Table of Contents - MALAYSIAN ASSOCIATION OF JAPANESE

Table of Contents
In Fulfilment of Motherhood: An Exploratory Study of Filipino Migrant Mothers on
Welfare in Japan .....................................................................................................................................1
An Ambivalent Homecoming: Case Studies of Japanese-Filipino Youth in Japan .............................22
Emerging Patterns and Strategic Directions of Japan and China’s Economic Cooperation
in CLMV: A Review ............................................................................................................................36
Longing for a “Gender-Open Japan”: Filipino Yaoi and BL Fans’ Imaginations of
Contemporary Japanese Gender and Sexual Norms ...........................................................................54
Performing the Nation: Representing Japanese Nationalism(s) in the NHK’s Taiga
Dramas .................................................................................................................................................67
The Japanese Haiku Poem in the Culture and Spiritual Life of Modern Vietnam...............................88
The Prospect of ASEAN’s Lead Role in East Asian Multilateral Cooperation ...................................94
Gender Distinction in Japanese Instructional Textbooks in the Philippines ...................................... 112
The Third Country Resettlement Programme in Japan: Myanmar Refugees from Thailand
who have Resettled in Japan ..............................................................................................................127
Current Trends in Japan and China: A Comparative Analysis of Political and Social
Attitudes in the Biotechnology Industry ............................................................................................134
The Reception of Haruki Murakami in Vietnam ...............................................................................146
Vietnam-Japan Economic Relations in the Context of Building an ASEAN Economic
Community ........................................................................................................................................155
From The Kojiki to Children’s Literature: The Intertextuality of Japanese Myths ............................163
The Empress Who Could Have Been: The Implications of Disallowing Women from
Ascending the Imperial Throne in Japan ...........................................................................................175
Negotiating Perceptions of Japan in Thailand: Transformation of Cultural Identity
Through Work ....................................................................................................................................184
Filipino Ladyboy Entertainers in Japan .............................................................................................190
近代朝鮮の女性に付与された新しい名前―「新女性」 ………………………………………….206
城山三郎『素直な戦士たち』における次男・健次の中学受験期以降―苛立つ思春期の実像―.. 214
マレーシアの中等教育における日本語教育の歴史的経緯と今後の展開………………………..220
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In Fulfilment of Motherhood:
An Exploratory Study of Filipino Migrant Mothers on Welfare in Japan
By Jocelyn O. Celero
Abstract
This paper explores the profile, perceptions, and politics of Filipino migrant mothers
in Japan who are on seikatsu hogo (living subsidy allowance). Despite being only the
fourth-largest group of migrants receiving public assistance, Filipino migrant
mothers’ ever-increasing participation in Japan’s labour sector and society has
inevitably shaped the public’s expectations on policies related to welfare and the
institution of family. While they are yet to gain visibility and voice in policymaking,
the perceptions of migrants who are on benefits would provide a valid basis for
assessing the impact of seikatsu hogo on non-citizens and on people who are
reconfiguring Japanese family and society. By focusing on Filipino migrant mothers
who aim to become the “best mother” and the “model adult citizen” while actively
engaging in family relations, this study attempts to uncover varying discourses on
welfare use from the perspective of its foreign consumers, who are often generally
labelled as a marginalised group. Through vignettes and a literature review, the study
reveals that Filipino migrant mothers who receive seikatsu hogo are subjected to
multiple welfare hierarchies with regard to the Japanese people as well as other
migrants. The contrasting perceptions of Filipino female recipients on seikatsu hogo
depict the ways in which they articulate the politics of family relations in the context
of Japanese society.
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In Fulfilment of Motherhood:
An Exploratory Study of Migrant Mothers on Welfare in Japan
By Jocelyn O. Celero
Introduction: Migrants on Welfare and the Future of Japan
With a population of above two million (MOJ, 2009), the migrant sector has contributed to Japan’s
crucial efforts in developing well-defined policies to promote immigrants’ rights, welfare, protection,
and the gradual integration to its mainstream society. Japan’s lack of response to this monumental
task has indicated the nation-state’s inability to determine the future of its immigrant settlers. Tsuda
(2006, p. 5) elucidates that the state’s negligence to provide citizenship rights is mainly due to its
view of immigrants as illegal and short-term residents. Despite this vague perception, Japan boasts a
comprehensive set of allowances and benefits that characterises its welfare-to-work regime (Ezawa
& Fuijiwa, 2005, p. 54), from which citizens and certain members of the migrant populace are
allowed to partake.
Among the social policies designed by Japan to extend support for families is the public
assistance programme, otherwise known as seikatsu hogo. It is a welfare benefit system that provides
necessary assistance to every person unable to meet the minimum standards of living (Aoki & Aoki,
2005, p. 18; italics for emphasis) by virtue of the 1950 Livelihood Protection Act, which upheld the
people’s rights to a fairly decent life, an objective promoted by the pro-livelihood political leaders of
the time (Yoshiya, 1966, p. 10). Aimed at maintaining minimum standards of living and achieving
socio-economic freedom, seikatsu hogo is hitherto paid for by the municipal government based on
eight categories: the basic living expenses, including food, clothing and utilities; housing costs;
compulsory education; medical care; elderly care; cost for giving birth; skill-training; and funerals
(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110705i1.html). Eligible candidates for public assistance
are selected through a means test, which implies that potential recipients must prove their eligibility,
which will consequently result in being stigmatised as stricken individuals, as well as weakened
public support for the said policy (Adolino & Blake, 2001, p. 247). Nevertheless, recipients of the
living subsidy allowances must fulfil their obligations in accordance with to the benefits they receive
by leading a decent and independent life and utilising their resources, including savings, real estate,
valuables as well as their ability to work (http://www.jca.apc.org/migrant-net/English/English.html).
In other words, seikatsu hogo represents the government’s efforts to narrow disparities between
citizens and attain socio-economic equality, insofar as it is possible.
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Table 1. Welfare Recipients from 1951-2010
While living subsidy programmes are accessible to all Japanese citizens in accordance with public
assistance law, migrants have also been covered by this welfare programme following the
humanitarian decision of local governments in 1954 to give out support to needy foreign residents,
including “special permanent and permanent residents, spouses of permanent foreign residents or
Japanese nationals, and those who received refugee status from the government”
(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110705i1.html). As of the fiscal year of 2009, more than
444,000 households with foreign nationals, or 731,000 foreigners, have received public assistance
(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110705i1.html). In total, more than 2.02 million people
have received benefits, as well as an all-time high of 1.46 million foreign households (see Table 1
above). Needless to say, migrants have added to the growing importance of welfare subsidies
provided by the government, as their rapidly-increasing numbers have inevitably formed an integral
part of the transformation of Japan’s social, cultural, and economic structures. These intertwined
realities spell out considerable implications, not only on welfare consumption and spending, but also
for the future of Japan’s welfare state.
Among these structures, the family is regarded as the cornerstone of Japanese society
(Takahashi in Chan, et.al, 2010: 56) and is crucial site to welfare policies, especially for seikatsu
hogo. Peng (in Alster, 2002, p. 41-42) notes that the family (and the corporate sector) has always
been the focus of Japan’s welfare system. Demographic and economic concerns have led to the
restructuring of the welfare state in Japan, which began in the 1990s, thus affecting the politics of
gender relations, in which women as well as migrants constituted the so-called marginalised groups
(Alster). The frequent identification of migrants and women as minority groups in relation to welfare
has led to their near invisibility in literature on Japan’s welfare state, as though their conditions and
perceptions on welfare are synonymous to those of Japanese women. In relation to welfare
consumption, immigrants have been depicted as one of the “social problem groups”, to borrow
Clarke’s phrase.
Furthermore, previous studies have focused on a narrower and more specific group of
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Japanese women on welfare assistance: single mothers. Ezawa and Fujiwara’s (2005) comparative
study on the efforts are made to reduce the reliance of single mothers on cash assistance and their
participation in the labour force in Japan and the United States involved Japanese single mothers’
households. Iwata (2007) reveals that Japanese single mothers have the tendency to perceive poverty
as a more personalised issue, instead of attributing it to socio-economic structures. Wright (2001)
proposes three typologies of unmarried single mothers in Japan: the ‘feminist group’ (educated but in
either high or low-paying jobs), the ‘family group’ (highly-skilled and career-oriented), and the
‘welfare group’ (low-skilled, part-timer, low-paid). Abe (2009), on the other hand, may have
attempted to define the extent of social exclusion in Japan, but she identifies the youth and the
elderly as being the population at social risk.
I will now depart from the aforementioned studies and direct my attention to the profile,
perceptions, and politics of welfare use, specifically that of Filipino migrant mothers in Japan.
Although migrants may be a vulnerable group with regard to welfare, their growing presence in the
labour market and Japanese society matter as they too, to a certain degree, shape the public’s
expectations on family policy. While they are yet to gain visibility and voice in policymaking, the
perceptions of migrants on welfare would provide a valid basis for assessing the impact of seikatsu
hogo in their lives as non-citizens and players in the restructuring of Japanese family and society.
Moreover, locating Filipino migrant mothers’ views and attitudes towards seikatsu hogo will provide
an important guide in exploring the ways in which they articulate the politics of family relations. As
Mary Daly (2004, p. 151) justifies, the recent developments around the family cast an interesting
light on welfare state reform. The evolving structure of the family challenges states to carry out new
duties which enable them to create diverse family support policies amidst the growing trend towards
policy retrenchment.
This study gathers the perceptions of Filipino mothers as migrants partaking of the living
subsidy system or seikatsu hogo in Japan. This paper aims to structure and link those views to
migrants’ politics of family relations. It also attempts to shed light on the following research
questions:
1. Who are the Filipino women on welfare? Do they form a diverse or distinct group?
2. How do they view seikatsu hogo and themselves as its recipients?
3. How are these perceptions linked to their views on family relations?
I divided my discussion and analysis of Filipino migrant mothers’ welfare use into two parts: 1) the
profile of Filipino migrant mothers on welfare; 2) their views on seikatsu hogo which are then
interconnected to; 3) the politics of family relations.
Theoretical Framework: The Politics of Welfare Use and Family Relations
I approached this study based on the assumption that people actively construct their own realities
from the symbols around them through social interaction (Blumer, 1969). By describing the
phenomenon of welfare use through the accounts or narratives of participants, I gathered the
meanings and interpretations they possess with regard to seikatsu hogo to draw an understanding on
the identities of these migrants on welfare and how and why they choose to be on it. I then referred
to extant literature on welfare to better structure how they communicate the politics of welfare use.
My hypothesis included perceptions that migrants are not easily “magnetised” by welfare benefits,
and the politics of welfare use intersect with the politics of family relations.
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Family relations contain some of the most prevalent issues that surface in the life narratives
of Filipino migrant mothers in this study. Family relations, which overlap with gender relations, have
provided the impetus for expanding this discussion on the politics of welfare use. Family relations,
according to Anthony Giddens (in Daly, 2004, p. 144), must embody the principles of “equality,
mutual respect, autonomy, decision-making through communication, and freedom from violence.”
To approach the politics of family relations, I referred to Daly’s (2004) depiction of the
transformation of family relations with regard to the ever-evolving definitions of family obligations
and family solidarity. Family obligations, she observed, have been redefined in contemporary social
policies in such a way that they focus on parenting responsibilities instead of spousal solidarity.
Family solidarity, on the other hand, is an offshoot of the reconfiguration of family obligations,
evident in every parent’s capacity to discern their responsibilities and their determination to uphold
them. This is why women aspire to become the “best mother” by combining motherhood and
employment (Esping-Andersen, 2003; also in Jenson, 2009, p. 465) and the “model adult citizen” by
supporting herself in the labour market instead of depending on the state for support (Lister, 2006, p.
174).
In sum, this study will cast a critical eye on how Filipino migrant mothers on seikatsu hogo
perceive the politics of welfare use in relation to their articulation of the politics of family relations,
by locating elements of family obligations and family solidarity.
Research Methodology
This is a qualitative interview study on the perceptions of Filipino mothers on seikatsu hogo. I
initially conducted ten in-depth interviews with Filipino migrant mothers (see Appendix A for
interview schedule). However, I selected five from the initial ten to better explore a common set of
ideas and experiences on welfare use, paint a picture of specific migrants’ welfare utility, as well as
to form typologies of migrant welfare recipients in Japan, on the primary basis that these five
mothers were current beneficiaries of seikatsu hogo. I assigned a pseudonym to each of my
interviewees and altered some personal details to retain anonymity. Through them, I elicited life
narratives with emphasis on their perceptions of themselves as recipients of this welfare programme.
I then utilised the readings in class as well as other related literature gathered to further discuss my
findings.
Who are the Filipino Mothers on Welfare in Japan?
Before identifying the profile of Filipino migrant mothers on welfare, it is necessary at this juncture
to depict the general migrant population of Filipinos in Japan. Kondo (2008, p. 19) identifies
Filipinos, along with Brazilians, Peruvians and Southeast Asians, as migrant groups that comprise
Japan’s “newcomers”. The first wave of Filipinos arrived in Japan in the mid-1980s. In addition to
colonial linkages, Filipinos were established vis-à-vis the Japanese in two ways: 1) Japanese men
who came to the Philippines to do business established sexual and marital liaisons, which resulted in
the migration of Filipinas to Japan; and 2) Filipinas became the brides of Japanese men via labour
and marriage migration systems mediated by the Philippine (local) government. Marriages between
Japanese and Filipinas took place through conventional and matchmaking meetings in the
Philippines, which consequently entitled Filipino women to spouse visas (Kondo). In terms of
numbers, contemporary Japanese-Filipino marriages have been between Japanese and entertainers or
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former talents (which how they refer to themselves) who have overstayed, a growing trend resulting
from amendments made on the immigration law in 2005, which restricted entry of entertainers in
Japan (Tutor, 2006). Not all these marriages have succeeded. In 2009 alone, 4,714 Filipina wives had
divorced from their Japanese husbands (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2009). The
breakdown of Japanese-Filipino marriages resulted in the growing prevalence of single mother
households in Japan, which has recently reached 1.23 million (Japan Health, Labour, and Welfare
Ministry). With all this in mind, how are Filipino migrants coping with their current status in Japan?
A recent talk given by Naoto Higuchi of the University of Tokushima elaborated on the
socio-economic problems migrants are currently facing in Japan. In his data, Filipino migrants have
approximately a 45% relief rate, which represents the fourth-largest group receiving public
assistance. More than 80% of Filipino migrant women in Japan are unmarried or single mothers who
are actively participating in the labour force. Higuchi argued that there is a correlation between the
education/occupation of parents and the educational achievements of their children. His data proved
that only 40% of Filipino single or unmarried mothers were able to send roughly 50% of their
children to high school. Furthermore, Higuchi located Filipina migrants’ vulnerability in Japanese
society in the context of poverty, which he attributed to social structural problems which should be
solved through meaningful social policies.
To verify Higuchi’s identification of Filipino migrants in need of welfare support, I turned
to the accounts of selected respondents currently under the living subsidy programme:
A.
Melanie: a full-time wife of a Filipino and mother of three
Melanie is divorced from her Japanese husband of two years. She was offered a permanent resident
visa by her former husband in exchange for custody of their daughter. In addition to allowing her to
stay in Japan, her visa has brought her a number of privileges. In 2000, she got married to a Filipino,
Tony, who was then an undocumented migrant and they had their first child the following year. Her
status also enabled Tony to legally stay in Japan after she defended him before the Philippines
embassy, stating that he should stay for the sake of their family. Tony’s long-term visa was not
released until 2007; as such, he was unemployed. At the club where Melanie was working, her
Japanese boss suggested that they turn to the welfare division at the nearby City Hall for public
assistance. Upon inquiring on the living subsidy allowance, the City Hall staff requested Melanie’s
record of tax contributions which, according to her, were paid for by her ex- husband and became
the main basis for passing the application for seikatsu hogo. For eleven years now, Melanie and
Tony, with their brood of three, have been continuously receiving living allowance. Tony holds two
part-time jobs, one of which is reported to the City Hall in order calculate subsidy adjustments.
Melanie, meanwhile, has stopped working since their second child was born, although she plans to
go back to work as soon as manages to find a helper who will care for her children, an agreement she
has made with Tony.
B.
Queenie: a DV victim on custody battle
Queenie came to Japan in 2001 as a talent (entertainer). At the bar where she was working, she met
Ishii, who became her boyfriend and later her husband. Their marital relationship started out well
until their first child was born in 2005. Queenie tried to endure his husband’s physical and verbal
abuse, but when she could no longer bear it, she decided to file for divorce. After it was approved in
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2006, Queenie opted to move away from Ishii, who kept pleading that they get back together. Her
financial struggles and her child’s deteriorating health prompted her to return to her husband despite
the dissolution of their marriage. Ishii took her back, settled all her debts, and renewed their
relationship. Their idyllic family life was short-lived; Ishii returned to his old habits of physical
violence, forcing Queenie to run away again, this time with their second child. Confused,
traumatised, and vulnerable, she sought the help of an NGO for victims of domestic violence in
Tokyo, where she sought shelter with her son. Meanwhile, a friend convinced her to apply for
seikatsu hogo. While it was easy for her to submit the documents needed, the city hall did not
immediately provide her with benefits. She was asked to live temporarily at the shelter for a month
to determine if she could get by each day without the assistance of others. Queenie had to empty her
bank account (in which was the money her family back in the Philippines had sent her), used rice to
feed and old clothes to dress her baby. She realised: “The more I showed them that I had the means
to rear my child, the less chance there was of receiving the allowance, so I had to prove that I was in
dire need of it.” After two weeks, she received her first allowance, and a few days after, she was
ordered to find an apartment to move into. She has been receiving seikatsu hogo for more than a year
now, but still feels incomplete. At present, she is fighting for her right to custody over her first child
in court. She lost to her husband in the lower court due to her alleged negligence, but hopes to be
favoured in the higher court, with the assistance of an NGO and a public lawyer. As soon as this is
settled, she plans to raise her two children single-handedly. She hopes to work again provided she
gets a danchi (government-owned house), a slot at hoikuen (daycare), or an aide she can pay to care
for her children.
C.
Jessa: battered and mentally-challenged
Jessa came to Japan after getting married to Nakayama, whom she met in the Philippines through a
friend. Having no knowledge of Nihongo, Jessa struggled to be a good wife to Nakayama and a
mother to Mika. Due to her husband’s lack of stable employment, Jessa was forced to work to make
ends meet for their family, which was the cause of their frequent quarrels. Nakayama would
physically hurt her but her strong desire to keep the family intact prevented her from getting out of
this abusive marriage. In 1997, after fifteen years, Jessa decided to escape and took Mika with her to
a friend’s house. It was, according to her, a difficult decision to leave and her mental health was
affected by the traumatic experience she had as a victim of domestic violence, but it was her
daughter who convinced her to run away. Jessa made several attempts to apply for seikatsu hogo
before her persistence was rewarded. When she was turned down the first few times, a Japanese
friend assisted her and explained her predicament to the welfare department staff. She had to go
through many interviews. She recalled an occasion when a social worker mocked her honesty: “The
case worker thought that I was lying, that I was not really sick and just wanted to get benefits. So, I
had to tell her that my husband got imprisoned for being involved in a brawl, which was true. I also
had to prove to him that I was in need of medical help and worried so much for the fate of my
daughter who witnessed how I suffered from her father’s mistreatment.”
Proving her worth was critical to her application’s approval. She has been a seikatsu hogo
beneficiary for twelve years now. Her daughter has turned seventeen this year and as much as Jessa
would like to continue working to minimise the allowance gap, she has yet to recover from mental
depression. Since her child’s allowance support will end next year, Mika has started a part-time job
to help with their family’s financial needs. Jessa is concerned about not reporting Mika’s
employment to the City Hall, as they fear that they might deduct Mika’s entire salary from the living
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subsidy allowance they receive. She wishes that the City Hall would understand that they sometimes
experience budget shortages and realise that her daughter’s employment matters, so they could at
least save and prepare for her college education.
D:
Linda: unmarried with dreams of a ‘whole’ family
Linda came to Japan as a talent in 1998. During her last year in that occupation, she met Kanda who
followed her to the Philippines and pledged support for her education in Japan. In 2002, Linda was
back in Japan with a student visa and enrolled in a vocational school where she studied Japanese and
culinary arts. She paid her debt of gratitude to Kanda by becoming his mistress. Their relationship
produced a son in 2003 and a daughter in 2006. Unable to settle his first marriage through a divorce,
Kanda exhausted all means to secure Linda’s permanent visa in 2005. Linda regards her acquisition
of permanent resident status a privilege unmarried Filipinas in Japan rarely get. Her Catholic
upbringing and conscience drove Linda to split from Kanda to raise their children single-handedly.
Despite the end of their relationship, Kanda continued extending support to the children. When
Linda tried to apply for boshi katte (living allowance for single mothers), the welfare staff offered
her seikatsu hogo instead since it might be impossible for her to rear her two children with the
amount provided by boshi katte. Aware of the negative impressions of most people on seikatsu hogo,
she insisted on boshi katte since she was determined to continue working to add to the subsidy.
However, the welfare staff’s initial decision was sustained and she was convinced to take the offer.
As a seikatsu hogo recipient, she is diligent in reporting her financial status to the City Hall. She
informs them of her monthly salary (from her part-time job as a cook) as well as Kanda’s paternal
support to their children. While she finds contentment in receiving seikatsu hogo while managing her
domestic duties and part-time job, she expresses a desire to find a suitable partner in life who could
be a father figure to her two children.
E:
Delia: undivorced mother of two
From being a house helper for years in the Philippines, Delia arrived in Japan in 2000 to become
Matsumoto’s wife after they were introduced by her former boss. It was a marriage of convenience,
Delia thought, since she never fell in love with him. His constant unemployment compelled Delia to
work in an o-bento factory. Since then, their roles have shifted: Delia was the provider while
Matsumoto became financially dependent. The marriage ended in divorce, but Delia failed to secure
permanent resident status. Her visa problem, however, was resolved when she met Suzuki in 2002
and they decided to live together. She got married for the second time and their marriage produced
two sons. A few years later, Suzuki’s consequent problems at work caused him to be more irritable,
indifferent, and even violent towards Delia and the kids. The turning point in their troubled family
life, Delia says, was when Suzuki angrily forced Delia and their children out of the house. Delia
turned to her friends who then sought the aid of an NGO and placed them in a shelter. This NGO
also assisted in Delia’s divorce from Suzuki and her application for seikatsu hogo. Even now, Delia
is able to recall how traumatised she was by the welfare officials’ inquiry on her family life and their
doubtfulness of her eligibility: “It was like a huge conference, but I would call it torture. Even the
NGO worker who accompanied me trembled during the interview. They kept on asking me to repeat
my painful story, and it was like they were thrusting a dagger deep into my heart. Applying for
seikatsu hogo was no joke. You have to tell them everything…the investigation was very thorough
and I had to win their trust. But when I passed, I felt relieved for myself and my children. ”
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Delia was accepted to receive seikatsu hogo and the main condition was that she cared for
her two sons. In 2009, a year after she moved to their new place, she received news of her husband’s
death. With her husband’s demise, Delia did not get divorced and was condemned by her in-laws. In
spite of her traumatic experiences, Delia felt she had to move on for the sake of her children. She
currently has a part-time job in a factory while caring for her sons. She finds that the living subsidy
allowance is sufficient for them to live a simple and frugal life, although she occasionally sends
money to her family in the Philippines for contingencies. Delia reveals she is waiting for a lot in
danchi. After this, she will wait for her younger son to reach grade school before she applies for a
full-time job.
Out of the five migrant mothers, only Melanie is married to a Filipino, while the rest are
either unmarried, divorced, or widows of their Japanese husbands. In terms how they entered Japan,
two are former entertainers, while the other three are mail-order brides. Most were victims of
domestic violence and received assistance from NGOs and friends in applying for seikatsu hogo. In
terms of status, four out of five were already permanent residents while one held a long-term visa.
Except for one who has a mental disability, the rest are determined to go back to work after making
the necessary arrangements for their family. I shall explore this position further when I tackle the
dynamics of family relations in the latter phase of this paper.
How do Filipino migrant mothers perceive seikatsu hogo?
The five mothers all agreed that seikatsu hogo is a privilege and not a social right that anyone can
acquire, given the fact that they are not Japanese citizens. The rigorous screening processes and tests
they underwent proved their awareness of the fact that seikatsu hogo is not readily available to all
those who may need it. The means test for seikatsu hogo, which is a method in which candidates’
income and assets are assessed and requires them to ‘spend’ their way into poverty to qualify (Myles
in Esping-Andersen, 2002: 161), have forced Filipino migrant mothers to narrate their accounts of
impoverishment which are subjected to scrutiny by the welfare authority to better fit to their
normative idea of what being “poor” means. In Clarke’s (2004, p. 33) words, immigrants must fit the
patterns of need that have been pre-determined, pathologised, and legitimised by welfare authorities.
Migrants’ experiences in acquiring seikatsu hogo prove of the intrusiveness of the means test which
consequently becomes the root of stigmatisation on the part of welfare recipients. However, these
experiences are not distinct from Japanese citizens receiving seikatsu hogo. As Aoki and Aoki
(2005, p. 14) as well as Iwata (2007, p. 44) prove, prejudice against Japanese families on welfare
are manifested in conversations with government support system employees, and caseworkers and
community professionals who share common beliefs that cultivate the discriminating attitude
towards them.
Filipino migrant mothers in this study regard seikatsu hogo as a source of empowerment. For
single mothers who were also victims of domestic violence, seikatsu hogo gave them the strength to
liberate themselves from abusive relationships and motivated them to renew their notion of family
(which will be discussed further in the family relations section). While the family remains to be an
important social ideology both in the Japanese and Filipino societies, migrant mothers who are
seikatsu hogo recipients no longer believe that the family is necessarily led by a male breadwinner.
Melanie provides an interesting case of viewing seikatsu hogo as an empowering tool. For her,
seikatsu hogo gave her a certain level of dominance over her husband, who relied on her permanent
10
visa status so he could legally remain in Japan and keep the family intact. Consequently, she
attributed their acquisition of the living subsidy assistance to her, despite the husband’s employment.
Parallel to her stance is Linda’s. Being unmarried, she obtains a sense of freedom and control
to live without relying on a husband for support. Are Japanese mothers as empowered as Filipinos?
Takahashi (in Chan, et. al., 2010, p. 54) reports that divorce and single parenthood are social risks in
Japan that have resulted from conflicts and power imbalances in family relations. Japanese
policymakers, she pointed out, have refrained from conducting policy interventions claiming that
divorce (or the lack of it) and domestic violence are private matters that individuals involved should
overcome on their own. As a result, the current generation of Japanese women have passively
resisted social norms perceiving women as being solely responsible for child care (Chan, p. 51). In
2000, only 10.6% of single Japanese mothers relied on seikatsu hogo, a ratio that has remained
relatively low throughout the postwar period (Ezawa & Fujiwara, 2005, p. 52). The small percentage
of Japanese women receiving seikatsu hogo reveals that the subsidy is not the primary source of
support for them, and thus, it does not necessarily empower their socio-economic lives.
Likewise, I too treat this notion of empowerment with caution. While Filipino migrant
mothers believe that they have achieved relative power over their lives through seikatsu hogo, it is
not primarily on the basis of their being migrants that are socially at risk, but on the precondition that
they are mothers who lack resources to care for their children. It is possible that Japan’s welfare state
has taken responsibility for the breakdown of families, placing their access to the welfare subsidy
under a ‘mother contract’ which must be fulfilled through childcare responsibilities. Such
circumstances illustrate the maternalist tendencies of Japan’s welfare state (Estevez-Abe, 2008, p.
22), in which the government promotes women’s subordination through welfare policies
(Marfording, 1997, p. 437) and reinforces patriarchy and the ‘breadwinner model’ by feeding
seikatsu hogo benefits to Filipino migrant mothers through their roles as wives and mothers, instead
as social citizens in their own right (Land, 1986; Paterman, 1989 in Crompton, 2006, p. 15).
Social citizenship is a core concept of the welfare state which must involve not only the
granting of social rights but also, as proposed by Esping-Andersen (2000, p. 164), how an
individual’s position interlocks with the roles of the market and family. As Ann Orloff (1993) points
out, social citizenship, in relation to gender, should not only ensure protection from market and
family failures by gaining access to basic welfare, but also guarantee women’s autonomy in the
labour market and the welfare state. Filipino migrant mothers may well believe that they are
“empowered” with reference to gaining courage to overcome hardships due to poverty, failed
marriages and broken homes by acquiring seikatsu hogo, but this does not warrant social citizenship
which should reflect genuine independence through maintaining a household without a reliance on
either on the labour market or family support. Ruth Lister (1997; also in Brush, 2002, p. 164) calls
this phenomenon “defamilialisation”, wherein welfare regimes like seikatsu hogo endow women
with “leverage against forces that downgrade care work, child bearing, household formation, and
sexuality to normative femininity in the context of marriage.”
Seikatsu hogo also informs migrant mothers of the prevailing socio-economic hierarchy
among welfare recipients. Seikatsu hogo beneficiaries tend to be at the bottom of this hierarchical
structure based on the fact that the living subsidy system covers eight domains of social needs (as
mentioned in the introduction). It creates a stratification of vulnerable groups. The degree of
vulnerability of the group of migrant mothers in this study is ambiguous and is difficult to gauge,
because of the politics that involved in their acquisition of seikatsu hogo. What is clear, however, is
that migrant mothers have a sense of awareness of the social stigma and negative perceptions of
seikatsu hogo recipients, which initially hindered their application, in addition to the social and
11
cultural barriers (e.g. lack of knowledge of Nihongo, discriminating images of Filipinos and single
mothers, marginal views on poverty).
Melanie describes seikatsu hogo as a “way of stealing citizens’ taxes”, while Queenie
believes it is a “measure of poverty” which designates seikatsu hogo recipients as being at the lowest
rank of society. Delia, on the other hand, believes that recipients of boshi katte are at the higher rank,
reasoning that: “If people know you are on seikatsu hogo, you are immediately looked down upon;
but if you tell them that you are receiving boshi katte, you have a higher status because you are only
receiving (an) allowance.” All of them believe that migrant mothers living in danchi are in the best
position among all welfare beneficiaries, because they only pay lower monthly amortisations, are
able to work to support their families, and receive jido teate (childcare allowance), which is only a
minimal amount, compared to those on living subsidy programmes. This explains why these migrant
mothers hope to secure a danchi: to be de-stigmatised.
Delia promised herself: “If my application to get a danchi is prioritised, I will do my best to
get out of here (seikatsu hogo). It is pitiful to be on seikatsu hogo for a long time; I do not want to
remain marginalised in the minds of Japanese people.” Queenie confessed: “I often ask myself: is
this the best I can be? Then, I try to motivate myself to prove that this support is temporary. I have to
prove myself to them.” The migrant discourse on seikatsu hogo further reinforces the idea of the
welfare state as a system of stratification (Esping-Andersen, 2000, p. 165). In the case of migrant
mothers, seikatsu hogo has become a programme that gave rise to social dichotomies evident in the
two layers of stratification: 1) citizens and migrants and, 2) migrants receiving seikatsu hogo, boshi
katte, and danchi.
The first hierarchy illustrates that citizens and migrants on seikatsu hogo are situated below
those who are not on welfare, paying taxes, and are able to maintain high standards of living. The
second layer further fragments the migrant group in terms of access to different kinds of welfare
support. Hence, migrants on welfare constitute diverse groups and do not share the same socioeconomic status. What can be gleaned from this is that migrants on seikatsu hogo occupy the base of
the two stratification systems. This provides one of best explanations as to why most migrant
mothers in this study (i.e. all ten of them) are highly motivated to return to the workforce: to gain
social inclusion.
In his discussion of the politics of social inclusion and exclusion, Halfmann (1998, p. 516)
argues that inclusion is a manifestation of social citizenship because it allows individuals to make
choices and bestows individuals with the right to access resources. In line with the first hierarchy,
migrants hope to be integrated with Japanese society. The second hierarchy might be more difficult
to overcome since migrants differ, from their point of entry, in terms of status, occupation, education
and other indicators. An important point to here is that seikatsu hogo, along with other welfare
services, is a constructor of hierarchies that further diversifies and stratifies the migrants receiving
them.
In summary, Filipino migrant mothers perceive seikatsu hogo as a privilege limited to a
certain group of vulnerable migrants. They define it as a source of empowerment, even though
further analysis lays bare that it is a mechanism of the Japanese welfare state that reinforces the
‘breadwinner model’ and maternal commitment to childcare. Finally, seikatsu hogo affirms the
consciousness of Filipino migrant mothers on the prevailing hierarchies in Japanese society, which is
characterised by two levels of poverty: 1) those between the Japanese upper- and middle-classes and
the Japanese “poor” and the migrant “poor”; 2) those among migrants under different welfare benefit
systems. Locating migrants on seikatsu hogo at the lowest segment of the two strata stimulates
migrant mothers into join the workforce with varying considerations, not only in relation to Japanese
12
society as a whole, but mainly with regard to their families. This point brings us to the next segment
of this paper, which will discuss how Filipino migrant mothers articulate and synthesise the politics
of family relations with their being seikatsu hogo consumers.
How are migrant mothers’ views on family relations linked to their perceptions?
To discuss the migrant mothers’ politics of family relations, I formed two important concepts: family
obligations and family solidarity. It is worth noting at this point that Filipino migrants consider
seikatsu hogo to be a family policy. Therefore, their articulations on the politics of using seikatsu
hogo inevitably reflected how they approached key issues and themes surrounding family relations.
Filipino migrant mothers perceive family obligations with reference to the breakdown of
marriage. Coming from a nation-state that does not legalise divorce, they see Japan as a state that
liberates women from unhappy marriages. Such perceptions, oftentimes, cause them to reflect that
marriage is a weak institution, which is thus incapable of holding firm the family structure.
However, instead of blaming the presence of this law or the lack of welfare services to keep the
family intact, Filipino migrant mothers, particularly single mothers, attributed the breakdown of
marriages to themselves. Despite the failure of their marriages, Filipino migrant mothers have not
lost faith in the institution of family; instead, their definition of it has altered.
They have accommodated into their understanding the notion of a family based on
commitment to parent-child relationships and not essentially on blood/relations. Filipino recipients
who were mothers saw how seikatsu hogo functioned as a social safety net, replacing failed marriage
and enabling them to regain a degree of self-sufficiency. It is important to stress here, however, that
Filipino women do not necessarily utilise marriage to gain socio-economic mobility, which is a
common misconception of Japanese-Filipino marriages. Japanese men who marry Filipino women
do not always have sufficient socio-economic capital to guarantee the improvement of their wives’
status. This is evident in the cases of Jessa and Delia, who were previously married to Japanese men,
and confessed that they assumed the role of a breadwinner almost throughout the marriage.
Nonetheless, as Jenson (2009, p. 472) argues, the welfare state has “substituted for the breadwinner”,
so as to guarantee a minimum income to mothers as well as their children through family
allowances, or in this paper’s context, the subsidies provided by seikatsu hogo.
One of the stigmas attached to seikatsu hogo is the truth referring to migrant recipients as
mostly single mothers who have failed as wives. However, this stigma is overturned by Filipino
women who are aware of their childcare responsibilities. It is not surprising that these single migrant
mothers who have lost their husbands have retained motherhood, mainly because they held custody
over their children, which warranted them seikatsu hogo benefits. As Jessa puts it: “Failure as a wife
is less degrading than failure as a mother. I felt rewarded when my daughter chose me over her
father. To me, that is all that matters.” These views verify Daly’s (2004, p. 137) argument that
parental obligations outlast marital breakups. On the part of a family that is led by an unmarried
woman, as is the case with Linda, paternal absenteeism does not hinder her commitment to raising
her children, although she believes that having a partner who could be a father figure to her children
would be the main reason for her to consider marriage in the future.
Meanwhile, Melanie, despite having a spouse, embodies a married mother who places a
premium on her childcare responsibilities, irrespective of the fact that her family is covered by
seikatsu hogo. To her, and the rest of the migrant mothers, the fulfilment of the maternal role is one
of the primary expectations placed on them by the welfare authorities. As such, attending to their
children’s needs and sustaining ‘quality parenthood’ are fundamental to disciplining migrant
13
mothers. Clarke (2004, p. 33) affirms that social policies are often shaped to police, reform, and
direct the culture of its migrant beneficiaries. In the maintenance of welfare support, migrant
mothers must foster ‘good parenthood.’ Linked to this idea of seikatsu hogo as a mechanism for
disciplining migrants are structural laws that prohibit the accumulation of savings for children’s
education (Aoki & Aoki, 2005, p. 11); full-time employment, especially at night; sending
remittances; and returning to one’s country. Such provisions are problematic and have caused
various incidences of deviance, as my respondents confessed.
Moreover, the notion of discipline imposed by seikatsu hogo on the lives of migrants may be
observed in their strong identification of themselves as responsible parents who, unlike the
‘deviants’, have no vices, consume second-hand goods and appliances, improve their knowledge of
Nihongo, participate in community building, and diligently report their concerns and needs to the
welfare authorities. The culture of reporting is another indicator of being a disciplined welfare
recipient, which involves informing one’s caseworker of the progress of the children in school, their
health, and so on. Indeed, these realities strengthen Daly’s (2004, p. 138) claim that the welfare state
has increasingly been intervening in the roles and responsibility of the family. Also, the welfare
state’s power to intervene has reduced public-private boundaries (Fraser, 1997, p. 62).
Filipino migrant mothers’ perceptions of family solidarity have broadened their grasp on
family relations in the context of utilizing seikatsu hogo. The first indicator of family solidarity is the
concept of the “best mother”, who is able to combine work and motherhood (Esping-Andersen,
2003, also in Jenson, 2009, p. 465). Basically, migrant mothers are all convinced that motherhood
requires a balance between maternity and employment, although most of them are hindered in their
efforts to participate in the labour force due to their parenting duties, problematised by their
interpretation of their role in accordance to the terms of seikatsu hogo, which is primarily being a
‘good parent’.
Migrant mothers are aware of the necessity of employment, not only as a measure of their
life progress and gradual removal from seikatsu hogo, but also as a means of social inclusion. With
this in mind, they have drawn their own time frame for regulating their family obligations in order to
be active in the labour force. With the exception of Jessa, due to her health condition, three of them
are awaiting the approval of their danchi and hoikuen applications where they can entrust their
children and engage in work. Melanie, on the other hand, is willing to pay a fellow Filipino privately
to care for her three children at night while she is at work. She stresses that, in consideration of the
rules of seikatsu hogo, she has to be with her children in the morning and must attend school
functions. Linda, on the other hand, juggles two part-time jobs but still manages to “devote quality
time” to her two children. This variety of life course decisions that mothers make in relation to their
children espouses the notion of choice.
Hakim (in Crompton, 2006, p. 11) emphasises that mothers’ exercise of making choices is
manifested through diverse employment patterns. She notes that mothers who tend to prioritise their
maternal role often resort to part-time work. An important source of difference in these migrant
mothers’ time-framing and decision-making with regard to their work and maternal roles is, they
construed, the age of their children. Having a one-year-old child, Queenie finds herself at a
disadvantage since the welfare authorities have stipulated in their agreement that she has to prioritise
her childcare duties above employment. Her situation exposes Crompton’s point (2006, p. 13) that
although mothers can have ‘choices’, they must make them in relation to other mothers and the
“normative (moral) framework” instituted by the welfare state. She further laments: “I cannot have a
job at all, being with my child… I was not allowed to. Mothers who can find a full-time job and have
14
children on the side are the better ones. I envy them because they can control their use of seikatsu
hogo. Unlike me, I still have to wait (for her child to grow up)…”.
Queenie’s views point to the reality that mothers who succeed in this balancing act have a
better status and greater control over their welfare. Furthermore, regulated choice-making on the part
of migrant mothers reveals their lack of political influence. Like other NSR groups Bolino (2006:
392-393) has identified, migrants in general are groups at social risk who lack political participation
and representation. These limitations translate into the fact that migrants lack a solid political base
and substantial power resources that might be useful in advancing welfare policy reforms in Japan.
When asked whether they would like to raise any reforms to the current living subsidy programmes,
they were unanimous in stating their contentment. Their absolute positive feedback and the
realisation that they lack the capacity to transform seikatsu hogo echo the belief that, on the part of
migrant recipients, the present welfare state should be the status quo.
Overlapping with the “best mother” idea is the concept of the “model adult citizen”, which
likewise surfaced in migrant mothers’ perceptions about family solidarity. As Lister (2006, p. 174)
defines it, a “model adult citizen” should possess independence by integrating herself into the labour
market instead of depending on the state. As mentioned earlier, migrant mothers have expressed
gratitude for receiving seikatsu hogo and do not wish to reform the system. Using a mix of the
politics of economic exchange, the Filipino cultural ideal of “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude), and
the Japanese ideals of “kimochi” and “ganbaru” for the sake of the family, they feel the importance
of repaying the ‘generosity’ of the welfare state by living a decent life with a simple lifestyle,
obtaining social capital (Daly, 2006, p. 145) by acquiring Nihongo skills to improve communication
with society, doing community service, performing maternal functions and, above all, working.
Migrant mothers reason that the state cannot be blamed for the deficiencies of seikatsu hogo.
As such, reforms calling for its expansion or increase in amount would imply, in their view,
ingratitude. As elucidated by Iwata (2007, p. 29), most welfare recipients attribute their failure and
success in life to their own life decisions and actions, instead of blaming it on social institutions.
Instead, as model citizens, they believe that migrant mothers should do their part by working in order
to substantiate seikatsu hogo. The idea of modelling linked to seikatsu hogo is equated with labour
participation to reduce welfare burdens. These arguments clearly show the prevalence of
individualism as a feature of a “model adult citizen.” Giddens (1991, p. 75, also in Crompton, 2006,
p. 9) said it best: “We are what we make of ourselves”, in the context of being a “model adult
citizen”, namely how our role as a model to our children depends on how we engage in various
endeavours. Long-term dependence on seikatsu hogo is deemed unworthy of the model of Japanese
society and family. To become a worker, like the Japanese, is a manifestation of one’s love for one’s
family (Rutherford, et.al., 2001, p. 91).
While migrant mothers value employment, they do not completely surrender motherhood in
exchange for it. Instead, they reconfigure family arrangements by seeking other sources of welfare
assistance (e.g. danchi, hoikuen) and temporarily entrust their children to others in order to generate
socio-economic capital. It may quite dispiriting to determine how and when migrant mothers may
actually succeed in altering the kind of welfare they get access to, but what seems clear is they
recognise that their reliance on seikatsu hogo is temporary. Lister (1997, p. 174) renders this
assertiveness to work as a mother’s desire to overcome (as has been constantly reiterated in this
paper) social exclusion and poverty. Migrant mothers maintain that achieving autonomy with and for
the family and raising one’s standards of living in order to end dependence on seikatsu hogo implies
freedom from the stigma society has attached to welfare consumption.
15
In sum, I have endeavoured to discuss the politics of family relations in tandem with seikatsu hogo
utilisation, using family obligations and family solidarity as the main analytical tools. Family
relations have been a dynamic area in evaluating the meaning and impact of seikatsu hogo in the
lives of Filipino migrant mothers and their families in Japan.
Family obligations have been redefined by migrant mothers upon reflection of their marital
failures and the effects of divorce as the state’s legal device for sanctioning dysfunctional
relationships. Accepting the idea that families need not have a father, Filipino migrant mothers give
credence to their parenting abilities with the support of seikatsu hogo as the “substitute
breadwinner”. The constancy of parenthood, often referred to as motherhood, over marriage bolsters
seikatsu hogo as a primarily familial form of financial support. Seikatsu hogo is a mechanism of the
welfare state that disciplines and directs the lives of its migrant receivers. It legitimises the power of
the state in redistributing roles and expectations in the family and minimises the private-public
divide by interfering with family affairs.
Family solidarity, on the other hand, was drawn out from the vignettes of migrant mothers
and organised using the “best mother” and “model adult citizen” concepts. The “best mother” idea
overlaps and at times conflicts with the previous claim of the ideal mother which prioritises maternal
roles over employment. Filipino mother respondents maintain that they are a step closer to becoming
the “best mother” if they are able to harmonise paid and unpaid work. While it may be accepted that
migrant mothers can make choices regarding their employment and maternal roles, these choices are
hampered by their lack of sufficient power resources that can allow them to push reforms in welfare
policies that concern them and their families. The “model adult citizen” idea intertwines with the
“best mother” concept as it also gives primacy to labour force participation of mothers in reclaiming
control over their lives and future.
This concept may be located in the way Filipino migrant mothers utilise the labour market as
a tool in gaining leverage, temporarily defamilialising themselves by delegating childcare tasks to
other social institutions in order to eventually refamilialise themselves by reclaiming control over
themselves and their families. Hence, migrant mothers who can become “model adult citizens” will
no longer be at the bottom of socio-economic hierarchies determined by the welfare state and,
instead of being “magnetised” by the welfare state’s ‘generosity’, they aim to be de-stigmatised from
welfare use.
Summary and Conclusion
At this juncture, my research tasks include answering the research questions I identified in the earlier
phase of this paper, highlighting the salient views of seikatsu hogo from the standpoint of Filipino
migrant mothers and interlink them with how they engage in the politics of family relations.
Filipino migrant mothers on welfare are those who hold permanent residence in Japan and
who have received seikatsu hogo upon surviving the breakdown of Japanese-Filipino marriages and
domestic violence. In addition to passing mean tests, they became eligible for seikatsu hogo based
on the welfare authorities’ normative profiles of the “needy”; namely, the sick, disabled, unemployed,
unmarried, and divorced. Although they are oftentimes identified as minority groups, migrants on
seikatsu hogo fall not only between the bipolarised hierarchy of the rich and the poor, but they
constitute a distinct group of welfare recipients that are situated beneath two other social
stratifications that consist of 1) the Japanese upper- and middle-classes, the Japanese poor and
migrants on welfare; and 2) migrants on different welfare programmes. In both hierarchies, seikatsu
hogo recipients are located at the base of the structure.
16
Seikatsu hogo possesses contrasting notions drawn in the minds and experiences of the
migrant mothers receiving it. They regard the living subsidy programme as a resource of the
privileged few, as a source of empowerment, and a locator of migrants in Japan’s socio-economic
structure. These Filipino mothers’ access to seikatsu hogo is principally anchored on their maternal
identity, which implies their lack of access to social citizenship as migrant residents. The living
subsidy allowance is an instrument of the welfare state which is not aimed at bettering the lives of
Filipino migrant women but bettering themselves so they can effectively fulfil their parental
responsibilities to their children. It also typifies how Japan’s welfare state subconsciously promotes
the ideology of familialism which delegates the role of childcare to women.
Linking the politics of welfare use to the politics of family relations, I established that family
obligations tend to be restructured from emphasising spousal solidarity to giving primacy to
parenthood. Migrant mothers attest to the importance of motherhood over marriage, and this
provides them with the impetus to pursue the ideals of good parenting expected of them by the state,
which acts as the alternative breadwinner in the place of the absent father. The welfare state is the
driving force behind the reconstruction of family obligations and is the intervening power between
the private and public sectors.
Family relations are also politicised through ideas of family solidarity. As migrant mothers
aspire to be the “best mother” by reconciling family and work life and a “model adult citizen” who
actively participates in the labour market, migrant mothers experience consequent
“defamilialisation,” and “refamilialisation” in order to overcome their dependence on seikatsu hogo
and attain “de-stigmatisation” from welfare use.
Bonoli (2006, p. 402) exposes the current trend among countries which have turned to
immigration as a solution to a variety of labour market problems spawning from an ageing
population, and as has been shown at the beginning of this paper, Japan shares the same problems.
As maturing welfare states grapple with the pressures and demands of our globalised world,
countries like Japan must be critical in determining its social, economic, and political trajectories in
both the near and far future. It must respond to a series of significant questions in relation to
immigration, the question of whether it is better to pursue a big or small Japan which forms the basis
of the next equally significant inquiry: should Japan be more universal or particularistic in terms of
welfare policies and the granting of rights? Providing answers to these questions are prerequisite to
eliminating the stigmatisation that tends to disorient people on the real functions of welfare state.
My paper is an attempt to uncover the truths about these compartmentalised, vulnerable
groups. Homogenising the fate of migrants as welfare recipients makes no difference in contributing
to the invisibility of their dislocations and of the varying discourses on welfare use from the
perspective of its consumers.
17
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APPENDIX A
Interview Schedule:
A. Life in Japan
1. Tell me about your arrival in Japan.
2. Describe your life here in Japan. How did you manage to get used to the Japanese way of
life?
3. How do you view the Japanese?
4. Can you recall the times you have compared them to Filipinos?
5. Could you have imagined yourself staying here in Japan for a long time?
B. Marriage to Japanese people (For those married or formerly married to Japanese people)
1. Tell me how you end up marrying a Japanese person.
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of being married to a Japanese person?
3. Do you think there are similarities and differences between Japanese and Filipino men?
4. What are the adjustments you have had to make in relating with your husband?
5. Do you remember the talks you have had with your husband about building a family and
plans to have children?
C. Views and beliefs as a mother
1. How do you view being a mother?
2. Who were your influences in having these beliefs? How did they influence you?
3. What do you think are the values that Filipino mothers hold?
4. As a mother of half-Japanese and half-Filipino children, how different or similar are you to
other mothers, like Japanese mothers here in Japan or Filipino mothers in the Philippines?
5. How do you think other people think of you as a mother? How do you react (or do you react
at all to) these perceptions?
D. Views and beliefs on raising children in Japan
1. Tell me about how and where you wanted to raise your children.
2. How were your ideas on child-rearing similar to or different from those of your husband?
3. Tell me about the advantages and disadvantages of raising children in Japan.
4. Share your experiences in taking care of your baby/babies.
5. Tell me about Japanese and Filipino beliefs, ways, or practices on caring for babies that you
think most mothers have.
E. Acquisition of welfare assistance
1. Please walk me through how you acquired welfare support (requirements, processes, people
who assisted you).
2. What motivated you to apply for welfare assistance (conditions, difficulties)?
3. In your view, how have the welfare benefits helped you and your family?
4. Has this changed how you see yourself and your family?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of being under government support?
6. If you could have the voice/authority to improve the services you were given, would you?
21
An Ambivalent Homecoming: Case Studies of Japanese-Filipino Youth in Japan
By Jenina Rosa De Dios
Abstract
The plight of thousands of Japanese-Filipino children (JFC), or children of Japanese
men and Filipino women employed as “entertainers” in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s,
has been the focus of NGO advocacy for two decades. Many JFC have since come of
age and migrated to Japan, but to date, there is little information on these young
Japanese-Filipino migrants (referred to in this paper as “JFY”). Data from NGOs
shows that many JFC occupy a disadvantaged socioeconomic status brought about by
their mothers’ unstable employment, non-recognition from their Japanese fathers, and
discrimination due to being children of former “entertainers”. JFY share these
characteristics, but due to migration, they face additional challenges, such as cultural
and linguistic adjustments in Japan. Based on interviews with JFY residing in the
Kanto area, this paper examines how they adjust to these challenges and view their
fathers’ homeland. While other JFC struggle to gain Japanese nationality, some JFY
were already Japanese nationals prior to migration. With their legal rights secured,
their ancestry became a means of migration, translating into opportunities for
economic and social mobility. But despite claims of feelings of belonging to Japan
and initial nostalgia for their “homecoming”, they came to realise that because of
their cultural marginality, they cannot fully belong to Japan. This paper analyses how
the JFY craft new identities for themselves, defining what it means to be both Filipino
and Japanese, as they synthesise their previous experiences in the Philippines with
their new experiences and opportunities in Japan.
22
An Ambivalent Homecoming: Case Studies of Japanese-Filipino Youth in Japan
By Jenina Rosa De Dios
Hitotsubashi University
Introduction
In recent years, studies have focused on depicting Japan as a multiethnic society, highlighting the
struggles and achievements of its various ethnic minorities in contrast to its common postwar
portrayal as being ethnically homogenous. Together with the older minority groups, migrants from
Asian and South American countries from the 1980s onwards have been altering the landscape of
Japanese society. Intermarriages between Japanese people and these “newcomer foreigners” have
produced new generations of individuals who are contributing to the ethnic diversity of Japan.
This paper focuses on one of Japan’s emerging ethnic minorities - the Japanese-Filipino youth (JFY),
who were born in the late 1980s to 1990s, raised in the Philippines, and have migrated to Japan as
adolescents. They form a specific subgroup of Japanese-Filipino children (JFC)1, a term that has
come to refer mainly to children born to Japanese men and Filipino migrant women employed to
work as “entertainers”2 in Japan in the 1980s (Asis, 2001).
Non-government organisations (NGOs) brought attention to the issue of JFC in the 1990s,
reporting that many of the JFC living in the Philippines suffered from poor living conditions due to
their mothers’ unstable employment, non-recognition and financial neglect from their Japanese
fathers, and discrimination as being out-of-wedlock children of former “entertainers” in Japan. There
are estimated to be between 100,000-200,000 JFC born from these Japanese-Filipino unions.3 While
NGOs have shed light on the general circumstances of JFC in the last two decades, it is only in
recent years that the unique situation of JFC who have migrated to Japan has begun to be examined.
These JFY’s experience of migration has meant that they have to contend with different and often
more complicated circumstances than those usually faced by JFC.
This paper aims to show how the experiences of JFY as children of mixed parentage,
children of migrants, and migrants themselves have led them to construct Japanese-Filipino ethnic
identities. An ethnic identity is defined as a “conscious awareness of who one is in relation to a
group, in terms of phenotype, language, culture, customs and behaviour” (Castles & Miller, 2003, p.
53). Such visible markers lead one to identify with a specific group, but they may also be used as
criteria for exclusion by other groups (Castles & Miller, 2003, p. 35). Traditional schools of ethnicity
regarded it in terms of biological, familial and cultural ties that are perceived to be relatively fixed
and unchanging (Isaac, 1975, p. 38, in Cornell & Hartmann 1998, p. 48). However, scholars have
since come to ascribe greater importance to the role of external constraints, including political,
economic and social ones, in shaping ethnic self-identification. Today, ethnic identities are viewed as
“the result of external ascription and experiences at the hands of circumstances, and also of the
The "c" in "JFC" indicates that they are children born from unions between Japanese men and Filipino
women, and does not indicate the state of childhood as many of them have already reached adult age
(Suzuki, 2010, p. 31). The abbreviations “JFY” and “JFC” will both be used throughout this paper.
2 The term is also a legal category (i.e. entertainer visa). The Philippine government refers to these
“entertainers” as “Overseas Performing Artists” or OPAs (Cabuag, 2003, in DAWN 2003, p. 1).
3 This estimate is based on the number of Filipino-Japanese marriages as recorded with the Commission
on Filipinos Overseas and Japan-based organisations (Asis 2001). Other NGOs have estimated the
number to be higher, at 340,000 (Centre for Japanese-Filipino Families website,
http://home.att.ne.jp/banana/cjff/homepage.htm). Retrieved November 22, 2011.
1
23
claims people make about themselves” (p. 80), adding the active component of the person “making”
him- or herself. In this globalised world where geographic mobility has become more pronounced,
individuals may find that their ethnic identities are disrupted upon their migration to new
sociocultural environments (Tsuda, 2003, p. 156), which could enable more mixed ethnic identities
to emerge.
This paper will begin by describing the background of Filipino women’s migration to Japan
as “entertainers”, and how children born as a result of intermarriages are perceived in Japanese
society. Next, it will differentiate the JFY from the JFC in the Philippines and Japan, and highlight
some of the themes that have emerged in the process of their adjustment to life in Japan. Finally, it
sketches how their shifting ethnic identities as Japanese-Filipinos lead them to regard their
“homecoming” as an ambivalent one.
Japan’s Myth of Monoethnicity and Reality of Ethnic Diversity
Despite the existence of indigenous people in Hokkaido and Okinawa and former colonial residents
within the state4, Japanese identity construction in the postwar years was based on racial, ethnic and
linguistic homogeneity, where anyone who was not “pure” Japanese in terms of race, ethnicity,
nationality, language, class and cultural heritage was referred to as the “other”, or gaikokujin
(“foreigner”) (Befu, 2001). Integrated into this discourse was a genre of literature known as
nihonjinron (theories of the Japanese), a central theme of which was the comparison of the Japanese
with a constructed image of foreigners/outsiders, emphasising the uniqueness of Japanese culture,
society and people, narrowing people down into binary categories of “we Japanese” and “the other”
(Lie, 2001). However, scholars who have documented the histories of the various marginalised
groups in Japan have shed light on the actual ethnic diversity of the country.5 More than two million
foreigners reside in Japan today, with the four largest groups being the Chinese, Koreans, Brazilians
and Filipinos (Ministry of Justice, 2009).
In the 1980s, Japan began to experience labour shortages in the undesirable “3K” (kiken,
kitsui, kitanai – dangerous, difficult, dirty) occupations, such as construction and factory work,
which better-educated Japanese began to avoid (Lie, 2001, p. 10). Such jobs were filled by nikkeijin
workers from South America (Brazil, Peru), the Middle East (Iran, Iraq) and Asian countries
(Thailand, South Korea, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines) in the 1980s and 1990s
(Lie, 2001; Kamada, 2009). However, the flow of migration from the Philippines to Japan was rather
different as it became increasingly feminised and concentrated in the specific sector of the
entertainment industry.
During the Japanese empire, the mixed-nation theory was strategically asserted to justify its
annexation of Korea, Taiwan and other areas (Oguma, 2002). To assimilate their colonial subjects, Japan
incorporated them into the state, depriving them of their nationality and granting them Japanese
nationality instead. After World War II and decolonization, about three-fourths of the Koreans returned
to Korea, but about 50,000 to 60,000 remained in Japan (Chapman, 2008).
5 Ethnic minorities in Japan are usually classified as follows: 1) the indigenous people of the Ainu and
the Okinawan; 2) the former colonial residents (mainly Korean and Chinese) who came to Japan during
the colonisation period; 3) the Burakumin, who are ethnically Japanese but are descendants of a group of
people classified as outcasts during the Tokugawa period of 1603-1867; and 4) foreign workers from
various Asian and South American countries (Lie, 2001; Weiner, 2009).
4
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Filipino Female Migration to Japan
The phenomenon of JFC began in the context of increased contact between the Philippines and
Japan brought about by Japan’s economic influence in Asia, as well as migration ties between the
two countries in the postwar era. From the 1970s, the Philippine government began actively pursuing
a migration-led development plan with tourism as one of its key pillars. In the same period, Japanese
tourism within Asia increased as a result of Japanese people’s higher spending power. Part of this
boom in outbound tourism consisted of sex-related tours to Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and
Thailand, catering specifically to Japanese men. Due to protests by women’s groups in the
destination countries, the number of sex tours eventually dwindled, but this instead paved the way
for thousands of Filipino women to work in Japan in bars, pubs and other establishments under
entertainer visas in the 1980s (DAWN, 2003; Suzuki, 2008).6
While contracted to “work as singers and dancers in performance venues” (DAWN 2003, p.
4), it has been reported that the actual work that these “entertainers” in Japan perform has little to do
with their pre-departure song and dance training. They are “forced to do ‘hostessing’ work”
(DAWN), which involves sitting down with customers, engaging them in lively conversation,
serving food and drinks, and providing an intimate atmosphere in which male customers can relax
and unwind (Parreñas, 2008; Faier, 2009). In DAWN's survey (2003, p. 4-5), it was also reported that
problematic work conditions, such as mistreatment and sexual harassment at the workplace, nonpayment or delayed salaries, contract violations, and immigration-related problems heavily
contributed to these women’s vulnerability.
These women’s vulnerable legal status 7 and restricted movement between their home and
workplace limited the spaces in which Japanese men and Filipino women could interact. As such,
entertainment establishments served as the main venue for them to meet, with many encounters
developing into emotional and sexual relationships. According to DAWN (2003), about half of the
entertainers who developed relationships with their customers eventually married them.
International Marriages and Children of Intermarriage
Coinciding with Filipino female migration to Japan was the general rise in intermarriages between
Japanese men and women from other Asian countries beginning in the 1980s. In 2000, there were
47,931 registered marriages between Japanese men and Filipino women, outnumbering those
between Japanese men and other Asian (mainly Korean and Chinese) women (Somusho, 2004). The
category of “spouse or child of Japanese nationals” has also overtaken that of “entertainers” as the
largest visa category among Filipino nationals since 2005, numbering 49,980 in 2008 (Ministry of
Justice, 2009). In contrast, the number of those with entertainer visas plummeted to 9,199 in 2008.8
Such trends show that these Filipino women’s initial temporary stay in Japan was made more
permanent by virtue of marriage and family.
Despite the rise in the number of intermarriages in Japan, there is little research to date on
In 2003, up to 82,741 Filipinos entered Japan under entertainer visas (Ministry of Justice, 2009).
DAWN reported that many Filipino OPAs are forced to run away from their employers when they are
no longer willing or are unable to tolerate their demands and workload. In doing so, these women leave
their documents behind, thus becoming undocumented, even if they have entered Japan legally.
8 This is attributed to more stringent criteria for the selection of entertainers. In 2004, a U.S. Trafficking
in Persons report identified Filipino entertainers in Japan as trafficked persons forced into prostitution.
Japanese immigration revised its selection criteria for entertainers in response to this directive
(Parreñas 2008, p. 136).
6
7
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the children of these unions. Mixed-blood individuals are said to have existed from when European
traders and missionaries first arrived in Japan. After World War II, as the ainoko ("cross-breed")
children of Japanese women and American servicemen reached school age, the issue became more
publicised, though they were considered to be a social problem and an object of pity (Fish, 2009).
The most common term and self-identity marker for people with mixed ancestry in Japan
today is hāfu (“half”), indicating “half-foreignness” (Hāfu Japanese website). It originated in the
1960s to commonly refer to people of Japanese and white mixed-parentage (Kamada, 2009). While
it has been criticised for denoting a deficiency of not being “whole” Japanese, it remains popular as a
self-identity marker among mixed-parentage individuals (Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008, p. 257). Terms
such as kokusaiji ("international child") and daburu ("double"), while regarded as having more
empowering connotations, have not been widely used in mainstream Japanese language.9
The Identities of Multiethnic People in Japan
While conventional theories dealt with ethnic identity as a collective, communal identity, the
situation for those of mixed parentage is rather different as it deviates from the standard notion of
ethnicity; that is, belonging to a single ethnic group and having a single ethnicity. For them, ethnic
identity “becomes a question and a decision in a way that does not exist for the children of an
ethnically homogenous marriage” (Lieberson & Waters, 1988, in Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p. 170).
While some identify solely or more strongly with one parent’s ethnic heritage, others claim their dual
or multiple heritages – a process which may entail additional meanings and challenges.
In a recent study, Kamada (2009) found that mixed Japanese-white adolescent girls’ selfidentifications changed from “half” to “hybrid” in the course of adolescence. They claimed Japanese
nationality, language, and customs, but also possessed the cultural capital associated with the highlyvalued ability to speak English and opportunities beyond Japan that their white, Western heritage has
accorded them (p. 179). Some highly-educated hāfu in Japan are seen as savvy cosmopolitans who
easily straddle both of their parents’ cultures (Murphy-Shigematsu, 2006, p. 83). According to the
“Hāfu Japanese” website10, the idealised image of a hāfu today is someone who has “English ability,
international cultural experience, Western physical features…yet often looking Japanese enough for
the majority to feel comfortable with.” However, many offspring of Japanese and mixed-parentage
do not fit into this type at all. Amerasians, or the children of Okinawan women and American men
employed at military bases, are said to experience more economic and family hardships than other
multiethnic people in mainland Japan. Okinawa's troubled history of being caught between Japan
and the U.S. has influenced their ethnic identities and social positions. For them, having a Caucasian
parent does not automatically guarantee the cultural capital to easily manage boundaries between
“Japanese” and “foreigner”.
Newcomer migrants also find themselves struggling with their ethnic identities while
negotiating their position in Japanese society. For example, although Brazilian nikkeijin 11 had
considered themselves “Japanese” in Brazil because of their ancestry, distinctive racial appearance,
and perceived cultural differences from mainstream Brazilians, once they arrived in Japan they
found that the Japanese understanding of what it means to be ethnically Japanese is more rigidly
defined, based on an ideology of “pure” Japanese descent as well as a homogenous culture in which
The use of daburu seems to be limited to parents and teachers of mixed ancestry children who wish to
highlight their endowment instead of deficiency (Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008, p. 257).
10 “What is a ‘Hafu’”, in http://www.hafujapanese.org/eng/bg02.html. Retrieved December 30, 2011.
11 A general term for Japanese descendants born and living outside Japan (Tsuda, 2003, p. x)
9
26
complete Japanese linguistic proficiency is also required (Tsuda, 2003; De Carvalho, 2003). This had
the effect of the Brazilian nikkeijin acquiring a different ethnic status as a foreign minority, which led
them to reconsider their ethnic identities.
These examples illustrate that multiethnic and mixed-parentage individuals in Japan, as both
insiders and outsiders, resist being limited to “either-or” categories as “Japanese” or “foreigner”.
Despite the pervasive myth of homogeneity that continues to breed prejudice and discrimination
against minorities, it is believed that an increasing numbers of people identify themselves by
emphasising not only their nationality acquired from their parents, but also their ethnic ties (MurphyShigematsu, 2006, p. 80), challenging and expanding rigidly-defined meanings of being Japanese.
JFC in the Philippines and Japan
This section describes the situation of JFC in the Philippines and Japan. The JFC living in the
Philippines are raised as Filipinos, speaking Filipino or another dialect as their first language, and
English as a second. They are referred to in their communities as Japinos (a shortened version of
"Japanese-Filipino"), anak ng Japayuki (child of a Japayuki), anak ng Hapon (child of a Japanese)
(Barile, 2001, p. 21), and shin-nikkeijin (new people of Japanese descent).12 Many are stigmatised by
their peers for their mothers’ former occupation as “entertainers” as well as for their fatherless
families, in a predominantly Catholic nation where having a complete family is highly valued. Many
of these single mothers’ main problems are financial, for few receive support or are even in contact
with their children’s fathers. This has led to a precarious situation for JFC as many are forced to stop
attending school or delay it in order to work instead. 13 As a result of not growing up with their
fathers, and for most, a complete lack of communication with them as well, JFC grow up without a
sense of their Japanese heritage. Those who are affiliated with one of the concerned NGOs join
activities that introduce Japanese culture and language. Moreover, meeting other JFC through NGOs
is seen to play a positive role in the formation of their identity (Asis, 2001, p. 115).
In contrast, JFC born and raised in Japan have no experience of living in the Philippines,
although they may have visited it occasionally. They are more likely than their Philippine
counterparts to live with both parents, or with Japanese stepfathers and/or half-siblings in cases
where their mothers have remarried.14 Data on Filipino women’s occupations in Japan show that the
majority are production process labourers and service workers, including entertainers (Somusho,
2004), which hints at their limited socioeconomic position and opportunities in Japanese society.
Japan-based JFC grow up speaking Japanese as their first language. The Japanese school
system and culture emphasises uniformity and compliance from its students; and those with foreign
backgrounds need to assimilate as much as they can to avoid ostracism and rejection by their
classmates. At the same time, they may downplay or hide their foreign background. In the process of
integrating more into school life, many lose touch with Filipino culture and language and strongly
identify as being Japanese.
They are differentiated from the Filipino nikkeijin, the descendants of Japanese prewar migrants.
After Japan’s defeat in the war, they hid their ancestry to avoid ostracism in their communities. As the
wartime stigma faded, many of them came to regard their heritage with pride. Many second- and thirdgeneration Filipino nikkeijin have begun to migrate to Japan to take advantage of the economic
opportunities that their nikkeijin status has afforded them (Ohno, 2008).
13 Such a situation is ironic since JFC are sometimes assumed by their peers to be well-off due to having a Japanese
father, reflecting a widespread Filipino belief in the affluence of Japanese people and their economic superiority.
14 An International Organisation on Migration (IOM) Japan survey of 106 JFC in Japan found that 82%
reside only with their mothers.
12
27
Locating the JFY
This section provides a profile of JFY based on information from in-depth interviews with five male
and four female JFY to contrast them with the two groups of JFC presented above. The respondents
were between ages 18 to 21, and had migrated to the Kantō area of Japan between the ages of 13 to
19. Similar to many JFC in the Philippines, most of the respondents had not grown up with their
fathers, and few were in communication with or financially-supported by them. However, eight of
them were recognised and entered in their fathers’ koseki (family registry). What makes the JFY
distinct is that they also spent a significant part of their childhood away from their mothers, who
were working in Japan. The JFY were left in the care of their maternal relatives, mostly
grandmothers and/or aunts as primary guardians. Their mothers regularly sent financial support for
the JFY and their families while the child was growing up in the Philippines, even as they
maintained a separate household in Japan.15
Half of the JFY decided to migrate to Japan themselves, citing a desire to find employment
and support their families. Their mothers may have consciously or unconsciously transmitted
migration-related norms and values that facilitated the JFY’s own mobility, leading them to decide
that working abroad was a viable option. The other half migrated because of their mothers’ decisions
for family reunification. These JFY initially resisted leaving since they were content with life in the
Philippines and did not want to interrupt their high school education. All the respondents were quite
recent migrants, having lived at most five years in Japan. All live with relatives, mostly mothers and
siblings, with one living with his stepfather as well.
There was an absence of Japanese cultural transmission during the JFY's childhood, which
led them to identify predominantly with Filipino culture. It was during childhood that they were first
made aware of their Japanese-Filipino mixed parentage, with their Japanese names and physical
appearance attracting attention and signalling their difference from relatives and classmates whose
parents were both Filipino. From their relatives, the JFY learned the words “half-Japanese”, “half”,
“mixed”, and “Japanese-Filipino”, which were the terms they used to describe themselves. These
early experiences of being different had a lasting impact on their identities.
The following sections highlight the major issues that have emerged from semi-structured
interviews conducted with JFY.
Adjustments in Migration
Upon arrival in Japan, JFY attempted to familiarise and adapt to its culture and norms, in all its
differences from the Filipino environment they were raised in. Their experiences in adapting to a
new cultural context challenged and problematised their primarily Filipino ethnic identities. In the
interviews, the JFY said that since they had little or no knowledge of Japanese language, lifestyle
and customs upon their arrival, their initial adjustment was quite difficult. Most felt overwhelmed
and disoriented especially during their first year in Japan. Their main difficulties were the language
and cultural differences and homesickness.
With school attendance a decisive factor in whether JFY could acquire the necessary literacy
skills to navigate their daily lives, the five who only learned Japanese on the job and through
informal methods were hindered from progressing to higher levels especially in reading and writing
15
Some mothers of JFY have remarried after divorcing the father of their children.
28
Japanese. For the four JFY who studied in Japanese high schools, school was an important site of
cultural contact as it meant immersion in an all-Japanese environment. While their school experience
was marked by a degree of social exclusion due to language and cultural barriers, they had a better
understanding of Japanese norms and behaviour because they had more exposure. This greater
degree of language acquisition and adaptation to Japanese culture and behaviour enabled them over
time to identify more strongly as Japanese.
Despite the difficulties, the respondents also acknowledged that they have had certain
opportunities in Japan; namely, the availability of jobs, higher salaries, the chance to be more
independent, and a better standard of living compared to the Philippines. Though the JFY spent the
greater part of their lives in the Philippines, most said they preferred to stay in Japan, citing more
work opportunities and a chance for a better future. A few however preferred to live in the
Philippines when they are much older, saying that they feel more at home and can have a more
comfortable lifestyle compared to the one they have in Japan. As for future plans, most of the JFY
wanted to finish university and find a good job.
From the interviews, it was seen that JFY’s employment in Japan was limited to part-time
service and construction work because of the daunting language barrier as well as the lack of a
university education. Only two of the respondents were in university at the time of the interviews.
Factors relating to JFY’s families’ socioeconomic backgrounds also affected how they have
integrated into Japanese society. It seems that the concentration of their mothers’ jobs in the service
sector and lack of support from their fathers has greatly limited the socioeconomic mobility of the
single-mother households they live in, which also hampers them from proceeding to the higher
education that would enable them to take on full-time jobs. However, they view their situation
positively in that they find value in their expanded earning potential in Japan, comparing it to what
they perceive as the more disadvantaged situation in the Philippines.
Being "half" and its meanings in the Philippines and Japan
The JFY mainly used the words "half" or "Japanese-Filipino" to identify themselves before and after
migration to Japan. Their Japanese surnames and physical appearance always invited attention from
their classmates and teachers in the Philippines, which elicited various reactions:
Shinji (male, 20, service worker and high school student): I’d get teased for being
Japanese, not in a mean way, but only because I was different. People noticed my
name and ask how to pronounce it. And I looked different from my friends too, but I
just wanted to be normal. Of course when you’re a kid you want to be like everyone
else. I’d just say, “so what if I’m half-Japanese, what can I do about it?”
Prior to migration, the JFY already distinguished themselves from their peers because of their mixed
parentage and their Japanese names. They accepted early on that they were different – not “just”
Filipino, but Japanese as well. However, it was only by virtue of having mixed parentage that they
identified themselves as such, and despite their assertion of being Japanese-Filipino, their Filipino
identity was salient prior to migration. Apart from being conscious of having a Japanese father, most
did not feel a strong connection to the country. Overall, it may be said that the Japanese side of the
JFY's identity was dormant in the Philippines.
Defining themselves as "half" might imply that they are neither "whole Filipino" nor "whole
29
Japanese", but for JFY, calling themselves "half" does not denote deficiency but rather as something
to be proud of.
Haruko: (female, 19, private university student): I think when I was a kid I was a bit
shy about being half, but over time when I thought about it more, I realized that mixed
people like us have more opportunities in life, more options.
Shifting ethnic identities
Ethnic identities are said to shift depending on geographical, social and legal factors (Cornell &
Hartmann, 1998). Compared to their previous passive acceptance that they are Japanese-Filipino, i.e.,
simply because of their names and appearance, the JFY later came to view it as having the option to
study and/or work in Japan as they grew older and became aware of the economic differences
between the two countries. JFY’s firsthand experience of life in Japan seemed to have added a more
active dimension to identifying as Japanese-Filipino. They highlight their Japanese ancestry because
they see it as a practical resource that would allow them take advantage of the job availability and
higher wages. They connected their ancestry to the right to live and work in Japan, and have access
to benefits such as welfare and scholarships. In this way, ethnicity seems to be manipulated for
economic advantage.
Another feature of the JFY’s ethnic identifications was the shift in the way they see and refer
to themselves depending on who they are with at a particular place and time, whether with Japanese,
Filipinos, other JFC, or other foreigners in Japan.
Haruko: Japanese people say I look Japanese so sometimes I don’t really feel I'm half.
At school they don’t see me as half either, but as Japanese and not Filipino. When I’m
with other halfs, that’s when I feel that I am. But when I’m with my American
classmates, I say I’m ‘gaijin’ (foreigner) like them.
Emi (female, 20, factory worker): When I’m with Japanese, I feel Japanese myself.
Because they say I’m no different from them. Even though I’m half, they see me as
Japanese. My way of speaking is futsuu (ordinary). They say I look Japanese too. But
when I’m with Filipinos, I still act Filipino.
JFY’s shifts in ethnic identification were also revealed in how they introduced themselves. To
Filipinos, they would usually mention their name, and only if asked, say they are “half”. However, to
Japanese, some would say their name and then add that they are “half” even without being asked.
Why is there a need to mention that they are “half” to Japanese people in particular? One JFY
answered, “so they won’t think I’m strange or stupid for not speaking Japanese well.” It could be
interpreted as an excuse to sidestep expectations held by Japanese that they are fluent in the language
simply because they are physically appear as Japanese or are Japanese citizens.
Having Japanese nationality was a notable influence on JFY's ethnic identities. They regard
being Japanese citizens as an advantage, in that it is a key to expanded opportunities and stability in
their lives. While many JFC in the Philippines may be motivated to seek Japanese nationality and
have been encouraged by the revised Nationality Law 16 , those who have changed their Filipino
In June 2008, ten JFC born out of wedlock were granted the right to Japanese nationality following a
Supreme Court decision that parts of Japan’s Nationality Law were unconstitutional. Previously, the
Nationality Law stated that a child born out of wedlock to a Japanese man and a foreign woman can
16
30
nationality to Japanese may still be in unstable situations with regard to their social, cultural,
linguistic, political and economic citizenships (Suzuki, 2010, p. 49). While a number of JFY are
Japanese citizens (whether from birth or acquired later on), they occupy an uncertain position in
Japan as they have limited linguistic and cultural knowledge, which are crucial in being accepted as
Japanese. By and large, they are still considered "foreigners" and have to negotiate their identities in
their new homeland. Ambivalences associated with having mixed parentage, lingering stereotypes of
"entertainers", and migration from a "Third World" country are also fed into their consciousness by
the surrounding society.
It was mentioned earlier that JFY initially expressed their ethnic identities as intrinsic by
virtue of their mixed ancestry. Being the child of Filipino and Japanese parents confirms in their
minds their belongingness to the Philippines and Japan. Although their primary socialisation took
place in the former which resulted in having a greater connection to that country and culture, their
sense of connection to the latter would tend to surface when they differentiated themselves from
their Filipino peers in terms of ancestry and nationality. This was particularly evident when they
stressed that those who have Japanese ancestry and nationality can easily come to Japan and find
work.
Fumika (female, 20, service worker): I’ve always been proud of being half, of having
a connection to Japan, even as a kid. Being Filipino means being bilingual [being able
to speak Filipino and English]. And being Japanese means getting jobs easily, things
like that. I’m Filipino because I grew up there, and I’m Japanese also because I can
stay here for a long time and learn about the other side of my identity. It’s the best of
both worlds.
Several JFY who have gained Japanese proficiency after several years in Japan found that it was
more comfortable appearing as a Japanese person in public, instead of a foreigner:
Akane (female, 20, cashier and university student): I changed when I got better at
speaking Japanese. I sometimes feel uncomfortable using Filipino even with friends
when everyone around us is Japanese. I hate it when they stare at me when they hear
us speaking in Filipino. I want them (the Japanese) to see me as one of them, so I use
only Japanese.
Despite the perceived advantages of having Japanese ancestry, the JFY admitted that being “half”
also had its downside, such as having more challenges:
Haruko: Being half or mixed is more complicated and confusing than anyone can
imagine, because of the different backgrounds. We have more personal issues and
internal struggles that we can’t tell our own parents or close friends about sometimes.
Mixed people, especially those who feel they aren’t accepted, have more chances but
only obtain Japanese nationality if the father recognises paternity before the child ‘s birth, or if the
couple marry before the child turns 20. The revision allows the father to admit paternity after the birth,
and excludes the parents’ marital status as a condition for the child to be eligible for Japanese
nationality. It is seen as a major development in upholding the rights of children born between Japanese
men and foreign women (Nagata, 2008).
31
at the same time, more insecurities.
Akane: At first, being half seems OK, because you can go to either place [Japan or the
Philippines] easily but it’s also not good because instead of being in one place and
knowing one culture, there’s two you have to deal with so it’s hard to adjust. You
have to know them both…. And you're not sure where you’re going to live someday.
It’s like nothing’s permanent.
In addition, while Japanese people might accept them as “ordinary” Japanese in certain contexts
based on their language ability, mannerisms and/or physical appearance, the JFY still assert their
difference by saying that since they have been socialised in the Philippines, they cannot see
themselves as fully Japanese. The lack of Japanese cultural and linguistic competence marks them as
different and serves as a boundary between them and Japanese people. Similarly, they differentiate
themselves from Filipinos by emphasising their Japanese ancestry and citizenship with its perceived
advantages. In this way, they construct their identities by aligning themselves in certain ways with
both groups, yet departing from them in others.
An Ambivalent Homecoming
Prior to migration, JFY claimed to be Japanese-Filipino because of their mixed parentage, accepting
it as a "natural" part of who they are. However, their understanding of their ethnic identification
became more nuanced and complex through their experiences in Japan, causing them to regard their
“homecoming” as an ambivalent one.
As with any migrant who adjusts to a new environment, the JFY are not immune to
comparing their former home and their present one. They articulated differences between the
Philippines and Japan as the former being "where the heart is" and the latter being "where the money
is". In other words, the Philippines is where family, friends and everything familiar to them can be
found. In contrast, Japan is a land of wealth and opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. They
acknowledged that living in either country has its advantages and disadvantages. In the Philippines,
the job shortage, lower salaries and lower standards of living were mentioned as the main
disadvantages, but these were made easier by the presence of family and friends. In their view, it is
easier to find happiness in the Philippines even if one is poor, because financial hardship is somehow
made up for by the emotional security offered by their loved ones. On the other hand, the
disadvantages of living in Japan were the language barrier, cultural differences, and homesickness,
but were compensated for by the availability of jobs (albeit unskilled ones) and the potential to earn
higher salaries, which they believe make their lives more secure. Seeing the two countries as polar
opposites led some of them to remark that there would always be something missing in either place.
Ryu (male, 20, construction worker): Here in Japan, the money’s really good. You can
earn more than in the Philippines. But money can’t buy happiness, right? If you really
want money, you come here to work and put up with it for a while. Put aside your
happiness so you can earn money. That’s the way it is.
Emi (female, 20, factory worker): I’m a Japanese citizen, so I have a right to be here.
But my heart and dreams are in the Philippines. It’s like I have to separate
practicalities, like work, from my dreams. In Japan, you can’t survive without working,
32
because you can’t rely on anyone but yourself. If you don’t work, you can’t live.
While asserting their legal right to reside and work in Japan, JFY accept that they will probably
never feel that they fully belong in their fathers' homeland. For one, their physical presence does not
automatically translate into an opportunity to build a strong relationship with their Japanese fathers,
who have lived apart from them since childhood. In addition, while some JFY may appear physically
similar to Japanese and are able to “pass” as one of the people, their lack of cultural and linguistic
proficiency marks them as outsiders. Experiences of discrimination in everyday life, as migrants
from a “Third World” country, and as children of former “entertainers” have also led them to
criticise some aspects of Japanese society and culture and long for the Philippines.
It is notable that the JFY clearly distinguish between being a Japanese citizen and being a
Japanese; despite asserting that they are the former, none of them identified themselves as the latter.
The ideology of homogeneity that values the “pureness” of Japanese blood labels those of mixed
ancestry as different from other Japanese (Befu 2001), placing them in the disconcerting position of
being “neither here nor there”.
Conclusion
The JFY have constructed their ethnic identities through historical, economic and sociocultural
circumstances and through assertions of their difference. The process of how they arrive at these is
hardly straightforward. From an acceptance of their mixed ancestry during childhood, they
underwent the process of migration to Japan, including adapting and adjusting to a new social and
cultural environment. While they acknowledge their cultural and linguistic differences from the
Japanese, they also asserted their legal right to belong, and they also distinguish themselves from
Filipinos in that their Japanese ancestry has become a means for possible economic and financial
mobility in Japan.
In Japan, JFY may not be considered “authentic” Japanese because of the restrictive criteria
of what it means to be one—criteria that have barred other minorities from achieving full equality
with the Japanese people. In their ambivalent position as ethnically and socioeconomically
marginalised youths, they are part of the Japanese landscape but struggle to find positive recognition
within it. Their pride in having both Filipino and Japanese heritage and the possibilities it brings is
somewhat tempered by the very different realities in the two countries.
In the course of adjustment to life in Japan, JFY become more aware of the ambivalences in
being Japanese-Filipino, and define what it means to belong to both. As they continue to cope with
differences and synthesise their previous experiences in the Philippines with their new experiences
and opportunities in Japan, it is hoped that they can serve as a bridge between the land of their
upbringing and their new home.
33
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Emerging Patterns and Strategic Directions of Japan and China’s
35
Economic Cooperation in CLMV: A Review17
Dennis D. Trinidad18
De La Salle University
Abstract
The objectives of this paper are to review and compare the changes in Japanese and
Chinese economic cooperation in CLMV and examine their emerging patterns and
future directions since the year 2000. In theory, the economic cooperation of
competing regional powers may not be optimal for development due to a lack of
strategic direction and coordination. However, an economic power transition as in the
case of China as a rising economic power and Japan as a declining economic power
could make economic cooperation simultaneously complementary and competitive.
This is because rising and declining economies tend to tailor their economic
cooperation policies to their specific economic needs. For instance, Japan tends to
adopt innovative types of economic cooperation while, as a rising economic power,
China focuses on cooperation that is market and resource-oriented. The study found,
amongst other things, that Japan has increasingly become an important market for
products from CLMV while China has become an important source of products for
CLMV. Moreover, Japan has emphasised ‘green technology’ in its cooperation with
CLMV while China has awarded contracts in CLMV to Chinese businesses under the
foreign contract engineering companies (FCECs) scheme.
Keywords: Mekong subregion, ASEAN, China, Japan, East Asia
Not for citation. This is a preliminary draft of the study which the author presented at the 3rd
International Conference of Japanese Studies Association in Southeast Asia in February 22-23, 2012,
held at the Armada Hotel of Petaling Jaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
18 Dennis D. Trinidad is an Associate Professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle
University, Manila, the Philippines. He concurrently serves as the coordinator of the Japanese Studies
programme and the Director of Social Development Research Centre in the same university. His areas of
research include regional cooperation in East Asia and the politics of economic reform. He can be reached
by email at dennis.trinidad@dlsu.edu.ph
17
36
Emerging Patterns and Strategic Directions of Japan and China’s
Economic Cooperation in CLMV: A Review
Dennis D. Trinidad
De La Salle University
Introduction
The purpose of economic cooperation in the areas of trade, investment and development is to
increase commercial activities, thereby enhancing the prospects of peace and stability by making
participating economies interdependent. However, zero-sum thinking in a post-Cold War East Asia
has continued to shape national perceptions and state behaviour. Moreover, East Asia is faces
unprecedented period in history in which Japan and China are both regional economic powers. The
post-Cold War era has also brought major structural changes in a region where economic power has
become the main basis of interaction among key actors (Zha & Hu, 2006). Consequently, the
economic cooperation of both countries with ASEAN is implicitly carried out in the context of
strategic rivalry. When this is the case, economic cooperation becomes embedded in the dynamics of
power relations between two competing regional powers. In theory, this condition may not be
optimal for development due to the lack of coordination and the heavy emphasis on strategic
allocation. This paper examines if this is also the case for Japan’s and China’s economic cooperation
towards Southeast Asia from year 2000 and onwards.
This study argues that Chinese and Japanese economic cooperation, particularly with
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (hereinafter referred to collectively as CLMV) are both
competitive and complementary. Competing initiatives in economic cooperation is attributed to a
broader regional power dynamics between China and Japan. As Nabers (2008) observes, rivalry with
China has led Tokyo to introduce new innovative proposals for regional institution-building each
time Beijing approached ASEAN bilaterally. Mulgan (2008) also notes that Japan also sought to
limit its vulnerability to China’s expanding power and potential threat by aligning with other AsiaPacific states and engineering a shift in the power balance in its favour. On the other hand,
complementing initiatives are attributed to their domestic economies. As a country suffering from
post-industrialisation problems, Japanese economic cooperation is expected to emphasise innovative
proposals. On the other hand, due to its on-going pursuit of industrialisation, China is likely to focus
its own economic cooperation to serve the needs of its domestic economy, thus pursuing strategic
market and resource-seeking proposals.
For this study, economic cooperation shall pertain to any initiatives or policies that seek to
increase commercial activities such as trade, investment and use of official development assistance
(ODA). Cooperation can either be formal, as is the case of free trade agreements (FTAs), or informal,
as when sub-state actors (for instance, firms or business organisations) from two or more countries
cooperate to increase trade and investment. The objectives of this paper are to review and compare
the changes in Japanese and Chinese economic cooperation in CLMV and examine their emerging
patterns and future directions since the year 2000. It is assumed that any difference in the patterns is
attributed to Japan’s and China’s domestic economies. As a consequence of the economic power
transition, Japan tends to adopt innovative types of economic cooperation while, as a rising
economic power, China focuses on cooperation that is oriented to the market and resources. In this
study, I borrowed OECD’s concept of innovation (as applied to economic cooperation) which
37
pertains to “medium- and long-term initiatives that consist of: Promoting entrepreneurship, investing
in smart infrastructure, encouraging R&D, green investment, upgrading the skills of workers,
steering market actors towards innovation-related investments, and accelerating activities for which
barriers may have been too high otherwise” (OECD, 2009, p. 5). Innovation also addresses global
issues, specifically health, climate change and other environmental challenges (OECD Innovation
Strategy Online 2012). On the contrary, economic cooperation geared towards the market and
resource-seeking intends to broaden market access, diversify sources of and maintain continuous
access to important natural resources for the purpose of sustaining and further expanding economic
growth.
The framework of analysis of the paper is the agency-structure approach based on the
rational choice model. Unlike realism, this approach assumes that states are not unitary actors.
Policymaking agents are assumed to be rational while domestic and regional structures serve as their
context of decisions. Domestic structures include state institutions, public perceptions, and the nature
of the country’s economy, among other things. Highlighting the significance of domestic factors to a
country’s external policies such as regional cooperation, Yoshimatsu (2010) attributed Japan’s and
China’s weaknesses – the former’s lack of policy decisiveness and the latter’s weak policy
credibility – in implementing external policies to domestic political institutions. Regional structures,
on the other hand, have to do with emerging East Asian regionalism and economic power transition.
These two factors have shaped Japan’s and China’s preferences with regard to economic cooperation.
In this light, the policymakers of each country perform a ‘two-level’ game of sorts in order to satisfy
both domestic and regional/international demands (Milner, 1997). In this paper, economic
cooperation policies are regarded as the outcomes of the decisions of policy-making agents, which
are shaped by their perceptions of domestic and regional structures. Hence, it is assumed that Japan’s
perceptions of China’s motives in the region and China’s views on Japan’s China policy are crucial
factors that will shape the future direction of their economic cooperation towards CLMV.
There are two major reasons why CLMV countries are significant in Japan’s and China’s
strategic economic diplomacy in the region. Firstly, CLMV countries offer cheap alternative
production sites for both Chinese and Japanese manufacturers, especially those that are labourintensive. The cost of production in Japan, particularly labour, is one of the highest in the developed
world. On the other hand, as China’s economy grows and the cost of labour rises, labour-intensive
firms will have to eventually relocate their productions elsewhere. With a more stable Mekong
region, on-going market reforms in Vietnam and recently, in Myanmar, CLMV has become a
potential destination of foreign investment.
Secondly, maintaining strong ties with countries in the region is strategically important for
both Japan and China. For the latter, cooperation with Southeast Asian nations is a crucial test of its
‘good neighbour’ policy. CLMV countries are located in the front doors of China’s Yunnan province.
A prosperous Mekong subregion would also mean prosperity and stability for Yunnan. Moreover, the
development of highway corridors that link Yunnan, China and all countries in the Mekong area will
also allow China access to the Andaman Sea by way of land. A peaceful coexistence with countries
in the region and with ASEAN countries which have claims over the Spratly Islands, like Vietnam,
could also help assuage the ‘China threat’. For Japan, maintaining good relations with ASEAN as a
whole is part of its strategic goal of maintaining a stable and peaceful Southeast Asian region. At
least in principle, Japan’s economic cooperation with CLMV is intended to ‘rectify’ the economic
disparity between the older and newer members of ASEAN.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that ASEAN has been passive in amidst these dynamics of
rivalry. In fact, ASEAN has influenced the regional cooperation agenda by identifying the economic
38
disparity between its older and newer members as obstacles to successful economic integration. The
issue of economic disparity arose when CLMV was admitted as members of ASEAN in the late
1990s (Severino, 2007, p. 35-44). In response, ASEAN introduced and adopted the Initiative for
ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 2000 to provide a framework for regional cooperation in rectifying the
divide between older and newer members. In 2001, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting adopted the Ha
Noi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap for Closer ASEAN Integration. Japan and China
have, in part, directed their economic cooperation strategies with CLMV with the goal of bridging
the development gap, which is in line with ASEAN’s goal.
In addition to rectifying economic disparities in the region, China is also a direct beneficiary
of economic cooperation in the Mekong area where CLMV is situated. The Yunnan province in
Southwest China is one of the Mekong River basin countries in addition to Thailand, one of the
founding members of ASEAN. Yunnan shares a border with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. It is one
of the poorest provinces in China and is also landlocked. It is interesting to note that China has had
territorial disputes with Vietnam. Japan, on the other hand, has demonstrated its interest in the
Mekong area in various ways. One was when it participated in the United Nations’s peacekeeping
operations in Cambodia. Another was indirectly through the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a
Japan-dominated regional institution, when it initiated the Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS)
Cooperation in 1992.
The structural division that was created by the Cold War had generally prevented commercial
activities between democratic and communist countries in East Asia from flourishing. Nevertheless,
Japan’s seikei bunri policy, which separated politics and economics, had allowed it to engage in
limited commerce with communist countries like Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China. With
the Cold War now over and the emergence of more stable political systems in the 1990s in Southeast
Asia, diplomatic ties with CLMV were restored. Japan’s investment in the region had increased
following the Plaza Accord in 1985. Meanwhile, China had embraced openness and economic
reforms since 1978. Foreign investment was gradually allowed, trade expanded, and the economy
grew at an unprecedented double-digit rate from the 1990s and onwards. Notwithstanding the spats
arising from controversies between China and Japan, the two have for the most part maintained
stable economic relations throughout the post-Cold War period. Japan even supported China’s
accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001.
An Overview of the Greater Mekong Subregion and CLMV
The Mekong is a long and winding international river in Asia that flows from the Quinghai province
to China’s Yunnan province and passes through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam,
before finally emptying into the South China Sea. It is about 4,909 kilometres (Zhu, 2008, p. 83)
long. The Chinese section of the river is called Lancang. It serves as a natural border between
Myanmar and Laos and between Thailand and Laos. The Mekong river basin countries consist of
China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
The term Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) was first coined by the ADB, which refers to
regional development projects in the area that was then known as the Indochinese region (composed
of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and Thailand, Myanmar and the Chinese province of Yunnan.
Other alternate names for the subregion include the Mekong River Basin Countries (MRBCs), which
was used in the first Bangkok Research Centre-IDE-JETRO report in 2008. From the point of view
of ASEAN, the Mekong subregion is a subregional development project similar to the BruneiIndonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asian Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and other regional growth
39
triangles. Excluding China’s Yunnan province, the subregion is also called mainland Southeast
Asia.19 For the purpose of this study, the Mekong subregion will refer to China’s Yunnan province,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The study will only focus on Japanese and
Chinese economic cooperation in CLMV, also known as the newer members of ASEAN. Social
upheavals have constantly beleaguered the CLMV countries almost throughout the post-war period.
The emergence of a more stable environment began in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War
and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. Chinese and Japanese economic cooperation with these
countries have since accelerated.
An Overview of Japanese and Chinese presence in CLMV
China’s early contacts with Southeast Asia stemmed from the tributary system which dates back to
Chinese dynastic rule. Kingdoms from mainland Southeast Asia once had a tributary relationship
with China at some point of their history. With the exception of Thailand, the Mekong countries
would eventually become Western colonies. The French ruled the Indochinese countries of
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam while the British took hold of Myanmar in the west and Malaya in the
south. During World War II, the subregion came temporarily under the power of the Japanese army.
The post-war period was characterised by independence movements, social upheavals and division
caused by the Cold War, which had shaped Chinese and Japanese relations with these countries. Zhu
(2008, p. 70) observed that Chinese foreign aid to CLV in the 1950s and 1960s were intended to
support national struggles and nation-building. Japan, on the other hand, had strictly adhered to US
foreign policy throughout the Cold War period. In an attempt to circumvent the restrictions created
by the bipolar structure on its foreign relations, Japan adopted the policy of seikei bunri to “justify
trading with nearby communist countries while adhering to the western camp” (Potter, 2008, p. 8).
Meanwhile, Chinese foreign aid would take a new shape and direction following China’s opening up
and adoption of economic reforms in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. In 1977, former Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda announced the Fukuda Doctrine which stressed “heart-to-heart diplomacy” with
Southeast Asia, accompanied by a plan to double Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to
the region in the coming years.
Because of political unstability in the 1970s and 1980s, CLMV had squandered the
opportunity to benefit from Japan and China’s new economic and commercial policies. The older
members of ASEAN, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, were the major
beneficiaries of Japan’s ODA doubling plan in the 1980s and 1990s. Thailand and Malaysia have
received the bulk of Japanese investments in Southeast Asia since the adoption of the Plaza Accord
in 1985. Indeed, Japanese aid and investments have been instrumental in the economic
transformation of these countries. Moreover, it also helped to project a good image of Japan as a
model of development, at least for Malaysia and Singapore (Lee, 1990, p. 178).
Japan’s aim to normalise relations with the CLMV may be traced back to the reparative
period in the 1950s and onwards. Table 1 below summarises the reparations and grants Japan has
thus far signed with CLMV. It is interesting to note that Japan paid reparations to Vietnam twice: one
was before the unification and another after the unification. Myanmar also received relatively higher
reparation payments from Japan, compared to Laos and Cambodia. This provides us a glimpse of
how relatively important the individual members of CLMV were to Japan during this period.
Southeast Asia is geographically divided into mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, Malaya Peninsula or West Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) and maritime Southeast Asia
(Brunei, East Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines).
19
40
Eventually, Vietnam would become one of the major recipients of Japanese ODA from the 1990s and
onwards.
Table 1: Japan’s Reparations Payments and Grants to CLMV
Country
Burma (Myanmar)
Laos
Cambodia
South Vietnam
Vietnam
Year of Agreement
1954
1958
1959
1959
1975
Settlement
$340 million
$2.8 million
$4.2 million
$390 million
Yen 8.5 billion
Payment Period
1955-1965
1959-1961
1959-1961
1960-1965
1975-1978
Source: Arase (1995, p. 29)
In 1992, Japan had shown keen interest in the Cambodian issue by dispatching SDF forces for the
first time since WWII to participate in UN’s peacekeeping mission. The success of Japan’s mission
in Cambodia was significant to Japan-Southeast Asia relations. For one, it showed the receptiveness
of the countries in the region to Japan assuming a political role. Moreover, it marked the beginning
of a proactive Japanese foreign policy and a gradual departure from the usual chequebook diplomacy.
On the other hand, China-Southeast Asia relations were beset by political and security
concerns throughout the Cold War period (Ba, 2003, p. 623-626). China’s policy of extending
support to local communist insurgents among Southeast Asian countries, especially in the 1960s, had
left a legacy of mutual suspicion and distrust. However, US-China rapprochement in the early 1970s
provided an opportunity to improve relations. Malaysia normalised ties with China in 1974, followed
by the Philippines and Thailand in 1975. China’s main concern in the Mekong subregion was the
perceived expansionism of Vietnam in Cambodia beginning in 1979. This was complicated by
Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union during the latter half of the 1970s. In view of the situation,
the Chinese sought strategic partnership with other members of ASEAN, particularly with Thailand,
Singapore and Indonesia (Ross, 1992, p. 52-66). The regional tension only dissipated in the late
1980s when Vietnam pulled its troops from Cambodia and during the fall of communism in Europe
and in the Soviet Union.
Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Development
From the mid- to late 1990s, stability in the Mekong countries had improved. Vietnam was admitted
into ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN had
also adopted a number of agreements to accelerate the integration of the economies of its members
from the 1990s and onwards. In 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was launched to
increase intra-regional trade among its members. AFTA’s ultimate aim was to eliminate all import
duties within ASEAN by 2015. In 2003, ASEAN leaders set the goal of creating a three-pillared
ASEAN community which aimed to transform the region into a competitive stable market and
production base under the Bali Concord II. The member countries also ratified the ASEAN charter in
2008. In the area of investment, several initiatives have been put forward since 1998, such as the
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and the ASEAN Investment Initiative (AII). The most recent was
the signing of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) in February 2009, which
promised national treatment of all investments, both from the region or from outside the region.
Japan, on the other hand, had declared in principle its full support of ASEAN’s goal of
41
integrating the economies of its member-states. Japan’s assistance to ASEAN is not just a matter of
principle per se, but one of national interest. The 2010 Diplomatic Bluebook revealed the importance
of a stable and prosperous ASEAN to Japan, stating that a more closely integrated ASEAN
functioning as a hub of regional cooperation is important to the stability and prosperity of Japan.
Meanwhile, since the adoption of the ‘open-door policy’ by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has
achieved remarkable economic growth. The economic rise of China has created mixed feelings
among the members of ASEAN (Siow & Sussangkarn, 2006, p. 102). For one, there was a growing
belief that foreign investments to the region were being diverted to China. Another was that China’s
rise offered opportunities but also posed a threat. In an attempt to dissuade its neighbours from the
perceived threat it posed, especially following the diplomatic row with the Philippines over the
Spratly islands in 1995, China gradually established mutually advantageous political relationships
with Southeast Asia. In 1997, ASEAN leaders and President Jiang Zemin signed a joint statement on
“good neigbourliness” as an important policy objective for China-ASEAN relations in the 21st
century. Premier Zhu Rongji also reiterated China’s support and the increase of Chinese assistance to
the region during the 4th China-ASEAN Summit. In 2003, Chinese and ASEAN leaders signed the
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. China also acceded to the terms
of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) during the same year.
China and ASEAN have also strengthened their economic ties by concluding a wide range of
trade and industrial arrangements. In particular, bilateral trade linkages have expanded steadily
through the formation of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). These positive engagements
with ASEAN were in accordance with China’s regional diplomacy that was articulated in a 2002
report of the 16th Party Congress, which served as a guideline in building ‘good neighbourly
relationships and partnerships’ with its neighbours (Medeiros, 2009, p. 126-27). The development of
the Mekong river basin is one of the areas of cooperation between China and ASEAN that is
stipulated in the Second Plan of Action signed in October 2010 in Ha Noi.
Today, both Japan and China have bilateral economic cooperation with CLMV. The two
countries also participate in various multilateral frameworks for the development of the Mekong
subregion, for example, the ADB’s Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS) development project, which
commenced in 1992. China and Japan are also partner countries of ASEAN in implementing the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). Table 2 below summarises the trends of Chinese and
Japanese economic cooperation with CLMV, particularly in terms of trade, investments and ODA.
Table 2: Trends of Chinese and Japanese Economic Cooperation with CLMV Countries
CLMV
Economic
China
Japan
42
Cambodia
Cooperation
Export
Trade
Import
2001
34.80
205.61
4.3
2006
35.09
697.76
717.1
2010
No data
No data
694.2
2001
8,016
6,123
_
2006
120.09
81.9
2.098
2010
208.3
157.8
_
No data
No data
No data
120.21
106.25
147.46
7.46
54.41
6.4
49.65
168.72
423.2
No data
No data
607.4
843
1,428
0.735
12.3
20.5
401.5
37.5
61.8
7.04
93.7
(2000)
134.19
497.35
3.25
No data
No data
75.47
64.05
121.45
252.65
1207.4
281.2
No data
No data
5081.12
12,398
22,695
4.69
245.6
103.8
_
387.5
263.2
_
186.7
(2000)
1010.75
1804.45
_
289.8
(2005)
2486.08
7463.36
396.4
No data
69.86
30.84
46.83
No data
No data
105
316,736
216,384
163
5,295
4,124
1,453
8,144.4
8,148.2
144
87.5
(2000)
289.8
(2005)
No data
459.53
562.73
807.81
Investment
ODA
Lao PDR
Trade
Export
Import
Investment
ODA
Myanmar
Trade
Export
Import
Investment
ODA
Vietnam
Trade
Export
Import
Investment
ODA
Source: Compiled from various sources by the author.
Figures for investment are in US$ million, compiled from the ASEAN-Japan Centre
Figures for CLMV export and import from Japan (2006, 2010) are in US$ million, compiled from JETRO (2010)
Figures for CLMV export and import from Japan (2001) are in million yen, compiled from ASEAN-Japan Centre
Figures for CLMV export and import from China (2001 and 2006) are in US$ million, based on Xingmin Ying (2008, p.
27)
Figures for Japanese ODA to CLMV (2006, 2010) are in US$ million, compiled from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Online data (2011)
Figures for Japanese ODA to CLMV (2001) are in US$ million, compiled from Japan’s Official Development Assistance
White Paper 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Figures for Chinese ODA to Cambodia are not available; for others, figures are for 2000 and 2005. Compiled from
Kobayashi (2008, p. 33)
Figures for China do not include that of Hong Kong
“_” means the figure is nil, insignificant or minimal
A major caveat in the study of Chinese aid is that there is no single source of reliable aid statistics
and no single government agency is in charge of monitoring and administering Chinese economic
assistance. As such, the figures above were compiled from various sources. Unlike Japan, China has
yet to become a major source of bilateral assistance but observers have noted that Chinese aid to
Africa and Asia has recently increased (Lum, Fisher, Gomez-Granger and Leland 2009, p. 9 and
Kobayashi, 2008). Moreover, a considerable amount of Chinese aid was spent for Chinese products
in the form of foreign contract engineering companies (FCECs) and for the development of
important mining industries in the region. An example of the latter was the US$40.5 million
provided by China for the Sinh Quyen Copper Mine Project in Vietnam in 2001 (Ha Thi & Do Tien,
2008, p. 383). FCECs are “usually state-owned enterprises in China which undertake public projects
in developing countries with the help of the Chinese government” (Kagami, 2010, p. 4). The idea is
43
quite similar to Japan’s “tied aid” which was in full force in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. This means
that Chinese aid projects are awarded to Chinese contractors. In Myanmar, FCECs cover the
construction of hydropower stations. In Cambodia, the China Shanghai Construction Engineering
Group (CSCE) was the main contractor for the US$200 million construction project of the Mekong
bridge, the Tonle Sap bridge, the No. 76 highway and the No. 8 highway (Zhu, 2008, p. 76).
Japan is the largest source of ODA for CLMV. However, Japanese assistance is highly
concentrated in Vietnam: a total of US$8.7 billion dollars were allocated between 2005 and 2009 to
various projects in the country. This amount is more than twice the amount disbursed to Myanmar
and more than the combined amount of what Cambodia and Laos had received during the same
period. Vietnam has been among the top recipients of Japanese ODA since the 1990s. About 63% of
Japanese aid to both Cambodia and Laos were in the form of grants, which were used mainly for
human resource development, grassroots and infrastructural projects, while aid to Vietnam was
overwhelmingly in the form of concessional loans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This reflects
Japan’s positive assessment of Vietnam’s capacity to repay the loan. 44.7% of ODA to Myanmar, on
the other hand, was in the form of grants.
In the last few years, Japan has made huge strides in untying its grants. As of 2009, 94.8% of
Japanese aid is already untied (OECD database, 2010). This means that non-Japanese contractors
and suppliers, now have, at least in principle, an equal chance of getting projects funded by Japanese
aid in recipient countries. On the contrary, projects funded by Chinese aid have been awarded mainly
to Chinese contractors. This is understandable, considering that such a scheme serves China’s
growing economy and that China is still inexperienced in the administration of its ODA. Moreover,
as a non-member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), China
does not have to comply with its rules on the binding status of bilateral aid. In part, the improvement
in the quality of Japan’s aid can be attributed to its membership to the OECD. During the early days
of its career as a donor, a huge proportion of Japanese aid was also tied.
With the exception of Vietnam, China outstrips Japan in terms of volume of investments in
CLMV in 2009. Japanese investment in Cambodia amounted only to US$4.8 million while China’s
was US$892.7 million during the same year. Japanese investments in Laos and Myanmar were also
relatively insignificant compared to Chinese investments. Between 1988 and 2010, Japan’s
investment in Myanmar was US$204.8 million, while China’s was US$6.4 billion (ASEAN-Japan
Centre). Although Japan had a higher volume of investments in Vietnam in 2009, the gap with China
was not wide, amounting to about US$163.5 million. Aside from China, Thailand is also a huge
investor in CLMV. However, Chinese and Thai overall investments in ASEAN countries have been
relatively small compared to Japan and the United States, with a cumulative investment of about
US$55 billion and US$49 billion, respectively, between 1995 and 2006. Chinese investment during
the same period was US$3 billion.
Ueki (2010, p. 330) cites three major reasons as to why Chinese businesses have started
relocating to developing countries from the year 2000 onwards. First is the “Go Global Policy”
adopted in 1999, which encouraged Chinese firms to invest abroad. Second is the increasing cost of
doing business in China, especially in the coastal areas and the final reason is to gain access to
tertiary markets by way of the General System of Preferences and free trade agreements that are
inaccessible in China. Ueki (2010) also notes that Chinese investments in CLMV were concentrated
mainly on the primary sectors. Figure 1 below also reveals that the majority of Chinese investment
between 1995 and 2006 went to Cambodia and Vietnam, while Japanese investments, despite being
much larger in terms of volume, were mainly concentrated in Vietnam.
44
Figure 1: Chinese and Japanese Investment Flow to CLMV, 1995-2006
Source: ASEAN-Japan Centre, cited in Ueki (2008, p. 112).
In terms of trade, the volume of trade between China and Japan, on one hand, and Cambodia, Laos
and Myanmar in 2009, on the other, were relatively negligible, especially compared to the older
members of ASEAN. However, the volume of trade between CLMV and its partner countries have
continued to increase since the late 1980s. In 2008, Vietnam had a trade deficit with China of
US$11.06 billion and a trade surplus with Japan of US$0.30 billion (ASEAN, 2009, p. 16-17).
Vietnam is also the largest exporter and importer among the four, followed by Myanmar in 2006
(Ueki, 2008, p. 125). However, the overall exports of CLMV accounted for only 6.36% of the
ASEAN total while its import was 7.73% of ASEAN’s total in 2006 (Ueki, 2008, p. 122). Cambodia,
Laos and Myanmar had trade deficits with both Japan and China in 2009. China was the largest trade
partner for Myanmar, accounting for about 70% of Myanmar’s border trade in 2007 (Kudo, 2010, p.
275). This is not surprising, considering that China is an avid supporter of the military junta in
Myanmar. Moreover, China’s significance as a source of imports for CLMV has increased
considerably from 10.09% in 2000 to 18.66% in 2006 (Ueki, 2008, p. 126). There is also a
considerable increase in border trade among the Mekong countries. Such improvements in trade may
also be attributed to the infrastructural development in the Mekong area under the GMS and other
frameworks of economic cooperation in place in the subregion. Transnational roads and railroad
networks have made market access much easier and have thus promoted border trade and other
economic activities within the subregion. The remarkable increase of China’s trade with CLMV and
ASEAN in general was an outcome of several factors including the expansion of its economy, its
accession to the WTO, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, and the “Go Global” policy, among
others.
Figure 2: China/Japan/Thailand/ASEAN4* Export to and Import from CLMV in US$ million
45
2000
2007
Source: Ueki (2008, p. 140)
*ASEAN4 – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore
The Mekong Subregional Development Framework and Japanese and Chinese InstitutionBuilding Efforts
Japan and China have employed both bilateral and regional approaches in strengthening their
economic cooperation with Mekong subregion countries in general and CLMV in particular, but
Japan’s use of the latter in its Mekong policy in the 2000s has been far more extensive than China’s.
At a moment, there are three regional frameworks for the development of the Mekong river basin
countries in which Japan and China contribute either technical or financial assistance or both. These
are: 1) ASEAN’s Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI); 2) the Asian Development Bank’s Greater
Mekong Subregional (GMS) Development; and 3) the Mekong River Commission (MRC).
The ASEAN leaders launched IAI at the Fourth Informal Summit held in November 2000,
which aimed to narrow the development gap between ASEAN6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) and its newer members, CLMV. The IAI Work Plan, adopted
in Ha Noi the following year, outlined what needs to be done to rectify the development divide. Four
priority areas of implementation were identified under the Plan, namely: 1) infrastructure
development; 2) human resource development; 3) Information and Communication Technology
(ICT); and 4) regional economic integration in CLMV (ASEAN website: 2011). Japan pledged its
support for the Work Plan during the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit held in Tokyo in
46
December 2003.
The first IAI Work Plan was implemented between 2002 and 2008. A total of 258 IAI
projects were identified for implementation, 186 of which were completed as of October 2009
(ASEAN website, 2011). ASEAN6 contributed US$33.4 million for 177 IAI projects. Singapore
provided 34% of the total funding. Among the IAI dialogue partners, Japan was the largest
contributor. It funded 47 IAI projects worth US$8.08 million. South Korea was the second largest
contributor, providing funds of about US$5.1 million for 7 projects. China, on the other hand,
funded only 1 project worth US$200,000 (ASEAN website, 2011). The project was a development
study for the inland waterway improvement in CLMV. Japanese-funded projects focused mainly on
human resource development and training. The IAI Work Plan is currently on its second phase of
implementation (2009-2015).
The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme, which was launched by six GMS
countries in 1992, is a subregional economic cooperation aiming to “enhance their economic
relations, building on their shared histories and cultures, covering nine priority sectors: agriculture,
energy, environment, human resource development, investment, telecommunications, tourism,
transport infrastructure, and transport and trade facilitation” (Asian Development Bank, 2011).
China’s support and participation in GMS had been reiterated by several prominent political figures
like Mr. Qiao Shi in 1993, Vice-Premier Jiang Chungyun in 1996, President Jiang Zemin when he
signed the joint statement on “Good Neighbourliness” with ASEAN leaders in 1999, Premier Zhu
Rongji during the Fourth China-ASEAN Summit and Premier Wen Jiabao during the second
Summit of the GMS in Kunming, 2005. The Chinese government has also instituted ministerial and
summit meetings with other Mekong countries under the ADB’s GMS framework. Since 1992,
about US$11 billion worth of projects have been either completed or implemented. One very
prominent project under the GMS programme is the development of economic corridors which will
eventually link the countries of the Mekong subregion. China has committed itself to the
development of the North-South economic corridor, which will extend from Kunming, Yunnan,
China to Bangkok, Thailand via the Laos and Myanmar route, and was endorsed for implementation
in November 2002. Japan, on the other hand, has committed itself to the development of the EastWest Corridor which will extend from the Andaman Sea to Da Nang, Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established in 1995 by Thailand,
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Japan is one of the fourteen development partners contributing
financial assistance to the projects and activities of the Commission while China and Myanmar are
dialogue partners. The aim of MRC is to ensure that the development of the Mekong Region is
sustainable and to ensure "reasonable and equitable use" of the Mekong River System (Mekong
River Commission, 2011). Being the uppermost riparian state of the Mekong river basin, China’s
role in achieving or obstructing this objective is of primary significance. With the rise of China, the
Chinese government began the construction of hydropower stations in the mainstream of Lancang in
the 1990s. Several studies warned of the environmental degradation and potential inter-state conflict
that these power stations could bring, especially to downstream Mekong river basin countries (Go,
2004, Roberts, n.d.). In 2009, China vehemently denied that its hydropower stations in Yunnan were
the main cause of unusually low water levels in downstream Mekong, and that its government “pays
equal attention to the development of the Mekong and its protection” (Ma, 2009).
Aside from bilateral economic cooperation with CLMV and participating and contributing to
GMS and MRC, Japan has also been active in other development cooperation schemes with CLMV.
These include participating in 1) the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya Mekong Economic Cooperation
Strategy (ACMECS), proposed by then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2003, which
47
outlined Thailand’s economic cooperation with CLMV under the South-South Cooperation
modality; 2) the ASEAN-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC),
established in 1998 which assists in the enhancement of ASEAN’s competitive potential, the
promotion of industrial cooperation and the provision of support for its new members; and 3) the
JICA-ASEAN Regional Cooperation Meeting (JARCOM) which “is a needs-oriented project
formulation support mechanism to promote South-South Cooperation among ASEAN countries
under the technical cooperation framework of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)”.
Japan’s Mekong policy since the 2000s has been characterised by, first of all, cooperative
gestures with China through policy dialogues, which first began in 2008. In the Third Japan-China
Policy Dialogue on the Mekong region, the two sides exchanged views on the “possibility of JapanChina cooperation in the region”. The policy dialogues, however, have yet to produce a concrete
work plan to coordinate their efforts on the development of the Mekong region. Secondly, while
engaging China in a dialogue, Japan sought at the same time to establish a much more
straightforward relationship with downstream Mekong river basin countries. An important event to
this end was when former Prime Minister Koizumi held the first summit meeting with CLV in
November 2004. Japan proposed the Japan–Mekong Region Partnership Program at the third JapanCLV foreign ministers’ meeting in January 2007. This program has 3 goals and identifies 3 priority
areas for cooperation. The Partnership Program is intended 1) to enhance Japan-Mekong Region
partnership, 2) to pursue sustainable regional development, and 3) to protect and empower the
people in the river basin countries. The three priority areas include the integration of the economies
of the region, expansion of trade and investment between Japan and the region and the pursuit of
common values (such as democracy and rule of law) and common goals of the region. Moreover,
Japan also pledged to expand its aid to CLV and the region as a whole for the next three years,
commence bilateral investment agreements with Cambodia and Laos, and the holding of JapanMekong Region Ministerial Meeting.
In January 2008, the first Japan-Mekong Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was convened in Tokyo.
At the meeting, Japan pledged US$20 million from the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) for
improving ‘efficiency of logistics and distribution of the East-West Economic Corridor and Second
East–West Economic Corridor in the region’ and the holding of a senior officials’ meeting to
coordinate the projects. The ministers also endorsed 23 concrete projects for the CLV Development
Triangle. In November 2009, the first Japan–Mekong summit was held in Tokyo. At the meeting, the
leaders issued the Tokyo Declaration, in which Japan expressed its commitments of more than 500
billion yen of ODA in the next three years beginning in 2010 for further development of both hard
and soft infrastructure and environment conservation to achieve a ‘Green Mekong’. Japan introduced
the concept of ‘A Decade toward the Green Mekong’ Initiative during the third Japan-Mekong
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting that was held in Ha Noi on July 21, 2010. The Green Mekong initiative
was envisioned to ensure and maintain a Mekong that has “rich biodiversity, rich land and water
resources, high resilience to natural disasters, clean urban environment and lush greenery.”
While Japan is promoting sustainable development through the Green Mekong initiative,
China was on the defensive posture, particularly with regard to its hydropower stations in Lancang.
This prompted the Chinese delegates headed by Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao to attend the first
MRC Summit that was held in Hua Hin, Thailand on April 5, 2010. In this summit, China strongly
rejected accusations that its dams in Lancang should be blamed for low water level in lower reaches
of the river and that climate change had caused the drought. The members of the MRC concurred
and declared that all stakeholders must act to preserve and protect the river.
Since the year 2000, Japanese leaders have sought to distinguish their approach from China’s
48
with regard to Southeast Asia in general and Mekong region in particular. Although there is a marked
lack of continuity and long-term vision in Japan’s diplomatic strategy towards Asia in the postKoizumi administrations, its Asia policy has been cautiously and strategically crafted in
consideration of China’s rising prominence in the region. Japan’s preference towards bilateral
FTAs/EPAs, with reference to the ‘Green Mekong’ concept, the ‘sharing of values’ or universal
values such as rule of law and human rights in its diplomacy with Mekong countries and the East
Asian region as a whole, and with reference to the ‘arc of freedom’ of former Prime Minister Taro
Aso, exemplified its efforts to differentiate Japan’s approach toward the Mekong river basin
countries from that of China’s.
Conclusion
The emergence of new regional dynamics in East Asia in which Japan and China are both economic
powers provides opportunities and challenges for ASEAN/Southeast Asian countries. As the two
countries’ economic activities with the region intensify, ASEAN members will only stand to benefit.
For ASEAN, Chinese and Japanese economic cooperation with CLMV is necessary in order to
achieve the goal of rectifying the economic disparity between ASEAN6 and CLMV. This goal is
important to ASEAN integration and presents an opportunity for ASEAN to engage both regional
powers constructively for the development of the subregion and the Southeast Asian region as a
whole.
The Mekong subregion, particularly the Yunnan province, is China’s gateway to mainland
Southeast Asia. As such, the political and economic stability of CLMV is advantageous to China and
its expanding economy. Economic cooperation with CLMV, therefore, is aimed at promoting its
policy of ‘good neighbourliness’. For China, it is an opportunity to demonstrate the good intentions
it has towards the region in the long-term. Economic cooperation is also a way of alleviating the
notion of the so-called ‘China threat. Because the Yunnan province is part of the subregion, China is
both a beneficiary and contributor to bilateral and multilateral subregional development programmes
currently in place. China’s economic cooperation aims to stimulate economic growth in the Yunnan
province and CLMV. This is manifested by China’s emphasis in its aid to CLMV on infrastructural
projects which will link Yunnan to the rest of the countries in the region and vice versa.
As for Japan, economic cooperation with CLMV is a demonstration of its desire to remain
relevant by supporting ASEAN goals and aspirations in the belief that, in the long run, the region’s
political and economic stability will be of benefit to Japan. However, Japan has to take into account
China’s growing political and economic clout in the region in its Southeast Asia/ASEAN policy. To
some extent, Japan’s economic cooperation with CLMV aims to prevent these countries from relying
too much on Chinese economic assistance.
In terms of ODA, Japan is still undisputedly the largest source of foreign aid to CLMV,
although it was observed that China’s foreign aid has also expanded. Japan’s ODA is highly
concentrated in Vietnam while Chinese aid is almost equally distributed amongst Cambodia,
Myanmar and Vietnam. A huge proportion of Chinese aid was spent on hard infrastructure, as was
Japanese aid to Vietnam, while aid to CLM were mostly in the form of grants used for the
development of both hard and soft infrastructures. It is interesting to note that China’s aid to CLMV
was tied to Chinese contractors under the FCEC scheme. As such, Chinese aid also serves China’s
economic expansion and growth. On the other hand, Japanese aid since 1998 was 94.8% untied.
In the area of investment, China is the largest investor to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar
while Japan is Vietnam’s largest investor. A glance at the overall investment inflows to Southeast
49
Asia/ASEAN indicates that Chinese investments are dwarfed by Japanese FDIs. Japan is the single
largest investor in the region and Thailand is the largest destination of these investments. China’s
investments are actually quite insignificant when compared to Japan and US investments, but it is
still important as their investments are mainly concentrated in CLMV. As for Chinese aid,
investment from China was also in line with the country’s economic expansion and growth through
state policies like “Go Global”. Most of the Chinese investment in CLMV was in the primary sector
and was for the development of hydropower stations.
China’s trade activity with the Southeast Asian region has increased significantly since the
1990s. With regard to CLMV nations, Japanese and Chinese trade with these countries, except for
Vietnam, has been negligible in terms of volume. However, it is interesting to note that in 2009 at
least, CLMV has imported more from China than it has from Japan. Moreover, Cambodia and
Vietnam’s exports to Japan were slightly larger than their exports to China in 2009. On the other
hand, Laos’s and Myanmar’s exports to China were a bit higher than their exports to Japan during
the same period. China, in a way, has become an important source of import products for CLMV in
the 2000s, while Japan has become an important market for CLMV products.
Both countries contributed to ASEAN’s IAI and ADB’s GMS programme. Japan’s financial
contributions to IAI for 2002-2008 far outweighed China’s contributions. Another point of
comparison between Chinese and Japanese economic cooperation in CLMV is on infrastructural
development. China has declared its commitment to the development of the North-South corridor,
which will obviously serve its intention of opening up Yunnan and linking it to the economies of
CLMV nations and granting access to the Andaman and South China Sea. On the other hand, Japan
has declared its commitment to the development of the East-West corridors which will link Thailand
and Vietnam, the largest destination of Japanese FDI and foreign aid, respectively, in the region.
Finally, in its efforts to strengthen ties with CLMV in a more straightforward manner, Japan
has resorted to ‘minilateralism’ by institutionalising the Japan-CLV foreign ministers’s meeting and
the Japan-Mekong Region Partnership. In doing so, Japan will be able to influence development
efforts in CLV based on its own preferences and outside the IAI, ASEAN and GMS framework.
China’s economic cooperation efforts geared towards resource and market-seeking are represented
by the economy’s continuing growth and expansion, as is reflected in the “Go Global” policy, the
prominence of Chinese contractors and suppliers in its economic aid, and its huge investments in
CLMV’s primary and energy sectors. Meanwhile, the innovativeness in Japan’s economic
cooperation with CLMV is demonstrated in its emphasis on the ‘Green Mekong’ initiative, its
absorption of CLMV’s export products, its emphasis on sustainable development, initiatives from
AMEICC, and its promotion of “common values”. Moreover, domestic factors such as public debts,
the strength of the yen, the issue of financial and pension reforms, and the rehabilitation of the
Tohoku region after the March 11 disaster may cause Japanese policymakers to scale down its
financial assistance further, not just to CLMV but to other countries and regions as well.
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Longing for a “Gender-Open Japan”: Filipino Yaoi and BL Fans”: Imaginations of
Contemporary Japanese Gender and Sexual Norms
53
By Tricia Abigail Santos Fermin
Abstract
Yaoi and Boys Love (BL) are umbrella terms often used interchangeably to refer to
romantic genres of manga, animation and text-based fiction (e.g. short stories and
novels). What makes yaoi and BL particularly curious and controversial is its
seemingly subversive stance towards heteronormative gender standards: their
storylines revolve mainly around love relationships between beautiful boys. The
emergence of the Internet facilitated introduction and global spread of these genres all
over the world, including Southeast Asia. This paper discusses Filipino fans
imaginations of Japanese society’s gender and social norms through their
consumption, reception and production of the said genres. Using supporting data
gathered from key informant interviews, participant observation in Filipino yaoi and
BL fan activities, as well as Filipino fanfiction analysis, I will show that due to
similar experiences of patriarchy in the Philippines and Japan, the yaoi genre acts as
an erotic media and masturbatory fantasy for women. However, differences in social
and cultural contexts lead them to associate yaoi and BL with issues of homosexuality
and sympathy towards LGBT social conditions and causes, an attitude divergent from
most of their Japanese counterparts. Many Filipino fans unfamiliar with the actual
gender order in Japanese society take these readings as representations of a very
tolerant Japanese society in terms of gender and sexual norms. Consequently, their
consumption and participation in yaoi and BL fan activities become a simulation and
an expression of their longing to be part of this “Gender-Open and Free Japan”.
Longing for a “Gender-Open Japan”: Filipino Yaoi and BL Fans’ Imaginations of
Contemporary Japanese Gender and Sexual Norms
54
Tricia Abigail Santos Fermin
Graduate School of Human Sciences
Osaka University
Introduction
Yaoi and Boys’ Love (henceforth referred to as BL) are considered as one of the most curious genres
to have originated from Japanese popular culture. Yaoi and BL are umbrella terms often used
interchangeably to refer to romantic genres of manga, animation and text-based fiction such as short
stories and novels, the storyline of which revolves mainly around the love relationships between
beautiful boys. While there is still much debate within the fan community as to the precise
definitions of these genres, the main difference, however, seems to be based on the question of
original authorship. Yaoi usually refers to fan-produced parodies or adaptations of original visual or
text-based fiction, many of them taking the form of self-published amateur manga (yaoi dōjinshi) or
novels (yaoi noberu). Fan artists and writers appropriate characters and settings from original
mainstream works and imagine alternative scenes or reinterpretations of the official story. Yaoi
stories highlight two male characters, who were not originally involved with each other romantically
but somehow share a strong bond (e.g. friendship, rivalry or even hatred). Fan writers use this
connection as a basis for reinterpreting them indulging in a homoerotic relationship.
On the other hand, BL is often used to refer to original, commercially-produced, mostly lighthearted stories that can either be in visual (e.g. anime, live action drama series and movies) or text
form (e.g. manga, novels). While it deals with a wide spectrum of relationships, from the seemingly
platonic to the sexual, yaoi and BL have gained a notorious reputation as a highly pornographic
genre. However, yaoi and BL are also particularly interesting because of its mainly female
heterosexual authorship and audience. Rather than being a gay genre, as what most people who first
encounter yaoi and BL readily assure, it was developed by women and produced today primarily for
and by women.
Yaoi and BL have formed a significant subculture in Japan, emerging from the dōjinshi
(amateur self-published works such as comics and novels) markets in the 1980s. Yaoi is immensely
popular, not just in the semi-annual Tokyo Comic Market, but also in other regional and local comic
markets in various parts of the country. These dōjinshi markets form the core of Japanese yaoi and
BL fan activities. Seeing the commercial potential of the genre based on its demand and sales
performance in amateur comic markets, several publications devoted to the genre were created in the
mid-1980s. These publications opened the genre to a wider audience and now enjoy an established
readership.
In the 1990s, the Internet and intensifying global flows brought about largely by the rapid
development of communications technology facilitated the international spread and popularity of
Japanese popular culture and the various fan and subcultural activities that come along with it. Yaoi
and BL, while still considered to be minor, have established a loyal fan following all over the world,
with documented fan activities in Asia, the United States and Europe.
However, it is increasing in popularity, the question remains as to why it is popular among
certain demographics in various countries. Given that yaoi and BL as an aesthetic and literary
expression was developed within and as a reaction to Japan’s restrictive patriarchal controls on
women’s sexuality, explanations of the Japanese case may not necessarily hold true in other socio-
55
cultural context. A text’s meaning and significance changes relative to the experiences and situation
of its specific audience. I will argue that by examining cross-cultural appropriations of popular
culture genres that are considered controversial and transgressive such as yaoi and BL, we may be
able to uncover the similarities and differences in the dynamics of social institutions between two
societies, as well as the possible influences and changes that may be faced by the appropriating
group and the society it is embedded in.
Objective
This paper discusses Filipino fans’ imaginations of Japanese society’s gender and social norms
through their consumption, reception and production of the said genres. I will argue that due to
similar experiences of patriarchy in the Philippines and Japan, the yaoi genre acts as an erotic media
and masturbatory fantasy for women in both societies. However, differences in social and cultural
contexts between Japan and the Philippines lead Filipino fans to associate yaoi and BL with issues of
homosexuality and sympathy towards LGBT social condition and causes, an attitude divergent from
most of their Japanese counterparts. Many Filipino fans not familiar with the actual gender order in
Japanese society take these readings as representations of a very tolerant Japanese society in terms of
gender and sexual norms, which may not be in line with the realities of Japan. Consequently, their
consumption and participation in yaoi and BL fan activities become a simulation and an expression
of their longing to be part of this “Gender-Open and Free Japan.”
Data Collection and Methodology
I collected data from three main sources, starting from March 2009 until September 2010. First, I
conducted focus interviews with a total of 27 self-ascribed yaoi and BL fans. Second, I engaged in
participant-observation activities of fan activities and gatherings, in particular through regular
“fangirling sessions” or “fan talk,” where I met my informants to talk about yaoi and BL either faceto-face or online, and by joining the Lights Out Yaoi Convention held annually in Manila. Lastly, I
conducted an analysis of yaoi fanfiction. I examined 82 yaoi and BL short stories written by 12
active Filipino fanfiction writers, three of which also served as my key interviewees, while the other
nine were writers I have encountered through Fanfiction.net, one of the main sites where fans can
read or post fanfiction from a wide range of television programmes and genres for public viewing
and critique.
A Common Experience of Patriarchy and Heteronormativity: Similarities in the Two Fandoms
From the onset of my research, it was apparent that Filipino fans shared many similar features with
Japanese fans in terms of motivational forces behind their engagement in yaoi fan activities and the
discourses about female desire that pervades the subculture. There have been many explanations
suggested as to the attractions of Yaoi and BL for its Japanese fans, and as the results of this study
showed, many of these Filipino fans share commonalities.
Studies asserting that yaoi and BL are at times used as a means to explore sexual desire in a
non-threatening, non-objectifying manner have been echoed by Filipino fans. Nagakubo for one,
asserts the importance of yaoi and BL as an erotic media that can function as a kind of “educational
book” (kyōyōhon) on sex and love for women (Nagakubo, 2007, p. 147). In a society where sexual
pleasure is deemed to be something that is given or even forced on women rather than sought for
56
oneself (Hori, 2009, p. 196), there is a lack of a medium or other forms of expression to help women
affirm their sexual desires and drives, unlike the case of men. Attempting to actively seek sexual
pleasure for oneself is considered as an immoral act (Nagakubo, 2007, p. 147).
Such is the reality that is also faced by Filipino women. While men are allowed more sexual
freedom and there is greater tolerance for premarital sexual activity, women, on the other hand, are
expected to control and set limits on male sexuality. Philippine society continues to uphold the value
of hiya or shame, and this strongly influences many aspects of female behaviour, especially in the
sexual realm (Upadhyay, Hintin, & Gultiano, 2006, p. 111). Furthermore, the Catholic teaching of
the procreative and uniting purposes of sexual intercourse that pervade discourses on sex and
marriage provides a religious and moral basis for the social controls on female desire in the largely
Christian Philippines.
Women who actively seek sexual pleasure are stigmatised as being lustful, as being people
who have a “disordered desire for, or inordinate enjoyment of sexual pleasure,” because sexual
pleasure is deemed to be “morally disordered when sought for itself and isolated from its procreative
and unitive purposes” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 2351). Laws and policies concerning
the definition of pornography and obscenity are also much stricter in the Philippines than in Japan,
where even depictions of foreplay, or even nudity, are prohibited for as long as a material as a whole
appeals to prurient interests. Thus, in this way, traditional values, religion and the law all conflate to
strictly control female sexuality in the Philippines.
And indeed, based on observations on fan talk among my informants, as well as during the
yaoi convention, yaoi and BL’s primary function and significance for individual fans is as
masturbatory fantasy. In other words, the affirmation of their sexual desires and the exploration of
sexual fantasies through pairing their favorite male anime, manga or game characters is the main
reason for their fandom. Filipino yaoi fans would interchangeably use the terms yaoi, porn or in fan
parlance, “(gay) porn” to refer to the genre. The focus of many fan discussions on why Character A
is said to be “so into” Character B, the discussions on what makes a scene “hot” and “sexy,” and the
“reality” (or lack thereof) in depictions of male-to-male sexual intercourse in yaoi and BL are very
telling signs that point to the use of the genre as a form of female erotica.
However, why exactly does it necessarily have to be this particular kind of male-to-male,
manga or animated erotica? Many theories of the Japanese fandom which illustrate the various
trajectories of female desire are also applicable to the Philippine case. Firstly, unlike heterosexual
erotica or pornography where the focus is on the female body and its portrayal is largely passive,
yaoi and BL mostly use a bird’s eye view or third person omniscient perspective (Hori, 2009, p. 182)
and shows not just the uke receiving pleasure, but also illustrates the face of the seme feeling
pleasure as he gives it (Mori, 2007, p. 80). This is coupled with an androgynous aesthetic which
better enables the reader or writer/artist to empathise, project or imagine herself as either the passive
or active side, as she pleases. Secondly, the emphasis on narrativity, character settings, and most of
all, the inextricable link between the deep bonds of love and sexual intercourse between the couple,
does away with the problem of objectification found in most heterosexual pornography.
These are also part of the attraction for Filipino yaoi fans. More conservative informants
have spoken of their discomfort when watching live action pornography, both heterosexual and
homosexual ones, which I suggest is mainly due to their internalisation of the feminine norms of
purity and sexual innocence. However, when they claim that with yaoi, at least the characters are just
“drawings” and are thus, merely imaginary, in their perception, it somehow mitigates the supposed
immorality of watching and/or reading yaoi. In addition, the majority of more liberally-minded
informants have professed a dislike and irritation for heterosexual erotica or pornography mainly
57
because of the “noisiness of female moaning noises” and how “sex seems to follow the same pattern
every time and everywhere”. All Filipino fans agree that what is more important is the story and how
the development of the characters and/or relationship is depicted. For them, while depictions of
sexual intercourse between characters is not absolutely necessary, unless it is vital to the plot. As
such, it becomes quite apparent that Filipino fans have problems with the passivity and
objectification of female characters that abound in most heterosexual romance and pornography, and
have thus found an alternative erotica in yaoi and BL.
Other kinds of female pleasures are being explored through yaoi in these two societies,
particularly those which do not fall neatly into the categories set forth by heteronormative standards.
Lesbian informants’ testimonies in the preceding chapter of how yaoi and BL served for them as
romantic fantasies that helped them affirm and develop their homosexual desires, as well as stories
that they can relate to, echo the themes of yaoi and BL as spaces for the development of queer, in
particular lesbian, sexual identities as asserted by Welker (2006). For example, those with
transgender desires, such as those who feel like they wish to imagine who it must feel like to violate
a man, or to “mount a man” have resonances among fans in both societies. There are also those who
get aroused by male-on-male sexual activities, and most cases in the Philippines have shown this
trend. As has been mentioned, this points to us the more complex nature of human desire: that one’s
biological gender should predetermine the gender of the subject/object of one’s desire is essentialist,
militates a repressive vision of female sexuality as one that always culminate in heterosexual sex and
sexual fantasies (Vincent, 2007, p. 72). And in this case, they are also radical and transgressive in
that sense.
Thus, while we can say that it is transgressive because it defies traditional ideas and norms
set on females, the undertones that this one has are not only moral, but also it has some legal
repercussions, as was mentioned in previous chapters. I suppose this should not be so surprising as
yaoi is a genre that was created as a reaction towards patriarchy and the pure and passive feminine
ideals it engenders. Yaoi and BL do seem to be quite relevant as a genre and form of expression for
women who experience similar patriarchal restrictions of gender and sexuality.
Main Differences: The Distinguishing Characteristics of the Filipino Yaoi Fandom
Another condition, Thorn suggested, for a social context to be considered as ripe for a yaoi and BL
fandom to take root in is fans’ abstract notions of homosexuality. He argues that one of the main
thrills of the genre is also based on this and a sense of taboo violation as they indulge in stories of
male-on-male romantic love. However, “homosexual” and “homosexuality” are such contentious
terms because of their differing perceptions and usage not only across but also among differing
social groups within a culture. And it is in these different ways of understanding that, I argue, spells
a great difference in attitudes towards male homosexuals and homosexuality between the Japanese
and Philippine yaoi fandoms.
A Clear and Unequivocal Association with a Gay Gender Identity
One major difference and distinguishing trait I have observed that the Philippine yaoi fandom has is
that most Filipino fans seem to make a clear, direct and unequivocal association between male
homosexuality and the sexual orientation of the couples featured in yaoi works. Clearly absent in
Filipino yaoi fan discourses and fan works are the often-heard and rather defensive assertions from
Japanese fans that characters are “not gay, but one who loves the other for who he is,” or that the
58
characters and the romance featured in such works are merely “fantasy”: that they are different from
“real gays,” and that their “homo (meaning, homosexual characters) are not gay” (Ishida, 2007b, p.
114). Most Filipino fans, at first, have difficulties comprehending such assertions. Filipino fans
would also argue that yaoi is indeed a romantic fantasy.
However, for them, the “fantastic elements” lie in the way that most of the situations
presented in the stories are highly improbable, and that the depictions of homosexual acts and
relationships are very much idealised mainly because of their lack of knowledge of such realities.
Nonetheless, none of my informants denied that these characters are either homosexual or gay, or
that the sexual relationship shared by yaoi characters takes reference and points to male
homosexuality existing in the real world. The centrality of the term “gay” and the idea of “gayness”
in Filipino yaoi fan discourse attest to this direct association. Many fans endearingly refer to the yaoi
genre as “gay porn” or “gay love.” While the works and fan fiction in themselves would rarely use
the term “gay” to describe the characters, they would in descriptions or in a synopsis of the story, or
when debating about certain couplings when engaging in fan talk: What makes them gay? What are
the signs in which episodes or chapter of a work that makes you say that he is so into him?
It may be argued that there may be a difference in the process in which Japanese and Filipino
fans reinterpret a story and turn it into a yaoi narrative, causing this divergence. In her discussion on
the yaoi genre’s romanticisation and sexualisation of homosocial relationships in original shōnen
manga works, Azuma notes that Japanese yaoi fangirls interpret the development of close male
homosocial ties in a way similar to the way most people tend to romanticise or sexualise very close
heterosexual friendships, thinking that the movement from close friends to lovers is a “natural
development” in a relationship (Azuma, 2009, p. 270). However, Filipino fans also do see the fine
line between homosocial and heterosexual ties and conduct their interpretation games in a similar
way, as Azuma points out. And even if a difference does exist, this still does not explain why a
character’s eventual indulgence in a male homosexual relationship should be equated with a male
homosexual identity and thus assert that the couple is “gay” by Filipino fans when Japanese fans do
not necessarily do so.
I argue that Filipino yaoi fans’ exposure and location in a context where male homosexuals
and their same-sex desires are realities openly seen and discussed in society, as well as Western-style
gay identity discourses and LGBT gender politics have become widespread and mainstream brought
about this direct association with yaoi and “gay.” And the absence of such conditions in the Japanese
context would spell out the difference in the attitudes towards male homosexuality and homosexuals
between the two fandoms.
In the realm of gender identity politics, to see and assert oneself as gay is “to adhere to a
distinctly modern invention, namely the creation of an identity and a sense of community based on
(homo)sexuality” (Altman, 1997, p. 423). Using Altman’s definition, when we speak of men who
have a “gay sexual identity,” our focus here is on men who have a consciousness and politics related
to their same-sex desires and sexuality. The formation of this identity and eventually the
establishment of gay gender politics is said to be weak in Japanese society, and McLelland (2000a,
2000b) attributes this to the absence of media images that realistically represent male homosexuality,
as well the tolerant attitude Japanese society supposedly has towards homosexual acts, as long as
they do not compromise the institutions of the state and family. Tan et.al. (Altman, 1997, p. 425-7)
have suggested that the absence of hostility towards homosexuality found in Western societies may
also retard the development of gay political movements, and in extension, I would argue, the
establishment of distinct identities based on a gay identity.
The Philippines, along with the rest of Southeast Asia, has often been considered as one of
59
the most tolerant societies towards homosexuality. In fact, the traditional spaces Philippine society
provide for people who exhibit same-sex desire and engage in homosexual acts as categories of
sexual identity that have endured even amidst Christianisation in the 16th century would attest to this.
However, such identities, such as the bakla of the Tagalogs, bayot for the Visayans (Hart, 1968) and
bantut among the people of Jolo (Johnson, 1997) to name a few, have mostly been associated with
transgender elements and have often been considered as a “third sex” category. Thus, these groups
are generally deemed as men who exhibit characteristics typically attributed to women, and deep
inside feel that they are women. Their same-sex desire is considered as a desire to be the opposite
sex: that is, to love a man as a woman. Because of their specific positioning in these traditional
cultures as “not men,” other men who engage in sexual acts with the bakla, bayot or bantut are not
questioned about their sexual orientation, nor branded as homosexuals.
However, despite the tolerance of traditional society, these groups of people have been
continuously stigmatised based on the largely Catholic sensibilities that have pervaded most
Philippine culture. The Catholic Church views homosexual acts as “acts of grave depravity,” and the
Catholic tradition has always declared that such acts are “intrinsically disordered” because they run
contrary to natural law, and that “[u]nder no circumstances can they be approved” (Catechism of the
Catholic Church, n. 2357). And with the Catholic Church wielding its great influence not only on the
cultural lives of the people but also in the political sphere, such a view has become the ideal and
norm that people are expected to live by. Thus, there seems to be a tension or contradiction that
exists in Philippine society: that while the existence of traditional categories of homosexuality are
tolerated, they can never be fully accepted and thus their existence will always be relegated to the
margins of society because of their supposed abnormal nature. Homophobia in the Philippines exists
in its mildest forms through teasing, while on the other end of the spectrum there have been reported
cases of physical violence, at times resulting to death, at its worst.
Such a condition is deemed fertile for the formation of communities with a politically-driven
identity based on sexuality and same-sex desire to fight for political rights and reform. As such,
when discourses from the 1970s Gay Rights Movement in America, Australia and Western Europe
were adopted by middle-class Filipino gay activists, they used it to find each other and build a
community and identity around a similar sexual orientation, eventually fighting for certain political
ends (Altman, 1999, p. 420-1). Gay communities were established in the next few decades and
eventually reached enough critical mass to surface in mainstream political discourse.
Many of these Filipino yaoi fans, the older ones in particular, grew up and matured in this
environment and have been exposed not only to a wide variety of identities based on same-sex desire,
but also to these middle-class sexual political discourses that have equated a specific sexual
orientation with a particular lifestyle and “gay” identity. As such, the love and desire that
characterise the bond between two male characters and the depictions of homosexual intercourse that
they encounter in yaoi and BL have been perceived as being unmistakably gay for Filipino fans. And
as seen in some of my informants’ experiences, even showing an interest in homosexuality and
homosexual relationships is in itself considered as indicative of a homosexual orientation. However,
this exposure and attraction that they have experienced with depictions of male-to-male love through
yaoi and BL, according to my informants, have made them more curious and want to learn more
about homosexuality in whatever way they can.
A Friendly and Sympathetic Stance with the LGBT Community
This leads me to my next point. Another divergence I have noticed from the attitudes of the Japanese
60
fandom is that Filipino fans generally have a friendlier and even sympathetic attitude towards
homosexuals. As we have seen in previous chapters, because of this direct association they have
made between yaoi and the “gay” identity and culture, fans have related how the genre encouraged
them to open their eyes towards homosexuality and dispel their prejudices towards it. As result,
many of them have reached out and are currently sharing very good friendships with gays in their
schools or places of work. Some of them are open supporters of gay rights and do volunteer work for
LGBT groups. Others use fan fiction and other works to explore the emotional issues of having
homosexual relationships in a homophobic society, or to defend homosexuality against moral
arguments. I suppose that because fans feel a certain bond with homosexuals in terms of having a
desire to liberate themselves sexually from the strict, male-centred discourses of morality and
propriety in mainstream Filipino society, they feel a great deal of sympathy and at times,
identification with them. As we can see, the case in Japan is quite different, where scholars of queer
studies scholars have criticise many of its fans for their detachment and disinterest, and their
occasional homophobic tendencies (Ishida, 2007a, 2007b). Some Filipino fans I have interviewed
know about this situation in Japan and expressed their disappointment about the general attitude of
Japanese yaoi and BL fans’ attitudes towards “real homosexuals.”
Of course, this is not to say that none of the Filipino fans out there subscribe to the “I’m not
gay, I just like you” mentality that pervades Japanese yaoi and BL fan discourse, or that none of
them make homophobic remarks or have tendencies towards homophobia. In fact, in my encounters
with Filipino yaoi fans during my fieldwork, there was one who mentioned that she subscribed to the
said way of thinking, and that being an open bisexual herself, she thinks that gender labels are moot.
I also met another who spoke negatively against the raucousness and gossip culture that she sees as
characteristic of bakla culture among her co-workers, in an attempt to describe the differences of
homosexuality portrayed in the world of yaoi and BL, as opposed to the real world. However, there
are few such people in proportion to the rest of the Filipino fujoshi population, and are the
exceptions rather than the rule.
An Acute Form of “Ultimate Love”
For the Japanese, yaoi is deemed to be an “Ultimate Love Fantasy,” a place where its largely
heterosexual audience seeks and finds stories of pure and ideal love relationships (Fujimoto, 2007, p.
64). Illouz (1997) asserts that romantic love in general has always been observed as a subversive
force. She further notes that the various figures that haunt people’s romantic imagination “affirm the
inalienable rights of passion, defy the normal arrangements and divisions by gender, class or national
loyalties”; it has always been imbued with an aura of transgression while being elevated to the status
of supreme value (Illouz, 1997, p. 8). In the case of yaoi and BL, it is evident that the love shared by
its male protagonists challenge current ideas and rules of kinship, which are considered to be
essential regulatory mechanisms in any social group. By presenting narratives about men pursuing
romantic and sexual relationships with other men, it questions the assumption that sociallysanctioned sexual love and unions have to be heterosexual.
It also questions the biological basis and moral ideologies that support the structure deemed
essential in order to sustain the continued existence of such a group. In other words, indulgence in or
the mere consumption of romantic love narratives exposes the artificialities of the rules that govern a
group. It pushes the limits of such rules that maintain a particular society. The imagination and
engagement in romantic love, thus, could be said to be evidence of an individual’s agency and free
61
choice with regard to social control and expectations. And in yaoi and BL discourse, the
relationships imagined here do away with many structural inequalities and shows us both literally
and metaphorically that it is possible to choose a lover for all he or she is and be regarded as an
equal.
Yaoi and BL stories written by Filipino fan writers and the pleasures that come in the
consumption of both Japanese and non-Japanese yaoi works are also in line with the “Ultimate Love
Fantasy” discourse. However, I would suggest that the longing for supreme love among Filipino
fujoshi is more intense, if we look at the two related themes that frequently occur in their fantasies,
compared to their Japanese counterparts.
First of these is the sub-theme of sacrifice and “going the distance.” While, of course, this is
not to say that these do not crop up in Japanese yaoi and BL stories, Filipino fujoshi narratives
centring on such themes mainly depict couples fighting for their love within a heteronormative
setting. Yaoi and BL works in Japan mostly situate their couples in environments in rather isolated
settings, mostly in settings where their homoerotic affairs, if made public, are generally left
unquestioned. While many Filipino stories also follow this convention, what I find striking is that if
and when the couples are situated in settings that include other people, the protagonists often express
anxiety, at the very least, about the prospect of being found out that they are romantically interested
or involved not just with this particular person, but with another man.
If the story is based on the perspective of another character outside of the couple, more often
than not there will be expressions of disbelief or disconcertedness if the character is male or fujoshilike curiosity if the character is female. Of course, the outcome would be different depending on
whether the author has set the story in a gender-open environment or not. However, the point I am
suggesting is that such anxieties expressed by the characters is a reflection of the strong and open
homophobia that exists in the environment of the author and that which she seeks to struggle against.
And given such settings, the couple usually has to respond in a manner which expresses that they
should be willing to face possible public embarrassment or homophobic persecution and make
sacrifices in order to express their love for each other. I would argue that this specific trait and
difference is brought about by Filipino fujoshis’ easy association between yaoi and BL couples’
relationships with homosexuality, and their acute awareness of the moral stigma and homophobia
that they need to hurdle in order to consummate their love.
Second is that Filipino fujoshi fantasies defy at times some of the conventions originally set
by the Japanese fandom, particularly those pertaining to faithful depictions of character personalities
and settings. Unlike yaoi dōjinshi in Japan, which interprets the practice of coupling as presenting
their own theories for the pairing of choice (Azuma, 2009), a good number of Filipino fans would at
times present their stories by placing couples in different settings and in so doing demonstrate that
no matter what point in space and/or time they are in, that the coupling would work; how the
“essence” of their characters and their purity of love means that they would always be meant for
each other despite changes in setting. It is for this reason that many of the Alternate Universe (AU),
Reincarnation Stories and Crossover fanfiction were made or discussed during “fangirling sessions”
as one of the ways they could imagine the timelessness of their coupling’s love relationship. A
possible explanation for this is that Filipino fujoshi have picked up and followed English language
fanfiction writing conventions, which include such categories. If Japanese yaoi fans take the
metaphor of carnal relations as the consummation of the highest level of love between two people,
then we could say that Filipinos take this idealisation a further step by showing placing it in space
and time.
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Organised Fandom as a Simulation and Longing for a “Gender-Open Japan”
In addition to the content and reception of yaoi and BL works, there is also a considerable difference
in the way fans organise themselves and the significance of their activities in relation to Japanese
and Philippine society.
An important point here is that if we are to consider female homosociality as one of the
prevalent desires that characterise the yaoi and BL fan community, the formation and growth of the
genre is greatly influenced by gender segregation within Japanese society. Ueno observes that that
yaoi and BL are the sexual fantasies of highly gender-differentiated societies, and predicts that the
genre, along with the rest of the otaku culture, would be widespread and popular in societies with the
same background (Ueno, 2009, p. 35). However, the Philippine case poses several questions to such
theories. For one, while sex-based segregation does exist in the Philippines, especially in terms of
occupational and wage differentials, such segregation does not translate to exclusion from
participation in the public sphere, which is said to be one of the main causes of weak female
homosocial bonds. In fact, in terms of quantitative indicators of female educational, labour and
political participation such as the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index, the Philippines far
outranks Japan in terms of equality in participation in the public sphere. However, yaoi and BL fan
fantasies and communities still exist in such a society. Furthermore, the yaoi and BL events in the
Philippines, while still largely female, are not fully and intentionally homosocial gatherings. It also
does not exclude possibilities of heterosexuality. In fact, it greatly welcomes heterosexual male
participants, whether as an observer or active participant, as long as they respect the interests of the
rest of the female participants within the play frame. Yaoi and BL events actually seek to encourage
understanding and bonding between heterosexual couples by giving the men the opportunity to learn
more about the interests of the woman that he is interested in. Thus, given such community
experiences, it would be quite difficult to apply Azuma’s theory and assume that female desire for
male homosocial bonding would be also be the primary form of desire that characterises Filipino
yaoi desire and the fan community.
Instead of examining it from the perspective of homosocial desire, it would be more
profitable if we were to examine the yaoi and BL fandom in the Philippines as part of the global
otaku culture and and derive the meanings Filipino fans attach to Japanese culture. Anime and
manga have been introduced and marketed in the Philippines as “Japanese” since the 1990s, and
have heightened the curiosity and imaginations of the many youths who became fans of the country
that generated these products.
In my encounters with Filipino fujoshi, and even as I reflect on my own experiences and
feelings as a follower of Yaoi and otaku culture in the Philippines, I have observed that Filipinos in
general imagine Japan as an exotic, “gender-open” and radical society and culture. In my key
informant interviews and participant-observation in yaoi and BL fan activities, I have observed that
most of my informants spoke of a Japan that they believe to be “open” and liberal, particularly in
terms its gender and sexual norms. All my informants related to me that their impression of Japanese
society and culture is that homosexuality is openly practiced in Japan, as depicted in yaoi and BL.
Those who have studied more about Japanese society would have learnt that in reality,
gender norms there are actually quite different from what they may seem. Four of my informants
who have travelled to Japan for studies or work were able to see the difference between reality and
the Japan depicted in yaoi and BL media.
What is worth noting here is the assumptions these Filipino fujoshi made about Japan being
“open,” or having a generally liberal attitude towards the construction of queer sexual identities,
63
based primarily on the existence of a massive industry of media products containing levels of
violence, sexual activity and gender-bending levels not seen in their own country. They believe
Japan to be open and radical towards such issues, when its abundance and easy access of sexually
explicit, violent or supposedly “morally objectionable” material is juxtaposed with the strict
regulations and access Philippine law and society imposes on such media. And based on this, I
suggest that through their active consumption and participation in yaoi and BL fan activities, Filipino
fujoshi are attempting to construct a simulacrum of Japan based on its global mediascapes and
appropriated otaku fan practices. In this sexually and gender-open Japan, they are able to freely
experiment with their sexuality and express their feelings and convictions with like-minded
individuals. Thus, it is evident here that one of the desires present among the Filipino fandom is a
desire for a “yaoi and BL Japan,” a Mecca of gender-bending and colourful transgressions that they
hope to participate in at least once in their lives, an ideal that the fandom strives to simulate to
provide refuge for its fans until they are able to act out this dream.
The issue of authenticity of many practices and fan resources in the fandom, thus, comes to
play an important role. In order to make their constructed and imagined Japan as real as possible,
those who possess knowledge, material and resources originating from the Japanese fandom are
considered to be important and are possible leaders in the community. Because of this, those who are
proficient in the Japanese language and can read and write in the original Japanese of yaoi and BL
works, and thus, access the latest information regarding the fandom and who own actual yaoi
dōjinshi or BL manga in the original Japanese are well-respected within the community. However,
on the other hand, it also at times becomes a point of contention as well as a source of in-group
subordination among fans.
Concluding Remarks
From the preceding arguments, it becomes apparent that the Filipino yaoi and BL fandom, like its
Japanese counterpart, is significant in Philippine society as it provides a means for women to explore
and develop themselves as sexual agents amidst their location in a patriarchal social system. It
provides the tools and spaces through which women from both societies can temporarily remove
themselves from androcentric society’s regimentation of their sexuality and be free to confront,
explore and realise their desires in a non-threatening and distanced manner. It also allows them to reimagine ways of constructing gender through the various experimentations they make through fan
fiction, dōjinshi, fan talk, cosplay and other gender-bending activities they engage in. But despite its
transgressive and resistant nature, in-group politics and subjugation is a given, which indicates that
these subcultures are also groupings in which similar or different types of social subordination may
occur.
However, because of the open existence of LGBTs and their subsequent politicisation in the
Philippines, the yaoi and BL genre was immediately connected to homosexuality and homosexual
issues. Here, the Philippine fandom is significant in its difference from the Japanese case in that it is
mostly sympathetic and supportive of LGBT issues, along with their more acute idealisation of male
homoerotic romance, a love against all odds—a “more supreme” or “more ultimate” than the
Japanese idea of “ultimate love” in yaoi and BL. Lastly, the yaoi and BL fandom, when viewed from
the context of the otaku fandom, is said to form images of and simulate a “gender-open Japan,” a
world which many of these fans long for and strive towards.
So what happens when a genre such as yaoi and BL, which emerged from a specific sociohistorical context, is circulated in global space, and picked up by a non-Japanese audience? My
64
research largely confirms the point McLelland made in his comparison of Japanese and English
language yaoi and BL websites: that we will see that many groups of women around the world share
similar sexual fantasies, and that yet the rhetorical space they occupy in their transgressions could
never be more different. This is definitely the case, as audiences bring in their socio-cultural
resources and baggage with them in their reading and interpretation of other cultural texts. However,
I would suggest that future considerations of the globalisation of the yaoi and BL phenomenon
include the genre’s contextualisation in the larger Japanese popular culture fandom from which it
stems. Doing so will provide a more nuanced understanding as to the other desires that exist in this
genre, especially with reference to an exoticised Other. And as the case of the Filipino fujoshi reveals,
one such desire is to be a part of an attractive, gender-open and permissive Japan.
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Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 31(3), 841-70.
Performing the Nation: Representing Japanese Nationalism(s) in the NHK’s Taiga Dramas
By Hansley A. Juliano
Ateneo de Manila University
66
Abstract
Contemporary representations of events and personages from the late Tokugawa era
and the early Meiji era as presented in the NHK’s annual taiga dramas continue to
reproduce undercurrents of nostalgia for the modernised-yet-traditional Japanese
ethos following the wakon-yōsai ("Japanese spirit, Western techniques") ethic of
modernity and industrialisation. They continue to traverse the fine line between an
official “political nationalism” which marks its uniqueness as its contribution to the
global-international community, and its spirit of "cultural nationalism" which harks
back to the rich imperial and pre-modern cultural/societal norms of Japanese society
(and its many extremist manifestations). My study analyses two dramas:
Shinsengumi! (新選組!, 2003) and Ryōmaden (龍馬伝, 2010), which were chosen
based on their contemporary time period and their portrayal of similar characters and
events. Comparing and contrasting the portrayals would exhibit a consistency of
upholding a particular image of Japanese history which emphasises, in many ways,
the nihonjinron way of thinking that highlights the uniqueness of the Japanese ethos
vis-à-vis other worldviews. This valorisation, in a way, is also complicit with the
reproduction of a Japanese self-image that underlies its alleged integration into the
global political setup, while simultaneously subverting Orientalist perceptions of
Japanese uniqueness.
“Uniquely Japanese” in an Age of Nationalism(s)
Imaging Japan as a country and its position in the world continues to be a contested terrain of
discourse within different sections of Japanese society. A majority of the literature employed in the
identification and interpretation has this tendency to emphasise the uniqueness of Japanese society,
and how its participation in the world should therefore be marked by this continuing uniqueness and
valorisation of the supposedly singular way by which Japan was able to make its mark as a country
in Asia which can stand toe-to-toe with other developed and civilised countries. The discourse of
Japanese nationalism, by virtue of its emergence and development in the context its desire to be held
as an equal by the Great Powers of the late 19th century as well as its desire to maintain its integrity
as an Asian nation (Benner, 2006, p. 37) opens spaces for determining what constitutes Japanese
identity as it is. However, it would perhaps be important to note that the usual clear-cut divisions of
“extreme nationalists” and “others” no longer hold when it comes to determining Japan’s identity
(Goto-Shibata, 2006, p. 81). It is therefore interesting to note why, in popular consciousnesses (both
domestic and international), the image of the Japanese as being fiercely, monolithically patriotic
persists.
Patriotism as practiced by the shishi (“men of high purpose”) of the late Tokugawa era (18531867) are marked by a level of “unquenchable conviction of being in the right” (Jansen, 1959, p.
212), with varying levels of intellectual sophistication. This was carried over by the extremist groups
67
of 1921-1941, “which fostered a powerful sense of brotherhood, an adamant defiance of political
authority, and a willingness to kill, and if necessary be killed, for the common cause” (Large, 2006, p.
87). Such predispositions of militant nationalism are well-documented in Japan’s actions during
World War II, when feudal loyalties were replaced by loyalty to the state, of which the Emperor was
a living personification.
Despite the marked ambivalences of society and state when it comes to the commemoration
of persons complicit with the violent excesses of such nationalism, there is still a large contingent
struggling to legitimise and valorise these people, largely from their families and parties (specifically
the LDP) (Trefalt, 2002, p. 122-3). Thus, the break between the Japanese people’s desire for the
preservation of cultural identity and the official state apparatuses’ desire to make Japan in tune with
the rapidly-modernising world is emphasised. As it appears, “[n]owhere is the touristic compulsion
of nostalgia more evident than in Japan, and nowhere are anxieties ‘people feel about modernity and
its consequences’ (or modernisation and Westernisation) ‘more acute’ than in Japan” (Gerster, 2005,
p. 294, 299, 300).
It is therefore not surprising that the relatively richer cultural heritage of Japan would be
valorised by the Japanese in their popular culture. However, by virtue of such an arrangement, it is
inevitable that such nostalgia will create discourses that precisely clash with the project of
positioning Japan as an accepted part of the contemporary global space. It is in this direction that we
ask what is in the enduring nostalgia of the Japanese for their pre-war/Imperial past that affects their
role, identity-formation and position in contemporary Japanese and global society.
The NHK (Japanese Broadcasting Company) has an annual tradition of producing the taiga
drama (translated as “Big River Drama”): a historical period drama that runs weekly. A majority of
these productions, starting with the 1st in 1963, Hana no Shōgai, features events of the most beloved
narratives of Japanese history, largely from the Sengoku (Warring States) period and the Bakumatsu
(late Tokugawa to early Meiji) period. That the series continue to receive acclaim among the
Japanese viewership for the past 50 years denotes something worth questioning. Looking at the
themes and representations consistent in the narratives, the reception of the Japanese to the historical
taiga drama produced by the NHK point us to images, functions and markers of Japanese society
that are valorised and deployed for particular purposes in contemporary society.
The study, therefore, seeks to address the gap in the literature regarding how Japanese
popular culture (as markers of the demographic which patronises them) affects in many ways the
perception of Japanese with regards to their society, and how their relation to their history and
contemporary condition continuously shapes their identity both as a nation and as part of the world.
In line with this, we also ask how does this knowledge points to us the continuing
struggles/questions that haunt discourses of Japanese nationalism to date. We can see, as I would
argue in this paper, that contemporary representations of late Tokugawa and early Meiji events and
personages, as presented in the annual taiga drama produced by the NHK, continue to reproduce
undercurrents of nostalgia for the modernised-yet-traditional Japanese ethos following the wakonyōsai ("Japanese spirit, Western techniques") ethic of modernity and industrialisation. They continue
to traverse the fine line between an official “political nationalism” which marks its uniqueness as its
contribution to the global-international community, contrasting it to the "cultural nationalism" which
harks back to the rich Imperial and pre-modern cultural/societal norms of Japanese society (as well
as its extremist manifestations).
My study analyses two dramas: Shinsengumi! (新選組!, 2003) and Ryōmaden (龍馬伝,
2010), which were chosen based on their contemporary time period and their mutual portrayal of
similar characters and events. Comparing and contrasting the portrayals would exhibit a consistency
68
of upholding a particular image of Japanese history which emphasises, in many ways, the
nihonjinron way of thinking that highlights the uniqueness of the Japanese ethos vis-à-vis other
worldviews. This valorisation, in a way, also is complicit with the reproduction of a Japanese selfimage that underlies its seeming-integration into the global political setup, while simultaneously
subverting Orientalist perceptions of Japanese uniqueness.
The dissonance of images of the Japanese-as-nipponjin and the Japanese as a person in the
international-global space (together with its gender and societal texts) exhibits the continuing rift
between the two nationalisms: a cultural nationalism that emphasises its native identities produced
by the Shinto-Buddhist tradition and a political nationalism that teaches the Japanese to be
cosmopolitan and downplays the excesses of Japanese culture which reared its negative extremes in
World War II. It must be argued, though, that such a struggle is not exactly monolithic and
dichotomous. In fact, their deployment for particular purposes usually finds them intertwined and
complementary. As such, political nationalism can actually shape the production and appreciation of
artefacts of cultural nationalism towards more acceptable and consensual lines of imaging.
The discussion will be qualitative and will employ a considerable amount of context analysis.
It will largely be an analysis of the discourses, both implicit and explicit, in the narratives of the
dramas chosen. Similarly, the public’s reception of the series will be also be analysed qualitatively,
namely the behaviours were observed in the audience of the series during the run of the series, as
well as the resonance of the issues featured in the series to Japanese societal issues during their
respective runs. In analysing the series’ narrative, three things will be considered: 1) the method by
which the setting is presented and explained in the particular narrative of the series; 2) the central
characters of the series, as they are historical figures, will be analysed and compared to the historical
data available regarding their lives and the popular/legendary perception of them; and 3) how the
presentation of the characters coincides with contemporary views of the Japanese people on issues
faced by Japan and its position in the world. The analysis of the reception of the series (based on
collected viewers’ ratings) will be reviewed with consideration for the central issues of contemporary
Japanese politics that were salient during the run of these series and how the narratives and
discourses of the series relate to the Japanese perception of their contemporary situation.
Investing on Cultural Nationalist Capital
It is not an exaggeration, I think, to note that despite continuing studies and emerging narratives
about the various identities of people within the larger breadth of Japanese history, representations of
Japanese identity remain to be largely uniform in the imagery and discourses that are accessible to
their reading public and to the world. Even if technically, the cultural practices of the Japanese to
date could very well be described as “syncretic” in their comfortable appropriation of foreign ideas,
cultures and practices (Kevenhörster, 2004, p. 92-93), it cannot be denied that the bases and rubrics
by which they employ such identity-formations are still generally a product of its long-standing
tradition of organising society around particular values, centring around communal preservation and
respect for authority. Nevertheless, to make such a claim without an understanding of how the
strands of thought regarding nationalism affect how Japanese citizens relate to their society and their
political environment would perhaps be falling into the trap of valorising the “uniqueness” of
Japanese identity, as will be demonstrated later. It must be said, however, that the stories and
surrounding structures which promote and expound on a Japanese nationalistic mode of thought lend
themselves very well to the modernist, liberal-democratic project of nation-building, as the situation
of the early Meiji period would show:
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In this orderly campaign the men of Meiji were aided by three half-fortuitous factors. First
was the relatively high degree of Japanese ethnocultural homogeneity resulting from two and a half
centuries of isolation and internal pacification by the Bakufu. … Second, the unique antiquity of the
imperial house (Japan is the only country whose monarchy has been monopolised by a single
dynasty throughout recorded history), and its emblematic Japanese-ness (contrast Bourbons and
Habsburgs), made the exploitation of the Emperor for official-nationalist purposes rather simple.
Third, the penetration of the barbarians was abrupt, massive, and menacing enough for most
elements of the politically-aware population to rally behind a programme of self-defence conceived
in the new national terms (Anderson, 2005, p. 95-96).
Considering this situation, in a sense, it is not surprising that the modern Japanese state built
by the Meiji oligarchs would be more or less centralised and would give the state a greater capacity
for ordering society. The precise threat of foreign invasion, instead of facilitating the demise of the
earlier Tokugawa shogunate, is often credited for stimulating and affirming the need for building,
maintaining, preserving and expanding the idea of a Japanese collective identity, even if this
apparent understanding was still being contested by the fallout and precariousness of peoples who
have been relying and reared on the feudal domain systems that have been maintained for more than
two centuries (Wilson, 2002, p. 5). With this, it has become the prerogative of the modern Japanese
state to ensure that it would deliver its promises of a change of lifestyle, greater prosperity and
security for its avowed constituency, even as it was beginning to face the usual problems of many
modern states, such as the need to educate their masses regarding the prerogatives of the state, which
is still arguably based around the values and scruples of the middle classes which built it (Tipton,
2002, p. 156).
Of course, the narrative of the evolution of Japanese national identity is not without its
consequences (inasmuch as the people involved in its propagation would like to project it as such, as
will be elaborated upon later). The imperialist episode of the Japanese militarist state (during the
early part of the Shōwa period) leading to their misadventures during World War II has impressed
and reiterated some hard lessons into the Japanese public consciousness, and the desire for a
collective and organised preservation of their identity was emphasised. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the
preservation of the strong hold of the Japanese state in the public affairs of the country (even during
and after World War II and the subsequent American occupation) contributed to the hegemonic role
the conservative elite, as exemplified in the contemporary Liberal Democratic Party or LDP during
1955 to 1992, has enjoyed and used in consolidating Japanese society as a stable and unique
politico-economic power within the Asian region at the time (Buckley, 1998, p. 28). Benefiting
greatly from being a “silent ally” of the United States of America during the length of the Cold War
and even up to this day, Japan was able to slowly regain the strength and influence (economically, at
least) it had lost after the war, becoming a model state among liberal-democratic regimes.
Nonetheless, it still suffers the stigma of being ambiguous with regard to its stance on national
territorial defence and the use of armed forces, with its Self-Defence Forces practically limited to
domestic defence and unable to contribute to multilateral operations as requested by its allies in the
developed world. Accusations of Japan “free-riding” in the developed world have become
commonplace among its allies in the United States and Europe, and the continuing tensions between
the Japanese public regarding Japan’s role in a militarised global space continues to be a source of
debate and questions regarding how expansive is Japan’s role in the world really is (Buckley, p. 102105).
It is not without reason that the question of military power figures in any discussion of
Japanese discourses on nationalism: after all, most modern states have relied upon modern armies to
70
preserve their territorial and politico-geographical perspectives. Their capacities and construction
suit armed forces to this responsibility precisely: “they are usually far more highly organised than
any association within a state ... [and] the military profession often – though not always – carries
with it certain emotional associations. In so far as this is so, the army may enjoy a politically
important moral prestige.” (Finer, 1975, p. 9). Even if, precisely, all modern armies have been
organised under its own internal social structures and norms, they nonetheless carry with them
imageries, iconographies and traditions of a past warrior culture endemic in a particular society (as is
the case with the Roman and Anglo-Saxon iconographies employed by many European armies). For
a country that has recently shaken off the yoke of the dominant samurai culture, the Japanese army
during the Meiji and Taishō periods appears more the exception than the rule, choosing precisely to
employ the alien, Western model of military organisation (which already has its roots in the hybrid
peasant- and samurai-composed militias of the Imperial loyalist rebels, such as the Kiheitai). Yet by
the advent of the Shōwa period just prior to World War II, the iconography of the samurai and
bushidō were resurrected and employed by the Imperial Japanese Army to enforce the martial élan
and esprit de corps of its troops.
For a country with a solid-warrior culture and a rich history oft-romanticised in popular
culture, Japan has a ready recourse to its past. With this dynamic at play, these stories continue to be
retold time and time again by various generations, so much so that every generation has a version of
history (as well as the heroes and villains of the narratives) that it returns to, interprets and presents
to its audience. As has been previously mentioned, the tendency to syncretism continues to shape and
inform images and representations of Japan (of and by the Japanese themselves), even with regard to
issues and aspects of life hitherto believed to be uniquely Japanese, such as religion (Kevenhörster,
2004, p. 96). Nevertheless, the roles and values of religion, specifically Shintōism, are experiencing
a unique revival in Japanese society which shapes public thinking. New religious denominations and
assemblies rally around reinterpretations or traditional assertions regarding Shintō beliefs and
practices, specifically as a quintessential manifestation of Japanese culture, even if “[t]he idea of the
divinity of nation and state, seen as one of the classical Shintō tradition and put into political practice
as official state ideology during the first part of the 20th century, seemed to disappear into oblivion
with Japan’s military defeat in 1945” (Prohl, 2004, p. 140). This actually serves certain purposes in
maintaining the influences of particular structures in society, such as the aforementioned debates on
Japan’s military identity, its role in the history of Asia, as well as the valorisation of many of its
cultural and historical high points that have been met with contestation by other countries.
In considering this, it is not without reason, we might say, that nostalgia has had a significant
when it comes to discussions about contemporary Japanese identity. While the discussion of this
paper focuses more on cultural nationalism and its particular disconnect with official state political
nationalism, tensions between their separation (and in fact, calls and arguments for their unification)
tend to figure in public discussion then and now. Indeed, it has been argued that “[d]espite
superficial differences, both cultural nationalism and political nationalism derive from a similar
perception of the moral decay so lamented in contemporary Japan. Today, the moral decline of postwar Japan has become a major public issue. Proliferating political and business scandals,
deteriorating public order and a rising crime rate are often attributed to the post-war denial of
Japanese traditions, the embrace of the West, and the lack of patriotism. Those who have a sense of
crisis often advocate a return to rather rigouristic pre-war ethics” (Askew, 2007, p. 140).
The irony of ironies is that the story of Japanese society may have reached the point of
development where, due to its fear to take part in a world it has been forced to participate in, it has
chosen to embrace and co-opt what it has perceived to be alien, only to reach the contemporaneous
71
era of its existence where it feels all the more alien to itself, or at least to the communities that the
representation of a formal Japanese identity (which is its nation-state) professes affinity and practices
hegemony over. Thus the value of a question Jacques Derrida posed earlier: “Before knowing
whether one can differentiate between the spectre of the past and the spectre of the future, of the past
present and the future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether the spectrality effect does not
consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual, effective presence and its
other” (Derrida, 2006, p. 48). Have the discussions of the Japanese on identity and nationalism come
to a point that, in seeking to maintain what is “unique” about their being a people of a particular
context and a culture unrivalled, they have inevitably rendered themselves exotic and spectral,
before and beyond any other attempt at Orientalisation?
One may hastily answer in the positive. However, we might precisely reiterate that this is not
as easy as it sounds, even if the usual conduits of information and force suggest that it is. As has
been suggested earlier, the growth of discussions regarding nationalism and the uniqueness of
Japanese identity has been steadily growing in recent years, most specifically labelled nihonjinron. A
brief definition: “The body of literature known as Japan Theory [nihonjinron] is difficult to describe
to a foreign audience. This theory (though often not very theoretical) encompasses a wide range of
popular books, newspapers and magazine articles, as well as scholarly works, devoted to such
questions as ‘Who are we (the Japanese)?’, ‘What makes the Japanese unique?’, ‘Why are the
Japanese so successful?’, ‘What makes the Japanese spirit so special?’, and most recently, ‘What
characteristics of Japanese religion form the basis for the superior Japanese spirituality?’” (Prohl,
2004, p. 140). They have been expressed precisely in conduits of popular consumption, and this is
easily visible in the spaces of mass media and popular literature. It might be said, of course, that
there has been a wealth of negative perceptions regarding the imagery of mass media and television
viewing as it has been shown and produced to date, as witness an excerpt from Theodor Adorno’s
description of popular productions:
“Nobody is deceived by intrigue [as a driving element of any narrative] any more now
that its law has established itself directly in all its omnipotence. Mass art registers this
fact inasmuch as it repudiates conflict as outmoded or if it borrows it from the store of
traditional culture removes it from the realm of genuine spontaneity by predetermining
its character....History is extruded from tales which have become cultural commodities,
even and especially there where historical commodities are exploited. History as such
becomes a costume identified with the individual concealing the frozen modernity of
monopoly and state capitalism. Hence the emergence of that false reconciliation, the
absorption of every negative counter-instance by an omnipotent reality, the elimination
of dissonance in the bad totality” (Adorno, 2001, p. 77).
We would argue, as the discussions of the stories would show, that while they are precisely part of
the schematics of mass culture which creates fictive images and resonances, it is precisely these
resonances that give them their particular power and allure in allowing people to present a particular
notion of Japanese identity. Compared to traditional representations of “Japanese-ness” that are
somewhat unapologetic with regards to the seeming-deviance of what is Japanese, popular
productions precisely pander to the exotic notion of Japanese identity and nation-affiliation, which
allows the Japanese themselves to have a positive view of their history and cultural heritage while
making them subjects of interest to an outside audience. While the dynamic is symptomatic of the
aforementioned tendency to syncretism, the valorisation of something “uniquely Japanese” continues
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to colour such representations, resonating with the fictive and admittedly esoteric public
repercussions it might engender.
The Collectivist-Inspired Tradition as Tragedy in Shinsengumi!
Known for their fierceness in numbers and their fastidious upholding of bushido (as they were
portrayed in countless media), the Shinsengumi, the special police force which patrolled Kyoto
during the Bakumatsu, became the paragon of samurai virtues, which is highly ironic considering
that a majority of them were rōshi or masterless samurai, the people most distrusted by the
Tokugawa status quo. It is in this context that the NHK production Shinsengumi! might be analysed
and put into consideration: the story of people who very much believed in the capacity to transcend
boundaries, but were nonetheless beholden to the values and aspirations the centuries-long status it
professed to (even if it no longer abided by it). It was precisely suggested in the narrative that the
very banner of the Shinsengumi, bearing the kanji makoto (誠; translated as “sincerity”) denotes
such a profession to tradition and beliefs that its leaders (particularly its head, Kondō Isami) lived by
(Shinsengumi!, 2004a).
Some background may be necessary: the Shinsengumi was an offshoot of an earlier project,
the Rōshigumi, which was assembled under the orders of the assigned Protector of Kyoto, daimyo
Matsudaira Katamori of Aizu han. While it was especially assembled in order to protect the
shogunate’s interests, its initial convenor Kiyokawa Hachirō was an Imperial loyalist intending to
use the office of the shogunate to sow terror in its domains (Oishi, 2004, p. 65). When the plot was
exposed, thirteen rōshi chose to stay and serve the purposes of the Aizu. Internal factions caused the
reputation of the group to suffer, but they were settled once the faction of Kondō Isami (along with
Hijikata Toshizō, Yamanami Keisuke, Okita Sōji, Nagakura Shinpachi, Saitō Hajime, Inoue
Genzaburō Tōdō Heisuke and Harada Sanosuke, all associated with his Shieikan dojo of the Tennen
Rishin-ryū fencing school) emerged victorious and took the helm of leadership. The post-faction
hierarchy was thus composed of the following (Wikipedia & Hillsborough 2005, p. 142):
Commander
(
局
長
Kyokuchô):
General
Commander
(
総
長
Sôchô):
Vice Commander (副長 Fukuchô): Hijikata Toshizō
Military Advisor (参謀 Sanbô): Itō Kashitarō
Troop Captains (組長 Kumichô):
Okita Sōji (instructor in kenjutsu)
Nagakura Shinpachi (instructor in kenjutsu)
Saitō Hajime (instructor in kenjutsu)
Matsubara Chūji (instructor in jujitsu)
Takéda Kanryūsai (instructor in military strategy)
Inoué Genzaburō
Tani Sanjūrō (instructor in spearing skills)
Tōdō Heisuke
Suzuki Mikisaburō
Harada Sanosuke
Corporals: Shimada Kai, Hashimoto Kaisuké
Observers: Yamazaki Susumu, Shinohara Yasunoshin
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Kondō
Yamanami
Isami
Keisuke
As the Shinsengumi was an organisation that accepted people of various backgrounds but are of
dedication to service, it is not surprising that documentation on the detailed lives of the members
were quite scarce. As such, fiction has willingly filled in the gaps. The introduction to the leaders of
the Shinsengumi, at least the core group from the Shieikan dojo), showed that a majority of them
were of questionable backgrounds. Nagakura Shinpachi, Harada Sanosuke and Saitō Hajime were
deserters from their han. The denizens of the Shieikan themselves (primarily Kondō and Hijikata)
were class-conscious and desired to transcend it, because of the limitations that their peasant
background imposed on their social mobility and desire for acknowledgment despite his virtues and
abilities. It is in this context, perhaps, that we can understand at length the logic behind their desire
to become better conduits of bushido than the samurai themselves (Shinsengumi!, 2004b):
Hijikata Toshizō: Kat-chan, will you teach me fencing? I want to become stronger. Will you
make me a pupil at Shieikan? I want to become a samurai.
Kondō Isami: A samurai?
Hijikata: Like you.
Kondō: It's impossible, forget it.
Hijikata: How can you say it?
Kondō: I finally realised it. We are mere farmers from Tama.
Hijikata: That's not true. You are a fine samurai.
Kondō: No I'm not. We will be farmers from Tama forever. That's how it is in life. I've made
up my mind... to become than better than the samurai! I will be a farmer with the best
samurai spirit! Do you really want to become strong?
Hijikata: Yes.
Kondō: You cannot become a samurai.
Hijikata: I can become like a samurai. It means the same thing to me though.
Kondō: Training is harsh at Shieikan.
Hijikata: Just how I want it!
It is therefore not surprising that they precisely structured their organisation to become more worthy
of being samurai than those born into the class (who by then became very complacent and inept due
to the centuries-long peace). The rules that the Shinsengumi lived by and imposed to their members
(and more so their leaders) became notorious throughout the Tokugawa domains for their harshness
and stringency, with every infraction punishable by seppuku. A lot of emphasis is given in the
narrative on how people can effect change through teamwork and being true to one’s self. In a way,
the samurai ethic was valorised and made into an ideal by the Shinsengumi, even if they were denied
it from the beginning. Nevertheless, its value and seeming perfection as a way of life was similarly
deconstructed, especially when the people that they begin sentencing to seppuku were those whom
they had known for quite some time (Shinsengumi!, 2004c):
Nagakura Shinpachi: Why must he commit seppuku? Isn't confinement sufficient
punishment?
Hijikata Toshizō: By our code, if you leave the group, i’ts seppuku.
Harada Sanosuke: But it’s Yamanami we're talking about.
Hijikata: All the more reason for him to commit seppuku. By sparing Yamanami... we'll be
showing emotions. It just takes one act of emotion to break up the group.
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Itō Kashitarō: You may not want to hear the comment of a newcomer... but Hijikata-kun;
strictness isn't everything in holding a group together. Warmth can also...
Hijikata: A newcomer should keep his comments to himself.
Takeda Kanryūsai: Judgement has already been passed on Yamanami.
Nagakura: I want to hear the Bureau Chief's thoughts.
Takeda: But...
Nagakura: Shut up! I want to hear it directly from the Bureau Chief!
Kondō Isami: Yamanami has already resigned himself. The only thing we can do for him is to
arrange a fine place of death for him.
Such desire to be worthy of service to the Shogunate, it appears, was not merely out of blind loyalty.
By virtue of their being agents of the Bakufu, they were exposed first hand to the inconsistencies and
incompetence of the people involved in the administration, which figured in the beginnings of the
Rōshigumi. As such, the portrayal of Bakufu officials was similarly ambivalent in this respect: some
are portrayed to be well-meaning and struggling to preserve the peace and order mandate of the
Tokugawa (such as the Shinsengumi’s benevolent patron Matsudaira Katamori), some truly
incompetent in their impudence and insistence on their class background. This often causes clashes
which, nonetheless, were won by the Shinsengumi’s persistence to function. Witness, for example,
the clash between Sasaki Tadasaburō, one of the leaders of the purely samurai-composed
Mimawarigumi and Kondō Isami during the Kyoto fire (Shinsengumi!, 2004d):
Sasaki Tadasaburō: I'm impressed with the Shinsengumi's fast response. We just arrived.
Kondō Isami: Perfect timing. I was just getting the fire report. Please listen to it.
Sasaki: We're taking the fire refugees to safety.
Kondō: Please wait.
Sasaki: What is it?
Kondō: We should have a meeting first.
Sasaki: We don't have time for that.
Hijikata: We need accurate information to act with prudence.
Sasaki: While we're doing that, the fire will gain momentum. If you'll excuse me....
Kondō: Please wait! Don't act on your own!
Sasaki: Are you going to tell us what to do?
Kondō: If we act on our own, the situation will get worse.
Sasaki: The Mimawarigumi consists of direct Shogunate vassals. You can't tell us what to do.
Hijikata: You have to follow us. Please do as we tell you.
Sasaki: I refuse!
Kondō: Sasaki-sama!
Sasaki: We will do things our own way.
Itō: We Shinsengumi arrived at the site first. The Mimawarigumi came later. Will you just
give in?
Sasaki: You're right. We're at fault for coming late. Let's hear your orders.
(After the fire was put out)
Kondō: It's over.
Sasaki: Kondō-san... that was great leadership.
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Kondō: Thank you.
Sasaki: In times of crisis... you men might be of greater service to the Shogunate.
It is perhaps interesting to note at this point, perhaps, that one of the aesthetic markers of this
particular drama is the frequent use of close-up shots which show the facial expressions of the
characters in particularly specific moments. In tense confrontations or in serious discussions,
characters who are trying to understand the profundity of their conversation companion will be
focused, the creases on their faces, forehead and brows emphasised to convey particular states of
emotion. Even in the most formal of conversations, the discussions between lords and vassals are
emphasised by subtle hints of emotions, noting that despite the formalities and rigidities of Japanese
social norms, the importance of amiability and harmony is always put into play. As such, in contrast
to what we will see later in Ryōmaden, it would be too surprising that even when women are
portrayed to be proactive, they are nonetheless bound by their social norms to deal with their lot in
life. The scene depicting the confrontation between Kondō Isami’s wife Tsune and his mistress
Oyuki (formerly the geisha Miyuki-dayu) gives us an idea (Shinsengumi!, 2004e):
Tsune: He's a clumsy kind of person, so I can tell when he's lying. What he said earlier is a
lie. He called you to Kyoto because he loves you. The rest is just an excuse.
Oyuki: I am truly happy to receive Kondō-sensei's compassion. Now that it's come to this... I
can't stay with him.
Tsune: Please stay by his side.
Oyuki: Eh?
Tsune: He recently lost a very precious friend. I'm sure he's deeply hurt by it. But I wasn’t
there for him at the time. You were. That vexes me. But it's my duty to protect the fencing hall
at Edo. So please take my place.
Oyuki: Are you sure?
Tsune: (nods)
Oyuki: You have no idea what kind of woman I am.
Tsune: My husband wouldn't fall for a bad woman. Please take care of Kondō Isami. (Bows)
Please promise me one thing though. That it'll only be while he's in Kyoto.
Oyuki: Only while he's in Kyoto.
Tsune: Yes. (Tears rolling down her right eye)
Oyuki: Very well. (Bows)
This recalls minding an observation from Roland Barthes: “This is what is expressed through a
practice of forms (a word whose plastic meaning and worldly meaning are here indissociable), by the
politeness of the salutation the bowing of two bodies which inscribe but do not prostrate themselves.
… [I]f I say that in this country politeness is a religion, I let it be understood that there is something
sacred in it; the expression should be canted so as to suggest that religion there is merely a politeness,
or better still, that religion has been replaced by politeness” (1982, p. 68). The markers of
harmonisation, despite what is seemingly problematic, are played out in a level of subtle intensity
that marks the a marker of Japanese sincerity as well, despite its avowed formality and detachment
(if only to highlight what would have been a rough confrontation between a wife and a mistress).
Finally, the entire rhetoric of sonnō jōi as it is portrayed in the drama appears to be very
quixotic, despite its high aspirations. It was actually noted that jōi as a principle is held by both sides
of the conflict: whether Imperial Loyalist or Shogunate official. As such, it is possible, at least in the
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narrative of Shinsengumi! that Kondō appears as an advocate of it no different to the Chōshū radicals.
The conversation between him and a Japanese doctor trained in Western medicine (which he
consulted regarding Okita’s worsening tuberculosis) gives us a few insights on it (Shinsengumi!,
2004f):
Doctor: Isn't Kondō-san a jōi advocate?
Kondō: Yes.
Doctor: Most of the tools here are from foreign countries. This (a scalpel)… this (tweezers)…
and also this (scissors). Western medicine is far more advanced than ours. I don't know why
Ii-tairō opened up the country. But if Japan disassociates itself from the world there will be
no bright future. What can ease the pain of your precious person... is knowledge from the
West. Do you still insist on expelling the foreigners?
Since it is, after all, a narrative which comes from the side of the Tokugawa Shogunate, it wouldn’t
be surprising that it will be very much conservative with the views that it employs and deploys with
regards to the ideas that have swept Japan at the time. It also not surprising that the leaders and
members of the Shinsengumi have been portrayed as tragic heroes and well-intentioned vanguards
who were forced to resort to extreme measures. This appears to be the case, especially to the
audience of the series which have become predisposed to taking the side of the Shinsengumi when it
comes to discussions of the historical events, even when cases have been made that they have
actively engendered their “propensity to kill” and “will to power” in arguably-inappropriate times,
such as the scuffles with sumo wrestlers, the slaughter of their former commander Serizawa Kamo,
the notorious Ikedaya incident, and their general treatment of their enemies (Hillsborough, 2005, p.
71-76; 87-110; 135-146). In the drama, such acts of violence have been portrayed as necessary
instances of bloodshed that a genuinely samurai should not be averse to doing, which will not be
easily understood by non-Japanese. We will see later how, in contrast to the Shinsengumi’s emphasis
on camaraderie and collective conviction to uphold tradition, the image of the shishi shall prove the
plausibility and pragmatism of an individual action that is unfettered (or at least, not bogged down)
by traditional and societal norms.
The Potentials and Limits of the Patriot-as-Übermensch in Ryōmaden
As there is a wealth of literature and productions portraying Sakamoto Ryōma in various lights, there
is already a broad-brush template of his portrayal as the quintessential shishi, whose values and
capabilities are not to be overestimated. Marius Jansen notes how “[h]is romantic career and his
buoyant, self-confident bearing and correspondence lent themselves extraordinarily well to the
image the nation holds of its Restoration shishi. A cluster of stories illustrating his quick intelligence,
his practical bent, his indifference to position and power, his nonchalance in money matters, and his
calm and casual bearing in time of danger, fitted him equally well for the roles of sage and warrior”
(Jansen, 1961, p. 345). As such, one might think that there is nothing more to be said of Ryōma as he
is known as a folk hero, well-loved and admired by many Japanese up to this day. Nonetheless,
interpretations of history for each generation would not be denied, and as such the 2010 production
Ryōmaden serves, as its executive producer Kei Suzuki shared. For the narrative, Suzuki wanted to
show “a cheerful, down-to-earth Ryōma” which nonetheless preserves his integrity as a man of
thought and practice, proving that “anyone — even a ‘nobody’ from the country — can actually
change the course of history. There are a lot of things about Japan today that also seem unchangeable.
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I hope this new Ryōma will demonstrate that they can in fact be changed" (as quoted in Corkill,
2009).
It is not surprising, therefore, that the narrative would take an approach that exhibits, in its
breadth and scope, the challenges that Ryōma chose to face in light of a Japan that was violently torn
from its sakoku (“locked country”) policy by the forces of outside intervention. As many stories
dealing with the late Tokugawa period would start, the arrival of American Commodore Matthew
Perry’s fleet, the “Black Ships,” served to strong-arm Japan into negotiations of opening its borders,
while opening new possibilities for the shogunate which has then ruled for 250 years (Jansen, 1961,
p. 51). If the story of Ryōmaden has a main strain, it would be the evolution of Sakamoto Ryōma’s
personality into the enterprising maverick he is well-known for in Japan to date. It is emphasised,
precisely, that he was not born the daredevil that he would be infamous of being. To complement his
story, on the other hand, the life of future Mitsubishi founder Iwasaki Yatarō was weaved into it as
well, as the foil perspective of the everyman who seems bound by situation and is easily overcome
by desperation. While, obviously, many artistic liberties were taken in the narrative, the story
nonetheless serves its purpose of showing to us an epic which started in the most unlikely of places.
Born in Tōsa han (present-day Kōchi Prefecture, Shikoku) in 1836, Sakamoto Ryōma was
the youngest son of lower-ranking (kashi) samurai who were nonetheless living amiably. As a child,
he was notorious for being an overly-kind, clumsy and weak-willed boy which suffered the disdain
of his fellow youth. In the opening episode, it is this clumsiness that would earn him the ire of a
high-ranking (jōshi) samurai, Kashiwabara Tadahachi, who would later threaten to kill him, if not for
the timely intervention of his then-ill mother (Ryōmaden, 2010a):
Ryōma: I’m very sorry! I’m very sorry!
Kashiwabara Tsunamichi: Was it you who pushed Tadahachi down?
Kashiwabara Tadahachi: You desecrated the spirit of the Samurai!
Ryōma: Please forgive me!
Tadahachi: Father, let me kill him now!
Sakamoto Kō: Please wait! Please have mercy! (Runs in, kneels next to Ryōma)
Servant: I’m so sorry my lord, this woman barged her way through.
Kō: Please spare my son! Please spare my son’s life!
Ryōma: Mother!
Tsunamichi: You low ranking Kashi dare to force your way into a Joshi’s residence?
Sakamoto Kō: My son is young and ignorant. He has no intention at all to offend my lords. I
beg you; I beg you please have mercy on him!
Tadahachi: That piece of dirt pushed me into the mud!
Kō: As regards to that, I will sternly discipline him and imprint on him what he did wrong.
Tadahachi: Shut up and move aside!
Kō: Then please kill me instead!
Ryōma: Mother!
Kō: It is the mother’s fault that the child was not taught. Please take my life instead!
Ryōma: No! No! Don’t kill my mother!
Tadahachi: Since you say so, I’ll kill you both together!
Ryōma: Don’t kill my mother!
Tsunamichi: That’s enough! Slashing your sword for something senseless like this, if you
stain the house, even the meals will taste bad. (To the Sakamotos) Get out right now.
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After saving her son’s life, Kō collapses into the ground and passes away. This harrowing experience
left an indelible mark on the young Ryōma, who from then on resolved to make use of his time by
honing himself into a samurai worthy of his name and her mother’s trust. When the story jumps to
the year 1852, he has already grown into a competent swordsman capable of besting others, although
still very much non-confrontational. When his childhood neighbour, then-birdcage seller Iwasaki
Yataro, ran afoul of another jōshi already known to abuse and kill kashi (very similar to what Ryōma
suffered in childhood), he immediately leapt to his aid and asked for forgiveness, suffering abuse in
Yataro’s place. Being a man with a sense of pride in his poverty, Yataro was very much annoyed with
Ryōma’s intervention, despite him saving his life. As they struggled and fell into a river, they have
this heated exchange (Ibid.):
Yataro: It’s all your nosy fault we fell down here! You stupid idiot!!
Ryōma: Yataro! Oi! (Pulls Yataro up the bank) Yataro! (Grabs him by the shoulder) Don’t
give up your life because of some silly trivial thing! Aren’t you supposed to be smart? Aren’t
you going to have a leisurely easy life?!!
Yataro: Kashi…will never be able to suppress the Joshi to the day they die! This will never
ever change!
Ryōma: Actually, Yataro….I know someone. She made a Joshi who had already raised his
katana, put it back down again. My mother. I had pushed down a Joshi child. Just when I was
about to be beheaded, (smiles) mother succeeded in changing the Joshi’s view. In Tōsa here,
Kashi are so badly abused by Joshi. Even though everyone is saying this country will not
change, I don’t think so. If my mother can move the Joshi to change, then Tōsa……one day
Tōsa will see reforms too.
Ryōma: Are you saying that the day will come when Kashi can win over the Joshi?
Ryōma: No! Kashi…and Joshi…. will all be the same!
Yataro: Ha! Ha! And what do we have to do to change this world into what you said?
Ryōma: I don’t know! I think hard about it every day. I still can’t figure it out. … What I
understand is... conflict is not going to change the world. Disputes with the Joshi, are not
going to change anything. That was not the way my mother had used then.
Acknowledging the growth and maturity of his son, Sakamoto Hachihei eventually relented to
Ryōma’s request of being allowed to travel the world, see a lot, and learn from it. Securing a travel
permit to Edo, Ryōma enrolled in a fencing school while meeting many other young impressionable
minds. Their burgeoning interests in the issues of the day, brought precisely about by the turmoil and
confusion besetting the Bakufu’s (the shogunate system) dealings with foreigners, led them to
questioning the current state of affairs in Japan to date. His meeting with Katsura Kogorō, then a
student of Yoshida Shōin (as well as their mutual witnessing of a “Black Ship” in motion)
confounded them about what precisely Japan could do to stand up to the foreign powers (Ibid.
2010b).
Back in Tōsa, however, Ryōma’s childhood friend Takechi Hanpeita has begun organizing
the kashi under the slogan of Imperial loyalism, charging that it is through the expulsion of the
foreigners from Japan that they protect its interests and culture. His good standing in Tōsa as a man
of letters and the sword, it appears, gave him enough credibility to be allowed to travel to Edo with
his students. However, Takechi has similarly adopted the stringent measures of samurai discipline, so
much that he was willing to command a loyal student to commit seppuku (ritual suicide) due to a
minor infraction that, supposedly, would compromise his advocacy of sonnō jōi. Ryōma, however,
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would have none of it and led the erring student to escape punishment. It is in this altercation that
Ryōma’s unorthodox and pragmatic stance would surface, clashing with the textbook samurai virtue
which Takechi supposedly upholds (Ryōmaden, 2010c):
Takechi Hanpeita: You let him go, didn’t you? … Ryōma, I’ve always treated you as my friend.
When I’m with you, you’re the only one who lets I feel at peace. However, do not stand in my
way anymore! I cannot be tied down by little things in front of me now.
Ryōma: Takuma’s life is a little thing in your eyes?
Takechi: That’s right.
Ryōma: Only the devil can say something like that.
Takechi: Then only the devil can accomplish great deeds!
Ryōma: In Takechi-san’s heart, you have the great honourable aspirations to change Tōsa, to
change Japan. But you also have that compassion towards a single stalk of flower. The devil
will not appreciate flowers.
(Takechi picks up his sword and cuts the flower off)
Takechi: Don’t talk like you know everything!
It is perhaps important to note at this point how the dialogue construction of the drama, as it is
presented, is consistently presented with an imaging of the Japanese psyche as something that does
not emphasise the directness of words but the experiential and harmonising tendencies; that is to say,
the hara of Japanese thought-logic which does not exactly correspond to the dichotomous belief
system in the Western dualistic Aristotelian logic (Yoshino, 1992, p. 13). Similarly, the aesthetics of
the scenes portrayed between individuals, whether they talk of ideas encompassing Japan’s place in
the world or their personal relationships, has that identifiable mark of precision, which Barthes noted
as the Oriental tendency towards “the infinitesimal… There is a convergence of the tiny and the
esculent: things are not only small in order to be eaten, but are also comestible in order to fulfil their
essence, which is smallness” (1982, p. 15). That the portrayal of Ryōma, in light of his image as the
most progressive among the figures of the Bakumatsu, serves as a mixture of such logical
forcefulness yet sensitive enough to operate along the lines of dialogical hara emphasizes further
how Japanese identity and commitment could actually blend with outside ideas. His conviction, all
the same, were to bring forth the detriment of the Bakufu, as he chose to join Takechi’s Tōsa Kinnōto
(Tōsa Loyalist Party) even when he was offered a post at the Tōsa administration by no less than the
reformist (yet still kashi-discriminating) Yoshida Tōyō. This is where the narrative deviates from
historical record: as could be recorded from his letters and expressions, the historical Ryōma was
very much still an extremist proponent willing to join in rōnin revolts (Jansen, 1961, p. 162).
In the drama, when Ryōma eventually escaped from Tōsa as a dappan rōshi (under the
assumption that to be truly able to change Japan one must not be bound by stringent loyalties), he
went straight to learn from the newly-appointed Naval Commissioner Katsu Rintarō (Ryōmaden,
2010d), who recently established a Naval Training Academy. Records again disagree: while Ryōma
supposedly was anxious to learn from Katsu, historical records hinted that he actually intended to
assassinate him due to his image as a kaikoku (open country) advocate, but was only stayed by
listening to Katsu’s explanations (Jansen, 1961, p. 163-164). This experience of conversion, it
appears, was given to another character, Okada Izō, a noted assassin working under Takechi
Hanpeita (and who, in this drama, was similarly Ryōma’s childhood friend), likely due to a lack of
documentation on the historical person (Ryōmaden, 2010e):
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Katsu Rintarō: Hey!
Ryōma: Yes?
Katsu: He’s here to kill me. Right! You knew that, who’re you bluffing, you asshole! Really!
Ryōma: Izō! Did Takechi-san tell you to come…?
Okada Izō: No….
Ryōma: Are you still killing people?!!
Izō: It’s not like that!
Katsu: (pats Ryōma) Stop, stop, stop! (Pats Izō) This fellow is just trying his best to do his job,
right? Before that happens, before you kill me, first listen to what I have to say. Then you can
do what you want, OK? Wait! (Takes out a globe)…. Hey, Izō. This is called a globe. It’s a
replica of the big wide world. Look here closely. This here is America. Here’s Europe and
here’s China. Now guess where Japan is. Eh? (He kneels next to the model.) Well,
Japan…..This little island in the corner, is Japan.
Izō: That’s Japan?
Ryōma: Eh?
Izō: What?!! That’s Japan?!
Ryōma: Eh? Izō…! You really didn’t know?!
Izō: How can that be!
Katsu: Yes! Yes! The globe has finally come to use! (To Izō) Hey! You’re very straightforward.
I like that! I like you! Very good!
“Like student, like mentor,” we could say. Katsu, despite being an official of the shogunate, was very
much open to pragmatic solutions to various problems: in fact, he did not hesitate to take in dappan
rōshi like Ryōma in order to teach them how to become independent citizens of a nascent nation.
The portrayal of Katsu very much suggests that of a benevolent mentor who is willing to listen to
people’s ideas, albeit still very much in a roundabout hara way that tests their character. His
statements in the narrative do suggest an ideal image of Japan that practically embodied how the
Meiji era unfolded:
People…won’t really get it, if you tell them. … It won’t be long before the people can
feel it for themselves, and then they’ll change. Firstly, our school has its own merits…
Right, we have no Han-related barriers. ... Secondly, we have no distinction in class
hierarchy. And finally, in order to sail the black ship, they’d have to pick up western
studies, anyhow. Once they realize how advanced western civilization is, they’ll know
it’s foolish to go to war with foreign countries (Ryōmaden).
When we say “Jōi, Jōi”, there’re really two levels, macro-Jōi and micro-Jōi. ”Expel
the foreigners! Strike them down!” That’s micro-level. What we’re doing is macro-Jōi
- learning from foreign culture and then, strengthening ourselves to defend Japan’s
independence. That’s macro-level (Ryōmaden, 2010f).
Nonetheless, in this portrayal of the shogunate, Katsu is a fish out of water. The shogunate, fearful
for its position and vengeful in the opportunism of the Chōshū han to advance Imperial loyalty
against the Tokugawa, does not tolerate any dissent, even constructive criticism. As such, Katsu’s
unorthodox methods were regarded as treason when it was discovered that one of his students in the
Naval Training Academy, Mochizuki Kameyata, was part of the aborted plot to burn Kyoto, the
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Ikedaya Affair. This, as it was recorded, sealed the fate of the Navy Training School Katsu organized
to modernize the Japanese militia and the country (Ryōmaden, 2010g):
Katsu Rintarō: Punish Chōshū?!
Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu: This is the chance to crush Chōshū, and confiscate its lands. Then
no one will dare defy us anymore. And the Bakufu will have peace.
Katsu: If I may, my Lord! If I may, my Lord! Is this the decision of our Shogun, Iemochi-kō?
At present, our country of Japan should focus on countering the challenge from foreign
countries. At this critical time, we cannot afford to have internal strife! Hitotsubashi-sama, I
beg you! Please reconsider this!
Yoshinobu: You dare to contradict me. You’re still as gutsy as ever. However, your obtrusive
behaviour is getting very irritating lately. The Navy Training Academy has housed numerous
dappan rōnin from various Hans. One of whom attempted to join Chōshū retainers in their
rebellion in the Ikedaya earlier….
Katsu: We work… We work only for Japan….
Yoshinobu: Silence!! This is not behaviour befitting of the Bakufu Navy Commissioner!!
Such a despotic portrayal of the Bakufu is nothing new, and is perhaps to be expected of a narrative
that practically glorifies the Meiji restoration. What might be noted, perhaps, is how the portrayal
practically is suggestive of the rhetoric used by Japanese extremists in the years prior to the Second
World War (1921-1941), where the privileged of society are denounced, the people’s interests are not
taken into consideration, and the tendency to use violent means to achieve one’s goals becomes more
and more appealing (Large, 2006, p. 95). Nevertheless, it was precisely made clear in the ultimate
fates of Takechi’s Tōsa Kinnōto and the Chōshū loyalists during the Hamaguri rebellion (defeated,
repressed and forced to commit seppuku) that their rhetoric cannot last without enduring resources
and institutional clout. In the narrative, as Ryōma chose to serve under the Satsuma han together
with his fellow students at the Naval Training Academy, he noted: “Takechi-san and his men…. their
desire to protect Japan was no different from ours. But, just by their aspirations, they could not
change the world. We should have learnt that from them already. The regret they left behind must not
be wasted in vain. Think about it. In order to accomplish our goal, what should we be doing?”
(Ryōmaden, 2010h). And it is in this field, precisely, that Ryōma found a way to bridge a possibility
to changing the balance of power in Japan: in bringing about the alliance between formerly-bitter
enemies Satsuma and Chōshū. By initiating exchanges between the domains, Ryōma’s recentlyestablished company (the Kameyama Shachu) brokered talks between Satsuma and the merchants of
Nagasaki, foremost being Thomas Glover as supplier of arms and ships (Ryōmaden, 2010i).
Eventually, when war between Chōshū and the Bakufu erupted, Ryōma’s company joined in the
battle at Shimonoseki and contributed to victory, while he simultaneously began planning for a
peaceful turnover of power from the shogunate back to the Emperor (the Taisei Hōkan movement)
(Ryōmaden, 2010j).
One might be tempted to think that, like the similar methodology of historical writing,
women were once again placed in the backburner. It must be emphasised, however, that the narrative
of Ryōmaden sought to highlight as much women participation in the story of Ryōma’s struggles.
First and foremost, as mentioned in the beginning, it was his mother that impressed on him the
capability of discussion and reasoning (a perceived Western construct at that if nihonjinron would be
believed, but is actually rooted in Japanese culture). Similarly, it was his sister Otome that impressed
on him a strength of character and conviction that would guide him throughout his life (Ryōmaden,
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2010a). On the other hand, though, the role of romantic relationships (and how women were
portrayed) in the narrative was ambivalent. While Ryōma’s childhood beloved, Hirai Kao, was
somewhat passive and accepting of her being merely a pawn in the struggles of Takechi’s rise to
power (even asking him to leave her in order to be able to continue his worthy fight; Ryōmaden,
2010k), the same cannot be said of the woman who later became his wife, Narasaki Ryō (or Oryō);
she was stubborn enough to join him in his travels and was even, in his own words, the means by
which he survived the ambush on the Terada-ya inn where he was stopping for the night (Ryōmaden,
2010l). The other two women, Chiba Sana (the daughter of Chiba Sadakichi, his kenjutsu master)
and the Nagasaki geisha Omoto (who also served as his accessory to avoid authorities) were
obviously smitten with him, because he acknowledged their strengths as women even though he did
not reciprocate their feelings. Much should be mentioned, nonetheless, of the merchant Ōura Kei,
who was the wealthiest woman in Nagasaki and who was the first to throw in her financial support to
Ryōma’s underground activities (Ryōmaden, 2010h).
Highlighting the roles of various people in the narrative does not only emphasise how Ryōma
was able to convince them to join his vision of a new Japan; in fact, the narrative would show that
had Ryōma not been willing to deal with different people of varying backgrounds and interests, his
efforts would have been left in vain. The precise virtue of Ryōma, viewed as enterprising,
modernistic and alien to the traditional Japanese culture, it appears, is actually very Japanese: the
willingness to depend and be interpersonal. To make either dimension of his narrative’s efforts
absolute is to fall into the trap of essentialisation, and“[t]he assumption that uniquely Japanese
modes of thinking and behaving are incomprehensible for non-Japanese tends to hinder social
communication between Japanese and foreign residents and the latter’s integration into social life in
Japan” (Yoshino, 1992, p. 37). Building the image of Sakamoto Ryōma as a poster boy for the ideal
liberal-individualist man, it would appear, inevitably falls flat due to the continuing tensions that
Japanese people view their association with each other. In fact, rather than reinforce a more
cosmopolitan notion of society, Ryōmaden fosters an image of a Japanese collective that is pragmatic
in its capacity to reach out to one another.
The Jōi of Nostalgia
Both these two dramas highlight the multiplicity of ideas during the period, in a time where there
would be a thousand opinions about the situation of their country and when it was difficult to discern
the right from the wrong. Despite this outward desire for their sakoku past, Japan is very much
willing to deal with foreigners and have integrated them in the development of the domains and the
country. Moreover, it could be noted that in both narratives, the changes that were engulfing and
posing the fall of the Shogunate were consistently portrayed as "inevitable." This fiery faith in the
inevitability of success through sincerity and enterprising (within or outside the norms of the
Japanese social hierarchy) suggests to us that, in many ways, it is the shishi who won the cultural
warfare. The desire to be part of the historical motions was universal among the characters, which
might be gleaned from the fictional representation of the scholar Sakuma Shōzan:
A person should just think about himself for the first ten years of his life. For the next
ten years he should live for his family. For the ten year after that, he should live for
his province. When he is 30 years old, he should live for Japan. When he hits 40, he
should live for the world. (Shinsengumi!, 2004g).
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It cannot be emphasised how great the reception of these two series were during their runs.
Shinsengumi! was among the few taiga dramas to have had a special epilogue, which recounted the
last days of Hijikata Toshizō and his death defending the Ezo Republic in Hokkaido. Ryōmaden,
being the well-loved depiction of a national hero as it was, created a phenomenon akin to a “Ryōma
fever” in Japan, supposedly contributing to tourism and history-related commerce immensely
(Spoinichi, 2011). In a way, it was actively stimulated, in part, by the post-episode travelogues
regarding sites related to the life and times of Sakamoto Ryōma. Such is quite remarkable,
considering that the ratings for the series averaged in the high tens: 17.4% for Shinsengumi! and
18.72% for Ryōmaden.
It would not be an unlikely assumption to argue that this overwhelming support for such
narratives of glorified Japanese past figures is an active manifestation of nationalism as nostalgia. It
is perhaps an amusing coincidence that Shinsengumi! was aired during the premiership of the
popular Koizumi Junichirō, who prided himself as a symbol of Japanese visibility in the post-war era.
When Koizumi and the Chinese premier Tang Jiaxuan said that “agreement over historical memory
is crucial to stable international relations in East Asia” (Kushner, 2007, p. 795), there was an implicit
understanding that they should both value their historical heritages and the weight that their actions
have as it is recorded. From here, the right wing pundits, including manga author Kobayashi
Yoshinori, there is a consistent critique of the Japanese supposedly losing sight of their pride as a
nation, instead kowtowing to former colonies (i.e. China, Taiwan) just because they made major
mistakes during World War II, even if Imperial Japanese history precisely has a glorious military and
national heritage. The nationalist project is also capitalized, in many ways, by the conservatives
affiliated in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to “normalise” Japan (Ryu, 2007, p. 724), especially
when it comes to perceptions of whether or not the Yasukuni Shrine should become a public
monument to Japanese heroes again (especially considering that Yasukuni still houses many war
criminals, together with the Restoration patriots and other war dead who served valiantly and
honourably during the Second World War). As might be noted: “it seems to many people that the
nation cannot acknowledge those who died in its service during the Second World War. For obvious
reasons, this is unsatisfactory to those who lost a member of their family” (Trefalt, 2002, p. 124).
This, in many ways, is constitutive of a reification of the situation of political alienation in
Japan that we have been witnessing to date: “[C]ertain political attitudes, including trust, do not
change suddenly. … If the new parties meet the expectations of their supporters and can manage to
expand their bases, then they will have made an important contribution to creating citizens closer to
the democratic ideal. Japan will enjoy a virtuous circle of political incorporation, increasing civic
orientation, and (probably) increasing trust. The flip side of this scenario is a vicious circle in which
new parties fail to live up to expectations and drive ever more voters into disengagement and
distrust.” (Kabashima et al, 2000, p. 798). To date, other than the surge of electoralist fervour that
brought the Democratic Party of Japan to power in 2009, no avid manifestation of historical
Japanese citizenship has yet arisen and is made manifest, made accessible, or made visibly apparent.
The closest, as it would seem, is the consumption and participation in the narratives of such popular
culture (as is portrayed in the taiga dramas), by which Japanese at least still have a sense of
connection to an active (if often forceful, violent and lethal) citizenship.
Thus, the failure and limitations of state-building in Japan might give us pause to reflect.
Might it not be indeed that the current liberal-democratic state of Japan is seen as the “new declining
Tokugawa”? Yet why does the consumption of culture as political traces no longer bring about active
participation? It is, after all, dictated by the medium: the narrative is shown in television, which only
stimulates reactions and not reflective thought. As Neil Postman wrote on the discursive apparatus of
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television: “[i]t comes as the unintended consequence of a dramatic change in our modes of public
conversation. … [I]t is an ideology nonetheless, for it imposes a way of life, a set of relations among
people and ideas, about which there has been no consensus, no discussion and no opposition” (1986,
p. 157). Moreover, these manifestations continue to support an idea of identity-formation that is
possible in individual efforts towards the enrichment of self-aesthetics, which fits nicely into the
dynamics of nostalgia and particular assumptions regarding a national identity:
“The use of religious symbols in the media contributes to the Zeitgeist of nostalgia by
idealising Japan’s past and Japanese religious history. This idealized view of Japanese
religious history and a proclaimed Japanese ‘spirituality’ helps to conceal their rather
problematic aspects. Japan Theory on religion and images of nostalgia consisting of
religious symbols promise a kind of salvation on the basis of Japanese ‘spirituality’
and on the foundation of the ‘Japanese spirit,’ which is often declared to be superior.
However nicely it may be phrased, this promise implies the inferiority of other
religious worldviews and can therefore be seen as a kind of religious nationalism”
(Prohl, 2004, p. 148).
As there is no resonance in the state apparatus for them to enact their pride and identity as Japanese,
it would seem there is no other space to enact the participatory side of being Japanese other than
consuming and being consumed by the signifiers of such dramatic representations, however fictive
they might be. The reception of people to the narratives of the Bakumatsu (as they are articulated in
the NHK dramas) exhibits an adherence to a Japanese narrative which people take pride on, but that
is not emphasized by the state. The perceived virtues of the historical Japanese actors, things which
they cannot find in the current political arena of Japan, further the cleavage between beingJapanese-as-identity and being-Japanese-as-citizen.
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The Japanese Haiku Poem in the Culture and Spiritual Life of Modern Vietnam
By Hoàng Thị Xuân Vinh, M.A.
Department of Literature
Hue University College of Pedagogy
A General Introduction to Japanese Haiku
Most national literature is derived from poetry, or at the very least employs verse as a textual
language. This is the case with the Western rondeau, ballad, and sonnet, Oriental Tang poetry, haiku,
sloka, sijo, six-eight-word distich metre and so on, and they all have one thing in common: they are
short and lovely like leaves hanging on sprigs. And all of the verse types above have been recorded
as the pinnacle achievements of national and world classical poetry.
In the garden of poetry, Japanese haiku is the profoundest, though it is perhaps the shortest
and most modest of all in terms of verse. Haiku may be compared to the smallest leaves on the
century-old tree of poetry. Below are some general aspects of haiku:
History of Formation
Haiku was perfected and developed during the prosperous Edo period (1603-1868). The appearance
of haiku (called hokku or haikai at that time) derived directly from renga in the middle period (11851603). Haiku originated from the oldest form of Japanese verse: the ancient tanka, because renga
itself originated from tanka. Haiku is the first half of a tanka. Matsuo Basho (1644-1694) was a great
Japanese poet who based his destiny on haiku. Today, he has thousands of followers in Japan and all
over the world.
Position
In the history of Japanese poetry, haiku is considered to represent its pinnacle. Haiku is the shortest
verse in a world full of short verses, which expresses the beauty of reticence in the culture and soul
of Japan.
Religion
Haiku is poetry rather than prayer, but it is imbued with religion in word as well as in the pauses
between them. Shinto, Zen, Lao-Tze and Tchuang-Tze beliefs are all religions have their hallmarks
in Haiku.
Theme
Nature, religion and society are the core themes of haiku. The theme of nature is mainly regarding
life, flowers and plants. It often moves along spring, summer, fall, and winter like a never-ending
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circle. Because of this, special words (kigo) are used to refer to seasons.
Perception of Beauty
Haiku often includes emotions and perceptions of beauty, such as sabi (solitude), wabi (modest),
yugen (profundity), aware (sad and moving), and karumi (gentleness).
Structure
A haiku consists of seventeen syllables divided into three lines in the following arrangement: five
syllables, seven syllables, five syllables. These three lines can be rewritten in one line, resulting in a
shorter poem. Rarely is punctuation used in haiku, or in fact, a title.
Artistic Excellence
The outstanding artistic beauty of haiku is its reticence and wordlessness, which suggests rather than
describes, and is felt rather than analysed or explained. Reticence and pauses between words define
haiku. Because Japanese is a syllabary language, there can be very few words in a seventeen syllable
haiku. Classical haiku before the 19th century employed kigo (special words) when referring to
seasons; modern haiku is simpler, and the rules of kigo are looser. Haiku often just announces
something which occurs in a moment of inspiration. Suddenness, contrasting beauty, and
ephemeralness are important in haiku.
Haiku in Vietnamese Schools
Unlike Western literature, Japanese literature entered the Vietnamese school curriculum slowly and
quietly. However, Japanese literature has managed to captivate Vietnamese readers with its modesty,
reticence and profundity. In the high school literature curriculum, haiku is the only representative of
Japanese literature, but it is better represented at a tertiary level of education. At the university level,
students stand to be exposed to haiku by renowned poets such as Matsuo Basho, Yosa Buson,
Kobayashi Issa, Masaoka Shiki, and Chiyo-ni. The most studied poet is Zen Buddhist Matsuo Basho,
with many of his haiku featuring in course books.
On withered sprigs
a crow is standing
autumn afternoon.
Trên cành khô
chim quạ đậu
chiều thu.
(Kare eda ni
karasu no tomari keri
aki no kure)
Peach blossoms like clouds Hoa đào như áng mây xa
bell of Ueno temple echoes chuông đền Ueno vang vọng
or Asakusa
hay đèn Asakusa
The water-rail sings
in capital
misses capital
Chim đỗ quyên hót
ở Kinh đô
mà nhớ Kinh đô
(Hana no kumo
kane wa Ueno ka
Asakusa ka)
(Kyo nite mo
kyo natsukashi ya
hototogisu)
When haiku first appeared in course books at the beginning of 2000, many teachers had difficulties
because they did not have enough knowledge of this unfamiliar verse, while students lacked the
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desire to love the lessons. But thanks to books and the Internet, things have gradually changed.
Haiku is no longer strange and challenging. At the moment, haiku lessons interest both teachers and
students, which inspire the teaching and learning of these poems. Many teachers have organised
haiku competitions in classes, with sweets and applause as presents. From haiku, students can learn
to appreciate on Chinese four-line poems and the traditional six-eight-word distichs of Vietnam.
Learning poetry in general and haiku in particular will enrich students’ knowledge of literature, their
spiritual life and also train their artistic and composing skills. It will also help Asians become closer.
There are many undergraduates and postgraduates who have studied Japanese haiku, as well as many
successful national and international workshops about Japanese literature, as well as haiku. This
means that haiku is not only pleasure but is also an actively-researched academic topic.
The introduction of Japanese literature and Haiku to Vietnamese schools is both timely and
necessary. Schools and the national education system always play a basic role in receiving and
transferring cultures, and Japanese haiku is now a part of the cultural life of millions of Vietnamese
students.
Haiku in Social and Cultural Life
Haiku has, little by little, diffused into our social and cultural life. Moreover, the love of haiku has is
now a passion. The composition and enjoyment of such poetry has become a Tao (Do). We have
haiku tao (haikudo), like tea tao (chado), swordsmanship tao (kendo), perfume tao (kodo) and
calligraphy tao (shodo).
Both professional and amateur poets will all gradually get acquainted with haiku. The role of
the school in transmitting haiku is very significant, because the majority of haiku lovers are students
and teachers, rather than well-known Vietnamese poets.
At first, haiku only appeared in certain newspapers, websites, newspapers, and blogs. Thanks to their
diligence and patience, haiku poets can now compile their poem collections and see them on
bookshelves.
Some examples of Vietnamese haiku include Chuồn chuồn nghiêng cánh (Thiên Bảo), Bài ca
đom đóm - Điệu Haiku đất Việt (Trần Nguyên Thạch), Tươi mãi với thời gian (Lưu Đức Trung),
Tuyển tập thơ Haiku (Haiku Club, Ho Chi Minh City), Mắt lá (Huyền Tri), Khúc vô thanh (Vũ Tam
Huề), Cúc rộ mùa hoa (Đông Tùng), and Chấm hoa vàng (Hà Thiên Sơn), Hương vương chiều tà Thơ Haiku Việt (Nguyễn Thị Kim). (3, p. 349).
For haiku writers who love improvisation, poetic inspiration might come in each sadna,
where their language will be transferred automatically into that of haiku. In some meetings of
Vietnamese haiku lovers, haiku becomes a gentle means of communication between like-minded
individuals.
2007 was the year haiku really blossomed in Vietnam. This was due to several events related
to haiku. The first was the Japanese-Vietnamese Haiku Composition Contest organised by the
Japanese Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City, Tuoi Tre newspaper and the University of Social Sciences
and Humanities of Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnamese people attempted Vietnamese and Japanese haiku
while Japanese people attempted the same with Vietnamese haiku. It was held again in 2009. The
results of the third contest in 2011 will be published at the beginning of 2012. These contests have
resulted in a haiku composition movement in society, involving both professionals and amateurs.
The majority of them are students, teachers, especially Buddhist monks and nuns. This may be a
cultural spiritual activity which should be popularised in other countries around the world.
2007 also marked the foundation of the Vietnamese Haiku Club. This club was founded
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voluntarily; according a representative of the Tuoi Tre newspaper during the awards ceremony for
the second Haiku composition contest in 2009: "There are many fans of this unique Japanese verse
which led to the foundation of the Haiku Club, and we have helped each other in composing,
organising meetings and publishing our poems. These are the main points where Japanese culture
has been absorbed in Vietnam" (4, p. 10-11).
The members of this club are increasing in number and come from a variety of backgrounds
and ages. The club regularly issues intramural magazines and its members’ poem collections. It is
obvious that "Vietnamese people become more integrated with Japanese culture by studying, loving
and composing haiku" (4, p. 10).
Issues in Transferring Japanese Haiku to Vietnam
Vietnamese are creative in absorbing foreign culture. As lovers of Japanese haiku, they open their
arms and hearts to welcome it, and then transferring it into Vietnamese haiku. In general, the
Vietnamese deeply understand Japanese haiku. In practical compositions, however, they compose
broad-minded haiku in a distinctly Vietnamese style. The technical term "Vietnamese haiku" has
officially appeared in club names, titles of poem collections, and some haiku-related articles in
Vietnam. The Japanese are serious and respect tradition; while the Vietnamese are often more
accommodating of it, which is why their haiku is less restricted by rules than Japanese haiku is. This
is reflected by the wide range of Vietnamese haiku themes: "The haiku produced by contestants have
a wide range of themes. They include a love of nation, the Vietnam-Japan relationship, and profound
feelings for Japanese culture and pretty Japanese girls, as well as emotions of daily life and empathy
for those living unhappy lives" (4, p. 14).
Những bài thơ Haiku Việt sau là một vài ví dụ:
- Xó chợ,
chiếc lon trống
hạt mưa mồ côi. (Nguyễn Thánh Ngã)
Corner of market
empty can
an orphan rain drop.
- Nở bừng giữa Hà Nội
hoa anh đào như nụ cười tươi
em gái xứ mặt trời.
(Phùng Phương Quý)
Blossom in Hanoi
peach blossoms like smile
girl from land of sun.
- Về qua sông tháng chạp
cô gái tưới những vồng hoa cải
nắng vàng trôi trên sông. (Nguyễn Minh Phúc)
Cross river December
the girl’s watering flowers
sunlight on river.
- Bên thềm rêu đá lạnh
bóng thời gian phủ kín Kinh thành
91
tiếng người xưa còn vọng. (Võ Thị Hoa)
On frozen moss-grown rock
shadow of time covers Citadel
voice of the past still echoes.
- Cúc áo bung ra
trắng ngần
hạ đến (Nguyễn Thế Thọ)
shirt buttons burst open
snow white
summer arrives
Vietnamese haiku does not have to follow seasonal themes or kigo like traditional Japanese haiku.
This allows the composers relative freedom.
The number of syllables in Vietnamese haiku is also an issue for composers. The author
Nguyễn Vũ Quỳnh Như discussed this in an article titled "Variations of Haiku 5-7-5 syllable
structure in Vietnam". "Haiku structure in Vietnam is transferred into the multiform, based on
individual perception" (p. 356). The author also believes that "Vietnamese haiku needs a standard" (p.
357), so that it expresses not only its creativity but also preserves the everlasting beauty of Japanese
haiku.
Because of the differences between the two languages, i.e. Japanese being a multi-syllable
language and Vietnamese being a single-syllable language, translating Japanese haiku into
Vietnamese results in a different numbers of syllables. The seventeen syllables of Japanese haiku are
often contained in 5-7 words (not more than ten words), while the seventeen syllables of Vietnamese
haiku are often in seventeen words. If Vietnamese haiku has seventeen syllables in seventeen words,
we may say that the haiku rules are being obeyed. But there will be an abundance of words, far more
than the reticence of Japanese haiku. If Vietnamese haiku allows fewer than seventeen syllables in
seventeen words, the rules of haiku would have been broken. Because of this, Vietnamese composers
have learnt to adapt, and temporarily fix the number of syllables in Vietnamese haiku: the maximum
number of words is seventeen; the maximum of three lines follows the 5-7-5 word order. In our
opinion, that is a clever and reasonable solution. Therefore, Vietnamese haiku lovers do not feel
restricted and lose their inspiration. Thanks to this, we have been able to enjoy Vietnamese haiku in
abundance.
Finally, I would like to end this article with my own haiku, which describes the vitality of
good haiku:
Giăng một sợi tơ trời
qua bao miền ngôn ngữ
chỉ mười bảy (17) thôi.
Spin a silk
through regions of languages
only seventeen.
92
References
Nguyễn, N. T. (2011). Tổng quan lịch sử văn học Nhật Bản, Nxb Giáo dục Việt Nam. Vĩnh Phúc.
Nhật, C.(2000). Văn học Nhật Bản từ khởi thủy đến 1868, Nxb Giáo dục, Hà Nội.
Nguyễn Vũ Quỳnh Như (2011), "Variations of Haiku 5-7-5 syllable structure in Vietnam".
Summary Record of International Science Workshop. Văn học Việt Nam và Nhật Bản trong bối cảnh
Đông Á. Ho Chi Minh City.
Japanese Consultant in Ho Chi Minh City (2009). "The Second Japanese-Vietnamese Haiku
Composition Contest”.
Ngữ văn lớp 10 (2009). Nxb Giáo dục, Hà Nội.
Contact Information
Th.S Hoàng Thị Xuân Vinh
Khoa Ngữ Văn, trường Đại học Sư phạm Huế
Việt Nam
Email:nethoang@gmail.com
Mobile: +84914173516
93
The Prospect of ASEAN’s Lead Role in East Asian Multilateral Cooperation
By Jan Vincent P. Galas
Abstract
East Asia is a region undergoing vast development. As the region further cooperates
in terms of economics and politics, it is significant to study the leadership in the
region in order to have a clear visual of the trajectory of East Asia. China, Japan and
South Korea have emphasised their support and recognition of “ASEAN centrality”
in East Asian regional cooperation in the recently concluded 2010 ASEAN
Ministerial Summit held in Hanoi. Hence, this research examines the validity and
extent of the lead role of ASEAN by chronicling official statements and press releases
of the “plus three countries” as well as analysing the aftermath of the 1998 Asian
financial crisis. This research argues that, in terms of credibility and status, ASEAN
had become a leader by default in the region due to the convenience of its sole
existence and the scope of its initiated frameworks. The findings also point that, with
all things constant, the validity and extent of ASEAN’s leadership contribution in East
Asian regional cooperation lies in its capacity to stimulate China, Japan and South
Korea to move into a new plane of regional integration by cultivating shared norms,
values and rules. If the platforms of ASEAN in the region did not exist, it would be
highly unlikely that the current level of cooperation in East Asia would ever be
reached. Thus, ASEAN’s lead role can be best depicted by its pivotal role in
synchronising cooperation in the region, notwithstanding its limitations in practical
and timely policy coordination.
Keywords: East Asia, ASEAN, Shared Norms, Constructivism and Multilateralism.
94
Introduction
Leadership is important in addressing international issues such as trade facilitation, transborder
security concerns and multilateral interactions at large. Effective leadership is significant in creating
conducive platforms for enhancing cooperation among countries. Though significant in many cases,
discourse on leadership in international institution building remains a topic more or less ignored in
the literature to date.20
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the validity and extent of the idea that ASEAN is
taking the leading role in East Asian regional cooperation. This would serve to contribution to the
growing number of literature that deals with the central topic of this study with the aim of expanding
current discourse on East Asia regionalisation and regionalism vis-à-vis the added value and
limitations of the role of ASEAN in the said region.
ASEAN becomes prominent and, at the same time, controversial with regard to its leadership
ability with regard to East Asian regional multilateralism because it manages to create and sustain
many multilateral structures to enhance its collective influence, and more importantly, engage great
powers.21 These regional arrangements also become the sites and subjects for various disagreements,
raising questions about ASEAN’s ability to remain in the leading position in East Asia.
It is important to emphasise that ASEAN never intended to be an organisation promoting
regional integration, in the same manner that the EU or ASEAN never intended to fulfil a classical
state-centric surety role, whether as a collective defensive organisation or a collective security
organisation, in which all member states would pledge to punish a member who commits
aggression.22 Instead, ASEAN’s original purpose was to accelerate economic growth, social progress
and cultural development in the Southeast Asian region through joint endeavours in the spirit of
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful
community of Southeast Asian nations. 23 Although the emphasis throughout the declaration was
about socio-economic development, the subtext was all about enhancing security in what is seen as a
fundamentally unstable and threatening regional environment.24 The establishment of ASEAN took
place at the height of the Vietnam War, which was, in one way or another, a spillover of the Cold War.
It is often argued that ASEAN is very much a product of its geopolitical circumstances.25
Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus among observers that, in the past decades,
ASEAN has contributed to stable relations between the great powers in East Asia. 26 Alice Ba argues
20
Arild Underdal, “Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management,” William Zartman (ed.),
International Multilateral Negotiations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), pp. 178-197. See also Jonas Tallberg,
Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
21 Vijayachandra Naidu, Great Power Relations, Regional Multilateralism, and International
Relations
of
East
Asia,
Slavic
Research
Center,
http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_2_ses/07_naidu.pdf. (Search date: March 23, 2011)
22 Arnold Wolfers, Collective Defense Versus Collective Security, Discord and Collaboration, Essays
on International Politics (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp.
181-204.
23 “ASEAN Declaration 1967,” http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm. (Search date: April 11, 2011)
24 Mark Beeson, “Conceptualizing East Asia: From the Local to Global,” Mark Beeson, Regionalism
and Globalization in East Asia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 7.
25 Beeson, p. 7..
26 Egberink Fenna and Frans-Paul van Putten, “ASEAN and Strategic Rivalry among Great Powers
in Asia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2010), p. 132.
95
that ASEAN establishes new channels and platforms for communication.27 However, due to the socalled ‘ASEAN Way’ which emphasises the idea of consensus, sovereignty and non-interference,
many scholars doubt ASEAN’s capability of taking the lead role towards East Asian regional
cooperation.
Previous Research
The existing studies on the role, contributions and constraints of ASEAN in East Asian regional
cooperation focus on the institutional makeup and relational strategy of ASEAN with great powers in
the region.
Amitav Archarya, in his article “Strong in the World of Weak: Southeast Asia’s Regional
Architecture,” analyses the status of ASEAN from a soft realist lens. According to Archarya,
individual ASEAN members may lack structural power, but collectively they acquire (as its founding
members would have rationally calculated) enough bargaining power to get the attention of the great
powers and even socialise them through its regional institutions. 28 Developing multilateral
institutions to engage great powers is part of the game for ASEAN. Assisting in its quest for
institutional leadership is the fact that the great power claimants to such leadership in Asia cancel
each other out because of their mutual rivalry.
With this, ASEAN will remain as the hub of Asian regionalism, not least because other
possible contenders either lack legitimacy (as is the case with the United States, Australia or Canada)
or are too divided among themselves to stake a leadership claim successfully (as is the case with
China and Japan or China and the United States). Archarya argues that ASEAN, for the time being,
looks to keep its leadership role in East Asian institutions. He added that other major powers are
unlikely to challenge ASEAN’s role out of a fear of undermining the whole process.
However, ASEAN’s prominent role is likely to come under increasing challenges from the
rising influence of China and India. A key challenge for ASEAN would be engaging these powers
without courting their dominance. ASEAN has had some success in this area in the past but
sustaining it in the future will require that ASEAN, as the hub of regional socialisation, remain a
cohesive organisation. Following Archarya’s logic, he points out the relevance of power struggles
among contending great powers in the region vis-à-vis ASEAN’s structural strength and legitimacy
in the region. However, in his final analysis, he did not explore how ASEAN contributes to the
ongoing evolution of East Asian regional cooperation, given the context he outlined.
Yuen Khong and Helen E. S. Nesadurai, in their work entitled, “Hanging Together:
Institutional Design and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and ARF,” argue that ASEAN’s
ability to “lead by default” depends on its ability to cooperate and work as one. 29 They further argue
the role of the institutions and soft balancing against potential Chinese power by facilitating the
United States’ prolonged commitment to the region. This line of thinking is almost similar to
27
Alice Ba, “Regional Security in East Asia: ASEAN’s Value Added and Limitations,” Journal of
Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2010), p. 116.
Amitav Acharya, “The Strong in the World of the Weak: Southeast Asia in Asia’s Regional
Architecture,” Asia’s New Multilateralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 173.
29 Yuen Khong and Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “Hanging Together: Institutional Design and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and ARF,” in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston,
28
Crafting Cooperation: The Design and Performance of Regional Institutions in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 32-82.
96
Archarya’s logic on great power rivalry.
However, unlike Archarya’s idea, Khong and Nesadurai argue that there is a conscious effort
from ASEAN to balance these great powers in the region in order to maintain its leadership position.
Although whether the leadership happens by default or through conscious soft balancing efforts on
the part of ASEAN, both arguments still fall short in explaining the leadership contribution of
ASEAN in the region.
The most interesting work on ASEAN’s position in East Asian region is Evelyn Goh
conceptual framework of enmeshment, balancing and hierarchical order. 30 Goh argues that in order
to influence the shape of the new regional order, ASEAN is pursuing two main pathways to order in
the region: 1) the "omni-enmeshment" of major powers; and 2) a complex balance of influence.31
The "omni-enmeshment" strategy mainly refers to broader and multidirectional efforts, by which the
ASEAN countries involve all major powers in a regional security dialogue or a form of institution,
either through bilateral arrangements or collective arrangements such as ARF.
The complex balance of influence implies the Southeast Asian version of indirect balancing
in bilateral or triangular relations, combined with the more ambitious aim of forging a region-wide
balance of influence among the major powers using competitive institutionalisation and diplomacy.
According to Goh, these strategies help produce a stable power distribution outcome. These efforts
have helped ASEAN successfully sustain its leadership in designing the regional security order.
Spring boarding from the work of Goh, this research further delves into the results of the
enmeshment process of the great powers within the regional arrangements that ASEAN created.
Surprisingly, the literature on ASEAN’s role in East Asian regional cooperation has thus far
been limited to only security matters, or its institutional make-up in general. There is an inadequate
analysis about the validity and extent of the “ASEAN centrality rhetoric” in East Asian multilateral
cooperation. As such, this research explores this issue with the goal of analysing the prospect of
ASEAN leadership in the region
Main Argument and Thesis Questions
This research argues that, with all things constant, the validity and extent of ASEAN’s leadership
contribution in East Asian regional cooperation lies in its capacity to stimulate China, Japan and
South Korea into moving into a new plane of regional integration by cultivating shared norms,
values and practices, notwithstanding its limitations in practical and timely policy coordination. In
addition, this study delves onto the following questions: 1) what is the extent of the validity of
ASEAN’s lead role in East Asian regional cooperation? 2) What are the contributions of ASEAN in
the power dynamics of East Asian regional cooperation?
Methodology
On an aggregate level, this research tests the causality of ASEAN’s role and capacity to cultivate
norms and cooperative practices as well as its ability to manoeuvre important turns of events in the
East Asian region in understanding the extent of its lead role in the said regional cooperation. To
accomplish this task, the researcher first accounts the historical conceptualisation of the East Asian
Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional
Security,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2006), pp. 321-323.
31 Goh, p. 321-323.
30
97
regional cooperation in exposing the evolution of ASEAN being at the core parallel of East Asian
integration. Then the research moves into explicating regional arrangements ASEAN framed in the
region, which is important in exposing how ASEAN is able to take advantage of the frameworks and
the Asian financial crisis in cultivating norms and practices in East Asia.
Given the complexity of the research topic, this study uses the qualitative method of research
because: 1) the analysis on the idea of extent and validity of ASEAN’s lead role in the region cannot
be quantified in numerical data; 2) the research data gathered is based heavily on text; and 3) the
research issue will explore an intangible factor that may not be readily apparent in the status quo.
Qualitative research is a type of scientific research widely used in the field of social sciences. This
research method seeks to answer questions that cannot be quantified, systematically uses a
predefined set of procedures to answer the given questions, collect evidence of data, and produces
findings that were not determined in advance and are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of
the study.32
ASEAN Centrality in East Asian Regional Cooperation
This section distinguishes the relevance of ASEAN-led frameworks compared to the other
institutions in Asia. It also identifies the contributions of ASEAN-led frameworks in the evolving
East Asian regional cooperation. Furthermore, this section accounts the recognition given by the
“plus three states” to the idea of ASEAN centrality.33 It also moves to the extent of explaining the
context of ASEAN centrality in East Asian regional cooperation. A table of the contributions of
ASEAN-led frameworks in terms of policies, treaties and projects in the region will also be provided
in this section. Finally, this section analyses how these policies, treaties and projects have cultivated
norms and values in East Asian regional transactions.
Comparing ASEAN with the other Multilateral Frameworks in Asia
In examining the validity and extent of the lead role performed by ASEAN in East Asia, it is helpful
to outline other existing multilateral frameworks in the region. As illustrated in Table 1, the
multilateral organisations that encompass the region are APEC, the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) and the frameworks led by ASEAN—APT, EAS and ARF. The
rest of the platforms preclude the idea of East Asian cooperation. Considering the scope of
membership, APT is the only existing framework that fits the geographical limits of the East Asian
region. Nonetheless, it is still important to probe the nature of other multilateral frameworks to
verify the validity of ASEAN’s lead role in the region beyond geographical reasoning.
Table 1. Multilateral framework in Asia34
“Family Health International: Qualitative Research Method: A data Collector’s Field Guide,”
http://www.fhi.org/NR/rdonlyres/.../overview1.pdf. (Retrieved March 26, 2011)
33 The concept of Plus Three refers to China, Japan and South Korea.
34 B. Gill and M. Green, pp. 2-3.
32
98
Organisation
Scope
Lead
Asia
Pacific
Economics U.S.
Economic
Cooperation
(APEC)
ASEAN
Three
(APT)
ASEAN
Regional
Forum
(ARF)
Members
Status
ASEAN, Japan, China,
South Korea, Australia,
India, New Zealand,
Canada, Chile, Hong Existing
Kong, Mexico, Papua
New
Guinea,
Peru,
Russia, Chinese Taipei,
United States
Plus
Economics ASEAN
Security
ASEAN
Comprehensive
Economics Japan
Economic
Partnership for
East
Asia
(CEPEA)
Japan, China, South Existing
Korea
Japan, China, South
Korea,
US,
Russia,
India, New Zealand, Existing
Australia, Canada, North
Korea, East Timor, EU,
Mongolia,
Pakistan,
Russia, Sri Lanka
ASEAN, China, South
Korea,
US,
Russia, Existing
India, New Zealand,
Australia
Japan, China, South
Korea,
US,
Russia,
East
Asian Economics ASEAN
India, New Zealand,
Summit
Australia
(EAS)
Argentina,
Canada,
Korean Energy
Chile, Czech Republic,
Development
Energy
Korea/U.S. EU, Indonesia, New
Organisation
Zealand,
Poland,
(KEDO)
Uzbekistan, Japan, US,
Australia
China,
Kazakhstan,
Shanghai
Security
China
Kyrgyzstan,
Russia,
Cooperation
Tajikistan,
and
Organisation
Uzbekistan
(SCO)
China
Japan, South Korea,
Six-party Talks Security
North Korea, Russia,
United States
Security
U.S.
Trilateral
South Korea, Japan,
Coordination
United States
and Oversight
99
Existing
Dissolved
Existing
Existing
Dissolved
Group
(TCOG)
Security
Trilateral
Security
Dialogue (TSD)
Japan/U.S.
Japan United States and
Australia
Existing
In discussing East Asian regional cooperation, the most contentious multilateral framework, aside
from the ASEAN initiated frameworks, is APEC—a platform endorsed by the United States. To put
things in perspective, it is important to point out that prior to APEC, there were no other regional
frameworks in Asia, except for the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which never materialised.
Therefore, APEC, before APT is created, represents the concept of East Asian multilateral
cooperation. Established in 1989, APEC’s primary goal was to further enhance economic growth and
prosperity for the region by achieving the “Bogor Goals” of free and open trade and investment in
the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for industrialised economies, and 2020 for developing economies. 35
Although with the turn of the events of the past decade, it seems that APEC has been losing its
position as a central organisation in the region.
As Hyun-Seok Yu argues in his work entitled “Explaining the emergence of New East Asian
Regionalism: Beyond Power and Interest-based Approaches,” APEC depicts the conflict between
liberal ideology and Asian resistance, which was fuelled by the Asian economic crisis in 1997. 36 Due
to the course of action taken by APEC at the height of the said financial crisis, Asian countries began
to realise the concept of “us,” in relation to the United States and the West. In short, using the lens of
identity politics, the 1997 financial crisis brought the end of credence of APEC and instigated the
surge of an exclusive Asia, if not that of East Asian cooperation.
Another progressive multilateral framework in the region is the CEPEA, a Japan-led proposal
for trade cooperation and free trade agreement. The goal behind this framework was to create a
multi-regional organisation of East Asian, Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian countries so that it
could enlarge and build up a multi-regional economic partnership specifically focusing on
cooperation, facilitation and liberalisation.37 It is viewed as an expanded concept of the East Asian
Community. It includes almost the entire Pacific-rim area.
However, it is important to note that CEPEA is adopted in the region to further the goals of
the East Asian Summit (EAS). During the third EAS in November 2007, the member nations of EAS
confirmed the importance of CEPEA with the goal of deepening economic integration in East Asia,
as well as narrowing development gaps in the region.38
Furthermore, to fully understand the concept of CEPEA, it is imperative to be aware of its three key
features: 1) ASEAN should be the driving force of CEPEA; 2) CEPEA should build on the de facto
integration of the region that has so far been led by the business sector for the economic and social
benefit of all the people of the region; and 3) CEPEA should take into account ‘open regionalism.39
“About APEC,” http://www.apec.org. (Retrieved April 21, 2011)
Hyun-Seok Yu, “Explaining the emergence of New East Asian Regionalism: Beyond Power and
Interest-based Approaches, “ Asian Perspective, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003), pp. 261-288.
37
Shinji Shigematsu, “CEPEA: Is It Possible to Organize Asia-Oceanic Community?” The Otemon Journal of
Australian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2006), pp. 21−28.
38 “Report of the Track Two Study Group on Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia
(CEPEA),” http://www.thaifta.com/thaifta/Portals/0/cepea_report.pdf. (Retrieved April 25, 2011)
39 “Report of the Track Two Study Group on Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia
(CEPEA),” http://www.thaifta.com/thaifta/Portals/0/cepea_report.pdf. (Retrieved April 25, 2011)
35
36
100
This means that CEPEA should not be seen as a separate framework from the ASEAN-led
frameworks; instead, it should be viewed as a component of the ASEAN framework.
Given the abovementioned discussions, it can be cautiously resolved that apart from
ASEAN-led frameworks, APEC seems to be the only other framework that exists in the region.
However, APEC is inclusive of the entire Asia Pacific and also, it has lost its credence after its
incapability to satisfactorily assist the East Asian nations during the wake of Asian financial crisis,
which paved way for the creation of APT.
Compared to other existing regional cooperation frameworks, it is clear that ASEAN is
positioned to run East Asian regional cooperation due to the fact that there are no other organisations
or platforms that cater exclusively to East Asian nations. Nevertheless, it is also important to check if
ASEAN’s lead role in the region is welcomed by the other non-Southeast Asian countries.
Recognition from Northeast Asian Nations
This section chronicles the official statements and press releases of Northeast Asian governments
with regard to the recognition given to ASEAN centrality in East Asian regional cooperation. It also
delves into the rationale of the “plus three” in participating in the ASEAN led frameworks.
China
China has been very supportive of the lead position of ASEAN in furthering East Asian regional
cooperation. Ever since the formation of APT, China has been clear in ensuring the creation of strong
bilateral relationship with ASEAN. Unlike Japan, who approached ASEAN countries individually,
China collectively approached ASEAN as an organisation when it forged the China-ASEAN FTA.40
During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
mentioned that China supported ASEAN’s lead role in East Asian cooperation.41 This was further
supported by Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue, who said that he hoped the existing
cooperation mechanisms would serve the overriding goal of regional peace and prosperity during the
13th ASEAN and 5th East Asia Summit in Hanoi last October 2010. 42 Hu also emphasised that
China attaches importance to and actively takes part in East Asian cooperation. Sun Yuanjiang, a
deputy director from the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) International Trade and Economic Affairs
Department, has said that China gives full respect to ASEAN's core role while working on
establishing an East Asian free trade area.43
China is the first major country outside the region to accede to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia and to forge a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity.
China also supports the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.44 This means that China
firmly supports ASEAN in playing the lead role in East Asia cooperation.
40
Rongji Zhu, "Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development," 5th APT Summit,
http://www.chinaembassy-indonesia.or.id/eng/20836. html. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
41 Jiechi Yang, “China-ASEAN
Foreign Ministers' Meeting,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn /eng/zxxx
/t719471.htm. (Retrieved April, 26. 2011)
42 “China hopes to deepen East Asian cooperation through leaders' meetings in Hanoi, ” Xinhua News,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201010/22/c_13569364. htm. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
43 “China-ASEAN
Free Trade Boom Spills over into World Economy,” Global Times,
http://business.globaltimes.cn/china-economy/2011-01/611681.html. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
44 “Embrace
New Opportunities for China-ASEAN Cooperation,”
http://www.fmprc. gov.cn
/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t653431.htm. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
101
The rationale behind China’s recognition and support to ASEAN lead role in East Asian
regional cooperation is further explained by Wang Hongying in his work entitled “Multilateralism in
Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialisation.” He argues that the Chinese government’s
attitude towards multilateralism has been quite instrumental, as indicated by the official discourse
after China’s post-cold War policy, which refers to a multipolar world order detailing China’s
opposition to alleged American hegemony in the international community. He also clarifies that
Chinese international relations scholars and policymakers are straight forward with practical reasons
for their limited endorsement of multilateralism, which is more political in nature. Multilateral
arrangements are used to counter-balance military alliances led by the United States and to
undermine American dominance in the region, as well as appease Southeast Asian nations and
ameliorate their perception of China as a threat.45
Hund argues that with the creation of APT, which is exclusive to East Asian nations, is very
interesting for China, since its strategic opponent, the United States, is not part of the framework. 46 It
also serves as an avenue for China to further cultivate its political goodwill towards the other East
Asian countries which allows them to yield higher diplomatic returns. With the advent of the
Northeast Asian summit, which is included in APT, China is now able to showcase political goodwill
with the goal of cautioning the “China threat theory.”
Lastly, with the China-ASEAN FTA, the relationship of China towards ASEAN is being
reinforced. Favourable economic conditions such as low labour and production costs, a strong inflow
of FDI and increasingly advanced means of industrial production, would boost additional Chinese
exports to ASEAN, and thus create a trade surplus with the developing countries of Southeast Asia.47
Japan
Japan also recognises the lead role of ASEAN in building East Asian regional cooperation. During
the ASEAN Summit in Thailand in October 2010, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama assured his
Southeast Asian counterparts that regional mechanisms centring on ASEAN will play a leading role
in bringing the concept of an ‘‘East Asian community,’’ but he has made it clear that the Japan-US
alliance remains the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.48 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan,
Seiji Maehara, has said that Japan intends to proactively support the effort towards development of a
regional community by ASEAN, which is at the core of the regional frameworks, including the EAS,
the ARF, and the APEC, and to make an active contribution itself in this process while respecting
ASEAN centrality during the official visit of H.E. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-General of the
ASEAN to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).49
According to a senior Japanese foreign ministry official, Japan’s new foreign policy roadmap
towards ASEAN, which was announced at the East Asia Summit in Hanoi, supports ASEAN
45
Hongying Wang, “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization?” Wixing Hu (eds.), China’s
International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts (Lanham/ New York/ Oxford: University Press
of America, 2000), pp. 71-91.
46 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 351.
47 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 351.
48 “Japan sees ASEAN at core of East Asian community, but stresses U.S. ties,” Japan Today,
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/japan-sees-asean-at-core-of-east-asian-community-butstresses-us-ties. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
49
“Meeting and Dinner between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Seiji Maehara and Secretary-General of
ASEAN Surin Pitsuwan,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ announce/2010/10/1020_02.html. (Search date: April
26, 2011)
102
centrality as it promotes an equal and effective Japan-ASEAN partnership in all cooperation
including their transparency. 50 Japan also supports ASEAN’s efforts to solve the South China Sea
disputes in a peaceful manner.51
Lastly, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, H.E. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, has been impressed with
the level of enthusiasm and strong commitment that Japan has articulated towards ASEAN
community building, in particular the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, which is considered by
the Japanese leadership to be a critical point in strengthen ASEAN. to enhance ASEAN integration
and strengthen ASEAN centrality.52
Although Japan is supportive of the role ASEAN is playing in the region, this does not mean
that Japan is keen in creating an exclusive economic or political bloc in the region. According to
Hund, Japan’s position with regard to cooperation talks in East Asia, boils down to the readiness of
the country in providing development aid and assistance. The Japanese government is dedicated in
supporting the Southeast Asian nations on various cooperation schemes, specifically in the areas of
transnational problems like piracy, drug-trafficking and HIV.
Japan had previously used the benefactor rhetoric when it came to its role in ASEAN. Japan’s
stance requests a transparent process, and is coherent and complementary to the global system, with
regard to all non-member countries.53 Hund also argues that APT is valuable to Japan because APT
is able to establish summit meetings that are exclusive only to the Northeast Asian countries. 54 This
is important to Japan because this materialises Japan’s idea of a new three-way forum. 55 Japan
anxiety in strengthening ties with the two Northeast Asian neighbours was evident during the time of
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.56
Were it not for the APT, it would be unlikely for these three countries to establish regular
annual summit meetings. Although the meetings are done in a casual manner, this annual interaction
of Northeast Asian officials may lead to more valuable diplomatic results that may pave the way to
mutual understanding and the diffusion of tension.
Japan’s interests in APT was also concretised with the idea that it needed to continuously
improve relations with ASEAN nations in order to create a healthy political environment to expand
Japanese business processes in the said region. Despite this, Hund argues that Japan does not
envision APT as the seedbed for an East Asian free trade or economic bloc. Instead, it prefers
selective bilateral approaches to trade liberalisation. On an aggregate level, Japan’s interests in East
Asian regional cooperation are based on the idea of ensuring the economic security of Southeast
Asia as a base for Japanese production and business, and not regional bloc-building in East Asia.
“ASEAN important to Japan,” New Asian Republic, http://newasiarepublic.com /?p=21308.
(Search date: April 26, 2011)
51 “ASEAN important to Japan,” New Asian Republic, http://newasiarepublic.com /?p=21308.
(Search date: April 26, 2011)
52 “Japan to Support ASEAN Integration and ASEAN’s Role in Regional Architecture,”
http://www.aseansec.org/25393.htm. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
53
Makiko Tanaka, “Statement by Her Excellency Makiko Tanaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on the
occasion
of
the
ASEAN
+3
Meeting,”
http://www.mofa.go.
jp/region/asiapaci/asean/conference/asean3/state0107.html. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
54 M. Hund and N. Okfen, op. cit., pp. 362-263.
55 Anthony Rowley, “New Trilateral forum among East Asian nations in the works,” The Business
Times, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg. (Retrieved April 28, 2011)
56 Rowley, “New Trilateral forum among East Asian nations in the works,” The Business Times,
http://www.businesstimes.com.sg. (Retrieved April 28, 2011)
50
103
South Korea
South Korea has been very vocal in supporting ASEAN’s lead role in East Asian regional
cooperation. In the opening statement by South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoo Ching-Ha
on the 30th Anniversary of the establishment of the Association of the Southeast Nations, he
emphasised that South Korea highly values the role ASEAN has been playing for the last thirty years
in ensuring peace and stability in the East Asian region. 57 ASEAN has set an excellent example for
regional cooperation by settling disputes through dialogue and promoting economic development
through various cooperation schemes.58
South Korea’s government participates in ASEAN-led frameworks, specifically the APT, as
the basis for an increasingly institutionalised regional body for economic, political and security
cooperation.59 It envisions the forum as developing into a more comprehensive community of values
and institutions.60 Korea has also shown great interest in a Japan-Korea FTA, which is frequently
portrayed as a first step towards a Northeast Asian FTA with China, which, in turn, could be the
foundation of an East Asian FTA including Southeast Asia.61 In the official discourse, East Asian
community-building is to be open and transparent to outsiders; for the US, Japan and Korea’s
membership is a guarantee for a US-centric world view.62
The annual individual Northeast Asian summits (breakfast meetings) that were established
within the APT process are portrayed as an important means of establishing trust between the leaders
of Korea, Japan and China through informal dialogues initially focusing exclusively on economic
issues. 63 The Korean government describes the ultimate purpose of APT as managing
interdependence among the countries of the region and providing peace and stability in the region.
Hund argues that Korea’s outlook on East Asia regional cooperation is juxtaposed on the existing
global structure as it aims to play a greater role in institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.64 He contends that coming from the South Korean Government
perspective, the collective voice of APT countries can be heard clearly by Washington and the
capitals of Europe in terms of playing a greater role in the international community.65
On the other hand, in his work entitled “China-Korea Relations: Keeping the Eye on the
(WTO) Prize While Containing Consular Crises”, Scott Snyder argues that Korea, like Japan and
other ASEAN states, does not wish East Asia to turn into a political or economic bloc.66 He states
“Opening Statement By H.E. Mr. Yoo Ching-Ha Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea,”
http://www.aseansec.org/4023.htm. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
58 “Opening Statement By H.E. Mr. Yoo Ching-Ha Minister of Foreign Affairs of Korea,”
http://www.aseansec.org/4023.htm. (Retrieved April 26, 2011)
59
“Reference Materials for the ASEAN Plus 3 Summit and State Visits to Singapore,” Korea.net,
http://www.korea.net/2k/focusonpub_focus/content.asp?cate=03& serial no = 151. (Retrieved April 27, 2011)
60 Roger Mitton, "Interview: Hong Soon-young," Asia Now,
http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/ asiaweek/interview/ hong.soon.young/index.html. (Retrieved
May 4, 2011)
61
Yong-Kul Won, “East Asia Economic Integration: A Korean Perspective,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol.
15, No. 1 (2001), pp. 71-96.
62 R. Mitton,
63 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 336.
64 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 336.
65 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 336.
66
Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: Keeping the Eye on the (WTO) Prize While Containing Consular Crises,"
Comparative Connections, Vol 3. No. 4 (2001).
57
104
that a one-sided regionalist approach will be detrimental to multilateralism.67 A further fragmentation
of the world economy will not do any good to the outward-oriented East Asian economies.
Although ASEAN’s lead role is open to criticism, in terms of size, intra-institutional issues
and lack of stringent executive powers, it must be noted that ASEAN centrality does not pose a
threat to the region because it is not seen as a power by neighbouring Northeast Asian countries and
the rest of the world. In addition, ASEAN has a good record of cooperation and, to certain extent,
credibility in leading the regional cooperation in East Asia.
The Extent of ASEAN’s Lead Role in the Region
To put things in perspective, it is important to contextualise the idea of ASEAN centrality. The lead
role that ASEAN is assuming in the region does not entail economic neither military supremacy.
Instead, the lead role that ASEAN is playing in the region pertains to its capacity to bring together
significant states, despite historical animosities, into a platform that enables them to create a
conducive environment for cooperation and regional norm cultivation.
Enmeshing Superpowers in the Frameworks
One clear achievement of ASEAN in the East Asian region is its capability to enmesh superpowers
in its regional frameworks. According to Goh, the idea of ‘enmeshment’ refers to the process of
engaging an actor or entity so as to draw it into deep involvement into a system or community,
enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim of
integration.68 In the process, the actor’s interests are redefined. Its identity possibly alters and goes
further than engagement because it includes the longer-term goal of identity alteration, and because
it is better able to accommodate multiple objects or targets so as to take into greater account the
integrity and order of the system.69 This situation is best exemplified by ARF. Through this forum,
ASEAN has managed to engage many big powers into action, bringing in the US, China, and the
European Union into a regional dialogue.
The same strategy has been done in APT dialogue, where China, Japan and South Korea have
been roped in for exchanges and cooperative measures in terms of economic matters. The rationale
behind these actions is to attract these powers to closer economic and political relationships with
Southeast Asia as a whole, and to deepen political and defence relationships with individual
countries, so as to further interdependence and to deepen their sense of having a stake in the region’s
security, so that they would be more interested in helping to maintain regional stability, mainly
through political and diplomatic means.70
Scott Snyder, "China-Korea Relations: Keeping the Eye on the (WTO) Prize While Containing
Consular Crises," Comparative Connections, Vol 3. No. 4 (2001).
68
Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,”
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2005), pp. 113–157.
69 Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,”
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2005), pp. 113–157.
67
70
Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International
Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2005), pp. 113–157.
105
The Context: More Economical, Less Political
Also, in terms of scope of the ASEAN-led frameworks, it can be modestly depicted that the focus is
more economical—creating financial cooperation exchanges in the region. Despite the fact that ARF
has been created to deal with security issues, most of the subject matters successfully dealt by ARF
were non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, food, energy security, climate change, illegal
migration, drug and human trafficking, and piracy. Issues concerning North Korea or territorial
claims in the South China Sea are areas that the ARF cannot address.
Cultivating Norms and Guiding Principles
To some extent, ASEAN has successfully cultivated norms and rules in East Asia. Moreover,
ASEAN was able to socialise not only the plus three countries but also major countries such as the
US, China and the European Union on the said norms and values in furthering the interests of the
region. If these norms did not exist, the present level of regional cooperation would not have been
attainable. ASEAN’s lead role may be best depicted in its pivotal role in coordinating cooperation in
the region.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that East Asian regional cooperation can be
expected to develop into a grouping whose members are linked by a firm bond of solidarity.71 As
may be noted from the criticism of expert observers, these norms are very few in number and are
general in nature. The power struggle between Japan and China alone prevents this idea from
emerging into an all-East Asian solidarity group as they will contend with each other for influence
and strategically position themselves in all the ASEAN-led frameworks.
However, the general rivalry between Japan and China, ironically, also causes them to make
long-term political investments in the region such as assigning political and economic resources to
Southeast Asian countries, without expecting direct material returns, as they are seeking to find more
acceptance as responsible and cooperative partners and increase their influence in Southeast Asia.72
As a result, Japan and China will be projecting and mirroring solidarity with Southeast Asia. 73 If the
situation within East Asian regional cooperation remains as it is, there is a possibility that sustained
and repetitive projection and mirroring could further the interaction process in the region, developing
projection into more genuine form of solidarity and cooperation.
Therefore, if all things are constant in the region, it is expected that through the ASEAN-led
frameworks, East Asian governments will continuously demonstrate good political will and openness
to participate in any transactions, either bilateral or multilateral in nature, and in all aspects—
political, economical, as well as, non-traditional security matters. A built-in system has even been
created for the Northeast Asian countries in APT called the trilateral dialogue to enhance political
relationships of the said countries.
The role of ASEAN in East Asian multilateral cooperation is based on its relationship with
the three Northeast Asian countries on how it can continuously generate values and norms that will
continuously enmesh and formalise the commitment of the said countries in the regional frameworks.
Non-compliance with these norms would lead to the destabilisation of the ASEAN-led frameworks
M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 365.
M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 365.
73 M. Hund and N. Okfen, p. 365.
71
72
106
but at the same time would also lead to loss of credibility of the deflecting country.
Conclusion
This study addresses the question of the validity and the extent of ASEAN’s lead role in East Asian
regional cooperation. It analyses the ASEAN-led frameworks and compares it to other existing
frameworks in Asia. It argues that in terms of credibility and status, ASEAN had become leader by
default in the region due to the convenience of its sole existence and scope of its initiated
frameworks—which encompasses China, Japan and South Korea. It is also not viewed as a threat to
nations outside and inside East Asia. Hence, the plus three nations have supported the lead role of
ASEAN in the region. But most importantly, due to historically mutual suspicions between the major
powers—Japan and China, ASEAN is placed in the lead position to create channels in furthering
multilateral cooperation in East Asia.
This research clarifies that the context of ASEAN’s lead role focuses more on economics
than politico-security by creating financial cooperation exchanges in the region. The argument on the
validity of ASEAN’s lead role in East Asian regional cooperation has been reinforced by chronicling
official statements and press releases where the plus three countries have recognised ASEAN’s
centrality in the region’s multilateral cooperation. However, it has also been clarified in this research
that despite the fact that the plus three have acknowledged ASEAN’s lead role, Japan and South
Korea do not envision the ASEAN-led frameworks, specifically APT, as the seedbed for an East
Asian free trade or economic bloc.
On the part of China, these ASEAN-led frameworks serve as an avenue for China to further
cultivate its political goodwill towards other East Asian countries, which allows China to yield
higher diplomatic returns. Furthermore, this study also discusses that the creation of the Northeast
Asian summit as a built-in informal meeting in the APT provides an annual channel for the plus
three countries to showcase political goodwill and cooperation with the goal of further improving the
condition of intra-East Asian relations.
This research also moves into the extent of augmenting previous studies on the major
contributions of ASEAN in the region by enmeshing China, Japan and South Korea in its initiated
frameworks that have resulted in the creation of policies, treaties, joint-declarations and other
multilateral projects. Finally, this research concludes that these contributions have become a tool in
cultivating norms and values in the region. If these platforms of ASEAN did not exist, it would be
highly unlikely that the present level of cooperation in East Asia would ever be attained. Hence,
ASEAN’s lead role can be best seen in its pivotal role in coordinating cooperation in the region.
With all things constant in the region, it is expected that through the ASEAN-led frameworks, East
Asian governments will continuously demonstrate good political will and openness to participate in
any transactions, either bilateral or multilateral in nature, and in all aspects such as political,
economical as well as non-traditional security matters.
The lead role of ASEAN in East Asian multilateral cooperation is based on its capacity to
stimulate China, Japan and South Korea into move into a new plane of regional integration by
cultivating shared norms, values and rules, notwithstanding its limitations in practical and timely
policy coordination. Nonetheless, since non-compliance with these norms and principles would
result in the loss of credibility of the deflecting countries, it can be assumed that, with all things
constant, the East Asian countries will uphold their obligations to the aforementioned commitments.
107
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Gender Distinction in Japanese Instructional Textbooks in the Philippines
By Joy Ann Faith D. Francisco
Ateneo de Manila University
The Philippines
Abstract
Recent studies about gender differences in the Japanese language have pointed out
changes over time. There is an evident decline in the use of feminine/women’s
language, and conformity to the general gender stereotypes of language usage is
slowly fading. In addition, women’s groups have been pushing for the elimination of
gender-stereotyped textbooks. With this in mind, the paper goes on to examine
commonly used Japanese language learning textbooks in the Philippines, specifically
in Ateneo de Manila University. This research aims to further the debate that the
distinction of male and female language is changing over time and is evident in the
different language instruction manuals.
Introduction
Language and society have always essentially been interlinked with each other. Language is largely
viewed as the foundation of a country’s culture (Carroll, 2001, p. 79). As such, we can consider that
in studying the Japanese language, we are able to penetrate into various and significant facets of the
country’s culture. Language then becomes a clear lens into which we can learn a lot about Japan
along with the changes in its society. While this is not a feature unique to Japanese society, it is one
of their attributes that they pride themselves on, and reflects their culture as being reflected in some
nihonjinron ideals, i.e. as being refined, elegant, dignified and homogenous, at least in the context of
the whole of Japan.
Japanese is well-known for its complex system of honorific and polite language based on a
combination of hierarchy and shifting in- and out- group relations and the existence of a clearly
differentiated male and female language (Carroll, 2006, p. 109). In the perspective of conformity,
people are expected to reify the roles and standards of language that as set by society; this is
especially true in a rigid and hierarchical setup like Japan’s. In this aspect, education and media
plays a big role in disseminating the expected norms and values of the Japanese.
Roughly four hundred million copies of textbooks are printed each year for use by
elementary and lower secondary school students in Japan. Although the textbooks are put out by
private publishers, they undergo rigorous inspection by the Ministry of Education prior to
publication (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda, 1995, p. 112). By looking at textbooks alone, we are
able to peek at how societal standards in Japan are regulated by these educational bodies, and how
these reflect changes in Japan’s ideals over time.
Studies about gender differences in the Japanese language have highlighted overt changes in
112
its traditions, structures, and forms from olden times. It was first established that women’s language
dated as far back as the 4th century, its usage limited to only certain social classes. Then it was
proliferated by the government as an established Japanese culture in the advent of the Meiji period’s
formation of a modern nation-state. From then on, the culture of gender difference in the Japanese
language was generally accepted by Japanese culture. Changes, however, are inevitable, and
language continues to evolve in this present time. Nowadays, there is an evident decline in the use of
feminine/women’s language, and conformity to the general gender stereotypes of language usage is
slowly fading. In addition, women’s groups have been pushing for the elimination of genderstereotyped textbooks in Japan (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda, 1995, p. 113). Women are slowly
gaining consciousness of the inequality that is seen in the Japanese language. On the other hand,
some people are disturbed by the changes in the Japanese language, as it indicates the destruction of
their precious culture.
With these ideas in mind, the researcher goes on to examine commonly used Japanese
language learning textbooks in the Philippines, specifically in Ateneo de Manila University. This
research aims to further the debate that the distinction of male and female language is changing over
time and is evident in the different language instruction manuals included in this research.
Significance of This Study
1.
2.
3.
Foreign language education now more focused on cultural literacy.
Gender distinction exists in Japanese language and culture.
Gender distinction in language has been changing in Japan.
Research Question
How do Japanese language instructional textbooks introduce gender distinction and its evolution to
non-Japanese learners at the elementary level?
Organisation of This Paper
What is gender distinction in the Japanese language?
Unlike the English language, where gender distinction exists but is not obvious, male language usage
and female usage in Japanese differ significantly in clearly codified ways, and people are familiar
with this difference even if this awareness is in the form of stereotypes (Carroll, 2011, p. 110).
Women are imbued with the cultural norms and tradition of speaking the “feminine” way
(onnarashii). This is characterised by, among others, politeness and tentativeness and the use of
special vocabulary (including verb forms) and sentence structures as well as by a distinctive tone of
voice and carriage (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda, 1995, p. 37). Masculine language, on the other
hand, tends to be direct, uses less honorific language and more plain forms than female language and
is also characterised by certain interactional particles which occur at the end of the phrase and or
sentence to express the speaker’s judgment and attitude towards the message and his interlocutor
(Carroll, 2011, p. 110).
However, as pointed out by a number of recent studies, the actual speech of Japanese men
and women often diverges from these gender "norms." For example, many women, including
younger women and speakers of regional dialects, do not use many of the "female" forms given in
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these textbooks, e.g. wa, wayo, da wa (yo), wa ne, wayo ne, kashira, and (noun/adjective noun) yo.
Furthermore, they generally use many of the "male" forms, e.g. (n) da, da yo, da ne, da yo ne, (plain
form of a verb/adjective) ne, yo, kana, (y)oo (yo), and the plain form of the verb alone (see Okamoto,
1995, 1996a; Matsumoto, 2002; Sunaoshi forthcoming). Accordingly, we also need to reconsider the
extent to which speech styles provided in such textbook examples are used in reality (Siegal &
Okamoto, 2003, p. 54.)
In this aspect, the researcher recognises that there are differences in the language taught and
used inside the classroom and the actual language that the Japanese use in their day to day
communication patterns. This is one of the limitations of the paper as it focuses on the textbooks that
are being used for basic Japanese language teaching and does not necessarily reflect the language
used outside classroom settings.
However, keep in mind that the importance of studying Japanese language textbooks also
depends on the idea that textbooks may indicate the possibility of several things: while they may
reflect the general example of the proper language that the Japanese government intends to
disseminate to the Japanese and the non-Japanese learners of the language, they may also show the
views and stands of the publishers regarding standard Japanese language. In this light, further
research about the ideals of the publishers would be a good area of further research.
Brief historical/theoretical Background of Gender Distinction in the Japanese language
National language studies (kokugogaku) often date the origin of women's language to as early as the
4th century, and they commonly construct a seamless narrative of Japanese women's language passed
down to the present (Inoue, 2002, p. 393).
Evidence of sex-exclusive features in Japanese can be found in literary works dating quite far
back in history, such as the Manyoshu, and in many works written by noble court ladies of the Heian
period (9th-12th century) (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda, 1995, p. 37). Paolo Calvetti (1992, p. 109)
asserts that a national language is the one indispensable defining element of a nation. While traces of
differences in men and women’s language have been seen as early as the 4 th century, it was not
recognised as an important facet in those early times and was only widely used among certain social
classes at a rate that was not significant enough to diffuse to the different layers of Japanese society.
It was during the feudal Muromachi period (14th-16th century) that a distinctly female language
called nyobokotoba evolved. Nyobokotoba developed initially as the language of court ladies
residing within women’s quarters and involved a special vocabulary for various foods, utensils and
other household items. As nyobokotoba came to be regarded as refined, graceful and feminine
language, it gradually spread to the temples, homes of the great lords and the warriors, the wealthy
merchant families, and finally to the general townspeople, eventually establishing itself as a
language of women in general (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda, p. 38). This was the starting ground
for establishing differences in men and women’s language.
The feminine language which has evolved in Japanese society was therefore not in any way a
natural feature of the Japanese language; instead, it was deliberately promoted and diffused through
educational channels (Saburo, 1966; Kokichiro, 1964). This feature was not established overnight
but diffused through the generations, and became eminent in the Japanese society as part of their
culture.
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Theoretical Framework
To delve deeper into the context of the changes in the Japanese language that brought about the
emergence of a distinct difference in the male versus female style, the researcher uses Miyako
Inoue’s claims on the proponents of this change. Inoue theorises that there is a historical relationship
between Japan's linguistic modernity-language standardisation, the rise of the novel, print capitalism,
and the emergence of Japanese women's language (2002, p. 392). This emergence of women’s
language therefore creates an established line between the way men and women utilise linguistic
functions.
The turning point of the evolution of Japanese women’s language was established in its rise
to the threshold of Japan's modernity during the late 19th and the early 20th century, when state
formation, nationalism, capitalist accumulation, industrialization, radical class reconfiguration,
colonialism, and foreign military adventurism were in full efflorescence (Inoue, 2002, p. 395).
Fishman’s (1973, p. 31) assertion that “language planning, particularly where it serves
modernisation is nationality planning” is an argument that sustains Inoue’s theory of language
change. Language planning is thus intertwined with national self-image and the image to be
projected to the outside world (Carroll, 2011, p. 21). In this context, male and female differences in
language were seen as a modern construct made by Japan during the Meiji period, where it was in
the process of forming a state that would exert cultural homogeneity, and to some extent, cultural
superiority. Language was seen as something that would exemplify these standards that the
government aimed for, and print capitalism, modernisation and consumption were the best vehicles
for the realisation of these goals.
In this light, language planning was one of the best ways in which Japan could carefully
establish the image it wanted the world to see. “Planning the past, motivating the future”. In this case,
planners looked to both the current situation and to history – both real and imagined – to construct an
ideal for the future. Such planning is not just a case of looking back to the past, which will establish
the goal of establishing a distinct national identity as a focus for loyalty – motivating the future
(Carroll, 2011, p. 21). As such, scholars might argue that this feature of women’s language was a
relatively new feature of Japan. However true this is, the reality exists as well that Japan only tried to
proliferate a way of language that was already found in their past but just needed to diffuse it into the
different layers of society. And with the existing elements of print capitalism, consumption and
media, these aims were all highly achievable.
Consumption is critical in another way. Speech forms referred to as "Japanese women's
language" and those used in letters simultaneously came to index gendered commodities in print
advertisements, for perfumes, ointments, menstrual garments, skin whitening creams, and other
similar items (Inoue, 2002, p. 410). Interestingly, women were subject to these changes and
consumed what the government explicitly tried to feed the Japanese to become part of the process of
modernisation, without consideration for future issues about the inequality posed by this feature of
the Japanese language. Initially, the process of language modification where female particular speech
forms were carved out, selected, and (re)constructed as Japanese women's language show that
process was critically linked to a network of diverse institutional and individual practices of
modernisation, and the particular form Japanese women's language took in its complex mimicry of
and resistance to the West (Inoue, 2002, p. 395).
From this, it is interesting to note that the changes the Japanese brought towards their
language systems in the process of modernisation in resistance to the West would, in the future,
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inevitably change once more due to Westernisation. Recent studies in the concept of change and
disorder in the Japanese language attribute this to the impact of globalisation and technological
advancements also. This shows that significant changes in Japan are always affected by undermined
factors of the outside world, especially the West. If the West in the past has contributed a lot to the
changes that the government imposed towards the Japanese language, Westernisation yet again
remains a solid key player in the new predicament of Japan, i.e. disorder in its language.
Lifting the Gender Barriers of the Japanese language: Disorder or Liberty?
Language is an evolving phenomenon which is subject to and exemplifies the evolution of societies.
Japanese gender distinction is by no means exempt to this. These linguistic systems and
communication habits are not fixed, but reflect changes in society over time (Carroll, 2011, p. 110).
The Japanese language that proponents of modernisation of the Meiji era have struggled to
establish is now on the brink of vanishing as the decline of feminine language slowly permeates
Japanese society. Young girls now use more rough (kitanai) words and figures of speech that were
hitherto the mainstay of men only. The advent of feminism in Japan has also contributed greatly to
the increasing consciousness of women, who experience inequality through their language. Two
contending ideas have arisen with regard to this evolution of language in Japan.
Disorder
The evolution in the Japanese language in terms of the deterioration of women’s language has
invited a lot of comments and criticisms, as shown by recent studies. As Mashimo Saburo, a scholar
of Japanese women's language, puts it, “We cannot hope for contemporary Japanese women to be as
witty and tactful as were those in the past, but, at least, I would like them to have a sincere and
humble attitude and to preserve the cultural heritage passed down from their ancestors without
destroying it" (1969, p. 81).
“Studies about the evolution of Japanese language in Japan is very interesting, you
must however conclude that Japanese language is a precious culture in need of
preservation” – Anonymous
“When I hear a Japanese woman speak like a man, I am shocked” – Anonymous
Through the following comments, we have discovered that the established language norms in Japan
have been embraced mostly as a precious culture, and that evolution of this language could possibly
be associated with the notion of disorder. Sociolinguistic changes reflect changes in people’s
behaviour, and if the latter is seen as negative, then so are the linguistic changes associated with it.
Consequently, these changes are characterised not as change but as a breakdown, disorder,
deterioration, and decay (Carroll, 2011, p. 80).
It is important to take note, however, that those who are extremely bothered and affected by
this change are those who are more educated and the older generations, as was also posited by
Inagaki and Inoue (1993, p. 6). Unsurprisingly, people from the educated classes are those who are
more concerned with maintaining the precious status quo of their elegant and refined language. The
people of the much lower classes, who have received only a compulsory education, would probably
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be less concerned with the changing nature of feminine language in Japan. As shown by NHK’s
1986 survey, 90% of those asked agreed that women should speak more politely than men. The only
group that disagreed were men in the 16-19 age group, while women in the same group agreed
accordingly.
In another NHK survey about the trend of women’s language, people were asked to select
specific comments that struck them about the female language and produced the following opinions:
Young women’s language has become rough (arappoi) – 75%
More women were using slovenly (kitanai) language – 45% overall but 58% of those in the
16-24 age group thought this
More women were using masculine language – 44/57%
Women no longer used honorific language as much – 38% overall
Men were also using more gender-neutral language – 37% overall
Feminine language was no longer used as much 24/34%
(NHK Hoso Bunka Kenkyujo, 1993b, p. 185-186)
In a slightly different and interesting account, one newspaper report lists some terms used by
teachers to their junior and senior high school pupils:
These included:
You are stupid, aren’t you? – Baka da naa
Drop dead – Shine
Don’t come to school! – Gakko ni kuru na
Fatty – Debu
Ugly – Busu
Blockhead- Manuke
The researcher notes that, according to the literature, these were female teachers, and in the writer’s
view, this made it even worse. A third says that not only were more and more schoolgirls using male
language but young female teachers were also doing the same (Carroll, 2011, p. 100).
An NHK poll in 1966 has shown that 58.2% of those surveyed felt that spoken language was
becoming confused (Takeda Sue, 1966, p. 2). In a survey made by the Cultural Affairs agency in
1995, approximately 70% agreed that “The state needs efforts to maintain the correctness and beauty
of the Japanese language” (Carroll, 2011, p. 100).
These cited facts not only indicate the changing ideals in language in Japan, but also how
people are becoming increasingly concerned by this change. The writer’s comment on the newspaper
article shows how it is unacceptable to use such negative remarks to students, but also the degree of
non-acceptance is intensified by the mere fact that it is female teachers who do this. This implies that
if male teachers were to do so in the Japanese classroom, it would be more acceptable than if female
teachers were.
Liberty
In a different but related manner, we will now look at liberty, mainly because the changes in the
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Japanese language paint a picture of the women of Japan breaking away from the chains of their
predetermined language customs. Differences in the way men and women speak appeal to people in
different ways as well. As Lakkoff has established in past studies, the marginality and powerlessness
of women is reflected in both the ways women are expected to speak, and in the ways in which
women are spoken of (Lakkoff, 1973, p. 1). Some may question this as one cannot in reality
generalise that the existence of women’s language in Japan is an indicator of inequality. Some
features of Japanese women’s language may imply the existence of inequality and sexism, such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Umazu – me (barren woman) – “Does not question the infertility of a man”
Onnabara (woman uterus) – “A woman who bears only girls”
Mibojin – (widow) – “The one who is not yet dead, who is yet to die”
Urenokori (unsold merchandise) – a reference to a woman who remains unwed past the socalled marriageable age of twenty five or so.
However, in some aspects, it does not prove true, as is the case with the usage of boku, kimi, or ore,
as most do not perceive this as inequality against women.
I agree with this in the sense that the words do not embody connotations that imply a
negative meaning towards women. In reality, while there may be some implications of inequality
brought about by women’s language, women’s language as a whole does not equate to inequality.
In looking at these words in the context of liberty, let us consider the types of words that are
intended to be used by men along with the manner of speaking solely intended for male Japanese.
Women in this day and age who use such figures of speech believe that their ability to do so is a
marker of freedom from the rigid boundaries of society. I believe that if language was once used as a
form of suppression towards women, women today are able to utilise language in a way beneficial or
perhaps liberating for them.
As such, I believe that a woman who uses male language confidently is not as an example of
disorder but us an example of a woman who is not afraid of being different from the general
Japanese view of a woman. In short, an “empowered woman” is able to attain her own sense of
liberty through her control of speech and language. As is evident from the NHK’s poll alone, not
many Japanese women would willingly adhere to this idea of liberty through language, especially
since those who are distinguished as such are those from the younger generations and would feasibly
therefore have a different reason for deviating from the norm.
One such nuance is that of Westernisation and modernisation. Because of this, younger
generations have been exposed to a different kind of culture that blurs the lines between the uchi
(inside) and the soto (outside) world. This results in a different kind of liberty that shapes the
younger generations through different norms and disrupts the more conservative older generations
through the changes that slowly seep through Japanese society.
Based on a Japanese male sociolinguist's research, the article compares the pitch of Japanese
women's voices and that of American women's voices and reports that Japanese women's voices
have significantly dropped these days because of the change in women's status in Japan. Japanese
women's speech –another deconstructed and fetishised part of a woman's body – now draws
intensive international attention, as an index of how far Japan has progressed or caught up with
America (Inoue, 2011, p. 393).
Is this, however, liberty? Or is it the case that Japan has been once more caught up and bound
by the ideals that it has always deliberately allowed the West to impose upon them?
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Cultural Literacy and the Japanese language (The Importance of Cultural Literacy in Foreign
Language Learning)
Japanese is now increasingly being taught as a foreign language in different countries, for example,
in the Philippines, which may also be attributed to its history of Japanese colonialism. In this study,
the researcher posits that foreign language education does not only consist of the practical process of
teaching the language but dignifies the purpose of cultural literacy. As described by Paulo Freire’s
ideals, in addition to enabling students to absorb culture implicitly, language teachers may also
encourage students to explicitly reflect on the cultural context of the language they are learning
(Ohara, Saft, & Crookes, 2001, p. 105). In addition to the old tradition of critical pedagogy and its
neighbouring discipline, feminist pedagogy, language specialists in particular are beginning to draw
upon the insights of critical language awareness (e.g. Fairclough,1992) and critical discourse
analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 1995).
Language use, therefore, should not be treated as mere technical lessons taught inside the
classroom as it actually is a vehicle of communication that should be carefully used when faced with
the actual situation of applying it in socialisation processes. In addition, presenting only rigid
traditional norms, or stereotypes is not only misleading but disassociates language use from the
learner's own personality and sense of self (Norton, 2000, p. 61; Siegal, 1996; Kramsch, 1993).
With regard to the context of the uchi (inside) and soto (outside) principles of the Japanese,
foreigners are instantly drawn into the other side of the line of outsiders, as language is the crucial
means of communication to establish rapport and good ties with their Japanese counterparts. Failure
to respond in a manner acceptable to the Japanese ear would lead to misunderstandings, negative
implications or, worst of all, ostracism. It is therefore important to gain not only a sufficient
command of Japanese but better understanding of their language culture.
In this light, gender distinction in the Japanese language is a crucial aspect to consider.
Foreign learners of the language who are unaware of the hierarchical and gendered aspect of the
language may be slightly ambivalent in their use of the language. As such, it is important that foreign
learners not only study the technicalities of the language but also be open to learning the culture of
gender distinct language in Japan for increased cultural sensitivity and awareness.
Once they are able to actually use the language they have learnt, especially in Japan, it is
therefore up to the foreign language learners to explore their preferences in using a gendered speech
style, or a neutral speech style in speaking the Japanese language.
Content Analysis
The researcher has done content analysis on five Japanese language textbooks used in Ateneo de
Manila University, the Philippines, to examine the changes of gender distinction in language in
Japan. The focus is on the grammatical notes and the explanations provided by the instructional
manuals.
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Grammatical items introduced with explanations of gender distinction:
Informal conversation patterns (including personal pronouns and sentence enders)
The imperative (plain and polite)
The request (plain)
Sentence enders (plain and polite)
Yarimasu/agemasu
The analysis of this paper focuses on the items that show distinction between male and female usage
of certain grammatical patterns, words, sentence-enders, and so on.
In this paper, the researcher will look at changes in gender distinction in the Japanese
language as time progresses with the means of looking at the explanations in the textbooks. The
importance of looking at the explanations is to show that certain patterns and language constructs in
the Japanese language are intended for the use of only either men or women. This paper also aims to
address how these notions have changed since the earliest of these textbooks were published in 1973,
and the most recent in 2000.
Grammatical items introduced with explanations of gender distinction:
Informal Conversation Patterns for Male and Females
MALE
Tanom: Genki?
Lee: Un, genki da yo.
Kimi wa do?
Tanom:Boku mo genki da. Kimi wa ashita
doko e iku?
Lee: Doko mo ikanai yo.
Tanom: Ja, boku to issho
Kyoto e ikanai?
Lee: Sore wa ii ne.
FEMALE
Toshiko: Genki?
Haruko: Ee, genki yo.
Toshiko: Watashi mo genki yo. Anata wa
ashita doko e iku no?
Haruko: Doko mo ikanai wa (yo).
Toshiko: Ja, watashi to isshoni Kyoto e
ikanai?
Haruko: Sore wa ii ne.
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Distinctions between Male and Female Speech in Plain Form
In a plain form sentence, there are some differences between a speech of a male and that of a
female. The conversation in lesson 20 is one between two men, and the other is one between two
women (Nihongo no Kiso I, p. 53)
Imperative (Plain)
A sentence that ends in imperative form is a very rough expression and is used only when men
are fighting or when men are speaking to children (Nihongo Shoho, p. 195).
E.g.
“eat”
taberu ->tabero “eat!”
“get up” okiru ->okiro “get up!”
Imperative Prohibitive (Plain)
When the imperative and prohibitive forms are used, they become strong and coercive
expressions. They are usually used at the end of the sentence, e.g. by the male member of a
family, or when a man in a higher rank gives orders to or scolds a member in a lower rank
(Nihongo no Kiso II, p. 12).
E.g.
Gakko o yasumuna!
Don’t skive off school!
Imperative Polite (V-Nasai Form)
It is used by parents to their children or by their children to their students and is a little gentler
than the imperative form. Women use this style instead of the imperative form (Minna no
Nihongo II, p.33).
E.g.
Hayaku gohan o tabe-NASAI
Hurry up and eat your rice (please)
Request (Plain) V-Te Kure Form
~Te kure is the plain form of ~te kudasai and is used to make requests. This form as it stands is
used only by men as in the case of the imperative form and prohibitive forms (Shin Nihongo no
Kiso II, p. 33).
E.g.
Chotto tetsudatte kure
Help me out for a second
Kono nimotsu wa jama da kara katazukete kure
This baggage is in the way, put it away (for me)
Sentence Enders (Speech Styles)
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This is a style often used by women, and is used to speak politely to oneself or of the listener.
(Nihongo Shoho, p. 219)
“N da” is the short form of “n desu”. Female speakers have the choice between the gender
neutral “n da” and the more feminine “no” in closing a sentence (Genki II, p. 37).
Sentence Ender Da-Yo
While sentences ending with “da yo” are common in the casual speech of women today, until
very recently, women were supposed to drop the “da” when they ended a sentence with “yo”
(Genki II, p. 37).
A: Kyo nan youbi? What day is it today?
B: Suiyoubi/Suiyoubi da yo. Wednesday
Sentence Ender No, Ka na, Na
The particles no, ka na, na at the end of the sentence indicate interrogative sentences, and are
used by both men and women, but the declarative ones are mainly used by women and children
(Nihongo no Kiso II, p. 34).
E.g.
Doko e iku no?
Where are you going?
- Kaimono ni iku no
- I am going shopping
Sentence Ender Wa
Wa is seen at the end of female speakers’ sentences. It usually follows short forms. It is
sometimes used with ne and yo (Genki II, p. 229).
E.g.
Ii wa ne
That sounds good
Shiranai wa yo
I don’t know
Yarimasu/Agemasu
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Yarimasu is used when the recipient is an inferior, but carries a less than elegant nuance, which
is why women do not use it often. Instead, women use agemasu when the recipient is an inferior
(Nihongo no Kiso II, p. 60).
E.g.
Watashi wa ototo ni hon o yarimashita
I gave my younger brother a book
Table 1. Examples of gender distinct lessons in Japanese language textbooks
● Sentence pattern exists but no gender distinction explanation (neutral)
* Optional usage, depending on the situation
Analysis
The paper delved into pointing out all the patterns that show gender distinction in the Japanese
language in all five books. In analysing Table 1, we will see the decrease in the appearance of
gender distinct explanations in textbooks from 1970 – 2000. In the textbooks, the informal
conversation patterns that specifically distinguish a different manner of conversation by males
and females were not seen in the more current textbooks, i.e. Shin Nihongo no Kiso, Minna no
Nihongo and Genki.
However, imperatives are discussed in all of the four books except in the most recent
Genki, which, in comparison to the four textbooks, shows a different approach in teaching. The
four books, however, show a somewhat similar form of lessons, perhaps because three of them
were made by the same publisher, 3a Corporation.
Nihongo no Kiso I & II – 3A Corporation
Nihongo Shoho - Bonjinsha Co., Ltd.
Shin Sihongo no Kiso I & II – 3A Corporation
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Minna no nihongo – 3A Corporation
Genki I & II - The Japan Times
Interestingly, in Minna no Nihongo, imperatives were introduced as an optional choice of usage
for women, e.g. when engaged in watching fights and cheering for their corresponding teams.
This shows that, somehow, women’s usage of men’s language has been increasingly accepted in
certain appropriate situations as well.
The earliest published book, i.e. Nihongo no Kiso I & II in 1973, has produced a perfect
ten with regard to the existence of gender distinct explanations. The number of ● means that the
sentence pattern exists but no gender distinction explanation exists indicates that speech patterns
that were hitherto held to be the mainstay of men are no longer introduced in the more recent
textbooks as language becomes less gender exclusive.
From the total number of gender distinct explanations out of ten, decreasing to 4 - 5 - 2 and 1, we can see that gender distinction explanations have decreased in these textbooks.
However, in no way do these textbooks provide a general example that represents the whole of
Japan; instead, they are but a tool in learning which reflects the evolution of Japanese society,
thus allowing us to glean a small peek of this changes.
We have to also consider that since the target of these textbooks are foreign language
learners, the textbook publishers may have overtly performed several considerations in trying to
relay their national language in the simplest manner, devoid of the cultural attributes of the basic
language they are trying to impart. In this light, it is imperative to know the objectives of the
publishers to fully uncover the underlying reasons of the change in women’s language usage
over time.
Conclusion
As a general trend, the number of items that involve the explanation of gender distinctions, and
at the same time the importance of knowing gender distinctions, is decreasing. This is parallel to
the present situation in Japanese language, where gender distinctions are disappearing.
However, in these textbooks, the imperative form is inseparable from the male style of
speech. This is because even though Japanese women’s language has evolved due to several
reasons like female empowerment, the growth of consciousness and a lack of tolerance to
stereotypes as to how women should behave especially in language usage, it does not change the
fact that men generally still embody the ideally strong characteristics that Japanese men are
expected to show. This adds to the idea that the blurring boundaries of men and women’s
language is primarily due to women’s own change in their language use, but the changes in
men’s language.
Personal pronouns are not significantly dealt with in these textbooks either, especially
since we are focusing on the grammatical explanations in English. Personal pronouns in general
are seen in the (kotoba) vocabulary part, which the researcher did not attempt to study in this
research. Although ending particles are not significantly dealt with in these textbooks, Genki
underscores “wa” as a clear gender marker. Gender-specific items are often explained in relation
to the levels of politeness and modality of speech. Genki, which apparently targets contemporary
learners, omits “rude” expressions such as imperatives and yarimasu/agemasu altogether,
perhaps due to their lack of cultural relevance.
Paper Synthesis
With all the changes evident in Japanese society and language and the decreasing gender
differences associated with it, the researcher proposes the ideas initiated by scholars such as the
insights of critical language awareness (e.g. Fairclough, 1992) and critical discourse analysis
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(e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 1995) to the many foreign Japanese language teachers. Let us try to teach
Japanese language in a manner that it is not devoid of its cultural essence, and therefore
contribute and dignify the description of Japanese language as a valuable culture.
In this aspect, the researcher believes in Siegal and Okamoto’s (2003, p. 61) statement:
“We are not suggesting that traditional norms should not be taught at all. Rather, they should be
taught as what they are – traditional norms that may or may not be followed in actual language
practices for a multitude of reasons.” Presenting only rigid traditional norms or stereotypes is not
only misleading but disassociates language use from the learner's own personality and sense of
self (Norton, 2000, p. 61; Siegal, 1996; Kramsch, 1993).
Some teachers have expressed worry that in opening to students the range of ways that
the Japanese language is used by men and women (or we might say, by those of greater or lesser
power) in varying social contexts, we run the risk of "teaching our students a nonstandard
Japanese", which will only be seen as erroneous by their Japanese interlocutors (Ohara, Saft, &
Crookes, 2001, p. 124).
One response to this is that if we are to expose students to the range of forms and
possibilities, we will enable them to at least be more critical listeners who understand the
"subtext of Japanese verbal interactions" better than would otherwise be the case (Ohara, Saft, &
Crookes, 2001, p. 124).
Japanese language is, overall, a valuable culture and tradition, and it is the duty and
obligation of teachers of this language to impart this culture in a manner that would not only
dignify genuine Japanese customs and traditions, but also exemplify the importance of cultural
sensitivity and awareness as well.
References
Abe, H. (1995). From stereotype to context: The study of Japanese women’s speech. Feminist
Studies, 21(3), 647-664.
Carroll, T. (2001). Language planning and language change in Japan. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.
Carroll, T. (2006) Changing language, gender, and family relations in Japan. In M. Rebick& A.
Takenaka (Eds.), The changing Japanese family. London: Routledge.
Fujimura-Fanselow, K. & Kameda, A. (1995). Japanese women: New feminist perspectives on
the past, present, and future. New York: Feminist Press at the City University.
Genki I & II. (2000). Grammatical notes and translation. Japan Times.
Lakoff, R. (1973). Language and woman’s place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Minna no nihongo. (1998). Grammatical notes and translation. 3a Corporation
Miyako, I. (2002). Gender, language, and modernity: Toward an effective history of Japanese
women's language. Oxford: Blackwell.
Nihongo no kiso. (1973). Grammatical notes and translation. 3a Corporation
Nihongo shoho. (1985). Grammatical notes and translation. Bonjinsha Co. Ltd.
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Ohara, Y., Saft S., & Crookes G. (2001). Toward a feminist critical pedagogy in a beginning
Japanese-as-a-foreign-language class. Association of Teachers of Japanese.
Shin nihongo no kiso I & II. (1992). Grammatical notes and translation. 3a Corporation
Siegal, M. & Okamoto, S. (2003). Toward reconceptualizing the teaching and learning of
gendered speech styles in Japanese as a foreign language. Japanese Language and Literature, 37,
49-66.
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The Third Country Resettlement Programme in Japan: Myanmar Refugees from
Thailand who have resettled in Japan
By Junko Miura
Abstract
Japan is the first Asian country to implement the third country resettlement
programme encouraged by the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees
(UNCHR). At the moment, more than 140,000 Myanmar refugees have been
living in ten border camps in Thailand for two decades. The programme began in
2010, with Japan accepting ninety Myanmar refugees (thirty refugees a year) from
the Mae La refugee camp in Thailand over three years. In 2010, Japan accepted
twenty-seven refugees from five families, and the second batch of eighteen
refugees from four families arrived in September 2011. After six months of
training on the Japanese language and culture by the Refugee Assistance
Headquarters (RHQ), all the refugees are expected to be self-reliant. However, the
programme has already faced serious challenges due to several factors, requiring
several reconsiderations of the system itself. In terms of the first refugee group
which arrived in Japan, the refugees have resettled in an area where the local
government has positive policies in accepting foreign nationals and seem to have
had a stable life so far. However, refugees who have resettled in areas that have
less foreign nationals are facing serious difficulties. From an anthropological
perspective, the research is focusing on the lives of refugees. The paper will be
based on field research in Japan and Thailand and is headed by the research group
from the Centre for Documentation of Refugees and Migrants (CDR). Using the
case study of Myanmar refugee families who have recently arrived in Japan, the
paper attempts to explore how refugees and migrants can survive in Japan through
interactions with Japanese people.
Introduction
Living for extended periods of time in camp-like conditions or unsafe urban settings has been
said to be the most intricate humanitarian problem. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) have promoted third country resettlement programmes as a tool in
providing refugee protection. Over 140,000 refugees from Myanmar have been in refugee camps
at the Thailand and Myanmar border for more almost thirty years. The United Nations, Canada,
Australia and other countries have been accepting refugees from camps in this area.
Japan has become the first Asian country to carry out the third country resettlement
programme promoted by UNHCR as a pilot project. In September 2010, the first group of
twenty-seven Myanmar refugees from the Mae La refugee camp in Thailand arrived in Japan.
The second batch of refugees from five families arrived in Tokyo in the autumn of 2011. For the
first six months after their arrival, training programmes for living guidance, culture, and
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Japanese language classes were provided by the Refugee Head Quarters (RHQ) in Tokyo.
Although the pilot programme has brought a positive image of the Japanese government to
international society, resettled refugees have faced various challenges after resettlement in Japan,
and the management of the programme has been criticised for to several reasons, such as the
briefness of its period of assistance. From the experiences of first group of Myanmar refugee
families, it is clear that various matters need to be attended to.
In this paper, an overview of the third country resettlement programme will be provided
at the beginning. In the second part of the paper, a brief account of the resettled refugees in
Japan will be discussed, based on original field research headed by the Centre for
Documentation of Refugees and Migrants (CDR) at the University of Tokyo. In the final section,
the possibilities and future of the third country resettlement programme will be explored.
The Third Country Resettlement Programme
While many industrialised countries, such as the US and Australia, have received refugees in
need of resettlement, there is a huge gap between resettlement needs for displaced people and
places available. Currently, approximately 805,500 refugees are in need of resettlement,
accounting for 10% of the world’s refugee population. The number of refugees in need of
resettlement is growing. Iraqi, Myanmar, and Bhutanese refugees represents for 70% of total
resettlements in 2009. The main host countries involved in the third country resettlement
programme are the United States, Australia and Canada. However, due to a lack of available
places for resettlement, UNHCR has been urging more countries to implement the resettlement
programme. As a result, seven countries, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Portugal,
Romania, Spain, and Japan have established similar programmes since 2008. The UNHCR
adheres to a set of resettlement criteria that are considered as a durable solution; legal and
physical protection needs, women-at-risk, survivors of violence and torture, children and
adolescents, those require urgent medical attention, older refugees, family reunifications, and a
lack of local integration prospects.
Having considered this background, Japan has begun to implement the third country
resettlement programme as a pilot project since 2010. In December 2008, the Japanese
government declared its acceptance of ninety Myanmar refugees from the Mae La refugee camp
in Thailand over three years. These refugees have fled from Myanmar due to the persecution of
the Karen ethnic minority. If the programme is successfully, Japan is likely to receive more
refugees in the future. This programme aims to alleviate the refugee situation in Asia, and
candidates are selected from refugees on the continent. Thus, they have been selected from the
Mae La camp in Thailand, which is the largest camp from the nine on the Myanmar-Thai border.
There are several criteria which assists the government in selecting refugees: “The candidate
must be recognised by UNHCR as a refugee being in need of international protection and for
whom Japan is recommendable to seek protection”, “the candidate must have local integration
prospects in Japan”, and “the candidate must be likely to find employment in Japan in order to
support themselves and their dependants”.
Assisted by UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the first
group of candidates was selected in February 2010 by the Japanese Ministry of Justice. They
were interviewed on basic personal and family information, and twenty-seven Myanmar
refugees from five families, including children, were chosen as candidates. They were provided
with training in the Japanese language and cultural orientation in the Mae La camp pre-departure.
With regard to resettlement, IOM provides support through the processing legal documents and
requirements, medical screening and counselling, cultural orientation, language and skill training,
pre-departure orientations, and moving assistance. IOM also provides logistical support and a
selection of refugees from the list given by UNHCR.
Upon arrival, the RHQ Settlement Support Centre in Tokyo will prepare accommodation
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and provide cultural orientation, training in the Japanese language and anything related to their
resettlement in Japan. However, it has been pointed out only 180 days is too short a period of
training, before setting refugees off to live independently. This is especially so since the
Japanese language is unique and they may be unfamiliar with it while living at the camp. Martin
Ford of the Maryland office where the third country resettlement programme has already been
implemented, states the importance of improving language skills for employment. He also
emphasises the significance of support from the local governments and companies. Children,
notably, are in need of schooling and employment with a long-term perspective.
The second batch of selected refugees for the third country resettlement programme, who
arrived in 2011, were still in the six month period of post-arrival training. Next section of this
paper will introduce some situations faced by the first group of refugees who resettled in Japan,
as revealed by the CDR field research held in May 2011.
The First Batch of Resettled Karen Refugees in Japan
Despite the high expectations of the Japanese government, it has been reported that the first
group still faces many challenges. Due to government policy, it is difficult to communicate with
resettled refugees, and very limited information related to the third country resettlement
programme is provided to public. Koike states that the Japanese government provides limited
information to the media to ensure the success of the third country resettlement programme. In
addition, NGOs and other institutions were completely eliminated in the process of making and
implementing policy. Accordingly, the Centre for Documentation of Refugees and Migrants
established their own field research in Mie and Chiba prefectures two months after their official
training ended. The following content will be discussed based on this research.
After the training programme ended in the middle of March 2011, five of the Karen
families were moved to two different prefectures in Japan. On grounds of employment, twelve
refugees from two families moved to Chiba prefecture, and the other fifteen refugees from three
families settled in Mie prefecture, in the west of Japan. Here, they took part in agricultural
activities in both prefectures, such as growing mushrooms, peanuts, tea and other plants. The
first six months after they started working was a training period, so that their salaries were
provided by the RHQ , but not by their employers. As of May 2011, two families had resettled in
Tougane and Yachimata city in Chiba prefecture. The two families were living separately and
had to walk one hour to get to each other’s home. Since they had no cars, it was hard for the two
families to communicate with one another and their places of settlement were in very remote
areas. The children did not have access to a school bus, and it took thirty minutes to get to
school by bicycle. The children seemed to be able to speak in Japanese better than their parents
since they had the chance to mingle and play with their Japanese school friends.
While families who had settled in Chiba managed to find a house for their own, all
members of the three families residing in Suzuka, Mie prefecture, lived in one detached house
owned by their employer. As of May 2011, the three families were living together, so they could
work together for certain tasks such as caring for the children and sharing information. Despite
having less private space, they seemed to have be mentally under less pressure to settle in,
compared to the families in Chiba. Since large numbers of foreign nationals reside in Suzuka
city due to its industry, the local government there is more experienced and has a positive policy
in dealing with non-Japanese nationals. Accordingly, the citizens there are also perhaps more
open to accepting non-Japanese people compared to an area with less foreign nationals.
Thus, having seen the brief living situation of Karen refugees who have resettled in
Japan last year, there are clearly different circumstances between the Chiba case and the Mie
case. In addition to their different environments, the work conditions at the two prefectures were
also different. While the resettled refugees in Mie had no extra work and could even afford to
work part-time during the weekend, the refugees in Chiba claimed they have been overworked.
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Several newspapers reported their harsh conditions in the summer of 2011. After the six month
training period in agriculture at their workplace, one refugee couple held a press conference in
Tokyo. They decided not to work with some of the companies due to a mismatch of work
conditions as explained by the RHQ. In addition to their excessive workload, it took two hours
for them to commute to and from the nursery school since they have little children. During their
six months of training, a total of 120,000 Japanese yen per month was provided by the RHQ, but
they expressed that this amount may not be sufficient as they still needed to pay for their
children’s school expenses, rent, and other costs of living.
All resettled families no longer receive subsidies from the Japanese government. As of
November 2011, the two Karen families who had settled in the Chiba prefecture and rejected
offers for employment on a farm have now moved to Tokyo and were searching jobs there.
Furthermore, in September, “lawyers representing the two families submitted a proposal to the
Foreign Ministry demanding improvements to their working conditions, which they claimed
involved extremely long hours and physically demanding work”. Surprisingly, the Foreign
Ministry’s Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division commented that the two families
were “no longer under its supervision and it doesn’t know their whereabouts”. Thus, although
the programme is implemented for “refugees”, they are still struggling to settle in due to a lack
of support. As it is still only a pilot programme, it is still fairly controversial and it could be
improved upon. The next section will discuss several suggestions to improve the third country
resettlement programme in Japan.
Reconsidering the Resettlement Programme in Japan
Despite the third country resettlement programme in Japan being the first time it was
implemented in Asia, it needs to be reconsidered with several factors in mind. Having seen the
struggle of resettling refugees in Japan, two main points could be suggested to reform the
programme. Firstly, the selection process of candidates should be reconsidered, and the selection
criteria for the candidates could perhaps be more open. Currently, the Japanese government
selects candidates as family units, but candidates should not be limited to family units only.
Secondly, the support system for refugees post-resettlement should also be improved. It may be
said that the government is currently the dominant supporter for the refugees, as it is difficult for
NGOs and civil organisations to provide support for them.
With regard to the selection of refugees, the selection criteria for candidates could be
expanded as at the moment they are limited to family units. The former UN High Commissioner
for Refugee’s representative in Japan, Saburo Takizawa, has influenced the government’s
decision-making process with regard to the third country resettlement programme. He points out
that the strict selection criteria is one of the reasons why resettled refugees are struggling to be
independent. At the moment, only families that have children may apply for the resettlement
programme in Japan. As such, youths and single people, who are perhaps more likely seek
opportunities for education and work, are ineligible to apply the programme.
In terms of the selection process, the Japanese government and also local NGOs should
participate in candidate selection. In the refugee camps in Thailand, children can go to school up
until high school, but there are no universities. CDR field research in the Mae La camp in 2011
revealed that a lot of school children wanted to continue studying after finishing school, but had
no choice but to apply for the resettlement programme. Furthermore, CDR’s research in the
Chiba prefecture also lead to the discovery that the main reason they decided to apply for the
resettlement programme is for their children’s education. As such, the selection process of
candidates could be more open.
Another important issue which should be reviewed to improve the situation is providing
proper support for refugees post-settlement. The general criticism is that the 180 day training
period is too short, and it should be longer. At a symposium held in October 2011 at the
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University of Tokyo, one of the refugees stated that the six month support programme for
vocational training at the farm was not expected at the Mae La camp and that conditions were
completely different from what they were told. In addition to the fact that other family members
live far from where he is, he said that his family felt lonely and isolated due to the lack of
support. Masaharu Nakagawa, Japan’s Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology, has also stated the six month period of support is insufficient. “There should be an
opportunity for the refugees to continue their language lessons, even if they get employment”.
Saburo Takizawa points out that NGOs, local municipalities and schools should all
become involved to create a better environment for resettled refugees. He emphasised that “we
cannot just point fingers at the government and expect them to act. The NGOs and the local
people are the only ones who can connect the refugees to the local community”. The most
difficult situation for families settled in Chiba was that they were living separately and had no
network to the various communities that could support them. Watanabe, one of refugee’s lawyers
who had submitted a proposal to the Foreign Ministry to improve their situation in September
2011, stated that a miscommunication between the RHQ and refugees were the cause of the
problem. Two families complained that the RHQ prohibited refugees from having landline
phones, fax machines or Internet access.
In terms of human mobility, the migrant network is necessary. Although this third
country resettlement programme was implemented by the Japanese government, it is still
necessary for refugees to have access to various networks to settle in Japan. Support should not
be limited only to the government. One of the main criticisms was that the government does not
allow NGOs or citizens to contact resettled refugees and that only limited information was open
to public, which is why refugees are facing difficulties in settling in Japan. In addition to the
perspectives of the government and various organisations, the perspectives of refugees should
also be taken into consideration. As Daniel Alkhal, a senior legal officer of UNHCR in Japan,
claims, there should be several phases for refugee integration. At the first phase, refugees should
be settled close to their communities, e.g. communities of Myanmar people. Then gradually,
they will be able move to other places independently.
It is clear to say that this anthropological perspective is absent in the system of the
programme. Douglas Massey reveals that migration networks were significant in that they can
be considered as social capital which permits migrants to access economic opportunities, such as
employment. Migration networks may also reduce their costs and risks in new places.
Furthermore, Massey states that migration networks “…convey information, provide financial
assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms”.
Because of this, such a network is a necessary factor in helping new migrants settle in a new
place, as resettled refugees are segregated from access to their own possible network. As the
programme began as a pilot project, the “successful” integration of the refugees is crucial. For
the Japanese government, this “success” may be interpreted to mean that the refugees are able to
settle in Japan “without any problems”.
Conclusion
Japan was the first Asian country to implement the third country resettlement programme
promoted by UNHCR. However, due to a lack of support and several other factors, the first
batch of resettled Karen refugees have been struggling. As the programme is still but a pilot
project, there are still many issues to be considered.
The initial six-month training period and consequent six-month period of support by the
RHQ have been deemed to be too short for refugees to be fully independent. Takizawa explains
the condition of the families of first batch that were facing language problems, overwork, long
commutes to school and isolation from other resettled families. This information was conveyed
to the Mae La refugee camp in Thailand, resulting in less refugees applying for resettlement in
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Japan. In addition to criticism of the short-term training period, the selection process of
candidates and support networks by various organisations are also hotly-debated issues. It was
revealed by CDR research that almost all the families applied for the resettlement programme
because they wanted their children to have a proper education. Furthermore, while some youths
wished to resettle in Japan to study, they are not qualified to do so while the current selection
criteria is still in force.
In addition, the anthropological perspective that considers the refugees’ background and
culture is also a significant issue in successful resettling. A migration network is greatly needed
as Massey states that this would provide financial and emotional support. Migration networks
are “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin
and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin”. These
crucial factors seem to have been eliminated in the government’s implementation of the project.
As Alkhal claims, refugee integration should be broken down into several phases and coupled
with community support. Furthermore, a partnership between ministries and local communities
is necessary.
Now is a crucial period for the Japanese government and all its related organisations as it
will determine the continuation of the third country resettlement programme. Japan has often
been criticised that they rare involve themselves in refugee issues as they accept only extremely
limited numbers of refugees, despite their high monetary contribution to UNCHR. As such, the
implementation of the third country resettlement programme should be seen as being highly
progressive, which is why the programme should be continued. As a pilot project, the number of
resettled refugees that can be accepted is very limited, and is but a small contribution to the
protracted refugee situation in Asia. However, if Japan is able to provide qualitative and unique
support to the programme, it could help raise awareness of refugee issues in Japan. The third
country resettlement programme should not be implemented for the status of nation, but it
should be addressed for “refugees” as a tool of humanitarian aid.
References
Alkhal, D. (2011). CDR-HSF Special Summer School 2011. September 27-29. University of
Tokyo.
Cabinet Secretariat - Naikaku kambou. (2008, December 16). Naikaku ryoukai (Cabinet
Approval), Daisangoku teiju ni yoru nanmin no ukeire ni kansuru pilot case no jisshi nit suite
(Refugee reception under the Third Country Resettlment Pilot Programme). Retrieved December
15, 2011, from http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/nanmin/081216ryoukai.html
Gurak, D. T, & Caces, F. (2010). Migration networks and the shaping of migration systems. In S.
Vertovec (Ed.), Migration (vol.1): Theories. London: Routledge.
IOM. (2010). Resettlement assistance: Helping refugees begin a new life. Retrieved May 12,
2011, from http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/712
Japan faces uphill challenge in receiving Myanmar refugees. (2011, November 3). Mainichi
Daily News.
Koike, K. (2011). Nihon wa kawattaka. Refugee Studies, (1) Refugee Studies Forum.
Martin, A. (2011, November 3). Karen refugees snub farm, try luck in Tokyo. Japan Times.
Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouauci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Tayler, J. E. (1998). Worlds in
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motion. In Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011, February 25). Press Release. Retrieved May 10, 2011, from
http:www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/23/2/0225_09.html
Miura, J., & Masutomi, S. (2011). Third country resettlement programme in Japan. CDRQ Vol. 2,
Center for Documentation of Refugees and Migrants.
Nakagawa, R. (2011, September 29). Myanmar nanmin toui Anjyu. Asahi Shimbun.
Oono (2010, August 1). Nihongo shutoku keizokushien wo. Tokyo Shimbun.
Refugee Assistance Headquarters. (2011). 2010 Budget Summary. Retrieved January 15, 2011,
from http://www.rhq.gr.jp/japanese/profile/fin05/fin_22_01.pdf
Takizawa, S. (2011, October 19). Nanmin jiritsu e ukezara hitsuyou. Yomiuri Shimbun.
UNHCR. (2010). Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2011. Retrieved May 2011, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c5acc3e2.html
UNHCR. (2004, November 1). Resettlement: A vital instrument of international protection and
an element of comprehensive solutions resettlement handbook. Department of International
Protection.
133
Current Trends in Japan and China:
A Comparative Analysis of Political and Social Attitudes in the Biotechnology Industry
By Kimberly Carrillo
4 BS Biology Minor in Japanese Studies
Abstract
Biotechnology, the manipulation of biological organisms for human technological
benefit, is one of the most forward fields in applied research. It promises
advancements in agriculture, medicine, bio-remediation and many others. Japan is
one of the pioneering and most highly advanced countries when it comes to
biotechnological research. However, there has been a lag in terms of the attention
given by the Japanese government to this field compared to other progressive
countries. The conservative Japanese society may have contributed to the gap
between the availability of advanced technology and the amount of the technology
applied in society. In this study, the Japanese government policy and its citizen’s
behaviour towards biotechnology will be compared to that of China. This
comparative study is also a response to the rising power of Asia. China is an
emerging giant in the field of biotechnology, making it a good candidate for
comparison. The rise of Asia, which may translate to the leading of Japan and
China in the field of scientific research, should attract the attention of various
talents. Japan and China both have their respective strengths and weaknesses in
terms of their political-economy in the biotechnological industry. Japan is
obviously way ahead in terms of the availability of technology. However, China
has been more aggressive and open-minded in applying new technologies. This is
due to the differences of perceptions and behaviours of the Japanese and Chinese
citizens, which is translated into having different regulatory measures from their
respective governments. This comparison provides a better understanding of the
specific measures that the Japanese society has to implement in order to improve
the management of this particular field.
Introduction
Biotechnology is one of the most promising and also intriguing issues of today. With concerns
ranging from cures for serious diseases and a possible remedy for growing starvation, it has
managed to gain many supporters. However, there exist anxieties caused by the thought of
manipulating nature and a fear of the unknown. Biotechnology simply cannot escape the
piercing eyes of public scrutiny. The good point of biotechnology is that it addresses problems
which are impossible to solve by conventional means. It also speeds up the research process
(Conway, 2000, as cited by Juang J., et al). Biotechnology, for most scientists, is the “Biology of
the Future”. This is due to its nature of being a very upstream research or applied field of
research. Its results do not only depend on the hopes of building-up knowledge in the form of
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literature. It is not a mere means of learning about the systems of the natural world like other
biological sciences. Instead, the implications are very much directed to technology or to
immediate human benefit.
On the other hand, biotechnology is also one of the most controversial fields of study.
Unlike the other sciences, biological systems are very close to our daily lives. These include
matters like the food we consume and our own bodies as living systems. Although these
concerns seem really close to us, the principles of the technology involved are very alien to most
people. The field is so specialised that not even a biological scientist will possess perfect
knowledge of the technology involved. This interplay of using the unfamiliar to manipulate the
familiar is the cause of great anxiety to the public.
Disambiguation
To provide a deeper understanding of this topic and since this paper will be presented to a
political science audience, I felt the need to define the scientific terms in a language suited for a
social science discussion about a natural science issue. I found the definition of the writer Arthur
Kornberg to be very appropriate for this purpose. He defined biotechnology as a “hybrid term”,
with the need to differentiate biology and technology (Kornberg, 2002). I took the liberty of
dissecting the word from its Greek and Latin roots, namely “bios”, which means life and “logia”
which means “a study of”, but some would also say that it could be from “logos” or “logic”. So
in a basic sense, biology is a study of the logic of life. Technology, on the other hand, has the
word “teknikos” or “techne”, which means “craft” or “skills”, and when “logia” is placed here, it
becomes a systematic approach to a craft (the Merriam-Webster Dictionary). In simpler terms,
Kornberg distinguished biology as a basic science while technology as an applied science; and
biotechnology is the interplay of both. He even further described it as a medium to translate the
knowledge from the academe to the business world.
One of the most mentioned terms in talking about biotechnology is the term GMO, i.e.
genetically-modified organisms or transgenic organisms. These are simply organisms which
have underwent manipulation of their genetic material through genetic engineering. In simple
terms, they involve the changing of the genetic make-up of the organism, which may likewise
affect its physical characteristics. This then gives us the liberty to modify certain characteristics
of the organisms in question, to cater to human needs. This makes genetic engineering one of the
major fields of the biotechnology industry.
Objectives
This study aims to acquire a deeper understanding of the biotechnology industry of Japan. In
order to do this, there was a need to compare the government policies and measures undertaken
by Japan to that of China in terms of biotechnology. The two countries already have their own
unique government policies in this field. These policies may also be seen as each governments’
response to the different concerns of their citizens. The similarities and differences of the two
country’s politics were assessed and their strengths and weaknesses were highlighted. There is
also an examination of the possible dynamics of the two countries, but there will be a greater
extent of research done for the part of Japan. Through this, a better conclusion was achieved
about the respective measures that Japan could take in order to continue being a superpower in
the biotechnology industry.
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The Significance of the Study
This paper is a result of my studies in Japanese politics and government. This is an output
reflecting the integration of learning acquired in my classes, which was then translated into a
comprehensive paper. This acts as a synthesis of my learning about the Japanese government and
brought the learning further to suit my own interests about the current topics of the world today.
As a Biology student, I understand the merit and potential of biotechnology through many
lectures and laboratory exposure which I experienced in Ateneo. When I considered this topic, I
felt the need to use my scientific knowledge to understand and clarify certain realities in
Japanese society and politics. I find biotechnology to be the most interesting field in biology,
and I am planning to pursue this (hopefully) for my Master’s degree in Japan. Japan has highlevel skills for biotechnology, but I felt like Japanese politics and people do not use it properly or
ideally. For this reason, I decided to write a paper about the biotechnology situation in Japan.
The Scope and Limitations of the Study
The focuses of this study are the political and economic trends concerning biotechnology,
particularly in pharmaceuticals and agriculture. These two are considered to be the most
profitable and promising, but at the same time the most controversial and hotly-debated fields in
biotechnology. The articles and newspapers acquired for this study ones which were published
from the year 2000 onwards, in order to keep the data as recent as possible.
Methodology
This paper also used the comparative method in assessing the different aspects of the countries
mentioned. The data was in the form of journal articles acquired through JSTOR, EBSCO and
Googlebooks. News articles or news sites were also viewed through the Internet. The
newspapers used include Asahi, Nikkei, and Japan Times for Japan, while for China there were
The Beijing Times, People’s Daily Online, and China Economic Times. Other articles were also
referred to, specifically social science articles about science. The translation of the articles and
news sites accessed online was done through the use of Google Translate and consultation with
translators. The government sites of the two countries were also referred to. Observations and
trends were obtained through these sources.
Theoretical Framework
The hypothesis of this study is that the citizen’s perception and behaviour of the two countries
affect the government’s policies and thus the dynamics of the biotechnology industry. The
independent variable is the citizen’s perception and behaviour, while the dependent variables are
the government’s policies and dynamics of the biotechnology industry of Japan and China.
The Biotechnology Power Struggle
Studying biotechnology always has merits politically and economically. First, in terms of
agriculture, biotechnology support may help the stability of the amount of crops produced within
a year. Through new advancements in genetic manipulation, companies may manage trading and
business better. This can be done by having more alternative solutions for various unpredictable
problems, like drought, typhoons and pest infestation. Thus, biotechnology can help even in the
private sector's businesses. In terms of politics, it can be a strong weapon to carve out a
prestigious position in international relations. Biotechnology is not an easy skill to acquire and
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master. Only highly-developed countries can get these skills or evolve these skills. It means that
the nation which acquires these skills will be relied upon by other countries, which may then be
used it as a strong diplomatic tool.
Biotechnology, as is the case with any form of technology, may be a good source of
strength when it comes to becoming an economic super power. The acquisition of technology,
which gives a country the ability to cure certain diseases or increase crop production, can
become a major advantage. This does not only involve the capacity to solve one’s own country’s
problems but also the power to impose intellectual property rights, which can be an ace up the
country’s sleeve when it comes to global politics. For instance, there was a topic of discussion
which caught the attention of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO), and the World Health Organisation (WHO), as it was about the
trade-related aspect of intellectual property rights for the cure of the HIV virus (Goldsmith,
2010). This matter does not involve the two countries discussed in this paper. However, this just
goes to show how certain biotechnological advancements, especially regarding the cures of
controversial diseases, can have such an enormous global impact. The same is true when it
comes to discoveries in agricultural biotechnology but public acceptance is more controversial.
This is because people who are the consumers of transgenic crops do not have the same
desperation for innovation compared to patients waiting for the cure of grave diseases. The need
for transgenes is usually applicable in situations where food is actually a problem. However,
those who protest against transgenic crops mostly belong to the middle- to upper-middle classes
in the social hierarchy. These are the people who may have considerable awareness regarding
these matters, which may not be the case for poor people, who need the food supply more than
they do.
On the economics of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology can create a bigger market in terms
of drugs. It can help companies to have more business sectors. In terms of reputation, the
discovery of a very advanced technology may also attract the influx of intellectuals towards the
country. This may raise the country’s reputation among the members of the scientific community
all over the world. For example, Southeast Asian countries who seek an improvement on their
own biotechnological fields will respect and seek support and education from the more advanced
countries.
From the political aspect, biotechnology can also help politics. For an ageing society like
Japan, the cost of medical support for older members of society is relatively expensive.
Additionally, most of the elderly use hospitals with expenses covered by the government. If
biotechnology can create new medicines which can revolutionise the treatment of disease, then
this can be a major boost in future adjustments and improvements for the government’s budget.
Biotechnology should get more attention as a political and social science issue. This is because
no matter how valuable a technology is, the research of most scientists will rely on the funding
and support of the government and its people. There are so many elegant and promising studies
which would have been very helpful in the aspect of curing diseases and alleviating hunger. This
is also one of the reasons why I felt the need to write something this scientifically inclined for a
political science audience.
From the abovementioned explanation, I would like to assert that biotechnology is an
important topic in Japanese politics and society. Additionally, I will use China as a basis for
comparison to explain Japanese biotechnological situation. The first reason for this is the
economic aspect. The need for the choice of China as a country for comparison is for the
obvious reason that both Japan and China are the economic superpowers of the 21st century.
There has been a current observable trend about the rise of Asia, which can be inferred from the
changing dynamics of the global economy. The United States is undergoing a serious depression,
which is the second worst since the Great Depression, caused by the Black Thursday
phenomenon of 1929. The United State’s credibility fell in terms of politics and economic
strength, even though it is still the top country in the world in terms of GDP ranking. This further
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affected Europe, which was had been suffering serious economic problems for quite sometime.
For instance, the Greek government was bankrupted; due to its huge deficit balance and
weakness reconstruction management, European countries have had to extend aid to bailout
Greece’s huge amount of debt, as it is part of the European Union. To make matters worse, other
European countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal also have great potential of becoming the
second Greece. To solve this economic crisis, Western countries have tried to recover through
the Asian market. It is easy to predict that America and Europe cannot recover from this
situation without the power of Asia. So it is quite certain that Asia will be the centre of the 21st
century. As such, it would be very productive and reasonable to compare Japan and China,
Asia’s leading countries.
The second reason is the political and societal perspective of the two countries. Japan
and China are geographically proximate and their cultures also have similarities like Buddhism,
Confucianism, and similar character symbols. However, interestingly, their political style and the
behaviour of their people are intriguingly different. For example, Japan is a democratic country
with a constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, China is a communist country with a
dictatorial government. Japanese people are also relatively more health-conscious, and are
known as the most health-conscious people in the world. However, the Chinese are historically
known for their innovative herbal medicines since ancient times. The third reason for using
China as a basis for comparison is that it is beginning to gain many new skills in terms of
biotechnology, making it a good rival but at the same time a good possible ally when it comes to
partnerships in biotechnological ventures.
The People’s Perception and Behaviour
Here is the Japanese government and Japanese society’s reaction about biotechnology and its
impacts. According to a survey which was done in 2000, there was an observed shift in the
attitudes of the Japanese society when it comes to the field of Biotechnology. It revealed that
there was a remaining optimism when it comes to the possible benefits of biotechnology.
However, there was also a growing air of anxiety among the masses who perceive the risks
associated with the advancing technology becoming more and more unappealing (Macer & Chen
Ng, 2000). This was a study done as an assessment of the public attitudes due to increased media
exposure when it comes to anti-GMO groups. Japanese scientists were also assessed and there
was an obvious gap between the professionals and the masses. The Japanese public has always
been interested in technological innovations. They were even reported to have the highest level
of biotechnology awareness, although awareness is not necessarily unanimous with
understanding. Even in 2000, 59% respondents agreed that genetic engineering improves human
life. However it was viewed to be less valuable than computers, information technology and
telecommunications. Furthermore, over the years, more people think that biotechnology can be
harmful to human society, as 24% of the respondents did in 2000. There was also a trend that
biotechnology was less risky compared to genetic engineering, although in fact, genetic
engineering is actually a subset of biotechnology (Macer & Chen Ng, 2000). This just goes to
show that the Japanese society does see the benefits of biotechnology. However, the
extensiveness of the possibilities introduced by biotechnology have also increased the anxiety of
the masses.
There was also a parallel survey done with scientists with 370 respondents, and it was
observed that more scientists think that genetic engineering improves human life, as was the
belief of 72% of the respondents. That same study pointed out that even scientists have doubts
and speculations when it comes to biotechnology, which was a significant amount as well
(Macer & Chen Ng, 2000). One might wonder why I needed to mention this parallel survey
about the scientist’s perception when they are not really technically part of the general public by
definition. This is because I wanted to point out a certain glitch in this survey where it claims to
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have sought the opinion of certain “scientists”. It can also be observed in this survey that it did
not point out the specific specialisations of these “scientists”. It should have been mentioned,
since scientists of different fields may come from a range of backgrounds, e.g. physics or
chemistry. These people are also “scientists” but their awareness of biotechnology may be just as
limited as other members of the non-science educated classes. Even scientists within the field of
biology have varying degrees of awareness and understanding when it comes to biotechnology.
As mentioned, biotechnology is a very specialised field. That is why the “ask a scientist” portion
of this particular survey is not a scientific opinion, but the public perception of a certain class of
people in disguised.
Other significant points of the survey also include that of the public respondents: 25%
thought of cloning and in vitro fertilisation as examples of biotechnology. There were varying
perceptions on different types of technology introduced by biotechnology research. However,
the most accepted application was the introduction of human genes into bacteria for the purpose
of producing pharmaceutical products, which had a 45% approval rate among respondents.
However, 33% disapproved. Despite the various advancements and dependence on various
industries in biotechnology, it is obvious that many people still do not understand the
implications of their stands. Japan, at least, has a better informed public who even discriminates
between biotechnology and genetic engineering. Results on the surveys basically reveal that
pessimism against biotechnology stems from bad publicity particularly of genetically modified
organisms. Though there is optimism, there is also an increased perception of the need for better
restrictions and regulations. 69% of respondents were very much in favour of the
implementation of international regulatory bodies to monitor the biotechnology industry. Such
regulations are expected to come from the United Nations and the World Health Organisation.
There has also been a significant decrease in public confidence in scientific organisations on this
field, and even lower confidence for the Diet and other government agencies. Interestingly, it is
the universities which have gained the greatest trust and can thus be very influential in this field
(Macer & Chen Ng, 2000).
However, are Japanese people really flexible in terms of their perceptions of
biotechnology? In terms of ethnology, Japanese are actually good in biotechnology. In other
words, Japanese people have always been innovative, and they have used biotechnological
techniques for a long time. For instance, microorganisms were reported to be found by
Leeuwenhoek from the Netherlands in 1673. However, Japanese people already had the
technology to separate microorganisms more than 500 years before that publication came to light.
Louis Pasteur was said to have discover "pasteurisation" or the method of heating to kill certain
microorganisms, but the Japanese had already used this technology long before the said
“discovery” was made. The point is that the Japanese people have been used to biotechnology
for such a long time, even if they did not understand it scientifically (Koizumi, 1994). On the
other hand, the attitude of Japanese people towards biotechnology is not completely positive
despite their history. In the study, it was found that almost all Japanese consumers feared
transgenic crops. According to a study by the Japanese cabinet in 2008, more than 65% of
Japanese people felt a resistance towards biotechnology like recombinant DNA technology. For
example, Japanese consumers really care whether or not products are produced artificially
through the recombination of genes. Through the Japanese media, people think that "We cannot
eat biotechnological food", "A rat which ate biotechnological crops died", "Biotechnology is one
of the reasons for the destruction of the ecosystem" etc. (Wedge, 2011).
Now, I shall discuss China. However, before discussing on the Chinese perception of
biotechnology, it would be useful to examine the demographics of China as well. China has a
very large land area, which can be suitable for crop production, so it is easy to conclude that it
has an extensive agricultural industry. However, China also has to sustain its very large
population. As such, the consumers of these agricultural products are mainly the Chinese people
themselves. The useful point about this is that China may not be as concerned about global
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policies regarding transgenic crops, since they can only perform relatively minimal exports
because of the high demands already present within their country.
According to a German company’s research about China’s social and medical conditions,
China had a population of more than 1.292 billion in year 2003 (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2004, as cited by Tang, 2004). This may account for 25% of the world’s total population.
However, the one child policy may have pushed China towards the intermediate area when it
comes to population growth. Therefore, issues like agricultural production and medicine are
becoming major topics of concern (Tang, 2004).
On the aspect of health care, China is in the unusual situation of having the problems of
both developed and developing countries. This is because of the uneven distribution of
development on different areas. For instance, diseases that are common in developing countries
such as infectious diseases and epidemics are very high in rural areas in China. On the other
hand, diseases that are common in developed countries such as obesity and diabetes may be
found in the more developed areas in the cities (Tang, 2004). This is an interesting point, since
this reality would affect the nature of the kind of scientific research which would be prioritised
by the Chinese in the field of biotechnology. This would also help explain the composition of the
people that exist in China. This kind of society would entail a mixed bag of problems which can
be tackled by scientific research. In a way, it makes China a very interesting society in which to
conduct scientific research, because the areas of interest are very diverse. If the Chinese
scientists intend to explore such diverse studies, then China can have research bases in such a
diverse field as well.
It was described in certain journal articles that there is not enough being published about
biotechnology in the media, which was observed to be supportive of agricultural biotechnology.
It was even found on an international survey of ten countries in 1999 by Environics International
that China is the country with the greatest public support when it comes to agricultural
biotechnology. However, China Daily has argued that the Chinese society has high awareness
when it comes to biotechnology but this does not automatically translate to a definite
understanding. It just goes to show that the society’s perception is shaped by the government,
since it is also the government which controls the media. There is still a growing market for
people who really do not want to eat genetically modified food, which is typical in other
countries as well. However, the Chinese attitude of practicality simply cannot put up with the
extra costs associated with trying to avoid these genetically modified products (Gale, et al. ,
2002).
Resulting Government Policies and Measures
Here, I would like to talk about the government policies that are related to biotechnology in
Japan. In an article by JETRO advisers in 2005, it was stated that Japan was already taking
biotechnology seriously with raising concerns about being left behind in the critical
advancements of the field. The article even pointed out the strengthening of China in the field,
which the article described as an “outward-looking” country. Some of the reasons which may
have led to this sudden shift in paradigms were the economic deflation and the government’s
deficit (JETRO, 2005).
There is also an air of discrimination in Japan. This includes discrimination against
women for job opportunities as well as the discrimination against foreign scientists. There is
even discrimination against “others” during exchanges between faculties in universities. Free
exchange and competition would have been very helpful in the progress of biotechnology. As
mentioned by Kornberg, science in the 21st century needs a network of different universities
across the world. The three centuries of isolation have made this all more difficult for Japan, and
they also have the problem of the language barrier. Japan needs to be more aggressive in
recruiting talents if they do not wish to lag behind Europe and the US, who are actively
140
attracting graduate students and post-doctoral professionals through advertisements and funding.
Japan has to work hard to attract these scientists to make up for the migration of scientists to the
US after World War II (Kornberg, 2002). This aspect of Japanese society can be disadvantageous
in the sense that it prevents good camaraderie among scientists. This may even affect the politics
between universities and other institutions in the field. Biotechnology is about exchange of
knowledge between different institutions, which is why the government has to take certain
measures to encourage a better relationship among the members of the Japanese scientific
community.
The METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) had made a projection of the
current biotechnology market products from 2001 to 2010. The study was made in 2002, which
is why some of the data were just predictions. The top key market sector products were still
Human Health 40%, and Agrifood 27% (Venning & Yukawa, 2005). From the government’s
perspective, there was still the Biotechnology Strategy Council, which consists of the Prime
Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister of Science and Technology Policy, the
five key Ministers for Education, Agriculture, Industry and Health and Environment. The
Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare has been given a large budget for pharmaceutical
development and its regulation, in collaboration with the Japan Health Sciences Foundation.
The Japanese government understands the importance of biotechnology, and they have
mapped out their strategy for it. For example, the Japanese government published a broad
outline for biotechnological strategy in 2001, in which they explained the importance of
biotechnology and how they expected it to bring big innovations in the 21st century. Then they
targeted three points in terms of biotechnological policy. The first was about innovative research
and development (R&D), where they intended to provide a bigger budget for biotechnological
R&D. In addition, they also planned to set ideal conditions for biotechnological research by
creating research laboratories (RL) specifically for this purpose. Additionally, they planned to
import scientists with the required skills in the field, due to a lack of skilled scientists in Japan.
The second point of their policies was to create an environment where biotechnology
could be easily connected to industry and business. The government is convinced that the final
benefactors of biotechnology are the private companies. The government designed measures to
extend the benefits to the people themselves so that the technology created can really change
people's lives. For example, the government will award incentives if companies can create new
technologies with direct societal applications. They have set laws for biotechnology which are
more adjustable to invigorate the market. They have also encouraged the ventures of bio
companies. Furthermore, they have also created a better connection between university research
and the industry. Additionally, they will also protect intellectual property rights (IPR) to make
the market fairer.
The third main point of the policies of the Japanese government is their efforts in raising
awareness of biotechnology among Japanese citizens. The government believes that it is
impossible for a society to make the leap to biotechnology without a possession of a deeper
understanding by its people. The correct information will be very important if biotechnology
wants to expand. The government is making the effort to explain not only how biotechnology
works scientifically, but also how it can fit and change people's daily lives in simple terms. This
involves the employment of professors to help connect biotechnology to people's lives. Also, the
government has to emphasise the safety of biotechnology over all else. This is because the
people's deepest concerns are about the safety of this technology (Biotechnology Senryaku
Taikou, 2002).
These are the policies of the Japanese government with regard to biotechnology so far.
On the other hand, there have been no observable successes which would encourage them to
stick to this outline. I still feel like Japan does not place as much importance on biotechnology as
it should. For example, the Japanese government is still looking to construct a more efficient
budget breakdown. And it seems that the budget for the life sciences is one of the sections where
141
the budget is to be cut. Japan does not feel a sense of urgency to expand its biotechnology
industry.
Asian countries in general (except perhaps Japan) have been known to lag behind in the
biotech industry, but countries like China are putting in extensive government support to dispel
this idea. Here, I shall discuss the aspect of China’s government policies concerning
biotechnology in China. China is actually one of the top four leading countries in the world for
biotech crop research. It is developing to be one of the largest agricultural biotechnology powers,
even having a significant amount of genetically modified crops which are still under trial.
However, of course, this still raises concerns for the policymaking organisations. Despite the
conflicting opinions of various authorities in China, the official policy of the government is to
promote biotechnology as one of its national priorities in technological development (Huang et
al., 2002). Agricultural biotechnology in China is viewed as a solution to food shortage and a
way of sustaining the income for poor farmers (MOA, 1990, as cited by Huang et al., 2002).
China is the second largest region in the world for plant biotechnology, after to North America
(Chen, 2000, as cited by Huang et al., 2002). However, the hurdle preventing further
development, despite its various advancements in plant biotechnology, is the growing global
debate about genetically modified crops and the trade regulations imposed by the European
Union (Huang et al., 2002). But, as I have mentioned earlier, the main consumers of Chinese
transgenic crops are the Chinese themselves, so I do not think that the regulations of the
European Union will have much of an impact on the Chinese approach to biotechnology. While
there have been increasing amounts of successfully genetically modified crops generated for
public research institutes, there is still a difficulty in securing public approval for them.
Most of biotechnological research in China is financed by the government. Several
supra-ministries and agencies were specially established to design the research strategy,
prioritisation, approval and allocation of budgets. These include the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST), the Stage Development Planning Commission (SDPC), and the Ministry
of Agriculture (MOA), in addition to several research institutes such as the Chinese Academy of
Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) (Huang et al.,
2001). Biotechnology in China is a daring national policy which supports the biotechnology
programme of 1986, as coordinated by the MOST, after the development of transgenic
techniques in 1983. Because of this, there was a rapid establishment of major agricultural
academies and universities, and funding for R&D has been increasing since the 1980s.
As for medicine, however, China has made major advancements in the field of
therapeutic cloning and human embryonic stem cells. There was even recognition of the rise of
the stem cell in the East. In addition to stem cell research, China also pioneered isolating and
sequencing certain genetic diseases (Tang, 2004). However, in the field of agriculture, China is
one of the global leaders in plant research. Its successes include the creation of the first
transgenic virus resistant tobacco (1993) and the first transgenic long shelf life tomato (1997).
Another one of its contributions is the transgenic Bt cotton, which causes the cotton to be
resistant to pests, thus reducing costs of further pesticide application. China’s Bt cotton has
become the world’s largest transgenic crop programme (Huang J. et. al 2011). According to the
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, in terms of intellectual
property rights, this is the only commercial transgenic right owned by China (ISAA, 2004, as
cited by Tang, 2004).
Although there are still restrictions, this is good proof of the strong support that
biotechnology receives from the Chinese society, and how appreciative the society is of the
benefits garnered from the technological advancements. Even the world’s first commercially
produced gene therapy drug was approved in China (Pearson et al., 2004).
Observations and Comparisons
142
By comparing Japan and China, it may be observed that both countries have advantages in the
field of biotechnology. Japan is obviously very much paving the way forward when it comes to
research because of the existing advancements in biotechnology and its many biotech companies.
There is also a need for smaller biotech companies in Japan to help bridge the gap
between academic discoveries and large pharmaceutical companies. But what still remains for
Japan is the presence of well-established scientific and engineering resources, and a large,
educated, skilled, and hard-working labour force. According to Kornberg, Japan needs to
overcome the hurdles which are constraining scientific freedom. It also needs to transcend its
conservative ties and the constraints of gender, age and ethnicity (Kornberg, 2002).
After working through this paper, I realised that Japan and China do have several
similarities and differences. With regard to similarities, both countries have a large and educated
labour force, which is characteristic of developed countries. However, as mentioned earlier,
China also has a considerable number of problems which are usually faced by developing
countries. Both of have a strong pharmaceutical sector, but for different reasons; Japan has one
because of its ageing population and its health-conscious mentality; China, on the other hand,
has a strong pharmaceutical sector because of the myriad of diseases which are a result of its
various living conditions. Both countries also have a considerably strong agricultural research
sector. However, Japan has stricter regulations that must be adhered to before the technology can
be implemented. While it has been a super power for quite some time in terms of biotechnology,
it has been lagging behind at present times as technology becomes more advanced and the public
becomes more vigilant.
I think that the Japanese people’s ability to access information about the GMO protests in
the West may have also affected their own insights. On the other hand, the Chinese government
has strong control over media exposure of biotechnology to the public, thus enabling them to
shape their perceptions. Additionally, from my own inferences, the government may also control
the access of information from outside through the Internet. For instance, Facebook is not really
common in China, so there is really a limit as to the extent to which the Chinese can participate
in the global discourse on biotechnology. This may be advantageous for China, since the
decision is given to the authorities, who may have a better understanding about the current
situation. However, this may also be a problem, since in order for a technology to improve,
feedback and criticism from consumers is needed.
Conclusion
From this study, it can be concluded that the Japanese society and the government need to be
informed about the ongoing advancements of other countries in biotechnology. This should be
done in order to access their own policy implementation and regulatory measures in
biotechnology research and industry. In this field, Japan has to uphold its principle of “改革”
(kaikaku) of knowledge acquisition and innovation. China is just one of the many countries who
are rising in the field of biotechnology. Japan can learn about the tactics and measures taken by
other countries in this field and create a system better than the existing one. Japan should also
take advantage of the fact that Asia’s time has come, and show the power of Asia to the world.
This would be beneficial to Japan and other countries which have close ties with Japan in Asia.
Recommendations
Obviously, there have been various constraints and problems encountered during the
construction of this paper. For instance, I am a foreigner who is trying to conduct research about
two countries whose languages I do not directly understand. This may have limited the extent of
how far I could reach in terms of the acquisition of articles. Another constraint was the time
143
frame involved. After experiencing the laborious work associated with attacking a very
controversial scientific topic, it was apparent that a topic like this would have been more suitable
for a thesis instead than a term paper. Obviously, as much as I would have like to make the data
acquired from Japan and China as parallel as possible, I was limited by the parameters set by the
sources themselves, since all of my data were from secondary sources.
Despite the disadvantages encountered, I still hold firm to the stand that a comparative
research between Japan and China in terms of biotechnology is essential and useful to the further
growth of Asia as a whole. As Japan is our main topic of interest, I think that Japan has to learn
more about its counterparts within Asia, and not take anything for granted when it comes to
technological advancements. As a country which does not have many natural resources, Japan
has to be extra vigilant about its position in the race towards the discovery of better technologies.
It will have to rely on its survival instincts as a small island nation.
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145
The Reception of Haruki Murakami in Vietnam
By Nguyễn Anh Dân
Hue University’s College of Education
Author’s Note
Nguyễn Anh Dân, Department of Literature, Hue University’s College of Education, Vietnam.
This research was published for the Third International Conference of the Japanese Studies
Association in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 22-23th February 2012.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nguyễn Anh Dân, Department of
Literature, Hue University’s College of Education, 34 Le Loi Street, Hue City, Vietnam. E-mail:
nguyenanhdan@gmail.com
Abstract
After receiving the Gunzo prize for the novel Hear the Wind Sing (風の歌を聴
け), Haruki Murakami (村上春樹, born 1949) has gradually demonstrated his
exceptional talent in contemporary Japanese literature. He is now well-known
outside Japan and has become a global writer. A number of Murakami’s works
have been translated into many languages, including Vietnamese. One of his first
novels to be introduced to Vietnam was Norwegian Wood (ノルウェイの森).
This novel, translated by Hạnh Liên and Hải Thanh, edited by Bùi Phụng and
published by the Literature Publishing House (Nhà xuất bản Vãn học) in 1997,
attracted the attention of the researcher in Vietnam. However, due to the
limitations of its translation, Murakami and his work did not leave a lasting
impression on Vietnamese readers at the time. It was not until 2006 when a new
translation by Trịnh Lữ was published by the Vietnam Writer Association
Publishing House (Nhà xuất bản Hội nhà vãn Việt Nam) and Nhã Nam Company
that Norwegian Wood lead to the “Murakami phenomenon” in Vietnam. Since
then, Murakami has become one of the most popular writers in Vietnam. The
reception of Murakami in Vietnam is not homogenous, due to several social
factors. Murakami’s works are highly appreciated by a section of the reading
public, but are ignored by others. There are several explanations for this
distinctive pattern of reception, including different cultural conceptions, the
lifestyle of Vietnamese youth, the factor of Vietnamese literature itself and the
development of market economy. This article will study the cause of the
Murakami phenomenon, and the pattern of reception of his works in Vietnam
from the viewpoint of cultural and comparative literature. In addition, a
prediction of the development of the Murakami phenomenon in the coming years
will also be discussed.
Keywords: Reception, Haruki Murakami, Vietnam
146
The Reception of Haruki Murakami in Vietnam
The first work of Haruki Murakami – a Japanese contemporary novelist – to be published in
Vietnam is Norwegian Wood, which was translated by Hạnh Liên and Hải Thanh and published
by the Literature Publishing House (Nhà xuất bản Vãn Học) in 1997. However, it was not until a
new translation by Trịnh Lữ was introduced that Haruki Murakami became a cultural
phenomenon with differing trends of reception. Simultaneously, this literature phenomenon also
made Murakami a famous writer in Vietnam. Following the new translation of Norwegian Wood,
the Murakami “book phenomenon” in Vietnam was born.
From the aspect of literary reception, Haruki Murakami has brought to Vietnam a vitality
that is new and vibrant but full of controversy. Fortunately, the introduction of his work had the
effect of promoting literary activities. Murakami, together with some Vietnamese writers, has
made an impact on Vietnamese literature in terms of causing a shift in the writing style of
several young writers, at least in the way sex is expressed in their works. In addition, after the
success of Norwegian Wood, sex, which was previously considered to be a sensitive topic, is
now being viewed in a more open manner.
Norwegian Wood and Haruki Murakami’s Appearances in Vietnam
It took quite a long time for Murakami’s works to reach Vietnamese readers. Since the
publication of his first work Hear the Wind Sing in 1979, it has taken twenty years for his works
to reach the Vietnamese public. The publication of the first translation of Norwegian Wood was,
ten years later, compared to its first publication in Japanese. What were the reasons for this
delay?
The first thing that should be noticed is that the year 1997 marked the ten year period of
the renovation of Vietnam following the 6th Congress of the Communist Party in 1986. During
this period of renovation, Vietnamese society experienced numerous changes and difficulties.
The wage and price crisis, the US embargo and the collapse of the Socialist system in the former
Soviet Union placed Vietnam in a very difficult situation. Vietnamese literature and art also
changed in sync with the process of economic revival and the international integration of
Vietnam. It was not only a favourable condition but also a challenge to Vietnamese literature.
This was one of the reasons for the delay in the introduction of Murakami’s works to Vietnam,
compared to other Asian countries such as China or Taiwan.
It should also be noted that the process of innovation in literature after 1986 had faced
many obstacles. Along with a renovation in all aspects of the country, writers have had to
“change their blood” themselves. They conducted many experiments in literature, during which
many writers were exposed to risks. These risks originated from problems with political
ideologies and the culture that these literary works had to face (depending on the opinion of the
censor). Bảo Ninh is one of the typical examples of this case. His novel The Sorrow of War (Nỗi
buồn chiến tranh), which was published in 1987, received a warm welcome from readers and
critics and was awarded a prize by the Vietnam Writer’s Association (Hội nhà vãn Việt Nam).
Unfortunately, shortly after, this novel was banned from publication. The author even had to
change its title into the rather romantic “Fate and Love” (Thân phận và tình yêu) to be able to
continue publishing his work. The novel’s title was not changed back to its original title until
2005. As such, the volatility in Vietnamese literature was one of the factors that made
Vietnamese translators more cautious when working on foreign literature.
Another special point to be considered is that, in addition to the barrier of censorship,
cultural barriers have also affected the works that a translator’s will choose to translate. As many
147
“literature accidents” like The Sorrow of War have occurred, the decision to translate and publish
“problematic” texts like Norwegian Wood in Vietnam was a risky one. However, the parts of the
novel that seemed problematic, sensitive or vulgar were removed to ensure the safety of the
publication. The problem is that the value of the work was significantly reduced because of this
act of omission by the translators. Clearly, the greatest failure of this novel in Vietnam was
perhaps the failure of the translators. The persons responsible for this failure were none other
than Hạnh Liên and Hải Thanh. Nevertheless, we should extend our sympathy to them because
what they translated was strictly “censored” by the social system, including the cultural
administration of governmental agencies, traditional concepts, the public’s reception and the
horizon of expectation of Vietnamese readers. Thus, the action of the translators is acceptable in
this context. Obviously, Norwegian Wood is a novel full sexual matter that may be beyond the
reception level of Vietnamese readers. It would have been difficult for this translation to pass the
censorship board if the translator had stuck with the original version.
At the time, there were many literary works that addressed sexual topics frankly. The
most noticeable example was that of the writer Nguyễn Huy Thiệp, who became the most
complicated phenomenon in Vietnamese literature after 1975. Many of his work describe sex.
This is the main reason for his stormy career. This example really demonstrates that sex is a
topic of taboo, which it is difficult to have a broad understanding of it in the community.
The failure of Norwegian Wood in Vietnam at the time may also be due to the act of
publishing itself. The Literature Publishing House only printed a limited number: 800 copies,
with a size 13x19cm. In the social context where Vietnam was suffering from economic turmoil,
the fact that Murakami’s novel could not reach many Vietnamese readers due to a lack of
advertising is acceptable.
These above-mentioned obstacles were the main reasons that prevented Murakami’s
works from reaching Vietnam earlier. Norwegian Wood was the first “representative” of
Murakami in Vietnam, but it was a delegate that “move[d] slowly and wear[ily]”.
The Trịnh Lữ Translation and the Murakami Phenomenon in Vietnam
It was almost ten years later, in 2006, that Trịnh Lữ was able to make a breakthrough in bringing
Murakami back to Vietnam with a new translation of Norwegian Wood. In actuality, Murakami
had lost too much finding a foothold in Vietnam, taking twenty years for the first introduction of
his works, and nearly half a decade more to establish himself. This is especially so, as during
this thirty year period, Norwegian Wood was the only novel considered for translation into
Vietnamese. Taking ten years to re-translate a work is not a short time, because most of
Murakami’s works had been published in Japan by that time (2006), with the exception for 1Q84
(Ichi kyû hachi yon).
The biggest difference between the Trịnh Lữ translation compared to the Hạnh Liên and
Hải Thanh translation is that he is almost completely loyal to the original version. Paragraphs
where sex was depicted were maintained as in the original version. Therefore, the integrity of the
novel was maintained. The Trịnh Lữ translation really brought Murakami to a higher position in
Vietnamese literature. It caused a unique literature phenomenon that is not only interesting but
also equally complex.
After twenty years of Vietnamese renovation from 1986, social circumstances had
changed dramatically by the time the Trịnh Lữ translation of Norwegian Wood was published.
Thanks to the many achievements of Vietnamese international integration, the living standards
of Vietnamese people were improved, which in turn facilitated the development of literature and
art. The development of Vietnamese literature was directed towards personal and current social
issues. The themes of fate and human tragedy received more attention. It can be said that
Vietnamese literature had really immersed itself in the currents trend of world literature. The
censorship of literary publications, however, had not decreased, especially of those that
148
contained sensitive issues such as politics, ideology or sex, such as the novel Saint Night (Ðêm
thánh nhân) by Nguyễn Ðình Chính. When the first volume of the novel was published in 1999,
the negative public opinion of the novels made the publisher hesitate to publish the second part.
I (Nguyễn Ðình Chính) have to admit that, in 2000, I intended to publish the
second volume of the novel but I was rejected by all of the publishers. At that
time, people criticised my book very sharply, the central committee of ideologyculture commission then made an expert report on my book but concluded that
there was nothing serious74. (Hoang, 2006)
Although it was concluded that the book did “not contain anything serious”, it was still banned
from publication. In order for his “spiritual child” to continue reaching readers, Nguyễn Ðình
Chính had to rename it to Zodiac Date (Ngày hoàng ðạo) and it was not until 2006 that both
volumes received authorisation to be printed. Fortunately, in the 2000s, the censorship of works
containing sexual elements seemed to slightly looser, although there were no specific written
notifications. Despite the fact that Norwegian Wood contains sexual elements, the fact that it
does not contain any sensitive political or ideological matters means that it is still an acceptable
work.
It should also be noted that the main literary audience of Norwegian Wood in 2006 were
young readers who never had to experience the ferocity of wars. Their main concerns were
personal issues as well as discovering the world outside. It was these young readers who most
eagerly expected Murakami’s works. There was an obvious alteration in social norms regarding
the aesthetic standards of Vietnamese literature at this time, compared to the 1990s. This change
was important in securing Norwegian Wood’s place in the hearts of readers. In other words, the
horizon of expectation or the limits of reader reception had improved. Thus, sexual topics were
seen in a different perspective, thus allowing Trịnh Lữ to translate Norwegian Wood more
honestly. If the Trịnh Lữ translation was published ten years ago, it would have been condemned
severely because the aesthetic opinion and the readers’ horizon of expectation at the time were
not open enough to appreciate this work.
The activities of publishers have also contributed greatly to creating a “Haruki
Murakami phenomenon” in Vietnam. This contribution exists through two main aspects. Firstly,
in 2006, the domestic literary market had welcomed a series of works that depicted sexual
matters candidly, such as Sleep Paralysis (Bóng ðè) by Ðỗ Hoàng Diệu and The Endless Field
(Cánh ðồng bất tận) by Nguyễn Ngọc Tý, both published in 2005. These works also provoked
less debate compared Norwegian Wood. These debates served as a psychological premise that
would facilitate the publication of Norwegian Wood later on. Secondly, the second time around
2000 13x20.5cm sized copies of Norwegian Wood were released, which is about 2.5 times
greater than that of the Hạnh Liên and Hải Thanh translation in 1997. The 2000 copies (as well
as its many reprints) helped Norwegian Wood reach a wider audience.
Moreover, the development of mass media and communication technology has also contributed
to the promotion of Norwegian Wood. This was achieved through several main channels,
namely:
First, the promotion activities of the publishers and business agencies, who stood to
profit from publishing the novels of Haruki Murakami.
Second, the rapid growth of the Internet in Vietnam was a channel that helped spread
information about the Haruki Murakami phenomenon rapidly. People posted their opinions,
comments and arguments about this phenomenon on various websites and forums. Also, these
websites and forums also shared electronic versions of Norwegian Wood and other writings of
Haruki Murakami illegally.
Third, the praise of ideal readers (e.g. theorists, critics) such as Nhật Chiêu, Trịnh Lữ,
74
Translated into English by Nguyễ n Anh Dân.
149
Phạm Xuân Nguyên, and Cao Việt Dũng for Norwegian Wood helped orient the psychology of
reception as well as trigger a positive response among readers.
Fourth, Murakami and his works have become interesting topics for scholarly researches.
They have become the theme of conferences, seminars and subjects of interest for scholars,
professors and university and college students.
Fifth, Murakami’s works have also spread directly to groups of readers. His writings
have aroused a lot of curiosity among Vietnamese readers. It is undeniable that some readers
choose to read Norwegian Wood just because of the sexual content. They are readers who were
without literary motivation, according to researcher Nhật Chiêu, “Its sexual content is a factor
that makes people who would not otherwise care about literature also seek out Norwegian
Wood” (Linh, 2006).
Sixth, the illegal printing and publication activities of business units in Vietnam meant
that most of Murakami’s books are now available in the market.
The above-mentioned channels have all contributed to a widespread Murakami
phenomenon in Vietnam. Because of this, Norwegian Wood and also later Vietnamese
publications of Murakami were greatly anticipated by many readers.
The Murakami phenomenon has made the atmosphere of Vietnamese literature more vibrant.
Together with other writings with sexual overtones, e.g. that of Đỗ Hoàng Diệu, Nguyễn
Ngọc Tư, Y Ban, and Võ Thị Hảo, Murakami has introduced to Vietnamese readers a “party of
sex” through their writings. One can consider this as a rising trend of erotic literature in Vietnam.
This phenomenon has sometimes been taken to extremes, causing the beauty of sex in literature
to be lost. Sex has become a means to attract customers rather than to introduce an element of
humanity. The Chain (Sợi xích) by Lê Kiều Như is a typical example.
A careful calculatation will show that The Chain contains 179 pages (excluding a few
bonus pages with sexual images that Lê Kiều Nhý offers the readers when buying the book).
Perhaps the readers are to read the book while looking at the illustrations Lê Kiều Nhý provides.
This book was printed in large font with a clear layout to increase the number of page. Readers
with an average reading speed can finish The Chain within 45 minutes. If we choose to skim
through the book because of the extremely bad writing style, it may take only 20 minutes or
even less to finish. This so-called novel with less than 20 thousand words can be roughly divided
into four sections with crude and vulgar depiction of sex, chunks of dialogue, brief descriptions
of the moods and feelings of characters; all in all, it is extremely promiscuous and inept 75 (Ngô,
2010).
In general, “the boom” of Norwegian Wood played an important role in opening the
hitherto half-closed curtain of sexual issues in the reception psychology of Vietnamese readers.
It also broke the cultural barriers of the readers’ horizon of expectation. With Norwegian Wood,
the literary activities in Vietnam have become more vibrant.
The Reception of Haruki Murakami in Vietnam: The “Broad Pathway” of Culture and
Literature
Why do so many Vietnamese readers like reading Haruki Murakami novels? First, the good
relationship between Japan and Vietnam has facilitated the development of culture and literature.
Japan officially established diplomatic relations with Vietnam on September 21st, 1973. Bilateral
cooperation between the two countries, which still exists today, has increasingly achieved good
results. There were a wide range of activities aimed at promoting Japanese culture and literature
in Vietnam through many different communication channels, in which the Japan Foundation
played a crucial role. Through sponsorship from this organisation, many cultural activities
related to Japan have been held, which in turn helped promote Japanese literature. Through these
75
Translated into English by Nguyễ n Anh Dân.
150
activities, the works of contemporary writers such as Kenzaburo Oe, Haruki Murakami, Ryu
Murakami, and Yoshimoto Banana have reached Vietnamese readers.
Secondly, Japanese literature has been included in the curriculum of universities,
colleges and other educational institutions related to literature in Vietnam. The beauty of Japan
and Japanese people as portrayed in literature has impacted Vietnamese readers, allowing them
to connect with Japanese literature. Murakami may have also helped extend the success of other
Japanese writers, such as Akutagawa Ryunosuke, Abe Kobo, Kawabata Yasunari, and
Kenzaburo Oe. He is also one of a few Japanese writers who have had many works translated
into Vietnamese, including Norwegian Wood (translated by Hạnh Liên and Hải Thanh, 1997;
Trịnh Lữ, 2006), The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle (ねじまき鳥クロニクル, Trần Tiễn Cao Ðãng,
2006), South of the Border, West of the Sun (国境の南、太陽の西, Cao Việt Dũng, 2007),
Kafka on the Shore (海辺のカフカ, Dýõng Týờng, 2007), After Dark (アフターダーク, Huỳnh
Thanh Xuân, 2007), Sputnik Sweetheart (スプートニクの恋人, Ngân Xuyên, 2008), HardBoiled Wonderland and the End of the World (世界の終りとハードボイルド ・ワンダーラン
ド, Lê Quang, 2010), A Wild Sheep Chase (羊をめぐる冒険, Minh Hạnh, 2011) and Dance
Dance Dance (ダンス・ダンス・ダンス, Trần Vân Anh, 2011)76. In addition to this, about 70
of his short stories have been translated into Vietnamese, and have been published in six
collections: Firefly (Ðom ðóm, 2006), A Perfect Day for Kangaroos (Ngày đẹp trời để xem
Kangaroo, 2006), After the Quake (Sau cơn động đất, 2006), Lexington Ghosts (Bóng ma ở
Lexington, 2007), TV People (Người Ti-Vi, 2007) translated by Phạm Vũ Thịnh, and Haruki
Murakami’s Short Stories - Research and Criticism (Truyện ngắn Murakami Haruki - nghiên cứu và
phê bình, 2006) by Hoàng Long. In addition to novels and short stories, two other books by
Murakami, Underground and What I Talk About When I Talk About Running, were translated into
Vietnamese in 2009 and 2011, respectively.
It is unusual for a Japanese writer to have many works translated into Vietnamese. Even
Kenzaburo Oe, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1994, had only a few of his writings
translated into Vietnamese. Professor Huỳnh Nhý Phýõng (2011) once said:
Compared to other Japanese writers such as Kawabata Yasunari and Mishima Yukio, Oe
Kenzaburo, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1994, hasn’t had many works translated
and introduced in Vietnam. According to our research data, his works that have been translated into
Vietnamese include the short story The Catch (Nuôi thù, translated by Diễm Châu), the novel A
Personal Matter (Một nỗi ðau riêng, trans. by Lê Ký Thýõng) and some other short stories, e.g.
Women Listening to the “Rain Tree” (Cây mýa thông minh, trans. by Dýõng Týờng), The PeopleSheep (Những con cừu ngýời) and A Silent Cry77 (Ngýời câm bất ngờ), translated by Lê Ngọc
Thảo78 (Huynh, 2011).
This comparison does not mean that Vietnamese readers prefer Murakami to Kenzaburo Oe,
because the number of translations published largely depends on the potential profit that a publisher
can make from printing the books. Moreover, the current socioeconomic status and the change in
aesthetic standards and the reader’s horizon of expectation in particularly have influenced the
demand for publications.
Thirdly, the fundamental change in aesthetic tastes in is a prominent factor that has enabled
world literature, including Murakami’s novels, to reach a Vietnamese audience. Young people care
about personal issues, the discovery of sex, and also contemporary problems. Therefore, they
empathise with what Murakami shares in his writings.
Although Norwegian Wood is not Murakami’s masterpiece, it has fascinated many readers
wherever it appears. One of many factors that account for its success is that it describes the lives of
young people so accurately and in such an attractive manner. Young people in general and students
Books are listed by the year of its appearance in Vietnam
The exact English title of these translations is not known.
78 Translated into English by Nguyễ n Anh Dân
76
77
151
in particular love this work because it can reflect the deepest thoughts of their mind (Linh, 2006).
We should also notice the change in the demands of readers where aesthetic tastes are
concerned. Murakami’s Vietnamese readers may be divided into two groups, i.e. the ideal readers
(professionals, theorists, critics, university professors and students) and the popular readers (who
read for entertainment). Although these two groups have different views about the Murakami
phenomenon, they all express their love for Murakami’s writing to some extent in their reception
psychology. This love may originate from the age and problems of Vietnam’s young generation.
They connect, empathise and share with its characters who are lonely, searching for the truth and the
meaning of their life as well as their own ego, who at odds with the Eastern and Western value
systems and the traditional and modern values depicted in the works of Murakami. These are the
main reasons why the majority of Murakami’s readers are young people.
Fourthly, the horizon of expectation of Vietnamese readers has gradually improved,
especially with regard to ideal readers. Equipped with literary theories, they are able to have a more
equitable and conscious view from the literary perspective and avoid an inequitable, one-sided social
view. They have welcomed Murakami’s works as a new wave and broadcast it to popular readers.
Because of this influence, the popular audience is more supportive of Murakami’s works.
The sixth factor for his success is is his own artistic style. Generally, Murakami’s short
stories and novels are created with two trends: a realistic, lyrical style and a surrealistic and magical
style. These trends are either separated (especially in his short stories) or coexist in one module.
Norwegian Wood and The South of the Border, The West of the Sun and Sputnik Sweetheart belong to
the former trend while Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World, A Wild Sheep Chase,
Dance Dance Dance, The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, Kafka on the Shore, After Dark and 1Q84
belong to the latter trend. Besides, his writings also have a “monstrous detective” motif, which is
difficult for readers to ignore them. The combination of this monstrous detective style, sex,
violence, politics and the endless search for meaning has produced a warm reception among
Vietnamese readers.
Finally, the complexity in the reception of Murakami’s works have also had a stimulating
effect on other readers, creating a spreading psychology that encourages readers to seek to satisfy
their curiosity. Therefore, they look to Murakami’s works to solve the questions about society
themselves.
However, as has already been mentioned, the reception of Haruki Murakami in Vietnam is
not homogeneous. There is both praise and rejection from the audience. This rejecting attitude may
originate from cultural barriers, that were formerly remnants of feudalism.
The Reaction to Haruki Murakami in Vietnam: The “Narrow Door” Concept
When Norwegian Wood of reappeared in Vietnam in 2006, there was a widespread debate about the
amount of “sex” in this novel. The question was posed: “Is the sex in Norwegian Wood is merely sex
or is it true art?” (Phan 2006)
The case presented by Norwegian Wood is not new to Vietnam. In the past, Truyện Kiều by
Nguyễn Du, and some of the writings of Vũ Trọng Phụng 79 , had faced similar circumstances.
Because of the limitations of the judgment of literary works that stemmed from inflexible political
and social perspectives as well as other negative motives, several authors and their works were taken
to the “guillotine”. Fortunately, time is a persuasive defence against the unjustified indictment of
these works and the authors. Murakami’s works, especially Norwegian Wood, have proven their own
value. Attribution or indictments that judge Norwegian Wood to be a work of pornography are the
product readers that hold traditional perspectives and standard of aesthetics dear.
The fact that a portion of Vietnamese readers dislike the works of Haruki Murakami accurately
reflects the social stratification of readers. Young readers who have been widely exposed to Western
79
Lucky Person (Số đỏ ), Making Whore (Làm đĩ), The Skill to Marry the Foreigner (Kỹ nghệ lấ y
Tây)…etc.
152
culture are will accept his works more easily, than the older ones who are more heavily influenced
by Confucianism concepts.
Another point that should be noted is that sex has always been a taboo subject in Vietnam.
Public demonstrations of sex have always lead to a negative reaction by the public. People feel
ashamed and skim through or even skip paragraphs that describe sex, because they fear that once
their doings are discovered by others, they would be thought to have bad manners.
The Vietnamese readers’ reaction to the writings of Murakami may be partly explained by
the fact that not all his works are easy to read or receive. Nhật Chiêu (2006) once said that “Another
prominent reason is that Norwegian Wood is very easy to read, unlike his later novels. Norwegian
Wood has a realistic and lyric style, while his later works contain factors of postmodernism and
surrealism” (Linh, 2006). In addition to sex, there are several barriers between Murakami’s works
and readers, such as philosophy, symbolism, and fantasy, which are incorporated in a fanciful and
postmodern style of storytelling. Therefore, it is more difficult for the reader to understand his novels.
This will lead to a gap in the perspective of the beauty of his works and the readers. In other words,
the academic factors in some of his novels have exceeded the average Vietnamese reader’s horizon
of expectation.
Also, the diffusion of the psychology of reception has also led to the rejection of Murakami.
The opinions of a group of readers will affect the opinions of another group. This diffusion involves
both the groups who like and dislike Murakami’s works.
In summary, the reaction to Haruki Murakami in Vietnam largely stems from the conflict
about the different concepts of sex in his works. This incident also demonstrates the existence of the
“narrow door” in the thinking process of readers. Only what is consistent with the aesthetic standard
of the public is allowed to pass through this “narrow door”. However, Murakami has not managed to
satisfy this standard, for the most part. A major part of his repertoire has been rejected by the public
but accepted just as quickly by the youth. A section of the Vietnamese readers cannot completely
accept sex in literature.
The Probability of Receiving Murakami’s Works in the Near Future
Despite the conflicting opinions, Murakami has overcome all the expectations and established a
foothold among the majority of the reader community in Vietnam. This reflects a change in aesthetic
concepts in Vietnamese readers, as shown by literary works with “concentrated” sexual matters like
Murakami’s. Along with the “Murakami phenomenon”, there is a new trend of sexual expression in
the works of Vietnamese writers. Other writers with similar cases include Võ Thị Hảo, Ðỗ Hoàng
Diệu, Nguyễn Ngọc Tý, and Vi Thùy Linh.
It has been more than five years since Trịnh Lữ’s translation of Norwegian Wood was
published. At present, Vietnamese readers have a relatively more open view towards sex. However, it
should also be recognised that sex is not completely encouraged in Vietnam, since Asian traditions
are still firmly embedded in the thinking of Vietnamese people. Some scenes depicted in the writings
of Murakami and certain Vietnamese writers are still negatively accepted by the public. If sex is
over-encouraged in Vietnamese literature, there will be a threat to the classic aesthetic standards of
Vietnam.
Among the twelve novels of Haruki Murakami, only Hear the Wind Sing, Pinball, 1973 and
1Q84 have not been translated into Vietnamese. Most of his short stories have been translated.
However, we need to admit that it is his novels, not his short stories, that have created an impression
on Vietnamese readers. More recently, two of his books that are still translated are A Wild Sheep
Chase and Dance Dance Dance. Readers are still waiting for 1Q84. It can be seen that Murakami is
still an interesting phenomenon for the audience of Vietnam. Therefore, his novels are still widely
welcomed by readers. However, I believe that the atmosphere generated by the introduction of
Murakami’s work in 2006 had already disappeared. There are now less debates over his writings.
The charges made against Norwegian Wood have been dropped. At the moment, people are more
153
concerned about finding special and outstanding points in each of his books in Vietnamese.
Although there is less public attention given to his works, Haruki Murakami continues to be
the subject of research for professors and students across the country. New findings from research on
Murakami are still regularly published in academic journals and reported in conferences and
seminars. It can be inferred that Murakami is still appealing to Vietnamese readers.
Conclusion
Haruki Murakami’s work is very successful in addressing timely issues. These include loneliness,
extreme sex, violence and homicide, accompanied by the process of self-awareness, finding the
meaning of life, the conflict between the Eastern and Western value system and tradition and
modernity. These issues are no longer faced only by a post-industrial Japan. Vietnam, on the way
toward industrialisation and modernisation has also faced with similar problems that may potentially
have direct and harmful effects on Vietnamese youth.
The influence of Western culture through the rapid development of the Internet and mass
media has negatively affected youth. A part of the Vietnamese youth are currently experiencing
“sex before marriage”, “public showing of private body parts” and “group sex”. What they
experience is similar to what is depicted in Norwegian Wood. The fact that school violence and
homicide by adolescents are increasing put into readers’ minds the characters in Murakami’s books,
such as Aoki, Tony Tokitani or Wataya Noburu.
The social upheaval in Vietnam has exerted a significant influence on the lifestyle of a
section of Vietnamese youth. What will they do to overcome their crisis of moral and spiritual
values? Dare they stand up to find the truth, to discover their own essence like what Toru Watanabe,
Toru Okada, Kafka Tamura and many other characters in Murakami’s works have done? This
depends on the bravery of each individual. In all likelihood, the people who have welcomed and
supported Haruki Murakami in Vietnam will have their own positive view and discover the solutions
themselves.
Haruki Murakami is one of the most interesting phenomen of literature, which fascinates
a large number of Vietnamese readers. Despite different opinions in reception, it is undeniable
that Murakami has established a special foothold among Vietnamese readers.
References
Hoàng, L. A. (2006). Nhà vãn Nguyễn Ðình Chính gặp “ngày hoàng ðạo”. Retrieved from
http://nld.com.vn/165106P0C1020/nha-van-nguyen-dinh-chinh-gap-ngay-hoang-dao.htm
Huỳnh, N. P. (2011). Ōe Kenzaburo đến Việt Nam. Retrieved from
http://khoavanhocngonngu.edu.vn/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2646%3Aekenzaburo-came-to-vietnam&catid=123%3Aht-vn-hc-vit-nam-nht-bn-trong-bi-cnh-onga&Itemid=188&lang=vi
Linh, T. (2006). Nhật Chiêu: “Rừng Nauy chân thật và gợi cảm”. Retrieved from
http://evan.vnexpress.net/news/doi-song-van-nghe/2006/09/3b9ad260/
Ngô, N. H. (2010). Lê Kiều Nhý: “Sợi xích”… xích chân ai. Retrieved from
http://antg.cand.com.vn/vi-VN/ktvhkh/2010/3/71952.cand
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Phan, Q. B. (2006). “Rừng Nauy” - sex thuần túy hay nghệ thuật ðích thực?. Retrieved from
http://evan.vnexpress.net/News/phe-binh/phe-binh/2006/08/3B9AD232/
Vietnam - Japan Economic Relations in the Context Of Building an
ASEAN Economic Community
By Nguyen Kim Lan
The Foreign Trade University of Vietnam
Abstract
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has been making significant progress in
highlighting its role in the international arena. The member countries are now
proceeding forward to set up the ASEAN Community, with the three pillars of the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security Community and the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Among these three pillars, the AEC is
expected to be established by 2015, with a detailed strategic schedule outlined in
the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, which was signed by the heads of
ten member countries at the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007. The Asian
dream of a common economic community the model of the EU, in a world with
unavoidable trends of regional integration to tackle the challenges of the global
financial crisis, has attracted the attention of member countries more than ever
before. This paper aims to give an overview of the bilateral relations between
Vietnam, a developing member in the Association for Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and Japan, the region’s leading economic power in Northeast Asia,
and provides an insightful look at the positive relationship between the regional
conditions and bilateral relations in the new East Asia context. More importantly,
bilateral relations can make a significant contribution to the shaping of the
regional setting, instead of being passively affected as was the case in the past.
Keywords: Vietnam, Japan, relations, East Asian community
JEL classification: F14, F15
The Introduction of the East Asian Community
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on the 8th of August
1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)
by the founding members of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN on the 7th of January 1984, Vietnam on the
28th of July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on the 23rd of July 1997, and Cambodia on the 30th
of April 1999, making up current ten member states of ASEAN.
The idea of establishing an East Asian community (EAC) initiated by ASEAN was
beyond the intellectual radar of all the ASEAN member states. During the formative years of
ASEAN, the founding members shied away from and even opposed the idea of ‘regional
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integration’. By virtue of Indonesia’s size, population, and rich natural resources, as well as its
strategic location, Jakarta was expected to be a regional leader in the Association. But Indonesia
under President Suharto’s administration (1966-1998) never behaved like a regional leader. In
fact, Suharto preferred to adopt a low leadership profile so as not to create anxiety among the
smaller neighbouring states. It was only in 1990 that the former Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir proposed the idea of an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), which was immediately
rejected by the US, Australia and the West. Because of the lack of strong support from China and
Japan’s usual ambivalence, the EAEG was subsequently renamed as the East Asia Economic
Caucus (EAEC). As such, the first experience of East Asian new regionalism failed because of
its idea of exclusiveness.
Conceptually, cooperation does not equal integration, as cooperation may or may not
lead to integration. From 1967 up to the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998, ASEAN was
mainly interested in regional cooperation. The idea of regional economic integration was first
officially initiated in October 2002 by the former Singaporean Prime Minister and in 2009 by
the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, when he proposed the creation of an ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC) by 2020.
For decades, East Asia as a region has become increasingly integrated through intense
economic links and informal business networks by Japanese and Chinese enterprises. Japanese
production networks and the “Japan-led flying geese” model of growth led to the rapid economic
development of a number of East Asian countries, underpinning the process of informal marketled integration in East Asia. As a form of cumulative development of East Asian regionalism, the
EAC project was initiated to develop East Asia from a region into a bona fide regional
community, where collective efforts are made for peace, prosperity, and progress. As envisioned
in the East Asian vision group report titled “Towards an East Asian Community: Region of
Peace, Prosperity and Progress”, which was submitted to the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei
Darussalam in 2001, it would be a comprehensive community-building process in which
community members are committed to (i) preventing conflict and promoting peace among the
nations of East Asia; (ii) achieving closer economic cooperation in areas such as trade,
investment, finance, and development; (iii) advancing human security in particular by
facilitating regional efforts for environmental protection and good governance; (iv) bolstering
common prosperity by enhancing cooperation in education and hum resources development; and
(v) fostering the identity of an East Asian community.
The four key characteristics of AEC include: (i) a single market and production base; (ii)
a highly competitive economic region; (iii) a region of equitable economic development; and
(iv) a region fully integrated into the global economy.
A single market and production base: An ASEAN single market and production base comprises
seven core elements: (i) free flow of goods; (ii) free flow of services; (iii) free flow of
investment; (iv) freer flow of capital; and (v) free flow of skilled labour; (vi) the priority
integration sectors, and (vii) food, agriculture and forestry.
A competitive economic region: This characteristic refers to (i) Competition policy; (ii)
Consumer protection; (iii) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR); (iv) Infrastructure development;
(v) Taxation, and (vi) E-Commerce.
Equitable economic development: Two important components of this characteristic of
AEC include (i) SME development, and (ii) Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI)
Integration into the global economy: Integration into the global economy requires: (i) A
coherent approach to external economic relations, and (ii) Enhanced participation in global
supply networks.
Vietnam-Japan Economic Relations
As the region is undergoing various trends of regional integration, Vietnam-Japan relations have
156
entered a new chapter of opportunities offered by the EAC building process. The mentality of
the zero sum game of the previous periods has been substantially replaced by the prevailing
trend of cooperation for development in the contemporary international relations in the region.
Vietnam and Japan Trade Relations
Vietnam’s trade exposure to Japan is fourth among the other trading partners, after China, the
US and the EU. Trade turnover between Japan and Vietnam in the period of 2000 - 2010 grew at
an average of 14.8%. Trading values between the two countries was estimated to be US$4872.3
million in 2000, US$13 billion in 2010. According to the Vietnamese General Department of
Customs, the two-way trade revenue between Vietnam and Japan reached US$1.6 billion in
March 2011. In the first three months of 2011, bilateral trade revenue totalled US$4.3 billion, up
22.5% year on year.
Export from Vietnam to Japan
Direct export to Japan was US$7.7 billion in 2010, or 10.75% of total export of the same year,
which makes Japan Vietnam’s fourth largest trading partner. On top of that, the export was so far
on an upward trend, growing by 23% last year. Consequently, the foreign trade target for
FY2011 could be revised down as the impact from Japan’s tsunami could reduce the estimate
target by US$1 to 2 billion. However, in our view, the negative impact should be limited to 2011,
bilateral trades between Japan and Vietnam resuming their growing trend in 2012. Vietnam key
exports items to Japan (above USD1 billion each) are textile and garments (15% of export),
electric cables (12%), machinery and equipment and accessories (11,7%), and seafood (11,6%).
Import from Japan
Vietnam’s import value from Japan was US$2.2 billion in 2000 and US$8.3 billion in 2010. In
ten years, import value had increased four-fold, growing at an average of 18%. Vietnam
imported machinery, steel, gasoline, raw material for the textile and garment industry, computers
and parts, and automobile and automobile components. Significantly, machinery imports were
valued at US$2.55 billion, accounting for nearly 30% of the total import value from Japan in
2010.
Source: Customs Statistics Organisation
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Vietnam-Japan two way trade
During a visit to Japan by Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2006, the leaders of
both countries agreed to begin negotiations on a Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement (VJEPA) to further enhance ties. On December 25th, 2008, Vietnam and Japan
concluded the VJEPA, which, together with previous economic agreements, created a stable,
favourable legal framework for trade and investment. Effective October 1st, 2009, the VJEPA
was Vietnam's first bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as the previous FTAs were concluded
within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The VJEPA is a
comprehensive bilateral agreement, which includes commitments on the liberalisation of trade in
goods/services, investment and other kinds of economic cooperation between the two countries.
The agreement complies with the standards and principles of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). As for trade in goods, Vietnam has agreed to liberalise 87.66% of trade revenue within
ten years, while Japan had pledged to liberalise 94.53% of trade revenue within ten years. The
level of Vietnam's commitment to Japan is fairly low compared to other ASEAN countries that
have signed bilateral agreements with Japan. For example, the Philippines and Thailand are
committed to liberalising 99% of trade revenue within ten years.
As for Japan, it has committed itself to cutting the average tariff on industrial products
from 6.51% in 2008 to 0.4% in 2019 (ten years after the VJEPA took effect). Notably,
Vietnamese textile-garment exports to Japan have paid a 0% tariff since the VJEPA took effect
on October 1st, 2009, compared to an average tariff of 7% previously. Leather products and
footwear will also pay a 0% import tariff for 5-10 years. As for farm products, which are
Vietnam's main export advantage and also Japan's most strongly protected sector, Japan has
pledged to lower the average tariff from 8.1% in 2008 to 4.74% in 2019. Following the
commitment, Vietnamese fresh vegetable/fruit exports to Japan will pay a 0% tariff in the 5-7
years after the agreement took effect. In addition, Japan has provided an annual 150 tonne tariff
quota on Vietnamese honey. This has been Japan's highest commitment to this kind of product so
far.
JEPA implementation has most benefited Vietnamese seafood exports. Japan will lower
the tariff on Vietnamese seafood from an average of 5.4% in 2008 to 1.31% in 2019. Shrimp,
crab and several kinds of fish products have enjoyed a 0% tariff immediately after the VJEPA
came into effect. Because Japan is Vietnam's leading seafood export market, the commitment is
vital for Vietnam to achieve its export growth targets.
As for Vietnam, the tariff reduction commitment itinerary under the VJEPA is fairly
consistent in terms of the scope and principles of commitments under other FTAs that Vietnam
has signed. Immediately after the VJEPA became effective, Vietnam terminated the tariff on
2,586 product lines, mostly for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery and electronics. In 2019,
after the VJEPA would have been in place for ten years, the tariff on an additional 3,717 items
will be terminated, increasing the total number of tariff-free items to 6,303, thus accounting for
67 % of the tariff lines on the committed table.
Japan offers huge potential, and cooperation between Vietnam and Japan has grown
robustly for the last thirty years. Two-way trade reached almost US$16.8 billion in 2010, about
four times that of 2000. Japanese direct investment in Vietnam is also prospering. Japanese
companies including many reputable industrial groups are increasing their presence in Vietnam,
with growing investment. By the end of last November, Japan's total Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) had exceeded US$20.7 billion, taking third place among foreign countries investing in
Vietnam. In the context that several major export markets like the US and the EU have been
affected by economic difficulties, reducing barriers for Vietnamese exports to Japan through the
VJEPA is facilitating the country's export promotion goals. Now that the VJEPA has been in
place for more than a year, several Vietnamese items have made use of the preferences of the
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VJEPA to increase exports to Japan, particularly textiles and garments, seafood, machinery and
equipment. Vietnamese exports to Japan were valued at US$7.728 billion in 2010, a 22.8%
increase from 2009, meaning that Japan is still the second largest export market for Vietnam,
after the US. The major exports to Japan are textiles and garments (with revenue at US$1,154
million in 2010, a 21% increase compared to 2009), electrical appliances/wire/cable (US$920
million, up 44%), machinery and equipment (US$903 million, up 51%) and seafood (US$894
million, up 17 %).
Vietnam and Japan are driving towards the goal of creating a strategic partnership for
peace and prosperity in Asia following the policy adopted in 2006 by leaders of the two
countries. Political and diplomatic relations between the two countries are developing positively.
Vietnam is the biggest recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA). In this
situation, the VJEPA has created a closer, more comprehensive legal framework for the
development of the economic, trade ties between the two countries, thus contributing to
strengthening Vietnam's position in the region and the world.
Japan’s Official Development Assistance for Vietnam
It is essential to note that Vietnam has greatly benefited both under Japan’s regional ODA
frameworks and Japan’s ODA programme for Vietnam. Bilaterally, Vietnam plays an important
role in Japan’s ODA diplomatic strategy as one of the Japan’s largest ODA recipients. From
1992-2010, Japan was Vietnam’s largest ODA donor with $13.5 billion, of which over $1 billion
was non-refundable aid, accounting for over 30% of ODA committed by international
community for Vietnam. Vietnam has effectively used Japan’s ODA in accelerating economic
restructuring, improving infrastructure, and in combating environmental pollution, infectious
diseases, and in poverty reduction and hunger elimination, and others. In particular, Vietnam’s
impressive achievements in socio-economic development and modernisation, thanks to Japan’s
ODA in recent years, have encouraged Japan to consider increasing ODA for Vietnam.
At present, Japan’s ODA policy attaches top priority to the promotion of economic
growth, the improvement in living and social aspects, the correction of imbalances, as well as
the protection of the environment and the strengthening of governance in the recipient countries,
thus ensuring long-term interests for Japanese companies doing business there, and the
economic security for Japan in the context of growing international competition. It is essential to
note that despite Japan’s ODA budget being cut by 10% since 2001 due to its own economic
difficulties, the Japanese government has stayed committed to giving aid to Vietnam with at an
increasing level every year. The accumulated volume of Japan’s ODA for Vietnam amounts to
481.5 billion yen since from 2002 to 2006, of which the annual volume has surpassed 100 billion
yen since the Japanese fiscal year of 2005. In the fiscal year of 2007 itself, Japan ODA for
Vietnam reached a record of 123.2 billion yen (equal to USD 1.1 billion), an increase of 19%
compared to the previous year.
At present, the two sides are actively promoting three big projects agreed by the
government leaders, namely the North-South expressway and high-speed railway and the master
plan for the Hoa Lac Hi-tech Park in Hanoi. On November 13th, 2008, Vietnamese Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung told the National Assembly that a joint committee of Japanese and
Vietnamese officials had been set up to probe the matter further and deal with it in accordance
with Vietnamese law. With the determination and untold efforts made by both sides in the fight
against corruption, the valuable ODA contributed by the Japanese people for the Vietnamese
people in assisting Vietnam in its industrialisation and modernisation process will be rightly
treasured and effectively used for the sake of the long-term interests of both the countries and
peoples, thereby contributing to the common peace and shared prosperity in the region.
Japanese Direct Investment in Vietnam
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While Vietnam’s poor infrastructure has been upgraded thanks to Japan’s ODA over fifteen years,
the FDI has yet to play an important role in Vietnam-Japan economic relations.
Table: Japan’s FDI projects in Vietnam, 1995 - 2009
Source: JETRO (2009)
The above table presents the changes in new FDI projects from Japan to Vietnam. In the period
from 1998, due to the impacts of the Asian financial monetary crisis, Japan’s FDI capital flow
into Vietnam had declined rapidly. The number of new investment projects was rather small.
In the following years, Japan’s FDI in Vietnam increased strongly. Specifically, the amount
increased from USD 136.02 million in 2003 to USD 913.9 million in 2005. Japanese companies’
investment in Vietnam marked a major breakthrough in 2006. This time is also recognised as the
starting point for Japan’s second investment wave into Vietnam. The number of new projects and
projects with increased capital by Japan’s leading transnational companies (TNCs) in this period
was rather large. Therefore, by the end of 2006, Japan had 735 FDI projects in cooperation in
Vietnam (accounting for 10.8%) with a total registered capital of USD7.4 billion (accounting for
22.2%), ranking fourth among countries and territories with investment capital (by registered
capital) in Vietnam. However, according to disbursed capital, Japan was ranked first with more
than USD 4.8 billion (accounting for 16.8% in the country).
Since Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007, FDI
into Vietnam has increased greatly. Along with this development, Japan’s FDI into Vietnam also
went up in terms of both the number projects and total investment capital. In 2007, the number
of newly licensed FDI projects from Japan was 156 with total registered capital of nearly USD
910 million. There were 48 projects with added capital this year, with an added capital of USD
339 million. In 2008, the number of such projects decreased to 147; however, the total capital
rose to nearly USD 7.3 billion. There were 46 projects with increased capital in 2008, with an
increased capital USD 290 million. Moreover, despite no longer being the first in terms of total
registered capital, Japan has the highest total disbursed capital among all the FDI projects. In the
period of 1988-2008, Japan investment reached nearly USD 5.2 billion, much higher than
Singapore (nearly USD 4 billion), Taiwan (USD 3.1 billion), and Korea (USD 2.8 billion).
Therefore, contrary to the above-mentioned predictions throughout the period of 1988-2009,
Japan’s recent projects have been at a much bigger scale, indicating that Vietnam has partly
taken advantage of Japanese investors’ shift of investment.
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Japanese investors are paying more attention to the Vietnamese market and considering our
country as a second destination after China. Part of the reason for this is the Japanese investors’
measures to spread risk as well as the fact that Vietnam’s investment environment has become
more attractive. Besides, the Vietnam-Japan investment agreement began to take effect in
December 2004 and Vietnam’s membership to WTO in 2007 has consolidated the legal
foundation for Japanese investors’ investment activities in Vietnam. Japan’s small and mediumsized enterprises, and enterprises desiring to invest abroad for the first time, have decided to
invest directly in Vietnam.
The Contributions of Vietnam-Japan Relations to East Asian Community Building
While the two countries have greatly benefited from the regional cooperation of the EAC
framework, positive developments in Vietnam-Japan relations in their turn have contributed
significantly to the regional community building process. Firstly, the combination of the
economic strengths between Vietnam and Japan, as well as the peaceful co-existence of the two
different political systems are themselves contributing to the increasing interdependence and
deepening integration of East Asia. Japan’s comprehensive engagements in Southeast Asia, i.e.
Japan’s pursuit of EPAs with ASEAN’s developing countries, including Vietnam will help
further promote sustainable economic development and help narrow the development gap in the
region, thus effectively accelerating ASEAN’s goals of building an economic community by
2015, one of important pillars of ASEAN community. If built successfully, the AEC may
become the very first model of community building in a region so diverse in terms of economic
levels, political systems, religions, and culture, contributing many experiences to the community
building process in a wider region.
Secondly, Vietnam-Japan relations may lend a model of reconciliation to other players in
the East Asia region. Vietnam’s mindset and experiences point to the fact that hatred and
hostility can help little, and that only confidence-building based on the spirit of forgiveness and
mutual understanding can serve as the best problem-solving approach. It is essential to note that
Vietnam’s approach is timely, in conjunction with Japan’s sincerity in correcting its past
transgressions. Thirdly, in the absence of a cooperative and constructive relationship between the
major powers, Vietnam-Japan relations may set a precedent of cooperation for a mutual benefit
between a major power and a smaller country, striving to narrow existing differences and work
towards a solidarity-based regional integration. Vietnam’s friendly and cooperative partnership
with Japan, which does not target any third countries, is believed to be the first step in a broad
strategy designed to promote integration within ASEAN, and between ASEAN countries and
non-ASEAN major powers in the region, as well as to reconcile the divergences between the
Northeast Asian countries with a view to creating a strong and united region.
Fourthly, the Vietnam-Japan engagement with the EAC has been intertwined with a
broader agenda of worldwide integration for development. From the perspective of the two
161
countries, the EAC is not a limited short-term goal towards building a narrow-minded and
exclusive nationalism and regionalism in East Asia, but a long-term goal closely associated with
global objectives for the sake of humanity. As the region confronts serious challenges in the
form of the environmental crisis, East Asia should put the creation of an environment and energy
conservation community for sustainable regional growth at the top of the agenda.
Conclusion
The strong and tangible interplay between regional and bilateral factors has been persuasively
reflected in Asia throughout the Cold War up until the present day. Bilateral relations between
Vietnam and Japan are an example of this: relations between the two countries were largely
affected by regional strategic factors in the late Cold War period, thus wasting many good
opportunities for both sides in terms of cooperation and development. The development of
bilateral relations between the two countries through confidence-building measures and
constructive approaches in dealing with differences, in their turn, would help overcome
obstacles between the two and contribute to a regional environment of cooperation favourable to
the EAC building process.
References
ASEAN Statistics (n.d.). ASEAN. Retrieved from http://www.aseansec.org/19226.htm
Balassa, B. (1961). The theory of economic integration. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Bình, T. (2009), Con đường tương lai của cộng đồng Đông Á. Saigon Times Online. Retrieved
from
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/nr091019080134/nr091019085342/nr091019084223/ns09110213480
1/newsitem_print_preview
Chowdhury, N. (2009) Giấc mơ chưa thành của châu Á. Tuanvietnam.net. Retrieved from
http://tuanvietnam.net/2009-11-10-giac-mo-chua-thanh-cua-chau-a
Yamamoto, S. (2007). Integration of East Asia economy and Japan ‘s role in the region.
Retrieved from http://www.jetro.go.jp/brazil/topics/20070307599-topics/presentationenglish.pdf
162
From The Kojiki To Children’s Literature: The Intertextuality Of Japanese Myths
By Pat-On Phipatanakul
Phd Student, Chulalongkorn University
Japanese Lecturer, Srinakharinwirot University
Abstract
Japanese myths were officially recorded in the Kojiki (Records of Ancient
Matters) in 712 A.D. Its content is about the founding of land, water, fire, nature,
and the heroic deeds of deities. The intertextuality of this literature is diversified
and is in accordance with the Japanese politics and society at different times,
especially before and during World War II. It was used as evidence to confirm the
authority of the emperors, who were believed to be the descendants of the Deity
of Sun, as stated in children’s textbooks. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Kojiki
was compiled again as children’s literature with the title of Kojikimonogatari or
the Kojiki fable. The work of Suzuki Miekichi, a writer of children’s literature
(1955), was originally published (1919) periodically in Akai Tori, a popular
children’s literature magazine. Moreover, there were other Kojiki fables used as
extracurricular books to encourage children to read as they were valuable
examples of ancient literature. The Kojikimonogatari, written by Takano Masami
(1965), was translated into Thai with the title of The Kojiki, the Oldest Myth of
Japan, by students from the Japanese Language Department, Faculty of Liberal
Arts, Thammasat University in 1979. The researcher conducted this comparative
study in order to compare the original context with the content of myths of
Japanese deities in the Kojiki fable in the post-World War II period. An analysis
of the development and changes of in context from the aspect of intertextuality
and a study of the factors in terms of social context shows that the myths of
Japanese deities in the Kojiki are outstanding in terms of culture. They are highly
appropriate in cultivating faith in children to teach them to be proud of their
Japanese identity and to understand Japanese ideals and traditions which have
been inherited from ancient times. In addition, it may also be used as a tool to
stimulate learning in children of the next and future generation. The content of
the retold myths after the war are similar to the original versions, as they reflect
the cultural heritage, thoughts, and beliefs of Japanese ancestors. This differs
from the use of the myths of deities to prove the political authority of the
emperors in the period before and during World War II.
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Introduction
The Japanese deity myths (日本神話) appeared in the first part of the Kojiki『古事記』, a text
completely compiled in 8 A.D. at the request of the empress. It is valuable with regard to history
and the literary arts, and it is well-known in Japan as it reflects the ideals and traditions of the
ancients. This has been passed on to the descendants and has become the identity of the present
Japanese society. There are several researchers interested in studying and reviewing the myths,
who present their work in new and different aspects. Research on the Kojiki is usually related to
the history and folklore as the deity myths in the Kojiki narrate the origin of islands, plants, food,
fire, natural phenomena, traditions and rituals. All deities are related to nature, reflecting the
ancient agricultural society of Japan. Even in modern-day society, Shinto beliefs (Shinto means
“the way of gods”80) and rituals for the Japanese way of living still exist, such as offerings given
to deities in different seasons, the belief in giving birth, funerals, and so on. The Deity of the Sun,
the Goddess Amaterasu, is the main character in the Kojiki, playing a significant role in the deity
myths. She gave birth to the ancestors of the Emperor Dynasty. The Kojiki was meant to affirm
the belief that Japanese emperors were descended from the gods.
The first literary analysis of the Kojiki took place during the Edo period 81, when the
Japanese grew interested in studying literature and historical textbooks. Motoori Norinaga (本居
宣長, 1730-1801) was the first person to seriously study the Kojiki; he is the author of 44
research textbooks titled Kojikiden, which were written during 1763-1798 A.D.
During the Meiji era (1868-1912), Japan was in a period of transition towards
modernisation as it was influenced by Western countries. This lead to the reformation of the
education system and culture; the nation experienced unrest due to political conflicts and the
unstable emperor system. All the incidents that occurred in the Edo and Meiji era up until World
War II had a strong influence on the education system of Japan’s children. The researcher
studied the influence of the Kojiki myths on Japanese society and attitudes during the aforesaid
periods, especially on patriotism, as the deity myths narrated the foundation of Japan and its
administration by the emperors, who resembled demigods. The deity myths were presented in
children’s textbooks before and during World War II.
Finance and proof for the textbooks were provided by the government; the books were
called Kokutei Kyokasho (国定教科書 State Textbooks), and were first used in 1904 A.D. until
the end of World War II in 1945. They were edited five times as stated in the thesis of Tanada
Mayumi “The Application of the Kojiki in the textbooks of Primary Level during World War II
in Showa Dynasty”82. Due to certain criteria, the Kojiki was chosen as teaching material for
students at a primary level during World War II during the Showa Dynasty, and two versions of
the Kojiki in textbooks were compared, the Sakura Textbook (1933) and the Asahi Textbook
(1941). It shows that the 4th and 5th editions of both textbooks were rewritten, adding the
concept that the deities still ruled Japan, and that they were of a high rank and connected to the
emperors. The content of the deity myths partly told about heroes such as Emperor Jimmu and
Yamato Takeru. Other stories told of the deities in the imaginations of the ancient Japanese, who
believed that deities created the islands of Japan. Tanada concludes that the change in politics
during the production of the textbook had influenced its content. The Kojiki was used as a tool to
80
Shin (神) means “gods”, Tou（道） means “way”.
The government administration under Shokun B.C. 1603-1867 A.D. was peaceful and the economy prosperous,
as merchants played an important role in society. The middle period of Edo was a time of research period,
especially in Chinese philosophy, Japanese history and literature, and new technology was applied in the
agricultural and industrial sectors.
82
棚田真由美『昭和戦期小学校国定教科書における『古事記』の教材化に関する考察』広島大学大学院
（
2001http://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/110006283310.pdf?id=ART0008301939&type=pdf&lang=jp&host=cinii&order_no=&pp
v_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1283807550&cp= (1 Sep 2010)
81
164
stimulate patriotism.
When the war ended, Japan, who had lost, attempted to develop its economy and restore
the nation from deterioration. The Japanese government depended on the cooperation and unity
of its citizens and their criticism that the emperors had led them to war. Furthermore, the royal
family was not as respected as it used to be. Post-war literature (戦後派文学) was created; it
was modern and presented a political concept influenced by foreign countries. Even though the
Kojiki was perceived as a tool to present the authority of the emperors, the people were growing
increasingly interested in both literature and the deity myths. There were more reviews, new
research, translations, and interpretations being made as may be seen from the number of printed
matter and modern media concerning the deity myths which were retold in the form of cartoons,
novels, children’s literature, movies and advertisements for different tourist attractions in many
prefectures.
The original version of the Kojiki, especially in the first part with the deity myths, was
written in Chinese characters, but was read in the Japanese style, which was different from other
works of literature from the same period. The Kojiki was read in many eras and the compilers
used the language used during that time. Moreover, it was interpreted and influenced by the
society and politics of the time. The Kojiki has been studied as literature and recompiled under
the title of Kojikiden (『古事記伝』, written by Motoori Norinaga during 1767-1798 A.D. and
published in 1822 A.D.), and it also has been rewritten as children’s literature, with the title of
Kojikimonogatari (古事記物語 the Kojiki fable) (written by Suzuki Miekichi and published in
series for children’s magazine Akai Tori（赤い鳥）during 1921-1922 A.D.). Moreover, as the
Kojiki was written for children, its content was adjusted to suit the ages of children and full of
ideological concepts which either the adults or the government wanted the children to learn.
In the 21st century, the Kojiki was presented in different forms. In addition to creating a
receptive attitude towards the political authority of the emperor, the Kojiki is also a fable, an
ancient literature textbook, and a history textbook, making it a suitable learning tool for children.
Even its forms of presentation have been adapted according to the social context of the time, its
core still reflects the roots of race, Japanese identity and the power of nature. The researcher
believes that the deity myths in the Kojiki is significant as it is a tool for cultivating ideas in
children from the past until present. The modern myth of deities is a learning material for
children. By looking to the past, the origins of Japanese identity, the belief in divinity and the
imagination of Japanese people with regard to the nature will continuous to be transfer to the
next generation.
The ‘Intertextuality’ of the Deity Myths in the Kojiki
Trisilp Boonkajon (2010) analysed comparative literature in terms of intertextuality and
concluded that “The concept of intertextuality posits that literature was created through a
promissory system and legacy of previous literary texts. The text itself has no unique meaning,
but it does have intertextuality. Intertextuality may be divided into different concepts, such as the
various meanings of the text, the relationship between the literary text and the cultural text, the
relationship between the text and the literature, the many relations between the text and
intertexts, and the readers or the persons who give definition to the text and who weave the
network of the ‘present text’ and ‘intertexts’, which include the cultural and social context.”83
Julia Kristeva, a French literary critic, provided a definition of intertextuality which was
used in the 1960s when France shifted from structuralism to post-structuralism. However,
intertextuality was influenced by a work by Roland Barthes (1915-1980 A.D.) called Theory of
the Text, in which he clarified the difference between a ‘work’ and a ‘text’: the text appears in
literature to explain something about the ‘work’, while the ‘text’ weaves the work, which
83
Trisilp Boonkajon (2010), The Light of Comparative Literature, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, pp.
130-157.
165
consists of words, to make a statement. “The text is the fabric of the words which make up the
work and which are arranged in such a way as to impose a meaning which is stable and as far as
possible unique”.84
In a piece titled The Text Unbound, Graham Allen explains that Barthes hypothesised that
there are two types of readers: those who maintain the original meaning, and those who create a
new meaning. He meant that readers are also writers. Authors became less important. He
provides an example from an article called The Death of the Author, which states that
A text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into
mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this
multiplicity is focused, and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the
author .… the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.
(Barthes, 1974a, p. 148)
The context comprises many writings linking different cultures through dialogue and contextual
humour. However, it must be emphasised that the birth of the reader depends on the value of the
writer’s death.
Barthes’ method involves cutting the context into smaller chunks and weaving them with
the thread of social context. His goal in attaining intertextuality was discovering the nature of
things, such as culture, ideals and the intertextual relationship. When the contexts are included in
the social context, they will not be closed or fixed; their meanings will evolve constantly. “The
text has a structure of definable elements, and yet, woven from the threads of the social text, its
intertextual relations can never be stabilised, exhaustively located and listed. The text combines
structure and infinity of meaning”.85
The Kojiki is honoured as a classic of ancient literature, which is the main genre of
Japanese literature because it is the first written literature to mention the origin of Japan, its
relationship with the Emperor dynasty, and the origin of the Shinto tradition and belief in deities.
It is unsurprising that the deity myths in the Kojiki have been presented and retold many times;
the Kojiki is a compilation of different local myths.
During the 6th and 7th century, or the period before the Kojiki was compiled, Japan was
still divided into many regions. There was a civil war. The Yamato dynasty was a federal
government ruling the country. During the Jinshin no Ran（壬申の乱）civil war of 672,
Emperor Temmu（天武天皇）succeeded the throne. He stated that history textbooks would be
a foundation for administration under the Emperor. The deity myths were compiled in order to
create an ideal medium to unite the country and the emperors, who were descended from the
deities and were legitimately entitled to rule Japan. Kudo Takashi (工藤隆) stated in The Origin
of the Kojiki that
The Kojiki and Nihon Shoki did not mention the myths of other tribes who had
lost to the Emperors, except the Myth of Izumo (出雲神話） and the Myth of
Hayato（隼人神話. Izumo used to be a large territory situated by the Sea of Japan
before being attacked and seized by Yamato. There was a statement in the Nihon
Shoki 『日本書紀』 regarding the myths of the country, which provides a clear
picture of the shift in the governing authority. The history and warship ritual to
deities, according to the beliefs of Izumo, were also significant. The Hayato tribe
caused disruptions to the federal government many times until 700 A.D. The
Kojiki contained scenes of battle between brothers during a visit to the sea. It is
clearly stated that the elder brother, named Hoderi, who was lost in the war, was
84
85
Graham Allen (2000), Intertextuality, “The Text Unbound: Barthes”, London and New York, pp. 61-62.
Graham Allen (2000), Intertextuality, “The Text Unbound: Barthes”, London and New York, pp.77-78.
166
an ancestor of the Hayato tribe even though he did not rule the country, but had
relations with the Emperor dynasty.86
In present-day Japan, Izumo is the eastern part of Shimane province（島根県）and is a fertile
lowland. Agriculture is its main industry. The content of the myths of Izumo is related to the
deity myths in the Kojiki. Its main character is the god Susanoo, who founded and created Izumo
city and the god Okuninushi. A third of the scenes from “The Era of Gods” in the Kojiki were
about these two major deities. Matsumae Takeshi (松前健) conducted research in his book titled
The Myth of Izumo, and stated that
An analysis of the Kojiki, shows that the deities of Izumo have certain
characteristics, for example, the Deity of Agriculture is related to water and soil,
and so on. But the Deities of Heaven, who were deities of Takaamanohara, were
mostly competent fighters. The fight between the deities of Izumo and the deities
of Heaven reflected the truth of the political situation, which was the background
of the deity myths. Both deities had a significant role in the culture of those who
lost the war. The Deity of Heaven, who had the authority to rule the country, is
respected and worshipped even today.87
This shows that the deity myths, especially those in the Kojiki, presented the objectives of
compiling the myths in the first place, even though the country was under the authority of deities
who were descendants of the Deity of the Sun, who was in turn a Deity of Heaven. This may be
compared to the Yamato dynasty, which believed it was right to wage war to unite different races
as one country. The myths, which stated the god Okuninushi’s unconditional rule of a land,
conveyed the meaning of the resettlement, namely, that is was not only about victory or defeat.
The myths are still passed down. All the deities were either heroes or deities of cultural
inheritance and they remained in nature to protect humans and help them remain in a state of
peace. The Japanese still worship deities at shrines, where they perform rituals as a sign of
respect to the deities and spirits. The Shinto belief is also a cultural inheritance derived from the
deity myths.
The context of the Kojiki is intertextuality and the deity myths are constantly retold
through different methods in each period. During the Meiji education reformation, the
government used the myths as a medium to cultivate ethnography in children. But after World
War II, the myths were passed over, because the emperors, who were thought to be demigods,
were accused of causing the country’s loss. In present-day Japan, the story-telling of the myths
has diversified in terms of format and content. The role of the goddess Amaterasu, who was an
ancestor of the Emperor dynasty, was transformed from being a representative of the state to
being the Sun, which is an important source of energy to humans. The myths are now used as a
tool to explain the concept of nature and the origin of Japanese identity to children. The original
belief in sacred items and the beliefs of Japanese people towards nature is still being transferred
to the current generation. The context of every retold myth is still unique, but they are connected
with the original contexts and intertexts, which form the network of cultural and social
intertextuality.
The concept of intertextuality is intertextuality for readers and interpreters, rather than
authors. This is why the deity myths in the Kojiki are constantly being reread, reinterpreted and
retold. When the Kojiki was first studied by Motoori Norinaga, the author of Kojikiden, it served
as an interpretation of the view of researchers during the Edo Period, emphasising the study of
koku gaku (国学: the study of Japanese thought and culture). Kounoshi Takamitsu (神光野志隆
86
工藤隆『古事記の起源』中央公論新社、2006 年（pp. 54-55）
松前健『出雲神話』講談社、昭和 51 年（pp. 12-16）
87
167
2010, p. 198-200) stated that “the significant issue of Motoori’s viewpoint towards the Kojiki is
based on the study on the Kojikiden, which values Nihon Shoki and the insertion of the Chinese
script, as shown in the Kojiki. In general, his interpretation has the principle that kogo(古語), or
the ancient language, emphasises the original Japanese identity.”88 Moreover, the causes of each
character’s actions were inserted in the Kojikiden to present rational concepts to the readers;
these were elements that made the Kojiki more realistic, comprehensible and readable, which
would have stimulated the interpretation of the deity myths in the periods to come.
From the Meiji Restoration in 1868 A.D（明治維新）until the beginning of World War II,
there was a protracted attempt to overthrow the military government, led by Shogun Tokugawa.
He established imperial administration to restore the emperors’ authority. The Japanese
education system was modernised, which resulted in the establishment of many schools all over
the country and the introduction of the Western educational systems, especially from the US.
There was later political conflict; the imperial system became unstable before and during World
War II. The government supported the improvement of textbooks for children. The main content
of Japanese textbooks was about the history, the pride of the Japanese people and honour of
emperors’ might, to cultivate patriotism in children. The Kojiki was applied because the deity
myths narrated the origin of Japan and the foundation of the imperial administration. The content
of the deity myths in this textbook were a testament of the pride of the country, which was ruled
by an emperor who with supreme authority (皇国思想).
Their defeat in the war brought limitations in the presentation of Japanese education,
which was under the authority of the US. The Civil Information and Education Section (CIE)
was an organisation under the Board of the General Headquarters of Allied Forces (GHQ). Any
content regarding patriotism or military concepts was smeared with ink; textbooks were called
Suminuri Kyoukasho (墨塗り教科書: textbooks smeared with ink). Any content concerning the
might of the emperors or the myths of Goddess Amaterasu and Emperor Jimmu (according to
the myths, he was the first emperor of Japan and a nephew to Goddess Amaterasu) were crossed
out or omitted.
During the present decade (2000 - 2010 A.D.), people questioned the Japanese identity
and they grew interested in tracing their past. Although the retelling of the Kojiki was altered
according to the social context of each period, its core shows the root of ethnicity, the Japanese
identity and forces of nature. The Kojiki has become more popular. Many researchers have
rewritten and simplified the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki, for example, Fun Reading Kojiki 『面白い
ほどよくわかる古事記』by Yoshida Asuhiko（吉田敦彦）in 2006, Study the Kojiki and Nihon
Shoki One More Time 『もう一度学びたい古事記と日本書紀』by Tada Gen (多田元) in 2007 and A
Spoken Version of the Kojiki 『口語訳古事記』by Miura Sukeyuki（三浦佑之）in 2006. Miura
used recording of an old man speaking to retell the entire Kojiki, with its content remaining the
same in all respects. The Kojiki was produced a comic book in the Japanese Classic Literature
Comic series 『漫画日本の古典』. The presentation of the deity myths in the present decade is
modern and accessible to all education levels; the content is easy to understand and it is no
longer just for scholars or literary specialists who study ancient Japanese.
In terms of intertextuality, the deity myths link the original context and the final context
together; the meaning is reinterpreted and transferred. The study of ancient literature in terms of
intertextuality was not accepted at first because it was believed that the honour of ancient
literature must retain its original identity completely, and that any alteration or modification was
not allowed. At present, this concept is universal and consistent with both Thai and Japanese.
Intertextuality is a tool that helps us analyse the meaning of certain aspects unmentioned by the
‘reproducers’ of literature and serves as a strategy for comparing the original context and the
new context more profoundly.
88
神野志隆光『本居宣長の『古事記伝』を読む I』講談社 2010 年
168
Kojikimonogatari – The Kojiki Fable（古事記物語, as expressed by Suzuki Miekichi)
Suzuki Miekichi (鈴木三重吉, 1882 - 1936), a literature writer for children, was the editor who
founded Akai Tori magazine (「赤い鳥」,1918). He was also a student of Natsume Souseki (夏
目 漱 石 ,1867-1916), a greatly-respected figure in modern Japanese literature) at Tokyo
University and produced many popular short stories for children. In his able hands, the Kojiki
was adapted into a story for children, thus inspiring a new generation of writers to modify
ancient literature into fables for children.
Born in Hiroshima, Suzuki was the youngest of five siblings; his mother had passed
away when he was nine, after which he was raised by grandmother. He was fragile and
introverted, and had liked reading since he was a child. He could read ancient Japanese literature
proficiently when he was in primary school and later became interested in the literary
masterpieces of the world, especially Hans Christian Andersen and the Grimm fairy tales, as
well as plays and poetry. He admired Master Souseki’s work and he wanted to study drama
abroad. However, he had problems with his neurosis, which forced him to take a break, during
which he went to live on Nomijima Island, where he wrote Chidori (千鳥). He sent this to
Souseki and his work was subsequently published in Hototogisu magazine (ホトトギス) in
1906. From that moment on, he wrote for Souseki.
After graduating from university, Suzuki began his career as a teacher in the Narita
Secondary School in Chiba prefecture, where he churned out many works of literature. He later
went on to teach at Chuo University (1912-1918), a period when many of his works were
published in leading magazines. In 1918, he had enough money to produce Akai Tori (red bird),
a monthly children’s magazine, in which he intended to promote the production of fables, fairy
tales and children’s song lyrics. Fukuda Kiyoto (福田清人, 1979) has analysed the reasons why
Suzuki became interested in children’s literature. “The first reason was the birth of his daughter.
The second was the finances for printing a collection of 13 pieces of Suzuki’s works; he had to
submit one Western fairy tale a month to the publishing house. The third was the uniqueness of
his literature; as a writer, he was heavily influenced by romanticism. Before he began to write
children’s literature seriously, he produced fables for adults by retelling foreign fables with an
aesthetic language style, so that they resembled a new work of children’s literature and they are
still popular today”.89 Suzuki’s fables were admired as completely artistic fables (芸術的童話).
The Akai Tori magazine was the starting point for the production of children’s literature in Japan
and had a strong influence on other children’s magazines. It may be said that Suzuki Miekichi’s
artistic being and psychological understanding of children were not only the properties of
literature, but also an inspiration for Japanese society and culture after World War II.
Suzuki told about his life in The Collection of Suzuki Miekichi, Volume 5, which was first
published in 1938.90 In the article called “The Terrible Textbook” (「悪文教科書」) he says that
he used to read a textbook of a girl who enjoyed reading, and states that the book said that “the
flag is the flag of Japan under the Emperor’s administration, the flag has an ambitious spirit even
though it is destroyed, we all are covered with the white colour of peace, we can rest our worry.”
He said that although he did not read that book closely, he realised that the book was nonsense.
He then told the girl that he would bring her some good books to read and criticised the
textbooks which the government forced the girls in the country to read, as they were not able
distinguish between good and evil. They were not qualified to produce any textbooks as the
content and language were so ambiguous that the children could not understand them. Therefore,
he intended to study the textbooks designated by the government because, to him, it was a big
problem if children were forced to read inappropriate textbooks.
89
福田清人「「赤い鳥」総論」、『「赤い鳥」複刻版 解説・執筆者索引』日本近代文学館、昭和 54 年
(p.4).
90
鈴木三重吉『鈴木三重吉全集 第五巻』岩波書店、1982 (pp.172-174).
169
He was concerned that children would not have good and suitable books to read as they
were under the social pressure of propaganda and war. This situation pushed Suzuki to produce
children’s literature, which was admirable in terms of literary value and the interwoven morals.
Akai Tori was shut down after 18 years of publication (196 volumes) and Suzuki died of cancer
in 1936.
Suzuki began writing the Kojiki fable and published its first chapter in Akai Tori in July
1919. “The Death of the Goddess” was the first chapter, and concerned the god Izanaki and the
goddess Izanami, who created the lands and deities. The goddess Izanami gave birth to a Deity
of Fire which caused her to die and be reborn in the land after death, which was called
Yominokuni （黄泉の国）. This part of the story is significant because it was the starting point of
all the other myths in the Kojiki. It tells of the split of heaven, earth and hell. The goddess
Izanami and the god Izanaki were the first characters who had designated genders and told about
the origin of nature, and birth and death of humans.
Torigoe Shin (鳥越信 2006, 140-142) says the following of Suzuki’s Kojiki myths: “[in]
the myths after the death of the goddess Izanami and after the god Izanaki went to Yominokuni,
the god violated one rule, the rule prohibiting him from peeking at the goddess, which is why he
saw a body that resembled a swollen and worm-ridden corpse, which frightened him and made
him run away. Suzuki Miekichi used honorific expressions to tell stories in the Kojiki. It is
concise, comprehensible and rhythmic. The interpretation and compilation of the Kojiki is
straightforward; it is a true creative art（純芸術品）.”91 The honorific expressions or “keigo” （敬
語） are the characteristic of the Japanese language. The myths in the Kojiki use honorific
expressions throughout the story because all the deities are exalted, as well as respected and
respectful. The Kojiki versions in the later periods were altered by reducing the number of
honorifics because they are incomprehensible, lengthy and out-of-date. Some writers and
researchers wrote the Kojiki in the style of the Kojiki fables of the war period. However, the
Kojiki fables of Suzuki Miekichi were admired as “the most appropriate retelling of the Kojiki
for children” (Kuwahara Saburou 桑原三郎, in The History of Japanese Children’s Literature92).
Below is a comparison of the same myths extracted from original Kojiki and the Kojiki
fables of Suzuki Miekichi:
By the time the sky and the land were separated from each other at the first time,
three deities were born in heaven but they were genderless and formless.
Later when the land was found not long ago and it had a form resembling oil
floating upon the surface of water like jelly fish, two deities were born from the
ground like a sprout of the grass. These five deities were special deities in heaven.
Later on, more deities were born until a generation with gender was produced,
and there were seven generations of deities all together; the god Izanaki and the
goddess Izanami were of the last generation.
All deities told the god Izanaki and the goddess Izanami that “You must both
build solid ground from the floating earth and create a land”. They also gave a
sacred spear to the couple and the couple stood on a bridge connecting heaven the
earth, where they stirred the muddy earth with the spear, and when they took the
spear out of the earth, the mud dropped from the spearhead and coagulated into
an island which was called Onogoro Island.
The Kojiki (original version) “The Ancient Literature
91
92
鳥越 信『はじめて学ぶ
鳥越 信『はじめて学ぶ
日本児童文学史』ミネルヴァ書房、2006 年（pp.140-142）
日本児童文学史』ミネルヴァ書房、2006 年（p.142）
170
Series, The Kojiki” (2004), summary of the Thai version,
translated by Attaya Suwanrada.
When the world was founded at for first time, heaven and earth were firstly
formed and the god Amenominakanushi, a deity who was an ancestor of the
Japanese people, was born on Takaamanohara in heaven. Later, the god
Takamumusuhi and the god Kamimusuhi were born.
By that time, heaven and earth were still unformed but were fluid, like floating oil
and light like jelly fish. In the middle, two deities were born from the ground like
the sprout of the grass, and there were more deities born after that. The god
Izanaki and the goddess Izanami were the last deities, who were born after eight
deities.
The god Amenominakanushi said to these two deities: “You both must coagulate
the floating earth into a solid ground and create Japan.” And he offered a great
spear to the couple.
The Kojikimonogatari of Suzuki Miekichi,
“The Death of the Goddess”
In the main content of the myths in the chapter about the foundation of land in the original Kojiki,
it was stated that everything in this world was founded by itself, and that heaven and earth split
themselves from each other, that all deities were born by themselves, and that only several gods
and goddesses were assigned to create different things such as water, fire, soil, and plants, which
would be useful for humans. The original text signifies the foundation of everything as
happening through the course of nature. Nature, which is abstract and without form, was formed
by itself irrationally, but the surrounding nature has its ground. The myths were used to explain
the change in nature to gain the readers’ approval.
The Kojikimonogatari shows that Suzuki signified the symbols used in the original
version such as the fact that the incompatibility of the two worlds were like water and oil. He
kept the word “jelly fish” and that the birth of deities was like an offshoot and originated through
the course of the nature. He tried to narrate the story clearly so that children would understand,
as is shown in the phrase that the two deities created “Japan”, instead of a “land” as mentioned
in the original version.
The same chapter of this myth was used in the compulsory textbook Kokuteikyoukasho
( 国定教科書 State Textbook) for the primary level, which was modified by the government,
during the fourth period (1933) and fifth period (1940), the periods during which the
government cultivated the children’s patriotism.
Once upon a time, there were two deities, the god Izanaki and the goddess
Izanami.
Both of them stood on the bridge of heaven and jabbed a spear called
Amanonuboko into the sea to stir the water, and when they lifted the spear, the
seawater dropped down from the spearhead and formed an island. When the
goddess Amaterasu was born, the god Izanaki was so pleased that he offered his
own necklace to her.
The goddess Amaterasu（天照大神）is the Deity of Sun, an ancestor of the Emperor dynasty and
worthy of honour and worship.
171
The foundation of the land was mentioned clearly in the textbook, as well as the fact that
the goddess Amaterasu was more honoured than other deities, was to inspire children to have
faith in the emperors, who were descendants of the holy deities, thus justifying their absolute
authority to rule the country. Irie Yoko (入江洋子, 2001) mentioned that “During the war, Japan
adopted the education system from Nazi Germany to inspire children to be patriotic and pay
respect to the emperors; the curriculum of the Japanese citizen (国民課) encouraged children in
all subjects.”93 In addition to their Japanese language lessons, their music lessons also contained
the soul-stirring anthem Kimigayo（君が代）, which was designated to be the Japanese national
anthem. The content aimed to praise the power of the emperors. Simple symbols were used to
teach children to be patriotic, such as the Japanese flag, the sun (referring to the deity who was
an ancestor of the Emperor dynasty), and rituals and important national days (bowing in the
direction of the palace to pay the highest respect). There was an attempt to unite citizens by
starting with the primary schools, before extending their power to other countries in the same
method of colonialism practised by Western countries.
Below is an extract from the chapter where the goddess Amaterasu was invited to go out
of the cave in the original version and in the Kojikimonogatari of Suzuki Miekichi, to show the
perception of the deities who were the ancestors of the Emperor dynasty:
(When all deities had performed their rituals, they brought some roosters to crow
for the goddess Amenousume to dance, and when her clothes fell from her, all the
other deities laughed out loud)
The goddess Amaterasu was suspicious, so she opened the door slightly to check
and asked “When she was hiding in the cave to keep heaven and earth in darkness,
how could the goddess Usume enjoy herself by dancing and how could all of you
could have fun?” The goddess Usume answered: “I am pleased and I laugh
because there is a deity who is mightier than you.” At that moment, the other two
deities looked into a mirror when the goddess Amaterasu stepped out of the cave
door as she was curious and the god Tachikarao grasped her arm and pulled her
outside.
Translated from the Kojiki (original version) “The
Kojiki, Ancient Literature” (2004)
(After looking into the mirror) The goddess Amaterasu asked “What is going
on?” and stepped out of the cave door to check.
Suddenly, the god Tachikarao grasped her hand and pulled her outside, and
another deity interposed her from behind, saying “Please do not go inside again.”
And then he used a rope to stop her.
Then, the long dark night around the world turned to be a bright sunny day again.
Translated from the Kojikimonogatari by Suzuki
Miekichi (1955), “Amenoiwaya”
These extracts show that the goddess Amaterasu in the original version and Suzuki version are
similar as she was a character of the myth; she had life and soul and expressed feelings like a
human. In the textbook, she was honoured as an exalted deity who could support the emperor’s
93
入江洋子『日本が神の国だった時代』岩波書店、2006 年 (pp. 16-17)
172
claims of authority.
In 1955, ten years after the end of World War II, the Kojiki fable of Suzuki was reprinted
after the Kojiki was omitted and ignored from textbooks and the Emperor was honoured as a
demigod at the same time. Currently, the Kojiki has regained popularity and children have not
been forced by the government to read the textbook. The new generation has stronger interest in
their past; they are curious about their own origin and Japanese identity, which is why they read
old myths and share it with others. The modern media is now an additional tool in the diffusion
of information. The Kojiki fable of Suzuki was reprinted in 2009 and some extra parts were
added. The introduction in the reprinted version states that “the original copy was a compilation
of children’s literature written by Suzuki Miekichi and printed in 1975. The letters were adjusted
to be the same form used at the time, and the content of the original version was not changed at
all.”94 The intertextuality of Japanese myths in the Kojiki is the context which maintains the
content of the original Kojiki, as well as the brainchild of the writer who aimed to create
literature “for children” and gave feedback on the usage of myths in propaganda during the war.
Conclusion
The myths of all cities were combined to be a national myth. Some content has been modified
according to the social context but the concept and the local myths have been maintained. The
main character in the Myth of Izumo had a role as the Deity of the Earth or the second-class
citizen in the Kojiki, but he supported the role of the Deity of Heaven to become more mighty
and respectful. Although the government interwove these myths into textbooks to cultivate
patriotism in the children during a certain period, the faith in the deities has evolved into interest
in original culture and tradition, which was ignored in the past. These myths still pass on the
roots and identity of the ancient Japanese people to the new generation.
At present, the fact or the truths of the war has been revealed. Japan was requested to
review the conflict of the countries which were abused during the war. The statement made by
the Emperor is still a sensitive issue. The Kojiki was not criticised for its role as a tool in
honouring the emperors, as it was before the war, but is seen as a work of literature reflecting the
varieties of ethnicities residing in the Yamato Kingdom. Suzuki Sadami ( 鈴木貞美 , 2005)
mentions in The Cultural Nationalism of Japan that nationalism was judged as being on the
extreme right (as opposed to the extreme left of social communism). At present, it is seen to
contain cultural meaning in the language and traditions that have been passed down from the
ancient times.95 The modern-day popularity of the Kojiki was a result of the search for answers
about the real Japanese identity. The restoration of the original myths in textbooks still shows the
cultivation of patriotism by the adults to children.
The comparative study between the original context and the content of the Japanese
myths in the Kojiki fables after the war focused on the perceptions of Suzuki Miekichi’s
interpretation. It showed that his distinguished writing style is aimed to preserve the culture of
the original version. He focused to symbols or imagery which were easy to understand, making
it suitable for children. He created the property of fable in the Kojiki to encourage children to
learn from reading. The researcher believes that his Kojiki fables will continue to be retold in the
next generation. The content, which is similar to the original version, shows the transfer of
culture and the ideas and beliefs of the ancient Japanese people. It differs from the application of
the deity myths in the political authority of the emperors before and during the war. As a creative
and valuable method of telling the deity myths in the form of fables, the Kojiki is not an example
of literature being used to boost the political authority of the emperors or to cultivate patriotism
in children. The study of intertextuality explains that the Kojiki is the context combined with the
literal and social context as well as the readers and those who reinterpret it. It remains as a
94
95
鈴木三重吉『古事記物語』PHP 研究所、2009 年.
鈴木貞美（2005）『日本の文化ナショナリズム』平凡社新書 303, pp. 25-44
173
dynamic context with new and various presentations depicting the Japanese identity of the
present age; it is modern but maintains the concept of the original Japanese people.
References
English
Allen, G. (2000). Intertextuality. London and New York: Routledge.
Thai
Bookhajon, T. (2010). The light of comparative literature. Chulalongkorn: Centre of Literature
Studies, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University.
Suwanrada, A. (2010). Learning Japanese myths of deities from kojiki literature. Chulalongkorn:
Chulalongkorn University Press.
Japanese
Fukuda, K. (1979). Akai tori (souron), akai tori (fukukokuban), kaisetsu, shippitsushasakuin.
Nihon kindai bungakukan.
Irie, Y. (2006). Nihon ga kami no kuni datta jidai. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.
Konoshi, T. (2010). Motoori Norinaga no ‘Kojikiden’ wo yomu. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Kudo, T. (2006). Kojiki no kigen. Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha.
Matsumae, K. (1976). Izumo shinwa. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Suzuki, M. (1982). Suzuki Miekichi zenshuu daigokan. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.
Suzuki, M. (2009). Kojiki monogatari. Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo.
Suzuki, S. (2005). Nihon no bunka nashonarizumu. Tokyo: Heibonsha.
Tanada, M. (2001) Showa senki shougakkou kokutei kyoukasho ni okeru ‘Kojiki’ no kyouzaika ni
kansuru kousatsu. Hiroshima: Hiroshima University.
Torigoe, S. (2006). Hajimete manabu Nihon jidou bungakushi. Kyoto: Minerva.
174
The Empress Who Could Have Been:
The Implications of Disallowing Women from Ascending the Imperial Throne in Japan
By Pia Angela Jabson Maske
If women ruled the world,
nothing would be different.
– Lisa Jervis
Introduction
To ponder the relationship between any feminist school of thought and the Japanese Imperial
Family is to risk falling into the trap of pondering something many consider to be
unthinkable. While most, if not all, strands of feminism suggest varying degrees of change,
royalty suggests history, tradition, and timelessness of values. In keeping with this perceived
discrepancy between the two, how, then, can the Japanese Imperial Family adapt to the
changing notions on women’s place, if at all?
Over the years, Japan has been known as a lot of things. In the years immediately after
the end of World War II, its image was largely coloured by its role as one of the key players on
the side of the Axis Powers, occupying countries like the Philippines. Then, for many years, it
was known as a “faceless economic superpower… [that] has the money and technology but does
not have a cultural influence in the world” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 2). It may have been – and still is
– among the top ten largest economies in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
but it was as if the rest of the world did not care much for the history and traditions of the land
that gave it Toyota, Honda, and Sony. In more recent decades, however, Japan has been working
on not only being an economic superpower, but also on being a cultural force. Nowadays, it is
known as a ‘cool’ country, strategising left and right to improve what Douglas McGray calls its
GNC, or its Gross National Cool (2002).
In spite of all the things Japan has been known for, it has never quite been the poster child
for gender equality. While it is true that women have achieved the right to suffrage shortly after
the end of World War II, and that women in the labour force are becoming more and more
accepted as a reality, the issue of gender equality remains unresolved.
In a general attempt to present the critiques of the status of women in Japan, this
essay has placed its focus on the Japanese Imperial Family and the rules of succession. The
paper is anchored on the question: “What are the implications of barring women from
ascending the Imperial Throne?”
Hence, this research will specifically attempt to discuss the following points: first,
although members of the Imperial Family are allowed to marry from outside what was
h i t h e r t o known as the aristocracy, there is a double standard for dealing with these marriages,
particularly with regard who gets to retain membership in the Imperial Family and who has to
renounce it. Second, the current rules of succession not only fail to recognise t he differences
among women, but also limit them to their reproductive function. Third, while barring
women from ascending the Imperial Throne was first made official at a time when it would
have been inconsistent with the absence of women suffrage, the carrying over of this practice
ignores that social values can and have evolved. In line with the third point, this paper will
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shed light on the idea that the rules of succession are not an isolated issue, and should the
Japanese government decide to amend them in the future, it is going to have to deal with a host
of other factors that have gone into the making and that will go into the keeping of these rules.
The Sun Lineage
Members of the House of Yamato, or the Japanese Imperial Family, are believed to have
descended from Jimmu Tennō, who is a descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu. The
Imperial Family is also believed to be the longest ruling dynasty in the entire world.
Compared to the Dragon Throne of China, which was occupied by different families, the
Chrysanthemum Throne of Japan has only been occupied by one family.
In order to ensure this, there have been at least three mechanisms that have been put
into place. These are 1) maintaining a harem; 2) t h e keeping of collateral families; and 3)
allowing women to accede to the throne.
The first, which is maintaining a harem, is a mechanism which is not exclusive to the
Japanese Imperial Family. In Imperial China, for example, while some emperors had more than
one wife – sometimes taking nine wives "to represent the union of his realm's nine regions",
others only had one but had many concubines (Hinsch, 2011, p. 41). During these times,
polygamy was not uncommon, and the harem was there in order to give the Emperor access to
many women, ensuring that there would always be an heir to the throne (Shillony, 2006, p. 2). If
the Japanese Emperor could not conceive a child, particularly a son, with his wife, he had at his
disposal some 10 or even 20 concubines from ambitious aristocratic families. Because of this,
the families of the aristocracy were usually hoped to give birth to a daughter, whom the Emperor
would favour and have a son with, and who would eventually become Emperor. In cases where
the Emperor was incapable of producing an heir, adoption was an option. However, because
succession to the Chrysanthemum Throne was patrilineal, adoption was limited to sons
from within the Imperial Family. As a result, families of the aristocracy never hoped to give
birth to a son whom the Emperor would favour and adopt, as this could not possibly be (Shillony,
p. 3).
The second, which is keeping collateral families, is a mechanism that allows the families
of the brothers of the Crown Prince, who is to inherit the Chrysanthemum Throne, to inherit it in
cases where the Crown Prince fails to produce an heir (Shillony, p. 3).
The third, which is allowing women to accede to the throne, is a mechanism saved for
cases where there is no male heir. In the e n t i r e history of Japan, there have been eight
reigning empresses. None of them could marry during their reign, and none of them could
pass on the throne to their children. The former is because of the idea that when a woman
marries, she becomes inferior to her husband, and for all intents and purposes, it was
inconceivable for the sovereign to be inferior to anyone, including her husband. The second is
because the Chrysanthemum Throne was patrilineal, which meant t h a t it w o u l d revert
to a male of paternal Imperial bloodline once an empress’ reign was over (Shillony, p. 4).
As is made evident by this, even if the throne reverts to the male line, women were not
barred from ascending the throne. However, during the Meiji restoration, the Imperial
Throne was restricted to Imperial male descendants, officially barring women from becoming
reigning empresses. At the time, the main justification for this was that, as women did not
serve in the military, they were not in any position to assume the highest post in the land,
which also serves as the commander-in-chief of the military (Shillony, p. 6). Moreover, during
the Meiji restoration, the Emperor and members of the Imperial Family were also prohibited
from adopting.
Now, while the third mechanism was done away with through a specific provision in the
constitution, the first mechanism was done away with through the Civil Code of 1898. In this
document, polygamy was outlawed, and Emperor Taishō, the 123rd Emperor of Japan, became
the first monogamous emperor. Fortunately for him, he and his wife were able to have four sons,
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the oldest being Hirohito, the 124th Emperor of Japan (Shillony, p. 7).
With four daughters – including Princess Sachiko, who died when she was less than a
year old almost ten years into his marriage, Emperor Hirohito and his wife had their first son,
Akihito, who would then become the 125th Emperor of Japan. After Akihito, they had two
more children, another boy and another girl (Shillony, p. 7).
As for the second mechanism, this was done away with after the end of World War II,
when the Emperor’s status was reduced from being the sovereign to being the symbol of the
state and the unity of the people, and the aristocracy was abolished. This was done as per
Article 14 of the present constitution of Japan, which states that “[a]ll of the people are
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin… [and] no privilege shall
accompany any award of honour, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be
valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it”.
It is important to note, however, that this only prevented the reappearance of
new collateral families. This is because at present, the Imperial Family is composed of the
sons and grandsons of the emperor, their wives and their unmarried daughters. As such, the
brother of the current Crown Prince Naruhito, Prince Akishino and his family, may still
be considered a collateral family (Shillony, 2006, p. 8).
Documents on Succession
As an attempt to shed light on the implications of barring women from ascending the Imperial
Throne, this study has placed its focus on the following three documents: 1) the 1947
Constitution of Japan; 2) the Imperial Household Law of 1947; and 3) the Advisory Council on
the Imperial House Law Report from 2005. The third is the output of the council convened by
then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to discuss possible measures that can be taken to ensure
the continuity and stability of the Imperial Line. Granted that none of its recommendations were
acted upon, this report provides an analysis of the current state of women with regard to
Imperial succession and what system can be put into place that can, in their words “be capable
of winning public understanding and support” (2005, p. 2).
The Emperor
In comparing the 1889 Constitution of the Empire Japan with the 1947 Constitution of Japan,
the following differences are evident:
First, with regard to the status of the emperor, in Article 3 of the Constitution of the Empire
of Japan, otherwise known as the Meiji Constitution, the Japanese Emperor is considered to be
“sacred and inviolable”. Article 4 states that he is “the head of the Empire, combining in Himself
the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them…”. Aside from these, Article 11 bestows upon him
“the supreme command of the Army and Navy”. Contrastingly, in the present constitution, the
emperor’s status has been largely reduced. As stated in Article 1 of the 1947 Constitution, he “shall
be the symbol of the State and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the
people with whom resides sovereign power”. It is clear, then, that unlike in the Meiji Constitution,
where sovereignty lies with the emperor, in the present constitution, sovereignty lies with the
people of Japan.
Second, with regard the rules of succession, in the Meiji Constitution, it is clear that, as per
Article 2, the Imperial Throne “shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to
the provisions of the Imperial House Law”. The first ten articles of the Imperial Household Law of
1889 support this. Article 5, for example, states that if there is no Imperial descendant, then “the
Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by an Imperial brother and by his descendants”. Accordingly,
Article 8 states that “[a]mong Imperial brothers and the remoter relations, precedence shall be
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given, in the same degree, to the descendants of full blood, and to the elder over the younger”. It
is clear, then, that in cases where there is no Imperial male descendant but an Imperial female
descendant, she cannot even be recognised as such because both the constitution and the Imperial
Household Law restricts the Chrysanthemum Throne to only Imperial male descendants.
The present it only states that, as per Article 2, the Imperial Throne “shall be dynastic”.
The reason Japan has not had a reigning empress since the end of World War II, despite
Emperor Hirohito’s first child being female, is because of the Imperial Household Law of 1947.
As it was in the Imperial Household Law of 1889, Article 1 states that the throne “shall be
succeeded to by male descendants in the male line of Imperial Ancestors”. The following
article then enumerates the order of succession, which includes the oldest son of the Emperor,
and the oldest son of the Emperor’s oldest son. In cases where the Emperor produces no male
heir, the throne is to be inherited by a brother of the Emperor and his descendants, or an
uncle of the Emperor and his descendants. In any case, the Chrysanthemum Throne is kept
within the male line of the Imperial Family.
The Imperial Family
Unlike its predecessor, the Imperial Household Law of 1947, through Article 5, limits the Imperial
Family to the Emperor, the Empress, “the Grand Empress Dowager, the Empress Dowager,
the Kotaishi (crown prince) and his consort, the Kotaison (Imperial grandson, heir apparent) and
his consort, the shinnô (male-line Imperial grandsons) and their consorts, the naishinnô
(unmarried male-line Imperial granddaughters), the ô (more distant male-line male descendants)
and their consorts, and the nyoô (more distant male-line unmarried female descendants) shall be
members of the Imperial Family”.
Excluding the brothers and unmarried sisters of the current emperor, Emperor
Akihito, the Imperial Family has ten members: the Emperor, the Empress, their two sons and
their respective families.
Crown Prince
Naruhito
Princess Aiko
Crown Princess
Masako
Emperor Akihito
Princess Mako
Prince Akishino
Empress Michiko
Princess
Kako
Princess Akishino
Prince Hisahito
Sayako Kuroda
As seen in the chart, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko have three children, meaning there
are eleven members in the Imperial Family. However, upon marrying a commoner in 2005,
she lost her Imperial status and is thus no longer considered to be a part of the Imperial family
(“Japanese princess weds”, 2005).
Under common law, when a man and a woman marry, they become one person, and this
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person is the husband. As such, a married woman is subsumed under her husband, and she is
referred to as a “femme covert”, because she is deprived of independent legal existence (Kaplan
& Bernays, 1997, p. 136; Snyder, 2009, p. 3). While this practice is said to have been carried
over from when women were considered as their husbands’ properties (Hamilton, Geist &
Powell, 2011, p. 147), and while Japan is not a common law country, it is as if women’s status is
still dependent on men. In the case of the then Princess Sayako, despite her royal or Imperial
status, as soon as she married a commoner, she lost her title and became a commoner like her
husband.
Perhaps some background will be required: i t i s st at ed t hat members of the Imperial
Family can only marry those from their own family, or those who belong to “certain noble
families specially approved by Imperial Order”, as per Article 40 of the Imperial Household
Law of 1889. With the changes made after World War II, however, they are now able to marry
from outside their circle.96 Emperor Akihito, for one, became the first crown prince in a long
time to marry a commoner.
As evidenced by Emperor Akihito’s marriage to Empress Michiko, and even Crown
Prince Naruhito’s marriage to Crown Princess Masako, when a male member of the Imperial
Family marries a commoner, he does not become a commoner himself. Rather, his wife
follows him in his Imperial status.
As evidenced by Emperor Akihito’s marriage to Empress Michiko, and even Crown
Prince Naruhito’s marriage to Crown Princess Masako, when a male member of the Imperial
Family marries a commoner, he does not become a commoner himself. Rather, his wife follows
him in his Imperial status. In contrast, according to Article 12 of the Imperial Household Law of
1947, when a female member of the Imperial Family “marries a person other than the Emperor
or a member of the Imperial Family, she shall lose the status of Imperial Family member” and
follows her husband’s commoner status. With regard to their children, Sayako Kuroda’s children
are ineligible from inheriting the throne not only because they are, as their mother is, considered
commoners, but also because their Imperial blood is from the female line. Obviously, Emperor
Akihito’s children are considered to be members of the Imperial Family, with Prince Naruhito
even being next in line to the throne.
This is actually reminiscent of how the French and the Dutch dealt with métis children, or
offspring of interracial unions, in French Indochina in the 1800s and in the Dutch East Indies as
early as the 1600s. This was problematic because France and the Netherlands needed to find a
way not only to prevent métis children from becoming a generation of paupers, but to do so in a
way that did not compromise European claims to privilege (Stoler, 1994).
On the one hand, the children of European men and native women, who were not
taken in by their fathers, were said to represent the sexual excesses of their mother.
Whatever became of them was their mother’s fault, especially since native mothers were
believed to only keep their children for future profit, culminating in them either being
labourers or prostitutes (p. 207). On the other hand, following the patriarchal principle,
children of European women and native men had no access to European prestige to begin
with. This is because any European woman who chooses to have relations with and marry a
non-European man is believed to be neither well-bred nor deserving of European standing
herself, let alone her children (p. 219).
The Imperial Descent
According to the Advisory Council on the Imperial House Law Report, there are four
criteria for Imperial succession:
One of the main reasons for this is that with the abolishment of the aristocracy, there were
very few prospects for members of the Imperial Family, who would have had to marry among
themselves in order to fulfil the Imperial Household Law of 1889.
96
179
One, the heir must be of Imperial descent. Two, the heir must belong to the Imperial
Family. These, the council believe, are “natural enough requirement[s]”, as the Chrysanthemum
Throne is dynastic or hereditary.
Three, the heir must be of legitimate birth. As has been discussed earlier, unlike the case
of the Meiji Restoration and its preceding rules, where children born to the Emperor’s concubines
were eligible to inherit the throne, the current Imperial House Law disallows this, and restricts it
only to legitimate children. This, the council explained, was “in the interests of public morals”
(2005, p. 4).
Four, the heir must be a male of male lineage. Under the Imperial Household Law of 1889,
there are at least six reasons behind the preclusion of women from ascending the throne (p. 4-5).
First, “a female Emperor’s dignity would be diminished by the presence of a consort,
for Japanese popular sentiment and social norms gave precedence to the male”. As has
been previously mentioned, this is so because it was inconceivable that the Emperor, who
is the sovereign, would be inferior to anyone, including her husband.
Second, “[t]he Japanese system of inheritance favoured males”. As such, if a married
couple has more than one child, their estate will be inherited by them, giving precedence to
sex over order of birth.
Third, “[i]n the minds of the Japanese people, female Emperors had throughout
history always served a provisional, interregnal role, and Imperial succession was still
perceived as passing through the male line”. Those who became reigning empresses were
either unmarried97 or widowed. Those who were widowed could have had children before they
became empresses, but because the throne was patrilineal, none of them could have passed it on
to their own children.
Fourth, a child “born of a female Emperor would inherit her husband’s surname; the
Imperial line would thus be diverted into a different course in violation of tradition.” This
concern was materialised during the marriage of Sayako Kuroda, whose Imperial identity was
lost in favour of her husband’s, who was a commoner. If she had been the reigning princess, with
the current rules on marriage to commoners still in place, rules on marriage with commoners
remain, she would have had to forego her Imperial status, again, in favour of her husband’s,
thus disrupting or even destroying the Imperial line forever.
Fifth, “[t]he consort of a female Emperor might interfere through her in affairs of State”,
especially since Japanese society of the time thought women inferior to their husband.
Sixth, “[a] woman’s assumption of the highest position of political authority would be
inconsistent with the absence of female suffrage in Japan”. Of course, with women having
had achieved the right to suffrage shortly after the end of World War II, this can no longer be
among the reasons why women are still barred from ascending the throne.
Considering this and other changes in the status of women in Japan, under the
Imperial Household Law of 1947, the following reasons have been given: First, “[t]he Imperial
succession had, in so far as past precedents were concerned, always run through the male line,
and that was consistent with popular sentiment”. Second, “[h]istorically speaking, female
Emperors have always served a provisional, interregnal role”.
A Question of Tradition
The case for tradition, or for anything that refers to p r e c e d e n t a n d history and “how
things have always been done”, is problematic, not only because it does not take into
consideration how things have changed since the tradition first came about, but also because
97
The term often used is “virgin” instead of “single”, but that is a different, yet related, issue.
180
it requires women to fulfil a very specific role, regardless of their individual characteristics and
capabilities.
Historically speaking, it is the men of the Imperial Family, and not the women, who have
been inheriting the Chrysanthemum Throne. However, this cannot be the only reason to continue
with this practice. After all, doing things simply because this is how they have always been done
does not render the act, according to Kelly Snyder, either correct or constitutional. She gives the
example of interracial marriages in the United States, and explains that if customs were to be
given precedence in matters of equal protection, then interracial marriages would have never
been allowed (Snyder, 2009, p. 575-576; Rosensaft, 2002, p. 201). By the same line of argument,
in the case of women suffrage, if customs were to be given precedence, then women would have
never been allowed to vote in elections or run for office.
Of course, this is not to say that just because a law worked in the United States means
that the same law will also work in Japan. To illustrate, unlike in the United States where people
are more comfortable with egalitarian forms of address – a student calling her teacher by her first
name, for example – in countries like China and Japan, people are more comfortable when they
are aware of their status relative to another person, so that they can address them accordingly
(Burnard, 2001, p. 372). To them, there is no neutrality in forms of address, and relationship and
status should always be made manifest. Perhaps it is because of this that there remains a sense of
hierarchy between men and women, where the former is considered superior in custom, if not in
law, and customs state that men have always been the one to inherit the Imperial Throne.
Suppose the reason why this was done in the first place was because women were
believed to be incompetent, or at least unfit to rule. Harry Lesser argues that this cannot be so,
for the v er y reason that the difference between men and women lies in the sphere of sexual
reproduction alone. All other claims that will be made after establishing this point will only
be directed towards most men and most women. He then concludes that there is nothing that
can be deduced about a particular man or woman based on the characteristics of most men
or most women (1979, p. 113). He follows up this by providing an example of a situation
wherein the generalisation on the relationship between a specific sex and the tasks they can
perform are made – if the accepted traits of women as a sex are employed in deciding the
traits of individual women. This, he says, completely ignores the varying degrees of
probability among people (p. 114).
To transform his example into a more contemporary reality, by reading only the first
part of the résumé and knowing that the applicant is a woman, it can be assumed that she is
unlikely to be able effective in working as a construction worker because women are far
inferior to men when it comes to physical strength. By isolating the case, however, and
actually meeting her for an interview, it may be the case that she is actually six feet tall, has the
muscles of a professional body-builder, and has an impressive employment record in major
construction companies.
In the case of the Imperial Throne, to dismiss a daughter of the Emperor from ever
acceding to the throne simply because she is a woman is to overlook the possibility of her
having the drive, the intelligence and whatever other characteristics unrelated to biological
factors that are necessary in a leader.
The Need for a Male Heir
Now that Emperor Akihito has a male h e i r apparent in Crown Prince Naruhito, Empress
Michiko is no longer under pressure to produce a male heir. Unfortunately, for the longest
time, the same cannot be said about Crown Princess Masako.
A graduate of Harvard University and of the University of Oxford, she married Crown
Prince Naruhito in 1993. Eight years and a miscarriage later, she gave birth to a baby girl,
Princess Aiko. Given the current rules of succession, however, although she and her husband
181
were able to produce a child, they were not able to produce the ‘right child’, that is, a baby boy
who could accede to the throne. During this time, Crown Prince Naruhito’s brother, Prince
Akishino, and his wife had two daughters – neither of which was the ‘right child’ either.
Because of this, there has been talk of amending the Imperial Household Law of 1947.
Unlike during the Meiji Restoration, where the preclusion of women from acceding to the
throne was expressly stipulated in the Constitution, it is, at present, stipulated only in the
Imperial Household Law, which can be amended by a majority vote in the Diet (Shillony, 2006,
p. 9). Even so, it was not an issue that could easily be brought to a vote, let alone be voted upon.
In the early 2000s, then, the question for the Japanese was this: should they stick with the
current law and, taking account the situation of the time, sit back and watch as the Imperial
Family gradually ceased to exist, or should the law be amended, allowing women to accede to
the throne in the hopes of continuing the Imperial line? A different, yet related question is
this: Should they give more importance to the Imperial Family reigning by, as the Meiji
Constitution puts it, “a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”, or to the Imperial Family
being “succeeded to by Imperial male descendants”?
If this Advisory Council were to be asked, they would give more importance to the
former, to allowing the Imperial line to continue for as long as it could. After all, the
present constitution only states that it be dynastic, and not that it be limited only to males of
the Imperial Family (2005, p. 8).
The Empress Who Could Have Been
In early 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi announced that he would submit a proposal to the Diet
to amend the Imperial Household Law, so as to allow women to accede to the throne (the
“Japan Bill”,2006). If the bill were to be passed, then Princess Aiko would have been the first
Empress of Japan in a long time.98
This announcement was met with negative feedback from members of the Diet. More
than 170 members, including over 100 from Koizumi’s own party, the LDP or the Liberal
Democratic Party of Japan, signed a petition against amending the law. This was in contrast to
an opinion poll cited in by BBC News, which stated that around two-thirds of the population
had no problem with having a reigning empress. 99
It is important to note that if the Diet were to amend the section of the Imperial
Household Law that prevents women from ascending the throne, it is also going to have
to make the necessary changes with regard t o the rules of marriage between members of
the Imperial family and commoners. This is because if they do not, and Princess Aiko
marries – in hopes of continuing the Imperial line – she will follow the status of her
husband as a commoner, and Japan will be left with no Imperial Family.
This notwithstanding, when the wife of Prince Akishino, who, at the time, had two
daughters, announced that she was pregnant, it was as if the universe held its breath and
waited for the announcement of the sex of the baby. On September 2006, Princess Akishino
gave birth to Prince Hisahito, the first baby boy born to the Imperial Family since his own
father (Walsh 2006). Upon his birth, Prime Minister Koizumi has decided that he would no
longer submit his proposal to the Diet, and any talk of amending the Imperial Household Law
died down.
As such, Prince Hisahito is now third in line to the throne, after his uncle, Crown Prince
98
The last female imperial reign was in the 1700s.
Details of the poll conducted were not given. As such, for the purpose of this study, it cannot be
considered to be representative of how the Japanese felt about the issue at the time. What is
important here is that within the Diet, there were many who were not in favour of changing the
Imperial Household Law.
99
182
Naruhito, and his father, Prince Akishino. Princess Aiko will not be Empress, and neither will
Prince Hisahito’s two elder sisters. For now, the Japanese Imperial Family has managed to
avert a succession crisis. However, should Japan persist with its current rules on succession
and marriages between members of the Imperial Family and commoners, when Prince Hisahito
eventually becomes Emperor, and Princess Aiko, Princess Mako, and Princess Kako get
married, he will be, quite literally, the last remaining member of the Japanese Imperial Family.
References
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Publishers.
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transnationalism. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
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Japanese Princess Weds Commoner. (2005, November 15). BBC News. Retrieved September 30,
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2011, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4630464.stm
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McGray, D. (2002). Japan's gross national cool. Foreign Policy, 130, 44-54.
Rosensaft, M. (2002). The right of men to change their names upon marriage. University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 5(1), 186-218.
Snyder, K. ( 2 0 0 9 ) . All names are not equal: Choice of marital surname and equal
protection. Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 30 , 561-687.
Stoler, A. (1994). Sexual affronts and racial frontiers. In Tensions of Empire. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Walsh, B. (2006, September 5). Japan celebrates: It's a boy! Time Magazine
183
Negotiating Perceptions of Japan in Thailand: Transformation of Cultural
Identity Through Work
By Tadasuke Tanimura
Introduction
Kenichi (not his real name) worked in a Japanese trading company in Bangkok. He was
one of the company’s locally-based employees (genchisaiyo in Japanese). When
dining with him and his friend one evening, he said “I do not like Japan because
everything is formal and rigid. When I got to Thailand, I found that Thailand was more
flexible and comfortable to live in.” His friend added “Right, Japan is too rigid and I
do not think I can follow the strict way of Japan anymore.” He was complaining
about the strictness of the working culture in Japan. But at the same time, they also
follow the Japanese working culture. Kenichi said, “The work is different. We have to
follow the Japanese way. If we do not work within the Japanese system, we will get
into trouble.”
Kenichi’s contradiction reflected a common viewpoint I have heard from
many other Japanese p e o p l e living and working in Thailand. Why do they follow
the Japanese working culture despite the fact that they dislike it?
This paper explores how Japanese workers in Thailand recreate perceptions of
Japan as a means of forging cultural boundaries between them and Japan and also
Thailand through their transnational working experiences in the latter.
This pattern of Japanese migration to Thailand does not fit in to other studies of
current Japanese migration. Many studies were done in developed countries such as the
US, the UK, Germany, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore (Ben-Ari, 2003; Fujita,
2008; Glebe, 2003; Machimura, 1999; Mizukami, 2007; Sakai, 2000; 2003; Thang et al.,
2002, etc.).
Recently, the demographics of the overseas Japanese residents have shown a
significant percentage shift from Europe and the Americas to Asia (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2008). The number is increasing, especially in China and Thailand. Thus, the
importance of studies on these developed countries is also increasing. Unlike the recent
economic boom in China which made the world sit up and pay attention, Thailand has
had an intimate economic relationship with Japan long before China opened up its
184
market. As a result of their long-lasting relationship which has blossomed due to
Japanese economic growth, Thailand has received about 30% of its total Foreign Direct
Investment from Japan, which is its largest contributor (Thailand, Board of Investment,
2009).100
Therefore, Japan and its community in Thailand have the longest and largest
economic and social presence in developing countries in Asia.
Background of the Japanese community in Bangkok
Despite the economic downturn of the 1990s, many Japanese companies continued to
establish branch offices overseas. Manufacturing companies sought cheap labour and
they found it in Thailand. More than half of the Japanese companies in Thailand are
engaged in the manufacturing sector (Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 2008).
Most of the factories are located in the suburbs of Bangkok. Japanese expatriates
prefer to live in Bangkok and commute to the suburbs because Japanese facilities such
as schools, supermarkets and restaurants are located in the city.
There are also businesses that cater exclusively to the Japanese. According to the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were 47,251 Japanese living in Thailand in
2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 101 The community is served by Japanese
amenities such as Japanese supermarkets, Japanese restaurants, Japanese schools and
Japanese department stores.
Working expatriates make up the majority of the Japanese community in Thailand.
They can be divided into two groups: those who come from Japan under the orders of
the companies they work for (chuzaiin), and those who volunteer to work abroad in
different conditions with lower pay and benefits (genchisaiyo). The former usually
The total amount of Japanese investment in 2006 was 110,476 million Baht out of
307,668 million (Thailand, Board of Investment, 2009). The second largest investment was
from the US 37,059 million. This shows the huge Japanese economic presence in Thailand.
100
101
This number was calculated by the Japanese Embassy in Thailand. The embassy only calculates the
Japanese who have register with the embassy. Hence, there may be a huge discrepancy between the
official number and the real number. According to those who live in Bangkok, some say the number of
Japanese could be more than 50,000 or 100,000.
185
believe that they will return to Japan in five years or less. 102 Genchisaiyo however,
may also consider returning to Japan, but when this will happen is uncertain.
Thailand is also one of the major destinations for Japanese visitors. About 1
million Japanese visited Thailand in 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008) and it
was the 6th largest destination for Japanese tourists in 2010 (JNTO, 2012).
This
means that there are many Japanese icons such as restaurants, department stores and
the Japanese residents. As such, many Japanese people feel a sense of familiarity
with Thailand and it is this familiarity that motivates them to choose to work here.
Kenichi had visited Thailand previously before deciding to work there. He quit
his job in Japan and moved to Thailand. For the first year, he spent time studying Thai
and started work soon after. Slowly, his view of Japan changed. For example, he had
never thought about what constituted the so-called Japanese working culture. It was
only when he came to Thailand that he began thinking of it and comparing to Thai
culture. The views he carried about work and Japan were in fact mostly based on
stereotypes.
Stereoptypical Japanese working culture and Thai culture
In the book Passport Japan, Engel and Murakami (2009) described some Japanese
stereotypes about the Japanese business. A number of these stereotypes were also
mentioned to me when I spoke to my Japanese friends in Bangkok. For example, in the
book Work Obsessed, a characteristic of Japanese businessmen is mentioned. “Many
Japanese executives feel that taking vacations shows disloyalty to both their companies
and their peers. Vacations of over a week are very rare, and no one on the management
track ever uses all of their allotted vacation time” (p. 23). One my friends noted how “in
Japan, people are working too hard.” This stereotype may not fit with the images of
youths in Japan.
Asano (2006) points out that a popular stereotype of Japanese youths was their
declining motivation to work. In a recent survey by t he Sankei newspaper,103 it was
found that 56% of Japanese companies think that the motivation to work among
younger Japanese is declining. Whether or not this is true, this stereotype cropped up
However, recently, what I heard from those expatriates in Bangkok and Singapore was
that they do not go back to Japan, but rather they are sent to other countries after 3 years
or more. But, they usually expect returning Japan after the stay.
103
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20120215-00000513-san-soci (Retrieved February 15, 2012)
102
186
many times in my conversations with Japanese friends and was used to criticise
Japanese society.
However, despite the criticisms, this hard working lifestyle was also mentioned
by the Japanese as an economically efficient working style. One of my friends told
me that “in terms of working style, Japan is obviously efficient. Of course they are
working too much, but that hard working style made Japan a rich country.” What means
is that working hard was the key to Japan’s success in the global economy. Yet, this
was the key reason why some Japanese came to dislike Japan. Their ambivalent feeling
is clearly expressed here.
On the other hand, the Japanese have different stereotypes of Thai companies.
Most of the stereotypes are, however, derived from Japanese stereotypes. For example,
punctuality is one of the main issues. My friend Kotaro said, “Thais are not punctual.
For the Japanese, punctuality is very important. Japanese companies are very accurate in
time-keeping, so when I have an appointment with a Japanese company, I will be there
at least five minutes beforehand. But of course this is Thailand, so even though the
person, even a Japanese person, is late, I do not really care. If this happened when I was
working in Japan, I would have been angry though.” His comment on punctuality is
obviously derived from the stereotype of the Japanese being punctual.
As mentioned earlier, some Japanese working in Thailand believe that the
Japanese work too hard. However, this stereotype is also used to explain the Thai
working style. A friend told me about the Thais in her company. “Unlike the normal
Thais, those who work in my company are very hard-working. I heard Thais don’t
think twice about taking leave from work, but in my company, they do things right
and they even work overtime.” She was praising her Thai colleagues but basing it on
the stereotype that Thai people are not hard-working.
Some Japanese combined the Japanese work culture with Thai culture. “I am
working in a Japanese company and, you know, Japanese companies in Thailand also
follow the Japanese work style. It’s structured. But this is Thailand, and our customers
know that. We hire Thai people so we cannot provide Japanese quality service.
Sometimes we get complaints but we have an excuse for that”. Although it may sound
like he has made a compromise with regard to working style, his expression shows the
syncretism of two cultures. In fact, many Japanese have expressed the necessity to blend
Japanese and Thai cultures. Their expressions to both cultures indicate their interstitial
position, which sets new cultural boundaries for the locally-employed Japanese.
187
Conclusion
Locally-employed Japanese in Bangkok interact with these stereotypes and create new
boundaries. For example, Kotaro said to me that he would have been angry if
punctuality was not abided by when he was working in Japan. But this perception has
been transformed by the Thai work culture, and Kotaro no longer cares about
punctuality.
As Kenichi’s friend and many of my friends mentioned, most Japanese think
that they adhere to Thai cultural principles to the point that they can no longer
return to Japan ever again. According to them, working in Thailand has transformed
them so m u ch that they will not be able to work in Japan again. This shows their
working style has blended with the Thai stereotypes, the result of which is a new
working style.
Locally-employed Japanese are creative actors; they do not live in an isolated
world. They inhabit the ambiguous borders between cultures and create new cultural
identities in the process. They create a home-like space by creating a new space in
between two cultures.
References
Asano, T. (2006). Kenshou wakamono no henbou: Ushinawareta 10nen no ato ni.
Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.
Ben-Ari, E. (2003). The Japanese in Singapore: The dynamics of an expatriate
community. In R. Goodman, C. Peach, A. Takenaka & P. White (Eds.), Global Japan:
The experience of Japan’s new immigrant and overseas communities. London & New
York: Routledge Curzon.
Engel, D., & Murakami, K. (2009). Passport Japan: Your pocket guide to Japanese
business, customs & etiquette (3rd ed.). Petaluma, CA: World Trade Press.
Fujita, Y. (2008). Bunkaimin: Ekkyou suru Nihon no wakamono to media
(CulturalMigrants: Young Japanese and Transnational Media). Tokyo: Shinyosha.
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Glebe, Gunter (2003). Dyusserudorufu no nihonjin komyuniti: esunosukeepu no nakani
ikiru (Japanese community in Dusseldorf: Living within ethnoscape). In Iwasaki, N.
(Ed.), Kaigai ni okeru nihonjin, Nihon no nakano gaikokujin (The Japanese in overseas,
foreigners in Japan). Tokyo: Showado.
Machimura, T. (1999). Ekkyoushatachi no rosanjerusu (Los Angeles of the
transborders). Tokyo: Heibonsha.
Mizukami, T. (2007). The sojourner community: Japanese migration and residency in
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). R e t r i e v e d N o v e m b e r 2 9 , 2 0 11 , f r o m
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2 5 , 2 0 0 8 , f r o m http://www.jcc.or.th/
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Sakai, C. (2003). The Japanese community in Hong Kong in the 1990s: The diversity of
strategies and intentions. In R. Goodman, C. Peach, A. Takenaka & P. White (Eds.),
Global Japan: The experience of Japan’s new immigrant and overseas communities.
London & New York: Routledge Curzon.
Sakai, J. (2000). Japanese bankers in the city of London: Language, culture and identity
in the Japanese diaspora. London & New York: Routledge.
Thang, L. L., MacLachlan, E., & Goda, M.(2002). Expatriates on the margins: A study
of Japanese women working in Singapore. Geoforum, 33, 539-555.
189
Filipino Ladyboy Entertainers in Japan
By Tricia Okada
Abstract
Although Japayukis or Filipino entertainers working in Japan are generally women,
references have also been made to ladyboys, who are Filipino male-to-female
transgender people or transsexuals. Transgender people are those who possess
biological characteristics associated with a particular gender but do not identify
themselves as such and behave differently from conventional gender roles. Transsexuals
are similar to transgender people will often take the next step of medical intervention.
Individuals who want to establish permanent gender roles will usually undergo sexual
reassignment surgery, either from male-to-female or female-to-male. This paper will
focus on Filipino ladyboys both as transgender people and as transsexuals. Who are the
ladyboy entertainers in Japan? What does it take to work as a “talent” at a pub in Japan
or, better yet, as a ladyboy entertainer? How does the Japanese audience perceive this
type of performance? Japanese society, with its ambivalence to gender, may be
perceived as a haven for these Filipino ladyboy entertainers. This ongoing research aims
to examine this unique Filipino subculture in Japan and how sexual and cultural
transformations are initiated and influenced by background, identity, and occupation. In
addition to applying theories of gender and migration, I have also conducted interviews
with ladyboy entertainers and with an organiser of a Filipino gay pageant in Yokohama,
who provided me with an overview of Filipino ladyboys in the Kanto area. Furthermore,
I have analysed the documentary film “Paper Dolls” by Tomer Heymann, and a short
Filipino television documentary programme to better present and compare the
conditions of Filipino ladyboy entertainers in Israel and Japan. I reviewed Martin
Manalansan IV's “Global Divas”, one of the main references of this research, to
describe Filipino gay men in the diaspora. With these current data, I will attempt to
probe into how the Filipino ladyboys’ life stories and their experiences working as
entertainers in Japan continue to transcend their "performance" onstage, as well as in
190
their personal life.
Introduction
The Spotlight on Filipino Entertainers or Talents in Japan
The main reason Filipinos choose to venture overseas is to seek better opportunities and
to earn what they feel they deserve from all their hard work. Economics and politics are
significant factors in the plight of Filipinos seeking greener pastures overseas.
It is interesting to note that, compared to Western countries, flourishing Asian
countries such as Japan are positively urging more Filipinos to embark on a career.
Filipino transgender entertainers first emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, along with
the economic bubble, which was the golden age for foreign club talents in Japan. Omise,
similar to a gentleman’s club, in this context, refers to Japanese pubs that feature shows,
sing along sessions, and hostesses.
Various terms are used to refer to gay homosexuals. Based on how the
informants and respondents are usually referred to in this study, however, I will only
cover the following terms, such as bakla in Filipino, with a wider circulation in Filipino
queerness, transgender, pre-operative, post-operative and non-operative transsexual
(TS), particularly male-to-female (M2F), and ladyboy in English, okama or new half in
Japanese. Recently, transpinay or trans male-to-female Filipino, has been an emerging
term coined by Filipino transgenders and transsexuals.
The Significance of this Study
This paper aims to document and represent the Filipino transgender and transsexual
entertainers before and after their experiences in Japan, and thereby have a better
understanding of this subculture, leading to both social and legal acceptance and
recognition not only of their nationality but also of their preferred gender in this
globalised society.
Although Filipino entertainers in Japan have already been the subject of much
research, there is as yet no extensive study available on Filipino transgender and
transsexual entertainers in Japan. As a result, this report aspires to spur further studies in
this unique subculture. At the same time, it intends to address the issue of labour and the
migration of this particular breed of entertainers.
191
Related Research
Martin F. Manalansan IV’s Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora is an
ethnographic study of Filipino gay men in New York and focuses on the diverse life
narratives of Filipino gay men, which create a sense of self and belonging or citizenship
in the midst of the demands of immigration and the idea of a global gay identity and
cultural practices. In addition, family, class, race and religion are sites where Filipino
gay men’s articulations of belonging and being are carried out. Manalansan (2003)
suggested that Filipino gay men’s experiences and discourses do not create a consistent
monolithic self. As an alternative, he found a pattern of possible transformations of
selves based on the situation. Furthermore, the author noted that the identities of these
men are inflected and reconfigured by race, class, gender and sexual orientation, and
immigration status.
He further argued that Filipino gay men do not readily assimilate into modern
gay personhood but instead actively recuperate their status as Filipino gays as means to
assert a particular kind of modernity. Through extensive fieldwork, research, and
meticulous analysis of their lives, Manalansan reveals that transnational gay identity is
not merely a consumable lifestyle, but rather a significant constituent in the
transforming relationships that queer immigrants of colour mobilise as they face the
challenges of a globalised world. What makes Manalansan’s work a valuable
contribution to research on gender studies is his intersection of Filipino gay men in the
diaspora and the comparative cultural understanding between Asian and Western sexual
and gender ideology. Although discourse on labour is not fully articulated in the book,
Manalansan’s study is clearly an inspiration that has prompted scholars of queer studies
to engage in related extensive research on queer immigrants of colour.
Force of Domesticity: Filipina Migrants and Globalisation by Rhacel Salazar
Parreñas had a chapter on Filipina migrant entertainers in Tokyo, which was based on
her firsthand fieldwork experience as an entertainer and she questioned if these
hostesses were trafficked. Parreñas (2008) stressed that being a hostess was not the
preferred occupation for most Filipina migrants, who believe that performing in Japan is
morally acceptable. She noted that in the disagreement over the morality of hostess
work, what was overlooked was the relationship between promoters, promotion
agencies, talent managers, and overseas performance artists. In addition, the severe
trafficking conditions are ironically bypassed in the initiative to protect these Filipina
192
entertainers from prostitution. She recommended that instead of implementing
restrictions that discourage labour migration to Japan, trafficked persons such as the
Filipina talents should have greater control over migration and labour themselves.
Jennifer Robertson’s Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in
Modern Japan, describes sexuality and ambivalence in Japan. The idea of gender as a
performance has a century old history in Japan, as demonstrated in the Noh and Kabuki
theaters. Moreover, the gender ideal is carefully studied and crafted from a repertoire of
markers and forms (kata), consisting of gestural, bodily, cosmetic, and linguistic
applications, which are coded as either masculine or feminine. The earliest Kabuki
performance involved females who took on male roles while male actors played female
roles. Eventually, the prohibition of female performers prompted the emergence of
onnagata, males who specialised in performing as females. Robertson (1998) also wrote
about ryousei and chusei, the most frequent Japanese terms referring to androgyny.
Ryousei, which is most generally used to label either someone with both female and
male characteristics, has been used to refer to persons who behave in both a feminine
and masculine manner at the same time. Chusei, on the other hand, has been used to
mean “neutral” or “in between,” and thereby neither female nor male. While ryousei
emphasises the combination of gender differences, chusei highlights the nullification of
differences.
Tomer Heymann’s “Paper Dolls” is a gritty and daring documentary that follows
the lives of a group of Filipino gays who work as caregivers and on their nights off, and
perform as cross-dressers in Tel Aviv nightclubs. Unlike the Filipino gays in Japan who
are employed as cross-dressers, as studied in this research, this poignant documentary
depicts the role of immigrant workers in Western culture and explores the lives of
societal outcasts and their quest for acceptance and freedom.
An “I-Witness” documentary by Howie Severino is another related reference in
this study, which presents the various facets of transpinay or transsexual Filipinos in
their journey from being a male to a female. Transpinays are categorised into three
groups. Pre-op is a term used for transsexuals who are about to undergo sexual
reassignment surgery, while the post-op is used for those who have undergone the
operation. Non-op, on the other hand, refers to transgender persons who do not plan to
undergo the operation at all. The documentary mainly follows the pre-op transgender
gay beauty pageant winner, Kristine Madrigal, who realised her dream of becoming a
real woman through sexual reassignment surgery during her stint as an entertainer in
Japan. She confesses that she has had many Japanese suitors but admits that seven out
of ten men still prefer real women. Thus, she decided to return home and have the
193
operation. One of the informants featured in the documentary is Erica Nagi, who has
had experience working as a talent in Japan; she does not recommend sexual
reassignment surgery as it caused her to lose her sexual drive and led to a failed longterm relationship with a Japanese man.
Methodology
In this study, the Filipino organiser of a gay beauty pageant held in Japan was first
interviewed in Yokohama; thereafter, interviews with eight transgender people and
transsexuals who worked as entertainers during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s were
conducted in Manila. The interview questions were formulated based on related
research and preliminary interviews that included, among others, the respondents’
background prior to moving to Japan, their status upon returning to Manila, queries on
work and gender-related issues, and their impressions of Japan. The attempt to
implement a survey of entertainers who are discreetly living as transgenders or
transsexuals or overstaying in Japan due to their visa status was unsuccessful because of
the resource person’s ambiguous and inconsistent correspondence. In fact, all the
interviewees and respondents consist of professional entertainers, entrepreneurs, and
hairstylists currently living in Manila, who were more supportive of this independent
research project.
Participant observation since 2009 was made possible through immersion in
Tokyo’s public spaces such as Nichome, the gay district of Tokyo, Kamata, the
downtown area where many middle class omise may be found; and Roppongi, which is
well-known for its high-end clubs. On one occasion in April 2011, a focused group
discussion took place at Club Mwah, Mandaluyong City, the Philippines, during a brief
rehearsal break of gay performers who used to work in Japan. Networking in the gay
community included voluntary work in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT)
film festivals, chats at a beauty salon, and with resource people from the academe, the
consulate, and the Filipino communities in Japan. Several blogs and videos online were
also examined to serve as secondary resources. Online activities describe in hindsight
the transgenders’, transsexuals’ and even outsiders’ responses and interactions. As a
result, an exchange of gay lingo in discourse materialised.
Results and Analysis
194
This section of the paper is divided into three production phases of a performance,
juxtaposing the Filipino entertainers’ life experiences before and after Japan.
Pre-production
Auditions
The boom of non-Japanese transgender performances in Japan occurred during the
bubble economy from 1985 until the early 1990s. Information about auditions for
talents in Japan was quickly disseminated among gays, who would try out with their
peers. Although the procedure of the auditions, including a pre-departure showcase
(PDS) for the Philippine Overseas Employment Association (POEA) officials, has
changed greatly in the past two decades, the main criteria for choosing an entertainer are
good looks that can “pass” for or absolutely resemble a woman, and talent in singing or
dancing. Most of those who auditioned in their late teens or twenties are transgenders or
those who intend to undergo sexual reassignment surgery in the future. All interested
entertainers have to go through a promotion agency, training, and pass the auditions
handled by the talent manager in the Philippines, which serves as a springboard to start
their career as Filipino entertainers in Japan.
Coming out and reasons for leaving
Unlike the Filipino gay US immigrants in Manalansan’s book, these cross-dressing gay
entertainers, who have realised that they are not “straight” at an early age, do not
undertake the gradual, dramatic process of coming out because their families and
colleagues have already recognised them as gays from the beginning. As Manalansan
(2003) states, the most pivotal rite of passage in the life cycle of a gay man is the
coming out event, wherein a gay man’s life is turned from a life of secrecy and careful
manipulation of behaviour and images to one of a public affirmation of identity. Perhaps
this coming out process is clearly visible and remarkable among Western gays. However,
there is a different version of events in the Philippines, where a less dramatic and subtle
coming out process occurs among Filipino gay immigrants or overseas contract workers,
who act as breadwinners for their families. Gender or sexual preference becomes less of
a concern when obtain the basic essentials of survival and comfort for them and their
families is takes precedence over all else.
In addition to an attractive salary, one of the motivating factors for these young
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transgenders and transsexuals to work in Japan is the proximity and urge to satisfy their
curiosity of the country’s unique culture. Most ladyboy entertainers, who are either high
school or college graduates of economics, engineering, social sciences and design, are
products of middle class and lower middle class society.
The contract and the arrival
The shortest contract is three months long and the longest is six months long and all
entertainers are expected to finish their contract. Those who pass the auditions cannot
choose which place and club to go to but must obey the promoter’s choice. As described
by Parreñas (2008), the club owner does not act as the employer but the promoter or the
promotion agency. Entertainers in the past were provided with a yellow card that
signified as an entertainment visa. Later on, this assumed various colours until it finally
became a certificate. In 2004, Japan limited its approval of entertainment visas to
foreigners in response to the Anti-Trafficking campaign. As such, the number of foreign
entertainers, including Filipinos, in Japan declined drastically.
In the 1980s, the monthly basic salary for entertainers was around US$450,
excluding tips from customers; in some cases, tips were even higher than the salary.
Recently, the monthly salary for transgender entertainers is basically almost the same as
the Japanese basic salary, ranging from US$1000 to US$2000, but is also dependent on
the location and type of club. Parreñas (2008) mentions that some Filipina entertainers
depended solely depend on tips because they would only get their salary at the end of
the contract or upon returning home. There has been no such case reported, however, for
Filipino transgender and transsexual entertainers.
Completely transgender entertainers or those mixed with biologically female
entertainers in Japan consist not only of those from the Philippines but those also from
Thailand, Taiwan, Mexico, or Russia. Omise with this particular brand of entertainment
may be found in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kanagawa, Saitama, Shizuoka, Kofu, Nagoya,
Osaka, Yamaguchi, Kumamoto and Fukuoka. According to an informant, there have
been about a thousand identified and unidentified Filipino transgender and transsexual
entertainers in Tokyo alone, from the 1990s until the 2000s. Interestingly, Filipino
trangenders and transsexuals are not to be found in Nichome, Shinjuku, despite being
the gay capital of Japan.
Production
196
Gender performance and ambivalence in Japan
The manner in which transgender and transsexual entertainers in Japan carry themselves
onstage is relevant, as well as when they are offstage. When they are offstage, are they
still “performing” their gender?
Since this particular type of entertainer is able to disguise their biological sex
both at work and in reality, performing in their preferred gender becomes more obvious
and becomes a lifestyle. This outcome dates back to the history of Japanese theatre,
when males performing female roles were widely appreciated and the performers’
genuine sexuality tended to be irrelevant. Moreover, this is a reflection of how gender in
Japanese society is more fluid and ambivalent, meaning there is a slim distinction of
masculinity and femininity that borders on androgyny. As such, for Filipino
transgenders and transsexuals, Japan is considered a haven where they can live as
women yet still be legally identified as men.
Clients
Customers of the omise are mostly straight males from the 20-60 year old age range, are
either married or single, and are employed as salary men or managers in the city and
fishermen or farmers in the provinces. Some companies have professional contracts
with the club owners to acquire group package services. Generally, entrance fees range
from 3,000 yen to 30,000 yen, including two to three shows and after-show services
such as face-to-face conversations with the talents. Generally, the kind of customers an
omise caters to and the amount of tips the talents receive will depend on the location of
the club. If the pub is in the main city of a high-class area, the clients will usually
comprise of mid-career businessmen, managers, or CEOs. Blue-collared workers do not
necessarily pay less; in fact, they will usually give a larger tip as they frequently visit
clubs as their amusement after a routine day at work. Christmas and Valentine’s Day are
the busiest time for club entertainers, because most single men want to escape their
loneliness and interestingly, some of them happen to appreciate the transgender
entertainment more.
“That’s entertainment!”
The clubs open usually from seven in the evening until four the next morning and can
197
either be an all-transgender or mixed with women performers, either only Filipinos or
international performers. Shows commence at seven or nine in the evening and run for
about fifteen to forty minutes. Dancing, singing Japanese or foreign songs, lip-syncing
to songs, cultural presentations and comedy sketches are among the production numbers
where the gorgeous transgenders and transsexuals grace the stage to show off their
talents in colourful and flamboyant costumes. Throughout the performance, the
spectators are under the magic spell of the fushigi (strange), omoshiroii (interesting),
and mezurashii (rare) ladyboy entertainers, as described by the audience members. After
the show and if the performers have built a good rapport with the audience, the
customers are allowed to interact and have a drink with them in the same venue.
Although it is an unwritten agreement between the talents and the mamasan or the club
manager not to go out with clients, the talents are able to find ways to meet the
customers outside the club as long as there is a mutual interest. The service immediately
after the performance is an opportunity for the entertainers to get acquainted with the
customers who can personally select the talent they wish to socialise with. Japanese
conversational language skills are not compulsory but can be developed.
Moreover, clients expect splendid social skills and charisma from the
entertainers to become potential regular customers. The talents are encouraged to “drink
back”, meaning to drink Coca-cola rather than alcohol, so as not to get tipsy and to
sustain professional services towards the clients and hopefully receive tips ranging from
10,000 to 50,000 yen. From this point on, some Japanese male clients, who later on
become their lovers or even husbands in spite of the talents’ real gender, will pursue
relationships with the entertainers.
As noted by Parreñas (2008), there is a false assumption that hostess work is
similar to prostitution. Hostess work, similar to those the female entertainers, includes
caring for the clients, flirting, and entertaining them, which also applies to the
transgender and transsexual entertainers.
“What’s love got to do with it?”
What makes Filipino transgender and transsexual entertainers appealing to Japanese
men? Filipinos’ cheerful personality and lambing, or the innate ability to express
tenderness are considered very attractive traits. Based on the interview, some salary men
confide their work-related problems to the entertainers, who later on become their
confidantes. Through the transgender entertainers’ performances and these light
conversations, the customers are able to find comfort, release stress, and forget their
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anxieties temporarily, but sadly, it involves a lot money.
Although sexual intimacy with a client is prohibited since this can open up
opportunities for the customer to move to another club that offers a newer set of
entertainers, there are inevitable circumstances wherein the customer and entertainer
themselves get into a serious relationship. The clients visit the club once and find
themselves attracted to the transgender or transsexual entertainers, who continue
working even though their clients have become their boyfriends and are aware of their
occupation. A respondent pointed out that her lover was not jealous of her job
entertaining male customers, because at the end of the day, she came home to him.
Moreover, men tend to get more attracted to transgenders or transsexuals because there
is acceptance of patriarchy in the mutual relationship and obviously no risk of
pregnancy. One of the respondents noted that if they engaged in sex, they were never
worried because they believed that the Japanese would behave responsibly and practice
safe and protected sex. She said education about safe sex would be unnecessary since
most transgenders were known to be more responsible in a foreign country.
Another interviewee emphasised that the Japanese preferred dating Filipinos
because of their admiration for Filipino’s priority of family over work and friends,
compared to the Japanese whose work always came before the family. This explains
why even if Filipinos do not have much money, they are happy people because the
family is most important thing to them.
Some of the transgenders’ lovers sponsor them for visas or sexual reassignment
surgery. According to one informant, some of these entertainers have married straight
Japanese women or lesbians in order to remain legally in Japan since Japanese law still
prohibits changing gender identity. In other cases of red tape malpractices in the
Philippines, a transsexual may buy the identity of another Filipino’s female who is in
need of money and cannot even afford to process her own passport. Then the
transsexual holds this new name and is legally identified as a female through fake
documents that allow her to marry a Japanese man. However, there have been cases
who have been reported and caught by Japanese authorities, which has led to the
deportation of these transsexuals, where they will be barred from ever entering Japan
again.
Since Japan is one of the most expensive places for this kind of medical
procedure, Thailand has gained popularity for its guaranteed safety and affordability.
Recuperation may take up to a month or so, depending on the person’s immune system.
There have been cases of depression post-surgery as a result of hormonal changes.
Although a rigid psychological assessment pre-operation is compulsory according to US
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law, this evaluation is not commonly practiced in Asian countries. Fortunately, there
have many successful sexual reassignment operations among Filipino transsexual
entertainers without side effects.
Days off from work
Besides work and dating, the transgenders’ and transsexuals’ main activities are learning
the Japanese language and tradition, shopping, travelling, going to church and
cultivating a friendship with other Filipinos. They admit that they feel a sense of
belonging among Filipinos living in Japan, even though their fellow countrymen are
aware of their work and sexual orientation. A good relationship with both the Filipinos
and the Japanese will help them cope with their arduous circumstances. They never
mention being homesick because they are often surrounded with Filipinos as they have
a support group both at the workplace and at home. Just like in any culture, gossip and
intrigue among fellow countrymen is inevitable. However, what stands out the most is
the strong camaraderie among other Filipino transgenders and transsexuals.
A Filipino transgender entertainer reported that most Japanese men and women
accepted and treated transpinays with respect. She added that even if they were
recognised as new half, they were not discriminated against or bullied but were seen to
be interesting, intriguing, and were appreciated for their cuteness or beauty.
A Filipina, a Japanese in cooperation with Unified Filipino Group in Yokohama
(UFG) produced Miss Gay Yokohama, a beauty pageant held from 1998 until 2004
when Japanese immigration became stricter with entertainment visa holders. The
organisers thought this gay beauty pageant was more appealing and because they
intended to support the gay community. Various Filipino and Japanese establishments
assisted in promotion and funds. Most transsexuals and transgenders in their twenties
and thirties looked forward to participate in this event. All the contestants were based in
Japan as entertainers but were professionals back home or graduates of prestigious
universities. According to the Filipina producer, the contest was a privilege for the gay
community to display their beauty and showcase their talents. The sponsors provided
the winner cash, giveaways, gift certificates, a round trip ticket to Manila and a trophy.
Moreover, the gay pageant was considered an exceptional wholesome entertainment and
was well-attended by mostly Filipino immigrants and Japanese. The audience each year
has increased, indicating the wider acceptance and recognition of the beauty of Filipino
gays, as well as their talent, charisma and appeal. She noted that the beauty pageant
itself presented a respectable and decent image of Filipino gays. Also, she shared her
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dream of organising such events because of her admiration and respect for gays and as a
result, the Miss Gay Yokohama pageant was her way of supporting the transgender and
transsexual community.
Post-production
Renewal of contract
Since their contract is only six months long, most transgenders or transsexuals either
renew their contract to work in Japan several times that can span an average of more
than fifteen years, or overstay in Japan as illegal immigrants, known as bilog. Working
and living as an entertainer in Japan has always given an edge or powerful stature to
transsexuals since they have money and experience living abroad. Furthermore,
transgenders or transsexuals, as one interviewee noted, are more mobile than female
entertainers, and can protect themselves. At the same time, they can easily adjust
without the anxiety of danger.
Meeting up transgender and transsexual entertainers in Japan is challenging
since they easily blend in and can “pass” as women. Fellow Filipinos indirectly share
information where these entertainers can be found because they try to protect those who
are overstaying and do not possess the legal documents needed to stay in Japan. The
illegal transgender and transsexual entertainers are in hiding or have completely
changed their identities to avoid being deported, thus leading to their “disappearance.”
The Filipino club managers themselves do not reveal the entertainers’ whereabouts so
they can continue to run their businesses. Their existence as Filipino overseas workers
and even their true sexual identity becomes null. Therefore, “pretending” to be women
and legal in a foreign country is their “performance” in itself. Irresponsible actions of
foreigners such as overstaying and marrying Japanese men with fake documents have
led the Japanese immigration to become stricter with entertainment visa holders since
2005. However, one respondent argued that the reason why Japanese immigration has
limited the release of entertainers’ visas was the dwindling situation of the Japanese
economy.
After saving money from working in Japan, some transgender entertainers have
chosen to spend it on sexual reassignment surgery in either Japan or Thailand, where
they are known to be more reliable and much more reasonable. Before the procedure,
the patient has to pass a string of psychological tests. In Thailand, the complete
reassignment surgery package done by the best medical doctors including cosmetic
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surgery may cost about US$11,500.
The three generations
The three groups of Filipino transgender and transsexual entertainers are divided into
the following periods: the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. Although the import of
entertainers began in the 1970s, the growth in the number of entertainers was more
apparent in the 1980s. According to the respondents of the 1980s group, the system
varies from the recent years in terms of professionalism, skills, and visa sponsorship.
The entertainers in the 1980s group, who mostly came from upper middle class
backgrounds, had stronger ties and friendships among themselves and continued to do
so until they returned home. In contrast to the subsequent decades, there was more
conflict and rivalry among colleagues, who aspired to become the favourites of the
clients or were confronted with issues regarding to love and relationships. In addition,
there have been unreported cases of suicide, drug addiction, and unprecedented changes
of identity and personality due of misguidance and a lack of self-management. A
respondent emphasised that everything was rooted in a person’s upbringing and
background. Regardless of being in the Philippines or overseas, how they manage
themselves is a reflection of the integrity and values influenced by their environment,
social class, and education. Most entertainers grew up in middle class families from
Tondo or Pasig –downtown Manila– and have either finished high school or completed
a college or even a postgraduate degree. As a middle-aged entertainer observed,
compared to the youth of the olden days, the youth of today have parents who are more
lenient and have more freedom to explore globally through the convenience of internet
access.
After the final curtain call
Entertainers whose contracts have ended and are returning to their home countries, tend
relive the lives they left behind before their experiences in Japan. Some of them
continue to pursue a career in the entertainment business as cross dressers or
choreographers; start up their own business such as a beauty salon; go back to school
for further studies and so on. But whatever they choose to do and the paths they take,
they have nurtured the lessons they learnt from living in Japan, for example maintaining
professionalism and excellence in everything they do, being punctual, maintaining
cleanliness and orderliness in their surroundings – the Japanese traits they have been
202
accustomed to – hence, they take pride in their “reappearance” in the Philippines. For
those who stayed in Japan for many years and decided to come back, it is difficult not to
compare the system of a developing country to that of a first world country, and it is
also difficult to adjust to the Filipino lifestyle. Since these balikbayans or returning
Filipinos have had a first-hand experience of how other countries’ systems work, they
feel they have more to contribute to Philippine society by venturing to adapt what they
have learnt overseas – work professionalism, good citizenship, good manners and
always trying one’s best.
If these Filipino transgenders and transsexuals would be given another chance to
return to Japan, they would opt to go back in a heartbeat even as non-entertainers. The
increasing unanimous response is because they have become accustomed to the safety
and easy going lifestyle, culture, and the people. Even though there have been reported
cases of suicide or drug addiction among Filipino entertainers in Japan, all the
interviewees in this study are grateful for their memorable time in Japan and have
avoided any references to any unpleasant experiences they may have had in that country.
Conclusion
Being able to pass for a female is related to the entertainers’ physical image from an
expert application of make-up and wearing the appropriate clothes. However, there is an
emotional or psychological aspect as well. Once they have attained a realistic acceptable
external image, they will build an internal one and believe they will pass for women.
Confidence happens gradually and by placing themselves in controlled situations, they
will achieve their goal of passing for women. Although some entertainers have
successfully undergone complete sexual reassignment surgery and stayed in Japan, the
rest, who are concerned with the long-term biological and psychological side effects of
the procedure, are content with their extraordinary work experience in Japan and resume
their lives as gays in the Philippines.
With these two types of entertainers in mind, and while Philippine society is
aware of the visibility of this preferred sexual orientation, it does not completely
provide the legal rights to support and protect them due to its conservative social norms
and religious beliefs, which can be a barrier to liberation. Furthermore, gay relationships
will never be similar to heterosexual relationships with the blessings of church and
society. As a result, these transgenders or transsexuals, who have the opportunity to
migrate to foreign countries where they can be legally accepted, tend to leave their
homeland once more to start all over again. On a more positive note, however, there are
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existing and emerging Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) non-governmental
organisations such as STRAP (the Society of Transsexual Women of the Philippines),
the Gay Movement for Human Rights in the Philippines (GAHUM), that continues to
address and support the issues concerning this community.
Diasporic people are faced with the challenge of developing multiple
relationships with their homeland and new land of settlement. As Manalansan (2003)
points out, they are in fact positioning and repositioning themselves depending on the
types of affinities and exclusions they encounter in daily life. Although the Filipino
transgender and transsexual entertainers may seem to have no indirect prejudice from
the Japanese, their visa status and occupation are still marginalised in terms of gender
and race if they intend to reside longer or even permanently in Japan. Sadly, this is not
only apparent during their stay in Japan but also in their country of birth. Similar to
other Filipino gay immigrants as identified by Manalansan, the Filipino transgender and
transsexual entertainers’ experiences and discourses in Japan do not construct a coherent
monolithic self but instead, a configuration of possible shifts is construed according to
their circumstances. While they may subconsciously represent queer liberation, they are
not victims of oppression. Rather, they represent queer subjects engulfed in challenges
that vary between survival and loss.
Although transgenders and transsexuals are visible in the media and in beauty
pageants, most Filipinos lack of education about transgenders and transsexuals. Not all
transgenders and transsexuals go to Thailand or Japan, but due to the lack of
opportunities, many talented and creative transgenders choose to become entertainers.
There is a possibility that they have become entertainers by accident because they
cannot be hired in their job of choice. And even if there are certain organisations that
support overseas migrant workers, their support does not encompass the protection or
the articulation of transgender and transsexual voices due to the moral and gender
ideology of Filipino society. Nevertheless, Japan is perceived as a unique haven for
transgenders and transsexuals to both live and professionally work in, but mostly as
entertainers, that are not obviously common practices in the Philippines. Besides the
Japanese admiration for Filipinos entertainers’ innate beauty, confidence, talent and
personality, the exceptional appeal of transgender or transsexual entertainers in Japan is
partially the result of the traditional Noh and Kabuki theatres that may be interpreted as
a combination of interplayed performance of both femininity and masculinity in
Japanese culture. Hence, the Filipino transgender and transsexual entertainers find Japan,
where gender ambivalence is manifested, as a land of promise and is a proper space
where they can blend in and articulate their sexual identity. Still, there is a need to
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reflect on the transgenders’ and transsexuals’ beliefs in their type of work in a foreign
country, their performances onstage and offstage that are not merely for entertainment
or gender liberation, but rather is a process of professional growth and perhaps a lifechanging experience both in mind and body as the transpinay that they are: a viable
identity in and of itself.
References
Buchthal, S., Levin, C., & Heymann, T. (Producers), Heymann, T. (Director). (2006).
Paper dolls. [Motion picture]. United States: Strand Releasing.
Manalansan IV, M. F. (2003). Global divas: Filipino gay men in the diaspora. US: Duke
University Press.
Namaste, K. (1996). Tragic misreadings: Queer theory’s erasure of transgender
subjectivity. In B. Beemyn & M. Edison (Eds.), Queer studies: A lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender anthology. New York: New York University Press.
Parreñas, R. S. (2008). The force of domesticity: Filipina migrants and globalization.
New York: New York University Press.
Robertson, J. (1998). Takarazuka: Sexual politics and popular culture in modern Japan.
California: University of California Press.
Transpinay. (2009, November 30). I-Witness. Manila: GMA Network.
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近代朝鮮の女性に付与された新しい名前―「新女性」
（「新女性」というディスコース誕生の背景とその意味に関する考察）
By Lee Jung Eun
Hitotsubashi University
【要旨】
本研究では、時代を三つに分けて「新女性」というディスコースを分析した。第一期は
1900 年代前後で、儒教知識人によって‘新しい女性’が提示されたのである。弟二期は
1910 年代前後で、女性自ら新たな思想と文物に接して直々に社会進出を挑んだのである。
弟三期は 1920 年代の頃で、「新女性」という言葉が印刷媒体と結びあって言葉も性格も
変わったことである。以上の分析から、‘新しい女性’は「新女性」が登場するようなき
っかけを、「新女性」は女性の社会進出を、そして、最後は消費・大衆文化と結びあって
ゴシップの対象になったことがわかった。しかし、本当の「新女性」とは、女性が人間と
して自覚していくのだと考えられる。
Keyword:「新女性」、‘新しい女性’、‘モダンガール’、儒教知識人、社会進出、印刷
媒体
１．はじめに
現在、韓国では 1920～30 年代の「新女性」研究が盛んである。 104 「新女性」研究は
104イ・ベヨン（2000）
「植民地期＜新女性＞の歴史的な性格：新聞と雑誌を中心に」
、韓国精神文化研究
員韓日国際シンポジウム。イ・ジョンウォン（1983）
「植民地朝鮮の＜新女性＞の役割の悩みに関する
研究‐1920 年代を中心に‐」
、韓国精神文化研究員韓国学大学院。キム・ミヨン（2003）
「1920 年代の
女性ディスコース形成に関する研究：新女性の主体形成の過程を中心に」、ソウル大学大学院博士論文。
イ・ソヨン（2002）
「植民地時期の女性雑誌研究‐1920~1930 年代を中心に‐」
、梨花女子大学大学院修
士論文。イ・ユンヒ（2007）
「韓国近代女性雑誌の表紙を通してみた女性イメージ‐『新女性』と『女
性』を中心に‐」梨花女子大学院修士論文。イ・オクジン（1980）
「女性雑誌を通してみた女権伸長‐
1906 年から 1929 年までを中心に‐」
、梨花女性大学大学院修士論文。イ・オクソク（1996）
「韓国近代
女性史に関する研究史」
、西江大学敎育大学院修士論文。
206
1970 年半ばまでは逸脱、虚栄、奢侈などのネガティヴなイメージと結び付けられており、
せいぜいジェンダー史のなかで言及されるだけで、まともな研究対象として取り上げるこ
と自体がタブー視されていた。105それが、1980 年代に入ってようやく学問研究の対象とし
て認知されたが、実際に研究が量的に増えたのは 1990 年代の後半である。当時、「新女
性」の生と思想、特に、伝統への挑戦と見なされた自由恋愛・自由結婚、「新女性」が体
現した近代性、日韓「新女性」の比較など、様々な研究テーマが出始め、最近では植民
地・家父長制・近代化・フェミニズムなどと関連づけて再検討されるまでになってきた。
これらの研究は確かに「新女性」の社会的位置、役割、生活像を眺望する重要なきっかけ
を提供していると考えられる。にもかかわらず、従来の研究アプローチは、「新女性」の
定義・意味深く掘り下げることを困難にしていると考えられる。というのは、先行研究の
ほとんどにおいて、当時の文化コードの象徴とみなされていた「新女性」とは中等教育を
受けた女性のことであるという前提を置いているからである。新知識が女性を近代に目覚
めさせたのは確かである。しかし、そのような前提は「新女性」＝「新しい教育を受けた
女性」という結論に落ちつくという限界の問題が生じってしまう。特に、個人の女性解放
を重視しすぎて（羅蕙錫、金一葉など）、同じような内容の研究が繰り返される傾向があ
り、民族性や階級制の検討の欠如が見られがちだ。即ち、当時の朝鮮女性の意識と生活態
度の変化についての包括的アプローチがなければ「新女性」が持つ意味を探るには限界が
あり、それ故、先行研究が 1920～30 年代に偏ってしまい、1920 年代以前の近代女性研究
が軽視されてしまったのである。もちろん、1920 年代からの「新女性」が強力な時代的シ
ンボルになったことは明らかである。それを検証するためには彼女たちを出現させた前時
代の社会と女性たちにも注目すべきである。
本研究では、従って「新女性」というディスコースを新たに考え、定義するため 1920
年以前、即ち 1900 年代から「新女性」が一つの時代的現象として、新たな社会勢力とし
て現れた理由を時代の変化に沿って分析する。本研究は時代を 3 つに分け「新女性」とい
う言葉が持つ意味がどのように変化してきたか、さらに「新女性」がどのように定義され
るべきかを考察することを目的とする。
２．「新女性」という言葉の登場
朝鮮で「新女性」という言葉が本格的に登場した時期は、1920 年からだとされて
いる 106。 何故なら、 その時期 に海外留学し ていた女 性たちが帰国 して活発 に活動し
始めたからである。しかし、実際は 1920 年代ではなく、それ以前からすでに東京
に留学して様々な女性運動や女性の社会進出に接した女子留学生たちが朝鮮に戻っ
105
井上和枝（2010 年 2 月 17 日）東京大学 2009 年度第 3 回コリア・コロキュアム「朝鮮の「新女性」－
その希求と「挫折」
」
、鹿児島国際大学。
106
金炅一（2004）
、
『女性の近代、近代の女性』
、プルン歴史
207
て新たな時代を準備していたのだ。 107彼女たちの留学期間であった 1910 年代は、ち
ょうど日本でも新しい女性論が流行した時期である。坪内逍遥 108が 1912 年大阪教育
会で‘新しい女性’というタイトルで講演をした時からすでに‘新しい女’という
言葉が流行し始めていた。 109その後、平塚らいてうが発行した『青鞜』（1911 年発
刊）を通じて本格的な新女性論が続々と現われ始め、「新女性」論争に火をつけたの
である。ちょうどその頃、日本で新しい女性論に接した朝鮮の女子留学生たちが
「新女性」、あるいは‘新女子’という非常に衝撃的な文化コードを朝鮮社会に持ち
込み、既存の家父長制下で女性本来のアイデンティティを失って生きていた朝鮮女
性たちに意識変革を触発させるきっかけを作り、「新女性」という言葉を朝鮮社会に
流行らせた。さらに、19 世紀後半、朝鮮の開港（1876 年）とともに朝鮮社会に流
入し た多様な近代 文物と思 想 110に接した女 性たちが いた。伝統的 な朝鮮の 家族制度
は、家父長制下で男性が強力な権限を持ち、家族を支配・統率することが基本であ
る。この徹底的な男性中心主義の伝統に抑えつけられ ていた女性たちの中で、新た
な思想と文物に接した一部女性たちが、留学せずとも、女性としての自我意識に目
覚め始めていたのである。当時の人々はこのような女性たちを「新女性」と呼びな
がら、家父長制に抑えつけられていて暮している女性（いわゆる「旧女性」）たちと
区別していたのである。
３．1900 年代に現れた新しい女性像と「新女性」
1910 年代、女子留学生たちが女性像に関する思想的な新しさや朝鮮社会に新文化
（商品、生活様式、ファッション、流行など）をもたらし社会に大きな反響を呼び
起こ した 111のは確か である。 しかし、 それ だけで「 新女性」とい うディス コースが
登場したと語るのは難しい。さらに遡って 1900 年前後の朝鮮の状況を考えてみる
べきだと考えられる。当時が朝鮮社会において西洋と日本から近代文物を受け入れ
ながら近代国家としての認識が広がった近代啓蒙期だったからだ。 112キリスト教の受
容、東学の人間平等思想、開化期女性解放思想などによる啓蒙の熱気が高まっていたた
め、女性たちが近代に目覚め始めたと考えられる。しかし、そのような動きは女性自身
が主体になったもの ではなかった。「新女性」というディスコースは儒教知識人である
107
1910 年に留学生数、総 420 名のうち、女学生数 34 名（8.1%）
、
『在本邦清韓両国留学生員数表』
、
（1910）
108
坪内 逍遥（つぼうち しょうよう、旧字体：坪內逍遙、1859 年 6 月 22 日（安政 6 年 5 月 22 日）- 1935
年（昭和 10 年）2 月 28 日）は主に明治時代に活躍した日本の小説家、評論家、翻訳家、劇作家。
（wikipedia 人物検索により。
）
109
村上信彦（1972）、
「日本の婦人問題」
、岩波新書 62、p28
110
キリスト教宣教師が建てた学校に通ったり翻訳された朝鮮の国漢文版の本を読んだりするなどの個人的
な活動。
111
パク・ソンミ（2007）
、
『近代女性帝国を渡り、朝鮮に回遊する』
、チャンビ
112
国号が大韓帝国に変更された時期。1897 年 10 月～1910 年 8 月 22 日。
208
男性によって提示されたのだ。19 世紀、朝鮮の開港とともに進んできた近代化過程の中で
も朝鮮の家族や社会は徹底的に男性中心主義であった。家父長制、女性蔑視などの伝統に
抑えつけられた女性たちの中で、新たな思想と文物に接した一部女性たちが自己意識に目
覚め始めたとしても容易に社会進出することは不可能であった。当時、女性に関するディ
スコースの形成主体は従って女性ではなく男性だった考えられる。彼らは朝鮮の開化期的
雰囲気をいち早く見極めた開化派知識人113であり、女性を近代へ目覚めさせる先頭に立っ
ていた。彼らは日本や西欧に留学した経験を生かし新たな近代文物を受け入れようとする
積極性を見せていた。近代市民社会を作ろうとした彼らは女性の権利・男女平等を主張し
ながら、家父長制的家族経営、早婚制度、畜妾制度、妓生制度、内外法などの廃止を訴え、
特に女性に男性と等しく教育を受けさせるべきだと強調した。このような活動は当時の印
刷媒体、『独立新聞』と『大韓毎日申報』を通じて行なわれていた。徐載弼によって創刊
された『独立新聞』には、彼を含め、多数の開化派知識人たちの文章が掲載されていたか
ら、女性の近代意識形成に大きく貢献したと考えられる。114彼らは新聞を読んだ男性が女
性に対する差別に目覚め、女性を家の外に出させるようにしむけた。当時まだ「新女性」
という言葉は登場していなかったが、彼らによって提案された新しい女性像は「新女性」
を生み出す土台になったと判断できる。もう一つ、1904 年 イ ギ リ ス 人 裵 說 （ Ernes
Thomas Bethell)が創刊した『大韓毎日申報』は 1907 年までは 6,000~7,000 部の
発行に過ぎなかったが、1908 年からは 1 万部以上発行される民族紙として最も影響
力ある朝鮮の代表的な言論となった。そのため、『大韓毎日申報』は新しい文物に接
し始めた朝鮮の男女にとって、新しい女性像を学び、奇抜な女性像に慣れ親しむ
「学習の場」になったとも考えられる。
その後、女性読者向けの『家庭雑誌』（1906 年創刊）、『女子指南』（1908 年創刊）など
の雑誌が創刊された。このように男性たちが女性たちに進歩的意識を注入しようとした目
的は国家を文明化し、女性を国民化することにあった。新しい女性たちは男性、儒教知識
人・読者によって指導され、近代に目覚めた結果、1910 年代に至って幅広く一般女性に
新しい女性像が拡がったと考えられる。
4．1910 年代の女性と「新女性」
男性によって提案された前時代とは異なり 1910 年代以降は自ら新たな思想と文物に接
した女性たちが直接社会進出に挑んだ。彼女たちは二つの部類に分けられる。一つはすで
に、1900 年代から 1910 年代にかけて日本に留学し、多様な女性運動や女性の社会進出を
113
이상재(李商在 1850~1927),유길준(兪吉濬 1856~1914),서재필(徐載弼 1864~1951),윤치호（尹致昊
1865~1945) など。
114
‘我々は何度も朝鮮の女性の地位向上について訴えてきた。今時、朝鮮の女性に必要なのは教育だ。し
かし、教育を受ける機会がない。女性に対する無関心と疎かは東洋の特徴だ。東洋より優れている西洋で
あるヨーロッパとアメリカの特徴は彼らのお母さん、家内、お姉さん、娘を常に考えていて、彼女らに兄
弟や息子と全く同じ機会を与えることである。
’‐1896 年 9 月 7 日 71 号『独立新聞』
209
目の当たりにした女子女学生たちだ。女子学校卒業後、上級学校進学を目指した女学生た
ちの一部は、留学の道を選択した。留学先は日本が圧倒的多数にのぼり、特に 1910 年の
植民地化以後はさらに増加の一途をたどった。日本で専門知識を学び、体験的に西欧文化
に出会った彼女たちは朝鮮の現実と比較し、朝鮮の旧来の社会や思想を改造すべき対象と
みなした。彼女たちは帰国後、当時はなかった女性像を提示しながら新しい時代の到来を
待っていたのだ。その時現れた有名な人物が羅恵錫、金一葉、金明淳、朴エスタ、金活蘭
たちだ。現在韓国で行われている「新女性」研究はほとんどがこの時代から出発している。
もう一つは「新女性」という名の下で、身分115的な囲いを脱皮した女性たち、言わば平
民116、妓生たちである。彼女たちは近代社会の到来とともに、新しい身分に生まれ変わり、
名字を持つことが可能となった朝鮮社会でもう一つの新女性像として現出した。彼女たち
は前者のように新しい教育を受けて「新女性」になったというよりは、外見の変化と共に
堅固な自我意識を持ち始めたと考えられる。特に外見の変化は、人々が服装によって妓生
と女学生を区別することができなくなったため、衣服によって社会的階級や地位が表示さ
れないという結果をもたらした。当時ほとんどの一般女性（平民、妓生を含め）とヤ
ンバンと言われる地主階級の婦人たちは朝鮮の伝統的な服装であるチマチョゴリと
いう韓服を着ていた。しかし、韓服のスカートであるチマは自由に歩けないほど長
かったし、チョゴリは胸が見えるほど短かったので、非常に不便なものだった。こ
れを 脱ごうとする 人間的な 衝動 117に従った 女性と、 韓服によって 表れる身 分の露出
をさけようとする意識が強かった女性とが新しい衣服を選びなおしたのである。断
髪の場合も美しさを表すというよりは、女性たちが伝統的束縛から離れる一つの象
徴的行為だった。 118彼女たちは自ら学習し、そのような行動を行うことで「新女性」
へと生まれ変わるきっかけを作りだしていた。ひとりひとりの女性個人の次元で近代
性がどのように経験されたか、どのように解釈されたかを明らかにするのは難しいかもし
れないが、社会全体の傾向として見ると、この時期の「新女性」は覚醒した女性たちが近
代と出会い、近代的職業に就いて社会的な人格として浮上したと考えられる。
５．1920 年代の大衆文化と「新女性」
1920 年代以降、このように一般女性たちにまで新しい女性像が幅広く拡がった理
由は何故かについて考えてみたい。それは、女性教育にもよるが、大衆文化の役割
が非常に大きかったことにもよると考えられる。前時代までの印刷媒体は新しい女性
像を提案し、女性を目覚めさせる役割を果たしたが、その大衆化までには至らなかった。
115
本研究では個人の社会的地位の意味を身分という言葉を使う。
官職を持たなかった一般の人を言う。百民、平人。
117
研究空間スユウノモ近代媒体研究チーム（2007）
、
『新女性-媒体から見た近代女性風俗史』
、ハンギョレ
新聞社
118
断髪は現社会を否認し、それに伴う風俗や習慣、道徳、法律を否認する現代像の一つ。許貞淑（1925 年
10 月）、
「私の断髪と断髪前後」、雑誌『新女性』
。しかし、断髪を最初したのは妓生康明花である。
116
210
1920 年代以前の朝鮮は日本総督府による武断政治期にあって、朝鮮人 が発行する新
聞、雑誌の多くが廃刊されていたため、新情報の習得には限界があった。しかし、
1919 年の 3・1 運動以後、日本総督府は武断統治から文化統治への変換を行なって
様々な印刷媒体 119の創刊を許可した。様々な印刷媒体の登場によって「新女性」の基準
が大きく拡散されていった。120当時から現在に至るまで「新女性」の概念と範囲を巡る多
様な議論が行なわれているのも「新女性」が大衆化された印刷媒体と結びあって創られた
ものだと考えられるからだ。大衆文化と共に「新女性」はもはや個人の出現、個人の逸脱
事例ではなく、一つの時代現象として人々の目に映るようになったのである。そのための
言葉が後に‘モダンガール’となって定着する。人々は西欧的価値観や社会主義的思想の
影響を受けた知識人としての「新女性」と、都市生活者のパターンを最初に形成した「新
女性」とを、
‘モダンガール’という時代的表象の一つとして捉えたのである。‘モダンガ
ール’は家父長制位階秩序と大衆文化という枠を通して近代社会の新たな文化主体に転換
され、余暇と消費を味わい、資本主義の拡大と都市化を通じて新しい消費主体を形成する
ようになった。121それを煽ったのが印刷媒体である。
‘モダンガール’は、西洋人のような
大きな目、高い鼻、スリムな体など西洋女性の美を見せながら新たな美学を作り出すこと
で、人々に近代的女性像を学習する場を提供し、消費を促進する役割を果たしたと考えら
れる。したがって、「新女性」は近代の主体として自らを構成していった。さらに、この
時代には映画も登場する。映画女優は、今まで憧れのモデルがなかった朝鮮女性に積極的
に受け入れられるようになり、新たな社会現象を引き起こした。例えば、1919 年、韓国人
が作った最初の韓国映画『義理的仇闘』122では金泳徳123という女性が登場するが、この映
画の彼女の庇髪と着物姿は人々の注目を浴び、庇髪の流行に拍車をかけた。その後、韓国
で最初の女優といわれる李月華が登場した時は、彼女の髪型、化粧法、衣装、そして私生
活に至るまで雑誌に連日掲載された 124 。彼女のように世間の注目を浴びる女優の登場は
「新女性」の生活を代弁し、朝鮮の女性たちの意識変化及び消費認識に大きな影響を与え
たのだ。また、洋服のみならず、断髪、靴、メガネなどは、もはや新女性の象徴として購
買意欲を刺激した。映画の目的は映像内容の伝達と興行であるが、結果的に当時の女性の
119
新 聞 と して は 『朝 鮮 日報 』、『 東 亜 日報 』 など 、 雑誌 とし て は 『新 女 子』、『 新女 性』 な ど があ る。
『新女性』1925 年 5 月号－「この頃、新女性という言葉が流行しているが、今日朝鮮社会で新女性とい
う名をこうだと言うのは難しい。時代から考えると年齢が基準になり、服装から考えると芸者、婦人、
妾、学生、女優が基準になるだろう。また、知識程度から考えると中等程度やそれ以上の知力を持つ人
ならだれでも新女性になる資格があるだろう。
」と新女性の定義の難しさが書かれている。
121
『新家庭』
、
「新女性の長所と短所」
、
（1935 年 9 月）－「新女性」は新聞、雑誌を読める、ピアノを弾け
る、詞と小説を書く、新派演劇ができる、活動写真に趣味を持つ、流行歌を歌える、都市に行ったり来
たりするか住む、外国語が話せる、女性解放を主張し、男性以上の良い職業を持つことが可能だ。
122
『義理的仇闘』は舞台で演劇を公演しながら舞台で表現できなかった所だけフィルムで撮って上映した
Kino-Drama である。再婚して義理のお母さんになった人から家門の誉れと財産を取り戻そうとする先
妻の息子との間の争いを画いた映画である。
（ちなみに、韓国では 1919 年 10 月 27 日『義理的仇闘』が
上映された日を映画の日と指定している。
）
123
『義理的仇闘』に登場する彼女は映画の女優としてより演劇人として認められていたため、最初の映画
女優として認められなかった。
124
キム・ナムソク、
『朝鮮の女優たち』
、国学資料院、2006 年、pp23～24
120
211
観客に新たな女性イメージを刻印したといえる。
6．結論
韓国において「新女性」のカテゴリーをどう扱うべきかという問題はそう単純で
はない。研究者の立場と時代によって「新女性」は‘ブルジョアの知識階層’、‘知
識女性の中で制度や因習に囚われない思考を持って社会的に行動する女性’、‘家父
長制に挑戦する女性’、‘新しい教育を受けた功利的な女性’、‘急進的自由主義の女
性’、‘社会主義の女性’、‘キリスト的啓蒙主義の女性’等々 にように様々に定義さ
れている。このように 1920 年代から登場し始めたと言われる「新女性」の様々な概念の
中で、すでに述べたように、最も一般的な定義は「中等以上の新しい教育を受けた女性」
である。しかし、これまで検討してきたことから明らかなことは、「新女性」とは単一の
実体ではなく、当時存在した様々な勢力との利害関係を反映したディスコースの効果とし
て構成されたものだということである。その観点からすると、「新女性」＝「教育を受け
た女生」とする等式はもはや成立し得ないと考えられる。
「新女性」というディスコースは時代によって変わってきたのは確かであるが、それは
女性の自我意識の確立がなければ成り立たないと考えられる。すでに述べたように、女性
個人の次元で近代がどのように経験されたか、どのように解釈されたかを明らかにするの
は難しい。しかし、｢新女性｣という社会的カテゴリーをひとつの切り口として考えるなら、
より具体的に問題に接近することができる。雑誌、新聞においては男性の視点から女性イ
メージが表出されていたので、「新女性」という概念の場合も、男性による女性の従属化
という側面が出てくる。しかし、その一方、自我意識に目覚めた女性たちも自分たちを
「新女性」として意識した。このように、「新女性」というイデオロギーがどのようにイ
メージ化されてきたのかに焦点を当てると、「新女性」という概念に多様な変化があった
ことが理解される。そして、｢新女性｣という概念が複雑なのは、男性から女性に投げかけ
られた視線と女性の主体化という矛盾する二つの側面があったからである。「新女性」の
一般的な定義は、上述したように、「新しい教育を受けた女性」である。しかし、1920 年
代半ばから教育を受ける女子学生が増えたため、もはや教育を受けた女性だけを「新女
性」と定義することはできなくなった。それは近代的な女性主体が作られる過程において、
「新女性」と呼ばれた女性たちの近代性の根拠とされたものは立場によって、時代によっ
て非常に相違するからだ。本研究では、しかし、近代への目覚めや新しい知識を基に自分
の存在価値、自我意識と女性としての自覚を持つに至った女性こそ「新女性」だと定義し
たい。
参考文献
井上和枝（2005）
「韓国「新女性」と「近代」の出会い」
、日韓歴史共同研究報告書、第 2
212
部日本の植民地支配と朝鮮社会、第 5 章植民支配と社会変化、日韓歴史共同研究委
員会
＿＿＿＿（2010）
「朝鮮の「新女性」－その希求と「挫折」」、東京大学 2009 年度第 3 回
コリア・コロキュアム
村上信彦（1972）
「日本の婦人問題」
、岩波新書 62、岩波新書
姜在彦（1996）
『朝鮮の儒教と近代』
、姜在彦著作選第 1 巻、明石書店
＿＿＿（1996）
『近代朝鮮の思想』
、姜在彦著作選第 5 巻、明石書店
イ・オクジン（1980）
「女性雑誌を通してみた女権伸長‐1906 年から 1929 年までを中心に
‐」
、梨花女性大学大学院修士論文
イ・オクソク（1996）
「韓国近代女性史に関する研究史」
、西江大学敎育大学院修士論文
イ・ジョンウォン（1983）
「植民地朝鮮の＜新女性＞の役割の悩みに関する研究‐1920 年
代を中心に‐」
、韓国精神文化研究員韓国学大学院
イ・ソヨン（2002）「植民地時期の女性雑誌研究‐1920~1930 年代を中心に‐」、梨花女
大学大学院修士論文
イ・ベヨン（2000）
「植民地期＜新女性＞の歴史的な性格：新聞と雑誌を中心に」
、韓国精
神文化研究員韓日国際シンポジウム。
イ・ユンヒ（2007）
「韓国近代女性雑誌の表紙を通してみた女性イメージ‐『新女性』と
『女性』を中心に‐」梨花女子大学院修士論文
金炅一（2004）
、
『女性の近代、近代の女性』
、プルン歴史
キム・ナムソク（2006）
、
『朝鮮の女優たち』
、国学資料院
キム・ミヨン（2003）
「1920 年代の女性ディスコース形成に関する研究：新女性の主体形
成の過程を中心に」
、ソウル大学大学院博士論文。
パク・ソンミ（2007）
、
『近代女性帝国を渡り、朝鮮に回遊する』
、チャンビ
『独立新聞』1896 年 5 月 16 日第 18 号、9 月 7 日第 71 号、11 月 17 日第 97 号
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213
城山三郎『素直な戦士たち』における次男・健次の中学受験期以降
――苛立つ思春期の実像――
By Mitsuhiro Tokunaga
Fukuoka Institute of Technology
【要旨】
城山三郎『素直な戦士たち』ではエリート教育の是非が問われているが、松沢家にあって、
徹底的な英才教育が施された長男・英一郎と放任主義で育てられた１歳年下の次男・健次
は対比的に描かれている。両者は幼少時には無難に棲み分けていたが、英一郎が中学生と
なって成績が思うように伸びなくなる頃、健次は成績を上げ出し、兄にとって恐るべき存
在となる。それでも、英一郎にばかり肩入れをする母親・千枝は何ら自らの行動を改めよ
うとはしないため、健次は苛立ちを強めていった。本稿では、そのような健次の中学受験
期から終局における心情を追うものである。
１．
兄との確執
健次は放任されてはいたが、両親の英一郎に対する接し方の影響を濃厚に受けていたと推
察される。その様子は、成長と共に明らかとなってくる。兄の後追いをするかのように R
進学スクールにも通い出し、
「ぼく、中学も絶対同じところへ入って見せる」（209 頁）と
公言して憚らないからである(1)。千枝や秋雄が R 進学スクールから、Z 中学・高等学校へ
と英一郎を進学させたがっている様子(2)を肌で感じ取っていた健次は、自らもそのレール
に乗りかかろうとする。もちろん、上位で Z 中学に合格した英一郎と合否ラインぎりぎり
でかろうじて入学できた健次とでは成績に雲泥の差がありはしたが、「健次の存在は、英
一郎にとって、両刃の剣であった」
（220 頁）はずである。例えば、合格祝いにドラムをね
だる健次に近所迷惑だからといって「千枝は健次にドラムをあきらめさせ、代りに、ステ
レオを英一郎と同じ高級品に買替えてやった」（220 頁）ことも、健次が目前に迫ってきて
いるという危機感を英一郎に自覚させたものと考えられる。千枝は露骨な英一郎へのひい
きを貫こうとし、「健次は、あなたのライバルでも何でもないわ。だいいち、席次だって、
えらいちがいでしょ。それに、健次をやっつけたければ、あなたがもっとがんばればいい
のよ。勉強量でぐんぐん差をつけるのよ」（220 頁）と言ってのける。けれども、このよう
214
な励まし方は、英一郎が健次に学業面で勝ち続けることを強いる強迫性を帯びていた。も
し、英一郎が学業に伸び悩むようになったならば、または健次が成績を上げていったなら
ば、英一郎の面子は潰れてしまう。一方、健次は自らの業績が正当に評価されないという
ことで、いよいよ屈折を余儀なくされていくはずなのである。
健次は中学入学時こそ、英一郎とは比較にならない程、振るわない成績であったが、英一
郎が中学 3 年生 2 学期に 152 位まで成績を下げてくる（227 頁）のに合わせたかのように
「それまで二〇〇番台だった二年生の健次が、どういう風の吹き回しか、一八七位になっ
た」
（227 頁）という。健次が「得意になった」（227 頁）のも無理はない。彼は、
「いった
い、兄貴はどうしたんだよ。ぼくと変わらなくなったじゃないか」（227 頁）と挑発するか
のようにして兄に迫るのである。そこには、健次が積年にわたって持っていた怨恨が滲み
出ていると解釈できる。千枝や秋雄による保護を一手に受けて育った兄は、健次にとって
最大のライバルであった。同じ家の下に生まれ育ったにもかかわらず、なぜこうまで違っ
た扱いを受けなければならないのか。健次の苛立ちは増幅し、自らの意志で考える力を持
った頃、決定的に顕在化するのである。
健次の屈折を象徴的に表すのが、英一郎に対する呼び方の変化である。「健次は、英一
郎を「兄貴」と呼ぶようになった。親しみからではない。英一郎にほぼ追いついたという
気持があり、母親を「おい」と呼ぶ英一郎への反撥もあった」（227 頁）というのが、その
理由であった。健次は、
「兄貴を兄貴と呼んで、どこがわるい」（227 頁）と言い張り、千
枝が制止しようとすると、「いやだ、絶対にいやだ。だって、お兄、いや兄貴は、ママの
ことを何と呼んでいる。あれが礼儀かい」（227 頁）と突っぱねる。確かに考えてみれば、
健次の言う通りなのであった。英一郎は千枝を「おい」と呼ぶようになり、千枝はおろお
ろしながらその指図に従っている状態がその時には出来上がりつつあったのである。健次
はその状態を正確に見抜いており、「兄貴ばかり甘やかして。まるで、ママは兄貴の召使
いじゃないか」
（228 頁）と千枝に迫る。けれども、千枝が「甘やかしているのではありま
せん。英一郎の勉強量を少しでもふやしてやりたい。ただそれだけです」
（228 頁）といっ
て英一郎擁護の姿勢を固持しようとするので、「それなら、ぼくのためにだって……」
（228 頁）
、
「どうせ、ぼくなんか……」
（229 頁）と言って「うらめしそうな目で秋雄たち
を見」（229 頁）ない訳にはいかなくなるのである。その直後、「たまりかねたように、健
次は急に高い声を上げ」
（229 頁）
、
「いいんだよ、ぼくは。いつか、思いきったことをやっ
てやるから」
（229 頁）と「拳をかため、片方の掌を音を立てて突く」（229 頁）のであっ
た。
あまりにも違う扱い。兄への過保護と自らへの放任。いや、千枝の健次に対する感情は、
放任を通り越して、憎悪にまで至っていると解釈することもできよう。両親への愛情に飢
え、兄ばかりが溺愛される状況に耐えかねている健次に焦点を当てるならば、英一郎・千
枝連合軍に挑戦状を叩き付けざるを得ないのが健次の胸中なのではなかったか。
その後、古川が自殺した際の事、健次は「古川さんも、死んでしまったんじゃ、何にも
215
ならないなぁ。まだルンペンになればよかった」
（233 頁）と言って英一郎を挑発する。健
次は続けて「わかってるよ、ママ。ぼく、絶対、自殺しないから」（234 頁）と言い、英一
郎も「ぼくもしないよ」
（234 頁）と続けてはいる。千枝は「洋々たる前途が、つい、その
先まで来てるんですもの」
（234 頁）と言って、とりわけ英一郎にやる気を起こさせようと
するのであるが、英一郎が「その先」をしつこく問い詰めるので、健次は「わからんだろ
う。いったい、どの先なんだろうな」（235 頁）と答えると共に、「兄貴、少しおかしくな
ったんじゃないの」
（235 頁）と「頭の脇で、指で渦巻をつくりながらいった」（235 頁）
のであった。実際に、英一郎は精神に異常を来たしていたのである。その様子を健次は正
確に見抜いていた。
２．
兄を凌駕した現実
神経科に入院することになった英一郎に対し、健次は「いいなぁ、兄貴は期末試験を受
けずにすむんだから」
（236 頁）と言い、千枝が「試験をしなければ、成績が落ちるんです
よ」
（236 頁）と注意すると、
「でも、安心して落ちれるんだ」（236 頁）と言って、「一向、
兄に同情しない」
（236 頁）のであった。千枝は「健次が挑戦的でしょ」（238 頁）と秋雄
に漏らし、
「二人を隔離」
（238 頁）する狙いが英一郎入院の目的の一つであると漏らす。
健次はここでも徹底的に冷遇視されるが、秋雄と千枝による会話を「健次は、襖に耳を当
て、盗み聞きし」
（238 頁）
、
「紙のように白くなった頬にそばかすを浮き立たせ、盗聴し続
けた」
（239 頁）のであった。その結果、健次は両親が自らを邪魔者視している事実を受け
入れざるを得なくなる。
「英一郎の入院後、健次は以前にまさって生き生きし」（242 頁）
、「気がねせずに、友人
たちと電話でおしゃべりし、ガール・フレンドと延々と話し合う」（242 頁）が、「勉強の
能率の落ちる様子もなかった」
（242 頁）のである。秋雄が入院中の英一郎を見舞いに行っ
た際、看護婦達は「弟が一度だけ来たわね」
（243 頁）、「腕白小僧みたいな威勢のいい子ね。
何だか病人とやり合ったらしいわ」
（243 頁）と話していた。健次が病院を訪れた事実は秋
雄にとって衝撃的であったが、その時に英一郎と喧嘩腰になった様子は秋雄には十分想像
できたと考えられる。健次は、英一郎入院という判断自体が兄弟隔離の意味を持っている
ことを身に染みて千枝から知らされているし、英一郎入院後の健次は一層溌剌としている
様子が手に取るように理解できていたからである。
「秋雄は、重い足どりで病院を出」（244 頁）ると、「盆おどりの音がきこえ」（244 頁）、
「浴衣姿の女の子を誘い、踊りから脱けようとする若者の姿が、健次に似て」（245 頁）見
えたのだった。この場面では、飽くまでも若者が健次に似ていたとしか描かれてはいない。
しかしながら、健次であったとしても、決しておかしくはない状況であった。健次はガー
ル・フレンドとも電話で長々と話し合う関係にあったからである。それでも、兄に肉薄す
るだけの成績を収めるのであるから、健次の才能には本来ならば瞠目しなければならない
216
はずである。事実、「壁には、年表や数式が貼られ、本棚には、参考書がきちんと分類さ
れ」
（245 頁）
「数種の受験雑誌も並び、他には音楽雑誌が一冊だけ」
（245 頁）の「英一郎
の部屋」
（245 頁）と、健次の勉強部屋は対照的であった。「健次の部屋は雑然としていた」
（246 頁）が、具体的には「床には、テープや週刊誌、ノートなどが散乱し、ロック・グ
ループの写真やポスターが、壁だけでなく、天井にも貼ってある。本棚は小さく、参考書
類は、英一郎の一割ほどしかない。小説や旅行記、人生論の本。音楽雑誌。モーター・ス
ポーツの雑誌。マンガもあれば、男のためのファッション雑誌もある。机の上に計画表ら
しいものはなく、ノートが三冊投げ出された上に、英語の参考書と若者向きのエッセイ集
が、いずれもページを開けたまま伏せてある」（246 頁）といった具合なのであった。とす
ると、勉強一筋で Z 中学での成績に頭打ちが生じ、喘いでいる英一郎とは異なり、様々な
知識を勉強以外にも貪欲に吸収し、多くの友人とも交わりながら成長を遂げている健次は、
本来ならば褒められなければなるまい。放任されてきた彼は、別に誰から干渉されるわけ
でもなく、自らの知的好奇心のままに様々なジャンルの本や雑誌を読み漁ってきたはずな
のである。それでも、成績が英一郎に肉薄してきたのだから、その素質には目を見張るも
のがあったと見るべきであろう。
引っ越しの話に及ぶや、千枝は「英一郎ひとりだと、きっと、健次が立ち寄るわ」（246
頁）
、
「たちまち健次が乱入します」
（249 頁）と断定し、そのような事態を阻止すべく、自
らが英一郎を守ってやらなければならないと主張する。だが、そんなことを今更強調した
ところで、解決の糸口が見いだせるという訳ではなかったのである。英一郎が退院し、自
宅に戻ると、「健次の電話で話す声。それも、ときどき、長電話になる。千枝が注意した
り、ときに、とりつがなかったりすると、健次は物凄い見幕で食ってかかる」（247 頁）よ
うになっていた。健次の長電話には、千枝や英一郎への当てつけという意図もあったと解
釈できる。「どうせ、おれは悪者なんだろ。悪者らしくさせてくれたって、いいじゃない
か」
（247 頁）というのが健次の主張であった。健次は千枝の愛情が自分には注がれない事
実を既に聞き知ってしまっていた。だからこそ、英一郎が「うるさいぞ、健次！」（247
頁）と言って受話器を「たたきつけるように切る」（248 頁）と「何をする！」（248 頁）
と言って「健次は英一郎の胸ぐらをつかんでゆさぶる」
（248 頁）までに激するのであった。
英一郎が自らに喧嘩を仕掛けてくるように健次は計算して長電話をしていたとしても決し
て不思議ではあるまい。一方、英一郎は健次の仕掛けた罠に見事にはまってしまっていた
と見なしてよい。
「体力のない英一郎はよろめいて、壁にぶつかる」（248 頁）ので「健次、
いいかげんになさい」
（248 頁）と「千枝がわめく」（248 頁）や、健次は「いきなりヴォ
リュームいっぱいにステレオをかける」
（248 頁）という有様であったが、千枝の命令など
健次はもはや聞き入れられなくなっていたのである。千枝・英一郎の絆を強引に引き裂く
までに健次は力を蓄えてきていたのだった。
千枝は振り返って「健次って、ほんとに頭がいいのかしら」
（250 頁）、
「左利きだし、迷
い子にはなるし、英才の素質はあったわね」（250 頁）と漏らす。秋雄が「IQ は、英一郎
217
より高かったな」
（250 頁）、
「元気もいいし、人づき合いもいい」（250 頁）と受けてやる
と、千枝は「その意味で、わたし、健次を警戒したの。わざと、じゃけんにしたのよ」
（251 頁）と自らの行動の意図するところを述べるのである。だが、健次の立場に立てば、
そのような扱いを母親から受けるしかない状態で思春期を迎え、分別もつくようになった
際、精神的に荒み出すのはやむを得まい。
３．
病んだ兄への蔑視
その後、英一郎が健次を敵視し、「いちばんいい本を、健次が狙ってるんだ。だから持っ
て行かなくちゃ」
（253 頁）などと「真顔になっていう」
（253 頁）ので、
「兄貴、かわいそ
うに、いよいよ決定的だよ。おれ、弟と見られたくないな」
（253 頁）と「健次は、頭の上
で輪をえがいて笑」
（253 頁）う。英一郎が「ぼくだって、おまえみたいな弟は要らないん
だ。消えてしまえ」
（253 頁）と言うので、健次も負けじと「兄貴こそ消えろ。あんなに勉
強してたくせに、成績だって、おかくれ同然じゃないか」（253 頁）と反撃する。「千枝の
疲れが目立」
（253 頁）つようになると、「寝ている千枝に代って、健次が台所で鼻唄をう
たいながら、洗い物をしていたりする。とにかく陽気である。家に二人の病人が居るとい
う顔ではない。寄り道・回り道が役立って、健次は、学校帰りに、スーパーや肉屋で買物
をしてくるし、簡単な料理もつくる」（254 頁）といった状態になるので、「健次は大きな
顔をするし、英一郎はいよいよ押され気味になる」
（255 頁）のであった。健次は料理まで
自分の力でできるようになっていた。その上で、Z 中学での学業にも自らの力だけで馴染
み、成績も中位にまで上げて行ったのであるから、その実力にはやはり瞠目せざるを得な
い。
健次は英一郎の行先を「マンションじゃなく、病院じゃないの」
（255 頁）と挑発するよ
うに言い、「そうか、いよいよ逃げ出すわけか。おれとくらべられたくないからな。その
中、くらべられるどころか、見すてられないようにな」
（255 頁）とも言う。英一郎が「お
まえは、スパイを使って、ぼくを狙ってる」（255 頁）と言い出すので、「兄貴なんか狙っ
たって、何の価値がある」
（255 頁）
、「パパ、処置なしだよ。やっぱり、早く病院に戻さな
くちゃ」
（256 頁）
、
「病院がいやなら、いっそルンペンになったら。この前、地下道で見た
やつなんか、空壜たたいて歌うたってた。ゼンマイ仕掛けの玩具みたいにはしゃいでた
な」
（256 頁）と次々に応戦する。英一郎は返す言葉がなくなり、「ルンペンをばかにする
と許さんぞ」（256 頁）と言うので、健次は「許さんだって？
おもしろいや、どうする
気」
（256 頁）と応じた。英一郎が「おまえなんか、消えてしまえ」（256 頁）とわめき、
冷静さを失ってしまっているのとは対照的に、健次は「ところが、ちょっとやそっとで消
えられないんだな。おれ、兄貴とちがって顔が広すぎるからね。むしろ、そちらの方が消
えやすいんじゃないの。友だちも居ないし、成績だって、おかくれ同然だもの」
（256 頁）
218
と兄を馬鹿にしたようにして言い返すのである。
結末では、英一郎が健次に飛びつき、ベランダから共に落下する事件にまで発展するが、
健次は「ドジだよ、兄貴は。ペンキの罐につまずいて、おれにとびついてきた。ほんとに
ドジだ、面倒見きれないな」
（262 頁）と言ってのける。こうして健次の様子を概観してみ
ると、特に英一郎の入院は健次を精神的に優位にしたと見られるのである。勉強ばかりし
て精神的に狂ってしまったのが兄の姿である事実を健次は確実に見抜いている。また、狂
ってしまった英一郎にしがみ続ける母・千枝とも距離を置き、結果的には精神的自立を早
期に遂げていくだろうとも考えられるのである。
【付記】
本文の引用は、城山三郎『素直な戦士たち』
（新潮社 1978 年 9 月）によった。引用末尾に
記した頁数も同書のものによる。
【註】
（１）中間（2007）は、「自己形成意識によって、個人がそうありたいと思う方向への自
己形成が促される」
（182 頁）
、「自己形成意識が全体的な自己の枠組みをも望む方向
のものへと変化させる」
（182 頁）とした上で、「自己形成意識が、自己形成過程に
おいて 2 つの点で肯定的な役割を果たしていると考えられるであろう。1 つは、実
際にその意識が目指す方向への自己形成過程を促進すること、そしてもう 1 つは、
その意識によって全体的自己のあり方が肯定的な方向へ変化することである」（182
～184 頁）というが、英一郎の後追いを自らの意志で行おうとする健次の様子を言
い当てていると言える。
（２）野辺地（1972）は、以下のように分析するが、これはそのまま千枝と英一郎に当て
はめて考えることができる。「現代のわが国の社会的、経済的不安から、親が子ど
もの将来に過大な期待を寄せたり、将来の生活の安定を望むあまり、異常とも思わ
れる学歴への期待や有名校への進学の期待をもつことが過保護の原因になっている
事実をも見逃すことはできない。このような傾向は、青年の自立や独立を求める意
欲を阻止し、依存的傾向を強め、分離の不安を高め、自我の形成を阻害する条件に
もなり、青年の自己疎外の重大な原因の一つであることはいうまでもない。」（41
頁）
【参考文献一覧】
中間玲子『自己形成の心理学』
（風間書房 2007 年 3 月）
野辺地正行「現代青年における自己疎外」、依田新・大西誠一郎・斎藤耕二・都留宏・西
平直喜・藤原喜悦・宮川知彰編『現代青年心理学講座 7 現代青年の生きがい』
（金子書房
1972 年 10 月）1-54 頁
219
マレーシアの中等教育における日本語教育の歴史的経緯と今後の展開
By Noriko Matsunaga,125 Megumi Kukimoto126
【要旨】
東南アジアの日本語教育は中等教育の学習者が中心となっている点が大きな特徴
である。そのうち、マレーシアの中等教育での日本語教育は青年海外協力隊の派
遣から既に 20 年以上の実績をもつが、日本語教師以外に人文系の人材が育ってき
ていない。また、教育機関や教師数は拡大しているものの、教師の多様化への対
応や教育の質向上も課題となっている。本報告では、マレーシアの東方政策と日
本留学・日本研究との関連性を考察するとともに、タイやインドネシアとの比較
からマレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育の普遍的な課題を明らかにするこ
とにより、今後のマレーシアにおける人文系の人材養成の可能性とその方策を提
言する。
１ はじめに：問題の所在と研究の目的
東南アジアの日本語教育の特徴は中等教育の学習者が中心となっている点である。その
うち、マレーシアの中等教育での日本語教育は青年海外協力隊（以下、協力隊）の国立全
寮制中高等学校（Residential School,以下 RS）への派遣から既に 20 数年以上の実績をも
つ127が、日本語教師以外に人文系の人材が育ってきていない128。また、中等教育の機関数
や教師数は拡大している129ものの、従来の日本留学経験者に加え、国内研修修了者の増加
125
九州大学大学院比較社会文化研究院 Kyushu University, Faculty of Social and Cultural
Studies
126
国際交流基金クアラルンプール日本文化センターThe Japan Foundation, Kuala Lumpur
協力隊の日本語教師のマレーシア派遣は 1984 年から 2000 年まで、のべ 114 名の隊員
が派遣された。人数は楠元貴久（2004）の記述をもとに報告者が合計した。
128
東方政策の主眼が理工系の人材養成にあることが主要因だと考えられる。日本語教師
以外の人文系の人材の受け皿（就職）が限られているという指摘（葉蕙 2010）もある。
129 教育機関数は当初の RS6 校から RS41 校（2004 年 10 月現在）まで拡大した。その後、
127
220
といった教師の多様化への対応や教育の質向上も課題となっている。
人文系人材がなぜ必要なのかということに関しては、まず、ソフトパワー130をどのよう
に磨き、活用するかが国際的に問われる時代になってきていることが挙げられる。従来、
欧米では文化を国力の発展と結びつけた文化外交が盛んに行われてきたが、近年、たとえ
ば、中国の孔子学院、華流、韓国の K-POP、韓流など、アジア各国においても文化輸出は
めざましい勢いを見せている。日本の場合、アニメ・マンガが日本のソフトパワーを代表
するものと言えるが、マレーシアにおいても同様で文化を担い、国際的文化発信力をもつ
人材が輩出することはマレーシアの更なる国力増進につながると考えられる。次に、複雑
化する社会における幅広い課題やニーズに対応するために日本語教育分野では、単に日本
語ができるだけでなく、日本語能力に加えた専門分野の知識・技能を備えた人材、いわゆ
る「日本語+α」人材の養成が世界的な課題となっている。これらの側面からも、理工系
のみならず、人文系人材の養成の必要性は高まっていると言えよう。
日本とマレーシアの関係という視点から言えば、両国の戦後の関係・交流は、1960 年代
から 70 年代の基礎作りを経て、1981 年に提唱された東方政策がその後押しをする形で推
進されてきたことは言うまでもない。1960 年代から日本との関係作りに奔走し、東方政策
を陰で支えてきた幾多の人々がいたことも事実である。彼らは「南方特別留学生131」など
の日本留学経験者、あるいは戦時下で直接日本人に日本語を学び、日本人教師から薫陶を
受けた人々であり、直接的な日本語経験の重要性を認知していた。そのような意味では、
マレーシアの独立を挟んで、戦前と戦後は断絶しているわけではなく、戦前の日本との関
係性の下地があってこそ、1980 年代以降の東方政策への進展が確認できるのだと考える。
以上の観点から考えると、マレーシアの日本語教育について考察するにあたり、東方政
策との関連性抜きにマレーシアの日本語教育を語ることはできない。はたして、東方政策
の所期の構想および RS20 年の教育実践の成果は現在に引き継がれているのであろうか。
現在も以前と同様の課題が残されているとすれば、RS 日本語教師経験者及びマレーシア
の日本語教育に関わった多数の経験と知見を結集することにより、課題を共有できるメリ
ットがある。問題解決に向けて連携できる可能性がある。
2005 年から政府系教育機関ではない Day School(DS)でも日本語教育が開始され、2010
年 5 月現在、RS48 校、DS37 校合計 85 校において実施されている（国際交流基金国別
情報 2010）
。
130
20 世紀末にアメリカ・ハーバード大のジョセフ・ナイ教授が提出した概念で、文化、
価値観、外交政策などの魅力によって望む結果を得る力をさす。この背景にはアメリカ
の例にみられるように、ハードパワー（軍事力、経済力）だけでは複雑化・多様化する
世界の課題を解決できないことが明らかになってきているということがある。
131 「南方特別留学生」とは、第二次世界大戦の時期（1943 年～1945 年）に「大東亜共栄
圏建設ニ協力邁進スベキ人材ヲ育成」するという目的のもとに、日本に占領された東南
アジアの各国より選抜され日本へ派遣された国費留学生のことである。マレーシアから
は、第 1 期・第 2 期合計 12 名が派遣されている（江上芳郎 1997：326-328）
。このほか、
私費による招聘である徳川奨学生などもいた。ウンク・アジズ元マラヤ大学副学長は、
徳川奨学金を得て早稲田大学で学んでいる。
221
本報告では、上記の問題提起をもとに、まず、マレーアの東方政策と日本留学・日本研
究との関連性について考察し、その上で、マレーシアのシ中等教育レベルの日本語教育の
現状と課題を述べる。さらに、マレーシア同様、中等教育の学習者が日本語教育の中心と
なっているタイやインドネシアとの比較からマレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育に
固有の課題を明らかにする。以上の考察により、今後のマレーシアにおける人文系の人材
養成の可能性とその方策を提言することを目的とする。
２ マレーシアの東方政策と日本留学・日本研究との関連性
マレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育の現状と課題を考察していくにあたり、マレ
ーシアの東方政策と日本留学・日本研究との関連性を確認する必要がある。戦時期の日本
占領の時代を経て、再びイギリスの占領下に入ったマレーシアでは、1957 年のマラヤ連邦
独立後、戦後処理の解決などを経て、1960 年代半ばからようやく経済援助や人的交流など
の面で日本との交流が再開されていく。1960 年代から現在までを年代ごとに区切って概観
してみると、以下表１のように 5 つの区分になる。
表１ マレーシア独立後の日本との文化交流
年代
1960 年代
時期区分・特徴
日本語教育の基礎作りⅠ
1970 年代
日本語教育の基礎作りⅡ
1980 年代
東方政策による日本留学
システムの確立時期
1990 年代
東方政策の推進時期
日本語教育の推進
東方政策の発展時期
日本語教育現地化の模索
2000 年代
事項
青年技術者派遣計画、日本語教育講座寄贈事業、
日本大使館主催日本語講座
各大学での日本語講座開講、民間レベルの日本語
講座開講
赴日講座、産業技術研修生渡日前講座（国際交流
基金）、RS での日本語教育開始（青年海外協力隊
日本語教師の派遣）
大学の日本研究プログラム、日本語専攻の設置、
日本語教師養成プログラムの実施、JLC132開設
レジデンシャルスクール日本語統一試験開始、一
般中等教育機関での日本語教育開始、国内の中等
教育日本語教員養成事業の開始、デイスクール日
本語統一試験開始
この時代区分の概観からもわかるように、1980 年代に入り、東方政策による日本留学や
産業技術研修生の派遣、RS での日本語教育が開始されるまでは、日本側からの日本語教
師
の派遣や日本語教育講座の開講が主軸になり、日本とマレーシアの相互交流の基礎作りが
行われてきた。特に、2000 年代以降、マレーシアの日本語教育の中心である、すべての
RS にマレーシア人教師がすべて配属されるようになり、さらに国内で中等教育日本語教
132
国際交流基金クアラルンプール日本語センター。開設は 1995 年。
222
員養成事業が開始されるようになったことは、日本語教育の「現地化133」にとって大きな
意味を有する事項と言えよう。
2-1 日本語教育の基礎作りと東方政策構想
1960 年代の青年技術者派遣計画に関しては、マレーシアの日本語教育の歴史の中で従来
触れられる機会が無かったが、「東方政策」との関連では重要な意味を持つことをここで
は
まず、指摘したい。なぜなら、1964-66 年の青年技術者派遣計画により 2 名の日本語教師
（鮎澤孝子氏・大曽美恵子氏）が外務省より派遣され、日本大使館で開設された日本語ク
ラスに、のちに東方政策の行政側の推進役となるハムダン氏（1970 年代に教育事務次官）、
教育側の推進役となるラザック氏(東方政策下で、マラ工科大日本留学予備教育の責任者)
といった人々が参加していたからである。ほかにも東方政策の推進者としては、元マラヤ
大副学長ウンク・アジズ氏がいる。彼らは日本占領下で日本人教師から直接日本語を習っ
ており、ラザック氏は元「南方特別留学生」
、ウンク・アジズ氏は徳川奨学生であった。
マハティール自身、「東方政策の意味するところは、マレーシアの発展に役立つ彼等の
哲学や倫理を学ぶことなのである。・・・ただ遠くから話を聞いているだけでは、その倫
理や技術を学ぶことは出来ない。直接の接触が重要なのである134」と述べており、日本の
技術習得だけではなく、日本について学ぶ、つまり、日本研究の重要性の認識が元々あっ
たと考えられるのである。
2-2 東方政策と日本留学・日本研究との関連性
以上のように、マハティールおよび 60 年代にマレーシアの日本語教育政策に関わった
人々は、日本留学経験者、あるいは戦時下で直接日本人に日本語を学び、日本人教師から
薫陶を受けた人々であり、日本留学と直接的な日本語経験の重要性を認知していた。
そういった日本研究の下地があったにも関わらず、日本語教師以外に人文系の人材が育
ってきていないのはなぜだろうか。要因としては大きく以下の 2 点が挙げられる。
① 東方政策の主眼が理工系の人材養成にあること
② 日本語教師以外の人文系の人材の受け皿（就職）が限られていること
このうち、①に関しては、「現行の東方政策プログラムは、学部レベルの自然科学系
（主に工学部）分野が中心となっているが、マレーシア経済の発展とともにより高度な技
術・人材が求められており、多様化するニーズに柔軟に対応するためにも、学問領域およ
133
具体的な説明として以下がある。「「現地化」というのは、・・・日本語教師については、
その国の正規のシステムに基づいて養成された教師が中心となる教育体制が整備され、
また、シラバス・カリキュラム・教材についても、それぞれの国や機関において教育行
政の目的や学習者のニーズに十分対応できる状態になることが望ましく、その方向に支
援するという考え方である」
（嶋津拓・濱部れい 2006：147）
。
134 マハティール・ビン・モハマド（1983：267）
。
223
び学問レベルの検討が望まれる」（国際開発高等教育機構 2007：65）との指摘もあり、社
会科学系の人材養成や大学院レベルへの留学の拡大が示唆されている。
これに関連して、マンガの人気は高いが、日本文学の翻訳は発達しておらず、翻訳人材
が不足していることを葉蕙(2010：83-93)でも指摘している。すなわち、社会科学系のみな
らず、人文科学系の人材養成に関しても課題が残されていることがうかがえる。
以上のように、マレーシアにおいては人文社会科学系の人材養成と大学院レベルへの留
学の拡大が課題となっている点が確認できた。つまり、東方政策により選抜される留学生
の学問領域・学問レベルを人文社会科学系・大学院レベルにも拡大していくことが、今後
のマレーシアの発展のために期待されていることは言うまでもない。
なぜなら、こうした人文社会科学系の人材養成を含め、日本語能力に加え、さらに専門
的な技術・知識を有する人材、言わば「日本語＋α」人材135の養成は東南アジアのみなら
ず、東アジアの国々においても喫緊の課題となっている。こうした課題を解決するために
は、当該国と日本との協力関係を基盤に考えていく必要があり、いくつかのアプローチが
考えられる。具体的には、(1）日本語学習者の日本語運用能力増強のための交流、(2)現地
の日本語教師の自己研修能力の向上、(3)日本語教育研究と日本研究分野の学術交流の推進、
(4)中等教育の充実といった 4 点からのアプローチである。
これら 4 点に関しては、相互に関連する部分があると考えられる。特に、マレーシアに
おいては、中等教育が日本語教育の中心になっていることから考えれば、日本語教育の中
心部分である上記(4)中等教育の充実をめざすアプローチが全体を解く鍵となるのではない
だろうか。そこで、次章では、マレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育の現状を先行研
究により概観し、課題を整理していくことにする。
３ マレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育の現状と課題
これまで見てきたように、マレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育は、協力隊の日本
語教師（1984～2000）の時代から現地の日本語教師の時代（1995～現在）へと大きく移
行した。また、日本語教育が実施される機関も、1984 年開始当初の RS2 校から、1992 年
に RS8 校に広がるまでは RS6 校が基盤となり、シラバス・教材の作製など制度的なもの
が整備されていっている。その後、現地の日本語教師が配属されてくる 1995 年以降は新
規に日本語教育が実施される機関が増え、1999 年 4 月には 26 校、協力隊教師の派遣が終
了する 2000 年には 30 校に拡大した136。その後、2005 年から DS でも日本語教育が開始
され、現地の日本語教師主導による RS+DS の時代へと変貌を遂げた。2009 年には RS43
校、DS22 校合計 65 校において実施されている137。そのほか、日本語教師養成プログラム
135
たとえば、中国では日本語+翻訳、日本語+IT、東南アジアでは日本語+医療といった人
材養成が実施されてきている。
136 楠元貴久(2004：12、119)。
137 アン・チュイ・キエン（2009：109）
。教員数は合計 88 名である（2009 年度の国際交
流基金統計による）
。アン・チュイ・キエン氏は IPBA の教師である。
224
による RS 日本語教師の日本派遣、国際言語教員養成所（IPBA）における現職教師対象の
日本語教師養成プログラムなどにより教師数も格段に増大している。
以上のように 2000 年以降、教育機関・教師数ともに大幅な拡大をしてきたことがわか
るが、冒頭で述べたように、従来の日本留学経験者に加え、国内研修修了者の増加といっ
た教師の多様化への対応や教育の質向上も課題となっているのが現状である。以下、現地
の日本語教師の指導的立場にある教師側の先行研究をもとに、現状と課題を整理していく
ことにする。
3-1 制度・教員養成・学習者の課題
2000 年以降のマレーシアにおける日本語教育の現状と課題は、大きく制度的課題、教員
養成の課題、学習者についての課題の 3 点に整理することができる。
まず、制度的な課題に関しては、次の 2 点がまとめられる138。
① 中等教育と高等教育の連携が少ない
② 理系重視の留学生政策により、予備教育での日本語履修経験者の割合が高くない
この 1 点目に関しては、日本語が高等教育の全国統一試験（入試）の科目ではないとい
うことに大きく起因している。2 点目に関しては、既に 2 章で考察してきた東方政策の問
題点と重なる事項である。
次に、教師養成に関しては、大きく 2 点にまとめられる139。
① 教育機関や教師数の拡大に伴う教師の多様化への対応
② 教師の質向上のための教師養成方針と本格的・継続性のある横のネットワークの構
築
これらは教師の質向上を課題とする点で、相互に関連するものと位置づけられる。ここ
でいう「教師の多様化」とは、IPG-KBA140修了者と日本留学を経験している教師という
ように、教師養成のコースが増えたことにより、教師のモチベーションや資質なども一様
ではなくなってきているということを指している。すなわち、IPG-KBA 修了者は元々日
本語以外の教科の教員からコンバートされ、最新のマレーシア教育事情に即した養成カリ
キュラムで学んでおり、新たなシラバスへの適応性があるという利点はあるものの、日本
留学を経験している既存の教員との運用力、バックグラウンドの違いがある。
こういった教師の質や能力の課題は、教育の質や学習者の能力と直結する課題であり、
アン・チュイ・キエン（2009）は、同時に学習者に対する日本語学習の動機付けと、学習
者の日本語発話能力の向上といった課題を指摘している。この問題は、全国統一試験の科
目ではない日本語を学習者が軽視する傾向があるということであり、既にみてきた制度上
138
根津誠（2010）
、根津誠・アン・チュイ・キエン（2009）
、アン・チュイ・キエン
（2009）をもとにまとめた。
139 根津誠（2010）
、根津誠・アン・チュイ・キエン（2009）
、アン・チュイ・キエン
（2009）
。
140 Institut Pendidikan Guru, Kampus Bahasa Antarabangsa（国際言語教員養成所）
225
の問題点とも重なるものである。
3-2 課題改善の試み
以上、制度的課題、教員養成の課題、学習者についての課題を整理する形で考察してき
た。こうした課題のうち、特に IPBA 修了者に対する支援の必要性がアン・チュイ・キエ
ンにより指摘されており、以下のような改善の試みがなされている141。
(1) 学習目標の Can-do 記述（CDS）の形による明文化
(2) 講師間での目標の共有
(3) 学習者であるコース参加者との目標の共有
(4) 内省的実践のツールとしてのポートフォリオの改善へ
このうち、4 点目のポートフォリオの改善に関しては、「e-ポートフォリオの作成を通し
てインターネット上のプロフェッショナルグループを作る試み」を検討中とのことである
142。
以上の概観をまとめると、改善の試みは進んでいるものの、教育の質向上や学習者の能
力向上は協力隊の日本語教師の時代から同様に叫ばれていたものであり143、いわば普遍的
な課題であると言える。特に、制度的な面では何も変わっていないという構造的な問題も
指摘できる。さらに、現地の日本語教員の多様化に伴う様々な課題のうち、指摘されてい
る課題のほかに、教師自身のモチベーションの向上に対する対策も必要なのではなかろう
か。
４ タイ・インドネシア・東アジアとの比較
本章では、まず、マレーシア同様、中等教育の学習者が日本語教育の中心となっている
タイ、インドネシアとの比較からマレーシアの中等教育レベルの日本語教育に固有の課題
を明らかにする。次に、2 章で指摘した人文社会系の人材養成の課題という観点から、各
地域の日本研究事情を概観し、マレーシアの今後を展望する。
4-1 マレーシア・タイ・インドネシアの日本語教育の概要
概要を把握するために日本語教育機関数、教師数、学習者数を一覧にまとめたのが表 2
である。注目されるのは、インドネシアの学習者数の急増で、現在第 3 位となっている。
2006 年から 2009 年にかけての増減率は 162.7 ％と、世界的に見ても顕著な増加傾向が示
されている。この数字を押し上げている要因は、全学習者数のほとんどを中等レベルの学
習者数が占めていることから見ても、中等レベルの学習者数の増加にあることは明らかで
あろう。これに関しては、インドネシアでは、2006 年のカリキュラム改訂により、日本語
141
根津誠・アン・チュイ・キエン（2009）
。
アン・チュイ・キエン氏 2011 年 9 月 16 日松永宛 Email。
143 詳細は前掲、楠元（2004）
。
142
226
が選択必修科目のひとつとして選択履修される割合が高くなったことが大きいこと、「日
本語には正規の教科書（基金と教育省が共同で製作）がある144」という点が日本語履修者
の増大につながったことが指摘されている。
マレーシア・タイ・インドネシアの 3 者を比較した場合、教育機関数、教師数、学習者
数ともにインドネシアが突出しており、次いでタイ（全体で 7 位）、マレーシア（全体で
11 位）の順となっている。ただし、日本語母語話者教師（以下、日本語母語教師）の教師
数全体に占める比率に関しては、インドネシアは 3.6％と極端に低く、逆にタイ 36.5％、
マレーシア 43.8％と、タイ、マレーシアのほうが高くなっている。この現象は、それぞれ
の国における日本語教育の「自立化」「現地化」の達成をめざす国際交流基金の日本語教
育事業方針を象徴するものとなっている。つまり、急激な学習者数の増加に対応して、日
本語母語教師の派遣による「直接教授型」から「アドバイザー型」支援へと移行せざるを
得ないという現状の反映である。さらに詳細の検討は必要であるが、日本語母語話者教師
の比率から言えば、インドネシア、タイ、マレーシアの順に、日本語教育の「自立化」
「現地化」への移行が進んでいると言えるのではないだろうか。
3 者の比較で最も顕著に異なる点は、中等教育と高等教育との連携の有無である。この
点は 3 章でも既に確認してきた点と重なるが、マレーシアの場合は中等教育と高等教育の
連携がまだ少なく、現状では日本語専攻の大学がマラヤ大学のみであり145、大学入試科目
にも日本語が入っていない。一方、インドネシア、タイでは日本語専攻の大学の数も多く、
タイでは大学入試科目にも日本語が入っているという中等・高等教育の連続性がある146。
この点の違いは、学習者の学習目的とも大きく連動している。たとえば、インドネシア
では、中等の 3 位、高等の 1 位に「将来の就職」の項目が挙げられており、タイでも高等
の 2 位に挙げられている。対するマレーシアは、高等の 3 位に「将来の就職」が入ってく
るものの、中等では１「マンガ・アニメ」、２「日本語そのもの」、３「コミュニケーショ
ン」の順になっており、実践的・実利的に日本語を学ぶというよりも、趣味の延長として
学ぶ傾向が強いことがうかがえる。この点は、葉蕙(2010)でマンガの人気は高くても翻訳
人材が不足しているという指摘と重なる点であり、学習者の興味・関心と人材養成システ
ムが連動していっていないことを反証するデータとも言える。
以上の点から、2 章で確認してきた内容と重なるが、東方政策により選抜される留学生
の学問領域・学問レベルを人文社会科学系・大学院レベルにも拡大していくことがマレー
シアの高等教育機関における人材養成として必要な課題であるとまとめることができる。
144
国際交流基金、日本語教育国別情報（2010）
。
ただし、日本語教育を副専攻としているマレーシア科学大学では、主専攻化が進められ
ており、日本語が副専攻の大学、選択必修科目となっている大学、日本語教育が実施さ
れている大学は数校ある。
146 インドネシアは入試科目に日本語は入っていないが、日本語科目成績優秀者に対し、特
定の日本語科目の受講を免除する大学がある。
145
227
表 2 マレーシア・タイ・インドネシアの日本語教育概況比較
マレーシア
22,856
124
388
170【43.8％】
15147
タイ
78,802
377
1,240
452【36.5％】
6+11
インドネシア
716,353
1,988
4,089
147【3.6％】
19148+8
１コミュニケーション
２日本語そのもの
３将来の就職
１コミュニケーション
２将来の就職
３日本語そのもの
１将来の就職
２コミュニケーション
３今の仕事
１
12,025
【52.6％】
73
88
41
38,685
【49.1％】
242
415
11
679,662
【94.9％】
1,701
2,575
１マンガ・アニメ
２日本語そのもの
３コミュニケーション
１日本語そのもの
２コミュニケーション
３アニメ・マンガ
１コミュニケーション
２歴史・文学等
３将来の就職
免許、採用試験、
養成講座
要教員免許
日本語教師養成機関
要教員免許+
養成プログラム修
了
派遣→国内研修
7 大学
中等・高等教育の連続性
標準教科書とカリキュラム・シラ
バスの連動性
なし
あり
教科書作成進行中
2 大学、
養成講座
なし
あり
日本語学習者数（人）
日本語教育機関数（機関）
日本語教師数(人)
うち、日本語母語教師（人）
【割合】
公的派遣日本語教師（人）JF・JICA
学習目的（高等教育）
日本語専攻のある大学（機関）
日本語学習者数（人）
【割合】
日本語教育機関数
日本語教師数（人）
学習目的（中等教育）
中
等
教
育
教師の資格
あり
あり
国際交流基(2011)、国際交流基金国別教育事情（2010 年度）等をもとに作成。
4-2 東アジア・東南アジアの日本研究の動向
次いで、東南アジアを概観する前に、東アジア地域の日本研究事情について私見をもと
に概観してみることにしよう。中国、韓国では人文科学系の研究を中心に、社会科学系の
研究も進んできているが、香港・台湾では歴史的に日本語教育分野の教員が中心となり日
本研究を担ってきたという背景があることから、社会科学系の人材が育ってきていないと
いう問題点がある。
それでは 、東南アジアではどう だろうか。「 The Japanese Studies Association in
Southeast Asia」が 2006 年にシンガポール、2009 年にベトナム、2012 年にマレーシア
で開催されるというように、近年とみに日本研究の機運は高まってきている。
JF（国際交流基金）からの派遣のみで、JICA（国際協力機構）からの派遣は 2000 年
に終了している。
148 21 世紀東アジア青少年大交流計画による日本語教師 9 名を含む。
147
228
特に、タイは日本語専攻の大学が多いということにも象徴されるように、日本研究や日
本との研究交流がさかんに行われてきている。たとえば、チュラロンコン大学日本語研究
学科では文学、文化、民俗学などの研究面での日本との交流があり、遠隔教育の実践、大
学生のチューター受け入れもなされている。また、カセサート大学でも日本語インストラ
クターの招待やボランティア大学生の受け入れがなされている。モンクタット王工科大学
では研究で使える日本語などの目標設定、チェンマイ大学ではタイ人・日本人教師のピア
による指導、日本語研究の交流がある。
インドネシアでは、バジャジャラン大学を中心とする日本語学科系、インドネシア大学
を中心とする日本研究学科系、インドネシア教育大学を中心とする日本語教育系での日本
研究が中心である。
マレーシアの場合、現時点では日本語専攻の大学はマラヤ大学日本研究系のみである。
2012 年 2 月に JF 主催、Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies (MAJAS)との共催
で「The Japanese Studies Association in Southeast Asia」が開催され、これを契機に日
本研究にもはずみがついていくことが期待される。
５ 考察と提言
以上、中等教育機関の日本語教育の制度面（中等教育と高等教育の連携が少ない、理系
重視の留学生政策など）、教師の質向上、学習者の問題（全国統一試験の科目では無い日
本語への学習動機付けなど）など、中等教育機関の日本語教師は現在も依然として協力隊
派遣教師と同様の課題を抱えていることがわかった。さらに、マレーシアに固有の問題を
明らかにしていくため、マレーシア同様、中等教育の日本語学習者が学習者の大半を占め
るタイとインドネシアとの比較を行った。
考察の結果、学習者の興味・関心と人材養成システムが連動していないことがマレーシ
アの中等教育に固有の問題であることがわかった。以下、こうした固有の問題が生じた背
景と要因について、タイ及びインドネシアとの比較から考察し、課題解決の方向性を探る
ことにしたい。
5-1 考察
タイの場合、大学の入試科目のひとつに日本語が導入されていること、大学を中心とす
る日本語教育の土台が 1980 年代から蓄積されている点がマレーシアとは大きく異なる。
言わば、高等教育機関での日本語教育がタイの日本語教育、人文系人材養成を下支えして
いると言えよう。また、バンコク日本文化センターとタイ教育省が共催で実施してきた中
等学校日本語現職教員日本語教師新規養成講座が教師養成・研修に果たしている役割も大
きいと言われている149。1981 年に始まった JICA ボランティア日本語教師の中等教育機関
への派遣は拡大され、現在も継続されている。ただし、タイの場合も、中等教育の教師養
149
野畑理佳・ウィバー・ガムチャンタコーン（2006）
、JF 国別情報 2010 による。
229
成と教師の質向上は今なお課題とされている150。
インドネシアの場合、大学の入試科目に日本語が入っていない点はマレーシアと同様で
あるが、タイ同様、大学を中心とする日本語教育の土台が 1990 年代から蓄積されており、
高等教育機関での人文系人材が育っている点が日本語教育学会の設立や日本語教師のネッ
トワーク構築など日本語教育を下支えする要因となっている。JICA ボランティア日本語
教師も大学や観光日本語教育機関に重点的に派遣されている151。
マレーシアの場合、現地で研修を受けた日本語教師が輩出している点は高く評価できる
が、既に 3 章で確認してきたように、IPBA 修了者の研修方法、現地教師のネットワーク
形成においては課題があり、改善の試みもなされている。ここで検討する必要があるのは、
教師の質向上のためには、長期的スパンでの教師養成・研修がなされる必要性があるので
はないかということである。たとえば、教師研修の方法のひとつとして日本の教育機関と
連携協力して行うという方法が考えられる 152 。さらに、タイ・インドネシアと同様、
JICA の協力隊日本語教師を「アドバイザー」という位置づけで、巡回配置するという方
法が考えられる。RS20 年の総括（楠元 2004：232―234）によれば、1 校に協力隊日本語
教師と現地教師とが固定的に配属される形式は現地教師の側にもプレッシャーやストレス
が大きいという弊害が指摘されている。ただし、現地教師へのインタビュー調査も実施し
ている楠元（2004）でも、RS の内情を熟知している協力隊経験者による「巡回型」の再
派遣の必要性が言及されている。したがって、RS の日本語教育にとって今なお普遍的な
課題が存在するということから考えても、同じ悩みや課題を共有する仲間として、協力隊
経験者が現地教師と連携できる可能性がある。
5-2 提言
以上の考察により、今後のマレーシアにおける人文系の人材養成の可能性とその方策を
提言する。以下、協力隊経験者との連携、中等教育へのボランティア教師の受け入れ、日
本語教師以外の人文系の人材の受け皿（就職）をつくるといった、大きく 3 点にまとめる
ことができる。
① 協力隊経験者との連携
現在の教育省＋JFKL＋RS、DS＋IPG-KBA という横の協力・ネットワークに、縦のネ
ットワーク（RS20 年の教育実績と人的資源＋中等教育レベルの日本語教育の実践におけ
る目標や課題の共有が可能）がプラスされることで、日本との連携・協力はより強固なも
のになっていくのではないか。ネットワーク形成には「相互学習」の視点が必要と言われ
ているが、アン・チュイ・キエン氏の「インターネット上のプロフェッショナルグループ
150
国際交流基金、日本語教育国別情報（2010）
国際交流基金、日本語教育国別情報（2010）
152
国際教養大とマレーシア科学大学の協力により、2012 年以降、日本語＋医療人材の
養成協力の可能性がある。
151
230
を作る試み」を例にとれば、グループのサポートとして日本とのネットワークが必要であ
り、ここに協力隊マレーシア RS 経験者が協力できる可能性があるのではないだろうか。
② ボランティア教師の受け入れの検討
ネットワーク形成には、それに関わる参加者の「相互学習」の機会を増やすことが肝要
であり、タイの事例にみられるような大学生のチューター受け入れ、日本語インストラク
ターの招聘やボランティア大学生の受け入れも検討してみる価値がある。ただし、教育経
験のない大学生にとって、中等レベルの生徒指導は困難で負担が大きいことが予想される。
そのため、大学への受け入れをまず試してみることが良いのではないだろうか。
③ マレーシア教育省側への提言となるが、マレーシア教育省による、日本語教師以外の
人文系人材の受け皿（就職）の増設ということである。
たとえば、中等教育の教師が研究することによりキャリアアップができる仕組みをつく
る。大学の日本語専攻、日本語教師養成機関をつくる。このように、大学に日本語・日本
文化関連のポストが増えることで、中等教育の日本語教師の研究へのモチベーションが生
まれるのではないだろうか。
また、IPG-KBA 修了者にも長期の日本留学の機会をつくる。日本留学の機会の提供は、
JF とのつながりだけでなく、大学間交流の活発化につながる可能性もある。
私見ながら、マハティールの東方政策および 60 年代にマレーシアの日本語教育方針に
関わった人々は、日本留学経験者、あるいは戦時下で直接日本人に日本語を学び、日本人
教師から薫陶を受けた人々であり、直接的な日本語経験の重要性を認知していた。留学は
個々人のレベルで日本文化とマレーシア文化の間に様々な相互学習と相互作用をもたらす
ものであり、その意味で中等教育レベルの日本語教師の日本留学経験者を増やすことが人
文系の人材を増やすツールのひとつではないかと考える。
以上の考察をまとめると、マレーシアの場合、大学で日本語専攻、日本研究プログラム
などの設置が今後増えていくことが人文系の人材の受け皿（就職）としても、教師間のネ
ットワークの構築に関しても重要ではないか。東方政策の構想にあった直接的な日本語経
験の重要性は、理系の人材養成には生かされているが、人文系の人材養成の面では十分に
生かされていない可能性がある。大学で日本語専攻、日本研究プログラムなどの設置が今
後増えていくことが人文系人材の養成にとっては不可欠ではないだろうか。
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