Untitled - EFTA Court

Transcription

Reproduction is authorized, provided that the source is acknowledged.
The recommended mode of citation is as follows: the case number, the names of the
parties in the form used in the side-heading of the pages of this Report, the year
(in square brackets) and title of the Report (EFTA Court Report), the page number.
Design and layout: Tuuli Sauren, INSPIRIT International Communications, Brussels, Belgium
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Case E-1/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway
Report of the EFTA Court
2008
www.eftacourt.int
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- ii -
The EFTA Court was set up under the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the
EEA Agreement) of 2 May 1992. This was originally a treaty between, on the one hand,
the European Communities and their then twelve Member States and, on the other
hand, the EFTA States Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland. The treaty entered into force on 1 January 1994, except for Liechtenstein
and Switzerland. Accordingly, the EFTA Court took up its functions on 1 January 1994 with
five judges nominated by Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and appointed
by common accord of the respective Governments. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined
the European Union on 1 January 1995. Liechtenstein became a member of the EEA
on 1 May 1995. The EFTA Court continued its work in its original composition of five
judges until 30 June 1995, under a Transitional Arrangements Agreement. Since that
date, the Court has been composed of three Judges appointed by common accord of the
Governments of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Since 1 August 2007, the EEA has
consisted of the 27 Member States of the European Union and of the three EFTA States
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
The present Report of the EFTA Court covers the period from 1 January 2008 to 31
December 2008 and contains the decisions rendered during that period as well as
an overview of other activities of the Court. The reader is referred to the first Report
of the Court 1994–1995 for general information on the establishment of the Court, its
jurisdiction, legal status and procedures.
The working language of the Court is English, and its Judgments, other decisions and
Reports for the Hearing are published in English. Judgments in the form of Advisory
Opinions, as well as the respective Reports for the Hearing, are translated to the language
of the requesting national court. Both language versions are authentic and published in
the Court Reports. When a case is published in two languages, the different language
versions are published with corresponding page numbers to facilitate reference.
A collection of relevant legal texts for the EFTA Court as amended, can be found in the
booklet EFTA Court Texts (latest edition September 2008). The booklet is available in
English, German, Icelandic and Norwegian, and can be obtained from the Registry. All
language versions of the texts can also be accessed on the EFTA Court website www.
eftacourt.int.
The EFTA Court has also published a booklet entitled “Legal framework, case law and
composition – 1994-2003”, which was republished in an updated form in November 2006
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Foreword
under the shorter title “Legal framework and case law”. The booklet has been updated
and published for the third time in July 2008. As the title indicates, the publication
summarizes the Court’s legal framework and its case law since 1994. In addition, it gives
an account of the Court’s composition, including the former Members and Registrars
of the Court. Its aim is to serve as a tool of information for those who take interest in
European integration. The booklet can be obtained from the Registry, by request through
the Court’s web site www.eftacourt.int.
Decisions of the EFTA Court, which have not yet been published in the Report, may be
obtained from the Registry by mail or e-mail registry@eftacourt.int, or on the EFTA
Court website www.eftacourt.int.
- ii -
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Foreword
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I
DECISIONS
OF THE COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A.
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Case
E-4/07, Jón Gunnar Þorkelsson v Gildi lífeyrissjóður
I. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . History and general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
–
II.
Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
– Judgment,
1 February 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
III.
Language
regime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
– Report
for the
Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
29
IV.
Duration
proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Case
E-5/07,ofPrivate
Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance
V.
Relationship with the Courts of the European Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authority
– Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. General
Principles of EEA Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judgment,
21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
February 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I.– Homogeneity
1.
Statutory
provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
– Report for the Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Case2.E-6/07,
HOB vín ehf. v Faxaflóahafnir sf.
62
13
64
13
13
86
15
II.
Protection and judicial defence of the rights of individuals and
– Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
economic operators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
– Judgment, 5 March 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
III. Effect of EEA law in the legal orders of the EFTA/EEA States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
– Report for the Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
IV. State liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Case E-7/07, Seabrokers AS v Staten v/Skattedirektoratet
V. Fundamental rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
– Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
VI. Duty of the Contracting Parties to loyally cooperate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
– Judgment, 7 May 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
VII. Other general principles of EEA law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Non-discrimination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Case2.E-8/07,
Celina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nguyen v the State, represented by the Ministry
Proportionality
25
of Justice
and
the
Police
3. Good administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
– Summary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Legal certainty
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
26
5.
Protection
of
legitimate
expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
– Judgment, 20 June 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
– Report
forofthe
Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. Legal
Nature
EEA
Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
29
Competences
Joined Cases
L’Oréal
Norge AS and L’Oréal SA v
D.
of E-9/07
the EEAand
JointE-10/07,
Committee
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
Per Aarskog AS, Nille AS and Smart Club AS
E. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
– Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
I.Action for failure of a Contracting Party to fulfil its obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
– Judgment, 8 July 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
II. Action for nullity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Locus standi to bring an action for nullity of a decision of the
Case E-4/08,
Claudia Sebjanic
Christian Peters
EFTA Surveillance
Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
– Order
of theand
President
of the
October
2. Nature
reviewability
of aCourt,
decision7 of
the EFTA2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Surveillance Authority. . . . . . . . . 299
36
3. Preclusion with arguments not raised in the administrative proceedings. . . . . . . . . . 37
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CONTENTS
Case E-2/08, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Republic of Iceland
– Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
– Judgment, 29 October 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Case E-3/08, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Republic of Iceland
– Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
– Judgment, 29 October 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Case E-5/08, Yannike Bergling v EFTA Surveillance Authority
– Order of the President of the Court, 19 November 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Joined Cases E-11/07 and E-1/08, Olga Rindal and Therese Slinning v
Staten v/Dispensasjons- og klagenemnda for behandling i utlandet
– Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
– Judgment, 19 December 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
II ADMINISTRATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
III JUDGES AND STAFF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
IV LIST OF COURT DECISIONS PUBLISHED IN THE EFTA COURT
REPORTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 .
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III. Action for failure of the EFTA Surveillance Authority to act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
IV. Preliminary reference procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Notion of court or tribunal entitled to refer questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Admissibility of a request and of questions referred by the national
court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Jurisdiction of the EFTA Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Form of Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
37
39
41
41
F. Fundamental Freedoms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
I. Free movement of goods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Rules of origin and product coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Discriminatory taxation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. State alcohol monopolies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. State licensing scheme for sale and rental of videos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Potentially dangerous substances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
43
45
46
51
52
II. Free movement of workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
I. Decisions of the Court
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-2-
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar Þorkelsson
v
Gildi-lífeyrissjóður
- 23 -
CASE E-4/07
v
(Invalidity pension rights – free movement of workers – Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 –
Regulation (EEC) No 574/72)
Judgment of the Court, 1 February 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Report for the Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Summary of the Judgment
1. Pensions based on projected rights,
i.e. calculated on the basis of the pension
points a person would accrue with a
pension fund if a member until the age of
retirement, as such fall inside the scope of
Regulation 1408/71.
2. Regulation 1408/71 does not
harmonise the material content of the
social security benefits which it covers.
The Regulation merely coordinates social
security benefits. One of the coordination
issues regulated by Regulation 1408/71
is whether contributions made to foreign
pension funds must be equated to
contributions made to the fund offering
the benefit when establishing whether the
conditions for the acquisition or retention
of a benefit are fulfilled. This coordination
is the same in nature when applied to the
award of benefits based on projected rights
as when applied to the award of benefits
based on accrued rights.
3. The Regulation does not contain any
general principle of derogation to the effect
-- 43 --
that it must under no circumstances lead
to a more favourable result than that which
would have been the result of change of
residence or work within a single State.
4. The provisions of Regulation 1408/71
pertaining to invalidity benefits distinguish
between two main categories of persons:
on the one hand, persons that are subject
only to legislation under which the amount
of invalidity benefits is independent of the
duration of periods of insurance and, on the
other hand, persons that are either subject
only to legislation under which the length
of insurance is relevant in this respect or
subject to legislations of both types.
5. The amount of an invalidity pension
based on projected rights is calculated
on the basis of the contributions which
the member would have paid had he or
she remained a member until the age of
retirement. The length of insurance is
therefore relevant when calculating the
amount of the benefit.
gegn
Gildi-lífeyrissjóði
(Réttur til örorkubóta – frjáls för launþega – Reglugerð (EBE) nr. 1408/71 – Reglugerð
(EBE) nr. 574/72)
Dómur EFTA-dómstólsins, 1. febrúar 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Skýrsla framsögumanns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Samantekt
2. Reglugerð 1408/71 samræmir ekki
efnisinntak þeirra almannatryggingabóta
sem falla undir gildissvið hennar.
Reglugerðin samhæfir einungis almannatryggingabætur. Samhæfingin sem mælt
er fyrir um í reglugerð 1408/71 lýtur
m.a. að því hvort framlögum í erlenda
lífeyrissjóði skuli jafnað við framlög í þann
sjóð sem greiðir bæturnar, þegar metið
er hvort fullnægt sé skilyrðum til þess að
öðlast eða viðhalda bótum. Eðli þessarar
samhæfingar er hið sama hvort heldur
úthlutun bóta byggir á framreiknuðum eða
uppsöfnuðum réttindum.
3. Reglugerðin verður ekki túlkuð svo
að hún hafi að geyma almennan fyrirvara
þess efnis að beiting hennar geti aldrei leitt
til hagstæðari niðurstöðu heldur en orðið
hefði við flutning á búsetu eða atvinnu í
einu tilteknu landi.
4. Þau ákvæði reglugerðar 1408/71
sem varða örorkubætur greina á milli
tveggja meginflokka einstaklinga. Annars
vegar eru þeir sem eingöngu heyra undir
löggjöf þar sem fjárhæð örorkubóta er
óháð tryggingatímabili. Hins vegar eru
þeir sem annað hvort heyra einvörðungu
undir löggjöf þar sem tryggingatímabil
skiptir máli, eða undir löggjöf af báðum
tegundum.
5. Fjárhæð örorkubóta sem byggja á
framreiknuðum réttindum miðast við iðgjöld
sem sjóðfélagi hefði greitt, hefði hann átt
aðild að sjóðnum fram að eftirlaunaaldri.
Lengd tryggingatímabils hefur því áhrif við
útreikning bótafjárhæðar.
-- 535 --
Summary
1. Bætur byggðar á framreikningi, þ.e.
stigafjölda sem einstaklingur myndi ávinna
sér í lífeyrisssjóði ef hann starfaði fram
að eftirlaunaaldri, falla sem slíkar undir
reglugerð 1408/71.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson vAuthority
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Mál E-4/07
6. When the competent institution
decides whether it is under an obligation
to provide a pension to a person to whom
the Regulation applies, the institution shall
take account of periods of insurance under
the legislation of any other EEA State
as if these periods had been completed
under its own legislation. Where the
acquisition, retention or recovery of the
right to benefits is conditional upon the
person concerned being insured at the
time of the materialisation of the risk, this
condition shall be regarded as having been
satisfied in the case of insurance under the
legislation of another EEA State.
-- 64 --
7. In this regard, it is not a condition
that the person concerned be barred from
continuing his membership in the social
security scheme of his previous State of
residence or employment.
8. Under Regulation 574/72, persons
shall present their claims in the State where
they were resident and where they had
social security entitlements at the time of
their injury. However, the lodging of a claim
with the relevant institution of another EEA
State is without prejudice to the right to
benefits under Regulation 1408/71.
8. Samkvæmt reglugerð 574/72 ber
einstaklingum að leggja fram kröfur sínar
í því ríki þar sem þeir voru búsettir og nutu
almannatryggingaréttinda þegar þeir urðu
fyrir slysi. Ef krafa er lögð fram hjá stofnun
í öðru EES-ríki, hefur það þó ekki áhrif á
bótarétt samkvæmt reglugerð 1408/71.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
7. Í þessu sambandi er það ekki skilyrði
að viðkomandi einstaklingur geti ekki
áfram átt aðild að almannatryggingakerfi
þess ríkis þar sem hann var áður búsettur
eða stundaði atvinnu.
Summary
6. Þegar þar til bær stofnun ákvarðar
hvort greiða skuli bætur til einstaklings
sem fellur undir reglugerðina, ber henni
að taka tillit til tryggingatímabila sem lokið
er samkvæmt löggjöf annarra EES-ríkja,
eins og þeim hefði verið lokið samkvæmt
þeirri löggjöf sem stofnunin starfar eftir.
Þegar rétturinn til að öðlast, viðhalda eða
endurheimta bótarétt er bundinn því skilyrði
að viðkomandi einstaklingur sé tryggður
á þeim tíma þegar áhættan kemur fram,
skal litið svo á að skilyrðinu sé fullnægt
þegar um er að ræða tryggingu samkvæmt
löggjöf annars EES-ríkis.
--- 747 ---
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
1 February 20081∗
(Invalidity pension rights – free movement of workers – Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 –
Regulation (EEC) No 574/72)
In Case E-4/07,
REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Héraðsdómur
Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court), Iceland, in a case pending before it between
and
Gildi-lífeyrissjóður (Gildi Pension Fund)
concerning rules on the free movement of workers within the EEA,
THE COURT,
composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Thorgeir Örlygsson and Henrik Bull (JudgeRapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: Skúli Magnússon,
having considered the written observations submitted on behalf of:
–
the Plaintiff, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, Supreme Court Attorney;
–
the Defendant, represented by Hörður Felix Harðarson, Supreme Court Attorney,
acting as Agent, assisted by Tryggvi Þórhallsson, District Court Attorney;
–
the Government of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First Secretary
and Legal Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent;
–
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Arne Torsten Andersen, Senior
Officer, and Lorna Young, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting
as Agents, assisted by Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson, Officer, Internal Market Affairs
Directorate; and
–
the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Viktor Kreuschitz,
Legal Adviser, and Nicola Yerrell, a member of its Legal Service, acting as Agents,
∗
Language of the Request: Icelandic.
- 85 -
1. febrúar 2008*1*
(Réttur til örorkubóta – frjáls för launþega – Reglugerð (EBE) nr. 1408/71 – Reglugerð
(EBE) nr. 574/72)
Mál E-4/07,
BEIÐNI, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar
og dómstóls, um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, frá Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur, í máli
sem þar er rekið
gegn
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
DÓMUR DÓMSTÓLSINS
varðandi reglur um frjálsa för launþega á Evrópska efnahagssvæðinu,
DÓMSTÓLLINN,
skipaður dómurunum Carl Baudenbacher, forseta, Þorgeiri Örlygssyni og Henrik Bull,
framsögumanni,
dómritari: Skúli Magnússon,
-
stefnanda, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Stefán Geir Þórisson, hrl., Reykjavík;
-
stefndu, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Hörður Felix Harðarson, hrl., Reykjavík og
honum til aðstoðar er Tryggvi Þórhallsson, hdl., Reykjavík;
-
ríkisstjórn Íslands, í fyrirsvari er Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, lögfræðingur og
sendiráðsritari á skrifstofu Evrópumála í utanríkisráðuneytinu;
-
eftirlitsstofnun EFTA, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Arne Torsten Andersen
aðalfulltrúi og Lorna Young, fulltrúi á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði og þeim til
aðstoðar er Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson, fulltrúi á sviði innri markaðar; og
-
framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Viktor
Kreuschitz, lögfræðilegur ráðgjafi og Nicola Yerrell lögfræðingur hjá lagadeildinni,
Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit á íslensku.
*
---959---
JUDGMENT
hefur, með tilliti til skriflegra greinargerða frá:
having regard to the Report for the Hearing,
having heard oral argument of the Plaintiff, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, the
Defendant, represented by Hörður Felix Harðarson, the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
represented by Lorna Young, and the Commission of the European Communities,
represented by Nicola Yerrell, at the hearing on 17 October 2007,
gives the following
Judgment
I
Facts and procedure
1
The Plaintiff is an Icelandic mariner who, having lived and worked in the
Republic of Iceland (hereinafter “Iceland”), in September 1995 moved to
Denmark where he still resides. He continued to work as a mariner in Denmark,
and paid contributions to a Danish pension fund. On 16 September 1996 the
Plaintiff, while at work on board a Danish fishing vessel, suffered an accident
causing his invalidity. The Plaintiff has been assessed with an invalidity rating
of 75%.
2
The Plaintiff had accrued rights to pension payments from several Icelandic
pension funds at the time of the accident. Pension premiums had been paid to
Lífeyrissjóður Vestfirðinga (the West Fjords Pension Fund) from 1975 to 1987,
to Lífeyrissjóður Austurlands (the Eastern Iceland Pension Fund) from 1991 to
1995, most recently in August 1995, and to the Defendant, then Lífeyrissjóður
sjómanna (the Mariners’ Pension Fund), now Gildi-lífeyrissjóður (Gildi Pension
Fund), from 1969 to 1995, most recently in September 1995.
3
For his accident, the Plaintiff was awarded a lump-sum payment of DKK 99
653.12 from his Danish pension fund. With this pension fund, it appears that
the Plaintiff had not acquired rights to any other benefits for his accident. He
does, however, receive a monthly pension of DKK 1 620 (approximately EUR
210) from the Danish municipality where he lives. In Iceland, since 1 October
1996, the Plaintiff has received invalidity pensions from the pension funds
named above in accordance with his accrued points and the assessment of
his loss of working capacity.
4
However, on the grounds of failing to meet a condition of having paid
contributions to the Defendant for at least six of the 12 months preceding the
accident, the Plaintiff has not been found to have a right to have his invalidity
--10
6 --
kveðið upp svofelldan
dóm
I
Málsatvik og meðferð máls
1
Stefnandi er íslenskur sjómaður. Hann bjó og starfaði á Íslandi þar til hann flutti til
Danmerkur í september 1995 þar sem hann er enn búsettur. Stefnandi starfaði
áfram sem sjómaður í Danmörku og greiddi iðgjöld í danskan lífeyrissjóð.
Þann 16. september 1996 slasaðist hann við störf á dönsku fiskiskipi og var í
kjölfarið metinn 75% öryrki.
2
Stefnandi hafði áunnið sér rétt til lífeyrisgreiðslna úr nokkrum íslenskum
lífeyrissjóðum á þeim tíma þegar slysið varð. Iðgjöld höfðu verið greidd af
launum stefnanda til Lífeyrissjóðs Vestfirðinga á tímabilinu 1975 til 1987, til
Lífeyrissjóðs Austurlands á árunum 1991 til 1995, síðast fyrir ágústmánuð
1995, og til stefnda í málinu, þá Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna, nú Gildi-lífeyrissjóðs,
á tímabilinu 1969 til 1995, síðast fyrir septembermánuð 1995.
3
Stefnandi fékk greidda eingreiðslu 99.653,12 danskar krónur í bætur úr danska
lífeyrissjóðnum vegna slyssins og virðist ekki hafa öðlast rétt til frekari bóta af
því tilefni hjá þeim lífeyrissjóði. Hann fær þó greiddan mánaðarlegan lífeyri
að upphæð 1.620 danskar krónur (um það bil 210 evrur) frá sveitarfélaginu
í Danmörku þar sem hann er búsettur. Stefnandi hefur fengið greiddar
örorkubætur frá þeim lífeyrissjóðum á Íslandi sem að framan eru taldir, í
samræmi við stigaeign hans og metna örorku, allt frá 1. október 1996.
4
Stefnandi hefur hins vegar ekki verið talinn eiga rétt á því að örorkubætur hans
séu ákvarðaðar út frá framreiknuðum stigafjölda, þ.e. stigafjölda sem hann
hefði getað áunnið sér í sjóði stefnda hefði hann áfram átt aðild að sjóðnum
--11
6 --
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
og munnlegs málflutnings umboðsmanns stefnanda, Stefáns Geirs Þórissonar,
umboðsmanns stefndu, Harðar Felix Harðarsonar, fulltrúa eftirlitsstofnunar EFTA, Lorna
Young, og fulltrúa framkvæmdastjórnar Evrópubandalaganna Nicola Yerrell, sem fram
fór 17. október 2007,
JUDGMENT
með tilliti til skýrslu framsögumanns,
pension calculated on the basis of projected points, i.e. pension points that
he would have been able to accrue with the Defendant, had he remained a
member of that pension fund and continued working until reaching the age of
retirement. The dispute between the parties concerns this right to projection
of entitlements.
5
The Plaintiff has brought an action before Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur and
demanded such payment from the Defendant. He bases his claim on the
view that he is entitled to an invalidity pension with account taken of projected
pension points with the Defendant, since the rules of the fund regarding
projection and the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Relations between
the Icelandic Pension Funds infringe provisions of the Agreement on the
European Economic Area (hereinafter the “EEA Agreement” or “EEA”) on the
free movement of workers, in particular Articles 28 and 29 and the rules based
thereon.
6
By a letter dated 19 March 2007, registered at the EFTA Court on 26 March
2007, Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur put a request to the Court for an Advisory
Opinion on the following three questions:
1. Does the term ‘social security’ as it is to be understood under the EEA
Agreement, and in particular Article 29 of the main text of the Agreement and
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application
of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons
and to members of their families moving within the Community, cover the
entitlement to invalidity benefit that arises in pension fund schemes such
as the Icelandic one?
2. Whether or not the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, the District
Court asks whether the provisions of the EEA Agreement on the free
movement of workers, and in particular Articles 28 and 29, can be interpreted
as meaning that a rule in the Articles of Association of Icelandic pension
funds which makes the right to a specific benefit (the right to projection of
entitlements) subject to the condition that the individual involved has paid
premiums to an Icelandic pension fund that is a party to the Agreement
on Relations between the Pension Funds, for at least 6 of the 12 months
preceding the date of an accident, is compatible with the EEA Agreement
when the reason why the individual is unable to meet this condition is that he
has moved to another State within the EEA in order to pursue employment
--12
7 --
5
Stefnandi höfðaði mál fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur og gerði kröfu um greiðslur
úr sjóði stefnda á grundvelli framreiknings. Hann heldur því fram kröfum sínum
til stuðnings, að hann eigi rétt á örorkubótum sem taki mið af framreiknuðum
stigafjölda. Reglur sjóðsins um framreikning og ákvæði í samkomulagi um
samskipti lífeyrissjóða brjóti í bága við ákvæði samningsins um Evrópska
efnahagssvæðið (hér eftir EES-samningur eða EES) um frjálsa för launþega,
einkum ákvæði 28. og 29. gr. EES og reglur sem á þeim byggja.
6
Með bréfi, dagsettu 19. mars 2007, skráðu í málaskrá EFTA-dómstólsins
26. mars 2007, óskaði Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur eftir ráðgefandi áliti varðandi
eftirfarandi þrjár spurningar:
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
og starfað fram að eftirlaunaaldri, þar sem hann uppfyllir ekki það skilyrði að
hafa greitt iðgjöld til stefnda í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði af undanfarandi
tólf mánuðum fyrir slysdag. Ágreiningur málsaðila snýst um umræddan rétt til
framreiknings.
2. Hvort heldur svarið við spurningu nr. 1 er játandi eða ekki, þá er spurt hvort
ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega, einkum 28. og 29. gr.,
verði skýrð svo, að regla í samþykktum íslenskra lífeyrissjóða, sem gerir
það að skilyrði fyrir tilteknum bótarétti (svokölluðum framreikningsrétti), að
launþegi greiði iðgjöld til íslensks lífeyrissjóðs, sem er aðili að samkomulagi
um samskipti lífeyrissjóða, í að minnsta kosti 6 af síðustu 12 mánuðum
fyrir slys, fái staðist ákvæði EES-samningsins, þegar ástæða þess að
einstaklingurinn uppfyllir ekki skilyrði er sú, að hann hafði flust til annars
- -13
7--
JUDGMENT
1. Nær hugtakið almannatryggingar, eins og það ber að skilja samkvæmt
EES-samningnum, einkum 29. gr. meginmáls samningsins og reglugerð nr.
1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971, um beitingu almannatryggingareglna gagnvart
launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra
sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja, til réttinda til örorkubóta, sem myndast í
lífeyrissjóðakerfi eins og því íslenska?
comparable to that which he pursued previously, and he has paid into a
pension fund in that State?
3. Is Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971, on the application
and to members of their families moving within the Community, to be
interpreted as meaning that workers are to present their compensation
claims in the state in which they were resident and in which they had social
security entitlements at the time of their injury?
II
Legal background
National Law
7
According to Icelandic law, workers are obliged to belong to a pension fund
which as a main principle shall be the pension fund of their respective occupation
or workers’ group. Icelandic pension funds are in general established on the
basis of agreements between workers’ and employers’ organisations, but
certain funds are governed by special legislation. In the event of loss of working
capacity, fund members are entitled to an invalidity benefit.
8
The Mariners’ Pension Fund (hereinafter also the “MPF”) was established
by special legislation, Act No 78/1970. The Act provided detailed instructions
for the fund including provisions which made invalidity pensions based on
projected rights mandatory. These rules were upheld when the 1970 Act was
replaced by Act No 49/1974 on the MPF (hereinafter “the 1974 Act”).
9
The 1974 Act was later replaced by Act No 94/1994 on the MPF (hereinafter
“the 1994 Act”) which was in force at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident. The Act
laid down general rules on the organisation and the objectives of the fund. It
stipulated that all mariners hired on board Icelandic vessels were in general to
be members of the fund. However, mariners could apply for a permission from
the Minister of Finance to remain outside the fund. In order to qualify for an
exemption they had to fulfil their insurance obligation by paying contributions
to the respective regional fund. The Act left the content of most rights and
entitlements to be laid down in a ‘regulation’ decided upon by the board of
the fund and approved by the workers’ and employers’ organisations and
the Minister of Finance. Thus it was left to the ‘regulation’ to provide rules on
whether invalidity pensions should be awarded on the basis not only of the
contributions already made (accrued rights) but also of contributions which
the member would have paid had he or she continued to be a member until
--14
8 --
II Löggjöf
Landsréttur
7
Samkvæmt íslenskum lögum er launþegum skylt að eiga aðild að lífeyrissjóði,
sem að meginstefnu til skal vera lífeyrissjóður viðkomandi starfsstéttar eða
launþegasamtaka. Íslenskir lífeyrissjóðir eru almennt stofnaðir á grundvelli
samninga samtaka launafólks og atvinnurekenda en ákveðnir sjóðir starfa
þó á grundvelli sérlaga. Verði sjóðsfélagar fyrir orkutapi, eiga þeir rétt á
örorkubótum.
8
Lífeyrissjóður sjómanna var settur á fót með sérstökum lögum, þ.e. lögum nr.
78/1970. Í lögunum voru ítarleg ákvæði um sjóðinn sem m.a. lögbundu réttinn
til örorkubóta á grundvelli framreiknings. Þessar reglur voru áfram í lögum nr.
49/1974 um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna (hér eftir lög nr. 49/1974), sem komu í stað
laganna frá 1970.
9
Lögin frá 1974 voru leyst af hólmi með lögum nr. 94/1994 um Lífeyrissjóð
sjómanna sem í gildi voru á þeim tíma þegar stefnandi varð fyrir slysinu (hér
eftir lög nr. 94/1994). Í lögunum voru almennar reglur um skipulag og markmið
sjóðsins. Samkvæmt þeim var meginreglan sú að allir sjómenn sem ráðnir
voru á íslensk skip áttu að vera félagar í sjóðnum. Sjómenn gátu þó sótt um
undanþágu frá aðildarskyldunni til fjármálaráðherra, en slík undanþága var
því aðeins veitt, að tryggingaskyldunni væri fullnægt með greiðslu iðgjalds
til lífeyrissjóðs viðkomandi byggðarlags. Samkvæmt lögunum skyldi inntak
réttinda fara samkvæmt reglugerð sem stjórn sjóðsins semdi og staðfest væri
af samtökum launþega og atvinnurekenda og af fjármálaráðherra. Það þurfti
því að ákveða með reglugerðinni hvort reikna bæri örorkubætur þannig, að
ekki væri aðeins miðað við greidd framlög (uppsöfnuð réttindi) heldur einnig
framlög sem viðkomandi sjóðfélagi hefði greitt ef hann hefði átt aðild að sjóðnum
fram að eftirlaunaaldri (framreiknuð réttindi). Samkvæmt upplýsingum frá
--15
8 --
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
3. Ber að túlka reglugerð nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971, um beitingu
almannatryggingareglna gagnvart launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi
einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja, svo
að launþegum beri að bera fram kröfur sínar um bætur í því landi þar sem
þeir eru búsettir og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar þeir slasast.
JUDGMENT
ríkis innan Evrópska efnahagssvæðisins til að stunda þar sambærileg störf
og áður og greitt í þarlendan lífeyrissjóð.
the age of retirement (projected rights). According to information submitted
by the parties during the oral hearing, most, if not all, Icelandic pension funds
offered invalidity pensions which included pensions based on projected rights.
This included the MPF, to which the Plaintiff belonged immediately before he
moved from Iceland, and which at the time was the only pension fund for
mariners.
10 According to the ‘regulation’ of the MPF which was in force at the time of the
Plaintiff’s accident, a fund member who suffered a loss of working capacity
of 40% or more was entitled to an invalidity pension from the fund based on
projection, provided that he had (a) paid premiums to the fund for at least three
of the preceding four calendar years and accrued not less than one point for
each of the years; (b) paid premiums to the fund for at least 6 months and for
at least 100 days during the preceding 12 months; and (c) suffered a reduction
of income as a result of the loss of working capacity.
11 The ‘regulation’ of the MPF did not provide for contributions, paid to funds
to which a member had belonged previously, to be taken into account when
determining whether the conditions for an invalidity pension based on projected
rights were fulfilled. However, an agreement of 14 December 1983 on the
relations between the pension funds, to which the MPF was a party, provided
for such a right, subject to certain conditions, for persons moving between
funds which were parties to the agreement.
12 The 1994 Act also left it to the ‘regulation’ to lay down the contributions to be
paid by employees and employers who were members of the fund. According
to information offered by the parties during the oral hearing, it seems that
funds which offered invalidity pensions based on projected rights did not give
their members a right to opt for invalidity pensions based on accrued rights
only against lower contributions.
13 The 1994 Act was replaced by Act No 45/1999 on the MPF. Act No 45/1999 was
repealed by Act No 137/2004 which stipulates that as from 1 January 2005, the
Defendant is governed by the Pension Act No 129/1997. The Pension Act lays
down general rules on the operation of pension funds in Iceland. Article 15(2)
of the Act states that invalidity pension rights are to be projected in accordance
with the rules specified in further detail in the Articles of Association of the
pension funds, provided that the member in question has paid into a fund for
at least three of the preceding four years, including at least six months of the
preceding twelve-month period.
--16
9 --
10 Samkvæmt reglugerð Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna, sem var í gildi þegar stefnandi
varð fyrir slysinu, átti sjóðfélagi sem varð fyrir orkutapi sem svaraði til 40%
örorku eða meira rétt á örorkubótum úr sjóðnum á grundvelli framreiknings
að tilteknum skilyrðum uppfylltum. Þau voru að hann hefði: a) greitt iðgjöld
til sjóðsins a.m.k. þrjú af undanfarandi fjórum almanaksárum og áunnið sér
ekki minna en eitt stig hvert þessara ára; b) greitt iðgjöld til sjóðsins í a.m.k. 6
mánuði og að lágmarki 100 daga á undanfarandi 12 mánuðum; og c) orðið fyrir
tekjuskerðingu af völdum orkutapsins.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
málsaðilum við munnlega meðferð málsins greiddu flestir, ef ekki allir, íslenskir
lífeyrissjóðir örorkubætur á grundvelli framreiknaðra réttinda á þeim tíma sem
slys stefnanda varð. Það átti einnig við um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna, sem þá
var eini lífeyrissjóður sjómanna og stefnandi var félagi í þegar hann flutti frá
Íslandi.
11 Í reglugerðinni var ekki mælt fyrir um að taka bæri tillit til framlaga sem sjóðfélagi
hafði greitt í lífeyrissjóði sem hann hafði áður verið aðili að, við mat á því hvort
skilyrði til örorkubóta á grundvelli á framreiknings væru uppfyllt. Samkomulag
um samskipti lífeyrissjóða frá 14. desember 1983, sem stefnandi var aðili að,
veitti hins vegar einstaklingum sem fluttu sig milli sjóða sem voru aðilar að
samkomulaginu slíkan rétt að ákveðnum skilyrðum uppfylltum.
13 Lög nr. 94/1994 voru leyst af hólmi með lögum nr. 45/1999 um Lífeyrissjóð
sjómanna. Þau lög voru numin úr gildi með lögum nr. 137/2004 sem kveða
á um, að frá og með 1. janúar 2005 skuli stefndi starfa á grundvelli laga um
skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða nr. 129/1997. Í þeim
lögum eru almennar reglur um starfsemi lífeyrissjóða á Íslandi. Samkvæmt 2.
mgr. 15. gr. laganna skulu örorkubætur framreiknaður samkvæmt reglum sem
nánar er kveðið á um í samþykktum lífeyrissjóða, enda hafi sjóðfélagi greitt
til lífeyrissjóðs í a.m.k. þrjú ár á undanfarandi fjórum árum, þar af a.m.k. sex
mánuði á síðasta tólf mánaða tímabili.
9 ---17
JUDGMENT
12 Lög nr. 94/1994 mæltu ekki fyrir um framlög til sjóðsins en í reglugerð um
sjóðinn voru ákvæði um þau framlög sem launþegum og atvinnurekendum bar
að greiða. Samkvæmt upplýsingum sem fram komu við munnlega meðferð
málsins virðast sjóðir sem greiddu örorkubætur á grundvelli framreiknings ekki
hafa gefið sjóðfélögum kost á að velja bætur byggðar á áunnum réttindum
eingöngu, gegn því að greiða lægri iðgjöld.
14 It is undisputed among the parties that the Plaintiff’s case falls to be assessed
under the 1994 Act.
EEA Law
15 Article 28(1) EEA reads:
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured among EC Member States
and EFTA States.
16 Article 29 EEA reads:
In order to provide freedom of movement for workers and self-employed
persons, the Contracting Parties shall, in the field of social security, secure,
as provided for in Annex VI, for workers and self-employed persons and their
dependants, in particular:
(a)aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit
and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account
under the laws of the several countries;
(b)payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Contracting
Parties.
17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application
and to members of their families moving within the Community (hereinafter
“Regulation 1408/71”) is referred to at point 1 of Annex VI to the EEA
Agreement. Unless otherwise indicated, the following provisions are quoted
with the wording applicable, subject to Protocol 1 of the EEA Agreement and
the adaptations contained in Annex VI, at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident.
18 Under Title I General provisions, Article 1 Definitions, item (j):
legislation means in respect of each Member State statutes, regulations and
other provisions and all other implementing measures, present or future,
relating to the branches and schemes of social security covered by Article 4 (1)
and (2) or those special non-contributory benefits covered by Article 4 (2a).
The term excludes provisions of existing or future industrial agreements,
whether or not they have been the subject of a decision by the authorities
rendering them compulsory or extending their scope. However, in so far as
such provisions:
(i) serve to put into effect compulsory insurance imposed by the laws and
regulations referred to in the preceding subparagraph; or
18 - 10
EES-réttur
15 Ákvæði 1. mgr. 28. gr. EES er svohljóðandi:
Frelsi launþega til flutninga skal vera tryggt í aðildarríkjum EB og EFTAríkjum.
16 Ákvæði 29. gr. EES er svohljóðandi:
Til að veita launþegum og sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum frelsi til flutninga
skulu samningsaðilar á sviði almannatrygginga, í samræmi við VI. viðauka,
einkum tryggja launþegum og sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum og þeim sem
þeir framfæra að:
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14 Ágreiningslaust er með málsaðilum, að um rétt stefnanda fer samkvæmt lögum
nr. 94/1994.
a) lögð verði saman öll tímabil sem taka ber til greina samkvæmt lögum hinna
ýmsu landa til að öðlast og viðhalda bótarétti, svo og reikna fjárhæð bóta;
b) bætur séu greiddar fólki sem er búsett á yfirráðasvæðum samningsaðila.
17 Í 1. lið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn er vísað í reglugerð ráðsins (EBE)
nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971 um beitingu almannatryggingareglna gagnvart
launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem
flytjast milli aðildarríkja (hér eftir reglugerð 1408/71). Tilvísanir í ákvæði hér
á eftir, með fyrirvara um bókun 1 við EES-samninginn og aðlögunarliði í
VI. viðauka, eru byggðar á ákvæðunum eins og þau voru á þeim tíma sem
stefnandi varð fyrir slysinu, nema annað sé tekið fram.
löggjöf: að því er varðar sérhvert aðildarríki, gildandi lög, reglugerðir
og önnur ákvæði ásamt síðari breytingum aðildarríkis um framkvæmd
almannatryggingareglna sem 1. og 2. mgr. 4. gr. ná til eða sérstakar bætur
sem eru ekki iðgjaldsskyldar og fjallað er um í 2. mgr. a í 4. gr.;
Undir þetta falla ekki ákvæði gildandi eða komandi kjarasamninga, óháð því
hvort yfirvöld hafa ákveðið að gera þau skyldubundin eða víkka gildissvið
þeirra. Ef slík ákvæði:
i) hafa verið notuð til að koma á skyldutryggingu þeirri sem kveðið er á um í
þeim lögum og reglugerðum sem um getur í undanfarandi undirgrein, eða
19 - 10
JUDGMENT
18 I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði,1. gr., Skilgreiningar, j-liður:
(ii) set up a scheme administered by the same institution as that which
administers the schemes set up by the laws and regulations referred to in
the preceding subparagraph,
the limitation on the term may at any time be lifted by a declaration of the
Member State concerned specifying the schemes of such a kind to which
this Regulation applies. Such a declaration shall be notified and published in
accordance with the provisions of Article 97.
[…]
19 Under Title I General provisions, Article 1 Definitions, item (r):
periods of insurance means periods of contribution or period of employment
or self-employment as defined or recognized as periods of insurance by the
legislation under which they were completed or considered as completed, and
all periods treated as such, where they are regarded by the said legislation as
equivalent to periods of insurance;
20 Under Title I General provisions, Article 4 Matters covered, paragraph 1(b) and
(e):
This regulation shall apply to all legislation concerning the following branches
of social security:
[…]
(b)invalidity benefits, including those intended for the maintenance
improvement of earning capacity;
[…]
(e)benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases;
21 Under Title I General provisions, Article 5 Declarations by the Member States
on the scope of this Regulation:
The Member States shall specify the legislation and schemes referred to
in Article 4 (1) and (2) […] in declarations to be notified and published in
accordance with Article 97.
22 Point I(b) of Iceland’s original Declaration pursuant to Article 5 (OJ C 398 of
31.12.1994 p. 10):
Invalidity benefits:
[…]
Act on the Seamen’s Pension Fund (49/1974 with later amendments)
[…]
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11 -
má hins vegar afnema þessa takmörkun hvenær sem er með yfirlýsingu
hlutaðeigandi aðildarríkis, þar sem fram kemur hvaða tryggingakerfi
reglugerðinni er ætlað að ná til. Gefa skal út tilkynningu um slíka yfirlýsingu og
hún birt samkvæmt ákvæðum 97. gr.
[...]
19 I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 1. gr., Skilgreiningar, r-liður:
tryggingatímabil: iðgjaldatímabil eða starfstímabil launþega eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklings eins og það er skilgreint eða viðurkennt sem
tryggingatímabil, samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf sem í gildi var þegar þeim var lokið
eða var talið lokið, og að auki öll tímabil sem farið er með sem slík þar sem þau
í téðri löggjöf eru talin jafngilda tryggingatímabilum;
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ii) hafa falið í sér fyrirmæli um að komið sé á fót kerfi undir stjórn sömu
stofnunar og kveðið er á um í þeim lögum og reglugerðum sem um getur í
undanfarandi undirgrein,
20 I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 4. gr., Tryggingaflokkar, 1. mgr., b- og e-liður:
Reglugerð þessi nær til löggjafar um eftirfarandi flokka almannatrygginga:
[...]
b) örorkubætur að meðtöldum bótum sem ætlaðar eru til að viðhalda eða
auka möguleika á tekjuöflun;
[...]
e) bætur vegna vinnuslysa og atvinnusjúkdóma;
21 I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 5. gr., Yfirlýsingar aðildarríkjanna um gildissvið
þessarar reglugerðar:
Aðildarríkin skulu, í opinberum auglýsingum sem ber að tilkynna og birta í
samræmi við 97. gr., tilgreina löggjöf og kerfi sem um getur í 1. og 2. mgr. 4.
gr. [...].
22 Liður I b í upprunalegri yfirlýsingu Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr. (Stjtíð. EB C 398,
31.12.1994, bls. 10):
[...]
Lög um lífeyrissjóð sjómanna (49/1974 með síðari breytingum)
[...]
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11 -
JUDGMENT
b) Bætur vegna örorku:
23 Point I(b) in the later Declaration made by Iceland pursuant to Article 5 (OJ
C 135 of 2.6.2005 p. 11):
Invalidity benefits:
[…]
The Pension Act No 129/1997 with later amendments
[…]
The Act on the Seamen Pension Fund No 45/1999 with later amendments
[…]
24 Under Title I General provisions, Article 10 Waiving of residence clauses –
Effect of compulsory insurance on reimbursement of contributions, paragraph 1:
Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation invalidity, old-age or survivors’
cash benefits, pension for accidents at work or occupational diseases and
death grants acquired under the legislation of one or more Member States
shall not be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, withdrawal or
confiscation by reason of the fact that the recipient resides in the territory of a
Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for payment
is situated.
[…]
25 Under Title III Special provisions relating to the various categories of benefits,
Chapter 2 Invalidity, Section 2 Employed persons or self-employed persons
subject either only to legislation under which the amount of invalidity benefit
depends on the duration of periods of insurance or residence or the legislation
of this type and of the type referred to in Section 1:
Article 40 General provisions, paragraph 1:
An employed person or a self-employed person who has been successively or
alternately subject to the legislation of two or more Member States, of which
at least on is not of the type referred to in Article 37 (1), shall receive benefits
under the provisions of Chapter 3, which shall apply mutatis mutandis […].
26 Under Title III Special provisions relating to the various categories of benefits,
Chapter 3 Old age and death (pensions):
Article 44 General provisions for the award of benefits where an employed
or self-employed person has been subject to the legislation of two or more
Member States, paragraph 1:
12 - 22
b) Örorkubætur:
[...]
Lög um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða nr. 129/1997,
með áorðnum breytingum
[...]
Lög um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna nr. 45/1999, með áorðnum breytingum
24 I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 10. gr., Eftirgjöf á skilyrðum um búsetu – Áhrif
skyldutryggingar á endurgreiðslu iðgjalda, 1. mgr.:
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23 Liður I b í síðari yfirlýsingu Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr. (Stjtíð. EB C 135, 2.6.2005,
bls. 11):
Hafi réttur til peningagreiðslna vegna örorku-, elli- eða eftirlifendabóta eða til
lífeyris vegna vinnuslysa eða atvinnusjúkdóma og styrkja vegna andláts verið
áunninn samkvæmt löggjöf eins eða fleiri aðildarríkja, skulu þessar greiðslur
ekki lækka, breytast, stöðvast tímabundið, falla niður eða vera gerðar upptækar
af þeirri ástæðu að viðtakandi hafi búsetu í öðru aðildarríki en því þar sem
stofnun sú sem ber ábyrgð á greiðslum er staðsett, nema kveðið sé á um
annað í þessari reglugerð.
[...]
25 III. bálkur, Sérákvæði um ýmsa bótaflokka, 2. kafli, Örorka, 2. þáttur, Launþegar
eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingar sem heyra annað hvort eingöngu undir
löggjöf sem gerir ráð fyrir því að fjárhæð örorkubóta fari eftir lengd tryggingaeða búsetutímabila eða sem heyra bæði undir slíka löggjöf og þá sem getið er
um í 1. þætti:
40. gr., Almenn ákvæði, 1. mgr.:
26 III. bálkur, Sérákvæði um ýmsa bótaflokka, 3. kafli, Elli og andlát (lífeyrir):
44. gr., Almenn ákvæði um greiðslu bóta þegar launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi
einstaklingur hefur heyrt undir löggjöf tveggja eða fleiri aðildarríkja, 1. mgr.:
12 - 23
JUDGMENT
Launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur sem hefur samfellt eða sitt á
hvað heyrt undir löggjöf tveggja eða fleiri aðildarríkja, og minnst ein þeirra er
annars eðlis en sú sem um getur í 1. mgr. 37. gr., skal fá bætur samkvæmt
ákvæðum 3. kafla, sem skal gilda að breyttu breytanda [...].
The rights to benefits of an employed or self-employed person who has been
subject to the legislation of two or more Member States […] shall be determined
in accordance with this Chapter.
Article 45 Consideration of periods of insurance or of residence completed
under the legislations to which an employed person or self-employed person
was subject, for the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits,
paragraphs 1 and 5:
1. Where the legislation of a Member State makes the acquisition, retention
or recovery of the right to benefits, under a scheme which is not a special
scheme within the meaning of paragraph 2 or 3, subject to the completion
of periods of insurance or of residence, the competent institution of that
Member State shall take account, where necessary, of the periods of
insurance or of residence completed under the legislation of any other
Member State, be it under a general scheme or under a special scheme
and either as an employed person or a self-employed person. For that
purpose, it shall take account of these periods as if they had completed
under its own legislation.
[…]
or recovery of the right to benefits conditional upon the person concerned
being insured at the time of the materialization of the risk, this condition
shall be regarded as having been satisfied in the case of insurance under
the legislation of another Member State, in accordance with the procedures
provided in Annex VI for each Member State concerned.
Article 46 Award of benefits, paragraph 2:
Where the conditions required by the legislation of a Member State for
entitlement to benefits are satisfied only after application of Article 45 and or
Article 40 (3), the following rules shall apply:
(a)the competent institution shall calculate the theoretical amount of the
benefit to which the person concerned could lay claim provided all periods
of insurance and/or of residence, which have been completed under the
legislation of the Member States to which the employed person or selfemployed person was subject, have been completed in the State in question
under the legislation which it administers on the date of the award of the
benefit. If, under this legislation, the amount of the benefit is independent
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24 -
45. gr., Mat á trygginga- eða búsetutímabilum sem launþegi eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklingur hefur lokið til að öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta
bótarétt samkvæmt löggjöf sem hann hefur heyrt undir, 1. og 5. mgr.:
1. Þegar löggjöf aðildarríkis setur það skilyrði fyrir rétti einstaklings til að
öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta bætur eftir kerfi, sem er ekki sérstakt
bótakerfi í skilningi 2. eða 3. mgr., að trygginga- eða búsetutímabilum sé
lokið, skal þar til bær stofnun þess aðildarríkis taka til greina, að því marki
sem nauðsynlegt er, trygginga- eða búsetutímabil sem lokið er samkvæmt
löggjöf annars aðildarríkis, hvort heldur sem það er gert eftir almennu
kerfi eða sérstöku bótakerfi og hvort heldur um er að ræða launþega eða
sjálfstætt starfandi einstakling. Með það í huga skal hún taka tillit til þessara
tímabila eins og þeim hefði verið lokið samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf sem hún
starfar eftir.
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Hafi launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur heyrt undir löggjöf tveggja
eða fleiri aðildarríkja skal ákvarða bótarétt hans [...] samkvæmt ákvæðum
þessa kafla.
[...]
46. gr., Úthlutun bóta, 2. mgr.:
Verði skilyrðum sem eru sett í löggjöf aðildarríkis vegna bótaréttar einungis
fullnægt með því að beita ákvæðum 45. gr. og/eða 3. mgr. 40. gr. gilda
eftirfarandi reglur:
a) þar til bær stofnun skal reikna út þá viðmiðunarfjárhæð bóta sem
viðkomandi gæti krafist ef öllum trygginga og/eða búsetutímabilum, sem
hefur verið lokið samkvæmt löggjöf þeirra aðildarríkja sem launþegi eða
sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur heyrði undir, hefði verið lokið í umræddu
ríki og samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf er stofnunin starfar eftir á þeim degi þegar
bótum er úthlutað. Ef bótafjárhæðin er samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf óháð lengd
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JUDGMENT
öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta bætur að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur sé
tryggður á þeim tíma er áhættan kemur fram skal litið svo á að því skilyrði
hafi verið fullnægt, enda sé viðkomandi tryggður samkvæmt löggjöf annars
aðildarríkis, í samræmi við reglur sem eru settar fyrir hvert aðildarríki í VI.
viðauka.
of the duration of the periods completed, the amount shall be regarded as
being the theoretical amount referred to in this paragraph;
(b)the competent institution shall subsequently determine the actual amount
of the benefit on the basis of the theoretical amount referred to in the
preceding paragraph in accordance with the ratio of the duration of the
periods of insurance or of residence completed before the materialization of
the risk under the legislation which it administers to the total duration of the
periods of insurance and of residence completed before the materialization
of the risk under the legislations of all the Member States concerned.
27 Under Title VI Miscellaneous provisions:
Article 86 Claims, declarations or appeals submitted to an authority, institution
or tribunal of a Member State other than the competent State, paragraph 1:
Any claim, declaration or appeal which should have been submitted, in order
to comply with the legislation of one Member State, within a specified period
to an authority, institution or tribunal of that State shall be admissible if it is
submitted within the same period to a corresponding authority, institution or
tribunal of another Member State. In such a case the authority, institution, or
tribunal receiving the claim, declaration or appeal shall forward it without delay
to the competent authority, institution or tribunal of the former State either
directly or through the competent authorities of the Member State concerned.
The date on which such claims, declarations or appeals were submitted to the
authority, institution or tribunal of the Second State shall be considered as the
date of their submission to the competent authority, institution or tribunal.
28 As referred to at point 1, adaptation (t), cf. originally adaptation (n), of Annex
VI to the EEA Agreement, the following has been added to Annex VI Special
procedures for applying the legislations of certain Member States to Regulation
1408/71 (cf. Article 89 of the Regulation), as regards Iceland, under point ZA,
cf. previously point P, originally point O:
Where employment or self-employment in Iceland has terminated and the
contingency occurs during employment or self-employment in another State
to which this Regulation applies and where the disability pension of both the
social security and the supplementary pension schemes (pension funds)
in Iceland no longer includes the period between the contingency and the
pensionable age (future periods), periods of insurance under the legislation of
another State to which this Regulation applies shall be taken into consideration
26 - 14
b) þar til bær stofnun skal síðan ákvarða raunverulegu bótafjárhæðina á
grundvelli þeirrar viðmiðunarfjárhæðar sem um getur í undanfarandi
staflið eftir hlutfallinu á milli lengdar trygginga- eða búsetutímabila, sem
var lokið samkvæmt löggjöf stofnunarinnar áður en áhættan kom fram, og
heildarlengdar trygginga- eða búsetutímabila sem var lokið samkvæmt
löggjöf allra hlutaðeigandi aðildarríkja áður en áhættan kom fram.
27 VI. bálkur, Ýmis ákvæði:
86. gr., Kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir sem lagðar eru fyrir yfirvöld, stofnun
eða dómstól í aðildarríki öðru en hinu lögbæra ríki, 1. mgr.:
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lokinna tímabila skal litið svo á að hún sé viðmiðunarfjárhæðin sem um
getur í þessum staflið;
Allar kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir sem samkvæmt löggjöf aðildarríkis hefði
átt að leggja fram við yfirvöld, stofnun eða dómstól í því aðildarríki innan tiltekins
tíma skulu taldar gildar ef gögnin eru lögð fram innan sama tíma við yfirvöld,
stofnun eða dómstól í öðru aðildarríki. Í slíku tilviki skulu yfirvöld, stofnun eða
dómstóll, sem veita viðtöku kröfu, yfirlýsingu eða áfrýjun, framsenda þar til
bæru yfirvaldi, stofnun eða dómstól fyrra ríkisins þessi gögn tafarlaust, ýmist
beint eða fyrir milligöngu lögbærra yfirvalda í hlutaðeigandi aðildarríki. Sá dagur
þegar slíkar kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir eru lagðar fyrir yfirvöld, stofnun
eða dómstól í síðara aðildarríkinu telst vera eiginlegur skiladagur gagnanna til
lögbærra yfirvalda, stofnunar eða dómstóls.
Hafi launaðri vinnu eða sjálfstæðri atvinnustarfsemi verið lokið á Íslandi, og
tilvikið verður þegar launuð vinna eða sjálfstæð atvinnustarfsemi er stunduð í
öðru ríki sem reglugerðin tekur til og þar sem örorkulífeyrir, bæði samkvæmt
almannatryggingakerfinu og viðbótarlífeyriskerfinu (lífeyrissjóðir), á Íslandi
felur ekki lengur í sér tímabilið frá því að tilvik kemur fram og fram að því að
lífeyrisaldri er náð (tímabil sem ekki er liðið), skal tekið tillit til tryggingatímabila
sem falla undir löggjöf annars ríkis sem reglugerðin tekur til að því er varðar
27 - 14
JUDGMENT
28 Eins og vísað er til í 1. lið í aðlögunarlið (t), upphaflega undir aðlögunarlið (n)
í VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn, hefur eftirfarandi verið bætt við VI. viðauka,
Sérstök tilhögun við framkvæmd á löggjöf tiltekinna aðildarríkja, við reglugerð
1408/71 (sbr. 89. gr. reglugerðarinnar) í aðlögunarlið ZA, hvað Ísland varðar,
sbr. fyrri aðlögunarlið (P), upphaflega aðlögunarlið (O):
for the requirement of the future periods as if they were periods of insurance in
Iceland.
29 Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the
procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application
and to their families moving within the Community (hereinafter “Regulation
574/72”) is referred to at point 2 of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement. Unless
otherwise indicated, the following provisions are quoted with the wording
applicable, subject to Protocol 1 of the EEA Agreement and the adaptations
contained in Annex VI, at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident.
30 Under Title IV Implementation of the special provisions of the Regulation
relating to the various categories of benefits, Chapter 3 Invalidity, old-age and
death (pensions), the Section on Submission and investigation of claims for
benefits:
Article 36 Claims for old-age and survivors’ benefits (excluding orphans’
benefits) and invalidity benefits in cases not referred to in Article 35 of the
implementing Regulation:
1. In order to receive benefits under Articles 40 to 51 of the Regulation, except
in the cases referred to in Article 35 of the implementing Regulation, the
person concerned shall submit a claim to the institution of the place of
residence in accordance with the procedure provided for by the legislation
administered by that institution. If the employed or self-employed person
has not been subject to that legislation, the institution of the place of
residence shall forward the claim to the institution of the Member State
to whose legislation he was last subject, indicating the date on which the
claim was submitted. That date shall be regarded as the date on which the
claim was submitted to the latter institution.
2. Where a claimant resides in the territory of a Member State to whose
legislation the employed or self-employed person has not been subject,
he may submit his claim to the institution of the Member State to whose
legislation the employed or self-employed person was last subject.
[…]
4. A claim for benefits sent to the institution of one Member State shall
automatically involve the concurrent award of benefits under the legislation
of all the Member States in question whose conditions the claimant satisfies
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29 Vísað er til reglugerðar ráðsins (EBE) nr. 574/72 frá 21. mars 1972 sem
kveður á um framkvæmd reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 1408/71 um beitingu
almannatryggingareglna gagnvart launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum
og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja (hér eftir reglugerð
574/72) í 2. lið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn. Tilvísanir í ákvæði hér á eftir,
með fyrirvara um bókun 1 við EES-samninginn og aðlögunarliði í VI. viðauka,
eru byggðar á ákvæðunum eins og þau voru á þeim tíma sem stefnandi varð
fyrir slysinu, nema annað sé tekið fram.
30 IV. bálkur, Framkvæmd sérákvæða reglugerðarinnar um hina ýmsu bótaflokka,
3. kafli, Örorka, elli og andlát (lífeyrir), undir þættinum Kröfur um bætur og
umfjöllun þeirra:
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kröfuna um tímabil sem ekki er liðið eins og um væri að ræða tryggingatímabil
á Íslandi.
36. gr. Kröfur um elli- og eftirlifendabætur (að undanskildum
munaðarleysingjabótum) og örorkubætur sem falla ekki undir 35. gr.
framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar:
1. Hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur skal leggja fram kröfu hjá stofnun á búsetustað,
eins og ráð er fyrir gert í löggjöfinni sem hún starfar eftir, til þess að fá
bætur samkvæmt 40.–51. gr. í reglugerðinni, að undanskildum þeim
tilvikum sem vísað er til í 35. gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar. Hafi
launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur ekki heyrt undir þá löggjöf,
skal stofnun á búsetustað senda kröfuna áfram til stofnunar sem starfar
samkvæmt löggjöf þess aðildarríkis sem krefjandi heyrði síðast undir og
tilgreina dagsetningu kröfunnar. Gildir dagsetningin sem skiladagur kröfu
hjá síðarnefndu stofnuninni.
2. Hafi krefjandi ekki heyrt undir löggjöf, sem launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi
einstaklingur, þess aðildarríkis þar sem hann er búsettur, getur hann sent
kröfu sína til stofnunar sem starfar samkvæmt löggjöf þess aðildarríkis sem
hann heyrði síðast undir.
4. Krafa um bætur sem send er til stofnunar í einu aðildarríki felur í sér að
bótum er sjálfkrafa úthlutað samtímis samkvæmt löggjöf allra hlutaðeigandi
aðildarríkja, þar sem krefjandi hefur fullnægt skilyrðum fyrir bótarétti, nema
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JUDGMENT
[...]
except where, under Article 44 (2) of the Regulation, the claimant asks for
postponement of any old-age benefits to which he would be entitled under
the legislation of one or more Member States.
31 Under the following Section on Investigation of claims for benefits in respect
of invalidity, old age and survivors in the cases referred to in Article 36 of the
Article 41 Determination of the investigating institutions:
1. Claims for benefit shall be investigated by the institution to which they have
been sent or forwarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of
the implementing Regulation. This institution is hereinafter referred to as
the ‘investigating institution’.
2. The investigating institution shall forthwith notify claims for benefits to all
the institutions concerned on a special form, so that the claims may be
investigated simultaneously and without delay by all these institutions.
Article 48 Notification to the claimant of the decisions of the institutions,
paragraph 1:
The final decision taken by each of the institutions concerned shall be notified
to the investigating institution. Each of these decisions must specify the
grounds and time-limits for appeal provided for by the legislation in question.
When all these decisions have been received, the investigation institution
shall communicate them to the claimant in his own language by means of a
summarized statement to which the aforesaid decisions shall be appended.
Periods allowed for appeals shall commence only on the date of receipt of the
summarized statement by the claimant.
32 Reference is made to the Report for the Hearing for a fuller account of the legal
framework, the facts, the procedure and the written observations submitted to
the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in so far as is
necessary for the reasoning of the Court.
III Findings of the Court
The first question
33 By its first question, Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur essentially asks whether
invalidity pensions based on projected rights fall under Regulation 1408/71
when the entitlement to such pensions is based on a scheme such as that
described in paragraphs 7−12 above.
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31 Þátturinn Athugun á kröfum vegna örorku-, elli-, og eftirlifendabóta í þeim
tilvikum sem um getur í 36. gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar:
41. gr., Úrskurður um hvaða stofnun beri að fjalla um kröfur:
1. Sú stofnun sem fengið hefur bótakröfur sendar samkvæmt ákvæðum
36. gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar, skal taka þær til athugunar. Þessi
stofnun er hér eftir kölluð „umsagnarstofnun“.
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krefjandi, samkvæmt 2. mgr. 44. gr. reglugerðarinnar, fari fram á að greiðslu
ellilífeyris, sem hann á rétt á samkvæmt löggjöf eins eða fleiri aðildarríkis,
sé frestað.
2. Umsagnarstofnun skal tilkynna öllum hlutaðeigandi stofnunum um
bótakröfur á þar til gerðum eyðublöðum, þannig að þær geti allar tekið
kröfurnar til athugunar tafarlaust.
48. gr., Ákvarðanir stofnana tilkynntar krefjanda, 1. mgr.:
Lokaákvörðun allra hlutaðeigandi stofnana skal tilkynnt umsagnaraðila. Í
hverri ákvörðun um sig skal koma fram hvaða forsendur og áfrýjunarfrestur
er tilgreindur í viðkomandi löggjöf. Eftir að umsagnaraðili fær ákvarðanirnar í
hendur skal hann senda krefjanda samantekt um þær á hans eigin tungumáli
ásamt fylgiriti með fyrrgreindum ákvörðunum. Krefjandi hefur tiltekinn frest til
áfrýjunar frá þeim degi er hann fær samantektina í hendur.
32 Vísað er til skýrslu framsögumanns um frekari lýsingu löggjafar, málsatvika og
meðferðar málsins, svo og um greinargerðir sem dómstólnum bárust. Þessi
atriði verða ekki rakin frekar eða rædd hér á eftir nema forsendur dómsins
krefji.
IIIÁlit dómstólsins
33 Með fyrstu spurningu sinni leitar Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur í aðalatriðum svara
við því hvort örorkubætur byggðar á framreikningi falli undir reglugerð 1408/71,
þegar rétturinn til bóta byggir á kerfi eins og því sem lýst er í málsgreinum 7-12
hér að framan.
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JUDGMENT
Fyrsta spurning
34 The Plaintiff argues that this is the case. He emphasises that Icelandic law
obliges persons working in Iceland to pay premiums to an Icelandic pension
fund. Further reference is made to Article 4(1) of Regulation 1408/71 whereby
the Regulation applies to legislation concerning inter alia invalidity benefits.
Moreover, the Plaintiff quotes Article 5, obliging the EEA States to specify such
legislation, and points out that the 1974 Act on the MPF with later amendments
was accordingly specified under the heading “Invalidity benefits” in Iceland’s
declaration pursuant to this Article. Both the EFTA Surveillance Authority
(hereinafter “ESA”) and the Commission of the European Communities
(hereinafter “the Commission”) also base their respective submissions on the
view that Regulation 1408/71 covers entitlement to invalidity benefits that arise
in pension fund schemes such as the Icelandic one, including pensions based
on projected rights.
35 The Defendant submits that benefits based on projection do not constitute
“social security” and thus fall outside the scope of Regulation 1408/71. If the
Regulation were to apply to such benefits, it is contended that they constitute
special non-contributory benefits subject to Article 10a of the Regulation. The
Defendant distinguishes in this respect between, on the one hand, ‘acquired’
(or ‘accrued’) rights to benefits and, on the other hand, the right to projection
of entitlements. According to the Defendant, Regulation 1408/71 is based on
a premise identical to one in Icelandic law, under which the right to invalidity
benefits based on projection is said not to constitute an ‘acquired right’.
Reference is made to the wording of Article 29 EEA which, in the view of the
Defendant, calls for the coordination only of ‘acquired’ social security rights.
The Defendant also cites the sixth recital of the preamble to the Regulation
which states that the provisions for coordination must guarantee that persons
falling under the Regulation “retain the rights and advantages acquired and
in the course of being acquired”. The Government of Iceland maintains that
Regulation 1408/71 covers the entitlement to invalidity benefits that arises
in pension fund schemes such as the Icelandic one. However, as part of its
observations concerning the second question from the national court, the
Government argues that a right to projection of invalidity benefits cannot be
considered an ‘acquired right’ and that the Regulation is only intended to
prevent citizens from losing their ‘acquired rights’ when moving within the
EEA.
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34 Stefnandi heldur því fram að svo sé og leggur áherslu á að íslensk lög skyldi
launþega á Íslandi til að greiða iðgjöld í íslenskan lífeyrissjóð. Jafnframt vísar
hann til 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, en samkvæmt því ákvæði nær
reglugerðin m.a. til löggjafar sem varðar örorkubætur. Stefnandi vitnar enn
fremur til 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar, sem skyldar EES-ríki til þess að tilgreina slíka
löggjöf í yfirlýsingu. Lög nr. 49/1974 með síðari breytingum hafi í samræmi
við það verið tilgreind undir fyrirsögninni „Bætur vegna örorku”, í yfirlýsingu
Íslands sem gefin var á grundvelli 5. gr. Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (hér eftir ESA)
og framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna (hér eftir framkvæmdastjórnin)
byggja einnig á því að reglugerð 1408/71 nái til örorkubótaréttar sem
myndast í lífeyrissjóðakerfi eins og því íslenska, þ.á m. til bóta byggðum á
framreikningi.
JUDGMENT
35 Stefndi heldur því fram að bætur byggðar á framreikningi teljist ekki til
almannatrygginga og falli því utan gildissviðs reglugerðar 1408/71. Verði
reglugerðin talin ná til slíkra bóta, teljist þær sérstakar bætur sem ekki eru
iðgjaldsskyldar og falli undir 10. gr. a í reglugerðinni. Stefndi greinir í þessu
sambandi á milli áunninna (eða uppsafnaðra) réttinda til bóta annars vegar og
réttarins til framreiknaðra réttinda hins vegar. Reglugerð 1408/71 er að mati
stefnda reist á sömu forsendu og íslensk löggjöf, þ.e. að réttur til örorkubóta
sem byggir á framreikningi teljist ekki til áunninna réttinda. Vísar stefndi til
orðalags 29. gr. EES, sem kveði eingöngu á um samræmingu áunninna
almannatryggingaréttinda. Stefndi vísar einnig til sjötta inngangsliðar
reglugerðarinnar, sem segir að ákvæði hennar um samræmingu verði að tryggja
einstaklingum sem reglugerðin nær til „réttindi og hagsbætur sem þeir hafa
áunnið sér og eru að ávinna sér”. Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur reglugerð 1408/71
ná til örorkubótaréttinda sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðakerfi eins og því íslenska
en heldur því hins fram í tengslum við aðra spurningu landsdómstólsins að
réttur til framreiknings örorkubóta geti ekki talist áunnin réttindi. Reglugerðinni
sé einungis ætlað að koma í veg fyrir að þegnar missi áunnin réttindi sín þegar
þeir flytjast búferlum innan EES.
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36 The Court notes that the distinction between benefits excluded from the scope
of Regulation 1408/71 and those which fall within its scope is based essentially
on the constituent elements of the particular benefit, in particular its purposes
and the conditions on which it is granted, and not on whether a benefit is
classified as a social security benefit by national legislation (see Case C-78/91
Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, at paragraph 14). The pension at issue in this
case is a benefit granted on the basis of invalidity within the meaning of Article
4(1)(b), without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal
needs. Already for that reason it does not fall under Articles 4(2a) and 10a as
a non-exportable ‘special non-contributory benefit’ (see Case E-5/06, ESA v
Liechtenstein, judgment of 14 December 2007, not yet reported, at paragraph
71).
37 The question is, however, whether only pensions based on accrued rights are
covered by the Regulation whereas pensions based on projected rights are
not, as claimed by the Defendant and the Government of Iceland.
38 Regulation 1408/71 does not harmonise the material content of the social
security benefits which it covers. The Regulation merely coordinates social
security benefits, to the extent they exist at the national level, in relation to
the categories of persons covered by the Regulation. One of the coordination
issues regulated by Regulation 1408/71 is to which extent contributions made
to foreign pension funds must be equated to contributions made to the fund
offering the benefit when establishing whether the conditions for the acquisition
or retention of a benefit are fulfilled. This coordination is the same in nature
when applied to the award of benefits based on projected rights as when
applied to the award of benefits based on accrued rights.
39 The above mentioned arguments of the Defendant based on the wording of
Article 29 EEA and of Regulation 1408/71 must be rejected. Such a limitation
to the general scope of the Regulation would, in light of its aim to facilitate the
free movement of workers, have to be based on clear wording. The wording
of Article 29 EEA and the Regulation does not, however, support such a
distinction. In the context of Article 29 EEA and the preamble to the Regulation,
a benefit based on projected rights may be considered as an “acquired” right
to the extent the person in question fulfils the conditions under national law for
being awarded such a benefit.
40 Consequently, pensions based on projected rights as such fall inside the scope
of Regulation 1408/71.
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37 Hins vegar er það álitaefni hvort gildissvið reglugerðar 1408/71 einskorðist við
bætur sem eru byggðar á uppsöfnuðum réttindum og að framreiknuð réttindi
falli þar með utan hennar, eins og haldið er fram af hálfu stefnda og ríkisstjórnar
Íslands.
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36 Það ræðst í grundvallaratriðum af efnisinntaki bóta, einkum tilgangi þeirra og
þeim skilmálum sem þær lúta, hvort þær falla undir reglugerð 1408/71 en ekki
af því hvort bæturnar eru skilgreindar sem almannatryggingabætur í landsrétti
(sjá mál C-78/91 Hughes ECR I-4839, 14. mgr.). Bætur þær sem málið varðar,
teljast réttindi sem veitt eru vegna örorku í merkingu b-liðar 1. mgr. 4. gr. og
byggjast ekki á einstaklingsbundnu og frjálsu mati á persónulegum þörfum
þess sem í hlut á. Þegar af þessum ástæðum falla þær ekki undir a-lið 2.
mgr. 4. gr. og 10. gr. a sem óyfirfæranlegar „sérstakar bætur sem ekki eru
iðgjaldsskyldar” (sjá mál E-5/06 Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA gegn Liechtenstein,
71. mgr., dómur frá 14. desember 2007, enn óbirtur).
38 Reglugerð 1408/71 samræmir ekki efnisinntak þeirra almannatryggingabóta
sem falla undir gildissvið hennar. Reglugerðin samhæfir einungis þær
almannatryggingabætur sem fyrir hendi eru í landsrétti, gagnvart þeim
einstaklingum sem hún tekur til. Samhæfingin lýtur m.a. að því að hvaða marki
framlögum í erlenda lífeyrissjóði skal jafnað við framlög í þann sjóð sem greiðir
bæturnar, þegar metið er hvort fullnægt sé skilyrðum til þess að öðlast eða
viðhalda bótum. Eðli þessarar samhæfingar er hið sama hvort heldur úthlutun
bóta byggir á framreiknuðum eða uppsöfnuðum réttindum.
40 Af framangreindu leiðir að bætur sem byggja á framreiknuðum réttindum falla
sem slíkar undir gildissvið reglugerðar 1408/71.
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JUDGMENT
39 Rökum stefnda, sem byggja á orðalagi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71,
verður að hafna. Í ljósi þess markmiðs reglugerðarinnar að auðvelda frjálsa för
launþega þyrftu slíkar takmarkanir á almennu gildissviði hennar að byggja á
skýru orðalagi. Slíkur greinarmunur verður hins vegar ekki reistur á orðalagi
29. gr. EES. Framreiknuð réttindi geta talist til áunninna réttinda í skilningi
29. gr. EES og inngangsorða reglugerðarinnar að því marki sem viðkomandi
einstaklingur uppfyllir skilyrði í landslögum fyrir úthlutun slíkra bóta.
41 As Article 4(1) makes Regulation 1408/71 applicable only to “legislation”
concerning social security, it must further be decided whether the pension
scheme in question is based on “legislation” within the meaning of the Regulation.
The term “legislation” is defined in Article 1(j), first subparagraph, as “statutes,
regulations and other provisions and all other implementing measures, present
or future, relating to the branches and schemes of social security” covered inter
alia by Article 4(1). However, Article 1(j), second subparagraph, excludes from
the term “legislation” “provisions of existing or future industrial agreements,
rendering them compulsory or extending their scope”. This limitation may be
lifted by a declaration of the EEA State concerned in relation to provisions
which serve inter alia to “put into effect compulsory insurance imposed by laws
and regulations referred to” in the first subparagraph of Article 1(j).
42 The 1994 Act on the MPF as well as previous and subsequent legislation
pertaining to that fund form part of a social security system under which
membership in a pension fund is mandatory for all workers. However, the 1994
Act left the material content of the benefits offered by the MPF to be regulated
in a ‘regulation’ which then, according to the Act, had to be approved by the
workers’ and employers’ organisations and the Minister of Finance. This raises
the question of whether the MPF’s ‘regulation’ at the time of the Plaintiff’s
accident was “legislation” within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article
1(j) of Regulation 1408/71, or whether it qualified as provisions of industrial
agreements under the second subparagraph of Article 1(j). In this respect, the
role of the Minister is relevant.
43 If, under a system such as that established by the 1994 Act, a decision on
whether a fund should offer benefits based on projection of rights is entirely left
to the workers’ and employers’ organisations, the provisions establishing such
pension rights fall under the second subparagraph of Article 1(j) of Regulation
1408/71 as provisions of industrial agreements. If, on the other hand, the
system is based on the premise that the Minister can impose this type of
social security benefit on the fund, the ‘regulation’ constitutes “implementing
measures” falling under the first subparagraph of article 1(j) in relation to that
type of pension.
44 It is for the national court to decide whether, according to the criteria set
out above, the rules at issue pertaining to the invalidity pension based on
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41 Reglugerð 1408/71 tekur samkvæmt 1. mgr. 4. gr. einungis til löggjafar um
almannatryggingar. Verður því einnig að meta hvort það lífeyriskerfi sem hér um
ræðir byggi á löggjöf í skilningi reglugerðarinnar. Hugtakið löggjöf er skilgreint
í fyrstu undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. sem „gildandi lög, reglugerðir og önnur ákvæði
ásamt síðari breytingum aðildarríkis um framkvæmd almannatryggingareglna”,
sem falla m.a. undir 1. mgr. 4. gr. Önnur undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. skilur hins
vegar undan hugtakinu „ákvæði gildandi eða komandi kjarasamninga, óháð
því hvort yfirvöld hafa ákveðið að gera þau skyldubundin eða víkka gildissvið
þeirra”. Ríki getur með yfirlýsingu fallið frá þessari takmörkun vegna ákvæða
sem m.a. er ætlað að koma á skyldutryggingu þeirri sem kveðið er á um í þeim
lögum og reglugerðum sem um getur í fyrstu undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr.
42 Lög nr. 94/1994, ásamt fyrri og síðari löggjöf varðandi stefnda, eru hluti
almannatryggingakerfis sem kveður á um skylduaðild allra launþega að
lífeyrissjóðum. Samkvæmt lögum nr. 94/1994 skyldi hins vegar mælt fyrir um
inntak þeirra bóta sem Lífeyrissjóður sjómanna greiddi í reglugerð sem samtök
launþega og atvinnurekenda og fjármálaráðherra þurftu að samþykkja. Þarf
því næst að meta hvort reglur sjóðsins hafi, á þeim tíma þegar slysið varð,
verið löggjöf í skilningi fyrstu undirgreinar j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 eða
kjarasamningur í skilningi annarrar undirgreinar j-liðar. Í því sambandi skiptir
máli hvert hlutverk ráðherra var.
44 Það er landsdómstólsins að meta í samræmi við framangreind viðmið, hvort
þær reglur sem varða örorkubætur byggðar á framreiknuðum réttindum og
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JUDGMENT
43 Ef kerfi eins og það sem sett var á fót með lögum nr. 94/1994 lætur samtökum
launþega og atvinnurekenda það alfarið eftir að ákvarða hvort sjóður skuli
greiða bætur á grundvelli framreiknaðra réttinda, teljast ákvæði um slík
bótaréttindi til kjarasamninga samkvæmt öðrum undirlið j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71. Ef kerfið byggir hins vegar á þeirri forsendu að ráðherra geti í skjóli
valdheimilda sinna ákveðið að sjóðurinn skuli veita slíkar almannatryggingar,
felur reglugerðin í sér ákvæði um framkvæmd, sem falla undir fyrstu undirgrein
j-liðar 1. gr., að því er varðar slíkar bætur.
projected rights fall under the first or the second subparagraph of Article 1(j) of
Regulation 1408/71.
45 Under Article 5 of Regulation 1408/71, all “legislation and schemes” referred to
in Article 4(1) are to be specified in declarations submitted by the EEA States
and published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (now: the
Official Journal of the European Union). In relation to social security schemes
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 1(j), this declaration also
serves the purpose of lifting the reservation on such schemes and thereby
subjecting them to the scope of the Regulation.
46 It is therefore necessary to assess whether the fact that the Icelandic declaration
at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident had not been updated to refer to the 1994
Act has any consequences in law. At that time, the declaration still listed “Act
on Seamen’s Pension Fund (49/1974 with later amendments)” as one of the
acts establishing invalidity benefit schemes covered by Article 4(1)(b) of the
Regulation. The declaration was not updated until 2004 when a reference to
Act No 45/1999 on the MPF replaced the reference to the 1974 Act.
47 In relation to social security legislation falling under the first subparagraph of
Article 1(j), the fact that the legislation has not been specified in the declaration
referred to in Article 5 of Regulation 1408/71 is not of itself proof that the
legislation falls outside the scope of the Regulation, see for comparison Case
35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249, at paragraph 9. That would go against the
aim of Regulation 1408/71 to facilitate the free movement of persons, see case
E-5/06 ESA v Liechtenstein, judgment of 14 December 2007, not yet reported,
at paragraph 74. Thus, if the national court should classify the invalidity pension
based on projected rights at issue as falling under the first subparagraph of
Article 1(j), the content of the declaration at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident
is not relevant for the applicability of the Regulation.
48 In case the national court should come to the conclusion that an ‘industrial
agreement’ is at issue, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 1(j)
of Regulation 1408/71 that the relevant social security scheme falls under the
Regulation in so far as this follows from the declaration made pursuant to that
provision. The second subparagraph of Article 1(j) only calls for the “schemes”
based on industrial agreements to be specified. The provision does not require
a specific reference to the “legislation” in question in order for the declaration
to be valid. Thus, the fact that the Icelandic declaration remained unchanged
when the MPF went from being regulated by the 1974 Act to being regulated
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45 Samkvæmt 5. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 skulu EES-ríki tilgreina hvers kyns
„löggjöf og kerfi” sem vísað er til í 1. mgr. 4. gr. í yfirlýsingum sem birta ber í
Stjórnartíðindum Evrópubandalagsins (nú Stjórnartíðindi Evrópusambandsins).
Með þessum yfirlýsingum má einnig afnema takmarkanir vegna
almannatryggingakerfa sem vísað er til í annarri undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. og fella
þau þar með undir gildissvið reglugerðarinnar.
46 Með hliðsjón af framangreindu er nauðsynlegt að meta hvort það hafi réttaráhrif
í för mér sér að yfirlýsing Íslands hafði ekki verið uppfærð með tilvísun í lög nr.
94/1994 á þeim tíma þegar slys stefnanda varð. Yfirlýsingin vísaði á þeim tíma
enn til laga um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna nr. 49/1974, með síðari breytingum, sem
fólu í sér örorkubótakerfi sem heyrði undir b-lið 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar.
Hún var ekki uppfærð fyrr en árið 2004, þegar tilvísun til laga nr. 45/1999 um
Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna kom í stað tilvísunarinnar til laganna frá 1974.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
um ræðir í málinu falli undir fyrstu eða aðra undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71.
48 Telji landsdómstóllinn að um kjarasamning sé að ræða, fellur
almannatryggingakerfið undir reglugerð 1408/71 samkvæmt annarri undirgrein
j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðarinnar, að því marki sem það leiðir af yfirlýsingu
samkvæmt ákvæðinu. Samkvæmt annarri undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. þarf aðeins
að tilgreina viðkomandi kerfi sem byggir á kjarasamningi, en sérstök tilvísun til
þeirrar löggjafar sem um ræðir er ekki skilyrði fyrir gildi yfirlýsingarinnar. Það
eitt að íslensku yfirlýsingunni var ekki breytt þegar lög nr. 94/1994 leystu af
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JUDGMENT
47 Þótt almannatryggingalöggjöf sem heyrir undir fyrstu undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr.
reglugerðar 1408/71 hafi ekki verið tilgreind í yfirlýsingu samkvæmt í 5. gr.
reglugerðarinnar, er það ekki sönnun þess að löggjöfin falli utan gildissviðs
reglugerðarinnar (sjá til samanburðar mál 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249,
málsgrein 9). Slík niðurstaða gengi gegn því markmiði reglugerðarinnar
að auðvelda frjálsa för fólks (sjá mál E-5/06 Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA gegn
Liechtenstein, dómur frá 14. desember 2007, enn óbirtur, málsgrein 71). Telji
landsdómstóllinn að þær örorkubætur sem um ræðir í málinu og byggðar eru
á framreiknuðum réttindum falli undir fyrstu undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71, leiðir af framansögðu að efni yfirlýsingarinnar á þeim tíma þegar slys
stefnanda varð ræður því ekki hvort reglugerðin eigi við.
by the 1994 Act does not by itself render the Regulation inapplicable to the
invalidity pension based on projected rights offered by the MPF under the
1994 Act.
49 The Defendant’s argument that the declaration has no legal effect because it
was not submitted to the Icelandic pension funds for approval must also be
rejected. The second subparagraph of Article 1(j) of the Regulation does not
require such clearance which, consequently, is purely an internal matter for the
State concerned, in its relationship with the pension funds.
50 Having established that the declaration has legal effect, it further needs to be
considered whether it nevertheless must be interpreted as excluding pensions
based on projected rights. Iceland’s declaration in 1994, citing the 1974 Act,
did not by its wording purport to exclude pensions based on projected rights.
Furthermore, although the provisions of the 1994 Act did not, as the 1974 Act,
require invalidity pensions to be based on projected as well as accrued rights,
pensions based on projected rights remained a part of the invalidity pension
scheme of the MPF and as such mandatory for mariners. Thus, it must be
concluded that the invalidity pension scheme continued to be covered by the
Regulation with regard to both accrued and projected rights.
51 The text concerning Icelandic invalidity pensions which was added as an
EEA adaptation to Annex VI to the Regulation confirms this interpretation
of the declaration. As shall be demonstrated in paragraphs 60−62 below, it
addresses the question of how to take into account periods of insurance in
other EEA States with regard to the condition that a fund member must have
paid contributions to the fund for a certain period preceding the date of an
accident in order to qualify for an invalidity pension based on projected rights.
52 Consequently, irrespective of whether the MPF’s ‘regulation’ falls under the
first or the second subparagraph of Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71, the
answer to the first question by Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur must be that the term
“social security”, as it is to be understood under Article 29 EEA and Regulation
1408/71, covers the entitlement to an invalidity benefit that arises in pension
fund schemes such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, including
pensions based on projected rights.
The second question
53 By its second question, Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur essentially asks whether
it is compatible with EEA law to subject the entitlement to invalidity benefits
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49 Þeim rökum stefnda að yfirlýsingin hafi engin lagaleg áhrif vegna þess að ekki
var leitað eftir samþykki lífeyrissjóðanna áður en hún var gerð, verður einnig
að hafna. Ekki er gerð krafa um slíka málsmeðferð í annari undirgrein j-liðar 1.
gr. reglugerðarinnar og er það því alfarið í höndum viðkomandi ríkis að ákveða
í samskiptum sínum við lífeyrissjóðina hvort samþykkis sé leitað.
50 Að þeirri niðurstöðu fenginni að yfirlýsingin hafi réttaráhrif, verður næst að
meta hvort túlka beri hana svo að hún undanskilji samkvæmt efni sínu bætur
byggðar á framreiknuðum réttindum. Orðalag yfirlýsingar Íslands frá árinu
1994, þar sem lög nr. 49/1974 eru tilgreind, leiðir ekki til slíkrar niðurstöðu.
Þar við bætist að bætur byggðar á framreiknuðum réttindum voru áfram hluti
af örorkubótakerfi Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna. Þær voru því skyldubundnar þótt
ákvæði laga nr. 94/1994 hafi ekki gert kröfu um slíkt, líkt og lög nr. 49/1974
gerðu. Niðurstaðan er því sú að örorkubótakerfið féll undir reglugerðina, bæði
hvað varðar bætur sem byggðu á uppsöfnuðum réttindum og bætur byggðar á
framreiknuðum réttindum.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
hólmi lög nr. 49/1974 um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna, fellir örorkubætur byggðar
á framreiknuðum réttindum, sem Lífeyrissjóður sjómanna veitti samkvæmt
lögum nr. 94/1994, því ekki undan gildissviði reglugerðar 1408/71.
51 Aðlögunarákvæði VI. viðauka reglugerðarinnar sem lýtur að íslenskum
örorkubótum staðfestir þessa túlkun á yfirlýsingunni. Eins og nánar kemur
fram í málsgreinum 60–62 í dóminum, lýtur ákvæðið að því hvernig taka beri
tillit til tryggingatímabila í öðrum EES-ríkjum, þegar metið er hvort uppfyllt sé
það skilyrði fyrir rétti til örorkubóta byggðum á framreiknuðum réttindum að
sjóðfélagi hafi greitt framlög til sjóðsins í tiltekinn tíma fyrir slysið.
Önnur spurning
53 Með annarri spurningu leitar Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur í meginatriðum
svara við því hvort það samræmist EES-rétti að setja það skilyrði fyrir rétti
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JUDGMENT
52 Af framangreindu leiðir, óháð því hvort reglugerð Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna fellur
undir fyrstu eða aðra undirgrein j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, að svarið við
fyrstu spurningu Héraðsdóms Reykjavíkur er, að hugtakið almannatryggingar,
í skilningi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71, nær til réttinda til örorkubóta
sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðakerfi eins og því, sem til skoðunar er í aðalmálinu,
þ.m.t. bóta byggðum á framreiknuðum réttindum.
based on projected rights, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, to
the condition that a member of a pension fund must have paid contributions to
a fund belonging to a certain group of funds for a specific period preceding the
date of an accident and thereby exclude contributions paid into social security
systems in other EEA States in relation to work there.
54 The national court in its question refers to “the provisions of the EEA Agreement
on the free movement of workers, and in particular Articles 28 and 29 EEA”.
The Court finds that the question falls to be considered first and foremost
under Regulation 1408/71, interpreted in light of the principle of free movement
of workers, as laid down in Article 28 EEA (see for comparison Case C-168/88
Dammer [1989] ECR 4553, at paragraph 22 and C-227/89 Rönfeldt [1991]
ECR 323, at paragraph 24).
55 Referring in particular to Article 45(1) of Regulation 1408/71 and the Icelandic
entry in Annex VI to the Regulation, the Plaintiff suggests answering the
second question in the negative. He argues that it is irrelevant that he could
have continued to pay contributions to the Defendant after moving to another
EEA State. ESA and the Commission submit, on the basis that the sole
reason why the Plaintiff did not fulfil the 6 month requirement was that he
had exercised his right to free movement and taken up work in another EEA
State, that his periods of insurance under the pension scheme there must be
taken into account by the Defendant. This is said to follow from Article 45(5) of
Regulation 1408/71. In their view, this conclusion is reinforced by the abovementioned Icelandic entry in Annex VI to the Regulation, which makes specific
provisions for access to projected invalidity benefits.
56 The Defendant finds that answering the second question in the negative may
give rise to “reverse discrimination” as workers moving domestically may be
put in a less favourable position than workers moving to another EEA State. It
is argued that this contravenes the principle laid down in Article 3 of Regulation
1408/71 and that answering the second question in the negative thus would
not be justified. The Defendant also adduces that the Agreement on Relations
between the Icelandic Pension Funds is an agreement between independent
parties, falling outside the scope of Regulation 1408/71, and that the pension
fund to which the Defendant paid contributions in another EEA State was not
a party to that Agreement. Further, the Defendant contends that the Icelandic
entry in Annex VI to the Regulation does not apply to pensions based on
projected rights.
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54 Í spurningunni er vísað til ákvæða „EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega,
einkum 28. og 29. gr.” Henni ber fyrst og fremst að svara á grundvelli reglugerðar
1408/71, eins og hún er túlkuð í ljósi meginreglunnar um frjálsa för launþega í
28. gr. EES (sjá til samanburðar mál C-168/88 Dammer [1989] ECR 4553, 22.
mgr. og C-227/89 Rönfeldt [1991] ECR I-323, 24. mgr.).
Case E-4/07
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Case E-1/06
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til örorkubóta byggðum á framreiknuðum réttindum, eins og til skoðunar er í
aðalmálinu, að sjóðfélagi hafi í tiltekinn tíma fyrir slys greitt iðgjöld til lífeyrissjóðs
sem tilheyrir ákveðnum hópi sjóða og útiloka þannig iðgjöld sem greidd eru í
almannatryggingakerfi annarra EES-ríkja vegna starfa þar.
56 Verði annarri spurningu svarað neitandi telur stefndi það geta valdið mismunun
gagnvart þegnum innanlands („reverse discrimination”). Staða launþega sem
flytji búferlum innanlands geti þá orðið lakari en þeirra sem flytja til annars
EES-ríkis. Slíkt gangi gegn meginreglu 3. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 og því
verði annarri spurningu ekki svarað neitandi. Samkomulag um samskipti
lífeyrissjóða á Íslandi sé samkomulag sjálfstæðra aðila sem falli utan gildissviðs
reglugerðar 1408/71, og lífeyrissjóðurinn sem stefnandi greiddi iðgjöld til í öðru
EES-ríki hafi ekki verið aðili að því samkomulagi. Þá telur stefndi að íslenska
aðlögunarákvæðið í VI. viðauka reglugerðarinnar taki ekki til bóta sem byggja
á framreiknuðum réttindum.
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JUDGMENT
55 Stefnandi telur að spurningunni beri að svara neitandi og vísar einkum til 1.
mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, og aðlögunarákvæðis Íslands í VI. viðauka
reglugerðarinnar. Stefnandi heldur því einnig fram að ekki skipti máli þótt hann
hefði getað haldið áfram að greiða iðgjöld til stefnda eftir að hafa flutt til annars
EES-ríkis. ESA og framkvæmdastjórnin telja að stefnda beri að taka tillit til
tryggingartímabila stefnanda í lífeyriskerfi annars EES-ríkis, þar sem eina
ástæða þess að stefnandi uppfyllti ekki skilyrði um greiðslur í 6 mánuði fyrir
slysið var að hann nýtti sér rétt sinn til frjálsrar farar og hóf störf í öðru EES-ríki.
Þessa niðurstöðu leiði af 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 og styðjist auk
þess við íslenska aðlögunarákvæðið í VI. viðauka reglugerðarinnar, þar sem
sérstaklega er kveðið á um rétt til framreiknings.
57 The provisions of Regulation 1408/71 pertaining to invalidity benefits distinguish
between two main categories of persons: on the one hand, persons that are
subject only to legislation under which the amount of invalidity benefits is
independent of the duration of periods of insurance (see Articles 37 to 39)
and, on the other hand, persons that are either subject only to legislation
under which the length of insurance is relevant in this respect or subject to
legislations of both types. For the latter category, Article 40 of the Regulation
provides that the provisions of Chapter 3 under Title III, pertaining to old age
and death, shall apply mutatis mutandis. Thus, for this category, Article 45
lays down the conditions for acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to
benefits and Article 46 regulates the calculation of the amount.
58 The amount of an invalidity pension based on projected rights is calculated on
the basis of the contributions which the member would have paid had he or
she remained a member until the age of retirement. The length of insurance is
therefore relevant when calculating the amount of the benefit. It cannot matter
in this respect that the length of insurance is based on projection. It is in any
case Article 46, not Article 39, which lays down rules capable of regulating this
kind of calculation. Consequently, Article 45 applies to the question of whether
the Plaintiff’s right to a pension based on projected rights can be made subject
to the condition that he had paid premiums to the Defendant for at least 6 of
the 12 months preceding the date of an accident.
59 Article 45(1) lays down the general principle that when the competent institution
decides whether it is under an obligation to provide a pension to a person to
whom the Regulation applies, the institution shall take account of periods of
insurance under the legislation of any other EEA State as if these periods had
been completed under its own legislation. Article 45(5) then prescribes that
where the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits is conditional
upon the person concerned being insured at the time of the materialisation of
the risk, this condition shall be regarded as having been satisfied in the case
of insurance under the legislation of another EEA State, in accordance with the
procedures provided in Annex VI for each EEA State concerned.
60 The provisions on invalidity benefits in Regulation 1408/71 refer to Annex VI
in only two places, Articles 37 and 45(5). As concluded above, Article 37 is not
applicable. Therefore, Iceland’s entry in Annex VI, as quoted in paragraph 28
above, clarifies the application of Article 45(5) to the condition that members
of Icelandic pension funds must have paid contributions to the fund for a
44 - 23
58 Fjárhæð örorkubóta sem byggja á framreiknuðum réttindum miðast við iðgjöld
sem sjóðfélagi hefði greitt, hefði hann átt aðild að sjóðnum fram að eftirlaunaaldri.
Lengd tryggingatímabils hefur því áhrif við útreikning bótafjárhæðar og ekki
getur haft þýðingu í þessu sambandi þótt lengd tryggingatímabils byggi á
framreikningi. Eftir sem áður er það 46. gr., en ekki 39. gr., sem á við um slíkan
útreikning. Það ræðst því af 45. gr., hvort setja megi það skilyrði fyrir rétti til
bóta byggðum á framreikningi, að stefnandi hafi greitt iðgjöld í viðkomandi
lífeyrissjóð í a.m.k. sex mánuði á undanfarandi 12 mánaða tímabili fyrir
slysið.
Case E-4/07
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Case E-1/06
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v Norway
57 Þau ákvæði reglugerðar 1408/71 sem varða örorkubætur greina á milli tveggja
meginflokka einstaklinga. Annars vegar eru þeir sem eingöngu heyra undir
löggjöf þar sem fjárhæð örorkubóta er óháð tryggingatímabili (sjá 37.-39.
gr.). Hins vegar eru þeir sem annað hvort heyra einvörðungu undir löggjöf
þar sem tryggingatímabil skiptir máli, eða undir löggjöf af báðum tegundum.
Hvað seinni flokkinn varðar, kveður 40. gr. reglugerðarinnar á um að ákvæði
3. kafla, III. bálks, um elli og andlát, skuli gilda að breyttu breytanda. Þannig
setur 45. gr., hvað þennan flokk varðar, fram skilyrði þess að öðlast, viðhalda
eða endurheimta bótarétt, og 46. gr. mælir fyrir um útreikning bótafjárhæðar.
60 Ákvæði um örorkubætur í reglugerð 1408/71 vísa eingöngu á tveimur stöðum
til VI. viðauka, þ.e. í 37. gr. og 5. mgr. 45. gr. Eins og áður segir á 37. gr. ekki
við. Aðlögunákvæðið skýrir því hvernig 5. mgr. 45. gr. verður beitt varðandi það
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JUDGMENT
59 Þegar þar til bær stofnun ákvarðar hvort greiða skuli bætur til einstaklings
sem fellur undir reglugerðina, er það meginregla samkvæmt 1. mgr. 45. gr. að
taka ber tillit til tryggingatímabila sem lokið er samkvæmt löggjöf annarra EESríkja, eins og þeim hefði verið lokið samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf sem stofnunin
starfar eftir. Þegar rétturinn til að öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta bótarétt er
bundinn því skilyrði að viðkomandi einstaklingur sé tryggður á þeim tíma þegar
áhættan kemur fram, skal samkvæmt 5. mgr. 45. gr. litið svo á að skilyrðinu sé
fullnægt þegar um er að ræða tryggingu samkvæmt löggjöf annars EES-ríkis,
í samræmi við reglur samkvæmt VI. viðauka.
certain period which is close in time to the materialization of the risk causing
the invalidity, in order to qualify for an invalidity pension based on projected
rights.
61 The adaptation first stipulates that it applies “[w]here employment … in Iceland
has terminated and the contingency occurs during employment or selfemployment in another State … and where the disability pension … in Iceland
no longer includes the period between the contingency and the pensionable age
(future periods)”. Within the context of Article 45(5), this refers to the situation
where a person no longer qualifies for a pension based on projected rights
because of having taken up work abroad and for that reason having ceased to
pay contributions to the Icelandic pension fund system, as Icelandic funds, at
the outset, only recognise contributions made to the fund in question.
62 The adaptation then provides that “periods of insurance under the legislation of
for the requirement of the future periods as if they were periods of insurance
in Iceland”. In relation to the condition that the individual concerned paid
contributions to the relevant fund for a certain period preceding the date of an
accident, this means that contributions made to the social security system of
another EEA State shall be taken into account as if they had been made to the
competent Icelandic fund.
63 In this respect, the agreement between Icelandic pension funds providing for
coordination of periods where members move from one Icelandic pension
fund to another is irrelevant for the legal situation under the Regulation. The
Regulation is not based on any assumption of such network agreements.
64 Moreover, the Regulation does not contain any general reservation to the
effect that it must under no circumstances lead to a more favourable result
than that which would have been the result of change of residence or work
within a single State.
65 It is not a condition for Article 45 of the Regulation to apply that the person
concerned be barred from continuing his membership in the social security
scheme of his previous State of residence or employment. Such a condition
could force persons availing themselves of the right to free movement to be
members of several legislation-based social security schemes at the same
time. This would go against the purpose of the Regulation which is to facilitate
the free movement of persons inter alia by making such parallel memberships
24 - 46
61 Aðlögunarákvæðið á í fyrsta lagi við „[h]afi launaðri vinnu ... verið lokið á
Íslandi, og tilvikið verður þegar launuð vinna eða sjálfstæð atvinnustarfsemi
er stunduð í öðru ríki ... og þar sem örorkulífeyrir ... á Íslandi felur ekki lengur
í sér tímabilið frá því að tilvik kemur fram og fram að því að lífeyrisaldri er náð
(tímabil sem ekki er liðið)”. Hvað 5. mgr. 45. gr. varðar, er með þessu vísað til
aðstæðna, þar sem einstaklingur hefur hafið störf í öðru ríki, hætt að greiða
iðgjöld í íslenska lífeyrissjóðakerfinu og á því ekki lengur rétt á bótum, sem
byggja á framreikningi, þar sem íslenskir lífeyrissjóðir viðurkenna í grunninn
einungis iðgjöld greidd til viðkomandi sjóðs.
Case E-4/07
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Case E-1/06
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v Norway
skilyrði fyrir rétti til örorkubóta byggðum á framreikningi, að félagar í íslenskum
lífeyrissjóðum hafi greitt iðgjöld í sjóðina í ákveðinn tíma stuttu áður en áhætta
sem veldur örorku kemur fram.
62 Samkvæmt aðlögunarákvæðinu skal í öðru lagi taka „tillit til tryggingatímabila
kröfuna um tímabil sem ekki er liðið eins og um væri að ræða tryggingatímabil á
Íslandi”. Í þessu felst að taka skal tillit til iðgjalda sem greidd eru í tryggingakerfi
annars EES-ríkis með sama hætti og hefðu þau verið greidd þar til bærum
íslenskum lífeyrissjóði, þegar metið er hvort fullnægt sé því skilyrði að iðgjöld
hafi verið greidd í viðkomandi sjóð í tiltekinn tíma fyrir slys.
63 Samkomulag íslenskra lífeyrissjóða um samræmingu tryggingatímabila við
flutning sjóðsfélaga milli lífeyrissjóða á Íslandi hefur ekki áhrif á réttarstöðuna
samkvæmt reglugerð 1408/71. Er í reglugerðinni ekki á neinn hátt gert ráð fyrir
slíkum samstarfssamningum milli þeirra almannatryggingastofnana sem hlut
eiga að máli hverju sinni.
65 Það er ekki skilyrði fyrir beitingu 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, að viðkomandi
einstaklingur geti ekki áfram átt aðild að almannatryggingakerfi þess ríkis þar
sem hann var áður búsettur eða stundaði atvinnu. Slíkt skilyrði gæti leitt til
þess að þeir sem nýta sér rétt sinn til frjálsrar farar neyðist til að eiga aðild að
- 47
24 -
JUDGMENT
64 Reglugerðin verður heldur ekki túlkuð svo að hún hafi að geyma almennan
fyrir vara þess efnis að beiting hennar geti aldrei leitt til hagstæðari niðurstöðu
heldur en orðið hefði við flutning á búsetu eða atvinnu innanlands.
unnecessary. Therefore, it does not matter whether or not the Plaintiff was
barred from continuing his membership in an Icelandic pension fund, including
the Defendant.
66 Based on the above, the answer to the second question must be that it is
not compatible with Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71 for a pension fund to
subject the entitlement to invalidity benefits based on projected rights, such as
those at issue in the main proceedings, to the condition that a fund member
must have paid contributions to a fund belonging to a certain group of funds
for a specific period preceding the date of an accident and thereby exclude
contributions paid into social security systems in other EEA States in relation
to work there.
The third question
67 By its third question, Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur asks whether Regulation
1408/71 means that workers are to present their compensation claims in
the State in which they were resident and in which they had social security
entitlements at the time of their injury.
68 The Plaintiff adduces essentially that, under Article 10(1) of Regulation 1408/71,
benefits such as those at issue in the case at hand must be paid to a migrant
from the EEA State where the benefits were acquired, irrespective of where
in the EEA that person resides. The Defendant, on the other hand, argues
that under the single State rule in Regulation 1408/71, an individual can only
rely on the social security system of the EEA State where he or she works.
Moreover, it is alleged that, in any case, the Defendant is not a competent
institution for the Icelandic social security system under Regulations 1408/71
and 574/72.
69 The Government of Iceland points to Article 36(1) of Regulation 574/72,
under which persons such as the Plaintiff are to present their claims to the
institution of the place of their residence, but does not specifically comment
on the consequences of such a claim being presented to an institution in
another EEA State. Likewise, ESA cites Article 36(1). However, by referring
further to Article 36(3), ESA argues that where a claimant submits his claim to
the institution of the EEA State of which he is a national, that institution shall
forward the claim to the competent institution. In any event, referring to Article
86(1) of Regulation 1408/71, ESA submits that failure to present a claim to
the correct authorities cannot affect the worker’s right to a benefit. Referring
25 - 48
66 Samkvæmt framansögðu er svarið við annarri spurningu, að það samræmist
ekki 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 að setja það skilyrði fyrir rétti til
örorkubóta sem byggja á framreiknuðum réttindum, eins og til skoðunar er í
aðalmálinu, að sjóðfélagi hafi í tiltekinn tíma fyrir slys greitt iðgjöld til lífeyrissjóðs
sem tilheyrir ákveðnum hópi sjóða og útiloka þannig iðgjöld sem greidd eru í
almannatryggingakerfi annarra EES-ríkja vegna starfa þar.
Þriðja spurning
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
fleiri en einu lögbundnu almannatryggingarkerfi samtímis. Því skiptir ekki máli
hvort stefnanda var meinað að eiga áfram aðild að íslenskum lífeyrissjóði,
þ.m.t. stefnda.
67 Í þriðju spurningu leitar Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur svara við því hvort
launþegum beri samkvæmt reglugerð 1408/71 að leggja fram kröfur sínar um
bætur í því landi þar sem þeir voru búsettir og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda
þegar þeir slasast.
69 Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur, að samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. reglugerðar 574/72
beri einstaklingum í sporum stefnanda að leggja fram kröfur sínar hjá stofnun
á búsetustað, en fjallar ekki sérstaklega um afleiðingar þess ef slík krafa
er lögð fram hjá stofnun í öðru EES-ríki. ESA vísar einnig til 1. mgr. 36. gr.
reglugerðar 574/72, en telur með vísan til 3. mgr. þeirrar greinar, að stofnun
skuli framsenda kröfu þar til bærri stofnun, þegar bótakrefjandi leggur fram
kröfu hjá stofnun í EES-ríki þar sem hann er ríkisborgari. Í öllu falli leiði það
af 1. mgr. 86. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, að sé krafa ekki send til réttra yfirvalda
hafi það ekki áhrif á bótarétt launþegans. Þá skuli samkvæmt 4. mgr. 36. gr.
og 41. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 sjálfkrafa úthluta bótum samtímis samkvæmt
25 - 49
JUDGMENT
68 Stefnandi heldur því í aðalatriðum fram að samkvæmt 1. mgr. 10. gr.
reglugerðar 1408/71 beri að greiða launþega bætur, eins og þær sem hér um
ræðir, í því EES-ríki þar sem réttindin voru áunnin, óháð því hvar á EES hann
er búsettur. Stefndi heldur því hins vegar fram að samkvæmt reglugerðinni geti
einstaklingur einungis sótt rétt í almannatryggingakerfi í einu EES-ríki, þ.e. því
ríki þar sem hann stundar atvinnu. Stefndi heldur því einnig fram, að hann sé
í öllu falli ekki þar til bær stofnun innan íslenska almannatryggingakerfisins
samkvæmt reglugerðum 1408/71 og 574/72.
to Articles 36(4) and 41 of Regulation 574/72, ESA adds that the submission
of a claim shall automatically involve the concurrent award of benefits under
the legislation of all of the EEA States under whose legislation the claimant
is entitled to benefits. Referring also to Article 48 of Regulation 574/72, ESA
then suggests that whichever institution the claim is submitted to, calculations
made by Icelandic authorities in accordance with Article 41 of Regulation
574/72 are subject to judicial review by Icelandic courts. Similarly, referring in
particular to Articles 36 and 41 of Regulation 574/72, the Commission argues
that a failure to submit the claim to the correct authorities cannot in any way be
relied upon to rule out that claim. The Commission further argues that it would,
in any event, be for the Defendant to examine the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the
additional projected invalidity pension upon having the claim forwarded from
another institution.
70 The Court notes that the question of which institution is competent to deal
with the claim is regulated first and foremost in Regulation 574/72. According
to Article 36(1) of that Regulation, persons claiming benefits pursuant to inter
alia Article 40 of Regulation 1408/71 shall submit their claims to the institution
of the place of residence.
71 The purpose of Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 is to facilitate the free
movement of persons. Seen in light of that aim, Regulation 1408/71 cannot
be interpreted to the effect that a person’s right under the Regulation depends
on the claim being submitted to the correct institution according to the detailed
and technical provisions of Regulation 574/72. This also follows from Article
86(1) of Regulation 1408/71 which is based on the premise that a claim may
be validly lodged in any EEA State. It is then for the relevant institution in that
State to forward the claim to the competent institution.
72 Furthermore, according to Article 36(4) of Regulation 574/72, a claim for
benefits sent to the institution of one EEA State shall automatically involve
the concurrent award of benefits under the legislation of all the EEA States
in question whose conditions the claimant satisfies. To this end, Article 41(1)
of Regulation 574/72 provides that claims for benefit shall be investigated by
the institution to which they have been sent or forwarded, the “investigating
institution”. Under Article 41(2), the investigating institution shall forthwith notify
claims for benefits to all the institutions concerned, so that the claims may
be investigated simultaneously and without delay by all institutions.
According to Article 48 of the same Regulation, the final decision taken by
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Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
löggjöf allra þeirra EES-ríkja þar sem krefjandi á rétt á bótum. ESA vísar
einnig til 48. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 og heldur því fram, að ekki skipti máli til
hvaða stofnunar stefnandi sendi kröfuna, því útreikningur íslenskra yfirvalda
á grundvelli 41. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 verði borinn undir íslenska dómstóla.
Framkvæmdastjórnin telur einnig, og þá einkum með vísan til 36. og 41. gr.
reglugerðar 574/72, að það geti ekki leitt til þess að kröfu sé hafnað þótt hún
sé send röngu yfirvaldi. Stefnda beri í öllum tilvikum að taka til athugunar kröfu
stefnanda um rétt til viðbótarörorkubóta á grundvelli framreiknaðra réttinda,
þegar hann hefur fengið kröfuna framsenda frá þeirri stofnun þar sem hún var
lögð fram.
70 Hvort stofnun er bær til þess að fjalla um kröfu eins og þá sem um ræðir í
málinu fer fyrst og fremst eftir reglugerð 574/72. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr.
hennar skulu einstaklingar sem gera kröfu um bætur samkvæmt m.a. 40. gr.
reglugerðar 1408/71 leggja hana fram hjá stofnun í búseturíkinu.
72 Þá er þess að geta, að samkvæmt 4. mgr. 36. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 skal krafa
um bætur sem send er stofnun í einu aðildarríki sjálfkrafa leiða til að bótum
samkvæmt löggjöf allra EES-ríkja, þar sem krefjandi á bótarétt, sé úthlutað
samtímis. Í samræmi við þetta er í 1. mgr. 41. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 mælt svo
fyrir að umsagnarstofnun, þ.e. sú stofnun sem fengið hefur bótakröfur sendar,
skuli taka þær til athugunar. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 41. gr. skal umsagnarstofnun
þegar í stað tilkynna öllum hlutaðeigandi stofnunum um bótakröfur, þannig að
þær geti allar tekið kröfurnar til athugunar samtímis og tafarlaust. Samkvæmt
26 - 51
JUDGMENT
71 Tilgangur reglugerða 1408/71 og 574/72 er að auðvelda frjálsa för fólks á
EES. Í því ljósi verður reglugerð 1408/71 ekki skýrð svo, að réttur einstaklings
samkvæmt reglugerðinni sé háður því, að krafan sé send til réttrar stofnunar
í samræmi við hin nákvæmu og tæknilegu ákvæði reglugerðar 574/72. Þetta
leiðir einnig af 1. mgr. 86. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 sem byggir á þeirri forsendu,
að leggja megi kröfu fram í hvaða EES-ríki sem er. Það er á ábyrgð viðkomandi
stofnunar í því ríki að framsenda kröfuna þar til bærri stofnun.
each of the institutions concerned shall be notified to the investigating
institution.
73 This entails that, in any case, it is the Defendant which will have to make
the final decision as to awarding the Plaintiff an invalidity pension based on
projected rights.
74 Article 48 of Regulation 754/72 also provides that when the relevant decisions
have been received by the investigating institution, it shall communicate them
to the claimant. Periods allowed for appeals shall commence only on the date
of receipt of the communication by the claimant. However, this may not be
interpreted to mean that a person can be deprived of any right he or she may
have under national law to have established, already at an earlier stage, his
legal rights by a court of law, see for comparison Dammer, at paragraph 21
and Rönfeldt, at paragraph 26.
75 The answer to the third question must be that under Regulation 574/72,
persons shall present their claims in the State where they were resident and
where they had social security entitlements at the time of their injury. However,
the lodging of a claim with the relevant institution of another EEA State is
without prejudice to the right to benefits under Regulation 1408/71. It is in any
case for each institution concerned to make the final decision as to whether
the claimant must be awarded the benefit which has been claimed from that
institution.
IV Costs
76 The costs incurred by the Government of Iceland, ESA and the Commission,
which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since
these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Héraðsdómur
Reykjavíkur, any decision on costs is a matter for that court.
On those grounds,
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur hereby gives the
following Advisory Opinion:
1. The term “social security”, as it is to be understood under Article 29 EEA and
Regulation 1408/71, covers the entitlement to an invalidity benefit that arises
27 - 52
73 Af framangreindu leiðir að það er hvað sem öðru líður hlutverk stefnda, að taka
lokaákvörðun um, hvort stefnandi fái örorkubætur byggðar á framreiknuðum
réttindum.
74 Samkvæmt 48. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 skal umsagnarstofnun einnig senda
viðeigandi ákvarðanir til bótakrefjanda þegar þær hafa verið mótteknar.
Krefjandi hefur frest til áfrýjunar frá þeim degi er hann fær tilkynninguna í
hendur. Af þessu leiðir ekki, að einstaklingur missi neinn þann rétt sem hann
kann að eiga að landsrétti til þess að fá staðfestan, þegar á fyrri stigum máls,
rétt sinn fyrir dómstólum (sjá til samanburðar mál C-168/88 Dammer, 21. mgr.
og mál C-227/89 Rönfeldt, 26. mgr.).
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
48. gr. sömu reglugerðar skal lokaákvörðun hverrar stofnunar tilkynnt
umsagnaraðila.
75 Þriðju spurningu verður því svarað svo, að samkvæmt reglugerð 574/72 ber
einstaklingum að leggja fram kröfur sínar í því ríki þar sem þeir voru búsettir
og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar þeir urðu fyrir slysi. Ef krafa er lögð
fram hjá stofnun í öðru EES-ríki, hefur það þó ekki áhrif á bótarétt samkvæmt
reglugerð 1408/71. Hvað sem öðru líður er það þeirrar stofnunar sem í hlut á
hverju sinni að taka ákvörðun um hvort krefjandi eigi rétt til þeirra bóta sem
hann gerði kröfu til hjá stofnuninni.
IV Málskostnaður
76 Ríkisstjórn Íslands, Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA og framkvæmdastjórn
Evrópubandalaganna, sem skilað hafa greinargerðum til EFTA-dómstólsins,
skulu hver bera sinn málskostnað. Þar sem um er ræða mál sem er hluti af
málarekstri fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur kemur það í hlut þess dómstóls að
kveða á um kostnað málsaðila.
Með vísan til framangreindra forsendna lætur
uppi svohljóðandi ráðgefandi álit um spurningar þær sem Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur
beindi til dómstólsins:
1. Hugtakið almannatryggingar, í skilningi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71,
nær til réttinda til örorkubóta sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðakerfi eins og því,
27 - 53
JUDGMENT
DÓMSTÓLLINN
in pension fund schemes such as the one at issue in the main proceedings,
including pensions based on projected rights.
2. It is not compatible with Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71 to subject the
entitlement to invalidity benefits based on projected rights, such as those at
issue in the main proceedings, to the condition that a member of a pension
fund must have paid contributions to a fund belonging to a certain group of
funds for a specific period preceding the date of an accident and thereby
exclude contributions paid into social security systems in other EEA States in
relation to work there.
3. Under Regulation 574/72, persons shall present their claims in the State
where they were resident and where they had social security entitlements
at the time of their injury. However, the lodging of a claim with the relevant
institution of another EEA State is without prejudice to the right to benefits
under Regulation 1408/71. It is in any case for each institution concerned
to make the final decision as to whether the claimant must be awarded the
benefit claimed from that institution.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Henrik Bull
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 February 2008.
Skúli Magnússon
Registrar
Carl Baudenbacher
President
28 - 54
2. Það samræmist ekki 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 að setja það skilyrði
fyrir rétti til örorkubóta sem byggja á framreiknuðum réttindum, eins og til
skoðunar er í aðalmálinu, að sjóðfélagi hafi í tiltekinn tíma fyrir slys greitt
iðgjöld til lífeyrissjóðs sem tilheyrir ákveðnum hópi sjóða og útiloka þannig
iðgjöld sem greidd eru í almannatryggingakerfi annarra EES-ríkja vegna starfa
þar.
3. Samkvæmt reglugerð 574/72 ber einstaklingum að leggja fram kröfur sínar í
því ríki þar sem þeir voru búsettir og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar
þeir urðu fyrir slysi. Ef krafa er lögð fram hjá stofnun í öðru EES-ríki, hefur það
þó ekki áhrif á bótarétt samkvæmt reglugerð 1408/71. Hvað sem öðru líður
er það þeirrar stofnunar sem í hlut á hverju sinni að taka ákvörðun um hvort
krefjandi eigi rétt til þeirra bóta sem hann gerði kröfu til hjá stofnuninni.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
sem til skoðunar er í aðalmálinu, þ.m.t. bóta byggðum á framreiknuðum
réttindum.
Henrik Bull
Kveðið upp í heyranda hljóði í Lúxemborg 1. febrúar 2008.
Carl Baudenbacher
dómritari
forseti
JUDGMENT
Skúli Magnússon
28 - 55
REPORT FOR THE HEARING
in Case E-4/07
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Héraðsdómur
Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík District Court), Iceland, in a case pending before it between
and
Gildi-lífeyrissjóður (Gildi Pension Fund)
concerning rules on free movement of workers within the EEA.
I
Introduction
1.
II
By a letter dated 19 March 2007, registered at the EFTA Court on 26 March
2007, Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur made a request for an Advisory Opinion
in a case pending before it between Jón Gunnar Þorkelsson (hereinafter
“the Plaintiff”) and Gildi-lífeyrissjóður (Gildi Pension Fund, hereinafter “the
Defendant”).
Facts and procedure
2.
The case before the national court concerns the issue of whether the Plaintiff
is entitled to have his disability pension calculated with account taken of
projected pension points, i.e. pension points that he would have been able to
accrue with the Defendant, had he remained a member of that pension fund
and continued working until turning 67.
3.
The Plaintiff is an Icelandic mariner who, having lived and worked in Iceland,
in September 1995 moved to Denmark where he still resides. He continued
to work as a mariner in Denmark, and paid contributions to a Danish pension
fund. On 16 September 1996, however, the Plaintiff, while at work on board a
Danish fishing vessel, suffered an accident causing his invalidity. The Plaintiff
has been assessed with a disability rating of 75%.
4.
The Plaintiff had accrued rights to pension payments from several Icelandic
pension funds at the time of the accident. Pension premiums had been paid
to Lífeyrissjóður Vestfirðinga (the West Fjords Pension Fund) in 1975–87, to
Lífeyrissjóður Austurlands (the Eastern Iceland Pension Fund) in 1991–95,
most recently in August 1995, and to the Defendant, then Lífeyrissjóður
29 - 56
í máli E-4/07
Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTAríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls, frá Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur í máli
sem rekið er fyrir dómstólnum
gegn
varðandi reglur um frjálsa för launþega á Evrópska efnahagssvæðinu.
I
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
SKÝRSLA FRAMSÖGUMANNS
Inngangur
1.
Með bréfi, dagsettu 19. mars 2007, óskaði Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur eftir
ráðgefandi áliti í máli sem rekið er fyrir dómstólnum milli Jóns Gunnars
Þorkelssonar (stefnandi), og Gildis-lífeyrissjóðs (stefndi). Beiðnin var skráð í
málaskrá dómstólsins 26. mars 2007.
2.
Ágreiningsefni máls þess sem rekið er fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur lýtur að
því hvort stefnandi eigi rétt á að útreikningur á örorkubótum hans taki mið af
framreiknuðum stigafjölda, þ.e. stigafjölda sem hann hefði getað áunnið sér í
sjóði stefnda frá slysdegi og til 67 ára aldurs ef hann hefði haldið áfram aðild
að sjóðnum og greitt í hann.
3.
Stefnandi er íslenskur sjómaður. Hann bjó og starfaði á Íslandi þar til hann flutti til
Danmerkur í september 1995 þar sem hann er enn búsettur. Stefnandi starfaði
áfram sem sjómaður í Danmörku og greiddi iðgjöld í danska lífeyrissjóðinn
HTS Pension. Þann 16. september 1996 slasaðist hann við störf á dönsku
fiskiskipi og var í kjölfarið metinn 75% öryrki.
4.
Stefnandi hafði áunnið sér rétt til lífeyrisgreiðslna úr nokkrum íslenskum
lífeyrissjóðum á þeim tíma þegar slysið varð. Iðgjöld höfðu verið greidd af
launum stefnanda til Lífeyrissjóðs Vestfirðinga á tímabilinu 1975 til 1987, til
Lífeyrissjóðs Austurlands á árunum 1991 til 1995, síðast fyrir ágústmánuð
29 - 57
II Málavextir og meðferð málsins
sjómanna (the Mariners’ Pension Fund), now Gildi-lífeyrissjóður (Gildi Pension
Fund), in 1969–95, most recently in September 1995.
5.
For his accident, the Plaintiff was awarded a lump-sum payment of DKK
99 653.12 from his Danish pension fund. With this pension fund, it appears
that the Plaintiff had not acquired rights to any other benefits for his accident.
In Iceland, since 1 October 1996, the Plaintiff has received disability pensions
from the pension funds named above in accordance with his accrued points
and the assessment of his loss of working capacity.
6.
However, on the grounds of failing to meet a condition of having paid
contributions to the Defendant for at least six of the 12 months preceding the
accident, the Plaintiff has not been found to have a right to have his disability
pension calculated on the basis of projected points. The dispute between the
parties concerns only this right to projection of entitlements.
7.
On 23 February 2006, the Plaintiff brought an action before Héraðsdómur
Reykjavíkur and demanded such payment from the Defendant. The Plaintiff
bases his claim on the view that he is entitled to a disability pension with
account taken of projected pension points with the Defendant, since the rules
of the fund regarding projection and the relevant provisions of the Agreement
on Relations between the Icelandic pension funds infringe provisions of the
EEA Agreement on the free movement of workers, in particular Articles 28 and
29 and the rules based thereon.
III Questions
8.
The following questions were referred to the Court:
1. Does the term ‘social insurance’1 as it is to be understood under the
EEA Agreement, and in particular Article 29 of the main text of the
Agreement and Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971
on the application of social security schemes to employed persons,
to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving
within the Community, cover the entitlement to disability benefit that
arises in pension fund schemes such as the Icelandic one?
2. Whether or not the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, the
District Court asks whether the provisions of the EEA Agreement on
the free movement of workers, and in particular Articles 28 and 29,
can be interpreted as meaning that a rule in the Articles of Association
1
Note: Article 29 EEA and the relevant provisions of Regulation 1408/71, in their English language versions, do not use the term
‘social insurance’ but rather ‘social security’.
30 - 58
5.
Stefnandi fékk sem eingreiðslu 99.653,12 danskar krónur í bætur úr danska
lífeyrissjóðnum vegna slyssins og virðist ekki hafa öðlast rétt til frekari bóta af
því tilefni hjá þeim lífeyrissjóði. Stefnandi hefur fengið greiddan örorkulífeyri
frá þeim lífeyrissjóðum á Íslandi sem taldir eru upp hér að ofan, í samræmi við
stigaeign hans og metna örorku, allt frá 1. október 1996.
6.
Stefnandi hefur hins vegar ekki verið talinn eiga rétt á því að örorkulífeyrir
hans sé ákvarðaður út frá framreiknuðum stigafjölda þar sem hann uppfylli
ekki það skilyrði að hafa greitt iðgjöld til stefnda í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði
á undanfarandi tólf mánuðum fyrir slysdag. Ágreiningur málsaðila snýst
einvörðungu um réttinn til framreiknings.
7.
Málið var höfðað fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur með stefnu birtri 23. febrúar
2006 þar sem stefnandi gerir kröfur um lífeyrisgreiðslur úr sjóði stefnda á
grundvelli framreiknings. Stefnandi heldur því fram, kröfum sínum til stuðnings,
að reglur sjóðsins um framreikning og ákvæði í samkomulagi um samskipti
lífeyrissjóða brjóti í bága við ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega,
einkum ákvæði 28. og 29. gr. EES og reglur sem á þeim byggja.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
1995, og til stefnda í málinu, Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna, nú Gildi-lífeyrissjóðs, á
tímabilinu 1969 til 1995, síðast fyrir septembermánuð 1995.
IIIÁlitaefni
Eftirfarandi spurningar voru bornar undir EFTA-dómstólinn:
1. Nær hugtakið almannatryggingar1, eins og það ber að skilja
samkvæmt EES-samningnum, einkum 29. gr. meginmáls
samningsins og reglugerðar nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971, um beitingu
einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja,
til réttinda til örorkubóta, sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðskerfi eins og því
íslenska?
2. Hvort heldur svarið við spurningu nr. 1 er játandi eða ekki, þá er spurt
hvort ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega, einkum 28. og
29. gr., verði skýrð svo, að regla í samþykktum íslenskra lífeyrissjóða,
1
Ath.: Í 29. gr. EES og viðeigandi ákvæði Reglugerðar 1408/71, í enskri útgáfu, er hugtakið „social insurance” ekki notað fyrir
almannatryggingar heldur „social security”.
30 - 59
8.
of Icelandic pension funds which makes a specific benefit right (the
right to projection of entitlements) subject to the condition that the
individual involved has paid premiums to an Icelandic pension fund
that is a party to the Agreement on Relations between the Pension
Funds, for at least 6 of the 12 months preceding the date of an
accident, is compatible with the EEA Agreement when the reason
why the individual is unable to meet this condition is that he has
moved to another state within the EEA in order to pursue employment
comparable to that which he pursued previously, and he has paid into
a pension fund in that state?
3. Is Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971, on the
application of social security schemes to employed persons, to selfemployed persons and to members of their families moving within the
Community, to be interpreted as meaning that workers are to present
their compensation claims in the state in which they were resident
and in which they had social security entitlements at the time of their
injury?
IV Legal background
National law
9.
Icelandic pension funds are established on the basis of agreements between
workers’ and employers’ organisations, but workers are obliged by law to
belong to the pension fund of their respective occupation or workers’ group and
to pay premiums to a pension fund. In the event of loss of working capacity,
fund members are entitled to a disability benefit on the basis of the rights
they have accrued through the payment of premiums to the fund. Some funds
also project rights when calculating such pensions, i.e. the funds calculate a
member’s rights as if he had paid premiums up to the age of drawing old-age
pension.
10. Under the rules of the Mariners’ Pension Fund (now the Defendant), which
were in force at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident, a fund member who suffers
a loss of working capacity of 40% or more is entitled to a disability pension
from the fund, provided that he has (a) paid premiums to the fund for at least
three of the preceding four calendar years and accrued not less than one
point for each of the years; (b) paid premiums to the fund for at least 6 months
and for at least 100 days during the preceding 12 months; and (c) suffered a
reduction of income as a result of the loss of working capacity.
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3. Ber að túlka reglugerð nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971, um beitingu
einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja,
svo að launþegum beri að bera fram kröfur sínar um bætur í því landi
þar sem þeir eru búsettir og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar
þeir slasast.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
sem gerir það að skilyrði fyrir tilteknum bótarétti (svokölluðum
framreikningsrétti), að launþegi greiði iðgjöld til íslensks lífeyrissjóðs,
sem er aðili að samkomulagi um samskipti lífeyrissjóða, í að minnsta
kosti 6 af síðustu 12 mánuðum fyrir slys, fái staðist ákvæði EESsamningsins, þegar ástæða þess að einstaklingurinn uppfyllir ekki
skilyrði er sú, að hann hafði flust til annars ríkis innan Evrópska
efnahagssvæðisins til að stunda þar sambærileg störf og áður og
greitt í þarlendan lífeyrissjóð.
IV Löggjöf
Landsréttur
Samkvæmt því, sem fram kemur í beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit eru íslenskir
lífeyrissjóðir stofnaðir á grundvelli frjálsra samninga samtaka launafólks og
atvinnurekenda en launþegar eru skyldaðir með lögum til að eiga aðild að
lífeyrissjóði viðkomandi starfsstéttar eða starfshóps og til að greiða iðgjöld
í lífeyrissjóð. Við orkutap eiga sjóðfélagar rétt á örorkubótum á grundvelli
þeirra réttinda sem þeir hafa áunnið sér með greiðslu iðgjalda í lífeyrissjóðinn.
Sumir sjóðirnir framreikna auk þess réttindin við útreikning lífeyris, þ.e.a.s.
reikna réttindin eins og sjóðfélagi hefði greitt iðgjald af launum sínum fram að
ellilífeyrisaldri.
10. Samkvæmt reglum Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna (nú stefnda í málinu), sem voru í
gildi þegar stefnandi varð fyrir slysinu, á sjóðfélagi sem verður fyrir 40% orkutapi
eða meira rétt á örorkulífeyri úr sjóðnum enda hafi hann (a) greitt iðgjöld til
sjóðsins í að minnsta kosti þrjú ár af undanfarandi fjórum almanaksárum og
áunnið sér eigi minna en 1 stig hvert þessara þriggja ára, (b) greitt iðgjöld
til sjóðsins í minnst 6 mánuði og að lágmarki 100 daga á undanfarandi 12
mánuðum og (c) orðið fyrir tekjuskerðingu vegna orkutapsins.
31 - 61
9.
11. Article 15(1) of the Pension Act No 129/1997, which took effect on 1 July 1998,
states that fund members are entitled to disability pensions if they suffer a
loss of working capacity assessed as being 50% or greater, provided that they
have paid premiums to the fund for at least two years and suffered a reduction
of income as a result of the loss of working capacity. Article 15(2) states that
disability pension rights are to be projected in accordance with the rules
specified in further detail in the Articles of Association of the pension funds,
providing that the member in question has paid into a fund for at least three of
the preceding four years, including at least six months of the preceding twelvemonth period.
EEA law
12. Article 28(1) EEA reads:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured among EC Member
States and EFTA States.
13. Article 29 EEA reads:
In order to provide freedom of movement for workers and self-employed
persons, the Contracting Parties shall, in the field of social security, secure,
as provided for in Annex VI, for workers and self-employed persons and their
dependants, in particular:
(a)aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit
and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account
under the laws of the several countries;
(b)payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Contracting
Parties.
14. Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application
and to members of their families moving within the Community (hereinafter
“Regulation 1408/71”) is referred to at point 1 of Annex VI to the EEA
Agreement. Unless otherwise indicated, the following provisions are quoted
with the wording applicable, subject to Protocol 1 of the EEA Agreement and
the adaptations contained in Annex VI, at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident.
15. Under Title I General provisions, Article 1 Definitions, item (j):
(j) legislation means in respect of each Member State statutes, regulations
and other provisions and all other implementing measures, present or future,
32 - 62
EES-réttur
12. Ákvæði 1. mgr. 28. gr. EES er svohljóðandi:
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
11. Í lögum nr. 129/1997 um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi
lífeyrissjóða, sem tóku gildi 1. júlí 1998, segir í 1. mgr. 15. gr. að sjóðfélagi eigi
rétt á örorkulífeyri ef hann verður fyrir orkutapi sem metið er 50% eða meira,
hafi hann greitt í lífeyrissjóð í a.m.k. tvö ár og orðið fyrir tekjuskerðingu af
völdum orkutapsins. Samkvæmt 2. mgr. 15. gr. skal örorkulífeyrir framreiknaður
samkvæmt reglum sem nánar er kveðið á um í samþykktum lífeyrissjóða, enda
hafi sjóðfélagi greitt til lífeyrissjóðs í a.m.k. þrjú ár á undanfarandi fjórum árum,
þar af a.m.k. sex mánuði á síðasta tólf mánaða tímabili.
1. Frelsi launþega til flutninga skal vera tryggt í aðildarríkjum EB og EFTAríkjum.
13. Ákvæði 29. gr. EES er svohljóðandi:
Til að veita launþegum og sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum frelsi til flutninga
skulu samningsaðilar á sviði almannatrygginga, í samræmi við VI. viðauka,
einkum tryggja launþegum og sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum og þeim sem
þeir framfæra að:
a) lögð verði saman öll tímabil sem taka ber til greina samkvæmt lögum hinna
ýmsu landa til að öðlast og viðhalda bótarétti, svo og reikna fjárhæð bóta;
14. Í 1. lið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn er vísað í reglugerð ráðsins (EBE)
nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971 um beitingu almannatryggingareglna gagnvart
launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem
flytjast milli aðildarríkja (reglugerð 1408/71). Tilvísanir í ákvæði hér á eftir, með
fyrirvara um bókun 1 við EES-samninginn og aðlögunarliði í VI. viðauka, eru
byggðar á textanum eins og hann var á þeim tíma sem stefnandi varð fyrir
slysinu, nema annað sé tekið fram.
15. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði,1. gr., Skilgreiningar, j-liður:
löggjöf: að því er varðar sérhvert aðildarríki, gildandi lög, reglugerðir
og önnur ákvæði ásamt síðari breytingum aðildarríkis um framkvæmd
32 - 63
b) bætur séu greiddar fólki sem er búsett á yfirráðasvæðum samningsaðila.
relating to the branches and schemes of social security covered by Article 4 (1)
and (2) or those special non-contributory benefits covered by Article 4 (2a).
The term excludes provisions of existing or future industrial agreements,
rendering them compulsory or extending their scope. However, in so far as
such provisions:
(i) serve to put into effect compulsory insurance imposed by the laws and
regulations referred to in the preceding subparagraph; or
(ii) set up a scheme administered by the same institution as that which
administers the schemes set up by the laws and regulations referred to in the
preceding subparagraph,
the limitation on the term may at any time be lifted by a declaration of the
Member State concerned specifying the schemes of such a kind to which
this Regulation applies. Such a declaration shall be notified and published in
accordance with the provisions of Article 97.
[…]
16. Under Title I General provisions, Article 1 Definitions, item (r):
(r) periods of insurance means periods of contribution or period of employment
or self-employment as defined or recognized as periods of insurance by the
legislation under which they were completed or considered as completed, and
all periods treated as such, where they are regarded by the said legislation as
equivalent to periods of insurance;
17. Under Title I General provisions, Article 3 Equality of treatment, paragraph 1:
1. Subject to the special provisions of this Regulation, persons resident in
the territory of one of the Member States to whom this Regulation applies shall
be subject to the same obligations and enjoy the same benefits under the
legislation of any Member State as the nationals of the State.
18. Under Title I General provisions, Article 4 Matters covered, paragraph 1(b) and
(e):
1. This regulation shall apply to all legislation concerning the following
branches of social security:
[…]
(b) invalidity benefits, including those intended for the maintenance
improvement of earning capacity;
- 33
64 -
Undir þetta falla ekki ákvæði gildandi eða komandi kjarasamninga, óháð því
hvort yfirvöld hafa ákveðið að gera þau skyldubundin eða víkka gildissvið
þeirra. Ef slík ákvæði:
i) hafa verið notuð til að koma á skyldutryggingu þeirri sem kveðið er á um
í þeim lögum og reglugerðum sem um getur í undanfarandi undirgrein, eða
ii) hafa falið í sér fyrirmæli um að komið sé á fót kerfi undir stjórn sömu
stofnunar og kveðið er á um í þeim lögum og reglugerðum sem um getur í
undanfarandi undirgrein,
má hins vegar afnema þessa takmörkun hvenær sem er með yfirlýsingu
hlutaðeigandi aðildarríkis, þar sem fram kemur hvaða tryggingakerfi
reglugerðinni er ætlað að ná til. Gefa skal út tilkynningu um slíka yfirlýsingu og
hún birt samkvæmt ákvæðum 97. gr.
[...]
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
almannatryggingareglna sem 1. og 2. mgr. 4. gr. ná til eða sérstakar bætur
sem eru ekki iðgjaldsskyldar og fjallað er um í 2. mgr. a í 4. gr.;
16. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 1. gr., Skilgreiningar, r-liður:
tryggingatímabil: iðgjaldatímabil eða starfstímabil launþega eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklings eins og það er skilgreint eða viðurkennt sem
tryggingatímabil, samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf sem í gildi var þegar þeim var lokið
eða var talið lokið, og að auki öll tímabil sem farið er með sem slík þar sem þau
í téðri löggjöf eru talin jafngilda tryggingatímabilum;
17. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 3. gr., Jafnræði við málsmeðferð, 1. mgr.:
1. Með fyrirvara um sérákvæði þessarar reglugerðar hafa einstaklingar,
búsettir í aðildarríki, sem þessi reglugerð gildir í, sömu skyldum að gegna og
njóta sömu réttinda og bóta og þarlendir ríkisborgarar samkvæmt löggjöf þess
ríkis.
18. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði., Ákvæði 4. gr., Tryggingaflokkar, 1. mgr., b- og
e-liður:
1. Reglugerð þessi
almannatrygginga:
nær
til
[...]
b) örorkubætur að meðtöldum bótum sem ætlaðar eru til að viðhalda eða
auka möguleika á tekjuöflun;
33 - 65
löggjafar
um
eftirfarandi
flokka
[…]
(e) benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases;
19. Under Title I General provisions, Article 5 Declarations by the Member States
on the scope of this Regulation:
The Member States shall specify the legislation and schemes referred to
in Article 4 (1) and (2) […] in declarations to be notified and published in
accordance with Article 97.
20. Point I(b) of Iceland’s original Declaration pursuant to Article 5:2
(b) Invalidity benefits:
[…]
Act on the Seamen’s3 Pension Fund (49/1974 with later amendments)
[…]
21. Point I(b) in the later Declaration made by Iceland pursuant to Article 5:4
b) Invalidity benefits:
[…]
The Pension Act No 129/1997 with later amendments
[…]
The Act on the Seamen5 Pension Fund No 45/1999 with later amendments
[…]
22. Under Title I General provisions, Article 10 Waiving of residence clauses
– Effect of compulsory insurance on reimbursement of contributions,
paragraph 1:
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation invalidity, old-age or
survivors’ cash benefits, pension for accidents at work or occupational diseases
and death grants acquired under the legislation of one or more Member States
shall not be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, withdrawal or
confiscation by reason of the fact that the recipient resides in the territory of a
Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for payment
is situated.
[…]
OJ C 398 of 31.12.1994 p. 10.
Note: in most of the written observations submitted to the Court, the Icelandic sjómanna as used in the title of this Act is translated
into “Mariners”.
4
OJ C 135 of 2.6.2005 p. 11.
5
Note: in most of the written observations submitted to the Court, the Icelandic sjómanna as used in the title of this Act is translated
into “Mariners”.
2
3
- 66
34 -
[...]
e) bætur vegna vinnuslysa og atvinnusjúkdóma;
19. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 5. gr., Yfirlýsingar aðildarríkjanna um gildissvið
þessarar reglugerðar:
Aðildarríkin skulu, í opinberum auglýsingum sem ber að tilkynna og birta í
samræmi við 97. gr., tilgreina löggjöf og kerfi sem um getur í 1. og 2. mgr. 4.
gr. [...].
20. Liður I b í upprunalegri yfirlýsingu Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr.2:
b) Bætur vegna örorku:
[...]
Lög um lífeyrissjóð sjómanna3 (49/1974 með síðari breytingum)
[...]
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
21. Liður I b í síðari yfirlýsingu Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr.4:
b) Örorkubætur:
[...]
Lög um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða nr. 129/1997
með áorðnum breytingum
[...]
Lög um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna5 nr. 45/1999 með áorðnum breytingum
[…]
1. Hafi réttur til peningagreiðslna vegna örorku-, elli- eða eftirlifendabóta
eða til lífeyris vegna vinnuslysa eða atvinnusjúkdóma og styrkja vegna andláts
verið áunninn samkvæmt löggjöf eins eða fleiri aðildarríkja, skulu þessar
greiðslur ekki lækka, breytast, stöðvast tímabundið, falla niður eða vera gerðar
upptækar af þeirri ástæðu að viðtakandi hafi búsetu í öðru aðildarríki en því
þar sem stofnun sú sem ber ábyrgð á greiðslum er staðsett, nema kveðið sé á
um annað í þessari reglugerð.
[...]
Stjtíð. EB C 398, 31.12.1994, bls. 10.
Ath.: Í flestum greinagerðum sem hafa borist EFTA-dómstólnum er orðið ,,sjómanna”, í merkingu þessara laga þýtt með orðinu
,,Mariners”.
4
Stjtíð. EB C 135, 2.6.2005, bls. 11.
5
Ath.: Í flestum greinagerðum sem hafa borist EFTA-dómstólnum er orðið ,,sjómanna”, í merkingu þessar laga þýtt með orðinu
,,Mariners”.
2
3
34 - 67
22. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 10. gr., Eftirgjöf á skilyrðum um búsetu – Áhrif
skyldutryggingar á endurgreiðslu iðgjalda, 1. mgr.:
23. Under Title I General provisions, Article 10a Special non-contributory benefits,
paragraph 1:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10 and Title III, persons to whom
this Regulation applies shall be granted the special non-contributory cash
benefits referred to in Article 4 (2a) exclusively in the territory of the Member
State in which they reside, in accordance with the legislation of that State,
provided that such benefits are listed in Annex IIa. […]
24. No such special non-contributory benefits have been listed in Annex IIa to
Regulation 1408/71 as regards Iceland. Presently, this is stated under point 1
adaptation (m) of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement.6
25. Under Title II Determination of the legislation applicable, Article 13 General
rules, paragraph (2)(a) and (c):
2. Subject to Articles 14 to 17:
(a)a person employed in the territory of one Member State shall be subject to the
legislation of that State even if he resides in the territory of another Member
State or if the registered office or place of business of the undertaking
or individual employing him is situated in the territory of another Member
State;
[…]
(c)a person employed on board a vessel flying the flag of a Member State
shall be subject to the legislation of the State;
26. Under Title III Special provisions relating to the various categories of benefits,
Chapter 2 Invalidity, Section 2 Employed persons or self-employed persons
subject either only to legislation under which the amount of invalidity benefit
depends on the duration of periods of insurance or residence or the legislation
of this type and of the type referred to in Section 1:
Article 40 General provisions, paragraph 1:
1. An employed person or a self-employed person who has been successively
or alternately subject to the legislation of two or more Member States, of which
at least on is not of the type referred to in Article 37 (1), shall receive benefits
under the provisions of Chapter 3, which shall apply mutatis mutandis […].
27. Under Title III Special provisions relating to the various categories of benefits,
Chapter 3 Old age and death (pensions):
6
Previously under adaptation (jb), as added by EEA Joint Committee Decision 7/94 of 21.03.1994, moved to adaptation (m) by way
of EEA Joint Committee Decision 82/97 of 12.11.1997.
- 68
35 -
1. Þrátt fyrir ákvæði 10. gr. og III. bálks skulu einstaklingar sem heyra undir
þessa reglugerð eingöngu hljóta sérstakar bætur í peningum, sem eru ekki
iðgjaldsskyldar og um getur í 2. mgr. a 4. gr., á yfirráðasvæði aðildarríkisins
þar sem þeir eru búsettir, í samræmi við löggjöf þess ríkis, að því tilskildu að
slíkar bætur séu tilgreindar í II. viðauka a. [...]
24. Engar slíkar sérstakar bætur sem eru ekki iðgjaldsskyldar eru skráðar af hálfu
Íslands í II. viðauka a við Reglugerð 1408/71. Nú er kveðið á um þetta í 1. lið í
aðlögunarlið (m) í VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn.6
25. II. bálkur, Ákvörðun um hvaða löggjöf skuli beita, 13. gr., Almennar reglur, 2.
mgr. a- og c-liður:
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
23. I. bálkur, Almenn ákvæði, 10. gr. a, Sérstakar bætur sem eru ekki iðgjaldsskyldar,
1. mgr.:
2. Með fyrirvara um ákvæði 14. – 17. gr.:
a) skal einstaklingur sem ráðinn er til starfa í einu aðildarríki heyra undir
löggjöf þess ríkis, jafnvel þótt hann búi í öðru aðildarríki eða skráð aðsetur
skrifstofu eða vinnustöð þess fyrirtækis eða einstaklings sem hann starfar
hjá sé í öðru aðildarríki;
[...]
c) skal einstaklingur sem starfar um borð í skipi er siglir undir fána aðildarríkis
heyra undir löggjöf þess ríkis;
40. gr., Almenn ákvæði, 1. mgr.:
1. Launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur sem hefur samfellt eða sitt
á hvað heyrt undir löggjöf tveggja eða fleiri aðildarríkja, og minnst ein þeirra
er annars eðlis en sú sem um getur í 1. mgr. 37. gr., skal fá bætur samkvæmt
ákvæðum 3. kafla, sem skal gilda að breyttu breytanda [...].
27. III. bálkur, Sérákvæð um ýmsa bótaflokka, 3. kafli Elli og andlát (lífeyrir):
6
Var áður í aðlögunarlið (jb), bætt við með ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 7/94 frá 21.3.1994, og fært í aðlögunarlið
(m) með ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 82/97 frá 12.11.1997.
35 - 69
26. III. bálkur Sérákvæði um ýmsa bótaflokka, 2. kafli Örorka, 2. þáttur, Launþegar
eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingar sem heyra annað hvort eingöngu undir
löggjöf sem gerir ráð fyrir því að fjárhæð örorkubóta fari eftir lengd tryggingaeða búsetutímabila eða sem heyra bæði undir slíka löggjöf og þá sem getið er
um í 1. þætti :
Article 44 General provisions for the award of benefits where an employed
or self-employed person has been subject to the legislation of two or more
Member States, paragraph 1:
1. The rights to benefits of an employed or self-employed person who has
been subject to the legislation of two or more Member States […] shall be
determined in accordance with this Chapter.
Article 45 Consideration of periods of insurance or of residence completed
under the legislations to which an employed person or self-employed person
was subject, for the acquisition, retention or recovery of the right to benefits,
paragraphs 1 and 5:
or recovery of the right to benefits, under a scheme which is not a special
scheme within the meaning of paragraph 2 or 3, subject to the completion of
periods of insurance or of residence, the competent institution of that Member
State shall take account, where necessary, of the periods of insurance or of
residence completed under the legislation of any other Member State, be it
under a general scheme or under a special scheme and either as an employed
person or a self-employed person. For that purpose, it shall take account of
these periods as if they had completed under its own legislation.
[…]
or recovery of the right to benefits conditional upon the person concerned
being insured at the time of the materialization of the risk, this condition
shall be regarded as having been satisfied in the case of insurance under
the legislation of another Member State, in accordance with the procedures
provided in Annex VI for each Member State concerned.
28. Under Title VI Miscellaneous provisions:
Article 86 Claims, declarations or appeals submitted to an authority, institution
or tribunal of a Member State other than the competent State, paragraph 1:
1. Any claim, declaration or appeal which should have been submitted, in
order to comply with the legislation of one Member State, within a specified
period to an authority, institution or tribunal of that State shall be admissible if
it is submitted within the same period to a corresponding authority, institution
or tribunal of another Member State. In such a case the authority, institution, or
tribunal receiving the claim, declaration or appeal shall forward it without delay
to the competent authority, institution or tribunal of the former State either
70 - 36
44. gr., Almenn ákvæði um greiðslu bóta þegar launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi
einstaklingur hefur heyrt undir löggjöf tveggja eða fleiri aðildarríkja, 1. mgr.:
1. Hafi launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingur heyrt undir löggjöf
tveggja eða fleiri aðildarríkja skal ákvarða bótarétt hans [...] samkvæmt
ákvæðum þessa kafla.
45. gr., Mat á trygginga- eða búsetutímabilum sem launþegi eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklingur hefur lokið til að öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta
bótarétt samkvæmt löggjöf sem hann hefur heyrt undir, 1. og 5. mgr.:
1. Þegar löggjöf aðildarríkis setur það skilyrði fyrir rétti einstaklings til
að öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta bætur eftir kerfi, sem er ekki sérstakt
bótakerfi í skilningi 2. eða 3. mgr., að trygginga- eða búsetutímabilum sé
lokið, skal þar til bær stofnun þess aðildarríkis taka til greina, að því marki
sem nauðsynlegt er, trygginga- eða búsetutímabil sem lokið er samkvæmt
löggjöf annars aðildarríkis, hvort heldur sem það er gert eftir almennu kerfi
eða sérstöku bótakerfi og hvort heldur um er að ræða launþega eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstakling. Með það í huga skal hún taka tillit til þessara tímabila
eins og þeim hefði verið lokið samkvæmt þeirri löggjöf sem hún starfar eftir.
[...]
öðlast, viðhalda eða endurheimta bætur að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur sé
tryggður á þeim tíma er áhættan kemur fram skal litið svo á að því skilyrði
hafi verið fullnægt, enda sé viðkomandi tryggður samkvæmt löggjöf annars
aðildarríkis, í samræmi við reglur sem eru settar fyrir hvert aðildarríki í VI.
viðauka.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
86. gr. Kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir sem lagðar eru fyrir yfirvöld, stofnun
eða dómstól í aðildarríki öðru en hinu lögbæra ríki, 1. mgr.:
1. Allar kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir sem samkvæmt löggjöf aðildarríkis
hefði átt að leggja fram við yfirvöld, stofnun eða dómstól í því aðildarríki
innan tiltekins tíma skulu taldar gildar ef gögnin eru lögð fram innan sama
tíma við yfirvöld, stofnun eða dómstól í öðru aðildarríki. Í slíku tilviki skulu
yfirvöld, stofnun eða dómstóll, sem veita viðtöku kröfu, yfirlýsingu eða áfrýjun,
framsenda þar til bæru yfirvaldi, stofnun eða dómstól fyrra ríkisins þessi gögn
tafarlaust, ýmist beint eða fyrir milligöngu lögbærra yfirvalda í hlutaðeigandi
36 - 71
28. VI. bálkur, Ýmis ákvæði
directly or through the competent authorities of the Member State concerned.
The date on which such claims, declarations or appeals were submitted to the
authority, institution or tribunal of the Second State shall be considered as the
date of their submission to the competent authority, institution or tribunal.
29. As presently referred to at point 1 adaptation (t) of Annex VI to the EEA
Agreement,7 the following has been added to Annex VI Special procedures for
applying the legislations of certain Member States to Regulation 1408/71 (cf.
Article 89 of the Regulation), as regards Iceland:8
Where employment or self-employment in Iceland has terminated and the
contingency occurs during employment or self-employment in another State
to which this Regulation applies and where the disability pension of both the
social security and the supplementary pension schemes (pension funds)
in Iceland no longer includes the period between the contingency and the
pensionable age (future periods), periods of insurance under the legislation of
for the requirement of the future periods as if they were periods of insurance in
Iceland.
30. Council Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of 21 March 1972 laying down the
procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application
of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and
to their families moving within the community (hereinafter “Regulation 574/72”)
is referred to at point 2 of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement. Unless otherwise
indicated, the following provisions are quoted with the wording applicable,
subject to Protocol 1 of the EEA Agreement and the adaptations contained in
Annex VI, at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident.
31. Under Title IV Implementation of the special provisions of the Regulation
relating to the various categories of benefits, Chapter 3 Invalidity, old-age and
death (pensions), the Section on Submission and investigation of claims for
benefits:
Article 36 Claims for old-age and survivors’ benefits (excluding orphans’
benefits) and invalidity benefits in cases not referred to in Article 35 of the
1. In order to receive benefits under Articles 40 to 51 of the Regulation,
except in the cases referred to in Article 35 of the implementing Regulation,
Originally under adaptation (n), made (t) by Joint Committee Decision 82/97 of 12.11.1997.
Originally point O, later renumbered P (by Joint Committee Decision 82/97 of 12.11.1997), now part of point ZA (by way of the EEA
Enlargement Agreement, cf. OJ L 130 of 29.4.2004 p. 3).
7
8
- 72
37 -
29. Eins og vísað er til í 1. lið í aðlögunarlið (t) í VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn7,
hefur eftirfarandi verið bætt við VI. viðauka, Sérstök tilhögun við framkvæmd
á löggjöf tiltekinna aðildarríkja, við Reglugerð 1408/71 (sbr. 89. gr.
reglugerðarinnar) hvað Ísland varðar8:
Hafi launaðri vinnu eða sjálfstæðri atvinnustarfsemi verið lokið á Íslandi, og
tilvikið verður þegar launuð vinna eða sjálfstæð atvinnustarfsemi er stunduð í
öðru ríki sem reglugerðin tekur til og þar sem örorkulífeyrir, bæði samkvæmt
almannatryggingakerfinu og viðbótarlífeyriskerfinu (lífeyrissjóðir), á Íslandi
felur ekki lengur í sér tímabilið frá því að tilvik kemur fram og fram að því að
lífeyrisaldri er náð (tímabil sem ekki er liðið), skal tekið tillit til tryggingatímabila
kröfuna um tímabil sem ekki er liðið eins og um væri að ræða tryggingatímabil
á Íslandi.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
aðildarríki. Sá dagur þegar slíkar kröfur, yfirlýsingar eða áfrýjanir eru lagðar
fyrir yfirvöld, stofnun eða dómstól í síðara aðildarríkinu telst vera eiginlegur
skiladagur gagnanna til lögbærra yfirvalda, stofnunar eða dómstóls.
30. Vísað er til reglugerðar ráðsins (EBE) nr. 574/72 frá 21. mars 1972 sem
kveður á um framkvæmd reglugerðar (EBE) nr. 1408/71 um beitingu
almannatryggingareglna gagnvart launþegum, sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklingum
og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja (reglugerð 574/72) í 2.
lið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn. Tilvísanir í ákvæði hér á eftir, með fyrirvara
um bókun 1 við EES-samninginn og aðlögunarliði í VI. viðauka, eru byggðar á
textanum eins og hann var á þeim tíma sem stefnandi varð fyrir slysinu, nema
annað sé tekið fram.
36. gr. Kröfur um elli- og eftirlifendabætur (að undanskildum
munaðarleysingjabótum) og örorkubætur sem falla ekki undir 35. gr.
framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar:
1. Hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur skal leggja fram kröfu hjá stofnun á búsetustað,
eins og ráð er fyrir gert í löggjöfinni sem hún starfar eftir, til þess að fá bætur
Upphaflega undir aðlögunarlið (n), sem var breytt í aðlögunarlið (t) með ákvörðun sameiginlegu EES-nefndarinnar nr. 82/97 frá
12.11.1997.
8
Upphaflega aðlögunarliður (o), sem var seinna breytt í aðlögunarlið (p) (með ákvörðun sameiginlegur EES-nefndarinnar nr. 82/97
frá 12.11.1997), en nú hluti af aðlögunarlið ZA (breytt með Samningi um stækkun EES , sbr. Stjtíð. EB nr. L 130 frá 29.4.2004,
bls. 3).
7
37 - 73
31. IV. bálkur, Framkvæmd sérákvæða reglugerðarinnar um hina ýmsu bótaflokka,
3. kafli, Örorka, elli og andlát (lífeyrir), undir þættinum, Kröfur um bætur og
umfjöllun þeirra
the person concerned shall submit a claim to the institution of the place of
residence in accordance with the procedure provided for by the legislation
administered by that institution. If the employed or self-employed person has
not been subject to that legislation, the institution of the place of residence shall
forward the claim to the institution of the Member State to whose legislation he
was last subject, indicating the date on which the claim was submitted. That
date shall be regarded as the date on which the claim was submitted to the
latter institution.
2. Where a claimant resides in the territory of a Member State to whose
legislation the employed or self-employed person has not been subject, he
may submit his claim to the institution of the Member State to whose legislation
the employed or self-employed person was last subject.
3. Where a claimant resides in the territory of a State which is not a Member
State, he shall submit his claim to the competent institution of that Member
State to whose legislation the employed or self-employed person was last
subject.
Should the claimant submit his claim to the institution of the Member State
of which he is a national, the latter shall forward such claim to the competent
institution.
4. A claim for benefits sent to the institution of one Member State shall
automatically involve the concurrent award of benefits under the legislation
of all the Member States in question whose conditions the claimant satisfies
except where, under Article 44 (2) of the Regulation, the claimant asks for
postponement of any old-age benefits to which he would be entitled under the
legislation of one or more Member States.
32. Under the following Section on Investigation of claims for benefits in respect
of invalidity, old age and survivors in the cases referred to in Article 36 of the
Article 41 Determination of the investigating institutions:
1. Claims for benefit shall be investigated by the institution to which they
have been sent or forwarded in accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of
the implementing Regulation. This institution is hereinafter referred to as the
‘investigating institution’.
2. The investigating institution shall forthwith notify claims for benefits to
all the institutions concerned on a special form, so that the claims may be
investigated simultaneously and without delay by all these institutions.
- 74
38 -
2. Hafi krefjandi ekki heyrt undir löggjöf, sem launþegi eða sjálfstætt starfandi
einstaklingur, þess aðildarríkis þar sem hann er búsettur, getur hann sent kröfu
sína til stofnunar sem starfar samkvæmt löggjöf þess aðildarríkis sem hann
heyrði síðast undir.
3. Sé krefjandi búsettur á yfirráðasvæðis ríkis sem ekki er aðildarríki, skal
hann leggja inn kröfu hjá þar til bærri stofnun sem starfar samkvæmt löggjöf
þess aðildarríkis sem launþeginn eða hinn sjáflstætt starfandi einstaklingur
heyrði síðast undir.
Sendi krefjandi kröfu sína til stofnunar í aðildarríki þar sem hann er ríkisborgari,
skal hún senda kröfuna áfram til þar til bærrar stofnunar.
4. Krafa um bætur sem send er til stofnunar í einu aðildarríki felur í sér að
bótum er sjálfkrafa úthlutað samtímis samkvæmt löggjöf allra hlutaðeigandi
aðildarríkja, þar sem krefjandi hefur fullnægt skilyrðum fyrir bótarétti, nema
krefjandi, samkvæmt 2. mgr. 44. gr. reglugerðarinnar, fari fram á að greiðslu
ellilífeyris, sem hann á rétt á samkvæmt löggjöf eins eða fleiri aðildarríkis, sé
frestað.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
samkvæmt 40.–51. gr. í reglugerðinni, að undanskildum þeim tilvikum sem
vísað er til í 35. gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar. Hafi launþegi eða sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklingur ekki heyrt undir þá löggjöf, skal stofnun á búsetustað
senda kröfuna áfram til stofnunar sem starfar samkvæmt löggjöf þess
aðildarríkis sem krefjandi heyrði síðast undir og tilgreina dagsetningu kröfunnar.
Gildir dagsetningin sem skiladagur kröfu hjá síðarnefndu stofnuninni.
41. gr. Úrskurður um hvaða stofnun beri að fjalla um kröfur:
1. Sú stofnun sem fengið hefur bótakröfur sendar samkvæmt ákvæðum 36.
gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar, skal taka þær til athugunar. Þessi stofnun
er hér eftir kölluð „umsagnarstofnun“.
2. Umsagnarstofnun skal tilkynna öllum hlutaðeigandi stofnunum um
bótakröfur á þar til gerðum eyðublöðum, þannig að þær geti allar tekið kröfurnar
til athugunar tafarlaust.
38 - 75
32. Undir þættinum, Athugun á kröfum vegna örorku-, elli-, og eftirlifendabóta í
þeim tilvikum sem um getur í 36. gr. framkvæmdarreglugerðarinnar:
Article 48 Notification to the claimant of the decisions of the institutions,
paragraph 1:
1. The final decision taken by each of the institutions concerned shall be
notified to the investigating institution. Each of these decisions must specify the
grounds and time-limits for appeal provided for by the legislation in question.
When all these decisions have been received, the investigation institution
shall communicate them to the claimant in his own language by means of a
summarized statement to which the aforesaid decisions shall be appended.
Periods allowed for appeals shall commence only on the date of receipt of the
summarized statement by the claimant.
V
Written observations
33. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the Court and Article 97 of the Rules of
Procedure, written observations have been received from:
- the Plaintiff, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, Supreme Court
Attorney;
- the Defendant, represented by Hörður Felix Harðarson, Supreme Court
Attorney, acting as Agent, assisted by Tryggvi Þórhallsson, District Court
Attorney;
- the Republic of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First
Secretary and Legal Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent;
- the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Arne Torsten Andersen,
Senior Officer, and Lorna Young, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive
Affairs, acting as Agents, assisted by Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson, Officer,
Internal Market Affairs Directorate;
- the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Viktor
Kreuschitz, its Legal Adviser, and Nicola Yerrell, a member of its Legal
Service, acting as Agents.
The Plaintiff
The first question
34. The Plaintiff holds that the Icelandic pension fund system falls under the
concept of ‘social security’ in Article 29 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation
1408/71. In this regard, it is emphasised that Icelandic law provides for the
obligation of all employees and self-employed persons working in Iceland
to pay premiums to an Icelandic pension fund. Reference is made to Article
- 39
76 -
48. gr. Ákvarðanir stofnana tilkynntar krefjanda, 1. mgr.:
1. Lokaákvörðun allra hlutaðeigandi stofnana skal tilkynnt umsagnaraðila.
Í hverri ákvörðun um sig skal koma fram hvaða forsendur og áfrýjunarfrestur
er tilgreindur í viðkomandi löggjöf. Eftir að umsagnaraðili fær ákvarðanirnar í
hendur skal hann senda krefjanda samantekt um þær á hans eigin tungumáli
ásamt fylgiriti með fyrrgreindum ákvörðunum. Krefjandi hefur tiltekinn frest til
áfrýjunar frá þeim degi er hann fær samantektina í hendur.
V Skriflegar greinargerðir
33. Í samræmi við 20. gr. stofnsamþykktar EFTA-dómstólsins og 97. gr. starfsreglna
hans hafa greinargerðir borist frá eftirtöldum aðilum:
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
- Stefnanda, Jóni Gunnari Þorkelssyni. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er
Stefán Geir Þórisson, hrl., Reykjavík;
- Stefnda, Gildi-lífeyrissjóði. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Hörður Felix
Harðarson, hrl., Reykjavík;
- Íslandi. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, lögfræðingur og sendiráðsritari á skrifstofu Evrópumála í utanríkisráðuneytinu;
- Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA. Í fyrirsvari eru sem umboðsmenn Arne Torsten
Andersen og Lorna Young, lögfræðingar á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði
og þeim til aðstoðar er Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson, fulltrúi á sviði innri
markaðar;
- Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru
Viktor Kreuschitz, lögfræðilegur ráðgjafi og Nicola Yerrell hjá lagadeildinni.
Fyrsta spurning
34. Stefnandi heldur því fram að íslenska lífeyrissjóðskerfið falli undir hugtakið
almannatryggingar í skilningi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71. Í því
sambandi er lögð áhersla á að í íslenskri löggjöf sé kveðið á um skyldu allra
launþega og sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklinga til að greiða iðgjöld í íslenskan
lífeyrissjóð. Vísað er til 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 þar sem segir að
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Stefnandi
4(1) of Regulation 1408/71 stating that the Regulation applies to legislation
concerning inter alia disability benefits and benefits for accidents at work.
Moreover, the Plaintiff quotes Article 5 of the Regulation, obliging the EEA
States to “specify the legislation and schemes referred to in Article 4 (1) and
(2)”. With reference to that obligation, it is pointed out that Act no 49/1974 on
the Mariners’ Pension Fund with later amendments was accordingly specified
under the heading “Invalidity benefits” in Iceland’s Declaration pursuant to this
Article. The Plaintiff notes that he paid premiums to the Mariners’ Pension Fund
which, after a merger in 2005, became Gildi Pension Fund, the Defendant in
the case at hand.
35. Furthermore, with regard to the material scope of Regulation 1408/71, the
Plaintiff underlines that the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(hereinafter “the ECJ”) has given a wide interpretation to the categories of
social benefits to which the Regulation applies. Allegedly, it follows from
the case law of the ECJ that it is of no significance in this context whether
a compensatory system is defined as a “social security system” under the
domestic legislation of each Member State or not.9 What has been considered
decisive in the assessment of whether a system constitutes a “social security
system” under Regulation 1408/71 is whether its rules include provisions
giving benefit recipients “a particular legally-defined position” not involving
individual and discretionary assessment of the recipient’s needs and personal
circumstances.10 Therefore, social assistance in the EEA States does not come
under the concept of social security, as legislation in that area generally involves
a subjective evaluation of the conditions for entitlement to the benefits.
36. The Plaintiff suggests answering the first question as follows:
9
10
The term “social security” as it is to be understood under the EEA Agreement,
and in particular Article 29 of the main part of the Agreement, and Council
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social
security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to
members of their families moving within the Community, as covering [sic] the
entitlement to disability benefit that arises in pension fund schemes such as
the Icelandic one.
The Plaintiff refers to e.g. Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR 1-4839.
The Plaintiff refers to e.g. Case 79/76 Fossi v Bundesknappschaft [1977] ECR 667.
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35. Að því er efnissvið reglugerðar 1408/71 varðar leggur stefnandi ennfremur
áherslu á að dómstóll Evrópubandalaganna (Evrópudómstóllinn) hafi
skýrt rúmt þá flokka tryggingabóta sem reglugerðin tekur til. Leiða megi af
dómaframkvæmd Evrópudómstólsins að ekki skipti máli í þessu samhengi hvort
bótakerfi sé skilgreint sem almannatryggingakerfi í löggjöf hvers aðildarríkis
eða ekki.9 Mat á því hvort kerfi sé almannatryggingakerfi samkvæmt reglugerð
1408/71 ráðist af því hvort í reglum þess séu ákvæði sem veiti bótaþegum
,,sérstaka lagalega skilgreinda stöðu” sem ekki feli í sér einstaklingsbundið
og frjálst mat á þörfum bótaþega og persónulegum aðstæðum hans.10
Samkvæmt þessu falli félagsleg aðstoð í EES-ríkjunum ekki undir hugtakið
almannatryggingar þar sem löggjöf á því sviði feli almennt í sér huglægt mat á
skilyrðum fyrir bótarétti.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
reglugerðin nái meðal annars til örorkubóta og bóta vegna vinnuslysa. Að
auki vísar stefnandi til 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar sem skyldar EES-ríkin til að
,,tilgreina löggjöf og kerfi sem um getur í 1. og 2. mgr. 4. gr.” Bent er á að lög
um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna nr. 49/1974, með síðari breytingum, hafi í samræmi
við þessa skyldu verið tilgreind undir liðnum ,,Örorkubætur” í yfirlýsingu sem
Ísland gaf á grundvelli 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Stefnandi tekur fram að hann
hafi greitt iðgjöld í Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna, sem varð Gildi-lífeyrissjóður við
samruna árið 2005, þ.e. stefndi í máli þessu.
9
10
Hugtakið almannatryggingar, í skilningi EES-samningsins, einkum 29. gr.
meginmáls samningsins, og reglugerðar ráðsins (EBE) nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní
1971 um beitingu almannatryggingareglna gagnvart launþegum, sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja,
nær til réttinda til örorkubóta, sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðskerfi eins og því
íslenska.
Stefnandi vísar t.d. í mál C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839.
Stefnandi vísar t.d. í mál 79/76 Fossi v Bundesknappschaft [1977] ECR 667.
40 - 79
36. Stefnandi telur að fyrstu spurningu beri að svara með eftirfarandi hætti:
The second question
37. On the translation into English of the original Icelandic request to the EFTA
Court, the Plaintiff alleges that the words “is unable to” in the fourth last line
of the second question should rather read “does not”. However, argues the
Plaintiff, this incorrect translation does not make any difference as to the
subject matter of the case since almost no migrant workers who move within
the EEA continue to pay premiums to the Icelandic pension funds. At the same
time, the Plaintiff also argues that since the rule in force is that workers must
work in Iceland and be members of Icelandic trade unions in order to be able
to pay into Icelandic pension funds, he was not under any circumstances able
to continue paying premiums to Icelandic pension funds.
38. The Plaintiff is of the opinion that he is entitled to additional pension rights, as
the premiums paid to the Danish pension fund for the last 12 months preceding
the accident should be taken into account when his rights are assessed. This
submission is supported, in particular, by reference to Articles 45(1) and 44(1)
cf. Article 40(1) of Regulation 1408/71.
39. The Plaintiff further argues that Article 10(1) of Regulation 1408/71 applies in
his case. In his opinion, that Article reflects a fundamental principle embodied
in the Regulation, namely the “exportability” of rights, meaning that rights
which have been acquired at the time of a person’s moving to another EEA
State remain in force. In such cases, benefits must be paid from the State of
origin, i.e. from the State where the benefits were acquired, irrespective of
where in the EEA the individual in question is resident.11
40. In support of the foregoing, the Plaintiff holds that Iceland’s entry in adaptation
(t) under point 1 of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement removes any doubt
regarding his rights vis-à-vis the Defendant.
41. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that even if no specific provision of Regulation
1408/71 would be applicable in the pending case, the relevant conditions for
projected entitlements constitute an obstacle to the free movements of workers
within the EEA, contrary to Article 28 EEA.
42. The Plaintiff suggests answering the second question in the negative.
11
The Plaintiff refers to Case 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213, Case 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213
and Case 139/82 Piscitello [1983] ECR 1427.
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37. Stefnandi gerir þá athugasemd við orðlag í enskri þýðingu álitsbeiðninnar til
EFTA-dómstólsins að í stað orðanna ,,is unable to” í fjórðu síðustu línu annarrar
spurningar ætti að standa ,,does not”. Þessi þýðingarvilla hafi þó engin áhrif
á efni málsins þar sem nær engir farandlaunþegar sem flytja innan EES haldi
áfram að greiða iðgjöld í íslenska lífeyrissjóði. Stefnandi heldur því fram að
honum hafi ekki undir neinum kringumstæðum verið kleift að halda áfram
greiðslum iðgjalda í íslenska lífeyrissjóði þar sem gildandi reglur mæla fyrir um
að launþegar verði að stunda atvinnu á Íslandi og vera meðlimir í íslenskum
verkalýðsfélögum til þess að geta greitt í íslenska lífeyrissjóði.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Önnur spurning
38. Stefnandi telur sig eiga rétt á viðbótarlífeyrisréttindum þar sem taka beri tillit
til iðgjalda sem hann greiddi í danskan lífeyrissjóð síðustu tólf mánuðina fyrir
slysið þegar réttindi hans eru metin. Hann vísar í þessu sambandi einkum til 1.
mgr. 45. gr. og 1. mgr. 44. gr., sbr. 1. mgr. 40. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
39. Stefnandi heldur því ennfremur fram að 1. mgr. 10. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71
eigi við í hans tilviki. Að hans mati endurspeglar hún þá grundvallarreglu
reglugerðarinnar að einstaklingur haldi þeim réttindum sem hann hefur áunnið
sér þegar hann flytur milli EES-ríkja (,,útflutningur réttinda”). Í slíkum tilvikum
beri að greiða bætur í upprunaríkinu, þ.e. því ríki þar sem réttindin eru áunnin,
óháð því hvar á EES-svæðinu viðkomandi einstaklingur er búsettur.11
40. Til stuðnings framansögðu heldur stefnandi því fram að íslenska ákvæðið í
aðlögunarlið (t) í 1. lið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn taki af allan vafa um
rétt hans gagnvart stefnda.
reglugerðar 1408/71 ættu við í máli þessu, þá feli umrædd skilyrði um
framreikning í sér hindrun á frjálsri för launþega innan EES, sem gangi gegn
28. gr. EES.
42. Stefnandi telur að annarri spurningu beri að svara ,,neitandi”.
11
Stefnandi vísar til máls 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213, máls 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213 og
máls 139/82 Piscitello [1983] ECR 1427.
41 - 81
41. Stefnandi heldur því ennfremur fram að jafnvel þótt engin tiltekin ákvæði
The third question
43. In the Plaintiff’s view, it follows from Article 10(1) of Regulation 1408/71 that
long term benefits, such as the additional disability benefits at stake in the
present case, must be paid to a migrant by his EEA State of origin, irrespective
of where in the EEA that person resides when the long term benefits are paid
out. The ECJ has clarified that the aim of Article 10(1) of Regulation 1408/71
is to guarantee the party concerned the right to have the benefit of such
payments, even after taking up residence in another EEA State.12
44. The Plaintiff suggests answering the third question as follows:
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971, on the application
and to members of their families moving within the Community, is not to be
interpreted as meaning that workers are to present their compensation claims
in the state in which they were resident and in which they had social security
entitlements at the time of their injury.
The Defendant
General
45. In the Defendant’s view, the main issue in the case is whether schemes for
disability benefits established by the Icelandic pension funds come under
‘social security’ within the meaning of Article 29 EEA. The Defendant maintains
that while addressing the broad implications of the main issue, the nature of
the specific benefit right in question must be considered as the fundamental
premise, as well as the distinct legal attributes of the Icelandic occupational
pension funds.
The first question
46. The Defendant makes a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand,
acquired (or accrued) rights to benefits and, on the other hand, the right to
projection of entitlements. Allegedly, Regulation 1408/71 is based on a premise
identical to the one found in Icelandic law, under which the right to disability
benefits based on projection is said not to constitute an acquired right in a legal
sense. Basically, a member in an Icelandic pension fund is entitled to specific
benefits in the event of disability, in proportion to the member’s contributions
to the fund. Through his contributions, the member comes into possession of
12
The Plaintiff refers to Case 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213.
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43. Stefnandi álítur það leiða af 1. mgr. 10. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 að bætur sem
koma til greiðslu yfir langan tíma, eins og viðbótarörorkubætur þær sem hér
um ræðir, beri að greiða í upprunaríkinu, óháð því hvar á EES viðtakandinn
er búsettur þegar bæturnar eru greiddar. Evrópudómstóllinn hafi gert ljóst
að markmið 1. mgr. 10. gr. sé að tryggja viðkomandi aðila réttindi til slíkra
greiðslna jafnvel eftir að hann hafi flutt til annars EES-ríkis.12
44. Stefnandi telur að þriðju spurningu beri að svara á eftirfarandi hátt:
Reglugerð ráðsins nr. 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971, um beitingu
einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja ber
ekki að túlka þannig að launþegum beri að leggja fram bótakröfur sínar í því
ríki þar sem þeir voru búsettir og nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar þeir
slösuðust.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Þriðja spurning
Stefndi
Almennt
45. Stefndi telur meginefni málsins vera hvort örorkubótakerfið sem íslenskir
lífeyrissjóðir hafa komið á falli undir almannatryggingar í skilningi 29. gr. EES.
Þegar það sé skoðað í víðu samhengi hljóti eðli þeirra sértæku bótaréttinda
sem um er rætt, svo og hin sérstöku lagalegu einkenni íslenskra starfstengdra
lífeyrissjóða, að vera grundvallarforsendur.
46. Stefndi telur grundvallarmun vera annars vegar á áunnum (eða uppsöfnuðum)
bótaréttindum og hins vegar réttinum til framreiknings. Reglugerð 1408/71
virðist að hans mati byggja á sömu forsendum og íslensk löggjöf, þ.e. að réttur
til örorkubóta sem styðjist við framreikning teljist ekki til áunninna réttinda í
lagalegum skilningi. Í grundvallaratriðum eigi sjóðfélagi í íslenskum lífeyrissjóði
rétt á ákveðnum bótum, hljóti hann örorku. Áunninn réttur hans til bóta aukist
með hverri iðgjaldagreiðslu. Með greiðslu iðgjaldanna öðlist sjóðfélagi hlutdeild
12
Stefnandi vísar til máls 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213.
42 - 83
Fyrsta spurning
a stake (a partial interest) in the fund, and the fund thus has a joint character.
Under Icelandic law, the Defendant alleges, statutory protection is extended
to acquired rights and to each member’s stake in the fund but not to the right
to projection of entitlements. According to the Defendant, there can be no
notion of rights being acquired without the payment of contributions, as that
would undermine each member’s stake in the fund and breach the statutory
protection of acquired rights [under Icelandic law].
47. Rather, the Defendant holds that Article 10a of Regulation 1408/71 may be
applicable to benefits based on projection. It is contended that the projection
constitutes special non-contributory benefits that may be limited to persons
residing in the State granting the benefit.
48. As for Regulation 1408/71 applying first and foremost to acquired rights in a
legal sense, the Defendant draws attention to the preamble, where emphasis
is put on “rights and the advantages acquired and in the course of being
acquired”.
49. The Defendant also underlines that according to Article 15(2) of the Pension
Act, the projection of entitlement to disability pension shall be determined in
accordance with rules specified in further detail in the Articles of Association for
each fund. In this context, the Defendant remarks that the ECJ has answered
the question on the interpretation of the word “acquired” with direct reference
to “schemes under national law”.13
50. Moreover, the Defendant points to Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71 excluding
provisions of existing or future industrial agreements from the scope of the term
‘legislation’. This limitation encompasses collective bargaining agreements
between labour unions and employers.14
51. The dominant feature of the establishment and operation of Icelandic pension
funds is said to be precisely such collective bargaining agreements. The
Defendant also maintains that the decision to grant additional disability benefits
based on projection was the subject of such an agreement (cf. Article 5 of Act
No 94/1994).
52. On this background, the Defendant contends that Iceland’s Declarations
[pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation 1408/71] were made without the knowledge
and consent of the Icelandic pension funds, in particular the Mariners’ Pension
The Defendant refers to Case 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213.
The Defendant refers to Case C-57/90 Commission v France [1992] ECR I-75.
13
14
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47. Stefndi heldur því á hinn bóginn fram að ákvæði 10. gr. a í reglugerð 1408/71
geti átt við um bætur sem byggja á framreikningi. Framreikningur feli í sér
sérstakar bætur sem ekki séu iðgjaldsskyldar og hægt sé að einskorða við
einstaklinga búsetta í því ríki sem greiðir bæturnar.
48. Hvað því viðkemur að reglugerð 1408/71 gildi fyrst og fremst um áunnin réttindi
í lagalegum skilningi, bendir stefndi á að í inngangsorðum hennar sé lögð
áhersla á “réttindi og hagsbætur sem þeir hafa áunnið sér og eru að ávinna
sér”.
Case Case
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Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
í sjóðnum og ljái þetta sjóðnum ákveðin sameignareinkenni. Stefndi heldur því
fram að samkvæmt íslenskri löggjöf séu áunnin réttindi og hlutdeild sjóðfélaga
lögvernduð en ekki rétturinn til framreiknings. Ekki sé hægt að ávinna sér
réttindi án þess að greiða iðgjöld þar sem slíkt myndi rýra hlutdeild hvers og
eins sjóðfélaga og brjóta gegn lögvernduðum áunnum rétti þeirra [að íslenskum
lögum].
49. Stefndi leggur ennfremur áherslu á að samkvæmt 2. mgr. 15. gr. laganna um
skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða skuli örorkulífeyrir
framreiknaður samkvæmt reglum sem nánar sé kveðið á um í samþykktum
hvers lífeyrissjóðs. Í því sambandi bendir stefndi á að Evrópudómstóllinn
hafi skýrt hugtakið ,,áunnin” með beinni tilvísun í ,,tryggingakerfi samkvæmt
innlendri löggjöf”.13
51. Stefndi heldur því fram að slíkir almennir kjarasamningar séu einmitt ráðandi
við stofnun og starfsemi íslenskra lífeyrissjóða og að sú ákvörðun að veita
viðbótarörorkubætur byggðar á framreikningi hafi byggst á slíkum samningi
(sbr. 5. gr. laga nr. 94/1994).
52. Í ljósi þess sem rakið er hér að framan heldur stefndi því fram að yfirlýsingar
Íslands [skv. 5. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71] hafi verið gerðar án vitundar eða
samþykkis íslenskra lífeyrissjóða, einkum og sér í lagi Lífeyrissjóðs sjómanna.
13
14
Stefndi vísar til máls 51/73 Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Smieja [1973] ECR 1213.
Stefndi vísar til máls C-57/90 Commission v France [1992] ECR I-75.
43 - 85
50. Að auki bendir stefndi á að samkvæmt j-liði 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 taki
hugtakið ,,löggjöf” ekki til ákvæða gildandi eða komandi kjarasamninga.
Þessi takmörkun nái til almennra kjarasamninga milli verkalýðsfélaga og
atvinnurekenda.14
Fund, and that these Declarations thus cannot be considered as Declarations
lifting the limitation on the term ‘legislation’ under Article 1(j) of Regulation
1408/71.
53. The Defendant also contends that such a Declaration in the sense of Article 1(j)
cannot be said to have been made by virtue of point O (now point ZA) added
to Annex VI to Regulation 1408/71 in respect of Iceland [presently referred
to at point 1 adaptation (t) of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement] as that point
contains no reference to the agreements between the workers’ and employers’
organisations inherent in the Articles of Association for each pension fund.
54. To the Defendant, the administering of acquired rights to disability benefits
from Icelandic pension funds seems fully compatible with the principles of
Regulation 1408/71, and the Defendant maintains that, to this extent, these
schemes for acquired rights converge with ‘social security’ within the meaning
of Article 29 EEA.
55. As concerns the right to disability benefits based on projection, however,
the Defendant pleads that such a right neither comes under the term ‘social
security’ in Article 29 EEA nor is subject to the principles laid down in Regulation
1408/71.
The second question
56. The Defendant’s arguments tied to Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71, as
set out above, are advanced also with respect to the second question. The
Defendant adds that the agreement between the Icelandic pension funds is
an undertaking of independent legal entities separate from the public sphere
and thus cannot be considered as ‘legislation’ or ‘law’ under Article 29 EEA or
Regulation 1408/71.
57. However, the Defendant argues that the answer to the second question, insofar
as it concerns free movement of workers, must take fully into account the
relevant facts of the pending case, without prejudice to whether the Icelandic
Pension Funds are covered by the term ‘social security’.
58. In this context, and as opposed to the Plaintiff, the Defendant contends that
nothing prevented the Plaintiff from continuing to pay contributions to the
Defendant after having taken up work on a foreign [i.e. not Icelandic] vessel.
59. Furthermore, the Defendant contends that answering the second question
in the negative may give rise to “reverse discrimination” as workers moving
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53. Það er ennfremur skoðun stefnda að slík yfirlýsing, í skilningi j-liðar 1. gr., geti
ekki talist hafa verið gefin á grundvelli O-liðar (nú liður ZA), sem bætt var við
VI. viðauka við reglugerð 1408/71 hvað Ísland varðar [sem nú er vísað til í
aðlögunarlið (t) í 1. tölulið VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn], þar sem O-liður
feli ekki í sér tilvísun í samninga samtaka launþega og atvinnurekenda sem
séu hluti af samþykktum hvers lífeyrissjóðs.
54. Stefndi álítur að framkvæmd íslenskra lífeyrissjóða við úthlutun áunninna réttinda
til örorkubóta samræmist fyllilega grundvallarreglum reglugerðar 1408/71 og
að því marki falli kerfi áunninna réttinda undir hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar” í
skilningi 29. gr. EES.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Í þeim felist því ekki yfirlýsing um afnám þeirra takmarkana á hugtakinu
,,löggjöf” sem fram koma í j-liði, 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
55. Stefndi heldur því hins vegar fram að réttur til örorkubóta á grundvelli
framreiknings falli hvorki undir hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar” í 29. gr. EES né
þær grundvallarreglur sem fram komi í reglugerð 1408/71.
Önnur spurning
57. Án þess að afstaða sé tekin til þess hvort íslensku lífeyrissjóðirnir falli undir
hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar” telur stefndi að svarið við þeim hluta annarrar
spurningar sem snertir frjálsa för launþega verði að taka fullt mið af staðreyndum
málsins.
58. Í þessu sambandi heldur stefndi því fram, gagnstætt stefnanda, að ekkert hafi
staðið í vegi fyrir því að stefnandi héldi áfram að greiða framlög í sjóð stefnda
eftir að hann hóf störf á erlendu [þ.e. ekki íslensku] skipi.
59. Stefndi heldur því einnig fram að sé annarri spurningu svarað neitandi geti það
valdið mismunun gagnvart þegnum innanlands (,,reverse discrimination”) með
44 - 87
56. Rök stefnda varðandi j-lið, 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 sem lýst er hér að framan
koma einnig fram í umfjöllun hans um aðra spurningu. Stefndi bendir auk
þess á að samkomulagið um samskipti íslenskra lífeyrissjóða sé skuldbinding
sjálfstæðra lögaðila sem séu óskyldir hinu opinbera, og geti því ekki talist
,,löggjöf” eða ,,lög” samkvæmt 29. gr. EES eða reglugerð 1408/71.
domestically may be put in a less favourable position than workers moving to
another EEA State. This is so because only 29 pension funds are parties to the
agreement between the Icelandic pension funds whereas 11 are not. A worker
in Iceland leaving one of the 29 funds and joining one of the 11 will thus lose
his rights to disability benefits based on projection. A worker leaving one of the
29 funds and joining a pension fund in another EEA State, on the other hand,
will retain his rights. According to the Defendant, such reverse discrimination
is prevented by the principle in Article 3 of Regulation 1408/71 and thus
answering the second question in the negative would not be justified.
The third question
60. The Defendant argues that under the single State rule in Regulation 1408/71,
an individual can only rely on the social security system of one EEA State,
namely the State where he works (lex laboris). According to the Defendant,
the principle of aggregation ensures that the EEA State of employment [in
casu Denmark] must take account of periods of insurance completed in other
EEA States when calculating whether the claimant has satisfied the necessary
qualifying periods of work, residence or contributions for entitlement to
benefits.
61. Moreover, the Defendant argues that the State of employment [in casu
Denmark] is the competent State for administering the social security benefits.
In any case, the Defendant also alleges that the Defendant is not a competent
institution for the Icelandic social security system under Regulations 1408/71
and 574/72.15
62. Furthermore, the Defendant contends that the exportability principle is fully
upheld by the Icelandic pension funds, as the Plaintiff has received all payments
he was entitled to on the basis of his acquired [as opposed to projected] rights
to disability benefits.
The Republic of Iceland
The first question
63. Referring in particular to its Declarations pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation
1408/71, the Republic of Iceland states that, since the negotiations on the EEA
Agreement, its position has been that on account of the compulsory nature of
the Icelandic pension fund scheme, the pension funds would fall within the
scope of Regulation 1408/71.
15
The Defendant refers to Case 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213 and Case C-481/93 Moscato [1995] ECR 3525.
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Þriðja spurning
60. Stefndi heldur því fram að samkvæmt reglugerð 1408/71 geti einstaklingur
einungis reitt sig á almannatryggingakerfi í einu EES-ríki, þ.e. því ríki þar sem
hann stundar atvinnu (lex laboris). Reglan um uppsöfnun réttinda tryggi að það
EES-ríki þar sem einstaklingur stundar vinnu [in casu Danmörk] taki til greina
tryggingatímabil sem lokið hefur verið í öðrum EES-ríkjum við ákvörðun á því
hvort bótakrefjandi uppfylli nauðsynleg skilyrði varðandi atvinnutímabil, búsetu
eða iðgjöld sem veita honum rétt til bóta.
Case Case
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Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
þeim hætti að staða launþega sem flytjast búferlum innanlands verði lakari en
þeirra sem flytja til annars EES-ríkis. Ástæðan sé sú að aðeins 29 lífeyrissjóðir
eru aðilar að samkomulaginu milli lífeyrissjóða en 11 sjóðir standa utan þess.
Launþegi á Íslandi sem segi sig úr einum þessara 29 lífeyrissjóða til að ganga
í einn af hinum 11 muni við það missa rétt sinn til örorkubóta á grundvelli
framreiknings. Launþegi sem segi sig úr einum þessara 29 lífeyrissjóða til að
ganga í lífeyrissjóð í öðru EES-ríki muni hins vegar halda þessum réttindum.
Að mati stefnda samræmist slík mismunun ekki meginreglu 3. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71 og því verði annarri spurningu ekki svarað neitandi.
61. Stefndi heldur því einnig fram að ríkið þar sem atvinna er stunduð [in casu
Danmörk] sé það ríki sem sé bært til að annast greiðslu almannatryggingabóta. Í
öllu falli sé stefndi ekki lögbært yfirvald innan íslenska almannatryggingakerfisins
samkvæmt reglugerðum 1408/71 og 574/72.15
62. Stefndi heldur því ennfremur fram, að íslenskir lífeyrissjóðir virði að fullu regluna
um útflutning réttinda (exportability principle). Stefnandi hafi því fengið allar
greiðslur sem hann átti tilkall til í samræmi við áunnin [en ekki framreiknuð]
réttindi hans til örorkubóta.
Ísland
63. Í máli Íslands kemur fram, að það hafi verið afstaða þess, allt frá því að
samningaviðræðurnar um EES-samninginn fóru fram, að íslensku lífeyrissjóðirnir
ættu að falla undir gildissvið reglugerðar 1408/71 þar sem aðildin að íslenska
lífeyrissjóðakerfinu sé skyldubundin. Er í þessu sambandi vísað sérstaklega til
yfirlýsingar Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
15
Stefndi vísar til máls 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213 og máls C-481/93 Moscato [1995] ECR 3525.
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Fyrsta spurning
64. The Republic of Iceland maintains that the answer to the first question should
be as follows:
The term “social insurance” is to be understood, under the EEA Agreement
and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71 on the application of social security
schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of
their families moving within the Community, to cover the entitlement to disability
benefit that arises in pension fund schemes such as the Icelandic one.
The second question
65. As regards the wording of the question, the Republic of Iceland emphasises
that the Articles of Association of Icelandic pension funds should not be
confused with the Agreement on Relations between the funds. The Articles of
Association of the Defendant do not make the right to benefits subject to the
condition that the individual has paid premiums to an Icelandic pension fund
party to the agreement, but rather emphasise the payments to that specific
fund. The Agreement on Relations, on the other hand, is a contract between
a number of Icelandic pension funds that facilitates co-operation between
them and inter alia results in transferral of rights when certain conditions are
fulfilled.
66. At the outset, the Republic of Iceland emphasises that Regulation 1408/71
provides for coordination and not harmonisation of social security legislation
within the EEA. The Regulation is thus not intended to give individuals special
rights that go beyond their rights under the national legislation concerned.
The aim of the regulation is to coordinate the practice between EEA States in
order to prevent citizens from losing their acquired rights when moving within
the EEA.16
67. The Republic of Iceland contends that the right to projection of disability
benefits cannot be considered “acquired rights” within the meaning of Article
29 EEA and Regulation 1408/71.17 At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff had
stopped paying into Icelandic pension funds and started paying into the Danish
system. At the time of his moving to Denmark, the Plaintiff had acquired rights
based on the points accrued through his payment of premiums in Iceland.
These rights where not in any way reduced, modified, suspended, withdrawn
or confiscated (cf. Article 10 of Regulation 1408/71). The Plaintiff’s right to
The Republic of Iceland refers to Joined Cases C-393/99 and C-394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I-2829, at paragraph 51;
Case E-3/04 Tsomakas [2004] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95, at paragraph 27; and Case E-3/05 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2006]
EFTA Ct. Rep. 101, at paragraph 46.
17
Note: the phrase “acquired rights” does not appear in Article 29 EEA or Regulation 1408/71.
16
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Hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar”, í skilningi EES-samningsins og reglugerðar
1408/71 um beitingu almannatryggingareglna gagnvart launþegum, sjálfstætt
starfandi einstaklingum og aðstandendum þeirra sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja,
nær til réttinda til örorkubóta, sem myndast í lífeyrissjóðskerfi eins og því
íslenska.
Önnur spurning
65. Í ljósi orðalags annarrar spurningar, er í máli Íslands lögð áhersla á að gera verði
skýran greinarmun á samþykktum íslenskra lífeyrissjóða og samkomulaginu
um samskipti lífeyrissjóða. Samþykktir stefnda í málinu geri það ekki að skilyrði
fyrir bótaréttindum að einstaklingur hafi greitt framlög í íslenskan lífeyrissjóð
sem er aðili að samkomulaginu en geri hins vegar kröfu um að greitt sé í
þennan tiltekna sjóð. Samkomulagið um samskipti lífeyrissjóða sé á hinn
bóginn samningur milli tiltekinna lífeyrissjóða sem auðveldi þeim samvinnu
og hafi meðal annars í för með sér að réttindi flytjist milli sjóða að vissum
skilyrðum uppfylltum.
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Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
64. Lagt er til að fyrstu spurningunni verði svarað sem hér segir:
67. Því er haldið fram að réttur til örorkubóta á grundvelli framreiknings geti ekki talist
,,áunnin réttindi” í skilningi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71.17 Á þeim tíma
sem slysið varð hafi stefnandi verið hættur að greiða til íslenskra lífeyrissjóða
og byrjaður að greiða í danska kerfinu. Þegar stefnandi flutti til Danmerkur hafi
hann verið búinn að ávinna sér réttindi byggð á þeim stigafjölda sem hann
hafði safnað með iðgjaldagreiðslum sínum á Íslandi. Réttindin hafi ekki á neinn
hátt verið lækkuð, þeim breytt, þau stöðvuð tímabundið, felld niður eða gerð
upptæk (sbr. 10. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71). Réttur stefnanda til framreiknings
Að hálfu Íslands er vísað til sameinaðra mála C-393/99 og C-394/99 Hervein and Others [2002] ECR I-2829, 51. mgr.; máls E-3/04
Tsomakas [2004] EFTA Ct. Rep. bls. 95, 27. mgr.; og máls E-3/05 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2006] EFTA Ct. Rep. bls.
101, 46. mgr.
17
Ath: hugtakið ,,áunnin réttindi” kemur hvorki fyrir í 29. gr. EES né í reglugerð 1408/71.
16
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66. Í upphafi málatilbúnaðar Íslands er lögð áhersla á að reglugerð 1408/71 sé
ekki ætlað að veita einstaklingum sérstök réttindi umfram réttindi sem þeir
hafi samkvæmt lögum í sínu heimalandi. Markmið reglugerðarinnar sé að
samræma aðferðir innan EES í þeim tilgangi að koma í veg fyrir að þegnar
missi áunnin réttindi þegar þeir flytjast búferlum innan EES.16
projection, however, depended on his ongoing payments to the pension funds,
a requirement which he did not fulfil. In that respect, the Republic of Iceland
stresses that it cannot be regarded as contrary to the EEA Agreement that
there may be better social rights in one State than another, as it is settled
case-law that the EEA Agreement does not detract from the power of the EEA
States to organise their social security systems.
68. Furthermore, the Republic of Iceland emphasises that the rules on projection –
as laid down in the Regulation of the Defendant (now the Articles of Association),
adopted with reference to the Act on the Mariners’ Pension Fund No 94/1994
– apply in an equal manner to everyone working in Iceland, foreigners as
well as Icelanders. Various reasons may give rise to a situation where any
such person does not have the right to projection, inter alia a break from work
lasting more than six months. The Republic of Iceland also questions why a
person leaving an Icelandic pension fund and moving to another EEA State,
taking up work and paying premiums to a pension fund there should be put in a
better position than a person leaving the same Icelandic pension fund and also
moving to another EEA State but not finding work there and thus not paying
premiums to any pension fund for six months. (It is pointed out that a person is
entitled to go to another EEA State and to stay for up to six months searching
and applying for jobs.18) From the Icelandic pension fund’s point of view, the
two persons are in the same situation, having stopped paying premiums.
69. Moreover, the Republic of Iceland submits that contrary to what the Plaintiff has
maintained in the case, he was able to apply for permission to continue paying
his premiums to the Defendant. This should not, however, be a decisive factor
in the present case, since the relevant rules on social security do not provide
a right to continue paying premiums in one EEA State after moving to another.
On the contrary, as Regulation 1408/71 aims to simplify procedures, a worker
is thus as a main rule only subject to the laws of one EEA State. The same
allegedly follows a contrario from Council Directive 98/49/EC on safeguarding
the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed persons
moving within the Community, as this Directive, which applies to pension
schemes other than those falling under Regulation 1408/71, obligates EEA
States to adjust their regulations in order to enable contributions to continue to
be made to a supplementary pension scheme established in one EEA State,
by or on behalf of a worker posted in another EEA State.
18
The Republic of Iceland refers to Case C-292/89 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Antonissen [1991]
ECR I-745.
92 - 47
69. Gagnstætt því sem stefnandi heldur fram, kemur það fram í máli Íslands að
stefnandi hefði getað sótt um að halda áfram greiðslum í sjóð stefnda. Þetta
skipti þó ekki sköpum í málinu því reglur þær um almannatryggingar sem við
eiga feli ekki í sér rétt til að halda áfram greiðslum í sjóð í einu EES-ríki eftir
að hafa flutt búferlum til annars ríkis. Þar sem markmið reglugerðar 1408/71
sé að einfalda málsmeðferð sé meginreglan þvert á móti sú að einungis lög
eins EES-ríkis gildi um launþegann. Sömu reglu megi leiða með gagnályktun
af tilskipun ráðsins 98/49/EB um verndun viðbótarlífeyrisréttinda launþega og
sjálfstætt starfandi einstaklinga sem flytjast á milli aðildarríkja. Sú tilskipun gildi
um önnur lífeyrissjóðskerfi en þau sem falla undir reglugerð 1408/71 og skyldi
EES-ríki til að aðlaga lög og reglugerðir sínar þannig að halda megi áfram
iðgjaldagreiðslum í viðbótarlífeyrissjóðskerfi í einu EES-ríki þótt viðkomandi
launþegi sé við störf í öðru EES-ríki.
18
Vísað er til máls C-292/89 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745.
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EFTA Surveillance
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68. Af hálfu Íslands er ennfremur lögð áhersla á að reglur um framreikning, sbr.
reglugerðir stefnda (sem nú kallast samþykktir), sem settar voru á grundvelli
laga um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna nr. 94/1994, gildi jafnt um alla sem stunda atvinnu
á Íslandi, bæði erlenda launþega og íslenska. Ástæður þess að einstaklingur
eigi ekki rétt á framreikningi geti verið margvíslegar, t.d. að hlé hafi verið gert
á vinnu í meira en sex mánuði. Dregið er í efa að staða einstaklings sem segir
sig úr íslenskum lífeyrissjóði og flytur til annars EES-ríkis, hefji þar atvinnu
og greiði í þarlendan lífeyrissjóð, eigi að vera betri en staða einstaklings sem
segir sig úr sama lífeyrissjóði, flytur einnig til annars EES-ríkis en fær ekki
vinnu og greiðir þar af leiðandi ekki iðgjald í lífeyrissjóð í sex mánuði. (Bent er
á að einstaklingur hafi rétt á að fara til annars EES-ríkis og dvelja þar í allt að
sex mánuði í atvinnuleit.18) Frá sjónarhóli íslenska lífeyrissjóðsins séu þessir
tveir aðilar í sömu sporum gagnvart sjóðnum, þ.e. hafa báðir hætt greiðslum í
hann.
hafi hins vegar verið háður áframhaldandi greiðslum hans í lífeyrissjóðina en
það skilyrði hafi stefnandi ekki uppfyllt. Í þessu sambandi er lögð áhersla á
að það geti ekki talist ganga gegn EES-samningnum að félagsleg réttindi séu
betri í einu landi en öðru, enda felist það í staðfastri dómaframkvæmd að EESsamningurinn rýri ekki vald EES-ríkja til að ákvarða almannatryggingakerfi
sitt.
70. The Republic of Iceland draws attention to the interplay between the public
social security system and the independent pension funds in Iceland, which
aims at preventing citizens from being compensated several times over for the
same loss. This is said to be of relevance also with regard to the foundation
and objectives of Regulation 1408/71. It could thus be argued that if the
Plaintiff would receive payments in line with his projected entitlements from the
pension funds in Iceland, he should receive less from the public social security
systems concerned.
71. As concerns the Agreement on Relations between pension funds, the Republic
of Iceland emphasises the nature of this agreement as a contract between
independent pension funds, free from interference by the Government. No
foreign pension fund has become a party to the agreement, but there is
nothing to prevent this from happening if such an intention is shared amongst
the parties and other foreign funds. It is further underlined that not all Icelandic
pension funds are parties to the agreement. Thus, not all workers enjoy the
benefits from this co-operation. It is submitted that if the Plaintiff’s arguments
were accepted, a situation could arise where a person moving to another EEA
State and paying premiums to a pension fund there would be put in a better
position than a person moving within Iceland and starting to pay premiums to a
another pension fund which is not a party to the Agreement on Relations. This
kind of discrimination can neither be endorsed nor be in line with the objectives
of Regulation 1408/71.
72. Moreover, the Republic of Iceland contends that the agreement concerned
is not covered by Regulation 1408/71 as it falls under the term ‘industrial
agreements’ and thus under the exception to the scope of the Regulation, laid
down in its Article 1(j). The ECJ has in a limited way addressed the meaning
of the term ‘industrial agreement’.19 Its point of departure has been whether
the agreement concerned follows directly from the application of the social
security legislation in issue. The Republic of Iceland emphasises in this regard
that the Agreement on Relations has no connection to the Icelandic social
security legislation. Moreover, the agreement was not made in order to further
implement any public rules or policy; the initiative came exclusively from the
pension funds themselves in order to facilitate their work and co-operation.
73. In the light of the above, the Republic of Iceland suggests answering the
second question as follows:
19
The Republic of Iceland refers to Joined Cases C-502/01 and C-31/02 Gaumain-Cerri and Barth [2004] ECR I-6483, at
paragraph 22.
94 - 48
72. Því er og haldið fram að samningur sá er um ræðir falli ekki undir reglugerð
1408/71 þar sem hann teljist til ,,kjarasamninga” og sé því undanskilinn gildissviði
reglugerðarinnar samkvæmt j-liði 1. gr. hennar. Evrópudómstóllinn hafi fjallað
um inntak hugtaksins ,,kjarasamningur” í afmörkuðu samhengi 19 Megin máli
skipti hvort viðkomandi samning hafi leitt beint af almannatryggingalöggjöfinni.
Í þessu sambandi er lögð áhersla á að samkomulagið um samskipti
lífeyrissjóða tengist ekki með neinum hætti íslenskri almannatryggingalöggjöf.
Að auki hafi samkomulaginu ekki verið ætlað að hrinda í framkvæmd neinum
opinberum reglum eða stefnumiðum. Lífeyrissjóðirnir hafi einir átt frumkvæðið
að samkomulaginu og hafi markmið þess verið að auðvelda starfsemi þeirra
og samvinnu.
73. Í ljósi framangreinds er af hálfu Íslands lagt til að annarri spurningu verði
svarað sem hér segir:
19
Vísað er til sameinaðra mála C-502/01 og C-31/02 Gaumain-Cerri og Barth [2004] ECR I-6483, 22. mgr.
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v Norway
71. Hvað varðar samkomulagið um samskipti lífeyrissjóða er af hálfu Íslands lögð
áhersla á að það sé í eðli sínu samningur milli sjálfstæðra lífeyrissjóða sem
ríkisstjórnin hafi ekki komið að. Enginn erlendur lífeyrissjóður hafi gerst aðili að
samkomulaginu, en ekkert standi því í vegi sé vilji til slíks hjá samningsaðilum
og einhverjum erlendum sjóðum. Þá er ennfremur lögð áhersla á að ekki
séu allir íslenskir lífeyrissjóðir aðilar að samkomulaginu og því njóti ekki allir
launþegar þeirra réttinda sem samkomulagið feli í sér. Ef fallist sé á málflutning
stefnanda geti komið upp sú staða að einstaklingur sem flytur til annars EESríkis og greiðir í lífeyrissjóð þar sé í betri stöðu en einstaklingur sem flytur
innan Íslands og hefur greiðslu iðgjalda í annan lífeyrissjóð sem ekki er aðili að
samkomulaginu um samskipti lífeyrissjóða. Slík mismunun verði hvorki studd
né samræmd markmiðum reglugerðar 1408/71.
70. Vakin er athygli á samspili opinbera almannatryggingakerfisins og sjálfstæðu
lífeyrissjóðanna á Íslandi sem miði að því að koma í veg fyrir að þegnum
sé bættur sami skaðinn oftar en einu sinni. Þetta sjónarmið endurspeglist
einnig í forsendum og markmiðum reglugerðar 1408/71. Þess vegna megi
halda því fram að ef stefnandi fengi greiddar bætur byggðar á framreikningi
frá íslenskum lífeyrissjóði ætti hann að fá lægri bætur frá viðkomandi
almannatryggingakerfi.
The provisions of the EEA Agreement on the free movement of workers are to
be interpreted as meaning that a rule in the Articles of Association of Icelandic
pension funds, which makes a specific benefit right (the right to projection
of entitlements) subject to the condition that the individual involved has paid
premiums to that fund for at least 6 of the 12 months preceding the date of an
accident, is compatible with the EEA Agreement.
The third question
74. The Republic of Iceland emphasises that the aim of Regulation 1408/71 is
coordination of national social security legislation of the EEA States in order
to further facilitate the free movement of workers within the EEA, and that
to this end the Regulation provides that the legislation of a single EEA State
shall apply to persons subject to the Regulation. Reference is made to the
general rules regarding the applicable law in Title II of Regulation 1408/71,
more specifically to Article 13(2)(a) and (c) of the Regulation. It is submitted
that it follows from these Articles that the applicable law in the case at hand
would be that of Denmark. Further reference is made to Article 36(1) and (4) of
Regulation 574/72, from which it follows that for the Plaintiff to receive benefits
pursuant to Article 40(1) of Regulation 1408/71, which applies in the case at
hand, he shall submit his claim to the institution of his place of residence.
75. The Republic of Iceland argues that when the abovementioned rules of
Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 574/72 are brought into the context of the
case at hand, it can be concluded, by mere interpretation of the provisions
of Regulation 1408/71 in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to its terms in its context and in the light of its object and purpose, that the
legislation applicable was that of Denmark and that claims for compensation
are to be presented there to the competent institution in conformity with the
requirements set forth by the law administered by that institution.
76. In the light of these observations, the Republic of Iceland suggests the following
answer to the third question:
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71 is to be interpreted as meaning that
workers are to present their compensation claims in the state in which they
were resident and in which they had social security entitlements at the time of
their injury.
- 49
96 -
Ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega ber að túlka með þeim
hætti að regla í samþykktum íslenskra lífeyrissjóða, sem felur í sér að sérstök
bótaréttindi (rétturinn til framreiknaðra bóta) séu háð skilyrði um að viðkomandi
einstaklingur hafi greitt framlög í sjóðinn í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði af tólf
áður en slysið á sér stað, samræmist EES-samningnum.
Þriðja spurning
74. Í athugasemdum Íslands er lögð áhersla á að markmið reglugerðar 1408/71
sé að samþætta almannatryggingalöggjöf í EES-ríkjunum í þeim tilgangi að
auðvelda frjálsa för launþega innan EES. Samkvæmt reglugerðinni skuli
einstaklingar sem reglugerðin nær til aðeins heyra undir löggjöf eins EES-ríkis.
Vísað er til almennra lagaskilareglna sem sé að finna í II. bálki reglugerðar
1408/71, nánar tiltekið í a- og c-liði 2. mgr. 13. gr. Því er haldið fram að af
þessum ákvæðum leiði að beita skuli danskri löggjöf í málinu. Ennfremur er
vísað í 1. og 4. mgr. 36. gr. reglugerðar 574/72. Hún feli það í sér að til þess
að fá greiddar bætur skv. 1. mgr. 40. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, sem eigi við í
þessu máli, verði stefnandi að leggja fram slíka kröfu hjá þar til bærri stofnun í
búseturíkinu.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
75. Færð eru rök fyrir því að séu framangreindar reglur, sem er að finna í reglugerð
1408/71 og 574/72, skoðaðar í tengslum við þetta mál megi komast að þeirri
niðurstöðu, með því einu að túlka ákvæði reglugerðar 1408/71 í samræmi við
almenna merkingu orðanna, í því samhengi sem þau eru sett fram í og í ljósi
tilgangs þeirra og markmiða, að dönsk löggjöf hafi átt við í málinu. Bótakröfur
beri því að leggja fram hjá lögbærri stofnun í Danmörku, í samræmi við kröfur
þeirrar löggjafar sem stofnunin sér um framkvæmd á.
Reglugerð ráðsins (EBE) nr. 1408/71 ber að túlka þannig að launþegum beri
að leggja fram kröfur sínar um bætur í því ríki þar sem þeir eru búsettir og þar
sem þeir nutu almannatryggingaréttinda þegar þeir slasast.
49 - 97
76. Í ljósi þessara athugasemda er lagt til að þriðju spurningu verði svarað sem hér
segir:
The EFTA Surveillance Authority
The first question
77. Firstly, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”) notes that
Regulation 1408/71 has its basis, its framework and its limits in Articles 28 and
29 EEA which are aimed at securing freedom of movement for workers.20 The
term ‘social security’ is not defined in the main Agreement or in Regulation
1408/71, but must be assumed to carry the same meaning in both contexts.
78. ESA then assesses whether the disability pension in the case at hand is
covered by Regulation 1408/71 as far as the nature of the benefit is concerned.
ESA refers in this regard to the ECJ, which, when faced with questions relating
to the scope of the term ‘social security’, has tended to base itself on the
branches of social security benefits covered by the Regulation, as exhaustively
listed in its Article 4(1).21 Article 4(1)(b) of the Regulation refers to invalidity
benefits. Moreover, Article 15 of the Pension Act and Article 11 of the Mariners’
Pension Fund Regulation, applicable at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident, both
provide for entitlement to disability benefits for fund members on certain terms.
Thus, ESA concludes that as far as the nature of the benefit is concerned, the
disability benefit in the present case is covered by the Regulation.
79. Subsequently, ESA deals with the question whether a pension scheme such as
the Icelandic one in the case at hand falls within the term ‘legislation’ referred
to in Article 4(1) and defined in Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71. Particular
reference is made to the ECJ’s broad interpretation of the term.22
80. A distinction is made between the rules governing the current scheme and the
rules governing the scheme in force at the time of the accident. As regards
the rules governing the current scheme, ESA submits that the Pension Act
satisfies the definition laid down in Article 1(j) of the Regulation. Article 2 of
the Act sets out the minimum contributions payable to the pension funds.
Chapter III of the Act lays down the general rules regarding pension rights in
pension funds, including a detailed description of the content of such rights
and entitlement thereto. In particular, Article 15 governs the right to a disability
pension, including the right to have this benefit calculated on the basis of
projected pension points.
ESA refers to Case 100/63 van der Veen [1964] ECR English special edition 565 and Case 24/75 Petroni [1975] ECR 1149, at
paragraph 11.
21
ESA refers to Case 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973, at paragraphs 12–14, Case 122/84 Scrivner [1985] ECR 1027, at paragraphs
19–21 and Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, at paragraph 15.
22
ESA refers to Case 87/76 Bozzone [1977] ECR 687, at paragraph 10, Case 300/84 van Roosmalen [1986] ECR 3097, at paragraph
28 and Joined Cases 82/86 and 103/86 Laborero and Sabato [1987] ECR 3401, at paragraph 23.
20
- 50
98 -
Fyrsta spurning
77. Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (ESA) bendir fyrst á að reglugerð 1408/71 byggist á og
sé takmörkuð við 28. og 29. gr. EES sem miði að því að tryggja frjálsa för
launþega.20 Hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar” sé hvorki skilgreint í meginmáli
EES-samningsins né í reglugerð 1408/71 en ganga verði út frá því að merking
hugtaksins sé sú sama í báðum tilvikum.
78. ESA víkur næst að því hvort örorkulífeyrir sá sem um ræðir í málinu falli
eðli sínu samkvæmt undir reglugerð 1408/71. ESA vísar í því sambandi
til Evrópudómstólsins sem hafi hneigst til að byggja skýringu á hugtakinu
,,almannatryggingar” á þeim flokkum almannatryggingabóta sem falla undir
reglugerðina, og séu tæmandi taldir upp í 1. mgr. 4. gr.21 Örorkubætur séu
nefndar í b-liði 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Að auki mæli 15. gr. laga um
skyldutryggingar lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða og 11. gr. laga um
Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna, sem hafi verið í gildi þegar stefnandi slasaðist, fyrir um
að sjóðfélagar eigi rétt til örorkubóta að ákveðnum skilyrðum uppfylltum. Af
þessu dregur ESA þá ályktun, hvað eðli bótanna snertir, að reglugerðin taki til
þeirra bóta sem málið varðar.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA
80. Gerður er greinarmunur á þeim reglum sem gilda um núverandi kerfi og reglum
sem giltu á þeim tíma sem slysið varð. Hvað varðar núgildandi reglur, telur ESA
að lögin um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða fullnægi
skilgreiningu j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Ákvæði 2. gr. laganna mæli fyrir
um lágmarksiðgjald til lífeyrissjóðs. Í III. kafla laganna séu almennar reglur
um lífeyrisréttindi í lífeyrissjóðum, þ.m.t. ítarleg útlistun á slíkum réttindum,
hvað þau feli í sér og hverjir geti gert tilkall til þeirra. Ákvæði 15. gr. fjalli um
rétt til örorkulífeyris, þ.m.t. réttinn til þess að hann taki mið af framreiknuðum
stigafjölda.
ESA vísar til máls 100/63 van der Veen [1964] ECR English special edition 565 og máls 24/75 Petroni [1975] ECR 1149,
11. mgr.
21
ESA vísar til máls 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] ECR 973, 12. – 14. mgr., máls 122/84 Scrivner [1985] ECR 1027, 19. – 21. mgr. og máls
C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, 15. mgr.
22
ESA vísar til máls 87/76 Bozzone [1977] ECR 687, 10. mgr., máls 300/84 van Roosmalen [1986] ECR 3097, 28. mgr., og
sameinaðra mála 82/86 og 103/86 Laborero og Sabato [1987] ECR 3401, 23. mgr.
20
50 - 99
79. ESA fjallar einnig um það hvort lífeyrissjóðskerfi eins og það íslenska, og um
ræðir í málinu, falli undir hugtakið ,,löggjöf” sem vísað er til í 1. mgr. 4. gr.
og skilgreint er í j-liði 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71. Er einkum vísað til þess að
Evrópudómstóllinn hafi skýrt hugtakið rúmt.22
81. It is further stated that the applicability of Regulation 1408/71 to Icelandic
pension funds such as the one in the case at hand was confirmed by Iceland’s
Declaration pursuant to Article 5 of the Regulation, specifying the Pension Act
under heading 1(b) ‘Invalidity benefits’. In this regard, ESA quotes case law of
the ECJ, where it is stated that “the fact that a Member State has specified a
law in its declaration must be accepted as proof that the benefits granted on the
basis of that law are social security benefits within the meaning of Regulation
no 1408/71”.23 Equally, Article 29 EEA must apply to disability benefits granted
from an Icelandic pension fund on the basis of the Pension Act.
82. As regards whether the scheme in force at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident
falls under the term ‘legislation’, ESA points out that, whereas the Act No
49/1974 on the Mariners’ Pension Fund was listed under point 1(b) ‘Invalidity
benefits’ in Iceland’s original Declaration, the legislation applicable at the time
of the Plaintiff’s accident, i.e. Act No 94/1994, which replaced Act No 49/1974,
never appeared on the list. The reason for this was, however, that Iceland did
not update its original Declaration until after the 1994 Act had in turn been
replaced by Act No 45/1999. ESA argues, in this regard, that Iceland’s failure
to keep its Declaration updated cannot have the effect of withdrawing the
legislation at issue from the scope of the Regulation.
83. With regard to Act No 94/1994, ESA points out that the substantive rules
governing pension rights were to be found not in the Act itself, but in the
Mariners’ Pension Fund Regulation. However, that Regulation was based on
the Act, it laid down generally formulated rules, it was subject to ministerial
approval and it gave rise to rights on the basis of a legally defined position. ESA
thus maintains that both the Act and the said Regulation should be regarded
as falling under the term ‘legislation’ in Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71.
84. Reference is made to Article 5 of Act No 94/1994, according to which the
Regulation was to be drafted by the Board of the Pension Fund and then
approved inter alia by the Minister of Finance. It is emphasised that although not
responsible for the drafting of the Regulation itself, the Icelandic Government
had the duty to ensure its legality. Moreover, ESA recalls that the classification
as ‘legislation’ under national law is not decisive for the purpose of the definition
in Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71. A notion of Community law must be given
an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community and
23
ESA refers to Case 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249, at paragraph 9, Case 237/78 Toia [1979] ECR 2645, at paragraph 8,
Case C-251/89 Athanasopoulos [1991] ECR I-2797, at paragraph 28 and Case C-131/96 Mora Romero [1997] ECR I-3659, at
paragraph 25.
--100
51 --
82. Hvað varðar reglur þær sem giltu þegar slysið varð og hvort þær hafi fallið
undir hugtakið ,,löggjöf”, bendir ESA á að lög nr. 49/1974 um Lífeyrissjóð
sjómanna hafi verið skráð undir lið 1(b), „Bætur vegna örorku”, í upphaflegri
yfirlýsingu Íslands. Þau lög sem leystu lög nr. 49/1974 af hólmi og í gildi voru
þegar slysið varð hafi hins vegar aldrei verið skráð þar. Skýringin sé þó sú að
Ísland uppfærði ekki upphaflega yfirlýsingu sína fyrr en eftir að lögin frá 1994
höfðu verið felld úr gildi með lögum nr. 45/1999. ESA heldur því fram í þessu
sambandi að vanræksla Íslands við að uppfæra yfirlýsingu sína taki umrædda
löggjöf ekki undan gildissviði reglugerðarinnar.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
81. Yfirlýsing Íslands á grundvelli 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar, sem tilgreinir lög
um skyldutryggingu lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða undir lið 1(b)
„Örorkubætur”, staðfesti að reglugerð 1408/71 taki til íslenskra lífeyrissjóða.
Í þessu sambandi vísar ESA til dómaframkvæmdar Evrópudómstólsins þar
sem fram komi að ,,sú staðreynd að aðildarríki hafi tilgreint ákveðin lög í
yfirlýsingu sinni verði að teljast staðfesting á því að bætur greiddar á grundvelli
nefndra laga séu almannatryggingabætur í skilningi reglugerðar 1408/71”.23
Ákvæði 29. gr. EES hljóti því einnig að gilda um örorkubætur sem greiddar
séu af íslenskum lífeyrissjóðum á grundvelli laganna um skyldutryggingu
lífeyrisréttinda og starfsemi lífeyrissjóða.
84. ESA vísar í máli sínu til 5. gr. laga nr. 94/1994, þar sem fram kom að stjórn
lífeyrissjóðsins skyldi gera drög að reglugerðinni og hún síðan meðal annars
samþykkt af fjármálaráðherra. ESA leggur áherslu á að þótt ríkisstjórn Íslands
hafi ekki sjálf borið ábyrgð á undirbúningi reglugerðarinnar hafi ríkisstjórninni
borið að tryggja lögmæti hennar. ESA minnir einnig á að flokkun landsréttar á
því hvað teljist ,,löggjöf” ráði ekki skilgreiningu j-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
Hugtök í löggjöf bandalagsins skuli túlkuð á sjálfstæðan og samræmdan hátt
innan bandalagsins og skýrð í samhengi við og í ljósi tilgangs viðkomandi
23
ESA vísar til máls 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249, 9. mgr., máls 237/78 Toia [1979] ECR 2645, 8. mgr., máls C-251/89
Athanasopoulos [1991] ECR I-2797, 28. mgr. og máls C-131/96 Mora Romero [1997] ECR I-3659, 25. mgr.
51 -- -101
83. ESA vekur athygli á því, hvað varðar lög nr. 94/1994, að efnisreglur um
lífeyrisréttindi hafi ekki verið að finna í lögunum sjálfum heldur reglugerð um
Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna. Sú reglugerð hafi hins vegar verið sett með stoð í
lögunum, hún hafi haft að geyma almennar reglur, verið háð samþykki ráðherra,
og veitt einstaklingum réttindi á grundvelli lagalega skilgreindrar stöðu. ESA
heldur því fram að bæði lögin og nefnd reglugerð falli undir hugtakið ,,löggjöf”
í j-liði 1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
must be construed by taking account of the context and purpose of the national
provision in question.24 It is also recalled that the ECJ has held the definition in
Article 1(j) to include “administrative action” by the Member States.25
85. Lastly, ESA addresses the Defendant’s allegations that any right of the
Plaintiff’s to projection of pension points follows from the Agreement on
Relations between the pension funds, which, according to the Defendant, is
not legislation within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71. ESA’s understanding
is that this agreement does regulate the question of which fund pays how
much to each individual, but does not have a bearing on the existence or
extent of a right. Therefore, the content and classification of the agreement
cannot change the conclusion that a disability benefit exists and is based on
‘legislation’ within the meaning of Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71.
86. Thus, ESA proposes that the first question be answered as follows:
The term ‘social insurance’ as it is to be understood under Article 29 EEA and
Regulation 1408/71 covers the entitlement to invalidity benefit granted as a
result of membership in a pension fund scheme such as the Icelandic one
under examination in the case at hand.
The second question
87. At the outset, ESA stresses that the question does not relate to the entitlement
to a disability benefit as such. The question relates only to the Plaintiff’s right
to have his disability pension calculated on the basis of a projection of future
points. In this respect, the question does not concern whether actual pension
points accrued in another EEA State have to be added to the pension points
accrued in Iceland when calculating the pension. Rather, the question is
whether, for the purposes of satisfying a condition which requires a previous
insurance record with the disbursing fund during a specified reference period,
EEA law requires that insurance periods in another EEA State be assimilated
as qualifying insurance periods, where satisfying the condition results in a
more advantageous method of pension calculation.
88. ESA then clarifies that as the Icelandic pension scheme builds on a system
of accumulation of pension points through periods of insurance, resulting
in a higher pension the longer a person has been insured and the more
pension points he has acquired, the case at hand falls to be assessed under
ESA refers to Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, at paragraph 11 and Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, at
paragraph 43.
25
ESA refers to Case 300/84 van Roosmalen [1986] ECR 3097, at paragraph 28.
24
- -102
52 --
85. Að lokum fjallar ESA um fullyrðingar stefnda þess efnis að rétt stefnanda til
framreiknings leiði af samkomulagi um samskipti lífeyrissjóða sem að hans mati
teljist ekki ,,löggjöf” í skilningi reglugerðar 1408/71. ESA telur samkomulagið
ákvarða hvaða lífeyrissjóður greiði ákveðna fjárhæð til einstaklinga en hafi
ekki áhrif á það hvort réttindin eru fyrir hendi eða hversu víðtæk þau séu.
Því geti inntak og flokkun samkomulagsins ekki breytt þeirri niðurstöðu að
örorkubótaréttur sé fyrir hendi og að hann byggist á ,,löggjöf” í skilningi j-liðar
1. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
ákvæðis í landsrétti.24 Þá bendir ESA á að Evrópudómstóllinn hafi komist
að þeirri niðurstöðu að j-liður 1. gr. nái einnig yfir ,,stjórnsýslufyrirmæli”
aðildarríkja.25
86. ESA leggur þar með til að fyrstu spurningu verði svarað sem hér segir:
Hugtakið ,,almannatryggingar” í skilningi 29. gr. EES og reglugerðar 1408/71
nær til réttinda til örorkubóta sem veitt eru vegna aðildar í lífeyrissjóðskerfi eins
og því íslenska og fjallað er um í máli þessu.
Önnur spurning
88. ESA bendir því næst á að íslenska lífeyrissjóðskerfið byggi á uppsöfnun
lífeyrisstiga á tryggingatímabilinu. Það leiði til þess að einstaklingur fái því
hærri bætur þeim mun lengur sem hann er tryggður og því fleiri stigum sem
hann safnar. Því fari um málið samkvæmt 40. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 sem
24
ESA vísar til máls 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, 11. mgr. og máls C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, 43. mgr.
ESA vísar til máls 300/84 van Roosmalen [1986] ECR 3097, 28. mgr.
25
52 -- -103
87. ESA leggur á það áherslu, í upphafi að spurningin varði ekki örorkubótaréttinn
sem slíkan heldur einungis rétt stefnanda til framreiknings. Spurningin snúist
ekki um það hvort bæta skuli uppsöfnuðum lífeyrisstigum í öðru EES-ríki við
lífeyrisstig á Íslandi við útreikning á lífeyri. Hún lúti fremur að því hvort EESlöggjöf geri kröfu um að sjóður, sem setur það skilyrði að einstaklingur hafi
verið tryggður hjá sjóðnum í ákveðinn tíma, taki til greina tryggingatímabil í
öðru EES-ríki ef það leiðir til hagstæðari útreiknings á lífeyri hans.
Article 40 of Regulation 1408/71, specifying that the rules under Chapter
3 of Title III (Articles 44 to 51a) shall apply mutatis mutandis. Reference is
also made to Article 1(r) of Regulation 1408/71, further defining ‘periods of
insurance’.
89. ESA recalls that the ECJ has consistently held that the Member States remain
competent to define the conditions for granting social security benefits, provided
that the conditions do not give rise to overt or disguised discrimination between
Community workers.26 The principle of equal treatment requires that, for the
purposes of recognising the right of migrant workers to social security or other
benefits, each EEA State should take into account certain facts arising in the
other EEA States, in order to equate these facts with those which arise in their
own territory.27
90. According to ESA, the Icelandic condition of previous periods of contributions
when disability risk materialises is basically a requirement that there exist
a close link in time between the accident and the contributions made to the
disbursing pension fund. The insured person remains qualified for projection
of pension points for six months after leaving the Icelandic pension system.
Reference is made to Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71 which requires that
where the legislation of an EEA State makes the acquisition of the right to
benefits conditional upon the person concerned “being insured at the time of
the materialization of the risk,” this condition shall be regarded as having been
satisfied in the case of insurance under the legislation of another EEA State.
91. ESA submits that, in an Icelandic context, “being insured at the time of the
materialization of the risk” for the purpose of being entitled to a projection of
pension points, must mean being insured in a qualifying manner, i.e. during a
completed period of six months out of the 12 preceding the accident. Therefore,
where national legislation requires that the insured person has been affiliated
with the pension system during a reference period connected in time to the
accident, Article 45(5) provides that an affiliation with a pension system in
another EEA state during that reference period will satisfy the condition. As
regards the Icelandic condition, this means that an insured person has the right
to a calculation based on projected points as long as he has paid premiums in
an EEA State during six of the 12 months preceding the accident.
26
27
ESA refers to Case C-306/03 Alonso [2005] ECR I-705, at paragraph 27, and to the case law cited there.
ESA refers to the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-373/02 Öztürk [2004] ECR I-3605, at paragraph
41 et seq. including, in particular, paragraph 53. Further reference is made to the case law cited under sub-headings (e) to (h) in
the Opinion, in particular, Case C-349/87 Paraschi [1991] ECR I-4501, at paragraph 27 and Case C-290/00 Duchon [2002] ECR
I-3567, at paragraph 46.
--104
53 --
89. ESA minnir á að Evrópudómstóllinn hafi ítrekað komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að
aðildarríkin geti sett skilyrði fyrir greiðslu almannatryggingabóta að því tilskildu
að skilyrðin leiði hvorki til sýnilegrar né dulinnar mismununar milli launþega
bandalagsins.26 Jafnræðisreglan feli það í sér að hvert EES-ríki eigi við mat
á því hvort einstaklingur eigi rétt á almannatryggingum eða öðrum bótum að
taka tillit til ákveðinna atvika sem verða í öðrum EES-ríkjum og leggja þau til
jafns við atvik sem verða á eigin forráðasvæði.27
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EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
mæli fyrir um að reglur samkvæmt ákvæðum 3. kafla, III. bálks (44. – 51. gr.
a) skuli gilda að breyttu breytanda. Einnig er vísað til r-liðar 1. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71 sem skilgreini frekar hugtakið ,,tryggingatímabil”.
91. ESA heldur því fram að séu orðin ,,tryggður á þeim tíma er áhættan kemur
fram”, skýrð í samhengi við réttinn til framreiknings á Íslandi hljóti þau að fela
það í sér að viðkomandi skuli vera tryggður að uppfylltum settum skilyrðum,
þ.e. í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði af tólf áður en slys varð. Þannig megi halda
því fram að sé það gert að skilyrði í landsrétti að einstaklingur hafi átt aðild að
lífeyriskerfi landsins í ákveðinn tíma sem tengdur er við slysið, teljist skilyrðinu
fullnægt samkvæmt 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, ef viðkomandi var
tryggður í öðru EES-ríki á viðmiðunartímanum. Hvað íslenska skilyrðið varðar
þýði þetta að sá sem er tryggður eigi rétt á framreikningi svo framarlega sem
hann hafi greitt iðgjöld í EES-ríki í sex mánuði af tólf áður en slysið varð.
26
27
ESA vísar til máls C-306/03 Alonso [2005] ECR I-705, 27. mgr. og þeirra mála sem vísað er til þar.
ESA vísar til álits Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer aðallögsögumanns í máli C-373/02 Öztürk [2004] ECR I-3605, 41. mgr., et seq., þ.m.t.
einkum 53. mgr. Ennfremur er vísað til mála sem um getur í undirfyrirsögnum (e) til (h) í álitinu, einkum máls C-349/87 Paraschi
[1991] ECR I-4501, 27. mgr. og máls C-290/00 Duchon [2002] ECR I-3567, 46. mgr.
53 -- -105
90. ESA telur að það skilyrði sem sett er á Íslandi um greiðslu iðgjalda í ákveðinn
tíma áður en tryggingaráhættan kemur fram sé í grundvallaratriðum krafa um
náið samband í tíma á milli slyss og greiddra iðgjalda í þann sjóð sem greiðir
út bætur. Sá tryggði haldi rétti sínum til framreiknings í sex mánuði eftir að
hann hætti þátttöku í íslenska lífeyrissjóðskerfinu. Vísað er til 5. mgr. 45. gr.
reglugerðar 1408/71. Þar komi fram að bindi löggjöf EES-ríkis bótarétt því
skilyrði að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur ,,sé tryggður á þeim tíma er áhættan
kemur fram” skuli líta svo á að skilyrðinu sé fullnægt ef einstaklingurinn er
tryggður samkvæmt löggjöf annars EES-ríkis.
92. ESA further supports its position by referring to the adaptation presently
contained in point 1(t) of Annex VI to the EEA Agreement, as regards Iceland.
In ESA’s view, this is intended to cover precisely the situation in the case at
hand.
93. In conclusion, ESA holds that the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 preclude
national rules such as the ones in the case at hand, which make a right to
projection of entitlements subject to the condition that the individual involved
has paid contributions to an Icelandic pension fund for at least six of the 12
months preceding an accident without enabling him to meet this condition by
having paid contributions into a pension fund in another EEA State.
94. ESA adds that another result would run counter to the principle of free
movement for workers underlying the provisions of Regulation 1408/71, and
that the answer to the second question suggested by ESA would follow equally
if Articles 28 and 29 EEA were applied directly, since the Regulation simply lays
down detailed rules implementing the principles set out in those provisions.
95. Thus, ESA proposes that the second question be answered as follows:
The provisions of the EEA Agreement on the free movement of workers, in
particular Articles 28 and 29 and Regulation 1408/71, in particular Article 45(5)
thereof, preclude national rules, such as those in the case at hand, which
makes a right to projection of entitlements subject to the condition that the
individual involved has paid contributions to an Icelandic pension fund for at
least 6 of the 12 months preceding the date of an accident without enabling
the individual to meet this condition by having paid contributions into a pension
fund in another EEA State.
The third question
96. As regards the third question, ESA refers to Regulation 574/72 and Article
36(1) thereof, from which it follows that in order to receive benefits under
Article 40(1) of Regulation 1408/71, the person concerned shall submit a claim
to the institution of their place of residence. To the extent it is not clear whether
the Plaintiff in the case at hand ever satisfied the conditions for entitlement to
a pension under the laws of Denmark, ESA finds it useful to note, in addition,
that Article 36(1) goes on to provide for that very situation. Thus, the Danish
authorities, if the Plaintiff never was subject to Danish social security legislation,
would have been obliged to forward the claim to the institution of the EEA State
to whose legislation the Plaintiff was last subject, in this case Iceland.
--106
54 --
93. Niðurstaða ESA er að ákvæði reglugerðar 1408/71 standi í vegi
landsréttarreglum, eins og þeim sem um ræðir í þessu máli, sem bindi rétt til
framreiknings því skilyrði, að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur hafi greitt iðgjöld í
íslenskan lífeyrissjóð í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði af tólf fyrir slys, án þess að
honum sé gert kleift að fullnægja skilyrðinu með greiðslu iðgjalda í lífeyrissjóð
í öðru EES-ríki.
94. ESA bætir því við að önnur niðurstaða gengi gegn meginreglunni um frjálsa för
launþega sem reglugerð 1408/71 byggi á, og að svarið við annarri spurningu
yrði hið sama ef 28. og 29. gr. EES væri beitt beint. Með reglugerðinni séu
einfaldlega settar ítarlegar reglur til framkvæmdar meginreglum þessara
ákvæða.
Case Case
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EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
92. Máli sínu til stuðnings vísar ESA einnig til gildandi aðlögunarákvæðis fyrir
Ísland undir t-lið 1. töluliðar í VI. viðauka við EES-samninginn. Ákvæðinu sé
sérstaklega ætlað að ná yfir aðstæður eins og þær sem hér um ræðir.
95. Leggur ESA því til að annarri spurningunum verði svarað sem hér segir:
Ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa för launþega, einkum 28. og 29. gr. EES,
og reglugerð 1408/71, einkum 5. mgr. 45. gr., heimila ekki landsréttarreglur,
eins og þær sem um ræðir í þessu máli, sem binda rétt til framreiknings því
skilyrði að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingur hafi greitt iðgjöld í íslenskan lífeyrissjóð
í að minnsta kosti 6 mánuði af 12 fyrir slys, án þess að honum sé gert kleift að
fullnæga skilyrðinu með greiðslu iðgjalda í lífeyrissjóð í öðru EES-ríki.
96. Í umfjöllun um þriðju spurninguna vísar ESA til reglugerðar 574/72, sérstaklega
1. mgr. 36. gr., sem feli það í sér að leggja beri fram bótakröfu samkvæmt 1.
mgr. 40. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 hjá stofnun á búsetustað. Að því marki sem
ekki sé ljóst hvort stefnandi í málinu hafi nokkurn tímann fullnægt skilyrðum
til að fá lífeyri samkvæmt dönskum lögum, telur ESA gagnlegt að benda á
að 1. mgr. 36. gr. kveði á um hvernig með skuli fara við slíkar aðstæður. Hafi
stefnandi ekki á neinum tíma heyrt undir danska almannatryggingalöggjöf
hefði dönskum yfirvöldum borið að framsenda kröfuna til stofnunar í því EESríki sem stefnandi heyrði síðast undir, í þessu tilviki til Íslands.
54 -- -107
Þriðja spurning
97. Moreover, ESA points out that it follows from Article 36(3) of Regulation 574/72
that where a claimant submits his claim to the institution of the EEA State
of which he is national, the latter shall forward the claim to the competent
institution. ESA therefore submits that, in the present case, it is not necessary
to rule on which legislation applied to the Plaintiff. It is sufficient to note that,
whatever the applicable national legislation, the EEA law provides for the
processing of his claim and the forwarding thereof to the relevant competent
institution.
98. In any event, due account should be taken of Article 86(1) of Regulation
1408/71 which states that claims submitted to an authority or institution in
one EEA State shall thereby be deemed to be submitted to the competent
authority of another EEA State. In that respect, ESA refers to the ECJ having
held, as regards the predecessor of Article 86 of Regulation 1408/71 (Article
83 of Regulation 4/5828), that the purpose of that provision includes to “prevent
persons concerned from being deprived of their rights on purely formal
grounds.”29 ESA therefore submits that failure to present a claim to the correct
authorities cannot affect the worker’s right to a benefit to which he is entitled.
99. Referring to Articles 36(4) and 41 of Regulation 574/72, ESA adds that the
submission of a claim shall automatically involve the concurrent award of
benefits under the legislation of all of the EEA States under whose legislation
the claimant would be entitled to benefits. Referring also to Article 48 of
Regulation 574/72, ESA then suggests that whichever institution the Plaintiff’s
claim should have been and has been submitted to, any challenge to the
calculation made by Icelandic authorities in accordance with Article 41 of
Regulation 574/72 is challengeable in the Icelandic courts.
100. Thus, ESA proposes that the third question be answered as follows:
Regulation 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 is to be interpreted as meaning that
workers are to present their compensation claims in the state in which they
were resident at the time of their injury. Should the worker present his claim in
another EEA State than the State of residence, the authorities of the receiving
State shall forward the claim to the competent State. Failure to present the
claim to the correct authorities shall not affect the worker’s right to a benefit.
Règlement no 4 fixant les modalités d’application et complétant les dispositions du règlement no 3 concernant la sécurité sociale
des travailleurs migrants (OJ 30 of 16.12.1958 p. 597).
29
ESA refers to Case 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213, at paragraph 7.
28
--108
55 --
98. Í öllu falli beri að taka tilhlýðilegt tillit til 1. mgr. 86. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
Samkvæmt henni skuli líta svo á að kröfur sem lagðar eru fram við yfirvöld
eða stofnun í einu EES-ríki teljist þar með lagðar fram hjá lögbærri stofnun í
öðru EES-ríki. Í þessu sambandi vísar ESA til niðurstöðu Evrópudómstólsins
varðandi þá grein sem 86. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 leysti af hólmi (83. gr.
reglugerðar 4/5828), þess efnis að tilgangur ákvæðisins sé meðal annars
að ,,koma í veg fyrir að hlutaðeigandi einstaklingar séu sviptir rétti sínum á
grundvelli formsatriða.”29 Sé krafa ekki send til réttra yfirvalda geti það ekki haft
áhrif á rétt launþegans til bóta sem hann á tilkall til.
Case Case
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EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
97. Það leiði af 3. mgr. 36. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 að þegar bótakrefjandi leggi fram
kröfu hjá stofnun í EES-ríki þar sem hann er ríkisborgari skuli stofnunin senda
kröfuna áfram til þar til bærrar stofnunar. ESA fullyrðir að ekki sé nauðsynlegt
að kveða upp úr um hvort íslensk eða dönsk löggjöf eigi við um stefnanda í
þessu máli. Það nægi að benda á að óháð því hvor löggjöfin eigi við, mæli
EES-löggjöf fyrir um meðferð kröfu stefnanda og að hún skuli áframsend til þar
til bærrar stofnunar.
99. Samkvæmt 4. mgr. 36. gr. og 41. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 skuli krafa um bætur
hafa í för með sér að bótum sé sjálfkrafa úthlutað samtímis samkvæmt löggjöf
allra þeirra EES-ríkja þar sem krefjandi á rétt á bótum. ESA vísar einnig til
48. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 og heldur því fram að í þessu sambandi skipti
ekki máli til hvaða stofnunar stefnandi ætti að hafa og hafi sent kröfuna, því í
öllum tilvikum megi véfengja útreikning íslenskra yfirvalda á grundvelli 41. gr.
reglugerðar 574/72, fyrir íslenskum dómstólum.
Reglugerð 1408/71 frá 14. júní 1971 ber að túlka þannig að launþegar skuli
leggja fram bótakröfur í því ríki þar sem þeir eru búsettir þegar þeir verða fyrir
slysi. Leggi launþegi fram kröfu í öðru EES-ríki en búseturíkinu skulu yfirvöld
í því ríki sem móttekur kröfuna senda hana áfram til stofnunar í þar til bæru
ríki. Sé krafan ekki send áfram til réttra yfirvalda skal það ekki hafa áhrif á rétt
launþegans til bóta.
Règlement no 4 fixant les modalités d’application et complétant les dispositions du règlement no 3 concernant la sécurité sociale
des travailleurs migrants (Stjtíð. EB 30, 16.12.1958, bls. 597).
29
ESA vísar til máls 92/81 Carraciolo [1982] ECR 2213, 7. mgr.
28
55 ---109
100. ESA leggur til að þriðju spurningu verði svarað sem hér segir:
The Commission of the European Communities
The first question
101. The Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter “the Commission”)
notes that the first question is essentially a question of whether a disability
pension granted under a scheme such as the Icelandic Mariners’ Pension
Fund falls within the material scope of Regulation 1408/71; and that it has
been suggested that such a pension is not a ‘social security benefit’ and, in
particular, does not arise from ‘legislation’.
102. Regarding the first issue, i.e. whether the disability pension constitutes a social
security benefit, the Commission recalls that the ECJ has emphasised that the
question of whether a particular benefit falls within the scope of Regulation
1408/71 is based on its essential characteristics and not on the formal criterion
of whether it is classified as a social security benefit under national law. Instead,
the ECJ has held that a benefit is to be regarded as a social security benefit if
it is granted to recipients without any individual and discretionary assessment
of personal needs, on the basis of a legally defined position, and if it concerns
one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation 1408/71.30 In
the Commission’s view, these conditions are met in the present case, as the
disability pension is granted on the basis of established rules and directed
towards the risk of invalidity as set out in Article 4(1)(b) of the Regulation.
103. On the second issue, the Commission remarks that the notion of ‘legislation’
for the purpose of defining the material scope of Regulation 1408/71 is
broad. As stated in the definition contained in Article 1(j), ‘legislation’ may
include not only legislation in the classical sense of statutes, regulations or
comparable provisions, but also “all other implementing measures” relating
to a branch of social security covered by Article 4(1) of the Regulation. The
ECJ has emphasised that the definition of ‘legislation’ is “remarkable for its
breadth, including as it does all provisions laid down by law, regulation and
administrative action by the Member States”.31
104. The fact that the rules governing the Mariners’ Pension Fund appear to
have been based on a legal act, contends the Commission, suggests that
the disability pension has a statutory basis and thus falls under the notion of
‘legislation’ for the purposes of Article 4(1) of Regulation 1408/71 on that basis
alone.
30
31
The Commission refers to Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-312/94 Hoever and Zachow [1996] ECR I‑4895.
The Commission refers to Case 87/76 Bozzone [1977] ECR 687, in particular at paragraph 11.
-- 110
56 --
101. Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna (framkvæmdastjórnin) telur að með
fyrstu spurningunni sé í meginatriðum leitað svara við því hvort örorkulífeyrir,
sem veittur er samkvæmt kerfi eins og því sem Lífeyrissjóður sjómanna á
Íslandi starfaði eftir, falli undir efnissvið reglugerðar 1408/71. Því hafi verið
haldið fram í málinu að slíkur lífeyrir teljist ekki ,,almannatryggingabætur” og
geti sér í lagi ekki talist leiða af ,,löggjöf”.
102. Hvað varðar spurninguna um hvort umræddur lífeyrir teljist
almannatryggingabætur bendir framkvæmdastjórnin á að Evrópudómstóllinn
hafi lagt áherslu á að mat á því hvort tilteknar bætur falli undir reglugerð
1408/71 byggist á því hvað einkenni þær helst en ekki því hvort bæturnar teljist
formsins vegna almannatryggingar samkvæmt landsrétti. Evrópudómstóllinn
hafi þannig komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að bætur teljist til almannatryggingabóta
ef ákvörðunin um veitingu þeirra byggist ekki á einstaklingsbundnu og frjálsu
mati á persónulegum þörfum bótaþega heldur á lagalega skilgreindri stöðu
og þær varði beint einn þeirra flokka almannatrygginga sem taldir eru upp
í 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar 1408/7130 Það er álit framkvæmdastjórnarinnar
að skilyrðunum sé fullnægt í þessu máli þar sem örorkulífeyririnn sé veittur á
grundvelli settra reglna og beinist að þeirri örorkuáhættu sem getið er í b-lið
1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar.
103. Að því er snertir hugtakið ,,löggjöf”, bendir framkvæmdastjórnin á að hugtakið
sé skýrt rúmt við afmörkun á efnissviði reglugerðar 1408/71. Eins og fram
komi í skilgreiningunni í j-liði 1. gr., nái hugtakið ,,löggjöf” ekki einungis til
löggjafar í hefðbundinni merkingu í formi laga, reglugerða eða sambærilegra
ákvæða, heldur eigi það einnig við um ,,önnur ákvæði” um framkvæmd
almannatryggingareglna sem 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðarinnar nær til.
Evrópudómstóllinn hafi lagt áherslu á að skilgreiningin á ,,löggjöf” sé ,,sérstök
vegna þess hve rúm hún er og taki til allra ákvæða í lögum, reglugerðum og
stjórnsýslufyrirmælum aðildarríkja”.31
104. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að þar sem reglur um Lífeyrissjóð sjómanna virðist
settar á grundvelli laga sé örorkulífeyririnn lögbundinn og falli þegar af þeirri
ástæðu undir hugtakið ,,löggjöf” í skilningi 1. mgr. 4. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
30
31
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til sameinaðra mála C-245/94 og C-312/94 Hoever og Zachow [1996] ECR I-4895.
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 87/76 Bozzone [1977] ECR 687, einkum 11. mgr.
56 --- 111
Case Case
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EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Fyrsta spurning
Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna
105. However, the Commission finds the status of the relevant Icelandic legislation
to be unclear from the information provided in the request for an Advisory
Opinion, and notes that the Defendant argues that the Icelandic Pension Funds
were established on the basis of collective agreements between workers’ and
employers’ organisations. Industrial agreements are expressly excluded from
the definition of ‘legislation’ contained in Article 1(j) of Regulation 1408/71, but
this exclusion may be lifted by means of a Declaration. In more general terms,
Article 5 of the Regulation also envisages that the legislation and schemes
falling within the scope of Article 4(1) shall be specified in a Declaration.
106. In this context, the Commission points to the Declaration made by Iceland
pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation 1408/71, listing the Mariners’ Pension Fund
under the heading of invalidity benefits covered by Regulation 1408/71. The
Commission then stresses, with reference to case-law of the ECJ, that where
a State has specified a scheme in its Declaration under Article 5, that must
be accepted as proof that the benefits granted under that scheme are social
security benefits within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71.32
107. Based on the above, the Commission suggests that the first question be
answered as follows:
A disability pension granted under a scheme such as the Icelandic Mariners’
Pension fund constitutes a social security benefit within the meaning of Article
4(1) of Regulation 1408/71.
The second question
108. The Commission underlines that, according to Article 29 EEA, the coordination
of national social security schemes is considered to be a key element in
ensuring free movement of workers within the EEA and preventing adverse
treatment in cases where a worker has been subject to more than one social
security legislation. The Commission highlights as particularly important in
this regard the principles of aggregation and exportability (items (a) and (b) of
Article 29) which essentially underpin the more detailed system of rules laid
down in Regulation 1408/71. In the case of a disability benefit such as the one
at issue in the present proceedings, the relevant rules are found in Chapter 3
of Title III of Regulation 1408/71.
109. The first question arising is whether the right to the projection of the Icelandic
disability pension falls within the scope of Article 45 or rather Article 46 of
32
The Commission refers to Case 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249 and Case C-251/89 Athanasopoulos [1991] ECR I-2797.
--112
57 --
106. Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar í þessu sambandi til yfirlýsingar Íslands, á
grundvelli 5. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71, þar sem Lífeyrissjóður sjómanna
er talinn upp í kaflanum um þær örorkubætur sem heyri undir reglugerð
1408/71. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur ennfremur áherslu á, með tilvísan í
dómaframkvæmd Evrópudómstólsins, að þegar ríki hafi talið tiltekið kerfi upp
í yfirlýsingu sinni samkvæmt 5. gr., verði það að teljast staðfesting þess að
bætur greiddar samkvæmt því kerfi teljist til almannatryggingabóta í skilningi
reglugerðar 1408/71.32
Case Case
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EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
105. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur þó að upplýsingar sem fram koma í beiðninni
um ráðgefandi álit bendi til þess að lagaumhverfi málsins sé óskýrt. Bendir
framkvæmdastjórnin á að það komi fram í máli stefnda að íslenskir lífeyrissjóðir
hafi verið stofnaðir á grundvelli kjarasamninga milli samtaka launþega og
atvinnurekenda. Kjarasamningar séu sérstaklega undanskildir skilgreiningunni
á ,,löggjöf” í j-liði 1. mgr. reglugerðar 1408/71 en víkja megi frá þeirri afmörkun
með yfirlýsingu. Ákvæði 5. gr. reglugerðarinnar geri einnig með almennari
hætti ráð fyrir því að löggjöf og kerfi sem heyra undir 1. mgr. 4. gr. séu talin
upp í yfirlýsingu þar að lútandi.
107. Á grundvelli framangreinds leggur framkvæmdastjórnin til að fyrstu spurningu
verði svarað sem hér segir:
Örorkulífeyrir sem veittur er samkvæmt kerfi eins og því sem Lífeyrissjóður
sjómanna starfaði eftir, telst til almannatryggingabóta í skilningi 1. mgr. 4. gr.
reglugerðar 1408/71.
108. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur áherslu á að samkvæmt 29. gr. EES sé
samþætting almannatryggingakerfa í EES-ríkjunum lykilatriði við að tryggja
frjálsa för launþega innan EES og koma í veg fyrir óhagræði þeirra sem hafa
heyrt undir fleiri en eitt almannatryggingakerfi. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur í
þessu sambandi einnig áherslu á mikilvægi meginreglnanna um uppsöfnun
og flutning réttinda (a- og b-liður 29. gr. EES) sem búi að baki hinu ítarlega
regluverki reglugerðar 1408/71. Reglur um örorkubætur eins og þær sem um
ræði í málinu sé að finna í 3. kafla í III. bálki reglugerðar 1408/71.
109. Fyrsta spurningin sem vakni sé hvort rétturinn til framreiknings heyri undir
45. eða 46. gr. reglugerðarinnar. Á grundvelli þeirra upplýsinga sem fylgja
32
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 35/77 Beerens [1977] ECR 2249 og máls C-251/89 Athanasopoulos [1991] ECR I-2797.
--113
57 --
Önnur spurning
the Regulation. On the basis of the information provided in the request for
an Advisory Opinion, it seems to the Commission that it should properly be
classified as a specific additional benefit entitlement – it is not simply a question
of the calculation of the amount of the basic disability pension (which would fall
under Article 46) but rather a question of the acquisition of a right to a separate
supplementary disability pension on the basis of “projected” future points.
The Commission would therefore conclude that entitlement to this benefit is
governed by the provisions of Article 45 of Regulation 1408/71.
110. The secondary question which follows on from this is whether the requirement
for contributions to have been made to the Icelandic pension fund for at least
six of the 12 months preceding the accident should be examined in light of
Article 45(1) or Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71. In the Commission’s
view, Article 45(1) applies in situations where a certain period of insurance or
residence is required for a right to disability benefits to be acquired and this
threshold cannot be reached without including periods completed in another
EEA State. In those circumstances, Article 45(1) will operate so as to require
those other periods to be included in the calculation to enable the “door to be
opened” and access to the benefit granted.
111. However, contends the Commission, in a case such as the present one,
the relevant rule does not simply impose a minimum insurance period.
Instead, it requires six months of contributions to have been made during the
12 months preceding the accident, i.e. during a period set by reference to
the materialisation of the risk. This should accordingly be equated with the
situation described in Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71, with the result
that this condition “shall be regarded as having been satisfied in the case of
insurance under the legislation of another Member State, in accordance with
the procedures provided in Annex VI for each Member State concerned”.
112. The Commission finds the conclusion further reinforced by the terms of Iceland’s
entry in Annex VI to Regulation 1408/71, which make specific provision for the
case of access to projected disability benefits.
113. As the sole reason for why the Plaintiff did not fulfil the six month requirement
was that he had exercised his right to free movement and taken up work in
Denmark, in the Commission’s opinion, it follows necessarily from the operation
of Article 45(5) of Regulation 1408/71 that the Defendant is obliged to take into
consideration his periods of insurance under that Danish pension scheme in
treating his claim for additional projected disability pension.
--114
58 --
110. Af framangreindu leiði að næsta spurning sé hvort meta beri skilyrðið um
greiðslu iðgjalda til íslenska lífeyrissjóðsins í að minnsta kosti sex mánuði af
tólf áður en slysið varð, í ljósi 1. mgr. 45. gr. eða 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar
1408/71. Það er álit framkvæmdastjórnarinnar að 1. mgr. 45. gr. eigi við
í tilvikum þar sem réttur til örorkubóta er bundinn því skilyrði að tilteknu
trygginga- eða búsetutímabili sé lokið og ekki sé unnt að fullnægja skilyrðinu
án þess að tímabil sem lokið er í öðru EES-ríki sé tekið til greina. Við þessar
aðstæður eigi 1. mgr. 45. gr. að tryggja að tímabil í öðrum EES-ríkjum verði
tekin með í reikninginn svo unnt sé að „opna dyrnar” og bætur fáist greiddar.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
beiðninni um ráðgefandi álit virðist framkvæmdastjórninni að rétt sé að flokka
framreikning sem sérstakan viðbótar bótarétt. Þetta sé ekki aðeins spurning um
útreikning á fjárhæð grunnörorkulífeyris (sem heyrir undir 46. gr.) heldur hvort
myndast hafi réttur til sérstaks viðbótarörorkulífeyris á grundvelli framreiknaðs
stigafjölda. Framkvæmdastjórnin kemst því að þeirri niðurstöðu að réttur til
slíkra bóta heyri undir ákvæði 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71.
111. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur hins vegar að reglur eins og þær sem um ræðir í
málinu mæli ekki aðeins fyrir um lágmarkstryggingatímabil heldur sé krafist
greiðslu iðgjalda í sex mánuði af tólf mánuðum fyrir slys, þ.e. á tímabili sem
taki mið af því hvenær áhættan kemur fram. Aðstæðunum verði því jafnað við
þær sem lýst er í 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71. Þar með skuli ,,litið svo
á að því skilyrði hafi verið fullnægt, enda sé viðkomandi tryggður samkvæmt
löggjöf annars aðildarríkis, í samræmi við reglur sem eru settar fyrir hvert
aðildarríki í VI. viðauka”.
113. Eina ástæða þess að stefnandi uppfyllti ekki skilyrðið um sex mánaða
iðgjaldagreiðslu var að hann hafði nýtt sér rétt sinn til frjálsra flutninga
og hafið störf í Danmörku. Því telur framkvæmdastjórnin að það leiði
óhjákvæmilega af 5. mgr. 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71 að stefnda beri að taka
tillit til tryggingatímabila í danska lífeyrissjóðskerfinu þegar lagt er mat á kröfu
stefnanda til viðbótarörorkulífeyris á grundvelli framreiknings.
58 ---115
112. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur aðlögunarákvæði fyrir Ísland í VI. viðauka við
reglugerð 1408/71, þar sem sérstaklega sé kveðið á um rétt til framreiknings,
styðja niðurstöður sínar enn frekar.
114. Based on the above, the Commission suggests that the second question be
Articles 28 and 29 of the EEA Agreement together with Article 45 of Regulation
1408/71 should be interpreted as requiring periods of insurance completed
under the legislation of another State to be taken into consideration for the
purposes of a claim for the right to projection of entitlements of such a disability
pension.
The third question
115. As regards the third question, the Commission points out that there are special
rules for the submission and investigation of claims for invalidity benefits in
Chapter 3 of Title IV of Regulation 574/42. According to Article 36(1) of that
Regulation, a claim should be submitted in the first instance to the institution of
the place of residence. Since the Plaintiff was resident in Denmark at the time
of the accident, and continues to reside there, his claim should therefore have
been presented to the Danish pension fund.
116. The Commission emphasises, however, that the primary purpose of Article
36 of Regulation 574/42 is to facilitate the handling of claims in cross-border
situations. As apparent from the terms of Article 36(4) of the Regulation, a
claim submitted will “automatically involve the concurrent award of benefits
under the legislation of all the Member States in question”. Article 41 of the
Regulation similarly envisages that although claims should first be investigated
by the institution which receives the initial claim under Article 36, all other
institutions must be notified so that they can simultaneously carry out their
own investigation of the claim. In this way, the Icelandic pension fund would
in any event be required to examine the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the additional
projected disability pension.
117. The Commission suggests that the third question be answered as follows:
In accordance with Article 36 of Regulation 574/72, such a claim should be
submitted in the first instance to the competent institution of the State of
residence.
Henrik Bull
Judge-Rapporteur
--116
59 --
Ákvæði 28. og 29. gr. EES-samningsins, ásamt 45. gr. reglugerðar 1408/71,
ber að túlka með þeim hætti að tryggingatímabil sem er lokið samkvæmt löggjöf
annars ríkis skuli talið með við ákvörðun á rétti til örorkulífeyris á grundvelli
framreiknings.
Þriðja spurning
115. Í umfjöllun sinni um þriðju spurningu bendir framkvæmdastjórnin á, að sérstakar
reglur um örorkubótakröfur og umfjöllun þeirra séu settar í 3. kafla, IV. bálki
reglugerðar 574/72. Samkvæmt 1. mgr. 36. gr. þeirrar reglugerðar skuli fyrst
leggja fram kröfu hjá stofnun á búsetustað. Stefnandi hafi verið búsettur í
Danmörku þegar slysið átti sér stað, og sé enn búsettur þar, og því hafi honum
borið að leggja fram kröfu hjá danska lífeyrissjóðnum.
Case Case
E-4/07E-1/06
Jón Gunnar
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
114. Með vísan til framangreinds leggur framkvæmdastjórnin til að annarri spurningu
verði svarað sem hér segir:
116. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur áherslu á að megintilgangur 36. gr. reglugerðar
574/72 sé að auðvelda afgreiðslu krafna þegar fleiri en eitt ríki eigi hlut að máli.
Eins og ljóst sé af skilmálum 4. mgr. 36. gr. reglugerðarinnar feli sending kröfu
til stofnunar í sér ,,að bótum er sjálfkrafa úthlutað samtímis samkvæmt löggjöf
allra hlutaðeigandi aðildarríkja”. Ákvæði 41. gr. reglugerðarinnar geri með
sama hætti ráð fyrir að þótt krafan sé fyrst tekin til athugunar hjá þeirri stofnun
sem fær hana senda samkvæmt 36. gr., skuli tilkynna öllum hlutaðeigandi
stofnunum um kröfu þannig að þær geti allar tekið hana til athugunar samtímis.
Samkvæmt þessu þyrfti íslenski lífeyrissjóðurinn alltaf að taka kröfu stefnanda
um rétt viðbótarörorkubóta á grundvelli framreiknings til athugunar.
117. Framkvæmdastjórnin leggur til að þriðju spurningu verði svarað sem hér
segir:
Í samræmi við 36. gr. reglugerðar 574/72 ber að leggja slíka kröfu fyrst fram
hjá þar til bærri stofnun á búsetustað.
Henrik Bull
framsögumaður
59 ---117
- 60 -
Case E-5/07
Private Barnehagers Landsforbund
v
EFTA Surveillance Authority
- 61 -
Case E-5/07
v
(Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Municipal
kindergartens – State aid – Notion of undertaking – Decision not to raise objections –
Initiation of the formal investigation procedure – Admissibility)
Judgment of the Court, 21 February 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Report for the Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
The Court is not required by Article 3(1) SCA
to follow the reasoning of the European
Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities
when interpreting the main part of that
Agreement, however the reasoning which
led those courts to their interpretations of
expressions in Community law is relevant
when those expressions are identical
in substance to those which fall to be
interpreted by the Court. This principle
must also apply to the issue of locus standi
to bring an action for annulment.
In the field of State aid, applicants who
challenge the merits of a decision appraising
aid taken on the basis of Article 1(3) in Part
I of Protocol 3 to the SCA or at the end
of the formal investigation procedure are
considered to be individually concerned by
that decision if their market position or, in
the case of an association of undertakings,
the market position of its members, is
- 62 -
substantially affected by the aid to which
the contested decision relates.
The mere fact that a measure such as
the contested decision may exercise an
influence on the competitive relationships
existing on the relevant market and that
the undertaking concerned was in a
competitive relationship with the addressee
of that measure cannot in any event suffice
for that undertaking to be regarded as
individually concerned by that measure.
An undertaking cannot rely solely on its
status as a competitor of the undertaking
in receipt of aid but must additionally show
that its circumstances distinguish it in a
similar way to the undertaking in receipt of
the aid.
In cases where ESA finds, on the basis
of the preliminary examination only and
without initiating the formal investigation
procedure under Article 1(2) in Part I of
When taking a decision in favour of an aid,
ESA may restrict itself to the preliminary
examination provided for under Article
1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 SCA only if it
is in a position to reach the firm view,
following the initial investigation, that the
measure cannot be classified as aid within
the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA or that
the measure, whilst constituting aid, is
compatible with EEA rules.
When the nature of an activity carried out
by a public entity is assessed with regard
to the State aid rules, it does not matter
whether the activity might, in principle, be
pursued by a private operator. The specific
circumstances under which the activity is
performed have to be taken into account
in order to assess whether a State is
providing a service as an economic activity
or whether it exercises its powers in order
to fulfil its duties towards its population.
Summary
The notion of “doubts” in Article 4(4) in Part
II of Protocol 3 SCA is an objective one.
Whether or not doubts exist with regard to
the facts, points of law or economic or social
assessments requires investigation of both
the content of the contested aid scheme
and the circumstances under which it was
adopted or operated. The investigation
must be conducted objectively, comparing
the grounds of the decision with the
information available to ESA when it took
the decision on the compatibility of the
disputed aid with the EEA Agreement. It
follows that judicial review by the Court
of the existence of “doubts” under Article
4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 SCA will, by
nature, go beyond simple consideration of
whether or not there has been a manifest
error of assessment by ESA in not initiating
a formal investigation procedure.
Case E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
vAuthority
Norway
Protocol 3 SCA, that aid is compatible with
the EEA Agreement, the persons intended
to benefit from the procedural guarantees
inherent in the formal investigation
procedure may secure compliance
therewith only if they are able to challenge
that decision. An action for the annulment
brought under Article 36(2) SCA by one of
the parties concerned should therefore be
declared admissible.
- 63 -
21 February 2008
(Action for annulment of a decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority – Municipal
kindergartens – State aid – Notion of undertaking – Decision not to raise objections –
Initiation of the formal investigation procedure – Admissibility)
In Case E-5/07,
Private Barnehagers Landsforbund, represented by advokat Peter Dyrberg and
advokat Ingvald Falch, with the law firm of Schjødt, Oslo, Norway,
Applicant,
v
EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Niels Fenger, Director, and Bjørnar
Alterskjær, Senior Officer, Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents, Brussels,
Belgium,
Defendant,
supported by the Kingdom of Norway, represented by Thomas G. Naalsund, advocate,
Office of the Attorney General (Civil Affairs) and Siri Veseth, legal adviser, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, acting as agents,
Intervener,
APPLICATION for the annulment of Decision No 39/07/COL of 27 February 2007 on
public financing of municipal day-care institutions in Norway,
THE COURT,
composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Thorgeir Örlygsson
and Bjørg Ven (ad hoc), Judges
having regard to the written pleadings of the parties and the written observations of the
Republic of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First Secretary and Legal
Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as agent, and the written observations of the
Commission of the European Communities, represented by Christophe Giolito and Bernd
Martenczuk, members of its Legal Service, acting as agents,
- 64 -
Judgment
I
Factual background
1
Kindergartens (barnehager) for children under compulsory school age (i.e.
between 0 and 6 years) have been available in Norway for decades. Public
kindergartens are run either by the municipalities (hereinafter “municipal
kindergartens”) or, to a very limited extent, by public institutions (e.g. hospitals).
Private kindergartens are run by companies or organisations or as family daycare institutions (hereinafter “private kindergartens”). At the relevant time, out
of 235 000 children enrolled at kindergartens in Norway, 108 000 attend private
kindergartens, whereof 80 000 were enrolled at kindergartens represented by
the Applicant, Private Barnehagers Landsforbund (hereinafter “PBL”).
2
Since the start of funding of the kindergarten sector by the state in 1963, there
have been three sources of finance for kindergartens in Norway: the State,
the municipalities and the parents. Activity-based State subsidies are granted
equally to the municipalities and to private kindergartens. The scale of these
grants is set by Parliament annually, with a present target of on average 50%
coverage of the operational costs of day-care centres. With regard to parental
fees, there were no limitations on municipal and private kindergartens before
2003. Furthermore, some municipalities granted additional aids to private
kindergartens on a voluntary basis.
3
Municipal kindergartens in general have been and are still organised like other
municipal activities. As such, the financing of the municipal kindergartens is
a part of the general budget of the municipality. It is subject to the general
rules of public budgeting, which means that the municipal budget has to be
complete, meaning that all expected costs connected with an activity have to
be budgeted in full.
4
In 2003, a reform of the financing of the kindergarten sector took place. It
originated from an agreement between political parties in June 2002, the socalled “Kindergarten Agreement”. The goal was to ensure equal treatment for
private and public kindergartens, affordable prices for parents and full coverage
of high quality kindergarten places for all children whose parents so wish.
- 65 -
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Authority vAuthority
Norway
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
gives the following
JUDGMENT
having heard oral argument of the Applicant, the Defendant, the Intervener and the
Commission of the European Communities at the hearing on 16 January 2008,
From the outset, it was recognised that a system where the majority of the
costs should be borne by the central State budget had to take into account the
important cost deviations with regard to kindergartens amongst the different
municipalities. It became furthermore clear in the legislative procedure that the
municipalities had much higher costs than the private kindergartens. In 2003,
the costs per child per hour of the private kindergartens were on average at
85% of the costs of the municipal kindergartens.
5
The major change introduced by the above mentioned reform was the
introduction of a maximum price ceiling on parental fees, to obtain the goal
of capping parents’ fees at 20% of the costs of the services. As of 1 January
2006, the applicable rate was fixed at NOK 2 250 per month with an intention
of reducing it to approximately NOK 1 800. The parental fee is disconnected
from the actual costs of the service; cost differences stemming from the age of
the child (given that costs for children aged 0–2 years are substantially higher
than for children aged 3–6 years) or from special needs are not accounted for.
Furthermore, parents with more than one child benefit from a fee reduction of
minimum 30% for the second child and minimum 50% for the third or following
children. Another main change was the introduction of a new obligation of the
municipalities to cover operational costs of non-municipal kindergartens.
6
In order to compensate for the new obligations of the municipalities (i.e. the
loss of revenue of both municipal and non-municipal kindergartens through the
introduction of the price ceiling which had to be covered by the municipalities),
so-called “discretionary funds” were introduced. These earmarked subsidies
are paid to the municipalities from the State budget and may be used to
compensate for the loss of revenue of existing kindergartens (non-municipal
or municipal) or for running costs of new kindergarten places. The system
came into effect on 1 May 2004 and for the year 2004, NOK 485 million were
allocated in the State budget for this purpose.
II Relevant law
EEA law
7
Article 59(2) of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter
“EEA” or the “EEA Agreement”) reads as follows:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Agreement, in particular to the rules on
- 66 -
8
Article 61(1) EEA reads as follows:
Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member
States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings
or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between
Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.
9
Article 16 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of
a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (hereinafter “SCA”) reads as
follows:
Decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall state the reasons on which
they are based.
10 Article 36(2) SCA reads as follows:
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be
contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute
proceedings before the EFTA Court against a decision of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority addressed to that person or against a decision addressed to another
person, if it is of direct and individual concern to the former.
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments,
the EFTA Surveillance Authority finds that aid granted by an EFTA State or
through EFTA State resources is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA
Agreement having regard to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, or that such aid
is being misused, it shall decide that the EFTA State concerned shall abolish
or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Authority.
…
3. The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time
to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it
considers that any such plan is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA
Agreement having regard to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, it shall without
- 67 -
JUDGMENT
11 Article 1(2)–(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the SCA, as amended by the
Agreements amending Protocol 3 thereto, signed in Brussels on 21 March
1994, 6 March 1998 and 10 December 2001 (hereinafter “Protocol 3 SCA”)
reads as follows:
delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The State concerned
shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted
in a final decision.
12 Article 4(2)–(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 SCA reads as follows:
2. Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority, after a preliminary examination,
finds that the notified measure does not constitute aid, it shall record that
finding by way of a decision.
finds that no doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the functioning of
the EEA Agreement of a notified measure, in so far as it falls within the scope
of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, it shall decide that the measure is
compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as a ‘decision not to raise objections’). The decision shall specify which
exception under the EEA Agreement has been applied.
finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the functioning of the
EEA Agreement of a notified measure, it shall decide to initiate proceedings
pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I (hereinafter referred to as a ‘decision to initiate
the formal investigation procedure’).
13 Article 13(1) in Part II of Protocol 3 SCA reads as follows:
The examination of possible unlawful aid shall result in a decision pursuant
to Article 4(2), (3) or (4) of this Chapter. In the case of decisions to initiate the
formal investigation procedure, proceedings shall be closed by means of a
decision pursuant to Article 7 of this Chapter. If an EFTA State fails to comply
with an information injunction, that decision shall be taken on the basis of the
information available.
National law
14 According to Section 1 of Act No 64 of 17 June 2005 on Day-Care Institutions
(hereinafter “the Kindergarten Act”), a kindergarten shall give children under
compulsory school age good possibilities for development and activities. It
must also, unless otherwise decided, assist in giving the child an upbringing in
accordance with the basic values of Christianity.
15 Section 8 of the Kindergarten Act establishes that the municipality is the
local kindergarten authority, charged with the supervision of kindergartens’
compliance with the applicable rules. Section 8, second paragraph, maintains
- 68 -
16 Section 14 of the Kindergarten Act reads:
Approved day-care centres shall be given equivalent treatment as regards
public contributions. The King may adopt regulations with further provisions on
what is meant by equivalent treatment.
17 Regulation No 539 of 19 March 2004 relating to equivalent treatment of child
care institutions in relation to public subsidies, as amended in 2005 (hereinafter
the “Regulation”), lays down the applicable rules on the public financing of the
kindergarten sector. Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulation establish the principle
of equivalent treatment, independent of ownership, as subject to the principles
laid down in the Regulation.
18 Section 3 of the Regulation Responsibility of the municipalities reads:
The municipality is the authority responsible for ensuring that all approved
kindergartens in the municipality receive public subsidies in an overall equal
manner.
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that the municipality shall see to it that there is a sufficient number of
kindergarten places.
The municipality shall pay the costs of ordinary operation of kindergartens
which are not paid by other public subsidies and parental contributions. If
parental contributions in non-municipal kindergartens are lower than parental
contributions in the municipality’s own kindergartens, the municipal is not liable
to pay the difference.
The municipality is under an obligation to grant subsidies such that the overall
public subsidies amount to at least 85% of what equivalent kindergartens
owned by the municipalities on average receive in public subsidies.
The municipality is not obliged to pay subsidies such that the overall public
financing of the kindergartens exceeds public subsidies received on average
by an equivalent kindergarten owned by the municipality.
19 According to the explanatory remarks accompanying the Regulation, the
municipalities have under Section 3, second and fourth paragraphs, the choice
between establishing the subsidy either in accordance with the cost coverage
principle (second paragraph) or as an equal nominal subsidy amount based
on unit costs (fourth paragraph). The choice must be the same for all nonmunicipal kindergartens in the municipality.
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JUDGMENT
The municipality is not obliged to pay the cost increases which exceed normal
price and cost increases for the municipal sector.
III The administrative procedure and the contested decision
20 In August 2004, PBL contacted the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter
“the Defendant” or “ESA”) with a view to filing a complaint concerning public
subsidising of municipal kindergartens in Norway. Some informal exchanges
of views between ESA and PBL took place in the course of 2004, inter alia in
a meeting on 16 September 2004.
21 By letter dated 23 February 2005, PBL submitted a formal complaint alleging
that the system for public contributions to the operation of municipally owned
day-care centres contained elements of State aid.
22 By e-mail dated 25 April 2005 and by letters dated 17 January 2006, 4 May
2006 and 6 June 2006, PBL submitted further information on the case.
Representatives of ESA held meetings with PBL on 5 April 2005 and 16
February 2006.
23 By letter dated 13 July 2006, ESA requested clarifications from the Norwegian
authorities. The Norwegian Government replied to the request by letter dated
25 September 2006.
24 By letters dated 2 October 2006 and 11 October 2006, PBL provided further
comments to ESA. On 13 December 2006, ESA officials held a meeting with
PBL, which formally called upon ESA to act under Article 37 SCA.
25 By letter dated 5 January 2007, PBL supplied further information to ESA. On
26 January 2007, ESA officials held a further meeting with PBL. By e-mail
dated 9 February 2007, PBL informed ESA that it maintained its complaint and
submitted further information by fax dated 12 February 2007.
26 On 27 February 2007, ESA adopted Decision 39/07/COL addressed to the
Kingdom of Norway, and notified the Decision to PBL by a letter dated the
same day. The operative part of the Decision reads as follows:
The EFTA Surveillance Authority concludes that the system of financing
municipal day-care institutions in Norway does not constitute State aid within
the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement.
27 ESA based its conclusion on three separate grounds: First, that municipal
kindergartens are not undertakings in the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA;
second, that the measure does not affect trade between Member States as
required by Article 61(1) EEA; and third, that even if the measure would be
considered State aid, the activity concerned constitutes a service of general
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IV Procedure and forms of order sought
28 By an application lodged at the EFTA Court on 4 April 2007, PBL brought an
action under Article 36 SCA for annulment of ESA’s Decision No 39/07/COL
of 27 February 2007 on public financing of municipal day-care institutions in
Norway. The statement of defence from ESA was registered at the Court on
14 June 2007.
29 The Applicant claims that the Court should:
– Annul Decision No. 39/07/COL, of 27 February 2007, of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority; and
– order the EFTA Surveillance Authority to pay the costs of the proceedings.
30 The application for annulment of the contested decision is based on four pleas
in law:
– that the EFTA Surveillance Authority failed to initiate the formal investigation
procedure;
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economic interest, and the contested measure constitutes an appropriate and
not manifestly discriminatory compensation thereof, the measure thus being
justified on the grounds of Article 59(2) EEA.
– that the EFTA Surveillance Authority interpreted and applied wrongfully
Article 61(1) EEA;
– that the EFTA Surveillance Authority interpreted and applied wrongfully
Article 59(2) EEA; and
– that the EFTA Surveillance Authority violated Article 16 SCA and the
principles of good administration, in particular the obligation to conduct an
impartial and diligent examination of the case.
31 The Defendant claims that the Court should:
– Dismiss the Application as inadmissible; in the alternative
– dismiss the Application as unfounded; and
32 The Applicant’s reply to the statement of defence was registered at the
Court on 20 August 2007. A rejoinder from the Defendant was registered on
5 October 2005. A statement of intervention from the Kingdom of Norway
was registered on 8 October 2007. Furthermore, a reply from the Applicant to
the statement in intervention from the Kingdom of Norway was registered on
26 October 2007.
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JUDGMENT
– order the Applicant to pay the costs.
33 The Republic of Iceland submitted written observations registered at the
Court on 20 August 2007. The Commission of the European Communities
(hereinafter the “Commission”) submitted written observations registered at
the Court on 16 August 2007.
34 The Applicant, the Defendant, the Intervener and the Commission presented
oral argument and replied to questions put to them by the Court at the hearing
on 16 January 2007 in Luxembourg.
35 Reference is made to the Report for the Hearing for a fuller account of the
facts, the procedure and the pleas and arguments of the parties, which are
mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in so far as is necessary for the
reasoning of the Court.
V Admissibility
Pleas based on substantive grounds – the second, third and fourth plea
Arguments of the parties
36 The Defendant, the Intervener and the Commission point out that in order
to have locus standi under Article 36(2) SCA for pleas based on substantive
grounds, the Decision must be of direct and individual concern to the Applicant.
It is submitted that it is not enough to qualify as a “party concerned” under
Article 1(2) of Protocol 3 SCA in order to be individually concerned with regard
to pleas on substantive grounds. Rather, the Applicant has to be able either to
rely on a particular interest in acting, especially because its negotiating position
is affected by the measure which it seeks to have annulled, or to show that one
or more of its members are individually concerned. Reference is made, inter
alia, to Cases 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95, English special
edition; T-95/03 Asociación de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio de la
Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid and Federación Catalana de Estaciones de
Servicio v Commission [2006] ECR II-4739, at paragraphs 42–43, and T-69/96
Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus and others v Commission [2001] ECR II1037, at paragraph 49.
37 The Defendant adds that an association formed for the protection of the
collective interests of a category of persons cannot be considered to be directly
and individually concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that
category. Reference is made to Cases T-585/93 Greenpeace v Commission
[1995] ECR II-2205, at paragraph 59, and T-350/03 Wirtschaftskammer
Kärnten and best connect Ampere Strompool GmbH v Commission [2006]
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38 The Defendant and the Intervener argue that in order to demonstrate individual
concern of the members of an association, it is not sufficient for them to be
direct competitors of the beneficiaries of the aid scheme. Rather, it is necessary
to examine whether they are merely affected by the alleged aid measure in the
same way as other operators in the sector concerned, or whether at least
one of them is affected in a way that distinguishes it from all other operators.
Reference is made to Cases C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft
Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737, hereinafter “Aktionsgemeinschaft
Recht und Eigentum”, at paragraph 35–37 and 72; Joined Cases E-5/04 to
E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord and others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005]
EFTA Court Report 117, at paragraphs 55–56 and 60, and Case T-228/00
Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia Soc. coop. rl and others v Commission
[2005] ECR II-787, at paragraph 34.
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ECR II-68. It is argued that the Applicant cannot gain standing by pooling the
general interests of its members, as this would amount to a circumvention of
the requirements of Article 36 SCA. Reference is made, inter alia, to Case
Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus, at paragraph 49.
39 The Commission submits that for the members of the Applicant to be individual
concerned, it is required that their position on the market be significantly
affected by the aid which is subject to the contested decision. During the oral
hearing, the Commission specified that, as pointed out by the Defendant, this
would require that certain of them are affected by the alleged aid measure in a
way which sets them apart from all other undertakings in the market.
41 Furthermore, the Defendant, the Intervener and the Commission claim that
the Applicant had no particular negotiating role in the proceedings leading to
the Decision. The Defendant argues that the Applicant’s complaints, meetings
and correspondence, or its relationship with the Norwegian Government
cannot constitute sufficient circumstances which distinguish the Applicant
individually from all other persons, and thus confer on it standing to bring
proceedings against a general aid scheme. Reference is made, inter alia,
to Cases T-398/94 Kahn Scheppvaart BV v Commission [1996] ECR II477, at paragraph 42; T-41/01 Rafael Pérez Escolar v Commission [2003]
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JUDGMENT
40 The Defendant, the Intervener and the Commission are of the opinion that the
Applicant did not provide any factual information with regard to admissibility
in its application, and that even in its reply, the Applicant has not adduced
evidence to fulfil the condition of individual concern.
ECR II-2157, at paragraphs 39–40, and Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und
Eigentum, at paragraphs 53–57.
42 The Applicant submits that under the Court’s case law, the action should be
admissible in its entirety. It argues that the Court has not examined whether
the individual members of the association would be more concerned than
any other competitor, that it has held admissible pleas both in relation to
an alleged failure to open the formal investigation procedure as well as to
challenging the contested decision on the merits, and that the high number
of members of the association did not keep the Court away from finding them
individually concerned by the decision at issue. Reference is made to Cases
E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1994–1995]
EFTA Court Report 59, at paragraphs 20–23; E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’
Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1998] EFTA Court Report 38,
“Husbanken I”, at paragraphs 30–35, and Fesil and Finnfjord, at paragraphs
58–60. Further reference is made to Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [2005]
ECR I-3657, at paragraph 53.
43 The Applicant contends that it represents the overwhelming part of the private
kindergarten sector in Norway, that it was at the origin of the complaint and
was active in the procedure leading to the contested decision and that the
core of the complaint is the distortion of competition to the detriment of the
private kindergartens which its members are exposed to on a daily basis and
which, according to the Applicant, in some cases threatens their economic
survival.
44 Furthermore, the Applicant claims to be the established caretaker of the interests
of private kindergartens in Norway vis-à-vis the Norwegian Government, and
that assisting its members by dealing with the financing system and doing
away with the distortion of competition is at the forefront of the Applicant’s
work.
Findings of the Court
45 With its second, third and fourth plea, the Applicant requests the Court to
review the contested decision on the merits.
46 Under Article 36(2) SCA, a natural or legal person may institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to another person only if the decision in question
is of direct and individual concern to the former. Since the contested decision
was addressed to the Kingdom of Norway, it must be considered whether it is
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47 In this respect, the Court notes that although it is not required by Article 3(1)
SCA to follow the reasoning of the ECJ and the CFI when interpreting the
main part of that Agreement, the reasoning which led those Courts to their
interpretations of expressions in Community law is relevant when those
expressions are identical in substance to those which fall to be interpreted by
the Court. This principle must also apply to the issue of locus standi to bring
an action for annulment (see Scottish Salmon Growers, at paragraphs 11 and
13, and Case E-2/02 Bellona [2003] EFTA Court Report 236, at paragraphs
39–40).
48 Article 230(4) EC corresponds in substance to Article 36(2) SCA. As the Court
held in Bellona, at paragraph 42, persons other than the addressees of a
decision cannot, according to the case law of the ECJ, claim to be individually
concerned, unless they are affected by that decision by reason of certain
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which
they are differentiated from all other persons and, by virtue of these factors, are
distinguished individually just as in the case of the person to whom a decision
is addressed (compare Plaumann; Case 169/84 Cofaz v Commission [1986]
ECR 391, at paragraph 22, and Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, at
paragraph 33).
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of individual and direct concern to the Applicant within the meaning of Article
36(2) SCA.
50 Accordingly, an applicant such as PBL must demonstrate that the position
on the market of at least some of its members is substantially affected. As
regards establishing such an effect, the ECJ has clarified that the mere fact
that a measure such as the contested decision may exercise an influence
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JUDGMENT
49 In the field of State aid, applicants who challenge the merits of a decision
appraising aid taken on the basis of Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the
SCA or at the end of the formal investigation procedure are, according to the
case law of the Court and of the ECJ, considered to be individually concerned
by that decision if their market position or, in the case of an association of
undertakings, the market position of its members, is substantially affected
by the aid to which the contested decision relates (see Aktionsgemeinschaft
Recht und Eigentum, at paragraphs 37 and 70; Case C-260/05 P Sniace v
Commission, judgment of 22 November 2007, not yet reported, at paragraph
54, and Case 525/04 P Lenzing v Commission, judgment of 22 November
2007, not yet reported, at paragraph 31).
on the competitive relationships existing on the relevant market and that the
undertaking concerned was in a competitive relationship with the addressee of
that measure cannot in any event suffice for that undertaking to be regarded as
individually concerned by that measure. Therefore, an undertaking cannot rely
solely on its status as a competitor of the undertaking in receipt of aid but must
additionally show that its circumstances distinguish it in a similar way to the
undertaking in receipt of the aid (for comparison, see Lenzing, at paragraphs
32–39, and Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, at paragraph 72).
51 In the case at hand, it has not been demonstrated that any of the Applicant’s
members are affected in this sense. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
Applicant does not have locus standi on behalf of its members.
52 Neither can the Applicant be considered to have locus standi by reason of its own
position. In this respect, the Court notes that the Applicant cannot be regarded
as a negotiator of the same kind as, for instance, the Landbouwschap in Joined
Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy and Others v Commission [1988]
ECR 219 or the International Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Committee (CIRFS)
in Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125. The
Landbouwschap was a body established under public law to protect the
common interests of agricultural undertakings, taking into account the public
interest, and acting in certain tariff negotiations (Van der Kooy, at paragraphs
3 and 18–23). CIRFS, an association whose membership consisted of the
main international manufacturers of synthetic fibres, had been, in particular,
the Commission’s interlocutor with regard to the introduction, extension and
adaptation of a “discipline” connected with the policy of restructuring that
sector in the EC (CIRFS, at paragraphs 3–5 and 29).
53 It follows from the foregoing that the action is inadmissible insofar as it
challenges the contested decision on substantive grounds.
Failure to initiate the formal investigation procedure – the first plea
54 The Defendant submits that the first plea is inadmissible. It recalls that under
Article 1(3) of Protocol 3 SCA, its obligation to initiate the formal investigation
procedure may arise only if the measure must be regarded, at least from a
preliminary assessment, as new aid. With respect to the procedure for existing
aid, no similar role for “parties concerned” exists, and consequently a decision
with regard to existing aid is not challengeable before the Court. Reference
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55 The Defendant argues that long before the entry into force of the EEA
Agreement, the funding of municipal kindergarten services was based on a
cost coverage model, and that municipal kindergartens have been established
and run by municipalities before and after that date at the expense of the
municipal treasury. To the Defendant, the only change was the introduction to
finance the non-municipal kindergartens in 2003. It is therefore of the opinion
that the decision concerned existing aid.
56 The Defendant concludes that the Court should examine whether the financing
system would, under the assumption that it constitutes aid, constitute new
aid. To the Defendant, this is a logical step in the assessment of admissibility
to verify that the procedural rights of the alleged “party concerned” actually
exist.
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is made to Bellona, at paragraph 46, and to the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities (hereinafter “the CFI”) in Case
T-330/94 Salt Union Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-1475, at paragraphs 33–
38. The Defendant points to the special procedure applicable to existing aid
and submits that it would be illegal to initiate the formal investigation procedure
with regard to existing aid. Reference is made, in particular, to the judgment
of the CFI in Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v
Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, at paragraph 115.
57 The Intervener supports the Defendant’s line of argument and claims that the
system for the municipalities’ financing of their municipal kindergartens has
remained completely unchanged.
59 According to the Applicant, the relevant test has been to examine firstly, on the
question of admissibility, whether the applicant could be an interested party
under a formal investigation procedure, and secondly, on the merits, whether
the assessment of the aid scheme raised serious difficulties of a nature such as
to warrant the opening of a formal investigation procedure. Reference is made
to Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125, at paragraphs 70–73,
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JUDGMENT
58 The Applicant submits that neither the Court nor the Community Courts
have considered the question of whether an aid scheme constitutes new or
existing aid in their case law on admissibility, even in cases relating to existing
aid. Reference is made to Scottish Salmon Growers, at paragraphs 20–23;
Husbanken I, at paragraphs 30–35, and Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission,
at paragraph 53.
85 and 91–96; and Joined Cases T-297/01 and T-298/01 SIC v Commission
[2004] ECR II-743. The Applicant finds that the approach submitted by the
Defendant would require the Court to investigate into the substance of the
case in order to rule on the admissibility. Furthermore, the Applicant considers
the financing system introduced in 2003 prima facie as new aid, since it would
entail inter alia new forms of financing, maximum prices on parental payments
and transfers at an unprecedented scale.
60 The Commission submits that the first plea is admissible if the Applicant is a
“party concerned” under Article 1(2) of Protocol 3 SCA.
61 In cases where ESA finds, on the basis of the preliminary examination only
and without initiating the formal investigation procedure under Article 1(2)
in Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, that aid is compatible with the EEA Agreement,
the persons intended to benefit from the procedural guarantees inherent in
the formal investigation procedure may secure compliance therewith only if
they are able to challenge that decision. An action for the annulment brought
under Article 36(2) SCA by one of the parties concerned should therefore be
declared admissible (see Case E-9/04 The Bankers’ and Securities Dealers’
Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2006] EFTA Court Report
54, at paragraph 51; Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, at paragraph
35, and Case T-254/05 Fachvereinigung Mineralfaserindustrie v Commission,
judgment of 20 September 2007, not yet reported, at paragraphs 32–33).
62 The “parties concerned” within the meaning of Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol
3 SCA who are thus entitled to institute proceedings for annulment are those
persons, undertakings or associations whose interests might be affected by the
grant of the aid, in particular competing undertakings and trade associations
(compare Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, at paragraph 36, and
Fachvereinigung Mineralfaserindustrie, at paragraph 34).
63 The Applicant is an association of undertakings running kindergartens as
an economic activity and finding themselves in competition with municipal
kindergartens. It must therefore be considered a ‘party concerned’ within the
meaning of Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. Since the Applicant, by
means of the present action, is seeking to safeguard its procedural rights, the
Court finds that the application is admissible with respect to the plea that the
Defendant failed to initiate the formal investigation procedure.
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65 The Applicant submits that the Defendant should have entertained serious
doubts with regard to the question of whether municipal kindergartens are
undertakings under Article 61(1) EEA, leading it to open a formal investigation
procedure. It further argues that the findings are borne out of an insufficient
examination that translates into an absence of appropriate reasoning.
66 The Applicant points out that the Defendant erred when it concluded that the
municipalities, when providing kindergarten services, are acting as a public
authority. It purports that the Defendant should have distinguished between
the municipality’s roles as an authority and as an operator. Some of the duties
referred to by the Defendant apply to any operator of a kindergarten, whilst
the duties the municipalities have in their role as kindergarten authority do not
require them to actually operate any kindergarten themselves. It is argued that
under the relevant case law, an entity’s exercise of regulatory functions does
not impede a finding that the entity is engaged in economic activity. Reference
is made to Case C-69/91 Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335, at paragraph 15,
and the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002]
ECR I-691.
67 The Applicant is of the view that the judgments of the ECJ in Cases 263/86
Humbel [1988] ECR 5365 and C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447 are not
relevant for the decision of the case at hand. It argues that these cases
dealt with the rights of the receiver of educational services under the rules
on the freedom to provide services, whereas in the present case the status
of the service provider has to be assessed under the competition rules. The
Applicant submits that under the competition rules, an activity may in principle
either qualify as public regulatory power or as economic activity. It is only with
regard to certain compulsory social security schemes that the ECJ has made
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VI The first plea – failure to initiate the formal investigation
procedure
JUDGMENT
64 The Court adds that the question of whether aid is new or existing cannot be
decisive for an applicant’s locus standi to safeguard its procedural rights. Where
appropriate, the Court would have to assess this question in deciding whether
to uphold a plea that ESA failed to initiate the formal investigation procedure
(see e.g. E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance
Authority [1999] EFTA Court Report 2, “Husbanken II”, at paragraphs 31–36).
exceptions to this basic test. In these cases, the ECJ referred in particular
to compulsory affiliation with those schemes, and to compulsory payments,
as essential for application of the principle of solidarity. Reference is made
to Cisal and Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993]
ECR I-637.
68 The Applicant submits that elements such as an entity’s public-law status,
its non-profit character and its pursuit of social objectives cannot be taken
into account when assessing whether it pursues an economic activity. To the
Applicant, the only relevant question is whether the municipalities are providing
services on a given market which could, at least in principle, be carried out by
private actors in order to make a profit. Reference is made, inter alia, to Cases
C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, at paragraph 21 et seq.; C-82/01
P Aéroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297; C-67/96 Albany
[1999] ECR I-5751, at paragraphs 77–86, and E-8/00 Landsorganisasjonen i
Norge v Kommunenes Sentralforbund and Others [2002] EFTA Court Report
114, at paragraphs 62–67. The Applicant argues that childcare services have
traditionally been provided by private actors, that the Norwegian State never
attempted to establish an entirely public system and that notwithstanding
the limitations to price competition introduced by the reform of 2003, there is
competition amongst the providers of the service.
69 The Defendant, supported by the Intervener, maintains that the municipal
kindergartens in Norway are not undertakings within the meaning of Article
61(1) EEA and argues that only services provided for remuneration are to be
considered as ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty, and that courses
provided by a national education system do not qualify as a service. To the
Defendant, the existence of parental fees does not change the finding that
kindergartens in Norway are essentially financed by the public purse. Such a
fee is just a contribution, not the consideration for a service. This is fostered
by the facts that the fees are disconnected from the actual costs, as they do
not increase for children with special needs and that fee reductions for social
reasons exist. Reference is made to Humbel, at paragraphs 18–19, and Wirth,
at paragraphs 16–19.
70 The Defendant and the Intervener argue that the Norwegian State and the
Norwegian municipalities have no commercial or other economic interest in
attracting as many children as possible to municipal kindergartens, as they
spend money every time they accept a child. Furthermore, they would have
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71 Relying on the findings of the ECJ in Wirth, at paragraphs 16–19, the Defendant
submits that the assessment of an activity of a public educational institution,
which is not a service if viewed in isolation, cannot be changed by the fact that
a similar activity is performed by other entities as an economic activity.
72 To the Commission, the central question in the present case is whether the
municipalities, when providing kindergarten places for their constituency, are
engaged in an economic activity by offering services on a market, or whether
their activity is non-economic in nature. The Commission notes that the ECJ
has not yet decided whether, and to which extent, establishments in the field of
education can be seen as “undertakings” within the meaning of the competition
provisions of the EC Treaty. However, the ECJ held in Humbel and in Wirth
that courses offered by educational institutions under the national education
system do not constitute services within the meaning of the Treaty provisions
on free movement of services.
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no economic interest in making the parents choose a municipal kindergarten
instead of a private one. It is pointed out that the municipalities are fulfilling
their duties towards their inhabitants in the social, cultural and education fields
when offering kindergartens to their inhabitants.
73 The Commission submits that although providing kindergarten services could
constitute an economic activity, this is not the case in the specific framework in
place in Norway. The decisive factors are in the Commission’s view the strong
public nature of the system, the absence of any potential price competition, the
duty of the municipalities to make available a sufficient number of kindergarten
places, the fact that it is not possible to charge cost-covering fees, the
objective of providing sufficient kindergarten places irrespective of costs, and
the strong element of solidarity which is thereby introduced into the system.
The Commission takes the view that by establishing and maintaining such
a system, the Norwegian State is not seeking to engage in a gainful activity,
but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and
education fields.
74 When reviewing new aid, the preliminary examination provided for under Article
1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 SCA is intended merely to allow ESA to form a prima
facie opinion on the partial or complete compatibility of the aid in question with
the EEA State aid provisions. This examination must be distinguished from the
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JUDGMENT
investigation under Article 1(2) in Part I of the Protocol – the formal investigation
procedure – which is designed to enable ESA to become fully informed of all
the facts of the case and to protect the rights of parties concerned by allowing
them to make their views known. The preliminary examination does not include
any obligation to give the parties concerned notice to submit their comments.
In a formal investigation procedure, consultation is carried out by means of the
decision to initiate a formal investigation being publicised in the Official Journal
of the European Union. This decision shall call upon the parties concerned to
submit their comments.
75 It is against this background that the requirement under Article 4(4) in Part II
of Protocol 3 SCA to initiate a formal investigation procedure when “doubts
are raised as to the compatibility with the functioning of the EEA Agreement”,
must be read. Therefore, when taking a decision in favour of an aid, ESA may
restrict itself to the preliminary examination provided for under Article 1(3) in
Part I of Protocol 3 SCA only if it is in a position to reach the firm view, following
the initial investigation, that the measure cannot be classified as aid within the
meaning of Article 61(1) EEA or that the measure, whilst constituting aid, is
compatible with EEA rules. If the initial analysis should have led ESA to the
opposite conclusion, ESA is under an obligation to carry out all the requisite
consultations and to that end to initiate the formal investigation procedure
pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 SCA.
76 The notion of “doubts” in Article 4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 SCA is an objective
one. Whether or not doubts exist with regard to the facts, points of law or
economic or social assessments requires investigation of both the content of
the contested aid scheme and the circumstances under which it was adopted
or operated. The investigation must be conducted objectively, comparing the
grounds of the decision with the information available to ESA when it took the
decision on the compatibility of the disputed aid with the EEA Agreement. It
follows that judicial review by the Court of the existence of “doubts” under Article
4(4) in Part II of Protocol 3 SCA will, by nature, go beyond simple consideration
of whether or not there has been a manifest error of assessment by ESA in not
initiating a formal investigation procedure (see, to that effect, Case E-9/04 The
Bankers’ and Securities’ Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance
Authority [2006] EFTA Court Report 54, at paragraph 64).
77 As stated above at paragraph 27, the contested decision is based on
three separate grounds, namely first, that municipal kindergartens are not
- 82 -
78 Under EEA competition rules, the concept of an undertaking encompasses
every entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the
entity and the way in which it is financed (see Article 1 of Protocol 22 to the
EEA Agreement and Landsorganisasjonen, at paragraph 62).
79 The Applicant claims that an activity which could, at least in principle, be carried
out by a private operator, is economic in nature. It points out that kindergartens
in Norway have not always been, and are not necessarily operated by public
entities. In fact, the Applicant is an association of undertakings running
kindergartens as an economic activity.
80 When the nature of an activity carried out by a public entity is assessed with
regard to the State aid rules, it cannot matter whether the activity might, in
principle, be pursued by a private operator. Such an interpretation would
basically bring any activity of the State not consisting in an exercise of public
authority under the notion of economic activity. It follows that the specific
circumstances under which the activity is performed have to be taken into
account in order to assess whether the Norwegian municipalities, when
offering their kindergarten places, are providing a service as an economic
activity or whether they are exercising their powers in order to fulfil their
duties towards their population. In this respect, the reasoning of the ECJ in
Humbel, which concerned the notion of “service” within the meaning of the
fundamental freedoms, can be transposed to a State aid case such as the one
at hand.
81 According to the first paragraph of Article 37 EEA, only services normally
provided for remuneration are to be considered as services within the meaning
of the EEA Agreement. For the purposes of that provision, the essential
characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration
for the service rendered (see for comparison, Humbel, at paragraph 17, and
Case 76/05 Schwarz, judgment of 11 September 2007, not yet reported, at
paragraph 38).
- 83 -
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Doubts as to whether the municipal kindergartens constitute undertakings
JUDGMENT
undertakings in the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, that the measure does not
affect trade between Member States, and that even if the measure would be
considered State aid, the contested measure would be justified on the grounds
of Article 59(2) EEA. Accordingly, if the Defendant did not need to entertain
doubts on one of these grounds, the present action will be unfounded.
82 It has been established in the contested decision that about 80% of the costs
of municipal kindergartens are borne by the public purse, and that there is
no connection between the actual costs of the service provided and the fee
paid by the parents whose child is attending the kindergarten. The Defendant
also took into account that the municipalities have a statutory duty to ensure
that sufficient places for children below compulsory school age exist for their
population, and that kindergartens in Norway have important social, cultural,
educational and pedagogical purposes.
83 It follows from the foregoing that the element of remuneration is absent in
the activity of municipal kindergartens in Norway. The parents’ fee which
constitutes only a fraction of the true costs of the service cannot be qualified as
a quid pro quo vis-à-vis the municipal kindergartens, but only as a contribution
to a system which is predominantly funded by the public purse. It is therefore
clear that the Norwegian State, when establishing and maintaining a system
where every child increases the costs incurred, is not seeking to engage in
gainful activity but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social,
cultural and educational fields.
84 Accordingly, the Defendant did not need to entertain doubts as to whether the
municipal kindergartens might constitute undertakings within the meaning of
Article 61(1) EEA. As this finding of the Defendant was sufficient to exclude
the existence of State aid in the measure at stake, the question of whether
the Defendant should have entertained doubts with regard to the other
points raised in the application cannot be material for the outcome of this
case. Therefore, the plea that the Defendant had failed to open the formal
investigation procedure must be rejected.
85 As the Court found all pleas of law brought forward by the Applicant either
inadmissible or unfounded, the application must be dismissed.
VII Costs
86 Under Article 66(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to
be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful
party’s pleadings. Since the Defendant has requested that the Applicant be
ordered to pay the costs and the latter has been unsuccessful, it must be
ordered to pay the costs. The costs incurred by the Republic of Iceland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the Commission of the European Communities are
not recoverable.
- 84 -
THE COURT
hereby:
1. Dismisses the application.
2. Orders the Applicant to pay the costs incurred by the Defendant.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Bjørg Ven
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 February 2008.
Carl Baudenbacher
Acting Registrar
President
JUDGMENT
Moritz Am Ende
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
On those grounds,
- 85 -
in Case E-5/071
APPLICATION to the Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 36 of the
Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority
and a Court of Justice in the case between
and
supported by the Kingdom of Norway, as intervener,
seeking the annulment of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s Decision No 39/07/COL of
27 February 2007.
I
Introduction
1. The case concerns the Decision by the EFTA Surveillance Authority of 27
February 2007, in which it declared that the system of financing municipal
day care institutions in Norway (hereinafter “the financing system”) does not
constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement
(hereinafter “the Decision”).
2. Kindergartens (barnehager) for children under compulsory school age (i.e.
between 0 and 6 years) have been available in Norway for decades. Public
kindergartens are run either by the municipalities (hereinafter “municipal
kindergartens”) or, to a very limited extent, by public institutions (e.g. hospitals).
Private kindergartens are run by companies or organisations or as family day
care institutions (hereinafter “private kindergartens”). Out of 235 000 children
enrolled at kindergartens, 108 000 children attend private kindergartens,
whereof 80 000 are enrolled at kindergartens represented by the Applicant,
Private Barnehagers Landsforbund.2
3. The application from Private Barnehagers Landsforbund (hereinafter “the
Applicant” or “PBL”) is based on four pleas in law: that the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (hereinafter “the Defendant” or “ESA”) failed to open formal
investigation proceedings; interpreted and applied wrongfully Article 61(1)
of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter “EEA”);
1
Revised in paragraphs 57, 97, 107, 110 and 112.
According to the data furnished in the Application, paragraph 3, without an indication of the year to which the numbers apply.
According to the Decision, 45% of children attending kindergartens were enrolled at non-municipal kindergartens in 2005.
2
- 86 -
Factual and legal background
EEA law
4.
Article 59(2) EEA reads:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Agreement, in particular to the rules on
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be
contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.
5.
Article 61(1) EEA reads:
Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member
States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings
or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between
Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.
6.
Article 1 of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA reads:
1. The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall, in cooperation with the EFTA States,
keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall
propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the progressive
development or by the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments,
the EFTA Surveillance Authority finds that aid granted by an EFTA State or
through EFTA State resources is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA
Agreement having regard to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, or that such aid
is being misused, it shall decide that the EFTA State concerned shall abolish
or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Authority.
[…]
- 87 -
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
II
interpreted and applied wrongfully Article 59(2) EEA; and violated Article 16 of
the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance
Authority and a Court of Justice (hereinafter “SCA”) and the principles of good
administration, in particular the obligation to conduct an impartial and diligent
examination of the case.
3. The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time
to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it
considers that any such plan is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA
Agreement having regard to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, it shall without
delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The State concerned
shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted
in a final decision.
7.
Under Section I of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA General, Article 1 Definitions
reads:
[…]
(c)‘new aid’ shall mean all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid,
which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;
[…]
8.
Under Section II of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA Procedure regarding notified aid,
Article 4 Preliminary examination of the notification and decisions of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority reads:
[…]
finds that the notified measure does not constitute aid, it shall record that
finding by way of a decision.
finds that no doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the functioning of
the EEA Agreement of a notified measure, in so far as it falls within the scope
of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, it shall decide that the measure is
compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as a ‘decision not to raise objections’). The decision shall specify which
exception under the EEA Agreement has been applied.
finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the functioning of the
EEA Agreement of a notified measure, it shall decide to initiate proceedings
pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I (hereinafter referred to as a ‘decision to initiate
the formal investigation procedure’).
9.
Under Section III of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA Procedures regarding unlawful
aid, Article 13(1) Decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority reads:
- 88 -
The examination of possible unlawful aid shall result in a decision pursuant
to Article 4(2), (3) or (4) of this Chapter. In the case of decisions to initiate the
formal investigation procedure, proceedings shall be closed by means of a
decision pursuant to Article 7 of this Chapter. If an EFTA State fails to comply
with an information injunction, that decision shall be taken on the basis of the
information available.
10. Under Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA Procedure regarding existing aid
schemes, Article 18 Proposal for appropriate measures reads:
Where the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in the light of the information submitted
by the EFTA State pursuant to Article 17 of this Chapter, concludes that the
existing aid scheme is not, or is no longer, compatible with the functioning of
the EEA Agreement, it shall issue a recommendation proposing appropriate
measures to the EFTA State concerned. The recommendation may propose,
in particular:
(a)substantive amendment of the aid scheme,
or
(b)introduction of procedural requirements,
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
or
(c)abolition of the aid scheme.
1. Where the EFTA State concerned accepts the proposed measures
and informs the EFTA Surveillance Authority thereof, the EFTA Surveillance
Authority shall record that finding and inform the EFTA State thereof. The
EFTA State shall be bound by its acceptance to implement the appropriate
measures.
2. Where the EFTA State concerned does not accept the proposed measures
and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, having taken into account the arguments
of the EFTA State concerned, still considers that those measures are necessary,
it shall initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 4(4) of this Chapter. Articles 6, 7
and 9 of this Chapter shall apply mutatis mutandis.
12. Article 16 SCA reads:
Decisions of the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall state the reasons on which
they are based.
- 89 -
11. Under Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA Procedure regarding existing
aid schemes, Article 19 Legal consequences of a proposal for appropriate
measures reads:
13. Article 36(2) SCA reads:
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute
proceedings before the EFTA Court against a decision of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority addressed to that person or against a decision addressed to another
person, if it is of direct and individual concern to the former.
National law
14. According to Section 1 of Act No 64 of 17 June 2005 on Day Care Institutions
(“the Kindergarten Act”), a kindergarten shall give children under compulsory
school age good possibilities for development and activities. It must also, unless
otherwise decided, assist in giving the child an upbringing in accordance with
the basic values of Christianity.
15. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Kindergarten Act, a kindergarten shall be a
pedagogic undertaking that should support parents in their roles of bringing
up and taking care of the children, thereby creating a good foundation for
the development of the child, lifelong learning and active participation in a
democratic society. It shall also promote human dignity, provide the child with
basic knowledge of central and topical subjects and support his/her curiosity,
creativity and quest for knowledge.
16. Section 8 of the Kindergarten Act establishes that the municipality is the
local kindergarten authority, charged with the supervision of kindergartens’
compliance with the applicable rules. Section 8, second paragraph, maintains
that the municipality shall see to that there is a sufficient number of kindergarten
places.
17. Section 14 of the Kindergarten Act reads:
Approved day care centres shall be given equivalent treatment as regards
public contributions. The King may adopt regulations with further provisions on
what is meant by equivalent treatment.3
18. The Regulation No 539 of 19 March 2004 (hereinafter “the Regulation”) relating
to equivalent treatment of child care institutions in relation to public subsidies,
as amended in 2005, provides the applicable rules on the public financing
of the kindergarten sector. Articles 1 and 2 of the Regulation establish the
principle of equivalent treatment, independent of ownership, as subjected to
the principles laid down in the Regulation.
3
As translated by ESA.
- 90 -
The municipality is the authority responsible for ensuring that all approved
kindergartens in the municipality receive public subsidies in an overall equal
manner.
The municipality shall pay the costs5 of ordinary operation of kindergartens
which are not paid by other public subsidies and parental contributions. If
parental contributions in non-municipal kindergartens are lower than parental
contributions in the municipality’s own kindergartens, the municipal is not liable
to pay the difference.
The municipality is under an obligation to grant subsidies such that the overall
public subsidies amount to at least 85% of what equivalent kindergartens
owned by the municipalities on average receive in public subsidies.6
The municipality is not obliged to pay subsidies such that the overall public
financing of the kindergartens exceeds public subsidies received on average
by an equivalent kindergarten owned by the municipality.
The municipality is not obliged to pay the cost increases which exceed normal
price and cost increases for the municipal sector.
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
19. Section 3 of the Regulation Responsibility of the municipalities reads:4
The municipality may reduce the subsidies allowed by it if the kindergarten
carries substantial lower staffing or salary costs per man-labour year than that
regarded as normal for an equivalent municipal kindergarten and the owner of
the kindergarten sets up a budget with unreasonable profit or salary for own or
close family’s work in the kindergarten.
By unreasonable profit and salary is meant that the normal compensation for
work and capital input in the kindergarten is exceeded.8
The reduction in the municipal subsidies shall be proportionate to the cost
savings the kindergarten has, cf. paragraph one.
21. According to the explanatory remarks accompanying the Regulation, the
municipalities have under Section 3, second and the fourth paragraphs, the
choice between establishing the subsidy either in accordance with the cost
coverage principle (second paragraph) or as an equal nominal subsidy amount
As translated by PBL.
A “reasonable profit” may be part of the “costs” in the meaning of this regulation.
6
Paragraph 3 was introduced in 2005 and took effect on 1 August 2005.
7
As translated by PBL.
8
Guidelines from the Ministry for Research and Education specify that a profit of 10% can be seen as reasonable (Rundskriv
F-07/2007).
4
5
- 91 -
20. Section 4 of the Regulation Reduction of municipal subsidies reads:7
based on unit costs (fourth paragraph). The choice must be the same for all
non-municipal kindergartens in the municipality.
Financing of kindergartens and the reform of 2003
22. Since the start of funding of the kindergarten sector by the state in 1963, there
have been three sources of finance for kindergartens in Norway: the State,
the municipalities and the parents. Activity-based State subsidies are granted
equally to the municipalities and to private kindergartens. The scale of these
grants is set by Parliament annually, with a present target of on average 50%
coverage of the operational costs of day care centres. With regard to parental
fees, there were no limitations on municipal and private kindergartens before
2003. Furthermore, some municipalities granted additional aids to private
kindergartens on a voluntary basis.
23. Municipal kindergartens in general have been and are still organised like other
municipal activities. As such, the financing of the municipal kindergartens is a
part of the general budget of the municipality. It is subject to the general rules
of public budgeting, i.e. that the municipal budget has to be complete, meaning
that all expected costs connected with an activity have to be budgeted in full.
24. The reform of 2003 originates from a political agreement between political
parties in June 2002, the so-called “Kindergarten Agreement”. The political goal
was to ensure equal treatment for private and public kindergartens, affordable
prices for parents and full coverage of high quality kindergarten places for all
children whose parents so wish. From the outset, it was recognised that a
system where the majority of the costs should be borne by the central State
budget had to take into account the important cost deviations with regard to
kindergartens amongst the different municipalities. Later in the legislative
procedure, it became clear that the municipalities had much higher costs
than the private kindergartens. Therefore, the purpose of the legislation was
adjusted insofar that the aim to provide equal treatment became the aim to
provide equivalent treatment for municipal and private kindergartens.
25. The major change was the introduction of a maximum price ceiling on parental
fees, to obtain the goal of capping parents’ fees at 20% of the costs of the
services. As of 1 January 2006, the applicable rate was fixed at NOK 2 250 per
month with an intention of reducing it to approximately NOK 1 800.9 The second
9
According to Section 4 of the Kindergarten Act, this limit may be increased with the consent of the parents’ council (the parents’
council consists of the parents of all the children in the kindergarten).
- 92 -
main change was the new obligation of the municipalities to cover operational
costs of non-municipal kindergartens, as established by the Regulation.
26. In order to compensate for the new obligations of the municipalities (i.e. the
loss of revenue of both municipal and non-municipal kindergartens through the
introduction of the price ceiling which had to be covered by the municipalities),
so-called “discretionary funds” were introduced. These earmarked subsidies
are paid to the municipalities from the State budget and may be used to
compensate for the loss of revenue of existing kindergartens (non-municipal
or municipal) or for running costs of new kindergarten places. The system
came into effect on 1 May 2004 and for the year 2004, NOK 485 million was
allocated in the State budget to this regard.
27. Figures furnished by the Norwegian Government in its statement of intervention
show that the annual contributions to the kindergarten sector from the State
budget were relatively stable from 1997 to 2002 at approximately NOK 6 billion
(at 2007 rates) and have increased ever since until they reached NOK 18
billion in 2007. The annual contributions by the municipalities to the sector
remained mostly unchanged from 2002 to 2006 at a rate of NOK 3.35 billion
on average. All in all, the Norwegian State now pays around 80% of the total
costs of kindergarten places.
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
29. Since 2003, the general price increase in the municipal sector has been the
following: 3.25% in 2004, 3.4% in 2005 and 2.8% in 2006. The average cost per
child per hour in the municipal kindergartens rose by 4.08% in 2004, 0.97% in
2005 and 5.9% in 2006. The corresponding costs of the private kindergartens
were on average at 84.1% in 2004 and 86.7% in 2005, after having risen by
3.01% in 2004 and 3.97% in 2005, when the new third paragraph of Section 3
of the Regulation was introduced.10
10
In 2003, cost increases were: general municipal costs: 3.7%, municipal kindergartens: 0%, non-municipal kindergartens: 5.64%.
- 93 -
28. In 2003, the costs per child per hour of the private kindergartens were on
average at 85% of the costs of the municipal kindergartens. 28% of the
private kindergartens incurred an operating loss and had to cover their costs
by consuming their equity capital. The average profit of private kindergartens
amounted to approximately 1.4%.
III Procedure
Pre-litigation procedure
30. In August 2004, PBL contacted ESA with a view to filing a complaint considering
public subsidising of municipal kindergartens in Norway. Some informal
exchanges of views between ESA and PBL took place in the course of 2004,
inter alia in a meeting on 16 September 2004.
31. By letter dated 23 February 2005, PBL submitted a formal complaint alleging
that the system for public contributions to the operation of municipally owned
day care centres contained elements of State aid.
32. By e-mail dated 25 April 2005 and by letters dated 17 January 2006, 4 May
2006 and 6 June 2006, PBL submitted further information on the case.
Representatives of ESA held meetings with PBL on 5 April 2005 and 16
February 2006.
33. By letter dated 13 July 2006, ESA requested clarifications from the Norwegian
authorities. The Norwegian Government replied to the request by letter dated
25 September 2006, forwarded by the Norwegian Mission to the European
Union by letter dated 29 September 2006.
34. By letters dated 2 October 2006 and 11 October 2006, PBL provided further
comments to ESA.
35. On 13 December 2006, ESA officials held a meeting with PBL, which formally
called upon ESA to act under Article 37 SCA.
36. By letter dated 5 January 2007, PBL supplied further information to ESA. On
26 January 2007, ESA officials held a further meeting with PBL. By e-mail
dated 9 February 2007, PBL informed ESA that it maintained its complaint and
submitted further information by fax dated 12 February 2007.
37. On 27 February 2007, ESA adopted Decision 39/07/COL addressed to the
Kingdom of Norway, and notified the Decision to PBL by a letter dated the
same day.
38. The operative part of the Decision reads as follows:
The EFTA Surveillance Authority concludes that the system of financing day
care institutions in Norway does not constitute State aid within the meaning of
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
- 94 -
40. By application registered at the EFTA Court on 5 April 2007, Private Barnehagers
Landsforbund requested the EFTA Court to annul the contested Decision.
IV Forms of order sought by the parties
41. The Applicant claims that the Court should:
(i) Annul Decision No. 39/07/COL, of 27 February 2007, of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority; and
(ii) Order the EFTA Surveillance Authority to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
39. ESA based its conclusion on three separate grounds: first, that municipal
kindergartens are not undertakings in the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA; second,
that the measure does not affect trade between Member States as required
by Article 61(1) EEA; and third, that even if the measure would be considered
State aid, the activity concerned constitutes a service of general economic
interest, and the contested measure an appropriate and not manifestly
discriminatory compensation thereof, the measure thus being justified on the
grounds of Article 59(2) EEA.
42. The Defendant claims that the Court should:
(i) Dismiss the Application as inadmissible; in the alternative
(ii) Dismiss the Application as unfounded; and
(iii)Order the Applicant to pay the costs.
43. The Kingdom of Norway, as intervener, contends that the Court should:
(i) Dismiss the Application as inadmissible; in the alternative,
(ii) Dismiss the Application as unfounded; and
(ii) Order the Applicant to pay the costs.
V Written procedure
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority represented by Niels Fenger, Director, and
Bjørnar Alterskjær, Senior Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs,
acting as agents,
– Private Barnehagers Landsforbund, represented by advokat Peter Dyrberg
and advokat Ingvald Falch, with the law firm of Schjødt.
- 95 -
44. Pleadings have been received from the parties:
45. Pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute of the EFTA Court, a statement in
intervention has been received from:
– the Government of Norway, represented by Thomas G. Naalsund, advocate,
Office of the Attorney General (Civil Affairs) and Siri Veseth, legal adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as agents.
46. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the EFTA Court, written observations
have been received from:
– the Republic of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First
Secretary and Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting as agent,
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Christophe
Giolito and Bernd Martenczuk, members of its Legal Service, acting as
agents.
VI Admissibility
47. In its application, the Applicant simply states that the action is admissible.11
The Defendant however, followed by the Government of Norway and the
Government of Iceland, raises the objection of inadmissibility with regard to
the different pleas of the application for two different reasons: according to the
Defendant, the first plea – the failure to open formal investigation proceedings
– is inadmissible as the financing system would even under the assumption
of being State aid constitute not new, but existing aid. With regard to the
second, third and fourth plea, the Defendant maintains that the Applicant is not
individually concerned by the Decision. The European Commission considers
the action to be inadmissible to the extent that the Applicant challenges the
Decision on substantive grounds.
The first plea – failure to open formal investigations
48. The Defendant recalls that under Article 1(3) of Protocol 3 SCA, its obligation
to open formal investigation proceedings may arise only if the measure is to
be regarded, at least from a preliminary assessment, as new aid. This is so
because only then may a person enjoy the procedural rights under Article 1(2)
of Protocol 3 SCA, and therefore ask for the annulment of the decision not to
open formal investigation proceedings in order to safeguard her procedural
11
Reference is made to Case E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers v EFTA Surveillance Authority, [1994–1995] EFTA Court Report 59,
at paragraph 20-23; Case E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1998] EFTA Court Report
38, at paragraphs 14–27; Joined Cases E-5 to E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord and others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA
Court Report 117, at paragraphs 55–60; and Case E-9/04 The Bankers’ and Securities’ Dealers Association of Iceland v EFTA
Surveillance Authority [2006] EFTA Court Report 42, at paragraphs 51–53.
- 96 -
49. The Defendant expresses the view that the financing system, even if it were
considered State aid, has to be assessed as existing aid. The Defendant points
out that long before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, the funding of
municipal kindergarten services was based on a cost coverage model, and
that municipal kindergartens have been established and run by municipalities
before and after that date at the expense of the municipal treasury. To the
Defendant, the only change was the introduction to finance the non-municipal
kindergartens in 2003. However, this cannot lead to a classification of the
unchanged, separate system for the municipal kindergartens as new aid.14
50. The Defendant therefore submits that the Court should examine whether the
financing system would, under the assumption that it constitutes aid, constitute
new aid. It is submitted that the Court should deny this and, accordingly, declare
the Application inadmissible in its totality.
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
rights.12 With regard to the procedure for existing aid, no similar role for “parties
concerned” exists, and consequently a decision with regard to existing aid is
not challengeable before the Court.13
52. In its reply to the Defendant, the Applicant points out that the Court has not
considered the question of whether an aid scheme constitutes new or existing
aid in its case law, even in cases related to existing aid.15 Reference is
also made to similar case law of the Community Courts.16 Furthermore, the
Applicant considers the financing system introduced in 2003 prima facie as
new aid, as it entails inter alia new forms of financing, maximum prices on
parental payments and transfers at an unprecedented scale.
Reference is made to Case E-2/02 Technologien Bau- und Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH and Bellona Foundation v EFTA
Surveillance Authority [2003] EFTA Court Report 52, at paragraph 46.
13
Reference is made to Case T-330/94 Salt Union Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-1475, at paragraphs 33–38.
14
Reference is made to Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, at
paragraphs 111–115.
15
Reference is made to Case E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers v EFTA Surveillance Authority, [1994–1995] EFTA Court Report 59,
at paragraphs 20–23; Case E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1998] EFTA Court Report
38, at paragraphs 30–35 and [1999] EFTA Court Report 2.
16
Reference is made to Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-3657, at paragraph 53; Case T-17/96 TF1 v Commission
[1999] ECR II-1757, at paragraph 31; and Case T-95/96 Gestevision Telecinco SA v Commission [1998] ECR II-3407, at
paragraphs 64–66.
12
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51. The Defendant’s submissions are supported in their entirety by the Government
of Norway and the Government of Iceland. The Government of Norway claims
that the system for the municipalities’ financing of their municipal kindergartens
has remained completely unchanged. The European Commission simply
states that this plea of the Application is admissible if the Applicant is a “party
concerned” under Article 1(2) of Protocol 3 SCA.
53. The Applicant points out that the approach put forward by the Defendant is
different from the approach so far conducted in the case law. According to
the Applicant, the relevant test has been to examine firstly, on the question of
admissibility, whether the applicant could be an interested party under a formal
investigation procedure, and secondly, on the merits, whether the assessment
of the aid scheme raised serious difficulties of a nature such as to warrant
the opening of a formal investigation procedure.17 The Applicant finds that the
approach submitted by the Defendant would require the Court to investigate
deeply into the substance of the case in order to rule on the admissibility.
54. Finally, the Applicant expresses the view that the Defendant’s stand would lead
to a situation where there would be no judicial review open to the Applicant,
a situation which would be at odds with the fundamentals of the EEA legal
order.
55. In its reply to the Government of Norway, the Applicant maintains that the
changes introduced in 2003 were of both qualitative and of quantitative nature
such as to qualify the present financing system as new aid.18 It is noted that
the Defendant did not assess the qualification of the financing system as new
or existing aid in the Decision, and that the question is thus outside the scope
of the present action.
56. In its rejoinder, the Defendant further outlines the differences between the
procedures on new and the procedures on existing aid. It is maintained that
only with respect to new aid do private parties enjoy the procedural rights
conferred to them by Article 1(2) of Protocol 3 SCA,19 whereas it is illegal for
ESA to open the formal investigation procedure with regard to existing aid.20 It
is submitted that the procedure for the review of existing aid is solely between
ESA and the EFTA State concerned. None of the measures taken according to
Article 18 of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA entails any legal effect and hence, they
are not challengeable acts.21 It is only if ESA, after having taken into account
the comments of the EFTA State concerned, still considers that the measures
Reference is made to Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125, at paragraphs 70–73, 85 and 91–96; and Joined
Cases T-297/01 and T-298/01 SIC v Commission [2004] ECR II-743.
Reference is made to Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309; and Case
C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA [1994] ECR I-3829.
19
Reference is made to Case T-395/04 Air One SpA v Commission [2006] ECR II-1343, at paragraphs 30–31.
20
Reference is made to Case C-312/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-4117, at paragraphs 14–17; Case C-47/91 Italy v
Commission [1994] ECR I-4635, at paragraphs 22–25; Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v
Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, at paragraph 115.
21
Reference is made to Case T-330/94 Salt Union Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-1475, at paragraph 36.
17
18
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57. The Defendant maintains that its approach does not confuse the issues
of admissibility and substance, but is a logical step in the assessment of
admissibility to verify that the procedural rights of the alleged “party concerned”
actually exist. To the Defendant, there is no reason to accept standing in
relation to judicial scrutiny of existing aid measures, as this would entail
the possibility of the annulment of the contested decision based on a nonexistent obligation. It adds that the question of whether or not the financing
system would constitute new or existing aid would not go into the substance
of the case, as this assessment would assume that the measure is aid in the
first place, and that it would not be of particular difficulty, as all the relevant
Norwegian rules have been presented to the Court.
58. With regard to the Applicant’s claim that it would be contrary to the fundamental
principles of EEA law if there were no judicial review open to it, the Defendant
submits that the Community Courts have refused standing in several cases,
even though no national remedies were available to the applicants concerned.24
However, the Defendant points out that in the present case, an action relating
to the financing system, brought by one of the Applicant’s members and
supported by the Applicant, has already been heard by the Norwegian courts.
After Tinn og Heddal tingrett (District Court) and Agder lagmansrett (Appellate
Court) declined to ask the EFTA Court for an advisory opinion, the case was
voluntarily withdrawn. Under these circumstances, ESA sees no compelling
policy reason to deviate from generally applicable case law under Article 36
SCA.25
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are necessary that it can initiate the formal investigation procedure.22 In the
opinion of the Defendant, the cases cited by the Applicant rather support its
own view.23
59. The Defendant, supported by the Government of Iceland, submits that for the
Applicant to have locus standi under Article 36(2) SCA for pleas based on
substantive grounds, the Decision must be of direct and individual concern to
the Applicant.
Reference is made to Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, at
paragraph 115.
Reference is made to Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125; and Joined Cases T-297/01 and T-298/01 SIC v
Commission [2004] ECR II-743; and Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-3657, at paragraph 49.
24
Reference is made to Case T-69/96 Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus Aktiengesellschaft and others v Commission [2001] ECR
II-1037, at paragraph 51; Case T-86/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission [1999] ECR II-179,
at paragraph 52; and Case T-212/00 Nuove Industrie Molisane Srl v Commission [2002] ECR II-347, at paragraph 48.
25
Reference is made to Case Salt Union Ltd v Commission [1996] ECR II-1475, at paragraph 39.
22
23
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The second, third and fourth plea – pleas on substantive grounds
60. With reference to the so-called Plaumann test in the case law of the Community
Courts, it is claimed that in the field of State aid, an association of undertakings
can be individually concerned in two different ways: first, if one or more of
its members are in a position to be individually concerned, or second, if it is
able to rely on a particular interest in acting, especially because its negotiating
position is affected by the measure which it seeks to have annulled.26 It is
argued that an association formed for the protection of the collective interests
of a category of persons cannot be considered to be directly and individually
concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that category.27
61. The Defendant claims that none of the Applicant’s members are individually
concerned, and that the Applicant had no particular negotiating role in the
proceedings leading to the Decision. With regard to the latter, reference is
made to case law of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities
(hereinafter “CFI”), whereas the mere fact that the applicant made a complaint
to and had correspondence and meetings with the Commission, cannot
constitute sufficient circumstances which distinguish the Applicant individually
from all other persons, and thus confer on it standing to bring proceedings
against a general aid scheme.28 It is submitted that in order to be individually
concerned with regard to pleas on substantive grounds, it is not enough to
qualify as a “party concerned” under Article 1(2) of Protocol 3 SCA.29
62. The Government of Norway supports the Defendant’s position, and adds that
the financing system must be considered as a scheme of general character
for the purposes of the requirements of locus standi. It is claimed that a mere
reference to the fact that certain of the Applicant’s members may be affected
by that general measure by virtue of their capacity of kindergarten operators
in Norway cannot be sufficient in this respect, as such a wide interpretation
would imply that any (alleged) competitor in a sector where a general measure
Reference is made to Case T-188/95 Waterleiding Maatschappij “Noord-West Brabant” NV v Commission [1998] ECR II3713, at paragraph 54; Case T-117/04 Vereniging Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren and Others
v Commission [2006] ECR II-3861, at paragraph 65; T-95/03 Asociación de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio de la
Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid and Federación Catalana de Estaciones de Servicio v Commission [2006] ECR II-4739,
at paragraphs 42–43; Case 282/85 DEFI v Commission [1993] 2469, at paragraph 16; Case C-6/92 Federmineraria and
others v Commission [1993] ECR II-6357, at paragraphs 17–18; Case T-69/96 Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus Aktiengesellschaft
and others v Commission [2001] ECR II-1037, at paragraph 49; and Case T-55/99 CETM v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, at
paragraph 23.
27
Reference is made to Case T-585/93 Greenpeace v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205, at paragraph 59; Case T-350/03
Wirtschaftskammer Kärnten and best connect Ampere Strompool GmbH v Commission [2006] ECR II-68.
28
Case T-398/94 Kahn Scheppvaart BV v Commission [1996] ECR II-477, at paragraph 42; Case T-41/01 Rafael Pérez Escolar v
Commission [2003] ECR II-2157, at paragraphs 39–40.
29
Reference is made to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737, at paragraph
35–37; Case T-30/03 SID v Commission [2007] ECR II-34, at paragraphs 24–27.
26
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63. To the Government of Norway, the Plaumann test requires that at least one of
the members of the Applicant must be directly and individually concerned for
the Applicant to have locus standi. The Government of Norway further notes
that in House Financing Fund, the EFTA Court did not address whether the
applicant had legal standing to challenge ESA’s decision on the merits.30
64. The European Commission also refers to the Plaumann test, and points out
that where an applicant challenges a decision on the merits, it is not sufficient
for the applicant to be a “party concerned” in the meaning of Article 1(2) of
Protocol 3 SCA. Rather, it is required that the applicant’s market position be
significantly affected by the aid which is the subject of the contested decision.31
The Commission further contends that the European Court of Justice of the
European Communities (hereinafter “ECJ”) appears to impose a stricter test
for establishing an effect on the applicant’s competitive position when the aid
scheme is of a general character.32
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is implemented would be entitled to challenge the legality of the general
scheme.
65. The Commission claims that the Applicant has made no effort in its application
to demonstrate in which way its members are affected by the financing system,
that the system is general in nature, that it affects a large and in principle
unlimited number of undertakings and that under these circumstances, neither
the Applicant nor its members would fulfil the conditions to be individually
concerned under the case law of the European courts.33
Case E-9/04 The Bankers’ and Securities’ Dealers Association of Iceland v the Authority [2006] EFTA Court Report 41, at
paragraph 52.
31
Reference is made to Case T-266/94 Skibsværftsforeningen and others v Commission [1996] ECR II-1399, at paragraph 50;
Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95 (English special edition), Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v
Council [2002] I-6677, at paragraph 36; Case C-198/91 Cook v Commission [1993] ECR I-2487, at paragraph 23; Case C-225/91
Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, at paragraph 17; Case 169/84 Cofaz v Commission [1986] ECR 391, at paragraph 25;
Case T-188/95 Waterleiding Maatschappij “Noord-West Brabant” NV v Commission [1998] ECR II-3713, at paragraph 54.
32
Reference is made to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737
(“Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum”), Conclusions of AG Jacobs, at paragraph 110; Case C-67, 68 and 70/85 van der
Kooy and others v Commission [1988] ECR I-219, at paragraph 15; Case C-41/99 P Sadam Zuccherifici and others v Council
[2001] ECR I-4239, at paragraph 30; Case T-398/94 Kahn Scheppvaart BV v Commission [1996] ECR II-477, at paragraphs
39–41; Case T-86/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission [1999] ECR II-179, at paragraph 45.
33
Reference is made to Case T-213/02 SNF v Commision [2004] ECR II-3047, at paragraph 60.
30
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66. In its reply to the Defendant, the Applicant elaborates on why in its view the
application is admissible under the case law of the EFTA Court. In several
cases, the EFTA Court held applications for actions for annulment to be
admissible where the applicants were associations of undertakings representing
the general interests of their members. In Scottish Salmon Growers, locus
standi had been granted to an association on the grounds that it had been
negotiating with the Commission and with ESA on behalf of the interests of its
members who had been centrally concerned by the outcome of the case.34 In
Husbanken I, it was sufficient for the association whose complaint had been
at the origin of the case to show that the legitimate interests of its members
were affected by the decision, by affecting their position on the market; and
that in this case, where the decision was a decision not to object to State
aid, locus standi could even arise alone from the facts that the association
was, as a representative of its members, at the origin of the complaint, that
it was heard in the procedure and that information was gathered from the
State in question.35 In Fesil and Finnfjord, the application of an association
representing the overwhelming majority of undertakings benefiting from an aid
scheme which had been declared illegal by ESA was considered admissible,
as its members were individually concerned as beneficiaries of the aid scheme
in question.36
67. In its analysis of the case law, the Applicant points out that the Court has not
examined whether the individual members of the association would be more
concerned than any other competitor;37 that it held admissible pleas both in
relation to an alleged failure to open the formal investigation procedure as
well as to challenging the contested decision on the merits;38 and that the
high number of members of the association did not keep the Court away from
finding them individually concerned by the decision at issue.39
68. The Applicant recalls that it represents the overwhelming part of the private
kindergarten sector in Norway; that it was at the origin of the complaint and
was active in the procedure leading to the contested act; and that the core of
the complaint is the distortion of competition to the detriment of the private
Case E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1994–1995] EFTA Court Report 59, at paragraphs 20–23.
Case E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1998] EFTA Court Report 38, at paragraphs
30–35.
36
Joined Cases E-5 to E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord and others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court Report 117, at
paragraphs 58–60.
37
Reference is made to Case E-2/94 Scottish Salmon Growers v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1994–1995] EFTA Court Report 59,
at paragraphs 20–23. Further reference is made to Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-3657, at paragraph 53.
38
Reference is made to Case E-9/04 The Bankers’ and Securities Dealers’ Association of Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority
[2006] EFTA Court Report 42, at paragraph 51; and Case E-4/97 The Norwegian Bankers’ Association v EFTA Surveillance
Authority [1999] EFTA Court Report 2.
39
Reference is made to Joined Cases E-5 to E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord and others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court
Report 117, at paragraphs 58–60.
34
35
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69. Furthermore, the Applicant claims to be the established caretaker of the interests
of private kindergartens in Norway vis-à-vis the Norwegian Government, and
that assisting its members by dealing with the financing system and doing
away with the distortion of competition is at the forefront of the Applicant’s
work.
70. The Applicant also outlines that the case law of the Court in Scottish Salmon
Growers and Husbanken I is rooted in the case law of the ECJ in Matra and
Cook,41 and that these cases have been confirmed by the ruling of the ECJ
in Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, although the Advocate General
invited the ECJ to overrule these judgements.42
71. In its rejoinder, the Defendant maintains that the Applicant did not provide any
factual information with regard to admissibility in its application, and that even
in its reply, the Applicant has still not adduced evidence to fulfil the condition of
individual concern. The Defendant argues that the applicability of each legal
plea put forward by the Applicant must be assessed separately.43 According
to settled case law relating to general aid schemes, if a plea is based on
substantive grounds, it is necessary to examine whether the Applicant is merely
affected by the alleged aid measure in the same way as other operators in the
sector concerned, or whether it is affected in a way that distinguishes it from
these operators.44
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kindergartens which its members are exposed to on a daily basis and which,
according to the Applicant, in some cases threatens their economic survival.40
72. The Defendant finds that the Court’s case law in Husbanken I and House
Financing Fund is of no relevance in this case, as the former judgment was
related to an individual aid scheme, whereas the Court did not rule on the
pleas on substantive grounds in the latter. The Defendant explains that in
In its description of the facts, the Applicant elaborates on how the Regulation distorts the competition between municipal and
private kindergartens. Firstly, the financing system perpetuates the cost differences between municipal and private kindergartens
as existing in 2003 to the detriment of the latter. Secondly, the municipalities are free to change the cost levels of their
kindergartens, whereas the private kindergartens are limited to the general rise of municipal costs. This especially impairs the
private kindergartens in the competition for qualified workforce, if the salaries offered by the municipalities rise faster than the
general cost level in the municipalities as it was the case in 2006. Taken all together, these factors will lead to a lower service
level offered by the private kindergartens compared to the municipal kindergartens, and accordingly damage their ability to take
on more children, which will be an increasing problem as full coverage of kindergarten places is supposed to be in place shortly
in Norway.
41
Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203; Case C-198/91 Cook v Commission [1993] ECR I-2487.
42
Reference is made to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737, and to the
Opinion of the Advocate General, at paragraphs 138–139.
43
Reference is made to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737; and Case
T-254/05 Fachvereinigung Mineralfaserindustrie v Commission [2007] ECR II-124, at paragraphs 30–35.
44
Reference is made to Joined Cases E-5 to E-7/04 Fesil and Finnfjord and others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court
Report 117, at paragraphs 55–56, 60. Further reference is made to Case T-228/00 Gruppo ormeggiatori del porto di Venezia Soc.
coop. rl and others v Commission [2005] ECR II-787, at paragraph 34.
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40
Fesil and Finnfjord, the members of the association had been found to be
individually concerned because they were faced with recovery claims, which is
not the case for the Applicant or its members. To the Defendant, the case law
of the ECJ shows that it is not sufficient for the members of the association to
be direct competitors of the beneficiaries of the aid in order to be individually
concerned.45
73. The Defendant maintains that the Applicant cannot gain standing by pooling
the general interests of its members, as this would amount to a circumvention
of the requirements of Article 36 SCA.46 Nor are the Applicant’s complaints,
meetings and correspondence, or its relationship to the Norwegian Government,
sufficient to establish circumstances peculiar to the Applicant by which it can
be distinguished individually from all other persons.47
VII Substance
Article 61(1) EEA – The notion of undertaking
74. The Applicant submits that the Defendant’s view according to which municipal
kindergartens are not undertakings under Article 61(1) EEA is wrong in
substance; that in any case, the matter is such that the Defendant should have
entertained serious doubts, leading it to open a formal investigation procedure;
and that the findings are borne out of an insufficient examination that translates
into an absence of appropriate reasoning.
75. The Applicant first points out that the Defendant erred when it concluded that
the municipalities, when providing kindergarten services, are acting as a public
authority. The Applicant purports that the Defendant should have distinguished
between the municipality’s roles as authority and as operator. Some of the
Reference is made specifically to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737,
at paragraph 72; and Case Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and others v Commission [2000] ECR
I-3659, at paragraph 41. Further reference is made to Case T-358/02 Deutsche Post AG and DHL International Srl v Commission
[2004] ECR II-1565, at paragraphs 37–43; confirmed by Case C-367/04 P Deutsche Post AG and DHL Express (Italy) Srl v
Commission [2006] ECR I-26, at paragraphs 40–43; Case C-6/92 Federazione Sindacale Italiana dell’Industria Estrattiva and
others v Commission [1993] ECR I-6357, at paragraphs 11–15; Case T-11/95 BP Chemicals Limited v Commission [1998] ECR
II-3235, at paragraphs 76–83; Case T-398/94 Kahn Scheppvaart BV v Commission [1996] ECR II-477, at paragraphs 39–41, 49.
46
Reference is made to Case T-69/96 Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus Aktiengesellschaft and others v Commission [2001] ECR
II-1037, at paragraph 49; Case T-86/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission [1999] ECR II-179,
at paragraphs 55–57, 60, 65; and Case T-117/04 Vereniging Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren and
Others v Commission [2006] ECR II-3861, at paragraph 66.
47
Reference is made to Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737, at
paragraphs 53–57; Case T-254/05 Fachvereinigung Mineralfaserindustrie v Commission [2007] ECR II-124, at paragraphs 38–40;
Case T-117/04 Vereniging Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren and Others v Commission [2006] ECR
II-3861, at paragraphs 68–73; Case T-30/03 SID v Commission, judgment of 23 April 2007, not yet reported, at paragraphs 38–42;
and Case T-86/96 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Luftfahrt-Unternehmen v Commission [1999] ECR II-179, at paragraph 61.
45
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76. To the Applicant, it follows from the case law that such elements as an entity’s
public-law status, its non-profit character and its pursuit of social objectives
cannot be taken into account when assessing whether it pursues an economic
activity.49 It submits that these aspects are only relevant for the assessment
of the compatibility of the aid and that the rulings upon which the Defendant
relied were either irrelevant or misapplied by the Defendant.50
77. The Applicant contests the Defendant’s position that kindergartens are
educational institutions. It is of the opinion that most of the references where
the Defendant translates Norwegian sources as “educational” should rather
be translated as “pedagogic”51 and that in reality the tasks of the kindergartens
are “care, upbringing and learning”52, because “pedagogy” and “learning” are
distinct concepts from “education” and “teaching” in Norway.53 It is argued that
the pedagogical aspects of kindergartens are pre-educational and not different
from what an upbringing by parents in a good home would entail. To the
Reference is made to Case C-69/91 Decoster [1993] ECR I-5335, at paragraph 15; and the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs
in Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691.
49
Reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, at paragraph 21 et seq.; Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002]
ECR I-691 and especially to the opinion of the Advocate General, at paragraph 46; Joined cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet
and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, at paragraphs 8–19; Case T-106/95 Fédération française des sociétés d’assurances (FFSA) and
others v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, at paragraphs 14–21; Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, at paragraphs 77–86;
Case C-219/97 Drivjende Bokken [1999] ECR I-6121, at paragraphs 77–86; Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov [2000]
ECR I-6451, at paragraphs 114–118; Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089, at paragraphs 19–22; Case E-8/00
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge v Kommunenes Sentralforbund and Others [2002] EFTA Court Report 114, at paragraphs 62–67;
the Commission’s Communication “Implementing the Community Lisbon programme – Social services of general interest in the
European Union”, COM(2006)117 final; and the Staff Working Document annexed to COM(2006)516 “Social services of general
interest in the European Union”.
50
Reference is made to Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande (BAI) v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, at paragraph 81; Case
C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473 and the Commission Decision 2005/842 on the application of Article
86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation
for services of general economic interest; and more generally for the relevance of the case law relied upon by the Defendant
Richard Plender QC, Definition of Aid, in: A. Biondi, P. Eckhout and J. Flynn (Eds.), The Law of State Aid in the European Union,
Oxford University Press 2003, at p. 15. The reference to Case C-199/06 Livre Francais, request for advisory opinion of 1 July
2006, not yet decided, seems to erroneous.
51
The Norwegian term is “pedagogisk”.
52
Reference is made to Section 2, third paragraph of the Kindergarten Act; further reference is made to the Regulation No XXX
of 1 March 2006 on a framework plan for the content and tasks of a kindergarten (“the Framework plan”): “Kindergartens are
pedagogic institutions that comprise care, upbringing, play and learning.”
53
Reference is made to the OECD Report “Equity in Education. Thematic Review – Norway Country Note” of 2004 (“the OECD
Report”).
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duties referred to by the Defendant apply to any operator of a kindergarten,
whilst the duties the municipalities have in their role as kindergarten authority
do not require them to actually operate any kindergarten themselves. It is
recalled that under the relevant case law, an entity’s exercise of regulatory
functions does not impede a finding that the entity is engaged in economic
activity.48
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48
Applicant, the borderline between upbringing and care on the one hand and
education on the other is defined by the threshold of compulsory education.54
78. In any event, the Applicant does not agree with the Defendant that the case
law in Humbel and Wirth55 is applicable to the case. It points out that these
cases dealt with the rights of the receiver of educational services under the
rules on the freedom to provide services, whereas in the present case the
status of the service provider has to be assessed under the competition rules.
The Applicant claims that in cases concerning the notion of undertaking in
competition law, the ECJ has not had recourse to its case law on the four
freedoms.56 The Applicant further adds that even with regard to the rules on
free movement, Humbel and Wirth constitute narrow exceptions, on which the
ECJ has not relied outside the ambit of education proper.57
79. The Applicant further submits that under the competition rules, an activity may
in principle either qualify as public regulatory power58 or as economic activity.
If public interests are at stake with regard to the latter, Article 86 EC (Article
59 EEA) provides the legal basis for these interests. It is only with regard to
certain compulsory social security schemes that the ECJ has made exceptions
to this basic test. In these cases, the ECJ referred in particular to the principle
of solidarity as that of a compulsory monopoly.59 It is noted that there is no
obligation of parents to enrol their children in kindergartens and that the ECJ
never applied this principle because an activity is funded through taxation. The
Applicant adds that if one would do so, practically all State aid would involve a
manifestation of the principle of solidarity.
80. To the Applicant, the only relevant question required to assess the notion of
undertaking is whether the municipalities are providing services on a given
market which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private actor in
54
55
56
57
58
59
The Applicant further points to the fact that kindergarten services are considered “social services” under the Norwegian VAT Act,
although this act makes also provisions for educational services.
Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365 and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447.
In its reply to the Statement of Intervention by the Norwegian government, the Applicant outlines the case law referred to in
footnote 48 as well as the judgments in Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, at paragraphs 37–45; Case C-82/01 P Aéroports
de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, at paragraphs 75–78, 82; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01
AOK Bundesverband and others [2004] ECR I-2493, at paragraphs 47–63; Case C-205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR
I-6295, upholding Case T-319/99 FENIN v Commission [2003] ECR II-357. Specific reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfner
and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979; and Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR I-7119.
Reference is made to Case C-159/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, at paragraphs 47–59; Case C-385/99
Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509.
The Applicant refers to Case C-343/95 Cali and Figli [1997] ECR I-1547 and Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994] ECR I-43
as examples of such case law.
The Applicant seems to refer to the Case law in, inter alia, Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691; and Joined cases C-159/91
and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637.
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81. Although it is admitted that the aid granted to operational costs is very important,
the Applicant explains that the recent aid increases have largely become
necessary due to the caps on parental payments and new requirements
imposed by regulation. It is argued that nonetheless, private kindergartens
are operating according to market principles with regard to investment, capital
costs, return of invested capital and risks related to loss and bankruptcy. To
the Applicant, parents’ fees are income attributable to the service providing
kindergarten, whether private or municipal. It is added that the existence of
certain socially motivated graduated fees is common in many sectors and
cannot lead to the conclusion that the entity would not be engaged in an
economic activity. Also, it is pointed out that private kindergartens are subject
to the same regulatory regime in terms of social functions as the municipal
kindergartens. The Applicant notes that heavy public regulation of a sector
does not mean that the remaining competition is not protected, and that this
parameter has never been included in the ECJ’s test of what qualifies as an
undertaking.61 Furthermore, the Applicant claims that when national authorities
intervene in order to ensure the existence of a market that would not otherwise
exist, the activities in question become economic in nature.62
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order to make a profit.60 In that regard, the Applicant points out that childcare
services have traditionally been provided on the market by private actors, that
the Norwegian State never attempted to establish an entirely public system
and that notwithstanding the limitations to pricing competition introduced by
the reform of 2003, there is competition amongst the providers of the service.
It is considered irrelevant that there might have been a different assessment in
the practice of the Commission.
Reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979; and Case C-82/01 P Aéroports de Paris v Commission
[2002] ECR I-9297.
61
Reference is made to Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851; Case T-513/93 Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri
Doganali v Commission [2000] ECR II-1807; and Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577.
62
Reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979; and Commission Decision 2006/225/EC of 2 March
2005 on the aid scheme implemented by Italy for the reform of the training institutions, OJ 2006 L 81/25, at paragraphs 50–57.
63
Reference is made to Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 291/03/COL of 18 December 2003 regarding the establishment
of private day care facilities on public sites with subsidised real estate leasehold fees in Oslo; Decision of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority 155/07/COL of 3 May 2007 on state aid granted in connection with Article 3 of the Norwegian Act on compensation for
value added tax (VAT), page 17; Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 225/06/COL of 19 July 2006 to initiate the procedure
provided for in Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to Article 3 of the Norwegian
Act on compensation for value added tax (VAT) (“Decision VAT I”), page 15; St.meld. No 28 (2003–2004); St.meld. No 24 (2002–
2003); and NOU 2003: 3, VAT and the Municipalities – distortions of competition between municipalities and private operators.
60
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82. Finally, reference is made to decisions of the Defendant and statements of
the Norwegian government where the Defendant, respectively the Norwegian
government, considered kindergartens in Norway to be undertakings acting on
a competitive market.63
Article 61(1) EEA – Existence of cross-border effect
83. The Applicant submits that the Defendant has examined the question of effect
on trade inappropriately.64 It is recalled that there is no threshold or percentage
below which it may be considered that trade between Member States is not
affected.65
84. It is highlighted that the test for cross-border effect is met if the aid scheme
at issue is likely to affect trade.66 The Applicant points out that the system
involves substantial amounts of money, which alone would be sufficient to
establish effect on trade.67 The economic importance of the kindergarten sector
in Norway and in Europe is emphasised, as well as the growing importance
of private operators in the sector throughout the EEA. The Applicant’s finds
the system to be discriminatory and ESA’s assertion that cross-border trade
is not affected to be erroneous, because the national regulation deters foreign
investment. Furthermore, the Applicant maintains that ESA’s statements in
the Decision that ‘the presence of foreign kindergartens is non-existent or
marginal’ and that ‘this situation is not likely to change in the future’ are wrong
and that the latter statement lacks foundation. The Applicant criticises that
the Decision failed to include a market analysis of the European kindergarten
sector, its developments and the potential effects thereof on the Norwegian
market.
85. It is pointed out that the Defendant established in the Decision that there are
a number of Norwegian Foreign Undertakings (hereinafter “NUF”)68 providing
kindergarten services in Norway, but concluded that they are not ‘truly’
foreign, as they have no business in their country of incorporation and appear
to be run by Norwegians. The Applicant submits that the Defendant cannot
deem a foreign registered company to be not ‘truly foreign’.69 Nor do these
undertakings need to be “actually engaged in cross-border activities” in order
to have an effect on trade. It is claimed that the legal standard to assess effects
on trade is the same as when assessing a restriction on free movement. To the
Reference is made to Husbanken II, at paragraph 70; and Commission Decision of 21 March 2007 C(2007) 856 final on State aid
N 49/07 – Spain, Subventions pour le développement de l’usage de la langue basque dans la vie sociale.
65
Reference is made to Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, at paragraph 81, with further references; Case C-172/03 Heiser
[2005] ECR I-1627, at paragraph 32; Decisions VAT I, page 14, and Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 298/05/COL of
22 November 2005 on the proposal for regionally differentiated rates of social security contributions for certain economic sectors,
pages 27, 28.
66
Reference is made to Case T-288/97 Regione Autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission [2001] ECR II-1169, at paragraphs
49–50; and Case T-35/99, Keller SpA v Commission [2002] ECR II-261, at paragraph 85.
67
Reference is made to Case C-451/03 Calafiori [2006] ECR I-2941, at paragraph 58.
68
NUF is an abbreviation for Norsk Utenlandsk Foretak.
69
Reference is made to Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919; and Case
C-167/01 Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10155.
64
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86. With regard to the Defendant’s assessment of the de minimis case rules in
the Defence, the Applicant notes that first, these ECJ cases did not rule that
small amounts of aid would not affect trade, and second, that the Norwegian
kindergarten sector receives unusually large amounts of public support. The
Defendant’s analysis is therefore rejected.
87. In the Applicant’s view, the local character of the activities of the beneficiaries
is not sufficient to prevent the aid from having effect on trade.70 It is claimed
that this could only be so if the services provided were not unique and not
readily sought for by people outside the local area, in combination with small
amounts of aid or strict time limitations. The Applicant finds that none of these
characteristics are present in the system at hand: the system is not of local
character, as it encompasses the entire country, it involves massive transfers
of resources and it is not defined in time. It is argued that even small amounts
of individual aid can have an impact on trade between Member States, if made
potentially available to all or a very large number of undertakings in a sector
with a large number of small companies.71
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Applicant, the existence of NUFs further demonstrates that there is nothing at
the regulatory level which hinders a foreign undertaking from investing in the
kindergarten market in Norway.
Article 59(2) EEA – Compatibility
89. First of all, the Applicant specifically submits that the Decision is based on
an erroneous conclusion due to insufficient examination, by making neither
reference to the Altmark ruling of the ECJ nor examining whether the criteria
laid down therein are fulfilled.72
Reference is made to Decision VAT I, page 14, with further references.
Reference is made to Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 298/05/COL of 22 November 2005 on the proposal for regionally
differentiated rates of social security contributions for certain economic sectors, pages 27, 28, with further references.
72
Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747.
70
71
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88. The Applicant submits that the State aid scheme cannot be accepted under
Article 59(2) EEA; that it infringes fundamental provisions of primary law; that
it infringes the principle of neutrality towards private and public undertakings;
and that the distortion of competition is disproportionate. The Applicant further
submits that the scheme’s compliance with Article 59(2) EEA is doubtful to the
point that ESA should have entertained serious doubts in that respect; and that
the Decision is vitiated by insufficient reasoning and examination.
90. Secondly, the Applicant claims that the financing scheme cannot be considered
compatible with the EEA Agreement, as it would entail discrimination on
grounds of nationality or a restriction to free movement.73 The existence of
discrimination is deduced from the fact that the entitlement to the preferential
scheme depends solely on the municipal ownership of the kindergarten, a
condition which can never be fulfilled by a foreign operator.74 It is maintained
that the relevant question under EEA law is not whether foreign operators
are singled out as being unprivileged, but whether they are barred from the
privileged group, and that the Defendant, faced with such a discrimination or
restriction, could not have founded its reasoning on an alleged lack of manifest
discrimination.75 The Applicant finds the case law on which the Decision is
based to be of no relevance, not least because it was delivered under the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Under the case
law which the Applicant considers relevant, ESA cannot approve any State aid
measure which is unnecessarily discriminatory.76 In any case, the Applicant
finds that the discrimination is manifest, as the unequal treatment has already
been admitted by the Government.77
91. It is claimed that the discrimination is entirely unnecessary, as private
kindergartens are performing public service as much as municipal ones, and
that the Defendant did not assess to which degree the advantages received
are necessary to discharge the public service obligation. The Applicant
claims that the Defendant did not apply the market economy investor test,
nor did it assess: what the effect of the financing system on the municipalities
was, whether there is overcompensation,78 how a control system avoiding
a discriminatory treatment could be implemented or whether the system is
proportionate. At least, the Applicant cannot find any indication in the Decision
Reference is made to Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, at paragraph 78, with further references; and
Case C-438/02 Hanner [2005] ECR I-4551, at paragraph 48.
Reference is made to Commission Decision 2003/193/EC of 5 June 2002 on State aid granted by Italy in the form of tax
exemptions and subsidised loans to public utilities with a majority public capital holding, OJ 2003 L 77/21, at paragraphs 121–122.
See footnote 39 as to how the Applicant considers the financial scheme to be detrimental to the private kindergartens.
75
Reference is made to Case E-2/06 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 63; and Case C-3/88
Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 4035.
76
Reference is made to Case T-371/94 British Airways plc and others v Commission [1998] ECR II-2405, at paragraph 285 et seq;
Case T-204/97 EPAC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2267, at paragraph 122 et seq.; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991]
ECR I-1433, at paragraph 16 et seq; Cases 80/77 to 81/77 Ramel [1978] ECR 927; Case C-63/89 Les Assurances du Crédit SA
v Council and Commission [1991] ECR I-1799, at paragraph 23; Commission Decision 2003/193/EC of 5 June 2002 on State aid
granted by Italy in the form of tax exemptions and subsidised loans to public utilities with a majority public capital holding, OJ 2003
L 77/21, at paragraph 112.
77
Reference is made to government statements that equal treatment of municipal and private kindergartens is “phased in” etc., inter
alia St.meld. No 28 (2003–2004).
78
The Applicant claims in his reply that many municipalities actually do receive more earmarked grants from the State than what
they are spending on kindergartens. It is purported that out of 130 million NOK in discretionary funds distributed to 25 investigated
municipalities, only 73 million NOK were spent on kindergartens. Reference is made to a letter from the Ministry to all municipalities
of 29 June 2007 (Annex A.24).
73
74
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92. The Applicant contests the Defendant’s notion of cost coverage and points to
the fourth Altmark criterion, which in the Applicant’s view demands that the
service must be performed at the least cost to the community, or at the cost
level of a well run and adequately provided enterprise.
Other submissions regarding serious doubts
93. The Applicant submits that the time taken in deciding on the complaint,
together with the fact that supplementary information had been requested from
the Member State, testifies to the serious doubts that the Defendant must have
had.81 Finally, the Applicant takes the position that when non-notified aid is at
issue, a condition for not opening the formal investigation procedure is that
ESA has arrived at the firm conviction that no aid is at issue.82
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that the Defendant has assessed these issues; thus, the Applicant finds that
the principle of transparency is infringed.79 Furthermore, the Applicant submits
that the Defendant did not fulfil its duty of diligent and impartial examination
when it simply concluded that no manifest discrimination could be assessed no
matter what would be the result of the cost coverage principle in practice.80
95. The Defendant refutes the Applicant’s submission that considerations relating
to cultural and social welfare are immaterial to the assessment of whether a
recipient of support constitutes an undertaking. It points out that in the BAI case
79
80
81
82
83
Reference is made to Case 238/82 Duphar BV and others [1984] ECR 523, at paragraph 21 et seq.; and Case C-231/03 Coname
[2005] ECR I-7287, at paragraph 17.
Reference is made to Joined Cases T-297/01 and T-298/01 SIC v Commission [2004] ECR II-743, at paragraph 56, with further
references.
Reference is made to Case T-73/98 Prayon-Rupel v Commission [2001] ECR II-867, at paragraph 98.
Reference is made to T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125, at paragraph 91; and Case C-204/97 Portugal v Commission
Reference is made to Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, at paragraph 23; Case 118/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2599,
at paragraph 7; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, at paragraph 36; and Case C-180/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR
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94. The Defendant recalls that in competition law, an undertaking is any entity
engaged in economic activity, defined as any activity consisting in offering
goods and services on a given market.83 In the Decision, the Defendant came
to the conclusion that this was not the case, as the municipal kindergartens
were not engaged in economic activities, but rather fulfilled the duties of
the municipalities towards their own population in the social, cultural and
educational fields.
referred to by the Applicant,84 it was undisputed that the recipient of the support
was an undertaking and that the question was solely whether the aim from the
grantor of the aid to an undertaking could be relevant when assessing whether
the measure was State aid. The Defendant further contests the submissions of
the Applicant that the notion of service is to be interpreted differently depending
on whether the case applies to the receiver or the provider of a service85 and
that case law concerning educational activities in the field of services would be
irrelevant for the purposes of an assessment under the State aid rules.86
96. The Defendant maintains its view that the municipal kindergartens are not
undertakings under Article 61(1) EEA.87 It explains that in Humbel, the ECJ
ruled that only paid services are to be considered as ‘services’ within the
meaning of the Treaty, and that courses provided by a national education
system do not qualify. The reasoning was that first, the State is not seeking to
engage in a gainful activity but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population.
Second, the system was, as a general rule, funded from the public purse and
not by pupils or their parents. That finding was not changed by the fact that
pupils or their parents must sometimes pay fees in order to make a contribution
to the operating expenses of the system.88 In Wirth, the ECJ held that those
considerations are equally applicable to courses given in an institute of higher
education which is financed, essentially, out of public funds.
97. The Defendant concludes that institutions which form part of the national
education system at any level and which are essentially funded by the public
purse are not to be regarded as providers of a service. Reference is made
to measures of Community institutions dealing with educational institutions
and their relationship to the internal market, in particular the State aid and
competition rules.89
98. The Defendant submits that whether or not the municipal kindergartens are
86
87
Case T-14/96 BAI v Commission [1999] ECR II-139.
Reference is made to Case C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849.
Reference is made to Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, at paragraphs 22–23.
Reference is made to Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365; Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447; and Case C-76/05
Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849.
88
Reference is made to Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at paragraphs 18–19.
89
Reference is made to the Commission Communication “Services of general economic interest in Europe”, OJ 2001 C 17/4 of
19.01.2001, at paragraph 29; the preamble of the Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ 2006 L 367/36, consideration 34; Commission decision of 25.04.2001
SG(2001) D/288165 on State aid N 118/00 – France, Subventions publiques aux clubs sportifs professionnels, at paragraphs
11–13, 16; Commission decision of 23.11.2005 C(2005) 4439 on State aid N 465/2005 – The Netherlands, school support
services; Commission decision of 8.11.2006 C(2006) 5228 on State aid NN 54/2006 – Czech Republic, Prerov logistics College,
at paragraphs 14–18. The Defendant further notes that the Commission’s Communication entitled “Implementing the Community
Lisbon programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union”, to which PBL refers in its application, does not
cover services for education and training, reference being made to footnote 7 of the Communication.
84
85
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99. For the Defendant, the existence of parental fees does not change the finding
that kindergartens in Norway are essentially financed by the public purse. Such
a fee is just a “contribution” like the fee ruled on by the ECJ in Humbel, not
the consideration for a service. In the Defendant’s view, the argument that the
parents’ fees are not a consideration for a service is fostered by the fact that
the fees are disconnected from the actual costs, as they do not increase for
children with special needs and that fee reductions for social reasons exist.
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part of the national education system, the underlying considerations in Humbel
and Wirth apply. First, the Norwegian State and the Norwegian municipalities
have no commercial or other economic interest in attracting as many children
as possible to municipal kindergartens, as they spend money every time they
accept a child into a municipal kindergarten. Nor do they have an economic
interest in making the parents choose a municipal kindergarten instead of
a private kindergarten. Second, the municipalities are fulfilling their duties
towards their inhabitants in the social, cultural and educational fields when
offering kindergartens to their inhabitants. Third, the vast majority of the funding
for the municipal kindergartens comes from the public purse.
101. The Defendant argues that the fact that attendance at kindergarten is not
compulsory does not alter its character of social and educational service and
cannot be used to distinguish this case from Humbel and Wirth. It points out
that these judgments both concerned courses which were beyond obligatory
90
Reference is made to Section 2 of the Kindergarten Act; the Framework plan; a white paper on life-long learning published by
the Norwegian Government in 2006 (St.meld. No 16 (2006–2007)); the requirements set out for the staff in a kindergarten set
out in Sections 17 and 18 of the Kindergarten Act; chapter 3.1 of the communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on efficiency and equity in European education and training systems, COM(2006) 481 final; the “glossary
on European education institutions” published by the information network on education in Europe – Eurydice in 2000, where the
Norwegian “barnehage” is classified as ISCED 0 (“Non-school education-oriented institution offering full- or part-time pre-primary
education and care for children from as early as their first year up to the age of 5”); the OECD Report; and chapter 4.2 of the
preparatory works of the Norwegian Kindergarten Act, Ot.pr. No 72 (2004–2005).
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100. In any case, the Defendant finds that kindergartens in Norway do form part of
the larger Norwegian national education system. It is argued that a Norwegian
kindergarten provides much more than “just” childcare and is an important
part of the concept of preschool education in Norway. This is illustrated with,
amongst others, references to the tasks of a kindergarten.90 The Defendant
recognises that there are some differences between a kindergarten and a
school especially in the first years of kindergarten, but points out that there is
a sliding scale of emphasis on education, with no abrupt change in the way
children are educated in the last year of kindergarten and the first year at
primary school.
school age. Neither can the assessment of an activity of a public educational
institution, which is not a service if viewed in isolation, be changed by the fact
that a similar activity is performed by other entities as an economic activity.91
102. The Defendant identifies three possible ways in which trade could theoretically
be affected by governmental support of municipal kindergartens: first, that
families from other EEA States could be inclined to use Norwegian municipal
kindergartens rather than kindergartens in other EEA States; second, that
municipal kindergartens would be enabled to engage in offering kindergarten
facilities abroad and third, that foreign operators would be affected in their
actual or potential operations in Norway. The Defendant does not find trade
affected in any of these ways and notes that it is only on the third point that the
Applicant does come to a different conclusion.
103. The Defendant submits that the amount of aid and the size of the undertakings
are relevant when assessing whether an aid measure affects intra EEA trade.92
The Defendant emphasises the need to look at the characteristics of the sector
concerned when assessing whether the condition concerning trade effect is
fulfilled,93 including the exposure to competition,94 any structural overcapacity95
or other “specific difficulties” on the market,96 or whether the sector has been
subject to liberalisation on Community level.97 To the Defendant, the local
character of the activities of the aid beneficiaries also constitutes one of the
factors to take into account in an overall assessment of whether there is an
effect on trade.98
104. The Defendant first finds little competition in the kindergarten sector in Norway,
as the area is highly regulated including a parental fee ceiling and characterised
by a dependency on State support. Second, the sector is characterised
Reference is made to Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, at paragraphs 16–19.
Reference is made to Joined Cases T-304/04 and T-316/04 Italy and Wam SpA v Commission [2006] ECR II-64, at paragraph
63.
93
Reference is made to Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-8031, at paragraph 51; and Case T-288/97 Regione Friuli
Venezia Giulia v Commission [2002] ECR II-1169, at paragraph 46.
94
Reference is made to Case C-113/00 Spain v Commission [2002] ECR I-7601, at paragraph 30; Joined Cases T-228/99
and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [2003] ECR II-435, at paragraph 298; Case 259/85
France v Commission [1987] ECR 4393, at paragraph 24; Joined Cases T-127/99, T-129/99 and T-148/99 Diputación Foral de
Álava v Commission [2002] ECR II-1275, at paragraph 219; Case T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, at
paragraph 49; and Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, at paragraph 76.
95
Reference is made to Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, at paragraphs 33–44; Case T-152/99 Hijos de
Andrés Molina v Commission [2002] ECR II-3049, at paragraphs 220–222; and Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR
96
Reference is made to Joined Cases C-278/92 to C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, at paragraphs 40–43.
97
Reference is made to Case C-148/04 Unicredito [2005] ECR I-11137, at at paragraph 57; Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission
[2003] ECR I-1487, at paragraph 75; and Case T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, at paragraph 51.
98
Reference is made to the Decision VAT I, p. 14.
91
92
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106. The Defendant contests the Applicant’s assertion that it stated that the
compensation rules in the Regulation pertaining to municipal kindergartens
have the effect of deterring foreign investment. Rather, it argues that it would
be unlikely for foreign providers of kindergartens to consider establishing
themselves in Norway because of the parental payment cap and the municipal
grant limits on non-municipal kindergartens. To the Defendant, it is thus not the
existence of the aid scheme, but the fact that it is not more generous to nonmunicipal kindergartens that has this effect.
107. The Defendant submits that it has not generally refuted that a company
registered as a NUF might be an indication of trade effect, but that upon
examination of the list provided by the Applicant, it found that all companies
were run by Norwegian residents, that only one of the companies did business
in its country of registration and that this company was not active in the
Norwegian kindergarten sector. Therefore, although the Defendant agrees
with the Applicant that these companies are indeed foreign undertakings, it
concludes that they could not constitute proof of cross-border elements.100
The Defendant contests that the ECJ´s case law in Centros, Überseering and
99
Including Decision No 298/05/COL, as cited by the Applicant.
Reference is made to Joined Cases C-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [2003] ECR
II-435, at paragraph 299; Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR-2671, at paragraph 11; Joined Cases C-278/92 to
C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, at paragraph 40; and Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671,
at paragraph 47.
100
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105. The Defendant contests the Applicant’s assertion that the Norwegian
scheme discriminates on the basis of nationality, and holds that even if all
kindergartens, private and municipal, were to be treated in the same manner
as municipal kindergartens, this would still not be likely to affect trade,
as municipal kindergartens are barred by law from making a profit on their
services to the public. In the Defendant’s view, a similar system applied to
private kindergartens would probably be an even bigger deterrent for foreign
entry. It clarifies, however, that it is not arguing that because the rules are nondiscriminatory, trade is not affected.
by a very high demand and a shortage of supply. Third, there has been no
liberalisation of kindergartens at the Community level. Fourth, a large majority
of kindergartens are run exclusively on a local level, a conclusion that is not
altered by the fact that the support system is nationwide. The Defendant does
not agree with the Applicant’s opinion that it has used a different standard in
the present case than in other cases.99
Inspire Art101 is relevant for the case at hand. It points out that these decisions
ruled on whether a company registered in one EEA State may legally conduct
business in another EEA State, whereas the question of whether effects on
trade are present is not whether circumvention has taken place, but whether
the aid affects trade between EEA States, and that this trade has to be real
and more than marginal.
108. Finally, the Defendant notes that the judgment of the EFTA Court in Husbanken
II referred to by the Applicant relates exclusively to the so-called balancing test
under Article 59(2) EEA, which is only relevant to the extent that a trade effect
already has been established.
109. The Defendant maintains that even if the financing system would constitute
State aid, it would be compatible with the EEA Agreement as it would only
constitute appropriate compensation for the provision of services of general
economic interest.
110. It is clear to the Defendant that all the costs incurred by municipal kindergartens
are related to a clearly defined service of general economic interest and that
it accordingly held in the Decision that the principle of cost coverage did not
lead to overcompensation. The Defendant submits that the Applicant never
questioned this prior to its application. In any event, the Defendant considers
possible excess grants received by the municipalities to be irrelevant, as
they are granted to the municipality in its capacity as public body and not
as kindergarten operator, and that in any event overcompensation would
only be relevant if the funds had been redirected to entities performing an
economic activity. Furthermore, the Applicant’s submission that the Defendant
should have applied the Altmark criteria is rejected, as these criteria relate
to the question of whether State aid is present, whereas the assessment of
the Defendant took place under the assumption that all support granted to
municipal kindergartens constitutes State aid.
111. The Defendant submits that the Applicant never clarified how it considers private
kindergartens to be discriminated against by the financing system. With regard
to the application of the cost coverage principle through the financing system,
the Defendant admits that this leads in general to higher amounts of support
paid to the municipal kindergartens. However, the Defendant is of the opinion
101
Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919; and Case C-167/01 Inspire Art
[2003] ECR I-10155.
- 116 -
113. The Defendant points out that it assessed two deviations from the cost
coverage principle in the Decision: first, a municipality is not obliged to grant
aid to non-municipal kindergartens covering higher operational costs than its
own kindergartens have and second, the municipalities can refuse to pay for a
significant rise in costs in a non-municipal kindergarten. The Defendant finds
both exceptions justified by the fact that the municipalities are, as owners, in
control of the cost development of their own kindergartens, but not of the private
ones, and that the private kindergartens have, as opposed to the municipalities,
the possibility to make profits which, moreover, would necessarily come mainly
from the municipal purse. With regard to the first deviation, it is added that a
municipality as grantor cannot be supposed to finance a higher service level
than what it has found appropriate for its own kindergartens. With regard to
102
Reference is made to Commission Decision 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty
to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest, OJ 2005 L 312/67 (taken over into the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee 91/2006
of 7 July 2006, OJ 2006 L 289/31), recitals 4, 11 and 14; Commission Decision C(2007) 641 final of 7 March 2007 on State aid NN
8/2007 – Spain, Financing of workforce reduction measures for RTVE, points 20, 45–46; Commission Decision 2005/406/EC of 15
October 2003 on ad hoc measures implemented by Portugal for RTP, OJ 2005 L 142/1, at paragraphs 153–157, 194; Commission
Decision 2004/838/EC of 10 December 2003 on State aid implemented by France for France 2 and France 3, OJ 2004 L 359/62, at
paragraphs 56, 101; Commission Decision 2005/163/EC of 16 March 2004 on the State aid paid by Italy to the Adriatica, Caremar,
Siremar, Saremar and Toremar shipping companies (Tirrenia Group), OJ 2005 L 53/29, at paragraph 59, 123–148; Commission
Decision C(2003) 3371 of 1 October 2003 on State aid N 37/2003 – United Kingdom, BBC Digital Curriculum, at paragraphs 23,
51; Commission Decision C(2005) 4668 final of 7 December 2005 on State aid N395/2005 – Ireland, Loan guarantees for social
infrastructure schemes funded by the Housing Finance Agency (HFA), at paragraph 38, 42; Buendia Sierra, An analysis of Article
86(2), in: Sanchez Rydelski (ed.), The EC State Aid Regime, 2006, p. 541 at p. 555–556; and Barosch, Sozialer Wohnungsbau
und europäische Beihilfenkontrolle, EuZW 2007, 559, 564, with further references to literature and Commission practice.
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Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
112. The Defendant agrees that an aid system has to be in conformity with the rules
on free movement, and that a national legislation treating public undertakings
more favourably than all other undertakings would be discriminatory.
However, based on the argument of the foregoing paragraph, it is submitted
that discrimination can only be found if a deviation from the cost coverage
principle exists, depending on whether the two groups are in objectively similar
situations and whether any difference of treatment might be justified.
that the cost coverage principle is the normal method of compensation for
services of general interest, regardless of whether the supported undertaking
is efficient or not, and as such can therefore not be contrary to the EEA
Agreement.102 To the Defendant, it is immaterial whether or not this principle
will lead in practice to a higher average payment to municipal kindergartens,
as the reason for this would be the higher costs of the municipal kindergartens,
not the fact that they are municipal. It is submitted that higher subsidies based
on higher costs are not an advantage as in the end, the advantage received by
all the recipients is the same: the coverage of their costs.
the second deviation, the Defendant finds that an EEA State is not obliged to
design a system of compensation which allows an undertaking to change its
business concept and still receive full compensation.
114. The Defendant refutes the Applicant’s argument relating to Preyon-Rupel.103
He points out that Norway was asked only once to submit information, and that
the Decision was adopted within 5 months after its receipt.
The Government of Norway
115. The Government of Norway recalls that according to ECJ case law, only
entities engaged in economic activity, defined as offering goods or services
on a given market, are undertakings.104 Economic activity presupposes the
assumption of risk for the purpose of remuneration.105
116. The Government of Norway concludes that the municipalities are not engaged
in an “economic activity”.106 First of all, the Government finds, having regard to
the intense regulation of the market and the massive financial contributions by
the State towards it, that a sector which is not based on supply and demand but
on the size of public grants cannot be regarded as a “market” for the purpose
of State aid rules. It is added that the municipalities have no economic interest
in attracting children to municipal or non-municipal kindergartens and that
consequently no real competition exists between the municipalities and other
providers of kindergarten services. This finding is supported by the arguments
that no price competition exists and that there is still a shortage of kindergarten
places. Finally, the Government takes the position that the parental fee cannot
be considered as “consideration for the service in question” for the following
reasons: a) it is de facto determined by Stortinget (the Norwegian Parliament)
and not agreed upon by kindergartens and parents; b) it is not even near the
real costs of the service and c) it is not paid to the municipal kindergarten as
such, but is entered into the general municipal budget.107
Case T-73/98 Prayon-Rupel v Commission [2001] ECR II-867.
Reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfer and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, at paragraph 21; and Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy
105
Reference is made to Case C-180/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451, at paragraphs 76–77.
106
Reference is made to Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, at paragraph 18; Case C-218/00
Cisal [2002] ECR I-691; Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at paragraph 18; and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447,
at paragraph 16.
107
Reference is made to Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at paragraphs 17 and 19.
103
104
- 118 -
119. The Government of Norway further agrees with the Defendant that the provision
of kindergarten services not only fulfils the underlying considerations in Humbel
and Wirth, but that kindergartens are indeed educational institutions. With
regard to the arguments of the Applicant, it submits that it is not relevant that
kindergartens are not schools and that the education methods are not entirely
the same. To the Government, what matters is the fact that the educational
tasks of kindergartens go far beyond childcare in the narrow sense. This finding
is supported by the fact that in Norway, kindergartens are the responsibility
of the Ministry of Education, and they are widely regarded as part of the
educational system and organised and financed under the responsibility of the
municipalities in a way similar to schools.
108
Reference is made to Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, at paragraph 17; and Case C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849,
at paragraphs 40–41.
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Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
118. The Norwegian Government agrees with the Defendant that the ECJ´s case
law in Humbel and Wirth applies to the present case, as the notion of “service”
and the notion of “undertaking” are interlinked which each other. It notes
that the consequence of the Applicant’s arguments would be that any public
educational institution would be an undertaking under the State aid rules, a
consequence which would be contrary to the general understanding of the
two cases. With regard to the Applicant´s argument that considerations as
to culture and social welfare would be irrelevant for the determination of aid,
it is claimed that the notion of aid has to be distinguished from the notion of
undertaking, and that such considerations are relevant to the latter. It is argued
that the same service which is not an economic activity for a public entity might
be such an activity for a private operator seeking profit.108
117. The Government of Norway disputes the Applicant’s view that the municipal
kindergartens are not based on the principle of solidarity. The Government
argues that the purpose of the system is to enable all parents to afford
kindergarten places. It is explained that the public grants should be seen rather
as financial contributions to parents in order to promote social equality than as
a financial support to kindergartens as such. The Government further points
to the existence of graduated fees for social reasons. It refutes the argument
of the Applicant that graduated fees are also common in other sectors such
as transportation, as in these sectors even the graduated fee is never below
marginal costs, thus having a different rationale than the discounts in the
kindergarten system.
120. Finally, with regard to the fact that neither secondary nor higher education
is compulsory in Norway, the argument of the Applicant that kindergarten
attendance is not obligatory is rejected. It is added that the absence of such
an element cannot make the service any less a public obligation.
121. The Government of Norway submits that the Applicant’s argument that the
existence of NUFs would establish proof of an effect on trade is based on
an overly formal approach to the effect on trade criterion. It is noted that the
judgments quoted by the Applicant merely show that an EEA State cannot
refuse to recognise a foreign registered company as a lawful legal object, and
that the Applicant has not argued that any of the NUFs have encountered
unlawful restrictions in their course of business due to their decision to register
their company abroad. It is added that the NUFs receive financial support on
the same terms as all other non-municipal kindergartens.
122. The Norwegian Government submits that only a cross-border activity which
is actually carried out, or which is likely to occur, can fulfil the conditions for
effect on trade. The Government finds it difficult to see how inter-state trade is
likely to be affected or capable of being affected if the recipients of the aid, its
customers and its competitors are all engaged in the same State.109
123. The Government finds that the Defendant has assessed the possibility
of potential trade effects with due regard. It argues that, contrary to the
suggestions of the Applicant, the basis for the analysis has to be whether it is
the application of the cost coverage principle on the municipal kindergartens
which is likely to deter foreign investments, and not whether any changes
to the financing of the non-municipal kindergartens might affect the level of
foreign investment. It is added that, although the effect on trade criterion is
normally considered easily met, it should require more than a mere hypothesis
that foreign companies may enter the Norwegian market for the Court to find
that a contested measure is capable of affecting inter-state trade.110
124. Like the Defendant, the Government of Norway finds it difficult to see which
part of the financing system is seen as discriminatory by the Applicant.
Reference is made to Case C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR-2671, at paragraph 11.
Reference is made to Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, at paragraph 79.
109
110
- 120 -
127. The Government of Norway shares the view of the Defendant with regard to
the limitations to the cost coverage principle for private kindergartens.111 With
regard to the limitation on cost increases, it is further argued that without such
a limitation, private kindergartens could simply increase their profits to a higher
level in order to get more funding, as profits are regarded as part of the costs.
This would practically lead to the introduction of the unit cost approach. It is
added that the limitations to the obligation of the municipalities to cover the
costs of the non-municipal kindergartens do not bar the municipalities from
granting more cost coverage.
111
See paragraphs 112 and 113 of this Report.
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v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
126. The Norwegian Government does not share the Applicant’s view that the
Regulation entails discrimination on the basis of nationality. It is argued that
the rules do not differentiate between Norwegian and foreign or public and
private, but between municipal and non-municipal operators. The reason
for the differentiation between these groups is that the municipal authorities
have control over the budget of the municipal kindergartens, but not over the
non-municipal kindergartens. To the Government, real equal treatment would
include barring non-municipal kindergartens from making profits and giving
municipal authorities the right to determine the annual cost level of each nonmunicipal kindergarten.
125. As far as the Applicant might be challenging the cost coverage principle
as such, the Government of Norway refutes this in accordance with the
arguments put forward by the Defendant. It is submitted that Article 59(2) EEA
permits a system of cost coverage, and that a limitation to the coverage of
real costs effectively prevents overcompensation. With view to the existence
of the maximum price ceiling, it is added that applying a different principle
leading to a lower compensation for municipal kindergartens would render
the municipal kindergartens unable to provide their services; thus putting at
stake the paramount objective of the Kindergarten reform, namely to increase
the number and availability of kindergarten places. The Government argues
that to the contrary, it would be the introduction of the unit cost principle
with a high amount to each kindergarten which would lead to a real risk of
overcompensation. With regard to the alleged abuse of the “discretionary
funds”, it is added that earmarked grants which are not spent on the activity for
which they are granted must be returned to the State.
128. The Government disagrees that private kindergartens are impaired in their
market behaviour. It points out that any cost increase resulting from an increase
of the number of children or the composition of children in the kindergarten
would be covered under the Regulation. Furthermore, the Government finds
that it is for the authorities to determine the scope and level of the service when
assigning a public service obligation, and that the undertaking discharging the
obligation cannot claim a right to provide the service at a more costly level than
the one requested by the authorities. The Government submits that the normal
increase of prices and costs in the municipal sector is a legitimate benchmark
which does not lead to unreasonable results in practice. It is argued that as
the average annual cost increase in municipal kindergartens is not known at
the time when the grants are calculated, this benchmark is the best alternative.
Furthermore, the Government finds that until now, this benchmark has led to
higher average cost increase in non-municipal kindergartens than in municipal
kindergartens.
129. To the Commission, the central question in the present case is whether the
municipalities, when providing kindergarten places for their constituency, are
engaged in an economic activity by offering services on a market, or whether
their activity is non-economic in nature.
130. Considering the existing case law of the ECJ, the Commission makes several
observations: first, the ECJ has consistently held that where the Treaty
intended to remove certain activities from the ambit of the competition rules,
it made an express derogation to that effect.112 The Commission notes that
there is no general exception sheltering the social field as a whole from the
application of State Aid and other competition rules. Second, the ECJ has
held that the concept of undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in
which it is financed.113 Third, the ECJ did not consider organisations charged
with the management of certain social security schemes to be undertakings if
the scheme was compulsory, based on the principle of solidarity and entirely
112
113
Reference is made to Joined cases 209/84 to 213/84 Asjes and others [1986] ECR 1425, at paragraph 40.
Reference is made to Case C-41/90 Höfer and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, at paragraph 21; and Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy
- 122 -
132. With regard to the case law in question, the Commission finds that although
providing kindergarten services could constitute an economic activity, this is
not the case in the specific framework in place in Norway. The Commission
points to the strong public nature of the system, the absence of any potential
competition on price, the duty of the municipalities to ensure a sufficient number
of kindergarten places, the fact that it is not possible to charge cost-covering
fees, the objective of providing sufficient kindergarten places irrespective of
costs and the strong element of solidarity which is thereby introduced into the
system.
133. The Commission takes the view that by establishing and maintaining such
a system, the Norwegian State is not seeking to engage in a gainful activity
but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and
educational fields. For these reasons, the Commission considers that given
the specific circumstances of the case, municipal kindergartens in Norway do
not carry out an economic activity.
Reference is made to Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, at paragraphs 18–20;
and Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and others [2004] ECR I-2493, at
paragraph 57.
115
Reference is made to Case C-244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance [1995] ECR I-4013, at paragraph 22; and
Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, at paragraph 87.
116
Reference is made to Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, at paragraph 20; and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, at
paragraph 19.
117
See footnote 54 of this Report.
114
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Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
131. The Commission notes that the ECJ has not yet decided whether, and to
which extent establishments in the field of education can be regarded as
“undertakings” within the meaning of the competition provisions of the EC
Treaty. However, the Commission points to the judgments Humbel and Wirth,
where the ECJ decided with regard to the provisions on free movement of
services that courses given by educational institutions under the national
education system do not constitute services within the meaning of the EC
Treaty.116 The Commission adds that the ECJ did not attach significance to the
question of whether the education was mandatory or not, but in particular to
the fact that only services provided against remuneration are to be considered
as services within the meaning of the EC Treaty. The Commission itself has
applied this case law in a number of State aid decisions.117
non-profit.114 Fourth, the ECJ held a non-profit organisation which managed an
optional pension scheme intended to supplement a basic compulsory scheme,
operating according to the principle of capitalisation, to be an undertaking
within the meaning of Article 85 et seq of the EC Treaty.115
134. With regard to the question of whether the Norwegian system has an effect
on trade by deterring foreign companies from establishing kindergartens in
Norway, the Commission notes that the parties agree that the NUFs examined
by the Defendant in the Decision are foreign undertakings, and concurs
accordingly.118 However, the Commission finds that this is not relevant to answer
the question of whether an effect on trade does exist. It notes that in principle,
there are no restrictions on private undertakings, including undertakings from
other EEA States, to set up private kindergartens in Norway. The Commission
therefore considers that the aid might be liable to affect cross-border trade to
the extent that the current financing system is discriminatory against private
kindergartens.119
135. The Commission acknowledges that the Decision enumerates certain factors
which moderate this view. However, neither the small amount of aid or size of
the undertaking, nor the regional or local character of the services supplied are
sufficient to exclude an effect on trade.120 It is added that an effect on trade can
also exist where undertakings from other Member States could be tempted to
establish themselves in another Member State in order to provide services in
that Member State.121
136. Finally, the Commission notes that in the assessment of whether a measure
involves state aid, it is not required to establish that aid has a real effect on
trade, but only that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition.122
The Commission states that the judgment of the CFI in Wam SpA123 should not
be considered as relevant authority as it is currently under appeal precisely as
regards the extent of the duty of the Commission to motivate the existence of
an effect on trade.124
137. The Commission concludes that since it is not excluded that undertakings from
other EEA countries might establish themselves in Norway to establish private
Reference is made to Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919; and Case
C-167/01 Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10155.
119
Reference is made to Case C-222/04 Cassa di Rispamio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, at paragraph 142.
120
Reference is made to Case C-172/03 Heiser [2005] ECR I-1627, at paragraphs 32–33; and Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR
I-7747, at paragraphs 81–82.
121
Reference is made to Case C-451/03 Calafiori [2006] ECR I-2941, at paragraph 58.
122
Reference is made to Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, at paragraph 44; Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission
[2005] ECR I-10901, at paragraph 111; Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, at paragraph 140; and
Joined Cases T-298/97 et al Mauro and others v Commission [2000] ECR II-2319, at paragraph 95.
123
Case T-316/04 Wam SpA v Commission [2004] ECR II-3917.
124
Pending Case C-494/06 P Commission v Italy and Wam SpA.
118
- 124 -
138. With regard to the argument of the Applicant that the duration of the procedure
proves the existence of serious difficulties, the Commission recalls that the
reasonable length of time for concluding a preliminary investigation depends on
the circumstances of each specific case.125 It is argued that the CFI’s decision
in Prayon-Rupel does not establish a rule of law that a delay of 2 years is ipso
facto evidence of serious difficulties, and that this part of the judgment was an
obiter dictum.126 The Commission further refuses the Applicant’s submission
that the requests for information made by the Defendant could constitute such
evidence. Such an assessment would defeat the purpose of the preliminary
investigation procedure, during which it must be possible for the investigating
authority to make requests for information to the Member State without
prejudging the outcome of the preliminary investigation.
139. The Commission does not agree that the Defendant needed to arrive at the
firm conviction that no aid is at issue because the measure to assess was
not notified.127 What matters is the substantive difficulty in disposing of the
matter. The Commission finds that at least with regard to the question whether
kindergartens in Norway do constitute undertakings, all relevant facts are
well established in the Decision and not contested, and that accordingly, the
Defendant did not encounter any particular difficulties.
Landsforbund
v EFTA Surveillance
Case E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
Norway
kindergartens, it cannot be excluded a priori that trade between EEA countries
could be affected.
The Government of Iceland
141. With reference to the judgments of the ECJ in Humbel and Wirth, it is argued
that the provision of kindergarten places by the municipalities is a public
function falling outside the scope of State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.
It is pointed out that pre-primary education is a service available to all which
is not motivated by profits, but rather part of the national education system.
The Government of Iceland adds that in Iceland, providing kindergartens is an
Reference is made to Case T-95/96 Gestevision Telecinco SA v Commission [1998] ECR II-3407, at paragraph 75; Case T-395/04
Air One v Commission [2006] ECR II-1343, at paragraph 63 et seq.
126
Reference is made to Case T-73/98 Prayon-Rupel v Commission [2001] ECR II-867, at paragraphs 85, 98.
127
Reference is made to Case C-301/87 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraphs 21–22.
125
- 125 -
140. The Government of Iceland supports the submissions of ESA and restricts itself
to make, after outlining the Icelandic law on kindergartens, some observations
on its view that municipal kindergartens are not undertakings.
obligation imposed on the municipalities by law. Finally, it is claimed that even
though the municipality provides its services on a given market, it cannot be
held to be an undertaking as it does so in order to perform a public function of
a purely social nature.128
Carl Baudenbacher
Judge-Rapporteur
128
Reference is made to Case T-319/99 FENIN v Commission [2003] ECR II-357, at paragraph 37–39.
- 126 -
Case E-6/07
HOB vín ehf.
v
Faxaflóahafnir sf.
- 127 -
CASE E-6/07
HOB vín ehf.
v
Faxaflóahafnir sf.
(Port charges – charges having equivalent effect to customs duties – internal taxation –
free movement of goods)
Judgment of the Court, 5 March 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Report for the Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
1. When port charges are not levied
on the products by reason of the fact that
they cross a frontier, they do not constitute
charges having equivalent effect to customs duties. Thus, Article 10 EEA is not
applicable to such port charges. It is immaterial in this context that goods arriving
from abroad by sea may be considered to
have entered the customs territory of the
importing State when brought ashore.
2. Article 11 EEA does not extend to obstacles to trade of a fiscal nature or having
an effect equivalent to customs duties.
3. In the context of Article 14 EEA,
regional and local authorities must be
equated to the central authorities of the
Contracting Parties. Similarly, a partnership
wholly owned by public authorities must
be equated to the public authorities
themselves. It cannot matter in this respect
that the body in question is considered,
under national law, to be a legal person
which is separate from the traditional
public authorities and whose activity is not
regarded as a public operation.
4. The fact that a charge is collected by
a body for its own benefit does not exclude
that it may constitute taxation within the
meaning of Article 14 EEA. Charges which
constitute payment for services rendered
in connection with the goods may also
constitute taxation. This is so even where
there is no legal obligation to receive
the service in question and the service
is provided on the basis of a contract,
governed by private law, between the
service provider and the customer.
5. The concept of taxation within the
meaning of Article 14 EEA must be
interpreted in a wide sense. Payment
for services provided by a public entity
constitutes taxation for the purposes of
- 128 -
HOB vín ehf.
gegn
Faxaflóahöfnum sf.
(Hafnargjöld – gjöld sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif og tollar – innlendir skattar – frjálsir
vöruflutningar)
Dómur EFTA-dómstólsins, 5. mars 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Skýrsla framsögumanns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Samantekt
2. Ákvæði 11. gr. EES nær hvorki til
viðskiptahindrana sem eru skattalegs eðlis
né ráðstafana sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif
og tollar.
3. Í tengslum við 14. gr. EES verður að
jafna svæðis- og staðbundnum stjórnvöldum
til miðlægra stjórnvalda samningsaðila.
Með sama hætti verður sameignarfélagi
sem er að fullu í eigu opinberra aðila
jafnað til þeirra. Skiptir í því sambandi ekki
máli þótt sameignarfélagið sé að landsrétti
sjálfstæður lögaðili gagnvart hefðbundnum
opinberum yfirvöldum og starfsemi þess
teljist ekki til opinberrar starfsemi.
4. Ekki er útilokað að gjald sem aðili
innheimtir í eigin þágu geti talist skattur
í skilningi 14. gr. EES. Gjöld fyrir veitta
þjónustu vegna vöru geta einnig talist
skattur. Þá er ljóst, að jafnvel þótt ekki sé
að lögum skylt að leita þjónustunnar og hún
veitt á grundvelli samnings einkaréttarlegs
eðlis milli þjónustuaðila og viðskiptavinar,
getur einnig verið um skatt að ræða.
5. Hugtakið skattur í skilningi 14. gr. EES
hefur rúma merkingu. Gjald fyrir þjónustu
sem opinber aðili veitir telst skattur í
skilningi 14. gr. EES, þegar kaupandi
hennar á ekkert val um viðsemjanda og
verður að reiða sig á umrædda þjónustu.
Skiptir í því samhengi ekki máli hvort gjald
er ákvarðað á grundvelli viðskiptalegra
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Summary
1. Þegar hafnargjöld eru ekki lögð á
vöru vegna flutnings hennar yfir landamæri
teljast þau ekki gjöld sem hafa samsvarandi
áhrif og tollar. Af þeirri ástæðu á 10. gr.
EES ekki við um slík hafnargjöld. Hefur í
því sambandi ekki þýðingu þótt vörur sem
fluttar eru með skipi frá öðrum löndum fari
inn á tollsvæði innflutningsríkisins þegar
þeim er skipað á land.
vín ehf.vvAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
Case E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
CaseCase
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
MÁL E-6/07
Article 14 EEA when customers have no
option but to rely on the services of that
provider. In this context, it cannot matter
whether the price has been set according
to purely commercial criteria, focusing
on profit maximisation, or according to
considerations of the general good usually
associated with the exercise of public
authority.
6. A system of taxation which makes no
reference to the origin of the goods may
still violate Article 14 EEA if it is designed
in such a way as to benefit typically
domestic products and to handicap
imported products to the same extent. A
port charge does not discriminate imported
products in relation to domestic products
as long as the reason why only imported
products become subject to the charge
is the fact that domestic products are not
transported by sea and so do not need
port services, and the body setting
the tariff for the port services does not set
the tariff for comparable services needed
in relation to domestic products. In this
respect, it cannot matter that the charge
in question clearly exceeds the cost
of the service for which it constitutes
payment.
7. For products to be considered similar
under the first paragraph of Article 14 EEA,
they must have similar characteristics and
meet the same needs from the point of view
of the consumer. This is not the case with
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.
8. The second paragraph of Article 14
EEA calls for an assessment of whether
or not the tax is of such a kind as to have
the effect, on the market in question, of
reducing potential consumption of imported
products to the advantage of competing
domestic products. For this to be the case,
it is not sufficient that the relevant products
are in competition with one another. It must
further be demonstrated that the higher
tax rate applies chiefly to the imported
products, and that the difference in tax
burden caused by the charge in question
would have an effect on the cross-elasticity
of the demand. In making this assessment,
one must take into account inter alia the
discrepancy in price which may exist
between the products independently of
that difference.
-- 130
129 --
8. Við beitingu annars málsl. 14. gr. EES
þarf að meta hvort skattur hafi þau áhrif á
viðkomandi markaði að möguleg neysla
innfluttra vara dragist saman, sem komi
innlendum vörum í samkeppni til góða. Í
slíkum tilvikum nægir ekki að viðkomandi
vörur séu í samkeppni, heldur þarf einnig
að sýna fram á að hærri skattur sé einkum
lagður á innflutta vöru og að mismunur á
skattbyrði, sem tiltekin gjöld hafi í för með
sér, myndi einnig hafa áhrif á víxlteygni
eftirspurnar á markaði. Við þetta mat skal
m.a. taka tillit til þess verðmunar sem er á
vörunum óháð mismunandi skattbyrði.
Summary
6. Þótt skattlagning taki ekki mið af
uppruna vöru getur hún samt sem áður
brotið gegn 14. gr. EES, ef hún er til þess
fallin að hygla almennt innlendum vörum
á kostnað innfluttra. Hafnargjöld fela ekki
í sér mismunun á innfluttri vöru gagnvart
innlendri vöru þegar ástæða þess að
gjöldin eru eingöngu lögð á innflutta vöru
er sú, að innlend vara er ekki flutt sjóleiðis
og þarf því ekki hafnarþjónustu, og sá sem
setur gjaldskrána fyrir hafnarþjónustuna
setur ekki gjaldskrá fyrir sambærilega
þjónustu sem þörf er á vegna innlendrar
vöru. Í þessu sambandi skiptir ekki máli
hvort gjöldin sem um ræðir fari augljóslega
fram úr kostnaði við veitta þjónustu.
7. Vörur teljast sams konar samkvæmt
fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES, ef þær hafa
sambærilega eiginleika og fullnægja sömu
þörfum frá sjónarhóli neytenda. Áfengir
drykkir og óáfengir eru ekki sams konar
vara í þessum skilningi.
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
Case E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
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CaseCase
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Surveillance
v Norway
sjónarmiða með hámarkshagnað í huga,
eða á grundvelli almannahagsmuna
sem að öllu jöfnu tengjast starfsemi hins
opinbera.
-- 131
129 --
5 March 20081∗
(Port charges – charges having equivalent effect to customs duties – internal taxation –
free movement of goods)
In Case E-6/07,
REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Hæstiréttur
Íslands (the Supreme Court of Iceland) in a case pending before it between
HOB vín ehf.
and
Faxaflóahafnir sf.
concerning rules on free movement of goods within the EEA,
THE COURT,
composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Thorgeir Örlygsson and Henrik Bull (JudgeRapporteur), Judges,
– the Appellant, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, Supreme Court Attorney;
– the Respondent, represented by Anton Björn Markússon, Supreme Court Attorney;
– the Government of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First Secretary
and Legal Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent;
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson and
Florence Simonetti, Officers, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as
Agents; and
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Richard Lyal and
Søren Schønberg, acting as Agents,
∗
Language of the Request: Icelandic.
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5. mars 2008*1*
(Hafnargjöld – gjöld sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif og tollar – innlendir skattar – frjálsir
vöruflutningar)
Mál E-6/07,
BEIÐNI, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTA-ríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar
og dómstóls, um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, frá Hæstarétti Íslands, í máli sem þar
er rekið
HOB-vín ehf.
gegn
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
Case E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
CaseCase
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
DÓMUR DÓMSTÓLSINS
varðandi reglur um frjálsa vöruflutninga á Evrópska efnahagssvæðinu,
DÓMSTÓLLINN,
skipaður dómurunum Carl Baudenbacher, forseta, Þorgeiri Örlygssyni og Henrik Bull,
framsögumanni,
dómritari: Skúli Magnússon,
hefur, með tilliti til skriflegra greinargerða frá:
– áfrýjanda, í fyrirsvari er Stefán Geir Þórisson, hrl., Reykjavík;
– stefnda, í fyrirsvari er Anton Björn Markússon, hrl., Reykjavík;
– ríkisstjórn Íslands, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Sesselja Sigurðardóttir,
lögfræðingur og sendiráðsritari á skrifstofu Evrópumála í utanríkisráðuneytinu;
– eftirlitsstofnun EFTA, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson
og Florence Simonetti, fulltrúar á lögfræði- og framkvæmdasviði; og
– framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna, í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Richard
Lyal og Søren Schønberg,
JUDGMENT
með tilliti til skýrslu framsögumanns,
Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit á íslensku.
*
- 133
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having heard oral argument of the Appellant, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, the
Respondent, represented by Anton Björn Markússon, the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
represented by Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson and Florence Simonetti, and the Commission
of the European Communities, represented by Richard Lyal and Søren Schønberg, at
the hearing on 14 December 2007,
gives the following
Judgment
I
Facts and procedure
1
Faxaflóahafnir sf. (hereinafter “the Respondent”) is a partnership founded by
several municipalities around the bay of Faxaflói in south-western Iceland. Its
principle object is the operation of four Icelandic ports (the Ports of Reykjavík,
Akranes, Grundartangi and Borgarnes). The Respondent’s tariffs provide for
four categories of port charges for the loading and unloading of cargo. The
charge for non-alcoholic beverages is ISK 370.80 per tonne while that for
alcoholic beverages amounts to ISK 1 022.30 per tonne.
2
HOB vín ehf. (hereinafter “the Appellant”), which imports alcoholic beverages
from other EEA States, and which has had to pay the higher charge on
alcoholic beverages, brought an action against the Respondent before the
Reykjavík District Court. The Appellant claimed, principally, reimbursement of
the charges that it had paid to the Respondent in connection with imports of
alcoholic beverages. In the alternative, the Appellant claimed reimbursement
of the difference between what it had paid and the amount that it would have
been required to pay if the imports had consisted of non-alcoholic beverages.
The Appellant pleaded inter alia that the charges were contrary to Article 10, 11
or 14 EEA. The Reykjavík District Court dismissed the action. It held that the
provisions of the EEA Agreement on the free movement of goods did not apply
to the Respondent, and that the charges that it levied could not be regarded as
customs, taxes or duties of any other type to be paid to a public entity, in addition
to which the court did not consider that the charges constituted a restriction on
the free movement of goods. The Appellant appealed to Hæstiréttur Íslands.
The appeal was lodged on 19 October 2006.
3
The significant point of dispute between the parties concerns the Appellant’s
argument that the provisions of the EEA Agreement on free movement of goods
apply to the Respondent, and that the imposition of charges in connection
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dóm
I
Málsatvik og meðferð máls
1
Faxaflóahafnir sf. (hér eftir stefndi) er sameignarfélag sem stofnað var
af nokkrum sveitarfélögum við Faxaflóa. Helsti tilgangur félagsins er
rekstur fjögurra íslenskra hafna, þ.e. Reykjavíkurhafnar, Akraneshafnar,
Grundartangahafnar og Borgarneshafnar. Samkvæmt gjaldskrá stefnda er
gert ráð fyrir fjórum flokkum hafnargjalda við lestun og losun vöru. Hafnargjöld
vegna óáfengra drykkja eru 370,80 krónur fyrir hvert tonn en vegna áfengis
1.022,30 krónur fyrir hvert tonn.
2
HOB vín ehf. (hér eftir áfrýjandi) sem flytur inn áfengi frá öðrum EES-ríkjum og
hefur þurft að greiða hin hærri gjöld vegna áfengis, höfðaði mál gegn stefnda
fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur. Áfrýjandi krafðist aðallega endurgreiðslu á þeim
gjöldum sem hann greiddi stefnda vegna innflutnings áfengis, en til vara að
stefnda yrði gert að greiða honum fjárhæð sem nemur mismuninum á því sem
hann greiddi og því sem honum hefði borið að greiða ef um óáfenga drykki
hefði verið að ræða. Hann byggði kröfur sínar m.a. á því að gjaldtakan væri
í andstöðu við 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES. Í héraðsdómi var stefndi sýknaðar af
kröfum áfrýjanda. Héraðsdómur taldi að ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa
vöruflutninga tækju ekki til stefnda og að þau gjöld sem hann innheimti væru
hvorki tollur, skattur né önnur gjöld sem ættu að renna til opinbers aðila, auk
þess sem gjöldin hindruðu ekki frjálsa vöruflutninga. Héraðsdómi var áfrýjað til
Hæstaréttar Íslands 19. október 2006.
3
Sá ágreiningur aðila sem hér skiptir máli varðar þá málsástæðu áfrýjanda
að ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa vöruflutninga taki til stefnda, og að
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Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
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kveðið upp svofelldan
JUDGMENT
og munnlegs málflutnings umboðsmanns áfrýjanda, Stefáns Geirs Þórissonar,
umboðsmanns stefnda, Antons Björns Markússonar, fulltrúa eftirlitsstofnunar EFTA,
Ólafs Jóhannesar Einarssonar og Florence Simonetti, og fulltrúa framkvæmdastjórnar
Evrópubandalaganna Richard Lyal og Søren Schønberg, sem fram fór 14. desember
2007,
with the import of alcoholic beverages via ports owned by the Respondent
constitutes a violation of Article 10, 11 or 14 EEA.
4
By a letter dated 8 May 2007, registered at the EFTA Court on 21 May 2007,
Hæstiréttur Íslands put a request to the Court for an Advisory Opinion on the
following two questions:
1. Does the levying of charges by a partnership owned by several municipalities,
in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages from other EEA States
through a port owned by the partnership, fall under the provisions of Article
10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement? The question is based on the premises
that the operation of the port is not regarded in law as a public operation;
the levying of the charges is based on an authorisation in law and the
charges are to meet the cost of the services provided, together with a share
of the cost related to the joint operation of the port.
2. If the answer to the first question is such that any of the abovementioned
provisions of the EEA Agreement apply, does that provision preclude the
levying of charges of the type referred to in the first question? The question
is based on the premise that higher charges are imposed in connection
with the import of alcoholic beverages than of non-alcoholic beverages,
and that in Iceland alcoholic beverages are generally imported, inter alia
from other EEA States.
II Legal background
National Law
5
Article 8(1)–(3) of the Ports Act No 61/2003 (Hafnalög) provides for three
different forms of operation of ports. First, a port may be owned by a municipality
and operated without appointing a special board of directors. Second, it may
be owned by a municipality and operated under a special board of directors.
Third, it can be operated as a public limited liability company, irrespective
of whether or not it is owned by public bodies, as a private limited liability
company, as a partnership or by a private body operating independently.
6
The Respondent was founded as a partnership under Article 8(3) of the Ports
Act. Article 8(3) states specifically that ports operated under that paragraph
are not regarded as public operators.
7
Chapter VI of the Ports Act addresses this type of ports specifically and states,
amongst other things, in Article 19, that they are permitted to pay dividends
to their owners only after having set aside funds for satisfactory maintenance
136 - 132
4
Með bréfi, dagsettu 8. maí 2007, skráðu í málaskrá EFTA-dómstólsins 21. maí
2007, óskaði Hæstiréttur Íslands eftir ráðgefandi áliti varðandi eftirfarandi tvær
spurningar:
1. Fellur gjaldtaka af hálfu sameignarfélags í eigu nokkurra sveitarfélaga,
vegna innflutnings á áfengi frá öðrum aðildarríkjum EES-samningsins um
höfn í eigu félagsins, undir ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES-samningsins?
Er þá miðað við, að rekstur hafnarinnar teljist lögum samkvæmt ekki opinber
rekstur, að gjöldin séu lögð á með heimild í lögum og að þau skuli standa
undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu, sem veitt er ásamt hlutdeild í sameiginlegum
rekstri hafnarinnar.
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
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gjaldtaka vegna innflutnings á áfengi um hafnir í eigu stefnda feli í sér brot
gegn 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES.
2. Ef svarið við fyrstu spurningu er á þann veg, að eitthvert þeirra
samningsákvæða, sem þar er vísað til, eigi við, stendur það ákvæði í vegi
gjaldtöku af því tagi, sem nefnd er í fyrstu spurningu? Er þá miðað við, að
hærri gjöld séu lögð á vegna innflutnings áfengra drykkja en óáfengra, og
áfengir drykkir séu almennt fluttir inn frá löndum utan Íslands, þar á meðal
frá öðrum aðildarríkjum EES-samningsins.
II Löggjöf
5
Samkvæmt 1.-3. tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga nr. 61/2003 getur rekstrarform hafna
verið þrenns konar. Í fyrsta lagi getur höfn verið í eigu sveitarfélags og án
sérstakrar hafnarstjórnar, í öðru lagi í eigu sveitarfélags með hafnarstjórn
og í þriðja lagi hlutafélag, hvort sem það er í eigu opinberra aðila eða ekki,
einkahlutafélag, sameignarfélag eða einkaaðili í sjálfstæðum rekstri.
6
Stefndi er sameignarfélag sem stofnað var samkvæmt 3. tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga.
Þar er sérstaklega tekið fram að hafnir sem eru reknar samkvæmt þeim lið
teljast ekki til opinbers rekstrar.
7
Í VI. kafla hafnalaga eru sérstök ákvæði um slíkar hafnir. Þar segir m.a. í 19.
gr. að þeim sé aðeins heimilt að greiða arð til eigenda sinna eftir að fé hefur
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JUDGMENT
Landsréttur
and renewal of the port, in accordance with more detailed provisions in the
regulation applying to the port, issued under Article 4 of the Act.
8
Article 20 of the Ports Act states that a port operated under Article 8(3) has full
operational authority, and that the levying of charges by the port shall cover
the cost of the services provided and a share of the cost related to the joint
operation of the port.
9
The Respondent’s charges are subject to the requirements of Article 20, cf.
Article 19, of the Ports Act.
EEA Law
Customs duties on imports and exports, and any charges having equivalent
effect, shall be prohibited between the Contracting Parties. Without prejudice
to the arrangements set out in Protocol 5, this shall also apply to customs
duties of a fiscal nature.
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall be prohibited between the Contracting Parties.
No Contracting Party shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of
other Contracting Parties any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that
imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.
Furthermore, no Contracting Party shall impose on the products of other
Contracting Parties any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect
protection to other products.
framework, the facts, the procedure and the written observations submitted to
the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in so far as is
The first question
14 By its first question, Hæstiréttur Íslands asks whether the levying of charges
by a partnership owned by several municipalities, in connection with the import
of alcoholic beverages from other EEA States through a port owned by the
138 - 133
8
Í 20. gr. hafnalaga kemur fram að höfn sem rekin er samkvæmt 3. tölul. 8.
gr. hefur starfsheimildir án takmarkana og að gjaldtaka hafnar skal miðuð við
að hún standi undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu sem veitt er ásamt hlutdeild í
sameiginlegum rekstri hennar.
9
Gjaldskrá sú sem stefndi setur þarf að uppfylla skilyrði sem fram koma í 20. gr.,
sbr. 19. gr. hafnalaga.
EES-réttur
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
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verið lagt til hliðar í fullnægjandi viðhald og endurnýjun hafnarinnar samkvæmt
nánari ákvæðum í reglugerð settri á grundvelli 4. gr. laganna.
Tollar á innflutning og útflutning, svo og gjöld sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif, eru
bannaðir milli samningsaðila. Með fyrirvara um það fyrirkomulag sem um getur
í bókun 5 skal þetta einnig eiga við um fjáröflunartolla.
Magntakmarkanir á innflutningi, svo og allar ráðstafanir sem hafa samsvarandi
áhrif, eru bannaðar milli samningsaðila.
Einstökum samningsaðilum er óheimilt að leggja hvers kyns beinan eða
óbeinan skatt innanlands á framleiðsluvörur annarra samningsaðila umfram
það sem beint eða óbeint er lagt á sams konar innlendar framleiðsluvörur.
Samningsaðila er einnig óheimilt að leggja á framleiðsluvörur annarra
samningsaðila innlendan skatt sem er til þess fallinn að vernda óbeint aðrar
framleiðsluvörur.
13 Vísað er til skýrslu framsögumanns um frekari lýsingu löggjafar, málsatvika og
meðferðar málsins, svo og um greinargerðir sem dómstólnum bárust. Þessi
atriði verða ekki rakin frekar eða rædd hér á eftir nema forsendur dómsins
krefji.
IIIÁlit dómstólsins
14 Með fyrstu spurningu sinni leitar Hæstiréttur Íslands svara við því hvort
gjaldtaka af hálfu sameignarfélags sem er í eigu nokkurra sveitarfélaga, vegna
innflutnings á áfengi frá öðrum EES-ríkjum um höfn í eigu félagsins, falli undir
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JUDGMENT
Fyrsta spurning
partnership, falls under the provisions of Article 10, 11 or 14 EEA. The question
is based on the premises that the operation of the port is not regarded in law as
a public operation; that the levying of the charges is based on an authorisation
in law and that the charges are to meet the cost of the services provided,
together with a share of the cost related to the joint operation of the port.
15 The Appellant is of the opinion that the case falls to be assessed under Article
10 EEA which prohibits customs duties and any charges having equivalent
effect. As domestic alcoholic beverages are only transported by road, it is only
on imported alcoholic beverages that the port charge in question has to be
paid. Consequently, the port charge falls exclusively on imported goods, in
connection with their importation into Iceland through the ports operated by the
Respondent. Furthermore, as the charge levied on alcoholic products exceeds
the cost of the service connected to it, the charge does not fall outside Article
10 EEA by virtue of being payment for services. In the alternative, the Appellant
alleges that the case must be assessed under Article 14 EEA prohibiting
discriminatory internal taxation. Should the Court come to the conclusion that
neither Article 10 nor Article 14 EEA applies, the Appellant is of the opinion that
the port charge needs to be scrutinised under Article 11 EEA on the prohibition
of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect.
16 The Appellant argues that there is no difference between Articles 10, 11 and
14 EEA in respect of which bodies are bound by them. The provisions apply
to measures emanating not only from the central government but also from
all local authorities. The levying of port charges is de facto a public measure
which must be examined under the rules on free movement of goods, even if
the ports themselves are organised as private operators.
17 According to the Respondent, already its status as a private body means
that Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA are not applicable to it. Article 10 EEA does
not apply also for the reason that the port charges are levied irrespective of
whether the goods have been imported or not and Article 14 EEA does not
apply also for the reason that the port charges are simply payment for services
rendered.
18 The Government of Iceland observes, firstly, that wine is excluded from the
scope of the EEA Agreement. Secondly, it is argued that Articles 10, 11 and 14
EEA only apply to actions of public bodies and for that reason do not apply to
an operation such as that of the Respondent. The fee charged by the ports of
the Respondent is merely payment for services provided. The tariff is set by
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15 Áfrýjandi telur úrlausn málsins ráðast af 10. gr. EES sem bannar tolla og gjöld
sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif. Hafnargjöldin sem hér um ræðir séu eingöngu
lögð á innflutt áfengi þar sem áfengi framleitt innanlands sé einungis flutt
landleiðina. Þar með leggist hafnargjöldin aðeins á innflutta vöru þegar hún
er flutt til landsins um hafnir sem stefndi rekur. Þar sem gjöld á innflutt áfengi
fari fram úr kostnaði við þá þjónustu sem veitt er í tengslum við innflutninginn,
falli þau ekki utan gildissviðs 10. gr. á þeirri forsendu að þau séu þjónustugjöld.
Áfrýjandi heldur því fram til vara að úrlausn málsins ráðist af 14. gr. EES sem
bannar mismunun í tengslum við innlenda skatta. Komist dómstóllinn að þeirri
niðurstöðu að hvorki 10. né 14. gr. EES eigi við, telur áfrýjandi að meta beri
lögmæti gjaldanna á grundvelli 11. gr. EES sem bannar magntakmarkanir og
allar ráðstafanir sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif.
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v Norway
10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES. Er þá miðað við að rekstur hafnarinnar teljist lögum
samkvæmt ekki opinber rekstur, að gjöldin séu lögð á með heimild í lögum og
að þau standi undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu sem veitt er, ásamt hlutdeild í
sameiginlegum rekstri hafnarinnar.
16 Áfrýjandi telur engan mun vera á 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES með tillit til þess
hverjir séu bundnir af ákvæðum þeirra. Ákvæðin eigi jafnt við um ráðstafanir
miðlægra sem staðbundinna stjórnvalda. Álagning hafnargjalda sé í raun
opinber ráðstöfun sem meta beri samkvæmt reglunum um frjálsa vöruflutninga
jafnvel þótt rekstrarfyrirkomulag hafnanna sé einkaréttarlegs eðlis.
18 Ríkisstjórn Íslands bendir í fyrsta lagi á að vín falli ekki undir gildissvið EESsamningsins. Í öðru lagi eigi 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES aðeins við um starfsemi
opinberra aðila og taki þar með ekki til starfsemi eins og þeirrar sem stefndi
hefur með höndum. Hafnargjöld áfrýjanda séu einungis endurgjald fyrir veitta
þjónustu. Ákvarðanir stefnda um gjaldtöku séu einkaréttarlegs eðlis og teknar
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JUDGMENT
17 Stefndi heldur því fram að 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES taki ekki til starfsemi hans
þegar af þeirri ástæðu að hann sé einkaréttarlegur aðili. Auk þess eigi 10. gr.
EES ekki við þar sem hafnargjöldin séu lögð jafnt á innlenda og innflutta vöru.
Þá eigi ákvæði 14. gr. EES heldur ekki við þar sem hafnargjöldin séu einungis
endurgjald fyrir veitta þjónustu.
the Respondent on a private law basis and without influence from the State
or municipalities. The Respondent is in competition with other ports, and
can price its services according to market conditions at any given time. The
Government finally observes that the Respondent has not been granted any
special or exclusive rights by the municipalities.
19 The EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”) observes that with regard
to alcoholic beverages, Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA only apply to beer and
spirits.
20 According to ESA, Article 10 EEA does not apply because the port charges
in question are levied also on goods which arrive from other Icelandic ports.
Therefore, they do not fulfil the requirement for falling under Article 10 EEA of
being unilaterally imposed on the goods in question by reason that the goods
cross a frontier.
21 ESA points out that in order for Article 14 EEA to apply, the port charges in
question need to qualify as taxation within the meaning of that Article. In this
respect, ESA sees no difference between the public institutions themselves
and bodies controlled by them in the way in which the Respondent is controlled
by the municipalities which own it. However, ESA does not find it obvious that
Article 14 EEA applies when the entity in question is acting outside the remit
of public law functions. The notion of taxation is normally associated with
contributions to public revenue that are compulsory. As ESA, in relation to the
second question posed by Hæstiréttur Íslands, comes to the conclusion that
in any case the port charges are not contrary to Article 14 EEA, ESA does not
find it necessary to conclude whether port charges such as those at issue in
the present case qualify as taxation at all.
22 ESA further argues that Article 11 EEA does not extend to trade obstacles of a
fiscal nature or having an effect equivalent to customs duties.
23 ESA’s views in relation to the first question are largely shared by the Commission
of the European Communities (hereinafter the “Commission”). The Commission
also refrains from drawing a conclusion with regard to whether the charges in
question constitute taxation in relation to Article 14 EEA.
24 The Court notes at the outset that it follows from Tables I and II of Protocol
3 to the EEA Agreement, which list beer and spirits, that Iceland is bound
by Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA in relation to those categories of products by
virtue of Article 8(3)(b) EEA and Article 1 of Protocol 3, cf. Case E-9/00 ESA v
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19 Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (hér eftir ESA) bendir á að hvað áfengi varðar gildi
10., 11. og 14. gr. EES aðeins um bjór og brennda drykki.
20 Að mati ESA á 10. gr. EES ekki við þar sem umrædd hafnargjöld eru einnig
lögð á vörur sem koma frá öðrum íslenskum höfnum. Gjöldin fullnægi þess
vegna ekki því skilyrði 10. gr. EES að vera einhliða lögð á umræddar vörur í
tengslum við flutning þeirra yfir landamæri.
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án íhlutunar ríkis eða sveitarfélaga. Stefndi eigi í samkeppni við aðrar hafnir
og geti verðlagt þjónustu sína í samræmi við markaðsaðstæður hverju sinni.
Ríkisstjórnin bendir loks á að sveitarfélögin hafi hvorki veitt stefnda nein sérstök
réttindi né einkarétt í tengslum við starfsemi hans.
21 ESA vísar til þess að 14. gr. EES eigi því aðeins við að hafnargjöldin sem
hér um ræðir séu skattur í skilningi þeirrar greinar. Í því sambandi telur ESA
að ekki verði gerður greinarmunur á opinberum stofnunum og aðilum sem
lúta stjórn þeirra, eins og stefnda, sem sé í eigu og undir stjórn sveitarfélaga.
ESA telur þó ekki augljóst að 14. gr. EES eigi við þegar starfsemi þess aðila
sem um ræðir fellur utan sviðs opinbers réttar. Hugtakið skattur tengist að
öllu jöfnu skyldubundnum framlögum til hins opinbera. Í ljósi niðurstöðu sinnar
varðandi aðra spurningu Hæstaréttar Íslands, að hvað sem öðru líður brjóti
hafnargjöldin sem um ræðir ekki gegn ákvæðum 14. gr. EES, telur ESA að ekki
sé þörf á að taka afstöðu til þess hvort þau teljist skattur eða ekki.
22 ESA heldur því einnig fram að 11. gr. EES eigi hvorki við um viðskiptahindranir
skattalegs eðlis né ráðstafanir sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif og tollar.
24 Dómstóllinn tekur í fyrsta lagi fram, að það leiðir af töflum I og II í bókun 3 við
EES-samninginn, þar sem ,,öl og áfengir vökvar” eru taldir upp, að Ísland er
samkvæmt b-lið 3. mgr. 8. gr. EES og 1. gr. bókunar 3 bundið af 10., 11. og
14. gr. EES hvað varðar þá vöruflokka, sbr. mál E-9/00 ESA v Noregur [2002]
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JUDGMENT
23 Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna (hér eftir framkvæmdastjórnin) tekur
að mestu undir með ESA varðandi svar við fyrstu spurningunni og tekur heldur
ekki afstöðu til þess hvort umrædd hafnargjöld teljist skattur í skilningi 14. gr.
EES.
Norway [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 72, at paragraph 30. However, as Article 8(3)(a)
EEA does not refer to Chapter 22 of the Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System, Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA do not apply to wine, cf. Case
E-4/04 Pedicel [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraphs 24–25 and 28–29.
25 Next, the Court finds it appropriate to assess whether charges such as the port
charges in question fall within the scope of Article 10 EEA.
26 It is not disputed that, formally, the port charge levied by the Respondent for
the loading and unloading of alcoholic beverages is imposed regardless of
whether the products are being imported or have been transported by sea
from another port in Iceland. Thus, as those charges are not levied on the
products by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, they do not constitute
charges having equivalent effect to customs duties, see for comparison Case
24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, at paragraphs 8−9 and Case
C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085 (hereinafter “Haahr Petroleum”),
at paragraph 20. Already for that reason, Article 10 EEA is not applicable.
It is immaterial in this context that goods arriving from abroad by sea may
be considered to have entered the customs territory of the importing State
when brought ashore. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (hereinafter the “ECJ”) in Case C-163/90 Legros [1992] ECR
I-4625, referred to by the Appellant, does not contradict this finding. The dues
imposed in that case were levied on goods by reason of the fact that they
crossed a regional border and the dues did not apply to goods originating
in that region, cf. paragraphs 4 and 11−12 of the judgment. The reason
why the port charge at issue in the present case is not levied on domestic
alcoholic beverages is that, for reasons of practicality or economy, they are not
transported by sea.
27 As Article 10 EEA is not applicable to port charges such as those at issue in
this case, the Court has to assess whether Article 14 EEA may apply.
28 Those who have submitted observations to the Court disagree, firstly, on
whether Article 14 EEA may be applicable to charges set by private bodies
and, secondly, on whether the Respondent in this respect must be considered
a private body or equated to a public authority. As the former question only
arises if the Respondent must be considered a private body in relation to
Article 14 EEA, the Court will deal with the latter question first.
29 Whether a certain body constitutes a public authority must be decided on the
basis of the relevant provisions of the EEA Agreement itself. In this context,
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25 Næst liggur fyrir að taka afstöðu til þess hvort hafnargjöldin sem um ræðir falli
undir gildissvið 10. gr. EES.
26 Ágreiningslaust er að hafnargjöld þau sem stefndi leggur á við lestun og losun
áfengis eru, formlega séð, innheimt óháð því hvort varan er innflutt eða hún
flutt með skipi frá annarri höfn innanlands. Þar sem gjöldin eru ekki lögð á
vöru vegna flutnings hennar yfir landamæri teljast þau ekki gjöld sem hafa
samsvarandi áhrif og tollar. Sjá til samanburðar mál 24/68 Commission v Italy
[1969] ECR 193, 8.-9. mgr. og mál C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR
I-4085, 20. mgr. (Haahr Petroleum). Þegar af þeirri ástæðu á 10. gr. EES ekki
við. Hefur í því sambandi ekki þýðingu þótt vörur sem fluttar eru með skipi frá
öðrum löndum fari inn á tollsvæði innflutningsríkisins þegar þeim er skipað á
land. Sú niðurstaða er ekki í ósamræmi við dóm dómstóls Evrópubandalaganna
(hér eftir Evrópudómstóllinn) í máli C-163/90 Legros [1992] ECR I-4625, sem
áfrýjandi vísar til. Það mál varðaði gjöld sem lögð voru á vörur við flutning
þeirra yfir héraðsmörk en ekki á vörur með uppruna í viðkomandi héraði, sbr.
4. og 11.-12. mgr. dómsins. Í málinu fyrir landsdómstólnum eru það hins vegar
fjárhags- og hagkvæmniástæður sem ráða því að innlent áfengi er ekki flutt
sjóleiðis og hafnargjöld því ekki á það lagt.
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EFTA Ct. Rep. 72, 30. mgr. Hins vegar vísar a-liður 3. mgr. 8. gr. EES ekki til
22. kafla í samræmdu vörulýsingar- og vöruheitaskránni, og því taka 10., 11.
og 14. gr. EES ekki til víns, sbr. mál E-4/04 Pedicel [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep.1,
24.-25. mgr. og 28.-29. mgr.
27 Þar sem 10. gr. EES á ekki við um hafnargjöld eins og þau sem hér um ræðir,
liggur næst fyrir að meta hvort gjaldtakan geti fallið undir 14. gr. EES.
29 Það ræðst af viðeigandi ákvæðum EES-samningsins hvort tiltekinn aðili
telst opinbert yfirvald eða ekki. Í því samhengi verður að jafna svæðis-- 136
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JUDGMENT
28 Þeir sem sendu dómstólnum athugasemdir eru í fyrsta lagi ósammála um
hvort gjaldtaka einkaaðila geti fallið undir 14. gr. EES, og í öðru lagi hvort
stefndi teljist einkaaðili í þessu sambandi eða honum verði jafnað til opinbers
yfirvalds. Þar sem fyrra álitaefnið kemur því aðeins til skoðunar að líta beri á
stefnda sem einkaaðila við beitingu 14. gr. EES, verður fyrst tekin afstaða til
þess síðara.
regional and local authorities must be equated to the central authorities of the
Contracting Parties. The obligations under the Agreement must be the same
for all Contracting Parties irrespective of the distribution of powers and tasks
between the central, regional and local levels of government. This distribution
may vary from one Contracting Party to the other (see for comparison with
regard to Article 28 EC, the provision corresponding to Article 11 EEA, Joined
Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior and Publivía
[1991] ECR I-4151, at paragraph 8).
30 Similarly, a partnership wholly owned by public authorities must be equated
to the public authorities themselves. Otherwise, EEA States could circumvent
their obligations under Article 14 EEA by means of such partnerships. It cannot
matter in this respect that the body in question is considered, under national
law, to be a legal person which is separate from the traditional public authorities
and whose activity is not regarded as a public operation.
31 Article 14 EEA covers not only taxes imposed directly on the goods as such,
but also taxes which have an immediate effect on the cost of the goods, see
for comparison Case 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247 (hereinafter “Schöttle”),
at paragraphs 13−15. The fact that the charge is collected by a body for its own
benefit does not exclude that it may constitute taxation within the meaning of
Article 14 EEA, see for comparison Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi [1977] ECR
557, at paragraph 19, and Haahr Petroleum, at paragraph 4. In this respect,
it follows from Haahr Petroleum that also charges which constitute payment
for services rendered in connection with the goods, for instance port services,
may constitute taxation in relation to Article 14 EEA, see paragraph 35 of that
judgment. It is also evident from the facts of that case that this is so even
though there is no legal obligation to receive the service in question and the
service is provided on the basis of a contract, governed by private law, between
the service provider and the customer.
32 In Haahr Petroleum, the tariff was set by the Minister in the exercise of official
authority vis-à-vis the ports. The ports were not free to set their own tariffs. In the
present case, it would seem that the port operator sets the tariff itself based on
an authorisation in law which subjects the pricing policy only to conditions of a
general nature. The question is whether, under such circumstances, payment
for services may qualify as taxation for the purposes of Article 14 EEA.
33 Public authorities must be able to engage in economic activities without their
pricing policy falling under Article 14 EEA whenever that activity consists in
146 - 137
30 Með sama hætti verður sameignarfélagi sem er að fullu í eigu opinberra
aðila jafnað til þeirra. Að öðrum kosti gætu EES-ríki með stofnun slíkra
sameignarfélaga sniðgengið skuldbindingar sínar samkvæmt 14. gr. EES.
Skiptir í því sambandi ekki máli þótt sameignarfélagið sé að landsrétti
sjálfstæður lögaðili gagnvart hefðbundnum opinberum yfirvöldum og starfsemi
þess teljist ekki til opinberrar starfsemi.
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og staðbundnum stjórnvöldum til miðlægra stjórnvalda samningsaðila.
Skuldbindingar allra aðila EES-samningsins eru þær sömu, óháð valddreifingu
og verkaskiptingu milli miðlægra stjórnvalda og svæðis-, og staðbundinna
stjórnvalda. Slík verkaskipting getur verið með ólíkum hætti í aðildarríkjunum.
Sjá til samanburðar með tilliti til 28. gr. EB, sem samsvarar 11. gr. EES,
sameinuð mál C-1/90 og C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior og
Publivía [1991] ECR I-4151, 8. mgr.
31 Ákvæði 14. gr. EES taka ekki einungis til skatta sem eru lagðir á vörurnar sem
slíkar heldur einnig skatta sem hafa bein áhrif á verð þeirra. Sjá til samanburðar
mál 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247, 13.-15. mgr. (Schöttle). Ekki er útilokað að
gjald sem aðili innheimtir í eigin þágu geti talist skattur í skilningi 14. gr. EES,
sbr. mál 74/76 Ianelli & Volpi [1977] ECR 557, 19. mgr., og Haahr Petroleum,
4. mgr. Af dómi í Haahr Petroleum leiðir í þessu samhengi að gjöld fyrir veitta
þjónustu vegna vöru, t.d. hafnargjöld, geta talist skattur í skilningi 14. gr. EES,
sbr. 35. mgr. dómsins. Af atvikum þess máls er einnig ljóst, að jafnvel þótt ekki
sé að lögum skylt að leita þjónustunnar og hún veitt á grundvelli samnings
einkaréttarlegs eðlis milli þjónustuaðila og viðskiptavinar, getur einnig verið um
skatt að ræða í skilningi 14. gr. EES.
33 Opinber yfirvöld verða að hafa svigrúm til þátttöku í atvinnustarfsemi án þess
að gjaldtaka þeirra falli undir 14. gr. EES hvenær sem þjónustan hefur bein
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JUDGMENT
32 Í máli Haahr Petroleum voru gjöldin ákveðin af ráðherra hafnarmála í skjóli
opinbers valds, en hafnirnar gátu ekki sett eigin gjaldskrá. Í máli því sem hér er
til umfjöllunar virðist hins vegar sem rekstraraðili hafnanna setji eigin gjaldskrá
á grundvelli lagaheimildar þar sem aðeins koma fram almenn viðmið um
ákvörðun gjaldanna. Vaknar þá sú spurning hvort greiðsla fyrir veitta þjónustu
geti við þær aðstæður talist skattur í skilningi 14. gr. EES.
services with immediate effect on the cost of goods originating in other EEA
States. This is particularly so when the authorities operate in a competitive
market which makes it possible for prospective customers to choose freely
between several operators who set their own prices. The realisation of the
internal market, as foreseen by the EEA Agreement, is not endangered by
Article 14 EEA not being applicable in such a situation. Furthermore, the concept
of taxation as customarily understood implies an element of compulsion.
34 However, those engaged in the handling of imported goods may find themselves
in a situation in which they have no option but to rely on the services of the
public provider in question. In such a situation, there is no difference in the effect
between the pricing policy of an individual public service provider which sets its
own prices and a tariff decided by a central authority and made obligatory for all,
or most, services providers in question, as was the case in Haahr Petroleum.
The application of the competition rules of the EEA Agreement to public
authorities when engaged in economic activities of an industrial or commercial
nature by offering goods or services on the market (see for comparison Case
C-343/95 Cali & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, at paragraph 16) does not fully meet
the need to ensure non-discrimination in these cases. Article 54 EEA which
prohibits abuse of a dominant market position may indeed also be applicable
in such situations. However, that provision lays down its own conditions which
are not the same as those of Article 14 EEA. Thus, Article 14 EEA may be
applicable in situations where Article 54 EEA is not, and vice versa.
35 The concept of taxation within the meaning of Article 14 EEA must be
interpreted in a wide sense, see for comparison Schöttle, at paragraph 13. The
Court further recalls that the ECJ, in Case C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995]
ECR I-2421, applied the EC Treaty provision parallel to Article 10 EEA to a fee
provided for in a contract. In view of this, and in order to avoid circumvention
of the prohibition laid down in Article 14 EEA, payment for services provided
by a public entity constitutes taxation for the purposes of Article 14 EEA when
the customers have no option but to rely on the service in question, see, in this
direction, also the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Haahr Petroleum, at
point 63.
36 In this context, it cannot matter whether the price has been set according to
purely commercial criteria, focusing on profit maximisation, or according to
considerations of the general good usually associated with the exercise of
public authority. The effect of the charge or fee in question on the cost of goods
would be the same regardless of motivation.
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34 Þær aðstæður geta hins vegar verið fyrir hendi við innflutning vöru að
innflytjendur verði að reiða sig á þjónustu tiltekins opinbers aðila og eigi í þeim
efnum ekkert val. Verður þá ekki gerður greinarmunur á áhrifum gjaldtöku
einstakra opinberra þjónustuaðila sem setja eigin gjaldskrá og gjaldtöku sem
ákveðin eru af miðlægu stjórnvaldi sem bindur alla eða flesta þjónustuaðila á
viðkomandi sviði, eins og í máli Haahr Petroleum. Þótt samkeppnisreglur EES
eigi við um atvinnustarfsemi opinberra aðila á sviði iðnaðar eða viðskipta sem
bjóða vöru eða þjónustu á frjálsum markaði er ekki að fullu tryggt að komið sé í
veg fyrir mismunun, sbr. mál C-343/95 Calli & Figli [1997] ECR I-1547, 16. mgr.
Ákvæði 54. gr. EES sem banna misnotkun á yfirburðastöðu gætu vissulega
einnig átt við í slíkum tilvikum. Á hinn bóginn eru skilyrði þeirra ákvæða ekki
þau sömu og 14. gr. EES. Því getur 14. gr. EES átt við um tilteknar aðstæður
sem 54. gr. EES tekur ekki til og öfugt.
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áhrif á verð vöru frá öðrum EES-ríkjum. Þetta á einkum við þegar yfirvöld
starfa á samkeppnismarkaði þar sem væntanlegir viðskiptavinir geta valið milli
nokkurra rekstraraðila sem setja eigin gjaldskrá. Það stefnir ekki virkni innri
markaðarins samkvæmt EES-samningnum í hættu þótt 14. gr. EES eigi ekki við
í slíkum tilvikum. Auk þess ber að hafa í huga að skattlagning í hefðbundnum
skilningi felur í sér ákveðna skyldu eða kvöð.
36 Við mat samkvæmt framansögðu skiptir ekki máli hvort gjald er ákvarðað
á grundvelli viðskiptalegra sjónarmiða með hámarkshagnað í huga, eða á
grundvelli almannahagsmuna sem að öllu jöfnu tengjast starfsemi hins opinbera.
Áhrif gjaldtökunnar á vöruverðið yrðu þau sömu óháð þeim sjónarmiðum sem
að baki búa.
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JUDGMENT
35 Hugtakið skattur í skilningi 14. gr. EES hefur rúma merkingu, sbr. til hliðsjónar
dóm Evrópudómstólsins í máli Schöttle, 13. mgr. Í því samhengi skal þess
getið að Evrópudómstóllinn hefur beitt þeirri grein EB-sáttmálans sem svarar
til 10. gr. EES um gjald sem ákveðið var með samningi, sbr. mál C-16/94
Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR I-2421. Með þetta í huga og svo komast
megi hjá því að bannákvæði 14. gr. EES verði sniðgengið ber að líta svo
á, að gjald fyrir þjónustu sem opinber aðili veitir teljist skattur í skilningi
14. gr. EES, þegar kaupandi hennar á ekkert val um viðsemjanda og verður
að reiða sig á umrædda þjónustu. Sjá um svipuð sjónarmið einnig álit Jacobs,
aðallögsögumanns í máli Haahr Petroleum, 63. mgr.
37 As follows from paragraph 29 above, Article 14 also applies to local taxes (see
also Case C-45/94 Cámara de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Ceuta
[1995] ECR I-4385). This entails that in relation to the criterion of there being
no option but to rely on the services of the public provider in question, the test
must be whether there is no alternative provider of the service requested by
the customer within the area normally served by the public service provider, in
this case by the ports operated by the Respondent. It is for the national court
to establish whether this is the situation.
38 Article 11 EEA does not extend to obstacles to trade of a fiscal nature or having
an effect equivalent to customs duties. Therefore, Article 11 is not applicable
to the charge at issue, see for comparison Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR
1343, at paragraph 33.
39 Based on the above, the answer to the first question must be that the levying
of charges for port services provided by a partnership owned by several
municipalities falls to be assessed under Article 14 EEA if there is no alternative
port to those of the partnership within the area normally served by those
ports.
The second question
40 In light of the answer to the first question, it is only necessary to answer the
second question in relation to Article 14 EEA. The question is thus whether
that Article precludes the levying of port charges which are higher for alcoholic
beverages than for non-alcoholic beverages, taking into account that in Iceland
alcoholic beverages are generally imported, inter alia from other EEA States.
41 The Appellant’s main submission is that the port charges violate Article 14
EEA by discriminating against alcoholic beverages imported from other
EEA States in relation to alcoholic beverages produced in Iceland. Imported
alcoholic products have to be transported to Iceland by sea. Road transport
is not an option. Domestic alcoholic products, on the other hand, are only
transported by road. They have not been transported by sea for many years.
The very high port charge for alcoholic beverages adds a cost element which
is lacking for domestic alcoholic beverages. The Appellant submits that there
is no appreciable difference in the costs related to the ports’ handling of
alcoholic beverages compared to the handling of non-alcoholic beverages.
Consequently, there is no objective justification for the very high charge for
alcoholic products. For this reason, it violates Article 14 EEA.
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38 Ákvæði 11. gr. EES nær hvorki til viðskiptahindrana sem eru skattalegs eðlis
né ráðstafana sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif og tollar. Gjöld eins og þau sem
um ræðir í málinu falla því ekki undir ákvæði 11. gr. EES, sbr. til hliðsjónar mál
252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, 33. mgr.
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37 Það leiðir af því sem fram kemur í 29. mgr. hér að framan að 14. gr. EES
tekur einnig til svæðisbundinna skatta, sbr. og dóm í máli C-45/94 Cámara de
Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Ceuta [1995] ECR I-4385. Því þarf þegar
metið er hvort kaupandi þjónustu eigi ekki val um viðsemjanda og verði að
reiða sig á þjónustu opinbers aðila að staðreyna, að annar aðili bjóði ekki þá
þjónustu sem leitað er eftir á því svæði sem hinn opinberi aðili þjónar almennt,
í þessu tilviki á starfssvæði þeirra hafna sem stefndi rekur. Það er hlutverk
landsdómstólsins að staðreyna hvort aðstæður séu með þessum hætti.
39 Með vísan til framangreinds ber að svara fyrstu spurningunni þannig, að
gjaldtaka vegna hafnarþjónustu sameignarfélags sem er í eigu nokkurra
sveitarfélaga fellur undir 14. gr. EES, ef ekki er til staðar önnur höfn á því
svæði sem hafnir sameignarfélagsins þjóna almennt.
Önnur spurning
41 Áfrýjandi heldur því aðallega fram að með því að mismuna áfengi fluttu inn frá
öðrum EES-ríkjum gagnvart áfengi framleiddu innanlands brjóti hafnargjöldin
gegn 14. gr. EES. Áfengi verði eingöngu flutt til landsins sjóleiðis og ekki sé
þess kostur að flytja það landleiðina. Innlent áfengi sé á hinn bóginn flutt
landleiðina og hafi ekki verið flutt sjóleiðis um árabil. Hin umtalsvert hærri
hafnargjöld á áfengi séu kostnaðarauki sem ekki falli á innlent áfengi. Ekki
sé verulegur munur á kostnaði við afgreiðslu áfengra og óáfengra drykkja. Af
þeim sökum séu engin hlutlæg rök sem réttlæti hin háu gjöld á áfengi og því
sé um brot gegn 14. gr. EES að ræða.
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JUDGMENT
40 Af svarinu við fyrstu spurningu leiðir að aðeins þarf að leysa úr annarri
spurningu á grundvelli 14. gr. EES. Álitaefnið er þá hvort greinin standi því
í vegi að innheimt séu hærri hafnargjöld á Íslandi vegna áfengra drykkja en
óáfengra, að teknu tillit til þess að áfengi er almennt flutt inn til landsins, þ.á m.
frá öðrum EES-ríkjum.
42 Although the Appellant has focused on comparing the situation for imported
and domestic alcoholic products, the Appellant does not exclude that the
difference in port charges for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages could
constitute illegal tax discrimination of imported alcoholic beverages vis-à-vis
domestic non-alcoholic beverages.
43 The Respondent and ESA as well as the Commission are all of the opinion
that there is no violation of Article 14 EEA. With regard to the Appellant’s main
submission concerning imported and domestic alcoholic products, they make
the observation that the port charge does not distinguish between imported
and domestic alcoholic products. The difference in treatment is caused by the
fact that only imported alcoholic products are transported by sea and for that
reason are subject to port charges. This is not relevant under Article 14 EEA.
As to possible discrimination of imported alcoholic beverages in relation to
domestic non-alcoholic beverages, it is maintained that alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages are neither similar nor competing products and for that
reason the difference in rates is not caught by Article 14 EEA. The Government
of Iceland has not commented upon the second question.
44 The Court will first address the Appellant’s main submission, the alleged
discrimination of imported alcoholic beverages in relation to domestic alcoholic
beverages.
45 Article 14 EEA prohibits, under its first paragraph, the direct or indirect imposition
of taxes on products of other EEA States in excess of those imposed directly or
indirectly on similar domestic products. Under its second paragraph, the Article
prohibits taxes of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to domestic
products which, although not similar to the imported products, nevertheless
are in a competitive relationship to them, see Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002]
EFTA Ct. Rep. 1 (hereinafter “Einarsson”), at paragraph 24. With regard to the
Appellant’s main submission, it is not necessary to decide whether the various
imported and domestic alcoholic products are similar or merely in competition.
In relation to the basic question of whether this difference in treatment is
relevant at all, when caused by the fact that only imported alcoholic beverages
are transported by sea and so become subject to the charge in question, the
answer must be the same under both paragraphs of Article 14 EEA.
46 Both the first and the second paragraph of Article 14 EEA apply to indirect
discrimination of goods imported from other EEA States. Thus, a system of
taxation which makes no reference to the origin of the goods may still violate
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43 Stefndi, ESA og framkvæmdastjórnin telja ekki brotið gegn 14. gr. EES.
Um aðalröksemd áfrýjanda varðandi mismunun á milli innflutts og innlends
áfengis er því haldið fram að við álagningu hafnargjaldanna sé ekki gerður
greinarmunur þar á milli. Munurinn skýrist af því að einungis innflutt áfengi sé
flutt sjóleiðis og beri því hafnargjöld. Aðstæður sem þessar hafi ekki þýðingu við
beitingu 14. gr. EES. Vegna hugsanlegrar mismununar á milli innflutts áfengis
og innlendra óáfengra drykkja er því haldið fram, að áfengir og óáfengir drykkir
séu hvorki sams konar vörur né í samkeppni á markaði og því feli munurinn
á gjöldunum ekki í sér brot gegn 14. gr. EES. Ekki bárust athugasemdir frá
ríkisstjórn Íslands vegna annarrar spurningar.
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42 Þótt áfrýjandi leggi í málflutningi sínum áherslu á að bera saman aðstæður
vegna innflutts og innlends áfengis útilokar hann ekki, að umtalsvert hærri
hafnargjöld á áfengi heldur en á óáfenga drykki geti falið í sér ólögmæta
skattalega mismunun milli innflutts áfengis og innlendra óáfengra drykkja.
44 Dómstóllinn fjallar fyrst um aðalmálsástæðu áfrýjanda sem varðar meinta
mismunun á milli innflutts og innlends áfengis.
46 Bæði fyrsti og annar málsl. 14. gr. EES eiga við um óbeina mismunun gagnvart
vöru sem er flutt inn frá öðrum EES-ríkjum. Þótt skattlagning taki ekki mið af
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JUDGMENT
45 Óheimilt er samkvæmt fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES að leggja hvers kyns beinan
eða óbeinan skatt á framleiðsluvörur annarra EES-ríkja umfram það sem beint
eða óbeint er lagt á sams konar innlendar framleiðsluvörur. Samkvæmt öðrum
málsl. greinarinnar er óheimilt að leggja á skatt sem er til þess fallinn að vernda
óbeint innlendar vörur sem eru í samkeppni við innfluttar vörur jafnvel þótt
þær séu ekki sams konar, sbr. mál E-1/01 Hörður Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct.
Rep. 1, 24. mgr. (mál Harðar Einarssonar). Við umfjöllun um aðalmálsástæðu
áfrýjanda er ekki nauðsynlegt að taka afstöðu til þess, hvort ýmsar tegundir
af innfluttu og innlendu áfengi séu sams konar eða eingöngu í samkeppni.
Mat á því hvort, mismunun af þessu tagi, sem skýrist af því að eingöngu
innflutt áfengi er flutt sjóleiðis, skipti yfir höfuð máli, leiðir til sömu niðurstöðu
samkvæmt báðum málsliðum 14. gr. EES.
Article 14 EEA if it is designed in such a way as to benefit typically domestic
products and to handicap imported products to the same extent, see for
comparison Case C-302/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-2055, at
paragraph 30.
47 However, as concerns alcoholic beverages, the charge in question is levied
for a service offered on equal terms to all in need of this particular service,
the loading and unloading of goods in the ports operated by the Respondent.
The facts of the present case thus differ from the situation in Haahr Petroleum
which concerned port charges which were higher for imported goods than
for domestic goods. The Respondent does not set the tariff for a comparable
service for similar or competing goods which are mainly domestic, i.e. the
loading and unloading of alcoholic beverages transported by road. Under such
circumstances, the difference in treatment of imported and domestic alcoholic
products resulting from the fact that the former are transported by sea and
consequently go through ports whereas the latter are transported by road and
so do not go through ports does not constitute a violation of Article 14 EEA.
48 In this respect, it cannot matter that the charge in question clearly exceeds
the cost of the service for which it constitutes payment, as alleged by the
Appellant. Whether or not such behaviour on part of the service provider may
constitute abuse of a dominant position on the relevant market and for that
reason violate competition law, is a different matter.
49 Next, the Court will address the Appellant’s alternative submission which is
that the difference in port charges for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages
may constitute discriminatory internal taxation of imported alcoholic beverages
vis-à-vis domestic non-alcoholic beverages.
50 In this perspective, it is clear that the same service is charged according
to different rates depending on the category of the products concerned.
However, as pointed out in paragraph 45 above, for the charges in question to
constitute discrimination contrary to Article 14 EEA, it is further necessary that
they distinguish between products which are either, under the first paragraph
of Article 14 EEA, similar, or, under the second paragraph, in a competitive
relationship with one another.
51 For products to be considered similar under the first paragraph of Article
14 EEA, they must have similar characteristics and meet the same needs
from the point of view of the consumer, see for comparison Case 106/84
154 - 141
47 Gjöldin sem hér um ræðir eru hins vegar innheimt fyrir þjónustu, þ.e. lestun
og losun áfengis í höfnum stefnda, og þjónustan er veitt með sömu skilmálum
öllum þeim sem hennar þarfnast. Atvik í máli þessu eru því ólík atvikum í máli
Haahr Petroleum þar sem hærri hafnargjöld voru lögð á innfluttar vörur en
innlendar. Stefndi setur ekki gjaldskrá fyrir sambærilega þjónustu vegna sams
konar vöru eða vöru sem er í samkeppni og er almennt innlend, þ.e. fyrir lestun
og losun áfengis sem flutt er landleiðina. Við þær aðstæður brýtur ólík meðferð
á innfluttu og innlendu áfengi ekki gegn 14. gr. EES, þegar ástæðan er sú að
innflutta varan er flutt sjóleiðis og þar af leiðandi um hafnir, en innlenda varan
er flutt landleiðina og fer því ekki um hafnir.
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uppruna vöru getur hún samt sem áður brotið gegn 14. gr. EES, ef hún er til
þess fallin að hygla almennt innlendum vörum á kostnað innfluttra, sbr. mál
C-302/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-2055, 30. mgr.
48 Í þessu sambandi skiptir ekki máli hvort gjöldin sem um ræðir fari augljóslega
fram úr kostnaði við veitta þjónustu, eins og áfrýjandi heldur fram. Það er svo
annað álitaefni hvort slík háttsemi af hálfu þjónustuaðila felur í sér misnotkun
á markaðsráðandi stöðu og sé þar með brot á samkeppnisreglum.
49 Áfrýjandi byggir á því til vara að mismunandi hafnargjöld á áfenga og óáfenga
drykki geti falið í sér skattalega mismunun sem bitni á innfluttu áfengi og skal
næst að því vikið.
51 Vörur teljast sams konar samkvæmt fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES, ef þær hafa
sambærilega eiginleika og fullnægja sömu þörfum frá sjónarhóli neytenda, sbr.
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JUDGMENT
50 Í þessu tilliti er ljóst að mismunandi gjöld eru lögð á sömu þjónustu eftir því
hvaða vöruflokkur á í hlut. Eins og fram kemur í 45. mgr. hér að framan brýtur
slík gjaldtaka því aðeins gegn ákvæði 14. gr. EES um bann við mismunun, að
gerður sé greinarmunur á vörum sem eru annað hvort sams konar, sbr. fyrsti
málsl. 14. gr. EES, eða vörum sem eiga í samkeppni á markaði, sbr. annar
málsl. 14. gr. EES.
Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, at paragraph 12. Alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages are clearly not similar products within the meaning of the
first paragraph of Article 14 EEA.
52 The second paragraph of Article 14 EEA calls for an assessment of whether
or not the tax is of such a kind as to have the effect, on the market in question,
of reducing potential consumption of imported products to the advantage of
competing domestic products. For this to be the case, it is not sufficient that
the relevant products are in competition with one another. It must further be
demonstrated that the higher tax rate applies chiefly to the imported products,
cf. Einarsson, at paragraph 31. Moreover, it must be demonstrated that the
difference in tax burden caused by the charge in question would have an effect
on the cross-elasticity of the demand. In making this assessment, one must
take into account inter alia the discrepancy in price which may exist between
the products independently of that difference. It is for the national court to
assess whether those three conditions are fulfilled in the present case.
53 Based on the above, the answer to the second question from Hæstiréttur
Íslands must be, firstly, that a port charge such as the one at issue does
not constitute discrimination contrary to Article 14 EEA of imported alcoholic
beverages in relation to domestic alcoholic beverages as long as the reason
why only imported alcoholic beverages become subject to the charge is the
fact that domestic alcoholic beverages are not transported by sea and so do
not need port services, and the body setting the tariff for the port services
does not set the tariff for comparable services needed in relation to domestic
alcoholic beverages.
54 Secondly, in order for such a charge to violate Article 14 EEA by discriminating
imported alcoholic beverages in relation to domestic non-alcoholic beverages,
the charge must have the effect, on the market in question, of reducing potential
consumption of the imported products to the advantage of competing domestic
products.
IV Costs
55 The costs incurred by the Government of Iceland, ESA and the Commission,
these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Hæstiréttur
Íslands, any decision on costs is a matter for that court.
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52 Við beitingu annars málsl. 14. gr. EES þarf að meta hvort skattur hafi þau
áhrif á viðkomandi markaði að möguleg neysla innfluttra vara dragist saman,
sem komi innlendum vörum í samkeppni til góða. Í slíkum tilvikum nægir ekki
að viðkomandi vörur séu í samkeppni, heldur þarf einnig að sýna fram á að
hærri skattur sé einkum lagður á innflutta vöru, sbr. 31. mgr. í máli Harðar
Einarssonar. Auk þess verður að sýna fram á að mismunur á skattbyrði, sem
tiltekin gjöld hafi í för með sér, myndi einnig hafa áhrif á víxlteygni eftirspurnar á
markaði. Við þetta mat skal m.a. taka tillit til þess verðmunar sem er á vörunum
óháð mismunandi skattbyrði. Það er hlutverk landsdómstólsins að meta hvort
þessum þremur skilyrðum er fullnægt í máli þessu.
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til hliðsjónar mál 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, 12. mgr.
Áfengir drykkir og óáfengir eru augljóslega ekki sams konar vara í skilningi
fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES.
53 Samkvæmt framansögðu er svarið við annarri spurningu í fyrsta lagi það að
hafnargjöld eins og þau sem hér um ræðir fela ekki í sér mismunun á innfluttu
áfengi gagnvart innlendu áfengi sem brýtur gegn 14. gr. EES, þegar ástæða
þess að gjöldin eru eingöngu lögð á innflutt áfengi er sú, að innlent áfengi er
ekki flutt sjóleiðis og þarf því ekki hafnarþjónustu, og sá sem setur gjaldskrána
fyrir hafnarþjónustuna setur ekki gjaldskrá fyrir sambærilega þjónustu sem
þörf er á vegna innlends áfengis.
54 Í öðru lagi brjóta slík gjöld því aðeins gegn 14. gr. EES með því að mismuna
innfluttu áfengi gagnvart innlendum óáfengum drykkjum, að gjöldin hafi þau
áhrif á viðkomandi markaði að möguleg neysla innfluttra vara dragist saman,
sem komi innlendum vörum í samkeppni til góða.
55 Ríkisstjórn Íslands, Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA og framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna, sem skilað hafa greinargerðum til dómstólsins, skulu hver bera
sinn málskostnað. Þar sem um er ræða mál sem er hluti af málarekstri fyrir
Hæstarétti Íslands kemur það í hlut þess dómstóls að kveða á um kostnað
málsaðila.
142 - 157
JUDGMENT
IV Málskostnaður
On those grounds,
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by Hæstiréttur Íslands, hereby gives the following
Advisory Opinion:
1.The levying of charges for port services provided by a partnership owned by
several municipalities falls to be assessed under Article 14 EEA if there is no
alternative port to those of the partnership within the area normally served by
those ports.
2.A port charge such as the one at issue does not constitute discrimination
contrary to Article 14 EEA of imported alcoholic beverages in relation to
domestic alcoholic beverages as long as the reason why only imported
alcoholic beverages become subject to the charge is the fact that domestic
alcoholic beverages are not transported by sea and so do not need port
services, and the body setting the tariff for the port services does not set
the tariff for comparable services needed in relation to domestic alcoholic
beverages.
In order for such a charge to violate Article 14 EEA by discriminating imported
alcoholic beverages in relation to domestic non-alcoholic beverages, the
charge must have the effect, on the market in question, of reducing potential
consumption of the imported products to the advantage of competing
domestic products.
Carl Baudenbacher Thorgeir Örlygsson Henrik Bull
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 5 March 2008.
Skúli Magnússon Carl Baudenbacher
Registrar President
158 - 143
DÓMSTÓLLINN
uppi svohljóðandi ráðgefandi álit um spurningar þær sem Hæstiréttur Íslands beindi til
hans:
1. Gjaldtaka vegna hafnarþjónustu sameignarfélags sem er í eigu nokkurra
sveitarfélaga fellur undir 14. gr. EES, ef ekki er til staðar önnur höfn á því
svæði sem hafnir sameignarfélagsins þjóna almennt.
2. Hafnargjöld eins og þau sem hér um ræðir fela ekki í sér mismunun á innfluttu
áfengi gagnvart innlendu áfengi sem brýtur gegn 14. gr. EES, þegar ástæða
þess að gjöldin eru eingöngu lögð á innflutt áfengi er sú, að innlent áfengi er
ekki flutt sjóleiðis og þarf því ekki hafnarþjónustu, og sá sem setur gjaldskrána
fyrir hafnarþjónustuna setur ekki gjaldskrá fyrir sambærilega þjónustu sem
þörf er á vegna innlends áfengis.
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
Case E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
CaseCase
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
Með vísan til framangreindra forsendna lætur
Slík gjöld brjóta því aðeins gegn 14. gr. EES með því að mismuna innfluttu
áfengi gagnvart innlendum óáfengum drykkjum, að gjöldin hafi þau áhrif á
viðkomandi markaði að möguleg neysla innfluttra vara dragist saman, sem
komi innlendum vörum í samkeppni til góða.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Henrik Bull
Kveðið upp í heyranda hljóði í Lúxemborg 5. mars 2008.
Carl Baudenbacher
dómritari
forseti
JUDGMENT
Skúli Magnússon
- 143
159 -
in Case E-6/07
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Hæstiréttur
Íslands (the Supreme Court of Iceland) in a case pending before it between
HOB vín ehf.
and
Faxaflóahafnir sf.
concerning rules on taxation and on free movement of goods within the EEA.
I
Introduction
1.
II
By a letter dated 8 May 2007, registered at the EFTA Court on 21 May 2007,
Hæstiréttur Íslands made a request for an Advisory Opinion in a case pending
before it between HOB vín ehf. (hereinafter “the Appellant”) and Faxaflóahafnir
sf. (hereinafter “the Respondent”).
Facts and procedure
2.
The case concerns the issue of whether Article 10, 11 or 14 of the Agreement
on the European Economic Area (hereinafter “EEA”) precludes a port operator
such as the Respondent from levying higher port handling charges for alcoholic
beverages than for non-alcoholic beverages.
3.
The Respondent is a partnership founded by several municipalities around
the Faxaflói bay in south-western Iceland. Its principle object is the operation
of four Icelandic ports (the Port of Reykjavík, the Port of Akranes, the Port of
Grundartangi and the Port of Borgarnes).
4.
The Respondent’s tariffs provide for four excise duty categories; excise on nonalcoholic beverages is ISK 370.80 per tonne while that on alcoholic beverages
amounts to ISK 1 022.30 per tonne.
5.
The Appellant, which imports alcoholic beverages from other EEA States,
and which has had to pay the higher excise on alcoholic beverages, brought
an action against the Respondent before the Reykjavík District Court. The
Appellant claimed, principally, reimbursement of the excise duties that it had
paid to the Respondent in connection with imports of alcoholic beverages. In
160 - 144
í máli E-6/07
Beiðni um ráðgefandi álit EFTA-dómstólsins, samkvæmt 34. gr. samningsins milli EFTAríkjanna um stofnun eftirlitsstofnunar og dómstóls, frá Hæstarétti Íslands í máli sem rekið
er fyrir dómstólnum
HOB vín ehf.
gegn
varðandi reglur um skattlagningu og frjálsa vöruflutninga á Evrópska efnahagssvæðinu.
I
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
vGildi-lífeyrissjóður
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
SKÝRSLA FRAMSÖGUMANNS
Inngangur
1.
Með bréfi, dagsettu 8. maí 2007, óskaði Hæstiréttur Íslands eftir ráðgefandi
áliti í máli sem rekið er fyrir dómstólnum milli HOB víns ehf. (áfrýjandi), og
Faxaflóahafna sf. (stefndi). Beiðnin var skráð í málaskrá EFTA-dómstólsins
þann 21. maí 2007.
2.
Ágreiningsefni málsins lýtur að því hvort ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr.
samningsins um Evrópska efnahagssvæðið (EES) útiloki rekstraraðila hafna,
eins og stefnda, frá því að innheimta hærri hafnargjöld vegna áfengra drykkja
en óáfengra.
3.
Stefndi er sameignarfélag sem stofnað var af nokkrum sveitarfélögum við
Faxaflóa. Helsti tilgangur félagsins er rekstur fjögurra íslenskra hafna, þ.e.
Reykjavíkurhafnar, Akraneshafnar, Grundartangahafnar og Borgarneshafnar.
4.
Samkvæmt gjaldskrá stefnda er gert ráð fyrir fjórum vörugjaldsflokkum.
Vörugjöld vegna óáfengra drykkja eru 370,80 krónur fyrir hvert tonn en vegna
áfengra drykkja 1.022,30 krónur fyrir hvert tonn.
5.
Áfrýjandi flytur inn áfenga drykki frá öðrum EES-ríkjum og hefur þurft að greiða
hin hærri vörugjöld vegna áfengra drykkja. Hann höfðaði mál gegn stefnda
fyrir Héraðsdómi Reykjavíkur og krafðist aðallega endurgreiðslu á þeim
vörugjöldum sem hann greiddi stefnda vegna innflutnings á áfengi, en til vara
að stefnda yrði gert að greiða honum fjárhæð sem nemur mismuninum á því
- 144
161 -
II Málavextir og meðferð málsins
the alternative, the Appellant claimed reimbursement of the difference between
what it had paid and the amount that it would have been required to pay if the
imports had consisted of non-alcoholic beverages. The Reykjavík District Court
dismissed the action on the grounds, inter alia, that the provisions of the EEA
Agreement on the free movement of goods did not apply to the Respondent,
and that the excise duties that it levied could not be regarded as customs,
taxes or duties of any other type to be paid to a public entity, in addition to
which the court did not consider that the duties constituted a restriction on the
free movement of goods.
6.
The Appellant originally appealed to Hæstiréttur Íslands on 15 August 2006,
but that case could not be registered (as required under Icelandic law) as the
Appellant intended on 27 September 2006; thus, another appeal was lodged
on 19 October 2006.
7.
The significant point of dispute between the parties concerns the Appellant’s
argument that the provisions of the EEA Agreement on free movement of goods
apply to the Respondent, and that the imposition of charges in connection
with the import of alcoholic beverages via ports owned by the Respondent
constitutes a violation of Article 10, 11 or 14 EEA.
III Questions
8.
The following questions were referred to the Court:
1. Does the levying of charges by a partnership owned by several
municipalities, in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages
from other EEA States through a port owned by the partnership, fall
under the provisions of Article 10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement?
The question is based on the premise that the operation of the port is
not regarded in law as a public operation; the levying of the charges is
based on an authorisation in law and the charges are to meet the cost
of the services provided, together with a share of the joint operation
of the port.
2. If the answer to the first question is such that any of the abovementioned
provisions of the EEA Agreement apply, does that provision preclude
the levying of charges of the type referred to in the first question? The
question is based on the premise that higher charges are imposed
in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages than of nonalcoholic beverages, and that in Iceland alcoholic beverages are
generally imported, inter alia from other EEA States.
162 - 145
6.
Niðurstöðunni var áfrýjað til Hæstaréttar Íslands, fyrst þann 15. ágúst 2006, en
málið var hins vegar ekki þingfest (eins og gert er ráð fyrir í íslenskum lögum) á
fyrirhuguðum degi þann 27. september 2006. Málinu var því áfrýjað öðru sinni
þann 19. október 2006.
7.
Sá ágreiningur aðila, sem hér skiptir máli, varðar þá málsástæðu áfrýjanda
að ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa vöruflutninga taki til stefnda, og að
gjaldtaka vegna innflutnings á áfengum drykkjum um hafnir í eigu stefnda feli í
sér brot gegn 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES.
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
sem hann greiddi og því sem honum hefði borið að greiða ef um óáfenga drykki
hefði verið að ræða. Með héraðsdómi var stefndi sýknaður af kröfum áfrýjanda
á þeim forsendum m.a. að ákvæði EES-samningsins um frjálsa vöruflutninga
tækju ekki til stefnda og að þau vörugjöld sem hann innheimti teldust hvorki
tollur, skattur né önnur gjöld sem ættu að renna til opinbers aðila, auk þess
sem ekki var talið að vörugjöldin hindruðu frjálsa vöruflutninga.
IIIÁlitaefni
Eftirfarandi spurningar voru bornar undir EFTA-dómstólinn:
1. Fellur gjaldtaka af hálfu sameignarfélags í eigu nokkurra sveitarfélaga,
vegna innflutnings á áfengi frá öðrum aðildarríkjum EES-samningsins
um höfn í eigu félagsins, undir ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EESsamningsins? Er þá miðað við, að rekstur hafnarinnar teljist lögum
samkvæmt ekki opinber rekstur, að gjöldin séu lögð á með heimild
í lögum og að þau skuli standa undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu, sem
veitt er ásamt hlutdeild í sameiginlegum rekstri hafnarinnar.
2. Ef svarið við fyrstu spurningu er á þann veg, að eitthvert þeirra
samningsákvæða, sem þar er vísað til, eigi við, stendur það ákvæði í
vegi gjaldtöku af því tagi, sem nefnd er í fyrstu spurningu? Er þá miðað
við, að hærri gjöld séu lögð á vegna innflutnings áfengra drykkja en
óáfengra, og áfengir drykkir séu almennt fluttir inn frá löndum utan
Íslands, þar á meðal frá öðrum aðildarríkjum EES-samningsins.
- 145
163 -
8.
IV Legal background
National law
9.
Article 8(1)–(3) of the Ports Act No 61/2003 (Hafnalög) provides for three
different forms of operation of ports. First, a port may be owned by a municipality
and operated without appointing a special board of directors. Second, it may
be owned by a municipality and operated under a specific board of directors.
Third, it can be operated as a public limited liability company, irrespective
of whether or not it is owned by a public body, as a private limited liability
company, as a partnership or by a private party operating independently.
10. The Respondent was founded as a partnership under Article 8(3) of the Ports
Act, which states specifically that ports operated under that paragraph are not
regarded as public operators.
11. Chapter VI of the Ports Act addresses this type of ports specifically and states,
amongst other things, in Article 19, that they are permitted to pay dividends
to their owners only after having set aside funds for satisfactory maintenance
and renewal of the port, in accordance with more detailed provisions in the
regulation applying to the port, issued under Article 4 of the Act.
12. Article 20 of the Ports Act states that a port operated under Article 8(3) is
authorised to operate without restrictions, and that the levying of charges by
the port should meet the cost of the services provided, and a share in the joint
operation of the port.
13. The Respondent’s list of tariffs is issued under the provision of Article 20,
cf. Article 19 of the Ports Act.
EEA law
Customs duties on imports and exports, and any charges having equivalent
effect, shall be prohibited between the Contracting Parties. Without prejudice
to the arrangements set out in Protocol 5, this shall also apply to customs
duties of a fiscal nature.
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall be prohibited between the Contracting Parties.
164 - 146
Landsréttur
9.
Samkvæmt 1.-3. tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga nr. 61/2003 getur rekstrarform hafna
verið þrenns konar. Í fyrsta lagi getur höfn verið í eigu sveitarfélags og án
sérstakrar hafnarstjórnar, í öðru lagi í eigu sveitarfélags með hafnarstjórn
og í þriðja lagi hlutafélag, hvort sem það er í eigu opinberra aðila eða ekki,
einkahlutafélag, sameignarfélag eða einkaaðili í sjálfstæðum rekstri.
10. Stefndi er sameignarfélag sem stofnað var samkvæmt 3. tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga.
Þar kemur fram að hafnir sem eru reknar samkvæmt þeim tölulið teljast ekki til
opinbers rekstrar.
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
IV Löggjöf
11. Í VI. kafla hafnalaga er fjallað sérstaklega um hafnir af þessu tagi. Þar segir
m.a. í 19. gr. að þeim sé aðeins heimilt að greiða arð til eigenda sinna eftir að
fé hefur verið lagt til hliðar í fullnægjandi viðhald og endurnýjun hafnarinnar,
samkvæmt nánari ákvæðum í reglugerð settri á grundvelli 4. gr. laganna.
12. Í 20. gr. hafnalaga kemur fram að höfn sem rekin er samkvæmt 3. tölul. 8.
gr. hafi starfsheimildir án takmarkana og að gjaldtaka hafnar skuli miðuð við
að hún standi undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu sem veitt sé ásamt hlutdeild í
sameiginlegum rekstri hennar.
13. Gjaldskrá stefnda er sett samkvæmt heimild í 20. gr., sbr. 19. gr. hafnalaga.
EES-réttur
Tollar á innflutning og útflutning, svo og gjöld sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif, eru
bannaðir milli samningsaðila. Með fyrirvara um það fyrirkomulag sem um getur
í bókun 5 skal þetta einnig eiga við um fjáröflunartolla.
Magntakmarkanir á innflutningi, svo og allar ráðstafanir sem hafa samsvarandi
áhrif, eru bannaðar milli samningsaðila.
- 146
165 -
V
No Contracting Party shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of
other Contracting Parties any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that
imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.
Furthermore, no Contracting Party shall impose on the products of other
Contracting Parties any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect
protection to other products.
Written observations
17. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the Court and Article 97 of the Rules of
Procedure, written observations have been received from:
– the Appellant, represented by Stefán Geir Þórisson, Supreme Court
Attorney;
– the Respondent, represented by Anton Björn Markússon, Supreme Court
Attorney;
– the Government of Iceland, represented by Sesselja Sigurðardóttir, First
Secretary and Legal Officer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, acting as Agent;
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson
and Florence Simonetti, Officers, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs,
acting as Agents;
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Richard
Lyal and Søren Schønberg, acting as Agents.
The Appellant
Scope of EEA rules on free movement on goods
18. According to the Appellant, the first question concerns the scope of Part II of
the EEA Agreement, on the free movement of goods. As to this question, the
Appellant points out that it is of no specific significance to the case that the
Port Act explicitly states that the operation of a port company such as the
Respondent is not regarded as a public operation. It must be assessed on the
bases of the function and operation of the Respondent whether the company
is de facto a public operation or not. The Appellant submits that it is clear that
the Respondent, being a partnership founded by several municipalities and
with the principal object of operating four ports in the area, is an entity falling
within the scope of Part II of the EEA Agreement.
- 166
147 -
Einstökum samningsaðilum er óheimilt að leggja hvers kyns beinan eða
óbeinan skatt innanlands á framleiðsluvörur annarra samningsaðila umfram
það sem beint eða óbeint er lagt á sams konar innlendar framleiðsluvörur.
Samningsaðila er einnig óheimilt að leggja á framleiðsluvörur annarra
samningsaðila innlendan skatt sem er til þess fallinn að vernda óbeint aðrar
framleiðsluvörur.
V Skriflegar greinargerðir
17. Í samræmi við 20. gr. stofnsamþykktar EFTA-dómstólsins og 97. gr. starfsreglna
hans hafa greinargerðir borist frá eftirtöldum aðilum:
– Áfrýjanda, HOB vín ehf. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Stefán Geir
Þórisson, hrl.;
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
– Stefnda, Faxaflóahafnir sf. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Anton Björn
Markússon, hrl.;
– Ríkisstjórn Íslands. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmaður er Sesselja
Sigurðardóttir, lögfræðingur og sendiráðsritari á skrifstofu Evrópumála í
utanríkisráðuneytinu;
– Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn eru Ólafur
Jóhannes Einarsson og Florence Simonetti, lögfræðingar á lögfræði- og
framkvæmdasviði;
– Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna. Í fyrirsvari sem umboðsmenn
eru Richard Lyal og Søren Schønberg.
Áfrýjandi
18. Að mati áfrýjanda varðar fyrsta spurningin gildissvið II. hluta EES-samningsins
um frjálsa vöruflutninga. Í því sambandi hafi það ekki sérstaka þýðingu fyrir
málið þótt skýrt sé tekið fram í hafnalögum að rekstur hafnarfyrirtækis eins og
stefnda teljist ekki til opinbers rekstrar. Meta þurfi, með hliðsjón af hlutverki og
rekstri stefnda, hvort rekstur fyrirtækisins sé í reynd opinber rekstur eða ekki.
Ljóst sé að stefndi, sem sé sameignarfélag stofnað af nokkrum sveitarfélögum
með það meginmarkmið að reka fjórar hafnir á tilteknu svæði, sé aðili sem
heyri að fullu undir gildissvið II. hluta EES-samningsins.
147 - 167
Gildissvið EES-reglna um frjálsa vöruflutninga
19. The Appellant states that the first question requires an examination of what
persons or bodies are bound by Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA and that there is
no difference between the three Articles in that respect. There is no doubt that
the Contracting Parties are bound by the said Articles. In theory, however, it is
less clear what entities are to be regarded as forming part of the ‘Contracting
Parties’ for the purpose of those provisions. According to long standing case
law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter the
“ECJ”), that concept is to be interpreted widely to cover public authorities of
the Member States in general. This covers not only the central government
of each State but also regional and local government. It is in fact irrelevant
whether discrimination against a product from another Member State stems
from federal, provincial or parish authorities. It is clear from case law that the
provisions apply to measures emanating from all local authorities.1 Moreover,
there is a large variety of different types of public undertakings, semi-public
bodies and quasi-autonomous national government organisations in the
Member States. These entities fulfil a wide variety of functions. Where a
Member State uses such a body as a medium for the execution of a measure,
then that measure clearly emanates from the State, regardless of the precise
status of the body concerned.2
20. When examining whether a partnership such as the Respondent, founded and
owned exclusively by municipalities, falls within the scope of Articles 10, 11 and
14 EEA, the Appellant finds that the Danish port cases must be considered.3
The cases concerned port charges in Denmark, levied by harbour companies
with very different ownership. The ports parties to the cases were either owned
by municipalities or by private limited companies. The port charges of all these
Danish ports were deemed by the ECJ to fall within the scope of a provision
comparable to Article 14 of the EEA Agreement.
21. In addition, the Appellant points to examples of the ECJ having examined
measures of privately owned companies under the rules on free movement of
goods.4 In Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands,5 the ECJ pointed out
The Appellant refers to Case 45/87 R Commission v Ireland [1987] ECR 1369 and Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa
de Publicidad Exterior and Publivía [1991] ECR I-4151.
The Appellant refers to Buy Irish, Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005.
3
The Appellant refers to Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573; Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR
I-4085; Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I‑4263; and Case C-242/95 GTLink [1997] ECR I-4449.
4
The Appellant refers to Buy Irish, Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005; Case C‑16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995]
ECR I-2421; Case C-72/03 Cabonati Apuani [2004] ECR I‑8027; and Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR
I-5699.
5
Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699.
1
2
168 - 148
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
19. Áfrýjandi telur að fyrsta spurningin kalli á mat á því til hvaða aðila ákvæði 10.,
11. og 14. gr. EES nái, en enginn munur sé á ákvæðunum hvað þetta snerti.
Ekki leiki nokkur vafi á því að ákvæðin bindi samningsaðilana. Fræðilega
séð liggi hins vegar ekki eins ljóst fyrir til hverra hugtakið ,,samningsaðilar”
í skilningi þessara ákvæða nái. Samkvæmt áralangri dómaframkvæmd
dómstóls Evrópubandalaganna (Evrópudómstóllinn) beri að túlka hugtakið
rúmt þannig að það nái til allra stjórnvalda aðildarríkjanna. Hugtakið, í þessum
skilningi, taki ekki aðeins til miðlægra stjórnvalda heldur einnig svæðis- og
staðbundinna stjórnvalda. Ekki skipti máli hvort rekja megi mismunun gegn
vörum frá öðrum aðildarríkjum til fylkis-, héraðs- eða sveitarstjórna. Það sé
ljóst af dómaframkvæmd að ákvæðin gildi um aðgerðir allra staðbundinna
yfirvalda.1 Auk þess sé að finna í aðildarríkjunum ólíkar tegundir opinberra
fyrirtækja, hálfopinberra aðila og hálfsjálfstæðra opinberra stofnana sem sinni
margvíslegum verkefnum. Feli aðildarríki slíkum aðila framkvæmd tiltekins
verkefnis teljist það verkefni augljóslega vera á höndum ríkisins, óháð stöðu
viðkomandi framkvæmdaraðila.2
21. Áfrýjandi bendir einnig á dæmi þess að Evrópudómstóllinn hafi metið aðgerðir
fyrirtækja í einkaeigu á grundvelli reglna um frjálsa vöruflutninga.4 Í máli
C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands,5 hafi Evrópudómstóllinn bent á að
Áfrýjandi vísar til máls 45/87 R Commission v Ireland [1987] ECR 1369 og sameinaðra mála C-1/90 og 176/90 Aragonesa de
Publicidad Exterior and Publivia [1991] ECR I-4151.
Áfrýjandi vísar til Buy Irish, máls 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005.
3
Áfrýjandi vísar til máls 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573; máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085;
sameinaðra mála C-114/95 og C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I-4263; og máls C-242/95 GT-Link [1997]
ECR I-4449.
4
Áfrýjandi vísar til Buy Irish, máls 249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005; máls C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR
I-2421; máls C-72/03 Cabonati Apuani [2004] ECR I-8027, og máls C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699.
5
Mál C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699.
1
2
- 148
169 -
20. Áfrýjandi telur að við mat á því hvort sameignarfélag eins og stefndi, sem hafi
verið stofnað af nokkrum sveitarfélögum og sé að fullu í eigu þeirra, falli undir
gildissvið 10., 11. og 14. gr., beri að líta til dóma Evrópudómstólsins sem varði
hafnir í Danmörku.3 Málin hafi snúist um hafnargjöld í Danmörku sem innheimt
voru af hafnarfyrirtækjum með mjög ólíka eignaraðild. Þær hafnir sem áttu
aðild að málunum hafi ýmist verið í eigu sveitarfélaga eða einkahlutafélaga.
Í öllum tilvikum hafi Evrópudómstóllinn talið að gjaldtakan félli undir gildissvið
ákvæða sem sambærileg eru 14. gr. EES-samningsins.
that the rules must have a wide scope to ensure that the Member States do
not abuse their relations with private entities in order to avoid the provisions
of the EC Treaty. Otherwise, the Member States would be able to avoid the
provisions directed at them, by transferring in whole or in part functions that
are by nature public functions. The levying of port charges is de facto a public
measure which must be examined under the rules on free movement of
goods. Otherwise, the door will be open for the EEA Contracting Parties to
discriminate against foreign products. The fact that the levying of the charges
is based on an authorisation in law and that the charges are to meet the cost
of the services provided, together with a share of the joint operation of the port,
merely confirms the public character of the charges.
Article 10 EEA
22. As to the second question, the Appellant’s main argument is that the
Respondent’s levying of charges is contrary to Article 10 EEA. The difference
between customs duties and charges having equivalent effect on the one hand
(Article 10 EEA) and internal taxation (Article 14 EEA) on the other hand is not
always obvious, but important, because if the charges belong to the former
group they are completely forbidden, no matter whether they are discriminatory
or not, whereas if the charges belong to the latter group it is possible to adjust
the taxation so that it is neutral between goods that compete on the market.
The ECJ has made it clear that a charge or tax cannot belong to both groups at
the same time. When considering the difference, the ECJ looks at the subject
matter rather than the form of the charges. More specifically, the ECJ looks at
the effect of the charges or the tax in light of the objectives of the EC Treaty.
In Dubois and Cargo, dealing with a charge by a private undertaking that had
been given the role of clearing imported products through customs in France,
the ECJ came to the conclusion that the charge in question was one having
equivalent effect to a customs duty.6
23. If it is a correct assumption that the charge issued by the Respondent should
be considered under Article 10 EEA, then it follows from case law of the
ECJ that the charge cannot be greater than the actual cost for the service
that is rendered. The said case law is equally clear on charges calculated
in accordance with the weight or value of the goods (ad valorem). A charge
issued ad valorem is contrary to Article 10 EEA as it does not fulfil the condition
6
The Appellant refers to Case C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR I-2421, at paragraphs 15–16.
170 - 149
Ákvæði 10. gr. EES
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
reglurnar beri að túlka rúmt til að tryggja að aðildarríki misnoti ekki tengsl við
einkaaðila til að komast undan ákvæðum EB-sáttmálans. Að öðrum kosti gætu
aðildarríkin komist undan tilteknum ákvæðum með því að færa, í heild eða að
hluta, verkefni sem séu í eðli sínu opinber til einkaaðila. Álagning vörugjalda
í höfnum sé í raun opinber ráðstöfun sem meta beri samkvæmt reglunum um
frjálsa vöruflutninga. Að öðrum kosti opnist leið fyrir EES-ríkin til að mismuna
erlendum vörum. Sú staðreynd að gjaldtaka byggist á lagaheimild og miði að
því að standa undir kostnaði við þá þjónustu sem veitt sé, ásamt hlutdeild í
sameiginlegum rekstri hafnarinnar, staðfesti aðeins að gjaldið sé í eðli sínu
opinbert.
23. Taki 10. gr. EES til gjaldtöku stefnda leiði af dómaframkvæmd Evrópudómstólsins
að gjaldið skuli ekki vera hærra en svo að það standi undir kostnaði við veitta
þjónustu. Dómaframkvæmdin sýni einnig að gjald sem miðist við þyngd eða
verðmæti vöru (ad valorem) gangi gegn ákvæðum 10. gr. EES vegna þess að
6
Áfrýjandi vísar til máls C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR I-2421, 15.-16. mgr.
- 149
171 -
22. Varðandi aðra spurningu byggir áfrýjandi aðallega á því að gjaldtaka
stefnda brjóti í bága við 10. gr. EES. Munurinn á tollum og gjöldum sem hafi
samsvarandi áhrif annars vegar (10. gr. EES) og innlendum sköttum (14. gr.
EES) hins vegar, sé ekki alltaf skýr. Hann sé hins vegar mikilvægur þar sem
gjöld sem falli undir fyrri flokkinn séu algjörlega bönnuð, hvort sem þau feli í sér
mismunun eða ekki, en þau sem falli í seinni flokkinn megi hins vegar leggja
á þannig að þau séu hlutlaus gagnvart vörum í samkeppni á markaðnum.
Það sé ljóst af dómum Evrópudómstólsins að gjald eða skattur geti ekki fallið
undir báða flokkana. Við aðgreininguna þarna á milli byggi Evrópudómstóllinn
fremur á efni gjalds en formi þess. Nánar tilekið líti dómstóllinn til þess hvaða
áhrif gjald eða skattur hafi í ljósi markmiða EB-sáttmálans. Í máli Dubois and
Cargo, um gjaldtöku einkafyrirtækis sem sá um að tollafgreiða innfluttar vörur í
Frakklandi, hafi Evrópudómstóllinn komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að umrætt gjald
hefði samsvarandi áhrif og tollar.6
of being a proportional payment.7 This is the case with the charges issued by
the Respondent, as the Respondent cannot show that there is any greater
cost connected to transporting alcoholic beverages than to transporting nonalcoholic beverages.
Article 14 EEA
24. Alternatively, the Appellant contends that the charges fall to be examined
under Article 14 EEA, as the excise tax discriminates between for example
imported beer and domestic beer production. If the measure is examined
under Article 14 EEA it has to be resolved whether the charge constitutes an
unlawful discrimination between similar domestic and imported products. On
that matter, the ECJ has decided that differing charges levied on comparable
products are not contrary to Article 14 EEA if those charges serve a lawful
purpose and are not discriminatory towards imported goods. As it is undisputed
that the basis for calculating the port charges does not reflect the actual cost
of providing the service, the charges in question do not meet the conditions for
being lawful in the sense of Article 14 EEA.8
Article 11 EEA
25. In the alternative, the Appellant contends that the charges are in violation of
Article 11 EEA, as they amount to a measure having equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction. In Enirisorse, the ECJ stated that if a measure has
been scrutinised with regard to the provisions corresponding to Articles 10
and 14 EEA, with the conclusion that it does not violate those provisions, then
it needs to be considered whether the measure falls within the scope of the
provision corresponding to Article 11 EEA, concerning technical barriers to
trade.9 According to the Appellant, the charges amount to measures having
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction.
Conclusion
26. The Appellant suggests answering the two questions as follows:
1. The levying of port charges by a partnership owned by several
municipalities, in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages from other
The Appellant refers to e.g. Case C-72/03 Cabonati Apuani [2004] ECR I‑8027 and Case C‑209/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR
I-1575.
8
The Appellant refers to Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573; Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR
I-4085; Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark [1997] ECR I‑4263; and Case C-242/95 GTLink [1997] ECR I-4449.
9
The Appellant refers to Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-1424, at paragraph 57.
7
- 172
150 -
24. Áfrýjandi heldur því fram til vara, að gjaldtakan falli undir 14. gr. EES þar sem
vörugjaldið mismuni t.d. innfluttum bjór gagnvart innlendum bjór. Við beitingu
14. gr. EES verði að svara því hvort gjaldið feli í sér ólögmæta mismunun milli
sams konar innlendra og innfluttra vara. Evrópudómstóllinn hafi ekki talið það
brjóta gegn 14. gr. EES að leggja mismunandi gjald á sambærilegar vörur
þjóni gjöldin lögmætum tilgangi og mismuni ekki innfluttum vörum. Þar sem
óumdeilt sé í málinu að hafnargjöldin byggist ekki á raunverulegum kostnaði
við veitta þjónustu geti umrædd gjöld ekki talist lögmæt samkvæmt 14. gr.
EES.8
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
það sé ekki í hlutfalli við kostnað vegna veittrar þjónustu.7 Hið sama eigi við um
gjaldtöku stefnda þar sem hann geti ekki sýnt fram á að meiri kostnaður hljótist
af flutningi áfengra en óáfengra drykkja.
25. Sé ekki fallist á framangreinda varakröfu heldur afrýjandi því fram að gjaldtakan
brjóti gegn ákvæðum 11. gr. EES þar sem hún teljist til ráðstafana sem hafi
samsvarandi áhrif og magntakmarkanir. Í dómi Evrópudómstólsins í máli
Enirisorse komi fram að séu ráðstafanir ekki taldar brjóta gegn ákvæðum
sem samsvara ákvæðum 10. og 14. gr. EES, sé nauðsynlegt að kanna hvort
þær heyri undir gildissvið ákvæða sem svara til 11. gr. EES um tæknilegar
viðskiptahindranir.9 Að mati áfrýjanda telst gjaldtakan til ráðstafana sem hafi
samsvarandi áhrif og magntakmarkanir.
Niðurstaða
1. Álagning hafnargjalda af hálfu sameignarfélags í eigu nokkurra
sveitarfélaga vegna innflutnings áfengra drykkja frá öðrum EES-ríkjum um
Áfrýjandi vísar t.d. til máls C-72/03 Cabonati Apuani [2004] ECR I-8027 og máls C-209/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR
I-1575.
8
Áfrýjandi vísar til máls 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573; máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085;
sameinaðra mála C-114/95 og C-115/95 Texaco and Olieselskapet Danmark [1997] ECR I-4263; og máls C-242/95 GT-Link [1997]
ECR I-4449.
9
Áfrýjandi vísar til sameinaðra mála C-34/01 til C-38/01 Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-1424, 57. mgr.
7
150 - 173
26. Áfrýjandi telur að spurningunum beri að svara sem hér segir:
EEA States through a port owned by the partnership, fall under the provisions
of Article 10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement.
2. The levying of charges of the type practised by Faxaflóahafnir sf vis-à-vis
the Appellant is contrary to Article 10 of the EEA Agreement.
The Respondent
27. The Respondent states that it has no objections to how the questions are
formulated. As to the substance of the questions, the Respondent does not
provide any observations.
The Government of Iceland
Scope of EEA rules on free movement on goods
28. The Government of Iceland restricts its written observations to the first question
referred to the Court, but emphasises the limitations on the material scope of
the rules of the EEA Agreement on free movement of goods in the area of
alcoholic beverages. It is understood, the Government of Iceland maintains,
that wine is excluded form the general scope of the EEA Agreement and that
Article 11 EEA does not apply to trade in wine.10
29. The first question essentially concerns the scope of the obligations under the
rules on free movement of goods in the EEA. The Government of Iceland
contends that Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA only lay obligations upon the
Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. These Articles are addressed to,
and relate only to measures taken by, the States themselves. The Articles do
not reach an operation such as that of the Respondent which is an independent
partnership with no public authority or functions. Furthermore, the Government
of Iceland notes that Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA do not have horizontal effect.
Rather, they are limited to the actions of public bodies.11
30. The Government of Iceland submits that one of the aims pursued with the
Ports Act was facilitating a move of the operation of ports from the public
sphere to other forms of undertakings, public limited liability companies,
irrespective of whether or not they are owned by a public body, private limited
liability companies, partnerships or private parties, operating independently.
This aim of the Ports Act has materialised inter alia with the establishment of
the Respondent. A port run by such a partnership is, by law, not considered a
Iceland refers to Case E-1/94 Restamark [1994–95] EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, at paragraph 40; Case E‑1/97 Gundersen [1997] EFTA Ct.
Rep. 110, [at paragraph 8] and Case E-4/04 Pedicel [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraphs 24–25 and 28–29.
11
Iceland refers to e.g. Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic [2002] ECR I-5031.
10
- 174
151 -
2. Gjaldtaka eins og sú sem Faxaflóahafnir sf. viðhefur gagnvart áfrýjanda
gengur gegn ákvæðum 10. gr. EES-samningsins.
Stefndi
27. Stefndi tekur fram að hann hreyfi ekki mótmælum við orðalagi spurninganna.
Hann sendi ekki inn efnislegar athugasemdir við málið.
Ríkisstjórn Íslands
Gildissvið EES-reglna um frjálsa vöruflutninga
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
höfn í eigu sameignarfélagsins, heyrir undir ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EESsamningsins.
28. Ríkisstjórn Íslands einskorðar skriflegar athugasemdir sínar við fyrstu
spurninguna sem borin er undir EFTA-dómstólinn en leggur áherslu á
takmarkað efnissvið reglna EES-samningsins um frjálsa vöruflutninga á sviði
áfengra drykkja. Vín heyri ekki undir almennt gildissvið EES-samningsins og
ákvæði 11. gr. EES eigi ekki við um viðskipti með vín.10
30. Því er haldið fram að markmið hafnalaga hafi m.a. verið að auðvelda flutning
hafnarstarfsemi frá hinu opinbera til fyrirtækja rekinna í formi hlutafélaga, hvort
sem þau væru í opinberri eigu eða ekki, einkahlutafélaga, sameignarfélaga eða
einkarekstrar. Markmiðið hafi m.a. náð fram að ganga með stofnun stefnda.
Höfn sem rekin sé af slíku sameignarfélagi teljist lögum samkvæmt ekki til
opinbers rekstrar, sbr. 3. tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga. Stefndi teljist ekki opinber
Vísað er til máls E-1/94 Restamark [1994] EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, 40. mgr.; máls E-1/97 Gundersen [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 110, 8. mgr.
og máls E-4/04 Pedicel [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 24.-25. mgr. og 28.-29. mgr.
11
Vísað er t.d. til máls C-159/00 Sapod Audic [2002] ECR I-5031.
10
151 - 175
29. Að mati ríkisstjórnar Íslands lýtur fyrsta spurningin í meginatriðum að afmörkun
þeirra skuldbindinga sem felist í reglunum um frjálsa vöruflutninga á EES.
Ákvæði 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES leggi aðeins skyldur á aðila EES-samningsins.
Greinarnar beinist að ríkjum og snerti eingöngu ráðstafanir þeirra. Þær eigi
ekki við um rekstur eins og þann sem stefndi hafi með höndum. Um sé að
ræða sjálfstætt sameignarfélag sem hafi ekkert opinbert vald eða hlutverk.
Ríkisstjórn Íslands telur einnig að ákvæði 10., 11. og 14. gr. hafi ekki áhrif
á lögskipti einkaaðila (lárétt áhrif) heldur takmarkist við ráðstafanir opinberra
aðila.11
public operation, cf. Article 8(3) of the Ports Act. The Respondent is not a public
entity, and its operation cannot in any way be considered a project undertaken
for the public authorities. The previous link to the municipal authorities has in
fact been terminated by the Respondent’s transformation into an independent
partnership and the ports it owns operate on a private law basis. The Respondent
is not endowed with any state powers, regulatory, disciplinary or otherwise,
and furthermore is neither set up by the public authorities nor sponsored by
them in any way. Even in the ECJ’s broadest interpretations of ‘state measure,’
that term must include at least the exercise of powers derived from public law
and national legislation must have conferred regulatory or disciplinary powers
upon the entity concerned.12 To further support this contention, it must be
borne in mind that the Respondent’s employees are not government officials
and therefore do not enjoy the same benefits as employees of public entities;
further, the Respondent’s ports, unlike ports run as public entities, are not
subject to the Icelandic Administration Act No 37/1993.
31. Moreover, the Government of Iceland maintains, a port run in the form of
a partnership, unlike those run as public entities, has unlimited operational
authority, whilst those not separate from a municipality are subject to limitations,
cf. Articles 10 and 15 of the Ports Act. Furthermore, it can pay dividends to its
shareholders after the costs of the port’s renewal and maintenance have been
satisfied, cf. Article 20 of the Ports Act. The tariffs of the Respondent are in
its sole discretion, unlike the tariffs of ports run as public entities, which are
subject to detailed rules on account of their public financing and their imposition
of service charges. The fee charged by the ports of the Respondent is not a
service charge within the traditional meaning given to that term under Icelandic
law, but merely remuneration for services provided. The tariffs are set by the
Respondent on a private law basis and without influence from the State or
municipalities. In fact, the Respondent is in competition with other ports, and
can price its services as it sees fit with regard to market conditions at any given
time.
32. The judgments referred to by the Appellant in order to support its contention
that the Respondent should be considered part of the State are in the opinion
of the Government of Iceland not relevant to the case at hand. For example,
to this end the Appellant refers to Dubois and Cargo.13 The facts in that case
Iceland refers to Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 4083 and Joined Cases 266/87 and 267/87
Association of Pharmaceutical Importers [1989] ECR 1295.
13
Case C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR I-2421.
12
176 - 152
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
aðili og starfsemi hans sé ekki að neinu leyti á vegum hins opinbera. Eftir að
stefndi varð sameignarfélag séu tengsl stefnda við sveitarfélög ekki lengur fyrir
hendi og hafnir í eigu félagsins séu nú reknar á einkaréttarlegum grundvelli.
Stefndi hafi engar opinberar valdheimildir, hvorki til reglusetningar, ákvörðunar
viðurlaga né annars. Þá hafi stjórnvöld hvorki staðið að stofnun stefnda né
styrkt hann að neinu leyti. Hugtakið „ríkisráðstafanir” verði, jafnvel í víðasta
skilningi Evrópudómstólsins, a.m.k. að fela í sér framkvæmd opinbers valds á
grundvelli opinbers réttar af hálfu aðila sem hafi að landsrétti verið fengið vald
til reglusetningar eða ákvörðunar viðurlaga.12 Í þessu sambandi er bent á að
starfsmenn stefnda séu ekki opinberir starfsmenn og njóti þar af leiðandi ekki
sömu kjara og starfsmenn hins opinbera. Auk þess heyri hafnir í eigu stefnda,
ólíkt höfnum í opinberum rekstri, ekki undir íslensku stjórnsýslulögin nr. 37/
1993.
32. Þeir dómar sem áfrýjandi byggir á til stuðnings þeirri fullyrðingu að stefndi
teljist til hins opinbera eiga að mati ríkisstjórnar Íslands ekki við í málinu.
Áfrýjandi vísi m.a. til Dubois and Cargo13 þar sem atvik hafi verið verulega
ólík þeim sem hér eru uppi. Málið hafi varðað gjald sem lagt var á fyrirtæki
vegna kostnaðar við eftirlit og úrlausn ýmissa formsatriða við flutning á vörum
12
13
Vísað er t.d. til máls 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 4083 og sameinaðra mála 266/87 og 267/87
Association of Pharmaceutical Importers [1989] ECR 1295.
Mál C-16/94 Dubois and Cargo [1995] ECR I-2421.
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31. Í máli ríkisstjórnar Íslands kemur einnig fram að höfn sem rekin sé af
sameignarfélagi hafi óskoraðar starfsheimildir en heimildir opinberra hafna
undir stjórn sveitarfélaga séu takmarkaðar, sbr. 10. og 15. gr. hafnalaga.
Sameignarfélag geti auk þess greitt arð til hluthafa eftir að fé hafi verið lagt til
hliðar í fullnægjandi viðhald og endurnýjun hafnarinnar, sbr. 20. gr. hafnalaga.
Það sé alfarið á valdi stefnda að ákveða gjaldskrána. Það eigi ekki við um
gjaldskrá opinberra hafna sem lúti nákvæmum reglum þar sem þær fái fjármagn
frá hinu opinbera og innheimti þjónustugjöld. Þau gjöld sem innheimt séu hjá
höfnum stefnda teljist ekki þjónustugjöld í hefðbundinni merkingu íslensks
réttar. Gjaldtaka stefnda sé á einkaréttarlegum grundvelli og hafi hvorki ríki né
sveitarfélög áhrif þar á. Stefndi sé í raun í samkeppni við aðrar hafnir og geti
verðlagt þjónustu sína með tilliti til markaðsaðstæðna á hverjum tíma.
differ widely from the circumstances in this case. The case concerned a charge
imposed on economic operators which included costs of controls and formalities
carried out in connection with the movement of goods across frontiers within the
European Community – which the Member States themselves were supposed
to bear, according to Article 9 and 12 EC at the time of the proceedings. The
judgment merely states that such a charge is incompatible with those provisions
no matter whether the charge is imposed by a public entity or a private one.
It must be borne in mind that the circumstances on the Community side are
different from the EFTA side of the EEA, as the EEA Agreement does not entail
any customs union between the Contracting Parties providing for rules such
as the abovementioned provisions. Thus, Dubois and Cargo does not support
the Appellant’s contention, and is irrelevant as a precedent in an EEA context.
The Appellant also refers to Case C-157/04 Commission v Netherlands.14 That
case concerned an undertaking afforded a monopoly on performing a service
of general economic interest, which is not the case here since the Respondent
has not been granted any special or exclusive rights by the municipalities.
Conclusion
33. Based on the above, the Government of Iceland suggests that the reply to the
first question should be that:
The levying of charges by a partnership owned by several municipalities,
where the operation of the port is not regarded in law as a public operation,
the levying of the charges is based on an authorization in law and they meet
the cost of the services provided with a share of the joint operation of the port,
in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages from other EEA States
through a port owned by the partnership, does not fall under the provisions of
Article 10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement.
General
34. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”) clarifies, first, that its
observations are applicable only insofar as the products concerned come
within the scope of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, ESA recalls the extent
to which this is the case with alcoholic beverages. Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA
14
Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699.
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yfir landamæri. Aðildarríkjunum hafi borið að standa undir þessum kostnaði
samkvæmt þáverandi 9. og 12. gr. EB. Í dóminum komi einungis fram að slíkt
gjald samræmist ekki fyrrnefndum ákvæðum óháð því hvort það sé lagt á
af hálfu ríkis- eða einkafyrirtækis. Hafa beri í huga að aðstæður innan ríkja
bandalagsins séu ólíkar þeim í EFTA-ríkjunum þar sem EES-samningurinn
feli ekki í sér tollabandalag með reglum líkum þeim sem fyrrgreind ákvæði
hafi að geyma. Mál Dubois and Cargo styðji því ekki fullyrðingu áfrýjanda og
eigi ekki við í EES-samhengi. Þá er þess getið að áfrýjandi vísi einnig til máls
Commission v Netherlands14 sem hafi varðað fyrirtæki með einkarétt á að
veita þjónustu með almenna efnahagslega þýðingu. Ekki sé um slíkt að ræða
í þessu máli þar sem sveitarfélögin hafi ekki veitt stefnda nein sérstök réttindi
eða einkaréttindi.
Niðurstaða
33. Með vísan til framangreinds er af hálfu ríkisstjórnar Íslands lagt til að fyrstu
spurningu verði svarað sem hér segir:
Gjaldtaka af hálfu sameignarfélags í eigu nokkurra sveitarfélaga, vegna
innflutnings á áfengum drykkjum frá öðrum EES-ríkjum um höfn í eigu félagsins,
í tilvikum þar sem rekstur hafnar telst ekki til opinberrar starfsemi samkvæmt
lögum og gjaldtakan hefur heimild í lögum og stendur undir kostnaði við þá
þjónustu sem veitt er, ásamt hlutdeild í sameiginlegum rekstri hafnarinnar,
heyrir ekki undir ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES.
Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA
34. Eftirlitsstofnun EFTA (ESA) tekur fram í upphafi að athugasemdir stofnunarinnar
eigi eingöngu við að því leyti sem þær vörur sem um ræðir falli undir gildissvið
EES-samningsins. ESA minnir í því sambandi á gildissvið samningsins
14
Mál C-157/94 Commission v Netherland [1997] ECR I-5699.
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Almennt
have an identical scope of application with regards to products and it is noted
that these provisions apply to spirits and beer.15
35. ESA then finds it appropriate to start by analysing the nature of the charges,
in order to determine which of the abovementioned provisions might be
applicable, before moving on to examining the scope of each of the provisions
and assessing whether and to what extent they preclude the contested
dock charges. First, the ECJ has held that the scope of Article 28 EC (which
corresponds to Article 11 EEA) “does not extend to the obstacles to trade
covered by other specific provisions of the Treaty” and that “obstacles of a fiscal
nature or having an effect equivalent to customs duties, which are covered by
Articles 23 EC, 25 EC and 90 EC, do not fall within the prohibition laid down in
Article 28 EC.”16 Second, the EFTA Court has concluded that Articles 10 and
14 EEA are mutually exclusive.17 Consequently, it falls to be examined which,
if any, of the provisions might be applicable to the case at hand.
Article 10 EEA
36. The dock charges are not ‘customs duties’ in the literal sense of the term. Nor,
in ESA’s opinion, can they be classified as charges having an equivalent effect
thereto. The dock charges must be paid to the Respondent on all products
that pass through its ports, irrespective of whether the products are domestic
or foreign and whether they arrive from another Icelandic port or a foreign
one. The charges are, in other words, not unilaterally imposed on the goods in
question by reason that they cross a frontier.
37. In Einarsson, the EFTA Court held that a charge that forms part of a general
system of internal duties applying systematically to categories of products
according to objective criteria applied without regard to the origin of the
products, falls within the scope of Article 14 EEA.18 Moreover, ESA submits,
the ECJ has also held that port charges having similar characteristics to
the ones at hand fell to be examined under the parallel provision in Article
90 EC.19
15
16
17
18
19
ESA refers, inter alia, to Case E-9/00 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 72, at paragraph 30, Case
E-1/94 Restamark [1994–95] EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, at paragraph 41 and Case E-6/96 Wilhelmsen [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 56, at
paragraph 22.
ESA refers to Case C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører [2003] ECR I-6065, at paragraph 32. Reference is also made to Case
27/67 Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH [1968] ECR English special edition 223, Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, at paragraph
33 and Joined Cases C-78/90 to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest and Others [1992] ECR I-1847, at paragraph 20.
ESA refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 20. Reference is also made to Case C-234/99 Nygård
[2002] ECR I-3657, at paragraph 17 and Case C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, at paragraph 19.
ESA refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 20.
ESA refers to Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraph 20 and Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01
Enirisorse [2003] ECR I-1424, at paragraph 60.
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gagnvart áfengum drykkjum. Vörusvið ákvæða 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES sé hið
sama og nái yfir brennda drykki og bjór.15
35. ESA telur rétt að víkja næst að eðli þess gjalds sem málið varði. Þannig sé
unnt að ákvarða hvert ofangreindra ákvæða eigi við áður en gildissvið hvers
ákvæðis sé skoðað og mat lagt á hvort, eða að hve miklu leyti, þau útiloki
umdeild hafnargjöld. Í fyrsta lagi, hafi það komið fram hjá Evrópudómstólnum
að 28. gr. EB (sem samsvarar 11. gr. EES) „nái ekki til viðskiptahindrana
sem önnur ákvæði sáttmálans eiga við um” og að „skattalegar hindranir eða
hindranir sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif og tollar, sem kveðið er á um í 23., 25.
og 90. gr. EB, falli ekki undir bannið í 28. gr. EB.”16 Í öðru lagi, hafi EFTAdómstóllinn komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að ekki beri að beita ákvæðum 10.
gr. og 14. gr. EES samtímis.17 Því verði að kanna hvaða ákvæði, ef eitthvert
þeirra, eigi við í máli þessu.
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36. ESA telur að hafnargjöldin sem um ræðir séu hvorki „tollar” í eiginlegum
skilningi þess orðs né gjöld sem hafi samsvarandi áhrif. Hafnargjöld beri
að greiða stefnda vegna allrar vöru sem fer um höfnina, óháð því hvort hún
er innlend eða erlend og hvort hún kemur frá íslenskri höfn eða erlendri.
Hafnargjöldin séu með öðrum orðum ekki einungis lögð á vöru við flutning
hennar yfir landamæri.
ESA vísar m.a. til máls E-9/00 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 72, 30. mgr.; máls E-1/94 Restamark
[1994-1995] EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, 41. mgr. og máls E-6/96 Wilhelmsen [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 56, 22. mgr.
ESA vísar til máls C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører [2003] ECR I-6065, 32. mgr. Einnig er vísað til máls 27/67 Firma Fink-Frucht
GmbH [1968] ECR English special edition 223; máls 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, 33. mgr. og sameinaðra mála C-78/90 til
C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de lÓuest and Others [1992] ECR I-1847, 20. mgr.
17
ESA vísar til máls E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 20. mgr. Einnig er vísað til máls C-234/99 Nygård [2002] ECR I-3657,
17. mgr. og máls C-213/96 Outokumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, 19. mgr.
18
ESA vísar til máls E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 20. mgr.
19
ESA vísar til máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 20. mgr. og sameinaðra mála C-34/01 til C-38/01 Enirisorse
[2003] ECR I-1424, 60. mgr.
15
16
154 - 181
37. Í máli Harðar Einarssonar hafi EFTA-dómstóllinn komist að þeirri niðurstöðu
að gjald, sem sé liður í almennri, ríkisbundinni gjaldtökutilhögun, lagt á með
kerfisbundnum hætti og samkvæmt málefnalegum viðmiðum á vöruflokka,
án tillits til uppruna vörunnar, falli undir 14. gr. EES.18Þar að auki hafi
Evrópudómstóllinn komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að hafnargjöld, svipuð þeim sem
hér um ræðir, skuli meta samkvæmt samsvarandi ákvæðum 90. gr. EB.19
38. ESA is, therefore, of the opinion that the dock charges do not have the
character of a customs duty within the meaning of Article 10 EEA. This is so
even if it could be established that no domestic alcohol products were de facto
subject to the dock charges, for example because they are always transported
by land.20 Indeed, even if there had been no domestic production at all, that
would not by itself have made the charges subject to Article 10 EEA.
Article 14 EEA
39. At the outset, ESA emphasises that the concept of internal taxation under
Article 14 EEA embraces all charges which are imposed on imports as well
as on domestic products irrespective of their nature or purpose. The ECJ has
ruled that the concept of taxation within the meaning of Article 90 EC (which
corresponds to Article 14 EEA) must be interpreted widely.21 The notion of
taxation covers not only taxes in the technical sense, such as consumption
taxes, but also parafiscal charges, monopoly levies, inspection fees and
charges on loading in ports.22 Moreover, a measure does not have to apply
to the entire area of the EEA State concerned; measures of local character
may also qualify as taxation within the meaning of that provision.23 That the
obstacle created by a national tax is only minor and incidental is not sufficient
to prevent the application of Article 14 EEA.24 The tax concerned may be based
either on legislation, international agreements or administrative regulations
and circulars.25 The fact that a tax or levy is collected by a body governed by
public law other than the State or is collected for its benefit and is a charge
which is special in the sense that it is collected for a specific purpose cannot
prevent it from falling within the scope of Article 14 EEA.26 Nor is it decisive for
the classification under that provision whether the charge represents payment
for a service provided.27
40. ESA then examines whether the dock charges can be said to qualify as a
measure of ‘taxation’ for the purposes of Article 14 EEA by virtue of the fact that
they are prescribed by way of compulsory public law rules, in casu the Ports
ESA refers to Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraphs 22–23.
ESA refers to Case 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247, at paragraph 13.
22
ESA refers to Case 77/72 Capolongo [1973] ECR 611, at paragraph 12, Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentrale [1976] ECR 181, at paragraph
5, Case 46/76 Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5, at paragraph 10 and Case C‑90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraph 20.
23
ESA refers to Case C-45/94 Cámara de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Ceuta [1995] ECR I-4385, at paragraphs 2–3.
24
ESA refers to Case 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247, at paragraph 14.
25
ESA refers to Joined Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93 Roders and Others [1995] ECR I-2229, at paragraph 1; Joined Cases C-78/90
to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest and Others [1992] ECR I-1847; and Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG [1982] ECR
1331, at paragraphs 17–18.
26
ESA refers to Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi [1977] ECR 557, at paragraph 19.
27
ESA refers to Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraph 35.
20
21
182 - 155
39. ESA leggur í upphafi áherslu á að hugtakið „skattur innanlands”, samkvæmt
14. gr. EES, taki til allra gjalda sem lögð séu á innfluttar og innlendar vörur
án tillits til eðlis þeirra, eiginleika eða tilgangs. Evrópudómstóllinn hafi túlkað
hugtakið „skattlagning”, í skilningi 90. gr. EB (sem samsvari 14. gr. EES),
rúmt.21 Skattlagning taki ekki eingöngu til skatta í tæknilegri merkingu, eins og
t.d. neysluskatta, heldur einnig skattatengdra gjalda, gjalda einokunaraðila,
eftirlitsgjalda og gjalda fyrir uppskipun í höfnum.22 Þá sé það ekki skilyrði að
einstök ráðstöfun gildi á öllu yfirráðasvæði tiltekins EES-ríkis; svæðisbundnar
ráðstafanir geti einnig talist skattlagning í skilningi ákvæðisins.23 Enda þótt
innlend skattlagning feli aðeins í sér smávægilega hindrun í einstaka tilvikum
nægi það ekki til að koma í veg fyrir beitingu 14. gr.24 Viðkomandi skattur geti
verið ákveðinn með stoð í lögum, alþjóðlegum samningum, reglugerðum
stjórnvalda og umburðarbréfum.25 Gjald falli ekki utan 14. gr. EES þótt það sé
innheimt af opinberum aðila, öðrum en ríkinu, eða fyrir hönd ríkisins og það
sé sérstakt í þeim skilningi að það er innheimt í ákveðnum tilgangi.26 Þá hafi
það heldur ekki úrslitaáhrif um beitingu 14. gr. hvort gjald sá lagt á til að standa
undir kostnaði við veitta þjónustu.27
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38. ESA telur því að hafnargjöld hafi ekki einkenni tolla í skilningi 10. gr. EES. Í því
sambandi skipti ekki máli þótt sýna mætti fram á að í reynd væru hafnargjöld
ekki lögð á neinar innlendar áfengisvörur, t.d. vegna þess að þær væru allar
fluttar landleiðina.20 Raunar myndi gjaldið ekki falla undir 10. gr. EES þótt engar
innlendar vörur væru til staðar.
ESA vísar til máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 22.–23. mgr.
ESA vísar til máls 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247, 13. mgr.
22
ESA vísar til máls 77/72 Capolongo [1973] ECR 611, 12. mgr.; máls 45/75 Rewe-Zentrale [1976] ECR 181, 5. mgr.; máls 46/76
Bauhuis [1977] ECR 5, 10. mgr. og máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 20. mgr.
23
ESA vísar til máls C-45/94 Cámara de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Ceuta [1995] ECR I-4385, 2.-3. mgr.
24
ESA vísar til máls 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247, 14. mgr.
25
ESA vísar til sameinaðra mála C-367/93 til C-377/93 Roders and Others [1995] ECR I-2229, 1. mgr.; sameinaðra mála C-78/90
til C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de lÓuest and Others [1992] ECR I-1847, og máls 17/81 Pabst &Richarz KG [1982] ECR
1331, 17.–18. mgr.
26
ESA vísar til máls 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi [1977] ECR 557, 19. mgr.
27
ESA vísar til máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 35. mgr.
20
21
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40. ESA víkur næst að því hvort hafnargjöldin geti talist skattur í skilningi
14. gr. EES á þeirri forsendu að álagning þeirra sé skyldubundin samkvæmt
opinberum reglum, í þessu tilviki hafnalögum. Ef sú sé raunin, gildi ákvæði
Act. If that is so, Article 14 will apply regardless of whether the Respondent may
be regarded as a public body competent to issue rules constituting ‘taxation’.
41. ESA notes that the Ports Act does not in itself fix the amount of the contested
dock charges, but provides a legal basis for claiming the charge and sets
out some parameters for its amount. For publicly operated ports, ESA further
notes that according to Article 17 of the Ports Act, the dock charges in question
“may” be collected by the ports. In practice, it would appear that such charges
must be imposed. Indeed, while municipalities are free to change the operating
form of a publicly operated port into a company, Article 18(3) of the Ports Act
provides that the operating form of a port run as a company shall revert to being
a port operated by the municipality without a special board of directors if the
port has a negative operating result for three consecutive years. Ports such as
the ones operated by the Respondent are therefore in practice prohibited from
setting their fees so low that the port is operating with a deficit and with the
consequence that the municipality will be forced to support it financially. As for
the tariffs set by non-public ports, Article 20 of the Ports Act states that these
shall be determined on the basis of covering the costs of the services provided
together with a proportion of the common cost of the port’s operation.
42. To ESA, it is not clear from the national court’s request to what extent each
port may decide how the fee structure shall be designed. In particular, it is not
clear to which extent the legislation implies that the ports are obliged to ensure
that they do not charge more than the actual cost of providing each service in
question (in addition to a part of the common costs) or whether it is sufficient
that the total income from all charges over a longer period corresponds to the
total costs. It would appear that the only limitation is that referred to above,
i.e. that ports which are owned by a municipality but operated on a non-public
basis are prevented from charging fees that in the long run do not allow them
to meet their operating costs.
43. On the one hand, as far as ESA is aware, it might be argued that according
to the general principles of Icelandic administrative law a legal authorisation
for a public body to charge fees that correspond to the cost of providing a
service would generally not permit a cross-subsidisation between different
product categories or recipients of services. On the other hand, the tariff at
issue seems to build on the premise that this is indeed possible under the
Ports Act, as the present list of tariffs clearly presupposes that the Respondent
is permitted to apply different rates to products such as alcoholic beverages
184 - 156
41. ESA bendir á að fjárhæð umdeildra hafnargjalda sé ekki ákveðin með
hafnalögum. Þau veiti gjaldtökunni lagastoð og setji ákveðin viðmið til ákvörðunar
á fjárhæð þeirra. Samkvæmt 17. gr. hafnalaga sé höfnum í opinberum rekstri
„heimilt” að innheimta hin umdeildu hafnargjöld. Í raun virðist þó sem það verði
að innheimta slík gjöld. Þótt sveitarfélögum sé frjálst að breyta rekstri hafnar
úr opinberum rekstri í félag, segi í 3. mgr. 18. gr. hafnalaga að rekstrarformi
hafnar skuli breytt í höfn í eigu sveitarfélags án sérstakrar hafnarstjórnar
þegar hún hafi haft neikvæðan rekstrarafgang í þrjú ár í röð. Höfnum eins og
þeim sem stefndi reki sé því í raun meinað að leggja á svo lág gjöld að það
leiði til rekstrarhalla sem hafi það í för með sér að sveitarfélag verði að styðja
höfnina fjárhagslega. Að því er gjaldtöku einkarekinna hafna snerti, mæli 20.
gr. hafnalaga fyrir um að hún skuli miðuð við að standa undir kostnaði við veitta
þjónustu ásamt hlutdeild í sameiginlegum rekstri hafnarinnar.
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v Norway
14. gr. EES óháð því hvort litið sé á stefnda sem opinberan aðila sem sé bær
til að setja reglur sem feli í sér skattlagningu.
43. Eftir því sem ESA best veit, mætti halda því fram að það leiði af grundvallarreglum
íslenskra stjórnsýslulaga að lagaheimild fyrir gjaldtöku vegna þjónustu
opinbers aðila leyfi ekki tilfærslur milli ólíkra vöruflokka eða þjónustukaupa.
Sú gjaldskrá sem hér um ræði virðist á hinn bóginn byggja á þeirri forsendu
að slíkt sé heimilt samkvæmt hafnalögum. Þar sé augljóslega gert ráð fyrir
að stefndi megi leggja mishá gjöld á áfenga drykki annars vegar og óáfenga
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42. ESA telur það ekki vera ljóst af álitsbeiðni landsdómstólsins hvaða svigrúm
hafnir hafi til að ákveða uppbyggingu gjaldanna. Einkum sé óljóst hvort
löggjöfin gefi til kynna að höfnum sé skylt að láta gjald endurspegla kostnað
við veitta þjónustu (ásamt hlutdeild í sameiginlegum rekstri) eða nægilegt sé
að heildartekjur vegna allrar gjaldtöku yfir lengri tíma samsvari heildarkostnaði.
Svo virðist sem aðeins sé um að ræða þá takmörkun sem nefnd sé hér að
ofan, þ.e. að útilokað sé að gjaldtaka einkarekinna hafna í eigu sveitarfélaga
nægi ekki fyrir rekstarkostnaði þeirra þegar til lengri tíma sé litið.
on the one hand and non-alcoholic on the other without it being immediately
obvious that the costs of handling these products are different.
44. However, underlining that it is neither for ESA nor for the EFTA Court to provide
an interpretation of Icelandic law, that competence lying solely with the national
court, ESA restricts itself to the following observation: assuming that the Ports
Act merely imposes loose parameters within which each port is free to set its
own fee structure, and that the Act allows the port to follow other considerations
than the actual costs for each service in question, the legislation leaves such a
margin for discretion to each port that the charge cannot be held to be fixed by
the Icelandic legislator. In such a case, the Ports Act would differ significantly
from the charges at stake in Haahr Petroleum where the level of the charges
was fixed by a ministerial regulation.28
45. On the basis that the dock charges cannot be classified as a tax by virtue
of the Ports Act itself, the question arises whether they may, nevertheless,
come within the scope of Article 14 EEA simply because they are prescribed
by a body that is owned and controlled by the State in the form of municipal
administration. The consequences of such an approach will be that the very
same charge for the very same service would fall within the ambit of Article 14
EEA if issued by a port owned and controlled by a public body but not if it falls
due in respect of a service rendered by a privately owned port.
46. ESA notes that the Respondent’s status as a partnership owned by several
municipalities means that, under Icelandic law, the owners carry unlimited
liability for the obligations of the Respondent. According to Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of
the partnership contract, other municipalities may be taken into the partnership
whereas entities other than municipalities may not buy a part of the company.
ESA thus cannot see any reason to regard a tariff set by the Respondent as
different from one set by the municipalities themselves (as owners of a harbour
or infrastructure facility). Consequently, if measures enacted by a municipality
would, under the same circumstances, be considered to fall within the scope
of Article 14 EEA, then ESA is of the view that the same should apply to the
charges laid down by the Respondent. That the Respondent does not qualify
as a public body under Icelandic law, according to Article 8(3) of the Ports Act,
is in this respect immaterial.
47. As far as ESA is aware, there is no case law from either the EFTA Court or
the ECJ as to whether a fee levied by a body such as the Respondent can fall
28
ESA refers to Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraphs 5–6.
186 - 157
44. ESA leggur hins vegar áherslu á að það sé hvorki í verkahring stofnunarinnar
né EFTA-dómstólsins að túlka íslenska löggjöf. Það sé alfarið á valdssviði
íslenskra dómstóla. ESA lætur því nægja að taka fram að feli hafnalögin
einungis í sér lausleg viðmið sem veiti höfnum frelsi til að ákvarða sína eigin
gjaldskrá, og heimili þeim að taka mið af öðrum þáttum en raunverulegum
kostnaði vegna þeirra þjónustu sem veitt sé, veiti löggjöfin hverri höfn svo
mikið svigrúm að ekki sé unnt að halda því fram að gjöldin séu ákvörðuð
af íslenska löggjafanum. Ákvæði hafnalaga séu þá að verulegu leyti ólík
gjaldtökuákvæðum í máli Haahr Petroleum þar sem gjöld voru ákvörðuð með
reglugerðum ráðuneytis.28
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drykki hins vegar, þótt ekki sé alveg ljóst að afgreiðslukostnaður þessara vara
sé mismunandi.
46. ESA bendir á að þar sem stefndi sé sameignarfélag í eigu nokkurra
sveitarfélaga beri eigendurnir samkvæmt íslenskum lögum ótakmarkaða
ábyrgð á skuldbindingum félagsins. Samkvæmt ákvæðum 2. og 3. tölul. 2.
gr. sameignarfélagssamnings geti ekki aðrir aðilar en sveitarfélög keypt hlut
í félaginu. Það sé því ekki ástæða til að ætla að gjaldskrá stefnda sé ólík
gjaldskrám sveitarfélaga (sem eigenda hafnar eða annars grunnvirkis). Af
þessu leiði að heyri ráðstafanir af hálfu sveitarfélaga við sömu kringumstæður
undir 14. gr. EES þá gildi það líka um gjaldtöku stefnda. Ekki skipti máli í þessu
sambandi að stefndi teljist ekki opinber aðili að íslenskum rétti, samkvæmt 3.
tölul. 8. gr. hafnalaga.
47. ESA veit ekki dæmi þess að EFTA-dómstóllinn eða Evrópudómstóllinn hafi
tekið á því hvort gjaldtaka aðila eins og stefnda falli undir 14. gr. EES af þeirri
28
ESA vísar til máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 5.– 6. mgr.
- 157
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45. Teljist hafnargjöld ekki skattur samkvæmt hafnalögum vakni sú spurning hvort
þau heyri samt sem áður undir 14. gr. EES þar sem þau séu ákvörðuð af aðila
í eigu og undir stjórn ríkisins í formi sveitarstjórna. Slík nálgun myndi leiða
til þess að gjald fyrir ákveðna þjónustu heyrði undir 14. gr. EES ef það væri
sett af höfn í eigu og undir stjórn opinbers aðila, en ekki ef um væri að ræða
þjónustu hafnar í eigu einkaaðila.
within the scope of Article 14 EEA solely by reference to the public ownership
structure of the body imposing the charge, even if that charge constitutes
payment for a service commercially rendered.
48. Articles 10, 11 and 14 EEA all have the purpose of ensuring that measures
enacted by the Contracting Parties do not impede the free movement of goods
within the EEA. Hence, it might seem logical to consider the scope ratione
personae of these provisions as applying to the State irrespective of the guise
in which it appears. Indeed, Article 11 EEA clearly applies to State entities
acting outside the remit of public law functions.29 Accordingly, ESA submits that
a decision by the Respondent not to accept the unloading of goods by ships
coming from other EEA States would fall within the scope of Article 11 EEA.30
Based on this assumption, ESA poses the question whether it would not be
logical to consider measures relating to charges for unloading the goods to be
covered by Article 14 EEA on taxation. However, ESA then identifies several
arguments against a finding to this effect.
49. In this regard, ESA notes that the notion of ‘taxation’ is normally associated
with compulsory contributions to public revenue. As reflected in the wording
of Article 14 EEA, in order for the ‘taxation’ in question to fall within the ambit
of that provision, it must be said to be imposed on the person liable to pay the
money concerned. The classic situation is where legislation (be it central or
local) lays down both a legal obligation to pay and the amount of the payment.
It seems less obvious to talk about a pecuniary charge as being ‘imposed’
by the relevant national legislation where it merely empowers a public body
(in the wide sense given to that notion under the EEA Agreement) to claim
a fee for a service rendered and in that respect itself set the level of the fee.
That is especially so if there is no element of factual compulsion because the
consumer can purchase the same goods or service elsewhere.
50. In addition, the levying of duties requires the State, at least implicitly, to
be acting in a regulatory capacity. It could conceivably have far-reaching
consequences to subject public bodies engaged in economic activity, such
as the Respondent, to the scope of Article 14 EEA. This is so even if Article
14 EEA would not regulate the level of pricing but only require the public body
As an example, ESA refers to discriminatory conditions in public contracts having been held to come within the scope of Article 11
EEA. Reference is made to Case E-5/98 Fagtún [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 51, at paragraphs 30–32.
30
ESA notes that the scope ratione personae of Article 28 EC has been interpreted widely by the ECJ. Reference is made to e.g.
Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977, at paragraphs 17–20.
29
188 - 158
48. Ákvæði 10., 11. og 14. gr. EES miði öll að því að tryggja að ráðstafanir
samningsaðila hindri ekki frjálsa vöruflutninga innan EES. Því væri rökrétt
að ætla að gildissvið (ratione personae) þessara ákvæða næði til ríkis í
hverri þeirri mynd sem það birtist. Þannig eigi ákvæði 11. gr. augljóslega við
ríkisrekna aðila sem starfi utan sviðs opinbers réttar.29 Samkvæmt því ætti
11. gr. við ef stefndi heimilaði ekki losun vöru af skipum sem kæmu frá öðrum
EES-ríkjum.30 Á grundvelli þessa setur ESA fram þá spurningu hvort ekki væri
rökrætt að ætla að 14. gr. EES, sem tekur til skatta, ætti við um gjaldtöku fyrir
losun vörunnar? ESA bendir þó á ýmis rök sem mæli gegn slíkri niðurstöðu.
Case Case
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v Norway
ástæðu einni að hann sé í opinberri eigu og þrátt fyrir að gjaldið sé vegna
þjónustu sem veitt sé á viðskiptalegum forsendum.
50. Auk þess bendir ESA á að álagning gjalda feli það, a.m.k. óbeint, í sér að
ríkið komi fram sem handhafi reglusetningarvalds. Það gæti haft víðtækar
afleiðingar að fella opinbera aðila sem séu í atvinnurekstri líkt og stefndi undir
14. gr. EES. Það ætti líka við þótt 14. gr. EES hefði ekki að geyma reglur um
Sem dæmi vísar ESA til þess að ákvæði 11. gr. EES nái til skilyrða í opinberum verksamningum sem valda mismunun. ESA vísar
til máls E-5/98 Fagtún ehf., [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 51, 30.-32. mgr.
30
ESA tekur fram að Evrópudómstóllinn hefur túlkað gildissvið (ratione personae) ákvæða 28. gr. vítt. ESA vísar t.d. til máls C-325/00
Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977, 17.-20. mgr.
29
- 158
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49. Í því sambandi bendir ESA á að hugtakið „skattar” tengist að öllu jöfnu
skyldubundnum framlögum til ríkisins. Eins og orðalag 14. gr. EES beri með sér
nái ákvæðið aðeins til „skatta” sem hafa verið lagðir á viðkomandi einstakling.
Dæmigert sé að í löggjöf (miðlægri eða staðbundinni) sé bæði mælt fyrir um
greiðsluskyldu og fjárhæð. Það liggi ekki eins beint við að tala um álagningu
þegar viðkomandi löggjöf feli ekki annað í sér en heimild fyrir opinberan aðila
(í víðum skilningi þess hugtaks samkvæmt EES-samningnum) til að taka gjald
fyrir veitta þjónustu og til að ákvarða fjárhæð gjaldsins. Þetta eigi einkum við
ef ekki sé um að ræða eiginlega þvingun þar sem neytandinn geti keypt sömu
vöru og þjónustu annars staðar.
not to discriminate between domestic products and products from other EEA
States.
51. In the dispute in the main proceedings, the Respondent would appear to be
engaged in economic activity as defined under the competition provisions
of the EEA Agreement. When drawing the line as regards applicability of
the competition provisions of the EC Treaty to public bodies, the ECJ has
distinguished between “a situation where the State acts in the exercise of
official authority and that where it carries on economic activity of an industrial
or commercial nature by offering goods or services in the market.”31 Thus,
it seems that Articles 53 and 54 EEA could be applied to the conduct of the
Respondent. Even if the applicability of the competition rules does not as
such exclude the application of the free movement provisions, it might still be
argued that bodies engaged in economic activity, such as the Respondent,
should not be subject to other constraints on their pricing decisions by the
EEA Agreement, than those that follow form the application of Articles 53 and
54 EEA.
52. Concluding its analysis of whether Article 14 EEA is applicable ratione
personae, ESA is of the opinion that neither the case law of the EFTA Court
nor that of the ECJ provides an unequivocal answer. However, ESA does not
find it necessary to reach a firm position on the issue as the dock charges
in any event fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 14 EEA for being a nondiscriminatory, and hence legal, taxation.
53. ESA submits that Article 14 EEA addresses situations in which domestic and
imported products are in competition and where differentiated taxation applies
to the detriment of imported products.32 The order of the national court does
not explain in what way the higher rate of duty applied on alcoholic beverages
could lead to a discrimination of imported goods with regard to similar domestic
products or to a protection of competing domestic products. It merely states
that its second question is “based on the premise that higher charges are
imposed in connection with the import of alcoholic beverages than of nonalcoholic beverages, and that in Iceland, alcoholic beverages are generally
imported, inter alia from other EEA States.”
54. Having regard to the arguments brought forward by the parties to the main
proceedings, ESA understands that two types of alleged discrimination
ESA refers to Case C-343/95 Cali [1997] ECR I-1547, at paragraph 16.
ESA refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraphs 17 and 22.
31
32
190 - 159
51. Eins og málið fyrir landsdómstólnum sé vaxið líti út fyrir að stefndi stundi
atvinnustarfsemi sem falli undir samkeppnisákvæði EES-samningsins. Við mat
á því hvort starfsemi hins opinbera falli undir samkeppniákvæði EB-sáttmálans
hafi Evrópudómstóllinn, greint á milli „aðstæðna þar sem ríkið kemur fram
sem handhafi opinbers valds og þar sem ríkið stundar efnahagsstarfsemi á
sviði iðnaðar eða viðskipta með því að bjóða vöru eða þjónustu á almennum
markaði.”31 Það líti því út fyrir að 53. og 54. gr. EES gæti átt við um starfsemi
stefnda. Jafnvel þótt ekki sé útilokað að ákvæðin um frjálsa vöruflutninga eigi
við í þeim tilvikum þar sem samkeppnireglurnar eigi við, megi halda því fram að
verðákvarðanir aðila í atvinnurekstri, eins og stefnda, eigi ekki að lúta öðrum
takmörkunum samkvæmt EES-samningnum en þeim sem leiði af 53. og 54.
gr. EES.
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verðlag heldur bannaði aðeins opinberum aðila að mismuna vörum frá öðrum
EES-ríkjum gagnvart innlendum vörum.
53. ESA telur að 14. gr. EES taki til aðstæðna þar sem samkeppni sé milli innlendra
og innfluttra vara og þar sem mismunandi skattlagning sé innfluttum vörum í
óhag.32 Ekki komi fram í úrskurði landsdómstólsins hvernig hærri gjöld á áfenga
drykki geti mismunað innfluttum vörum gagnvart sams konar innlendum vörum
eða verndað innlendar vörur í samkeppni við innfluttar. Þar segi aðeins að
seinni spurningin sé „miðuð við, að hærri gjöld séu lögð á vegna innflutnings
áfengra drykkja en óáfengra, og áfengir drykkir séu almennt fluttir inn frá
löndum utan Íslands, þar á meðal frá öðrum aðildarríkjum EES-samningsins”.
54. Með hliðsjón af málflutningi aðila fyrir landsdómstólnum, telur ESA að hin
meinta mismunun kunni að vera tvenns konar. Í fyrsta lagi kunni innfluttum
ESA vísar til máls C-343/95 Cali [1997] ECR I-1547, 16. mgr.
ESA vísar til máls E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 17. og 22. mgr.
31
32
- 159
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52. Það er niðurstaða ESA að hvorki dómaframkvæmd EFTA-dómstólsins né
Evrópudómstólsins svari því með ótvíræðum hætti hvort 14. gr. EES eigi við
um stefnda (ratione personae). ESA telur þó að ekki sé þörf á að komast að
ákveðinni niðurstöðu þar sem hafnargjöldin feli ekki í sér mismunun og séu því
lögmæt samkvæmt 14. gr. EES.
may be invoked. The first type concerns an alleged discrimination between
imported alcoholic beverages and domestic alcoholic beverages. The second
type of alleged discrimination concerns the competitive relationship between
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. The list of tariffs established by the
Respondent provides for five categories of dock charges, the charge on nonalcoholic beverages being significantly lower than the charge on alcoholic
beverages. Since most alcoholic beverages in Iceland are imported, the higher
rate of dock charges applies de facto mostly to imported alcoholic beverages,
whereas a lower rate applies both to imported and domestic non-alcoholic
goods. According to this argument, there is discrimination against imported
alcoholic beverages and a corresponding protection of domestic non-alcoholic
beverages.
55. As to the first type of alleged discrimination, ESA notes that the contested dock
charges do not differentiate between domestic and imported goods. On the
contrary, the dock charges apply systematically and in accordance with the
same criteria to both domestic and imported alcoholic beverages. Moreover,
the charges cannot constitute discrimination simply because the majority
of the alcohol consumed in Iceland is produced abroad. Indeed, Article 14
EEA cannot even be invoked against internal taxation imposed on imported
products where there is no similar or competing domestic product.33
56. This conclusion would not be altered, ESA maintains, even if it were
demonstrated that domestic alcoholic beverages were in fact mostly transported
by road and that, as a consequence, the dock charges applied de facto mostly
to imported products. The comparison of taxes imposed on imported and
domestic products shall take place only on the basis of the national system
of internal taxation concerned (in the present case dock charges). The dock
charges apply to goods that are loaded and unloaded in harbours. The situation
of goods that do not enter ports shall not be taken into account. Indeed, the
fact that domestic alcoholic beverages are transported predominantly by road
might change at any time. It would be impracticable to suggest that the extent
of the legality or illegality of a charge varies from day to day according to the
way domestic goods are being transported.
57. ESA then goes on to discuss the second type of alleged discrimination at
length. Restating that the aim of Article 14 EEA is to guarantee the neutrality
of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and
33
ESA refers to Case C-47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I-4509, at paragraph 10.
192 - 160
56. Sama niðurstaða ætti við þótt sýnt væri fram á að innlendir áfengir drykkir væru
að mestu leyti fluttir landleiðina og hafnargjöld því í raun að mestu leyti lögð á
innflutta vöru. Þegar skattlagning á innlendar og innfluttar vörur sé borin saman
eigi aðeins leggja viðkomandi kerfi innlendrar skattlagningar til grundvallar (í
þessi máli, hafnargjöld). Hafnargjöld séu lögð á vörur sem séu lestaðar eða
losaðar í höfn. Ekki eigi að taka tillit til vöru sem ekki fari um höfn. Það að
innlendir áfengir drykkir séu að mestu leyti fluttir landleiðina sé breytingum
háð. Óraunhæft sé að miða við að lögmæti gjaldtöku taki breytingum frá degi
til dags allt eftir því hvernig innlendar vörur séu fluttar.
57. ESA fjallar því næst ítarlega um síðarnefnda tegund meintrar mismununar og
ESA ítrekar að markmið 14. gr. EES sé að tryggja hlutleysi innlendra skatta
að því er varðar samkeppni milli innlendra og innfluttra vara. ESA telur að því
33
ESA vísar til máls C-47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I-4509, 10. mgr.
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55. Hvað varðar fyrri tegund meintrar mismununar tekur ESA fram að hin umdeildu
hafnargjöld geri ekki greinarmun á innlendri og innfluttri vöru. Þvert á móti séu
hafnargjöldin lögð á með kerfisbundnum hætti og á grundvelli sömu viðmiða
fyrir innlenda og innflutta áfenga drykki. Þá geti gjöldin ekki talist fela í sér
mismunun af þeirri ástæðu einni að meirihluti áfengra drykkja til neyslu á
Íslandi sé framleiddur erlendis. Reyndar sé ekki einu sinni unnt að byggja
á 14. gr. EES vegna innlendra skatta á innfluttar vörur þar sem ekki er um
að ræða neinar innlendar vörur sem séu sambærilegar eða í samkeppni við
þær.33
áfengum drykkjum að vera mismunað gagnvart innlendum áfengum drykkjum
og í öðru lagi kunni mismununin að snerta samkeppnisstöðu áfengra drykkja
gagnvart óáfengum drykkjum. Gjaldskrá stefnda geri ráð fyrir fimm flokkum
hafnargjalda þar sem gjöld vegna óáfengra drykkja séu töluvert lægri en gjöld
vegna áfengra drykkja. Megnið af áfengum drykkjum á Íslandi sé innflutt og því
séu hærri hafnargjöld í reynd aðallega lögð á innflutta áfenga drykki en lægri
gjöld á bæði innflutta og innlenda óáfenga drykki. Samkvæmt þessu sé um að
ræða mismunun gagnvart innfluttum áfengum drykkjum og innlendir óáfengir
drykkir njóti að sama skapi verndar.
imported products, ESA notes that it must first be considered whether the
domestic and imported goods in question are similar or competing within the
meaning of Article 14 EEA. Its first paragraph covers “similar” products; once
similarity between a domestic and an imported product is established, any
tax must be the same for both products. Where the imported and domestic
products are not similar, the second paragraph applies. That provision is
more specifically intended to prevent any form of indirect fiscal protectionism
affecting imported goods which are in a competitive relationship with domestic
products.
58. According to the order of the national court, alcoholic beverages are mostly
imported, which would imply that the higher rate of the dock charges apply in
practice mostly to non-Icelandic alcoholic beverages. However, if it appeared
that the national production of at least some alcoholic beverages was
significant, this would be sufficient in order to state that the dock charges do
not infringe Article 14 EEA.34
59. Turning to the first paragraph of Article 14 EEA and the question of whether
the products are “similar”, the first element to be assessed is whether “certain
objective characteristics” are present in both products or categories of products,
such as their composition and, notably in the case of alcoholic beverages, taste
and alcohol content. Second, ESA states, consideration is given to whether or
not these products are capable of meeting the same needs from the point of
view of the consumers.35 However, the relevant case law of the ECJ indicates
that this second element is not taken into consideration where the products
exhibit manifestly different characteristics.36
60. ESA observes that many of the cases brought before the ECJ regarding
similarity or inter-changeability of imported and domestic products subject to
different taxes have concerned alcoholic products of different types. In all those
cases, the alcoholic strength of the products at stake was a decisive element.
In John Walker, the ECJ held that since the alcoholic strength of Scotch whisky
was 40% by volume whereas the alcoholic strength of fruit wine was 20%,
these products were not similar.37 The contention that those products could
both be consumed in the same way did not need to be assessed because,
even if it were established, it would not have been sufficient to render similar
ESA refers to Case 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, at paragraph 23.
ESA refers to Case 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, at paragraph 13, Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833,
at paragraph 12 and Case C-265/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2305, at paragraph 42.
36
ESA refers to Case 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, at paragraphs 12−13.
37
ESA refers to Case 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, at paragraphs 12−13.
34
35
194 - 161
58. Í úrskurði landsdómstólsins komi fram að áfengir drykkir séu að mestu leyti
innfluttir, sem gefi til kynna að hærri hafnargjöld séu, í raun, aðallega lögð á
erlenda áfenga drykki. Ef það kæmi hins vegar í ljós að innlend framleiðsla á
a.m.k. einhverjum áfengum drykkjum væri töluverð væri það nægilegt til að
hafnargjöldin teldust ekki brjóta í bága við ákvæði 14. gr. EES.34
Case Case
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v Norway
þurfi fyrst að kanna hvort innlendar og innfluttar vörur séu sams konar eða í
samkeppni, í skilningi 14. gr. EES. Fjallað sé um „sams konar” vörur í fyrsta
málsl. 14. gr. EES. Ef um sams konar vörur sé að ræða beri að skattleggja þær
á sama hátt. Séu innlendar og innfluttar vörur ekki sams konar beri að beita
öðrum málsl. 14. gr. EES. Markmið þess ákvæðis sé einkum að koma í veg
fyrir hvers konar óbeina skattavernd sem bitni á innfluttum vörum sem séu í
samkeppni við innlendar vörur.
60. ESA bendir á að mörg mál fyrir Evrópudómstólnum varðandi sambærileika
eða staðgengi innfluttra og innlendra vara sem hafi lotið mismunandi sköttum
hafi varðað áfengi af ýmsu tagi. Í öllum þessum málum hafi áfengisinnihald
vörunnar verið ákvarðandi þáttur. Í John Walker-málinu hafi Evrópudómstóllinn
komist að þeirri niðurstöðu að skoskt viskí og ávaxtavín væru ekki sams konar
vörur vegna þess að áfengisstyrkleiki viskís væri 40% en styrkleiki ávaxatvíns
væri 20%.37 Ekki hefði þurft að leggja mat á þá staðhæfingu að drykkjanna væri
neytt á sama hátt vegna þess að drykkirnir tveir, skoskt vískí og ávaxtavín,
ESA vísar til máls 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, 23. mgr.
ESA vísar til máls 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, 13. mgr.; máls 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, 12. mgr.
og máls C-265/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2305, 42. mgr.
36
ESA vísar til máls 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, 12.-13. mgr.
37
ESA vísar til máls 243/84 John Walker [1986] ECR 875, 12.-13. mgr.
34
35
- 161
195 -
59. Varðandi fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES og það álitaefni hvort vörur séu „sams konar”
sé fyrst lagt mat á hvort „tilteknir hlutlægir eiginleikar” séu fyrir hendi hjá báðum
vörum eða vöruflokkum, eins og t.d. samsetning vörunnar og, einkum þegar
um sé að ræða áfenga drykki, bragð og áfengisinnihald. Því næst sé athugað
hvort vörurnar geti uppfyllt sömu þarfir að mati neytenda.35 Dómaframkvæmd
Evrópudómstólsins í þessu sambandi bendi þó til þess að ekki sé tekið tillit til
síðarnefnda atriðsins þegar vörur hafi verulega ólíka eiginleika.36
two products, Scotch whisky and fruit wine, whose intrinsic characteristics
were fundamentally different.
61. ESA takes the view that, in the present case, the two categories of beverages
exhibit manifestly different characteristics. In light of the abovementioned
case law, a product that does not contain any alcohol does not have the same
characteristics as a product that does. There is therefore no need to assess
whether they could partially fulfil the same needs from the point of view of the
consumer. Consequently, ESA contends that the fact that a higher rate of dock
charges applies to alcoholic beverages than to non-alcoholic beverages does
not lead to an infringement of the first paragraph of Article 14 EEA.
62. Turning to the second paragraph of Article 14 EEA, ESA submits that any
assessment of the compatibility of a given tax with this provision requires
an actual competitive relationship to be established between the products
concerned. Furthermore, account must be taken of the impact of the tax on
that competitive relationship. The essential question is whether or not the tax
is of such a kind as to have the effect, on the market in question, of reducing
potential consumption of imported products to the advantage of competing
domestic products.38
63. The two categories of products are defined in very broad terms in the tariff.
It is clear that, in general, alcoholic beverages and non-alcoholic beverages
do not meet identical needs and that they are not substitutes for one
another. Admittedly, it cannot be fully excluded that there may be a degree of
substitution between two specific products falling under these categories. This
could be the case e.g. for beers containing a very low degree of alcohol and
beers containing no alcohol. However, nothing in the request from the national
court refers to any feature specific to the Icelandic market indicating that this
might be the case. Thus, ESA submits that there is no general competitive
relationship between alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.
64. Moreover, ESA submits, even if it was established that there was a competitive
relationship between alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, the dock charges
would not have any protective effect. It does follow from case law that a tax that
applies in theory equally to imported and domestic goods may nevertheless
be considered as having a protective effect if the higher tax applies de facto
exclusively or mostly to imported goods and if it has the effect of reducing
potential consumption of imported products to the advantage of competing
38
ESA refers to Case 356/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3299, at paragraphs 14−15.
- 196
162 -
61. ESA telur að þeir tveir flokkar drykkja sem um ræðir í máli þessu hafi verulega
ólíka eiginleika. Af framangreindri dómaframkvæmd megi ráða að óáfengar
og áfengar drykkjarvörur hafi ekki sömu eiginleika. Því sé ekki þörf á að
leggja mat á það hvort þær uppfylli að einhverju leyti sömu þarfir neytenda. Af
þessum sökum sé ekki um að ræða brot á fyrsta málsl. 14. gr. EES þótt hærri
hafnargjöld séu lögð á áfenga drykki en óáfenga.
62. Að því er varðar seinni málsl. 14. gr. telur ESA að ekki verði lagt mat á hvort
tiltekinn skattur samræmist ákvæðinu nema staðfest sé að þær vörur sem um
ræði séu í samkeppni. Auk þess verði að taka tillit til þeirra áhrifa sem skatturinn
hafi á samkeppnisstöðu varanna. Megin spurningin sé hvort skatturinn hafi þau
áhrif á viðkomandi markaði að möguleg neysla innfluttra vara dragist saman
sem komi innlendum vörum í samkeppni til góða.38
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
gætu hvort sem er ekki talist sams konar þar sem grundvallarmunur væri á
eiginleikum þeirra.
64. ESA heldur því einnig fram að jafnvel þótt sýnt væri fram á samkeppni milli
þessara vöruflokka hefðu hafnargjöldin engin verndaráhrif. Það megi leiða
af dómaframkvæmd að skattur sem að formi til sé lagður jafnt á innflutta og
innlenda vöru geti samt sem áður haft verndaráhrif. Það eigi við sé hærri
skattur í raun eingöngu eða að mestu leyti lagður á innflutta vöru og hann
dragi úr mögulegri neyslu á innfluttum vörum og komi þannig innlendri vöru í
38
ESA vísar til máls 356/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 3299, 14.-15. mgr.
162 - 197
63. Þeir vöruflokkar sem málið varði séu skilgreindir á mjög almennan hátt í
gjaldskránni. Ljóst sé að almennt uppfylli áfengir og óáfengir drykkir ekki sömu
þarfir neytenda og geti því ekki komið hver í annars stað. Að vísu sé ekki
með öllu útilokað að innan þessara vöruflokka megi finna staðgengdarvörur.
Þannig geti bjór með mjög lágt áfengisinnihald t.d. komið í stað óáfengs bjórs
og öfugt. Hins vegar vísi álitsbeiðni landsdómstólsins ekki til neinna sérstakra
aðstæðna á íslenskum markaði sem gefi slíkt til kynna. ESA telur því að áfengir
og óáfengir drykkir séu almennt ekki í samkeppni.
domestic products.39 However, in the present case, the Respondent’s tariff is
drafted in such a way that both imported and domestic non-alcoholic beverages
bear the lighter tax burden. It has been brought forward that alcoholic beverages
are mostly imported, thus the higher rate of the dock charge applies de facto
mostly to imported alcoholic beverages. In contrast, there is no indication that
the bulk of non-alcoholic goods is produced in Iceland and that no substantial
import of non-alcoholic beverages takes place. It thus seems that, even if an
alleged competitive advantage to non-alcoholic products was demonstrated,
it would benefit both domestic and imported products.40 The disparity between
the respective tax burdens is therefore not likely to have the effects of favouring
the sale of non-alcoholic beverages produced in Iceland.
65. In conclusion, ESA submits that the fact that the dock charges are higher
for alcoholic beverages than for non-alcoholic beverages does not infringe
Article 14 EEA, even if the provision were to be regarded as applicable to the
contested dock charges.
Article 11 EEA
66. ESA recalls that Article 11 EEA does not apply to obstacles of a fiscal nature
falling within the ambit of Article 14 EEA. Conversely, in the event that the
Court should find Article 14 not to be applicable to the disputed dock charges,
the question arises as to whether that could trigger the application of Article 11
EEA.
67. However, in ESA’s opinion, Article 11 EEA cannot preclude the disputed dock
charges. It is submitted that the reasoning in Corsica Ferries is fully transposable
to the present case.41 First, as detailed above, the disputed dock charges
apply to all products without any distinction as regards their origin. Second,
the additional expense borne by imported products (and domestic products
transported by sea) subject to the dock charges is marginal. Consequently,
ESA considers that any restrictive effect the dock charges might possibly have
on the free movement of goods is too uncertain and indirect for their imposition
to come within the scope of Article 11 EEA.
ESA refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 13 and Case C-421/97 Yves Tarantik [1999] ECR
I-3633.
40
ESA refers to Case C-421/97 Yves Tarantik [1999] ECR I-3633, at paragraph 31, Case C-113/94 Casarin [1995] ECR I-4203, at
paragraph 24, Case 200/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 3953, at paragraph 20 and Case C-230/89 Commission v Greece
41
ESA refers to Case C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, at paragraphs 30–32.
39
198 - 163
65. Niðurstaða ESA er að jafnvel þótt ákvæði 14. gr. EES væru talin eiga við um
hin umdeildu hafnargjöld brjóti það ekki gegn þessum ákvæðum að leggja á
hærri hafnargjöld vegna áfengra en óáfenga drykkja.
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
samkeppni til góða.39 Gjaldskrá stefnda í máli þessu sé hins vegar með þeim
hætti að lægri gjöld leggist bæði á innfluttar og innlendar óáfengar drykkjarvörur.
Því hafi verið hreyft að áfengir drykkir séu að mestu innfluttir og því leggist
hærri hafnargjöld í raun aðallega á innflutta áfenga drykki. ESA tekur fram að
aftur á móti bendi ekkert til þess að megnið af óáfengum drykkjum sé framleitt
á Íslandi og að innflutningur á óáfengum drykkjum sé óverulegur. Jafnvel þótt
sýna mætti fram á betri samkeppnisstöðu óáfengra drykkja virðist sem það
kæmi bæði innlendum og innfluttum vörum til góða.40 Sá munur sem sé á
skattlagningu þessara vöruflokka sé því ekki líklegur til að hygla sölu óáfengra
drykkja sem framleiddir séu á Íslandi.
67. ESA telur ekki að 11. gr. EES útiloki hafnargjöldin. Rökin í máli Corsica Ferries
eigi að fullu við í máli þessu.41 Í fyrsta lagi séu umdeild hafnargjöld lögð á allar
vörur, óháð uppruna þeirra, eins og rakið er ítarlega hér að framan. Í öðru lagi
sé sá umfram kostnaður sem leggist á innfluttar vörur (og innlendar vörur fluttar
á sjó) óverulegur. ESA telur því að hindri hafnargjöldin frjálsa vöruflutninga séu
áhrifin of óviss og óbein til að álagning gjaldanna heyri undir 11. gr. EES.
ESA vísar til máls 1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 13. mgr. og máls C-421/97 Yves Tarantik [1999] ECR I-3633.
ESA vísar til máls C-421/97 Yves Tarantik [1999] ECR I-3633, 31. mgr.; máls C-113/94 Casarin [1995] ECR I-4203, 24. mgr.; máls
200/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 3953, 20. mgr. og máls C-230/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-1909, 10. mgr.
41
ESA vísar til máls C-266/96 Corsica Ferries France [1998] ECR I-3949, 30.-32. mgr.
39
40
- 163
199 -
66. ESA bendir á að ákvæði 11. gr. EES eigi ekki við um skattalegar hindranir
sem falli undir ákvæði 14. gr. EES. Komist dómstóllinn hins vegar að þeirri
niðurstöðu að 14. gr. EES eigi ekki við um umdeild hafnargjöld vakni sú
spurning hvort ákvæði 11. gr. EES eigi við.
Conclusion
68. For the reasons set out above, ESA proposes that the questions be answered
as follows:
The levying of a charge such as the one at issue in the main proceedings is not
precluded by Articles 10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement.
General
69. The Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter “the Commission”)
notes that the national court seeks to ascertain whether port charges such as
those levied by the Respondent under national legislation such as the Ports
Act are contrary to Article 10, 11 or 14 EEA. The Commission thus considers
it useful to start with the second question and examine, first, whether a dock
charge such at the one at issue falls within the scope ratione materiae of
either Article 10, 11 or 14 EEA and then, second, whether the dock charges in
substance violates the relevant provision.
70. The Commission submits that, in the context of the EC Treaty, it is well
established that Article 25 EC relating to customs duties and charges having
equivalent effect on the one hand, and Article 90 EC relating to discriminatory
internal taxation on the other, are provisions which cannot be applied together,
with the result that the same charge cannot belong to both categories.42
Equally, Article 28 EC, which concerns quantitative restrictions on imports
and measures having equivalent effect, does not extend to customs duties or
obstacles of a fiscal nature, which are covered by Articles 25 and 90 EC.43 In
this respect, the logic of the EEA Agreement is no different.44 It must therefore
be determined which of the abovementioned provisions, if any, falls to be
applied.
Article 11 EEA
71. The Commission dismisses application of Article 11 EEA. A port fee levied
on the loading and unloading of goods in a harbour is not equivalent to a
The Commission refers to Case C-234/99 Nygård [2002] ECR I-3657, at paragraph 17.
The Commission refers to, in particular, Joined Cases C-78/90 to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l’Ouest and Others [1992]
ECR I-1847, at paragraph 20; and Case C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører [2003] ECR I-6065, at paragraph 32.
44
The Commission refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 20.
42
43
200 - 164
68. Samkvæmt framansögðu telur ESA að svara beri spurningunum sem hér
segir:
Ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES-samningsins útiloka ekki álagningu gjalda
eins og þeirra sem um ræðir í máli því sem rekið er fyrir landsdómstólnum.
Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna
Almennt
69. Framkvæmdastjórn Evrópubandalaganna (framkvæmdastjórnin) bendir á að
landsdómstóllinn leiti svara við því hvort hafnargjöld, eins og þau sem stefndi
leggi á með lögum, eins og hafnalögum, fari í bága við ákvæði 10., 11. eða
14. gr. EES. Því sé gagnlegt að byrja á annarri spurningunni og athuga fyrst
hvort hafnargjöld eins og þau sem hér um ræðir falli undir gildissvið (ratione
materiae) 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES og síðan hvort hafnargjöldin fari efnislega
gegn viðeigandi ákvæði.
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
Niðurstaða
70. Framkvæmdastjórnin heldur því fram að í EB-rétti sé viðurkennt að ákvæðum
25. gr. EB, varðandi tolla og ráðstafanir sem hafa samsvarandi áhrif, og
ákvæðum 90. gr. EB, varðandi skattlagningu innanlands, skuli ekki beitt
samtímis, sem þýði að sama gjaldið geti ekki fallið undir báða flokka.42 Á
sama hátt taki ákvæði 28. gr. EB, sem varði magntakmarkanir á útflutningi og
ráðstafanir sem hafi samsvarandi áhrif, ekki til tolla eða skattatakmarkana sem
mælt sé fyrir um í ákvæðum 25. og 90. gr. EB.43 Reglur EES-samningsins séu
ekki ólíkar að þessu leyti.44 Því beri að ákvarða hvert fyrrnefndra ákvæða, ef
eitthvert þeirra, eigi við í málinu.
71. Framkvæmdastjórnin hafnar því að 11. gr. EES eigi við. Hafnargjald sem lagt
sé á við lestun og losun vöru í höfn jafngildi ekki magntakmörkunum af því
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls C-234/99 Nygård [2002] ECR I-3657, 17. mgr.
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar einkum til sameinaðra mála C-78/90 til 83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de lÓuest and Others [1992]
ECR I-1847, 20. mgr.; og máls C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører [2003] ECR I-6065, 32. mgr.
44
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 20. mgr.
42
43
- 164
201 -
quantitative restriction of the kind envisaged by Article 11 EEA (leaving aside
the hypothesis of a charge so high as to be prohibitive)45.
Article 10 EEA
72. Further, the Commission also dismisses application of Article 10 EEA. It is
submitted that the port fees are manifestly not ‘customs duties’. Neither can
they be regarded as charges having equivalent effect. Certainly, any pecuniary
charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed
unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier and is not
a customs duty in the strict sense constitutes a charge having equivalent effect
within the meaning of Article 25 EC.46 However, the port fees at issue are not
applied by reason of the goods crossing a frontier. On the contrary, they apply
(with the exception of vehicles owned by passengers) to all goods loaded or
unloaded within the harbours operated by the Respondent. They are applied
at the same time (the time of loading or unloading) and according to the same
criteria (type and weight of goods). They are thus, in principle, to be regarded
as forming part of a general system of internal taxation, and not as a charge
having equivalent effect to a customs duty.47
Article 14 EEA
73. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the port fees fall to be examined
(if at all) under Article 14 EEA. The Commission recalls that this provision
seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods between the EEA States
under normal conditions of competition by eliminating all forms of protection
which may result from the application of internal taxation in a manner which
discriminates against products from other EEA States, and to guarantee that
internal taxation is neutral for the purposes of competition between domestic
and imported products.48 It is noted that Article 14 EEA covers not only taxes
imposed directly on goods but also taxes on operations associated with the
goods.49
74. According to the Commission, the first issue which arises in the present case
is whether the port fees in question are properly to be regarded as constituting
a form of taxation. In so far as the Respondent is a partnership governed by
The Commission refers to Case 47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I-4509, at paragraphs 12–13 and Case C-383/01 De
Danske Bilimportører [2003] ECR I-6065, at paragraphs 40–42.
46
The Commission refers to Case C-173/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-4917, at paragraph 39.
47
The Commission refers to Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at paragraphs 21–23.
48
The Commission refers to Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 22.
49
The Commission refers to Case 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247.
45
- 202
165 -
72. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að 10. gr. EES eigi heldur ekki við. Hafnargjöld
séu augljóslega hvorki „tollar” né geti þau talist gjöld sem hafi samsvarandi
áhrif. Vissulega teljist hvert það gjald sem lagt sé einhliða á vörur við flutning
þeirra yfir landamæri, og strangt tiltekið geti ekki talist tollur, til gjalda sem hafi
samsvarandi áhrif í skilningi 25. gr. EB. Í því sambandi skipti ekki máli hvaða
nafni gjaldið nefnist eða með hvaða hætti það sé lagt á.46 Umrædd hafnargjöld
séu hins vegar ekki lögð á sérstaklega við flutning vara yfir landamæri. Þvert
á móti séu þau lögð á allar vörur sem séu lestaðar eða losaðar í höfnum sem
stefndi reki (að undanskildum ökutækjum í eigu farþega). Þau séu lögð á
samtímis (við lestun eða losun) og samkvæmt sömu viðmiðum (vöruflokki og
þyngd vöru). Því beri að meginstefnu til að líta á þau sem hluta af almennu
kerfi innlendra skatta og ekki sem gjöld sem hafi samsvarandi áhrif og tollar.47
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
tagi sem 11. gr. EES geri ráð fyrir (nema ef gjald væri svo hátt að það hefði
bannáhrif).45
74. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur fyrsta álitaefnið vera hvort rétt sé að líta á umrædd
gjöld sem skatta. Að því marki sem stefndi sé sameignarfélag, sem lúti
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 47/88 Commission v Denmark, 12.-13. mgr. og máls C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører [2003]
ECR I-6065, 40-42. mgr.
46
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls C-173/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-4917, 39. mgr.
47
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 21.-23. mgr.
48
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, 22. mgr.
49
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 20/76 Schöttle [1977] ECR 247.
45
165 - 203
73. Samkvæmt framangreindu telur framkvæmdastjórnin að skoða eigi
hafnargjöldin (ef þau eigi yfir höfuð að skoða) samkvæmt ákvæðum 14. gr.
EES. Hún minnir á að greinin eigi að tryggja frjálsa vöruflutninga milli ríkja á
hinu Evrópska efnahagssvæði við eðlilegar samkeppnisaðstæður. Það skuli
gert með því að útiloka hvers konar vernd sem kunni að felast í innlendri
skattlagningu sem mismuni vörum frá öðrum EES-ríkjum, og með því að
tryggja að innlend skattlagning sé hlutlaus gagnvart samkeppni milli innlendra
og innfluttra vara.48 Þá er tekið fram að ákvæði 14. gr. EES nái ekki einungis
til skatta sem lagðir séu beint á vörur heldur einnig til skatta á vörutengdan
rekstur.49
private law, the fees in question could equally well be regarded simply as the
price of the service rendered (unloading of goods from a vessel).
75. The Commission points to Haahr Petroleum50 where the ECJ examined a
similar fee. That case concerned shipping and goods duties paid by users
of commercial ports (including both ports operated by local authorities and
private ports). These duties, which formed part of the revenue of the ports,
were laid down in regulations issued for each port by the Ministry of Transport.
The duties were fixed at such a level as to enable the ports to cover their
operating and maintenance expenditure and to create reserves for extensions
and modernisation. Shipping duties were fixed according to tonnage. Goods
duties were normally a fixed amount per tonne, though there were exemptions
and special rates for certain goods.
76. The Commission notes that the ECJ found, without discussion, that the duties
were fiscal in nature. However, the question whether they could instead be
analysed as consideration for the port services rendered was examined by
the Advocate General. He noted that a charge fixed by a public authority could
be regarded in certain circumstances as the price of a service, but only under
strict conditions, namely that there be a direct link between the amount paid
and a specific and identifiable benefit actually conferred on the recipient of the
service.51
77. More generally, submits the Commission, it could be argued that where a
public authority imposes a charge for a service provided by it, that charge is to
be regarded as a tax if it is fixed according to criteria which do not reflect the
cost of providing the service. In such circumstances, the public authority does
not act as a normal market participant. Instead, it spreads the cost of services
among users according to other criteria such as the ability to pay.
78. In Haahr Petroleum52 the charge in issue was fixed centrally by a State
authority. The Commission notes, however, that the charge was considered to
be fiscal in nature even where it was paid to a private operator. In a system of
that kind, it may be thought that the financing of port infrastructure has been
largely removed from the market mechanism and is instead governed by a
set of charges based on notions of ability to pay or the utility of the goods
discharged, criteria which are typically those of taxation.
50
51
52
Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085.
The Commission refers to the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, at point 52 referring
to Case C-111/89 Bakker Hillegom [1990] ECR I-1735, at paragraphs 12–16.
Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085.
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75. Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls Haahr Petroleum 50 þar sem
Evrópudómstóllinn lagði mat á sambærileg gjöld. Málið varðaði flutnings- og
vörugjöld sem notendum verslunarhafna var gert að greiða (bæði í höfnum
sem reknar voru af sveitarfélögum og einkareknum höfnum). Gjöldin, sem voru
hluti af tekjum hafna, voru ákveðin með reglugerð sem samgönguráðuneytið
gaf út fyrir hverja höfn. Fjárhæð gjaldsins var miðuð við að það stæði undir
kostnaði við rekstur og viðhald hafnarinnar og að varasjóður væri til staðar
vegna stækkunar og þróunar. Flutningsgjöld tóku mið af tonnatölu. Vörugjöld
voru almennt föst fjárhæð fyrir hvert tonn en frá því voru undantekningar og
sérstök gjöld lögð á ákveðnar vörur.
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
einkaréttarlegum reglum geti umrædd gjöld allt eins talist greiðsla fyrir veitta
þjónustu (affermingu).
76. Evrópudómstóllinn hafi komist að þeirri niðurstöðu, án sérstakrar umfjöllunar,
að gjöldin væru skattalegs eðlis. Aðallögsögumaðurinn í málinu hafi hins vegar
kannað hvort líta mætti á gjöldin sem þjónustugjöld. Hann hafi talið að undir
vissum kringumstæðum væri mögulegt að líta á gjöld ákvörðuð af opinberum
yfirvöldum sem þjónustugjöld. Það gæti þó aðeins átt við að ströngum skilyrðum
uppfylltum. Nánar tiltekið ef um væri að ræða beint samband milli fjárhæðar
gjaldsins og tiltekins, aðgreinanlegs endurgjalds til handa þjónustuþega.51
78. Í máli Haahr Petroleum52 hafi fjárhæð þess gjalds sem um var að ræða verið
ákveðin af ríkisvaldi. Gjaldið hafi talist skattalegs eðlis jafnvel þótt það hafi
verið greitt til einkaréttarlegs aðila. Ætla mætti að í slíku kerfi hafi fjármögnun
hafnarmannvirkis að mestu verið utan markaðarins og hafi þess í stað byggt
á gjöldum sem miðist við greiðslugetu eða notagildi vöru. Þessi viðmið séu
dæmigerð fyrir skattlagningu.
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085.
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til álits Jacobs, aðallögsögumanns, í máli C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085, 52. mgr. þar
sem vísað er til máls C-111/89 Bakker Hillegom [1990] ECR I-1735, 12.-16. mgr.
52
Mál C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum [1997] ECR I-4085.
50
51
- 205
166 -
77. Almennt séð megi halda því fram að leggi stjórnvöld á gjöld vegna þjónustu
sinnar og gjöldin taka ekki mið af kostnaði vegna þjónustunnar, beri að líta á slík
gjöld sem skatta. Stjórnvöld hegði sér þá ekki eins og venjulegur þátttakandi
á markaði. Þess í stað dreifi þau þjónustukostnaði á neytendur samkvæmt
öðrum viðmiðum, eins og t.d. greiðslugetu þeirra.
79. In the present case, the port fees are fixed not by the State but by the port
operators, subject to State oversight. The Commission argues that the degree
of State oversight is not sufficient to render the Respondent’s schedule of port
fees attributable to the exercise of (central) State authority, since the State’s
intervention is confined to ensuring that the fees are set at a level sufficient
to ensure continued operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. In the
case of a private port operator, therefore, the issue of tax could not arise,
irrespective of the criteria used in determining the charge. The Respondent,
however, is a partnership of public authorities, and the reasoning set out above
is applicable to them. That is true notwithstanding the fact that the applicable
legislation states that their ports are not regarded as public ports; the concept
of a tax is an autonomous one to be interpreted by the Court in light of the
relevant facts.
80. In this context, the Commission adds that for the purposes of the EC Treaty
rules on free movement, the acts of all public bodies are imputable to the
Member State concerned.53 Directly effective Community law is binding on
all organs and authorities of the Member States, including local authorities.54
That is true whether or not they are acting in their regulatory capacity.55 It is
submitted that the situation is no different under the EEA Agreement.
81. The Commission suggests that if the Respondent bases its charges on the
cost of providing the service, then it participates in the market in the same way
as other private operators, and the port fees are to be regarded as the price
of the service rendered. If, conversely, the port fees are fixed independently of
cost, it is at least arguable that they fall to be examined in the light of Article 14
EEA. In that perspective, it is not obvious what relation there may be between
the different levels of port fees laid down in the Respondents schedule of fees
and any differences in the cost of unloading the goods comprised in the various
categories, in particular categories 3 and 4.
82. However, it is not indispensable, argues the Commission, to decide whether
the fees are properly to be regarded as a tax since they do not in any event
discriminate against imported products. The Respondent’s fee schedule does
not distinguish between products on the basis of their origin. With one exception
53
54
55
The Commission refers to Case 45/87 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 4929.
The Commission refers to Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839.
The Commission refers to Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723.
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Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
79. Í því máli sem hér um ræði séu hafnargjöld ekki ákvörðuð af ríkinu heldur
rekstaraðilum hafna, undir eftirliti ríkisins. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að eftirlit
ríkisins með gjaldskrá stefnda sé ekki nægilegt til þess hún geti talist stafa frá
(miðlægu) ríkisvaldi. Afskipti ríkisins einskorðist við að sjá til þess að gjöldin séu
nægilega há til að tryggja áframhaldandi rekstur og viðhald hafnarmannvirkja.
Ef höfn sé rekin af einkaaðila geti því ekki verið um skatt að ræða og skipti
í því sambandi ekki máli hvaða viðmið séu lögð til grundvallar við ákvörðun
gjaldsins. Stefndi í málinu sé hins vegar sameignarfélag í eigu stjórnvalda og
eigi röksemdafærslan hér að ofan við um hann. Í því sambandi skipti ekki máli
að gildandi löggjöf mæli fyrir um að ekki beri að líta á hafnir í eigu sveitarfélaga
sem opinberar hafnir. Skattahugtakið sé sjálfstætt hugtak sem dómstólnum
beri að túlka í ljósi þeirra staðreynda sem máli skipta.
80. Í þessu sambandi bætir framkvæmdastjórnin því við að í skilningi reglna
EB-sáttmálans um frjálsa vöruflutninga teljist allar gerðir opinberra aðila
vera á ábyrgð hlutaðeigandi aðildarríkis.53 Löggjöf bandalagsins sem hafi
bein áhrif sé bindandi fyrir allar stofnanir og yfirvöld í aðildarríkjunum, þar
með talin sveitarfélög.54 Það gildi hvort sem þau komi fram sem handhafar
reglugerðarvalds eða ekki.55 Sama eigi við samkvæmt EES-samningnum.
82. Það sé þó ekki nauðsynlegt að ákvarða hvort rétt sé að líta á gjöldin sem skatta
þar sem þau feli ekki í sér mismunun gagnvart innfluttum vörum. Í gjaldskrá
stefnda sé ekki gerður greinarmunur á vörum eftir uppruna þeirra. Með einni
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 45/87 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 4929.
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839.
55
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723.
53
54
- 207
167 -
81. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur að miðist gjaldtaka stefnda við kostnað hans við að
veita þjónustuna sé hann þátttakandi á markaði með sama hætti og aðrir aðilar
í einkarekstri og líta beri á hafnargjöldin sem greiðslu fyrir veitta þjónustu.
Séu gjöldin hins vegar ákveðin óháð því hvað þjónustan kosti megi færa fyrir
því rök að þau beri að skoða í ljósi 14. gr. EES. Í þessu sambandi sé ekki
augljóst hvaða tengsl geti verið á milli ólíkra gjaldflokka í gjaldskrá stefnda og
mismunandi kostnaðar við losun vara í hinum ólíku vörugjaldsflokkum, einkum
flokkum 3 og 4.
which is not material to the present case,56 there is no overt discrimination
between domestic goods and goods imported from other EEA countries.
83. Nor, in the Commission’s view, is there any covert discrimination arising from
the inclusion of domestic and imported goods in different categories of the
fee schedule. The ECJ has held that a system of differentiated taxes under
which an advantage is granted to a single product which represents the bulk of
domestic production or a system structured in such a way as to give preference
to domestic production may offend against Article 90 EC.57 Conversely, Article
90 does not prohibit a differentiated scheme of taxation based on objective
criteria if the scheme is not discriminatory and does not have the effect of
protecting domestic products from competing imported products.58 In the
present case it is apparent that domestic and imported products both fall into the
less heavily and more heavily charged categories. In particular, at least some
alcoholic beverages are produced in Iceland (brennivín, beer). That conclusion
is not affected by the fact that most alcoholic beverages are in fact imported
products. The same is true of fruit juices, which fall into the less heavily taxed
category. There does not appear to be any basis for the conclusion that goods
which are typically imported are systematically allocated to the more heavily
charged categories while goods which are typically of domestic production are
placed in less heavily taxed categories.
84. In so far as the second question implies a comparison between alcoholic and
non-alcoholic drinks, the Commission adds that these two types of product are
probably not to be regarded as similar products for the purposes of the first
paragraph of Article 14 EEA. This may be inferred from the conclusion that beer
and wine are not to be considered similar products in that context.59 Instead,
they are in a relationship of partial competition to which the second paragraph
of that provision applies. In such circumstances, the protective effect of any
difference in taxation is not presumed and must be demonstrated. However,
in light of the foregoing remarks regarding the absence of any apparent
discrimination system, it is not necessary to engage in such an analysis.
The Commission notes that the Respondent’s port fee schedule includes a 50% reduction for the handling of plant and machinery
transported domestically, but in so far as this is to be considered discriminatory it does not render the entire fee schedule
unlawful.
57
The Commission refers to, for example, Case 68/79 Hans Just [1980] ECR 501 and Case 112/84 Humblot v Directeur des services
fiscaux [1985] ECR 1367.
58
The Commission refers to Case 200/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 3953.
59
The Commission refers to Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417.
56
- 208
168 -
84. Varðandi þann samanburð á áfengum og óáfengum drykkjum sem gefin sé
til kynna í annarri spurningu tekur framkvæmdastjórnin fram að sennilega sé
ekki unnt að líta á þessar tvær vörutegundir sem sams konar vörur, í skilningi
14. gr. EES. Þetta megi leiða af þeirri niðurstöðu að bjór og vín geti ekki talist
sams konar vara í þessu samhengi.59 Vörurnar séu á hinn bóginn að hluta til
í samkeppni og því eigi seinni málsl. 14. gr. EES við. Þar sem svo hátti til sé
ekki gengið út frá því sem gefnu að mismunandi skattar hafi verndaráhrif og
því þurfi að sýna fram á slík áhrif. Ekki sé þó nauðsynlegt að kanna þetta frekar
þar sem kerfið feli, eins og áður segir, ekki í sér sýnilega mismunun.
Framkvæmdastjórnin bendir á að í gjaldskrá stefnda sé gert ráð fyrir allt að 50% afslætti af flutningi vinnutækja innanlands en þótt
slíkt leiddi til mismununar hefði það ekki áhrif á lögmæti gjaldskrárinnar í heild sinni.
57
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar t.d. til máls 68/79 Hans Just [1980] ECR 501 og máls 112/84 Humblot v Directeur des services fiscaux
[1985] ECR 1367.
58
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 200/85 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 3953.
59
Framkvæmdastjórnin vísar til máls 170/78 [1980] ECR 417.
56
- 209
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Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
83. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur heldur ekki að um sé að ræða dulda mismunun þótt
innlendar og innfluttar vörur falli undir ólíka vörugjaldsflokka í gjaldskránni.
Evrópudómstóllinn hafi talið að kerfi mismunandi skatta, sem komi einni
tiltekinni vöru til góða sem sé dæmigerð fyrir stóran hluta innlendrar framleiðslu,
eða kerfi sem sé þannig uppbyggt að það ívilni innlendri framleiðslu, geti
brotið í bága við ákvæði 90. gr. EB.57 Ákvæði 90. gr. EB útiloki hins vegar
ekki kerfi mismunandi skatta, ef það byggi á hlutlægum viðmiðum, leiði ekki
til mismununar og verndi ekki innlendar vörur gegn samkeppni frá innfluttum
vörum.58 Í máli þessu liggi ljóst fyrir að bæði innlendar og innfluttar vörur falli
undir hærri og lægri vörugjaldsflokka. Einkum beri að nefna að sumar tegundir
áfengra drykkja séu framleiddar á Íslandi (brennt vín og bjór). Það breyti þó
ekki því að megnið af áfengum drykkjarvörum séu innflutt. Hið sama eigi
við um ávaxtasafa sem tilheyri lægri vörugjaldsflokki. Enginn ástæða sé til
að ætla að vörur sem venjulega séu innfluttar séu kerfisbundið settar í hærri
gjaldskrárflokk og vörur sem almennt séu innlendar í lægri flokk.
undantekningu, sem ekki varði þetta mál,56 sé því ekki um að ræða sýnilega
mismunun gagnvart innfluttum vörum frá öðrum EES-ríkjum.
85. Consequently, the Commission submits that the Respondent’s fee schedule
is not in any event contrary to Article 14 EEA, even if that fee schedule is
properly to be regarded as fiscal in nature.
Conclusion
86. Based on the above, the Commission considers it unnecessary to examine
separately the first question and suggests the questions be answered as
follows:
A system of port charges is not rendered contrary to the provisions of Article
10, 11 or 14 of the EEA Agreement by the mere fact that a single type of
product which is most usually imported falls within the highest category of
charges.
Henrik Bull
Judge-Rapporteur
- 210
169 -
Niðurstaða
86. Að framansögðu telur framkvæmdastjórnin ekki nauðsynlegt að fjalla um
fyrstu spurninguna sérstaklega og leggur til að spurningunum sé svarað sem
hér segir:
Kerfi hafnargjalda fer ekki í bága við ákvæði 10., 11. eða 14. gr. EES af þeirri
ástæðu einni að ein vörutegund, sem venjulega er innflutt, fellur undir hæsta
gjaldflokk.
Henrik Bull
framsögumaður
Case Case
E-4/07Case
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vín ehf.vAuthority
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
85. Framkvæmdastjórnin telur því að gjaldskrá stefnda brjóti ekki gegn 14. gr.
EES, jafnvel þótt gjaldskráin verði talin skattalegs eðlis.
169 - 211
- 212 -
Case E-7/07
Seabrokers AS
v
The Norwegian State, represented by
Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes)
- 213 -
CASE E-7/07
Seabrokers AS
v
The Norwegian State, represented by Skattedirektoratet (the Directorate of Taxes)
(Freedom of establishment – double taxation agreement – calculation of maximum credit
allowance for tax paid in another EEA State – debt interest and group contributions)
Judgment of the Court, 7 May 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
1. The case at hand concerns the
situation where a company in one EEA State,
the home State, establishes a branch in
another EEA State, the host State, through
which it runs a part of its business. Under
such circumstances, the rules at issue in
the main proceedings primarily affect the
freedom of establishment. Therefore, they
must be examined under Article 31 EEA.
Should the rules have restrictive effects on
the free movement of capital, those effects
would be the unavoidable consequence
of a possible obstacle to freedom of
establishment, and do therefore not
justify an independent examination under
Article 40 EEA. Furthermore, Article 4 EEA
applies independently only where specific
provisions preventing discrimination do not
apply.
2. Even though according to its wording,
Article 31 EEA is intended to secure, in
particular, the benefit of national treatment
in a host State, it also prohibits the home
State from hindering the establishment
in other EEA States of its own nationals
or companies incorporated under its
legislation.
3. The EEA Agreement does not oblige
the Contracting Parties to give relief for
double taxation within the European
Economic Area, nor does it lay down
any criteria for the attribution of areas of
competence between the Contracting
Parties in relation to the elimination of double
taxation. Consequently, the Contracting
Parties have retained their competence to
determine the connecting factors for the
allocation of their fiscal jurisdiction, inter
alia by concluding bilateral agreements.
However, as far as the exercise of their
taxation power so allocated is concerned,
the EEA States must comply with EEA
rules.
4. A higher tax burden resulting from
the fact that a taxpayer is subjected to two
tax regimes is, as such, liable to dissuade
214 - 172
Seabrokers AS
v
Staten v/Skattedirektoratet
(Etableringsrett – skatteavtale – beregning av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i
en annen EØS-stat – gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag)
Domstolens dom, 7. mai 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Rettsmøterapport. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Domssammendrag
1. Saken gjelder et tilfelle der et selskap i
én EØS-stat (hjemstaten) oppretter en filial
i en annen EØS-stat (vertsstaten) og driver
deler av sin virksomhet gjennom denne
filialen. I slike tilfeller berører de aktuelle
reglene i saken for tingretten i første
rekke den frie etableringsretten. Reglene
må derfor vurderes etter EØS-avtalens
artikkel 31. Skulle reglene ha restriktive
virkninger for den frie bevegeligheten
for kapital, vil disse virkningene være
den uunngåelige følgen av en eventuell
hindring for etableringsretten, og de kan
derfor ikke begrunne en selvstendig
vurdering etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 40.
Videre får EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 bare
selvstendig anvendelse der særskilte
bestemmelser mot forskjellsbehandling
ikke får anvendelse.
sine egne statsborgere eller selskaper
stiftet i samsvar med dens lovgivning i å
etablere seg i en annen EØS-stat.
2. Selv om EØS-avtalen artikkel 31
etter sin ordlyd særlig har til formål å sikre
nasjonal behandling i en vertsstat, forbyr
bestemmelsen også at hjemstaten hindrer
4. En tyngre skattebyrde som er
forårsaket av at skatteyter blir underlagt to
skattesystemer, kan som sådan avholde
selskaper fra å gjøre bruk av den frie
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
SAK E-7/07
215 - 172
Summary
3. EØS-avtalen
forplikter
ikke
avtalepartene til å gi lettelser for dobbelt
beskatning i Det europeiske økonomiske
samarbeidsområde, og avtalen fastlegger
heller ingen kriterier for tilordning av
myndighet,
avtalepartene
imellom,
ved avskaffelse av dobbeltbeskatning.
Avtalepartene har følgelig bibeholdt
sin
myndighet
til
å
fastsette
tilknytningskriteriene ved fordeling av sin
skattejurisdiksjon, blant annet gjennom
bilaterale avtaler. Men med hensyn
til utøvelsen av den således fordelte
beskatningsmyndigheten må EØS-statene
overholde EØS-reglene.
companies from using their right of
establishment under the EEA Agreement.
However, obstacles to the freedom of
establishment that are a consequence of
a mere difference in tax regimes between
States are outside the scope of the EEA
Agreement.
5. In order to determine whether a
disadvantage caused by rules on apportionment of expenses when calculating
the maximum credit allowance is the mere
result of the application in parallel of two
different tax systems, or a restriction on the
freedom of establishment that falls under
Article 31 EEA, it needs to be assessed
whether a company with a branch in another EEA State is in a situation which is,
with regard to those expenses, objectively
comparable to the one of a company having all its business within the home State.
6. A company conducting all its business
in its home State and having all its debt
interest expenses linked to that State,
and a company conducting its business
in its home State and through a branch
in another EEA State (the host State) but
having all its debt interest expenses linked
to the home State, are in a comparable
situation with respect to these expenses.
Thus, they should get the same tax
treatment in the home State with respect
to these expenses.
7. Consequently, an EEA State which
attributes, in applying the principle of net
income taxation, a portion of debt interest
expenses of a company to income earned
through its branch in another EEA State,
when calculating the maximum credit
allowance for tax paid in that State, restricts
the freedom of establishment within the
meaning of Article 31 EEA, insofar as
the expenses can only be linked to the
company’s business in the former State.
8. When comparing two companies
that make group contributions to daughter
companies in their home State, the fact
that one of the companies has a branch
in another EEA State does not place it in a
different position with regard to the group
contributions. Both companies should thus
get the same tax treatment with respect to
the group contributions.
9. Consequently, an EEA State which
attributes, in applying the principle of net
income taxation, a portion of a company’s
costs in the form of group contributions
made to other companies under this
State’s fiscal jurisdiction to income earned
through the company’s branch in another
EEA State, when calculating the maximum
credit allowance for tax paid in that State,
restricts the freedom of establishment
within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
216 - 173
5. For å fastslå om en ulempe som
skyldes regler om tilordning av utgifter ved
beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag er
en følge av at to stater anvender hvert sitt
skattesystem på samme tilfelle, eller utgjør
en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten
som omfattes av EØS-avtalen artikkel 31,
må det gjøres en bedømmelse av hvorvidt
et selskap med en filial i en annen EØS-stat
er i en situasjon som, med hensyn til disse
utgiftene, objektivt sett er sammenlignbar
med situasjonen til et selskap som driver
all sin virksomhet i hjemstaten.
8. Ved sammenligning av to selskaper
som yter konsernbidrag til datterselskaper
i sin hjemstat, settes ikke ett av selskapene
i noen annen stilling med hensyn til
konsernbidragene ved det faktum at
selskapet har en filial i en annen EØSstat. Begge selskaper bør således få den
samme skattemessige behandlingen med
hensyn til konsernbidragene.
9. En EØS-stat som, i sin anvendelse av
nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i
en annen EØS-stat tilordner en andel av et
selskaps utgifter i form av konsernbidrag ytt
til andre selskaper under den førstnevnte
statens beskatningsmyndighet til inntekt
ervervet ved selskapets filial i den andre
EØS-staten, hindrer følgelig den frie
etableringsretten
etter
EØS-avtalen
artikkel 31.
Summary
6. Et selskap som driver all sin
virksomhet i hjemstaten og har alle sine
gjeldsrentekostnader knyttet til den staten,
og et selskap som driver sin virksomhet
i hjemstaten samt gjennom en filial i en
annen EØS-stat (vertsstaten), men som
har alle sine gjeldsrentekostnader knyttet
til hjemstaten, er i en sammenlignbar
situasjon med hensyn til disse utgiftene.
Således bør selskapene få samme
skattemessige behandling i hjemstaten
med hensyn til disse utgiftene.
7. En EØS-stat som, i sin anvendelse av
nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt
i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en andel
av et selskaps gjeldsrentekostnader til
inntekt ervervet ved selskapets filial i den
andre EØS-staten, hindrer følgelig den
frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen
artikkel 31 for så vidt kostnadene bare
kan knyttes til selskapets virksomhet i den
førstnevnte staten.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen.
Hindringer for den frie etableringsretten
som alene er en følge av forskjeller
mellom
statenes
skattesystemer,
ligger imidlertid utenfor EØS-avtalens
anvendelsesområde.
217 - 173
7 May 2008*1
(Freedom of establishment – double taxation agreement – calculation of maximum
credit allowance for tax paid in another EEA State – debt interest and group
contributions)
In Case E-7/07,
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Stavanger
tingrett (Stavanger District Court), Norway, in a case pending before it between
Seabrokers AS
and
Concerning the interpretation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the European Economic
Area (EEA) on prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 31 EEA on
the freedom of establishment and Article 40 EEA on free movement of capital in the
EEA.
THE COURT,
composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Thorgeir Örlygsson (Judge-Rapporteur)
and Henrik Bull, Judges,
– the Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Smedsvig, Attorney;
– the Defendant, represented by Amund Noss, advocate, Office of the Attorney General
(Civil Affairs), acting as Agent;
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Per Andreas Bjørgan, Deputy
Director, Florence Simonetti, Officer, and Ida Hauger, National Expert, Department of
Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents;
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Richard Lyal, Legal
Adviser and member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent,
* Language of the Request: Norwegian.
218 - 174
7. mai 2008*1∗
(Etableringsrett – skatteavtale – beregning av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i
en annen EØS-stat – gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag)
I sak E-7/07,
ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i medhold av artikkel 34 i Avtale mellom EFTA-statene
om opprettelse av et Overvåkingsorgan og en Domstol fra Stavanger tingrett i en sak
som står for tingretten, mellom
Seabrokers AS
og
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
DOMSTOLENS DOM
om tolkningen av Avtale om Det europeiske økonomiske samarbeidsområde (EØSavtalen) artikkel 4 om forbud mot forskjellsbehandling på grunnlag av nasjonalitet, artikkel
31 om etableringsretten og artikkel 40 om fri bevegelighet for kapital i EØS, avsier
DOMSTOLEN,
sammensatt av: Carl Baudenbacher, president, Thorgeir Örlygsson (saksforberedende
dommer) og Henrik Bull, dommere,
justissekretær: Skúli Magnússon,
etter å ha tatt i betraktning de skriftlige innleggene fremmet av:
– saksøker, representert ved advokat Thomas Smedsvig,
– saksøkte, representert ved advokat Amund Noss, Regjeringsadvokaten,
– Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap, representert ved Legal Adviser og
medlem av Kommisjonens juridiske tjeneste Richard Lyal.
∗
Språket i anmodningen om en rådgivende uttalelse: norsk.
-- 174
219 --
JUDGMENT
– EFTAs overvåkningsorgan, representert ved Deputy Director Per Andreas Bjørgan,
Officer Florence Simonetti og National Expert Ida Hauger, Department of Legal &
Executive Affairs, og
having heard oral argument of the Plaintiff, represented by its Attorney Thomas
Smedsvig, the Defendant, represented by its Agent Amund Noss, the Government of
Germany, represented by its Agent Christoph Blaschke, the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
represented by its Agent Florence Simonetti, and the Commission of the European
Communities, represented by its Agent Richard Lyal, at the hearing on 1 February
2008,
gives the following
Judgment
I
Facts and procedure
1
By a letter dated 25 May 2007, registered at the Court on 30 May 2007,
Stavanger tingrett has referred to the Court, under Article 34 of the Agreement
between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and
a Court of Justice, three questions on the interpretation of Articles 4, 31 and 40
EEA.
2
Those questions have arisen in a case pending before Stavanger tingrett
between Seabrokers AS (hereinafter the “Plaintiff”) and the Norwegian State,
represented by the Directorate of Taxes (hereinafter the “Defendant”). The case
concerns a dispute on whether the Plaintiff’s tax assessment for the income
year 2002, on the basis of the rules set out in the Norwegian Act Relating to
Tax on Assets and Income of 26 March 1999 No 14 (lov 26. mars 1999 nr. 14
om skatt av formue og inntekt (skatteloven); hereinafter the “Tax Act”) and in
Regulation 19 November 1999 No 1158 Complementing and Implementing
the Tax Act (forskrift 19. november 1999 nr. 1158 til utfylling og gjennomføring
mv. av skatteloven; hereinafter “FSFIN”) on maximum credit allowance for tax
paid in a foreign State, is compatible with Articles 4, 31 and 40 EEA.
3
The Plaintiff is a Norwegian Private Limited Company which operates a real
estate business in Norway through a mother company and five daughter
companies there. It develops and rents out its properties, all of which are
regulated as offices/industry. The properties are – or are in the process of
becoming – developed with office buildings financed by loans guaranteed by
mortgages on the properties.
220 - 175
og etter å ha hørt muntlige innlegg fra saksøker representert ved Thomas Smedsvig,
saksøkte representert ved Amund Noss, Den tyske regjering representert ved
Christoph Blaschke, EFTAs overvåkningsorgan representert ved Florence Simonetti, og
Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap representert ved Richard Lyal, i rettsmøte
den 1. februar 2008,
slik
Dom
Faktum og saksgang
1
Ved brev datert 25. mai 2007, mottatt ved EFTA-domstolen 30. mai 2007, har
Stavanger tingrett i medhold av artikkel 34 i Avtale mellom EFTA-statene om
opprettelse av et Overvåkingsorgan og en Domstol forelagt tre spørsmål om
tolkningen av EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 og 40 for EFTA-domstolen.
2
Spørsmålene har oppstått i en sak mellom Seabrokers AS (”saksøker”) og
staten v/Skattedirektoratet (”saksøkte”) som står for Stavanger tingrett.
Saken gjelder en tvist om hvorvidt saksøkers ligning for inntektsåret 2002,
på grunnlag av reglene i lov 26. mars 1999 nr. 14 om skatt av formue og
inntekt (skatteloven) og forskrift 19. november 1999 nr. 1158 til utfylling og
gjennomføring mv. av skatteloven (”FSFIN”) om maksimalt kreditfradrag for
skatt betalt i fremmed stat, er forenlig med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 og 40.
3
Saksøker er et aksjeselskap som driver virksomhet med fast eiendom i Norge
gjennom et morselskap og fem datterselskaper. Selskapet utvikler og leier ut
sine eiendommer, som alle er regulert til kontor/industri. Eiendommene er –
eller er i ferd med å bli – utbygd med kontorbygninger finansiert ved lån sikret
med pant i eiendommene.
- 175
221 -
JUDGMENT
I
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
med henvisning til rettsmøterapporten,
4
The Plaintiff also has a branch in Aberdeen in the United Kingdom (the UK),
whose only business activity is ship broking. Renting its office space, the
branch has no investment in real property, with the exception of a detached
house purchased for the use of employees. Since its only debts are due to
operating expenses, the branch has low debt interest costs. Having registered
it as a branch of a foreign enterprise in the UK, the Plaintiff has submitted tax
declarations for the branch’s operations in the UK and has been charged tax
on its operations there.
5
The two units, i.e. the real estate business in Norway and the ship broking
business in the UK, are operated separately, both with regard to the nature
and location of the business activities.
6
The Plaintiff used the direct method in its accounts and tax declarations, meaning
that tax-deductible expenses, both debt interest and group contributions, were
entered in the country where the expenses arose and were spent. Before
deduction of debt interest expenses and group contributions, the Plaintiff’s
net global income was NOK 14 787 889, of which the net income abroad was
63.77166%, i.e. NOK 9 430 482. Debt interest expenses, including interest
expenses abroad, were NOK 2 871 039 and group contributions paid by the
mother company to two of its daughter companies in Norway were NOK 2 579
000.
7
In the income year 2002, the Plaintiff’s net income from the branch in the UK
was taxed there at a rate of 30%, and the Plaintiff paid GBP 235 375.20 in
tax in the UK. In its Norwegian tax declaration for the same income year, the
Plaintiff claimed a credit allowance of NOK 2 635 023, corresponding to the tax
paid in the UK.
8
The Stavanger Tax Assessment Office, by decision of 13 February 2004,
reduced the credit allowance for tax on income which the Plaintiff’s branch in
Aberdeen had paid to the UK authorities, to NOK 1 667 373. In reaching its
decision, the Tax Assessment Office applied an exception in Section 16–28–
4 litra b of the FSFIN. Debt interest expenses and group contributions were
apportioned in accordance with the principle of net income taxation.
9
In attributing the expenses in question to the Plaintiff’s branch in the UK in
proportion to its income there, the interest expenses (NOK 2 871 039) and
group contributions (NOK 2 579 000) were multiplied by the net income
abroad (NOK 9 430 482) and divided by the company’s total net income
222 - 176
5
De to enhetene, dvs. eiendomsvirksomheten i Norge og skipsmeglervirksomheten i Det forente kongerike, drives både etter sin art og lokalisering hver
for seg.
6
Saksøker brukte den direkte metode i sine regnskap og selvangivelser, noe som
innebærer at fradragsposter, både gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag, ble bokført
i det landet hvor utgiftene oppsto og ble betalt. Netto globalinntekt før fradrag
for gjeldsrentekostnader og konsernbidrag var NOK 14 787 889, hvorav netto
utenlandsinntekt var 63,77166 %, dvs. NOK 9 430 482. Gjeldsrentekostnader
inkludert renteutgifter fra utlandet var NOK 2 871 039 og ytte konsernbidrag
fra morselskapet til to av datterselskapene i Norge var NOK 2 579 000.
7
I inntektsåret 2002 ble saksøkers nettoinntekt fra filialen i Det forente kongerike
skattlagt der med en skattesats på 30 %, og saksøker betalte GBP 235 375,20
i skatt i Det forente kongerike. I selvangivelsen til norske skattemyndigheter for
det samme inntektsåret krevde saksøker kreditfradrag i norsk skatt med NOK
2 635 023, svarende til skatten betalt i Det forente kongerike.
8
Ved vedtak av 13. februar 2004 reduserte Stavanger ligningskontor kredit
fradraget for inntektsskatt som saksøkers filial i Aberdeen hadde betalt til britiske
skattemyndigheter, til NOK 1 667 373. Ligningskontoret anvendte i denne
forbindelse en unntaksregel i FSFIN § 16–28–4 bokstav b. Gjeldsrentekostnader
og konsernbidrag ble fordelt i henhold til nettoinntektsprinsippet.
9
Tilordningen av de aktuelle utgiftene til saksøkers filial i Det forente kongerike
forholdsmessig etter saksøkers inntekt der, fremkom ved at renteutgiftene
(NOK 2 871 039) og konsernbidragene (NOK 2 579 000) ble multiplisert med
netto utenlandsinntekt (NOK 9 430 482) og dividert med selskapets totale
- 176
223 -
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Saksøker har også en filial i Aberdeen i Det forente kongerike, med skipsmegling
som eneste virksomhet. Filialen leier kontorer og har ingen investeringer i fast
eiendom, med unntak av en enebolig innkjøpt til bruk for ansatte. Ettersom dens
eneste gjeld er driftsgjeld, har filialen lave gjeldsrentekostnader. Da filialen er
registrert som en filial av et utenlandsk foretak i Det forente kongerike, har
saksøker levert selvangivelse for filialens virksomhet i Det forente kongerike
og blitt skattlagt for dens virksomhet der.
JUDGMENT
4
(NOK 14 787 889). So calculated, debt interest expenses attributed to the UK
branch were NOK 1 830 909 (2 871 039 x 63.77166%) and group contributions
NOK 1 644 671 (2 579 000 x 63.77166%). Accordingly, the net income abroad
after deduction of debt interest expenses and group contributions was NOK 5
954 902 (9 430 482 - (1 830 909 + 1 644 671)). In order to find the maximum
credit allowance, the net income abroad so calculated was multiplied by the
income tax rate in Norway (28%). Hence, the credit allowance was NOK 1 667
373 (5 954 902 x 28%).
10 It is undisputed between the parties to the main proceedings that the Plaintiff’s
global tax burden was higher than would have been the case had the Plaintiff
conducted all its business activities in Norway. The Plaintiff paid NOK 3 582 248,
including the UK tax not compensated by the credit allowance. Had the Plaintiff
conducted all its activities in Norway, the tax would have been NOK 2 614 598.
The latter figure corresponds to 28% of a total net income of NOK 9 337 850,
i.e. 14 787 889 - (2 871 039 + 2 579 000).
11 The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Tax Assessment Office on 9 March
2004 to the Higher Assessment Appeal Board which upheld the decision of the
Tax Assessment Office in a decision of 8 November 2004.
12 The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit before Stavanger tingrett on 2 February 2005,
claiming mainly: 1) that the decision by the Higher Assessment Appeal Board
of 8 November 2004 be quashed. 2) Principally, that the new tax assessment
be based on the deduction in full of debt interest and group contributions under
the tax assessment in Norway. Alternatively, that the assessment be based
on an apportionment of debt interest and group contributions in proportion
to the apportionment of the Plaintiff’s gross capital in Norway and the UK.
The Defendant countered in its defence with the claim that the action be
dismissed.
13 Before Stavanger tingrett, the Plaintiff has pleaded that the decision by the
Higher Assessment Board and the Norwegian rules on calculation of credit
allowance in Section 16–28–4 of the FSFIN, cf. Sections 16–21 and 16–28
of the Tax Act, are contrary to the provisions of the EEA Agreement on nondiscrimination and the fundamental freedoms, referring to Articles 4, 31, 34
and 40 EEA. The Defendant has pleaded in its defence that the relevant tax
rules under domestic law are not contrary to EEA law.
- 224
177 -
10 Det er ubestridt mellom partene i saken for tingretten at saksøkers globale
skattebyrde var høyere enn den ville ha vært dersom saksøker hadde drevet
sin samlede virksomhet i Norge. Saksøker betalte NOK 3 582 248, inkludert
den britiske skatt som ikke ble kompensert gjennom kreditfradraget. Dersom
saksøker hadde drevet sin samlede virksomhet i Norge, ville skatten ha vært
NOK 2 614 598. Det sistnevnte tallet svarer til 28 % av en total nettoinntekt på
NOK 9 337 850, dvs. 14 787 889 - (2 871 039 + 2 579 000).
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
nettoinntekt (NOK 14 787 889). Slik beregnet ble gjeldsrentekostnader tilordnet
den britiske filialen NOK 1 830 909 (2 871 039 x 63,77166 %) og konsernbidrag
NOK 1 644 671 (2 579 000 x 63,77166 %). Netto utenlandsinntekt etter
fradrag for gjeldsrentekostnader og konsernbidrag ble følgelig NOK 5 954 902
(9 430 482 - (1 830 909 + 1 664 671)). For å fastsette maksimalt kreditfradrag
ble den beregnede netto utenlandsinntekten multiplisert med skattesatsen
for inntektsskatt i Norge (28 %). Kreditfradraget ble følgelig NOK 1 667 373
(5 954 902 x 28 %).
11 Saksøker påklaget den 9. mars 2004 ligningskontorets vedtak til overlignings
nemnda, som fastholdt dette ved vedtak av 8. november 2004.
13 Under henvisning til EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31, 34 og 40 har saksøker for
Stavanger tingrett anført at overligningsnemndas vedtak og de norske reglene
om beregning av kreditfradrag i FSFIN § 16–28–4, jf. skatteloven §§ 16–21
og 16–28, strider mot EØS-avtalens bestemmelser om ikke-diskriminering og
grunnfrihetene. Saksøkte har i sitt tilsvar anført at de relevante internrettslige
skattereglene ikke er i strid med EØS-retten.
- 225
177 -
JUDGMENT
12 Saksøker tok ut søksmål ved Stavanger tingrett den 2. februar 2005, i
hovedsak med påstand om følgende: 1) Overligningsnemndas vedtak av
8. november 2004 oppheves. 2) Prinsipalt: Ved den nye ligningen legges til
grunn at gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag fullt ut kommer til fradrag ved ligningen
i Norge. Subsidiært: Ved ligningen legges til grunn en fordeling av gjeldsrenter
og konsernbidrag i forhold til fordelingen av saksøkers bruttoformue i Norge og
Det forente kongerike. Saksøkte tok til motmæle med påstand om frifinnelse.
14 Stavanger tingrett has referred the following three questions to the Court:
1. Is it contrary to Article 4, 31 or 40 of the EEA Agreement to attribute,
according to the principle of net income taxation, debt interest to the income
abroad when calculating the maximum credit allowance?
according to the principle of net income taxation, group contributions to the
income abroad when calculating the maximum credit allowance?
3. Will the answer to question 1 and/or 2 be the same if the debt interest
and/or the group contributions can only be linked to the business in Norway?
II Legal background – national law
15 In Norway, income tax is based on the principle of net income taxation.
Moreover, taxpayers are subject to the principle of global income taxation,
meaning that they are taxed on income derived from Norway and abroad.
However, under Section 16–20(1) of the Tax Act, taxpayers may claim a credit
allowance for income tax paid to foreign tax authorities. Section 16–20(1), first
sentence, Tax deductions for tax paid in a foreign State, reads:
(1)A taxpayer as mentioned in Sections 2–1 and 2–2 who here in this Kingdom
must pay tax on
a. income from sources in a foreign State, or
b. a capital in a foreign State,
may claim deductions from Norwegian tax on conclusively assessed tax on
income or capital or corresponding tax which is established as having been
imposed on the taxpayer and paid in the relevant foreign State where the
income has its source or the capital is located.
16 Pursuant to Section 16–21(1) and (3) of the Tax Act, deductions can only be
claimed for income tax paid to foreign tax authorities, within the maximum credit
allowance. Section 16–21(1) and (3), Limitations on the right to deductions –
the maximum credit allowance, read, at the relevant time:
(1)Deductions from Norwegian income tax under Section 16–20 may not
exceed the portion of Norwegian tax on total taxable income, as calculated
before the deduction, which proportionally falls on the income abroad. The
deduction is also limited to the income tax which the taxpayer has paid in
the source State on this income. Foreign income tax can only be deducted
from Norwegian income tax.
[…]
- 226
178 -
1. Er det i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne gjeldsrenter
til utenlandsinntekten etter nettoinntektsprinsippet ved beregningen av det
maksimale kreditfradraget?
2. Er det i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne konsernbidrag
til utenlandsinntekten etter nettoinntektsprinsippet ved beregningen av det
maksimale kreditfradraget?
3. Vil svaret på spørsmål 1 og/eller 2 bli det samme dersom gjeldsrentene
og/eller konsernbidraget utelukkende kan knyttes til virksomheten i Norge?
II Rettslig bakgrunn – nasjonal rett
15 I Norge bygger inntektsskatt på nettoinntektsprinsippet. Norske skatteytere
er dessuten underlagt globalinntektsprinsippet, noe som innebærer at de blir
beskattet for inntekter oppebåret i Norge og i utlandet. Etter skatteloven § 16–
20 første ledd kan imidlertid skatteyterne kreve et kreditfradrag for inntekts
skatt betalt til utenlandske skattemyndigheter. Paragraf 16–20 første ledd
første punktum (Skattefradrag for skatt betalt i fremmed stat) lyder:
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
14 Stavanger tingrett har forelagt følgende tre spørsmål for EFTA-domstolen:
(1)Skattyter som nevnt i §§ 2–1 og 2–2 som her i riket må svare skatt av
a.inntekt med kilde i fremmed stat, eller
b.formue i fremmed stat,
kan kreve fradrag i norsk skatt for endelig fastsatt inntektsskatt eller fomuesskatt
eller tilsvarende skatt som godtgjøres å være ilagt skattyteren og betalt i
vedkommende fremmede stat hvor inntekten har kilde eller formuen er.
(1)Fradrag i norsk inntektsskatt etter § 16–20 kan ikke overstige den delen
av norsk skatt på samlet skattepliktig inntekt, beregnet før fradraget, som
forholdsmessig faller på utenlandsinntekten. Fradraget er også begrenset
til den inntektsskatten som skattyteren har betalt i kildestaten på denne
inntekten. Utenlandsk inntektsskatt kan bare komme til fradrag i norsk
inntektsskatt.
…
- 227
178 -
JUDGMENT
16 Etter skatteloven § 16–21 første og tredje ledd kan det bare kreves fradrag
for inntektsskatt betalt til utenlandske skattemyndigheter innenfor maksimalt
kreditfradrag. Paragraf 16–21 første og tredje ledd (Begrensninger i fradrags
retten – maksimalt kreditfradrag) lød, på det aktuelle tidspunktet:
(3) The terms “income abroad” and “capital abroad” refer to income from
sources abroad and capital located abroad which are taxed abroad and
which are included in the taxpayer’s total income or capital which is taxable
in Norway.
17 A further elucidation of the maximum credit allowance calculation is provided
for in Section 16–28–4 of the FSFIN, Attribution of income and expenses when
calculating a maximum tax deduction, which read, at the relevant time:
When calculating the maximum tax deduction under Section 16–21 of the Tax
Act, the following method is used:
a. Unless otherwise indicated below, income and expenses shall be attributed
to Norway or abroad according to where the income is legitimately derived
or the expenses are legitimately incurred.
b. Expenses which cannot be attributed to a specific business shall be
attributed to Norway or abroad in proportion to where the net income
otherwise is attributed. Debt interest which is deductible in Norway shall
always be attributed in this way.
c. Expenses which cannot be attributed to a specific business may
exceptionally be apportioned according to a different distribution key than
what follows from the first sentence of [litra] b, if the taxpayer establishes
that such a distribution key will provide a reasonable result in accordance
with generally accepted commercial principles and generally accepted
principles of corporate economics and the taxpayer establishes that such a
distribution key is used consistently. This does not apply to debt interest.
[…]
18 The Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom signed a double taxation
agreement (hereinafter the “DTA”) on 12 October 2000, which has been
effective in Norway since 1 January 2001. The DTA is incorporated into
Norwegian law pursuant to Act No 15 of 28 July 1949 Relating to Authority for
the King to Enter into Agreements with Foreign States for the Prevention of
Double Taxation etc.
19 Article 7 of the DTA provides that Norway has the right to levy taxes on
companies resident in Norway, and that in such cases the UK can only levy
taxes on income derived from a permanent establishment in the UK. Article 7,
Business profits, reads:
- 228
179 -
17 En nærmere klargjøring av beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget gis
i FSFIN § 16–28–4 (Tilordning av inntekter og utgifter ved beregningen av
maksimalt kreditfradrag) som lød, på det aktuelle tidspunktet:
Ved beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget etter skatteloven § 16–21
anvendes følgende fremgangsmåte:
a. Med mindre annet følger nedenfor, skal inntekter og utgifter tilordnes Norge
eller utlandet etter hvor inntekten rettmessig er oppebåret eller utgiften
rettmessig er pådratt.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
(3) Med utenlandsinntekt og utenlandsformue menes inntekt med kilde i
utlandet, som skattlegges i utlandet og som inngår i skattyterens samlede
inntekt eller formue som er skattepliktig i Norge.
b. Utgifter som ikke kan tilordnes en bestemt virksomhet, skal tilordnes Norge
eller utlandet forholdsmessig etter hvor nettoinntekten for øvrig er tilordnet.
Gjeldsrenter som er fradragsberettigede i Norge skal alltid tilordnes slik.
c. Utgifter som ikke kan tilordnes en bestemt virksomhet, kan unntaksvis
fordeles etter en annen fordelingsnøkkel enn det som følger av bokstav b
førte punktum, dersom skattyter godgjør at en slik fordelingsnøkkel gir et
rimelig resultat i overensstemmelse med alminnelig aksepterte forretnings
messige og bedriftsøkonomiske prinsipper og skattyter godtgjør at en slik
fordelingsnøkkel anvendes konsekvent. Dette gjelder ikke gjeldsrenter.
…
19 Skatteavtalen artikkel 7 fastsetter at Norge har rett til å beskatte selskaper
hjemmehørende i Norge, og at Det forente kongerike i slike tilfeller bare kan
beskatte inntekter oppebåret ved et fast driftssted i Det forente kongerike.
Artikkel 7 (Fortjeneste ved forretningsvirksomhet) lyder:
179 - 229
JUDGMENT
18 Kongeriket Norge og Det forente kongerike undertegnet den 12. oktober 2000
en skatteavtale (”skatteavtalen”) som har vært gjeldende i Norge siden 1.
januar 2001. Skatteavtalen er inkorporert i norsk rett i henhold til lov 28. juli
1949 nr. 15 om adgang for Kongen til å inngå overenskomster med fremmede
stater til forebyggelse av dobbeltbeskatning m.v.
1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in
that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise
carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be
taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that
permanent establishment.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, where an enterprise
of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State
through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each
Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits
which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or
similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of
which it is a permanent establishment.
3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be
allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes
of the permanent establishment, including a reasonable allocation of
executive and general administrative expenses incurred for the purposes
of the enterprise as a whole, whether in the Contracting State in which the
permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.
4. No profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of the
mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise
for the enterprise.
5. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, the profits to be attributed
to the permanent establishment shall be determined by the same method
year by year unless there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary.
6. Where profits include items of income or capital gains which are dealt with
separately in other Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those
Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article.
20 In order to avoid double taxation, Norwegian taxpayers have, according to the
DTA, a right to credit allowance for income tax paid in the UK. Article 28 DTA,
Elimination of double taxation, reads:
1. Subject to the provisions of the law of the United Kingdom regarding the
allowance as a credit against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a
territory outside the United Kingdom (which shall not affect the general
principle hereof):
- 230
180 -
2. Når et foretak i den kontraherende stat utøver forretningsvirksomhet
i den annen kontraherende stat gjennom et fast driftssted der, skal det,
med forbehold om bestemmelsen i punkt (3) i denne artikkel, i hver av de
kontraherende stater tilskrives det faste driftssted den fortjeneste som det
ventelig ville ha ervervet hvis det hadde vært et særskilt og selvstendig
foretak som utøvet samme eller lignende virksomhet under samme eller
lignende vilkår og som opptrådte helt uavhengig i forhold til det foretak hvis
faste driftssted det er.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
1. Fortjeneste som oppebæres av et foretak i en kontraherende stat skal bare
kunne skattlegges i denne stat, med mindre foretaket utøver forretnings
virksomhet i den annen kontraherende stat gjennom et fast driftssted
der. Hvis foretaket utøver slik forretningsvirksomhet, kan dets fortjeneste
skattlegges i den annen stat, men bare så meget av den som kan tilskrives
det faste driftssted.
3. Ved beregningen av et fast driftssteds fortjeneste skal det innrømmes
fradrag for utgifter som er påløpt i forbindelse med det faste driftssted,
herunder en rimelig andel av direksjons- og alminnelige administrasjons
kostnader påløpt foretaket som en helhet, uansett om de er påløpt i den
kontraherende stat hvor det faste driftssted ligger eller andre steder.
4. Ingen fortjeneste skal henføres til et fast driftssted utelukkende i anledning
av dettes innkjøp av varer for foretaket.
5. Ved anvendelse av de forestående punkter skal den fortjeneste som
tilskrives det faste driftssted fastsettes etter den samme fremgangsmåte
hvert år, med mindre det er fyldestgjørende grunn for noe annet.
6. Hvor fortjenesten omfatter inntekter eller formuesgevinst som er særskilt
omhandlet i andre artikler i denne overenskomst, skal bestemmelsene i
disse artikler ikke berøres av reglene i nærværende artikkel.
1. Med forbehold om bestemmelsene i Det Forente Kongerikes lov om
godskriving mot britisk skatt av skatt som skal betales i et område utenfor
Det Forente Kongerike (dog uten å påvirke bestemmelsene i dette punkts
alminnelige retningslinjer), skal følgende gjelde:
180 - 231
JUDGMENT
20 For at dobbeltbeskatning skal unngås, har norske skatteytere etter skatteavtalen
rett til kreditfradrag for inntektsskatt betalt i Det forente kongerike. Skatteavtalen
artikkel 28 (Unngåelse av dobbeltbeskatning) lyder:
a.Norwegian tax payable under the laws of Norway and in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention, whether directly or by deduction,
on profits, income or chargeable gains from sources within Norway
(excluding in the case of a dividend, tax payable in respect of the profits
out of which the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against
any United Kingdom tax computed by reference to the same profits,
income or chargeable gains by reference to which the Norwegian tax is
computed;
[…]
2. Subject to the provisions of the laws of Norway regarding the allowance as
a credit against Norwegian tax of tax payable in a territory outside Norway
(which shall not affect the general principle hereof) –
a.Where a resident of Norway derives income or owns elements of capital
which, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be
taxed in the United Kingdom, Norway shall allow:
i. as a deduction from the tax on the income of that resident, an
amount equal to the United Kingdom tax paid on that income;
ii. as a deduction from the tax on the capital of that resident, an amount
equal to the United Kingdom tax paid on elements of capital;
Such deduction in either case shall not, however, exceed that part
of the Norwegian tax, as computed before the deduction is given,
which is attributable, as the case may be, to the income or the same
elements of capital which may be taxed in the United Kingdom.
b. Where in accordance with any provision of this Convention income
derived or capital owned by a resident of Norway is exempt from tax in
Norway, Norway may nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on
the remaining income or capital of such resident, take into account the
exempted income or capital.
3. For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Article income, profits and capital
gains owned by a resident of the United Kingdom which may be taxed in
Norway in accordance with this Convention shall be deemed to arise from
sources in Norway.
232 - 181
…
2. Med forbehold av bestemmelsene i Norges lovgiving om godskriving mot
norsk skatt av skatt som skal betales i et område utenfor Norge (dog uten
å påvirke bestemmelsene i dette punkts alminnelige retningslinjer), skal
følgende gjelde:
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
(a) Norsk skatt som skal betales i henhold til Norges lover og
overensstemmende med bestemmelsene i denne overenskomst, enten
direkte eller gjennom avkorting, av fortjeneste, inntekt eller skattbar
gevinst fra kilder i Norge (unntatt når det gjelder dividender, skatt
som skal betales av det overskudd hvorav dividenden utdeles), skal
godskrives mot enhver britisk skatt beregnet av den samme fortjeneste,
inntekt eller skattbare gevinst som er grunnlaget for beregningen av
den norske skatt;
(a)Når en person bosatt i Norge oppebærer inntekt eller eier formue som i
henhold til bestemmelsene i denne overenskomst kan skattlegges i Det
Forente Kongerike, skal Norge innrømme:
i. som fradrag i den skatt som ilegges vedkommende persons inntekt et
beløp som tilsvarer den skatt som er betalt til Det Forente Kongerike
på denne inntekten,
ii. som fradrag i den skatt som ilegges vedkommende persons formue
et beløp som tilsvarer den skatt som er betalt til Det Forente
Kongerike på disse deler av formuen.
Slikt fradrag skal imidlertid ikke overstige den del av inntektsskatten
eller formuesskatten, beregnet før fradrag er gitt, som kan henføres
henholdsvis til den inntekt eller de samme deler av formuen som
kan skattlegges i Det Forente Kongerike.
3. Ved anvendelse av punkt (1) denne artikkel skal inntekt, fortjeneste og
formuesgevinst som tilkommer en person bosatt i Det Forente Kongerike
og som kan skattlegges i Norge overensstemmende med denne
overenskomst, anses for å skrive seg fra kilder i Norge.
- 181
233 -
JUDGMENT
(b)Når, i henhold til enhver bestemmelse i denne overenskomst, inntekt
som oppebæres eller formue som eies av en person bosatt i Norge
er unntatt fra beskatning i Norge, kan Norge likevel ved beregningen
av skatten på denne persons gjenværende inntekt og formue ta i
betraktning den unntatte inntekt eller formue.
21 When calculating the credit allowance to which a taxpayer is entitled under
Article 28 of the DTA, Norwegian tax authorities apply the provisions of the Tax
Act and the FSFIN on maximum credit allowance, cited above.
III Legal background – EEA law
Within the scope of application of this Agreement, and without prejudice to
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited.
23 Article 31(1) EEA reads:
Within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member
State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States. This shall
also apply to the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals
of any EC Member State or EFTA State established in the territory of any of
these States.
[…]
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of an EC Member State
or an EFTA State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the territory of the Contracting Parties shall,
for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of EC Member States or EFTA States.
‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under civil or
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons
governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profitmaking.
restrictions between the Contracting Parties on the movement of capital
belonging to persons resident in EC Member States or EFTA States and no
discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the
parties or on the place where such capital is invested. Annex XII contains the
provisions necessary to implement this Article.
- 234
182 -
III Rettslig bakgrunn – EØS-rett
22 EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 lyder:
Enhver forskjellsbehandling på grunnlag av nasjonalitet skal være forbudt
innenfor denne avtales virkeområde, med forbehold for de særbestemmelser
den selv gir.
23 EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 første ledd lyder:
I samsvar med bestemmelsene i denne avtale skal det ikke være noen
restriksjoner på etableringsadgangen for statsborgere fra en av EFs
medlemsstater eller en EFTA-stat på en annen disse staters territorium. Dette
skal gjelde også adgangen til å opprette agenturer, filialer eller datterselskaper
for så vidt angår borgere fra en av EFs medlemsstater eller en EFTA-stat som
har etablert seg på en av disse staters territorium.
…
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
21 I beregningen av hvilket kreditfradrag en skatteyter har krav på etter
skatteavtalen artikkel 28 anvender norske skattemyndigheter skattelovens og
FSFINs bestemmelser om maksimalt kreditfradrag, sitert ovenfor.
Når det gjelder anvendelsen av bestemmelsene i dette kapittel, skal selskaper
som er opprettet i samsvar med lovgivningen i en av EFs medlemsstater eller
ene EFTA-stat, og som har sitt vedtektsbestemte sete, sin hovedadministrasjon
eller sitt hovedforetak innen avtalepartenes territorium, likestilles med fysiske
personer som er statsborgere i EFs medlemsstater eller EFTA-statene.
Ved selskaper skal forstås selskaper i sivil- eller handelsrettslig forstand,
herunder også kooperative selskaper, samt andre juridiske personer i offentligeller privatrettslig forstand, unntatt dem som ikke driver ervervsmessig
virksomhet.
Innen rammen av bestemmelsene i denne avtale skal det mellom avtalepartene
ikke være noen restriksjoner på overføring av kapital tilhørende personer
bosatt i EFs medlemsstater eller EFTA-statene og ingen forskjellsbehandling
på grunn av partenes nasjonalitet, bosted eller stedet for kapitalanbringelsen.
Vedlegg XII inneholder de bestemmelser som er nødvendige for å gjennomføre
denne artikkel.
- 235
182 -
JUDGMENT
framework, the facts, the procedure and the written observations submitted
to the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only insofar as is
IV Findings of the Court
General
27 In its questions, the national court refers to Articles 4, 31 and 40 EEA. The
Court notes that the case at hand concerns the situation where a company
in one EEA State, the home State, establishes a branch in another EEA
State, the host State, through which it runs a part of its business. Under such
circumstances, the rules at issue in the main proceedings primarily affect the
freedom of establishment. Therefore, they must be examined under Article 31
EEA. Should the rules have restrictive effects on the free movement of capital,
those effects would be the unavoidable consequence of a possible obstacle
to freedom of establishment, and do therefore not justify an independent
examination under Article 40 EEA (see for comparison Case C-231/05 Oy AA
[2007] ECR I-6373, at paragraphs 23 and 24). Furthermore, Article 4 EEA
applies independently only where specific provisions preventing discrimination
do not apply (see Case E-10/04 Piazza [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76, at paragraph
31). Therefore, the Court will only address the questions referred to it under
Article 31 EEA.
28 Freedom of establishment under the EEA Agreement entails a right for
companies, formed in accordance with the law of an EEA State and having their
registered office, central administration or principle place of business within the
EEA, to pursue their activities in another EEA State through a branch established
there, see Article 34 EEA. Even though according to its wording, Article 31 EEA
is intended to secure, in particular, the benefit of national treatment in a host
State, it also prohibits the home State from hindering the establishment in other
EEA States of its own nationals or companies incorporated under its legislation
(see for comparison Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services, judgment
of 6 December 2007, not yet reported (hereinafter “Columbus Container”), at
paragraph 33, and Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, at
paragraph 31). Therefore, the fact that the Plaintiff is a Norwegian company
cannot prevent it from invoking the rules relating to freedom of establishment
against Norway, since it has exercised its right of freedom of establishment in
the UK.
- 236
183 -
Innledning
27 Tingretten viser til EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 og 40 i sine spørsmål. EFTAdomstolen bemerker at saken gjelder et tilfelle der et selskap i én EØS-stat
(hjemstaten) oppretter en filial i en annen EØS-stat (vertsstaten) og driver deler
av sin virksomhet gjennom denne filialen. I slike tilfeller berører de aktuelle
reglene i saken for tingretten i første rekke den frie etableringsretten. Reglene
må derfor vurderes etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Skulle reglene ha restriktive
virkninger for den frie bevegeligheten for kapital, vil disse virkningene være
den uunngåelige følgen av en eventuell hindring for etableringsretten, og
de kan derfor ikke begrunne en selvstendig vurdering etter EØS-avtalen
artikkel 40, sml. sak C-231/05 Oy AA, Sml. 2007 s. I-6373 (avsnitt 23 og 24).
Videre får EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 bare selvstendig anvendelse der særskilte
bestemmelser mot forskjellsbehandling ikke får anvendelse, se sak E-10/04
Piazza, EFTA Court Report 2005 s. 76 (avsnitt 31). EFTA-domstolen vil derfor
bare vurdere de forelagte spørsmålene etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
28 Den frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen innebærer en rett for selskaper
som er opprettet i samsvar med en EØS-stats lovgivning og har sitt vedtekts
bestemte sete, sin hovedadministrasjon eller sitt hovedforetak i EØS, til å utøve
sin virksomhet i en annen EØS-stat gjennom en filial etablert der, se EØSavtalen artikkel 34. Selv om EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 etter sin ordlyd særlig har
til formål å sikre nasjonal behandling i en vertsstat, forbyr bestemmelsen også
at hjemstaten hindrer sine egne statsborgere eller selskaper stiftet i samsvar
med dens lovgivning i å etablere seg i en annen EØS-stat, sml. sak C-298/05
Columbus Container Services, dom av 6. desember 2007, ennå ikke i Sml.
(”Columbus Container” avsnitt 33) og sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml.
2005 s. I-10837 (avsnitt 31). Det faktum at saksøker er et norsk selskap kan
derfor ikke være til hinder for at det gjør gjeldende reglene om fri etableringsrett
mot Norge, ettersom selskapet har utøvet sin frie etableringsrett i Det forente
kongerike.
183 - 237
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
IV Rettens bemerkninger
JUDGMENT
26 Det vises til rettsmøterapporten for en mer utførlig redegjørelse for det rettslige
rammeverket, sakens faktum, saksgangen og de skriftlige innleggene fremmet
for EFTA-domstolen, som i det følgende bare vil bli omtalt eller drøftet i den
utstrekning det er nødvendig for EFTA-domstolens begrunnelse.
29 Three questions have been referred to the Court. The first and the second
one concern the same legal issue, i.e. attribution of expenses in accordance
with the principle of net income taxation when calculating the maximum credit
allowance for tax paid by a company in a foreign State. However, a distinction
is made between the two types of expenses involved, namely debt interest and
group contributions. In question three, an answer to the first and the second
question is requested based on the assumption that the expenses involved are
only linked to the company’s business activities in Norway. Taking into account
the subject matter of the case and the above described relationship between
the questions, the third question will be answered together with the first and
the second question respectively.
The first question – debt interest expenses
30 The first and the third question, read together, concern in essence the issue of
whether it is contrary to Article 31 EEA for an EEA State, when calculating the
maximum credit allowance for tax paid in another EEA State, to attribute debt
interest expenses of a company to income earned through its branch in that
State, and whether the answer depends on the expenses being linked solely
to the business activities in the former State.
31 The Plaintiff maintains that while direct taxation falls within the competence of the
Member States, this competence must nonetheless be exercised in a manner
consistent with the EEA Agreement. Articles 31 and 34 EEA prohibit the home
State from hindering the establishment in another EEA State of its nationals or
companies incorporated under its legislation, and in that respect no distinction
is made with regard to whether the business is conducted through agencies,
branches or subsidiaries. Unlike companies which conduct business only in
Norway and Norwegian companies which establish a subsidiary in another
EEA State, Norwegian companies which perform business through a branch
office in another EEA State are deprived of the benefit of full tax deductions.
According to the Plaintiff, this entails a difference in treatment which results in
a tax disadvantage.
32 The above mentioned difference in treatment cannot, according to the Plaintiff,
be explained by different tax rates in Norway and the UK and/or the income
from the permanent place of business being calculated differently in Norway
and the UK. As a consequence, companies might be dissuaded from carrying
on their activities through branches in other EEA States. Accordingly, this tax
treatment constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment contrary
238 - 184
Første spørsmål – gjeldsrentekostnader
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
29 Tre spørsmål er forelagt for EFTA-domstolen. Spørsmål 1 og 2 gjelder samme
rettslige problemstilling, nemlig tilordning av utgifter i overensstemmelse med
nettoinntektsprinsippet ved beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget for
skatt som et selskap har betalt i en fremmed stat. Imidlertid skjelnes det mellom
de to aktuelle formene for utgifter, nemlig gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag. I
spørsmål 3 utbes svar på spørsmål 1 og 2 basert på den forutsetning at de
aktuelle utgiftene utelukkende er knyttet til selskapets virksomhet i Norge. Tatt
i betraktning hva saken gjelder, og det ovenfor beskrevne forholdet mellom
spørsmålene, vil spørsmål 3 bli besvart sammen med henholdsvis spørsmål 1
og 2.
30 Lest sammen gjelder spørsmål 1 og 3 i korthet hvorvidt det er i strid med EØSavtalen artikkel 31 at en EØS-stat ved beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag
for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner et selskaps gjeldsrentekostnader
til inntekt ervervet ved en filial i den andre staten, og hvorvidt svaret avhenger
av om utgiftene utelukkende er knyttet til virksomheten i den førstnevnte
staten.
32 Den ovennevnte forskjellsbehandlingen kan ifølge saksøker ikke forklares
med forskjellig skattesatser i Norge og Det forente kongerike og/eller med
at inntekten fra det faste driftsstedet blir beregnet på forskjellig måte
i henholdsvis Norge og Det forente kongerike. Som en følge av dette kan
selskaper avholdes fra å utøve sin virksomhet gjennom filialer i andre EØSstater. Denne skattemessige behandlingen utgjør således en restriksjon
- 184
239 -
JUDGMENT
31 Saksøker fremholder at selv om direkte beskatning faller innenfor medlems
statenes kompetanse, må denne kompetansen likevel utøves på en måte
som er forenlig med EØS-avtalen. EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 og 34 forbyr
hjemstaten å legge hindringer i veien for at dens statsborgere eller selskaper
stiftet i samsvar med dens lovgivning etablerer seg i en annen EØS-stat, og
i så henseende skjelnes det ikke ettersom om virksomheten drives gjennom
agenturer, filialer eller datterselskaper. I motsetning til selskaper som driver
virksomhet bare i Norge, og norske selskaper som etablerer et datterselskap
i en annen EØS-stat, fratas norske selskaper som driver virksomhet gjennom
en filial i en annen EØS-stat, fordelen ved fullt skattefradrag. Ifølge saksøker
innebærer dette en forskjellsbehandling som resulterer i en skattemessig
ulempe.
to Article 31 EEA. The Plaintiff refers to Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR
1-11819 (hereinafter “de Groot”) according to which the Member States cannot
deprive a citizen of the benefit of a tax deduction based on the assumption that
he will receive a similar deduction in another State where he has performed
work. Moreover, in the view of the Plaintiff, the legal and factual circumstances
in this case differ from Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793 (hereinafter
“Gilly”), and therefore the Defendant cannot rely on that case.
33 The Defendant argues that the EEA States are free to tax the global income
of resident companies and refers in that respect to Gilly. The Defendant bases
its observations on two main arguments. Firstly, that there is no obligation
under the EEA Agreement to give relief for double taxation, and therefore the
Norwegian tax rules at issue cannot be deemed contrary to the Agreement on
the grounds that foreign tax is not fully credited. Secondly, that the difference
in tax burden claimed by the Plaintiff is explained solely by the fact that the
Plaintiff is exposed to income tax in two different tax regimes. In this regard,
the Defendant points out that the tax rate in Norway is 28%, while the UK tax
rate is 30%, and the tax credit is limited to the Norwegian tax rate applied to
the foreign income. The Defendant also argues that the net income from the
UK branch is calculated differently in the UK than in Norway.
34 According to the Defendant, the Norwegian tax rules at issue are not
discriminatory. A taxpayer exposed to two tax jurisdictions is in another and
objectively different situation than one who receives all his income in one
State. Therefore, it is not relevant to compare the global tax burden of the
Plaintiff with the tax burden of a company that conducts all its business in
Norway. With reference to Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967 the
Defendant argues that tax paid to the UK should be disregarded when making
a comparison between a company conducting all its business in Norway and
the Plaintiff. Finally, the Defendant contests that the reasoning of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter the “ECJ”) in de Groot
should be relevant, since that case concerns personal allowances and relates
to the case law of the ECJ concerning the obligations of the State of residence
and the source State with respect to such allowances.
35 The Defendant’s view is essentially shared by the Government of Germany.
36 The EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”) remarks that it is up to
the EEA States to take measures necessary to prevent double taxation by
applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria adhered to in international
240 - 185
33 Saksøkte anfører at en EØS-stat står fritt til å skattlegge globalinntekten til
hjemmehørende selskaper og viser i så henseende til Gilly. Saksøkte bygger
sine innlegg på to hovedanførsler. For det første foreligger det ingen plikt etter
EØS-avtalen til å gi lettelser for dobbeltbeskatning, og de aktuelle norske
skattereglene kan derfor ikke anses å være i strid med EØS-avtalen på det
grunnlag at utenlandsk skatt ikke fullt ut kommer til fradrag. For det andre
skyldes den forskjellen i skattebyrde som saksøker påberoper seg, utelukkende
at saksøker er utsatt for inntektsbeskatning i to forskjellige skattesystemer. I
denne henseende påpeker saksøkte at skattesatsen i Norge er 28 % mens den
britiske skattesatsen er 30 %, og at kreditfradraget er begrenset til den norske
skattesatsen anvendt på den utenlandske inntekten. Saksøkte anfører også
at nettoinntekten fra den britiske filialen beregnes annerledes i Det forente
kongerike enn i Norge.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
på den frie etableringsretten i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Saksøker
viser til sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819 (”de Groot”), hvoretter
medlemsstatene ikke kan frata en borger fordelen ved et skattefradrag basert
på den antagelse at han vil motta et lignende fradrag i en annen stat hvor han
har arbeidet. Slik saksøker ser det, skiller dessuten de rettslige og faktiske
omstendighetene i denne saken seg fra sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s.
I-2793 (”Gilly”), og saksøkte kan derfor ikke støtte seg på den saken.
34 Ifølge saksøkte er de aktuelle norske skattereglene ikke diskriminerende. En
skatteyter som opererer i to skattejurisdiksjoner, er i en annen og objektivt sett
forskjellig situasjon enn en som mottar hele sin inntekt i én stat. Det er derfor
ikke relevant å sammenligne saksøkers globale skattebyrde med skattebyrden
til et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i Norge. Med henvisning til sak
C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml 2006 s. I-10967, hevder saksøkte at det bør ses bort
fra skatt betalt til Det forente kongerike når man sammenligner saksøker med
et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i Norge. Til slutt bestrider saksøkte
at EF-domstolens resonnement i de Groot bør være relevant, ettersom den
saken gjelder personlige fradrag og relaterer seg til praksis fra EF-domstolen
om hjemstatens og kildestatens forpliktelser med hensyn til slike fradrag.
36 EFTAs overvåkningsorgan (”ESA”) bemerker at det er opp til EØS-statene
å treffe nødvendige tiltak for å forhindre dobbeltbeskatning, særlig ved å
anvende fordelingskriteriene man holder seg til i internasjonal skattepraksis.
- 185
241 -
JUDGMENT
35 Saksøktes syn deles i hovedsak av Den tyske regjering.
tax practice. Nonetheless, the States are obliged to comply with EEA law when
exercising their taxation power, and cannot introduce discriminatory measures
contrary to the fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the rules on calculation of
credit allowance must comply with Article 31 EEA which prohibits restrictions
on the freedom of establishment, other than those that inevitably result from
the fact that tax systems are national.
37 According to ESA, disadvantageous tax treatment that follows from direct or
indirect discrimination resulting from the rules of one jurisdiction, rather than
simply from disparities in the applicable national tax provisions or the division
of tax jurisdiction between two countries’ tax systems, infringes Article 31 EEA
unless it can be justified.
38 If expenses are intrinsically linked to the business in Norway, the calculating
method at issue would in ESA’s opinion entail that a company with an
establishment in another EEA State would derive from these expenses less
tax advantage than if it had operated solely in Norway. This would amount
to differentiated tax treatment contrary to Article 31 EEA. The application
of the contested tax rules in the case at hand means that the tax base for
the Norwegian head office increases with an amount equal to the deduction
attributed to the UK branch. In ESA’s view, this situation is comparable to
that examined in de Groot and the considerations of the ECJ in that case are
applicable in this case. If the expenses are intrinsically linked to the business
in Norway, the State where the branch is established, exercising its limited
tax competence in accordance with international tax practice, would not take
those expenses into account due to the lack of cohesion between them and the
income derived where the branch is established. This is liable to discourage
Norwegian companies from creating, acquiring or maintaining a branch in
another EEA State and accordingly, the rules constitute a restriction under
Article 31 EEA.
39 On the other hand, when expenses not related solely to the activity in Norway
are deducted from the income abroad for the purposes of calculating the credit
allowance, ESA is of the opinion that there is no restriction on the freedom of
establishment of Norwegian companies within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
40 The Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter the “Commission”)
submits that by attributing part of the interest expenses to the Plaintiff’s Scottish
branch, the Norwegian tax authorities reduced the amount of tax that should
be paid by that branch and hence the amount of the tax credit to be granted to
242 - 186
37 Ufordelaktig skattemessig behandling som følger av direkte eller indirekte
diskriminering forårsaket av reglene i én jurisdiksjon, og ikke simpelthen
av ulikheter i eller delingen av jurisdiksjon mellom to lands skattesystemer,
bryter ifølge ESA med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31, med mindre behandlingen kan
rettferdiggjøres.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Ikke desto mindre er statene forpliktet til å overholde EØS-retten når de
utøver sin beskatningsmyndighet, og de kan ikke innføre diskriminerende
ordninger i strid med grunnfrihetene. Reglene om beregning av kreditfradrag
må derfor overholde EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 som forbyr restriksjoner på den
frie etableringsretten, ut over dem som uunngåelig følger av det faktum at
skattesystemene er nasjonale.
38 Der utgifter er uløselig knyttet til virksomheten i Norge, vil den aktuelle
beregningsmetoden etter ESAs oppfatning innebære at et selskap med et
driftssted i en annen EØS-stat vil få en mindre skattefordel av disse utgiftene
enn om selskapet kun hadde drevet i Norge. Dette vil utgjøre skattemessig
forskjellsbehandling i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Anvendelsen av de
bestridte skattereglene i den foreliggende saken innebærer at skattegrunnlaget
for det norske hovedkontoret øker med et beløp lik fradraget tilordnet den
britiske filialen. Etter ESAs oppfatning er dette tilfellet sammenlignbart med
det som ble vurdert i de Groot, og EF-domstolens betraktninger i den saken er
anvendelige i denne saken. Hvis utgiftene er uløselig knyttet til virksomheten
i Norge, vil staten der filialen er etablert, når denne staten utøver sin
begrensede beskatningsmyndighet i henhold til internasjonal skattepraksis,
ikke ta i betraktning disse kostnadene på grunn av mangel på samhørighet
med inntekten ervervet der filialen er etablert. Dette kan avholde norske
selskaper fra å opprette, anskaffe eller opprettholde en filial i en annen EØSstat, og reglene utgjør således en restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
40 Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap (”Kommisjonen”) fremholder at
ved å tilordne en del av renteutgiftene til saksøkers skotske filial har norske
skattemyndigheter redusert den skatt som skulle betales av filialen, og
dermed saksøkers kreditfradrag i Norge. Kommisjonen anfører at med mindre
- 186
243 -
JUDGMENT
39 På den annen side, når det for å beregne maksimalt kreditfradrag gjøres fradrag
i utenlandsinntekten for utgifter som ikke utelukkende er knyttet til aktiviteten
i Norge, er ESA av den oppfatning at det ikke foreligger noen restriksjon på
norske selskapers frie etableringsrett etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
the Plaintiff in Norway. The Commission argues that unless the difference in
tax treatment in the case at hand between the Plaintiff and a company doing
business solely in Norway corresponds to an objective and relevant difference
in situation, it constitutes discrimination contrary to Article 31 EEA.
41 The Commission points out that the calculating rules at issue provide that debt
interest expenses, which are deductible in Norway, must always be attributed
to Norway and the foreign country in question in proportion to where the
net income of the company is earned, irrespective of the purpose for which
the debt was incurred. According to the Commission, such a calculation is
discriminatory. Allocating debt interest expenses independently of the purpose
for which the debt was incurred does not correspond to the situation of the
taxpayer. This is contrary to Article 31 EEA. In the Commission’s view, the
logic of de Groot is transferable to the case at hand to the extent that it shows
that a State cannot withdraw normal tax advantages where a taxpayer earns
income which is taxed in another State.
42 If, on the other hand, the interest expenses relate to financial obligations
incurred for the company as a whole, the Commission is of the opinion that a
proportional amount should indeed be attributed to the income earned in the
UK.
43 The Court notes that Norwegian income tax is, as explained earlier, based on
the principle of net income taxation. An income tax of 28% is levied on resident
taxpayers’ net income, after deduction of such expenses as debt interest. In
other words, this deduction of expenses works to the taxpayers’ advantage by
reducing the tax base.
44 Furthermore, resident taxpayers with income both in Norway and abroad are
taxed, according to the principle of global income taxation, on their combined
net income in Norway and abroad. When a resident taxpayer has income in
another State (the host State) which taxes that income, the principle of global
income taxation entails double taxation.
45 To relieve such double taxation, Norway grants a tax credit for tax paid in the
host State, but only up to a maximum amount, cf. Section 16–21(1) and (3) of
the Tax Act and Section 16–28–4 of the FSFIN. This amount is calculated as
28% of the taxpayer’s net income in the host State after deduction of a portion
of expenses such as debt interest, proportionate to the part of the global net
income derived in the host State. This deduction of expenses when calculating
- 244
187 -
41 Kommisjonen påpeker at gjeldsrentekostnader, som er fradragsberettigede i
Norge, etter de aktuelle beregningsreglene alltid må tilordnes Norge og det
aktuelle fremmede landet forholdsmessig etter hvor selskapets nettoinntekt
er ervervet, uavhengig av hvilket formål gjelden ble pådratt for. Ifølge
Kommisjonen er en slik beregning diskriminerende. Å fordele gjeldsrente
kostnader uavhengig av hvilket formål gjelden ble pådratt for, motsvares ikke
av skatteyterens situasjon. Dette strider mot EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Etter
Kommisjonens oppfatning er logikken i de Groot overførbar til den aktuelle
saken i den grad denne logikken viser at en stat ikke kan inndra vanlige
skattefordeler der en skattebetaler har inntekt som skattlegges i en annen
stat.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
forskjellen i skattemessig behandling av saksøker i denne saken og et selskap
som driver virksomhet kun i Norge, motsvares av en objektiv og relevant
forskjell i selskapenes situasjon, utgjør behandlingen diskriminering i strid med
EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
42 Hvis renteutgiftene derimot knytter seg til finansielle forpliktelser pådratt for
selskapet som helhet, er Kommisjonen av den oppfatning at et forholdsmessig
beløp ganske visst burde tilordnes inntekten ervervet i Det forente kongerike.
43 EFTA-domstolen bemerker at norsk inntektsskatt, som forklart ovenfor, bygger
på nettoinntektsprinsippet. En inntektsskatt på 28 % ilegges hjemmehørende
skatteyteres nettoinntekt etter fradrag for slike utgifter som gjeldsrenter. Dette
fradraget for utgifter er med andre ord til skatteyters fordel, ved at det reduserer
skattegrunnlaget.
45 For å lette slik dobbeltbeskatning gir Norge et kreditfradrag for skatt betalt
i vertsstaten, men bare inntil et maksimumsbeløp, jf. skatteloven § 16–21
første og tredje ledd og FSFIN § 16–28–4. Dette beløpet beregnes til 28 %
av skatteyterens nettoinntekt i vertsstaten etter fradrag for en andel av utgifter
slik som gjeldsrenter, forholdsmessig etter den delen av globalinntekten som
er oppebåret i vertsstaten. Dette fradraget for utgifter ved beregningen av det
- 245
187 -
JUDGMENT
44 Videre er det etter globalinntektsprinsippet slik at hjemmehørende skatteytere
med inntekt både i Norge og i utlandet beskattes på sin samlede nettoinntekt
i Norge og utlandet. Når en hjemmehørende skatteyter har inntekt i en annen
stat (vertsstaten) som skattlegger denne inntekten, innebærer globalinntekts
prinsippet dobbeltbeskatning.
the maximum credit allowance works to the taxpayer’s disadvantage. Provided
that the taxpayer has income taxable in the host State, every increase in debt
interest expenses will reduce the maximum allowance granted to offset tax
levied in the host State.
46 As a result, a taxpayer may, as in the case at hand, be left with having paid
more tax in the host State than what Norway compensates in credit allowance.
This is so if the host State does not allow deduction of the expenses in question
when it calculates the base on which to tax the taxpayer’s income. The effect
may occur even if the tax rate in the host State is the same as, or lower than,
in Norway. That depends on the amount of the expenses and the amount of
the net income in the host State relative to the global net income.
47 In effect, this is the same as if Norway, for such taxpayers, would allow deduction
only of a portion of expenses such as debt interest when calculating the global
net income on which Norwegian income tax is assessed (cf. paragraphs 43–
44 above). This means that the Norwegian rules on maximum credit allowance
have the potential of leading to a more burdensome result for taxpayers with
income earned through a branch in another EEA State than would have been
the case had the taxpayers not exercised their freedom of establishment. After
having been granted a credit allowance from the Norwegian global income
tax, such taxpayers may not be able to enjoy, in effect, the same deduction of
expenses as taxpayers with the same total income, but earned in Norway only.
This places taxpayers with a branch in another EEA State in a less favourable
position for the sole reason that they made use of their right of establishment
under the EEA Agreement.
48 The EEA Agreement does not oblige the Contracting Parties to give relief for
double taxation within the European Economic Area, nor does it lay down any
criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Contracting
Parties in relation to the elimination of double taxation. Consequently, the
Contracting Parties have retained their competence to determine the connecting
factors for the allocation of their fiscal jurisdiction, inter alia by concluding
bilateral agreements. However, as far as the exercise of their taxation power
so allocated is concerned, the EEA States must, as stated above, comply
with EEA rules. In particular, such an allocation of fiscal jurisdiction does not
permit the States to introduce discriminatory measures which are contrary to
EEA rules (see for comparison, Case C-170/05 Denkavit [2006] I-11949, at
paragraphs 43 and 44).
246 - 188
46 Som et resultat av dette kan en skatteyter, slik som i den foreliggende saken,
ende opp med å ha betalt mer i skatt i vertsstaten enn det Norge kompenserer
for ved kreditfradrag. Dette er tilfellet hvis vertsstaten ikke gir fradrag for de
aktuelle utgiftene ved beregningen av grunnlaget for skatt på skatteyternes
inntekt. Virkningen kan inntre selv om skattesatsen i vertsstaten er den
samme som, eller lavere enn, i Norge. Det avhenger av hvor store utgiftene
er og størrelsen på nettoinntekten i vertsstaten i forhold til den globale
nettoinntekten.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
maksimale kreditfradraget er til ulempe for skatteyteren. Når skatteyteren har
inntekt som er skattbar i vertsstaten, vil enhver økning i gjeldsrentekostnadene
redusere det maksimale kreditfradraget som gis for å kompensere for skatt
ilagt i vertsstaten.
48 EØS-avtalen forplikter ikke avtalepartene til å gi lettelser for dobbeltbeskatning
i Det europeiske økonomiske samarbeidsområde, og avtalen fastlegger
heller ingen kriterier for tilordning av myndighet, avtalepartene imellom, ved
avskaffelse av dobbeltbeskatning. Avtalepartene har følgelig bibeholdt sin
myndighet til å fastsette tilknytningskriteriene ved fordeling av sin skatte
jurisdiksjon, blant annet gjennom bilaterale avtaler. Men med hensyn til
utøvelsen av den således fordelte beskatningsmyndigheten, må EØS-statene,
som nevnt ovenfor, overholde EØS-reglene. Særlig tillater en slik fordeling av
beskatningsmyndigheten ikke at statene innfører diskriminering som strider
mot EØS-reglene, sml. sak C-170/05 Denkavit, Sml. 2006 s. I-11949 (avsnitt
43 og 44).
- 188
247 -
JUDGMENT
47 Faktisk sett er dette det samme som om Norge, for slike skatteytere, ville gi
fradrag bare for en andel av utgifter slik som gjeldsrenter, ved beregningen
av den globale nettoinntekt som det utlignes norsk inntektsskatt på (jf.
avsnitt 43–44 ovenfor). Dette innebærer at de norske reglene om maksimalt
kreditfradrag potensielt gir seg mer tyngende utslag for skatteytere med
inntekt ervervet gjennom en filial i en annen EØS-stat enn tilfellet hadde vært
for disse skatteyterne hvis de ikke hadde utøvet sin etableringsrett. Etter at
kreditfradraget er gitt i den norske globalinntektsskatten kan det være at disse
skatteyterne faktisk sett ikke nyter godt av samme fradrag for utgifter som
skatteytere med samme totale inntekt, men ervervet kun i Norge. Dette setter
skatteytere med en filial i en annen EØS-stat i en mindre gunstig stilling alene
fordi de har benyttet seg av etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen.
49 By the DTA, Norway and the UK have allocated their taxation powers.
Norway exercises its taxation power, so allocated, by applying the provisions
on maximum credit allowance of the Tax Act and the FSFIN. This exercise
of taxation power must, as stated above, be in conformity with Norway’s
obligations under the EEA Agreement. Accordingly, the Defendant’s argument
that the tax rules at issue cannot be deemed contrary to the EEA Agreement
since no obligation to give relief for double taxation can be established under
that Agreement must be rejected.
50 Thus, it needs to be assessed whether rules limiting maximum credit
allowance, such as the ones at issue in the main proceedings, restrict the
freedom of establishment under Article 31 EEA. In that regard, it is recalled
that all measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the
exercise of freedom of establishment under the EEA Agreement must be
regarded as constituting restrictions within the meaning of Article 31 EEA (see
for comparison Columbus Container, at paragraph 34, and also Case E-2/06
EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2007] EFTA Ct. Rep. 164, at paragraph
64).
51 The Court notes that a higher tax burden resulting from the fact that a taxpayer
is subjected to two tax regimes is, as such, liable to dissuade companies from
using their right of establishment under the EEA Agreement. However, it follows
from what is stated in paragraph 48 above that obstacles to the freedom of
establishment that are a consequence of a mere difference in tax regimes
between States are outside the scope of the EEA Agreement (for comparison
see also to that effect Gilly, at paragraphs 47 and 48).
52 Consequently, the difference between the Plaintiff’s actual tax burden and the
tax burden which the Plaintiff would have borne had all its operations been
conducted in Norway, caused by the difference in tax rates under the two
respective tax regimes (28% and 30%), does not constitute a restriction on
the freedom of establishment. However, this explains only a fraction of the
Plaintiff’s additional tax burden, compared to what it would have paid, had
all its business activities taken place in Norway, cf. paragraph 10 above.
Most of the difference is caused by the rules on apportionment of expenses
when calculating the maximum credit allowance, see paragraphs 45−47
above. In order to determine whether such a disadvantage is the mere result
of the application in parallel of two different tax systems, or a restriction on
the freedom of establishment that falls under Article 31 EEA, it needs to be
248 - 189
50 Følgelig må det vurderes om regler som begrenser maksimalt kreditfradrag,
slik som reglene det gjelder i saken for tingretten, begrenser den frie
etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. I så henseende minnes det om
at alle tiltak som kan hindre eller gjøre utøvelsen av den frie etableringsretten
etter EØS-avtalen mindre attraktiv, må anses å utgjøre restriksjoner etter EØSavtalen artikkel 31, sml. Columbus Container (avsnitt 34) og også sak E-2/06
ESA mot Norge, EFTA Court Report 2007 s. 164 (avsnitt 64).
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
49 Ved skatteavtalen har Norge og Det forente kongerike fordelt sin beskatnings
myndighet. Norge utøver den således fordelte myndigheten ved å anvende
bestemmelsene om maksimalt kreditfradrag i skatteloven og FSFIN. Denne
utøvelsen av beskatningsmyndighet må, som nevnt ovenfor, være i overens
stemmelse med Norges forpliktelser etter EØS-avtalen. Saksøktes anførsel
om at de aktuelle skattereglene ikke kan anses å være i strid med EØS-avtalen
ettersom det ikke kan utledes noen plikt til å gi lettelse for dobbeltbeskatning
av avtalen, kan følgelig ikke føre frem.
52 Den forskjellen mellom saksøkers faktiske skattebyrde og skattebyrden
saksøker ville ha hatt dersom saksøker hadde drevet sin samlede virksomhet
i Norge, som forårsakes av forskjellen i skattesatser mellom de to respektive
skattesystemene (28 % og 30 %), utgjør følgelig ikke en hindring for den frie
etableringsretten. Imidlertid forklarer dette bare en brøkdel av saksøkers ekstra
skattebyrde, sammenlignet med hva saksøker ville ha betalt dersom den
samlede virksomheten hadde vært drevet i Norge, jf. avsnitt 10 ovenfor. Det
meste av forskjellen skyldes reglene om tilordning av utgifter ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag, se avsnitt 45–47 ovenfor. For å fastslå om en
slik ulempe kun er en følge av at to stater anvender hvert sitt skattessytem
på samme tilfelle, eller utgjør en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten
som omfattes av EØS-avtalen artikkel 31, må det gjøres en bedømmelse av
- 189
249 -
JUDGMENT
51 EFTA-domstolen bemerker at en tyngre skattebyrde, forårsaket av at skatteyter
blir underlagt to skattesystemer, som sådan kan avholde selskaper fra å gjøre
bruk av den frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen. Imidlertid følger det av
bemerkningene i avsnitt 48 ovenfor at hindringer for den frie etableringsretten
som alene er en følge av forskjeller mellom statenes skattesystemer, ligger
utenfor EØS-avtalens anvendelsesområde, sml. også i den retning Gilly
(avsnitt 47 og 48).
assessed whether a company with a branch in another EEA State is in a
situation which is, with regard to those expenses, objectively comparable to
the one of a company having all its business within the home State.
53 The parties to the main proceedings disagree as to whether the expenses in
question relate solely to the Plaintiff’s business activities in Norway or whether
it is not possible to link them to any specific activity. It is for the national court
to make that factual assessment.
54 In that regard, the Court notes that when expenses are linked to the income
of a company’s branch in another EEA State, apportioning them to the income
from the business activities of that branch when calculating the maximum
credit allowance corresponds to the situation of the taxpayer. These expenses
arise solely as a result of the activities of the branch and are not linked to the
income generated by the taxpayer in the home State. This means that such a
taxpayer is not in a comparable situation to a taxpayer whose expenses are all
incurred in the home State. When taxed in two separate fiscal jurisdictions, a
taxpayer cannot expect the same tax treatment by the home State with regard
to expenses related to the branch as with regard to expenses related to the
taxpayer’s activities in the home State. Consequently, to the extent the host
State does not grant a deduction for expenses relating solely to the income of
the branch when calculating the tax on the income of the branch, the resulting
burden for the taxpayer is simply a consequence of the two States exercising
their different tax regimes in parallel and does not constitute a restriction within
the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
55 Similarly, when expenses cannot be linked to any particular business activities
of a company conducting part of its business operations through a branch in
another EEA State, the attribution of the expenses in proportion to the parts
of the global net income earned in the home State and in the host State,
respectively, corresponds to the situation of the taxpayer. Also in this case,
the taxpayer is not in a comparable situation to a taxpayer whose expenses
relate solely to the home State. If the host State does not grant a similar
proportionate deduction for expenses when calculating the tax on the income
of the branch, the resulting burden for the taxpayer is simply a consequence
of the two States exercising their different tax regimes in parallel and does not
constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
- 250
190 -
54 EFTA-domstolen bemerker i så henseende at når utgifter er knyttet til inntekten
til et selskaps filial i en annen EØS-stat, svarer det til skatteyterens situasjon å
tilordne utgiftene til inntekten fra filialens virksomhet, ved beregningen av det
maksimale kreditfradraget. Disse utgiftene oppstår utelukkende som følge av
filialens virksomhet og er ikke knyttet til inntekten som skatteyteren har opptjent
i hjemstaten. Dette innebærer at en slik skatteyter ikke er i en sammenlignbar
situasjon med en skatteyter som har pådratt seg alle sine utgifter i hjemstaten.
Når en skatteyter er underlagt beskatning i to ulike jurisdiksjoner, kan
skatteyteren ikke forvente samme skattemessige behandling fra hjemstatens
side med hensyn til utgifter knyttet til filialen som med hensyn til utgifter knyttet
til virksomheten i hjemstaten. I den utstrekning vertsstaten ikke gir fradrag
for utgifter utelukkende knyttet til filialens inntekt når filialens inntektsskatt
beregnes, er altså byrden dette resulterer i for skatteyter alene en følge av at
de to statene utøver hvert sitt skattesystem på samme tilfelle, og den utgjør
ingen restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
55 Likeledes, når utgifter ikke kan knyttes til noen bestemt del av virksomheten
til et selskap som driver en del av sin virksomhet gjennom en filial i en annen
EØS-stat, motsvares det av skatteyterens situasjon å tilordne utgiftene
forholdsmessig etter netto globalinntekt fordelt på henholdsvis hjemstat
og vertsstat. Heller ikke i dette tilfellet er skatteyteren i en sammenlignbar
situasjon med en skatteyter hvis utgifter utelukkende er knyttet til hjemstaten.
Hvis vertsstaten ikke gir et tilsvarende forholdsmessig fradrag for utgifter når
filialens inntektsskatt beregnes, er byrden dette resulterer i for skatteyter alene
en følge av at de to statene utøver hvert sitt skattesystem på samme tilfelle, og
den utgjør ingen restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
190 - 251
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
53 Partene i saken for tingretten strides om hvorvidt de aktuelle utgiftene
utelukkende knytter seg til saksøkers virksomhet i Norge, eller om det ikke
lar seg gjøre å knytte utgiftene til noen bestemt virksomhet. Bedømmelsen av
faktum på dette punktet ligger til tingretten.
JUDGMENT
hvorvidt et selskap med en filial i en annen EØS-stat er i en situasjon som, med
hensyn til disse utgiftene, objektivt sett er sammenlignbar med situasjonen til
et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i hjemstaten.
56 On the other hand, a company conducting all its business in its home State
and having all its debt interest expenses linked to that State, and a company
conducting its business in its home State and through a branch in another
EEA State (the host State) but having all its debt interest expenses linked to
the home State, are in a comparable situation with respect to these expenses.
Thus, they should get the same tax treatment in the home State with respect
to these expenses. As described in paragraphs 46 and 47 above, the rules at
issue do not guarantee this.
57 Consequently, the attribution of debt interest expenses related solely to a
taxpayer’s business in the home State to the income of a branch situated in
another EEA State when calculating the maximum credit allowance constitutes
a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
58 In the request for an Advisory Opinion, Stavanger tingrett states that in case
the calculation of the maximum credit allowance is found to be a restriction,
the Defendant will plead that the restriction can be justified on grounds relating
to the general interest. However, the request does not contain any information
on what these grounds may be, nor have the parties commented upon them.
Therefore, the Court is not in a position to assess such grounds and must
confine itself to concluding that the Norwegian rules at issue constitute a
restriction.
59 In light of the above, the answer to the first question is that an EEA State
which attributes, in applying the principle of net income taxation, a portion of
debt interest expenses of a company to income earned through its branch in
another EEA State, when calculating the maximum credit allowance for tax
paid in that State, restricts the freedom of establishment within the meaning of
Article 31 EEA, insofar as the expenses can only be linked to the company’s
business in the former State.
The second question – group contributions
60 The second and the third question, read together, concern in essence the issue
of whether it is contrary to Article 31 EEA for an EEA State, when calculating
maximum credit allowance for tax paid in another EEA State, to attribute a
portion of group contributions that are made between companies under its
fiscal jurisdiction to income earned through a branch in the other EEA State.
61 The Plaintiff, the Defendant, the Government of Germany and ESA argue with
regard to group contributions more or less in the same way as with regard
252 - 191
57 Følgelig utgjør det en restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 å tilordne
gjeldsrentekostnader som utelukkende er knyttet til skatteyters virksomhet
i hjemstaten, til inntekten til en filial som ligger i en annen EØS-stat, ved
beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
56 På den annen side er et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i hjemstaten
og har alle sine gjeldsrentekostnader knyttet til den staten, og et selskap
som driver sin virksomhet i hjemstaten samt gjennom en filial i en annen
EØS-stat (vertsstaten), men som har alle sine gjeldsrentekostnader knyttet
til hjemstaten, i en sammenlignbar situasjon med hensyn til disse utgiftene.
Således bør selskapene få samme skattemessige behandling i hjemstaten
med hensyn til disse utgiftene. Som beskrevet i avsnitt 46 og 47 ovenfor, sikrer
ikke de aktuelle reglene dette.
58 I anmodningen om en rådgivende uttalelse oppgir Stavanger tingrett at dersom
beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag blir ansett å utgjøre en restriksjon, vil
saksøkte påberope seg at restriksjonen lar seg rettferdiggjøre av allmenne
hensyn. Imidlertid inneholder anmodningen ikke noe informasjon om hvilke
hensyn dette kunne være, og partene har heller ikke kommentert dette. Derfor
har EFTA-domstolen ikke de nødvendige forutsetninger for å vurdere slike
hensyn og må begrense seg til å konkludere med at de aktuelle norske reglene
utgjør en restriksjon.
59 I lys av det ovenstående er svaret på første spørsmål at en EØS-stat som, i sin
anvendelse av nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen av maksimalt kredit
fradrag for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en andel av et selskaps
gjeldsrentekostnader til inntekt ervervet ved selskapets filial i den andre EØSstaten, hindrer den frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 for så
vidt kostnadene bare kan knyttes til selskapets virksomhet i den førstnevnte
staten.
Annet spørsmål – konsernbidrag
61 Saksøker, saksøkte, Den tyske regjering og ESA argumenterer mer eller
mindre på samme måte med hensyn til konsernbidrag som med hensyn til
- 191
253 -
JUDGMENT
60 Lest sammen gjelder spørsmål 2 og 3 i korthet om det er i strid med EØSavtalen artikkel 31 at en EØS-stat ved beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag
for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en andel av konsernbidrag ytt
mellom selskaper under sin egen beskatningsmyndighet, til inntekt ervervet
ved en filial i den andre EØS-staten.
to debt interest expenses, as described in paragraphs 31–39 above. ESA
further notes that the objective behind the rules on group contributions is to
allow companies within the same group to transfer profit from one company to
another, normally for the purpose of covering losses incurred by the receiving
company. To ESA’s understanding, under Norwegian law group contributions
at the outset are only available when both the donor and the recipient are
Norwegian companies. As group contributions are only awarded in a situation
where the transfer of funds takes place between Norwegian tax subjects, the
overall logic of the system entails that group contributions made by the Plaintiff
will never be deductible in the UK where the necessary cohesion between the
tax subjects is absent.
62 ESA is of the opinion that a Norwegian company which establishes a branch
abroad will suffer a disadvantage if it is not able to deduct from its income
in Norway the same amount of expenses that it could have deducted had
it not exercised its freedom of establishment. Such a disadvantage results
from the manner in which the national tax provisions at issue treat expenses
linked to the business in Norway, i.e. as partially attributable to the branch.
This difference in tax treatment is liable to discourage Norwegian companies
from creating, acquiring or maintaining a branch in another EEA State and
constitutes a restriction under Article 31 EEA.
63 According to the Commission, the provisions of the Norwegian Tax Act on
group contributions apply solely to companies with income taxable in Norway.
Norway would not grant a deduction in respect of group contributions made
to a company in the UK, nor can it expect the UK to grant such a deduction.
The Commission further maintains that the attribution of group contributions,
as referred to in the second question, gives rise to discrimination contrary to
Article 31 EEA in the same way as the attribution of debt interest expenses.
Such an attribution does not correspond to the situation of the taxpayer and is
contrary to the principle of fiscal cohesion, which serves to protect the internal
logic of national tax regimes so long as they are not arranged in such a way
as to favour national situations or traders. According to the Commission, it
must be possible for a taxpayer to invoke this principle in order to ensure that
tax rules are applied in a consistent manner and in accordance with the logic
of the system. Furthermore, the EEA States may not artificially increase their
tax base by, in effect, extending group contribution schemes to cover income
earned in another EEA State.
254 - 192
63 Ifølge Kommisjonen gjelder skattelovens bestemmelser om konsernbidrag
utelukkende for selskaper med inntekt som er skattbar i Norge. Norge ville
ikke gitt fradrag for konsernbidrag ytt til et selskap i Det forente kongerike,
og Norge kan heller ikke forvente at Det forente kongerike gir et slikt fradrag.
Kommisjonen fremholder videre at den tilordningen av konsernbidrag som
annet spørsmål viser til, forårsaker diskriminering i strid med EØS-avtalen
artikkel 31 på samme måte som tilordningen av gjeldsrentekostnader. En slik
tilordning motsvares ikke av skatteyterens situasjon og strider mot prinsippet
om skattesystemers indre sammenheng, som tjener til å beskytte nasjonale
beskatningsordningers indre systematikk så lenge de ikke ordnes slik at de
begunstiger nasjonale situasjoner eller aktører. Ifølge Kommisjonen må det
være mulig for en skatteyter å påberope seg dette prinsippet for å sikre at
skattereglene anvendes på en sammenhengende måte og i overensstemmelse
med logikken i systemet. Dessuten kan EØS-statene ikke på en kunstig måte
øke sitt skattegrunnlag ved faktisk å utvide konsernbidragsordninger til å
dekke inntekt ervervet i en annen EØS-stat.
- 192
255 -
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
62 ESA er av den oppfatning at et norsk selskap som etablerer en filial i utlandet,
vil utsettes for en ulempe hvis selskapet ikke kan trekke fra i sin inntekt i Norge
samme beløp i utgifter som det hadde kunnet trekke fra hvis det ikke hadde
utøvet sin frie etableringsrett. En slik ulempe forårsakes av måten de aktuelle
nasjonale skattebestemmelsene behandler utgifter knyttet til virksomheten i
Norge på, nærmere bestemt som utgifter som for en del må tilskrives filialen.
Denne skattemessige forskjellsbehandlingen kan motvirke at norske selskaper
oppretter, erverver eller opprettholder en filial i en annen EØS-stat, og utgjør
en restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
JUDGMENT
gjeldsrentekostnader, som beskrevet i avsnitt 31–39 ovenfor. ESA bemerker
videre at tanken med reglene om konsernbidrag er å tillate selskaper innenfor
samme konsern å overføre fortjeneste fra ett selskap til et annet, vanligvis
for å dekke tap pådratt av mottagerselskapet. Slik ESA forstår det, kan
konsernbidrag etter norsk rett i utgangspunktet bare ytes hvis både giver
og mottager er norske selskaper. Ettersom konsernbidrag bare ytes i tilfeller
der kapitaloverføringen skjer mellom norske skattesubjekter, innebærer den
overordnede logikken i systemet at konsernbidrag som saksøker har ytt, aldri
vil være fradragsberettigede i Det forente kongerike der den nødvendige
samhørigheten mellom skattesubjektene ikke er til stede.
64 The Court notes that in calculating the maximum credit allowance for the
Plaintiff’s tax paid in the UK, the Defendant applied Section 16–28–4 litra b of
the FSFIN. Accordingly, a part of group contributions made from the Plaintiff
to two of its daughter companies in Norway was apportioned to the income of
the Plaintiff’s branch in the UK. As a result of this, the Plaintiff was, in effect,
not able to deduct, from its total taxable income, the same amount in group
contributions as if it had conducted all its business in Norway. The Norwegian
rules on maximum credit allowance work in the same way with regard to
proportional attribution of group contributions as with regard to debt interest
expenses. Reference is made to paragraphs 45–47 above.
65 In order to establish whether this constitutes a restriction on the freedom of
establishment, it needs to be assessed whether a company with a branch in
another EEA State is, with regard to group contributions as a cost factor, in a
situation which is objectively comparable to the one of a company having all
its business within the home State, see paragraph 52 above.
66 The request from the national court does not contain information on the
conditions under Norwegian tax law for deducting group contributions for
income tax purposes. However, according to written and oral observations
submitted to the Court, group contributions seem to be deducted from the
taxable income of the donor and added to the taxable income of the recipient,
provided that both companies are subject to Norwegian fiscal jurisdiction. Such
a system of intra group financial transfers generally serves the purpose of
mitigating tax disadvantages within a group of companies, by allowing them to
balance out their profits and losses. The logic behind not allowing deductions
for group contributions made to companies abroad is generally to prevent
companies from freely choosing the State in which profits are to be taxed.
67 When comparing two companies that make group contributions to daughter
companies in their home State, the fact that one of the companies has
a branch in another EEA State does not place it in a different position with
regard to the group contributions. The existence of the branch abroad has
no bearing on the possibility of the home State to tax the group contributions
at the receiving companies. Both companies should thus get the same tax
treatment with respect to the group contributions. As described in paragraphs
46 and 47 above, the rules at issue do not guarantee this.
68 In light of the above, attributing group contributions in circumstances such as
in the case at hand to the income of a branch situated in another EEA State
- 256
193 -
65 For å fastslå hvorvidt dette utgjør en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten
må det gjøres en bedømmelse av hvorvidt et selskap med en filial i en
annen EØS-stat er i en situasjon som, med hensyn til konsernbidrag som en
utgiftspost, objektivt sett er sammenlignbar med situasjonen til et selskap som
har all sin virksomhet i hjemstaten, se avsnitt 52 ovenfor.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
64 EFTA-domstolen bemerker at ved beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget
for saksøkers skatt betalt i Det forente kongerike, anvendte saksøkte FSFIN §
16–28–4 bokstav b. Således ble en del av konsernbidragene ytt fra saksøker til
to av datterselskapene i Norge tilordnet inntekten til saksøkers filial i Det forente
kongerike. Som en følge av dette fikk saksøker faktisk sett ikke fradrag i sin
samlede skattepliktige inntekt for det samme beløpet i konsernbidrag som hvis
saksøker hadde drevet sin samlede virksomhet i Norge. De norske reglene om
maksimalt kreditfradrag virker på samme måte med hensyn til forholdsmessig
tilordning av konsernbidrag som med hensyn til gjeldsrentekostnader. Det
vises til avsnitt 45–47 ovenfor.
66 Anmodningen fra tingretten inneholder ikke informasjon om skattelovens
vilkår for å gjøre fradrag for konsernbidrag når det gjelder inntektsskatt. Etter
skriftlige og muntlige innlegg fremmet for EFTA-domstolen ser det imidlertid
ut til at konsernbidrag trekkes fra giverens skattbare inntekt og legges til
mottagerens skattbare inntekt, forutsatt at begge selskaper er underlagt norsk
beskatningsmyndighet. Et slikt system med konserninterne transaksjoner tjener
som regel til å redusere skatteulemper innen et konsern ved å la selskapene
i konsernet utligne fortjeneste og tap. Logikken bak ikke å tillate fradrag for
konsernbidrag ytt til selskap i utlandet, er som regel å forhindre selskaper fra
fritt å velge hvilken stat fortjenesten skal skattlegges i.
68 I lys av det ovenstående svarer det ikke til skatteyterens situasjon å tilordne
konsernbidrag til inntekten til en filial som ligger i en annen EØS-stat, under
193 - 257
JUDGMENT
67 Ved sammenligning av to selskaper som yter konsernbidrag til datterselskaper
i sin hjemstat, settes ikke ett av selskapene i noen annen stilling med hensyn til
konsernbidragene ved det faktum at selskapet har en filial i en annen EØS-stat.
Eksistensen av den utenlandske filialen har ingen betydning for hjemstatens
mulighet til å skattlegge konsernbidragene på mottagerselskapenes hånd.
Begge selskaper bør således få den samme skattemessige behandlingen
med hensyn til konsernbidragene. Som beskrevet i avsnitt 46 og 47 ovenfor,
sikrer ikke de aktuelle reglene dette.
does not correspond to the situation of the taxpayer. Therefore, the Court
concludes that it constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA
to attribute group contributions in a situation such as the one in the case at
hand to the income of a branch situated in another EEA State when calculating
the maximum credit allowance.
69 In the request for an Advisory Opinion, Stavanger tingrett states that in case
the calculation of the maximum credit allowance is found to be a restriction,
the Defendant will plead that the restriction can be justified on grounds relating
to the general interest. However, the request does not contain any information
on what these grounds may be, nor have the parties commented upon them.
Therefore, the Court is not in a position to assess such grounds and must
confine itself to concluding that the Norwegian rules at issue constitute a
restriction.
70 In light of the above, the answer to the second question is that an EEA State
which attributes, in applying the principle of net income taxation, a portion of a
company’s costs in the form of group contributions made to other companies
under this State’s fiscal jurisdiction to income earned through the company’s
branch in another EEA State, when calculating the maximum credit allowance
for tax paid in that State, restricts the freedom of establishment within the
meaning of Article 31 EEA.
V Costs
71 The costs incurred by the Government of Germany, ESA and the Commission,
these proceedings are a step in the proceedings pending before Stavanger
tingrett, any decision on costs for the parties to those proceedings is a matter
for that court.
On those grounds,
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by Stavanger tingrett hereby gives the following
Advisory Opinion:
1.
An EEA State which attributes, in applying the principle of net income
taxation, a portion of debt interest expenses of a company to income earned
through its branch in another EEA State, when calculating the maximum credit
- 258
194 -
69 I anmodningen om en rådgivende uttalelse oppgir Stavanger tingrett at dersom
beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag blir ansett å utgjøre en restriksjon, vil
saksøkte påberope seg at restriksjonen lar seg rettferdiggjøre av allmenne
hensyn. Imidlertid inneholder anmodningen ikke noe informasjon om hvilke
hensyn dette kunne være, og partene har heller ikke kommentert dette. Derfor
har EFTA-domstolen ikke de nødvendige forutsetninger for å vurdere slike
hensyn og må begrense seg til å konkludere med at de aktuelle norske reglene
utgjør en restriksjon.
Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
slike omstendigheter som i den foreliggende sak. EFTA-domstolen konkluderer
derfor med at det i et tilfelle som den foreliggende sak utgjør en restriksjon
etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 å tilordne konsernbidrag til inntekten til en filial
som ligger i en annen EØS-stat, ved beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag.
70 I lys av det ovenstående er svaret på annet spørsmål at en EØS-stat som, i sin
anvendelse av nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen av maksimalt kredit
fradrag for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en andel av et selskaps
utgifter i form av konsernbidrag ytt til andre selskaper under den førstnevnte
statens beskatningsmyndighet til inntekt ervervet ved selskapets filial i den
andre EØS-staten, hindrer den frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen
artikkel 31.
V Saksomkostninger
71 Omkostningene som er påløpt for Den tyske regjering, ESA og Kommisjonen,
som har fremmet innlegg for EFTA-domstolen, kan ikke kreves dekket.
Ettersom foreleggelsen for EFTA-domstolen utgjør et ledd i behandlingen av
saken som står for Stavanger tingrett, ligger det til tingretten å ta en eventuell
avgjørelse om saksomkostninger for partene i den saken.
På dette grunnlaget avgir
DOMSTOLEN,
1. En EØS-stat som, i sin anvendelse av nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en
andel av et selskaps gjeldsrentekostnader til inntekt ervervet ved selskapets
194 - 259
JUDGMENT
som svar på spørsmålene forelagt av Stavanger tingrett, følgende rådgivende uttalelse:
allowance for tax paid in that State, restricts the freedom of establishment
within the meaning of Article 31 EEA, insofar as the expenses can only be
linked to the company’s business in the former State.
2.
An EEA State which attributes, in applying the principle of net income taxation,
a portion of a company’s costs in the form of group contributions made
to other companies under this State’s fiscal jurisdiction to income earned
through the company’s branch in another EEA State, when calculating the
maximum credit allowance for tax paid in that State, restricts the freedom of
establishment within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Henrik Bull
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 May 2008
Skúli Magnússon
Carl Baudenbacher
Registrar
President
260 - 195
2. En EØS-stat som, i sin anvendelse av nettoinntektsprinsippet, ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i en annen EØS-stat tilordner en
andel av et selskaps utgifter i form av konsernbidrag ytt til andre selskaper
under den førstnevnte statens beskatningsmyndighet til inntekt ervervet ved
selskapets filial i den andre EØS-staten, hindrer den frie etableringsretten
etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
Carl Baudenbacher Thorgeir Örlygsson Seabrokers
AS v The
Norwegian
State
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
CaseE-7/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
filial i den andre EØS-staten, hindrer den frie etableringsretten etter EØSavtalen artikkel 31 for så vidt kostnadene bare kan knyttes til selskapets
virksomhet i den førstnevnte staten.
Henrik Bull
Avsagt i åpen rett i Luxembourg den 7. mai 2008.
Carl Baudenbacher
Justissekretær President
JUDGMENT
Skúli Magnússon - 195
261 -
in Case E-7/07
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Stavanger tingrett
(Stavanger District Court), Norway, in a case pending before it between
Seabrokers AS
and
concerning interpretation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area
(EEA) on prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 31 EEA on the
freedom of establishment in the EEA and Article 40 EEA on free movement of capital.
I
Introduction
1.
II
By a letter dated 25 May 2007, registered at the Court on 30 May 2007,
Stavanger tingrett made a request for an Advisory Opinion in a case pending
before it between Seabrokers AS (hereinafter the “Plaintiff”) and the Norwegian
State, represented by the Directorate of Taxes (hereinafter the “Defendant”).
Facts and procedure
2.
The case concerns a dispute on whether tax assessment on the basis of the
rules set out in the Norwegian Act Relating to Tax on Assets and Income (the
Tax Act) of 26 March 1999 No 14 (lov 26. mars 1999 nr. 14 om skatt av formue
og inntekt (skatteloven)) and of Regulation 19 November 1999 No 1158
Complementing and Implementing the Tax Act (forskrift 19. november 1999
nr. 1158 til utfylling og gjennomføring mv. av skatteloven av 26. mars 1999
nr. 14; hereinafter “FSFIN”) on maximum credit allowance for tax paid in a
foreign State is compatible with Articles 4, 31 and 40 EEA.
3.
The Plaintiff is an operator of a real estate business in Norway, developing
and renting out its property there. All of the properties are regulated as offices/
industry. The properties are – or are in the process of becoming – developed
with office buildings financed by loans guaranteed by mortgages on the
properties.
4.
The Plaintiff also has a branch in Aberdeen in the United Kingdom (UK),
whose only business activity is ship broking. Renting its office space, the
branch has no investment in real property, with the exception of a detached
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i sak E-7/07
ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i medhold av artikkel 34 i Avtalen mellom EFTAlandene om opprettelse av et Overvåkingsorgan og en Domstol fra Stavanger tingrett,
Norge, i en sak for denne mellom
Seabrokers AS
og
vedrørende tolkning av EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 om forbud mot nasjonalitetsbasert
diskriminering, artikkel 31 om fri etableringsrett innen EØS og artikkel 40 om fri
bevegelighet av kapital.
Innledning
1.
II
Ved brev av 25. mai 2007, mottatt ved EFTA-domstolen 30. mai 2007, har
Stavanger tingrett anmodet om en rådgivende uttalelse i en verserende
sak mellom Seabrokers AS (”saksøker”) og staten v/Skattedirektoratet
(”saksøkte”).
Faktum og saksgang
2.
Saken gjelder en tvist om hvorvidt beregning av skatt på grunnlag av
bestemmelsene i lov 26. mars 1999 nr. 14 om skatt av formue og inntekt
(skatteloven) og forskrift 19. november 1999 nr. 1158 til utfylling og
gjennomføring mv. av skatteloven av 26. mars 1999 nr. 14 (”FSFIN”) om
maksimalt kreditfradrag for betalt skatt i fremmed stat er forenlig med EØSavtalen artikkel 4, 31 og 40.
3.
Saksøker driver i Norge et eiendomsselskap som utvikler og leier ut sin eiendom
der. Samtlige eiendommer er regulert til kontor/industri. Eiendommene er –
eller er i ferd med å bli – utbygd med kontorbygninger finansiert ved lån sikret
med pant i eiendommene.
4.
Saksøker har også en filial i Aberdeen i Det forente kongerike som kun driver
skipsmeglervirksomhet. Filialen leier kontorer og har ingen investeringer i fast
eiendom, med unntak av en enebolig innkjøpt til bruk for ansatte. Siden dens
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I
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case
vín
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sf.
E-7/07
Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
RETTSMØTERAPPORT
house purchased for the use of employees. Since its only debts are due to
operating expenses, the branch has low debt interest costs. Having registered
it as a branch of a foreign enterprise in the UK, the Plaintiff has submitted tax
declarations for the branch’s operations in the UK and has been charged tax
on its operations there.
5.
The two units are operated separately both with regard to the nature and
location of the business conducted.
6.
The Plaintiff used the direct method in its accounts and tax declarations,
meaning that tax-deductible expenses, both interest and group contributions,
were entered in the country where the expense arose and was spent.
7.
In the tax income year 2002, the Plaintiff paid the UK tax authorities GBP 235
375.20 in withholding tax on the profits calculated at the permanent place of
operation in Aberdeen. In its Norwegian tax declaration for the same income
year, the Plaintiff claimed a credit allowance of NOK 2 635 023, corresponding
to the withholding tax paid in the UK.
8.
The Stavanger Tax Assessment Office, by a decision of 13 February 2004,
reduced the credit allowance for tax on income which the Plaintiff’s branch in
Aberdeen had paid to the UK tax authorities, to NOK 1 667 373. The reduction
was based on a calculation of the maximum credit allowance in accordance
with the principle of net income taxation. In reaching its decision, the Tax
Assessment Office applied an exception in Section 16–28–4 litra b FSFIN
which has its legal basis in the Tax Act.
9.
In its decision, the Tax Assessment Office apportioned debt interest and
group contributions in accordance with the principle of net income taxation.
In calculating the maximum credit allowance, interest expenses and group
contributions paid are multiplied by the net income abroad and divided by the
company’s total net income. The calculation was as follows, in NOK:
Global income before deduction of interest expenses abroad
14 787 889
Income abroad before deduction of interest expenses
9 430 482
Debt interest including interest expenses abroad
2 871 039
Group contributions paid
2 579 000
Debt interest share to be divided:
(9 430 482 x 2 871 039) / 14 787 889 = 1 830 909
264 - 197
5.
De to enhetene drives atskilt både med hensyn til arten og lokaliseringen av
virksomheten de driver.
6.
Saksøker har brukt den direkte metode i sine regnskap og selvangivelser, noe
som betyr at fradragspostene, både gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag, ble bokført
i det landet hvor kostnaden oppsto og ble forbrukt.
7.
For inntektsåret 2002 betalte saksøker til britiske skattemyndigheter GBP
235 375,20 i kildeskatt av det overskuddet som ble beregnet ved det faste
driftsstedet i Aberdeen. I selvangivelsen til norske skattemyndigheter for
inntektsåret 2002 krevde saksøker kreditfradrag i norsk skatt med NOK 2 635
023, som tilsvarte kildeskatten betalt i Det forente kongerike.
8.
Ved vedtak av 13. februar 2004 reduserte Stavanger likningskontor
kreditfradraget for inntektsskatt som saksøkers filial i Aberdeen hadde betalt
til britiske skattemyndigheter, til NOK 1 667 373. Nedsettelsen var basert på
en beregning av maksimalt kreditfradrag i henhold til nettoinntektsprinsippet.
Likningskontoret anvendte i denne forbindelse en unntaksregel i FSFIN § 16–
28–4 bokstav b, som har hjemmel i skatteloven.
9.
I vedtaket fordelte likningskontoret gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag i henhold
til nettoinntektsprinsippet. Ved beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag
multipliseres rentekostnader og ytet konsernbidrag med netto utenlandsinntekt
og divideres med selskapets totale nettoinntekt. Beregningen av maksimalt
kreditfradrag fremkom slik (i NOK):
14 787 889
Utenlandsinntekt før fradrag for rentekostnader
9 430 482
Gjeldsrenter inkludert rentekostnader fra utlandet
2 871 039
Ytet konsernbidrag
2 579 000
Andel gjeldsrenter til fordeling:
(9 430 482 x 2 871 039) / 14 787 889 = 1 830 909
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Globalinntekt før fradrag for rentekostnader fra utlandet
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Þorkelsson
vAuthority
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vín
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sf.
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Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
eneste gjeld er driftsgjeld, har filialen lave gjeldsrentekostnader. Da filialen er
registrert som en filial av et utenlandsk foretak i Det forente kongerike, har
saksøker levert selvangivelse for filialens virksomhet i Det forente kongerike
og blitt skattlagt for dens virksomhet der.
Group contributions to be divided:
(9 430 482 x 2 579 000) / 14 787 889 = 1 644 671
Income abroad
9 430 482
- interest deduction
1 830 909
- group contributions
1 644 671
= Net income abroad 5 954 902
The maximum credit allowance is obtained by multiplying the net income
abroad by the income tax rate in Norway: NOK 5 954 902 x 28% =
NOK 1 667 373.
10. The Plaintiff appealed the decision on 9 March 2004. In the appeal, the following
was alleged: 1) The Tax Assessment Office’s decision entailed double taxation.
The branch’s income in the UK is fully taxed in the UK. Debt interest and group
contributions which are exclusively related to the business in Norway are not
considered deductible in the UK. By Norwegian tax assessment authorities
nevertheless attributing a considerable part of these items to the UK, the tax
base in Norway is increased correspondingly notwithstanding the tax paid in
the UK. 2) The Tax Assessment Office’s decision entails discrimination contrary
to the EEA Agreement as well as the Double Taxation Agreement between
Norway and the UK. Establishing a business in another EEA State shall not
increase the total tax cost as compared to the business being established in
Norway. 3) It is contrary to the regulations when the credit method is used such
that the tax base is expanded in that tax paid in the UK is not deducted from
Norwegian tax calculated on global income.
11. The assessment of the Tax Assessment Office was upheld by the Higher
Assessment Appeal Board in Stavanger in a decision of 8 November 2004. In
its ruling, the Appeal Board stated that expenses which cannot be attributed
to a specific business shall be attributed to Norway or the UK in proportion
to where the net income is otherwise attributed (the principle of net income
taxation), cf. Section 16–28–4 litra b FSFIN. The Appeal Board did not find
a basis for using an alternative apportionment of the group contributions in
accordance with Section 16–28–4 litra c of the Regulation. The Plaintiff’s plea
that the taxation was contrary to the EEA Agreement was not considered.
12. The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit before Stavanger tingrett on 2 February 2005,
claiming mainly the following: 1) That the decision of the Higher Assessment
Appeal Board of 8 November 2004 be quashed. 2) Principally: that the new tax
266 - 198
Utenlandsinntekt
9 430 482
- rentefradrag
1 830 909
- konsernbidrag
1 644 671
= Netto utenlandsinntekt 5 954 902
Maksimalt kreditfradrag oppnås ved å multiplisere netto utenlandsinntekt
med skattesatsen for inntektsskatt i Norge: NOK 5 954 902 x 28 % =
NOK 1 667 373.
10. Saksøker påklaget likningen den 9. mars 2004. I klagen ble det anført følgende:
1) Likningskontorets vedtak innebar dobbeltbeskatning. Filialens inntekter i
Det forente kongerike beskattes fullt ut i Det forente kongerike. Gjeldsrenter og
konsernbidrag som utelukkende er relatert til virksomheten i Norge, anses ikke
fradragsberettigede i Det forente kongerike. Ved at norske likningsmyndigheter
likevel tilordner en vesentlig andel av disse poster til Det forente kongerike, økes
skattegrunnlaget i Norge tilsvarende uten hensyn til den skatt som er betalt i
Det forente kongerike. 2) Likningskontorets vedtak innebærer diskriminering i
strid med så vel EØS-avtalen som skatteavtalen mellom Norge og Det forente
kongerike. Å etablere en virksomhet i et annet EØS-land skal ikke øke den
totale skattekostnaden i forhold til om virksomheten var etablert i Norge. 3) Det
er i strid med regelverket når kreditmetoden anvendes slik at skattegrunnlaget
utvides ved at betalt skatt i Det forente kongerike ikke kommer til fradrag ved
beregnet norsk skatt av globalinntekt.
11. Likningskontorets vedtak ble fastholdt av overlikningsnemnda i Stavanger
i vedtak av 8. november 2004. I sitt vedtak fastslo overlikningsnemnda at
kostnader som ikke kan tilordnes en bestemt virksomhet, skal tilordnes
Norge eller Det forente kongerike forholdsmessig etter hvor nettoinntekten
for øvrig er tilordnet (nettoinntektsprinsippet), jf. FSFIN § 16–28–4 bokstav
b. Overlikningsnemnda fant ikke grunnlag for en alternativ fordeling av
konsernbidraget i henhold til forskriften § 16–28–4 bokstav c. Saksøkers
anførsel om at beskatningen var i strid med EØS-avtalen ble ikke vurdert.
12. Saksøker tok ut søksmål ved Stavanger tingrett den 2. februar 2005, med
følgende påstand: 1) Overlikningsnemndas vedtak av 8. november 2004
oppheves. 2) Prinsipalt: Ved den nye likningen legges til grunn at gjeldsrenter
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Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case
vín
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-7/07
Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
(9 430 482 x 2 579 000) / 14 787 889 = 1 644 671
Konsernbidrag til fordeling:
assessment be based on debt interest and group contributions being deducted
in full under the tax assessment in Norway. Alternatively: that the assessment
be based on an apportionment of debt interest and group contributions in
proportion to the apportionment of the Plaintiff’s gross capital in Norway and
Aberdeen.
13. The Defendant countered in its defence with the claim that the action be
dismissed.
14. Before Stavanger tingrett, the Plaintiff has pleaded that the decision by the
Higher Assessment Appeal Board and the Norwegian rules on calculation
of credit allowance in Section 16–28–4 FSIFN, cf. Sections 16–21 and
16–28 of the Tax Act, are contrary to the EEA Agreement’s provisions on
non-discrimination and the fundamental freedoms, referring to Articles 4, 31,
34 and 40 EEA. The Defendant has pleaded in its defence that the relevant tax
rules under domestic law are not contrary to EEA law.
III Questions
15. The following questions have been referred to the Court:
according to the principle of net income taxation, debt interest to the
income abroad when calculating the maximum credit allowance?
according to the principle of net income taxation, group contributions
to the income abroad when calculating the maximum credit
allowance?
3. Will the answer to question 1 and/or 2 be the same if the debt interest
and/or the group contributions can only be linked to the business in
Norway?
IV Legal background
National law
Rules on credit allowance under Norwegian law
16. Under Section 16–20(1) of the Tax Act, taxpayers may claim a credit allowance
for income tax paid to foreign tax authorities. Section 16–20(1), Tax deductions
for tax paid in a foreign State, reads:
(1) A taxpayer as mentioned in Sections 2–1 and 2–2 who here in this
Kingdom must pay tax on
268 - 199
13. Saksøkte tok til motmæle i tilsvar den 4. mars 2005 med påstand om
frifinnelse.
14. Med henvisning til EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31, 34 og 40, har saksøker for
Stavanger tingrett anført at overlikningsnemndas vedtak og de norske reglene
om beregning av kreditfradrag i FSFIN § 16–28–4, jf. skatteloven §§ 16–21
og 16–28 strider mot EØS-avtalens bestemmelser om ikke-diskriminering og
grunnfrihetene. Staten har i sitt tilsvar anført at de relevante internrettslige
skattereglene ikke er i strid med EØS-retten.
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vAuthority
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AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
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EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
og konsernbidrag fullt ut kommer til fradrag ved likningen i Norge. Subsidiært:
at det legges til grunn en fordeling av gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag i forhold
til fordelingen av saksøkers bruttoformue i Norge og Aberdeen.
III Spørsmål
15. Følgende spørsmål er forelagt for EFTA-domstolen:
1. Er det i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne
gjeldsrenter til utenlandsinntekten etter nettoinntektsprinsippet ved
beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget?
2. Er det i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne
konsernbidrag til utenlandsinntekten etter nettoinntektsprinsippet
ved beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradraget?
3. Vil svaret på spørsmål 1 og/eller 2 bli det samme dersom gjeldsrentene
og/eller konsernbidraget utelukkende kan knyttes til virksomheten i
Norge?
Norsk rett
Regler for kreditfradrag etter norsk rett
16. Etter skatteloven § 16–20 første ledd har skattytere krav på kreditfradrag for
inntektsskatt betalt til utenlandske skattemyndigheter. Paragraf 16–20 første
ledd (Skattefradrag for skatt betalt i fremmed stat) lyder:
(1) Skattyter som nevnt i §§2–1 og 2–2 som her i riket må svare skatt av
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269 --
IV Rettslig bakgrunn
a. income from sources in a foreign State, or
b. a capital in a foreign State,
may claim deductions from Norwegian tax on conclusively assessed tax on
income or capital or corresponding tax which is established as having been
imposed on the taxpayer and paid in the relevant foreign State where the
income has its source or the capital is located.
17. Pursuant to Section 16–21(1) and (3) of the Tax Act, deductions can only be
claimed for income tax paid to foreign tax authorities, within the maximum credit
allowance. Section 16–21(1) and (3), Limitations on the right to deductions –
the maximum credit allowance, reads:
(1) Deductions from Norwegian income tax under Section 16–20 may not
exceed the portion of Norwegian tax on total taxable income, as calculated
before the deduction, which proportionally falls on the income abroad. The
deduction is also limited to the income tax which the taxpayer has paid in the
source State on this income. Foreign income tax can only be deducted from
Norwegian income tax.
[…]
(3) The terms “income abroad” and “capital abroad” refer to income from
sources abroad and capital located abroad which are taxed abroad and
which are included in the taxpayer’s total income or capital which is taxable in
Norway.
18. A further elucidation of the maximum credit allowance calculation is provided
for in Section 16–28–4 FSFIN, Attribution of income and expenses when
calculating a maximum tax deduction, which reads:
When calculating the maximum tax deduction under Section 16–21 of the Tax
Act, the following method is used:
a. Unless otherwise indicated below, income and expenses shall be attributed
to Norway or abroad according to where the income is legitimately derived
or the expenses are legitimately incurred.
b. Expenses which cannot be attributed to a specific business shall be
attributed to Norway or abroad in proportion to where the net income
otherwise is attributed. Debt interest which is deductible in Norway shall
always be attributed in this way.
270 - 200
b. formue i fremmed stat,
kan kreve fradrag i norsk skatt for endelig fastsatt inntektsskatt eller
formuesskatt eller tilsvarende skatt som godtgjøres å være ilagt skattyteren
og betalt i vedkommende fremmede stat hvor inntekten har kilde eller formuen
er.
17. Etter skatteloven § 16–21 første og tredje ledd kan det bare kreves fradrag
for inntektsskatt betalt til utenlandske skattemyndigheter innenfor maksimalt
kreditfradrag. Paragraf 16–21 første og tredje ledd (Begrensninger i
fradragsretten – maksimalt kreditfradrag) lyder:
(1) Fradrag i norsk inntektsskatt etter § 16–20 kan ikke overstige den delen
av norsk skatt på samlet skattepliktig inntekt, beregnet før fradraget, som
forholdsmessig faller på utenlandsinntekten. Fradraget er også begrenset til
den inntektsskatten som skattyteren har betalt i kildestaten på denne inntekten.
Utenlandsk inntektsskatt kan bare komme til fradrag i norsk inntektsskatt.
…
(3) Med utenlandsinntekt og utenlandsformue menes inntekt med kilde
i utlandet og formue i utlandet, som skattlegges i utlandet og som inngår i
skattyterens samlede inntekt eller formue som er skattepliktig i Norge.
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AS ehf.
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Surveillance
v Norway
a. inntekt med kilde i fremmed stat, eller
18. En nærmere klargjøring av beregningen av det maksimale kreditfradrag gis
i FSFIN § 16–28–4 (Tilordning av inntekter og utgifter ved beregningen av
maksimalt skattefradrag) som lyder:
Ved beregningen av det maksimale skattefradraget etter skatteloven § 16–21
anvendes følgende fremgangsmåte:
(a) Med mindre annet følger nedenfor, skal inntekter og utgifter tilordnes Norge
eller utlandet etter hvor inntekten rettmessig er oppebåret eller utgiften
rettmessig er pådratt.
(b) Utgifter som ikke kan tilordnes en bestemt virksomhet, skal tilordnes Norge
eller utlandet forholdsmessig etter hvor nettoinntekten for øvrig er tilordnet.
Gjeldsrenter som er fradragsberettigede i Norge skal alltid tilordnes slik.
271 --- 200
c. Expenses which cannot be attributed to a specific business may
exceptionally be apportioned according to a different distribution key than
what follows from the first sentence of [litra] b, if the taxpayer establishes
that such a distribution key will provide a reasonable result in accordance
with generally accepted commercial principles and generally accepted
principles of corporate economics and the taxpayer establishes that such a
distribution key is used consistently. This does not apply to debt interest.
d. When spouses submit separate tax declarations it shall be held, when
calculating the maximum tax deduction, that each spouse’s tax be assessed
in Class 1. Each spouse’s debt interest which is deductible in Norway shall
be apportioned according to his or her net income in Norway and abroad,
respectively.
Norway’s double taxation agreement with the United Kingdom
19. The Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom signed a double taxation
agreement (hereinafter the “DTA”) on 12 October 2000, which has been
effective in Norway since 1 January 2001. The DTA is incorporated into
Norwegian law through Act No 15 of 28 July 1949 Relating to Authority for
the King to Enter into Agreements with Foreign States for the Prevention of
Double Taxation etc. The rules of Article 28 of the DTA are implemented in
Norwegian law by Sections 16–20 et seq. of the Tax Act.
20. Article 7 of the DTA provides that Norway has the right to levy taxes on
companies resident in Norway, and that in such cases the UK can only levy
taxes on income derived from a permanent establishment in the UK. Article 7,
Business profits, reads:
1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only
in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise
carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in
the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent
establishment.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, where an
enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each
Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits
which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise
272 - 201
(d) Når ektefeller leverer egen selvangivelse skal det ved beregningen av det
maksimale skattefradrag legges til grunn at vedkommende lignes i klasse
1. Den enkelte ektefelles gjeldsrenter som er fradragsberettiget i Norge,
fordeles etter dennes nettoinntekt i henholdsvis Norge og utlandet.
Norges skatteavtale med Det forente kongerike
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(c) Utgifter som ikke kan tilordnes en bestemt virksomhet, kan unntaksvis
fordeles etter en annen fordelingsnøkkel enn det som følger av b første
punktum, dersom skattyter godtgjør at en slik fordelingsnøkkel gir et rimelig
resultat i overensstemmelse med alminnelig aksepterte forretningsmessige
og bedriftsøkonomiske prinsipper og skattyter godtgjør at en slik
fordelingsnøkkel anvendes konsekvent. Dette gjelder ikke gjeldsrenter.
19. Kongeriket Norge og Det forente kongerike undertegnet en skatteavtale den
13. oktober 2000 (”skatteavtalen”) som har vært gjeldende i Norge siden 1.
januar 2001. Skatteavtalen er inkorporert i norsk rett gjennom lov av 28. juli
1949 nr. 15 om adgang for Kongen til å inngå overenskomster med fremmede
stater til forebyggelse av dobbeltbeskatning m.v. Reglene i skatteavtalen
artikkel 28 er gjennomført i norsk rett i skatteloven §§ 16–20 flg.
1. Fortjeneste som oppebæres av et foretak i en kontraherende stat
skal bare kunne skattlegges i denne stat, med mindre foretaket utøver
forretningsvirksomhet i den annen kontraherende stat gjennom et fast driftssted
der. Hvis foretaket utøver slik forretningsvirksomhet, kan dets fortjeneste
skattlegges i den annen stat, men bare så meget av den som kan tilskrives det
faste driftssted.
2. Når et foretak i en kontraherende stat utøver forretningsvirksomhet i den
annen kontraherende stat gjennom et fast driftssted der, skal det, med forbehold
av bestemmelsen i punkt (3) i denne artikkel, i hver av de kontraherende stater
tilskrives det faste driftssted den fortjeneste som det ventelig ville ha ervervet
hvis det hadde vært et særskilt og selvstendig foretak som utøvet samme eller
- 201
273 -
20. Skatteavtalen artikkel 7 bestemmer at Norge har beskatningsretten til selskaper
som er hjemmehørende i Norge, og at Det forente kongerike i slike saker kun
har beskatningsrett for inntekter som er oppebåret ved et fast driftssted i Det
forente kongerike. Artikkel 7 (Fortjeneste ved forretningsvirksomhet) lyder:
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions
and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent
establishment.
3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be
allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the
permanent establishment, including a reasonable allocation of executive and
general administrative expenses incurred for the purposes of the enterprise as
a whole, whether in the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment
is situated or elsewhere.
4. No profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of
the mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise
for the enterprise.
5. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, the profits to be attributed
to the permanent establishment shall be determined by the same method year
by year unless there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary.
6. Where profits include items of income or capital gains which are dealt
with separately in other Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of
those Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article.
21. Norwegian taxpayers are subject to the principle of global income taxation,
meaning that they are taxed on income derived from Norway and abroad. In
order to avoid double taxation, Norwegian taxpayers have, according to the
DTA, a right to credit allowance for income tax paid in the UK. Article 28 DTA,
Elimination of double taxation, reads:
1. Subject to the provisions of the law of the United Kingdom regarding the
allowance as a credit against United Kingdom tax of tax payable in a territory
outside the United Kingdom (which shall not affect the general principle
hereof):
(a) Norwegian tax payable under the laws of Norway and in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention, whether directly or by deduction, on profits,
income or chargeable gains from sources within Norway (excluding in the
case of a dividend, tax payable in respect of the profits out of which the
dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against any United Kingdom
tax computed by reference to the same profits, income or chargeable gains
by reference to which the Norwegian tax is computed;
(b) in the case of a dividend paid by a company which is a resident of Norway
to a company which is a resident of the United Kingdom and which
274 - 202
3. Ved beregningen av et fast driftssteds fortjeneste skal det innrømmes
fradrag for utgifter som er påløpt i forbindelse med det faste driftssted, herunder
en rimelig andel av direksjons- og alminnelige administrasjonsutgifter påløpt
foretaket som en helhet, uansett om de er påløpt i den kontraherende stat hvor
det faste driftssted ligger eller andre steder.
4. Ingen fortjeneste skal henføres til et fast driftssted utelukkende i anledning
av dettes innkjøp av varer for foretaket.
5. Ved anvendelse av de foranstående punkter skal den fortjeneste som
tilskrives det faste driftssted fastsettes etter den samme fremgangsmåte hvert
år, med mindre det er fyldestgjørende grunn for noe annet.
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lignende virksomhet under samme eller lignende vilkår og som opptrådte helt
uavhengig i forhold til det foretak hvis faste driftssted det er.
6. Hvor fortjenesten omfatter inntekter eller formuesgevinst som er særskilt
omhandlet i andre artikler i denne overenskomst, skal bestemmelsene i disse
artikler ikke berøres av reglene i nærværende artikkel.
21. Norske skattytere er underlagt globalinntektsprinsippet, noe som betyr at
de blir beskattet for inntekter som er oppebåret i Norge og i utlandet. For at
dobbeltbeskatning skal unngås, har norske skatteytere etter skatteavtalen
rett til kreditfradrag for inntektsskatt som er betalt til Det forente kongerike.
Skatteavtalen artikkel 28 (Unngåelse av dobbeltbeskatning) lyder:
1. Med forbehold om bestemmelsene i Det Forente Kongerikes lov om
godskriving mot britisk skatt av skatt som skal betales i et område utenfor
Det Forente Kongerike (dog uten å påvirke bestemmelsene i dette punkts
alminnelige retningslinjer), skal følgende gjelde:
(a) Norsk skatt som skal betales i henhold til Norges lover og overensstemmende
med bestemmelsene i denne overenskomst, enten direkte eller gjennom
avkorting, av fortjeneste, inntekt eller skattbar gevinst fra kilder i Norge
(unntatt når det gjelder dividender, skatt som skal betales av det overskudd
hvorav dividenden utdeles), skal godskrives mot enhver britisk skatt
beregnet av den samme fortjeneste, inntekt eller skattbare gevinst som er
grunnlaget for beregningen av den norske skatt;
(b) Når det gjelder en dividende som utdeles av et selskap hjemmehørende
i Norge til et selskap hjemmehørende i Det Forente Kongerike og dette
275 --- 202
controls directly or indirectly at least 10 per cent of the voting power in the
company paying the dividend credit shall take into account (in addition to
any Norwegian tax for which credit may be allowed under the provisions
of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph) the Norwegian tax payable by the
company in respect of the profits out of which such dividend is paid.
2. Subject to the provisions of the laws of Norway regarding the allowance
as a credit against Norwegian tax of tax payable in a territory outside Norway
(which shall not affect the general principle hereof) (a) Where a resident of Norway derives income or owns elements of capital
which, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed
in the United Kingdom, Norway shall allow:
i. as a deduction from the tax on the income of that resident, an amount
equal to the United Kingdom tax paid on that income;
ii. as a deduction from the tax on the capital of that resident, an amount
equal to the United Kingdom tax paid on elements of capital;
Such deduction in either case shall not, however, exceed that part of
the Norwegian tax, as computed before the deduction is given, which is
attributable, as the case may be, to the income or the same elements
of capital which may be taxed in the United Kingdom.
(b) Where in accordance with any provision of this Convention income derived
or capital owned by a resident of Norway is exempt from tax in Norway,
Norway may nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on the remaining
income or capital of such resident, take into account the exempted income
or capital.
3. For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Article income, profits and
capital gains owned by a resident of the United Kingdom which may be taxed
in Norway in accordance with this Convention shall be deemed to arise from
sources in Norway.
EEA law
Within the scope of application of this Agreement, and without prejudice to
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited.
276 - 203
2. Med forbehold av bestemmelsene i Norges lovgivning om godskriving
mot norsk skatt av skatt som skal betales i et område utenfor Norge (dog
uten å påvirke bestemmelsene i dette punkts alminnelige retningslinjer), skal
følgende gjelde:
(a) Når en person bosatt i Norge oppebærer inntekt eller eier formue som i
henhold til bestemmelsene i denne overenskomst kan skattlegges i Det
Forente Kongerike, skal Norge innrømme:
i. som fradrag i den skatt som ilegges vedkommende persons inntekt et
beløp som tilsvarer den skatt som er betalt til Det Forente Kongerike på
denne inntekten,
ii. som fradrag i den skatt som ilegges vedkommende persons formue et
beløp som tilsvarer den skatt som er betalt til Det Forente Kongerike på
disse deler av formuen.
Slikt fradrag skal imidlertid ikke overstige den del av inntektsskatten
eller formuesskatten, beregnet før fradrag er gitt, som kan henføres
henholdsvis til den inntekt eller de samme deler av formuen som kan
skattlegges i Det Forente Kongerike.
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kontrollerer direkte eller indirekte minst 10 pst. av de stemmeberettigede
aksjer i det selskap som utdeler dividenden, skal det ved godskrivningen tas
i betraktning (i tillegg til enhver norsk skatt som det kan tillates godskrivelse
for etter bestemmelsene i underpunkt (a) i dette punkt) den norske skatt som
skal betales av selskapet av det overskudd hvorav dividenden utdeles.
3. Ved anvendelse av punkt (1) denne artikkel skal inntekt, fortjeneste og
formuesgevinst som tilkommer en person bosatt i Det Forente Kongerike og
som kan skattlegges i Norge overensstemmende med denne overenskomst,
anses for å skrive seg fra kilder i Norge.
EØS-rett
22. EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 lyder:
Enhver forskjellsbehandling på grunnlag av nasjonalitet skal være forbudt
innenfor denne avtales virkeområde, med forbehold for de særbestemmelser
den selv gir.
- 203
277 -
(b) Når, i henhold til enhver bestemmelse i denne overenskomst, inntekt som
oppebæres eller formue som eies av en person bosatt i Norge er unntatt
fra beskatning i Norge, kan Norge likevel ved beregningen av skatten på
denne persons gjenværende inntekt og formue ta i betraktning den unntatte
inntekt eller formue.
23. Article 31(1) EEA reads:
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member
State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States. This shall
also apply to the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals
of any EC Member State or EFTA State established in the territory of any of
these States.
[…]
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of an EC Member State
or an EFTA State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the territory of the Contracting Parties shall,
for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of EC Member States or EFTA States.
‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under civil or
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons
governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profitmaking.
restrictions between the Contracting Parties on the movement of capital
belonging to persons resident in EC Member States or EFTA States and no
discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the
parties or on the place where such capital is invested. Annex XII contains the
provisions necessary to implement this Article.
V Written Observations
26. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the EFTA Court and Article 97 of the
Rules of Procedure, written observations have been received from:
– the Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Smedsvig, Supreme Court Attorney;
– the Defendant, represented by Amund Noss, advocate, Office of the
Attorney General (Civil Affairs), acting as Agent;
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Per Andreas Bjørgan,
Deputy Director, Florence Simonetti, Officer, and Ida Hauger, National
Expert, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as Agents;
278 - 204
I samsvar med bestemmelsene i denne avtale skal det ikke være noen
restriksjoner på etableringsadgangen for statsborgere fra en av EFs
medlemsstater eller en EFTA-stat på en annen av disse staters territorium. Dette
skal gjelde også adgangen til å opprette agenturer, filialer eller datterselskaper
for så vidt angår borgere fra en av EFs medlemsstater eller en EFTA-stat som
har etablert seg på en av disse staters territorium.
Når det gjelder anvendelsen av bestemmelsene i dette kapittel, skal selskaper
som er opprettet i samsvar med lovgivningen i en av EFs medlemsstater eller
en EFTA-stat, og som har sitt vedtektsbestemte sete, sin hovedadministrasjon
eller sitt hovedforetak innen avtalepartenes territorium, likestilles med fysiske
personer som er statsborgere i EFs medlemsstater eller EFTA-statene.
Ved selskaper skal forstås selskaper i sivil- eller handelsrettslig forstand,
herunder også kooperative selskaper, samt andre juridiske personer i offentligeller privatrettslig forstand, unntatt dem som ikke driver ervervsmessig
virksomhet.
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25. EØS-avtalen 40 lyder:
Innen rammen av bestemmelsene i denne avtale skal det mellom avtalepartene
ikke være noen restriksjoner på overføring av kapital tilhørende personer
bosatt i EFs medlemsstater eller EFTA-statene og ingen forskjellsbehandling
på grunn av partenes nasjonalitet, bosted eller stedet for kapitalanbringelsen.
Vedlegg XII inneholder de bestemmelser som er nødvendige for å gjennomføre
denne artikkel.
26. I medhold av artikkel 20 i vedtektene for EFTA-domstolen og artikkel 97 i
rettergangsordningen er skriftlige innlegg mottatt fra:
– saksøker, representert ved høyesterettsadvokat Thomas Smedsvig,
– saksøkte, representert ved advokat Amund Noss, Regjeringsadvokaten,
– EFTAs Overvåkingsorgan (ESA), representert ved Deputy Director Per
Andreas Bjørgan, Officer Florence Simonetti, og National Expert Ida
Hauger, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs og
279 - 204
V Skriftlige innlegg
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Richard
Lyal, Legal Adviser and a member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent.
The Plaintiff
27. The Plaintiff maintains that the Norwegian rules on credit allowance and
the way they have been practiced by the Norwegian tax authorities entail a
restriction contrary to Articles 4, 31 and 40 EEA.
28. With respect to the factual background of the case, the Plaintiff explains
that all of the company’s interest expenses on real estate debt (NOK 2 778
369) incurred in Norway. The Plaintiff also explains that, within the limits of
its net profit earned in Norway (NOK 2 579 000), it transferred the profit as
group contributions to two daughter companies in Norway. The Norwegian tax
authorities allocated the Plaintiff’s deductible interest expenses (NOK 2 871
039) between the business in Norway and the UK, based on the proportionate
share of the global income (Norway: 36.22834% and the UK: 63.77166%).
The allocation had the effect that deductible interest expenses incurred on
real estate properties in Norway was reduced (by NOK 1 830 909) and taxable
income in Norway increased, based on the assumption that deduction should
be granted abroad. Thereby, the net income before group contributions in
Norway was increased (from NOK 2 579 038 to NOK 4 409 957) in spite of the
fact that the Plaintiff could not deduct the reduced interest expenses in the UK.
The deductible group contributions were also allocated in the same manner
as the interest expenses, resulting in an increase of the net taxable income in
Norway (by NOK 1 644 628), again based on the assumption that deduction
should be granted abroad.
29. According to the Plaintiff, the Norwegian tax authorities assessed the total
taxable income for the Plaintiff as follows (in NOK):
Norway
UK
Global income
5 357 407
9 430 482
14 787 889
0
-92 670
-92 670
-2 778 369
0
-2 778 369
Net income before group contributions
2 579 038
9 337 812
11 916 850
Group contributions
-2 579 000
0
-2 579 000
38
9 337 812
9 337 850
Profit before interest expenses
Interest:
- interest expenses on taxes / bank charges
- interest expenses on real estate debt
Net taxable income
280 - 205
Saksøker
27. Saksøker fremholder at de norske reglene om kreditfradrag, og måten disse
har blitt praktisert av norske skattemyndigheter på, innebærer en restriksjon i
strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 og 40.
28. Med hensyn til sakens faktiske bakgrunn forklarer saksøker at selskapets
rentekostnader på eiendomsgjeld (NOK 2 778 369) i sin helhet er pådratt i
Norge. Saksøker forklarer også at saksøker, innen grensene av sin nettoinntekt
i Norge (NOK 2 579 000), overførte overskuddet som konsernbidrag til sine
to datterselskaper i Norge. De norske skattemyndighetene fordelte saksøkers
fradragsberettigede rentekostnader (NOK 2 871 039) mellom virksomheten
i Norge og Det forente kongerike basert på den forholdsmessige andelen
av globalinntekten (Norge: 36,22834 % og Det forente kongerike: 63,77166
%). Fordelingen hadde som følge at de fradragsberettigede rentekostnadene
pådratt ved eiendom i Norge ble redusert (med NOK 1 830 909), og at den
skattepliktige inntekten i Norge økte, basert på den antagelse at fradrag skulle
bli gitt i utlandet. Dermed ble nettoinntekten før konsernbidrag i Norge økt (fra
NOK 2 579 038 til NOK 4 409 957), til tross for det faktum at saksøker ikke
kunne få fradrag for de reduserte rentekostnadene i Det forente kongerike.
De fradragsberettigede konsernbidragene ble også fordelt på samme måte
som rentekostnadene, noe som førte til en økning av den skattepliktige
nettoinntekten i Norge (med NOK 1 644 628), igjen basert på den antagelse at
fradrag skulle bli gitt i utlandet.
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– Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap (Kommisjonen), representert
ved Legal Adviser og medlem av Legal Service Richard Lyal.
Overskudd før rentekostnader
Norge
Det forente
kongerike
Globalinntekt
5 357 407
9 430 482
14 787 889
0
-92 670
-92 670
Renter:
- rentekostnader på skatter /
bankgebyrer
- rentekostnader på eiendomsgjeld
-2 778 369
0
-2 778 369
Nettoinntekt før konsernbidrag
2 579 038
9 337 812
11 916 850
Konsernbidrag
-2 579 000
0
-2 579 000
38
9 337 812
9 337 850
Skattbar nettoinntekt
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281 -
29. Ifølge saksøker beregnet de norske skattemyndighetene den totale skattbare
inntekten for saksøker slik (i NOK):
30. The Plaintiff sets up the following table for the calculation of the net tax using
the credit method (in NOK):
Calculation of Norwegian tax on global income
Norway
UK
0
2 635 023
Taxes in each country
Global income tax paid to
Norway (28%)
Total taxes paid before
credit allowance
Global income
Paid taxes
2 614 598
2 614 598
2 635 023
5 249 621
Calculation of credit allowance
Total income UK
9 430 482
Credit allowance interest expenses (63.77166%)
-1 830 909
Credit allowance group contributions (63.77166%)
-1 644 671
Calculated net income attributed abroad
5 954 902
31. The Plaintiff next explains in figures the total tax it paid after the credit
allowance had been granted. The tax calculated by Norwegian tax authorities
on net income attributed abroad (to the UK) amounted to (NOK 5 954 902 x
28%) NOK 1 667 373 (the tax credit allowance), whereas the tax actually paid
in the UK was NOK 2 635 023. The tax paid in Norway (28%) was NOK 2 614
598 - 1 667 373 = 947 225. Thereby the total tax paid by the Plaintiff amounted
to NOK 2 635 023 + 947 225 = 3 582 248.
32. The Plaintiff points out that the tax paid in the UK is not influenced by the
Norwegian tax authorities’ calculation of the credit allowance. If the business
in Norway had been the only activity, the Plaintiff would have owed no taxes. If
the branch in the UK had been a subsidiary, the only tax for the activity there
would be the UK tax (30% of UK net income). Thus, the tax cost is higher only
because the Plaintiff conducts business both in Norway and through a branch
office in the UK. If all business would have been conducted in Norway only, the
total tax would have been NOK 2 614 598, not NOK 3 582 248. Therefore, in
this instance, the result is an increased tax cost of NOK 967 650 which would
have been avoided if the Plaintiff had not conducted any business in the UK.
33. In the view of the Plaintiff, the national court essentially asks whether, in
circumstances such as those in question in the main proceedings, the
provisions of the EEA Agreement relating to the freedom of establishment and
282 - 206
Beregning av norsk skatt på globalinntekt
Skatt i hvert land
Norge
Det forente
kongerike
0
2 635 023
Global inntektsskatt betalt
til Norge (28 %)
Betalt skatt
2 635 023
2 614 598
Sum betalt skatt før
kreditfradrag
Globalinntekt
2 614 598
5 249 621
Beregning av kreditfradrag
Totalinntekt Det forente kongerike
9 430 482
Kreditfradrag rentekostnader (63,77166 %)
-1 830 909
Kreditfradrag konsernbidrag (63,77166 %)
-1 644 671
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30. Saksøker setter opp følgende tabell for beregningen av nettoskatt ved
anvendelse av kreditmetoden (i NOK):
5 954 902
32. Saksøker påpeker at skatten betalt i Det forente kongerike ikke er påvirket av
de norske skattemyndigheters beregning av kreditfradraget. Hvis virksomheten
i Norge hadde vært den eneste virksomheten, ville ikke saksøker skyldt noe
i skatt. Dersom filialen i Det forente kongerike hadde vært et datterselskap,
ville den eneste skatten for virksomheten der vært den britiske skatten (30
% av britisk nettoinntekt). Følgelig er skattekostnadene høyere kun fordi
saksøker driver virksomhet både i Norge og gjennom et filialskontor i Det
forente kongerike. Hvis hele virksomheten hadde vært drevet kun i Norge,
ville den totale skatten ha vært NOK 2 614 598, ikke NOK 3 582 248. Derfor
er resultatet i dette tilfellet en økt skattekostnad på NOK 967 650, som hadde
vært unngått dersom saksøker ikke hadde drevet noe virksomhet i Det forente
kongerike.
33. Slik saksøker ser det, spør den nasjonale domstolen i det vesentlige om EØSavtalens bestemmelser om fri etableringsrett og fri bevegelighet av kapital,
under slike omstendigheter som i den aktuelle saken, er til hinder for at
-- 206
283 --
31. Saksøker forklarer deretter, med tall, den samlede skatten saksøker betalte
etter kreditfradraget. Skatten beregnet av norske skattemyndigheter på
nettoinntekten tilregnet utlandet (Det forente kongerike) beløp seg til (NOK
5 954 902 x 28 %) NOK 1 667 373 (kreditfradraget), mens skatten faktisk betalt
i Det forente kongerike var NOK 2 635 023. Skatten betalt i Norge (28 %) var
NOK 2 614 598 - 1 667 373 = 947 225. Den samlede skatten som saksøker
betalte, beløp seg dermed til NOK 2 635 023 + 947 225 = 3 582 248.
the free movement of capital preclude legislation or practice of an EEA State
which restricts the right of a company residing in that State to deduct for tax
purposes expenses incurred by the company in respect of interest on debt in
that State and group contributions to subsidiaries in that State, because the
company also conducts business in another EEA State.
34. The Plaintiff maintains that while direct taxation falls within the competence
of the Member States, this competence must nonetheless be exercised in a
manner consistent with the EEA Agreement.1
35. According to the Plaintiff, Article 31 EEA grants to nationals of the EEA States
freedom of establishment, which includes the right to take up and pursue
activities and to set up and manage undertakings, under the conditions
laid down for its own nationals by the EEA State where such establishment
is effected. This entails, in accordance with Article 34 EEA, the right of
companies or firms, formed in accordance with the law of an EEA State and
having their registered office, central administration, or principal place of
business within the EEA, to exercise their activity in the EEA State concerned,
through a subsidiary, a branch, or an agency.2 These provisions prohibit the
State of origin from hindering the establishment of its nationals or companies
incorporated under its legislation in another EEA State.3 The Plaintiff stresses
that the EEA Agreement makes no distinction with regard to whether business
is conducted through agencies, branches or subsidiaries.
36. As regards the tax treatment in question, the Plaintiff states that, under
Norwegian tax law, debt interest and group contributions paid in Norway are
fully deductible towards income in Norway. The legislation and practice at issue
in the main proceedings entail that debt interest and group contributions paid
in Norway shall be allocated to the income abroad in proportion to the taxable
income in the two States. Thus, unlike companies which conduct business only
in Norway or Norwegian companies which establish a subsidiary in another EEA
State, Norwegian companies which perform business through a branch office
in another EEA State are deprived of the benefit of full deduction. This entails a
difference in treatment which results in a tax disadvantage. As a consequence
1
2
3
The Plaintiff refers to Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I-1727, at paragraph
37; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, at paragraph 29; Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury
Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995, at paragraph 40, Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-2647, at paragraph
21 and Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007], ECR I-2107, at paragraph 25.
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain [1999] ECR I-6161, at paragraph 35; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005]
ECR I-10837, at paragraph 30; Case C-471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I-2107, at paragraph 29 and Case C-347/04 Rewe
Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-2647, at paragraph 25.
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, at paragraph 21; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR
I-10837, at paragraph 31 and Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-2647, at paragraph 26.
284 - 207
35. Ifølge saksøker gir EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 statsborgere av EØS-statene fri
etableringsrett, noe som inkluderer retten til å starte og utøve næringsvirksomhet,
og til å opprette og lede foretak, på de vilkår som etableringsstaten har fastsatt
for egne borgere. Dette innebærer, i henhold til EØS-avtalen artikkel 34, en rett
for selskaper som er stiftet i overensstemmelse med lovgivningen i en EØSstat, og som har sitt vedtektsbestemte sete, sin hovedadministrasjon eller sitt
hovedforetak innen EØS, til å utøve virksomhet i den angjeldende EØS-staten
gjennom et datterselskap, en filial eller et agentur.2 Disse bestemmelsene
forbyr opprinnelsesstaten å legge hindringer i veien for at dens statsborgere,
eller selskap som er stiftet i overensstemmelse med dens lovgivning, etablerer
seg i en annen EØS-stat. 3 Saksøker understreker at EØS-avtalen ikke skjelner
mellom virksomhet drevet gjennom agenturer, filialer eller datterselskaper.
36. Når det gjelder den aktuelle skattemessige behandlingen, uttaler saksøker
at etter norsk skatterett er gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag ytet i Norge fullt ut
fradragsberettiget i inntekt i Norge. Den aktuelle lovgivningen og praksisen
innebærer at gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag ytet i Norge skal fordeles på
utenlandsinntekten forholdsmessig etter den skattbare inntekten i de to statene.
Følgelig, i motsetning til selskaper som driver virksomhet kun i Norge eller
norske selskaper som etablerer et datterselskap i en annen EØS-stat, fratas
norske selskaper som driver virksomhet gjennom en filial i en annen EØSstat, fordelen ved fullt fradrag. Dette innebærer en forskjellsbehandling som
resulterer i en skattemessig ulempe. Som en konsekvens av denne forskjellen
Saksøker viser bl.a. til forente saker C-397/98 og C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft m.fl., Sml. 2001 s. I-1727 (avsnitt 29), sak C-446/03
Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837 (avsnitt 29), sak C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes og Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, Sml.
s. I-7995 (avsnitt 40), sak C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, Sml. 2007 s. I-2647 (avsnitt 21) og sak C-524/04 Test Claimants in the
Thin Cap Group Litigation Sml. 2007 s. I-2107 (avsnitt 25).
2
Saksøker viser til sak C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, Sml. 1999 s. I-6161 (avsnitt 35), sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005
s. I-10837 (avsnitt 30), sak C-471/04 Keller Holding, Sml. 2006 s. I-2107 (avsnitt 29) og sak C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, Sml.
2007 s. I-2647 (avsnitt 25).
3
Saksøker viser til sak C-264/96 ICI, Sml. 1998 s. I-4695 (avsnitt 21), sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837 (avsnitt
31) og sak C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, Sml. 2007 s. I-2647 (avsnitt 26).
1
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v Norway
34. Saksøker fremholder at selv om direkte beskatning hører inn under
medlemsstatenes kompetanse, må denne kompetansen likevel utøves på en
måte som er i overensstemmelse med EØS-avtalen.1
lovgivning eller praksis i en EØS-stat innskrenker retten til et selskap fra den
staten til å få skattefradrag for kostnader pådratt av selskapet med hensyn til
gjeldsrenter i den staten og konsernbidrag til datterselskaper i den staten, fordi
selskapet også driver virksomhet i en annen EØS-stat.
of this difference, parent companies might be dissuaded from carrying on their
activities through branch offices in other EEA States.4 Accordingly, this tax
treatment constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment.5
37. The Plaintiff contests the arguments of the Defendant that the credit rules at
issue do not affect the Plaintiff’s right to income deduction in the company’s
global income due to the fact that it has received a full income deduction for debt
interest and group contributions in relation to the assessment of the Norwegian
tax on the company’s global income. In its view, this is misleading and beside
the point. In this regard, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant disregards
the fact that the UK tax is not affected by the deduction calculated in Norway.
The Plaintiff also points out that it is not contested by the Defendant that the
global tax is increased by the calculation of the tax claimed by Norwegian
Tax Authorities. Moreover, and most importantly, the calculation of the credit
allowance has resulted in a much higher tax for the Plaintiff compared to a
company conducting the same business in Norway only, or through a subsidiary
in the UK. Consequently, the Defendant’s statement that the Plaintiff pays less
tax than other taxpayers with corresponding income from business conducted
exclusively in Norway is incorrect.
38. According to the Plaintiff, the fact that it does not receive a deduction in full
for income tax paid in the UK cannot be explained by different tax rates in
Norway and UK and/or the income from the permanent place of business being
calculated differently in Norway and the UK, respectively. Firstly, the difference
in rates (30% in the UK and 28% in Norway) constitutes an insignificant
difference in this respect. Secondly, the marginal difference in tax rates is
irrelevant as the difference in tax paid is caused solely by the allocation to the
branch in the UK of a proportionate share of the expenses incurred in Norway.
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-385/00 de Groot, according to which the Member
States cannot deprive a citizen from the benefit of a tax deduction based on
the assumption that he will receive a similar deduction in the other State where
he performed work.6 Moreover, in the view of the Plaintiff, the legal and factual
circumstances in this case differ from Case C-336/96 Gilly, and therefore the
Defendant cannot rely on that case.7
39. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant has not claimed any justification for
the tax treatment at issue. On the contrary, the Norwegian legislator has, in
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-168/01 Bosal [2003] ECR I-9409, at paragraph 27.
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz [2007] ECR I-2647, at paragraph 36.
6
Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, at paragraphs 85 and 87.
7
Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793.
4
5
286 - 208
38. Ifølge saksøker kan ikke det faktum at saksøker ikke mottar fullt fradrag for
inntektsskatt betalt i Det forente kongerike, forklares med forskjellig skattesats
i Norge og Det forente kongerike og/eller at inntekten fra det faste driftsstedet
blir beregnet på forskjellig måte i henholdsvis Norge og Det forente kongerike.
For det første utgjør ulikheten i satser (30 % i Det forente kongerike og 28 %
i Norge) en ubetydelig forskjell i denne sammenheng. For det annet er den
marginale forskjellen i skattesatser irrelevant siden forskjellen i betalt skatt
alene er forårsaket av fordelingen av en forholdsmessig andel av kostnadene
pådratt i Norge til filialen i Det forente kongerike. Saksøker viser til sak C-385/00
de Groot, hvoretter medlemsstatene ikke kan frata en statsborger fordelen av
et skattefradrag basert på den antagelse at han vil motta et lignende fradrag
i den andre staten hvor han arbeidet.6 Dessuten, slik saksøker ser det, skiller
de juridiske og faktiske omstendighetene i denne saken seg fra sak C-336/96
Gilly, og derfor kan ikke saksøkte støtte seg på den saken.7
39. Ifølge saksøker har ikke saksøkte påberopt seg noe som kan rettferdiggjøre
den aktuelle skattemessige behandlingen. Tvert imot har den norske
Saksøker viser til sak C-168/01 Bosal, Sml. 2003 s. I-9409 (avsnitt 27).
Saksøker viser til sak C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, Sml. 2007 s. I-2647 (avsnitt 36).
6
Sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819 (avsnitt 85 og 87).
7
Sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793.
4
5
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37. Saksøker bestrider saksøktes argumenter om at de aktuelle kreditreglene ikke
påvirker saksøkers rett til inntektsfradrag i selskapets globalinntekt på grunn
av det faktum at saksøker har mottatt fullt inntektsfradrag for gjeldsrenter og
konsernbidrag ved den norske likningen av selskapets globalinntekt. Etter
saksøkers syn er dette villedende og saken uvedkommende. I så henseende
gjør saksøker gjeldende at saksøkte overser det faktum at den britiske skatten
ikke er påvirket av fradraget beregnet i Norge. Saksøker påpeker også at det
ikke er bestridt av saksøkte at globalskatten økes ved beregningen av den
skatten de norske skattemyndighetene krever. Dessuten, og ikke minst, har
beregningen av kreditfradraget resultert i en mye høyere skatt for saksøker
sammenlignet med et selskap som driver den samme virksomheten kun i Norge
eller gjennom et datterselskap i Det forente kongerike. Følgelig er saksøktes
påstand om at saksøker betaler mindre skatt enn andre skattebetalere med
tilsvarende inntekt fra virksomhet drevet utelukkende i Norge, uriktig.
kan morselskaper avholdes fra å utøve sin virksomhet gjennom filialer i andre
EØS-stater.4 Således utgjør denne skattemessige behandlingen en restriksjon
på den frie etableringsretten.5
the Plaintiff’s view, admitted that the relevant legislation may entail a restriction
contrary to the EEA Agreement. The Plaintiff refers inter alia to the “Consultation
memorandum on avoidance of international double taxation (høringsnotat
om unngåelse av internasjonal dobbeltbeskatning)” issued by the Ministry of
Finance in relation to a recent reassessment of the credit method.8 In the view
of the Plaintiff, the Ministry acknowledges in this memorandum that the current
rules fail to meet Norway’s obligations under the EEA Agreement.
40. The Plaintiff points out, that despite recognising that the rules do not in practice
prevent double taxation and thus discrimination, the Ministry chose to uphold
the rules with respect to allocation of debt interest when amendments to the
Tax Act and associated Regulations were adopted on 15 June 2007. In that
regard, the Plaintiff quotes Odelsting Proposition No 20 (2006–2007), page 19.
The Plaintiff maintains that when rules actually work in this fashion in specific
cases, they must be set aside as being in violation of the EEA Agreement. The
Plaintiff maintains that the reasons given for not amending the current rules are
only technical in nature. It argues that obstacles to the freedom of movement
of workers cannot be justified by arguments relating to the cohesion of the EEA
State’s tax system or by the aim of simplifying and coordinating the collection
of income tax or by technical difficulties.9 As concerns group contributions, the
Plaintiff notes that the Ministry proposed amendments to the current rules and
thereby acknowledged, and acted upon, the fact that the practice of the earlier
rules entailed discriminatory treatment against companies operating through
cross-border divisions that violated the EEA Agreement.10
41. The Plaintiff also argues that there is a logical inconsistency in the legislative
amendments as concerns the allocation of debt interest. In that regard the
Plaintiff notes inter alia that an amendment was made for wage earners and
pensioners, but not for businesses, with the result that taxpayers in the latter
group are expressly treated differently from taxpayers that belong to the former
group although they are in the same situation.
8
9
The Plaintiff quotes point 4.1 of the memorandum.
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819.
The Plaintiff refers to page 21 of Ot.prp.No 20 (2006–2007). The Plaintiff also notes that the credit method will be dealt with by the
ECJ in the pending Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co. The Plaintiff furthermore refers to the Opinion of
the Advocate General in the same case, from 29 March 2007, who, in the view of the Plaintiff, came to the conclusion that the use
of the credit method instead of the exception method to avoid international double taxation constitutes a violation of the freedom
of establishment under the EC Treaty.
10
288 - 209
40. Saksøker påpeker at departementet, til tross for erkjennelsen av at reglene
ikke i praksis forhindrer dobbeltbeskatning og følgelig diskriminering, valgte å
opprettholde reglene om fordeling av gjeldsrenter da endringer i skatteloven
og tilhørende forskrifter ble vedtatt 15. juni 2007. I den forbindelse siterer
saksøker Ot.prp. nr. 20 (2006–2007) side 19. Saksøker fremholder at når regler
faktisk virker på denne måten i enkeltsaker, må de settes til side som stridende
mot EØS-avtalen. Saksøker fremholder at grunnene som er gitt for ikke å
endre de gjeldende reglene kun er av teknisk art. Videre hevder saksøker at
hindringer for den frie bevegelighet av arbeidstakere ikke kan rettferdiggjøres
med argumenter om sammenheng i EØS-statens skattesystem eller med
det siktemål å forenkle og samordne inndrivning av inntektsskatt, eller med
tekniske vanskeligheter.9 Når det gjelder konsernbidrag, bemerker saksøker at
departementet foreslo endringer i de nåværende reglene og dermed erkjente,
og handlet på grunnlag av, det faktum at praktiseringen av de tidligere reglene
innebar en diskriminerende behandling av selskaper med virksomhet på tvers
av landegrenser, som brøt EØS-avtalen.10
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lovgiveren, slik saksøker ser det, innrømmet at den relevante lovgivningen kan
innebære en restriksjon i strid med EØS-avtalen. Saksøker viser blant annet
til høringsnotat om unngåelse av internasjonal dobbeltbeskatning fremmet av
Finansdepartementet i forbindelse med en nylig revurdering av kreditmetoden.8
Slik saksøker ser det, erkjenner departementet i dette høringsnotatet at de
gjeldende reglene ikke lykkes i å oppfylle Norges forpliktelser etter EØSavtalen.
8
9
Saksøker siterer punkt 4.1 i notatet.
Saksøker viser til sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819.
Saksøker viser til side 21 i Ot.prp.nr. 20 (2006–2007). Saksøker bemerker også at kreditmetoden vil bli behandlet av EFdomstolen i den pågående sak C-298/05 Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co. Saksøker viser videre til generaladvokatens
innstilling av 29. mars 2007 i den samme saken, som etter saksøkers oppfatning konkluderte med at bruken av kreditmetoden
i stedet for unntaksmetoden for å unngå internasjonal dobbeltbeskatning, utgjør en krenkelse av den frie etableringsretten etter
EF-traktaten.
10
- 209
289 -
41. Saksøker hevder også at logikken i endringene i lovgivningen er inkonsistent
når det gjelder fordelingen av gjeldsrenter. I den forbindelse bemerker saksøker
blant annet at det ble gjort endringer for lønnsmottakere og pensjonister, men
ikke for virksomheter, med det resultat at skattebetalere i sistnevnte gruppe
uttrykkelig behandles annerledes enn skattebetalere som tilhører førstnevnte
gruppe, selv om de er i samme situasjon.
42. The Plaintiff suggests answering the questions as follows:
Question 1:
Articles 31, 40 and 4 preclude rules and practice such as those at issue in
the main proceedings, whereby a company forfeits, in the calculation of the
income tax payable by it in its State of residence, part of the deductible debt
interest and thereby part of the company’s tax advantage, because, during the
year in question, the company also received income through a branch office in
another Member State which was taxed in that State.
Question 2:
income tax payable by it in its State of residence, part of the deductible group
contributions and thereby part of the company’s tax advantage, because,
during the year in question, the company also received income through a
branch office in another Member State which was taxed in that State.
43. Should the Court not give affirmative answers to the questions above, the
Court is requested in the third question to consider whether the answers will
be different given the fact that the debt interest and the group contributions can
only be linked to the business conducted in Norway and thus not deductible
in the UK. In this case, the Plaintiff proposes that the questions should be
Question 1:
income tax payable by it in its State of residence, part of the deductible debt
interest which is only incurred on its investments in this State and thereby part
of the company’s tax advantage, because, during the year in question, the
company also received income through a branch office in another Member
State which was taxed in that State and whose activity was not related to the
investments in the State of residence.
Question 2:
income tax payable by it in its State of residence, part of the deductible group
contributions which are only contributed to daughter companies in this State
and thereby part of the company’s tax advantage, because, during the year
290 - 210
Spørsmål 1:
Artikkel 31, 40 og 34 er til hinder for regler og praksis som de aktuelle i denne
saken, hvorved et selskap mister, ved beregningen av inntektsskatten det
skal betale i sin hjemstat, en del av de fradragsberettigede gjeldsrentene og
dermed en del av selskapets skattefordel, fordi selskapet i løpet av det aktuelle
året også mottok inntekt gjennom en filial i en annen medlemsstat som ble
beskattet i den staten.
Spørsmål 2:
Artikkel 31, 40 og 4 er til hinder for regler og praksis som de aktuelle i denne
saken, hvorved et selskap mister, ved beregningen av inntektsskatten det
skal betale i sin hjemstat, en del av det fradragsberettigede konsernbidraget
og dermed en del av selskapets skattefordel, fordi selskapet i løpet av det
aktuelle året også mottok inntekt gjennom en filial i en annen medlemsstat
som ble beskattet i den staten.
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42. Saksøker foreslår at spørsmålene besvares som følger:
Spørsmål 1:
Artikkel 31, 40 og 4 er til hinder for regler og praksis slik som de aktuelle i
denne saken, hvorved et selskap mister, ved beregningen av inntektsskatten
det skal betale i sin hjemstat, en del av de fradragsberettigede gjeldsrentene
som utelukkende er pådratt ved dets investeringer i denne staten og dermed
del av selskapets skattefordel, fordi selskapet i løpet av det aktuelle året også
mottok inntekt gjennom en filial i en annen medlemsstat som ble beskattet i
den staten og hvis virksomhet ikke var knyttet til investeringene i hjemstaten.
Spørsmål 2:
Artikkel 31, 40 og 4 er til hinder for regler og praksis slik som de aktuelle i
denne saken, hvorved et selskap mister, ved beregningen av inntektsskatten
det skal betale i sin hjemstat, en del av det fradragsberettigede konsernbidraget
som utelukkende er gitt til datterselskaper i denne staten og dermed del av
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43. Skulle domstolen ikke svare bekreftende på spørsmålene overfor, bes
domstolen i det tredje spørsmålet om å vurdere hvorvidt svarene vil bli
annerledes gitt det faktum at gjeldsrentene og konsernbidraget kun kan knyttes
til virksomheten som er drevet i Norge, og derfor ikke er fradragsberettiget i
Det forente kongerike. I så fall foreslår saksøker at spørsmålene besvares
som følger:
in question, the company also received income through a branch office in
another Member State which was taxed in that State and whose activity was
not related to the investments in the State of residence.
The Defendant
44. The Defendant maintains that the Norwegian legislation regarding maximum
credit allowance is in conformity with the EEA Agreement.
45. The Defendant explains that Norwegian income tax is calculated according to
the principle of global income taxation. Accordingly, the global income of the
Plaintiff, including income derived from the permanent establishment in the UK,
was taken into account. The Plaintiff then received a full income deduction for all
global expenses, including debt interest and group contributions. According to
the Defendant, this tax treatment is identical to the tax treatment of a company
without foreign source income. Since the Plaintiff is also subject to taxation in
the UK, it is entitled under Norwegian domestic law to a credit to be set against
the tax payable to Norway. The credit was calculated in accordance with the
rules of the FSFIN on maximum credit allowance. It is not disputed that the
total global tax burden of the Plaintiff is higher than that of a company which
conducts all of its business in Norway.
46. The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff’s foreign tax was not fully credited for
two reasons. First, the tax rate in Norway is 28%, while the UK tax rate is 30%,
and the tax credit is limited to the Norwegian tax rate levied on foreign income.
Second, the net income from the UK branch is calculated differently in the UK
and in Norway. The Plaintiff did not receive any deductions for debt expenses
or group contributions in the UK. However, Norway allocated a portion of the
Plaintiff’s debt and group contribution expenses to the UK when calculating the
Plaintiff’s foreign income. This is explained by the following table (in NOK):
Comparison with a company that conducts all of its business in Norway
Plaintiff
A company that conducts all of
its business in Norway
Ordinary Norwegian income tax
2 614 598
2 614 598
Norwegian credit allowance
-1 667 373
Not applicable
Tax paid to Norway
= 947 225
2 614 598
Tax paid to the UK
+2 635 023
Not applicable
Global tax
= 3 582 248
2 614 598
292 -- 211
Saksøkte
44. Saksøkte fremholder at den norske lovgivningen angående maksimalt
kreditfradrag er i overensstemmelse med EØS-avtalen.
45. Saksøkte forklarer at norsk inntektsskatt er beregnet etter
globalinntektsprinsippet. Følgelig ble saksøkers globalinntekt, inkludert
inntekt oppebåret fra det faste driftsstedet i Det forente kongerike, tatt med
i beregningen. Saksøker fikk deretter fullt inntektsfradrag for alle globale
kostnader, inkludert gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag. Ifølge saksøkte er denne
skattemessige behandlingen identisk med den skattemessige behandlingen
av et selskap uten inntekt fra utlandet. Siden saksøker også er gjenstand for
beskatning i Det forente kongerike, er saksøker berettiget etter norsk rett til et
kreditfradrag i skatten som skal betales til Norge. Kreditfradraget ble beregnet
i henhold til reglene i FSFIN om maksimalt kreditfradrag. Det bestrides ikke at
den totale globale skattebyrden for saksøker er høyere enn den for et selskap
som driver all sin virksomhet i Norge.
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selskapets skattefordel, fordi selskapet i løpet av det aktuelle året også mottok
inntekt gjennom en filial i en annen medlemsstat som ble beskattet i den staten
og hvis virksomhet ikke var knyttet til investeringene i hjemstaten.
46. Saksøkte fremholder at saksøkers utenlandske skatt ikke kom til fradrag fullt
ut av to grunner. For det første er skattesatsen i Norge 28 %, mens den britiske
skattesatsen er 30 %, og skattefradraget er begrenset til norsk skattesats pålagt
den utenlandske inntekten. For det annet er nettoinntekten fra den britiske
filialen beregnet forskjellig i Det forente kongerike og i Norge. Saksøker fikk
ingen fradrag for gjeldskostnader eller konsernbidrag i Det forente kongerike.
Norge fordelte imidlertid en del av saksøkers gjeld- og konsernbidragskostnader
til Det forente kongerike ved beregningen av saksøkers utenlandske inntekt.
Dette forklares ved følgende tabell (i NOK):
Sammenligning med et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i Norge
Saksøker
Alminnelig norsk inntektsskatt
Norsk kreditfradrag
Skatt betalt til Norge
Et selskap som driver all sin
virksomhet i Norge
2 614 598
2 614 598
- 1 667 373
Kommer ikke til anvendelse
= 947 225
=2 614 598
Skatt betalt til Det forente kongerike
+ 2 635 023
Kommer ikke til anvendelse
Global skatt
= 3 582 248
=2 614 598
293 -- 211
47. With regard to the applicable EEA law, the Defendant argues that it follows
from case law of the ECJ that when the rules on freedom of establishment
apply, the national measure is to be assessed under these rules, although the
rules on free movement of capital in principle could apply. In the opinion of the
Defendant, the principles of analysis are identical under both sets of rules.11
Moreover, in the opinion of the Defendant, there is no differential treatment in
the case at hand and hence Article 4 EEA is not applicable.
48. The Defendant argues that EEA States are free to tax the global income
of resident companies.12 This will result in juridical double taxation which
obviously is an impediment to the establishment of a foreign branch. However,
the EEA States are not obliged under the EEA Agreement to eliminate such
double taxation. EEA law does not contain any rule on the question of which
of the two States should prevent double taxation. The only remedies available
are bilateral tax treaties and unilateral relief rules of the resident State.
49. In the view of the Defendant, it is clear from the case law of the ECJ that
although eliminating double taxation is one of the purposes of the EC Treaty,
cf. now Article 293 EC, it is not itself a multilateral tax treaty. It does not confer
upon individuals any rights which they can invoke before their national courts.13
Therefore, there is within the internal market an objective difference between
a taxpayer staying at home and a taxpayer exposing himself to two tax
jurisdictions. The Defendant also points out that the EEA Agreement contains
no provision corresponding to the second indent of Article 293 EC. Therefore,
elimination of double taxation or harmonisation of the tax base or tax rates in
the EEA States is not one of the objectives of the EEA Agreement.
50. Since no obligation to give relief for double taxation can be established under
the EEA Agreement, Norwegian credit rules cannot be deemed contrary to the
Agreement on the grounds that not all foreign tax is credited. In that regard, the
Defendant argues that while the EEA Agreement requires States to establish
a level playing field for domestic and cross-border investments within its own
tax jurisdiction, it does not impose on them the obligation to harmonise their
tax bases and tax rates. If the EEA Agreement would be interpreted to the
The Defendant refers to the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967, at
paragraphs 14 and 15.
12
The Defendant refers to Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793 and Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967.
13
The Defendant refers Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793, at paragraphs 14, 16, 17, 23 and 24; Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert
[2006] ECR I-10967, at paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C-170/05 Denkavit [2006] ECR I-11949, at paragraph 43 and Case C-524/04
Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107, at paragraph 49.
11
294 - 212
48. Saksøkte hevder at en EØS-stat har frihet til å beskatte globalinntekten til
selskaper hjemmehørende der.12 Dette resulterer i en rettslig dobbeltbeskatning,
som åpenbart er en hindring for etableringen av en utenlandsk filial. EØSstatene er imidlertid ikke forpliktet etter EØS-avtalen til å eliminere slik
dobbeltbeskatning. EØS-retten inneholder ikke noen regel vedrørende
spørsmålet om hvilken av de to statene som skal forhindre dobbeltbeskatning.
De eneste tilgjengelige løsningene er bilaterale skatteavtaler og unilaterale
regler om lettelser i hjemstaten.
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47. Når det gjelder EØS-retten som skal anvendes, hevder saksøkte at det
følger av rettspraksis fra EF-domstolen at når reglene om fri etableringsrett
får anvendelse, skal det nasjonale tiltaket vurderes etter disse reglene, selv
om reglene om fri bevegelighet av kapital i prinsippet også kunne anvendes.
Etter saksøktes oppfatning er vurderingstemaet det samme under begge
regelsettene.11 Uansett foreligger det, etter saksøktes oppfatning, ingen
forskjellsbehandling i den foreliggende saken, og EØS-avtalen artikkel 4
kommer derfor ikke til anvendelse.
50. Siden det ikke kan oppstilles noen forpliktelse til å gi lettelser for
dobbeltbeskatning etter EØS-avtalen, kan ikke norske kreditregler anses å
være i strid med avtalen på grunnlag av at ikke all utenlandsk skatt kommer
til fradrag. I så henseende hevder saksøkte at mens EØS-avtalen krever at
statene sikrer like vilkår for innenlandske og grenseoverskridende investeringer
innenfor sin egen skattejurisdiksjon, pålegger den dem ikke en forpliktelse til å
Saksøkte viser til generaladvokat Geelhoeds innstilling i sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967 (avsnitt 14 og 15).
Saksøkte viser til sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793 og sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967.
13
Saksøkte viser til sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793 (avsnitt 14, 16, 17, 23 og 24), sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006
s. I-10967 (avsnitt 21 og 22), sak C-170/05 Denkavit, Sml. 2006 s. I-11949 (avsnitt 43) og sak C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin
Cap Group Litigation, Sml. 2007 s. I-2107 (avsnitt 49).
11
12
- 212
295 -
49. Slik saksøkte ser det, er det klart ut fra rettspraksis fra EF-domstolen at selv
om det å avskaffe dobbeltbeskatning er ett av EF-traktatens mål, jf. nå EFtraktaten artikkel 293, er den ikke i seg selv en multilateral skatteavtale. Den
gir ikke enkeltpersoner rettigheter som de kan påberope seg for sine nasjonale
domstoler.13 Derfor er det i det indre marked en objektiv forskjell mellom en
skattebetaler som holder seg hjemme og en skattebetaler som utsetter seg
selv for to skattejurisdiksjoner. Saksøkte påpeker også at EØS-avtalen ikke
inneholder noen bestemmelse tilsvarende EF-traktaten artikkel 293 annet
strekpunkt. Derfor er ikke avskaffelse av dobbeltbeskatning eller harmonisering
av skattegrunnlaget eller skattesatsene i EØS-statene et av formålene med
EØS-avtalen.
effect that all foreign tax should be credited in the State of residence (in this
case Norway), the Agreement could in fact be regarded as a multilateral tax
agreement. The State of residence would then no longer be free to determine
its tax burden by defining its own tax base and tax rates.
51. The Defendant maintains that the Norwegian credit rules are not discriminatory.
It is, in the view of the Defendant, not relevant to compare the global tax
burden of the Plaintiff with the tax burden of a company that conducts all of its
business in Norway. A taxpayer exposed to two tax jurisdictions is in another
and objectively different situation than one that receives all his income in
one State. The Defendant refers to the reasoning of the ECJ in Kerckhaert
14
and concludes that tax paid to the UK should be disregarded when making
a comparison between a company conducting all its business in Norway
and the Plaintiff. The credit rules do not affect the Plaintiff’s right to income
deductions in the company’s global income. What distinguishes the Plaintiff
from a company that conducts all of its business in Norway is that in addition
to the income deductions, the Plaintiff receives a credit allowance for tax paid
abroad.
52. The Defendant further points out in this regard that the Norwegian legislation
does not make any negative distinction between domestic and cross-border
situations. The Defendant argues that, therefore, several previous judgments
regarding imputation tax systems and cross-border group contributions, from
the ECJ and the EFTA Court, are not relevant to the case at hand.15
53. Finally, the Defendant contests that the reasoning of the ECJ in Case C‑385/00
de Groot should apply in the case at hand. In that regard, the Defendant points
out that the case concerns personal allowances and relates to case law of the
ECJ concerning the obligations of the State of residence and the source State
with respect to such allowances.16 The deductions in question in this case are
on the other hand interest expenses and group contributions, and there is no
similar ECJ jurisprudence on such expenses. With regard to the foregoing, the
Defendant suggests answering the questions as follows:
(1) It is not contrary to Article 4, 31 or 40 of the EEA Agreement to attribute,
according to the principle of net income taxation, debt interest to the income
abroad when calculating the maximum credit allowance
The Defendant refers to Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967, at paragraphs 15–18.
Therefore, in the view of the Defendant, the judgments in Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071; Case C‑315/02 Lenz
[2004] ECR I‑7063 and Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477 are not relevant to the case at hand. Further reference is
made to Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank [2004] EFTA Ct. Rep. p. 11 and Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837.
16
The Defendant refers to Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, at paragraphs 88–91.
14
15
296 - 213
51. Saksøkte fremholder at de norske kreditreglene ikke er diskriminerende.
Slik saksøkte ser det, er det ikke relevant å sammenligne saksøkers globale
skattebyrde med skattebyrden til et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i
Norge. En skattebetaler som er utsatt for to skattejurisdiksjoner er i en
annen og objektivt sett forskjellig situasjon enn en som mottar all sin inntekt
i én stat. Saksøkte viser til EF-domstolens begrunnelse i Kerckhaert 14 og
konkluderer med at skatt betalt til Det forente kongerike bør det ses bort fra
ved sammenligningen av et selskap som driver all sin virksomhet i Norge,
og saksøker. Kreditreglene påvirker ikke saksøkers rett til inntektsfradrag i
selskapets globalinntekt. Det som skiller saksøker fra et selskap som driver
all sin virksomhet i Norge, er at saksøker i tillegg til inntektsfradragene får et
kreditfradrag for skatt betalt i utlandet.
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harmonisere sine skattegrunnlag og skattesatser. Dersom EØS-avtalen skulle
bli tolket slik at all utenlandsk skatt skulle komme til fradrag i hjemstaten (i dette
tilfellet Norge), kunne avtalen faktisk regnes som en multilateral skatteavtale.
Hjemstaten ville ikke lenger ha frihet til å bestemme sin skattebyrde ved å
fastsette sitt eget skattegrunnlag og sine egne skattesatser.
53. Til slutt bestrider saksøkte at EF-domstolens resonnement i sak C-385/00 de
Groot bør anvendes i foreliggende sak. I så henseende påpeker saksøkte
at saken gjelder personlige fradrag og relaterer seg til rettspraksis fra EFdomstolen vedrørende forpliktelsene til hjemstaten og kildestaten i forhold til
slike fradrag.16 De aktuelle fradragene i denne saken er derimot rentekostnader
og konsernbidrag, og det foreligger ingen lignende rettspraksis fra EFdomstolen om slike kostnader. Hensett til det ovennevnte foreslår saksøkte å
besvare spørsmålene som følger:
(1) Det er ikke i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne, etter
nettoinntektsprinsippet, gjeldsrenter til utenlandsinntekten ved beregningen av
maksimalt kreditfradrag.
Saksøkte viser til sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967 (avsnitt 15–18).
Derfor er dommene i sak C‑35/98 Verkooijen, Sml. 2000 s. I‑4071, sak C‑315/02 Lenz, Sml. 2004 s. I‑7063 og sak C‑319/02
Manninen, Sml. 2004 s. I‑7477 etter saksøktes oppfatning ikke relevante for den foreliggende saken. Videre vises det til sak
E-1/04 Fokus Bank, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2004 s. 11 og sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837.
16
Saksøkte viser til sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819 (avsnitt 88–91).
14
15
- 213
297 -
52. Videre påpeker saksøkte i så henseende at den norske lovgivningen ikke gjør
noen negativ forskjell på innenlandske og grenseoverskridende situasjoner.
Saksøkte hevder at flere tidligere dommer fra EF-domstolen og EFTAdomstolen vedrørende godtgjørelsessystemer og grenseoverskridende
konsernbidrag derfor ikke er relevante for den foreliggende saken.15
(2) It is not contrary to Article 4, 31 or 40 of the EEA Agreement to attribute,
according to the principle of net income taxation, group contributions to the
income abroad when calculating the maximum credit allowance.
(3) The answer to question 1 is the same even if the debt interest can only be
linked to the business in Norway. The answer to question 2 is the same even
if the group contributions can only be linked to the business in Norway.
54. In the view of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”), the case
in question, which concerns an alleged restriction to the establishment of
a branch in another EEA State, should be assessed under Article 31 EEA
only, because any restriction on the free movement of establishment could
bring about restrictions on free movement of capital. Thus, an independent
examination under Article 40 EEA is not justified.17 Furthermore, Article 4 EEA
only applies where specific provisions preventing discrimination do not apply.
55. In ESA’s view, the questions referred to the Court may be reformulated as
follows: 1) Does the allocation of deductible expenses to a foreign branch of
a Norwegian company, for the purposes of calculating the credit allowance,
constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment when it applies to
expenses that are not economically linked to the business in Norway? 2)
Does the allocation of deductible expenses to a foreign branch of a Norwegian
company, for the purposes of calculating the credit allowance, constitute a
restriction on the freedom of establishment when it applies to expenses that
are economically linked solely to the business in Norway?
56. ESA submits that as a general rule, tax systems of Member States are not
covered by the EEA Agreement, but States must exercise their taxation power
in a way that is consistent with EEA law.18
57. ESA maintains that juridical double taxation, with its inherent negative effects
on the functioning of the EEA, is not contrary to any provision of EEA law,
including Article 31 EEA. In that respect ESA recalls, firstly, that the EEA
Agreement does not contain a provision equivalent to Article 293 EC, which
calls for negotiations leading to the abolishment of double taxation. In any
17
18
ESA refers to Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I‑6373, at paragraph 24.
ESA refers inter alia to Case E-1/01 Hörður Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 17; Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance
Authority v Iceland [2003] EFTA Ct. Rep. 143, at paragraph 26 and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, at
paragraph 19.
298 - 214
(2) Det er ikke i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 4, 31 eller 40 å tilordne, etter
nettoinntektsprinsippet, konsernbidrag til utenlandsinntekten ved beregningen
av maksimalt kreditfradrag.
(3) Svaret på spørsmål 1 er det samme selv om gjeldsrentene kun kan
knyttes til virksomheten i Norge. Svaret på spørsmål 2 er det samme selv om
konsernbidragene utelukkende kan knyttes til virksomheten i Norge.
EFTAs overvåkingsorgan
54. Slik EFTAs overvåkingsorgan (”ESA”) ser det, bør den aktuelle saken, som
angår en påstått restriksjon på etableringen av en filial i en annen EØS-stat,
vurderes kun etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31, fordi enhver restriksjon på den
frie etableringsretten kan medføre restriksjoner på den frie bevegelighet av
kapital. Følgelig er det ikke grunn til en selvstendig prøving på grunnlag av
EØS-avtalen artikkel 40.17 Dessuten kommer EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 bare til
anvendelse når særskilte bestemmelser som skal forhindre diskriminering,
ikke kommer til anvendelse.
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55. Etter ESAs syn kan spørsmålene forelagt for domstolen omformuleres på
følgende måte: 1) Utgjør fordelingen av fradragsberettigede kostnader
til en utenlandsk filial av et norsk selskap, når det gjelder beregning av
kreditfradraget, en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten, når fordelingen
kommer til anvendelse på kostnader som ikke er økonomisk knyttet til
virksomheten i Norge? 2) Utgjør fordelingen av fradragsberettigede kostnader
til en utenlandsk filial av et norsk selskap, når det gjelder beregning av
kreditfradraget, en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten, når fordelingen
kommer til anvendelse på kostnader som utelukkende er knyttet økonomisk til
virksomheten i Norge?
57. ESA fremholder at rettslig dobbeltbeskatning, med sine iboende negative
virkninger på EØS-avtalens funksjon, ikke er i strid med noen bestemmelse
i EØS-retten, inkludert EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. I den forbindelse minner
ESA for det første om at EØS-avtalen ikke inneholder noen bestemmelse
tilsvarende EF-traktaten artikkel 293, som krever forhandlinger med sikte på
17
18
ESA viser til sak C-231/05 Oy AA, Sml. 2007 s. I-6373 (avsnitt 24).
ESA viser bl.a. til sak E-1/01 Hörður Einarsson, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2002 s. 1 (avsnitt 17), sak E-1/03 EFTAs overvåkingsorgan mot
Island, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2003 s. 143 (avsnitt 26) og sak C-319/02 Manninen, Sml. 2004 s. I‑7477 (avsnitt 19).
- 214
299 -
56. ESA gjør gjeldende at skattesystemet til en medlemsstat i utgangspunktet ikke
faller inn under EØS-avtalen, men at statene må utøve sin beskatningsmyndighet
på en måte som er i overensstemmelse med EØS-retten.18
event, the ECJ has consistently held that this provision defines an objective
and is not intended to lay down a directly applicable legal rule.19 Secondly,
according to case law of the ECJ, Community law in its current state does not
lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence amongst
the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the
Community.20 Consequently, it is up to the States to take measures necessary
to prevent double taxation by applying, in particular, the apportionment criteria
adhered to in international tax practice. Thus, the ECJ has recognised that the
States are competent to conclude bilateral agreements to reduce or eliminate
double taxation.21 These conventions are designed to eliminate or mitigate
the negative effect on the functioning of the internal market resulting from the
coexistence of national tax systems.22
58. ESA submits that the EEA States are nonetheless obliged to comply with
EEA law when it comes to the exercise of their taxation power, and cannot
introduce discriminatory measures contrary to the fundamental freedoms.23
ESA concludes that the rules on calculation of credit allowance must therefore
not constitute discrimination or restriction on the freedom of establishment as
laid down in Article 31 EEA.
59. ESA submits that the freedom of establishment which Article 31 EEA
guarantees nationals of an EEA State entails, in accordance with Article 34
EEA, for companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of an EEA
State and having their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the EEA, the right to exercise their activity in another
EEA State through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency. Even though the
rules on freedom of establishment are mainly aimed at ensuring that foreign
nationals and companies are treated in the host State in the same way as
nationals of that State, they also prohibit the State of origin from hindering the
establishment in another EEA State of one of its nationals or of a company
ESA refers to Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793, at paragraphs 15 and 16.
ESA refers to Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967, at paragraphs 22 and 23.
21
ESA refers to Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793, at paragraph 23.
22
ESA refers to Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967, at paragraph 21.
23
ESA refers to Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank [2004] EFTA Ct. Rep. p. 11, at paragraphs 20–21; Case C-385/00 De Groot [2002] ECR
I-11819, at paragraph 94 and Case C-265/04 Bouanich [2006] ECR I-923, at paragraph 50.
19
20
300 - 215
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å avskaffe dobbeltbeskatning. Uansett har EF-domstolen gjennomgående
holdt fast ved at denne bestemmelsen definerer et mål, og ikke er ment å
oppstille en direkte anvendelig rettsregel.19 For det annet, etter EF-domstolens
rettspraksis, fastsetter ikke fellesskapsretten på sitt nåværende stadium noen
generelle kriterier for fordeling av medlemsstatenes kompetanse i forhold til
avskaffelse av dobbeltbeskatning innen fellesskapet.20 Følgelig er det opp til
statene å treffe nødvendige tiltak for å forhindre dobbeltbeskatning, særlig
ved å anvende fordelingskriteriene som følges i internasjonal skattepraksis.
Således har EF-domstolen anerkjent at statene har kompetanse til å inngå
bilaterale avtaler for å redusere eller avskaffe dobbeltbeskatning.21 Disse
konvensjonene har til formål å fjerne eller bøte på den negative virkningen
som sameksistensen av nasjonale skattesystemer har for det indre markeds
funksjon.22
59. Ifølge saksøker garanterer EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 statsborgere av EØSstatene fri etableringsrett, noe som inkluderer retten til å starte og utøve
næringsvirksomhet, og til å opprette og lede foretak, på de vilkår som
lovgivningen i etableringsstaten fastsetter for egne borgere. Dette innebærer,
i overensstemmelse med EØS-avtalen artikkel 34, en rett for selskaper
som er opprettet i samsvar med lovgivningen i en EØS-stat, og som har sitt
vedtektsbestemte sete, sin hovedadministrasjon eller sitt hovedforetak innen
EØS, til å utøve virksomhet i en annen EØS-stat gjennom et datterselskap,
en filial eller et agentur. Selv om reglene om fri bevegelighet hovedsakelig
tar sikte på å sikre at utenlandske statsborgere og selskaper blir behandlet
på samme måte i vertsstaten som statsborgere av den staten, forbyr reglene
også opprinnelsesstaten å oppstille hindringer for at en av dens statsborgere
eller et selskap som er stiftet i overensstemmelse med dens lovgivning, og
ESA viser til sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793 (avsnitt 15 og 16).
ESA viser til sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967 (avsnitt 22 og 23).
21
ESA viser til sak C336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793 (avsnitt 23).
22
ESA viser til sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967 (avsnitt 21).
23
ESA viser til sak E-1/04 Fokus Bank, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2004 s. 11 (avsnitt 20–21), sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819
(avsnitt 94) og sak C-265/04 Bouanich, Sml. 2006 s. I-923 (avsnitt 50).
19
20
301 - 215
58. ESA hevder at EØS-statene likevel er forpliktet til å rette seg etter EØS-retten
når det gjelder utøvelsen av sin beskatningsmyndighet, og at de ikke kan innføre
diskriminerende ordninger i strid med grunnfrihetene.23 ESA konkluderer med
at reglene om beregning av kreditfradrag derfor ikke må utgjøre diskriminering
eller en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten som fastsatt i EØS-avtalen 31.
incorporated under its legislation which comes within the definition contained
in Article 31 EEA.24
60. ESA derives from the case law of the ECJ that, in the absence of harmonisation
of national measures in this field, the difficulties ensuing for economic operators
because of mere differences in tax regimes between States are outside
the scope of the EEA Agreement.25 Article 31 EEA prohibits restrictions on
freedom of establishment, other than those that inevitably result from the fact
that tax systems are national. Disadvantageous tax treatment that follows from
direct or covert discrimination resulting from the rules of one jurisdiction, rather
than simply from disparities in or the division of tax jurisdiction between two
countries’ tax systems, infringes Article 31 EEA unless it can be justified.
61. ESA first assesses whether, in a situation in which debt interests and group
contributions cannot be linked to any specific activity, either in Scotland or in
Norway, the Norwegian credit rules constitute a restriction of the freedom of
establishment.
62. ESA points out that the tax rules under examination aim to eliminate or mitigate
the effects of double taxation, by granting a tax credit, limited to the tax in
Norway that falls on the proportion of the income derived abroad. The logic
behind this appears to be, in ESA’s view, that differences in the overall tax
burden stemming from the exercise in parallel by two EEA States of their fiscal
sovereignty is not to be borne by Norway. As EEA States are not obliged to
eliminate double taxation, they are not compelled by the EEA Agreement to
grant full relief when they adopt methods intended to relieve double taxation
63. In the view of ESA, the fact that Norway does not grant tax deductions for
expenses not connected with any specific income does not constitute a
restriction on the freedom of establishment of Norwegian companies.
64. ESA remarks that the absence of full deduction could lead to a heavier
overall tax burden for a Norwegian company with a branch in the UK, than
for companies solely based in Norway if the costs attributed to the branch in
the UK are not fully deductible there. However, in the given situation, such a
24
25
ESA refers to Case C-81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] ECR 5483, at paragraph 16 and Case C-200/98 X and Y v
Riksskatteverket [1999] ECR I-8261, at paragraph 26.
ESA refers to Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793, at paragraphs 47 and 48 and the conclusions of Advocate General Poiares
Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, at paragraph 23.
302 - 216
60. ESA utleder fra EF-domstolens rettspraksis at, i mangel av harmonisering
av nasjonale tiltak faller de vanskeligheter for de næringsdrivende som kan
følge av forskjeller i medlemsstatenes beskatningsordninger, utenfor EØSavtalens virkeområde.25 Restriksjoner som uunngåelig resulterer fra det
faktum at skattesystemer er nasjonale, anses ikke som restriksjoner på den
frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Ufordelaktig skattemessig
behandling som følger av direkte eller skjult diskriminering forårsaket av reglene
i én jurisdiksjon, og ikke kun av ulikheter i eller delingen av skattejurisdiksjon
mellom to lands skattesystemer, krenker EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 med mindre
den kan rettferdiggjøres.
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som for øvrig er omfattet av definisjonen i EØS-avtalen artikkel 31, etablerer
seg i en annen EØS-stat.24
61. ESA vurderer først hvorvidt de norske kreditreglene utgjør en restriksjon på
den frie etableringsretten i en situasjon hvor gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag
ikke kan knyttes til noen bestemt virksomhet i Skottland eller i Norge.
62. ESA påpeker at skattereglene som undersøkes her, har som formål å fjerne eller
dempe virkningene av dobbeltbeskatning ved å gi et skattefradrag begrenset
til den skatten i Norge som faller på andelen av inntekten fra utlandet. Den
underliggende logikken ser etter ESAs oppfatning ut til å være at forskjeller i
den samlede skattebyrden som stammer fra to EØS-staters samtidige utøvelse
av sin skattemessige suverenitet, ikke skal bæres av Norge. Da EØS-stater
ikke er forpliktet til å avskaffe dobbeltbeskatning, følger det at de ikke tvinges
av EØS-avtalen til å gi full skattelettelse når de tar i bruk metoder for å lempe
på dobbeltbeskatning.
64. ESA bemerker at mangelen på fullt fradrag kunne føre til en større samlet
skattebyrde for et norsk selskap med en filial i Det forente kongerike enn for
selskaper som kun er basert i Norge, hvis kostnadene tilordnet filialen i Det
forente kongerike ikke er fullt ut fradragsberettigede der. I den foreliggende
ESA viser til sak C-81/87 Daily Mail og General Trust, Sml. 1988 s. 5483 (avsnitt 16) og sak C-200/98 X og Y mot Riksskatteverket,
Sml. 1999 s. I-8261 (avsnitt 26).
25
ESA viser til sak C-336/96 Gilly, Sml. 1998 s. I-2793 (avsnitt 47 og 48) og generaladvokat Poiares Maduros innstilling i sak
C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837 (avsnitt 23).
24
-- 216
303 --
63. Det faktum at Norge ikke gir skattefradrag for kostnader som ikke er tilknyttet
noen bestemt inntekt, utgjør etter ESAs oppfatning ikke en restriksjon på den
frie etableringsretten for norske selskaper.
difference would result from the differences in the two tax systems, as regards
tax rate and rules on deduction.26
65. ESA concludes that when expenses not solely related to the activity in Norway
are deducted from the income taxed abroad for the purposes of calculating the
credit allowance, there is no restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA.
66. ESA next assesses the situation where debt interest and group contributions
can be linked solely to the business in Norway. It submits that under such
circumstances, the method for calculating the credit allowance would entail
that a company with an establishment in another EEA State would derive from
these expenses a lesser tax advantage than if it had operated solely in Norway.
In the opinion of ESA, this amounts to differentiated tax treatment contrary to
Article 31.
67. ESA underlines that if certain expenses can be linked solely to the activity of
the business in Norway, this means that even if the company had no branch
(either in Norway or the UK) it would bear the exact same amount of expenses.
Moreover, such expenses will not increase or decrease in proportion to the
income of the branch. ESA also notes that such expenses will not be deductible
from the income of the branch when calculating the tax payable in the UK.
68. In the given situation, the effect of the Norwegian tax rules is that expenses
considered partially attributable to the branch in the UK are deductible from
the tax payable in Norway only in proportion to the income of the Norwegian
head office. This means that the tax base for the Norwegian head office
increases with an amount equal to the deduction attributed to the UK branch.
In ESA’s view, this situation is comparable to that examined in de Groot
and the considerations of the ECJ in that case are applicable in this case.27
ESA remarks that if the expenses are intrinsically linked with the business
in Norway, the State where the branch is established, exercising its limited
tax competence in accordance with international tax practice, would not take
those expenses into account due to the lack of cohesion between them and
income derived in the territory of the branch.
69. ESA contends that a Norwegian company that establishes a branch abroad
will suffer disadvantage since it will not be able to deduct from its income in
ESA refers to Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert [2006] ECR I-10967, at paragraph 20, concerning a disadvantage resulting from the
exercise in parallel by two States of their fiscal sovereignty.
27
ESA refers to Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819.
26
304 - 217
65. ESA konkluderer med at når kostnader som ikke alene er tilknyttet virksomheten
i Norge, trekkes fra den beskattede inntekten i utlandet ved beregningen av
kreditfradraget, er det ingen restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
66. ESA vurderer så situasjonen hvor gjeldsrenter og konsernbidrag kan knyttes
utelukkende til virksomheten i Norge. ESA hevder at under slike omstendigheter
ville metodene for beregning av kreditfradraget innebære at et selskap med
et driftssted i en annen EØS-stat, ville få en mindre skattefordel av disse
kostnadene enn om selskapet kun hadde drevet i Norge. Etter ESAs mening
innebærer dette en skattemessig forskjellsbehandling i strid med artikkel 31.
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situasjonen ville imidlertid en slik forskjell skyldes ulikhetene i de to
skattesystemene når det gjelder skattesats og fradragsregler.26
68. I den foreliggende situasjonen er virkningen av de norske skattereglene at
kostnader som anses å delvis kunne tilordnes filialen i Det forente kongerike,
er fradragsberettigede i skatten som skal betales i Norge bare i forhold til
inntekten til det norske hovedkontoret. Dette betyr at skattegrunnlaget for
det norske hovedkontoret øker med et beløp tilsvarende fradraget som er
tilordnet den britiske filialen. Etter ESAs oppfatning er denne situasjonen
sammenlignbar med den som ble vurdert i de Groot, og EF-domstolens
betraktninger i den saken er anvendelige i denne saken.27 ESA bemerker at
dersom kostnadene er uløselig knyttet til virksomheten i Norge, ville staten
hvor filialen er etablert, når den utøver sin begrensede beskatningsmyndighet
i henhold til internasjonal skattepraksis, ikke ta de kostnadene i betraktning, på
grunn av den manglende sammenhengen mellom dem og inntekten opptjent
på territoriet til filialen.
69. ESA hevder at et norsk selskap som etablerer en filial i utlandet, vil utsettes for
en ulempe siden det ikke vil kunne trekke fra i sin inntekt i Norge det samme
ESA viser til sak C-513/04 Kerckhaert, Sml. 2006 s. I-10967 (avsnitt 20) vedrørende en ulempe som følge av to staters parallelle
utøvelse av sin skattemessige suverenitet.
27
ESA viser til sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819.
26
- 217
305 -
67. ESA understreker at dersom visse kostnader kan knyttes utelukkende til
selskapets virksomhet i Norge, betyr dette at selv om selskapet ikke hadde
noen filial (verken i Norge eller i Det forente kongerike), ville det oppebåret
nøyaktig like store kostnader. Dessuten vil ikke slike kostnader øke eller avta i
forhold til filialens inntekt. ESA bemerker også at slike kostnader ikke vil være
fradragsberettigede i inntekten til filialen ved beregningen av skatten som skal
betales i Det forente kongerike.
Norway the same amount of expenses that it would have deducted had it not
exercised its freedom of establishment. This disadvantage is, in ESA’s view, not
due to disparities between the tax systems of the two countries involved, but
the manner in which the national tax provisions at issue treat expenses linked
to the business in Norway. This is liable to discourage Norwegian companies
from creating, acquiring, or maintaining a branch in another EEA State. The
rules accordingly constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment under
Article 31 EEA.
70. ESA suggests answering the reformulated questions as follows:
1) Article 31 EEA does not preclude national tax provisions, such as those at
issue in the main proceedings, whereby a portion of the deductible expenses
that are not economically linked to the activity of the head office is allocated to a
branch established in another Contracting Party for the purposes of calculating
the maximum credit allowance.
2) National tax provisions, such as those at issue in the main proceedings,
whereby a portion of the deductible expenses that are economically linked
solely to the activity of the head office is allocated to a branch established in
another Contracting Party for the purposes of calculating the maximum credit
allowance, constitute a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA. It is for
the national court to assess whether that restriction can be justified.
71. With respect to the applicable EEA law, the Commission of the European
Communities (hereinafter “the Commission”) submits that the general
prohibition of discrimination in Article 4 EEA does not need to be examined
separately. Further, the relevant freedom is the freedom of establishment
provided for in Article 31 EEA, whereas the free movement of capital protected
by Article 40 EEA is only affected in a subsidiary manner.28
72. The Commission submits that as a general rule, the tax system of an EEA/
EFTA State is not covered by the EEA agreement, but the States must however
exercise their taxation power in consistency with EEA law.29
73. As concerns the freedom of establishment, the Commission states that its
aim is to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the host country by
28
29
The Commission refers to Case C-231/04 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373, at paragraphs 23–24.
The Commission refers to Case E-6/98 Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, at paragraph 34; Case
E-1/01 Hörður Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, at paragraph 17 and Case E-1/03 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland [2003]
306 - 218
70. ESA foreslår å besvare de omformulerte spørsmålene på følgende måte:
1) EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 er ikke til hinder for nasjonale skattebestemmelser,
slik som de aktuelle i denne saken, hvorved en del av de fradragsberettigede
utgiftene som ikke er økonomisk knyttet til hovedkontorets virksomhet, fordeles
til en filial opprettet i en annen avtalepart ved beregningen av maksimalt
kreditfradrag.
2) Nasjonale skattebestemmelser, slik som de aktuelle i denne saken,
hvorved en del av de fradragsberettigede kostnadene som er økonomisk
knyttet utelukkende til hovedkontorets virksomhet, fordeles til en filial opprettet
i en annen avtalepart ved beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag, utgjør en
restriksjon etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Det er opp til den nasjonale domstolen
å vurdere hvorvidt restriksjonen kan rettferdiggjøres.
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kostnadsbeløpet som det ville ha trukket fra dersom det ikke hadde utøvet
sin frie etableringsrett. Denne ulempen er, etter ESAs oppfatning, ikke en
følge av ulikheter mellom skattesystemene til de to involverte landene, men
av måten de omstridte nasjonale skattereglene behandler kostnader knyttet til
virksomheten i Norge på. Dette kan avholde norske selskaper fra å opprette,
anskaffe eller opprettholde en filial i en annen EØS-stat. Reglene utgjør følgelig
en restriksjon på den frie etableringsretten etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap
72. Kommisjonen gjør gjeldende at skattesystemet til en EØS/EFTA-stat i
utgangspunktet ikke faller innenfor EØS-avtalen, men at statene likevel må
utøve sin beskatningsmyndighet i overensstemmelse med EØS-retten.29
73. Når det gjelder etableringsfriheten, uttaler Kommisjonen at dens formål er
å sikre fordelen av nasjonal behandling i vertsstaten, ved å forby enhver
28
29
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-231/05 Oy AA, Sml. 2007 s. I-6373, (avsnitt 23–24).
Kommisjonen viser til sak E-6/98 Norge mot EFTAs overvåkingsorgan, EFTA Ct. Rep. 1999 s. 74 (avsnitt 34), sak E-1/01 Hörður
Einarsson, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2002 s. 1 (avsnitt 17) og sak E-1/03 EFTAs overvåkingsorgan mot Island, EFTA Ct. Rep. 2003 s. 143
(avsnitt 26).
307 --- 218
71. Hva angår EØS-retten som skal anvendes, hevder Kommisjonen for De
europeiske fellesskap (”Kommisjonen”) at det ikke er nødvendig å undersøke
det generelle diskrimineringsforbudet i EØS-avtalen artikkel 4 separat. Videre
er den relevante friheten etableringsfriheten fastslått i EØS-avtalen artikkel
31, mens den frie bevegelighet av kapital, som er beskyttet av EØS-avtalen
artikkel 40, bare er påvirket på underordnet vis.28
prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in which companies have
their seat.30 Equally, Article 31 EEA prohibits the EEA State of origin from
hindering the establishment in another EEA State of one of its nationals or of
a company incorporated under its legislation.31
74. In the present case, while a company doing business solely in Norway would
enjoy a full deduction for the expenses in question, the Plaintiff has suffered
double taxation by reason of the fact that part of its income is earned in another
EEA State. Unless this difference in treatment corresponds to an objective
and relevant difference in situation, it constitutes discrimination contrary to
Article 31 EEA. Alternatively, if a company such as the Plaintiff is in a different
situation from a company which operates solely in Norway, then any difference
in treatment must correspond to that difference in situation.32
75. The Commission first examines the calculation of the maximum credit
allowance in Norway in relation to expenses referred to in the first question,
i.e. debt interest. In the Commission’s view, if the interest expenses relate to
financial obligations incurred for the company as a whole, then a proportional
amount should indeed be attributed to the income earned in the UK. In that
case, it would be up to the Plaintiff to make such a claim to the UK authorities.
Whether or not the interest expenses relate solely to the business in Norway is,
however, a question of fact for the national court. Therefore, the observations
of the Commission are submitted on the hypothesis that the interest expenses
in issue were incurred for the sole purposes of the Norwegian business
operations of the Plaintiff.
76. The Commission holds that by attributing part of the interest expenses to the
Scottish branch, the Norwegian tax authorities reduced the amount of tax
that should be paid by that branch and hence the amount of the tax credit to
be granted to the Plaintiff in Norway. The rules on calculating the tax credit
provide that debt interest expenses, which are deductible in Norway, must
always be attributed to Norway or the foreign country in question in proportion
to where the net income of the company is earned, irrespective of the purpose
for which the debt was incurred. The Commission is of the opinion that such a
calculation is discriminatory. Allocating debt interest expenses independently
30
31
32
The Commission refers to Case C-446/04 Test Claimants FII [2006] ECR I-11753, at paragraph 40.
The Commission refers to Case C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, at paragraph 21 and Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005]
ECR I-10837, at paragraph 31.
As concerns the concept of discrimination, the Commission refers to Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] ECR I-2651,
at paragraph 26.
308 - 219
74. I den foreliggende saken har saksøker blitt rammet av dobbeltbeskatning på
grunn av det faktum at deler av saksøkers inntekt er opptjent i en annen EØSstat, mens et selskap som kun driver virksomhet i Norge, kan nyte godt av fullt
fradrag for de aktuelle kostnadene. Med mindre denne forskjellsbehandlingen
relaterer seg til en objektiv og relevant forskjell i selskapenes situasjon,
utgjør den diskriminering i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31. Alternativt,
hvis et selskap som saksøker og et selskap som kun driver i Norge, er i
forskjellige situasjoner, må enhver forskjellsbehandling tilsvare den forskjellen
i situasjonen.32
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diskriminering basert på selskapers hjemsted.30 Likeledes forbyr EØS-avtalen
artikkel 31 opprinnelsesstaten i å hindre at en av dens statsborgere eller et
selskap opprettet i samsvar med dens lovgivning etablerer seg i en annen
EØS-stat.31
76. Kommisjonen fremholder at norske skattemyndigheter, ved å tilordne deler
av rentekostnadene til den skotske filialen, reduserte skattebeløpet som
skulle betales av den filialen og dermed kreditfradraget som skulle gis
saksøker i Norge. Reglene om beregningen av kreditfradraget foreskriver
at gjeldsrentekostnadene, som er fradragsberettigede i Norge, alltid må
tilordnes Norge eller det andre aktuelle landet forholdsmessig etter hvor
selskapets nettoinntekt er opptjent, uten hensyn til hvor gjelden var pådratt.
Kommisjonen er av den mening at en slik beregning er diskriminerende. Å
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-446/04 Test Claimants FII, Sml. 2006 s. I-11753 (avsnitt 40).
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-264/96 ICI, Sml. 1998 s. I-4695 (avsnitt 21) og sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837
(avsnitt 31).
32
Når det gjelder diskrimineringsbegrepet, viser Kommisjonen til sak C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland, Sml. 1999 s. I-2651
(avsnitt 26).
30
31
309 - 219
75. Kommisjonen undersøker først beregningen av maksimalt kreditfradrag i Norge
i forhold til kostnader vist til i det første spørsmålet, altså gjeldsrenter. Dersom
rentekostnadene relaterer seg til finansielle forpliktelser pådratt for selskapet
som helhet, er det Kommisjonens oppfatning at et forholdsmessig beløp klart
nok bør tilordnes inntekten opptjent i Det forente kongerike. I så fall ville det
være opp til saksøker å fremme et slikt krav overfor britiske myndigheter.
Om rentekostnadene kun relaterer seg til virksomheten i Norge eller ikke, er
imidlertid et faktisk spørsmål som det må være opp til den nasjonale domstolen
å avgjøre. Derfor er Kommisjonens innlegg avgitt under den forutsetning at de
omstridte rentekostnadene ble pådratt utelukkende av grunner som relaterer
seg til saksøkers norske næringsvirksomhet.
of the purpose for which the debt was incurred does not correspond to the
situation of the taxpayer.
77. The Commission points out that Norway has recognised the disincentive against
doing business in another country, inherent in (juridical) double taxation, by the
laying down of rules in the DTA with the UK for the avoidance of such double
taxation. Those rules allocate the taxing power, entitling the host State to tax
the income of a permanent establishment, taking into account a proportionate
amount of the general expenses of the taxpayer. The State of residence of
the taxpayer is in return obliged to grant a credit in the amount of the tax paid,
although not more than the amount it would charge on the same income.
78. The Commission contends that attributing interest expenses to the branch,
in the manner laid down in the Norwegian legislation and applied in the case
at hand, is contrary to the allocation of taxing power stipulated in the DTA. It
disregards the rule that only expenses which are incurred for the purposes
of the branch are deductible in the State where the branch is situated. This
is also contrary to Article 31 EEA because it treats a company which makes
use of its freedom of establishment less favourably than a company which
operates solely in Norway, and may furthermore be considered contrary to that
provision because it erects an important obstacle to cross-border business
activity. There is no apparent justification for that obstacle, and none has thus
far been pleaded by the Norwegian tax authorities.
79. In the Commission’s view, the logic of the de Groot judgment, 33 relied on by
the Plaintiff, is transferable to this case to the extent that it shows that a State
cannot withdraw normal tax advantages where a taxpayer earns income which
is taxed in another State.
80. The Commission contends that the difference in tax rates between the two
States involved cannot account for the large reduction made in the amount
of the credit allowance. This difference clearly corresponds to the attribution
of part of the interest expenses to the UK income. In so far as the interest
expenses in question relate to a debt incurred solely for the purposes of the
Norwegian business, the allocation of a part of them to the branch in Scotland
in order to calculate the amount of credit for tax paid by the branch is contrary
to Article 31 EEA.
33
Case C-385/00 de Groot [2002] ECR I-11819.
310 - 220
77. Kommisjonen påpeker at Norge har anerkjent at det er et disincentiv mot
å drive virksomhet i et annet land iboende i (rettslig) dobbeltbeskatning,
ved at Norge sammen med Det forente kongerike har fastsatt regler i
skatteavtalen for å unngå slik dobbeltbeskatning. Disse reglene fordeler
beskatningsmyndigheten og gir vertsstaten beskatningsrett for inntekter
fra et fast driftssted under hensyntagen til et forholdsmessig beløp av
skattebetalerens generalomkostninger. Hjemstaten er til gjengjeld forpliktet til
å gi et kreditfradrag i den betalte skatten, skjønt ikke mer enn beløpet den ville
beskattet den samme inntekten med.
78. Kommisjonen hevder at det å fordele rentekostnader til filialen på den måten
som er nedfelt i den norske lovgivningen og anvendt i den foreliggende
saken, er i strid med fordelingen av beskatningsmyndighet som er fastsatt i
skatteavtalen. Den tar ikke hensyn til regelen om at kun kostnader som er
pådratt filialen er fradragsberettigede i den staten der filialen ligger. Denne
metoden er også i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 fordi den behandler et
selskap som benytter seg av sin frie etableringsretten mindre fordelaktig enn
et selskap som kun driver i Norge. Den kan videre også anses som stridende
mot artikkel 31 fordi den oppstiller et betydelig hinder for grenseoverskridende
næringsvirksomhet. Det er ingen opplagt rettferdiggjøringsgrunn for et slikt
hinder, og så langt har ikke de norske skattemyndighetene påberopt seg
noen.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case
vín
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-7/07
Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
fordele gjeldsrentekostnader uavhengig av det formål gjelden var pådratt for,
korresponderer ikke med skattebetalerens situasjon.
80. Kommisjonen hevder at forskjellen i skattesatser mellom de to involverte
statene ikke kan være årsaken til den betydelige reduksjonen som ble gjort
i kreditfradragets størrelse. Denne forskjellen korresponderer klart nok med
tilordningen av deler av rentekostnadene til den britiske inntekten. I den
utstrekning de aktuelle rentekostnadene relaterer seg til en gjeld som kun er
pådratt av grunner som relaterer seg til den norske virksomheten, er fordelingen
av en del av dem til filialen i Skottland for å beregne kreditfradraget for skatt
betalt av filialen, i strid med EØS-avtalen 31.
33
Sak C-385/00 de Groot, Sml. 2002 s. I-11819.
- 220
311 -
79. Etter Kommisjonens oppfatning er logikken bak dommen i de Groot,33 som
saksøker støtter seg på, overførbar til denne saken i den grad den viser at en
stat ikke kan fjerne normale skattefordeler i de tilfellene hvor en skattebetaler
har inntekt som er beskattet i en annen stat.
81. With respect to the expenses referred to in the second question, i.e. group
contributions, the Commission points out that even if the UK had a similar
scheme of group contributions, it would not be obliged under Article 31 EEA
to extend the scheme to a contribution made to a company in Norway.34 That
is, moreover, consistent with the scheme as laid down in the Norwegian
legislation itself that applies solely to companies and to income taxable in
Norway. Norway would not grant a deduction in respect of a group contribution
to a company in the UK, nor can it expect the UK to grant such a deduction.
82. Accordingly, just as the attribution of a part of the specific expenses of the
head office to the permanent establishment in another EEA State gives rise
to discrimination contrary to Article 31 EEA, as described above, so is the
attribution of a portion of the group contribution to the branch discriminatory,
the Commission argues.
83. The Commission contends that such an attribution does not correspond to the
situation of the taxpayer, as it disregards the fact that it is unable to deduct any
part of the group contributions in the host State of the branch. By this, Norway
has in effect re-appropriated, in an indirect manner, a portion of the tax base
allocated to the UK under the DTA.
84. Further, the Commission submits that the attribution of part of the group
contributions to the branch in the UK is contrary to the principle of fiscal
cohesion, which serves to protect the “internal logic of national tax regimes”,
so long as they are not “arranged in such a way as to favour national situations
or traders”.35
85. The Commission argues that the principle of fiscal cohesion has in general
been advanced by national tax authorities as a justification for measures which
are unfavourable to taxpayers who do business across frontiers. Equally, it
must be possible for the taxpayer to invoke the concept of cohesion in order to
ensure that the tax rules are applied in a consistent manner and in accordance
with the logic of the system. This approach can be seen in certain of the ECJ’s
judgments.36
The Commission refers to Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373.
The Commission refers to the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR
36
The Commission refers to Case C-234/01 Gerritse [2003] ECR I-5933 and Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477.
34
35
312 - 221
82. Følgelig, på samme måte som tilordningen av en del av de særskilte
kostnadene fra hovedkontoret til det faste driftsstedet i en annen EØSstat forårsaker diskriminering i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 som
beskrevet over, er også tilordningen av en del av konsernbidraget til filialen
diskriminerende, anfører Kommisjonen.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case
vín
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-7/07
Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
81. Med hensyn til kostnadene vist til i annet spørsmål, altså konsernbidrag,
påpeker Kommisjonen at selv om Det forente kongerike hadde hatt et
tilsvarende konsernbidragssystem, ville Det forente kongerike ikke vært
forpliktet etter EØS-avtalen 31 til å inkludere i systemet et bidrag gjort til et
selskap i Norge.34 Dette stemmer for øvrig overens med systemet den norske
lovgivningen selv fastsetter, som kun gjelder for selskaper og skattbar inntekt
i Norge. Norge ville ikke ha gitt fradrag for et konsernbidrag til et selskap i Det
forente kongerike, og Norge kan heller ikke forvente at Det forente kongerike
gir et slikt fradrag.
83. Kommisjonen hevder at en slik tilordning ikke korresponderer med
skattebetalerens situasjon, da den ikke tar hensyn til det faktum at
skattebetaleren ikke kan trekke fra noen del av konsernbidraget i filialens
vertsstat. Med dette har Norge, på en indirekte måte, i virkeligheten lagt
beslag på en del av skattegrunnlaget som er lagt til Det forente kongerike etter
skatteavtalen.
85. Kommisjonen anfører at prinsippet om skattemessig sammenheng vanligvis
har blitt fremmet av nasjonale skattemyndigheter som en rettferdiggjøring for
ordninger som er ugunstige for skattebetalere som driver virksomhet på tvers
av landegrensene. På samme måte må det være mulig for skattebetaleren å
påberope seg sammenhengsbegrepet for å sikre at skattereglene anvendes
på en konsistent måte og i overensstemmelse med logikken i systemet. Denne
tilnærmingen kan ses i visse av EF-domstolens dommer.36
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-231/05 Oy AA, Sml. 2007 s. I-6373.
Kommisjonen viser til generaladvokat Poiares Maduros instilling i sak C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Sml. 2005 s. I-10837 (avsnitt
66).
36
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-234/01 Gerritse, Sml. 2003 s. I-5933 og sak C-319/02 Manninen, Sml. 2004 s. I‑7477.
34
35
313 --- 221
84. Videre gjør Kommisjonen gjeldende at tilordningen av en del av
konsernbidragene til filialen i Det forente kongerike strider mot prinsippet
om skattemessig sammenheng, som tjener til å beskytte ”de nationale
beskatningsordningers indre systematikk”, så lenge de ikke ”begunstiger
nationale situationer eller operatører”.35
86. In the Commissions’ view, the group deduction scheme applied in the case at
hand is based on a balancing which takes place solely at the national level in
order to ensure there is no loss of tax base. The integrity of the tax base has
been recognised as a legitimate interest.37 An EEA State may not artificially
increase its tax base by, in effect, extending the group contribution scheme to
cover income earned in another EEA State.
87. The Commission submits that consequently, the allocation in question of group
contributions made by the Plaintiff is contrary to Article 31 EEA.
88. The Commission suggests answering the questions as follows:
1. Article 31 of the EEA Agreement precludes national tax provisions under
which, in order to calculate the maximum credit allowance, a portion of the
debt interest paid by a company is attributed to income earned through a
foreign permanent establishment, in so far as the debt interest is not in reality
attributable to the business activities of the foreign permanent establishment.
2. Article 31 of the EEA Agreement precludes national tax provisions under
which, in order to calculate the maximum credit allowance, a portion of the
group contributions made by a company is attributed to income earned through
a foreign permanent establishment..
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Judge-Rapporteur
37
The Commission refers to Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373.
314 - 222
87. Kommisjonen gjør gjeldende at den aktuelle fordelingen av saksøkers
konsernbidrag følgelig er i strid med EØS-avtalen artikkel 31.
88. Kommisjonen foreslår at spørsmålene besvares som følger:
1. EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 er til hinder for nasjonale skattebestemmelser
som, for å beregne maksimalt kreditfradrag, tilordner en del av gjeldsrentene
betalt av et selskap til inntekt opptjent gjennom et fast utenlandsk driftssted, i
den grad gjeldsrentene ikke i realiteten må tilordnes næringsvirksomheten ved
det faste utenlandske driftsstedet.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón E-6/07
Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Case
vín
Faxaflóahafnir
sf.
E-7/07
Seabrokers
AS ehf.
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTAHOB
Surveillance
v Norway
86. Etter Kommisjonens oppfatning er gruppefradragssystemet anvendt i den
foreliggende saken basert på en avveining som utføres alene på nasjonalt
plan for å sikre at ikke noe av skattegrunnlaget går tapt. Skattegrunnlagets
fullstendighet er blitt anerkjent som et legitimt hensyn.37 EØS-stater får
ikke på kunstig måte øke sine skattegrunnlag ved i virkeligheten å utvide
konsernbidragssystemet til å omfatte inntekt opptjent i en annen EØS-stat.
2. EØS-avtalen artikkel 31 er til hinder for nasjonale skattebestemmelser som,
for å beregne maksimalt kreditfradrag, tilordner en del av konsernbidragene
gitt av et selskap til inntekt opptjent gjennom et fast utenlandsk driftssted.
Thorgeir Örlygsson
37
Kommisjonen viser til sak C-231/05 Oy AA, Sml. 2007 s. I-6373.
-- 222
315 --
Forberedende dommer
- 316 -
Case E-8/07
Celina Nguyen
v
The Norwegian State, represented by
Justis- og politidepartementet
(the Ministry of Justice and the Police)
- 317 -
CASE E-8/07
Celina Nguyen
v
The Norwegian State, represented by Justis- og politidepartementet
(the Ministry of Justice and the Police)
(Compulsory insurance for civil liability in respect of motor vehicles –
Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – compensation for
non-economic injury – conditions for State liability – sufficiently serious breach)
Judgment of the Court, 20 June 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
1. The Motor Vehicle Insurance
Directives do not seek to harmonise
the rules of the EEA States governing
civil liability. The EEA States are free to
determine the rules of civil liability applicable
to road traffic accidents. However, the EEA
States must exercise their powers in this
field in compliance with EEA law. National
provisions governing compensation for
road accidents cannot therefore deprive the
Directives of their effectiveness. Moreover,
the EEA States must ensure that the civil
liability arising under their domestic law
is covered by insurance which complies
with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Insurance Directives.
3. Redress such as the one at issue in
the main proceedings by its nature gives
a person the right to obtain compensation
from another person and as such constitutes a form of civil liability. In this regard,
it is irrelevant whether redress under national law may have a penal character and
whether the penal character is primary or
secondary to the compensatory function of
the institution. Although the Motor Vehicle
Insurance Directives are not intended to
require the adoption a particular type of liability, they require that all civil liability in
respect of the use of motor vehicles be
covered, irrespective of whether the liability is based on fault or on risk.
2. Article 3(1) of the First Motor Vehicle
Directive, read in conjunction with Article
1(1) and 1(2) of the Second Directive and
Article 1 of the Third Directive, must be interpreted as covering both economic loss
and non-economic injury such as pain and
suffering.
4. Consequently, it is not compatible
with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except redress for non-economic
injury (“pain and suffering”), which is a
form of civil liability, from the compulsory
insurance system under national law.
- 318
224 -
Celina Nguyen
v
Staten v/Justis- og politidepartementet
(Obligatorisk forsikring for erstatningsansvar med hensyn til motorvogner – direktiv
72/166/EØF, 84/5/EØF og 90/232/EØF – erstatning for ikke-økonomisk skade – vilkår
for statens erstatningsansvar – tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd)
Domstolens dom, 20. juni 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Rettsmøterapport. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Case Case
E-4/07E-8/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Celina
Nguyen v The
Norwegian
State
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
SAK E-8/07
Domssammendrag
2. Bestemmelsene i første motorvognforsikringsdirektivs artikkel 3 nr. 1, lest i
sammenheng med annet direktivs artikkel
1 nr. 1 og 2 samt tredje direktivs artikkel
1, må tolkes dit hen at de omfatter både
økonomisk tap og ikke-økonomisk skade,
som tort og smerte.
3. Slik oppreisning som det gjelder i saken for tingretten, gir etter sin art én person
rett til erstatning fra en annen person og
utgjør som sådan en form for erstatningsansvar. I denne henseende er det uten betydning hvorvidt oppreisning etter nasjonal
rett kan ha en pønal karakter og hvorvidt
den pønale karakteren er overordnet eller underordnet instituttets erstatnings
funksjon. Selv om noe krav om å etablere
en særskilt form for ansvar ikke er tilsiktet
med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene, krever disse at ethvert erstatningsansvar med
hensyn til bruk av motorvogn skal omfattes, uten hensyn til om ansvaret bygger på
skyld eller er objektivt.
4. Følgelig er det ikke forenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (“tort og
smerte”), som er en form for erstatningsansvar, fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal rett.
- 319
224 -
Summary
1. Motorvognforsikringsdirektivene tar
ikke sikte på å harmonisere EØS-statens
regler om erstatningsansvar. EØS-statene
står fritt til å fastlegge erstatningsreglene
som skal gjelde for trafikkulykker. Statene
må imidlertid utøve sin myndighet på dette
området i overensstemmelse med EØSretten. Nasjonale bestemmelser om erstatning ved trafikkulykker får således ikke
frata direktivene deres tjenlige virkning.
Enn videre må EØS-statene sikre at det
erstatningsansvar som etter nasjonal rett
kommer til anvendelse, er dekket av forsikring i overensstemmelse med motorvognforsikringsdirektivenes bestemmelser.
5. Maintaining a rule excepting such
redress from the compulsory insurance
coverage under national law constitutes a
sufficiently serious breach of EEA law to
entail State liability, provided that the other
conditions for State liability as laid down in
the Court’s case law are fulfilled.
320 - 225
Case Case
E-4/07E-8/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
Celina
Nguyen v The
Norwegian
State
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
for staten hvis også de øvrige vilkårene
for statens erstatningsansvar, slik disse er
nedfelt i EFTA-domstolens praksis, er oppfylt.
Summary
5. Det å opprettholde en regel som
unntar slik oppreisning fra den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen etter nasjonal rett,
utgjør et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på
EØS-retten til å utløse erstatningsansvar
321 --- 225
20 June 2008*1
(Compulsory insurance for civil liability in respect of motor vehicles – Directives
72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC and 90/232/EEC – compensation for non-economic injury –
conditions for State liability – sufficiently serious breach)
In Case E-8/07,
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Oslo tingrett
(Oslo District Court), Norway, in a case pending before it between
Celina Nguyen
and
The Norwegian State, represented by Justis- og politidepartementet (the Ministry
of Justice and the Police)
concerning the interpretation of the EEA Agreement, with particular reference to the
following Acts referred to in Annex IX:
–
the Act referred to in point 8 of Annex IX (Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April
1972 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement
of the obligation to insure against such liability, hereinafter the “First Directive”);
–
the Act referred in point 9 of Annex IX (Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC of
30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, hereinafter
the “Second Directive”);
–
the Act referred to in point 10 of Annex IX (Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of
14 May 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, hereinafter the
“Third Directive”);
(hereinafter collectively the “Directives” or the “Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives”).
*
Language of the Request: Norwegian
322 - 226
20. juni 2008*
(Obligatorisk forsikring for erstatningsansvar med hensyn til motorvogner – direktiv
72/166/EØF, 84/5/EØF og 90/232/EØF – erstatning for ikke-økonomisk skade – vilkår
for statens erstatningsansvar – tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd)
I sak E-8/07,
ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i medhold av artikkel 34 i Avtale mellom EFTA-statene
om opprettelse av et Overvåkingsorgan og en Domstol fra Oslo tingrett i en sak som står
for tingretten, mellom
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
DOMSTOLENS DOM
Celina Nguyen
og
om tolkningen av EØS-avtalen, med særskilt henvisning til følgende rettsakter omhandlet
i vedlegg IX:
–
rettsakten omhandlet i nr. 8 i vedlegg IX; rådsdirektiv 72/166/EØF av 24. april 1972
om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ansvarsforsikring for motorvogn
og kontroll med at forsikringsplikten overholdes (”første direktiv”)
–
rettsakten omhandlet i nr. 9 i vedlegg IX; annet rådsdirektiv 84/5/EØF av
30. desember 1983 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om
ansvarsforsikring for motorvogn (”annet direktiv”)
– rettsakten omhandlet i nr. 10 i vedlegg IX; tredje rådsdirektiv 90/232/EØF av
14. mai 1990 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ansvarsforsikring
for motorvogn (”tredje direktiv”)
*
JUDGMENT
(heretter også ”direktivene” eller ”motorvognforsikringsdirektivene”), avsier
Språket i anmodningen om en rådgivende uttalelse: norsk.
- 226
323 -
THE COURT,
composed of: Carl Baudenbacher, President, Thorgeir Örlygsson (Judge-Rapporteur)
and Ola Mestad (ad hoc), Judges
–
the Plaintiff, represented by Christian Lundin, advokat;
–
the Defendant, represented by Karin Fløistad, advokat, Office of the Attorney
General (Civil Affairs), acting as Agent;
–
the Kingdom of Belgium, represented by Liesbet Van den Broeck, Attaché with the
Directorate General Legal Affairs of the Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, acting as Agent;
–
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Bjørnar Alterskjær, Senior Officer,
and Florence Simonetti, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, acting as
Agents;
–
the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Nicola Yerrell, a
member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent,
having heard oral argument of the Plaintiff, represented by advokat Tom Sørum, the
Defendant, represented by its Agent Ketil Bøe Moen, the EFTA Surveillance Authority,
represented by its Agent Bjørnar Alterskjær and the Commission of the European
Communities, represented by its Agent Nicola Yerrell, at the hearing on 16 April 2008,
gives the following
Judgment
I
Facts and procedure
1
By a reference dated 14 September 2007, registered at the Court on
17 September 2007, Oslo tingrett made a request for an Advisory Opinion in a
case pending before it between Celina Nguyen (hereinafter the “Plaintiff”) and
the Norwegian State, represented by the Ministry of Justice and the Police
(hereinafter the “Defendant”).
2
The Plaintiff lost her husband and two children in a road traffic accident on
8 December 2002. The Plaintiff herself was only slightly injured physically, but
324 - 227
sammensatt av: Carl Baudenbacher, president, Thorgeir Örlygsson (saksforberedende
dommer) og Ola Mestad (ad hoc), dommere,
justissekretær: Skúli Magnússon,
etter å ha tatt i betraktning de skriftlige innleggene fra:
–
saksøker, representert ved advokat Christian Lundin,
–
saksøkte, representert ved advokat Karin Fløistad, Regjeringsadvokaten,
–
Kongeriket Belgia, representert ved Liesbet Van den Broeck, Attaché, Directorate
General Legal Affairs of the Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade
and Development Cooperation,
–
EFTAs overvåkingsorgan, representert ved Bjørnar Alterskjær, Senior Officer, og
Florence Simonetti, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive Affairs, og
–
Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap, representert ved Nicola Yerrell, medlem
av Kommisjonens juridiske tjeneste,
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
DOMSTOLEN,
med henvisning til rettsmøterapporten,
og etter å ha hørt muntlige innlegg fra saksøker representert ved Tom Sørum, saksøkte
representert ved Ketil Bøe Moen, EFTAs overvåkingsorgan representert ved Bjørnar
Alterskjær, og Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap representert ved Nicola Yerrell,
i rettsmøte den 16. april 2008,
slik
Dom
Faktum og saksgang
1
Ved brev av 14. september 2007, mottatt ved EFTA-domstolen den
17. september 2007, har Oslo tingrett anmodet om en rådgivende uttalelse i
en sak som står for tingretten mellom Celina Nguyen (saksøker) og staten v/
Justis- og politidepartementet (saksøkte).
2
Saksøker mistet sin ektemann og to barn i en trafikkulykke den 8. desember
2002. Saksøker fikk selv bare lettere fysiske skader, men hun sliter med
-- 227
325 --
JUDGMENT
I
has suffered from psychological afflictions since the accident. The driver of the
car which caused the accident was intoxicated.
3
By judgment of 7 June 2005, Halden tingrett (Halden District Court) sentenced
the driver to one year and six months in prison for inter alia manslaughter,
driving intoxicated, and for having inflicted a considerable psychological injury
upon the Plaintiff. The driver was also ordered to pay the Plaintiff a redress of
NOK 400 000 (about EUR 48 000) for non-economic injury. According to the
reference, redress is not punishment, but a civil form of liability in tort law which
is to compensate for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”). Redress can
be awarded in both criminal and civil proceedings. The precondition is that the
person having caused injury acted with qualified fault.
4
The person having caused the injury to the Plaintiff has not paid the redress.
The redress awarded to the Plaintiff can not be claimed from the insurance
company covering the person having caused the injury since Norwegian law
explicitly excepts redress from the compulsory insurance coverage.
5
On 11 September 2006, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit before Oslo tingrett against
the Defendant with a claim for compensation for incorrect implementation of
the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives. The Plaintiff argues that it is contrary
to the Directives to except redress from the insurance coverage and that the
breach is sufficiently serious to entail State liability under the conditions set out
in the case law of the EFTA Court. On this basis, she claims compensation,
corresponding to the redress that has not been paid out to her.
6
Oslo tingrett decided to submit a Request for an Advisory Opinion to the EFTA
Court on the following questions:
1. Is it compatible with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except
redress for non-economic loss (“pain and suffering”) from the compulsory
insurance system under national law?
2. If the question is answered in the negative: is an exception from the
insurance coverage as mentioned in question 1, a sufficiently serious
breach of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to be able to entail State
liability?
II Legal background
National Law
7
The duty to carry insurance for injury caused by motor vehicles is regulated
by the Norwegian Automobile Liability Act of 3 February 1961 (lov 3. februar
326 - 228
3
I Halden tingretts dom av 7. juni 2005 ble sjåføren dømt til fengsel i ett år og
seks måneder for bl.a. uaktsomt drap og kjøring i ruspåvirket tilstand samt
for å ha påført saksøker en betydelig psykisk skade. Sjåføren ble samtidig
dømt til å betale saksøker kr 400 000 i oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade.
Ifølge foreleggelsen er oppreisning ikke straff, men en sivil ansvarsform
i erstatningsretten som skal kompensere for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort
og smerte”). Oppreisning kan tilkjennes både i straffesak og i sivil sak.
Forutsetningen er at skadevolder har utvist kvalifisert skyld.
4
Skadevolderen har ikke betalt oppreisningsbeløpet. Oppreisningen som
saksøker ble tilkjent, kan ikke kreves av skadevolderens forsikringsselskap
ettersom norsk lov uttrykkelig unntar oppreisning fra den obligatoriske
forsikringsdekningen.
5
Ved stevning av 11. september 2006 reiste saksøker søksmål mot saksøkte
ved Oslo tingrett med krav om erstatning for feilaktig gjennomføring av
motorvognforsikringsdirektivene. Saksøker anfører at det er i strid med
direktivene å unnta oppreisning fra forsikringsdekningen, og at bruddet er
tilstrekkelig kvalifisert til å utløse EØS-rettslig erstatningsansvar etter vilkårene
i rettspraksis fra EFTA-domstolen. På dette grunnlaget krever hun erstatning
som tilsvarer den oppreisningen hun ikke har fått utbetalt.
6
Oslo tingrett besluttet å anmode EFTA-domstolen om en rådgivende uttalelse
til følgende spørsmål:
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
psykiske plager etter ulykken. Sjåføren av bilen som forårsaket ulykken, var
ruset.
1. Er det forenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”) fra den obligatoriske
forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal rett?
2. Hvis spørsmålet besvares benektende: Er et unntak fra forsikrings
dekningen som nevnt i spørsmål 1, et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på
motorvognforsikringsdirektivene til å kunne utløse erstatningsansvar for
staten?
Nasjonal rett
7
Forsikringsplikten for skader forårsaket av motorvogner er regulert av lov
3. februar 1961 om ansvar for skade som motorvogner gjer (bilansvarslova).
-- 228
327 --
JUDGMENT
II Rettslig bakgrunn
1961 om ansvar for skade som motorvogner gjer (bilansvarslova), hereinafter
the “Automobile Liability Act”). The Act establishes that injured parties have a
claim for compensation from the insurance company for property damage and
personal injury which is caused by a motor vehicle. Liability is not conditioned
upon fault of the driver or others. The injured party can claim compensation
directly from the insurance company as a matter of strict liability. Section 4 of
the Automobile Liability Act reads:
When a motor vehicle causes injury, the injured party may claim compensation
from the insurance company with which the vehicle, pursuant to chapter IV, is
insured, even if no one is to blame for the injury.
8
The insurance covers economic loss. In addition, it shall cover permanent
injury compensation but not redress. This follows from Section 6 (Assessment
of the compensation) of the Act, which regulates how the insurance payment
is to be determined. The Section reads:
The compensation is assessed according to general rules on torts except as
otherwise provided.
The Act applies also to compensation for permanent injury under Section 3−2
of the Torts Act of 13 June 1969 No 26, but not to compensation (redress) for
non-economic injury.
…
9
According to the request from the national court, Section 6, first paragraph
establishes that the amount of compensation is determined according to
ordinary rules of compensation found in the Torts Act of 13 June 1969 No
26 (skadeserstatningsloven 13. juni 1969 nr. 26, hereinafter “the Torts Act”).
Section 3−1, first paragraph of the Torts Act states:
Compensation for personal injury shall cover the injury sustained, loss of
future earnings and expenses which the personal injury is presumed to cause
the injured party in the future.
10 In addition to covering the economic loss, the insurance company shall cover
permanent injury compensation if under the Torts Act the general conditions
for this are fulfilled. This follows from Section 6, second paragraph of the
Automobile Liability Act. Permanent injury compensation is not compensation
for economic loss, but an amount which is to compensate for reduced quality
of life. The basic condition is that lasting and significant medical injuries have
been inflicted upon the injured party.
328 - 229
Gjer ei motorvogn skade, har skadelidaren krav på skadebot hjå det trygdelaget
som vogna er trygda i etter kapitel IV, endå om ingen er skuld i skaden.
8
Forsikringen dekker økonomisk tap. Den skal i tillegg dekke menerstatning,
men ikke oppreisning. Dette følger av bilansvarslova § 6 (korleis skadebota vert
fastsett) som regulerer fastsettelsen av forsikringsutbetalingen. Bestemmelsen
lyder:
Skadebota vert fastsett etter vanlege skadebotreglar når ikkje anna er sagt.
Lova gjeld og skadebot for mein etter lov 13 juni 1969 nr. 26 om skadeserstatning
§ 3–2, men elles ikkje skadebot (oppreisnad) for ikkje økonomisk skade.
…
9
Ifølge anmodningen fra den nasjonale domstol fastslår § 6 første ledd
at utmålingen skjer etter de alminnelige erstatningsreglene som finnes i
skadeserstatningsloven av 13. juni 1969 nr. 26. I skadeserstatningsloven §
3–1 første ledd heter det:
Erstatning for skade på person skal dekke lidt skade, tap i framtidig erverv og
utgifter som personskaden antas å påføre skadelidte i framtiden.
10 I tillegg til å dekke det økonomiske tapet skal forsikringsselskapet dekke
menerstatning hvis skadeserstatningslovens alminnelige vilkår for dette er
oppfylt. Dette følger av bilansvarslova § 6 annet ledd. Menerstatning er ikke
erstatning for økonomisk tap, men et beløp som skal kompensere for redusert
livskvalitet. Grunnvilkåret er at skadelidte er påført varige og betydelige
medisinske skader.
329 - 229
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
JUDGMENT
Loven fastsetter at skadelidte har krav på erstatning fra forsikringsselskapet
for tingsskade og personskade forårsaket av motorvogn. Ansvaret er ikke
betinget av skyld hos føreren eller andre. Den skadelidte kan kreve erstatning
på objektivt grunnlag direkte fra forsikringsselskapet. Bilansvarslova § 4
lyder:
11 Section 6, second paragraph of the Automobile Liability Act prescribes that the
compulsory road traffic insurance does not cover redress for non-economic
injury (“pain and suffering”). It is this exception which the case pending before
Oslo tingrett relates to.
12 Redress comes into question if the person who caused the injury did so
intentionally or with gross negligence. Redress is awarded and the redress
amount is determined on the basis of an overall assessment of what is
reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, injured parties or their survivors
do not have any absolute claim to redress, but in practice redress is normally
awarded if the conditions for it are fulfilled. Redress is regulated in Section
3−5 (Compensation (redress) for non-economic injury) of the Torts Act, which
reads:
Anybody who intentionally or by gross negligence has
(a) caused personal injury …
may, regardless of whether permanent injury compensation is paid under
Section 3−2 or standardised compensation is paid under Section 3−2a,
be ordered to pay the victim such non-recurrent amount as the court finds
reasonable in compensation (redress) for inflicted pain and suffering and
for other offence or injury of a non-economic kind. …
Anybody who intentionally or by gross negligence has caused another
person’s death may be ordered to pay to the spouse, common-law spouse
[“samboer”], children or parents of the deceased such redress as mentioned
in the preceding paragraph.
13 In its request, Oslo tingrett states that it is clear that redress, in addition to
having a function of individual deterrence, also has the purpose of providing
compensation to the injured party for burdens inflicted.
EEA law
14 Article 1(2) of the First Directive reads:
“[I]njured party” means any person entitled to compensation in respect of any
loss or injury caused by vehicles;
15 Article 3(1) of the First Directive reads:
Each Member State shall, subject to Article 4, take all appropriate measures
to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in
its territory is covered by insurance. The extent of the liability covered and the
330 - 230
12 Oppreisning er aktuelt hvis skadevolder har forårsaket skaden ved forsett
eller grov uaktsomhet. Oppreisningen tilkjennes og utmåles etter en helhetlig
rimelighetsvurdering. Skadelidte eller dennes etterlatte har altså ikke noe
absolutt krav på oppreisning, men i praksis vil oppreisning normalt bli tilkjent
hvis vilkårene for dette er oppfylt. Oppreisning er regulert i skadeserstatnings
loven § 3–5 (erstatning (oppreisning) for skade av ikke økonomisk art), som
lyder:
Den som forsettlig eller grovt aktløst har
a)voldt skade på person …
kan – uansett om det ytes menerstatning etter § 3–2 eller standardisert
erstatning etter § 3–2a – pålegges å betale den fornærmede en slik
engangssum som retten finner rimelig til erstatning (oppreisning) for den
voldte tort og smerte og for annen krenking eller skade av ikke-økonomisk
art. …
Den som forsettlig eller grovt aktløst har voldt en annens død, kan pålegges
å betale avdødes ektefelle, samboer, barn eller foreldre slik oppreisning
som nevnt i første ledd.
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
11 Bilansvarslova § 6 annet ledd fastsetter at den obligatoriske trafikkforsikringen
ikke dekker oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”). Det er
dette unntaket saken for Oslo tingrett dreier seg om.
13 I foreleggelsen fastslår Oslo tingrett at det er på det rene at oppreisning, i
tillegg til å ha en individualpreventiv funksjon, også har til formål å gi skadelidte
kompensasjon for påførte belastninger.
EØS-rett
14 Første direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 2 lyder:
I dette direktiv menes med:
…
2. skadelidte, enhver person som har rett til erstatning for skade forårsaket av
et kjøretøy, …
Med forbehold for anvendelsen av artikkel 4 skal hver medlemsstat treffe alle
hensiktsmessige tiltak for å sikre at erstatningsansvar for kjøretøyer som er
hjemmehørende på dens territorium, er dekket av en forsikring. Hvilke skader
- 230
331 -
JUDGMENT
15 Første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1 lyder:
terms and conditions of the cover shall be determined on the basis of these
measures.
16 Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Second Directive reads:
1. The insurance referred to in Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC shall
cover compulsorily both damage to property and personal injuries.
2. Without prejudice to any higher guarantees which Member States may lay
down, each Member State shall require that the amounts for which such
insurance is compulsory are at least:
- in the case of personal injury, 350 000 ECU where there is only one
victim; where more than one victim is involved in a single claim, this
amount shall be multiplied by the number of victims,
…
17 Article 1 of the Third Directive reads:
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 2 (1) of Directive
84/5/EEC, the insurance referred to in Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC
shall cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the
driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.
…
framework, the facts, the procedure and the written observations submitted
to the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only insofar as is
The first question
19 By the first question, Oslo tingrett in substance asks whether it is compatible
with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except redress for non-economic
injury (“pain and suffering”) from the compulsory insurance system under
national law.
20 The Plaintiff maintains that it follows from the wording and the aim of the
Directives that liability for redress towards the Plaintiff must be covered by
the compulsory liability insurance. The Plaintiff also argues that all civil liability
in respect of the use of motor vehicles must be covered by insurance, and
refers in that regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European
332 - 231
16 Annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 og 2 lyder:
1. Forsikringen nevnt i artikkel 3 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF skal dekke både
tingskade og personskade.
2. Hver medlemsstat skal, med forbehold for høyere garantibeløp som
medlemsstatene eventuelt selv fastsetter, kreve at den lovpliktige
ansvarsforsikring minst skal dekke:
- for personskade, 350 000 ECU dersom det er bare én skadelidt. Dersom
det er flere skadelidte i samme skadetilfelle, multipliseres dette beløpet
med antall skadelidte,
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
som dekkes, samt forsikringsvilkårene bestemmes innen rammen av disse
tiltakene.
…
17 Tredje direktivs artikkel 1 lyder:
Med forbehold for artikkel 2 nr. 1 annet ledd i direktiv 84/5/EØF skal forsikringen
nevnt i artikkel 2 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF dekke ansvar for personskader
som skyldes bruk av kjøretøy, for alle passasjerer bortsett fra føreren.
…
18 Det vises til rettsmøterapporten for en mer utførlig redegjørelse for det rettslige
rammeverket, sakens faktum, saksgangen og de skriftlige innleggene til EFTAdomstolen, som i det følgende bare vil bli omtalt eller drøftet i den utstrekning
det er nødvendig for EFTA-domstolens begrunnelse.
III Rettens bemerkninger
Første spørsmål
20 Saksøker anfører at det følger av direktivenes ordlyd og formål at oppreisnings
ansvaret overfor saksøker må dekkes av den obligatoriske ansvarsforsikringen.
Saksøker anfører videre at alt erstatningsansvar med hensyn til bruk av
333 - 231
JUDGMENT
19 Oslo tingretts første spørsmål gjelder om det er forenlig med motorvogn
forsikringsdirektivene å unnta oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og
smerte”) fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal rett.
Communities in Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711 (hereinafter
“Ferreira”).
21 The Defendant concludes from the wording and the aim of the Directives
that redress for non-economic injury falls outside their scope. The Defendant
points to the special character of the institution of redress under Norwegian tort
law. The Defendant stresses that although the institution has a compensatory
function, its primary character is of a penal nature. The Defendant does not
argue that the classification under national law is in itself decisive for the
assessment of whether redress falls under the Directives or not. Civil liability
is an autonomous concept under the Directives. In the Defendant’s view, the
characteristics of the institution of redress under Norwegian law do, however,
support its interpretation of the scope of the Directives.
22 The Kingdom of Belgium, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission
of the European Communities argue in favour of the Plaintiff’s view.
23 As a preliminary point, the Court recalls that the Motor Vehicle Insurance
Directives are designed to ensure the free movement of motor vehicles
normally based within the EEA and of persons travelling in those vehicles, and
to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive
comparable treatment irrespective of where within the EEA the accident has
occurred (see Cases E-1/99 Finanger [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 119 (hereinafter
“Finanger”), at paragraphs 25-27; E-7/00 Helgadóttir [2000-2001] EFTA Ct.
Rep. 246 (hereinafter “Helgadóttir”), at paragraph 28 and C-537/03 Candolin
[2005] ECR I-5745 (hereinafter “Candolin”), at paragraph 17).
24 The Directives do not seek to harmonise the rules of the EEA States governing
civil liability (see Helgadóttir, at paragraph 30 and Ferreira, at paragraph 23).
Therefore, as EEA law stands at present, the EEA States are free to determine
the rules of civil liability applicable to road traffic accidents. However, the
EEA States must exercise their powers in this field in compliance with EEA
law. National provisions governing compensation for road accidents cannot
therefore deprive the Directives of their effectiveness (see for comparison
Candolin, at paragraph 27 and 28).
25 Moreover, the EEA States must ensure that the civil liability arising under their
domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with the provisions of
the Directives (see for comparison Case C-356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I-3067,
at paragraph 33 and Ferreira, at paragraph 29).
334 - 232
21 Saksøkte slutter fra direktivenes ordlyd og formål at oppreisning for ikkeøkonomisk skade faller utenfor direktivenes virkeområde. Saksøkte peker
på oppreisningsinstituttets særlige karakter i norsk erstatningsrett. Saksøkte
understreker at selv om instituttet har en erstatningsfunksjon, er instituttets
overordnede karakter av pønal art. Saksøkte anfører ikke at kategoriseringen
i nasjonal rett i seg selv er avgjørende for bedømmelsen av om oppreisning
er omfattet av direktivene eller ikke. Erstatningsansvar er et autonomt
begrep i direktivenes forstand. Etter saksøktes oppfatning er det likevel slik
at oppreisningsinstituttets karakteristika underbygger saksøktes tolkning av
direktivenes virkeområde.
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
motorvogn må dekkes av forsikring, og viser i så henseende til EF-domstolens
dom i sak C-348/98 Ferreira, Sml. 2000 s. I-6711 (heretter ”Ferreira”).
22 Kongeriket Belgia, EFTAs overvåkingsorgan og Kommisjonen for De
europeiske felleskap argumenterer til fordel for saksøkers oppfatning.
23 Innledningsvis minner EFTA-domstolen om at motorvognforsikringsdirektivene
har til formål å sikre fri bevegelighet av motorkjøretøyer som er hjemmehørende
innenfor EØS, samt av personer som reiser med disse kjøretøyene, og å
garantere at skadelidte i ulykker forårsaket av disse kjøretøyene får tilsvarende
behandling uansett hvor i EØS ulykken har inntruffet, se sak E-1/99 Finanger,
EFTA Court Report 1999 s. 119, heretter ”Finanger” (avsnitt 25–27), sak E-7/00
Helgadóttir, EFTA Court Report 2000–2001 s. 246, heretter ”Helgadóttir”
(avsnitt 28) og sak C-537/03 Candolin, Sml. 2005 s. I-5745, heretter ”Candolin”
(avsnitt 17).
25 Enn videre må EØS-statene sikre at det erstatningsansvar som etter nasjonal
rett kommer til anvendelse, er dekket av forsikring i overensstemmelse med
direktivenes bestemmelser, sml. sak C-356/05 Farrell, Sml. 2007 s. I-3607
(avsnitt 33) og Ferreira (avsnitt 29).
- 232
335 -
JUDGMENT
24 Direktivene tar ikke sikte på å harmonisere EØS-statenes regler om erstatnings
ansvar, se Helgadóttir (avsnitt 30) og Ferreira (avsnitt 23). Følgelig står EØSstatene, etter någjeldende EØS-rett, fritt til å fastlegge erstatningsreglene som
skal gjelde for trafikkulykker. EØS-statene må imidlertid utøve sin myndighet på
dette området i overensstemmelse med EØS-retten. Nasjonale bestemmelser
om erstatning ved trafikkulykker får således ikke frata direktivene deres tjenlige
virkning, sml. Candolin (avsnitt 27 og 28).
26 The Court notes that the Directives do not contain any explicit provision
excepting an institution such as the one at issue from their scope. Article 1(2)
of the First Directive which defines the concept of “injured party” refers to “any
loss or injury caused by vehicles” and Article 1(1) of the Second Directive
and Article 1 of the Third Directive refer, in particular, to “personal injuries”
in defining what shall be subject to compulsory insurance. The wording
encompasses any type of loss or injury irrespective of whether it is economic
or non-economic, and does not therefore support the finding that the latter falls
outside the scope of the Directives.
27 In light of the above, Article 3(1) of the First Directive, read in conjunction with
Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Second Directive and Article 1 of the Third Directive,
must be interpreted as covering both economic loss and non-economic injury
such as pain and suffering. A different interpretation would run counter to the
aim of ensuring free movement and guaranteeing victims comparable treatment
irrespective of where within the EEA the accidents occur, cf. paragraph 23
above.
28 Redress such as the one at issue in the main proceedings by its nature
gives a person the right to obtain compensation from another person and as
such constitutes a form of civil liability. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether
redress under national law may have a penal character and whether the
penal character is primary or secondary to the compensatory function of the
institution. It follows from inter alia Ferreira that although the Directives are not
intended to require the adoption of a particular type of liability, they require that
all civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles be covered, irrespective
of whether the liability is based on fault or on risk. Any other interpretation
would deprive Article 3(1) of the First Directive, as developed and amended by
the Second and the Third Directives, of its intended effect to protect the victims
of road-traffic accidents by means of compulsory civil liability insurance (see
also for comparison Case C‑166/02 Viegas [2003] ECR I-7871, at paragraphs
21 and 22).
29 In light of the above, the answer to the first question must be that it is not
compatible with the First, Second and Third Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives
to except redress for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”), which is a
form of civil liability, from the compulsory insurance system under national
law.
336 - 233
27 I lys av det ovenstående må bestemmelsene i første direktivs artikkel 3 nr.
1, lest i sammenheng med annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 og 2 samt tredje
direktivs artikkel 1, tolkes dit hen at de omfatter både økonomisk tap og ikkeøkonomisk skade, slik som tort og smerte. En annen tolkning ville gå på tvers
av formålet om å sikre fri bevegelighet og garantere skadelidte tilsvarende
behandling uansett hvor i EØS ulykkene inntreffer, jf. avsnitt 23 ovenfor.
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
26 EFTA-domstolen bemerker at direktivene ikke inneholder noen bestemmelse
som uttrykkelig unntar et institutt slik som det foreliggende fra direktivenes
virkeområde. Første direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 2 viser til ”skade forårsaket av et
kjøretøy” i definisjonen av begrepet ’skadelidte’, og annet direktivs artikkel
1 nr. 1 samt tredje direktivs artikkel 1 viser særlig til ”personskade” når det
fastsettes hva som skal være gjenstand for obligatorisk forsikring. Ordlyden
omfatter enhver form for tap eller skade, uten hensyn til om tapet eller skaden
er økonomisk eller ikke-økonomisk, og ordlyden kan derfor ikke tas til inntekt
for at sistnevnte faller utenfor direktivenes virkeområde.
29 I lys av det ovenstående må svaret på første spørsmål være at det ikke er
forenlig med første, annet og tredje motorvognforsikringsdirektiv å unnta
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”), som er en form for
erstatningsansvar, fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal
rett.
- 233
337 -
JUDGMENT
28 Slik oppreisning som det gjelder i saken for tingretten, gir etter sin art én
person rett til erstatning fra en annen person og utgjør som sådan en form
for erstatningsansvar. I denne henseende er det uten betydning hvorvidt
oppreisning etter nasjonal rett kan ha en pønal karakter og hvorvidt den pønale
karakteren er overordnet eller underordnet instituttets erstatningsfunksjon. Det
følger av blant annet Ferreira at skjønt noe krav om å etablere en særskilt form
for ansvar ikke er tilsiktet med direktivene, krever disse at ethvert erstatnings
ansvar med hensyn til bruk av motorvogn skal omfattes, uten hensyn til om
ansvaret bygger på skyld eller er objektivt. Enhver annen tolkning ville frata
bestemmelsene i første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1, slik de er utviklet og endret
ved annet og tredje direktiv, deres tjenlige virkning som vern for skadelidte i
trafikkulykker ved hjelp av obligatorisk forsikring for erstatningsansvar, sml.
også sak C-166/02 Viegas, Sml. 2003 s. I-7871 (avsnitt 21 og 22).
The second question
30 By the second question, Oslo tingrett in substance asks whether excepting
redress for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”) from the compulsory
insurance coverage constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of the Motor
Vehicle Insurance Directives to be able to entail State liability.
31 In cases of violation of EEA law by a Contracting Party, the Contracting
Party is obliged to provide compensation for loss and damage caused to
individuals and economic operators, in accordance with the principle of State
liability which is an integral part of the EEA Agreement, if the conditions laid
down in Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95, (hereinafter
“Sveinbjörnsdóttir”), at paragraphs 62–69 and Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002]
EFTA Ct. Rep. 240 (hereinafter “Karlsson”), at paragraphs 25 and 37–48, are
fulfilled.
32 It is, in principle, for the national court to assess the facts of the case, and
to determine whether the conditions for State liability for breach of EEA law
are met. The Court may nevertheless indicate certain circumstances and
considerations which are for the national court to take into account in its
evaluation (see Karlsson, at paragraph 36).
33 As regards the condition for liability that the breach of EEA law must be
sufficiently serious, the Court has already held that this depends on whether,
in the exercise of its legislative powers, an EEA State has manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers. In order to
determine whether this condition is met, the national court hearing a claim
for compensation must take into account all the factors that characterise the
situation before it. Those factors include, inter alia, the clarity and precision
of the rule infringed; the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national
authorities; whether the infringement, and the damage caused, was intentional
or involuntary; and whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable
(see Karlsson, at paragraph 38 and Sveinbjörnsdóttir, at paragraphs 68 and
69).
34 Furthermore, if a breach of EEA law has persisted despite settled case law
from which it is clear that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement,
the breach will be sufficiently serious (see Karlsson, at paragraph 40). In this
regard, the Court notes that in Ferreira the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ruled that the Member States must ensure that the civil liability
- 338
234 -
30 Oslo tingretts annet spørsmål gjelder om det å unnta oppreisning for ikkeøkonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”) fra den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen
utgjør et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på motorvognforsikringsdirektivene til å
kunne utløse erstatningsansvar for staten.
31 I samsvar med prinsippet om statens erstatningsansvar, som er del av EØSavtalen, er en avtalepart forpliktet til å yte erstatning for tap og skade påført
privatpersoner og markedsaktører ved avtalepartens brudd på EØS-retten,
hvis vilkårene nedfelt i sak E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, EFTA Court Report 1998
s. 95, heretter ”Sveinbjörnsdóttir” (avsnitt 62–69) og sak E-4/01 Karlsson,
EFTA Court Report 2002 s. 240, heretter ”Karlsson” (avsnitt 25 og 37–48) er
oppfylt.
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Annet spørsmål
32 Det tilligger i prinsippet den nasjonale domstolen å bedømme faktum i saken
og avgjøre om vilkårene for statens erstatningsansvar for brudd på EØS-retten
er oppfylt. EFTA-domstolen kan dog gi anvisning på visse omstendigheter og
hensyn som den nasjonale domstolen må ta i betraktning i sin vurdering, se
Karlsson (avsnitt 36).
34 Videre, dersom et brudd på EØS-retten har vedvart til tross for at det fremgår
av fast rettspraksis at den aktuelle atferden utgjør en overtredelse, vil bruddet
være tilstrekkelig klart, se Karlsson (avsnitt 40). I denne henseende bemerker
EFTA-domstolen at EF-domstolen i Ferreira (avsnitt 29) fastslo at medlems
statene må sikre at det erstatningsansvar som etter nasjonal rett kommer til
- 339
234 -
JUDGMENT
33 Når det gjelder vilkåret om at bruddet på EØS-retten må være tilstrekkelig
kvalifisert, har EFTA-domstolen alt lagt til grunn at dette avhenger av hvorvidt
en EØS-stat ved utøvelsen av sin lovgivende myndighet åpenbart og grovt har
satt seg ut over rammene for sin myndighetsutøvelse. For å avgjøre om dette
vilkåret er oppfylt, må den nasjonale domstolen som behandler et krav om
erstatning, ta i betraktning alle de faktorer som kjennetegner det aktuelle tilfellet.
Til disse faktorene hører blant annet graden av klarhet og presisjon i regelen
som er overtrådt, hvor omfattende skjønnsfrihet denne regelen overlater til
nasjonale myndigheter, om overtredelsen og den forårsakede skaden var
forsettlig eller ikke, og om en eventuell rettsvillfarelse var unnskyldelig eller
ikke, se Karlsson (avsnitt 38) og Sveinbjörnsdóttir (avsnitt 68 og 69).
arising under their domestic law is covered by insurance which complies with
the provisions of the Directives (see paragraph 29 of the judgment). In the
context of the case before the national court, it is undisputed that Norway has
maintained a rule excepting redress for pain and suffering from the compulsory
insurance coverage despite the fact that redress is a form of civil liability.
35 Consequently, the Court concludes that maintaining the rule excepting redress
for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”) from the compulsory insurance
coverage under Norwegian law constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of EEA
law to entail State liability, provided that the other conditions for State liability
as laid down in the Court’s case law are fulfilled.
36 In light of the above, the answer to the second question must be that excepting
redress for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”), which is a form of civil
liability, from compulsory insurance coverage under national law constitutes a
sufficiently serious breach of EEA law to be able to entail State liability.
IV Costs
37 The costs incurred by the Kingdom of Belgium, the EFTA Surveillance Authority
and the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted
observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are a
step in the proceedings pending before Oslo tingrett, any decision on costs for
the parties to those proceedings is a matter for that court.
340 - 235
35 Følgelig konkluderer EFTA-domstolen med at det å opprettholde regelen
som unntar oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”) fra
den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen etter norsk rett, utgjør et tilstrekkelig
kvalifisert brudd på EØS-retten til å utløse erstatningsansvar for staten hvis
også de øvrige vilkårene for statens erstatningsansvar, slik disse er nedfelt i
EFTA-domstolens rettspraksis, er oppfylt.
36 I lys av det ovenstående må svaret på annet spørsmål være at det å unnta
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”), som er en form for
erstatningsansvar, fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal
rett, utgjør et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på EØS-retten til å kunne utløse
erstatningsansvar for staten.
Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
anvendelse, er dekket av forsikring i overensstemmelse med direktivenes
bestemmelser. For så vidt gjelder saken som står for tingretten, er det ubestridt
at Norge har opprettholdt en regel som unntar oppreisning for tort og smerte
fra den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen, til tross for at oppreisning er en
form for erstatningsansvar.
IV Saksomkostninger
JUDGMENT
37 Omkostningene som er påløpt for Kongeriket Belgia, EFTAs overvåkingsorgan
og Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap, som har fremmet innlegg for
EFTA-domstolen, kan ikke kreves dekket. Ettersom foreleggelsen for EFTAdomstolen utgjør et ledd i behandlingen av saken som står for Oslo tingrett,
ligger det til tingretten å ta en eventuell avgjørelse om saksomkostninger for
partene i den saken.
- 235
341 -
On those grounds,
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by Oslo tingrett hereby gives the following
Advisory Opinion:
1. It is not compatible with the First, Second and Third Motor Vehicle Insurance
Directives to except redress for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”),
which is a form of civil liability, from the compulsory insurance system under
national law.
2. Excepting redress for non-economic injury (“pain and suffering”), which is a
form of civil liability, from compulsory insurance coverage under national law
constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of EEA law to be able to entail State
liability.
Carl Baudenbacher
Thorgeir Örlygsson
Ola Mestad
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 20 June 2008.
Skúli Magnússon
Carl Baudenbacher
Registrar
President
342 - 236
DOMSTOLEN,
som svar på spørsmålene forelagt av Oslo tingrett, følgende rådgivende uttalelse:
1. Det er ikke forenlig med første, annet og tredje motorvognforsikringsdirektiv
å unnta oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”), som er en
form for erstatningsansvar, fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter
nasjonal rett.
2. Det å unnta oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (”tort og smerte”), som
er en form for erstatningsansvar, fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen
etter nasjonal rett, utgjør et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på EØS-retten til å
kunne utløse erstatningsansvar for staten.
Carl Baudenbacher Thorgeir Örlygsson Case Case
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Celina
Nguyen
Þorkelsson
v The
vAuthority
Norwegian
State
Case E-8/07
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
På dette grunnlaget avgir
Ola Mestad
Avsagt i åpen rett i Luxembourg den 20. juni 2008.
Carl Baudenbacher
Justissekretær President
JUDGMENT
Skúli Magnússon - 236
343 -
in Case E-8/07
on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by Oslo tingrett
(Oslo District Court), Norway, in a case pending before it between
Celina Nguyen
and
The Norwegian State, represented by Justis- og politidepartementet (the Ministry
of Justice and the Police)
concerning interpretation of the Directives on motor vehicle insurance, referred to at
points 8, 9 and 10 of Annex IX to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the
EEA Agreement).
I
Introduction
1.
II
Facts and procedure
2.
1
2
By a letter dated 14 September 2007, registered at the Court on 17 September
2007, Oslo tingrett made a request for an Advisory Opinion in a case pending
before it between Celina Nguyen (hereinafter the “Plaintiff”) and the Norwegian
State, represented by the Ministry of Justice and the Police (hereinafter the
“Defendant”).
The case concerns a dispute on whether national legislation that excepts
redress for non-economic loss from compulsory insurance coverage is contrary
to the Directives on motor vehicle insurance referred to at points 8, 9 and 10
of Chapter I of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement. The Directives are as follows:
Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the
laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of
the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure
against such liability1 (hereinafter the “First Directive”); the Second Council
Directive 84/5/EEC of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the
use of motor vehicles on motor vehicle insurance2 (hereinafter the “Second
Directive”); and the Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against
OJ 1972 L 103, p. 1, referred to at point 8 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement.
344 - 237
i sak E-8/07
ANMODNING til EFTA-domstolen i medhold av artikkel 34 i Avtalen mellom EFTAlandene om opprettelse av et Overvåkingsorgan og en Domstol fra Oslo tingrett
i en sak for denne mellom
Celina Nguyen
og
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
RETTSMØTERAPPORT
vedrørende tolkningen av motorvognforsikringsdirektivene, omhandlet i nr. 8, 9 og
10 i vedlegg IX til Avtale om Det europeiske økonomiske samarbeidsområde (EØSavtalen).
Innledning
1.
II
Faktum og saksgang
2.
1
2
Ved brev 14. september 2007, mottatt ved EFTA-domstolen 17. september
2007, har Oslo tingrett anmodet om en rådgivende uttalelse i en verserende
sak mellom Celina Nguyen (heretter ”saksøker”) og staten v/Justis- og
politidepartementet (heretter ”saksøkte”).
Saken gjelder en tvist om hvorvidt nasjonal lovgivning som unntar oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap fra den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen er i strid
med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene omhandlet i nr. 8, 9 og 10 i kapittel I i
vedlegg IX til EØS-avtalen. Dette er følgende direktiver: rådsdirektiv 72/166/
EØF av 24. april 1972 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om
ansvarsforsikring for motorvogn og kontroll med at forikringsplikten overholdes1
(heretter “første direktiv”), annet rådsdirektiv 84/5/EØF av 30. desember
1983 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om ansvarsforsikring for
motorvogn2 (heretter “annet direktiv”), og tredje rådsdirektiv 90/232/EØF av
14. mai 1990 om tilnærming av medlemsstatenes lovgivning om
EFT 1972 L 103 s. 1, omhandlet i nr. 8 i vedlegg IX til EØS-avtalen.
-- 237
345 --
I
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles3 (hereinafter “the Third
Directive”). Reference is hereinafter made to these Directives together as “the
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives” or “the Directives”.
3.
On 8 December 2002, the Plaintiff lost her husband and two children in a road
traffic accident. The Plaintiff herself was only slightly injured physically, but has
suffered from psychological afflictions since the accident. The driver of the car
which caused the accident was intoxicated.
4.
By judgment of 7 June 2005 of Halden tingrett (Halden District Court), the
driver was sentenced to one year and six months in prison for inter alia
manslaughter, driving while intoxicated, and for having inflicted a considerable
psychological injury upon the Plaintiff.
5.
At the same time, the driver was ordered to pay the Plaintiff a redress of
NOK 400 000 (about 48 000 euros) for non-economic loss. According to the
request, redress is not punishment, but a civil form of liability in tort law which
is to compensate for non-economic loss (“pain and suffering”). Redress can be
awarded in both criminal and civil cases. The precondition is that the person
who caused the injury acted with qualified fault.
6.
The redress awarded to the Plaintiff cannot be claimed from the insurance
company covering the person who caused the injury. This is so because
Section 6, second paragraph of the Norwegian Automobile Liability Act of 3
February 1961 (lov av 3. februar 1961 om ansvar for skade som motorvogn
gjer (bilansvarslova), hereinafter the “Automobile Liability Act”) explicitly
excepts redress from the compulsory insurance coverage. The person who
caused the injury has not paid the redress.
7.
In an application of 11 September 2006, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit before
Oslo tingrett against the Defendant with a claim for compensation for incorrect
implementation of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives. She pleads that it is
contrary to the Directives to except redress from the insurance coverage, and
that the breach is sufficiently serious to entail State liability under the conditions
set out in the judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir.4
On this basis, she claims compensation, corresponding to the redress that has
not been paid out to her. The Defendant contests that the Directives require
that redress be covered by the road traffic insurance. It is pleaded that there
is no conflict between national law and EEA law, and that the Directives are
Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95.
3
4
346 - 238
Den 8. desember 2002 mistet saksøker sin ektemann og to barn i en
trafikkulykke. Saksøker fikk selv bare lettere fysiske skader, men hun sliter
med psykiske plager etter ulykken. Sjåføren av bilen som forårsaket ulykken,
var ruset.
4.
I Halden tingretts dom av 7. juni 2005 ble sjåføren dømt til fengsel i ett år og
seks måneder for bl.a. uaktsomt drap, kjøring under ruspåvirkning og for å ha
påført saksøker en betydelig psykisk skade.
5.
Sjåføren ble samtidig dømt til å betale saksøker oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk
tap med NOK 400 000 (ca. 48 000 euro). Ifølge foreleggelsen er oppreisning
ikke straff, men en sivil ansvarsform i erstatningsretten som skal kompensere
for ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”). Oppreisning kan tilkjennes både i
straffesak og i sivil sak. Forutsetningen er at skadevolder har utvist kvalifisert
skyld.
6.
Oppreisningen som saksøker ble tilkjent, kan ikke kreves av skadevolderens
forsikringsselskap. Dette skyldes at den norske loven om motorvognforsikring,
lov av 3. februar 1961 om ansvar for skade som motorvogner gjer
(bilansvarslova), § 6 annet ledd uttrykkelig unntar oppreisning fra den
obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen. Skadevolderen har ikke selv betalt
oppreisningsbeløpet.
7.
Ved stevning av 11. september 2006 reiste saksøker søksmål mot saksøkte
ved Oslo tingrett med krav om erstatning for feilaktig gjennomføring av
motorvognforsikringsdirektivene. Hun anfører at det er i strid med direktivene
å unnta oppreisning fra forsikringsdekningen, og at bruddet er tilstrekkelig
kvalifisert til å utløse EØS-rettslig erstatningsansvar etter vilkårene i EFTAdomstolens sak E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir.4 På dette grunnlaget krever hun
erstatning som tilsvarer den oppreisningen hun ikke har fått utbetalt. Saksøkte
bestrider at motorvognforsikringsdirektivene krever at oppreisning skal være
dekket trafikkforsikringen. Det er anført at det ikke foreligger motstrid mellom
Sak E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, EFTA Court Report 1998 s. 95.
3
4
347 --- 238
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
3.
ansvarsforsikring for motorvogn3 (heretter “tredje direktiv”). Disse direktivene
vil i fellesskap heretter omtales som ”motorvognforsikringsdirektivene” eller
”direktivene”.
therefore not breached. In the opinion of the Defendant, the possible breach
of the Directives would in any case not be sufficiently serious to entail State
liability under EEA law.
8.
Oslo tingrett decided to request an Advisory Opinion from the Court on
interpretation of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives. Oslo tingrett refers in
particular to Article 3(1) of the First Directive, Articles 1 and 3 of the Second
Directive and Article 1 of the Third Directive. Oslo tingrett also refers to
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter
the “ECJ”) in Case C-348/98 Ferreira5 and Case C-166/02 Viegas6 and of the
Court in Case E-7/00 Helgadóttir.7 Finally, Oslo tingrett refers to two judgments
of Norges Høyesterett (the Supreme Court of Norway) regarding the Motor
Vehicle Insurance Directives.8
9.
In relation to the dispute on whether the possible breach of the Directives
constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of EEA law to entail State liability,
Oslo tingrett states that as a point of departure the conditions for liability are
the same in EEA law as in Community law and refers in that respect to the
judgment of the ECJ in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du
pêcheur9 and to Case E-4/01 Karlsson.10
III Questions
10. The following questions have been referred to the Court:
1. Is it compatible with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except
redress for non-economic loss (“pain and suffering”) from the
compulsory insurance system under national law?
2. If the question is answered in the negative: is an exception from the
insurance coverage as mentioned in question 1, a sufficiently serious
breach of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to be able to entail
State liability?
Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711, at paragraphs 27−29.
Case C-166/02 Viegas [2003] ECR I-7871, at paragraph 21.
Case E-7/00 Helgadóttir [2000−2001] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246, at paragraph 29.
8
Rt. 2000 page 1811 Finanger I, in particular page 1825, and Rt. 2005 page 1365 Finanger II.
9
Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029.
10
Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 240, at paragraphs 32, 36 and 38. Oslo tingrett also refers to the judgment of the ECJ
in Case C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I-493, at paragraph 38.
5
6
7
348 - 239
8.
Oslo tingrett besluttet å anmode om en rådgivende uttalelse fra EFTA-domstolen
om tolkningen av motorvognforsikringsdirektivene. Domstolen viser særlig til
første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1, annet direktivs artikkel 1 og 3 og tredje direktivs
artikkel 1. Det vises videre til EF-domstolens dommer i sak C-348/98 Ferreira5
og sak C-166/02 Viegas6 og til EFTA-domstolens rådgivende uttalelse i E-7/00
Helgadóttir.7 Avslutningsvis vises det til to dommer fra Norges Høyesterett
som gjelder motorvognforsikringsdirektivene.8
9.
I forhold til spørsmålet om hvorvidt det eventuelle bruddet på direktivene er
et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på EØS-retten til å utløse erstatningsansvar
for staten, fremholder Oslo tingrett at vilkårene for erstatningsansvar etter
EØS-retten i utgangspunktet er de samme som etter EF-retten, og viser i
den anledning til EF-domstolens avgjørelser i de forente sakene C-46/93 og
C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur9 og til sak E-4/01 Karlsson.10
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
nasjonal rett og EØS-retten, og at direktivene derfor ikke er brutt. Saksøkte
er av den oppfatning at et eventuelt brudd på direktivene uansett ikke er
tilstrekkelig kvalifisert til å utløse erstatningsansvar etter EØS-retten.
III Spørsmål
10. Følgende spørsmål er forelagt EFTA-domstolen:
1. Er det forenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”) fra den
obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal rett?
8
9
Sak C-348/98 Ferreira, Sml. 2000 s. I-6711 (avsnitt 27–29).
Sak C-166/02 Viegas, Sml. 2003 s. I-7871 (avsnitt 21).
Sak E-7/00 Helgadóttir, EFTA Court Report 2000–2001 s. 246 (avsnitt 29).
Rt. 2000 s. 1811 Finanger I, se særlig s. 1825, og Rt. 2005 s. 1365 Finanger II.
Forente saker C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur og Factortame, Sml. 1996 s. I-1029.
10
Sak E-4/01 Karlsson, EFTA Court Report 2002 s. 240 (avsnitt 32, 36 og 38). Oslo tingrett viser også til EF-domstolens dom i sak
C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark, Sml. 2001 s. I-493 (avsnitt 38).
5
6
7
-- 239
349 --
2. Hvis spørsmålet besvares benektende: Er et unntak fra
forsikringsdekningen som nevnt i spørsmål 1, et tilstrekkelig
kvalifisert brudd på motorvognforsikringsdirektivene til å kunne
utløse erstatningsansvar for staten?
IV Legal background
National law
11. In Norway, the duty to carry insurance for injury caused by motor vehicles
is regulated by the Automobile Liability Act. The Act establishes that injured
parties have a claim for compensation from the insurance company for property
damage and personal injury which is caused by a motor vehicle. Liability is
not conditioned upon fault of the driver or others. The injured party can claim
compensation directly from the insurance company as a matter of strict liability.
Section 4 of the Automobile Liability Act reads:
When a motor vehicle causes injury, the injured party may claim compensation
from the insurance company with which the vehicle, pursuant to chapter IV, is
insured, even if no one is to blame for the injury.
12. The insurance covers economic loss. In addition, it shall cover permanent injury
compensation for non-economic loss, but not redress (“pain and suffering”).
This follows from Section 6 (Assessment of the compensation) of the Act,
which regulates how the insurance payment is to be determined. The Section
reads:
The compensation is assessed according to general rules on torts except as
otherwise provided.
The Act applies also to compensation for permanent injury under Section 3–2
of the Torts Act of 13 June 1969 No 26, but not to compensation (redress) for
non-economic injury.
In addition to compensation, there shall be paid interest pursuant to Section 3
of the Act relating, inter alia, to Interest on Overdue Payments. Notification of
the injury to the insurance company is considered a demand for payment.
13. According to the request from the national court, Section 6, first paragraph
establishes that the amount of compensation is determined according to
ordinary rules of compensation found in the Torts Act of 13 June 1969 No 26
(skadeserstatningsloven 13. juni 1969 nr. 26, hereinafter “the Torts Act”). In
Section 3–1, first paragraph of the Torts Act it is stated:
Compensation for personal injury shall cover the injury sustained, loss of
future earnings and expenses which the personal injury is presumed to cause
the injured party in the future.
14. In addition to covering the economic loss, the insurance company shall cover
permanent injury compensation if under the Torts Act the general conditions
- 350
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Nasjonal rett
11. Forsikringsplikten for skader forårsaket av motorvogner er i Norge regulert
av bilansvarslova. Loven fastsetter at skadelidte har krav på erstatning fra
forsikringsselskapet for tingsskade og personskade forårsaket av motorvogn.
Ansvaret er ikke betinget av skyld hos føreren eller andre. Den skadelidte
kan kreve erstatning på objektivt grunnlag direkte fra forsikringsselskapet.
Bilansvarslova § 4 lyder som følger:
Gjer ei motorvogn skade, har skadelidaren krav på skadebot hjå det trygdelaget
som vogna er trygda i etter kapitel IV, endå om ingen er skuld i skaden.
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IV Rettslig bakgrunn
Skadebota vert fastsett etter vanlige skadebotreglar når anna ikkje er sagt.
Lova gjeld og skadebot for mein etter lov 13. juni 1969 nr. 26 om skadeserstatning
§3–2, men elles ikkje skadebot (oppreisnad) for ikkje økonomisk skade.
Attåt skadebot skal det og svarast rente etter lov om renter ved forsinket
betaling m.m. §3. Melding om skaden til trygdelaget vert rekna som påkrav.
13. Ifølge anmodningen fra den nasjonale domstol fastslår § 6 første ledd
at utmålingen skjer etter de alminnelige erstatningsreglene som finnes i
skadeserstatningsloven av 13. juni 1969 nr. 26. I skadeserstatningsloven §
3–1 første ledd heter det:
Erstatning for skade på person skal dekke lidt skade, tap i framtidig erverv og
utgifter som personskaden antas å påføre skadelidte i framtiden.
14. I tillegg til å dekke det økonomiske tapet skal forsikringsselskapet dekke
ménerstatning hvis skadeserstatningslovens alminnelige vilkår for dette er
- 351
240 -
12. Forsikringen dekker det økonomiske tapet. Den skal i tillegg dekke
ménerstatning for ikke-økonomisk tap, men ikke oppreisning. Dette følger av
bilansvarslova § 6 (korleis skadebota vert fastsett) som regulerer fastsettelsen
av forsikringsutbetalingen. Bestemmelsen lyder som følger:
for this are fulfilled. This follows from Section 6, second paragraph of the
Automobile Liability Act. Permanent injury compensation is not compensation
for economic loss, but an amount which is to compensate for reduced quality
of life. The basic condition is that lasting and significant medical injuries have
been inflicted upon the injured party.
15. The Automobile Liability Act Section 6, second paragraph, prescribes that the
compulsory road traffic insurance does not cover redress for non-economic
injury (“pain and suffering”). It is this exception which the case pending before
Oslo tingrett relates to.
16. Redress comes into question if the person who caused the injury did so
intentionally or with gross negligence. Redress is awarded and the redress
amount determined on the basis of an overall assessment of what is
reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, injured parties or their survivors
do not have any absolute claim to redress, but in practice redress is normally
awarded if the conditions for it are fulfilled. Redress is regulated in Section
3–5 (Compensation (redress) for non-economic injury) of the Torts Act, which
reads:
Anybody who intentionally or by gross negligence has
(a) caused personal injury or
(b) inflicted such offence or displayed such misconduct as mentioned in
Section 3–3
may, regardless of whether permanent injury compensation is paid under
Section 3–2 or standardised compensation is paid under Section 3–2a,
be ordered to pay the victim such non-recurrent amount as the court finds
reasonable in compensation (redress) for inflicted pain and suffering and
for other offence or injury of a non-economic kind. In the case of offence or
misconduct as mentioned in Sections 195, 196 and 200, third paragraph, of
the Penal Code, when determining the redress amount, particular importance
is to be attached to the nature of the act, how long the conduct has endured,
whether the act is a misuse of a blood relationship, care relationship, a
relationship of dependence or trust, and whether the act was committed in an
particularly painful or offensive way.
Anybody who intentionally or by gross negligence has caused another
person’s death may be ordered to pay to the spouse, common-law spouse
352 - 241
15. Bilansvarsloven § 6 annet ledd fastsetter at den tvungne trafikkforsikringen
ikke dekker oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk skade (“tort og smerte”). Det er
dette unntaket saken for Oslo tingrett dreier seg om.
16. Oppreisning er aktuelt hvis skadevolder har forårsaket skaden ved forsett
eller grov uaktsomhet. Oppreisningen tilkjennes og utmåles etter en helhetlig
rimelighetsvurdering. Skadelidte eller dennes etterlatte har altså ikke noe
absolutt krav på oppreisning, men i praksis vil oppreisning normalt bli tilkjent hvis
vilkårene for dette er oppfylt. Oppreisning er regulert i skadeserstatningsloven
§ 3–5 (erstatning (oppreisning) for skade av ikke økonomisk art), som lyder
som følger:
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oppfylt. Dette følger av bilansvarslova § 6 annet ledd. Ménerstatning er ikke
erstatning for økonomisk tap, men et beløp som skal kompensere for redusert
livskvalitet. Grunnvilkåret er at skadelidte er påført varige og betydelige
medisinske skader.
Den som forsettlig eller grovt aktløst har
a) voldt skade på person eller
kan – uansett om det ytes menerstatning etter §3–2 eller standardisert erstatning
etter §3–2a – pålegges å betale den fornærmede en slik engangssum som
retten finner rimelig til erstatning (oppreisning) for den voldte tort og smerte og
for annen krenking eller skade av ikke-økonomisk art. Ved krenking eller mislig
atferd som nevnt i straffeloven §§ 195, 196 og 200 tredje ledd, skal det ved
utmålingen av oppreisning særlig legges vekt på handlingens art, hvor lang
tid forholdet har pågått, om handlingen er et misbruk av slektskapsforhold,
omsorgsforhold, avhengighetsforhold eller tillitsforhold, og om handlingen er
begått på en særlig smertefull eller krenkende måte.
Den som forsettlig eller grovt aktløst har voldt en annens død, kan pålegges
å betale avdødes ektefelle, samboer, barn eller foreldre slik oppreisning som
nevnt i første ledd.
353 --- 241
b) tilføyd krenking eller utvist mislig atferd som nevnt i §3–3,
[samboer*], children or parents of the deceased such redress as mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.
17. The national court explains in its request that Section 3–5, first paragraph, litra
b is not relevant in the case at hand whereas litra a of the same paragraph,
regarding intentional or grossly negligent infliction of injury on a person, such
as in the present case, may be relevant.
18. In the preparatory works, the exception for redress in the Automobile Liability
Act was motivated with reference to the legal institution of redress being
based on considerations relating to individual deterrence, with certain penal
characteristics. In the report of the expert committee, which prepared the Act,
it is stated:11
Also some persons in Norway have voiced the opinion that the road traffic
insurance shall cover redress for pain and suffering, partly to secure the car
owner against the risk of this liability, partly to guarantee the injured party
coverage. However, the majority in the Norwegian committee – all except the
Chairman – cannot find reason to propose a novel system to this effect, at
least not as long as claims for redress are based on gross fault. The liability
then has, in essence, a deterring purpose, and should therefore be kept out of
the insurance.
19. In its request, Oslo tingrett states that it is nevertheless clear that redress, in
addition to having a function of individual deterrence, also has the purpose of
providing compensation to the injured party for burdens inflicted.
20. On certain conditions, the Automobile Liability Act provides for later settlements
between the insurance company and the person who caused the injury.
According to the Automobile Liability Act Section 12, first paragraph, litra a,
the liable insurance company has a right to recourse against the driver or user
of the insured motor vehicle in cases of intent or gross negligence.
EEA law
21. Article 1(2) of the First Directive reads:
“[I]njured party” means any person entitled to compensation in respect of any
loss or injury caused by vehicles;
22. Article 3(1) of the First Directive reads:
* The Norwegian concept of samboer is distinct from and generally broader than the concept of a common-law spouse
11
Report of the Motor Vehicle Committee of 1951, page 61.
354 - 242
18. Bilansvarslovas unntak for oppreisning ble i forarbeidene begrunnet med at
oppreisningsinstituttet bygger på individualpreventive betraktninger med visse
pønale trekk. I innstillingen fra det fagkyndige utvalget som forberedte loven,
heter det:11
Også enkelte i Norge har tatt til orde for at trafikkforsikringen skal dekke
oppreisning for tort og svie, dels for å sikre vogneieren for risikoen for dette
ansvar, dels for å sikre skadelidtes dekning. Den norske komités flertall, alle
unntatt formannen, finner imidlertid ikke å kunne foreslå noen slik nyordning,
iallfall ikke så lenge oppreisningskrav baseres på grov skyld. Ansvaret har da
i det vesentlige preventive formål og bør holdes utafor forsikringen.
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17. Den nasjonale domstolen forklarer i foreleggelsen at dens henvisning at § 3–5
første ledd bokstav b ikke er aktuell i denne saken, men at første ledd bokstav
a om forsettlig eller grovt uaktsom skadeforvoldelse på person, slik som i den
foreliggende sak, kan være aktuell.
19. I foreleggelsen fastslår Oslo tingrett at det likevel er på det rene at oppreisning,
i tillegg til å ha en individualpreventiv funksjon, også har til formål å gi skadelidte
kompensasjon for påførte belastninger.
20. Bilansvarslova åpner på bestemte vilkår for et etteroppgjør mellom
forsikringsselskapet og personlig skadevolder. Etter bilansvarslova § 12 første
ledd bokstav a vil ansvarlig forsikringsselskap ha regressrett mot sjåføren
eller brukeren av motorvognen i tilfeller hvor det er utvist forsett eller grov
uaktsomhet.
EØS-rett
I dette direktiv menes med:
…
2. skadelidte, enhver person som har rett til erstatning for skade forårsaket av
et kjøretøy,
22. Første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1 lyder som følger:
11
Innstilling fra motorvognansvarskomiteen av 1951 s. 1961.
- 242
355 -
21. Første direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 2 lyder som følger:
Each Member State shall, subject to Article 4, take all appropriate measures
to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in
its territory is covered by insurance. The extent of the liability covered and the
terms and conditions of the cover shall be determined on the basis of these
measures.
23. Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Second Directive reads:
1. The insurance referred to in Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC shall
cover compulsorily both damage to property and personal injuries.
2. Without prejudice to any higher guarantees which Member States may
lay down, each Member State shall require that the amounts for which such
insurance is compulsory are at least:
– in the case of personal injury, 350 000 ECU where there is only one victim;
where more than one victim is involved in a single claim, this amount shall
be multiplied by the number of victims,
…
24. Article 2(1) of the Second Directive reads:
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance
policy issued in accordance with Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, which
excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by:
– persons who do not have express or implied authorization thereto, or
– persons who do not hold a licence permitting them to drive the vehicle
concerned, or
– persons who are in breach of the statutory technical requirements
concerning the condition and safety of the vehicle concerned,
shall, for the purposes of Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC, be deemed
to be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an
accident.
…
25. Article 3 of the Second Directive reads:
The members of the family of the insured person, driver or any other person
who is liable under civil law in the event of an accident, and whose liability is
covered by the insurance referred to in Article 1 (1) shall not be excluded from
insurance in respect of their personal injuries by virtue of that relationship.
356 - 243
Med forbehold for anvendelsen av artikkel 4 skal hver medlemsstat treffe alle
hensiktsmessige tiltak for å sikre at erstatningsansvar for kjøretøyer som er
hjemmehørende på dens territorium, er dekket av en forsikring. Hvilke skader
som dekkes, samt forsikringsvilkårene bestemmes innen rammen av disse
tiltakene.
23. Annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 og 2 lyder som følger:
1. Forsikringen nevnt i artikkel 3 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF skal dekke både
tingskade og personskade.
2. Hver medlemsstat skal, med forbehold for høyere garantibeløp
som medlemsstatene eventuelt selv fastsetter, kreve at den lovpliktige
ansvarsforsikring minst skal dekke:
– for personskade, 350 000 ECU dersom det er bare én skadelidt. Dersom
det er flere skadelidte i samme skadetilfelle, multipliseres dette beløpet
med antall skadelidte,
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…
24. Annet direktivs artikkel 2 nr. 1 lyder som følger:
1. Hver medlemsstat skal treffe de nødvendige tiltak for å sikre at enhver
lovbestemmelse eller klausul nevnt i en forsikringspolise utstedt i samsvar
med artikkel 3 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF, som bestemmer at forsikringen ikke
dekker følgende personers bruk av eller kjøring med et kjøretøy:
– personer som ikke uttrykkelig eller stilltiende har tillatelse til det, eller
– personer som ikke har førerkort for vedkommende kjøretøy, eller
ved gjennomføringen av artikkel 3 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF ikke skal komme
til anvendelse med hensyn til krav fra tredjepersoner som er skadelidte i en
ulykke.
…
25. Annet direktivs artikkel 3 lyder som følger:
Medlemmer av forsikringstakerens familie, av sjåførens familie eller av familien
til enhver annen person som er erstatningsansvarlig for en skade dekket av
den forsikring som er nevnt i artikkel 1 nr. 1, kan ikke under henvisning til
dette slektskap utelukkes fra forsikringsdekningens omfang når det gjelder
personskader.
357 - 243
– personer som ikke etterkommer de lovbestemte krav til kjøretøyets tekniske
og sikkerhetsmessige stand,
26. Article 1 of the Third Directive reads:
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 2 (1) of Directive
84/5/EEC, the insurance referred to in Article 3 (1) of Directive 72/166/EEC
shall cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the
driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.
…
V Written Observations
27. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute of the EFTA Court and Article 97 of the
Rules of Procedure, written observations have been received from:
– the Plaintiff, represented by Christian Lundin, advocate;
– the Defendant, represented by Karin Fløistad, advocate, Office of the
Attorney General (Civil Affairs), acting as Agent;
– the Kingdom of Belgium, represented by Liesbet Van den Broeck, Attaché
with the Directorate General Legal Affairs of the Federal Public Service for
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, acting as
Agent;
– the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Bjørnar Alterskjær, Senior
Officer and Florence Simonetti, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive
Affairs, acting as Agents;
– the Commission of the European Communities, represented by Nicola
Yerrell, a member of its Legal Service, acting as Agent.
The Plaintiff
28. In relation to the first question, the Plaintiff submits that the Norwegian rule
on exception of liability for redress from insurance coverage is contrary to the
Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives.
29. The Plaintiff maintains that it follows from the clear wording of the Directives
that liability for redress towards the Plaintiff should have been covered by
liability insurance. Article 3(1) of the First Directive must be understood to
mean that any personal liability which the driver of a motor vehicle may incur
shall be covered by insurance. Liability for redress is a personal liability in this
sense. The Second and the Third Directives clarified that the right to make
exceptions from insurance coverage cannot be applied to third party victims
such as the Plaintiff. The wording of the Directives thus leaves the legislator
no room for discretion in implementing the Directives and makes it clear that
358 - 244
Med forbehold for artikkel 2 nr. 1 annet ledd i direktiv 84/5/EØF skal forsikringen
nevnt i artikkel 2 nr. 1 i direktiv 72/166/EØF dekke ansvar for personskader
som skyldes bruk av kjøretøy, for alle passasjerer bortsett fra føreren.
…
V Skriftlige innlegg
27. I medhold av artikkel 20 i vedtektene for EFTA-domstolen og artikkel 97 i
rettergangsordningen er skriftlige innlegg mottatt fra:
– saksøker, representert ved Christian Lundin, advokat,
– saksøkte, representert ved Karin Fløistad, advokat, Regjeringsadvokaten,
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26. Tredje direktivs artikkel 1 første ledd lyder som følger:
– Kongeriket Belgia, representert ved Liesbet Van den Broeck, Attaché with
the Directorate General Legal Affairs of the Federal Public Service for
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation,
– EFTAs overvåkingsorgan, representert ved Bjørnar Alterskjær, Senior
Officer, og Florence Simonetti, Officer, Department of Legal & Executive
Affairs,
– Kommisjonen for De europeiske fellesskap, representert ved Nicola Yerrell,
medlem av Legal Service.
Saksøker
29. Saksøker hevder at det følger av direktivenes klare ordlyd at oppreisningsansvaret
overfor saksøker skulle ha vært dekket av ansvarsforsikring. Første direktivs
artikkel 3 nr. 1 må forstås slik at ethvert personlig erstatningsansvar som
en fører av en motorvogn kan pådra seg, skal være dekket av forsikringen.
Oppreisningsansvar må anses som et personlig erstatningsansvar i denne
sammenheng. Annet og tredje direktiv avklarte at retten til å gjøre unntak
fra forsikringsdekningen ikke kan gjøres gjeldende overfor en skadelidt
tredjeperson slik som saksøker. Direktivenes ordlyd innrømmer således ingen
skjønnsfrihet for lovgiver ved gjennomføringen av direktivene og etterlater
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359 --
28. I forhold til det første spørsmålet gjør saksøker gjeldende at den norske
regelen om unntak fra forsikringsdekning for oppreisningsansvar er i strid med
motorvognforsikringsdirektivene.
all liability which may be incurred by a driver shall be covered by insurance.
In this respect, the Plaintiff contests that the wording “damage to property and
personal injury” in Article 1(1) and (2) of the Second Directive, does not cover
non-economic loss. Such an understanding has in her view neither basis in the
Preambles nor in the wording of the Directives.
30. The Plaintiff refers to the general aim of safeguarding consumer interests in
EEA law, cf. the twelfth recital of the Preamble to the EEA Agreement. This
aim is followed up in the Directives. Therefore, the purpose of the Directives
is to secure insurance coverage for the victim’s claim for compensation. In the
Plaintiff’s view, this purpose is undermined if non-economic loss is excepted
from insurance coverage under the Directives. Moreover, as redress is a central
part of tort law in most European countries, excepting it from the scope of the
Directives leads to unequal treatment of victims in the various EEA States.12
31. The Plaintiff maintains that her understanding of the Directives is also
supported by case law of the ECJ and refers in that respect to Case C-166/02
Viegas13 and Case C-348/98 Ferreira.14 In the view of the Plaintiff, Høyesterett
interpreted the Directives in the same way in the cases Finanger I and
Finanger II.15
32. The Plaintiff contests the arguments that liability for redress is a personal
liability and that it is not reasonable that the community of the insured has to
finance coverage of this type of liability. Firstly, the penal element of liability
for redress is ensured through the insurance companies’ right of recourse.16
Secondly, the compulsory liability insurance also covers the tort-feasor’s
liability towards a third party for economic loss (loss of income and additional
expenses) and non-economic loss (permanent injury compensation), in cases
of negligence, gross negligence or intent. In this respect, the Plaintiff explains
that it must be assumed that most motor vehicle accidents occur as a result of
some form of negligence. The fact that motor vehicle liability insurance exists
does not exclude liability for the tort-feasor, cf. Section 11, first paragraph of
the Automobile Liability Act. The Plaintiff also points out that the purpose of
redress is twofold – i.e. penal purpose and compensating the victim. Today,
The Plaintiff refers inter alia to Case C-168/00 Leitner [2002] ECR I-2631, at paragraphs 18, 21 and 22.
Case C-166/02 Viegas [2003] ECR I-7871, at paragraph 21.
14
Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711, at paragraph 29.
15
Rt. 2000 page 1811 Finanger I, at page 1825 and Rt. 2005 page 1365 Finanger II at paragraphs 98 and 101.
16
The Plaintiff refers to Case C-129/94 Bernáldez [1996] ECR I-1829, at paragraph 22, in relation to the right of insurance companies’
right of recourse.
12
13
360 - 245
30. Saksøker viser til den generelle målsetningen om å ivareta forbrukernes
interesser i EØS-retten, jf. tolvte betraktning i fortalen til EØS-avtalen. Denne
målsetningen følges opp i motorvognforsikringsdirektivene. Direktivenes
formål er således å sikre skadelidte forsikringsdekning for sitt erstatningskrav.
Etter saksøkers mening ville formålet med direktivene undergraves dersom
erstatning for ikke-økonomisk tap unntas fra forsikringsdekningen i henhold
til direktivene. Videre er oppreisning en sentral del av de fleste europeiske
lands erstatningsrett, slik at det å unnta oppreisning fra direktivenes
anvendelsesområde fører til ulik behandling av skadelidte i de ulike EØSlandene.12
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ingen tvil om at alt erstatningsansvar som en bilfører kan pådra seg, skal være
dekket av forsikring. Saksøker bestrider i denne sammenheng at ordlyden
”tingskade og personskade” i artikkel 1 nr. 1 og 2 i annet direktiv ikke omfatter
ikke-økonomisk tap. Etter hennes oppfatning er det ikke holdepunkter for en
slik tolkning, verken i fortalene eller i ordlyden til direktivene.
32. Saksøker bestrider anførselen om at oppreisningsansvar er et personlig
ansvar, og anførselen om at det ikke er rimelig om forsikringsfellesskapet
må finansiere dekning av denne type ansvar. For det første ivaretas det
pønale element i oppreisningsansvaret gjennom forsikringsselskapenes
regressrett.16 For det andre dekker den tvungne ansvarsforsikringen også
skadevolders ansvar overfor tredjeperson for økonomisk tap (inntektstap og
ekstrautgifter) og ikke-økonomisk tap (ménerstatning), i tilfeller hvor det er
utvist uaktsomhet, grov uaktsomhet eller forsett. I den sammenheng forklarer
saksøker at det må antas at de fleste ulykker med motorvogn finner sted som
følge av en form for aktsomhet. Det forhold at det foreligger ansvarsforsikring
for motorvogn utelukker ikke ansvar for skadevolderen, jf. bilansvarslova § 11
første ledd. Saksøker påpeker også at oppreisningsinstituttets formål er todelt
– et pønalt formål og kompensasjon til skadelidte. I dag er det førstnevnte
Saksøker viser blant annet til sak C-168/00 Leitner, Sml. 2002 s. I-2631 (avsnitt 18, 21 og 22).
Sak C-166/02 Viegas, Sml. 2003 s. I-7871 (avsnitt 21).
14
Sak C-348/98 Ferreira, Sml. 2000 s. I-6711 (avsnitt 29).
15
Rt. 2000 s. 1811 Finanger I, på s. 1825 og Rt. 2005 s. 1365 Finanger II (avsnitt 98 og 101).
16
Saksøker viser til sak C-129/94 Bernáldez, Sml. 1996 s. I-1829 (avsnitt 22) vedrørende forsikringsselskapenes regressrett.
12
13
361 --- 245
31. Saksøker hevder at hennes tolkning av direktivene også støttes av EFdomstolens rettspraksis og viser i den anledning til sak C-166/02 Viegas13
og sak C-348/98 Ferreira.14 Etter saksøkers oppfatning har Høyesterett tolket
direktivene på samme måte i sakene Finanger I og Finanger II.15
the former is a significantly less weighty consideration.17 The main purpose,
namely the objective of compensation, is not sufficiently safeguarded if the
tort-feasor’s liability is not covered by the insurance.
33. Finally, with respect to the first question, the Plaintiff maintains that in Denmark
and Sweden, equivalent rules on redress are covered by compulsory liability
insurance. Therefore, if redress falls outside the scope of the compulsory
liability insurance in Norway, it will lead to a disparity amongst the legal systems
of the Nordic EEA countries and thereby different conditions of competition for
traffic insurance companies and disparity in the level of protection for road
users.
34. In relation to the second question, the Plaintiff maintains that the State is liable
on the basis of the EEA Agreement and the EEA Act which implements the
EEA Agreement in Norwegian law. The Plaintiff argues that the conditions for
liability as laid down in case law are fulfilled in the case at hand.18 The Plaintiff
argues that the norm for liability is the same in the EEA as in the EU, and refers
in that respect to the need for homogeneity.
35. When assessing whether the breach is “sufficiently serious,” all factors
that characterise the situation must be taken into account. 19 Central to the
assessment is whether the provision to be implemented in national legislation
has left room for discretion. If the State is left with discretion, it has greater
latitude and more is required in order to establish State liability. In such cases,
the breach must be “manifest and grave”. The Plaintiff refers in this respect
to Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur.20 The judgment
must be interpreted to the effect that where the national authorities are not
granted discretion the reason for restrictive application of the conditions for
liability will not weigh as heavily, and less is required in order to establish
liability.
36. As concerns the State’s error in this case, the Plaintiff submits that the
State did not have discretion in implementing the Directives with respect to
the requirement for insurance coverage of the driver’s personal liability. The
The Plaintiff refers to developments in the relevant national law and quotes inter alia proposals for amendments to the Automobile
Liability Act to the effect that redress would be covered by compulsory insurance. These proposals were according to the Plaintiff
put on hold due to the Plaintiffs filing of a lawsuit against the State, cf. Ot.prp. No 30 (2006−2007).
18
The Plaintiff refers to Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95, at paragraph 66 and Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002]
19
E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 240, at paragraph 38.
20
Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029, at paragraphs 41−47. The Plaintiff
also refers to Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, at paragraph 28, Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94,
C-189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer [1996] ECR I-4845, Case C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499, Case C-424/97 Haim
[2000] ECR I-5123 and Case C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I-493.
17
- 362
246 -
33. Til det første spørsmålet hevder saksøker avslutningsvis at i Danmark og
Sverige er de tilsvarende reglene om oppreisning dekket av den obligatoriske
ansvarsforsikringen for motorvogn. Dersom oppreisning faller utenfor
anvendelsesområdet for den obligatoriske ansvarsforsikringen, vil dette føre
til rettsulikhet i de nordiske EØS-land, og dermed til ulike konkurransevilkår for
trafikkforsikringsselskaper og ulikt beskyttelsesnivå for trafikkantene.
34. Til det andre spørsmålet hevder saksøker at staten er erstatningsansvarlig med
grunnlag i EØS-avtalen og EØS-loven som gjennomfører EØS-avtalen i norsk
rett. Saksøker anfører at vilkårene for erstatningsansvar, slik de er fastlagt
i rettspraksis, er oppfylt i dette tilfellet.18 Saksøker anførerer at normen for
erstatningsansvar er den samme i EØS som i EU og viser i den sammenheng
til behovet for homogenitet.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
formålet et betydelig mindre vektig hensyn.17 Hovedformålet, nemlig
kompensasjonshensynet, ivaretas ikke i tilstrekkelig grad dersom skadevolder
ikke er dekket av ansvarsforsikring.
36. I forhold til statens feil i denne saken gjør saksøker gjeldende at staten ikke hadde
skjønnsfrihet ved gjennomføringen av motorvognforsikringsdirektivene når det
gjelder kravet om forsikringsdekning av førers personlige erstatningsansvar.
Saksøker viser til utviklingen i nasjonal rett og siterer blant annet endringsforslag til bilansvarslova som går ut på at oppreisning
skal dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen. I følge saksøker har lovendringsarbeidet blitt stilt i bero på grunn av saksøkers
anleggelse av søksmål mot staten, jf. Ot.prp. nr. 30 (2006–2007).
18
Saksøker viser til sak E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, EFTA Court Report 1998 s. 95 (avsnitt 66) og sak E-4/01 Karlsson, EFTA Court
Report 2002 s. 240 (avsnitt 32).
19
Sak E-4/01 Karlsson, EFTA Court Report 2002 s. 240 (avsnitt 38).
20
Forente saker C-46/93 og C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur og Factortame, Sml. 1996 s. I-1029 (avsnitt 41 til 47). Saksøker viser
også til sak C-5/94 Hedley Lomas, Sml. 1996 s. I-2553 (avsnitt 28), forente saker C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94 og C-190/94
Dillenkofer, Sml. 1996 s. I-4845, sak C-140/97 Rechberger, Sml. 1999 s. I-3499, sak C-424/97 Haim, Sml. 2000 s. I-5123 og sak
C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark, Sml. 2001 s. I-493.
17
- 363
246 -
35. I vurderingen av hvorvidt bruddet er ”tilstrekkelig kvalifisert” må alle de
faktorer som kjennetegner den foreliggende situasjon tas i betraktning.19
Sentralt i vurderingen er om bestemmelsen som skal gjennomføres i nasjonal
lovgivning har åpnet for skjønnsmessige vurderinger. Dersom det er åpnet for
skjønnsmessige vurderinger, er statens spillerom større, og det skal mer til
for å konstatere ansvar. I slike tilfeller må bruddet være ”åpenbart og grovt”.
Saksøker viser i denne sammenheng til forente saker C-46/93 og C-48/93
Brasserie du pêcheur.20 Dommen må tolkes dit hen at i tilfeller hvor nasjonale
organer ikke er gitt skjønnsfrihet, veier ikke hensynene for en restriktiv
anvendelse av vilkårene for erstatningsansvar like tungt, og det skal mindre til
for å konstatere erstatningsansvar.
wording of the Directives is, in her view, unambiguous and precise, leaving no
room for alternative interpretation. Therefore, the exception of redress from
compulsory insurance coverage constitutes a manifest breach of the wording
and purpose of the Directive. It is principally submitted that already for that
reason the breach of the Directives is sufficiently serious to establish liability of
the State towards the Plaintiff. In the view of the Plaintiff, the legal situation is
relatively parallel to the situation in Finanger II. Therefore, reference is made
to Høyesterett’s grounds for imposing liability on the State.21
37. The Plaintiff suggests the following answers to the questions:
1. It is incompatible with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except
insurance scheme under national law.
2. The exception from insurance coverage as mentioned in point [1]
constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of the Motor Vehicle Insurance
Directives for the State to be held liable towards Celina Nguyen.
The Defendant
38. The principal view of the Defendant is that redress for non-economic loss falls
outside the scope of the Directives, as they merely regulate economic loss
resulting from personal injury or damage to property. Thus, it is compatible with
the Directives to except redress for non-economic loss (“pain and suffering”)
from the compulsory insurance. If the Directives are to be interpreted as
requiring redress for non-economic loss to be covered by the compulsory
insurance, this breach cannot be considered sufficiently serious so as to
establish State liability.
39. At the outset, the Defendant notes that whereas the content of the relevant
Norwegian law as such is undisputed among the parties, there might be
different views in relation to the legislative reasoning concerning redress for
non-economic loss. In that regard, the Defendant states in essence that the
characteristics of redress for non-economic loss differ from ordinary liability,
as its motivation is not only to compensate the victim, but more importantly,
to deter and penalise the tort-feasor. In the Defendant’s view, the character
of redress as individual sanction will be impaired if a third party, such as an
insurance company, is obliged to cover the redress.
21
Rt. 2005 page 1365 Finanger II, at paragraphs 94 to 104.
364 - 247
37. Saksøker foreslår følgende svar på spørsmålene:
1. Det er uforenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”) fra den obligatoriske
forsikringsordningen i nasjonal rett.
2. Unntaket fra forsikringsdekningen som nevnt i punkt [1] utgjør et
tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på motorvognforsikringsdirektivene til at staten er
erstatningsansvar[lig] overfor Celina Nguyen.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
Direktivenes ordlyd er etter hennes oppfatning utvetydig og presis og gir ikke
rom for tolkningsalternativer. Unntaket for oppreisning fra den obligatoriske
forsikringsdekningen utgjør derfor et åpenbart brudd på direktivenes ordlyd
og formål. Det gjøres prinsipalt gjeldende at allerede av denne grunn er
bruddet på direktivene tilstrekkelig til å konstatere erstatningsansvar for staten
overfor saksøker. Etter saksøkers oppfatning er den rettslige situasjonen
relativt parallell til saksforholdet i Finanger II. Det vises derfor til Høyesteretts
begrunnelse for ileggelse av ansvar for staten [i den saken].21
Saksøkte
39. Saksøkte bemerker innledningsvis at selv om innholdet i den aktuelle norske
lovgivningen er uomtvistet mellom partene, kan det foreligge ulike oppfatninger
om den legislative begrunnelsen for oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap.
I denne sammenheng går saksøktes argumentasjon i hovedsak ut på at
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap skiller seg fra alminnelig erstatningsansvar
ettersom begrunnelsen ikke bare ligger i å kompensere skadelidte, men også,
og i større grad, i å avskrekke og straffe skadevolderen. Etter saksøktes
mening vil oppreisningsinstituttets karakter av individuell sanksjon bli svekket
dersom en tredjepart slik som et forsikringsselskap er forpliktet til å dekke
oppreisningen.
21
Rt. 2005 s. 1365 Finanger II (avsnitt 94 til 104).
365 - 247
38. Saksøktes prinsipale syn er at oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap faller utenfor
direktivenes anvendelsesområde ettersom de kun regulerer økonomisk
tap knyttet til personskade eller tingsskade. Det er således forenlig med
direktivene å unnta oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”) fra
den obligatoriske forsikringen. Hvis direktivene må tolkes slik at oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap må dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen, kan
ikke dette bruddet anses som et tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd til å utløse
40. The Defendant submits that the first question must be answered in the
affirmative. In its view, this conclusion follows from both the wording and the
purpose of the Directives. The Defendant refers in particular to the wording
of Article 1(1) and (2) of the Second Directive which requires civil liability for
damage to property and personal injuries to be compulsorily covered up to
specified amounts. In the Defendant’s view, personal injury as well as damage
to property entail economic loss by their nature. Given that the Directives only
mention economic loss and only have minimum requirements for economic
loss, the wording clearly indicates that the Directives are limited to such loss.
41. The Defendant also refers to the Directives’ aim of removing barriers to free
movement of motor vehicles and persons within the European Economic Area
resulting from disparities between national provisions on liability insurance for
motor vehicles, cf. the seventh and eighth recitals of the First Directive, and to
ensure adequate compensation and protection of victims, cf. the fifth recital of
the Preamble to the Second Directive and the tenth recital of the Preamble to
the Fifth Directive.22
42. In relation to the purpose of the Directives, the Defendant states that the
requirement of compulsory insurance for motor vehicles is justified by the
considerable risk involved in motor traffic. These considerations are not
relevant when it comes to redress for non-economic loss, as it is conditional
upon the tort-feasor having acted with intent or gross negligence, cf. Section
3–5 of the Torts Act. The risk of such wrongful conduct cannot be considered
to be greater when it comes to motor traffic than to other areas of life. Also, the
Defendant points out that it would be very difficult to determine which incidents
would be covered as the Tort Act is based on general tort law, and is applicable
to tort-feasors in general. Moreover, requiring redress for non-economic loss to
be covered by the compulsory insurance seems to go far beyond the purpose
of the Directives, as there is no actual economic loss to be compensated.
43. The Defendant also maintains that the nature of redress for non-economic loss
makes it unsuitable for insurance coverage. Firstly, redress is conditional upon
the tort-feasor having caused the injury intentionally or with gross negligence.
Secondly, the evaluation of whether the conditions are fulfilled must be based
on a broad assessment involving a considerable amount of discretion both with
22
Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC,
88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance
against civil liability to the use of motor vehicles (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 14), added to Annex IX EEA by Decision No 86/2006 and
entered into force 1 March 2008.
366 - 248
41. Saksøkte viser også til direktivenes formål, som er å fjerne hindringer for
motorvogners fri bevegelighet av motorvogner og personer i EØS, forårsaket
av forskjeller mellom nasjonale bestemmelser om ansvarsforsikring for
motorvogner, jf. syvende og åttende betraktning i fortalen til første direktiv, og
å garantere en tilstrekkelig erstatning til og beskyttelse av skadelidte, jf. femte
betraktning i fortalen til annet direktiv og betraktning nr. 10 i fortalen til femte
direktiv22.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
40. Saksøkte gjør gjeldende at det første spørsmålet må besvares bekreftende.
Etter saksøktes oppfatning følger denne konklusjonen både av ordlyden og
formålet til direktivene. Det vises særskilt til ordlyden i annet direktivs artikkel 1
nr 1. og 2 som krever at den obligatoriske ansvarsforsikringen skal dekke både
erstatningsansvar for tingsskade og personskade opp til visse fastsatte beløp.
Saksøktes syn er at både tingsskade og personskade etter sin art innebærer
økonomisk tap. Siden direktivene kun nevner økonomisk tap og bare setter
minimumskrav til økonomisk tap, taler ordlyden klart for at direktivene er
begrenset til slikt tap.
43. Saksøkte hevder også at oppreisningsinstituttets art gjør oppreisning for ikkeøkonomisk tap uegnet for forsikringsdekning. For det første er oppreisning
betinget av at skadevolder har forvoldt skaden på en forsettlig eller grovt
uaktsom måte. For det andre bygger vurderingen av hvorvidt vilkårene er oppfylt
på en bred vurdering som innebærer et betydelig skjønn både med hensyn til
22
Europaparlaments- og rådsdirektiv 2005/14/EF om endring av rådsdirektiv 72/166/EØF, 84/5/EØF, 88/357/EØF og 90/232/EØF
samt europaparlaments- og rådsdirektiv 2000/26/EF av 16. mai 2000 om ansvarsforsikring for motorvogner (EFT 2005 L 149
s. 14), tilføyd i vedlegg IX til EØS-avtalen ved EØS-komiteens beslutning nr. 86/2006, i kraft 1. mars 2008.
- 248
367 -
42. I forhold til formålet til direktivene fremholder saksøkte at kravet om obligatorisk
forsikring for motorvogn rettferdiggjøres av den betydelige risiko biltrafikken
medfører. Disse betraktningene er ikke relevante i forhold til oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap siden oppreisning er betinget av at skadevolder
har opptrådt forsettlig eller grovt uaktsomt, jf. skadeserstatningsloven §
3–5. Risikoen for slik urettmessig opptreden kan ikke anses som større i
biltrafikken enn på andre livsområder. Saksøkte påpeker også at det ville bli
meget vanskelig å avgjøre hvilke hendelser som skulle være dekket ettersom
skadeserstatningsloven bygger på alminnelig erstatningsrett og kommer til
anvendelse overfor skadevoldere generelt. Å kreve at oppreisning for ikkeøkonomisk tap skal dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen synes videre å
gå langt utover direktivenes formål siden det ikke er noe faktisk økonomisk tap
som skal erstattes.
respect to the conditions for the redress and its calculation. The calculation
of the redress is based on elements of both tort law and criminal law. This
fact makes it difficult for insurance companies and the victims to negotiate
the amounts, with the result that each case will be litigated and the costs of
insurance will increase tremendously. The cost will eventually be born by all
drivers, which is not reasonable in light of the penal characteristics of redress
described above.
44. The Defendant maintains that its understanding of the Directives is further
supported by the case law of both the EFTA Court and the ECJ which seems to
deal only with the question of compensation for economic loss. The Defendant
also refers to case E-7/00 Helgadóttir23 and stresses the wording “all actual
loss incurred” used by the Court in paragraph 29 in relation to Article 3(1) of
the First Directive and the insurance coverage of the Directives. With respect
to Article 1 of the Second Directive, the Defendant refers to the opinion of the
Advocate General in Case C-348/98 Feirrera24, which in its view is supported
by the opinion of the Advocate General and the judgment of the ECJ in Case
C-63/01 Evans25. In the view of the Defendant, these cases show that the
Directives limit the scope of the obligation to insure, and that for claims not
specifically mentioned in the Directives a further analysis of the nature of the
claim has to be made before one can conclude on the extent of the obligation to
insure. In this regard, the Defendant reiterates the specific personal character
of claims for redress, i.e. that it is based on personal wrongdoing and calls for
an assessment of guilt on the part of the tort-feasor in each individual case.
Such an assessment is impossible in cases where the identity of the tortfeasor is unknown. If the Directives were interpreted to cover such claims it
would interfere with national liability law.
45. For further support of its views, the Defendant refers to opinions of legal
experts and to legislation in other states, namely Denmark, Finland and
Sweden, maintaining that redress for non-economic loss is not covered by
compulsory insurance in these states. It also refers to the legislative history
of the Fifth Directive which in its view shows that the starting point of the
Directives is not that all loss must be covered by the insurance, but rather
Case E-7/00 Helgadóttir [2000−2001] EFTA Ct. Rep. 246.
Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711, at paragraph 43.
25
Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447, at paragraphs 27, 30 and 31.
23
24
- 368
249 -
45. Til ytterligere støtte for sitt synspunkt viser saksøkte til uttalelsene fra
rettslærde og til lovgivningen i andre land, nærmere bestemt Danmark,
Finland og Sverige, og hevder at oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap
ikke dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen i disse landene. Saksøkte
viser også til lovgivningshistorikken til femte direktiv, som etter saksøktes
oppfatning viser at direktivenes utgangspunkt ikke er at alt tap skal dekkes av
Sak E-7/00 Helgadóttir, EFTA Court Report 2000–2001 s. 246.
Generaladvokatens innstilling i sak C-348/98 Ferreira, Sml. 2000 s. I-6711 (avsnitt 43).
25
Sak C-63/01 Evans, Sml. 2003 s. I-14447 (avsnitt 27, 30 og 31).
23
24
- 369
249 -
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
44. Videre hevdes det at saksøktes forståelse av direktivene har støtte i både
EFTA-domstolens og EF-domstolens rettspraksis, som synes bare å ta for
seg spørsmålet om erstatning for økonomisk tap. Saksøkte viser også
til sak E-7/00 Helgadóttir23 og fremhever ordlyden ”alt faktisk tap som
har oppstått” som blir benyttet av domstolen i avsnitt 29 i forhold til første
direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1 og forsikringsdekningen i henhold til direktivene.
I forhold til annet direktivs artikkel 1, viser saksøkte til generaladvokatens
innstilling i sak C-348/98 Ferreira,24 som etter saksøktes oppfatning er støttet
av generaladvokatens innstilling og dommen i sak C-63/01 Evans.25 Etter
saksøktes mening viser disse sakene at direktivene avgrenser rekkevidden
av forsikringsforpliktelsen, og at det for krav som ikke er nevnt uttrykkelig i
direktivene, må foretas en nærmere analyse av kravets art før man kan trekke
slutninger om omfanget av forsikringsforpliktelsen. I denne sammenheng
pekes det igjen på oppreisningskravets særegne personlige karakter, dvs. at
det bygger på personlig skyld og nødvendiggjør en vurdering av skadevolders
skyld i hver enkelt sak. Det er umulig å foreta en slik vurdering i saker med
ukjent skadevolder. Hvis direktivene tolkes slik at disse kravene må dekkes,
griper det inn i nasjonal erstatningsrett.
vilkårene for oppreisning og i forhold til utmålingen. Oppreisningsutmålingen
bygger på elementer fra både erstatningsretten og strafferetten. Dette gjør at
det er vanskelig for forsikringsselskapene og ofrene å forhandle om beløpene,
med det resultat at man må prosedere hver sak for retten, noe som igjen fører
til at forsikringsutgiftene øker betraktelig. Utgiftene vil til slutt måtte bæres av
alle bilførere, hvilket ikke er rimelig i lys av de pønale trekk ved oppreisning.
to establish insurance coverage up to the minimum requirements set by the
Directives.26
46. As concerns the second question, the Defendant submits that it should be
answered in the negative. For an assessment of whether a breach of EEA
law by a State is sufficiently serious to entail State liability, the Defendant
refers to Case E-4/01 Karlsson.27 The Defendant also refers to case law of
the ECJ, as in its view, the conditions for liability under EEA law are, at least
in principle, the same as under EC law.28 In the opinion of the Defendant, it
follows from this case law that an absolute prerequisite for entailing liability
is that the breach of the State is sufficiently serious, meaning that the state
has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its powers. A breach may
be considered sufficiently serious if the Directive in question does not give
leeway for any interpretation, and the Member State has not taken sufficient
and correct measures to implement the directive. Where this is not the case,
a more nuanced approach is necessary.29 In such a situation, the margin of
discretion of the State is important but not decisive. The degree of clarity
and precision of the rule is also important, as well as all the factors which
characterise the situation.30 Therefore, even though the State was not left with
any discretion, a mistake in implementing EEA law may be excusable.31 In that
regard, the clarity and precision of the rule in question is of vital importance.32
47. In the view of the Defendant, the wording of the Directives is not clear and
precise with respect to the scope of compulsory insurance coverage. The
wording indicates that it only concerns economic loss. Moreover, excepting
redress for non-economic loss from compulsory insurance is not contrary to the
purpose of the Directives. Finally, other countries have shared the Defendant’s
understanding of the Directives and the Community legislator has shared the
interpretation that the Directives do not require all types of compensation to be
Reference is made to a proposal of the European Parliament, which was not adopted, to amend Article 1(1) of the Second
Directive to include in the compulsory insurance cover all necessary and appropriate legal costs borne by victims during the
settlement of the claim. The Defendant also refers to a report of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on certain issues relating to motor insurance, summarising that national legislation differs on whether legal costs are covered by
compulsory insurance.
27
Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 240, at paragraph 38.
28
The Defendant refers to the opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447, at paragraph 152 and
to the opinion of the Advocate General in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR
29
The Defendant refers to Case C-278/05 Robins [2007] ECR I-1053, at paragraphs 70−73.
30
The Defendant refers to the opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, at paragraph 160
and to the opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, at paragraphs 130−139.
31
The Defendant refers to Case C-392/93 British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631, at paragraphs 42−44.
32
The Defendant refers to Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447, at paragraph 86.
26
370 - 250
46. Med hensyn til det andre spørsmålet gjør saksøkte gjeldende at det må
besvares benektende. Hva gjelder vurderingen av hvorvidt et brudd på EØSretten er tilstrekkelig kvalifisert til å utløse erstatningsansvar for staten, vises
det til sak E-4/01 Karlsson.27 Det vises også til EF-domstolens rettspraksis
ettersom saksøktes syn er at vilkårene for erstatningsansvar i EØS-retten
iallfall i prinsippet er de samme som i EF-retten.28 Etter saksøktes oppfatning
følger det av denne rettspraksis at det er en absolutt forutsetning for at det skal
foreligge erstatningsansvar at statens brudd er tilstrekkelig kvalifisert, hvilket vil
si at staten åpenbart og grovt har satt seg ut over rammene for sin handlefrihet.
Et brudd kan anses som tilstrekkelig kvalifisert dersom det aktuelle direktivet
ikke gir noe spillerom for tolkninger, og medlemsstaten ikke har iverksatt
tilstrekkelige og riktige tiltak for å gjennomføre direktivet. Hvis dette ikke er
tilfellet, er det nødvendig med en mer nyansert tilnærming.29 I en slik situasjon
er statens skjønnsfrihet viktig, men ikke avgjørende. Regelens klarhets- og
presisjonsgrad er også viktig, i tillegg til de faktorer som kjennetegner den
foreliggende situasjonen.30 Selv om staten ikke er overlatt noe skjønnsfrihet,
kan derfor feil gjennomføring av EØS-retten være unnskyldelig.31 I denne
sammenheng er klarheten og presisjonsnivået til den aktuelle regelen av
avgjørende betydning.32
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
forsikringen, men snarere å etablere forsikringsdekning for økonomisk tap opp
til minimumskravene som er fastsatt i direktivene.26
Det vises til et forslag fra Europaparlamentet, som ikke ble vedtatt, om å endre annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 slik at alle
nødvendige og formålstjenlige rettshjelpsutgifter som bæres av ofre i forbindelse med fastsettelsen av kravet også blir omfattet
av den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen. Saksøkte viser også til Kommisjonens rapport til Europaparlamentet og Rådet om
visse spørsmål vedrørende motorvognforsikring, der det fremgår at nasjonal lovgivning er forskjellig med hensyn til hvorvidt
rettshjelpsutgifter dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen.
27
28
Saksøkte viser til generaladvokatens innstilling i sak C-63/01 Evans, Sml. 2003 s. I-14447 (avsnitt 152) og til generaladvokatens
innstilling i forente saker C-46/93 og C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur og Factortame, Sml. 1996 s. I-1029 (avsnitt 84).
29
Saksøkte viser til sak C-278/05 Robins, Sml. 2007 s. I-1053 (avsnitt 70–73).
30
Saksøkte viser til generaladvokatens innstilling i sak C-5/94 Hedley Lomas, Sml. 1996 s. I-2553 (avsnitt 160) og til generaladvokatens
innstilling i sak C-224/01 Köbler, Sml. 2003 s. I-10239 (avsnitt 130–139).
31
Saksøkte viser til sak C-392/93 British Telecommunications, Sml. 1996 s. I-1631 (avsnitt 42–44).
32
Saksøkte viser til sak C-63/01 Evans, Sml. 2003 s. I-14447 (avsnitt 86).
26
- 250
371 -
47. Etter saksøktes oppfatning er ikke direktivenes ordlyd klar og presis med
hensyn til rekkevidden av den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen. Ordlyden
taler for at det kun er økonomisk tap som omfattes. Å unnta oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap er videre heller ikke i strid med direktivenes formål.
Endelig har andre land tolket direktivene på samme måte som saksøkte, og
fellesskapslovgiveren har også tolket direktivene slik at det ikke kreves at alle
former for erstatning skal dekkes. Samlet sett taler dette for den konklusjon at
covered. All this supports the conclusion that the Defendant’s possible breach
of the Directives is not sufficiently serious to entail State liability.
48. The Defendant requests the Court to answer the first question as follows:
1. It is compatible with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except
insurance system under national law.
Consequently, it is of no actual interest to the pending case for the Court to
answer question 2.
49. Alternatively, the Defendant suggests that the Court answers the second
question as follows:
2. An exception from the insurance coverage as mentioned in question 1 is
not a sufficiently serious breach of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to
be able to entail State liability.
The Kingdom of Belgium
50.
The Kingdom of Belgium limits its observations to the first question. It is
submitted that excluding redress from the compulsory insurance coverage
is contrary to the Directives. The Kingdom of Belgium refers to the overall
purpose of the Directives to facilitate the free movement of goods and persons
and to safeguard the interests of persons who may be victims of accidents
caused by motor vehicles, cf. the first, second and third recitals of the Preamble
to the First Directive. The Kingdom of Belgium also refers to Article 3(1) of
the First Directive and to the Second Directive, which establishes minimum
amounts which the compulsory insurance shall cover, intended to guarantee
victims adequate compensation irrespective of the Member State in which the
accident occurs, cf. the fifth recital of the Preamble to that Directive.
51. The Kingdom of Belgium adds that according to case law, Member States are
free to determine the type of civil liability applicable to road traffic accidents.
However, they must ensure that the civil liability arising under their domestic
law is covered by insurance that complies with the provisions of the Directives,
irrespective of whether it was based on fault or risk. As compensation for pain
and suffering is a part of civil liability, it has to be covered by the compulsory
insurance. This conclusion is also supported by the judgment of the Court
in Case E-7/00 Helgadóttir33 where the Court referred to “all actual loss” in
paragraph 29.
33
372 - 251
48. Saksøkte ber om at spørsmålene besvares som følger:
1. Det er forenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta oppreisning for
ikke-økonomisk tap (”tort og smerte”) fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen
etter nasjonal rett.
Det er derfor uten betydning for den verserende saken å svare på
spørsmål 2.
49. Saksøkte foreslår subsidiært at Domstolen besvarer det andre spørsmålet
som følger:
2. Et unntak fra forsikringsdekningen som nevnt i spørsmål 1 er ikke et
tilstrekkelig kvalifisert brudd på motorvognforsikringsdirektivene til å kunne
utløse erstatningsansvar for staten.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
saksøktes mulige brudd på direktivene ikke er tilstrekkelig kvalifisert til å utløse
Kongeriket Belgia
51. Kongeriket Belgia tilføyer at det følger av rettspraksis at medlemslandene
står fritt til å avgjøre hva slags erstatningsansvar som kommer til anvendelse
på trafikkulykker. De må imidlertid sørge for at det erstatningsansvaret som
oppstår i henhold til nasjonal rett, er dekket av forsikring som etterkommer
bestemmelsene i direktivene, uten hensyn til om ansvaret bygger på skyld
eller [plassering av] risiko. Ettersom erstatning for tort og smerte er en del av
erstatningsansvaret, må den dekkes av den obligatoriske forsikringen. Denne
konklusjonen er også støttet av EFTA-domstolens avgjørelse i sak E-7/00
Helgadóttir33 der EFTA-domstolen viste til ”alt faktisk tap” i avsnitt 29.
33
- 251
373 -
50. Kongeriket Belgia avgrenser sitt innlegg til det første spørsmålet. Det gjøres
gjeldende at å unnta oppreisning fra den obligatoriske forsikringsdekningen
er i strid med direktivene. Kongeriket Belgia viser til at direktivenes generelle
formål er å fremme den frie bevegelighet for varer og personer, samt å verne
interessene til personer som kan bli utsatt for bilulykker, jf. første, annen og
tredje betraktning i fortalen til første direktiv. Det vises også til første direktivs
artikkel 3 nr. 1 og til annet direktiv som fastsetter minimumsbeløp som den
obligatoriske forsikringen skal dekke, i den hensikt å garantere ofrene en
tilstrekkelig erstatning uansett hvilken medlemsstat skaden inntreffer i, jf.
femte betraktning i fortalen til annet direktiv.
52. The Kingdom of Belgium suggests the first question to be answered as
follows:
It is not compatible with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives to except
redress for non-economic loss from the compulsory insurance system under
national law.
53. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (hereinafter “ESA”) submits that the first
question must be answered to the effect that it is incompatible with the
Directives to except redress for non-economic loss (pain and suffering) from
the compulsory insurance system under national law if such redress constitutes
a civil liability.
54. According to ESA, EEA States have full discretion with regard to the type of civil
liability applicable to road traffic accidents, as the Directives do not harmonise
the rules of the EEA States governing civil liabilities. However, the States
must, according to the wording of Article 3(1) of the First Directive, ensure
that all civil liability arising under domestic law is covered by insurance. In that
regard, the EEA States do not have any discretion.34 ESA states that there
is no express derogation in the Directives for specific types of liabilities. Any
derogation from the general rules contained in Article 3(1) must be interpreted
strictly35 and therefore a cautious approach must be taken with regard to nonexplicit derogations.
55. Therefore, the wording of Article 3(1) of the First Directive, and the case law
concerning that provision, do not support the finding that non-economic loss
is excluded or could be excluded from the scope of the Directive. Nor do other
parts of the Directive support such a conclusion.
56. ESA contests the view of the Defendant that Article 1(1) of the Second Directive
is limited to economic loss. The wording “both damage to property and personal
injury” does not in itself exclude non-economic loss. This wording merely
aims at distinguishing damage to properties from personal damage, whether
economic or not, as each category of damage is subject to a specific minimum
amount. Moreover, in ESA’s view, the wording “all actual loss” in paragraph
ESA refers to Case C-348/98 Ferreira [2000] ECR I-6711, at paragraph 29, Case C-166/02 Viegas [2003] ECR I-7871, at
paragraph 21, Case C-537/03 Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745, at paragraph 24 and Case C-356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I-3067, at
paragraph 33.
35
See Case C-537/03 Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745, at paragraphs 18 and 21 and Case E 1/99 Finanger [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 119,
at paragraph 33 and Case E-5/96 Nille [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 30, at paragraph 33.
34
374 - 252
Det er ikke forenlig med motorvognforsikringsdirektivene å unnta oppreisning
for ikke-økonomisk tap fra den obligatoriske forsikringsordningen etter nasjonal
rett.
EFTAs overvåkningsorgan
53. EFTAs overvåkningsorgan (heretter “ESA”) gjør gjeldende at det første
spørsmålet må besvares med at det er uforenlig med direktivene å unnta
oppreisning for ikke-økonomisk tap (tort og smerte) fra den obligatoriske
forsikringsordningen i nasjonal rett dersom slik oppreisning utgjør et
erstatningsansvar.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
52. Kongeriket Belgia foreslår at det første spørsmålet besvares som følger:
54. Ifølge ESA har EØS-statene full skjønnsfrihet i forhold til hva slags
erstatningsansvar som kommer til anvendelse på trafikkulykker ettersom
direktivene ikke harmoniserer EØS-statenes regler om erstatningsansvar.
Ifølge ordlyden i første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1 må imidlertid statene sørge for
at samtlige former for erstatningsansvar i intern rett er dekket av forsikring. I så
henseende har ikke EØS-statene noen skjønnsfrihet.34 ESA fremholder at det
ikke finnes noe uttrykkelig unntak for bestemte ansvarsformer i direktivene.
Ethvert unntak fra hovedregelen i artikkel 3 nr. 1 må tolkes strengt35 og man må
derfor ha en forsiktig tilnærmingsmåte til unntak som ikke fremgår uttrykkelig.
56. ESA bestrider saksøktes synspunkt om at annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 er
begrenset til økonomisk tap. Ordlyden ”både tingskade og personskade”
utelukker ikke i seg selv ikke-økonomisk tap. Denne ordlyden tar utelukkende
sikte på å sondre mellom tingsskade og personskade, enten tapet er økonomisk
eller ikke, ettersom hver kategori er underlagt et bestemt minimumsbeløp.
ESAs mening er dessuten at ordlyden ”alt faktisk tap” i avsnitt 29 i
ESA viser til sak C-348/98 Ferreira, Sml. 2000 s. I-6711 (avsnitt 29), sak C-166/02 Viegas, Sml. 2003 s. I-7871 (avsnitt 21), sak
C-537/03 Candolin, Sml. 2005 s. I-5745 (avsnitt 24) og sak C-356/05 Farrell, Sml. 2007 s. I-3067 (avsnitt 33).
35
Se sak C-537/03 Candolin, Sml. 2005 s. I-5745 (avsnitt 18 og 21), sak E-1/99 Finanger, EFTA Court Report 1999 s. 119 (avsnitt
33) og sak E-5/96 Nille, EFTA Court Report 1997 s. 30 (avsnitt 33).
34
375 --- 252
55. Ordlyden i første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1 og rettspraksis som gjelder
bestemmelsen støtter således ikke synspunktet om at ikke-økonomisk tap
faller utenfor direktivets anvendelsesområde. Heller ikke andre deler av
direktivet støtter en slik konklusjon.
29 of the judgment of the Court in Case E-7/00 Helgadóttir36 would appear to
encompass both economic and non-economic loss. In any case, Article 1(1)
of the Second Directive merely supplements Article 3(1) of the First Directive
and does not amend or replace it. ESA also maintains that according to current
case law no distinction is made between economic and non-economic loss.37
57. Finally, with respect to the first question, ESA submits that the Defendant’s
argument that the motivation and character of redress is personal, is irrelevant
for the assessment of whether non-economic loss is covered by the Directives.
In that regard, ESA refers to the purpose of the Directives to ensure free
movement and to guarantee equal treatment of victims of car accidents,
irrespective of where within the EEA they occur. ESA recalls that in several
cases of the Court and the ECJ the courts have refused to restrict the coverage
of the Directives on the basis of the victim’s contribution to the damage. In any
event, if it is the wish of the legislator in Norway to make the one causing the
damage pay in the end, a right of recourse of the insurance companies, as well
as criminal sanctions, could ensure that.
58. As concerns the second question, ESA states that the EFTA Court has applied
the same methods as the ECJ when assessing whether a breach of the EEA
Agreement is sufficiently serious to entail State liability. The test applied is
whether, in the exercise of its legislative powers, an EEA State has manifestly
and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers.38
59. ESA notes that it is for the national court to determine whether the conditions
for State liability are met, but finds it appropriate to give certain guidance based
on the available information.
60. According to ESA, the first test to apply when assessing whether a breach is
sufficiently serious is the discretion enjoyed by the EEA State concerned when
implementing the relevant act. If the State has either considerably reduced or
even no discretion, a mere infringement of the law at issue may be sufficient to
establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.39
61. ESA argues that the Directives at issue did not leave any discretion to the
State legislators concerning whether liability that applies in a State should be
ESA refers to Case C-166/02 Viegas [2003] ECR I-7871, at paragraph 13, that concerned both economic and non-economic
loss.
38
Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct. Rep. 240, at paragraph 38.
39
C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123, at paragraph 38 and C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I‑493, at paragraphs
39−40.
36
37
- 376
253 -
57. I forhold til det første spørsmålet hevder ESA avslutningsvis at saksøktes
argument om at oppreisning etter sin begrunnelse og art er personlig er uten
betydning for vurderingen av om ikke-økonomisk tap dekkes av direktivene.
I så henseende viser ESA til direktivenes formål, som er å sørge for fri
bevegelighet og å garantere for lik behandling av ofre for bilulykker uansett
hvor i EØS ulykken oppstår. ESA minner om at i flere av EFTA-domstolens
og EF-domstolens saker har domstolene avvist å innskrenke dekningen etter
direktivene på grunnlag av skadelidtes medvirkning til skaden. Det er uansett
slik at dersom det er den norske lovgivers ønske at den som forårsaker skaden
skal betale til slutt, kan dette sikres gjennom regressrett for forsikringsselskapet,
og det samme gjelder for strafferettslige sanksjoner.
CaseCase
E-4/07
Jón Gunnar
Þorkelsson
vAuthority
E-8/07
Celina
Nguyen
v The
Norwegian
State
Case
E-1/06
EFTA Surveillance
v Norway
EFTA-domstolens avgjørelse i sak E-7/00 Helgadóttir36 kan synes å omfatte
både økonomisk og ikke-økonomisk tap. Under enhver omstendighet utgjør
annet direktivs artikkel 1 nr. 1 bare et tillegg til første direktivs artikkel 3 nr. 1
og endrer eller erstatter ikke denne bestemmelsen. ESA fremolder også at i
gjeldende rettspraksis sondres det ikke mellom økonomisk og ikke-økonomisk
tap.37
58. Når det gjelder det andre spørsmålet, uttaler ESA at EFTA-domstolen har
anvendt de samme metodene som EF-domstolen i vurderingen av hvorvidt
bruddet på EØS-retten er tilstrekkelig kvalifisert til å utløse erstatningsansvar
for staten. Testen som anvendes er hvorvidt en EØS-stat i sin utøvelse av
lovgivningsmyndighet åpenbart og grovt har satt seg ut over rammene for sin
handlefrihet.38
60. Ifølge ESA er det første som skal undersøkes ved vurderingen av om bruddet
er tilstrekkelig kvalifisert, graden av skjønnsfrihet som den berørte EØS-staten
har ved gjennomføringen av den aktuelle rettakten. Hvis staten enten har liten
eller ingen skjønnsfrihet, så vil selve den omstendighet at det er begått en
overtredelse være tilstrekkelig for å fastslå et tilstrekklig kvalifisert brudd.39
61. ESA hevder at de aktuelle direktivene ikke overlot noen skjønnsfrihet til
de nasjonale lovgivere i forhold til spørsmålet om erstatningsansvar som
ESA viser til sak C-166/02 Viegas, Sml. 2003 s. I-7871 (avsnitt 13) som gjaldt både økonomisk og ikke-økonomisk tap.
38
39
Sak C-424/97 Haim, Sml. 2000 s. I-5123 (avsnitt 43) og sak C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark, Sml. 2001 s. I-493 (avsnitt 39–40).
36
37
- 377
253 -
59. ESA fremholder at det er opp til den nasjonale domstol å avgjøre hvorvidt
vilkårene for statens erstatningsansvar er oppfylt, men finner det hensiktsmessig
å gi en viss veiledning basert på tilgjengelig informasjon.

Untitled - EFTA Court

Transcription

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