The Truth About Human Origins

Transcription

Apologetics Press, Inc.
230 Landmark Drive
Montgomery, Alabama 36117-2752
© Copyright 2003
ISBN: 0-932859-58-5
Printed in China
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
in any form without permission from the publisher, except in
the case of brief quotations embodied in articles or critical re
views.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Brad Harrub (1970 - ) and Bert Thompson (1949 - )
Includes bibliographic references, and subject and name indices.
ISBN 0-932859-58-5
1. Creation. 2. Science and religion. 3. Apologetics and Polemics
I. Title
213—dc21
2003111100
DEDICATION
On occasion, there are certain individuals who quietly step
into our lives—and who leave such an indelible imprint that
we find our existence changed forever.
This book is dedicated to four such individuals, whom we
never will be able to repay for their unwavering moral and fi
nancial support of our work, and who expect nothing in re
turn for their incredible generosity—except our continued
pledge to teach and defend the Truth.
This book (and numerous others like it) never could have
come to fruition without the ongoing support of these two
Christian couples who, although separated by many miles,
walk side by side in their combined efforts to ensure the suc
cess of Apologetics Press.
This side of heaven, few will know the full impact of their
sacrifices. Fortunately, God does.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 1 — The “Record of the Rocks” [Part I] . . . . . . 3
Biological Taxonomy and Human Evolution . . . . . . 4
Did Man Evolve from the Apes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
An Examination of the “Record of the Rocks” . . . . . 12
Aegyptopithecus zeuxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Dryopithecus africanus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Ramapithecus brevirostris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Orrorin tugenensis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Australopithecus (Ardipithecus) ramidus . . . . . 27
Australopithecus anamensis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Ardipithecus ramidus kadabba . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Kenyanthropus platyops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Chapter 2 — The “Record of the Rocks” [Part II] . . . . 41
Australopithecus afarensis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Lucy’s Rib Cage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Lucy’s Pelvis and Gender . . . . . . . . . . 47
Lucy’s Appendages—Made for Bi
pedalism, or Swinging from Trees?. . 50
Australopithecine Teeth:
More Evidence that
Lucy was Arboreal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Australopithecine Ears:
Human-like or Ape-like? . . . . . . . . . 54
Lucy: Hominid or Chimp? . . . . . . . . 55
Australopithecus africanus/
Australopithecus boisei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
The Laetoli Footprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Homo habilis/Homo rudolfensis . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Homo erectus/Homo ergaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Homo sapiens idaltu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
-i-
What Does the “Record of
the Rocks” Really Show? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
The Parade of Fossil Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Neanderthal Man. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Nebraska Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Piltdown Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Java Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Rhodesian Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Chapter 3 — Molecular Evidence of Human Origins . . 99
Chromosomal Counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Real Genomic differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
“Mitochondrial Eve” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
The Demise of Mitochondrial Eve . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
The Molecular Clock
—Dating Mitochondrial Ancestors . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Serious Errors in Mitochondrial
DNA Data in the Scientific Literature. . . . . . . . . . . 126
Neanderthal vs. Human DNA—
Is It a Match? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Chapter 4 — The Problem of Gender
and Sexual Reproduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
“Intellectual Mischief and Confusion”—
Or Intelligent Design? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
From Asexual to Sexual Reproduction—
The Origin of Sex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
The Lottery Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
The Tangled Bank Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . 145
The Red Queen Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . 147
The DNA Repair Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 148
Why Sex? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
The 50% Disadvantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Mars and Venus, or X and Y? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Differences Among Various Species . . . . . . . . . . . 164
- ii -
Differences in Animal and Human Sexuality . . . . 167
The Complexity of the Human
Reproductive System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Anatomical Differences
Between Human Males and Females . . . . . . . . . . 173
Cellular Differences Between
Human Males and Females . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
The Future of Human Reproduction . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Chapter 5 — The Problem of Language . . . . . . . . . . 183
Evolutionary Theories
on the Origin of Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Adam—The First Human
to Talk and Communicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Tower of Babel—and
The Universal Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
The Brain’s Language
Centers—Created by God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Anatomy of Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Birds of a Feather—Or Naked Ape? . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Complexity of Language—Uniquely Human . . . . 202
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Chapter 6 — The Problem of the Brain . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
History of the Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
The Evolution of the Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Growing Neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
The Brain Versus a Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Twelve Cranial Nerves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Chapter 7 — The Evolution
of Consciousness [Part I] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
The Origin of Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
The Origin of the Genetic Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
The Origin of Sex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
- iii -
The Origin of Language and Speech . . . . . . . . . . . 253
The Origin of Consciousness—
“The Greatest of Miracles” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Importance of Human Consciousness . . . 253
“Mystery” of Human Consciousness . . . . 256
Consciousness in General . . . . . . . . 257
Consciousness and the Brain . . . . . . 259
Consciousness and the Mind . . . . . . 260
Consciousness Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Why—and How—Did Consciousness Arise? . . . . . 271
Why Did Consciousness Arise? . . . . . . . . 272
Why Do We Need Consciousness? . . . . . 276
How Did Consciousness Arise? . . . . . . . . 286
Evolutionary Bias and the
Origin of Human Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
What Does All of This have to do with
the Origin of Human Consciousness? . . . . . . . . 301
Radical Materialism—A “Fishy” Theory . . . . . . . . . . 306
Do Animals Possess Consciousness? . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Brain, the Mind, and
Human Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Materialism, Supernaturalism,
and the Brain/Mind Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
The Concept of Mind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Chapter 8 — The Evolution
of Consciousness [Part II] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Theories of the Origin
of Human Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
The “Hard Problem” of Human Consciousness . . 350
“Failure is not an Option” . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
Theories of Human Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Dualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Psychical Monism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
- iv -
Radical Materialism (Functionalism) . . . . 364
Panpsychism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Epiphenomenalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Identity Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
Nonreductive Materialism/
Emergent Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Dualist-Interactionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Chapter 9 — The Problem
of Skin Color and Blood Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
What is a “Race”?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Why So Many Racial Characteristics? . . . . . . . . . 439
The Origin of Man’s “Colors” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
Other Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
Differences Between Human
and Animal Blood Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Components of Human Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
Different Blood Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
The Adam and Eve Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
Humans, Animals, and Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
What about Blood Types of Other Animals?. . . . . 459
What about Hibernation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
What about Birds? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
What about Fish? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Chapter 10 — Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
- v -
Ever since Copernicus decided to put the Sun at the center
of the solar system, various scientists and philosophers have
worked overtime in their efforts to diminish the role of human
kind in the Universe. As a result, we have gone from being the
crowning glory of God’s creation, to a hairless ape stuck on a
small planet circling a mediocre sun in the distant reaches of
one arm of a single galaxy that is one among billions of others.
Some of the most widely read authors in the evolutionary camp
(such as Carl Sagan, Stephen Jay Gould, Steven Weinberg, and
Richard Dawkins) have repeatedly emphasized the lack of our
uniqueness, and the “luck” supposedly related to our very ex
istence (mundane as it may be).
Thus, man is viewed as occupying neither the center of the
Universe, nor any sort of preeminent place in the living world;
rather, we are nothing more, nor less, than the product of the
same natural, evolutionary processes that created all of the
“other animals” around us. In short, we are at best a “cosmo
logical accident.” Or, to express the idea in the words of the
late, eminent evolutionist of Harvard, George Gaylord Simp
son: “Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process that
did not have him in mind. He was not planned. He is a state of
matter, a form of life, a sort of animal, and a species of the Or
der Primates, akin nearly or remotely to all of life and indeed
to all that is material” (1967, p. 345).
According to the most extreme version of this view, it is the
utmost arrogance on man’s part to identify any characteristic
that distinguishes him from members of the animal kingdom.
Any differences we might think we perceive are merely a mat
ter of degree, and for all the things we may do better, there are
other things we certainly do worse. Other primates, in partic
ular, are worthy of coequality because they are supposed to
- vii -
be our nearest living relatives. Some even have gone so far as
to suggest that this kinship puts a burden on us to make laws
granting special rights to apes (Cavalieri and Singer, 1993; cf.
Maddox, 1993).
The problem with such extreme positions is that they pro
vide no reasonable stopping point. If we include other primates
in a “global community of equals,” then why not include all
mammals, all animals, all living things? If apes’ rights advo
cates can devise criteria that divide humans and apes from the
other animals, then is it not equally legitimate for humans to
devise criteria that separate us from the apes? In other words,
can we say that there are no essential differences between hu
mans and, say, chimpanzees? To put it another way, are there
enough similarities to make us treat all primates on the same
level (or almost on the same level) as members of our own
species? Or is man truly unique in his own right?
In this book, we affirm the unqualified uniqueness of hu
mankind. The fact is, there are numerous different aspects that
man possesses—which animals do not. And each of those as
pects not only is significant, but also serves to separate man
from the animal kingdom in a most impressive fashion. Con
sider, for example, the following few examples among many
that could be offered (and will be, later in this volume).
• First, man is capable of speaking and communicating his thoughts via language.
• Second, man can improve his education, accumulate knowledge, and build on past achievements.
• Third, man is creative, and can express himself via art,
music, writing, etc.
• Fourth, closely related to man’s creative ability is his
gift of reasoning.
• Fifth, included in man’s uniqueness is his free-will ca
pacity to make rational choices.
• Sixth, only man lives by a standard of morality, and
has the ability to choose between right and wrong.
- viii -
• Seventh, only man possesses a conscience.
• Eighth, only man can experience heart-felt emotions.
• Ninth, man alone possesses a unique, inherent religious inclination; i.e., he has the ability to worship.
• Finally, and very likely most important, is the fact that
man bears the spiritual imprint of God due to the fact
that he possesses an immortal soul.
Knowing “the truth about human origins” centers on these
(and other related) factors. It is our goal in this book to exam
ine a number of these issues, and to provide what renowned
American news commentator Paul Harvey might call “the rest
of the story.” We invite you to join us on a fascinating journey
examining the origin and uniqueness of humanity—a journey
that, we promise, will be anything but dull, and one that may
even change the way you think about yourself and your fellow
travelers in this pilgrimage we call “life.”
Brad Harrub
Bert Thompson
December 2003
- ix -
It begins very early in a child’s life, and never recedes—the
constant barrage of speculation suggesting that men evolved
from ape-like creatures over millions of years of geologic time.
By early adolescence, many children already have a subcon
scious image of early man as a club-carrying, long-armed, haircovered creature who lived in a cave. High school science books
reinforce this notion with pictures of creatures like Lucy and
Neanderthal Man, and by the end of their college careers, stu
dents frequently have accepted this evolutionary progression
of man as a scientific fact. As such, man’s existence, and his
status in the Universe, are placed on a level just slightly above
that of the animals.
Many in the current generation view man as little more than
an educated ape that is the end result of fortuitous (and com
pletely natural) circumstances. All of our actions and behav
iors thus are viewed simply as “carry-overs” from our ape-like
ancestry. With fragmentary skulls of our alleged ancestors in
hand, evolutionists strive diligently to remove any vestige of
a supernatural Creator.
But what is the real truth about human origins? What do
those fossilized skulls really tell us about early man and his
appearance on the Earth? This book begins by examining the
“record of the rocks” in exacting detail, and in so doing, re
veals the paucity of evidence for evolutionary theory. It docu
ments that on more than one occasion, evolutionary scientists
have paraded a “missing link” before the world, only to dis
cover that it was not even close to being human (and, in some
cases, actually was fraudulent!).
This volume also addresses DNA similarities, as well as the
frequently parroted claim that chimpanzees are “98% human.”
While such announcements make for good headlines, the sci
entific data portend something entirely different.
-1-
In uncovering the truth about human origins, we also ex
amine three critically important problems that evolutionists
have struggled mightily to explain—or, at times, have simply
avoided altogether: (1) the origin of language and communi
cation; (2) the origin of gender and sexual reproduction; and
(3) the origin of consciousness. These physiological differences
represent vast chasms between humans and animals—chasms
that evolutionists have not been able to span with either the
available scientific evidence or fanciful hypothetical constructs.
We invite you to examine the data presented here—and then
decide for yourself the truth about human origins. Person
ally, we believe that there is a far better explanation for the
origin of mankind than organic evolution—to wit, a divine Cre
ator. By the time you have finished reading this book, see if you
don’t agree.
- 2 -
1
Homo sapiens, the genus and species classification for hu
mans, means literally “wise man”—a designation that at times
appears almost comical in light of the contentious claims of
evolutionists that humans descended from ape-like ancestors.
The pictures of our putative predecessors adorn the walls of
science classrooms all over the world. Most of us, in fact, are
familiar with the charts that show an ape on one end, a human
at the other, and a whole host of ape-like intermediates in be
tween. In an effort to bolster their theory of common descent
for all living creatures, evolutionists have worked feverishly to
demonstrate a convincing continuity between humans and our
alleged ape-like ancestors. And, admittedly, at times they ap
pear to have done their job so well that the ape-like interme
diates they depict attain such fame that children immediately
recognize their names and can easily recite their traits. For in
stance, while many individuals may not recognize the scientific
name of Australopithecus afarensis, they very likely have heard
of “Lucy” (the popular name for a famous set of fossils). Pic
tures of her fossilized remains have been paraded before us as
an example of what is arguably the most famous, and the most
widely known, of all the so-called “missing links.”
Using a handful of bone fragments, a piece of a skull, or a
few teeth, evolutionary artists portray what they want us to
believe these hairy, ape-like creatures must have looked like.
Frequently, we see them carrying primitive clubs, living in
- 3 -
caves, or huddled around a fire with others of their kind. And
so, from a very young age, children deposit deep within the
recesses of their minds the images of these creatures crawling
down out of the trees in Africa, learning to walk uprightly, and
eventually evolving larger brains, advanced intelligence, and
language. This image, however, is completely fictitious—as
we will document in this chapter, and as some evolutionists
themselves have been willing to admit publicly. Paleontologist
Douglas Palmer, for example, stated in the March 16, 2002 is
sue of New Scientist: “The trouble is we probably know more
about the evolution of extinct trilobites than we do about hu
man evolution” (173[2334]:50).
In this book, we would like to critically examine the actual
evidence of human origins found within the fossil record. Ad
ditionally, we would like to offer an updated, “corrected” in
terpretation of that evidence, because the current evolutionbased interpretation simply does not fit the available facts.
BIOLOGICAL TAXONOMY
AND HUMAN EVOLUTION
As we begin to assemble, disassemble, and then reassem
ble the puzzle of the “record of the rocks” in regard to human
evolution, we first need to understand the terminology cur
rently in use in evolutionary circles regarding what frequently
is called “fossil man.” A brief refresher course in biological
nomenclature seems appropriate at this juncture.
Scientists employ what is commonly referred to as the binomial nomenclature system, first devised by the Swedish
botanist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778), and revised somewhat
down through the years. Biologists today group all living or
ganisms into specific hierarchical assemblages, in which each
category is “nested” within the next higher category. Depicted
in a graphic format, the assemblages would appear something
similar to the chart as seen on the next page (after Mayr, 2001,
p. 23).
-4-
The earliest scientist to attempt to divide organisms into
recognizable groups (which he called “kingdoms”) was Lin
naeus. He recognized only two distinct groups: Animalia (ani
mals) and Plantae (plants). Later modifications to the twokingdom concept were made by the German embryologist,
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), who suggested the addition of a
third kingdom (which he referred to as the Protista) that in
cluded two groups: (1) Protozoans (like, for example, the amoe
ba); and (2) Monera.
Later, American biologist Herbert F. Copeland (1902-1968)
of Sacramento City College in Sacramento, California, split
Haeckel’s Monera into two groups. He retained the original
Monera designation, but used it to refer only to prokaryotes
(i.e., bacteria in the traditional sense). He placed the eukary
otes (plus various algae) into a new kingdom, the Protoctista.
[Eukaryotes are cells that are characterized by membranebound organelles (such as the nucleus, ribosomes, et al.). An
imals, plants, fungi, and protoctists are eukaryotes. Prokary-
- 5 -
otes are cells that possess a plasma membrane themselves, yet
lack a true nucleus and membrane-bound organelles within
their cytoplasm. In prokaryotes, the DNA normally is found
in a single, naked, circular chromosome (known as a geno
phore) that lies free in the cytoplasm. Archaebacteria and eu
bacteria are prokaryotes.]
Then, in 1959, American Robert H. Whittaker of Cornell
University proposed his now-famous “five-kingdom concept,”
which included Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protoctista, and
Monera (see Whittaker, 1959). Of the five kingdoms, one
(Monera) is prokaryotic, and four (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi,
and Protoctista) are eukaryotic. It is the five-kingdom con
cept that still is used widely by most scientists and that was, in
fact, the basis for the classic 1998 atlas of the living world, Five
Kingdoms: An Illustrated Guide to the Phyla of Life on Earth, by
Lynn Margulis and Karleve V. Schwartz that has become prac
tically the taxonomists’ “Bible.”
However, as molecular biology began to come into its own,
and as scientists were able to examine the DNA of various or
ganisms, it became apparent to them that the five-kingdom
concept no longer provided enough accuracy. Carl Woese, a
biologist from the University of Illinois, proposed two radi
cal changes in the taxonomic system then in place. First, he
divided the bacteria (Whittaker’s Monera) into two distinct
groups that, at the time, he labeled: (1) Archaebacteria and;
(2) Eubacteria. [Archaebacteria (from the Greek archae, mean
ing ancient) are organisms that exist in a variety of “hostile”
environments such as hot-water springs, or even within solid
rock, frequently are thermophilic (heat-loving), produce me
thane, and are anaerobic (live only in the absence of free oxy
gen). For an excellent discussion of the Archaea, see Ward and
Brownlee, 2000, pp. 6-10.] Second, Woese proposed an en
tirely new category, the “domain,” which he boldly placed
above kingdoms. In his scheme, the five kingdoms were spread
over three domains: (1) Archaea (which Woese subdivided
into two kingdoms—Crenarchaeota (heat-loving forms) and
- 6 -
Euryarchaeota (mainly methane-producing forms); (2) Bac
teria; and (3) Eucarya (which includes the plants, animals, pro
tests, and fungi). [For an up-to-date treatment of the history of
the taxonomic matters discussed here, see Tudge, 2000, pp.
95-106.]
Today, the current status in taxonomy acknowledges Woese’s
“domain” proposal. However, the five-kingdom concept still
remains extremely popular, and likely will until such a time
at some point in the distant future when it is overtaken by the
domain concept. [Identification of an organism usually is
given by listing only the genus and species. For example, the
common pine tree is known as Pinus ponderosus. The common
rat is Rattus rattus. The common housecat is referred to as Felis
domesticus. And so throughout this book whenever you see two
Latinized names being used (e.g.: Australopithecus africanus or
Homo erectus), that simply represents the genus and species of
the particular creature under discussion.]
At this point, we would like to call attention to three spe
cific terms that are used when man or man’s alleged ancestors
are being discussed since they currently are the source of some
controversy within the taxonomic branch of science. These
terms are: (1) hominoid; (2) hominid; and (3) hominin. An ex
planation is in order.
Briefly stated, under the broad outlines of the Linnaean sys
tem, humans would be classified as follows: Animalia (since
man is considered as an animal); Chordata (because humans
have backbones); Mammalia (since humans have hair and
suckle their young); Primates (because humans share certain
morphological traits with apes, monkeys, and lemurs); Ho
minidae (since humans are separated from “other apes” by,
among other traits, bipedalism); Homo (mankind’s generic
classification as human); and sapiens (the species name desig
nating “wise”). In chart form, then, man’s exact scientific clas
sification would be rendered as at appears in the listing on the
next page.
-7-
Kingdom
Phylum
Subphylum
Superclass
Class
Order
Suborder
Tribe
Superfamily
Family
Subfamily
Tribe
Genus
Species
Subspecies
Animalia
Chordata
Vertebrata
Tetrapoda
Mammalia
Primates
Anthropoidea
Catarrhina
Hominoidea
Hominidae
Homininae
Hominini
Homo
sapiens
sapiens
As the chart above indicates, the Linnaean system also rec
ognizes groupings such as superfamilies, subfamilies, tribes,
etc. In the case of humans, the most frequently recognized
superfamily is the Hominoidea (from which the term “homi
noids” is derived). The term hominoid includes all of the liv
ing apes. In fact, under the superfamily Hominoidea, three
families are included: (1) the Hylobatidae (which includes the
so-called lesser apes of Asia, the gibbons, and the siamangs);
(2) the Hominidae (which includes living humans and fossil
apes that allegedly possess a suite of characteristics such as bi
pedalism, reduced canine tooth size, increasing brain size, etc.);
and (3) the Pongidae (which includes the remaining African great
apes such as gorillas, chimpanzees, and the Asian orangutan).
It is from the level of the superfamily onward that most of the
present debate over the classification of humans begins. In a
December 4, 2001 article titled “Is It Time to Revise the Sys
tem of Scientific Naming?” on National Geographic’s Web site,
Lee R. Berger, a paleoanthropologist at the University of Wit
watersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, discussed the con
troversy from an evolutionary viewpoint (which explains the
evolution-based dates, which we do not accept).
-8-
Modern-day genetic research is providing evidence
that morphological distinctions are not necessarily
proof of evolutionary relatedness. Recent evidence
suggests that humans are in fact more closely related
to the chimpanzee and bonobo than either species is
to the gorilla. Chimps and humans share something
like 98 percent of genes, indicating that we share a
common ape ancestor.
Divergence times between the two groups based on
a molecular clock suggest that the chimpanzee/human
split occurred between five and seven million years
ago. In turn, the African apes, including humans, are
more closely related to each other than any are to the
orangutan.
In recognition of these and other genetic relationships,
some argue that we must overhaul the present mor
phologically based classification system for one that
is more representative of our true evolutionary rela
tionships as evinced by our genes.
This is where the term hominin comes into play. Un
der the new classification model, hominoids would
remain a primate superfamily, as has always been the
case. Under this hominoid umbrella would fall orang
utans, gorillas, chimps, and humans, all in the family
Hominidae.
In recognition of their genetic divergence some 11 to
13 million years ago, the orangutans would be placed
in the sub-family Ponginae and the African apes, in
cluding humans, would all be lumped together in the
sub-family Homininae. The bipedal apes—all of the
fossil species as well as living humans—would fall into
the tribe Hominini (thus hominin). All of the fossil gen
era, such as Australopithecus, Ardipithecus, Kenyanthropus,
and Homo, would fall into this tribe.
A few evolutionary biologists want a more extreme
classification, which would include humans and chim
panzees within the same genus, the genus Homo (2001,
emp. added).
-9-
The taxonomic controversy, therefore, turns out to be a
matter of “old” versus “new.” Under the old, morphologically
based system, the term “hominid” refers to the bipedal ape
lineage (which would include humans). Under the new, molecular-based system, hominid refers not just to bipedal apes,
but rather to the broader grouping of all the great apes. Thus,
under the new system, “hominin” (as opposed to “hominid”)
would refer to all (living or dead) species of bipedal apes (which,
again, would include humans). It is likely that the newer term
will “win out” in the end (as Berger noted in his article). Until
it does, however, we may expect to continue to see both terms
appear in the scientific literature concerning human classifi
cation and/or evolution.
There is one part of the evolutionary classification scheme,
however, where there is no controversy. Every man, woman,
and child living today is classified as Homo sapiens sapiens.
DID MAN EVOLVE FROM THE APES?
Evolutionists today, of course, do not contend that man de
scended from the apes. Instead, they contend that both men
and apes descended from a common ancestor. We, however,
agree with the late evolutionary paleontologist of Harvard
University, George Gaylord Simpson, who summed up such
an idea quite succinctly when he wrote:
On this subject, by the way, there has been way too
much pussyfooting. Apologists emphasize that man
cannot be descendant of any living ape—a statement
that is obvious to the verge of imbecility—and go on
to state or imply that man is not really descended from
an ape or monkey at all, but from an earlier common
ancestor. In fact, that earlier ancestor would certainly
be called an ape or monkey in popular speech by any
one who saw it. Since the terms ape and monkey are
defined by popular usage, man’s ancestors were apes
or monkeys (or successively both). It is pusillanimous
[cowardly—BH/BT] if not dishonest for an informed
investigator to say otherwise (1964, p. 12, emp. in orig).
- 10 -
Ironically, some evolutionists have even gone so far as to
suggest—albeit incorrectly—that Charles Darwin himself never
claimed that man came from the apes. Yet he most certainly
did. In The Descent of Man, Darwin wrote:
But a naturalist would undoubtedly have ranked as
an ape or a monkey, an ancient form which possesses
many characters common to the Catarhine and Plat
yrhine monkeys, other characters in an intermediate
condition, and some few, perhaps, distinct from those
now found in either group. And as man from a genealogical point of view belongs to the Catarhine
or Old World stock, we must conclude, however,
much the conclusion may revolt our pride, that
our early progenitors would have been properly
designated. But we must not fall into the error of sup
posing that the early progenitors of the whole Simian
stock, including man, was identical with, or even closely
resembled, any existing ape or monkey (1871, pp.
519-520, emp. added).
Since the time of Darwin, evolutionists have struggled to
devise plausible theories about why those ancient apes de
cided to leave the confines of the treetops in favor of bipedal
locomotion on the plains. Marcel-Paul Schutzenberger de
fined the problem well when he lamented:
Gradualists [those who believe in slower rates of evolution—BH/BT] and saltationists [those who believe
in a more rapid rate of evolution—BH/BT] alike are
completely incapable of giving a convincing expla
nation of the quasi-simultaneous emergence of a num
ber of biological systems that distinguish human be
ings from the higher primates: bipedalism, with the
concomitant modification of the pelvis, and, without
a doubt, the cerebellum, a much more dexterous hand,
with fingerprints conferring an especially fine tactile
sense; the modifications of the pharynx which per
mits phonation; the modification of the central ner
vous system, notably at the level of the temporal lobes,
permitting the specific recognition of speech. From
the point of view of embryogenesis, these anatomi-
- 11 -
cal systems are completely different from one another.
Each modification constitutes a gift, a bequest from a
primate family to its descendants. It is astonishing that
these gifts should have developed simultaneously
(1996, pp. 10-15).
It is indeed “astonishing” that these apes (or, to be more polit
ically correct, “ape-like creatures”) could have experienced
the “simultaneous emergence of a number of biological sys
tems” that distinguish them from human beings. It is equally
“astonishing” to see how evolutionists have interpreted the
evidence of the fossil record that they insist establishes such
an event as actually having occurred. We invite you to join us
on this fascinating journey while we investigate “the record
of the rocks” as it applies to human evolution.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
“RECORD OF THE ROCKS”
As we begin an examination of the fossil record as it alleg
edly relates to human evolution, let’s be blunt about one thing.
Of all the branches to be found on that infamous “evolution
ary tree of life,” the one leading to man should be the best doc
umented. After all, as the most recent evolutionary arrival,
pre-human fossils supposedly would have been exposed to
natural decay processes for the shortest length of time, and
thus should be better preserved and easier to find than any
others. [Consider, for example, how many dinosaur fossils we
possess, and those animals were supposed to have existed
over sixty-five million years before man!] In addition, since
hominid fossils are of the greatest interest to man (because they
are supposed to represent his past), it is safe to say that more
people have been searching for them longer than for any other
type of fossils. If there are any real transitional forms any
where in the world, they should be documented most abun
dantly in the line leading from the first primate to modern man.
Certainly, the fossils in this field have received more public
ity than in any other. But exactly what does the human fossil
record reveal?
- 12 -
Not much, as it turns out. First, there is the problem caused
by the paucity of physical evidence. In their book, People of the
Lake, Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin addressed this point
when they wrote:
What the fossils tell us directly, of course, is what our
ancestors and their close relatives look like. Or rather,
to be more accurate, they give us some clues about
the physical appearance of early hominids, because
until someone is lucky enough to come across a com
plete skeleton of one of our ancestors, much of what
we can say about them is pure inference, guesswork (1978, p. 19, emp. added).
And more often than not, that “guesswork” is based on an
appalling lack of evidence, as the evolutionists themselves
have been known to admit. John Reader, author of the book,
Missing Links, wrote in New Scientist:
The entire hominid collection known today would
barely cover a billiard table, but it has spawned a sci
ence because it is distinguished by two factors which
inflate its apparent relevance far beyond its merits.
First, the fossils hint at the ancestry of a supremely selfimportant animal—ourselves. Secondly, the collec
tion is so tantalisingly incomplete, and the specimens
themselves often so fragmented and inconclusive, that
more can be said about what is missing than about
what is present. Hence the amazing quantity of liter
ature on the subject. ...[B]ut ever since Darwin’s work
inspired the notion that fossils linking modern man
and extinct ancestor would provide the most convinc
ing proof of human evolution, preconceptions have
led evidence by the nose in the study of fossil man (1981,
89:802).
Lyall Watson, writing in Science Digest, put it even more bluntly:
“The fossils that decorate our family tree are so scarce that
there are still more scientists than specimens. The remark
able fact is that all the physical evidence we have for human
evolution can still be placed, with room to spare, inside a sin
gle coffin” (1982, 90[5]:44). And, as you will see in the pages
- 13 -
that follow, even though numerous hominid fossils have been
discovered since Reader and Watson offered such assessments,
none qualifies as a legitimate “human ancestor.”
The public, of course, continues to be misled into thinking
that some sort of “documented evolutionary progression”
from an ape-like creature to modern man has been found
within the fossil record. That, as it turns out, is “wishful think
ing,” to use the words of paleontologist David Raup:
A large number of well-trained scientists outside of
evolutionary biology have unfortunately gotten the
idea that the fossil record is far more Darwinian than
it is. This probably comes from the over-simplification inevitable in secondary sources: low-level text
books, semi-popular articles, and so on. Also, there
is probably some wishful thinking involved. In the
years after Darwin, his advocates hoped to find
predictable progressions. In general, these have
not been found—yet the optimist has died hard, and
some pure fantasy has crept into textbooks (1981, 213:
289, emp. added).
As we make our way in this book through the alleged evi
dence for human evolution, you will witness firsthand some
of that “pure fantasy.”
Furthermore, the public at large generally has no idea just
how paltry, and how fragmentary (literally!), the “evidence”
for human evolution actually is. Harvard professor Richard
Lewontin lamented this very fact when he stated:
When we consider the remote past, before the origin
of the actual species Homo sapiens, we are faced with a
fragmentary and disconnected fossil record. Despite
the excited and optimistic claims that have been made
by some paleontologists, no fossil hominid species
can be established as our direct ancestor…. The ear
liest forms that are recognized as being hominid are
the famous fossils, associated with primitive stone
tools, that were found by Mary and Louis Leakey in
the Olduvai gorge and elsewhere in Africa. These
fossil hominids lived more than 1.5 million years ago
- 14 -
and had brains half the size of ours. They were cer
tainly not members of our own species, and we have
no idea whether they were even in our direct ances
tral line or only in a parallel line of descent resem
bling our direct ancestor (1995, p. 163).
Second, it is practically impossible to determine which “fam
ily tree” one should accept. Richard Leakey (of the famed
fossil-hunting family in Africa) has proposed one. His late
mother, Mary Leakey, proposed another. Donald Johanson,
former president of the Institute of Human Origins in Berke
ley, California, has proposed yet another. And as late as 2001,
Meave Leakey (Richard’s wife) has proposed still another. At
an annual meeting of the American Association for the Ad
vancement of Science some years ago, anthropologists from
all over the world descended on New York City to view hom
inid fossils exhibited by the American Museum of Natural His
tory. Reporting on this exhibit, Science News had this to say:
One sometimes wonders whether orangutans, chimps
and gorillas ever sit around the tree, contemplating
which is the closest relative of man. (And would they
want to be?) Maybe they even chuckle at human sci
entists’ machinations as they race to draw the defini
tive map of evolution on earth. If placed on top of
one another, all these competing versions of our evo
lutionary highways would make the Los Angeles free
way system look like County Road 41 in Elkhart, In
diana (see “Whose Ape Is It, Anyway?,” 1984, p. 361
parenthetical item in orig.).
How, in light of such admissions, can evolutionary scientists
possibly defend the idea of ape/human evolution as a “scien
tifically proven fact”?
The evolutionary tree that has been presented to demon
strate the origin of humans has two main branches (and as
sorted twigs) within the primate family (Hominidae). One con
sists of the genus Australopithecus, while the other is composed
of the genus Homo. The categories to which various fossils
have been assigned may be more telling than we first thought,
- 15 -
for evidence now exists which demonstrates that all fossils in
the Australopithecus group share a common trait—one buried
deep within the ear—while all those in the genus Homo share a
completely different physiology, likewise related to the ear.
Richard Leakey commented:
Part of the anatomy of the inner ear are three C-shaped
tubes, the semicircular canals. Arranged mutually
perpendicular to each other, with two of the canals
oriented vertically, the structure plays a key role in
the maintenance of body balance. At a meeting of
anthropologists in April 1994, Fred Spoor, of the
University of Liverpool, described the semicircular
canals in humans and apes. The two vertical canals
are significantly enlarged in humans compared with
those in apes, a difference Spoor interprets as an ad
aptation to the extra demands of upright balance in a
bipedal species. What of early human species? Spoor’s
observations are truly startling. In all species of the
genus Homo, the inner ear structure is indistinguish
able from that of modern humans. Similarly, in all
species of Australopithecus, the semicircular canals look
like those of apes.... [I]f the structure of the inner ear
is at all indicative of habitual posture and mode of lo
comotion, it suggests that the australopithecines were
not just like you and me, as Lovejoy suggested and
continues to suggest (1994, pp. 34-36, emp. added).
Thus it appears that, as creationists have contended, all fos
sils can be placed into one of two groups: apes or humans.
While it is impossible to present any scenario of human
evolution upon which even the evolutionists themselves
would agree, the schematic on the next page (gleaned from the
latest scientific literature) represents the most up-to-date assess
ment available on the subject (see Figure 1). [NOTE: We do not
accept the evolution-based dates attached to the finds, but have
left them intact for reference purposes.]
In the search for man’s alleged ancestors, evolutionists claim
that some 28 millions years ago there existed a monkey-like
creature by the name of Aegyptopithecus zeuxis that occupies
- 16 -
Figure 1 — The alleged evolutionary timeline of man
- 17 -
the exalted status of the first animal on the long road toward
humankind. It is, then, with Aegyptopithecus zeuxis that we be
gin our investigation.
Aegyptopithecus zeuxis
According to Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin (in their
book Origins), the ancestor that humans share with all living
apes is Aegyptopithecus zeuxis (linking Egyptian ape)—a creature
that they suggest lived 28 million
years ago, and that they have
identified specifically as “the
first ape to emerge from the Old
World monkey stock” (1978, p.
52). A 12-year-old child, how
ever, could look at the fossil re
mains of Aegyptopithecus, and be
able to identify them as having
come from an ape. There is no
controversy here; evolutionists
Figure 2 — Artist’s concept of
acknowledge that Aegyptopithecus
Aegyptopithecus zeuxis
is merely an ape.
Dryopithecus africanus
The next creature in the search for man’s alleged evolution
ary ancestor is Dryopithecus africanus. [Dryopithecus means “wood
land ape”; the creature also goes by the name Proconsul.] D.
africanus, according to Leakey and Lewin, was “the ancestor to
both apes and humans,” and, according to evolutionary the
ory, “is the stock from which all modern apes evolved” (1977,
p. 56).
The first fossil of D. africanus (which supposedly lived in Af
rica some 20 million years ago) was discovered by Louis and
Mary Leakey (Richard’s parents) in 1948 at Rusinga Island,
Lake Victoria, Africa. Standard evolutionary theory suggests
that “earlier members of Dryopithecus may well have given rise
to the ancestors of both the human and the ape lines” (Leakey
and Lewin, p. 56). And so the next creature in the evolutionary
chart will be D. africanus, at about 20 million years.
- 18 -
But based on what evidence? Paleontologist David Pilbeam
answered that when he wrote: “It has come to be rather gen
erally assumed, albeit in a rather vague fashion, the pre-Pleistocene hominid ancestry was rooted in the Dryopithecinae”
(1968, 24:368). Upon reading that statement, creation scien
tist Duane Gish noted somewhat dryly:
When a scientist is forced to “assume” something in a
rather “vague fashion,” it should be obvious that he
is resorting to wholly unscientific methods to estab
lish what he cannot do by a valid scientific method.
What strange qualities could paleoanthropologists de
tect in an animal that allows them to decide on one hand
that it was the progenitor of the chimpanzee, the go
rilla, and the orangutan, and yet on the other hand was
the progenitor of the human race? (1995, p. 223).
Figure 3 — Artist’s representation of Dryopithecus africanus
In the end, however, as Pilbeam and Elwyn Simons pointed
out, Dryopithecus already was “too committed to ape-dom” to
be the progenitor of man (1971, 173:23). Again, no controversy
here; the animal is admittedly an ape.
- 19 -
Ramapithecus brevirostris
G. Edward Lewis, a student at Yale University, was the first
to discover Ramapithecus, and it was he who named it. The
species name assigned to the creature was brevirostris, mean
ing “short-snouted.” Mr. Lewis found his specimen (a single
upper jaw) in 1932 around Haritalyangar, a cluster of villages
in the Siwalik Hills about a hundred miles north of New Delhi,
India. Ramapithecus was dated at approximately 12-15 mil
lion years ago. At the time, Lewis designated the find the first
true hominid. In their book, The Monkey Puzzle, evolutionists
John Gribbin and Jeremy Cherfas observed:
…[W]e now come to the interesting bit, the begin
ning of our own ancestral line. It starts with a creature
called Ramapithecus, found first in India and named af
ter a prince in Indian mythology. Ramapithecus is
known to us as a handful of jaw scraps and teeth and
a bit of skull; there is none of his body skeleton, though
in keeping with his status as man’s ancestor he is usu
ally drawn upright. The oldest ramapithecine fossils
are about 14 million years old, and the conventional
wisdom has it that some time during the long gap be
tween Aegyptopithecus and Dryopithecus there lived a
common ancestor of Dryopithecus and Ramapithecus.
This missing link, probably around 25 million
years old, would be the youngest common ancestor of man and the African apes, for by the
time we find Dryopithecus in the fossils, according to the traditional picture, the line of Ramapithecus and man has already split off and become distinct. That all the ramapithecine fossils are
younger than the dryopithecine fossils is just the luck
of the draw; some day, the paleontologists hope, a
very old Ramapithecus will turn up (1982, p. 74, emp.
added).
According to Leakey and Lewin, Ramapithecus fossil finds
currently consist of a few fragments of upper and lower jaws
and a collection of teeth from some 30 or so creatures. In 1961,
Louis Leakey found a Ramapithecus specimen (an upper jaw
and, later, a lower jaw) at Fort Ternan in southern Kenya. Even
- 20 -
Figure 4 — Artist’s representation of Ramapithecus brevirostris.
Jaw fragment at lower left represents actual fossils found.
- 21 -
though Ramapithecus fossils have been found in Greece, India,
Pakistan, Turkey, Hungary, and China, Leakey and Lewin be
lieve that the only species to give rise to the hominids was the
one from Africa (1977, p. 30). Perhaps this would be a good
place to insert some of their candid admissions.
Now if we are absolutely honest, we have to admit
that we know nothing about Ramapithecus; we don’t
know what it looked like; we don’t know what it did;
and naturally, we don’t know how it did it! But with
the aid of jaw and tooth fragments and one or two
bits and pieces from arms and legs, all of which rep
resents a couple of dozen individuals, we can make
some guesses, more or less inspired.
Before we slip into a mood of total speculation, it is
worth trying to squeeze out of the miserable fragments
of petrified limb bones some clues about how Rama
pithecus got around.... We cannot be certain, but it must
have happened some time because by the time rea
sonable hominid fossils appear (at about three mil
lions years ago) our ancestors were walking about
with a respectable upright gait (p. 27, parenthetical
item in orig.).
Why did Ramapithecus take to eating tough fibrous
foods—a life-style that must have demanded more and
more time on the ground rather than in the trees?
Why did its canines shrink? Why did it start to walk
around on two legs, when, by all accounts, walking
on four is much less expensive, energetically? And
what kind of social life was it having? These are the
sort of questions to which we would like the answers,
but to which, for the moment, we have only guesses
(pp. 31-32).
What can we say about the sexual selection of Rama
pithecus? Nothing. At least nothing that comes from
direct evidence (p. 35).
Did Ramapithecus live in harems? Were the males
much bigger than the females? And did the males
have a thick coat so as to make them look even big
ger, just like the geladas? It is possible, but we simply
don’t know (p. 36).
- 22 -
How bright was Ramapithecus? With little more than
a fossil teeth and jaws for evidence, it is not easy to
say, of course (p. 37).
The most dramatic thing to have happened to Rama
pithecus during that frustrating fossil void is that it
learned how to walk upright. We don’t know how it
got around the place before it adopted this highly un
usual method of locomotion; maybe it moved smooth
ly on all fours, much as olive baboons do today. We
don’t know (p. 39).
We are talking here of habitual upright walking, rather
than occasional bipedalism, something that all apes
are capable of, inelegant though it looks. That it hap
pened we know. That there are considerable advan
tages to be had once an ape has stood up is incontro
vertible. But why it should happen in the first place is
a mystery because most of the advantages are appar
ent only when upright walking is very well advanced....
We have to admit to being baffled about the origins
of upright walking (pp. 40,42, emp. in orig.).
A number of years ago, Robert Eckhardt, a paleoanthro
pologist at Penn State University, published an article in Sci
entific American headlined by the statement: “Amid the bewil
dering array of early fossil hominids, is there one whose mor
phology marks it as man’s hominid ancestor? If the factor of
genetic variability is considered, the answer appears to be
no” (1972, 226[1]:94). In other words, according to Eckhardt,
at that time, nowhere among the fossil apes or ape-like crea
tures could be found what might be judged to be a proper an
cestor for man. Simons, Pilbeam, and others consider Rama
pithecus to have been a hominid—a judgment made solely on
the basis of a few teeth and jaw fragments. Eckhardt made
twenty-four different measurements on a collection of fossil
teeth from two species of Dryopithecus and one species of Ram
apithecus, and compared the range of variation found for these
fossil species to similar measurements made on a population
of domesticated chimpanzees from a research center and on
a sample of wild chimpanzees in Liberia.
- 23 -
The range of variation in the living chimpanzee popula
tions actually was greater than those in the fossil samples for
fourteen of the twenty-four measurements, the same for one,
and less for nine of the measurements. Even in the minority
of cases where the range of variation of the fossil samples ex
ceeded those in living chimpanzees, the differences were very
small. Thus, in tooth measurements, there was greater varia
tion among living chimpanzees, or a single group of apes,
than there was between Dryopithecus, an admitted ape, and
Ramapithecus, an alleged hominid. And remember, Rama
pithecus was judged to be a hominid solely on the basis of its
dental characteristics!
Eckhardt extended his calculations to five other species of
Dryopithecus and to Kenyapithecus (which, according to Pilbeam
and Simons, is the equivalent of Ramapithecus). After stating
that on the basis of tooth-size calculations there appears to be
little basis for classifying the dryopithecines in more than a sin
gle species, Dr. Eckhardt went on to say: “Neither is there com
pelling evidence for the existence of any distinct hominid spe
cies during this interval unless the designation ‘hominid’ means
simply any individual ape that happens to have small teeth and
a corresponding small face” (226[1]:101). Eckhardt’s conclu
sion was that Ramapithecus seems to have been an ape—morphologically, ecologically, and behaviorally.
Even more devastating evidence against the assumption
of a hominid status for Ramapithecus have been recent revela
tions concerning the living, high-altitude baboon Theropithecus
galada found in Ethiopia. This baboon has incisors and ca
nines that are small (relative to those of extant African apes),
closely packed and heavily worn cheek teeth, powerful mas
ticatory muscles, and a short, deep face, plus other man-like
features allegedly possessed by Ramapithecus (and Austra
lopithecus, a creature we will discuss later). Since this animal
is nothing but a baboon in all respects, and is living today, it is
certain that it has no genetic relationship to man. Yet it has
many of the facial, dental, and mandibular characteristics
used to classify Ramapithecus as a hominid.
- 24 -
While it is true that the possession of such features by mon
keys or apes is highly exceptional, to include these facial, den
tal, and mandibular characteristics among those considered
to be diagnostic of hominids, since they are possessed at least
in one case by a monkey, is both unwarranted and invalid.
These facts would render highly uncertain, if not impossible,
the classification of any fossil as a hominid solely on the basis
of dental and associated characteristics.
These considerations, plus the information compiled by
Eckhardt, offer compelling evidence that Ramapithecus was
no hominid at all, but was simply an ape or monkey with a
diet and habitat similar to that of galada baboons. Thus, there
is no real evidence for a hominid of any kind in the huge 20million-year gap between the supposed branching point of
apes, australopithecines, and man. Many evolutionists be
lieve that man’s ancestors branched off from the apes roughly
20 million years ago; thus, they date the australopithecine fos
sils from 2-4 million years ago or thereabouts. Based on evo
lutionary dating methods, this would mean that there was a
period of about 20-24 million years during which hominids
supposedly were evolving, yet not a single undisputed hom
inid fossil from that period has been discovered.
Remember that evolutionists believe that Ramapithecus was
in man’s lineage because the incisors and canine teeth (the
front teeth) of this animal were relatively small in relation to
the cheek teeth (as is the case in man). They believe the shape
of the jaw was parabolic, as in humans, rather than U-shaped,
as in most apes. And because of some other subtle anatomi
cal distinctions found relating to the jaw fragments, the creature’s face is believed to have been shortened (although no
bones of the face or skull have yet been recovered).
Thus, all of the evidence linking Ramapithecus to man is
based solely upon extremely fragmentary dental and mandibular (jaw) evidence. But, of course, as Duane Gish has aptly
observed: “With less evidence, broader speculations are al
lowed” (no date).
- 25 -
In the end, what shall we say about Ramapithecus? While it
is true that in the past some anthropologists considered this
creature to be the first true hominid, that no longer is the case.
Thanks to additional work by Pilbeam, we now know that
Ramapithecus was not a hominid at all, but merely another
ape (1982, 295:232). Anthropologist Jonathan Marks summed
up the evidence regarding Ramapithecus by observing sim
ply: “Looks, as we all know, can be deceiving, and Ramapithecus
has since been shown not to have been a human ancestor.
Details of its face show it to have been more closely related to
the orangutan” (2002, p. 12). Gish, therefore, was correct in
stating: “He is no longer considered to have been a creature
in the line leading to man” (1985, p. 140). Once again, no
controversy here; the animal is admittedly an ape.
What, then, shall we say of these three “ancestors” that
form the taproot of man’s family tree? We simply will say the
same things the evolutionists themselves have admitted: all
three were nothing but apes. Period.
Orrorin tugenensis
The 13 fossil fragments that form Orrorin tugenensis (bro
ken femurs, bits of lower jaw, and several teeth) were found
in the Tugen Hills of Kenya in the fall of 2000 by Martin Pick
ford and Brigitte Senut of France, and have been controversial
ever since. If Orrorin were considered to be a human ancestor,
it would predate other candidates by around 2 million years.
Pickford and Senut, however, in an even more drastic scenario,
have suggested that all the australopithecines—even those con
sidered to be our direct ancestors—should be relegated to a deadend side branch in
favor of Orrorin. Yet
paleontologist Da
vid Begun of the Un
iversity of Toronto
conceded that evoFigure 5 — Broken femur from Orrorin
lutionists have been
tugenensis
- 26 -
completely unable to tell whether Orrorin was “on the line to
humans, on the line to chimps, a common ancestor to both, or
just an extinct side branch” (2001). Lots of controversy here—
but no evidence of a creature on its way to becoming human.
Australopithecus (Ardipithecus) ramidus
In 1994, Tim White and his coworkers described a new
species known as Australopithecus ramidus (White, et al., 371:
306-312). [Australopithecus means “southern ape”; “Ardi” means
“ground” or “floor” in the Afar language of Africa; ramidus
means “root.”] The initial fossil find in 1993 included seven
teen fossils (mainly dental) found within volcanic strata cov
ering about 1.5 kilometers west of the Awash River within the
Afar Depression at Aramis, Ethiopia. Eleven of the fossils
were comprised of a single tooth, a piece of a tooth, or in one
case, a piece of bone. The strata in which the fossils were found
were dated by evolutionists as being 4.4 million years old.
Later, in 1994, a mandible and partial postcranial skeleton of
a single individual also was found. The authors of the paper
in Nature described the cranial fossils as “strikingly chimpanzee-like in morphology” (1994: 371:310, emp. added).
The pieces of arm bone were described as exhibiting “a host
of characters usually associated with modern apes” (371:311).
The August 23, 1999 issue of Time magazine contained a fea
ture article, “Up from the Apes,” about the creature (Lemonick and Dorfman, 1999). Morphologically speaking, this was
the earliest, most ape-like australopithecine to date, and ap
peared to be a good candidate for the most distant common
ancestor of the hominids. [For an excellent discussion of A.
ramidus, see Wise, 1994.]
In 1995, however, White completely reclassified the crea
ture as Ardipithecus ramidus (1995, 375:88). And one year after
that, Donald Johanson (the discoverer of “Lucy”) admitted in
the March 1996 issue of National Geographic that A. ramidus
possessed “many chimp-like features” and that “its position
on the human family tree is in question” (189[3]:117).
- 27 -
Australopithecus anamensis
In 1965, a research team from Harvard University discov
ered a small piece of a left humerus in the Kanapoi region of
East Lake, Turkana in Africa. It would be thirty years before
that single bone would be assigned to its appropriate place in
human paleoanthropology—as a member of the Australopithecus
anamensis group of fossils (see Johanson and Edgar, 1996).
Except for the discovery of a single molar in 1982, no further
A. anamensis fossils were found until the early 1990s, when
Meave Leakey and her coworkers from the National Museums
of Kenya began their work in the Kanapoi region. Initially, the
finds were classified tentatively as Australopithecus afarensis (see
Coffing, et al., 1994). In 1995, Meave Leakey and colleagues
reclassified the finds as Australopithecus anamensis (Leakey, et
al., 1995). [Anamensis means “lake” in the Turkana language.]
The latest fossils—which contain no postcranial material, and
consist almost exclusively of teeth—are dated at 3.8-4.2 mil
lion years old.
All of the fossils found by Leakey and her coworkers were
found within a single region east of Lake Turkana. And what
do those fossils tell us? The respected Archaeologyinfo.com
Web site explained: “The dental apparatus of A. anamensis is
markedly ape-like,” and “in general, the dentition of A. ana
mensis is very primitive for a hominid.” Yet Leakey, et al., be
lieve that A. anamensis was bipedal—a belief based on the ex
amination of postcranial fragments, specifically a single piece
of a tibia. And what is it about the tibia that has caused the re
searchers to suggest that A. anamensis may have walked in an
upright fashion? The distal portion of the tibia is thick in ar
eas that are subjected to high forces of stress during bipedal
locomotion, and the condyles (which join with the femur to
form the knee joint) are concave and equal in size—two condi
tions present in modern humans ( Johanson and Edgar, 1996).
Yet the meager numbers of fossils that have been found are
admitted by evolutionists to bear striking similarities to both
Ardipithecus and Pan (the actual genus of the chimpanzees). In
fact, as the Archaeologyinfo.com Web site went on to state:
- 28 -
Though specific comparisons between A. anamensis and Ardipithecus ramidus would be difficult, due to the small skeletal collections that have been
obtained for both fossil hominids, a general similarity seems to be clear. Both species have retained
ape-like crania and dentition, while also exhibiting
rather advanced postcrania, more or less typically
hominid-like in form (see “Australopithecus anamen
sis,” 2003, emp. added).
The conclusion? A. anamensis is “more or less” a hominid,
even though it is similar to Ardipithecus ramidus (which, as Don
ald Johanson admitted, possesses “many chimp-like features”).
Its dentition is “markedly ape-like.” And it is “very primitive”
for a hominid. Enough said.
Ardipithecus ramidus kadabba
The bright yellow and white wording on the front cover of
the July 23, 2001 issue of Time announced somewhat authori
tatively, “How Apes Became Humans,” and claimed that a
new hominid discovery
of a creature known as
Ardipithecus ramidus ka
dabba (kadabba—taken
from the Afar language
—means “basal family
ancestor”) tells “scien
tists about how our old
est ancestors stood on
two legs and made an
evolutionary leap.” Yet
those empty cover-story
words became almost
secondary as Time read
ers found themselves ut
terly enthralled by the
“ape-man” drawing that Time cover courtesy of TIMEPIX. Copyfilled the whole cover. right © 2001. Used by permission.
- 29 -
Unfortunately, many readers may never make it to page 57,
where staff writers Michael Lemonick and Andrea Dorfman
admitted that the discoverers of the fossils under discussion,
Yohannes Haile-Selassie and his colleagues, “haven’t collected
enough bones yet to reconstruct with great precision what ka
dabba looked like.” That seemingly insignificant fact, however,
did not prevent the magazine’s editors from putting an intim
idating, full-color “reconstruction” of this new fossil find on the
cover—an image, if we may kindly say so, that becomes some
what less than forthright in light of the actual facts of the mat
ter. A thorough investigation of this “scientific discovery” re
veals that this creature was “reconstructed” from only 6 bone
fragments and a few teeth—of which, the only one that might
provide the artist with any structural information of the head
was a portion of the right mandible.
In their article, “One Giant Step for Mankind,” Lemonick
and Dorfman invited readers to meet their “newfound ances
tor, a chimplike forest creature that stood up and walked 5.8
million years ago” (2001, 158:54). According to evolutionists,
Ardipithecus ramidus kadabba lived between 5.2 and 5.8 mil
lion years ago, which beats the previous record holder by near
ly a million-and-a-half years and, according to evolutionists’
estimates, places A. kadabba “very close to the time when hu
mans and chimps first went their separate ways” (158:56). Lem
onick and Dorfman went on to comment:
…[N]o one has yet been able to say precisely when
that first evolutionary step on the road to humanity
happened, nor what might have triggered it. But a
discovery reported last week [July 12—BH/BT] in the
journal Nature has brought paleontologists tantaliz
ingly close to answering both these questions (158[3]:
56; for the original Nature article, see Haile-Selassie,
2001).
That’s a pretty bold statement, considering the fact that re
searchers had only the following bone fragments from which
to glean all of this information: a fragment of the right mandi
ble, one intermediate hand phalanx, the left humerus and
- 30 -
ulna, a distal humerus, a proximal hand phalanx fragment, a
left clavicle fragment, a proximal foot phalanx, and a few teeth.
In addition, these bones were not laid out neatly in typical
skeletal format, all grouped together and just waiting for re
searchers to dig them up. No indeed! These few bones took
researchers 5 years to collect, and came from 5 different locations! And so, from a fossilized toe, a piece of jawbone, a
finger, arm bones, a clavicle, and a few teeth we have this in
credible “ape-man” to prove “how apes became human.”
Prominently displayed in the center of page 59 of the Time
article is a single unimpressive toe bone, about which Lemonick
and Dorfman wrote: “This toe bone proves the creature walked
on two legs.” Amazing, is it not, what one can discern from
a single toe bone! The human foot contains 26 individual
bones (see Netter, 1994, p. 492), yet evolutionists claim that
they can distinguish walking characteristics from an examina
tion of just one? That bold caption also failed to inform the
reader that this toe bone (found in 1990) is “chronologically
younger” than the other bone fragments, and was found in a
separate location from the rest of the fossils. In fact, the bone
fragments that make up this new specimen came from five lo
calities of the Middle Awash in Ethiopia: Saitune Dora, Alaya,
Asa Koma, Digiba Dora, and Amba East (Haile-Selassie, 2001,
412:181). Lemonick and Dorfman conceded: “Exactly how this
hominid walked is still something of a mystery, though with a
different skeletal structure, its gait would have been unlike ours”
(158:57). But that did not stop the authors from speculating that
“kadabba almost certainly walked upright much of the time,”
and that “many of its behaviors undoubtedly resembled those
of chimpanzees today” (158:57). Interesting speculation—especially in view of the fact that the ages of the fossilized bone
fragments composing kadabba vary by hundreds of thousands
of years according to the evolutionists’ own dating schemes.
What was it that convinced evolutionists that kadabba walked
upright and was on the road to becoming man? A single toe
bone!
- 31 -
In contemplating the origin of “two-leggedness,” the au
thors of the Time article suggested that these animals were re
warded with additional food for their bipedal mobility. The
writers then went into painstaking detail to describe the envi
ronment in which researchers believe these creatures lived—
an environment that, in their view, necessitated that the ani
mals walked upright. Meave Leakey, head of paleontology at
the National Museums of Kenya, wife of Richard Leakey, a
well-known member of the world’s most famous fossil-hunting family, stated: “And if you’re moving into more open coun
try with grasslands and bushes and things like this, and eating
a lot of fruits and berries coming off low bushes, there is a [ex
pletive deleted] of an advantage to be able to reach higher.
That’s why the gerenuk [a type of antelope—BH/BT] evolved
its long neck and stands on its hind legs, and why the giraffe
evolved its long neck” (as quoted in Lemonick and Dorfman,
p. 59). Yet even staunch evolutionists (such as the late Stephen
Gould) cringe at statements like that. In fact, in an article titled
“The Tallest Tale” that he penned for the May 1996 issue of Nat
ural History, Dr. Gould began by stating: “The tallest tale is the
textbook version of giraffe evolution—a bit of a stretch.” Gould
then went on to state:
Giraffes, we are told, got long necks in order to browse
the leaves at the tops of acacia trees, thereby winning
access to a steady source of food available to no other
mammal. Lamarck, the texts continue, explained the
evolution of long necks by arguing that giraffes
stretched and stretched during life, elongated their
necks in the process and then passed the benefits along
to their offspring by altered heredity. This lovely idea
may embody the cardinal virtue of effort rewarded,
but heredity, alas, does not operate in such a manner.
A neck stretched during life cannot alter the genes that
influence neck length and offspring cannot reap any
genetic reward from parental striving (1999b, 105[5]:
19-20).
In commenting on why this example of evolution with the giraffe’s neck is bad science, Dr. Gould wrote:
- 32 -
If we choose a weak and foolish speculation as a pri
mary textbook illustration (falsely assuming that the
tale possesses weight of history and a sanction in evi
dence), then we are in for trouble as critics properly
nail the particular weakness and then assume that the
whole theory must be in danger if supporters choose
such a fatuous case as a primary illustration (105[5]:56,
parenthetical item in orig.).
Creationist Luther D. Sunderland further reiterated the
foolishness of this line of thinking when he stated:
Evolutionists cannot explain why the giraffe is the on
ly four-legged creature with a really long neck and yet
everything else in the world [without that long neck
—BH/BT] survived. Many short-necked animals, of
course, existed side by side in the same locale as the gi
raffe (1988, pp. 83-84).
And so, as Leakey herself pointed out, the evolutionists’ the
ories regarding bipedalism “are all fairy tales really because
you can’t prove anything” (as quoted in Lemonick and Dorf
man, p. 60). Fairy tales?
While Ardipithecus ramidus kadabba undoubtedly will stir con
troversy among evolutionists as to exactly where it fits into the
“evolutionary family tree,” it does little to answer the questions
of “how apes became human,” or when and why these crea
tures became bipedal. Given the small measurements of the
fossilized bones collected, kadabba is very likely to find itself
relegated to the same branch as the infamous Lucy (Australopithecus afarensis)—simply a fossilized ape.
Kenyanthropus platyops
In the March 22, 2001 issue of Nature, a new hominid ge
nus named Kenyanthropus platyops (from eastern Africa) was
described (Leakey, et al., 2001). Using their new specimen to
rework humanity’s pedigree, paleoanthropologist Meave
Leakey and her colleagues at the National Museums of Kenya
in Nairobi argued that the small-brained creature is so unusual
it belongs not just to a new species, but rather to an entirely
new genus! This new species now is nestled in the roots of the
- 33 -
human family tree at a time when scientists thought only one
ancestral species existed, leaving it unclear just which (if either!)
was the direct forebear of modern humankind.
The authors named this new find Kenyanthropus platyops,
which means flat-faced man of Kenya, “in recognition of
Kenya’s contribution to the understanding of human evolu
tion through the many specimens recovered from its fossil
sites” (410:433). However, an exhaustive study of the article
reveals a list of 36 cranio-dental fossils from this site, of which
only 5 contain bone fragments. The remaining 31 are frag
ments of teeth. Only two of these specimens, the skull and a
partial upper jaw, are intact enough to be assigned to this new
taxon. The authors described their new finds as “a well-preserved temporal bone, two partial maxillae, isolated teeth,
and most importantly a largely complete, although distorted,
cranium” (410:433). Distorted indeed! Even an untrained eye
can look at the figures provided in the article and see the ex
tensive damage to this newly found fossil. The flat face of
platyops adds another wrinkle in the evolutionary timeline—a
wrinkle that is no small problem because creatures younger
than K. platyops (and therefore closer to Homo sapiens) have
much more pronounced, ape-like facial features. K. platyops
was dated at 3.5 million years, and yet has a much flatter face
than any other hominid that old. Thus, the evolutionary sce
nario seems to be moving in the wrong direction!
Additionally, the authors provided a ta
ble in which the derived cranial features
of this new species were compared to oth
er finds (410:434). Out of the 21 charac
teristics listed, Kenyanthropus platyops dif
fers from Homo rudolfensis (considered the
most primitive species in our own genus,
which also includes Homo erectus and Homo
habilis) in only one area: the upper molar
size. H. rudolfensis is listed as having a mod
Figure 6 — Kenyanerate upper molar, whereas K. platyops is
thropus platyops
- 34 -
listed as small. So, as a result of a very fragmented and “dis
torted” cranium that possesses “small” upper molars, we now
have been graced with a new genus.
Scattered throughout the text of the March 22, 2001 Nature
article were hidden reminders that everything about this re
cent discovery is speculative and indefinite. Below are a few
statements that the authors used to describe this new find (al
so referred to as KNM-WT 40000):
Most of the [cranial] vault is heavily distorted, both
through post-mortem diploic expansion and com
pression from an inferoposterior direction (p. 434).
The original shape of the severely distorted mastoids
cannot be reconstructed, but other parts of the left
temporal are well preserved (p. 435).
It is preserved in two main parts, the neurocranium
with the superior and lateral orbital margins, but lack
ing most of the cranial base; and the face, lacking the
premolar and anterior tooth crowns and the right in
cisor roots (p. 433).
Only the right M2 crown is sufficiently preserved to
allow reliable metric dental comparisons. It is partic
ularly small, falling below the known ranges of other
early hominin species (p. 434).
Inability to distinguish between first and second mo
lars makes meaningful intertaxon comparisons of
these elements difficult (p. 437).
The sex of KNM-WT 40000 is difficult to infer. The
small M2 crown size could suggest that the specimen is
female (p. 436).
One quick and easy way for a paleontologist to get the public’s attention is to announce a find that is either: (1) very old;
or (2) directly related to the ancestry of humans. With K. plat
yops, Leakey does both. And so the race for claim on the old
est “common” ancestor is on—again! In 1994, Tim White and
colleagues described the new species Australopithecus ramidus,
dated at 4.4 million years old. Morphologically, this was the most
ape-like australopithecine yet discovered (as well as the earli
est), and seemed a good candidate for the most distant com-
- 35 -
mon ancestor of the hominids. A year later, Meave Leakey and
her colleagues described the 3.9-4.2 million year old Australo
pithecus anamensis. This taxon is slightly more similar to Ardi
pithecus and Pan (the chimpanzees) than the better known and
slightly later A. afarensis, and stood for a while as the ancestor
of the later hominids (or a close cousin to some unknown, an
cestral taxon).
Some have argued that part or all of the material regarding
K. platyops belongs more properly in the genus Australopithecus.
If Leakey, et al., are right in their assertion that facial flatness
connects K. platyops and H. rudolfensis in a significant manner,
then that implies that their lineage had an evolutionary history
distinct from the australopithecines. Therefore, evolutionists
would conclude that we are descended from Kenyanthropus by
way of H. (or K.) rudolfensis, or that the latter species is com
pletely distinct from us and does not belong in our genus.
Aside from the obvious concerns over the extrapolations
made from this fossil find, there are two other issues with which
the authors conveniently chose not to deal. (1) No postcranial
remains have been recovered from the site in which the cra
nium was found, and as a result, we know nothing about K.
platyops’ locomotory adaptation, particularly its degree of bi
pedality. Was this creature even able to walk upright as hu
mans do? (2) Leakey placed a tremendous amount of impor
tance on the flatness of the facial features of this fossil, due to
the widely acknowledged fact that more modern creatures
would possess an admittedly flatter facial structure than their
older, more ape-like alleged ancestors.
Tim White, the renowned anthropologist from the Univer
sity of California at Berkeley, recognized immediately the se
rious nature of the problem that K. platyops presented to the
standard evolutionary scenario, and was not afraid to discuss
the problem in a quite public fashion (in fact, he has been one
of the most vocal critics of K. platyops). He wrote: “If you think
of a family tree with a trunk, we’re talking about two trunks,
if they’re right” (as quoted in McCall, 2001, p. 4-A, emp. ad
ded). A tree with—two trunks?
- 36 -
Apparently, however, they are not “right.” Two years after
Meave Leakey and her coworkers announced the discovery
of K. platyops, no less of an evolutionary anthropologist than
Tim White himself called into question the legitimacy of Leakey’s decision to create a completely new genus and species to
“house” her find. White’s discussion centered on the issue of
whether paleontologists take into consideration skeletal var
iations when they report the latest “missing link.” His point is
a legitimate one, and, truth be told, is one that should be made
much more frequently than it is. After all, anyone who has ever
sat in a room full of 200 individuals of various ages and from
various cultures, realizes that skulls (and body sizes) come in a
variety of shapes and forms. But, on occasion, impatient pa
leontologists are all too eager to be the ones to identify the next
branch on the family tree. Thus, they rush to judgment—only
later to discover they were “not right.” In an article he authored
for the March 28, 2003 issue of Science (“Early Hominids—Diversity or Distortion?”), White rebuked some of his overzeal
ous paleontologist colleagues as he attempted to “rein in” the
tendency of fossil hunters to classify every new find as a dif
ferent genus or species.
In his article, he quoted two former Harvard professors—
Ernst Mayr, who once described hominid taxonomy as a “be
wildering diversity of names,” and George Gaylord Simpson,
who lamented “the chaos of anthropological nomenclature”
(White, 2003, 299:1994). White then commented that many
paleoanthropologists herald each new fossil as evidence for
biodiversity, thus pointing to a “bushy” hominid tree. But, as
White noted: “Whether judged from fossil evidence or zoo
logical considerations, the metaphor of an early hominid bush
seems seriously misplaced” (p. 1994). He then offered as an ex
ample the 2002 announcement of the African “Toumaï” hom
inid cranium from Chad, which, he noted,
was enthusiastically greeted as “the tip of an iceberg
of taxonomic diversity during hominid evolution 5-7
million years ago.” The same author even predicted
- 37 -
a Late Miocene “African ape equivalent of the Bur
gess Shale.” How could a single fossil from a previously unknown period warrant such claims? (p.
1994, emp. added).
How indeed? How can scientists make bold claims with just
a single specimen, especially when they consider the normal
variation found in that room of 200 people? White inquired:
New hominid fossils are routinely given new species
names such as Ardipithecus ramidus, Australopithecus ana
mensis, Australopithecus garhi, and Homo antecessor. At the
same time, long-abandoned names such as H. heidel
bergensis and H. rhodesiensis have recently been resur
rected. Textbook authors and publishers eagerly adopt
these taxa. But does the resultant nomenclature ac
curately reflect early hominid species diversity? (p.
1994).
He then went on to make a statement that should (but proba
bly will not) echo throughout the halls of academia.
To evaluate the biological importance of such taxo
nomic claims, we must consider normal variation
within biological species. Humans (and presum
ably their ancestors and close relatives) vary considerably in their skeletal and dental anatomy. Such
variation is well documented, and stems from onto
genetic, sexual, geographic, and idiosyncratic (indi
vidual) sources (p. 1994, parenthetical items in orig.,
emp. added).
The fact is, even within our own families, we find huge varia
tions.
In his article in Science, White launched an all-out attack on
those who are so quick to name new species. One of the first
bombs he dropped was aimed at Meave Leakey because of her
(mis)naming of Kenyanthropus platyops. White believes this is
just one more example of scientists being too quick to give us
a “bushy family tree.”
In an article titled “Flat-faced Man in Family Feud” that was
posted on the Nature Science Update portion of Nature’s Web
site on March 28, 2003, Rex Dalton noted that White believes
- 38 -
it was “geology, not genes” that “gave the Flat-faced Man his
distinctive looks” (2003). In other words, White has suggested
that, over time, fine-grained rock invaded tiny cracks in the
skull, and distorted its shape in an irregular way (White was
granted access to the Kenyanthropus fossil). His explanation for
the unusually flat face is based on skulls of pigs that, he noted,
were “flattened and narrowed by geological deformation, not
natural selection.” And White is not alone in his assessment.
Elwyn Simons, who studies primate evolution at Duke Uni
versity, concurred: “The evidence may not support the descrip
tion of a new genus” (as quoted in Dalton, 2003).
Dalton noted that Bernard Wood, a hominid specialist at
George Washington University in Washington, D.C., agrees
that geological processes very likely altered the skull. Dalton
also pointed out that Leakey’s team knew that. Wood noted:
“What is at issue is whether that alteration materially affects if
this is a new genus” (as quoted in Dalton). White went on to
say:
There are two questions to be asked in considering
whether the fossil constitutes evidence of early hom
inid species diversity. First, are the described morpho
logical differences from the A. anamensis to A. afarensis
lineage real, or are they merely artifacts of postmor
tem fossilization processes? Second, does the puta
tively new morphology lie outside the expected range
of phenotypic variation of this lineage? (p. 1995).
His first point was illustrated in the Science article by an in
tricate sequence of pictures of pig skulls that almost anyone
would consider to be separate species. Yet experts know the
skulls are all from the same species. Geological processes, as
it turns out, distorted the skulls. After burial, these skulls were
crushed, extruded, and otherwise modified, sometimes in non
linear and asymmetric ways. In illustrating his second point,
White showed two very different-looking skulls of modern fe
male chimpanzees. One skull was narrow, the other broad; one
profile had a pronounced slant, while the other was compres
sed. The teeth, brow ridges, skullcap, and eye sockets were vast-
- 39 -
ly different—yet both these specimens belonged to the same
species—and are even the same sex! White remarked: “This
variation is normal in a single sex of an extant species; even
more variation is present in other extant ape species” (p. 1995).
The phrase, “a picture speaks a thousand words,” comes to
mind as one reads Dr. White’s Science article. The pig skulls are
grossly distorted, and the two chimpanzee skulls show incred
ible variation. Entire cranial regions are different between the
two. Given the fact that we know geological conditions distort
fossils, and given the fact that we see so much variation within
species, one cannot help but wonder how many “missing links”
have been “created” using only one skull—a skull that was ei
ther damaged by geological conditions, or simply was a vari
ation of a human?
In the “acknowledgments” section of her Nature article,
Leakey thanked the National Geographic Society for funding
her fieldwork and laboratory studies. This simple “thank-you”
likely indicates that the editors of National Geographic soon will
be mailing a full-color, slick-paper, professionally produced,
eye-catching magazine into our homes so that we, our chil
dren, and our grandchildren can read articles about this new
species. National Geographic and others are quick to run cover
stories featuring world-famous evolutionists such as Donald C.
Johanson (discoverer of our alleged hominid ancestor, “Lucy”) or the late Louis and Mary Leakey (in-laws of Meave, both
of whom spent their entire professional careers on the African
continent searching for the ever-elusive “missing link” between
humans and ape-like ancestors). However, when the issue hits
newsstands near you, remember what Greg Kirby, senior lec
turer in population biology at Flinders University, Adelaide,
said in an address on the case for evolution in South Australia
in 1976: “…not being a paleontologist, I don’t want to pour too
much scorn on paleontologists, but if you were to spend your
life picking up bones and finding little fragments of head and
little fragments of jaw, there’s a very strong desire to exagger
ate the importance of those fragments…” (as quoted in Snell
ing, 1990, p. 16).
- 40 -
2
Australopithecus afarensis
Donald Johanson’s account of the discovery of the crea
ture now known popularly as “Lucy” reads like a Hollywood
script—filled with mystery, excitement, and emotion. In Johanson’s own words, “Lucy was utterly mind-boggling” ( Johanson and Edey, 1981, p. 180). He tells of feeling a strong,
subconscious “urge” to go with American graduate student
Tom Gray to locality 162. The superstitious paleontologist
even recalls writing in his daily diary that he was “feeling good”
about the day. So, on November 30, 1974, Johanson (who was
serving at the time as the director of the Cleveland, Ohio, Mu
seum of Natural History) and Gray loaded up in a Land Rover
and headed out to plot an area of Hadar, Ethiopia, known as
“locality 162.” After several hours of surveying in 100+ degree
heat, the two decided to head back. However, on returning to
their vehicle, Johanson suggested they take an alternate route
in order to survey the bottom of a nearby gully. In Johanson’s
words: “It had been thoroughly checked out at least twice be
fore by other workers, who had found nothing interesting. Nev
ertheless, conscious of the ‘lucky’ feeling that had been with me
since I woke, I decided to make that small final detour.”
Buried in the sandy hillside of the slope was an arm bone—
the single bone that eventually led to the unearthing of a skel
eton that was nearly 40% complete. While the description of
this famous find may read like some serendipitous treasure un-
- 41 -
earthed in a movie script, the truth is far from it. It soon would
become one of the most famous (and most controversial) fos
sils of all time, and would shake every limb on the famous hom
inid family tree, completely upsetting then-current theories
about how man came to be bipedal. Richard Leakey and Roger
Lewin stated of the find: “Johanson had stumbled on a skeleton
that was about 40% complete, something that is unheard of
in human prehistory farther back than about a hundred
thousand years. Johanson’s hominid had died at least 3 mil
lion years ago” (1978, p. 67, emp. added). But as additional stud
ies were carried out, it soon became obvious that this “miss
ing link” was, in fact, “too good to be true.”
Dr. Johanson named his find Austral
opithecus afarensis—thus designating it as
the southern ape from the Afar depres
sion of northeastern Ethiopia ( Johanson,
et al., 1978, 28:8). The creature quickly
earned the nickname “Lucy,” after the
Beatles’ song, “Lucy in the Sky with Di
amonds,” which played through the cel
ebratory night at Johanson’s camp. The
fossil, officially designated as AL 288-1,
consisted of skull fragments, a lower jaw,
ribs, an arm bone, a part of a pelvis, a thigh
Figure 1 — Reconstrucbone, and fragments of shinbones. It was
tion of skull of Australsaid to be an adult, and was dated at 3.5
opithecus afarensis
million years. [Johanson also found at Hadar the remains of some 34 adults and 10
infants, all of which are dated at 3.5 million years.] In their as
sessment of exactly where this new species fit in, Johanson and
colleague Tim White took pride in noting: “These new homi
nid fossils, recovered since 1973, constitute the earliest defin
itive evidence of the family Hominidae” (1979, 203:321). Not on
ly was this fossil find unusually complete, but it also was be
lieved to have been from an animal that walked in an upright
fashion, as well as being the oldest human ancestor—the equiv
alent of a grand slam in baseball.
- 42 -
Figure 2 — Artist’s concept of Australopithecus afarensis
- 43 -
Having collected the fossils, Johanson and White were re
sponsible for publishing their descriptions, as well as providing
an interpretation of how they fit into the hominid family tree.
Not wanting to waste valuable space on the description of A.
afarensis in one of the major science journals, they ultimately
decided to publish it in Kirtlandia, a relatively obscure publi
cation of the Cleveland Museum of Natural History. Then, in
what was either an extremely naïve (albeit zealous) move, or
a calculated, ambitious one, Johanson and White decided to
bump the Leakey’s prized Australopithecus africanus off the main
hominid tree and replace it with A. afarensis (for their full as
sessment, see Johanson and White, 1979). Leaky’s A. africanus
was relegated to a tangential side branch that went—literally—
nowhere. This decision eventually would weigh heavily on Lucy
as she fell under attack from scientists who felt she was nothing
more than another example of A. africanus—or worse yet, an
animal with a great deal of chimp-like qualities.
One of the ironic discoveries regarding Lucy had to do with
the size of her skull. Prior to her discovery, evolutionists had
assumed that these ape-like species had evolved larger brains,
which then allowed them to crawl down out of the trees and
begin foraging for food on the ground. According to evolution
ary timelines, the creatures adopted bipedalism as their pri
mary form of transportation, and once on the ground, began to
use tools. Lucy took this nice, neat little story and flipped it up
side down. Her brain case was not enlarged. In fact, from all
appearances, it was comparable in size to the common chim
panzee. And yet, Johanson and White were absolutely con
vinced this creature walked uprightly like man. They noted:
Bipedalism appears to have been the dominant form
of terrestrial locomotion employed by the Hadar and
Laetolil hominids. Morphological features associated
with this locomotor mode are clearly manifested in
these hominids, and for this reason the Laetoli and
Hadar hominid remains are unequivocally assigned
to the family Hominidae (1979, 203:325, emp. ad
ded).
- 44 -
Johanson insisted that afarensis was the direct ancestor of
man (see Johanson and Edey, 1981). In fact, the words “the
dramatic discovery of our oldest human ancestor” can be found
emblazoned on the cover of his book, Lucy: The Beginnings of
Humankind. Numerous evolutionists, however, strongly dis
agree. Lord Solly Zuckerman, the famous British anatomist,
published his views in his book, Beyond the Ivory Tower. He stud
ied the australopithecines for more than 15 years, and conclud
ed that if man descended from an apelike ancestor, he did so
without leaving a single trace in the fossil record (1970, p. 64).
Some might complain, “But Zuckerman’s work was done be
fore Lucy was even discovered.” True, but that misses the point.
Zuckerman’s research—which established conclusively that the
australopithecines were nothing but knuckle-walking apes—
was performed on fossils younger (i.e., closer to man) than
Lucy!
And therein lies the controversy. If Lucy and her descen
dants were discovered to be nothing more than an ape, then
all of Johanson’s fame and fortune would instantly vanish like
an early morning fog hit by a hot noonday Sun. Remember—
this single discovery made Johanson’s career. Upon returning
the entire Hadar hominid fossil collection to the National Mu
seum in Ethiopia (as he had previously agreed he would), Johanson recounted:
Lucy had been mine for five years. The most beauti
ful, the most nearly complete, the most extraordi
nary hominid fossil in the world, she had slept in my
office safe all that time. I had written papers about
her, appeared on television, made speeches. I had
shown her proudly to a stream of scientists from all
over the world. She had—I knew it—hauled me up
from total obscurity into the scientific limelight
( Johanson and Edey, 1981, p. 374, emp. added).
Thus, one can understand why he would have such a vested
interest in keeping this fossil upright and walking on two feet.
If others were to discover that Lucy was not a biped, then her
- 45 -
hominid status would be relegated to that of nothing but an
ape—something far less rewarding for Dr. Johanson, profession
ally speaking.
Did Johanson examine the evidence prior to making his
decision about Lucy’s ability to walk uprightly? Or was Lucy
“upright” and “walking” even before all of her fossils were uncovered—i.e., from the moment that single arm bone buried
in the sand was discovered? By his own admission, Johanson
noted: “This time I knew at once I was looking at a hominid
elbow. I had to convince Tom, whose first reaction was
that it was a monkey’s. But that wasn’t hard to do” ( Johanson,
et al., 1994, p. 60, emp. added). However, as more and more
individuals gained access to the fossils (or replicas thereof),
Johanson’s “hominid” began to be called into question.
We would like for you to examine the evidence regarding
this famous hominid fossil, and then determine for yourself
whether Lucy and her kin were, in fact, our human ancestors
—or merely ancient apes. Consider the following anatomical
discoveries that have been made since Johanson’s initial dec
laration of Lucy as a entirely new hominid species.
Lucy’s Rib Cage
Due to the impossibility of reconstructing Lucy’s skull from
the few fragments that were available, the determination that
Lucy walked uprightly like a human had to be derived from her
hips and ribs. Peter Schmid, a paleontologist at the Anthropo
logical Institute in Zurich, Switzerland, studied Lucy exten
sively, and then summarized his efforts as follows.
When I started to put the skeleton together, I expected
it to look human. Everyone had talked about Lucy as
being very modern, very human, so I was surprised
by what I saw. I noticed that the ribs were more round
in cross-section, more like what you see in apes. Hu
man ribs are flatter in cross-section. But the shape of
the rib cage itself was the biggest surprise of all. The
human rib cage is barrel shaped, and I just couldn’t
get Lucy’s ribs to fit this kind of shape. But I could get
- 46 -
them to make a conical-shaped rib cage,
like what you see in apes (as quoted in
Leakey and Lewin, 1992, pp. 193-194).
Schmid went on to note:
The shoulders were high, and, com
bined with the funnel-shaped chest,
would have made arm swinging im
probable in the human sense. It wouldn’t have been able to lift its thorax for
the kind of deep breathing that we do
when we run. The abdomen was pot
bellied, and there was no waist, so that
Figure 3 — Lucy’s
would have restricted the flexibility
rib cage was conithat’s essential for human running (as
cal shaped, unlike
quoted in Leakey and Lewin, p. 194).
the barrel-shaped
rib cage of a human
True, ribs can be “tweaked” and rotated so
(above).
that they appear more “barrel like” or conical, but the best (and correct) arrangement
always will be the original morphology. The facets from the
ribs that line up on the vertebrae provide a tighter fit when
aligned correctly In Lucy’s case, her ribs are conical, like those
found in apes.
Lucy’s Pelvis and Gender
A great deal of the “hype” regarding Lucy has been pure
speculation from the very beginning. In fact, incredible though
it may seem, even the gender of this creature is now being
called into question. Johanson’s original assessment stated:
“The most complete adult skeleton is that of AL 288-1 (‘Lucy’).
The small body size of this evidently female individual (about
3.5 to 4.0 feet in height) is matched by some other postcranial
remains…” ( Johanson and White, 1979, 203:324). And yet,
in his original review, Johanson’s description of postcranial
[below the skull—BH/BT] data was both speculative and defi
cient. Johanson and colleagues noted: “Strong dimorphism
in body size; all skeletal elements with high level of robusticity
in muscle and tendon insertion; pelvic region and lower limbs
- 47 -
indicate adaptation to bipedal locomotion…” ( Johanson, et
al., 1978, 28:7-8). From the beginning, it was considered an
adult female. It would be from the shattered fragments of the
pelvis that Donald Johanson and others would interpret the
AL 288-1 fossils as being a female—primarily due to the di
minutive size. But these bones were far from being problem
atic. As Hausler and Schmid discovered: “The sacrum and the
auricular region of the ilium are shattered into numerous small
fragments, such that the original form is difficult to elucidate.
Hence it is not surprising that the reconstructions by Lovejoy
and Schmid show marked differences” (1995, 29:363).
Figure 4 — Lucy had a smaller, kidney-shaped birth canal (as in
the illustration at the right), as opposed to that found in a human (left).
In regard to Lucy’s pelvis, Johanson affirmed: “Lucy’s wider
sacrum and shallower pelvis gave her a smaller, kidney-shaped
birth canal, compared to that of modern females. She didn’t
need a large one because her newborn infant’s brain wouldn’t
have been any larger than a chimpanzee infant’s brain” ( Jo
hanson, et al., 1994, p. 66). That admission begs the question
as to why this fossil was not categorized from the outset as sim
ply a chimpanzee. But this gender declaration poses additional
- 48 -
problems for Lucy. As Hausler and Schmid noted: “If AL 288-1
was female, then one can exclude this species from the ances
tors of Homo because its pelvis is certainly less primitive than
the pelvis of Sts 14 [designation for a specific A. africanus fossil—BH/BT]” (29:378). Both of the pelvises mentioned display
some degree of damage, and both are missing critical parts, but
it should be noted that in regard to the Lucy fossil, more than
one attempt was made at reconstruction.
After various reconstructions of the inlet and midplane of
Lucy’s pelvis, along with comparisons to other fossils and mod
ern humans, it became evident that the shape of Lucy’s pelvis
was not structured correctly for the eventuality of a birth pro
cess. The pelvis was just too narrow to accommodate an au
stralopithecine fetus. Hausler and Schmid noted that Lucy’s
pelvis was ridgeless and heart-shaped—which means that “she”
was more likely a “he.” They noted:
Contrary to Sts 14 [designation for a specific A. afri
canus fossil—BH/BT], delivery [of a baby—BH/BT] in
AL 288-1 would have been more complicated than
in modern humans, if not impossible, due to the pro
truding promontorium…. Consequently, there is
more evidence to suggest that AL 288-1 was male rath
er than female. A female of the same species as AL
288-1 would have had a pelvis with a larger sagittal
diameter and a less protruding sacral promontorium.
...Overall, the broader pelvis and the more laterally
oriented iliac blades of AL 288-1 would produce more
favourable insertion sites for the climbing muscles in
more heavily built males…. It would perhaps be better to change the trivial name to “Lucifer” according to the old roman god who brings light after
the dark night because with such a pelvis “Lucy”
would apparently have been the last of her species (29:380, emp. added).
This declaration produced an immediate reaction from the
evolutionist community, as many scientists worked diligently
to try to defend Lucy. If Hausler and Schmid’s conclusion is
- 49 -
correct, then this implies that the equivalent female of this
species would be even smaller—something unheard of in try
ing to compare this creature to modern-day humans! Lucy’s
pelvis is not what it should be for an upright-walking hominid
—but the dimensions easily fall within primates found among
the family Pongidae (apes).
Lucy’s Appendages—Made for
Bipedalism, or Swinging from Trees?
But what do Lucy’s arms and legs tell us in regard to her lo
comotion? If she were a biped, surely her upper and lower
extremities would point toward an upright stance. After all,
the bone that led to Johanson’s discovery of Lucy was that of
an arm. Yet the bony framework that composes Lucy’s wrists
may be the most telling factor of all. Brian Richmond and Da
vid Strait of George Washington University experienced what
many might call a “eureka!” moment while going through
some old papers on primate physiology at the Smithsonian In
stitute in Washington, D.C.
“We saw something that talked about special knuck
le walking adaptations in modern African apes,” Dr.
Richmond said. “I could not remember ever seeing
anything about wrists in fossil hominids…. Across the
hall was a cast of the famous fossil Lucy. We ran across
and looked at it and bingo, it was clear as night and
day” (see BBC News, 2000).
The March 29, 2000 San Diego Union Tribune reported:
A chance discovery made by looking at a cast of the
bones of “Lucy,” the most famous fossil of Australo
pithecus afarensis, shows her wrist is stiff, like a chimpanzee’s, Brian Richmond and David Strait of George
Washington University in Washington, D.C., re
ported. This suggests that her ancestors walked on
their knuckles (Fox, 2000).
Richmond and Strait discovered that knuckle-walking apes
have a mechanism that locks the wrist into place in order to
stabilize this joint. In their report, they noted: “Here we pre-
- 50 -
sent evidence that fossils attributed to Australopithecus anamen
sis (KNM-ER-20419) and A. afarensis ( AL 288-1) retain spe
cialized wrist morphology associated with knuckle-walking”
(2000, 404:382, parenthetical item in orig.). They went on to
note:
Pre-bipedal locomotion is probably best characterized
as a repertoire consisting of terrestrial knuckle-walking, arboreal climbing and occasional suspensory ac
tivities, not unlike that observed in chimpanzees to
day. This raises the question of why bipedalism would
evolve from an ancient ancestor already adapted to
terrestrial locomotion, and is consistent with models
relating the evolution of bipedalism to a change in feed
ing strategies and novel non-locomotor uses of the hands
(404:384, emp. added).
Moreover, additional evidence has come to light which sug
gests that Lucy is little more than a chimpanzee. Johanson
and his coworkers admitted in an article in the March 31, 1994
issue of Nature that Lucy possessed chimp-proportioned arm
bones (see Kimbel, et al., 1994) and that her alleged descen
dants (e.g., A. africanus and H. habilis) had ape-like limb pro
portions as well—which is a clear indication that she did not
evolve into something “more human.”
Figure 5 — Illustration depicting non-locking hand joint of human, which contrasts with locking-type joint possessed by Lucy
- 51 -
Not only have Lucy’s wrists and arm-bones been called
into question, but there also is a mountain of evidence that
demonstrates this creature was better adapted for swinging
through the trees, like modern-day chimps. After thoroughly
examining A. afarensis fossils, Stern and Susman noted: “It is
demonstrated that A. afarensis possessed anatomic character
istics that indicate a significant adaptation for movement in
the trees” (1983, 60:280). They went on to comment: “The
AL 333-91 [designation for specific A. afarensis fossil—BH/BT]
pisiform [bone of the hand— BH / BT] is ‘elongate and rod
shaped’ and thus resembles the long, projecting pisiform of
apes and monkeys” (60:281).
Stern and Susman’s research detailed the fact that the hands
and feet of Australopithecus afarensis are devoid of the normal
human qualities assigned to hands and feet. Instead, their re
search demonstrated that these creatures had long, curved fin
gers and toes typical of arboreal primates. [In reading through
the following descriptions of the fossils, bear in mind that the
St. Louis, Missouri, zoo proudly displays a life-size replica of
Lucy—with perfectly formed human hands and feet.]
Stern and Susman noted: “The overall morphology of metacarpals II-V [bones that comprise the hand—BH/BT] is simi
lar to that of chimpanzees and, therefore, might be interpreted
as evidence of developed grasping capabilities to be used in
suspensory behavior” (60:283). In looking at the morphol
ogy of the fingers, they affirmed:
The markedly curved proximal phalanges [bones of
the fingers—BH/BT] indicate adaptation for suspen
sory and climbing activities which require powerful
grasping abilities…. The trapezium [bone at the base
of the first digit—BH/BT] and first metacarpal are very
chimpanzee-like in relative size and shape…. En
larged metacarpal heads and the mildly curved, parallel-sided shafts are two such features of the Hadar
metacarpals not seen in human fingers. The distal
phalanges, too, retain ape-like features in A. afarensis.
...On the other hand, the Hadar fossil falls within the
- 52 -
range of each ape and less than 1 SD [standard deviation—BH/BT] unit away from the means of gorilla and
orangutan (60:284).
In their concluding remarks, Stern and Susman remarked:
It will not have escaped the reader’s attention that
the great bulk of evidence supporting the view that the
Hadar hominid was to a significant degree arboreal.
...We discovered a substantial body of evidence indi
cating that arboreal activities were so important to A.
afarensis that morphologic adaptations permitting ad
ept movement in the trees were maintained (60:313).
In the September 9, 1994 issue of Science, Randall Susman
reported that the chimp-like thumbs in A. afarensis were far
better suited for tree climbing than tool making (Susman, 1994).
Lucy also possessed a nonhuman gait, based on ratio of leg size
to foot size (see Oliwenstein, 1995, 16[1]:42). One researcher
even went so far as to suggest that A. afarensis was little more
than a failed experiment in ape bipedalism, and as such should
be consigned to a side branch of the human evolutionary tree
(as reported by Shreeve, 1996). So not only were Lucy’s ribs and
pelvis wrong, but her limbs also were physiologically more
conducive to swinging around in treetops.
Australopithecine Teeth:
More Evidence that Lucy was Arboreal
One of Donald Johanson’s specialties is identifying differ
ences within the teeth of alleged hominids. In fact, in his orig
inal description, he gave a great deal of attention to the dentition
of A. afarensis. By measuring the various differences in molars
and canines, he systematically assigned various fossils to pre
determined groups. However, even his highly trained eyes
may have missed some important microscopic data. Anthro
pologist Alan Walker has been working on ways of possibly
determining behavior based on evidence from the fossil re
cord. One of his methods includes quantitative analysis of
tooth microwear. Using image enhancement and optical dif-
- 53 -
fraction methods of scanning, Walker believes he might be
able to reconstruct ancient diets from paleontological sam
ples. In speaking of Walker’s material, Johanson noted:
Dr. Alan Walker of Johns Hopkins has recently con
cluded that the polishing effect he finds on the teeth
of robust australopithecines and modern chimpan
zees indicates that australopithecines, like chimps,
were fruit eaters…. If they were primarily fruit eaters,
as Walker’s examination of their teeth suggests they
were, then our picture of them, and of the evolution
ary path they took, is wrong ( Johanson and Edey, 1981,
p. 358).
So rather than foraging on the ground for food, we have mi
croscopic evidence that australopithecines were fruit eaters.
Australopithecine Ears: Human-like or Ape-like?
Knowing that modern human bipedalism is unique among
primates (and other mammals), Fred Spoor and his colleagues
decided to evaluate the vestibular apparatus of the inner ear—
an area designed to help coordinate body movements. Mod
ern human locomotor activity requires that the vestibular ap
paratus of the inner ear be able to maintain body posture, even
though we constantly are balancing all of our weight on very
small areas of support. Anyone who has ever suffered vertigo
knows firsthand just how crucial this area is for balance and
everyday activities.
Using high-resolution computed tomography, these re
searchers were able to generate cross-sectional images of the
bony labyrinth that comprised the inner ear. They noted:
“Among the fossil hominids, the earliest species to demon
strate the modern human morphology is Homo erectus. In contrast, the semicircular canal dimensions in crania from south
ern Africa attributed to Australopithecus and Paranthropus re
semble those of the extant great apes” (Spoor, et al., 1994, 369:
645). With that single declaration, Spoor and his colleagues
have drawn a line which unequivocally states that all fossils
- 54 -
prior to Homo erectus possessed ape-like morphology, allowing
them to climb trees, swing from branches, or walk hunched
over on their knuckles.
Their measurements led to the following observation:
“Among the fossil hominids, the australopithecines show
great-ape-like proportions and H. erectus shows modern-human-like proportions” (369:646). So, not only were the ribs,
pelvis, limbs, hands, and feet of this “fruit eater” chimp-like,
but there also is evidence which suggests that the organ re
quired for balance in Australopithecus afarensis was chimp-like
as well.
Figure 6 — Size and orientation of semi-circular canals in the
ears of humans (pictured above) are significantly different from
those discovered in creatures identified as australopithecines.
Lucy: Hominid or Chimp?
When Lucy first arrived on the scene, newsmagazines such
as Time and National Geographic noted that she had a head
shaped like an ape, with a brain capacity the size of a large
chimp’s—about one-third the size of a modern man’s. In an
article that appeared in New Scientist, evolutionist Jeremy
Cherfas noted: “Lucy, alias Australopithecus afarensis, had a
skull very like a chimpanzee’s, and a brain to match” (1983,
93:172). Adrienne Zihlman observed: “Lucy’s fossil remains
- 55 -
match up remarkably well with the bones of a pygmy chimp”
(1984, 104:39). It should be no surprise then, that in Stern
and Susman’s 1983 analysis of A. afarensis, they pointed out:
These findings of ours, in conjunction with Christie’s
(1977) observation on enhanced rotation at the tibio
talar joint in AL 288-1, Tardieu’s (1979) deductions
about greater voluntary rotation at the knee in AL
288-1, Senut’s (1981) and Feldesman’s (1982a) claims
that the humerus of AL 2881 is pongid in certain of its
features, and Feldesman’s (1982b) demonstration that
the ulna of AL 288-1 is most similar to that of Pan pan
iscus [a chimp—BH/BT], all seem to lead ineluctably
to the conclusion that the Hadar hominid was vitally
dependent on the trees for protection and/or suste
nance (60:311).
All of these characteristics led inevitably to the conclusion
that Lucy was simply a chimp-like creature. And yet, more than
a decade earlier, Charles Oxnard, while at the University of
Chicago, already had passed judgment on these creatures. His
multivariate computer analyses indicated that the australopith
ecines were nothing but knuckle-walking apes (1975).
You might be asking yourself why this charade has been al
lowed to go on this long. The answer—woven around power,
fame, and money—can be found in Johanson’s own words.
There is no such thing as a total lack of bias. I have it;
everybody has it. The fossil hunter in the field has
it…. In everybody who is looking for hominids there
is a strong urge to learn more about where the hu
man line started. If you are working back at around
three million, as I was, that is very seductive, because
you begin to get an idea that that is where Homo did
start. You begin straining your eyes to find Homo traits
in fossils of that age…. Logical, maybe, but also bi
ased. I was trying to jam evidence of dates into a
pattern that would support conclusions about
fossils which, on closer inspection, the fossils
themselves would not sustain (Johanson and Edey,
1981, pp. 257,258, emp. added).
- 56 -
He went on to admit: “It is hard for me now to admit how tan
gled in that thicket I was. But the insidious thing about bias is
that it does make one deaf to the cries of other evidence” (p.
277). Questions are being raised as to whether or not afarensis
is more primitive than africanus, or whether they are one and
the same. Others point to the all the chimp-like features, and
question whether this creature ever really walked uprightly.
Finally, in the March 1996 issue of National Geographic, Donald Johanson himself admitted: “Lucy has recently been de
throned” (189[3]:117). His (and Lucy’s) fifteen minutes of fame
are history. As Lee Berger declared: “One might say we are
kicking Lucy out of the family tree” (as quoted in Shreeve,
1996). [For an extensive discussion and refutation of Austra
lopithecus afarensis, see Gish, 1995, pp. 241-262.] Isn’t it fasci
nating to see how often the “hominid family tree” gets pruned?
Australopithecus africanus/Australopithecus boisei
At this point, we need to discuss briefly two creatures that,
although not as important in the lineage of man as they once
were, nevertheless have become so popular and well known
that they at least bear mentioning here. In 1924, Raymond
Dart (professor of anatomy at the University of Witwatersrand,
South Africa) had presented to him a skull that had been un
covered at the lime mines at Taung, South Africa (Taung means
“place of the lion” in the Bantu Language). He described his
find in Nature magazine in 1925, and labeled it Australopithecus
africanus. [The word Australopithecus means “southern ape.”] He
further indicated that it was the direct ancestor of humans. It
was the skull, professor Dart said, of an infant creature, 4-5 years
old (see Dart, 1925). Other investigators, such as John T. Rob
inson and Robert Broom (as well as Dart himself) uncovered
additional finds of Australopithecus africanus in later years, but
none ever received the acclaim that Dart’s original skull did. In
fact, in commenting on this fact in his book, Bones of Contention,
Marvin Lubenow noted:
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By 1960, it would have been difficult to find any public-school book that touched on human origins that
did not have a picture of the Taung skull. That popu
larity has remained. The fossil received much pub
licity in 1984, the sixtieth anniversary of its discov
ery. Pictures of Taung are still found in most books
dealing with human origins (1992, p. 50).
It is because of “that popularity” that we felt compelled to
discuss Australopithecus africanus here. But it is not just because
of the creature’s popularity. As it turns out, Australopithecus
africanus has become the subject of some controversy over the
past several years. Here, by way of summary, is what happened.
In 1973, a geologist from South Africa, T.C. Partridge, used
thermoluminescence analysis of calcite, as well as uranium
dating methods, to date the cave from which the Taung skull
had come (1973, 246:75-79; see also Tattersall, et al., 1988, p.
571; Klein, 1989, p. 113). Whereas the Taung child had been
dated at somewhere between two and three millions years
old, Dr. Partridge’s data indicated that the cave could not have
been any older than about 0.87 million years old—which meant
that the age of the Taung discovery would have to be decreased
to no older than 0.87 million years. And therein is the contro
versy.
As anatomist Phillip Tobias (also of the University of Wit
watersrand at the time) admitted: “…[T]he fact remains that
less than one million years is a discrepant age for a supposed
gracile australopithecine in the
gradually emerging picture of
African hominid evolution” (see
Butzer, 1974, 15[4]:411). That is to
say, if Australopithecus africanus
was the direct ancestor of hu
mans, and was dated at only 0.87
million years, that became prob
lematic, since no one would believe that it was possible to go
Figure 7 — Australopithecus
from Australopithecus africanus to
africanus
- 58 -
Figure 8 — Artist’s rendition of Australopithecus africanus
- 59 -
modern humans in the “short” time span of just a little over
three-quarters of a million years. Further compounding the
problem was the fact that modern humans already had been
documented as being on the scene in Africa 0.75 million years
ago. Karl W. Butzer of the University of Chicago recognized
the problem immediately, and wrote in Current Anthropology:
If the Taung specimen is indeed no older than the
youngest robust australopithecines of the Transvaal,
then such a late, local survival of the gracile [a term
used to describe Australopithecus africanus—BH/BT]
lineage would seem to pose new evolutionary…problems (1974, 15[4]:382).
Problems—to be sure. But, as it turned out, those “prob
lems” never were addressed, since just a year after Partridge
offered up the “young” dates of 0.87 million years for the cave
in which the Taung fossil had been found, Donald Johanson
discovered Lucy, and the problem of the obviously incorrect
dates that had been assigned to the Taung skull faded into the
background. In the meantime, Johanson and his collaborator,
Tim White, revised the human family tree, and Australopithecus
afarensis (Lucy) replaced Australopithecus africanus (Taung) as
our direct nonhuman evolutionary ancestor. Thus, the dating
of A. africanus became a non-issue, and africanus was moved
off to the australopithecine branch of the family tree, becom
ing the link between Lucy and the robust australopithecines
(discussed below).
All of this would have worked just fine—from an evolution
ary viewpoint—were it not for the discovery in 1985 of the nowfamous “black skull,” KNM-WT 17000 (see Walker, et al., 1986).
Dated at 2.5 million years, the black skull appears to have
more in common with Australopithecus afarensis and the robust
australopithecines. Where, then, does Australopithecus africanus
fit? As Lubenow noted: “Australopithecine phylogeny is now
in disarray…. Africanus became odd man out. Many evolution
ists are now moving africanus (including Taung) back into the
human line, between Lucy and Homo habilis” (1992, p. 52).
- 60 -
But that makes Partridge’s re-dating of the cave (in which the
Taung skull was found) relevant again. How can A. africanus
be “only” 0.87 million years old and be moved back into the
phylogenetic line leading to humans? As Lubenow went on
to note: “His work has not even been addressed, let alone an
swered…. [T]he full analysis and description of the Taung skull
still has not been published, and the dating problem raised
by Partridge continues to be ignored” (p. 52). The attitude of
some evolutionists seems to be: if the data do not conform to
the theory, then simply ignore the data.
Fourteen years after Raymond Dart found the Taung skull,
on June 8, 1938, Robert Broom bought from a lime-quarry
worker a maxillary fragment containing a single first molar.
After examining the material, Broom was convinced that this
was a different species from A. africanus. Broom learned from
the quarry worker that a young boy the name of Gert Ter
blanche (who worked as a local guide) had found the bones.
Terblanche led Dr. Broom to Kromdraai, the place of the specimen’s discovery, where Broom found several more cranial
and mandibular fragments associated with the original max
illary specimen. Eventually, this partial cranium (designed as
TM 1517) became the type specimen for the creature that came
to be known as Australopithecus robustus. Broom’s efforts were
instrumental in altering the view that the South African speci
mens were not simply apes, but hominids. After he published a
scientific monograph on the finds in 1946, the South African
australopithecines were taken seriously as human ancestors.
A. robustus remains have been discovered mainly at three
different sites in South Africa: Swartkrans, Dreimulen, and
Kromdraai, and are dated at approximately 2 million years old.
However, almost all of the A. robustus cranial specimens are
extremely fragmentary; only one, SK 1585, has been complete
enough to obtain a brain size (530 cc). The main issue regard
ing A. robustus is whether or not it should remain a separate
species from A. boisei (discovered by Louis and Mary Leakey,
discussed below). Some evolutionists insist upon placing the
- 61 -
creatures into separate lineages, while others suggest that A.
africanus, A. robustus and A. boisei should be included in a mon
ophyletic lineage (under the genus name Paranthropus), since
postcranial evidence shows little difference among the three.
Before we discuss that point further, let us introduce Australo
pithecus boisei.
On July 17, 1959, while her husband Louis was ill at their
work site at Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, Mary Leakey ventured
out on yet another fossil hunt and discovered some teeth (at
tached to a skull, as it turns out) sticking out of the ground.
She and her husband Louis later named it Zinjanthropus boisei.
[Zinjanthropus means “East Africa Man”; boisei derives from
Charles Boise, a philanthropist who had funded some of the
Leakey’s research through the National Geographic Society.]
The Leakey’s gave the creature the nickname “Nutcracker
Man” because of its massive jaws, and dated it at 1.8 million
years.
At first, even though Zinjanthropus appeared to share a suite
of traits with Broom’s Australopithecus robustus, the Leakeys were
convinced that they had discovered the first toolmaker. And
since fashioned tools are associated only with man, they were
certain that they had in their possession the skull of the direct
ancestor of humans. Louis discussed the find in the feature article—“Finding the World’s Earliest Man”—that he authored for
the September 1960 issue of National Geographic, and in which
he boldly proclaimed that the fossils were “obviously human”
(118[3]:421, emp. added). On page 435, underneath the artist’s concept of what Zinjanthropus boisei was supposed to have
looked like, was the following caption: “This earliest man yet
found lived beside the shore of a long-vanished lake” (emp.
added).
But, the “obviously human” and “earliest man” designa
tions were not to stick. In 1960 and 1961, the Leakeys discov
ered additional fossils, to which they gave colorful nicknames
such as Cinderella (Olduvai Hominid 13), George (O.H. 16),
Twiggy (O.H. 24—yes, named after the British model by the
- 62 -
same name), and Johnny’s Child (O.H. 7, named after Louis’
son Jonathan). Eventually, these fossil finds were placed into
the genus and species of Homo habilis. Since the fossils were
dated at 1.8 million years, and since they were more “modern”
than Zinjanthropus, Louis and Mary realized that Zinjanthro
pus, their “obviously human, earliest man,” wasn’t either, but
instead was a “super-robust australopithecine.” They thus re
named the creature Australopithecus boisei, because it was sim
ilar to the specimen Raymond Dart found 35 years earlier.
To complicate matters even more, some researchers be
lieve that there should be only two different species. The sug
gestion is that A. boisei and A. robustus are one and the same
(and should be referred to as the robust australopithecines
because of their larger size), while A. africanus, the smaller of
the bunch (and thus referred to as the gracile form) is a sepa
rate species entirely. Still other evolutionists believe that all
three creatures should be placed into the genus Paranthropus,
since, as we pointed out above, postcranial evidence shows lit
tle difference among the three.
What should we make of all of this? Very little, truth be
told. Most of it is a completely moot point nowadays. As we
noted earlier, Lord Solly Zuckerman, the famous British anat
omist, studied the australopithecines
for more than 15 years, and conclud
ed that if man did descend from an
apelike ancestor, he did so without
leaving a single trace in the fossil re
cord (1970, p. 64).
In his volume, Man: His First Mil
lion Years, the late evolutionist Ash
ley Montagu remarked that “...the
skull form of all australopithecines
shows too many specialized and ape
like characters to be either the direct
ancestor of man or of the line that led
Figure 9 — Australoto man” (1957, pp. 51-52, emp. adpithecus robustus
- 63 -
ded). One of the world’s foremost experts on the australopith
ecines, Charles Oxnard (of the departments of anatomy and
anthropology at the University of Chicago), performed com
puterized multivariate analysis of Australopithecus, and com
pared them to similar analyses of man and modern apes. Ac
cording to Dr. Oxnard, his studies show that Australopithecus
was not an intermediate between man and ape. In an article in
Nature, he wrote:
Multivariate studies of several anatomical regions,
shoulder, pelvis, ankle, foot, elbow, and hand are now
available for the australopithecines. These suggest
that the common view, that these fossils are similar to
modern man or that on those occasions when they
depart from a similarity to man they resemble the Af
rican great apes, may be incorrect. Most of the fossil
fragments are in fact uniquely different from both man
and man’s nearest living genetic relatives, the chim
panzee and gorilla. To the extent that resemblances ex
ist with living forms, they tend to be with the orang
utan… (1975, 258:389).
Writing on the australopithecines in the journal Homo, Oxnard
concluded:
Finally, the quite independent information from the
fossil finds of more recent years seems to indicate ab
solutely that these australopithecines, of half to 2 mil
lion years and from sites such as Olduvai and Sterk
fontein, are not on a human pathway (1981, 30:
243).
They most certainly are not. As we will document later in the
section on Homo habilis, Louis Leakey eventually reported the
contemporaneous existence of Australopithecus, Homo hab
ilis, and Homo erectus fossils at Olduvai Gorge (see Mary Leak
ey, 1971, 3:272). If Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo erec
tus existed as contemporaries, it should be plainly obvious that
one could not have been ancestral to another. The australopith
ecines are an evolutionary dead-end.
- 64 -
The Laetoli Footprints
In the April 1979 issue of National Geographic, Mary Leak
ey reported finding fossil footprint trails at Laetoli, Tanzania.
The strata above the footprints were dated at 3.6 million years,
while the strata below them were dated at 3.8 (Leakey, 1979,
155:450). Lubenow remarked: “These footprint trails rank as
one of the great fossil discoveries of the twentieth century” (1992,
p. 173). Why is this the case? Not only did Dr. Leakey discover
three distinct trails containing sixty-nine prints, but she also
found footprints that depicted one individual actually
walking in the steps of another!—something that only humans have the intelligence (or inclination) to do. Dr. Leak
ey was forced to admit that the footprints were “remarkably
similar to those of modern man” (155:446). In her autobiog
raphy, Disclosing the Past, she wrote:
The Laetoli Beds might not have included any foot
bones among the hominid remains they had yielded
to our search, but they had given us instead one of the
most graphic alternative kinds of evidence for biped
alism one could dream of discovering. The essentially human nature and the modern appearance of
the footprints were quite extraordinary.
As the 1978 excavations proceeded, we noted a curi
ous feature. In one of the two trails, some of the indi
vidual prints seemed unusually large, and it looked
to several of us as if these might be double prints,
though by no amount of practical experiment in the
modern dust could we find a way in which one indi
vidual could create such a double print….
The prints in one of the trails did indeed turn
out to be double, as Louise [Robbins, an anthropologist—BH/BT] and I and several others had expected,
and at last we understood the reason, namely that
three hominids had been present….
I will simply summarize here by saying that we ap
pear to have prints left three and a half million years
ago, by three individuals of different stature: it is
tempting to see them as a man, a woman and a
child (1984, pp. 177,178, italics in orig., emp. added ).
- 65 -
Tempting indeed! In an article titled “The Scientific Evi
dence for the Origin of Man,” David Menton discussed Dr.
Leakey’s self-proclaimed views on this matter.
In a recent lecture in St. Louis, Mary Leaky pointed
out one additional feature of her footprints that one
does not often see mentioned in the literature; all of
the larger foot prints of the trail have a smaller foot
print superimposed on them! Mary Leaky herself
conceded that it appears that a child was intentionally lengthening its stride to step in an elder’s footprints! It shouldn’t be necessary to em
phasize that this is a far more sophisticated behaviour
than one expects from apes. In addition there were
thousands of tracks of a wide variety of animals that
are similar or identical to animals living in the area to
day including antelopes, hares, giraffes, rhinoceroses,
hyenas, horses, pigs and two kinds of elephants. Even
several birds’ eggs were found and many of these could
be easily correlated with eggs of living species (1988,
emp. added).
Figure 10 — Laetoli footprint
trail
Yet most evolutionists insist
upon ascribing the footprints to
A. afarensis—on the assumption
that humans simply could not
have lived as far back as 3.7 mil
lion years. The specialist who
carried out the most extensive
study to date of the Laetoli foot
prints, however—and who did
so at the personal invitation of
Mary Leakey herself—is Russell
Tuttle of the University of Chi
cago. He noted in his research
reports that the individuals who
made the tracks were barefoot
and probably walked habitually
unshod. As part of his investiga-
- 66 -
tion, he observed seventy Machiguenga Indians in the rugged
mountains of Peru—people who habitually walk unshod. Af
ter analyzing the Indians’ footprints and examining the avail
able Laetoli fossilized toe bones, Tuttle concluded that the ape
like feet of A. afarensis simply could not have made the Laetoli
tracks (see Bower, 1989, 135:251). In fact, he even went so far
as to state:
A barefoot Homo sapiens could have made them.
...In all discernible morphological features, the
feet of the individuals that made the trails are indistinguishable from those of modern humans (as
quoted in Anderson, 1983, 98:373, emp. added).
Several years later, in an article on the Laetoli footprints in
the February 1989 issue of the American Journal of Physical An
thropology, Dr. Tuttle wrote: “In discernible features, the Laetoli G prints are indistinguishable from those of habitually barefoot Homo sapiens” (78[2]:316, emp. added). One
year later, he then went on to admit in the March 1990 issue
of Natural History:
In sum, the 3.5 million-year-old footprint traits at
Laetoli site G resemble those of habitually unshod
modern humans. None of their features suggests that
the Laetoli hominids were less capable bipeds than
we are. If the G footprints were not known to be
so old, we would readily conclude that they were
made by a member of our genus, Homo. In any
case, we should shelve the loose assumption that the
Laetoli footprints were made by Lucy’s kind, Austra
lopithecus afarensis (p. 64, emp. added).
Louise Robbins, the anthropologist who worked closely with
Mary Leakey on the Laetoli project, commented: “The arch
is raised—the smaller individual had a higher arch than I do
—and the big toe is large and aligned with the second toe.…
The toes grip the ground like human toes. You do not
see this in other animal forms” (1979, 115:196-197, emp.
added).
- 67 -
Interestingly, Mary Leakey originally labeled the Laetoli
footprints as “Homo sp. indeterminate,” indicating that she
was willing to place them into the genus of man, but was unwilling to designate them as Homo sapiens—which they clearly
were. It is obvious, of course, why she was unwilling to call
them Homo sapiens. Since the tracks (3.7 million years old) are
dated as being older than Lucy (3.5 million years old), and
since Lucy is supposed to have given rise to humans, how
could humans have existed prior to Lucy in order to make
such footprints? [See Lubenow, 1992, pp. 45-58 for a more
detailed refutation of Lucy, and pp. 173-176 for a discussion
of the Laetoli footprints.]
Homo habilis/Homo rudolfensis
The specimens that eventually would be designated as Homo
habilis were discovered in 1960 and 1961 by Louis Leakey at
Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, Africa (Leakey, et al., 1964).
[The name Homo habilis means literally “able man” or “handy
man.”] The actual designation of the fossils to the genus and
species of Homo habilis took place three years later in 1964,
however, when Dr. Leakey and his coworker, Phillip Tobias
of the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa, authored
an article titled “A New Species of the Genus Homo from Ol
duvai Gorge” for the April 4, 1964 issue of Nature (Leakey,
1964). From the very moment of their initial discovery, the
Homo habilis fossils were the subject of an intense controversy.
Many evolutionists voiced their opinion that the fossils rep
resented nothing more than a mixture of australopithecine
and Homo erectus fossils, and thus did not merit being placed
into a new taxon. Furthermore, scientists who examined the
fossils admitted that the finds included both adult and juve
nile forms, and therefore were skeptical of creating a new spe
cies designation since juveniles are notoriously difficult to eval
uate.
But there was much more to the controversy than that. In
his book, Bones of Contention, Marvin Lubenow explained why.
- 68 -
However, a philosophical problem was also at the
center of the controversy. At that time, the accepted
scenario for human evolution went from Australopith
ecus africanus (including Taung) to Homo erectus and
then on to Homo sapiens. Many evolutionists felt that
there was not “room” between africanus and erectus
for another species, nor was there need for one. But
Louis was marching to the tune of a different drum
mer. Louis believed in “old Homo.” Louis did not be
lieve that humans had evolved from the australopith
ecines, at least not from the ones that had been dis
covered thus far. He believed that the transition from
primates to humans took place much farther back in
time. In Louis’s evolutionary scheme, there was not
only room for a new taxon, there was a desperate need
for one. In fact, Louis felt that he had discovered the
true ancestor of modern humans (1992, p. 159).
And that was only half of the problem. There was something
else that was equally as serious, or perhaps more so. As Lubenow went on to clarify:
Louis Leakey was at least consistent. He recognized
that for evolution to go from africanus to erectus to sapi
ens represented a problem. The cranium of africanus,
although very small, is thin, high domed, and gracile.
The erectus cranium is thick, low domed, and robust.
The sapiens cranium is thin, high domes, and gracile.
Thus, to go from africanus to erectus to sapiens represents
a reversal in morphology. And a reversal is an evolu
tionary “no-no.” It was for this reason that Louis be
lieved that neither Homo erectus nor the Neanderthals
were in the mainstream of evolution. Both these robust
groups, he felt, were evolutionary cul-de-sacs that led
to extinction. The Homo habilis cranium, on the other
hand, was thin, high domed, and gracile. By going from
habilis directly to sapiens, Louis avoided the reversal
problem. Although most evolutionists have accepted
habilis into the hominid family, they have also re
tained erectus. Hence, they still have a reversal problem
in going from habilis to erectus to sapiens.
- 69 -
The concept of reversals in the fossil record is intrigu
ing. A rule in evolution, “Dollo’s Law,” says that re
versals in morphology are not supposed to happen….
Evolutionists have a logical reason for holding to this
“you-can’t-go-back” idea. Mutations are, they say, the
raw material for evolutionary change. When mutations
occur in an organism, those mutations represent per
manent changes in the genetic structure of the organ
ism. Whether the mutational events are for better or for
worse, the genes that had programmed the former con
dition are gone. Through mutations, those genes are
permanently changed and have become different genes
which program for something a bit different. To be
lieve that chance mutations could occur that would ex
actly restore the former genes would be like believing
in the tooth fairy. Hence, reversals have not been con
sidered a part of evolutionary theory.
This lack of reversals gives to evolution a one-way
directionality which is basic to the system…. How
ever, in spite of the many references in today’s litera
ture to reversals, seldom is there any hint that evolu
tionists understand the serious implications these re
versals have for their theory (pp. 159-160,161).
In 1972, at East Turkana, Kenya, Richard Leakey discov
ered the famous skull KNM-ER 1470 (KNM standing for Kenya
National Museum; ER is for East Rudolf, where the fossils
were found). Leakey classified the skull
as H. habilis, and originally dated it at
2.9 million years (a date later revised
downward to 1.9 million years; for
an in-depth discussion of the evolu
tionary presuppositions and politics
behind the KNM-ER 1470 “re-dating
scenario,” see Lubenow, pp. 247-266).
KNM-ER 1470 was a shocking find,
since it was dated so old, yet had a
very large cranium (800 cc) and an
extremely modern cranial morphol
Figure 11 — Homo
ogy, including high doming and thin
habilis
- 70 -
Figure 12 — Artist’s rendition of Homo habilis
- 71 -
walls. The skull was so much at odds with what evolutionary
theory would have predicted that Richard Leakey himself com
mented: “Either we toss out this skull or we toss out our theo
ries of early man. It simply fits no previous model of human
beginnings” (1973b, 143[6]:819). Science News, in discussing the
new fossil discovery, commented: “Leakey further describes
the whole shape of the brain case as remarkably reminiscent
of modern man, lacking the heavy and protruding eyebrow
ridges and thick bone characteristics of Homo erectus” (see “Leakey’s New...,” 1972, 102:324, emp. added). In a report that he
wrote for Nature, Richard Leakey commented: “The 1470 cra
nium is quite distinctive from H. erectus…” (1973a, 242:450).
Yes, it certainly is! Comparisons have documented that skull
1470 is much more modern than any of the known Homo erec
tus fossils. Furthermore, not only does 1470 qualify for true
human status based on cranial shape, size, and thickness of
the cranial wall, but there also is evidence from the inside of
the skull that Broca’s area (the part of the brain that controls
the muscles for producing articulate speech in humans) was
present. An article from the Leakey Foundation in the spring
of 1991 reported the find as follows:
The two foremost American experts on human brain
evolution—Dean Falk of the State University of New
York at Albany and Ralph Holloway of Columbia
University—usually disagree, but even they agree that
Broca’s area is present in a skull from East Turkana
known as 1470. Philip [sic] Tobias,…renowned brain
expert from South Africa, concurs…. So, if having
the brains to speak is the issue, apparently Homo has
had it from the beginning (see AnthroQuest, 1991, 43:
13).
Even though all the available evidence points to skull 1470
being from a true human, evolutionists have continued to sug
gest that it was from a “hominid” on the way to “becoming”
human. Examine the way famed anthropological artist Jay Mat
ternes put “flesh on the bones” of 1470 for the June 1973 issue
of National Geographic. The being from whom skull 1470 was
- 72 -
supposed to have come was drawn as a young black woman
who looks quite human—except for the fact that she has a very
apelike nose. [Human noses are composed of cartilage, which
generally does not fossilize, and the nose was missing on 1470.]
Thus, it is obvious that there was a singular purpose behind
giving the woman an apelike nose—to make her look as “primi
tive” as possible. Had she been given a human nose, no one
would have questioned the fact that this particular specimen
of Homo habilis was, in fact, Homo sapiens. As Louis Leakey
himself stated: “I submit that morphologically it is almost im
possible to regard Homo habilis as representing a stage between
Australopithecus africanus and Homo erectus” (1966, 209:12801281).
Today, the “problem” of Homo habilis has been resolved,
thanks to two incredibly important finds. First, in 1986, Tim
White, working with Donald Johanson at Olduvai Gorge,
found a partial adult skeleton that has been designed as Olduvai
Hominid 62 and dated at approximately 1.8 million years old.
This was the first time that postcranial material had been found
in association with a Homo habilis skull. The surprise was that
the body of this H. habilis adult was not large, as H. habilis was
thought to be, but actually was smaller (just a little more than
three feet tall) than the famed australopithecine, Lucy (discus
sed earlier). As Lubenow noted:
Thus, we have strong evidence that the category known
as Homo habilis is not a legitimate taxon but is com
posed of a mixture of material from at least two sepa
rate taxa—one large and one small. This new discov
ery also seems to remove the taxon Homo habilis as a
legitimate transition between afarensis (or africanus) and
Homo erectus (1992, p. 165).
[Some evolutionists, in an attempt to salvage Homo habilis
as a form ancestral to man, have suggested that the smaller,
gracile forms should continue to be considered as H. habilis,
while the larger forms should be renamed as Homo rudolfensis.]
Perhaps this is why Duane Gish, in his book, Evolution: The
Fossils Still Say No!, remarked about Homo habilis:
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No paleoanthropologist has succeeded in sorting out
all the creatures that are put into the taxon Homo habilis
by some and taken out by others. Some insist that H.
habilis is a bona fide taxon, including creatures inter
mediate between the australopithecines, either afaren
sis or africanus, and Homo erectus. Others argue just as
strenuously that those creatures classified as H. habilis
are no more than variants of the australopithecines
(1995, p. 265).
In fact, evolutionist Ian Tattersall wrote under the title of “The
Many Faces of Homo habilis” in the journal Evolutionary An
thropology: “…[I]t is increasingly clear that Homo habilis has
become a wastebasket taxon, little more than a convenient
recipient for a motley assortment of hominid fossils from the
latest Pliocene and earliest Pleistocene” (1992,[1]:34-36, emp.
added). In speaking of H. habilis, geologist Trevor Major sum
marized the situation as follows:
In fact, the whole issue of its place among Homo is
highly contentious, and the species has become a
dumping ground for strange and out-of-place
fossils. Some paleontologists have tried to impose
some order by reassigning australopithecine-like
specimens to Homo rudolfensis, and the most modernlooking specimens to “early African erectus” or Homo
ergaster (to which some would assign the Turkana boy).
Apart from a small difference in brain size between
australopithecines (less than 550 ml) and habilines
(around 500-650 ml), there are no other compelling
reasons to divide them between two genera (1996, 16:
76, parenthetical items in orig., emp. added).
Second, and even more damaging to the evolutionary sce
nario, was the fact that Louis Leakey later reported the con
temporaneous existence of Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and
Homo erectus fossils at Olduvai Gorge (see Mary Leakey, 1971,
3:272). And even more startling was Mary Leakey’s discovery
of the remains of a circular stone hut at the bottom of Bed I
at Olduvai Gorge—beneath fossils of H. habilis! Evolution
ists have long attributed the deliberate manufacture of shelter
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only to Homo sapiens, yet Dr. Leakey discovered the australo
pithecines and H. habilis together with manufactured housing.
As Gish asked:
If Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo erectus ex
isted contemporaneously, how could one have been
ancestral to another? And how could any of these crea
tures be ancestral to Man, when Man’s artifacts are
found at a lower stratigraphic level, directly under
neath, and thus earlier in time to these supposed an
cestors of Man? (1995, p. 271).
Good questions. Lubenow was forced by all the available ev
idence to conclude that, as a possible fossil ancestral form of
man, “Homo habilis is dead” (p. 166). We agree.
Homo erectus/Homo ergaster
And what about Homo erectus? Until March 2002, most evo
lutionary anthropologists and paleontologists believed that
two creatures belonged in the H. erectus niche: Homo ergaster
and Homo erectus. H. ergaster was believed to have emerged in
Africa and then spread to Europe. H. erectus was believed to
have existed mainly in Asia. But an article in the March 21, 2002
issue of Nature has challenged the traditional thinking about
these two species. Writing under the title of “Remains of Homo
erectus from Bouri, Middle Awash, Ethiopia,” Berhane Asfaw
(of the Rift Valley Research Service in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)
and his co-authors discussed their discovery of a partial skull
(referred to as a calvaria), which they have labeled as H. erectus.
The skull, discovered on December 27, 1997 in the Afar Rift of
Ethiopia known as the Middle Awash, in a sedimentary section
of the Bouri formation known as the Dakanihylo (“Daka”),
has been dated at approximately 1 million years old (Asfaw, et
al., 2002). The significance in the evolutionary debate of what
is now being called the Daka skull is this:
The skull is almost identical to Homo erectus fossils
found in Asia…. It is so similar, the team believes that
it cannot possibly be that of another species. The Daka
specimen suggests that Homo erectus was not limited to
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Asia, separated from its contemporary, Homo ergaster.
Homo erectus instead was a robust, far-flung species that
lived in Asia, Africa, and Europe (McKee, 2002).
Tim White, one of the co-authors of the Nature paper, put it
this way:
This fossil is a crucial piece of evidence showing that
the splitting of Homo erectus into two species is not jus
tified…. What we are saying in this paper is that the
anthropological splitting common today is giving the
wrong impression about the biology of these early hu
man ancestors. The different names indicate an ap
parent diversity that is not real. Homo erectus is a bio
logically successful organism, not a whole series of dif
ferent human ancestors, all but one of which went ex
tinct (as quoted in “Ethiopian Fossil Skull…,” 2002).
Asfaw, et al., wrote:
To recognize the basal fossils representing this ap
parently evolving lineage with the separate species
name “H. ergaster” is therefore doubtfully necessary
or useful. At most, the basal members of the H. erectus
lineage should be recognized taxonomically as a
chrono-subspecies (H. erectus ergaster) [2002, 416:
318-319, parenthetical item in orig.].
The graduate student who actually found the skull (and who is
a co-author of the Nature paper), Henry Gilbert, probably said
it best when he commented: “One of the biggest impacts this
calvaria will have on the field is in making Homo erectus look
more like a single species again” (as quoted in “Ethiopian Fos
sil Skull…,” 2002).
Now that evolutionists have wiped out one-half of the Homo
erectus niche by eliminating Homo ergaster, what shall we say
about the single remaining member of the H. erectus category?
Examine a copy of the November 1985 issue of National Geo
graphic and see if you can detect any differences between the
pictures of Homo erectus and Homo sapiens (Weaver, 168:576577). The fact is, there are no recognizable differences. Almost
forty years ago, Ernst Mayr, the famed evolutionary taxono-
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mist of Harvard, remarked: “The Homo erectus stage is char
acterized by a body skeleton which, so far as we know, does not
differ from that of modern man in any essential point” (1965,
p. 632). His statement is as true today as when he originally
made it. Furthermore, the skull of H. erectus shares many fea
tures with the Neanderthals, but with flatter brow ridges and
a less prominent mid-facial region. Some H. erectus skeletons
were short and stocky like the Neanderthals, but one specimen
—a nine to eleven-year-old boy from West Turkana, Kenya—was
quite tall and slender (Andrews and Stringer, 1993, p. 242).
Cranial volume varied from 850 to over 1100 milliliters (ml)
for H. erectus, and 1250 to over 1740 ml for Neanderthals. The
average for modern humans is 1350 ml, but we exhibit a broad
range of 700 to 2200 ml (Lubenow, 1992, p. 138).
In general, such things as skeletal proportions, the angular
ity of the face, and the shape of the brain case vary considerably
among fossil humans. Yet such differences—which are every
bit as dramatic—occur just as frequently among modern hu
mans. A Watusi today could not fail to miss a Mbuti pygmy
who strolled into his village, and an Inuit certainly would stand
out at a gathering of Australian aborigines. Despite obvious
facial features, both H. erectus and H. sapiens neanderthalensis ap
pear to fit within a distinct human kind. Although some spec
imens do exhibit a mixture of traits, there is no clear lineage
from, say, H. erectus to H. sapiens.
In fact, the evidence of the fossil
record suggests that they not only
were contemporaries, but also in
some cases were even neighbors
(Stringer and Gamble, 1993, p.
137). Remarkable confirmation
of that very scenario was pre
sented in two different articles in
the December 13, 1996 issue of
Science (Gibbons, 1996; Swisher,
et al., 1996). Creationist Marvin
Figure 13 — Homo erectus
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Figure 14 — Artist’s reconstruction of Homo erectus
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Lubenow, in his text on the alleged fossil evidence for human
evolution, Bones of Contention, summarized the imaginary Ho
mo erectus to Homo habilis to Homo sapiens lineage as follows:
…Homo erectus individuals have lived side by side with
other categories of humans for the past two million
years (according to evolutionist chronology). This fact
eliminates the possibility that Homo erectus evolved in
to Homo sapiens…. On the far end of the Homo erectus
time continuum, Homo erectus is contemporary with
Homo habilis for 500,000 years. In fact, Homo erectus
overlaps the entire Homo habilis population…. Thus,
the almost universally accepted view that Homo habilis
evolved into Homo erectus becomes impossible…. Homo
habilis could not be the evolutionary ancestor of Homo
erectus because the two groups lived at the same time
as contemporaries….
When a creationist emphasizes that according to evo
lution, descendants can’t be living as contemporaries
with their ancestors, the evolutionist declares in a rath
er surprised tone, “Why, that’s like saying that a parent
has to die just because a child is born!” Many times I
have seen audiences apparently satisfied with that anal
ogy. But it is a very false one. In evolution, one species
(or a portion of it) allegedly turns into a second, better-adapted species through mutation and natural se
lection. However, in the context of human reproduc
tion, I do not turn into my children; I continue on as a
totally independent entity. Furthermore, in evolution,
a certain portion of a species turns into a more advanced
species because that portion of the species allegedly
possesses certain favorable mutations which the rest
of the species does not possess. Thus the newer, more
advanced group comes into direct competition with
the older unchanged group and eventually eliminates
it through death…. The analogy used by evolutionists
is without logic, and the problem of contemporane
ousness remains.
Although the most recent date usually given for the dis
appearance of Homo erectus is about 300,000 y.a., at least
106 fossil individuals having Homo erectus morphology
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are dated by evolutionists themselves as being more
recent than 300,000 y.a. Of those 106 fossils individ
uals, at least sixty-two are dated more recently than
12,000 y.a. This incontrovertible fact of the fossil rec
ord effectively falsifies the concept that Homo erectus
evolved into Homo sapiens and that Homo erectus is our
evolutionary ancestor. In reality, it falsifies the entire
concept of human evolution (1992, pp. 121,127,129,
parenthetical items and emp. in orig.).
Lubenow therefore has suggested that all these forms should
be included within a highly variable, created humankind (pp.
120-143). The fossil evidence for evolution (human or other
wise) simply is not there. Apes always have been apes, and hu
mans always have been humans.
Furthermore, in examining the evidence regarding the or
igins of humans, we need to keep in mind the condition of the
original fossils. The skeletons and skulls often are extremely
fragmented or crushed (as in the case of the Daka skull and
Kenyanthropus platyops), and do not look anything like the skel
etons you see in science classrooms. The skeletons often are
crushed by the weight of the dirt and rocks on top of them,
and rarely are they complete. Rather than simply digging up
a complete skeleton, researchers often find small pieces of bones
scattered over large areas (some as large as a football field!).
Often these fossilized bone fragments are put together like a
jigsaw puzzle with missing pieces. Occasionally, however, pieces
get put together that really belong to two or three different
puzzles! For, you see, it is not just a few links out of the chain
that are missing. It is the entire chain!
Homo sapiens idaltu
In our discussion of Kenyanthropus platyops in chapter one, we
mentioned a specific criticism of the creature that appeared in
an article (“Early Hominids—Diversity or Distortion?”) authored
by University of California (Berkeley) anthropologist Tim White
in the March 28, 2003 issue of Science (2003). White publicly
disparaged Meave Leakey and her colleagues for “overinter-
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preting” the alleged diversity seen in hominid fossils, and for
“rushing to judgment” to name a new species (which, White
suggested, very likely belonged in a genus and species that al
ready existed).
Three months must represent a very long time in the evo
lutionary community—time enough to conveniently “forget”
the chastisement you unsparingly heaped on your erring col
leagues, and time enough to make exactly the same mistake yourself! Three short months was the amount of time
that passed between White’s cautioning of his fellow evolu
tionists, and his own announcement of a new species!
The June 12, 2003 issue of Nature carried a striking series of
photos announcing White’s latest find. There—emblazoned
on the cover under the title “African Origins”—was a subtitle
that boldly announced: “Ethiopian fossils are the earliest Homo
sapiens.” Headlines that screamed, “Oldest Homo sapiens fos
sils found,” appeared in almost every major media outlet. In
fact, MSNBC even sent out “news bites” that showed up on cell
ular phones and pagers, stating:
OLDEST HUMAN FOSSILS DISCOVERED: Homo
sapiens fossils found in Ethiopia are the oldest known
found, making them a key link between pre-human
and modern humans.
White and his colleagues designated this “latest and greatest”
find as Homo sapiens idaltu—the new sub-species name “idaltu”
(which means elder) having come from the African Afar lan
guage.
While the names of the paleoanthropologists, the locations
of the fossils, or the name given to a new fossil discovery may
change, the story remains the same: Evolutionists claim to have
made a “landmark discovery” that will “change the way peo
ple think about their own history.” Or, the suggestion is offered
that such-and-such a find “documents beyond doubt that ev
olution occurred in the past, and will shake up the evolution
ary tree of life.” While some admit that “these fossils raise more
questions and contradict some of the previous data,” the bot-
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tom line always is something like this: “Our find sets a new
age record, making it the most important (oh, by the way, we
would appreciate more funding in the future).” OK, so that
last little bit usually is not included in the media clips. But it is
true all the same. These researchers are dependent on grants,
and those grants commonly are awarded based on past achievement(s). Thus, the researcher who can grab the most spotlight,
pound his or her chest the loudest, and claim an appropriate
“fifteen minutes of fame,” likely will be rewarded in the end
(including making a considerable sum on the side for writing
a book on the “most important find” in human history!)
So what did Tim White and his colleagues really find? The
very first sentence in an on-line National Geographic report stated:
“Three fossil skulls recovered from the windswept scrabble of
Ethiopia’s dry and barren Afar rift valley lend archaeological
credence to the theory that modern humans evolved in Africa
before spreading around the world” (Roach, 2003). Three fos
silized skulls? Well, not exactly. In commenting on the find,
Chris Stringer noted: “Three individuals are represented by
separate fossils: a nearly complete adult cranium (skull parts
excluding lower jaw), a less complete juvenile cranium, and
some robust cranial fragments from another adult” (2003, 423:
692, parenthetical item in orig.). The fact of the matter is, the
third “skull” is so fragmented that White and his colleagues de
cided not to even include a photo of it in their report in Nature.
They found some bone fragments, and from those they com
posed an adult skull and part of a juvenile skull (with some left
overs remaining unused).
The Nature article contained some good science, in that the
researchers did uncover some fossils. They put them together
(as they thought they best fit). They took them back to the lab,
made measurements, and compared them with other anthro
pometric data. But that was where the good science stopped,
and speculation began. In an effort to help fill in some gaps in
evolutionary theory, White and his colleagues painted a “be
fore” picture that was intended to help explain away and fill
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such gaps. Over the past several years, evolutionists have had
a hard time explaining just how man evolved “out of Africa,”
when researchers were finding Neanderthal fossils in Europe.
How could this occur, when previously, evolutionists asserted
that Homo sapiens had evolved from Neanderthals, and then
left Africa? Enter the “side-by-side” theory. This latest twist
in evolution has both modern humans and Neanderthals co
existing in many of the same regions, including Europe. That
helped explain the Neanderthal fossils in Europe, but evolu
tionists still needed evidence in Africa to back up their claims.
Then, Tim White, and his coworkers arrived to save the day.
They not only speculated about how their new find fits into
the “out of Africa” theory, but also went on to note: “When
considered with the evidence from other sites, this shows that
modern human morphology emerged in Africa long before
the Neanderthals vanished from Eurasia” (2003, 423:746747).
Truth be told, this latest find is nothing more than a mod
ern human that has been dated (using evolutionary methods)
at 154,000-160,000 years old. When you disregard the dating
(due to the inherent evolutionary assumptions), you will see
that White and his colleagues found nothing more than bone
fragments from two human adults and a child (Homo sapiens)
who once lived in Africa. That’s it. End of story. Tim White
would do well to reread his own cautionary advice to his evo
lutionary colleagues, regarding hastily assigning new names
for every bone fragment discovered. As the old adage suggests,
“the sauce that’s good for the goose, is good for the gander.”
WHAT DOES THE “RECORD OF
THE ROCKS” REALLY SHOW?
While artists’ depictions of ape-like ancestors strive to provide
us with missing links, we now know that fossils indistinguish
able from modern humans can be traced all the way back to
4.5 million years ago (using evolutionary dating methods).
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This suggests that true humans were on the scene before aus
tralopithecines appeared in the fossil record. Additionally, we
now know that anatomically modern Homo sapiens, Neander
thals, archaic Homo sapiens, and Homo erectus all lived as con
temporaries at one time or another. None of these creatures
evolved from a more robust form to a more gracile condi
tion. Additionally, all the fossils ascribed to the Homo habilis
category are contemporary with Homo erectus. Thus Homo hab
ilis not only did not evolve into Homo erectus, but it could not
have evolved from Homo erectus.
More than 6,000 human-like fossils exist. Some are partial
skulls, while others may be only a few teeth. Most of these fos
sils can be placed into one of two groups: apes or humans. A
few fossils do have odd characteristics or show abnormal bone
structure. But does that mean humans evolved? No. It simply
means that we have variations in bone structure—variations
you probably can see all around you. Some heads are big;
others are small. Some noses are pointed, and some are flat.
Some jawbones look angled, while some look square. Does
that mean some of us still are “evolving”? Or does it mean
that there are occasional differences in humans?
Remember this simple exercise the next time you see a pic
ture of one of those ape-like creatures displayed prominently
across the front cover of a national news magazine. Look at a
skeleton (any one will do) and try to draw the person that used
to live with that bony framework. What color was the hair?
Was it curly, or straight? Was the person a male or a female?
Did he or she have chubby cheeks, or thin? These are difficult
(if not impossible!) questions to answer when we are presented
only a few bones with which to work. The reconstructions you
see in pictures are not based merely on the fossil evidence,
but also are based on what evolutionists believe these creatures “should” have looked like. The fossil evidence itself,
however, is clear. Man always has been man; he did not evolve
over millions of years. Rather, God, the Giver of life, created
mankind on the sixth day of creation, just as the Bible states
(Genesis 1:26-27).
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THE PARADE OF FOSSIL ERRORS
We all have seen pictures of our alleged animal ancestors.
Artists draw these creatures as hairy animals that shared both
human and ape-like characteristics, often carrying clubs and
living in caves. Most of us even recognize their names: Nean
derthal Man, Rhodesian Man, Lucy, Java Man. But what is
the truth about the origin of humankind? Did we evolve from
ape-like ancestors as many would have us believe, or were we
made in the image and likeness of God as Genesis 1:26-27 teach
es? Examine the evidence that follows, and then you be the
judge. We think you will see that man did not evolve from ape
like creatures, but was created by God.
In looking at the evidence regarding the origins of humans,
we first need to dig deeply into the ground. Buried under lay
ers of dirt and rocks we find fossilized skeletons—many of which,
once they are uncovered, are stored in vaults where they are
better protected than gold. However, these skeletons do not
look anything like the skeletons you see in science classrooms
or those that are taped to the wall at Halloween. These skele
tons often are crushed by the weight of the materials on top of
them, and rarely are they complete. Rather than simply dig
ging up a complete skeleton, researchers frequently find small
pieces of bones scattered over large areas (some as large as a
football field!). Often, these fossilized bone fragments are put
together like a jigsaw puzzle—with missing pieces. Occasion
ally, however, pieces get put together that belong to two or
three different puzzles! But what about all the pictures you’ve
seen on the covers of magazines—those complete ape-like skulls?
Many time, such images are simply pictures of casts that were
created using whatever bone fragments were available. From
the casts, researchers try to imagine what the creature (a hairy
“proto-human” frequently shown living in a cave) might have
looked like. Actually, these alleged ape-like creatures that are
supposed to be the “missing links” between humans and apes
are far from it. Consider the evidence.
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NEANDERTHAL MAN
For many years, evolutionists taught that Neanderthals
(sometimes spelled Neandertals) were brawny, prehistoric
creatures that used primitive stone tools, whereas “modern”
humans’ descendants were more sophisticated. If we were to
spot a Neanderthal walking the streets of a modern city, we
likely would recognize him by his prominent brow ridges,
low forehead, flat skull, weak chin, jutting mid-facial region,
very large nose, forward-sloping face, and short, muscular
limbs—to name some of the more visible characteristics (see
Stringer and Gamble, 1993, pp. 76-77). The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language uses words such as crude,
boorish, and slow-witted to describe this species. However,
as the facts slowly are becoming known, they are requiring a
renovation of that definition.
After discovering the first Neanderthal skullcap in 1856 in
the Neander Valley near Dusseldorf, Germany, German anat
omist Ruldolph Virchow said in essence that the fossil was the
remains of a modern man afflicted with rickets and osteopo
rosis. In 1958, at the International Congress of Zoology, A.J.E.
Cave stated that his examination of the famous Neanderthal
skeleton established that it was simply an old man who had
suffered from arthritis. Francis Ivanhoe authored an article
that appeared in Nature, titled “Was Virchow Right About Ne
anderthal?” (1970). Virchow had reported that the Neander
thal man’s ape-like appearance
was due to a condition known
as rickets, which is a vitamin D
deficiency characterized by ov
erproduction and deficient cal
cification of bone tissue. The
disease results in skeletal de
formities, enlargement of the
liver and spleen, and tender
ness throughout all the body.
Dr. Cave noted that every NeFigure 15—Neanderthal skull
anderthal child’s skull that had
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been studied to that point in time apparently was affected by
severe rickets, which in children commonly produces a large
head due to late closure of the epiphysis and fontanels.
Even though Ivanhoe was an evolutionist, he nevertheless
went on to note that the wide distribution of Neanderthal finds
in various parts of the world explained the differences seen in
bone configuration. The extreme variation in locations of
these Neanderthal discoveries probably played a role in the
diversity of fossils assigned to the Neanderthal group. The
differences likely were the result of different amounts of sun
light for a given area, which prevented or retarded vitamin D
production (vitamin D is manufactured in the skin upon ex
posure to sunlight). In adults, a lack of vitamin D causes oste
omalacia, a softening of the bones that results in longer bones
“bowing” (a condition reported in many Neanderthal fossils).
Scientists have debated long and hard concerning whether
there exists any difference between modern humans and Ne
anderthal specimens. One of the world’s foremost authorities
on the Neanderthals, Erik Trinkaus concluded:
Detailed comparisons of Neanderthal skeletal remains
with those of modern humans have shown that there
is nothing in Neanderthal anatomy that conclusively
indicates locomotor, manipulative, intellectual or lin
guistic abilities inferior to those of modern humans
(1978, p. 10).
In the March 2, 2001 issue of Science, Ann Gibbons authored
an article titled The Riddle of Coexistence (Gibbons, 2001). She
began with a dramatic opening, asking the reader to imagine
forty thousand years ago when “our ancestors wandered into
Europe and met another type of human already living there,
the brawny, big-brained Neandertals.” She then went on to
state that “such a collision between groups of humans must
have happened many times” (291:1725). Can’t you just picture
that introduction? “Hi, I’m Neandertal Man.” Reply, “Nice to
meet you Mr. Neandertal, I’m Modern Man.”
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This “collision” of two groups was necessitated by recent
fossil findings that place Neanderthals and modern humans
in the same place at the same time. Scientists dated the re
mains of anatomically modern humans from caves at Qafzeh
and Skhul in Israel, and found them to be 92,000 to 100,000
years old (according to their measuring techniques). However, this is 40,000 years before the fossil record has Neanderthals inhabiting the neighboring cave of Kebara,
only 100 meters away from Skhul! No missing link here.
NEBRASKA MAN
The June 24, 1922 Illustrated London News presented on its
front cover a man and a woman who had been reconstructed
from a single tooth found in the state of Nebraska. The artist
even incorporated clothing and imaginary surroundings into
the drawings of this alleged “missing link.” When Henry Fair
field Osborn, head of the department of vertebrate paleontol
ogy at New York’s American Museum of Natural History, re
ceived the fossil tooth in February of that year, he would have
thought it a gift from the gods—had he believed in any god at
all. Marxist in his views, and a prominent member in good
standing of the American Civil Liberties Union, he was aware
that plans were being made by the ACLU to challenge legis
lation that would forbid the teaching of evolution in Ameri
can schools. He saw in the
tooth precious evidence for
the test case, which even
tually was held in 1925 at
Dayton, Tennessee (the
famous Scopes “Monkey
Trial”).
Figure 16 — Artist’s depiction of
Nebraska Man
- 88 -
The trial, as it turns out,
was an arranged affair, but
the tooth was not brought
in as evidence because dissension occurred among
those who knew of its existence. The truth leaked out slowly
and obscurely at first, but eventually was thrust into the public
eye in the January 6, 1923 issue of the American Museum Novi
tiates, where nine authorities cited numerous objections to the
claim that the tooth was even distantly related to the primate.
A further search was made at Snake Creek (the site of the origi
nal discovery), and by 1927 it was concluded (albeit begrudg
ingly) that the tooth was that of a species of Prosthennops, an ex
tinct genus related to the modern peccary (a wild pig). These
facts were not considered generally newsworthy, but did appear
in Science (see Gregory, 1927, 66:579). The fourteenth edition
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929, 14:767) coyly admitted
that a mistake had been made and that the tooth belonged to a
“being of another order.” Creationist Duane Gish observed:
“This is a case in which a scientist made a man out of a pig, and
the pig made a monkey out of the scientist” (1995, p. 328).
PILTDOWN MAN
Piltdown was an archaeological site in England where, in
1908 and 1912, fossil remains of humans, apes, and other mam
mals were found. In 1913, at a nearby site, researchers found
an ape’s jaw with a canine tooth worn down like a human’s.
And thus another missing link was put forth—one that pos
sessed the skull of a human and the jawbone of an ape. Pilt
down was proclaimed genuine by several of the most brilliant
British evolutionists of the day—Sir Arthur Smith-Woodward,
Sir Arthur Keith, and Grafton Elliot Smith. How did these faked
fragments of bone fool the best scientific minds of the time?
Perhaps the desire to be part of a great discovery blinded those
charged with authenticating it. Many English scientists felt left
out by other discoveries on the Continent. Neanderthal had
been found in Germany in 1856, and Cro-Magnon in France
in 1868. Perhaps national (or professional) pride had kept the
researchers from noticing the scratch marks made by the filing
of the jaw and teeth—items that were apparent to investigators
after the hoax was exposed.
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Of course, the deception did far more than dupe a few evo
lutionists. The whole world was taken in. Museums world
wide proudly displayed copies and photographs of the Pilt
down remains. Books and periodicals also spread the news
across the globe. Thus, the fraud had many convinced that man
kind did, indeed, come from an evolutionary ancestry—which
shows how gullible people can be at times. In 1953, Piltdown
Man was exposed as a forgery. The skull was modern, and the
teeth on the ape’s jaw had been filed down and treated bio
chemically to make them appear “old.” No missing link here.
JAVA MAN
This “missing link” was classified as Homo erectus, the crea
ture that supposedly gave rise to Homo sapiens (humans). Eu
gene Dubois went to the former Dutch Indies as a health offi
cer in 1887. Because he had had an interest in geology and pa
leontology since his youth, he immediately began searching
for fossils. First he worked on Sumatra, and then went to Java
where he supervised the collection of more than twelve thou
sand fossils from the area around the mountain of Lawu. The
fossils varied from fish to elephants to hippopotami, but fos
sils of anthropoids or early humans were conspicuously ab
sent. In 1890, the Dutch anatomist focused his attention on
the banks of Solo near the village Trinil. In a bend of this river,
he found eroded layers of sandstone and volcanic ash—which
seemed to him the perfect place to search for fossils. Excavators
discovered a human-like fossilized tooth in September 1891.
A month later, they uncovered the upper part of a skull. The
bone of the skull was thick and had
such a curve that its brains could be
only half as big as the brain of a mod
ern human. In the front of the skull,
above the missing orbits, were clear
eyebrow bags. Initially, Dubois be
lieved that the fossils belonged to a
Figure 17 — Java Man’s
large, extinct chimpanzee.
skull cap
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The team kept digging in the riv
erbank, however, and one year later
discovered a thighbone in the same
sandstone layers, about fifteen me
ters upstream from the spot where
the tooth and the skull had been dis
covered. In contrast to the ape-like
skull, the thighbone looked like a
modern human thighbone. It was
clear that it belonged to an uprightwalking creature. Dubois’ first reac
tion was to attribute these discover
Figure 17 — Artist’s deies to one individual—an uprightpiction of Java Man
walking specimen of an extinct species of chimpanzee. He dubbed it Anthropopithecus erectus (i.e.,
the erect-walking, human-like anthropoid). Despite further
excavations, the team did not discover more than one other
tooth. The teeth and femur were, in fact, human. However,
the skullcap eventually was shown to be from a giant gibbon
(monkey). No missing link here.
RHODESIAN MAN
This famous skeleton was found in a zinc mine in 1921 in
what was then British Rhodesia in southern Africa. The find
consisted of the bones of three or four family members: a man,
a woman, and one or two children. The bones were dug out
by workers at a mining company, not by an experienced sci
entist, and so there is much that still remains unknown about
the exact circumstances surrounding their owners. Only the
skull of the man survived, and it was this skull that ended up
causing evolutionists headaches. Once the fossil reached the
British Museum of Natural History, the first staff member to
examine the bones was Sir Arthur Smith-Woodward. [This
was the same scientist who previously had achieved world
wide acclaim as the co-discoverer of what has since became
known as one of the most blatant scientific frauds of modern
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times—Piltdown Man.] The facial bones forced Smith-Woodward to admit, in his paper written in 1921 for Nature, their
“very human characteristics”He still alleged certain ape-like
qualities, and no underling was going to challenge his author
ity while he remained in office. Smith-Woodward retired in
1928, and events took a still darker turn. Before he retired, he
placed W.P. Pycraft, one of the Museum’s professional orni
thologists (a specialist in birds) and “assistant keeper” of the
Museum’s department of zoology, in charge of the reconstruc
tion of Rhodesian Man’s bones. Why a bird specialist should
be assigned to reconstruct human remains, no one is quite sure.
What specialized knowledge would an ornithologist have re
garding the finer points of human anatomy that would qual
ify him for such a task? Nevertheless, rather than have an ex
pert in human anatomy reconstruct the crushed hip, Pycraft
reconstructed it—with an entirely false orientation. This then
gave poor Rhodesian Man a rather ridiculous posture—that
of having the knees bowed outwards, while the feet (which
were not available) were turned
inwards. Rhodesian Man thus was
nicknamed “stooping man” as a re
sult of the posture given to him by
these “bird men.” It was not until
many years later—when scientists
trained in human anatomy exam
ined the skeleton—that the find was
determined to be nothing more than
Figure 18 — Rhodesian
modern man. No missing link here.
Man skull
CONCLUSION
In the July 2002 issue of Scientific American, editor in chief
John Rennie published what he intended to be a stinging re
buke of creationism, titled “15 Answers to Creationist Non
sense.” Amidst all the derogatory things he had to say, he nev
ertheless admitted that “the historical nature of macroevolu-
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tionary study involves inference from fossils and DNA rather than direct observation” (2002, 287[1]:80, emp. added).
Thank you, Mr. Rennie, for pointing out the obvious. Twentyfive years earlier, Stephen Jay Gould had tried to get across the
same point when he wrote:
Paleontologists have paid an exorbitant price for Darwin’s argument. We fancy ourselves as the only true
students of life’s history, yet to preserve our favored
account of evolution by natural selection, we view our
data as so bad that we never see the very process we
profess to study (1977b, 86[5]:14, emp. added).
Just how bad are the data? Consider the following real-life
scenario. The July 11, 2002 issue of Nature announced the dis
covery by French scientist Michel Brunet of a fossil hominid
that he designated as Sahelanthropus tchadensis—a creature pur
ported to show a mixture of “primitive” and “evolved” char
acteristics such as an ape-like brain size and skull shape, com
bined with a more human-like face and teeth. The authors of
the article also reported that the creature had a remarkably
large brow ridge—more like that of younger human species—
and they dated it at between six and seven million years old
(i.e., 3.5 million years older than any other fossil hominid; see
Brunet, et al., 2002).
In an article (“New Face in the Family”) that she authored
for the July 10, 2002 on-line edition of ABCNews.com, sci
ence writer Amanda Onion reported the find as follows:
A team of French and Chadian researchers announced
today they have found the skull, jaw fragments and
teeth of a six million to seven million-year-old rela
tive of the human family. The find, which is the oldest
human relative ever found, suggests humans may have
begun evolving from chimpanzees sooner than re
searchers realized.
The skull’s human-like face and teeth are surprising
since they come from a period when researchers be
lieved human ancestors just began evolving. Many
expected a specimen as old as this one—named Toumaï—to appear more chimp-like.
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An international team led by French paleontologist
Michel Brunet found the unusually complete skull,
two lower jaw fragments, and three teeth last year in
Chad, Central Africa.
The skull shows both chimp and human-like features,
but is clearly a member of the hominid family—the
family including species more closely related to hu
mans than chimpanzees. Brunet called the find Sa
helanthropus tchadensis—referring to the discovery site
in Chad, in Africa’s Sahel region, and nicknamed it
“Toumaï,” “hope of life” in Africa’s Goran language.
He may have walked on two feet but researchers say
it’s difficult, if not impossible, to know if this ancient
hominid was a direct ancestral link to humans or pos
sibly a false start within the apparently complex “bush”
of life (2002).
The vaunted New York Times reported the find in its August
6, 2002 on-line edition, under the heading of “Skulls Found in
Africa and Europe Challenge Theories of Human Origins”:
Two ancient skulls, one from central Africa and the
other from the Black Sea republic of George, have
shaken the family tree to its roots, sending scientists
scrambling to see if their favorite theories are among
the fallen fruit. Probably so, according to paleontolo
gists, who may have to make major revisions in the
human genealogy and rethink some of their ideas….
At each turn, the family tree, once drawn straight as a
ponderosa pine, has had to be reconfigured with more
branches leading here and there and, in some cases,
apparently nowhere….
In announcing the discovery in the July 11 [2002] is
sue of the journal Nature, Dr. Brunet’s group said the
fossils—a cranium, two lower jaw fragments, and sev
eral teeth—promised to “illuminate the earliest chap
ter in human evolutionary history.” The age, face, and
geography of the new specimen were all surprises….
The most puzzling aspect of the new skull is that it
seems to belong to two widely separated periods….
“A hominid of this age,” Dr. [Bernard] Wood [a pale-
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ontologist of George Washington University—BH/BT]
wrote in Nature, “should certainly not have the face of
a hominid less than one-third of its geological age”
(see Wilford, 2002).
So are we now to believe that some fossil hominids experi
enced “devolution”? Truth be told, we can believe pretty much
whatever we want about Sahelanthropus tchadensis—since, as it
turn out, it was manufactured from the skull of a gorilla. Read
the following assessment, made after further study of the skull.
A prehistoric skull touted as the oldest human remains
ever found is probably not the head of the earliest
member of the human family, but of an ancient fe
male gorilla, according to a French scientist.
Dr. Brigitte Senut of the Natural History Museum in
Paris, said yesterday that aspects of the skull, whose
discovery in Chad was announced on Wednesday,
were sexual characteristics of female gorillas
rather than indications of a human. Dr. Senut, a
self-confessed heretic amid the hoopla over the skull,
which dates back six or seven million years, said its
short face and small canines merely indicated a female
and were not conclusive evidence that it was a hom
inid.
“I tend towards thinking this is the skull of a female
gorilla,” she said. “The characteristics taken to con
clude that this new skull is a hominid are sexual char
acteristics. Moreover, other characteristics such as the
occipital crest [the back of the skull where the neck
muscles attach—BH/BT]...remind me much more of
the gorilla.”
…The skull’s braincase is ape-like, the face is short,
and the teeth, especially the canines, are small and
more like those of a human. But Dr. Senut said these
features were characteristic in female gorillas. She cited
the case of a skull that was discovered in the 1960s, and
accepted for 20 years as that of a hominid before ev
eryone agreed it was a female gorilla.
Dr. Senut was not the only French scientist to raise ques
tions about the hominid theory. Yves Coppens, of the
College of France, told the daily Le Figaro that the skull
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had an ambiguous shape, with a back like that of a
monkey. “The exact status of this new primate is not
yet certain,” he said (Chalmers, 2002, emp. added).
One scientist assessed S. tchadensis as follows:
The discovery consisted of a single, partial skull, albe
it distorted, broken and recemented after burial, with
no bones below the neck. It has excessively heavy brow
ridges, a sagittal crest, and an ape-sized brain. The liv
ing creature would have been chimp size, but its (now
distorted) face was (probably) flatter than most chimps
and its teeth showed wear patterns more typical of hom
inids than chimps….
Unfortunately there is no direct way to date the new
specimen. The six-seven million year age came from
nearby mammal, reptile, and fish fossils, similar spec
imens of which are found in Kenya, several hundred
miles to the south, and have been dated to six-seven
million years old….
Summarizing the facts, we have one partial, broken,
distorted, and recemented skull and a few teeth, which
at best, point to a transition between chimp and the
chimp-like Australopithecus, coupled with a poorly es
tablished date (Morris, 2002, 31[9]:1,2, parenthetical
items in orig.).
So what is the point of all of this? The point is this: The evidence is one thing; the inferences drawn from that evidence
are entirely another. David Hull, the well-known philosopher
of science, wrote as early as 1965:
[S]cience is not as empirical as many scientists seem
to think it is. Unobserved and even unobservable en
tities play an important part in it. Science is not just
the making of observations. It is the making of infer
ences on the basis of observations within the frame
work of a theory (16[61]:1-18).
Data (a.k.a., “the facts”) do not explain themselves; rather, they
must be explained. And therein lies an important point that
all too often is overlooked in the creation/evolution contro
versy. Rarely is it the data that are in dispute; it is the inter-
- 96 -
pretation placed on the data that is in dispute. Sady, in today’s scientific paradigm (especially where evolution is con
cerned), theories sometimes overrule the data. In his 2000
book, Science and Its Limits, philosopher Del Ratzsch noted that
this primacy of “theories over data” has had enormous impli
cations for the practice of science, the end result being that the
ultimate “court of appeal” has effectively moved away from the
actual data and toward the “informed consensus” of scientists.
As he put it:
Pieces of observational data are extremely important.
...[T]here is still room for disagreement among scien
tists over relative weights of values, over exactly when
to deal with recalcitrant data, and over theory and evi
dence. But such disagreements often take place with
in the context of a broad background agreement con
cerning the major presuppositions of the discipline
in question. This broad background of agreement
is usually neither at issue nor at risk. It has a protected status…. Thus, objective empirical data have
substantial and sometimes decisive influence on in
dividual theories, but they have a more muted impact
on the larger-scale structure of the scientific picture
of reality (p. 71, emp. added).
In other words, when it comes to the “large-scale structure
of the scientific picture of reality” (as, for example, when the
paradigm of evolution is under discussion), do not look for the
data themselves to make much of a difference. In such an in
stance, the actual data have a “more muted impact.” Or, as
Mark Twain remarked in Life on the Mississippi: “There is some
thing fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale re
turns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact”
(1883, p. 156).
The proposed timeline and fossil lineage for our alleged de
scent is so muddled and contorted that evolutionists themselves
frequently have difficultly knowing which branches are viable
versus which are merely dead-ends. Jeremy Rifkin summed
it up quite well when he wrote:
- 97 -
What the “record” shows is nearly a century of fudg
ing and finagling by scientists attempting to force vari
ous fossil morsels and fragments to conform with Darwin’s notions, all to no avail. Today the millions of
fossils stand as very visible, ever-present reminders of the paltriness of the arguments and the overall shabbiness of the theory that marches under
the banner of evolution (1983, p. 125, emp. added).
Once again, we find ourselves in agreement.
- 98 -
3
While many evolutionists proclaim that human DNA is
98% identical to chimpanzee DNA, few would lie by idly and
allow themselves to receive a transplant using chimpanzee
organs. As a matter of fact, American doctors tried using chimp
organs in the 1960s, but in all cases the organs were totally
unsuitable. The claim of 98% similarity between chimpan
zees and humans is not only deceptive and misleading, but
also is scientifically incorrect. Today, scientists are finding
more and more differences in DNA from humans and chimps.
For instance, a 2002 research study proved that human DNA
was at least 5% different from chimpanzees—and that num
ber will probably continue to grow as we learn all of the de
tails about human DNA (Britten, 2002).
In 1962, James Watson and Francis Crick received the Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine for their discovery concerning
the molecular structure of DNA. Just nine years earlier, in 1953,
these two men had proposed the double helical structure of
DNA—the genetic material responsible for life. By demonstrat
ing the molecular arrangement of four nucleotide base acids
(adenosine, guanidine, cytosine, and thymine—usually designated A, G, C, and T) and how they join together, Watson and
Crick opened the door for determining the genetic makeup
of humans and animals. The field of molecular biology became
invigorated with scientists who wanted to compare the proteins
and nucleic acids of one species with those of another. Just thir-
- 99 -
teen short years after Wat
son and Crick were award
ed their Nobel Prize, the
declaration was made that
“the average human poly
peptide is more than 99 per
cent identical to its chim
panzee counterpart” (King
and Wilson, 1975, pp. 114
115). This genetic similar
ity in the proteins and nu
cleic acids, however, left a
great paradox—why do we
not look or act like chim
panzees if our genetic ma
terial is so similar? King and
Wilson realized this quan
dary, and wrote: “The mo
lecular similarity between
Figure 1 — DNA shown in doublechimpanzees and humans
helix, parent-strand form (top), and
is extraordinary because
during replication of two new comthey differ far more than
plementary strands (bottom). Courtesy U.S. Department of Energy Humany other sibling species
man Genome Program [on-line],
in both anatomy and life”
http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis.
(p. 113). Nevertheless, the
results matched what evo
lutionists had hoped to find, and as such, the claim has rever
berated through the halls of science for decades as evidence
that humans evolved from an ape-like ancestor.
One year following Watson and Crick’s Nobel ceremony,
chemist Emile Zuckerkandl observed that the protein sequence
of hemoglobin in humans and the gorilla differed by only 1 out
of 287 amino acids. Zuckerkandl noted: “From the point of
view of hemoglobin structure, it appears that gorilla is just an
abnormal human, or man an abnormal gorilla, and the two
- 100 -
species form actually one continuous population” (1963, p.
247). The molecular and genetic evidence only strengthened
the evolutionary foundation for those who alleged that humans
had emerged from primate ancestors. Professor of physiology
Jared Diamond even titled one of his books The Third Chim
panzee, thereby viewing the human species as just another big
mammal. From all appearances, it appeared that evolution
ists had indeed won a battle—humans were at least 98% iden
tical to chimpanzees. However, after spending his professional
career looking for evolutionary evidence in molecular struc
tures, biochemist Christian Schwabe was forced to admit:
Molecular evolution is about to be accepted as a meth
od superior to paleontology for the discovery of evo
lutionary relationships. As a molecular evolutionist I
should be elated. Instead it seems disconcerting
that many exceptions exist to the orderly progression of species as determined by molecular
homologies; so many in fact that I think the excep
tion, the quirks, may carry the more important mes
sage (1986, p. 280, emp. added).
On April 14, 2003, the International Human Genome Se
quencing Consortium (headed up in the United States by the
National Human Genome Research Institute and the Depart
ment of Energy) announced the successful completion of the
Human Genome Project. The Consortium had completed its
task a full two years ahead of schedule, and sequenced the en
tire human genome of 3.1 billion base pairs (see “Human Ge
nome Report…,” 2003; Pearson, 2003b). Before this massive
project was created, scientists estimated that humans posses
sed 80,000 to 100,000 genes (a gene is a section of DNA that is
a basic unit of heredity, while the genome constitutes the to
tal genetic composition of an organism). As preliminary data
from the genome project began to stream in, a special issue of
Science, published on February 16, 2001, set the number of
genes in a human at between 35,000 and 40,000 (see Pennisi,
2001, 291: 1178; Malakoff, 2001, 291:1194). One year later al
most to the day, Science reported the revised number—70,000
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(Shouse, 2002, 295:1457; Haney, 2002). Currently, it appears
that approximately 1.5% of the human genome consists of genes
that code for proteins. These genes are clustered in small re
gions, with large amounts of “non-coding” DNA (often referred
to as “junk DNA”) between the clusters. The function of these
non-coding regions is only now being determined. These find
ings indicate that even if all of the human genes were differ
ent from those of a chimpanzee, the DNA still could be 98.5
percent similar if the non-coding DNA of humans and chim
panzees was identical.
Jonathan Marks, professor of anthropology at the Univer
sity of California in Berkeley, pointed out an oft’-overlooked
problem with this “similarity” line of thinking.
Because DNA is a linear array of those four bases—A,
G, C, and T—only four possibilities exist at any specif
ic point in a DNA sequence. The laws of chance tell us
that two random sequences from species that have no
ancestry in common will match at about one in every
four sites. Thus even two unrelated DNA sequences will
be 25 percent identical, not 0 percent identical (2000,
p. B-7).
Therefore a human and any
earthly DNA-based life form
must be at least 25% identi
cal. Would it be correct, then,
to suggest that daffodils are
one-quarter human? The
idea that daffodils are onequarter human is neither pro
found nor enlightening, but
outright ridiculous! There is
hardly any biological comparison—except perhaps the
DNA
—that would make daf
Figure 2 — Electrophoresis refodils
appear similar to hu
sults, documenting what are remans.
As Marks went on to
ferred to as non-coding (“junk”)
portions of DNA strands
concede:
- 102 -
[M]oreover, the genetic comparison is misleading
because it ignores qualitative differences among ge
nomes…. Thus, even among such close relatives as
human and chimpanzee, we find that the chimp’s ge
nome is estimated to be about 10 percent larger than
the human’s; that one human chromosome contains
a fusion of two small chimpanzee chromosomes; and
that the tips of each chimpanzee chromosome contain
a DNA sequence that is not present in human (p. B-7).
The truth is, if we took all of the DNA from every cell, and
then compared the DNA in monkeys and humans, the 4-5%
difference in DNA would represent approximately 200 million differences in a human body, compared to that of
an ape! To help make this number understandable, consider
the fact that if evolutionists were forced to pay you one penny
for every one of those differences, you would walk away with
$2,000,000. Given those proportions, a 5% difference does not
sound quite so small.
CHROMOSOMAL
COUNTS
It would seem to make
sense that if humans and
chimpanzees were genet
ically identical, then the
manner by which they
store DNA also would be
similar. Yet it is not. DNA, the fundamental blueprint of life, is
tightly compacted into chromosomes. All cells that possess a
nucleus contain a specific number of chromosomes. Common
sense would necessitate that organisms that share a common
ancestry would possess the same number of chromosomes.
However, chromosome numbers in living organisms vary from
308 in the black mulberry (Morus nigra) to six in animals such
as the mosquito (Culex pipiens) or nematode worm (Caenorhabditis elegans) [see Sinnot, et al., 1958]. In addition, complexity
- 103 -
does not appear to affect chromosomal number. The radiolaria,
a simple protozoon, has over 800, while humans possess 46.
Chimpanzees, on the other hand, possess 48 chromosomes.
A strict comparison of chromosome number would indicate
that we are more closely related to the Chinese muntjac (a small
deer found in Taiwan’s mountainous regions), which also pos
sesses 46 chromosomes.

PREDICTION
Simple to Complex
FACTS
Chromosome Count
Man
Fern—512
Dog
Crayfish—200
Bat
Dog—78
Herring Gull
Herring Gull—68
Reptiles
Reptiles—48
Fern
Man—46
Crayfish
Bat—32
Figure 3 — Chromosome numbers in various organisms
This hurdle of differing numbers of chromosomes may ap
pear trivial, but we must remember that chromosomes con
tain genes, which themselves are composed of DNA spirals.
If the blueprint of DNA locked inside those chromosomes
codes for only 46 chromosomes, then how can evolution ac
count for the loss of two entire chromosomes? The job of DNA
is to continually reproduce itself, and if we infer that this change
in chromosome number occurred through evolution, then
we are asserting that the DNA locked in the original number
of chromosomes did not do its job correctly or efficiently.
Considering that each chromosome carries many genes, los
ing chromosomes does not make physiological sense, and
probably would prove deadly for new species. No respectable
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biologist would suggest that by removing one (or several) chro
mosomes, a new species would likely be produced. To remove
even one chromosome could potentially remove the DNA codes
for millions of vital body factors. Eldon J. Gardner summed it
up this way: “Chromosome number is probably more con
stant, however, than any other single morphological charac
teristic that is available for species identification” (1968, p. 211).
Humans always have had 46 chromosomes, whereas chimps
always have had 48.
REAL GENOMIC DIFFERENCES
One of the downfalls of previous molecular genetic stud
ies has been the limit at which chimpanzees and humans could
be compared accurately. Scientists often would use only 30
or 40 known proteins or nucleic acid sequences, and then
from those extrapolate their results for the entire genome.
Today, however, we have the majority of the human genome
sequences, almost all of which have been released and made
public. This allows scientists to compare every single
nucleotide base pair between humans and primates—
something that was not possible prior to the Human Genome Project. In January 2002, a study was published in
which scientists had constructed and analyzed a first-generation human/chimpanzee comparative genomic map. This
study compared the alignments of 77,461 chimpanzee bacte
rial artificial chromosome [BAC] end sequences to human
genomic sequences. Fujiyama and colleagues “detected can
didate positions, including two clusters on human chromo
some 21 that suggest large, nonrandom regions of differences
between the two genomes” (2002, 295:131). In other words,
the comparison revealed some “large” differences between
the genomes of chimps and humans.
Amazingly, the authors found that, of the entire human
genome, only 48.6% matched chimpanzee nucleotide se
quences. The human Y chromosome was only 4.8% covered
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by chimpanzee sequences! This study analyzed the alignments
of 77,461 chimpanzee sequences to human genomic sequences
obtained from public databases. Of these, 36,940 end se
quences were unable to be mapped to the human genome
(295:131). Almost 15,000 of those sequences that did not match
with human sequences were speculated to “correspond to
unsequenced human regions or are from chimpanzee regions
that have diverged substantially from humans or did not match
for other unknown reasons” (295:132). While the authors noted
that the quality and usefulness of the map should “increas
ingly improve as the finishing of the human genome sequence
proceeds” (295:134), the data already support what creationists
have stated for years—the 98% equivalency figure between
chimps and humans is grossly misleading, as Britten’s study
revealed (Britten, 2002).
Figure 4 — Comparison of human and ape DNA sequences ©
= cytosine, G = guanine, A = adenine, T = thymine). Arrangement 1 shows more similarity between chimps and humans (consistent with evolutionary consensus). Arrangement 2 shows more
similarity between chimps and gorillas than between chimps and
humans. Both arrangements try to find the greatest number of
matches by inserting artificial gaps. The letters bolded show key
points of agreement.
Exactly how misleading came to light in an article—“Jumbled DNA Separates Chimps and Humans”—published in the
October 25, 2002 issue of Science, shortly before this book
- 106 -
went to press. The first three sentences of the article, written
by Elizabeth Pennisi (a staff writer for Science), represented a
“that was then, this is now” type of admission of defeat. She
wrote:
For almost 30 years, researchers have asserted that
the DNA of humans and chimps is at least 98.5% iden
tical. Now research reported here last week at the
American Society for Human Genetics meeting sug
gests that the two primate genomes might not be
quite as similar after all. A closer look has uncov
ered nips and tucks of homologous sections of DNA
that weren’t noticed in previous studies (298:719, emp.
added).
Genomicists Kelly Frazer and David Cox of Perlegen Sciences
in Mountain View, California, along with geneticists Evan Eich
ler and Devin Locke of Case Western University in Cleveland,
Ohio, compared human and chimp DNA, and discovered a
wide range of insertions and deletions (anywhere from between
200 bases to 10,000 bases). Cox commented: “The implica
tions could be profound, because such genetic hiccups could
disable entire genes, possibly explaining why our closest cousin
seems so distant” (as quoted in Pennisi, 298:721).
Roy Britten, of the California Institute of Technology in Pasa
dena, analyzed chimp and human genomes with a customized
computer program. To quote Pennisi’s article:
He compared 779,000 bases of chimp DNA with the
sequences of the human genome, both found in the
public repository GenBank. Single-base changes ac
counted for 1.4% of the differences between the hu
man and chimp genomes, and insertions and dele
tions accounted for an additional 3.4%, he reported in
the 15 October [2002] Proceedings of the National Acad
emy of Sciences. Locke’s and Frazer’s groups didn’t com
mit to any new estimates of the similarity between the
species, but both agree that the previously accepted
98.5% mark is too high (298:721, emp. added).
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While Locke’s and Frazer’s team was unwilling to commit
to any new estimate of the similarity between chimps and hu
mans, Britten was not. In fact, he titled his article in the Octo
ber 15, 2002 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, “Di
vergence between Samples of Chimpanzee and Human DNA
Sequences is 5%” (Britten, 99:13633-13635). In the abstract
accompanying the article, he wrote: “The conclusion is that
the old saw that we share 98.5% of our DNA sequence
with chimpanzee is probably in error. For this sample, a
better estimate would be that 95% of the base pairs are exactly
shared between chimpanzee and human DNA” (99:13633,
emp. added). The news service at NewScientist.com reported
the event as follows:
It has long been held that we share 98.5 per cent of
our genetic material with our closest relatives. That
now appears to be wrong. In fact, we share less than
95 per cent of our genetic material, a three-fold increase in the variation between us and chimps.
The new value came to light when Roy Britten of the
California Institute of Technology became suspicious
about the 98.5 per cent figure. Ironically, that number
was originally derived from a technique that Britten
himself developed decades ago at Caltech with col
league Dave Kohne. By measuring the temperature
at which matching DNA of two species comes apart,
you can work out how different they are.
But the technique only picks up a particular type of
variation, called a single base substitution. These oc
cur whenever a single “letter” differs in correspond
ing strands of DNA from the two species.
But there are two other major types of variation that
the previous analyses ignored. “Insertions” occur when
ever a whole section of DNA appears in one species
but not in the corresponding strand of the other. Like
wise, “deletions” mean that a piece of DNA is missing
from one species.
Together, they are termed “indels,” and Britten seized
his chance to evaluate the true variation between the
two species when stretches of chimp DNA were re-
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cently published on the internet by teams from the
Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, and
from the University of Oklahoma.
When Britten compared five stretches of chimp DNA
with the corresponding pieces of human DNA, he
found that single base substitutions accounted for a
difference of 1.4 per cent, very close to the expected
figure.
But he also found that the DNA of both species was
littered with indels. His comparisons revealed that
they add around another 4.0 per cent to the genetic
differences (see Coghlan, 2002, emp. added).
It seems that, as time passes and scientific studies increase,
humans appear to be less like chimps after all. In a separate
study, Barbulescu and colleagues also uncovered another ma
jor difference in the genomes of primates and humans. In their
article “A HERV-K Provirus in Chimpanzees, Bonobos, and
Gorillas, but not Humans,” the authors wrote: “These observations provide very strong evidence that, for some
fraction of the genome, chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas are more closely related to each other than they are
to humans” (2001, 11:779, emp. added). The data from these
results go squarely against what evolutionists have contended
for decades—that chimpanzees are closer genetically to humans
than they are to gorillas. Another study using interspecies rep
resentational difference analysis (RDA) between humans and
gorillas revealed gorilla-specific DNA sequences (Toder, et
al., 2001)—that is, gorillas possess sequences of DNA that are
not found in humans. The authors of this study suggested that
sequences found in gorillas but not humans “could represent
either ancient sequences that got lost in other species, such as
human and orang-utan, or, more likely, recent sequences which
evolved or originated specifically in the gorilla genome” (9:431).
The differences between chimpanzees and humans are not
limited to genomic variances. In 1998, a structural difference
between the cell surfaces of humans and apes was detected.
After studying tissues and blood samples from the great apes,
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and sixty humans from various ethnic groups, Muchmore
and colleagues discovered that human cells are missing a par
ticular form of sialic acid (a type of sugar) found in all other
mammals (1998, 107[2]:187). This sialic acid molecule is found
on the surface of every cell in the body, and is thought to car
ry out multiple cellular tasks. This seemingly “minuscule” dif
ference can have far-reaching effects, and might explain why
surgeons were unable to transplant chimp organs into humans
in the 1960s. With this in mind, we never should declare, with
a simple wave of the hand, “chimps are almost identical to us”
simply because of a large genetic overlap.
Homology (i.e., similarity) does not prove common an
cestry. The entire genome of the tiny nematode (Caenorhabditis elegans) also has been sequenced as a tangential study
from the Human Genome Project. Of the 5,000 best-known
human genes, 75% have matches in the worm (see “A Tiny
Worm Challenges Evolution”). Does this mean that we are
75% identical to a nematode? Just because living creatures
share some genes with humans does not mean there is a lin
ear ancestry. Biologist John Randall admitted this when he
wrote:
The older textbooks on evolution make much of the
idea of homology, pointing out the obvious resem
blances between the skeletons of the limbs of differ
ent animals. Thus the “pentadactyl” [five bone—BH/
BT] limb pattern is found in the arm of a man, the wing
of a bird, and flipper of a whale, and this is held to in
dicate their common origin. Now if these various struc
tures were transmitted by the same gene couples, var
ied from time to time by mutations and acted upon by
environmental selection, the theory would make good
sense. Unfortunately this is not the case. Homologous
organs are now known to be produced by totally dif
ferent gene complexes in the different species. The
concept of homology in terms of similar genes handed
on from a common ancestor has broken down… (as
quoted in Fix, 1984, p. 189).
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Yet textbooks and teachers still proclaim that humans and
chimps are 98% genetically identical. The evidence clearly
demonstrates vast molecular differences—differences that can
be attributed to the fact that humans, unlike animals, were cre
ated in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26-27; see
Lyons and Thompson, 2002a, 2002b). Elaine Morgan com
mented on this difference when she observed:
Considering the very close genetic relationship that
has been established by comparison of biochemical
properties of blood proteins, protein structure and
DNA and immunological responses, the differences
between a man and a chimpanzee are more astonish
ing than the resemblances. They include structural dif
ferences in the skeleton, the muscles, the skin, and the
brain; differences in posture associated with a unique
method of locomotion; differences in social organi
zation; and finally the acquisition of speech and toolusing, together with the dramatic increase in intellec
tual ability which has led scientists to name their own
species Homo sapiens sapiens—wise wise man. During the
period when these remarkable evolutionary changes
were taking place, other closely related ape-like species
changed only very slowly, and with far less remark
able results. It is hard to resist the conclusion that
something must have happened to the ancestors
of Homo sapiens which did not happen to the ancestors of gorillas and chimpanzees (1989, pp. 17
18, emp. added).
That “something” actually is “Someone”—the Creator.
“MITOCHONDRIAL EVE”
On the first day of 1987, a scientific “discovery” seized the
attention of the popular press. The original scientific article
that caused all the commotion—“Mitochondrial DNA and Hu
man Evolution”—appeared in the January 1, 1987 issue of Na
ture, and was authored by Rebecca Cann, Mark Stoneking,
and Allan C. Wilson (see Cann, et al., 1987). These three sci-
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entists announced that they had “proven” that all modern
human beings can trace their ancestry back to a single woman
who lived 200,000 years ago in Africa. This one woman was
nicknamed “Eve” (a.k.a., “mitochondrial Eve”)—much to the
media’s delight. An article in the January 26, 1987 issue of
Time magazine bore the headline, “Everyone’s Genealogical
Mother: Biologists Speculate that ‘Eve’ Lived in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Lemonick, 1987). A year later, that “speculation”
became a major Newsweek production titled, “The Search for
Adam and Eve” (Tierney, et al., 1988). The provocative front
cover presented a snake, tree, and a nude African couple in a
“Garden of Eden” type setting. The biblical-story imagery
was reinforced as the woman offered an apple to the man.
A word of explanation is in order. For decades, evolutionists
had been trying to determine the specific geographical origin
of humans—whether we all came from one specific locale, or
whether there were numerous small pockets of people placed
around the globe. When they set out to determine the specific
geographical origin of humans, a curious piece of data came
to light. As they considered various human populations, Af
ricans seemed to show much more genetic variation than nonAfricans (i.e., Asians, Europeans, Native Americans, Pacific
Islanders, et al.). According to molecular biologists, this in
creased variability is the result of African populations being
older, thus, having had more time to accumulate mutations
and diverge from one another. This assumption led some re
searchers to postulate that Africa was the ancient “cradle of
civilization” from which all of humanity had emerged.
The genetic material (DNA) in a cell’s nucleus controls the
functions of the cell, bringing in nutrients from the body and
making hormones, proteins, and other chemicals. Outside
the nucleus is an area known as the cytoplasmic matrix (gen
erally referred to simply as the cytoplasm), which contains,
among other things, tiny bean-shaped organelles known as
mitochondria. These often are described as the “energy fac
tories” of the cell.
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Mitochondria contain their own DNA, which they use to
make certain proteins; the DNA in the nucleus oversees pro
duction of the rest of the proteins necessary for life and its func
tions. However, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) was thought
to be special for two reasons. First, it is short and relatively
simple in comparison to the DNA found within the nucleus,
containing only thirty-seven genes instead of the 35,000+ genes
located in the nuclear DNA. This makes it relatively easy to
analyze. Second, unlike nuclear DNA, which each person in
herits in a jumbled form from both parents, mitochondrial
DNA was thought to be passed on only through the mother’s
line (more about this later). Working from the assumption that
mtDNA is passed to the progeny only by the mother, Dr. Cann
and her coworkers believed that each new cell should contain
copies of only the egg’s mitochondria. In trying to draw the
human family tree, therefore, researchers took a special inter
est in these minute strands of genetic code. What they really
were interested in, of course, was the variations in mitochon
drial DNA from one group of people to another.
Although our mtDNA should be, in theory at least, the same
as our mother’s mtDNA, small changes (or mutations) in the
genetic code can, and do, arise. On rare occasions, mutations
are serious enough to do harm. More frequently, however,
the mutations have no effect on the proper functioning of ei
ther the DNA or the mitochondria. In such cases, the mutational
changes will be preserved and carried on to succeeding gen
erations.
Theoretically, if scientists could look farther and farther
into the past, they would find that the number of women who
contributed the modern varieties of mitochondrial DNA gets
less and less until, finally, we arrive at one “original” mother.
She, then, would be the only woman out of all the women liv
ing in her day to have a daughter in every generation till the
present. Coming forward in time, we would see that the mtDNA
varieties found within her female contemporaries were grad
ually eliminated as their daughters did not have children, had
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only sons, or had daughters who did not have daughters. This
does not mean, of course, that we would look like this puta
tive ancestral mother; rather, it means only that we would have
received our mitochondrial DNA from her.
To find this woman, researchers compared the different
varieties of mtDNA in the human family. Since mtDNA occurs
in fairly small quantities, and since the researchers wanted as
large a sample as possible from each person, they decided to use
human placentas as their source of the mtDNA. So, Rebecca
Cann and her colleagues selected 145 pregnant women and
two cell lines representing the five major geographic regions:
20 Africans, 34 Asians, 46 Caucasians, 21 aboriginal Austra
lians, and 26 aboriginal New Guineans (Cann, et al., 1987, 325:
32). All placentas from the first three groups came from babies
born in American hospitals. Only two of the 20 Africans were
born in Africa.
After analyzing a portion of the mtDNA in the cells of each
placenta, they found that the differences “grouped” the sam
ples by region. In other words, Asians were more like each
other than they were like Europeans, people from New Guinea
were more like each other than they were like people from
Australia, and so on.
Next, they saw two major branches form in their computer-generated tree of recent human evolution. Seven African
individuals formed one distinct branch, which started lower
on the trunk than the other four. This was because the differ
ences among these individuals were much greater than the
differences between other individuals and other groups. More
differences mean more mutations, and hence more time to
accumulate those changes. If the Africans have more differ
ences, then their lineage must be older than all the others. The
second major branch bore the non-African groups and, signif
icantly, a scattering of the remaining thirteen Africans in the
sample. To the researchers, the presence of Africans among
non-Africans meant an African common ancestor for the nonAfrican branches, which, likewise, meant an African common
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ancestor for both branches. The nickname “Eve” stuck to this
hypothetical common ancestral mother, and later, then, fired
the media’s imagination.
Having concluded that the African group was the oldest,
Dr. Cann and her colleagues wanted to find out just how old
the group might be. To do this, they used what is known as a
“molecular clock” that, in this case, was based on mutations
in the mtDNA. The rate at which the clock ticked was deter
mined from the accumulation of changes over a given period
of time. As we note below in our discussion of the so-called
molecular clock, if the assumption was made that there was one
mutation every 1,000 years, and if scientists found a difference
of 10 mutations between us and our ancient hypothetical an
cestor, they then could infer that that ancestor lived 10,000
years ago.
The researchers looked in two places for their figures. First,
they compared mtDNA from humans with that from chim
panzees, and then used paleontology and additional molecu
lar data to determine the age of the supposed common ances
tor. This (and similar calculations on other species) revealed a
mutation rate in the range of 2% to 4% per million years. Sec
ond, they compared the groups in their study that were close
geographically, and took the age of the common ancestor from
estimated times of settlement as indicated by anthropology
and archaeology. Again, 2% to 4% every million years seemed
reasonable to them.
Since the common mitochondrial ancestor diverged from
all others by 0.57%, she must have lived sometime between
approximately 140,000 (0.57 ÷ 4 × 1,000,000) and 290,000
(0.57 ÷ 2 × 1,000,000) years ago. The figure of 200,000 was
chosen as a suitable round number.
The results obtained from analysis of mitochondrial DNA
eventually led to what is known in evolutionary circles as the
“Out of Africa” theory. This is the idea that the descendants
of mitochondrial Eve were the only ones to colonize Africa
and the rest of the world, supplanting all other hominid pop-
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ulations in the process. Some
(though not all) evolutionists
claim that such an interpre
tation is in agreement with ar
chaeological, paleontological,
and other genetic data (see
Stringer and Andrews, 1988;
for an opposing viewpoint,
see the written debate in the
April 1992 issue of Scientific
American).
While many evolutionists have accepted the mitochondrial
DNA tree, they differ widely in their views regarding both the
source of the nuclear DNA and the “humanity” of Eve. Some
believe that Eve contributed all the nuclear DNA, in addition
to the mitochondrial DNA. Some believe she was an “archaic”
Homo sapiens, while others believe she was fully human. The
exact interpretation is hotly debated because mitochondrial
DNA is “something of a passenger in the genetic processes that
led to the formation of new species: it therefore neither con
tributes to the formation of a new species nor reveals anything
about what actually happened” (Lewin, 1987, 238:24).
THE DEMISE OF MITOCHONDRIAL EVE
Things change rapidly in science. What is popular one day,
is not the next. Theories come, and theories go. And so it is
with mitochondrial Eve. She once was in vogue as the evolu
tionary equivalent of “wonder woman.” Now, she has become
virtually the “crazy aunt in the attic” who no one wants to ad
mit even exists.
But it was not forbidden fruit that caused her demise this
time around. The “passing” of one of evolution’s most famil
iar icons is due to two groups of new scientific facts that have
surfaced since her introduction in 1987. If humans received
mitochondrial DNA only from their mothers, then researchers
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could “map” a family tree using that information. And, if the
mutations affecting mtDNA had occurred at constant rates,
then the mtDNA could serve as a molecular clock for timing
evolutionary events and reconstructing the evolutionary his
tory of extant species. It is the “ifs” in these two sentences that
are the problem.
Mitochondrial Eve is alleged to have lived in Africa at the
beginning of the Upper Pleistocene period (between 100,000
and 200,000 years ago). She has been described as the mostrecent common ancestor of all humans on Earth today, with
respect to matrilineal descent. The validity of these assertions,
however, is dependent upon two critically important assump
tions: (1) that mtDNA is, in fact, derived exclusively from the
mother; and (2) that the mutation rates associated with mtDNA
have remained constant over time. However, we now know
that both of these assumptions are wrong!
First, let us examine the assumption that mtDNA is derived
solely from the mother. In response to a paper that appeared
in Science in 1999, anthropologist Henry Harpending of the
University of Utah lamented: “There is a cottage industry of
making gene trees in anthropology and then interpreting them.
This paper will invalidate most of that” (as quoted in Strauss,
1999b, 286:2436). Just as women thought they were getting
their fair shake in science, the tables turned. As one study
noted:
Women have struggled to gain equality in society, but
biologists have long thought that females wield abso
lute power in a sphere far from the public eye: in the
mitochondria, cellular organelles whose DNA is thought
to pass intact from mother to child with no paternal
influence. On page 2524, however, a study by Philip
Awadalla of the University of Edinburgh and Adam
Eyre-Walker and John Maynard Smith of the Univer
sity of Sussex in Brighton, U.K., finds signs of mixing
between maternal and paternal mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA) in humans and chimpanzees. Because biologists have used mtDNA as a tool to trace hu-
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man ancestry and relationships, the finding has
implications for everything from the identification of bodies to the existence of a “mitochondrial Eve” 200,000 years ago (Strauss, 1999b, 286:
2436, emp. added).
Earlier that same year, Strauss had written another article
in Science, titled “Can Mitochondrial Clocks Keep Time?,” in
which she remarked:
New information about the complexities of mitochon
drial biology is also raising new questions about the
mtDNA clock. Conventional wisdom has it that mi
tochondrial DNA comes only from the mother’s egg.
But electron microscopy and DNA detection studies
have revealed that the sperm’s mitochondria can
enter the egg (1999a, 283:1438, emp. added).
Strauss went on to note:
Recombination could also be bad news for use of
mt DNA in other questions of human ancestry…. Re
combination could also cause problems for mitochon
drial Eve. Studies of mtDNA from living people on
various continents show a surprising homogeneity,
suggesting that we are all descended from a woman
who lived a mere 200,000 years ago in Africa. But
such homogeneity might be due to recombination rather than a common recent ancestor (283:
1438).
Svante Pääbo of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology opined: “Mitochondrial Eve is the one woman
who carried the ancestral mitochondrial DNA. There was no
woman, if there was recombination” (as quoted in Strauss,
1999a, 283:1438, emp. added).
One year after Strauss’ articles, researchers made this star
tling admission:
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is generally assumed
to be inherited exclusively from the mother…. Sev
eral recent papers, however, have suggested that ele
ments of mtDNA may sometimes be inherited from
the father. This hypothesis is based on evidence that
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Figure 5 — Hominoid evolution according to Andrews and Stringer (1993, p. 220). Rectangles with italicized names represent
the occurrence of extinct ape species. Note the almost complete absence of suggested fossil ancestors leading up to humans and modern apes (bold text). “My” = millions of years.
mtDNA may undergo recombination. If this does oc
cur, maternal mtDNA in the egg must cross over with
homologous sequences in a different DNA molecule;
paternal mtDNA seems the most likely candidate….
If mtDNA can recombine, irrespective of the
mechanism, there are important implications
for mtDNA evolution and for phylogenetic studies that use mtDNA (Morris and Lightowlers, 2000,
355:1290, emp. added).
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In 2002, a study was conducted that concluded:
Nevertheless, even a single validated example of paternal mtDNA transmission suggests that the interpretation of inheritance patterns in other kindreds
thought to have mitochondrial disease should not
be based on the dogmatic assumption of absolute maternal inheritance of mtDNA…. The unusual case described by Schwartz and Vissing is more than a mere
curiosity (Williams, 347:611, emp. added).
Figure 6 — Illustration of how paternal mtDNA in the sperm can
cross over with homologous sequences in a different DNA molecule, specifically the maternal mtDNA contained within the
egg
And now we know that these are more than small “fractional”
amounts of mtDNA coming from fathers. The August 2002
issue of the New England Journal of Medicine contained the results of one study, whose authors remarked:
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Mammalian mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is thought
to be strictly maternally inherited…. Very small
amounts of paternally inherited mtDNA have been
detected by the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in
mice after several generations of interspecific back
crosses…. We report the case of a 28-year-old man
with mitochondrial myopathy due to a novel 2-bp
mtDNA deletion…. We determined that the mtDNA
harboring the mutation was paternal in origin and
accounted for 90 percent of the patient’s muscle
mt DNA (Schwartz and Vissing, 347:576, emp. added).
Ninety percent! And all this time, evolutionists have been se
lectively shaping our family tree using what was alleged to be
only maternal mtDNA!
As scientists have begun to comprehend the fact, and sig
nificance, of the “death” of mitochondrial Eve, many have
found themselves searching for an alternative. But this recom
bination ability in mtDNA makes the entire discussion a moot
point. As Strauss noted:
Such recombination could be a blow for researchers
who have used mtDNA to trace human evolutionary
history and migrations. They have assumed that the
mtDNA descends only through the mother, so they
could draw a single evolutionary tree of maternal descent—all the way back to an African “mitochondrial
Eve,” for example. But “with recombination there is
no single tree,” notes Harpending. Instead, different
parts of the molecule have different histories. Thus,
“there’s not one woman to whom we can trace
our mitochondria,” says Eyre-Walker (1999b, 286:
2436, emp. added).
Our thoughts on the matter exactly.
THE MOLECULAR CLOCK—
DATING MITOCHONDRIAL ANCESTORS
Second, let us examine the assumption that the mutations
affecting mtDNA did actually occur at constant rates. The re
searchers who made the initial announcement about Eve not
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only gave a location for this amazing female, but also pro
posed the time period during which she was supposed to have
lived. However, in order for the mtDNA theory to be of any
practical use, those scientists had to assume that random mu
tations in the DNA occurred at documented, steady rates. For
example, if they speculated that there was one mutation ev
ery 1,000 years, and they found a difference of 10 mutations
between us and our ancient hypothetical ancestor, they then
could infer that that ancestor lived 10,000 years ago. Scientists—who use this concept to determine the age of mitochon
drial Eve—refer to this proposed mutation rate as a “molecular clock.” One group of researchers described the process as
follows:
The hypothesis of the molecular clock of evolution
emerged from early observations that the number of
amino acid replacements in a given protein appeared
to change linearly with time. Indeed, if proteins (and
genes) evolve at constant rates they could serve as mo
lecular clocks for timing evolutionary events and re
constructing the evolutionary history of extant species
(Rodriguez-Trelles, et al., 2001, 98:11405, parenthet
ical item in orig.).
It sounds good in theory, but the actual facts tell an entirely
different story. As these same researchers went on to admit:
The neutrality theory predicts that the rate of neutral
molecular evolution is constant over time, and thus
that there is a molecular clock for timing evolution
ary events. It has been observed that the variance
of the rate of evolution is generally larger than
expected according to the neutrality theory, which
has raised the question of how reliable the molecular clock is or, indeed, whether there is a
molecular clock at all…. The observations are in
consistent with the predictions made by various sub
sidiary hypotheses proposed to account for the overdispersion of the molecular clock (98:11405, emp.
added).
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Another study that was published in 2002 pointed out a builtin, natural bias for older ages that result from use of the molec
ular clock. The researchers who carried out the study noted:
There is presently a conflict between fossil- and molecular-based evolutionary time scales. Molecular ap
proaches for dating the branches of the tree of life fre
quently lead to substantially deeper times of diver
gence than those inferred by paleontologists…. Here
we show that molecular time estimates suffer from a
methodological handicap, namely that they are asym
metrically bounded random variables, constrained
by a nonelastic boundary at the lower end, but not at
the higher end of the distribution. This introduces a
bias toward an overestimation of time since diver
gence, which becomes greater as the length of the mo
lecular sequence and the rate of evolution decrease.
...Despite the booming amount of sequence informa
tion, molecular timing of evolutionary events has con
tinued to yield conspicuously deeper dates than indi
cated by the stratigraphic data. Increasingly, the dis
crepancies between molecular and paleontological
estimates are ascribed to deficiencies of the fossil rec
ord, while sequence-based time tables gain credit. Yet,
we have identified a fundamental flaw of molecular dating methods, which leads to dates that are
systematically biased towards substantial overestimation of evolutionary times (Rodriguez-Trelles, et al., 2002, 98:8112,8114, emp. added).
Until approximately 1997, we did not have good empirical
measures of mutation rates in humans. However, that situation
greatly improved when geneticists were able to analyze DNA
from individuals with well-established family trees going back
several generations. One study revealed that mutation rates in
mitochondrial DNA were eighteen times higher than previous estimates (see Parsons, et al., 1997).
Ann Gibbons authored an article for the January 2, 1998
issue of Science titled “Calibrating the Mitochondrial Clock,”
the subheading of which read as follows: “Mitochondrial DNA
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appears to mutate much faster than expected, prompting new
DNA forensics procedures and raising troubling questions
about the dating of evolutionary events.” In that article, she
discussed new data which showed that the mutation rates used
to obtain mitochondrial Eve’s age no longer could be consid
ered valid.
Evolutionists have assumed that the clock is constant,
ticking off mutations every 6,000 to 12,000 years or
so. But if the clock ticks faster or at different rates at
different times, some of the spectacular results—such
as dating our ancestors’ first journeys into Europe at
about 40,000 years ago—may be in question (1998a,
279:28).
Gibbons then quoted Neil Howell, a geneticist at the Univer
sity of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, who stated: “We’ve
been treating this like a stopwatch, and I’m concerned that it’s
as precise as a sun dial. I don’t mean to be inflammatory, but
I’m concerned that we’re pushing this system more than we
should” (279:28). Gibbons concluded:
Regardless of the cause, evolutionists are most con
cerned about the effect of a faster mutation rate. For
example, researchers have calculated that “mitochon
drial Eve”—the woman whose mtDNA was ancestral
to that in all living people—lived 10,000 to 200,000
years ago in Africa. Using the new clock, she would
be a mere 6,000 years old (279:29, emp. added).
“Mitochondrial Eve” a mere 6,000 years old—instead of
200,000?! Gibbons quickly went on to note, of course, that
“no one thinks that’s the case,” (279:29). She ended her arti
cle by discussing the fact that many test results are (to use her
exact word) “inconclusive,” and lamented that “for now, so
are some of the evolutionary results gained by using the
mt DNA clock” (279:29).
We now know that the two key assumptions behind the data
used to establish the existence of “mitochondrial Eve” are not
just flawed, but wrong. The assumption that mitochondrial
DNA is passed down only by the mother is completely incorrect
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(it also can be passed on by the father). And, the mutation rates
used to calibrate the so-called “molecular clock” are now known
to have been in error. (To use the words of Rodriguez-Trelles
and his coworkers, the method contains a “fundamental flaw.”)
Philip Awadalla and his coworkers noted in Science: “Many
inferences about the pattern and tempo of human evolution
and mtDNA evolution have been based on the assumption of
clonal inheritance. There inferences will now have to be re
considered” (1999, 286:2525). Yes, they will. The same year
that Awadalla, et al., published their paper on recombination
in mitochondrial DNA, Evelyn Strauss published a paper in
Science (“Can Mitochondrial Clocks Keep Time?)” in which
she noted:
The DNA sequences pouring in from sequencing pro
jects have fueled the effort and extended the clock
approach to many genes in the cell nucleus. But the
wash of data has uncovered some troubling facts. It’s
now clear that in many cases, the main assumption underlying molecular clocks doesn’t hold
up: Clocks tick at different rates in different lineages
and at different times…. For the clock to work with
either sort of DNA [nuclear or mitochondrial—BH/
BT], nucleotide changes must tick away steadily so
scientists can convert the number of nucleotide dif
ferences seen between two organisms into the number
of years since they diverged. Different genes evolve at
different rates, depending on the selective forces upon
them, but the model requires only that each gene’s
clock maintains its own rate. Early work hinted that
this might not always be true, and now a plethora
of data shows that many genes don’t conform to
this model (1999a, 283:1435,1436, emp. added).
John Avise, an evolutionary geneticist at the University of
Georgia in Athens, went so far as to remark: “There’s an emerg
ing consensus that there are significant rate heterogeneities
across different lineages. How big they are and how to deal
with them is very much a matter of concern” (as quoted in Strauss,
283:1435).
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SERIOUS ERRORS IN
MITOCHONDRIAL DNA DATA
IN THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
Avise commented that the problems with the molecular
clock are a “matter of concern.” Philip Awadalla suggested
that the inferences that have been drawn from those clocks “will
now have to be reconsidered.” Ann Gibbons reported that the
“evolutionary results gained by using the mtDNA clock” are “in
conclusive.” When each of these writers made those statements,
they had no idea about the “bomb” that was about be dropped
on the evolutionary community regarding the inaccuracy of
huge sections of the reported mitochondrial DNA data. Just
when evolutionists thought it could not possibly get any worse
—it did!
The “evolutionary results gained by using the mtDNA clock”
are not just “inconclusive.” They’re wrong! In the January
2003 edition of the Annals of Human Genetics, geneticist Peter
Forster of Cambridge published an article (“To Err is Human”)
in which he documented that, to use his words, “more than
half of the mtDNA sequencing studies ever published
contain obvious errors.” He then asked: “Does it matter? Un
fortunately, in many cases it does.” Then came the crushing blow
for “Mitochondrial Eve”: “…fundamental research papers,
such as those claiming a recent African origin for mankind (Cann, et al., 1987; Vigilant, et al., 1991)…have been
criticized, and rejected due to the extent of primary data
errors” (67[1]:2, emp. added). Then, as if to add salt to an al
ready open and bleeding wound, Dr. Forster acknowledged
that the errors discovered thus far are “only the tip of the ice
berg…,” and that “there is no reason to suppose that DNA se
quencing errors are restricted to mtDNA” (2003, 67[1]:2,3).
One month later, Nature weighed in with an exposé of its
own. In the February 20, 2003 issue, Carina Dennis authored
a commentary on Forster’s work titled “Error Reports Threaten
to Unravel Databases of Mitochondrial DNA.” Dennis reiter-
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ated the findings that “more than half of all published studies
of human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequences contain
mistakes.” Then, after admitting that “published mtDNA se
quences are popular tools for investigating the evolution and
demography of human populations,” she lamented: “[T]he
problem is far bigger than researchers had imagined.
The mistakes may be so extensive that geneticists could
be drawing incorrect conclusions to studies of human
populations and evolution” (2003, 421:773, emp. added).
In her report, Dennis quoted Eric Shoubridge, a geneticist
a McGill University’s Montreal Neurological Institute in Can
ada, who investigates human diseases that result from prob
lems with mtDNA. His response was: “I was surprised by the
number of errors. What concerns me most is that these errors
could be compounded in the databases” (421:773). In 1981,
the complete sequence of human mtDNA—known as the “Cam
bridge Reference Sequence”—was published in a database for
mat for scientists to use in their research (see Anderson, et al.,
1981). It is from that initial database that many of the mtDNA
sequences have been taken and used to predict, among other
things, the Neolithic origin of Europeans (Simoni, et al., 2000)
and the “factuality” of the creature known as “Mitochondrial
Eve.” Yet Dr. Forster has been busily engaged in making cor
rections to that 1981 database almost since its inception, and
has compiled his own database of corrected mitochondrial se
quences.
Eric Shoubridge (quoted above) isn’t the only one who is
“concerned” about Peter Forster’s findings. Neil Howell, vice
president for research at MitoKor, a San Diego-based biotech
company that specializes in mitochondrial diseases, suggested
that Forster’s error-detection method “may even underestimate the extent of the errors”(as quoted in Dennis, 421:773774, emp. added).
What has been the response of the scientific community?
Let Forster answer: “Antagonism would be an understate
ment in some cases” (as quoted in Dennis, 421:773). He did note,
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however, that, at times, some of the scientists whose published
papers have been found to contain the errors were “forthcom
ing in resolving discrepancies in sequences.” That’s nice—since
“truth” and “knowledge” are what science is supposedly all
about (our English word “science” derives from the Latin sci
entia, meaning knowledge).
In the end, where does all of this leave “Mitochondrial Eve”?
Could we put it any plainer than Dr. Forster did when he said
that “fundamental research papers, such as those claiming a
recent African origin for mankind have been criticized, and
rejected due to the extent of primary data errors”? Criticized—
and rejected?!
Poor Eve. How many times, we wonder, will she have to
die before she finally can be buried—permanently—and left
to “rest in peace”? We suggest that, rather than merely “re
considering” their theory and attempting to revamp it accord
ingly, evolutionists need to admit, honestly and forthrightly,
that the clock is “broken,” and that mitochondrial Eve, as it
turns out, has existed only in their minds, not in the facts of the
real world. Science works by analyzing the data and forming
hypotheses based on those data. Science is not supposed to
“massage” the data until they fit a certain preconceived hypoth
esis. All of the conclusions that have been drawn from research
on mitochondrial Eve via the molecular clock must now be
discarded as unreliable. A funeral and interment are in order
for mitochondrial Eve.
NEANDERTHAL VS. HUMAN DNA—
IS IT A MATCH?
Creationists accept the “Neanderthal” species as nothing
more than modern man. Evolutionists disagree, based mainly
on studies regarding Neanderthal DNA. The July 11, 1997 is
sue of the journal Cell contained an article by Krings, et al., ti
tled “Neanderthal DNA sequences and the Origin of Modern
Humans” (Krings, et al., 1997). In that article, Dr. Krings and
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his coworkers explained how they successfully extracted mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA—which resides in the cell’s mito
chondria or “energy factories”) from the humerus (right arm
bone) of the original Neanderthal fossil discovered in 1856.
The scientific team doing the research, led by Svante Pääbo
of the University of Munich, chose to search for mtDNA rather
than nuclear DNA, due in large part to the fact that whereas
there are only two copies of DNA in the nucleus of each cell
(one from each parent), there are 500 to 1,000 copies per cell
of mtDNA. Hence, the possibility was much greater that some
of the ancient mtDNA might have been preserved. Unlike nuclear DNA, mtDNA can be passed on in an unchanged form
from a mother to her offspring. [And, as noted earlier, we now
know that mtDNA from the father can be passed on in a simi
lar fashion.] Thus, since changes in mtDNA are the result of
mutations rather than genetic mixing, evolutionists believe that
mtDNA is a more accurate reflection of evolutionary history.
At the conclusion of their research, the scientists who were
involved suggested that fewer differences in the mtDNA exist
between modern humans, than exist between modern humans
and the Neanderthal specimen. Therefore, based upon those
differences, evolutionists have suggested that the Neanderthal
line diverged from the line leading to modern humans about
550,000 to 690,000 years ago, and that Neanderthals became
extinct without contributing any genetic material to modern
humans through intermarriage. As Marvin Lubenow explained:
The implications are that the Neandertals did not
evolve into fully modern humans, that they were a dif
ferent species from modern humans, and that they were
just one of many proto-human types that were failed
evolutionary experiments. We alone evolved to full hu
manity (1998, 12[1]:87).
When the first Neanderthal fossil was discovered, the crea
ture was classified as Homo neanderthalensis, and as such was
considered a separate species within the genus Homo. However,
when additional evidence became available (in 1964) to suggest
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that Neanderthals were, in fact, humans, Neanderthals were re
classified as Homo sapiens neanderthalensis (i.e., a sub-species of
humans), and modern humans were given a sub-species des
ignation as well—Homo sapiens sapiens. Now, there is a clamor
ing among evolutionists—based on mtDNA evidence—to return
to the original H. neanderthalensis designation. In his 1999 book,
The Human Inheritance, Bryan Sykes of the Institute of Molecu
lar Medicine at Oxford University, wrote:
The mitochondrial DNA pattern of the Neanderthal
does indeed show that human mtDNA diversity was
much greater in the past, and allows a calibration of
the divergence time of the Neanderthal pattern from
that characterising modern humans of about 600 ka
[thousand years ago—BH/BT]. Gene divergence pre
cedes population and species divergence, but this fig
ure is certainly compatible with interpretations from
the fossil record that the Neanderthal lineage sepa
rated from our own at about 300 ka. Equally, it is in
compatible with suggestions that Neanderthals were
either uniquely ancestral to recent Europeans through
evolution, or were partly ancestral through hybridisa
tion (pp. 43-44).
In his 2000 book, Genes, People, and Languages, Luigi CavalliSforza, who is professor emeritus of genetics at Stanford Uni
versity and the director of the International Human Genome
Project, commented:
There is a considerable difference between the mtDNA
of this Neandertal and that of practically any modern
human. From a quantitative evaluation of this differ
ence it was estimated that the last common ancestor
of Neandertal and modern humans lived about half a
million years ago. It is not quite clear where those com
mon ancestors lived, but modern humans and Nean
dertal must have separated early and developed sep
arately, modern humans in Africa and Neandertals in
Europe. The results of mitochondrial DNA show clearly
that Neandertal was not our direct ancestor, unlike ear
lier hypotheses made by some paleoanthropologists
(p. 35).
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We beg to differ! The results of mtDNA research do not
“show clearly that Neandertal was not our direct ancestor.” A
closer examination of the mtDNA research shows that it is not
all it has been cracked up to be. The Krings study compared
DNA sequences from 1669 modern humans with one Nean
derthal. Statistically, this not only is insignificant, but also in
correct. As Lubenow wrote in regard to this mtDNA research:
Statistics has been used to cloud the relationship be
tween Neandertals and modern humans. It is improper
to use statistical “averages” in situations where many
entities are being compared with only one entity. In
this case, 994 sequences from 1669 modern humans
are compared with one sequence from one Neander
tal. Thus, there is no Neandertal “average,” and the
comparison is not valid (1998, 12[1]:92).
The original study showed that the Neanderthal individual
had a minimum of 22 mtDNA substitution differences when
compared to modern humans. Yet the mtDNA substitution
differences among modern humans range from 1 to 24. As
Lubenow correctly noted:
That means that there are a few modern humans who
differ by 24 substitutions from a few other modern
humans—two substitutions more than the Neander
tal individual. Would not logic demand that those few
modern humans living today should also be placed
in a separate species? To state the question is to reveal
the absurdity of using such differences as a measure of
species distinctions (12[1]:92).
Furthermore, as Maryellen Ruvolo of Harvard has pointed
out, the genetic variation between the modern and Neander
thal sequences is within the range of substitutions within other
single species of primates. She concluded: “…[T]here isn’t a
yardstick for genetic difference upon which you can define a
species” (as quoted in Kahn and Gibbons, 1997, 277:177). Ge
neticist Simon Easteal of Australian National University, not
ing that chimpanzees, gorillas, and other primates have much
more intra-species mtDNA diversity than modern humans,
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wrote: “The amount of diversity between Neanderthals and
living humans is not exceptional” (as quoted in Wong, 1998,
278[1]:32). In an article in Scientific American titled “Ancestral
Quandary: Neanderthals Not Our Ancestors? Not So Fast,”
Kate Wong observed: “The evolutionary history of mtDNA,
a lone gene, is only so informative.” She then went on to quote
geneticist Alan R. Templeton of Washington University, who
admitted: “You can always construct a gene tree for any set of
genetic variation. But there’s a big distinction between gene
trees and population trees” since a population tree comprises
the histories of many genes (1998, 278[1]:30). D. Melnick and
G. Hoelzer of Columbia University even went so far as to state:
“Our results suggest serious problems with use of mtDNA to
estimate ‘true’ population genetic structure…” (1992, p. 122).
Why is this the case? Luigi Cavalli-Sforza admitted that “..the
mitochondrial genome represents only a small fraction of an
individual’s genetic material and may not be representative of
the whole” (as quoted in Mountain, et al., 1993, p. 69).
In an article titled “Recovery of Neandertal DNA: An Evaluation,” Marvin Lubenow (1998, 12[1]:95) offered several
different alternative interpretations for the mtDNA data which
have been used to suggest that Neanderthals and humans are
not the same species. Among those were the following.
1. Perhaps the single individual from whom the mtDNA was
extracted was from a small, isolated group of Neanderthals.
After all, the Neander Valley in Germany (where the fossil was
discovered in 1856) is one of the northernmost Neanderthal
sites, close to ice-age glaciers. Of the 345 Neanderthal individ
uals discovered thus far, only 14 are from Germany, and 12 of
them were far to the south of where this individual was found.
2. Perhaps Neanderthals did, in fact, contribute to the mod
ern gene pool, but their sequences disappeared through ran
dom genetic loss, selection, or both. Biochemist John Marcus
has suggested that the human race might well have had much
greater mtDNA sequence variation in the past but, being ge
netically stronger, ancient humans were able to cope with in-
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creased genetic variation. Today, because our genome con
tains many more harmful mutations, we are somewhat “weak
er.” Perhaps greater mtDNA variation was deleterious to health,
and selective pressure therefore has reduced the amount of
variation in present populations.
3. Perhaps the single Neanderthal from whom the mtDNA
sequences were derived was at one extreme of a diverse spec
trum in Neanderthals that included other more modern-like
sequences. Future recovery of mtDNA from other Neander
thals (if that is possible) could help confirm whether or not
this is true.
4. Perhaps our Neanderthal ancestors underwent a popu
lation “bottleneck” that wiped out a great deal of the original
genetic variation. In support of such a concept, Kahn and Gib
bons wrote in Science: “Living humans are strangely homoge
neous genetically, presumably because…their ancestors un
derwent a population bottleneck that wiped out variations”
(1997, 277:175).
Over the past several years, the scientific community has
witnessed (not always to its liking, we might add) a serious
“redefining” of the Neanderthal people. Some anthropolo
gists of the past depicted them as culturally stagnant, if not
outright stupid, individuals. In 1996, however, researchers
were forced to reevaluate their long-held views on Neander
thals, due to the discovery of five different types of musical
instruments, items of personal ornamentation (similar to our
jewelry), and even the first example of a Neanderthal cave
painting (see: Hublin, et al., 1996; “Neanderthal Noisemaker,”
1996; Folger and Menon, 1997; “Human Origins,” 1997). Fur
thermore, almost all anthropologists recognize burial rituals
as being not just strictly associated with humans, but as a dis
tinctly religious act as well. That being the case, the strongest
evidence to date that the Neanderthals were, in fact, human,
is that at four different sites where Neanderthal fossils were
found, Neanderthals and modern humans were buried
together! As Lubenow noted:
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That Neandertals and anatomically modern humans
were buried together constitutes strong evidence that
they lived together, worked together, intermarried,
and were accepted as members of the same family,
clan, and community…. If genuine mtDNA was re
covered from the fossil from the Neander Valley, the
results have been misinterpreted (1998, 12[1]:89).
Yes, they have. In his 2001 book, The Evolution Wars, Michael
Ruse noted:
Modern humans, that is Homo sapiens like us, were at
one point thought all to come after Neanderthals, but
now the thinking is that our remains date back almost
as far, and there is evidence in some places that
modern humans lived together with Neanderthals.... A new skeleton, apparently a modern human/Neanderthal hybrid, has just been discovered
(Duarte, 1999) [2001b, pp. 187-188, emp. added].
As archaeologist Randall White of New York University said
regarding the Neanderthals: “The more this kind of evidence
accumulates, the more they look like us” (as quoted in Folger
and Menon, 18[1]:33). Yes, they do. And so they should!
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4
The advertisement indicates that this particular ovulation
predictor kit “is the only technology based solely on hormone
monitoring that provides you with personalized daily fertil
ity information for pregnancy planning.” For around fifty dol
lars, a person can purchase this product, which is intended as
an aid in determining the optimum moment for a human fe
male to conceive. Viewing this scenario through a baboon’s
eyes, the ad would seem to indicate that baboons are a some
what more superior species when compared to humans. The
female baboon, for example, does not need a “hormonal moni
toring kit” to detect her period of ovulation. Instead, she gives
off a distinctive smell, and the skin around her genitalia swells
and turns a bright red color that is visible from some distance.
Most other female animals are equally aware of their own ov
ulation, and often will “advertise” it to males using visual sig
nals, odors, or behaviors. The question becomes: Whence did
these differences in physiology and behavior originate? Or,
to put it more bluntly: How did sex evolve?
Take a look around. The world surrounding you is literally
teeming with living organisms ranging in size from micro
scopic bacteria to giant California redwoods. But how did it
all get here? One of the first thoughtful questions children of
ten ask is, “Where did I come from?” If we were to allow evo-
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lutionists to answer this question, they would point to frag
ments from the fossil record and declare that humans have de
scended from an ancient ape-like ancestor. Evolutionists have
spent many decades trying to iron out a seamless sequence of
descendants in their so-called “evolutionary tree of life.” How
ever, one of the most glaring failures of this alleged lineage is
its inability to account for the origin of sexual (as opposed to
asexual) reproduction and the existence of a male and female
within each species that reproduces sexually.
Biology textbooks are quick to illustrate amoebas evolving
into intermediate organisms, which then conveniently give rise
to amphibians, reptiles, mammals, and, eventually, humans.
Yet, interestingly, we never learn exactly when (or how!) in
dependent male and female species developed. Somewhere
along this evolutionary path, both males and females were re
quired to permit the procreation that was necessary to further
the existence of a particular species. But how do evolutionists
explain this? When pressed to answer questions like, “Where
did males and females actually come from?,” or “What is the
evolutionary origin of sex?,” evolutionists become as silent
as the tomb in which they have laid this problem. How is it that
at one point in time, “nature” was able to evolve a female mem
ber of a species that produces eggs and is internally equipped
to nourish a growing embryo, while at the same time evolving
a male member that produces motile sperm cells? And, further,
how is it that these gametes (eggs and sperm) “conveniently”
evolved so that they each contain half the normal chromosome
number of somatic (body) cells? [Somatic cells reproduce via
the process of mitosis, which maintains the species’ standard
chromosome number; gametes are produced via the process
of meiosis, which halves that number. We will have more to
say about both later.]
The evolution of sex (and its accompanying reproductive
capability) is not always a favorite topic of discussion in many
evolutionary circles, because no matter how many theories and
proposals evolutionists conjure up (and there are several!), they
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still must surmount the enormous hurdle of explaining the ori
gin of the first fully functional female and the first fully function
al male necessary to begin the process. In his book, The Mas
terpiece of Nature: The Evolution of Genetics and Sexuality, Gra
ham Bell admitted that the whole problem of sexual repro
duction “represents the most important challenge to the mod
ern theory of evolution” (1982, book jacket). He then went on
to describe the dilemma in the following manner:
Sex is the queen of problems in evolutionary biology. Perhaps no other natural phenomenon has
aroused so much interest; certainly none has sowed
as much confusion. The insights of Darwin and Men
del, which have illuminated so many mysteries, have
so far failed to shed more than a dim and wavering
light on the central mystery of sexuality, emphasizing
its obscurity by its very isolation (p. 19, emp. added).
The same year that Bell published his book, evolutionist
Philip Kitcher noted: “Despite some ingenious suggestions
by orthodox Darwinians, there is no convincing Darwinian
history for the emergence of sexual reproduction” (1982, p.
54). Evolutionists since have freely admitted that the origin of
gender and sexual reproduction still remains one of the most
difficult problems in biology (see, for example, Maynard-Smith,
1986, p. 35). In his 2001 book, The Cooperative Gene, evolution
ist Mark Ridley wrote (under the chapter title of “The Ultimate
Existential Absurdity”): “Evolutionary biologists are much
teased for their obsession with why sex exists. People like to
ask, in an amused way, ‘isn’t it obvious?’ Joking apart, it is far
from obvious…. Sex is a puzzle that has not yet been
solved; no one knows why it exists” (pp. 108,111, emp. ad
ded). In an article in Bioscience on “How Did Sex Come About?,”
Julie Schecter remarked:
Sex is ubiquitous…. Yet sex remains a mystery to re
searchers, to say nothing of the rest of the popula
tion. Why sex? At first blush, its disadvantages seem
to outweigh its benefits. After all, a parent that repro
duces sexually gives only one-half its genes to its off-
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spring, whereas an organism that reproduces by di
viding passes on all its genes. Sex also takes much
longer and requires more energy than simple division.
Why did a process so blatantly unprofitable to its ear
liest practitioners become so widespread? (1984, 34:
680).
Why sex? Why indeed?! We invite you to read further as
we survey several issues concerning the origin of gender and
sexual reproduction.
“INTELLECTUAL MISCHIEF AND
CONFUSION”—OR INTELLIGENT DESIGN?
The distinguished microbiologist of the University of Mas
sachusetts at Amherst, Lynn Margulis, and her son Dorion
Sagan (Ms. Margulis is one of the late Carl Sagan’s former
wives; Dorion is their son) have gone on record as stating:
“Many theories of sex are clearly fallacious…. Putting these
ideas of sexual origins together, our hypothesis is quite differ
ent from the accepted wisdom about the role of sex in evolu
tion” (1997, pp. 290,293). Yes, it is. To quote them directly:
“…complex microscopic beings and their descendants de
veloped the first male and female genders, and our kind of cellfusing sexuality involving penetration of an egg by a sperm”
(p. 78). In his 2001 book, Liaisons of Life, Tom Wakeford addres
sed this unorthodox idea and concluded:
Margulis’s hypothesis for the origin of sexuality is
radical. She believes that the ecological relations of
ancient microbes drove a process that ultimately led
to our way or reproducing. She bases this ambitious
idea on a theory she published in 1967. Now classic,
the theory attempted to explain the biggest missing
link in evolution—the jump from bacteria (often called
prokaryotes), all of which lack nuclei, to modern cells,
or eukaryotes, whose cells contain nuclei.
The differences between prokaryotes and eukaryotes
are so profound that they make the distinction be
tween dinosaurs and dogs or birds and bees look neg-
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ligible. Eukaryotes include animals, plants, protists,
and fungi, each cell of which generally contains hun
dreds of times more DNA than a prokaryote.
Unlike many other transitions in evolution, there are
no intermediates between eukaryotes and prokary
otes. It is as if honeybees mutated into humans with
out any evidence of rats, cats, or chimpanzees in be
tween. The evolutionary processes behind this great
revolution have had to be discerned without the help
of one of the evolutionist’s most trusted sources of
evidence—the fossil record (pp. 147-148, parentheti
cal item in orig.).
Perhaps it is this complete lack of evidence that has caused Mar
gulis and Sagan to suggest that since sex is basically a historical
mishap of sorts—a kind of “accidental holdover” from the era
of single-celled organisms—then the maintenance of sex be
comes a “nonscientific” question that “leads to intellectual mis
chief and confusion” (as quoted in Crow, 1988, pp. 59-60).
While there may well be many “clearly fallacious” theories
regarding the origin of sex, and while the fact that sex exists
may indeed represent to evolutionists a matter of “intellectual
mischief and confusion,” the fact of both the ubiquity and the
complexity of sexual reproduction has not eluded Darwinists.
Niles Eldredge, a staunch evolutionist at the American Mu
seum of Natural History, has admitted that “sex occurs in all
major groups of life” (Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980, p. 102).
Or as Jennifer Ackerman wrote somewhat emphatically in her
2001 book, Chance in the House of Fate: “Now, it seems, nature
hurls the sexes at each other” (p. 49, emp. added).
But why is this the case? Evolutionists are forced to con
cede that there must be “some advantage” to a system as phys
iologically and energetically complex as sex, as Mark Ridley
admitted when he wrote: “…[I]t is highly likely that sex has
some advantage, and that the advantage is big. Sex would
not have evolved, and been retained, unless it had some ad
vantage” (2001, p. 254, emp. added). Yet locating and explain
ing that advantage seems to have eluded our evolutionary
colleagues. Sir John Maddox, who served for over twenty-
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five years as the editor of Nature, the prestigious journal pub
lished by the British Association for the Advancement of Sci
ence (and who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1994
for his “multiple contributions to science”), authored an amaz
ing book titled What Remains to be Discovered in which he ad
dressed the topic of the origin of sex, and stated forthrightly:
The overriding question is when (and then how) sex
ual reproduction itself evolved. Despite decades of
speculation, we do not know. The difficulty is that
sexual reproduction creates complexity of the genome
and the need for a separate mechanism for produc
ing gametes. The metabolic cost of maintaining this
system is huge, as is that of providing the organs spe
cialized for sexual reproduction (the uterus of mam
malian females, for example). What are the offsetting
benefits? The advantages of sexual reproduction
are not obvious (1998, p. 252, parenthetical items in
orig., emp. added).
The fact that the advantages of sex are “not obvious” is
well known (though perhaps not often discussed) within the
hallowed halls of academia. J.C. Crow lamented:
Sexual reproduction seems like a lot of baggage to
carry along if it is functionless. Evolutionary conser
vatism perpetuates relics, but does it do so on such a
grand scale as this?… It is difficult to see how a pro
cess as elaborate, ubiquitous, and expensive as sex
ual reproduction has been maintained without serv
ing some important purpose of its own (1988, p. 60).
What is that “purpose”? And how can evolution via natu
ral selection explain it? Would “Nature” (notice the capital
“N”) “select for” sexual reproduction? As it turns out, the com
mon “survival of the fittest” mentality cannot begin to explain
the high cost of first evolving, and then maintaining, the sex
ual apparatus. Sexual reproduction requires organisms to first
produce, and then maintain, gametes (reproductive cells—i.e.,
sperm and eggs). Additionally, various kinds of incompatibil
ity factors (like the blood Rh factor between mother and child)
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can pass along addition
al “costs” (some of which
can be life threatening)
that are inherent in this
“expensive” means of re
production. In sexual or
ganisms, problems also
can arise in regard to tis
sue rejection between
Figure 1 — Photomicrograph of male
the mother and the newsperm cell attempting penetration
ly formed embryo. The
of female egg cell
human immune system
is vigilant in identifying foreign tissue (such as an embryo that
carries half of the male’s genetic information), yet evolution
ists contend that the human reproductive system has “selec
tively evolved” this “elaborate, ubiquitous, and expensive”
method of reproduction. In trying to reconcile the logic be
hind what causes such things to occur via naturalistic evolution,
vitalist philosopher Arthur Koestler observed:
Once upon a time it all looked so simple. Nature re
garded the fit with the carrot of survival and punished
the unfit with the stick of extinction. The trouble only
started when it came to defining “fitness.” …Thus nat
ural selection looks after the survival and reproduc
tion of the fittest, and the fittest are those which have
the highest rate of reproduction—we are caught in a cir
cular argument which completely begs the question
of what makes evolution evolve? (1978, p. 170).
The question of “what makes evolution evolve” is espe
cially critical when it comes to the origin of sex and sexual re
production. As Dr. Maddox went on to say: “Much more must
be learned of the course of evolution before it is known how
(rather than why) sexual reproduction evolved…. That task
will require intricate work by future generations of biologists”
(pp. 253,254, parenthetical item in orig.). It is our contention,
based on the evidence at hand, that the intricacy, complex
ity, and informational content associated with sexual reproduc-
- 141 -
tion demand the conclusion that sex is neither a “historical ac
cident” resulting in evolutionary baggage nor a product of or
ganic evolution itself, but rather is the product of an intelligent
Creator.
FROM ASEXUAL TO SEXUAL
REPRODUCTION—THE ORIGIN OF SEX
Many single-celled organisms reproduce asexually. If we
all descended from these single-celled creatures, as Margulis
and Sagan have suggested, then why was the simple-yet-efficient method of asexual reproduction set aside in favor of sex
ual reproduction? In an intriguing article titled “The Enigma
of Sex and Evolution,” biologist Jerry Bergman wrote:
Evolution requires sexual reproduction to have evolved
from asexual reproduction via natural selection….
The lack of evidence of any biological systems that can
bridge the chasm between sexual and asexual repro
duction either today or in the past is also a major diffi
culty with evolution theory. Actually, the complete lack
of any transitional forms for all sexual traits is a huge
major fossil gap. The same problem also exists here as
with any transitional form: structures are useless or
worse until they are at least marginally functional. This
is especially true regarding reproduction, and would
result in rapid extinction if the features produced by
mutations were less than fully functional (1996, 33:
230, emp. in orig.).
Dobzhansky and his co-authors commented on this “enigma”
in their book, Evolution:
With respect to the origin of sexual reproduction, two
challenging questions present themselves. First, in
what kinds of organisms did sex first arise? And sec
ond, what was the adaptive advantage that caused sex
ual reproduction to become predominant in higher or
ganisms? (1977, p. 391)
Asexual reproduction is the formation of new individuals
from cells of only one parent, without gamete formation or
fertilization by another member of the species. Asexual repro-
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duction thus does not require one egg-producing parent and
one sperm-producing parent. A single parent is all that is re
quired. In addressing this point, evolutionist George C. Wil
liams admitted that the “immediate advantage of asexual re
production is generally conceded by all those who have seri
ously concerned themselves with the problem” (1977, p. 8).
In fact, he went on to note that “the masculine-feminine con
trast is a prima facie difficulty for evolutionary theory” (p. 124).
Sporulation (spore formation) is one method of asexual
reproduction among protozoa and certain plants. A spore is
a reproductive cell that produces a new organism without
fertilization. In some lower forms of animals (e.g., hydra),
and in yeasts, budding is a common form of asexual repro
duction as a small protuberance on the surface of the parent
cell increases in size until a wall forms to separate the new in
dividual (the bud) from the parent. Regeneration is another
specialized form of asexual reproduction that allows some
organisms (e.g. starfish and salamanders) to replace injured
or lost parts. All of these processes require only one “parent,”
and work quite well in stable environments.
As they have struggled to explain the existence of sexual
reproduction in nature, evolutionists have suggested four dif
ferent (and sometimes contradictory) theories, known in the
literature as: (1) the Lottery Principle; (2) the Tangled Bank Hypothesis; (3) the Red Queen Hypothesis; and (4) the DNA Re
pair Hypothesis. We would like to discuss each briefly.
The Lottery Principle
The Lottery Principle was first suggested by American bi
ologist George C. Williams in his monograph, Sex and Evolu
tion (1975). Williams’ idea was that sexual reproduction in
troduced genetic variety in order to enable genes to survive in
changing or novel environments. He used the lottery analogy
to get across the concept that breeding asexually would be
like buying a large number of tickets for a national lottery but
giving them all the same number; sexual reproduction would
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be like purchasing few tick
ets, but giving each of them
a different number. The es
sential idea behind the Lot
tery Principle is that since sex
introduces variability, orga
nisms would have a much
better chance of producing
offspring that will survive if
they produced a range of
types rather than just more
Figure 2 — An example of the
of the same.
asexual reproduction process
The point being made by
known as budding
those who hold to the Lot
tery Principle is that asexual reproduction is, in fact, poorly
equipped to adapt to rapidly changing environmental condi
tions, due to the fact that the offspring are exact copies (i.e.,
clones) of their parents, and thus inherently possess less ge
netic variation, which ultimately could lead to improved
adaptability and a greater likelihood of survival. As Carl Zim
mer wrote under the chapter title of “Evolution from Within”
in his 2000 book, Parasite Rex: “A line of clones might do well
enough in a forest, but what if that forest changed over a few
centuries to a prairie? Sex brought the variations that could
allow organisms to survive change” (p. 163). Matt Ridley ad
ded:
…[A] sexual form of life will reproduce at only half
the rate of an equivalent clonal form. The halved re
productive rate of sexual forms is probably made
up for by a difference in quality: the average sexual offspring is probably twice as good as an equivalent cloned offspring (1993, p. 254, emp. added).
It would be “twice as good,” of course, because it had twice
the genetic endowment (having received half from each of the
two parents). Reichenbach and Anderson summarized the is
sue as follows:
- 144 -
For example, why do most animals reproduce sex
ually rather than asexually, when asexual reproduc
tion seems to conform best to the current theory that
in natural selection the fittest are those that preserve
their genes by passing them on to their progeny? One
theory is that sexual reproduction provides the best
defense against the rapidly reproducing, infectious
species that threaten the existence of organisms. The
diversity in the species that results from combining
different gene pools favors the survival of those that
are sexually reproduced over those that by cloning in
herit repetitive genetic similarity (1995, p. 18, emp.
added).
It is that “diversity in the species,” according to the princi
ple, which helps an organism maintain its competitive edge
in nature’s struggle of “survival of the fittest.” But the Lottery
Principle has fallen on hard times of late. It suggests that sex
would be favored by a variable environment, yet a close in
spection of the global distribution of sex reveals that where
environments are stable (such as in the tropics), sexual re
production is most common. In contrast, in areas where the
environment is unstable (such as at high altitudes or in small
bodies of water), asexual reproduction is rife.
The Tangled Bank Hypothesis
The Tangled Bank Hypothesis suggests that sex evolved in
order to prepare offspring for the complicated world around
them. The “tangled bank” phraseology comes from the last
paragraph of Darwin’s Origin of Species in which he referred
to a wide assortment of creatures all competing for light and
food on a “tangled bank.” According to this concept, in any
environment where there is intense competition for space,
food, and other resources, a premium is placed on diversifi
cation. As Zimmer described it:
In any environment—a tidal flat, a forest canopy, a
deep-sea hydrothermal vent—the space is divided into
different niches where different skills are needed for
survival. A clone specialized for one niche can give
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birth only to offspring that can also handle the same
niche. But sex shuffles the genetic deck and deals the
offspring different hands. It’s basically spreading out
progeny so that they’re using different resources (2000,
p. 163).
The Tangled Bank Hypothesis, however, also has fallen
on hard times. In his book, Evolution and Human Behavior, John
Cartwright concluded:
Although once popular, the tangled bank hypothesis
now seems to face many problems, and former ad
herents are falling away. The theory would predict a
greater interest in sex among animals that produce
lots of small offspring that compete with each other.
In fact, sex is invariably associated with organisms that
produce a few large offspring, whereas organisms pro
ducing small offspring frequently engage in partheno
genesis [asexual reproduction—BH/BT]. In addition,
the evidence from fossils suggests that species go
for vast periods of time without changing much
(2000, p. 96, emp. added).
Indeed, the evidence does suggest “that species go for vast
periods of time without changing much.” Consider the follow
ing admission in light of that point. According to Margulis and
Sagan, bacteria “evolved” in such a fashion as to ultimately
be responsible for sexual reproduction. Yet if that is the case,
why, then, have the bacteria themselves remained virtually
unchanged—from an evolutionary viewpoint—for billions of
years of Earth history? In his classic text, Evolution of Living
Organisms, the eminent French zoologist, Pierre-Paul Grassé,
raised this very point.
[B]acteria, despite their great production of intra
specific varieties, exhibit a great fidelity to their
species. The bacillus Escherichia coli, whose mutants
have been studied very carefully, is the best example.
The reader will agree that it is surprising, to say
the least, to want to prove evolution and to discover its mechanisms, and then to choose as a
material for this study a being which practically
stabilized a billion years ago (1977, p. 87, emp. ad
ded).
- 146 -
Additionally, it should be noted that today we still see organ
isms that reproduce asexually, as well as organisms that repro
duce sexually—which raises the obvious question: Why do some
organisms continue to reproduce asexually, while others have
“evolved” the ability to reproduce sexually? Don’t the asex
ual organisms ever “need” genetic variety in order to enable
genes to survive in changing or novel environments (the Lot
tery Principle)? Don’t they ever “need” to prepare their off
spring for the complicated world around them (the Tangled
Bank Hypothesis)?
The Red Queen Hypothesis
The Red Queen Hypothesis was first suggested by Leigh
Van Valen in an article titled “A New Evolutionary Law” in
Evolutionary Theory (1973). His research suggested that the prob
ability of organisms becoming extinct bears no relationship
to how long they already may have survived. In other words,
as Cartwright put it: “It is a sobering thought that the struggle
for existence never gets any easier; however well adapted an
animal may become, it still has the same chance of extinction
as a newly formed species” (p. 97). Biologists came to refer to
the concept as the Red Queen Hypothesis, named after the
character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass who
took Alice on a long run that actually went nowhere. As the
queen said to poor Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the
running you can do, to keep in the same place.” Think of it as
a “genetics arms race” in which an animal constantly must
run the genetic gauntlet of being able to chase its prey, elude
predators, and resist infection from disease-causing organisms.
In the world of the Red Queen, organisms have to run fast—
just to stay still! That is to say, they constantly have to “run to
try to improve” (and the development of sex would be one
way of accomplishing that). Yet doing so provides no auto
matic guarantee of winning the struggle known as “survival
of the fittest.” “Nature,” said the eminent British poet Lord
Tennyson, is indeed “red in tooth and claw.” Currently, the Red
- 147 -
Queen Hypothesis seems to be the favorite of evolutionists
worldwide in attempting to explain the reason as to the “why”
of sex.
The DNA Repair Hypothesis
Think about it. Why are babies born young? Stupid question—with a self-evident answer, right? Evolutionists suggest
otherwise. The point of the question is this. Our somatic (body)
cells age. Yet cells of a newborn have had their clocks “set back.”
Somatic cells die, but the germ line seems to be practically im
mortal. Why is this the case? How can “old” people produce
“young” babies? In a landmark article published in 1989, Bern
stein, Hopf, and Michod suggested that they had discovered
the answer: “We argue that the lack of ageing of the germ line
results mainly from repair of the genetic material by meiotic
recombination during the formation of germ cells. Thus our
basic hypothesis is that the primary function of sex is to repair
the genetic material of the germ line” (p. 4).
DNA can be damaged in at least two ways. First, ionizing
radiation or mutagenic chemicals can alter the genetic code.
Or, second, a mutation can occur via errors during the repli
cation process itself. Most mutations are deleterious (see Cart
wright, 2000, p. 98). In an asexual organism, by definition, any
mutation that occurs in one generation will automatically be
passed on to the next. In his book, The Red Queen (1993), Matt
Ridley compared it to what occurs when you photocopy a doc
ument, then photocopy the photocopy, and then photocopy
that photocopy, etc. Eventually, the quality deteriorates se
verely. Asexual organisms, as they continue to accumulate mu
tations, face the unpleasant prospect of eventually becoming
both unable to reproduce and unviable—neither of which would
be at all helpful to evolution.
But if sex “evolved,” it would help solve this problem, since
mutations, although they might still be passed on from one
generation to the next, would not necessarily be expressed
- 148 -
in the next generation (a mutation has to appear in the genes
of both parents before it is expressed in the offspring). As
Cartwright put it:
In sexually reproducing species on the other hand,
some individuals will be “unlucky” and have a greater
share than average of deleterious mutations in their
genome, and some will be “lucky,” with a smaller share.
The unlucky ones will be selected out. This in the long
term has the effect of constantly weeding out harmful
mutations through the death of those that bear them.
Deleterious mutations…would have devastating con
sequences if it were not for sexual reproduction (p. 99).
In his book, The Language of Genes, Steve Jones claimed that sex
exists because
…if a sexless organism has a harmful change to the
DNA, it will be carried by all her descendants. None
of them can ever get rid of it, however destructive it
might be, unless it is reversed by another change in
the same gene—which is unlikely to happen. In time,
another damaging error will occur in a different gene
in the family line. A decay of the genetic message will
set in as one generation succeeds another, just like the
decay that takes place within our aging bodies as our
cells divide without benefit of sex. In a sexual creature
the new mutation can be purged as it passes to some
descendant but not others (1993, p. 86).
But, as Bergman correctly pointed out:
The problem with this conclusion is that a harmful or
lethal mutation causes the entire line to die out, purg
ing it forever form the population while millions of
other lines carry on. With sex, because most mutations
are recessive, many mutations that are not lethal are
spread to the race in general. Problems result only if
the same defect is inherited from both parents; thus,
the harmful traits can accumulate in the race. With
asexual animals the weaker lines are rapidly selected
out, often in one generation (1996, 33:221, emp. in
orig.).
- 149 -
It is clear, therefore, as Cartwright admitted in regard to
the DNA repair hypothesis: “This theory is not without its
problems and critics” (p. 99). One of those problems, expres
sed by Mark Ridley (no kin to Matt), is: “We do not know for
sure that sex exists to purge bad genes” (2001, p. 254). No, we
certainly do not. And, in fact, evidence is beginning to mount
that perhaps the DNA Repair Hypothesis is itself in need of
“repair.” As Sir John Maddox noted:
One view is that sexual reproduction makes it easier
for an evolving organism to get rid of deleterious
changes. That should certainly be the case if there is
more than one genetic change and if their combined
effect on the fitness of the evolving organisms is greater
than the sum of their individual changes acting sepa
rately. But there is no direct evidence to show
that this rule is generally applicable. Indeed, a
recent experiment with the bacterium E. coli suggests
otherwise (1998, p. 252, emp. added).
We should not overlook an important fact throughout all
of this: These theories valiantly attempt to explain why sex
exists now, but they do not explain the origin of sex. How,
exactly, did nature accomplish the “invention” of the mar
velous process we know as sex? In addressing this very issue,
Maddox asked quizzically: “How did this process (and its
complexities) evolve?… The dilemma is that natural selection cannot anticipate changes in the environment, and
so arrange for the development of specialized sexual organs
as a safeguard against environmental change” (p. 253, par
enthetical item in orig., emp. added). Exactly our point! It is
one thing to develop a theory or hypothesis to explain some
thing that already exists, but entirely another to develop a
theory of hypothesis to explain why that something (in this
case, sex) does exist. As Mark Ridley begrudgingly admit
ted:
Sex is not used simply for want of an alternative. Noth
ing, in an evolutionary sense, forces organisms to re
produce sexually. Indeed, the majority of live repro-
- 150 -
duction on Earth is probably not sexual. Microbes,
such as bacteria, do most of the reproduction on this
planet, and they usually do it by doubling their cellu
lar contents and then dividing from one cell to two,
without any genetic input from another cell (2001, p.
109, emp. added).
Perhaps Cartwright summarized the issue well when he
said: “There is perhaps no single explanation for the mainte
nance of sex in the face of severe cost” (p. 99). Since he is speak
ing of a strictly naturalistic explanation, we would agree whole
heartedly. But we would go even farther to state that there is
no purely naturalistic explanation at all for the origin or the
maintenance of sex.
WHY SEX?
Why does sex exist at all? In his 2001 book, Evolution: The
Triumph of an Idea, Carl Zimmer admitted:
Sex is not only unnecessary, but it ought to be a recipe for evolutionary disaster. For one thing, it is an
inefficient way to reproduce…. And sex carries other
costs as well…. By all rights, any group of animals that
evolves sexual reproduction should be promptly outcompeted by nonsexual ones. And yet sex reigns.
...Why is sex a success, despite all its disadvantages?
(pp. 230,231, emp. added).
From an evolutionary viewpoint, sex is indeed “an inefficient
way to reproduce.” As Williams noted, the task of determin
ing why sexual reproduction evolved seems “immensely difficult…because we can immediately see an enormous disad
vantage in sexual reproduction” (1977, pp. 155,169). The brief
reproduction period involved with, and few offspring pro
duced by, sexual reproduction produce such clear disadvan
tages that Princeton’s eminent biologist, John Tyler Bonner,
asked, “What use is sex” to evolution, and why would it evolve?
(1958, p. 193; cf. also Maynard-Smith, 1971).
- 151 -
Think for a moment about some of the events that had to
occur before sexual reproduction could “evolve.” First, two
physically distinct sexes, male and female, had to materialize
(Crook, 1972, pp. 233-235). Second, the male and female had
to “appear at the same time and in the same breeding com
munity” (Sheppard, 1963, p. 239). Third, sperm production
in the male, and egg production in the female, had to evolve.
Fourth, the female had to evolve a structure (e.g., a uterus) ca
pable of carrying the unborn until birth. Fifth, nature had to
come up with a process by which the information carried within
the DNA could be reproduced faithfully time and time again.
It is the complexity of this process, and the manner in which
it is copied from generation to generation, which drove Mark
Ridley practically to distraction in The Cooperative Gene.
The purpose of life is to copy DNA or, to be more exact,
information in the form of DNA. Information copying,
or information transfer, is a familiar enough activity
to us in human culture. We do it all the time…. Human
beings have invented an extraordinary range of media
for transmitting, or copying, information. But I can
tell you one thing about all these media. When humans
set themselves to the task of copying information, they
do just that: they copy it. In biological terms, clonal
reproduction (or virgin birth) is the analogy for the way
humans transmit information. No one in human cul
ture would try the trick of first making two copies of a
message, then breaking each into short bits at random,
combining equal amounts from the two to form the
version to be transmitted, and throwing the unused half
away. You only have to think of sex to see how
absurd it is. The “sexual” method of reading a book
would be to buy two copies, rip the pages out, and make
a new copy by combining half the pages from one and
half from the other, tossing a coin at each page to de
cide which original to take the page from and which
to throw away. To watch a play, you would go twice,
pre-programmed to pay attention to the first perfor
mance at one random set of times, amounting to half
the total length, and to pay attention to the second per
formance at the complementary other half set of times
(2001, pp. 108-109, emp. added).
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Again, from an evolutionary viewpoint, sex would be con
sidered “absurd.” But from a design viewpoint, it is nothing
short of incredible!
Yet there is an even more important question than why sex
exists. That question is this: How did sex come to exist? Evo
lution is dependent on change (our English word “evolution”
derives from the Latin evolvere, meaning “to unroll; to change”).
Quite obviously, if everything remained the same, there would
be no evolution. Evolutionists believe that the driving forces
behind evolution are genetic mutations and natural selection
occurring over lengthy spans of geologic time (as Peter Ward
put it in his 2001 book, Future Evolution, “Evolution takes time,”
p. 153). Mutations are primarily the result of mistakes that
occur during DNA replication. There are three different types
of mutations: beneficial, deleterious, and neutral (see Mayr,
2001, p. 98). Neutral mutations, while admittedly frequent, are,
as their name implies, “neutral.” They do not “propel” evolu
tion forward in any significant fashion. Deleterious mutations
“will be selected against and will be eliminated in due time”
(Mayr, p. 98). That, then, leaves beneficial mutations, which,
according to evolutionists, are incorporated into the species
by natural selection, eventually resulting in new and different
organisms.
But what does all of this have to do with the origin of sex?
Evolutionists adhere to the view that the first organisms on
Earth were asexual, and thus they believe that, during bil
lions of years of Earth history, asexual organisms experienced
numerous beneficial mutations that caused them to evolve
into sexual organisms. But the change of a single-celled, asex
ual prokaryote (like a bacterium) into a multi-celled, sexual
eukaryote would not be a “magical” process carried out by
just a few, well-chosen beneficial mutations (as if nature had
the power to “choose” anything!). In fact, quite the opposite
would be true. Why so? Ernst Mayr, who probably ranks as
the most eminent evolutionary taxonomist in the world, com
mented in his book, What Evolution Is: “Any mutation that in-
- 153 -
duces changes in the phenotype [the outward, physical make
up of an organism—BH/BT] will either be favored or discrimi
nated against by natural selection…. [T]he occurrence of new
beneficial mutations is rather rare” (p. 98, emp. added).
Beneficial mutations (viz., those that provide additional infor
mation for, and instructions to, the organism) are indeed “rath
er rare.” Furthermore, as evolutionists candidly admit, muta
tions that affect the phenotype almost always are harmful
(Crow, 1997; Cartwright, 2000, p. 98). Famed Stanford Uni
versity geneticist Luigi Cavalli-Sforza addressed this fact when
he wrote:
Evolution also results from the accumulation of new
information. In the case of a biological mutation, new
information is provided by an error of genetic trans
mission (i.e., a change in the DNA during its trans
mission from parent to child). Genetic mutations
are spontaneous, chance changes, which are rarely beneficial, and more often have no effect, or a
deleterious one (2000, p. 176, parenthetical item in
orig., emp. added).
In addressing the complete ineffectiveness of mutations as
an alleged evolutionary mechanism, Grassé observed:
Some contemporary biologists, as soon as they ob
serve a mutation, talk about evolution. They are implic
itly supporting the following syllogism (argument):
mutations are the only evolutionary variations, all liv
ing beings undergo mutations, therefore all living be
ings evolve. This logical scheme is, however unaccept
able: first, because its major premise is neither obvious
nor general; second, because its conclusion does not
agree with the facts. No matter how numerous they
may be, mutations do not produce any kind of evolution…. The opportune appearance of mutations
permitting animals and plants to meet their needs seems
hard to believe. Yet the Darwinian theory is even more
demanding: a single plant, a single animal would re
quire thousands and thousands of lucky, appropriate
events. Thus, miracles would become the rule: events
- 154 -
with an infinitesimal probability could not fail to oc
cur…. There is no law against daydreaming, but sci
ence must not indulge in it (1977, pp. 88,103,107, par
enthetical item in orig., emp. added).
Grassé is not the only prominent evolutionist to take such
a view in regard to mutations as an ineffectual driving force for
evolution. In a speech that he presented at Hobart College
several years ago, the late Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay
Gould spoke out in a somewhat militant fashion about the sub
ject when he said: “A mutation doesn’t produce major new
raw material. You don’t make a new species by mutating the
species.... That’s a common idea people have; that evolution
is due to random mutations. A mutation is not the cause of ev
olutionary change” (1984b, p. 106). [All of this raises the ques
tion: If mutations are not the cause of evolutionary change,
then what is?]
There is more to the problem of the origin of sex, however,
than “just” the fact of rare, beneficial mutations and their muchmore-frequent cousins, the harmful, deleterious mutations.
There is the added problem related to the two different types
of cell division we mentioned earlier—mitosis and meiosis.
During mitosis, all of the chromosomes are copied and passed
on from the parent cell to the daughter cells. Meiosis (from the
Greek meaning to split), on the other hand, occurs only in sex
cells (eggs and sperm); during this type of replication, only half
of the chromosomal material is copied and passed on. [For an
excellent, up-to-date description of the intricate, complicated,
two-part process by which meiosis occurs, see Mayr, 2001, p.
103.] Once meiosis takes place, “the result is the production
of completely new combinations of the parental genes, all of
them uniquely different genotypes [the genetic identity of an
individual that does not show as outward characteristics—BH/
BT]. These, in turn, produce unique phenotypes, providing
unlimited new material for the process of natural selection”
(Mayr, p. 104, emp. added).
- 155 -
It is those very facts—that meiosis allegedly has “evolved”
the ability to halve the chromosome number (but only for ga
metes), and that it actually can provide “unlimited new material”—which make the meiotic process so incredible. And the
critical importance of meiosis to life as we know it has been ac
knowledged (albeit perhaps begrudgingly) even by evolu
tionists. Margulis and Sagan, for example, wrote:
We think that meiosis became tied to two-parent sex
and that meiosis as a cell process, rather than two-parent sex, was a prerequisite for evolution of many
aspects of animals…. [M]eiosis seems intimately
connected with complex cell and tissue differentiation. After all, animals and plants return every
generation to a single nucleated cell. We believe that
meiosis, especially the chromosomal DNA-alignment
process in prophase, is sort of like a roll call, ensuring
that sets of genes, including mitochondrial and plastid
genes, are in order before the multicellular unfolding
that is the development of the embryo (1997, p. 291,
emp. added).
Margulis and Sagan have admitted that meiosis is critical
for sexual reproduction. Yet in their book, Slanted Truths, they
stated unequivocally that “meiotic sex” evolved approximately
“520 million years ago” (1997, p. 293). How, pray tell, could
the bacteria that are supposed to be responsible for the evolu
tion of sex have “stabilized a billion years ago” (as Dr. Grassé
plainly stated that they did), and then 500 million years after
that stabilization, mutate enough to “evolve” the painstaking
process of meiosis? Is anyone actually listening to what evo
lutionists are saying? Read carefully the following scenario,
as laid out in Jennifer Ackerman’s 2001 book, Chance in the
House of Fate, and as you do, concentrate on the items we have
placed in bold print that are intended to draw the reader’s at
tention to the “just-so” nature of the account being proffered.
The first sex cells may have been interchangeable
and of roughly the same size. By chance, some may
have been slightly bigger than others and stuffed
with nutrients, an advantage in getting progeny off
- 156 -
to a good start. Perhaps some were smaller, faster,
good at finding mates. As organisms continued to
meld and join their genetic material, the pairs of a
larger cell with a smaller one proved an efficient sys
tem. Over time, the little rift between the sexes wid
ened, as did the strategies of male and female for prop
agating their own genes (pp. 48-49, emp. added).
The first sex cells may have been…. By chance, some may
have been…. Perhaps some were…. Over time, the…. It
is little wonder then, that in their more candid moments, evo
lutionists admit, as Ackerman eventually did, that “when it
comes to sex, we inhabit a mystery” (p. 115).
Figure 3 — Graphic depiction of meiosis and mitosis
- 157 -
Notice, however, the admission by Margulis and Sagan
that “meiosis seems connected with complex cell and tissue
differentiation.” Yes, it certainly does—now! But how did a pro
cess as incredibly complex as meiosis ever get started in the
first place? What (or, better yet, Who) “intricately connected
it with complex cell and tissue differentiation”? With all due
respect, there is not an evolutionist on the planet who has been
able to come up with an adequate (much less believable) ex
planation as to how somatic cells reproduce by mitosis (there
by maintaining the species’ standard chromosome number
in each cell), while gametes are produced by meiosis, wherein
that chromosome number is halved so that, at the union of the
male and female gametes during reproduction, the standard
number is reinstated.
Lewis Thomas, the highly regarded medical doctor who
served for many years as president of the prestigious SloanKettering Cancer Center in New York City, was unable to
contain either his enthusiasm or his praise for the system that
we know as “sexual reproduction.” In his book, The Medusa
and the Snail, he wrote about the “miracle” of how one sperm
cell forms with one egg cell to produce the cell we know as a
zygote, which, nine months later, will become a completely
new human being. His conclusion?
The mere existence of that cell should be one of the
greatest astonishments of the earth. People ought to
be walking around all day, all through their waking
hours, calling to each other in endless wonderment,
talking of nothing except that cell.... If anyone does
succeed in explaining it, within my lifetime, I will
charter a skywriting airplane, maybe a whole fleet of
them, and send them aloft to write one great excla
mation point after another around the whole sky, un
til all my money runs out (1979, pp. 155-157).
Dr. Thomas’ money is perfectly safe. No one has been able
to explain—from an evolutionary viewpoint—the origin of sex,
the origin of the incredibly complex meiotic process that makes
sex possible, or the amazingly intricate development of the
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embryo (which is itself a marvel of design). At conception, the
chromosomes inherited from the sperm are paired with the
chromosomes inherited from the egg to give the new organ
ism its full chromosomal complement. Evolutionary theorists
ask us to believe that random, chance occurrences brought
about this marvelously interdependent process of, first, split
ting the genetic information into equal halves, and, second,
recombining it through sexual reproduction. Not only is an
intricate process required to produce a sperm or egg cell in
the first place via meiosis, but another equally intricate mecha
nism also is required to rejoin the genetic information during
fertilization in order to produce the zygote, which will become
the embryo, which will become the fetus, which eventually will
become the newborn. The idea that all of this “just evolved”
is unworthy of acceptance, especially in light of the evidence
now at hand.
THE 50% DISADVANTAGE
While sexual reproduction requires two parents (and there
fore is neither as rapid nor as efficient as asexual reproduc
tion), it does possess certain advantages, not the least of which
is that species can benefit from the variability of mixing ge
netic material from two different parents. During sexual re
production, organisms are required to produce haploid ga
metes (sperm or egg cells) in which meiotic division has oc
curred, in order to remove half of the genes. Then, when the
gametes fuse (i.e., when the sperm fertilizes the egg), they
produce a zygote—a process that restores the full diploid com
plement of chromosomes, with half coming from each par
ent. In the end, sexual reproduction causes only half of a parent’s genes to be sent to each of its progeny. British evolution
ist Richard Dawkins of Oxford University described the pro
cess as follows: “Sexual reproduction is analogous to a rou
lette game in which the player throws away half his chips at
each spin. The existence of sexual reproduction really is a
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huge paradox” (1986, p. 130). Ask yourself this question: If
organisms benefit by passing along their own genetic mate
rial, then why would these organisms “evolve” into a situation
in which the reproduction process not only poses an enormous
risk for genetic errors through mistakes in DNA replication,
but also replaces half of their genetic material with that from
another parental unit?
Sexual reproduction has a “selective disadvantage” of at
least 50%—a disadvantage that will not budge! At conception,
the zygote receives 50% of its genetic material from the fa
ther and 50% from the mother. However, by reproducing
sexually, both the mother and father are required to give up
50% of their own genetic material. This leaves both parents
at a disadvantage, because a full 50% of their own genetic ma
terial will not be passed on. But, as Harvard’s Mayr has admit
ted: “No matter what the selective advantage of sexual repro
duction may be, that it does have such an advantage in
animals is clearly indicated by the consistent failure of
all attempts to return to asexuality” (2001, p. 104, emp. ad
ded). The conundrum of sexual reproduction leaves evolution
ists completely baffled because the terms are permanently
fixed and completely unyielding. Considering the possibility
of potential mechanisms for reproduction, it remains to be de
termined why nature ever would “evolve” sexual reproduction
at all. In his book, Sex and Evolution, George C. Williams com
mented on this “50% disadvantage”:
The primary task for anyone wishing to show favor
able selection of sex is to find a previously unsuspected
50% advantage to balance the 50% cost of meiosis.
Anyone familiar with accepted evolutionary thought
would realize what an unlikely sort of quest this is. We
know that a net selective disadvantage of 1% would
cause a gene to be lost rapidly in most populations,
and [yet] sex has a known disadvantage of 50%. The
problem has been examined by some of the most dis
tinguished of evolutionary theorists, but they have
either failed to find any reproductive advantage in
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sexual reproduction, or have merely showed the for
mal possibility of weak advantages that would prob
ably not be adequate to balance even modest recom
binational load. Nothing remotely approaching
an advantage that could balance the cost of meiosis has been suggested. The impossibility of sex
being an immediate reproductive adaptation in
higher organisms would seem to be as firmly established a conclusion as can be found in current
evolutionary thought. Yet this conclusion must
surely be wrong. All around us are plant and animal populations with both asexual and sexual
reproduction (1975, p. 11, emp. added).
While evolutionists admit that sex is disadvantageous to an
individual (at a whopping 50% rate!), they nevertheless claim
that it has some “evolutionary advantage” to the entire species.
Therefore, they classify sex as an “altruistic” trait because it
operates at an expense to the individual, yet is beneficial to
the entire community. Evolutionists commonly refer to this
“benefit” as “diversity.”
Early in the twentieth century, geneticists August Weismann,
R.A. Fisher, and H.J. Muller elucidated the importance of di
versity, stating: “Sex increases diversity, enabling a species
to more rapidly adapt to changing environments and thereby
avoid extinction” (as quoted in ReMine, 1993, p. 200) They
believed this diversity allowed evolution to occur much more
rapidly. At first, their idea appeared plausible and reason
able, and, in fact, was taught in an unchallenged fashion for
several decades. Commenting on the altruism theory about
the origin of sex, M.T. Ghiselin stated:
Weismann explicitly stated that sex exists for the good
of the species, and even though Lloyd Morgan pointed
out the fallacy [as early as 1890], this view remained
the dominant one for nearly 80 years. Why this should
have happened is something of a puzzle. The view
does have certain intuitive appeal, but that does not
explain why it was not subjected to more critical scru
tiny (1988, p. 11, bracketed item in orig.).
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However, by the mid 1960s this explanation had been “sub
jected to a more critical scrutiny,” and eventually the idea of
group selection overriding individual selection was shown to
be false and was discarded.
It also was believed that sexual reproduction might “speed
up” evolution. However, theorists soon realized that—from an
evolutionary viewpoint—an organism’s “fitness” was dam
aged, not improved, as a result of sexual reproduction. Gra
ham Bell pointed out:
Sex…does not merely reduce fitness, but halves it. If
a reduction in fitness of a fraction of one percent can
cripple a genotype, what will be the consequence of
a reduction of 50 per cent? There can be only one an
swer: sex will be powerfully selected against and
rapidly eliminated wherever it appears. And yet
this has not happened (1982, pp. 77-78, emp. added).
Additional scientific findings have caused researchers to
do a 180-degree turn-around in their explanation of the evo
lutionary purpose of sex. It now is claimed that sex is advan
tageous, not because it hastens evolution, but rather, because it slows it down. The necessity in this change in direc
tion was lamented by Bell:
To save the situation, then we must perform a com
plete volte-face [about-face—BH /BT]: just as it was
self-evident to Weismann, Fisher and Muller that a
faster rate of evolution would benefit a population,
so we must now contrive to believe in the self-evident desirability of evolving slowly (p. 100).
This 180-degree about-face often is explained in the follow
ing manner. An asexual species is both too specialized and
too dependent on its particular niche. As the niche vanishes,
the species goes extinct. Asexual species thus inadvertently
“adapt themselves out of existence” by refining a mode of life
that is so restricted, it eventually disappears. Meanwhile, sex
ual species lag behind. Sex blunts the precision with which a
species can adapt to a particular niche. Thus, according to evo
lutionists, sexual reproduction has slowed down evolution in
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order to prevent extinction. Considering the incredible diffi
culty involved in inventing a coherent theory about the origin
of sex in the first place, and the vast smorgasbord of possible
explanations available to try to explain sex, it is no wonder
that we often find evolutionists disposing of one theory, only
to replace it instantaneously with another.
MARS AND VENUS, OR X AND Y?
Modern self-help books would have us believe that men
and women hail from “different planets,” so to speak. But
what really separates them, we are told, are radically different
chromosomes. These chromosomes contain the genetic ma
terial that differentiates males and females. In order for a change
to occur from asexual reproduction to sexual reproduction,
two things had to occur at the very least: (1) a single sex first
had to “evolve” (so that it then could evolve into a second sex
—all the while retaining the first); and (2) double homologous
chromosomes also had to evolve.
But by what known method could an asexual organism pro
duce a sexual organism? And did you ever wonder: Which
of the two sexes (male and female) evolved first? Well, won
der no more. Evolutionists somehow have divined the answer.
As Jennifer Ackerman boldly put it: “The female was the
ancestral sex, the first self-replicating organism; it gave rise
to the male, a variant, and the two still share many character
istics “ (2001, pp. 113-114, emp. added). Of course, Ms. Ack
erman offered not a shred of scientific evidence for her auda
cious assertion—because there isn’t any! Upon hearing her state
ment, we cannot help but be reminded of the now-famous com
ment made by R.E. Dickerson several years ago in a special
issue of Scientific American on evolution. Dr. Dickerson (who
was addressing specifically the evolution of the intricate “ge
netic machinery” of the cell) boasted that since “there are no
laboratory models, one can speculate endlessly, unfettered
by inconvenient facts” (1978, 239[3]:85, emp. added). That
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also applies to the subject of the origin of sex. There are no
adequate laboratory models; hence, Ms. Ackerman is free to
“speculate endlessly, unfettered by inconvenient facts,” and
to claim without any proof whatsoever that “the female was
the ancestral sex.”
The second issue—the sudden appearance of double ho
mologous chromosomes—presents no less of a problem. Why
is this the case? Of the 46 human chromosomes, 44 are mem
bers of identical pairs, but two, the X and Y (generally re
ferred to as the “sex chromosomes”), stand apart. Evolution
ists thus are faced with the daunting challenge of explaining
not only the origin of sex chromosomes themselves, but also
the evolution of two totally different sex chromosomes
(X and Y).
Human females possess two X chromosomes, while men
possess one X and one Y. Some evolutionists (like Ackerman,
quoted above) argue that the male Y chromosome somehow
evolved from the female X chromosome. We know today
that the X chromosome is the “home” for thousands of genes,
while the Y has only a few dozen. Of those, only 19 are known
to be shared by both X and Y. If, as evolutionists argue, the Y
chromosome originally was identical to the X, then research
ers have a great deal of work ahead of them in order to ex
plain the fact that of the 19 shared genes, the X chromosomes
possesses all 19 on the tip of the short arm of the chromo
some, whereas they are scattered across the entire length of
the Y. Thus while both chromosomes do share certain genes,
those genes are found in totally different places, indicating
that the male Y chromosome is not simply an “evolved” X
chromosome.
DIFFERENCES AMONG VARIOUS SPECIES
In his book titled Why Is Sex Fun?, evolutionist Jared Dia
mond posed the question as to why men do not breast-feed
babies. This problem caused Diamond to speculate:
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Yes, it’s true that no male mammal has ever become
pregnant, and that the great majority of male mam
mals normally don’t lactate. But one has to go further
and ask why mammals evolved genes specifying that
only females, not males, would develop the necessary
anatomical equipment, the priming experience of preg
nancy, and the necessary hormones. Both male and
female pigeons secrete crop “milk” to nurse their squab;
why not men as well as women? Among seahorses
it’s the male rather than the female that becomes preg
nant; why is that not also true for humans? (1997, p.
42).
We also do not question that fact that most humans prefer to
participate in sexual relations in private, whereas animals are
indifferent to the presence of other animals or humans. Also
of interest is the fact that most human women experience a
complete shutdown of fertility somewhere between the ages
of forty and fifty-five, whereas men do not. [Most animals do
not experience a shutdown of their reproductive facilities at a
similar time period in their lives.] We frequently do not ques
tion certain practices—simply because they are commonplace
and because we are accustomed to seeing things performed a
certain way. But we must learn to ask ourselves two questions:
(1) “How did something get that way in the first place?”; and
(2) “Why is it that way?”
What causes some animals to breed, and then spend years
caring for their young, while others leave their young to fend
for themselves almost immediately after birth? The method
and nature of reproduction, and the degree of parental care,
varies widely among living organisms. With the stroke of their
pen, scientists have grouped pollination, asexual budding,
sexual reproduction, and viral replication under the same
“reproductive” umbrella, all the while giving scant attention
to the complexity and intricacy involved in these various forms
of reproduction. Consider, for example, the dizzying array
of samaras, pomes, nuts, pips, and just plain fluff produced
by trees. Some of the seed designs are absolutely ingenious,
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and, truth be told, dwarf mankind’s attempts at engineering.
Considering the odds of actual germination, it is no wonder
that we find that in a bumper-crop year, the average oak can
produce thousands of acorns, while an elm tree can produce
tens of thousands of winged samaras (a dry, “winged” seed).
Among the plant species, however, problems occur that can
not be explained by normal evolutionary theory. While most
of the higher plants are hermaphrodites (i.e., they bear both
pollen and eggs), there are those species in which pollen and
eggs exist in separate plants. Indeed, the suggestion that dioecy
[where female and male flowers are borne on separate plants]
allegedly has “evolved” from hermaphroditism [where both
female and male reproductive organs are found on the same
flower] is a central problem in evolutionary biology (Ashman,
2000, p. 147).
Probably the most elaborate and showy courtship rituals
belong to the bird family. Before mating season, many male
birds grow colorful plumage that they use to “show-off” while
trying to attract a mate. Courtship among reptiles often in
volves frequent fighting among rival males during breeding
season. Many often display vivid colors, produce loud noises,
or secrete pheromones (special scents) in an effort to commu
nicate with and attract members of the opposite sex. Salmon,
on the other hand, migrate to special spawning grounds dur
ing the breeding season. Often, these spawning grounds are
located a great distance from normal feeding grounds because
young fish have different feeding requirements compared to
the adults. During their breeding periods, European eels also
are known to travel great distances to special spawning grounds
in the Sargasso Sea. The reproductive habits of social insects
revolve around a tightly knit colony that centers on a queen.
Other “sexual oddities” can be observed amidst the animal
kingdom. Take, for example, two types of seals. Using the lin
eage provided by evolutionists, it would appear that these
two species are quite similar, and thus could be expected to
reproduce in a comparable fashion. However, harbor seals are
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monogamous, whereas male elephant seals may inseminate
as many as 100 females during their lifetimes. But this is only
the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The following chart demon
strates only a few of the reproductive differences observed in
just four common farm animals.
Cow
Age at Pu
berty
Length of
Estrus Cycle
Duration of
Estrus
Ewe
Sow
Mare
15
months
12 months
6 months
7 months
20-21 days
17 days
20-21 days 21 days
18 hours
30 hours
2-3 days
12-16 hours
Time of Ovu
after end of
lation
estrus
end of
estrus
Gestation
Length
148 days
283 days
5-6 days
24-48
40-44
hours
hours after
before
beginning
the end
of estrus
of estrus
336
114 days
days
The evolutionary “tree of life” does not demonstrate how
these animals came to have gestation periods of different
lengths, or varying estrus cycles, even though they allegedly
have descended from the same “branch” (i.e., the mammals).
Add to this mix the marsupials (from the Latin marsupium,
meaning “pouch,” since most, like the kangaroo, have some
sort of pouch in which their young develop, thereby shorten
ing the gestation period), and evolutionists find themselves
with a bewildering hodgepodge of complexity so puzzling
that simple lines and branches cannot even come close to ex
plaining the history of sexual reproduction.
DIFFERENCES IN ANIMAL
AND HUMAN SEXUALITY
Humans, unlike animals, do not copulate merely for re
productive purposes. Human females ovulate at only one
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point during their monthly cycle, but their bodies remain re
ceptive throughout the month. This indicates that mating at
all other times (i.e., outside of the ovulation period) has no
procreative function. Thus, sexual relations in humans often
are performed not for reproduction, but rather for enjoyment
and pleasure. During sexual activity, the bodies of human
males and females experience certain modifications and physi
ological changes that are not found in animals. Many of these
represent modifications that account for the heightened stim
ulation and pleasure that occurs during copulation. If humans
are a product of evolution, why, then, are females receptive
to copulation almost all of the time, whereas animals utilizing
an estrus cycle are not? Additionally, why do female humans
experience menopause (the cessation of fertility via ovulation)
as a regular phenomenon, which is not the norm for most wild
animals? These are questions that evolutionists generally leave
unasked, much less unanswered.
Genesis 31:35 indicates that menstrual bleeding of females
has been with humanity since at least the time of Jacob and
Rachel (cf. also Leviticus 20:18). The human female’s men
strual cycle is divided into two main phases—the follicular,
(or proliferative) phase, and the luteal (or secretory) phase.
The follicular phase (during which estrogen levels rise) is char
acterized first by menstruation, and then by proliferation of
the endometrial tissue. The ovarian cycle in female primates,
however, consists of four stages: proestrus, estrus, matestrus,
and diestrus. It is only in the second stage (estrus) that the fe
male animal experiences a swelling of the vulva, during which
various uterine processes occur that result in receptivity to
copulation. Physically, a female primate is not able to receive
a male unless she is in estrus. [The term “estrus” comes from the
Greek meaning mad or frenetic desire, and generally is ob
served when female animals are “in heat.”] Thus, the period
of sexual receptivity of the female monkey or ape is much
more restricted than that of a human female.
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The differences that have been documented between estrus
and menstrual cycles have caused evolutionists to formulate
an attempted explanation for the human menstrual cycle. In
1993, Margie Profet, a self-taught evolutionary biologist, wrote
a paper titled “Menstruation as a Defense Against Pathogens
Transported by Sperm.” Profet claimed that various micro
bial infections—caused by pathogen-toting spermatozoa—applied the adaptive pressure needed to cause menstruation.
Simply put, she believed human sperm were carrying diseasecausing organisms that necessitated the female to slough off
the walls of the uterus as a means of self-defense. While other
theories had existed prior to Profet’s work, hers was the first
to gain widespread scientific and public recognition. Three
years later, Beverly Strassmann, an anthropologist at the Uni
versity of Michigan in Ann Arbor, submitted a critical review
of Profet’s anti-pathogen hypothesis, and then proposed an
alternative theory. She claimed that the reason the uterine
endometrium is shed/reabsorbed in the cycle of regression
and renewal is because it is energetically less costly than main
tenance of the endometrium in an implantation state. We will
leave it up to our readers to determine whether these scien
tists are “serious” or “seriously grasping.” Suffice it to say that
neither of these theories explains how or why the human fe
male normally ovulates a single egg cell, instead of, say, five,
six, seven, or more. They also do little to explain why human
females routinely are sexually receptive, while animals are not.
Anatomically speaking, how did humans “evolve” an anatomy
that receives pleasure from sexual activity? And why haven’t
we “evolved” enjoyment from other activities that evolutionists say were passed down from our ape-like ancestors?
While God placed sexual relations only inside the mar
riage relationship (Hebrews 13:4), society has concluded that
marriage and love are not prerequisites for sexual activity in
humans. However, it should be noted when comparing hu
man reproduction to that of animals, humans—married or un-
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married—spend vast amounts of time, money, and energy in
courtship and bonding prior to sexual relations. Can we ob
serve various animals courting members of the opposite sex
for months or years prior to having sexual relations? Com
menting on the multiple facets that sex takes among humans,
John Langone wrote:
Sex is normal human behavior, a powerful drive that
we are all born with, as natural as hunger and thirst. It
enables us to bring new life into the world, and at the
same time it is pleasurable. One cannot deny that we
are often first attracted sexually to the one we decide
to spend a good deal of time with, even our entire life
time. Sex, also, is closely tied to our very vitality, our
physical and mental vigor, our capacity to grow and
create and act (1980).
Are we to believe, as many evolutionists espouse, that the
differences observed in human sexual relations are merely a
product of culture and upbringing? If this is true, then why do
we find similar courting rituals in so-called “lost” civilizations
that are protected from outside contact? Did humans “evolve”
the ability to date, fall in love, and desire to be married to one
individual for life?
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE HUMAN
REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM
Consider just how sophisticated the human reproductive
cycle must be in order to function correctly. During early ju
venile years, humans experience a delayed sexual develop
ment phase in which reproduction does not occur. Is it by
mere chance that our bodies are not able to reproduce at such
a young age? Once this juvenile period is over, changes occur
throughout the body, requiring simultaneous coordination of
further development in many different types of tissues. Addi
tionally, the production and regulation of gametes must be
timed just right. Females also must endure a previously un
known monthly ovulation cycle, which allows for fertilization.
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Once fertilization takes place, the female body then must pre
pare itself for the many changes that occur during pregnancy.
Are these carefully orchestrated processes mere happenstance?
While the male reproductive system may appear fairly sim
ple, the true mechanics actually are quite complex. Unlike
with other cells in the body, the production of sperm cells
[spermatogenesis] does not occur at 98.6°F/37°C (normal
body temperature). Instead, it occurs at a somewhat reduced
temperature. To facilitate this, the sperm-producing organs,
or testes, are located outside the body cavity in the scrotum,
allowing them to remain about 3°C cooler than the rest of the
body. This special location allows for the production of mil
lions of sperm cells, which are stored according to maturity
and then delivered during sexual intercourse. Additionally,
males possess a cremaster muscle, which involuntarily raises
or lowers the scrotal sac (depending on environmental con
ditions) in order to maintain a constant testicular temperature.
Are such things as the precise location and temperature regu
lation of the male testes just a fortuitous occurrence—or the prod
uct of an intelligent Creator?
Likewise, the female body has been designed in such a man
ner as to be receptive to sperm, while at the same time being
able to protect the abdominal area from bacteria in the envi
ronment. In addition, after producing eggs, the female repro
ductive system provides an environment in which a fertilized
embryo can grow (keep in mind that the embryo does not pos
sess its own blood supply, and therefore must obtain oxygen
and nutrients from the mother’s uterine wall). The uterus it
self must be able to expand and hold the weight of an infant,
plus the placenta and amniotic fluid—roughly 15 pounds—which
is no small task (imagine a structure about the size of an orange
able to expand and carry 3 five-pound bags of sugar!) After the
child is born, the uterus returns to its normal size, and then, amaz
ingly, is able to repeat this entire process again in future preg
nancies. The female body also must orchestrate the production
of milk for an infant, in conjunction with the baby’s arrival.
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While we take many of these feats for granted, science has yet
to design a machine that even comes close to mimicking bio
logical reproduction.
Reproductive hormones also play a critical role in the or
chestrated process of sexual development and reproduction.
While certain hormones can be found in both males and fe
males, their actions and target organs are completely differ
ent between the two sexes. Additionally, females possess re
productive hormones that are not found in males. Did these
reproductive hormones also just “evolve?” The following is a
summary of the hormones (found in males or females) that are
required for humans to be able to reproduce.
Males
1. Follicle-stimulating hormone—stimulates sper
matogenesis
2. Luteinizing hormone—stimulates the secretion
of testosterone
3. Testosterone—stimulates the development and
maintenance of male secondary sexual charac
teristics
Females
1. Follicle-stimulating hormone—stimulates the
growth of ovarian follicle
2. Luteinizing hormone—stimulates conversion of
ovarian follicles into corpus luteum; stimulates
secretion of estrogen
3. Estrogen—stimulates development and mainte
nance of female secondary sexual characteristics;
prompts monthly preparation of uterus for preg
nancy.
4. Progesterone—completes preparation of uterus
for pregnancy; helps maintain female second
ary sexual characteristics
5. Oxytocin—stimulates contraction of uterus; ini
tiates milk release
6. Prolactin—stimulates milk production
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The levels and production of these various hormones must
be maintained carefully and regulated on a daily basis. Is this
complex internal feedback mechanism—which is carried out
primarily by the brain—purely a trait that was passed on from
our alleged original sea-dwelling ancestors? If it is, why, then,
don’t those sea-dwelling organisms possess the same hor
mones? The complexity of the human reproductive system
is practically incomprehensible. While scientists try to “play
God” in their attempts to create living humans in laboratory
settings, they still are light-years away from creating actual
egg and sperm cells and all of the necessary components as
sociated with them.
ANATOMICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
HUMAN MALES AND FEMALES
Any second-grade child easily could identify anatomical
differences between the male and female species. However,
these represent only external features. There also exist nu
merous internal differences. If we are to believe that sexual
reproduction evolved from asexual reproduction, this means
that the gametes also evolved. Anatomically speaking, what
are the “chances” of a female evolving an egg large enough to
accept the genetic material from the male (so that the con
ceived embryo has a chance to grow), yet small enough that
it can fit through her own fallopian tubes? Furthermore, the
egg also must possess the capability of creating a special bar
rier once that single sperm has penetrated the egg’s cell wall,
so that no other sperm can penetrate and add still more ge
netic material. And exactly how long in the evolutionary
scheme of things did it take for a sperm cell to become small
enough to be able to fertilize the egg, yet motile enough so that
it could reach the egg?
With all of these anatomical differences, we must consider
that each one also represents an entirely different type of cell
that may or may not be present in the opposite sex. Yet evolu-
- 173 -
tionists suggest that all of this is merely a “historical accident.”
Furthermore, the expense of producing two separate genders
via such an accident is extremely costly for the species. Con
sider, for example, the fact that we have males and females in
approximately equal numbers. Scientifically speaking, it re
quires only a few males to keep a species alive and thriving.
From an evolutionary point of view, the expense of produc
ing so many males would appear not only unnecessary, but al
so counterproductive. Jones noted:
Biologists have an adolescent fascination with sex.
Like teenagers, they are embarrassed by the subject
because of their ignorance. What sex is, why it evolved
and how it works are the biggest unsolved problems
in biology. Sex must be important, as it is so expen
sive. If some creatures can manage with just females
so that every individual produces copies of herself,
why do so many bother with males? A female who
gave them up might be able to produce twice as many
daughters as before; and they would carry all of her
genes. Instead, a sexual female wastes time, first in find
ing a mate and then in producing sons who carry on
ly half of her inheritance. We are still not certain why
males exist; and why, if we must have them at all, na
ture needs so many. Surely, one or two would be enough
to impregnate all the females but, with few exceptions,
the ratio of males to females remains stubbornly equal
throughout the living world (1993, p. 84).
But what is this great expense to which biologists continu
ally refer? The anatomical differences observed in males and
females go far beyond the external differences observed by
the second grader mentioned above. Yet scientists admittedly
are reluctant to examine these differences in light of evolution
ary theory. [A chart comparing some of the anatomical struc
tures of males and females, and their primary functions, can
be found on page 177.]
Realize that each one of these anatomical structures requires
its own arterial and venous blood supply, as well as processes
of nerve innervation that are not always apparent in the op-
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posite sex. Additionally, many of these structures have their
own specific lymphatic drainage. How could the vascular
and nervous tissue that supports the male prostate have
evolved from a female equivalent, since females do not
even possess a prostate? Did humans continue to evolve to
accommodate all the sexual and reproductive organs?
CELLULAR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
HUMAN MALES AND FEMALES
The human sperm cell and egg cell have been optimized
in totally different ways. The egg is nonmotile, covered by a
protective coating, and carries a large nutrient supply for
growth and development. Sperm cells, by contrast, are ex
tremely motile, built solely for fertilization, and have been
streamlined for delivering DNA to the egg. Evolutionists
would have us believe that these differences resulted from
millions of years of trial and error. However, in the case of re
production, sperm and egg cells that are not fully functional do not result in fertilization—thus the species would
not be able to reproduce, and therefore would become extinct. How many generations of “error” would it take in this
trial-and-error period before all sexually reproducing animals
would die out? Are we to believe that these two totally differ
ent types of cells happened practically overnight by chance?
Take a closer look at these two cells to determine if they are
the products of chance—or the product of intelligent design.
Sperm cells are unlike any other cells in the body. They have
been “stripped down” of everything unnecessary for fertilization—thus they are not encumbered with things like ribosomes,
an endoplasmic reticulum, or a Golgi apparatus. However,
the mitochondria (the powerhouses of the cell) have been ar
ranged strategically in the center of the sperm cell where they
can most efficiently propel the flagellum. This long, motile fla
gellum is driven by dynein motor proteins that use the energy
of ATP (provided by all those mitochondria) to slide the mi-
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crotubules inside the flagellum, thus bending certain portions
of it. The head (or cap) of the sperm contains a specialized ac
rosomal vesicle, which contains hydrolytic enzymes that allow
the sperm to penetrate the egg’s outer layer. Without this spe
cial vesicle, the sperm cell would be unable to penetrate the
coating of the egg cell. Upon contact with the egg, the con
tents of the acrosomal vesicle are released and the sperm cell
then is bound tightly to the egg so that the genetic material can
be transferred (Alberts, et al., 1994, p. 1026). Production of
these incredible cells occurs throughout life. In a man, it takes
about 24 days for a spermatocyte to complete meiosis in or
der to become a spermatid, and then another 5 weeks for a sper
matid to develop into a mature motile sperm. Does this sound
like something that occurred randomly overnight?
Egg cells, on the other hand, proliferate only in the fetus.
These special cells undergo meiosis well before birth, but then
can remain in a “suspended” state for up to 50 years. So while
sperm cells are produced continually over a man’s lifetime,
egg cells are produced only during fetal development (i.e.,
no more are made after the female baby is born). During this
fetal production stage, enough eggs are produced to last an
adult woman throughout her life. The yolk, or egg cytoplasm,
in these egg cells is rich in lipids, proteins, and polysaccharides.
Egg cells also contain specialized secretory vesicles (located
under the plasma membrane) that possess cortical granules.
These granules alter the egg coat upon fertilization in order to
prevent more than one sperm from fusing with the egg (Al
berts, et al., p. 1022). Additionally, egg cell development (a
developing egg is called an oocyte) occurs in timed stages af
ter mensus begins. Interestingly, while the general stages of
oocyte development are similar, we know today that this pro
cess actually varies from species to species. How does the ran
domness concept associated with evolution explain these ex
tremely complex cellular characteristics, or the differences seen
among species? Homer Jacobson addressed such problems
when he stated:
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MALE
Organ
Penis
Primary Function
Erectile organ of copulation and urinary excre
tion
Testicle
Production of male sex hormones and sperm
Seminal
Vesicles
Provide an alkaline fluid containing nutrients and
prostaglandins
Ductus
Deferens
Convey sperm to ejaculatory ducts
Prostate
Secretes alkaline fluid that helps neutralize acidic
seminal fluid, and enhances motility of sperm
Epididymis
Scrotum
Storage and maturation of spermatozoa
Encloses and protects the testes
FEMALE
Organ
Vagina
Labia Major
and Minor
Primary Function
Organ of copulation, and passageway for fe
tus during parturition
Elongate vaginal canal and protect external gen
italia
Clitoris
Erectile organ associated with feelings of pleasure
during sexual stimulation
Ovary
Egg production and female sex hormones
Uterus
(Womb)—site of implantation; sustains life of the
embryo
Uterine
Tube
Convey egg or embryo toward uterus; common
site of fertilization
Mammary
Glands
Produce and secrete milk for nourishment of
infant
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Directions for the reproduction of plans, for energy
and the extraction of parts from the current environ
ment, for the growth sequence, and for the effector
mechanism translating instructions into growth—all
had to be simultaneously present at that moment. This
combination of events has seemed an incredibly unlikely happenstance, and has often been
ascribed to divine intervention (1955, 43:121, emp.
added).
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION
During their investigation of the complexity of sexual re
production at the cellular level, Bruce Alberts and his col
leagues commented: “Whatever the origins of sex may be, it
is striking that practically all complex present-day organisms
have evolved largely through generations of sexual, rather
than asexual reproduction. Asexual organisms, although plen
tiful, seem mostly to have remained simple and primitive”
(1994, p. 1013). Striking indeed! Yet we as humans currently
find ourselves on the verge of a reproductive shift—one that
will place evolutionists in the position of playing God, while
simultaneously eluding many of these tough questions.
Within our lifetimes, there can be little doubt that we will
see serious scientific attempts at human cloning (by “serious”
we mean experiments intended to carry a clone from its for
mation in the laboratory to birth via a surrogate mother). Clon
ing already has occurred in several mammalian species, and
it likely is only a matter of time before someone announces
the appearance of the first human clone. It is our personal be
lief that somewhere on this planet, a surrogate mother already
is carrying the first cloned embryo—or will be shortly. In fact,
Italian in vitro expert Severino Antinori announced on Fri
day, April 5, 2002, that a woman taking part in his controver
sial human cloning project already was eight weeks pregnant
with a cloned embryo (see Daniel, 2002). Nineteen days later,
on Wednesday, April 24, 2002, Dr. Antinori claimed that as
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of that date, three cloned pregnancies were in progress (see
“Italian Cloning Scientist...,” 2002). Once we cross this thresh
old, human reproduction no longer will take place as God or
dained, but will occur instead solely at the discretion of man (or
woman!). [NOTE: In July 2002, researcher Orly Lacham-Kaplan at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, announced
that she had discovered a method by which to fertilize eggs us
ing genetic material harvested from somatic (body) cells—without the use of sperm (see “Eggs Fertilised without Sperm,” 2002).
The implications of such a procedure are obvious. As one news
report observed, this process “could help lesbian couples to
have baby girls that are genetically their own” (Highfield, 2002).
This is what we meant when we commented that future human
reproduction no longer will take place as God ordained, but
instead will occur instead solely at the discretion of man (or
woman!).]
In the September 2003 issue of Fertility and Sterility, James
Grifo and his colleagues at New York University School of Medi
cine, along with researchers at Sun Yat Sen University Medi-
Figure 4 — Insertion into oocyte, during cloning process, of
full complement of genetic material from somatic cell
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cal Science in China, created the first human pregnancy using
techniques related to cloning. The procedure was carried out
in China, in an effort to avoid laws and regulations regarding
human experimentation. As Helen Pearson noted in an article
that appeared on Nature magazine’s Web site:
The team fertilized eggs from two women in test tubes.
They then sucked out the nucleus of one egg and in
jected it into the other, which they had stripped of its
own nucleus. The idea is that the second egg will bet
ter direct the growth of an embryo (2003a).
After creating seven “reconstructed” zygotes, the team im
planted five of those into a 30-year-old woman who already
had undergone two failed attempts at in vitro fertilization. Sci
entists reported a successful triplet pregnancy, and even were
able to detect fetal heartbeats. At 33 days, a “fetal reduction to
a twin pregnancy was performed” (see Zhang, et al., 2003).
One of the two remaining babies was lost after 24 weeks, due
to “premature rupture of membranes,” and was pronounced
dead as a result of “respiratory distress” (Zhang, et al.). The fi
nal remaining infant died at 29 weeks after suffering from a
cord prolapse.
In light of this evidence, and the unfortunate deaths of the
children that resulted from the experiment, it is as unbeliev
able as it is terrifying that Grifo and his colleagues would dare
to conclude: “Viable human pregnancies with normal karyo
type [the chromosomal characteristics of an individual—BH/
BT] can be achieved through nuclear transfer.” How tragic that
we already have lost three innocent lives because scientists
are resolved to further “improve” this technique. How many
more humans will have to die before we realize human clon
ing is morally and ethically reprehensible?
Cloning bypasses the normal fertilization process between
an egg and a sperm cell. Cloning allows scientists to take a
mature body cell, subject it to harsh treatment so that it re
verts to an “embryonic” mode, and then transfer its genetic
material into an egg cell whose nucleus has been removed
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(leaving the egg empty, but healthy). Upon realizing that it no
longer is in a hostile environment, the body cell “wakes up”
and begins to develop—having forgotten where it came from
and what it was on its way to becoming. As it begins to grow
once more, it creates a whole new organism. This new organ
ism then will be an exact genetic duplicate of the original body
cell from which it was taken. But is this a safe method of re
production? Ask yourself what happens to all of the embryos
that are used to try to get the procedure “up and running,”
so-to-speak. How many failed human clones will we have to
produce before we realize how morally bankrupt such a pro
cedure really is? [For a brief look at humanity’s future from
an evolutionist’s point of view, see Peter Ward’s 2001 book,
Future Evolution, pp. 139-153.]
Human reproduction was designed and created by God.
During the activities of the Creation week (described in Gen
esis 1), it was only at the creation of man that a “divine confer
ence” of the members of the Godhead occurred. Additionally,
the Bible specifically denotes a separate creation of males
and females. The sexes were not created simultaneously as
in the case of the members of the animal kingdom. Genesis
1:26-27 records: “And God said, ‘Let us make man in our im
age, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the
fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over the
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that
creepeth upon the earth.’ And God created man in his own
image, in the image of God created he him; male and female
created he them” (emp. added). He commanded Adam and
Eve to “be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and
subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over
the birds of the heavens, and over every living thing that mov
eth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:28). This command came from
the God Who spoke life into man, and Who designed humans
and their means of reproduction completely separate from the
animals.
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Sexual reproduction is not merely the product of millions
of years of evolution. As these numerous examples of differences adequately demonstrate, the highly complex
and intricate manner in which the human body reproduces is not a matter of mere chance or a “lucky role of
the dice.” Rather, it is the product of an intelligent Designer.
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5
In 1994, an article appeared in Time magazine titled “How
Man Began.” Within that article was the following bold asser
tion: “No single, essential difference separates human beings
from other animals” (Lemonick, 143[11]:81). Yet, in what is
obviously a contradiction to such a statement, evolutionists ad
mit that communication via speech is uniquely human—so much
so that it often is used as the singular most important dividing
line between humans and animals. In a book titled Eve Spoke,
evolutionist Philip Lieberman admitted: “Speech is so essen
tial to our concept of intelligence that its possession is virtually
equated with being human. Animals who talk are human, be
cause what sets us apart from other animals is the ‘gift’ of speech”
(1998, p. 5, emp. in orig.). In The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hu
man Evolution, editors Jones, Martin, and Pilbeam conceded
that “[t]here are no non-human languages,” and then went on
to observe that “language is an adaptation unique to humans,
and yet the nature of its uniqueness and its biological basis are
notoriously difficult to define” (1992, p. 128). Terrance Dea
con noted:
In this context, then, consider the case of human lan
guage. It is one of the most distinctive behavioral ad
aptations on the planet. Languages evolved in only
one species, in only one way, without precedent, ex
cept in the most general sense. And the differences
between languages and all other natural modes of com
municating are vast (1997, p. 25).
What events transpired that have allowed humans to speak,
while animals remained silent? If we are to believe the evolu
tionary teaching that currently is taking place in colleges and
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universities around the world, speech evolved as a natural
process through time. Yet no one is quite sure how, and there
are no known animals that are in a transition phase from non
speaking to speaking. In fact, in the Atlas of Languages, this re
markable admission can be found: “No languageless commu
nity has ever been found” (Matthews, et al., 1996, p. 7). This rep
resents no small problem for evolutionists. In fact, the origin
of speech and language (along with the development of sex and
reproduction) remains one of the most significant hurdles in
evolutionary theory, even in the twenty-first century. In fact,
some evolutionists simply have stopped discussing the matter.
Jean Aitchison noted: “In 1866, a ban on the topic was incor
porated into the founding statues of the Linguistic Society of
Paris, perhaps the foremost academic linguistic institution of
the time: ‘The Society does not accept papers on either the
origin of language or the invention of a universal language’ ”
(2000, p. 5). That is an amazing (albeit inadvertent) admission
of defeat, especially coming from a group of such eminent sci
entists, researchers, and scholars.
The truth of the matter is, however, that the origin of hu
man languages can be discerned—but not via the theory of
evolution. We invite your close attention to the information
that follows, which demonstrates conclusively that humans
were created by God with the special unique ability to employ
speech for communication.
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES
ON THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH
Many animals are capable of using sounds to communicate.
However, there is a colossal difference between the grunt of a
pig or the hoot of an owl, and a human standing before an au
dience reciting Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken.” This
enormous chasm between humans and animals has led to a
multiplicity of theories on exactly how man came upon this un
equaled capability. But there is one common theme that stands
out amidst all the theories: “The world’s languages evolved
spontaneously. They were not designed” (Deacon, p. 110).
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Design indicates that there was a Designer; thus, evolution
ists have conjured up theories that consider language nothing
more than a fortuitous chain of events. Most of these theories
involve humans growing bigger brains, which then made it phys
iologically possible for people to develop speech and language.
For instance, in the foreword of her book, The Seeds of Speech,
Jean Aitchison hypothesized:
Physically, a deprived physical environment led to
more meat-eating and, as a result, a bigger brain. The
enlarged brain led to the premature birth of humans,
and in consequence a protracted childhood, during
which mothers cooed and crooned to their offspring.
An upright stance altered the shape of the mouth and
vocal tract, allowing a range of coherent sounds to be
uttered (2000, p. x).
Thus, according to Aitchison, we can thank “a deprived physi
cal environment” for our current ability to talk and commu
nicate. Another evolutionist, John McCrone, put it this way:
It all started with an ape that learned to speak. Man’s
hominid ancestors were doing well enough, even
though the world had slipped into the cold grip of the
ice ages. They had solved a few key problems that had
held back the other branches of the ape family, such
as how to find enough food to feed their rather over
sized brains. Then man’s ancestors happened on the
trick of language. Suddenly, a whole new mental land
scape opened up. Man became self-aware and self-possessed (1991, p. 9).
Question: How (and why) did that first ape learn to speak?
It is easy to suggest that “it all started with an ape that learned
to speak.” But it is much more difficult to describe how this
took place, especially in light of our failure to teach apes to speak
today. In his book, From Hand to Mouth: The Origins of Language,
Michael Corballis stated:
My own view is that language developed much more
gradually, starting with the gestures of apes, then gath
ering momentum as the bipedal hominins evolved.
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The appearance of the larger-brained genus Homo some
2 million years ago may have signaled the emergence
and later development of syntax, with vocalizations
providing a mounting refrain. What may have distin
guished Homo sapiens was the final switch from a mix
ture of gestural and vocal communication to an auton
omous vocal language, embellished by gesture but not
dependent on it (2002, p. 183).
The truth, however, is that evolutionists can only speculate
as to the origin of language. Evolutionist Carl Zimmer summed
it up well when he wrote:
No one knows the exact chronology of this evolution,
because language leaves precious few traces on the
human skeleton. The voice box is a flimsy piece of cart
ilage that rots away. It is suspended from a slender Cshaped bone called a hyoid, but the ravages of time
usually destroy the hyoid too (2001, p. 291).
Thus, theories are plentiful—while the evidence to support
those theories remains mysteriously unavailable. Add to this
the fact that humans acquire the ability to communicate (and
even learn some of the basic rules of syntax) by the age of
two, and you begin to see why Aitchison admitted: “Of course,
holes still remain in our knowledge: in particular, at what stage
did language leap from being something new which humans
discovered to being something which every newborn human
is scheduled to acquire? This is still a puzzle” (p. ix). Yes, it is
“a puzzle.”
ADAM—THE FIRST HUMAN
TO TALK AND COMMUNICATE
In a chapter titled “What, When, and Where did Eve Speak
to Adam and He to Her?,” Philip Lieberman stated:
In the five-million-year-long lineage that connects
us to the common ancestors of apes and human be
ings, there have been many Adams and many Eves.
In the beginning was the word, but the vocal commu
nications of our most distant hominid ancestors five
million years or so ago probably didn’t really differ
from those of the ape-hominid ancestor (1998, p. 133).
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Using biblical terminology, Lieberman had written a year ear
lier: “For with speech came a capacity for thought that had
never existed before, and that has transformed the world. In
the beginning was the word” (1997, p. 27).
When God created the first human beings—Adam and Eve
—He created them in His own image (Genesis 1:26-27). This
likeness unquestionably included the ability to engage in in
telligible speech via human language. In fact, God spoke to
them from the very beginning of their existence as humans
(Genesis 1:28-30). Hence, they possessed the ability to under
stand verbal communication—and to speak themselves!
God gave very specific instructions to the man before the
woman was even created (Genesis 2:15-17). Adam gave names
to the animals before the creation of Eve (Genesis 2:19-20).
Since both the man and the woman were created on the sixth
day, the creation of the man preceded the creation of the wo
man by only hours. So, Adam had the ability to speak on
the very day he was brought into existence!
That same day, God put Adam to sleep and performed history’s first human surgery. He fashioned the female of the spe
cies from a portion of the male’s body. God then presented
the woman to the man (no doubt in what we would refer to as
the first marriage ceremony). Observe Adam’s recorded re
sponse: “And Adam said, ‘This is now bone of my bones and
flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was
taken out of man’ ” (Genesis 2:23). Here is Adam—less than
twenty-four hours old—articulating intelligible speech with a
well-developed vocabulary and advanced powers of expres
sion. Note, too, that Eve engaged in intelligent conversation
with Satan (Genesis 3:1-5). An unbiased observer is forced to
conclude that Adam and Eve were created by God with oral
communication capability. Little wonder, then, that God told
Moses: “Who had made man’s mouth?… Have not I, the Lord?
Now therefore, go, and I will be with your mouth and teach
you what you shall say” (Exodus 4:11-12).
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This circumstance should not surprise us, since the rest of
the created order also was brought into existence fully formed
and operational. Adam’s body was that of a man—not a child.
His body possessed reproductive capability (Genesis 1:28).
His mind was mentally and psychologically functional on the
level of an adult. Likewise, trees and plants were completely
operational in their photosynthetic, reproductive, and fruitbearing capability (Genesis 1:11-12). Animals, too, were cre
ated fully functional (Genesis 1:20-25). And, the Sun, Moon,
planets, and stars were created instantaneously to provide the
services they were intended to provide (Genesis 1:14-18). Once
again, the biblical explanation of the beginning of the human
race and linguistic functionality is logical, reasonable, and sci
entifically feasible. The evolutionary model is not.
TOWER OF BABEL—AND
THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE
Nobody knows exactly how many languages there are in the
world, partly because of the difficulty of distinguishing be
tween a language and a sub-language (or dialects within it).
One authoritative source that has collected data from all over
the world, The Ethnologue, lists the total number of languages
as 6,809.
The Bible’s explanation of the origins of multiple human
languages is given in the Tower of Babel incident (Genesis 11:
1-9). Scripture simply and confidently asserts: “Now the whole
earth had one language and one speech” (11:1). When Noah
and his family stepped off of the ark, they spoke a single lan
guage that was passed on to their offspring. As the population
increased, it apparently remained localized in a single geo
graphical region. Consequently, little or no linguistic varia
tion ensued. But when a generation defiantly rejected God’s
instructions to scatter over the planet, God miraculously in
tervened and generated the major language groupings of the
human race. This action forced the population to proceed
with God’s original intention by clustering according to shared
languages.
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This depiction of the origin of hu
man languages coincides well with
the present status of the world’s lan
guages. The extant linguistic evi
dence does not support the model
postulated by evolutionists for the
origin of languages. Many evolu
tionary linguists believe that all hu
man languages descended from a
single, primitive language, which
itself evolved from grunts and noi
ses of the lower animals. The single
most influential “hopeful monster”
theory of the evolution of human
language was proposed by Noam
Chomsky, the famed MIT linguist,
and has since been echoed by nu
merous anthropologists, philosophers, linguists, and psychol
ogists. Chomsky argued that the ability of children to acquire
the grammar necessary for a language can be explained only
if we assume that all grammars are variations of a single, ge
neric “universal grammar,” and that all human brains come
“with a built-in language organ that contains this language blue
print” (Deacon, 1997, p. 35). However, the existing state of hu
man language suggests that the variety of dialects and sub-languages has developed from a relatively few (perhaps less than
twenty) languages. These so-called “proto-languages,” from
which all others supposedly developed, were distinct among
themselves—with no previous ancestral language. Creationist
Carl Wieland thus observed: “The evidence is wonderfully
consistent with the notion that a small number of languages,
separately created at Babel, has diversified into the huge va
riety of languages we have today” (1999, p. 22).
THE BRAIN’S LANGUAGE CENTERS—
CREATED BY GOD
In contemplating how language arose, evolutionists fre
quently link the evolution of the brain to the appearance of lan-
- 189 -
guages. But consider that over 5,000 languages exist, and you
begin to understand that the development of language cannot
be viewed as a simple, clear-cut addition to human physiology
that was made possible by an enlarged brain unique to Homo
sapiens. Terrance Deacon commented on the intricacy of evolv
ing a language when he stated: “For a language feature to have
such an impact on brain evolution that all members of the spe
cies come to share it, it must remain invariable across even the
most drastic language change possible” (p. 329, emp. in
orig.).
The complexity underlying speech began to reveal itself in
patients who were suffering various communication problems.
Researchers began noticing analogous responses among pa
tients with similar injuries. The ancient Greeks noticed that
brain damage could cause the loss of the ability to speak (known
as aphasia). Centuries later, in 1836, Marc Dax described a
group of patients that could not speak normally. Dax reported
that all of these patients experienced damage to the left hemi
sphere of their brain. In 1861, Paul Broca described a patient
who could speak only a single word (the word “tan”). When
this patient died, Broca examined his brain and noted dam
age to the left frontal cortex, which has since become known
anatomically as “Broca’s area.” While patients with damage to
Broca’s area can understand language, they generally cannot
produce speech because words are not formed properly and
thus their speech is slurred and slow.
In 1876, Carl Wernicke found that language problems also
could result from damage to another area of the brain. This
area, later termed “Wernicke’s area,” is located in the poste
rior part of the temporal lobe. Damage to Wernicke’s area
results in a loss of the ability to understand language.
Thus, patients can continue to speak, but the words are put
together in such a way that they make no sense. Interestingly,
in most people (around 97%), both Broca’s area and Wernicke’s
area are found only in the left hemisphere, which explains the
language deficits observed in patients with brain damage to the
left side of the brain. Evolutionists freely acknowledge that
- 190 -
Figure 1 — Left hemisphere of human brain with language centers—Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area—highlighted. LifeART
image copyright © (2003) Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. All
rights reserved. Used by permission.
[t]he relationship between brain size and language is
unclear. Possibly, increased social interaction com
bined with tactical deception gave the brain an initial
impetus. Better nourishment due to meat-eating may
also have played a part. Then brain size and language
possibly increased together (Aitchison, 2000, p. 85).
But the brain is not simply larger. The connections are vast
ly different as well. As Deacon went on to admit: “Looking
more closely, we will discover that a radical re-engineering of
the whole brain has taken place, and on a scale that is unprec
edented” (p. 45). In order to speak a word that has been read,
information is obtained from the eyes and travels to the vi
sual cortex. From the primary visual cortex, information is
transmitted to the posterior speech area (which includes Wernicke’s area). From there, information travels to Broca’s area,
and then to the primary motor cortex to provide the necessary
muscle contractions to produce the sound. To speak a word
that has been heard, we must invoke the primary auditory cor
tex, not the visual cortex. Deacon commented on this complex
neuronal network—not found in animals—when he wrote:
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There is, without doubt, something special about hu
man brains that enables us to do with ease what no oth
er species can do even minimally without intense ef
fort and remarkably insightful training. We not only
have the ability to create and easily learn simple sym
bol systems such as the chimps Sherman and Austin
struggled to learn, but in learning languages we ac
quire an immensely complex rule system and a rich
vocabulary at a time in our lives when it is otherwise
very difficult to learn even elementary arithmetic. Many
a treatise on grammatical theory has failed to provide
an adequate accounting of the implicit knowledge that
even a four-year-old appears to possess about her newly
acquired language (p. 103).
ANATOMY OF SPEECH
The mechanics involved in speaking have anatomical re
quirements that are found primarily in humans. There is no
animal living presently, nor has one been observed in the fos
sil record, that possesses anything close to the “voice box” (as
we commonly call it) that is present in humans. As informa
tion scientist Werner Gitt observed in his intriguing book, The
Wonder of Man:
Only man has the gift of speech, a characteristic other
wise only possessed by God. This separates us clearly
from the animal kingdom…. In addition to the nec
essary “software” for speech, we have also been pro
vided with the required “hardware” (1999, p. 101).
Furthermore, the lack of any “transitional” animal form
(with the requisite speech hardware) in the fossil record poses
a significant continuity problem for evolutionists. As Deacon
noted:
This lack of precedent makes language a problem for
biologists. Evolutionary explanations are about bio
logical continuity, so a lack of continuity limits the
use of the comparative method in several important
ways. We can’t ask, “What ecological variable corre
lates with increasing language use in a sample spe-
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cies?” Nor can we investigate the “neurological cor
relates of increased language complexity.” There is
no range of species to include in our analysis (p. 34).
To simplify the anatomy required for speech by using an anal
ogy, think of a small tube resting inside a larger tube. The in
ner tube consists of the trachea going down to the lungs, and
the larynx (which houses the voice box). At the larynx, the in
ner tube opens out to the larger tube, which is known as the
pharynx. It not only carries sound up to the mouth, but al
so carries food and water from the mouth down to the stom
ach. A simplistic description of how humans utter sounds in
speech can be characterized by the control of air generated by
the lungs, flowing through the vocal tract, vibrating over the
vocal cord, being filtered by
facial muscle activity, and
then being released out of
the mouth and nose. Just as
sound can be generated by
forcing air across the nar
row mouth of a bottle, air is
streamed across the vocal
cords, which can be tight
ened or relaxed to produce
a variety of different reso
nances. The physiological
components necessary can
be divided into: (1) the sup
ralaryngeal vocal tract; (2)
the larynx; and (3) the subglottal system.
In 1848, Johannes Mul
ler demonstrated that hu
man speech involved modFigure 2 — Physiological components involved in speech. LifeART
ulation of acoustic energy
image copyright © (2003) Lipby the airway above the larpincott, Williams & Wilkins. All
ynx (called the supralaryn
rights reserved. Used by permisgeal tract). The sound ension.
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ergy for speech is generated in the larynx at the vocal folds.
The subglottal system, which consists of the lungs, trachea,
and their associated muscles, provides the necessary power
for speech production. The lungs produce the initial air pres
sure that is essential for the speech signal; the pharyngeal cav
ity, oral cavity, and nasal cavity shape the final output sound
that is perceived as speech.
BIRDS OF A FEATHER—OR NAKED APE?
Imagine the conundrum in which evolutionists find them
selves when it comes to speech and language. The animal that
comes closest to producing anything that even vaguely resem
bles human speech is not another primate, but rather a bird.
Deacon noted:
In fact, most birds easily outshine any mammal in
vocal skills, and though dogs, cats, horses, and mon
keys are remarkably capable learners in many do
mains, vocalization is not one of them. Our remark
able vocal abilities are not part of a trend, but an ex
ception (pp. 30-31).
For instance, a famous African gray parrot in England named
Toto is able to pronounce words so clearly that he sounds rath
er human. Like humans, birds can produce fluent, complex
sounds. We both share a double-barreled, double-layered sys
tem involving tunes and dialects, which is controlled by the
left side of our brains. And just like young children, juvenile
birds experience a period termed “sub-song” where they twit
ter in what resembles the babbling of a young child learning
to speak. Yet Toto does not have “language” as humans under
stand it. Humans use language for many more purposes than
birds use song. Consider also that it is mostly male birds that
sing. Females remain songless unless they are injected with the
male hormone testosterone (see Nottebohm, 1980). Consid
er also that humans often communicate intimately between
two or three people, while bird communication is a fairly longdistance affair.
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Oddly, some researchers have even gone so far as to sug
gest that both animate and inanimate objects can communi
cate. According to a group that refers to itself as the Global
Psychic Team, “animals, trees, plants, rocks—all of nature
—telepathically communicate with us, sending images, feelings,
even words. The key is in learning how to listen and respond”
(see “Animals Talk,” 2002). But what evidence exists to dem
onstrate that animals (much less plants and rocks!) have the
unique ability to communicate that is possessed by humans?
While evolutionary language scientists assert differently, the
truth is that animals do not possess the ability to talk and com
municate like humans.
One of the big “success” stories in looking at the human
like qualities of non-human primates is a male bonobo chimp
known as Kanzi (see Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1994;
Skoyles and Sagan, 2002, pp. 217-220). Kanzi was born Oc
tober 28, 1990, and began his journey to learn to “speak” as a
result of the training given to his mother, Matata, via a “talk
ing” keyboard. Matata never did master the keyboard, but
Kanzi did. Through many years of intense training and close
social contact with humans, this remarkable animal attained
the language abilities of an average two-year-old human. By
age ten, he had a “spoken” vocabulary (via the keyboard) of
some two hundred words. In fact, Kanzi was able to go be
yond the mere parroting or “aping” of humans; he actually
could communicate his wants and needs, express feelings, and
use tools. When tested against a two-year-old girl by the name
of Alia (where both the girl and the chimp were given verbal
instructions to carry out certain tasks), Kanzi performed bet
ter than Alia. And, as he grew into adulthood, Kanzi began to
prefer the company of humans to that of other chimps. Inas
much as Kanzi can accomplish these things, does this prove
that chimps are merely hairy, child-like versions of humans?
Hardly. To use the words of the famous American news
commentator, Paul Harvey, someone needs to tell “the rest
of the story.” For example, in their 2002 volume, Up from
Dragons, John Skoyles and Dorion Sagan discussed Kanzi at
great length. Among other things, they wrote:
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Kanzi did this when he was 5, and Alia was only 2.
But it was not really a fair contest. Alia was learning
not only to understand spoken speech, but also to
speak, something that would provide feedback on
her comprehension. Since Kanzi could not make
speech sounds, he was working under a handicap
when trying to understand spoken English. It is re
markable that he could understand single words, let
alone the short sentences above. Interestingly, while
Kanzi will never, for anatomical reasons, be able
to speak, he does have a far wider range of vocal
sounds than other chimps….
Kanzi shows that while chimps may have the poten
tial to learn language, they require a “gifted” envi
ronment to do so. Kanzi was surrounded by intelli
gent apes with PhDs [i.e., humans—BH/BT] who spoke
to him and gave him a stream of rich interactions.
They gave Kanzi’s brain a world in which it could
play at developing its ability to communicate….
Therefore, as much as in his brain, Kanzi’s skill
lies in the environment that helped shape it
(2002, pp. 215,216, emp. added).
Kanzi does not have the anatomical equipment required for
speech. Aside from the mimicking ability of parrots, no ani
mal does. As Skoyles and Sagan noted: “Chimps lack the vo
cal abilities needed for making speech sounds—speech requires
a skilled coordination between breathing and making move
ments with the larynx that chimps lack” (p. 214). Humans, how
ever, do possess the anatomical equipment required for speech.
But there is more. Regardless of the amount of instruction
such animals receive, there appear to be built-in limits on
their progress. On February 15, 1994, the public television
program NOVA aired a show titled “Can Chimps Talk?” (for
a full transcript of the show go to www.primate.wisc.edu/pin
/nova.html). The show began with a “conversation” with
Kanzi, who was required to use a talking keyboard to respond
to queries from his human counterpart. As the television pro
gram demonstrated quite effectively, he often responded in-
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correctly when asked a question. For instance, one of the hu
mans asked, “Is there any other food you’d like me to bring in
the backpack?” Kanzi’s talking keyboard response was: “ball.”
The program then focused on Washoe, a chimpanzee that,
in the 1970s, was taught a portion of American Sign Language
by Allen and Beatrice Gardner at the University of Nevada.
By the time Washoe was five, the trainers reported that she
could use 133 signs. Headlines were quick to report that a non
human primate was using human language. This spurred oth
er scientists, such as Herb Terrace, to begin experimenting with
animal language. Terrace set out to replicate some of the Gard
ners’ study by using his own ape, Nim Chimsky (sarcastically
named after Noam Chomsky, who believes language is con
fined solely to humans). The main goal of the project was to de
termine if a chimpanzee could create a sentence. In the docu
mentary, Terrace stated: “I have concluded that, unfortunately,
the answer to that question is no.” Nim’s sign usage could best
be interpreted as a series of “conditioned discriminations” simi
lar to behaviors seen in many less-intelligent animals. This work
suggested that Nim, like circus animals, was using words only
to obtain food rewards. Terrace realized that while Nim seemed
to be using a combination of signs, he actually was imitating
the trainer. This caused Terrace to look at some of Gardners’
films. He decided that Washoe, too, was being led by his teach
er and was merely imitating.
As Skoyles and Sagan candidly admitted, Kanzi’s skill was
“in the environment that helped shape it.” That is exactly
what Terrace discovered. Such an assessment always will be
true of “talking animals.” But it is not always true of humans.
Consider the following case in point.
As we mentioned earlier, the eminent linguist Noam Chom
sky has championed the idea that humans are born with a
built-in “universal grammar”—a series of biological switches
for complex language that is set in place in the early years of
childhood. This, he believes, is why children can grasp elab
orate language rules even at an early age—even without
adults to teach them. Chomsky noted: “The rate of vocab-
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ulary acquisition is so high at certain stages in life, and the pre
cision and delicacy of the concepts acquired so remarkable,
that it seems necessary to conclude that in some manner the
conceptual system with which lexical items are connected is
already in place” (1980, p. 139). John W. Oller and John L.
Omdahl went on to comment:
In other words, the conceptual system is not really con
structed in the child’s mind as if out of nothing, but
must be, in an important sense, known before the fact.
The whole system must be in place before it can be em
ployed to interpret experience (1997, p. 255, emp. in
orig.).
Powerful support for Chomsky’s theory emerged from a
decade-long study of 500 deaf children in Managua, Nicara
gua, which was reported in the December 1995 issue of Scien
tific American (Horgan, 1995, 273[6]:18-19). These children start
ed attending special schools in 1979, but none was taught (or
used) a formal sign language. Within a few years, and under no
direction from teachers or other adults, they began to devel
op a basic “pidgin” sign language. This quickly was modified
by younger children entering school, with the current version
taking on a complex and consistent grammar. If Chomsky is
correct, where, then, did humans get their innate ability for
language? Chomsky himself will not even hazard a guess. In
his opinion, “very few people are concerned with the origin of
language because most consider it a hopeless question” (as
quoted in Ross, 1991, 264[4]:146). The development of lan
guage, he admits, is a “mystery.” The fundamental failing of
naturalistic theories is that they are inadequate to explain the
origins of something so complex and information-rich as hu
man language, which itself is a gift of God and is part of man’s
having been created “in His image” (see Thompson, 2002, pp.
85-134).
The fact is, no animal is capable of speaking in the manner
in which people can speak. Speech is a peculiarly human
trait. In an article titled “Chimp-Speak” that dealt with this
very point, Trevor Major wrote:
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First, chimps do not possess the anatomical ability to
speak. Second, the sign language they learn is not
natural, even for humans. Chimps have to be trained
to communicate with this language; it is not some
thing they do in the wild. And unlike humans, trained
chimps do not seem to pass this skill on to their young.
Third, chimps never know more than a few hundred
words—considerably less than most young children....
[E]volutionists have no way to bridge the gap from in
nate ability to language relying on natural selection
or any other purely natural cause. Why? Because lan
guage is complex and carries information—the trade
marks of intelligent design (1994, 14[3]:1).
Another MIT scientist, Steven Pinker (director of the university’s Center of Cognitive Neuroscience), stated in The Lan
guage Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind:
As you are reading these words, you are taking part in
one of the wonders of the natural world. For you and
I belong to a species with a remarkable ability: we can
shape events in each other’s brains with remarkable
precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind con
trol or the other obsessions of fringe science; even in
the depictions of believers, these are blunt instruments
compared to an ability that is uncontroversially pres
ent in every one of us. That ability is language. Sim
ply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably
cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in
each other’s minds. The ability comes so naturally that
we are apt to forget what a miracle it is....
Language is obviously as different from other animals’
communication systems as the elephant’s trunk is dif
ferent from other animals’ nostrils.... As we have seen,
human language is based on a very different design.
The discrete combinatorial system called “grammar”
makes human language infinite (there is no limit to the
number of complex words or sentences in a language),
digital (this infinity is achieved by rearranging discrete
elements in particular orders and combinations, not
by varying some signal along a continuum like the mer
cury in a thermometer), and compositional (each of
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the infinite combinations has a different meaning pre
dictable from the meanings of its parts and the rule
and principles arranging them). Even the seat of hu
man language in the brain is special... (1994, pp. 1,365,
parenthetical comments in orig., emp. added).
The Bible mentions only two (supernaturally caused) exceptions
to this rule: the serpent in the Garden of Eden and Balaam’s
donkey. However, unlike man, both of these animals were con
trolled externally; Satan controlled the serpent, and God con
trolled the donkey. It is evident that only man was given the
gift of speech. It is an intrinsic part of his nature that associates
him with God and separates him from the rest of creation.
Without detracting anything from primates like Kanzi and
Washoe, fundamental differences between animals and hu
mans nevertheless remain. Unlike human children, animals:
(1) do not have a special region in the brain devoted to lan
guage; (2) have a much smaller brain overall; and (3) lack the
anatomy to speak the words they may think. In summary, hu
mans have an innate, built-in, hard-wired ability to acquire and
communicate complex languages from the moment of their
birth.
Admittedly, animals do possess a measure of understand
ing. They can learn to respond to commands and signs, and
in some cases even can be trained to use minimal portions of
human sign language. But, as biologist John N. Moore has
pointed out:
Although the chimpanzee Washoe has been taught the
American Sign Language, such an accomplishment
is primarily an increase in an ability of the anthro
poid to respond to direct presentation of signs. And,
further, the learned capability of the chimpanzee Lana
to utilize push buttons connected with a computer to
“converse” with a human trainer depends fundamen
tally upon increased conditional reflex response to
signs (1983, p. 341, emp. in orig.).
Even though apes, dogs, and birds can be “trained” to do cer
tain things, they cannot reason and communicate ideas with
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others so as to have true mental communion. The intelligence
of animals is unlike that of humankind. As Moore went on to
discuss,
[t]he purest and most complex manifestation of man’s
symbolic nature is his capacity for conceptual thought,
that is, for thought involving sustained and high order
abstraction and generalization. Conceptual thought
enables man to make himself independent of stimulus
boundness that characterizes animal thinking. Ani
mals, especially primates, give undeniable evidence
of something analogous to human thought—analogous yet medically different in that their thought is
bound to the immediate stimulus situation and to the
felt impulse of the organism. Animal thinking, too, is
riveted to the realm of survival (broadly taken) and
therefore encompasses a variety of needs pertinent
to the species as well as to the individual. These dif
ferences account for the distinction between conceptual thought, which is the exclusive prerogative of man,
and perceptual thought, a cognitive function based
directly upon sense perception, which man shares with
other animals (p. 344, emp. in orig.).
Thus, the issue is not “can animals think?,” but rather “can
they think the way humans do?” The answer, obviously, is a
resounding “No!” In summarizing his thoughts on this sub
ject, Trevor Major offered the following conclusion concerning
the intelligence of chimpanzees.
Are chimps intelligent? The answer is yes. Do chimps
possess the same kind of intelligence as humans? The
answer would have to be no. Humans are more intel
ligent, and they possess additional forms of intelligence.
What we must remember, also, is that the greatest ca
pabilities of the apes belong to a handful of superstars
like Kanzi and Sheba. Even these animals lack the em
pathy, foresight, and language capabilities of all but
the youngest or most intellectually challenged of our
own species (1995, 15:88, emp. in orig.).
Moore commented further:
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Animals can think in several ways...though only on
the perceptual, not on the conceptual level. The key
difference here is one between conceptual and per
ceptual thinking. The latter, which is typical of animal
thinking, requires the actual or nearly immediate pres
ence of the pertinent objects. Man’s thinking, on the
other hand, is independent of the presence of pertinent
objects. It is, in fact, independent of objects altogether,
as is the case with logical or mathematical exercises.
Secondly, the difference between human and animal
thinking resides in the fact that, whether or not the
object of the mental operation is present, animals can
not make judgments or engage in reasoning. For ex
ample, animals are unable to conclude that such and
such is or is not the case in a given situation or that if
such and such is the case, then so and so is not (p. 344,
ellipses and emp. in orig.).
Although animal trainers and investigators since the sev
enteenth century have tried to teach chimpanzees to talk, no
chimpanzee has ever managed it. A chimpanzee’s sound-producing anatomy is simply too different from that of humans.
Chimpanzees might be able to produce a muffled approxima
tion of human speech—if their brains could plan and execute
the necessary articulate maneuvers. But to do this, they would
have to have our brains, which they obviously do not (Lieb
erman, 1997, p. 27).
COMPLEXITY OF LANGUAGE—
UNIQUELY HUMAN
No known language in all of human history can be considered “primitive” in any sense of the word. In her book,
What is Linguistics?, Suzette Elgin remarked: “The most an
cient languages for which we have written texts—Sanskrit for
example—are often far more intricate and complicated in their
grammatical forms than many other contemporary languages”
(1973, p. 44). Lewis Thomas, a distinguished physician, scien
tist, and longtime director and chancellor of the Sloan Ketter
ing Cancer Center in Manhattan, acknowledged: “…[L]an-
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guage is so incomprehensible a problem that the language we
use for discussing the matter is itself becoming incomprehen
sible” (1980, p. 59). It appears that, from the beginning, hu
man communication was designed with a great amount of com
plexity and forethought, and has allowed us not only to com
municate with one another, but also with our Creator.
In a paper titled “Evolution of Universal Grammar” that
appeared in the January 2001 issue of Science, M.A. Nowak
and his colleagues attempted to discount the gulf that sepa
rates humans and animals (Nowak, et al., 2001). This paper,
which was a continuation of a 1999 paper titled “The Evolution
of Language” (Nowak and Krakauer, 1999), used mathemat
ical calculations in an effort to predict the evolution of gram
mar and the rules surrounding it. While Nowak and his team
inferred that the evolution of universal grammar can occur via
natural selection, they freely admitted that “the question concerning why only humans evolved language is hard to answer” (96:8031, emp. added). Hard to answer? The mathe
matical models presented in these papers do not tell us any
thing about the origination of the multitude of languages used
in the world today. If man truly did evolve from an ape-like
ancestor, how did the phonologic [the branch of linguistics that
deals with the sounds of speech and their production] com
ponent of our languages become so diverse and variegated?
Nowak’s paper also did not clarify the origination of written
languages, or describe how the language process was initiated
in the first humans, considering we know today that parents
teach languages to their offspring.
Nowak and his collaborators believe that the “first step” in
the evolution of language was “signal-object associations.”
They speculate that common objects, frequently utilized, were
given a representative signal or sign (in a manner similar to
modern sign language). These researchers also believe that
early in evolution, these signals were “likely to have been
noisy” and therefore “mistaken for each other.” Nowak sug
gests that these errors necessitated the formation of words, and
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describes this step in the evolution of language as compara
ble to going “from an analogue to a digital system.” However,
there is no evidence that demonstrates how these “prehistoric”
people made the quantum leap from signals to words. The last
step Nowak describes is the evolution of basic grammatical
rules in an effort to convey even more information than just
simple words. While these speculations make a nice, neat, pro
gressive path toward human language, they do little to explain
adequately the anatomical differences found in animals and
humans. The human supralaryngeal airway differs from that
of any other adult mammal, and is quite essential for speech.
While chimpanzees have been taught to communicate via sign
language, they cannot speak, and do not appear to use any
complex syntax in communication.
Nowak and his colleagues began with the assumption that
language “evolved as a means of communicating information
between individuals” (96:8030), and then went on to specu
late that natural selection favors the emergence of a universal,
rule-based language system. But if natural selection “favors”
a complex language, how do we account for the nonvocal com
munication observed in animals, and why hasn’t this commu
nication “emerged” into a formal language in those animals?
In an effort to explain this embarrassing lack of understanding,
Nowak, et al., offered several speculations as to why animals
have not evolved a better form of communication. In their ex
planation, they listed:
• Signal-object associations form only when informa
tion transfer is beneficial to both speaker and listener.
• In the presence of errors, only a very limited commu
nication system describing a small number of objects
can evolve by natural selection.
• Although grammar can be an advantage for small sys
tems, it may be necessary only if the language refers to
many events.
• Thus, animals may not possess the need to describe
“many” events.
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But such speculations leave gaping holes in regard to potential
explanations as to why animals cannot use speech. As Deacon
noted:
How could anyone doubt that language complexity
is the problem? Languages are indeed complicated
things. They are probably orders of magnitude more
complicated than the next-most-complicated com
munication system outside of the human sphere. And
they are indeed almost impossibly difficult for other
species to acquire (1997, p. 40).
Also, consider that when language first appears on the scene,
it already is fully developed and very complex. The late Har
vard paleontologist George Gaylord Simpson described it
this way:
Even the peoples with least complex cultures have
highly sophisticated languages, with complex gram
mar and large vocabularies, capable of naming and
discussing anything that occurs in the sphere occupied
by their speakers. The oldest language that can be re
constructed is already modern, sophisticated, com
plete from an evolutionary point of view (1966, p. 477).
Chomsky summed it up well when he stated:
Human language appears to be a unique phenomenon,
without significant analogue in the animal world….
There is no reason to suppose that the “gaps” are bridge
able. There is no more of a basis for assuming an evo
lutionary development from breathing to walking (1972,
pp. 67-68).
CONCLUSION
The fact of the matter is, language is quintessentially a hu
man trait. All attempts to shed light on the evolution of human
language have failed—due to the lack of knowledge regarding
the origin of any language, and due to the lack of an animal
that possesses any “transitional” form of communication. This
leaves evolutionists with a huge gulf to bridge between humans
with their innate communication abilities, and the grunts, barks,
and chatterings of animals. Deacon lamented:
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So this is the real mystery. Even under these loosened
criteria, there are no simple languages used among oth
er species, though there are many other equally or more
complicated modes of communication. Why not? And
the problem is even more counterintuitive when we
consider the almost insurmountable difficulties of teach
ing language to other species. This is surprising, be
cause there are many clever species. Though research
ers report that languagelike communication has been
taught to nonhuman species, even the best results are
not above legitimate challenges, and the fact that it is
difficult to prove whether or not some of these efforts
have succeeded attests to the rather limited scope of
the resulting behaviors, as well as to deep disagree
ments about what exactly constitutes language-like
behavior (1997, p. 41).
Evolutionist R.L. Holloway, in an article on “Paleoneuro
logical Evidence for Language Origins” written for the New
York Academy of Sciences, recognized this gaping chasm be
tween humans and animals, and admitted: “The very fact…
that human animals are ready to engage in a great ‘garrulity’
over the merits and demerits of essentially unprovable hypoth
eses, is an exciting testimony to the gap between humans and
other animals” (1976, 280:330). Toward the end of his book,
as Deacon was summarizing the conundrum, he noted:
Evolution has widened the cognitive gap between the
human species and all others into a yawning chasm.
Taken together, the near-universal failure of nonhu
mans and the near-universal success of humans in ac
quiring symbolic abilities suggests that this shift cor
responds to a major reassignment of cognitive resources
to help overcome natural barriers to symbol learning.
Other species’ failures at symbol learning do not re
sult from the lack of some essential structure present
only in human brains. As we have seen, chimpanzees
can, under special circumstances, be brought to un
derstand symbolic communication, though at best on
a comparatively modest scale (p. 412).
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Should you be suspicious when someone says that language
evolved? In his paper titled “A Physicist Looks at Evolution,”
British physicist H.S. Lipson put it well when he wrote:
I have always been slightly suspicious of the theory
of evolution because of its ability to account for any
property of living things (the long neck of the giraffe,
for example). I have therefore tried to see whether bi
ological discoveries over the last thirty years or so fit
in with Darwin’s theory. I do not think that they do.
To my mind, the theory does not stand up at all (1980,
31:138).
Indeed, the Bible still offers the only plausible explanation
for the origin of human language: “Then God said, ‘Let Us make
man in Our image, according to Our likeness;’ …So God cre
ated man in His own image; in the image of God He created
him; male and female He created them” (Genesis 1:26-27; cf.
Genesis 11:1-9). Humans are capable of communicating in hu
man language because God created them to do so!
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6
INTRODUCTION [by Brad Harrub]
On July 17, 1990, U.S. President George H.W. Bush de
clared that the years between 1990 and 2000 were to be des
ignated as the “Decade of the Brain,” and announced that this
declaration was intended “to enhance public awareness of the
benefits to be derived from brain research” through “appro
priate programs, ceremonies, and activities.” Millions of grant
dollars were shifted toward neurobiological studies to encour
age neuroscientists to try to answer some basic questions in
this area. It was during this “decade of the brain” that I found
myself completing my graduate degree in the neurobiology
department at the University of Tennessee Medical School.
Those years of in-depth study taught me a great deal about the
anatomy and physiology of the brain, and about how it works
within the body as a whole. But they also taught me that, as sci
entists, we are far from unlocking all the secrets that this incredi
ble structure holds. In fact, scientists are not agreed as to how
we can unlock the remaining secrets. We now possess the abil
ity to record the activity from a single neuron located deep with
in the brain, but we can only speculate about the role that par
ticular activity plays in such things as memories or emotions.
The more we learn about this complex group of cells, the more
we realize we do not know much about the “big picture.”
I vividly recall an occasion in which those of us in one of my
graduate classes were being asked to explain the molecular
events that transpire when a neuron fires. The professor phrased
the question something like this: “Suppose for a minute that
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you want to remember a phone number, what events would
take place at the cellular level within the basal ganglia during
that thought process?” After a lengthy discussion about cal
cium and sodium channels, a student in the back of the class
spoke up and said, “Yeah, but exactly where would that phone
number be stored, and how does the brain remember things?”
The professor’s answer: We don’t know. Robert Ornstein and
Richard Thompson summed it up well when they stated: “Af
ter thousands of scientists have studied it for centuries, the on
ly word to describe it remains amazing” (1984, p. 21, emp. in
orig.).
Consider this simple test. Read the following sentence: Mom
had hot apple cider ready for us on that cold snowy day. In the sec
onds that were required for you to complete the sentence,
your brain already had carried out a multitude of tasks. Ini
tially, your eyes focused on the piece of paper on which the
sentence was written, and then transmitted the visual stimuli
chemically via your optic nerve to your brain. The brain re
ceived that chemical signal, and immediately recognized the
symbols on the page as English letters. It then compiled those
letters into an entire sentence (using rules that you learned long
ago in elementary school), which it analyzed and comprehend
ed. In addition, your brain also may have painted a mental im
age of this snowy day and your mother. You may even have
found yourself suddenly craving a mug of hot apple cider. Al
so during that short span, your ears reported any unusual
sounds, and your nose constantly was sampling the air for new
odors. All the while, your brain was keeping your body at homeostasis—that is, it signaled your heart to beat and your lungs
to respire, it measured hormone levels in your blood stream
(and made adjustments as needed), and relayed any pain or
sensation that you might be feeling during those few short sec
onds. And all of this is merely the proverbial “tip of the ice
berg.” The brain, and the nerves associated with it, carry out
countless physiological functions, most of which we understand
at only a very basic level. Again, truth be told, we have yet to
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understand exactly how this unique organ can perform all of
these functions—simultaneously and with such marvelous pre
cision.
And therein lies the enigma surrounding the brain. How
can we take three pounds of matter, and in that small space
cram all of our education, memories, communication skills,
emotions, likes, and dislikes—yet, all the while it is those same
three pounds of matter that keep our heart beating, cause our
lungs to respire, and give us a detailed internal map of the po
sition of our arms or legs? How is it that a certain smell instan
taneously can carry us back to a period in our childhood, of
fering us crystal clear images of that particular time in our
life? Exactly how is it that we can distinguish between a banana
and an orange, just by using our nose? What chemical reactions
occur to tell us which one is an orange? Where is that mem
ory stored, and how long will that memory remain stored?
What part of our brain controls our emotions? Where do we
hold feelings such as love and hate? How is it that the sound
of one voice can bring tears of joy, while sounds from another
can cause our blood pressure to begin to climb? In fact, why
is it that humans love at all?
As vexing as these questions are, they are even more trou
bling for individuals who espouse that the brain arrived here
by Darwinian mechanisms. Evolutionists would like us to be
lieve that the brain is nothing more than an advanced computer—it receives input (via the senses), and after the input
makes its way through various neuronal circuits, output is
the end result. Input equals output. Ornstein and Thompson
speculated: “What exists as only a few extra cells in the head
of the earthworm, handling information about taste and light,
has evolved in us humans into the incredibly complex and so
phisticated structure of the human brain” (1984, p. 22). These
sentiments no doubt are shared by thousands of individuals
who stand in utter awe of the brain, yet who chalk up its exis
tence to pure happenstance. Is the brain merely the product
of evolution, or were humans created differently than animals?
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HISTORY OF THE BRAIN
The earliest known reference to the brain anywhere in hu
man records was written on papyrus in the seventeenth century B.C. (see Breasted, 1930). According to James Breasted,
the individual who translated and published the contents of
that document, the word “brain” occurs only eight times in
Egyptian history, six of them on the pages of the Smith Papy
rus describing the symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis of two
patients suffering from compound fractures of the skull. The
organ that we commonly refer to as the brain has not always
held a revered status in the eyes of men. In fact, the brain was
given little importance by ancient Egyptians who believed that
it cooled the body and did little else. As these skilled preservers
of the dead prepared bodies for mummification, they excised
the brain through the nose with a wire loop and discarded it.
Often, the brain simply was pitched into the sand (primary at
tention was given to the heart, which they considered the most
important organ of the body). The classical Greeks, to whom
we owe so many ideas, also were divided over whether the heart
or the brain served as the seat
of one’s intellect. The famed
Hippocratic writers rightly be
lieved the brain to be the dom
inant location for things like in
telligence and passion. Plato
also taught that the brain was
the supreme organ of the body,
assigning to it such things as
passions of the heart, emotions,
and even appetites of the belly.
Aristotle, a student of Plato,
Figure 1 — The human brain.
contended on the other hand
LifeART image copyright ©
that the heart was the center
(2003) Lippincott, Williams
of thought and sensation, be& Wilkins. All rights reserved.
Used by permission.
lieving that the brain worked
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as a refrigerator to cool the heart (which is ironic, now that we
know the brain generates the most heat!). And so, the debate
continued for centuries.
At the time the Old Testament was translated into Greek
(finished sometime during the second century B.C.), the ma
jority of people adhered to Aristotle’s viewpoint, and believed
that the heart was the center of understanding. The Scriptures
are replete with references to man’s intellect and emotions as
residing in “the heart”—what we now refer to as “the mind.”
The King James Version lists 830 occurrences of the word heart
in over 762 verses. Just a short period after Christ walked this
Earth, a philosopher by the name of Galen (A.D. 130-200) re
alized Aristotle’s mistake, and noted that the “power of sen
sations and of movement flows from the brain” and that “what
is rational in the soul has its existence there” (as quoted in Fincher, 1984, p. 13). He went on to question: “Why is the brain ca
pable of cooling the heart, and why is the heart not rather ca
pable of heating the brain which is placed above it, since all
heat tends to rise? And why does the brain send to the heart
only an imperceptible nerve impulse, while all the sensory or
gans draw a large part of their substance from the brain?” Un
fortunately, however, early human anatomy was based on a
combination of animal dissections and fertile imagination, which
only perpetuated the confusion, allowing Shakespeare (15461616) to have Portia frame the question, “Tell me, where is fancy
bred, Or in the heart or in the head?”
Great discoveries about human physiology and the struc
ture of the human brain were made during the Renaissance
Period. Leonardo da Vinci discovered that he could pour wax
into the ventricles (open spaces) of an ox brain, and then strip
away the flesh after it had cooled. The hardened wax model
that resulted, represented the true shape of the cavities that
had remained clandestine within the brain for millennia. In
the nineteenth century, the debate over the brain/mind erupt
ed into a furor, led by these famous words:
“What is mind?” ——“No matter.”
“What is matter?” ——“Never mind.”
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Eventually, anatomy revealed the truth, and cardiocentric
believers found themselves jarred by the fact that during em
bryonic formation, nerves developed directly from the brain,
while blood vessels developed independently from the heart.
Further human dissections firmly established that the heart
was more or less a pump, while the brain held all of the intri
cate secrets of consciousness and the senses, including emo
tions such as love. However, some theories die hard. For in
stance, we challenge you to find a Valentine’s card with a pic
ture of a brain with an arrow going through it. While we know
that the heart is not the center of our emotions, many people
still make references such as “you always will hold a special
place in my heart.”
Thus, after years of deliberating and conjecture, the cere
bral cortex began to be viewed as more than a mere radiator
for the heart. Paradoxically, before men even speculated on
its higher functions, part of the answers already had been re
corded: “…It is to be conceived that the motor force, or the
nerves themselves, take their origin from the brain, where
fantasy is located” (see Fincher, p. 16). French mathemati
cian René Descartes, who was born in France in 1596, made
this fitting declaration. During his lifetime, a series of biologi
cal discoveries rocked the sci
entific world, and stimulated
Descartes to probe the brain.
He was devoutly religious, and
his philosophy was a bold at
tempt to reconcile scientific
methods while remaining true
to his faith in God. Descartes
was the one who penned the
Figure 2 — Cerebral hemisphere dissection demonfamous words, “cogito ergo sum”
strating the cortex. LifeART
(“I think, therefore I am”). Acimage copyright © (2003)
cordingly, Descartes defined
Lippincott, Williams & Wilthinking as the whole range of
kins. All rights reserved. Used
conscious mental processes—inby permission.
- 214 -
tellectual thoughts, feeling, will, and sensations. He was of the
firm opinion that the mind always was at work, even during
periods of sleep. Based on his work, Descartes made a com
plete and total division between mind and body—one far more
drastic than Plato’s.
Descartes’ work was very important because it established
“a modern philosophical basis for the belief that a human be
ing lives a dual existence involving a spiritual soul and a body”
(Elbert, 2000, p. 217). However, he believed that the body and
soul interacted at a particular place, and he unfortunately felt
obligated to try to determine that place. Due to the insufficient
knowledge of Descartes’ day, he concluded that the interaction
took place in the pea-sized pineal gland—a structure that we
now know is an endocrine gland that manufactures and secretes
melatonin in accordance with our circadian rhythms.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRAIN
If you were to walk into a neuroanatomy class at a major
medical school, you very likely would find more than fifty
white porcelain buckets—each filled with preservative fluids,
and containing a brain that had been collected from a donor
cadaver. The first thing you would notice as you examined
the physical mass of the brain probably would be the various
convolutions and wrinkles (known as sulci) that cover the en
tire surface. Had the brain not been soaking for weeks in a
fixative such as formaldehyde, you would be able to see that
the brain itself is extremely soft, with almost a custard-like con
sistency. Upon cutting the brain in half, you would observe
what appear to be striations in various areas, and you would
find various hollow ventricles that normally are bathed in ce
rebrospinal fluid. Hidden within this gray and white tissue is
the most intricately wired communication network in the world.
Those three pounds of “matter” represent literally billions
of interconnected nerve cells and millions of protective glial
cells—which, according to evolutionists, arose by the effects
of time, natural law, and chance from nonliving matter. The
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11
brain has been estimated to contain 100 billion (10 ) neurons
(Kandel, 1991, p. 18), each a living unit within itself. While
most neurons share similar properties, they can be classified
into “perhaps as many as 10,000 different types” (p. 18). Over
100 thousand billion electrical connections are estimated to
be present throughout the human brain, which has been said
to be more than “all the electrical connections in all the elec
trical appliances in the world.” In describing this awesome
organ, R.L. Wysong wrote:
The human brain weighs about three pounds, con
tains ten billion neurons with approximately 25,000
synapses (connections) per neuron. Each neuron is
made up of 10,000,000,000 macromolecules. The hu
man mind can store almost limitless amounts of in
formation (a potential millions of times greater than
the 1015 bits of information gathered in a lifetime), com
pare facts, weigh information against memory, judg
ment and conscience and formulate a decision in a
fraction of a second (1976, p. 340, parenthetical item
in orig.).
Arguably, the brain is the most unique organ in the entire
body—not merely because of its physical make-up, but be
cause of what it does and how it does it. As evolutionist George
Bartelmez put it many years ago: “Only a single fundamental
organ has undergone great specialization in the genus Homo.
This is the brain” (1926, p. 454). Today, from an evolutionary
perspective, that assessment still is viewed as correct. As
Johanson and Edgar noted seventy years later: “This change
in both size and shape represents one of the most remarkable
morphological shifts that has been observed in the evolution
ary history of any mammal, for it entailed both an enhanced
cranial capacity and a radical reorganization of brain pro
portions” (1996, p. 83).
We believe that the brain deserves a great deal more re
spect than evolutionists are willing to afford it. The late evo
lutionist Isaac Asimov characterized the human brain as “the
most complex and orderly arrangement of matter in the uni-
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verse” (1970, p. 10). When Paul Davies, professor of mathe
matics and physics at the Universe of Adelaide, referred to it
as “the most developed and complex system known to science”
(1992, 14[5]:4), he did not overstate the case. Sherwin Nuland,
in The Wisdom of the Body, wrote in regard to the human brain:
Though the three pounds represent a mere 2 percent
of the body weight of a 150-pound person, the quartful
of brain is so metabolically active that it uses 20 per
cent of the oxygen we take in through our lungs. To
supply this much oxygen requires a very high flow of
blood. Fully 15 percent of the blood propelled into
the aorta with each contraction of the left ventricle is
transported directly to the brain. Not only does the
brain demand a large proportion of the body’s oxy
gen and blood but it also begins its life requiring an
equivalent share, or even more, of its genes. Of the
total of about 50,000 to 100,000 genes in Homo sapiens,
some 30,000 code for one or another aspect of the
brain. Clearly, a huge amount of genetic information
is required to operate the human brain…. From all of
this emerges the brain’s overarching responsibility—
it is the chief means by which the body’s activities are
coordinated and governed (1997, pp. 328,346).
James Trefil addressed the brain’s complexity when he wrote:
The brain is a physical system. It contains about
100 billion interconnected neurons—about as
many neurons as there are stars in the Milky Way
galaxy…. In the end, by mechanisms we still haven’t
worked out (but we will do so!), these signals are con
verted, by neurons in different parts of the brain, into
the final signals that produce images or smells or sounds
(1996, pp. 217-218, parenthetical item in orig., emp.
added).
Notice Trefil’s admission that the brain works “by mecha
nisms we still haven’t worked out.” Ian Tattersall, in his book,
Becoming Human, wrote in a similar fashion in describing the
brain’s marvelous sophistication—while admitting that “there’s
a huge amount that we don’t know.”
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[T]he brain is an extremely power-hungry mechanism
that, because of its size, monopolizes some 20 per
cent of our entire energy intake…. But the matter
doesn’t rest there, for sheer brain size is far from the
full story. The organization—the structure—of our
brains is also unique, and it is this that appears
to hold the ultimate key to our remarkable cognitive powers. There’s a huge amount, of course,
that we don’t know about how the brain works and
especially about how a mass of chemical and electrical
signals can give rise to such complex effects as cogni
tion and consciousness (1998, pp. 69,70, emp. added).
The point in Dr. Tattersall’s last sentence is well taken. There
is a “huge amount that we don’t know”—including (among
other things) how “a mass of chemical and electrical signals
can give rise to such complex effects as cognition and con
sciousness.” [Pardon us if we are a bit skeptical of Trefil’s exu
berant suggestion, “but we will do so!” On this topic, we agree
wholeheartedly with Robert Jastrow of NASA, who admitted:
“Is it possible that man, with his remarkable powers of intel
lect and spirit, has been formed from the dust of the earth by
chance alone? It is hard to accept the evolution of the human
eye as a product of chance; it is even harder to accept the evolu
tion of human intelligence as the product of random disrup
tions in the brain cells of our ancestors.… Among the organs
of the human body, none is more difficult than the brain to
explain by evolution. The powers that reside in the brain make
man a different animal from all other animals” (1981, pp. 9899,104).] Tattersall suggested: “Little as we understand the
highly complex workings of our brains in producing con
sciousness, it is clear that there is a ‘whole brain’ effect in the
production of our prized awareness” (2002, p. 73). But, the
“whole brain” idea doesn’t get us very far, as Daniel Dennett
admitted in Consciousness Explained.
[T]he trouble with brains, it seems, is that when you
look in them, you discover that there’s nobody
home. No part of the brain is the thinker that does
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the thinking or the feeler that does the feeling, and
the whole brain appears to be no better a candidate
for that very special role (1991, p. 29, emp. in orig.).
Yet in spite of the fact that when we look at the brain, “there’s
nobody home,” and in spite of the fact that “neuroscience is
said to be awash with data about what the brain does, but vir
tually devoid of theories about how it works” (Lewin, 1992, p.
163), there are some things we do know.
The brain, although being the most complex structure existing on Earth—and perhaps in the Universe—is a well-defined object: it is a material entity
located inside the skull, which may be visualized,
touched and handled. It is composed of chemical sub
stances, enzymes and hormones which may be mea
sured and analyzed. Its architecture is characterized
by neuronal cells, pathways and synapses. Its function
ing depends on neurons, which consume oxygen, ex
changing chemical substance through their membranes,
and maintaining states of electrical polarization inter
rupted by brief periods of depolarization (Cardoso,
1997/1998, emp. in orig.).
The brain is a helmet-shaped mass of gray and white
tissue about the size of a grapefruit, one to two quarts
in volume, and on average weighing three pounds
(Einstein’s brain, for example, was 2.75 pounds). Its
surface is wrinkled like that of a cleaning sponge, and
its consistency is custardlike, firm enough to keep from
puddling on the floor the brain case, soft enough to
be scooped out with a spoon…. The human genome
database accumulated to 1995 reveals that the
brain’s structure is prescribed by at least 3,195
distinctive genes, 50 percent more than for any
other organ or tissue… (Wilson, 1998, p. 97, paren
thetical item in orig., emp. added).
Some overall descriptions of the properties of the hu
man brain are instructive. For instance, 10 billion neurons are packed into the brain, each of which, on
average, has a thousand links with other neurons,
resulting in more than sixty thousand miles of writ-
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ing. Connectivity on that scale is beyond comprehension, but undoubtedly it is fundamental to the
brain’s ability to generate cognition. Although indi
vidual events in an electronic compute happen a mil
lion times faster than in the brain, its massive connectivity and simultaneous mode of activity allows biology to outstrip technology for speed. For
instance, the faster computer clocks up a billion or so
operations a second, which pales to insignificance be
side the 100 billion operations that occur in the brain
of a fly at rest…. To say that the brain is a computer is
a truism, because, unquestionably, what goes on in
there is computation. But so far, no man-made com
puter matches the human brain, either in capacity or
design…. Can a computer think? And, ultimately, can
a computer generate a level of consciousness… (Lew
in, 1992, pp. 160,163, emp. added).
The human brain’s increase in neurons is due to its
greater size, not to greater density, since humans have
only about 1.25 as many neurons per cubic centimeter
as chimpanzees do. There are approximately 146,000
neurons per square millimeter of cortical surface. The
human brain has an area of about 2,200 square centi
meters and about 30 billion neurons (more than as
sumed until quite recently). The chimpanzee and the
gorilla have brains of about 500 square centimeters,
and with about 6 billion neurons (Ornstein, 1991, p.
63, parenthetical item in orig.).
Can anyone—after reading descriptions (and admissions!)
such as these—really believe that the human brain is “only an
other organ” as Michael Lemonick claimed in Time magazine
(2003a, 161[3]:66)? Not without denying the obvious! In the
January 16, 1997 issue of Nature, Sir Francis Crick’s close col
laborator, Christof Koch, wrote: “The latest work on informa
tion processing and storage at the single cell (neuron) level
reveals previously unimagined complexity and dynamism” (385:207, parenthetical item in orig., emp. added). His
concluding remarks were: “As always, we are left with a feeling
of awe for the amazing complexity found in Nature” (385:210).
Amazing complexity? What an understatement!
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A case in point is British evolutionist Richard Dawkins. In
the preface to his book, The Blind Watchmaker, he discussed
the brain’s incredible complexity and “apparent design,” and
the problem posed by both.
The computer on which I am writing these words has
an information storage capacity of about 64 kilobytes
(one byte is used to hold each character of text). The
computer was consciously designed and deliberately
manufactured. The brain with which you are under
standing my words is an array of some ten million ki
loneurones. Many of these billions of nerve cells have
each more than a thousand “electric wires” connect
ing them to other neurons. Moreover, at the molecu
lar genetic level, every single one of more than a tril
lion cells in the body contains about a thousand times
as much precisely coded digital information as my
entire computer. The complexity of living organisms is matched by the elegant efficiency of their
apparent design. If anyone doesn’t agree that
this amount of complex design cries out for an
explanation, I give up (1986, p. ix, emp. added).
But, after having described the brain’s immense complexity
and “apparent” design, and after being just about ready to
“give up,” he reconsidered, and wrote:
No, on second thought I don’t give up, because one
of my aims in the book is to convey something of the
sheer wonder of biological complexity to those whose
eyes have not been opened to it. But having built up
the mystery, my other main aim is to remove it again
by explaining the solution (p. ix).
He then spent the remainder of the book informing the reader
(using, of all things, well-designed computer programs!) that
the design in nature is merely “apparent,” not “real.”
But, the question lingers: How did natural selection pro
duce the human brain? Basically, there are two views within
the evolutionary camp. Some, like MIT’s Steven Pinker, be
lieve that the brain can be broken down into individual com
ponents, each of which evolved for specific purposes (see Mor
ris, 2001, p. 208). To quote Pinker:
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The mind, I claim, is not a single organ but a system
of organs, which we can think of as psychological fac
ulties or mental modules…. The word “module”
brings to mind detachable, snap-in components, and
that is misleading. Mental modules are not likely to
be visible to the naked eye as circumscribed territories
on the surface of the brain, like the flank steak and
the rump roast on a supermarket cow display. A men
tal module probably looks more like roadkill, sprawl
ing messily over the bulges and crevasses of the brain
(1997a, pp. 27,30).
Others, having been heavily influenced by a theory set forth
by the late paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould, and his close
friend, population geneticist Richard Lewontin, take a differ
ent approach. These two Harvard professors advocated the
view that the brain evolved for its own set of reasons, and that
certain human traits then followed that had nothing whatso
ever to do with natural selection. According to Gould:
…[T]he brain got big by natural selection for a small
set of reasons having to do with what is good about
brains on the African savannas. But by virtue of that
computational power, the brain can do thousands
of things that have nothing to do with why natural selection made it big in the first place…. Nat
ural selection didn’t build our brains to write or to
read, that’s for sure, because we didn’t do those things
for so long (1995, emp. added).
Since written language is allegedly a relatively recent evolu
tionary invention, then it could not be an ability that evolved
during ancestral times as hominids roamed the savannas of
Africa. Gould’s point, then, is that the ability to read and write
must be a by-product of the way the brain itself is constructed.
Indeed, says Gould, it would be easy to construct quite a large
list of human intellectual abilities that could not have been
shaped by natural selection. Such a list might include such
things as the ability to learn higher mathematics, to under
stand complicated games like chess, to play a violin, and per
haps even to form linguistic constructions.
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In addition to reading and writing, Dr. Gould cited con
sciousness as a “quirky accident” that was simply a fortuitous,
unexpected by-product of the brain having evolved and got
ten bigger. A brief history lesson is in order.
In 1978, the Royal Society of London sponsored a sympo
sium on the subject of “adaptation.” Dr. Lewontin had been
invited to attend, but he does not care much for airplanes. He
asked his friend Dr. Gould to co-author the paper with him,
and then to present it at the British Symposium. The paper
was titled “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme” (see
Gould and Lewontin, 1979), and became famous practically
overnight. [NOTE: When Gould and Lewontin referred to
the “Panglossian paradigm” in the title of their paper, they were
alluding to the ideas espoused by Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s
famous novel, Candide. In his novel, Voltaire satirized the be
liefs of the eminent German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm
von Leibniz, who maintained that this was “the best of all pos
sible worlds.” According to Dr. Pangloss, in this best of all worlds,
everything existed for a purpose. For example, in explaining to
Candide why he had contracted syphilis, Dr. Pangloss said:
“It is indispensable in this best of all possible worlds. For if
Columbus, when visiting the West Indies, had not caught this
disease, which poisons the source of generation, which fre
quently even hinders generation, and is clearly opposed to the
great end of Nature, we should have neither chocolate nor co
chineal” (see Morris, 2001, p. 85).]
The Gould/Lewontin paper (which was published a year
later in 1979) began with a description of the central dome of
St. Mark’s Church (San Marco in Italian), located in Venice see
Figure 3). The dome is supported by two distinct arches that
meet at right angles. The arches divided the dome into four ta
pering, triangular spaces. As Gould and Lewontin noted, these
spaces are an unavoidable by-product of mounting a dome
on two rounded arches; the arches could not divide the inner
surface of the dome in any other way.
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These spaces are known as spandrels. [The term spandrel
actually was misapplied by Gould and Lewontin. As it turns
out, the correct term is “pendentive,” as several authors have
pointed out; see Houston, 1990, pp. 498-509; Dennett, 1995,
pp. 271-275; Ruse, 2001b, p. 236.] In the spandrels, artisans
painted mosaics of the four biblical evangelists (Matthew,
Mark, Luke, and John) and mosaic images representing the
Tigris, Euphrates, Nile, and Indus rivers. Gould and Lewon
tin remarked that the spandrels were not created by the arch
itect for any specific purpose. Rather, they were “non-adaptive side effects”; the spandrels had to be there. They were
not created for the purpose of housing mosaics; they were
decorated because there were empty spaces to be filled.
According to Gould and Lewontin, a similar phenomenon
occurs during the course of evolution. Organisms, they sug
gested, possess numerous traits that were not molded by nat
ural selection. Such traits exist because they are, in effect,
by-products of something
else (see Schwartz, 1999). This
does not mean that these traits
are not useful. Once a span
drel exists, natural selection
supposedly was able to mod
ify it in some way to make it
useful, just as the architects
of San Marco found that the
triangular spaces (spandrels)
could be used for decorative
mosaics. The spandrels often
turned out to be useful when
adapted for some purpose,
but, as Gould and Lewontin
noted, the spandrels originally
evolved for secondary purposes. They therefore could
Figure 3 — The spandrels of
not be attributed directly to
San Marco. Image courtesy of
Alan Humm.
natural selection.
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Three years later, Gould and Yale University paleontolo
gist Elisabeth Vrba invented the term “exaptation” to define
and illuminate the role played by spandrels. What, exactly, is
an exaptation? Gould explained: “…[W]hat shall we call struc
tures that contribute to fitness but evolved for other reasons
and were later co-opted for their current role? They have no
name at present, and [Elisabeth] Vrba and I suggest that they
be called ‘exaptations’” (1984a, p. 66; for Vrba reference, see
Gould and Vrba, 1982). Thus, exaptations are spandrels that
organisms have adapted for some useful purpose. In a 1997
article he authored for the New York Review of Books (“Evolu
tion: The Pleasures of Pluralism”), Gould wrote: “Natural se
lection made the human brain big, but most of our mental
properties and potentials may be spandrels—that is, nonadap
tive side consequences of building a device with such struc
tural complexity” (1997a, 44[11]:52).
From an evolutionary viewpoint, the “extraordinary in
crease in the human brain size was the fastest evolutionary
transformation known” (Ornstein, 1991, p. 35, emp. added).
On some levels, it might make sense that the larger the brain,
the more intelligent the animal. However, we now know that
brain size does not determine intelligence. The tiny mouse
lemur (Microebus murinus) has a brain that represents three
percent of its overall body weight, whereas the human brain
accounts for only two percent, and yet this tiny mouse cannot
talk or make complex tools. Simply put, brain size does not
determine intelligence. Tattersall put it this way:
We know remarkably little about the actual sequence of events in human brain enlargement
over time. Even less do we understand the effects of these events…. Intuitively, from a human
vantage point, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that,
somehow, brain expansion is intrinsically a good thing
—though perhaps the contemplation of the extreme
rarity of this phenomenon in nature should make us
think again…. [A]s it turns out, the concept of a
gradual increase in brain size over the eons is
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actually rather problematic. For a start, this idea
strongly implies that every ounce of extra brain
matter is equivalent in intelligence production
to every other brain ounce—which is clearly not
the case (2002, pp. 67,68, emp. added).
No evidence exists that demonstrates a relationship between
brain size and intelligence within any given species. The hu
man brain, for example, is known to have a range in volume
from less than 1,000 to more than 2,000 cubic centimeters. In
fact, some of the most intelligent people in history had small
brains.
Yet, evolutionists often classify hominid fossils largely ac
cording to brain size (see the chart in Pinker, 1997a, pp. 198
199). They assume that the human brain started out in pri
mates as a relatively small organ, and then evolved through
time to the size we now see it. Peter Wilson commented on
this in his book, Man the Promising Primate:
We distinguish hominid fossils from other primate
remains partly by the relative size of the braincase.
As we move from Australopithecus africanus to Homo
habilis, Homo erectus, and finally Homo sapiens, we have
a creature whose probable brain size increases from
400 cubic centimeters to 1,500 cubic centimeters. That
brain is housed in a cranium that becomes more and
more vaulted, loses its ridges and crests, and shows
more and more evidence of a forehead and backhead
(1980, p. 45).
Gould, however, concluded one of the chapters in his book,
Ever Since Darwin, by asking:
But why did such a large brain evolve in a group of
small, primitive, tree-dwelling mammals, more sim
ilar to rats and shrews than to mammals convention
ally judged as more advanced? And with this pro
vocative query I end, for we simply do not know the
answer to one of the most important questions we
can ask (1977a, p. 191, emp. added).
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Growing a bigger brain is not quite as straightforward as it
first might appear. It is not simply a matter of “putting on
weight” like one does with his or her body. Every neuron that
is “added” must be of the right kind (excitatory or inhibitory),
must possess the right neurotransmitters, and must be “inter
connected” with literally thousands of other neurons. Harvard’s Ernst Mayr correctly remarked: “The unique charac
ter of our brain seems to lie in the existence of many (perhaps
as many as forty) different types of neurons, some perhaps
specifically human” (2001, p. 252, parenthetical item in orig.).
Also, a rich supply of oxygenated blood must be present,
which would entail allowing additional blood vessels to reach
these new neurons. Additionally, our brains require a tremen
dous amount of energy. As an example, a newborn’s brain
consumes 60% of the energy that the baby produces (Gib
bons, 1998b, 280:1345), while adults devote only 20% of their
cardiac output to this organ (which accounts for only two per
cent of our body weight—Van De Graaf and Fox, 1989, p. 438).
So the question then becomes, if humans (and their brains)
evolved, why would nature “select” for a larger brain that is
more energy consuming? Michael Ruse recognized the huge
hurdle to be overcome in “evolving” brains when he stated:
“When we developed brains, they are so expensive to produce
that one needs really big ones or their benefits do not outweigh
their costs” (2001a, p. 70). Furthermore, the question must be
asked: Where does the energy come from in the first place? It
would make sense that supporting a “bigger” brain would re
quire a higher energy consumption, yet a human’s basal met
abolic rate is no higher than that of a large sheep, which has a
brain one-fifth as large. As Gibbons noted: “Humans are ap
parently getting enough energy to feed their brains without in
creasing their overall energy intake, so it must be coming from
some other source” (1998b, 280:1345). But exactly what that
source is, remains to be determined.
Researchers have long known that an animal’s body size
plays a critical role in brain size (see Gibbons, 280:1345).
Whales and elephants compensate for their large brains by an
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increased size in other organs that can provide energy (e.g.,
larger heart and lungs provide more oxygen). But humans do
not follow this rule. In the context of simian primates, for ex
ample, the human brain is approximately “three times larger
than the value predicted for an ‘average’ monkey or ape with
our body size” ( Jones, et al., 1992, p. 116). If evolutionists are
correct, then the human brain has tripled in size since “Lucy”
walked the Earth, yet our bodies have yet to even double. Ac
cording to primatologist Robert D. Martin, humans “have the
largest brain size relative to body size among placental mam
mals” (as quoted in Gibbons, 280:1345). Yet, as Mayr has ad
mitted:
What is perhaps most astonishing is the fact that
the human brain seems not to have changed one
single bit since the first appearance of Homo sapiens, some 150,000 years ago. The cultural rise of
the human species from primitive hunter-gatherer to
agriculture and city civilizations took place without
an appreciable increase in brain size. It seems that in
an enlarged, more complex society, a bigger brain is
no longer rewarded with a reproductive advantage
(2001, p. 252, emp. added).
One question that evolutionists admittedly have difficulty
answering is why “other animals” have not similarly “evolved”
larger brains. If humans were able to somehow surmount all
of the physiological and energy-related obstacles standing in
the way of growing larger brains, why have reptiles, birds, or
fish not followed suit? Exactly how is our brain different from
those of animals? Was it forced to grow larger and “rewire” as
we climbed out of trees and changed our diets? Hardly! Evo
lutionists admit that “our brain is unusually large” and that
“its internal wiring shows only subtle differences from other
mammals” ( Jones, et al., p. 107). But if the wiring is essentially
the same, and if we know of animals that have larger brains,
then what accounts for the vast differences we see between
human intelligence and animal intelligence?
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Equally important, of course (at least from the human van
tage point) is the question: What caused the tremendous in
crease in human brain size? Scientists admit that no one
knows. Johanson and Edgar wrote: “We cannot answer exactly why we evolved our large brains” (1996, p. 80, emp.
added). Ornstein admitted:
We look at whether the human mind is, in part,
an accident. Its evolution turns around a central
question: Why is our brain so big? Why have a
brain capable of not only chess when there was no
game, but of building guided missiles when there was
no metal or chemistry or writing? For the brain (which
is the most “costly” neural material in the body) bal
looned up radically 2 million years ago, and the “usual
suspects” for this expansion don’t seem to have pri
mary responsibility. It was not language, it was not
tools, it was not bipedalism alone. The brain seems
to have increased in size before all the organized
societies, cooperation, and language would have
had any call for such a development.
This is the central mystery of the mind: It is diffi
cult to see why we are so advanced relative to our near
est ancestors. We aren’t just a slightly better chimp,
and it’s difficult, on reflection, to figure out why. This
gigantic cortex has given us our adaptability as well
as the extra capacity to adapt to the heights of the Hi
malayas, the Sahara Desert, the wilds of Borneo, even
to central London….
Life challenges alone were probably not enough to
inspire the astonishing rapidity of brain growth. There
must have been another reason…. This develop
ment occurred well before organized society or lan
guage and long before technology. It is an amazing
spurt in growth in the most complicated structure in
all biology (1991, pp. 8,37, parenthetical item in orig.,
emp. added).
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But was it the brain’s size alone that allowed these “nonadap
tive side consequences”? Apparently not, as Johanson and
Edgar went on to note.
In absolute size, the human brain breaks no records.
Elephant brains exceed ours by a factor of four, and
some whale brains are even bigger…. Monkeys, apes,
and humans possess the biggest brains relative to
body weight of any terrestrial mammal. So, part of
the answer is that the human brain is just a highly
elaborated ape brain. Yet this is still something differ
ent, something unique, about the size of the human
brain. Our brain is three times larger than the pre
dicted size for a hypothetical non-human primate of
average body size…. But size isn’t everything. Our
brain also differs significantly from those of apes in the
proportion of various parts…. The human brain is a
sponge that soaks up sensations and observations, and
it is a masterful organ for storing, retrieving, and pro
cessing a wide range of detailed and complicated in
formation…. So, size alone does not explain our
unusual mental abilities. What counts is what’s in
side the package and how it is all arranged… (p. 80,
emp. added).
Earlier, we quoted Ian Tattersall, who ended his assessment
of the brain with these comments: “There’s a huge amount,
of course, that we don’t know about how the brain works and
especially about how a mass of chemical and electrical signals
can give rise to such complex effects as cognition and con
sciousness” (1998, p. 70). We also quoted Richard Morris, who
lamented:
Scientific knowledge of the brain is woefully incom
plete. Scientists do not know how the brain acquires and stores information, how it produces
feelings of pleasure and pain, or how it creates
consciousness. The functioning of the human
brain is a profound mystery (2001, p. 200, emp.
added).
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We could not have said it better ourselves. Evolutionists
do not know how the brain evolved. Nor do they have much
understanding about how the brain acquires and stores infor
mation, in spite of decades of intensive research. Ernst Mayr
of Harvard admitted: “The synapses, for instance, apparently
play an important role in memory retention, but how they do
so is almost entirely unknown” (2001, p. 252). Similarly, evo
lutionists do not know how the brain creates consciousness (a
subject we will examine in the next chapter). Yet the leading
candidate to serve as a potential evolutionary explanation
for the mind (and then, ultimately, consciousness) is, perhaps
somewhat conspicuously, the brain. Some (like Pinker and
his colleagues) believe that the brain evolved its specific re
gions with a purpose (if you will pardon the pun) “in mind.”
Others, like Gould and his followers, believe that, to quote
Ornstein, “structures that evolved for one purpose later changed
their function” and gave rise to consciousness (1991, p. 33).
Not much agreement here, to be sure.
But there is one place where a consensus does exist. Mon
roe Strickberger, in his textbook, Evolution, put it like this:
“[A]lthough we do not yet know the precise relationship be
tween the matter of the brain (neurons, synapses, and so on)
and the thoughts and feelings it produces, that such a relationship exists is no mystery” (2000, p. 56, parenthetical
item in orig., emp. added). That a relationship between brain,
mind, and consciousness exists may be “no mystery.” But why
and how that relationship exists, certainly is!
Perhaps it is because of the mystery that surrounds the var
ious functions and attributes of the brain that, as our knowl
edge of the brain has multiplied in what sometimes seems to
be almost a geometric progression, it has becoming increas
ingly popular to “downplay” the extreme complexity of the
brain itself—no doubt in the hope that the general populace
will begin to think like this: “Well, if the once-impenetrable
fortress of humanity that is the human brain has now been
breached and explained by science, we have answered the
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most basic issue: evolution’s major problem is solved!” At
tempts to minimize the brain’s amazing abilities have become
rather commonplace. Consider just one example.
In an article on mind/body problems titled “The Power of
Mood” that he authored for the January 20, 2003 issue of Time
magazine, Michael D. Lemonick commented:
The brain, after all, is only another organ, and it
operates on the same biochemical principles as the
thyroid or the spleen. What we experience as feelings,
good or bad, are at the cellular level no more than a
complex interaction of chemicals and electrical ac
tivity (2003a, 161[3]:66, emp. added).
In the introductory article (“Your Mind, Your Body”) he wrote
to accompany the feature articles in that same issue of Time,
he suggested:
Mind and body, psychologists and neurologists
now agree, aren’t that different. The brain is just
another organ, albeit more intricate than the rest….
Scientists are also learning something else. Not only
is the mind like the rest of the body, but the well-being of one is intimately intertwined with that of the
other. This makes sense because they share the
same systems—nervous, circulatory, endocrine and
immune (2003b, 161[3]:63, emp. added).
In The God Experiment, Russell Stannard wrote:
It is a widely held assumption that nothing goes on in
the brain that is markedly different from what hap
pens in inanimate matter. Although the processes oc
curring in the brain are undoubtedly more intricate
because of the extreme complexity of the physical
structure, they are nevertheless all to be held accountable for—in principle—through the operation of the well-established laws of nature (2000,
p. 45, emp. added).
Tufts University philosopher Daniel Dennett, in an interview
on this very subject, said matter-of-factly: “The mind is some
how nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind
is the brain…” (as quoted in Lewin, 1992, p. 157, emp. added).
Nuland took the same approach.
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The mind is a man-made concept, a way to cate
gorize and contemplate the manifestations of certain
physical and chemical actions that occur chiefly in
the brain. It is a product of anatomic development
and physiologic functioning. What we call the mind
is an activity, made up of a totality of the innumerable
constituent activities of which it is composed, brought
to awareness by the brain. The brain is the chief organ
of the mind, but not its only one. In a sense, every cell
and molecule in the body is a part of the mind, and
every organ contributes to it. The living body and
its mind are one—the mind is a property of the
body (1997, p. 349, emp. added).
In The Astonishing Hypothesis, Francis Crick even went so far
as to suggest that it soon may be possible to identify specific
neurons in the brain that cause consciousness. He asserted that,
eventually, all mind processes, including consciousness, will
be explicable as nothing more than the firing of neurons—i.e.,
in terms of interactions between atoms and molecules (1994,
pp. 3,259). Steven Pinker is on record as stating: “Nothing in
the mind exists except as neural activity” (1997b, emp. ad
ded). B.A. Farrel announced bluntly: “A human being is a mod
ulator of pulse frequencies, and nothing more” (as quoted in
Allan, 1989, p. 63). Or, as Jerome Elbert put it: “I do maintain
that ‘mental events can be reduced to brain events’ ” (2000,
p. 265, emp. in org.). He then predicted:
Science will probably succeed in describing how our
consciousness arises from natural processes. It will
probably explain how thinking, reasoning, emotions,
motivations, and intuition function as a result of the
activity of the brain, and as a result of the brain inter
acting with the rest of the body and the outside world
(p. 268).
Think with us for a moment, however, about the implica
tions of what you have just read. Beliefs have consequences!
If: (a) “what we experience as feelings, good or bad, are at the
cellular level no more than a complex interaction of chemi
cals and electrical activity”; (b) “mind and body…aren’t that
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different”; (c) “the mind is a property of the body” and “mind
is a man-made concept”; (d) “nothing in the mind exists ex
cept as neural activity,” what does all of this mean?
Let Steven Pinker explain. He believes (as noted above)
that “nothing in the mind exists except as neural activity.”
Would it surprise you to learn, then, that in a New York Times
article, Pinker suggested that women who murder their new
born babies may not be either mad or evil, but simply uncon
sciously obeying “primeval instincts to sacrifice their children
for the good of the tribe”? (see Blanchard, 2000, p. 382). In
his fascinating book, Does God Believe in Atheists?, John Blan
chard addressed Dr. Pinker’s suggestion: “This is the logical
outworking of materialism, but if reducing the brain’s activity to electrical impulses can sanction murder, what
can it condemn?” (p. 382, emp. in orig.).
What indeed? Atheistic philosopher Michael Ruse admit
ted that if evolution is accepted as true, then “morality is no
more…than an adaptation, and as such has the same status
as such things as teeth and eyes and noses” (1995, p. 241, emp.
added). But if, as Ruse went on to say, “morality is a creation
of the genes” (p. 290), then by what criterion, or group of cri
teria, do humans make moral decisions? Reichenbach and
Anderson commented on this very issue when they wrote:
Reductionism, however, threatens the very concept
of the person. Where persons’ actions and beliefs are
ultimately explainable in terms of unpredictable neu
ral firings and chemical transfers, those acts and be
liefs are no longer the purposeful product of human
choice…. This means that reductionism is particularly disastrous for morality, not to mention our
concept of personhood itself (1995, p. 279, emp.
added).
And what place is there for the famed human possession,
“free will”? Are we merely products of our environment? Does
input truly equal output? Nancey Murphy recognized the
quandary of losing our free will and reducing the brain to lit
tle more than matter.
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First, if mental effects can be reduced to brain events,
and the brain events are governed by the laws of neu
rology (and ultimately by the laws of physics), then
in what sense can we say that humans have free will?
Are not their intendings and willings simply a prod
uct of blind physical forces, and thus are not their
willed actions merely the product of the blind forces?
(1998, p. 131).
She went on to comment:
Second, if mental events are simply the products of
neurological causes, then what sense can we make of
reasons? That is, we give reasons for judgments in all
areas of our intellectual lives—moral, aesthetic, scien
tific, mathematical. It seems utter nonsense to say that
these judgments are merely the result of the blind
forces of nature (p. 131).
Have we no option but to do whatever our genes have pro
grammed us to do? In other words, how can the materialist
escape from the stranglehold of determinism—the idea which
suggests, as its name implies, that everything we do is “deter
mined,” and that we have, in essence, no free will. This farci
cal idea is exactly what Cornell professor William Provine
has advocated. In 1998, during “Darwin Day” at the Univer
sity of Tennessee at Knoxville, he delivered the keynote lec
ture titled “Evolution: Free Will and Punishment and Mean
ing in Life.” During that lecture, he displayed a slide that stated:
“Finally, free will is nonexistent.” It went on to note: “Free
will is the worst of all cultural inventions. Belief in free will fu
els our revenge-minded culture” (Provine, 1998).
In the now-famous text of his Compton Lectures, Objective
Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, British philosopher Sir
Karl Popper made the point that even if determinism were
true, it could not be argued, since any argument is itself pre
sumably predetermined by purely physical conditions—as
would be any opposing arguments. As Popper put it:
According to determinism, any such theories—such
as, say, determinism—are held because of a certain
physical structure of the holder (perhaps of his brain).
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Accordingly, we are deceiving ourselves (and are
physically so determined as to deceive ourselves) when
ever we believe that there are such things as arguments
or reasons which make us accept determinism. Or in
other words, physical determinism is a theory which,
if it is true, is not arguable, since it must explain all
our reactions, including what appear to us as beliefs
based on arguments, as due to purely physical conditions. Purely physical conditions, including our phys
ical environment, make us say or accept whatever we
say or accept… (1972, p. 223, emp. added).
In their book, The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and
Our Mind, Sir John Eccles and his co-author Daniel Robinson
commented on the correctness of Popper’s assessment—and
the absurd nature—of determinism when they observed: “This
is an effective reductio ad absurdum” (reduction to the absurd
—BH /BT]. They then went on to state: “This stricture applies
to all of the materialist theories” (1984, p. 38; cf. also Eccles,
1992, p. 21). Yes,, it is absurd. And yes, it does apply to “all
of the materialist theories.”
A good illustration of this is the life, teachings, and actions
of the French novelist commonly known as the Marquis de
Sade (1740-1814), who gave his name to sadism, in which a
person derives sexual satisfaction from inflicting pain and hu
miliation on others. De Sade argued that, since everything is
chemically determined, whatever is, is right. The distinguished
microbiologist, Lynn Margulis, and her co-author/son Dorion
Sagan, discussed this very point in their book, What is Life?
The high-born Frenchman Donatien Alphonse Fran
cois de Sade (1740-1814) keenly felt the vanishing ba
sis for morality. If Nature was a self-perpetuating
machine and no longer a purveyor of divine authority, then it did not matter what he, as the infamous marquis de Sade, did or wrote (1995, p. 40,
emp. added).
Or, as Ravi Zacharias put it: “Thinking atoms discussing mo
rality is absurd” (1990, p. 138).
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In his book, In the Blood: God, Genes and Destiny, Steve Jones
suggested that criminal behavior was determined largely by
genetic make-up (1996, pp. 207-220). In discussing Jones’ book,
one writer, Janet Daley, insisted that if genetics is found to be
ultimately responsible for “bad” traits, then it also must ac
count for “good” ones. As she observed: “If we can never be
truly guilty, then we can never be truly virtuous either.” Da
ley went on to say:
Human beings are only capable of being moral inso
far as they are free to choose how they behave. If they
have no power to make real choices—if their freedom
to decide how to act is severely limited by forces out
side their control—then it is nonsense to make any eth
ical judgements about them. It would be wrong, as well,
to base a judicial system on the assumption that peo
ple are free to choose how they will act. The idea of put
ting anyone on trial for anything at all becomes ab
surd (1996).
In fact, attempting to locate a “basis for morality” in the
blind outworkings of nature is futile. As Ruse put it: “There is
no justification for morality in the ultimate sense” (as quoted
in O’Hear, 1997, p. 140). In Dave Hunt’s words, “There are no
morals in nature. Try to find a compassionate crow or an hon
est eagle—or a sympathetic hurricane” (1996, p. 41). Are those
who advocate the idea that “nothing in the mind exists except
as neural activity,” willing to accept the consequences of their
belief?
GROWING NEURONS
Every human begins life as a single fertilized cell. When the
male and female gametes join to form the zygote that will grow
into the fetus, it is at that very moment that the formation of a
new body begins. It is the result of a viable male gamete joined
sexually with a viable female gamete, which has formed a zy
gote that will move through a variety of important stages.
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The first step in the process—which eventually will result in
the highly differentiated tissues and organs that compose the
body of the neonatal child—is the initial mitotic cleavage of
that primal cell, the zygote. At this point, the genetic material
doubles, matching copies of the chromosomes move to oppo
site poles, and the cell cleaves into two daughter cells. Shortly
afterwards, each of these cells divides again, forming the em
bryo. [In humans and animals, the term “embryo” applies to
any stage after cleavage but before birth (see Rudin, 1997, p.
125).]
As the cells of the embryo continue to divide, they form a
cluster of cells. These divisions are accompanied by addi
tional changes that produce a hollow, fluid-filled cavity in
side the ball, which now is a one-layer-thick grouping of cells
known as a blastula. Early on the second day after fertilization,
the embryo undergoes a process known as gastrulation, in which
the single-layer blastula turns into a three-layered gastrula con
sisting of ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm, surrounding
a cavity known as the archenteron. Each of these layers will give
rise to very specific structures. For example, the ectoderm will
form the outermost layer of the skin and other structures, in
cluding the sense organs, parts of the skeleton, and the nervous
system. The mesoderm will form tissues associated with sup
port, movement, transport, reproduction, and excretion (i.e.,
muscle, bone, cartilage, blood, heart, blood vessels, gonads,
and kidneys). The endoderm will produce structures associ
ated with breathing and digestion (including the lungs, liver,
pancreas, and other digestive glands) [see Wallace, 1975, p. 187].
Within 72 hours after fertilization, the embryo will have
divided a total of four times, and will consist of sixteen cells.
Each cell will divide before it reaches the size of the cell that
produced it; hence, the cells will become progressively smaller
with each division. About twenty-two days after fertilization,
the brain begins its embryonic development with the forma
tion of the neural tube. About twenty-two days after fertiliza
tion, this hollow region begins to develop (Moore and Per-
- 238 -
saud, 1993, p. 385). The cells located within this hollow tube
eventually will multiply, migrate, and become the brain and
spinal cord. Once the brain is fully developed, three distinct
regions can be identified: forebrain, midbrain, and hindbrain.
Structures such as the cerebrum, thalamus, and hypothala
mus are located within the forebrain. The midbrain is made
up of the superior and inferior colliculi and the cerebral pe
duncles. The hindbrain is composed primarily of the cerebel
lum, pons, and medulla oblongata. Literally millions of neu
rons are housed in each of these structures, from which radi
ate communicating axons to other regions to allow the entire
brain the unique ability to communicate with itself (thanks to
a small structure known as the corpus callosum, the left and
right hemispheres of the brain possess the ability to commu
nicate with one another).
While regions and structures within the brain have been
dissected exhaustively and mapped out considerably, what
can those neurological pathways tell us about function? Can
we look at the exterior surface of the brain and determine the
intellectual capabilities of an individual? Evolutionists must
think so; look at the “dumb,” hairy, club-carrying creatures
that they portray as our ancestors. These evolutionists would
like to be able to look at a fossilized skull, or even an endocra
nial cast, and determine what “prehuman” brains were capa
ble of doing in the distant past. However, as Terrence Deacon
admitted: “Surface morphology and underlying brain func
tions are not directly correlated in most cases.” He went on to
say, therefore, that “we must be careful when drawing func
tional interpretations from endocasts” (1999, p. 116).
Many materialists are adamant that the human brain has
evolved through a layering process—with each “higher spe
cies” adding a new layer. Thus, as Ian Tattersall remarked in
his book, The Monkey in the Mirror, “as far as is known, not
much if anything has been ‘lost’ in the course of human brain
evolution. Our skulls still house the descendants of structures
that eons ago governed the behavior of ancient fish, of primi
tive mammals, and of early primates” (2002, p. 72).
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According to this “triune” brain theory, the brain evolved
in three stages: the reptilian brain, followed by the paleocor
tex, and then the neocortex. Thus, the innermost portion of
our brain is said to be the reptilian brain—since evolutionists
believe it to be the oldest and most primitive portion. It there
fore would include structures such as the pons and medulla,
and would handle many of the autonomic tasks needed for
survival (e.g., breathing). According to evolutionists, this por
tion of our brain has remained basically unchanged by evo
lution, and we therefore share it with all animals that possess
a backbone. The next layer is said to be the mammalian brain
or the paleocortex, which is alleged to have arisen when mam
mals evolved from reptiles. It would include structures such
as the amygdala and hypothalamus. Then, on top of this, evo
lutionists claim we have added another layer—the neocortex
or human brain, which allows humans to handle logic. This
new layer is said to “envelop” the other layers in gray matter,
and amounts to 85% of the human brain mass. In his biogra
phy of Carl Sagan, William Poundstone observed that even
Sagan propagated this myth. He noted: “His extended discus
sion of the triune brain implicitly endorses it as (at least) an in
teresting idea. That was what some neurologists found objec
tionable. ‘It’s dismaying for people like us,’ complained Boyd
Campbell of Walter Reed Army Medical Center, ‘to see Sa
gan come and swallow all that stuff, write The Dragons of Eden,
and get a Pulitzer Prize for it’ ” (1999, p. 254, parenthetical item
in orig.). Dismaying, to be sure. As James Trefil pointed out,
this way of thinking is “completely wrong”:
Unfortunately, this understanding of the brain has
led to a rather oversimplified notion of brain function
in some parts of the popular press—in which the brain
is seen as a set of successive overlays. At the bottom
(the brain stem and diencephalons) is a kind of prim
itive, reptilian brain shared with all animals, with pro
gressive overlying refinements added until we get to
the cerebral cortex, which reflects the highest brain
functions. In its extreme form, this view presents the
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idea of the brain as a kind of sedimentary structure,
like the stratifications of the Grand Canyon. Each new
layer adds a new function, while underlying layers stay
more or less the same. This is another of those concepts
that the French call a fausse idée claire. It’s simple, elegant, clear, and completely wrong (1997, p. 75,
parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
And yet the textbooks still show a progression through fish,
amphibians, reptiles, and mammals. This theory of how the
brain evolved in layers has suffered the same fate as that of a
soufflé when the oven door is slammed—it has fallen flat.
THE BRAIN VERSUS A COMPUTER
Walk into any office, hospital, or even grocery store, and
you will find yourself in the presence of computers. Com
puters have become an integral part of our everyday lives—
they even played a role in getting this book to you. But most
intelligent individuals will agree that computers did not arrive
on this planet by time, natural law, and chance. Computers
are designed and manufactured, and they constantly are be
ing improved to increase their speed and capabilities. But the
computer fails miserably in comparison to the human brain.
When is the last time a computer grabbed a pencil to com
pose a sonnet, a short story, or a poem? How many comput
ers are capable of taking a piece of wood, fashioning it in the
shape of a violin, and then sitting down to play Barber’s Adagio
for Strings. And yet evolutionists insist that the human brain—
an object far more complex, and with far more capabilities than
a computer—“evolved” in order to provide us with memories,
emotions, the ability to reason, and the ability to talk. Other
individuals like to “simplify” the human brain down to the
level of modern-day computers. They rationalize that, like com
puters, the human brain can rapidly process, store, and recall
bits of information. Also, some scientific investigators compare
neuronal connections to the wiring found within computers.
However, the inner workings of a computer always can be re
duced to one thing—electronics. The basic function of comput-
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ers always involves the movement of an electrical charge in a
semiconductor. The brain, on the other hand, operates purely
on electrochemical reactions. The transmission of nerve sig
nals involves chemicals known as neurotransmitters. Once a
neuron is caused to fire, it moves these neurotransmitters into
the tiny space between itself and the neighboring neurons (at
the synapse), in order to stimulate them.
Additionally we know that the human brain can reason and
think—i.e., we possess self-awareness. Computers have the abil
ity to carry out multiple tasks, and they can even carry out com
plex processes—but not without the programming and instruc
tion they receive from humans. Additionally, computers do
not possess the ability to reason. When asked to translate into
Russian the sentence—“the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak”
—one computer came up with words that meant “the vodka is
fine, but the meat is tasteless” (Allan, 1989, p. 68)—which is a
far cry from the original meaning. Nor are computers self-aware.
In comparing a modern-day computer to the awesome power
of the human brain, astrophysicist Robert Jastrow admitted:
“The machine would be a prodigious artificial intelligence, but
it would be only a clumsy imitation of the human brain” (1981,
p. 143).
It has been estimated that if we learned something new ev
ery second of our lives, it would take three million years to ex
haust the capacity of the human brain (Weiss, 1990, p. 103).
Plainly put, the brain is not just an advanced computer. All
those convolutions and neuronal networks are the result of
an intelligent Creator. If we are able to rationalize that a com
puter found in the middle of the Sahara Desert did not just
“happen” by random chance, then why are so many willing
to believe that a far more complex human brain occurred in
such a fashion?
TWELVE CRANIAL NERVES
We all have experienced the unpleasantness of sitting in
front of a doctor with our tongue outstretched, saying “Ah,”
while the physician gags us with a wooden tongue depressor.
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Interestingly, this dreadful routine, which is performed on a
daily basis in clinics and doctors’ offices around the world,
has an important purpose. By having you open your mouth,
protrude your tongue, vocalize the word “Ah,” and confirm
an intact gag reflex, doctors are able to not only look at the
back of your throat, but also to assess many of your cranial
nerves. Every human is born with twelve pairs of these special
nerves, each performing a different function, and each going
to a different location within the body.
Figure 4 — Superficial view of cranial nerves and the interior
base of the skull demonstrating the various foramina. LifeART
image copyright © (2003) Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. All
rights reserved. Used by permission.
Unlike nerves that originate from your spinal cord, cranial
nerves drop directly out of the brain and then proceed to their
target organs. Recall, however, that your brain is completely
encased in bone—your skull. So, exactly how do these twelve
cranial nerves get to where they need to go? Quite simply,
they travel through well-placed foramina or “holes.” Each
pair of nerves has a specific “hole” through which it descends
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in order to reach a target such as the eye (optic nerve) or the
heart (vagus nerve). If you were to take a skull and pour water
where the brain normally would be sitting, you soon would
notice water coming out of several different holes. These holes
allow the cranial nerves to travel from the brain to their target
organs. But ask yourself this question: How did the holes get
there? Did they evolve, too? Did these cranial nerves simply
“evolve” out of the brain and then wait around until holes
evolved in the skull? And let’s not make a small issue out of
these tiny holes: the brain is constantly bathed in cerebro
spinal fluid—a fluid that you do not want “leaking” out of the
cranium. The formation of the holes and the dural layers that
prevent this “leakage” definitely point to an intelligent De
signer.
CONCLUSION
Neuroscientists already have gone, to use the Star Trek man
tra, “where no one has gone before.” Scientists now possess
the ability to record the neurological activity from a single
neuron. Using ultra-fine microelectrodes, we can proceed
down through the cortex of the brain and patch-clamp neu
rons in order to determine exactly what ionic changes are oc
curring across the neuronal membranes. We have the ability
to use tracer dyes to detect where a nerve sends a specific sig
nal. Entire maps have been made that demonstrate the neu
rological pathways of specific types of neurons. We have tre
mendous hope that new areas of research, such as neuronal
stem cells and nerve growth factors, will relieve or cure some
of the neurological diseases that exist today. But science is far
from understanding and comprehending the complexity of
the brain. In fact, the brain remains a puzzle with far more
pieces missing than have been properly set in place to com
plete the puzzle.
Upon hearing of the death of a child, a mother will begin to
weep uncontrollably. What actually caused the tears to flow
down her face? Where does she hold those treasured memo-
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ries of her offspring? Some scientists would have us believe
that those tears are merely a product of organic evolution,
and that through time, humans “naturally selected” for them.
But why? Man can reason, laugh, cry, and even worship. Why
would we selectively want to cry at the loss of a loved one? Or
why would our fleshly “brain” go to great lengths to worship
and praise something it has never seen—unless we are more
than mere matter? Evolutionist Steven Pinker wrestled with
this point in his book, How the Mind Works.
How does religion fit into a mind that one might have
thought was designed to reject the palpably not true?
The common answer—that people take comfort in the
thought of a benevolent Sheperd, a universal plan, or
an afterlife—is unsatisfying, because it only raises the
question of why a mind would evolve to find comfort
in beliefs it can plainly see are false. A freezing person
finds no comfort in believing he is warm; a person faceto-face with a lion is not put at ease by the conviction
that it is a rabbit (1997a, pp. 554-555).
The precision and complexity of our brain, and the man
ner in which it is able to interact with our mind, clearly point
to an intelligent Designer. Writing in the Bulletin of Atomic Sci
entists, psychologist Roger Sperry of the California Institute
of Technology observed:
Before science, man used to think himself a free agent
possessing free will. Science gives us, instead, causal
determinism wherein every act is seen to follow in
evitably from preceding patterns of brain excitation.
Where we used to see purpose and meaning in human
behavior, science now shows us a complex bio-physical machine composed entirely of material elements,
all of which obey inexorably the universal laws of phys
ics and chemistry…. I find that my own conceptual
working model of the brain leads to inferences that are
in direct disagreement with many of the foregoing; es
pecially I must take issue with that whole general materialistic-reductionist conception of human nature and
mind that seems to emerge from the currently prevail-
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ing objective analytic approach in the brain-behaviour
sciences. When we are led to favour the implications
of modern materialism in opposition to older, more
idealistic values in these and related matters, I suspect
that science may have sold society and itself a
somewhat questionable bill of goods (1966, pp.
2-3, emp. added)
We suspect so, too.
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7
“Once consciousness was established, there was no
going back” (Richard Leakey, 1994, p. 149).
“We have reached the stage where ignoring the prob
lem will not cause it to go away” (Eccles and Robinson,
1984, p. 17).
In a book review that Joel Peck authored about the Encyclo
pedia of Evolution for the February 27, 2003 issue of Nature, he
commented: “Given the relatively small number of working
evolutionary biologists, the field receives a surprisingly large
amount of media attention” (421:895). Yes, it does. However,
while it might be said that sifting through the jumble of scien
tific and philosophical literature on organic evolution makes
for a somewhat interesting journey, truth be told, it is not al
ways an educational one. At practically every turn, the things
that evolutionists admittedly recognize as unknown far out
weigh those that they claim are known. Questions vastly out
number answers. Problems greatly exceed solutions. Theories
increasingly eclipse facts. Doubts routinely overshadow cer
tainties. Nothing is what it seems.
Think this is an exaggeration? Think again. In the specific
areas of evolutionary thought that are incontrovertibly the
most important for the theory’s hegemony and success, one
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finds everywhere “challenges,” “problems,” “enigmas,” “mys
teries,” “puzzles,” “disappointments,” and yes, at times, even
a strong dose of obfuscation. We would like to like to illustrate
this claim by presenting a few brief examples.
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Take, for example, the very origin of life itself. As long ago
as 1957, evolutionary anthropologist Loren Eiseley summed
up the matter in his classic text, The Immense Journey, when he
wrote:
With the failure of these many efforts, science was
left in the somewhat embarrassing position of hav
ing to postulate theories of living origins which it could
not demonstrate. After having chided the theologian for his reliance on myth and miracle, science found itself in the unenviable position of
having to create a mythology of its own: namely,
the assumption that what, after long effort, could
not be proved to take place today, had, in truth,
taken place in the primeval past (pp. 201-202, emp.
and italics added).
From that day to this, the situation has not changed one iota.
Follow the time line. In 1961, Harry Fuller and Oswald Tippo
admitted in their text, College Botany:
The evidence of those who would explain life’s ori
gin on the basis of the accidental combination of suit
able chemical elements is no more tangible than that
of those people who place their faith in Divine Crea
tion as the explanation of the development of life.
Obviously the latter have just as much justification
for their belief as do the former (p. 25).
Six years later, in speaking of the concept of spontaneous
generation, evolutionists D.E. Green and R.F. Goldberger
wrote in their text, Molecular Insights into the Living Process:
There is one step [in evolution—BH/BT] that far out
weighs the others in enormity: the step from macro
molecules to cells. All the other steps can be accounted
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for on theoretical grounds—if not correctly, at least
elegantly. However, the macromolecule to cell transition is a jump of fantastic dimensions, which lies
beyond the range of testable hypothesis. In this
area, all is conjecture. The available facts do not pro
vide a basis for postulation that cells arose on this plan
et. This is not to say that some paraphysical forces were
not at work. We simply wish to point out that there
is no scientific evidence (1967, pp. 406-407, emp.
added).
Almost a decade-and-a-half after that, Nobel laureate Sir Fran
cis Crick wrote:
An honest man, armed with all the knowledge avail
able to us now, could only state that in some sense,
the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which
would have had to have been satisfied to get it going
(1981, p. 88, emp. added).
After another four years had passed, evolutionist Andrew
Scott authored an article in New Scientist on the origin of life
titled “Update on Genesis,” in which he observed:
Take some matter, heat while stirring, and wait. That
is the modern version of Genesis. The “fundamen
tal” forces of gravity, electromagnetism and the strong
and weak nuclear forces are presumed to have done
the rest.... But how much of this neat tale is firmly es
tablished, and how much remains hopeful specula
tion? In truth, the mechanism of almost every major
step, from chemical precursors up to the first recog
nizable cells, is the subject of either controversy or
complete bewilderment.
We are grappling with a classic “chicken and egg” di
lemma. Nucleic acids are required to make proteins,
whereas proteins are needed to make nucleic acids
and also to allow them to direct the process of protein
manufacture itself.
The emergence of the gene-protein link, an absolutely
vital stage on the way up from lifeless atoms to our
selves, is still shrouded in almost complete mystery....
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We still know very little about how our genesis
came about, and to provide a more satisfactory
account than we have at present remains one of
science’s great challenges (1985, 106:30-33, emp.
added).
John Horgan concluded that if he were in the creationist
camp today, he would focus on the subject of the origin of life
because, he has suggested, this
...is by far the weakest strut of the chassis of modern
biology. The origin of life is a science writer’s dream.
It abounds with exotic scientists and exotic theories,
which are never entirely abandoned or accepted, but
merely go in and out of fashion (1996, p. 138).
In an article titled “The Origin of Life: More Questions Than
Answers,” well-known origin-of-life researcher Klaus Dose
pointed out:
More than 30 years of experimentation on the origin
of life in the fields of chemical and molecular evolu
tion have led to a better perception of the immensity
of the problem of the origin of life on Earth rather
than to its solution. At present all discussions on
principal theories and experiments in the field
either end in stalemate or in a confession of ignorance (1988, 13[4]:348, emp. added).
Or, as renowned physicist Paul Davies and his coworker, Phil
lip Addams, noted:
Some scientists say, just throw energy at it and it will
happen spontaneously. That is a little bit like saying:
put a stick of dynamite under the pile of bricks, and
bang, you’ve got a house! Of course you won’t have a
house, you’ll just have a mess. The difficulty in trying to explain the origin of life is in accounting
for how the elaborate organizational structure
of these complex molecules came into existence
spontaneously from a random input of energy.
How did these very specific complex molecules
assemble themselves? (1998, pp. 47-48, emp. added).
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THE ORIGIN OF THE GENETIC CODE
Or, consider the origin of the genetic code. Evolutionist
Douglas Hofstadter remarked:
A natural and fundamental question to ask on learn
ing of these incredibly interlocking pieces of software
and hardware is: “How did they ever get started in
the first place?” It is truly a baffling thing. One has to
imagine some sort of bootstrap process occurring,
somewhat like that which is used in the development
of new computer language—but a bootstrap from sim
ple molecules to entire cells is almost beyond one’s
power to imagine. There are various theories on the or
igin of life. They all run aground on this most central
of all central questions: “How did the Genetic Code,
along with the mechanisms for its translation (ribo
somes and RNA molecules) originate?” For the moment, we will have to content ourselves with a
sense of wonder and awe, rather than with an answer (1980, p. 548, emp. added).
Leslie Orgel, one of the “heavyweights” in origin-of-life stud
ies, similarly admitted:
We do not yet understand even the general features
of the origin of the genetic code.... The origin of the
genetic code is the most baffling aspect of the
problem of the origins of life, and a major concep
tual or experimental breakthrough may be needed
before we can make any substantial progress (1982,
p. 151, emp. added).
Writing in Nature on “The Genesis Code by Numbers,” ev
olutionist John Maddox commented:
It was already clear that the genetic code is not merely
an abstraction but the embodiment of life’s mecha
nisms; the consecutive triplets of nucleotides in DNA
(called codons) are inherited but they also guide the
construction of proteins. So it is disappointing that
the origin of the genetic code is still as obscure
as the origin of life itself (1994, 367:111, emp.
added).
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THE ORIGIN OF SEX
Consider, too, the origin of sex. In his book, The Master
piece of Nature: The Evolution of Genetics and Sexuality, Graham
Bell described the dilemma in the following manner:
Sex is the queen of problems in evolutionary biology. Perhaps no other natural phenomenon has
aroused so much interest; certainly none has sowed
as much confusion. The insights of Darwin and Men
del, which have illuminated so many mysteries, have
so far failed to shed more than a dim and wavering
light on the central mystery of sexuality, emphasizing
its obscurity by its very isolation (1982, p. 19, emp. ad
ded).
Much of nature reproduces sexually, yet evolutionists do not
have the first clue as to how sex evolved. Sir John Maddox
(quoted above), who served for over twenty-five years as the
distinguished editor of Nature, the prestigious journal pub
lished by the British Association for the Advancement of Sci
ence (and who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1994 in
recognition of his “multiple contributions to science”), authored
an amazing book titled What Remains to be Discovered, in which
he addressed the origin of sex, and stated forthrightly: “The
overriding question is when (and then how) sexual reproduc
tion itself evolved. Despite decades of speculation, we do
not know” (1998, p. 252, parenthetical item in orig., emp. ad
ded).
THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE AND SPEECH
Then, think about the origin of language and speech, which
remains one of the most significant hurdles in evolutionary
theory, even in the twenty-first century. In fact, some evolu
tionists simply have stopped discussing the matter completely.
Earlier in this book, we quoted from The Seeds of Speech: Lan
guage Origin and Evolution by Jean Aitchison, who wrote:
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In 1866, a ban on the topic was incorporated into the
founding statues of the Linguistic Society of Paris, per
haps the foremost academic linguistic institution of
the time: “The Society does not accept papers on ei
ther the origin of language or the invention of a uni
versal language” (2000, p. 5).
Our observation was (and is) that this is an amazing (albeit
perhaps inadvertent) admission of defeat, especially coming
from a group of such eminent scientists, researchers, and schol
ars. In regard to the origin of language, Aitchison commented:
Of course, holes still remain in our knowledge: in par
ticular, at what stage did language leap from being
something new which humans discovered to being
something which every newborn human is scheduled
to acquire? This is still a puzzle (p. ix, emp. added).
Again, we concur; it is “a puzzle.”
THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS—
“THE GREATEST OF MIRACLES”
Earlier, we quoted evolutionist Graham Bell, who opined
in regard to the origin of sex that “perhaps no other natural
phenomenon has aroused so much interest; certainly none
has sowed as much confusion.” We beg to differ. In our esti
mation, there can be little doubt that there is one challenge/
problem/enigma/mystery/puzzle that outranks all others in
regard to the difficulty it presents for evolutionary theory—
the evolution of consciousness. And if the scientific litera
ture can be taken as any type of accurate gauge, the evolution
ists themselves agree with us. If sex is the “queen” of problems
in evolutionary biology, then the evolution of consciousness
must surely rank as the “king” of such problems.
The Importance of Human Consciousness
When speaking of consciousness (also referred to in the lit
erature as “self-awareness”), evolutionists freely admit that,
from their vantage point at least, “consciousness is one’s most
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precious possession” (Elbert, 2000, p. 231). David MacKay
of the University of Keele in England wrote: “[Conscious
ness is] for us, the most important aspect of all” (1965, p. 498).
As famed paleoanthropologist Richard Leakey put it: “The
sense of self-awareness we each experience is so brilliant it il
luminates everything we think and do…” (1994, p. 139). In
their book, Evolution, the late geneticist Theodosius Dobzhan
sky (of the Rockefeller University) and his co-authors wrote:
“In point of fact, self-awareness is the most immediate
and incontrovertible of all realities. Without doubt, the
human mind sets our species apart from nonhuman animals”
(Dobzhansky, et al., 1977, p. 453, emp. added). Ervin Laszlo,
in his volume, Evolution: The Grand Synthesis, commented:
The phenomenon of mind is perhaps the most
remarkable of all the phenomena of the lived
and experienced world. Its explanation belongs
to a grand tradition of philosophy—to the perennial
“great questions” that each generation of thinkers an
swers anew…or despairs of answering at all (1987, p.
116, ellipsis in orig., emp. added).
The late Robert Wesson, a Hoover Institution Senior Re
search Fellow, observed in his book, Beyond Natural Selection:
Life has a dual nature: its material basis and the es
sence of functionality and responsiveness that distin
guishes living things and flourishes at higher levels of
evolution. The material and the mental are both
real, just as are causation and will. The mind derives
richness from these two sides, like feeling and bodily
function, love and sex, the spiritual and the carnal,
the joy of creation and the satisfaction of bodily wants
(1997, p. 278, emp. added).
Or, as philosopher Michael Ruse remarked: “The important thing from our perspective is that consciousness is
a real thing. We are sentient beings” (2001b, p. 200, emp.
added). Sir Cyril Hinshelwood, professor of chemistry at the
Imperial College in London, commented: “I almost hesitate
to say this in a scientific gathering; but one does just wonder
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what would be the point or purpose of anything at all if
there were not consciousness anywhere” (1965, p. 500,
emp. added).
And creationists certainly agree. In his work, Understand
ing the Present: Science and the Soul of Modern Man, theist Bryan
Appleyard observed:
A moment’s thought would convince a child that the
most striking thing about us is that we are utterly un
like anything else in nature. Light, gravity, even the
whole biological realm are related to us only in the
most superficial way: we reflect light, if dropped we
fall, and we have a body system roughly comparable
to a large number of animals. All of which is trivial
compared with the one attribute we have that is
denied to the rest of nature—consciousness (1992,
pp. 193-194, emp. added).
Yes, consciousness is a “real thing.” But why is it an “im
portant thing”? The late evolutionist and Harvard professor,
Stephen Jay Gould, concluded:
Consciousness, vouchsafed only to our species in the
history of life on earth, is the most god-awfully potent
evolutionary invention ever developed. Although
accidental and unpredictable, it has given Homo sa
piens unprecedented power both over the history of
our own species and the life of the entire contemporary
biosphere (1997b, p. ix).
With consciousness has come the ability to control—well—
almost everything! But with that “unprecedented power”
has come unprecedented responsibility because, as even evo
lutionists are wont to admit, actions have consequences. Wellknown evolutionist Donald Griffin, in the 2001 revised edi
tion of his classic text, Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Con
sciousness, admitted as much when he wrote:
It is self-evident that we are aware of at least some of
what goes on around us and that we think about our
situation and about the probable results of various
actions that we might take. This sort of conscious sub-
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jective mental experience is significant and useful because it often helps us select appropriate
behavior (p. ix, emp. added).
“Selecting appropriate behavior” (or, as the case may be, not
selecting appropriate behavior) becomes a key point in this
discussion. As evolutionists John Eccles and Daniel Robin
son correctly observed in The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain
and Our Mind: “Whether one takes human beings to be ‘chil
dren of God,’ ‘tools of production,’ ‘matter in motion,’ or ‘a
species of primate’ has consequences” (1984, p. 1). Yes, as we
will show, it certainly does.
The “Mystery” of Human Consciousness
Consciousness is undeniably real. And it does have consequences—something that practically every rational human
freely admits. But admitting all of that is the easy part. The dif
ficulty arises in explaining why—why consciousness exists; why
it is real; why it works the way it does; and why it “has conse
quences.” When it comes to explaining the origin of conscious
ness, evolutionists admit (to use their own words): “Clearly, we
are in deep trouble” (Eccles and Robinson, 1984, p. 17). Just
how “deep” that “trouble” really is, appears to be one of the
most widely known, yet best-kept secrets in science. In a chap
ter (“The Human Brain and the Human Person”) that he au
thored for the book, Mind and Brain: The Many-Faceted Prob
lems, Sir John Eccles wrote: “The emergence and development
of self-consciousness…is an utterly mysterious process…. The
coming-to-be of self-consciousness is a mystery that concerns
each person with its conscious and unique selfhood” (1982,
pp. 85,97). Or, as British physicist John Polkinghorne was wont
to admit: “The human psyche has revealed its shadowy and
elusive depths” (1986, p. 5).
Consider the following admissions from those within the
evolutionary community, and as you do, notice the descrip
tive terms (“problem,” “mystery,” “puzzle,” “riddle,” “chal
lenge,” “muddle,” etc.) that generally are employed in any
discussion of consciousness. [AUTHORS’ NOTE: While we
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might just as easily have quoted from only one or two sources,
we wanted to provide extensive documentation of just how
serious this concern actually is. To do so, we have quoted from
a wide variety of sources among those within the evolutionary
establishment. We do not believe that any fair-minded read
er could possibly consider the concessions below and fail to
realize that evolutionary theory has absolutely no adequate ex
planation for the origin of human consciousness—“our most
precious possession.”]
Consciousness in General
Consciousness is the highest manifestation of life,
but as to its origin, destiny, and the nature of its
connection with the physical body and brain—
these are as yet unsolved metaphysical questions,
the answer to which can only be found by continued
research in the direction of higher physical and psy
chical science (Carrington, 1923, p. 54, emp. added).
Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be conscious. Nobody even knows what
it would be like to have the slightest idea about how
anything material could be conscious (Fodor, 1992,
p. 5, emp. added).
There is nothing strange about consciousness
except that we don’t understand it…. You can’t ex
plain consciousness on the cheap…. I admit that I am
not able to explain consciousness (Scott, 1995, pp.
132,141,163, emp. added).
We still have no clue how mind and matter are
related, or what process led to the emergence of
mind from matter in the first place (Davies, 1995,
emp. added).
It seems to me that there is a fundamental problem
with the idea that mentality arises out of physicality—
that is something which philosophers worry about
for very good reasons. The things we talk about in
physics are matter, physical things, massive objects,
particles, space, time, energy and so on. How could our
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feelings, our perception of redness, or of happiness
have anything to do with physics? I regard that as a
mystery (Penrose, 1997, p. 94, emp. added).
We need to close the gap between the physical and
subjective realms of this topic before we can hope to
reach an understanding of consciousness. Until then
it remains, according to Scientific American, “biology’s most profound riddle” ( Johanson and Ed
gar, 1996, p. 107, emp. added).
The problem of consciousness tends to embarrass biologists. Taking it to be an aspect of living
things, they feel they should know about it and be
able to tell physicists about it, whereas they have noth
ing relevant to say (Wald, 1994, p. 129, emp. added).
The “problem of consciousness” has been identified as an outstanding intellectual challenge
across disciplines ranging from basic neuroscience
through psychology to philosophy, although opinions vary widely on the chances of achieving a
solution (Zeman, 2001, 124:1264, emp. added).
Human consciousness is just about the last surviving
mystery…. With consciousness, however, we are
still in a terrible muddle. Consciousness stands
alone today as a topic that often leaves even the most
sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused. And,
as with all the earlier mysteries, there are many who
insist—and hope—that there will never be a demystifi
cation of consciousness. Science does not answer all
good questions. Neither does philosophy (Dennett,
1991, pp. 21,22, emp. added).
Why do we have “sentience,” as we might call it? Why
do we have the capacity of self-awareness?… Why is
it that what is essentially no more than a bunch of at
oms should have thinking ability?… I’m afraid that
at this point, we start to run out of answers. The
Darwinian qua Darwinian is reduced to silence. This
is not to deny the existence of consciousness. Any
thing but!… The point is that as a Darwinian, that
is to say as a scientist and an evolutionist, there
seems to be no answer. At least, no answer at the
moment (Ruse, 2001b, pp. 197,198,199, emp. added).
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The evolution of the capacity to simulate seems to
have culminated in subjective consciousness. Why this
should have happened is, to me, the most profound mystery facing modern biology… (Daw
kins, 1976, p. 59, emp. added).
Clearly we are in deep trouble…. It will be real
ized that the modern Darwinian theory of evolution
is defective in that it does not even recognize the ex
traordinary problem presented by living organisms’
acquiring mental experiences of a nonmaterial kind
that are in another word from the world of matter-energy, which heretofore was globally comprehensive.
...We believe that the emergence of consciousness
is a skeleton in the closet of orthodox evolutionism…. It remains just as enigmatic as it is to an ortho
dox evolutionist as long as it is regarded as an exclu
sively natural process in an exclusively materialist
world (Eccles and Robinson, 1984, pp. 17,18).
Consciousness and the Brain
[W]e infer a close, highly intimate relation between
brain and consciousness. But there is a seemingly un
bridgeable conceptual gap between the brain as a
physical object and mental consciousness. This is the
most baffling problem (Gregory, 1977, pp. 275-276,
italics in orig., emp. added).
We can turn now to what is probably the “most unanswered” problem in brain evolution…conscious awareness (Sperry, 1977, p. 424, emp. added).
What the connection, or the relationship, is between
what goes on mentally in the mind and what goes on
physically in the brain, nobody knows. Perhaps we
shall never know. The so-called mind/brain problem has proved so elusive, many have come to
regard it as a mystery of ultimate significance….
Unlike less complicated physical structures, the brain
is accompanied by consciousness. As we said earlier, we do not know why this should be. For the
time being at least, we must simply accept it as a brute
fact (Stannard, 2000, pp. 41-42,44, emp. added)
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One immediate question, which seems not to
have been answered, is: Why, of all physical objects, are only brain states conscious? Or is it sup
posed that consciousness is widespread among ob
jects? If so we have no knowledge of this. But if not,
what makes brains uniquely conscious objects? (Greg
ory, 1977, p. 280, italics in orig., emp. added).
Just what sort of neural activity leads to conscious
ness remains a challenging mystery…” (Griffin,
2001, p. 5, emp. added).
Scientific knowledge of the brain is woefully incom
plete. Scientists do not know how the brain acquires and stores information, how it produces
feelings of pleasure and pain, or how it creates
consciousness. The functioning of the human
brain is a profound mystery, one that scientists have
only begun to understand (Morris, 2001, p. 200, emp.
added).
Exactly what it is about our brains that leads to
our extraordinary consciousness remains obscure… (Tattersall, 1998, p. 69, emp. added).
The key philosophical question posed by conscious
ness concerns its relationship to the neural processes
which correlate with it. How do the events which reg
ister in our experience relate to those occurring in
our brains? This “problem of consciousness” is
the modern formulation of the ancient “mindbody problem” (Zeman, 2001, 124:1282, emp. ad
ded).
Consciousness and the Mind
It is amazing to verify that even after several centu
ries of philosophical ponderations, hard dedication
to brain research, and remarkable advances in the
field of neuroscience, the concept of mind still remains obscure, controversial and impossible to
define within the limits of our language (Cardoso,
1997/1998, emp. added).
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Of all the problems which arise in connection
with the notion of “mind” the most difficult is
the fact of consciousness itself. Consciousness is
often defined as awareness—awareness of self and of
the environment—but this does no more than substi
tute one word for another, since we are equally un
able to explain the subjective aspects of awareness.
But even if we have to take the fact of awareness as a
given, just as we take light or gravity as givens, we can
still usefully ask certain questions, such as: where in
the brain is awareness, or consciousness, located? Is
it a function of the whole brain or only of part? Is it a
property of neurones [the British spelling of neurons
—BH/BT] or nerve cells? Is there more than one kind
or level of consciousness? What does it mean to be un
conscious and what mechanisms determine whether
we are conscious or not? (Taylor, 1979, pp. 73-74, emp.
added).
The intangible mind…defies explanation in
terms of evolutionary theory (Wesson, 1997, p. 276,
emp. added).
…[S]cientists remain unsure about the precise
basis of mind (Wilson, 1998, p. 99, emp. added).
Unfortunately, what we call the mind is notoriously refractory to scientific study… (Dobzhan
sky, et al., 1977, p. 453, emp. added).
What kind of thing is a mind? What is the relation be
tween our minds and our bodies and, more specifi
cally, what is the relation between what goes on in our
minds and what goes on in our brains? How did brains
and minds originate? Can our brains be regarded as
nothing more than exceedingly complicated machines?
Can minds exist without brains? Can machines have
minds? Do animals have minds? None of these questions is new, and some of them are extremely old.
None of them can be answered in a way that is
wholly satisfactory (Glynn, 1999, p. 4, emp. added).
The emergence of full consciousness…is indeed
one of the greatest of miracles (Popper and Eccles,
1977, p. 129, emp. added).
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CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED
The past three decades have witnessed a serious and no
ticeable increase in interest in the subject of consciousness,
accompanied by a surge of publications, new scientific and/
or philosophical journals, and scientific meetings (see, for ex
ample: Eccles, 1966, 1967, 1970; 1973; 1979; 1982; 1984; 1989;
Dennett, 1991; McGinn, 1991; Ornstein, 1991; Eccles, 1992;
Edelman, 1992; Flanagan, 1992; Fodor, 1992; Milner and Rugg,
1992; Searle, 1992; Beloff, 1994; Crick, 1994; Eccles, 1994;
Penrose, 1994; Pinker, 1994; Sperry, 1994; Metzinger, 1995;
Scott, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Dennett, 1996; Libet, 1996; Velmans, 1996; Koch, 1997; Penrose, 1997; Pinker, 1997a; Weis
krantz, 1997; Cotterill, 1998; Hurley, 1998; Jasper, et al., 1998;
Rose, 1998; Glynn, 1999; Velmans, 2000; Wright, 2000; Don
ald, 2001; Griffin, 2001; Greenfield, 2002; Tolson, 2002; Lem
onick, 2003a, 2003b; Pinker, 2003).
One would think that since so much has been written on
the subject of consciousness, surely, the definition of this oft’discussed topic would be a straightforward, simple matter.
Think again! [One dictionary on psychology had the follow
ing entry under “consciousness”: “Consciousness is a fascinat
ing but elusive phenomenon; it is impossible to specify what
it is, what it does or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading
has been written about it” (Sutherland, 1989).] Scientists and
philosophers cannot even agree on the definition of the term,
much less on the origin of that which they are attempting to de
fine.
Our English word “consciousness” has its roots in the Latin
conscio, formed by the coalescence of cum (meaning “with”)
and scio (meaning “know”). In its original Latin sense, to be
conscious of something was to share knowledge of it, with
someone else, or with oneself. As C.S. Lewis noted in his book,
Studies in Words:
A “weakened” sense of conscientia coexisted in Latin
with the stronger sense, which implies shared knowl
edge: in this weak sense conscientia was, simply, knowl-
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edge. All three senses (knowledge shared with another,
knowledge shared with oneself and, simply, knowl
edge) entered the English language with “conscience,”
the first equivalent of conscientia. The words “con
scious” and “consciousness” first appear early in the
17th century, rapidly followed by “self-conscious”
and “self-consciousness” (1960).
Consciousness, however, has become a rather ambiguous
term in its everyday usage. It can refer to: (1) a waking state;
(2) experience; and (3) the possession of any mental state. It
may be helpful to the reader to provide an example of each of
these three main usages: (1) the injured worker lapsed into
unconsciousness; (2) the criminal became conscious of a ter
rible sense of dread at the thought of being apprehended;
and (3) I am conscious of the fact that sometimes I get on your
nerves. Anthony O’Hear suggested:
In being conscious of myself as myself, I see myself
as separate from what is not myself. In being con
scious, a being reacts to the world with feeling, with
pleasure and pain, and responds on the basis of felt
needs…. Consciousness involves reacting to stimuli
and feeling stimuli (1997, pp. 22,38).
The phrase “self-consciousness,” at times, can be equally
ambiguous, as it may include: (1) proneness to embarrass
ment in social settings; (2) the ability to detect our own sensa
tions and recall our recent actions; (3) self-recognition; (4) the
awareness of awareness; and (5) self-knowledge in the broad
est sense (see Zeman, 2001, 124:1264). O’Hear went on to sug
gest:
Self-consciousness, though, is something over and
above the sensitivity and feeling implied by conscious
ness. As self-conscious I do not simply have pleasures,
pains, experiences, and needs, and react to them: I
am also aware that I have them, that there is an “I”
which is a subject of these experiences and which is a
possessor of needs, experiences, beliefs, and disposi
tions….
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A self-conscious person, then, does not simply have
beliefs or dispositions, does not simply engage in prac
tices of various sorts, does not just respond to or suf
fer the world. He or she is aware that he or she has be
liefs, practices, dispositions, and the rest. It is this
awareness of myself as a subject of experience, as a
holder of beliefs, and an engager in practices, which
constitutes my self-consciousness. A conscious ani
mal might be a knower, and we might extend the epi
thet “knower” to machines if they receive informa
tion from the world and modify their responses ac
cordingly. But only a self-conscious being knows
that he is a knower (pp. 23-24, emp. added).
Neurobiologist Antonio Damasio believes that conscious
ness comes in two forms. First is “core consciousness,” which
is limited to the here and now, and is what we share with other
higher primates. The second, which is the ingredient humans
possess that makes us unique, he has labeled as “extended
consciousness.” This type of consciousness adds awareness
of past and future to the mix (see Tattersall, 2002, p. 73). No
bel laureate Gerald Edelman, director of neurosciences and
chairman of the department of neurobiology at the Scripps
Research Institute (1992, pp. 117-123), believes that we should
distinguish between what he calls “primary consciousness”
(equivalent to Damasio’s “core consciousness”) and “higher
order consciousness” (equivalent to Damasio’s “extended con
sciousness”). [Stanford University biologist Paul Ehrlich pre
fers the terms “consciousness” and “intense consciousness”
(2000, pp. 110-112).] What is involved in the transition from
primary to higher consciousness is that the subject of the con
sciousness does not merely “have” experiences, but is able,
over and above that, to refine, alter, and report its experi
ences. Primary consciousness lacks any notion of an experi
ence or self. In other words, a “non-self-conscious” creature
is aware of and/or able to react to stimuli. But higher-order
consciousness represents an awareness of the plans and con
cepts by which one makes one’s way in the world.
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Ian Tattersall commented: “…[I]f consciousness were some
thing more susceptible to scientific analysis than it is, we would
certainly know a lot more about it by now than we do—which
is very little indeed” (2002, p. 59). Donald Johanson and Blake
Edgar, in their book, From Lucy to Language, admitted that “con
sciousness, being inherently singular and subjective, is a tricky
prospect for objective scientific analysis…” (1996, p. 107).
True enough. But, as it turns out, defining it is no less of a “tricky
prospect.” Nobel laureate Sir Francis Crick was not even will
ing to give it a try. In his book, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The
Scientific Search for the Soul, he lamented:
Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by con
sciousness. It is better to avoid a precise definition of
consciousness because of the dangers of premature
definitions. Until the problem is understood much
better, any attempt at a formal definition is likely to
be either misleading or overly restrictive or both. If
these seems like cheating, try defining for me the word
gene. So much is now known about genes that any
simple definition is likely to be inadequate. How much
more difficult, then, to define a biological term when
rather little is known about it (1994, p. 20, emp. in
orig.).
Richard Leakey, on the other hand, was at least willing to
inquire: “What is consciousness? More specifically, what is it
for? What is its function? Such questions may seem odd, given
that each of us experiences life through the medium of con
sciousness, or self-awareness” (1994, p. 139, emp. in orig.). Yes,
such questions do seem a bit odd, considering all the “press”
given to the subject of consciousness over the past many years.
But, as Adam Zeman wrote in the extensive review of con
sciousness he prepared for the July 2001 issue of the scien
tific journal, Brain: “Whether scientific observation and theory
will yield a complete account of consciousness remains a live
issue” (124:1264). A “live issue” indeed! Just getting scientists
and philosophers to agree on a standard, coherent definition
seems to be an almost impossible task. In his 1997 volume,
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The Large, the Small and the Human Brain, British mathemati
cal physicist Roger Penrose asked: “What is consciousness?
Well, I don’t know how to define it. I think this is not the
moment to attempt to define consciousness, since we do
not know what it is…” (p. 98, emp. added; Penrose’s central
thesis is basically that “there should be something outside of
known physics,” p. 102).
But the fact that “we do not know what it is” has not pre
vented people from offering a variety of definitions for “our
most precious possession,” consciousness. Johanson and Ed
gar went on to say:
But what about the apparently extrasomatic structure
of the mind, or consciousness? Where does the brain
end and the mind begin, or are they one and the same?
Is it consciousness—more than bipedalism, language,
or evolved culture—that really sets humans apart? First,
what is consciousness? No single definition may
suffice for such an elusive concept, but we can de
scribe consciousness as self-awareness and self-reflection, the ability to feel pain or pleasure, the sen
sation of being alive and of being us, the sum of what
ever passes through the mind (p. 107, emp. added).
Their suggestion that “no single definition may suffice for
such an elusive concept” has been echoed by others who have
broached the puzzle of consciousness. In his 2001 book, A
Mind So Rare, Canadian psychologist Merlin Donald noted:
[W]e must mind our definition of consciousness. It is
not really a unitary phenomenon, and allows more
than one definition. In fact, it encompasses at least
three classes of definition. The first is the definition
of consciousness as a state…. A second class of func
tional definition takes an architectural approach,
whereby consciousness is defined as a place in the
mind…. This does not imply that there is a single neu
ral locus, a “consciousness module” somewhere in
the brain. We have already dismissed that as a possi
bility…. This definition acknowledges the very wide
reach of awareness and the fact that it can bring cog-
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nition, emotion, and action under a unified command.
...It gives an organism more focused intellectual pow
er….
The third definition of consciousness takes a frankly
human-centered view of cognition and has more to
do with enlightenment, or illumination, than with
mere attention. This is the representational ap
proach…. This rigorous standard of awareness in
variably excludes animals from true consciousness,
primarily because we have language and they don’t.
This is a bit circular, however. If awareness is defined
in advance as a direct product of language, it is hardly
surprising that it should be special to humans. More
over, it is not obvious that language is a good criterion
for awareness. The use of language is driven by many
agendas, very few of which originate in language. Lan
guage is an add-on, a Johnny-come-lately in the evo
lutionary sequence, and it gets most of its material and
its content from much older parts of our mental uni
verse…. In itself, language cannot bestow self-awareness…. The mere possession of symbols will not alter
basic ability. The capacity to take a perspective on one’s
own mental states cannot be changed simply by one’s
possessing a lexicon or vocabulary (pp. 118,119,120,
emp. in orig.).
For University of Washington neurobiologist William Cal
vin, consciousness consists of “contemplating the past and
forecasting the future, planning what to do tomorrow, feeling
dismay when seeing a tragedy unfold, and narrating our life
story.” For Cambridge University psychologist Nicholas Hum
phrey, an essential part of consciousness is “raw sensation.”
According to Steven Harnad, editor of the respected journal,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, “consciousness is just the capac
ity to have experiences” (for documentation of statements by
Calvin, Humphrey, and Harnad, see Lewin, 1992, pp. 153-154).
And, even though Roger Penrose started out by admitting, “I
don’t know how to define it; I think this is not the moment to
attempt to define consciousness, since we do not know what it
is,” that did not keep him from offering up his own set of defi
nitions for consciousness.
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It seems to me that there are at least two different as
pects to consciousness. On the one hand, there are
passive manifestations of consciousness, which in
volve awareness. I use this category to include things
like perceptions of colour, of harmonies, the use of
memory, and so on. On the other hand, there are its
active manifestations, which involve concepts like
free will and the carrying out of actions under our free
will. The use of such terms reflects different aspects
of our consciousness (1997, pp. 98-99, emp. in orig.).
Notice how frequently “consciousness” seems to be tied to
“awareness” (or “self-consciousness” with “self-awareness”)?
There’s a reason for that: the two commonly are used inter
changeably in the scientific and philosophical literature. Eccles
noted: “One can also use the term self-awareness instead of
self-consciousness, but I prefer self-consciousness because it
relates directly to the self-conscious mind” (1992, p. 3). The
late evolutionist of Harvard, Kirtley F. Mather, offered his
personal opinion when he said: “[A]wareness is a term that I
prefer to consciousness” (1986, p. 126). In his book, The Evo
lution of Consciousness, Stanford University biologist Robert
Ornstein suggested: “Being conscious is being aware of
being aware. It is one step removed from the raw experi
ence of seeing, smelling, acting, moving, and reacting” (1991,
pp. 225-226, emp. added). New Zealand anthropologist Pe
ter J. Wilson, in his volume, Man: The Promising Primate, addressed the concept of “self” consciousness.
[S]elf-consciousness means that an individual per
ceives difference in himself, regarding himself as a
complex and heterogeneous entity made up of sepa
rate but interrelated parts…. The main division of
the human person separates what he sees of himself,
the surface of his body, from what he cannot see but
supposes of himself—what is inside. The “inside” is
most frequently the subject, that which perceives yet
can also consider itself as an object, something to be
perceived or conceived. What is within is frequently
acknowledged to be the owner of the body yet is also
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thought of as being possessed. We can speak of “my
mind” or “my spirit” as easily as “my body.” This selfconsciousness or individuality is the basis of bond
ing and of permanent in relationships (1980, p. 85, emp.
in orig.).
Paul Ehrlich, in his 2000 text, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures,
and the Human Prospect, also addressed the intriguing concept
of “self” consciousness.
We have a continuous sense of “self”—of a little indi
vidual sitting between our ears—and, perhaps equally
important, a sense of the threat of death, of the poten
tial for that individual—our self—to cease to exist. I
call all of this sort of awareness “intense consciousness”; it is central to human natures and is perhaps the least understood aspect of those natures
(p. 110, emp. added).
He went on to note, however:
Consciousness may well be limited to higher verte
brates, perhaps restricted to Homo sapiens…. Intense
consciousness, as I’ve defined it, appears unique to
Homo sapiens among modern organisms…. Conscious
ness itself, a broader concept than that implied by the
term intense consciousness as I am using it, has
many meanings. I prefer to define consciousness sim
ply as the capacity of some animals, including human
beings, to have, when awake, mental representations
of real-time events that are happening to them or are
being perceived by them (pp. 112,111, emp. in orig.).
And, last but not least, of course, let it be noted that even
though certain scientists and philosophers do not know what
consciousness is, they do know what it is not. As evolutionary
humanist Jerome W. Elbert put it in his 2000 book, Are Souls
Real?:
We can define consciousness as what it is like to be
a person who is awake or dreaming and has a
normally functioning brain…. By our definition,
consciousness is interrupted by dreamless sleep, and
it returns when we awaken or have a dream. By almost
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anyone’s definition, consciousness leaves when a per
son is under general anesthetic during surgery. The
fact that consciousness can be halted and restarted is
evidence that it is due to the operation of a process,
rather than the presence of a spiritual entity. This is
consistent with the view that consciousness arises from
a dynamic process within the brain, rather than from
the presumable continuous indwelling of a soul (p. 223,
emp. in orig.).
Or, to quote Roger Penrose: “I am suggesting that there are
not mental objects floating around out there which are
not based in physicality” (1997, p. 97, emp. added). So much,
then, for the idea that self-consciousness or self-awareness
has any “spiritual” origin or significance. [We will have more
to say on this point later.]
Before we leave this section on the definition of conscious
ness, perhaps we should say something about the prickly sub
ject of “qualia,” which is a term that certain philosophers have
coined to refer to what they believe are “subjective dimen
sions of experience” that are real “only in the eye of the be
holder.” In his article reviewing the subject of consciousness,
Zeman discussed not only the definition of the term, but also
the contentious nature of the claim that qualia actually exist.
Consciousness in its first sense is the behavioural ex
pression of our normal waking state. But when we
are conscious in this first sense we are always con
scious of something. In its second sense conscious
ness is the content of experience from moment to mo
ment: what it feels like to be a certain person, now, in
a sense in which we suppose there is nothing it feels
like to be a stone or lost in dreamless sleep. This sec
ond sense of consciousness is more inward than the
first. It highlights the qualitative, subjective dimen
sion of experience. Philosophers sometimes use the
technical (and controversial) term “qualia” to refer
to the subjective texture of experience which is the
essence of this second sense of consciousness (2001,
124:1265, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).
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These so-called “subjective dimensions” parade through the
literature under quite a variety of names, as Daniel Dennett
explained:
Philosophers have adopted various names for the
things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder)
that have been supposed to provide a safe home for
the colors and the rest of the properties that have been
banished from the “external” world by the triumphs
of physics: raw feels, sensa, phenomenal qualities, intrinsic properties of conscious experiences, the qualitative content of mental states
and, of course, qualia, the term I will use (1998, p.
141, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).
Certain philosophers (e.g., Owen Flanagan, 1992, and Da
vid Chalmers, 1995) steadfastly insist that, to quote Flanagan,
“qualia are for real” (p. 61). Others, like Dennett, argue just as
strongly that they are not. As Dennett went on to say: “There
are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined,
but I’m going to ride roughshod over them. I deny that there
are any such properties” (p. 141, emp. in orig.). Dennett does,
in fact, deny that qualia exist. In his 1998 book, Brainchildren,
he wrote in a chapter titled “Instead of Qualia”: “[T]here are
no qualia…so I have recommended abandoning the word,
but I seem to have lost that battle” (p. 141).
As we write this, the battle is raging over whether qualia
are real or not. At this point in time, all we can say is “stay
tuned,” while the philosophers try to reach a consensus re
garding whether we actually see a green leaf on the tree, or
whether we just “think” we see a green leaf (or a tree!).
WHY—AND HOW—DID
CONSCIOUSNESS ARISE?
When Sir Karl Popper and Sir John Eccles stated in their
classic text, The Self and Its Brain, that “the emergence of full
consciousness…is indeed one of the greatest of miracles,” they did not overstate the case (Popper and Eccles, 1977,
- 271 -
p. 129, emp. added). Be sure to notice their use of the word
“emergence.” The “miracle” of the “emergence” of conscious
ness has to do with two things: (1) the fact of its existence; and
(2) the reason for its existence. In other words, why did con
sciousness arise, and how did it do so?
Why Did Consciousness Arise?
At the outset, let us state what is common knowledge (and
readily admitted) within the scientific community: evolution
ary theory cannot begin to explain why consciousness arose.
In our estimation, one of the most fascinating books published
within the last thirty years was a volume with the seemingly
unprofessional title, The Encyclopaedia of Ignorance (see Duncan
and Weston-Smith, 1977). But, although the title may appear
somewhat whimsical, the content of the volume is anything
but. In chapter after chapter, distinguished, award-winning
scientists (such as Nobel laureate Sir Francis Crick and twotime Nobel laureate Linus Pauling) enunciated and explained
some of the most important things in the world—things of
which science is completely ignorant. Interestingly, one
of the chapters in the book, written by Richard Gregory (pro
fessor of neuropsychology and director of the brain and per
ception laboratory at the University of Bristol in England),
was “Consciousness.” In his discussion, Dr. Gregory asked:
Why, then, do we need consciousness? What does
consciousness have that the neural signals (and physi
cal brain activity) do not have? Here there is some
thing of a paradox, for if the awareness of conscious
ness does not have any effect—if consciousness is not
a causal agent—then it seems useless, and so should
not have developed by evolutionary pressure. If, on
the other hand, it is useful it must be a causal agent:
but then physiological description in terms of neural
activity cannot be complete. Worse, we are on this al
ternative stuck with mentalistic explanations, which
seem outside science. To develop science in this di
rection we would have to reverse the direction of phys
ical explanations which have so far proved so suc-
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cessful. It might be argued that the “inner” world of
consciousness is essentially different from the physi
cal world: but then it seems strange that the physical
signals of the nervous system are so important (1977,
p. 277, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).
In this brief assessment, Gregory has isolated several key
points. First, what does consciousness have that the brain, by
itself, does not? Second, if consciousness does not have some
“real function,” then, obviously, nature would have “selected
against” it—and it never would have appeared in the first place.
Third, if it does actually have some function, in light of our
current knowledge about how the neural network of the brain
operates, what is that function? And if there is beneficial
function, why haven’t the brains of animals selected for it?
To echo Gregory’s question, “Why do we need conscious
ness?”
Why indeed? Philosopher Michael Ruse noted some of the
major hurdles involved in “nature” being able to “select” for
consciousness when he asked:
What of the ultimate question, namely that of con
sciousness? Darwinians take consciousness very se
riously. Consciousness seems so large a part of what
it is to be a human that it would be very improbable
that natural selection had no role in its production and
maintenance. Even if one agrees that consciousness
is in some sense connected to or emergent from the
brain—and how could one deny this?—consciousness
must have some biological standing in its own
right…. But what is consciousness, and what func
tion does it serve? Why should not an unconscious
machine do everything that we can do? (2001a, p. 72,
emp. added).
Some materialists, of course, have suggested that a machine
can do “everything we can do.” The eminent British physiol
ogist Lord E.D. Adrian, in the chapter he authored on “Con
sciousness” for the book, Brain and Conscious Experience, con
cluded: “As far as our public behavior is concerned, there is
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nothing that could not be copied by machinery, nothing therefore that could not be brought within the framework of physical science” (1965, p. 240, emp. added). [Lord
Adrian’s remarks were made at a scientific symposium held
at the Vatican during the week of September 28-October 4,
1964. Following his speech, the seminar participants engaged
in a roundtable discussion that centered on Adrian’s lecture.
One of those in attendance was Wilder Penfield, the worldrenowned Canadian neurosurgeon, who dryly responded to
Lord Adrian: “I had in mind to ask whether the robot could,
in any conceivable way, see a joke. I think not. Sense of humor
would, I suspect, be the last thing that a machine would have”
(as quoted in Eccles, 1966, p. 248). Brilliant stroke!]
Evolutionary theory has no adequate answer to the ques
tion of how consciousness arose, as evolutionists Eccles and
Robinson admitted.
[A]ll materialist theories of the mind are in conflict with biological evolution…. Evolutionary the
ory holds that only those structures and processes that
significantly aid in survival are developed in natural
selection. If consciousness is causally impotent,
its development cannot be accounted for by evolutionary theory (1984, p. 37, emp. added).
Dr. Eccles addressed this critically important point once again
in his 1992 book, The Human Psyche.
In accord with evolutionary theory only those struc
tures and processes that significantly aid in survival
are developed in natural selection. If consciousness
is causally impotent, its development cannot be ac
counted for by evolutionary theory. According to bi
ological evolution, mental states and consciousness
could have evolved and developed only if they were
causally effective in bringing about changes in neu
ral happenings in the brain with the consequent
changes in behaviour (p. 20, emp. in orig.).
Or, as Gregory had asked several years earlier:
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If the brain was developed by Natural Selection, we
might well suppose that consciousness has survival
value. But for this it must, surely, have causal effects.
But what effects could awareness, or consciousness, have? (1977, p. 276, emp. added).
In his 2000 book, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, Robert Wright (former senior editor of The Sciences) addressed this
same point when he wrote:
[B]rains have consciousness. They don’t just process
information; they have the subjective experience of
processing information. They feel pleasure and pain,
have epiphanies of insight, and so on…. [A]ccording
to this mainstream scientific view, consciousness—
subjective experience, sentience—has zero behavioral
manifestations; it doesn’t do anything…. In techni
cal terms: consciousness, subjective experience, is
“epiphenomenal”—it is always an effect, never a cause.
...[I]f consciousness doesn’t do anything, then its ex
istence becomes quite the unfathomable mystery. If
subjective experience is superfluous to the day-to-day
business of living and eating and getting our genes into
the next generation, then why would it have ever arisen
in the course of natural selection? Why would life ac
quire a major property that has no function? (pp. 305,
306,307, emp. in orig.).
Evolutionists may not be able to explain what causal effect(s) consciousness might possibly have that would endow
it with a “survival value” significant enough for “nature” to
“select,” but one thing is certain: most of them are not willing
to go so far as to suggest that consciousness does not exist, or
that it is unimportant to humanity. As Ruse put it:
Of course, this does not address the ultimate question,
namely, that of consciousness. As you might expect,
there are divided opinions on this matter. There are
those who, even today, want to deny that consciousness
has any great biological significance. Others, relatedly,
feel that consciousness is something very recently ac
quired, and so it cannot have been a major factor in
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human evolution. The average evolutionist, however,
particularly the average Darwinian, feels extremely
uncomfortable with such a dismissive attitude. Consciousness seems a very important aspect of human nature. Whatever it may be, consciousness is
so much a part of what it is to be human that Darwin
ians are loath to say that natural selection had no or
little role in its production and maintenance (2001b,
pp. 197, emp. added).
While the “average Darwinian” may indeed be “extremely
uncomfortable” with the suggestion that natural selection had
“little or no role in the production and maintenance of con
sciousness,” the truth of the matter is that no Darwinian can
explain why, or how, natural selection could have played
any part whatsoever in such a process. Yet, as Richard Hein
berg observed in his book, Cloning the Buddha: The Moral Im
pact of Biotechnology: “Since no better material explanation is
apparently available, it is assumed that whatever explana
tion is at hand—however obvious its shortcomings—must be
true. Natural selection thus becomes an inscrutable, godlike
agency capable of producing miracles” (1999, p. 71, emp. in
orig.).
From an evolutionary viewpoint, consciousness doesn’t
do anything. It doesn’t “help” the neural circuits in the brain.
It apparently doesn’t have any “great biological significance,”
and it doesn’t seem to bestow any innate “survival benefit”
on its possessor. We ask, then, what is left? Or, to repeat Gregory’s question: “Why do we need consciousness?”
Why Do We Need Consciousness?
Why do we need consciousness? From an evolutionary
viewpoint, maybe we don’t. W.H. Thorpe, in his chapter, “Eth
ology and Consciousness,” for the book, Brain and Conscious
Experience, asked regarding consciousness: “Is there a good
selective reason for it or is there just no reason at all why the
animal should not have got on quite as well without having
developed this apparently strange and new faculty” (1965, p.
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497). Perhaps, amidst all the other “happenstances” resulting
from billions of years of evolution, consciousness is, to put it
bluntly, a “quirky accident.” Ironically (or maybe not), those
are the exact words the late evolutionist of Harvard, Stephen
Jay Gould, used to describe the origin of consciousness when
he said: “The not-so-hidden agenda in all this is a concern with
human consciousness. You can’t blame us for being fascinated
with consciousness; it’s an enormous punctuation in the history
of life. I view it as a quirky accident” (as quoted in Lewin,
1992, pp. 145-146, emp. added). Or, as Sir Fred Hoyle observed
of Gould’s reference to consciousness being “an enormous
punctuation in the history of life”: “Professor Gould accepts
human consciousness as an exception to his general thesis; it
is a phenomenon sudden in its appearance and exceptional in
its nature” (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1993, p. 177). Theo
dosius Dobzhansky suggested:
Self-awareness is, then, one of the fundamental, and
possibly the most fundamental, characteristic of the
human species. This characteristic is an evolutionary novelty; the biological species from which man
kind has descended had only rudiments of self-awareness, or perhaps lacked it altogether (1967, p. 68, emp.
added).
An “exceptional evolutionary novelty”? In fact, it is so ex
ceptional that some evolutionists have given up altogether try
ing to figure out why consciousness exists at all. One such promi
nent figure in the field is British philosopher Colin McGinn.
In speaking about McGinn’s views on our inability to explain
the origin of consciousness, James Trefil wrote in his book,
Are We Unique?:
Others have suggested more esoteric arguments about
the fundamental unknowability of consciousness. For
example, philosopher Colin McGinn of Rutgers Uni
versity has suggested, on the basis of an argument from
evolutionary theory, that the human mind is simply
not equipped to deal with this particular problem.
His basic argument is that nothing in evolution has
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ever required the human mind to be able to deal
with the operation of the human brain. Conse
quently, the argument goes, although we may be able
to pose the problem of consciousness, our brains have
not developed to the point where we can hope to solve
it (1997, p. 186, emp. added).
In his 2000 volume, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the
Human Prospect, Paul Ehrlich discussed the situation as well
when he wrote that McGinn doubts
…that we will ever understand how a pattern of elec
trochemical impulses in our nervous systems is trans
lated into the rich experience of, say, watching an op
era or flying an airplane. He believes that our minds
did not evolve in such a way as to enable us to
answer that question, which may be fated to remain unanswered for a very long time, if not forever (p. 112, emp. added).
To quote McGinn himself:
What I argue is that an understanding of conscious
ness is beyond the reach of the human mind, that cog
nitively we are not equipped to understand it in the
way we understand other phenomena we experience
in the physical world. You can analyze brain struc
ture and function in the way we analyze other phe
nomena, but the information you get tells you about
nerve cells and circuits. Alternatively, you can think
about consciousness as subjective experience. And
what you find is that the two sides of inquiry never
meet and, I think, never will. There’s nothing myste
rious about the physics and chemistry underlying
consciousness. Our problem is that the phenomenon
that arises from that chemistry and physics—consciousness—isn’t available to the kind of analytical thinking
of which humans are capable (as quoted in Lewin,
1992, p. 168)
Some evolutionists, however, are not quite ready to throw
in the towel just yet. Rather than admit defeat, they have opted
to defend the view that the “why” of consciousness has some-
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thing to do with the brain—although they are not quite sure
what or how. Stephen Jay Gould believed that the brain
evolved, got bigger, and somehow produced consciousness
as an “exaptation.” What, exactly, is an exaptation? Allow us
to remind you of Gould’s definition:
…[W]hat shall we call structures that contribute to fit
ness but evolved for other reasons and were later co
opted for their current role? They have no name at
present, and [Elisabeth] Vrba and I suggest that they
be called “exaptations” (1984a, p. 66; for the Vrba ref
erence, see Gould and Vrba, 1982).
In other words, a big brain did not “evolve” in order to pro
duce consciousness. Instead, for one reason or another (that
no one seems quite able to explain), consciousness “just hap
pened” as a fortuitous, unexpected by-product. Gould discus
sed human consciousness as one of the brain’s “exaptive pos
sibilities” when he wrote:
I do not doubt that the brain became large for an adap
tive reason (probably a set of complex reasons) and
that natural selection brought it to a size that made
consciousness possible. But, surely, most of what our
brain does today, most of what makes us so distinc
tively human (and flexible), arises as a consequence
of the non-adaptive sequelae, not of the primary adap
tation itself—for the sequelae must be so vastly greater
in number and possibility. The brain is a complex com
puter constructed by natural selection to perform a
tiny subset of its potential operations. An arm built
for one thing can do others (I am now typing with fin
gers built for other purposes). But a brain built for some
functions can do orders of magnitude more simply by
virtue of its basic construction as a flexible computer.
Never in biological history has evolution built a
structure with such an enormous and ramifying
set of exaptive possibilities. The basis of human flexi
bility lies in the unselected capacities of our large brain
(1984a, pp. 67-68, parenthetical items in orig., emp.
added).
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We covered the Gould/Vrba idea of “exaptations” in chap
ter six, and so we will not repeat that material here. For now,
however, one thing is certain: consciousness does appear to
be connected to the brain. Yet that causes as many problems
as it presents solutions, as Gregory observed:
We believe that consciousness is tied to living organ
isms: especially human beings, and more particularly
to specific regions of the human brain…. This in turn
generates the question: “What is the relation between
consciousness and the matter or functions of the
brain?” …One trouble about consciousness is that it
cannot be (or has not yet been) isolated from brains,
to study it in different contexts. So the classical meth
ods of scientific inquiry are not fully available for in
vestigating the brain/mind relation (1977, pp. 274,
276, parenthetical item in orig.).
Paleoanthropologist Richard Leakey chimed in to agree:
The most obvious change in the hominid brain in its
evolutionary trajectory was, as noted, a tripling of
size. Size was not the only change, however; the over
all organization changed, too. The brains of apes and
humans are constructed on the same basic pattern:
both are divided into left and right hemispheres, each
of which has four distinct lobes: frontal, parietal, tem
poral, and occipital. In apes, the occipital lobes (at the
back of the brain) are larger than the frontal lobes; in
humans, the pattern is reversed, with large frontals and
small occipital lobes. This difference in organization presumably underlies in some way the generation of the human mind as opposed to the ape
mind. If we knew when the change in configuration
occurred in human prehistory, we would have a clue
about the emergence of human mind.
Alas, Leakey lamented:
Much of this, of course, is speculation. How can
we know what happened to our ancestors’ level
of consciousness during the past 2.5 million years?
How can we pinpoint when it became as we experi
ence it today? The harsh reality anthropologists
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face is that these questions may be unanswerable. If I have difficulty proving that another human
possesses the same level of consciousness I do, and if
most biologists balk at trying to determine the de
gree of consciousness in nonhuman animals, how is
one to discern the signs of reflective consciousness in
creatures long dead? (1994, pp. 145,154-155, paren
To be sure, brains are terribly important from an evolu
tionary perspective. Brain scientist Roger Sperry remarked:
It is clear that the human brain has come a long way
in evolution…. Maybe the total falls a bit short of uni
versal causal contact; maybe it is not even quite up to
the kind of things that evolution has going for itself
over on Galaxy Nine; and maybe, in spite of all, any
decision that comes out is still predetermined. Nev
ertheless, it still represents a very long jump in the di
rection of freedom from the primeval slime mold,
the Jurassic sand dollar, or even the latest model oran
gutan (1977, p. 433).
One widely held view regarding the “very long jump” from
the three pounds of matter inside a human skull being “just” a
brain, to the type of complex brain that permits and/or pro
duces consciousness, appears to be that once the brain reached
a certain size, consciousness merely “came along for the ride.”
Or, as Ruse theorized:
Whatever position is taken on evolution, no one is de
nying that consciousness is in some sense connected
to or emergent from the brain. The question—at least
the question that concerns Darwinians—is whether,
over and above the brain, consciousness has some bi
ological standing in its own right. General opinion (my
opinion!) is that somehow, as brains got bigger and
better during animal evolution, consciousness started
to emerge in a primitive sort of way. Brains developed
for calculating purposes and consciousness emerged
and, as it were, got dragged along. Most Darwin
ians think that at some point, consciousness came into
its own right (2001b, pp. 197-198, parenthetical item
in orig., emp. added).
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There are, however, a number of “alternative explanations”
for why the brain ultimately developed consciousness. Greg
ory listed just a few when he wrote: “It has been suggested that:
(1) mind and brain are not connected (epiphenomenalism);
or (2) that the brain generates consciousness; or (3) that con
sciousness drives the brain; or (4) that they both work in par
allel (like a pair of identical clocks) without causal connection”
(1977, p. 279, parenthetical items in orig.). Then again, not ev
eryone is ecstatic about the concept of increased brain size be
ing responsible for something as important and quixotic as
consciousness. Roger Lewin, in Complexity: Life at the Edge of
Chaos, observed:
I found many biologists distinctly uncomfortable with
talking about increase in brain size as a measure of
complexity. “I’m hostile to all sorts of mystical urges
toward great complexity,” said Richard Dawkins
when I asked him whether an increase in computa
tional complexity might be considered an inevitable
part of the evolutionary process. “You’d like to think
that being able to solve problems contributes to Dar
winian fitness, wouldn’t you?,” said John Maynard
Smith. “But it’s hard to relate increased brain size to
fitness. After all, bacteria are fit” (1992, p. 146).
Steven Pinker, the eminent psychologist from MIT, is no
happier with the idea that “a big brain explains it all.” In his
book, The Language Instinct, he lamented:
At the level of the whole brain, that there has been se
lection for bigger brains is, to be sure, common among
writings about human evolution (especially from pa
leoanthropologists). Given that premise, one might
naturally think that all kinds of computational abili
ties might come as a by-product. But if you think about
it for a minute, you should quickly see that the prem
ise has it backwards. Why would evolution ever have
selected for sheer bigness of brain, that bulbous, met
abolically greed organ? A large-brained creature
is sentenced to a life that combines all the disadvantages of balancing a watermelon on a broom-
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stick, running in place in a down jacket, and for
women, passing a large kidney stone every few
years. Any selection on brain size itself would
surely have favored the pinhead. Selection for
more powerful computational abilities (language, per
ception, reasoning, and so on) must have given us a
big brain as a by-product, not the other way around!
(1994, pp. 374-375, parenthetical items in orig., emp.
added).
Furthermore, “brain size,” as it turns out, doesn’t live up to its
vaunted reputation. Brain size and intellect among living peo
ple have been thoroughly explored by, among others, such
scientists as evolutionist W. LeGros Clark, who reported that
skulls from humans of normal intelligence vary in cranial ca
pacity anywhere from 900cc to 2,300 cc. In fact, Dr. Clark
discussed one completely normal human being whose brain
size was a mere 720 cc (see Clark, 1958; pp. 357-360, Howe,
1971, p. 213).
If natural selection didn’t “choose” consciousness (because
it has no “causal effects”), if consciousness has no known func
tion (from an evolutionary point of view), and if “evolving a
big brain” isn’t an adequate explanation for consciousness—
then, to repeat our original question, why did consciousness
arise in the first place? What does it do?
Some evolutionists have suggested that consciousness arose
“so that people could process language.” But, as Wright pointed
out:
People who claim to have a scientific answer usually
turn out to have misunderstood the question. For ex
ample, some people say that consciousness arose so
that people could process language. And it’s true, of
course, that we’re conscious of language. As we speak,
we have the subjective experience of turning our
thoughts into words. It even feels as if our inner, con
scious self is causing the words to be formed. But,
whatever it may feel like, the (often unspoken) prem
ise of modern behavioral science is that when you
are in conversation with someone, all the causing hap-
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pens at a physical level. That someone flaps his or her
tongue, generating physical sound waves that enter
your ear, triggering a sequence of physical processes
in your brain that ultimately result in the flapping of
your own tongue, and so on. In short: the experience of assimilating someone’s words and formulat
ing a reply is superfluous to the assimilation and the
reply, both of which are just intricate mechanical pro
cesses.
Besides, if conscious experience arose to abet human
language, then why does it also accompany such things
as getting our fingers smashed by rocks—things that
existed long before human language? The question
of consciousness—as I’m defining it here—isn’t the ques
tion of why we think when we talk, and it isn’t the ques
tion of why we have self-awareness. The question of
consciousness is the question of subjective experience
in general, ranging from pain to anxiety to epiphany;
it is the question of sentience (2000, p. 307, parentheti
cal item and emp. in orig.).
Peter Wilson asked:
But how is self-consciousness possible? What evolu
tionary conditions in the constitution and environ
ment of the early hominid came together, formulat
ing a problematic that made such consciousness adap
tive? We might choose to cite certain suggestions that
language is the prerequisite, for it is only with the aid
of language that we can find the way to give reality,
by articulation to the inchoate intuition of the divided
self. But language may play this role only in a me
chanical sense, by providing a means of expressing
and symbolizing consciousness (1980, p. 86, emp. in
orig.).
“Expressing” and “symbolizing” consciousness are not the
same as “explaining” consciousness.
Alwyn Scott, in his book, Stairway to the Mind: The Contro
versial New Science of Consciousness, suggested that “conscious
ness gives an evolutionary advantage to the species that de
velops it” (1995, p. 162). But what, exactly, might that advan-
- 284 -
tage be? W.H. Thorpe chose the simplest option of all: “The
production of consciousness may have been an evolutionary
necessity, in that it may have been the only way in which highly
complex living organisms could become fully viable” (1965,
p. 493). Adam Zeman, in the review of the subject of con
sciousness that he wrote for the journal, Brain, chose a differ
ent tact: “[I]t can be argued, at a conceptual level, that the
concept of one’s own mind presupposes the concept of other
minds” (2001, 124:1281). In an article he wrote for New Scien
tist titled “Nature’s Psychologists” (and, later, in his book, A
History of the Mind), Nicholas Humphrey seized on that thought
to provide one example of the type of theories that have been
proposed to explain the “evolutionary advantage” of con
sciousness. He suggested that the purpose of consciousness
is to allow “social animals” to model another’s behavior on
the basis of their insight into another creature’s psychologi
cal motivation. In other words, our knowledge of our own
mental states supplies us with insight into the mental states
underlying the actions of others—which then: (a) provides us
with the ability to predict what someone else is likely to do;
and (b) thereby becomes a major determinant of our own bi
ological success (1978). Or, as Paul Ehrlich asked:
What could have been the selective advantage that led
to the evolution of intense consciousness? This type
of consciousness helps us to maneuver in a compli
cated society of other individuals, each of whom is also
intensely conscious. Intense consciousness also allows
us to play without acting out the plans and to consid
er that other individuals probably also are planning
(2000, p. 113).
Not to be outdone, Merlin Donald, in A Mind So Rare, offered
up his own supposition. “Conscious capacity,” he wrote, “may
be seen as an evolutionary adaptation in its own right, whose
various functions have evolved to optimize or boost cognitive
processing” (2001, p. 131). Ah, yes—“optimizing cognitive
processing.” And how would consciousness (which, as Eccles
admitted, is “causally impotent”) accomplish that? Then, last,
but certainly not least, Ruse weighed in with his guess.
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This raises the question of what consciousness actu
ally does. Why should we not just have a nonthinking
machine, which does everything? Is consciousness
little more than froth on the top of the electronics of
the brain? Is consciousness just an epiphenomenon,
as philosophers would say? Slowly but positively,
brain scientists do feel that they are groping toward
some understanding of the virtues of consciousness,
over and above the operation of blind automata. It is
felt that consciousness may act as a kind of filter
and guide—coordinating all the information
thrown up by the brain. Consciousness helps to
prevent the brain from getting overloaded, as happens
all too often with computers. Consciousness regulates
experience, sifting through the input, using some and
rejecting some and storing some… (2001b, p. 198, emp.
added).
Thus, consciousness, so we are told: (a) acts as a filter or
guide to coordinate all the information thrown up by the brain;
(b) prevents the brain from getting overloaded; (c) regulates
experience; (d) sifts through input into the brain; and (d) re
jects some experience and stores others. Pretty impressive
achievement, wouldn’t you say, for the nebulous “something”
referred to as consciousness that, supposedly, “natural selec
tion had no or little role in producing” (Ruse), “is causally im
potent” (Eccles), “is fundamentally unknowable” (McGinn),
and “is not a causal agent” (Gregory). Which, in turn, brings
us to our next question.
How Did Consciousness Arise?
It is not enough to ask why consciousness arose. One also
must inquire as to how consciousness originated. In Man: The
Promising Primate, Wilson asked:
[H]ow is it possible for one species, the human, to de
velop consciousness, and particular self-consciousness, to such a degree that it becomes of critical im
portance for the individual’s sanity and survival? And
what is the meaning of this development in and for
human evolution? (1980, p. 84).
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Human consciousness is so pervasive, and so undeniable,
that the mechanism of its existence must be explained. But
how? One practically can envision Stephen Jay Gould shrug
ging his shoulders in exasperation, and sighing in frustration,
as he admitted: “…[W]e must view the evolution of human
consciousness as a lucky accident that occurred only by the
fortunate (for us) concatenation of numerous improbabili
ties” (1984a, p. 64, parenthetical item in orig.). Five years later,
he continued in the same vein: “Homo sapiens may form only a
twig, but if life moves, even fitfully, toward greater complex
ity and higher mental powers, then the eventual origin of selfconscious intelligence may be implicit in all that came before”
(1989, p. 45). After another five years had passed, he wrote:
Homo sapiens did not appear on the earth, just a geo
logic second ago, because evolutionary theory predicts
such an outcome based on themes of progress and in
creasing neural complexity. Humans arose, rather, as
a fortuitous and contingent outcome of thousands of
linked events, any one of which could have occurred
differently and sent history on an alternative pathway
that would not have led to consciousness (1994, 271
[4]:86).
Then, two years later, in his book, Full House: The Spread of Ex
cellence from Plato to Darwin, Dr. Gould concluded:
If one small and odd lineage of fishes had not evolved
fins capable of bearing weight on land (though evolved
for different reasons in lakes and seas), terrestrial ver
tebrates would never have arisen. If a large extraterres
trial object—the ultimate random bolt from the blue—
had not triggered the extinction of dinosaurs 65 mil
lion years ago, mammals would still be small creatures,
confined to the nooks and crannies of a dinosaur’s world,
and incapable of evolving the larger size that brains big
enough for self-consciousness require. If a small and
tenuous population of protohumans had not survived
a hundred slings and arrows of outrageous fortune (and
potential extinction) on the savannas of Africa, then
Homo sapiens would never have emerged to spread
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throughout the globe. We are glorious accidents of
an unpredictable process with no drive to complexity, not the expected results of evolutionary
principles that yearn to produce a creature capable of understanding the mode of its own necessary construction (1996a, p. 216, parenthetical
items in orig., emp. added).
While it is convenient to surmise that consciousness is a “con
catenation of numerous improbabilities,” the result of the “con
tingent outcome of thousands of linked events,” or a “glorious
accident,” such speculation does not explain how consciousness
arose. So how did it arise?
On occasion (quite often, in fact), evolutionists have been
known to criticize creationists for their reliance on what the
evolutionists see as “just-so” stories (a phrase from Rudyard
Kipling’s children’s book of the same title, in which fanciful
explanations are offered for adaptations, such as the elephant’s
trunk). But, as the old adage suggests, “the sauce that is good
for the goose also is good for the gander.” Or, to put it another
way, evolutionists are not above weaving their own “just-so”
stories—when it suits their purpose. Consider the following
examples.
In A Mind So Rare, Donald crafted a fascinating “just-so”
story about how consciousness might have arisen. Walk with
him on his imaginary journey.
The path to higher conscious function was long and
indirect…. We stand at the far end of a long process
of evolution. The material origins of consciousness
started in specific kinds of nervous systems. Conscious
capacity evolved, with its various component systems
in parallel, in many species, in a series of slow-moving
adaptations of the vertebrate brain, each for its own
local reasons. The earliest conscious functions were
focused on achieving basic perceptual unity, and more
recently evolved ones on gaining a better fix on shortterm events in the environment, as well as achieving
more effective control over behavior in the interme
diate term. The core brain systems of primates remain
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the foundation of human conscious capacity, but they
have been greatly expanded in the human brain, through
the neocortex.
Conscious capacity involves many brain subsystems,
some of which evolved independently of one another.
However, there is reason to think that in early homi
nids, all these systems might have changed together,
in a fairly synchronized manner, as a sort of evolu
tionary cluster. When a cluster of traits evolves more
or less simultaneously as a piece, it is sometimes called
a suite of adaptations. I have called the cluster of skills
underlying human conscious capacity, the hominid
Executive Suite. [Donald included in the Executive
Suite: self-monitoring, divided attention, self-reminding, autocuing, self-recognition, rehearsal and review,
whole-body imitation, mindreading, pedagogy, ges
ture, symbolic invention, and complex skill hierarchies—BH/BT.] We don’t yet have a complete or
detailed picture of the Executive Suite….
Any species aspiring to a high degree of intelligence must acquire symbolic skill. There is some
thing different and powerful about symbolic capacity,
and intentional representations. According to our pres
entindications, only humans have this ability….
[T]he special nature of human cognition can be ap
proached by comparing ourselves with other primates.
Humans are broadly equipped with more powerful
mental models than most primates. We also have more
communicative ability, more symbolic capacity, and
more advanced tool technology than they have. In this
sense, there seems to be some hierarchy of primate in
telligence, and it probably parallels our global impres
sion of the hierarchy of primate consciousness. The
underlying mechanisms of this putative hierarchy
should tell a story of conservative, gradualistic change,
regardless of what interpretative spin we might wish
to place on it….
Down deep, we are still primates and retain the pri
mate kind of mind, which lacks some of the special
ized capacities of bats, fishes, birds, cats, and so on
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and has its own peculiar profile. Moreover, we are a
special kind of primate, with a very particular pattern
of emotional and social behavior. This is a deep design feature of being human, and our representa
tional capacity cannot alter that fundamental constraint.
...Symbols can radically amplify the power of any
mind, whatever its design. They can alter awareness
as well. Or is it the other way around? Perhaps symbolic skill is the result, not the cause, of increased
conscious capacity. This is the heart of the matter (pp. 114,115-116,117,138-139, emp. added).
By way of summary, then, what have we “learned” via this
scenario? First, “the path to higher conscious function was
long and indirect.” Second, “any species aspiring to a high de
gree of intelligence must acquire symbolic skill.” Third, un
fortunately, “we don’t yet have a complete or detailed picture”
of how such things as self-recognition, the use of symbolic lan
guage, etc. arose. Fourth, we’re not sure if such skills caused
consciousness, or if consciousness caused such skills.
The “heart of the matter,” therefore, is this: there is not a
shred of scientific evidence for the classic “just-so” story as told
by Donald. It is little more than “pie-in-the-sky, I-hope-so-byand-by” wishful thinking. But it is hardly the only such “just
so” story now making the rounds. Stephen Jay Gould—effective popularizer of evolution that he was—spun a much more
fascinating tale of how he thought consciousness evolved. By
his best guess, human consciousness is rooted in the destruction of the dinosaurs 65-70 million years ago as the re
sult of a giant asteroid hitting the Earth and driving them to
extinction.
Does this strike you as a bit odd? Does it leave you wonder
ing exactly how the dinosaurs’ demise could possibly account
for, of all things, human consciousness? Read on. Another
“just-so” story is right around the corner.
If mammals had arisen late and helped to drive dino
saurs to their doom, then we could legitimately pro
pose a scenario of expected progress. But dinosaurs
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remained dominant and probably became extinct
only as a quirky result of the most unpredictable of
events—a mass dying triggered by extraterrestrial im
pact. If dinosaurs had not died in this event, they would
probably still dominate the domain of large-bodied
vertebrates, as they had for so long with such conspic
uous success, and mammals would still be small crea
tures in the interstices of their world. This situation pre
vailed for a hundred million years; why not for sixty
million more? Since dinosaurs were not moving to
ward markedly larger brains, and since such a prospect
may lie outside the capabilities of reptilian deign, we
must assume that consciousness would not have evolved
on our planet if a cosmic catastrophe had not claimed
the dinosaurs as victims. In an entirely literal sense, we
owe our existence, as large and reasoning mammals,
to our lucky stars (Gould, 1989, p. 318).
The meaning of the extraterrestrial theory for human
consciousness as a cosmic accident begins with a ba
sic fact that should be more widely known (but that
will surprise most non-professionals, who assume
something different): dinosaurs and mammals evolved at
the same time. Mammals did not arise later, as superior
forms that gradually replaced inferior dinosaurs by
competition. Mammals existed throughout the 100 mil
lion years of dinosaurian domination—and they lived
as small, mostly mouse-sized creatures in the ecolog
ical interstices of a world ruled by large reptiles. They
did not get bigger; they did not get better (or at least
their changes did nothing to drive dinosaurs toward
extinction). They did nothing to dislodge the incum
bents; they bided their time.
Structural or mental inferiority did not drive the di
nosaurs to extinction. They were doing well, and show
ing no sign of ceding domination, right until the extra
terrestrial debacle unleashed a set of sudden conse
quences (as yet to be adequately specified, although
the “nuclear winter” scenario of a cold, dark world has
been proposed for the same reasons). Some mammals
weathered the storm; no dinosaurs did. We have no rea-
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son to believe that mammals prevailed as a result of
any feature traditionally asserted to prove their superiority—warm-bloodedness, live bearing, large brains,
for example. Their “success” might well be attributed
to nothing more than their size—for nothing large and
terrestrial got through the Cretaceous debacle, while
many small creatures survived.
In any case, had the cometary shower (or whatever)
not hit, we have no reason to think that dinosaurs, hav
ing dominated the earth for 100 million years, would
not have held on for another 65 to continue their he
gemony today. In such a case, mammals would prob
ably still be mouse-sized creatures living on the fringes
—after all, they had done nothing else for 100 million
years before. Moreover, dinosaurs were not evolving
toward any form of consciousness. In other words, those
comets or asteroids were the sine quibus non [something
absolutely indispensable—BH/BT] of our current ex
istence. Without the removal of dinosaurs that
they engendered, consciousness would not have
evolved on our earth (Gould, 1984a, pp. 65-66, ital
ics and parenthetical items in orig., emp. added).
Little wonder, then, that Dr. Gould concluded in an article
(“The Evolution of Life on the Earth”) he wrote for the Octo
ber 1994 issue of Scientific American: “H. sapiens is but a tiny,
late-arising twig on life’s enormously arborescent bush—a small
bud that would almost surely not appear a second time if we
could replant the bush from seed and let it grow again” (271
[4]:91).
As far as Gould and some of his colleagues are concerned,
Homo sapiens may be nothing but a “tiny twig” or a “small bud.”
But human consciousness (“our most precious possession,”
“the greatest of miracles”) has defied every attempt by evolu
tionists to explain either the reason for its existence or the mech
anism leading to its development. Further complicating mat
ters is the obvious and undeniable fact that our consciousness/
self-awareness allows us to experience (and express!) what Sir
Roger Penrose has referred to as “non-computable elements”
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—things like compassion, morality, and many others—that mere
neural activity is extremely hard pressed to explain. As Dr. Penrose put it:
There are some types of words which would seem to
involve non-computable elements—for example, judge
ment, common sense, insight, aesthetic sensibility, com
passion, morality…. These seem to me to be things
which are not just features of computations…. If there
indeed exists some sort of contact with Platonic ab
solutes which our awareness enables us to achieve,
and which cannot be explained in terms of computa
tional behaviour, then that seems to me to be an important issue (1997, p. 125, first ellipsis in orig., sec
ond ellipsis and emp. added).
An important issue? Talk about understatement! It is diffi
cult enough to try to invent “just-so” stories to explain why
consciousness arose in the first place, and then to explain how
it did so. But to try to explain the role that consciousness plays
in such “important issues” within humanity as common sense,
judgment, aesthetics, compassion, and morality—well, let’s
just say that Michael Ruse had it right when he observed: “I
hardly need say that all of these suggestions raise as many
questions and problems as they answer. Philosophers and
scientists are working hard toward answers and resolutions”
(2001b, pp. 199-200, emp. added). Anthony O’Hear, in his
book, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolu
tionary Explanation, remarked: “What is crucially at issue here
is not how human self-consciousness might have come about,
but what its significance is once it has come about” (1997, p. 22).
In a special April 10, 2000 issue of Time magazine devoted
to the subject of “Visions of Space and Science,” Steven Pinker,
professor of brain and cognitive sciences at MIT and author
of How the Mind Works, wrote an article titled “Will the Mind
Figure Out How the Brain Works?,” in which he concluded:
Will we ever understand the brain as well as we un
derstand the heart, say, or the kidney? Will mad sci
entists or dictators have the means to control our
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thoughts? Will neurologists scan our brains down to
the last synapse and duplicate the wiring in a silicon
chip, giving our minds eternal life?
No one can say. The human brain is the most complex
object in the known universe, with billions of chat
tering neurons connected by trillions of synapses. No
scientific problem compares to it. (The Human Ge
nome Project, which is trying to read a long molecu
lar sentence composed of billions of letters, is simple
by comparison.) Cognitive neuroscience is arming so
many brilliant minds with such high technology that it
would be foolish to predict that we will never under
stand how the brain gives rise to the mind. But the prob
lem is so hard that it would be just as foolish to predict
that we will.
One challenge is that we are still clueless about
how the brain represents the content of our
thoughts and feelings (2000, 155[4]:91, parentheti
cal item in orig., emp. added).
Or, as brain scientist John Beloff admitted in an article ti
tled “The Mind-Brain Problem”: “The fact is that, leaving
aside mythical and religious cosmologies, the position of
mind in nature remains a total mystery…. At present there
is no agreement even as to what would count here as decisive
evidence” (1994, emp. added).
We would like to close this discussion about how conscious
ness arose with the following statements from Bryan Apple
yard.
Hard science will fight back at this point by attempt
ing to deny this is a problem at all. Self-consciousness
is merely a by-product of evolutionary complexity.
Animals develop larger brains as survival mecha
nisms. Over millions of years these brains attain awe
some levels of miniaturization and organization; in
deed, they become the most complicated things in the
universe. Then, one day, this complexity gives rise
to something utterly unprecedented. Perhaps the in
ternal functional explanation is that the brain-machine
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becomes so complex that it begins to make new con
nections not directly related to the daily requirements
of survival. By some design fluke, a surplus of proces
sing capacity emerges which manifests itself as selfawareness. The higher primates are able to start the
thought processes which will lead to the cosmically
staggering insight: “I am a higher primate.” Perhaps
the critical moment comes when, as the biologist Rich
ard Dawkins has suggested, the brain achieves suffi
cient complexity to be able to contain a model of itself.
Or, as Douglas Hofstadter puts it, “The self comes in
to being at the moment it has the power to reflect itself.”
…The reason such explanations feel inadequate, even
though, as children of the scientific age, we probably
accept them at the back of our minds, is that they are
incoherent. They do not explain self-consciousness, they explain complexity.
Of course, the hard evolutionist may still respond by
claiming that this is a by-product of complexity. The
elaborations and anomalies of our language and our
awareness are merely a kind of surplus capacity to idle
that happens to occur in the brain. We have more neu
rons than are strictly necessary to gather food or re
produce, so when they are not thus engaged, or even
sometimes when they are, they chatter on in endless
circular arguments which only seem important. In re
ality, they are trivial—in the words of Peter Atkins they
are “special but not significant.”
But, again, this is incoherent. How can it be “not sig
nificant” that we are able to use and understand the
words “not significant”? What meaning can the word
“significant” have in such a context? Significant to
what? If self-consciousness is “not significant,”
then where on earth is significance to be found?
(1992, pp. 194,195-196, italics in orig., emp. added).
We couldn’t have said it better ourselves. If human con
sciousness doesn’t rank as being “significant,” what does?
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EVOLUTIONARY BIAS AND THE
ORIGIN OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
Bias is a difficult thing to admit. It also is a difficult thing to
overcome. Some would even say impossible. Donald Johan
son, in his book, Lucy: The Beginnings of Humankind (which dis
cusses Australopithecus afarensis, arguably the world’s most fa
mous “hominid” fossil), addressed this subject in an admira
bly candid manner when he wrote: “There is no such thing as
a total lack of bias. I have it; everybody has it.” But Dr. Johan
son did not stop there. He went on to note: “The insidious
thing about bias is that it does make one deaf to the cries
of other evidence” ( Johanson and Edey, 1981, p. 277, emp.
added).
Oh, how true. And the veracity of this assessment is espe
cially evident when the bias involves an intractable determi
nation to live without God. Will Durant was a self-proclaimed
humanist and avowed atheist, yet he nevertheless wrote: “The
greatest question of our time is not communism vs. individu
alism, not Europe vs. America, not even the East vs. the West;
it is whether men can bear to live without God” (1932, p. 23).
The steely resolve “to live without God” has become the
mantra of many scientists and philosophers. Sir Julian Huxley,
himself an atheist, compared God to the disappearing act per
formed by the Cheshire cat in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
when he wrote: “The supernatural is being swept out of the
universe.... God is beginning to resemble not a ruler, but the
last fading smile of a cosmic Cheshire cat” (1957, p. 59). To
Huxley, and thousands of others like him, “the God argu
ment” has been effectively routed.
Disbelief in God, though, is an a priori decision that is not
based on evidence! Time and again, eminent atheists, agnos
tics, skeptics, and infidels have made their positions in this re
gard crystal clear. The widely published comments of the late
biochemist and science writer, Isaac Asimov, are an excellent
example. In a thought-provoking interview by the editor of The
- 296 -
Humanist, Paul Kurtz, Dr. Asimov was asked how he would
classify himself. He responded: “Emotionally, I am an athe
ist. I don’t have the evidence to prove that God doesn’t exist,
but I so strongly suspect he doesn’t that I don’t want to waste
my time” (Asimov, 1982, 2[2]:9).
Once a person comes to the decision that he “strongly sus
pects” that God does not exist, where does that leave him?
With God out of the picture, two facts become prominent—
and problematic—very quickly. First, a naturalistic system of
origins (i.e., organic evolution) must be invoked to explain,
not just man’s origin, but everything! As Huxley went on to
say three years after he made the above statement: “The earth
was not created; it evolved. So did all the animals and plants
that inhabit it, including our human selves, mind and soul as
well as brain and body. So did religion” (1960, pp. 252-253).
George Gaylord Simpson wrote that evolution “achieves
the aspect of purpose without the intervention of a purposer,
and has produced a vast plan without the action of a planner”
(1947, p. 489). In a strictly reductionist scheme, the idea that
organisms deliberately pursue goals must be rejected, since
“purpose” cannot be reduced to the laws of physics. Biologist
Alex Novikoff wrote: “Only when purpose was excluded from
descriptions of all biological activity…could biological prob
lems be properly formulated and analyzed” (1945, 101:212-213).
Another scientist from Harvard, E.O. Wilson (the “father
of sociobiology”), weighed in on this same theme in his book,
On Human Nature, when he commented on the very first page:
“If humankind evolved by Darwinian natural selection, ge
netic chance and environmental necessity, not God, made the
species” (1978, p. 1). Or, as Brown University evolutionist Ken
neth Miller put it in his 1999 volume, Finding Darwin’s God:
My particular religious beliefs or yours notwithstand
ing, it is a fact that in the scientific world of the
late twentieth century, the displacement of God
by Darwinian forces is almost complete. This view
is not always articulated openly, perhaps for fear of
offending the faithful, but the literature of science is
- 297 -
not a good place to keep secrets. Scientific writing, es
pecially on evolution, shows this displacement clearly
Second, with God having been “displaced,” like it or not,
man is on his own. Simpson remarked in his book, Life of the
Past:
Man stands alone in the universe, a unique prod
uct of a long, unconscious, impersonal material pro
cess with unique understanding and potentialities.
These he owes to no one but himself, and it is to
himself that he is responsible. He is not the crea
ture of uncontrollable and undeterminable forces,
but is his own master. He can and must decide and
manage his own destiny (1953, p. 155, emp. added).
Nobel laureate Jacques Monod, in his dismally depressing
magnum opus, Chance and Necessity, concluded: “Man at least
knows he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe,
out of which he has emerged only by chance” (1971, p. 180).
But Monod’s comments are “lighthearted” compared to those
of another Nobel laureate, Steven Weinberg. In his book about
the origin and fate of the Universe, The First Three Minutes, he
penned what many believe are some of the most seriously
disheartening words imaginable. Read, and weep.
It is almost irresistible for humans to believe that we
have some special relation to the universe, that hu
man life is not just a more-or-less farcical outcome of
a chain of accidents reaching back to the first three
minutes, but that we were somehow build in from
the beginning. As I write this I happen to be in an air
plane at 30,000 feet, flying over Wyoming en route
home from San Francisco to Boston. Below, the earth
looks very soft and comfortable—fluffy clouds here
and there, snow turning pink as the sun sets, roads
stretching straight across the country from one town
to another. It is very hard to realize that this all is
just a tiny part of an overwhelmingly hostile universe. It is even harder to realize that this present uni
verse has evolved from an unspeakably unfamiliar
early condition, and faces a future extinction of end-
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less cold or intolerable heat. The more the universe
seems comprehensible, the more it also seems
pointless. But if there is no solace in the fruits of our
research, there is at least some consolation in the re
search itself. Men and women are not content to com
fort themselves with tales of gods and giants, or to con
fine their thoughts to the daily affairs of life; they also
build telescopes and satellites and accelerators, and
sit at their desks for endless hours working out the mean
ing of the data they gather. The effort to understand
the universe is one of the very few things that lifts hu
man life a little above the level of farce, and gives it
some of the grace of tragedy (1977, pp. 154-155, emp.
added).
Alas, then, as Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin put it in their
book, Origins: “There is no law that declares the human ani
mal to be different, as seen in this broad biological perspec
tive, from any other animal” (1977, p. 256). A bleak thought,
to be sure—but from an evolutionist’s self-imposed view, in
escapably true nevertheless.
Perhaps now is the time to ask: Where does all of this inevitably lead? Actions have consequences, and beliefs have
implications. In a chapter titled “Scientific Humanism” in his
book, The Humanist Alternative, Paul Kurtz concluded: “To
adopt such a scientific approach unreservedly is to accept as
ultimate in all matters of fact and real existence the appeal to the evidence of experience alone—a court subordinate to no higher authority, to be over-ridden by no
prejudice however comfortable” (1973, p. 109, emp. added).
That “higher authority” must be avoided at all cost. Herman
J. Eckelmann, in an article titled “Some Concluding Thoughts
on Evolutionary Belief,” echoed an interesting refrain when
he asked: “Is it possible that one can have too high an emo
tional stake in wanting to have a God-less universe?” (1991, p.
345). That “emotional stake” is a driving force behind the re
fusal to submit to that “higher authority.” If you doubt that,
then listen to the admission of Harvard geneticist Richard
Lewontin.
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Our willingness to accept scientific claims against com
mon sense is the key to an understanding of the real
struggle between science and the supernatural. We
take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity
of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill
many of its extravagant promises of health and life,
in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community
for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have
a prior commitment, a commitment to naturalism. It is not that the methods and institutions of
science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but,
on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an ap
paratus of investigation and a set of concepts that pro
duce material explanations, no matter how counter
intuitive, no mater how mystifying to the uninitiated.
Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent
Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who
could believe in God could believe in anything. To ap
peal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any mo
ment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that
miracles may happen (1997, p. 31, italics in orig., emp.
added).
Or, as Alwyn Scott confessed:
In the realm of science, one’s attitude toward
what Karl Popper called “the great tradition of
materialism” is often used as an index of respectability. Those who turn away from this tradition to
consider the nature of consciousness run the risk of
being marked as flakes who might also believe in
psychokinesis (spoon bending), mental telepathy,
clairvoyance, precognition, and the like. The safest
course—especially for the young scientist—is to
shun such temptations and concentrate on the
data from a particular level of the hierarchy (1995,
p. 167, parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
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WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS HAVE
TO DO WITH THE ORIGIN OF
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS?
Once the scientists and philosophers have admitted their
bias against God and the supernatural, and therefore have
limited themselves to the purely naturalistic explanations of
fered by organic evolution, they are severely limited in how
they can explain human consciousness—what Popper and
Eccles called “the greatest of miracles.” These individuals des
perately desire—in fact, absolutely must have—evolution as
an explanation for “whatever exists” (which includes human
consciousness). As Sir Francis Crick put it: “The ultimate aim
of the modern movement in biology is in fact to explain all of
biology in terms of physics and chemistry” (1966, p. 10, emp.
added). Emil du-Bois-Reymand (1818-1896), the founder of
electrochemistry, and Hermann von Helmholtz (1812-1894),
the famed German physiologist and physicist who was the first
to measure the speed of nerve impulses, agreed: “All the activ
ities of living material, including consciousness, are ultimately
to be explained in terms of physics and chemistry” (as quoted
in Leake, 1964, sec. 4, pp. 5-6, emp. added). Richard Leakey
observed:
This is one of the paradoxes of Homo sapiens: we ex
perience the unity and diversity of a mind shaped by
eons of life as hunter-gatherers. We experience its
unity in the common possession of an awareness of
self and a sense of awe at the miracle of life. And we
experience its diversity in the different cultures—expressed in language, customs, and religions—that we
create and that create us. We should rejoice at so
wondrous a product of evolution (1994, p. 157,
emp. added).
Robert Ornstein wrote in The Evolution of Consciousness:
Our mind did not spring from a designer, nor from a
set of ideal and idealized programs…. Instead, it
evolved on the same adaptive basis as the rest
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of biological evolution, using the processes of ran
dom generation and selection of what is so gener
ated…. The story of the mind lies in many accidents
and many changes of function (1991, pp. 4-5, emp.
added).
Ornstein went on to say:
Working in such boundless time, all evolution needs
is a tiny and consistent advantage at any point for
things to add up…. In millions of years, and with a
generation time of five years, there is an immense
time for adaptations to tally up in prehumans. And,
in living beings who reproduce quickly (in animals,
generation times are only three or four years, and in
bacteria, almost no time), major changes can occur
in only a few thousand years. E. coli, the bacterium of
choice for research, has a generation cycle of hours.
Granted so much time, and selection for advantages,
all the biological miracles have had plenty of time
and plenty of chance to have happened (p. 28, ital
ics and parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
Alan Dressler dryly commented in his book, Voyage to the Great
Attractor: “The universe has invented a way to know itself”
(1994, p. 335).
Or has it? Can “biological miracles” occur just because
there is supposed to have been “plenty of time and plenty of
chance?” Monod wistfully wrote: “Chance alone is the source
of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere.… All
forms of life are the product of chance...” (1972, pp. 110,167).
Such a view, however, ascribes to “chance” properties that it
does not, and cannot, possess. Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley
addressed this logical fallacy and concluded: “Chance is in
capable of creating a single molecule, let alone an entire uni
verse. Why not? Chance is no thing. It is not an entity. It has
no being, no power, no force. It can effect nothing for it has
no causal power within it” (1984, p. 118).
One of the twentieth century’s most eminent evolutionists
was French zoologist Pierre-Paul Grassé, “whose knowledge
of the living world,” according to evolutionary geneticist
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Theodosius Dobzhansky, “was encyclopedic” (1975, 29:376).
In his classic tome, Evolution of Living Organisms, Dr. Grassé
addressed the idea of chance being responsible for evolution
when he wrote: “To insist...that life appeared quite by
chance and evolved in this fashion is an unfounded supposition which I believe to be wrong and not in accordance with the facts” (1977, p. 107, emp. added).
Grassé also addressed, as did Ornstein in his quote above,
bacterial generation times and their relevance to evolution.
In fact, Dr. Grassé discussed the very microorganism, Esche
richia coli, that Ornstein mentioned—yet drew an entirely dif
ferent conclusion.
Bacteria, the study of which has formed a great part
of the foundation of genetics and molecular biology,
are the organisms which, because of their huge num
bers, produce the most mutations…. [B]acteria, de
spite their great production of intraspecific varieties,
exhibit a great fidelity to their species. The bacillus
Escherichia coli, whose mutants have been studied very
carefully, is the best example. The reader will agree
that it is surprising, to say the least, to want to
prove evolution and to discover its mechanisms
and then to choose as a material for this study a
being which practically stabilized a billion years
ago (p. 87, emp. added).
In spite of all this, numerous scientists and philosophers ex
hibit a dogged determination to explain the incredible nature
of human consciousness—a determination that, if we may kind
ly say so, is itself incredible! And they are not the least bit shy
about admitting their built-in bias. Colin McGinn put the mat
ter in perspective quite well when he said: “Resolutely shunning the supernatural, I think it is undeniable that it must be
in virtue of some natural property of the brain that organisms
are conscious. There just has to be some explanation for how
brains [interact with] minds” (1993, p. 6, italics in orig., emp.
added).
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In other words, now that it has been declared (by what al
most amounts to divine fiat) that God didn’t do it, then it’s
obvious that “something else” must have. There just has to
be some naturalistic explanation for how brains interact with
minds! As Gordon Allport summarized the problem: “For two
generations, psychologists have tried every conceivable way
of accounting for the integration, organization and striving of
the human person without having recourse to the postulate of
a self” (1955, p. 37).
Whatever that explanation may be, and wherever that “self ”
may have come from, there is one thing evolutionists know it
is not—God and the supernatural. Ian Glynn, in his book, An
Anatomy of Thought: The Origin and Machinery of the Mind, admitted as much when he wrote:
My own starting position can be summed up in three
statements: first, that the only minds whose existence
we can be confident of are associated with complex
brains of humans and some other animals; second,
that we (and other animals with minds) are the prod
uct of evolution by natural selection; and, third, that
neither in the origin of life nor in its subsequent
evolution has there been any supernatural interference—that is, anything happening contrary to the laws of physics…. If the origin of life
can be explained without invoking any supernatural processes, it seems more profitable to look
elsewhere for clues to an understanding of the
mind (1999, p. 5, parenthetical item in orig., emp. ad
ded).
Scott addressed this same concept.
What, then, is the essence of consciousness? An an
swer to this question requires the specification of an
“extra ingredient” beyond mere mechanism. Tradi
tionally this ingredient has been called the soul, although the behaviorists dealt with the hard problem
by denying it. From the perspective of natural science, both of these approaches are unacceptable
(1995, p. 172, italics in orig., emp. added).
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Crick wrote:
The idea that man has a disembodied soul is as un
necessary as the old idea that there was a Life Force.
This is in head-on contradiction to the religious be
liefs of billions of human beings alive today. How will
such a radical change be received? (1994, p. 261).
The commitment to materialism and naturalism evinced
by such statements is overwhelming. Claude Bernard, the
progenitor of modern physiology, believed that the cause of
all phenomena is matter, and that determinism is “the foun
dation of all scientific progress and criticism” (as quoted in
Kety, 1960, 132:1863). Thomas Huxley reflected this posi
tion when he observed: “Thoughts are the expression of mo
lecular changes in the matter of life, which is the source of our
other vital phenomena” (1870b, p. 152). Huxley also said:
“Mind is a function of matter, when that matter has attained a
certain degree of organization” (1871, p. 464). He therefore
concluded: “Thought is as much a function of matter as mo
tion is” (1870a, p. 371). More recently, Franklin M. Harold, in
The Way of the Cell, was exceedingly blunt in his assessment.
Biochemists insist, rightly, that when one takes cells
apart one finds nothing but molecules: no forces
unique to life, no cosmic plan, only molecules whose
writhings and couplings underlie and explain all that
the cell does… I share the commitment to a material conception of life…. Ever since Descartes, there
have been mechanistic biologists who see it as their
task to “reduce” biology to chemistry and physics, for
instance, to demonstrate that all biological phenom
ena can be completely explained in terms of the mo
tions of their constituent parts and the forces between
them. Biochemists and molecular biologists, in
particular, commonly believe that such reduction
is their objective, though they will not all agree on
the meaning of the term. Some are satisfied that re
duction has effectively been accomplished, thanks to
the near-universal consensus that all that living things
do is based on their physical substance, and that no
metaphysical agencies or vital forces need be invoked….
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The bedrock premise of this book is that life is a
material phenomenon, grounded in chemistry
and physics…. Even the human mind emerges
from the activities of the brain and represents a
product of evolution, though these are matters of
which we know little, and understand less. I know of
no evidence for the existence of vital forces unique to
living organisms, and their erratic history gives one
no reason to believe that life’s journey is directed to
ward a final destination in pursuit of a plan or pur
pose. If life is the creation of some cosmic mind
or will, it has taken great care to hide all material traces of its intervention….
The findings of biologists cut even closer to the bone.
They compel us to admit that we humans, like all
other organisms, are transient constellations of
jostling molecules, brought forth by a mindless
game of chance devoid of plan or intent. For any
one who takes science seriously, it becomes ever hard
er to believe that behind the appearances abides a cos
mic mind that is even remotely comprehensible to us,
or one that has the slightest concern for human wel
fare, personal or collective…. The universe revealed
by science is under no obligation to be meaningful to
mankind, and one can make a strong case that it is in
fact utterly indifferent to us…. More than a few con
temporary scientists believe that a tendency to selforganization is inherent in the physical universe, and
that underpins the emergence and progressive evolu
tion of life…. For better or for worse, mankind makes
itself…. I do not feel diminished by the discovery that
we are all part of a vast biotic enterprise that brought
forth consciousness, understanding, and morality from
mindless chemistry (2001, pp. 65,67,254,255,256,257,
emp. added).
RADICAL MATERIALISM—A “FISHY” THEORY
We are tempted to say, “Methinks thou protesteth too much!”
These strained machinations—all of which are being invoked
in order to deny any place to God and the supernatural—re-
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mind us of the now-famous story told by Sir Arthur Edding
ton in his book, The Philosophy of Physical Science, about the ich
thyologist and his “special” net for catching fish.
Let us suppose that an ichthyologist is exploring the
life of the ocean. He casts a net into the water and
brings up a fishy assortment. Surveying his catch, he
proceeds in the usual manner of a scientist to systema
tise what it reveals. He arrives at two generalisations:
(1) No sea-creature is less than two inches long. (2) All
sea-creatures have gills. These are both true of his catch,
and he assumes tentatively that they will remain true
however often he repeats it. In applying this analogy,
the catch stands for the body of knowledge which con
stitutes physical science, and the net for the sensory
and intellectual equipment which we use in obtaining
it. The casting of the net corresponds to observation;
for knowledge which has not been or could not
be obtained by observation is not admitted into
physical science. An onlooker may object that the
first generalisation is wrong. “There are plenty of seacreatures under two inches long, only your net is not
adapted to catch them.” The ichthyologist dismisses
this objection contemptuously. “Anything uncatchable
by my net is ipso facto outside the scope of ichthyo
logical knowledge. In short, “what my net can’t catch
isn’t fish.” Or—to translate the analogy—“If you are not
simply guessing, you are claiming a knowledge of the
physical universe discovered in some other way than
by the methods of physical science, and admittedly un
verifiable by such methods. You are a metaphysician.
Bah!” (1958, p. 16, emp. added).
During 1977-1978, Australian electrophysiologist and No
bel laureate Sir John Eccles (who was a personal friend of Sir
Arthur Eddington’s) was invited to present the prestigious
Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.
As he began, he commented:
The tremendous successes of science in the last cen
tury have led to the expectation that there will be forth
coming in the near future a complete explanation in
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materialist terms of all the fundamental problems con
fronting us…. When confronted with the frightening
assertion by scientists that we are no more than par
ticipants in the materialist happenings of chance and
necessity, anti-science is a natural reaction. I believe
that this assertion is an arrogant over-statement,
as will appear in lecture after lecture. In fact, the aim
of the whole lecture series is an attack on monistmaterialism, which is unfortunately believed in
by most scientists with religious-like fervour. You
might say that it is the belief of the establishment
(1979, pp. 8-9, emp. added).
Five years later, in his book, The Wonder of Being Human: Our
Brain and Our Mind, Eccles wrote:
When such troubles arise in the history of thought, it
is usual to adopt some belief that “saves” the day. For
example, the denial of the reality of mental events, as
in radical materialism, is an easy cop-out…. Radical
materialism should have a prominent place in the
history of human silliness (Eccles and Robinson,
1984, p. 17).
We could not agree any more than we do. It is comforting
to know that there are men of science as esteemed as Sir John
Eccles who are willing to admit as much. It also is comforting
to know that there are other individuals of the same stature in
science who are willing to step forward and say essentially
the same thing. Consider, as just one example, the following.
In November 1982, at the Isthmus Institute in Dallas, Texas,
four renowned evolutionists who were Nobel laureates—Sir
John Eccles, Ilya Prigogine, Roger Sperry, and Brian Josephson—took part in a series of very frank discussions, narrated
by Norman Cousins, the highly esteemed editor of the Satur
day Review for more than a quarter of a century. Three years
later, in 1985, the four Nobel laureates released an absolutely
amazing book, Nobel Prize Conversations, containing the entire
text of those discussions, along with Mr. Cousins’ narrative
comments. In his “Prelude,” Cousins wrote:
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Although each represented a different scientific dis
cipline they had one thing in common: each had re
ceived the Nobel Prize, each had used the gifts of in
telligence they had received in service of human life.
The awards they had received in ceremonies in Stockholm’s Nobelstiftelsen signified that the scientific com
munity as a whole had come to accept their work not
only as valid but as important to mankind. Another
element also unites the four Nobel Laureates. Each
of them is concerned about the relation between
the human mind and human brain, about the role
of human consciousness in an evolving universe,
about the interplay between time and mind, about
the world as a “work of art” which cannot simply
be reduced to neural events within the brain or
to immutable mechanisms measured by quantum
analysis (pp. 4-5, emp. added).
Later, we will quote statements made by Roger Sperry and
Sir John Eccles in the Nobel Prize Conversations book. But for
now, we would like to leave the reader with the thought-provoking comments of Brian Josephson. Before we do, how
ever, we would like to offer Mr. Cousins’ assessment of what
you are about to read. He wrote:
Dr. Josephson has proposed that the inclusion of
God or Mind in science is not only plausible, but
may even be necessary if science is ever to fully
understand Nature or to overcome its difficulties in
explaining phenomena like evolution and creativity
Now, Josephson’s remarks:
If we want to put God or Mind into science, then we
have to say that there is an intelligence behind the
scenes, which is creating order, at least leaving things
less disordered than they would have been without
the intelligence being present. And so we can iden
tify the unobserved order with intelligence….
So just from the fact that scientific work makes no
mention of God or Mind, we see that science and
the mentalist revolution are at the present time
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totally separated from each other. But, as you
have already said, things are beginning to change
and overlapping views are beginning to be found.
However, the fact remains that science gets on quite
well without God, and perhaps we should look into the
reasons why this might be. If we assume God or Mind
does exist, then why hasn’t this appeared in scientific
experiments? I’d like to indicate two facts which may
be relevant.
Firstly, science casts the spotlight which it uses to
search for knowledge very selectively; in other words
what scientists choose to look at, to try to explain
in scientific terms, is rather restricted, rather
biased. And the content of science is biased in a
materialistic direction. This applies to almost all the
sciences, the physical sciences as well as the biological
sciences. The reason is very largely that it is easier to
study quantitatively the behavior of matter and the
grosser aspects of behavior (both animal and human),
than it is to study higher behavior where the influence
of God might be significant. So science, in choosing
the simpler problems to examine first, tends always to
look in directions where theological concepts are not
very relevant.
Secondly, even with a particular field, science likes to
look at simple phenomena, as these are more easily
connected with fundamental laws. Then one tends to
say, “We can explain the simple phenomena very well
now; eventually, we’ll be able to explain the complex
phenomena as well.” The gap between simple and
complex phenomena is one which scientists tend,
just as a matter of faith, to assume (especially if they
are of materialistic orientation) will be bridged
without invoking any higher being.
An alternative approach for the scientist is to say, Let’s
investigate the opposite view, i.e., that perhaps we
should be taking God or Mind into account in
science; what would a science look like which had
God in there playing a part, accounting thereby for
particular phenomena? There are various ways into
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this problem, and the way I’m going to take is to say
that if we want to put God or Mind into science,
then the primary feature of Mind, the one which
is most closely connected with the science we’ve
got, is intelligence (see Cousins, 1985, pp. 91,92-93,
94, parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
How very refreshing! And the fact that such statements
come from a Nobel laureate who is an admitted evolutionist,
is, to say the very least, surprising. But Dr. Josephson is not
alone in such thinking. The eminent British theoretical phys
icist (and former Master of Queen’s College, Cambridge) John
Polkinghorne expressed similar thoughts in an article he wrote
in 2001 (“Understanding the Universe”) for publication in
the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.
Those of us privileged to be scientists are so excited
by the quest to understand the workings of the physi
cal world that we seldom stop to ask ourselves why we
are so fortunate. Human powers of rational comprehension vastly exceed anything that could be
simply an evolutionary necessity for survival, or
plausibly construed as some sort of collateral spinoff from such a necessity….
I believe that science is possible because the physical
world is a creation and we are, to use an ancient and
powerful phrase, creatures “made in the image” of
the Creator….
I agree with John Leslie’s analysis, presented in his
book, Universes, that suggests, firstly that it would be
irrational just to shrug this off as a happy accident,
and secondly that there are two broad categories of
possible explanation: either many universes with a vast
variety of different natural laws instantiated in them,
of which ours is the one that by chance has allowed us
to appear within its history; or a single universe that
is the way it is because it is not “any old world,” but a
creation that has been endowed by its Creator with
just the circumstances that will allow it to have a fruit
ful history….
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I believe that, while the many-universes hypothesis
seems to have only one explanatory piece of work that
it can do, there are other kinds of explanations that the
thesis of theism can afford, such as granting an under
standing of the intelligibility of the universe, and also
providing the ground for the widely attested phenom
ena of religious experience…. My conclusion is to pre
fer the explanation of Anthropic fruitfulness in terms
of a Creator, which strikes me as being more econom
ic and forming part of a cumulative case for theism….
With, for example, Paul Davies in his book The Mind of
God, I cannot regard this dawning of consciousness as being just a fortunate accident in the
course of an essentially meaningless cosmic history….
What I have sought to show is that religious believers
who see a divine Mind and Purpose behind the uni
verse are not shutting their eyes and irrationally be
lieve impossible things. We have reason for our beliefs. They have come to us through that search for
motivated understanding that is so congenial to the
scientist (950:177,178,179,182, emp. added).
Human powers of rational comprehension do “vastly ex
ceed anything that could be simply an evolutionary necessity.”
The primary feature of mind, it seems, is intelligence —which
we see all around us. Perhaps that is what drove Sir Arthur
Eddington himself to say, shortly before he died: “The idea
of a universal mind, or Logos, would be, I think, a fairly plau
sible inference from the present state of scientific theory” (as
quoted in Heeren, 1995, p. 233). Or, as John Beloff put it in an
article on “The Mind-Brain Problem”:
…[T]he position of mind in nature remains a total mystery. It could be that there exists some sort
of a cosmic mind, perhaps co-equal with the material
universe itself, from which each of our individual
minds stems and to which each ultimately returns.
All we can say is that it looks as if a fragment of mindstuff becomes attached to an individual organism, at
or near birth, and thereafter persists with this symbi
otic relationship until that organism perishes (1994,
emp. added).
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Again, we say, how very refreshing. We will have more to
say later on this aspect of human consciousness. Now, how
ever, it is appropriate that we examine the idea of whether
humans alone possess consciousness, or whether certain mem
bers of the animal kingdom possess the same kind of selfawareness.
DO ANIMALS POSSESS CONSCIOUSNESS?
Earlier, we quoted Stephen Jay Gould, who concluded that
consciousness has been “vouchsafed only to our species in
the history of life on earth” (1997b, p. ix). Is Dr. Gould cor
rect? Or do other creatures possess self-awareness as well?
Certainly, the answer to such a question hinges on the defini
tion one assigns to “consciousness.” In one of the sections
above, we discussed at length the difficulty inherent in attempt
ing to define consciousness. Ervin Laszlo, founder of the Gen
eral Evolution Research Group, addressed this problem in Evo
lution: The Grand Synthesis, when he observed:
The first thing to remember is that we cannot investi
gate the human mind with the methods used to in
vestigate the human brain, or indeed any matter-energy system in the universe. Thoughts, images, feel
ings, and sensations are “private”; none of us has di
rect access to the mind of anyone else—not even of
his closest friend or relative. Mind can only be inves
tigated through introspection (1987, p. 117).
One way to approach the problem is to define conscious
ness with the broadest possible stroke and in the simplest pos
sible terms. Previously, we quoted Steven Harnad, editor of
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, who did exactly that when he
defined consciousness as “the capacity to have experiences”
(as quoted in Lewin, 1992, pp. 153-154). Penrose followed
suit in The Emperor’s New Mind.
What evidence do we have that lizards and codfish
do not possess some low-level form of consciousness?
What right do we have to claim, as some might, that
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human beings are the only inhabitants of our planet
blessed with an actual ability to be “aware”? Are we
alone, among the creatures of earth, as things whom
it is possible to “be”? I doubt it. Although frogs and
lizards, and especially codfish, do not inspire me with
a great deal of conviction that there is necessarily “some
one there” peering back at me when I look at them,
the impression of a “conscious presence” is indeed
very strong with me when I look at a dog or a cat or,
especially, when an ape or monkey in the zoo looks
at me. I do not demand that they feel as I do, nor even
that there is much sophistication about what they feel.
I do not ask that they are “self-aware” in any strong
sense…. All I ask is that they sometimes simply
feel! (1989, p. 383, italics in orig., emp. added).
If these are the sole criteria for defining consciousness—the
capacity to “just have experiences” or to “sometimes simply
feel”—then animals obviously possess consciousness, since
they “have experiences.” The problem is that such simple def
initions of consciousness are woefully inadequate (we even
would go so far as to say that they are, if you will pardon the
intended play on words, “simply wrong!”). And, by and large,
those in the scientific and philosophical communities have ac
knowledged as much. Previously, we quoted Robert Ornstein,
in his book, The Evolution of Consciousness, to that effect: “Being conscious is being aware of being aware. It is one step
removed from the raw experience of seeing, smelling, acting,
moving, and reaction” (1991, pp. 225-226, emp. added).
That “one step” is a mighty big step, however! The differ
ence between merely “being aware” (i.e., “just having expe
riences” or “simply feeling”) and actually being “self-aware”
(i.e., knowing that you are having experiences, and knowing
that you are feeling) is colossal—a fact that seems to have eluded
some who wish to imbue “other species” with the trait of con
sciousness. Marian Dawkins, author of the book, Through Our
Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, is a good exam
ple. She wrote:
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Our near-certainty about (human) shared experiences
is based, amongst other things, on a mixture of the
complexity of their behavior, their ability to “think”
intelligently and on their being able to demonstrate to
us that they have a point of view in which what hap
pens to them matters to them. We now know that these
attributes—complexity, thinking and minding about
the world—are also present in other species. The conclusion that they, too, are consciously aware is
therefore compelling. The balance of evidence (us
ing Occam’s razor to cut us down to the simplest hy
pothesis) is that they are and it seems positively un
scientific to deny it (1993, p. 177, italics and parenthet
ical item in orig., emp. added).
But we are not talking about other species being “con
sciously aware.” We are talking about them being “consciously
self-aware.” As Laszlo went on to say:
The human mind, however, is not just the subjective
side of a two-sided survival mechanism. The mind,
as introspection reveals, is also the seat of abstract
thought, feeling, imagination, and value. I not only
sense the world, I also interpret my sensations.
Like presumably all human beings, I have consciousness. I am aware of having sensations and, on
successively higher levels of abstraction, I am
aware of being aware of having sensations. Ulti
mately I, like other members of the human species,
learn to abstract from immediate sensations in ways
that lesser species cannot, and can come to deal
with pure forms of thought. These include scientific
and mathematical concepts, aesthetic constructions,
and the abstract meanings of words and concepts.
Consciousness is not a mysterious transcendental trait:
it is the capacity for internally describing the internal
description of the perceived and conceived environ
ment (1987, p. 118, italics in orig., emp. added).
Are other species “self-aware”? Tattersall admitted:
I have already said that nonhuman mammals are far
from being automatons, and this is clearly true; but
does it necessarily follow that they have a concept of
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self that would be broadly familiar to us? The answer
to this is almost certainly no; but it has to be admitted
that the degree to which nonhuman primates may or
may not have an internal image of self is a devilishly
hard question to approach (2002, p. 63).
Wilson, in Man: The Promising Primate, therefore concluded:
It seems to me that human self-consciousness is
something that is “personal” to the human species, if only in the simple sense that other animals can
not have a consciousness of being human. Anything
that is personal to a species cannot have originated or
have any meaning in any way other than through selfreference, that is, the individuals making up the
species must think about themselves and must
have been in a problematic situation that made
thinking about themselves productive and adaptive (1980, p. 96, emp. added).
Do other species “think about themselves” in “productive
and adaptive” ways? Remember: we are not asking if animals
possess instinct. Nor are we asking if they can “adapt.” We are
inquiring as to whether or not they are self-aware—to the ex
tent that they actually “think about themselves.” Eccles con
cluded: “It has been well said that an animal knows, but only
a man knows that he knows” (1967, p. 10). Nick Carter, in an
article titled “Are There Any Insurmountable Obstacles to Des
cartes’ Dualism?,” wrote that we might think of animals “as
beings that have extension and sensation, but not thought”
(2002). In the context, he was speaking of “higher thought”—
the ability to think, to think about thinking, and to let others
know we are thinking. Humans not only possess such self-awareness and thought capability, but also the ability to let other
humans know that they possess those two things! As Harvard’s Nobel laureate George Wald concluded:
I have all kinds of evidence that other persons are
conscious; our mutual communication through
speech and writing helps greatly…. There is no
way to shore up scientifically one’s prejudices about
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animal consciousness. One is in the same trouble with
nonliving devices. Does that garage door resent hav
ing to open when the headlights of my car shine on
it? I think not. Does a computer that has just beaten a
human player at chess feel elated? I think not. But
there is nothing one can do about those situations ei
ther (1994, p. 128, emp. added).
In their book, Evolution, Dobzhansky, et al., followed this same
line of reasoning.
In point of fact, self-awareness is the most immediate and incontrovertible of all realities. We infer the existence of self-awareness, or mind, in people
other than ourselves only by analogy with our own in
trospective experiences. Therefore, when it comes to
the question of whether or not some rudiments of selfawareness may be present among other animals, con
clusive evidence is unobtainable. No wonder that com
petent scientists are far from unanimous in their judge
ments. Some are willing to ascribe the beginnings of
mind to some mammals (apes, monkeys, dogs), or even
to all animals with developed nervous systems. Other
scientists make mind an exclusively human possession.
For example, Teilhard de Chardin, in a now-famous
statement, wrote: “Admittedly the animal knows.
But it cannot know that it knows—this is quite certain….” Human selfawareness obviously differs greatly
from any rudiments of mind that may be present in
nonhuman animals. The magnitude of the difference makes it a difference in kind, and not one of
degree. Without doubt, the human mind sets our
species apart from nonhuman animals. Unfortu
nately, what we call the mind is notoriously refractory
to scientific study (1977, p. 453, emp. added).
While the mind may be “notoriously refractory to scientific
study” (a concept we will discuss at some length later), there
are certain things we do know, in addition to those items men
tioned above. As Ehrlich confessed (from an evolutionary view
point): “…[H]uman beings are also the only animals that seem
fully aware of the consciousness of other individuals and thus
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have been able to develop empathy, the capacity to identify
emotionally with others” (2000, p. 111). Nowhere is this more
evident than in the human response to death. Dobzhansky con
cluded: “Self-awareness has, however, brought in its train som
ber companions—fear, anxiety and death awareness…. Man
is burdened by death-awareness. A being who knows that he
will die arose from ancestors who did not know” (1967, p. 68).
But consider (to choose just one example) the animal that
evolutionists believe is our closest living relative—the chimpan
zee. Famed paleoanthropologist Richard Leakey admitted:
…[C]himpanzees at best seem puzzled about death….
The chimpanzees’ limitation in empathizing with oth
ers extends to themselves as individuals: no one has
seen evidence that chimps are aware of their own
mortality, of impending death. But, again, how would
we know?… Ritual disposal of the dead speaks clearly
of an awareness of death, and thus an awareness of
self (1994, pp. 153,155, italics. in orig., emp. added).
Dobzhansky, et al., also addressed this same point.
Ceremonial burial is evidence of self-awareness
because it represents an awareness of death.
There is no indication that individuals of any species other than man know that they will inevitably die…. The adaptive function of death awareness
is not as clear. What conceivable advantage could our
remote ancestors at the dawn of humanity derive from
knowing that they would inevitably die?… It is most
probable that death-awareness arose originally not
because it was adaptively useful by itself, but because
it was a by-product of self-awareness, which was
adaptive (1977, p. 454, emp. added).
The information contained in the two quotations above
can be summarized as follows: (1) chimpanzees are unaware
of their own mortality, and have no ability to empathize emo
tionally with others (a peculiarly human trait, according to Ehr
lich); (2) in fact, there is no indication that individuals of any
species other than humans know they will inevitably die; (3)
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death-awareness arose because it was a product of selfaware
ness; and (4) ceremonial burial is evidence of selfawareness
because it represents an awareness of death.
Now, note the logical conclusion that inescapably follows.
Death-awareness and ceremonial burial are allegedly evi
dence of, and products stemming from, self-awareness. But
chimps (our nearest supposed relative), like all animals, do
not comprehend the fact that they will one day die, and do
not perform ritualistic burials of their dead. If understanding death and burying the dead are evidence of selfawareness, and if no animal understands death or buries its dead, then no animal is self-aware!
The scientist who literally “wrote the book” on animal con
sciousness, Donald R. Griffin, published the first edition of
his now-famous work, Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Con
sciousness, in 1992, and the second edition in 2001. In that sec
ond edition, he offered the following assessment of animal
consciousness.
Can scientific investigation of animal mentality tell us
whether animals are conscious? The short answer is
“not yet,” because it is very difficult to gather convinc
ing evidence about whatever conscious experiences
may occur in animals…. Have scientists proved con
clusively that animals are never conscious, perhaps by
means of evidence so complex and technical (like quan
tum mechanics) that ordinary people cannot under
stand it? No, almost all biologists and psychologists
who study animal behavior avoid any such sweeping
claim, and they often grant that some animals are prob
ably conscious at times. But they hasten to argue that
there is no way to tell whether they are or not, and
that for this reason the subject cannot be investigated
scientifically.… Although the available evidence
does not prove conclusively that any particular
animal is conscious, it is quite sufficient to open our
eyes to an appreciative view of animals in which we
attempt to understand what life is like for them….
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It is important to distinguish between perceptual and
reflective consciousness. The former, called “primary
consciousness,” includes all sorts of awareness, where
as the latter is a subject of conscious experiences in
which the content is conscious experience itself. Re
flective consciousness is thinking, or experiencing feel
ings, about thoughts or feelings themselves, and it is
often held to include self-awareness and to be
limited to our species…. Many behavioral scientists
…believe that it is likely that animals may sometimes
experience perceptual consciousness but that reflec
tive consciousness is a unique human attribute….
[R]eflective consciousness…is a form of introspection, thinking about one’s thoughts, but with
the addition of being able to think about the
thoughts of others….
[T]here are in fact several kinds of evidence bearing
on the question of animal consciousness…. One type
of evidence is especially relevant, and yet it has been
almost completely neglected by scientists. This is an
imal communication. To appreciate its relevance, we
need only ask ourselves how we judge whether
our human companions are aware of anything or
what the content of their conscious experiences
may be. Our chief source of evidence comes from
human communication….
Because we know far too little to judge with any con
fidence when animals are or are not conscious, the ques
tion of animal consciousness is an open one, awaiting
adequate scientific illumination. There is of course no
reason to suppose that other animals are capable of the
enormous variety of thinking that our species has de
veloped, largely through the use of our magnificent language—especially written language, which allows the
dissemination and preservation of knowledge far be
yond what can be achieved by direct communication
and individual memories. The principal difference
between human and animal consciousness is probably in their content (pp. x,xi,7,8,15, italics and par
enthetical item in orig., emp. added).
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“The question of animal consciousness,” says Dr. Griffin, is an
“open one.” Admittedly, “reflective consciousness” (which in
cludes, among other things, self-awareness, the process of in
trospection, and the ability to invent symbolic language—all es
sential, definitive traits of human consciousness) has eluded
every member of the animal kingdom. But, Griffin opined,
“the principal difference between human and animal conscious
ness is probably in their content.”
That last statement must surely rank as one of the greatest
understatements of all times. “Other than your husband’s as
sassination, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?” “Ex
cept for the difference in their content, what’s the difference
in human and animal consciousness?” Does anyone besides
us see something terribly wrong here? As Tattersall put it:
But comfortable as monkeys may become with mir
rors and their properties, it has also been shown that
they cannot identify their own reflection in a mirror.
...What do we make of all this? First, it is evident that
there is a qualitative difference among the perceptions of self exhibited by monkeys, apes, and
human beings (2002, p. 65, emp. added).
Key in on Tattersall’s reference to monkeys and mirrors,
and allow us to explain the significance of such a concept. For
more than thirty years, researchers have tried to figure out a
way to test—objectively—whether any given animal is “self
aware.” In The Origin of Humankind, paleoanthropologist Rich
ard Leakey concluded: “An experience as private as conscious
ness is frustratingly beyond the usual tools of the experimen
tal psychologist. This may be one reason that many research
ers have shied away from the notion of mind and conscious
ness in nonhuman animals” (1994, pp. 149-150). Or, as Grif
fin noted: “Both reflective consciousness and self-awareness
are often held to be uniquely human attributes.” Then, in
speaking of animals, he asked: “What sorts of evidence might
indicate whether or not they think about their own thoughts?”
(2001, p. 277).
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Good question. What “sorts
of evidence” could lead scien
tists and philosophers to con
clude that at least some animals
possess self-awareness? There
have been a number of sugges
tions offered, such as mind-reading (i.e., the ability to compre
hend what another animal has
in mind to do in order to alter
behavior), divided attention (an
ability to concentrate on more
than one thing at a time), de
layed response (acting later, as
if on the “memory” of some
thing), self-recognition (the abil
ity of an animal to recognize
itself, as opposed to other an
imals of its kind), etc.
But it has been self-recogThere is no evidence that annition, for the most part, that
imals understand death.
has captured the attention of
various researchers. In the late 1960s, one of those research
ers was Gordon G. Gallup, a psychologist at the State Univer
sity of New York, Albany. Dr. Gallup devised a test intended
to determine an animal’s “sense of self ”—the mirror test. His
idea was that if an animal were able to recognize its own re
flection in a mirror as “itself,” then it could be duly said to pos
sess an awareness of itself, i.e., consciousness. Gallup’s report
of the experiment was published in a 1970 article in Science
(see Gallup, 1970). It has been called “a milestone in our un
derstanding of animal minds” (Leakey, 1994, p. 150). Here is
how the test was carried out.
An animal (such as a chimpanzee, an orangutan, or a go
rilla) is left in a room to become familiarized with a mirror.
After a period time, the animal is gently anesthetized. While
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it is asleep, a dot is painted on its forehead with paint. The an
imal then is allowed to wake. After the animal has fully recov
ered, the mirror is brought back. As Merlin Donald observed
in A Mind So Rare:
Most animals will take no notice of the dot and con
tinue to treat the image in the mirror as if it were an
other animal. But certain ape subjects instantly rec
ognize themselves in the mirror and touch their fore
heads as if they knew that (a) the forehead in question
was their own and (b) they didn’t normally have a dot
on it. Monkeys and other mammals do not behave
this way. They do not see themselves in the mirror im
age (2001, p. 141).
In speaking of some of those “ape subjects” (chimpanzees and
orangutans), Ian Tattersall remarked:
Their immediate reaction was to use the mirror as an
aid in picking the paint off their faces. Clearly they had
recognized themselves, and they were soon pulling
faces and exploring their persons using the unfamil
iar opportunity. Interestingly, several gorillas tested
did not seem to recognize themselves, although one,
the famous Koko, a sign language star, definitely does
recognize her own reflection (2002, pp. 63-64).
Mirror self-recognition has been extensively studied and dis
cussed since the Gallup experiment, as reviewed in the book,
Self-awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspec
tives, edited by Parker, Mitchell, and Boccia (1994). What, then,
should we make of all this? Or perhaps a more appropriate
question is: What have researchers made of all this? First, as
Leakey admitted, “…psychologists wondered how widespread
self-recognition would prove to be. Not very, is the answer.
Orangutans passed the mirror test, but, surprisingly, gorillas
did not” (p. 150). Harvard’s Griffin admitted:
It is difficult to be certain whether the failure of most
animals to recognize mirror images as representations
of their own bodies demonstrates that they are inca
pable of self-awareness, as Gallup claims, or whether
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they fail for some other reason to correlate the appear
ance and movements of the mirror image with those
of their own bodies (pp. 275-276).
Yet, while Griffin acknowledged that when the mirror-test re
sults are in, it still is “difficult to be certain” about whether an
imals who pass the test are self-aware, he nevertheless went
on to say: “On balance, it seems most likely that mirror selfrecognition as indicated by the Gallup-type experiment does
strongly indicate self-awareness” (p. 276). Donald commented:
“A loose hierarchy emerges from these considerations. Bits
and pieces of conscious capacity appear in different species.
Even perception, short-term memory, flexibility of mind, and
mindreading skill might be stronger in one species and weaker
in another.” However, humans, he concluded, “have more of
everything. We might be called superconscious. But other
species have many component features of our conscious ca
pacity” (p. 130). But are those “component features” enough
to justify animals being thought of as possessing conscious
ness?
Conceding the obvious—that some of the experimental sub
jects did appear to recognize themselves in the mirror—Tattersall inquired:
[T]he fact that most apes recognize their own reflec
tions in mirrors surely is significant at some level, es
pecially when we realize that monkeys do not…. So
far so good, perhaps; but does the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror convincingly demonstrate that one has a concept of self? This is a tough
issue, but most cognitive scientists would, I think, argue
that without such a concept individuals would lack any
means of interpreting the reflected image, and would
thus be unable to recognize themselves. Nonetheless,
even if we accept this, where does it leave us? It
seems equally likely that recognizing one’s reflection
is only a part—maybe even, just one small consequence
—of what we human beings are familiar with as the
concept of self (2002, pp. 63-64, italics in orig., emp.
added).
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Dr. Tattersall has raised several important points. First, does
the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror “convincingly dem
onstrate that one has a concept of self?” Second, if we answer
yes to such a question “where does that leave us?” And third,
is it possible that “recognizing one’s reflection is ‘only a part’
—maybe even just one small consequences—of what we hu
man beings are familiar with as the concept of self”?
In an assessment that we will use again later in our section
on the theory of consciousness known as “functionalism,”
Robert Wesson observed:
Self-awareness is a special quality of the mind. A com
puter may be able to analyze difficult problems, but we
do not suppose that it is self-aware, that is, has a mind.
Self-awareness is different from information processing; even when confused and unable to think clear
ly, one may be vividly aware of one’s self and one’s con
fusion. The essence of mind is less data processing
than will, intention, imagination, discovery, and
feeling (1997, p. 277, emp. added).
Dr. Wesson is correct. Self-awareness is different from mere
information processing. The chimpanzee or orangutan with
a spot of paint on its forehead may be able to process the in
formation that tells the animal it has a spot of paint on its fore
head. But does that mean the chimpanzee or orangutan pos
sesses intention, imagination, discovery, feeling, and all the oth
er things that we normally associate with consciousness and/
or self-awareness? Hardly. Listen to Dennett’s assessment.
We human beings do many intelligent things unthink
ingly. We brush our teeth, tie our shoes, drive our cars,
and even answers questions without thinking. But
most of these activities of ours are different, for
we can think about them in ways that other creatures can’t think about their unthinking but intelligent activities….
Please imagine, in some detail, a man in a white lab
coat climbing hand over hand up a rope while hold
ing a red plastic bucket in his teeth. An easy mental
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task for you. Could a chimpanzee perform the same
task? I wonder. I chose the elements—man, rope,
climbing, bucket, teeth—as familiar objects in the per
ceptual and behavioral word of a laboratory chimp.
I’m sure that such a chimp can not only perceive such
things but see them as a man, a rope, a bucket, and so
forth. In some minimal sense, then, I grant that the
chimp has a concept of a man, a rope, a bucket (but
does not have concepts, presumably, of a lobster, or
a limerick, or a lawyer). My question is: What can a
chimp do with its concepts? … Can a chimp call to
mind the elements of a solution when these elements
are not present to provide the chimp with visible re
minders of themselves?…
What makes a mind powerful—indeed, what
makes a mind conscious—is not what it is made of
it, or how big it is, but what it can do. Can it concen
trate? Can it be distracted? Can it recall earlier events?
Can it keep track of several different things at once?
Which features of its own current activities can it no
tice or monitor?…
[T]he dog cannot consider its concept. It cannot ask
itself whether it knows what cats are; it cannot won
der whether cats are animals; it cannot attempt to dis
tinguish the essence of cat (by its lights) from the mere
accidents. Concepts are not things in the dog’s world
in the way that cats are. Concepts are things in our
world… (1996, pp. 154-155,156-157,158,159, italics
What sets human consciousness apart from animals, with
their “bits and pieces” or “component features of conscious
capacity” is, as Dennett correctly observed, what the human mind can do! Earlier, we quoted O’Hear, who assessed
the situation quite succinctly when he commented that a “self
conscious person”
does not simply have beliefs or dispositions, does not
simply engage in practices of various sorts, does not
just respond to or suffer the world. He or she is aware
that he or she has beliefs, practices, dispositions, and
the rest. It is this awareness of myself as a subject of
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Only humans carry out elaborate rituals for their dead—an indication that they, unlike animals, are self-aware.
experience, as a holder of beliefs, and an engager in
practices which constitutes my self-consciousness. A
conscious animal might be a knower…but only
a self-conscious being knows that he is a knower
(1997, p. 24, emp. added).
When Griffin asked, “Can scientific investigation of an
imal mentality tell us whether animals are conscious?,” and
answered, “not yet” (2001, p. x), he fairly well summed up
most researchers’ opinion of the matter. While he personally
believes that “the weight of the evidence” suggests that many
animal species do possess “perceptual consciousness,” he nev
ertheless was willing to admit: “But it remains an open ques
tion” (p. 277). And it is safe to say that “the researchers” are
badly split on whether or not even “advanced mammals” (like,
for example, chimpanzees and orangutans) can justifiably be
said to possess self-awareness. For example, three contribu
tors to a 1997 symposium volume (Animal Consciousness and
Animal Ethics) argued that many animals do have conscious
experiences of some sort. But just as many (or more) other
contributors disagreed (see Dol, et al., 1997).
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In the book he wrote that contained lengthy interviews
with a variety of scientists and philosophers on consciousness (Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos), Roger Lewin asked
Tufts University philosopher Daniel Dennett (the author of
Consciousness Explained): “So you’re denying this kind of con
sciousness to all animals but humans?” Dr. Dennett responded:
“I am.” Lewin then remarked: “No animal without language
experiences a sense of self, argued Dan, not in the way that
humans experience self” (Lewin, 1992, p. 157). We concur, and,
except for his reference to humans being animals, we agree
with Edelman, who wrote: “While we may not be the only
conscious animals, we are, with the possible exception of the
chimpanzee, the only self-conscious animals” (1992, p. 115).
But why is all of this so? W.H. Thorpe was constrained to
say: “I find it very difficult to imagine a highly organized con
sciousness which could be of real use to the animal in its ev
eryday life without a fairly elaborate mechanism behind
it” (1965, p. 498, emp. added). Our point exactly. Now, whence
came that mechanism?
THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
We suspect that it hardly will come as any great shock for
us to observe that, “somehow,” brains, minds, and conscious
ness are viewed as “going together.” Brains are “mysteriously”
linked to minds. Ehrlich commented: “[W]hen we think of
brains, we ordinarily think of minds, just as when people think
of legs they think of walking and running…” (2000, p. 109).
True enough. And, as philosopher Colin McGinn (quoted
earlier) opined: “There just has to be some explanation for
how brains [interact with] minds” (1993, p. 6, emp. in orig.).
But minds, just as “mysteriously,” are linked to conscious
ness. When we think of minds, we also think of conscious
ness, a fact that physicist Freeman Dyson of Princeton’s Insti
tute for Advanced Study discussed in his semi-autobiographical
book, Disturbing the Universe.
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It is remarkable that mind enters into our awareness of nature on two separate levels. At the high
est level, the level of human consciousness, our minds
are somehow directly aware of the complicated flow
of electrical and chemical patterns in our brains. At
the lowest level, the level of single atoms and elec
trons, the mind of an observer is again involved in
the description of events…. But I, as a physicist, can
not help suspecting that there is a logical connection
between the two ways in which mind appears in my
universe. I cannot help thinking that our awareness
of our own brains has something to do with the pro
cess which we call “observation” in atomic physics.
That is to say, I think our consciousness is not just
a passive epiphenomenon carried along by the
chemical events in our brains, but is an active
agent forcing the molecular complexes to make
choices between one quantum state and another. In
other words, mind is already inherent in every elec
tron, and the processes of human consciousness dif
fer only in degree but not in kind from the processes
of choice between quantum states which we call
“chance” when they are made by electrons (1979, p.
249, emp. added).
The undeniable fact that brains are linked to minds, and
that minds are linked to consciousness, has produced a true
conundrum for evolutionists. As science writer James Trefil
asked: “How can we go from a purely physical-chemical sys
tem such as the brain to something nonphysical such as our
mental experience? What, in other words, is the connection
between the firing of neuron 1,472,999,321 and my experience of seeing blue?” (1997, p. 180, emp. in orig.). In an “in
vited review” on the subject of consciousness that he was asked
to write for the journal, Brain, Zeman commented on what he
referred to as “the current fascination with consciousness,”
and suggested that it “reflects the mounting intellectual pres
sure to explain how ‘vital activity’ in the brain generates a
‘mental element’ with rich subjective content” (2001, 124:
1284).
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There is indeed “mounting intellectual pressure” to ex
plain the brain’s “vital activity,” which somehow generates
the “mental element” we know as consciousness. After all,
consciousness, we are assured, is “our most precious posses
sion.” Surely, that alone would serve to justify a serious and
sustained investigation into the “rich subjective content” of
human self-awareness.
MATERIALISM, SUPERNATURALISM,
AND THE BRAIN/MIND CONNECTION
Truth be told, however, from an evolutionary perspective,
the investigation is extremely self-delimiting. After all, evo
lution, by definition, is a naturalistic process. George Gaylord
Simpson once noted: “Evolution is a fully natural process,
inherent in the physical properties of the universe, by which
life arose in the first place and by which all living things, past
or present, have since developed, divergently and progres
sively” (1960, 131:969, emp. added). If evolution is accepted
as the correct explanation of human origins, and if evolution
is a “fully natural process,” then whatever exists must be the
result of purely naturalistic processes. In short, to paraphrase
McGinn, “there just has to be” some naturalistic explana
tion for how the brain produces the mind, and for how the
mind, in turn, produces consciousness. As Christopher Wills
wrote in his volume, Children of Prometheus: “[T]he human
brain is the most remarkable product of evolution to be found
among the Earth’s living organisms” (1998, pp. 228-229).
Ehrlich similarly concluded: “Evolution is the key to the mind”
(p. 109)
As you might expect, whatever the evolutionary explana
tion turns out to be for how the brain gave rise to the mind,
and how the mind then gave rise to consciousness, material
causes ultimately were responsible; nothing supernatural was involved! As Heinberg noted:
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But if the existence of purpose in organisms is prob
lematic for the purely mechanistic explanation of life
—and for the more general philosophy of materialism,
which holds that all observable phenomena are ex
plainable as the results of material causes—consciousness is doubly so…. Understandably, reductionist
and materialist science—which is at war with theistic philosophies and features a non-physical
God at the center of cosmos and creation—has
therefore sought to find purely physical, chemical explanations for consciousness in humans
and other creatures (1999, p. 68, italics in orig., emp.
added).
It should not surprise us, then, to see evolutionist Andrew
Brown, writing in The Darwin Wars, state: “All working biolo
gists agree that intelligence, curiosity, free will and so on are
produced by the normal, law-bound mechanical processes
of the world” (1999, p. 154). James Trefil observed in 101 Things
You Don’t Know about Science and No One Else Does Either: “Let
me define materialism as the belief that the brain is a physical
system governed by knowable laws of nature, and that every
phenomenon (including mental phenomena) can ultimately be explained in this way” (1997, pp. 187-188, par
enthetical item in orig., emp. added). Elbert remarked in Are
Souls Real?:
The brain is all that is needed for consciousness….
Modern knowledge of the brain and consciousness
supports the idea that consciousness results from
the operation of the central nervous system, especially the brain. Nothing else seems to be needed
to generate consciousness…. In my opinion, there is
no good reason to believe that the mind needs a
supernatural explanation (2000, pp. 222,249,
255, emp. in orig.).
Donald Griffin (of animal-consciousness fame) was equally
blunt in his assessment.
I will take it for granted that behavior and conscious
ness (human and nonhuman) result entirely from
events that occur in their central nervous systems. In
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other words, I will proceed on the basis of emergent materialism, and assume that subjective con
sciousness is an activity of central nervous systems,
which are of course part of the physical universe. Just
what sort of neural activity leads to consciousness re
mains a challenging mystery,…but there is no need
to call upon immaterial, vitalistic, or supernatural processes to explain how some fraction of
human or animal brain activity results in conscious, subjective thoughts and feelings (2001, p.
5, parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
Neurophysiologist and Nobel laureate Ragnar Granit, in an
article on “Reflections on the Evolution of the Mind and En
vironment,” admitted: “Like so many other biologists, I think
of mind or conscious awareness as an emergent property in
the evolution of life. This implies that it exists in nuce [necessarily—BH/BT] in properties of matter, just as does the insulin
molecule or the double helix containing DNA” (1982, p. 97).
Richard Gregory, in his discussion on “Consciousness” in
The Encyclopaedia of Ignorance, suggested that when it comes to
the appeal to the supernatural, “there is no such evidence between brains, and no evidence within brains, for non-physical causes” (1977, p. 277, emp. in orig.). Francis Crick, in The
Astonishing Hypothesis, provided what may well be the most
complete and well-thought-out statement of the scientific ma
terialists’ view of the human brain ever to be put into print.
You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and
your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and
free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a
vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated mol
ecules. As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased
it: “You are nothing but a packet of neurons” (1994,
p. 3).
Or, as Robert Wesson put it in Beyond Natural Selection: “The
mind is no more independent of the body than living crea
tures are independent of their physiology” (1997, p. 277). E.O.
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Wilson intoned: “Virtually all contemporary scientists and phi
losophers expert on the subject agree that the mind, which
comprises consciousness and rational process, is the brain at
work” (1998, p. 98).
THE CONCEPT OF MIND
Evolutionists speak effusively of an individual cell as con
taining “previously unimagined complexity and dynamism”
(Koch, 1997, 385:207), and the brain (which is composed of
between 10 and 100 billion cells!) as being “the most devel
oped and complex system known to science” (Davies, 1992,
14[5]:4). Whence has come the “amazing complexity” that
careens through the human body—from the individual cells
to the master organ, the brain? And what part does it play in
regard to the human mind and human consciousness?
On the one hand, evolutionists freely admit that, even at
the cellular level, there is an “unimagined complexity and
dynamism.” Yet on the other hand, they expect us to believe
that, ultimately, this has resulted from a disorganized bunch
of macromolecules fortuitously coming together in a “just-so”
fashion to produce not only the cell’s (and the organism’s) in
credible intricacy, but also the human mind and its accompa
nying self-awareness. In fact, Daniel Dennett addressed this
very point in Kinds of Minds. Speaking specifically about humanity’s rise from macromolecules to cells to complete or
ganisms that possess both minds and consciousness, he wrote:
These impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scraps of molecular machinery are the
ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the world. It is
rare for such a solid and uncontroversial scientific fact
to have such potent implications for structuring all sub
sequent debate about something as controversial and
mysterious as minds, so let’s pause to remind ourselves
of these implications.
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There is no longer any serious informed doubt
about this: we are the direct descendants of these
self-replicating robots. We are mammals, and all
mammals have descended from reptilian ancestors
whose ancestors were fish whose ancestors were ma
rine creatures rather like worms, who descended in
turn from simpler multicelled creatures several hun
dred million years ago, who descended from singlecelled creatures who descended from self-replicating macromolecules, about three billion years ago.
There is just one family tree, on which all living things
that have ever lived on this planet can be found—not
just animals, but plants and algae and bacteria as well.
You share a common ancestor with every chimpan
zee, every worm, every blade of grass, every redwood
tree. Among our progenitors, then, were macromolecules.
To some people, all this seems shocking and unlikely,
I realize, but I suspect that they haven’t noticed how
desperate the alternatives are (1996, pp. 22-23, emp.
added)
The “alternatives” mentioned by Dennett are any concepts
which suggest that something other than strict materialism
may be at work (concepts that he, as a self-professed atheistic
evolutionist, absolutely abhors). “So,” said Dennett, “let’s see
what story can be told with the conservative resources of sci
ence. Maybe the idea that our minds evolved from simpler minds is not so bad after all” (p. 24, emp. added).
Notice the progression allegedly involved in all of this.
Macromolecules evolved into single-celled creatures, which
evolved into multi-celled creatures, which eventually evolved
into creatures with “simpler minds,” which then evolved into
—humans. And at the conclusion of that laborious and timeconsuming process, how did the human mind turn out? Ap
parently, not very well, as Robert Ornstein forthrightly con
cluded:
The mind is a squadron of simpletons. It is not
unified, it is not rational, it is not well designed—or
designed at all. It just happened, an accumulation
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of innovations of the organisms that lived before us.
The mind evolved, through countless animals and
through countless worlds. Our mind did not spring
from a designer, nor from a set of ideal and idealized
programs…. Like the rest of biological evolution, the
human mind is a collage of adaptations (the propen
sity to do the right thing) to different situations. Our
thought is a pack of fixed routines—simpletons. We
need them…. The mind is the way it is because the
world is the way it is. The evolved systems organize the
mind to mesh with the world.
This complicated internal system should have fore
warned us that the mind isn’t designed to be under
stood as we might a software routine. It is, basically,
just another organ to help a person operate in the
world, to stay out of trouble, to eat, sleep, and repro
duce. So why should human beings ever have
evolved the ability to know what their mental system is doing, any more than we know what our
pancreas is doing? We have not done so. Our natural view of our mental state is deeply distorted
(1991, pp. 2,4,7,11, parenthetical item in orig., emp.
added).
Now, let’s see if we understand all of this correctly? Non
living macromolecules gave rise to living cells, which then
gave rise to organisms with “simpler minds,” which then
evolved into humans with minds that are “not unified, not ra
tional, and not well designed,” but instead are composed of
“a squadron of simpletons.” Admittedly, there is a “compli
cated internal system” with a “previously unimagined com
plexity and dynamism” that permits humans (and humans
alone!) to possess self-awareness, use symbolic language, and
be aware of the fact that they one day will die. But, in the end,
the human mind “did not spring from a designer,” and is “ba
sically, just another organ.”
The real truth of the matter is, while evolutionists fall all
over themselves to avoid any possible hint that the human
mind may have a supernatural origin (what Dennett referred
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to as a “desperate alternative”), they nevertheless cannot of
fer an adequate explanation for the concept of mind, or how
it could have arisen from “chemical and electrical signals that
give rise to such complex effects as cognition and conscious
ness.” Renowned physiologist Sir Charles Sherrington re
marked in his book, Man on His Nature: “A radical distinction
has therefore arisen between life and mind. The former is an
affair of chemistry and physics; the latter escapes chemistry
and physics” (1975, p. 230). Max Delbrück, the father of mo
lecular genetics and a Nobel laureate, found even more deeply
puzzling the matter of how human rationality could have
evolved out of “natural” occurrences. He wrote:
Why, then, do the formal operations of the mind carry
us so much further? Were those abilities not also mat
ters of biological evolution? If they, too, evolved to let
us get along in the cave, how can it be that they per
mit us to obtain deep insights into cosmology, elemen
tary particles, molecular genetics, number theory? To
this question I have no answer (1978, 47:353; cf. also
Delbrück, 1986, p. 280).
E.O. Wilson noted in his book, Consilience: “But even as mindbody dualism is being completely abandoned at long last, in
the 1990s, scientists remain unsure about the precise basis of mind” (1998, p. 99, emp. added). Nobel laureate Roger
Sperry commented in a similar vein:
One can agree that the scientific evidence speaks
against any preplanned purposive design of a super
natural intelligence. At the same time the evidence
shows that the great bulk of the evolving web of
creation is governed by a complex pattern of
great intricacy with many mutually reinforcing di
rective, purposive constraints at higher levels, par
ticularly. The “grand orderly design” is, in a sense,
all the more remarkable for having been self-developed.
The point is that human nature and these higher
kinds of controls in nature don’t reduce any more
to physical and chemical mechanisms, but have to
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be reckoned with now in their own form, in their
own right. Vital, mental, social and other higher
forces, once evolved, become just as real as the evolved
forces of molecules and atoms and must be given
their due, over and above the elementary physical components (as quoted in Cousins, 1985, pp. 8586,87, emp. added).
In an interview (“You Have to be Obsessive”) in the Febru
ary 17, 2003 issue of Time magazine, the cover-story article of
which was intended to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of
James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of the structure
of DNA, Dr. Watson commented:
We have more frontiers [in biology—BH/BT] now than
when I was getting started. How the mind works,
for example, is still a mystery. We understand the
hardware, but we don’t have a clue about the operat
ing system. There are enough questions to keep peo
ple occupied for the next hundred years (161[7]:52,
emp. added).
Writing on the subject, “What is Mind?,” in the on-line
journal, Brain & Mind (for which she serves as editor), Silvia
Cardoso asked:
But...what about the mind?… [A] few neuroscien
tists, such as the Nobel Prize recipient Sir John Eccles,
asserted that the mind is distinct from the body. But
most of them now believe that all aspects of mind,
which are often equated with consciousness, are likely
to be explained in a more materialistic way as the be
havior of neuronal cells. In the opinion of the famous
neurophysiologist José Maria Delgado [1969, p. 30]:
“It is preferable to consider the mind as a functional
entity devoid of metaphysical or religious implica
tions per se and related only to the existence of a brain
and to the reception of sensory inputs” (1997/1998).
Yet Cardoso admitted:
Mind is a definition which tries to rescue the essence
of man. The essence of a person arises from the
existence of mental functions which permit him
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or her to think and to perceive, to love and to hate, to
learn and to remember, to solve problems, to com
municate through speech and writing, to create and
to destroy civilizations. These expressions are closely
related with brain functioning. Therefore, without
the brain, the mind cannot exist, without the behav
ioral manifestation, the mind cannot be expressed
(1997/1998, emp. added).
Daniel Dennett, in Kinds of Minds, wrote:
A naked human mind—without paper and pencil,
without speaking, comparing notes, making sketches
—is first of all something we have never seen. Every
human mind you’ve ever looked at—including most
especially your own, which you look at “from the inside”—is a product not just of natural selection but of
cultural redesign of enormous proportions. It’s easy
enough to see why a mind seems miraculous, when
one has no sense of all the components and how
they got made (1996, pp. 153-154, emp. added).
Trefil asked:
The mind is…well, what is it, exactly? Formal defini
tions usually mention something like “the sum of men
tal activities,” but that doesn’t tell us very much. On the
other hand, we all have had the experience of mind.
Close your eyes and think of an episode from your
childhood. You probably can conjure up a fairly de
tailed visual image of some setting, maybe even some
sounds and smells. You have these images “in mind,”
but where, exactly, are they? They obviously don’t
correspond to any sensory input into your brain right
now, even though they must involve the firing of neu
rons somewhere… (1996, pp. 217218, first ellipsis in
orig., emp. added).
But can “mind” be reduced simply to “the firing of neu
rons”? In addressing this very issue, E.O. Wilson wrote:
I have spoken so far about the physical processes that
produce the mind. Now, to come to the heart of the
matter, what is the mind? Brain scientists understand
ably dance around this question. Wisely, they rarely
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commit themselves to a single declarative definition.
Most believe that the fundamental properties of the
elements responsible for mind—neurons, neurotrans
mitters, and hormones—are reasonably well known.
What is lacking is a sufficient grasp of the emergent, holistic properties of the neuron circuits,
and of cognition, the way the circuits process information to create perception and knowledge….
Who or what within the brain monitors all this activ
ity? No one. Nothing. The scenarios are not seen by
some other part of the brain. They just are…. Con
sciousness is the massive coupled aggregates of such
participating circuits. The mind is a self-organizing
republic of scenarios that individually germinate,
grow, evolve, disappear, and occasionally linger to
spawn additional thought and physical activity (1998,
pp. 109,110, italics in orig., emp. added).
The last part of Dr. Wilson’s quote is another terrific example
of a “just-so” story. But notice what he admits is “lacking” in
regard to explaining mind and/or consciousness—a sufficient
grasp of the emergent, holistic properties of the neuron cir
cuits, and of cognition, the way the circuits process informa
tion to create perception and knowledge. Physicist Erwin
Schrödinger correctly pointed out, in fact:
Not every nervous process, nay by no means every cerebral process, is accompanied by consciousness. Many of them are not, even though phys
iologically and biologically they are very much like
the “conscious” ones, both in frequently consisting of
afferent impulses [conveying nerve impulses to the
central nervous system—BH/BT] followed by efferent
ones [conveying nerve impulses away from the cen
tral nervous system—BH/BT]… (1967, p. 101, emp. ad
ded).
In an article he authored on “Brain, Mind and Behavior,”
Malcolm Jeeves recognized what he called the “take-home
message” in regard to the brain-mind problem.
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Nevertheless, the same take-home message emerged
from all of these studies, whether human or animal,
namely, the remarkable localization of function in the
brain and the specificity of the neural substrate under
lying mental events. As each advance occurred, mind
and brain were seen to be ever more tightly linked
together (1998, p. 81, emp. added).
Evidence of the fact that the “mind and brain” are, in fact,
“tightly linked together” came to the forefront between May
1973 and February 1974 when three teams of American as
tronauts participated in prolonged orbital flights known as
the Skylab Program. During this exercise, astronauts spent
84 days in space—longer than ever previously attempted. The
flights were designed to enable ground-based specialists to
monitor the health of people in space. One of NASA’s princi
pal discoveries was that, on the day the astronauts were due to
return to Earth (and thus, admittedly, a day that they would
have been under a great deal of stress), the astronauts’ im
mune systems were visibly affected. Important processes in
the immune system (such as white-cell transformation) were
abnormally depressed. Remember: the astronauts’ environ
ment had not changed. The “matter” that surrounded them
had not changed. Yet their mental states had changed dra
matically. This provided additional evidence which docu
mented that the mind could have a physical effect on the body.
But how can the mind do that if it is merely a brain made up of
neuronal circuits?
Brain researcher and Nobel laureate Roger Sperry spent
his entire adult career trying to get “a sufficient grasp” of the
“brain/mind problem.” It was from that perspective that he
admitted:
I have not been inclined to look particularly at the lit
tle molecules of the brain or even at its big macro-molecules in this connection. It has always seemed
rather improbable that even a whole brain cell
has what it takes to sense, to perceive, to feel or
to think on its own (1977, p. 424, emp. added).
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Roger Lewin of Harvard spoke to this when he said:
The magic of it all is that while no single neuron
is conscious, the human brain as a whole is….
How does it do it? How are simple electrical signals
across individual cell membranes transformed into
cascades of cognition? How are billions of individual
neurons assembled into a brain, seat of the mind?
(1992, p. 163, emp. added).
One of the overriding questions in regard to the so-called
brain/mind problem, as Dr. Lewin noted, is how a single cell
(i.e., a neuron) that is not conscious somehow becomes
conscious. As Dennett put it:
Each cell—a tiny agent that can perform a limited num
ber of tasks—is about as mindless as a virus. Can it be
that enough of these dumb homunculi—little men—are
put together the result will be a real, conscious person,
with a genuine mind? According to modern science,
there is no other way of making a real person (1996, p.
23).
Is human consciousness held within single neurons?
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He is absolutely right. According to modern science, “mind”
does not, and cannot, arise out of the “mindlessness” of “just”
brain cells. Gordon Rattray Taylor, in The Natural History of
the Mind, presented and discussed the medical evidence con
cerning consciousness, and concluded: “Consciousness thus
cannot be a property of neurones as such” (1979, p. 75,
emp. added; “neurones” is the British spelling for neurons).
Susan Greenfield, writing in 2002 on “Mind, Brain and Con
sciousness” for the British Journal of Psychiatry, concluded:
Within each macro brain region there is no single isolated complete function…. So brain regions
are bit players on the brain stage, and not autonomous
units…. We can no more attribute autonomous func
tions to the most basic level of brain function—genes
—than we can to the most macro—the brain regions.
In both cases there is very little room for manoeuvre
and therefore it is hard to see how personalisation
of the brain—the mind—might develop (181:91,
emp. added).
[As odd as it may sound, some researchers, in order to avoid
the problem of how the mind could develop consciousness,
have opted for exactly the opposite—that consciousness de
veloped the mind! In his book, Enchanted Looms: Conscious
Networks in Brains and Computers, Rodney Cotterill boldly sug
gested: “I believe…that it is the mind that is the product
of consciousness. I believe, moreover, that it is the sheer
abundance of experience mediated by consciousness that fools
us into misunderstanding the nature of this fundamental at
tribute” (1998, p. 10, emp. added).]
While we were carrying out the research for this book, we
stumbled across one of the most concise, yet profound, dis
cussions on these points that we have ever seen. Although it
was penned eight decades ago, it appears as fresh and current
as if it had been written yesterday. In his 1923 book, Life: Its
Origin and Nature, Hereward Carrington made the following
observations.
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There can be no doubt that the majority of the bodily
activities can be accounted for on purely physical and
chemical lines, and there are many scientists today
who contend that every activity of the body can thus
be accounted for. The body and its activities are re
garded as a physico-chemical mechanism. On this
view, the activities of the mind and consciousness are
the production of brain-action, in the same way that
other activities of the body result from their function
ing of certain specific organs and their activities. This
is the materialistic conception.
Certainly, the matter of the brain cannot in itself
“think.” There is no more reason why a certain
specific nervous structure should give rise to active consciousness, than that any other complex
living material should do so. The question is: Does
consciousness somehow arise from the flow of the ner
vous currents within the brain? Materialistic science
says that the activities of the mind are somehow syn
onymous with these nervous currents. Yet there are
other nervous currents traveling about all over the
body, which do not give rise to self-consciousness.
Why is it that they should do so in the special organ
of thought, known as the brain?
[Thomas Henry] Huxley attempted to account for
consciousness by assuming that it somehow followed
along with, or resulted from, certain specific brain
activities, and that, just as the shadow of a horse ac
companies the horse, so thoughts and mental activi
ties of all kinds accompany the nervous currents,
which play to-and-fro in the higher centers of the ce
rebral cortex. He coined the term “epiphenomenon”
to express or signify this by-product, so to say, of brain
activity. The difficulty with this theory is that, for
us, the important thing is the shadow and not
the horse! And it is also difficult to explain why
such a mere by-product should ever have come
into being in the process of evolution. Furthermore the specific character of the relationship
between these two (mind and brain) is not in the
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least explained by this formula. It merely states
the facts. The primary question still remains: How
can a particular thought (apparently a non-material thing) and a particular brain-change (a material thing) be related one to another? (pp. 45,
49-50, italics and parenthetical items in orig., emp.
and bracketed item added).
Talk about “cutting to the chase” (and eighty years ago at that!).
Carrington was right to ask: “How can a particular thought
(apparently a non-material thing) and a particular brainchange (a material thing) be related one to another?” Should
the fact that eighty years have passed, and neuroscience still
cannot answer these types of questions, tell us something?
Is it possible that the problem lies with evolutionary the
ory? We are convinced that it does. If one begins with the
wrong assumption, one inevitably will reach the wrong con
clusion. The eminent biologist Paul Weiss elucidated this prin
ciple, from the standpoint of attempting to understand living
organisms, when he wrote:
Maybe our concept of our nervous system is equally
inadequate and insufficient, because so long as you
use only electrical instruments, you get only electrical
answers; if you use chemical detectors, you get chemi
cal answers; and if you determine numerical and ge
ometrical values, you get numerical and geometrical
answers. So perhaps we have not yet found the
particular kind of instrument that tells us the next
unknown (as quoted in Smythies, 1969, p. 252, emp.
added; NOTE: Weiss’ comment is included in a dis
cussion of a paper by J.R. Smythies, “Some Aspects
of Consciousness,” in Beyond Reductionism, edited by
Arthur Koestler and J.R. Smythies).
After reading Dr. Weiss’ assessment, Arthur C. Custance com
mented in his book, The Mysterious Matter of Mind: “Obviously,
we shall not even try to invent this particular kind of instru
ment of research so long as we accept the monistic view of mind
as really only the outworking of brain…” (1980, p. 23, emp. in
orig.). “Modern science” begins with the wrong assumption
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(evolution), looks in the wrong place (the brain alone), and is
using the wrong equipment (a materialistic viewpoint). As Ec
cles and Robinson put it:
The theories of the brain-mind relationship that are
today held by most philosophers and neuroscientists
are purely materialistic in the sense that the brain is
given complete mastery! The existence of mind or con
sciousness is not denied except by radical materialists,
but it is relegated to the passive role of mental experi
ences accompanying some types of brain action, as
in epiphenomenalism… (1984, p. 34).
Sperry was quite blunt in his forceful criticism of such ma
terialism. “When reductionist doctrine tried to tell us that there
are no vital forces, just as it also had long taught that there are
no mental forces, materialist science was simply wrong”
(as quoted in Cousins, 1985, p. 77, emp. added). Or, as Eccles
and Robinson went on to note:
Finally, the most telling criticism of all materialist the
ories of the mind is against its key postulate that the
happenings in the neural machinery of the brain pro
vide a necessary and sufficient explanation of the totality
both of the performance and of the conscious experience of a
human being…. Our opposition to materialism, there
fore, has been on exclusively metaphysical and sci
entific grounds and is not to be read as a veiled apolo
gia for religion…. The history of humanity establishes that there are human attributes—moral,
intellectual, and aesthetic attributes—that cannot
be explained solely in terms of material composition and organization of the brain (1984, pp. 37,
169, italics in orig., emp. added).
It is our contention that consciousness is one of the “hu
man attributes” that “cannot be explained solely in terms of
material composition and organization of the brain.” As evi
dence, we now would like to examine the various theories of
how human consciousness arose.
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8
THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN
OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
In his 1997-1998 Gifford Lectures at the University of Ed
inburgh, Holmes Rolston said to his audience: “Humans do
seem to be an exceptional species” (1999, p. 164). Yes, we do!
And one of the things that makes us “exceptional” is the reality
of our self-consciousness. Evolutionists acknowledge, to use
Michael Ruse’s words, that “consciousness is a real thing.” Ze
man, in commenting on the fact that human self-awareness is
intuitive, discussed just how “real” it is.
The first intuition is that consciousness is a robust phe
nomenon which deserves to be explained rather than
being explained away. Sensory experiences like those
of colour, sound or pain, the simplest and most vivid
instances of consciousness, are phenomena which any
full description of the world must reckon with. Indeed,
experiences of this kind are arguably our point of de
parture in gaining knowledge of the world. Conscious
ness, in this sense, is the “sea in which we swim.”
The second intuition is that consciousness is bound
up with our physical being. This thought is pre-scientific: everyone knows that fatigue, alcohol, knocks
on the head and countless other physical events can
modify the state and contents of consciousness. But
science has fleshed out the thought…[and] suggests
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that consciousness is rooted in the brain, and that the
structure of consciousness is mirrored by the structure
of a set of neural processes. It has become reasonable
to suppose that every distinction drawn in experience
will be reflected in distinctive patterns of neural ac
tivity.
The third intuition is that consciousness makes a
difference. It seems self-evident that much of our be
haviour is explained by mental events; if we could not
see or hear or touch, if we could not experience pain
or pleasure, if we lacked conscious desires and inten
tions, we would not and could not behave as we do. If
this is true it is natural to suggest that consciousness is
a biological capacity which evolved in the service of
action (2001, 124:1282, emp. added).
But consciousness is more than merely “a real thing.” It is
important—because “it makes a difference!” As we noted
earlier, Stephen Jay Gould called it the “most god-awfully
potent evolutionary invention ever developed.” Johanson
and Edgar somewhat blushingly observed that it “adds lay
ers of richness to our lives” (1996, p. 107). Laszlo referred to it
as “perhaps the most remarkable of all the phenomena of the
lived and experienced world.” Donald Griffin admitted:
The effectiveness of conscious thinking and guid
ing behavioral choices on the basis of emotional “feels”
about what is liked or disliked may well be so great
that this core function is one of the most important
activities of which central nervous systems are
capable…. Although much of our behavior takes
place without any awareness, and this includes most
of our physiological functions and the details of such
fairly complex actions as coordinated locomotion,
the small fraction of which we are aware is certainly important (2001, pp. 3,4-5,13, italics in orig.,
emp. added).
Such comments provide powerful testimony to the ulti
mate importance of human consciousness. Robert Jahn and
Brenda Dunne, in the chapter they co-authored (“The Spiritual
- 348 -
Substance of Science”) for the book, New Metaphysical Foun
dations of Modern Science, commented on the significance of the
role of consciousness when they wrote:
In our age, however, as science and its derivative tech
nologies press forward into increasingly abstract and
probabilistic domains of quantum and relativistic me
chanics, the role of spirit or consciousness—whether
divine or human, individual or collective—in the struc
ture and operation of the physical world inescapably
returns to more pragmatic and theoretical relevance,
and can no longer casually be set aside if the goal
is a truly comprehensive understanding of nature (1994, p. 157, emp. added).
Indeed, the role of consciousness can “no longer casually be
set aside.” What Popper and Eccles unhesitatingly called “the
greatest of miracles—the emergence of full consciousness,”
must somehow be explained. Even though, as Wald (quoted
earlier) admitted, “the problem of consciousness tends to em
barrass biologists,” it nevertheless finally seems to be getting
its fair due in “polite discourse.” Eccles himself commented:
“…[T]here are now signs that the conscious self or psyche can
be referred to in ‘polite’ scientific discourse without evoking
an outrage verging on obscenity!” (1992, p. 234).
Let us, then, enter into a “polite scientific discourse” about
the conscious self. And as we begin, let us do so by noting that,
as Eccles and Robinson said about humans, “we are not ‘basi
cally’ or ‘fundamentally or ‘at root’ zygotes; we are persons,
the most extraordinary production of all” (1984, p. 51, emp.
in orig.). Admitting that fact has serious implications. Eccles
and Robinson continued:
There is in all of this a chilling neglect of what can on
ly be called a moral point of view…. What is the mor
al point of view, and how is it related to human hap
piness?… Without being specific at this point, we may
say that the moral point of view begins with man’s
awareness of the fact of his own transcendence;
the recognition that human persons are different
from and rise above those utterly material events
comprised in the purely physical cosmos.
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Even if a citizen has had special training in science,
he is still conditioned in his daily perceptions by a
pervasive metaphysics that imposes a definite charac
ter on the full range of cognitive, emotional, social, and
aesthetic processes—the processes that are brought
to bear on the serious matter of life (pp. vii,viii,
Human persons undeniably “are different from, and rise
above those utterly material events comprised in the purely
material cosmos.” Dobzhansky and his co-authors freely admitted: “Without doubt, the human mind sets our species apart
from nonhuman animals” (1977, p. 453). Yes, it does—far apart!
The question is: Why? How does the General Theory of Evo
lution account for the origin of the emergence of full consciousness—“the greatest of miracles”? It is our intent here to answer
that question. We would like to present and discuss a veritable
plethora of theories that has been proposed in what we be
lieve are failed attempts to explain the origin of human con
sciousness.
THE “HARD PROBLEM” OF
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
At the outset, let us point out that not everyone within the
evolutionary community believes that consciousness can be
explained. That is the very position that David Chalmers has
taken. [ James Trefil refers to those who say that the problem
of consciousness never will be solved as “Mysterians” (1997,
p. 185).] E.O. Wilson wrote concerning Chalmers’ views:
The Australian philosopher David Chalmers recently
put the matter in perspective by contrasting the “easy
problems” of general consciousness with the “hard
problem” of subjective experience…. The hard prob
lem is more elusive: how physical processes in the
brain addressed in the easy problems give rise to sub
jective feeling. What exactly does it mean when we
say we experience a color such as red or blue? Or
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experience, in Chalmers’ words, “the ineffable sound
of a distant oboe, the agony of an intense pain, the
sparkle of happiness or the meditative quality of a
moment lost in thought? All are part of what I am
calling consciousness. It is these phenomena that
compose the real mystery of the mind” (1998, pp.
115-116, emp. in orig.).
This “hard problem” may be, in fact, so hard that it is unsolv
able. As Griffin noted:
The lack of definitive evidence revealing just what
neural processes produce consciousness has led Chal
mers (1996) to designate the question of how brains
produce subjective awareness as the “hard problem.”
He and others claim that it is such a difficult problem that normal scientific investigation is unable,
in principle, to solve it, and that consciousness must
be something basically distinct from the rest of the phys
ical universe (2001, p. 13, emp. added).
In short, Chalmers’ philosophical resolution of this “hard
problem” is to offer a new way of thinking, which he calls naturalistic dualism. In essence, this is the idea that there exists
both a physical realm with its own set of well-established laws,
and a “consciousness” realm with its own set of “psychophysi
cal” laws—laws, by the way, that have yet to be discovered (see
Wyller, 1996, p. 218). Thus, when it comes to explaining hu
man consciousness, science is impotent—at least for the time
being. Alwyn Scott remarked along these lines:
In the last few decades, however, science has made
some progress in gathering objective information
about a phenomenon that is thought by many to be
ineffable. Once off limits to serious researchers, con
sciousness is again becoming an acceptable subject
of scientific inquiry. It has benefited from medical
technology to analyze the brain—positron emission
tomography is but one example—and still more in
sights come from physics, chemistry, biology, neu
roscience, psychology, and even sociology and phi
losophy. The evidence, bit by bit, is derived from ex-
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periments and theories testing elements of the expe
rience of consciousness…. Yet here, as with the efforts of ancient sages, no comprehensive understanding of consciousness has arisen from the
scientific Balkanization of the subject. The re
search has not yet been synthesized into one over
arching understanding. The experience of conscious
ness is richer; its explanation, by necessity, must be
more complex. Consciousness cannot, alas, be reduced to the response to an inkblot or the activity of a set of neurons (1995, pp. 1-2, emp. added).
“Failure is not an Option”
Darwinians realize, of course, that evolution is not “just” a
theory, but also a cosmogony—i.e., an entire world view. Dob
zhansky acknowledged as much when he wrote in Science:
Evolution comprises all the states of development of
the universe; the cosmic, biological, and human or
cultural developments. Attempts to restrict the con
cept of evolution to biology are gratuitous. Life is a
product of the evolution of inorganic matter, and man
is a product of the evolution of life (1967, 155:409).
Because evolution is so pervasive, whatever is here must be
explained by evolution; there can be no exceptions—not even
human self-awareness. James Trefil conceded this point:
No matter how my brain works, no matter how much
interplay there is between my brain and my body, one
single fact remains. For whatever reason, by whatever
process, I am aware of a self that looks out at the world
from somewhere inside my skull. I would suggest to
you that this is not simply an observation, but the cen
tral datum with which every theory of consciousness
has to grapple. In the end, the theory has to explain
how to go from a collection of firing neurons to
this essential perception (1997, p. 181, emp. added).
Yes, it certainly does! Not explaining consciousness is not
an option. And so, evolutionists have no choice but to “buckle
down,” “put their collective noses to the grindstone,” “burn
the midnight oil,” and come up with a believable explanation
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for the origin of consciousness. Even though, to use Bryan Appleyard’s summary of the problem, “hard, deterministic science’s view of man is that he is a curious accident” and that
“self-consciousness is a problem,” it is “not of a different order
from other problems…” (1992, p. 191). In short, yes, it’s a prob
lem. And it’s a serious problem—of considerable magnitude.
But we’ll figure it out. To use Trefil’s words, even though con
sciousness is produced by “mechanisms we still haven’t worked
out, we will do so!” (1996, p, 218, emp. added). And so, the
journey begins.
THEORIES OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS
Speaking in broad strokes, there are two main approaches
to what most scientists and philosophers refer to as the “mind
body problem.” In The Natural History of the Mind, Gordon
Taylor assessed them as follows:
It will be useful to remind you here that there are two
main philosophical positions about the Mind/Body
problem, as it is called. They are known as the dualist
and monist, terms I shall not be able to avoid using.
Dualists maintain that the brain and the mind are two
distinct beings; monists assert that they are only one
thing seen from two different angles, so to speak. Du
alists are generally divided into three clans: those who
think the body creates mental effects as a byproduct
but is not affected by mind (a view known as epiphe
nomenalism); those who think the two interact; and
those who claim that the two move in parallel by pure
coincidence, a view not many people take seriously.
Monists are also split into those who deny that mental
events exist at all…and those who claim that mental
events are just physical events described in another
language…. None of these views, I may as well warn
you, stands up to inspection (1979, pp. 2021, paren
We would like to discuss these two broad groups, and their
subdivisions, in some detail. Then, as we bring this discus
sion on consciousness to a close, we want to offer a third alter
native that does “stand up to inspection.”
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Dualism
The concept known as dualism is attributed to the seventeenth-century French physician/mathematician/philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), who probably is most fa
mous for his well-known statement, “I think, therefore I am.”
Interestingly, however, the idea for dualism did not originate
with Descartes (although he is the one who generally receives
credit for it). Some twelve hundred years earlier, Augustine,
in his City of God (11.26), had written:
Without any delusive representation of images and
phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I
know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I
am not afraid of the arguments of the Academicians,
who say, “What if you are deceived?” For if I am de
ceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived;
and if I am deceived, by this same token I am (see
Custance, 1980, p. 28).
In the end, however, it was Descartes who “resolved to take
myself as an object of study and to employ all the powers of
my mind in choosing the paths I should follow” (as quoted in
Fincher, 1984, p. 16). The paths Descartes chose, eventually
designated him as the father of the mind/body theory of in
teractionism. In his book, Discourse on Method and the Medita
tions (1642), Descartes suggested that the mind was every bit
as real as matter, yet was entirely separate from matter—and
therefore from the brain as well. In Descartes’ language, the
mind was res cogitans (thinking substances), as opposed to the
brain, which was res extensa (material or physical substances).
Descartes even thought he had located the “seat” of conscious
ness in the brain—the pineal gland. Wyller summarized Des
cartes’ views as follows:
René Descartes is generally considered to be the orig
inator of the modern mind-body problem. He argued
that the essence of physical bodies is their extension
in space, while the mind is a substance which does
not extend in space, but which thinks. He believed
that mind states and physical states are mutually in-
- 354 -
teractive—through the pineal gland in the brain. Thus
arose the Cartesian mind-body dualism that still in
fluences modern scientific thinking in this field (1996,
p. 213, emp. in orig.).
Figure 1 — Descartes taught
that the seat of consciousness
was centered in the pineal
gland. LifeART image copyright © (2003) Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. All rights reserved. Used by permission.
It is something of a mild un
derstatement to suggest that
dualism “still influences mod
ern scientific thinking in this
field.” In his classic 1949 book,
The Concept of Mind, philoso
pher Gilbert Ryle (whom we
shall discuss more in greater
detail shortly) referred to du
alism as “the official doctrine”
(p. 11). In commenting on that
phrase, Australian physicist and
mathematician Paul Davies inquired in his book, God and the
New Physics:
What are the features of the dualistic theory of the
mind? The “official doctrine” goes something like
this. The human being consists of two distinct, sepa
rate kinds of things: the body and the soul, or mind.
The body acts as a sort of host or receptacle for the mind,
or perhaps even as a prison from which liberation may
be sought through spiritual advancement or death. The
mind is coupled to the body through the brain, which
it uses (via the bodily senses) to acquire and store in
formation about the world. It also uses the brain as a
means to exercise its volitions, by acting on the world
in the fashion described earlier in this chapter. How
ever, the mind (or soul) is not located inside the brain,
or any other part of the body; or indeed anywhere in
space at all…. An important feature of this picture is
that the mind is a thing; perhaps even more specifi
cally, a substance. Not a physical substance, but a ten-
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uous, elusive, aetherial sort of substance, the stuff that
thoughts and dreams are made of, free and independ
ent or ordinary ponderous matter (1983, p. 79, paren
thetical items in orig.).
Trefil summed it up like this:
One way of looking at this question (which is almost
certainly wrong) is to imagine that somewhere in the
brain is an “I” who is watching the final products of
the processing of signals by neurons. The essence of
this view is that there is something in “mind” that tran
scends (or at least is distinct from) the workings of the
physical brain. The seventeenth-century French phi
losopher and mathematician René Descartes advo
cated such a view of mind/body dualism, so the hy
pothetical place where mental images are viewed is
often referred to as the “Cartesian Theater” (1996,
pp. 217-218, parenthetical items in orig.).
[The phrase “Cartesian Theater” was invented by Daniel Dennett when he wrote: “As we shall soon see, the exclusive at
tention to specific subsystems of the mind/brain often causes
a sort of theoretical myopia that prevents theorists from see
ing that their models still presuppose that somewhere, conve
niently hidden in the obscure ‘center’ of the mind/brain, there
is a Cartesian Theater, a place where ‘it all comes together’ and
consciousness happens. This may seem like a good idea, an
inevitable idea, but until we see, in some detail, why it is not,
the Cartesian Theater will continue to attract crowds of theo
rists transfixed by an illusion” (1991, p. 39).]
Earlier, we mentioned a fascinating book, Nobel Prize Con
versations, which included the text of a series of “conversa
tions” that occurred in November 1982, at the Isthmus Insti
tute in Dallas, Texas, among four Nobel laureates: Sir John
Eccles, Ilya Prigogine, Roger Sperry, and Brian Josephson.
Norman Cousins was the esteemed moderator for those con
versations. After listening to Drs. Eccles and Sperry discuss
their research (which we will discuss below) documenting
that the mind exerts a significant influence on the brain, Cou-
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sins was constrained to say that when we see evidence such as
that produced by the scientific research of Nobel laureates like
Sperry and Eccles
…that mind is in charge of brain, we spontaneously
recognize their conviction as something we’ve always
known or at least suspected. What grips us as we lis
ten to these men is not only the elegance of their dem
onstrations, nor the sheerly rational force of their ar
guments, but their everydayness…. We find ourselves agreeing with Sperry and Eccles because
what they say seems “right” (1985, pp. 39-40, emp.
added).
As Trefil put it: “There is a sense in which something like Des
cartes’ procedure remains valid for the question of human
consciousness” (1997, p. 181). Perhaps that explains, at least
in part, why, as Trefil went on to note, “[t]his so-called mindbody dualism has played a major role in thinking about men
tal activity ever since Descartes” (p. 181).
But that is not all that Dr. Trefil had to say. He also com
mented: “Philosophers have, in fact, written long and detailed
critiques of the Cartesian approach to the world” (p. 181). Lat
er, we will return to the idea behind Trefil’s comment that
“there is a sense in which something like Descartes’ procedure
remains valid for the question of human consciousness,” be
cause he is absolutely correct in such an assessment. For now,
however, we would like to concentrate on his statement that
“philosophers have, in fact, written long and detailed critiques
of the Cartesian approach to the world.”
Yes, they certainly have. And so have their counterparts
in the scientific community. In his exhaustive review on “con
sciousness” for the journal Brain, Zeman stated that “there is
a deep dissatisfaction with the Cartesian separation of body
and mind” (2001, 124:1264). True enough. But, as Adrian ad
mitted: …[A]greement in rejecting dualism has not been cou
pled with agreement in accepting anything else” (1965, p. 239).
The question, then, is why is there such a “deep dissatisfac
tion”?
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Simply put, there is “deep satisfaction” with the Cartesian
view that body and mind are separate because: (a) such a con
cept is deemed “unscientific”; (b) it does not “square” with
evolutionary concepts; and (c) still worse (at least in the eyes
of many), it has “theological overtones.” Canadian anthro
pologist Arthur C. Custance addressed these matters in The
Mysterious Matter of Mind.
Most of the important thinkers who followed Des
cartes rejected interactionism. It was not a testable hy
pothesis. Above all, it introduced the supernatural into the picture and thus removed the concept from the scientific laboratory into the theological seminary…. What emerged was a determi
nation to reduce everything to physics and chemis
try, or perhaps more precisely to physics and mathe
matics… (1980, p. 31, emp. added).
Harvard’s Kirtley Mather was a bit more blunt when he wrote
in The Permissive Universe:
Enough is now known about human nature to vali
date the concept that each human being is an indivis
ible unity composed of body, mind, and spirit… I
know of no scientifically verifiable data that would
support the idea that the human soul is a separate en
tity inserted from above or without into the human
body and residing therein during a person’s lifetime….
Equating thus the human soul with the spiritual as
pects of the life of man, it follows that the soul, like
the body or the mind, is a product of evolutionary
processes… (1986, p. 174, emp. added).
As Sperry put it:
[A] central requirement imposed by science would
seem to be a relinquishment of dualist concepts in
conformance with the explanation of mind in monistmentalist terms. Such a shift from various dualistic,
other worldly beliefs to a monistic, this-world faith,
would mean that our planet should no longer be con
ceived, or treated, as merely a way-station to some
thing better beyond. This present world and life would
thus in each case, acquire an added relative value and
meaning (as quoted in Cousins, 1985, pp. 159-160).
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Or, to use Mather’s words: “The conclusion is inescapable.
Mankind’s destiny is that of an earth-bound creature. Salva
tion must be sought here on this terrestrial planet” (p. 157). Ze
man therefore concluded:
The suggestion that conscious events are identical
with the corresponding neural events offers a reduc
tionist and materialist, or physicalist, solution to the
mind-body problem…. Why should consciousness
be an exception to the stream of successful reductions of phenomena once considered to be beyond the reach of science? (124:1282, emp. added).
A few paragraphs prior to this one, we mentioned the 1949
book, The Concept of Mind, by British philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
That book played a critical role in what many today view as
the final debunking of Cartesian dualism. Ryle stated clearly
that his goal was to expunge once and for all the “official doc
trine” of what he called “the dogma of the ghost in the ma
chine” (pp. 15-16). In fact, he was the one who invented that
now-famous phrase.
Figure 2 — The human brain. Is there a “ghost in the machine?”
LifeART image copyright © (2003) Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. All rights reserved. Used by permission.
- 359 -
The vaunted and venerable Encyclopaedia Britannica, in its
assessment of Descartes, offered the following concise com
mentary.
The strongest 20th-century attack on Cartesian dual
ism was launched by the British analytic philosopher
Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949), where he
exposes what he describes as the fallacy of the ghost
in the machine. He argues that the mind—the ghost—
is simply the intelligent behaviour of the body. Like
many contemporary analytic philosophers, Ryle main
tains that metaphysical questions about being and re
ality are nonsense because they include reference to
empirically unverifiable entities. His position, like
that of the Australian philosopher J.J.C. Smart, is ultimately materialist: The mind is the brain. The
American pragmatist Richard Rorty in Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature (1979) argues that the Cartesian de
mand for certain knowledge by way of representative
ideas is a holdover from the mistaken quest for God.
Rorty says that philosophy in the Cartesian tradition is the 20th century’s substitute for theology
and should, like God, be gently laid to rest (“Des
cartes and Cartesianism,” 1997, 15:559, emp. added).
Roger Lewin, in his discussion of human consciousness in
Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, suggested that “Cartesian
dualism dominated philosophical thinking for three centu
ries until the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle effectively de
molished it” (1992, p. 157). Ryle’s vicious attack upon Carte
sian dualism was only the first of many to follow, leading E.O.
Wilson to conclude: “Virtually all contemporary scientists and
philosophers expert on the subject agree that the mind, which
comprises consciousness and rational process, is the brain at
work. They have rejected the mind-brain dualism of René Des
cartes…” (1998, p. 98). Or, as Michael Lemonick chirped in
the January 20, 2003 issue of Time magazine: “Descartes was
dead wrong” (2003b, 161[3]:63).
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Monism
Was Descartes “dead wrong”? We do not believe that he
was. And we will have more to say on that shortly. But for now,
we would like to examine monistic theories of consciousness.
As we begin, perhaps a definition of “monism” is in order. The
American Heritage Dictionary defines monism as:
the view in metaphysics that reality is a unified whole
and that all existing things can be ascribed to or de
scribed by a single concept or system; the doctrine
that mind and matter are formed from, or reducible
to, the same ultimate substance or principle of being.
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary goes farther.
That doctrine which refers all phenomena to a single
ultimate constituent or agent—the opposite of dualism.
The doctrine has been held in three generic forms:
(1) matter and its phenomena have been explained as
a modification of mind, involving an idealistic mo
nism; (2) mind has been explained by and resolved
into matter, giving a materialistic monism; or (3) mat
ter, mind, and their phenomena have been held to be
manifestations or modifications of some one substance,
or a supposed “unknown something” of some evolu
tionists, which is capable of an objective and subjective
aspect (emp. added).
In speaking about the concept of monism, Ruse offered this
assessment:
On the other hand, there are the monists. Most fa
mously, there was the seventeenth-century Dutch phi
losopher Benedict Spinoza. He argued that when think
ing of consciousness, there is no reason to think that
one is considering a separate substance. Consciousness, in some way, is simply a manifestation of the
physical world. Spinoza and his modern-day follow
ers do not want to say that consciousness does not ex
ist, or that it is simply material substance in a tradi
tional way. Consciousness is obviously not round, or
red, or hard, or anything like that. Rather, conscious
ness in some sense is emergent from or an aspect of
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material substances. In other words, the notion of
material substance has to be extended, from red
and round and hard, to include consciousness
(2001b, pp. 199-200, emp. added).
According to this view, the human brain is considered to
be an electrochemical machine. The mind and the brain are
one, with the mind being merely an extension of the physical
mechanisms of the brain (and being entirely dependent upon
those mechanisms for its existence/expression). The pillar
upon which modern neural science is founded—materialistic
monism—contends that all behavior is a reflection of brain
function. Thus, according to this view, everything that a per
son says, thinks, and does can be accounted for by certain phys
ical actions within the brain. The “mind”—such as it is—therefore is reduced to a range of functions carried out by the phys
ical matter within the brain. This reductive perspective allows
evolutionists to then declare that matter is all that exists, and
that the human brain and mind evolved from lower animals,
so that humans have no “spiritual” component. There is, so it
has been said, no “ghost in the machine.”
Today, “for the most part, materialism, the philosophical
alternative to dualism, dominates modern thinking about con
sciousness” (Lewin, 1992, p. 157). Yes, it certainly does. British
physiologist Lord E.D. Adrian, in the chapter he wrote on “Con
sciousness” for the book, Brain and Conscious Experience, admit
ted: “…[B]y the beginning of the century it was becoming more
respectable for psychologists to use some kind of monism as
a working hypothesis and even to be whole-hearted behav
iorists” (1965, p. 239). The late, eminent British electrophysi
ologist, Sir John Eccles, writing in his book, The Human Psyche,
commented:
The dominant theories of the brain-mind relationship that are today held by neuroscientists
are purely materialistic in the sense that the brain
is given complete mastery. The existence of mind or
consciousness is not denied, but it is relegated to the
passive role of mental experiences accompanying
- 362 -
some types of brain action, as in psychoneural identity,
but with absolutely no effective action on the brain.
The complex neural machinery of the brain functions
in its determined materialistic fashion regardless of
any consciousness that may accompany it. The “com
mon sense” experiences that we can control our actions
to some extent or that we can express our thoughts in
language are alleged to be illusory. Actually, it is rare
for this to be stated so baldly, but despite all the so
phisticated cover-up the situation is exactly as stated.
An effective causality is denied to the self-conscious mind per se (1992, p. 17, italics in orig., emp.
added).
Dr. Eccles’ assessment is correct, and provides a satisfactory
springboard from which we can begin an investigation into
the “the dominant theories of the brain-mind relationship.”
Psychical Monism
We would like to discuss psychical monism first, in order
to quickly dispense with it. This doctrine contends that consciousness is the only reality—i.e., the material world only
“appears” to be there. Thoughts are causally connected,
but physical events are not necessarily so. (This doctrine is
the exact inverse of epiphenomenalism, which we shall dis
cuss shortly.) As Carrington pointed out eighty years ago:
The contention of this theory is that nothing exists
save states of consciousness in the individual. Neither
the material world nor other minds exist (save in the
mind of the individual). In refutation of this theory, it
may be pointed out that, if brain changes are thus caused
by, or are the outer expression of, thought—why not
muscular changes, and in fact all physical phenomena
throughout the world everywhere—for we cannot ra
tionally draw the line of distinction here. Such is the
logical outcome of the theory…. While many philos
ophers are inclined to accept this view, it may be stated
that the physical scientists are naturally repelled
by it, and so is common sense (1923, pp. 52,53,
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Common sense is indeed “repelled” by psychical monism
—more popularly known as solipsism—which, according to
the Cambridge International Dictionary of English, is “the theory
or view that the self is the only reality.” Carrington correctly
concluded: “This doctrine is so opposed to common sense and
daily experience that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it” (p. 53).
Agreed.
Radical Materialism (Functionalism)
Currently, there exists a small-but-vocal group of philoso
phers that parades under the title of the “radical material
ists.” Previously, we quoted from Eccles and Robinson, who
noted: “The existence of mind or consciousness is not denied
except by radical materialists…” (1984, p. 34, emp. added).
According to Eccles, in radical materialism, “there is a denial
or repudiation of the existence of mental events. They are
simply illusory. The brain-mind problem is a non-problem”
(1992, pp. 17-18). In a fascinating article (“The Mind-Brain
Problem”) that he wrote for publication on-line, John Beloff
addressed the concept of radical materialism and those of the
past who have defended it.
Our third solution, which denies that there are any
distinct mental or subjective events that need explain
ing, is a purely twentieth century development and it
stems from four quite different sources that have very
little connection with one another. The first, in point
of time, arose among psychologists of the first decades
of this century who sought to make psychology the
study of behaviour, human or animal, and, in doing
so to discredit introspection that was previously taken
to be the distinctive technique of psychology as a sci
ence. We may call this “Watsonian Behaviourism and
its offshoots.” The second, in point of time, arose with
in Anglo-American philosophy and I shall call it “Lin
guistic Behaviourism.” Its classic statement is to be
found in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949). The
third was likewise a product of AngloAmerican phi
losophy (if that can be stretched to include Australia
- 364 -
where some of its most vocal proponents taught phi
losophy), and we could call it “Strict Materialism,” i.e.
the doctrine that there are no private sense-data, only
brain-events and their associated behaviours. D.M.
Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968) may
be cited as a classic text (1994, parenthetical item and
emp. in orig.).
Today, it is unlikely that anyone is better known for defend
ing the concept of “radical materialism” in a more formida
ble fashion than philosopher Daniel C. Dennett of Tufts Uni
versity in Boston, whose reverence for Ryle’s work is utterly
unabashed, and who has written a slew of books on human
consciousness (1984, 1987, 1991, 1996, 1998), including one
titled Consciousness Explained (1991). Speaking of that book and
its author, Andrew Brown wrote in The Darwin Wars:
It is difficult to think of anyone else who would have
the self-confidence to write a book called simply Con
sciousness Explained, or the nerve, once it was finished,
to publish the contents under that title. It’s a wonder
ful book; but it doesn’t explain consciousness. The
heart of Dennett’s position seems to be that consciousness itself is a misleading category, and
that the only way to make sense of it is to redefine all one’s terms in terms of externally visible
states and behaviours. Carried to extremes—the nor
mal destination of Dennett’s ideas—this leads him to
assert such things as that thermostats have beliefs….
He has devoted his life to exorcising the ghost from
the machine (1999, pp. 153,154, emp. added).
Paul Ehrlich went on record as stating: “In Consciousness Ex
plained, he takes an interesting cut at the problem, but he does
not ‘explain’ consciousness to my satisfaction” (2000, p. 112).
Nor did he explain it to anyone else’s. In his 1994 book, How
the Self Controls Its Brain, Sir John Eccles quoted Dennett’s
statement from page 21 of Consciousness Explained, “human
consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery,” and
then wryly commented: “It is still a mystery at the end of his
468-page book” (p. 31). In a review of Daniel Dennett’s 2003
book, Freedom Evolves, that he authored for the March 2, 2003
- 365 -
issue of the New York Times, Galen Strawson (professor of phi
losophy at the University of Reading in England, and author
of Freedom and Belief) commented:
In the last several years the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett has published two very large, interesting and in
fluential books. The first, Consciousness Explained (1991),
aimed to account for all the phenomena of conscious
ness within the general theoretical framework set by
current physics. It failed, of course, and came to be
affectionately known as Consciousness Ignored… (2003).
Dennett has indeed “devoted his life to exorcising the ghost
from the machine.” Speaking of himself, and others of his ilk,
he wrote:
For other, more theoretically daring researchers, there
is a new object of study, the mind/brain. This newly
popular coinage nicely expresses the prevailing ma
terialism of these researchers, who happily admit to
the world and to themselves that what makes the brain
particularly fascinating and baffling is that somehow
or other it is the mind (1991, pp. 38-39, emp. in orig.).
As one might expect, the radical materialism espoused by
Dennett has not gone down well with those who believe that
consciousness does exist, and that it does matter. Even among
some of his evolutionist colleagues, his ideas have drawn con
siderable (and substantial) criticism. In assessing Dennett’s
work, Trefil wrote:
One group of thinkers argues, in essence, that the prob
lem of consciousness either cannot or should not be
addressed. In its simplest form, this position holds
that there is no problem of consciousness at all—that
once you understand what the neurons are doing,
there’s nothing else to explain. Perhaps the most in
fluential of these is the philosopher Daniel Dennett in
Consciousness Explained….
The problem comes when Dennett approaches the
problem of consciousness. The first time I read his
book, I became confused because about halfway
through I began to think, “Hey—this guy doesn’t think
that consciousness exists.”
- 366 -
This seemed to me to be such a bizarre view that I ac
tually read the book several times, and when that failed
to persuade me otherwise I still worried that I was
missing something. I’m sure Dennett would deny that
this is a proper interpretation of his work, but other
scholars (most notably John Searle in the New York
Review of Books) seem to have come to the same con
clusion….
Until you have explained how I come to that central
conclusion about my own existence, you have not
solved the problem of consciousness. You certainly
won’t solve the problem by denying that consciousness exists. For me, reading Dennett’s book
was a little like reading a detailed discussion on the
workings of a transmission, only to be told that there
is no such thing as a car (1997, pp. 182,183,184, par
enthetical comment in orig., emp. added).
[Strawson, in his review of Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, wrote
rather bluntly: “Dennett continues to deny the existence of
consciousness, and continues to deny that he is denying it”
(2003, emp. added). Eccles, in How the Self Controls Its Brain,
concluded: “Dennett…discounts a unique Self which is cen
tral to our experience. Dennett wants to get rid of the Carte
sian Theater, but all he seems to finish with is emptiness” (1994,
p. 33).]
Two aspects of radical materialism are closely associated
with Dennett. The first is what he refers to as “the intentional
stance,” which, not coincidentally, happens to be the title of
one of his books (1987). Dennett’s definition in that book was
this: “The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and
explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other ‘inten
tional’ states to systems—living and nonliving” (p. 495). Grif
fin, in Animal Consciousness, investigated Dennett’s position,
and concluded:
The contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett has
advocated what he calls “the intentional stance” when
analyzing not only human and animal cognition but
also many examples of self-regulating inanimate
mechanisms…. His insistence on including such sim-
- 367 -
ple devices as thermostats in this extended category
of intentional systems leads him to deny any special status to conscious mental experiences….
Dennett appears to be arguing that if a neurophysiological mechanism were shown to organize and guide a particular behavior pattern, this
would rule out the possibility that any conscious
mental experiences might accompany or influence such behavior….
Dennett prefers a theoretical framework that encom
passes the whole range of systems from thermostats
to scientists and philosophers. Yet he applies terms
that ordinarily refer to conscious mental states, such
as belief and desire even to thermostats. This amounts
to a sort of semantic piracy in which the meaning of
widely used terms is distorted by extension in order
to paper over a fundamental problem—namely, the
question whether conscious mental experiences oc
cur in other species (2001, p. 263, italics in orig., emp.
added).
Griffin, of course, is renowned in his own right for his work
with animal consciousness—which is why he raised the issue of
how Dennett’s work questions “whether conscious mental ex
periences occur in other species.” But Dennett’s position does
not question consciousness solely “in other species.” It is most
notorious for calling into question whether consciousness oc
curs in humans.
The second aspect of radical materialism closely associ
ated with Dennett is the concept of “functionalism.” This view
ultimately arises from Dennett’s strong ties to the artificial in
telligence (AI) community. Beloff summarized the function
alist position as follows.
Functionalism differs from previous materialist the
ories of mind by insisting that mental events need
not be identified exclusively with brain events; if com
puting machinery made from wires, transistors, etc.
can serve the same functions as our brain in mediat
ing between inputs and outputs, then mental events
- 368 -
may be predicated of any such system that possessed
the necessary information-processing capacities.
Functionalism was a late twentieth-century doctrine
that obviously owed its existence to the rise of Artifi
cial Intelligence. Its most compendious exposition
today is a book with the question-begging title, Con
sciousness Explained, by Daniel C. Dennett (1994, emp.
in orig.).
In reviewing Dennett’s position, Johanson and Edgar ex
plained that he
…argues that consciousness can be understood from
the metaphor of a computer. He views the mind as
the software to the brain’s hardware, a program that
writes a narrative of our experience, edited and com
piled from the multiple drafts of information stream
ing into the brain. In this view, the present moment
of sensation is insignificant compared to the subse
quent mental reflection and contemplation, from
which meaning arises. Consciousness—the mind—is
simply a product of the brain… (1996, p. 107).
As Scott put it, this is the view that “the essential aspects of
mental dynamics will eventually be expressed as a formula and
represented on a system constructed from integrated computer
circuits” (1995, p. 2).
What are the implications of Dennett’s brand of function
alism in regard to things such as the mind/soul? Davies ad
dressed those implications when he wrote:
Functionalists recognize that the essential ingredient
of mind is not the hardware—the stuff your brain is
made of, or the physical processes that it employs—
but the software—the organization of the stuff, or the
“program.” They do not deny that the brain is a ma
chine, and that neurons fire purely for electrical reasons—there are no mental causes of physical processes. Yet they still appeal to causal relations between
mental states: very crudely, thoughts cause thoughts,
notwithstanding the fact that, at the hardware level,
the causal links are already forged….
- 369 -
Functionalism solves at a stroke most of the traditional
queries about the soul. What stuff is the soul made of?
The question is as meaningless as asking what stuff
citizenship is made of or Wednesdays are made of.
The soul is a holistic concept. It is not made of stuff at
all. Where is the soul located? Nowhere. To talk of
the soul as being in a place is as misconceived as try
ing to locate the number seven, or Beethoven’s fifth
symphony. Such concepts are not in space at all (1983,
pp. 85,86, emp. added).
If all of this strikes you as a bit odd, let us reassure you: you
are not alone. In fact, even Daniel Dennett, the current high
priest of functionalism, has admitted that his ideas generally
do not go down terribly well. Beloff went on to note:
[M]aterialists and behaviourists are not stupid. They
are as much aware as we are that what they are saying
is outrageous, in the sense of defying something deep
rooted in our thought and language, it is just that they
are undeterred. Dennett, at the outset of his lengthy
treatise, warns us that his efforts at “demystification”
as he calls it, will be viewed by many as an “act of in
tellectual vandalism.” But, if we cannot formally re
fute the materialism or functionalism…, neither can
its proponents persuade us to deny or overlook that
red patch that refuses to go away. In dismissing the
third solution from further consideration, I can do
no better than John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind,
1992, p. 8) when he says, “if your theory results in
the view that consciousness does not exist, you
have simply produced a reductio ad absurdum of
your theory” (1994, emp. added).
We agree. Suggesting that consciousness (a.k.a., self-awareness) does not exist is absurd! [That fact, nevertheless, has
not kept some from actually denying that consciousness ex
ists. Lawrence Kubie wrote in Brain Mechanisms and Conscious
ness: A Symposium: “Although we cannot get along without the
concept of consciousness, actually there is no such thing”
(1956, p. 446).] In Beyond Natural Selection, Wesson concluded:
- 370 -
Self-awareness is a special quality of the mind…. Selfawareness is different from information processing;
even when confused and unable to think clearly, one
may be vividly aware of one’s self and one’s confusion.
The essence of mind is less data processing than will,
intention, imagination, discovery, and feeling. If some
kinds of thinking can be initiated by a computer, oth
ers cannot (1997, p. 277).
Earlier, we gave the first part of the quote below by Roger
Lewin. Now we would like to present the last portion of the
quote in this context.
To say that the brain is a computer is a truism, be
cause, unquestionably, what goes on in there is com
putation. But so far, no man-made computer matches
the human brain, either in capacity or design…. Can
a computer think? And, ultimately, can a computer
generate a level of consciousness that Dan Dennett
or Nick Humphrey, or anyone else, has in mind?
(1992, p. 160).
Good questions, those. And we all know the answers to them,
do we not?
One last item bears mentioning in regard to radical mate
rialism. It has a counterpart in psychology—behaviorism. Paul
Davies commented on this fact when he wrote:
The materialist believes that mental states and oper
ations are nothing but physical states and operations.
In the field of psychology, materialism becomes
what is known as behaviourism, which proclaims
that all humans behave in a purely mechanical
way in response to external stimuli (1983, p. 82,
emp. added).
According to behaviorists, only the brain exists, and mind is
just an “off-shoot” of it (referred to as an “epiphenomenon”—
discussed below). In the discipline of behaviorism, “mind has
no independent existence and the question of the origin of
mind is entirely secondary to the question of the origin and
nature of brain tissue” (Custance, 1980, p. 21).
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But such a position presents its own set of problems. Writ
ing under the title of “Consciousness” for The Encyclopaedia of
Ignorance, Richard Gregory discussed some of them.
Psychology has traditionally sought “laws of mind”
to explain behaviour. There are many terms, such as
“motivation,” “fear,” “hunger,” and “shame,” which
it is quite difficult to conceive as having simple physi
ological correlates. One can well imagine that the physi
cal state of lack of food is monitored, and signaled to
brain regions which activates food-seeking behaviour;
and we might describe this in an animal, or another
person, to include a sensation like our feeling of hun
ger. It is more difficult to conceive a physiological state
for shame, or guilt, or pride…. The issue is important. It raises the question of how physiology is
related to psychology, and whether consciousness can be affected or controlled apart from physiological changes (1977, pp. 278-279, emp. added).
Behaviorism has fallen onto hard times of late—and for several
good reasons, among which are the ones summarized below
by Beloff, who referred to behaviorism as “methodologically
misleading, philosophically false, and ideologically pernicious.”
And that was the kindest thing he had to say! Read on.
My first charge against Behaviourism is that it com
mits what Aldous Huxley once called “The Original
Sin of the Intellect: Oversimplification.” In other words
it offers us a picture of man in which the most impor
tant dimension of existence has been left out, and in
which the highlights have been placed on what is, in
fact, extraneous. I believe that to accept this shallow
travesty as a revelation of truth is to coarsen one’s sen
sibilities and to close one’s mind to just those aspects
of reality which should evoke our deepest feelings of
wonder or reverence.
Secondly, I regard behaviourism as incompatible with
any genuine morality…. We defined behaviourism
in the previous chapter as the doctrine that everything
that can be said about Mind can, in principle, be said
in terms of behaviour, whether actual or potential….
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Our conclusions were that it was methodologically
misleading, philosophically false and ideologically per
nicious. But in the end, perhaps its most glaring fault
is simply a certain unmistakable silliness which
qualifies it, surely, as one of the oddest intellectual aberrations of the twentieth century (1962,
pp. 47,48,49, italics in orig., emp. added).
In his 1994 book, How the Self Controls Its Brain, Sir John
Eccles threw down the gauntlet in what he termed a “chal
lenge to all materialists” (p. x). He expressed sharp criticism
of, among others, Sir Francis Crick and his collaborator, Chris
tof Koch, when he referred to their work as “science fiction of
a blatant kind” (p. 30). But he reserved his harshest criticism
for Daniel Dennett’s brand of radical materialism when he re
ferred to functionalism as an “impoverished and empty the
ory” (p. 33). Why characterize functionalism in such termi
nology? In John Searle’s uncompromising words: “... the deep
er objection can be put quite simply: the theory has left out the
mind” (as quoted in Zeman, 2001, 124:1283).
Panpsychism
In his classic work, Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews,
Thomas H. Huxley had a chapter titled “On the Physical Ba
sis of Life.” Within that chapter was this sentence: “Thoughts
are the expression of molecular changes in the matter of life,
which is the source of our other vital phenomena” (1870b, p.
152). Lord Adrian concluded:
…[N]ow we can add that there is no need to invoke
extraphysical factors to account for any of the public
activities of the brain…. Consciousness is a logical
construction…. It arises when unconscious processes
are integrated; its base line in the individual and in
the animal kingdom is arbitrary (1965, pp. 239-240,
246).
This is the essence of the view known as panpsychism. When
Gregory asked: “What is the relation between consciousness
and the matter or functions of the brain?” (1977, p. 274), he hit
at the very heart of panpsychism, which is the view that “some
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primordial consciousness attaches to all matter, presumably
even to atoms and subatomic particles” (Eccles and Robinson,
1984, p. 37). As Eccles and Robinson remarked in regard to
the radical materialism that we discussed above:
The alternative is to espouse panpsychism. All types
of panpsychists evade the problems by proposing that
there is a protoconsciousness in all matter, even
in elementary particles! According to panpsychism,
the evolutionary development of brain is associated
merely with an amplification and refinement of what
was already there as a property of all matter. It merely
is exhibited more effectively in the complex organi
zations of the brains of higher animals (p. 14).
Huxley put it like this: “Mind is a function of matter, when
that matter has attained a certain degree of organization” (1871,
p. 464). But, there is a caveat. To quote Eccles, while “it is as
serted that all matter has an inside mental or protopsychical
state, since this state is an integral part of matter, it can
have no action on it” (1992, p. 17, emp. added).
In other words, consciousness does exist—everywhere, all
the time, in every material thing. In the case of human beings,
it “just happened” to come together in a “certain degree of or
ganization” that permitted consciousness to be expressed,
and then generated self-awareness as the end result.
However, after all is said and done, as Rupert Sheldrake
correctly noted: “The conscious self [has]…a reality which is
not merely derivative from matter” (1981, p. 203). Paul Davies
commented: “We still have no clue how mind and matter are
related, or what process led to the emergence of mind from
matter in the first place” (1995). With some understatement,
Zeman confessed: “…[W]e have no clear understanding of
what kind of property could render physical events intrinsi
cally mental” (2001, 124:1284). Not surprisingly, then, Eccles
and Robinson concluded: “[Panpsychism] finds no support
whatsoever in physics” (1984, p. 37).
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Epiphenomenalism
The careful reader will have noticed that, from time to time
during our discussion of the concept of consciousness, the
terms “epiphenomenon,” “epiphenomena,” or “epiphenom
enalism” have appeared. We purposely postponed any dis
cussion of epiphenomenalism until this point, because it is
best considered under the subject of the monist-materialist
views that we are discussing here.
Epiphenomenalism, according to Eccles, is the view that
“mental states exist in relation to some material happenings,
but causally are completely irrelevant” (1992, pp. 17). The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines epiphenomenon as “a sec
ondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by
it.” For example, pathologists frequently use the word to re
fer to the secondary symptoms of a disease. So, when Eccles
says that epiphenomenalism suggests that mental states exist,
but “causally are completely irrelevant,” his point is that, like
in a disease, the symptom does not cause anything, but is
itself caused by something else. That, in essence, is how
epiphenomenalism works. Shadworth Hodgson, in his book,
The Theory of Practice (1870), proposed that conscious mental
events were caused by physical changes in the nervous system,
but could not themselves cause physical changes. As one au
thor put it: “Like the whistle of a railway engine (which does
not affect the engine), or the chime of a clock (which does not af
fect the clock), they were caused by (and accompanied) phys
ical events, but they did not themselves act as causal agents.
In a slightly later terminology, they were epiphenomena…”
(Glynn, 1999, p. 8, parenthetical items and emp. in orig.).
The man who referred to himself as “Darwin’s bulldog,”
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), coined the term “epi
phenomenalism” in an article he authored for the Fortnightly
Review in 1874. The time was ripe for him to originate such a
concept because, as Beloff explained
…the view that prevailed among scientists of the late
19th century was to look for the causes of our behav-
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iour in the brain alone…. For the epiphenomenalist,
the brain was a machine, like everything else in na
ture, and the mind no more than a passive reflection
of its activity (1994).
Huxley, therefore,
proposed that as the noise of the babbling brook is
only a by-product of the rushing water, so the mind,
though distinct from the brain, is nevertheless only a
by-product of it. The brain therefore causes the mind
as the brook causes the babbling, but the mind can
not have any influence on the brain any more than
the babbling can have any influence on the brook.
This was termed epiphenomenalism (Custance, 1980,
p. 23).
Today, from the perspective of the reductionist-materialist,
epiphenomenalism is as good an explanation as any, since “so
far as we can tell, mental activity is always associated with ner
vous activity” (Glynn, 1999, p. 9). Griffin wrote:
Conscious thinking may well be a core function of
central nervous systems…. The fact that we are con
sciously aware of only a small fraction of what goes
on in our brains has led many scientists to conclude
that consciousness is an epiphenomenon or trivial byproduct of neural functioning (2001, p. 3, emp. in
orig.).
Richard Lewontin and the late Stephen Jay Gould argued
that language, consciousness, and, in fact, most of our other
distinctively human mental capacities are merely “side ef
fects” of the fact that our brain grew big for “other reasons”
(reasons, they say, by the way, that cannot be reconstructed).
According to Lewontin, our extraordinary human abilities are
“epiphenomena of all those loose brain connections with noth
ing to do” (as quoted in Schwartz, 1999).
Referring to human consciousness as a “trivial by-product” or a “side effect” seems to be the height of folly (if not
conceit). Being asked to think of self-awareness as a “symp
tom” of a “disease” (i.e., the brain) isn’t much better. And, ap-
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parently, we are not the only ones who think so. In The Won
der of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind, Eccles and Rob
inson referred to the concept of epiphenomenalism as “gib
berish.”
The epiphenomenalist’s causal theory should not be
confused with the ordinary causal laws of the physi
cal sciences. The latter are confined to the manner in
which force and matter are distributed in time and
space. But with epiphenomenalism we are faced with
a radically different entity—a mental entity—taken to
be nonmaterial and nonphysical. If it exists at all,
then by definition it cannot be composed of or
reduced to material elements or combinations
thereof. To say that it “arises” from these is, alas, gib
berish (1984, p. 55, italics in orig., emp. added).
But why is this the case? The two authors continued:
On the epiphenomenalist’s assumption, there are two
entities—the mental and material—having real ex
istence. Furthermore, the former is alleged to be
caused by the latter, in just the way that entirely mate
rial causes result in entirely material effects. But note
that in any purely physical interaction, it is never necessary that event A cause event B; it is merely contin
gently the case, given the composition and laws of
the physical world, that events of type A happen to
cause or faithfully lead to events of type B. Accord
ingly, to argue that brain states, in a natural-causal
fashion, produce mental states is to admit that it could
be otherwise. All purely natural phenomena could
be other than they are. Thus, the epiphenomenal
ist, to the extent that he endorses a causal theory of
brain-mind relationships, can never establish that the
brain is necessary in order that there be mind. There
is nothing logically contradictory in the claim that
there are minds without brain and brains without
minds…. Once it is granted that there are genuinely
mental (nonphysical) events, it follows that an ex
haustive inventory of the physical universe and its
laws must be incomplete as an inventory of real exis-
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tents, because mental events are left out. If there can
be mind in addition to matter, there can be mind with
out matter (p. 55, emp. in orig.).
Whew! No epiphenomenalist would willingly want to go
that far, we can assure you. Mind without matter? Eccles and
Robinson are absolutely correct, of course: “To argue that
brain states…produce mental states is to admit that it could be
otherwise.” And it gets progressively worse for the epiphe
nomenalist, as Ian Glynn pointed out in his book, An Anatomy
of Thought: The Origin and Machinery of the Mind.
[I]f mental events are epiphenomena, they cannot have any survival value. Darwin’s struggle for
existence is a struggle in the physical world, and if
mental events cannot cause physical effects they can
not affect the outcome in that struggle. But if they
cannot affect the outcome—if they have no survival value—why should we have evolved brains
that make them possible?… That they make con
scious thought possible is not relevant, for thought
that merely accompanies behaviour without influ
encing it will be ignored by natural selection….
Even if the notion that mental events are epiphenomena is true, it leaves unexplained what
most needs explaining. Why should particular
physical changes in our nervous systems cause
feelings or thoughts? Even epiphenomena need
to be accounted for. The smoke from the engine
may not move the train, but its presence is not a mys
tery. There’s no smoke without fire, we are told, and
we are confident of locating the fire in the engine’s
firebox…. So despite its promising start, the notion
that mental events are epiphenomena has not got us
out of the difficulties that a combination of common
sense and physics got us into (1999, pp. 10,11-12, emp.
added).
It seems that we keep returning to that phrase “common
sense.” And rightly so! Would that there were more of it in
discussions by philosophers and scientists regarding the subject
of human consciousness. Things that are counter-intuitive
may just be...wrong—as Beloff concluded:
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There are, however, at least three good reasons for
doubting the epiphenomenalist thesis. In the first
place, it is profoundly counter-intuitive; in the sec
ond place its implications lead to absurd conclusions;
in the third place there exist certain anomalous men
tal phenomena which are inexplicable given the known
properties of the brain.
As if this were not enough, we must note that epiphe
nomenalism necessarily sacrifices the concept of “free
will,” a concept which permeates so profoundly all
talk of “justice,” “merit” and “morality.” For, clearly,
the commission of a crime is as much the outcome of
impersonal brain processes as is altruistic behaviour.
Hitler is no more blameworthy for his misdeeds than
he is for his reflexes, both ultimately being products
of his brain, essentially just a complex electrochemi
cal machine (1994).
Depriving humans of free will is no small matter. In speak
ing of the implications of philosopher John Searle’s work,
Rodney Cotterill remarked:
Searle also stresses the importance of intentionality,
by which he means that mental states are usually re
lated to, or directed toward, external situations and
circumstances…. One aspect of intentionality con
cerns choice, irrespective of whether this implies the
exercise of free will. Even if choices were not really free, the fact that we are able to handle it
would still warrant contemplation. Searle’s point
is well taken…. Searle has identified one of the
defining characteristics of the higher organism
(1998, p. 320, italics in orig., emp. added).
Free will is “one of the defining characteristics of higher or
ganisms.” And it does exist—sort of.
Sort of? Apparently so. Writing on “Problems Outstand
ing in the Evolution of Brain Function” in The Encyclopaedia of
Ignorance, brain scientist and Nobel laureate Roger Sperry
wrote:
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Unlike “mind,” “consciousness,” and “instinct,” “free
will” has made no comeback in behavioral science in
recent years. Most behavioral scientists would refuse
to list free will among our problems outstanding, or
at least as an unanswered problem…. Every advance
in the science of behavior, whether it has come
from the psychiatrist’s couch, from microelectrode
recording, from brain-splitting, or from the running
of cannibalistic flatworms, seems only to reinforce
that old suspicion that free will is just an illusion.
The more we learn about the brain and behavior,
the more deterministic, lawful, and causal it appears (1977, p. 432, emp. added).
And so, with one fell swoop of the pen, we are asked to be
lieve that free will is “just an illusion.” It appears that the best
the evolutionists can do is to suggest that “in the abstract there
may be no free will,” but “in practice,” there really is. Paul Ehr
lich has suggested exactly that—in those very words.
That enormous complexity of our brains can also, in
a way, explain humanity’s famed “free will.” …Thus,
although in the abstract there may be no free will, in
practice the brains of human beings evolved so that
intentional individuals can make real choices and can
make them within a context of ethical alternatives….
Natural selection has endowed us with the capacity to
figure out a course of action in virtually any situation,
“accepting” the possibility that a chosen course may
prove unfortunate (2000, pp. 124,125).
[After reading a quotation like the one above from Ehrlich, we
cannot help but wonder if the people who write such things
ever read them?!]
But what is the origin of human free will? Steven Pinker is
convinced that the explanation is “all in the circuits.” In an
article he authored (“Are Your Genes to Blame?”) for the Jan
uary 20, 2003 issue of Time magazine, he testified:
As we increase our knowledge of how the genome
works, many beliefs about ourselves will indeed have
to be rethought. But the worst fears of the genophobes
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are misplaced. It is easy to exaggerate the significance
of behavioral genetics for our lives. For one thing,
genes cannot pull the strings of behavior directly. Be
havior is caused by the activity of the brain, and the
most genes can do is affect its wiring, size, shape and
sensitivity to hormones and other molecules. Among
the brain circuits laid down by genes are the ones
that reflect on memories, current circumstances and
the anticipated consequences of various courses of
action and that select behavior accordingly—in an in
tricate and not entirely predictable way. These circuits are what we call “free will,” and providing
them with information about the likely consequences of behavioral options is what we call
“holding people responsible.” All normal people
have this circuitry, and that is why the existence of
genes with effects on behavior should not be allowed
to erode responsibility in the legal system or in every
day life (161[3]:99, emp. added).
Not everyone is willing to buy into such a hypothesis, how
ever. As Paul Davies asked: “Where is there room in the de
terministic predictive laws of electrical circuitry for free will?”
(1983, p. 74, emp. in orig.). Or, in the words of Daniel Dennett:
If the concept of consciousness were to “fall to science,”
what would happen to our sense of moral agency and
free will? If conscious experience were “reduced” some
how to mere matter in motion, what would happen to
our appreciation of love and pain and dreams and joy?
If conscious human beings were “just” animated ma
terial objects, how could anything we do to them be
right or wrong? (1991, pp. 24-25).
Sir John Eccles, though by his own admission a committed
Darwinian (see Eccles, 1967, p. 7; 1977, p. 98), argued strongly
(from his own research into the relationship between mental
intentions and neural events) in behalf of free will—what he
called “the freedom to know and freedom to act” (see Cousins,
1985, p. 152). As Eccles himself stated:
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If we can establish that we have freedom to bring about
simple movements at will, then more complex social
and moral situations must also in part at least be open
to control by a voluntary decision, i.e., of mental
thought processes. Thus we have opened the way to
the consideration of personal freedom and moral re
sponsibility (as quoted in Cousins, p. 154).
There is one thing epiphenomenalism does not do—and that
is to “open the way to the consideration of personal freedom
and moral responsibility.” To quote E.O. Wilson:
And old impasse nonetheless remains. If the mind
is bound by the laws of physics, and if it can con
ceivably be read like calligraphy, how can there be
free will? I do not mean free will in the trivial sense,
the ability to choose one’s thoughts and behavior free
of the will of others and the rest of the world all around.
I mean, instead, freedom from the constraints imposed by the physiochemical states of one’s own
body and mind (1998, p. 119, emp. added).
Good question. If the mind is “bound by the laws of physics,”
then “how can there be free will?” Little wonder that Herbert
Feigl lamented: “Scientific psychology, as the well-known
saying goes, having first lost its soul, later its consciousness,
seems finally to lose its mind altogether” (1967, p. 3).
The truth of the matter is, however, that: “If consciousness
has a biological function at all, it must ultimately be manifest
in behaviour” (Zeman, 2001, 124:1280). Yet, as Eccles and
Robinson rightly remarked: “Observable behavior is not a
reliable guide to comprehending the psychological dimension
of life…. Morally we are possessed of ‘oughts,’ which, as we
have argued, have absolutely no material or physical reference”
(1984, pp. 52,169, emp. in orig.). Enough said.
Identity Theory
Earlier in this discussion, we quoted Gordon Taylor, who
mentioned that monists are “split into those who deny that
mental events exist at all…and those who claim that mental events are just physical events described in another
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language. This last position [is] known as identity theory” (1979, pp. 20-21, emp. added). Herbert Feigl, one of iden
tity theory’s most ardent defenders (in his 1967 book, The “Men
tal” and the “Physical”), described the concept in this manner:
I think that it is precisely one of the advantages of the
identity theory that it removes the duality of two
sets of correlated events, and replaces it by the much
less puzzling duality of two ways of knowing the
same event—one direct, the other indirect (p. 106,
emp. added).
Confused? We are not surprised. In our judgment, identity
theory is not exactly an easy concept to comprehend. Doubt
that? Listen to the following definition offered by Feigl, who
began by stating that “it will be advisable first to state my the
sis quite succinctly,” and then offered the following “succinct”
summary:
The raw feels of direct experience as we “have” them,
are empirically identifiable with the referents of cer
tain specifiable concepts of molar behavior theory,
and these in turn are empirically identifiable with the
referents of some neurophysiological concepts…. The
identity thesis which I wish to clarify and to defend asserts that the states of direct experience
which conscious human beings “live through,”
and those which we confidently ascribe to some
of the higher animals, are identical with certain
aspects of the neural processes in those organisms.
...[I]dentity theory regards sentience…[as] the basic
reality (1967, pp. 78,79,107, emp. added).
Now, doesn’t that clear up any confusion you may have expe
rienced?!
In short, identity theory (a.k.a., “phenomenalistic par
allelism”) suggests that while sentience itself is indeed “the
basic reality,” whatever hints of consciousness that an organ
ism (including a human) might experience are, in fact, the
end result of “neural processes.” Brain and consciousness (or
mind and body) are but two different expressions of one un-
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derlying reality—just as the convex and concave surfaces of a
sphere are but two expressions of an underlying reality. As
Ruse described it:
[M]ost Darwinians who think about these sorts of
things are inclined to some kind of monism, or (as it
is often known today) to some kind of identity theory. They think that body and mind are manifestations of the same thing, and that as selection works
on one it affects the other, and as it works on the other
it affects the former (2001b, pp. 199-200, parentheti
The key phrase here, of course, is that “body and mind are
manifestations of the same thing.” And so, “mental” events are
just “physical” events” described in another language. Eccles
offered this synopsis:
Mental states exist as an inner aspect of some mate
rial structures that in present formulations are re
stricted to brain structures such as nerve cells. This
postulated “identity” may appear to give an effective
action, just as the “identical” nerve cells have an effec
tive action. However, the result of the transaction
is that the purely material events of neural action are themselves sufficient for all brain-mind
responses (1992, pp. 17-18, italics in orig., emp. ad
ded).
However, seventeen years earlier in a chapter he had au
thored on “The Brain-Mind Problem as a Frontier of Science”
for the 1975 Nobel Conference, Eccles had debunked such a
view.
Most brain scientists and philosophers evade this con
frontation across such a horrendous frontier by es
pousing some variety of psychoneural parallelism. The
conscious experiences are regarded as merely being
a spin-off from the neural events, every neural event
being postulated by its very nature to have an associ
ated conscious experience. This simple variety of par
allelism is certainly mistaken, because the great ma
jority of neural activities in the brain do not give rise
to conscious experiences. Parallellism also is unable
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to account for the experience that thought can give rise
to action, as in the so-called voluntary movements,
which must mean that cognitive events can effect
changes in the patterns of impulse discharges of cere
bral neurons. An even more pervasive experience is
that we can, at will, set in train neural machinery to re
call conscious memories from the data banks in our
brains, and then judge the correctness of the recalls.
The most telling criticism against parallelism can be
mounted against its key postulate that the happen
ings in the neural machinery of the brain provide a
necessary and sufficient explanation of the totality both of the performance and of the conscious experience of a human being (1977, pp. 75
76, emp. in orig.).
Furthermore, four years prior to that, Dr. Eccles had pointed
out that, in identity theory,
…it is postulated that all neuronal activity in the ce
rebrum comes through to consciousness somehow
or other and is all expressed there. An often-used anal
ogy is that neuronal activity and conscious states rep
resent two different views of the same thing, one as seen
by an external observer, the other as an inner experi
ence by the “owner” of the brain. This proposed identification, at least in its present form, is refuted by
the discovery that after commissurotomy, none
of the neuronal events in the minor hemisphere
is recognized by the conscious subject (1973, pp.
218-219, emp. added).
[A commissurotomy is a procedure wherein the corpus cal
losum (the great tract of approximately 200 million nerve fi
bers that links the brain’s two hemispheres) is surgically sev
ered, thereby disconnecting the two hemispheres from each
other. Connections of the hemispheres to lower brain regions
(known as the basal ganglia or midbrain) remain intact, and
the person on whom the surgery has been performed remains
relatively unaffected (see Eccles, 1989, pp. 205-210).] Dr. Ec
cles’ point is well taken. If certain neuronal events no longer
are recognized by the “owner” of the brain, yet that “owner”
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still is conscious, the consciousness is something more than
simply “neuronal events.” In the book that Dr. Eccles edited
on Brain and Conscious Experience, he concluded: “There can
be much complex functional activity going on in the fully or
ganized human brain and yet it does not reach consciousness.
I think it is very important to appreciate that it is not just
complex nerve structure that gives consciousness” (1965,
p. 499, emp. added).
John Searle, in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), argued that
mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological proces
ses in the brain, and are themselves features of the brain. He
referred to this point of view as “biological naturalism,” and
suggested that “mental processes are as much a part of our bi
ological natural history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or en
zyme secretion” (see Scott, 1995, p. 132). Beloff, in his discus
sion of identity theory, expressed serious doubts about its ex
plicatory value.
Thus the so-called “mind-brain identity” theory, as
sociated with Herbert Feigl in the United States and
with Bertrand Russell in Britain, which flourished dur
ing the 1950s, insisted that the mental events we as
sociate with consciousness just are the relevant brain
events but viewed, as it were, from the inside rather
than the outside. Whether such a formulation is even
tenable, I am still very doubtful; it begs the question as to whether two entities that have entirely
different properties could, ontologically, be regarded as one and the same (1994, italics in orig.,
emp. added).
But surely that is just the point! How can two entities that have
completely different properties be regarded as “one and the
same”? Is it not obvious that identity theory fails to account
for the important qualitative properties of consciousness—
the features that we experience in the first person as an “I” or
a “me.” Identity theory cannot begin to explain what Eccles
referred as “the certainty of my inner core of unique individ
uality” (1992, p. 240).
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Nonreductive Materialism/Emergent Materialism
Without doubt, one of the most vocal supporters of monis
tic materialism is Sir Francis Crick, who suggested in his 1994
book, The Astonishing Hypothesis, that, eventually, everything
will be explicable in terms of the neural pathways in the brain
—a claim that he correctly identified in the title of his book as
“astonishing!” During the twentieth century, refinements of
monistic-materialistic concepts appeared under the name of
nonreductive materialism. The British philosopher C.D.
Broad and certain of his contemporaries held the view that
the brain is the seat of all mental capacities, but they simulta
neously maintained that while “mental states” emerge from
the physical substratum of the brain, those mental states are
not reducible to the brain. This view came to be called emergent materialism (see Wyller, 1996, p. 215). In the words of
Jerome Elbert:
The chemistry of living and nonliving matter is the
same. The differences between living and nonliving
matter are found in the elaborate and intricately or
ganized structure of living matter. Living matter is
the highly refined product of billions of years of test
ing and modification of self-reproducing structures.
Living matter is a completely natural and beautifully
organized product of Earth’s unusually favorable en
vironment…. Emergent properties of matter [are]
described as properties that emerge from matter
when special circumstances apply to it, such as
the organization of the matter into large numbers
of similar units that can interact with each other.
Consciousness may be the most challenging example of such an emergent property. It gives mat
ter a radically new property that is acquired only un
der very special conditions. Think of what a tiny frac
tion of the solar system’s matter is conscious! (2000,
pp. 215,243, emp. in orig.).
Scott concurred: “Thus, I suggest, consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, one born of many discrete events fusing
together as a single experience” (1995, p. 3, emp. in orig.).
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One of the best-known advocates of emergentism is phi
losopher John Searle. In opposition to the pure reductionists,
Searle argues that first-person mental experiences (“I am in
pain”) cannot be reduced to mere neural firings, for in so do
ing, important first-person features like subjectivity are lost.
In opposition to the dualists, however, Searle suggests that
the strict dichotomy between mental and physical properties
should be discarded. Mental properties are simply “one kind
of property” that physical things can possess. Pain and other
mental phenomena are just features of the brain (and
perhaps the rest of the central nervous system) [see Searle,
1984, p. 19]. Consciousness, therefore, is simply a higher-order feature of the brain. Searle denies that consciousness tran
scends the physical, or that it possesses causal powers that
cannot be explained by the interactions of the brain’s neurons.
According to this view, as Reichenbach and Anderson pointed
out, “consciousness has no life of its own apart from that in
which it is realized. But because of this, Searle’s emergentist
view leaves no room for free moral agency” (1995, p. 286).
Such an assessment is correct, as Searle himself admitted:
As long as we accept this conception of how nature works, then it doesn’t seem that there is any
scope for the freedom of the will because on this
conception the mind can only affect nature in so far
as it is a part of nature. But if so, then like the rest of
nature, its features are determined at the basic microlevel of physics (1984, p. 93, emp. added).
Consciousness, then, according to this theory, is viewed as
something that has “emerged from” the neural pathways of
the brain, but, in and of itself, is not reducible to those neural
pathways.
Another well-known advocate of the nonreductive phys
icalist viewpoint is Roger Sperry who, like Francis Crick and
John Eccles, won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.
Dr. Sperry, however, adopted a view diametrically opposed to
that of Crick’s monist-materialism, yet was unwilling to accept
the form of dualism advocated by Eccles. He concluded:
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Consciousness is conceived to be a dynamic
emergent property of brain activity, neither
identical with nor reducible to, the neural events
of which it is mainly composed…. Consciousness
exerts potential causal effects on the interplay of ce
rebral operations…. In the position of top command
at the highest levels in the hierarchy of brain organi
zation, the subjective properties were seen to exert
control over the biophysical and chemical activities
at subordinate levels (as quoted in Jeeves, 1998, p. 88,
emp. added).
Sperry’s concept is what is referred to as a “top-down view”
(like that of Dr. Eccles ) where mental events are given onto
logical priority. But, unlike Eccles, Sperry is adamant about
avoiding any hint of dualism. Thus, while the emergent ma
terialists may claim that mental states emerge from the phys
ical substratum of the brain without being reducible to the
brain, the fact remains, as Ernst Mayr noted, “emergentism
is a thoroughly materialistic philosophy” (1982, p. 64). Yes,
it is.
The nonreductive physicalist view regards mental activity
and correlated brain activity as “inner” and “outer” aspects of
one complex set of events, which together constitute “conscious
human agency.” As Jeeves explained:
The irreducible duality of human nature is on this view
seen as duality of aspects rather than duality of
substance…. It does not mean that the mind is a mere
epiphenomenon of the physical activity of the brain.
We may think of the way the mind “determines” brain
activity as analogous to the relation between the soft
ware and the hardware of our computers. According
to this view, we regard mental activity as embodied in
brain activity rather than as being identical with brain
activity (p. 89, italics in orig., emp. added).
Sperry, in a chapter (“Holding Course Amidst Shifting Par
adigms”) he authored for the book, New Metaphysical Founda
tions of Modern Science, discussed the concepts behind emer
gent materialism. He began by noting that, in emergent ma-
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terialism, “the traditional difference between the physical and
the mental (as subjectively perceived) is deliberately retained,
but with these previously separate, dual realms not inextrica
bly merged...” (1994, p. 110, parenthetical item in orig.). In
Sperry’s view, conscious or mental phenomena are “dynamic,
emergent phenomena (or configurational) properties of the
living brain in action” (as quoted in Cousins, 1985, p. 66, par
enthetical item in orig.). In commenting on this, Cousins re
marked:
This seems to imply that the source of mental inten
tions is the brain itself in living action—but that once
these emergent mental properties appear, they have
causal control potency over the “lower” activities of
the brain at the subnuclear, nuclear and molecular
levels. Mind emerges from brain, then takes
charge as chief or director in the complex chain
of command within the brain. In Sperry’s view, there
is no need to appeal to any source outside the living
brain in order to explain the origin and existence of
mental phenomena (1985, pp. 66-67, emp. added).
Cousins is correct. Sperry himself stated:
One can agree that the scientific evidence speaks
against any preplanned purposive design of a super
natural intelligence. At the same time the evidence
shows that the great bulk of the evolving web of crea
tion is governed by a complex pattern of great intri
cacy with many mutually reinforcing directive, pur
posive constraints at higher levels, particularly. The
“grand orderly design” is, in a sense, all the more re
markable for having been self-developed (as quoted
in Cousins, 1985, p. 87).
[W.H. Thorpe wrote in a similar vein: “The most important
biological discovery of recent years is the discovery that the
processes of life are directed by programmes…[and] that life
is not merely programmed activity but self-programmed
activity” (1977, p. 3, emp. added).] But Sperry did not end
there. Rather, he went on to comment:
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In my view, mental phenomena as dynamic emergent properties of physical brain states become
inextricably interfused with, and thus inseparable from, their physiologic substrates…. [I]t still
seems to me a mistake overall to abandon the age-old
common-sense distinction between mind and mat
ter, the mental and the physical. This basic common
distinction long preceded the varied philosophic jar
gon and scientific terminology. The highly distinctive specialness of conscious states with their subjective qualities does not go away just because
they are taken to be emergent properties of physical brain processes (pp. 109-110,111, emp. added).
With all due respect, Dr. Sperry (distinguished scientist
and Nobel laureate that he is) appears to “want it both ways.”
He believes that it is a mistake to abandon the distinction be
tween the physical and the mental, and admits that conscious
ness endows a “highly distinctive specialness” that does not
disappear just because someone (like him) claims that it is
merely an “emergent property of physical brain processes.”
Yet he wants to believe that “the scientific evidence speaks
against any preplanned purposive design of a supernatural in
telligence” and that “there is no need to appeal to any source
outside the living brain in order to explain the origin and exis
tence of mental phenomena.” Richard Heinberg contradicted
Sperry with common sense facts of nature when he commented:
Darwin added an essential historical dimension to
the discussion: Not only are all living organisms com
posed solely of insensate matter obeying physical
laws, but they have been assembled over eons of time
into their present functional combinations by a pro
cess that is random and purposeless….
However, the idea that organisms have no inner sense
of purpose is contradicted by our own human expe
rience. We each make plans, formulate goals, and pur
sue strategies routinely. And there is every indication
that other creatures do the same, if perhaps not as con
sciously. The evidence is so persuasive that many bi-
- 391 -
ologists who otherwise subscribe to a reductionist-mechanist view are nevertheless forced to acknowledge
some capacity of inner purpose on the part of organ
isms (1999, pp. 65,67-68, emp. in orig.).
Medawar and Medawar, in their textbook, The Life Sciences:
Current Ideas of Biology, wrote in agreement: “Purposiveness is
one of the distinguishing characteristics of living things. Of
course birds build nests in order to house their young, and
equally obviously, the enlargement of a second kidney when
the first is removed comes about to allow one kidney to do the
work formerly done by two” (1977, pp. 11-12, emp. in orig.).
Cell biologist Edmund Sinnot remarked:
Life is not aimless, nor are its actions at random. They
are regulatory and either maintain a goal already
achieved or move toward one which is yet to be real
ized…. [Every living thing exhibits] activity which tends
toward a realization of a developmental pattern or goal.
...Such teleology [purpose], far from being unscien
tific, is implicit in the very nature of the organism (1961,
p. 41, bracketed items added).
Evolutionist Sir John Eccles strongly disagreed with his Nobel
Prize-winning evolutionist colleague, Roger Sperry, when he
wrote:
Great display is made by all varieties of materialists
that their brain-mind theory is in accord with natural
law as it now is. However, this claim is invalidated by
two most weighty considerations. Firstly, nowhere
in the laws of physics or in the laws of the derivative sciences, chemistry and biology, is there any
reference to consciousness or mind…. Regard
less of the complexity of electrical, chemical or bio
logical machinery, there is no statement in the “natu
ral laws” that there is an emergence of this strange non
material entity, consciousness or mind. This is not to
affirm that consciousness does not emerge in the evo
lutionary process, but merely to state that its emergence is not reconcilable with the natural laws
as at present understood (1992, pp. 19-20, emp.
added).
- 392 -
Sperry may want emergent materialism to be true, but, as
Eccles so eloquently pointed out, such “is not reconcilable
with the natural laws as at present understood.”
Dualist-Interactionism
When we began our examination of theories of human con
sciousness, we quoted Gordon Taylor, who assessed a number
of the theories of the mind, and then stated: “None of these
views, I may as well warn you, stands up to inspection” (1979,
pp. 20-21, emp. added). Our comment at the time was: “As
we bring this discussion on consciousness to a close, we want
to offer a third alternative that does ‘stand up to inspection.’”
We now have reached that point.
Earlier, we quoted from Adam Zeman who, in his review,
“Consciousness,” for the journal Brain, mentioned that “the
current fascination with consciousness reflects the mounting
intellectual pressure to explain how ‘vital activity’ in the brain
generates a ‘mental element,’ with rich subjective content”
(2001, 124:1284). In other words, the pressure is on to answer
the question: Whence comes consciousness?
Surely, by now it is evident from our review that all of the
monist-materialistic concepts have failed miserably to offer
any cogent, consistent, and adequate theory about the origin
of human consciousness. Acknowledgment of that fact prompts
the question: “Why, then, do so many scientists and philoso
phers cling to the monist-materialist viewpoint?”
We are convinced that the monist-materialistic view has
remained so deeply ingrained because the only legitimate alternative—some form of dualism—postulates a supernatural
origin for human self-awareness! And we cannot do better to
prove our point than to quote from Daniel Dennett.
The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and ar
gued for, is materialism: there is only one sort of stuff,
namely matter—the physical stuff of physics, chemis
try, and physiology—and the mind is somehow noth
ing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is
the brain. According to the materialists, we can (in prin-
- 393 -
ciple) account for every mental phenomenon using
the same physical principles, laws, and raw materials
that suffice to explain radioactivity, continental drift,
photosynthesis, reproduction, nutrition, and growth.
It is one of the main burdens of this book to explain consciousness without ever giving in to the
siren song of dualism….
The standard objection to dualism was all too familiar
to Descartes himself in the seventeenth century, and
it is fair to say that neither he nor any subsequent dual
ist has ever overcome it convincingly. If mind and body
are distinct things or substances, they nevertheless must
interact; the bodily sense organs, via the brain, must in
form the mind, must send to it or present it with per
ceptions or ideas or data of some sort, and then the
mind, having thought things over, must direct the body
in appropriate action. Hence the view is often called
Cartesian interactionism or interactionist dualism….
It is surely no accident that the few dualists to avow
their views openly have all candidly and comfortably
announced that they have no theory whatever of how
the mind works—something, they insist, that is quite
beyond human ken. There is the lurking suspicion that
the most attractive feature of mind stuff is its promise
of being so mysterious that it keeps science at bay for
ever. This fundamentally unscientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most disqualifying feature, and is the reason why in this book I adopt
the apparently dogmatic rule that dualism is to
be avoided at all costs. It is not that I think I can give
a knock-down proof that dualism, in all its forms, is
false or incoherent, but that, given the way dualism wal
lows in mystery, accepting dualism is giving up
(1991, pp. 33,34,37, italics and parenthetical item in
orig., emp. added).
In Dennett’s view, monistic-materialism must rule! Pe
riod. The acceptance of something—anything—outside of sci
ence is unthinkable, and represents what Nobel laureate
Jacques Monod referred to as “animism” (belief in spirits). In
his book, Chance and Necessity, Monod addressed this matter in
very blunt terms.
- 394 -
Animism established a covenant between nature and
man, a profound alliance outside of which seems to
stretch only terrifying solitude. Must we break this
tie because the postulate of objectivity requires it?
[Monod answers “Yes!”—BH/BT]
…[A]ll these systems rooted in animism exist outside
objective knowledge, outside truth, and are strangers
and fundamentally hostile to science, which they are
willing to use but do not respect or cherish. The di
vorce is so great, the lie so flagrant, that it can only
obsess and lacerate anyone who has some culture or intelligence, or is moved by that moral ques
tioning which is the source of all creativity. It is an af
fliction, that is to say, for all those who bear or will bear
the responsibility for the way in which society and cul
ture will evolve….
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at
last that he is alone in the universe’s unfeeling
immensity, out of which he emerged only by
chance. His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his
duty. The kingdom above or the darkness below; it is
for him to choose (1972, pp. 31,171-172,180, italics in
orig., emp. added).
Animism, says Monod, is a “lie so flagrant, that it can only ob
sess and lacerate anyone who has some culture or intelligence.”
Why does he write in such terrifyingly angry words about a be
lief in something other than the monist-materialist viewpoint?
Perhaps Carrington answered that question best when he wrote
that in animism
…we have the world-old notion of mind or soul, and
body, existing as separate entities, influencing each
other. Mind is here supposed to influence matter, and
utilize it for the purposes of its manifestation. Were
such a theory true, it would of course enable us to ac
cept not only the reality of psychic phenomena but
the persistence of individual human consciousness after death. The main objection to this doctrine is that it postulates a form of dualism, which
is very obnoxious to many minds! It is possible,
- 395 -
however, that such a doctrine may one day be forced
upon us by the gradually increasing evidence fur
nished us by psychical research (1923, p. 53, italics
Those of the monist-materialist bent know full well what
the implications would be if they were to allow (or, perish the
thought, accept) any form of dualism. As Custance asked:
“[H]ow can we account for ‘mind’ if it did not originate in the
physical world?” (1980, p. 20). Let us answer that by quoting
two of Monod’s evolutionist colleagues—Eccles and Robinson.
It is not in doubt that each human recognizes its own
uniqueness…. Since materialist solutions fail to
account for our experienced uniqueness, we are
constrained to attribute the uniqueness of the
psyche or soul to a supernatural creation. To give
the explanation in theological terms: Each soul is a
Divine creation, which is “attached” to the growing
fetus at some point between conception and birth. It
is the certainty of the inner core of unique individual
ity that necessitates the “Divine creation.” We submit that no other explanation is tenable (1984, p.
43, emp. added).
Strong stuff, that. But equally strong was their out-and-out con
demnation of the monist-materialist viewpoint.
[T]he denial of the reality of mental events, as in radi
cal materialism, is an easy cop-out…. Radical materialism should have a prominent place in the history of human silliness. We regard promissory
materialism as a superstition without a rational
foundation. The more we discover about the brain,
the more clearly do we distinguish between the brain
events and the mental phenomena, and the more won
derful do both the brain events and the mental phe
nomena become. Promissory materialism is simply a religious belief held by dogmatic materialists…who often confuse their religion with their
science (1984, pp. 17,36, emp. added).
- 396 -
So what is the alternative? Darwin’s contemporary, Alfred
Russel Wallace, addressed that question in 1903 when he wrote
(at the age of 80) his classic work, Man’s Place in Nature: A Study
of the Results of Scientific Research in Relation to the Unity or Plu
rality of Worlds.
The other body and probably much larger would be
represented by those who, holding that mind is
essentially superior to matter and distinct from
it, cannot believe that life, consciousness, mind
are products of matter. They hold that the marvel
ous complexity of forces, which appear to control mat
ter, if not actually to constitute it, are and must be
mind products (as quoted in Wyller, 1996, p. 231,
emp. added).
Neurologist Wilder Penfield wrote:
Or, if one chooses the second, the dualistic alternative,
the mind must be viewed as a basic element in itself.
One might, then, call it a medium, an essence, a soma.
That is to say, it has a continuing existence. On this
basis, one must assume that although the mind is silent
when it no longer has its special connection to the brain,
it exists in the silent intervals, and takes over control
when the highest brain-mechanism does go into ac
tion (1975, p. 81, emp. in orig.).
More recently, James Trefil conceded: “Nonetheless, there
is a sense in which something like Descartes’ procedure
remains valid for the question of human consciousness”
(1997, p. 181, emp. added). Paul Davies wrote: “…[P]hysics,
which led the way for all other sciences, is now moving to
wards a more accommodating view of mind…” (1983, p. 8).
He is correct. In fact, speaking of Cartesian dualism, Custance
maintained:
The theory cannot be disproved so long as there are
mental phenomena whose neural correlates remain
unknown. That there are mental phenomena cannot
be doubted for reasons which are logically compul
sive and were adopted (though not invented) by Des
cartes; they cannot be doubted because the very act
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of doubting them establishes their reality. The reality of conscious existence is confirmed each time
it is denied…. Most of the important thinkers who
followed Descartes rejected interactionism…. But
slowly, as the evidence has accumulated, it appears that the monistic view is showing signs of
insufficiency and a new dualism is in the making
(1980, pp. 30,31, italics and parenthetical items in orig.,
emp. added).
Custance, too, is correct. There is now a “new dualism in the
making.” In speaking of the evolutionary emergence of selfconsciousness, for example, various writers (e.g., Lack, 1961,
p. 128; Lorenz, 1971, 2:170) have even broached the subject
of the “unbridgeable gap or gulf between soul and body.”
Carl Gustav Jung summed up this idea of a separate mind/
body interaction when he said: “I simply believe that some part
of the human Self or Soul is not subject to the laws of space
and time” (as quoted in Davies, 1983, p. 72). Lord Adrian tartly
snorted: “…[T]he gulf between mental and material can scarce
ly be called self-evident.” Then he quietly admitted:
Yet for many of us there is still the one thing which
does seem to lie outside that tidy and familiar frame
work. That thing is ourself, our ego, the I who does
the perceiving and the thinking and acting, the person
who is aware of his identity and his surroundings. As
soon as we let ourselves contemplate our own place
in the picture we seem to be stepping outside the boun
daries of natural science (1965, pp. 239,240).
Or, as Eccles concluded: “It is my thesis that we have to rec
ognize that the unique selfhood is the result of a supernatural creation of what in the religious sense is called
a soul” (1982, p. 97, emp. added).
Notice, too, what Carrington conceded: “It is possible, how
ever, that such a doctrine may one day be forced upon us by
the gradually increasing evidence furnished us by psychical
research” (1923, p. 53). Even Zeman, seventy-eight years later
in his exhaustive, peer-reviewed article on consciousness, ad-
- 398 -
mitted that “a number of commentators believe that some ver
sion of this…‘dual-aspect’ theory holds out the greatest prom
ise of an eventual solution to the philosophical conundrum of
consciousness” (2001, 124:1284, emp. added). Roger Lewin
conceded:
[F]or the most part, materialism, the philosophical
alternative to dualism, dominates modern thinking
about consciousness…. True, Cartesian dualism is
not completely dead, as evidenced in the views of
Sir John Eccles, one of this century’s greatest neurol
ogists… (1992, p. 157, emp. added).
In an article—“Scientists in Search of the Soul”—that he wrote
for Science Digest, John Gliedman admitted:
From Berkeley to Paris and from London to Prince
ton, prominent scientists from fields as diverse as neur
ophysiology and quantum physics are coming out of
the closet and admitting they believe in the possibility, at least, of such unscientific entities as the
immortal human spirit and divine creation (1982,
90[7]:77, emp. added).
One of the scientists discussed at some length by Mr. Gliedman
was Sir John Eccles of Great Britain. Daniel Dennett wrote in
his book, Consciousness Explained: “Ever since Gilbert Ryle’s
classic attack (1949) on what he called Descartes’ ‘dogma of
the ghost in the machine,’ dualists have been on the defensive”
(1991, p. 33). Not any more! Allow us to introduce you to Sir
John Eccles—the man Roger Lewin called “one of this century’s
greatest neurologists.”
Dr. Eccles, until his death in 1997 at the age of 94, was one
of the world’s most eminent electrophysiologists. He gradu
ated from Oxford (where he matriculated on a Rhodes schol
arship under the man he called “the greatest neuroscientist of
the age, Sir Charles Sherrington”—Eccles, 1994, p. 13) in 1929
with a D.Phil. (the British equivalent of an American Ph.D.),
was a professor of physiology at Australian National Univer
sity from 1952-1966, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in
1958, and five years later in 1963 won the Nobel Prize in Phys-
- 399 -
iology or Medicine (shared with Alan L. Hodgkin and Andrew
F. Huxley) for his research on the biophysical properties of
synaptic transmission. Gliedman, in his 1982 article on “Sci
entists in Search of the Soul,” had this to say about Dr. Eccles:
At age 79, Sir John Eccles is not going “gentle into the
night.” Still trim and vigorous, the great physiologist
has declared war on the past 300 years of scientific
speculation about man’s nature.
Winner of the 1963 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medi
cine for his pioneering research on the synapse—the
point at which nerve cells communicate with the brain
—Eccles strongly defends the ancient religious
belief that human beings consist of a mysterious
compound of physical and intangible spirit.
Each of us embodies a nonmaterial thinking and per
ceiving self that “entered” our physical brain some
time during embryological development or very early
childhood, says the man who helped lay the corner
stones of modern neurophysiology. This “ghost in
the machine” is responsible for everything that makes
us distinctly human: conscious self-awareness, free
will, personal identity, creativity and even emotions
such as love, fear, and hate. Our nonmaterial self
controls its “liaison brain” the way a driver steers
a car or a programmer directs a computer. Man’s
ghostly spiritual presence, says Eccles, exerts just
the whisper of a physical influence on the computerlike brain, enough to encourage some neurons to fire and others to remain silent. Boldly ad
vancing what for most scientists is the greatest heresy
of all, Eccles also asserts that our nonmaterial self sur
vives the death of the physical brain (90[7]:77, emp.
added).
While there are many other things we could say about Dr.
Eccles and the various honors and awards that were bestowed
upon him during his lengthy and impressive professional ca
reer, these are enough to convince the reader of his qualifica
tions to speak on the subjects that he is about to address. [The
- 400 -
reader who is interested in learning more about Dr. Eccles
might wish to visit the following Web sites: (1) http://www.
asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/biogs/P000382b.htm; (2)
http://www.nobel.se.medicine/laureates/1963/index.html.
We also strongly recommend his 1994 book, How the Self Con
trols Its Brain, which was written in what was to be the twilight
of a magnificent career that spanned seven decades. Note es
pecially chapter two, which he titled simply “My Story.”]
Anyone familiar with neurophysiology or neurobiology
knows the name of Sir John Eccles. [One of us (BH) studied
Dr. Eccles’ works while earning a Ph.D. in neurobiology.]
But for those who might not be familiar with this amazing
gentleman, we would like to introduce Dr. Eccles via the fol
lowing quotation, which comes from a chapter (“The Col
lapse of Modern Atheism”) that Norman Geisler authored
for the book, The Intellectuals Speak Out About God (which, by
the way, also contained a chapter by Dr. Eccles). Geisler wrote:
The extreme form of materialism believes that mind
(or soul) is matter. More modern forms believe mind
is reducible to matter or dependent on it. However, from
a scientific perspective much has happened in
our generation to lay bare the clay feet of materialism. Most noteworthy among this is the Nobel Prize winning work of Sir John Eccles. His
work on the brain demonstrated that the mind
or intention is more than physical. He has shown
that the supplementary motor area of the brain
is fired by mere intention to do something, without the motor cortex of the brain (which controls
muscle movements) operating.So, ineffect, themind
is to the brain what an archivist is to a library. The for
mer is not reducible to the latter (1984, pp. 140-141,
italics and parenthetical item in orig., emp. added).
Eccles, and his lifelong friend, Sir Karl Popper, the famed
British philosopher of science, viewed the mind as a distinctly
non-material entity. But neither did so for religious reasons.
Dr. Eccles was a committed Darwinian evolutionist (as was
- 401 -
Popper). Rather, they believed what they did about the hu
man mind because of their research! Speaking specifically of
human self-consciousness, Eccles wrote:
It is dependent on the existence of a sufficient number
of such critically poised neurons, and, consequently,
only in such conditions are willing and perceiving pos
sible. However, it is not necessary for the whole cor
tex to be in this special dynamic state…. On the basis
of this concept [activity of the cortex] we can face up
anew to the extraordinary problems inherent in a strong
dualism—interaction of brain and conscious mind, brain
receiving from conscious mind in a willed action and
in turn transmitting to mind in conscious experiences.
...Let us be quite clear that for each of us the primary reality is our consciousness—everything else
is derivative and has a second order reality. We
have tremendous intellectual tasks in our efforts to un
derstand baffling problems that lie right at the center
of our being (1966, pp. 312, 327, bracketed item and
emp. added).
Dr. Eccles spent his entire adult life studying the brain-mind
problem, and concluded that the two were entirely separate.
In the book from which we quoted above (Nobel Conversations),
Norman Cousins, who moderated a series of conversations
among four Nobel laureates, including Dr. Eccles, made the
following statement: “Nor was Sir John Eccles claiming too
much when he insisted that the action of non-material mind
on material brain has been not merely postulated but scientifically demonstrated” (1985, p. 68, emp. added). Eccles
himself, in his book, The Understanding of the Brain, wrote:
When I postulated many years ago, following Sher
rington [Sir Charles Sherrington, Nobel laureate and
Eccles’ mentor—BH/BT], that there was a special area
of the brain in liaison with consciousness, I certainly
did not imagine that any definitive experimental test
could be applied in a few years. But now we have this
distinction between the dominant hemisphere in li
aison with the conscious self, and the minor hemi
sphere with no such liaison (1973, p. 214).
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Before we proceed, we would like to add this one note. On
March 15, 1952, the British Medical Journal ran an obituary no
tice for Sir Charles Sherrington. That notice read as follows:
The death on March 4, 1952 of Sir Charles Sherring
ton at the age of 94 marked the passing of the man of
genius who laid the foundations of our knowledge of
the functioning of the brain and spinal cord. His clas
sic work Integrative Action of the Nervous System, pub
lished in 1906, is still a source of inspiration to physi
ologists all over the world. It was reprinted as recently
as 1947 for the first post-war (World War II) Interna
tional Congress on Physiology. His work did for neu
rology what the atomic theory did for chemistry. It is
still as refreshing as it was in 1906, and it has needed
no revision.
How embarrassing it must be for evolutionists to have to ad
mit that this “genius” who “laid the foundation of our knowl
edge of the functioning of the brain and spinal cord” told one
of his prized students, Sir John Eccles, just prior to his (Sherrington’s) death: “For me now, the only reality is the human soul” (as quoted in Popper and Eccles, 1977 p. 558, emp.
added). What an amazing statement from the man who con
structed many of the pillars on which modern neuroanatomy
now stands! Cousins continued:
Until quite recently, science assumed that to attrib
ute to non-material forces such as mental intentions
any kind of “causal” potency or control is to lapse in
to primitive mysticism or vague religious feeling….
Eccles is the one who showed that the mental acts
of intention initiate the burst of discharges in a
nerve’s brain cell. He has tried to re-enfranchise the
human mind, to get science to recognize thinking as
a more comprehensive human activity than the mere
operation of neural mechanisms….
In any event it is clear that both you [Eccles—BH/BT]
and Dr. [Roger] Sperry are upholding a “mentalist
revolution” in science. Strictly orthodox materialists
may doubt such a revolution and label it an atavistic
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throwback to “prescientific” perceptions of nature
which believed that non-material reality could act on
the material. But in fact, both of you have reached
your conclusions through the rigorous discipline
of the laboratory. If you are persuaded that mental realities initiate and direct biochemical reactions in the brain, it is scientific experimentation,
not philosophical speculation, that has convinced
you (1985, pp. 56,21,57, italics in orig., emp. added).
What, precisely, is the relationship between mind and brain?
Eccles answered as follows.
How can the mental act of intention activate across
the mind-brain frontier those particular SMA [supplementary motor area—BH/BT] neurons in the ap
propriate code for activating the motor programs that
bring about intended voluntary movements? The an
swer is that, despite the so-called “insuperable”
difficulty of having a non-material mind act on a
material brain, it has been demonstrated to occur by a mental intention—no doubt to the great
discomfiture of all materialists and physicalists
(as quoted in Cousins, 1985, pp. 55-56, emp. in orig.).
As I indicated earlier in this Conversation, what may
be called “mental intentions,” with their ability to ini
tiate a burst of discharges in a nerve cell, are not con
fined strictly to the human species. I alluded to the
work of Robert Porter and Cobie Brinkman, whose
laboratory monkeys initiated voluntary movements
by pulling levers to obtain food. It was found that with
this voluntary act, performed by simians, many of
the nerve cells of the SMA began to discharge
well before the cells in the motor cortex and in
deed before any other nerve cells of the brain, except
for a small focus in the premotor cortex, which is just
anterior to the motor cortex….
[These examples] show that mental intentions truly
exist and that they initiate the burst of discharges in a
nerve cell that leads to voluntary movement…. [W]e
have discovered that mental intentions act upon
the SMA in a highly selective, discriminating
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manner. In a fashion which is not yet fully under
stood, mental intentions are able to activate across
the mind-brain frontier those particular SMA neurons
that are coded for initiating the specialized motor pro
grams that cause voluntary movements. As I remarked
earlier, this may present an “insuperable” difficulty
for some scientists of materialist bent, but the fact
remains, and is demonstrated by research, that
non-material mind acts on material brain (pp. 6162,85-86, italics in orig., emp. added).
In The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind, Eccles
and Robinson discussed the research of three groups of scien
tists (Robert Porter and Cobie Brinkman, Nils Lassen and Per
Roland, and Hans Kornhüber and Luder Deecke), all of whom
produced startling and undeniable evidence that a “mental
intention” preceded an actual neuronal firing—thereby
establishing that the mind is not the same thing as the
brain, but is a separate entity altogether (1984, pp. 156-164).
As Eccles and Robinson concluded:
But it is impressive that many of the samples of sev
eral hundred SMA nerve cells were firing probably
about one-tenth of a second before the earliest dis
charge of the pyramidal cells down to the spinal cord.
...Thus there is strong support for the hypothesis that
the SMA is the sole recipient area of the brain for men
tal intentions that lead to voluntary movements (pp.
157,160, emp. in orig.).
Interestingly, Eccles was not the first to document this type
of independence in regard to the mind’s action on the brain,
as he himself conceded:
Remarkable series of experiments in the last few years
have transformed our understanding of the cerebral
events concerned with the initiation of a voluntary
movement. It can now be stated that the first brain
reactions caused by the intention to move are in nerve
cells of the supplementary motor area (SMA). It is
right at the top of the brain, mostly on the medial sur
face. This area was recognized by the renowned neu-
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rosurgeon Wilder Penfield when he was stimulating
the exposed human brain in the search for epileptic
“foci” (regions of aberrant activity associated with
epileptic seizures) [Eccles and Robinson, 1984, p. 156,
parenthetical items and emp. in orig.].
In 1961, Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield reported a
dramatic demonstration of the reality of active mind at work.
He observed mind acting independently of the brain un
der controlled experimental conditions that were reproducible
at will (see Penfield, 1961; 1975; Custance, 1980, p. 19). Dr.
Penfield’s patient suffered from epilepsy, and had one hemi
sphere of his temporal lobe exposed from a previous surgery.
Penfield reported:
When the neurosurgeon applies an electrode to the
motor area of the patient’s cerebral cortex causing
the opposite hand to move, and when he asks the pa
tient why he moved the hand, the response is: “I didn’t do it. You made me do it.” …It may be said that
the patient thinks of himself as having an existence
separate from his body. Once when I warned a pa
tient of my intention to stimulate the motor area of
the cortex, and challenged him to keep his hand from
moving when the electrode was applied, he seized it
with the other hand and struggled to hold it still. Thus
one hand, under the control of the right hemisphere
driven by an electrode, and the other hand, which he
controlled through the left hemisphere, were caused
to struggle against each other. Behind the “brain
action” of one hemisphere was the patient’s
mind. Behind the action of the other hemisphere was
the electrode (as quoted in Koestler, 1967, pp. 203
204, emp. added).
Penfield went on to conclude:
But what is it that calls upon these mechanisms, choos
ing one rather than another? Is it another mechanism
or is there in the mind something of different essence?
To declare that these two are one does not make them
so. But it does block the progress of research (p. 204).
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Upon closing his surgical practice, Dr. Penfield wrote:
Throughout my own scientific career, I, like the other
scientists, have struggled to prove that the brain ac
counts for the mind. But now, perhaps, the time has
come when we may profitably consider the evidence
as it stands, and ask the question: Do brain-mechanisms account for the mind? Can the mind be explained by what is now known about the brain?
If not, which is more reasonable of the two possible hypotheses: that man’s being is based on
one element, or on two? (1975, p. xiii, emp. added).
Penfield’s final observations caused him to reflect as follows:
This is the correct scientific approach for a neuro
physiologist: to try to prove that the brain explains
the mind and that mind is no more than a function of
the brain. But during this time of analysis, I found no
suggestion of action by a brain-mind mechanism
that accounts for mind-action….
In the end I conclude that there is no good evidence,
in spite of new methods, such as the employment of
stimulating electrodes, the study of conscious patients,
and the analysis of epileptic attacks, that the brain
alone can carry out the work that the mind does.
I conclude that it is easier to rationalize man’s
being on the basis of two elements than on the
basis of one (1975, pp. 104,114, emp. added).
These are the words of a man who studied the brain for dec
ades, and who collected and analyzed the data firsthand. In
The Mystery of the Mind, Penfield concluded that the mind might
very well be “a distinct and different essence” (p. 62, emp.
added). We agree wholeheartedly. A.O. Gomes, in his chap
ter, “The Brain-Consciousness Problem in Contemporary
Scientific Research” for the book, Brain and Conscious Experi
ence, wrote:
…[R]esearch is frequently conducted as if the whole
occurrences under study were ultimately nothing
more than the transformations of some physiological
events into others; the mental phenomena involved
- 407 -
are either ignored or given only a secondary impor
tance…. How can physical sense receptors affect
sense? How can a reaction in the brain condition
a reaction in the mind? How can the (often quoted!)
“enchanted loom” of nerve impulses in the brain, which
always weaves meaningful, but never abiding, patterns
—how can this “loom” evoke such rich mental expe
riences as the vision of everything we see, all the
sounds we hear, all the bodily sensations we may ever
become aware of? (1965, pp. 448, 446, parenthetical
item in orig., emp. added).
In the book containing the Nobel laureate conversations on
these matters, Cousins commented: “The question naturally
arises: where do mental intentions come from, what is
their source, their origin?” (1985, pp. 66-67, emp. added).
These “mental intentions” are truly important, as Tattersall
admitted when he wrote:
Everybody can agree that a major aspect of conscious
ness is the ability to form intentions; and nobody will
dispute that human beings spend much of their lives
in this activity, however hollow those intentions may
eventually turn out to be (2002, p. 58).
So how did Eccles answer the question of where these men
tal intentions originate? He responded: “In contrast to these
materialist or parallelist theories are the dualist-interaction
theories. The essential feature of these theories is that
mind and brain are independent entities…” (Eccles and
Robinson, 1984, p. 35, emp. added). By way of summary, here
is Dr. Eccles’ view:
A brief outline of the hypothesis may be given as fol
lows. The self-conscious mind is actively engaged in
reading out from the multitude of active centers at
the highest level of brain activity, namely, the liaison
modules that are largely in the dominant cerebral
hemisphere. The self-conscious mind selects from
these modules according to attention and interest,
and from moment to moment integrates its selection
to give unity even to the most transient experiences.
- 408 -
Furthermore, the self-conscious mind acts upon these
neural centers modifying the dynamic spatiotempo
ral patterns of the neural events. Thus it is proposed
that the self-conscious mind exercises a superior
interpretative and controlling role upon the neural events…. A key component of the hypothesis is
that the unity of conscious experience is provided by
the self-conscious mind and not by the neural ma
chinery of the liaison areas of the cerebral hemisphere.
...The present hypothesis regards the neuronal ma
chinery as a multiplex of radiating and receiving struc
tures: the experienced unity comes, not from a neurophysiological synthesis, but from the proposed
integrating character of the self-conscious mind
(1982, pp. 244-245, emp. added).
It was the concept of the “self-conscious mind” to which Dr.
Eccles devoted his life’s research, and on which he spoke and
wrote so often. In his invited lecture at the 1975 Nobel Con
ference, he reminded his fellow Nobel laureates:
There is the continual experience that the self-conscious mind can effectively act on the brain events.
This is most overtly seen in voluntary action, but
throughout our waking life we are deliberately evok
ing brain events when we try to recall a memory or to
recapture a word or phrase or to express a thought or
to establish a new memory…. This hypothesis gives a
prime role to the action of the self-conscious mind,
an action of choice and searching and discovering and
integrating…. A key component of the hypothesis
is that the unity of conscious experience is provided by the self-conscious mind and not by the
neural machinery of the liaison areas of the cerebral hemisphere…. Furthermore, the active role
of the self-conscious mind is extended in our hypothesis to effect changes in the neuronal events.
Thus not only does it read out selectively from the on
going activities of the neuronal machinery, but it also modifies these activities (1977, pp. 81,82,83, emp.
in orig.).
- 409 -
Dr. Eccles then concluded by saying:
There must be a partial independence of the selfconscious mind from the brain events with which
it interacts. For example, if a decision is to be freely
made it must be initiated in the self-conscious mind
and then communicated to the brain for executive
action. This sequence is even more necessary in the
exercise of creative imagination, where flashes of in
sight become expressions by triggering appropriate brain ac
tions (p. 87, italics in orig., emp. added).
How, then, would Dr. Eccles categorize himself? He cer
tainly does not fit the description of a monist-materialist. Is
he then a strict dualist? Does he consider himself a vitalist?
What position does he take as a result of his fascinating, Nobel
Prize-winning discoveries? In his book, The Human Mystery,
he quelled any suspicions.
If I should be asked to express my philosophical po
sition, I would have to admit that I am an animist on
Monod’s definition. As a dualist I believe in the real
ity of the world of mind or spirit as well as in the real
ity of the material world. Furthermore I am a finalist
in the sense of believing that there is some Design in
the processes of biological evolution that has eventu
ally led to us self-conscious beings with our unique
individuality; and we are able to contemplate and we
can attempt to understand the grandeur and wonder
of nature, as I will attempt to do in these lectures. But
I am not a vitalist in the generally accepted sense of
that term. I believe that all of the happenings in living
cells will be found to be in accord with physics and
chemistry, much of which has yet to be discovered.
Yet, as I have already stated, I believe with Polanyi
that there is a hierarchic structure with emergence of higher levels that could not have been
predicted from the operations going on at a
lower level. For example the emergence of life could
not have been predicted even with a complete knowl
edge of all happenings in a prebiotic world, nor could
the emergence of self-consciousness have been pre
dicted (1979, pp. 9-10, emp. added).
- 410 -
Eventually, Sir John came to refer to himself as a “dualist-interactionist” (as did Sir Karl Popper). Eccles calmly admitted:
As a dualist-interactionist, I believe that my experienced uniqueness lies not in the uniqueness
of my brain, but in my psyche. It is built up from
the tissue of memories of the most intimate kind from
my earliest recollection onwards to the present…. It
is important to disclaim a solipsistic solution of the
uniqueness of the self. Our direct experiences are of
course subjective, being derived solely from our brain
and self. The existences of other selves are established
by intersubjective communication (1992, p. 237, ital
ics in orig., emp. added).
Popper and Eccles presented their views in their massive
600-page book published in 1977, The Self and Its Brain: An Ar
gument for Interactionism, which became an overnight sensa
tion, and ultimately a classic in its field. In his portion of that
volume, Popper wrote:
But the human consciousness of self transcends,
I suggest, all purely biological thought…. [O]nly
a human being capable of speech can reflect upon
himself. I think that every organism has a programme.
But I also think that only a human being can be
conscious of parts of this programme, and revise
them critically (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p. 144, emp.
added).
Four years before that book’s publication, Eccles went on rec
ord as stating:
I was a dualist, now I am a trialist! Cartesian dualism
has become unfashionable with many people. They
embrace monism in order to escape the enigma of
brain-mind interaction with its perplexing problems.
But Sir Karl Popper and I are interactionists, and what
is more, trialist interactionists! (1973, p. 189, emp.
in orig.).
[NOTE: The term “trialist” as employed by Dr. Eccles is not
to be confused with the word “trialism” that John Cotting
ham uses in his attempt to provide what he believes is “a more
- 411 -
realistic category” in which to put animals—as creatures that
have extension and sensation, but not thought (see Carter,
2002).]
In the section that he wrote for The Self and Its Brain, Pop
per discussed his view (shared by Eccles) that reality should
be seen as having three different aspects, which he subse
quently labeled as World I, World II, and World III. World I
is the objective world of physical entities. World II is the
subjective psychic inner reality of each human being. World
III is the world of human culture (i.e., the world of ideas).
Popper and Eccles both agreed that “the self-conscious mind
is an independent entity to be superimposed upon the
neural machinery”—a superimposition that can lead to a
variety of interactions in the brain as it moves between Worlds
I, II, and III. Continuous subjective interactions exist between
World I and World II, as well as cultural interactions affecting
both World I and World II. As Reichenbach and Anderson
summarized it:
Events in World 1 affect World 2, and vice versa, not
by any physical interaction, since the mental is non
physical, but through transfer of information. That
is, there is a constant information flow between the
brain and the mind. The brain is the liaison between
the world of our mental experience and the world of
our motor and bodily events. Thus, in voluntary move
ment, mental intentions initiate a sequence by
transferring information to the brain. Eccles lo
cates the point of interaction between mental inten
tion and the body in the nerve cells of the supplemen
tary motor area (SMA), located at the top of the brain.
He notes experiments in which nerve cells in the SMA
discharged before cells responsible for motor activity.
From this he concludes that mental intentions act on
cells in the SMA, which contain an “inventory of all
learned motor programs” [Eccles and Robinson, 1984,
p. 161] (1995, pp. 281-281, emp. added).
- 412 -
Dr. Eccles himself performed numerous experiments in which
nerve cells in the SMA discharged—solely as a result of men
tal intention—before the cells responsible for motor activity.
He discussed on numerous occasions the scientific evidence
substantiating that the mind is a separate entity from the brain
—evidence that he had gathered through a lifetime of study on
the brain-mind problem (see Eccles, 1973, 1979; 1982; 1984;
1989, 1992, 1994). Eccles stated: “We are a combination of
two things or entities: our brains on the one hand, and
our conscious selves on the other” (1984, p. 33, emp. ad
ded).
Could Popper and Eccles be onto something here? Could
there be a “world,” within each human, containing a “psychic
inner reality”? Jay Tolson, in an article (“The Ghost Hunters”)
that he penned for the December 16, 2002 issue of U.S. News
& World Report, used humans’ ability to employ symbolic lan
guage (in a way that no animal can) to inquire about “a person
beneath the personality.”
Using language at its most refined limit—irony—shows
how we often mean something more or other than
what we say. Might that not be a tantalizing glimpse
of a self beyond the mere representation of the
self, a person beneath the personality? A ghost
in the machine, after all? (133[23]:46, emp. added).
Even Paul Davies was constrained to ask:
Can the mind somehow reach into the physical world
of electrons and atoms, brain cells and nerves, and
create electrical forces? Does mind really act on mat
ter in defiance of the fundamental principles of phys
ics? Are there, indeed, two causes of movement
in the material world: one due to ordinary physical processes and the other due to mental processes?… The only minds of which we have direct
experience are those associated with brains (and ar
guably computers). Yet nobody seriously suggests that
God, or departed souls, have a brain. Does the notion of a disembodied mind, let alone a mind
- 413 -
completely decoupled from the physical universe, make any sense? (1983, pp. 75,72, parentheti
While the committed monist-materialist would answer “no”
to every one of Dr. Davies’ questions, our research answers
“yes” to each of them. With the available scientific evidence
(from reputable scientists such as Penfield, Eccles, and others)
which documents that mind does interact with matter (the
brain), what other conclusion could one possibly reach? As
Eccles himself put it:
A purely materialist explanation would seem to suf
fice with the conscious experiences as a derivative
from brain functioning. However, it is a mistake to
think that the brain does everything and that
our conscious experiences are simply a reflection of brain activities, which is a common philo
sophical view. If that were so, our conscious selves
would be no more than passive spectators of the per
formances carried out by the neuronal machinery of
the brain. Our beliefs that we can really make deci
sions and that we have some control over our actions
would be nothing but illusions. There are of course
all sorts of subtle cover-ups by philosophers from such
a stark exposition, but they do not face up to the issue.
In fact all people, even materialist philosophers, be
have as if they had at least some responsibility for their
own actions.
These considerations lead me to the alternative hy
pothesis of dualist-interactionism. It is really the
commonsense view, namely that we are a combination of two things or entities: our brains on
the one hand; and our conscious selves on the
other (1982, pp. 87,88, emp. added).
Even Feigl admitted:
Vitalists or interactionists…hold that biological con
cepts and laws are not reducible to the laws of phys
ics, and hence—a fortiori—that psychological concepts
and laws are likewise irreducible…. The upshot of
this longish discussion on the difference between the
- 414 -
scientific and the philosophical components of the
mind-body problem is this: If interactionism or
any genuine emergence hypotheses are sensibly formulated, they have empirical content and
entail incisive limitations of the scope of physical determinism (1967, pp. 7,18, emp. added).
But did he accept the evidence then available for interaction
ism? As a defender of the materialistic “identity theory,” no,
he did not. He demurred, suggesting that “someday,” a better
explanation would come along.
Whatever role the self may play in the determination
of human conduct, it may yet very well be explained
by a more or less stable structure of dispositions due
to some constitutionally inherited, maturationally and
environmentally modified, and continually modu
lated structure of the organism (especially the ner
vous and endocrine systems) [pp. 7,18,19, parenthet
ical item in orig.].
Then, not long after Feigl wrote that interactionism hypothe
ses, if “sensibly formulated,” could have “empirical content,”
Sir John Eccles came along and “sensibly formulated” his dualist-interactionist theory—and then provided the “empirical
content” to go along with it.
And where does such “empirical content” lead? Davies in
quired: “Does the notion of a disembodied mind, let alone a
mind completely decoupled from the physical universe, make
any sense?” We respond that it most certainly does. Eccles,
Penfield, and others have shown conclusively that mind exists independently of matter.
The thought, then, of a “universal mind” that stands be
hind this Universe no longer sounds quite so far-fetched. In
fact, Harvard’s Nobel laureate, George Wald, in the chapter
he wrote (“The Cosmology of Life and Mind”) for New Meta
physical Foundations of Modern Science, addressed this very theme.
I had already for some time taken it as a foregone con
clusion that the mind—consciousness—could not be lo
cated. It is essentially absurd to think of locating a phe-
- 415 -
nomenon that yields no physical signals, the presence
or absence of which, outside of humans their like, can
not be identified.
But further than that, mind is not only not locatable,
it has no location. It is not a thing in space and time,
not measurable; hence, as I said at the beginning of
this chapter, not assimilable as science. And yet it is
not to be dismissed as an epiphenomenon: it is the
foundation, the condition that makes science possi
ble….
A few years ago it occurred to me that these seem
ingly very disparate problems might be brought to
gether. And this could happen through the hypothe
sis that mind, rather than being a very late develop
ment in the evolution of living things, restricted to
organisms with the most complex nervous systems—
all of which I had believed to be true—has been there
always. And that this universe is life-breeding
because the pervasive presence of mind had
guided it to be so (1994, pp. 128,129, emp. added).
Dr. Wald is in good company in sensing what he called
“the pervasive presence of mind.” The late, distinguished as
tronomer from Great Britain, Sir Arthur Eddington, admit
ted: “The idea of a universal mind, or Logos, would be, I think,
a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific
theory” (as quoted in Heeren, 1995, p. 233). Over seventy
years ago, physicist Sir James Jeans wrote:
Today there is a wide measure of agreement which
on the physical side of science approaches almost una
nimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading to
wards a non-mechanical reality: the Universe begins
to look more like a great thought than a great ma
chine. Mind no longer looks like an accidental
intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as
the Creator and governor of the realm of matter.... We discover that the Universe shows evidence
of a designing or controlling Power that has some
thing in common with our own minds (1930, emp.
added).
- 416 -
In a discussion about the origin of the genetic code in their col
lege biology text, The New Biology, Robert Augros and George
Stanciu asked:
What cause is responsible for the origin of the genetic
code and directs it to produce animal and plant spe
cies? It cannot be matter because of itself matter has
no inclination to these forms, any more than it has to
the form Poseidon or the form of a microchip or any
other artifact. There must be a cause apart from
matter that is able to shape and direct matter. Is
there anything in our experience like this? Yes,
there is: our own minds. The statue’s form origi
nates in the mind of the artist, who then subsequently
shapes matter, in the appropriate way…. For the
same reasons there must be a mind that directs
and shapes matter in organic forms (1987, p. 191,
emp. added).
Or, to quote NASA astronomer Robert Jastrow: “That there
are what I, or anyone would call supernatural forces at work is
now, I think, a scientifically proven fact” (1982, p. 18).
Physicist Freeman Dyson addressed the idea of a “univer
sal soul” in his semi-autobiographical book, Disturbing the Uni
verse.
We had earlier found two levels on which mind man
ifests itself in the description of nature. On the level
of subatomic physics, the observer is inextricably in
volved in the definition of the objects of his observa
tions. On the level of direct human experience, we
are aware of our own minds, and we find it conve
nient to believe that other human beings and animals
have minds not altogether unlike our own. Now we
have found a third level to add to these two. The peculiar harmony between the structure of the universe and the needs of life and intelligence is a
third manifestation of the importance of mind
in the scheme of things. This is as far as we can go as
scientists. We have evidence that mind is important on
three levels. We have no evidence for any deeper uni
fying hypothesis that would tie these three levels to-
- 417 -
gether. As individuals, some of us may be willing to
go further. Some of us may be willing to entertain
the hypothesis that there exists a universal mind
or world soul which underlies the manifestations
of mind that we observe. If we take this hypothesis
seriously, we are, according to Monod’s definition, ani
mists. The existence of a world soul is a question that
belongs to religion and not to science (1979, pp. 251
252, emp. added).
Nine years later, in an article he authored (“Mankind’s Place
in the Cosmos”) for U.S. News and World Report, Dyson went
even farther:
The mind, I believe, exists in some very real sense in
the universe. But is it primary or an accidental conse
quence of something else? The prevailing view among
biologists seems to be that the mind arose acciden
tally out of molecules of DNA or something. I find
that very unlikely. It seems more reasonable to
think that mind was a primary part of nature from
the beginning and we are simply manifestations
of it at the present stage of history (1988, p. 72,
emp. added).
In his article, “The Mind-Brain Problem,” John Beloff made
a startling admission.
The fact is that, leaving aside mythical and religious
cosmologies, the position of mind in nature remains
a total mystery. It could be that there exists some
sort of a cosmic mind, perhaps co-equal with the ma
terial universe itself, from which each of our individual minds stems and to which each ultimately
returns. All we can say is that it looks as if a fragment
of mind-stuff becomes attached to an individual or
ganism, at or near birth, and thereafter persists with
this symbiotic relationship until that organism perishes
(1994, emp. added).
Then, with an even bolder tact, Arne Wyller dared to ask in
his book, The Creating Consciousness: “What if there existed
a mind before people…perhaps a consciousness we will
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one day find in another part of the Universe, perhaps a uni
versal consciousness field: The Planetary Mind” (1996, p.
223, emp. added).
Just think. “What if” there existed a mind before people—a
“universal/planetary/cosmic Mind Who could “attach a frag
ment of mind-stuff” to an individual organism at birth? Just
think! As Richard Heinberg remarked in Cloning the Buddha:
The Moral Impact of Biotechnology:
But at least the spiritual view leaves open the door for
the possibility that our explanations for biological
phenomena are still incomplete in some fundamen
tal way. To prematurely close that door might be a pro
found error. If we think we have essentially the whole
picture of what life is and how it works, when in real
ity we have only a part of that picture; if our working
philosophy systematically excludes certain kinds of
evidence and certain kinds of explanations; and fur
ther, if we act on our philosophy in ways that have
global repercussions, then we could be getting ourselves
into serious trouble indeed. A spiritual perspective,
even in its weakest and most generalized form, would
hold that present material explanations for biological and psychological realities are necessary
but not sufficient. Something else must be taken
into account (1999, pp. 74-75, emp. added).
CONCLUSION
That “something else” of which Heinberg wrote has in
trigued almost everyone who has worked on the brain-mind
problem—some to a greater degree than others. In his book,
The Large, the Small and the Human Brain, British mathemati
cal physicist Sir Roger Penrose remarked:
It seems to me that there is a fundamental problem with the idea that mentality arises out of
physicality—that is something which philosophers
worry about for very good reasons. The things we
talk about in physics are matter, physical things, mas-
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sive objects, particles, space, time, energy and so on.
How could our feelings, our perception of redness,
or of happiness have anything to do with physics? I
regard that as a mystery (1997, p. 94, emp. added).
So do thousands (maybe even millions!) of others. As Dennett
admitted:
It does seem as if the happenings that are my con
scious thoughts and experiences cannot be brain hap
penings, but must be something else, or something cause
or produced by brain happenings, no doubt, but some
thing in addition, made of different stuff, located in a
different space…. Mind stuff…has some remarkable properties…but it is extremely resistant to
definition….
Since we don’t have the faintest idea (yet) what prop
erties mind stuff has, we cannot even guess (yet) how
it might be affected by physical processes emanating
somehow from the brain, so let’s…concentrate on the
return signals, the directives from mind to brain.
These, ex hypothesi, are not physical; they are not light
waves or sound waves or cosmic rays or streams of
subatomic particles. No physical energy or mass is
associated with them. How, then, do they get to make
a difference to what happens in the brain cells they
must affect, if the mind is to have any influence over
the body?… How can mind stuff both elude all physi
cal measurements and control the body? (1991, pp. 27,
28,34,35, italics and parenthetical items in orig., emp.
added).
Good questions. Pity, isn’t it, that monistic materialists like
Dennett cannot answer them?
One thing is certain, however: the fact of our self-awareness—of our consciousness—is both self-evident and undeni
able. The belief in an “inner self,” a “personal psyche,” or a
“soul” is well nigh universal. Dennett also noted:
The idea that a self (or a person, or, for that matter, a
soul) is distinct from a brain or a body is deeply rooted
in our ways of speaking, and hence in our ways of
thinking…. It is quite natural to think of “the self
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and its brain” as two distinct things, with different
properties, no matter how closely they depend on
each other. If the self is distinct from the brain, it seems
that it must be made of mind stuff. In Latin, a think
ing thing is res cogitans…. So the conscious mind is not
just the place where the witnessed color and smells
are, and not just the thinking thing. It is where the ap
preciating happens. It is the ultimate arbiter of why
anything matters. Perhaps this even follows some
how from the fact that the conscious mind is also sup
posed to be the source of our intentional actions (1991,
pp. 29,31, italics and parenthetical item in orig., emp.
added).
Jerome Elbert wrote in agreement: “The soul belief is so ba
sic in our culture that, through ordinary communications,
most of us come to believe that a network of neurons cannot,
by itself, generate our thoughts and awareness of the world”
(2000, p. 217). How very true.
Materialism certainly has not disproved the existence of
our oh-so-vital “inner self.” Nor will it ever. Steven Goldberg,
in his book, Seduced by Science, was correct when he explained:
Modern science certainly does not claim that it
can prove the nonexistence of the soul. On the
contrary, the dominant philosophical assumption of
most twentieth-century scientists has been precisely
the opposite: science deals with falsifiable proposi
tions, that is, propositions that can be demonstrated
wrong in an empirical test…. [S]cience simply does
not speak to the validity of other systems, such as meta
physics, pure mathematics, or logic (1999, p. 18, emp.
added).
Eccles, in his Gifford Lectures (presented at the University of
Edinburgh in 1977-1978), warned:
We must not claim to be self-sufficient. If we espouse
the philosophy of monist-materialism, there is
no base on which we can build a meaning for life
or for the values. We would be creatures of chance
and circumstance. All would be determined by our
inheritance and our conditioning. Our feeling of free-
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dom and of responsibility would be but an illusion.
As against that I will present my belief that there is a
great mystery in our existence and in our experiences of life that is not explicable in materialist terms… (1979, p. 10, emp. added).
After one has rightly rejected monistic materialism, what,
then, is left? As Eccles and Robinson noted:
We reject materialism because, as we have seen, it
doesn’t explain our concepts but denies them. It is
at this point that we, as noble and rational beings, can
give vent to the urgings of faith; not faith as the veil of
ignorance, sloth, or fear, but faith as a state of mind
vindicated by the efforts of reason and common sense
(1984, p. 173, emp. in orig.).
How refreshing—to see a man of the stature of Sir John Eccles
speak of faith “vindicated by the efforts of reason and com
mon sense.” Roger Sperry went on to say: “More than ever
there is need today to raise our sights to higher values above
those of material self-interest, economic gain, politics, produc
tion power, daily needs for personal subsistence, etc, to higher,
more long term, more god-like priorities” (1985, pp. 158-159).
German physicist Max Planck, in his Scientific Autobiography
and Other Papers (1950), wrote:
Religion and natural science do not exclude each oth
er, as many contemporaries of ours would have us be
lieve or fear; they mutually supplement and condition
each other. The most immediate proof of the compati
bility of religion and natural science, even under the
most thorough critical scrutiny, is the historic fact that
the very greatest natural scientists of all times—men such
as Kepler, Newton, Leibniz—were permeated by a most
profound religious attitude. Religion and natural sci
ence are fighting a joint battle in an incessant, neverrelaxing crusade against skepticism and against dog
matism, against disbelief and against superstition, and
the rallying cry in this crusade has always been, and
always will be: “On to God!” (as quoted in Eccles, 1992,
p. 247).
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Sadly, however, the perception persists that “faith” has some
how “lost out” to science—an idea that Dr. Eccles worked fe
verishly during his lifetime to dispel.
There is a pervasive belief that religion and science
are antagonistic, and that religion has been mortally
defeated. This is a mistake based upon ignorance and/
or prejudice. Yet atheistic materialism is the in-thing
for all “tough-minded” materialists. It is surprising that
this fallacious belief has been propagated despite the
fact that some of the greatest scientists of this century
have recognized the necessity for a religious attitude to
life and to science (1992, p. 244).
In the end, Eccles was compelled to admit:
We have to be open to some deep dramatic signifi
cance in this earthly life of ours that may be revealed
after the transformation of death. We can ask: What
does this life mean? We find ourselves here in this
wonderfully rich and vivid conscious experience and
it goes on through life; but is that the end? This selfconscious mind of ours has this mysterious relation
ship with the brain and as a consequence achieves ex
periences of human love and friendship, of the won
derful natural beauties and of the intellectual excite
ment and joy given by appreciation and understand
ing of our cultural heritages. Is this present life all to
finish in death, or can we have hope that there will be
further meaning to be discovered?…
Man has lost his way ideologically in this age. It is what
has been called the predicament of mankind. I think
that science has gone too far in breaking down man’s
belief in his spiritual greatness…and has given him
the belief that he is merely an insignificant animal that
has arisen by chance and necessity in an insignificant
planet lost in the great cosmic immensity….
I think the principal trouble with mankind today is that
the intellectual leaders are too arrogant in their selfsufficiency. We must realize the great unknowns in the
material makeup and operation of our brains, in the
relationship of brain to mind and in our creative imag-
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ination. When we think of these unknowns as well as
the unknown of how we come to be in the first place, we
should be much more humble. The unimaginable fu
ture that could be ours would be the fulfillment of this,
our present life, and we should be prepared to accept
its possibility as the greatest gift. In the acceptance of
this wonderful gift of life and of death, we have to be
prepared not for the inevitability of some other exis
tence, but we can hope for the possibility of it….
This whole cosmos is not just running on and run
ning down for no meaning. In the context of Natural
Theology, I come to the belief that we are creatures
with some supernatural meaning that is as yet ill de
fined. We cannot think more than that we are all part
of some great design…
Each of us can have the belief of acting in some un
imaginable supernatural drama. We should give all we
can in order to play our part. Then we wait with se
renity and joy for the future revelations of whatever is
in store after death (1992, pp. 251-252).
Twenty-five years earlier, Dr. Eccles had been even more spe
cific. He wrote, incredibly:
The arguments presented by [American biologist
H.S.] Jennings preclude me from believing that
my experiencing self has an existence that merely
is derivative from my brain with its biological ori
gin, and with its development under instructions de
rived from my genetic inheritance. If we follow Jen
nings, as I do, in his arguments and inferences, we
come to the religious concept of the soul and its
special creation by God…. I cannot believe that this
wonderful divine gift of a conscious existence has no
further future, no possibility of another existence un
der some other, unimaginable conditions (1967, p. 24,
emp. added).
Biblical teaching regarding man acknowledges that he is
composed of two distinct parts—the physical and the spiri
tual. We get an introduction to the origin of the physical por
tion as early as Genesis 2:7 when the text states: “Jehovah God
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formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his
nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul (nephesh chayyah).” It is important to recognize both what this pas
sage is discussing and what it is not. Genesis 2:7 is teaching
that man was given physical life; it is not teaching that man
was instilled with an immortal nature. The immediate (as
well as the remote) context is important to a clear understand
ing of the intent of Moses’ statement. Both the King James and
American Standard Versions translate nephesh chayyah as “liv
ing soul.” The Revised Standard Version, New American Stan
dard Version, New International Version, and the New Jeru
salem Bible all translate the phrase as “living being.” The New
English Bible translates it as “living creature.”
The variety of terms employed in our English translations
has caused some confusion as to the exact meaning of the
phrase “living soul” or “living being.” Some have suggested,
for example, that Genesis 2: 7 is speaking specifically of man’s
receiving his immortal soul and/or spirit. This is not the case,
however, as a closer examination of the immediate and re
mote contexts clearly indicates. For example, the apostle Paul
quoted Genesis 2:7 in 1 Corinthians 15:44-45 when he wrote:
“If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body. So
also it is written, ‘The first man Adam became a living soul.’
The last Adam became a life-giving spirit.” The comparison/
contrast offered by the apostle between the first Adam’s “nat
ural body” and the last Adam (Christ) as a “life-giving spirit”
is absolutely critical to an understanding of Paul’s central mes
sage (and the theme of the great “resurrection chapter” of the
Bible, 1 Corinthians 15), and must not be overlooked in any
examination of Moses’ statement in Genesis 2:7.
There are six additional places in the Old Testament where
similar phraseology is employed, and in each case the text
obviously is speaking of members of the animal kingdom. In
Genesis 1:24, God said: “Let the earth bring forth living creatures (nephesh chayyah) after their kind.” Genesis 1:30 records
that God provided plants as food “to every beast of the earth,
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and to every bird of the air, and to everything that creeps on
the earth, everything that has the breath of life (nishmath chay
yah).” When the Genesis Flood covered the Earth, God made
a rainbow covenant with Noah and with every living creature
(nephesh chayyah) that was in the ark with Him (Genesis 9:12).
God pledged that He would remember the covenant that He
made with every “living creature” (nephesh chayyah; Genesis
9:12), and therefore He never again would destroy the Earth
by such a Flood. The rainbow, He stated, would serve as a re
minder of that “everlasting covenant” between God and every
living creature (nephesh chayyah, Genesis 9:15). The final oc
currence of the phrase is found in Ezekiel’s description of the
river flowing from the temple in which every living creature
(nephesh chayyah) that swarms will live (47:9).
Additionally, the Bible declares: “For that which befalleth
the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them:
as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one
breath; and man hath no preeminence above the beasts” (Ec
clesiastes 3:19). Does this mean, therefore, that man possesses
only a material nature and has no immortal soul/spirit? No, it
does not! In speaking to this very point, Jack P. Lewis wrote:
It would seem that arguments which try to present
the distinctiveness of man from the term “living soul”
are actually based on the phenomena of variety in
translation of the KJV and have no validity in fact.
Had the translators rendered all seven occurrences
by the same term, we would have been aware of the
fact that both men and animals are described by it.
To make this observation is not at all to affirm that the
Old Testament is materialistic. We are concerned at
this time only with the biblical usage of one term. Nei
ther is it to deny a distinction in biblical thought be
tween men and other animals when one takes in con
sideration the whole Old Testament view. Man may
perish like the animals, but he is different from them.
Even here in Genesis in the creation account, God is
not said to breathe into the animals the breath of life;
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animals are made male and female; there is no sepa
rate account of the making of the female animal; they
are not said to be in God’s image and likeness; they
are not given dominion. Man is the crown of God’s
creation (1988, p. 7).
When Dr. Lewis suggested that “man may perish like the ani
mals,” he captured the essence of the passage in Ecclesiastes
3:19. It is true that both men and beasts ultimately die, and that
in this regard man “hath no preeminence above the beasts.”
Yet while both creatures are referred to as nephesh chayyah, the
Scriptures make it clear that God did something special in ref
erence to man. Genesis 1:26-27 records: “And God said, ‘Let
us make man in our image, after our likeness....’ And God
created man in his own image, in the image of God created he
him; male and female created he them.” Nowhere does the
Bible state or imply that animals are created in the image of
God. What is it, then, that makes man different from the ani
mals?
The answer, of course, lies in the fact that man possesses an
immortal nature. Animals do not. God Himself is a spirit ( John
4:24). And a spirit “hath not flesh and bones” (Luke 24:39).
In some fashion, God has placed within man a portion of His
own essence—in the sense that man possesses a spirit that nev
er will die. The Old Testament prophet, Zechariah, spoke of
Jehovah, Who “stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the
foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit (ruach) of man
within him” (12:1). The Hebrew word for “formeth,” yatsar, is
defined as to form, fashion, or shape (as in a potter working
with clay; Harris, et al., 1980, 1:396). The same word is used
in Genesis 2:7, thereby indicating that both man’s physical
body and his spiritual nature were formed, shaped, molded, or
fashioned by God. The authors of the Theological Wordbook of
the Old Testament noted:
The participial form meaning “potter” is applied to
God in Isa. 64:7 where mankind is the work of his
hand. When applied to the objects of God’s creative
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work, the emphasis of the word is on the forming or
structuring of these phenomena. The word speaks to
the mode of creation of these phenomena only in
sofar as the act of shaping or forming an object may
also imply the initiation of that object (Harris, et al.,
1:396, emp. added).
As the Creator, God “initiates” the object we know as man’s
immortal nature (i.e., his soul or spirit). Solomon, writing in
the book of Ecclesiastes, noted that “the dust returneth to the
earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave
it” (12:7, emp. added). Man’s physical body was formed of the
physical dust of the Earth. Would it not follow, then, that his
spiritual portion would be formed from that which is spiritual?
When the writer of Hebrews referred to God as “the Father of
our spirits” (12:9), he revealed the spiritual source of the soul
—God.
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9
Humans come in a rainbow of colors: sandy yellows, reddish-tans, creamy whites, pale pinks. And who among us is
not curious about the skin colors, hair textures, bodily struc
tures and facial features associated with racial background.
Why do many Africans have deep black skin, while that of most
Europeans is pale pink? Why do the eyes of most “white” peo
ple and “black” people look pretty much alike, but differ so
much from the eyes of Orientals? Why do some races have
kinky hair, while others have straight hair? Why do some races
grow to over 7 feet tall (e.g., African Watusis), while others are
less than 5 feet (e.g., African Pygmies)? The answers to some
of these questions, and others, may often be found in a study
of the origin of various races.
Currently, society recognizes three or four major “races”
of humans, as the word race generally is defined: (a) Cauca
soid; (b) Mongoloid; (c) Negroid; and (d) Australoid. Generally
speaking, the Australoids are considered a subgroup of the Cau
casoids, simply because the two groups have so many features
in common, despite the fact that Australoids possess dark skin
(the Australoid group often is known as the Australian Aborig
inal Group).
But consider the conundrum evolutionists face in explaining
why humans have mostly naked skin that comes in a variety
of sandy yellows, reddish-tans, silky browns, creamy whites,
and pale pinks. We are the only “primates” (their classification,
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not ours) that remain hairless and that exhibit this rainbow of
colors. Yet, these colors also cause many of us to stop and ask:
“How could so many different colors have originated from
Adam and Eve?”
Like Rudyard Kipling, in his Just So stories, we could weave
all sorts of yarns to explain why different peoples are the way
they are. We could spin one tale about how the Scandinavians
became tall, and still another story about how they became
light-skinned. For instance, researchers used to believe that
the Pygmy people of southern Africa were short because food
was scarce—until additional scientific studies showed normal
levels of growth hormone, but revealed a genetic defect that
prevents the Pygmies’ bodies from using the hormone to its
fullest extent (Fackelmann, 1989). Did nature select this mu
tation because it offered survival advantages, or did this char
acteristic arise as a result of random variation?
The answer is not at all obvious, because we know so many
exceptions to the rules of natural selection. The fact is, for
most variations that endow human populations with their
distinctive characteristics, it is difficult to know what forces
of selection (if any) have been at work. Take the Japanese, for
instance. Their teenagers are considerably taller than their
grandparents ever were. The difference, as it turns out, is a
matter of a vastly improved diet, not genetics. For hundreds
of years, the people of Japan have survived without nature’s
“selecting” mutations for smaller stature. So how do we know
for sure that a scarce food supply was responsible for the sur
vival of growth-limiting changes in the Pygmy?
The list of such just-so stories is endless. Why are the Inuit
relatively short and bulky? The answer in the past has been
that such a stature helps them retain heat. Why are some peo
ple in Africa relatively tall and slender? The answer in the
past has been that such a stature helps them lose heat. Yet, in
each case, we could list a dozen exceptions. What about those
tall peoples who have survived quite well in cold areas, like
the Dutch? And what about those short peoples who have done
just fine in hot areas, like the Pygmies?
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If Africans have less hair to keep them cooler, as some have
suggested (Folger, 1993), then how have Asians—with rela
tively little body hair—fared so well in cold climates? Asians
also have an epicanthic fold—an extra layer of skin on the up
per eyelid. We could invent an anecdotal account about their
eyes adapting to the winds of the Mongolian steppes and/or
the bright glare of snow. But if we did, would this be enough?
Are variations in the structure of the eyelid a matter of life and
death? Were individuals who had this epicanthic fold much
more likely to survive than those who lacked it?
The goal for such a traditional Darwinian approach, of
course, is to answer the following question: How does a par
ticular trait enhance survival value, or enable the production
of more offspring? One anthropology textbook emphasized
the “pervasiveness of adaptation in the microevolution [smallscale differentiation—BH /BT] of man” (Keesing and Keesing,
1971, p. 51). Yet, as we will show in this chapter, this turns out
to be more of a hope than a statement substantiated by the ac
tual evidence.
An article in the October 2002 issue of Scientific American
claims to hold the answer to this complex puzzle. The authors
believe that human skin color has continued to evolve—in an
effort to get “just the right color.” The claim is: “Throughout
the world, human skin color has evolved to be dark enough
to prevent sunlight from destroying the nutrient folate but
light enough to foster the production of vitamin D” ( Jablonski and Chaplin, 2002, 287[4]:75, emp. added). The skin on
chimpanzees and apes is light because it is covered and pro
tected by the abundance of hair on their bodies. As such, evo
lutionists like Jablonski and Chaplin believe the first humans
had light skin. [Other evolutionists, however, believe exactly
the opposite, and suggest that humans “started out” black and
“became” white. Jones addressed this point when he wrote:
“Although a change in skin colour is the most striking event in
human evolution, nobody really knows why melanin was lost
as people emerged from Africa” (1996, p. 195). Jones certainly
got it right when he admitted: “The theory of evolution is infi
nitely flexible” (p. 184).]
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According to Jablonski and Chaplin’s theory, we were
forced to give up our hair in order to cool our growing brains
(maybe this explains why many humans today find them
selves “folliclely challenged!”). Once rid of the body hair,
evolutionists proclaim, humans then were subjected to the
damaging effects of sunlight, especially UV rays. To combat
this problem, evolutionists contend, humans began producing
more melanin, the dark-pigmented molecule that serves the
dual purpose of physically and chemically filtering out harm
ful UV rays. The Scientific American report also points out (p.
76) that the melanin may have played a role in preserving folate—a compound important in preventing neural-tube defects
such as spina bifida.
The article informs readers that “the earliest members of
Homo sapiens, or modern humans, evolved in Africa between
120,000 and 100,000 years ago and had darkly pigmented
skin adapted to the condition of UV radiation and heat that
existed near the equator” (p. 79). This dark skin became prob
lematic, however, when humans began to venture out of this
tropical region. With less sunlight available, humans were un
able to produce vitamin D in sufficient quantities, and were
subject to various diseases such as rickets and osteomalacia.
Thus, people who settled in regions without as much sunlight
were then forced to undergo further evolution in order to pro
duce a lighter skin color. [For those of you keeping track, here’s
a quick summary: We lost body hair to cool our growing brains.
Our pink skin and folate levels were in danger of UV radiation,
so we evolved lots of melanin and became dark skinned. But
some humans traveled to areas where there was not as much
sunlight, thus they were required to evolve lighter skin.]
Humans therefore evolved skin dark enough to prevent sunlight from destroying the nutrient folate, but
light enough to foster vitamin D production. Seems like
an awful lot of “evolving” to solve a puzzle that creationists
solved a long time ago—with much less evolving. Equally trou
bling is the fact that we see all colors on the Earth today. If
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there were one skin color that was ideal—protecting folate,
while permitting the production of vitamin D—then why do
we see so many color variations today?
So, how, exactly, has natural selection worked to preserve
dark and light skin coloring? The traditional explanation, as
shown above, makes what seems to be at first glance a reason
able link between the strong sunlight of the tropics and the
protective powers of melanin. Natural selection, so the argu
ment goes, favored the survival of dark-skinned people in equa
torial areas. If light-skinned people lived in the tropics, they
would suffer from higher rates of skin cancer.
Then what prevented Africans from migrating to higher
latitudes? The answer, we are told, lies in vitamin D. To make
this important substance, humans need exposure to ultravio
let light. [It is true that exposure to sunlight stimulates the pro
duction of vitamin D in significant quantities. To quote Jones:
“Ultraviolet light, though, is not all bad. When it penetrates
the skin, it makes vitamin D; far more than comes from even a
well balanced diet” (1996, p. 194).] If people in higher latitudes
were too dark, their skin would not be able to make enough
vitamin D. A shortage of vitamin D results in rickets, which has
a severe effect on bone development. So everything works out
perfectly: light people get a little melanin to avoid rickets; and
dark people get a lot of melanin to avoid skin cancer. One thing
is certain, however: whatever explanation is proffered, some
sort of evolutionary process must be responsible for lighter
and darker strains of humans (see Wills, 1994, p. 80).
The story seems less plausible, however, when we try to imag
ine exactly how such a selection process might have worked.
Yes, skin cancer is deadly. And yes, it is something that afflicts
lighter-skinned people who spend a lot of time in strong sun
light. People of European ancestry living in the sunny climes
of Australia, New Zealand, and Hawaii do suffer the highest
rates of skin cancer in the world.
But as we look backwards in human history, we have to
face the fact that the danger of dying from basal cell carcino
mas and melanomas hardly would compare to the tragedies
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represented by childhood diseases, plagues, strife, starvation,
and natural hazards. It is difficult to imagine that in a mixed
population of light- and dark-skinned people living near the
tropics, evolution selected the traits for dark skin because cancer gradually eliminated their lighter-skinned neighbors.
On the other hand, unlike the skin-cancer scenario, the abil
ity to produce sufficient vitamin D represents a definite survival
advantage. But exposure to the Sun is not an absolute require
ment. Oils from various fish—cod, halibut, sardines, salmon,
and mackerel—are a rich source of vitamin D (Sackheim and
Lehman, 1994, p. 516). Not surprisingly, such fish figure promi
nently in the diets of Scandinavians and the Inuit. With the right
foods, they have been able to overcome the disadvantage of
living in areas where the Sun is weaker, and in which the cold
climate dictates many layers of protective clothing, both of which
are factors that would prevent them from manufacturing ad
equate levels of vitamin D.
Still, all of this does not begin to explain why Africans re
mained in tropical zones. They could have moved northward,
and endured (as many European children did) dastardly doses
of cod liver oil. Today, thanks to the availability of vitamin
supplements, and the fact that vitamin D is added routinely
to food products (like milk), people of African descent can sur
vive in England and Canada without a high incidence of rick
ets. When we look to the original population of the Americas,
the story blurs completely. People of brownish complexion live
across every climatic zone—from Alaska in the north, to Ti
erra del Fuego in the south. Apparently, no mechanism has
been at work to sort skin color by latitude.
There are numerous other problems with the climatic the
ory of skin color (see Diamond, 1992, pp. 114-117), and still,
we have barely touched on the rich storehouse of human va
riety. Perhaps apparently neutral characteristics will turn out
to have some survival advantage (Patterson, 1999, pp. 40-44).
For example, researchers have found a correlation between
ABO blood groups and resistance (or susceptibility) to differ-
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ent diseases. Further, blood groups seem to have a strong geo
graphic distribution. We may discover that a particular blood
type became concentrated in a region where it offered a slightly
better chance of survival. On this point, however, all we have
so far is another Kiplingesque just-so type story. No doubt, nat
ural selection has had some impact on human history, but it
seems largely inadequate to explain a good portion of the
variations that exist between different human populations.
WHAT IS A “RACE”?
A human race most often is defined as a group of people
with certain features in common that distinguish them from
other groups of people. While the Bible recognizes only one
race—the human race—society has categorized at least four ma
jor races. As we mentioned earlier, those four are as follows:
(1) Causcasoid; (2) Mongoloid; (3) Negroid; and (4) Austra
loid. These designations represent the entire spectrum of hu
man skin colors based upon the amount of melanin that is con
tained in the skin. If someone were to attempt a breakdown
by percentages of people worldwide, the groups would look
like this:
Caucasoid 55%(of world’s population)
Mongoloid 33%
Negroid
8%
Australoid
4%
It is interesting to note that these races are distributed around
the globe throughout over 100 or more nations of significance,
and speak more than 3,000 tribal languages and dialects. As
we examine the various groups of people around the world—
from the Inuit to the !Kung, from the Swedish to the Greek,
and from the Indian to the Watusi—we witness an astounding
array of skin color, hair type, stature, and facial features. Then,
in addition to all that physical diversity, we must add differ
ences in culture and language. Thanks to incredible techno-
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logical advances, humans have lived (if only for a short time)
at the South Pole, on the top of Mount Everest, and even be
yond Earth itself. Well before the advent of modern science,
we have occupied the remotest islands, the driest deserts, and
the coldest steppes. It is difficult to imagine any other creature
that has been so successful at colonizing so many different parts
of this planet (giving the cockroach its due, of course).
Yet, for all these differences, we constitute a single biologi
cal species. Men and women with familial and cultural ties on
different continents can meet, marry, and have families of
their own—a fact that frustrates any attempt to parcel the
world’s populations into distinct subspecies or well-defined
races. We witness immense diversity because we are able to
detect patterns and distinguish among individuals of our own
kind. This discriminating discernment of the human form is
something that we cannot ignore, and is something that re
sults in a variety of psychological responses (such as physical
attraction and group identity). Nevertheless, at the biological
level, such variation reflects only minute differences in our
genetic code. We view a few of these in our physical appearance,
but find many more only at the cellular or molecular level.
One person may possess resistance to a particular disease, while
another is unable to digest milk as an adult. Whether on the
inside or the outside, the combination of many subtle differ
ences makes each human stand out as an individual within a
group, while our similarities identify us with humanity as a
whole. As British evolutionist Steve Jones put it in his book,
In the Blood: God, Genes and Destiny, “…[T]he essence of race
lies on the surface. The genes involved, and many others, show
that Homo sapiens is, compared to other mammals, very uni
form from place to place” (1996, p. 183).
Speaking in broad terms, research on racial differences has
led scientists to at least three major conclusions. First, there
are many more differences among people than just hair texture,
skin color, and facial features. Dozens of other variations have
been found to exist. Consider, for example, these examples.
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(a) Apocrine glands, which produce scents that we
commonly refer to as body odor, vary widely among
the races. Asians have an extremely low distribution
of apocrines (Koreans are among the least odor-producing people on Earth—50% of them have no apo
crine glands at all). Blacks have an extremely high dis
tribution of apocrines. Whites fall midway between
the two.
(b) Ear wax among races is quite different. One of the
most accurate ways to distinguish Asians from blacks
and whites is to check for differences in earwax. Asians
produce dry, crumbly earwax. Blacks and whites pro
duce moist, adhesive earwax.
(c) Metabolism rates can differ significantly among
races. The higher the metabolic rate, the higher the
threshold for sensing cold. The Eskimo’s metabolic
rate is 15-30% higher than that of a European. Equa
torial people have the lowest metabolism of all be
cause fewer calories are needed to keep their bodies
warm.
There are many other differences that could be discussed—
teeth, brain size, blood-flow rates, body shape, etc.
Second, research has shown that in many instances the suc
cess of a race’s survival has been aided by its genetic variabil
ity. While the evolutionist would equate this with chance pro
cesses operating in the sphere of “survival of the fittest,” crea
tionists see it as just one more example of God’s beneficent de
sign. He has given us such variability, genetically speaking, that
we can successfully adapt as the need arises. More will be said
about this later.
Third, despite the human species’ wealth of built-in variation,
and despite our constant references to “race,” no one has ever
been able to suggest a truly reliable way to distinguish one race
from another. While it is possible to classify a great many peo
ple on the basis of certain physical characteristics, there are
no known features, or groups of features, that will do the job
in all cases.
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Some have suggested that skin color be the criterion. Yet,
this provides innumerable difficulties because, while most Af
ricans from south of the Sahara and their descendants around
the world have skin that is darker than that of most Europe
ans, there are millions of people in India, whom many an
thropologists classify as members of the Caucasoid race, who
have darker skins than most American Negroes. And some Af
ricans, living in the sub-Saharan regions, have skin coloration
that is no darker than that of some Spaniards, Italians, Greeks,
or Lebanese.
Some have suggested that stature be the criterion for a race.
African Pygmies, because of their short height, have been con
sidered racially distinct from other dark-skinned Africans, for
example. Yet if stature is then to become a (or the) racial crite
rion, would not it be necessary to include in the same race both
the tall African Watusis and Scandinavians of similar stature?
Yet no one recommends such.
Still others have suggested that a variety of appearance
features become the criterion for race determination. For
example, most people are familiar with the almond shaped eye
of the Oriental. The little web of skin that is so characteristic
in Oriental eyes is said to be a distinguishing feature of the
Mongoloid race. Yet, if one were to accept that argument, how,
then, could it be argued that the American Indian, who lacks
this epicanthic fold, is also Mongoloid (which is the case)? Oth
er so-called distinguishing features fare no better. Such fea
tures as hair color, eye color, hair form, the shapes of noses
and lips, and many of the other traits often set forth as typical
“markers” of one race or another are all too often found dis
tributed throughout many races. Among the tall people of the
world there are those who exhibit every skin color imaginable
—from black to white and everything in between. Among black
people of the world there are some who possess kinky hair,
some who possess straight or wavy hair, and again, many in
between. Among the broad-nosed, full-lipped people of the
world, it is true that there are many with dark skins, but there
are likewise many with light skins, and many in between.
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And the situation worsens. The world is filled with popula
tions that just seem to defy classification. Consider some of
these well-known examples: (a) the Bushmen of southern Af
rica appear to be as much Mongoloid as Negroid; (b) the Ne
gritos of the South Pacific do look Negroid, but are far-removed from Africa and have no known links to that continent;
(c) the Ainu of Japan are a hairy aboriginal type of people who
appear to the naked eye to be more Caucasoid than anything
else; (d) the aborigines of Australia sometimes look Negroid,
but often have straight or wavy hair and are occasionally blond
as children.
To accommodate this immense diversity, many different
classification systems have been proposed. Some have sug
gested as many as two- or three-dozen races. But none has ev
er been able to accomplish its task of successfully defining just
how, in the end, a race should be accurately determined.
WHY SO MANY RACIAL
CHARACTERISTICS?
Why are there so many different racial characteristics? What
is their origin? And how long did it take for all this to occur?
It will come as no great surprise to learn that, once again,
the evolutionists’ explanations fall far afield from those of
fered by creationists. Listen, first, to the proposed evolutionary
explanation, offered by Boyce Rensberger in the January/ Feb
ruary 1981 issue of Science Digest:
To understand the origin and proliferation of human
differences, one must first know how Darwinian evo
lution works. Evolution is a two-step process. Step one
is mutation: somehow a gene in the ovary or testes of
an individual is altered, changing the molecular con
figuration that stores instructions for forming a new
individual. The children who inherit that gene will be
different in some way from their ancestors. Step two
is selection: for a racial difference, or any other evolu
tionary change to arise, it must survive and be passed
through several generations. If the mutation confers
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some disadvantage, the individual dies, often during
embryonic development. But if the change is benefi
cial in some way, the individual should have a better
chance of thriving than relatives lacking the advantage.
If a new trait is beneficial, it will bring reproductive
success to its bearer. After several generations of mul
tiplication, bearers of the new trait may begin to out
number nonbearers. Darwin called this natural selec
tion to distinguish it from the artificial selection exer
cised by animal breeders (89[1]:56).
Since racial differentiation is dependent upon genetic mu
tations, and (as every evolutionist knows full well) since mu
tations occur rarely, it is plainly obvious that the production
of races in an evolution-based continuum will be a painfully
slow process—thus, the assumption that a lot of time is required
to explain human variation, since evolution works at a steadybut-slow pace. Charles Darwin, of course, accepted this as a
matter of principle; but not all evolutionists agree. A few bold
dissenters, citing examples from the fossil record, believe that
species arise on Earth during brief moments of intense change,
rather than by slow accumulation of new features (e.g., Eldredge, 1985, pp. 21-22). So, too, we are told, within human
populations, distinct groups might possibly arise during mo
mentous natural events. Add to that the fact that more and
more evolutionists are expressing concern about the so-called
“molecular clock,” which was supposed to express the rate at
which genetic differences have accumulated in two related
species. Such a calculation, however, depends on knowing the
date of a putative presumed common ancestor—something on
which not everyone agrees (nor is there always agreement on
whether the two species are, in fact, closely related). In any case,
evolutionists assume that humans diverged from each other
at about the same rate that we diverged from our supposed
closest relative—chimpanzees. Yet, interestingly, a closer look
at families of known lineage has revealed mutation rates that
are almost twenty times higher than previous estimates (see
Gibbons, 1998a). The upshot is this: we cannot trust the intu-
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ition of Darwinists’ regarding the time it “might” take to pro
duce the differences we see in human populations. The rate
may be slow—or not. It may be steady—or not. And, undoubt
edly, other (perhaps even unknown) factors have had their own
part to play in all of this as well.
Consider the creationist alternative. Biologists determine
species (among other ways) by including in a species all indi
viduals that are capable of interbreeding to produce fertile
offspring. There is only one species of man on Earth—Homo
sapiens. That, on the face of it, is an interesting fact. Anthro
pologists and biologists place all races in existence today into
a single species, which points to the fact that the differences be
tween human races are not really all that great. Members of
all races can intermarry and produce fertile offspring.
It also is interesting to note that these “differences” within
the groups are just as pronounced as differences among the
groups. Negroid people range in color from black to sallow;
Mongoloid people range from yellow to white to bronzebrown; Caucasoids range from pink (as in England) to dark
brown (as in Southern India). These skin colors—to which most
people refer when they speak of a “race” of people—are caused
by the brown pigment in the skin known as melanin. Unfor
tunately, “melanin has been much disregarded by biologists
because it is hard to study and because, at first sight, its func
tion is obvious. It is found in all kinds of creatures and comes
in several different varieties” ( Jones, 1996, p. 185). Melanin
actually is the molecule at the end of a long, biochemical path
way that, along its way, produces chemicals involved in nerve
transmission. It is manufactured in special cells known as “me
lanocytes.” Each melanocyte produces small granules (known
as melanosomes) that pass into the other cells of the skin.
[Black-skinned people have no more melanocytes than whiteskinned people, but the melanocytes that are present are much
more active.] Melanin, as it turns out, “has remarkable and
unexpected properties” that allows it to wield “an influence
far greater than once appeared possible” ( Jones, p. 188).
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The more melanin a person has, the darker the skin will be
as an adult. Conversely, the less melanin in the skin, the lighter
the skin will be as an adult. A person whose skin possesses no
melanin is referred to as an albino, and cannot produce body
pigment. Such a person’s pinkish-white color is caused by
blood vessels showing through the colorless skin. The claim
that there are many different skin colors in the world is not al
together accurate. The apparent differences in color are sim
ply differences in the amount of the melanin found in the skin,
not differences in the type of color. There is only one coloring
agent for the human race; the shade of color simply depends
upon how much melanin a person possesses.
Melanin does far more than simply provide the body with
pigmentation. Its most important role is in protecting the body
by absorbing ultraviolet (UV) radiation from sunlight that
falls on the skin. UV radiation can damage the skin and produce
skin cancer if not filtered out by the melanin. People who have
large amounts of melanin in their skin generally are very re
sistant to the effects of UV radiation. People with only small
amounts of melanin may suffer badly if exposed to too much
UV light. The energy of the UV light penetrates deeper into
their skin, and can cause damage to the skin tissues. As Jones
has pointed out:
Ultraviolet light is powerful stuff, as anyone who has
watched their carpets fade knows. Melanin is good at
keeping it out. People without much melanin are at
high risk of skin cancer…. Whites with light skins are
at eight times greater risk than are those with dark.
Thirty times more sun is needed to cause sunburn
(the prime cause of skin cancer) in blacks than in
whites (parenthetical item in orig., p. 192).
There are at least three factors to be considered, from a cre
ationist point of view, in any attempt to explain the origin of
what we today call races: (a) the origin of man; (b) the known
historical and/or biblical facts regarding man; and (c) the na
ture of the areas to which man migrated. Here are some perti
nent facts bearing on each of these points.
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First, the biblical record makes it abundantly clear that God
created man. As a part of the whole creation, man was pro
nounced “very good.” Thus, man did not “evolve” his skin
color. God gave him the best possible combination of skin
color genes. The writer of Acts observed that God “made of
one every nation of man to dwell on all the face of the earth”
(17:26). This fits perfectly with both recorded history and cur
rent scientific facts—man always has been man. Adam was
the first man (1 Corinthians 15:45). And, through Eve, all liv
ing would come (Genesis 3:20). This becomes critical in de
termining the origin of racial characteristics.
Second, we do know that historically, and biblically, the line
of human descent passed through Adam and Eve and their
descendants to Noah and his family. However, whatever ge
netic material had been dispersed into the human race prior
to the global Flood was severely limited by the destruction of
that Flood.
Third, after the Flood, the Tower of Babel incident occurred.
Men refused to obey God and cover the Earth. So, God con
fused their languages, and as a natural result, men migrated
to various parts of the globe where they could be with others
who spoke their language. This migration, as will be discussed
shortly, had a part to play in producing various racial charac
teristics.
THE ORIGIN OF MAN’S “COLORS”
Most people, when they speak of a “race,” refer to the ra
cial characteristic of skin coloration. For the purpose of the
present discussion, we will limit our discussion, for the most
part, to the origin of such a characteristic (being careful to do
so only in an accommodative sense). In humans, skin color is
caused by melanin. Around 1913, Charles Davenport ob
served that humans carried two genes for color, and that each
gene consisted of “black” or “white” alleles (one allele from
the mother, and one from the father, for each gene). Jones
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put it like this: “The genetics of skin pigment is simple. Blacks
and whites differ by just one gene, present in two forms. One
makes pigment, the other does not” (p. 187). Hence, our col
oration depends on the number of black and white alleles we
received from our parents. Davenport noted (correctly) that
children inherited these genes independently of other char
acteristics, such as straight versus curly hair (which explains
why albino Nigerians look different from albino Scots).
These genes reside in the nucleus of every cell in our body,
along with copies of all the other genes we inherited from our
parents. However, color genes express themselves in only one
place—the melanocytes. These are specialized skin cells that
have a monopoly on melanin production. Each melanocyte
is an incredibly complex chemical factory, transforming raw
materials into granules of melanin, which it delivers to neigh
boring cells.
We also now know there is more to the production of skin
color than simply turning genes on or off to make black, white,
and a variety of shades in between. We all possess the essential
ingredients for making melanin; all of us could be black or
brown (the exception, of course, being albinos, whose bodies
produce no melanin at all). Actual coloration varies according
to the pigment package delivered by the melanocytes. The end
product depends not only on slight genetic differences, but al
so on certain environmental stimuli (such as exposure to strong
ultraviolet radiation). The story does not end there, however.
Skin also includes keratin—a fibrous protein that contributes
to the toughness of the skin, and which grows to form nails and
hair. Because this substance has a relatively high concentra
tion of sulfur, it adds a yellow hue to our palette of skin colors.
Asians (especially from the Far East) happen to have an extrathick layer of keratin which, when combined with melanin,
contributes to the yellow-brown color of their skin.
While geneticists today believe that almost half a dozen
genes may have at least some effect on pigmentation (Wills,
1994, pp. 78-79), pigment production appears to be controlled
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in large part by two pairs of genes. Geneticists refer to them
using the letter designations Aa and Bb, where the capital let
ters represent dominant genes and the small letters represent
recessive genes. A and B, being dominant, produce melanin
very well. Being recessive, a and b produce melanin to a lesser
degree.
If Adam and Eve were both AABB, they could have pro
duced only children that were the darkest Negroid coloration
possible, and they themselves would likewise have been Ne
groid. That, in all likelihood, would have produced a world
composed only of Negroid people. But, as has already been
noted, the Negroid race composes less than 10% of the world’s
population, so by a process of elimination, this choice can be
ruled out.
If Adam and Eve had both been aabb, they could have
had only children that were aabb, and which were the lightest
Caucasoid possible. Then, the world would contain no other
groupings. But it does. So, this option also is ruled out by a
process of elimination.
The real question is this: Is there a mechanism by which the
racial characteristics which we see today could have originated
with one human couple—in the short, few thousand year or so
history of the Earth?
The answer is a resounding yes! If Adam and Eve had been
“heterozygous” (AaBb; two dominant, two recessive genes),
they would have been middle-brown in color. And, from them
—in one generation—racial differences easily could have oc
curred.
A person born AABB carries genes for the darkest Ne
groid coloration possible, and since all genes are dominant,
has no genes for lightness. If that person married another per
son who likewise carried all dominant genes, and moved to
an area where no intermarriage with people of different col
ors occurred, the offspring resulting from this marriage would
then carry the same dominant genes. These offspring will have
“lost” the ability to be “white.” Conversely, if a person who is
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aabb, and hence the lightest Caucasoid possible, marries an
other person who likewise carries all recessive genes, and
moves into an area where no intermarriage with people of
other colors occurs, henceforward this union will produce on
ly offspring of the lightest possible Caucasoid coloration. The
offspring so produced have “lost” the ability to be “black.” They
no longer have the genes necessary to produce enough mela
nin for the black color. Observe the following skin-color pos
sibilities that can occur in a single generation.
From these possibilities, one obtains the following:
1 ⎯ Darkest Negroid
4 ⎯ Dark
6 ⎯ Medium skin
4 ⎯ Light
1 ⎯ Lightest Caucasoid
Thus, starting with two parents who were heterozygous
(i.e., middle-brown in color), extreme racial colors (black and
white, to name only two examples) could be produced in such
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a way that races would have permanently different colors. Of
course, it is also possible to produce a middle-brown race that
will have a fixed middle-brown color. If the original middlebrown parents produce offspring of either AAbb (or aaBB),
and these offspring marry only their own kind (avoiding inter
marriage with those not of their own genetic makeup), their
descendants will be a fixed middle-brown color.
The whole process is “put into reverse,” however, when peo
ple from different colored races intermarry. Different combi
nations of genes (i.e., different from those originally carried
by the two parents) occur, and the offspring thus begin to show
a rainbow effect of skin colors, ranging from black to white.
Is it likely that people of various colorations intermarried?
The preponderance of so many colorations in the world is evi
dence aplenty that they did. Interestingly, even evolution
ists agree on this point. Rensberger remarked:
Race mixing has not only been a fact of human his
tory but is, in this day of unprecedented global mo
bility, taking place at a more rapid rate than ever. It is
not farfetched to envision the day when, generations
hence, the entire “complexion” of major population
centers will be different. Meanwhile, we can see such
changes taking place before our eyes, for they are
a part of everyday reality (1981, 89[1]:54, emp. added).
Francisco Ayala of the University of California has observed
that if the process started out with a couple that had only a
6.7% heterozygosity (which is the average in modern humans),
the different combinations possible would be 1 x 102017 be
fore the couple would have one child identical to another (1978,
p. 63)! It is quite likely that Adam and Eve were heterozygous.
Otherwise, their descendants would have lacked variation.
However, one might suggest that Adam and Eve began with
all dominant (or all recessive) sets of genes, but that changes
occurred after the Creation as the result of mutations. Indeed,
many of the genetic differences, and many of the genetic dis
orders, no doubt have arisen since the first couple was removed
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from that original, pristine environment. Thus, the possibil
ity that some heterozygosity is a product of mutations cannot
be ruled out.
OTHER FACTORS
There can be little doubt that racial characteristics existed
before the Flood, at least to some degree. But once the Flood
had come and gone, drastically altering both the Earth and
man’s environment, and once the Tower of Babel incident had
occurred, man found himself migrating to new (and different
environments). To what extent did these factors influence ra
cial characteristics? One scientist has observed:
Studies on the relationship between skin colour and
health or diet in a given environment suggest the fol
lowing influences: after Babel, those who went to cold
er climates but had darker skin could suffer from vi
tamin D deficiency such as rickets (for example, the
Neanderthals). Since the skin produces vitamin D from
sunlight, any person with a darker skin is worse off in
a cold region since there is less sunlight. A dark skin
is more sunlight resistant and therefore can produce
less vitamin D. Such a colder environment, because of
the available sunlight and the available diet, would tend
to favour those who inherited fairer skins. Dark-skinned people in such an area would therefore tend to be
less healthy and would have fewer children. Gradu
ally the number black people in any group that went
to a cold region would be outnumbered by the white.
Likewise those who went to more sunny or hotter re
gions with darker skins would survive better (that is, get
less skin cancer). In this case the fairer persons would
dwindle from the population and a black race would
result.
It is reasonable to suggest that Noah and his family
possessed genes for both dark and light—dark enough
to protect them, yet light enough to ensure sufficient
vitamin D. It is unlikely that in the world before the
Flood there would have been extremes of heat or cold,
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so that a balanced skin colour was most suitable. This
balance would be in the middle-brown range. After
Babel, when the genes for darkness or lightness were
separated out into different groups, the environment
played a part in favouring certain heredity groups in
certain areas. This is not to say that the environment
produced dark skin or light skin. We know this has not
been the case because there are a certain number of
dark-skinned races, such as the Pygmies, who live in
the dark jungles and are not exposed to much sunlight;
the Eskimos, who are dark skinned yet live in very cold
sunless regions; and the white Europeans who have
moved to hot areas and stayed a white race, for exam
ple the Australians. These people demonstrate that the
genes governing skin colour which they inherited are
more important factors than any effect the environ
ment can have. The final ratio of dark to light genes in
any one group however, is commonly a most useful
balance for surviving in that environment. People did
not gain their light or dark skins merely as an adapta
tion to the environment in the evolutionary sense of an
organism developing something new to cope with a
new environment. All the basic factors of skin colour
were present in the first created man. Adam was de
signed to cope by having the best ability to produce
vitamin D and the best protection from any radiation.
He was most probably middle-brown in colour, and
indeed most of the world’s population still is (Mackay,
1984, 6[4]:9-10).
Besides environment, other physical characteristics play a
part in what we call racial characteristics. For example, the
yellowish color in Mongoloid races is due to the extra thicken
ing of the keratin layer in the skin, which causes the sunlight
to be reflected from the skin. The normal brown color pro
duced by the melanin is “altered,” and the end result is a yel
low brown. Or, consider the Mongoloid eye as opposed to the
Caucasoid eye. The Caucasoid eye has only one layer of fat;
the Mongoloid eye has a double fold of fat, producing an “al
mond” appearance.
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But why are certain racial features as they are? Oftentimes,
we simply do not know. Evolutionists fare no better. Nobody
knows, for example, why Orientals have epicanthic eye folds
or flatter facial profiles. The thin lips of Caucasoids and most
Mongoloids have no known advantages over the full lips of
Negroid races. Why should middle-aged and older Caucasoid
men go bald so much more frequently than the men of other
races? Why does the skin of Bushmen wrinkle so heavily in the
middle and later years? Or why does the skin of Negroids re
sist wrinkling so well? These are questions for which we cur
rently possess no answers.
One possible answer to varying racial characteristics, how
ever, is a phenomenon known as the “founder effect.” We wit
ness this most often in small, isolated communities that have
an unusually high incidence of rare, inherited disorders (Dia
mond, 1988, p. 12). Using genealogical detective work, med
ical researchers trace their patients’ ancestries to a single cou
ple (or a very small group) of close relatives—“the founders.”
This appears to be the case with French Canadians, particu
larly those of eastern Quebec, whose ancestors emigrated from
the Perche region of France in the seventeenth century. Small
pioneering groups, together with early marriages, large fami
lies, and geographical isolation, created a pronounced found
er effect. One study discovered that a middling 15% of the sett
lers contributed 90% of the genetic characteristics in individ
uals who suffered from one or more of five genetic disorders
(Heyer and Tremblay, 1995).
As discomfiting as it may be, in reality, it is only natural
that much of our information on founder effects should come
from the study of debilitating, and often fatal, diseases. If med
ical researchers can isolate a faulty gene that is responsible
for a particular problem, then this may suggest a specific treat
ment or cure. Also, genetic testing can tell prospective par
ents whether they might pass on these mutations to their chil
dren. And genetic counseling can help such prospective par
ents decide if they even want to have children in the first place.
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Fortunately, however, the historical records also include
some cases of the founder effect that were not related directly
to diseases. In an article on “The Origin of Peoples,” Trevor
Major described one such instance as follows.
In a now-classic study, H. Bentley Glass (1953) found
that the Dunkers—a community of German Baptist
Brethren in Pennsylvania’s Franklin County—are, in
most respects, very similar to other people of European
descent. Their religious customs require them to dress
a certain way, and marry within the community, but
otherwise their physical appearance is not unusual.
Although there have been some outside marriages,
most of the surviving members are descended from
fifty families that emigrated from Germany in the ear
ly 1700s. Glass found that the frequencies of blood types
and other genetic traits among the Dunkers differ from
the frequencies of these features between U.S. and Ger
man populations. It seems unlikely that any selective
forces were in operation to favor the survival of Dunk
ers with blood group A, for instance. Therefore, Glass
concluded, the founding population of Dunkers in
cluded, purely by chance, an unusually high propor
tion of people with blood group A (1998, 18:12).
As it turns out, the founder effect is a small part of a much
broader concept known as genetic drift, which occurs any
time the frequency of a genetic trait changes within a popula
tion. If, in the case of the founder effect, the emigrating group
possessed a set of unique or rare traits, then those specific
traits would be that much more difficult to locate among the
people who had stayed behind. In other words, there will be
a “drift” away from those characteristics. Furthermore, in
some cases, a highly prolific individual or family may skew the
genes of a relatively diverse population, and this may occur in
combination with some other form of genetic drift, such as
the founder effect. As Major went on to note:
For example, groups of Ashkenazic Jews moved east
ward out of Germany in the 17th century, and were
isolated culturally from the surrounding population.
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Several rare inherited disorders, such as Tay-Sachs
disease, afflict this group at high rates. Evolutionists
have thought this to be a sign of natural selection at
work. Perhaps the population hung on to these genes
because they offered some survival advantage, such
as resistance to tuberculosis and other maladies of the
crowded ghettos in which they lived (Diamond, 1991).
However, Neil Risch believes otherwise, at least in
the case of idiopathic torsion dystonia, which occurs at
a rate of one in three thousand among the Ashkenazim
today (Glausiusz, 1995). First, migration patterns favor
genetic drift via the founder effect in these people. And
second, historical records show that wealthier couples
had more children. If a mutation arose in one of these
families, as Risch infers from the genetic data, then it
could become more frequent in later generations. This
is a matter of misfortune, not adaptation (18:12-13).
There is another form of genetic drift known as a “popula
tion bottleneck,” which is the most striking. Typically, these
bottlenecks occur when catastrophes such as natural disasters,
epidemics, or wars decimate all but a small remnant of the
original population. For instance, a tornado could destroy an
entire village, except for a fortunate few. Those survivors would
bequeath their genetic characteristics to subsequent genera
tions. If there were a high degree of relatedness among the sur
vivors, then their descendants might appear quite distinct from
neighboring peoples. Of course, the Bible shows the Flood of
Noah to be the greatest bottleneck of all time. According to the
Genesis account, all of us must trace our ancestry to Noah’s
three sons and their wives.
One last effect upon racial characteristics may well be mate
selection (see Diamond, 1992, pp. 99-109). More often than not
(although, admittedly, not always), we marry someone who
speaks the same language as we do, who belongs to the same
cultural, religious, social, and political group, and who may even
possess the same color skin or racial characteristics that we pos
sess. The inadvertent result is a barrier, obvious or otherwise,
that may exist between two neighboring peoples, or even be
tween groups who live exist in close proximity.
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What is the bottom line? In reference to the human race,
Daniel E. Koshland made the following admission: “Such di
lemmas make us confront another reality. At the present time
the way in which mutation and selection (survival of the fittest)
has worked over evolutionary time no longer seems to apply
to Homo sapiens” (2002, 295:2216, parenthetical item in orig.).
What we do know is that the races were produced in a very short
time span, and that the racial variations we see today are merely
an expression of the original genetic endowment of Adam and
Eve as carried through to us by Noah. No “evolutionary pro
cess” was able, or needed, to produce them.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN
AND ANIMAL BLOOD TYPES
Blood has been called the liquid of life. With it, lives that
have been ravaged by traumatic injuries can be saved, while
on the opposite end of the spectrum, sustained blood loss typi
cally results in death. It is via this crimson fluid that oxygen is
transported throughout the human body. On average, human
adults possess approximately five liters of this vital liquid, which
travels through more than 50,000 miles of convoluted arteries,
arterioles, veins, venules, and capillaries. The total volume of
blood represents only 8-9% of the total weight of a human.
However, this small percentage does not reflect the major role
blood plays in properly maintaining all the organs in the body.
Even organs that play an active role in the circulatory system
—such as the heart that is responsible for pumping blood, or
the endocrine system that secretes hormones and salts into
the vascular system—are themselves dependent on it. Evolu
tionists have a difficult time explaining how the heart could
have evolved to serve as a blood “pump,” since the heart itself
requires oxygenated blood.
“Blood is thicker than water” is the cry from society in de
fense of the actions of family members. From a strictly physi
ological perspective, this is true. Blood has a viscosity that
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ranges between 4.5 and 5.5, while water has a viscosity of 1.
But what else do we really know about this iron-rich fluid that
flows just below the skin’s surface? Evolutionists tout the idea
that the blood running through the human circulatory system
is similar in nature to the blood coursing through the veins of
fish, bears, and birds. Is it just another product of evolution as
many would have us believe? Does the fact that humans pos
sess four blood types, prove that we could not all have de
scended from Adam and Eve? The Lord said to Moses:
For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have giv
en it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for
your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atone
ment for the soul (Leviticus 17:11).
It is our hope that this study will help you learn more about
this precious liquid that was selected by God Himself to wash
away man’s sins.
COMPONENTS OF HUMAN BLOOD
The study of blood is called hematology. Blood is one of the
few substances in the human body that is not “fixed” in place.
Tissues (such as nerves, muscles, and organs) have a specific
function and are limited in movement. Blood, however, is not
limited to any one part of the body. Its job is to provide these
“fixed” tissues with nourishment and then carry off waste prod
ucts. Blood itself is composed of a cellular portion referred to
as formed elements, and a fluid portion designated as plasma. The formed elements constitute approximately 45% of the
total volume of blood, and are comprised of erythrocytes, leu
kocytes, and platelets. Plasma is a straw-colored liquid that con
sists primarily of water and dissolved solutes. Approximately
90% of plasma is water, 9% is protein material, 0.9% is salts,
and 0.9% is sugar, urea, etc.
Erythrocytes (also known as red blood cells—see illustra
tion on next page) are the most common of the formed ele
ments. These cells provide oxygen to tissues, and assist in re-
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covering carbon dioxide (a waste product). In humans, red
blood cells are anucleated (i.e., they are devoid of nuclei), while
birds, amphibians, and other animals have red blood cells that
are nucleated—something else evolutionists have a difficult time
explaining. Some animals produce these cells intravascularly
(i.e., in the blood stream), whereas humans and some animals
produce them extravascularly (in the bone marrow or other
hematopoietic tissue). All cells require a nucleus for replica
tion and maturation. Even red blood cells have a nucleus dur
ing their very early stages of development. However, in hu
mans the production of red blood cells occurs in the bone mar-
Erythrocytes (red blood cells)
row, and thus we do not normally see these nucleated cells in
the circulation (although they occasionally are found in new
borns). As the red blood cell matures and is ready to leave the
bone marrow, it expels its nucleus. The reason for anucleated
red blood cells in humans is best explained by understanding
the blood cell’s specific function. In humans, the smallest blood
vessels (capillaries) often are so narrow that nucleated red blood
cells would have a difficult time passing through them. Even an
anucleated red blood cell is larger (8µm) than capillaries (23µm). However, without the nucleus present, the red blood
cell is flexible, and is able to fold over on itself. The anucleated
red blood cell’s shape (a biconcave disc) can best accomplish
this feat.
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Red blood cells contain hemoglobin, which carries oxy
gen to every cell in the body. Hemoglobin is a complex pro
tein that has two chains (referred to as alpha and beta). An ev
olutionary origin of hemoglobin would require a minimum of
120 mutations to convert an alpha to a beta. At least 34 of those
changes require changeovers in 2 or 3 nucleotides. Yet, if a sin
gle nucleotide change occurred through mutation, the result
would ruin the blood and kill the organism.
The formed element portion of blood also possesses platelets and leukocytes. Platelets are much smaller than red blood
cells, and serve to stop blood loss from wounds (hemostasis).
Leukocytes serve as the primary line of defense in the vascu
lar system. Two categories, granulocytes and lymphoid cells,
circulate throughout the blood stream in an effort to identify
and combat foreign pathogens such as bacteria, viruses, etc.
Adding to this complexity are the numerous salts that are
required in blood. These salts are primarily basic ions, such
as sodium, potassium, phosphate, and magnesium that help
maintain a steady pH value for the blood. These bicarbonate
ions remove carbon dioxide from the tissues and help maintain
a slightly alkaline pH of 7.4. During traumatic injuries or sur
geries, a great deal of attention is given to the pH of the blood
significant decrease or loss of this alkalinity can cause rapid and
violent breathing, with death likely to occur at a pH of 7.0 or
below. Conversely, if the pH of the blood is allowed to go be
yond 7.6, it also can prove fatal.
Evolutionists assert that life evolved from the sea, and are
quick to point out the sodium chloride and other salts found in
blood probably originated from the sea. However, on average,
the concentration of sodium chloride (salt) in seawater is 2.7%
(0.8% other salts, some of which are not present in blood and
would not benefit the cardiovascular system). If evolutionists
took the time to do the math, they would find that the Baltic
Sea—one of the “fresher” large bodies of water—still is much
too salty to have played any physiological part in the evolu
tion of blood.
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DIFFERENT BLOOD TYPES
Human blood is categorized into four different types: A, B,
AB, and O. But why that is the case—from an evolutionary
viewpoint—is an enigma. As evolutionist Steve Jones admitted:
“What blood groups are actually for, nobody really knows”
(1996, p. 179). Each letter designates the type of antigen, or
protein, found on the surface of the red blood cells. [For ex
ample, the surface of red blood cells for type B blood would
have antigens known as B-antigens.]
Through blood testing, we can determine a person’s blood
type, and identify the so-called ABO antigens. Most of us, for
example know what our own blood type is in the ABO system—e.g., O-negative, AB-negative, B-positive (the positive or
negative refers to the Rhesus factor, which is another type of
antigen on the surface of red blood cells).
Blood typing is critical when blood transfusions become
necessary during illness, surgery, or other such situations. Per
sons with type O blood are so-called universal donors, and can
donate blood to people with types A, B, AB, or O. However, a
person with AB blood type can give blood only to persons with
AB blood type.
Blood
Type
O+
O
A+
A
B+
B
AB+
AB
Percent of
Population
37%
6%
34%
6%
10%
2%
4%
1%
Possible
Recipients
O+, A+, B+, AB+
Anyone
A+, AB+
A+, A-, AB+, AB
B+, AB+
B+, B-, AB+, AB
AB+
AB+, AB-
- 457 -
THE ADAM AND EVE ISSUE
Admittedly, humans possess four blood types, which at first
glance appears to be a strong victory for evolutionists and a
gargantuan hurdle for creationists. However, the variations that
we see in blood types fit easily into the biblical account, once
we understand the possibilities. From the four phenotypic blood
groups (A, B, AB, and O), there are six possible genotypes: AA,
AO, BB, BO, AB, OO. No medical difference exists between
AA, and AO; both are considered type “A,” and behave the
same. In a similar manner, there is no significance to BB or BO;
they are classified as type “B.”
Types “A” and “B” are said to be codominant. That is, they
take precedence over “O” if it also is present. This means that
they both are dominant to type “O,” but equal to each other.
Thus, if a mother has type AO blood, the A is dominant, and
she can be described as having type A blood even though the
O also is present (think of O as being the silent partner). So if a
mother and father are types AO and BO, then the blood type
of their offspring can be, A, B, AB, or O.
In the case of Adam and Eve, if Adam was type AO and Eve
was type BO, then all four blood types would be possible in
their offspring (see chart below). Any resulting children would
have a 25% chance of being A, B, O, or AB. Thus each child
would have 25% chance of being any of the four blood types.
25%
AB
25%
BO
25%
AO
25%
OO
So, obviously, Adam and Eve can easily account for the four
different blood types we see today. In addition, there were eight
members of Noah’s family aboard the ark when God destroyed
all other living creatures via the global flood. Those eight in
dividuals would have had no problem passing on all four blood
types through their family lines.
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HUMANS, ANIMALS, AND BLOOD
When God created all living creatures, He did so knowing
that we all would have different needs. With those needs came
different requirements. Paul, writing to the Christians in Cor
inth, stated: “All flesh is not the same flesh: but there is one
kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes,
and another of birds” (1 Corinthians 15:39). Evolutionists will
find no comfort in knowing that human blood is vastly differ
ent from that of animals. Human blood does not need to be
specialized for long periods of hibernation (like the blood of
North American bears). Additionally, a human’s oxygen needs
are different from fish and birds, and consequently the com
position of our blood varies as well. Scientists categorize ani
mals into two broad classes—warm-blooded and cold-blooded
—according to how the animals regulate their internal temper
atures. Yet evolutionists would have us believe that blood from
all living creatures shares a common origin.
WHAT ABOUT BLOOD TYPES
OF OTHER ANIMALS?
The red blood cells of all non-mammalian vertebrates (i.e.,
fish, amphibians, reptiles, and birds) are nucleated, flattened,
and ellipsoidal. If, in fact, humans evolved from a common
ancestor several million years ago, then it would make sense
that blood cells would be similar in all animals. This is far from
the case, however.
Chimpanzees have blood types A and minimal O, but never B. Gorillas have blood types B and minimal O, but never A.
Plus, there is no blood type AB in either of these primates, while
some humans do possess AB type blood. Currently, eight blood
groups are commonly found in dogs, and are categorized un
der what is known as the dog erythrocyte antigen (DEA) system. The table on the next page outlines the eight common
blood groups of the DEA system used in the United States.
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New
Nomencla
ture
DEA-1.1
DEA-1.2
DEA-3
DEA-4
DEA-5
DEA-6
DEA-7
DEA-8
Old
Nomenclature
A1
A2
B
C
D
F
Tr
He
Inci
dence
40
20
5
98
25
98
45
40
So, while humans have blood types A,B, and O, dogs pos
sess eight different types. And since we know that blood types
are inherited, the question arises, “Whence did dogs inherit
these additional blood types?” Furthermore, consider that
cats have 11 blood types, and cows are reported to have al
most 800 different blood types! Evolving 800 different blood
types is no small feat, considering man has yet to evolve even
one. Additionally, evolutionists must answer the question,
“Why don’t all living things have blood?” If a true circulatory
system is the most energy-efficient method of distributing ox
ygen and food, and is the best mechanism for cleansing or
ganisms, then why do plants not employ a similar system?
WHAT ABOUT HIBERNATION?
While we all enjoy a good night’s sleep, how many of us
sleep for several weeks at a time? Hibernating animals have
an element in their blood known as Hibernation Inducement
Trigger (HIT). Research suggests that it is some kind of opiate
chemically related to morphine. As the days get shorter, as the
temperature changes, and as food becomes scarce, HIT trig
gers hibernation. Exactly how and why it happens remains a
mystery, but we do know that humans do not possess HIT in
their blood.
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WHAT ABOUT BIRDS?
Birds have a circulatory system that is very similar to a mammal’s. Bird blood is similar to ours in that it contains both red
cells and leukocytes. However, unlike humans, a bird’s
red blood cells are nucleated! This, of course, poses the
question of which was the original blood cell—the nucleated
one or the anucleated one? Additionally, birds’ oxygen re
quirements are much greater than those of humans, and there
fore the composition of birds’ blood is different from humans’.
WHAT ABOUT FISH?
Is your blood ready for a good long swim? Most of us rarely
consider the complexity involved in living in an aquatic en
vironment where even blood is different. Fish blood is thicker
than human blood, and has a lower pressure, because it is
pumped by a heart with only two chambers. Consequently,
the flow of blood through a fish’s body is slow. Because the
blood flows slowly through the gills where it takes on oxygen,
and because water contains less oxygen than air, fish blood is
not as rich in oxygen as human blood. Also, as a result of the
slow flow of blood through the gills, the blood cools and ap
proaches the temperature of the water surrounding the fish. If
human blood were to do the same, there would be a race to
the death—either death by hypothermia, or death from a lack
of oxygen.
CONCLUSION
When you take into account such things as: (a) the inherited nature of human blood; (b) its osmolality (osmolality is a
measurement of the concentration of solutes per liter of solu
tion); (c) the specific amounts of ions, proteins, and organic
molecules it contains; (d) the fact that it must be kept at a spe
cific volume; and (d) the fact that it must be maintained at a
specific pH, it quickly becomes apparent that there must have
been a designer behind this incredible life-giving liquid.
- 461 -
Additionally, the bloodletting (for sin) of every lamb under
the Old Covenant could not do what the blood of one sinless
Lamb of God could do in taking away the sins of the entire
world (Exodus 12:12; 1 Corinthians 5:7). The writer of the book
of Hebrews expressed it this way: “For it is not possible that
the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins” (He
brews 10:4). The blood of Jesus Christ—shed on the cross at
Calvary—was red just like yours and mine, but it paid a debt
that cannot be repaid. Could all four blood types have come
from Adam and Eve? Definitely! The only question that re
mains in regard to Adam and Eve is, which one was type “A”
and which one was type “B.”
- 462 -
10
There are numerous ways in which mankind bears God’s
image. For example, only human beings have a yearning to
know a cause for things. Only humans are concerned with
their origin, their present purpose, and their destiny. No animal—regardless of how “close” to humans certain evolutionists
think that animal may be—ever pondered such things. Also,
only human beings contemplate death, practice funeral rituals,
and bury their dead. God has indeed “placed eternity” in our
hearts (Ecclesiastes 3:11). Human civilizations from time im
memorial have believed in life after death, and therefore have
attempted to make some plans for it. One look at the Egyptian
pyramids is evidence aplenty of this fact. Additionally, only
humans are historical beings. We record past events, recount
them, discuss them, and even learn from them. And so on.
The Bible paints a picture of man as a being that stands on
a different level from all other creatures upon the Earth. He
towers high above all earthly creation because of the phenom
enal powers and attributes that God Almighty has freely given
him. No other living being was given the capacities and capa
bilities, the potential and the dignity, that God instilled in each
man and woman. Humankind is the peak, the pinnacle, the
crown, the apex of God’s creation. And what a difference that
should make in our lives. As Poe and Davis put it:
Whether people are an aspect of God or creatures of
God has profound implications for human existence
on earth. If people are the result of the creative activ
ity of God based on God’s intentional, self-conscious
decision to make people, then creation results from
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the purpose of God. People have a purpose, and this
purpose emerges from the Creator-creature relation
ship. If, on the other hand, people are aspects of a...
unity of which all things are a part, but which lacks selfconsciousness, then life has no purpose. It merely ex
ists (2000, p. 128).
Whether or not we are created in the image and likeness of
God does indeed have “profound implications for human ex
istence.” Anthropologist Jonathan Marks made the following
statement in his book, What It Means to be 98% Chimpanzee:
“The question of who and what you are is not trivial” (emp.
added). The context in which he made that statement, how
ever, is as important as the statement itself. Here, from his book,
are the comments immediately preceding that sentence:
Science gives us authoritative ideas about kinship,
which force us to reconceptualize our place in the or
der of things, which is by that very fact disorienting.
But it doesn’t stick around to explain it to us, to rein
tegrate us, to give new meaning to our existence. That’s
the problem with Darwinian theory, of course. It tells
us our ancestors were kin to apes, the products of eons
of ordinary biological processes of survival and repro
duction, and not merely zapped into existence in the
Garden of Eden, but it doesn’t tell us what that means
or what to do about it. It just walks away from the
wreckage (2002, p. 222, emp. in orig.).
What “wreckage,” exactly, is Dr. Marks talking about? Let
Richard Dawkins, the renowned evolutionist of Oxford Uni
versity, answer. In the 1989 edition of his highly acclaimed
1976 book, The Selfish Gene, Dawkins wrote: “My own feeling
is that a human society based simply on the gene’s laws
of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty
society in which to live. But unfortunately, however much
we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true” (pp.
2,3). Six years later, in his book, River Out of Eden, he contin
ued in the same vein:
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[I]f the universe were just electrons and selfish genes,
meaningless tragedies...are exactly what we should
expect, along with equally meaningless good fortune.
Such a universe would be neither evil nor good in its
intention. It would manifest no intentions of any kind.
In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind phys
ical forces and genetic replication, some people are
going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky,
and you won t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any
justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the
properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no
design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but
pitiless indifference (1995, pp. 132-133, emp. in orig.).
Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg referred to a similar “piti
less indifference” in his classic book on the origin of the Uni
verse, The First Three Minutes, when he lamented:
It is almost irresistible for humans to believe that we
have some special relation to the universe, that human
life is not just a more-or-less farcical outcome of a chain
of accidents reaching back to the first three minutes,
but that we were somehow built in from the beginning.
...It is very hard to realize that this all is just a tiny part
of an overwhelmingly hostile universe…[which] has
evolved from an unspeakably unfamiliar early condi
tion, and faces a future extinction of endless cold or in
tolerable heat. The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless (1977,
pp. 150,155, emp. added).
The “Darwinian wreckage” that has been foisted on human
ity has caused untold sorrow. If we teach people that they have
descended from animals, why would it surprise us that they
then act like animals? If we convince people that they live in
a “pointless” universe where their lives are filled with “pitiless
indifference,” why should we be at all surprised when they
spend their lives in a fruitless search for an ever-elusive hap
piness, and end their lives (sometimes intentionally!) in com
plete and utter despair?
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Man did not evolve from an “imageless” lower creation.
Rather, God created him with the unique abilities we have
discussed in this book. While in some aspects, man is very dif
ferent from the infinite God Who created him, the passages of
Scripture that speak of the imago Dei reveal his likeness to Him.
Thus, we are justified in concluding that man was created “to
be and do on a finite level what God was and did on an
infinite level” (Morey, 1984, p. 37, emp. added). How very
thrilling, and yet how extremely humbling, to know that we
alone bear God’s image! And yes, what a profound difference
such knowledge should make in our lives!
- 466 -
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- 506 -
A
Aegyptopithecus zeuxis—16,
18,20
Afar Depression—27
AL 288-1—42,47-49,56
albino—442,444
animism—394
anti-pathogen hypothesis—
169
Ardipithecus ramidus—27,29,
35
Ardipithecus ramidus
kadabba—29-31,33
asexual reproduction—142143,147-148,153,159,162
Australopithecus—9,15-16,24,
36,54,57,64,74-75,96
Australopithecus afarensis—
3,28,33,36,41-45,5053,55,57,60,66-67,73,
296
Australopithecus africanus—
7,44,51,57-63,69,73,
226
Australopithecus anamensis—
28-29,36,38
Australopithecus boisei—
57,61-63
Australopithecus garhi—38
Australopithecus robustus—
61-63
Australopithecus ramidus
(see Ardipithecus rami
dus)
B
binomial nomenclature—4
blastula—238
brain size—283
Broca’s area—190-191
C
Cartesian approach—357
Cartesian dualism (see
dualism)
Cartesian Theater—356,367
chimp DNA (see DNA)
chromosomal counts—103
chromosomes—103-105,
159,163
double homologous—164
sex chromosomes—164
X chromosome—164
Y chromosome—164
cloning—178,180
- 507 -
Consciousness—247-428
accident of—223
animals and—230-233
brain and—259-260,
325-345
defined—259-267
dualistic interactionism
and—393
emergent materialism
and—387-393
epiphenomenalism and—
375-386
evolution of—247-428
evolutionary bias and—
296-300
functionalism—364-372
“hard problem of”—
350-351
human—
importance of—
253-255
mystery of—256-261
origin of—296-349
identity theory and—
382-386
materialism and—331332,345-346,362,364371,373-374,387,392
mind and—333-346
miracle of—253-260
monism and—361-364
panpsychism and—
373-375
psychical monism and—
363-364
radical materialism
and—364-372
cremaster muscle—171
D
Daka—75,80
determinism—235-236,305
DNA—99-134,148-156,332
chimp DNA—107,109
human DNA—109,128
maternal mtDNA—121
mitochondrial DNA—
111,123-124,126
Mitochondrial Eve—128
mtDNA—113-115,117-118,
120-122,124-127,129133
Neanderthal DNA—128,
132
DNA Repair Hypothesis—
143,148,151
Dryopithecus africanus—1819,23-24
dualism—336,351,354,355357,399
Cartesian—359-361,394,
388-389,393-402,410411
dualist-interactionism—393
dualist-interactionist—411
E
ectoderm—238
egg cell—175-176
- 508 -
Subject Index
emergent materialism—
387-393
endoderm—238
epiphenomenalism—375386
epiphenomenon—286,329,
343,371,375-376,389,416
erythrocytes—454
estrus—169
evolution of sex—135-182
gametes—158,170
gastrulation—238
genetic code, origin of—251
ghost in the machine—
359-360,362,365,
366,399-400,413
Homo erectus—7,34,54-55,
64,68-69,72-80,84,9091,226
Homo erectus ergaster—76
Homo ergaster—74-76
Homo habilis—34,51,60,6364,68-71,73-75,79,84
Homo rudolfensis—34,36,
68,73-74
Homo sapiens—3,7-8,10,14,
34,36,67-69,73,75-77,7981,83-84,90,111,116,
130,134,186,217,226,
228,255,269,287,292,
301,432,436,441,453
Homo sapiens idaltu—80-81
Homo sapiens
neanderthalensis—77,
129-130
Homo sapiens sapiens—10,
111,130
hopeful monster—189
human DNA (see DNA)
Human Genome Project—
101,105,110,130,294
Hylobatidae—8
H
I
hemoglobin—100,456
hermaphrodites—166
HERV-K Provirus—109
Hominidae—7-9,15,42,44
hominin—7,9-10,35,185
Homo—7,15-16,74
identity theory—382-386
(see phenomenalistic
parallelism)
F
free will—234-235,245,268,
331-332,379-382,400
functionalism—325,364-372
G
J
Java Man—85,90
- 509 -
K
Kanzi—195-197,200-201
Kenyanthropus platyops—
33-39,80
Kenyapithecus—24,36
KNM-ER 1470—70,72
KNM-WT 17000—60
KNM-WT 40000—35
L
Laetoli—65,67
footprints—44,65-68
language, origin of—183-207
larynx—193-194,196
leukocytes—456
life, origin of—248-252
Lottery Principle—143-145,
147
Lucy—1,3,27-28,33,40-42,
44-50-53,55-57,60,68,
73,85,228,265,296
M
marsupials—167
materialism—234,246,300,
305,308,331-332,345346,362,364-371,373-374,
387,393,396,399,401,422423
maternal mtDNA (see DNA)
meiosis—136,155-160,176,
386
melanin—442
menstrual cycle—168-169
mental intentions—404405,408,412-413
mesoderm—238
Middle Awash in Ethiopia—31
mitochondria—112-113,117118,121,129,175
mitochondrial clocks—115128
mitochondrial DNA (see
DNA)
Mitochondrial Eve—111118,122,124,126,128
mitosis—136,155,157-158,
386
molecular clock—9,115-127
monism—361-364,384,411
monistic materialism—387,
394,422
monist-materialist—395396
mtDNA (see DNA)
mtDNA clock—126
N
Neander Valley—132
Neanderthal DNA (see DNA)
Neanderthal Man—1,83,8589,128-134
Nebraska Man—88
neural tube—238
nonreductive materialism—
387-393
- 510 -
Subject Index
O
S
Olduvai Gorge—14,62,64,
68,73-74
origin of life—248-252
Orrorin tugenensis—26-27
Out of Africa—83,115
ovulation—135
ovulation cycle—170
Sahelanthropus tchadensis—
93-96
self-aware—314-319,322,324325,327,420
self-awareness—242,253254,258,265-270,277,284,
292,313,316-330,333,335,
352,370,374,376,393,400,
420
self-conscious mind—409410
self-recognition—263,289,
290,322-323
semicircular canal—54
sex chromosomes
(see chromosomes)
sex, origin of—135-182
sexual reproduction—135182
sialic acid—110
Smith Papyrus—212
spandrels—223-225
sperm—120,136,138,140,
152,155,158-159,169,
171,173,175-177,180
P
Panglossian paradigm—223
panpsychism—373-374
Paranthropus—54,62-63
patch-clamp—244
phenomenalistic parallelism—383-385
Piltdown Man—89-90,92
pineal gland—215,354
platelets—456
Pongidae—8,50
psychical monism—363364
R
radical materialism
(see functionalism)
Ramapithecus brevirostris—
20-26
Red Queen Hypothesis—
143,147-148
reductionism—234
Rhodesian Man—85,91-92
rickets—86-87,432-434,448
T
Tangled Bank Hypothesis—
143,145-147
Taung skull—58-61
Toto (parrot)—194
Tower of Babel—188-189,443
- 511 -
tree of life—167
trialist—411
triune brain—240
Tugen Hills—26
twelve cranial nerves—242
U
ultraviolet radiation—442
universal language—188-189
V
vitamin D—86-87,431-434,
448-449
W
Washoe—197,200
Wernicke’s area—190
written language—222
X
X chromosomes (see
chromosomes)
Y
Y chromosome (see
chromosomes)
Z
Zinjanthropus boisei (see
Australopithecus boisei)
- 512 -
A
Adrian, E.D.—273-274,
362,398
Antinori, Severino—178
Aristotle—212-213
Asimov, Isaac—216,296297
Awadalla, Philip—125
B
Bell, Graham—137,162,
252-253
Berger, Lee R.—8,10,57
Bergman, Jerry—142,149
Britten, Roy—107-108
Broca, Paul—190
Broom, Robert—57,61
Brunet, Michel—93-94
C
Cann, Rebecca—111,113,
115
Cardoso, Silvia—337
Carrington, Hereward—
342,344,363-364,
395,398
Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi—
130,132,154
Cave, A.J.E.—86
Chalmers, David—271,
350-351
Chaplin, George—431-432
Chomsky, Noam—189,197198,205
Clark, W. Legros—283
Copeland, Herbert F.—5
Corballis, Michael—185
Crick, Francis—99-100,220,
233,249,265,272,301,
332,337,373,387-388
D
Damasio, Antonio—264
Dart, Raymond—57,61,63
Darwin, Charles—11,440
Dawkins, Richard—ix,29,
159,221,282,464
Dawkins, Marian—314
Dax, Mark—190
Delbrück, Max—336
Dennett, Daniel—218,232,
271,325-326,328,333334,338,341,356,365-371,
373,381,393-394,399,420
Descartes, René—214-215,
354,356,358,360-361,
394,397-398
- 513 -
Diamond, Jared—101,164
Dickerson, R.E.—163
Dobzhansky, Theodosius—
142,254,277,303,317-318,
350,352
Dubois, Eugene—90-91
E
Grassé, Pierre-Paul—146,
154-156,302-303
Gregory, Richard—272-274,
276,280,282,286,332,
372-373
Griffin, Donald—255,319,
321,323-324,327,331,
348,351,367-368,376
Eccles, John—236,256,271,
274,286,301,307-309,337,
345,349,356-357,362365,367,373-375,377-378,
381-382,384-386,388389,392,396,398-405,
408-415,421,422-424
Eddington, Arthur—307,
312,416
Edgar, Blake—28,216,229230,258,265-266,348,369
Eldredge, Niles—139,440
H
F
Jablonski, Nina G.—
431-432
Johanson, Donald—15,2729,40-42,44-48,50-51,5354,57,60,73,216,229-230,
258,265-266,296,348,
369
Josephson, Brian—308-309,
311,356
Fisher, R.A.—161-162
G
Galen—213
Gallup, Gordon G.—322323
Gould, Stephen Jay—ix,32,
93,155,222-225,231,255,
277,279-280,287,290-292,
313,348,376
Haeckel, Ernst—5
Hausler, Martin—48-49
Hodgkin, Alan L.—400
Hoyle, Fred—277
Huxley, Andrew F.—400
Huxley, Julian—296-297
Huxley, Thomas—305,343,
373-375
J
K
Krings, M.A.—128,131
- 514 -
Name Index
L
Lacham-Kaplan, Orly—179
Leakey, Louis—14,18,20,40,
61-66,68-69,73-75
Leakey, Mary—14,15,18,40,
61-68,74
Leakey, Meave—15,28,3233,36-38,40,80
Leakey, Richard—13,15-16,
18,20,22,32,42,70,72,
247,254,265,280,299,
301,318,321
Lewin, Roger—13,18,20,22,
42,282,299,328,341,360,
371,399
Lewis, C.S.—262
Lewis, G. Edward—20
Lewis, Jack P.—426
Lewontin, Richard—14,222224,299,376
Lieberman Philip—183,
186-187
Linnaeus, Carolus—4-5
Lubenow, Marvin—57,60,
61,65,68,69-70,73,75,7980,129,131-133
M
Maddox, John—139,141,
150,251-252
Margulis, Lynn—6,138-139,
142,146,156,158,236
Marks, Jonathan—26,102,
464
Mayr, Ernst—37,76,153,
160,227,231,389
McGinn, Colin—277-278,
286,303,328,330
Monod, Jacques—298,302,
394-395
Morgan, Elaine—111
Morris, Richard—230
Muller, Hermann J.—
161-161
Muller, Johannes—193
O
Oxnard, Charles—56,64
P
Partridge, T.C.—58,60-61
Penfield, Wilder—274,397,
406-407,414-415
Penrose, Roger—266-267,
270,292-293,313,419
Pickford, Martin—26
Pilbeam, David—19,23-24,
26,183
Pinker, Steven—199,221,231,
233-234,282,293,380
Planck, Max—118,422
Plato—212
Polkinghorne, John—
256,311
Popper, Karl—235-236,261,
271,300,349,401,411-413
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Poundstone, William—240
Prigogine, Ilya—308,356
Profet, Margie—169
R
Rennie, John—92
Richmond, Brian—50
Robinson, Daniel—236,247,
256,259,274,308,345,349,
364,374,377-378,382,396,
405,408,412,422
Robinson, John T.—57
Ruse, Michael—134,227,
234,237,254,273,275,281,
285-286,293,361,384
S
de Sade, Marquis—236
Sagan, Carl—ix,240
Sagan, Dorion—138-139,142,
146,156,158,195-197,236
Schmid, Peter—46-49
Schwartz, Karleve V.—6
Searle, John—367,370,379,
386-388
Senut, Brigitte—26,95
Shakespeare, William—213
Sherrington, Charles—336,
399,402-403
Simons, Elwyn—19,23-24,39
Simpson, George Gaylord—
ix,10,37,205,297-298,330
Skoyles, John R.—195-197
Smith-Woodward, Arthur—
89,91-92
Sperry, Roger—245,281,
308-309,336,340,345,
356-357,379,388-393,
403,422
Spoor, Fred—16,54
Stoneking, Mark—111
Strait, David—50
Strassmann, Beverly—169
Strauss, Evelyn—117-118
T
Thomas, Lewis—158,202
Trefil, James—217,240,277,
329,331,338,350,352,
356-357,366,397
V
da Vinci, Leonardo—213
Voltaire—223
Vrba, Elisabeth—225,279280
W
Wald, George—316,349,
415-416
Walker, Alan—53-54,60
Watson, James—99-100,337
Watson, Lyall—13
Weinberg, Steven—ix,298,
465
Weismann, August—161
- 516 -
Name Index
Wernicke, Carl—190
Wesson, Robert—254,262,
325,332,370
White, Randall—134
White, Tim—27,35-40,42,
44,60,76,80-83
Whittaker, Robert H.—6
Wieland, Carl—189
Williams, George C.—143
Wilson, Allan C.—111
Wilson, E.O.—297,333,336,
338,350,360,382
Wilson, Peter—226,268,
284,286,316,333
Woese, Carl—6-7
Z
Zeman, Adam—265,270,
285,329,347,357,359,
374,393,398
Zimmer, Carl—144-145,
151,186
Zuckerkandl, Emile—100
Zuckerman, Lord Solly—
45,63
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