Nasser`s Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A

Transcription

Nasser's Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A Rational-Choice Explanation
Author(s): Ben D. Mor
Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 359-375
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 4, 1991, pp. 359-375
Nasser's Decision-making in the 1967 Middle East
Crisis: A Rational-choice Explanation*
BEN D. MOR
Department of Political Science, University of Haifa
Nasser's behavior in the 1967 Middle East crisis has been variously explained in terms of decisionmaking deficiencies, personality-related pathologies, and uncontrolled escalation. This paper argues
that such accounts are unsatisfactory. They are biased by their use of backward induction, which infers
from Nasser's ultimate failure an inevitability to the escalation of the crisis. This inference puts a
premium on the evaluation of decisions, rather than on their explanation. It is also inconsistent with
Nasser's actual behavior toward the end of the crisis, which strongly suggests an attempt at deescalation. The paper offers an alternative, rational-choice explanation of the crisis. It argues that when
the focus of inquiry is shifted from Nasser's failure to his objectives and perception of the strategic
context, the crisis decisions of the Egyptian leader can be shown to have been consistent with strategic
rationality. Moreover, Nasser's failure was the result not of personality or cognitive deficiencies but
rather of Israel's failure to communicate the threshold beyond which she would be compelled to attack.
This conclusion underscores the importance of signaling limits to an opponent's escalation so as to
facilitate the opponent's learning in crisis.
1. Introduction
In May 1967 the status quo in the Middle
East changed dramatically as a result of
three major decisions made by Gamal
Abdoul Nasser in the course of a week: (1)
the decision to place the Egyptian army on
alert and move its forces into Sinai (14
May); (2) the decision to request the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) troops (16 May); and (3) the
decision to blockade the Straits of Tiran
(22-23 May). In making the third decision,
in particular, Nasser appeared to challenge
knowingly a repeated Israeli casus belli.
Meir Amit, then head of Mossad, the Israeli
intelligence service, later recalled that 'until
May 23, I thought there was a possibility for
maneuvers, that there is a leeway for alternatives. But when Nasser closed the Straits,
I said: "This is it, there is no way to avoid
war"' (Brecher, 1980, p. 104).
Mohamed Heikal, the noted Egyptian
* am
I
grateful to Steven J. Brams, Gideon Doron, and
Zeev Maoz for their support, encouragement, and
invaluable advice, without which this paper could not
have been written. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Daniel
Heradstveit, Frank C. Zagare, and an anonymous
referee for the JPR also provided helpful comments
and suggestions. Needless to say, responsibility for any
errors contained in this paper is solely mine.
journalist and confidant of Nasser, wrote in
Al-Ahram on 26 May that 'Israel cannot
accept or remain indifferent to what has
taken place', and 'hence, I say, that Israel
must resort to arms ... An armed clash ...
is inevitable' (quoted in Shamir, 1971, p.
198). After the Tiran blockade, when Israel
still failed to attack, Nasser escalated once
again by signing the UAR-Jordan Defense
Agreement (30 May). Six days later, on 5
June, 1967, Israel launched the pre-emptive
strike that began the Six Day War.
Given a near-consensus among students
of the 1967 crisis that Nasser, at least
initially, did not seek armed conflict with
Israel, and given the subsequent disaster
that befell him, how can his decisions be
explained? Studies of the crisis published so
far have generated heated controversy with
respect to many aspects of Nasser's behavior. Among the important questions that
remain open and await further investigation
are the following: Did Nasser stumble into
the crisis or did he plan his actions in
advance? Was he carried away by the
unfolding events or did he calculate his
moves carefully? Did he possess accurate
information about Israeli preferences and
capabilities or did he misperceive them?
Was he aware of his army's condition or was
360
Ben D. Mor
he misled by his military advisers to inflate
its strength? Did he attempt to de-escalate
the crisis or did he escalate until the very last
moment? Did his initial successes lead him
to prefer war over a diplomatic settlement,
or did he prefer the latter option until the
end? Did he anticipate an Israeli attack or
did he believe he could avert it?
In their attempt to provide an explanation
for Nasser's behavior, various scholars have
supplied different answers to these
questions. Consequently, the Six Day War
literature is presently flooded with a variety
of competing explanations. Still, a review of
the studies conducted to date suggests a
general convergence on two types of explanations. The first focuses on the psychology
of the Egyptian leader. It points to pathologies in Nasser's decision-making, citing the
intrusion and influence of irrational factors,
inadequate cognitive processing, emotionally biased interpretations of reality, and
personality deficiencies. Nasser's disastrous
decisions are then variously explained by his
cognitive rigidity, his tendency to succumb
to wishful thinking, his inability to withstand
the pressures of the situation and of his
advisers, and his basic passivity and lack of
foresight.
The second more prevalent type of explanation glosses over the decision-making process itself, concentrating instead on the strategic implications of Nasser's behavior. The
pattern that emerges is perceived to conform to the characteristics of a 'brinkmanship crisis' (Lebow, 1981). Nasser's failure is
then explained as a case of brinkmanship
that went out of control.
The contention of this paper is that both
accounts of Nasser's decision-making are
unsatisfactory. I intend to show that by
making the outcome of the crisis the starting-point of their analysis, these accounts
produce explanations that are partial and
biased. I will offer an alternative explanation of Nasser's behavior by arguing that,
contrary to the conventional wisdom on the
crisis, Nasser's decision-making was not only
rational but strategically so. His failure,
moreover, resulted primarily from impediments to crisis learning that were exogenous, and unrelated, to the nature of his
decisional process or to loss of control on his
part.
This paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 evaluates the psychological and
brinkmanship explanations by juxtaposing
them with the available evidence; Section 3
examines Nasser's crisis perception, hypothesizes about his crisis objectives, and argues
that his decisions followed the imperatives
of strategic rationality; Section 4 analyzes
the reasons for Nasser's failure; and Section
5 discusses some of the conclusions that can
be drawn from the 1967 case with respect to
crisis management.
2. Explaining Nasser's Behavior: The
Remaining Puzzles
Of the voluminous literature on the 1967
crisis, none is available that deals specifically and exclusively with Nasser's decisionmaking process. There is no equivalent, for
the Egyptian side, to those comprehensive
studies of Israel's crisis behavior by Brecher
(1980, 1975, 1972) or Stein & Tanter (1980).
The literature reviewed in this section is
thus derived, for the most part, from works
that deal with the Six Day War in general
and in a variety of contexts.
A micro-level comparison of these studies
reveals important differences of interpretation on many key issues. At the macro
level of comparison, however, most (but not
all) studies may be seen as falling into two
groups, in accordance with the type of
explanatory variables they employ and
emphasize. One group focuses on the individual level (i.e. Nasser's psychology),
whereas the other is concerned with the
interstate level (i.e. the dynamics of brinkmanship). The critical evaluation presented
in this section addresses these two kinds of
studies.
Two caveats are in order before we proceed. First, the division of existing studies
into two kinds of explanation is hardly airtight. Few of the works cited below fall
clearly in one of the two groups. In fact,
most scholars shift back and forth between
the individual and interstate levels of analysis.' The second (and related) caveat is that
the following discussion is not meant as a
Nasser'sDecision-makingin the 1967Crisis 361
criticism of individual works. The studies
mentioned below are not reviewed in their
entirety; rather, they are assessed in the
context of the two broad explanations to
whichthey contributein their analysis.
2.1 ThePsychologicalExplanation
A psychological explanation of Nasser's
behavior has been offered by two of his
foremost biographers. Lacouture (1973)
argues that serious deficienciesin Nasser's
cognitiveabilitiesand generalcharacterprevented him from correctly assessing the
consequences of his decisions. Specifically,
he was incapableof distinguishingbetween
fact and fantasy and 'seemed not to understand the relation between an act and its
consequences,the fall of a hammerand the
sound it makes' (p. 310). He was unable to
foresee the opponent'sreactionsto his own
moves, and succumbedto wishfulthinking,
not the least because he 'allowedhimself to
be seduced by the gobbledygookdispensed
by his own radio ...' (p. 301).
These pathologies resulted in serious
errors in estimatingIsrael's reaction to the
Tiran blockade as well as the USA's ability
to restrainits ally from attacking.When the
Egyptian hawks (Minister of War Shams
Badran and Commander-in-ChiefMarshall
Amer) stepped up their pressureon Nasser
to escalate, he was forced to make rash
moves (p. 305).
Nutting (1972), who draws a generally
sympatheticportraitof Nasser, nevertheless
argues that, during those critical weeks in
May and June, he was prone to wishful
thinking and resisted all information or
advice that seemed to counter his tenaciously held views of the crisis. This cognitive rigidityled him to exclude his Ministers
from the decision-makingprocess; in the
one case in which his recent decisionswere
discussed by the Cabinet, he refused to be
drawn into the discussion (p. 410). His
unshakenconfidencein his perceptionof the
crisis led him to believe, until the end, that
Israel would not attack, that if it did, Egypt
would prevail, and that the Soviets would
support him, 'even if this involved another
worldwar' (p. 409).
Amos (1979, p. 49) argues that Nasser
was drawninto escalation as a result of the
charges of cowardice that were leveled
against him by the conservative Arab
regimes. His own rural origins had made
him particularlysensitiveto such insults.He
also harbored a paranoid suspicion of the
United States, which led him to interpret
events andformulatepreferencesin the context of a perceived collusion between the
United States and Israel (p. 52).
Bar-Zohar (1970) and Kimche & Bawly
(1968) argue that the impulsive side of
Nasser's personalitytook over as the crisis
progressed. Though initially moderate and
responsible, the Egyptian leader gradually
became intoxicatedwith his own successes.
By the time of the Tiran decision, his
euphoricconditioncloudedhis abilityto appreciatecorrectlythe directionthe crisiswas
taking.
The influenceof Nasser'sinitial successes
on his subsequentpreferencesand actionsis
mentioned in several other studies, including those which generallyespouse a brinkmanship explanation. Safran (1969), for
example, suggests that Nasser allowed 'his
pridein his tacticalvirtuosityto blindhim to
strategicimperatives'(p. 267). Similararguments are made by Laqueur(1969, p. 124)
and Dawn (1968, p. 223). Draper (1968)
writesthat the Tirandecisionwas influenced
by the fact that the Egyptiandeterrentforce
concentrated in the Sinai could easily be
used to make offensive demandson Israel.
The making of these demands was in turn
facilitatedby the sheer presenceof the force
which, as Heikal reports,dazzledthe Egyptians (pp. 76-77).
Lebow (1981) views this effect of the concentrationof force as the primaryreasonfor
Nasser's overconfidence in his military
power, whichin turnconditionedhis assessment of the risks involved in a more bellicose policy. Stein (1988) argues that
Nasser's overestimation of Egyptian military capabilitieswas the resultof motivated
error: having committedhimself to a challenge of Israeli deterrence, Nasser and his
advisers now engaged in 'wishful thinking
andpost hoc bolsteringof their decision'(p.
10).
Other scholars cite the influence of the
362
Ben D. Mor
Arab propaganda machine which fed on
Nasser's initial successes. Laqueur (1969)
concludes that 'it influenced not only the
massesbut also, in the long run, the leaders,
whose judgment was likely affected' (p.
107). Dawn (1968), Amos (1979), and Yost
(1968) suggestthat the Arab sloganseventually had the effect of limitingpolicyoptions.
There are three difficultieswith the psychological explanation. First, it fails to
account for Nasser's initial successes
because it focuses almost exclusivelyon his
subsequentfailure.In fact, the entire course
of the crisisis interpretedin termsof its final
outcome, and one cannot but conclude that
the gains Nasser managed temporarilyto
secure were obtainedby luck, or, at best, as
a result of Israeli weakness. Lacouture
(1973), for example, through a form of
backward induction, concludes that even
the initialsteps on 14 and 16 May were mistaken (p. 302), thus suggesting that there
was an inexorabilityto the course of the
crisis.
This argumentpresents a methodological
difficulty.If one assumesan inexorableand
inevitablechainof events, then the explanatory problemreducesitself to identifyingthe
first link in the chain. And if, in addition,
the final outcome is known to have been
disastrous, all subsequent decisions are
taken to be a priori mistaken and are
explained in terms of 'what went wrong'
(see also Lebow, 1981, pp. 91-92). This
focus inflates the importance of certain
factors by assumption rather than by an
examinationof the facts; it puts a premium
on the evaluationof decisions, not on their
explanation. In addition, there is the implicit assumption that bad outcomes are
necessarilythe resultof faultyproceduresor
personality-relatedpathologies. The latter
factors may or may not be responsiblefor
the failure of strategies;this failure, above
all, is an empiricalquestion (Herek et al.,
1987;Maoz, 1990a).
Empirically, too, there is no conclusive
evidence to suggest that Nasser's initial
decisions sealed the fate of the entire crisis.
The facts do not suggest that his mobilization decision, or even his UNEF decision,
made war inevitable. In fact, the opportuni-
ties to arrestthe crisisexisted throughoutits
course, even as late as 30 May, as I argue
in Section 4. Therefore, the psychological
thesis is unwarrantedin concluding that
Nasser's failure lay with his initial
decisions.The second difficultyin the psychological
explanationconcernsits inabilityto account
for the variability over time in Nasser's
behavior: Having escalated throughout
most of the crisis,why did he stop escalating
in June?3Why the sudden caution after 'so
many rash moves' (Lacouture, 1973, p.
305)? It is unclear,in other words,why deficiencies in Nasser'scharacterand decisional
process led first to impulsive escalatory
moves, then to cautionaryrestraint.Neither
is it clear why 'this grand master who had
triumphedin so manyclose chess mates' (p.
304) fell victimto so many inherentflawsin
his personality in the months of May and
June, 1967. Why did these same flaws not
lead him to reckless escalation in January
1960, when he mobilizedand moved 50,000
troopsand 500 tanksinto Sinaiin reactionto
an Israelistrikeagainstthe Syrianvillage of
Tawfiq?4
The third difficulty in the psychological
explanation relates to Nasser's ability to
revise his probability estimates of Israeli
attackin responseto incominginformation.
The psychologicalexplanation argues that
he displayed cognitive rigidity in resisting
such revision, despite the availabilityof evidence requiringit (Nutting, 1972, pp. 408410). This explanation suggests that he
could not correctlyassess the consequences
of his own decisionsand actions in terms of
their likely effect on the probability of
Israeliattack(Lacouture,1973, p. 310).
This argument is again strongly
influenced by the knowledge of Nasser's
subsequent failure. Working from the
known outcome back to the decision, it is
clear that at some point something went
wrong. In fact, though, Nasser not only
revised his probability estimates several
times duringthe course of the crisis- as he
himself reported in his speech of 23 July
1967 - but his estimates themselves were not
far off the mark, as we shall see. Moreover,
Nasser's estimates were not groundless-
Nasser's Decision-making in the 1967 Crisis
they were based on a certain strategicconception, which Heikal elaborated on in an
Al Ahram articlepublishedin Septemberof
1964 (see Safran, 1969, p. 292 and the discussionbelow).
2.2 The Brinkmanship Explanation
In contrast to the psychological explanation, the main thrustof the brinkmanship
explanation lies not in the idiosyncratic
characteristicsof the Egyptianleader, or his
decision-makingprocess, but rather in his
manipulationof riskand, more generally,in
the dynamics of escalation. Yost (1968)
arguesthat 'by 17 May the crisishad already
acquireda momentumwhich seemed inexorably to sweep all partiestowardand over
the brink' (p. 315). Khouri (1968) and
Draper (1968) mention Tiran as the critical
turning-point,at which the cycle of escalation went out of control.
Stein (1988) argues that the deterrent
strategiesused by Egypt and Israelwere the
catalyst (rather than the solution) to the
process of 'miscalculatedescalation'. The
success of Nasser's deterrent strategy
unleashed a series of demands from his
domestic public, and from Arab allies and
foes, which he could not resist or control.
On the Israeliside, 'the failureof its deterrent strategy dictated a military response,
sooner or later' (p. 2; emphasisadded).
Amos (1979) points out that at a certain
point in the crisis - the removal of UNEF -
the localized Egyptian-Syrian-Israeliconflict becameintertwinedwith the intra-Arab
conflict, as waged in the Arab media; these
two conflicts'beganto cycle together, building up a dynamismof their own' (p. 57).
Dupuy (1978), too, writes that both sides
blunderedinto the crisis and contributedto
its escalation: 'It was a case of tragic, and
classic, escalation..
.' (p. 225).
The brinkmanshipthesis, then, maintains
that as the crisis progressed, the rush of
events became an autonomousforce which
neither side could control. In terms of
Nasser'sdecisions, the argumentappearsto
be that by asking for the removal of UNEF,
or by imposing the blockade, he inadvertently relinquished control over factors
decisive for the subsequent development of
363
the crisis, namelyIsraeliperceptionof available options, and domestic and Arab pressures for furtherescalation.
The first problem in the brinkmanship
explanation concerns the symmetryof the
crisis-dynamicsargument- the contention
that both parties were overtaken by events
and that both parties, once beyond a
certainpoint, could no longer exert control
over the cycle of escalation. It is curious
that those who advance this argumentalso
make abundant simultaneous references
to Nasser's psychological shortcomings
and to the impact of non-rational (or irrational) elements on his decision-making
process.
The symmetry of the argument in fact
makes idiosyncratic factors irrelevant. If
neither Nasser nor Israel's decision-makers
could controlthe rushof events afterTiran,
then Nasser'sown shortcomingsshould not
have mattered - he could no longer avert
disastereven if he were a paragonof rationality. Elaboratingon the ways in which he
departed from a rational decision-making
mode tends to confuse rather than
enlighten, because it implies that had
another leader been at the helm at this
point, the crisis would have ended differently. But if this conclusion is drawn, it
necessarily undercuts the force of the
'uncontrollablemomentum' argument and
elevates the psychology of the individual
leader to the status of the primaryexplanatory factor.
The second (and related) difficultyin the
brinkmanshipexplanationlies in its failure
to document convincingly the thesis that
after the UNEF or Tirandecision, the crisis
acquiredits own uncontrollablemomentum.
Vague as it is, this argumentmustbe at least
refutable. Looking at the Egyptian side of
the (symmetric)equation, could it be maintained that in making the UNEF or Tiran
decisions, Nasser pulled the triggerto war?
A negative answercould be given if it were
shown that, even at this stage, there was no
consensus in the Israeli governmentfor a
pre-emptivestrike.
I will examine the evidence on this point
later. For now, suffice it to say that unwarranted attention to the Israeli casus belli
364
Ben D. Mor
over Tiran has led several observers to inherentin the post hoc approachthatunderassume on this basis alone that Nasser's lies the prevailingaccountsof the crisis.
blockade of the Straits pre-determinedthe
Finally, if Nasser'scrisis decisionscan be
outcome of the crisis.
explained on the basis of strategicrationality, then his failureshouldbe interpretedin
a differentlight. This suggestsin turnthat it
3. Nasseras a StrategicallyRationalActor
may be necessaryto re-evaluatethe lessons
The difficultiesencounteredby the psycho- concerning crisis management that have
logical and brinkmanship explanations been drawn to date from this particular
suggest that an alternative perspective on case.
Most observersagree that Nasser, at least
Nasser's 1967 behavior is in order. In the
remainderof this paperI develop a rational- initially, did not want war with Israel
choice explanation of Nasser's crisis (Dawn, 1968, p. 202; Khouri, 1968, pp.
decision-making.This approachis theoreti- 244-245; Yost, 1968, p. 304), nor did he
cally attractiveif only for the reason that it think it very likely on the eve of the crisis
has not been appliedto this case before and (Safran, 1969, pp. 267-271). Since 1956, he
thereby provides a fresh angle on events had continuallyarguedthat the Arabs were
that have perhapsbeen overstudiedfrom a not yet readyto undertakean armedconflict
cognitive approach.5More importantly,in with Israel. During the Arab summitmeetapplying a rational-choiceapproachto the ings of 1964-65, for example, he decisively
study of Nasser's 1967 behavior, one per- opposed a Syrianproposalto launch largeforce proceedsfrom a premisethat has been scale guerrillaattacksagainst Israel, out of
repeatedlyrejected: that Nasser's behavior concern that such a strategymight provoke
can be explained on the basis of strategic Israelto attack(Safran,1969, p. 273).
It is worth noting that Nasser did not
rationality.
A rational-choice explanation must go intervene when Israel launched a raid
beyond the assertion that decision-makers againstthe Jordanianvillage of al-Samuon
choose coursesof actionthat maximizetheir 13 November 1966. Neither did he come to
values or policy objectives (Allison, 1971). Syria's assistance - despite the EgyptianThe essence of strategicrationalityis that, in Syrian joint defense agreement (in effect
choosing a maximizingaction, actors take since November 1966) - when, on 7 April
into account the alternatives,preferences, 1967, Israel bombardedSyrianpositions in
and possible strategychoices of other rele- the Golan Heights and shot down six Syrian
vant actors (Niou et al., 1989). The rele- MIGs (Yaniv, 1987).
On 25 September 1964, in an Al Ahram
vance of other actors derives from the fact
that in an interdependentenvironment,out- article, Heikal described the conditions
comes are the result of the interactionof under which Nasser believed Egypt could
individualchoices.
successfullyengage Israelin war. These conI shall argue that Nasser's 1967 decisions ditions were: 'the concentrationof superior
can be interpretedfrom such a perspective. militarypower; the isolationof Israel;Arab
This argumentrequires that we reproduce unity' (Safran, 1969, p. 292; see also
the strategicenvironment,as it appearedto Draper, 1968, p. 71). None of these conthe Egyptian leader, and understand his ditions obtained on 14 May when Nasser
choices in the particularcontext in which decided to mobilize.
It is possible to conclude, then, that
he thought he was operating. With respect
to each of Nasser's decisions, then, the Nasser - at least initially - preferred the
question to be asked is not how it contri- statusquo to war. Thus, when rumorsbegan
buted to his subsequent failure but rather circulatingtoward mid-Maythat Israel was
why it was made at that particularstage in about to launcha strike againstthe Damasthe crisis. By refrainingfrom the use of the cus regime, the alternativesfacing Nasser
crisis outcome as the starting-pointof ex- were either to escalate or to refrain from
planation, we can avoid the logical pitfalls action (as he had done before).6 Nasser
could easily foresee the consequences of the
latter strategy: whether Israel in fact
attacked Syria or not, Egypt would be
faulted for not coming to the assistance of its
Syrian ally. This would have constituted a
serious personal blow to Nasser; not only
had he for a long time now been taunted by
his foes in the Arab world for having agreed
to the stationing of UNEF troops on Egyptian territory (Draper, 1968, p. 44; Khouri,
1968, pp. 244-245; Yost, 1968, pp. 303304), but his cautious strategy with regard to
Israel had also contributed to his decline in
prestige in the Arab world (Safran, 1969, p.
282).
On the other hand, if Nasser escalated
and Israel attacked Syria nevertheless, this
would represent a failure of Egyptian deterrence. But Nasser had good reasons to
doubt that such would be the outcome of
Egyptian escalation. With the assistance of
the 1960 Rotem crisis as an analogy (see
note 4), he could have estimated that if
Egypt signaled its intention to support its
ally, Israel would probably prefer to abstain
from attacking Syria than risk confrontation
on a second front. And, even if the Israelis
were not planning to overthrow the Damascus regime, the Egyptian deterrent move
would still appear to have been effective.
Finally, there was no reason to suppose that
Israel, as the status quo power, would be
interested in escalating further the situation
along the Egyptian-Israeli border.
Nasser could have expected, then, that
Egyptian mobilization would either deter
Israel from attacking Syria or appear to do
so (which was just as good), without triggering an actual Egyptian-Israeli confrontation. This was the most desirable outcome
for the Egyptian leader. In fact, Israel responded to Nasser's 14 May decision by
alerting regular army units and moving
some of them to the Sinai border. This was
followed (on 16 May) by a limited mobilization of reserves (Brecher, 1980, p. 36).
Nasser's crisis behavior after 14 May is
more puzzling and raises two questions: (1)
Why did he at all consider further escalation
as a possible strategy? and (2) Why did he
actually choose the escalation strategy after
14 May? The first question requires that we
365
establish a relevance (or means-end connection) between Nasser's objectives in the
1967 crisis and an escalation strategy. The
second question requires that we show that
Nasser's actual crisis behavior - escalation
up to 30 May and de-escalation thereafter was a maximizing means toward his goals.
Before these questions can be addressed, it
is necessary to examine Nasser's crisis perception after 14 May - in particular, his view
of Israel's preferences.
Once Nasser made his initial move by
mobilizing Egyptian troops, the crisis
moved to its second stage. At this point
Nasser's main concern was no longer Israel's
intentions with respect to Syria but rather
her possible reaction to his own future
moves. Having changed the strategic picture
by his mobilization decision, the Egyptian
leader had to consider Israel's preferences
anew. But whereas Nasser could estimate
Israel's preference structure with relative
certainty in the first stage of the crisis, he
could no longer do so once in the second
stage. This is indicated by his probabilistic
estimates of an Israeli attack, which he specified after the war, in his speech at the
Cairo University auditorium on 23 July
1967:
1. 'When we concentrated our forces I estimated that the likelihood of war breaking out was 20 per cent.'
2. 'Before we closed the Gulf of Aqabah,
we convened a meeting of the Higher
Executive Committee ... We discussed
the closure of the Gulf of Aqabah. That
meeting took place on 22nd May. At that
meeting I told them that the possibility of
war was 50 per cent.'
3. 'At another [subsequent] meeting I said
that the likelihood of war was 80 per
cent.'
4. 'Then came the political changes in Israel
at the beginning of June. As we followed
what was going on there, the probability
of war became 100 per cent' (cited in
Laqueur, 1968, pp. 197-207).
The probability estimates contained in
these statements can be interpreted in conditional terms, namely as dependent on the
366
Ben D. Mor
strategy choices made by both parties to the
conflict at each of the different crisis stages.
This interpretation follows from Nasser's
overall perception of the crisis, as will be
argued later. The probability estimates can
be seen to imply that Nasser considered two
possible sets of Israeli preferences: one
which would make the non-attack strategy
rational for Israel's leaders, and another
which would make the attack strategy
rational.
Under the first set of preferences, Israel
was perceived to prefer some level of escalation along the Egyptian-Israeli border to
war between the two countries. This preference reflects the view that Israel was the
status quo power, and therefore content
with preserving it. Safran (1969, p. 266)
writes that 'both Egypt . . . and Israel
seemed to be in agreement that full-scale
war was not likely as long as the kind of
politico-military balance that prevailed
during that period continued to exist
.'.
Nutting (1972, p. 408) recalls that in his conversations with the Egyptian leader during
the last days of the crisis, Nasser indicated
that 'he could ride out the storm provided
he offered Israel no further provocation'.
Earlier on, then, he must have believed that
Israel was not interested in war with Egypt.
In addition, we can speculate that Nasser
was aware that political considerations of
international sympathy and support were
paramount to the Israeli government.
(After all, he believed that one of the conditions for the success of an Egyptian military campaign against Israel was her isolation.) Even if Israel subsequently decided
to attack, she would prefer war in which she
could appear as the defensive party - i.e. the
party confronted by escalation - to war in
which she would appear as the intransigent
aggressor, even if in the former case she
would necessarily have to confront a mobilized opponent. For a time, then, Israel
would be ready to tolerate some Egyptian
escalation - and would choose retaliatory
measures short of war - rather than engage
in full-scale war. Nasser's experience in the
Rotem crisis could only lend additional support to this view. It is reflected in the relatively low probability estimate of Israeli
attack that he believed to apply following
his mobilization decision of 14 May.
However, the fact that Nasser thought of
an Israeli attack in probabilistic terms indicates that he considered it possible - and
increasingly more probable - that Israel's
policy preferences would change. Moreover, in relating his probability estimates of
Israeli attack to his own pattern of escalation, Nasser testified to his understanding
that Israel's crisis strategy might change in
reaction to his own moves. Specifically, it
appears that he was concerned with the
probability that at some point in the crisis
the situation would make it rational for
Israel to attack, whether he continued to
escalate or not. He understood, in other
words, that once a certain level of escalation
was reached, Israel would prefer war over
any other possible resolution of the crisis.
Below this level, Egyptian escalation
would succeed; but not knowing where the
red line would be drawn, Nasser could
choose to face the risk inherent in a gamble
or opt out (i.e. stabilize or end the crisis),
either by abstaining from further escalation
or by de-escalating, as he indicated to Nutting he thought would be possible.
Given this strategic context, the question
to be asked is whether Nasser's crisis
decisions were based on strategic rationality. The answer depends on the crisis
objectives the Egyptian leader was pursuing. In the absence of well-grounded
empirical data on Nasser's goals, we can
only hypothesize about their nature. This
hypothesis, in turn, gives rise to a rationalchoice explanation to the extent that: (1)
Nasser's crisis decisions can be shown to
have been a relevant and maximizing means
toward his presumed goals; and (2) other
observed aspects of his behavior were consistent with the hypothesized goals.9
The hypothesis suggested here is that in
the 1967 crisis Nasser sought to restore his
leadership position in the Arab world by
avenging his defeat in the 1956 war (hence
the crisis objective) and, at the same time,
achieve this goal without provoking an
Israeli attack (hence the crisis constraint)."'
The hypothesized objective meets the
relevance:
requirement of means-end
Nasser did not raise the ante so as to
'manipulate the shared risk of war' (Schelling, 1966, p. 99); if that were the purpose,
then any of a number of escalatory moves
could have the desired effect. Rather, he
sought to challenge very specific arrangements (i.e. the forced stationing of UNEF
on Egyptian soil) and commitments (i.e. the
Israeli casus belli over Tiran), which he
found to be humiliating but had had to
endure ever since the 1956 war. And
because his humiliation eventually cost him
his leadership of the Arab world, he saw an
intrinsic value in his final act of escalation the conclusion of the Egyptian-Jordanian
defense pact - which signified his newly restored status as undisputed leader.
If Nasser's escalatory moves were logically connected to his crisis objective, the
question is whether they were also a maximizing means toward this objective, given
the constraint of avoiding war. Elsewhere
(Mor, 1990) I argue that Nasser's perception
of the strategic context and his probability
estimates can be used to model the 1967
crisis as a multi-stage game. I reasoned that
if Nasser's actual crisis behavior conformed
to the mathematical solution of the game,
then it can be interpreted on the basis of
strategic (i.e. game-theoretic) rationality.
The solution to the game indicated that
Nasser's crisis behavior was rational (i.e.
maximized his crisis objectives under the
war-avoidance constraint) if the value he
associated with each successive escalatory
move - UNEF, Tiran, and the Pact - grew
faster than the (increasing) probability of
war. This result is understandable, because
as Nasser progressed through the crisis, the
odds of war (as he perceived them) grew
and could be offset only by increasingly
higher values associated with successive acts
of escalation."
It can be argued that Nasser's actual
valuation of his escalation moves conformed
to this pattern. If the scope of the agenda
that Nasser could credibly force upon the
Israelis is taken as a criterion, then certainly
the valuation of successive escalation moves
increased as the crisis progressed: the
removal of UNEF and the blockade of
the Straits were designed to eradicate the
367
embarrassing remnants of the 1956 war; the
Tiran blockade had the additional value of
constituting an open challenge to Israel,
which considered it to be a casus belli. But
whereas UNEF and Tiran were seen as
obstacles to the restoration of Nasser's
status in, and leadership of, the Arab world
- and in this sense were 'negatives' to be
removed, or undone - the Pact decision was
unrelated to the post-1956 period and could
therefore be seen as a major positive
achievement. The Pact enabled Nasser through the concentration of Arab power
and the show of Arab unity - to open up the
possibility of expanding the agenda to
include the pre-1956 period, namely the
humiliating consequences of the 1948-49
war.12
But Nasser's ability to solidify his considerable gains depended in turn on his
ability to stabilize the crisis and force Israel
to deal diplomatically with the newly
created agenda. Thus, whereas Nasser's
valuation of the UNEF, Tiran, and the Pact
achievements was sufficiently high to offset
the increased probability of war he associated with obtaining them, after 30 May the
constraint of avoiding war dictated prudence. (This is also the game-theoretic
result: it was rational for Nasser to stop
escalating after the Pact decision; see Mor,
1990, for details.)
Did Nasser's behavior in the post-Pact
period (31 May-4 June) conform to the
of
strategic rationality?
imperatives
Whereas observers of the crisis concur that
Nasser escalated up to the point of signing
the Pact, there is no agreement on the
nature of his moves thereafter: Did he escalate the crisis further, or did he attempt to
de-escalate it after 30 May?
In the early days of June, the Arab military noose around Israel was gradually tightening. In addition to Egyptian, Jordanian,
and Syrian troops, Israel now had to confront the presence of Iraqi forces in Jordan,
which constituted an Israeli casus belli
(Stein & Tanter, 1980, p. 107). On 4 June,
Iraq officially joined the Egyptian-SyrianJordanian pact. Whereas Israel's decisionmakers believed that the joint military capabilities of the Arab states would increase
368
Ben D. Mor
their intent to attack(Stein & Tanter, 1980,
p. 236), it appearsthat the militarymoves
under Nasser's control were designed for
defensive purposes.
There is in fact substantialevidence that
Nasser attemptedto stabilizethe crisisafter
30 May. Nutting's personal testimony has
already been mentioned. In a conversation
Nuttinghad with Nasserduringthe last days
of the crisis, the Egyptian leader told him
that he still believed war could be avoided,
provided there was no furtherprovocation
(Nutting, 1972,p. 408). Nasseracted on this
belief by instructingEgyptianforces in Sinai
to abstain from any provocation of the
Israelis. Defensive positions were taken
despite the objectionsof Badranand Amer,
who pressured for a pre-emptive strike.13
According to Bar-Zohar (1970, p. 176),
when the EgyptianHigh Commandmet on
2 June, Nasser instructedthat, in light of
indicationsthat the crisis was subsiding,no
excuse should be given to the Israelis for
attacking. Khouri (1968, p. 247), too,
arguesthat 'as soon as he had achieved his
most immediatepolitical objectives, Nasser
was content to sit back and go no further'.
There is also the recordof Nasser'sdiplomatic activities during the last days of the
crisis:his pledge to Johnson and De Gaulle
that Egypt would not be the one to attack
(Heikal, 1973;Riad, 1981);his responseto a
question put to him (on 2 June) by British
MP ChristopherMayhewthat Egypt had no
intentionof attackingIsrael;a similarassurance he gave Johnson's envoy, Charles
Yost, when the latter visited Cairo at the
beginningof June; his decisionto send Vice
President Zakaria Mohieddin on a visit to
Washingtonon 5 June;and his agreementto
a return visit by Vice President Hubert
Humphrey(Heikal, 1973;Riad, 1981;Yost,
1968). On 31 May, Egypt's Ambassadorto
the United States, El Kony, suggested a
formula for a compromise solution to the
issue of Tiran(Stephens, 1971, p. 307).
What of this was picked up by the Israelis
is a different matter. What concerns us here
is whether Nasser in fact viewed his public
statements as essentially stabilizing. Dawn
(1968) argues that although Nasser could
not abstain from belligerent rhetoric, he was
'the last to join the campaignof words' (p.
220) and even then took care to emphasize
that Egypt would act militarilyonly in response to an Israeliattack.A similarpoint is
made by Heikal (1973, p. 245).
Heikal'saccountis particularlyinteresting
because it revealssomethingabout Nasser's
own perception of the role of rhetoric in
general. Heikal writes (pp. 237-238) that
earlier in 1967, when Sadat returnedfrom
Washingtonafter a meeting with Johnson,
he brought with him a message from the
AmericanpresidentadmonishingNasserfor
his open attackson the USA and callingon
him to resort to quiet diplomacy. In response, Nasser called in the US ambassador
and sent through him a verbal message to
Johnson.In this message, Nasserstated that
quiet diplomacywould suit the USA, which
has 'money and atom bombs, riches and
power without limit' but 'would not suit us
because I would be cut off from the support
of my masses'. Arguingthat 'the main weapon of the Revolution is its masses', he
added: 'If I am to be readywith my weapon
I must always be ready to talk to the Arab
people.'
Badeau (1968, p. 98) has also arguedthat
'the Arab world is highly verbal;words are
often ends in themselvesand not necessarily
forerunnersof action'. In the 1967 crisis,
however, suchwas not the perceptionof the
Israelis. Cohen (1988, p. 10) notes that
Nasserwas 'utterlyobliviousto the yawning
culturalgap whichensuredthat his vituperative rhetoricwas taken at its face value by
Israel'. His hints of moderationwere 'concealed by a thicket of threateninghyperbole'.
4. TheReasonsfor Nasser'sFailure
If Nasser's crisis behavior was strategically
rational,then where did he go wrong?If we
consider that Nasser chose to de-escalate
the crisis after 30 May in the hope of stabilizing the situation, and an Israeli attack
occurrednonetheless, then the logicalplace
to begin the analysis is with the Pact
decision.
In Nasser's perception, Israel's preferences after 30 May should have made it
369
rational for her to abstain from attack, tioning in Ismailia when the Israeli attack
provided he did not escalate further, which was launched (Bar-Zohar, 1970, p. 176).
he didn't. Instead, Israel behaved as if her
Dupuy (1978, p. 236) maintains that
Nasser's
decision to retain Amer as his comdid
make
an
attack
strategy
preferences
rational. Clearly, then, Nasser misperceived mander in chief and first deputy - despite
Israel's preferences after 30 May. More pre- deteriorating relations and rumors that the
cisely, since he perceived the probability of latter was planning a coup - 'seems ample
Israeli attack to be related to his own evidence that he did not expect a war to
moves, his failure lay in not realizing that his eventuate in 1967'. Derogy & Carmel (1979)
latest escalatory step had, in effect, raised - relying on the testimony of the Soviet diplomat Sakharov, who was stationed in Cairo
this probability to certainty.
This shifts the attention to Nasser's (1968-70) before defecting to the West decision to sign the Egyptian-Jordanian argue that the Soviets knew of Israel's plan
Pact. At this stage of the crisis, his percep- to attack on 5 June, but did not inform
tion was that further escalation on his part Nasser of this so as 'to prevent his backing
(i.e. the Pact) would raise the probability of out...' (p. 218).
On the other hand, in his 23 July 1967
an Israeli attack to 0.80. Given this percepvaluation
but
his
speech Nasser claimed to have correctly
tion,
more-than-offsetting
of the Pact, it was rational for Nasser to assessed the implications of Dayan's
escalate, and to conclude logically - when appointment. In the same speech he also
Israel once again failed to attack - that he indicated that on 2 June, in a meeting with
would get yet another chance to stabilize the senior military officers at the Supreme Comcrisis by de-escalating. In other words, mand HQ, he told his listeners that he
Nasser interpreted the Israeli restraint expected an Israeli attack to take place
following his 30 May decision as evidence within 48 to 72 hours, and even specified
that the outcome of the 'chance event' - the that the attack would begin on 5 June with a
signing of the Pact - was in his favor, strike against the Egyptian Air Force. The
because it did not trigger an Israeli shift in same account is repeated in Sadat (1977)
and Riad (1981).
policy preferences.
These accounts cannot be easily reconThis analysis conforms with the evidence
and further research is required in
to
staon
above
Nasser's
ciled,
attempts
presented
bilize the crisis after 30 May. Bar-Zohar order to establish the correct picture. But
(1970, p. 176) argues that when the Egyp- the evidence is perhaps not as contradictory
tian High Command met on 2 June, the as it appears to be at first sight. To begin
view of the participants was that Dayan's with, it is possible that Nasser was simply
appointment to the post of Defense Minister uncertain about the implications of Dayan's
(1 June) was an Israeli domestic matter. appointment. There were, after all, quite a
few indicators that the crisis was in fact subTherefore, it 'created no undue excitement'.
According to Lebanese press reports, by siding. Primary among them was the US
3 June Egyptian military commanders diplomatic effort, which appeared to be
believed that the crisis was over and that gaining momentum with the visits of Robert
further alertness in the armed forces was not Anderson and Charles Yost, the imminent
necessary (Shamir, 1967, p. 202). This atti- departure to Washington of Moheiddin, and
tude of the Egyptian elite may explain why the expected return visit of Humphrey. Barthe deployment of Egyptian aircraft near Zohar (1970, pp. 180-181) provides ample
the country's civilian airport was that of 'sit- evidence that around the world the general
ting targets for enemy attacks' (Nutting, opinion was that the crisis was in fact over,
1972, p. 416); why on 4 June 'Egyptian and Mansfield (1969, pp. 168-169) writes
generals were seen on the tennis courts of that 'many seasoned observers in the Middle
Cairo' (Churchill & Churchill, 1967, p. 75); East believed that [Nasser] had got away
and why the Egyptian commander of the with it'. It is not surprising therefore - but
Sinai front, General Murtaghi, was vaca- somewhat inconsistent with his claim to
370
Ben D. Mor
have predicted the onset of war - that in the
same speech of 23 July Nasser lashed out at
the USA for having engaged in deception
prior to the Israeli attack.
Nasser's statement of 2 June to his military officers may well have been a warning
rather than a prediction. Given the officers'
over-confidence in the Egyptian army's
capabilities and level of preparedness,
Nasser may have felt it necessary to jolt
them into action. In this he apparently did
not succeed, as revealed subsequently by
the poor alertness level of the Egyptian
forces.
Returning to the analysis of Nasser's misperception, the question arises as to
whether it in fact came into play on 30 May,
when he signed the Pact, or earlier (22
May), when he decided to close the Straits.
The answer depends on when Israel's policy
preferences actually changed. If the change
occurred after 22 May, then the prevalent
view in the literature, namely that Tiran was
the point of no return, is correct. There are
good reasons, however, to doubt this claim.
They lie in Israel's perception of the crisis,
and of her options, in the period following
Nasser's Tiran decision.
Eban's (1977) analysis of the crisis
suggests that he in fact viewed the Tiran
blockade as a point of no return, but not in
the sense of rendering war inevitable but
rather in the sense of ensuring some form of
Israeli resistance. Eban's preference was
that this resistance take the form of combined international action, spearheaded by
the United States, to open the Straits to
Israeli navigation. He argues that Dayan
voiced a similar opinion in a Cabinet meeting called by Eshkol on 23 May.14 During
that same meeting, according to Eban, 'our
military colleagues had made no proposals
for immediate military action' (p. 333; see
also Brecher, 1980, pp. 117-126). Ezer
Weizman (then Chief of Operations) writes
(1976, p. 211) that at that point the General
Staff 'was perplexed and confused' as well.
Its doubts concerning the necessity of an
Israeli strike were eliminated only around
26 May (p. 213).
Rabin's (1979) memoirs contain a scathing, and revealing, indictment of Israeli
hesitation following Nasser's Tiran decision.
He recalls (pp. 80-81) a particularly bitter
confrontation with Interior Minister Moshe
Chaim Shapira on 23 May. The latter, who
was adamantly opposed to any military
action, accused Rabin (then Chief of Staff)
of compromising Israel's security. He
repeated his opposition to the military
option in a meeting of Cabinet members
held by Eshkol on 26 May. Rabin writes that
'Shapira was not the only minister to hold
such views, though the others refrained
from expressing themselves so bluntly' (p.
90). Even as late as 30 May, when the Pact
was signed, Rabin perceived that 'our political leaders remained captive to their illusory
hopes that war might be averted' (p. 93).
Similar accounts of Israel's hesitation
following Nasser's 22 May decision are
provided by Kimche & Bawly (1968, pp.
137-138) and Bar-Zohar (1970, p. 119).
The reaction to Nasser's signing of the
Pact, however, was quite different. Eban
(1977, p. 380) writes that 'by his journey to
Cairo on 30 May, Hussein made it certain
that war would break out and that it would
not necessarily be limited to the EgyptianIsraeli front'. Eban understood the significance of the Pact, namely that Israel would
now have to fight on three fronts. Accordingly, in a 31 May meeting with heads of
departments in the Foreign Ministry, he
argued that 'the assumption of two weeks'
respite [decided on by the government on 28
May] must now be revised, and that our dialogue with the United States must be modified accordingly' (p. 381). 15
Stein & Tanter (1980, p. 218) write that
'Israel's leaders were stunned by the joint
defense pact', but understood its significance. They 'quickly jettisoned the prevailing hypothesis that Arab unity was insufficient to permit an attack . . . and
drastically updated their estimate of the
likelihood of joint Arab military action' (p.
219). It was in response to this development
that Eban, who led the dovish coalition,
decided to reopen the 28 May decision to
delay military action by two additional
weeks (p. 220). Kimche & Bawly (1968, p.
154) argue that, together with the growing
evidence that the USA was getting nowhere
in its diplomatic efforts, the Pact was decisive in leading to the collapse of 'Eban's antiwar front' (p. 155). At that point, 'there
were no more doubters' in the government
(p. 154). (See also Dayan, 1976, p. 373, and
Churchill & Churchill, 1967, p. 52, on this
point.)
5. Conclusion: Teaching and Crisis
Management
Why did Nasser fail to realize that his Pact
decision would trigger the change in Israel's
policy preferences? The answer appears to
be somewhat paradoxical: Nasser failed
because up to that point he had succeeded so
well. Despite the odds against him, Nasser
managed, within the course of three weeks,
to escalate with impunity and secure for
himself gains which only a month before
appeared to be beyond his reach. All the
chance events involved in his escalatory
choices turned out in his favor - namely,
they resulted in an outcome which permitted him to proceed with his escalation. If
learning requires a negative discrepancy between expectations and outcomes (Bandura, 1977; Maoz, 1990a), we may argue
that in the case of Nasser in 1967 there was
no trigger to learning.
The key lies in Israel's reaction to
Nasser's moves. Draper (1968, p. 70) argues
that 'the evidence is overwhelming that
Israel acted exactly as Nasser expected it to
act'. This is inaccurate - Nasser had reasons
for being surprised. As the odds against him
grew and Israel still remained hesitant,
Nasser's expectations fell short of the actual
outcomes. Thus, there was no reason for
him to revise his strategy (or, rather, to
revise his probability estimate of Israeli
attack and thereby his own strategy).
Hence, the strategy which appeared rational
at the outset of the crisis remained so until
the end (or at least until the beginning of
June, when he might have realized his
mistake).
To recall, Stein (1988, p. 2) argues that
'Egyptian deterrence did not fail but succeeded too well' in that it 'unleashed a set of
demands which the president was unable to
resist'. The conclusion suggested here is that
371
Nasser's success was in fact at the root of his
failure, but for a different reason altogether
- it did not permit a trigger to learning,
which was required in order for him to reevaluate his strategy.
This naturally turns attention to the
Israeli behavior. Did Israel in fact fail to
'teach' Nasser that he was approaching the
red line, or the point at which the nonattack strategy would cease to be rational?
Several participants and observers have
argued precisely that. Weizman (1976, p.
215), for example, writes: 'I don't hesitate
to number our government's hesitancy and
apprehensions as direct causes of Egyptian
escalation'. This also appears to be the view
of Safran (1969), Cohen (1988), Quandt
(1977), Amos (1979), Bar-Zohar (1970),
and Yaniv (1987).
Cohen (1988, p. 14) writes that 'the measured warnings and unobtrusive military dispositions preferred by Israel either failed to
register with the Egyptians or were simply
taken as proof of weakness'. Yaniv (1987)
argues that in comparison with Ben-Gurion's handling of the 1960 Rotem crisis, Eshkol's defensive actions in 1967 were neither
discreet nor decisive enough to convey the
correct message. In addition, Eshkol did not
enjoy the reputation for toughness and
resolve that had been Ben-Gurion's (pp.
118-119). Bar-Zohar (1970, p. 65) argues
that in the meeting in which the decision to
close the Straits was taken, Nasser's advisers
reasoned that even Ben-Gurion took no immediate action when Egypt proceeded to
close the Gulf in September 1955. It was
hard to believe, therefore, that Eshkol
would risk war over Tiran. There was
nothing in Israel's behavior during the
period thereafter which could have convinced Nasser that he had been wrong.
If the conclusion is that the success of
Nasser's strategy provided no trigger for
revisions, then it appears to be an interesting variant of a more general empirical
observation on learning, namely that
'nothing fails like success'. Jervis (1975) discusses this paradox with respect to decisionmakers' learning from history - when analogizing to the past leads to the adoption of a
strategy that worked then even if it does not
372
Ben D. Mor
apply to the present. This study suggests
that the paradox may also operate within a
given conflict; the mechanism which
produces it, however, appears to be somewhat different: the analogy drawn is not
from the present to a past event, but rather
from the present to some earlier strategic
scenario which guides expectations. In
Nasser's case, the parallels between the
actual events of the crisis and his earlier
expectations were strong enough to produce
a repetition of the successful strategy. These
parallels would have appeared far less reassuring to Nasser had Israel managed the crisis differently. Instead, Israel's behavior
could have only convinced him that his earlier estimates were rather conservative.
When seen in a broader perspective of
crisis escalation in general, this conclusion
points to the importance of teaching in crisis. From the perspective of the defender
who is interested in preserving the status
quo, sharp escalatory moves - such as were
initiated by Nasser in 1967 - may appear to
be the product of resolve, boldness, or recklessness. In some crises, this is in fact the
case, and the defender may then justly
perceive that its only alternatives are capitulation or attack. But this study suggests that
bold escalation may also be the result of
insufficient indicators for strategy revision.
This occurs when a challenger's expectations are met, or even surpassed by actual
events.
If the challenger is simply interested in
provoking the defender to attack, then the
defender must decide whether to do so or to
capitulate. But if the challenger's objective
is to achieve a maximal revision of the status
quo short of war, then it is paradoxically
interested in being 'taught' by the defender
about the latter's preferences. If the
defender fails to do so, it may bring about
an outcome which is inferior for both
"
parties.
Determining what the challenger really
wants is not an easy task. Neither is it
certain that the challenger will interpret the
defender's messages and signals correctly.
But the lesson of the 1967 case is that by
failing to attempt to teach the challenger
where the red line will be drawn, a defender
traps itself in an attribution error. It attributes the challenger's boldness to the
latter's preferences and concludes therefrom that a defense of the status quo
requires nothing less than war. In effect,
then, the defender relinquishes the means
by which it can evaluate the challenger's
objective.
NOTES
1. Unfortunately, this practice does not result in
explanations that integrate the two levels and specify their interrelationships. One consequence of
this is that, within single studies, explanations
offered at one level are often inconsistent with
explanations offered at another level, as I argue
below.
2. One wonders what the historical verdict would
have been had the United Nations, or the major
powers, taken successful steps to stabilize the crisis. One suspects that Nasser's decisions would
have been heralded as the product of an ingenious
strategic mind.
3. Both Lacouture (1973) and Nutting (1972) supply
ample documentation for Nasser's cautious policy
after 30 May. More is said on this point later.
4. For a discussion of the 1960 Rotem crisis and some
of its parallels to the 1967 crisis, see Yaniv (1987).
That the Rotem analogy influenced Nasser's thinking is suggested by Amos (1979, p. 55), Brecher
(1980, p. 46), Dupuy (1978, p. 230), Heikal (1973),
Kimche & Bawly (1968, pp. 84-85), Stein (1988, p.
4, fn. 29) and Stein & Tanter (1980, p. 138). Israeli
and American decision-makers also shared this
perception initially. See Eban (1977, p. 323),
Quandt (1977, p. 39), Rabin (1979, p. 68), and
Weizman (1976, p. 209). Stein (1988, p. 5) argues
that Nasser's restraint in the 1960 crisis was the
result of his then secure position at home and
abroad. In 1967, on the other hand, he was a weak
leader who could not resist the pressures exerted
on him. This reasoning is not entirely convincing. It
presupposes that insecurity and weakness breed
aggression, whereas strength yields restraint. This
relationship, however, is not logically necessary: a
weak leader may realize that he/she cannot afford
to take the same risks that a strong and secure
leader can. In fact, despite his weakness, Nasser
showed remarkable restraint during the years
immediately preceding the 1967 crisis, as well as
during the crisis itself, as is argued later.
5. There are, however, rational-choice studies of the
crisis from the Israeli perspective. See Stein &
Tanter (1980), Wagner (1974), and Zagare (1984,
1981). Maoz (1990b) uses the dollar auction game
to analyze the 1967 crisis, which he offers as an
instance of 'the paradox of crisis escalation' - confrontations that end in war, contrary to the wishes
of the parties involved and despite their efforts to
prevent it.
6. The question of Israel's intentions with respect to
Syria in mid-May is an intensely debated one in the
literature (see, for example, Badeau, 1968, p. 110;
Derogy & Carmel, 1979, pp. 207-222; Laqueur,
1968, pp. 74-75; Shamir, 1971, p. 187; and Yaniv,
1987, pp. 115-117). Neither is there agreement on
whether Nasser believed the Soviet and Syrian
reports of Israeli troop concentrations near the
Syrian border. Dawn (1968, p. 209) and Yost
(1968, pp. 303-304) argue that Nasser believed an
Israeli attack on Syria was forthcoming. I agree
with Safran's (1969) view that even if he had doubts
about the reliability of the information, 'in a
certain particular sense he believed it to be essentially true' (p. 278; emphasis in original).
7. As Safran (1968, p. 291, fn. 19) argues, the 80%
estimate, then, must have been made between the
Tiran decision and 1 June. There is also no apparent reason to think that Nasser was insincere, or
intent on misleading his audience, when he specified these probability estimates in his speech. They
do not seem to advance any deceptive purpose on
his part, and they are quite consistent with his interpretation of the course of the crisis. It should be
noted, though, that Sadat (1977, p. 172), who participated in the 22 May meeting of the Higher Executive Committee, recalls that Nasser said he
believed war would occur with certainty if the
Straits were closed. This is contrary to Nasser's
statement quoted above. If Sadat is correct, then
Nasser in effect opted for war when he closed the
Straits. Stein (1988) argues, based on the Sadat
figure, that Nasser decided to challenge Israeli
deterrence because he was led to underestimate
Israel's military capability and overestimate his
own. There is reason to doubt Sadat's account on
this point. Heikal, who on 26 May had written an
Al Ahram article arguing that war was inevitable
(see quote in the introduction), said to Stephens
(1971, p. 481) in July 1969 that this had not been
Nasser's view at the time. The testimony of
Anthony Nutting (1972; see below) supports Heikal's claim. It also contradicts Badran's account (see
Safran, 1969, p. 300, fn. 25) that in a conference
held by Nasser on 28 May in the Egyptian General
Headquarters, he stated that the probability of war
had risen from 80% to certainty. (Note that Badran's account contradicts that of Sadat.)
8. Because we seek at this point to present the crisis
from Nasser's perspective, it makes sense to incorporate his own probability estimates into the overall strategic picture. Whether Nasser was in fact
justified in generating these particular estimates is
a different matter, to be discussed later.
9. This approach to analyzing the crisis follows the
'inference pattern' Allison (1971) specifies for the
Rational Actor Model. See in particular his explanation of the Soviet decision to place missiles in
Cuba, which involves several hypotheses about
Soviet objectives.
10. Although this hypothesis suggests that Nasser was
attempting brinkmanship, it leads to an interpretation of Nasser's behavior and failure that differs
373
in several respects from the brinkmanship explanation discussed in Section 2.2.
11. This argument presumes that Nasser was 'riskneutral' (i.e. his attitude toward risk did not affect
the expected-value calculation) and that he was
uncertain about the outcome of war against Israel.
That is, Nasser did not think he would necessarily
lose the war but neither did he expect to be necessarily successful in maintaining his crisis achievements if war broke out.
12. Some students of the 1967 crisis have extended
their criticism of Nasser's behavior to include the
values underlying his preference formation (i.e.
pride, personal prestige, and a leadership role). It
is therefore important to recall at this point
Cohen's (1988) perceptive comment that 'to the
Arab leader the fraternal Arab states are what the
family is to the individual: the source of his identity
and reputation. The revelation of Nasser's impotence [i.e. during the Samu incident of November
1966 and the Syrian-Israeli clash of 7 April 1967] in
full view of his peers was an excruciating humiliation which would not go unavenged' (p. 7).
13. Much has been written about the deployment pattern of the Egyptian forces. The best analyses are
those of Dupuy (1978) and Stein (1988). This issue
resulted in a sharp division of opinion between the
Israelis and the Americans during the course of the
crisis. Israel argued (through Eban, who on 27 May
was in Washington for a meeting with Lyndon
Johnson) that the Egyptian deployment suggested
a likely attack. The Pentagon, however, did not
find evidence for this claim. Later on, when head
of Mossad, Meir Amit, visited Washington, he
found it difficult to convince Pentagon officials that
Israel's estimate of Egyptian intentions was correct. (See Eisenberg et al., 1979, for details on this
meeting.)
14. Following the advice of Ya'acov Herzog, the
Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office,
Eshkol agreed on 23 May to invite leaders of the
opposition to participate in the deliberations of the
Ministerial Committee on Defense. Dayan took
part in the 23 May meeting as a member of the Rafi
party. On 1 June he became Defense Minister.
Dayan's (1976, p. 378) recollection of the meeting
is that although he indicated that a US solution to
the Tiran blockade would be acceptable ('I would
be very pleased'), he 'did not think anything would
come out of it'. Therefore, he recommended to the
Committee that following the forty-eight hour respite requested by the USA, Israel should launch a
strike against the Egyptians.
15. The Pact decision appears to have changed the perception of the crisis in Washington as well. BarZohar (1970, p. 157) reports that upon hearing of
Nasser's move, 'the Americans realized that they
had been on the wrong track'; Walt Rostow called
Evron, Israel's Minister in Washington, and 'confessed for the first time that he could see no
solution'.
16. This conclusion relates to signaling during a crisis.
Similar arguments are often raised in connection
374
Ben D. Mor
with crisis initiation, where the issue is that of effective signaling of commitment to deter challenges to
the status quo (see, for example, the discussion of
the Korean War in George & Smoke, 1974, and
Lebow, 1981). In Israel's case, an interest in conveying to Nasser the limits of Israeli tolerance
made sense as long as Nasser did not conclude the
Pact with Jordan. But once Israel failed to deter
this further escalation of the conflict, and once this
development triggered the change in her preferences concerning war, she became interested in
keeping Nasser in the dark about her true preferences, so as to maintain strategic surprise. Paradoxically, Israel's earlier failure at signaling may have
helped her to project a consistent pattern of moderation even as she was preparing for war: Dayan's
press conference of 3 June; the pictures of Israeli
soldiers (several thousands of whom had been
granted leave) resting on the beaches; and the routine communique issued by the Cabinet on 4 June,
made the 'right' impression in Cairo (see Churchill
& Churchill, 1967, pp. 74-75, and Brecher, 1980,
p. 165).
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BEN D. MOR, b. 1956, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa,
Israel. Research areas: decision-making, international crises, the Middle East, and formal modeling.

Nasser`s Decision-Making in the 1967 Middle East Crisis: A

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