Artikel: Europe`s worst massacre. The making of Srebrenica into a

Artikel: Europe’s worst massacre. The making of Srebrenica into a global area
Auteur: Erna Rijsdijk
Verschenen in: Skript Historisch Tijdschrift, jaargang 24.1, 49-64.
© 2014 Stichting Skript Historisch Tijdschrift, Amsterdam
ISSN 0165-7518
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Erna Rijsdijk
Europe's worst massacre
The Making of Srebrenica into a Global Accident
Srebrenica is often referred to as "Europe's worst massacre since
World War 1!."^ It took, however, a long time before Srebrenica
materialised in world politics as a disaster. Srebrenica more or less
was a non-issue in global discourse when it actually happened.
Until today, the meaning of the events in Srebrenica is being contested in the media, by politicians and last but not least in the
International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). My
thesis will be dedicated to the various narrative reconstructions of
what happened in Srebrenica and how these reconstructions relate to our understandings of world politics.
Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the War Crimes Tribunal on the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), recently said in her opening statement of the
Milosevic trial that crimes against humanity are not local affairs. They
affect all of us throughout the world. ^ This statement could never have
been made without presuming that modern time and space compressing
technologies make us all witnesses to a specific kind of violence that is
generally understood as a crime. The events in Srebrenica are perceived as
a global crime with global witnesses, because of its supposed universal
meaning as a humanitarian disaster. Paul Virilio has called these disasters
"global or general accidents."-* As Frangois Debrix has demonstrated for
the Rwanda case, it only took place as a global accident for a world audience after it had actually happened."'' The local violence first had to be redescribed and reterritorialised in universal terms (as genocide) before it
reached its global public. Likewise, international media represented
Srebrenica as a global accident ("Europe's worst massacres since World
War II") only long after many disasters already had taken place. As a
result, global attention was mainly focused on the relatively short time
span covering the events during and just after the fall of UN "safe area"
Srebrenica in July 1995 when thousands of the population of the enclave
were killed. Most of the violence and human misery that had happened
earlier had not been covered in universal terms, and largely failed to affect
a world audience. In the following section I will show the trajectory in
which the events in Srebrenica were transformed into a global accident.
Srebrenica hardly happened in world news
In 1992, Srebrenica was an isolated enclave in the Bosnian war. The inhabitants desperately tried to resist Serb forces from conquering the area. The
enclave hosted thousands of people who had fled their homes in Eastern
Bosnia as a result of the attacks by Serbs. Although the situation in the
enclave was precarious, the world media did not perceive this as such. Two
Dutch journalists, Frank Westerman and Bart Rijs, have reconstructed the
situation in the enclave in their book Het Zwartste Scenario (The Blackest
Scenario). They, firstly, point at the fact that the situation in Srebrenica had
a lot in common with the situation in Sarajevo, but media attention was
not equally divided between the two areas. Like Sarajevo, Srebrenica was
surrounded and attacked since the beginning of the Bosnian war. However,
the media focused on the capital, which had an airport, where the president resided and where the headquarters of the UN forces were hosted. In
Srebrenica, on the other hand, oblivion ruled. There was no water, no electric power, no telephone, no press.-" Westerman and Rijs describe
Srebrenica's troubled relation with the modern media:
To accommodate the urgent need for news special radio meetings are
held in the house of the "technician". The "technician" is a student who
has removed the engine and the transformer from his cassette player and
connected the two poles on a spinning wheel. Every hour, somebody steps
on the pedals to generate electric power which results in the news sounding from the loudspeakers on the wall. ... The radio meetings have a tragic dimension. The audience listens quietly ... to reports about the breakup of the apartheid in South Africa, the quarrels over the Black Sea fleet,
the siege of Sarajevo while their own drama is being silenced. Strange,
because they are world news. However, nobody reports it. The only outgoing messages come from radio amateurs."
The BBC picked up some of the emergency signals and brought the news
about a threatening famine. In November 1992, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - the biggest supplier of emergency
aid in Bosnia - warned of a coming disaster.' On 19 February 1993, the
UNHCR issued another alarming report about the situation in Srebrenica:
There is no food such as we know it. They have not had real food for
months. They are surviving on the chaff from wheat and roots from trees.
Every day people are dying of hunger and exhaustion. The medical situation could not be more critical. People who are wounded are taken to the
hospital where they die from simple injuries because of the lack of medical supplies. They have problems of epidemic proportion with scabies and
lice.^
More bad news came from Simon Mardel, a British doctor of the World
Health organisation. He had reached Srebrenica after a five-hour walk and
reported after his visit at a press conference in Belgrado "that people were
dying at the rate of twenty to thirty a day. He estimated that 170 wounded
needed to be evacuated as soon as possible and that up to 18,000 women
and children also wanted to be evacuated."'^ Bosniacs and foreign journalists carried the news of the desperate situation in Srebrenica to Sarajevo
and the outside world, prompting the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, French General
Philippe Morillon to undertake the dangerous trip to Srebrenica with a
small UNPROFOR party on 11 March 1993.^^ He aired his decision to go
over short wave radio: "With the knowledge that a real tragedy is developing in Srebrenica, 1 have decided to travel there and I have decided to stay
there to ease the fears of the population."^^ Without the consent of his
UN bosses in New York and Paris, Morillon took the initiative to turn the
world's attention to the isolated enclave. Accompanied by a contingent
of British troops and a Dutch United Nations Military Observer (UNMO)
he reached Srebrenica, where he met a population that was in a state of
complete panic.^-^ Fifty thousand to sixty thousand people (pre-war inhabitants and refugees from the surrounding villages) were compressed into
an area of approximately 150 km centred on this town.^ The crowd initially responded to Morillon's visit by taking him hostage. ^-^ A video camera registered Morillon's promise to the people in Srebrenica: "I deliberately came here and I am now decided to stay here in Srebrenica. You are now
under the protection of the UN forces."^" These words are recalled in
many later accounts on Srebrenica and they have become iconic for the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission. ^'
The radio hams of Srebrenica were the first to inform the world that
General Morillon was resolved to remain in besieged Srebrenica until aid
arrived.^ Morillon was allowed to leave on 13 March and during the following weeks, UNHCR brought a number of humanitarian aid convoys
into Srebrenica. They also evacuated 8,000 - 9,000 people to territory that
was held by the Bosnian government. The evacuations happened in a state
of total panic. Twenty people died as a result of the journey on overcrowded trucks on their way to safe territory.^" The evacuations were supported by the Bosnian Serbs, but opposed by the Bosnian Government, who
felt that the evacuations contributed to the "ethnic cleansing" of the territory. Finally, the evacuations were stopped.'^'^
David Rohde emphasises that it was journalist Tony Birtley who helped
keeping the events in Srebrenica in the headlines. Birtley was a British
reporter who worked freelance for the American television network ABC.
He had flown into the enclave on a secret Bosnian Army helicopter flight.
In his stories he described the misery among the population and warned
of the town's imminent collapse.^^ According to Rohde, Birtley's images of
the Serb artillery attack on 12 April - which had left fifty-six people dead
in Srebrenica among which fourteen children who were found dead in a
schoolyard - made a crucial difference and put pressure on the West to
act. 22 Westerman and Rijs, however, also point at other media sources.
After the artillery attack an UNHCR employee reported on the BBC radio
that pieces of human flesh were sticking on the fence of a basketball field.
Tim Judah of the London Times wrote about a terrifying bombardment
that had killed or mutilated anyone who was not able to run fast
enough.-^-^ The besieged Bosniacs of the enclave made it on to the cover of
Time magazine thereby temporarily taking over the martyr role of
Sarajevo. According to Westerman and Rijs the reports of this attack made
Srebrenica into the symbol of the inadmissible Bosnian Serb aggression. ^^
Morillon's action and the subsequent media attention had put Srebrenica
on the agenda of the UN Security Council. On 16 April 1993, four days
after the attack, the UN Security Council "demanded" Srebrenica to be tre-
ated as a "safe area" by "all parties and others concerned," which "should
be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act" in resolution
8 1 9 . ^ Although the enclave was about to be overrun by Serb forces, the
Security Council initially did not see any military obligations for UN forces to establish or protect such a "safe area."^" Nevertheless, initiatives
taken by others had their own momentum and on 18 April a
Demilitarisation Agreement was negotiated between the commander of the
Bosniac Army (ARBiH) General Halilovic, the commander of the Bosnian
Serb Army General Mladic and the UNPROFOR commander General
Morillon/'' Contrary to what was suggested by the Security Council, the
agreement included the immediate deployment of approximately 170
UNPROFOR troops, principally from the Canadian contingent/" The
meaning of the new status of Srebrenica was still unclear and was left to be
handled by UNPROFOR.
The night after the Srebrenica Demilitarisation Agreement, General
Morillon had stated in a press conference in Sarajevo that any further
attack by the Serbs on the people of Srebrenica would constitute "a declaration of war against the entire world." ^" Unfortunately, the resoluteness
of the UNPROFOR commander's words was not reflected in the positions
of the Security Council members as can be illustrated by the conversations
between journalists and the US Department of State spokesman Richard
Boucher at a press conference on 19 April:
Q: Richard, you referred to the demihtarisation of Srebrenica. Isn't that
a euphemism, for basically the surrender of all arms by the Bosnian defenders? The Serbs aren't being demilitarised.
Boucher: No. And I described for you in the next sentence what it meant.
It meant that the UN would engage in a process of disarming the government forces there. As part of that agreement, the Bosnian Government
defenders of Srebrenica are to turn over their arms to UNPROFOR.-^^
Q: So, Richard, do you consider Srebrenica to have fallen essentially?
Boucher: At this point I think it's immaterial to argue over the status of
Srebrenica. ... The conversation about the status of "safe area" Srebrenica was continued at another press conference on 22 April:
Q: And the peacekeepers should protect the Muslims in Srebrenica? ...
Boucher: We've supported the UN resolution, we've supported the
deployment of the UNPROFOR troops, and they are indeed there to make
sure that it remains a safe area.
Q: But I understood that they — that the rules of engagement are that they
have to return fire in self-defence, not to defend Muslims; that they don't
have any authority to do that. Is that true?
Boucher: Saul, you know — ask UNPROFOR. They're the commanders in
this situation. You have to ask the commanders in this situation what their
rules are.
Q: No, but we took part in the passage of this resolution and in the whole
business of this, so we ought to know what the rules of engagement are for
people that — who are acting under ... something that we agreed to.
Boucher: Saul, once again, the UN has forces throughout the world authorised by UN resolutions that we've supported. That does not mean that
I think I should be responsible for explaining the rules of engagement in
any particular place, particularly given people on the ground that are
doing a very difficult job. Now, we have supported the safe area resolution.
The UN soldiers are out there to try to see that that is respected. But precisely where they're deployed and how they'll respond to different circumstances is something for them to talk about if they wish to.-*
UNPROFOR itself actively promoted the Demilitarisation Agreement as
a "remarkable breakthrough" instead of portraying the new situation as "a
surrender" to the dominance of the Bosnian Serb army like Sarajevo journalists had reported. After all, the situation could also be explained in
other terms. In the view of the reporter from Sarajevo the population in the
enclave had become prisoners of war of the Bosnian Serb Army guarded by
a UN force. UNPROFOR, however, .nade sure that the UN press corps supplied New York correspondents with a positive and detailed version of the
agreement much earher than their colleagues in Sarajevo. According to
Silber and Little, "the unfortunate v/ord 'surrender' did not feature prominently, not, in fact, at all" in the reports of the New York correspondents.-'-'
The perspective of a "remarkable breakthrough" accomplished by
UNPROFOR was later countered by more negative accounts about the
actual situation in Srebrenica. It was part of the Demilitarisation
Agreement that 500 sick and wounded were allowed to be evacuated.-'^
These evacuations led to another wave of media attention:
Aid workers described how the evacuation helicopters were mobbed by
desperate people clamouring to get on board. One UNHCR official described a vast wall of amputees, hobbling down the hillside to the sports field
where the helicopters landed, and told of how he had had to make an
arbitrary selection from the other side of a coil of barbed wire: some to go
others to stay. One man, he said, who had lost an eye, offered to pluck out
the other eye if it meant he could get aboard the evacuation flight. These
scenes continued to be broadcast around the world, and continued to
dominate the international news agenda.-^-'
Frank Westerman reported for the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant:
"Srebrenica resembles hell as it has been imagined in paintings."-'"
Moreover, on 25 April, a mission of the UN Security Council visited
Srebrenica. They found that the Vice-President of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina had agreed to the "safe area" status of Srebrenica under
duress, because the UNPROFOR officers had told him that no outside support would be forthcoming.^' They also found that the short range perspectives for Srebrenica were that the town was practically under siege,
with Serb forces controlling access to it and that inhuman conditions prevailed in the enclave with potentially catastrophic consequences.-^" The
mission found that Srebrenica had become the "equivalent of an open jail"
and concluded that the refusal of Serb forces to allow medical assistance
and the cutting of the water supply and electricity had put into effect "a
slow-motion process of genocide."-^" Even though resolution 819 had
declared the city a safe area, the UN mission reported that the actual situation did not correspond to either the spirit or the intent of the resolution.'^^ The mission did, however, approve of the fact that UNPROFOR
had acted without the explicit consent of the Security Council. In fact,
they reported that in case UNPROFOR had not acted, the alternative result
could have been a massacre of 25,000 people.'^^
The report of the mission prompted the Security Council to adopt resolution 824 on 6 May, three weeks after it had adopted resolution 819.
Convinced that this would contribute to the implementation of a new
peace plan for Bosnia,^ ^ it declared that not only Srebrenica, but also
Sarajevo, and other threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla,
Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, and their surroundings should be treated as safe
areas by all parties.'^-' Again, however, this resolution did not contain any
references to enforcement measures, except for "strengthening" UNPROFOR by adding fifty United Nations military observers. Nevertheless, the
resolution stated that the Security Council was also convinced that further
steps must be taken to achieve the security of all safe areas.^^ In June, the
more practical implications of this decision were included in resolution
836. The Council decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR in order
to enable it
to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the withdrawal of military of paramilitary units other than those of
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key point
on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian
relief to the population.^-*
It authorised UNPROFOR
in carrying out the mandate ... acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments
against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them
or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to
the freedom of movement of the Force or of protected humanitarian convoys.46
The resolution allowed UN member states to act "nationally or through
regional organisations or arrangements" and
to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close
co-ordination with the Secretary-General and the Force, all necessary
measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas ..., to
support the Force in the performance of its mandate^
The resolution was ambiguous about the international commitment to
the "safe areas" and it is important to note that it did not guarantee the defence of the "safe areas" by means of any UN protection. The use of force
was explicitly linked to "acting in self-defence" of UNPROFOR."^" It was
left up to the willingness of member states to support the defence of
UNPROFOR (thus not to support the defence of the population of the
enclave directly) by UN approved air attacks. However, there was no such
willingness. None of the sponsors of resolution 836 offered any additional troops to implement the resolution in Srebrenica.'^^ As the UN
Srebrenica Report has concluded, even though the Serb attacks and strangulation of the "safe areas" in 1993 and 1994 was widely covered by the
media and most likely by diplomatic and intelligence reports, the international community did not find the political will to materialise the new status of Srebrenica.^^ Although several members of the Islamic Conference
offered large contingents of troops, the Secretariat did not accept these
offers because they anticipated that the Bosnian Serbs would never agree
with the deployment of peacekeeping forces from Islamic countries.-'^
Finally, a Dutch offer to provide troops was accepted to replace the
Canadians in Srebrenica. In February 1994, after several delays caused by
Serb obstruction, a lightly armed Dutch battalion arrived in Srebrenica.-*
According to Rohde, the Bosnian Serbs barred media visits in spring 1994
after initially having allowed a few foreign journalists into the UN enclave. Rohde admits that most journalists, including him, did not make any
effort to get into the enclave via a Bosnian Army helicopter as had been
done before by Tony Birtley. By early July, the focus of the media coverage
of the war in Bosnia had almost completely shifted back to Sarajevo.-'-"' The
Dutch journalist Bart Rijs confirms this view by his statement that journalists were too much depending on observations from Belgrado, Zagreb,
Moscow, Washington and The Hague. He found the scarce reports about
what happened in Srebrenica confusing and he also blames himself for
having too easily believed some of the reports concerning the role of the
Dutch battalion. With hindsight he concludes that the Dutch reporters
were as much surprised by the developments in Srebrenica in July 1995 as
many politicians.-"^
On 7 July 1995 - one day after the Bosnian Serb forces had started their
final attack on the enclave - Bosnian Serb Army General Milan Gvero gave
an explanation for the exclusion of foreign media on the Bosnian Serb
radio: "There is no reason the UN and foreign media should be involved
in the problem, since it would only serve the Muslim cause. "-•^ In the
same radio programme he said that the problem of Srebrenica was mainly
the result of media manipulation. "Muslims are trying to bring the attention of the media to that little town they have already used as a joker in
the war game." According to this general, the Muslims had considered the
UN "safe area" to be a cover for their terroristic actions.-'"
Foreign media attention revived after the Bosnian Serb forces had started
to increase the pressure on 6 July by seriously shelling the enclave. On 11
July, they had forced the Dutch UNPROFOR troops and the population of
the enclave out of Srebrenica. A Serb camera crew recorded Mladic saying:
"Here we are, on 11 July, 1995, in Serbian Srebrenica just before a great
Serb Holy day. We give this town to the Serb nation. Remembering the
uprising against the Turks the time has come to take revenge on the
Muslims."-'' Soon after the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, shattered
but persistent reports about mass executions were presented by Western
media.
UN Special Rapporteur for human rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki
announced on 24 July that 7,000 of Srebrenica's 40,000 residents seemed
to have "disappeared."-''^
Mass graves bring Srebrenica into global being
After the fall of the enclave, the Dutch UN staff initially denied that the
Dutchbat soldiers had witnessed any mass atrocities. Dutch army General
Hans Couzy later explained the initial "confusion" in a book about his
own career."^ His explanation indicates that not mentioning the deaths of
the Bosnian Muslims was related to a higher priority for the safety of the
Dutch peacekeepers:
On Sunday morning, I flew to Zagreb to welcome [the Dutchbat soldiers]. There I got first-hand information about what happened. The
image I was presented with was not as shocking as reality later appeared
to me. I was not informed about any massacre. Only one member of the
medical team told me that he had seen many dead bodies on the road, but
others who had accompanied him in the car, declared that it concerned a
few deaths. These were contradicting opinions and observations that were
of little use to me. In general, I was told that the evacuation of tens of
thousands of refugees had gone reasonably well under the circumstances.
According to their observations a few summary executions had taken
place - which should not have happened - however, the number was supposed to be very limited. Upon my return in the Netherlands, I kept silent
about that. I told the minister about ir, but not the press. After all, there
were still about three hundred Dutch soldiers in the area. 1 did not want
to endanger them by accusations about war crimes in an early stage.'" 1
The Dutch Minister of Development Affairs Pronk went to Bosnia on 15
July to inquire about the situation. Back in the Netherlands, on 18 July, he
states in the national News programme Nova:
"We should not be fooled by people who say that nothing has been confirmed. Thousands of people have been killed. Refugees have been selected, there is no access to prisoners who are still there in a camp. There really have been massacres. That was something that we knew that could happen. The Serbs have done it before. It was genocide that took place.""^
Minister Pronk was attacked for his statements in the Dutch parliament.
De Hoop Scheffer, Blauw and Hoekema, three members of parliament from
different political parties, protested against the categorising as genocide
because they thought that it was "irresponsible from a political point of
view.""^ Nevertheless, on the 21 of July the Dutch Defence Minister
Voorhoeve, who was responsible for the military mission, also stated that
"What happened is that people were deported and murdered in groups.
That is genocide."'"^
On 10 August 1995, US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine
Albright presented aerial photos of possible mass executions at a closed
session of the Security Council."^ For David Rohde, these photos combined with the stories of refugees from the enclave were the incentives to set
out for a journalistic investigation in Bosnia in order to find evidence for
the mass executions of the former population of Srebrenica. " He published his findings in the Christian Science Monitor and was the first to focus
public attention on the existence of mass graves in August 1995.
It was only after the events in Srebrenica were understood in terms of
mass graves and genocide that the meaning of Srebrenica as a global accident was multiplied in countless news items, several books, reports, documentaries and even in two theatre plays. On 2 August 2001, the United
Nations International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) sentenced that the
former Bosnian Serb Army commander General Radislav Krstic was guilty
of genocide for his role in the attack on the Srebrenica enclave in July
1995. With this judgement, the ICTY defined what happened in Srebrenica
as genocide, which, according to the tribunal, constitutes "the crime of crimes. "^7
The shortcomings of the global witness
The perception of Srebrenica as a global accident that was happening in
a short time span has its repercussion in academic writings. In the nineties, in studies of international relations a whole body of literature has
emerged around a problem called "complex (humanitarian) emergency."
Srebrenica is often treated as an example of such a crisis. Jan-Willem
Honig, for example, describes Srebrenica as a "classic example" of such a
crisis. He explains that "it seemed to erupt suddenly and was over in little
more than a week. Events focused on a geographically limited area in eastern Bosnia, but involved important actors and high stakes."""
However, historicising Srebrenica as "a short crisis" that was "mismanaged" by the international community masks what Michael Dillon and
Julian Reid have called "the emerging political complexes" that have
brought the crisis into being. These emerging political complexes include
the practices of the international community - or in Dillon and Reid's
terms, of global liberal governance itself - that cause "the turbulent confluence of local and global dynamics.""^ Understanding Srebrenica as a
"complex emergency" covers up the long disastrous period that preceded
the massacre during which the international community already was
involved in the course of the war in the former Yugoslavia. It also masks
the larger geographical context of the events in Bosnia, which can not be
treated as unconnected to the events in Srebrenica. There is a lot more to
say about this problem. However, for the purposes of this article I have restricted myself to a reconstruction of the trajectory that transformed the
events in Srebrenica into a global accident. I have done this, first of all, to
demonstrate the problematic position of the global witness and the shortcomings of our testimonies since Srebrenica should have concerned us
long before it became a "global accident."'^^
m
Erna Rijsdijk is a PhD. candidate of the University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne,
United Kingdom. This article will be part of her forthcoming thesis "Welcome to the
Real World: The Construction of a UN "Safe Area" and the Case of Dutchbat in
Srebrenica, e.rijsdijk@xs4all.nl
Zie ook: www.xs4all.nl/~rysdyk/gallery
Noten
I. Note that this is the subtitle of David Rohde's famous book about Srebrenica
Endgame. David Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's
Worst Massacre Since World War II, 1998
2.ICTY, Opening Statement Chief Prosecutor Carta Del Ponte in the case Milosevic
"Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia," IT-02-54, 12 February 2002. Avaiable from
http://www. un. org/icty/transe54/020212IT.htm
3. In Frangois Debrix, "Deterritorialised territories, borderless borders: the new
geography of international medical assistance," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 5
(1998): p. 840.
4. Ibid.
5. Frank Westerman and Bart Rijs, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, (Srebrenica:
The Darkest Scenario), 1997. pp. 80
6. Ibid. pp. 80, 81 (My translation)
7. Ibid. Almost since the beginning of the war, the Office of the UNHCR had a significant presence in Bosnia and they played an important role in giving account of the
humanitarian situation. See UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), United Nations, 15 November
1999. pp. 9, 10. Available from
http://www. bosnet. org/warcrimes/reports/srebrenica.pdf
8. UNHCR report cited in Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of
a War Crime, 1996. p. 82
9. Ibid. p. 84 and Westerman, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, pp. 97, 98
10. UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 13 and Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War
Crime, p. 85
II. NPS/NOVA, Interview with Ex-General Philippe Morillon on Dutch television 1996.
Transcript and RealAudio file available on
http://www.xs4all.nl/~frankti/Srebrenica/monllon_nova_160196.html (Quote from
transcript)
12. Laura Silber & Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 1996. p. 266 and Rohde,
Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre Since World
War II. pp. 45, 46
13. Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment, 2000. p. 185
14. UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 13
15. Morillon later said in a television inten/iew: "I found a population that was in a
state of complete panic, it was hell, real hell. And hell is where hope has completely
vanished. The population translated their panic into taking my freedom of movement.
I was taken hostage, but I had been aware that I would run that risk." NPS/NOVA,
Interview with Ex-General Philippe f\Aorillon on Dutch television. (Quote from transcript)
16. Ibid.
17. See e.g. Silber, The Death of Yugoslavia, p. 267, Westerman, Srebrenica: Het
Zwartste Scenario, p. 102 and Leslie Woodhead, A Cry from the Grave Antelope
Films production for BBC2's Storyville in association with Thirteen/WNET for PBS,
1999. Real Audio and Real Video stream of this documentary available from
http://www. domovina. net/index_srebrenica. html
18. Mark Thompson, Forging War, 1999. p. 240
19. UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 14
20. Ibid.
21. Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst IVIassacre
Since World War II. p. 46
22. Ibid. p. 47
23. Tim Judah, "Reckoning Time in the Valley of Death", The Times, 17 April 1993.
(In Westerman, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, pp. 106, 269n) Judah also reported about the first UNHCR convoy that reached Srebrenica in November 1992, see
Tim Judah, "UN Brings Hope to Embattled Srebrenica", The Times, 30 November
1992. Referred to in Westerman, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 267n
24. Westerman, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 106
25. UN, Security Council Resolution 819, 16 April 1993. Available from
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/819e.pdf
26. UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 20
27. See Annex II, "Agreement for the Demilitarisation of Srebrenica" in UNSCI\/I,
Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant To Resolution 819
(1993), United Nations, 30 April 1993. pp. 15, 16. Available from
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports/25700e.pdf
28. UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 20
29. Silber, The Death of Yugoslavia, p. 275
30. Although UNPROFOR released a press statement on 21 April entitled
"Demilitarisation of Srebrenica a Success," it should be noted that it is acknowledged
in the UN Srebrenica Report that the demilitarisation was far from complete. "The
Canadian force ... proceeded to oversee the demilitarisation of the town of
Srebrenica, though not the surrounding area. The Bosniacs ... handed over approximately 300 weapons, a large number of which were non-serviceable; they also handed over a small number of heavy weapons, for which there was no significant
amount of ammunition. A large number of light weapons were removed to areas
outside the town." UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 20
31. USDS, "Department of State Daily Press Briefing (19 April 1993)", [www].
Available from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9304/930419db.html
32. USDS, "Department of State Daily Press Briefing (22 April 1993)", [www],
Electronic Research Collection. Available from
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1993/9304/930422db.html
33. Silber, The Death of Yugoslavia, p. 273
34. See Annex II, "Agreement for the Demilitarisation of Srebrenica" in UNSCM,
Report of the Security Council Mission Estatlished Pursuant To Resolution 819
(1993). pp. 15, 16
35. Silber, The Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 273, 74
36. Frank Westerman, "Srebrencia lijkt op de hel zoals afgebeeld op schilderijen"
(Srebrenica resembles hell as imagined on paintings), De Volkskrant, 26 May 1993.
Reference in Westerman, Srebrenica: Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 269n
37. UNSCM, Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant To
Resolution 819 (1993). p. 6
38. Ibid. p. 7
39. Ibid. p. 6
40. Ibid. p. 8
41. Ibid. p. 6
42. The Security Council had learned on 6 May that the Bosnian-Serb Assembly had
rejected the Vance-Ovi/en Peace Plan. See UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (198). p. 21
43. UN, Security Council Resolution 824, 6 May 1993. Available from
http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930506a.htm
44. Ibid.
45. UN, "Security Council Resolution 836", Security Council 1993. Available from
http://www. vm. ee/nato/ifor/un/u930604a. htm
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See also UN, Srebrenica Report: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998). p. 24
49. Ibid. p. 31
50. Ibid. p. 109
51. Ibid. p. 31
52. Dutchbat, Dutchbat in Vredesnaam, 1996. p. 22
53. Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre
Since World War II. p. 131
54. Theo Klein, "Srebrenica ook journalistieke les" (Srebrenica also a lesson for journalism). Volkskrant, 7 October 2001.
55. UNPROFOR Civil Affairs, Bosnian Serb Radio News Summary, 10 July 1995,
19:00 hours. (Quoted in Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica:
Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II. p. 130)
56. Ibid.
57. Footage in Woodhead, A Cry from the Grave.
58. See for an overview, DomovinaNet, "Srebrenica - Dutchbat", [www]. Available
from http://www.domovina.net/index_srebrenica.html
59. In Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst
Massacre Since World War II. p. 328
60. Hans A. Couzy, Mijn jaren als bevelhebber, 1996
61. Ibid. p. 166 (My translation.)
62. Bakker, Vertrekpunt Den Haag: Rapport van de Tijdelijke Commissie
"Besluitvorming Uitzendingen", Tweede Kamer: Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming
Uitzendingen, 4 september 2000 2000. p. 194.
http://www.parlement.nl/doc/rapbak/hfdframe/rapbak001.htm (My translation)
63. Ibid. (My translation)
64. Ibid. p. 195 {My translation)
65. See for a reconstruction of the initial response of the United States to the fall of
Srebrenica Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "New Proof Offered Of Serb
Atrocities", Washington Post, 28 October 1995. Available from
http://www.bosnet.org/bosnia/cities/srebrenica2.shtml According to a Dutch official
report the Dutch government had requested the US government to make the aerial
photos of the area around Bratunac. See Bakker, Vertrekpunt Den Haag: Rapport van
de Tijdelijke Commissie "Besluitvorming Uitzendingen", p. 202
66. Rohde, Endgame: the Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre
Since World War II. p. IX
67. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic: Judgement, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2 August
2001.
68. Jan Willem Honig, "Avoiding War, Inviting Defeat: The Srebrenica Crisis, July
2001," Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2001). By
emphasising the short time span of the Srebrenica crisis. Honig seems to contradict
his own extensive study of Srebrenica where he goes back to 1991 to describe the
background of the events in Srebrenica. "The Serbian plan for creating a new state
with new borders boded ill for the small town of Srebrenica in the eastern part of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to the border with Serbia. For according
to Milosevic's vision, eastern Bosnia was to become part of this new, 'greater,'
Serbia." See Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, p. 71
69. Michael and Julian Reid Dillon, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex
Emergency" Alternatives, No. 25 (2000): p. 118.
70. I would like to thank Marieke de Goede and Adzer van der Molen for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
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