
N/A
Assumption Title
ASS-RPAS.03-001
FLARE Permit to fly
ASS-RPAS.03-002
Adequate time availability and volumes of TSA
ASS-RPAS.03-003
ASS-RPAS.03-005
ASS-RPAS.03-008
ASS-RPAS.03-009
Table 25: Exercise 2 related assumptions
The demonstration technique for EXE–RPAS.03-002 is a flight test session formed by four flight trials.
FLARE
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CIRA will provide a FLARE Optionally Piloted System, an experimental facility composed of:
FLARE Optionally Piloted Aircraft: a TECNAM P92 VLA-class aircraft extensively modified in
order to obtain an avionic flying test bed with RPAS capabilities.
Ground Control Station: housed in a movable shelter and equipped with the remote pilot
station and the control working positions for mission management.
Data-link: for the video and data exchange between FLARE and Ground Control Station.
FLARE Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA) is the Flying Test Bed developed by CIRA in order to carry
out in flight validation of UAS and GNC enabling technologies.
An Optionally Piloted Aircraft is a hybrid vehicle, able to fly with or without a human crew on board the
aircraft, it is remotely piloted by a ground pilot which can interface directly with the on-board flight
control system, or send just high-level commands to the on-board flight control computer that is able
to manage autonomously the flight mission. The flight control computer can be charged to carry out
the entire flight mission or just some phases of it. These remotely operations are possible by means
of a wireless radio link between the OPA and the remote flight control station, located both on the
ground and on-board another aircraft.
OPAs usually have both a pilot on board and in the remote control station. The facility of hosting the
crew on board offered by OPAs can prompt the designers to choose off-the shelf certified aircrafts as
baseline airframes for OPAs.
The baseline aircraft chosen by CIRA as Flying Test Bed, named FLARE Flying Laboratory for
Aeronautical Research (FLARE), is the TECNAM P92-Echo S, VLA category. The mounted
powerplant is a Rotax 912 ULS2 100 Hp, four-cylinder, four-stroke. The engine is coupled with a two
blade fixed pitch propeller. The P92-Echo S was selected due to
•
•
its excellent VLA flying characteristics, that allow it to be operated on very short semiprepared/grass airstrips;
the low costs related to its modifications, operations and maintenance.
The following table summarizes the TECNAM P92-Echo S main features and performances, whereas
the subsequent figure shows a three-view drawing of the aircraft.
SPECIFICATIONS
ENGINE
Manufacturer
Model
Power
Number of cylinders
PROPELLER
Manufacturer
Model
Number of Blades
Type
DESIGN WEIGHT & LOADING
MTOW
Baggage Allowance
Limit Loads
Ultimate Loads
DIMENSIONS
Fuselage Height
ROTAX
912 ULS
98 hp
4
GT PROPELLER
GT-2/173/VRR-SRTC
FW101
2
FIX PITCH - WOOD
600 kg
20 kg
+4/-2 G
+6/-3 G
2,5 m
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Fuselage Length
6,3 m
Wing Span
9,6 m
Cabin Width
1,06 m
Cabin Height (Seat to cover)
0,91 m
Fuel Tank Capacity
45 x2 lt
PERFORMANCE (15 °C Sea Level - 450 kg)
VMAX
222 km/h
Cruise Speed 75%
204 km/h
VNE
260 km/h
Stall Speed (Flaps down - Power off)
65 km/h
Practical Ceiling
4572 m
Take-off Run
100 m
Take-off Distance
200 m
Landing Run
90 m
Landing Distance
250 m
Rate of Climb
6,1 m/s
Range
503 Nautical Miles
Table 26: TECNAM P92 Echo S specifications
Figure 8: TECNAM P92 Echo S
Modifications to the aircraft were needed in order to accommodate on board all the experimental
avionics.
In order to allocate the major portion of the equipment inside the cabin (and therefore, to facilitate
installation and maintenance activities) the left seat has been removed and the resulted space has
been used to this purpose, together with that of the baggage bay. For a more rational installation of
the embarked systems two mounting trays have been installed in place of the left seat rails and of the
baggage bay.
The remote piloting camera and related mounting support has been installed on the upper side of the
wing.
The peculiar antennas have been installed on the upper wing (n. 4) and on the bottom fuselage (n. 3).
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An auxiliary alternator to provide the required electrical power has been installed in the engine bay. .
Moreover, a new propeller with a reduced blade pitch has been installed in order to minimize the
weight growth impact on the aircraft performance.
All modifications have been made with the aircraft manufacturer formal approval.
The figure below shows a 3D view of the FLARE.
Figure 9: FLARE Optionally Piloted Aircraft
DATA-LINK
The Data-Link System has been designed in order to provide effective communication between RPAS
and Ground Control Station. The system is able to manage the receiving and the transmission of:
•
•
•
•
Housekeeping data
Command & Control data
Remote Piloting Video
Payload data
FLARE Data-Link is formed by two separate simplex mono-directional channels:
•
•
The Wide Band Data Link, devoted to the downlink and has a 12 Mbps bitrate;
The Narrow Band Data Link, devoted to the uplink (with 1 Mbps bit-rate).
The table below reports the FLARE- Data Link system specifications.
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Table 27: FLARE-Data Link Datasheet
5.2.2.1 Activities
General activities to be performed for this demonstration exercise within the preparatory, execution
and post-execution phases are explained below.
demonstration high-level project objectives;
• Definition of the scenarios that will allow the collection of the required data (for nominal, nonnominal and degraded operations);
• Preparation of the Demonstration Plan;
• Preparation of a detailed experimental plan;
• RPAS setup and configuration;
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• Preparation of the systems logs (for the quantitative data collection);
• Preparation of the supporting material (for the qualitative data collection);
• Training of the remote and on-board pilots;
• Q&A sessions to address questions emerging before the flight trial; alternatively standard training
exercises will be reviewed and discussed within in group sessions.
As the FLARE Permit To Fly from the Malta Aviation Authorities is a preliminary requirement for the
exercise execution, a formal request for it will be submitted by CIRA.
The Ground Control Station will be installed in a properly chosen site in order to guarantee the best
data-link coverage of the airspace that will be used during the tests.
The FLARE System shall be transported to the Luqa aerodrome a month before the beginning of the
exercise in order to fulfil extensive on-ground activities. In this phase a shakedown of the systems
involved and a rehearsal of the test procedures will be performed.
At the same time a detailed planning of the flight missions will be carried out and will conclude with
the issue of the “Flight Test Card” document.
The following execution activities are foreseen for this exercise:
•
Execution of the flight trials;
•
Observations of the performance of the involved actors during the runs;
•
Monitoring of the systems (RPAS and ATC system, with the special attention to the C2L
technology);
•
Collection of the data for further analyses (both qualitative and quantitative);
•
De-briefings (post-run and post-exercises) and collection of feedback from the participants.
Post execution activities are mainly related to the analysis and examination of the data acquired,
along the critical review of the records of the communications between ATCOs and the RPAS pilot.
All the analysed data and the performance evaluation results will be presented in the final test report
plan.
Once the exercise is finalised, the following activities will be carried out:
• A debriefing between ATCOs, RPAS pilot and FLARE on board safety pilot will be held after the
execution phase to compile any questionnaire and record any special event arisen;
(hypothesis, success criteria, low-level and high-level objectives);
• Exercise reporting (to be incorporated into overall Demonstration Report);
• Review of the exercise results to provide accordingly adaptations of the experimental plan and
inputs for the following exercise (live trial in non-segregated airspace).
The table below sketches the roles and the responsibilities of the main actors involved in the exercise.
Role
Senior HF Expert
Responsibilities
HF activities;
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Responsibilities
Coordination of results analysis.
Junior HF Expert
Observations;
Qualitative data analysis.
aspects
format;
Quantitative data analysis.
Security Expert
Identify likely security threats;
Identify and deploy threats emulation tools;
Assess impact on impact areas (see par. 4.3.2).
Coordination of safety related data analysis.
data collection; data analysis.
RPAS Pilot
Operations as Remote Pilot in Flight Trials;
Human Factors evaluation of procedures and
technologies to be implemented on RPAS, for
comparison with on-board Pilot;
Interact with ATCo in IFR type of operations.
Safety Pilot
Flight Trials Execution as on-board Safety Pilot;
comparison with RP.
Systems Integration Engineers
On-Board System Integration for DAA system and
C2L security system.
Communication/Datalink Engineers Implementation and management of C2L for
RPAS Flight Trials;
Support to the C2L and GPS signals spoofing
simulated and flight trials.
Control Engineers
Implementation and integration of Flight Control
System on-board.
On-board Decision Support System Integration of DAA system on-board RPAS;
Definition of test scenarios and metrics;
Results Analysis for in-flight tests on DAA system.
Data Analysis Experts
Collect and analyse flight recorded data for DAA
system performance evaluation.
Coordinating Engineer
Logistical coordination and technical/operational
preparation for flight test.
Flight Test Engineer
Preparation of flight tests;
Conduction of flight tests;
Assessment of results.
Coordinate simulations and operational activities.
simulations and real operations.
MATS Safety Expert
activation and operations
Table 28: Exercise Roles and Responsibilities
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presented.
Activities
Preparatory
Execution
PostExercise
TOTAL by
resource
provider
(units)
CIRA
DBLUE
MATS
NAIS
UoM
2
2
1,5
3,5
2
2
2
1,5
1
1
2
2
1
1
3
6
6
4
5,5
6
TOTAL
(units)
27,5
The exercise requires an interaction between ATCOs and FLARE on board safety pilot for:
• Pre take-off operations and taxing;
• Take-off;
• Climb to test altitude;
• Navigation up to the point of hand over to the remote pilot;
• Navigation from the point of hand over to the on board safety pilot up to descent point;
• Descent;
• Approach and Landing;
• Taxing to the parking lot.
The remaining phases of the FLARE flight mission will be carried out by the remote pilot, interacting
with ATCOs.
Whenever possible, standard procedures will be applied.
If minor modification to standard procedures will emerge for RPAS integration, they will be included
into general recommendations.
The adopted procedures will include:
• ATC handling procedures for RPAS (in nominal, non-nominal and degraded conditions);
• In case of communication loss the same emergency procedures already agreed on in EXERPAS.03-001 (RTS), will be applied within this exercise.
• The TSA1 procedures (RPAS entering and leaving the TSA) addressed in EXE-RPAS.03-001
(RTS) will be applied within this exercise.
FLARE standard configuration will be modified embarking an on board GPS spoofing system, in order
to jeopardize the GPS signal during C3L security threats tests.
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The following adaptations for this exercise are also required:
• Adaptation of the RPAS FDR (the actual FDR should be modified in order to include all the
information required for the demonstration assessment);
• The MALTA ATC Centre will be equipped with an ADS-B In receiver and antenna. The
equipment will support the ATC operation, complementing the Radar-based surveillance
operations.
Four flight trials will be performed within this exercise.
5.2.2.7 Training
It is assumed that the familiarisation of the controllers with appropriate knowledge of RPAS concepts,
operational settings and procedures, as well as the training needs of the remote pilots would have
been covered during RTS. If additional training needs emerge, they will be addressed through briefing
sessions.
Training of the on-board pilots will be provided.
Activity
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
Preparatory
Scenario 1
Preparatory
Scenario 7
Execution
Scenario 1
Execution
Scenario 7
PostExercise
Scenario 1
PostExercise
Scenario 7
The planned starting date for the preparatory activities of Exercise 2 has been set in January 2015.
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In addition to data collection methods presented in 5.1.3.1, to better capture and describe the
differences between the tasks, the performance and the subjective assessment of the overall concept,
a specific feedback collection will be prepared for the on-board pilot (by the means of questionnaires,
de-briefings and interviews).
Moreover, data recording is provided by the UAS FDR.
The analysis of the data obtained during the flight trials (quantitative data logs and subjective
assessments of the exercise participants collected through questionnaires, interviews and
debriefings) will be performed against the objectives of the simulation and the associated hypotheses
and indicators. Given that the number of trials will provide a limited set of data possibly not sufficient
for the statistical analysis, it is anticipated that the results will mostly rely on the qualitative
assessment.
•
Position;
•
Barometric Altitude;
•
Attitude;
•
Track angle;
•
IAS speed;
•
TAS speed;
•
Ground Speed;
•
Vertical Speed;
•
Wind speed;
•
Wind direction.
Limitations:
•
The flight trials will be performed in a segregated airspace with no actual traffic;
• The flight trials will be executed in an area no wider than 10 NM from the coast.
Representativeness:
•
•
•
Security threats are addressed.
This exercise addresses the introduction of the RPAS en-route operations in non-segregated airspace
through the means of flight trials.
This phase of the demonstration is considered as the more realistic one as well as the more
challenging one to assess the feasibility of the use of DAA system in support to remote pilot and
controller’ decisions and operations in a mixed environment. Both manned and un-manned traffic is
included in the scope of this exercise.
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Flight trial (non-segregated area).
The RPAS supporting technology that will be addressed within this demonstration exercise is the
Detect and Avoid technology, focusing on solutions specifically based on the use of ADS-B and TIS-B
technology, and on its compatibility with the existing safety nets.
Stakeholder
External
/ Internal
Involvement
CIRA
Internal
System Developer
Responsible for
Deep Blue expects to consolidate its knowledge in
Demonstration Plan increase its well-grounded experience in the field of
definition, Flight
Demonstration
Safety Assessment.
Contributor to Real
Time Simulations
Human Performance,
Safety and
Design of simulation UOM expects to consolidate capacity to carry out
and flight test
flight tests and evaluate results and will, with MATS
campaigns, support
and the local authorities, bring into Malta the RPAS
in their execution,
domain of such activities. It also intends to exploit
coordination in legal the effort of establishing a legal and operational
issues relating to the framework in which to operate RPAS testing in
permit to fly and
Malta in the future, thus facilitating further
results evaluation.
involvement in RPAS flight test in the country.
Deep Blue
Internal
University of
Malta
Internal
MATS
Internal
Providing simulation
and ATCO
involvement
Support the concept and improve the idea that ATM
procedures for RPAS should be as those applicable
controller.
Nimbus
Internal
Light UAS
manufacturer
Collect experience in light UAS segment integration
in real traffic scenarios in order to foster their future
development beside traditional aircrafts with
suitable control technologies (e.g. automatic
dependent surveillance in broadcast).
Obj.
Identifier
Hypothesis
Indicators/Metrics
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OBJRPAS.03HP001
procedures emerging from the introduction of
the RPAS are feasible and consistent within
the overall context.
Remote Pilot’s and ATCO’s acceptability
of the changes
OBJRPAS.03HP002
task performance.
Error propensity
Workload
OBJRPAS.03HP003
Pilot’s workload
Trust in the system
OBJRPAS.03HP004
The accuracy and timeliness of information of
the assessed technologies (C2L and DAA) is
sufficient to support pilot’s task performance.
of
information
provided
by the
technology
OBJRPAS.03HP005
airspace does not require major modifications
of the existing HMI (both for the controller
and the remote pilot).
Discrepancies between system-provided
and human-required information
Error propensity
Workload
OBJRPAS.03HP006
communication.
Communication load
phraseology, etc.)
OBJRPAS.03HP007
The new concept and changes it brings to the
current way of working are considered
and controllers).
the new concept
OBJRPAS.03HP008
expertise.
expertise
OBJRPAS.03SAF001
associated
with
the
detect-and-avoid
technologies do not compromise the
continued safety of operation
Stakeholder workload, risk of error, risk
of accident resulting from expected
response to D&A function outputs.
OBJRPAS.03SAF003
OBJRPAS.03SAF004
operation
vehicle manoeuvre.
OBJRPAS.03PER 001
The minimum distance value (i.e. the
distance at the Closest Point of Approach) is
expected to be not lower than the allowed
The distance between RPAS and air
traffic at the CPA.
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one. In other words, the separation volume
set for other traffic shall not be infringed in
the considered test case.
OBJRPAS.03PER 002
It is expected that the total number of cases
where the self-separation algorithm has not
been able to avoid the separation volume
breach is lower than a percent threshold (to
be set during the project development).
The total number of infringements
OBJRPAS.03PER 003
It is expected that the maximum deviation is
while at the same time reducing the nuisance
as much as possible (these two aims are in
trade-off).
The deviation from the optimal flight
path.
OBJRPAS.03PER 004
It is expected that the time delay deviation is
while at the same time reducing the nuisance
as much as possible (these two aims are in
trade-off).
The difference in actual and planned
time to reach the destination waypoint
OBJRPAS.03CAP001
The introduction of RPAS has no negative
impact on en-route throughput in terms of
number of movements per volume of the
considered airspace.
Number of movements per volume of
considered en-route airspace per hour
does not decrease with the introduction
of RPAS.
Table 32: Exercise specific Demonstration Objectives and related hypotheses
SCN–RPAS.03-002 En-Route Operations of the RPAS in presence of potentially conflicting manned
traffic;
SCN–RPAS.03-004 Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – One manned vehicle involved;
SCN–RPAS.03-006 Detect and Avoid testing (Traffic Avoidance) – Unmanned vehicle involved
To allow for the assessment of the impact that RPAS integration will have on the current procedures,
it is necessary to have a baseline against which the comparison of the obtained results can be
performed. This baseline therefore refers to the traffic situation where potentially conflicting traffic is
present and current procedures in place with the pilot on-board. On the other hand, the solution
scenario addresses the same situation with potentially conflicting traffic, but with the flight managed
by the remote pilot.
Therefore, the solution scenarios address en-route operations of RPAS in presence of potentially
conflicting traffic and the performance of DAA functionalities to ensure traffic and conflict avoidance.
N/A
Assumption Title
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ASS-RPAS.03-001
FLARE Permit to fly
ASS-RPAS.03-002
Adequate time availability and volumes of TSA
ASS-RPAS.03-003
ASS-RPAS.03-005
ASS-RPAS.03-006
ASS-RPAS.03-007
ASS-RPAS.03-008
ASS-RPAS.03-009
ASS-RPAS.03-010
Table 33: Exercise 3 related assumptions
The demonstration technique for EXE–RPAS.03-003 is a flight test session formed by four flight trials
CIRA will provide FLARE Optionally Piloted System.
Manned and unmanned vehicles will be present during these flight trials.
General Aviation manned aircrafts equipped with Mode S Transponder with ADS-B out (supported by
CIRA) will populate the scenario as manned air traffic.
Unmanned traffic will be provided by Nimbus: an innovative light UAV platform with STOL capabilities
which will be indicated as PRP70. This RPA is a fixed wing aircraft with a canard control horizontal
surface in a forward position with respect to the main wing. The Nimbus RPA will be equipped by
Mode S Transponder with ADS-B out and a portable GCS.
FLARE Optionally Piloted System is an experimental facility composed of:
• FLARE Optionally Piloted Aircraft: a TECNAM P92 VLA-class aircraft extensively modified in
order to obtain an avionic flying test bed with RPAS capabilities;
• Ground Control Station housed in a movable shelter and equipped with the remote pilot
station and the control working positions for mission management;
• Data-link for video and data exchange between FLARE and Ground Control Station.
Details about FLARE characteristics and Data-link specifications have been described in 5.2.1.7.
5.3.2.1 Activities
General activities to be performed for the demonstration exercise within the preparatory, execution
and post-execution phase are explained below.
demonstration high-level project objectives;
• Definition of the scenarios that will allow the collection of the required data (for nominal and nonnominal operations);
• Preparation of the Demonstration Plan;
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• Preparation of a detailed experimental plan;
• RPAS setup and configuration;
• Preparation of the systems logs (for the quantitative data collection);
• Preparation of the supporting material (for the qualitative data collection);
• Training of the remote and on-board pilots;
• Q&A sessions to address questions emerging before the flight trial; alternatively standard training
exercises will be reviewed and discussed in group sessions.
The following execution activities are foreseen for this exercise:
•
Performance of the flight trials;
•
Observations of the performance of the involved actors during the runs;
•
Monitoring of the systems (RPAS and ATC system, with the special attention to the C2L and
DAA technologies);
•
Collection of the data for the further analyses (both qualitative and quantitative);
•
De-briefings (post-run and post-exercises) and collection of feedback of the participants.
Post execution activities are mainly related to the analysis and examination of the data acquired,
along the critical review of the records of the communications between ATCOs and the RPAS pilot.
All the analysed data and the performance evaluation results will be presented in the final test report
plan.
Once the exercise is finalised, the following activities will be carried out:
• A debriefing between ATCOs, RPAS pilot and FLARE on board safety pilot will be held after the
execution phase to compile any questionnaire and record any special event arisen;
(hypothesis, success criteria, low-level and high-level objectives);
• Exercise reporting (to be incorporated into overall Demonstration Report);
• Review of the exercise results and accordingly adaptations of the experimental plan and inputs
for the following exercise (live trial in non-segregated airspace).
The table below sketches the roles and the responsibilities of the main actors involved in the exercise.
Role
Responsibilities
Senior HF Expert
HF activities;
Coordination of results analysis.
Junior HF Expert
Observations;
Qualitative data analysis.
format;
aspects
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Role
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Responsibilities
Quantitative data analysis.
Coordination of safety related data analysis.
data collection; data analysis.
RPAS Pilot
Operations as Remote Pilot in Flight Trials;
comparison with on-board Pilot;
Interact with ATCo in IFR type of operations.
Safety Pilot
Flight Trials Execution as on-board Safety Pilot;
comparison with RP.
Systems Integration Engineers
On-Board System Integration for DAA system and
C2L security system.
Communication/Datalink Engineers Implementation and management of C2L for
RPAS Flight Trials;
Support to the C2L and GPS signals spoofing
simulated and flight trials.
Control Engineers
Implementation and integration of Flight Control
System on-board.
On-board Decision Support System Integration of DAA system on-board RPAS;
Definition of test scenarios and metrics; Results
Analysis for in-flight tests on DAA system.
Coordinating Engineer
Logistical coordination and technical/operational
preparation for flight test.
Flight Test Engineer
Preparation of flight tests;
Conduction of flight test;
Assessment of results.
Coordinate simulations and operational activities.
simulations and real operations.
MATS Safety Expert
activation and operations.
Data Analysis Experts
Collect and analyse flight recorded data for DAA
system performance evaluation;
NIMBUS RPAS Crew
To perform NIMBUS RPAS flight.
Table 34: Exercise Roles and Responsibilities
presented.
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Activities
CIRA
DBLUE
MATS
NIMBUS
UoM
3
1,5
-
2
3
2
2
1,5
1,5
1
1
2
1
0,8
3
6
5,5
2,5
4,3
7
Preparatory
Execution
PostExercise
TOTAL by
resource
provider
(units)
TOTAL
(units)
25,3
The exercise requires an interaction between ATCOs and FLARE on board safety pilot for the
following activities:
• Pre take-off operations and taxing;
• Take-off;
• Climb to test altitude;
• Navigation up to the point of hand over to the remote pilot;
• Navigation from the point of hand over to the on board safety pilot up to descent point;
• Descent;
• Approach and Landing;
• Taxing to the parking lot.
The remaining phases of the FLARE flight mission will be carried out by the remote pilot, interacting
with ATCOs.
Whenever possible, standard procedures will be applied.
If minor modification to standard procedures will emerge for RPAS integration, they will be included
into general recommendations.
The adopted procedures will include:
• ATC handling procedures for RPAS (in nominal, non-nominal and degraded conditions);In case
of communication loss the same emergency procedures already agreed on in EXE-RPAS.03-001
(RTS) , will be applied within this exercise;
• The TSA2 procedures (RPAS entering and leaving the TSA) addressed in EXE-RPAS.03-001
(RTS) will be applied in this exercise.
FLARE standard configuration will be modified embarking ADS-B OUT, in order to transmit FLARE
position to ATC, as well as to the ground control station.
The following adaptations for this exercise are also required:
• Adaptation of the RPAS FDR: the current FDR should be modified in order to include all the
information required for the demonstration assessment;
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•
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Integration of the Traffic Avoidance system in the software and update of the mission
automation logic in order to coordinate the operations of the collision avoidance and Traffic
Avoidance algorithms. The Traffic Avoidance algorithm, indeed, is currently integrated in a
software environment different from the global one including only the collision avoidance
system;
The MALTA ATC Centre will be equipped with an ADS-B In receiver and antenna. The
equipment will support the ATC operation, complementing the Radar-based surveillance
operations.
Four flight trials will be performed within this exercise.
5.3.2.7 Training
It is assumed that the familiarisation of the controllers with appropriate knowledge of RPAS concepts,
operational settings and procedures, as well as the training needs of the remote pilots would have
been covered during RTS and previous flight trials. If additional training needs emerge they will be
addressed through briefing sessions.
Training of the on-board pilots will be provided.
Activity
Week
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
Preparatory
Scenario 2
Preparatory
Scenario 4
and 6
Execution
Scenario 2
Execution
Scenario 4
and 6
PostExercise
Scenario 2
PostExercise
Scenario 4
and 6
The planned starting date for the preparatory activities of Exercise 3 has been set in January 2015.
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In addition to data collection methods presented in 5.1.3.1, to better capture and describe the
differences between the tasks, the performance and the subjective assessment of the overall concept,
a specific feedback collection will be prepared for the on-board pilot (by the means of questionnaires,
de-briefings and interviews).
Moreover, data recording is provided by the RPAS FDR.
The analysis of the data obtained during the flight trials (quantitative data logs and subjective
assessments of the exercise participants collected through questionnaires, interviews and
debriefings) will be performed against the objectives of the simulation and the associated hypotheses
and indicators. Given that the number of trials will provide a limited set of data possibly not sufficient
for the statistical analysis, it is anticipated that the results will mostly rely on the qualitative
assessment.
•
Position
•
Barometric Altitude
•
Attitude
•
Track angle
•
IAS speed
•
TAS speed
•
Ground Speed
•
Vertical Speed
•
Wind speed
•
Wind direction
Additional variables (from other traffic, the traffic avoidance and collision avoidance systems) to be
recorded are:
Other traffic
For each target indicated by the ADS-B IN Surveillance System on-board the RPAS vehicle:
•
position data;
•
velocity data;
•
target identifier;
•
TCAS equipment.
Traffic Avoidance System
•
diagnostic signal of the traffic avoidance algorithm;
•
logical state signal of the traffic avoidance algorithm;
•
conflict flag associated to each considered intruder;
•
predicted time to Closest Point of Approach associated to each considered intruder;
•
predicted time to First Loss of Separation associated to each considered intruder;
•
planar dimension of the separation volume associated to each considered intruder;
•
vertical dimension of the separation volume associated to each considered intruder;
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•
longitudinal reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm;
•
lateral reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm;
•
speed reference command issued by the traffic avoidance algorithm.
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Collision Avoidance System
•
diagnostic signal of the collision avoidance algorithm;
•
logical state signal of the collision avoidance algorithm;
•
collision flag associated to each considered intruder;
•
predicted time to Closest Point of Approach associated to each considered intruder;
•
predicted time to collision volume breach associated to each considered intruder;
•
radius of the collision avoidance volume associated to each considered intruder;
•
longitudinal reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm;
•
lateral reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm;
•
speed reference command issued by the collision avoidance algorithm.
Limitations:
•
The flight trials will be executed in an area no wider than 10 NM from the coast;
Even if other IFR traffic will be involved, the test area will be managed as a TSA and all the
traffic will be aware of the test purposes.
Representativeness:
•
•
•
•
Traffic Avoidance functionalities are tested in real traffic conditions;
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6 Implementation considerations
The main objective of the RAID project is to demonstrate and assess of the impact of RPAS
integration into unrestricted airspace on the current ATM environment as it is defined by the European
RPAS Steering Group (ERSG) Roadmap [2].
Specifically, the demonstration activities address the following areas identified by the ERSG
Roadmap:
•
Integration into ATM and Airspace environments;
•
Verification and Validation;
•
Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures;
•
Security issues;
•
Operational contingency procedures and systems.
The RAID project furthermore foresees the definition of recommendations and guidelines in support to
the integration of RPAS and deployment activities.
In order to obtain the relevant information in a structured and comprehensive way, the demonstration
activities have been organized around the affected KPAs: safety, security, capacity and human
performance. In addition, given the nature of the demonstration objectives, system performance
related to DAA Technology and its impact on the feasibility of the project has also been considered.
Furthermore, the recommendations will similarly address these five main areas.
As with respect to human performance aspects, for the execution of the demonstration exercise it is
foreseen to use the OPV, which will ensure also participation of the on-board pilots. By this means, it
has been allowed for specifically designed demonstration exercises to evaluate the different
behaviour of on-board pilot and remote pilot in the execution of standard procedures and overall flight
in cooperation with the Air Traffic Controller. In this first area, consequently, it is expected that the
RAID outcomes could contribute to the definition and optimization of remote pilot procedures and
operating methods in order to allow a smooth integration of RPAS into the current operational context.
Since the project specifically applies to the en-route operations, its results have to be integrated with
those of other projects focused on the Take-Off and Landing procedures.
As far as the safety aspects are concerned, the project results could support the safety evaluation of
new separation modes, as they are foreseen by the SESAR Concept of operations, and supported by
the DAA technology implementation on RPAS.
The safety aspects results will address procedures for the use of RPAS in the process of separation
assurance and in the management of procedures related to the TSA. Furthermore, the project will
address the occurrences of non-nominal situation and degraded situation, which will also support the
identification of safety recovery procedures and in general to assess the changes in safety levels
during the use of RPAS. The safety assessment expected in the project may be complemented with
safety assessment outcomes of other SESAR RPAS projects to provide a global measure of RPAS
integration in the commercial traffic.
Together with the safety aspects, a set of security risks related to the Command and Control Link will
be investigated. Quantitative measures of the negative effects caused by malicious actions (such as
jamming and spoofing) on the data-link communication between RPA and the RPS will be used in
assessing the intrinsic security level of the RPAS. Additionally it is envisaged that the assessment of
needs for risk management and identification of mitigation activities will be performed. Further, the
project aims to identify a list of hazards, the probability of their occurrence and their severity.
The effects on airspace capacity of the RPAS introduction in en-route operations will be also
investigated. A comparison between the number of movements per volume of considered en-route
airspace per hour, with and without the RPAS, will provide relevant information about the impact of
RPAS introduction on airspace capacity.
Finally, the project would assess the DAA system as proposed, in terms of relevant technical
performance, such as the deviation from the planned trajectories and the effectiveness of system
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design in terms of Closest Point of Approach granted. The measurement and comparisons between
simulated and in-flight context will allow to evaluate and to assess the effectiveness of the system,
both in nominal and in non-nominal conditions. The comparison with other DAA system submitted to
demonstration experimentations in the context of the SESAR RPAS Demonstration Activities will
support the identification of a standard requirements set for the RPAS DAA system.
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7 Communication plan
This section of Demonstration Plan describes the approach to be adopted by project team to ensure
the objectives & activities of the SESAR Integrated RPAS Demonstration are properly communicated
to the wider Stakeholder community in an efficient manner.
The execution of Communication Plan is focused on the dissemination of relevant results of the
project demonstration activities to the Stakeholders such as experts, the scientific community and
general public interested in RPAS development.
All communications activities will be conducted following the SESAR JU communication guidance for
an effective and dynamic communication and in accordance with SESAR JU Corporate
Communication Team.
In particular the project communication team will involve the SJU Corporate communication Team at
the appropriate time when preparing external communication activities for:
•
•
•
•
•
Communication co-ordination and synergies with the SJU
SESAR messaging support
Invitation of SESAR experts to participate in RAID events
SESAR content support
Validation of SESAR-related content
The SJU will be informed in case of any significant change in the project’s Communication Plan.
Here below in the table are shown the points of contact of RAID Communication team:
Company
Name
Telephone
e-mail
NAIS
Marco ROMANI
(Communication
Manager)
+39 06 91139002
marco.romani@nais-solurions.it
CIRA
Edoardo FILIPPONE
+39 082 3623322
e.filippone@cira.it
Table 37: RAID partner communication team
Any form of communication (press release, article, brochure, report or other project documentation)
will include the key messages indicated on the SESAR Communication guidance, as reported in
details in the next paragraph.
7.1 Objectives and key messages
The main objective of Communication Plan is to establish a community of experts and professionals
interested into the integration of RPAS in ATM environment. At the same time it is intended to
broaden the audience of people informed on the RPAS and its possible future applications. Therefore,
the appropriate communication activities will be regularly executed during the project lifetime to
present the on-going results achieved and the activities planned to be performed subsequently.
By means of key messages it will be possible to create awareness on the RPAS applications and
usefulness and, last but not the least, that this innovation is supported and driven by SESAR JU
programme.
The project communication objectives will aim:
a. To present RAID as one of the nine European projects funded by the SESAR Joint
Undertaking and its focus on the integrated Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS)
demonstration activities (pre-operative flight tests in the non-segregated airspace) to external
audience.
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b. To demonstrate to Stakeholders and wider audience that the mature technological solutions
and procedures to support the integration of RPAS into the non-segregated ATM environment
are available to internal and external audience.
c. To present to project Stakeholders and wider audience the potential RPAS application areas,
such us: monitoring and surveillance for traffic management, patrol or emergency, aerial mails
and parcels distribution.
d. To create a community interested into RPAS system and its applications in commercial and
general aviation domains of ATM.
e. To publish the RAID project results including recommendations and issues to be considered
in the following steps of the RPAS development. At the same time the activities conducted by
the project team in the process of the milestones achievement will be reported and major
events in the Air Traffic Transport community of interest for the RPAS integration.
The Communication team will also consider the Stakeholders’ feedback collected during the
envisaged communication events and through other communication activities in order to improve the
communication means’ effectiveness and evaluate the achievements.
As already mentioned all communication materials released or conducted by RAID Communication
team will include key messages that will be rephrased and tailored whenever appropriate. In any case
all the external communication will include the RAID logo and will indicate SESAR JU as a co-financer
of the project.
Two support messages, articulated by the SESAR JU, will be used as follows:
• SESAR Demonstration Activities prove that first SESAR solutions are operational, ready for
industrialisation and deployment;
• SESAR generates benefits in complex, real-life environments;
Furthermore, a background message will be provided in order to explain what the SESAR
Demonstration Activities are intended to achieve, as follows:
• SESAR in-flights demonstrations show on a larger scale the benefits of the programme in day-today operations and build confidence in the SESAR solutions amongst the ATM community;
• SESAR Integrated RPAS Demonstration Activities aim to:
o
Demonstrate how to integrate RPAS into non-segregated airspace in a multi-aircraft and
manned flight environment, in order to explore the feasibility of integration with the wider
aviation community by 2016.
o
Focus on concrete results filling the operational and technical gaps identified for
RPAS integration into non-segregated airspace;
o
Capitalise on the SESAR delivery approach by providing synergies, risk and
opportunities, with the overall SESAR programme.
7.2 Target audience
The target audience of the communication will include the wide range of professionals: general public,
industry, scientific community and other ATM related institutions including SESAR partners:
•
International and national Civil Aviation Authorities and ANSPs – ENAC, CAD (Civil Aviation
Directorate of Malta Transportation Ministry), ENAV, MATS and EUROCONTROL.;
•
European and International Institutions and Regulators such as EASA (European Aviation
Safety Agency), ICAO, EU (DG MOVE), ERSG (European RPAS Steering Group) and EDA
(European Defence Agency), ESA (European Space Agency);
•
Military & Civil (Government) Institutions – Aeronautica Militare, Armed Forces of Malta
(AFM), Red Cross and Civil Protection and Defence, Coast Guard;
•
Technology providers – e.g. ALENIA AERMACCHI, SELEX ES, AERMATICA and others;
•
Scientific community – Universities and associations (e.g. AIAA);
•
Quality & Standard organizations – EUROCAE (WG-73 UAV Systems), RTCA, SAE, IEEE;
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•
Industry and professional associations – CANSO (Transforming Global ATM Performance),
AOPA (Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association), UASIT (Associazione italiana dei sistemi di
velivoli senza pilota a bordo), UVS International and Assorpas (Italian Association on Light
RPAS), ANACNA (Associazione Nazionale Assistenti e Controllori Navigazione Aerea) and
IFATCA (International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations), STASA ( Centro
Studi Trasporto Aereo Sicurezza Volo & Ambiente);
•
Public audience – trade press, pilots and general public;
7.3 Communication activities
The communication activities are intended to implement the project communication strategies. These
activities were initiated at the project kick-off meeting by means of the Consortium first press release,
issued on Partners’ websites and digital media (see 7.3.2 Kick-off meeting press release).
The planned communication activities consist of the following tasks:
1) Text writing and publishing by media:
•
Print media-such as articles on newspaper and magazine, issues of brochures.
•
Participation or public speaking in the scheduled events-e.g. exhibitions and workshops.
Digital media such as project website, including newsletters, blogs services accessible
both for desktop and mobile devices (smart-phones and tablets).
2) Organisation of project workshops, with the purpose of both dissemination of project
outcomes and as an opportunity to receive feedback by the participants that may enhance the
final project results.
3) Dissemination of project results.
4) Analysis and evaluation of results obtained through communication activities performed:
•
•
Evaluation reports of media communication channels effectiveness.
• Evaluation reports of dissemination events.
5) Deliver in the Final Report the Communication effectiveness analysis.
6) Contribution on SESAR JU yearly reports, as described on the SESAR JU Communication
guidelines:
•
Not more than 2 pages
•
Be accessible to non-specialist readers (descriptive language, avoid jargon);
•
Be structured as follows:
o Project objectives
o Members
o Description of demonstration(s)
o Results (alternatively expected performance gains)
o A view on implementation
•
Be as concise and straight forward as possible
•
Answer the following questions:
o What was achieved in performance gains?
o Which lessons were learned in terms of translating the trials into every day
procedures?
Any communication material and press will be provided to the SJU at the end of the project by the
dissemination kit, as part of Final Report.
Contribution to the six-monthly critical progress report might also include high resolution images,
pictures of the trials, and graphics whenever possible to be used by the project partners and the
SESAR JU in its outreach activities.
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The result of the communication activities will deliver an information simple to broadcast and costefficiently with the aim of contributing to the creation of a project community interested on RPAS and
their applications.
In the following table is reported a summary view of planned communication activities:
Activity
Event
Date
Project kick-off
October 29, 2014
Responsible
Estimate costs
CIRA + NAIS
€ 500 issues
(Partners
contribution)
€ 1000 effort for
writing
CIRA + NAIS
€ 1000 issues
(Partner
contribution)
€ 500 effort for
editing
NAIS
€ 500 design &
editing
Print & Digital media:
Newspaper and
press agency
articles
(minimum 2 articles
in the following media
including project
team websites)
AIRPRESS
www.airpressonline.it
Air Transport News
www.atn.aero
or
Aviation Week
www.aviationweek.co
m
Issue of Demonstration
Report & In-flight
demonstration(s)
May, 2015
Issue of Final Report
September, 2015
Issue of Demonstration
Report & In-flight
demonstration(s)
May, 2015
FINMECCANICA
press
www.finmeccanica.it
Magazine articles
(minimun 2 articles in
the following
magazine)
VFRMagazine
www.vfrmagazine.it
Volare Magazine
www.edidomus.it
SPACE magazine
www.spacemagazine
.it
Issue of Final Report
September, 2015
Brochures / Flyers /
2 Banner (Poster)
1° Progress meeting of
Demonstration phase
March / April,
2014
(RAID Comm. KIT)
(updated on the base of
project milestone)
Project Website
1° Progress meeting of
Demonstration phase
Dedalonews
www.dedalonews.it
Avionews
www.avionews.it
Issue on April,
2014 and
continuous update
(Partners
contribution)
€ 500 printing
€ 1.500 design &
development
NAIS
€ 1.000 effort for
editing and up-
(Partners
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contribution)
Multimedia animation
October, 2014
dating
design and
production
March, 2104
Mailing / Newsletter
and Social Media
(Linkedin)
Any progress meetings
and events participation
June, 2014
NAIS
November, 2014
(Partners
contribution)
design and editing
Partner corporate
communication
budget
May, 2015
September, 2015
November, 2015
Events & Workshops:
Project
promotion by RAID
Comm. Kit
World ATM Congress
March 4-6, 2014
http://worldatmcongress.
org
Madrid
Deep Blue
SESAR Innovation Days
November 24-26,
2014
CIRA / Deep Blue
Partner corporate
communication
budget
RPAS CivOps
June 23-26, 2014
CIRA / NAIS
€ 1.000
http://rpas-civops.org/
Brussel
Project results
dissemination
1° RAID Project
Workshop
April / May, 2015
CIRA
€ 2.000
La Valletta, Malta
MATS
€ 2.000
Project
promotion by RAID
Comm. Kit
AIAA
June 15, 2015
University
Aviation and aeronautics
forum and exposition
Dallas, Texas
(USA)
of
Partner corporate
communication
budget
2° RAID Project
Workshop
September /
October, 2015
Project
promotion by RAID
Comm. Kit
Participation &
promotion
Project results
dissemination
http://www.sesarinnovatio
ndays.eu/
Malta
CIRA
€ 2.000
CIRA
Partner corporate
communication
budget
NIMBUS
Partner corporate
communication
budget
CIRA / Deep Blue
Partner corporate
communication
budget
Capua
Event participation &
Project promotion
Farnborough Air Show
July, 2014
http://www.farnborough.c
om/
Farnborough
Project
promotion by RAID
Comm. Kit
AUVSI's Unmanned
Systems 2014
May 12-1, 2014
Orange County
Orlando, Florida
Project
promotion by RAID
Comm. Kit
SESAR Innovation Days
November, 2015
http://www.sesarinnovatio
ndays.eu/
Table 38: RAID communication activities overview
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7.3.1 Project Logo and Presentation template
A dedicated RAID logo has been designed by the project team (see Figure 10 below) and its
application initiated through the slides presented during the kick-off meeting together with the logo
“Powered by SESAR”.
Figure 10: RAID logo
The project team and specifically the project Communication Manager is at disposal to further revise
the project logo and project presentation template based on the comments and feedback provided by
SESAR JU feedback, if any.
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7.3.2 Kick-off meeting press release
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8 References
[1] EUROCONTROL ATM Lexicon
https://extranet.eurocontrol.int/http://atmlexicon.eurocontrol.int/en/index.php/SESAR
8.1 Reference Documents
The following documents provide input/guidance/further information/other:
[2] European RPAS Steering Group (ERSG), Roadmap for the Integration of Civil Remotely
Piloted Aircraft System into the European Aviation System, June 2013.
[3] ATM-FUSION Consortium, ICONUS Study funded by SESAR JU, 2012.
[4] ATM Master Plan https://www.atmmasterplan.eu
[5] Operational Focus Area, Programme Guidance, Edition 03.00.00, date 4.05.2012
[6] SJU Communication Guidelines
[7] SESAR Safety Reference Material, Ed. 00.02.01, SESAR Consortium, Brussels, 2012.
[8] Safety Management Manual (SMM), ICAO Doc. 9859, 2nd edition, International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), Montreal, 2008.
[9] Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne
Systems and Equipment. SAE ARP 4761, SAE International, Warrendale, 1996.
[10]Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes. CS-25. European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), 2003.
[11] Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes.
Government.
14 CFR Part 25, United States
[12]ICAO Manual on RPAS, Ed. 1.0, April 2012.
[13]MIDCAS Concept of Operations – D2.2.2-1, 15-02-2011.
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-END OF DOCUMENT-
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RAID Demonstration Plan

Transcription

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