PDF - Future Directions International

19 June 2013 | Vol. 4, № 21.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to the Strategic Weekly
Analysis. This week’s issue begins with a
review of the political turmoil in India. It
considers the recent movements within
the
opposition,
BJP-led,
National
Democratic Alliance, that are threatening
to split apart the coalition.
how it addresses the ethnic and religious
tensions plaguing the troubled Gulf state .
In Sri Lanka, religious strife between
Buddhists and Muslims threatens to spark
new conflict on the troubled island nation,
as memories of the recent Tamil civil war
fade.
We also investigate recent calls by the
leaders of the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Uganda to re-demarcate their
border on Lake Albert, and the potential
impact this will have on proposed oil
exploration projects on the lake.
In Iran, the surprise victory of Hassan
Rouhani, a moderate elected on a
platform of change, sets the stage for a
likely clash between the new reformist
President and the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei .
In Yemen, the ongoing national dialogue
continues, however, the key issue will be
We then turn our attention to Africa, with
an analysis of the growing tension
between Egypt and Ethiopia about the
damming and use of the Nile river.
I trust that you will enjoy this edition of
the Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd)
Institute Director and CEO
Future Directions International
Political Turmoil in BJP, NDA as Modi is Promoted
When Gujarat State Chief Minister (CM) Narendra Modi was appointed as head of the
Bharatiya Janata Party’s Election Campaign Committee, a rift was opened within the, BJPled, National Democratic Alliance, which now threatens to split the coalition. Opposition to
the move was further emphasised by senior BJP leader Lal Krishna Advani, who resigned in
protest.
Background
The NDA is a coalition of 13 parties, which is currently in national opposition, although
holding power in many states. CM Narendra Modi’s appointment has shaken the BJP and
threatened the stability of the NDA. It has also sparked controversy over the involvement of
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, a powerful Hindu volunteer nationalist
organisation) in internal BJP politics.
Comment
Within the NDA, the
Janata Dal (United) party
is adamantly opposed to
Modi’s
appointment,
which they argue is only a
step
removed
from
naming him as a Prime
Ministerial
candidate.
Indeed, the move is widely
seen
as
a
virtual
declaration to that effect. In his first Pictured: Narendra Modi. Source: samvada.org
term, Modi had the dubious distinction of inflaming anti-Muslim sentiment during the 2002
Gujarat riots. The JD(U) alleges his response was inadequate, resulting in hundreds of
Muslim deaths. It has labelled him a “divisive personality”, who would polarise the
electorate. Bihar State CM Nitish Kumar, the de facto leader of the JD(U), is a particularly
strong critic of Modi and has opposed his appointment. At the time of writing, a split seems
certain, with Kumar, other JD(U) Chief Ministerss and JD(U) President Sharad Yadav,
convening between 13 and 15 June to make a formal decision. For its part, the BJP is waiting
for the JD(U) to take the first step, clearly preferring continuation of the status quo.
A prospective split would severely weaken the NDA coalition, but there are no signs that the
BJP is reconsidering the appointment of Modi. In the meantime, the JD(U) is manoeuvring to
keep its hold on state power in Bihar if the split is confirmed. It has already entered into
discussions with independent state legislators and Congress members; if its hold is solidified,
it is likely that it will attempt to form a federal “third front”. The JD(U) appears to be
overwhelmingly concerned with appealing to its minority support base; Modi’s political
history threatens that aim. The split, therefore, is primarily over the so-called “Godhra taint”
and its electoral impact.
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The decision has also provoked resistance from within the BJP, though for different reasons.
Before his resignation, which was drafted a day in advance, L. K. Advani forwarded three
demands to his party: first, that he would be announced as the BJP Prime Ministerial
candidate and should the BJP-led NDA return to power, he would be allowed to hold the
position for at least six months. Second, that CM Narendra Modi should be made the
convener, not the head, of the party’s election committee. Third, that even if Modi were
appointed to that position, he would report to Advani and follow his dictates. In short,
Advani wished to direct the electoral campaign, to be the party’s key decision maker and,
eventually, Prime Minister.
Advani’s resignation forced BJP President Rajnath Singh to the negotiating table, along with
other senior BJP members. In the end, however, it was the RSS Supreme Chief, Mohan
Bhagwat, who convinced Advani that his concerns would be addressed. Bhagwat was
prompted to do so by ex-BJP President Nitin Gadkari. This is significant, because it was RSS
pressure that spurred the BJP to announce Modi’s appointment and he remains despite
Advani’s efforts. As a result, Advani withdrew his resignation within 36 hours, with
assurances from the BJP and RSS that he would be consulted on all important party
decisions. Since this volte-face, Advani has spoken with Kumar, attempting to persuade him
to stay with the NDA coalition; but it is unlikely his appeal had any impact.
The political furore has had two main effects. First, the political reputation of Advani,
formerly a giant of the BJP, is severely tarnished. This has strengthened the authority of
party President Rajnath Singh, who appointed Modi, and possibly increased the influence of
RSS within the BJP. Sources claim Singh achieved his first term as party president after the
RSS forced Advani to resign; now Bhagwat has convinced Advani to reconsider his
resignation, which has diminished his influence. With Advani sidelined, Modi is set to
become a Prime Ministerial candidate. Consequently, the second effect is that the JD(U) split
is almost certain, which some claim would be a death knell to the NDA; the BJP seems to
believe Modi is worth the price. The results of the split, combined with Advani’s selfdestruction, would demolish most barriers to Modi’s further advancement, leaving him free
to campaign after the monsoon.
Daniel Barnes
Research Assistant
Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Sri Lanka’s Renewed Ethnic Tension
Sri Lanka appears to be moving towards renewed ethnic strife – this time between
Buddhists and Muslims
Background
The Muslim community makes up approximately ten per cent of Sri Lanka’s population of
twenty million. Relegated to a back seat during the Civil War between ethnic Sri Lankans and
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Tamilians, who fought for a homeland, Sri Lanka’s Muslims now appear to have taken the
place of the latter. Muslim-owned businesses have been fire-bombed and boycotted. As in
Burma (Myanmar), Buddhist groups have formed to lead organised protests and violence
against Muslims.
Comment
Four years after Sri Lanka’s civil war ended, ethnic strife again appears to be growing. This
time around, it is the Muslims who are the target of ethnic Buddhist Singhalese. A hard-line
Singhalese group, the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force, BBS) has taken the lead in
attacking and boycotting Muslim-owned businesses. Created in July last year by Kirama
Wimalajothi and Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, the BBS has specific grievances against Sri
Lanka’s Muslim community. According to them, Muslims have increased their birth-rate to
take over the country; they demand an end to certain Muslim institutions, such as the ritual
slaughter of animals and the wearing of the niqab, the all-enveloping outer garment worn by
Muslim women.
The BBS claims that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist nation and it is incumbent upon ethnic minorities
to comply with the Buddhist tradition, much as Muslims Moreover, when Azard Sally, a
Muslim politician and former deputy Mayor of Colombo, spoke out against the BBS in May,
he was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, allegedly, according to a police
report, for instigating communalism. His arrest only compounded the fears of Sri Lankan
Muslims, who fear they are being placed in the same position as the ethnic Tamil minority
prior to the civil war. The general consensus among Muslims is that when Sinhalese
extremists attack Muslims the government stands idly by, but if Muslim politicians speak up
on the issue they are arrested and depicted as terrorists.
This is worrying enough, but the issue is compounded by allegations of covert government
encouragement to the BBS. Sally, an outspoken critic of the Rajapakse government and the
BBS, alleged that the violence against Muslims was encouraged by the government. Even if
this proves to be unfounded, there remains a close link between the BBS and the Rajapakse
government. For instance, president Rajapakse opened the Buddhist Cultural Centre, which
was founded by Wimalajothi, in 2011. The Secretary of Defence, Lieutenant Colonel
Nandasena Gotabaya Rajapakse, inaugurated the BBS’ Buddhist Leadership Academy in
Galle, in March this year. For its part, while emphasising it has no political agenda, the BBS
states that it will support the government of President Rajapakse, who is it declares, a true
Buddhist Sinhalese leader. Furthermore, despite concerted efforts by Muslim
parliamentarians to get the Rajapakse government to enact measures to protect Muslims in
Sri Lanka, no real action has been taken and no arrests made.
It would be short-sighted to classify the violence as anti-Muslim, though. The current
violence appears to be part of a cycle by hard-line Buddhist forces, to ensure the primacy of
Buddhism in the country. These forces, made up of Buddhist monks and other groups, predate the BBS, thus detracting from arguments that imply the BBS is responsible for the
violence against Muslims. Hard-line Buddhist monks have razed Hindu temples and Christian
churches since 2009. One church was razed because it was allegedly being used to convert
Buddhist Sinhalese to Christianity. If this is correct, it would be no different from hard-line
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Muslims forbidding the conversion of Muslims to other religions in Muslim-majority
countries. A case in point, is the kidnapping of a sixteen year old, Amman Ullah, who
converted from Islam to Christianity in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province two weeks
ago. He is presumed to have been murdered for his beliefs.
The government of Sri Lanka would be wise to take immediate action to prevent a further
escalation of the violence. If it does not, there could be two reactions. On the one hand, Sri
Lankan Muslims could find themselves in the same situation as ethnic Tamilians were just
prior to the civil war. This could lead to the formation of vigilante Muslim groups, tasked
with safe-guarding Muslims and their property. Such a situation, however, could easily lead
to a drastic escalation of violence and even all-out ethnic strife. On the other hand, and just
as likely, disenchanted Sri Lankan Muslims could receive guerrilla training in militant training
camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan and parts of the Middle East. Again, on-going violence
against Muslims could attract the attention of al Qaeda-like groups, which are seeking a
legitimate platform; violence against fellow-Muslims would be an ideal launch pad for
terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka.
This is a dangerous situation and President Rajapakse would be best advised not to let it
continue unacknowledged.
Lindsay Hughes
Research Analyst
Indian Ocean Research Programme
lhughes@futuredirections.org.au
*****
A Surprise Victory: Hassan Rouhani, the New President of Iran
The 14 June Iranian presidential election produced a shock victory for Hassan Rouhani. A
moderate, elected on a campaign of change, Rouhani is likely to clash with Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Background
In the days leading up to the 14 June election, Hassan Rouhani, a cleric, was an unlikely
candidate to become the Iranian president. A series of manoeuvres, however, by former
reformist presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, in addition to the
withdrawal of presidential candidate Reza Aref, strongly positioned Rouhani against the
remaining five candidates.
Page 5 of 13
Comment
A week before the Iranian
elections, many would have
thought that the future
Iranian president would
either be Saeed Jalali,
hand-picked by Khamenei,
or
Tehran
Mayor
Mohammad
Bagher
Ghalibaf. Hassan Rouhani
won the vote though,
gaining a 50.71 per cent
majority and totalling over
18 million of the 36.7
million valid votes. Rouhani, who represents the Moderation and Development Party,
campaigned on a platform of engagement with the West, nuclear transparency, economic
revitalisation and freeing of existing political prisoners. The last of these policies was picked
up a week before the election, as part of the strategy to consolidate the reformist camp
vote. The problem with these policies is that, though the President is elected, executive
power rests with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Rouhani was very much under the radar of analysts, who suspected that Khamenei would
position his favoured loyalists in a fixed vote. The celebrations that lasted through the nights
of the 14-15 June, however, would testify to the large-scale public support that Rouhani has
engendered. The crowds, numbering in their tens of thousands, bore little resemblance to
the post-election chaos of 2009, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was made president in an
allegedly rigged vote. Ahmadinejad, who achieved world-wide notoriety for his speeches
both at home and, famously, at the United Nations General Assembly, was quiet on election
day. He voted late in the afternoon and with little media attention.
Change, however, may not be the catch-cry of the day. Rouhani, although elected on a
campaign of change, has a strong historical closeness to both Khamenei and Ruhollah
Khomeini before him. His association with both Ayatollahs stretches back to the 1960s,
when Rouhani was a student of Khomeini, while exiled in France. Consequently, Rouhani’s
proclivities in initiating reform may be somewhat less than some are expecting. With
reformist former presidents Rafsanjani – who was unsuccessful in becoming a 2013
presidential candidate – and Khatami, however, giving their endorsement to Rouhani, there
may be a degree of reformist influence in his presidency.
There have been some criticisms that Rouhani’s victory may be part of a long play by
Khamenei, to feign legitimacy in the election. This was the position taken by Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while speaking in Poland on 15 June; he said that there
should be ‘no wishful thinking’ about Rouhani’s victory. Netanyahu made mention of a
potential Iranian-led Holocaust against Israel and that Iran’s nuclear programme must be
stopped by ‘any means necessary.’ The White House and the Kremlin have made more
Page 6 of 13
positive remarks; both administrations seeking at least partial relations with the new
government and insisting that it follow the mandate of the Iranian public.
The problem is that Rouhani will face considerable opposition in government. Though he
professes to be a moderate, he has been elected on a reformist agenda. If he fails to uphold
that promise, it may result in future problems for both the government and the clerical
regime. Rouhani will be conflicted between his loyalties to various groups, principally that of
his backers Rafsanjani and Khatami and then Khamenei. Iran’s foreign policy, which is the
domain of the Supreme Leader and not the president.
With Iran’s political system so veiled, it is hard to predict how Khamenei may react to a
Rouhani presidency. With Ahmadinejad out of the picture, Khamenei may use the next four
years to once again consolidate his power over the Iranian government. If Rouhani does
follow the mandate set by the Iranian public, however, those years will again be
characterised by a classical power struggle between the government and the clerics in Qom.
Gustavo Mendiolaza
Research Analyst
Indian Ocean Research Programme
gmendiolaza@futuredirections.org.au
*****
National Dialogue Resumes in Yemen, but Divisions Remain
As Yemen resumes its national dialogue, how it addresses the grievances of its different
ethnic and religious groups will be crucial in determining whether a peaceful transition can
be reached.
Background
The second round of national dialogue is under way in Yemen, with President Abdrabuh
Mansur Hadi claiming progress is being made. The UN-backed talks, which are being held in
the nation’s capital Sanaa in March and June, are aimed at drafting a new constitution and
preparing for the upcoming elections in 2014. But as the Gulf of Aden state heads toward its
first contested election since the 2011-12 uprising, observers remain divided as to whether
the political process is on the right track.
Page 7 of 13
Comment
The recent talks are part of a deal that eased former strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh from
power, following an eleven-month uprising against his 33-year rule. As well as drafting a new
constitution and preparing for elections, the meetings are meant to address important
problems, including the rights of different ethnic and religious groups. Nine different
working groups have been created since April, comprising more than 565 people across the
country. These groups are working on a range of issues, from development to the question
of Yemen’s formerly divided south.
Given the chaos following Saleh’s departure, this alone seems reason for optimism. As
President Hadi said at the opening of the dialogue in Sanaa, ‘We are holding our second
open session amid changes, developments and positive achievements’. He went on to add
that the talks had taken steps toward ‘drawing the outlines of a new Yemen where justice,
equity and freedom prevail’.
Indeed, even outside Yemen, leaders are slowly becoming more hopeful. As a senior UN
official, Special Adviser Jamal Benomar, told the Security Council on 11 June, ‘Yemen is in the
heart of its transition … in a country awash with arms and a history of conflict, such an
inclusive process of dialogue is a great achievement’. He added that ‘the “dialogue” is
extending well beyond the Conference,’ with people around the country engaging in
important debates about Yemen’s future.
Yet the situation remains precarious and important challenges will have to be overcome if
Yemen is to find peace in the future. While preparations for the electoral process are
underway, including steps to create a voting registry, a new constitution still appears a long
way off. Crucially, any new constitution will have to address the “Southern question”, with
many in the south demanding independence and boycotting the talks altogether. With proindependence sentiment on the rise in many parts of the south, this will remain a key
question for the future. Greater involvement in the talks by all parties in the south is needed
if it is to be properly answered.
To the north, the Houthi’s, a Shia group of around 100,000 people that occupies Yemen’s
north-west, are also demanding more autonomy. The Houthi’s supposedly enjoy the tacit
support of Iran and have historically been discriminated against. In 2004, they launched a
rebellion against the government and tensions remain high despite a ceasefire in 2010. The
group has been staging almost daily protests, sometimes resulting in violence and deaths,
and some observers worry that tensions between the Houthi and the government are
hindering the National Dialogue. Though the group is a part of the dialogue process, further
violence could derail the talks.
Looking ahead, the challenges facing the country are stark. Reaching an agreement with
these groups will not be easy. Add to that the security threat still posed by Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, and the ongoing blackouts and faltering economy, and it then becomes
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easy to see why many Yemenis remain sceptical. But the country does appear to be moving
in the right direction, albeit slowly, and many realise that the national dialogue offers an
opportunity to pave the way for something better. As Yaser al-Awadhi, a member of
parliament, concluded, ‘this is a historical opportunity that will not come again’.
Andrew Manners
Research Analyst
Indian Ocean Research Programme
amanners@futuredirections.org.au
*****
The Nile Saga: the Reason behind the Rhetoric
While the war of words continues, Egypt is failing to recognise the reality of recent Nile
developments- Egypt will face reduced water supplies in coming years, and threats of war
are not a viable method for dealing with the issue.
Background
In the past fortnight, since Ethiopia diverted the Blue Nile to continue work on its Grand
Renaissance Dam, global attention has focused on Egypt’s unfavourable reaction and the
potential for ‘water wars’ in the region. Following the announcement of the diversion, the
international impact assessment was released to the concerned governments, with the
finding that the dam will not significantly impact either Egypt or Sudan. Despite this, Egypt
has been vocal about its objection to the dam; during a televised meeting, Egyptian officials
were heard discussing ways of sabotaging the dam. Ethiopia has maintained a firm stance
that the dam will not harm Egypt and that it welcomes discussion of the topic, but it will not
consider delaying or ceasing construction of the dam. Speculation about the outcome of the
disagreement has been rife, but has thus far failed to consider the long-term implications for
Egypt’s water-security.
Comment
Egypt has spent the past three decades propagating a myth of Egyptian ownership of the
Nile, based on “historic rights”. This has been punctuated by threats of a military response
against any upstream country that disrupts its flow. Egypt’s position has been one of
hegemonic confrontation, in its efforts to maintain the status quo in regional patterns of
water distribution. Its response to Ethiopia’s diversion of the Nile has prompted speculation
about the potential for water wars. Given the current geo-strategic currents within the
region and Egypt’s internal situation, it is highly doubtful that this course of action will be
pursued.
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Military analysts have highlighted the
operational difficulties involved in any attack
on the dam. Such an action would be difficult,
highly risky and close to impossible without the
cooperation of Sudan. If Egypt were to attempt
an attack, it would earn the condemnation of
the international community. The geostrategic
tide in the region is shifting towards the
upstream nations, as the CFA gains
international recognition. Egypt cannot afford
to risk the ire of the international community;
its ailing economy is currently relying on loans
from regional neighbours to avert fiscal
collapse. Underlying these factors, is the fact
that the Egyptian government lacks the
resources and the internal strength to engage
in external military operations at present.
Against this context, the provocative
comments from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
politicians can best be understood as an effort
to divert attention from strong ongoing
domestic opposition. In the past fortnight,
President Morsi has balanced between denying the heavily incendiary stance taken by some
Egyptian commentators, while still attempting to leverage the issue for his political benefit.
In a press conference last week, Morsi claimed that he did not want to go to war, but that
‘our blood substitutes any decrease of the flow of the river waters, even a single drop.’ This
“last-ditch” effort to maintain a hegemonic stance on the Nile, reveals the limits of Egypt’s
capacity to act and is ultimately damaging to Egypt’s long-term water-security interests.
Egypt is heavily reliant on the Nile for its national livelihood; 97 per cent of the country’s
water supply originates from the river, which is a key strategic priority. It is probable that
Egypt’s current share of the Nile’s flow will reduce over the coming decades. Rapid
population growth is projected for the region; estimates indicate that Egypt and Ethiopia’s
combined population will increase by 100 million by 2050. Even if Egypt were to maintain its
current share, its per capita water supply would fall. Furthermore, geostrategic power is
shifting in favour of the upstream nations, which are eager for the economic growth and
development that hydropower projects could offer. While the Renaissance dam is not
expected to reduce water flow, proposed dams at Baro, Karadobi, Mabil, Mandaia and
Border may do so. Electricity sales and irrigation potential place developments within the
mutual interests of upstream states; the Ugandan president this week released a statement
in support of Ethiopia’s dam. While in past decades unrest, disasters and economic collapse
have made large infrastructure developments in upstream states impossible, strong regional
growth and interest from China as a finance source, have removed former barriers.
Page 10 of 13
Egypt already experiences serious water-stress and uses close to its full water entitlement;
thus the prospect of reduced future water supplies poses a serious water security risk.
Reduced supplies would have serious implications for the country’s, already strained,
agricultural sector, as well as for industry and household consumption. Egypt must recognise
that it no longer operates in an internal, regional or global environment, where hegemonic
threats are a realistic or effective option for dealing with water security issues. Rather, it
must accept that maintaining its control of the Nile is unlikely and that its long-term
interests lie in cooperation and consensus with upstream nations.
Lauren Power
Research Analyst
Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
lpower@futuredirections.org.au
*****
Leaders Call for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda
to Re-Demarcate their Border on Lake Albert
Tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda have the potential
to escalate, as civil society leaders of the two countries call for a joint border redemarcation before oil exploration continues on Lake Albert.
Background
Leaders of groups participating in
a NGO-facilitated dialogue in
Uganda’s western Hoima District,
have called on the governments
of Uganda and the DRC to revise
their border. In a joint statement
on 13 June, the leaders issued a
message
which
read,
“participants call upon the
governments of Uganda and DRC
with the involvement of border
communities to expeditiously
follow up on the implementation
of the provisions on the remarking of the porous borders by the Border Demarcation
Committee basing on the available GPS in order to coordinate and mitigate further and/or
future conflicts”.
Page 11 of 13
Comment
The question of border re-demarcation has not always been a source of tension between
the DRC and Uganda. The boundary was originally established in 1915, by the colonial
powers, the United Kingdom and Belgium, which divided Lake Albert in half laterally. In
recent years, however, growing interest in emerging oil and gas fields located in the Lake
Albert basin bordering the two countries, has increased tensions and made the border issue
a point of concern between the DRC and Uganda. There has been less exploration on the
DRC side and Uganda is well-ahead; it is currently on track to develop an oil refinery in
Hoima District.
Although the tensions associated with the border initially arose due to the discovery of
hydrocarbons, incidents such as illegal fishing have also been a recent aggravation. Local
reports from 1 June, indicated that five Ugandan nationals (three fisheries enforcement
officials and two policemen), were arrested by DRC security officials for allegedly crossing
into DRC waters on Lake Albert. The Ugandans conversely claimed that they had not crossed
into DRC territory and were in Ugandan waters at the time. In 2007, a Canadian national
employed by Heritage Oil, was killed, allegedly by DRC soldiers, when the company’s boat
was believed to have crossed into DRC waters. These incidents highlight the risk posed by
the poorly defined border to locals of the affected countries and, importantly, to resource
companies and their employees operating on both sides of the lake.
Previous attempts at revising the border have provoked the DRC and Uganda to increase
security at border points and to become more aggressive in their claims to their share of the
water. During these periods of tension, operating on the lake, particularly in the poorly
defined border area, becomes more risky and the possibility of violent incidents is
elevated.Although a review of the border demarcation is needed, because substantial oil
and gas discoveries in Lake Albert have encouraged increased exploration, it is doubtful that
it will be an easy and uncontested process.
The Uganda-DRC border issue is also having a notable impact on the neighbouring region. As
more discoveries continue to be made in the region, particularly minerals, oil and gas, it is
likely that previously dormant issues, such as those relating to colonial border demarcations,
will again come to the fore. Future Directions International has previously discussed such
occurrences involving the Somali-Kenya and Malawi-Tanzania borders. Agreements showing
a commitment to cooperation are necessary in promoting peaceful coexistence and
exploitation of mineral resources on the border of the two countries. Any disputes are likely
to slow down exploration and production, hampering the productivity of investments in the
affected countries and deterring further interest and development in the region.
Kim Moss
Research Analyst
Minerals and Energy Research Programme
kmoss@futuredirections.org.au
*****
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What’s Next?

June 19: An International Monetary Fund delegation will arrive in Pakistan and meet with
Pakistani officials after the country's budget is presented.

June 20: Pakistani Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan will meet with various
departments to discuss a new security policy.

June 19-21: Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang will visit China to boost bilateral ties.
The visit will be Sang's first to China and the first by a Vietnamese leader since China's new
government was formed.

June 21: Islamist parties in Egypt have called for a rally in support of President
Mohammed Morsi's government.

June 21: The British government is expected to ratify an extradition agreement with
Jordan.
Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future
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