SRI LANKA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST

Transcription

SRI LANKA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES
(SIJBS)
Volume III
Sri Lanka International Buddhis Academy
Pallekele, Sri Lanka
2014
1
Sri Lanka International Journal of Buddhist Studies
( SIJBS )
ISBN
Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy
(SIBA) Pallekele, Kundasala , Kandy
Sri Lanka
i
Sri Lanka international Journal of Buddhist Studies
(SIJBS)
Volume 3
Advisory Board
Ven. Dr. Phramaha Somachai Thanavuddho
Ven. Bhikkhu analayo
Hon. Dr. Pradeep NilangaDela
Prof. Y. Karunadasa
Prof. Richard F. Gombrich
Prof. P.B.Meegaskumbura
Prof. Oliver Abeynayake
Prof. George D. Bond
Prof. Jonathan S. Walters
Prof. Asanga Tilakaratne
Prof. Kapila abhayawansa
Prof. Tilak Kariyawasam
Prof. Toshiichi Endo
Prof. Padmasiri de silva
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Sri Lanka International Journal of Buddhist Studies
(SIJBS)
Volume 3
Editorial Board
Chief Editor
Bhikkhuni Dr. W. Suvimalee
Associate Editors
Ven. Mahawela Rathanapala
Ms. Hasanthi Y. Dahanayake
Mr. U.L.B. Kotandeniya
Mr. Thilina Bandara
2014
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Contributors
Analayo, Bhikkhu PhD (Peradeniya)
Associate Professor, Centre for Buddhist Studies,
University of Hamburg, Germany
Ariyaratne, Iromi (PhD Candidate, Peradeniya)
H.O.D., Department of Buddhist Studies,
Author of some books in Sinhala on Buddhism and
research articles for academic journals
Emmer, John
M.A. Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy,
M.A.Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University
MSc. Computer Science, Ball State University, Indiana
B.A. Philosophy, Earlham Collage, Indiana
Fernando, Anoja,PhD (University of Colombo)
MBBS (Ceylon), BA, FRCP (London)
Anoja Fernando is Emeritus Professor at the University of Ruhuna,Sri Lanka, where she
was Professor of Pharmacology and Dean, Faculty of Medicine. She is a past President of
the Sri Lanka Medical Association. Currently she is the Chairperson, Ethics Review Comiv
mittee, Sri Lanka Medical Association, Chairperson, Subcommittee on Professionalism and
Ethics, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, and Member, Working Committee on Biotechnology and Bioethics, National Science Foundation, Sri Lanka. She teaches medical ethics
to undergraduates and postgraduates.
She was Chairperson of the National Bioethics Committee from 2004 to 2008 and Chairperson, National Committee on Ethics in Science and Technology, from 2010 to 2013. Professor Fernando was also President of the Asian Bioethics Association from 2010-2012, and a
member of the Steering Committee of the Forum for Ethical Review Committees in Asia
and the Western Pacific from 2003 to 2009. She is a resource person for research ethics
training workshops conducted by FERCAP and WHO/SEARO, and a member of FERCAPSIDCER survey teams evaluating Ethical Review Committees in the Asia Pacific region.
She is also a resource person for bioethics teaching/training activities organized by
UNESCO in the region. She contributed the Chapter on Sri Lanka to the Handbook of
Global Bioethics, Springer, 2014.
Gaveshika, Rev. Dhamma,
M.A. Buddhist Studies,
B.A. University of Peradeniya
Goonatilake, Susantha PhD
Dr. Susantha Goonatilake was first trained in electrical engineering in Sri Lanka, Germany
and Britain and later in sociology in Sri Lanka and Britain.
He has been interested in exploring the geo-politics of knowledge and his 15 books published by global scholarly publishing houses include: Toward a Global Science: Mining
Civilizational Knowledge; Merged Evolution: the Long Term Implications of Information
Technology and Biotechnology; Technological Independence: the Asian Experience; Evolution of Information:
Lineages in Genes, Culture and Artefact; Aborted Discovery: Science and Creativity in the
Third World. He has taught or researched in several universities in Europe, USA and Japan.
v
He has also worked at the UN and been a senior consultant for all the UN organs dealing
with knowledge and science and technology issues (such as UNU, UNESCO, UNDP, ILO,
FAO, ESCAP, APDA, etc.
Hoffman, Frank J. PhD
Professor Frank J. Hoffman obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion (1981) in University of
London, King's College; M.A. in Asian Philosophy (1974) in University of Hawaii – Manoa. He is
Professor of Philosophy, West Chester University, and Visiting Scholar (Associate), South Asia
Center, University of Pennsylvania. At SIBA, Dr Hoffman is Professor of Philosophy and Bud-
dhism, Kandy, Sri Lanka (2012 - present).
Professor Hoffman has approximately 100 publications including books, book chapters,
journal articles, encyclopedia articles, and book reviews. He served as Chair of the Greater
Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium and Chair, of the Greater Philadelphia Asian Studies
Consortium.
Mrozik, Susanne PhD (Harvard)
Susanne Mrozik is Associate Professor of Religion at Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts, USA. She received her Ph.D. in the Study of Religion from Harvard University in
1999 and her M.T.S. in World Religions from Harvard Divinity School in 1990. At Mount
Holyoke College, Prof. Mrozik teaches courses on Buddhist ethics, Buddhist literature, Buddhism in America, Women and Buddhism, as well as introductory survey courses in Buddhism and Religion.
Prof. Mrozik is the recent recipient of grants from Fulbright and American Institute of Sri
Lankan Studies This has enabled her to take a two-year leave of absence from Mount Holyoke College to conduct research on Buddhist nuns in Sri Lanka. Prof. Mrozik has published books and articles on a range of topics including Budhist ethics and Buddhist women
and conducts ethnographic research on Sri Lankan Buddhist nuns. As a specialist in Buddhist ethics and gender, she has also engaged in textual research on Buddhist Sanskrit literature. She is the author of Virtuous Bodies: The Physical Dimensions of Morality in Buddhist
Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2007), co-editor of Women Practicing Buddhism: American Experiences (Wisdom Publications, 2007), and co-editor of Embedded Languages:
Studies in Sri Lankan and Buddhist Cultures: Essays in Honor of W.S. Karunatillake
(Godage International Publishers, 2012).
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Q, Rev. Phap
M.A.Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy
B.A. Vietnam Buddhist University
Singh, Anand PhD
Associate Professor,
Buddhist Studies & Civilization, Gautam Buddha University,
Greater Noida, Gautam Buddha Nagar, UP, India, 201308
Sramon, Rev. Upali
M.A. Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy
B.A. Hons. University of Peradeniya
Wickramasinghe, Chandima, PhD
Chandima S.M. Wickramasinghe earned a BA. in Western Classical Culture from the University of Peradeniya. Having successfully completed the research on a comparative perspective on ancient slavery she received her Ph.D. in Classics from the University of Nottingham in UK in 2004. She was a Fulbright Research Fellow of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA from November 2009 to May 2010.. She has been teaching multiple
modules ranging from Greek and Roman literature, philosophy, religion, social history, art
history and political history to Greek language both at undergraduate and postgraduate level
at Peradeniya since 2004. Her work focuses on ancient slavery, social history in ancient
Greece, comparative studies on various aspects of Aristotle‘s Ethics and Buddhist teachings,
Euripidean dramas and on Ancient Greek Vase paintings.
Currently she is serving as a senior Lecturer in Greek and Roman Studies in the Dept. of
Classical Languages, University of Peradeniya.
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She has a number of research articles to her credit in Academic Journals in Sri Lanka and
abroad. She has also received the State Literary Award for the best drama translation into
Sinhala (of a book in Greek) in 2010
Yuan, Cong
M.A.Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy
B.A. Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Wanguangqian,People‘s
Republic of China
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Contents
On the Bhikkhunã Ordination Controversy
Ven. Bhikkhu Anālayo
An Asian Viewpoint on the Ethics of Modern Medicine
Anoja Fernando
The Concept of Nonviolence in Buddhism and its Application to
Conflict Resolution in society
Frank J. Hoffman
Love and Social Justice
Susanne Mrozik
Issues in Buddhist Ecological Studies: Some Gleanings
Anand Singh
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The key to a Successful Life: A Comparative Study on Morality
in Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and that in Buddhist Discourses
Chandima S.M.Wickramasinghe
Buddhist Explorations of the New Globalised World
Susantha Goonatilake
The Buddhist Standpoint with regard to the Partaking
of Garlic by the Ubhatosaïgha
Iromi Ariyaratne
No Esoteric Buddhism – The Scope of the Early Buddhist
Teachings for Lay People
John Emmer
Relationship Between Buddhism and Beliefs in Gods
Ven. Dhamma Gavesishika
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Why are the Samacitta-devas Called “ Same-minded Deities”?
Ven. Upali Sraman
The Seven Methods of Eliminating the Taints
Ven. Phap Q
A Brief History of Chinese Lay Buddhism:
From 1st Century B.C. to 13th Century A.D.
Cong Yuan
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Bhikkhu Anàlayo
INTRODUCTION
In the Theravàda tradition the lineage of bhikkhunãs died out some thousand years ago. Present day attempts to revive this lineage meet with opposition. In what follows I examine arguments raised by opponents to the revival of bhikkhunã ordination. I begin with the legal
aspect, followed by taking up the question whether a revival of an order of bhikkhunãs is desirable.
Before getting into the actual topic, I need to briefly comment on the methodological background for my discussion, in particular on different ways how Vinaya can be read. For the
present context two modes of reading Vinaya are of particular importance. One is what I
would call a legal reading, the other is a historical-critical reading. A legal reading attempts
to understand legal implications, a historical-critical reading attempts to reconstruct history
through comparative study. Both ways of reading have their proper place and value, depending on the circumstances and particular aim of one‘s reading the Vinaya.
For someone ordained within the Theravàda tradition, the Pàli Vinaya is the central law
book on which the observation of the monastic rules is based.1 The rules in the way they are
set forth in the Theravàda Vinaya are binding on anyone taking ordination in the Theravàda
tradition, not the rules in other Vinaya traditions. So for legal purposes, the appropriate reading is a legal reading of the descriptions given and the rules pronounced in the Theravàda
Vinaya, together with their understanding by later Theravàda tradition. Other Vinayas are
not of direct relevance, as they do not have legal implications for a monastic of the Theravàda tradition.
The situation is different, however, when one aims at reconstructing an early, perhaps the
earliest possible account of what happened. This requires a historical-critical mode of reading, where the relevant portion of the Theravàda Vinaya needs to be studied in comparison
with other Vinaya traditions.
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SIJBS Volume 3
In the first part of the present article I will be examining the legal question, consequently my
discussion will be based solely on the description given in the Theravàda Vinaya, irrespective of the historical likelihood or otherwise of this description. In the second part of the article I will attempt a historical reconstruction of the Buddha‘s attitude towards an order of
bhikkhunãs, hence at that point I will also consult Vinayas of other traditions.2
THE LEGAL QUESTION: THE RULES
The main argument raised against bhikkhunã ordination is based on the widely held assumption that, once a Theravàda bhikkhunã order has become extinct, it cannot be revived. This
assessment is based on the two main rules that, according to the Cullavagga (Cv) of the Pàli
Vinaya, were given by the Buddha to bhikkhus on the matter of the higher ordination of female candidates. The two rules are as follows:
Cv X.2: "Bhikkhus, I authorize the giving of the higher ordination of bhikkhunãs by bhikkhus."3
Cv X.17: "Bhikkhus, I authorize the higher ordination in the community of bhikkhus for one
who has been higher ordained on one side and has cleared herself in the community of bhikkhunãs."4
According to the earlier rule given to bhikkhus on the issue of ordaining bhikkhunãs (Cv
X.2), bhikkhus alone can give the higher ordination. Without this rule being explicitly rescinded, the subsequent rule (Cv X.17) then stipulates that the higher ordination of female
candidates requires the cooperation of a community of already existing bhikkhunãs. These
first perform their part in giving the candidate the higher ordination, followed by a completion of the ordination ceremony in the presence of a community of bhikkhus.
The reasons why these rules are held to prevent a revival of an extinct order of bhikkhunãs
can be gathered from the writings of two eminent contemporary Theravàda bhikkhus, Phra
Payutto and Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro. Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro (2001/2013: 449f) critically takes up
the suggestion that
"because the original allowance for bhikkhus to ordain bhikkhunãs was never explicitly rescinded, it is still in place and so bhikkhus may ordain bhikkhunãs."
2
Bhikkhu Anālayo
He explains that
"this argument ignores the fact that the Buddha followed two different patterns in
changing Community transactions, depending on the type of changes made. Only
when totally withdrawing permission for something he had earlier allowed ... did he
follow the pattern of explicitly rescinding the earlier allowance."
"When keeping an earlier allowance while placing new restrictions on it, he followed
a second pattern, in which he merely stated the new restrictions for the allowance
and gave directions for how the new form of the relevant transaction should be conducted in line with the added restrictions."
"Because Cv.X.17.2, the passage allowing bhikkhus to give full Acceptance to a candidate who has been given Acceptance by the Bhikkhunã Saïgha, simply adds a new
restriction to the earlier allowance given in Cv.X.2.1, it follows this second pattern.
This automatically rescinds the earlier allowance."
He concludes that
"in the event that the original Bhikkhunã Saïgha died out, Cv.X.17.2 prevents bhikkhus from granting Acceptance to women".
So according to Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro, with the disappearance of an order of bhikkhunãs it
becomes impossible for bhikkhus to give the higher ordination to female candidates. The
reason is that the first rule (Cv X.2) that allows them to do so has been implicitly rescinded
by the promulgation of the second rule (Cv X.17). His argument is in line with a basic principle in law in general and in the Vinaya in particular, where the latest rule on a particular
matter is the one that is valid and which has to be followed.
In a similar vein, Phra Payutto (2013: 58f) explains that
"when the Buddha prescribes a specific rule and then later makes revisions to it ...
the most recent version of the rule is binding. It is not necessary to say that previous
versions have been annulled. This is a general standard in the Vinaya." He adds that
"the reason why the Buddha didn‘t rescind the allowance for bhikkhus to ordain
bhikkhunis is straightforward: the bhikkhus were still required to complete the bhikkhuni ordinations."
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Phra Payutto (2013: 71) adds that
"if one were to assume that the original allowance for bhikkhus to ordain bhikkhunis
by themselves has been valid all along ... then later on in the Buddha‘s lifetime there
would have also been ordinations conducted solely by the bhikkhus...but this didn‘t
happen. Why? Because once the Buddha laid down the second regulation the bhikkhus practiced accordingly and abandoned the first allowance."
In short, Phra Payutto and Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro conclude that the earlier ruling has been automatically rescinded by the later ruling. The interpretation proposed by Phra Payutto and
Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro clearly follows an inner coherence and logic. It is in line with a basic
Vinaya principle according to which the latest rule on a specific issue is the valid one. This
inner coherence explains why the conclusion arrived at by these two eminent bhikkhus has
for a long time been taken as the final word on the issue.
THE LEGAL QUESTION: THE NARRATIVE CONTEXT
Note that the discussion so far has considered the two rules apart from their narrative context. Vinaya law is in principle case law. The various rules which according to the Vinaya
have been promulgated by the Buddha come in response to a particular situation (the only
exception being the garudhammas). As with any case law, a study of the significance of a
particular ruling requires an examination of its narrative context. This narrative context, independent of its historical accuracy, determines the legal applicability of the respective rule.
In order to take into account this requirement, in what follows I sketch the Vinaya narrative
at the background of these two rules. In this sketch I follow a legal reading of the text, in the
sense that I am not attempting to reconstruct or make a pronouncement on what actually
happened. Instead my intention is only to summarize what the Pàli Vinaya presents as the
narrative background to the promulgation of these two rules, Cv X.2 and Cv X.17.
The promulgation of Cv X.2 is preceded by an account of how Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã became the first bhikkhunã. This took place by her accepting the eight garudhammas,
"principles to be respected". The sixth of these garudhammas deals with the ordination of
bhikkhunãs. It reads as follows:
4
Bhikkhu Anālayo
"A probationer (sikkhamànà) who has trained for two years in six principles should
seek for the higher ordination from both communities."
5
Having become a bhikkhunã through the acceptance of the eight garudhammas, Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã then approached the Buddha with the following question: "Venerable sir, how
should I proceed in relation to those Sàkyan women?"6 She was asking about the proper
course to be taken in relation to her following of 500 Sàkyan women, who had come together with her in quest of higher ordination. In reply to this question, the Buddha promulgated
Cv X.2, according to which bhikkhus on their own should give the higher ordination to female candidates.
Considering the background to the first rule clarifies that, according to the Vinaya narrative,
the Buddha wanted from the outset bhikkhunã ordination to be done by both communities.
This is clearly evident from his pronouncement of the sixth garudhamma.
Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã had accepted to undertake this and the other garudhammas and thereby became a bhikkhunã. Since she was only a single bhikkhunã, she was unable to follow the
sixth garudhamma. There were no other bhikkhunãs to form the minimum quorum required
for higher ordination. Because it was impossible for her at this juncture of events to act according to the sixth garudhamma, she approached the Buddha and inquired about the proper
line of conduct to be adopted regarding her female followers. In reply, the Buddha authorized that bhikkhus should give them ordination on their own.
So the first of the two rules under discussion, Cv X.2, has a very clear purpose. It addresses
a situation where an ordination by a community of bhikkhus in cooperation with a community of bhikkhunãs is the proper way to proceed, as indicated in garudhamma 6. However, this
is not possible if a community of bhikkhunãs is not in existence. In such a situation the Buddha authorized that the bhikkhus should give the higher ordination on their own. He laid
down this rule after having promulgated the sixth garudhamma and thereby after having
clearly expressed his preference for bhikkhunã ordination to be conducted by both communities.
The ruling Cv X.2 comes in the Vinaya directly after the report of Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã becoming a bhikkhunã. Following Cv X.2, the Vinaya continues with a series of other events
related in some way or another to an already existing bhikkhunã order. For example, the
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Buddha explains to Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã that for her and the new bhikkhunãs the rules they
have in common with the bhikkhus are as binding as the rules promulgated specifically for
them (Cv X.4).7 Then the Vinaya reports that the bhikkhus were actively engaged in various
legal performances on behalf of the bhikkhunãs (Cv X.6), such as recitation of the code of
rules (pàñimokkha), the confession of offences (àpatti), and the carrying out of formal acts
(kamma). Later on, the Buddha is on record for explicitly stopping the bhikkhus from doing
these legal activities on behalf of the bhikkhunãs.
8
According to the Vinaya narrative, the rule Cv X.17 was occasioned by the fact that some
female candidates were too shy to reply to questions by the bhikkhus regarding their suitability for higher ordination. As part of the standard procedure for the higher ordination for
males as well as females, the ordaining monastics need to ascertain that the candidate has no
sexual abnormality. In a traditional setting women can easily feel embarrassed if they have
to reply to such questions in front of bhikkhus.
To deal with this problem, the second of the two rules mentioned above came into existence.
According to the rule Cv X.17, the questioning of female candidates was now delegated to
the bhikkhunãs. A community of bhikkhunãs should first give higher ordination. Once this
has been accomplished, the bhikkhus perform their part. This second rule is given in a situation where a community of bhikkhunãs is in existence. Its purpose is to enable the carrying
out of the higher ordination for a female candidate without creating unnecessary embarrassment for them.
The wording of Cv X.17 does not support the assumption by Phra Payutto that Cv X.2 could
not be rescinded because "the bhikkhus were still required to complete the bhikkhuni ordinations". Cv X.17 clearly indicates that a female candidate should receive "the higher ordination in the community of bhikkhus". This is sufficient in itself and does not require the
maintenance of any other rule in order to function. Even if there had never been any ruling
of the type given at Cv X.2, the functionality of Cv X.17 would not be in any way impaired.
It would still be clear that bhikkhus are to give the higher ordination to female candidates,
once these have been ordained by the bhikkhunãs. In fact already with the sixth garudhamma
the Buddha had made it clear that he wanted bhikkhus to perform their part in the ordination
of bhikkhunãs. Once this was made clear, there was no need to make a rule just to clarify
that.
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Bhikkhu Anālayo
The function of Cv X.2 is more specifically to enable the giving of the higher ordination to
female candidates in a situation where no bhikkhunã order is in existence. This is unmistakably clear from the narrative context. In contrast, the function of Cv X.17 is to regulate the
giving of the higher ordination to female candidates when a bhikkhunã order is in existence.
This is also unmistakably clear from the narrative context. So there is a decisive difference
between the two rules that needs to be taken into consideration: The two rules are meant to
address two substantially different situations.
Contrary to the assumptions by Phra Payutto and Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro, what we have here is
not just an early rule and its subsequent adaptation. Instead we have two rules on related but
different issues. This explains why, after an order of bhikkhunãs had come into existence
during the lifetime of the Buddha, there were no ordinations by bhikkhunãs conducted solely
by bhikkhus. There can be only one situation at a time: Either a community of bhikkhunãs is
in existence, in which case Cv X.17 is to be followed, or else a community of bhikkhunãs is
not in existence, in which case Cv X.2 is to be followed.
Since the belief in the impossibility of reviving an order of bhikkhunãs has such a long history in Theravàda circles, perhaps an example may help to clarify the point at issue. Suppose a
person regularly commutes from home to work via a highway that connects two towns, and
this person hears that the municipal authorities have set a speed limit of 100 km/h for this
highway. Later on, the municipal authorities set another speed limit of 50 km/h.
Even though the earlier limit of 100 km/h has not been explicitly abolished, when caught by
the police for driving at 80 km/h this person will not be able to argue that he or she had on
that day decided to follow the earlier speed limit regulation. It is not possible to assume that
both limits are valid simultaneously and one can freely choose which one to follow. The last
speed limit is the one that counts.
The situation changes considerably, however, once closer investigation reveals that the second speed limit set by the municipal authorities was not put up by the highway, but in
town. It refers to traffic in the town in which this person works, it does not refer to the highway that leads up to this town. In that case, both speed limits are valid at the same time.
While driving on the highway, the speed limit is still 100 km/h, but when leaving the highway and driving into town to reach the working place, the speed limit of 50 km/h needs to
be observed.
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In the same way, Cv X.2 and Cv X.17 are both valid. The second of the two, Cv X.17, does
not imply a rescinding of the first, just as the town speed limit does not imply a rescinding
of the speed limit for the highway. Both rules are simultaneously valid, as they refer to two
distinctly different situations.
In sum, the traditional belief that the Theravàda Vinaya does not enable a reviving of an extinct bhikkhunã order seems to be based on a reading of the relevant rules without sufficient
consideration of their narrative background. If studied in their narrative context, it becomes
clear that an extinct order of bhikkhunãs can be revived by the bhikkhus, as long as these are
not extinct as well.
As already stated by the Jetavan Sayàdaw in 1949:
―the Exalted One‘s statement ―Bhikkhus, I allow bhikkhus to ordain bhikkhunãs‘
concerned...a period in the past when the Bhikkhunã Sangha did not exist; in the future, too, it will be restricted to a period when the Bhikkhunã Sangha will not exist;
and at present it is restricted to a period when the Bhikkhunã Sangha does not exist."
He further explains that the Buddha knew "that when the Bhikkhunã Sangha is nonexistent the occasion arises for an allowance [given to] the Bhikkhu Sangha [to be
used], the Buddha laid down ... that woman can be ordained by the Bhikkhu Sangha,
that is: Bhikkhus, I allow Bhikkhus to ordain bhikkhunãs."9
The interpretation proposed by the Jetavan Sayàdaw is clearly a more accurate reflection of
the Pàli Vinaya than the interpretations proposed by Phra Payutto and Bhikkhu Ṭhànissaro.
The conclusion that emerges, after giving sufficient consideration to the narrative context of
the two rules in question, is that it is definitely possible to revive an extinct order of bhikkhunãs through ordination given by bhikkhus alone.
THE ORDER OF BHIKKHUNäS: THE DESIRABILITY OF ITS REVIVAL
Phra Payutto (2014: 71) also wonders whether it is at all desirable for females to become
bhikkhunãs. He comments that
"ordaining as a bhikkhuni may create even more obstacles for women. This is because once they have taken bhikkhuni ordination they will be obliged to keep the
311 training precepts. Go ahead and try to keep these rules in the present high-tech
age. Would this simply increase problems?" "In today‘s social environment and gen8
Bhikkhu Anālayo
eral way of life, keeping the 311 training rules will be a stumbling block for women
who are ordained."
While it is of course true that keeping precepts that evolved in a different setting two and a
half millennia ago is a challenge, the same applies also to bhikkhus. One might similarly
wonder if it is not going to increase the problems for males if they take higher ordination.
Another point worth noting is that often arguments raised against the revival of the bhikkhunã order seem to assume that this implies a rejection of the eight or ten precept nuns that
have developed in Theravàda countries. These are the mae chis in Thailand, the thila shins
in Burma and the dasasil màtàs in Sri Lanka, to which the sãladhàràs in the West could be
added. The wish to revive a bhikkhunã order does not require a replacing of these orders in
the respective countries. There is no reason why both cannot exist side by side. The question
is thus not one of abolishing or dismissing what is already there, but rather one of enabling
women to choose between the alternatives of becoming an eight or ten precept nun and taking ordination as a bhikkhunã.
Nowadays in Theravàda countries some men also prefer not to become bhikkhus, and instead live a celibate lay life, at times by becoming anagàrikas. Such celibate males exist
alongside with bhikkhus, in fact often they live in close relationship with bhikkhus at a monastery. In the same way, the option of being an eight or ten precept nuns will probably be of
continuing appeal to some women in Theravàda countries. This does not imply, however,
that the alternative option of becoming a bhikkhunã should not also be made available to
those who feel ready for it.
Improving the situation of the eight or ten precept nuns is a very important and praiseworthy
task that should be given full attention, but this does not suffice to fulfil the wish of those
who want to have access to full ordination. Alongside such endeavours, there clearly remains a need to restore full ordination for bhikkhunãs. If some eight and ten precept nuns in
Theravàda countries do not want to become bhikkhunãs, then this does not dispense with the
need of reviving such an order in principle for others who do want higher ordination.
Recent developments in Sri Lanka have in fact shown that numbers of dasasil màtàs, who
earlier were not interested in bhikkhunã ordination, changed their mind once this became
available and took higher ordination.
10
Moreover, the new bhikkhunãs in Sri Lanka are well
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respected by laity and make a major contribution by meeting the needs of lay followers.
11
This leaves little room for arguing that a revival of the bhikkhunã order is not needed or will
not be beneficial for society at large.
THE ORDER OF BHIKKHUNäS: THE BUDDHA‘S ATTITUDE
The notion that such a revival is better avoided often seems related to the impression conveyed by the account of the founding of the bhikkhunã order in the Vinaya. According to the
narration that comes before the garudhammas, the Buddha originally refused to let Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and her followers go forth.
In order to understand the implications of this passage, a shift from the legal reading adopted earlier to a historical-critical reading is required. With what follows the task is not to ascertain the legal implications of a particular regulation in the Theravàda Vinaya, but much
rather to attempt to reconstruct a historical event, in order to appreciate what the canonical
texts have to say about the attitude of the Buddha towards an order of bhikkhunãs.
For a historical-critical reading that aims at reconstructing an early account of what happened, the relevant portion from the Theravàda Vinaya needs to be studied in comparison
with other Vinaya traditions, because during the long period of oral transmission a portion
of text can be lost.
The possibility of a portion of text being lost can be illustrated with the case of the Chabbisodhana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikàya, the "Discourse on Sixfold Purity". In spite of the explicit reference to six in its title, the discourse expounds only five types of purity of an arahant. The commentary reports several explanations for this inconsistency, one of them being
that, according to the reciters from India, an arahant‘s detachment in regard to the four nutriments (edible food, contact, volition, and consciousness) should be added to the five purities
mentioned in the discourse.
12
That this is indeed the solution can be seen through compara-
tive study of a parallel preserved in the Madhyama-àgama, a discourse collection brought
from India to China so as to be translated into Chinese. Besides the five purities mentioned
in the Chabbisodhana-sutta, this parallel lists the four nutriments as a sixth purity.
13
From this it follows that at some point during oral transmission from India to Sri Lanka this
sixth purity was lost. Indian reciters still knew of a complete version of the discourse that
10
Bhikkhu Anālayo
had this sixth purity, but by the time the discourse had reached Sri Lanka, this part of the
text had gone missing. The case of the Chabbisodhana-sutta shows that substantial portions
of a Pàli canonical text could get lost during oral transmission.
The difficulties of relying on oral transmission are explicitly taken up in the Pàli discourses
themselves. The Sandaka-sutta points out that oral tradition might be well heard or else
might not be well heard, as a result of which some of it is true, but some of it is otherwise. 14
The Caïkã-sutta also takes up the unreliability of oral tradition, recommending that someone
who wishes to preserve truth should not take a stance on oral transmission claiming that this
alone is true, everything else is false.
15
So a historical-critical reading that considers the parallel versions of a particular text offers a
way of giving proper consideration to the nature of oral transmission and its possible errors
in accordance with the indications made in the Sandaka-sutta and the Caïkã-sutta. Doing
justice to the indications in these Pàli discourses requires allowing, in principle, the possibility that at times a portion of text preserved in the Pàli canon could be incomplete due to textual loss.
Based on allowing in principle this possibility, revisiting the account of the founding of the
order of bhikkhunãs in the Pàli Vinaya brings to light a turn of events that is not entirely
straightforward. After the Buddha had refused Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã‘s request to go forth,
she and her followers shaved off their hair and put on robes.
According to the Pàli commentarial tradition, Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã had earlier become a
16
stream-enterer.
It seems inconceivable that a stream-enterer would openly defy the Bud-
dha‘s command in this way.
17
Moreover, when Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã with shaven head and
wearing robes approaches ânanda, the latter comments on her exhausted bodily condition
after having travelled, but makes no remark at all about her being shaven-headed and wearing robes.
18
The solution to this conundrum can be found by consulting accounts of the same event in
other Vinayas, adopting what I have called a historical-critical reading, in order to allow for
loss of text during oral transmission. Relevant to the present issue are versions of this story
preserved in the canonical texts of three schools, the Mahã÷àsaka, the Målasarvàstivàda, and
the Sarvàstivàda. All these are texts from India, which have been brought to China for trans11
SIJBS Volume 3
lation. Besides the Chinese translation, in the case of the Målasarvàstivàda Vinaya we also
have the relevant passage preserved in a Sanskrit fragment as well as in Tibetan translation.
These texts report that when Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã approached the Buddha with her request,
he indeed did not allow her to go forth, but he then offered her an alternative. This alternative was that she could shave her hair and wear robes.
19
But she should apparently do so
staying in the protected environment at her home instead of going forth to wander around
India as a homeless person.
The perspective afforded by a historical-critical reading based on a comparative study
changes the situation considerably. Instead of the Buddha just being against an order of
bhikkhunãs in principle, he offers an alternative. This alternative seems to express his concern that, at a time when the Buddhist order was still in its beginnings, lack of proper dwelling places and the other harsh living conditions of a homeless life might be too much for
queen Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and her following.
The Theravàda Vinaya in fact records that bhikkhunãs were raped, making it clear that in ancient India for women to go forth could be dangerous.20 The situation then was clearly quite
different from modern South and Southeast Asia, where women who have gone forth can
expect to be respected in their choice of living a celibate life.
For Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and her following to go forth in such a situation would indeed be
comparable to a household with many women and few men, which can easily be attacked by
robbers (Cv X.1).21 The possibility of being raped would indeed be similar to ripe crop of
rice or sugar cane that is suddenly attacked by a disease.
Returning to the Vinaya narration, on the assumption that Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and her followers had received an explicit permission to shave their hair and wear robes, the rest of the
story flows on naturally. It now becomes understandable why they would indeed do so and
why ânanda on seeing Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã shaven-headed and in robes would not find
this worth commenting on.
Laity at times followed the Buddha for quite some distance on his journeys.22 In view of
such a custom, it seems natural for Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and her group similarly to follow
the Buddha in an attempt to show that they were able to brave the living conditions of going
forth. Such an action would not have been something the Buddha had forbidden. Having in
12
Bhikkhu Anālayo
this way proven their ability to handle the condition of going forth would also explain why
the Buddha eventually allowed them to become bhikkhunãs.
In order to validate this alternative understanding of how the bhikkhunã order came into existence, the canonical principle of the four mahàpadesas needs to be followed.23 According
to the principle enshrined in these four mahàpadesas, any particular statement claiming to
go back to the Buddha needs to be compared with the discourses and the Vinaya in order to
ascertain if it conforms with them. In the present case, this requires examining what other
canonical passages have to say about the Buddha‘s attitude towards an order of bhikkhunãs.
Do other canonical passages support what the historical-critical reading has brought to light,
namely that the existence of an order of bhikkhunãs is not something undesirable that the
Buddha would rather have avoided?
The Lakkhaõa-sutta of the Dãgha-nikàya describes the Buddha‘s possession of thirty-two
superior bodily marks. Each of these has a special relationship to his virtues and former
deeds. Here the wheel-marks on the soles of the Buddha‘s feet are portents of his destiny to
be surrounded by a large retinue of four assemblies of disciples. These four assemblies are
bhikkhus and bhikkhunãs, as well as male and female lay followers.24 According to this discourse, the Buddha was from his birth destined to have an order of bhikkhunãs. This makes
the existence of bhikkhunãs an integral and indispensable part of the sàsana, the Buddha‘s
dispensation.
The Pàsàdika-sutta in the same Dãgha-nikàya proclaims that the completeness of the holy
life taught by the Buddha was evident in the accomplishment of his four assemblies of disciples, including an order of bhikkhunãs.25 The same emerges from the Mahàvacchagotta-sutta
in the Majjhima-nikàya according to which the completeness of the Buddha‘s teaching can
be seen in the high numbers of bhikkhus and bhikkhunãs who had become fully liberated,
and in the fact that similarly high numbers of lay followers of both genders had reached other levels of awakening.26 Clearly, without accomplished bhikkhunãs the Buddha‘s dispensation would not have been complete.
According to the Mahàparinibbàna-sutta in the Dãgha-nikàya, the Buddha had declared that
he would not pass away until he had achieved his mission of having competent disciples
from each of the four assemblies, including bhikkhunãs.27 The importance of this statement
13
SIJBS Volume 3
is reflected in the fact that it recurs again in the Pàli canon in the Saüyutta-nikàya, the
Aïguttara-nikàya, and the Udàna.28
In this way, from his birth until his passing away, it was an integral part of the Buddha‘s
mission to have an order of bhikkhunãs. On following the mahàpadesa principle, the results
of the above historical-critical reading finds confirmation. An order of bhikkhunãs is a desirable, in fact an indispensable part of the dispensation of the Buddha.
THE ORDER OF BHIKKHUNäS: THE DURATION OF THE TEACHING
The passages surveyed so far help to set into context the prophecy that because an order of
bhikkhunãs had come into existence during the lifetime of the Buddha, the duration of the
teachings will be shortened to 500 years.
29
Now this prophecy is surprising, since one would
not expect the Buddha to do something which he knew in advance would have such an effect. In fact, the prophecy in the way it is recorded in the Vinaya has not come true, as after
2,500 years the teaching is still in existence. Even the bhikkhunã order was still in existence
in India in the 8th century and thus more than a 1,000 years after the time of the Buddha.
It also needs to be noted that the basic condition described in this prophecy has been fulfilled when an order of bhikkhunãs came into existence during the Buddha's lifetime. The
prophecy has no relation to whether an order of bhikkhunãs continues or is revived nowadays.
It seems, then, that here we have another presentation that is not entirely straightforward. On
following the same principle of the four mahàpadesas, we now need to examine what other
passages have to say about possible causes for a decline of the teaching. A discourse in the
Aïguttara-nikàya describes how each of the four assemblies can contribute to the thriving of
the Buddha‘s teachings. Here a bhikkhunã can stand out for illuminating the Buddhist community through her learnedness.30 Another discourse in the same collection indicates that a
bhikkhunã also illuminates the community through her virtue.31 These two discourses reflect
a clear appreciation of the contribution that learned and virtuous bhikkhunãs can make to the
Buddhist community, instead of seeing them as something detrimental.
Other discourses more specifically address what prevents the decline of the teaching. According to a discourse in the Saüyutta-nikàya, such a decline can be prevented when the
14
Bhikkhu Anālayo
members of the four assemblies, including bhikkhunãs, dwell with respect for the teacher,
the Dhamma, the Saïgha, the training, and concentration.32 Here the bhikkhunãs actually
contribute to preventing decline, rather than being themselves its cause.
Similar presentations can be found in three discourses in the Aïguttara-nikàya. In agreement with the Saüyutta-nikàya discourse just mentioned, these three discourses present respectful behaviour by the members of the four assemblies, including bhikkhunãs, as what
prevents decline. Besides respect for the teacher, the Dhamma, the Saïgha, and the training,
these three discourses also mention respect of the four assemblies for each other, heedfulness, and being helpful (to one another).33
These passages clearly put the responsibility for preventing a decline of the teaching on each
of the four assemblies. It is their dwelling with respect towards essential aspects of the Buddha‘s teaching and each other that prevents decline.
According to Phra Payutto (2013: 49),
"the Buddha laid down the eight garudhammas as a protective embankment. With
such protection the teachings will last for a long time, just like before."
Now for this protective embankment of the eight garudhammas, to function, the collaboration of the bhikkhus is required. Most of the eight garudhammas involve interactions between bhikkhus and bhikkhunãs in such matters as spending the rainy season retreat (2), announcement of the observance day and the exhortation, ovàda (3), invitation, pavàraõà (4),
penance, mànatta (5), and the granting of higher ordination, upasampadà (6).34 These clearly require the cooperation of bhikkhus. Partaking in the higher ordination of bhikkhunãs, provided this accords with the legal requirements of the Theravàda Vinaya, thereby supports
what according to Phra Payutto is the protective embankment constructed by the Buddha for
protecting the long life of his dispensation.
In sum, following the principle of the four mahàpadesas it seems clear that an order of bhikkhunãs is desirable and an important asset in order to prevent the decline of the Buddha‘s
teaching. In fact Buddhist countries that do not have such an order are in this respect in the
category of border countries. It is an unfortunate condition to be reborn in such a border
country, since the four assemblies, including an order of bhikkhunãs, are not found there.35
Such a condition makes it more difficult to practice the Dharma.
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SIJBS Volume 3
A Buddhist tradition that has only three of the four assemblies could be compared to a noble
elephant with one leg crippled. The elephant can still walk, but only with difficulties. The
medicine to restore the crippled leg is now available, all it needs is a concerted effort to support the healing process.
16
Bhikkhu Anālayo
ABBREVIATIONS
AN
Aïguttara-nikàya
Be
Burmese edition
Ce
Ceylonese edition
Cv
Cullavagga
D
Derge edition
Dhp-a Dhammapada-aññhakathà
DN
Dãgha-nikàya
Mâ
Madhyama-àgama
MN
Majjhima-nikàya
Mv
Mahàvagga
Ps
Papa¤casådanã
Q
Peking edition
Se
Siamese edition
SN
Saüyutta-nikàya
Sv
Suttavibhaïga
Ud
Udàna
Vin
Vinayapiñaka
REFERENCES
Anàlayo 2010: "Women‘s Renunciation in Early Buddhism - The Four Assemblies and the
Foundation of the Order of Nuns", in Dignity & Discipline, Reviving Full Ordination
for Buddhist Nuns, T. Mohr and J. Tsedroen (ed.), 65-97, Boston: Wisdom, 2010.
Anàlayo 2011a: A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikàya, Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing Corporation.
Anàlayo 2011b: "Mahàpajàpatã's Going Forth in the Madhyama-àgama", Journal of Budhist
Ethics, 18: 268-317. http://www.buddhis muskunde.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/pdf/
analayo/Mahapajapati.pdf
Anàlayo 2013a: The Legality of Bhikkhunã Ordination, Malaysia: Selangor Buddhist Vipassanà Meditation Society (reprinted 2014, New York: Buddhist Association of the
17
SIJBS Volume 3
United
States).
http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hambur.de/fileadmin/pdf/
analayo/Legality withTranslations.pdf
Anàlayo 2013b: "A Note on the Term Theravàda", Buddhist Studies Review, 30.2: 216-235.
Blackstone, Kate 1999: "Damming the Dhamma: Problems with Bhikkhunãs in the Pali Vinaya", Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 6: 292-312.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu 2009: The Revival of Bhikkhunã Ordination in the Theravàda Tradition,
Georgetown, Penang: Inward Path Publisher (reprinted 2010 in Dignity & Discipline, Reviving Full Ordination for Buddhist Nuns, T. Mohr and J. Tsedroen (ed.),
99-142. Boston: Wisdom).
Clarke, Shayne 2014: Family Matters in Indian Buddhist Monasticism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Mrozik, Susanne 2014: "We Love Our Nuns: Affective Dimensions of the Sri Lankan
Bhikkhunã Revival", Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 21: 57-95.
Payutto, Phra and M. Seeger 2013: The Buddhist Discipline in Relation to Bhikkhunis,
Questions and Answers, R. Moore (translated), http://www.buddhistteachings.org/thebuddhistdiscipline-in-relation-to-bhikkhunis
Payutto, Phra and M. Seeger 2014: The Buddhist Discipline in Relation to Bhikkhunis,
Questions and Answers, R. Moore (translated), http://www.buddhistteachings.org/
downloads-part-ii
Perera, L.P.N. 1993: Sexuality in Ancient India, A Study Based on the Pàli Vinayapiñaka,
Sri Lanka: University of Kelaniya, Post-graduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies.
Salgado, Nirmala S. 2013: Buddhist Nuns and Gendered Practice, In Search of the Female
Renunciant, New York: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, Michael 1993: "Bhikùuõã-Karmavàcanà, Die Handschrift Sansk. c.25(R) der Bodleian Library Oxford", in Studien zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde, Festgabe des
Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde für Professor Dr. Heinz Bechert zum
18
Bhikkhu Anālayo
60. Geburtstag am 26. Juni 1992, M. Hahn (ed.), 239-288, Bonn: Indica et Tibetica
Verlag.
Ṭhànissaro Bhikkhu 2001/2013: The Buddhist Monastic Code II, The Khandaka Rules
Translated & Explained by Ṭhànissaro Bhikkhu (Geoffrey DeGraff), Revised Edition, California: Metta Forest Monastery.
END NOTES
* Acknowledgement: I am indebted to Adam Clarke, Petra Kieffer-Pülz, and Ven. Dhammadinnà for comments on a draft of this paper.
1
On the centrality of the Pàli canon for a Theravàda sense of identity cf. Anàlayo 2013b.
2
My presentation is based in part on points already raised in Anàlayo 2010, 2011b and 2013a.
3
Vin II 257,7: anujànàmi, bhikkhave, bhikkhåhi bhikkhuniyo upasampàdetun ti. In Vinaya contexts the term
anujànàmi has a stronger nuance than simply "to allow", standing for a legal prescription or order; cf. Clarke
2014: 126.
4
e
Vin II 271,34: anujànàmi, bhikkhave, ekato-upasampannàya bhikkhunãsaïghe (B : bhikkhunisaïghe)
e
visuddhàya bhikkhusaïghe upasampadan ti (S : upasampàdetun ti).
5
Vin II 255,19: dve vassàni chasu dhammesu sikkhitasikkhàya sikkhamànàya ubhato-saïghe upasampadà pari-
yesitabbà.
e
e
e
6
Vin II 256,37: kathàhaü, bhante, imàsu sàkiyanãsu (B , C , and S : sàkiyànãsu) pañipajjàmã ti?
7
Vin II 258,17. This passage is addressed to Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã, who became a bhikkhunã by accepting the
garudhammas, and implicitly also addressed to her followers, who were ordained by bhikkhus only. This
would settle a problem raised by Phra Payutto 2013: 58, according to which "in the formal explanation
(vibhaïga) of the bhikkhuni training rules laid down by the Buddha there is this definition: The term
"bhikkhunã" refers to a woman who has been ordained by both sanghas. This poses a problem in that, if bhikkhunis are ordained without a bhikkhuni sangha present, none of these training rules will formally apply to
them or be legally binding." In a modern-day situation of creating a new bhikkhunã order through ordination by
bhikkhus only, the first generation of such bhikkhunãs could rely on Cv X.4, just as Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã and
her followers did.
8
Vin II 259,25, Vin II 260,11, and Vin II 260,30. If bhikkhus undertake legal actions on behalf of bhikkhunãs
when a bhikkhunã order has gone out of existence and is being revived, then they would incur a dukkaña, but
this would not invalidate the legal act itself.
9
Translated in Bodhi 2009: 60 and 62 (= 2010: 137 and 138).
10
Salgado 2013: 140-142.
11
Mrozik 2014.
12
Ps IV 94,23, commenting on MN 112.
13
Mâ 187 at T I 732b18.
19
SIJBS Volume 3
14
e
MN 76 at MN I 520,6: sussutam (S : susutaü) pi hoti dussutam pi hoti, tathà pi hoti a¤¤athà pi hoti. The
Sanskrit fragment parallels to this discourse have unfortunately not preserved this particular statement; for a
comparative study cf. Anàlayo 2011a: 413-416.
15
MN 95 at MN II 171,1 notes that what has been well transmitted may still be wrong, consequently it does not
suffice for one who protects the truth to come to the one-sided conclusion: This is true, everything else wrong,
svànussutaü yeva hoti, ta¤ ca hoti rittaü tucchaü musà ... saccam anurakkhatà ... purisena nàlam ettha
ekaüsena niññhaü gantuü: idam eva saccaü, mogham a¤¤an ti; on the parallels cf. Anàlayo 2011a: 557-566.
16
Dhp-a I 115,13 reports that the Buddha established Mahàpajàpatã Gotamã in the fruit of stream-entry at the
outset of his first visit to Kapilavatthu.
17
Blackstone 1999: 302f in fact comes to the conclusion that "in defying the Buddha, Mahàprajàpatã ... poses a
direct challenge to the Buddha's authority".
18
Vin II 254,4 (Cv X.1).
19
Mahãśàsaka: T 1421 at T XXII 185b27; Målasarvàstivàda: Schmidt 1993: 242,5, T 1451 at T XXIV 350b16,
and D 6 da 100b2 or Q 1035 ne 97b4; Sarvàstivàda: Mâ 116 at T I 605a17; for a translation of these permissions and a more detailed study cf. Anàlayo 2011b: 287f.
20
Cf., e.g., Vin I 89,10 (Mv I.67) and the discussion in Perera 1993: 107f.
21
Vin II 256,16.
22
Vin I 220,21 (Mv VI.24) reports that the Buddha was followed by a whole group of lay people wishing to
make offerings in turn, a group apparently so large that it took a long time before each could get its turn; another such reference can be found in Vin I 238,33 (Mv VI.33).
23
DN 16 at DN II 123,30 and AN 4.180 at AN II 167,31; cf. also the same principle in relation to rules at Vin I
250,34 (Mv VI.40).
24
DN 30 at DN III 148,18.
25
DN 29 at DN III 125,24.
26
MN 73 at MN I 490,21.
27
DN 16 at DN II 105,8.
28
SN 51.10 at SN V 261,18, AN 8.70 at AN IV 310,32, and Ud 6.1 at Ud 63,32.
29
Vin II 256,9 (Cv X.1); for a more detailed discussion of this prophecy cf. Anàlayo 2010: 78-82.
30
AN 4.7 at A II 8,22
31
AN 4.211 at AN II 226,1.
32
SN 16.13 at SN II 225,8.
33
AN 5.201 at AN III 247,20, AN 6.40 at AN III 340,13, and AN 7.56 at AN IV 84,22.
34
The delivery of the garudhammas is reported in Vin II 255,9 (Cv X.1).
35
AN 8.29 at AN IV 226,8.
20
Asian Viewpoint on the Ethics of Modern Medicine
Anoja Fernando
INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the twentieth century, biomedical and technological advances in the
field of medicine and healthcare gave rise to ethical dilemmas and controversies at regular
intervals. The issues debated include contraception, assisted reproductive technologies such
as in-vitro fertilization and surrogacy, organ transplantation, and more recently genetic engineering, embryo research and cloning.
Since most advances in modern medicine originated in the West, in technologically developed countries, the new ethics of biomedicine is also Western in origin, and rooted in Western values. Many Asian countries today practice Western medicine in addition to their indigenous systems of medicine. These countries will, in the future, as they have already begun to
do so, face the new situations resulting from modern technological advances, and the ethical
solutions they demand. The Asian countries thus face a rather complex ethical situation,
although only a few of these countries have begun facing these challenges seriously. How
do we Asians resolve the conflicts between the traditional ethical norms of our countries and
the Western model of bioethics, with its emphasis on individual autonomy?
Japanese physicians were among the earliest to comment on some of the disparities between
Eastern and Western ethics. In many traditional Asian societies more importance is accorded to the well-being of the community, and the harmony resulting from respecting family
ties and values, rather than encouraging individual autonomy and uniqueness as in the West.
Asian ethics tends to emphasize a person‘s obligations to others rather than a person‘s
rights. The existence of a divergence between Asian and Western ethics was also recognized by moral philosophers and physicians in the West. In ―Transcultural Dimensions in
Medical Ethics‖, Edmund Pellegrino said ―Western values, however, may be strongly at
odds with worldviews held by billions of other human beings. Those billions…may be
drawn more strongly by the spiritual and qualitative dimensions of life. Their ethical systems may be less dialectical, logical or linguistic in character, less analytical, more synthetic
or more sensitive to family or community concensus than to individual autonomy, more virtue-based than principle-based.‖
In Sri Lanka, for example, Western medicine is practiced together with the traditional indigenous systems. The predominant cultural ethos is derived from Buddhism and Hinduism,
and pervades 85% of the population. Sri Lankan scholars, Arsecularatne and Babapulle, in
1996, suggested that there could be a certain resistance in such a population to ideas intro21
SIJBS Volume 3
duced through a purely Western model of medical ethics and they propose the introduction
of Asian views on medical ethics to Sri Lankan undergraduates because of its cultural relevance. The possibility of integrating Wetsern ethics with Buddhist ethics for example, need
not seem too far-fetched. Since the 18th century, the cultural ethos of the West seems to
have gradually transformed from one of orthodox revealed religion to one of science and
secular liberalism. Buddhism is perceived as a rational philosophy, which is not in conflict
with modern scientific discoveries, and therefore appears to have the potential to contribute
positively towards a universal ethos in science and medicine.
Characteristics of Theravāda Buddhism
In my presentation, I will briefly outline some of the main characteristic features of Theravāda Buddhism relevant to the interpretation of the Buddhist viewpoint towards some of the
controversial issues in modern medicine, and how they can be applied to these issues. Obviously there can be no Buddhist view stated in the original Pali canon regarding modern
medical dilemmas. However, given the fundamental Buddhist ethics, a Buddhist viewpoint
can be worked out for almost any given situation. Given its pragmatic nature, and the reliance placed on individual endeavour and free will, Buddhism seems ideally suited for situational ethics.
Theravāda Buddhism is the original, authentic doctrine as proclaimed by the Buddha, 2500
years ago and is found in south Asian countries such as Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma.
Later variations of Buddhism, such as the Mahāyāna, Zen and Tantric schools are prevalent
in countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Tibet and Vietnam. I shall confine myself to the
Buddhist teaching of the original Theravāda tradition.
1.The Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology)
The main difference between Buddhism and the other major world religions is that Buddhism does not believe in an all-powerful creator God. Buddhism is atheistic. If the definition of religion is a belief in tivrtse because only they have the rare privilege of accessibility
to salvations.he existence of a superhuman controlling power or a system of blind faith or
worship, then Buddhism is not a religion. Buddhism is one of the most anti-authoritarian
systems of thinking. The Buddha advised not to accept anyone or anything as an authority.
(including the Buddha and his teaching) without subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny. Ideas
should not be accepted or rejected without proper investigation and verification. In this process of investigation and verification, personal experience plays an extremely important
role.
2. Buddhist Concept of the Universe
According to the Buddha‘s teaching the universe is a vast cosmic space in which ae located
innumerable worlds, with many different kinds of beings – humans, animals, spirits, etc. In
22
Anoja Fernando
this vast cosmos, the place of man appears so small and insignificant as to become almost
nothing. Nevertheless, human beings assume a unique position in this universe because only they have the rre privilege of accessibility to salvation. The short human life, in the continuous cycle of existence known as saüsāra, provides an opportunity to work towards
one‘s salvation, and escape from this existence to a state known as nirvana.
3 Basic features common to all these worlds of existence
There are three basic features common to these worlds of existence. They are: Impermanence (anicca) which means that everything physical and mental, is in a state of ever changing flux. Nothing that exists is permanent.
2) Non-substantiality (anatta). This means that nothing has a soul or an abiding substance. The Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Orignation (pañiccasamuppāda), emphasizes
that everything arises and exists in relation to everything else. From another viewpoint, everything can be analyzed until it is reduced to nothing. In this state of interdependence and
nothingness, there is no place for an unchanging, independent soul or substance. According
to Buddhism, man, or this entity we refer to as ―I‖, is a psychophysical unit composed of
one physical and 4 mental components. The physical component is form (råpa), and the 4
mental components are feelings, physical/psychic (vedanā), perceptions, ideas, concepts
(sa¤¤ā), dispositions or purposive activities (saïkhāra) and consciousness or mental activity
(vi¤¤āõa). All these five factors are constantly changing, and therefore one cannot find any
permanent entity, like a self or a soul, in any one of these components.
3) The third feature of this saüsāric existence is that it is basically one of suffering or a state
of non-satisfaction, arising from desire, or craving, (taïhā). Whatever happiness obtained
can only be temporary, and further craving leads to more suffering or state of being unfulfilled. The Buddha showed the way to escape from this endless cycle of not -satisfying
saüsāra and achieve a permanent happiness, or nirvāõa, by getting rid of craving. The path
to nirvāõa consists of the practice of morality, wisdom and mediation, (sãla, samādhi and
pa¤¤ā), and is described the Noble Eightfold Path. When successfully practised, it will lead
to ultimate enlightenment.
To summarize, the Buddhist worldview is characterized by impermanence, insubstantiality
(absence of a permanent soul) and the reality of the saüsāric cycle of a state of nonsatisfaction.
3) The Basis of Buddhist Ethics
I now now come to the bsis of Buddhist ethics. What are the beliefs and concepts in Buddhism that will guide a person to take moral responsibility for his actions? The basis of
Budhist ethics rests on 3 doctrines considered to be verifiably true. They are:
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1 The Reality of Free Will and Self-determination (in this sense, Buddhism is
not teleological, not being theistically determinant nor naturally determinant).
2 The Reality of Survival After Death or Rebirth. All living beings will be
reborn an infinite number of times until they attain nirvāõa.
3 The Reality of Moral Causation or Kamma. Karmic or moral law is one of
the 5 natural laws described by the Buddha. Karmic actions are moral (or immoral)
actions, where one acts through body, speech or mind. In producing the consequences of such karmic actions, it is the intention that is of crucial importance. Rebirth is heavily dependent on the good or bad consequences resulting from good or
bad kamma.
These 3 doctrines, i.e., Free Will, rebirth and the moral law of kamma, make individual
moral responsibility meaningful, and will guide a person to act in any given situation.
4 Basic Principles of Buddhist Ethics
It is difficult to describe Buddhist ethical theory using terminology used to describe
Western theories of ethics, because Buddhism does not fit neatly into any of the
main categories. It is neither strictly teleological nor strictly deontological, although
there are some elements of both. It could best be described as a form of virtue ethics, where the emphasis is on developing a virtuous character, Damien Keown maintains that ―In the course of Buddhist history there never arose a branch of learning
concerned with the philosophical analysis of moral norms.‖ He also says that the
closest approximation to ethics in the early texts is sãla, or morality, and that while
Buddhism has good deal to say about morality it has little to say about ethics. He
suggests an alternative explanation for the need for these two words, in that morality
denotes the existing values of a society as against ethics referring to a critical analysis of these values by philosophers. I would suggest that Buddhism being a very
pragmatic religion or way of life, was more concerned with promoting the practice
of morality as a means of achieving ultimate realization rather tha encouraging it as
a theoretical discipline.
On the other hand, it is possible to compare the basic principles in Western and Buddhist ethics and see some similarities. Two of the most fundamental principles of
Buddhist ethics are ahiüsā (or non-violence) and karuõā (or compassion). Ahiüsā
(non-violence or non-harming) forms the cornerstone of Buddhist ethics and can be
compared to non-maleficence. This respect for life is meant to be extended to all
living beings, including animals. Intentional killing of any being, including one‘s
own self, is considered to be absolutely immoral, whatever the motive.
Karuõā (compassion towards all living beings) can be compared to the ultimate in
beneficence, aims to alleviate or prevent suffering, and is directed towards the wellbeing of others as well as one‘s own self. Aung San Suukyi, leader of the Burmese
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Anoja Fernando
democracy movement and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, has this to say:
―I am a Buddhist. As a Buddhist, the answer is very simple and clear. That is compassion and mercy is the real panacea. I am sure that when we have compassion and
mercy in our hearts, we can overcome not only terrorism but also many other evil
things that are plagueing the world.‖ This is the Buddhist view, although it may
sound rther naïve and impractical in today‘s context (e.g. The political consequences
of Emperor Ashoka‘s conversion to Buddhism).
As for the principles of human rights and Individual autonomy so highly emphasized
in Western bioethics, Buddhism describes these ethical requirements in the form of
reciprocal duties between people in various relationships, carried out to create a just,
harmonious and peaceful society. e.g. Between parents and children, teachers and
pupils, employer and employee, ruler and the ruled, etc. The duties of one correspond to the ‗rights‘ of the other. These moral duties are contined in the voluntary
precepts a virtuous person undertakes, eg. Refrain from killing/harming…
Application of Buddhist Ethics to Modern Medicine
To summarize the basic principles of Buddhist Ethics i.e.1) ahiüsā (or nonviolence) 2) karuõā (or compassion) and 3) the ethical obligations of reciprocal duties embodied in the precepts, could be utilized to resolve most of the dilemmas arising from technological advances in modern medicine.
Ethiical issues at the beginning of life
A brief look at the Buddhist attitude towards abortion would exemplify how Buddhism considers ethical issues at the beginning of life. According to Buddhism, conception occurs when the ‗stream of consciousness‘ (gandhabba) of a diceased person seeking rebirth enters a fertilized ovum. While it is not stated in the scriptures
exactly exactly when this occurs it is generally believed to commence from this
point of conception. An abortion,( generally defined as the intentional termination of
pregnancy resulting in death of the foetus), is considered to be morally wrong based
on the ethical principle of respect for life and non-violence towards all living beings.
The current Roman Catholic thinking on the commencement of life is the same as in
Buddhism, although earlier, it had varied from 4 months (according to St. Augustine) to 40 -80 days after conception (Thomas Acquinas). Abortion of course is not
condoned by the church, although since 1967, abortion has been legalized in many
countries under certain critera.
As for in-vitro fertilization, the procedure itself produces no problem for Buddhism, but the destruction of surplus embryos would be considered wrong as with
abortion.
However, as with abortion and IVF, destruction of surplus embryos would be wrong.
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SIJBS Volume 3
The first cloning of an animal was met with disapproval and opposition from the theistic religions since it appeared to usurp the authority of a creator God who gave life.
From a Buddhist perspective there is no objection to this method of creating life, as
Buddhism does not believe in a Creator God. However, as with abortion and IVF,
destruction of surplus embryos would be wrong.
As for genetic engineering, the question should be looked at from the point of causing harm/benefit to the potential life. Since research in the field is still experimental,
and the beneficial effects uncertain, Buddhism would discourage such research on
the basis of avoiding harm to potential human beings.
Euthanasia and end of life issues
I shall now briefly consider the Buddhist viewpoint on euthanasia. This is the same
as for abortion. Active euthanasia is considered morally wrong, since the intention
to kill (or cause death) is present. Even for the most compassionate of motives, intentional causing of death is unacceptable. Bddhism considers human life to be very
precious, more valuable than animal life for example, because of the ability of humans to devlop morally and intellectually towards their goal of attaining enlightenment. Any attempt to shorten this life artificially by any person, i.e. by suicide or
euthanasia is invariably wrong. Withholding active treatment on the other hand,
when a patient is about to die, or is suffering from a terminal illness, is permissible.
On this issue, Buddhist and Christian viewpoints are similar, although for different
reasons.
To summarize in this manner, any situation demanding an ethical solution could be
analyzed using respect for life and non-harming as the guiding principles.
Conclusion
To conclude I have shown that the two fundamental ethical principles in Buddhism that provide guidance to decision making in medical ethics are ahiüsā (or non-violence), and
karuõā (or compassion) towards all living beings, including one‘s own self, in all karmic or
moral actions, the intention is the most important factor in determining the consequences of
one‘s actions. Respect for life and the practice of compassion are values found in most
world religions. However, in Western bioethics, it appears that religious principles have
been replaced to a large extent by contemporary societal norms, and the value placed on individual rights and autonomy has transformed medical ethics in the Western world, resulting
in the current thinking on, e.g., abortion and euthanasia. These are some of the reasons
there appears to be a certain degree of conflict between Western and Asian ethics in the
world today.
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Anoja Fernando
While I would not dare to recommend a return to fundamental religion, it should be possible
to determine common values among the world religions to help develop ethical guidelines
for modern medicine.
In 1993, the Parliament of the World‘s Religions met in Chicago to determine whether consensus on basic moral teachings could be achieved among the religions of the world. The
document that resulted from this conference, known as the ‗Declaration towards a Global
Ethic‘ set out the fundamental moral principles to which apparently all religions subscribed.
It is interesting to note that leading Buddhists at the conference felt obliged to protest at the
inclusion of the phrases ―a unity of religions under God ― and at references to ―God the Almighty‖ and ―God the Creator‖ during invocations.
Two years ago, UNESCO undertook to develop universal norms on Bioethics, which process is now nearing completion. I found it rather intriguing to observe that the principle of
respect for life, which appeared in the very first draft had somehow managed to disappear in
subsequent versions. One of the reasons for this is apparently the very divergent views held
by different countries with regard to euthanasia, and the need to reconcile these views. Another reason had been pressure from the feminist lobby regarding the moral status of the embryo and a woman‘s right to abortion in countries where abortion is legal, the embryo is not
considered as a human being until birth, and therefore is without rights. An international
declaration on bioethics that does not mention the fundamental ethical principle of respect
for life is disappointing, but the primary aim of the declaration was to obtain consensus
among the countries.
Perhaps it would be relevant to ask whether it is necessary for Western and Asian ethics to
come closer together in the current climate of globalised health in an interdependent world,
with increasing international collaborative research and the development of universal declarations on the human genome, human genetic data and bioethical norms. I believe that it
would be mutually beneficial for a closer rapport between the two in working towards consensus.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge reference to the writings of Damien Keown and Peter
Harvey, who have attempted to describe the moral teachings of Buddhism in relation to
Western ethics. I have also benefited from discussion with Ven.Professor Dhammavihari,
Ven.Bhikkhuni Kusuma and Ven. Bhikkhuni Suvimalee.
27
28
“The Concept of Nonviolence in Buddhism and Its Application to
Conflict Resolution in Society”
Frank J. Hoffman
Lead quotation: from Thich Nhat Hahn
"Anyone can practice some nonviolence, even soldiers. Some army generals, for
example, conduct their operations in ways that avoid killing innocent people; this is a kind
of nonviolence. To help soldiers move in the nonviolent direction, we have to be in touch
with them. If we divide reality into two camps -- the violent and the nonviolent -- and stand
in one camp while attacking the other, the world will never have peace. We will always
blame and condemn those we feel are responsible for wars and social injustice, without recognizing the degree of violence in ourselves. We must work on ourselves and also work
with those we condemn if we want to have a real impact." Venerable Thich Nhat Hahn,
"Ahimsa: The Path of Harmlessness" in David W. Chappell (ed.), Buddhist Peacework
(Boston: Wisdom, 1999), p. 155.
INTRODUCTION
In Indian thought the idea of ahiüsā is ancient.Proudfoot has documented that the
meaning of ahiüsā changes with the context of use.As Indu Mala Ghosh says: ―Generally,
non-violence is equated with ahiüsā. Non-violence means ―non-killing‖ and is usually
compared with pacifism. But ahiüsā, though apparently negative, has a positive counterpart and as such covers a much wider sphere. Apart from ‗non-killing it includes a feeling
of loving kindness and compassion towards all. Ahiüsā is doing good to all with all – body,
mind and speech.‖
Ahiüsā is a very big concept with a complex history. I.B. Horner writes:
The emergence in India of the notion of ahiüsā, non-harming, non-injury, is historically speaking not clear. Its origin cannot be attributed to a definite date or to any particular
teacher, social reformer or lawgiver. The problem of the birth of the idea of non-injury is
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indeed as obscure as that of ―leaving the world‖, of forsaking home for homelessness. Noninjury, which includes the principle of sparing life, of not taking it, or not depriving man or
beast of it, receives much emphasis in the surviving Jain texts; but whether the notion actually sprang up under the Jains or whether they exploited some life-saving tradition already
there we do not know.
In this paper I will confine myself to discussing the meanings of ahiüsā as they are
found in early Indian Pali Buddhism of the Nikāyas. Only passing references to show the
larger context are justified in this brief compass.
In Buddhist thought, the term, ahiüsā, means non-harming, non-injury, and nonviolence. As Kedar Nath Tiwari writes:
―The eightfold path consist of right view, right thought, right speech, right action,
right living, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration
Of these, the first two
come under what is known as pa¤¤ā the next three come under sãla and the last three under
samādhi. More specifically speaking, it is sãla which represents Buddhist morality. Let us
see the items under sãla.
The first is right speech. This consists in refraining from telling a lie, back-biting,
harsh talk and idle gossip. Moreover, according to it our speech should be free from any
kind of ill will and selfish interest. The second is right action, which consists in the observance of five precepts known as Pa¤casãla. These are: (1) Not to kill, but to practise
harmlessness and compassion (ahiüsā), (2) Not to take that which is not given, but to practise charity and generosity (cāga), (3) Not to commit sexual misconduct, but to practise
chastity and self-control (brahmacarya), (4) Not to indulge in false speech, but to practise
sincerity and honesty (sacca), (5) Not to take intoxicating drinks or drugs, but to practice
restraint and mindfulness. The third, i.e., right living, consists in adopting a just honestly
earned and undeceitful means of livelihood which does not debar others of their just rights
of the same.‖
The concept of ahiüsā is that of a virtue in Buddhism. Perfect expression of ahiüsa is
an idealization, whereas in practice one is following ahiüsā in one or more particular ways
and also as a matter of degree within a particular way. None of the following, (a) through
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Frank J. Hoffman
The Concept of Nonviolence in Buddhism....
(e), are absolutes from some timeless perspective. The following ways are among the possible ways in which a person may exemplify ahiüsā:
(a) Ahiüsā can be expressed by a believer in one religion who tries to see the good
in people of other faiths rather than contend with them. [Pali texts say no contending with
anyone in the world]
(b) Ahiüsā can be expressed in vegetarianism rather than participating in a process
of taking sentient beings‘ life for food when there are alternatives. Horner shows that vegetarianism is not required in early Buddhism, but that the emphasis is on not taking life.]
(c) Ahiüsā can be expressed by not retaliating when attacked when diplomacy, generosity, or satyagraha are alternatives. [Gandhi practiced ahiüsā in this way]
(d) Ahiüsā can be expressed by being a peace-maker, through social action that involves opposing war and seeking diplomatic solutions to conflict. [ML King practiced
ahiüsā in this way when he opposed the war in Vietnam]
(e) Ahiüsā can be expressed by one who has a combatant's social role by keeping
harm to the minimum degree possible under the circumstances. [some Generals have surrendered against overwhelming odds instead of fight to the last combatant and that‘s ahiüsā
too]
This is not to commit to being a doormat to the world. None of these expressions of
ahiüsā commits one to not defend one's country, family, or self, but only to seek only often
overlooked alternatives to immediately striking out to harm. The main philosophical argument of this paper focuses on (e) above, how combatants can minimize harm. The trajectory
of my thought is that the concept of ahiüsā is that of a virtue which applies both to ordinary
citizens who are civilians and also to those charged with defense of the public, such as people in the military, the government, and the police.
This paper concerns some ways in which ahiüsā may be expressed. Although the
main reference points are to Buddhism, much of what I have to say about the scope of the
virtue of ahiüsā shows that ahiüsā could be a secular virtue as well as one that particular
religions might aspire to incorporate. Buddhist texts sometimes say that to do good and
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avoid unskillful actions is the whole dhamma. One can readily see that doing good is the
perfect antidote to doing unskillful actions. Ahiüsā may be held from a secular point of
view on the basis of reasoning just as appropriately as it may be held on the basis of religious thinking. Investigating Buddhist texts here is an opportunity to make a philosophical
argument with wide-ranging application.
In the early Buddhist way of thinking, a cycle of continual rebirths (rather than enlightenment) stems from craving and ignorance and importantly, from possessive and egocentered thinking. Kalupahana writes of the Buddha‘s view, belief in a permanent ‗self‘ or
atman often led to selfishness and egoism (ahaükāra, mamaükāra) and was the root cause
of craving, suffering. In Buddhist view, roots of violence are also traceable to egoism, not
just as a general theoretical belief but as an applied outlook. It is not, I think, that theory of
atman comes first in a person‘s experience and the greedy conduct follows theory. Buddhism recognizes that beings naturally go toward pleasure and avoid pain. But it also says
that, through mindfulness one can understand the causes of arising of ―likes and dislikes‖ so
as to see how both obsessive attachment and hatred arise. Once one becomes mindfully
aware of the causal process in detail, it is possible to resist being drawn into behaviors illustrative of attraction and aversion. Conversely, when there is polarization between groups
mired in a ―devil or angel‖ mentality replete with narrow ―likes and dislikes‖, then these
groups become locked in a cycle of destructive and self-destructive behaviors (e.g., mindless violence and imperialistic aggression).
An illustration of resistance of obsessive perceptions is given in the Madhupiõóikasutta or ―Discourse of the Honey-Ball‖ where the setting of the sutta is in Nigrodha‘s monastery in Kapilavatthu. There Buddha went into the woods to meditate and sat down under
a little tree. Then 'Stick-in-Hand' asked Buddha what views he holds. Buddha replies that
according to his teaching there is no contending with anyone in the world. As a result perceptions are not obsessive and one is not controlled by sense pleasures and has no craving.
After hearing this 'Stick-in-Hand' left, shaking his head with wrinkled brow.
When Buddha met monks he told them all that happened with 'Stick-in-Hand' . Then
a monk asked for further explanation of the teaching. Buddha replied that evil unskilled
states of mind are eliminated by following the teaching. These include attachment, repugnance, views, perplexity, pride, becoming, ignorance, violence, disputes, and lies.
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Frank J. Hoffman
Nobody understood, so they asked Kacchana the Great. Then Kacchana the Great
said that asking him instead of Buddha is like someone looking for the pith while standing
in front of a big tree.
Sure, the monks agreed, Buddha knows dhamma, but everyone knows you can explain it so please go ahead.
OK, Kacchana the Great, said, listen up and I will tell you. Then Kacchana the Great
explained causally how the various sorts of consciousness (i.e., visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, olfactory consciousness, gustatory consciousness, bodily consciousness,
and mental consciousness) arise depending on antecedent causal conditions. He explained
that in each case consciousness arises when there is a gateway, (such as eye, etc.). On the
other hand, when there is no gateway, then there is no consciousness. That's how I understand it, Kacchana said, and you can ask Buddha if this is the full, correct meaning.
So the monks went to Buddha, stated Kacchana's explanation, and inquired. Buddha
replied that the explanation given was exact.
Then Ananda said that it is as if an exhausted hungry person were to find a HoneyBall and find it sweet, so too an able monk would find this teaching sweet. So Buddha
named this teaching the Discourse of the Honey-Ball. Ananda was very pleased.
MAIN ARGUMENT
In early Buddhism, since roots of violence stem from egoism, then conversely roots
of nonviolence -- involving behaviors of both abstention from killing and injury and also the
positive valuation of life -- stem from following the precepts on the Buddhist path. This paper will both explain ahiüsā in early Buddhism and also advance a philosophical argument,
the schema of which is below. In simplest terms the main argument is as follows:
(1) Ahiüsā is a virtue
(2) The virtue of ahiüsā can be expressed in several ways.
(3) One of the ways in which the virtue of ahiüsā can be expressed is that those charged
with defense of the public use appropriate restraint and do no harm.
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(4) Those charged with the defense of the public include the military, government, and police.
(5) Military, government, and police can use appropriate restraint and avoid doing harm.
Therefore, the concept of ahiüsā as a virtue applies to the military, the government, and the
police.
Philosophically speaking, the virtue of ahimsa can be cultivated by anyone of good
will regardless of whether they have a religious commitment. Ahiüsā, on this view, is not
just a virtue for ascetics and sages but a viable virtue that most people can achieve to a
greater or lesser extent. Ahiüsā is not an all or none matter, like a toggle switch, but a matter of degree. Here I am focusing on the often-overlooked opportunities for ahiüsā within
the lives of those whose job it is to manage conflict.
I. AHIýSĀ
II. AHIýSĀ is a virtue that can be expressed in several ways
In support of the premise (1), section I offers relevant textual details, and likewise
each of the following sections support their respectively numbered premises.
Akira Hirakawa provides a detailed analysis of ahiüsā. Hirakawa states that ahiüsā
is ―a word formed by adding the negative prefix a to the word hiüsā, a derivative
from the root han meaning ‗to kill‘ and ‗to injure‘. Accordingly, ahiüsā carries the
meaning of not killing, and not injuring.‖ (287) He points out that ahiüsā appeared
as early as the Chandogya Upani÷ad (III, 17) of the early period. The Dharmasutra
literature of Hinduism emphasizes ahiüsā and in accordance with that there originated many people who practice vegetarianism. And in recent times Gandhi and his
followers emphasized ahiüsā and made it a key point in a nationwide movement.
Although ahiüsā crops up from time immemorial in Indian tradition, the doctrinal
basis for its assertion varies in each context. In Hinduism the idea of an imperishable atman
that undergoes countless transmigrations and also the idea of the unity of atman-brahman
(from the standpoint of moksha), here the idea of ahiüsā is based on the idea that life is one.
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Frank J. Hoffman
(Arthur Herman popularly puts it, in Community Violence and Peace, we are the community
in the sense of the is of identity.) In Jainism there is a reverence for all life where life includes even plants and minerals. So there ahiüsā goes deep down. In Gandhi‘s thought
ahiüsā goes wide across all India to include all people including harijans (children of God,
today‘s dalits).
Ahiüsā is clearly an important idea in sãla or morality within Buddhism. There, as
both Hirakawa and Gomez observe, there is a tradition of abstaining from injuring living
beings (expressed by pānātipātāveramani and pānātipātāpātivirati in addition to ahiüsā).
Ahiüsā is the most popular of the three ways to speak of non-injury in Buddhism and the
other two terms are used mainly in sãla and Vinaya contexts forbidding the killing of living
beings.
When used in Vinaya veramani means ―abstaining‖ and pativirati means
―restraining‖. Sãla involves deliberate, reflective, abstention from doing bad deeds. Buddhaghosa even defines sãla as cetanā (intention). Sãla is not simply happening to avoid
wrong. From a Buddhist view sãla is the will to practice and actualize the teaching so that
one proceeds towards enlightenment.
Morality, concentration, and wisdom (sãla, samādhi, pa¤¤ā) have informed Buddhist
practice from early on in Buddhist tradition. But these are not 1, 2, 3 in a stepwise manner
but each interpenetrates the other. I think that Hirakawa is exactly right when he claims that
―These three practices are each separate and yet they are not exclusive but progress towards
the highest by mutually helping each other.‖ (287) So, for example, wisdom is purified by
sãla and vice versa. (D I, p. 124). As the motivating power to proceed along the Buddhist
path, ahiüsā is supported by sãla and actualized by the mental power that arises with it.
In Sarvāstivāda ahiüsā is viewed as an independent mental power, but it is not so in
Theravāda. In Mahāyāna ahiüsā has been construed as based on compassion (Sthiramati)
and as actualized through the suppression of anger (Dharmapāla).
The practice of ahiüsā is considered universal as stated in Dhammapada 129 because all tremble before punishment and all fear death, so comparing oneself with another
one should not kill or cause another to kill. So it is asserted from the perspective of compassion but also maintained from the point of view of a consciousness of shame.
Sāma¤¤aphalasutta (Dialogues of the Buddha I , p. 79) says ―the bhikkhu, putting away the
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killing of living things, holds aloof from the destruction of life. The cudgel and the sword
he has laid aside, and ashamed of roughness, and full of mercy, he dwells compassionate
and kind to all creatures that have life.‖
As Hirakawa comments: ―This shows that the practice of ahiüsā is not limited to
human beings only, but includes all living beings. Its basis is compassion (dayā), sympathy
and pity (hitānukampā), as well as the feeling of shame (lajjā) of the cruelty of killing and
injuring life. Thus, ahiüsā is united with compassion and a consciousness of shame.‖ (288)
As a mental power (caitasika-dharma), sãla is the spirit of compassion.
In early Buddhism ahimsā is not just the ethical rule that one should avoid harming
all living beings. Ahiüsā is also the religious idea that through the practice of Buddhism
enlightenment is attainable.
So in early Buddhism ahiüsā appears as right action
(sammākammantā) within the eightfold noble path. It also appears in the ten kinds of good
actions (dasakusalakammapatha), the first of which is not to kill living beings (D. III, p.
269). In teaching morality to laypersons Buddha emphasizes ahiüsā in conversation with
Sigālaka (D. III, p. 181).
In view of the human condition as one of struggle, eating to survive, ahiüsā is clearly an ideal that one might approximate to a greater or lesser extent, but short of sainthood,
not actually achieved in everyday life.
Hikakawa comments: ―Some, like the Jains, take to
vegetarianism to escape this killing. But even this cannot be called a correct way of life,
from the standpoint of those who look upon plants also as possessing life.‖ (289)
Various manifestations of ahiüsā are, first, in the life of the lay Buddhist practitioner (upāsaka, upāsikā) who accepts the Three Gems (ti-ratana) of Buddha, Dhamma, and
Sangha and undertakes observance of the five precepts. The first precept is not killing living beings. This includes both intention and action. If there is intent, but not right action,
then confession (pañidesanā) may be done.
Non-killing is so important that it also occurs in other contexts, in the eight precepts
practiced on the four fast days (uposatha) of the month; as the first of the ten precepts of
male and female novices, the sāmanera and sāmaneri. And the third precept of the pārājikā
in the Pātimokkha, in the Vinaya of the monks and nuns, the bhikkhu-s and bhikkunã-s. In-
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tentional killing of a human being is a pārājikā offence and results in the most severe form
of monastic discipline, namely expulsion from the monastery. Ordering others to kill, abortion, and suicide are placed on the same level (Vin. III, p. 73, 82).
Killing animals is a pācittiya offence (no. 61), but can be forgiven by confession
(āpatti-desanā) and does not result in expulsion. Plantlife or vegetation is also protected by
pācittiya rules (no. 20, 62). Monks strain their water in order to avoid drinking water that
contains living beings that would die as a result.
Hirakawa observes that the Buddha did not ban the eating of meat, only the taking of
life. (In early Buddhism Devadatta asks Buddha to pass a rule banning eating of meat and
fish altogether, but Buddha declines.) ―He did prohibit the ten kinds of flesh that were censured by society. Apart from that, meat could be eaten by one, provided it was not seen or
heard or suspected by him that an animal was specially killed for the eater and the meat was
prepared as food for him only (tikoti-parisuddhamacchamaüsa): Vin. IV, pp. 218-20; Sn.
242).‖ (290)
In ancient India Buddha did not require vegetarianism of his followers and what was
against the rules was the taking of life. For example, abstention from animal sacrifice is
consistently part of Buddhist tradition from the beginning. In Mahāyāna tradition vegetarianism was often understood as a requirement, but discussion of that goes beyond this paper.
In the pillar edicts of King Asoka, there are expressions of the principle of ahiüsā
(in 2, 5, 7); also in the rock edicts in Girnar and other places (in 1, 2, 4, 11, and 13). In these
ways religious offerings of animal sacrifice were prohibited, meat eating was restricted, and
meat consumption at the king‘s own table was minimal. Even when animals were killed,
young ones under six months old and pregnant ones were not to be killed. Domesticated
animals were supposed to be treated with respect, and branding, castration were prohibited,
as were burning of forests without cause and killing wildlife. It is evident that Asoka was a
philanthropist and benefactor of many worthwhile projects. As Hirakawa comments on
Asoka, ―He worked in a positive way for the love and protection of animals. He built hospitals for both men and animals; he cultivated medicinal plants, planted trees by the roadside
and dug numerous wells, thus serving the needs of both man and beast. Asoka, in this way,
spread the influence of Buddhism over the whole of India, which tremendous influence last37
SIJBS Volume 3
ed for a long period of time in the spiritual life of the Indian people."‖(290) Logically
speaking, non-killing would entail both pacifism and vegetarianism, but neither are upheld
by Asoka as moral absolutes. (Hoffman, "Asoka‖ in Encyclopedia of Monasticism). He
made progress in dhamma towards these ideals and was tolerant of religions generally after
the bloody battle at Kalinga and his subsequent change of heart.
By contrast, it should be noted as a brief aside that in Mahāyāna Buddhism of China and
Japan there is a definite prohibition against eating meat, by contrast with Theravāda
Buddhism of South Asia. For example, not taking life is interpreted as giving another
being life by not eating and so is compassionate behavior. Thus the Mahāparinirvāna
Sutra (Taisho 12, p. 386 a, b) states: ―The eating of meat extinguishes the sea of great
compassion.‖ (Hirakawa 291) Buying and setting free fish, birds, and animals also
shows compassion. (Taisho, 24, p. 1005-1007, 1029, 1049-1050). In punishments, there
are no amputations or death sentences: censure, punishment, jail, and exile are permitted.
II. THE VIRTUE OF AHIýSĀ CAN BE EXPRESSED IN SEVERAL
WAYS.
Luis O. Gomez has shown the development of the idea of ahiüsā. One part of my
overall argument is to argue that there is no essence of ahiüsā but there are a family of features (in a Wittgensteinian sense) that comprise the concept of ahiüsā. I will next survey
some of them.
I.B. Horner has identified several forms that ahiüsā can take in early Buddhism. For
example, Vinaya iv, 34 speaks against monks chopping down trees and destroying vegetable
growth. Vinaya i, 137-138; iv, 296 speaks against trampling crops or grasses. Vin. iv, 32-33
speaks against killing beings while digging soil. It is recognized that ekindriyajiva or onefacultied life exists in trees, plants, and soil, and that water may have sappānakaudaka or
breathers in it.
As seen in Aïgulimālasutta (―Discourse with Aïgulimāla") MLS II # 86, p. 284
ahiüsā can be expressed by not retaliating when attacked. In this Pali Buddhist sutta topics
such as personal self-transformation, psychic powers, miracles, and the relation between
ethics and enlightenment are discussed.
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Frank J. Hoffman
Thus have I heard. Buddha was near Sāvatthi in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiõóika's monastery. The Buddha set out on a road toward the abode of Aïgulimāla, an infamous bandit
who wore a garland of fingers. Usually people traveled this way only in large groups of
twenty or thirty, and even then it would be dangerous. Monks three times tried to discourage him, but the Buddha set out anyway. It appears the Buddha was not deterred by those
attempting to discourage him from traveling there. As he approached, Aïguligmāla saw
him and thought about killing the Buddha. As Aïgulimāla was trailing him with bow and
arrow, Buddha with psychic power made it such that Aïgulimāla was not able to catch up
with him no matter how fast he ran. Aïgulimāla questions him about this and the Buddha
replies that he stands still having renounced violence whereas Aïgulimāla is unrestrained
regarding taking life and is always moving. The Buddha's response thus shows the cultural
value of quiescence and non-violence. After hearing the Buddha's speech, Aïgulimāla
threw away his sword and weapons in a chasm. Then the Buddha made his way to Sāvatthi
with Ven. Aïgulimāla as his attendant. A big crowd complained to King Pasenadi about
Aïgulimāla's presence. If he became a monk, asked the Buddha of the king, how would you
regard him? The king said he would extend the usual courtesies due to monks. Then the
Buddha introduced King Pasenadi to the converted Aïgulimāla. At first the king was afraid
and found the change hard to believe. But then he offered to have the robes and medicines
necessary for monastic life prepared for Aïgulimāla. After telling the Buddha of his extreme discomfort on hearing the cries of a woman in labor leading to childbirth, the Buddha
advises Aïgulimāla to give the woman a blessing on the unborn child saying that he had not
deprived anything of life since being born of the Ariyan birth. Then Ven. Aïgulimāla meditated, acquired super-knowledge, and became perfected. When once some villagers of
Savatthi beat him up with clods, gravel, and sticks, Aïgulimāla endured it without retaliating. This is the ripening of karma. Then in private meditation Aïgulimāla uttered a solemn
utterance about his conversion to "Harmlessness‖. He declared the supremacy of the Buddhist path, and experienced the three-fold knowledge.--turning the other cheek
Ahiüsā can be expressed in vegetarianism; What is meant by ―vegetarianism‖ is a matter of
definition. If not taking life is what is meant by vegetarianism, there are few if any vegetarians. To see this, consider that, for example, even in boiling water with vegetables one is
killing tiny living organisms in the water. In common usage of the term, however, vegetarians are contrasted with both those who eat meat or fish and with vegans who abstain also
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from dairy products. There are also ―fish vegetarians‖, those who will abstain from meat
but not fish. (To Cherish All Life explores this topic in greater detail than I can here.)
Simply not to kill, injure or harm life is different from cherishing all life. Both of
these emphases may be found in different parts of Buddhist tradition. As Luis Gomez puts
it : ―Our examination of the Pali scriptures and related sources had demonstrated that there
was not just one unalloyed ideal of nonviolence in early Buddhism. Instead we encountered
several definitions and redefinitions of ahiüsā. As ritual thinking was rationalized and ethicized, a tradition of nonviolence as abstention vied with a tradition of nonviolence based on
a valuation of life.‖
Gomez also notices a connection between self-cultivation and non-violence. He sees
that the application of non-violence and no-self in everyday life often raises questions not all
of which are specifically addressed in Buddhist texts. Gomez interprets Buddhist selfcultivation as a very humble kind of practice involving not lying, not stealing, etc. It is interpreted as a practice that is centered neither on public peace protests nor on compliance
with moral rules, but on going beyond merit and demerit so that ―love is ever present in the
mind.‖
It is I think not so important from a Buddhist perspective whether one avoids social
engagement and sticks to what Gomez calls ―a very humble practice‖ as it is in what spirit
any social engagement occurs. In the development of Western Buddhism in the USA there
are those who emphasize the practice of meditation by itself with perhaps a little supplementary reading and those who use Buddhist meditation practice in a socially engaged manner.
Criticism of a negative sort without any form of appreciation merely contributes to polarization; furthermore, to be done without attachment the socially engaged Buddhist must not be
attached to the fruits of action.
There is no reluctance to accept the idea of socially engaged Buddhism in the work
of Cynthia Keppley Mahmood‘s paper, "Equality, Ethnicity, and the Political Potential of
Buddhism". By contrast to Gomez, in a concluding paragraph Mahmood writes:
The Buddhist alternative, then, is one which demands cultural self-determination; which demands equality; and which demands democracy. In short, it is a religious tradition which is
as much about justice as it is about peace. While lauding the beautiful messages of peace
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Frank J. Hoffman
and loving kindness expressed in Buddhist writings, we cannot forget the more difficult
message of rebellion against injustice handed down to us from ancient India.
Whether and to what extent there is a ―message of rebellion‖ in the Buddhism of ancient
India is a matter of interpretation. For alongside anti-brahmanism, anti-caste, and antiVedic pronouncements there is also the advice not to contend with anyone in the world.
III. ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THE VIRTUE OF AHIýSĀ CAN BE
EXPRESSED IS THAT THOSE CHARGED WITH DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC USE APPROPRIATE RESTRAINT AND AVOID DOING HARM.
As ThichNhat Hahn emphasized in the quotation with which we began, "Anyone can practice some nonviolence, even soldiers. Some army generals, for example, conduct their operations in ways that avoids killing innocent people; this is a kind of nonviolence.‖
And as Swiderski writes:
From Asoka's universal realm of dharma to Chief Joseph's refusal to fight and
Gandhi's satyagraha there have been many instances of warlike tempers turning
away from injurious action. We can recognize the contours of ahiüsā and feel the
struggle of its rise in different lives, in many times and places, by understanding that
the resolution not to harm other beings demands a careful balance between determination and ease. It is never practised perfectly, toward all being alike without contradiction or dissent. Imperfection makes ahiüsā what it is in the lives of the violent, the destructive the conqueror and conquered.
THOSE CHARGED WITH THE DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC INCLUDE THE
MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND POLICE.
Defense of the public is a concept that arises in organized societies and would not
exist otherwise (for example in a so-called ―state of nature‖). There are many more
people who are charged with the defense of the public than just military, government, and police (e.g., firemen and school crossing guards).
As I.B. Horner notes:
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SIJBS Volume 3
The emergence in India of the notion of ahiüsā, non-harming, non-injury, is historically
speaking not clear. Its origin cannot be attributed to a definite date or to any particular
teacher, social reformer or law-giver. The problem of the birth of the idea of non-injury is
indeed as obscure as that of "leaving the world", of forsaking home for homelessness. noninjury, which includes the principle of sparing life, of not taking it, of not depriving man or
beast of it, receives much emphasis in the surviving Jain texts; but whether the notion actually spring up under the Jains or whether they exploited some life-saving tradition already
there we do not know. Although the birth of the notion may be hidden to us, the magnitude
of the stress the Jains lay on doing anything so calamitous as taking life has the appearance
of a protest; a protest against an existence and more or less widespread slaughter of creatures of which it was impossible to be unaware.
Buddhism also was aware of this state of things; and was very much alive to the diverse purposes for which life was destroyed. If it did not use the word ahiüsā and the verbs
connected with it as frequently as the contemporary Jains, it all the same fostered the scruple
against the taking of life as much as they did. Other sects which inhabited the Valley of the
Ganges at the same time, while not making such a mark on the thought and custom of the
day, nevertheless contributed to this new or revived scruple and upheld it by themselves
practising non-injury under the form of vegetarianism.
In the same place Horner notices that the Asoka Rock Edits I and V (234 BC) oppose killing of animals and comments that this shows Buddhist teaching on compassion to
all that lives and breathes. (4) There were non-slaughter days existing in ancient India (4-5)
which may or may not have coincided with uposatha days (5) before Asoka the Buddha
surely protested against the taking of life (5-6) There were great animal sacrifices decreed
under Asoka but he did not eliminate warfare, agriculture, and meat-eating.
Concerning warfare, Horner notices three ways in which the Buddha faced the fact
of fighting: S I 85 speaks of the futility of war; force is contrasted with dhamma in Dh. 2567; secondly he eliminated warfare as an occupation for monks in third pārājikā rule -- murder, incitement to murder or to suicide results in expulsion from the Order; third, he faced
the fact of fighting by using military metaphors that emphasized discipline, being steadfast,
and fighting a spiritual battle (16)
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Frank J. Hoffman
Horner writes: "The monk-world had a different code from the lay-world, for it was
one of as complete non-harming as it was possible to achieve. But in the completeness of
this there was a curious anomaly connected with some of the foods that a monk might
eat." (20)
"The eating of neither fish nor meat was banned for monks; and if not positively encouraged was likewise not positively discouraged. Indeed fish and meat formed two out of
the five permissible "soft foods" the other three being different cereals. It looks as if, because the laity was neither stopped from growing grain, which after all did not involve the
intentional taking of life, nor from occupations which made the eating of meat possible, so
similarly the monks were allowed to partake of cereals, fish and meat.
Horner on taking life. But we have seen that in the case of the last two, certain restrictions were imposed: meat, and fish, had to be "pure" in the three respects, and meat had
to be "the meat of those (animals) whose meat is allowable." [fn. to Vin. iv 88] Gifts to the
Order were made allowable, kappakata, by the donor uttering some phrase to the effect that
he was giving, for with a few minor exceptions, it was an offence to take anything not given.
[fn. to Pārājikā I I.] But, especially in times of scarcity, monks had a right to ask, and in
fact incurred an offence of wrongdoing if they did not, whether the meat that was being given to them was that of certain animals: of an elephant, horse, dog, serpent, lion, tiger, leopard, bear or hyena. For the meat of these animals came to be unallowed. But the reasons for
this ban do not in the least imply that for monks or laity meat - eating was thought to be
wrong in itself. Elephants and horses are attributes of royalty; dogs and serpents are revolting and disgusting; whether to catch any of the wild animals mentioned, including again the
serpent, might involve the monks in personal danger." (21)
"Although the eating of meat by laity and monks alike is tacitly condoned, the
bloody trades which bring animals to destruction for this purpose by no means escape condemnation." (23) Numerous textual references support the view that bad rebirths await
those who kill (A. v. 288; M i 387 ff., iii. 203)
"But monks did not, or should not, themselves actually take animal life. They did
not act as butchers, they did not fish, hunt or trap. All their food was provided for them by
the laity. Yet, unlike those recluses and brahmins who are recorded to have lived on jujube
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fruits, sesamum, beans or uncooked rice, they were able to receive gifts of fish and meat,
provided they observed the restrictions and safeguards of not receiving more food than their
one begging bowl would hold; of not eating more than once a day; of establishing the fish
and meat was "pure"; and that it was not the meat of certain prohibited animals." (24)
Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Equality, Ethnicity, and the Political Potential of Buddhism" p 25-33. Writes: "One of the persisting problems in many Western treatments of
Buddhism is the tendency to regard this tradition as essentially other-worldly in its orientation, a stereotype which may well accommodate an admiration for ahimsa, but hardly allows
for a recognition of Buddhism as an active political force. Max Weber is probably the key
culprit in the perpetuation of this image for our discipline, writing in his influential Religion
in India that Buddhism was "a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion"
which "had no sort of tie with any 'social' movement" and "has established no 'sociopolitical' goal." As Edward Said's classic ―Orientalism‖ has shown us this attitude which
labeled Eastern religion as a tradition of uncompromising mysticism was of long standing in
the West, and was not unrelated to the West's own political goals of this-worldly domination." (26)
"Both the Buddha and Mahavira are also described as being of Kshatriya origin, but
on the widespread evidence of indigenous' [indigenous] elevation to Kshatriya status this
can no longer be taken as evidence of Aryan ethnicity. Lalmani Joshi and G.C. Pande are
two scholars who have effectively argued for the non-Aryan foundations of the Buddhist
movement, pointing out that many features of both Buddhism and Jainism have antecedents
dating back to the Indus Valley civilization. These include the concept of holy places (not a
feature of nomadic Aryan life) especially marked by caityas which later became to stupas of
Buddhism. The pipal tree, another iconographic theme of the Indus Valley, remained sacred
as the bodhi tree under which the Buddha attained Enlightenment. Meditation postures still
utilized in the Buddhist and Jaina traditions are replicated in Indus Valley sculpture, and the
ideal of asceticism which pervades both is at a wide remove from the some-imbibing, heroworshipping, celebratory Aryans portrayed in the Vedas. Both the Buddha and Mahavira, of
course, are described in their respective schools not as innovators, but as perpetuators of tradition, part of long lines of past and future Buddhas and Jinas. Futhermore, references within the Vedic texts themselves to alien, marginal individuals known as munis and yatis ac-
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cords with the idea of a persisting minority tradition, which perhaps only required a change
of social circumstances for its full renaissance." (pp. 31-32)
Swiderski writes: "The discrepancy between the Asoka of the Buddhist chronicles
and the Asoka of the rock edicts has been much discussed. The chronicles' Emperor is an
idealist abstraction within the context of Indian Buddhist thought, while the inscriptions'
Emperor is a practical, if pompous, ruler of an Indian state. The Buddhists needed to see a
champion who would do anything to assure the advancement of their religion. Students of
the inscriptions see a man who was able to employ Buddhist organization and ideology to
shore up his rule, much as Constantine employed Christianity. The legend and discernible
career of Asoka raise questions about the meaning and practice of ahiüsā which extend beyond the historical issues of Asoka's intentions and actions. Considering Asoka helps formulate the parameters of ahiüsā in a warlike society and culture, what turns an aggressive
person to ahiüsā and what commitment to ahiüsā, both of kind and of degree, does this
person display afterward? This obviously leads to a confusing array of psychological, sociological and anthropological issues. Taking Asoka as a model I wish simply to explore how
the rise of ahiüsā in the lives of warlike might responsibly be addressed. Ahiüsā has risen
in the lives of warriors and rulers other than Asoka, in many different times and in different
parts of the world.‖
George Victor writes in G. Sundara Ramaiah, K. Ravi, and SDA Joga Rao‘s Buddhism and Peace that holy books by themselves are not enough; what is needed is for people
to put their tenets into action (127).
Victor states: "The point is action promotes peace rather than books and ideals; and
political power will be ahead of everything. Again to clarify this point, a lecture on peace in
a class room is no doubt related to peace, but it is not something making peace or world
peace. Peace making is an effort, a dialogue, an agreement and a resolution that gives joy to
all those concerned and involved. It is not limited to words but culminates in action. A
worldwide action, that yields results alone can contribute for world peace rather than utterances for certain occasions. If one's thoughts and actions are oriented towards his own land
and limited to his won village, how can he contribute for world peace? The efforts of peace
making should transcend the borders of one's own land, then alone the word 'world peace'
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will have a meaning. India's contribution to world peace counts after the land becomes independent and with the emergence of the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru." (127)
George Victor continues: "The sayings may be good, the heritage might be the better, but a commitment and involvement will be the best. Peace relates to the present and
future; and all that glorious past do not help in making peace. The problems of peace are
the problems of the present day society and nations at large. Any discussion on past does
not help to promote peace as 'peace as such relates to the present' and creates a hope for future. the present problems of peace do not have their answers in the past, but needs a thorough dialogue and determination with reference to the contemporary situation. 'Let noble
thoughts come to our minds' and the people at the helm of affairs shall be awakened to make
India to contribute for world peace." (129)
V. MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, POLICE CAN USE APPROPRIATE RESTRAINT TO
AVOID DOING HARM.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, the concept of ahiüā as a virtue applies to the military, the government, and the police.
Concluding quotation from Hirakawa:
―The world in which man lives is one of mutual injury, and life is sustained by sacrificing others. Therefore, the Buddha looked at this life and said, ―Existence is suffering‖ (dukkha). Thus, the actual practice of ahiüsā can be undertaken only on the basis of a
true cognition of life, the contradictions of which are difficult to resolve. That is to say, in
our lives the practice of perfect and absolute ahiüsā in this particular sense is impossible.
The inward feeling of the spirit of ahiüsā, therefore, and its outward manifestation, the act
of ahiüsā, become different from one another. The action of ahiüsā is difficult to perfect,
but the spirit of ahiüsā in the heart is not impossible to perfect, by learning and practice.‖ (289)
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
P.S. Sivasway Aiyer, Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals (Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1935, 1976).
Nathaniel Altman, Ahimsa (Wheaton IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1980).
David W. Chappell (ed.), Buddhist Peacework (Boston: Wisdom, 1999).
Mahinda Deegalle, Buddhism, Conflict, and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka (New York:
Routledge, 2006).
Indu Mala Gosh, Ahimsa Buddhist and Gandhian (Indian Bibliographies Bureau with Balaji
Enterprises, 1988).
Luis Gomez, "Nonviolence and the Self in Early Buddhism" in Kenneth Kraft, Inner Peace/
World Peace (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992).
Margaret Cone and Richard F. Gombrich, ThePerfert Generosity of Prince Vessantara:
A Buddhist Epic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Arthur L. Herman, Community, Violence, and Peace (Albany: SUNY Press, ----).
Akira Hirakawa, ―Ahimsa‖ in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism vol 1 (2) Acala – Akan.Edited by
G.P. Malalasekera (Ceylon: Government Press, 1963).
Frank J. Hoffman, ―Asoka‖ in Encyclopedia of Monasticism (Chicago: Fitzroy Deaborn,
2000).
Frank J. Hoffman, ―Gandhi‖ in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(London: Routledge, 1998).
I.B. Horner, Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society,
1967).The Wheel Publication Series # 104.
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David J. Kalupahana, The Buddha and the Concept of Peace (Sri Lanka: Sarvodaya,1999).
Kenneth Kraft, Inner Peace, World Peace: essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
George Kotturan, Ahimsa: Gautama to Gandhi (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1973).
S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989).
Amrut W. Nakhre, Social Psychology of Nonviolent Action (Delhi: Chanaka Publications,
1982).
Rajendra Prasad, Varnadharma, Nishkama Karma, and Practical Morality (New Delhi:
D.K. Printworld, 1999).
I. Proudfoot, Ahimsa and a Mahabharata Story (Canberra: Australian National University,
1987). Asian Studies Monographs, new series no. 9.
Gail Hinich Sutherland, Nonviolence, Consumption, and Community Among Ancient Indian
Ascetics (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1997).
Richard M. Swiderski, "Giving Up the Struggle: The Rise of Ahimsa in the Lives of the
Warlike" in S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989).
G. Sundara Ramaiah, K. Ravi, and SDA Joga Rao, Buddhism and Peace: an Interdisciplinary Study, Essays in Honour of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Visakhapatnam: Andhra
University, 1991).
S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989).
Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, "Equality, Ethnicity, and the Political Potential of Buddhism" p
25-33 in S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989).
Arturo Speziale, The Ethical and Religious Values of Ancient India (Calcutta: Sujan Publications, 1987).
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Kedar Nath Tiwari, Classical Indian Ethical Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998).
Venerable Thich Nhat Hahn, "Ahimsa: The Path of Harmlessness" in David W. Chappell
(ed.), Buddhist Peacework (Boston: Wisdom, 1999).
P. George Victor, "Individuals and Nations for Peace" in G. Sundara Ramaiah, K. Ravi, and
SDA JogaRao, Buddhism and Peace: an Interdisciplinary Study, Essays in Honour of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama (Visakhapatnam: Andhra University, 1991).
KoshelyaWalli, Ahimsa in Indian Thought (Varanasi: BharataManisha, 1974).
G. Sundara Ramaiah, K. Ravi, and SDA JogaRao, Buddhism and Peace: an Interdisciplinary Study, Essays in Honour of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Visakhapatnam: Andhra
University, 1991).
Discourse of the Honey-Ball, (Madhupiõóikasutta) MLS pp. 141-148; MN I 108-114.
Discourse with Aïgulimāla MLS II p 284 Abhayakumarasutta MN
END NOTES
This paper is an expanded version of "Buddhism and Nonviolence" read at the 13th International Congress of Vedanta, Sept. 12-15, 2002, at Miami University of Oxford Ohio.
"Buddhism and Nonviolence". It was revised and presented in Kandy (2011).
2
I. Proudfoot writes:
―For instance, in enumeration so the universal norms
(sadhāranadharma) it implies not causing injury; or, as a penitential discipline, it may connote not adopting an aggressive attitude; or, in terms of yogic practice, not having an unsullied spirit which could produce aggressive emotions. Along another spectrum, it may imply
not taking life, or not causing pain or not causing an apprehension of injury. Or again it
may relate to different spheres of action, expressing a principle of social morality, an ascetic
ideal, a quality of sacrificial procedure, and so forth. Running through all these variations is
another kid of dichotomy, between ahimsā seen in terms of the effect on the object (‗noninjury‘) and ahiüsā as a quality of the subject (‗non-injuriousness‘).
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Needless to say, no single translation is adequate to encompass this range of connotations. If one is necessary as an expedient, ‗harmlessness‘ is least prejudicial to the wide
range of possible meaning of ahimsa. I thus the advantage of ambiguously representing
both ‗non-injury‘ and ‗non-injuriousness.‘‖ I. Proudfoot, Ahiüsā and a Mahābhārata Story
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1987). Asian Studies Monographs, new series
no. 9), p. 1.
3
Indu Mala Gosh, Ahimsa Buddhist and Gandhian (Indian Bibliographies Bureau with Balaji Enterprises, 1988), p. 17.
I.B.Horner, "Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life" (Kandy: Sri Lanka, Buddhist Publication Society, 1967). The Wheel Publication No. 104, p.3.
4
KedarNathTiwari, Classical Indian Ethical Thought (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 1998),
pgs. 64-65.
5
Rajendra Prasad, Varnadharma, Nishkama Karma, and Practical Morality (New Delhi:
D.K. Printworld, 1999), p. 145 and p. 150 shows the appeal of secularism in a way that does
not exclude the religious but which contrasts with fundamentalism.
6
7
David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976),
p. 38.
I.B. Horner (trans.), ―Discourse of the Honey-Ball‖ (Madhupiõóikasutta) Middle Length
Sayings pgs. 141-148; MajjhimaNikāya I 108-114.
8
9
Key terms here are 'Stick-in-Hand' (daõóapāni) -- nickname of pretentious fellow who
walks with a gold cane and questions Buddha; brahmin' -- in Buddhist (NOT Hindu) useage,
'true brahmin' one who follows the Buddhist path; 'obsessions' (papañca) -- cravings, also
conceptual proliferations; stopping the obsessions without remainder is enlightenment
(nibbāna); sensory impingement or contact (phassa) -- important in the causal analysis of
sorts of consciousness and bondage to things of the world
10
See Akira Hirakawa, ―Ahimsa‖ in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism vol 1 (2) Acala – Akan.
Ed. y G.P. Malalasekera (Ceylon: Government Press, 1963).
I.B.Horner, "Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life" (Kandy: Sri Lanka, Buddhist Publication Society, 1967). The Wheel Publication No. 104, p. 2.
11
12
Luis O. Gomez, "Nonviolence and the Self in Early Buddhism" in Kenneth Kraft (ed.),
Inner Peace, World Peace (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 45. Gomez continues to say:
―In many cases, abstention was regarded as ethically equivalent to involvement, and the
practice of nonviolence was motivated as much by an ideal of self-realization as by an ideal
of cosmic healing.
We also found that the close connection between self-cultivation and nonviolence, an
essential feature of early Buddhism, raises important questions about the role of the self. As
a ritual symbol, nonviolence serves as a mechanism for constructing or maintaining a self50
Frank J. Hoffman
image. In other contexts as well, nonviolence involves self-assertion as much as self-denial.
It might be said that the self that is asserted is that of all beings. Yet the individual self, first
split into self and other, then reintegrated in the experience of non-self, is what gives meaning to the concept of all beings, and to the activity of nonviolence.
While not harming and no-self are the fundamental guidelines of Buddhist ethics, the
specific application of these guidelines is not always clear. How are we to deal with the
problems that arise when we try to implement the principles of nonviolence in our daily
lives or in larger social contexts? What about situations in which avoiding violence may
lead to the suffering of others? How about cases where justice seems to require [p. 45 ends]
violence? [p. 46 starts here] Buddhist texts address some of these issues but leave others
unresolved. In the AvatamsakaSutta (which unfortunately has no early counterpart), a paradox is used to define the Buddhist ideal of altruism: "The bodhisattva will not give up one
single living being for the sake of all beings, nor will he give up all beings for the sake of
one living being."
What distinguishes (or should distinguish) advocates of nonviolence who identify themselves with Buddhist teachings is a recognition of the indispensable link between nonviolence and self-cultivation. The Vinaya rules imply that nonviolence forms part of a morality
of abstention, in which one's own daily behavior is the starting-point of any campaign for
peace. Refraining from lying, for example, would take precedence over public verbal activities such as issuing proclamations in support of world harmony (or writing essays on ahimsa). Similarly, it may be more valuable to recycle one's recyclable trash on a regular basis
than to join marches on behalf of the environment. Even working in a crisis center for victims of family violence might still represent a step outside the primary arena of concern.
The core of Buddhist nonviolence is a very humble kind of practice. Its basis is not harming, not stealing, not lying, and so on.
If ethical behavior could be governed by principles that would provide, in all circumstances, an unambiguously moral and rational course of action, then self-cultivation would
center on compliance, and we would no longer be able to speak of virtue. But Buddhist self
-cultivation nurtures a kind of virtue that transcends mere compliance with moral principles.
Thus when Buddhists speaks of a Buddha or a saint, they say that he or she has gone beyond
merit and demerit, beyond good and evil, beyond self and other, "beyond the heavens and
the hells." For those who have attained this state, "love is ever present in the mind." (46)
Luis O. Gomez, "Nonviolence and the Self in Early Buddhism" in Kenneth Kraft (ed.), Inner Peace, World Peace (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), p. 46.
13
See KedarNathTiwari, Classical Indian Ethical Thought (Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass,
1998), pgs. 128-133, on niskama karma, i.e.‖action for no selfish gain, for no desired
end‖ (p. 130).
14
Cynthia KeppleyMahmood, "Equality, Ethnicity, and the Political Potential of Buddhism"
p 25-33 in S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989), p. 32-33.
15
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Venerable ThichNhat Hahn, "Ahimsa: The Path of Harmlessness" in David W. Chappell
(ed.), Buddhist Peacework (Boston: Wisdom, 1999), p. 155.
16
Warlike" in S. Narayan (ed.), Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1989), p. 121.
17
I.B. Horner, Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1967). The Wheel Publication Series # 104, p. 3.
18
19
G. SundaraRamaiah, K. Ravi, and SDA JogaRao, Buddhism and Peace: an Interdisciplinary Study, Essays in Honour of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Visakhapatnam: Andhra
University, 1991).
20
52
Love and Social Justice 1
Susanne Mrozik
This paper explores the intersection of Buddhism with social justice work in the US today.
In the paper, I focus scholarly attention on two social justice activists, both of whom draw
upon Buddhist meditation and philosophy to deal with racial, class and gender discrimination in the contemporary US. Before proceeding, however, I wish to clarify that I have chosen to discuss the contemporary US not because I think the US is more important than Sri
Lanka or any other country. I absolutely do not think that. I love Sri Lanka and deeply value its many contributions, including its Buddhist contributions, to the world. I am limiting
my comments to the US context because this is the context in which I have been able to
study the relationship between Buddhism and social justice work.
The first activist is bell hooks, an African American woman and distinguished US professor,
who has published extensively on racial, class and gender discrimination. Please note that
hooks uses an unconventional lowercased spelling of her pen name in order to downplay the
authority of herself as ‗author‘; she wants her readers to focus on what she says instead of
who she is. hooks is a practitioner of Buddhist meditation and draws extensively upon Buddhist meditation and philosophy in her writing. Buddhist meditation and philosophy offer
her tools to ‗transform a culture of domination and oppression into one of love‘ (hooks
1996,292).
Scholars of Buddhism usually speak of ‗loving kindness‘ (mettā) and
‗compassion‘ (karuõā), rather than ‗love‘. hooks, however, uses the language of love because there is a long history of religious and ethical discourse on love in the West, due in
part to Christianity‘s emphasis on love. hooks who was raised in a Christian community,
draws upon both Christianity and Buddhism in her work and uses language familiar to her
US audience. The complex relationship in the US between Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism is itself a fascinating topic, but one outside the scope of this brief paper. I can only
note here that it is not unusual in the US for religious practitioners to draw from more than
one religious tradition, perhaps because the US is home to so many different religions.
What does hooks mean by the word ‗love‘? For some Buddhists, the word ‗love‘ may have
negative connotations, signifying attachment and clinging. hooks, however, has a more expansive vision of love, one that, in fact, comes close to modern socially engaged Buddhist
concepts of loving kindness and compassion. For hooks, love is the opposite of attachment;
love takes us beyond our attachment to self-gratification, whether gratification through romantic love or other sources of worldly pleasure (see hooks 2000, 19, 108, 111). As she
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puts it in an American idiom, love is not about ‗getting what one wants, whether it‘s a hug
or a new sweater or a trip to Disneyland‘ (hooks 2000, 19, 108, 111). Rather, love is the
experience of connection with others. And here hooks uses language familiar to a Buddhist
audience, namely, language that evokes the Buddhist teaching of dependent co-arising
(pratãtya-samutpāda): she speaks of interdependence, interconnection, and interbeing (Just
as Buddhists in the US may draw upon more than one religious tradition in their writings,
so too they may draw upon more than one branch of Buddhism in their writings.)
For hooks, love is the experiential realization of interbeing. It is the opening of our hearts to
the larger network of interconnected beings. It is also, according to hooks, ‗an active practice‘ (hooks 1996, 287; see also hooks 2000, 165, 171). Opening our hearts to others requires taking their needs as seriously as our own. Thus love and social justice work go hand
-in-hand for hooks (hooks 2000, 19). An advocate of socially engaged Buddhism, she believes that love ‗leads to greater commitment and involvement with the world‘ (hooks 1996,
289) furthermore this commitment to the world is a commitment to the spiritual as well as
material welfare of others. There is an explicitly religious dimension to hooks‘ vision of
social justice. Indeed on several occasions hooks defines love as ‗the will to extend one‘s
self for the purpose of nurturing one‘s own or another‘s spiritual growth‘, borrowing this
definition from an American psychiatrist‘s publications on love (Peck 1978, 81,qtd. in
hooks 2004).
So let us examine how hooks draws on Buddhist meditation and philosophy to create a ‗love
ethic‘ and why she believes this ‗love ethic‘ can help to alleviate the suffering caused by
discrimination. hooks writes that ‗[to] commit to love is fundamentally to commit to a life
beyond dualism. That‘s why, in a culture of domination, love is so sacred. It erodes dualisms - the binary oppositions of black and white, male and female, right and wrong‘ (hooks
1996, 287). Why? Because love, which is the active practice of working to benefit others,
requires that we pay careful attention to others. Love, I would argue, is for hooks a mindfulness practice, prompting us to engage in what Thich Nhat Hanh calls ‗deep looking‘ and
‗deep listening‘ of others. Deep looking and listening makes it much harder to reduce others
to smimplistic dualisms. As hooks observes: ―when we hear another person‘s thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, it is more difficult to project onto them our perceptions of who they
are‘ (hooks 2000, 49). Speaking autobiographically, she further observes: ―In my case, life
was easier when I felt that I could trust another black person more than I could trust a white
person. To face the reality that this is simply not so is a much harder way to live in the
world…things are always more complex than they seem. [Understanding] this is what it
means to see clearly. Such understanding is more useful and more difficult than the idea
that there is a right and wrong, or a good or bad, and you only have to decide what side
you‘re on. In real love, real union or communion, there are no simple rules‘ (hooks 1996,
289).
hooks informs us that it was ‗the Buddhist call to move beyond dualisms‘ that first attracted
her to Buddhism (hooks 1996,287). In other words, it was Buddhism‘s critique of all con54
Susanne Mrozik
ventional labels and identities
philosophically articulated as the teachings of no-self
[anātman] and emptiness [†ånyatā] that first attracted hooks to Buddhism. Why? Because
labels and identities like black and white, male and female, right and wrong, often serve as
the basis for oppression. From the very beginning, therefore, hooks harnesses the Buddhist
meditational and philosophical goal of seeing clearly, that is, of seeing reality as it is to the
social justice goal of alleviating suffering caused by discrimination. Scholarship on Buddhism in the US still focuses a disproportionate attention on white converts to Buddhism.
But in addition to the long history of Asian and Asian American Buddhists in the US, dating
back to the 19th century, there is also a more recent history of convert Buddhists of color,
including African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. Again and again we read in
their publications that Buddhism speaks to them in part because it offers tools to alleviate
the suffering caused by discrimination (e.g., essays in Baldoquin 2004: Unno in Gregory
and Mrozik 2008; Willis 2001) for these socially engaged Buddhists, the Buddhist goal of
ending suffering includes ending the suffering caused by racial, class, and/ or gender discrimination.
I turn now to a second soial justice activist. Her name Hilda Ryumon Gutierrez Baldoquin.Baldoquin, who was born in Cuba of African and Spanish heritage, and who moved
later with her family to the US is a Soto Zen priest and social justice activist. Like hooks,
she uses Buddhist meditation and philosophy to lessen our attachment to labels and identities that serve as a basis for oppression. For example, she writes:
In my experience, systems of oppression necessitate notions of identity, and consequently,
our habitual attachment to this notion perpetuates oppression. It is the nature of oppression
to obscure the limitless essence, the vastness of who we are – that the nature of our mind is
luminous, like a clear pool reflecting a cloudless sky (Baldoquin 2004, 181 – 182)
Our attachment to notions of identity – both those we construct for ourselves and those we
project onto others - divide living beings into mutually exclusive and antagonistic categories
of victim and perpetrator. This generates further suffering and obscures the true nature of
our reality, that is, our condition of interdependence. It also obscures ‗the vastness of who
we are‘, by which Baldoquin means our capacity for liberation, that is, our capacity for unbounded wisdom and compassion.
Coming from historically disadvantaged communities in the US, Baldoquin and hooks are
especially concerned about attachment to the identity of victim. In other words, they are
concerned about internalized racism and sexism, among other possible internalized negative
identities. Indeed hooks argues that [in] ‗ a culture of domination, preoccupation with victimhood and identity is inevitable‘ (hooks 1996, 288). ―A culture of domination like ours
says to people: There is nothing in you that is of value; everything of value is outside you
and must be acquired‘ (1996,291). She speaks of women and African Americans, who in
spite of great professional success, still feel a ‗deep-seated sense of unworthiness that is potentially more life-threatening than structures of domination‘ (hooks 1996, 290-291).
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How do we let go of our deep-seated habitual attachment to notions of identity, whatever
they might be for each of us individually? Not surprisingly, hooks and Baldoquin turn to
meditation, especially mindfulness meditation (Baldoquin 2004, 183-184). Indeed, hooks
argues that meditation is the starting point for all individual and communal transformation:
A fundamental shift in consciousness is the only way to transform a culture of
domination and oppression into one of love. Contemplation is the key to this shift.
There is no change without contemplation. The image of Buddha under the Bodhi
tree illustrates this – here is an action taking place that may not appear to be a meaningful action. Yet it transforms (hooks 1996, 292).
So my first point is that social justice activists like hooks and Baldoquin draw upon Buddhist meditation and philosophy to address the suffering of discrimination. In this way Buddhist perspectives are shaping human values in US society by becoming part of social justice advocacy.
My second point is that moving beyond dualisms, that is, letting go of labels and identities can never be an exscuse to ignore the fact that labels and identities like black and white,
male and female, right and wrong are in fact regularly used as a basis for oppression. In
Buddhist philosophical terms, we need to hold together conventional and ultimate perspectives on reality, as Baldoquin argues, drawing upon the Mahayāna philosopher Nagarjuna:
Nagarjuna distinguishes between two ways of perceiving reality, which he calls two
‗truths‘. From the standpoint of ultimate truth, distinctions such as those of race,
ethnicity, and class have no meaning. From the standpoint of conventional truth,
however, they do. The challenge is for us to recognize that the world as we know it
is far less solid and fixed than we think it is. Concepts like race, ethnicity and class
are merely conventional concepts and lack any ultimate meaning. But this doesn‘t
mean that they don‘t matter. Nagarjuna was careful to say that ultimate truth does
not negate conventional truth: Instead it teaches us to see the conventional world
with a more open heart and mind; it encourages us to let go of our prejudices because we see that they have no ultimate meaning. Unfortunately some dharma practitioners [i.e., white practitioners in North America] use ultimate truth as a way of
denying the reality of the pain of racism and oppression, but for something that supposedly isn‘t real, it sure as heck hurts. Ultimate truth isn‘t supposed to make us
stop caring about the pain of others; it‘s supposed to inspire us to stop that pain
(Baldoquin in Gregory and Mrozik 2008, 148).
According to hooks, the point of moving beyond attachment to labels and identities, is to
learn how to ‗hold one another accountable for the positions we occupy in dominator culture
without evoking a politics of blame or victimhood‘, which makes communication and
change impossible (hooks in Gregory and Mrozik 2008, 39). The challenge for those of us
committed to social justice is to combine accountability with love: to be mindful of each
other‘s suffering, to be mindful of our complicity in systems of oppression, but also to re56
Susanne Mrozik
member that each of us are always more than any conventional labels and identities, each of
us has an unbounded capacity for wisdom and compassion. Hooks writes:
In my work I am constantly grappling with ways to end dominator culture. I am
constantly face to face with the suffering caused by imperialist white supremacist
capitalist patriarchy…Thinking outside the box of dualism and living a practice of
equanimity gives my life balance. But more than that, spiritual practice is the circle
surrounding this work, the force empowering me to open my heart…to have a practice of compassion that joins rather than separates, that takes the broken bits and
pieces of our damaged self and world, bringing them together‘ (hooks in Gregory
and Mrozik 2008, 39)
Indeed, hooks re-defines the Buddhist middle way as precisely this effort to combine accountability with love. The Buddhist middle way for her is a ‗space of radical openness…
that invites the communication‘ (Gregory and Mrozik 2008,39). Returning to Baldoquin‘s
invocation of the two truths, I would argue that the Buddhist middle way entails holding
both truths together. When we privilege a conventional perspective, we buy into the limited
and limiting labels that obscure ‗the vastness of who we are‘. When we privilege an ultimate perspective, we pretend that our differences do not matter, which can make us complacent about addressing the iniquities in our communities (Mrozik 2008,14).
Now I come to my third and final point, which takes outside Buddhist Studies to Postcolonial Studies and the work of Gayatri Spivak. I was excited to learn that Spivak is also writing
about love (Devi 1994) the context for Spivak‘s writings on love is her engagement with
historically disadvantaged tribal communities in India and her translation of the Bengali author Mahesweta Devi‘s stories about these communities. Very briefly, Spivak adds to the
proceeding discussion of love the following: 1) She warns of the danger of paternalism and
ethnocentrism, which can accompany or even motivate efforts to help those labeled as
needy. She cautions against an arrogance that assume that gifts flow in one direction only –
from privileged to disadvantaged. The so-called ‗needy‘ have as much to give as those dispensing their benevolence (Devi 1994 xxv, 200). 2) Like hooks and Baldoquin, Spivak believes that the key to love is refusing to reduce persons to conventional labels and identities;
like them, she believes that love requires us to make the effort to know others in their
‗ethical singularity‘ (Devi 1994, xxiv; Spivak 2005, passim). But she is also realistic about
the fact that we can never fully know another person, especially when we occupy different
positions in local or global hierarchies. Thus love – the effort to open oneself up to another
in a mutual exchange of giving and receiving – is both necessary and always just outside our
grasp (Devi 1994, xxv).
I find Spivak‘s humility especially instructive since I as a white, middle-class, universityeducated US citizen, come from one of the most unfairly privileged social groups in the
world today. Bringing together hooks, Baldoquin and Spivak, I am trying to learn how to
combine love with accountability, opening my heart to the larger interconnected network of
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beings in a mutual exchange of giving and receiving, but always mindful of the ways in
which my own unfair privilege shapes these interactions. More broadly, I would argue that
social justice activists like hooks and Baldoquin, who turn to Buddhist meditation and philosophy to alleviate the suffering of racial, class, and gender discrimination, have much to
teach contemporary Buddhists about ‗suffering and the stopping of suffering‘ (MajjhimaNikāya 1.140 qtd. In Hallisey 1998).
Works cited
Devi Mahasweta (introduced and translated by GayatriChakarvortySpivak), 1994, Imaginary Maps, Routledge
Gregory, Peter N., and Susanne Mrozik, eds., 2008, Women Practicing Buddhism: American Experiences, Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications.
Baldoquin,HildaRyumon Gutierrez, 2004, ‗ Don‟t Waste Time in Dharma Color, and Culture:New Voices in Western Buddhism, ed. Baldoquin,Berkley : Parallax Press.
Hallisey, Charles,1998, ‗Buddhism‘, Evil & Suffering, ed. Jacob Neusner, Cleveland,OH:
the Pilgrim Press
hooks, bell,1996, ‗Contemplation and Transformation‘ in Buddhist Women on the Edge:
Contemporary Perspective from theWestern Frontier, ed. Marianne Dresser, Berkeley:
North Atlantic Books.
---,2000, All About Love: New Visions: New York: William Morrow.
Hallisey, Charles,1998, ‗Buddhism‘, Evil & Suffering, ed. Jacob Neusner, Cleveland ,OH:
the Pilgrim Press
hooks, bell,1996, ‗Contemplation and Transformation‘ in Buddhist Women on the Edge:
Contemporary Perspective from theWestern Frontier, ed.Marianne Dresser, Berkeley:
North Atlantic Books.
Kasimow, Harold John P. Keenan,and Linda Klepinger Keenan, eds.,2003, Beside Still Waters: Jews, Chistians,and the Way of theBuddha Somerville ,MA: Wisdom Publications.
Mrozik, Susanne,2008, ‗What does Buddhist Practice Mean to American Women?‘, in Peter
N. Gregory and Susanne Mrozik,eds., Women Practicing Buddhism: Americn Experiences,
Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications.
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Peck, M. Scott, 1978, The Road Less Travelled: A New Psychlogy of Love: Traditional Values and Spiritual Growth, NewYork:Touchstone.
Seager, Richard Hughes, 2012, Buddhism in America, 2nd ed.., New York: Columbia University Press.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 2005, ‗Scattered Speculations on the Subaltern and the Popular‘ in Postcolonial Studies 8:4:475-476.
Willis, Janice Dean, 2008 (reprint of 2001), Dreamng Me: Black, Baptist and Buddhist: One
Woman‟s Spiritual Journey, Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications.
END NOTES
1. The paper was originally presented at the 4th Bi-annual International Conference of
Sri Lanka Association for Buddhist Studies, at the Sri Lanka International Buddhist
Academy, Pallekele,Kandy, Sri Lanka, December 11, 2010. I am grateful to the USSri Lanka Fulbright Commission for making my participation in that conference possible, as well as for supporting me through a longer period of research in Sri Lanka.
2. There are many publications on Buddhism in the US. Readers may wish to consult
Kasimow, et al 2003 and Seager 2012
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60
Contemporary Issues in Buddhist Ecological Studies:
Some Gleanings
Anand Singh
The twentieth century produced some new approaches and dimensions with which to examine the academic and theological interpretations of human relations with nature and consequent ecological degeneration. Scholars are taking a keen interest to interpret and apply the
teachings of the Buddha to investigate and apply Buddhist doctrines to environmental concerns. My present paper merely analyzes the evolution and growth of such investigations
and concerns and postulates some suggestions wherever it is appropriate.
In a controversial article penned in 1967 on Christianity and the environment, Lynn White,
while criticizing Christianity, commended Buddhism for its holistic and egalitarian
worldview in contrast to Christian ideology. White, in his essay, argues that Buddhism promotes preservation and sustainability while Christianity encourages human domination over
nature which leads to environmental crisis.1 It caused widespread furor among the scholars
studying Christianity who challenged the hypothesis set a-float by White and pointed out
that western ethical practices overwhelmed by Christian ethics encompass at least five attributes towards nature –(i)) ‗despotic‘, (ii) ‗dominion over‘ (iii) ‗stewardship‘ (iv)
‗subordination to‘ and (v) ‗particular in‘2 It emboldened Donald K. Swearer to categorize
Buddhist ecological studies into five taxonomical classifications – (i) ‗eco apologists‘ (ii)
eco-critics‘ (iii) – ‗eco-constructivists (iv) – ‗eco-ethicists‘ and (v)- ‗eco-contextualists.‘3
The ‗eco-apologists‘ support that environmentalism is embedded in Buddhist texts and traditions. The prominent monologues and books which support this hypothesis are – DharmaGaiya: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism & Ecology, (ed.) Allen Hunt Badiner (1990),
Buddhism & Ecology, (ed.) Martine Batchelor& Kerry Brown (1992) and Dharma Rain:
Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism, (ed)Stephanie Kaza& Kenneth Kraft (2000)4 The
‗eco-critics‘ counter arguments proposed by the ‗apologists‘ and propounded that Buddhist
ethics and tradition are not compatible with modern environmentalism. They contend that
modern ecological problems are new to human species, so that text compiled in the preChristian era cannot essentially explain and solve such problems. Ian Harris is the main
proponent of this school who says that soteriology of Buddhism is based on negative assessment of nature as fundamentally unsatisfactory (dukkha), and subject to change (anicca)
which does not promote grounds for environmental ethics. He charges that Buddhist tradition is primarily anthropocentric, not bio-centric and emphatically focuses on spiritual liberation.5.
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The ‗eco-constructivists‘ believe that Buddhist environmental ethics can be constructed
from Buddhist doctrinal tenets and recommend a critical analytical approach towards the
formation of a Buddhist environmental ethics based on normative commitments. Lambert
Schmithausen suggessts that a viable Buddhist environmental ethics depend upon realizing a
positive value in nature and natural diversity but in such a way that essentials of tradition are
not lost. Schmithausen says that early Buddhist tradition does not ascribe to nature an inherent value, neither in life as such, nor in species or eco-system. The issue is not preserving,
restricting, transforming or subjugating nature but only for liberation (vimutti) for all constituents of the existence.6 Even the soteriological orientation of early Buddhism cannot be
constructed to have a positive ecological consequence in such a way that a person who has
attained nibbāna or motivated by karuõā or mettāis to act on behalf of other sentient beings.7
The ‗eco-ethicists‘ perceive that a viable Buddhist environmental ethics should be evaluated
in reference to Buddhist ethics. The interest and concerns of religion and ecology should be
closely interlinked. E.F.Shumaker says that the Buddha recommends a reverent and nonviolent attitude to all sentient beings and plants. In his book Small is beautiful, he advocates a
non-exploitative Buddhist lifestyle of simplicity, non-violent and moderate consumption.8
The ‗eco-contextualists‘ speaks about Buddhist environmentalism out of particular contexts
and situations. The protests of Buddhist monks and civilians against deforestation and installation of cable cars on the revered southern mountains of Chian Mai province of Thailand could be examples of it. Donald K.Swearer says that,
‘
This ongoing narratives that connect myth and history, past and present,humans and
nature give an environmental ethics a multi dimensionalinclusiveness it otherwise lacks,‟9
Seth Devere Clippard in his essay The Lorax Wears Saffron: Towards aBuddhist Environmentalism argues for the reorientation of Buddhist ecological studies. His argument is
based on the suggestions given by Swearer with some modifications and adjustments in
thought and methodology dealing with such studies. He says that eco-Buddhist ethics need
focus on establishing textual justification of what Buddhist environmental ethics says towards a discourse in which Buddhist rhetoric and environmental practices are intimately
linked through specific communal encounters.10 Ian Harris in his paper The Causation of
Telos: The Problem of Buddhist Environmental Ethics says that early Buddhist literature
possesses elements that may harmonize with ecological consciousness but their outlook towards the causal process minimizes the chances of developing an authentic Buddhist environmental ethics. He categorizes the scholars who are engaging themselves in ecological
studies in Buddhism into four groups- 1. Forthright endorsement of Buddhist environmental
ethics by traditional representatives of doxic truth.H.H.Dalai Lama is the most suitable representative of this school.11
2. The Japanese and North American scholars who accept that Buddhism has resources to
address the current environmental issues.12
62
Anand Singh
Contemporary Issues in Buddhist Ecological Studies…
.
3. Critical treatments, which while acknowledging the difficulties involved in reconciling
traditional modes of thought with those employed by scientific ecology, and optimistic
about the possibility of establishing an authentic Buddhist response to environmental problems,13
4. Outright rejection of the possibility of using Buddhist environmental ethics on the
grounds that the other-worldliness of Pāli literature implies a negation of the natural realm
for all practical purposes.14
Pragati Sahni follows the pattern of Ian Harris and classifies the trends in Buddhist ecological studies into four categories (i) The writing which believes ardently that Buddhism is environmental can be categorized as ‗partisan‘. Those who believe that claims of Buddhist
environmentalism can be validated by Buddhist texts are ‗positivists‘ and the third group
which belongs to a judgmental approach to determine the extent of Buddhism as ecological
is known as ‗sanguine‘.15
Though my intention is not to divide Buddhist ecological studies into domains of particular
approaches and dialectical knots but to facilitate these studies in a homogeneous and holistic
direction, the following taxonomical classification has been evolved:
1.
Engaging Buddhist texts and traditions
2.
Antithesis and counter arguments
3.
Towards engaged Buddhism and Buddhist approach to deep and shallow ecology.
In the present paper the first two domains will be covered in its broader spectrum.
Engaging Buddhist Texts and Traditions
The folowers of the school who seek seeds of environmentalism in Buddhist canonical texts
and traditions, consider nature as an entity out of which everything has been originated but
that human beings can be alienated from it. It cannot be considered a mere physical world
external to man. One of the earliest exponents who supported this view is Lily de Silva who
discovered a close relationship between human morality and nature. In her essay The Hill
Wherein My Soul Delights, she explores ecological aspects found in early Buddhist texts and
says that,
“Modern humanity has exploited nature without any moral restraint to such an extent that
nature has been rendered almost incapable of sustaining healthy life. Invaluable gift of nature, such as air and water have been polluted with disastrous consequences. Humanity is
now searching for ways and means of converting the pollution problems as our health is
almost threatened.16
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She points out moral degeneration in human society by citing the examples in Buddhist canonical literature and examines the impact on life of their various dimensions. She divides
her essay into ‗Nature as dynamic‘, ‗Morality and Nature‘, ‗Human Use of Natural Resources‘, ‗Attitudes Towards Animal and Plant Life, and ‗Atitudes Towards Pollution‘. In
the chapter ‗Nature as dynamic‘ she deals with anicca as one of the important characteristics
of nature and the world considered as dynamic though they lead to disintegration. (lujjatiti
loko),17 While discussing ‗Morality and Nature‘ she reiterates Buddhist doctrines that the
natural process is affected by the morals of humanity as exemplified in Agga¤¤a and CakkavattisihanādaSutta of the DãghaNikāya. Both sutta-s narrate that lobha is the main cause for
decline of human civilization.18 With further reference to Sigālovādasutta, KaranãyamettaSutta, NandivisālaJātaka she feels that humans survive on natural resources but their consumption must be accompanied by moral restraint and the doctrines of true kamma and rebirth which make for a sympathetic attitude of mind in people towards nature.19
Stephen Batchelor in his essay The sand of the Ganges – Notes Towards a Buddhist Ecological Philosophy relates human existence as one of many forms of life existing in the universe and among them birth as a human being is seen as an exceptional opportunity. The
unwanted and unwarranted greed lead to deterioration of the universe and only teachings of
the Buddha can revive the lost vision of wholeness of the universe to save it from the brink
of disaster.26 The healing process starts with putting his own life in order by avoiding lobha and moha.20 In another essay of his The Buddhist Economics Rediscovered he puts forward economic terms and values that depend upon non-duality in such a way that the separation between agent, act and object become conceptual on the basis of ÷u¤¤atā . the resultant economics here is to take into account the Buddhist acceptance of reality as ‗acentric‘
which means no one can monopolize in comparison to another.21 Martine Batchelor asserts
that ecological gleaning is possible from Buddhist texts and finds that Buddhism throughout
the ages has been indifferent to any attempt to bestow human life with a flamboyance and
high standard of material life. The aim of the Buddha was to expound the true way of life in
this mundane world in the midst of relationships in the human cycle.‖22
Padmasiri de Silva is another prominent scholar who supports the view that ecological facets can be found in Buddhist canonical texts and traces Buddhist doctrines which are ecologically meaningful.23 He says that Buddhism is able to look into the mirror of nature without attachment, and with a mind of equanimity one can discover the most profound truth in
this mirror and can be blessed to feel the nature of transience in the very rhythm of nature, in
the falling of flowers, the decay of leaves and the change of seasons. It is significant because it reveals an attachment as well as a deep sentiment towards nature.24 Buddhism takes
lobha, dosa and moha as the root of acquisitive, destructive and confused life style. The
wanton greed get expression in diffused life orientation bound in sensuality and hedonism in
reference of kāmataïhā. The lobha also manifests in limitless demand and desire bound to
bhavetaïhā, a destructive and violent attitude to oneself, others and natural world. It finds
expression in the form of hatred, which exhibits sometimes in the self- annihilation instinct
or vibhavataïhā.. The unimaginative pattern of consumption leads to the cycle of desires
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Anand Singh
and disaster. The psychological root of such disaster and recovery are very much imbibed in
the tenets of Buddhism.25
Patñccasamuppāda is the most cherished metaphysical doctrine of the Buddha discussed
among scholars in support or against environmentalism in Buddhism. In a soteriological
explanation Alan Sponberg says that environmentalism is conditioned in the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. Here individual identity is perceived as a dynamic and growing stream of
karmic conditioning that goes to many lives and life forms. The self is a form of dynamic
stream which leads to consequential environment sustaining altruism.26 Sulak Sivaraksa uses the word ‗interdependent‘ for pañiccasamuppāda in place of ‗dependent origination‘ and
propounds that the doctrine of interdependence co-arising is the sui-generis of Buddhist understanding of nature.The anthropocentric ideas are major causes for environmental degradation and pañiccasamuppāda reorients human vision towards more eco friendly world
view.27 David Kalupahana says that Buddhism considers humans as a part of nature, and
dependently arisen like everything else that exists. The learning of such distinctions will
reveal a significant relationship between nature and humanity.28Chatsumarn Kabiisingh also
argues that pañiccasamuppāda can be exemplified for environmentalism and that human
culture as a part of nature can be identified as an individual or collectively as a nation and
will be responsible for utilizing or violating natural laws.29 Andrew Olendzki accepts that
the doctrine of pañiccasamuppāda has not been properly utilized for environmentalism in
Buddhism. If human beings are more interconnected, then there is more attachment to the
conditioned phenomenon but the inherent core idea in Buddhism lies beyond in, viz., more
efforts to get less connected, less entangled and less attached.30 The zeal and aim may be to
become unconnected but pañiccasmuppāda in the context of eco-Buddhism emphasizes how
to survive and live in the world while still in the realm of saüsāra.31Joanna Macy applies the
idea of kamma, anatta and pañiccasamuppāda with nature. In her book World as Lover,
World as Self, she takes inspiration from dependent origination from which she moves to the
nature of the self.
The self coexists with the world and acts for the sake of self means doing for the sake of
others and may be termed as „giving the self‟32.
P.A.Payutto connects the root of environmental problems to lobha and dosa which to lead to
ill conceived consumerism and consumption, the main cause of pollution, poverty and other
social evils. He refers to the fact that environment friendly sutta-s from the Buddhist texts
can be taken without sacrificing very essentials of the tradition.33 The potential for promoting a positive and optimistic attitude to environment in Kindred Sayings of the Buddha like
Kata¤¤utā(gratitude) , muditā (altruistic joy), mettā (loving kindness) and sukha (happiness)
could be utilized .34Bhikkhu Buddhadasa defines human- nature relationship by applying
Dhamma nature to it and compares the degeneration of environment to disregarding and
harming Dhamma.35 He argues that Dhamma represent nature in the sense of natural laws
and as the natural world, so Dhamma as a law of nature can be equated to pañiccasamuppāda.36 Donald K. Swearer says that the difference between Payutto and Buddhadasa
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SIJBS Volume 3
could be surmised by differentiating Buddhadasa‘s spiritual bio-centrism based on identification of nature and Dhamma with Payutta‘s textual strategy in which teachings are more
systematic and more carefully grounded in Pāli texts and Theravada historical traditions.
Payutto says that Buddhist world view of mutual trust and co-operation can be an alternative
to western dualism and materialism which he feels responsible for many forms of global imperils.37 Christopher Ives tries to solve the controversy over use of pañiccasamuppāda by
Buddhist environmentalists. Ives illustrates that when a common environmental concern
like identification with nature is explained in terms of pañiccasamuppāda, one succumbs to
certain ‗rhetorical pitfalls‘.38 Rita M. Gross uses Buddhist texts to solve the issues such as
population, consumption and environment. She argues that Buddhist religion does not encourage reproduction and restraint of population growth as well as unacceptability of slavery and abuse. She also praises the Buddha for preaching majjhimapañipadā as it moderates
the level of consumption.39 Ken Jones in his essay The social Face of Buddhism says that
Buddhist virtues are a matter of character and its importance is on the cultivation of a personality which cannot but be moral, rather than focusing on the morality of particular acts
and choices.40 Allan‘s idea is that the western environmentalism has conceived the notion
of the individual as autonomous but Buddhist virtues reflect a notion of self in dynamic and
developmental mode. Buddhist ethics and soteriology requires a significant integrity or
coherence of personal identity, yet that identity or individuality of the self is seen as a dynamic karmic continuity rather than an essential ontological substantiality. The environmentalism in Buddhism is based in relationship with other species and is framed by understanding of personal identity which is fundamentally trans-human. Buddhism has traditionally molded the problems of inter-species relationship in a quite different manner and as a
result traditional Buddhist environmentalism should be judged in a different manner from its
counterpart in the west. Buddhism locates the humans in profound interrelationship with
other sentient existing and ultimately with the eco-sphere. It has been imbedded in the doctrine of ahimsa or in sunyavāda which could be learnt as examples of non-dualism that entails compassionate activity towards all other beings. It argues that all things are seen as
empty or intrinsic existence, all things could be inter-related and the only possible course of
action becomes real that seeks to compassionately sustain all existence.41 All these scholars
have firm belief that for the cultivation of eco-ethics Buddhist texts and traditions could directly be instrumental and the tenets of the Buddha envisaged formation of such ethics to
actualize the goodwill for nature and society.
Anti-thesis and Counter Arguments:The main spokesman for this school is Ian Harris who questions the presence of environmentalism in Buddhism and says that methodologically Buddhism lacks evidence to sustain
an environmental ethics. He mentions that Buddhism might be sympathetic to animals but
their chief motive could be different. It has no defined environmental ethics and more or
less concerned with dukkha that overwhelmed every aspect of life and the ultimate zeal of
Buddhist doctrines is to attain nibbāna. In Buddhism there is no conformity between nature
and man and it has no doctrinal or historical basis for environmental ethics In the Buddhist
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Anand Singh
metaphysical assumptions the life is a reality about the conditioned existence, suffering and
constant rebirth which differs radically from contemporary metaphysical assumptions dealing with ecology and makes it difficult to evolve an environmental ethics based on Buddhist
world view.42 Harris is extremely critical of Joanna Macy and other scholars of similar approach and blames them for superimposing the teleological principles from process theology
on eco-Buddhism. He says that Macy‘s conclusion leads to anachronism in her treatment of
early Buddhist Indic sources.43 He also criticizes David Kalupahana for his understanding of
nature which interpretation implies all conditioned things are subject to pañiccasamuppāda
and will prelude to human life as a segment of world process.
Kalupahana includes human
44
beings but Harris keeps human beings out of nature. Harris says that the Buddha expressed
mettā towards animals but mettā was seen as a method to calm down these dangerous animals.45 Ian Harris contemplates that concern for the welfare of the animals is not a specific
domain of Buddhism but a larger ethics of civility. The sympathetic attitude for animals is
compatible with Buddhism but does not arise from its core ethics. The wilds are praised in
Buddhist texts and traditions not for its intrinsic value but for its role to facilitate the monastic life. The contemporary eco-ethics does easily set with Buddhist world view of
‗nirvanicatelogy‘. The absence of concern for the future of samsara due to over emphasis on
liberation from it and impermanence render the world a domain devoid of such attributes
and obviate the need to justify concerns for the natural world.46
Clippard explains the word ‗atelogy‘ because Harris argues that Buddhism does not possess
teleology that makes it difficult by justifying particular entities that do not participate in the
process of nibbāna. Clippard found this interpretation of nibbāna problematic and thinks
the ‗atelogy‘ is a compromise between him and Harris.47 Lambert Smithausen also argues
that it is difficult to find an indisputable environmentalism in early Buddhism due to contradictory view regarding nature. He interprets two dimensions of nature which is not directly
linked to human population and the other in direct relation with human beings including
plants and cattle resources. He investigates both these dimensions in early Buddhist Indic
sources with special reference to sentiency of plants in early Buddhist texts.48 In his monumental work the Principle of Sentiency of Plants in Buddhism, he finds that Vedic literature
shows some sort of sentiency in plants and seeds and indicates that everything in the universe has some level of consciousness but the early Pāli texts
do not show such
tradition.
Only positive induction which supplements such views is pañiccasamuppāda. He reflects
that certain verses of the Buddhist texts include plants in the group of animate beings but
also emphasizes that such verses are very few in number.49Smithausen further says hatahiüsā in Buddhism is also categorical. In early Buddhism a monk is not allowed to kill but in
later forms of Buddhism Bodhisatta may kill for restoration of Dhamma.
Peter Harvey in his analysis of environmentalism in Buddhist countries finds that Buddhist
texts may not be always conducive to modern ecological studies but may be seen as ecological because human beings are not all set against nature and have potential to act in a compassionate manner towards all other beings.50 Paul Waldau has almost the same opinion and
proposes that Buddhist Literature offers some support but it is not a regular feature in Bud67
SIJBS Volume 3
dhism. The treatment of animals in early Buddhism is based on two different features first
sympathetic based on karuõā and mettā and the other neglected.51 The root of negligence is
Buddhism‘s preoccupation with human beings52 Florin Deleanu says that unkind treatment
was given to animals but it is not common and some kind of sympathy could also be drawn
towards animals. The unfair treatment depicted in literary sources is mainly because of contemporary literary conventions.53. Malcolm David Eikel has also been critical to environmental ethics in Buddhism and says that Buddhism does not show any subjective view
about acting for the sake of nature.54
However, the opinion set afloat by Harris does not seem to be appropriate because in early
Buddhist texts especially in the gātha literature abundance of sources are found which praise
wildlife and forests. The wilderness is praised because of their attributes not for their role in
monastic development. The relationship between human and animals in Buddhism could be
widely regarded as an important example of resources management and insufficient attention has been paid to such positive functional features of the Buddhist animal complex in
relationship to the costs of ecologically viable alternatives. In Buddhism, the exploitation of
cattle resources proceeds in such a way as not to impair the survival and well being of animal population. In Buddhism the relationship between the human and animal population is
symbiotic rather than competitive. The principles of tikoñiparisuddha and condemnation of
the Vedic yahana-s clearly give the sustainable approach of the Buddha and under new techno-environmental conditions such ideas should be considered to diffuse the modern ecological crisis. The concept of ahiüsā in its traditional context accounts for a reluctance to kill
and eat meat and the Buddha‘s view of eco-system provided, in principle and in fact, for
adaptive and efficient utilization of cattle power and products. The concept of ahimsāand
protection of animal is functionally interrelated with the traditional ecological system and its
parts are certainly interwoven into a complex texture which cannot be changed as long as
traditional eco-system remains functional. It is not possible for a culture to exist and perpetuate itself with a dysfunctional ecosystem. The exponents are concerned with present day
world because the modern ecological crisis emerged in current decades but this eco system
reflects a millennium or more of massive culture contact, including conquest and the forcible imposition of alien principles of socio-politicl and economic organization as well as the
more subtle infiltration of alien values and alternatives. But if we analyze the classical Buddhist eco system, the socio-economic practices as they once were they were beyond the contemporary trauma and dislocation. The concepts of ‗irrational Buddhist eco system‖ is
vague or culture bound. The most of argued relationships within Buddhist ecology are unrecognized, frequently evaded or rejected by `those who propound that Buddhist environmentalism is not possible.
End Notes
1.
White Lynn Jr.The Historical Roots Our Ecological Crisis, 967:1203-1207
2.
Gustafson,James M.A. A Sense of Divine:: The Natural Environment From a theocratic Perspective, 1994 pp.:77-110
68
Anand Singh
3.
Swearer, Donald K. An Assessment of Buddhist Eco Philosophy; 2006 pp. 123-124
4.
Ibid, 200, pp.:125-127
5.
Harris, Ian. Buddhism & Ecology, 200, p.113
6.
Schmithausen, Lambert, Buddhism & Nature, 1997, p11
7.
.Swearer, Donald K. op.cit.2006, pp135-137
8.
Shumacher, E.F. Small is Beautiful, 1973, pp.-56
9.
Swearer, Donald K. Principles & Poetry, Places and Stories: The Resources of Buddhist
Ecology, 2001, pp225-247
10.
Clippard, S.D.The Lorex Wears Saffron: Towards a Buddhist Environmentalism, 2011,p212
11.
Harris, Ian, 1994, pp46-59 (Tenzin Gyatso, His Holiness the 14 Dalai Lama, A Tibetan Buddhist Perspective on Spirit in Nature, in Rochoteller Steven C. & John C. Elder (ed.) Spirit
& nature-Why the environment is a Religious Issue, Boston, (Becon Press, 1992, pp. 109123)
12.
Ibid. [according to Harris the main exponents of this school are-NoritoshiAramaki,
Sshizen-hakaikara-saseie-Rekeshi no tenkainitsuiti (From Destruction of Nature to
Revival of Nature: Ona HistoricalConversation, Deai, 11,1, 1992 , pp.3-22), joanna
Macy , The Greening of Self, In Allan Hunt Badiner (ed.) Dharma Gaiya: A Harvest
of Essays in Buddhism & Ecology, Berkely: Parallex Press, 1990:pp. 53-63, Brian
Brown, Towards a Buddhist Ecological Cosmology, Bucknell Review, 37.2 1993:
pp.124-137]
13.
Schmithhausen, Lambert, Buddhism & Nature, Tokyo: The International Insitute of
Buddhist Studies, 1991, The Problems of Sentience of the Plants, Tokyo: The International Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1991
14.
Hakmaya, Noriaki, Shizen-hihan 10-shite no Bukkyo (Buddhism as a ciriticism of
Physis/Natrua), KomazawadaigakuBukkYoogakabuRamshoo, 21, 1990,pp.280-4-3
15.
Sahni, Pragati, Environmental Ethics in Buddhism, 2006:12
16.
De Silva, Lily, the Hill Where My soul Delights, in Buddhism and Ecology, 1994,
p.17
17.
Ibid, 1994, pp.18-31
18.
Ibid. 1994,pp19-21 (Lily de Silva cites Aïguttara Nikāya which mentions Mount
Sineru which has depth of 184000 leagues and emerges above the sea level up to
84000 leagues. It was a classical symbol of stability and steadfastness but was destroyed by heat without leaving even ashes at a time when multiple suns shine..
A.iV, 100
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SIJBS Volume 3
19.
Ib id, 1994, 22-23
20.
Batchelor, Stephen, The Sand of Ganges, 1994-33-34
21.
Batchelor, Stephen, Buddhist Economics Reconsidered, 1990pp. 78-83
22.
Martine Batchelor, Even Stones Smile, 1994. 1-7
23.
De silva, Padmasiri, Environmental Philosophy & Ethics in Buddhism, 1998.
24.
Ibid, 1998, p.24
25.
Ibid, 1998 p.26
26.
Ibid 1998,26
27.
Sponberg, Alan, The Buddhist Conception of Ecological Self, 1999, pp107
28.
Sivaraksa, Siva, Conflict, Culture & Change: Engaged Buddhism in a Globalized
World, 2005, pp71-75
29.
Kalupahana, David J., Towards a Middle Path Survival, 1991, pp247-256
30.
ChatsumarnKabilsingh, Buddhist Monks & forest Conservation, 1990, pp.301-310
31.
Mcmohan, David, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, 2008,pp181-182
32.
Clippard, S.D.., op.cit. 2011,p220
33.
Joanna Macy, World as Lover, World as Self, 1999,pp181-192
34.
Payutta, P.A. Buddhist Solution For Twenty First Century,1990,pp. 170-171
35.
Payutto, p.A., Khon Thai Kap Pa (Thais and Forest(, 1994, pp.22-24
36.
Swearer Donald K, The Hermeneutics pf Buddhist Ecology in Contemporary Thailand, Buddhadasa&Dhammapitaka, 1997,pp21-44
37.
SantakaoBhikkhu, BuddhadasaBhikkhu Life & Society through the Natural Eyes of
voidness, 1996, pp. 158-161
38.
Swearer, Donald K. 1997, pp30-37
39.
Ives Christofer, In searchof Green Dharma: Philosophical Issues in Buddhist Environmental Ethics, 2008, pp23-44
40.
Gross, Rita M. Buddhist Resources for Issues of Population, Consumption & the Environment, 1997, pp.291-312
41.
Jones, Ken, The Social Face of Buddhism, An approach to Political & Social Activitism, 1989, p.157
70
Anand Singh
42.
Sponberge, Alan, op.cit
43.
Harris, Ian, Causation &Telos: The Problems of Buddhist Environmental Ethics,
1994. 54-55
44.
Harris, Ian, Buddhist Emvoronmental Ethics &Detraditionalization; the Case of Eco
Buddhism, 1995, 199-211
45.
Sajni, Pragati, op.cit.,2008,p.27
46.
Harris, Ian, How Environmental is Buddhism? 1991, p.10746 Harris, Ian, Ecological
Buddhism, 2003, pp..1711-181
47.
Clippard, S.D.op.cit.2011
48.
Schmithhausen, Lambert, Buddhism & Nature, 1991,p.1
49.
Schmithhausen, Lambert, The Principle of Sentiency of Plants in Early Buddhism,
1991,pp.2-6
50.
Harvey Peter, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 2000, pp11-30
51.
Waldau Paul, Buddhism & Animal Rights, 200,pp.81-122
52.
Waldau, Paul, Speciesism in Christianity & Buddhism, 1998, p.229
53.
Deleanu, Florin, Buddhist „Ethology‟in Pali canon Between Symbol & Observation,
2000.pp.79-127
54.
Eckel, Malcom David, Is there Buddhist Philosophy in Nature?, 1997, pp327-349
71
72
The Key to a Successful Life: A Comparative Study on Morality
In Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and that in Buddhist Discourses
Chandima S.M. Wickramasinghe
The core of Aristotle‘s Nicomachean ethics is about making one‘s life a success. In relation to achieving success in one‘s life he refers to identifying and adopting the right values:
the things that are good and bad for man. In this process he makes the individual responsible for his actions and decisions. Furthermore, he also talks about justice, the concept of
pleasure and friendship in his discourses and considers eudaimonia as the supreme good.It
must be noted thatNicomachean ethics was not composed by Aristotle for publication but it
was a collection of his lectures and discussions that took place at Lyceum edited and published by his son Nicomachus after the death of Aristotle.1 The instructions recorded are directed at young men who attended this educational institute in Athens.
Buddhist discourses and instructions on the other hand, are not limited to a particular social
group as such. It addresses the wider society and is rich in discourses and instructions that
help its followers to achieve success in their lives in the course of the phenomenal cycle of
re-birth (Saüsāra cakra) by recognizing the right values. In this process Buddhism guides
both the lay devotees, monks and nuns through multifarious counsels ranging from the simple Five Precepts (Pa¤casãla) to the noble eightfold path (ariya aññhāïgikamagga). Furthermore the concept of good and bad deeds (kusala and akusala kamma respectively) which
makes the doer/agent responsible for his/her actions and decisions which form the core of
Buddhism. The ultimate goal of Buddhism is to attain Nibbana,2 a state of eternal happiness
acquired by shedding all associations and links with the phenomenal world.
The paper compares and contrasts the concepts of morality and the idea of making one responsible for one‘s actions as observable in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean ethics with those in
Buddhism, in order to understand the basis for such instructions in their respective social
and cultural settings. The nature of this study and the possible unfamiliarity of the compared components require us to examine each part independently prior to comparing them.
The Nicomachean ethics begins with problems such as ‗what makes life worth living?‘
‗what is the link between living a fulfilled life and living as we morally ought? 3 His brief
answers to the questions reveal that eudaimonia is what makes life worth living and to live a
life enriched with eudaimoniais the goal of morality. The satisfaction of this answer depends
upon Aristotle‘s definition of the term eudaimonia. In this regard we do not have to exhaust
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SIJBS Volume 3
ourselves as his Nicomachean Ethics begins with an outline of his approach to eudaimonia,
and the basis on which, he thinks, his view rests. Moreover, the last segment of the volume
provides a more detailed account on what he meant by the term eudaimonia.4 It is crucial,
thus, to understand the key technical terms in Aristotle‘s Ethics: Eudaimonia and arête,
which are also vital for this study. Eudaimonia is often translated as ‗happiness‘ but it could
easily give a misleading impression as the English term happiness suggests a feeling of one
kind or another.5 But Aristotle clearly says that his eudaimonia does not contain any such
feeling at all. He states that eudaimonia is accomplishing one‘s full potential and is just not
a matter of feeling although this itself would be very satisfying (x, 7, 1177a11). It is very
much to do with what one has made of oneself and one‘s life. According to Aristotle the
concept of eudaimonia is connected with ‗living well‘ or ‗doing well‘ (l,4,1095a 19). Taking such notions into consideration Hughe translates eudaimonia as ‗fulfilled life‘ or
‗fulfillment‘ and the adjective eudaimonia as ‗fulfilled‘and believes that even this interpretation may not be fully immune to misrepresentations. To overcome such drawbacks he uses
a range of terms such as ‗happiness‘, ‗fulfillment‘, or ‗human flourishing‘ depending upon
the respective context when translating eudaimonia.6
The present study too identifies the difficulty of translating eudaimonia with a single English term as it encapsulates a range of meanings as stated by Hughe. To overcome any
drawback that may occur in this regard the present study uses the original Greek term in
transliteration. A similar approach is taken with regard to the term arête which again encompasses a range of connotations from ‗virtue‘, ‗excellence‘, ‗skill‘, to ‗being good at‘
Nicomachean ethics begins with the objective of life and proceeds to discuss moral goodness, responsibility, moral and intellectual ‗virtues‘ among other topics.7 Apparently, the
aim of aristotle‘s lectures and discussions was to provide good moral theory and moral training to his students who could be potential politicians. Yet, he constantly refers to both ordinary people ane cultured people. He views eudaimonia as the highest of all practical goods,
but is aware that opinions as to what it (eudaimonia) consists of may differ according to individual circumstances (l.iv,1095a09-b13).
Aristotle considers that the knowledge of Good (agathas) is of great importance in conducting our lives. (l1094a1-22) and is of the opinion that the science that studies supreme good
for man is politics (l.ii,1094a22-b10). He further states that the students of politics must
have some general knowledge and experience of life and continues to state that a good student of political science must be conversant with the practical business of life, from which
politics draw its premises and subject-matter (l.iii,1094b11-1095a2). The end is no doubt
eudaimonia but the views on it may differ according to individual and circumstances
(l.iv.1095a-28).8 For instance, while some may consider wealth as eudaimonia, for some it
could be honour or intelligence. Thus many people link eudaimonia, with material or abstract things which bring them good fortune and happiness.9 Aristotle mentions that if anyone wants to make a serious study of ‗fine and just things‘(ethics) or of political science
generally, he must be well trained in habits (l.iv.1095a29-b13). He further says that one
74
The Key to a Successful Life…
who is well trained in habits can easily grasp the moral virtues and if one is neither in possession of them already nor has any possibility to possess them should at least be prepared
to listen to wise men (l.iv.1095a29.b13)10 The emphasis here is rather on training the intellectual sphere that deals with the respective virtues which is vital for smooth functioning of
a society. With regard to life, Aristotle recognizes three tupes, of which the highest he
seems to consider as the contemplative life (x.vii.1177a5-25).11 Thus Aristotle puts more
weight upon the practical activity of the mind which may ultimately lead to correct and just
decisions.
In his discourse on what is good for man he states that it must be an ultimate end or the aim
of human life i.e. something self-sufficient. He continues that eudaimonia fits such descriptions since people choose it for its own sake an it is not instrumental for something else(l.
vii. 1097a15-b2). On the contrary material items such as wealth or abstract things as honour, pleasure, intelligence and good qualities are chosen partly for themselves and partly for
one‘s eudaimonia (happiness) (l.vii.1097b2). Aristotle connects eudaimonia with the virtuous activity of the soul, and the function of the good man is to perform virtuous activities
well and rightly. Aristotle links what is good for man with intellectual virtue (l.vii.1097b221098a27; l,xii, 1102a17). Thus it is with moral goodness combined with some kind of study
or learning something divine and blissful one may acquire eudaimonia. All other goods are
necessary pre-conditions of eudaimonia or naturally contribute to it and are instrumental in
reaching it (l.ix.1099a32.1100a9).
Aristotle continues that arête (virtue) must be one of the three interconnected modifications
found in the soul: feelings, faculties and dispositions (ll.v,1105b24=26).12 By coupling virtues with the soul he is coating them with some metaphysical feature and is of the view that
one receives commendations or blame based on one‘s virtues and vices (II.V,1105b26-20).
Thus it is vital to distinguish between them. Aristotle in this regard focuses on the sphere of
actions and feelings, in which he considers the mean condition as the virtue as opposed to
the vices which are the excess and deficiency of a particular sphere of action or feeling
(1107a28-1108b9).13 Accordingly each sphere is, thus, vital in identifying the virtue without
falling into its vices and it is such training he aims at through his teaching. The following
chart contains a few spheres of actions and feelings that affect most individuals throughout
their lives along with theiur respective virtues and vices according to Arostotle‘s teachings
(ll.vii,1107b18-20).
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SIJBS Volume 3
Sphere of ac- Excess
tion/feelingg
Means
Deficiency
Pleasure and
pain
Licentiousness(akolasia)
Temperence
(Sōphrosunē)
Insensibility(anaisthēia)
Anger
Irascibility (orgilotēs)
Patience
(Prāotēs)
Lack of spirit (aorgēsia)
Self-expression
Boastfulness(alazoneia)
Truthfulness
(alethēia)
Understatement (eironeia)
Social conduct
Obsequiousness
Flattery
(areskeia) Friendliness
(philia)
Cantankerousness (duskolia)
(kalakeia)
Shame
Shyness (kataplēxis)
Modesty
(aidas)
Shamelessness(anaischuntio)
Aristotle continues that if eudaimonia is an activity in accordance with arête (virtue) it is
reasonable to assume that it in accordance with the highest virtue, which he perceives as the
contemplative activity that itself is divine and noble. It must also be noted here that Aristotle considers intellect as the highest asset of an individual (x.vii, 1177a6-b12). According to
Aristotle, therefore, moral virtues associated with contemplation or intelligence leads one to
acquire eudaimonia.
His discussion on voluntary and involuntary actions is also linked with moral goodness and
he tries to distinguish between such actions first according to the reactions they receive from
the society. This leads him to define such actions as voluntary and involuntary and his speculative observation directs him to form another group, namely, non-voluntary and involuntary and his speculative observation directs him to form another group, namely, nonvoluntary. His criterion in forming this sub-division is ignorance accompanied by repentance and pain (lll.i.1109b30-1110b37)15 Aristotle‘s political agenda is clear when he identifies the importance of setting such limitations in identifying voluntary and involuntary actions as useful for legislators when prescribing honours and punishments.
Accordingly, a good moral training enables one to arrive at right judgement and to identify
the truth (lll.iv.113a12.34; xii.ll9b4-18). He further states that once established it is not easy
to amend a bad moral condition though it is not impossible (ll.v.114a8-27). Aristotle clearly
distinguishes between the spiritual pleasures and bodily pleasures because the latter is even
shared by animals because the latter does not require a mental effort and is not permanent
(lll.x.1117b28-1118b5). The virtues or moralities Aristotle discusses, therefore, aim partly
at forming intelligent or morally reserved people possessing intelligence or wisdom as a key
76
element and who are intended to be the rulers of the society and partly at forming a better
ñHaving discussed moral teachings in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean ethics our study now requires a similar focus on morality/ethics in Buddhist teachings16 where it forms a central
part. These teachings can be grouped under four headings. 1) epistemology or theory of
knowledge, ii) a theory of the universe and the world,iii) a theory of morality iv) a theory of
ultimate reality called Nibbāna. The first two groups form the background to the moral and
spiritual enhancement of the individual and it finally leads to achieve the goal of Buddhism,
Nibbāna, which is also hard to explain in one word.
The Buddha instructs his followers17 to control their five senses as a preliminary procedure
towards achieving success in their lives.18 This could be considered as the first step towards
practicing good moral virtues. Five precepts are directed towards this end and it reminds
devotees what evil/vicious things one must avoid in the course of controlling their physical
and verbal activities.19 Accordingly abstinence from taking life (pānātipātā), abstinence
from taking what is not given (adinnādānā) abstinence from unethical/unacceptable sexual
conduct (kāmesumicchācārā), abstinence from deception and uttering empathy words
(musāvādā veramani) and abstinence from taking alcohol which is the cause of sloth and
violence (surāmeraya majjapamādaññānā veramani) can only be done through one‘s awareness of the benefits of such conduct to one self and to the others.20 One requires some wisdom and intellgencein order to open up one‘s mind to welcome such noble perception. Such
a moral training may open the path towards Buddhist sile principles which may help one to
purify one‘s physical an verbal activities and to become a brahmachariya (one with noble
disposition)21 It is only at such a state that one would be able to improve his mind in order
to reach the ultimate goal of Buddhism – Nibbāna. A society consisting of such people is
certainly a noble human society. This sãla principle blended with altruism is taken a step
further by incorporating it with the notion of reciprocity between one‘s duty and obligations
towards the others as stated in the Sigālovāda sutta.22
The necessity for one to be moral arises from the theory of dependent origination,
(pañiccasamuppāda) which highlights that everything depends upon everything else.23 In
fact, this is based on the doctrine of egolessness (anatta) that prompts altruistic actions.
This doctrine of interdependence nullifies the existence of a separate soul or individual since
independence is impossible in a world where everything is interconnected.24 Buddhism,
therefore, in the process of instructing its followers to practice good moral virtues promotes
altruism, by encouraging one to understand oneself as part of a larger whole and not as a
separate person.25 This interdependence and interrelatedness in turn promotes one‘s responsibility for the rest of the universe in the same way the rest of the universe is responsible for
that self. This theory emphasizes the need for one‘s good behavior and loving kindness to
all beings(sabbe sattā) A central theme in Buddhist ethics is that one should treat others
exactly the same way one treats oneself‘ (attānaü upamaü katvā)26 The dichotomy between
egoism and altruism breaks down again when Buddha repeatedly emphasizes the necessity
of ‗other—regarding‘ virtues for one‘s development as a person, both on a social and spiritual level, where progress is impossible without cultivating ‗other-regarding‘ virtues.27
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Another reason for moral and social commitment originates from the Buddhist theory of rebirth. According to this theory, we have been navigating in saüsāra for immeasurable periods and and during these periods we have been relating ourselves to an infinite number of
beings.28 The hypothesis or belief prompts us to practice social virtues as it imposes a kind
of moral obligation to help others.29
Making individuals responsible for their actions is also part of the theory of kusala and akusala kamma (good and bad actions) which will generate respective results.30 In defining
good actions which take one on the path to Nibbāna, Buddhism identifies three characteristics of Nibbāna, the absence of great (alobha), absence of hatred (adosa) and the absence of
ignorance (amoha). Any physical, vocal or mental action leading towqrds these three characteristics is termed good while any action that opposes these three is termed bad.31 For an
action to be moal absolutely, it needs to be conditioned by spiritual awareness or wisdom.
Nonetheless, Buddhism condemns bad actions and the evil doer based on two points. Firstly, such actions may harm the doer/agent as he may lose in the present existence as well as
in the subsequent births. Secondly, they may lead to social imbalance.32 This is because
Buddhism considers that morality or ethics is not a theory of commands but is an implication that follows from the nature of things as they are (yathābhåta). Morality follows from
the nature of the reality itself. And morality benefits both the doer/agent as well as the others. Morality has positive effects for all beings and it has power to generate salvation, liberation or enlightenment. Buddhism considers morality as a universal medium of communication and as a way of obtaining ‗power‘. Parābhava sutta (the discourse on the causes of
loss) explains the utilitarian feature of morality that leads one to win or succeed while immorality (adhamma) leads one to fail.33 The Buddha also refers to common motives for immoralities and their destructive results.33 Thus, one is responsible for one‘s actions and their
consequences whether good/bad.
The element of anti-authoritarian thinking in Buddhism also promotes one‘s own speculative contemplation that may lead to wisdom. In the Kālama sutta an individual is asked to
give up action that he himself considers bad/unwholesome (akusala) and to accept and follow the actions he himself thinks are good and wholesome (kusala).35 But the correct identification of actions require a good moral and spiritual training for which a series of instructions are required as a guidance and it is provided by Dhamma, which the Buddha himself
regarded and respected as his own teacher.36 Meditation connects spiritual with sensory faculty as extrasensory powers could be attained through practicing meditational exercises and
Nibbāna is rated as the highest extra sensory power one may acquire through such exercise.
The final but the most sublime reason for practicing morality is that through moral behaviour one derives a spiritual happiness which is all pervasive and unrelated to any object.37
The most central moral virtues in Buddhism are love (mettā),, compassion (karuõā), sympathetic joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā).38 and he clearly states that in order to attain
Nibbāna or the eternal happiness the practice of the sublime virtues must be incorporated
78
with wisdom with which could be acquired through following the noble eightfold path
(ariya aññhaïgika magga)40
A correct vision (sammā diññhi) of phenomenal things is considered the first step in a long
journey towards Nibbāna41 and it is also essential to lead a good life and to distinguish good
from evil in order to avoid evil.42
All good moral virtues are directed towards acquiring eternal happiness which is not connected with worldly pleasures which are unsatisfactory (unāva hutvāna jahanti dehaü,
kāmehi lokamhi na hi atthi titti43) but towards spiritual happiness that comes through improved wisdom. This unsatifaction, according to Buddhism, is due to dukkha (suffering). It
is through eliminating the dukkha, that one may be able to acquire eternal happiness – the
goal of Buddhism, Nibbāna, which itself is a supreme moral condition achieved via wisdom.
The achievement of life according to Buddhism is to use one‘s life as a means to reduce the
number of re-births in saüsāra (the phenomenal cycle of existence) which is prone to suffering (dukkha).44 The path he found to navigate saüsāra consists of two aspects, namely
morality and wisdom. It is the insight (pa¤¤ā into worldly reality that frees one from samsāra because it is ignorance (moha) that binds one to it45 The correct vision or sammā diññhi
helps one to have correct/right perception (sammā saïkappā) and correct/right awareness
(sammā sati) which in turn guide one to a correct attempt towards a right way of living
(sammā vayāma)46 But this practice of wisdom must essentially be combined with the practice of morality, because the nature of Nibbāna, or the ultimate reality, is moral. The practice of morality, therefore, is a cultivation of Nibbanic features which will direct one towards Nibbāna, because the nature of Nibbāna is moral perfection. In other words, the
practice of morality leads to permanent happiness. It is the mental realm of the individual
that is addressed in the process of cultivating morality and directing one towards supreme
happiness, or the summum bonum of Buddhist morality, Nibbāna. The doctrine of kamma is
a metaphysical doctrine, it is rather a psychological principle or a law based on the law of
causation as applied to a series of mental events.47 This very well accommodates the necessity of spiritual work – meditation, which leads to wisdom – as opposed to physical work
which can also be performed by animals. Last, but not least, it must be noted that Buddhist
ethics are fused with sãla (morality), samādhi (meditation), and pa¤¤ā (wisdom) which
when put together form a wide arena of individual actions.48
Having briefly discussed Aristotle‘s and Buddhist concepts of virtues/moralities we now
come to the comparative part of the discussion. It is evident from the above discussion that
both teachings emphasize the value of good morality and their utilitarian trait not just to the
agent but also to others. Aristotle‘s view regarding how the others may benefit from one‘s
good moral conduct could be understood through implication as his instructions are directed
mostly to potential politicians, whose virtuous conduct would certainly benefit the general
public. By stating that a good politician must be well versed in social matters and good
moral practices he is expanding his theory from egoism to altruism. When he stresses upon
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the spiritual enhancement of the soul and intellectual virtues he is once again focusing on
the individual. Similarly Buddhism develops the altruistic view point and it constantly alternates between altruism and egotism when making one responsible for one‘s actions and with
regard to acquiring wisdom.
moral virtue
Egotism
altruism
wisdom
In both teachings mere practice of morality is considered insufficient and it needs to incorporate wisdom to achieve the respective targets, eudaimonia and Nibbāna. Both could be
understood to a certain extent as the ultimate happiness or spiritual happiness well away
from worldly pleasures. But since the Aristotilian view point does not give space to a concept of re-birth his eudaimonia does not contain a salvific feature. This is the main distinction between these two teachings. As mentioned above Buddhist teachings are concerned
about freeing oneself from the phenomenal cycle of births and good morality helps one in
this process and if this is coupled with wisdom it enables one to attain Nibbāna. Notably,
both the Aristotelian teachings and Buddhist teachings are aware of the association between
the contemplative life and the active life in achieving their respective goals.
The process of both teachings is to move from the known to the unknown and expect a gradual improvement in virtues or morality first towards the betterment of self and then to that of
the society as a wider whole. But since the process essentially requires wisdom it flashes
back towards the individual with a superior motive of intellectual development. Since Aristotilian teachings are not conditioned with a religious flavor it lacks some of the deep insights Buddhism presents to its devotees in the process of practising morality and in explaining its consequences. Aristotle‘s Ethics is directed towards a group of intelligent youths who
would be assigned responsibilities in society and the instructions are to help them only in
their present existence whereas the very nature of Buddhist ethics, coated with a religious
perspective, help its followers irrespective of social status, gender or age to succeed in their
present and in all their subsequent existences until they attain Nibbāna.
End Notes
1. Norman, R.,Moral Philosophers: an introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. Oxford University
Press, Oxford and New York, 1998, P.27. This is reflected in the disorderly manner the
sections of the volumes (categorized into ten Books) are arranged without giving the entire
80
corpus a coherent flow. Also cf. D.S. Hutchinson, ‗Ethics‘ in J.Barns ed. The Cambridge
Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York 1995,
p.197.
2. Pāli: Nibbāna, Sanskrit:Nirvāna: Sinhala: Nirvāõa. Ven.l. Dhammalankara
3. Hughes, G.J.,Aristotle‟s Ethics, Routledge,
p.13;D.S.Hutchinson, 1995, pp.199.200.
London
and
New
York,
2001,
4. This section may either confuse or clarify his idea depending upon the manner one chooses to solve a few key issues in interpreting the term eudaimonia.
5. Hughes, 2001,p.22.
6. Hughes, 2001, p.22. Also see D.J.Soccio, Archetypes of Wisdom: an introduction to Philosophy, sixth ed. Thomson Wadsworth, Belmont, 2007, p.185.
7. The entire corpus contains ten Books and these themes cover the first four and the sixth,
Books.1.Bywater,Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, Clarendon Press, London, 1979;
H.Tredennick revised with notes and appendices & introduction and bibliography by
J.Barnes, The Ethics of Aristotle, the Nicomachean ethics tr. By J.A.K.Thompson, Penguin
Books, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, New York, Ontario and Victoria, 1976.
8. Hutchinson, 1995, pp.202-203
9. Ibid, 1995, pp.198-200
10. Also see ibid, 1995p.203
11. Also see ibid, 1995 p.204-207.
12. Feelings are all conditions attended by pleasure or pain. Dispositions are conditions in
virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings concerned.
13. Norman, 1949, pp35-36; D.Ross, Aristotle, fifth revised ed., Methuen and Co. Ltd, London, 1949, pp.202-208.
14. Hardie, W.F.R.,Aristotle‘s Ethical Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford and
New York, 1980, pp.129, p151
15. Hardie, 1980,pp.152-159
16. The Buddhist teachings are classified as Dhamma ‗the truth‘.
17. Many young men became followers of Buddhism founded by the Buddha as a youth himself, and it was presented to the world as a religion that is relevant to lives of the youth.
Buddhism is a mere guide to intelligent and anxious youth who begin to involve themselves in social responsibilites (ven. M. Pa¤¤āloka (type Sinhala font) Sadeepa publishers, Colombo,2001, p. 33-34). But this does not mean that Buddhism neglected the reli-
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gion which highlights the outcome of good and bad deeds from the contemporary society
in Buddhist India as illustrations in the course of instructing its followers (ibid pp. 38-39).
18. Ven. Pa¤¤āloka, 2001,pp.36-37.
19. Also see, Ven.A. Rahula, (Sinhala font), 1993Ratna Publishers, Colombo, 1963, pp.147165.
20. Narasu, P.L., The Essence of Buddhism, 1993, Asian Educational services, New Delhi and
Madras,pp.39-55.
21. Rahula, 2001 pp.38-39;also see Tacibana, The Ethics of Buddhism,, the Buddha Sahitya
sabha, Colombo,1943, pp. 43-43.
22. Saddhatissa, H.,Buddhist Ethics,: Essence of Buddhism, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
London, 1970, pp.118-119. 136 and 142; also see P.de Silva, Buddhism, Ethics and Society: The Conflicts and Dilemmas of our time, Monash University Press, Victoria, 2002,
p122.
23. Dharmasiri G.,Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics, revised and 3rd extended ed., Singapore1998,p.17
24. Also see Mahasi Sayadaw, A Discourse on Dependent Origination tr. By U Ayi Maung,
Buddhadhamma Foundation, Bangkok, 1999.
25. The ordinary unenlightened person is, in Buddhist terminology, called puthujjana (puthu=
separate; jana people)
26. Dharmasiri, 1998,p.23.
27. Ibid, 1998,p.23
28. Edirisinghe, T.H.,tr. of What Buddhists Believe by Ven. K. Sri Dhammananda, Samayawardhana Publishers, Colombo, 1992, pp. 113-119.
29. Dharmasiri, 1998, p.27.Also we must note that the Buddha uses the term outcaste (vasala)
to those who are immoral and the Sutta (the discourse on the outcaste) explains that one
becomes an outcaste not by birth (according to brahmanical doctrines) but by doing immoral action (Sutta Nipāta, D.Anderson and H. Smith, eds. Pali Text Society, new ed.,
Luzac and co., London, 1965, pp.21-22). Mangala Sutta also discusses the basic positive
virtues (Sutta Nipāta (PTS new ed.) pp.45-47)
30. Premasiri,P.D., „Introduction to Ethics in Buddhism‟ in Studies in Buddhist Philosophy
and Religion and Religion, collected papers of Prof. P.D. Premasiri, ed.by Ven. S. Pemaratana and ven. R. Padmasiri, Buddha Dhamma Mandala Society, Singapore,2006,
p.10.11.
31. Dharmasiri, 1998,p.29
32. Ibid, 1998, p.38
82
33. Parābhava sutta, Sutta Nipāta (PTS new ed.) pp.18-20
34. Ibid Sutta Nipata (,PTS new ed) pp. 18-20
35. Kālāma sutta in Aïguttara Nikāya, Tikanipāta, ed. Aïguttaqra Nikāya Editorial Board of
Tipiñaka Translation Committee, Buddha Jayanti Tipiñaka Series (henceforth mentioned
as BJP), government publishers, Colombo 1960,pp.336-345.
36. Dharmasiri,1998,p.2
37. Ibid 1998, pp.41-42
38. Ibid, 1998,p.55
39. Without breaking the widely accepted religious concept of the Indian society, which believed Brahma has the highest position (in the universe) therefore, the Buddha gives a new
definition to the word.: Accordingly, Brahmana is a person who excels in the highest noble virtues such as mettā karuõā, muditā and upekkhā and calls them the four brahmavihāra.
40. Dãgha Nikāya ll, ed.T.W.R.Davids and J. E. Carpenter, for Pali Text society, Oxford University Press, London, 1947, p. 251: (eightfold path: Right understanding, right thought,
right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort right mindfulness, right concentration.)
41. Sammādññhi Sutta in Majjhima Nikāya I,.ed. Majjhima Nikāya Editorial Board of the tipitaka Translation Committee, BJP, 1964, Government Publishers, Colombo, pp. 110-133,
states the responsibility of Sammaditthi when following the noble eightfold path; Ven. M.
Pa¤¤āloka. Sadeepa Publishers, Colombo, 2002, p.52.
42. Ven. Pa¤¤āloka, 2002, pp. 50-54
43. ‗Everyone abandons the body (at death), there is no satisfaction in worldly pleasures.‘Dharmasiri, 1998, p.11.
44. Parivimaüsana Sutta, Saüyutta Nikāya II, ed. Saüyutta Nikāya Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka Translation Committee, BJP, government Publishers, Colombo, 1962, pp.126-127;
Pañccasamuppāda sutta, Saüyutta Nikāya II (Buddha Jayanti Publication), pp. 02.13. Also
see Ven. M. Pa¤¤āeoka 2002, p.52,
45. Dharmasiri, 1998,p.12. Also see Ven. Pa¤¤āloka, 2002,pp.84-87
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46. Samaõamaõóika Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya I (BJP) pp.300-307, Mahacattārisaka Sutta,
Majjhima Nikāya III, ed. Ven. N. Lankananda, tr. Ven. K. Sumanasara and
Ven.L.Lankananda, (BJP) 1974,Government Publishers,pp.212-223. The responsibility of
right mindfulness (Sammā Sati) in following the noble eightfold path is explained in Andakavinda Sutta in Aïguttara Nikāya, Pa¤caka Nipāta (BJP) p.222-223 and that of Sammā
Vayama is explained in many suttas including Vitakkasantāna sutta, Majjhima Nikāya I
(BJP, 1968) pp.300-307. Also see Ven. Pa¤¤aloka 2002,p.52.
47. See Dharmasiri, 1998,p.15 for details and for an explanation.
48. De Silva, 2002 p. 52.
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Buddhist Explorations in the New Globalised World
There are some stray references to possible Buddhist influences on European classical
thought. Aristoxenes (320-300 BCE) mentions a dialogue on human life between Socrates
and an Indian philosopher. Pythagoras, one of the founders of Orphism, is alleged to have
traveled widely and been influenced by among others Indians. Pythagoras‘s thought has
such characteristic South Asian views as transmigration of the soul and the ability to recollect past lives. Pythagoras himself ‗remembered‘ having fought in the Trojan War in a previous life. Almost all the theories, religious, philosophical and mathematical, taught by the
Pythagoreans, Rawlinson has noted were known in India in the 6th century BCE. Thus Pythagoreans like the Buddhists refrained from destroying life and eating meat.
Empedocles (490-430 BCE) a disciple of Pythagoras propounded the four element theory of
matter and the four humour theory of disease. Empedocles‘s theory that matter consisted of
four elements- earth, water, air and fire- has parallels in the earlier panchabhåta concept of
prthvi, ap, tejas, vayu and akasa- earth, water, heat (fire), air and emptiness (ether). It
should be noted that the Buddhists recognized four: earth, water, heat and air. The later,
Aristotelian view of the physical world also incorporated the essential panchabhåta concept
with five elements - earth, water, air, fire and ether. The doctrine of four humors was later
followed in medicine by Hippocrates (460-377 BCE). The theory of humors evokes direct
comparison with the Tridosha of Ayurveda.
Atomic theories likewise again occur in the two systems, appearing earlier in South Asia, in
the atomic theory of the Buddha, and was earlier than that of Democritus'. Heraclitus's concept of everything in a state of flux is preceded in a more sophisticated manner by the anicca
and anatta discussions of the Buddhists.The Questions of Milinda philosophical dialogues
between the Buddhist monk Nagasena and the Indo Greek ruler Menander indicate the continuing intellectual dialogue between Greece and Buddhism in the post-Asokan period. And
neoplatonism had very many features in common with Buddhism, especially its recommendation of abstention from sacrifice and meat eating.
These discussions find an echo in other writers like Clement of Alexandria in the 2ndCentury
CE who referred repeatedly to the presence of Buddhists in Alexandria and was the first
Greek to refer to the Buddha by name. Clement was firm; flatly declaring that the 'Greeks
stole their philosophy from the barbarians' .And evidence of continuing contacts with South
Asia even in the European Dark Ages even in the extreme North of Europe exists in the
form of a Buddhist image dated from circa 6th century CE discovered under the oldest
church in Sweden .
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With the passing of its Classical age and the onset of the Dark Ages in Europe after the advent of Christianity, contacts between Europe and South Asia continued, this time largely
through Arab intermediaries. The Arabs were now to perform the functions earlier performed by the Persians, Alexandrians and Greeks which had brought together the ideas of
East and West.One could give examples during the time of the Enlightenment which
brought Europe out of its stagnation.
Thus theco-discoverer of the calculus, Leibnitz, Needham noted was probably influenced by
the time moments concept of Buddhists khannavāda incorporated in the concept of Leibnitz's "Monadology" which perceives the world as consisting of unextended atomic pointinstants. The scientific Revolution accompanying the Enlightenment challenged received
Christian dogma. Newton's ideas were now to influence the economic and political ideas of
his time through Locke and David Hume. They created a climate of skepticism that challenged the given order and ultimately led to the Enlightenment. Several commentators have
pointed to the surprising and detailed similarities between the thought of David Hume and
of the Buddha. These commentators included such scholars as Moorthy, Whitehead and de
la Vallee Poussin , especially in relation to the idea of the self. Jacobson summarised that in
both Buddhism and Hume‘s viewpoints separated by over 2,000 years, ―there is no thinker
but the thoughts, no perceiver but the perceptions, no craver but the cravings..... The similarity ...... is striking‖ .This coincidence as recent research suggests was no accident but
probably due to transmission of Buddhist ideas from Thailand. These initial parallelisms and
influences were increased in the coming centuries.
Partly as a result of translations, many of the more accurate ones being through the Royal
Asiatic Society in Sri Lanka and its lay and monk associates, several 19thcentury philosophical figures were attracted to South Asian ideas. Schopenhauer had identified the central tenets of his philosophy as expressly common with Buddhism, partly one should add due to a
gross misunderstanding of the Buddhist concept dukkha, often translated wrongly as
‗suffering‘. Nietzsche was attracted to Buddhism in his later period because of his relationship with Schopenhauer. Many other German literary and artistic figures of the 19thand early 20th centuries were also influenced by Buddhism. They included Richard Wagner, Eduard Grisebach, Josef Viktor Widmann, Ferdinand von Hornstein, Max Vogrich, Karl
Ghellerup, Fritz Mauthner, Hanz Much, Herman Hesse and Adolf Vogel.
Americans in turn had begun to discover Asian thought in the 18thcentury but this expanded
significantly in the 19thcentury. Ralph Waldo Emerson was one such important figure who
was to declare, in exaggerated fulsome ―The East is grand and makes Europe appear the
land of trifles‖. Other admirers included Thoreau, Alcott and Parker. Arnold‘s best-selling
book ―The Light of Asia‖, the Theosophist Movement and the World Parliament of Religions in 1892 were some key events in an eventful century of bringing non Western ideas
westwards. The World Parliament of Religions was meant to be a celebration of Western
civilization and its religions, but it introduced perhaps for the first time in the Western
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sphere, South Asian thought to a large Western gathering especially Buddhist thought
through Anagarika Dharmapala.
Colonel Olcott and Madame Helena Petrova together had established the Theosophical Society in New York in 1875 with the objective of studying "ancient and modern religions,
philosophies and sciences". The movement was a curious mixture of the occult and a search
for serious knowledge and attracted many influential persons such as Thomas Edison. After
Olcott and Blavatsky had personally taken up abode for some time in South Asia, they also
helped inspire the local population of the worth of their past intellectual heritage, although,
because of the Theosophist interest in the occult, not always in what we would call a scientific direction. In fact Olcott in his later years was to be denounced in Sri Lanka as distorting
the real message of Buddhism.
By the end of the 19thcentury exchanges had now intensified. It was observed by Dale Riepe, for example that there was Buddhist influences on William James, Charles A. Moore,
Santayana, Emerson, and Irving Babbitt and these influences helped enlarge the debates in
America on philosophy especially on perspectives in epistemology, psychology and on the
self .
As we entered the 20thcentury these contacts continued and expanded. This interest in Eastern inspired thought would sometimes lead to the creation of a background for important
scientific discoveries. There are thus traces of Eastern philosophical influences and parallels
in the realm of modern physics for example in the preparation of the background for Einstein's theories through the philosophical ideas of Ernst Mach and Hume both having almost
identical views with Buddhism on the nature of the self. These were two of the few philosophers which Einstein read before his Special Relativity paper. Einstein gave Mach credit for
significant influences on his own thinking especially in the development of Spacial Relativity. He also wanted his General Relativity to conform to Mach‘s ideas.
Mach himself had an attraction to South Asian literature and science, including its mathematics. Some of his friends were Buddhists like Paul Carus and Theodor Beer. Paul Carus
was strongly influenced by Buddhism and his viewpoint which he called ―Monism‖ was
closely related to the philosophical positions of Ernst Mach. Ernst also contributed to Paul
Carus‘ journals The Open Court and The Monist. Although Mach did not write extensively
on Buddhism, in 1913 in an autobiographical fragment he wrote tellingly:
I can scarcely confess how happy I felt, on thus becoming free from every tormenting, foolish notion of personal immortality, and seeing myself introduced into the
understanding of Buddhism, a good fortune which the European is rarely able to
share.
Although Einstein, the physicist was influenced by Mach the philosopher, Einstein himself
in his own later philosophical musings after his main discoveries were essentially over, rejected adherence to what he called "Mach-Buddhist reductionism‖.
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The example of Ernst Mach brings us almost to the threshold of the present. In the last four
decades South Asian intellectual interactions with the West has increased.
Buddhism in America today has found many homes and many voices. Several writers have
drawn attention to the effect of Buddhism on American culture, including for example on its
post-World War 2 poetry. The reform and protest movements associated with the 1950s
Beat Generation and the 1960's counter culture had several threads that owe itself to Buddhism. This international flow of Buddhist ideas has had many effects down to some subject matter in medical and psychology faculties in Western campuses
A Search for New Psychologies
Many explorations had begun to nibble away in the 1960s at the received wisdom of Western psychology. Buddhism generally posits that in most people, there is a distortion of perception which however, can be changed by techniques such as meditation. Several Western
researchers have, now supported these claims that cognition can be enhanced by meditation,
mindfulness training is a cornerstone in such efforts.
The initial studies done on the general topic of meditation was by Dr Herbert Benson and
his colleagues at Harvard. The results of these and other related studies were published in
the most orthodox of scientific journals. Initially they were done on Transcendental Meditation TM and later on Buddhist meditators. The direct Theravada connection is seen in the
case of Vippasana influenced psychology.
A new mode of perception, experimental observations indicate occur after Vippasana which
among other qualities, are more animated, sensuous, and vivid and syncretic. It results in
new experiences beyond the everyday ones and results in new perceptual activities hitherto
blocked or ignored.Daniel Goleman – a near household name in US psychology today and
whose first book was on Theravada, published in Kandy- observes that meditation results in
a flow experience. This is characterized by a merging of action and awareness. It also is accompanied by increased attention to a limited stimulus field blocking out others, a heightened awareness of body states and their function, and clarity as regards cues from the environment and how to respond to it. Meditation leads, therefore, to a sharpening of perception
and to selectively responding to the really important stimuli from the environment.Clearly,
the meditators had a physiologically healthier response.
One of the earlier figures like Daniel Golemanto ferry in Sri Lanka Theravāda ideas directly
into post World War 2 psychotherapy was the British psychiatrist R.D.Laing, who imbibed
it especially through his interactions with the late Godwin Samararathne. In the late sixties,
Laing influenced a significant number of his colleagues. He began as a Freudian, but
through several stages, came to a mixture that combined Buddhism with existentionalism.
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Mikulas has pointed out the many commonalities between Buddhism and behavior modification. These are a focus on the "here and now" and a derived "ahistorical" attitude; emphasis on the perception of reality as it is without distortion. He argued for greater integration of
Buddhist practices in behavior modification packages. He considers Buddhist literature as a
storehouse of information for psychology. De Silva discussed the parallels between this
Buddhist tradition and modern behavioral techniques such as in thought stopping, modeling
and in behavior modification for treatment of obesity and stimulus control. He finds resemblance between the Western and the Buddhist, in both concepts and practices.
Jon Kabat-Zinn, the director of the Stress Reduction Clinic at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center has successfully used mindfulness meditation to help patients suffering
stress related disorders, including chronic pain. He gets each of his patients to become the
scientist if his or her own body and mind", getting to know themselves. On the basis of randomized trials, these techniques have yielded both physical and psychological symptom reduction that persists over time. Dr. Dean Ornish of Harvard University who developed the
only system that has been scientifically proved to reverse heart disease and has been given
high publicity. A significant part of the Ornish system is in the use of meditative type exercises straight out of standard Theravada practice.
By the nineties, sufficient scholarly data as well as clinical experience had been gathered to
make some broad statements about the inflow of Buddhist methodology into Western psychological practice. Recognizing this, regular reviews of the current situation has appeared
since the 1970s every decade or so in the professional Western psychological literature. By
the 90s, millions of Americans had tried meditation. It had infiltrated the culture and had
become incorporated in many lives. It had entered as an important tool in medicine, education, psychology and personal development. And, many of the different techniques of 'mind
technology' had become in certain medical areas near mainstream, if not mainstream.
Hundreds of research findings on the topic have been published. Almost every week, one
researcher has noted, one sees reports in this burgeoning new field. This figure is many
times more than those published on most psycho-therapies. The published research covers a
wide variety of topics and includes physiological, psychological and chemical factors.In a
consensus report released in 1984, the National Institute of Health (NIH) of the US recommended meditation (together with changes in diet) above prescription drugs as a first treatment for low level hypertension.
Colonial anthropology
Buddhism deals with human behaviour some of which have been demonstrated at the laboratory level. But in search of the primitive the West created anthropology. After the 1960s
and 1970s in other parts of the world the anthropology enterprise was denounced as a hand
maiden of colonialism with the social function of keeping the locals at bay by considering
them as inferior. However recently Sri Lanka has witnessed a rise of a colonial anthropolo89
SIJBS Volume 3
gy based on the false idea of the alleged flow of Protestant ideas and cultural influences on
the theory and practice of contemporary Sinhalese Buddhism. This idea of Protestant Buddhism and its alleged subsequent transformation was originated by Obeyesekera (1970,
1988). This theme has been accepted as true by many others and has led to a chain of citations in the international literature legitimizing its validity (thus Bond 1988, Brow1996, Holt
1991, Kapferer 1988, Kapferer 1991, Malalgoda 1976, Mcgowan, 1992, Prothero, 1996,
Roberts 1994, Spencer 1990, Stirrat 1992).
A careful examination of the evidence given by Obeyesekere for Protestant influences as
well as of the contextual knowledge of these alleged transformations (for example in other
studies on the period including on key actors like Dharmapala, Olcott etc) find that the examples of alleged Protestantism is open to debate. I have pointed this out in a book
(Susantha Goonatilake, Anthropologizing Sri Lanka: A Civilizational Misadventure Indiana
University Press, 2001).
On the contrary, the flow of ideas from Sri Lanka to the West beginning with such journals
like The Open Court and the Monist were more influential than the alleged flow of
Protestant ideas and these Buddhist ideas had echoes not only in Western philosophy, but
also in modern science and psychology. In fact, we have seen that these Buddhist derived
psychologies have more acceptance and empirical validity in the West than the now somewhat discounted Freudian approaches that Obeysekera has used on his Sinhalese subject
matter.
A cornerstone of the ―Protestant Buddhism‖ thesis was that the Buddhist revival was largely
an externally driven one, brought about by the ―Protestant‖ ideas of the Theosophists, especially of Olcott. But, these alleged ―Protestants‖ Olcott and Blavatsky were irrational mystics opposed to Protestantism. The principal villains and targets of the Protestant Buddhism
thesis are monks in the manner Edmund Perry pointed out in his Forward to an American
translated edition of Rahula‘s book, Heritage of the Bhikkhu, as a ―conspiracy to convert the
Buddhist monk from public leader to disengaged recluse‖.
An assertive global thrust not a one dependent on Protestants is seen in the caliber of the
monk scholars who preceded the arrival in the country of Olcott. Letters written by many of
the leading translators and writers of books on South Asia and Buddhism, such as Childers,
Fausboll, Rhys Davids, Oldenberg, Rost, Muller, Minayeff, Hardy, Warren, Geiger, Lanman, Sir Edwin Arnold and Paul Carus brought together in a volume by Guruge indicate the
extent to which these writers were dependent for their work on these Sinhalese monks and
their intellectual heritage. Summarizing the nature of this debt, Viggo Fausboell, the great
Danish Pali scholar said in a letter: ―We, Europeans, must, of course, stand in need of such
help as we are so far from the living fountains of Buddhism and so scantily furnished with
materials‖. The partial correspondence with these monks in Guruge‘s book come to over
450 pages indicating the richness of this East-West exchange of scholarly views .These
monks had within them several of the characteristics of Western Renaissance men and sub90
scribed to a very broad meaning of learning. As Guruge comments where the Western
scholars ―expected religious conservatism and narrow mindedness, they were confronted
with an amazing width of vision and an unbelievably refreshing liberality‖. As Copper, the
English editor who reported on the Panadura debates noted, ―Some of the Buddhist priests
are thoroughly versed in the works of modern scientists‖ .
This Renaissance mood driven by a local cultural logic is seen in the initial relationship with
Obeysekera‘s ―Protestants‖. When the journal of the Theosophists began in 1879, Olcott
invited Mohotivatte and Hikkaduwe to contribute to it. So Sinhalese in fact had begun
reaching out to the world, using Olcott as a channel, before he reached Sri Lanka, the reverse of Theosophist influence on Buddhism. Olcott‘s correspondence from New York with
Ven Piyaratana Tissa is very revealing about the power relationship that he set up before he
went to Sri Lanka - it was that of student to a guru, not of Protestant missionary. To put these anthropology writings in the correct perspective one has to only give one more example
namely that of Bruce Kapferer whose writing in this field arer based on four books on the
Sinhalese and his methodology is revealed when one realises that ultimately his entire distortion of Sinhalese culture is built on just three Sinhalese who believed in exorcism!
Let me summarize and contexualisze.
The connections the local intelligentsia made with intellectual circles in the West led to
translations and dissemination of Buddhist material. Journals like The Open Court and The
Monist provided platforms for such East-West dialogues. It helped in inputs to western philosophical discussions on the self and on the act of observation. These had reverberation not
only in Western philosophy but also in modern physics.Decades later these Buddhist inputs
occurred in the behavioral sciences, Buddhist ―mind technology‖ having direct and indirect
effects on aspects of modern psychology and medicine.
And even a key father figure of (debatable) anthropology, Malinowski, is now known to being influenced by Ernst Mach with his connections to Buddhist influenced circles.It should
be noted in parentheses that Freud, is not given an official therapeutic position in the US
while vipassana meditation is.
What of the future?
Unlike in the 19th and early part of the 20th century much of the academic literature on Sri
Lanka society and its beliefs are written by foreigners. Unfortunately, some of our academics who do not read widely are even unaware of this literature. But there is much that can be
done using the observable aspects of Buddhist literature.
We are, however, in an important cusp of global history where the economic, political and
cultural axis is rapidly turning towards Asia. While much Eurocentric theorising occurred at
the time of Western hegemony, we should again think for ourselves. The possibilities are
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not only in decolonising such subjects as anthropology, but there are other avenues. For example, although it has been suggested for several decades that the modern system of arithmetic arose out of Buddhist circles, we have not yet systematically explored the Buddhist
literature for this or for the history of science itself, a contrast to the case of Hindu texts.
There are new possibilities for Buddhist oriented epistemologies, in for example future studies and in the new developments in genetic engineering and computer science which are redesigning the body and the mind. One could in fact even design a whole sociology based on
Buddhist epistemologies to replace the biased ones existing at present. I have attempted
some of these in publications elsewhere (a brief summary attached) but due to space reasons
will not summarise them except to indicate that only our imagination and self-confidence
limits our joint possibilities.
92
The Buddhist Standpoint with regard to the Partaking of Garlic by the
Ubhatosaṅgha
Iromi Ariyaratne
01. Introduction
Garlic is a popular food among people and most citizens enjoy the taste of it in a delicious
curry and as an additional ingredient mixed into congees, curries and soups. In Ayurvedic
treatments, it plays an important role as a medicine. In accordance with the P  li Vinaya Pi
 aka, there is sufficient evidence to prove that garlic was a popular food in India at the time
of the Buddha. And also, P  li Vinaya literature clearly mentions that garlic was a most
popular food among the Buddhist Saṅgha community of that period. Besides, in Sri Lanka,
Buddhist lay followers offer garlic curry as an efficacious health food to the Saṅgha at alms
giving ceremonies. Although the Sinhala Buddhist monks and nuns practise a flexible principle with regard to having garlic, Buddhist followers who are living in some Mah  y  na
countries refuse all foods which contain garlic. Sri Lankan lay followers who know this
matter well regarding this Mah  y  na practice, are confused and question whether garlic is
permissible or not for the Buddhist Saṅgha.
In accordance with Therav  da Vinaya Pi  aka, the Buddha has established two Vinaya
rules and has taken a decision not to allow the taking of garlic as a food for Buddhist Bhikku
-s and Bhikkhuni-s because of some disciplinary problems which had arisen in the Buddhist
community of that time. Hence there is a contemporary necessity to point out the exact Buddhist stand with regard to the acceptability of garlic as a food by the Ubhatosaṅgha. Therefore, the main object of this paper is to examine the Vinaya rules relating to consuming garlic by the Buddhist Ubhatoaṅgha. The Collection of Therav  da Vinaya in early Buddhism
and the Commentaries (A  hakat ) are meant to promote this message.
02. The word Lasu  a
Garlic is one of the crops which is in the lily family and it represents the Amaryllidaceae
cast. The biological name of the garlic is Allium Sativum. Porrum Sativum and Allium
Ophiscorodon take similar meanings for it. In the Sinhala Language, garlic is used as iqÿÆKq
(Sudul  u) and in the Tamil language it is used as nts;sntd;fhak; (Vellaveng  yam) or
znts;shapg;Gd;LZ (Vell  yippundu). In the Sanskrit language, the word la  una is used
to identify garlic. Ra  una, rason , rasonaka, ari  ta, d  rghapatraka, kanda, mahakanda,
ugragandha, vam  ri, yavane  a are synonyms for it. The Hindi word l  san has been derived from the Sanskrit la  una. In Prakrit Language, both words lasu  a and lasa  a are
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used for garlic and the P  li term lasuna could be derived from them. In the P  li literature
both lasuna and lasu  a occur for the garlic.
The Monier William‘s Sanskrit - English dictionary has mentioned that la  una is one of the
ten kinds of onion. Therefore, it is clear that the Sanskrit word la  una is not used to identify other onions and it is used only for garlic. But in Sinhala language, the word l  u is in
common usage for all kinds of onion and there are few adjectives which come before the
word l  u and those help to recognize what kind of onion is meant. As examples, garlic is
called sudul  u because the skin of its pod is white in colour and so are its cloves. Red onion is called ratul  u due to the red skin and the onion that is imported from Bombay is
called Bombai l  u.
The first usage of p  li word lasuna in the Vinaya Pi  aka can be found in the P  cittiyap 
li of the Bhikkhun  Vibha  gha. Apart from this, it can be found in the Khuddhakavatthukkhandhaka of the Cullavaggap  li and also the Apad  nap  li and the Vim  navatthup  li
of the Khuddakha Nik  ya use the word lasuna with a similar meaning. It is clear that the
word lasuna which is included in the P  li Vinaya Pi  aka was used only for garlic and two
facts can be found to prove it.
01. The P  cittiyap  li mentions that it exist as bundles (bha  ika)
02. The Cullavaggap  li mentions that it causes a bad aroma from the mouth after
having garlic
It is a well-known thing that garlic and red onion exist as bundles. But a bundle of garlic has
more cloves than a bundle of red onion. The Encyclopaedia of Britannica says that it could
include twenty (20) cloves in a well grown pod of garlic. The Samantap  s  dik  (Vinaya 
hakath ) takes the word bha  ika as an adjective and introduces a new word for garlic.
That is bha  ikalasu  a. The A  hakath  mentions that those contain not only one or two
cloves, but those have more cloves. The T  k  doesn‘t care for the word bha  ikalasu  a
and tries to give another word for garlic. That is ga  hika lasu  a. The word gan  hika
lasu  a is used because it has more cloves. In Sanskrit language, the word ugraga  dha is
used as a similar word for garlic because of its bad aroma.
The P  cittiyap  li says that lasuna originated in the Magadha region in India. Therefore the
Samantap  s  dik  has called the word M  gadhaka lasu  a also for garlic.
The Apatti Desan  of the P  cittiyap  li introduces the other four kinds of onion as well.
Those are;
01. Pala  ḍuka - it is yellow coloured and has only one pod
02. Bha  janaka - it is red coloured and has two pods.
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Iromi Ariyaratne
The Buddhist Standpoint with regard to the Partaking …
03. C  palasu  a - it has only a root, not a pod and it may refer to leeks.
04. Haritaka - it is a green coloured onion.
In accordance with this context, there arises a problem regarding the usage of the word
lasuna. It has been clearly mentioned in the above explanation that the word lasuna, la  una
and l  san are used systematically in the P  li, Sanskrit and Hindi languages. But in post
canonical literature an attempt is seen to use the word lasu  a to denote all kinds of onion.
Specially, the Samantap  s  dik  has used the word bha  ikalasu  a while the Vinaya 
k  has used the word ga  iakalasu  a for garlic. And also, in the Apad  na  hakath , the
word rattalasu  a is used for bha  janaka (red onion). The commentator Buddhagosa has
recorded in the Samantap  s  dik  that he has taken some ideas to describe the lasu  a
sikkh  pada from A  hakath  s of the Mah  paccar  and the Kurund . Therefore, there is a
possibility to say that the word lasu  a has been used to mean all kinds of onion in the A 
hakath  era. In the same A  hakath , it is pointed out again that the garlic was born in the
Magadha region. Although all other onions can be grown in Sri Lanka, the garlic is not
grown. Then it is clear that the word lasu  a has been used for all onions in Sri Lanka. But
the An  pattidesan  of P  cittiyap  li has included the word C  palasuna. It is clear that
the An  pattidesan  also was prepared by Tipi  aka editors when it was written. However,
after the examination of the Pi  aka, the A  hakath  and the  k  carefully, it can be
pointed out that Buddhist Bhikkhu-s and Bhikkhun -s were prevented from eating the garlic
only among other onions.
03. Usefulness of Garlic
In accordance with scientific analysis, garlic contains the following elements.
01. Oil
02. Diallyl Disulfide (C6H10S2)
03. Diallyl Trisulfide (C6H10S3)
04. Allyl Prophyl Disulfide (C6H12S2)
Garlic is used as a valuable and popular food in both the eastern and western worlds as a
result of the above contents which have a high medicinal value. Garlic has been popularized
as a food in western countries during the time of the 2nd world war. It has been used as a
charm and a medicine in the ancient and medieval periods.
The Samantap  s  dik  which explains the usefulness of garlic says that it is very valuable
as an additional ingredient to mix with soups and meat. It mentions that garlic can be eaten
mixed with soups, meat, oil, salads, leaves or curries as well as added into rice and congees.
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In addition, garlic is a valuable medicine and it contains the strength of curing illnesses. In
 yurvedic medicine, garlic is used as a medicine for three kinds of illnesses such as wind,
bile, phlegm. The western medical research has also confirmed that the garlic has a skill to
cure illnesses such as diabetes, heart ailments, and blood pressure. Apart from these, it is
also considered as an aphrodisiac medicine in the Ayurvedic method.
04. Rules and regulations related to partaking of garlic in Indian society during the Buddhist
era
It has has been identified that the  rama  a tradition which originated in religious ideas
existing among tribal societies before the arrival of the  ryans ( ry  gamana). Scholars
say that the Br  hma  a tradition was established by the  ryans who migrated to India with
new religious ideas. There is no doubt that the natives who laid the foundation for the 
rama  a tradition represented the An  rya society partook of garlic as a popular food. There
is an important piece of evidence in the Apad  nap  li in the Khuddaka Nik  ya to prove
that the ascetics who led a wandering life partook of garlic as a popular food. In accordance
with the record, Lasu  ad  yaka who was one of the disciples of the Gotama Buddha was
an ascetic in the time of the Vipassi Buddha. At that time, he had gone to the dwelling place
of the Sa  gha with a pingo full of garlic and offered it to the Sa  gha. As a result of that
meritorious deed he had a birth in heaven for an eon (Kappa). The Apad  na  hakath  has
presented two opposing ideas for the meaning of the word ‗Lasu  a‘.
01. The commentator, who begins the lasu  ad  yakathera  hakath  says that the
onion brought by him was garlic and he offered it to the mah  saṅgha for medical purposes.
But the Khuddaka Nik  ya doesn‘t mention that he offered garlic to Bhikkh -s for medical
purposes. Therefore, it is clear that the commentator has tried to justify the partaking of garlic by Mah  sa  gha according to the Vinaya rules.
02. The commentator has tried to explain that the onion that was brought by the ascetic was ‗red onion‘ (Lasu  a  upajīvāmīti rattalasu  a  ropetvā tadeva gocara  katvā jīvika  kappemīti attho.). In this case, it is important to know that the Vinaya Pi  aka
and the Samantap  s  dik  use the word ‗bha  janaka‟ to identify only the red onion. And
also, the A  hakath  doesn‘t take the word ‗bha  janaka‘ as a synonym for ‗ratta lasu  a‘.
Thus, it can be decided that the commentator has attempted to comment on the Lasu  ad 
yaka in order not to contradict the Vinaya rules established by the Buddha. But, the commentator has not paid attention to the fact that the story included in the Ther  pad  na is
related according to the order of the Buddha, Vipassi. As a result of the unnecessary attempt
of the commentator, another problem has arisen. That is, which kind of onion has been offered to the Mah  sa  gha by the ascetic, Lasunad  yaka? However, there is a possibility to
decide this issue in that he brought garlic because there is a common agreement that the Sutta Pi  aka is more credible than the post canonical texts.
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Besides, it can be clearly proved that members of the Ubhatosa  gha has partaken of garlic
till the Buddha established certain Vinaya rules. The Ka  jikad  yik  Vim  navatthu of the
Vim  navatthu mentions that as the fruit of offering a congee containing garlic, cloves and
long pepper, ka  jikad  yik  who was a Buddhist female lay devotee was born as an angel.
According to the Vim  navatthua  hakath , she is the wife of a physician who had treated
the Buddha when the Buddha was staying in the Andhakavinda forest. He was suffering
from a stomach ache and in the meantime Venerable  nanda had got that congee as a medicine from her while he was seeking alms. Therefore, the P  li literary sources have proved
that Buddhist monks led by the Buddha who represented the Sama  a tradition have taken
garlic as a food and a medicine.
The Br  hma  a rules regarding partaking garlic are more different than the  rama  a tradition. In Accordance with Br  hma  a teachings, a Br  hmin who gets the Upanayana
(Dvija), should not eat any kind of onion as well as garlic. The Manusm  ti, the great law of
the Br  hmins mentions that the first observance of a Br  hmin that should be followed is to
restrain himself from eating onion (garlic, red onion and Bombay onion).
However, it can be recognized that there are two justifiable reasons to prohibit eating garlic.
01. Understanding that it disturbs the life of chastity because garlic is an aphrodisiac
medicine
02. Spreading a bad aroma from the mouth after taking garlic
Specially, Br  hmins who as lay people spent a worldly life popularized the consumption of
garlic and most probably fed wives and their children on it. Therefore, it is impossible to
decide that the first reason mentioned above was an attempt to establish the Br  hmin convention. However, it is important to note that the Manusm  ti has prohibited eating all kinds
of onion. And also, there is no sufficient evidence to prove the second reason also. Therefore, I am arguing to prove another fact which could have happened.
Local core-value system of the Indian An  rya tradition was completely rejected by the 
ryans after their Indian invasion and they established their own cultural background. As a
result of the caste system of the  ryans, the native tribal people of India were dispelled
from the major society. Although the An  ryans were dispelled from society,  ryans didn‘t
stop all their connections with them. There was an obligatory link between the  ryans and
An  ryans due to the fact that  ryans expected that the An  ryans should be their hirelings.
Hence, all the subordinate services and occupations of society were done by the An  ryans.
Though  ryans accepted their service they didn‘t accept the Anariyan cultural, ethical and
social patterns of their life styles as well as religious ideas. It can be concluded that all native foods which were preferred by the An  ryans may also have been rejected by The 
ryan society. There is sufficient evidence in the Manusm  ti to affirm that garlic was a popular food of the An  ryans and that the major society wished to prohibit eating it. According
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to the Manusm  ti, if a br  hmin (dvija) eats any kinds of onion (garlic, red onion or Bombay onion), that is a course that can lead him to become a Ca  d  la.
Ca  d  la is one of the native clans that have been living in India when the  ryans migrated to India. They represented the major clan among the other four clans of the lowest castes
of the society such as Ve  a, Nes  da, Rathak  ra, Pukkusa. According to Br  hmanic
rules, if one maintains a relationship with a Ca  d  la, he will become an impure person
and a Ca  d  la. Hence, it is clear that the rule of the prohibition of partaking of garlic was
established because garlic was a popular food of An  ryans.
05. The Therav  da Vinaya Rules on Partaking of Garlic
According to some Mah  y  na Vinaya texts, consumption of garlic is a minor offence and
monks or nuns who have consumed garlic is not allowed to enter a temple or sa  gha community for five days due to the bad aroma of garlic. If he or she has eaten onion, they are
prohibited to enter the sa  gha community for three days. Nuns are specially prohibited to
waste time cultivating garlic according to the Mah  yana vinaya tradition.
In Vajray  na Vinaya it is clearly mentioned that garlic has originated from a lump of blood
which dripped from a demigoddess‘s womb. Therefore garlic is considered as a polluted
food and that it will cause one to sleep heavily, eclipse thoughts, disturb sensibilities and
moreover it will obstruct the higher attainments of the mind.
Although the Therav  da Vinaya literature has not mentioned such facts, the Buddha has
twice delivered discourses to the effect that the Ubhatosaṅgha should desist from eating
garlic. And also, it can be seen that the Therav  da Vinaya rules with regard to the partaking
of garlic have been established on reasonable grounds.
01.
The vinaya rule and amendment for the Bhikkhu-s - Cullavaggap  li, KhuddakavatthukkhandhakaOnce when the Buddha was teaching the Dhamma sitting surrounded by a large assembly, a certain monk who had eaten garlic sat down at one
side, thinking that it will disturb other monks due to the bad smell of garlic he had
eaten. The Buddha saw the monk, who was sitting down at one side and addressed
him and asked ―Why is that monk sitting to one side?‖ Then the Bhikkhu-s explained the reason to the Buddha. On that occasion, the Buddha explained to the
monks that they should refrain from eating any foods that would cause a disturbance to Dhamma talks. Hence, the Buddha established a Vinaya rule saying;
―Garlic should not be eaten. Whoever should eat it, there is an offence of wrong-doing.‖
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―Na bhikkhave lasu  a  kh  ditabba . Yo kh  deyya  patti dukka  ass ‟ti‖
At that time, Arahant S  riputta had wind in his stomach (Udarav  t  b  dho). Then the
Arahant Moggall  na approached the venerable S  riputta and asked when he had the
wind in his stomach before, and by what means did he get comfort. Venerable S  riputta
answered that taking garlic made him comfortable. The Buddha was informed of the matter
by the Bhikkhu-s. Then the Buddha amended the earlier rule by laying down another new
rule.
―I allow you, monks to eat garlic in the case of illness.‖
―Anuj  n  mi bhikkhave  b  dapaccay  lasu  a  kh  ditu ‖
02. The rule for the Bhikkhun -s - P  cittiyap  li, Bhikkhun  Vibha  gha, Lasu  a Vagga, Pa  hama Sikkh  pada.
According to the Nid  na story of the Sikkh  pada, the Buddha had established a Vinaya
rule for bhikkhun -s saying that they should refrain from eating garlic. Once, when the Buddha was staying at the Jetavan  r  ma in S  vatthi, a certain lay devotee wished to offer
garlic to the Bhikkhun  Sa  gha. Therefore, the keeper of the field was instructed by him
saying that if the bhikkhun  s came, to give two or three bundles of garlic for each bhikkhun
. At that time, there was a festival in S  vatthi and the garlic was used up as soon as it was
brought in. The Bhikkhun -s, having approached the lay follower, requested some garlic. He
instructed them to go and take garlic from the keeper of the field. At that moment, Bhikkhun
 Thullanand  had gone to the field, and, not knowing moderation, had taken away a large
quantity of garlic. The keeper of the field looked down upon, criticized and spread it about
saying how can these Bhikkhun -s, not knowing moderation take away so much garlic? The
Buddha was informed about this incident by the order of the bhikkhun -s. On that occasion,
the Buddha addressing the monks, gave a reasoned talk:
In a previous existence, the Bhikkhun  Thullanand  was the wife of a certain Br  hmin and
there were three daughters, by name, Nand , Nandavat  and Sundar  nand . Then, the Br 
hmin having passed away was born in the womb of a certain swan and his feathers were
made all of gold. He gave a feather one by one to them. Then, the greedy wife of the Brahmin saying that; ―this swan is giving us a feather one by one‖ took hold of that swan and
plucked him. Although the feathers grew again they turned white. Then the Buddha addressed the monks saying ―So at that time, the Bhikkhun  Thullanand  lost the gold through
too much greed and now she will lose the garlic.‖ Therefore, the Buddha advised her saying
―One should be pleased with what is received, for too much greed is bad‖. Finally, the Buddha established a new Vinaya rule saying ―Whoever nun should eat garlic, there is an offence of expiation‖
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―Y  pana bhikkhun  lasu  a  kh  deyya p  cittiya‟nti‖
In the analysis that was put forward by the editors of the Vinaya pi  aka, the above Vinaya
rule was added for further explanation. In accordance with that analysis;
01. If she says, ―I will eat‖ and accepts, there is an offence of wrong doing.
02. For every clove of garlic there is an offence of expiation.
03. If she thinks that it is garlic when it is garlic and eats, there is an offence of expiation.
04. If she is in doubt as to whether it is garlic, there is an offence of expiation.
05. If she thinks that it is not garlic when it is garlic and eats, there is an offence of expiation.
06. If she thinks that it is garlic when it is not garlic and eats, there is an offence of
wrong doing.
07. If she is in doubt as to whether it is not garlic and eats there is an offence of wrong
doing.
If she thinks that it is not garlic when it is not garlic and eats there is no offence.
There is no offence if it is Pala  duka, Bha  janaka, Hharitaka or C  valasu  a. And
also if it is in a concoction of broth, in a concoction of meat, in a concoction of oil, or if
it is in a salad or dainties is also not offence. And if she is mad also then no offence. And
also, the first person has committed it, then also no offence.
Hence in the Therav  da Vinaya literature it is clearly mentioned that the garlic can
be eaten as a medicine or an additional ingredient which is mixed with other foods. But,
there is no doubt it cannot be eaten as a separate food. And also cannot be eaten if there
is the perception of garlic.
06. Conclusion
I have discussed the problem regarding the prohibition of eating garlic among the three traditions of B  hma  a-s,  rama  a-s and Buddhists. Though the Br  hma  a-s were against
the eating of garlic on the basis of racial deference,  rama  as were allowed to eat it. The
Buddhists allowed it as a medicine and as an ingredient but have taken steps to control the
overuse as it would be a reason to disturb to the Dhamma talks. But the Therav  da Vinaya
tradition has not taken the aphrodisiac feature as a reason to prohibit eating garlic as well as
Br  hmin tradition. But some Mah  y  na and Vajray  na texts have tried to explain the
bodily reactions that could have happened after taking garlic. The analysis of the situation
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Iromi Ariyaratne
shows the Buddhist standpoint is based on entirely different ground and in my article I attempted to point it out.
Bibliography
Primary resources
P  cittiyap  li, (1993), Pali Text Society
Cullavaggap  li, Cha  hasaṅg  yan  (CS), Version 4.0.
Khuddaka Nik  ya, Apad  nap  li, Ku  ad  na Vagga, Lasu  ad  yakather  pad  na,
Cha  hasaṅg  yan  (CS), Version 4.0.
Khuddaka Nik  ya, Vim  navatthup  li, (CS), Version 4.0.
Samantap  s  dik  n  ma vinaya  hakath , (CS), Version 4.0.
Apad  na  hakat , (CS), Version 4.0.
Vim  navatthua  hakath , (CS), Version 4.0.
Vinayat  k , (CS), Version 4.0.
Domsum Gyen, editor; Kunkhen Padmakarpo, (2005), Taipei; The corporate Body of the
Buddha Educational Foundation.
mdÑ;a;sh md,s" ,iqk j.a." nqoaO chka;s uqøKh ^2006&" foysj,'
Secondary Resources
A Comparative Dictionary of Indo-Aryan languages, http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries,
25. 10. 2010, 2. 30 p.m.
A Sanskrit- English Dictionary, Ed: Williams, Monier., (1899), Delhi; Motilal Banarsidass
Publishers.
Book of the Discipline, Expiation, Pali Text Society.
Marasinghe, M. M. J., (2009- Revised Edition), Gods in Buddhism, Nugegoda; Sarasavi
Publishes (Pvt) Ltd
The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Volume IV, Editor: Benton, William., (1983),
www.britannica.com, 25. 10. 2010, 10. 30 a.m.
fifkúr;ak" kdf.dv wdßhodi'" ^2001&" ukqiauD;sh iy udkj YsIagdpdrh" fld<U 10¦
weia' f.dvf.a iy ifydaorfhda'
End Notes
1.
A Comparative Dictionary of Indo-Aryan languages, http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries, 25. 10.
2010, 2. 30 p.m.―Garlic, one of the ten kinds of onion‖
2.
A Sanskrit- English Dictionary, Ed: Williams, Monier., (1899), Delhi; Motilal Banarsidass Publishers,
871, 899 pages.
3.
“… y  sa  ayy  na  lasunena attho aha  lasunen  ti… ekek  ya bhikkhuniy  dve tayo bha  dike
deh  ti.” P  cittiyap  li, Bhikkhun  Vibha  ga, (1993), Pali Text Society, P. 258.
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SIJBS Volume 3
“Etena bhante bhikkhun  lasuna  kh  yita  . „so m  bhikkhu vy  b  dhiyi  su‟ ti ekamanta 
nisinnoti.‟” Cullavaggap  li, (CS), Version 4.0.
4.
The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Volume IV, Editor: Benton, William., (1983), page 420
5.
“Ga  ikalasu  amevāti ga  o pho  o etassatthīti ga  ika . Ga  asaddo hi pho  apariyāyo,
bahutthe ikapaccayo. Bahuga  ikalasu  anti hi vuttaṃ hoti. Ga  asaddo hi pho  e ca kapole cāti
dvīsu atthesu vattati, idha pana pho  e vattatīti da  habba . Potthakesu pana o  hajena catutthakkharena pā  ho atthi, so vīma  sitvā gahetabbo. Bahūsu hi pubbapotthakesu ka  hajo tatiyakkharo ca o  hajo catutthakkharo cāti dve akkharā aññamañña  parivattitvā ti  hanti.”Vinayat 
k , (CS), Version 4.0.
6.
―Lasuna  n  ma m  gadhaka  vuccati.‖ P  cittiyap  li, Bhikkhun  Vibha  ga, (1993), Pali Text
Society, P. 258.
7.
The P.T.S. translator has mentioned that pala  uka refers to beetroots. But it is a wrong idea. Book
of the Discipline, Expiation, Pali Text Society.
8.
The Manusm  ti has mentioned the word  janaka for red onion. The Manusm  ti, V. 5. 19
9.
fifkúr;ak" kdf.dv wdßhodi'" ^2001&" ukqiauD;sh iy udkj YsIagdpdrh" fld<U 10" weia'
f.dvf.a iy ifydaorfhda" 207" 209" 230" 231 msgq'
10.
The P.T.S. translator has mentioned that it is Terminalia citrine (Aralu). But it can be said the word
haritaka that has used in the P  cittiyap  li is not gallnut.
11.
Kurundiya  pana j  tadesa  avatv  „m  gadhaka  n  ma bha  ikalasuna‟nti vutta … Pala 
duk  d  na  va  ena v  mi  j  ya v  n  natta  veditabba . va  ena t  va pala  uko n  ma
pa  duva  o hoti. bha  janako lohitava  o. Haritako haritapa  ava  o. Miñjāya pana pala 
ukassa ekā mi  jā hoti, bha  janakassa dve, haritakassa tisso. Cāvalasu  o ami  jako, a 
kuramattameva hi tassa hoti. Mahāpaccariyādīsu pana „„pala  ukassa tī  i mi  jāni, bha 
janakassa dve, haritakassa eka‟‟nti vutta .
12.
Samantap  s  dik  n  ma Vinaya  hakat , dutiyabh  ga, Bhikkhun  vibha  ghava  an , The
Hev  vit  ra  a Edition, Page 686.
13.
The Buddha Jayanti edition mentions the word C  palasuna. mdÑ;a;sh md,s" ,iqk j.a." nqoaO chka;s
uqøKh ^2006&" 136 msgqj'
14.
The New Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Volume IV, Editor: Benton, William., (1983), 420 P.
15.
Samantap  s  dik  n  ma vinaya  hakath , (CS), Version 4.0.
16.
Marasinghe, M. M. J., (2009- Revised Edition), Gods in Buddhism, Nugegoda; Sarasavi Publishes
(Pvt) Ltd, Pp. 01- 40.
17.
„„Himavantassāvidūre , tāpaso āsaha  tadā;
Lasu  a  upajīvāmi, lasu  a  mayhabhojana .Khuddaka Nik  ya, Apad  nap  li, Kunda  na
Vagga, Lasu  ad  yakather  pad  na, (CS), Version 4.0.
18.
„„Khāriyo pūrayitvāna, sa  ghārāmamagacchaha ;
Ha  ho ha  hena cittena, sa  ghassa lasu  a  ada .
„„Vipassissa naraggassa, sāsane niratassaha ;
Sa  ghassa lasu  a  datvā, kappa  saggamhi modaha . Ibid.
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Iromi Ariyaratne
19.
“So bahūni lasu  āni kājenādāya manussapatha  āharitvā pasanno dāna  datvā buddhappamukhassa bhikkhusa  ghassa bhesajjatthāya datvā gacchati.”Apad  na  hakat , (CS), Version 4.0.
20.
„„Pipphalyā lasu  ena ca, missa  lāmañjakena ca;
Adāsi  ujubhūtasmi  [ujubhūtesu (ka.)], vippasannena cetasā.‖ Khuddaka Nik  ya, Vim 
navatthup  li, (CS), Version 4.0..
21.
Bhagavā andhakavinde viharati. Tena ca samayena bhagavato kucchiya  vātarogo uppajji. Bhagavā āyasmanta  ānanda  āmantesi „„gaccha tva  ānanda, pi  āya caritvā mayha  bhesajjattha
 kañjika  āharā‟‟ti. „„Eva  bhante‟‟ti kho āyasmā ānando bhagavato paṭissu  itvā
mahārājadattiya  patta  gahetvā attano upa  hākavejjassa nivesanadvāre a  hāsi. Ta  disvā
vejjassa bhariyā paccuggantvā vanditvā patta  gahetvā thera  pucchi „„kīdisena vo, bhante,
bhesajjena attho‟‟ti. Sā kira buddhisampannā „„bhesajjena payojane sati thero idhāgacchati, na bhikkhattha‟‟nti sallakkhesi. „„Kañjikenā‟‟ti ca vutte „„na yida  bhesajja  mayha  ayyassa, tathā hesa
bhagavato patto, handāha  lokanāthassa anucchavika  kañjika  sampādemī‟‟ti somanassajātā
sañjātabahumānā badarayūsena yāgu  sampādetvā patta  pūretvā tassa parivārabhāvena
aññañca bhojana  paṭiyādetvā pesesi. Ta  paribhuttamattasseva bhagavato so ābādho vūpasami.
Sā aparena samayena kāla  katvā tāvati  sesu uppajjitvā mahati  dibbasampatti  anubhavantī
modati.Vim  navatthua  hakath , (CS), Version 4.0.
22.
―La  una   ru  jana  caiva pal  u  kavak  ni ca
abhak  y  n  dvij  tin  mamedhyaprabhav  ni ca‖
“La  una   ru  jana  caiva pal  du  kavak  ni
Abhak  y  ni dvij  tin  mamedhyaprabhav  ni ca‖ The Manusm  ti, V. 5. 19
23.
“Chatr  ka  vi  var  ha  ca la  una  gr  makuku  a 
pal  u   ru  jana  caiva maty  jagadhv  pateddvija ” ibid.
24.
Domsum Gyen, Editor; Kunkhen Padmakarpo, (2005), Taipei; The corporate Body of the Buddha
Educational Foundation.
25.
Cullavaggap  li II, Khuddakavatthukkhandhaka, Tipi  aka.org.cscd.
26.
P  cittiyap  li, Bhikkhun  Vibha  ga, (1993), Pali Text Society, P. 259.
27.
P  cittiyap  li, Bhikkhun  Vibha  ga, (1993), Pali Text Society, P. 259.
103
104
No Esoteric Buddhism – The Scope of the Early Buddhist Teachings for
Lay People
John Emmer
Abstract
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of
Arts degree in Buddhist Studies at the Sri Lanka International Buddhist Academy. Its purpose is to show the range of teachings presented in the Pāli Nikāyas as relevant for nonmonastics and in particular to that class of people known as ‗householders‘. What the thesis
demonstrates is that, while many scholars and traditions have taken the deeper teachings of
the Buddha and the higher attainments of the Path to be reserved for monks, what the earliest texts actually show us is that the full range of teachings are presented to and as relevant
for the laity. And in fact, the laity can, even as householders, attain to the highest goals of
the practice, save perhaps for arahantship itself. Their role is not limited to providing material support for the Saṅgha in return for merit that may improve their state in this or future
lives. Nor are the Buddha‘s teachings directed to the laity limited to the kinds of practical
advice found in texts like the Sigālaka Sutta, but in fact they contain all aspects of the teachings and in particular everything enumerated in the bodhipakkhiya-dhammā.
In his History of Buddhism in Ceylon Rahula highlighted ―Two important statements [that]
might be regarded as an index to the orthodox Buddhist attitude towards the religion of the
laity in general‖, one of which was the indication that the ―way to heaven‖ was more appropriate for the lay person than the ―way to enlightenment‖ (251-252), meaning that it was
more appropriate for lay people to focus on improving the conditions of their rebirth than to
aim directly at full enlightenment. The other statement that he emphasized was the following exchange between the lay disciple Anāthapiṇḍika, on his death-bed, and two of the
Buddha‘s most prominent bhikkhus, Sāriputta and Ānanda. Sāriputta had given him a teaching recommending the abandonment of clinging to objects ranging from the sense-sphere in
general to ―flavors‖ and ―tangibles‖ all the way to ―the base of neither-perception-nor-nonperception‖ as well as ―this world‖ and ―the world beyond‖
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―When this was said, the householder Anāthapiṇḍika wept and shed tears. Then the
venerable Ānanda asked him: "Are you foundering, householder, are you sinking?"
"I am not foundering, venerable Ānanda, I am not sinking. But although I
have long waited upon the Teacher and bhikkhus worthy of esteem, never before
have I heard such a talk on the Dhamma."
"Such talk on the Dhamma, householder, is not given to lay people clothed in
white. Such talk on the Dhamma is given to those who have gone forth.”
"Well then, venerable Sāriputta, let such talk on the Dhamma be given to lay
people clothed in white. There are clansmen with little dust in their eyes who are
wasting away through not hearing [such talk on] the Dhamma. There will be those
who will understand the Dhamma."
Then, after giving the householder Anāthapiṇḍika this advice, the venerable
Sāriputta and the venerable Ānanda rose from their seats and departed. Soon after
they had left, the householder Anāthapiṇḍika died and reappeared in the Tusita
heaven. (M.III.261-262; 1111-1112)
Rahula reports that the Commentary here remarks that lay people ―neither understand nor
like to hear a talk that advocates the renunciation of their possessions‖ (251). In a note in
their translation, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi explain:
This statement does not imply that there is any inherent exclusiveness or arbitrary
discrimination in the Buddha's way of presenting his teaching. But as those who remain in lay life must look after
their families, possessions, and occupations, such talk
leading to complete detachment would not have been appropriate for them.
(1358n1306)
Even if the difference in teachings is not ―arbitrary‖, this certainly seems to indicate that
some teachings are better suited for lay people and others may be generally withheld for the
monks exclusively. Dutt takes this to the extreme that ―householders were as far as possible
kept away from the deeper teachings, lest they should be frightened away from taking interest in the religion‖ (ctd in Samuels 235). In his chapter on ―The Lay Life,‖ where he makes
the statements cited above, Rahula goes on to detail primarily teachings on virtue and meritmaking, indicating that those are what are relevant for the laity (251-265). Gombrich goes
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No Esoteric Buddhism –.
so far as to say ―that meditation was considered to be normally impossible for the laity, and
that much of the Buddha's teaching was given only to the Sangha‖ (qtd. in Bluck 2). However, meditation was indeed taught to and recommended for the laity, and Anālayo points
out that ―the reply given to Anāthapiṇḍika… does not seem to correspond to a general pattern in the… discourse collections that teachings on insight are not given to lay people‖, and
argues that it is rather Anāthapiṇḍika himself who had not previously shown an interest in
such teachings (10-11). In general then, ―it is not because of any unwillingness to teach on
the part of the Buddha, but due to a lack of interest or receptivity on the side of the lay followers that certain topics are not [generally] taught to them in more detail‖ (11).For example
we see this pattern in the Saṃyutta Nikāya when the Buddha initially tells Dhammadinna
and the other householders to study the ―deep‖ teachings, and they themselves declare such
teachings as unsuitable for them (S.V.407; 1833-1834). Nonetheless, we are confronted here
with a common perception that certain teachings were at least generally withheld from lay
people and reserved for monks.
So were there any teachings that were considered beyond the grasp or otherwise inappropriate for lay people? Is it true that ―much of the Buddha's teaching was given only to the
Sangha‖? In the MahāparinibbānaSutta (DN 16), the Buddha said: ―I have taught the
Dhamma, Ānanda, making no ‗inner‘ and ‗outer‘: the Tathāgata has no ‗teacher‘s fist‘ in
respect of doctrines‖ (D.II.100; 245). In his note on this passage, Walshe calls out this
―famous statement, implying that there is no ‗esoteric‘ teaching in Buddhism, at least as
originally taught by the Founder‖ (568n388).In order to examine the question of whether the
Buddha withheld any teachings from lay people, we might look in this same sutta at his own
list of what have been called ―the original essential doctrines‖ (Warder, 9), the thirty-seven
topics that Buddha declared, just before his final Nibbāna, to the monks he had gathered for
this purpose, as
―those matters which I have discovered and proclaimed [and which] should be thoroughly learnt by you, practiced, developed and cultivated. … They are: The four
foundations of mindfulness, the four right efforts, the four roads to power, the five
spiritual faculties, the five mental powers, the seven factors of enlightenment, the
Noble Eightfold Path.‖ (D.II.119-120; 253)
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Elsewhere, the Buddha described this list as ―the things you should recite together‖ so that
his teachings would not be lost or confused after his passing (D.III.127; 432). These are the
bodhipakkhiya-dhammā, for which Nyanatiloka gives as a definition: ―the thirty-seven
‗things pertaining to enlightenment‘, or ‗requisites of enlightenment‘ [which] comprise the
entire doctrine of the Buddha‖ (42, emphasis added). If this assessment is accurate and all
of these topics can be shown as being taught to and as appropriate for lay people, then we
have a strong case that the Buddha‘s lack of a ‗teacher‘s fist‘ extended equally to lay people
as well as monastics.2
Before we examine each of the seven groups, we can note that in fact the whole list
is taught to the ―wanderer‖Udāyin in MN 77, the MahāsakuludāyiSutta (M.II.1-22; 629647). However, since the sutta is delivered to a ―wanderer‖ and the Buddha merely declares
of each of the topics that he has proclaimed them to his disciples, who in turn are described
as ―bhikkhus‖ throughout the dialog, this only indicates that the topics are not hidden from
other wanderers, who were typically ascetics, not that the Buddha necessarily considered
them appropriate topics for householders. It is better for our purposes here if we can show
that the topics are indeed taught directly to householders and as relevant to their practice as
lay disciples.
1. The Four Foundations of Mindfulness
In MN 51, Pessa, ―the elephant driver‘s son‖, after the Buddha has described how
certain monks abide in the four foundations of mindfulness, is reported to have exclaimed:
“It is wonderful, venerable sir, it is marvellous how well the four foundations of
mindfulness have been made known by the Blessed One: for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain
and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realisation of Nibbāna. From
time to time, venerable sir, we white-clothed lay people also abide with our minds
well established in these four foundations of mindfulness.‖ (M.I.340; 444)
It could be objected that this does not show that the Buddha actually taught these as appropriate for lay people, since he was only describing what the monks were doing. But there is
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no mention here of any reticence on the part of the Buddha over Pessa‘s knowledge or practice. Rather, after Pessa leaves, he turns to the bhikkus and says that ―Pessa, the elephant
driver‘s son, is wise, he has great wisdom. If he had sat a while longer until I had expounded
for him [on another topic], he would have greatly benefited‖ (M.I.343; 446). The Commentary indicates that this means Pessa would have attained the fruit of stream-entry had he
heard the rest of the discourse (1253n546). So clearly, neither the Buddha nor the tradition
has a problem with this lay person knowing and practicing the four foundations of mindfulness.
In another sutta, in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Ānanda goes to see the householder
Sirivaḍḍha, who is sick and has requested an audience. The following exchange ensues:
"I am not bearing up, venerable sir, I am not getting better.Strong painful
feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding,
is to be discerned."
"Well then, householder, you should train thus: 'I will dwell contemplating the
body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending,mindful, having removed covetousness and displeasurein regard to the world. I will dwell contemplating feelings infeelings . . . mind in mind . . . phenomena in phenomena, ardent,clearly comprehending, mindful, having removed covetousness and displeasure in regard to the world.'
It is in such a way that you should train."
"Venerable sir, as to these four establishments of mindfulness taught by the
Blessed One-these things exist in me, and I live in conformity with those things. I
dwell, venerable sir, contemplatingthe body in the body . . . feelings in feelings . . .
mind in mind. . . phenomena in phenomena, ardent, clearly comprehending,mindful,
having removed covetousness and displeasure in regardto the world. And as to these
five lower fetters taught by theBlessed One, I do not see any of these unabandoned in
myself."
"It is a gain for you, householder! It is well gained by you,householder! You
have declared, householder, the fruit of non-returning."
(S.V.177; 1654-1655)
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Here we do have one of the Buddha‘s foremost disciples directly attempting to teach a lay
person the foundations of mindfulness, only to discover that they are already known and
practiced by this householder. Again, there is no surprise or displeasure or any suggestion
of irregularity in the householder‘s having this knowledge. The next sutta in the text is in
fact the same except the householder‘s name is given as Mānadinna (S.V.178; 1655).
2. The Four Right Efforts
From the discussion with Udāyin mentioned above, we get the following exposition,
which serves as a nice, condensed definition of the topic:
―Again, Udāyin, I have proclaimed to my disciples the way to develop the four right
kinds of striving. Here a bhikkhu awakens zeal for the non-arising of unarisen evil
unwholesome states, and he makes effort, arouses energy, exerts his mind, and
strives. He awakens zeal for the abandoning of arisen evil unwholesome states . . .
He awakens zeal for the arising of unarisen wholesome states . . .He awakens zeal
for the continuance, non-disappearance, strengthening, increase, and fulfillment by
development of arisen wholesome states, and he makes effort, arouses energy, exerts
his mind, and strives. And thereby many disciples of mine abide having reached the
consummation and perfection of direct knowledge.‖ (M.II.11; 636-637)
However, as noted above, it is better if we can find another source beyond the discourse
with Udāyin, such that we can see the Efforts being taught as something to be practised by
the laity as well. Indeed, while they are not named as such, the same kinds of effort or striving are clearly the topic in a sutta delivered to the householder Vajjiyamāhita, in AN 10:94:
“If, householder, when one strives in a particular way, unwholesome qualities increase and wholesome qualities decline, then, I say, one should not strive in such a
way. But if, when one strives in a particular way, unwholesome qualities decline
and wholesome qualities increase, then, I say, one should strive in such a
way.‖ (A.V.192: 1469)
They may also be seen where Ānanda tells the Saykan Mahānāma that ―the noble disciple…
is energetic in abandoning unwholesome states and in undertaking wholesome
states‖ (M.I.356; 462-463). It may be objected that each of these really only discusses two
of the Four Right Efforts, but I think the fourfold understanding is clearly implied. There is
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not much sense in increasing wholesome qualities if they are not maintained once they have
been developed. Furthermore, as Nyanatiloka points out, the Four are also the same as the
sixth element of the Noble Eightfold Path (144), and so we may presume that, if that Path is
taught to householders, the full range of Right Effort is also implied. See below for the Noble Eightfold Path as taught to householders.
3. The Four Roads to Power
In the Saṃyutta Nikāya, we find an occasion where the Brahmin Uṇṇābha asks
Ānanda about the path to abandoning desire, which Ānanda has told him is the purpose for
which one goes forth as a follower of the Buddha, at which point Ānanda describes to him
the iddhi-pāda; the roads to, or bases for,spiritual power:
“Here, brahmin, a bhikkhu develops the basis for spiritual power that possesses concentration due to desire and volitional formations of striving. He develops the basis
for spiritual power that possesses concentration due to energy . . . concentration due
to mind . . . concentration due to investigation and volitional formations of striving.
This, brahmin, is the path, this is the way for the abandoning of this desire.‖ (SN.V.272; 1733)
Now, although this is clearly an example of an open policy as regards teaching these doctrines to non-monastics, it is also clear that, once again, the context here is the behavior of
monks, so it could still be asserted that the roads to power are not here taken to be appropriate for the practice of lay people. However, when Uṇṇābha objects that this teaching represents a contradiction, since it is saying that one uses desire to abandon desire, Ānanda gives
examples from Uṇṇābha‘s own behavior that very day, such as ―What do you think, brahmin, did you earlier have the desire, 'I will go to the park,' and after you went to the park,
did the corresponding desire subside?‖ (SN.V.272; 1733) After showing all four kinds of
action present in Uṇṇābha‘s own behavior, Ānanda says that ―It is exactly the same, brahmin, with a bhikkhu…‖ (SN.V.273; 1733). Therefore, we can say at least that, even if it is
not assumed that a lay person could achieve the same results as a dedicated bhikkhu, one
could certainly begin the training in the practice of developing these roads to power as a lay
person.
4. The Five Spiritual Faculties
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In the Aṅguttara Nikāya we find three suttas with the following identical passage,
although two are directed to Mahānāma and one to Nandiya, who are both described as
―Sakyans‖, meaning members of the Buddha‘s family clan, and each of whom approaches
the Buddha asking for advice as to how they should ―dwell‖ amidst all of their ―various engagements‖ as lay people, to which the Buddha replies:
―Good, good, Mahānāma! It is fitting for you clansmen to approach the
Tathāgata and ask: „Bhante, with all our various engagements, how should we
dwell?‘
―Mahānāma, a person with faith succeeds, not one without faith. An energetic person succeeds, not one who is lazy. One with mindfulness established succeeds,
not one who is muddle-minded. One who is concentrated succeeds, not one who is
unconcentrated. One who is wise succeeds, not one who is unwise. Having established yourself in these five qualities, you should further develop six things.
(A.V.329; 1565)
Although not named as such here, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom are
indeed the Five Spiritual Faculties. In the first presentation of this exchange, the Buddha
then directs Mahānāma to recollect the Tathāgata, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, his own virtuous behavior, his own generosity, and the deities. For each of these, such recollection is
said to allow one to be ―called a noble disciple who dwells in balance amid an unbalanced
population, who dwells unafflicted amid an afflicted population… one who has entered the
stream of the Dhamma…‖ (A.V.329-332; 1565-1568) The discussion after the repeated dialogue in the secondsutta directed to Mahānāma includes the advice to develop these recollections ―while walking, standing, sitting, and lying down. …while engaged in work and
while living at home in a house full of children.‖ (A.V.333-334; 1568) These passages are
particularly nice for our theme here in that they not only show the Buddha teaching these
spiritual topics to lay followers but also stressing the results for them in the context of their
lay lives. The laity can appreciate and develop the Spiritual Faculties and reap fruit of that
development even within the context of householder life.
5. The Five Mental Powers
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Distinguishing texts on the Powers is difficult because the list is the same as the Faculties we just looked at. Karunadasa claims that ―The two classes of Controlling-Faculties
(indriyāni) and Powers (balāni) are absolutely identical except in name‖ (210n2), while
Nyanatiloka and Karunaratna say that the Powers are distinguishable from the Faculties in
being ―unshakable by their opposites‖ (36; 511)3, thereby representing a further stage of development. As both comprise an example of this identity and a teaching to a non-bhikkhu,
let us return to the presentation to Udāyin we mentioned above:
―Again, Udāyin, I have proclaimed to my disciples the way to develop the
five spiritual faculties. Here a bhikkhu develops the faculty of faith, which leads to
peace, leads to enlightenment. He develops the faculty of energy . . . the faculty of
mindfulness . . . the faculty of concentration . . . the faculty of wisdom, which leads to
peace, leads to enlightenment. And thereby many disciples of mine abide having
reached the consummation and perfection of direct knowledge.
Again, Udāyin, I have proclaimed to my disciples the way to develop the five
powers. Here a bhikkhu develops the power of faith, which leads to peace, leads to
enlightenment. He develops the power of energy . . . the power of mindfulness . . . the
power of concentration . . . the power of wisdom, which leads to peace, leads to enlightenment. And thereby many disciples of mine abide having reached the consummation and perfection of direct knowledge.” (M.II.11-12; 637)
I have not identified any suttas that explicitly teach the Powers as opposed to the Faculties
to the laity, but given their at least near identity, I would not take this to be any sign that anything was being deliberately withheld from the laity.At the very least, we have in the above
example the distinction being made for one who is not himself a bhikkhu.
6. The Seven Factors of Enlightenment
Kelly identifiesseveralsuttas where the Seven Factors are mentioned to lay people
(53, 65). In one, the ―bhikkhuni from Kajaṅgāla‖ is asked by ―a number of lay followers‖ to
explain ―A question about one, a concise statement about one, an explanation of one‖, repeated up to ten. The bhikkhuni gives them a statement about something in each number
where each category, properly understood or practiced or developed, leads to ―an end of suffering‖ ―in this very life‖:
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[When a bhikkhu has a mind completely well developed in seven things, completely
sees their delimitations, and completely breaks through their meaning, in this very
life he makes an end of suffering.] What seven things? The seven factors of enlightenment… What eight things? The noble eightfold path…‖ (A.V.57; 1378)
The Buddha himself shows up at the end of the sutta to say that he would have answered
just as the bhikkhuni did (A.V.58-59; 1379). However, this discourse is clearly about the
practice of bhikkhus, and what the Seven Factors themselves are is not taught to the lay people here.
In the Bojjhaṅgasaṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Kelly identifies two of the suttas
as directed to lay people. In one the Buddha is found teaching Prince Abhaya all seven of
the Factors as the causes of ―knowledge and vision‖, but once again the discourse is given in
terms of a bhikkhu‘s practice — e.g. ―Here, prince, a bhikkhu develops the enlightenment
factor of mindfulness…‖ However, at the end of the discourse, the prince exclaims ―Surely
they are factors of enlightenment! … One who possesses even a single factor of enlightenment would know and see things as the really are, not to speak of one who possesses the
seven factors of enlightenment. … I have made the breakthrough to the Dhamma‖ (S.V.128;
1616-1617). Bodhi points out in a note that this last declaration indicates the prince‘s attainment of stream-entry (1913n114).
In the other example from the Bojjhaṅgasaṃyutta, the Buddha describes the Seven
Factors to ―the brahminSaṅgārava‖, to whom he tells:
“These seven factors of enlightenment, brahmin, are nonobstructions, nonhindrances,
noncorruptions of the mind; when developed and cultivated they lead to the realization
of the fruit of true knowledge and liberation. What seven? The enlightenment factor of
mindfulness is a nonobstruction . . . The enlightenment
factor of equanimity is a nonobstruction. . . . These sevenfactors of enlightenment are
nonobstructions, nonhindrances,noncorruptions of the mind; when developed and cultivated they lead to the realization of the fruit of true knowledge and liberation.‖ (S.V.126; 1615)
Here we find no indication that these states need be limited to the practice of bhikkhus, and
indeed throughout this sutta, the Buddha uses the phrase ―one dwells‖ as opposed to the of114
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ten used ―a bhikkhu dwells‖ when describing various forms of practice (S 46:55 passim;
1611-1615).
7. The Noble Eightfold Path
We saw above that ―the bhikkhuni from Kajaṅgāla‖ also taught the gathered lay followers about the Noble Eightfold Path as the topic for the number eight, but we also noted
there that she taught each topic as practised by bhikkhus. However, in a discourse with the
Brahmin, Jāṇussoṇī, the Buddha suggests the Eightfold Path as an alternative to the brahmin
ritual for the paccorohaṇī festival, a means of celebrating the uposatha day that involves
practices mostly focused on the home fire and offerings to brahmins (A.V.234; 1500-1501).
The Buddha sees Jāṇussoṇī preparing for these rituals, asks him about what he‘s doing, and
upon hearing Jāṇussoṇī‘s description tells him that:
―The paccorohaṇī festival in the Noble One‟s discipline, brahmin, is quite
different from the paccorohaṇī festival of the brahmins. …
―Here, brahmin, the noble disciple reflects thus: „The result of wrong view is
bad both in this present life and in future lives.‟ Having reflected thus, he abandons
wrong view, he descends from wrong view.‖ (A.V.234-235; 1501)
The Buddha then continues with this formula through the rest of the Noble Eightfold Path
plus knowledge and liberation: ―the result of wrong intention…, wrong speech…, wrong
action…, wrong livelihood…, wrong effort…, wrong mindfulness…, wrong concentration…, wrong knowledge…, [or] wrong liberation is bad both in this present life and in future lives‖, hence the ―noble disciple‖ abandons all of these (A.V.235; 15011502).Jāṇussoṇī declares that ―the paccorohaṇī festival of the brahmins is not worth a sixteenth part of the paccorohaṇī festival in the Noble One‘s discipline‖ and announces in the
common formula that he will now ―go for refuge to the Master Gotama, to the Dhamma, and
to the Saṅgha of bhikkhus. Let Master Gotama consider me a lay follower who from today
has gone for refuge for life‖ (A.V.235-236; 1502). We see here an example of the Noble
Eightfold Path taught as directly relevant for and to be practised by a lay person who shall
remain a householder.
Conclusion
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It may be objected that certain doctrines like the Four Noble Truths, Dependent
Origination, the Five Aggregates, and the Three Marks of Existence are not in this list, and
that they certainly belong in any list claiming to represent ―the entire doctrine of the Buddha‖. However, it is not difficult to find examples of the other main doctrines as taught to
the laity as well.
For example, the Buddha teaches ―Soṇa the householder‘s son‖, to understand each
of the the Five Aggregates (material form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and
consciousness) in terms of the Three Marks (impermanence, non-self, and suffering) in the
following manner:
"What do you think, Soṇa, is form permanent or impermanent?"- "Impermanent, venerable
sir."- I"s what is impermanent suffering or happiness?"- "Suffering, venerable sir."- "Is what
is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: 'This is mine,
this I am, this is my self'?" - "No,venerable sir." (S.III.49; 888)
After going over each of the Five Aggregates in this manner, the Buddha declares that
"Seeing thus, Soṇa, the instructed noble disciple experiences revulsion towards form,
revulsion towards feeling, revulsiontowards perception, revulsion towards volitional
formations,revulsion towards consciousness. Experiencing revulsion, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion [his mind] is liberated.When it is liberated there comes
the knowledge: 'It's liberated.'He understands: 'Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been
lived,what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.‘‖ (S.III.50; 888)
Here we have an example not only of these doctrines being taught to a householder, but a
declaration that a ―noble disciple‖, which includes anyone who practices correctly, not necessarily a bhikkhu or bhikkhuni, can achieve liberation through the understanding of these
principles. In the very next sutta, the Buddha also reviews for Soṇa each of the Five Aggregates in terms of the pattern of the Four Noble Truths, for example, one must ―understand
form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation‖ (S.III.50; 889).
The Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination are even more directly represented in the
Buddha‘s teachings to a householder in the following example:
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“When he knew that the householder Upāli‟s mind was ready, receptive,free from hindrances, elated, and confident, he expoundedto him the teaching special to the Buddhas:
suffering, its origin,its cessation, and the path. Just as a clean cloth with all
marks re-
moved would take dye evenly, so too, while the householderUpāli sat there, the spotless
immaculate vision of the Dhammaarose in him: "All that is subject to arising is subject to
cessation."Then the householder Upālisaw the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, understood the Dhamma, fathomed the Dhamma;he crossed beyond doubt, did away with perplexity, gainedintrepidity, and became independent of others in the Teacher's Dispensation. Then he said to the Blessed One: "Now, venerable sir, we must go. We are busy and
have much to do." (M.I.379-380; 485)
Note that here we have the householder Upāli, upon learning and understanding these teachings, attaining to stream-entry and yet remaining ―busy‖ with his householder duties. In addition, we may also note that the reference to ―the path‖ being expounded above is another
example of the Eightfold Path being taught for a householder.
I have shown that all thirty-seven elements of the bodhipakkhiya-dhammāwere taught to and
for lay people. And I have suggested with some further examples that any other doctrine
that could be taken as central to the teachings of the Buddha can also be found to be expounded to lay people in the Pāli Nikāyas. Given the evidence presented here, I think it
would be hard to maintain that the early Buddhist position really was that any teachings
were to be withheld from the laity as inappropriate for their consumption or beyond their
ability to practice.
End Notes
1
References to canonical texts will be given with a single-letter abbreviation followed by the PTS
volume (where appropriate) and page number(s), followed after a semicolon by the page number(s)
in the translation used. For editions and abbreviations, see the bibliography. Where I give two-letter
identifiers (also indicated in the bibliography) for the Nikāya instead of the single-letter, the identifier is followed by a sutta number instead of a page reference. So, for example, ―D.II.180; 461‖ refers
to the PTS edition, Volume II, page 180 of the Dῑgha Nikāya, found on page 461 of the translation,
and ―DN 31‖ refers to the thirty-first sutta of the Dῑgha Nikāya. Note that the numbering of suttas in
the Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas are not consistent between editions. Here I use the numbering
as in the editions prepared by Bodhi and listed in the bibliography.
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2
I must note here my indebtedness to Kelly for the ease of conducting the survey of topics that follows. His appendix contains a comprehensive listing of suttas delivered to lay people with short
summaries of each, which made locating occasions where the topics were taught much easier than if
I had to search all the texts myself! (39-71)
3
Karunaratna does acknowledge, however, that ―in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (V.219) we find these five
powers being identified with the five spiritual faculties‖ (511).
4
An examination of the ―unshakableness‖ might show that the Powers are just a stage of development only attainable by arahants, and thus not directly accessible to the lay person who is not themselves ready to attain arahantship.
5
The section in brackets is elided in Bodhi‘s translation. I have restored it given the pattern present
in the previous responses. The reference to the Noble Eightfold Path is left in the quote for its relevance to the next section of this paper.
Abbreviations for Canonical Texts
D/DN Dῑgha Nikāya.Trans. Maurice Walshe as ―The Long Discourses of the Buddha.” Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 1995.
M/MN Majjhima Nikāya.Trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi as ―The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha.”4thed. Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2009.
S/SN
Saṃyutta Nikāya.Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi as ―The Connected Discourses of the Buddha.‖ Boston: Wisdom, 2000.
A/AN Aṅguttara Nikāya.Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi as ―The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha.‖
Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012.
Other Works Cited
Anālayo, Bhikkhu. ―Teachings to Lay Disciples: The Saṃyukta-āgama Parallel to the
Anāthapiṇḍikovāda-sutta.‖ Buddhist Studies Review.27.1 (2010): 3-14.
Bluck, Robert. ―The Path of the Householder.‖Buddhist Studies Review. 19.1 (2002): 1-18.
Dutt,Nalinaksha. ―Place of Laity in Early Buddhism.‖Indian Historical Quarterly.21
183.
(1945):
163-
Gombrich, Richard. Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.
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Karunadasa, Y. ―Bodhipakkhiyā-dhammā.‖ Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Ed. G.P. Malalasekera.
Vol. III. Government of Ceylon, 1971.
Karunaratna, Upali. ―Bala.‖Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Ed. G.P. Malalasekera. Vol. II. Government
of Ceylon, 1966.
Kelly, John. ―The Buddha‘s Teachings to Lay People.‖Buddhist Studies Review. 28.1 (2011): 3-78.
Nyanatiloka, Ven. Ed. Ven. Nyanaponika. Buddhist Dictionary: Manual of Buddhist Terms and
Doctrines. 1952. 4th ed. Rpt. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 2004.
Rahula, Walpola. History of Buddhism in Ceylon. 1956. 2nd ed. Colombo: M.D. Gunasena& Co.
Ltd., 1966.
Samuels, Jeffrey. ―Views of Householders and Lay Disciples in the SuttaPiṭaka: A Reconsideration
of the Lay/Monastic Opposition.‖ Religion. 29 (1999): 231-241.
Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism. 1970. 3rd ed. Delhi: MotilalBanardsidass, 2000.
119
120
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUDDHISM AND
BELIEFS IN GODS
Ven. Dhammagaweshika
Abstract
The Purpose of this research was to analyze and study the relationship between belief in
gods and Buddhism.
The beliefs prevalent in India during pre-Buddha period before Enlightement are analyzed
and how the Buddha proclaimed the sublime Dhamma message in that environment was
studied in this research survey.
The faith, confidence and reliance in Sri Lankan Buddhism in the early days of Buddhism in
the post-Parinibbāna Period, the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the period between Anuradhapura Era to Mahanuwara period and current times are considered in depth for analysis
and founding of relationship between beliefs Gods and Buddhism as an institution.
The Development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka
Arrival of Arhant Mahinda; the Contemporary Religious and Social conditions and the religious and social development of early Buddhism in Sri Lanka. It is timely to consider social
and religious changes in post-Buddhist Sri Lanka and analyze how they helped to develop
Buddhism in Sri Lanka.According to E. W. Adikaram in “Early History of Buddhism in
Ceylon” the following conditions existed with regard to beliefs before the arrival of Arahant
Mahinda in Sri Lanka:
“Yakkhas and tree-deities, Jainism and a few other cultures existed. King Pandukābaya
built devalas for the Yakkhas Chittarāja, Kalavela and Vibhishana.‖ (Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, E. W. Adikaram, 1946 Buddhist Cultural Centre, part 2 Chapter…. pp 4344)
This is how Ven. Walpola Rahula describes the social and religious state during the period
of early Buddhism in his book, “History of Buddhism in Ceylon” :
“The dead relative or leader becomes a god and listens to living kinsmen as before; accepts
the offerings; treats well those people doing well and punishes the evil doers. This belief is
propagated from the distant past and exists even today.”
Other examples are, King Mahāsena, who built the Minneri tank, who was deified as Minneri Deviyo (God of Minneri) and the God inhabiting Samanta Kūta (Adam‘s Peak). The
God Sumana, was a post Buddhist god. He was a Yakkha and during the first visit of the
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Buddha to Sri Lanka, he became a Buddhist. This might have led to the elevation of Sumana
to the pantheon of Buddhist gods.
It is seen that large groups of Nigantas, Ajivakas, Paribbājakas, Pasandās, Pabbajitas and
other ascetics known as Samanas were present in Sri Lanka at the time. The worship of the
dead, trees and rocks was also practiced.nt; e.g., nuga (banyan) tree, is still worshiped even
today. (History of Buddhism in Ceylon; Ven. Walpola Rahula, 1955; Paris; Page 49)
Establishment of Buddhism
The development or failure of any phenomenon like a religion is dependent on the leadership of the country. Their strategic wisdom, intelligence and ability are the other factors that
influence the success of a religion taking root.
Even the Buddha had close associations with King Pasenadi Kosala, King Bimbisara, King
Ajātasathu and the Princes of Vajji and Malla.
Holding Dhamma discussion and meditation sessions during poya (full moon) days, giving
permission to accept the king‘s invitation for spending the rainy season retreat in his domain
under his personal care, are some of the rules of discipline established by the Buddha on the
request of king Bimbisara. As the Buddha heeded the king‘s requests, so did the King also
give consent to the Buddha‘s requests. Since the subjects are bound to obey the king‘s orders it is very easy to promote any philosophy under royal patronage.
Similarly, Arahant Mahinda too did not clash with the ‗blasphemies‘ of the time, and he had
to find a place for those beliefs too. We will consider how he followed the same method.
It is appropriate to consider the strategies employed by Arahant Mahinda. First, a sociological survey was done. It is common to assimilate the indigenous culture and beliefs during
propagandization or the introduction of a new religion in a different country. A Similar influence was there in early Buddhism, brought in by Arahant Mahinda to Sri Lanka. He
chose suttas and stories that were easy to understand and were commensurate with the attitudes of the people. It conformed to a style of preaching that was absorbed by the people
very easily.
By preaching the Chullahatthipadopama Sutta first, an understanding was generated about
the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha in addition to showing how a monk becomes a bhikkhu
and the value of becoming a bhikkhu. By preaching Peta Vatthu and Vimāna Vatthu, next,
the good and bad moral values of the deeds done and consequent operation of the Law of
Kamma were explained. By this method of leading the people from a known terrain to a
new one he gained an opportunity to attract the people who believed in petas to Buddhism
and by explaining the four noble truths he could show them the dangers of samsāra, thereby.
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Relationship between Buddhism and belief in gods
Further examination of the suttas preached by Arahant Mahinda in succession- the
Devadåta Sutta which points to the results of good and bad deeds, the Bāla Pandita Sutta
showing how refraining from evil and doing good deeds create good kamma can be beneficial in both (this and next) worlds- shows that a new philosophy was successful in revealing
new goals in the spiritual development of the people.
A branch of the Bodhi tree, under which the Buddha sat determining to become enlightened,
was planted in Anuradhapura to replace tree worship. In addition, the induction of gods into
Buddhism as a support needed by the people was done at this time. But the gods were not
given elevated status. Instead of trees and rocks, chaitiyas enshrining relics of the Buddha
were introduced for worship. The women were given a chance to achieve liberation by establishing the Bhikkhuni-Order
After some time, King Devanamapiyatissa, according to the Mahāvamsa, asked Arahant
Mahinda whether the Buddha Sāsana (the Teaching of the Buddha) had been established in
Sri Lanka. This is how Arahant Mahinda replied:
“When a son born of Sri Lankan parents is ordained, then the Sāsana is established in Sri
Lanka‖ (Mahavansa, Buddhist Cultural Centre, 2003, edited by Nandadeva Wijesekara,
page 72)
Aritta and his brother of the royal family were ordained and became winners of the path and
fruits (magga-phala) finally ending in the attainment of Arahanthood. Thus the establishment of the Buddha Sāsana was started with the Royal Patronage of King Devanamapiyatissa.
It can be inferred that it was possible for Arahant Mahinda to establish speedily the Buddha‘s philosophy without deviating from the basic core of original Buddhism, since there
was no organized and developed religion in the country, at the time.
It is felt necessary to analyze here what happened to the Buddha‘s Teaching introduced by
Arahant Mahinda, after it received royal (state) patronage.
Receiving Royal Patronage for Buddhism
There is an important idea embedded in the request by the king from the Arahant to mark
boundaries (sãma) around the city so that he (i.e., the king) could live and act properly according to Buddhism. (Mahāvamsa)
Doesn‘t it show that it is the king‘s responsibility to safeguard the Sāsana? Only a Buddhist
could lay claim to the kingdom of Lanka from the 3rd century, B.C. up to the 9th century
A.D., until the decay of the Sinhala Kingdom. (Wilhem Geiger, Culavamsa, London, 1929.
Published by J. Jetley. Page 308)
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The upliftment of the Buddha Sāsana was the main responsibility of the king. According to
history, all the kings have modified the Sasana. The Pāthradhātu (the sacred alms bowl) of
the Buddha and Dantadhātu (the Sacred Tooth Relic) of the Buddha were noble items of
possession required to establish kingship in Sri Lanka.
Some monks supported certain kings whom they could control for their own benefit. Some
kings have supported certain powerful monks to fulfill their own needs. For e.g., King
Dutugamunu, went to war with the Chola King Elara, saying “This exercise of mine is not
for me to have all the luxuries and glory of a king. But to save the country, nation and the
religion with the monks of the Sangha at the forefront.‖
What is implied by this statement is that some kings have donated the kingdom to the Buddha Sāsana. (e.g. Kings Dutugamunu, Saddhātissa, Siri Meghawanna, Mugallāna etc.)
It shows an attempt to make their reign free of problems. One reason for this may be the
closeness of the bikkhus to the public. Buddhism too had to undergo the natural changes of
time. Ven. Walpola Rahula Thero makes the following candid comment in his book, ―The
History of Buddhism in Ceylon”
―When Buddhism became the state religion; it lost its basic characteristics of appicchatā
(contentment with few wants) and virāga (absence of sensual desires) and gradually turned
into a civil institution burdened with lots of social and religious responsibilities from time to
time.”
No religion can keep its original form once it becomes an institution. To retain the power
and glory, they have to cope with the changing times. The essential law of nature is to adapt
or die.
Similarly, due to various interrelationships, Sri Lankan Buddhism has undergone lots of
changes, from one ruler to another.
The relationship between Buddhism and beliefs in gods from Anuradhapura
era to the Kandy era
Pre-Mahinda Period
After king Pandukābhaya built Anuradhapura, the worship of Yakkhas, Nāgas and trees had
existed there. According to the Mahāwansa, Ninganta, Kumbānda, Jina and Brāhmaõa worship had also spread in Sri Lanka during this period of time.
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Period after the arrival of Arahant Mahinda.
Getting rid of the ‗blasphemous‘ worship of trees and replacement of it with the worship of
the Bodhi tree, to respect the Buddha, started during the reign of King Devānampiyathissa.
In place of the worship of rocks (pabbata), all the stupas in the vicinity of Mihinthale, where
Arahant Mahinda resided, had become places of worship, e.g. Chethiyagiri, Wessagiri,
Magagiri etc. (.See Ven.Meegoda Pa¤¤āloka, Purathana Sri Lanka, Sadeepa publishers,
2001, p.96)
The inception of a Buddhist mode of worship which is opposed to myths, in addition to the
worship of the Buddha‘s sacred relics, worship of the Bodhi tree, all got established during
Devānampiyathissa‘s reign. It is worthwhile at this point to venture into an investigation into how the beliefs in gods which are common to the people encroached into Buddhist practices.
To perpetuate Buddhism itself righteous strategies (sammā payoga) are neccessary. The
Buddha too has employed this social wisdom of action. What does the author of
Mahāwaüsa say? That God Vishvakarma and Sakka had taken the form of two Buddhists
and came to assist the construction of ―Mahāseya‖ and “Mirisawetiya‖ under the patronage
of king Dutugemunu. (Mahāwansa Pg.180)
Once all popular gods among the people were designated as Buddhist gods, it was not difficult to introduce Buddhism with a new face to the populace.
Similarly, as Atthanāyake M. Herath mentions in his book Thupavamsa- Experimental
Analyses; during the reign of king Dutugemunu, the king had gone to the Kataragama
Devala to ask the god there for help, and to make a vow pledging fulfillment when the war
was won (Their form of supplication is called ―bāraya‖ in Sinhala) and he fulfilled the
promise after victory. If the rulers of the country, had not deviated from beliefs in gods, the
ruled would have definitely followed the paradigm set by the rulers Therefore, it seems that
the belief in gods was incorporated into Buddhist practices to heed the voice of the common
man.
It seems that for anything to be popular and bear currency it has to be generally recognized
by the general populace.
Safe Establishment of the Budhdha Sāsana (the Buddha‟s Teachings) and
the Arising of Conflicts.
Every time the Sri Lankan kingdom was over-run by the Indians, the religions like Niganta,
Brāhmaõism, and Jainism made periodic resurgent headways in the kingdom, in addition to
the Mahāyāna influence on Buddhism. These had multiplied by the time of king Walagambā. During the time of invasions, and when the ruler was weak, it was observable there were
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instances of trouble surging up in the kingdom. This was a special feature in the history of
Sri Lanka.
As an attempt to prevent the deterioration of the Buddha Sāsana during these times and to
safeguard the pure Dhamma of the Buddha, hitherto broadcast and carried down in the oral
tradition it had to be recorded in the form of writing. Thus sponsorship and royal patronage
for writing the Tripitaka by king Walagambā should be appreciated. Also, during his time
there arose a schism in the Sāsana created by the monks residing at Abayagiri.
It can be seen that the beliefs in gods and part of Mahāyāna doctrinal view got mixed with
the pristine Buddhism when the Saïgha community was thus divided as in the Abayagiriya
and Mahāvihāra Schools during this time.
The Abayagiri monks accepted the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism and during the time of
king Mahāsena, there was a marked development. The king destroyed the temple belonging
to the Mahāvihāra group, which was Theravādin, but later, the king supported the Theravādins thus rectifying his past mistakes. According to the history of the Sāsana, after King
Mahāsena‘s passing away, it was legendary that he was born as a god called ―Minneri Deviyo.‖
The popular belief that the people of the ruling classes who had done great services to the
community will be born as gods, (are deified) was not rejected by conventional Buddhism.
For e.g., the Upāsaka Anāthapiõóika, and Dhammika becoming gods after doing good deeds
in this life itself.
During the reign of King Gajabā, the belief in Patthini Devi spread in the country. It is recorded in the history of the Buddha Sāsana that Cholas had taken away 20,000 Sinhalese to
their country, and that King Gajabā had waged war against them and secured their release
and brought them back with an additional 20,000 Cholas from that country in revenge. The
Patthini belief came to Sri Lanka along with those Cholas. (,See Ven. Dharmakirthi, Sāsanika Ithihāsaya, Systematic Printers 1996)
The arrival of the Sacred Tooth Relic of the Buddha during the time of King Kitsirimevan
resulted in an increase in the enthusiasm in Buddhism and it resulted in safeguarding the
Sacred Tooth Relic which became the responsibility of the king, the possession of which
ensured for the king a natural right to the throne. The Mahāwaüsa records the kings who
have donated ―giribhānda”, water, añāvisi Buddha pūjā (offerings for the twenty eight
Buddhas) and ornaments as offerings for the sacred tooth relic. (Mahāwaüsa p.38)
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After each påjā, (offering) the merits were transferred to the gods too. This clearly shows
that there was an affinity, a close bond between gods and Buddhism. Mahāwaüsa says that
king Mahinda too had honoured both Buddhism and Shivāism equally. (Mahāwaüsa)
What is implied by the presence of the practice of Bodhisathva worship and god
Vibeeshana, during the reign of king Dhāthusena? The people look up to the gods for help
when their problems were not solved by the rulers. People in faith expect relief in the next
world from Buddhism, as well as relief and luxuries in this world from gods. This might be
the reason for the increase in the belief in gods.
―Mese pawathi anathuru gee rangum puda
Those sithin we siti sura viman mada
Yase pathala diya thula uthula mananada
Ase pura daku wibisana surindu sanda”
( Thotagamuwe Sri Rāhula Thera, Sellihini Sandesaya. Verse77. Seedevi Offset Printers
and Publishers. 2006)
Polonnaruwa Era – Dark Shadows
When the Dravidians were ruling the country there were lots of changes and influences that
took place in Buddhism. The concepts in Shivāism encroached into Buddhist practices. Buddhists were attracted to Devalas. The ruins of the Shiva Devālas (temples) built during this
time can be seen even today.
The removal of the cow from the sandakadapahana (moon stone) and Tamil stone inscriptions serve as proofs for the spread of Shivāism during this period. (Prof. Anuradha Seneviratne, Polonnaruwa; Madyakālina Lankāwe Aganuwara. 1998. Page 283)
The construction of (kovils) Hindu temples was increased due to invasion by Kālinga Māga.
In Ravaging hoardes of Tamils, in search of treasure caused destruction of Buddhist temples
and villages made a huge negative impact on Buddhism. The increase of beliefs in Gods
during this time might have resulted in acceleration of the assimilation of gods into Buddhism.
Beliefs in Buddhist practices
This becomes clear through the ―Kathikāwata.‖ (Conventions) written during Polonnaruwa
and Dambadeni periods. (Nivandama Sri Dhammajothi Himi, Sāsanika Ithihasaya, Systamatic Printers; 1996.Page 107) The deterioration of the Sāsana or the power of Buddhism
and increase in belief in gods may have resulted in holding this convention.
Nature of Gampola and Kotte periods
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By the time of the Gampola period the monks had to lean towards the concepts of people in
order to safeguard Buddhism. The Devalas (temples for gods) were erected inside Buddhist
temples due to such influences. They even allowed the drawings and pictures inside the temple too. By doing that their intention was to keep Buddhism intact, without allowing its total
destruction.
Parākramabāhu (IV) can be considered as the greatest among the kings of the Kotte era. According to the Sandesha kāwyas (sandesha poems), reference to beliefs in gods enjoyed an
elevated place during this period.
“Riwibimba yuru riwikula kamala kara
Piyumamba nithorawa randi ura madala
Manaramba himi ruu sirini manahara
Parakumba naranidu sanda daku mithura”
(Salalihini Sandesaya. Thotagamuwe Sri Rahula Himi. Verse 19)
In the “Parevi Sandesaya‖ (message sent through a dove) it is pledged that god Upulwan
find a suitable prince consort for Princess ―Chandrāwathi.‖
In the ―Salalihini Sandesaya‖ (message send through the bird salalihiniya) the god
Vibeeshana was pledged to give a gift of a son to the King‘s daughter Lokanāthā.
―Eseyin dasaman mahanel kusum gena
Pudamin e surawara siri saran wadimina
Melakata isuru wee parakum raja kumaru
Palakoota kimeka oba sonda theda bala maharu‖
( Thotagamuwe Sri Rahula Himi, Salalihini Sandesaya Verse105)
The Salalihini Sandesaya also mentions the Nallur Kovil built in Jaffna for the Saivite by
Prince Sapumal.
A priest who wrote vehemently against the god belief showing the true essence of Buddhism
was the Ven. Vidāgama Maithree. In the Gira Sandeshaya (message carried by a parrot) and
Budugunālankāraya believed to be written by him, disclaimed critically the god belief,
treating them to be inferior to Buddhism. What is meant by this? That the Buddhist monks
at that time had taken steps to safeguard Buddhism irrespective of their own attitudes.
There was a lot of turmoil after the Kotte Period in the country. It became worse with foreign invasions, and by the division of the country into 3 parts. After king Rājasinghe came
into power and ruled from Sithāwaka and became a Hindu, the situation became tragic for
Buddhism. The temples were destroyed, monks were killed and the religious books burnt.
Some monks ran away. Others disrobed. (See Ven. P. Gnānarāma, Island of Light, p. 40)
Buddhism and Belief in gods in the Kandy Period
128
The situation became so serious that by the Kandy period what was left of the Sangha was a
symbolic group wearing a yellow strip of cloth around the neck, called ―Ganinwahanses‖
towards the end of the Kandy period, the rulers from Vadiga region constructed Hindu Kovils (Temples) for the use of their wives.
The pathetic state of the bikkhus is evident in the Sangha Convention (kathikāwatha) written
at this time.
The belief in Hindu gods had increased and the rulers used it as a strategy to uphold their
superiority over the people of this country.
The bikkhu became helpless after losing their royal sponsorship and due to prevailing local
calamities and foreign threats. After losing the higher ordination (upasampadā) to bikkhuhood, those who kept the Sāsana safe were a group called ―Ganinnānses‖ mentioned
above who unfortunately had not learnt facts of pure Buddhism. They protected Buddhism
while feeding their families at the same time. They were a good civil group that did not
know Buddhism in depth. The bikkhus who could teach or learn a text book were lost. When
the lineage of ordained bikkhus was lost, this group that protected the temples and their
properties serving as guardians of Buddhism did not have a proper understanding of Buddhism and they remained Sāmaneras.
This group brought the practice of god worship for their own profit. They performed religious rites and rituals for the benefit of worldly luxuries and in effect they became priests
performing rites and rituals instead of becoming Buddhist monks.
During the reign of Kirthi Sri Rājasinghe, Buddhism in Sri Lanka was revived by bringing
back Upasampadā with the arrival of a group of monks from Siam (Thailand) led by Ven.
Upali Thero.
Although Buddhism was given priority for the sake of keeping power, it should be emphasized that the kings of Kandy made devalas and conducted the annual perahara.
Another unique feature of the Kandy period was the construction of four major devalas surrounding the Temple of the Tooth. The Hindu kings had performed peraharas (religious
processions) parading in front of these devalas. The perahara is a way of thanking the gods
for helping people in this life. This also shows the concept of beliefs in gods among people.
Not only that, it is natural to lean towards psychological needs for profit and luxury, if they
are easily accessible. Since the philosophical aspect of the Theravada view is very deep,
people automatically lean towards an easygoing and luxurious way of life.
References
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References in English
Ambagoda Dhamma Kusala Thera, 1957, 2500 Buddhajayanthi. Mahāvihāra Pali, Tipiñaka
Granthamālā – Sri Lanka Government.
Aïguttara Nikāya. Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka Translation Committee, published under
the PATORNAGE of the Government of Ceylon 1962.
Aththanāyake M. Herath; Thåpavansa – Experimental Analyses.
Balangoda Ananda Mithree Himi. Dãganikāya. Published by the Sri Lanka Government.
E. W. Adikaram, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon. 1946. Buddhist Cultural Centre.
Majimdar, Raychaduri and Datta AN. Advanced History of India. Pg 140
Professor: M. M. J. Marasinghe, Gods in Early Buddhism 1974, University of Sri Lanka –
Vidyalankara Campus.
Walpola Rahula Thero, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, 1956, The Buddhist Cultural Centre.
Wilhelm Geiger. Mahāvansa. Published by Gautham Jeley 1912, 6A, Shanhpur Jat, New
Delhi.
References in Sinhala
Aïguttara Nikāya. The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka Translation Committee. Published by
the Government of the Democratic Socialistic Republic of Sri Lanka. (1982)
Achārya.Hemachandra Dissanayake, Visudhdhi Mārgaya. Sinhala translation 2000, Buddhist Cultural Centre, Nadimala.
Achārya.Nandadeva Wijesekara, Mahāwansa Sanskaranaya - 2003. Buddhist Cultural Centre, Nadimala.
Kuddaka Nikāya. Petawatthu and Vimānawatthu. The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka
Translation Committee. Published by the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of of Sri Lanka. (1982)
Deega Nikāya – Pūjya Ananda Balangoda Maithri. The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka
Translation Committee. Published by The Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1962)
130
Piriwāna poth wahanse. Nadimala Buddhist Cultural Centre. Ajith Printers pvt ltd 2009.
Pūjya. Ambalangoda Dhammakusala. Mahāvagga Pāli - The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka
Translation Committee.Published by the by the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1957)
Pūjya. Nevandama Sri Dharma Keerthi, Sasanika Ithihāsaya. Systematic Printers – 1996.
Pūjya. Paravahara Sri Pannagana, Sutta Nipātha, Budhdha Jayanthi Tripiñakamālā. The Editoriall Board of the Tripiñaka Translation Committee, published by the Government of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1977)
Pūjya.Meegoda Pa¤¤āloka. Purāthana Sri Lankawa. Sadeepa Prakashana. 2001.
Majjima Nikāya - The Editorial Board of the Tripiñaka Translation Committee, pulished by
the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1982)
Mahāchārya Anurādha Senevirathne. Polonnaruwa Madyakaleena Aganuwara. 1998
Saüyutta Nikāya - The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka Translation Committee, published
by the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1982)
Sutta Nipātha - The Editorial Board of the Tipiñaka Translation Committee, published by the
Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. (1982)
131
132
THE VIEW OF PRACTICE IN THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM:
The Seven Methods of Eliminating the Taints
Ven. Phap. Q
Abstract
Having delivered discourses for 45 years, the Buddha left a huge treasure of teachings for human beings. The aim is to explain the meaning of life, the human predicament
and the phenomenon of injustice seen in society. The Buddha pointed out the way in the
practice that leads to true happiness.
The ultimate goal of Buddhism is to help human beings to be free from suffering and
build their lives in peace and happiness. To achieve all that, we must concentrate our mind,
live in right Dhamma, learn to understand the teachings, practice the Path and apply it in
daily life through ―The seven methods to eliminate the taints‖. The Buddha‘s teachings are
considered as a boat for conveying humans from ignorance to enlightenment.
We clearly see that Buddhism is a unique path leading to the cessation of suffering.
The Buddha teaches us a way of life, a way of practice, a philosophy that is very useful because it shows us how to eliminate the taints radically.
The Buddha teaches us to eliminate all false ideas which impel us into metaphysical
realms of thought, constantly reminding us that they are all illusions. He directed human beings to the path that leads to reality, that is the perception of suffering and the path to its cessation.
The origin of human suffering is ignorance which is expressed in many different
forms. This is a characteristic of ignorance or the taints/defilements that arise from ignorance. So, if we want to solve a problem, we should base the solution on the characteristic
or taint to find out the most appropriate method for eradicating it. The Buddha had a method
for each type. According to the Buddha human beings have seven different starting points
for each taint for which he has offered seven different methods.
There are taints that should be abandoned by seeing
According to the Buddha‘s analysis, the first type of taint is due to lack of
knowledge (jñāna) namely the lack of the seeing into the constituents of form. If we want to
eliminate suffering arising from the source of form we must apply the seeing method. In
Sabbāsava Sutta, the Buddha has described as follows:
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“Here, bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary person, who has no regard for noble ones
and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who has no regard for true men
and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, does not understand what
things are fit for attention and what things are unfit for attention. Since that is so, he
attends to those things unfit for attention and he does not attend to those things fit
for attention.”
With regard to the meaning of this passage, the Buddha focused the problems on
what things are fit for attention and what things are unfit for attention. The first problem, the
Buddha taught is to use knowledge (jñāna) to do the work of attention. The knowledge here
implies the Buddha‘s Teaching or the Sages‘ words. It is the truth or nature of life that the
Buddha has taught and revealed. The second is the object of attention. The object that the
Buddha advised us to attend is what brings the real benefits and peace in life, the opposite
of what brings human suffering and sorrow springing from the taint of sensual desire, taint
of being and taint of ignorance.
Our every noble thought of merit making work in temples put to use this method.
For example, it is time for morning prayer session. At that time we are sleeping very well,
but hearing the bell, we wake up, but the craving for sleep gets the better of us, thinking,
―We shall keep sleeping, tomorrow we shall chant‖. If we know how to practice the Buddha‘s teachings, we will have to attend immediately like this: ―we must practice like as if
the turban on our head is on fire.‖ If we just sleep well, not knowing any better, when do we
escape from sufferings? But with proper attention, there will be created motive power to
make us put forth more and more effort (viriya). And like a hen conscientiously warming
her eggs, they will hatch young chicks. If we are more zealous in putting forth effort, we
will be able to exert more restraint over ourselves, avoid laziness and be heedfull. In The
Dhammapada, the Buddha taught:
“Heedfulness is the Deathless path,
heedlessness, the path to death.
Those who are heedful do not die,
heedless are like the dead.”
In other words, the methods that are not practical, far-fetched, unrealistic, do not
bring happiness, the Buddha advised us to give up these methods, should not attend, because
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Ven. Phap. Q
T he view of practice...
when attending, they will increase the suffering for human beings. To describe this, the
Buddha has given a few examples of the problems that do not need attention, as follows:
“„Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the
past? Having been what, what did I become in the past?”
This is the metaphysical problems of the Theravāda tradition, the Buddha refused to answer
these problems, because they are not related to the purpose of the pure living life, not to
cease the suffering and there is no benefit for enlightenment. According to the Buddha, the
problem that we were in the past or not, after the end of this life, we exist or do not, and how
will we exist like in the future? ... Suffering still exists in the life of human beings. First, we
need to solve the problems of suffering in the present life. So, the metaphysical questions
which are not practical are not the subject to attend for an ordinary person that is in suffering. This is the meaning of the sentence: ―what things are fit for attention and what things
are unfit for attention‖ that has been taught by the Buddha. It belongs to the field of
―knowledge‖ (jñāna), not ―faith‖. So, the kinds of suffering that lack knowledge, we need
to give them up. We must use knowledge to eliminate For example, a candidate enters the
examination room or a staff member that does professional work; a candidate must learn by
heart all the lessons and understand what he has to do, a staff member must have the professional knowledge in his field. To learn by heart all the lessons of the candidate or the professional knowledge of a staff member belongs to the ―knowledge‖ that is the condition not to
make them fear and have anxiety, without this condition, it is the cause of suffering. This is
the meaning of the sentence: ―There are taints that should be abandoned by seeing‖.
There are taints that should be abandoned by restraining
The second taint is the lack of restraining, namely, carelesness that arises from taints.
In Sabbāsava Sutta, the Buddha has taught:
“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, abides with the eye faculty restrained. While
taints, vexation, and fever might arise in one who abides with the eye faculty unrestrained, there are no taints, vexation, or fever in one who abides with the eye faculty restrained. Reflecting wisely, he abides with the ear faculty restrained … with the
nose faculty restrained … with the tongue faculty restrained … with the body faculty
restrained … with the mind faculty restrained … While taints, vexation, and fever
might arise in one who abides with the faculties unrestrained, there are no taints,
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vexation, or fever in one who abides with the faculties restrained. These are called
the taints that should be abandoned by restraining.”
The Buddha advised the monks to have careful attitude towards restraining the six
sense-organs: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind (Salāyatana). Why did the Buddha
advise us to restrain them? That advice is not redundant because anyone has always kept his
six sense-organs carefully. Here, the concept of restraining six sense-organs that the Buddha
mentioned to the specific characteristics, does not bear the normal meaning as we understand. Restraining eyes does not bear the meaning: Do not let dust go into either eyes nor
prohibit the monks to look at form. Their ears should not hear, their nose should not smell,
their tongue taste, their body should not experience touch, their mind should not cognize all
dhammā. The meaning of restraining is to have the careful attitude when six sense-organs
contact with six external sense objects, such as form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and
dhammā. Do not let six external sense objects attract because six sense-organs are gateway
for all defilements to appear. For example, when the eyes see beauty, there
immediately
arises desire in the mind towards that form, so it is bound and attracted by that form, that
person will not control himself, his mind is so distracted that he cannot meditate, preventing
his wisdom from arising. These are the obstacles for him to liberate. Therefore, all the
monks must restrain the six sense-organs carefully, do not let desire arise in the mind. In
Majjhima Nikāya I – No. 33. Mahāgopālaka sutta, the Buddha taught:
―Here, on seeing a form with the eye, a bhikkhu grasps at its signs and features.
Even though, when he leaves the eye faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome states of
covetousness and grief might invade him, he does not practise the way of its restraint, he does not guard the eye faculty, he does not undertake the restraint of the
eye faculty. On hearing a sound with the ear … On smelling an odour with the nose
… On tasting a flavour with the tongue … On touching a tangible with the body …
On cognizing a mind-object with the mind, he grasps at its signs and features. Even
though, when he leaves the mind faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and grief might invade him, he does not practise the way of its restraint,
he does not guard the mind faculty, he does not undertake the restraint of the mind
faculty.”
Or more exactly, the monks should have contact with the things that lead to liberation. They should not have contact with the things that prevent them to attain enlightenment.
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Likewise, ears hear sound; nose smells odour; tongue tastes sweet; body feels soft or hard
and mind cognizes all things (dhammas), all also have such meaning. This is the Buddha‘s
general explanation, because the meaning of six sense-organs and six external sense objects
are also called twelve spheres (dvādasa-āyatana), including all things (all dhammas) in the
world. Any dhamma also belongs to these twelve categories in this world, so the Buddha
said dvādasa-āyatana that implies all dhammas.
Starting from this meaning, we can develop and concretize the problems to understand them more easily. The concept of ―restraining‖ includes what we need to use like a
house is the necessary place where we live, we need to keep maintaining it. We cannot say
the house is the material that is controlled by impermanence, so one can do whatever he
likes with it, let it go to ruin.. Let it be. Or we say that we are having a sickness, but we do
not want to cure it because the body is impermanent. To understand like this it means it is
not suitable to the spirit of the Buddha‘s teachings. In fact, the Buddha said impermanence
is the nature of things and change is natural. The human beings should not be suffering from
those changes because they belong to natural law. Birth, old age, disease and death are natural laws governing human beings. When we were born, grew up, became old, succumbed to
sickness and death, that is natural, we should not be suffering because of this change. This is
not the same meaning of ―let it be‖: when having sickness, and we do not take medicine or
we do not repair our ramshackled house. This is the meaning of the word ―impermanence‖
that the Buddha mentioned.
In short, the meaning of restraining in this Sutta is to restrain six sense-organs because they are the six gateways to arise all the defilements. In other words, the causes that
make our body and mind suffer, we must restrain them carefully.
There are taints that should be abandoned by using
The third taint is the lack of using, namely, material. According to the Buddha, human beings not only have psychological suffering but also the suffering lack of material
wants such as the lack of food, clothing, housing, healing materials, etc. We want to eliminate this suffering we must use the best method to give it up, namely, the spirit of ―content
with few desires‖. In Sabbāsava Sutta, the Buddha has described as follows:
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“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, uses the robe only for protection from cold, for
protection from heat, for protection from contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind,
the sun, and creeping things, and only for the purpose of concealing the private
parts. He uses almsfood neither for amusement nor for intoxication nor for the sake
of physical beauty and attractiveness, but only for the endurance and continuance of
this body, for ending discomfort, and for assisting the holy life. He uses the resting
place only for protection from cold, for protection from heat, for protection from
contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, the sun, and creeping things, and only for
the purpose of warding off the perils of climate and for enjoying retreat. He uses the
medicinal requisites only for protection from arisen afflicting feelings and for the
benefit of good health.”
Four requisites (catupaccaya) of a monk in the Buddha‘s time are: robes (cīvara),
alms food (piõóapāta), residence (senāsana) and medicine (besajja). Four types of requisites are very important to a monk who lives in the pure living, homeless in the forest. These
are the minimum requisites that cannot lack less for the monk. If a monk lives in the forest
that lacks these requisites, he will certainly have so many difficulties in his pure living that
can lead to death. So, the Buddha said: “While taints, vexation, and fever might arise in one
who does not use the requisites thus”. Of course, in the spirit of ―content with few desires‖
is not to wish excessiveness, just enough to feed our body and the purpose is to practice the
pure living. This Buddha‘s spirit must not base on the external physical form, but it is based
on the thoughts in the mind of human beings, the purpose of life and the circumstances that
he lives. For example, the level of ―content with few desires‖ of a king is different from the
level of the poor in a society, that does not base on external physical form that forces the
king to look like the level of ―content with few desires‖ of the poor. Also, once a society
changes, time and space are different, the level of demand in Saṅgha Order also changes, so
we should not take four requisites as the standard to apply to all ages and to all the Saṅgha
Order do not live in the same society.
We should understand the Buddha‘s spirit and educational purpose is how the monks
can achieve enlightenment within this life. For this goal, whatever obstacles to the path of
liberation, the Buddha advised monks to avoid them. Therefore, we should learn the spirit of
the Buddha‘s teachings rather than learning to stereotyped attitudes that bear the nature of
form. We can say that the specific regulations are only valuable for those who do not under138
Ven. Phap. Q
stand the Buddha‘s educational spirit. It can be broken in the aspect of form for those who
have understood clearly when that form is no longer suitable to the fact. The purpose and
life of monks in the Buddha‘s time and in the society today are the same that is to attain enlightenment and liberation, but different from the aspect of form of activities because the
living conditions of each age and social needs are different. Therefore, we should adhere to
the Buddha‘s educational spirit and should not keep the form.
Through the sources of Buddhist scripture, we see that the Buddha has advised the
monks to live in the forests, the mountains, and the quiet places where are very good for
practice and meditation. He has rarely told to the monks to go to the villages or the urban
areas to propagate Buddhism by chanting and praying for the laymen. We can say that the
activities of the Saṅgha Order in the Buddha‘s time until after his death about one hundred
years were the asembly that have practiced with the form of pure living, is not the form of
religious activities. However, the activities of the Saṅgha Order in the King Ashoka‘s time
are the form of religious activities. From this time onwards, Buddhism focused on the propagation and bring the benefits for the human beings. This is typical character of two Buddhist stages in two different ages. Therefore, the activities of the Saṅgha Order are also different. This is the point that we should note.
In summary, the four requisites (catupaccaya) are the indispensable conditions of life
for monks who live in the forest. If the monks lack of one of these four requisites, the defilements will appear. Through the Buddha‘s teachings, we see that the Buddha‘s educational
way is very scientific and practical, not to deny the reality of human life such as food, clothing, housing, etc. Whether the monks or laymen still arise the defilements if they lack of the
material in their life. We must use the material to eliminate these kinds of defilements, not
the spirit. This is the particular thought in Sutta Piṭaka and symbolizes the Buddha‘s thought
in Theravāda Buddhism.
There are taints that should be abandoned by enduring
According to the Buddha‘s analysis, the fourth taint is the lack of enduring. In
Sabbāsava Sutta, the Buddha has described as follows:
“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, bears cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, the sun, and creeping things; he endures ill-
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spoken, unwelcome words and arisen bodily feelings that are painful, racking,
sharp, piercing, disagreeable, distressing, and menacing to life.”
Enduring is withstanding and patience. Here, the Buddha has referred to the endurance such as cold and heat, hunger and thirst, gadflies, mosquitoes, ill-spoken, unwelcome,
etc. They can be divided into two kinds of endurance: natural and social relation. The kinds
of endurance come from cold and heat, hunger and thirst, gadflies, mosquitoes, rain, storm,
etc, to belong to nature, no one can escape, even if the monks or the laymen, the mandarins
or the normal people, all live together in one space, we all are affected by the climate when
it has changed, especially the monks‘ life that is homeless, living in the forests, the mountains. It is hard to avoid the harsh climate in India. Before such circumstances, there is only
the endurance can alleviate the suffering of human psychology. Second one is the endurance
of the relationship between man and man, man and society. Experience life shows that these
relationships are too complex for us to avoid the collisions of life. The same problem, but
this person said that it was good, the other said it was bad, even if husband and wife, mother and children, brothers are close relatives, but they are also very difficult to avoid all discords let alone the social community, especially in a society that has unequal classes like
the rich treating the poor badly. In this case, only the endurable attitude can alleviate the suffering of human psychology. This is the Buddha‘s meaning of endurance.
In summary, human beings cannot change the extreme discontent between man and
man and man and society. These are the things that are inevitable, which we need to endure
and try to reduce the psychological suffering among humanity.
There are taints that should be abandoned by avoiding
According to the Buddha‘s analysis, the fifth taint is lack of careful attitude of avoiding. In Sabbāsava Sutta, the Buddha has described as follows:
“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, avoids a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull,
a wild dog, a snake, a stump, a bramble patch, a chasm, a cliff, a cesspit, a sewer.
Reflecting wisely, he avoids sitting on unsuitable seats, wandering to unsuitable resorts and associating with bad friends, since if he were to do so wise companions in
the holy life might suspect him of evil conduct.”
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The Buddha advised the monks to avoid the dangers that may occur to them and
even to normal people. These kinds of danger cannot use the methods such as chanting suttas, reciting the Buddha‘s name, the endurance to give up. We must apply the method of
avoiding. For example, when we meet a madman, we cannot use arguments to analyze a
wrong or right thing or apply the causal theory to teach them, in this case, the best way is to
avoid. When we see a fierce dog; a war area, etc, the most effective method is that we
should stay away from these dangers we cannot use the arguments or any other method to
avoid.
Through this teaching, we see that the Buddha‘s teachings are very practical and scientific. They do not bear the mystical and sublime nature that the human beings cannot understand. The Buddha‘s method is to base on the cause that makes the defilement to arise
and eradcate twith a very specific method. That is the Buddha‘s spirit and educational method in the Theravāda Buddhism.
There are taints that should be abandoned by removing
The sixth taint is due to not removing. This meaning is presented by the Buddha in
Sabbāsava Sutta like this:
“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, does not tolerate an arisen thought of sensual
desire; he abandons it, removes it, does away with it, and annihilates it. He does not
tolerate an arisen thought of ill will … He does not tolerate an arisen thought of cruelty … He does not tolerate arisen evil unwholesome states; he abandons them, removes them, does away with them, and annihilates them.”
Here, the meaning of "removing", is that the Buddha has advised the monks to remove the roots of greed, hatred, ignorance and all evil things because they are the cause to
arise the suffering for human life. These kinds of defilement belong to psychology. To remove them, we must apply psychology by lighting the lamp of wisdom. It is a method to
remove the causes the defilements to arise and when they arise they can be removed , and
when they are removed, human beings can free themselves from this kind of suffering.
There are taints that should be abandoned by developing
The seventh taint is due to not developing. This meaning is presented by the Buddha
in Sabbāsava Sutta like this:
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“Here a bhikkhu, reflecting wisely, develops the mindfulness enlightenment factor,
which is supported by seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, and ripens in relinquishment. He develops the investigation-of-states enlightenment factor … the energy enlightenment factor … the rapture enlightenment factor … the tranquillity enlightenment factor … the concentration enlightenment factor … the equanimity enlightenment factor, which is supported by seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, and ripens
in relinquishment.”
The Buddha advised the monks to practice The Seven limbs of enlightenment (The
seven Bodhyāṅga). Due to the practice of these Seven limbs of enlightenment, disenchantment with the world arises in the minds of the monks and they abandon the world without
any attachment. This is because by practicing the seven factors of enlightenment the monks
know and see with the six external sense organs the real nature of the six sense objects
through their understanding of dependent originations (pañccasamuppāda). Thus they do
not get attracted to the six sense objects. These are the benefits of practising the seven factors of enlightenment:
1). Smṛti-sambhodhi (in Pali, Sati Sambojjhanga) Power of remembering the various
peaceful and purified states passed through in contemplation.
2). Dharma-pravicaya- sambhodhi –yanga,(in Pali, Dhammavicaya Sambojjhanga):
Discrimination of the true and the false. It is the wisdom of the selective function of the
mind. This attitude of selection has two meanings: the first is to choose the method to practice that is suitable for the level of motive power; the second is that in the Buddha‘s time,
there were many philosophical systems, many religions advocated to practice in different
ways, each religion believing that their teachings were true, others were false. In this case, a
person who wanted to achieve the ultimate goal of enlightenment, must have a clever discriminative mind to distinguish between good and evil and then chose for himself best way
to practice. That is the reason why the Buddha has recommended to a practitioner to choose
the best way for practice.
3). Vīrya-sambhodhi (in Pali, viriya sambojjhanga) . After choosing e the good
method, one has to put forth concerted effort to practice it.
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4). Prīti- sambhodhi (Pali, Piti Sambojjhanga) it is a happy attitude to practise the
Buddha‘s teachings. This happy state only appears after the Dharma-pravicaya- sambhodhi
–yanga and the Vīrya-sambhodhi.
5). Praśrabdhi-sambhodhi: (Pali, Passaddhi Sambojjhaïga) Riddance of all passions
and ignorance and grossness or weight of body or mind, so that they may be light or
free and at ease.
6). Samādhi-sambodhi: (Pali, Samadhi Sambojjhaïga)Power to keep the mind in a
given realm undiverted.
7). Upekṣā-sambhodhi (Pali, Upekkha Sambojjhaïga). Complete abandonment, unperturbed by all disturbances of subconscious or ecstatic mind. To let go (upekṣā), one of
the chief Buddhist virtues, that of renunciation, leading to a state of equanimity without
pleasure or pain, or independence of both. It is defined as the mind in equilibrium, i.e. above
the distinction of things or persons, of self or others; having abandoned the world and all
things, and having no affections or desires. Upekṣā is one of the seven Bodhyāṅga. The
Buddha taught: ―If one wishes to penetrate into the profound realm of liberation of the Maha
-Bodhisattvas, Buddhists must first be able to let go of all of the five desires of ordinary
people.‖
Thus, these seven limbs of enlightenment is a process of practice from an ordinary person to
the saint. He needs to go through each stage to eliminate the suffering and attain the goal of
liberation and enlightenment. This is the meaning of the practice in Theravāda Buddhism.
Conclusion
It can be said that Sabbāsava Sutta (All the Taints) in Majjhima Nikāya I is the representative sutta for the view of practice in Theravāda Buddhism. The Buddha has assigned to this
sutta, the role of wisdom and offered his Teaching for one who knows and sees, not for one
who does not know and see, for only one who knows and sees can understand his Teaching.
That understanding is the foundation for us to practice and remove our ignorance that is the
origin of human suffering. The Buddha has described that understanding as ―Wise attention‖
or ―To know and see the reality of all things wisely.‖ It is not exercising one‘s imagination
but a real knowing and seeing which brings about Release. It can be said that ―Wise Atten-
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tion‖ is a guideline for those who do scientific research on psycho-physical phenomena and
the process of their development and to analyze and evaluate them.
One special point in this sutta is that the Buddha has presented not one but seven different
methods to remove the seven different phenomena of defilement because they differ in nature.
Through seven different methods to get rid of all defilements, we can see that the Buddha‘s
Teaching on practice according to Theravāda Buddhism is very practical and scientific, is
not vague and abstract, not containing any mystical meaning but with a very logical methodology. Anyone, no matter what position in society can also accept his Teaching easily and
have the ability to attain liberation. At the same time, these seven methods also express the
spirit of practice in Theravāda Buddhism that does not limit in any way, what is likely to be
reduced or removed in human suffering, it is considered as the method of practice par excellence in Buddhism
In short, I hope that the Buddha‘s Teaching in this sutta will help human beings have a happy life based on wisdom to build up a society that is very moral, modern and progressive.
And the spirit of this sutta is very adaptable to everyone who wants to attain enlightenment
and liberation as expressed in the Dhammapada:
―Mind precedes all knowables,
mind's their chief, mind-made are they.
If with a corrupted mind
one should either speak or act
dukkha follows caused by that,
as does the wheel the ox's hoof.”
“Mind precedes all knowables,
mind's their chief, mind-made are they.
If with a clear, and confident mind
one should speak and act
happiness follows caused by that,
as one's shadow ne'er departing.”
End Notes
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1
.Jñāna (Sanskrit; Pāli, ñāṇa). General term meaning knowledge, particularly in the context
of the understanding of doctrines. In terms of Buddhist epistemology, tradition (anuśrava) is
not by itself a valid form of knowledge, nor are sense-perception or reason reliable means of
knowledge until the distorting influence of unwholesome mental factors such as the three
roots of evil (akusala-mūla) have been eliminated. Once this has been achieved, one who
reflects with right attention (yoniśo manasikāra) will perceive with the proper mode of cognitive
awareness and see things ‗as they really are‘ (yathābhūta). In later Mahāyāna sources jñāna comes to
mean ‗non-conceptualizing‘ or ‗non-dual‘ awareness, and is sometimes used synonymously for enlightenment (bodhi) itself. Based on the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra and Yogācāra doctrines, the basic Buddha awareness of enlightenment is subdivided according to the function into the five awarenesses
(pañca-jñāna). (Source: A Dictionary of Buddhism, Oxford University Press, 2003, 2004 (which is
available in electronic version from answer.com).
2
Teachings of the Buddha, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Part one: The Root fifty
Discourses, 1. The Division of the Discourse on the root, No. 2 Sabbāsava Sutta, A translation of the
Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 199 Elm
Street Somerville Massachusetts 02144, 2005, pp. 91 – 92.
3
K.Sri Dhammananda, The Dhammapada – No.21, Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, Kualalumpur,
1988, p. 83.
4
Discourses, 1. The Division of the Discourse on the root, No. 2 Sabbāsava Sutta, A translation of the
Street Somerville Massachusetts 02144, 2005, pp. 92.
5
Ibid, pp. 93 – 94.
6
Discourses, 4. The Great Division of Pairs, No. 33. Mahāgopālaka sutta, A translation of the
Street Somerville Massachusetts 02144, 2005, pp. 314.
7
Teachings of the Buddha, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, Part one: The Root fifty Discourses,
1. The Division of the Discourse on the root, No. 2 Sabbāsava Sutta, A translation of the Majjhima Nikāya,
Translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 199 Elm Street Somerville Massachusetts
02144, 2005, pp. 94.
8
Ibid, pp. 94.
9
Ibid, pp. 94 – 95.
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10
Ibid, pp. 95
11
Ibid, pp. 95
12
Ibid, pp. 95 – 96.
Bibliography
Original Sources:
1. Teaching of the Buddha, The Middle Length Discourses of the
Buddha:
Part one: The Root fifty Discourses, 1. The Division of the Discourse on the root, No. 2:
Sabbāsava Sutta, A translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 2005.
Part one: The Root fifty Discourses, 3. The Division of Similes, No. 22. Alagaddåpama Sutta, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi,
2005.
Part one: The Root fifty Discourses, 4. The Great Division of Pairs, No. 33. Mahāgopālaka
sutta, a translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi,
Wisdom Publications, 2005.
Part Two: The Middle Fifty Discourses, 2.The Division on Bhikkhus, No. 61 Ambalaṭṭhikarāhulovāda Sutta, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Ñāṇamoli and
Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 2005.
Part Three: The Final Fifty Discourses, 2. The Division of One by One, No. 115 Bahudhàtuka Sutta, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Translated by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and
Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications, 2005.
2. Pali Text Society Translation Series, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, A New
Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya VOLUM I:
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Ven. Phap. Q
Part I: The Book with Verses - 1. Devatāsaṃyutta: Connected discourses with Devatās, II.
Nandana, 20 (10) Samiddhi, Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi, THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY
OXFORD in association with WISDOM PUBLICATION, 2000.
3. Saüyutta Nikāya - Satipaññhāna Saüyutta II, SN 47.13 PTS: S v 161, CDB ii 1642.
Translated from the Pali by òhanissaro Bhikkhu Alternate, translation Nyanaponika/
òhanissaro, (Source: www.realtruthlife.blogspot.com/2011/04/saüyutta-nikāya-satipaññhāna
-saüyutta.html#.UVCaO530DAE). The Dhammapada, Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, Kualalumpur, 1988.
5. K. Sri Dhammananda, The Dhammapada:
Chapter V- Bāla Vagga (Fools), V: 7 The leper‘s confidence in the Triple Gem
(Suppabuddha), Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, 2009.
Chapter VI- Paṇḍita Vagga (The Wise), VI: 9. One must work for his own liberation
(Dhammika), Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society, 2009.
Chapter XX- Magga Vagga (The Way or The Path), Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society,
2009.
6. Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, G P Malalasekera (1899-1973), which is available as
printed version from.
7. A Dictionary of Buddhism, Oxford University Press, 2003, 2004.
8. Buddhist Dictionary, Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, by NYANATILOKA
MAHATHERA.
2). Internet Resources:
9. Www.thuvienhoasen.org
10. Www.hoavouu.com
11. Www.buddhismtoday.com
12. Www.budsas.org
13. Buddhist Door: Glossary
14. Www.Accesstoinsight.Org
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148
Why Are the Samacitta-devas called „same-minded deities‟?
Upali Sraman
Abstract
Samacitta, loosely rendered here as ‗equipoised mind‘, is a term significantly used in the
Mahāyāna literature written in the Sanskrit language, foremost of them being
Samādhirājasūtra, Kāśyapaparivarta, Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra etc.. Samacitta has been
mentioned as ‗the factor by which Bodhisattva can attain incomparable perfect enlightenment‘ (kṣipraṃcaanuttarāṃsamyaksambodhiṃpratilabhate). This statement has been attributed to the Buddha in the Samādhirājasūtra in reply to a question posed by
KumāraCandraprabha. The question of Candraprabha also includes other accomplishments
such as gaining acute wisdom, being devoid of fear, eliminating rāga-doṣa-moha, progress
in the śīla (morality), dhyāna(concentration), prajñā (wisdom), purity in bodily behavior,
discarding verbal faults, destroying mental defilements. Development of Samacitta has been
emphasized as the reason for succeeding in all these virtues (etānguṇān). The importance
attributed to this concept of ‗samacitta‘ therefore makes us curious as to what its implications are.
Samacitta has two basic implications: firstly, development of a mental state that remains
even in all situations without being emotionally overwhelmed. Secondly, samacitta encourages to have unbiased attitude to all living beings i.e. to consider all living beings as equal.
Although highly emphasized in the Mahāyāna literature, the term samacitta is available in
Pāli literature as well. However, there are significant differences in the way the term samacitta is used in the Pāli and Sanskrit texts.
Following research methods used in Indian philological studies, I attempt to clarify the conceptual significations and to understand the development of the term samacitta within Buddhist literature written in Pāli and Sanskrit languages. The practical implications of the term
samacitta in modern social contexts will also be discussed
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Samacitta, rendered here as ‗same-mind‘, is a term significantly used in the Mahāyāna literature written in the Sanskrit language, foremost of them being Samādhirājasūtra, Kāśyapaparivarta, Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Bodhisattvabhumi etc.. Samacitta has been mentioned as
‗the factor by which Bodhisattva can attain incomparable perfect awakening‘ (kṣipraṃ ca
anuttarāṃ samyaksambodhiṃ pratilabhate). This statement has been attributed to the Buddha in the Samādhirājasūtra in reply to a question posed by Kumāra Candraprabha. The
question of Candraprabha also includes other accomplishments such as gaining acute wisdom, being devoid of fear, eliminating lust (rāga), hatred (doṣa), and delusion (moha), progress in the morality (śīla), concentration (dhyāna), wisdom (prajñā), purity in bodily behavior, discarding verbal faults, and destroying mental defilements. Development of Samacitta has been emphasized as the reason for succeeding in all these virtues (etān guṇān).
The importance attributed to this concept of ‗samacitta‘ therefore makes us curious as to
what its implications are.
Samacitta has two basic implications: firstly, development of a mental state that remains
even in all situations without being emotionally overwhelmed. Secondly, samacitta encourages to have unbiased attitude to all living beings i.e. to consider all living beings as equal.
In spite of the fact that it is a very significant concept in the Mahayāna literature I have not
come across any major study done on samacitta. In fact, a detailed study on samacitta will
be very helpful in the understanding of Buddhist universalistic ethics. Although widely seen
in Buddhist Sanskrit texts it is used in very few instances in the
Pāli literature. In this early stage of research on samacitta I take into consideration the contexts in Pāli literature where the term samacitta is used and some commentarial attempts at
defining it. These instances will intimate us on the ethical imports of samacitta in the Pāli
texts.
I begin an inquiry into the term samacitta firstly from an etymological perspective and then
engage with the contexts wherein it is used. Eventually I shall relate the etymological explanations with the actual usages and see if the contextual senses comply with etymological
meanings or not. Examining the commentarial interpretations on the term samacitta I highlight its ‗inter-subjective‘ aspect.
1. Samacitta: etymology of the term
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Upali Sraman
Why Are the Samacitta-devas
called ‗same-minded...
The term samacitta has two possible etymological explanations:
i.
Sama (Skt. śama < √śam ‗to be quiet or calm‘) + citta; where sama stands for
‗calmness‘, ‗tranquility‘, ‗mental quiet‘. Citta (< √cit, to perceive, fix the mind
upon, attend to, be attentive, observe, take notice of) basically means mind.
Thus, sama-citta here would refer to a ‗tranquil state of mind‘.
ii. Sama (adj. ‗even‘, ‗level‘) + citta (―mind‖) meaning ‗even mind‘. This meaning has
two suggestions. Firstly, it refers to retention of the same state of mind for a long
time. Secondly, it refers to looking at living beings evenly, i.e. in an unbiased manner.
The essential core of what samacitta means in the literary sources can be subsumed in the
two etymological explanations given above. Some scholars prefer to take the first meaning
―tranquil mind‖, whereas others prefer to use the second one. Bhikkhu Bodhi has used
‗same-minded‘ based on the exegesis on the word in Pāli commentaries. Bhikkhu Anālayo
translates it as ‗even mind‘ based on the Chinese rendering in the Āgamas. However, the
variety of contexts where samacitta is used (particularly in Sanskrit texts) renders it problematic, if not impossible, to attempt a one-word rendering.
2. Samacitta-devas: Same-minded deities
In the Aṅguttaranikāya, a collection of ten discourses has been made under the title Samacittavagga. Among the ten discourses the term samacitta is mentioned only in the fifth discourse as a qualification for a group of deities (devas). However classifying all the ten discourses under the heading Samacittavagga indicates that the term samacitta was significant
in the minds of the compilers of the Pāli Canon. The compilers followed several criteria
such as unity of contents or ideas to classify discourses into different categories. It is appropriate therefore to assume that each of the discourses in this collection relate to samacitta.
Each of these discourses contains some ethical categories.
These categories include the importance of gratefulness as precondition for birth in sappurisabhumi; rendering service to parents; importance of abandoning misconduct
(duccarita) by body, speech, and mind; worthiness of the sekhas (those still in training) and
asekhas (the already trained ones, or ‗beyond training‘) in the Buddha‘s teaching and so on.
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Although the collection of the discourses in samacittavagga does not show an explicit progressive link from one to the next it appears to me that there is an attempt to show some
connection between basic virtues of gratefulness and bodily restraints with the gradual training in the path of awakening. The enumeration of various ethical factors such as gratitude
(kṛtajñena) and the factors of noble abode (or brahmavihāras such as loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy and equanimity) principles of sense-restraint is presented in the
instances where samacitta is a very important concept in Mahāyāna texts as well. Thus,
gratitude as a virtue is placed in the same context of samacitta. In its deeper implications
samacitta is very closely associated with the brahmavihāras which are also known as appamānas or immeasurables. In my subsequent researches I hope to delineate this relationship between samacitta and the brahmavihāras. Suffice it to say here that just as developing
samacitta, the brahmavihāras also allow innumerable beings to dwell in a single space without conflicting with each other. In this paper we are concerned with samacitta basically as a
qualification of the devas.
The term samacittadevas are mentioned in the fifth discourse of this collection in a discussion on the internal fetters (ajjhattasaṃyojana) and external fetters (bahiddhāsaṃyojana).
This is the most explicit use of the term in the canonical Pāli texts. The commentarial definitions of this term are based on this instance. The following is a brief summary of the context
of this discourse.
In this discourse, when the venerable Sāriputta was pointing out the distinction between internally fettered and externally fettered beings many deities called
samacittadeva approached the place where the Blessed One was residing. The deities
reported to the Buddha Sāriputta‘s exposition on the internally fettered and externally fettered being to the Buddha. They then requested the Buddha to join in and express his approval of Sāriputta‘s exposition. Accepting the request the Buddha appeared in the place where Venerable Sāriputta was and gave a description of the samacitta-devas. These deities, the Buddha said, have that kind of a mind or mental
state due to which even if many of them stand in a very small space they do not create inconvenience to each other. Then the Buddha enunciates that one should train so
as to become one with tranquil senses and that those with tranquil senses have tranquil minds, tranquil, bodily conduct, tranquil verbal conduct, and tranquil mental
conduct. One should consider bringing tranquil gifts for companions in the religious
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life. The Buddha further remarks that this kind of training is absent in non-Buddhist
Upali Sraman
teachings.
In further discussion the Buddha shows how different stages of mental and moral development leads to the elimination of the fetters resulting in attainment of the fruit of non-returner
and being born into different heavenly realms. In addition to other aspects of doctrinal significance, the fact that innumerable deities are not in conflict with each other while remaining together in one place seems to be an important message conveyed by this discourse. It is
particularly relevant to the understanding of the notion
of samacitta/samacittatā that the Buddha emphatically comments to Sāriputta that ―it was
not after being born into their heavenly realm ... it was while still in the human realm [in a
former life] that those gods of even mind cultivated a good mind, extensively and greatly,
and thereby acquired the ability to stand together on the tip of an awl – ten, twenty, thirty,
forty, fifty, or sixty of them – without obstructing one another.‖
In sum, this instance shows that samacitta is a quality of the mind that can be developed
within the human world. It is not a result of an action only to be experienced after death in a
heavenly realm. Inculcation and experience of samacitta begin in the human birth itself.
Being endowed with this quality of the mind allows living in a limited space without conflict. How does one develop this quality of the mind? The training in the tranquility of the
senses and so on are mentioned in the sutta itself as immediate factors resulting in the development of samacitta. As mentioned, the fact that this collection of ten discourses begins
with gratefulness indicates that practice of virtues like gratitude gradually creates the conditions for the development of samacitta.
The reference to a large number of deities assembled in a limited space without conflicting
with each other has a very close parallel with an instance found in the Mahāyāna Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra. In this discourse the space in question is a ‗tiny chamber‘, with the harmonious coexistence of the assembled members in such a tiny space sharing a common attitude
becoming an especially significant instance of being ‗samacitta-minded‘, as it were. The
relevant passage reads, in Chinese translation:
―A fantastic congregation, including incredible arrays of gods, celestial bodhisattvas,
and other beings, is assembled within Vimalakīrti‘s tiny chamber, where they sit on
magnificent thrones of unimaginable size—all without jumbling
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up against each other, and entirely without contorting the dimensions of the ordinary
world ...‖
The passage in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra continues to describe in detail the miraculous
things that happen in such a ‗tiny chamber‘ thanks to the peaceful co-existence of all these
beings.
Thia extract is significant in several aspects. Firstly, this parallelism seems to be all the
more important as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra contains number of significant references to
the doctrine of samacittatā. Secondly, the fact that Sariputta (Skt. Sariputra) is the protagonist in both these instances suggests the possibility of gleaning a train of thought connecting
the Pali text and the Vimalakirtinirdesasutra. Thirdly, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra expands
the concept of samacitta as meaning ‗same-minded‘ to include the non-discrimination between male and female members of the assembly. An important message in this instance is
to show how impossible things become possible by existing in a place without conflict by
developing ‗samacittatā‘.
The popularity of the discourse samacitta deities mentioned in the Theravāda tradition on
the above has been commented upon as follows:
―It is a very short discourse, but had a singular impact on the huge assembly of devas
who, according to tradition, assembled to hear it. It is said that a very large
number of them attained Arahatship, and innumerable were those who reached
stream-entry. This discourse of the Venerable Sāriputta is, in fact, counted
among the few which had unusually far-reaching results among beings of
the higher worlds; and although it is a very brief text rather cryptic without
the commentarial explanation, it had a high reputation in
succeeding centuries. It is the sermon that was preached by the arahant Mahinda on
the evening of his arrival in Ceylon, and the Mahāvaṃsa (X IV, 34ff).‖
Why this discourse was so popular among the deities is hard to understand. A possible reason could be its reference to the deities attaining full awakening (arahathood). But the emphasis is however on culmination of virtues in the human life itself.
154
All subsequent traditional exegesis of the term, to which I now turn, is based on this disUpali Sraman
course. The following section shows commentarial reasonings on why the deities are referred to as samacitta-devas. The key term here is samacitta. In order to understand why the
deities were called ‗same-minded‘ it is important first to understand the word samacitta.
3. Samacitta in the Pāli Commentarial Literature (Aṭṭhakathā)
Samacitta has been used in the Pāli commentarial literature in several instances. In fact, the
actual meaning(s) of ‗samacitta‘ has been expanded and elaborated only in the commentaries. The commentarial interpretations can be broadly categorized under the two aspects as
follows.
3.1. Sameness of mind or mental state: Samacittā devatā or same-minded deities are so
called due to the sameness of the exquisiteness of (their) mind. All of them are measured in
the individuality of their own selves (and at the same time) in the exquisite resemblance of
(their) minds (with each other). That is the reason the name ‗same-minded‘ was given to
them.
This indicates that although they were distinct as individuals they all had the same exquisite
mental state (sukhumabhāvasamatā).
An extension to this meaning can be seen with reference to a group of monks or deities who
have the same spiritual attainments (ekasamāpattilābhiniyo) or the same objects (of meditation) (ekārammaṇalābhiniyo).
Another instance of the use of the term samacitta is referring to all the members in a congregation being unanimous on a decision. ―When or as long as (tāva) spiritual attainment is
spoken of by the elder, the strength of the spiritual attainment is not talked about. Therefore,
we shall having assembled the ten powers call them the strength of the spiritual attainments.‖ One instance is when ―the elders thought in future a certain monk, or nun, or god, or
human being may think ―these discourses are spoken of by the disciples‖ and would disrespect thus.
Therefore, the elders decided to inform the Buddha and make the discourse a
Buddha word (lit. spoken by the all knowing one). ―Thus, it will be respect worthy in future‖ all were of one-mind or unanimous (ekacitta) on this decision.
The commentary to the Vinaya piṭaka uses the term samacitta in defining
‗samānasaṃvāsaka‘ (an equal co-resident or a person with whom one lives). Thus, an equal
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co-resident is a person who has no discord with regard to thoughts due to the fact of
(having) same mentality. This use of samacitta reflects the practical significance of sustaining cordial attitudes, free of discord, while living in a community.
In sum, all these definitions imply that samacitta is an inter-subjective experience. It is referring to a group of people or monks sharing the same idea or having that kind of a mental
state or spiritual attainment that make it possible to live in a single space without conflict.
3.2. Non-discriminative attitudes
A slightly more nuanced interpretation of the term samacitta can be seen when it is used in
the sense of having non-discriminative or ‗equal‘ attitude to all beings. The commentators
describe the Buddha being called even-minded on account of his aspiration to bring about
happiness
(sukhūpasaṃhārakāmatāya)
and
dispel
the
unsatisfactoriness
(dukkhāpanayanakāmatāya) of all living beings. For example, he had the same attitude towards his own (relatives and well-wishers) as he had exactly the same towards others; just
as towards his mother Mahāmāya, exactly the same towards Ciñcā Mānavikā; just as towards the father Suddhodana, similarly towards Suppabuddha; just as towards the son Rāhula, similarly towards murderers like Devadatta, Dhanapālaka, and Aṅgulimāla. Whether towards beings in heaven or on the earth, just the same.‖ Therefore, the pleasant word (?
sātāgiro) was properly said that ―He was the same towards all living beings.‖
The non-discriminative attitude leads to the inculcation of sense of dissolution of the barriers between self and others. In the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa connects it with metta or
boundless benevolence and explains systematically various techniques that conduce to development of this attitude. This aspect of samacitta, i.e. in relation to dissolving the barrier
between oneself and others, is widely discussed in the Buddhist Sanskrit texts as well.
The non-discriminative aspect of samacitta can be translated as ‗even-mind‘. This attitude
engenders non-discriminative compassionate action. Practising generosity with an evenmind (samacitta) is considered a praiseworthy virtue. This is one of the outstanding qualities
of householder Ugga. The commentary explains ‗practising generosity with an unbiased
mind‘ is not generating any thought of differentiation as ―I shall give little to this one, I shall
give more to this one‖. Instead, Ugga sets the example of giving similar gifts. Giving gifts
non-discriminately is an important expansion of the meaning of the term samacitta.
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Upali Sraman
4. Conclusion
The above commentarial interpretations generally converge with the two etymological explanations suggested at the beginning of this paper. They also add substantial nuance to the
meaning of samacitta distinct from its usages in Buddhist Sanskrit texts.
A very important dimension of meaning emerging from the first set of interpretations is the
‗inter-subjective‘ aspect of samacitta. This inter-subjectivity is generally concerned with the
exquisite state of mind (sukhumābhāva), having the same spiritual attainments
(ekasamāpatti), or unanimous agreement over a thought (ekacitta). It is not a disparate individual experience. It refers to a shared quality of mind – indicating a mental space where
the group of people identifies with one another and fits together. This is significantly different from the reference to samacitta as a quality that a bodhisattva, as an individual, develops
towards all living beings. This distinction, (i) samacitta as a shared mental attitude versus
(ii) samacitta as a spiritual experience developed only by a bodhisattva, opens up a significant avenue for further academic inquiry. Although appearing in a very few instances the
inter-subjectivity is a significant aspect of samacitta that we learn from the Pali texts.
The second set of interpretations is connected with non-discriminative attitudes towards all
living beings. The best example given in this regard is that of the Buddha who had the same
extent of compassion towards close relatives and those who tried to harm him. What is absent in the commentarial definitions is the role of samacitta in the soteriological process.
The Mahāyāna texts greatly elaborated this concept as a crucial requirement in the spiritual
journey of a bodhisattva. The second aspect of samacitta as a bodhisattva quality is mostly
seen in Buddhist Sanskrit texts.
In samacitta we see the broadness of Buddhist universalistic thinking. Beginning from objective, very common/basic materialistic characteristics, one is expected to realize the emotional and psychological sameness of beings and inculcate a consciousness of Universal
equality. The awakened beings develop samacitta having been fully matured with the virtues of detachment, compassion, wisdom, a fearless and indomitable attitude to serve humanity. Thus as far as the Buddhist social engagement is concerned the concept of samacitta is very significant to demonstrate wider vision of Buddhist enlightenment project which
goes beyond individualistic concerns.
End Notes
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1
This essay is a modified extract from a section of the thesis titled ―Samacitta: An Inquiry of its Usag-
es, Meanings, and Implications in the Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit Sources‖ submitted to the Department of
Post Graduate Studies at SIBA, Kandy, in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts in Buddhist Studies. I am thankful to Bhikkhu Anālayo, Sāmānerī Dhammadinnā, Prof. Charles Hallisey, Bhikkhuni Waskaduwe Suvimalee and Justin Fifield for kindly discussing on this subject during the process of preparing this paper. All shortcomings are due to my ignorance and failure to understand their comments.
2
.Dutt Nalinaksha (1984). Samādhirāja Sūtra, ed. (Gilgit Manuscripts II), 3 parts,. Srinagar 1941-54, repr.
Delhi. p. 14
3
Williams, Monier (1899) 2005: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.p.1053,cl
4
.Williams, Monier (1899) 2005: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. p. 395, cl
5
Somaratne, G.A (2005), "Citta, Manas and Viññāṇa: Aspects of Mind as Presented in Early Buddhist Pali
Discourses", in Dhamma-Vinaya, Essays in Honour of Venerable Professor Dhammavihari (Jotiya Dhirasekera), A. Tilakaratne et al. (eds.), Colombo: Sri Lanka Association for Buddhist Studies, pp. 169-202.
6
Woodward & E. M. Hare, (1932),The Book of the Gradual Sayings, , Vol. I 1995, p. 59.
7
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2011), The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Complete Translation of the Anguttara
Nikaya (Teachings of the Buddha). Boston: Wisdom Publication.
8
The Chinese Madhyama-āgama (MĀ 21) contains a parallel to this discourse, where the Chinese equivalent
to samacitta (等心天) for samacitta means ‗even mind‘. Email communication with Bhikkhu Anālayo dated
06/06/2013.
9
R. Morris (1885, 2nd edn. 1961, 1989) Aṅguttara-nikāya, Vol. I. London: Pali Text Society, pp. 61-70.
10
atha khalu bhagavāṃstasyāṃ velāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāṃ bhāṣate sma | tadyathā - bodhisattvena
mahāsattvena samacittena bhavitavyam | sarvasattveṣu maitracittena bhavitavyam | kṛtajñena bhavitavyam |
kṛtavedinā ca bhavitavyam | sarvapāpaviratacittena bhavitavyam | (Vaidya P.L (1961). Svalpaksara prajnaparamita Based on the ed. by in: Mahayana-sutra-samgrahah, Part 1.Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute
(Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, p.17)
11
―Atha kho sambahulā samacittā devatā yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkamiṃsu; upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ aṭṭhaṃsu. Ekamantaṃ ṭhitā kho tā devatā bhagavantaṃ etadavocuṃ – „„eso, bhante,
āyasmā sāriputto pubbārāme migāramātupāsāde bhikkhūnaṃ ajjhattasaṃyojanañca puggalaṃ deseti bahiddhāsaṃyojanañca. Haṭṭhā, bhante, parisā. Sādhu, bhante, bhagavā yenāyasmā sāriputto tenupasaṅkamatu
anukampaṃ upādāyā‟‟ti. Adhivāsesi bhagavā tuṇhībhāvena.‖ (Aṅguttara-nikāya, Vol. I 1885, 2nd edn. 1961,
1989) ed. R. Morris; London: Pali Text Society.
12
Idha, sāriputta, sambahulā samacittā devatā yenāhaṃ tenupasaṅkamiṃsu; upasaṅkamitvā maṃ abhivādetvā
ekamantaṃ aṭṭhaṃsu. Ekamantaṃ ṭhitā kho, sāriputta, tā devatā maṃ etadavocuṃ – „eso, bhante, āyasmā
sāriputto pubbārāme migāramātupāsāde bhikkhūnaṃ ajjhattasaṃyojanañca puggalaṃ deseti bahiddhāsaṃyojanañca. Haṭṭhā, bhante, parisā. Sādhu, bhante, bhagavā yena āyasmā sāriputto tenupasaṅkamatu anukampaṃ upādāyā‟ti. (Aṅguttara-nikāya, Vol. I (1885, 2nd edn. 1961, 1989) ed. R. Morris; London: Pali Text Society,)
13
Mc Rae, John R. (2004), The Vimalakīrtisūtra Translated from the Chinese (Taishō vol. 14, No. 475), Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, pp. 59-60.
14
Nyanaponika Thera (1987, reprint. 2008), The Life of Sāriputta Compiled and Translated from the Pāli texts, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, p. 20.
Samacittā devatāti cittassa sukhumabhāvasamatāya samacittā. Sabbāpi hi tā attano attabhāve sukhume
cittasarikkhake katvā māpesuṃ. Tena samacittā nāma jātā. (Commentary to the Anguttaranikāya from the
Chattasangāyana Versionfrom the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/s0402a.att3.xml )
16
Aparampi kāraṇaṃ – sabbāpi hi tā ekasamāpattilābhiniyo vā ahesuṃ ekārammaṇalābhiniyo vāti evampi
samacittā (Commentary to the Anguttaranikāya from the Chattasangāyana Version from the website: http://
tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/s0402a.att3.xml )
17
Aparampi kāraṇaṃ – „„therena ekena pariyāyena samāpattipi samāpattithāmopi kathito, ko nu kho imaṃ
samāgamaṃ sampatto, ko na sampatto‟‟ti olokayamānā tathāgatassa asampattabhāvaṃ disvā „„mayaṃ
tathāgataṃ pakkositvā parisaṃ paripuṇṇaṃ karissāmā‟‟ti sabbāpi ekacittā ahesuntipi samacittā. Aparampi
kāraṇaṃ – anāgate kocideva bhikkhu vā bhikkhunī vā devo vā manusso vā „„ayaṃ desanā sāvakabhāsitā‟‟ti
15
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Upali Sraman
Why Are the Samacitta-devas called ‗same-minded...
agāravaṃ kareyya, sammāsambuddhaṃ pakkositvā imaṃ desanaṃ sabbaññubhāsitaṃ karissāma. Evaṃ
anāgate garubhāvanīyā bhavissatīti sabbāva ekacittā ahesuntipi samacittā. (Commentary to the Anguttaranikāya from the Chattasangāyana Versionfrom the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/s0402a.att3.xml )
samānasaṁvāsako hi samacittatāya cittena aviyutto hoti, samānasīmāyaṁ ṭhito
kāyasāmaggidānato sarīrena aviyutto (Commentary to the Vinayapitaka from the Chattasangāyana Versionfrom the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/vin04t.nrf5.xml )
18
19
Ayañhi bhagavā sukhūpasaṃhārakāmatāya dukkhāpanayanakāmatāya ca sabbasattesu samacitto, yādiso
attani, tādiso paresu, yādiso mātari mahāmāyāya, tādiso ciñcamāṇavikāya, yādiso pitari suddhodane, tādiso
suppabuddhe, yādiso putte rāhule, tādiso vadhakesu devadattadhanapālakaaṅgulimālādīsu. Sadevake lokepi
tādī. Tasmā sammadevāha sātāgiro – „„sabbabhūtesu tādino‟‟ti (The Commentary to the Suttanipāta from the
Chattasangāyana Version from the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/s0501a.att9.xml )
20
."Mettāvasenāti mettāyanavasena. Samacittatanti hitūpasaṃhārena samānacittataṃ. Sīmāsambhedo sā eva samacittatā. Imasmiṃ puggaleti mettākammaṭṭhānikapuggale. Nisinneti bhāvenabhāvalakkhaṇe bhummaṃ.‖ Visuddhimagga Commentary from the Chattasangāyana
Version from the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/e0103n.att9.xml
21
Athakhvāhaṃ bhante, samacittova demi (R. Morris (ed.; 1885, 2nd edn. 1961, 1989) Aṅguttaranikāya, Vol. IV., London: Pali Text Society,p. 215).
Bibliography
1. Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2011), The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Complete
Translation of the AnguttaraNikaya (Teachings of the Buddha). Boston: Wisdom
Publication.
2. Dutt, Nalinaksha (1984). SamādhirājaSūtra, ed. (Gilgit Manuscripts II), 3 parts,. Srinagar 1941-54, repr. Delhi.
3. John R, Mc Rae. (2004), TheVimalakīrtisūtra Translated from the Chinese (Taishō
vol. 14, No. 475), Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research,
pp. 59-60.
4. MorrisR. ed.; Aṅguttara-nikāya, Vol. I 1885, 2nd edn. 1961, 1989) London: Pali
Text Society.
5. Thera,Nyanaponika (1987, reprint. 2008),The Life of SāriputtaCompiled and Translated
from the Pāli texts, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
6. Morris,R. (1885, 2nd edn. 1961, 1989) Aṅguttara-nikāya, Vol. I. London: Pali Text
Society.
7. Somaratne, G.A (2005), "Citta, Manas and Viññāṇa: Aspects of Mind as Presented
in Early Buddhist Pali Discourses", in Dhamma-Vinaya, Essays in Honour of Venerable Professor Dhammavihari (JotiyaDhirasekera), A. Tilakaratne et al. (eds.), Colombo: Sri Lanka Association for Buddhist Studies.
8. Vaidya P.L (1961). Svalpaksaraprajnaparamita Based on the ed. by in: Mahayanasutra-Samgrahah, Part 1.Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts,
p.17)
159
SIJBS Volume 3
9. Williams, Monier (1899) 2005: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass.
10. Woodward & E. M. Hare, (1932),The Book of the Gradual Sayings, , Vol. I 1995.
Websites
1. Commentary to the Anguttaranikāya from the Chattasangāyana Version from the
website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/s0402a.att3.xml
2. Commentary to the Anguttaranikāya from the ChattasangāyanaVersionfrom the
3. Commentary to the Vinayapitaka from the ChattasangāyanaVersionfrom the website: http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/vin04t.nrf5.xml
4. The Commentary to the Suttanipāta from the Chattasangāyana Version from the
5. Visuddhimagga Commentary from the Chattasangāyana Versionfrom the website:
http://tipitaka.org/romn/cscd/e0103n.att9.xml
160
A Brief History of Chinese Lay Buddhism:
From 1st Century B.C.E. to 13th Century A.C.E.
Cong Yuan
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show the history of thoughts, events and activities of
Chinese laypeople from 1st century B.C. up to 13th century A.D. and its relationship with the
development of Buddhism in China, as well as its interactions with Confucianism and Taoism. The thesis demonstrates the function of laypeople in three aspects: the role of negotiators between Buddhist Saṅgha and imperial government; the role of compromisers between
Buddhist and Confucian/Taoist intellectuals; the role of interpreters of Indian Buddhist
thought and innovators of new localized doctrine. Through this study the reader may understand how Buddhist doctrine and practice evolved when it spread from one civilization to
another, with regard to its interaction with local politics, society and culture.
Introduction
The term ―lay Buddhism‖ in the title means the religious thoughts, practice, and social
activities of lay Buddhists. The Buddhist monastic community (Saṅgha) is traditionally
viewed as the major force in spreading Buddhism, with laypeople supporting them financially. However, when Buddhism spreads from one civilization to another, it has to form a
new local Saṅgha from local laypeople, while faced with doubts, challenges and even hostility from local ideology and political power. In such context, laypeople‘s responsibility for
Buddhism is far beyond financial and organizational support. They must negotiate with
power, debate with criticizers, and interpret the doctrine in a most acceptable way for local
people, together with the Saṅgha.
The development of Chinese lay Buddhism is a typical example. Within the first 200
years of Chinese Buddhist history, there was no local Saṅgha at all. In this situation, the task
of interpreting and spreading Buddhism was naturally attributed to Chinese laypeople.One
of the most important results of their efforts is the birth of Chinese Buddhist Sects: Chan,
Pure Land, Tiantai ((天台, etc.
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SIJBS Volume 3
The time range covered in this thesis started from 1st century B.C. (when Buddhism first
spread to China) up to late 13th century (the end of Song Dynasty). The whole history is divided into five periods chronologically, namely Early Period (2 B.C. - 280 A.D.), Localization Period I (280 – 420 A.D.), Localization Period II (420 – 589 A.D.), Sectarian period I
(589 – 907 A.D.), Sectarian period II (907 – 1279 A.D.).
The narrative account of following chapters follows two lines, the ―intellectual‖ line and
the ―popular‖ line, with the first line taken major part. For lay Buddhist intellectuals, the
thesis focuses on their own writings and relevant historical records; for popular Buddhism,
the discussion will regard to their belief, organizations and activities.
Early period
There are some controversies on the exact date when Buddhism first spread to China.
According to an official dynastic history book Sanguozhi( ,(三国志on year 2 B.C. at the
reign of Emperor Liu Xin ( 1-27 ,汉哀帝/刘欣B.C.) of Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-9
A.D.), an envoy from Dayuezhi ( (大月氏(predecessor of Kushan Empire) taught a Chinese
scholar named Jinglu ( (景卢Buddhist sutras. In these sutras, there were terms such as
Buddha, Bhikṣu, Śramaṇa and Upāsaka ((45 ,三国志.
Buddha as a God
At the time of Eastern Han Dynasty, Buddhism was spread mostly among aristocrats. Lay
Buddhists could not tell the difference between Buddha and the Taoist gods. From historical
records such as Houhanshu (，后汉书English translation: Book of the Later Han, an
official historical record of Later Han dynasty ), it can be seen that there already Upāsaka-s
who were treated together with foreign Śramaṇa-s in this period, but their practice was often
mixed up with Taoist cults without proper understanding of the Buddhist doctrine. ( ,后汉书
(98
Li HuoLun: The First Attempt to Localize the Dharma
A serious problem for Chinese Buddhism during 2-3rd century is that before the first Chinese Bhikṣu got ordained in the Jiaping ( 253-249 ,嘉平A.D.) period of Wei Kingdom (曹
,魏 220-265 AD)( ,高僧传T50 No.2059 P346), there were no local monks at all, therefore
Chinese lay Buddhists had to took the responsibility of interpreting the Dharma to ordinary
people and defending it from all kinds of criticism.The book Li HuoLun ( (理惑论written by
Mouzi ( ,(牟子is a great attempt for the sake of interpreting the Dharma to ordinary people
162
Cong Yuan
A Brief History of Chinese Lay Buddhism…
and defending it from different kinds of criticism.Mouzi tried to answer three important
questions in his work: 1) Is Buddhism a “barbaric religion ”that is not suitable for Chinese
people? 2) Is Buddhist monasticism a kind of violation to the traditional Chinese ethic of
Xiao (，孝filial piety)? 3) Why did Buddhism talk about reincarnation, karma and life after
death ―without factual basis‖?
For the first question, Mouzi stated that Buddhism was able to show the truth, and the fact
that the Buddha was a foreigner does not necessarily mean he was not a saint. Furthermore,
the theory of Buddhism could be consistent with Confucianism. For the second question,
Mouzi explained that Buddhist renunciation can be justified with two reasons: firstly it is
done for the sake of a spiritual goal which is even nobler than filial piety; secondly, even
filial piety can also be completed through the merits earned from Buddhist practice. For the
last question, Mouzi pointed out that the existence of soul is already taken as true in Chinese
funeral rituals, and it should be considered as true for the sake of moral restraint (by way of
Karma and its effect).However, Mouzi‘sunderstanding of Karma and rebirth is not exactly in
accordance with the original teaching of the Buddha, for he was suggesting that a ―soul‖
was enjoying or suffering from the effects of deeds.(弘明集T52 No. 2102 P2-3)
Localization Period I
Lay Buddhist Groups Centered with Eminent Monks
During Jin Dynasty (-265 ,晋朝420 A.D.)，Chinese lay Buddhists began to form groups
to have discussion on Dharma, promoted by the widespread influence of eminent monks.
There were mainly three kinds of people engaged in such groups: emperors, government
officials, and hermits. Buddhist emperors generally showed great respect to eminent monks,
while supporting their groups financially and helping them with their sermons. They also
honored the monks with titles and positions. The leadership of eminent monks in such
groups was based on their vast knowledge and impressive virtue. Started by Ven. Huiyuan(
417-334 ,慧远A.D.), the ―White Lotus Society((白莲社‖ is regarded as the first Pure Land
lay Buddhist group in China. Members of this group practiced―Samādhi of mindfulness of
the Buddha (Chinese:(念佛三昧‖, the textual source of which is Amitāyurdhyāna-Sūtra.(高
,僧传 T50 No.2059 P358)
Feng Fa Yao: The First Local Guidebook for Lay Buddhist Practice
Feng Fa Yao ( (奉法要is a summary of lay Buddhist practice written by Xi Chao( ,郗超
377-336A.D.), who was one of the major ministers of the government at his time.The essay
is the first attempt in Chinese Buddhist history to elaborate the whole path to liberation spe163
SIJBS Volume 3
ciallyfor lay Buddhists, with emphasis on precepts and rituals, as well as interpretation on
the compatibility between Buddhist and Confucian morality. Its content includes three refuges, five/eight precepts, six recollections (on Triple Gem, offering, precepts and heavenly
beings), ten wholesome ways of action, five realms (heaven, human world, animals, hungry
ghosts and hell), five aggregates, five hindrances (sensory desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor,
restlessness, doubt), and six sensual bases (together with their objects). Besides, the author
also attempted to implant Confucian ideas such as Shendu ( ,慎独literal meaning: be
mindful when alone)into Buddhist practice. However, he was unable to show Buddhist meditation techniques in detailand his illustration of Nirvāṇa was inadequate, which may be resulted to the fact that he couldn‘t see enough Chinese translation of sutras at his time.A
more possible reason is that born in a Confucian culture, Chinese lay Buddhists often tended
to focus more on the theory of Karma and the practice of morality, on which they were already well-learned, rather than specific techniques of meditation. Another point that deserves attention is that Early Buddhist text and Mahāyāna text spread into China almost at
the same period of time, but Chinese Buddhists knew little about the historical evolution of
Buddhist thoughts in India, so they naturally took both as the original teaching of the Buddha, which can be reflected from Feng Fa Yao‘s description on Nirvāṇa.( ,弘明集T52 No.
2102 P86-87)
Should Monks Worship the Emperors?
In ancient China, the normal etiquette of meeting with the emperor is to kneel down first
and then kowtow to the emperor. Four hundred years after Buddhism spread to China, government officials of Eastern Jin Dynasty came to ask such question: ―Should Buddhist
monks follow this etiquette as well?‖ This idea was supported by Prime Minister Huan
Xuan ( 404-369，桓玄A.D.). Meanwhile, Buddhist government officials showed their
enthusiasm on refuting the prime minister‘s challenging assertion. They pointed out that the
Buddhist way of behavior was unique because their value was different from others. However, they admitted that monks also had the responsibility to show their respect to the emperor in their mind, they just didn‘t have to express it physically. Finally, the Buddhists succeeded in persuading Huan Xuanto declare that he would not force monks to worship the
emperor. This incident represented the attempt of the Chinese government to put Buddhism
into imperial order. At the end, both sides agreed to compromise: the government promised
not to force the monks to act against Vinaya, whereas the Buddhists declared that they
would respect the dominant reign of empire. ( ,弘明集T52 No. 2102 P80-84)
Localization Period II
Lay Buddhists‘ Response to the Censure of Buddhism from Taoist Side
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Cong Yuan
Starting from 2nd century B.C., Taoists began to develop a new aboriginal religion out of
the early Taoist philosophy founded by Laozi (6 ,老子th century B.C.). This movement
accelerated at the time of Southern and Northern Dynasties, when Taoists began to censure
Buddhism as a foreign religion which is not suitable for Chinese culture.
In 4th century, a Taoist priest named Wang Fu (3，王浮rd -4thcentury) made a fake ―sutra‖
calledLaoziHuahu Jing ( .)老子化胡经The story in this sutra says that Laozi, the founder of
Chinese Taoist philosophy, went west through the Gobi desert and transformed his appearance into Shakyamuni Buddha to preach deep doctrine to Indian people. This fake sutra appeared as the beginning of continuous Taoist effort to create new texts attempting to show
the advantage of Taoism over Buddhism by saying the Buddha was in fact an avatar or disciple of Laozi.
In 5th century, another Taoist priest named Zhang Rong(
)张融wrote an essay titled asSan
Po Lun ( ,)三破论literally ―disproving (Buddhism) in three aspects‖. This work was
generally viewed as a typical criticism from the Taoist side by its contemporaries.In this
work, Zhang Rong claimed that “Buddhists tell exaggerated lies on ‗merits‘ and their effects, cheating people to build temples and statues for them” and that Buddhist monks and
nuns were unproductive. Furthermore, he concocted a story that Laozi transformed into the
Buddha and cheated the Indian people with Buddhism:
“…they cannot understand the deep doctrine of Tao. Therefore Laozi went west and
transformed into the Buddha to teach them….Laozi finally found out that the Western Barbarians were so uncivilized that he decided to make them extinct, that‘s why he let them become monks and nuns to prevent them from having any more descendants….”)
No. 2102 P50)
,弘明集T52
Such groundless fabrications seriously irritated Buddhist people, who started refuting San
Po Lun with numerous articles. Mie HuoLun ( (灭惑论is one of such articles written by Liu
Xie ( 520-?465 ,刘勰A.D.), a famous literary critic, writer and lay Buddhist. In this work, he
responded that “Laozi had been a hermit for most of the time when he was in China.He went
abroad most probably for the sake of ascetic life, how come he suddenly turned himself into
a popular teacher with thousands of disciples in India?” Besides, Liu Xie pointed out that the
popular version of Taoism was quite different from the original philosophy of Laozi. They
were either “practicing supernatural powers” or “taking advantage of people‘s desire and
cheating them with tricks”. (Ibid. P51)
The adequate counter-arguments proposed in Mie HuoLun shows that as early as 5th century, Chinese lay Buddhists already realized the uniqueness of Buddhist doctrine and were
able to apply the Buddhist Right View to distinguish Buddhism from superstitious religions.Furthermore, their counter-criticism to the doctrines of Taoism and the popular prac165
SIJBS Volume 3
tice of Taoists in turn stipulated Taoists to reform their religious belief by re-editing Buddhist texts into Neo-Taoist texts, which will start another stage of Buddhist-Taoist relationship in the following centuries.
Xiao Yan: The Bodhisattva Emperor
Emperor Xiao Yan ( 549-464 ,萧衍A.D.) is the most famous Buddhist Emperor in
Chinese history. On year 519 A.D., he got Bodhisattva ordination from Ven.Huiyue ( ,(慧约
thereafter he started calling himself “Bodhisattva Emperor ((菩萨皇帝”, his ministers also
called him as such. ( ,续高僧传T50 No. 2060 P469) His Buddhist activities can be
summarized into two categories: financial support to Buddhismand Saṅghaadministration
reform.
Financial Support for Buddhism
Xiao Yan built more than ten new temples in his capital (present day Nanjing), as well as
many statues and stupas. During his reign, there were more than five hundred Buddhist temples and more than 100,000 monks and nuns in the capital city. He organized great DharmaAssemblies (,法会a kind of Buddhist ceremony) several times every year, such as
UllambanaDharmaAssembly. Besides, he ―offered himself to the service of Buddha (get ordained as monk)‖ four times during his reign, each time he spent from several days to as
long as a month in the temple and then he paid the Sangha 100,000,000 units of Chinese
currency each time for his disrobing. ((127,南史
Saṅgha Administration Reform
Based on the vegetarian doctrine recommended on some Mahāyāna texts such as
MahāyānaMahāparinirvāṇaSūtra and LaṅkāvatāraSūtra, Xiao Yan issued his famous edict
DuanJiurou Wen ( ,断酒肉文literal meaning “essay on refraining from alcohol and meat”)
which prohibited all monastic members from eating non-vegetarian food.( 广弘明集T52
No.2103 P336)Vegetarianism had since become a fixed tradition for Chinese Saṅgha.
1. Lay Buddhist Ceremonies and Organizations
Popular Buddhist Art: Zhuandu and Changdao
Zhuandu (,转读literal meaning “chanting”) is a kind of musical chanting of Buddhist
sutras, usually done by monks. Ever since 5th century A.D., this kind of chanting had become an effective way to attract laypeople. Here is a record that shows how it worked:
166
Cong Yuan
“It is always true that music can move and attract people…Successful chanting should be
well on both melody and lyrics.…Good melody makes people happy, good lyrics makes
people understand the doctrine easily. …When Ven. Tanping ( (昙凭chants, even horses on
the road will stop and listen to him; when Ven. Sengbian ( (僧辩chants, sometimes the birds
will wander over the temple to enjoy it.” ( ,高僧传T50 No.2059 P417)
Changdao (,唱导literal meaning “propagating”) is a kind of dramatic public speech on
Buddhist doctrine. It is said to be started by Ven. Huiyuan, who always gave a Dharma talk
on Karma and rebirth at the beginning of every ceremony he joined (Ibid. P417). The effect
of Changdao was described as follows:
―When they talked about impermanence, people trembled with worry; when they talked
about hell, people became horrified and burst into tears…everybody was moved, some knelt
down and some started kowtow while revealing their own bad karma, and some were chanting the name of the Buddha. ‖(Ibid. P418)
Although Changdao was usually meant for lower class people, the script for it was often
written by famous monks, lay scholars and sometimes even emperors. Ten scripts written by
Emperor Xiao Gang (551-503 ,萧纲 A.D., the son of Xiao Yan) can be found in the
TaishōShinshūDaizōkyō. ( ,广弘明集T52 No. 2103, P205-206)
Lay Buddhist Organizations: Fashe and Yishe
Fashe ( ,法社literal meaning: Dharma Society) is a kind of Buddhist organization where
lay people convened to keep precepts (usually eight precepts) together. Fashe was often
started by eminent monks, for example, a record in north China of 6th century says:
“Ven. Daoji ( (道纪and seven fellow monks used to wander around Ye ( (邺City and
preach Dharma.…He persuaded people to keep eight precepts and organize Fashe to
practice together…Within several years, ninety percent of people in Ye City had become
Fashe members.”( ,续高僧传T50 No.2060 P701)
Yishe (,邑社literal meaning: Town Society) is a kind of lay Buddhist organization where
Buddhists of the same town practice chanting sutra, handwriting sutra, or raise funds to
build stupas, statues and temples. Here is an example that shows the prosperity of Yishe:
―Ven. Baoqiong ( )宝琼advised people to form Yishe, thirty people in each one. These lay
people chanted PañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāPrajñāpāramitāSūtra together every month. When
they gathered, each person chanted one volume of sutra in sequence. Ven. Baoqiong had
instructed thousands of Yishe among his disciples.‖ (Ibid. P688)
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SIJBS Volume 3
Building statues was another popular practice of Yishe. A monument would be set up after the building was complete, on which lay people wrote their own names, the names of
their family members and the name of the leader monk, together with their wishes such a
peaceful world or a good harvest. The statues built during this period were not only the statues of the historical Buddha, but also Buddhas in other realms such as Amitābha Buddha
and Bodhisattvas such as Avalokiteśvara and Maitreya. In some places, Bodhisattva statues
obviously outnumbered Buddha statues, (北朝造像銘考Inscriptions on Buddhist Statues in
the Period of the Northern Dynasties, 7) which showed the increasing popularity of Bodhisattva belief of that time.
Sectarian Period I :
Fu Xing Shu——Emotions and Human Nature
The prominent status of Buddhism in Chinese culture began to decline as the dynasty and
central government declined as well during the late 8thcentury to 9thcentury. Buddhist temples that were exempt from state taxes beforehand were targeted by the state for taxation.
On year 845 Emperor Li Chan ( 846-814 ,唐武宗/李瀍A.D.) finally forced 4,600 Buddhist
monasteries to shut down along with 40,000 temples and shrines, forcing 260,000 Buddhist
monks and nuns to return to secular life. Although the ban would be lifted just a few years
after, Buddhism never regained its once dominant status. However, Chan Buddhism continued to flourish for it was mostly autarky and not much dependent on monastic manor economy.
The practice of Chan Buddhism is generally based on the theory of Buddha nature. According to texts such as MahāyānaMahāparinirvāṇaSūtra, the Buddha nature is shared by
all sentient beings, and could be viewed as part of the human nature. Therefore Buddha nature becomes the intersection between Chan Buddhism and Confucianism, since Confucius
suggested that human nature is originally wholesome, and perfect human nature could be
attained through the cultivation of mind. Confucian scholars saw the possibility to reconstruct their theory with the philosophy of Chan. Their achievement was represented by the
essay Fu Xing Shu (,(复性书 which was written by Li Ao ( 836-774 ,李翱A.D.), a wellknown Confucian scholar in Tang Dynasty. In this work, Li Ao tried to integrate Buddhist
philosophy into the Confucian theory of emotion (―Qing‖, (情and Human Nature (―Xing‖,
.(性As he wrote in Fu Xing Shu:
―Human Nature is the reason why people are able to become saints; emotions are what
hinder people from realizing their Human Nature. Joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, hatred and
desire, these are all emotions. Once people are distracted by their emotions, their Human
Nature will be covered, but this is not the problem of the Human Nature itself. …‖
168
Cong Yuan
―Some of the emotions are wholesome, some are not, but the Human nature is always
wholesome….The Human Nature of the Saints are not different from that of ordinary people. However, ordinary people‘s Human Nature was covered by their emotions so that they
are always engaged in hurting and killing each other. They cannot realize their nature
throughout their life.‖
It should be noted that although Confucius himself mentioned that Human Nature is originally wholesome, but it is never mentioned in Confucian texts before Li Ao that Human Nature of all the people are equal, and that Human Nature covered by emotions is the cause of
unwholesome. The relationship between emotion and Human Nature in Fu Xing Shu is obviously related to the (Chan) Buddhist theory of Buddha-nature and afflictions.
Fu Xing Shu is one of the earliest attempts in Chinese history to reconstruct Confucian
philosophy with reference to Buddhist theory, which was succeeded by Neo-Confucians in
Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.), and finally flourished as the mainstream of Chinese
philosophy.
Sectarian Period II:
The Flourishing of Pure Land Buddhism among Laypeople
As early as 2ndcentury A.D., Pure Land sutras (principally the Shorter SukhāvatīvyūhaSūtra, Longer SukhāvatīvyūhaSūtra, and the AmitāyurdhyānaSūtra) had begun
to be translated into Chinese by a Kushan monk named Lokakṣema (147 AD -?). On year
402 A.D., Chinese monk Huiyuan started White Lotus Society, a group for lay Pure Land
practitioners. This event is generally considered the start of Chinese Pure Land sect.
Themethodology of Huiyuan‘s group is to focus their mind on the visualization of Amitābha
Buddha and his pure land of Sukhāvatī, which is generally based on Buddhānusmṛti (Skt.
meaning ―mindfulness of the Buddha‖). In Tang Dynasty, a pure land scholar monk named
Daochao ( 645-562 ,道绰A.D.) suggested that all the teachings of the Buddha could be
categorized into two paths: The Holy Path ( ,圣教门traditional meditation practice to purify
the mind) and the Pure Land Path ( ,净土门the meditation practice based on Amitābha
Buddha‘s grace, leading to rebirth in the Pure Land). He argued that in his time it was already the Degeneration Age (Skt. Saddharma-vipralopa, Chinese: ,(末法when people were
not qualified to practice the Holy Path, therefore they can only practice the ―shortcut‖ of
Pure Land Path. Later, another Pure Land scholar, Ven. Shandao ( 681-613 ,善导A.D.)
proposed that the salvation through Amitābha Buddha could be achieved simply by chanting
his name, thus he made the practice much easier for ordinary people to follow. During Song
Dynasty ( 1279-960，宋朝A.D.), the theory of Pure Land became more systemized, with
various guiding handbooks spreading vastly, of which the most famous one is LongshuJing169
SIJBS Volume 3
tu Wen ((龙舒净土文, a ten-volume Pure Land meditation guide written by lay Buddhist
Wang Rixiu ( 1173-? ,王日休A.D.). In this book, Wang summarized the Pure Land theory
and practice of his time, together with his own answers to frequently asked questions about
Pure Land, as well as compiled stories of how devoted people got blessed from the
Amitābha Buddha.
Along with the vast spread of Pure Land Buddhism among laypeople, different kinds of
Pure Land Buddhist society also began to flourish in China, especially in big cities. Some of
these societies were similar to the previously mentioned White Lotus Society in 5th century,
the common form of which is that people regularly gathered in a certain place to practice
Pure Land meditation, either chanting or visualization. Other kinds of societies include the
societies of setting free animals ( ,(放生会the societies of vegetarians, the societies of
building statues, etc.
Although activities such as keeping vegetarian diet and setting free animals are common
practices shared by many Mahāyāna sects, most of the participants of these societies were
Pure Land Buddhists, which could be proved by the usual Huixiang ( ,回向dedication of
merits) ritual at the end of their gathering. Wishes such as ―May every participant successfully get rebirth in the Pure Land‖ or ―May we get the highest level of rebirth‖ were often
found in the chanting books of such societies. ((134 ,宋代居士佛教研究
Conclusion
Ever since Buddhism spread to China, its development has been structured in three kinds of
relationships: the relationship between Buddhist Saṅgha and Chinese autocratic monarchy;
the relationship between Buddhism and Confucianism, the dominant ideology in imperial
China (sometimes together with the aboriginal religion Taoism); and the relationship between Buddhism and Chinese patriarchal society.
Lay people functioned as lobbyists and negotiators between the Saṅgha and imperial government. The tension lies in the fact that although Shakyamuni Buddha advised monks not
to violate state laws, Buddhist Saṅgha, as a social organization, is still out of the normal imperial administration. It is free from any taxes and labor request from the government. When
the government showed its ambition to put the Saṅgha into imperial order, Buddhist laypeople spoke out at the right time to negotiate with them, which can be seen in the debate of
whether monks should worship the emperors.
Lay people functioned as communicators and compromisers between Buddhist intellectuals
and Confucian/Taoist scholars.The historical criticism against Buddhism from either Confucian or Taoist side mostly focused on whether Buddhist monasticism is a violation to social
and family responsibility. Chinese lay Buddhists solved the problem with twofold counterarguments. Firstly, they pointed out Buddhists consisted not only monks, the majority of
170
Cong Yuan
them were laypeople; secondly they explained the consistency of Buddhist and Confucian
ethics, for which they emphasized the doctrine of Karma and rebirth for it is helpful to
maintain Confucian moral code.
Lay people functioned as interpreters and innovators of Buddhist doctrine. The tension
between Buddhism and the patriarchal society of imperial China lies in the fact that personal, spiritual attempt for liberation was considered inferior to social and family role-playing
in Chinese feudal system, and the dominant ideology (Confucianism) did not encourage
people to think beyond the mundane world. As a result, Chinese lay people were not capable
of abandoning their career and family, in most cases they could not engage themselves into
intensive, long-standing meditation retreats as Indian Buddhists often did.Therefore they
were in need of easy, short-cut meditation techniques, which resulted to the flourishing of
localized meditation: Chan for intellectuals (mostly), and Pure Land for ordinary people.
Much of these philosophical innovations were led by monks, but they could not win much
recognition and popularity without the support and propaganda of laypeople.
End Notes
1
References to canonical texts will be given with the original Chinese title of the text, plus a single-letter ab-
breviation followed by volume number, order number, and page number(s). For example, ― 弘明集T52 No.
2102 P5‖ refers to a text titled as ― ,”弘明集numbered 2102 in TaishōShinshūDaizōkyō, and it can be found on
vol. 52, page 5 of the canon. For editions and abbreviations, see the bibliography. Note that the canonical
sources used in this thesis were all written in classical Chinese, and there was no available complete English
translation for the time being. Therefore all the quotations in English were translated by the author of the thesis. Citations from other works will be given only in title and page number, with detailed information provided
in the bibliography. For example, ―A History of Buddhist Philosophy, 56‖ refers to page 56 of David J. Kalupahana‘sA History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuites, University of Hawaii Press: 1992.
Citations from online resources will be given footnotes showing the link, with details in the bibliography.
2
http://www.eurasianhistory.com/data/articles/l01/486.html
3
http://zh.wikisource.org/zh/%E5%BE%A9%E6%80%A7%E6%9B%B8
4
See note 1 on page 2 for a description of the citation methodology used for the canonical texts.
Abbreviations for Canonical Texts
TTaishōShinshūDaizōkyō((大正新脩大藏經. Tokyo: DaizōShuppansha (大藏出版株式會
(社, 1988.
XShinsan Dainippon Zokuzōkyō((新纂大日本續藏經. Tokyo: ZōkyōShoin ((藏經書院,
1967
Other Works Cited
)三国志 .陈寿Sanguozhi). 2000 ,浙江古籍出版社 :杭州.
171
SIJBS Volume 3
)后汉书 .范晔Houhanshu). 2000 ,浙江古籍出版社 :杭州.
Kalupahana, David J. A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuities.
University of Hawaii Press: 1992
)南史 .李延寿Nanshi). 1986 ,上海古籍出版社 :上海.
Chisui, Sato ((佐藤智水. ―Inscriptions on Buddhist Statues in the Period of the Northern
Dynasties ((北朝造像銘考‖ Shigakuzasshi:86(10), 1421-1467, 1561-1562, 1977-10-20
Wikisource.―‖複性書http://zh.wikisource.org/zh/%E5%BE%A9%E6%80%A7%E6%9B%
B8Accessed: February 2014
2001：彰化彰化师范大学硕士学位论文宋代居士佛教研究 .谢智明
172
173
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SRI LANKA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST

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