SOW Chap 4 - Worldwatch Institute

Transcription

T H E WO R L DWAT C H I N S T I T U T E
Special 20th Anniversar y Edition
STATE OF TH E WOR LD
20o3
Chris Bright Christopher Flavin Gary Gardner Mia MacDonald
Anne Platt McGinn Danielle Nierenberg Payal Sampat Janet Sawin
Molly O’Meara Sheehan Linda Starke Howard Youth
Chapter 5
Charting a New
Energy Future
Janet Sawin
For eight years, people in the Thai province
of Prachuap Khiri Kan have fought proposals to build two large coal-fired power plants
in the region out of concern for the environmental and health impacts of the plants.
When Thailand’s Prime Minister visited one
possible site in January 2002, he was met by
20,000 protesters. With help from the international environmental organization Greenpeace, people of this province have begun
installing what they really want—wind and
solar power. Meanwhile, halfway around the
world, the state legislature in California passed
a groundbreaking law in September 2002
that sets a target of generating 20 percent of
electricity from new renewable sources by
2017. From Southeast Asia to California,
leaders in business, government, and civil
society are calling for a transition to a renewable energy economy.1
Between the late 1990s and 2020, global
energy consumption is projected to rise nearly
60 percent due to population growth, continued urbanization, and economic and industrial expansion. Consumption of electricity,
the most versatile form of energy, will increase
even more sharply by most estimates—nearly
70 percent. The largest share of this growth
is expected to occur in the developing world,
where some 2 billion people have no access
to modern forms of energy such as electricity and piped gas. And most of the additional
energy is projected to come from fossil fuels,
according to national and international agency
forecasts. But meeting these demands with
conventional fuels and technologies will further threaten the natural environment, public health and welfare, and international
stability.2
Renewable energy technologies have the
potential to meet world energy demand many
times over and are now ready for use on a
large scale. Wind and solar power are the
fastest-growing energy sources in the world.
By some estimates, “new renewables” (which
excludes large-scale hydropower and traditional biomass) already account for more
than 100,000 megawatts (MW) of grid-connected electric capacity. Globally, new renewable energy supplies the equivalent of the
85
State of the World 2003
CHARTING A NEW ENERGY FUTURE
residential electricity needs of more than 300
million people.3
In 1999, the International Energy Agency
noted that “the world is in the early stages of
an inevitable transition to a sustainable energy
system that will be largely dependent on
renewable resources.” This is a bold statement for an organization that represents North
America, Europe, and Japan—areas that
depend so heavily on fossil fuels. But it seems
logical, given the many problems associated
with the use of conventional energy and the
tremendous surge in renewable energy investments over recent years. The world now uses
10 times as much wind energy as it did only
a decade ago, and solar power consumption
has risen sevenfold. Political support for renewables is on the rise as well. Several countries
have recently passed strong new legislation
to support renewable energy, opening markets
in a rapidly growing list of countries.4
Yet change is never easy, and there are
strong forces—including politically powerful industries—that wish to maintain the status quo. The forces for and against change
were on full display at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in summer 2002. The
European Union and Brazil proposed the
adoption of specific numerical targets for the
use of new renewable energy worldwide.
Strong opposition arose from the fossil fuel
industry and from the governments of most
oil-producing nations and major fossil fuel
users such as China and the United States.
The battle in Johannesburg ended in a
watered-down, non-numerical goal to
increase renewable energy use. But the fact
that the issue even arose at a global summit
was highly significant. While the world is
sharply divided on what kind of energy future
must lie ahead, many nations now view
renewable energy as a credible alternative to
fossil fuels.5
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Resistance to change is inevitable, but the
world cannot afford to be held back indefinitely by those who are wedded to energy systems of the past. Each year new power plants,
refineries, pipelines, and other forms of conventional infrastructure—facilities that will
be around for at least a half-century—are
added to the global energy system to replace
existing capital stock and to meet ever-rising
demand, much of it in the developing world.
An estimated $200–250 billion is invested in
energy-related infrastructure every year, and
another $1.5 trillion is spent on energy consumption, with nearly all of this investment
going to conventional energy. As a result,
societies are in the process of further locking
themselves into indefinite dependence on
unhealthy, unsustainable, insecure energy
structures.6
We have a brief window of opportunity to
start down the path to a more sustainable
world—one in which rising demand for
energy is met without sacrificing the needs of
current and future generations and the natural environment. Nongovernmental organizations, working with local communities,
can make a difference on a small scale, as in
Thailand, but alone they will not bring about
the transformation necessary for movement
toward a renewably powered world.
The rapid expansion of renewable technologies over the past decade has been fueled
by a handful of countries that have adopted
ambitious and deliberate government policies aimed to advance renewable energy. These
successful policy innovations have been the
most important drivers in the advancement
and diffusion of renewable technologies such
as wind and solar photovoltaics (PVs). By
examining the policies that have worked
toward this end over the past two decades, as
well as those that have failed, we can get some
idea of what is required to launch a global
takeoff in renewables in the decade ahead.
The Case for Renewables
New renewable resources provide only a small
share of global energy production today. (See
Figures 5–1 and 5–2.) Yet the advantages of
shifting away from fossil fuels and nuclear
energy and toward greater reliance on renewables are numerous and enormous. Several
countries have begun this transition in
response to rising demand for energy, increasing concerns about fuel supplies and global
security, the growing threat of climate change
and other environmental crises, and significant
advances in renewable technologies and the
benefits they offer.7
Global oil production is expected to peak
early in this century. “In 20–25 years the
reserves of liquid hydrocarbons are beginning to go down so we have this window of
time to convert over to renewables,” according to Harry Shimp, president and chief executive officer of BP’s solar division. But of
greater concern to many is not when or if economically recoverable fossil fuel reserves will
be depleted, but the fact that the world cannot afford to use all the conventional energy
resources that remain.8
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, a body of approximately 2,000 scientists and economists who advise the United
Nations on climate change, has concluded
that global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
must be reduced at least 70 percent over the
next 100 years to stabilize atmospheric CO2
concentrations at 450 parts per million (ppm),
which would be 60 percent higher than preindustrial levels. The sooner societies begin to
make these reductions, the lower the impacts
and the associated costs—of both climate
change and emissions reductions—will be.
(See Box 5–1.) Because more than 80 percent
of human-made CO2 emissions are due to the
burning of fossil fuels, such reductions are not
possible without significant and rapid
improvements in energy efficiency and a shift
to renewable energy.9
Additional environmental costs of conventional energy production and use include
destruction wrought through resource extraction; air, soil, and water pollution; acid rain;
and biodiversity loss. Conventional energy
requires vast quantities of fresh water. Mining and drilling affect the way of life and the
very existence of indigenous peoples worldwide. In China, the environmental and health
costs of air pollution, due mainly to coal
burning, totaled approximately 7 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1995. The
World Bank estimates that under business as
usual, these costs could rise to 13 percent of
China’s GDP by 2020. After a decade-long
study, U.S. and European researchers calculated that the environmental and health costs
associated with conventional energy are equivFossil Fuels (64 percent)
Fossil Fuels (77 percent)
Nuclear (17 percent)
Nuclear (6 percent)
Source: IEA
Hydro and Traditional
Biomass (15 percent)
New Renewables
(2 percent)
Figure 5–1. World Energy Consumption
by Source, 2000
Source: IEA
Hydropower
(17 percent)
Other Renewables
(2 percent)
Figure 5–2. World Electricity
Generation by Type, 2000
87
BOX 5–1. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
In its 2001 report, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change found that “there is new
and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities” that have increased
atmospheric concentrations of CO2. Pre-industrial concentrations were 280 ppm; today they
are 371 ppm. Between 1990 and 2100, global
temperatures are projected to increase
between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees Celsius, and land
areas will likely warm faster than the global
average.To stabilize CO2 “at 450… ppm would
require global anthropogenic [human-made]
emissions to drop below 1990 levels, within a
few decades.” Even if greenhouse gas emissions
were to stabilize at present levels, it is expected
that average temperatures and sea level would
continue rising for centuries, but the rate of
change will slow once stabilization is achieved.
Under provisions of the Kyoto Protocol to
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, industrial countries must reduce their
CO2 emissions an average 5.2 percent below
alent to 1–2 percent of the European Union’s
annual GDP, and that the price paid for conventional energy is significantly lower than its
total costs. (See Table 5–1.) These estimates
do not include the costs of climate change—
potentially the most expensive consequence.
Global economic losses due to natural disasters, which are in line with events anticipated
as a result of global warming, appear to be
doubling with each decade, and annual losses
from such events are expected to approach
$150 billion over the next 10 years.10
The direct economic and security costs
associated with conventional energy are also
substantial. Nuclear power is one of the most
expensive means of generating electricity,
even without accounting for the risks of
nuclear accidents, weapons proliferation, and
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their 1990 levels by the end of the first “commitment period” (2008–12).The protocol will
enter into force 90 days after ratification by 55
countries accounting for at least 55 percent of
industrial-country 1990 CO2 emissions. As of
mid-October 2002, 96 nations had ratified
Kyoto, including the European Union and Japan,
representing 37.4 percent of industrial-country
emissions. Russia (17.4 percent) and Poland (3
percent) have officially declared their intention
to ratify it soon—which would raise the total
to 57.8 percent and thus bring the protocol
into effect.
The United States represents 25 percent of
current global emissions, and 36.4 percent of
industrial-country 1990 emissions. Its March
2001 withdrawal from negotiations on the protocol dealt a blow to international efforts to
battle climate change, but it also pushed the
rest of the world to move forward and reach
final agreement on the treaty in July 2001.
SOURCE: See
endnote 9.
problems associated with nuclear waste. Political, economic, and military conflicts over
limited resources such as oil will become
more significant as demand increases worldwide. Similarly, the price of fossil fuels will
become increasingly erratic as demand rises
and conflicts rage in oil-rich regions, which in
turn would affect the stability of economies
around the world. The economic costs of
relying on imported fuels are extremely
high—it is estimated that African countries
spend 80 percent of their export earnings on
imported oil. Likewise, the benefits of reducing imports can be significant. If not for
Brazil’s 25-year ethanol program, which now
displaces 220,000 barrels of oil per day, the
country’s foreign debt would be about $140
billion higher, according to one estimate.11
Table 5–1. Costs of Electricity With and
Renewable resources are genWithout External Costs
erally domestic, pose no fuel or
transport hazards, and are much
Electricity
Generating
External
Total
less vulnerable to terrorist attack.
Source
Costs 1
Costs 2
Costs
They can be installed rapidly and
(cents per kilowatt-hour)
in dispersed small- or large-scale
applications—getting power
Coal/lignite
4.3–4.8
2–15
6.3–19.8
quickly to areas where it is
Natural gas (new)
3.4–5.0
1–4
4.4–9.0
urgently needed, delaying investNuclear
10–14
0.2–0.7
10.2–14.7
Biomass
7–9
1–3
8–12
ment in expensive new electric
Hydropower
2.4–7.7
0–1
2.4–8.7
plants or power lines, and reducPhotovoltaics
25–50
0.6
25.6–50.6
ing investment risk. All renewWind
4–6
0.05–0.25
4.05–6.25
ables except biomass energy
1
avoid fuel costs and the risks
For the United States and Europe. 2 Environmental and health
costs for 15 countries in Europe.
associated with future fuel price
SOURCE: See endnote 10.
fluctuations. They pose significantly lower social, environmental, and health costs than conventional energy
Many of the jobs are high-wage and highfuels and technologies do.
tech, and require a range of skills, often in
Further, “renewables is not just about
areas that are rural or economically depressed.
energy and the environment but also about
Economic woes and high unemployment
manufacturing and jobs.” This ringing
rates influenced Spain’s 1994 decision to
endorsement came from U.K. Energy Mininvest in renewable energy. In Germany, the
ister Brian Wilson in July 2002, after the
wind industry has created 40,000 jobs, comcommissioning of a new 30-megawatt wind
pared with 38,000 in nuclear power—an
farm atop Beinn an Tuirc, a hill in the northindustry that generates 30 percent of Gerern reaches of Argylle, Scotland. The Kintyre
many’s electricity.13
Peninsula of Argylle once thrived on its fishA recent study in California concluded
eries, whiskey production, and textile manuthat increasing renewable energy technologies
in that state would create four times more jobs
facture. These traditional sources of
than continued operation of natural gas
employment are in decline, and now wind
plants, while keeping billions of dollars in
power is breathing new life into the region’s
California that would otherwise go to out-ofeconomy, generating enough electricity to
state power purchases. According to Goversupply 25,000 homes. A new turbine manunor Gray Davis, over a five-year period the net
facturing plant on the peninsula will provide
benefits of renewable energy, compared with
steady jobs and produce the first large-scale
business as usual, include $11 billion in ecowind turbines ever built in Britain.12
Using renewables stimulates local econnomic development benefits for California
because of associated job creation and inomies by attracting investment and tourist
state investments.14
money and by creating employment not only
in northern Scotland but elsewhere around
In developing countries such as Brazil and
the world. Renewable energy provides more
India, where millions of people lack access to
jobs per unit of capacity or output and per
power, renewables can provide electricity
dollar spent than conventional energies do.
more cheaply and quickly than the extension
89
of power lines and construction of new plants
could, and can aid in economic development.
Renewables are also sources of reliable power
for businesses in countries such as India where
power cuts are common. M. Kannappan,
India’s Minister of Non-Conventional Energy
Sources, has stated that renewables have
“enormous potential to meet the growing
requirements of the increasing populations of
the developing world, whilst offering sustainable solutions to the threat of global climate change.”15
The energy services delivered by renewables provide communities with access to
education, clean water, improved health care,
communications, and entertainment. These
resources, in turn, improve the quality of life
(particularly for women), raise living standards, increase productivity, and reduce the
potential for economic and political instability. In Inner Mongolia, thousands of people
now have access to education, information,
and other benefits for the first time thanks to
the use of televisions and radios powered by
small wind and solar systems. As a result,
they have become more productive and
increased their monthly household incomes
by as much as $150. (The average per capita
annual net income in Inner Mongolia ranges
from about $120 to $240.)16
Many of the components if not the entire
systems for solar homes, wind farms, and
other renewable technologies are now manufactured or assembled in developing countries, creating local jobs, reducing costs, and
keeping capital investments at home. China
and India have both developed domestic
wind turbine industries. Brazil’s ethanol program, begun in 1975, has created more than
1 million jobs while also bringing the nation’s
CO2 emissions 20 percent below what they
would have been otherwise. Brazil now
exports ethanol fuel and will soon begin
exporting its technologies as well. And in
90
Kenya, more than 100 firms (6 of them
domestic) provide PV systems or service,
with numerous companies selling solar home
systems in almost every town.17
Developing countries that invest in renewables will discover that they are energy-rich—
that they can leapfrog over dirty technologies
relied on earlier in industrial countries and can
develop their economies with clean, domestic, secure sources of energy that avoid longterm and costly imports.
In light of the many advantages of renewables, the Task Force on Renewable Energy
of the Group of Eight industrial countries
concluded in 2001 that “though there will be
a higher cost in the first decades, measured
solely in terms of the costs so far reflected in
the market, successfully promoting renewables over the period to 2030 will prove less
expensive than taking a ‘business as usual’
approach within any realistic range of discount rates.”18
State of the Technologies 2003
Since the 1970s and 1980s, renewable technologies have improved significantly in both
performance and cost. Some are experiencing
rates of growth and technology advancement
comparable only to the electronics industry.
Global clean energy markets exceeded $10
billion in 2001 and are expected to surpass
$82 billion by 2010, and major corporations
are entering the renewables marketplace—
including Royal Dutch/Shell, BP, and General Electric. Technical progress of many
renewables—particularly wind power—has
been faster than was anticipated even a few
years ago, and this trend is expected to continue. While costs are still a concern with
some technologies, these are falling rapidly
due to technological advances, learning by
doing, automated manufacturing, and
economies of scale through increased pro-
duction volumes.19
Solar and wind are the most commonly
known renewables, but inexhaustible energy
supplies are also offered by biomass; geothermal; hydropower; ocean energy from
the tides, currents, and waves; and ocean
thermal energy. This chapter principally
focuses on wind power and solar photovoltaics—which produce electricity from sunlight—because they are the fastest-growing
renewables and have the greatest potential for
helping all countries achieve more sustainable
development.
During the past 15–20 years, wind energy
technology has evolved to the point where it
competes with most conventional forms of
power generation. In many instances, wind is
now the cheapest option on a per-kilowatthour (kWh) basis. The main trends in wind
energy development are toward lighter, more
flexible blades, variable speed operation,
direct-drive generators, and taller machines
with greater capacity. The average turbine
size has increased from 100–200 kilowatts
(kW) in the early 1990s to more than 900 kW
today, making it possible to produce more
power with fewer machines. (One 900 kW
machine can provide the electricity needed for
about 540 European homes.) Turbines with
capacity ratings of 2,000–5,000 kW (2–5
MW) are being manufactured for use offshore. At the same time, small wind machines
that can be installed close to the point of
demand—atop buildings, for example—are
also under development. (See Box 5–2.)
Advances in turbine technology and power
electronics, along with a better understanding of siting needs and wind energy resources,
have combined to extend the lifetime of
today’s wind turbines, improve performance,
and reduce costs.20
Since the early 1980s, the average cost of
wind-generated electricity has fallen from
about 44¢ (in 2001 dollars) per kilowatt-
BOX 5–2. EXAMPLES OF ADVANCES
IN WIND TECHNOLOGY
• At the Rocky Flats test site in Colorado,
the U.S. Department of Energy is testing
a lightweight turbine with two blades
rather than the usual three. It is
expected to be 40 percent lighter than
today’s standard turbines, require less
material, and thus be 20–25 percent
cheaper.
• Vestas is now equipping offshore
turbines with sensors to detect wear
and tear on components, along with
backup systems in case of power electronic system failures.
• A turbine developed in Germany can
desalinate water, generate electricity, or
make hydrogen by electrolysis.
• Mathematical climatic models have been
developed in Germany and Denmark to
predict wind resources 24–36 hours in
advance with reasonable accuracy.This
will be important for managing wind
power as it reaches a high percentage of
the total electric system.
SOURCE: See
endnote 20.
hour to 4–6¢ at good wind sites. Costs vary
from one location to the next due primarily
to variations in wind speed and also to different institutional frameworks and interest
rates. Globally, wind costs have declined by
some 20 percent over just the past five years,
and the Danish turbine manufacturer Vestas
predicts that the generating costs of wind
energy will continue to drop annually by 3–5
percent. As this happens, it will become economical to site turbines in regions with lower
wind speeds, increasing the global potential
for wind-generated electricity. 21
Global wind capacity has grown at an aver91
age annual rate over 30 percent durMegawatts
25,000
ing the past decade. (See Figure
5–3.) An estimated 6,824 MW of
20,000
wind capacity were added worldwide in 2001, bringing the total to
15,000
more than 24,900 MW—enough to
provide power to approximately 14
10,000
million households. While Europe
accounts for more than 70 percent of
5,000
total capacity, wind is now generatSource: BTM, EWEA, AWEA, press reports
ing electricity in at least 45 countries.
0
Sales in 2001 surpassed $6 billion,
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
nearly double the total two years
Figure 5–3. Cumulative Global Wind
earlier, and it is estimated that more
Capacity, 1992–2001
than 100,000 people are now
cell phone towers. (See Chapter 2.) Further,
employed in the wind industry worldwide.22
The majority of turbines operating today
such problems have been mitigated in recent
are on land, but wind power is now moving
years through the use of painted blades,
offshore. This is due to a shortage of sites on
slower rotational speeds, tubular turbine towland, particularly in Europe, and the fact that
ers, and careful siting of projects.25
wind speeds offshore are significantly higher
Both wind and sun are intermittent
and more consistent. Stronger winds generresources, meaning they cannot be turned
ate more electricity, while consistency reduces
on and off as needed. But there is no guarwear and tear on machines. More than 80
antee that any resource will be available when
MW of turbines are now spinning offshore,
it is required, and utilities must have backup
all of them in Europe, with an additional
power for generation every day. Assessments
5,000 MW in the pipeline worldwide and
in Europe and the United States have conmore than 20,000 MW proposed for areas
cluded that intermittent sources can account
surrounding northern Europe.23
for up to 20 percent of an electric system
Experts estimate that onshore wind
without posing technical problems; higher
resources could provide more than four times
levels might demand minor changes in operational practices. The wind already provides
global electricity consumption. Offshore
electricity to the grid (transmission lines) that
resources are substantial as well. While some
greatly exceeds 20 percent in regions of Gerof that potential is too costly to exploit over
many, Denmark, and Spain, and distributed
the near term, the promise of large amounts
generation—for example, the use of solar
of wind power at competitive prices is enorpanels on rooftops, or clusters of turbines
mous.24
along the path of a power line—can improve
As with all energy technologies, there are
electric system reliability.26
disadvantages associated with wind power.
The environmental factor that has caused the
The challenges posed by intermittency are
most controversy and concern is bird mornot of immediate concern in most countries
tality. This is a site-specific problem, however,
and will be overcome with hybrid systems,
and it is relatively low compared with other
improvements in wind forecasting technology,
threats to birds such as vehicles, buildings, and
and further development of storage tech92
Megawatts
nologies. New storage technologies
2,000
could also help tap renewable
resources that are far from demand
centers. Furthermore, what is most
1,500
significant is the per kilowatt-hour
cost of electricity generated. Wind
1,000
power is already cost-competitive
with most conventional technologies. Solar PVs are likely to see dra500
matic cost reductions, and they
Source: Maycock
produce power in the middle of hot
0
summer days when demand is great1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
est and electricity costs are highest.27
Figure 5–4. Cumulative Global Photovoltaic
According to the U.S. National
Capacity, 1992–2001
Renewable Energy Laborator y
(NREL), PVs have the “potential to become
States, but there are growing markets and
one of the world’s most important indusmanufacturing bases in developing countries
tries.” The potential PV market is huge, rangas well, including China and India. Global PV
ing from consumer products (such as
output is expected to increase at annual rates
calculators and watches) and remote standof 40–50 percent over the next few years. As
alone systems for electricity and water pumplarger factories come into operation, manuing to grid-connected systems on buildings
facturers can increase the degree of automaand large-scale power plants.28
tion.30
Each year the sun delivers to Earth more
Such evolving industrial processes, along
than 10,000 times the energy that humans
with technological advances in PVs and
currently use. While PVs account for a small
economies of scale, have led already to sigshare of global electricity generation, they
nificant cost reductions. Since 1976, costs
have experienced dramatic growth over the
have dropped 20 percent for every doubling
past decade. Since 1996, global PV shipof installed PV capacity, or about 5 percent
ments have increased at an average annual rate
annually. PVs are now the cheapest option for
of 33 percent. It took nearly 30 years, up until
many remote or off-grid functions. When
1999, for the world to produce its first
used for facades of buildings, PVs can be
gigawatt (GW) of solar PVs (see Figure 5–4),
cheaper than other materials such as marble
but some experts expect a doubling as soon
or granite, with the added advantage of proas 2003. The PV industry generates business
ducing electricity. Currently, generating costs
worth more than $2 billion annually and
range from 25¢ to $1 per kWh, which is still
provides tens of thousands of jobs. More
extremely high, and cost remains the prithan a million households in the developing
mary barrier to more widespread use of solar
world now have electricity for the first time
PVs. But companies around the world are in
from solar PVs, while more than 100,000
a race to create future generations of products
households in industrial countries suppleto make PVs cost-competitive even for onment their utility power with PV systems.29
grid use. (See Box 5–3.)31
The production of solar cells is concenIn addition to cost, one of the primary
trated in Japan, Europe, and the United
concerns regarding PVs’ ability to meet a
93
BOX 5–3. THE SOLAR RACE
• An Australian company is the first to
manufacture solar PVs that can be
incorporated into glass walls of buildings.
When light falls on the glass from any
angle, it will generate electricity.
• The U.S. National Renewable Energy
Laboratory and Spectrolabs have developed a Triple-Junction Terrestrial Concentrator Solar Cell that is 34 percent
efficient and that can be manufactured
for less than $1 per watt, according to
NREL. (The maximum recorded laboratory efficiency is 24.7 percent, while the
average cost of today’s PVs is $5–12
per watt.)
• Spheral solar technology, being
developed in Canada, will bond tiny silicon beads into an aluminum foil.While
mass market application could take
decades, this technology could halve the
cost of power generation.
SOURCE: See
endnote 31.
major portion of global electricity demand is
the length of time they must operate to produce as much energy as was used to manufacture them. The energy “pay-back” period
for today’s cells in rooftop systems is one to
four years, with expected lifetimes of up to 30
years, depending on the technology. The
manufacture of PVs also requires a number of
hazardous materials, including many of the
chemicals and heavy metals used in the semiconductor electronics industry. There are
techniques and equipment to reduce environmental and safety risks, however, and
these problems are minimal compared with
those associated with conventional energy
technologies.32
Global markets for renewables such as
94
solar and wind power are only just beginning a dramatic expansion, starting from relatively low levels. It is useful to point out,
however, that despite increasing concerns
regarding safety and high costs, it took less
than 30 years for nuclear power to develop
into an industry that provides 16–17 percent of global electricity. The same can happen with renewable technologies. In fact,
during 2001 the nuclear industry added only
25 percent as much capacity to the grid as
wind did. If the average growth rates of wind
and solar PV over the past decade were to
continue to 2020, the world would have
about 48,000 MW of installed solar PV capacity and more than 2.6 million MW of wind—
equivalent to 78 percent of global electric
capacity in 2000, or about 45 percent of projected 2020 capacity. Such continued growth
is unlikely, but recent industry reports have
concluded that if the necessary institutional
framework is put in place, it is feasible for
wind to meet 12 percent of global electricity
demand by 2020 and for PVs to meet 26
percent by 2040.33
The German Story
When the 1990s began, Germany had virtually no renewable energy industry, and in the
view of most Germans the country was
unlikely ever to be in the forefront of these
alternative energy sources. Regulations governing the electricity sector, which dated
from the 1930s, granted utilities monopoly
rights to produce, distribute, and sell electricity. Utility opposition, entrenched nuclear
and coal industries, and a general tendency to
conservatism made Germany barren ground
for renewable energy advocates. Jochen
Twele, a German wind energy expert, recalls
that, “when I started my job on wind energy
in 1981, I thought that wind energy had
only a chance in remote areas of developing
countries. So I concentrated on Africa.” Due
to the strength of labor unions—traditionally
strategic partners with the Social Democratic
Party (known as SPD)—the indifference to
renewables in the German left was at least as
strong as it was among the industry-friendly
and strongly pro-nuclear Christian Democrats. Even today, utilities and the government maintain strong ties. For example, in the
state of North Rhine–Westphalia, many local
political representatives are board members of
the state utility company.34
Yet by the end of the 1990s, Germany
had been transformed into a renewable energy
leader. With a fraction as much potential in
wind and solar power as the United States,
Germany has almost three times as much
installed wind capacity (more than one third
of total global capacity) and is a world leader
in solar PVs as well. In the space of a decade,
Germany created a new, multibillion-dollar
industry and tens of thousands of new jobs.
This metamorphosis provides helpful lessons
for the scores of countries that have not yet
determined how to unleash the potential of
their own indigenous renewable energy
sources.
The German story began in the 1970s,
when high oil prices sparked a growing interest in alternative sources of energy and the
government began funding renewable energy
research and development (R&D). But the
resulting sporadic efforts were unsuccessful in
spurring commercial development. The major
political parties remained comfortable with
the strategy that nuclear power would be the
long-run replacement for fossil fuel plants.
All of this changed with the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant accident in 1986, which
led the public to turn firmly against nuclear
power and to begin a serious search for alternatives. For the first time, Germans began to
question their energy supply system. Two
years later, rising awareness of climate change,
brought on by record high temperatures and
mounting scientific evidence of humaninduced warming, heightened people’s concerns. In 1990, the German Bundestag
prepared a study on protecting Earth’s climate, with the goal of developing new strategies for a less risky (meaning less nuclear
power) and less carbon-intensive energy
future.35
In response to mounting public pressure,
in late 1990 the Bundestag passed a new
energy law that required utilities to purchase
the electricity generated from all renewable
technologies in their supply area, and to pay
a minimum price for it—at least 90 percent
of the retail price in the case of wind and
solar power. This new “Electricity Feed-in
Law” (EFL)—Stromeinspeisungsgesetz—
provided fair access and standard pricing for
new renewables. It was a dramatic break from
past regulation as it enabled private producers to sell their renewably generated electricity to utilities at a competitive price, and it
prevented electric utilities from further stalling
development.36
The German law was inspired in part by
similar policies that had proved effective in
Denmark. It was strongly supported by owners of small hydropower plants in southern
mountainous areas of Germany and by farmers on the northern plains who envied their
Danish neighbors’ ability to profitably install
wind turbines and sell their power. These
conservative Christian Democrat supporters
of renewables were joined by Social Democrats and Greens who favored legislation to
protect the environment and create a market
for renewable energy. Hermann Scheer, a
Social Democrat in the Bundestag who is
considered one of the “fathers” of German
renewable energy policy, also played an important role by helping to draft and push through
the revolutionary one-page EFL. For their
part, the coal industry and electric utilities did
95
not take renewables seriously, and chose not
to actively oppose the legislation, and the
law was adopted unanimously by the German
Bundestag.37
Wind energy development began a steady
and dramatic surge soon after the EFL
entered into force on 1 January 1991. Farmers, small investors, and start-up manufacturers created a new industry from scratch,
and a growing number of turbines rose up
from the flat plains of the northern coast
where the wind blows strongest.
The average cost of manufacturing
wind turbines in Germany fell by 43
percent between 1990 and 2000.
Because most of the initial wind development was in the north, the coastal states and
their utilities bore the greatest financial burden for Germany’s renewable energy projects. The strong regional variations fostered
opposition to the law and to wind power
itself among utilities and conservative factions of the German government, leading to
efforts to declare the EFL unconstitutional.
But there was increasing support for renewables as well. In September 1997, 5,000 people flocked to the streets of Bonn to rally in
favor of wind power and continuation of the
EFL. Opponents failed to overturn the law,
although it was amended in 1998 to set a cap
on electricity generated by renewable energy.38
The 5 percent cap, combined with falling
electricity prices (and thus declining payments for renewable electricity) due to deregulation of the market, threatened the viability
of existing and planned renewable energy
projects. This was of great concern not only
to renewable energy developers and producers, but also to major German financial institutions that were underwriting these projects.
In response, the Bundestag adopted the
96
Renewable Energy Law (REL) in April
2000.39
The Renewable Energy Law removed the
cap on renewables, and required that renewable electricity be distributed among all suppliers based on their total electricity sales,
ensuring that no one region would be overly
burdened. The law also required companies
that operate the transmission system to pay
the costs of connection to the electric grid,
eliminating barriers that arose when utilities
discouraged wind development through
inflated connection charges. Perhaps most
important, it established specific per kilowatt-hour payments for each renewable technology based on the real costs of generation.
Electric utilities qualify for these payments as
well, a change driven by liberalization of the
electricity sector, which the government correctly expected would reduce utility opposition while further stimulating the renewables
market.40
Although the vote on this new law was not
unanimous, broad support from the German
public—including labor unions, farmers, environmentalists, and renewable industries—
enabled the SPD-Green coalition to push it
through Parliament. Again, utilities challenged the law, claiming that it was a subsidy
and not legal within the European Union.
The government responded that preferential payments for renewable energy were
intended to internalize the costs of conventional energy and compensate for the benefits of renewables. In March 2001, the
European Court of Justice ruled that the
payments were not state aid and therefore not
a subsidy. Utilities have since realized that
they, too, can benefit from the REL.41
After the first access and pricing law was
enacted, some barriers to wind energy
remained. A major obstacle to German wind
development in the mid-1990s was lengthy,
inconsistent, and complex procedures for sit-
ing wind turbines. As the number of turbines installed in some regions began to skyrocket, local opposition to wind power started
to emerge as well. The German government
responded by encouraging communities to
zone specific areas for wind—a step that both
addressed issues that created opposition to
wind power, such as noise and concern about
aesthetic impacts, and assured prospective
turbine owners that they would find sites for
their machines.
Worldwide, one of the major barriers to
renewable technologies has been the high
initial capital costs of these projects. Thus
the cost of borrowing plays a major role in the
viability of renewable energy markets. Germany addressed this through low-interest
loans offered by major banks and refinanced
by the federal government. In addition,
income tax credits granted only to projects
and equipment that meet specified standards
have enabled people to take tax deductions
against their investments in renewable energy
projects. Over the years, these credits have
drawn billions of dollars to the wind industry. The combination of these two policies and
the access and pricing laws has enabled a
diverse group of Germans to invest in wind
power, leading to significant increases in
installed capacity, associated jobs, and a broad
base of political support for the industry.42
In the late 1980s, before the access and
pricing laws and investment tax credits, the
German government established a small, subsidized demonstration program that was
inspired by Denmark’s experiences, in an
effort to change its approach to R&D. The
program offered a one-time investment rebate
or an on-going production payment to people who installed wind turbines, in exchange
for participation in a long-term measurement
and evaluation effort. It funded the installation of only 350 MW, a fraction of today’s
total wind capacity, but was significant because
it encouraged wind development and enabled
German manufacturers to sell their machines
at higher prices to finance internal R&D.
The program has also made it possible for the
German government to track and publish
years of useful data on capacity, generation,
and operation of wind machines, which continues to this day. 43
Several state governments have offered
incentives for renewable projects, have funded
studies of onshore wind potential, and have
established institutes to collect and publish
wind energy data. The federal government
recently carried out an offshore resource
study, and has advanced awareness about
renewable technologies through architectural, engineering, and other relevant vocational training programs, as well as through
publications on the potential of renewables
and available subsidies.44
Although all these policies have played an
important role, the fair access and standard
pricing laws (EFL and REL) have had the
greatest impact on Germany’s renewables
industries, particularly wind power. They
ended uncertainties regarding whether producers could sell their electricity into the grid
and at what price, and they provided investor
confidence—making it easier for even small
producers to obtain bank loans and drawing
investment money into the industries.
Increased investment drove improvements
in technology, advanced learning and experience, and produced economies of scale that
have led to dramatic cost reductions. The
average cost of manufacturing turbines in
Germany fell by 43 percent between 1990
and 2000. As a result, it became more profitable to install turbines in areas with lower
wind speeds, thereby distributing turbines
more evenly around Germany and reducing
conflicts with competing land uses.45
German wind capacity mushroomed from
56 MW at the beginning of 1991 to more
97
than 6,100 MW a decade later, with additions
increasing steadily each year. Wind capacity
was expected to reach nearly 12,000 MW by
the end of 2002, meeting 3.75 percent of
Germany’s electricity needs. In northern
reaches of the country, where most of the
development is concentrated, wind power
provides as much as 26 percent of annual
electricity needs, close to nuclear power’s
share for Germany as a whole. Some 40,000
people work in Germany’s wind industry,
producing turbines for domestic use and
export. So many Germans own shares in turbines or work in the industry that there is now
broad public support for wind power.46
Germany has promoted solar energy with
policies similar to those for wind power.
Incentives to encourage PVs began in 1991
with the 1,000 Roofs program, which like the
early wind programs offered support in
exchange for ongoing evaluation and monitoring of systems. It was upgraded in 1999 to
100,000 Roofs, a five-year program that offers
10-year low-interest loans to individuals and
businesses for installation of solar PVs. Since
1992, PVs have experienced an average
annual growth rate of nearly 49 percent. Germany surpassed the United States in 2001,
ending the year with 192 MW of capacity,
most of which is on-grid. When the 100,000
Solar Roofs program expires at the end of
2003, it is expected that Germany’s PV capacity could reach nearly 440 MW.47
By lowering the cost of capital, the
100,000 Solar Roofs program effectively
reduced the price of PV installation by 37 percent. Combined with the mandated payments
of 45¢ per kWh under the REL, this program
has had a major impact on the PV market.
Total PV system prices have fallen 39 percent
over the past decade, and full-time jobs in the
PV industry have more than quadrupled, to
6,000, since 1995. To meet rapidly rising
demand, major German manufacturers plan
98
to expand PV manufacturing facilities significantly over the next five years, which will
further reduce costs and increase employment.48
Germany has pledged to reduce its CO2
emissions 21 percent below 1990 levels by
2010, and the nation will accomplish much
of this through increased use of renewable
energy. Total renewable energy revenues in
Germany and electricity produced by renewable sources both increased 35 percent
between 2000 and 2001. For the longer
term, the German government aims for wind
to generate 25 percent of electricity needs by
2025, with 20,000–25,000 MW of capacity
offshore, and considers solar PVs as a viable
long-term option for large-scale power generation.49
Policy Lessons From
Around the World
It is difficult to claim that something is impossible once it has already occurred. This is
why it is globally significant that the world’s
third largest economy, a country with no tradition of renewable energy development, was
able to transform itself from laggard to leader
in less than a decade. What Germany has
accomplished can be replicated elsewhere—
if a successful mix of policies is in place.
The main obstacles that have kept new
renewables from producing more than a small
share of energy in most of the world, despite
their tremendous advantages and potential,
are lack of access to the grid, high cost, lack
of information, and biased, inappropriate,
and inconsistent government policies. Germany’s dramatic success over the past decade
stems from a range of policies introduced to
address all these barriers. The experiences of
Germany and other countries provide an
array of promising policy options that can
be disseminated around the world.
There are five major categories of relevant
policies:
• regulations that govern capacity access to
the grid and utility obligations,
• financial incentives,
• education and information
dissemination,
• stakeholder involvement, and
• industry standards and permitting.
There is not necessarily a direct link
between these policy types and the four obstacles just described, as some of the policy
options tackle a combination of barriers. An
additional critical element is the need for a
general change in government perspective
and approach to energy policy.
As Germany’s experience demonstrates,
access to the grid is imperative for renewables
to gain a foothold. Three main types of regulatory policies have been used to open the
grid to renewables. One guarantees price,
another ensures market share (mandated targets), and the third guarantees utility purchase
of excess electricity from small-scale, distributed systems. The first is the fair access and
standard pricing law. The marriage of a guaranteed market and long-term minimum payments has reduced the risks associated with
investing in renewables, making it profitable
to invest in wind, solar, and other technologies and easier to obtain financing. By creating demand for renewable electricity, the
access and pricing law has attracted private
investment for R&D, has spread the costs of
technology advancement and diffusion relatively evenly across a nation’s population,
and has enabled the scale-up in production
and experience in installation, operation, and
maintenance needed to bring down the costs
of renewable technologies and the power
they produce.
Laws similar to Germany’s access and pricing law have been enacted in Denmark, Spain,
and several other European countries, includ-
ing France, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. When
Spain passed an access and pricing law in
1994, relatively few wind turbines were spinning in the Spanish plains or mountains; by
the end of 2000, the country ranked third in
the world for wind installations, surpassed
only by Germany and the United States.
Spain now generates 2 percent of its electricity
with the wind—but more than 20 percent in
some regions—and is home to the world’s
second largest wind turbine manufacturer.50
While fair access and standard pricing laws
establish the price and let the market determine capacity and generation, mandated targets work in reverse—the government sets a
target and lets the market determine the
price. (See Box 5–4.) A mandated capacity target, called a Renewables Portfolio Standard
(RPS), is primarily responsible for the rapid
growth of wind energy in Texas since 1999,
when the state required that 2,000 MW of
additional renewable capacity be installed
within a decade. Texas was more than halfway
there with wind alone by mid-2002, and the
target will likely be met before 2009. But
the mandates have done little to encourage
the use of more expensive technologies such
as solar PVs, despite vast solar resources in
Texas. Nationwide, about a third of the 50
states have RPS laws, many of them with less
success than Texas.51
The United Kingdom passed legislation on
mandated targets in 1989. Between 1990
and 1998, renewable energy developers competed for contracts to provide electric capacity in a series of bidding rounds. While this
system made it easier to obtain financing and
drove wind costs down through competition, it created major problems. The bidding
system led to flurries of activity followed by
long lulls with no development, making it difficult to build a domestic turbine manufacturing industry and infeasible for small firms
or cooperatives to take part. In addition,
99
BOX 5–4. RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGETS
Although no agreement was reached at the
World Summit on Sustainable Development on
numerical targets for new renewables with specific deadlines, countries around the world are
setting their own targets.“Targets” can be goals
or obligations.They can be highly effective if
used to guide policies that encourage the use
of renewables. But targets alone achieve little.
For example, renewable energy targets for
capacity and generation have been set in the
United States since the mid-1970s, often in federal legislation, but rarely achieved.An extreme
example is President Jimmy Carter’s goal for
wind energy to produce 500 billion kWh of
electricity by 2000—actual wind generation
reached only about 1 percent of this target.
Germany, on the other hand, has exceeded
most if not all of its targets to date. Denmark
has also set national targets, or goals, for wind
and other renewables since the country’s earliest national energy plans, nearly three decades
ago.Time and again, Denmark’s targets for wind
competition to reduce costs and win contracts led developers to seek sites with the
highest wind speeds, which are often also
areas of scenic beauty. This increased public
opposition to wind energy and made it more
difficult to obtain project permits. When the
program ended in late 1999, more than 2,670
MW of wind capacity were under contract,
but only 344 MW had been installed.52
Another option used in a number of countries, including Japan, Thailand, Canada, and
several states in the United States, permits
consumers to install small renewable systems
at their homes or businesses and then to sell
excess electricity into the grid. This “net
metering” is different from the access and
pricing laws in Europe primarily in scale and
implementation. In the United States, 36
states—including California and Texas—had
100
energy have been surpassed: for example, in
1981, the national energy plan called for wind
to generate 10 percent of the nation’s electricity by 2000; this target was met three years
early. In 1999 the government aimed to double
the nation’s share of electricity generated by
renewables to 20 percent by the beginning of
2003, a goal that has been met with wind alone.
The current energy plan aims for renewable
resources to meet 35 percent of Denmark’s
energy needs by 2030 in order to meet ambitious CO2 emissions reduction targets. Such
policies send strong signals to the market,
announcing that the wind industry is a good
place to invest for the long term. But targets in
Denmark and Germany have had meaning only
because appropriate, consistent, long-term policies have been enacted to achieve them. Unfortunately, changes in Danish policies since 1999
could jeopardize existing targets.
SOURCE: See
endnote 51.
net metering laws by mid-2002, with varying
degrees of success. Neither California nor
Texas saw much benefit for wind power, let
alone for more costly renewables like solar
PVs, until other incentives were added to
the mix. Success in attracting new renewable
energy investments and capacity depends on
limits set on participation (capacity caps,
number of customers, or share of peak
demand); on the price paid, if any, for net
excess generation; on the existence of gridconnection standards; on enforcement mechanisms; and on other available incentives.
Mandated targets and net metering can be
used simultaneously.53
Of all these regulatory options, the fair
access and standard pricing laws have consistently proved to be the most successful. While
more than 45 countries have installed wind
capacity during the
Megawatts
3,500
1990s, just three—GerSource: Gipe, AWEA,
Germany
(est)
3,000
many, Denmark, and
BWE, Wagner, IDAE
United States
Spain—accounted for
2,500
Spain
more than 59 percent
2,000
of total additions for the
1,500
period 1991 through
1,000
(est)
2001. More than 80
percent of the 1,388
500
(est)
MW of wind capacity
0
installed worldwide dur–500
ing the first half of 2002
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
was located in three
Figure 5–5. Wind Power Capacity Additions in Germany, Spain,
countries with guaranand the United States, 1980–2002
teed minimum prices—
Germany, Spain, and
Italy. (See Figure 5–5.)54
ping center developers flocked to the wind
Financial incentives, the second category
business, and untested designs were rushed
of policies, directly reduce the costs of renewinto production—all to take advantage of
able energy. Market compensation in the
credits that enabled wealthy investors to
form of tax credits, rebates, and payments
recoup anywhere from 66 to 95 percent of
subsidizes investment in a technology or the
their investment over the first few years, in
production of power. (See Box 5–5.) This has
some cases without even generating a kilobeen used extensively in Europe, Japan, the
watt-hour of power.56
United States, and India (the only developA decade later, India saw a similar boom,
ing country that has enacted tax credits to
due to a combination of investment tax creddate).55
its, financing assistance, and accelerated depreIn the early 1980s, the initial capital costs
ciation. India is now the world’s fifth largest
of renewable projects were far higher than
producer of wind power and has developed
they are today. To encourage investment in
a domestic manufacturing industry. As in
renewables, the U.S. government and CaliCalifornia, however, investment-based subfornia offered investors credit against their
sidies and a lack of turbine standards or proincome tax, making it possible for people to
duction requirements led wealthy investors to
recoup a significant share of their money in
use wind farms as tax shelters, and several
the first few years and reducing their level of
projects experienced poor performance
despite the significant technology advancerisk. The credits played a major role in a wind
ments since the early 1980s. In both cases,
boom that many called California’s second
wind energy markets and industries slowed
gold rush. The lessons learned and economies
of scale gained through this experience
considerably when investment credits
advanced wind technology and reduced its
expired.57
costs. But enormous tax breaks and a lack of
Japan has provided investment subsidies
technology standards encouraged fraud and
through rebates and has seen dramatic success
the use of substandard equipment. Inexperiwith PVs. As with the early wind subsidies in
enced financial companies and former shopGermany and a similar effort in Denmark, PV
101
BOX 5–5. THE CASE FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES
While some observers argue that incentives to encourage the development and
use of renewables are costly and unnecessary, market compensation is warranted
for several reasons. First, it begins to
account for the environmental, social, and
security costs of conventional energy that
are not incorporated into the price of the
energy. Second, nuclear power and fossil
fuels have feasted on decades of subsidies,
and in most cases continue to receive far
more subsidies than renewables, creating
an uneven “playing field.” Renewables have
been competing against moving targets, as
continued subsidies and research for conventional energy have reduced their costs
as well.As a result, renewables are behind
on the learning curve and need compensation in order to close the gap. German
parliamentarian Hermann Scheer has
noted that “no energy source was ever
established without political support. Policy support for the initiation of renewable
energy is a matter of market fairness for
abolishing the existing bias.” Finally, the
electricity sector in most countries is governed by regulations that were enacted to
aid in the development of conventional
electric systems and now favor them at
the expense of renewables.
SOURCE: See
endnote 55.
users receive a rebate in return for providing
data about system operations. By 2000, the
Japanese government was investing $200
million annually in this program. The goal was
to create market awareness and stimulate PV
production in order to reduce costs through
economies of scale and technology improvements, and thereby enable large-scale power
generation and the export of PVs to the rest
102
of the world. And the policy has succeeded.
Total capacity has increased an average of
more than 41 percent annually since 1992,
and Japan now leads the world in the manufacture and use of solar PVs, having surpassed
the United States at both in the late 1990s.
(See Figure 5–6.) To keep up with demand,
Japanese PV manufacturers have dramatically
increased their production capacity. As a
result, PV system costs in Japan have dropped
75 percent since the mid-1990s, and Sharp is
now the world’s leading producer of solar
cells.58
Since 1994, the U.S. government has
offered a production tax credit for people
who supply wind-generated electricity to the
grid. The credit has encouraged wind development, but only in those states with additional incentives, and it provides greater
benefit to those with higher income levels and
tax loads. California has enacted a production
incentive that awards a per kWh payment,
rather than a tax credit, for existing and new
wind projects. The program has kept 4,400
MW of existing renewable capacity online
and led to the development of another 1,300
MW. It is financed through a small per kWh
charge on electricity use, meaning that Californians share the cost of the program according to the amount of power they consume.
Provided that such payments are high enough
to cover the costs of renewable generation and
are guaranteed over a long enough time
period, this policy is a possible alternative to
the fair access and standard pricing law—
similar in effect and perhaps more politically
feasible in some countries.59
Experiences to date demonstrate that payments and rebates are preferable to tax credits. Unlike tax credits, the benefits of payments
and rebates are equal for people of all income
levels. In addition, investment grants result in
more even growth over time rather than
encouraging people to invest at the end of tax
Megawatts
periods (as tax credits tend to do). Fur500
ther, production incentives are generally
Source: PVPS, EPI
Japan
preferable to investment subsidies
400
United States
because they promote the desired outcome—generation of electricity. They
300
are most likely to encourage optimum
performance and a sustained industry.
200
However, policies must be tailored to
particular technologies and stages of
100
maturation. Investment subsidies in the
form of tax credits or, preferably, rebates
0
can be helpful when a technology is
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
still maturing and relatively expensive,
Figure 5–6. Cumulative Photovoltaic Capacity
as seen with PVs in Japan.60
in Japan and the United States, 1992–2001
Financing assistance in the form of
low-interest, long-term loans and loan guarterms of long-term, low-interest loans vary by
antees is also essential to overcome barriers
technology, with the most favorable ones
due to the high up-front capital costs of
being for PVs. Through small-scale lending
renewables. Lowering the cost of capital can
programs, even low-income people are able
bring down the average cost of electricity
to purchase small systems. In addition, the
and reduce the risk of investment, as seen in
national government has worked to obtain
Germany. Even in the developing world, all
bilateral and multilateral funding for largebut the very poorest people are able and willscale projects, particularly wind.62
ing to pay for reliable energy services, and the
Information dissemination is the third key
rate of on-time payment is extremely high.
policy component. Even if a government
But the poor also need access to low-cost
offers generous incentives and low-cost capcapital and the opportunity to lease systems.61
ital, people will not invest in renewable energy
One of the most successful means for disif they lack information regarding resource
seminating household-scale renewable techavailability, technology development, the
nologies in rural China has been through
numerous advantages and potential of renewlocal public-private bodies that offer such
ables, the fuel mix of the energy they use, and
services as technical support, materials sale,
the incentives themselves. During the 1980s,
subsidies, and government loans for locally
several states in the United States offered
manufactured technology. These bodies fresubstantial subsidies for wind energy—including a 100 percent tax credit in Arkansas, a
quently provide revolving credit, with repaystate with enough wind to generate half of its
ment linked to the timing of a household’s
electricity. But these subsidies evoked little
income stream—for example, payments come
interest due to a lack of knowledge about
due after crops have been harvested. As a
result of this program more than 140,000
wind resources. By contrast, it was wind
small wind turbines, producing power for
resource studies in California, Hawaii, and
more than a half-million people, have been
Minnesota that led to interest in wind energy
installed in Inner Mongolia—the greatest
there.63
number of household-scale wind plants operPast experiences—from failed Californian
ating anywhere in the world. In India, the
wind projects in the 1980s to early develop-
103
ment projects in Africa—or lack of experience
have left people in much of the world with a
perception that renewables do not work, are
inadequate to meet their needs, are too expensive, or are too risky as investments. Above all,
it is essential that government leaders recognize the inherent value of renewable energy.
Then governments, nongovernmental organizations, and industry must work together
to educate labor organizations about employment benefits, architects and city planners
about ways to incorporate renewables into
building projects and their value to local
communities, agricultural communities about
their potential to increase farming incomes,
and so on. In India, the government’s Solar
Finance Capacity Building Initiative educates
Indian bank officials about solar technologies
and encourages them to invest in projects.
The Indian government has also used print,
radio, songs, and theater to educate the public about the benefits of renewable energy
and government incentives, and has established training programs.64
Knowledge is power, as the saying goes,
and disseminating information about renewables far and wide will beget more renewable
power. At the local, national, and international
levels, it is essential to share information
regarding technology performance and cost,
capacity and generation statistics, and policy
successes and failures in order to increase
awareness and to avoid reinventing the wheel
each time. While several countries now do this
on a national level, a centralized global clearinghouse for such information is clearly
needed.
A fourth strategy that has increased support for renewables—particularly wind
power—is encouraging individual and cooperative ownership. In Germany and Denmark, where individuals singly or as members
of cooperatives still own most of the turbines
installed, there is strong and broad public
104
support for wind energy. Farmers, doctors,
and many others own turbines or shares of
wind farms, and stand beside labor and environmental groups in backing policies that
support wind power. The largest offshore
wind farm in the world as of late 2002—the
40 MW Middelgrunden project off the coast
of Copenhagen—is co-owned by a utility and
several thousand Danes who have purchased
shares in the project. Through cooperatives,
people share in the risks and benefits of wind
power; often avoid the problems associated
with obtaining financing and paying interest;
play a direct role in the siting, planning, and
operation of machines; and gain a sense of
pride and community. Several surveys have
demonstrated that those who own shares of
projects and those living closest to wind turbines view wind power more positively than
those who have no economic interest or experience with it.65
Public participation and a sense of ownership are as important in the South as in
the North. When technologies are “forced”
on people without consultation regarding
their needs or desires or are donated as part
of an aid package, people often place little
value on them and do not feel they have a
stake in maintaining them. On the flip side,
when individuals and communities play a role
in decisionmaking and ownership, they are literally empowered and become invested in
the success of the technologies.
The fifth essential ingredient in the policy
package is industry standards—ranging from
technology certification to siting and permitting requirements. Germany established an
investment tax credit for wind energy in 1991,
and while it too has been abused as a tax
loophole for the wealthy, Germany has
avoided the quality control problems experienced in California and India by enacting
turbine standards and certification requirements. Standards can include everything from
turbine blades, electronics, and safety systems to performance and compatibility with
the transmissions system. Denmark adopted
wind turbine standards in 1979, largely due
to pressure from the wind industry itself.
The sharing of information among turbine
owners and manufacturers and the Danish
technology standards program have combined to enable manufacturers to recognize
and address problems with their technologies
and to create pride in Danish machines. Standards prevent substandard technologies from
entering the marketplace and generate greater
confidence in the product, reducing risk.
They are credited with playing a major role
in Denmark’s rise to become the world’s
leading turbine manufacturer. Eventually,
technology standards should be established at
the international level.66
Standards and planning requirements can
also reduce opposition to renewables if they
address other potential issues of concern,
such as noise and visual or environmental
impacts. Siting or planning laws can be used
to set aside specific locations for development or to restrict areas at higher risk of
environmental damage or injury to birds, for
example. Both Germany and Denmark have
required municipalities to reserve specific
areas for wind turbines and have set restrictions on proximity to buildings and lakes,
among other things. These policies have been
extremely successful, reducing uncertainty
about if and where turbines can be sited and
expediting the planning process. The United
Kingdom offers the best example of how the
lack of planning regulations can paralyze an
industr y. Despite having the best wind
resources in Europe, the nation added little
wind capacity under its renewables obligation
regulations, in great part because a lack of
planning regulations virtually halted the
process for obtaining planning and environmental permits.67
Perhaps the most important step governments can take to advance renewables is to
make a comprehensive change in their perspective and approach to energy policy. Governments need to eliminate inappropriate,
inconsistent, and inadequate policies that
favor conventional fuels and technologies
and that fail to recognize the social, environmental, and economic advantages of
renewable energy. Fossil fuels and nuclear
power have received the lion’s share of government support to date, and continue to
get $150–300 billion a year in subsidies
worldwide. Most of these subsidies—80–90
percent by some estimates—are found in the
developing world, where the price for energy
is often set well below the true costs of production and delivery. Even relatively small
subsidies in developing countries for kerosene
and diesel can discourage the use of renewable energy.68
Every dollar spent subsidizing
conventional energy is a dollar not
invested in clean, secure renewable energy.
Mature technologies and fuels should not
require subsidization, and every dollar spent
on conventional energy is a dollar not invested
in clean, secure renewable energy. These subsidies should either be eliminated or shifted
to wind, solar PVs, and other renewable technologies. Pricing structures must account for
the significant external costs of conventional
energy and the advantages of renewable
energy, as Germany has begun to do through
the Renewable Energy Law and other countries are doing with energy or carbon taxes.
As the single largest consumers of energy in
most, if not all, countries, governments
should purchase ever-larger shares of energy
from renewables and thereby set an example,
increase public awareness, reduce perceived
105
risks associated with renewable technologies,
and reduce costs through economies of scale.
At the international level, the Global Environment Facility has allocated $650 million
to renewable energy projects in developing
countries since 1992. However, this is but a
small fraction of global investments in carbonintensive energy projects through international financial institutions like the World
Bank and taxpayer-funded export credit agencies. According to one study, between 1992
and 1998, the World Bank Group put 100
times more money into fossil fuels than it
did in renewables. Even a small shift in
resources would have a tremendous impact on
renewables industries and markets, although
more than a small shift is needed.69
The United States is the only country
to have seen a decline in total wind
generating capacity over the last decade.
Policies enacted to advance renewable
energy can slow the transition if they are not
well formulated or are inconsistent, piecemeal, or unsustained. For example, because
early investment credits in California were
short-lived and extensions were often uncertain, many equipment manufacturers could
not begin mass production for fear that credits would end too soon. When incentives
expired, interest waned and the industries
and markets died with them. In the case of
wind power, the impact was felt as far away
as Denmark, which relied on selling its turbines in California. The U.S. Production Tax
Credit for wind energy has been allowed to
expire several times, only to be extended
months later. As a result, the credit has stimulated wind capacity growth but has created
cycles of boom and bust in the market.70
This on-and-off approach to renewables
has caused significant uncertainties, bank106
ruptcies, and other problems and has made
the development of a strong industry in the
United States a challenge, at best. Indeed, the
United States is the only country to have
seen a decline in total wind generating capacity over the last decade. In India, uncoordinated, inconsistent state policies and
bottlenecks imposed by state electricity boards
have acted as barriers to renewables development. Even in Denmark, years of successful wind energy growth ended in 1999 when
the government changed course, and uncertainty overtook years of investor confidence.
The future of some planned offshore wind
farms is now uncertain, as is Denmark’s target to produce half its electricity with wind by
2030.71
Consistent policy environments are necessary for the health of all industries. Consistency is critical for ensuring stability in the
market, enabling the development of a
domestic manufacturing industry, reducing
the risk of investing in a technology, and
making it easier to obtain financing. It is also
cheaper. Government commitment to
develop renewable energy markets and industries must be strong and long-term (see Box
5–6), just as it has been with fossil fuels and
nuclear power.72
Unlocking Our Energy Future
Renewable energy has come of age. After
more than a decade of double-digit growth,
renewable energy is a multibillion-dollar
global business. Wind power is leading the
way in many nations, generating more than
20 percent of the electricity needs in some
regions and countries, and is cost-competitive
with many conventional energy technologies. Solar cells are already the most affordable option for getting modern energy
services to hundreds of millions of people in
developing countries. Renewable energy can
BOX 5–6. FORGING A NEW ENERGY FUTURE
• Enact renewable energy policies that are consistent, long-term, and flexible, with enough lead
time to allow industries and markets to adjust
• Emphasize renewable energy market creation.
• Provide access to the electric grid and standardized payments that cover the costs of generation
with policies similar to the fair access and standard pricing laws used in much of Europe.
• Provide financing assistance to reduce up-front costs through long-term, low-interest loans,
through production payments for more advanced technologies, and through investment rebates
for more expensive technologies such as solar PV, with gradual phaseout.
• Disseminate information regarding resource availability, the benefits and potential of renewable
energy, capacity and generation statistics, government incentives, and policy successes and failures
on local, national, and international levels.
• Encourage individual and cooperative ownership of renewable energy projects, and ensure that
all stakeholders are involved in the decisionmaking process.
• Establish standards for performance, safety, and siting.
• Incorporate all costs into the price of energy, and shift government subsidies and purchases from
conventional to renewable energies.
generate electricity, can heat and cool space,
can do mechanical work such as water pumping, and can produce fuels—in other words,
everything that conventional energy does.73
Renewable technologies are now attracting the funds of venture capitalists and multinational corporations alike. The major oil
companies BP and Royal Dutch/Shell have
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in
renewable energy development. While this
is a fraction of what they devote to oil and gas,
it is a move in the right direction. BP currently
has 20 percent of the global market share
for solar cells and plans to enlarge its solar
business to $1 billion by 2007, while Shell
intends to become an industry leader in offshore wind energy. Commitments from major
firms to invest in renewable energy over the
next few years total at least $10–15 billion,
and clean energy investment worldwide is
expected to increase more than eightfold
between 2001 and 2010, to over $80 billion
annually.74
As a result of such investments, the use of
renewable energy is expanding rapidly. If current growth rates continue, economies of
scale and additional private investments in
R&D and manufacturing capability will
achieve further dramatic cost reductions,
making renewable energy even more affordable in both North and South. A classic example of the impacts of scale economies and
learning is Ford’s Model T car, which declined
in price by two thirds between 1909 and
1923 as production increased from 34,000 to
2.7 million. A simple calculation shows that
if wind power continues to grow at the pace
of the past decade, it will exceed 2.6 million
MW by 2020. At that level, wind energy
alone would provide nearly three times as
much electricity as nuclear power does today.75
Whether growth continues at this level
107
will hinge largely on policy decisions by governments around the world. The growth of
the past decade has occurred because of substantial policy changes in a half-dozen countries, and those nations alone are not large
enough to sustain the needed growth at the
global level. But recent developments suggest
that political support for renewables is rising
around the world.
The European Union has a goal of
having renewables generate 22 percent
of Europe’s electricity by 2010.
One example is Europe, where the wind
power industry is now centered. Tony Blair,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
which so far has been a European straggler on
renewables, calls his nation’s investment in
renewable energy technology “a major downpayment in our future” that will “open up
huge commercial opportunities.” And the
European Union has adopted the goal of
having renewables generate 22 percent of
Europe’s electricity by 2010. Developing
countries such as China and India have
recently strengthened their renewable energy
policies, and Brazil is leading the way in Latin
America with a comprehensive and ambitious renewable energy law. Even in the
United States, despite an oil-oriented White
House, nearly half the members of Congress
have joined the Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency Caucus. Although this
political support has not yet translated into the
needed federal legislation, many states—
including Arizona, California, Nevada, and
Texas—have enacted pioneering laws in recent
years.76
Despite the substantial strides being made
in technology, investment, and policy, renewables continue to face a “credibility gap.”
Many people remain unconvinced that renew108
able energy could one day be harnessed on a
scale that would meet most of the world’s
energy needs. Renewable energy sources
appear too ephemeral and sparsely distributed to provide the energy required by a
modern post-industrial economy. But those
assumptions are outdated. In the words of
Paul Appleby of BP’s solar division, “the natural flows of energy are so large relative to
human needs for energy services that renewable energy sources have the technical potential to meet those needs indefinitely.”77
The Group of Eight Renewable Energy
Task Force projects that in the next decade up
to a billion people could be served with
renewable energy. BP and Shell have predicted that renewable sources could account
for 50 percent of world energy production by
2050, and David Jones of Shell has forecast
that renewables could emulate the rise of oil
a century ago, when it surpassed coal and
wood as the primary source of fuel.78
Not only is solar energy alone sufficiently
abundant to meet all of today’s energy needs
thousands of times over, harnessing it is not
particularly land- or resource-intensive. All
U.S. electricity could be provided by wind turbines in just three states—Kansas, North
Dakota, and South Dakota—or with solar
energy on a plot of land 100 miles square in
Nevada. Farming under the wind turbines
could continue as before, while farmers
enjoyed the supplementary revenues from
spinning wind into electricity. In cities around
the world, much of the local power needs
could be met by covering existing roofs with
solar cells—requiring no land at all. Additional energy will be provided by wind and
ocean energy installations located several kilometers offshore, where the energy flows are
abundant.79
The other credibility gap that must be
filled is how to provide renewable energy
when and where it is needed—how do you
get wind or sunshine into a gas tank, for
example, and on a still, dark night? That
question, which has stumped generations of
engineers, has now been answered by automobile and energy companies around the
world. Hydrogen will be the fuel of choice—
to be produced from renewable energy, stored
underground, and carried to our cities and
factories by pipeline. Major automobile manufacturers around the world are developing
hydrogen fuel cell–powered cars that will
emit only water from their tailpipes. DaimlerChrysler, BMW, General Motors, and Nissan plan to sell their first such cars in 2003,
and in 2002 Toyota and Honda raced to see
who would be first to put a fuel cell car on the
road. Full commercialization of fuel cell cars
is expected as soon as 2010.80
In early 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change released its most recent
report, confirming that in order to stabilize
the world’s climate, “eventually CO2 emissions would need to decline to a very small
fraction of current emissions”—meaning close
to zero. If the world is to achieve this—which
it must—countries must begin today, not
tomorrow, to make the transition to a renewable, sustainable energy future.81
We still have a long way to go to achieve
these visions. Today most of the world is
locked into a carbon-based energy system
that is neither better nor necessarily cheaper
than renewable energy—it is the product of
past policies and investment decisions. Breaking the lock will not be easy. But Germany
and other countries are proving that change
is indeed possible. The key is ambitious, forward-looking, consistent government policies that drive demand for renewable energy
and create a self-reinforcing market.
109
Chapter 6
Scrapping Mining
Dependence
Payal Sampat
In 1886, in the dry and dusty high veldt of
South Africa, a man named George Harrison
stumbled across an outcrop of gold. This
accidental discovery had significant consequences. The remote farming region was
soon transformed into a hive of activity:
financiers and mining companies arrived from
London and Amsterdam, as did tens of thousands of workers from other parts of southern Africa. The city of Johannesburg grew out
of this gold rush. The deposit that lies below
the metropolitan area has since produced,
by some estimates, a third of all the gold
ever mined.1
Although Harrison chanced upon nuggets
of the metal on the soil’s surface, most of
Johannesburg’s gold lies several kilometers
underground, scattered through a giant
“reef” of rock and earth. To get to this reef,
miners must burrow very deep, extracting
several tons of rock and soil in order to produce just a few ounces of the yellow metal.
The material is then treated with cyanide in
order to separate out the specks of gold from
the dirt. More than a century of such digging
110
has completely transformed the landscape
around Johannesburg. Pale yellow mountains of waste ore and rock rise above the
flat city, towering over its poor, predominantly black neighborhoods. Some of these
heaps span several hundred hectares each and
are 45 meters high. Winds carry dust containing cyanide and heavy metals from these
heaps into nearby homes and schools.2
During the first hundred years after Harrison’s discovery, South Africa’s mining industry flourished using a series of practices that
were damaging to both the environment and
the mine workers. The mines paid low wages,
operated under dangerous working conditions, and employed an almost exclusively
black work force—mainly workers brought in
from Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and
other neighboring nations. Once the
apartheid policies that enabled these practices were ended in the late 1980s, the mines
began to lose some of their apparent luster.
Less than a decade later, world prices for
gold and other metals took a nosedive. Companies began to close down mines where
SCRAPPING MINING DEPENDENCE
Table 6–1. Mining in the Global Economy,
operating costs far exceeded returns
Late 1990s
and to downsize the work force. In
the span of just a decade, mining
Global Indicator
Mining’s Share
Value
companies laid off half of all mine
(percent)
3
workers—nearly 400,000 people.
Johannesburg’s history is unique,
Gross world product
0.9
$361 billion 1
of course, but many of its experiEmployment
0.5
13 million workers 2
ences as a mining-dependent region
Energy use
7–10
4,900–6,600
are not. Mining has left a lasting
terawatt hours
mark on people and landscapes
Sulfur
dioxide
emissions
13
142 million tons 3
around the world. Each year mining
activities take more materials out of
Frontier forests threatened
39
5.3 million
square kilometers4
the earth than the world’s rivers
move. A single mine in Papua New
1
Based on gross domestic product data for 1998, in current
Guinea, the Ok Tedi, generates an
U.S. dollars. Includes some extraction of oil and natural gas.
2
astounding 200,000 tons of waste a
Employment in nonfuel minerals and metals mining, processday on average—more than all the
ing, and basic manufacturing in the formal sector. 3Data for 1995.
4
Refers to undeveloped tracts of forest. 1997 estimate; includes
cities in Japan, Australia, and Canada
some
oil and gas extraction.
combined. Mines have uprooted
SOURCE: See endnote 5.
tens of thousands of people from
their homelands and have exposed
many more to toxic chemicals and polluore from the earth in order to improve the
tion. And mining is the world’s most deadly
quality of our lives? Thankfully, it is not. The
occupation: on average, 40 mine workers
billions of tons of material already mined and
are killed on the job each day, and many
circulating in cities and factories or lying in
more are injured.4
landfills can serve the same functions as underIf an accountant were to weigh the costs
ground ores, with far fewer ecological costs.
and benefits of extracting minerals from the
Through improved design of cities, transport,
earth and then processing and refining them,
homes, and products, societies can find ways
the balance sheet would reveal this: an industo use the existing stock of minerals far more
try that consumes close to 10 percent of
efficiently—and to use smaller amounts of
world energy, spews almost half of all toxic
materials overall—dramatically reducing the
need to mine underground ores.6
emissions from industry in some countries,
and threatens nearly 40 percent of the world’s
undeveloped tracts of forest—while generatMinerals Inventory
ing only a small share of jobs and economic
output. (See Table 6–1.) 5
The term “minerals” refers to a variety of
Clearly, minerals themselves have brought
materials found in the earth. It includes metbenefits to those who have had access to them.
als such as iron, copper, and gold; industrial
People use minerals extensively in their daily
minerals, like lime and gypsum; construction
lives—in utensils used to cook dinner, in bicymaterials such as sand and stone; and fuels,
cles or trains or cars taken to get to work, and
such as coal and uranium. The first three catin pipes or pitchers that carry water to homes.
egories of minerals are the primary focus of
But is it necessary to extract mountains of
this chapter.7
111
People have extracted minerals
Million Tons
10,000
from the earth since ancient times.
Source: USGS, UN
Babylonians, Assyrians, and Byzan8,000
tines mined for copper and lead
thousands of years ago in what is
6,000
today southern Jordan, for example.
Metals
Since the Industrial Revolution,
4,000
Construction and Industrial Minerals
however, minerals have been
extracted and used in much larger
2,000
quantities. In recent times, this
trend has accelerated greatly: in
0
1999, some 9.6 billion tons of mar1970
1985
1975
1995
2000
1990
1980
ketable minerals were dug out of
Figure 6–1. Production of Non-fuel Minerals
the earth, nearly twice as much as in
and Metals, 1970–99
1970. (See Figure 6–1.) This figure
accounts for minerals that finally
reach markets, but does not include the wastes
2001 were valued at $125 billion—and about
generated in producing these minerals—the
$21 billion of this was gold.10
unused portion of the ore (the rock or earth
After metal ores are extracted from the
that contains minerals), or the earth moved
earth, the material has to go through several
to reach the ore, which is known as overstages in order to produce usable metal. These
burden. If these categories were included in
refining and smelting processes vary, dependthe total amount of materials mined each
ing on the type of metal. The ore is crushed
year, the figure would be considerably larger.8
and ground, and then the metal is separated
By weight, most of the minerals extracted
out through different kinds of processes: gold
are used for construction, such as stone,
ore is treated with chemicals, for instance,
sand, and gravel. Although metals are mined
while aluminum is separated out by exposing
in smaller quantities, they are more valuable
the processed ore to an extremely powerful
per unit of weight. Iron is by far the most
electric current.
Construction materials are typically mined
mined metallic ore. Much of this iron ore is
relatively close to where they are to be used.
used to make steel—some 845 million tons
But more valuable minerals have historically
of raw steel were produced in 2000. About
traveled quite long distances—gold was
135 million tons of bauxite ore were mined
shipped from the Americas to Europe in the
that same year, which produced some 24
sixteenth century, for example. With the availmillion tons of aluminum—a lightweight
metal used in cars, aircraft, and beverage
ability of cheap energy and improved transcans. And about 15 million tons of refined
portation networks in the twentieth century,
copper were produced in 2000, much of
some metal ores travel thousands of miles
which was used in electrical equipment,
just to be refined and processed. For instance,
cables, and construction.9
some copper that is mined in Chile gets
smelted in Europe—and may end up in radiAlthough gold is produced in much tinier
ators of cars made in Japan and driven in
quantities—less than 2,500 tons a year—it
California.11
brings in a disproportionate share of the revenue from metals mining. Metals mined in
Minerals are found all over the world—
112
Pacific islands, Andean mountains, North
American deserts, and African rainforest.
Some of the world’s largest countries are also
the major producers and consumers of minerals. (See Table 6–2.) China, for instance,
produces 22 percent of the world’s iron ore,
29 percent of the silicon, and 39 percent of
the tin. Australian mines produce nearly 40
percent of all bauxite, 27 percent of diamonds, and almost a quarter of all lead. About
14 percent of all gold and a quarter of all
phosphate are mined in the United States.12
Some ores are mined in just one or only a
few regions. Most of the world’s bauxite, for
instance, comes from Australia, Guinea, Brazil,
or Jamaica. South Africa produces 44 percent of the world’s chromium, which is used
in making stainless steel, and more than half
of the world’s platinum. Chilean mines produce more than a third of the world’s copper.13
Mineral consumption is also most concentrated in a few parts of the world. The
United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and
Western Europe, with 15 percent of the
world’s population, together consume most
of the metals produced each year: about 61
percent of all aluminum, 60 percent of lead,
59 percent of copper, and 49 percent of
steel. On a per capita basis, the different levels of consumption are especially marked:
the average American uses 22 kilograms of
aluminum a year, the average Indian uses 2
kilograms, and the average African uses just
0.7 kilograms.14
How are these billions of tons of minerals
used? Most go into expanding the built-up
environment: constructing roads, railways,
bridges, factories, or residences. In addition to
needing sand and gravel to make concrete,
construction activities account for 34 percent
of the use of steel, 30 percent of copper, 17
percent of lead, and 19 percent of the aluminum consumed in industrial countries. The
transportation sector—including vehicle
Table 6–2. Major Mineral Producing
Countries, Selected Minerals, 2001
Mineral
Countries
Share of World
Production
(percent)
Bauxite
Australia
Guinea
Brazil
39
11
10
Copper
Chile
United States
Indonesia
35
10
8
Diamond
Australia
Dem. Rep. of Congo
Russia
27
25
21
Gold
South Africa
United States
Australia
16
14
11
Iron ore
China
Brazil
Australia
22
20
16
Lead
Australia
China
United States
24
19
14
Mercury
Spain
Kyrgyz Republic
Algeria
36
18
16
Nickel
Russia
Australia
Canada
21
15
15
Platinum group
South Africa
Russia
United States
53
35
5
Silicon
China
Russia
Norway
29
14
11
Tin
China
Indonesia
Peru
39
21
16
SOURCE: U.S. Geological
Survey, Mineral Commodity
Summaries 2001 (Reston,VA: 2001).
fleets—uses about 70 percent of lead produced each year, 37 percent of steel, 33 percent of aluminum, and 27 percent of copper.15
113
In industrial nations, the amount of
Dollars
175
material being added to the built-up
(1990 dollars)
environment each year has continued
150
to grow, even though most of these
countries have already put in place
125
much of the urban infrastructure and
transportation networks that consume
100
large amounts of materials. Every year,
75
the United States adds another 2 billion tons of material to interstate highSource: World Bank
50
way systems, railroads, factories, and
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
buildings that have been in place for
16
decades.
Figure 6–2. Metals and Minerals Price Index,
1960–2001
In addition to the minerals newly
extracted from the earth each year,
factories and builders get some of their raw
the world consumes enormous volumes of
materials from recycled or secondary sources.
minerals each year, quarrying and extracting
About half of the world’s lead comes from
minerals generates less than 1 percent of
recycled supplies, as does a third of aluminum,
global economic product. The global mining
steel, and gold. But for some metals, the
industry includes several large multinational
recycling rate is far lower and appears to be
corporations (such as Anglo American, Rio
falling: for instance, just 13 percent of copTinto, and BHP Billiton), state-owned comper is from recycled sources, down from 20
panies such as Chile’s Codelco and several in
percent in 1980. Merely 4 percent of the
India, and smaller mining companies that are
world’s zinc is obtained from recycled
known as “juniors.” In addition, some 13
sources.17
million artisanal or small-scale miners work
over productive seams of metal or precious
It is far less energy-intensive to produce
stones alone or in cooperatives. Most of these
metals from secondary sources than from
miners are in the developing world, con“virgin” or newly mined ores. Yet recycling’s
verging near gold deposits in the Brazilian
potential is poorly realized. In many parts of
Amazon and Ghana, in diamond-rich areas in
the world, governments heavily subsidize
West Africa, and near columbite-tantalite
the extraction of virgin materials by offering
(coltan) ores in the Democratic Republic of
mining firms tax write-offs and inexpensive
the Congo.19
access to land and by subsidizing diesel and
other fuels—making it more expensive to
The Johannesburg gold reef is an excepproduce minerals from recycled sources than
tionally rich lode of metal that has been
to dig up new supplies from underground.
worked for over a century. But firms today
Although minerals are nonrenewable and
develop some mineral deposits with life spans
are mined in greater quantities each year,
estimated in decades, or even years—and are
prices for virgin minerals have been in steady
always in search of new, untapped deposits of
decline since the oil crisis in the early 1970s.
minerals. Multinational mining companies
(See Figure 6–2.)18
have increasingly focused their quest in the
The minerals sector is a relatively small
developing world, where mines can be worked
more cheaply as labor costs are lower and
player in the global economy. Even though
114
environmental regulations are typically not as
strict as in Australia, Western Europe, or
North America. In 2001, mining companies
spent $566 million exploring for nonferrous
metals deposits in Latin America—almost 30
percent of the $2 billion they spent overall—
and another $272 million in Africa. Almost
two thirds of the exploration expenditure in
1997 was spent in search of gold deposits, but
this share fell to about 40 percent in 2001.
Since global metals prices took a downturn in
the late 1990s, mining companies have
invested much less in their quest for new
mineral lodes. Total exploration spending fell
by half between 1997 and 2001.20
Ecosystems, People, and Mines
The Lorentz National Park in the Indonesian
province of West Papua, which is the western
half of the island of New Guinea, is one of the
world’s most biologically diverse and least
explored places. At 2.5 million hectares—
about the size of Vermont in the United
States—it is the largest protected area in
Southeast Asia. It is a naturalist’s dream come
true. In the span of about 125 kilometers, the
park covers a dramatic range of ecosystems:
mangrove swamps at sea level, highland cloud
forest, and snow-peaked mountains. Its geographic isolation and the sweeping changes in
elevation and climate have made it home to
unique plant, amphibian, and insect species;
visiting biologists recently discovered a new
type of tree kangaroo.21
But the area has more than just biological
wealth. Lorentz lies next to what is considered
the world’s richest lode of copper and gold
ore, valued at about $50 billion. The U.S.
mining company Freeport McMoRan first
dug open the deposit in 1973, and has
expanded its foothold ever since. The company now dumps 70 million tons of waste
each year into the nearby Ajkwa River, and by
the time it closes in 30 years, it will have
excavated a 230-square-kilometer hole in the
forest that is visible from outer space. The
region’s population has increased from 6,000
to 70,000 in the last 30 years—most of these
are immigrant workers—and the area now
boasts an 18-hole golf course for mining
executives.22
Lorentz is one of many world biological
treasures that are seriously endangered by
mining. Much new mining development is
taking place in or near ecologically fragile
regions around the world—including World
Heritage sites such as the Bystrinski National
Reserve in Russia and the Sierra Imataca
Reserve in Venezuela. By one estimate, mining projects threaten nearly 40 percent of
the world’s large, untouched forests. These
include a titanium mine being developed in
a Madagascar forest that is inhabited by rare
lemurs, birds, and indigenous plant species;
gold exploration in Peru’s Andean cloud
forests; and columbite-tantalite mining in
the Okapi Reserve in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, home to the endangered
lowland gorilla. Also in the works is a nickel
and cobalt mine on Gag Island, off the coast
of Papua New Guinea. The reefs off the island
are inhabited by an astounding variety of
coral, fish, and mollusks.23
The environmental impact of mines
extends beyond the threats to habitat. The
mining industry is one of the planet’s leading
polluters. (See Table 6–3.) Smelting metals
contributes some 19 million tons of acidrain-causing sulfur dioxide to the atmosphere
annually—about 13 percent of global emissions. In the United States, processing minerals contributes almost half of all reported
toxic emissions from industry, sending 1.5
million tons of pollutants into the air and
water each year.24
Extracting, processing, and refining minerals is extremely energy-intensive. Between
115
Table 6–3. Selected Examples of Mining’s Environmental Toll
Impact
Example
Details
Biodiversity
loss
Okapi Reserve and
Kahuzi-Biega National
Park, Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Mining for coltan—used to make capacitors for cell phones and
other electronics—has resulted in an 80–90 percent decline in
the population of the eastern lowland gorilla in the Reserve.
Only 3,000 gorillas remain.
Water
pollution
Ok Tedi,
Papua New Guinea
On average, 200,000 tons of contaminated tailings and waste rock
dumped each day into Ok Tedi River, which feeds into the Fly
River.This has silted up the two rivers to four or five times more
than normal, flooding nearby villages and killing off plant life in a
2,000-square-kilometer area near the river basin.
Air
pollution
Norilsk nickel smelter,
Russia
The smelter is the country’s largest source of sulfur dioxide and
other air pollutants, which have destroyed an estimated 3,500
square kilometers of forest and harmed the health of local
residents.
Water use
Gold mines in northeastern Nevada
Mines in the Nevadan desert pumped out more than 2.2 trillion
liters of groundwater between 1986 and 2000—as much water
as New York City uses each year.
SOURCE: See
endnote 24.
7 and 10 percent of all oil, gas, coal, and
hydropower energy produced globally each
year is used to extract and process minerals.
(This figure does not include the energy used
to ship ores and metals around the world.)
Mining and processing just three materials—
aluminum, copper, and steel—consumes an
astounding 7.2 percent of world energy. This
is more than the entire Latin American region
uses each year.25
A sizable share of the energy used in
extracting and refining minerals comes from
fossil fuels such as oil and coal, whose burning emits the carbon that is implicated in
global climate change. In the United States,
half of the electricity used to smelt aluminum
comes from coal-burning power plants, for
instance. But mining’s role in global climate
change does not end with its fossil fuel use.
Producing cement from limestone releases an
additional 5 percent of annual carbon emissions to the atmosphere each year. The aluminum smelting process releases about 2
116
tons of carbon dioxide for each ton of primary aluminum produced, and another 3
tons of perfluorocarbons, or PFCs—which
are very rare gases not emitted through any
other industrial activity. PFCs are extremely
potent greenhouse gases: a ton of PFCs is
equivalent to the greenhouse potential of
6,500–9,200 tons of carbon. In 1997, PFC
emissions from aluminum smelters in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were equivalent to about 19 million tons of carbon—
although at least this is 50 percent less than
their emissions in 1990, thanks to improvements in smelter efficiencies.26
In the last century, lower energy costs and
the development of new mining technologies
have made it possible to transform landscapes
completely. Earth-moving equipment is used
to literally move mountains in order to get to
a mineral deposit. These technological
advancements have led to two trends: the
extraction of minerals from lower-grade
ores—ores that contain very small amounts of
mineral—and the development of surface
mines instead of underground ones. Today,
about two thirds of metals are extracted from
surface mines. These “open-pit” mines use
more diesel fuel and generate a lot more
waste than the subterranean kind. On average, open-pit mines produce 8–10 times more
waste than underground mines do.27
The amount of wastes generated by mines
is staggering: every year, Canadian mines
generate more than a billion tons—60 times
larger than the amount of trash Canadian
cities discard. To transport these wastes, some
mines now use a kind of giant dump truck
that can move 360 tons of material—each
behemoth tire on this truck weighs 4.5 tons
and stands almost 5 meters feet high.28
In 2000, mines around the world extracted
some 900 million tons of metal—and left
behind some 6 billion tons of waste ore. This
figure does not include the overburden earth
moved to reach the ores. Much of this waste
came from the production of just iron ore,
copper, and gold. (See Table 6–4.) For every
usable ton of copper, 110 tons of waste rock
and ore are discarded, and another 200 tons
of overburden earth are moved. For gold, the
ratio is more staggering: about 300,000 tons
of wastes are generated for every ton of marketable gold—which translates into roughly
3 tons of wastes per gold wedding ring. Much
of this waste is contaminated with cyanide and
other chemicals used to separate the metal
from ore.29
The amount of waste generated by mines
has increased as ore grades have declined for
a number of metals. As the more easily accessible and rich veins of metal have been dug
out, miners have turned to less abundant
sources—using more energy and chemicals to
extract the same amount of metal while generating more wastes. In 1906, U.S. copper
ores yielded on average 2.5 grams of metal for
Table 6–4.Wastes Produced by Mining
Selected Metals, 2000
Waste
Produced
Metal
Share of
Metal
Ore That is
Produced Usable Metal
(million tons) (million tons) (percent)
Iron Ore
Copper
Gold
Lead
Aluminum
SOURCE: See
2,113
1,648
745
260
104
845
15
0.0025
7
24
40
0.91
0.00033
2.5
19
endnote 29.
every 100 grams of ore. In 2000, U.S. miners extracted copper from ore with an average grade of 0.44 grams of metal per 100
grams of ore, meaning that five times more
waste is now generated per gram of marketable metal.30
Chemical innovations have also contributed to the dual trends in low grading and
surface mines. In the late 1800s, U.S.
chemists patented cyanide heap-leaching as a
method of separating gold from ore. Today,
gold mines everywhere from South Africa to
Nevada use this technique. Cyanide is mixed
with water and then is poured or sprayed
over heaps of crushed ore in order to dissolve
bits of gold. Once the usable gold is removed,
the stacks of crushed ore—known as tailings—are treated to reduce cyanide concentrations, although the chemical is never
entirely diluted. When gold prices shot up in
the early 1980s, this method gained new
popularity as miners rushed to extract gold
from deposits containing even tiny amounts
of the metal. Between 1983 and 1999, U.S.
consumption of crystalline sodium cyanide
more than tripled, reaching 130 million kilograms—about 90 percent of which was used
in gold mining. A teaspoon containing a 2
percent cyanide solution can kill an adult.31
Where do these chemical-laced wastes end
117
up? They are piled into heaps, walled into
constructed holding areas (called dams), and
in some parts of the world simply dumped
into rivers, streams, or oceans. (Tailings dams
are typically built by stacking piles of wastes
above ground or in freshwater ponds.) Today
only three mines in the world—all of them on
the Pacific island of New Guinea—officially
use rivers to dump tailings. Even so, mine
wastes elsewhere have spilled out of waste
sites and poisoned drinking water supplies
and aquatic habitat. In the U.S. West, mining has contaminated an estimated 26,000
kilometers of streams and rivers.32
There is no reliable way to dispose of billions of tons of materials discreetly. Catastrophic spills of mine wastes in recent years
have resulted in enormous fish kills, soil and
water pollution, and damage to human health.
In 2000, for instance, a tailings dam split
open at the Baia Mare mine in Romania.
This accident sent some 100,000 tons of
wastewater and 20,000 tons of sludge contaminated with cyanide, copper, and heavy
metals into the Tisza River, and eventually
into the Danube—destroying 1,240 tons of
fish and polluting the drinking water supplies of 2.5 million people. That same year
major accidents took place at mines in Gallivare (Sweden), Guangxi (China), Cajamarca
(Peru), Tolukuma (Papua New Guinea),
Sichuan (China), and Borsa (Romania). The
accident at a copper mine in Guangxi killed
29 people and destroyed more than 100
homes. Of the hundreds of mining-related
environmental incidents since 1975, about 75
percent have involved tailings dam ruptures.
According to the U.N. Environment Programme, there are 3,500 tailings storage facilities in active use around the world and several
thousand others that are now closed, all of
which pose potential risks.33
Mining’s effects frequently persist long
after an operation is closed. Acid drainage is
118
an especially long-lived problem. This happens when a mining operation excavates rock
that contains sulfide minerals. When these
materials are exposed to oxygen and water,
they react to form sulfuric acid. This acid will
continue to form, and to drain out of the
rock, as long as the rock is exposed to air and
water and the sulfides have not been
depleted—a process that can take hundreds
or thousands of years. The Iron Mountain
mine in northern California, for instance,
has been closed since 1963 but continues to
drain sulfuric acid, along with heavy metals
such as cadmium and zinc, into the Sacramento River. The river’s bright orange water
is completely devoid of life, and has a pH of
minus 3—which is 10,000 times more acidic
than battery acid. Experts report that the
mine may continue to leach acid for another
3,000 years.34
Mines have not only transformed landscapes, but have also dramatically altered the
lives of local people who live near mineral
deposits. (See Table 6–5.) Hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted in order
to make way for mine projects. Many others
have had to forsake traditional occupations
and endure the effects of living beside a mine
that poisons their water supplies or near a
smelter that pollutes the air they breathe. At
the same time, mines have brought jobs,
roads, and electricity to poor regions. Men
with little other choice for work and communities living in extreme poverty have had
to make the Faustian tradeoff—typically not
out of their own choice: incur increased risks
of lung disease and other health problems in
exchange for jobs and income.35
Each year 14,000 mine workers are killed
at accidents on the job, and many more are
exposed to chemicals or particulates that
increase their risks of respiratory disorders
and certain kinds of cancers. There have been
significant improvements in mine safety in
Table 6–5. Selected Examples of Mining’s Impact on Local Communities
Impact
Example
Details
Mining on
indigenous
lands
Zortman–Landusky
mine, Montana,
United States
Mining for gold has destroyed Spirit Mountain, a sacred site for
the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes.The mine was abandoned
by the Pegasus Gold company in 1998, when it went bankrupt,
leaving the tribes a toxic legacy of cyanide waste and acid drainage.
Loss of
traditional
occupations
Tambo Grande, Peru
Farmers have opposed a proposed Canadian gold mine, complaining that it will drain water supplies, take over farmland, and contaminate their soils. In a referendum in June 2002, 94 percent of the
area’s residents voted against the proposed mine.
Human
rights abuses
Monywa Copper Mine, The Burmese military government has partnered with the CanaMyanmar (formerly
dian firm Ivanhoe to develop the copper mine and build railways,
Burma)
dams, and other infrastructure. Nearly a million laborers have
been forced to work on the project.
Health
hazards
Metals refineries,
Torréon, Mexico
SOURCE: See
Heavy metals emissions from lead, silver, and bismuth refineries
have resulted in lead poisoning in children, which can cause permanent brain damage.
endnote 35.
the last few decades, but mining is still the
world’s most hazardous occupation. According to the International Labour Organization,
the sector employs less than 1 percent of all
workers but is responsible for 5 percent of all
worker deaths on the job.36
Prostitution and drug use are serious problems at mining camps where migrant workers live, which has led to a high incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases, including
HIV/AIDS. In South Africa, between 20
and 30 percent of workers at gold mines are
HIV-positive (although this is not significantly higher than the average infection rate
for adults there).37
Mine workers in some countries, including
Colombia, China, Myanmar, and Russia, are
still prevented from forming independent
trade unions for collective bargaining. Union
organizers there face serious threats: at the La
Loma mine in Colombia, for example, three
union leaders were murdered in 2001 because
of their efforts to organize workers.38
Indigenous peoples have been especially
hard hit by mining projects. By one estimate, as much as 50 percent of the gold
produced between 1995 and 2015 will come
from indigenous peoples’ lands, in places as
diverse as the Kyrgyz Republic and Nevada.
The impacts of this intrusion into native
lands can be diverse, affecting autonomy,
traditional lifestyles, health, occupations, and
even physical safety. For instance, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission has confirmed that the Indonesian army is
responsible for rapes and the continued use
of armed force against Amungme and
Ndunga villagers near Freeport McMoRan’s
Grasberg mine on West Papua. In Australia,
the Mirrar—an aboriginal people—have contested a huge uranium mine that is being
developed on their traditional lands and
sacred sites. This area, the Kakadu Reserve,
was declared a World Heritage site in 1998.
And in French Guiana, the Wayana people,
who live downstream from gold mining operations, suffer from mercury poisoning—their
hair sample tests showed mercury levels two
119
to three times higher than World Health
Organization limits—which can lead to neurological and behavioral problems, especially
in children.39
Tailing the Money
More than 200 years ago, Adam Smith
observed in The Wealth of Nations: “Of all
those expensive and uncertain projects which
bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the
people that engage in them, there is none perhaps more perfectly ruinous than the search
after new silver and gold mines.” In contrast,
the industry’s proponents have held that mining can serve as a powerful and necessary
engine of economic development. They argue
that poor countries that put up with the ecological and social costs of mining will benefit over the long term because of the income
and jobs that mining can help generate.
Results on the ground, however, do not bear
out these claims.40
Mineral dependence has been shown to
slow and even reduce economic growth in
developing countries—a phenomenon economists have dubbed “the resource curse.”
Harvard economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew
Warner studied 95 developing countries that
had high ratios of natural resource exports relative to gross domestic product (GDP) for the
period between 1970 and 1990. They found
that the higher the dependence on natural
resource exports, the slower the growth rates
per capita. Economist Richard Auty of the
University of Lancaster in the United Kingdom looked at economic growth in 85 countries between 1970 and 1993 and found that
in this period small countries that were rich
in hard minerals (such as copper, bauxite,
and tin) actually had negative GDP growth
rates, averaging –0.2 percent a year.41
This inverse relationship between mineral wealth and economic affluence has held
120
true even in wealthy countries that mine.
Between 1980 and 2000, for example, mining-dependent counties in the United States
grew at half the rate of other counties on
average. Thomas M. Power, who heads the
Economics Department at the University of
Montana, notes that in the United States
“the historic mining regions have become
synonymous with persistent poverty, not
prosperity.” He points to the Appalachian
region, with its coal; the Black Hills of South
Dakota, which were dug over for gold and
silver; and lead mines in the Ozarks, among
others. “Persistent poverty” is common to
several other historically mined regions
around the world: Rio Tinto in Spain, Bihar
in India, and Potosí in Bolivia rank among
the poorest in their respective countries.42
Ten countries—six of them in Africa—
derive more than 30 percent of their export
income from trading minerals. (See Table
6–6.) Most of these also number among the
world’s most impoverished nations: almost
two thirds of Niger’s population lives below
the poverty line, for instance, as does nearly
half of Peru’s.
Several of these mineral-exporting countries are heavily indebted to international
lenders. Much of what they earn from minerals and other exports never enters the
national economy at all but goes instead to
service their huge debts. Mauritania, for
instance, spends a quarter of its export earnings repaying interest on its external debt—
which is 1.3 times the size of its gross national
income.43
Conditions in mining-dependent countries have been steadily declining in the last
two decades. According to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the proportion of people living on less
than $1 a day in developing countries that are
mineral exporters rose from 61 percent in
1981–83 to 82 percent in 1997–99.44
Table 6–6. Mineral Dependence and
Poverty Rates, Selected Countries,
1990s
Country
Share of Non-Fuel
Population
Minerals in Value Below Poverty
of Total Exports
Line 1
Guinea
Niger
Zambia
Jamaica
Chile
Peru
Dem. Rep. of Congo
Mauritania
Papua New Guinea
Togo
(percent)
(percent)
71
67
66
53
43
40
40
40
35
30
40
63
86
34
21
49
n.a.
57
n.a.
32
1
National Poverty Line.
UNCTAD, Handbook of World Mineral Trade
Statistics 1994-1999 (New York: 2001);World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2001 (Washington, DC:
2001); U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 2001 (New York: 2001).
SOURCE:
Why are mining-dependent countries more
likely to be poor and to grow more slowly?
Economists have explained the resource curse
in different ways. One is that extracting raw
materials for export is far less lucrative than
processing the materials or manufacturing
finished goods. Second, countries that have
made mining the centerpiece of their
economies have found that laying all their
stakes in this one sector has proved an unsafe
bet, given the swings and overall downward
trend in world mineral prices.45
Other reasons may have to do with the
way the resource revenues are distributed.
Mineral-rich countries have typically invested
little in social services, such as education or
health care. Several countries dependent on
mining are among the world’s most corrupt;
others are beleaguered by conflicts over
resources and the resulting political instabil-
ity. A study by Transparency International
about the extent of corruption in different
parts of the world revealed that 26 out of 32
mineral-dependent countries evaluated—some
of which are also oil-dependent—had governments that were categorized as corrupt or
highly corrupt. Bolivia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Zambia all feature on this list.46
Although countries such as the United
States, Canada, and Australia have historically extracted minerals and continue to do so,
the industry has not been the primary driver
of their economic development. Thomas
Power of the University of Montana notes
that these three countries “were high-income,
advanced nations with stable political and
economic institutions when they started to
develop their natural resources.” The domestic availability of natural resources provided
a competitive advantage for these nations.
But as transportation costs have fallen and
trade has expanded, a domestic supply of
minerals is no longer a prerequisite for economic growth, as it was a century ago. In fact,
countries that are resource-poor, such as
Japan or South Korea, have grown far more
rapidly than many mineral-rich nations.47
By extracting minerals, countries are essentially running down their stocks of nonrenewable resources. Under traditional
economic accounting, however, this extraction appears on the credit side of the ledger.
By conventional measures, mining in Chile
contributed between 7 and 9 percent of the
country’s GDP during the first half of the
1990s. In order to arrive at a more ecologically accurate measure of Chile’s income from
mining, economists from the University of
Chile and Chile’s National Commission for
the Environment calculated the long-term
losses that nation was incurring by depleting
its natural resources. They concluded that
traditional accounting methods “overestimated the economic income generated by
121
the Chilean mining sector…by 20–40 percent.” The conventional measure is likely to
be even more off the mark than this, for the
researchers did not factor in environmental or
health losses from mining, such as air or water
pollution.48
Mining, then, has not proved to be an
economic winner in either the short term or
the long term. Its frequently short-lived
appeal contributed the term “ghost town” to
the American lexicon a centur y ago. A
rumored gold strike would bring droves of
miners into an area, which would be abandoned once the deposit was picked over.49
In many ways, mining economies today are
subject to the same boom-and-bust cycles.
Their fortune is linked to a number of factors
such as global mineral prices, labor and fuel
costs, and the productiveness of the lode
being mined. Take Papua New Guinea, for
example. New Guineans have had to endure
the development of four of the world’s most
polluting mines, which together provide
about 15 percent of the country’s GDP.
Three of these—Misima, Ok Tedi, and Porgera—are scheduled for closure between 2004
and 2011, less than 20 years after they were
first opened. At that point, 5,000 workers will
lose their jobs and the country will be left to
deal with the legacy of billions of tons of
highly contaminated wastes.50
Mining provides only a thin trickle of jobs:
globally, extracting non-fuel minerals employs
just 5 million people, or less than 0.2 percent
of all workers. (Processing and refining minerals employs about another 8 million.) And
in many parts of the world, these jobs are in
decline. An International Labour Organization study reveals that 32 percent of mine
workers in 25 key mining countries lost their
jobs between 1995 and 2000.51
Mine workers are getting laid off as operations close down, cut back on expenses, or
invest in labor-saving technological improve122
ments. When minerals prices plummeted in
the 1990s, mining companies in Australia, the
United States, the Philippines, and elsewhere
laid off tens of thousands of workers. (See
Table 6–7.) Between 1985 and 2000, Australian mines laid off some 36,000 workers—
almost half the work force. Some 40,000
workers lost jobs in Philippine mines between
1985 and 1995, amounting to a 60-percent
decline. And in China, 2.4 million mine workers (most of them coal miners) lost their jobs
between 1995 and 2000, as minerals prices
fell and ores petered out. Job attrition is likely
to continue there: another 100 coal and nonfuel mines are scheduled to close in the next
few years.52
In countries where labor and civil rights
laws are strong, mine workers have been paid
well in comparison with the prevailing wage—
in large part due to the occupational hazards they face and to the efforts of mine
workers’ unions. But contrary to industry
claims that mining boosts local economies,
Table 6–7. Employment Losses in
Mining, Selected Countries, 1985–2000
Employment Employment Change,
in 19851
in 20001
1985–2000
(thousands)
India
South Africa
United States
Romania
Mexico
Canada
Australia
Bolivia
Thailand
755
807
344
205
83
78
84
70
58
(thousands)
(percent)
600
417
227
77
68 2
53
48
47
17
–21
–48
–34
–62
–18 2
–31
–43
–33
–71
1 Data for some countries may include coal mining.
1999 figure.
SOURCE: International Labour Organization, The Evolution of Employment,Working Time and Training in the
Mining Industry (Geneva: 2002).
2
many mining jobs have not gone to local
people near the mine site but to a mobile or
migrant work force. Companies have frequently imported labor to operate mines and
machinery, as happened in South Africa,
where miners were brought in from Lesotho,
Mozambique, and Namibia.53
If the benefits of mining are so mixed and
minerals prices so low, why are mining operations still expanding? Mining firms have
profited from direct and indirect subsidies
handed out to them by governments in many
parts of the world. For starters, mining firms
benefit immensely from the cheap fuel and
from the roads and other infrastructure made
available to them.
In traditional mining countries, several
pro-mining laws were originally developed
in the nineteenth century in an effort to
expand the frontiers of colonial control. In the
United States, for instance, an 1872 mining
law gives miners the right to explore for and
extract minerals for as little as $12 a hectare
on public lands—with no royalty payments for
minerals removed. This law has generated
immense profits for mining interests. Between
1993 and 2001, mining firms hauled $11
billion worth of gold, silver, and other minerals off U.S. federal lands, having paid a
fraction of 1 percent of that in fees and permits—leading former U.S. Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt to dub the law “a
license to steal.”54
Until 1991, Australia charged no federal
income tax to gold miners. Even today, mining firms there pay state governments small
amounts of royalties, ranging from 1 to 5
percent. And until 2002, when they were
nationalized, most mines in South Africa
were privately owned and did not pay royalties or taxes on profits.55
In recent years, other countries have tried
to emulate some of these outdated laws. Since
1990, more than 100 countries—almost all in
the developing world—have rewritten their
laws, and in some cases amended their constitutions, in order to attract foreign investment in mining. Countries such as Ecuador,
Argentina, and Tanzania now offer fast-track
approval processes, allow 100-percent foreign ownership of mines, charge no taxes for
imported equipment, let companies repatriate all profits, and in some cases, such as in
Papua New Guinea, provide immunity to
companies against compensation claims.56
The final handout of public money comes
when mines close down or are abandoned,
and governments and taxpayers are stuck
with cleanup bills for the mess left behind.
U.S. taxpayers have been left with hefty tabs
for cleanup after companies have gone bankrupt or just walked away from uneconomical
projects. Altogether, it will cost $32–72 billion to try and mop up toxic messes at the
half-million abandoned mines across the
United States—and most of these costs will
be footed by taxpayers. Galactic Resources,
Inc., a Canadian mining company, stuck U.S.
taxpayers with a $200 million bill when it
declared bankruptcy and walked away from
the Summitville gold mine in Colorado in
1992. The 3,300-hectare mine had been
leaking cyanide into the Alamosa River since
its first week in operation and had destroyed
25 kilometers of the river by the time it was
closed. When Galactic left, it had mined $130
million worth of metals at Summitville in
exchange for $7,000 in mining permits.57
International financial institutions and
development agencies have also helped
bankroll extractive industries. The Asian
Development Bank, the World Bank Group,
and assorted export credit agencies have
actively promoted mining in developing
countries through loans, investment guarantees, and influence over mining and investment laws. Between 1995 and 1999, the
World Bank Group spent close to $6 billion
123
to fund mining projects around the world,
and the Inter-American Development Bank
spent another $1 billion. The World Bank’s
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) has underwritten investment to
develop mines in sub-Saharan Africa, Peru,
Central Asia, and Russia; in 2000, 12 percent
of its guarantees supported the mining sector. MIGA has provided more than $100
million in guarantees and equity coverage
to developers of the Antamina mine in Peru,
which is being built next to the Huascarán
National Park, a World Heritage Site. And it
reinsured the Omai Gold Mine in Guyana,
where a tailings dam collapse in 1995 released
3 billion liters of contaminated effluent into
the Essequibo River. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation has also backed
mine projects that have harmed people and
the environment, including the Kumtor Mine
in the Kyrgyz Republic, where there have
been a series of mine accidents involving
cyanide spills.58
Digging Out
An ecologically inclined accountant studying the balance sheet for mining might be baffled by our situation. It seems absurd that the
world continues to obtain minerals in a way
that uses so much energy and generates
untenable amounts of pollution, and that
poor regions are encouraged to yoke their
futures to an unstable and short-lived source
of income at risk to the health and safety of
their citizens. This accountant would be
pleased to learn that there are less-damaging
ways to obtain materials and jobs—many of
which have been in use for a long time—and
that these practices could help balance out the
cost-and-benefit account books more evenly.
Most of the energy use and environmental damage associated with minerals production occur during extraction, refining, and
124
smelting of virgin materials. Tapping into
minerals that have already been extracted and
recirculating them through the economy
would eliminate much, although certainly
not all, of this damage. For example, producing the most energy-intensive metals—
aluminum, steel, and copper—solely from
recycled metal could reduce the energy used
each year to obtain metals by as much as 70
percent. This savings exceeds the amount of
energy used annually by the entire South
Asian region—which is home to a quarter of
the world’s people. This is because it takes far
less energy to recycle discarded materials than
to extract, process, and refine metals from ore.
It takes 95 percent less energy to produce aluminum from recycled materials than from
bauxite ore, for instance. Recycling copper
takes between five and seven times less energy
than processing ore; recycled steel uses two
to three-and-a-half times less.59
To make up for losses due to recycling, or
dissipation, a closed-loop economy might
supplement above-ground stocks with some
amount of newly mined materials. Truly sustainable use of resources would require using
smaller amounts overall and maximizing the
amount of service obtained from each kilogram of material. This would require more
than just finding ways to recirculate materials through the global economy. For planners,
it would involve designing cities and transportation systems in ways that are less spread
out and materials-intensive than they are at
present. For consumers, using fewer minerals may well involve a shift in what is valued:
for many, the “good life” might not be
equated to the amount of stuff accumulated.
To comprehend just how absurd it is to
continue to mine new metals while existing
stocks lie untapped, consider two of the most
environmentally damaging metals mined:
gold and copper. Currently, three times more
gold is sitting in bank vaults, in jewelry boxes,
and with private investors than is waiting in
the reserves identified in underground mines.
(See Figure 6–3.) This is enough gold—
150,000 tons—to meet the current demand
for 17 years.60
But even if we are able to tap into this
above-ground gold mine, a more fundamental question is, Does the world really
need an additional 2,400 tons of gold each
year? Gold industry advertising campaigns
try to convince people that this yellow metal
is indeed a necessity, but in fact 80 percent of
it is used to make jewelry. Much of this is used
in wedding dowries in India and the Middle
East. Reducing our dependence on newly
mined gold—and its sizable environmental
impact—will thus undeniably involve cultural
change there and elsewhere.61
Global data on where copper ends up are
more sketchy than for gold. For the United
States, however, analysts have estimated the
amount of mined copper that is in use or in
landfills. (See Figure 6–4.) They surmise that
in the United States, about 70 million tons of
copper are in products that are currently in
use. Some of this copper is built into long-
lived products such as buildings and electricity cables, where it has a useful life span of
40 years, on average. Copper is also contained in shorter-lived items such as electronic products and durable goods such as
washing machines, whose useful life ranges
from one to seven years, on average. Even
though copper and its alloys can be easily
recycled, about 40 million tons of the metal
sits in U.S. landfills—as discarded car stereos,
pipes, or other products. (An exception is
copper contained in scrap iron and steel,
which is nearly impossible to separate out
from the ferrous metal.) And U.S. recycling
rates for copper are much higher than the
global average. Just 13 percent of copper
consumed worldwide comes from recycled
sources.62
This is unfortunate, because metals are
eminently recyclable. Used copper or aluminum can be transformed back into the
same amount of metal with very little additional supplement of new metal. Aluminum
from a beverage container can be melted
down, refabricated, and used to make a new
can just weeks after it is dropped into a recy-
Private Investors (24,000 tons)
In Landfills
(40 million tons)
Fabrication
(31,000 tons)
Banks and Institutions
(31,000 tons)
In Use
(70 million tons)
Above ground
Jewelry
(65,000 tons)
Below ground
Above ground
Below ground
Unmined Reserves
(50,000 tons)
Unmined Reserves
(90 million tons)
Source: Lehman Bros.
Source: Zeltner et al.
Figure 6–3. Gold Stocks Above and Below
Ground, 2000
Figure 6–4. U.S. Copper Stocks Above and
Below Ground, 1990s
125
cling bin. Had the 7 millions tons of cans
thrown away by Americans between 1990
and 2000 been recycled, they would have
yielded enough aluminum to make 316,000
Boeing 737 planes—which is about 25 times
the size of the world’s entire commercial
airfleet.63
Why do we expend so much energy trying
to find new underground mines if so much
useful metal lies in cities and landfills? In several countries, the subsidies offered for virgin
materials extraction make it cheaper to dig up
new minerals than to recycle existing, aboveground supplies. Mining companies have
fought hard to maintain this status. In the
United States, for instance, the industry has
staunchly opposed any reforms to the 1872
mining law—and has invested large amounts
of money to maintain this support. Between
mid-1997 and mid-2000, U.S. mining interests contributed almost $21 million to political campaigns.64
Current materials systems are aligned along
the uneven playing field that favors miners and
places recyclers at a disadvantage. For
instance, most smelters and refineries are not
set up to accept secondary sources of material. In Germany, the government introduced
aggressive laws in the 1990s to encourage
recycling—without first ensuring that materials markets could absorb an avalanche of secondary materials, much of which ended up
languishing in warehouses.65
Another constraint to recycling is that
many modern products are made of a complex set of alloys and materials, which are
not easy to separate out and reprocess. But
this is hardly insurmountable: products ranging from computers to cars are being designed
to be disassembled for repair, reuse, and, ultimately, recycling. Mitsubishi makes a washing machine that can be taken apart using just
a screwdriver; Audi makes a 100-percent recyclable car. To aid recycling, some manufac126
turers now put bar codes on parts to identify
the different materials.66
Recognizing the value of scrap metals,
auto recyclers in the Netherlands recycle
about 86 percent by weight of discarded cars.
Most cars there are taken apart and
reprocessed to reclaim materials in hubcaps,
batteries, and other car parts, and this is
funded by a $130 disassembly fee that new car
buyers pay. Encouraged by the Dutch model,
the European Union (EU) has proposed a
Scrap Car Directive, which requires manufacturers to take responsibility for cars at the
end of their useful lives. Under the proposal,
carmakers will have to recycle all recyclable
parts of the vehicle, and 85 percent of all
materials by weight. The EU proposal also
requires manufacturers to discontinue use of
heavy metals such as cadmium, mercury, and
lead in auto parts because of the health risks
they pose during mining, use, and disposal.67
In a similar vein, in June 2000, the European Commission passed a Directive on Waste
from Electronics and Electronic Equipment,
which is slated to become European law in
early 2003. The directive calls for electronics
manufacturers to stop using heavy metals by
2006, and for producers to take financial and
physical responsibility for recycling, including
providing a place for households to return discarded equipment free of charge. Still under
negotiation are recycling and reuse targets for
producers. Currently, 90 percent of the EU’s
electronic waste—from computers, televisions, stereos—ends up in landfills. Many
countries outside Europe, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have
introduced or proposed similar laws requiring electronics firms to take back and recycle
their products.68
Producing materials from secondar y
sources has significantly smaller impacts than
virgin sources would in terms of energy use,
toxic emissions, and occupational health haz-
ards—but it does not eliminate them entirely.
In a sustainable materials system, repair, reuse,
and remanufacture are the methods of first
choice. Recognizing this, the Danish government has banned aluminum cans in favor
of reusable glass bottles—nearly 100 percent
of bottles there are returned and reused.69
Secondary materials options are laborintensive and have the potential to create
many more jobs than mining. But this may not
be reassuring to skilled mine workers in places
with few alternative income sources. If we
are to move to an economy based on less virgin materials mining, a key component will be
investment in transition plans to provide safety
nets and employment opportunities to workers and communities. The Canadian Labour
Congress (CLC) has worked hard to promote “just-transition” plans for workers from
sectors such as chemicals, pulp and paper,
and mining, noting that “just-transition is an
essential part of environmental change.” It has
recommended that displaced workers be
retrained for high-paying, “green” jobs. The
CLC has highlighted the need for unions and
governments to be prepared for change: to
anticipate that environmental imperatives
will—or should—determine the viability of
certain industries and jobs. Trade union federations elsewhere, such as the AFL-CIO in
the United States, and the European Trade
Union Congress, have also endorsed similar
fair transition plans.70
With mining jobs in decline around the
world, governments, firms, and unions have
a tremendous opportunity to create safer,
more meaningful, ecologically sustainable
employment for these workers and the families they support. Following the enormous
layoffs of the 1990s, the South African
Employment Bureau and the National Union
of Mine workers there developed transition
plans to retrain and employ former mine
workers—some whom have found new jobs
in steel and paper recycling, for instance. In
the United States, recycling and remanufacturing employ more than a million people—
many more than its mines, which have about
220,000 workers.71
Why do we expend so much energy
trying to find new underground mines
if so much useful metal lies in cities
and landfills?
Many towns around the world are looking
away from mining and toward more ecologically sustainable industries. Chloride, Arizona, a former silver mining town in the
United States, for instance, is looking toward
wind energy to reinvigorate its economy.
China has 4.3 million mine workers—almost
a third of the world’s work force in mining—
in nearly 400 mining towns. The mines in
some 80 percent of these towns have been
largely depleted, and about 100 nonferrous
metal mines are expected to close down in the
next few years. Li Rongrong, the minister in
charge of the State Economic and Trade
Commission, has urged these moribund mining regions to expand their economies “in line
with sustainable development.”72
Even if we are able to reconfigure our
materials economy so that most of our
resources come from secondary sources, some
mining will likely continue. And there are
many immediate opportunities for improving
the way mines operate. For instance, it makes
sense to do away with some practices that are
very damaging and yield so little benefit—
such as pouring cyanide over tons of ore to
produce a few kilograms of gold that are ultimately used for ornamental purposes. Another
practice ripe for change is the dumping of tailings and other mine wastes into rivers and the
ocean. And any mining that continues must
127
be out of the boundaries of protected areas,
and must be conducted with the free, prior,
and informed consent of local communities.73
In Costa Rica, intact forests are very valuable to the country—ecotourism is the second-largest source of the country’s revenue.
In June 2002, President Abel Pacheco
declared a moratorium on all open-pit mines,
noting that “the true fuel and the true gold
of the future will be water and oxygen; they
will be our aquifers and our forest.” Similarly,
the county of Cotacachi in Ecuador has
banned all forms of mining in order to protect its cloudforest and people.74
Any mining that continues must be out of
the boundaries of protected areas and
conducted with the free, prior, and
informed consent of local communities.
In many parts of the world, a few farsighted leaders are taking strong stands against
the continued use of cyanide, mercury, and
other toxic chemicals in mines. The Baia
Mare spill in Romania in 2000 prompted the
Czech Senate and the German Parliament to
ban gold mining that used cyanide leaching
methods. The Provincial Board of the Mindoro province in the Philippines passed a 25year moratorium on mining in January 2002,
following controversies over cobalt and nickel
mining. And in 1998, a citizens’ initiative in
Montana led to a ban on the use of cyanide
leaching for new mines or expansions of existing mines in the state.75
Removing subsidies handed out to miners,
such as those granted under the U.S. mining
law, would have considerable environmental
benefits—reducing pollution, for instance,
and helping to boost secondary materials
production. It would also add income to the
public treasury—resources that could be
128
directed toward developing more sustainable
materials paths or toward improving social
services such as education or health care.
Charges for mining permits will also need to
be adjusted, to better reflect the long-term
costs of depleting nonrenewable resources.
Polluters must also be held responsible
for damage caused during mine operations
and for the ongoing expenses of mine closure. The cost of trying to clean up hundreds
of thousands of abandoned mines in the
United States alone is estimated as between
$32 billion and $72 billion. Although no
overall estimates exist for cleanup costs at
mines in China, India, South Africa, or Eastern Europe, it is certain that their governments face very large tabs as well. Legislators
and environmental agencies must ensure that
polluters, not taxpayers, foot these bills, by
requiring companies to provide financial
guarantees such as surety bonds before they
are allowed to start mining. Unfortunately,
the Bush administration in the United States
is currently attempting to roll back rules that
have required mining companies to post
reclamation bonds to cover cleanup expenses
at mines.76
Many community groups, environmental and human rights organizations, trade
unions, and policy think tanks around the
world are working together to campaign for
some of these changes, which is contributing
to the momentum for a new approach to
our dependence on minerals and mining.
These regional and international networks
include the Western Mining Activist Network in North America; the African Initiative
on Mining, the Environment, and Society;
the Mines, Minerals, and People network in
India; and the Global Mining Campaign.77
Agencies whose expressed purpose is to
reduce poverty are beginning to reconsider
their role in financing an industry that has
hurt the poor and the environment. Respond-
ing to pressure from environmental and
human rights groups, MIGA cancelled its
risk insurance to Freeport McMoRan’s Grasberg mine in West Papua in 1997. In October 2002, the International Finance
Corporation, the private arm of the World
Bank Group, decided not to back the controversial Rosia Montana gold mine project
in Romania, under directions from Bank president James Wolfensohn. The World Bank is
currently undertaking an Extractive Industries
Review to evaluate its future funding to mining, oil, and gas. The report is due to be
completed at the end of 2003.78
The mining industry itself has begun to
examine its impact on the environment and
communities. In 1998, nine of the world’s
largest mining companies joined together to
review the pressing issues they faced; this
led to a two-year research effort—the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development
(MMSD) Project—which issued a report in
2002. Mining companies also jointly formed
an International Council on Mining & Met-
als, which is now charged with implementing the conclusions of that report. The
MMSD study acknowledges some aspects of
the industry’s role in environmental damage
and human rights violations, but critics note
that it “adds little to the existing debate
about how the minerals sector should evolve
to meet the challenge of sustainable development.”79
There is no question that mineral use has
done much to improve the lives of billions of
people and to foster the development of modern societies. But we are several eons past
the Iron and Bronze Ages of our ancestors—
and should no longer need to use polluting
and destructive methods to continue to obtain
these benefits. Our success in accelerating
the transition to materials systems that are less
polluting, that create healthy and safe jobs,
and that tap into existing supplies will help
determine our legacy to future generations—
and whether ours will be the age that at long
last puts harmful mining practices on the
scrap heap of history.
129
Chapter 7
Uniting Divided Cities
Molly O’Meara Sheehan
When South Africa’s apartheid regime toppled 10 years ago, it captured the imagination
of the world. No other country had plunged
so deep into the twentieth century governed
by laws that brutally divided, by skin color, all
of its cities, towns, and villages. A decade
into a new era, Johannesburg, South Africa’s
largest city, still has a long way to go to overcome this history. Sandton, its prime northern suburb, is a vision in concrete, chrome,
and glass—its skyline punctuated by gleaming five-star hotels, office complexes, and
upscale shopping malls. Soweto, the best
known of the townships erected by blacks
not permitted in the “official” city, remains
for the most part dusty and ramshackle. All
of Johannesburg’s white population had a
toilet in their home in 1995; only half of the
black population did. And as of 1998, only 13
percent of households in Johannesburg’s
black township of Alexandra had one. This
disparity in neighborhoods is echoed in
grossly inadequate access to education and
health care for the black majority.1
While South Africa’s history of racial divi130
sions enshrined in law is unique, its cities
are not the only ones that need to be united.
Cities divided into rich and poor, healthy
and unhealthy, “legal” and “illegal,” are all
too common worldwide. In some sense, this
is nothing new. Plato observed around 400
BC that “any city, however small, is in fact
divided into two, one the city of the poor, the
other of the rich.” Centuries of technological innovations and social progress have done
little to close the gap. Priced out of the
“legal” real estate market, hundreds of millions of people seek shelter in the most precarious places, on steep hillsides or
floodplains, living not only with the constant threat of possible eviction but also more
vulnerable to natural disasters, pollution,
and disease from lack of water and toilets.
More than half the people in Cairo, Nairobi,
and Mumbai (formerly Bombay), for example, lack adequate housing—living in slums
or even on the pavement.2
Slum residents have not gained much from
society’s intense use of key resources over
the last century, a use that has pushed the
UNITING DIVIDED CITIES
Human Development Index, 1998
planet’s support systems to their limits. One
tensions over water. 4
group of scientists has estimated that people
Cities will have to be the building blocks
have transformed half of Earth’s land surof development that values nature and peoface through agriculture, forestry, and urbanple—and they do hold enormous potential for
ization; contributed to a 30-percent increase
both environmental and social progress.
in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
When people are concentrated in one place,
since the beginning of the Industrial Revothey ought to be able to use fewer materials,
lution; and today use more than half of all
and to recycle them with greater ease, than
available surface fresh water. The benefits of
widely dispersed populations can; at the same
all this activity, however, have accrued to a reltime, they should be more easily linked to
atively wealthy minority. In 2001, 52 perschools, health care, and other key services.
cent of the gross world product went to the
Compared with higher forms of government,
12 percent of the world living in industrial
city halls are closer to people, so organized citnations—the same group responsible for a disizens theoretically have a better chance of
proportionate share of industrial timber conchanging the status quo on matters of envisumption, paper use, and carbon emissions.
ronmental and social concern. Throughout
These inequities are perhaps most glaring in
history, higher levels of health and educathe world’s slums, where the poor are exposed
tion have come after periods of urbanization;
to the worst environmental conditions,
today, the countries that rank highest in surincluding pollution from the wealthy.3
veys of freedom and human development are
While the inequalities of wealth, power,
also the most urbanized. City-level investopportunities, and survival prospects that
ments in water infrastructure, waste provision,
health, and education match up with national
hobble humanity are crystallized in cities,
rankings of human development that take
these places will have an important role to
into account life expectancy and literacy. (See
play in any shift toward development that
Figure 7–1.) Many cities perform better or
does not destroy the environment. At the
worse in these measures of “development”
root of sustainable development—which can
than could be explained by income alone,
be defined as meeting the needs of all today
without endangering the prospects of
future generations—is the challenge
1.0
Stockholm, Sweden
of improving the welfare of billions of
people without further undermining
0.8
Earth’s support systems. Cities are
where most of the world’s people
0.6
will live and where an even greater
share of key planetary resources will
0.4
be used in the coming decades. Key
Niamey,
global environmental problems have
0.2
Niger
their roots in cities—from the vehicle exhaust that pollutes and warms
0.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
the atmosphere, to the urban
City Development Index, 1998
demand for timber that denudes
forests and threatens biodiversity, to
Figure 7–1. Link Between Human Development
and City Development, 150 Cities, 1998
the municipal thirst that heightens
131
suggesting that municipal policies can make
a big difference.5
By ensuring that their poorest slum
dwellers feel secure in their own homes, can
make a living, and are healthy, the world’s relatively poorer cities could leapfrog their
wealthier counterparts in the North, creating
an urban model that values both people and
nature. Cities typically are responsible for
granting titles to property, providing water
and waste disposal, organizing public transportation, and making building codes and
land use rules. These activities could be carried out in a way that makes it easier for poor
people to survive, while also having environmental benefits for the whole city and the
world. Local governments can, for instance,
promote metals recycling, organic waste composting, and urban agriculture, can give priority to cheap public transportation, and can
allow people to run small businesses out of
their homes. Such activities have the potential to green cities, create job opportunities,
and reduce the demand for materials from
logging, mining, and industrial agriculture, all
of which take an enormous environmental
toll.
Urban centers in the developing South
now dominate the ranks of the world’s largest
cities, so they are well positioned to capture
the public’s imagination. While most of the
world actually lives in smaller cities, towns,
and villages, big cities command special attention. Many people either know of or have
been to large metropolises, which often serve
as national capitals, financial hubs, sites for
major airports, and centers of commerce and
media. The cities of the industrial North were
center stage in this regard for just a brief
moment in history, claiming all the slots in the
top 10 in 1900. By 2001, however, only
Tokyo and New York remained on that list.
(See Table 7–1.) Demographers expect that
by 2015, Los Angeles and Shanghai will be
132
bumped from the top 10, as Karachi and
Jakarta move up. Why shouldn’t some of the
cities that lead us toward a more equitable and
environmentally friendly model of development be some of these behemoths of the
twenty-first century? 6
In many cases, municipal reforms that benefit the poorest people and nature will be
more likely if city halls become more open and
accountable. Local governments usually do
not boldly address the needs of their poorest
people in ways that would yield wide-ranging
environmental benefits because people who
have more money and influence—from real
estate developers to leaders of polluting industries—often push a different agenda. In the
last decade, some cities have started to include
their poorest citizens in decisionmaking, often
with national and international support. From
slum dwellers federations worldwide to an
innovative budgeting process in many Brazilian cities, poor people’s voices are rising in
open political arenas. If they are to help unite
divided cities, governments will have to work
even more closely with large numbers of poor
urbanites, many of whom live in slums.7
Poverty and Inept
Government in an
Urbanizing World
Slums are an intensely local phenomenon
with growing global significance. A neighborhood-by-neighborhood look at the
world’s cities would reveal that not all poor
people live in slums, and that not all slums are
uniformly poor. As urban poverty concentrates in slums, however, these neighborhoods offer government officials distinct
places on the ground where they could find
and work with some of their poorest constituents.
Although “slums” are generally under-
Table 7–1.World’s 10 Largest Urban Areas, 1000, 1800, 1900, and 2001
1000
1800
1900
2001
(million population)
Cordova1
Kaifeng
Constantinople 2
Angkor
Kyoto
Cairo
Baghdad
Nishapur
Hasa
Anhilvada
0.45
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.18
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.10
Peking 3
London
Canton 4
Edo 5
Constantinople
Paris
Naples
Hangchow 6
Osaka
Kyoto
1.10
0.86
0.80
0.69
0.57
0.55
0.43
0.39
0.38
0.38
London
New York
Paris
Berlin
Chicago
Vienna
Tokyo
St. Petersburg
Manchester
Philadelphia
6.5
4.2
3.3
2.7
1.7
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.4
Tokyo
São Paulo
Mexico City
New York
Mumbai 7
Los Angeles
Calcutta
Dhaka
Delhi
Shanghai
26.5
18.3
18.3
16.8
16.5
13.3
13.3
13.2
13.0
12.8
1 Cordoba today. 2 Istanbul today. 3 Beijing today. 4 Guangzhou today. 5 Tokyo today. 6 Hangzhou today.
Formerly Bombay.
SOURCE: 1000–1900 from Tertius Chandler, Four Thousand Years of Urban Growth: An Historical Census (Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987); 2001 from U.N. Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001
Revision (New York: 2002).
7
stood to be urban areas with miserable living
conditions, they vary dramatically from place
to place and are described by a universe of
overlapping terms—some of them are colorful; many of them, like “slum,” are frankly
negative; and few are synonymous. “Squatter
settlements” are formed when poor people
build shelter on land that does not belong to
them. Such settlements may also be called
“illegal” or “informal,” terms that are often
used interchangeably when describing the
off-the-books nature of some slums. Other
development authorized by landowners that
is not in the squatter category may still be illegal or informal because the land is not zoned
for building, or because it has been unlawfully
subdivided into smaller parcels, or because the
dwellings are not up to the standards of building codes.8
All these terms can give a false impression
of the character of communities without conveying the basic problem of insecurity. Lawabiding people often live in “illegal” housing.
Many “squatter settlements” are packed with
rent-paying tenants. Neighborhoods settled
by squatters decades ago may no longer be
slums. And some illegally built or subdivided
neighborhoods may be upscale from the outset. As every city has its own history, culture, economy, and real estate peculiarities,
each slum has its own look and feel—whether
it’s a kampung in Indonesia, a favela in Brazil,
a gecekondu in Turkey, or a bidonville in parts
of francophone Africa. Despite the tremendous variation, one common characteristic
of slums tends to be the insecurity that residents feel in their own homes, which often
thwarts them from improving their living
conditions and reaching their full potential.9
The United Nations estimates that 712
million people lived in slums in 1993 and
that their ranks swelled to at least 837 million
by 2001, with slum dwellers accounting for
56 percent of the urban population in Africa,
37 percent in Asia and Oceania, and 26 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.
These rough numbers, drawn from surveys
and census data that may be incomplete or
out of date, give some sense of the scale of the
global slum population, although they may
133
well underestimate it. Another U.N.
Billion People
10
study suggests that more than 1 billion
DEVELOPING NATIONS
people worldwide live in slums.10
Urban population
8
Urban growth is meeting up with
Rural population
poverty and inept governments to fuel
6
MORE
DEVELOPED NATIONS
the current proliferation of slums. World
Total
population
population increased by some 2.4 bil4
lion in the past 30 years, and roughly
half of that growth took place in cities.
2
Over the next three decades, the industrial North is not expected to expand in
0
total population very much. In contrast,
2000
2030
1970
demographers believe that in many develFigure 7–2. World Population Growth by
oping countries, urban migration and
Region in 1970 and 2000, with
growth combined with high birth rates
Projection for 2030
will mean that between 2000 and 2030
urban share of world population is likely to
nearly all of the 2.2 billion people added to
have grown from nearly 50 percent today to
world population will end up in urban cenmore than 60 percent.12
ters of the developing world. (See Figure
7–2.) While the size and growth of the urban
While rural people tend to have less access
population in developing nations dominates
to cash, education, clean water, and sanitation
global population projections, there is always
than city dwellers do, the deficits cause more
a lag between censuses, and all nations have
severe problems in an urban setting. People
their own definitions of “urban” that tend to
are less able to grow their own food in cities,
change over time, so these estimates are
so they must rely on the cash economy for
rough.11
survival. Urban jobs tend to require higher
Poverty may be even harder to measure on
levels of education. And inadequate sanitation
a global basis than population size is, but
brings infectious disease to more people in
various studies do point to greater numbers
cities, where dense populations make it easof urban poor. One U.S. dollar will buy far
ier for disease to spread. Addressing the World
Bank in April 2002, economist Jeffrey Sachs
less food in Jakarta or São Paulo than in
noted that too often the fact that most of the
Dacca or Nairobi—and it will buy even less
poor live in rural areas is used to argue for
in New York. For that reason, the internaonly a rural-led growth strategy to end
tional standard of a $1 a day income to denote
poverty. “We need a better urban-based strat“extreme poverty” or lack of money to meet
egy as well,” he pointed out.13
basic food needs invariably underestimates
poverty in cities. Still, the World Bank sugSlums take root when local governments
gests that some 1.2 billion people worldwide
fail to serve large numbers of poor people.
were extremely poor as of 1998, with rural
Many cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin Amersub-Saharan Africa and South Asia hardest hit.
ica have housing laws and codes copied from
Martin Ravallion of the World Bank estithose written in nineteenth- or twentiethmates that the urban share of extreme poverty
century Europe that make little sense in their
is currently 25 percent worldwide, and likely
current context. Poor people, by building
to reach 50 percent by 2035. By then the
their own shelters, have become the devel134
oping world’s “most important organizers,
builders, and planners,” in the words of
researchers Jorge Hardoy and David Satterthwaite. Yet most codes are written not for
these local builders but for engineers or architects in a different time and place. In Nairobi,
for example, Kenyan codes call for the building materials standard in the United Kingdom.14
Even if appropriate housing codes were on
the books, the larger problem of governments being unable or unwilling to enforce
laws and provide needed urban services would
remain. In many countries, national governments have given local governments more
responsibility for providing services in the
last several decades, but have been slower to
give cities money from national tax revenue
or to allow local governments to raise the
needed funds themselves. Moreover, the disparity between the budgets of rich and poor
cities is striking. A survey of 237 cities worldwide shows an average municipal revenue
per person of just $15.20 in Africa, $248.60
in Asia, $252.20 in Latin America, and
$2,763.30 in Western Europe, the United
States, Japan, and the rest of the industrial
world. The ratio of city budgets in Africa to
those of the industrial world, 1:182, is far
higher than the 1:51 ratio of per capita
income between sub-Saharan Africa and highincome nations.15
As money buys political influence virtually
everywhere in the world, bribes and kickbacks often keep cash-strapped local officials
in developing nations from operating in the
interests of their poorest constituents. The
nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency International, in a ranking of 102
nations, found corruption rampant in many
nations with large or growing numbers of
urban poor, including Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda.16
The available data on population, poverty,
and corruption, while patchy, thus suggest
that the conditions for large and growing
slums exist in many parts of the world. The
areas of particular concern include sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and parts of Latin
America. (See Figure 7–3).17
The Paradox of Slums
A slum can demonstrate both the very best
and the very worst in society, showing the
ingenuity of poor people in desperate circumstances as well as the failure of government to make the most of this human energy.
People who are not born into informal settlements may find their way there because
their other options are far bleaker. While the
energy that people in slums may invest in
securing a better future for their families
shows the resiliency of the human spirit, if
government were functioning well, people
would not have to try so hard to achieve a
decent standard of living. Mtumba, an informal community in Nairobi, is one place where
it is easy to see both the good and the bad
aspects of life in a slum. (See Box 7–1.)18
All over the world, people move to new
places for better opportunities, and when
they choose informal settlements in urban
areas it is often because these slums, shantytowns, or squatter settlements offer the best
chance for them to survive. In some cases,
slums may offer the most affordable lodging
close to jobs, even if the location still requires
a very long commute. In general, the “offthe-books” nature of informal communities
confers certain advantages. People can skirt
zoning laws that separate residences from
businesses, and can set up shop inside their
home or just outside. Plus they face low
short-term costs: low rent and no property
taxes.
But the same informality that may help
poor people gain a tenuous toehold on the
135
42 countries (of 77 surveyed) where at least 10
percent of the population lives on less than $1 a day
67 countries with urban growth rate over 4 percent
Source:World Bank, UNPD,
Transparency Intl.
Figure 7–3.
35 most corrupt countries (of 102 surveyed)
The Overlap of Poverty, Urban Growth, and Corruption
ladder toward economic security can also
prevent them from moving up that ladder. As
informal settlements legally do not exist, people who live there often lack not only money
and political power, but any legal means of
solving problems. The owners of slum
dwellings can more easily get away with charging exorbitant rents. Although the share of
residents who are owners versus renters varies
among communities, the proportion of
renters is often higher than commonly
thought (people assume that most, if not all,
inhabitants are recent migrants who have
built their own accommodation). The shacks
can be lucrative investments, but their owners do not typically reinvest their profits by
repairing them or hooking them up to electricity or water, and tenants have no way to
hold landlords accountable.19
A related irony is that the poorest urban
136
residents often pay the highest price for essential goods and services that are delivered by
government at much lower cost to wealthier
residents. In some cases, this is because a
household without a formal address does not
qualify for hookup to the public water system,
entry into public schools, or other essentials.
In Mumbai, for example, pavement dwellers
have trouble obtaining the cards that qualify
poor people for food aid and health care.
What makes informal settlements so cheap in
the short term is that the cost of urban services are not factored in from the beginning,
as they would be in the formal construction
sector; in the latter case, the government
provides streets and services and someone
buys the land at the outset, then the buildings
are constructed, and only afterwards do people move into finished houses. In contrast,
informal settlements begin with people mov-
BOX 7–1. LIFE IN MTUMBA, A NAIROBI SLUM
The view from a mound of dirt and rubbish on
the edge of Mtumba, a Nairobi neighborhood, is
striking.To the south, acacia bushes dot the
grass plains of Nairobi National Park as far as
the eye can see; to the north lies the dense collection of one-story shacks that constitute
Mtumba—5–6 hectares where roughly 6,000
people crowd into 800 makeshift structures
that are cobbled together with mud, wattle,
plastic tarps, and iron sheets. Priced out of the
“formal” real estate market, like 55 percent of
Nairobi’s residents, the people of Mtumba have
settled in “informal” housing—and this can be
both cheered and despaired. Many have fought
hard to make it to Nairobi, and surmount daily
challenges not only to survive but to improve
their community. If government worked properly, it would tap this human potential rather
than squander it.
On paper—in local maps and laws—the
borders of the National Park’s 11,700 hectares
are well defined, helping to protect the rhinos
and giraffes that live there.What does not
show up on any map is Mtumba.This means
that its residents are endangered, receiving no
protection from the law. Mtumba’s families have
moved twice, landing in their current location
in 1992, where they have had their homes completely demolished once and been threatened
with eviction several times.“Every day we are
waiting for the demolition squad,” says George
Ng’ang’a.“We are refugees in our own country.”
Ng’ang’a, like others, came to Mtumba
because it offered a respite from rural violence
and a closer proximity to jobs. He says his family’s land was taken by the colonial Kenyan government in 1952 to build a golf course.“My
ing onto land, then building homes and businesses over time, and only later, if at all,
negotiating connections to urban streets,
water systems, and electricity grids and obtaining title to property.20
As a result, poor people often end up
father was a businessman,” he says,“so we went
to different places, like nomads.” Ng’ang’a continued the itinerant lifestyle, always looking for
better opportunities for himself, his wife, and
their children.“We came to the Nairobi slums,
even though I have an education.”
For several years in a row the people of
Mtumba have chosen George Ng’ang’a to be
the leader of the community’s governing council in informal elections. Residents have elected
a committee that has built a school, where four
teachers juggle morning and afternoon shifts to
teach more than 400 children. On Sundays,
community leaders convene committee meetings in the school, Mtumba’s sturdiest structure,
with a wood frame and corrugated metal walls
and roof.
Even with this concerted effort, Mtumba
remains ineligibile for basic urban services. Residents share three pit latrines and two water
taps.“It’s expensive,” says Tom Werunga of the
water that private companies truck in and
hook up to the taps.“A family needs 100 liters
per day for drinking and cleaning.” This costs 25
Kenyan shillings, nearly half the earnings of
someone who makes 50–60 shillings per day, as
Werunga does. Nairobi’s slum dwellers pay
more than residents of wealthy housing estates
for water—as a result, they use less than
enough to meet health needs.The under-five
mortality rate is more than 151 per thousand
births in Nairobi slums, far higher than the
average for the city as a whole (61 per
thousand) and 25 percent more than in rural
Kenya (113 per thousand).
SOURCE: See
endnote 18.
building their own schools and latrines and
purchasing water, at a very high cost, from
private vendors. The price of water in the
slums may be 7–11 times the tap price of
piped water in wealthier areas in Nairobi,
12–25 times the tap price in Dhaka, 16–34
137
times the tap price in Tegucigalpa, 20–60
times the tap price in Surabaya, and 28–83
times the tap price in Karachi. Toilet stalls,
generally operated by governments rather
than private vendors, are not as pricey but far
less common. Pointing to deficiencies in data
supplied by governments, researchers at the
UK-based International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) have estimated that as much as two thirds of the urban
population in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has no safe way to dispose of human
waste.21
Water that is too expensive for slum
dwellers to use in adequate amounts, combined with few toilets, leads to disease. When
asked at an international conference to sum
up the worst environmental health threats
to poor people in cities of the developing
world, IIED’s David Satterthwaite showed a
slide with a single word: “shit.” At a later
meeting, renowned epidemiologist Sir
Richard Doll provided a more thorough summary: “bugs and shit.” Slum dwellers pay
more for each liter of water they consume
than wealthier residents hooked up to municipal water mains and sewers, and they disproportionately suffer from water- and
waste-borne pathogens—from diarrhea-causing E. coli and rota virus to roundworm. “Put
bluntly,” writes health researcher Carolyn
Stephens, “the poor pay more for their
cholera.” Gullies filled with stagnant water
often serve as cesspools in slums, and attract
mosquitoes, so slum residents are also more
vulnerable to malaria. (See Chapter 4.) 22
Furthermore, the money slum dwellers
spend on water, kerosene, or other key items
from private vendors does not reach public
coffers, where it could then be used to extend
public services, from water pipes to health
clinics, into slums. In Mumbai, local authorities are beginning to understand that bringing slum dwellers “onto the books” will help
138
the city, and they are now working with the
National Slum Dwellers Federation and its
partners, other NGOs. “From sanitation to
access to policymaking—when poor people
are allowed these things, government has an
easier job,” says Sheela Patel, who directs an
NGO in Mumbai, the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC),
that works with slum dwellers.23
Slums can also breed disease that threatens
broader public health. While pathogens travel
quickly in crowded slum conditions, they do
not stop at the gates of wealthier enclaves. By
weakening people’s immune systems, the
AIDS virus makes people more susceptible to
other communicable diseases, speeding the
transmission of airborne pathogens such as the
tuberculosis bacteria. Both HIV and tuberculosis are spreading rapidly in urban centers
of the developing world.24
Moreover, economic inequality, in the
form of glaring disparities between poor slums
and posh gated enclaves, may itself be a drag
on public health. Researchers comparing U.S.
metropolitan areas found a higher level of
premature deaths in the places with the highest income inequality, while in 13 industrial
countries there were lower levels of premature
deaths from certain diseases in more egalitarian countries. One theory to explain these
findings is that cities or countries with high
levels of inequality may be underinvesting in
important physical and social infrastructure,
such as education, that could serve to prevent
some diseases. Another possibility is that high
levels of inequality contribute to social tensions that stress people; as the immune system
takes cues from both body and mind, people
under stress are more susceptible to illness.25
The persistence of slums in an era of
unprecedented prosperity may also contribute
to tensions that threaten local, national, and
even global security. Slums do not create
criminals, but the lack of policing in bad
neighborhoods allows criminals to victimize
a city’s poorest people. Following the September 2001 attacks on the United States,
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote that in an increasingly interconnected world, it will be impossible to ignore
the problems of people living in desperate
conditions at home or abroad: “If you don’t
visit a bad neighborhood, a bad neighborhood will visit you.” The educated and relatively wealthy young hijackers who used
planes as weapons on September 11 did not
come from the slums; however, the contrast
of poverty in the Middle East with wealth in
the United States and Western Europe
appears to have been at least one factor motivating their actions.26
From Bulldozing to Upgrading
Governments around the world have taken
various tacks to address slums over the years,
with spurts of change as urbanization transformed the United Kingdom and other
nations of the west from the mid-nineteenth
to early twentieth centuries, then Latin America in the mid-twentieth century, and then
much of Asia and Africa in recent years.
Whether razing blighted neighborhoods or
building giant public housing projects, governments have been slow to consult poor
people when making plans to improve their
living conditions. Over time, the potential
for organized citizens to transform their own
neighborhoods has become much clearer.
Individuals working in Latin America led
the way in showing policymakers the contributions of poor people. John F. C. Turner, a
British architect, helped secure a major World
Bank loan in 1958 to work with communities to rebuild after a devastating earthquake
in Lima, Peru. He says that he and his colleagues “soon realized that our professional
assumptions of design, construction and man-
agerial superiority were exaggerated, to say the
least. We soon learned that we needed our
supposed clients’ own knowledge and the
skills of local builders—and how badly our
own bright ideas ignored their realities.”27
Turner drew on his experiences working in
Lima and elsewhere to give a scathing critique
of prevailing government policy in 1976:
“Comparing the cities that the poor build
with the ‘redevelopment’ schemes built to
‘rehabilitate’ the poor, one could paraphrase
Churchill: Never in urban history did so many
of the poor do so much with so little; and
never before did so few of the rich do so little with so much.” That same year, U.S.
scholar Janice Perlman published the findings
of her research in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro
in The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty
and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, which found
that policymakers’ assumptions about favelados were “empirically false, analytically misleading, and pernicious in their policy
implications,” as these poor people gave much
more to the city than they got in return.28
To better support the efforts of poor
urbanites, governments and NGOs adopted
two general tactics. One was to set aside land
for them, and in some cases equip that land
with water taps or other services. This became
known as the “sites” or “sites-and-services”
approach. Governments were not always able
to find suitable land to do this, however.
With the second method, “upgrading,” governments worked with residents to extend
streets or sewers into existing communities.
A few countries launched into this on a
national scale. In many other cases, community groups or NGOs took the lead.29
Indonesia was one of the first of just a few
countries to make a national policy of helping slum residents upgrade their neighborhoods. As urban populations grew in the
mid-twentieth century, local governments
there responded by evicting people who set139
tled on land not designated for housing. But
by the late 1960s, government officials also
began to focus on improving conditions in
existing informal settlements, or kampungs.
With the first Kampung Improvement Programmes, city governments provided concrete slabs and gutters on demand to
kampung residents in Indonesia’s two largest
cities, Jakarta and Surabaya. People used these
to construct paths and drains. In the 1970s,
as these efforts attracted the support of
national government and international agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Government of the
Netherlands, the program was extended to
hundreds of cities and towns.30
Activists from Mumbai have been at
the forefront in mobilizing a global
push for the rights of slum residents.
Initially, the program in Surabaya was seen
by some as proceeding too slowly. The
Surabaya Institute of Technology helped to
broker extensive agreements between the
kampung communities and the local government, which made the process more timeconsuming. People in Surabaya’s kampungs
ended up with more ownership of and
responsibility for the improvements they
made—which is often given as a reason that
improvements in Surabaya’s kampungs continue to be made to this day. As of 1990, the
living conditions of some 1.2 million people
were improved; a more recent annual review
done by the Surabaya Institute of Technology
in 2001, found that the bulk of low-income
people had benefited in some way.31
In the slums of Cairo, NGOs have helped
to strengthen the capabilities of industrious
residents—in particular, the Zabbaleen, a
marginalized social group who survive as
140
wastepickers (zabbaleen is Arabic for garbage
collector). In the 1940s, this group started
collecting garbage to bring back to their settlements, where they would sort out the recyclable, nonorganic material and use the
organic waste (food scraps and so on) to feed
animals they bred in their homes for milk,
eggs, and meat. By the 1970s, Cairo’s burgeoning population was creating more waste
than the collectors could handle. In 1981, an
NGO called Environmental Quality International received a Ford Foundation grant to
work with the Zabbaleen—in particular, with
Zabbaleen Gameya, a group formed in the
1970s to focus on the welfare of garbage
collectors.32
Over the next decade, the resulting Zabbaleen Environment and Development Programme helped improve both the living
conditions of the Zabbaleen and the waste
collection capacity of the city. In 1984, technical advisors working with the Zabbaleen
set up a composting plant in the community
of Mokattam, where many of them lived.
Residents could take waste from any animals
they bred to the plant, removing a health
hazard from their homes. The income from
the compost sales supported the start-up of
rag and paper recycling, another income
source, the proceeds of which were used to
launch literacy classes and health projects. In
1986, the garbage collectors’ group introduced some low-cost technologies that made
recycling nonorganic waste much easier. As a
result, Mokattam became Cairo’s main trading post for plastic, paper, cardboard, and
metal.33
Although the program has fallen short of
some of its goals, the Zabbaleen have made
real gains, building water and wastewater systems, schools, and health clinics—and they
could do better still with government support.
Between 1979 and 1991, infant mortality
decreased from 240 per thousand to 117.
Today, about 40,000 Zabbaleen work in the
daily pickup and recycling of some 3,000
tons of household trash, about one third of
the city’s total garbage output, at no cost to
the government. As Cairo moves toward contracting with private companies for waste services, the city risks destroying the Zabbaleen’s
door-to-door system that generates seven to
eight full-time jobs per ton of waste and recycles 80 percent of the waste it collects. While
NGOs have taken the lead in working with
the Zabbaleen, the city government could
now step in, using the funds it would spend
on a large international waste contractor to
partner with the Zabbaleen and improve their
working conditions.34
In India, since 1987 the National Slum
Dwellers Federation (NSDF) has partnered
with social workers, researchers, students,
doctors, and other professionals in the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres, as well as with a collective of women’s
groups called Mahila Milan (“women
together”), to engage government officials as
partners in improving the living conditions of
poor people in Mumbai. Some 40 percent of
people there live in slums or other forms of
degraded housing, while perhaps another 10
percent live with no roof above their heads,
on the pavement.35
The coalition of NSDF, SPARC, and
Mahila Milan, known as the Alliance, has
organized communities around a project of
common interest—say, improving working
conditions or building a toilet—and then
used that project to negotiate with officials
and to give local authorities, national government, and international agencies an idea
of what might be accomplished with greater
support. Refusing to deliver slums as “vote
banks” to local politicians, the Alliance instead
offers to work with whomever is in power.36
Among other achievements, this coalition
has shown that when poor people have set-
tled in places that are not safe, communities
and government officials must cooperate to
figure out a better solution. Many of Mumbai’s poor people made their homes in
shanties on the land alongside the rail lines,
where they are ineligible for basic services
and risk being hit by trains. With the Alliance,
these shanty dwellers began to organize themselves in the late 1980s, conducting a census,
starting a savings group, and approaching
the government with proposals for relocation. They made some headway in the mid1990s, when the government began to
negotiate with the World Bank on a major
project that would expand Mumbai’s rail network and construct new roads—and in the
process displace many families. The government invited railway communities to participate in organizing their relocation. When
rail authorities started illegally demolishing
shacks in February 2000, the Alliance documented the activity, forcing the bulldozers to
stop. The next month, some 4,000 families
moved into new accommodations.37
Activists from Mumbai have also been at
the forefront in mobilizing a global push for
the rights of slum residents. In 1996, the
National Slum Dwellers Federation of India,
partner NGOs, and the Asian Coalition for
Housing Rights joined forces with the South
African Homeless People’s Federation to
forge Shack/Slum Dwellers International
(SDI). Today, SDI boasts members from
Argentina, Cambodia, Colombia, India,
Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Nepal, the
Philippines, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Through this
network, slum residents are organizing themselves and learning from each other. Communities collect data on their neighborhoods,
set up savings accounts that eventually can be
turned into revolving loan funds, and negotiate with officials to change government
policies in their favor.38
141
The importance of local governments
working with their poorest citizens comes
through in these stories from Indonesia,
Egypt, and India: extensive consultation with
neighborhood residents in Surabaya helped
the government improve slums there; in
Cairo, NGOs helped the wastepickers develop
their living areas—an improvement that could
be lost if government does not join in now;
and Mumbai’s slum dwellers, together with
NGOs, are showing government officials how
they would gain by better partnerships.
Securing Homes and Jobs
Policymakers often describe “slum upgrading” in terms of discrete projects—but that
mindset will not yield the kind of systematic
changes in land rules, city services, and access
to finance needed to encourage and build
on the work of communities. Surveying
papers on the performance of “aid” projects,
the editors of Environment and Urbanization
found poor urban people puzzled, and in
some cases angered, by the activity in which
they had little chance to participate and that
fizzled out when the advisors left. Governments could better use their power to be
effective partners with slum dwellers in two
broad areas: helping residents secure their
homes and improving their prospects of making a living.39
A central problem blocking wider adoption
of “self-help” solutions is that—in the eyes of
the law—residents of informal settlements
do not belong on the land they live on. People have difficulty convincing themselves, let
alone anyone else, to invest in improving
their neighborhood if there is a widespread
perception that it all could be bulldozed the
next day. In the Mokattam settlement of
Cairo and the kampungs of Surabaya, in contrast, people had a sufficient sense of security
that they would not be summarily evicted.
142
And in Mumbai, activists negotiated deals
with local governments before proceeding
with upgrading projects. Thus governments
could take steps to ensure that more poor
people feel safe in their own homes.40
The most obvious way for a family to
secure their home is by getting a title to the
property. If governments were to grant people in informal settlements this legal recognition, it theoretically could open up new
opportunities for development, and even
credit—a point made most famously by Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who
describes buildings without titles as “dead
capital,” useful only for whatever shelter they
provide. Buildings with titles, in contrast,
can have a whole other “life” in capital markets, where their owners can leverage them.
De Soto was instrumental in prompting Peru
to undertake a massive titling program that
formalized some 1 million urban land parcels
between 1996 and 2000, first in the pueblos
jovenes of Lima, and then in other cities.41
Evidence from various cities, including
Lima, suggests that titling may not be a “onesize-fits-all” first step, however, as it is not just
red tape but murky questions of land ownership that separate the informal from the
formal world. In Lima, as in many Latin
American cities, numerous informal settlements took shape as groups of settlers planned
“invasions” of unused public land. Switching
the title from the state to the residents has
therefore been fairly straightforward. Lima’s
land titling operation has been criticized for
starting with these easy cases and avoiding settlements on private land, where the ownership
situation may be much more complex.42
Indeed, in much of Africa and Asia, many
informal settlements are on private land, and
sorting out ownership can be complicated
by a mix of colonial land laws and indigenous,
customary laws. Shlomo Angel, who surveyed housing indicators in more than 50
cities worldwide for a joint World Bank/UNHABITAT program in the 1990s, argues that
the formal land market simply has not worked
well for poor people in these places, so that
even if governments could formalize every
parcel of land quickly, this would raise prices
and ultimately not serve the interests of many
poor people.43
Rather than two clearcut categories of
“legal” and “illegal” settlement, a continuum exists with varying degrees of security,
as intermediate forms of tenure confer some
of the advantages of property rights to people who lack legal titles. Some ad hoc arrangements have arisen over time and become
widely accepted, whereas others were introduced by governments. Reviewing more than
a dozen examples of non-title means of
achieving secure tenure from around the
world, British development analyst Geoffrey
Payne concludes that governments should
“maintain a wide range of statutory, customary, and non-statutory tenure options,
so that all households, especially the poor
and vulnerable, can obtain access to land,
shelter, services and livelihood opportunities
in ways that meet their short- and longer-term
needs.” 44
Over the years, policymakers have more
widely recognized people’s right to secure
housing. UN-HABITAT launched a new
global campaign for secure tenure in 1999,
helping national and local governments
change laws and policies to promote housing
rights and oppose forced evictions. Heads of
state meeting in New York for the United
Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 pledged
to achieve a significant improvement in the
lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020,
with the two measures of “improvement” to
be access to better sanitation and security of
tenure—a goal initially set forth by the Cities
Alliance, a joint effort of the World Bank,
UN-HABITAT, associations of local author-
ities, and bilateral aid agencies launched in
1999.45
When asked how improved security will be
measured, Billy Cobbett of the Cities Alliance
acknowledges: “It’s tricky.” Many governments do not count slum dwellers in their
censuses, let alone measure their sense of
security. Nonetheless, says Cobbett, this goal
is forcing national governments, local authorities, and the World Bank to begin to realign
themselves to better serve the needs of the
poor.46
The second area where governments need
to take action is in improving the livelihood
prospects of the poor. Most people come to
cities seeking a better life, holding out the
hope of finding a job. Indeed, the top concern of mayors worldwide, according to one
survey, is jobs. Many cities, in their quest for
economic development, look outward rather
than inward—trying to lure large companies
to set up shop within their borders, for example. Some mayors will overlook lax environmental standards or poor working conditions
as long as companies bring much-needed
jobs to their people. But cities could do much
more to match the desire of poor people for
employment with work that would actually
improve the local environment. One local
government that has just started to make
strides in this area is the tiny county of Cotacachi in Ecuador. (See Box 7–2.) While
national governments often retain control of
education, which is central to boosting job
skills, cities can carry out many of their duties
in ways that widen poor people’s access to
employment. Key areas for cities to target
include water and waste services, urban agriculture, transportation and land use decisions, and small-scale credit operations.47
Mounds of refuse and inadequate water
and sanitation in poor urban communities
suggest jobs in construction and service provision that desperately need to be filled. To
143
BOX 7–2. GREENING LIVELIHOODS IN COTACACHI, ECUDAOR
In Cotacachi County, Ecuador, a local
government is working with an umbrella organization of NGOs and some 37,000 citizens to
transform the economy so that people will be
making a living in ways that do not harm the
environment. Cotacachi County lies between
the western slope of the Andes mountains and
the Pacific Ocean, in Ecuador’s largely rural
northern province of Imbabura.While Cotacachi is small and relatively rural, even the
world’s biggest cities could take lessons from
the way its local leadership is striving to create
green jobs for poor citizens.
“One of the significant driving forces for
the creation of the ecological county was our
encounter with some typical faces of unsustainable development,” writes Carlos Zorrilla,
president of an environmental NGO called
DECOIN. Since the 1960s, land reform policies
had encouraged small farmers to farm mountainous areas covered by tropical forests
unsuited to the task, while the World Bank,
Mitsubishi, and others had proposed large
mining projects.
In 1996, the county elected a new mayor,
this end, municipal authorities could partner with slum dwellers who need both wages
and cleaner streets. The system of garbage collection and recycling in Cairo discussed earlier is an example of an opportunity for
municipal authorities to partner with people
in low-income settlements for mutual benefit. Starting in 1997, the municipality of Santo
Andre in São Paulo, Brazil, started a program that employs people, many of whom
previously could not find work, to collect
and recycle garbage.48
City governments could also do much
more to link water and waste services to
urban agriculture, which by itself stands to
provide both jobs and nutrition. When com144
Auki Tituaña, who introduced annual participatory assemblies.The next year, members of
DECOIN proposed the creation of an “ecocanton.” Over the course of three years,
citizens and local authorities hammered out a
new ecological ordinance, which clearly states
things that are not to be done: no mining, no
logging near water sources, no farming of
genetically modified crops, and no industries
that could introduce toxic elements, such as
cyanide, mercury, lead, or other heavy metals,
to the environment. But it also provides measures for positive change—from requiring
garbage to be separated and recycled, to financial incentives to owners of native forests for
sustainable management, to promotion of
organic farming.To pursue less damaging businesses, the county is studying the flower industry, researching cleaner technologies for leather
crafting, and seeking markets for “green products” such as shade-grown organic coffee. In
2002, UNESCO awarded Cotacachi a Cities for
Peace Prize for these and other efforts.
SOURCE: See
endnote 47.
posted, organic trash—paper, food scraps,
and even human waste—turns into a valuable
resource that could be used on crops within
or around cities. Rosario, a city of more than
1 million in Argentina, is one place where
people are nourishing farms and gardens with
urban compost, reducing the problems and
costs of waste management while growing
food. People in Rosario’s Empalme Graneros,
a villa miseria or slum, separate organic waste
from trash they collect, compost it, and sell
it as fertilizer or use it on their own gardens.49
While composting offers a natural link
between sanitation and agriculture, some
cities in Latin America have introduced a
“human-made” way of connecting the two.
Since 1991, Curitiba, Brazil, a city whose
metropolitan region includes some 2.5 million people, has taken the money it would
have paid waste collectors to fetch garbage
from hard-to-reach slums and has spent it
instead on food from local farms on the urban
periphery. For every bag of garbage brought
to a waste collection site, a low-income family gets a bag of locally grown vegetables and
fruits. In Juiz de Fora, a city of about 600,000
inhabitants in the Brazilian state of Minas
Gerais, families receive a liter of milk for each
10 kilograms (22 pounds) of garbage.50
In the first global survey of urban agriculture for the U.N. Development Programme, Jac Smit and colleagues at The
Urban Agriculture Network estimated that
800 million urban farmers harvest 15 percent
of the world’s food supply in a variety of
ways, from growing vegetables on rooftops or
in market gardens on vacant plots to raising
fish in wastewater filtered through aquatic
plants. Tilapia and carp cultivated this way in
Calcutta provide safe food and a source of
income. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, policies
to promote urban agriculture have been in
place since 1982; today, some 90 percent of
leafy vegetables come from urban agriculture, which employs 20 percent of residents,
ranking as the city’s second largest source of
employment. To bring more poor people
into urban agriculture, city governments
worldwide could include space for farmers’
markets in land use plans, grant temporary
leases for gardens in vacant lots, link urban
farmers to sources of credit, and promote
organic farming methods that use local compost and eliminate the need for chemical fertilizers and pesticides.51
Other municipal decisions that affect the
job prospects of the poor include those concerning transportation and land use. Whether
or not someone can find a job in a city is inor-
dinately influenced by the famous real estate
maxim: location, location, location. The best
locations for people who do not have extra
money to spend on transportation are those
that are not far from places of business. Zoning laws that separate homes from businesses
discriminate against the poor, as do decisions
to invest in infrastructure for private cars
rather than dedicated bus lanes, cheap paratransit (such as mini-buses), safe pedestrian
walkways, or bicycle paths.52
Jeff Maganya, former East Africa Transport
Program Manager of the Intermediate Technology Development Group, notes that politicians and policymakers in Nairobi, as in other
national capitals, generally have cars themselves and are often out of touch with the
transportation realities of Nairobi’s car-less
population. “More than 95 percent of money
that is meant to tackle transport issues in
Kenya goes to motorization, while less than
5 percent of Kenyans actually own cars,” says
Maganya. “Most people who make decisions,” he adds, “have only seen bicycles as a
pastime, as something they buy for their kids.
So bicycles have been seen as recreational
things, and have been heavily taxed.” Indeed,
for many years, a large fee for registering
bicycles prevented poor people from buying
them. When Kenya reduced its tax on bicycles from 80 percent to 20 percent between
1986 and 1989, bicycle sales surged by 1,500
percent.53
Curitiba, Brazil, launched a public bus
system in the 1970s that showed that giving
higher priority to the transport and location
needs of the less affluent majority paid citywide dividends—and some other cities in
South America have followed suit. In
Curitiba, several main roadways radiating
from the city’s core serve as express busways.
Bus stops are futuristic glass tubes where
people pay in advance while protected from
the elements, and then quickly step directly
145
onto the bus without having to walk up
steps—all elements of a subway system at a
fraction of the cost. Before the buildings
along the transportation corridors were fully
developed, the city bought up strategic land
and set it aside for affordable housing. In
1998, Mayor Enrique Peñalosa started similar transformations in Bogotá, Colombia.
The city commissioned a fleet of cleaner,
more efficient buses, invited bus operators to
bid on them, and gave the buses their own
lanes to circumvent traffic. Electronic ticketing makes transferring between buses easier,
and satellite-based communication boosts
safety, as bus drivers can call for help when
needed. Lima, Peru, is planning a similar system, and activists in Santiago, Chile, are also
pushing for one.54
A final area where governments could do
more to help the survival prospects of the
poor is credit. Even in the United States,
which has a long tradition of credit, it took
a spate of bank mergers in the 1990s to make
banks take note of a pioneering 1977 law, the
Community Reinvestment Act. This required
banks proposing to merge with another company to prove that they had met the credit
needs of low-income people in their communities. The effect was dramatic, write Paul
Grogan and Tony Proscio in Comeback Cities:
“It was as if the flat earth of retail banking had
suddenly found its Columbus. Banks by the
hundreds were planting new flags in the former terra incognita of the inner city.” Total
lending in poor U.S. neighborhoods averaged $3 billion a year between 1977 and
1989; it soared to $43 billion in 1997. 55
Finance is important in slums because the
lack of affordable credit prevents people from
building infrastructure into poor settlements
from the beginning. In much the same way
that intermediate forms of tenure may offer
people enough security to improve their living conditions, smaller-scale financial insti146
tutions may allow people to take a step toward
working themselves out of poverty. From
India to Brazil, small-scale lending or “microcredit” is growing in significance as a source
of loans for shelter and small business in poor
urban neighborhoods. (See Table 7–2.)56
Just as titling programs might not be a
practical first step in securing tenure for many
people, a loan is a long shot for most of the
world’s urban poor. People need to be able
to document their solvency before they can
contemplate taking out a loan. For this reason, Shack/Slum Dwellers International
makes group efforts to save money the cornerstone of its approach. In South Africa,
slum communities that have joined the South
African Homeless People’s Federation have
established savings groups. They pooled their
savings to start a revolving loan fund, which
opened for business in 1995 and attracted the
support of the South African government.
Slum residents in Cambodia, India, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Zimbabwe have
launched similar savings groups. Assessing
the results of community-savings schemes
worldwide, one analyst concludes that “when
money goes into community savings, it circulates many times—helping build houses
and start small businesses; helping people in
crisis; paying school fees and doctor’s bills—
generating more assets and options for people’s future.” 57
Opening Up City Hall
Finding ways for poor people to feel secure
in their homes and make a living are things
governments should place at the top of their
“to do” lists—but too often do not. Opportunities to meet the needs of the poorest
urban residents while making cities more verdant and vibrant places are rarely seized, as the
wealthy, even if a small minority, have greater
political power, especially when politicians
Table 7–2. Selected Microfinance Institutions Operating in Slums
Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) Bank,Ahmedabad, India
SEWA, which started in 1972, opened a bank in 1974. It now has 35,936 clients and nearly $11 million in
outstanding loans, half of which are for housing.All SEWA members are self-employed women, and 70 percent live in urban Ahmedabad.They make monthly savings deposits, held as lien against defaults, and have
a 96 percent repayment rate.The municipal government and the private sector match savings of SEWA
members to provide infrastructure in slums through the Parivartan slum upgrading project, which has
helped reduce serious illness in slums.
Payatas Scavengers’ Association Savings and Loan, Quezon City, Philippines
The association started in 1993, and loans began in 1997. It has 5,953 clients and $1.3 million in outstanding loans. Payatas is a village of 300,000 on a 15-hectare municipal dump outside Manila. Scavengers’ association members are wastepickers in the bottom 30 percent of the national income distribution.About 80
percent use their homes, made of scavenged building materials, for sorting trash to sell, reuse, or recycle.
Members make weekly savings deposits and can take out loans for small businesses, land, or housing.
Women receive 98 percent of all the housing loans.The government has asked the Payatas community
to consult on housing issues.
uTshani Fund, for members of the Homeless People’s Federation, South Africa
The organization started in 1990, and began loans in 1995. It has 70,000 clients and $2.7 million in
outstanding loans. Homeless People’s Federation members are shack dwellers in the bottom 20 percent
of national income distribution. Some 80 percent live in cities and 15 percent in peri-urban areas; 60 percent use their home for sewing, selling fruit, carpentry, or other micro-enterprises. Some 10 percent of
members are homeless and 60 percent live on land with no secure title, which is needed to receive housing subsidies from the South African government.An NGO called People’s Dialogue helps members
secure title and receive the subsidies, while uTshani provides loans.There is a repayment rate of 95 percent for enterprise loans and 93 percent for housing loans.Women receive 90 percent of loans, and all
the housing loans.
Banco Palmas, Palmeira District, Fortaleza, Brazil
The institution started in 1998 and had 900 clients as of 2001. Palmeira is a favela of 30,000, including
1,200 street children.With an initial loan of 2,000 reales from an NGO, the Palmeira Residents Association
started Banco Palmas to guarantee micro-loans with low interest rates without proof of income (neighbors
serve as guarantors of good credit) and to issue credit cards, which are now used by more than 500 families. Between 1998 and 2000, local business sales increased by 30 percent and generated 80 new jobs. Bank
clients have worked through a solidarity network to pave streets, clean drainage canals, and construct a
school. Some 65 percent of all bank clients are women.
SOURCE: See
endnote 56.
can be bribed. Since the 1990s, poor people
have gained some measure of political power
as slum dwellers have united within cities and
even across national borders, as a number of
Brazilian cities have opened city budget decisions to public scrutiny, and as various cities
worldwide have started to truly engage citi-
zens in setting local priorities. National governments and international agencies must do
more to support these efforts to open up
city halls around the world.58
In 2002, Patrick McAuslan, an expert on
urban land law at the University of London,
reflected on his decades of experience advis147
ing policymakers: “I began to wonder
whether one of the problems that we’ve had
in dealing with land issues is that we’ve never
addressed sufficiently the politics of land.
The fact is that the current land tenure situation generally accommodates the elites.”
McAuslan also noted: “I think the single
most important thing is to ensure that the
poor have a voice.”59
Government corruption not only muffles
the voices of slum residents, it also exacts a
price. “When you take a complaint to a local
authority employed by the government,” says
Isaac Mburu, who lives in Nairobi’s Mtumba
slum, “if you go without cash, you won’t be
served.” A recent study by Transparency
International–Kenya found that 67 percent of
the interactions that people had with public
officials required bribes, but that the poorest
and least educated encountered bribery in
75 percent of their interactions with public
institutions. “Corruption is a tax on the
poor,” says Transparency International’s
Michael Lippe.60
The emergence of Shack/Slum Dwellers
International and the national federations of
slum dwellers that constitute it have helped
to amplify the concerns of poor urban residents. In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to take
just one example, poor people formed the Solidarity and Urban Poor Federation in 1994
to save money and convince the municipal
government to stop evicting people from
informal settlements. Through SDI, sidewalk
slum dwellers from Mumbai helped Phomn
Penh’s poor start their first savings groups.
Pooling $5,000 in savings that attracted
matching funds from aid agencies, in 1998
the Cambodians opened a fund that provides
loans for housing and small businesses and
that has served 1,500 families so far. Today,
the government has stopped evictions and
works with the federation to secure alternative land for families displaced by development
148
projects.61
Another positive sign comes from Brazil,
where local authorities have pioneered “participatory budgeting.” Several municipalities
tried different approaches to consulting more
actively with their constituents in the 1970s
and 1980s. Then, in 1988, a new national
constitution devolved more power to subnational governments and introduced several instruments that could be adopted at
the local level, including participatory budgeting—a process that requires elected officials to engage citizens in setting public
priorities and to show clearly how funds will
be allocated, bringing democracy closer to the
people.62
Porto Alegre, a city of 1.3 million in the
south of Brazil, began to gain international
fame after it adopted participatory budgeting
in 1989. In the early 1990s, Brazil was rocked
by scandals that pointed to private money
buying political influence and public funds
being used for politicians’ private enjoyment
at every turn. In 1992, President Collor was
impeached on charges of influence peddling
and graft; in 1993, the same lawmakers that
had hounded Collor came under fire themselves for taking bribes to dole out federal
funds to construction companies, charities,
and municipal governments; and in 1994,
politicians were among those implicated in a
major organized crime ring. The huge gulch
between rich and poor—the wealthiest 10
percent of Brazil claims 48 percent of the
nation’s output, whereas the poorest 10 percent has less than 1 percent—only heightened
public outrage. Yet in the midst of all this,
Porto Alegre was trying to change its local
politics so that votes would mean more than
bribes.63
Local officials in Porto Alegre now present
information about the city budget in a first
round of public meetings in each of 16 districts. More than half the budget typically
goes to salaries of city employees, while other
funds may be earmarked to service municipal
debt. The share that is set aside for infrastructure to be determined through the participatory process varies from city to city and
year to year, but it is generally 10–20 percent
of Porto Alegre’s total budget. After the initial assembly, each neighborhood within each
district holds an open meeting to rank their
most pressing needs—for instance, do they
need better water supply or a paved road
first? 64
Then the jockeying for specific projects
begins in earnest. In a second round of district meetings, citizens elect delegates to represent their district on a city-wide budget
council. These representatives take the neighborhood concerns and negotiate among
themselves to agree on district-wide priority
lists to bring to the municipal budget council. That council, which also has members
elected in city-wide elections, then decides
how to distribute funds among districts.65
This experiment has amplified the voices of
Porto Alegre’s poor. Between 1992 and
2002, citizens have directed more than $700
million to needed projects. A survey done
after the first year of participatory budgeting
revealed that most of the city’s poor people
wanted clean water and toilets, whereas the
government previously assumed that their
top priority was public transport. Today, 85
percent of the city has sewer connections,
compared with 46 percent in 1989. Street
paving is another high priority in the poorest
neighborhoods; 30 kilometers of streets are
now paved, drained, and lighted each year.66
In 1994, another Brazilian city, Belo Horizonte, took the same basic approach, adapting it over time to the particular concerns of
its residents. Once district representatives are
elected in Belo Horizonte, for instance, they
take a district-wide bus tour to see firsthand
the top priorities identified by each neigh-
borhood and to get a better sense of the relative needs in each place. Housing quickly
emerged as a priority of many neighborhoods, and the issue was popularized by the
Homeless Movement. In response, the city
created an additional participatory budgeting
process to address housing needs, allocating
about $8 million in 2001–02.67
Porto Alegre was trying to change its
local politics so that votes would mean
more than bribes.
Today, people in more than 140 cities in
Brazil are benefiting from participatory budgeting. In July 2001, the government enacted
a national City Statute that requires municipalities to include citizens in urban planning
and management through participatory budgeting, among other measures. Only a bit of
the budget is up for grabs, and invariably
more needs are identified than there is cash
to address them. But the process does get
important issues on the agenda and thwarts
corruption. Even if only a small share of a
city’s budget is open to the participatory
process, local authorities have to explain
where the rest of the money is going.68
Another way that some local governments
have been engaging citizens is by adopting a
local version of the Agenda 21 for environment and development that national leaders
endorsed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.
At the urging of an association of local authorities, the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), delegates
in Rio included the goal that “by 1996, most
local authorities in each country should have
undertaken a consultative process with their
population and achieved a consensus on a
Local Agenda 21.” 69
To draft a Local Agenda 21, each gov149
ernment must consult extensively with citizens
to survey existing social, economic, and environmental conditions and to draft a list of
local priorities. By 1996, some 2,000 municipalities worldwide had introduced some version of a Local Agenda 21, and by 2002 the
figure reached 6,416 local governments in
113 countries. Mayors in mostly northern
countries initially dominated the effort, with
Leicester in the United Kingdom and Hamilton-Wentworth in Canada being early pioneers, but southern cities are now emerging
as strong leaders. For example, once citizens
became engaged in Porto Alegre’s budgeting,
the city revamped its environmental planning to include greater citizen involvement.
Manizales in Colombia and Nakuru in Kenya
are also showing the way.70
Mayors, local leaders, and citizens are very
much on the front lines of reconciling the
needs of poor people for a better standard of
living with the health of the environment—
and they need support from their national
governments. In 2001, local authorities
engaged in developing Local Agenda 21s
with their citizens identified three areas where
they could use such help: sufficient funds to
implement new efforts; political support by
heads of state and other national leaders; and
revision of a wide variety of national taxes,
regulations, and standards to reward sustainable development practices. By granting
more power to local governments while
allowing citizens to elect local officials, some
national governments have allowed the poor
to have more say than ever before. Richard
Stren, Director of the Centre for Urban and
Community Studies at the University of
Toronto, points to national laws enacted by
Brazil, India, the Philippines, and South Africa
in the last decade or so that have helped open
up city halls.71
A whole chapter of South Africa’s 1996
constitution focuses on local government
150
and has opened the way for more inclusive
governance in Johannesburg and all its cities.
In 1999, Johannesburg’s local government
laid out a three-year plan, iGoli 2002, to
begin to make up for the imbalances between
services afforded to wealthy white neighborhoods and poor black townships that became
entrenched through years of apartheid. While
the plan represents a step forward, a great deal
of debate has centered on whether services
will be provided by government or private
contractors, and it is still too early to measure
success.72
International agencies could also be more
effective advocates for the urban poor. One
challenge the World Bank has in supporting
urban development is that its negotiations
have to be with national, not local, governments. In February 2002, the Bank solicited
the advice of Jane Jacobs on this point. Jacobs
rose to prominence in the 1960s by analyzing policymakers’ approach to slums in the
United States, but much of what she observed
40 years ago in New York City resonates with
people familiar with slums in many other
parts of the world today. Writing in The Death
and Life of Great American Cities in 1961, for
example, she noted: “Conventional planning
approaches to slums and slum dwellers are
thoroughly paternalistic. The trouble with
paternalists is that they want to make impossibly profound changes, and they choose
impossibly superficial means for doing so.
To overcome slums, we must regard slum
dwellers as people capable of understanding
and acting upon their own self-interests,
which they certainly are. We need to discern,
respect, and build upon the forces for regeneration in real cities. This is far from trying to
patronize people into a better life, and it is far
from what is done today.” 73
When queried by the World Bank in 2002,
Jacobs similarly pulled no punches: “If you
really are serious about supporting cities, you
should be able to lend directly to cities and
negotiate directly with them….If you are
intimidated into dealing only with national
governments, your intended help for cities will
be inefficient at best and perhaps self-defeating.” With the formation of the Cities Alliance
mentioned earlier, the World Bank is still not
lending directly to local governments, but it
has taken an important step toward building
stronger relationships with them.74
International agencies can lend some measure of political support by bringing local
authorities to the table to figure out how to
make urban development work for people
and the planet. There is no legally binding
treaty that compels nations to improve the living conditions of their cities while at the
same time reducing the demands that urban
areas make on Earth’s resources. But in 1976,
in Vancouver, delegates from national governments did zero in on the role of human
settlements in the international push to reconcile environmental and development concerns. Twenty years later, at a Cities Summit
in Istanbul, hundreds of local governments
and NGOs joined representatives of 171
countries in endorsing a Habitat Agenda to
work toward a better urban future.75
The United Nations agency charged with
carrying out the Habitat Agenda is UNHABITAT. For much of the 1990s it struggled without a permanent head, solid
management, or stable funding to raise the
profile of its twin goals: to ensure adequate
shelter for all people and to make cities,
towns, and villages greener and more equitable places to live. But in the twenty-first century, UN-HABITAT has turned a corner,
led by a charismatic new Executive Director,
Anna Tibaijuka, who has inspired the confidence of national governments to give the
organization needed funds.76
For local authorities, the run-up to the
World Summit on Sustainable Development
held in Johannesburg in August-September
2002 was somewhat similar to the reception
they received in Rio 10 years earlier. The fact
that local authorities and NGOs were engaged
at all in the talks was a big step forward. But
UN-HABITAT, ICLEI, and other advocates
of good urban governance faced an uphill
battle in trying to focus national leaders on
the importance of cities to the future of sustainable development. They had to fight to
include in official documents acknowledgement of the important role that cities could,
should, and must play in charting a course for
development that takes into account the needs
of the poorest as well as the finite capacity of
the planet.77
South Africa’s 1996 constitution focuses
on local government and has opened
the way for more inclusive governance
in all its cities.
But if the negotiations and discussions at
the World Summit were not as useful as they
could have been for local governance and
the role of cities, the backdrop of Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a compelling
image of a divided city that had thrown off the
yoke of apartheid—and might, just possibly,
begin to unite itself and chart a course for
urban development that put its poorest people and their need for a healthy environment
first. In the coming decades, with most of the
world’s people living in cities for the first
time in history and at least one in six people
mired in extreme poverty, uniting divided
cities will become an even greater global challenge. To rise to the task, governments must
combat corruption and open city halls up to
all their citizens, especially the poorest ones.
151
Chapter 8
Engaging Religion in the Quest
for a Sustainable World
Gary Gardner
As the U.S. debate over drilling for oil in
Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) gathered steam in early 2002, an
unusual ad appeared on television. Over magnificent shots of seacoasts, forests, and mountains, the narrator intones a Jewish prayer in
which God says, “This is a beautiful world I
have given you. Take care of it; do not ruin
it.” The ad then argues against drilling in
ANWR, and proposes that America’s energy
needs be met through conservation, higher
fuel efficiency standards, and greater use of
solar and wind power. Perhaps the most
arresting statement is the last one: “Brought
to you by the Sierra Club and the National
Council of Churches.” 1
The teaming of a prominent U.S. environmental organization and a coalition of mainline Christian churches is especially surprising
because environmentalists and people of faith
An expanded version of this chapter appeared
as Worldwatch Paper 164, Invoking the Spirit:
Religion and Spirituality in the Quest for a
Sustainable World.
152
have had limited contact since the start of the
modern environmental movement. Nevertheless, it may represent an emerging trend.
Spiritual traditions—from large, centralized
religions to local tribal spiritual authorities—
are beginning to devote energy to what some
see as the defining challenge of our age: the
need to build just and environmentally healthy
societies. Worldwide, the major faiths are issuing declarations, advocating for new national
policies, and designing educational activities in
support of a sustainable world—sometimes in
partnership with secular environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club, sometimes
on their own. Responding to the global crisis,
smaller traditions are reviving ancient rituals
and practices in the service of sustainability. The
quickening of religious interest in environmental issues suggests that a powerful new
political alignment may be emerging that could
greatly strengthen the effort to build a sustainable world.
The budding rapprochement of religious
and environmental groups could be of historic
significance. Should it blossom, it could help
ENGAGING RELIGION IN THE QUEST FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD
heal the centuries-old rift in the West between
religion and the sciences (including economics and other social sciences). These two
streams of thought have diverged since the
European enlightenment, as science has gradually replaced religion as the authoritative
source for some of humanity’s grandest questions, such as how the universe was formed.
In the process, however, the scientific focus
on writing an objective story about “what is”
was achieved largely without reference to the
emotive story of “what ought to be,” a traditional strength of religion. (See Box 8–1.)
By the twentieth century, industrial societies
in particular were strongly oriented to the
cognitive, the rational, and the logical, with
devastating consequences: science, largely
unrestrained by ethics (whether from religion or anywhere else), helped to deliver the
most violent and most environmentally damaging century in human history. 2
Our civilization’s challenge is to reintegrate
our societal heart and head, to reestablish
spirituality as a partner in dialogue with science. To accomplish this, the two groups
will need to surmount the suspicion and misunderstanding that have kept them at arm’s
length for at least 40 years. The checkered history of religious involvement in societal
affairs—multiple episodes of warfare, oppression, intolerance, and hypocrisy—is commonly cited by environmentalists as a reason
to avoid engagement with religion, even
among those who acknowledge the selflessness and the passionate defense of marginalized people that are a major part of religious
history. While acknowledging its shortcomings, the religious community can rightly
claim enormous capacity for self-reform.
At the same time, the environmental community has often alienated potential allies
with what is perceived as scientific aloofness,
even self-righteousness. Its “left-brain”
approach to its work is partly to blame for its
BOX 8–1. WHAT IS RELIGION?
A single, authoritative definition of religion
remains elusive, despite religion’s status as
one of the oldest of human institutions.
Still, several characteristics common to
many definitions can help to stake out the
rough boundaries of the discipline. In the
most general terms, religion is an orientation to the cosmos and to our role in it. It
offers people a sense of ultimate meaning
and the possibility for personal transformation and celebration of life.To this
end it uses a range of resources, including
worldviews, symbols, rituals, ethical norms,
traditions, and (sometimes) institutional
structures. Religion also offers a means of
experiencing a sustaining creative force,
whether as a creator deity, an awe-inspiring presence in nature, or simply the
source of all life.
Many of these characteristics give religion substantial influence over the environment.Worldviews shape attitudes toward
the natural world; rituals have been used
to govern resource use, especially among
indigenous peoples; ethics influences
resource use and distribution; and institutional power can be wielded in ways that
have an impact on the environment.
SOURCE: See
endnote 2.
inability to connect with greater numbers of
people, to inspire profound commitment on
a large scale. Given the central place of culture in national development—and the central place of religion in most cultures—a
sustainable world cannot effectively be built
without full engagement of the human spirit.
But with great effort, the two communities
can bring about a historic reconciliation and
generate the societal energy needed to sustain
the planet and its people.3
153
The Potential Power of
Engaged Religion
Religious institutions and leaders can bring at
least five strong assets to the effort to build
a sustainable world: the capacity to shape
cosmologies (worldviews), moral authority, a
large base of adherents, significant material
resources, and community-building capacity. Religions are experienced at informing our
perspectives on issues of ultimate concern.
They know how to inspire people and how to
wield moral authority. Many have the political clout associated with a huge base of
adherents. Some have considerable real estate
holdings, buildings, and financial resources.
And most produce strong community ties
by generating social resources such as trust
and cooperation, which can be a powerful
boost to community development. Many
political movements would welcome any of
these five assets. To be endowed with most or
all of them, as many religions are, is to hold
considerable political power.
Indeed, religion is an important source of
change within individuals and across societies. Cultural historian Thomas Berry sees
religion as one of the major societal drivers of
change in the world, along with education,
business, and government. And a recent textbook on psychology and the natural environment lists religion as one of four key
sources of individual behavior change
throughout history. Indeed, major societal
changes of recent decades support these assertions. The Nicaraguan revolution (which was
strongly supported by proponents of “liberation theology”), the U.S. civil rights movement led by the Reverend Martin Luther
King and energized by thousands of religious
supporters, and the Shi’ite-inspired Iranian
revolution are just a few societal-level changes
in the twentieth century that were strongly
154
influenced or led by religious institutions or
people of faith. Meanwhile, the global boycott of Nestlé products in the 1970s in
response to the company’s aggressive marketing of baby formula is an example of individual (consumer) behavior change that was
strongly bolstered by religious groups.4
The first key asset that religion brings to
bear on societal change is the capacity to
provide meaning for a person’s life by shaping the individual’s cosmology—the fundamental philosophical grounding out of which
a person lives his or her life. A cosmology
offers answers to the most profound questions
human beings ask: Who am I? Why am I
here? What are my obligations to the world
around me? Cosmologies are typically
expressed in the form of stories—tools of
communication that can engage people at a
deep, affective level. The creation stories of
many religious traditions, for example, offer
ways of interpreting not only the origin of the
universe, but peoples’ place and purpose in it
as well. Thus cosmologies give rise to ethics
because they help people to understand their
relationship with each other and, in some
traditions, their relationship to the natural
world. (See Box 8–2.) The capacity to influence cosmology therefore translates into influence over ethics and, in turn, over behavior.5
Religious cosmologies regarding the natural environment are diverse, and the broad
range of teachings might suggest that some
religions are naturally “greener” than others.
But the reality is more complex. Nearly all religions can be commended and criticized for
one aspect or another of their posture toward
the environment. A religion’s environmental
credentials may depend on whether its teaching, its practice, or its potential for “greening”
itself is being assessed. And scholars see great
potential for developing environmental ethics
even within traditions that have lacked them.6
Religion’s capacity to provide meaning is
BOX 8–2. RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON NATURE
In the three western monotheistic traditions—
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—morality has
traditionally been human-focused, with nature
being of secondary importance and with God
transcending the natural world.Thus the natural world can be seen as a set of resources
for human use, a perspective that some
observers blame for the wasteful and destructive development of the past two centuries.
Yet scholars in each of these traditions find
substantial grounds for building a strong environmental ethics.The Judaic concept of a
covenant or legal agreement between God and
humanity, for example, can be extended to all
of creation.The Christian focus on sacrament
and incarnation are seen as lenses through
which the entire natural world can be viewed
as sacred.And the Islamic concept of viceregency teaches that the natural world is not
owned by humans but is given to them in
trust—a trust that implies certain responsibilities to preserve the balance of creation.
Hinduism and Buddhism in South Asia contain teachings concerning the natural world
that are arguably in conflict. Some scholars in
these traditions emphasize the illusory nature
of the material world and the desirability of
escaping suffering by turning to a timeless
world of spirit, in the case of Hinduism, or by
seeking release in nirvana, in the case of some
meditative schools of Buddhism.This otherworldly orientation, some scholars argue,
minimizes the importance of environmental
degradation. On the other hand, both religions
place great emphasis on correct conduct and
on fulfillment of duty, which often includes
obligations to environmental preservation.
Thus Hindus regard rivers as sacred, and in
the concept of lila, the creative play of the
gods, Hindu theology engages the world as
a creative manifestation of the divine.
Meanwhile, Buddhist environmentalists often
stress the importance of trees in the life of the
Buddha, and “socially engaged” Buddhism in
Asia and the United States is active in environ-
mental protection, especially of forests.
The East Asian traditions of Confucianism
and Taoism seamlessly link the divine, human,
and natural worlds.The divine is not seen as
transcendent; instead, Earth’s fecundity is seen
as continuously unfolding through nature’s
movements across the seasons and through
human workings in the cycles of agriculture.
This organic worldview is centered around the
concept of ch’i, the dynamic, material force that
infuses the natural and human worlds, unifying
matter and spirit. Confucianists and Taoists
seek to live in harmony with nature and with
other human beings, while paying attention to
the movements of the Tao, the Way. Despite
the affinity of these traditions with an environmental ethic, however, deforestation, pollution,
and other forms of environmental degradation
have become widespread in contemporary
East Asia due to many factors, including rapid
industrialization and the decline of traditional
values in the last 50 years with the spread of
Communism.
Finally, indigenous traditions, closely tied
to their local bioregion for food and for materials for clothing, shelter, and cultural activities,
tend to have their environmental ethics
embedded in their worldviews. Gratitude for
the fecundity of nature is a common feature
of their cultures. Ritual calendars are often
derived from the cycles of nature, such as
the appearance of the sun or moon, or the
seasonal return of certain animals or plants.
Indigenous traditions often have a very light
environmental footprint compared with industrial societies. Still, many indigenous traditions
recall times of environmental degradation in
their mythologies. Since the colonial period,
the efforts of indigenous people to live
sustainably in their homelands have been hurt
by the encroachment of settlements and by
logging, mining, and other forms of resource
exploitation.
SOURCE: See
endnote 5.
155
rooted deep in the human psyche. This capacity is often expressed through symbols, rituals, myths, and other practices that work at the
level of affect. These speak to us from a primal place, a place where we “know” in a subconscious way. Ritual, for example—the
repeated patterns of activity that carry the
often inexpressible meaning of human experience—is a deep form of communication
that is tapped by both religious and secular
leaders. A president or prime minister singing
the national anthem at a sporting event, hand
over heart, is engaging in powerful ritualistic
behavior that speaks to compatriots in a profound way. Because religious and spiritual
traditions have needed tools to express spiritual concepts that are well beyond the capacity of language to convey, they have for
millennia turned to ritual for help.7
Ritual communication, it turns out, has
also had an important role in environmental
protection among traditional societies. Where
resources have been managed well, the credit
often goes to “religious or ritual representation of resource management,” according to
cultural ecologist E. N. Anderson. Before
stripping bark from cedar trees, for instance,
the Tlingit Indians of the Pacific Northwest
perform a ritual apology to the spirits they
believe live there, promising to take only
what they need. Among the Tsembaga people of New Guinea, pig festivals, ritual pig
slaughters, and pig-eating ceremonies play a
key role in maintaining ecological balance,
redistributing land and pigs among people,
and ensuring that the neediest are the first to
receive limited supplies of pork. Rituals such
as these are often dismissed as superstition by
modern peoples, yet anthropologists assert
that skilled use of ritual made many traditional
societies far more successful in caring for
their environment than industrial societies
have been. The key, says Anderson, is traditional societies’ understanding that ritual
156
helps people make emotional connections
with the natural world, connections that
industrial societies are slow to make.8
Growing out of the religion’s capacity to
shape worldview is a second asset: the capacity to inspire and wield moral authority. This
is a subtle asset, easily overlooked. Asked in
1935 if the Pope might prove to be an ally of
the Soviet Union, Josef Stalin is said to have
replied scornfully, “The Pope? How many
divisions has he got?” The dictator’s response
betrays a dim understanding of the power
that accrues to persons and organizations
skilled in appealing to the depths of the
human spirit. Ironically, papal influence exercised through the Solidarity protest movement in Poland in the early 1980s was an
important factor in the eventual unraveling of
Communist rule in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the Dalai Lama strongly affects Chinese government policy toward Tibet, even
though he has lived in exile since 1959.
Charisma and moral suasion are not the exclusive reserve of religious leaders, of course,
but religious leaders have extensive experience
in spiritual matters, and understand well the
power inherent in touching people at the
level of spirit.9
Turning to the more worldly assets, a
third source of power for religions is the
sheer number of followers they claim.
Although only estimates are available, it
seems that some 80–90 percent of people on
the planet belong to one of the world’s
10,000 or so religions, with 150 or so of
these faith traditions having at least a million
followers each. Adherents of the three
largest—Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism—
account for about two thirds of the global
population today. Another 20 percent of the
world subscribes to the remaining religions,
and about 15 percent of people are nonreligious. (See Table 8–1.) 10
Degrees of adherence among the billions
Table 8–1. Major Religions:
Number of Adherents and Share
of World Population, 2000
Adherents
Share of World
Population
(million)
(percent)
Christianity
Islam
Hinduism
Confucianism and
Chinese folk religion
Buddhism
Indigenous religions
Sikhism
Judaism
Spiritualism
Bahá’í faith
Jainism
Shintoism
Taoism
Zoroastrianism
2,000
1,188
752
33.0
19.6
12.4
Total
4,988
Religion
SOURCE: See
391
360
228
23
14
12
7
4
3
3
3
6.5
5.9
3.8
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.05
0.05
0.05
82.4
endnote 10.
of religious people vary greatly, of course, as
does the readiness of adherents to translate
their faith into political action or lifestyle
choices. And many believers within the same
religion or denomination may interpret their
faith in conflicting ways, leading them to act
at cross-purposes. But the raw numbers are so
impressive that mobilizing even a fraction of
adherents to the cause of building a just and
environmentally healthy society could advance
the sustainability agenda dramatically. Adding
nonreligious but spiritually oriented people to
the totals boosts the potential for influence
even more.
Influence stemming from having a large
number of followers is further enhanced by
the geographic concentration of many religions, which increases their ability to make
mass appeals and to coordinate action. In
120 countries, for example, Christians form
the majority of the population. Muslims are
the majority in 45 countries, and Buddhists
are in 9. When most people in a society have
similar worldviews, leaders can make mass
appeals using a single, values-laden language.
Pakistan did this in 2001 when, as a result of
the National Conservation Strategy, the government enlisted Muslim clergy in the North
West Frontier Province to launch an environmental awareness campaign based on
teachings from the Koran. Government leaders and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) saw the religious leaders as a critical
part of their mass awareness campaign, given
their broad presence in the country and the
fact that in some regions more people go to
mosques than to schools.11
Of course, size is not always the most
important determinant of the potential to
help shape a sustainable world. Indigenous
traditions, typically small in number, often
possess great wisdom on how to live in harmony with nature. Most have an intimate
knowledge of their local bioregion, which in
turn is the source of revelation, ritual, and collective memory for them. And their worldviews tend to integrate the temporal and
spiritual realms. Although the stereotype of
indigenous people as good stewards of their
resource base is overstated, specialists in religion and ecology see indigenous cultures as
having an especially small environmental footprint, as well as rituals of reciprocity and
respect for nature. These characteristics give
them particular moral relevance that can be
an important source of knowledge and inspiration in building a sustainable world.12
The fourth asset that many religions can
bring to the effort is substantial physical and
financial resources. Real estate holdings alone
are impressive. The Alliance of Religions and
Conservation (ARC), an NGO based in the
United Kingdom, estimates that religions
157
own up to 7 percent of the habitable area of
the world. And buildings abound: Pakistan
has one mosque for every 30 households;
the United States has one house of worship
for every 900 residents. In addition, clinics,
schools, orphanages, and other religiously
run social institutions give religious organizations a network of opportunities to shape
development efforts. A large share of schools
are run by religions, especially in developing
countries. Confucian and Indian Vedic health
care make important religious contributions
to the health systems of China and India.
And in the United States, the largest provider
of social services after the federal government is the Catholic Church.13
The pace of meetings and collaborations
among religious and environmental groups
has increased markedly since 1986.
While headlines regularly expose the less
than ethical use of religious wealth, some
exemplary cases illustrate the impact that religious institutions could have in helping to
nudge the world toward sustainability. In the
United States, the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), representing
275 Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish institutional investors, has been a leader for more
than three decades in shaping corporate operating policies through the use of social policy shareholder resolutions. More than half of
all socially oriented shareholder resolutions
filed in the United States in the past three
years were filed or co-filed by religious groups;
on more than a third of them, religious
groups were the primary filers. This role has
caught the attention of secular activists on corporate responsibility. “One of the first things
we do when we run a campaign is make sure
that the ICCR is on board,” says Tracey
158
Rembert of the Shareholder Action Network,
which advocates ethical investing and shareholder action.14
Finally, religion has a particular capacity to
generate social capital: the bonds of trust,
communication, cooperation, and information dissemination that create strong communities. Development economists began to
recognize in the 1970s and 1980s that economic development is fueled not just by
stocks of land, labor, and financial capital but
also by education (human capital) and healthy
ecosystems (ecological capital). By the 1990s,
many theorists added social capital (community building) to the list because of its importance as a lubricant and glue in many
communities: it greases the wheels of communication and interaction, which in turn
strengthens the bonds that community members have with one another.15
While social capital is built by a broad
range of groups in civil society, from political
parties to civic clubs and hobby groups, religion is especially influential. Religions are present throughout most societies, including in
the most difficult to reach rural areas. They
tend to bring people together frequently, and
they encourage members to help one another
as well as the dispossessed. Perhaps most
important, the beliefs shared among members
are an especially strong unifying force. “Sacred
meaning is one of the deepest bonding forces
societies possess,” notes Mary Clark, a writer
on historical change. Moreover, she adds,
where sacred meaning is absent, societies tend
to disintegrate.16
Data from the United States support this
interpretation of religion as community
builder. Analyzing survey data, sociologist
Andrew Greeley showed that religious institutions or persons, which are responsible for
34 percent of all volunteerism in the United
States, generated volunteers not just for religious work but for other society-building
efforts as well. About a third of the educational, political, youth, and human services
voluntarism, about a quarter of the healthrelated voluntarism, and about a fifth of the
employment-related volunteer work was
undertaken by people motivated by their
faith. The willingness to work for societal
betterment, not just for the particular interests of a religious group, holds potential for
the movement to build a sustainable world,
especially because the environment is an issue
of common concern for the planet and for
future generations that transcends religious
and national differences.17
Cooperation and Caution
As deforestation, climate change, water shortages, extensive poverty, and other global ills
have assumed greater prominence in the
public mind, and as the religious and environmental communities increasingly appreciate their common interest in combating
these problems, the two communities have
begun to work together on the agenda of sustainable development. The trend is hopeful
and could represent the budding emergence
of a powerful new alliance for sustainability.
But significant obstacles to cooperation also
exist, and these must be managed well if the
full engagement of earth and spirit is to be
realized.
On the positive side, the pace of meetings
and collaborations among religious and environmental groups has increased markedly
since the World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) sponsored an interreligious meeting
in Assisi, Italy, in 1986 that brought together
representatives of five of the world’s major
religions. That seminal meeting was followed
by other major conferences and important initiatives, both between the two communities
and among religious traditions. (See Table
8–2.) Some of the initiatives have blossomed
into networks: the National Religious Partnership for the Environment in the United
States and the Alliance for Religions and
Conservation in the United Kingdom bring
together diverse faith groups to plan strategies for raising awareness and taking action on
environmental issues. The increased activity
and commitment represented by the initiatives
suggests that environmentalism is not just a
passing fad for religious groups.18
One development of particular note was a
10-part conference series on world religions
and ecology held at Harvard University’s
Center for the Study of World Religions from
1996 to 1998. The series brought together
the most diverse spectrum of individuals and
institutions ever convened on the topic, with
more than 800 scholars and environmental
activists from major religious traditions and
from six continents participating. The conferences are noteworthy not only for the
scholarship they produced—nine volumes on
environmentalism from the perspective of
major religious traditions, with another forthcoming—but also for their extensive engagement of people from outside of religion and
religious studies. Scientists, ethicists, educators, and public policymakers all took an
active part. A culminating conference was
held at the American Museum of Natural
History, and the United Nations Environment Programme hosted conference organizers for their press briefing announcing the
conferences’ findings. Perhaps most significant
for the religion/environment dialogue, the
Forum on Religion and Ecology (the follow-on organization to the conferences) is
housed at Harvard’s Center for the Environment, so that scholars of religious traditions can be in continuing contact with
environmental scientists and policymakers.19
Despite the many laudable advances, serious obstacles remain to more extensive religious/environmental collaboration. These
159
Table 8–2. Religious Initiatives and Partnerships on Environment and Sustainability
Description
Initiatives
World Wide Fund for Nature
conference, Assisi, Italy, 1986
In the first major meeting of its kind, representatives of five
of the world’s faiths discuss strategies for helping their communities to assist in protecting the environment.
World Council of Churches (WCC)
Climate Change Programme, 1988
The WCC creates a program to lobby governments and
international organizations to fundamentally reorient “the
socioeconomic structures and personal lifestyles” that have
led to the current climate change crisis.
Global Forum of Spiritual and
Parliamentary Leaders, 1988, 1990,
1992, and 1993
In their 1990 statement, 32 globally renowned scientists
appeal to the world religious community “to commit, in word
and deed, and boldly as is required, to preserve the environment of the Earth.”
Parliament of World Religions, 1993
and 1999
Commemorating the first Parliament in 1893, representatives
of the world’s religions gather and issue declarations on
ethics regarding global issues, from environmental degradation
to violations of human rights.
Summit on Religion and Environment,
Windsor, England, 1995
Hosted by Prince Phillip, leaders of nine world religions,
along with secular leaders, gather to discuss implementation
plans for religion-based conservation projects. The
conference results in the creation of the Alliance of Religions
and Conservation.
Harvard conferences on Religions of
the World and Ecology, 1996–98
Some 800 scholars from a broad range of religious traditions
do research and outreach work on the religion/ecology connection. Nine volumes, each focusing on a different tradition,
are published.The Forum on Religion and Ecology emerges to
continue the work.
Religion, Science and Environment
Symposia, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew convenes a series of shipboard symposia focusing on regional water-related
environmental issues. The symposia involve scientists, policymakers, religious leaders, and journalists.
Millennium World Peace Summit
of Religious and Spiritual Leaders,
August 2000
More than 1,000 religious leaders meet at the United Nations;
environment is a major topic of discussion. U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan calls for a new ethic of global stewardship.
Sacred Gifts for a Living Planet conference, Nepal, 2000
Organized by WWF and ARC, 11 major religions, representing
4.5 billion people, offered 26 conservation gifts to help
improve the environment.
International Seminar on Religion,
Culture, and Environment,Tehran,
Iran, June 2001
Sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme
and the Islamic Republic, conference discusses the importance
of fighting environmental degradation.The Seminar culminates
in the signing of the Tehran Declaration, which reaffirms
commitments made at the Millennium World Peace Summit.
SOURCE: See
160
endnote 18.
fall into two major categories: mutual misperceptions, and differences in worldview
that produce opposing positions on sensitive
issues.
Today’s misperceptions of religion by environmentalists, and of the environmental
movement by people of faith, are manifestations of the centuries-long growing chasm
between science and spirituality, a chasm that
widened by the twentieth century. Near-mystical writings like those of John Muir, founder
of the Sierra Club, which testified to the aweinspiring power of nature, gave way to more
scientific analysis. And in recent decades, with
the emergence of the agenda that became
the sustainability movement (which included
the environment, women’s issues, and other
areas on which many religions had not been
vocal), the gap between the two has at times
appeared unbridgeable.
In this context, a landmark 1967 essay
by historian Lynn White may have helped
widen the breach, at least between groups in
the United States. White argued that the
Judeo-Christian mandate to subdue Earth
and to be fruitful and multiply set the philosophical foundation for environmentally
destructive industrial development in the
Christian West. The claim is controversial
and has been strongly critiqued by many
religious scholars, not least because White’s
argument is founded on just a few lines of
scripture. Still, many critics of White acknowledge that parts of the Bible may have helped
create an instrumentalist view of nature
among Jews and Christians.20
Sierra Club Executive Director Carl Pope
takes the critique of White in a different
direction, arguing that an entire generation
of environmentalists was soured on religion
by their skewed reading of White’s essay. He
notes that environmentalists have widely
ignored the fact that whatever the merits of
the critique, White also asserted that religion
would need to be part of the solution to the
growing environmental crisis. He even ended
the essay by suggesting that St. Francis of
Assisi, the Tuscan lover of nature and the
poor, become the patron saint of ecologists.21
The incomplete reading of White’s essay,
Pope argues, gave many environmentalists
the belief that religion is the problem, and led
many environmental groups to shun religious communities in their work. But he
sees this as a great mistake: Environmentalists have “made no more profound error
than to misunderstand the mission of religion
and the churches in preserving the Creation,” Pope says. “For almost thirty years,
we…acted as though we could save future
generations, and…unnamed…species, without the full engagement of the institutions
through which we save ourselves….We
rejected the churches.” 22
Although the situation is improving,
uneasiness between the two groups continues
today, at least in the United States. Cassandra Carmichael, Director of Faith-Based Outreach at the Center for a New American
Dream, a U.S. NGO that helps Americans
consume responsibly, notes that environmentalists and religious people—both of
whom she works with closely—have trouble
understanding each other. “Their perspectives are often different…[they] may not have
experience talking or working [with each
other], which is a shame, because they often
share the same values when it comes to environmental sustainability.” The challenge, she
says, is to develop a common language that
would help the two communities work as
partners.23
At the same time, some negative perceptions of religion are not entirely unfounded,
and these pose special challenges to religious
institutions and people of faith. To the extent
that religion acts as a conservative social force,
it may correctly be perceived as an obstacle to
161
sustainability, since a sustainable world will not
be built without major changes to the world’s
economies. Where religions neglect their
prophetic potential and their calling to be
critics of immoral social and environmental
realities, they are likely to be distrusted by
those working to change those trends.
Indeed, some would argue that religions and
religious people today too seldom wear the
mantle of the prophet, in the sense of being
a critic of the established order. Franciscan
writer and author Richard Rohr asks, “Why
is it that church people by and large mirror
the larger population on almost all
counts?...On the whole, we tend to be just as
protective of power, prestige, and possessions as everyone else.” 24
But Rohr does not despair. He sees a long
tradition of reform of religion that allows it
to get back to its roots—and to the power and
influence found there. Paradoxically, that
charismatic power emerges from an embrace
of powerlessness, of vulnerability, and of spiritual freedom (liberation from undue attachment to the material world) that are found at
the core of the great religions. Thus the very
reform of religion that could benefit the effort
to heal the planet and its people would also
likely give religion a critical new relevance.25
Beyond the differences in perception lie
tensions that emerge from differing worldviews. Consider the issue of the status of
women. Advocates of sustainability often
view women as being denied equality and
even oppressed by some religions, while some
religions see the question of gender equality
as a non-issue, given their view that family
and societal roles played by men and women
are naturally different. Because of the central
role of women in combating malnutrition,
reducing infectious disease, promoting education, and stabilizing populations (see Chapter 3), the perception that religion
contributes to the marginalization of half of
162
humanity is a serious obstacle for collaboration on development issues. On the other
hand, the fact that women are more involved
than men in nearly all religions offers hope
that their voices will one day carry equal
weight with those of men.26
Similarly, divergent views of when human
personhood begins—at conception, or later—
have left many religious people and sustainability advocates at odds over abortion, an
especially sensitive issue. Representatives of
the Vatican and of Muslim countries, for
example, battled with proponents of reproductive rights over language to be included
in the final declaration from the International
Conference on Population and Development
in Cairo in 1994—a battle that left each side
more wary than ever about prospects for
future dialogue, much less cooperation. As
long as the two communities hold their current positions, cooperation is unlikely on
those issues.27
The profound issue of what constitutes
truth is another difference in worldview that
can separate the two communities. Some religious positions are based on a belief that the
universe contains a set of objective truths—
things that are true in all places, at all times—
such as that God exists, or that all sentient
beings have a right to live. For many people
of faith, objective truth is not negotiable.
When the two communities are separated by
an issue that religious people see as containing an objective truth, compromise would
seem to be impossible. On such issues, the
two sides may simply need to agree to disagree, respecting each other’s views while
putting disagreements aside and working
together on areas of agreement.
In addition, different perspectives on the
place of humanity in the natural order can
also separate the two communities—and create divisions within them. Some deep ecologists, for example, see humans as just
another of many species in the natural world,
with no greater or lesser moral value than
other species, while more mainstream environmentalists would assign a special place
to humanity, even as they demand that
humans live in a way that respects the entire
natural world. Similar divisions can be found
among spiritually inclined people as well,
with some spiritual adherents to the Gaia
hypothesis—the idea that the planet is a single, interconnected organism, all of which is
vital—taking positions similar to those of
deep ecologists.28
Despite the tremendous challenges, collaboration is possible, even between scienceoriented environmentalists and scripturally
centered religious traditions. Evangelical
Christians in the United States, for example,
have formed an Evangelical Environmental
Network to promote conservation and environmental stewardship—not only because of
scientific arguments for conservation, but
because the natural world is God’s creation
and must therefore be protected. The group
is credited with playing a pivotal role in blocking attempts in the U.S. Congress in 1996 to
weaken the Endangered Species Act, calling
it the “Noah’s Ark of our day” for its role in
preserving species, and accusing Congress of
“trying to sink it.” The credibility of the
evangelical group with moderate members of
Congress—combined with a $1 million lobbying effort—helped persuade some of those
members not to dilute the act.29
The Environment as
Sacred Ground
Ritual, as noted earlier, was central in regulating the use of trees, rivers, and other
resources among indigenous peoples and
could conceivably be adapted to other cultures. (See Box 8–3.) More broadly, the values that mold our perspective of nature
“come primarily from religious worldviews
and ethical practices,” according to Mary
Evelyn Tucker and John Grim of the Forum
on Religion and Ecology at Harvard University’s Center for the Environment. Given
the power of religion to shape our views of
nature, religious teachings about the natural
world in this era could influence how quickly
or easily the world makes the transition to
sustainable economies. Growing religious
interest in environmentally friendly ethics
and practices suggest that the world’s religions are beginning to use their many assets
to advance this teaching role.30
On some issues, the two sides may need
to agree to disagree, respecting each
other’s views while working together on
areas of agreement.
Consider, for example, the many statements in recent years by religious leaders on
behalf of the environment. The Dalai Lama
has made environmental protection the theme
of numerous major statements since the mid1980s—including several speeches at the
Earth Summit in 1992—and environmental
protection is one of the five points of his
peace plan for Tibet. Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew, symbolic leader of the 250-million member Orthodox Church, has been in
the forefront of bringing scientists and religious leaders together to study water-related
environmental issues. And Pope John Paul II
issued major environmental statements in
1990 and 2001, and a joint statement with
Patriarch Bartholomew in June 2002.31
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in
particular, has effectively leveraged moral
authority and church resources for environmental and social ends. Elected by the Holy
Synod in 1992, the Patriarch has made envi163
BOX 8–3. THE LINK BETWEEN RITUAL, ECOLOGY, AND SUSTAINABLE CULTURES
For thousands of years, ritual has played a central role in governing sustainable use of the
natural environment.The Tsembaga people of
New Guinea, for example, use ritual to allocate
scarce protein for their people in a way that
does not cause irreversible damage to the
land.The Tukano of the Northwest Amazon
use myth and ritual to prevent overhunting and
overfishing in their territory.And in the longest
continually inhabited place in the United
States, the Hopi village of Oraibi, people spend
up to half of their time in ritual activity during
certain parts of the year.Among all enduring
cultures, ritual has been “a sophisticated social
and spiritual technology” that has helped people to live in harmony with the natural world.
A recent example of the use of ritual for
conservation comes from Thailand, where
“environmentalist monks” are finding ways
to engage Buddhism in the effort to save the
country from further deforestation. In 1991,
in the village of Giew Muang, a monk named
Prhaku Pitak helped to breathe life into an
ineffective local forest conservation movement.The effort focused on a forest used by
10 surrounding villages that had been degraded
and denuded by decades of exploitation. Pitak
first used slide shows, environmental education
programs, and agricultural projects to teach
villagers the importance of forest conservation, finding ways to make his case in a
Buddhist framework. He dubbed the Buddha
“the first environmentalist,” for example,
ronmental awareness and ecumenical dialogue an important pursuit of his patriarchate. In addition to regular environmental
statements, he established Religion, Science
and the Environment (RSE) in 1994, an
organization that has brought religious and
political leaders, scientists, journalists, and
theologians together for symposia and train164
because the Buddha’s life was closely
integrated with forests.And he stressed the
interrelatedness of trees, water supply, and
food production, capitalizing on the Buddhist
teaching of “dependent origination,” the
interdependence of all things.
Pitak’s use of religious rituals to support
the conservation efforts was perhaps his most
creative and effective initiative. Because many
of the villagers followed indigenous religions
as well as Buddhism, Pitak first followed their
suggestion to enlist a village elder in asking the
village’s guardian spirit to bless the conservation effort.A shrine was built to the spirit,
and offerings were made, involving every
household in the village.Then Pitak turned to
Buddhist rituals. Joined by 10 other monks and
surrounded by the villagers, Pitak “ordained”
the largest tree in the forest, wrapping a
saffron robe around it and following most of
the rite used in a normal ordination ceremony.
No villager actually viewed the tree as a monk
of course, but the ordination gave the conservation effort a sacred meaning.Villagers no
longer dismissed the effort, because it was
now more than a civic activity. In seeing the
trees not just as resources but as part of
a larger ecological and mystical reality, the
villagers were part of the millennia-long chain
of generations that have used ritual to help
maintain sustainable resource use.
SOURCE: See
endnote 30.
ing; in the process he has raised the profile of
environmental issues in the Aegean and Black
Seas, down the Danube River, in the Adriatic
Sea, and in the Mediterranean.32
Perhaps the most influential RSE initiative
has been the shipboard symposia hosted by
the Patriarch and focusing on water-related
environmental issues. Aboard a chartered
ship for approximately a week, scientists and
theologians hear dozens of lectures on the
environmental problems facing the area they
are traveling in. The participants tend to be
influential: in addition to the Patriarch, the
2002 Adriatic Sea symposium included a
special consultant to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, the former head of the U.N. Environment Programme, the head of the U.N.
Development Programme, two Roman
Catholic cardinals, the Primate of the Church
of Sweden, imams from Egypt and Syria, a
sheikh from Albania, the grand imam of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, several ambassadors, several heads of environmental and
development-oriented NGOs, the president
of the U.N. Foundation, and some 40 journalists. Sharing meals and living quarters,
lectures and field trips, these high-profile
participants and other attendees learn and
network with each other, to impressive effect.
The Adriatic symposium ended in Venice
with the Ecumenical Patriarch and Pope
John Paul II signing a joint declaration on
environmental protection.33
The gatherings focus on bodies of water in
real trouble, such as the Black Sea, now the
most degraded marine area in Europe. Damage to the sea in the past three decades has
been described as “catastrophic,” due to
coastal development, invasion of exotic
species, damming of rivers feeding the sea,
and the growing burden of fertilizer runoff
and other pollutants. The 1997 Symposium
visited ports in seven countries, sponsored
field trips to degraded areas, and offered
more than 30 lectures. Beyond building relationships among scientists and religious leaders and raising public environmental
awareness through the hundreds of news
reports generated by participating journalists,
the trip inspired concrete initiatives on behalf
of the environment. It gave rise to the Halki
Ecological Institute, for example, a two-week-
long program in 1999 to introduce Orthodox priests and seminary students and journalists to the environmental ills of the Black
Sea. The World Bank increased funding for a
Black Sea program, one of its few grant initiatives, in part because a World Bank vice
president was at the 1997 symposium. And an
educational and environmental remediation
campaign for the Black Sea region, sponsored by the U.N. Environment Programme
and the World Council of Churches, is now
being planned, again because of contacts
made at the symposium.34
Similar fruits are being reaped from the
1999 symposium on the Danube River. Participants testify to the role of this gathering
in creating a sense of connection among the
people of the river’s nine host countries, even
in the face of the ongoing Yugoslav war.
“Divided peoples felt united by the river,”
explains Philip Weller, then a program director of the WWF Danube Carpathian project
and a meeting participant. “The symposium
helped people to feel connected to nature.”
This emotional connection was possible
because of the great interest generated by
the Ecumenical Patriarch’s participation.
“People are still talking about…the Patriarch’s involvement, three years after the
event,” notes another participant. This is a
prime example of how the moral authority of
religion might be focused on building a sustainable world. 35
Far from the Danube, a very different
case—the effort to clean up the Ganges River
in India—illustrates the role that worldviews
play in setting attitudes toward the environment. It also demonstrates the hard work and
respect needed to bring together people with
widely divergent religious and secular worldviews. The Ganges, also known as the Ganga,
is one of the world’s major rivers, running for
more than 2,500 kilometers from the
Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. It is also one
165
of the most polluted, primarily from sewage
but also from animal carcasses, human corpses,
and soap and other pollutants from bathers.
Indeed, scientists measure fecal coliform levels at thousands of times what is permissible,
and levels of oxygen in the water are similarly
unhealthy. Renewal efforts have centered primarily on the government-sponsored Ganga
Action Plan (GAP), started in 1985 with the
goal of cleaning up the river by 1993. Several
western-style sewage treatment plants were
built along the river, but they were poorly
designed, poorly maintained, and prone to
shut down during the region’s frequent power
outages. The GAP has been a colossal failure,
and many argue that the river is more polluted
now than it was in 1985.36
There is another view of the river, however,
that parallels the scientific one. Hindus revere
the Ganga as a goddess, a sacred river whose
waters are, by definition, pure. Believers flock
to it to bathe in the conviction that the river’s
water will cleanse them, even removing their
sins. Indeed, along the seven-kilometer stretch
at Varanasi (also known as Banaras), one of
India’s most sacred cities, some 60,000 pilgrims take a “holy dip” each day. In addition,
many Hindus long to have their cremated
remains disposed of in the Ganga in order to
release them from the ongoing cycle of suffering that governs life in the material world.
To Hindus, the river is much more than a
conduit for Himalayan snowmelt. It is Mother
Ganga, the source of eternal life.37
The difference in Hindu and secular perspectives on the river could not be more
stark. Indeed, to many Hindus it is a grave
insult to describe Mother Ganga as polluted.
They do not deny that foul material has been
dumped in the river, nor do they dispute the
scientific reality of high levels of fecal coliform.
But for many Hindus, these are mundane
issues with no relevance to the Ganga’s spiritual essence. Indeed, Mother Ganga’s essen166
tial purity leaves some Hindus unmoved by
the calls for a cleanup, since such an effort
would make no difference to Mother Ganga’s
essential identity. Others, however, see
cleanup as a way of respecting and honoring
Mother Ganga. In any case, the sensitivities
about language complicate religious involvement in ending abuse of the Ganga.38
Yet such engagement is possible, as evidenced by the activities of Dr. V. B. Mishra,
a hydrologist and professor of civil engineering who has been working for more than
two decades to rid the river of contaminants.
He is also the mahant, or head priest, of the
Sankat Mochan Temple in Varanasi. With his
two professional hats, Mishra embodies the
divergent secular and religious worldviews—
and finds both necessary for a complete
understanding of the river. “Science and technology are one bank of the river,” he explains,
“and faith is the other.…Both are needed to
contain the river and ensure its survival.”
With only one bank, he says, the river would
spill away and disappear.39
Mishra has brought his integrated perspective to his activism, although he is careful about which hat is given the greater
prominence at any particular moment. In
1984, he founded the Sankat Mochan Foundation—a secular organization that works
with many people who are driven by their
Hindu faith—to launch a Clean Ganga Campaign, intended to rid the river of its contaminants. The efforts of his group helped to
prompt the government to launch the GAP
in 1985. (The foundation later opposed the
government efforts, however, once they
failed.) More recently, the foundation has
worked to bring alternative sewage technology to the river—technology that will be
more reliable than the high-tech but fragile
projects built by the GAP.40
Today the Clean Ganga Campaign is careful to respect the distinction between phys-
ical cleanness and purity in its campaign for
the Ganga. It maintains respect for religious
belief in Ganga’s purification power even as
it promotes measures to reduce the material
waste load on the river. By carefully making
the distinction between cleanness and purity,
the Campaign earns the respect of both sides,
and helps to create a fusion of Hinduism
and science.41
Ethical Consumption
Religions have long had a strong interest in
restraining consumption, although for reasons
very different from the concerns of environ-
mentalists. The ecological argument against
excessive consumption—that population
growth, ever-greater levels of individual consumption, and one-time use of materials have
combined to deplete stocks of raw materials
and to degrade ecosystems—is solid, well
established, and stands strongly on its own.
But religious traditions broaden the discussion by citing the corrosive effect of excessive
consumption not only on the environment,
but on the development of character, both of
individuals and of societies. (See Table 8–3.)
Living simply, many religions teach, frees up
resources for those in need and frees the
human spirit to cultivate relationships with
Table 8–3. Selected Religious Teachings on Consumption
Religion or Faith
Quotation
Indigenous: Micmac
chief, North America
Miserable as we seem in thy eyes, we consider ourselves…much happier than
thou, in this that we are very content with the little that we have.
Judaism: Isaiah 55:2
Why do you spend your money for that which is not bread, and your labor for
that which does not satisfy?
Christianity:
1 John 3.17
How does God’s love abide in anyone who has the world’s goods and sees a
brother or sister in need and yet refuses to help?
Islam: Koran 7.31
Eat and drink, but waste not by excess; verily He loves not the excessive.
Taoism:Tao Te Ching
chapter 33
He who knows he has enough is rich.
Hinduism:
Acarangasutra
2.114–19
On gaining the desired object, one should not feel elated. On not receiving the
desired object, one should not feel dejected. In case of obtaining anything in
excess, one should not hoard it. One should abstain from acquisitiveness.
Confucianism:
Confucius, XI.15
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault.
Buddhism:
Buddhadasa Bhikkhu
The deep sense of calm that nature provides…protects our heart and mind.The
lessons nature teaches us lead to a new birth beyond suffering caused by our
acquisitive self-preoccupation.
Bahá’í:The Bahá’í
Statement on Nature
The major threats to our world environment…are manifestations of a worldencompassing sickness of the human spirit, a sickness that is marked by an
overemphasis on material things and a self-centeredness that inhibits our ability
to work together as a global community.
SOURCE: See
endnote 42.
167
neighbors, with the natural world, and with
the world of spirit. Adding these social and
spiritual arguments for moderation to the
newer ecological one yields a powerful case for
simplicity, and situates consumption more
clearly in a comprehensive understanding of
what it means to be a developed person and
a developed society.42
Religion in industrial countries is
struggling in its efforts to counter the
consumerist tide.
Despite a history of teachings on the spiritual corruption associated with excessive
attachment to wealth or material accumulation, religious leaders and institutions in
industrial nations have largely failed to address
the consumerist engine that drives industrial
economies, aside from issuing occasional
statements on the topic. Concrete initiatives
to promote simple living—such as simplicity
circles in pockets of the United States and
Europe, where neighbors gather to discuss
how to achieve simplicity in a high-consumption culture—are few, and most are not
promoted or sponsored by organized religion. The newly installed Archbishop of Canterbur y, Rowan Williams, has said that
curbing the culture of consumption will be a
large focus of his ministry as head of the
Anglican Church. But he must be sobered by
the experience of Pope John Paul II, who set
as a strategic goal of his papacy a dampening
of the influence of consumerism in industrial cultures. Despite centuries of experience
preaching against the illusion of satisfaction
provided by earthly wealth, religion in industrial countries is struggling in its efforts to
counter the consumerist tide.43
These traditions might find encouragement in the spiritually rooted ethic of mod168
erate consumption found in a developing
country, Sri Lanka. Since 1958, a grassroots
development effort there known as Sarvodaya
Shramadana has promoted village-based
development programs that explicitly integrate material and spiritual development. The
movement, whose name roughly means
“awakening of all through sharing,” motivates
villagers to undertake a broad range of development projects, from latrine building to
establishment of preschools and cultural centers, within a framework of Buddhist principles. The movement has grown to encompass
more than half of the country’s 24,000 villages and is now the largest development
NGO in Sri Lanka. Its success draws on two
major assets that religion brings to development: the motivational power of religious
principles and the capacity to generate and use
“social capital” for development.44
Buddhist principles are central to Sarvodaya’s vision of development, and from this
vision emerges the Sarvodayan ethic of consumption. In the Buddhist worldview, the
goal in life is spiritual awakening, or enlightenment, which requires a person to overcome desire—the source of all human
suffering, according to the Buddha. Overcoming desire, in turn, requires a spiritual
detachment from material goods, so that the
individual is indifferent to them, neither craving goods nor rejecting them. This posture of
indifference is difficult to achieve in a culture
of mass consumption, where advertisers deliberately confuse needs with desires and encourage acquisitiveness. Thus for Sarvodayans,
consumption is not an economic end, as it
often is in the West, where consumption is
regarded as a prime engine of economic
growth. Instead, Sarvodayans see consumption as a tool: it provides the material platform
needed to support the spiritual work of arriving at enlightenment.45
Indeed, one of the distinguishing features
of the Sarvodayan vision of development is
that it explicitly and deliberately includes
not just the material requisites for a dignified
life, but also the educational, social, cultural,
and spiritual requirements. This broad perspective is reflected in the list of 10 major
human needs that guide Sarvodayan development work:
• a clean and beautiful environment,
• a clean and adequate supply of water,
• basic clothing,
• a balanced diet,
• a simple house to live in,
• basic health care,
• simple communications facilities,
• basic energy requirements,
• well-rounded education, and
• cultural and spiritual sustenance.46
The list of 10 basic needs helps to support
an ethic of moderate consumption. By placing nonmaterial needs on a par with material ones, the list underlines the importance of
the nonmaterial dimension of development.
And it implicitly suggests where to limit consumption: if meeting the 10 needs essentially provides for a decent life, seeking more
would seem to signal “greed, sloth, or ignorance,” in the words of one Sar vodaya
observer, and would not therefore further a
person’s development.47
The Sarvodayan consumption ethic is further shaped by a principle of social justice
that underlies the Sarvodayan vision of development. Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne, founder of the
movement, notes that one purpose of the
list of 10 basic needs is to analyze the development status of the weakest group in the
community, then work to improve its position. This recalibration function is far more
feasible from a list of 10 basic needs than it
would be if the list essentially embraced a
wide range of human desires. Indeed, the
Sarvodaya goal is a “no poverty, no affluence” society.48
In a more subtle but still powerful way, the
social capital created by Sarvodaya activities
likely reinforces an ethic of moderate consumption. The word shramadana refers to
the voluntary gift of labor made by villagers
in Sarvodaya projects, such as road building,
clearing an irrigation ditch, or other activities that benefit the village as a whole. Sharing pervades the movement’s philosophy: as
part of their work project, villagers eat
together, sharing food that each has contributed. They share chants, prayers, and
meditation as part of the project. They share
ideas. And in the ideal, they share a commitment to what Buddhists know as “right
speech”—encouragement, praise, and the
avoidance of gossip and slander.49
The emphasis on sharing creates strong
community ties; in fact, studies identify
increased cohesion and village unity as one of
the most important outcomes of the projects.
This social outcome may in fact be more
important than the physical achievements of
the project, because it fosters long-lasting ties
of mutual trust and communication that make
other community initiatives possible. In one
village, for example, the practice of sharing
food during the work camp prompted villagers to institute a monthly potluck meal
after the project ended.50
While Sarvodaya is far ahead of most others in inspiring adherents to moderate consumption, western religions are showing signs
of flexing their market muscle to steer consumption in a greener direction. Such activities are an adaptation of the established
religious practice of using boycotts to influence corporations on issues of social justice.
Religious support globally for the boycott
of Nestlé products in the 1970s, for example,
pressured that company to end its aggressive marketing of baby formula in developing
countries, where it had too often displaced
breast-feeding, the healthier approach. And
169
churches were strong supporters of grape
and lettuce boycotts in support of the United
Farm Workers in California in the 1960s and
1970s.51
Today some congregations are moving
beyond boycotts to help steer consumption
toward green companies, largely by harnessing another great religious asset—the sheer
mass of adherents. Because of the substantial
market presence of people of faith, these
fledgling efforts could potentially have a large
impact. One creative example in the United
States is the work of the Regeneration Project in California, an initiative of the Episcopal Church. It includes Episcopal Power and
Light (EP&L), a ministry that promotes
green energy and energy efficiency. EP&L was
started in 1996 when Reverend Sally Bingham realized that she might capitalize on the
state’s deregulation of energy to persuade a
bloc of customers—the state’s Episcopalians—
to choose energy generated from renewable
sources, such as wind, geothermal, and biomass. The project also encourages participating parishes to undertake an energy audit
of their buildings. The Regeneration Project
includes California Interfaith Power and
Light, which does political advocacy to promote renewable energy.52
In its short life, the Regeneration Project
has spread to seven states, and it could have
a substantial effect on energy consumption
patterns if adopted by religious groups and
adherents nationwide. In addition to offering a shot in the arm for emerging renewable
energy companies, the project could help
boost energy conservation. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) calculated in 1995 that an energy efficiency
upgrade of the country’s 269,000 houses of
worship—which account for about 5 percent of U.S. commercial building floor
space—would prevent 6 million tons of carbon dioxide from being released to the
170
atmosphere, while saving congregations more
than $500 million.53
The carbon savings would be only a tiny
fraction of U.S. carbon emissions, but the
real returns would come from enlisting congregant support for similar conservation activities in their homes. Of the 12 categories of
commercial buildings designated by the U.S.
Department of Energy and used in the EPA
survey, only office buildings are visited by
more adults more frequently than houses of
worship. Indeed, the 44 percent of the American public who visit a church, synagogue, or
mosque at least monthly constitutes a huge
pool of potential converts to energy efficiency and green energy sources, especially if
efforts to green the church are accompanied
by efforts to raise consciousness among congregants, as in the EP&L program.54
Another effort to tackle ethical consumption is religious participation in the
Interfaith Coffee program run by Equal
Exchange, a for-profit U.S. company. The
company sells only coffee that is “fair-traded,”
which means that participating farmers are
guaranteed a minimum price for their harvest,
no matter what market conditions might
dictate. This helps farmers avoid the erratic
price swings that characterize many international commodity markets, which gives them
greater economic stability. Equal Exchange
is also committed to helping farmers secure
credit at rates they can afford, and to encouraging ecologically sustainable farming practices, including organic and shade-grown
cultivation.55
Equal Exchange recognized that its ethical approach to coffee might appeal to people of faith. They knew, too, that many
Americans are regular churchgoers, and that
some of these attend “coffee hours” after
services. So they established their Interfaith
Coffee Program to encourage congregations
and individuals to switch to fair-traded cof-
fee. Begun in 1997 as a partnership with the
aid agency Lutheran World Relief, the program now includes the American Friends
Service Committee, the Presbyterian Church
USA, and the Unitarian Universalist Service
Committee. While small, it has grown
rapidly: more than 3,500 congregations participated at the end of 2001, just over 1 percent of all houses of worship in the United
States, but up from a handful when the program started. The Interfaith program is the
fastest-growing segment of Equal Exchange’s
business, and now accounts for 11 percent of
the firm’s sales.56
As with green energy, the potential for
people of faith to change coffee consumption
patterns is huge. Coffee is the second most
widely consumed beverage in the United
States, and its ethical consumption requires
little or no sacrifice. Yet drinking fair-traded
coffee yields great personal satisfaction—it’s
“drinking a cup of justice,” in the words of
one Lutheran Interfaith Coffee participant.
With 99 percent of the institutional religious
market untouched, the program would have
a major impact on the U.S. coffee market if
religious groups nationwide were to climb on
board—and if participating congregants were
persuaded to take their new habit home.57
The coffee program offers extensive
opportunities to educate congregations about
a host of justice issues, from the terms of
trade in international commerce to the value
of co-ops and organic farming. It can help
people of faith, who have long supported
aid and relief programs, to broaden their
efforts beyond charity and into justice. Grasping this bigger picture, one participant noted
that “our consumer dollars are hurting the
very people our offering dollars are trying to
help.” Such consciousness-raising can spark
a “virtuous circle,” as consumers begin to
consider the effects of other patterns of consumption on far-flung people and places.58
Another potentially high-leverage area for
introducing ethics into economic decisions is
through financial investments. As noted earlier, religious institutions are already active in
holding corporations accountable for their
practices through the use of shareholder resolutions. This consciousness, extended to
religious individuals, could have a substantial
effect on investment patterns. Socially responsible investment (SRI) accounted for only
12 percent of all investments in 2000. Religiously led campaigns to persuade the 44
percent of Americans who attend religious services at least monthly to shift their investment
dollars to SRI could give a substantial boost
to the SRI movement.59
Accelerating Engagement
In pockets of activity worldwide, many religions are beginning to show interest in building a sustainable world, as the record of the
past decade demonstrates. At the same time,
advocates of sustainability are becoming
somewhat more receptive to spiritual appeals,
as seen in the WWF collaboration with
churches along the Danube River or the ad
initiative by the Sierra Club and the National
Council of Churches in the United States.
More extensive engagement of environmentalism by the religious community, and of
spirituality by the environmental and development communities, is possible—and
needed. Some of this can occur in the form
of partnerships. Some can take place within
each community. If the conditions are indeed
ripe to build bridges between the two disciplines, such initiatives could conceivably contribute to a historic ending to the schism
between society’s head and heart.
At the international level, several organizations have shown leadership in tackling this
engagement head-on, setting an example for
the work of local religious and environmen171
tal communities. The U.N. Environment
Programme, for example, has published
reports on faiths and the environment dating
back to 1991. It has given guidance and support to the Interfaith Partnership for the
Environment, a group of scholars from diverse
faiths, in various projects, including the publication of a book describing the posture of
major religions toward the environment. The
World Bank has held major interfaith meetings on development questions since 1998,
out of which has emerged the World Faiths
Development Dialogue, which has increased
religious input to the work of the Bank. On
the religious side, the World Council of
Churches’ Climate Change Programme was
formed in 1988 to lobby governments and
international organizations to work for poli-
cies to combat climate change.60
Each side has important assets to bring to
the table. Religions could use their asset
base—their ability to shape worldviews and
their authority, numbers, material resources,
and capacity to build community—to
advance the work of sustainability. Each religious tradition will know how it might best
use its particular strengths; the mix of actions
will vary from tradition to tradition and from
place to place. For each of the five asset areas,
any number of activities is possible. (See
Table 8–4.)
In the arena of moral authority—perhaps
the most powerful asset religions possess—
several initiatives are possible. First, religious
leaders might use their elevated social standing to call for an end to systematic abuse of
Table 8–4. Leveraging Religious Assets
Asset
Approaches to Consider
Worldview
development
• Assess teachings; ensure that the natural world is sufficiently represented in worldview
and ethics.
Moral
authority
• Use the pulpit to address the global crisis of sustainability.
• Use the congregational newsletter, bulletin, or Web site as a platform.
• Make effective use of the media, through placement of op eds, letters to the editor,
and coverage of congregation’s environmental activities.
• Engage political leaders who make decisions affecting sustainability.
Numbers
• Encourage members to write letters, join boycotts or protests, or in other ways
creatively bring their full political weight to bear on these issues.
• Educate members about consumption and encourage them to consume less and to buy
products that have low environmental impact.
• Encourage members to shift investments to companies with exemplary environmental
and labor records.
Material
resources
• Use physical facilities as a venue for discussing issues of sustainability or for organizing
sustainability activities.
• Use physical facilities as a showcase of simplicity and for renewable energy, energy conservation, organic gardening, or other activities that could promote sustainable living.
• Shift purchasing and investment decisions to favor a sustainable world.
Community
building
• Increase bonds of trust and communication, and deepen emotional ties to the environment, by organizing environmentally oriented service activities.
• Build on existing social ties to support congregants in attempts to simplify their lives.
172
the environment and for the creation of a
just and environmentally healthy world in a
way that would capture the attention of many
people.
Efforts such as the WWF-sponsored meeting of religious leaders in Assisi in 1986 or the
Ecumenical Patriarch’s symposia for religious
leaders and scientists are good models of the
ecumenical spirit needed to expand the openness of each community to the perspective of
the other. Imagine stepping up a few notches
the bold initiative of the Ecumenical Patriarch
in co-signing an environmental declaration
with the Pope. Suppose that these western
religious leaders, along with the Dalai Lama,
the Grand Muftis of Syria, and leaders of a
dozen other religions, were to travel to the
North Pole to bear witness to a melting
world, and to call for action to stop it. Or suppose they were to hold an interreligious prayer
vigil outside the annual meetings of the World
Bank, calling attention to policies that serve
to increase the miseries of the poor. Surely
such leadership would lift discussion of these
issues to an entirely new level, and might
well increase pressure for action. It would
also likely enhance the prestige of religion, as
followers and critics alike would gain new
respect for leaders who demonstrated a willingness to grapple seriously with contemporary challenges.
Wrestling with such challenges might help
religions to increase their moral authority in
another way. By reading the “signs of the
times” through the lens of their own scriptures, religious traditions might demonstrate
the relevance of their teachings for the major
issues of our day, even as they help address the
tremendous environmental and social needs
of this moment in history. Several tools—
retrieval, reevaluation, and reconstruction—
are used by some theologians for evaluating
scripture and tradition in the light of contemporary circumstances.61
The first is to retrieve teachings that have
lain dormant but that are especially relevant
today. One example of this was the revival last
decade of the Hebrew tradition of the
Jubilee—the teaching from Leviticus that
debts should be forgiven, and slaves freed,
every 50 years—to generate support for the
goal of reducing the debt of the world’s poorest nations. Known for millennia, this scriptural teaching became particularly evocative
in the 1990s because of contemporary circumstances: poor countries struggled under
the burden of huge debt payments, which
were siphoning off the money available for
investments in health and education. As the
year 2000 approached, and nations searched
for a meaningful way to mark the millennium, the Jubilee tradition spoke to the global
community in a new and fresh way.62
Arguably the most powerful latent teaching in many faith traditions is the exhortation
to avoid preoccupation with wealth and materialism. Excessive consumption is the engine
that runs the world’s most powerful
economies, and the arguments used to resist
it—it is bad for the environment, and often
bad for human health—have made only small
dents in the trend. Religions are in a position
to weigh in more strongly with the spiritual
and moral case against excessive consumption:
that it diverts attention from the most important goals of life, and that it squanders
resources that might be used to help the
poor. And beyond preaching, they could
become more active in the community by
sponsoring neighborhood groups that seek to
promote simplicity and by otherwise offering
support to those who seek to live simply.
Religions also reevaluate and reconstruct
traditional teachings in light of present realities. A good example of this comes from
Africa, where the high rates of HIV infection
have pushed some churches and mosques to
rethink their teachings on condom use.
173
Increasingly uncomfortable with prohibitions of condom use as they watch masses of
people—often their own congregants—lie
sick and dying from a disease that prophylactics could largely prevent, many local leaders have questioned the policy. Muslim
communities in several African nations have
changed direction on teachings about condoms. And a Catholic bishop in South Africa
has called for a reversal of his church’s teaching on condom use.63
The challenge for advocates of
sustainability may be to build a greater
appreciation for the importance of
spirituality into their work.
Whether these particular reevaluations and
reconstructions should be adopted broadly by
various religions is a question to be decided
by each tradition. The point here is simply
that established religions have centuries of
experience reading their central tenets in the
light of contemporary realities. Indeed, it is
the adaptability of religion, which results
from the universality and timelessness of their
core teachings, that helps to make it one of
the most enduring of human institutions.
Some scholars even suggest replacing the
term “religious traditions” with “religious
processes,” so consistent is the theme of adaptation in the history of most religions.64
The challenge for environmentalists and
other advocates of sustainability, meanwhile,
may be to build a greater appreciation for the
importance of spirituality into their own work.
Public overtures toward people’s spiritual
sensibilities could be a powerful step forward
for sustainability. This is important not simply to win religious people as allies, but
because spirituality is important for development. All development activities are embed174
ded in a cultural context; if pursued unwisely,
they can provoke a cultural backlash. The
Shah of Iran, in his attempt to “modernize”
that country between the 1950s and 1970s,
paid too little attention to religious sensibilities in the process and learned firsthand,
through the 1979 revolution that dethroned
him, how costly this insensitivity can be.
A good demonstration of the sensitivity
needed is found at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which works around
the world on issues of reproductive health.
In Kenya, where UNFPA seeks to prevent
the spread of AIDS by halting the contraction of HIV among sex workers, the agency
collaborates with Catholic parishes and with
secular health clinics—but in different ways.
UNFPA underwrites the provision of condoms at the health clinic. But at the parishes,
the agency follows a policy sensitive to
Catholic teaching about condom use and
funds programs that offer income-generating projects as an alternative to the sex work.
In sum, UNFPA identifies common ground
for collaboration rather than focusing on
areas of difference—a helpful model for traversing the bumpy spots in the relationship
between sustainability groups and some religious communities.65
In addition to respecting the religious sensibilities of a culture, environmentalists might
seek ways to express spirituality in their own
programs and communication efforts. Such
expressions need not be religious, of course,
but might instead focus on creating an emotional/spiritual connection between the public and the natural environment—an
indispensable and largely missing link in the
effort to generate commitment to sustainability. As Harvard biologist Stephen Jay
Gould has suggested, “We cannot win this
battle to save species and environments without forging an emotional bond between ourselves and nature as well—for we will not
fight to save what we do not love.” 66
Building on Gould’s thought, environmental educator David Orr challenges scientists (including environmentalists) to knead
emotion into their work. He notes that most
biologists and ecologists “believe that cold
rationality, fearless objectivity, and a bit of
technology” will get humanity out of its environmental predicament. But those tools have
long been used, with minimal success. What
is missing, Orr unabashedly asserts, is love.
“Why is it so hard to talk about love, the most
powerful of human emotions, in relation to
science, the most powerful and far-reaching
of human activities?” Orr asks. He notes that
passion and good science, far from being
antithetical, are as interdependent as the heart
and the brain. Both are needed if we are to
fully understand our world and our role in it.67
Environmentalists can help to infuse a
sense of emotion into their work by getting
back to the movement’s own roots. Although
a rare voice today, passionate environmental
writing was once the norm for conservationists. Consider this from the writings of John
Muir, founder of the Sierra Club: “Perched
like a fly on this Yosemite dome, I gaze and
sketch and bask…humbly prostrate before
the vast display of God’s power, and eager to
offer self-denial and renunciation with eternal toil to learn any lesson in the divine manuscript.” Such prose reaches people in a
different place than the one that takes in
analysis and statistics—the necessary yet limited language of modern environmentalism—
and it motivates in a way that the science
alone cannot.68
By combining their considerable skills and
complementary perspectives, environmentalists and religious people can help reunite
our civilization’s head and heart, re-engaging
religion in the quest for a new cosmology, a
new worldview for our time. Cultural historian Thomas Berry calls this emerging perspective a New Story—the story of a people
in an intimate and caring relationship with
their planet, with their cosmos, and with each
other. Its ethics would deal not just with
homicide and suicide, but equally with biocide and geocide, in Berry’s words. It would
be as comfortable with awe and wonder as
with weights and measures. It would rewrite
the story of unrestrained science and technology, of a human species alienated from its
own home. It would be the vehicle to guide
us to a socially just and environmentally sustainable future.69
175
Notes
State of the World: A Year in Review
October 2001. U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), “Deforestation Continues at a
High Rate in Tropical Areas; FAO Calls Upon
Countries to Fight Forest Crime and Corruption,” press release (Rome: 3 October 2001);
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA, NASA Report 2001 Ozone
Hole Similar in Size to Holes of Past Three Years,”
press release (Washington, DC: 16 October 2001);
cancer study presented at European Cancer Conference, Lisbon, and cited in “Counting Chernobyl’s Cancer Cost,” Environment News Service,
23 October 2001.
November 2001. FAO, “International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
Approved by FAO Conference,” press release
(Rome: 3 November 2001); U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Agency, “U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Increase by 3.1 Percent in
2000—1 Percentage Point Lower than GDP
Growth,” press release (Washington, DC: 9
November 1999); World Trade Organization,
“Conference Ends With Agreement on New Programme,” press release (Geneva: 14 November
2002); “Smugglers Steal 38 Mln Animals from
Brazil’s Forests,” Reuters, 14 November 2001;
Reg Watson and Daniel Pauly, “Systematic Distortions in World Fisheries Catch Trends,” Nature,
29 November 2001, pp. 534–36; David Quist
and Ignacio H. Chapela, “Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico,” Nature, 29 November 2001, pp.
541–43.
December 2001. “Mexican Officials Report
Deforestation Worse Than Previously Thought,”
Associated Press, 4 December 2001; U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), “Felling of Forests
Adding to World’s Water Shortages as Dams Fill
Up With Silt,” press release (Nairobi: 4 December 2001); United Nations, Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “The United
Nations Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (in force as from 11 December 2001),” at
<www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>, viewed 12
September 2002; World Meteorological Organization, “WMO Statement on the Status of the
Global Climate in 2001,” press release (Geneva:
18 December 2001).
January 2002. North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, “Significant Biodiversity Loss Across North America, NAFTA Body’s
State of the Environment Report Says,” press
release (Montreal: 7 January 2002); M. Vrijheid
et al., “Chromosomal Congenital Anomalies and
Residence Near Hazardous Waste Landfill Sites,”
The Lancet, vol. 359 (2002), pp. 320–22; Marcos
A. Orellana, “Unearthing Governance: Obstacles
and Opportunities for Public Participation in Minerals Policy,” in Carl Bruch, ed., The New “Public”: The Globalization of Public Participation
(Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute,
2002), p. 238; Government of Germany, “Trittin:
Zukunft der Windenergie Liegt auf See,” press
release (Berlin: 25 January 2002).
February 2002. “Worst Flooding in Decades
Inundates Indonesia,” Environment News Service,
177
NOTES, A YEAR IN REVIEW
7 February 2002; Mark F. Meier, “Shrinking Glaciers and Rising Sea Level: Has the Impact Been
Underestimated?” presentation at the 2002 Annual
Meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS), Boston, 16 February 2001; Charles Birkeland et al., “New Technologies Make Marine Reserves Imperative,”
presentation at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the
AAAS, Boston, 18 February 2001; Basel Action
Network, “High-Tech Toxic Trash from USA
Found to Be Flooding Asia,” press release (Seattle: 25 February 2002).
March 2002. U.N. Population Division (UNPD),
“Experts Concur: Fertility In Developing Countries May Fall Below Two-Child Family Norm,”
press release (New York: 21 March 2002); idem,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World
Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, Data
Tables and Highlights (New York: United Nations,
2002); U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center,
“Antarctic Ice Shelf Collapses,” press release (Boulder, CO: 21 March 2002); United Nations, “Monterrey Conference on Development Financing
Concludes; Participants Resolve to Eradicate
Poverty, Achieve Sustainable Economic Growth,”
press release (New York: 22 March 2002).
April 2002. Bob Burton, “New Zealand Ends
Rainforest Logging on Public Lands,” Environment News Service, 1 April 2002; David Buchan,
“Market in Greenhouse Gas Allowance Trading
Opens,” Financial Times, 2 April 2002; Howard
W. French, “China’s Growing Deserts Are Suffocating Korea,” New York Times, 14 April 2002;
“Cracks in China’s Three Gorges Dam,” BBC
News Online, 12 April 2002.
May 2002. “Occidental Petroleum Abandons Oil
Development on U’wa Land,” Environment News
Service, 3 May 2002; Inform, “130 Million Cell
Phones Will Be Discarded Annually in the US by
2005,” press release (New York: 8 May 2002);
“Poachers Kill Rwandan Endangered Mountain
Gorillas,” Reuters, 15 May 2002; World Health
Organization (WHO), “Pollution-related Diseases Kill Millions of Children a Year,” press release
(New York: 9 May 2002); CRC Reef Research
Centre, “Too Much Stress for the Reef?,” press
release (Townsville, Australia: 23 May 2002);
178
Office of the President of Mexico, “The Federal
Government Makes the Seas of Mexico a National
Whale Sanctuary,” press release (Mexico City: 24
May 2002); Katharine G. Seelye, “President Distances Himself From Global Warming Report,”
New York Times, 5 June 2002; European Commission, “European Union Ratifies the Kyoto
Protocol,” press release (Brussels: 31 May 2002).
June 2002. “Costa Rica Cracks Down on Mining,
Logging,” Environment News Service, 11 June
2002; Axel Bugge, “Brazil’s Amazon Destruction Down But Still Alarming,” Reuters, 12 June
2002; WHO, “Europe Achieves Historic Milestone as Region Is Declared Polio-Free,” press
release (Geneva: 21 June 2002).
July 2002. Office of the Mayor of New York
City, “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg Signs Temporary Recycling Requirements,” press release
(New York: 1 July 2002); UNICEF, “Joint Report
Details Escalating Global Orphan Crisis Due to
AIDS,” press release (New York: 10 July 2002);
Julie Eilperin, “U.S. Withholds $34 Million in
Family Planning Funding to UN,” Washington
Post, 23 July 2002; Office of the Governor of
California, “Governor Davis Signs Historic Global
Warming Bill,” press release (Sacramento, CA:
22 July 2002); “Bush Signs Yucca Mountain Resolution,” Environment News Service, 24 July 2002.
August 2002. UNEP–World Conservation Monitoring Centre, “‘World Atlas of Biodiversity’ First
Map-Based View of Earth’s Living Resources,”
press release (Cambridge, UK: 1 August 2002);
Andrew Balmford et al., “Economic Reasons for
Conserving Wild Nature,” Science, 9 August 2002,
p. 950; UNEP, “Regional and Global Impacts of
Vast Pollution Cloud Detailed In New Scientific
Study,” press release (Nairobi: 12 August 2002);
Feminist Majority Foundation, “Male Preference
Continues to Grow in Asia,” press release (Arlington, VA: 15 August 2002); International Energy
Agency, “Energy and Poverty: IEA Reveals a
Vicious and Unsustainable Circle,” press release
(Paris: 21 August 2002); Conservation International, “World’s Largest Rain Forest National Park
Created in Northern Amazon,” press release
(Washington, DC: 22 August 2002).
NOTES, A YEAR IN REVIEW AND CHAPTER 1
September 2002. United Nations, “With a Sense
of Urgency, Johannesburg Summit Sets an Action
Agenda,” press release (3 September 2002); Conservation International, “U.S. Government Commits $36 Million to Protect Congo’s Forests,”
press release (Washington, DC: 4 September
2002); Keith Bradsher, “A Rosy, Pink Cloud,
Packed With Pollution,” New York Times, 10 September 2002; World Food Programme, “Southern Africa Crisis Worsens: 14.4 Million People In
Dire Need,” press release (Rome: 16 September
2002); Mike Linstead, “Greens Save Schroeder’s
Skin,” BBC News Online, 23 September 2002.
Chapter 1. A History of Our Future
1. Except where otherwise noted, account of
Stone Age people drawn from Paul R. Ehrlich,
Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human
Prospect (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000); for
a popular article on the transition that they evidently started, see Jared Diamond, “The Great
Leap Forward,” Discover, May 1989, pp. 50–60.
2. Henri Delporte, Les Aurignaciens: Premiers
Hommes Modernes (Paris: Maison des roches,
1998), pp. 56–69.
3. Needles and spear points from ibid., pp.
63–66; rope and amber from Diamond, op. cit.
note 1, p. 57; music, art, and burial grounds from
Clive Gamble, The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 337, 310, 405.
4. This is the main point of Diamond, op. cit.
note 1.
5. A generation, the interval between birth and
reproduction, is here assumed to be 20 years.
6. Robert Engelman, Brian Halweil, and
Danielle Nierenberg, “Rethinking Population,
Improving Lives,” in Worldwatch Institute, State
of the World 2002 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2002), p. 130; Danielle Nierenberg,
“Population Growing Steadily,” in Worldwatch
Institute, Vital Signs 2002 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), p. 88; absolute poverty
from World Bank, World Development Report
2000/2001 (New York: Oxford University Press),
p. 23.
7. Food imports and drought from Engelman,
Halweil, and Nierenberg, op. cit. note 6, p. 134;
cropland quality from Brian Halweil, “Farmland
Quality Deteriorating,” in Worldwatch Institute,
Vital Signs 2002, op. cit. note 6, p. 102.
8. Seth Dunn, “Carbon Emissions Reach New
High,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2002,
op. cit. note 6, p. 52; idem, “Carbon Emissions
Continue Decline,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital
Signs 2001 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 52.
9. Danielle Nierenberg, “Toxic Fertility,” World
Watch, March/April 2001, pp. 30–38.
10. Elena Bennett and Steve R. Carpenter, “P
Soup,” World Watch, March/April 2002, pp.
24–32.
11. Nierenberg, op. cit. note 9; Bennett and
Carpenter, op. cit. note 10.
12. Anne Platt McGinn, “Toxic Waste Largely
Unseen,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs
2002, op. cit. note 6, p. 112; disposal procedures
from Travis Wagner, In Our Backyard: A Guide to
Understanding Pollution and Its Effects (New
York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1994), pp. 133–39.
13. Payal Sampat, “Groundwater Shock,” World
Watch, January/February 2000, pp. 10–22.
14. Anne Platt McGinn, Why Poison Ourselves? A
Precautionary Approach to Synthetic Chemicals,
Worldwatch Paper 153 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, November 2000).
15. Overviews of bioinvasion from Yvonne
Baskin, A Plague of Rats and Rubbervines: The
Growing Threat of Species Invasions (Washington,
DC: Island Press, 2002), from Harold A. Mooney
and Richard J. Hobbs, Invasive Species in a Changing World (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000),
and from Chris Bright, Life Out of Bounds (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).
179
NOTES, CHAPTER 1
16. For the Argentine ant, see Caroline E. Christian, “Consequences of Biological Invasion Reveal
the Importance of Mutualism for Plant Communities,” Nature, 11 October 2001, pp. 635–39.
tility in Europe: the Revised Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility Project (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986), p. 27.
17. Rate of tropical forest decline from U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2000 (Rome: 2001), pp.
9–10; global forest decline from Janet N.
Abramovitz, “Forest Loss Unchecked,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2002, op. cit. note 6,
p. 104; wetlands from Janet Larson, “Wetlands
Decline,” in Worldwatch Institute, op. cit. note 8,
p. 96.
25. East-West Center, The Future of Population
in Asia (Hawaii: East-West Center, 2002), pp.
25, 106–09; Bloom and Williamson, op. cit. note
24, p. 419.
18. Lisa Mastny, “World’s Coral Reefs Dying
Off,” in Worldwatch Institute, op. cit. note 8, p.
92; Gary Gardner, “Fish Harvest Down,” in
Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2000 (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 40; IUCN
Species Survival Commission, 2002 IUCN Red List
of Threatened Species (Gland, Switzerland:
IUCN–World Conservation Union, 2002), p. 8.
19. Consumption statistic from United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), The State of World
Population 2001 (New York: 2001), chapter 1.
20. Smallpox eradication campaign from F. Fenner et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 1988); for world
population in 1967, see the U.S. Census Bureau,
International Database, at <www.census.gov/ipc/
www/worldpop.html>.
21. Fenner et al., op. cit. note 20.
22. René Dubos, Man Adapting (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 379.
23. Fenner et al., op. cit. note 20.
24. David E. Bloom and Jeffrey G. Williamson,
“Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles
in Emerging Asia,” The World Bank Economic
Review, vol. 12, no. 3 (1998), pp. 422–24; Ansley J. Coale, “The Decline of Fertility in Europe
Since the Eighteenth Century as a Chapter in
Human Demographic History,” in Ansley J. Coale
and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fer-
180
26. Population increase in the twentieth century
from U.S. Census Bureau, World Population Information, Historical Estimates of World Population,
at <www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html>,
viewed 10 October 2002; industrial-country total
fertility rate (TFR) from UNFPA, op. cit. note 19;
United Nations, Report on the International Conference on Population and Development, 18 October 1994, chapter 6, section 6.1.
27. Estimates of annual increments in population
growth (recent years and projections) available
from U.S. Census Bureau, op. cit. note 20, and
from United Nations Population Division, World
Population Prospects, Population Database, at
<esa.un.org/unpp/>.
28. Ann Hwang, “AIDS Passes 20-Year Mark,”
in Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2002, op. cit.
note 6, pp. 90–91; the dozen countries with substantial declines in TFRs are Bangladesh, India,
Iran, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Syria, Turkey, and Viet Nam;
Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, Iran’s Family Planning
Program: Responding to a Nation’s Needs (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, June
2002); TFR data from United Nations Population
Division, op. cit. note 27.
29. Radheshyam Bairagi and Ashish Kumar
Datta, “Demographic Transition in Bangladesh:
What Happened in the Twentieth Century and
What Will Happen Next?” Asia-Pacific Population
Journal, December 2001, pp. 4–7; TFR data from
United Nations Population Division, op. cit. note
27.
30. TFR data from United Nations Population
Division, op. cit. note 27; Thomas McDevitt, Population Trends: Peru (Washington, DC: U.S. Cen-
NOTES, CHAPTERS 1 AND 2
sus Bureau, March 1999), p. 2; U.N. Development
Programme, Human Development Report 2002
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
31. Population Reference Bureau, 2001 World
Population Data Sheet, wallchart (Washington,
DC: 2001).
32. Developing-world TFR from United Nations
Population Division, op. cit. note 27.
33. Brian Halweil, “Where Have All the Farmers Gone?” World Watch, September/October
2000, pp. 12–28; Christopher Flavin, “Wind
Energy Surges,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital
Signs 2002, op. cit. note 6, p. 42; Molly O. Sheehan, “Solar Cell Use Rises Quickly,” in ibid., p. 44.
34. John Terborgh and Carel van Schaik, “Why
the World Needs Parks,” in John Terborgh et al.,
eds., Making Parks Work: Strategies for Preserving
Tropical Nature (Washington, DC: Island Press,
2002), pp. 5–6.
Chapter 2. Watching Birds Disappear
1. “The Extinction of Spix’s Macaw in the
Wild,” World Birdwatch, March 2001, pp. 9–11;
Alison J. Stattersfield and David R. Capper, eds.,
Threatened Birds of the World (Barcelona: Lynx
Edicions, 2000), p. 258; Josep del Hoyo, Andrew
Elliott, and Jordi Sargatal, eds., Handbook of Birds
of the World, Volume 4 (Barcelona: Lynx Edicions,
1997), p. 419; Renato Caparroz et al., “Analysis
of the Genetic Variability in a Sample of the
Remaining Group of Spix’s Macaw by DNA Fingerprinting,” Biological Conservation, vol. 99, no.
3 (2001), pp. 307–11.
2.
Stattersfield and Capper, op. cit. note 1.
3.
Ibid.
4. Josep del Hoyo, Andrew Elliott, and Jordi
Sargatal, eds., Handbook of the Birds of the World,
Volume 6 (Barcelona: Lynx Edicions, 2001), pp.
100–01; idem, Handbook of the Birds of the World,
Volume 2 (Barcelona: Lynx Edicions, 1994), p.
239; Hussein Adan Isack, “The Cultural and Economic Importance of Birds Among the Boran
People of Northern Kenya,” in A. W. Diamond
and F. L. Filion, The Value of Birds (Cambridge:
International Council for Bird Preservation, 1987),
pp. 91–95.
5. Kenneth D. Whitney et al., “Seed Dispersal
by Certatogymna Hornbills in the Dja Reserve,
Cameroon,” Journal of Tropical Ecology, vol. 14
(1998), pp. 351–71; del Hoyo, Elliott, and Sargatal, Volume 6, op. cit. note 4, pp. 91–92.
6. Deborah J. Pain and Michael W. Pienkowski,
eds., Farming and Birds in Europe (New York: Academic Press, 1997), pp. 128–37; Josep del Hoyo,
Andrew Elliott, and Jordi Sargatal, eds., Handbook
of the Birds of the World, Volume 5 (Barcelona:
Lynx Edicions, 1999), pp. 499, 523; A. W. Diamond, “A Global View of Cultural and Economic
Uses of Birds,” in Diamond and Filion, op. cit.
note 4, pp. 106; Daniel A. Walsh, “Birds as Indicators of Forest Stand Condition in Boreal Forests
of Eastern Canada,” in Diamond and Filion, op.
cit. note 4, pp. 261–64.
7. David Peakall and Hugh Boyd, “Birds as
Bio-Indicators of Environmental Conditions,”
and S. J. Ormerod and Stephanie J. Tyler, “Dippers and Grey Wagtails as Indicators of Stream
Acidity in Upland Wales,” in Diamond and Filion,
op. cit. note 4, pp. 113–18, 191–207.
8. Alison J. Stattersfield, BirdLife International,
e-mail to author, June 2002; Stattersfield and
Capper, op. cit. note 1; David W. Steadman,
“Human-Caused Extinction of Birds,” in Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla, Don E. Wilson, and Edward
O. Wilson, eds., Biodiversity II: Understanding
and Protecting Our Biological Resources (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1996), p. 148.
Box 2–1 from the following sources: Graham M.
Tucker and Melanie F. Heath, Birds in Europe:
Their Conservation Status (Cambridge, U.K.:
BirdLife International, 1994), p. 13; U.K. Environment Agency, at <www.environment-agency
.gov.uk/yourenv/eff/wildlife/ 213126/?ver
sion=1&lang=_e>, viewed May 2001; U.S. Geological Survey, at <www.mbr-pwrc.usgs.gov/
bbs/trend/guild99.html>, viewed May 2001;
Mike Crosby, “Asia’s Red Data Birds: The Facts,”
World Birdwatch, June 2001, p. 17; “Half of Aus-
181
NOTES, CHAPTER 2
tralia’s Land Birds Predicted to Become Extinct
by End of 21 st Centur y,” at <www.nccn
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96. Ibid.; L. D. C. Fishpool and Michael I. Evans,
eds., Important Bird Areas in Africa and its Associated Islands (Cambridge, U.K.: BirdLife International, 2001); Melanie F. Heath et al., Important
Bird Areas in Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: BirdLife
188
International, 2001); Nigel J. Collar et al., eds.,
Threatened Birds of Asia: The BirdLife International Red Data Book (Cambridge, U.K.: BirdLife
International, 2001); BirdLife International,
at <www.birdlife.net/sites/ibaprogramme.cfm>,
viewed March 2002; Stattersfield et al., op. cit. note
11, p. 29; Box 2–2 from Duan Biggs, BirdLife
South Africa, e-mail to author, August 2002, and
from Stephen W. Evans, “Blue Swallow Action
Plan Workshop,” BirdLife South Africa, at
<www.birdlife.org.za/news/news_front.cfm?ipkNe
wsID=334>, viewed August 2002.
97. Meffe and Carroll, op. cit. note 37, pp. 7–21.
98. WRI, op. cit. note 13, p. 244; 8.8 percent
from M. J. B. Green and J. R. Paine, “State of the
World’s Protected Areas at the End of the Twentieth Century,” presented at the IUCN World
Commission on Protected Areas Symposium at
Albany, Australia, November 1997 (figure includes
marine reserves).
99. Richard L. Knight, “Private Lands: The
Neglected Geography,” Conservation Biology, April
1999, pp. 223–24; Catherine M. Allen and
Stephen R. Edwards, “The Sustainable-Use
Debate: Observations from IUCN,” Oryx, vol.
29, no. 2 (1995), pp. 92–98; Jon Paul Rodríguez,
“Impact of Venezuelan Economic Crisis on Wild
Populations of Animals and Plants,” Biological
Conservation, vol. 96, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151–59.
100. Jeffrey A. McNeely and Sara J. Scherr, Common Ground, Common Future (Washington, DC,
and Gland, Switzerland: Future Harvest and
IUCN, 2001).
101. Robert A. Rice and Justin R. Ward, Coffee,
Conservation, and Commerce in the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Migratory
Bird Center and Natural Resources Defense Council, June 1996); Lisa J. Petit, “Shade-grown Coffee: It’s for the Birds,” Endangered Species Bulletin,
July/August 1998, pp. 14–15; Brian Halweil,
“Why Your Daily Fix Can Fix More than Your
Head,” World Watch, May/June 2002, pp. 36–40.
102. “La Biodiversidad en Torno a la Aceituna,”
Bio Andalucia, June 2002, p. 37; cacao, inte-
NOTES, CHAPTER 2
grated pest management, and organic farming
from mission statement for 1998 sustainable cacao
conference, Smithsonian Migratory Bird Center
and Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute,
Panama City, Panama, 30 March 1998, at
<natzoo.si.edu/smbc/Research/Cacao/cacaomis
sion.htm>, viewed February 2002; “The Biodiversity Benefits of Organic Farming,” Soil Association briefing paper, 27 May 2000, at
<www.soilassociation.org/>, viewed April 2002.
103. 2002 Farm Bill, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), at <www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/farm
bill/fbfaqhome.asp>, viewed June 2002; Farm
Service Agency, USDA, “The Conservation
Reserve Program,” PA-1603, revised October
2001; Tina Adler, “Prairie Tales: What Happens
When Farmers Turn Prairies into Farmland and
Farmland into Prairies,” Science News, 20 January
1996, pp. 44–45; Dan L. Reinking, “A Closer
Look: Henslow’s Sparrow,” Birding, April 2002,
pp. 146–53, citing J. R. Herkert, “Population
Trends of the Henslow’s Sparrow in Relation to
the Conservation Reserve Program in Illinois,
1975–1995,” Journal of Field Ornithology, vol.
68, pp. 235–44.
104. D. W. Macdonald and P. J. Johnson, “Farmers and the Custody of the Countryside: Trends in
Loss and Conservation of Non-productive Habitats 1981–1998,” Biological Conservation, vol.
94, no. 2 (2000), pp. 221–34; M. Ausden and G.
J. M. Hirons, “Grassland Nature Reserves for
Breeding Wading Birds in England and the Implications for the ESA Agri-environment Scheme,”
279–91.
105. C. J. M. Musters et al., “Breeding Birds as
a Farm Product,” Conservation Biology, April
2001, pp. 363–69; C. J. M. Musters, Environmental Biology Institute of Evolutionary and Ecological Sciences, Leiden University, The
Netherlands, e-mail to author, May 2002.
106. “California Compromise: Farmers Flood
Fields for Birds,” Audubon Activist, April 1993,
p. 7; “Rice Habitat Swells,” at <www.abag.ca.gov/
bayarea/sfep/news/newsletter/est9712.html>,
viewed December 2001.
107. SEO/BirdLife, “SEO/BirdLife Promueve
el Cultivo de Arroz Ecológico en el Delta del
Ebro Través de Riet Vell, Una Empresa Constituida
por sus Cocios y Simpatizantes,” press release
(Madrid: 8 June 2001); “La Fundación Avina
Apoya el Delta del Ebro,” La Garcilla, no. 111
(2001), p. 42.
108. Martha Honey, Ecotourism and Sustainable
Development: Who Owns Paradise? (Washington,
DC: Island Press, 1999), pp. 3–25.
109. Thomas S. Hoctor, Margaret H. Carr, and
Paul D. Zwick, “Identifying a Linked Reserve
System Using a Regional Landscape Approach:
The Florida Ecological Network,” Conservation
Biology, August 2000, pp. 984–1000.
110. Ibid.
111. Randy S. Kautz and James A. Cox, “Stategic Habitats for Biodiversity Conservation in
Florida,” Conservation Biology, February 2001,
pp. 55–77.
112. The Nature Conservancy, Nature Conservancy Landmarks: A Quarterly Report (Arlington, VA: spring 2002), p. 14.
113. Ibid.; Florida Forever, at <www.dep.sta
te.fl.us/lands/carl__ff>, viewed May 2002.
114. William Shepard, “Birding Trails in North
America,” Birding, vol. 33, no. 5 (2001), pp.
416–27; “Birding Florida on the Great Birding
Trail,” at <www.floridabirdingtrail.com>, viewed
April 2002.
115. Shepard, op. cit. note 114.
116. U.S. Department of Interior and U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2001 National Survey
of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated
Recreation: National Overview, May 2002, at
<www.fws.gov/>, viewed June 2002.
117. H. Ken Cordell and Nancy G. Herbert,
“The Popularity of Birding is Still Growing,”
Birding, vol. 34, no. 1 (2002), pp. 54–61.
189
118. Frank Gill et al., American Birds: Ninetyninth Christmas Bird Count (CBC) (New York:
National Audubon Society, 1999); U.S. Geological Survey CBC introduction, at <www.mp1-pwrc
.usgs.gov/birds/cbc.html#intro>, viewed April
2002; 101st CBC summary, at <www.audubon
.org/bird/cbc/101stsummary.html>, viewed April
2002.
Reserve Kenya,” brochure (Nairobi/Lamu: 2001).
121. Ibid., p. 167.
2. Based on author’s visit, May 2002, and on
WWF and KWS, op. cit. note 1; Lamu Archipeligo
population growth from Johnson M. Kazunga et
al., Socio-economic Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss
in the Priority Sites of the East African Marine
Ecoregion, Country: Kenya, Priority Sites: LamuKiunga and Mida-Malindi (Kenya/Tanzania:
WWF, October 2001), p. 2; East African coast
population growth from WWF, Tanzania Program Office, The Eastern African Marine Ecoregion: A Large-scale Approach to the Management
of Biodiversity (Dar es Salaam: 2001), p. 7; Kenya
population growth rate and global rate from U.N.
Population Division (UNPD), World Population
Prospects: The 2000 Revision, CD-ROM edition,
(New York: 2001).
122. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, “The Peregrine
Falcon is Back: Babbitt Announces Removal of
World’s Fastest Bird from Endangered Species
List,” press release (Washington, DC: 1999); U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service, “The Bald Eagle is Back,”
press release (Washington, DC: 2 July 1999). The
bald eagle remained on the Endangered Species
List through 2001 and into 2002.
Julie Church, project executant, WWF/KWS
Kiunga Marine National Reserve project, EAME
Support to the Secondary School Girls Scholarship
Program, Kiunga Marine National Reserve Area,
Lamu District, Kenya, Progress Report, January
2001 to January 2002, report prepared for World
Wildlife Fund, pp. 3–4.
123. Red kite from Ward J. M. Hagemeijer and
Michael J. Blair, eds., The EBCC Atlas of European
Breeding Birds: Their Distribution and Abundance
(London: T & A D Poyser, 1997), pp. 134–35.
4.
Based on author’s visit, May 2002.
5.
Ibid.; Church, op. cit. note 3.
119. Asian Waterbird Census from <www.wet
lands.agro.nl/wetlands_icu/ap/inf2000.doc>,
viewed May 2002; other citizen science projects
from <www.birdsource.org>, viewed May 2002.
453.
280–81.
125. Ibid., pp. 122, 417.
126. Ibid., p. 257; “Lear’s Macaw Population
Increase,” World Birdwatch, March 2002, p. 3.
127. Filion quoted in Diamond and Filion, op.
cit. note 4, p. 8.
Chapter 3. Linking Population,Women,
and Biodiversity
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Kenya
Wildlife Services (KWS), “Kiunga Marine National
190
6. Biodiversity from “Everglades National Park
Information Page,” Everglades National Park, at
<www.everglades.national-park.com/info.htm
#eco>, viewed 29 July 2002; history from G.
Thomas Bancroft, “United States of America: The
Everglades National Park,” presented at Human
Population, Biodiversity, and Protected Areas: Science and Policy Issues, American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 20–21 April 1995,
Washington, DC; new development from Michael
Grunwald, “Growing Pains in Southwest Fla.,”
Washington Post, 25 June 2002; panther population from National Wildlife Federation, People &
Wildlife: A World Connected (Washington, DC:
2002).
7. New development and restoration plan from
Grunwald, op. cit. note 6; impact of growing
NOTES, CHAPTER 3
populations from Bancroft, op. cit. note 6; Florida
population growth from U.S. Census Bureau,
“State and County QuickFacts: Florida,” at <quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html>, viewed
20 July 2002; Lee and Collier county population
growth from “Florida Population Change for
Counties sorted in Alphabetical Order,” Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 29 April 2002,
at <eire.census.gov/popest/data/counties/tables/
CO-EST2001-08/CO-EST2001-08-12.php>,
viewed 20 July 2002.
8. Figure 3–1 and other population data from
UNPD, op. cit. note 2; new projections expected
from Stan Bernstein, Senior Research Adviser,
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), New
York, discussion with author, 27 September 2002,
based on research presented at UNPD meetings
in 2001 and 2002.
9. Preamble, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations, June 1992, at <www.bio
div.org/convention/articles.asp>, viewed 27 September 2002; United Nations, Agenda 21: The
United Nations Programme of Action from Rio
(New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, undated), Chapter 24.
10. U.N. Development Programme (UNDP),
Human Development Report 2002 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 22–23.
11. Amartya Sen, “Population and Gender
Equality,” The Nation, 24/31 July 2000, p. 18.
12. China from Conservation International,
“Biodiversity Hotspots: Mountains of Southwest
China,” at <www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/
Hotspots/china/>, viewed 19 September 2002;
Eastern Himalayas from Paul Harrison and Fred
Pearce, American Association for the Advancement of Science Atlas of Population and Environment (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000); Central Africa and Danube River Basin
from Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edwards,
and Johanna Mang, eds., The Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss (London: Earthscan, 2000).
13. Root causes from Wood, Stedman-Edwards,
and Mang, op. cit. note 12, p. 15. Box 3–1 from
the following: definition of biodiversity from World
Resources Institute (WRI), “What is Biological
Diversity?” at <www.wri.org/biodiv/biodiv.html>,
viewed 7 July 2002; resilience of ecosystems from
Anthony C. Janetos, “Do We Still Need Nature?
The Importance of Biological Diversity,” Consequences, vol. 3, no. 1 (1997), p. 9; value of ecosystem ser vices from Andrew Balmford et al.,
“Economic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature,”
Science, 9 August 2002, p. 950; estimates of forest loss over past 100 years from WRI et al., World
Resources 2000–2001 (Washington, DC: WRI,
2000), p. 51; data on forest loss from U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Global Forest Resources Assessment 2000 (Rome: 2001), pp.
9–10; Nepal comparison from Oxford Desk Reference Atlas (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), p. viii; forest biodiversity from U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Outlook 3 (London: Earthscan, 2002), p.
94; Central American, mangrove, wetland, and
grassland losses from WRI et al., op. cit. this note,
p. 51; species loss from IUCN–World Conservation Union, 2002 IUCN Red List of Threatened
Species (Gland, Switzerland: 2002); past extinctions
from UNEP, op. cit. this note, pp. 121–22.
14. India from World Commission on Forests
and Sustainable Development, Our Forests, Our
Future (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 59, and from Madhav Gadgil and
Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1992), cited in WRI et al., op. cit. note 13,
p. 10; Newfoundland from Lenard Milich,
“Resource Management Versus Sustainable Livelihoods: The Collapse of the Newfoundland Cod
Fishery,” Society and Natural Resources, 1 September 1999, pp. 625–42, cited in ibid.
15. Footprint from WWF, UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, and Redefining
Progress, Living Planet Report 2002 (Gland,
Switzerland: WWF, June 2002), p. 4; vehicles and
carbon emissions from UNDP, Human Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), pp. 2, 4.
16. Family size decline from UNPD, op. cit.
note 2; U.S. Census Bureau, “Largest Census-
191
NOTES, CHAPTER 3
to-Census Population Increase in U.S. History as
Every State Gains, Census Bureau Reports,” press
release (Washington, DC: 2 April 2001); U.S.
population current and expected from UNPD,
op. cit. note 2; U.S. fertility rates from Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, “Women are
Having More Children, New Report Shows,”
press release (Atlanta, GA: 12 February 2002);
planets from Peter H. Raven, “Foreword” in Harrison and Pearce, op. cit. note 12, p. x; Bill McKibben, Maybe One: A Personal and Environmental
Argument for Single-Child Families (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1998), p. 12.
17. UNFPA, The State of World Population 2001
(New York: 2001), pp. 2–3.
18. Wood, Stedman-Edwards, and Mang, op.
cit. note 12, pp. 40–41. Box 3–2 from the following: species from World Wildlife Fund, The
Western Congo Basin Moist Forest: An Endangered
Space (Washington, DC: 2001), p. 1; tropical
wilderness designation from Conservation International, “Conservation Strategies: Tropical
Wilderness: Congo Forest,” at <www.conserva
tion.org/xp/CIWEB/strategies/tropical_wilder
ness/tropical_wilderness.xml#congo>, viewed 19
September 2002; details of bushmeat trade, income
from hunting, and Congo Basin population from
Bushmeat Crisis Task Force, Bushmeat: A Wildlife
Crisis in West and Central Africa and Around
the World (Silver Spring, MD: 2000); food insecurity from FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in
the World 2000 (Rome: 2000), p. 4; population
growth rates from UNPD, op. cit. note 2; schooling rates from UNESCO, 1999 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (Paris: 1999), and from UNESCO,
World Education Report 2000 (Paris: 2000), with
literacy data from UNESCO, February 2000
assessment, all cited in UNFPA, op. cit. note 17.
19. Hotspots designation from Norman Myers et
al., “Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities,” Nature, 24 February 2000, pp. 853–58;
Figures 3–2 and 3–3 based on Richard P. Cincotta
and Robert Engelman, Nature’s Place: Human
Population and the Future of Biological Diversity
(Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2000), pp. 40–41, 56–63.
192
20. Population growth in hotspots and reasons
from UNFPA, op. cit. note 17, p. 22, from Wood,
Stedman-Edwards, and Mang, op. cit. note 12, pp.
63–65, and from Cincotta and Engelman, op. cit.
note 19, pp. 63–64; rural-to-rural migration from
UNPD, Population, Environment and Development: The Concise Report (New York: United
Nations, 2001), p. 29.
21. UNFPA, Population & Sustainable Development: Five Years After Rio (New York: 1999), p.
23; Cincotta and Engelman, op. cit. note 19, pp.
41, 63–64.
22. World Wildlife Fund, Conservation Strategies
Unit, Disappearing Landscapes: The Population/Environment Connection (Washington, DC:
2001), pp. 15–18.
23. Daily rural-to-urban migration from UNEP,
Global Environment Outlook 2000 (Nairobi: 1999),
p. 47; urban population and migration data from
UNPD, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001
Revision; Data Tables and Highlights (New York:
United Nations, 2002), pp. 1–2; impacts of fast
urban growth from United Nations, Economic and
Social Council, “Demographic Dynamics and Sustainability,” Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on Sustainable Development acting as the
preparatory committee for the World Summit on
Sustainable Development, Organizational Session,
30 April–2 May 2001, p. 2; women-headed households from FAO, Gender and Food Security,
Division of Labor, Facts and Figures, at
<www.fao.org/gender/en/labb2-e.htm>, viewed
29 July 2002.
24. Urbanization and infrastructure from
Jonathan G. Nash and Roger-Mark De Souza,
Making the Link: Population, Health, Environment (Washington, DC: Population Reference
Bureau, 2002); impacts of sprawl from Sierra
Club, “Sprawl Factsheet,” at <www.sierraclub.org/
sprawl/factsheet.asp>, viewed 19 September 2002.
25. Past and expected rural population growth
from UNPD, op. cit. note 23, pp. 46–49.
26. Women farmers from FAO, op. cit. note 23.
NOTES, CHAPTER 3
27. Marc Lacey, “To Fuel the Mideast’s Grills,
Somalia Smolders,” New York Times, 25 July 2002.
1993), pp. 3–5; UNFPA, op. cit. note 17, pp.
38–39, 41.
28. Conservation International, IUCN, The
Nature Conservancy, WRI, and WWF, Conservation in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: September 1999); Lorena Aguilar, Executive
Summary—The Unavoidable Current: Gender
Policies for the Environmental Sector in Mesoamerica (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2002); Lorena
Aguilar, senior gender advisor, IUCN, Moravia,
Costa Rica, discussion with author, 30 July 2002.
32. Mayling Simpson-Hebert, “Water, Sanitation, and Women’s Health: The Health Burden of
Carrying Water,” Environmental Health Newsletter (World Health Organization), 1995, cited in
Justine Sass, Women, Men, and Environmental
Change: The Gender Dimensions of Environmental
Policies and Programs (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2002), p. 4.
29. United Nations, The Programme of Action of
the International Conference on Population and
Development (New York: 1994); fertility decline
from United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Population and Development,
Concise Report on World Population Monitoring,
2000: Population, Gender, and Development (New
York: 2001), p. 10; women’s rights and management of natural resources from Carolyn Gibb
Vogel and Robert Engelman, Forging the Link:
Emerging Accounts of Population and Environment Work in Communities (Washington, DC:
Population Action International, 1999), pp.
33–36, and from UNFPA, op. cit. note 17, pp.
40–41; World Bank, Engendering Development:
Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and
Voice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001);
impact of education from Population Council and
Rockefeller Foundation, Accelerating Girls’ Education: A Priority for Governments (New York:
Population Council, 1995), and from World Bank,
World Development Report 1993 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 42–43.
30. Gender and resources from UNFPA, op. cit.
note 17, pp. 37–41; land tenure estimate from
Katherine Spengler, “Expansion of Third World
Women’s Empowerment: The Emergence of Sustainable Development and Evolution of International Economic Strategy,” Colorado Journal of
International Environmental Law and Policy, summer 2001, p. 320.
31. Rekha Mehra, Gender in Community Development and Resource Management: An Overview
(Washington, DC: International Center for
Research on Women and World Wildlife Fund,
33. Women’s agricultural work from Mehra, op.
cit. note 31, p. 4; data on agricultural labor force
and women’s workloads from FAO, op. cit. note
23.
34. Mary Hill Rojas, Working with CommunityBased Conservation with a Gender Focus: A Guide
(Gainesville, FL: MERGE, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, June 2000),
p. 4.
35. Bina Agarwal, Are We Not Peasants Too?:
Land Rights and Women’s Claims in India (New
York: Population Council, 2002), pp. 5–7.
36. Mehra, op. cit. note 31, pp. 11, 16, 18.
37. Namibian Association of Community Based
Natural Resource Management Support Organizations, Namibia’s Community-Based Natural
Resource Management Programme: Enhancing
Conservation, Development and Democracy in
Namibia’s Rural Areas (Windhoek, Namibia:
2001), p. 14.
38. Agnes Quisumbing, Senior Research Fellow,
International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, DC, discussion with Brian Halweil
and Danielle Nierenberg, 24 July 2001; El Salvador
from Sass, op. cit. note 32, p. 3.
39. India from UNFPA, op. cit. note 17, p. 39;
Nigeria and Louisiana from Women’s Environment
and Development Organization (WEDO), Risks,
Rights, and Reforms: A 50-Country Survey Assessing Government Actions Five Years After the International Conference on Population and
Development (New York: 1999), pp. 17, 48. Box
193
NOTES, CHAPTER 3
3–3 from the following: Maathai quote from Ethirajan Anbarasan, “Wangari Muta Maathai: Kenya’s
Green Militant,” UNESCO Courier, December
1999; Green Belt founding and network from
Frances Moore Lappé and Anna Lappé, Hope’s
Edge: The Next Diet for a Small Planet (New York:
Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, 2002), pp. 170–71;
1999 estimates from Wangari Maathai, The Green
Belt Movement: Sharing the Approach and the Experience (New York: Lantern Books, 2002), p. 63;
tree planting, crops, conservation activities, and
income generation from Lappé and Lappé, op. cit.
this note, pp. 167–93; final Maathai quote from
Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, Speaking Truth to Power
(New York: Crown Publishers/Random House,
2001), cited in “Human Rights Heroes,” Ms.,
April/May 2001, pp. 58–60.
40. Information on gender and conservation
organizations from WIDTECH, Mainstreaming
Gender in Conservation (Washington, DC: Development Alternatives, Inc., May 2002). Box 3–4
from the following: gender and environment in
industrial nations from Susan Buckingham-Hatfield, Gender and Environment (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1, 74, 98, and from Stakeholder
Forum, “Gender and Sustainable Consumption:
Bridging Policy Gaps in the Context of Chapter 4,
Agenda 21, Changing Consumption and Production Patterns,” April 1999, at <www.unedfo
rum.org/publ/consumption/summary.htm>,
viewed 6 July 2002; food safety and gender from
Buckingham-Hatfield, op. cit. this note, p. 74;
receptivity to shifts from Stakeholder Forum, op.
cit. this note; green electricity from Matthew J.
Kotchen, Michael R. Moore, and Christopher F.
Clark, “Environmental Voluntary Contracts
Between Individuals and Industry: An Analysis of
Consumer Preferences for Green Electricity,” in
Eric W. Orts and Kurt Deketelaere, eds., Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to
Regulatory Innovation in the United States and
Europe (London: Kluwer Law International,
2001), p. 419; statement excerpt from “Final
Conclusions, Meeting of Women Leaders on the
Environment, 7–8 March 2002, March 2002,
Helsinki, Finland,” at <www.mtnforum.org/
resources/library/mwlen02a.htm>, viewed 9 September 2002.
194
41. Population policies from Gayle D. Ness with
Meghan V. Golay, Population and Strategies for
National Development (London: Earthscan, 1997),
pp. 92–95; population and environment in current
policies from UNPD, World Population Monitoring 2001 (New York: United Nations, 2001), pp.
24–27.
42. Poverty from World Bank, “New World
Bank Report Urges Broader Approach to Reducing Poverty,” press release (Washington, DC: 12
September 2000); children not in school from
UNESCO, Education for All: Year 2000 Assessment, Statistical Document (Paris: UNESCO,
2000), p. 10; research on fertility and girls’ education from Population Reference Bureau/Measure Communication, Is Education the Best
Contraceptive? Policy Brief (Washington, DC:
2000); Figure 3–4 based on total fertility rates
from UNPD, op. cit. note 2, and on female secondary school enrolment rates for school years
1998–99 and 1999–2000 (or an average if data for
both years were available), from UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, Education Sector, Gross and Net
Enrolment Ratio at Secondary School Level by
Countr y and by Gender for the School Years
1998/1999 and 1999/2000 (Paris: 2002); illiteracy data from UNESCO, Institute for Statistics,
Literacy and Non-Formal Education Sector,
Regional and Adult Illiteracy Rate and Population by Gender (Paris: UNESCO, 2002); changes
in women’s access from UNESCO, “Statistics
Show Slow Progress Toward Universal Literacy,”
press release (Paris: 2 September 2002); UNDP,
op. cit. note 10.
43. Contraceptive usage figures from UNPD,
“Majority of World’s Couples Are Using Contraception,” press release (New York: 20 May 2002);
350 million from UNFPA, The State of World
Population 1999 (New York: 1999), p. 2; estimates
of unmet need from John A. Ross and William L.
Winfrey, “Unmet Need in the Developing World
and the Former USSR: An Updated Estimate,”
unpublished manuscript, received 1 November
2001.
44. Financial resources from UNFPA, op. cit.
note 17, p. 52.
NOTES, CHAPTER 3
45. John C. Caldwell, “The Contemporary Population Challenge,” prepared for Expert Group
Meeting on Completing the Fertility Transition,
UNPD, New York, 11–14 March 2002; Robert
Engelman, vice president, research, Population
Action International, Washington, DC, e-mail to
author, 26 September 2002; industrial-country
policies from UNPD, op. cit. note 41.
46. Components of community-based programs
from Population Action International, “Community-Based Population and Environment Programs: Integrating Resource Conservation and
Reproductive Health,” fact sheet (Washington,
DC: 2001).
51. Biodiversity details from Conservation International, “Conservation Regions: Asia-Pacific,
Melanesia,” at <www.conservation.org/xp/
CIWEB/regions/asia_pacific/melanesia/melane
sia.xml>, viewed 19 September 2002; program
information from WWF—Solomon Islands, “Raising Awareness on Population and Environment
Issues in Western and Choiseul Provinces of the
Bismarck Solomon Seas Ecoregion,” unpublished
proposal, January 2002; gender equity policy from
World Wildlife Fund, Conservation Strategies
Unit, Social Dimensions in a Biological World:
Integrating Gender and Conservation in Priority
Ecoregions (Washington, DC: 2001), pp. 13–14;
fertility figure from UNPD, op. cit. note 2.
47. Tropical rainforest from UNESCO, Biosphere Reserves: Special Places for People and Nature
(Paris: 2002); program information from Conservation International, “Conservation International’s Field-Based Population-Environment
Programs,” unpublished document, 2002.
52. Statement by Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, executive director, UNFPA, at Panel Discussion at the
Third Preparatory Committee for the Johannesburg Summit, New York, 29 January 2002.
48. “Building Organizational Capacity for Integrated Reproductive Health Programs,” World
Neighbors in Action, spring/summer 2001; World
Neighbors, “World Neighbors—Ecuador Annual
Report, October 2001,” unpublished report,
2001; World Neighbors, “Three Year Program
Plan FY 02—Integral Development Bolivar,”
unpublished document, 2002.
54. Nepal from author’s discussions with WWF—
Nepal Program Office staff, other conservation
practitioners, program participants, and government agency staff, Kathmandu, Phakding, and
Namche, March 2002; Tanzania from author’s
discussions with WWF—Tanzania Program Office
staff, Dar es Salaam, May 2002.
49. Working for Water, at <www.dwaf.gov.za/
wfw/>, viewed 27 September 2002; Caroline
Hanks, “The Working for Water Program in South
Africa,” Women’s Health Project Newsletter, August
2000, pp. 4–5; Cape Floral Kingdom from Conservation Planning Unit, Scientific Services Division, Western Cape Nature Conservation Board,
Footprints in the Fynbos: Humans and Biodiversity
Meet in the Cape Floristic Region (Stellenbosch,
South Africa: June 2002), p. 5.
50. Jane Goodall Institute, at <www.janegood
all.org/jgi/programs/tacare.html>, viewed 6 July
2002; Jane Goodall Institute, “TACARE Project
Annual Report 2001,” unpublished report, 2002;
Christina Ellis, director, Africa Programs, Jane
Goodall Institute, e-mail to author, 30 July 2002.
53. Conservation International, op. cit. note 47.
55. Figure on adolescents from UNPD, op. cit.
note 2; World Bank, “Bangladesh: Girls’ Education Gets US$121 Million in World Bank Support,” press release (Washington, DC: 12 March
2002); “Early Marriage Linked to High Maternal
Mortality, UNICEF Says,” UN Wire, 8 July 2002.
56. World Wildlife Fund, Conservation Strategies
Unit, “Gender and Ecoregion Conservation: The
Burning Questions,” Sharing Across Boundaries,
March 2001; Bronwen Golder, senior research
fellow, World Wildlife Fund, e-mail to author, 26
September 2002.
Mia MacDonald, Deborah Snelson, and Caroline
Stem, “Report of the WWF—U.S. Population
and Gender Project Review,” unpublished report,
June 2002.
195
58. Ibid.
59. Working groups from Ness with Golay, op.
cit. note 41, pp. 40–44.
60. IUCN from Aguilar, Executive Summary,
op. cit. note 28; Sundarbans project from UNDP
and UNFPA, “Biodiversity Management in the
Sundarbans World Heritage Site: An Integrated
Two Country Approach in India and Bangladesh,
2002,” project proposal, 2002.
61. Brazil from José Goldemberg, Leapfrog
Energy Technologies (San Francisco, CA: Energy
Foundation, 1997), cited in UNDP, op. cit. note
15, p. 84.
62. “Turn the Tide: Nine Actions for the Planet,”
at <www.newdream.org/turnthetide/>, viewed
18 September 2002; information on women’s
participation from Seán Sheehan, national outreach director, Center for a New American Dream,
Takoma Park, MD, discussion with author, 11
October 2002; Women’s Environmental Network,
at <www.wen.org.uk>, viewed 19 September 2002.
63. Daniel Mavella, project executant, WWF
Tanzania Program Office, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, discussion with author, 6 May 2002.
64. UNFPA and U.N. Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, Population, Environment and
Poverty Eradication for Sustainable Development—
Actions Toward Johannesburg 2002, Background
Paper No. 14, World Summit on Sustainable
Development, second preparatory session, 28 January–8 February 2002, p. 9.
65. H.R.2506, Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 107th Congress, 1st session, 2002, and Conference Report 107-345, Title II, Child Survival
and Health Programs Fund; Lisa Moreno, senior
legislative policy analyst, Population Action International, discussion with author, 23 July 2002.
Chapter 4. Combating Malaria
1. Figure of 7,000 based on range of annual
deaths from Joel G. Breman, “The Ears of the Hip-
196
popotamus: Manifestations, Determinants, and
Estimates of the Malaria Burden,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, January/February 2001(supp.), p. 1; history and Burnet quote
from Andrew Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman: A
Short History of Epidemics, Plagues, Famine and
Other Scourges (New York: M. Evans & Company,
Inc., 1991), p. 14, 17–18.
2. Hindi from Nikiforuk, op. sit. note 1, p. 17;
Ann Hwang, “AIDS Passes 20-Year Mark,” in
Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2002 (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), pp. 90–91.
3. Population at risk from World Health Organization (WHO), The World Health Report 1999
(Geneva: 1999), p. 49; Patrice Trouiller et al.,
“Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A
Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure,” The Lancet, 22 June 2002, pp. 2188–94.
4. WHO, WHO Expert Committee on Malaria:
Twentieth Report, WHO Technical Report Series
No. 892 (Geneva: 2000).
5. Figure of $3–12 billion from WHO, “Economic Costs of Malaria Are Many Times Higher
than Previously Estimated,” press release (Geneva:
25 April 2000); $2.5 billion from Report of the
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health,
Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for
Economic Development (Geneva: WHO, 20
December 2001), p. 161; $150 million estimate
from Jeffrey D. Sachs, Center for International
Development, Harvard University, Cambridge,
MA, e-mail to author, 5 March 2002; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Budget for HIV/AIDS Increase 8 Percent,” press
release (Washington, DC: 4 February 2002).
6. Figure 4–1 adapted from John Luke Gallup
and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Economic Burden of
Malaria,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine
& Hygiene, January/February 2001 (supp.), p. 86;
geography from ibid.; percent from WHO, op. cit.
note 3; Norman G. Gratz, Robert Steffen, and
William Cocksedge, “Why Aircraft Disinsection?”
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, August
2000, pp. 995–1004.
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
7. Figure of 90 percent from WHO, op. cit.
note 4, p. 3, and from Joel G. Breman, Andréa
Egan, and Gerald T. Keusch, “The Intolerable
Burden of Malaria: A New Look at the Numbers,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine &
Hygiene, January/February 2001 (supp.), p. iv;
outpatient clinics from UNICEF Programme Division and WHO, “The Global Malaria Burden,”
The Prescriber, January 2000; five strains from
Donovan Webster, “Malaria Kills One Child Every
30 Seconds,” Smithsonian, September 2000, p. 40;
B. Greenwood, “Malaria Mortality and Morbidity in Africa,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, August 1999, p. 617.
8. J. Kevin Baird, “Resurgent Malaria at the
Millennium,” Drugs, April 2000, pp. 721, 733–36.
9. Sean C. Murphy and Joel G. Breman, “Gaps
in the Childhood Malaria Burden in Africa: Cerebral Malaria, Neurological Sequelae, Anemia,
Respiratory Distress, Hypoglycemia, and Complications of Pregnancy,” American Journal of
Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, January/February
2001 (supp.), pp. 57–67; Kenya from Ellen Ruppel Shell, “Resurgence of a Deadly Disease,”
Atlantic Monthly, August 1997, p. 49; cerebral
malaria from P. A. Holding and R. W. Snow,
“Impact of Plasmodium falciparum Malaria on
Performance and Learning: Review of the Evidence,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine &
Hygiene, January/February 2001 (supp.), pp.
68–75.
10. Helen L. Guyatt and Robert W. Snow, “The
Epidemiology and Burden of Plasmodium falciparum-related Anemia among Pregnant Women
in Sub-Saharan Africa,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, January/February 2001
(supp.), pp. 36–44; miscarriages, stillbirths, and
low birth weight from Murphy and Breman, op.
cit. note 9, p. 57; 30 percent and 60 percent from
Jeffrey Sachs and Pia Malaney, “The Economic and
Social Burden of Malaria,” Nature, 7 February
2002, p. 682.
11. Sachs and Malaney, op. cit. note 10, pp.
682–83; Catherine Goodman, Paul Coleman, and
Anne Mills, Economic Analysis of Malaria Control
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva: Global Forum for
Health Research, May 2000), pp. 162–63.
12. Number living in poverty from Molly O.
Sheehan, “Poverty Persists,” in Worldwatch Institute, op. cit. note 2, pp. 148–49; Goodman,
Coleman, and Mills, op. cit. note 11, pp. 159–73.
13. Isolating cycle from Sachs and Malaney, op.
cit. note 10, p. 684; costs and development aid
from WHO, op. cit. note 5.
14. Figure 4–2 from WHO, op. cit. note 3, p. 50;
Thomas C. Nchinda, “Malaria: A Reemerging
Disease in Africa,” Emerging Infectious Diseases,
July-September 1998, pp. 398–403; Robert W.
Snow, Jean-François Trape, and Kevin Marsh,
“The Past, Present and Future of Childhood
Malaria Mortality in Africa,” Trends in Parasitology, December 2001, pp. 593–97.
15. Official estimates from WHO, op. cit. note
3, p. 49; three times higher from Ebrahim Samba,
“The Malaria Burden and Africa,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, January/February 2001 (supp.), p. ii; high-fever episodes and
potential doubling from Breman, op. cit. note 1,
pp. 1, 7.
16. Andrew Spielman and Michael D’Antonio,
Mosquito: A Natural History of Our Most Persistent
and Deadly Foe (New York: Hyperion, 2001), p.
95; Jean-François Trape, “The Public Health
Impact of Chloroquine Resistance in Africa,”
American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene,
January/February 2001 (supp.), p. 15.
17. Baird, op. cit. note 8, pp. 719, 728–30;
WHO, op. cit. note 3, p. 52.
18. Replacement drugs from Nchinda, op. cit.
note 14, and from WHO, op. cit. note 4, pp. 5,
31; Thailand from Eliot Marshall, “Reinventing an
Ancient Cure for Malaria,” Science, 20 October
2000, p. 437.
19. Martin Enserink and Elizabeth Pennisi,
“Researchers Crack Malaria Genome,” Science,
15 February 2002, p. 1207; Malcolm J. Gardner
et al., “Genome Sequence of the Human Malaria
Parasite Plasmodium falciparum,” Nature, 3 Octo-
197
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
ber 2002, pp. 498–511; Robert A. Holt et al.,
“The Genome Sequence of the Malaria Mosquito
Anopheles gambiae,” Science, 4 October 2002, pp.
129–49.
20. Malaria belt from Webster, op. cit. note 7, p.
36; Afghanistan and Sierra Leone from UNICEF
Programme Division and WHO, op. cit. note 7;
North and South Korea, Tajikistan, and urban
areas from WHO, op. cit. note 4, p. 6; urban
malaria also from Vincent Robert et al., “Malaria
Transmission in Urban Africa,” American Journal
of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene (in press).
21. David J. Rogers and Sarah E. Randolph,
“The Global Spread of Malaria in a Future, Warmer
World,” Science, 8 September 2000, pp. 1763–66.
22. Box 4–1 from the following: J. B. Opschoor
and D. W. Pearce, “Persistent Pollutants: A Challenge for the Nineties,” in J. B. Opschoor and
David Pearce, eds., Persistent Pollutants: Economics and Policy (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991); cod and turbot from World
Wildlife Fund (WWF), Resolving the DDT
Dilemma: Protecting Human Health and Biodiversity (Washington, DC: June 1998), p. 11; DDE
from Matthew P. Longnecker, Walter J. Rogan,
and George Lucier, “The Human Health Effects
of DDT (Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) and
PCBs (Polychlorinated Biphenyls) and an
Overview of Organochlorines in Public Health,”
Annual Review of Public Health, vol. 18 (1997),
pp. 211–44; animal effects from H. Burlington and
V. F. Lindeman, “Effect of DDT on Testes and
Secondary Sex Characteristics of White Leghorn
Cockerels,” Proceedings of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, vol. 74 (1950), pp.
48–51, and from V. Turusov, V. Rakitsky, and L.
Tomatis, “Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
(DDT): Ubiquity, Persistence, and Risks,” Environmental Health Perspectives, February 2002, pp.
125–28; Committee on Hormonally Active Agents
in the Environment, Board on Environmental
Studies and Toxicology, National Research Council, Hormonally Active Agents in the Environment
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000),
pp. 165, 289; Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, “Toxicological Profile for DDT,
DDE, DDD: Draft for Public Comment” (Atlanta,
198
GA: September 2000); W. R. Kelce et al., “Persistent DDT Metabolite p,p’-DDE Is a Potent
Androgen Receptor Antagonist,” Nature, 15 June
1995, pp. 581–85; Matthew P. Longnecker et al.,
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The Lancet, 14 July 2001, pp. 110–14; Greenpeace
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Long-Term Occupational Exposure to DDT,”
The Lancet, 31 March 2001, pp. 1014–16.
23. Institute of Medicine (IOM), Malaria:
Obstacles and Opportunities (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 90–129;
Leonard Jan Bruce-Chwatt, Essential Malariology
(London: William Heinemann Medical Books,
Ltd., 1980), pp. 10–30, 97–124; Andy Coghlan,
“Four-Pronged Attack,” New Scientist, 20 February 1999, p. 11.
24. Figure 4–3 from U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Environmental Health
Center, Navy Medical Department Pocket Guide to
Malaria Prevention and Control, Technical Manual (Iowa City: University of Iowa, Virtual Naval
Hospital, 2000); IOM, op. cit. note 23; microliters
from Martin Enserink, “Building a Disease-Fighting Mosquito,” Science, 20 October 2000, p. 440;
share deposited from J. C. Beier et al., “Quantitation of Malaria Sporozoites Transmitted in vitro
During Salivation by Wild Afrotropical Anopheles,”
Medical and Veterinary Entomology, vol. 5 (1991),
pp. 71–79; rapid dispersal period from Gary
Taubes, “Malaria Parasite Outwits the Immune
System,” Science, 20 October 2000, p. 435.
25. Taubes, op. cit. note 24.
26. Bruce-Chwatt, op. cit. note 23, pp. 13–29,
35–41; 20-fold from Taubes, op. cit. note 24.
27. J. C. Beier, “Malaria Parasite Development
in Mosquitoes,” Annual Review of Entomology, vol.
43 (1998), pp. 519–43.
28. IOM, op. cit. note 23, p. 27; Bruce-Chwatt,
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
op. cit. note 23, pp. 97–114.
29. Bruce-Chwatt, op. cit. note 23, pp. 158–59;
explanation and examples from Spielman and
D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, pp. 96–97.
30. Spielman and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, p.
97.
31. Mario Coluzzi, “The Clay Feet of the Malaria
Giant and Its African Roots: Hypotheses and Inferences About Origin, Spread and Control of Plasmodium falciparum,” Parassitologia, September
1999, pp. 277–83; Robert S. Desowitz, The
Malaria Capers: More Tales of Parasites and People, Research and Reality (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 146–47.
32. Figure of 95 percent from Malcolm Gladwell,
“The Mosquito Killer,” New Yorker, 2 July 2001,
p. 45; emergence of parasite from Coluzzi, op. cit.
note 31.
Desowitz, op. cit. note 31, p. 148; Gallup and
Sachs, op. cit. note 6, p. 89.
Desowitz, op. cit. note 31, p. 148; Gallup and
Sachs, op. cit. note 6, p. 89; A. Ashley-Koch, Q.
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Plasmodium falciparum Growth in Thalassemic
Red Blood Cells: Further Evidence by Using
Biotin Labeling and Flow Cytometry,” Blood, 1
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35. Range of bites in Africa from J. C. Beier, G.
F. Killeen, and J. I. Githure, “Short Report: Entomologic Inoculation Rates and Plasmodium falciparum Malaria Prevalence in Africa,” American
Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, July
1999, pp. 109–13, and from Yeya Tiémoko Touré
and Mario Coluzzi, “The Challenges of Doing
More Against Malaria, Particularly in Africa,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, December
2000, p. 1376; success rate from J. Kevin Baird,
Parasitic Diseases Program, U.S. Naval Medical
Research Unit, Jakarta, Indonesia, e-mail to author,
18 August 2002; risk and toll from Baird, op. cit.
note 8, pp. 719–43.
36. Baird, op. cit. note 8, pp. 734–37; partial
immunity and course of infection from Shell, op.
cit. note 9, pp. 47–49.
37. Baird, op. cit. note 8, pp. 734–37; P. D.
McElroy et al., “Dose- and Time-Dependent Relations between Infective Anopheles Inoculation and
Outcomes of Plasmodium falciparum Parasitemia
among Children in Western Kenya,” American
Journal of Epidemiology, May 1997, pp. 945–56.
38. W. F. Bynum, “Mosquitoes Bite More Than
Once,” Science, 4 January 2002, pp. 47–48; Desowitz, op. cit. note 31, pp. 143–52.
39. David McCullough, The Path Between the
Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal,
1870–1914 (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1977); percentages from Spielman and D’Antonio,
op. cit. note 16, p. 125.
40. Bruce-Chwatt, op. cit. note 23, p. 4; Gladwell, op. cit. note 32, pp. 42–44.
41. IOM, op. cit. note 23, pp. 41–43; Spielman
and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, pp. 157–59.
42. IOM, op. cit. note 23, pp. 41–42; Gladwell,
op. cit. note 32, pp. 47–48.
43. WWF, op. cit. note 22, p. 3; Spielman and
D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, p. 165; Bruce-Chwatt,
44. Gladwell, op. cit. note 32, p. 50; Spielman
and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, pp. 157–59;
Bruce-Chwatt, op. cit. note 23, pp. 280–85.
45. Spielman and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16,
pp. 148–50; IOM, op. cit. note 23, p. 42.
46. IOM, op. cit. note 23, p. 44; Desowitz, op.
cit. note 31, p. 213–16.
47. Desowitz, op. cit. note 31, pp. 217–18;
M. A. Farid, “The Malaria Campaign—Why Not
199
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
Eradication?” World Health Forum, vol. 19 (1998),
pp. 417–27.
pp. 179–83.
49. Ibid.
50. David Brewster, “Is It Worth a Dam If It
Worsens Malaria?” British Medical Journal, 11
September 1999, pp. 651–52.
51. J. F. Walsh, D. H. Molyneux, and M. H.
Birley, “Deforestation: Effects on Vector-borne
Disease,” Parasitology, vol. 106 (1993) (supp.), pp.
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the Lacandon Forest, Southern Mexico,” Epidemiology and Infection, June 1999, pp. 461–69;
Beier, Killeen, and Githure, op. cit. note 35.
52. Sri Lanka from R. Ramasamy et al., “Malaria
Transmission at a New Irrigation Project in Sri
Lanka: The Emergence of Anopheles annularis as
a Major Vector,” American Journal of Tropical
Medicine & Hygiene, November 1992, pp.
547–53, and from Spielman and D’Antonio, op.
cit. note 16, p. 176; Tigray from Brewster, op. cit.
note 50, pp. 651–52, and from Tedros A. Ghebreyesus et al., “Incidence of Malaria among Children Living Near Dams in Northern Ethiopia:
Community Based Incidence Survey,” British
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53. Burton H. Singer and Marcia Caldas de Castro, “Agricultural Colonization and Malaria on
the Amazon Frontier,” Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences, December 2001, pp. 187,
191.
54. Ibid., p. 189.
55. Y. Ye-Ebiyo, R. J. Pollack, and A. Spielman,
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Anopheles arabiensis Mosquitoes Feeding on Maize
Pollen,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine &
Hygiene, July/August 2000, pp. 90–93; Spielman and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, pp. 220–21.
56. V. P. Sharma, “Re-emergence of Malaria in
200
India,” Indian Journal of Medical Research, January 1996, p. 32; Tennessee Valley Authority from
Spielman and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, pp.
152–53.
57. Preferences from Walsh, Molyneux, and Birley, op. cit. note 51, from Spielman and D’Antonio, op. cit. note 16, p. 211, and from Donald R.
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for Disease Control,” Pesticide Safety News, first
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58. Warren et al., op. cit. note 57.
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60. U. D’Alessandro and H. Buttiens, “History
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61. Cost from WHO, op. cit. note 3, p. 59;
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62. Ministry of Health, Mexico, “Experience in
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64. López-Carrillo et al., op. cit. note 62, pp.
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72. Henk Bouwman, “Malaria Control and the
Paradox of DDT,” Africa: Environment and
Wildlife, May 2000, p. 56.
65. Rise in annual infections from Roberts and
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González, “The Phasing Out of DDT in Mexico,”
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Gómez-Dantés and A. E. Birn, “Malaria and Social
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66. González, op. cit. note 65.
67. Pan American Health Organization (PAHO),
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68. José Manuel Galindo Jaramillo, “Promoting Health Through Sustainable Development,”
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69. Rich Liroff, “DDT’s Future Under the
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70. Burton Singer, “We Can Do Something
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71. U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP),
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73. Ibid.; South African Broadcasting Corporation, “Malaria Below Acceptable Levels,”
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of Evils: As a Tropical Scourge Makes a Comeback,
So, Too, Does DDT,” Wall Street Journal, 26
July 2001.
74. PAHO, “Situation of Malaria Programs in the
Americas,” Epidemiological Bulletin, March 2001;
Peter Trigg and Anatoli Kondrachine, “The Global
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75. Resistance from B. Sina and K. Aultman,
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H. Noukpo, and G. Ahoueya, “Overview of Factors Influencing the Emergence of Insecticide
Resistance,” presentation at Multilateral Initiative
on Malaria Conference, Insecticide Resistance in
Malaria Vectors, Harare, Zimbabwe, 5–9 March
2001; frequency of bites from Gallup and Sachs,
76. WHO, op. cit. note 4, pp. 57–64; Gerry F.
Killeen, Ulrike Fillinger, and Bart G.J. Knols,
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77. Geoffrey A. T. Targett and Brian M. Greenwood, “Impregnated Bednets,” World Health,
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78. Incidence from WHO, “Malaria Major Killer
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201
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
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Impregnated Bednet Programme,” The Lancet,
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the Second International Conference on Insecticide
Treated Nets, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
11–14 October 1999 (London: Malaria Consortium of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 1999), p. 4–3.
80. USAID, Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development, Division of Agriculture,
Natural Resources and Rural Enterprise, Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Insecticide-Treated Materials in USAID Activities in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: January
2002).
81. Program for Appropriate Technology in
Health Canada, Barriers to Trade in Mosquito Nets
and Insecticides in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ottawa,
ON, Canada: April 1998); Kabir Cham, List of
African Countries Which Have Reduced and/or
Waived Taxes and Tariffs on Nets, Netting Materials and Insecticides (Geneva: WHO, Roll Back
Malaria, March 2002).
82. DDT user status from WHO, “Final DDT
Agreement Endorses RBM Objectives,” RBM
News, February 2001, p. 6; United Nations Treaty
Collection, “List of Signatories and Parties to the
Stockholm Convention (as of 4 October 2002)”
at <www.pops.int/documents/signature/sign
status.htm>, viewed 16 October 2002; UNEP,
“Revised List of Requests for Specific Exemptions
in Annex A and Annex B and Acceptable Pur-
202
poses in Annex B Received by the Secretariat Prior
to the Commencement of the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on 22 May 2001” (Geneva: 14
June 2001); possible existing taxes based on Cham,
op. cit. note 81.
83. Amir Attaran et al., “Balancing Risks on the
Backs of the Poor,” Nature Medicine, July 2000,
pp. 729–31; Todd Seavey, The DDT Ban Turns
30—Millions Dead of Malaria Because of Ban,
More Deaths Likely (Washington, DC: American
Council on Science and Health, June 2002).
pp. 219–20.
85. J. F. Trape et al., “Combating Malaria in
Africa,” Trends in Parasitology, May 2002, pp.
224–30; housing from Spielman and D’Antonio,
op. cit. note 16, pp. 220–21; Malaria Consortium, Malaria and Poverty: Opportunities to
Address Malaria through Debt Relief and Poverty
Reduction Strategies, background paper for the
Fourth RBM Global Partners Meeting, Washington, DC, 18–19 April 2001 (London: Malaria
Consortium of the London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine, April 2001).
86. Mills quoted in WHO, op. cit. note 5; $2.5
billion from Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health, op. cit. note 5; 1¢ for every $100 is
a Worldwatch estimate based on industrial-country gross domestic product in David Malin Roodman, “Economic Growth Falters,” in Worldwatch
Institute, op. cit. note 2, p. 58.
87. S. Meek, J. Hill, and J. Webster, The Evidence
Base for Interventions to Reduce Malaria Mortality in Low and Middle-Income Countries, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Working
Paper Series No. WG5:6 (London: Malaria Consortium of the London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine, September 2001), p. 26.
88. David McGuire, NetMark Africa (USAID
and the Academy for Educational Development),
Washington, DC, discussion with author, 12
December 2001.
89. Cost-effectiveness from D. B. Evans, G.
NOTES, CHAPTER 4
Azene, and J. Kirigia, “Should Governments Subsidize the Use of Insecticide-impregnated Mosquito Nets in Africa? Implications of a
Cost-effectiveness Analysis,” Health Policy and
Planning, June 1997, pp. 107–14; China and
Viet Nam from WHO, op. cit. note 3, p. 55, and
from Tran Duc Hinh, “Use of Insecticide-Impregnated Bed Nets for Malaria Control in Vietnam,”
Mekong Malaria Forum (Regional Malaria Control Programme in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), April 2000; Zambia from McGuire, op. cit.
note 88, and from Michael Macdonald, USAID
Environmental Health Project, Arlington, VA, email to author, 14 February 2002.
90. Malariologists eradicated from Farid, op. cit.
note 47, p. 426; A. J. McMichael and R. Beaglehole, “The Changing Global Context of Public
Health,” The Lancet, 5 August 2000, pp. 495–99;
M. F. Myers et al., “Forecasting Disease Risk for
Increased Epidemic Preparedness in Public
Health,” Advances in Parasitology, vol. 47 (2000),
pp. 309–30.
91. Difficulties of predictions from P. Carnevale
et al., “Diversity of Malaria in Rice Growing Areas
of the Afrotropical Region,” Parassitologia, September 1999, pp. 273–76; high altitudes from
Brewster, op. cit. note 50; benefits of draining
rice paddies from Gladwell, op. cit. note 32, p. 51.
92. A. Seyoum et al., “Traditional Use of Mosquito-Repellent Plants in Western Kenya and Their
Evaluation in Semi-field Experimental Huts
Against Anopheles gambiae: Ethnobotanical Studies and Application by Thermal Expulsion and
Direct Burning,” Transactions of the Royal Society
of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene, May/June 2002,
pp. 225–31; G. P. Bhat and N. Surolia, “In vitro
Antimalarial Activity of Extracts of Three Plants
Used in the Traditional Medicine of India,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene,
October 2001, pp. 304–08; S. J. Moore, A.
Lenglet, and N. Hill, “Field Evaluation of Three
Plant-Based Insect Repellents Against Malaria
Vectors in Vaca Diez Province, the Bolivian Amazon,” Journal of the American Mosquito Control
Association, June 2002, pp. 107–10.
93. S. Abdulla et al., “Impact on Malaria Mor-
bidity of a Programme Supplying Insecticide
Treated Nets in Children Aged Under 2 Years in
Tanzania: Community Cross Sectional Study,”
British Medical Journal, 3 February 2001, pp.
270–73; child survival from Schellenberg et al., op.
cit. note 78.
94. G. Kidane and R. H. Morrow, “Teaching
Mothers to Provide Home Treatment of Malaria
in Tigray, Ethiopia: A Randomised Trial,” The
Lancet, 12 August 2000, pp. 550–55; “Ethiopia
Mothers Spread Home Treatment Message,”
RBM News, December 2000, p. 3.
95. East African Network for Monitoring Antimalarial Treatment, “Monitoring Antimalarial
Drug Resistance within National Malaria Control
Programmes: The EANMAT Experience,” Tropical Medicine & International Health, November 2001, pp. 891–98.
96. Integrated Management of Childhood Illness
from WHO, op. cit. note 3, pp. 57–58;
artemisinins from Robert G. Ridley, “Medical
Need, Scientific Opportunity and the Drive for
Antimalarial Drugs,” Nature, 7 February 2002, pp.
686–93; suppositories from WHO, Communicable Diseases 2000: Highlights of Activities in 1999
and Major Challenges for the Future (Geneva: January 2000), p. 82, and from Julie McLaughlin,
Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC, email to author, 25 September 2002.
97. David Schellenberg et al., “Intermittent
Treatment for Malaria and Anaemia Control at
Time of Routine Vaccinations in Tanzanian Infants:
A Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial,” The
Lancet, 12 May 2001, pp. 1471–77; Catherine A.
Goodman, Paul C. Coleman, and Anne J. Mills,
“The Cost-Effectiveness of Antenatal Malaria Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene,
January/February 2001 (supp.), pp. 45–56; Helen
L. Guyatt et al., “Free Bednets to Pregnant Women
through Antenatal Clinics in Kenya: A Cheap,
Simple and Equitable Approach to Delivery,”
Tropical Medicine & International Health, May
2002, pp. 409–20.
98. Joanne McManus, “Finding a Cure,” Far
203
Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 2000,
p. 43.
99. Ibid.; frontier areas and emergencies from
WHO, op. cit. note 4, pp. 18–26, 60; E. K. Ansah
et al., “Improving Adherence to Malaria Treatment
for Children: The Use of Pre-Packed Chloroquine
Tablets vs. Chloroquine Syrup,” Tropical Medicine
& International Health, vol. 6, no. 7 (2001), pp.
496–504.
100. Comparison of malaria and AIDS from Dr.
Stephen Hoffman, Celera Genomics, Rockville,
MD, discussion with author, 19 July 2002; Novartis from Novartis International AG, Novartis
Annual Report 2001 (Basel: 2002), from “Poor
Countries Get Deal on Malaria Drug,” USA Today,
24 May 2001, and from Gautam Naik, “New
Malaria Strain Hits Africa,” Asian Wall Street
Journal, 30 July 2001.
101. Gro Harlem Brundtland from Moisés Naím,
“The Global War for Public Health,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2002, pp. 24–36; Eliot
Marshall, “A Renewed Assault on an Old and
Deadly Foe,” Science, 20 October 2000, pp.
428–30. Table 4–3 from the following: WHO, op.
cit. note 3, pp. 59–62; Global Fund from “Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria:
Over view,” at <www.globalfundatm.org/
overview.html>, viewed 27 September 2002, with
confirmed funds from “Q&A on the Progress of
the Global Fund, July 2002,” at <www.global
fundatm.org/faq_finaltopublic.html#3>, viewed
4 October 2002, and approved projects from
“Proposals/Components Approved for Funding
with No or Minor Adjustments,” at <www.glob
alfundatm.org/files/Proposalslist_40.doc> viewed
4 October 2002; Roll Back Malaria (RBM) from
Barbara Crossette, “U.N. and World Bank Unite
To Wage War on Malaria,” New York Times, 31
October 1998, with $24 million from Gunther
Baugh, Resource Mobilization and Administration,
RBM Secretariat, e-mail to Suprotik Basu, Malaria
Team, World Bank, 11 October 2002; Medicines
for Malaria Venture (MMV) from Jocelyn Kaiser,
“Raising the Stakes in the Race for New Malaria
Drugs,” Science, 25 September 1998, p. 1930,
with current MMV budget, quote, and projects
from Declan Butler, “What Difference Does a
204
Genome Make?” Nature, 3 October 2002, pp.
426–28, and from Geoffrey Cowley, “Bill’s Biggest
Bet Yet,” Newsweek, 4 February 2002, pp. 44–52;
Multilateral Initiative on Malaria in Africa funding
from “Anteing Up for a World War on Malaria,”
Science, 29 August 1997, p. 1207, from Médicins
Sans Frontières, Access to Essential Medicines
Campaign and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
Working Group, Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in
Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected
Diseases (Geneva: September 2001), and current
budget from Andréa Egan, Multilateral Initiative
on Malaria, National Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, MD, e-mail to author, 1 October 2002.
102. Webster, op. cit. note 7; Gro Harlem
Brundtland, “Health: A Pathway to Sustainable
Development,” Journal of the American Medical
Association, 10 July 2002, p. 156.
Chapter 5.
Charting a New Energy Future
1. Thailand from Grainne Ryder, “Coal-fired
Power Is Obsolete,” The Nation, 12 May 1999,
and from Greenpeace, “Blessings Rain Down for
a Solar Future,” press release (Prachuap Khiri Kan
Province, Thailand: 2 May 2002); U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EREN), “California
Mandates 20 Percent Renewable Power by 2017,”
at <www.eren.doe.gov/news/news_detail.cfm
?news_id=325>, viewed 25 September 2002.
2. International Energy Agency (IEA), World
Energy Outlook, 2001 Insights: Assessing Today’s
Supplies to Fuel Tomorrow’s Growth (Paris: IEA,
2001), pp. 26–27; DOE, Energy Information
Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2002 (Washington, DC: 2002), pp. 1, 4; 2 billion from José Goldemberg, “Rural Energy in
Developing Countries,” in U.N. Development
Programme (UNDP), U.N. Department of Social
and Economic Affairs (UN-DESA), and World
Energy Council (WEC), World Energy Assessment:
Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability (New
York: UNDP, 2000), p. 348.
3. Eric Martinot, “The GEF Portfolio of GridConnected Renewable Energy: Emerging Expe-
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
rience and Lessons,” cited in Group of Eight (G8)
Renewable Energy Task Force, G8 Renewable
Energy Task Force Final Report (July 2001), pp.
27–28; 300 million from Eric Martinot, Climate
Change Program, Global Environment Facility, discussion with author, 4 October 2002.
4. IEA, The Evolving Renewable Energy Market
(Paris: 1999), p. v.
5. Christopher Flavin, discussion with author,
11 October 2002.
6. Annual investments in energy infrastructure
from UNDP, UN-DESA, and WEC, op. cit. note
2, and from Eric Martinot, Climate Change Program, Global Environment Facility, e-mail to
author, 9 October 2002.
7. Figures 5–1 and 5–2 are calculated by Worldwatch with data from IEA, World Energy Outlook
2002 (Paris: 2002), pp. 410–11.
8. Shimp quoted in “Feature—Solar Power to
Challenge Dominance of Fossil Fuels,” Reuters, 9
August 2002.
9. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2001), pp. 223–24; Box 5–1 based on ibid., pp.
10, 12–13, 17, with countries that have signed or
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, ratification dates, and
share of emissions available at <unfccc.int/
resource/kpstats.pdf>.
10. Wu Zongxin et al., “Future Implications of
China’s Energy-Technology Choices,” prepared for
the Working Group on Energy Strategies and
Technologies, China Council for International
Cooperation on Environment and Development,
24 July 2001, p. 5; World Bank, Clear Water,
Blue Skies: China’s Environment in the New Century, China 2020 Series (Washington, DC: 1997);
European Union (EU) from European Commission, “New Research Reveals the Real Costs of
Electricity in Europe,” press release (Brussels: 20
July 2001); losses due to natural disasters from
U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), “Financial Sector, Governments and Business Must Act
on Climate Change or Face the Consequences,”
press release (Nairobi: 8 October 2002). Table 5–1
based on the following: low coal figure is for the
United States, and the high figure is European
average; generating costs for coal and wind from
“On Track as the Cheapest in Town,” Windpower
Monthly, January 2002, p. 30; low natural gas
cost (for Europe) from David Milborrow, e-mail
to author, 18 September 2002; high natural gas
cost (U.S.) from DOE, EREN, “Economics of
BioPower,” at <www.eren.doe.gov/biopower/
basics/ba_econ.htm>, viewed 15 July 2002;
nuclear is 1993 levelized costs in California, from
California Energy Commission, 1996 Energy Technology Status Report: Report Summary (Sacramento, CA: 1997), p. 73; direct-fired biomass
low figure as of 1999 in the United States from
Dallas Burtraw, Resources for the Future, “Testimony Before the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, 14
September 1999; high figure for direct-fired biomass from U.S. DOE, EREN, “Biomass at a
Glance,” at <www.eren.doe.gov/biopower/
basics/index.htm>, viewed 15 July 2002;
hydropower low figure calculated by DOE based
on 21 projects completed in 1993; high
hydropower figure calculated using 30-year lifetime
and real cost of capital from DOE, EIA, Energy
Consumption and Renewable Energy Development
Potential on Indian Lands (Washington, DC: April
2000); photovoltaics (PVs) (unsubsidized in favorable climates) from Paul Maycock, e-mail to
author, 18 October 2002; external costs from EU
EXTERNE Project and from European Commission, op. cit. this note.
11. Africa from Hermann Scheer, Member of
German Parliament, cited in Alenka Burja, “Energy
Is a Driving Force for Our Civilisation: Solar
Advocate,” 2002, at <www.foldecenter.dk/
articles/Hscheer_aburja.htm>, viewed 8 October
2002; Brazil from J.R. Moreira and J. Goldemberg,
“The Alcohol Program,” Energy Policy, vol. 27, no.
4 (1999), pp. 229–45.
12. Quote and details on Kintyre from “Wind
Energy Turns Kintyre Economy Around,” Environment News Service, 8 July 2002.
13. Renewable energy jobs from Virinder Singh
205
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
with BBC Research and Consulting and Jeffrey
Fehrs, The Work that Goes into Renewable Energy,
Research Report no. 13 (Washington, DC: Renewable Energy Policy Project, November 2001);
John Whitman, “Unemployment in Spain Plummets to 21 Year Lows,” The Spain-U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, at <www.spainuscc.org/eng/
publications/LinkFall2000/paro21.html>, viewed
6 August 2002; Wilson Rickerson, Germany and
the European Wind Energy Market (Berlin: Bundesverband WindEnergie (BWE, German Wind
Energy Association), 2002); Jochen Twele,
Windenergie—Technik & Repowering (Berlin:
BWE, 2002).
14. California Public Interest Research Group,
“Developing Renewable Energy Could Mean
More Jobs,” KTVU News, 25 June 2002, at
<www.bayinsider.com/partners/ktvu/news/2002/
06/25_solar.html>, viewed 16 July 2002; Steve
Rizer, “Davis Supports Plan to Double State’s
Level of Renewable-Based Electricity,” Solar &
Renewable Energy Outlook, 1 April 2002, p. 73.
15. M. Kannappan, speech at 2002 Global Windpower Conference in Paris, cited in European
Wind Energy Association (EWEA), “Think Paris,
Act Global,” Wind Directions, May 2002, p. 11.
16. Inner Mongolia from Eric Martinot et al.,
“Renewable Energy Markets in Developing Countries,” in Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 2002 (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, in
press), p. 14 (draft); per capita annual net income
in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region from
Debra Lew, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, e-mail to author, 4 October 2002.
17. India from Indian Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (MNES), Annual Report
1999-2000, at <mnes.nic.in/frame.htm?publica
tions.htm>, viewed 29 July 2002; China from
Debra Lew, “Alternatives to Coal and Candles:
Wind Power in China,” Energy Policy, vol. 28
(2000), pp. 271–86; ethanol in Brazil and carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions from Monica Saraiva
Panik, “Greenhouse Gases are Global,” Sustainable Development International, Edition 4, p. 112,
at <www.sustdev.org/journals/edition.04/
download/ed4.pdfs/sdi4_111.pdf>, viewed 27
206
July 2002, and from CO2e.com, “Environment:
Brazil to Take Renewable Energy Plan to Johannesburg,” Inter Press Service, 17 May 2002; Brazil
exports from Suani T. Coelho, Executive Assistant
for the Secretary of State for the Environment, São
Paulo, Brazil, discussion with author, 25 July
2002; PV suppliers and service providers in Kenya
from James & James World Renewable Energy
Suppliers and Ser vices, at <www.jxj.com/
suppands/renerg/select_company/567_61.html>,
viewed 7 September 2002; local Kenyan firms
from John Perlin, “Electrifying the Unelectrified,”
Solar Today, November-December 1999.
18. G8 Renewable Energy Task Force, op. cit.
note 3, pp. 5, 9.
19. Clean energy markets in 2001 from Eric
Martinot, Climate Change Program, Global Environment Facility, e-mail to author, 19 September
2002; projection from Al Massey, “Staying Clean
and Green in a Developing World,” Ethical Corporation Magazine, 7 February 2002; speed of
progress from IPCC, Working Group 3, Climate
Change 2001: Mitigation, Summary for Policy
Makers, p. 5, at <www.ipcc.ch/pub/wg3spm.pdf>,
viewed 10 August 2002.
20. Wind as cheapest option from Daniel M.
Kammen, “Testimony for the Hearing on the
Role of Tax Incentives in Energy Policy,” Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC,
11 July 2001; technology trends from D. I. Page
and M. Legerton, “Wind Energy Implementation During 1996,” Renewable Energy Newsletter,
CADDET, September 1997, at <www.cad
det-re.org/html/397art6.htm>, viewed 22 September 1998, and from IEA, “Long-term Research
and Development Needs for Wind Energy for the
Time Frame 2000 to 2020,” October 2001, at
<www.afm.dtu.dk/wind/iea>, viewed 7 October
2002; average size installed worldwide in 2001
from BTM Consult, International Wind Energy
Development: World Market Update 2001, cited
in Paul Gipe, “Soaring to New Heights: The
World Wind Energy Market,” Renewable Energy
World, July-August 2002, p. 34; turbines for offshore from Peter Fairley, “Wind Power for Pennies,” Technology Review, July/August 2002, p. 43;
small-scale turbines from “Building Integrated
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
Wind Turbines,” RENEW: Technology for a Sustainable Future, July/August 2002, p. 27. Box 5–2
based on the following: DOE lightweight turbine
and Vestas offshore equipment from Fairley, op. cit.
this note, pp. 42, 43; German turbine from Eize
de Vries, “Where to Next? Developments and
Trends in Wind Turbines,” Renewable Energy
World, July-August 2002, p. 70; climatic models
from Birger Madsen, BTM Consult, e-mail to
author, 14 September 2002.
21. Cost in early 1980s calculated by Worldwatch Institute based on Paul Gipe, “Overview of
Worldwide Wind Generation,” 4 May 1999, at
<rotor.fb12.tu-berlin.de/overview.html>, viewed
3 March 2000; current wind costs from “On Track
as the Cheapest in Town,” Windpower Monthly,
January 2002, p. 30; 20 percent decline over five
years from EWEA and Greenpeace, Wind Force 12,
May 2002, p. 12, at <www.ewea.org/doc/Wind
Force12.pdf>, viewed 17 July 2002; Vestas from
“Renewables: Expansion Plan Progress,” Energy
Economist, April 2002, p. 36.
22. Capacity and generation from BTM Consult, “International Wind Energy Development:
World Market Update 2001—Record Growth!”
press release (Ringkøbing, Denmark: 8 April
2002); Figure 5–3 from BTM Consult, EWEA,
American Wind Energy Association (AWEA),
Windpower Monthly, and New Energy; estimated
number of households from EWEA and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 21, p. 5; 70 percent and 45
countries from “Operating Wind Power Capacity,”
Windpower Monthly, July 2002, p. 66; 2001 wind
sales totaled $6–6.5 billion, with $6 billion from
Søren Krohn, “Danish Wind Turbines: An Industrial Success Story,” at <www.wind power.dk/arti
cles/success.htm>, viewed 14 October 2002, and
$6.5 billion from Peter Asmus, “Another Enron
Casualty: Wind Power?” Environmental News
Network, 29 January 2002; sales in 1999 from
Christopher Flavin, “Wind Power Booms,” in
Lester R. Brown et al., Vital Signs 2000 (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 56;
number employed worldwide is Worldwatch estimate, based on Andreas Wagner, GE Wind Energy
and EWEA, e-mail to author, 18 September 2002,
and on EWEA, Forum for Energy and Development, and Greenpeace, Wind Force 10 (London:
1999).
23. British Wind Energy Association, “Europe’s
Seas: An Abundant Source of Clean Power,” 6
December 2001, at <www.bwea.com/view/news/
arc/eweaowec.html>, viewed 19 July 2002; EWEA
and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 21, p. 5.
24. Onshore resources, estimated at 53,000 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) (53,000 terawatt-hours)
of electricity annually, from Michael Grubb and
Niels Meyer, “Wind Energy: Resources, Systems
and Regional Strategies,” in Laurie Burnham, ed.,
Renewable Energy Sources for Fuels and Electricity
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993), pp.
186–87, 198; global net electricity consumption
in 1999 at 12,833 billion kWh, according to EIA,
“International Energy Outlook 2002,” at
<www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/tbl_20.html>, viewed
12 July 2002.
25. Bird deaths from Paul Gipe, Wind Power
Comes of Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
May 1995), from National Wind Coordinating
Committee, “Avian Collisions with Wind Turbines: A Summary of Existing Studies and Comparisons to Other Sources of Avian Collision
Mortality in the United States,” August 2001, at
<www.nationalwind.org/pubs/avian_collisions.pdf>,
viewed 3 September 2002, and from Danish
Energy Agency, Wind Power in Denmark: Technology, Policies and Results 1999 (Copenhagen:
Ministry of Environment and Energy, September
1999), p. 21; mitigation from AWEA, “Proposed
Repowering May Cut Avian Deaths in Altamont,”
Wind Energy Weekly, 28 September 1998.
26. Figure of 20 percent from R. Watson, M. C.
Zinyowera, and R. H. Moss, eds., Climate Change
1995—Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of
Climate Change: Scientific Technical Analyses, Contribution of Working Group II to the Second
Assessment Report of the IPCC (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and from Michael
Grubb, “Valuing Wind Energy on a Utility Grid,”
Parts 1–3, Wind Energy Weekly, vol. 27, no.
350–53; need for only minor changes from David
Milborrow, Survey of Energy Resources: Wind
Energy (London: WEC, 2001), at <www.world
energy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/
207
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
wind/wind.asp>, viewed 3 September 2002.
27. For information regarding wind prediction
and forecasting tools and modeling, see
<www.iset.uni-kassel.de>.
28. DOE, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), “The Photovoltaics Promise,”
NREL Report No. FS-210-24588, at
<www.nrel.gov/ncpv/pdfs/24588.pdf>, viewed
19 July 2002.
29. Sun’s energy from Richard Corkish, “A
Power That’s Clean and Bright,” Nature, 18 April
2002, p. 680; increase of PV cell and module
shipments since 1996 from European Photovoltaics Industry Association (EPVA) and Greenpeace, Solar Generation, October 2001, p. 3, at
<archive.greenpeace.org/~climate/climatecount
down/solargeneration/solargen_full_report.pdf>,
viewed 26 July 2002; doubling from Jon R.
Luoma, “Beyond the Fringe,” Mother Jones,
July/August 2002, p. 42; $2 billion PV industry
from U.S. National Center for Photovoltaics, cited
in Ricardo Bayon, “Unenlightened? The U.S.
Solar Industry May Be Eclipsed,” The American
Prospect, 15 January 2002, and from PV industry
data from EPVA, 2001; job estimate based on
Singh, BBC, and Fehrs, op. cit. note 13, pp.
11–12, on “Job Opportunities in Photovoltaic and Renewable Energy Engineering,”
at <www.pv.unsw.edu.au/bepv/jobopps.htm>,
viewed 9 October 2002, and on 3,800 jobs for
every $100 million in solar cell sales, according to
the Solar Energy Industries Association; number
of households from Martinot et al, op. cit. note 16,
p. 3 (draft); Figure 5–4 from Paul Maycock, PV
News, various issues.
30. Growth rates projected by Sharp, cited in
“Solar Cell Production Continues to Grow in
Japan,” Renewable Energy World, July-August
2002, p. 18.
31. Drop in costs per doubling from EPVA and
Greenpeace, op. cit. note 29, p. 14; 5 percent
annual cost decline from Bernie FischlowitzRoberts, “Sales of Solar Cells Take Off,” EcoEconomy Update (Washington, DC: Earth Policy
Institute, 11 June 2002); building facades from
208
Steven Strong, “Solar Electric Buildings: PV as a
Distributed Resource,” Renewable Energy World,
July-August 2002, p. 171; generating costs from
EPVA and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 29, p. 14. Box
5–3 based on the following: Australian company
(Sustainable Technologies International) from
“Feature—Solar Power to Challenge Dominance
of Fossil Fuels,” Reuters, 9 August 2002; NREL
cell from “High Yield Solar Cell,” RENEW: Technology for a Sustainable Future, May/June 2002,
p. 27; maximum recorded efficiency (single crystalline cells) and costs from IEA, Photovoltaic
Power Systems Programme (PVPS), 2000, cited
in EPVA and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 29, pp. 8,
15; spheral solar technology, being developed by
Automation Tooling Systems of Ontario, Canada,
from Rajiv Sekhri, “Canadian Firm Says Set to
Slash Solar Power Costs,” Reuters, at <www.planet
ark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/16934/story
.htm>, viewed 18 July 2002.
32. DOE, NREL, “Energy Payback: Clean
Energy from PV,” at <www.nrel.gov/ncpv/
pdfs/245 96.pdf>, viewed 19 July 2002; expected
lifetime from BP Solar, at <www.bpsolar.com/
ContentDetails.cfm?page=125>, viewed 18 September 2002; PV manufacture risks from Larry
Kazmerski, “Photovoltaics—Exploding the
Myths,” Renewable Energy World, July-August
2002, p. 176, and from U.K. Department of
Trade and Industry, at <www.dti.gov.uk/renew
able/photo voltaics.html>, viewed 3 September
2002.
33. Share provided by nuclear power in 1988
estimated from graph by the Uranium Information
Centre, Ltd., “Nuclear Power in the World Today,”
July 2002, at <www.uic.com.au/nip07.htm>,
viewed 24 September 2002; additional nuclear
capacity in 2001 according to International Atomic
Energy Agency, Power Reactor Information System, cited in “Another Record Year for European
Wind Power,” Renewable Energy World On-Line,
March-April 2002, at <www.jxj.com/magsandj/
rew/news/2002_02_03.html>, viewed 14 August
2002; wind and solar growth and share of current
capacity calculated using average annual global
growth rates of wind and solar PV between 1992
and 2001, year-end 2001 cumulative installed
capacity, and total global installed electric capac-
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
ity figure of 3,400 gigawatts; feasible growth in
wind capacity from EWEA and Greenpeace, op. cit.
note 21, p. 6; PV projection from EPVA and
Greenpeace, op. cit. note 29, p. 5.
34. Quote and North Rhine–Westphalia from
Jochen Twele, BWE, e-mail to author, 29 August
2002.
35. Andreas Wagner, GE and EWEA, discussion
with author, 10 September 2002.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Opposition to EFL from Jochen Twele,
BWE, discussion with author, 14 April 1999, and
from Kevin Rackstraw, “Wind Around the World,”
Sustainable Business.com and Global Environment and Technology Foundation, December
1998, at <www.sustainablebusiness.com/insider/
dec98/3-wind.cfm>, viewed 28 January 2000;
pro-wind rally from BWE, “5,000 Supporters of
Wind and Renewable Energies Out on the Street,”
press release (Berlin: September 1997).
39. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz
und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU, Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Safety), Act on Granting Priority to
Renewable Energy Sources (Bonn: April 2000).
(Federal Ministry of Economics), e-mail to author,
30 March 2001; training programs and publications from BMU, Environmental Policy: The Federal Government’s Decision of 29 September 1994
on Reducing Emissions of CO2, and Emissions of
Other Greenhouse Gases, in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Bonn: November 1994), p. 32.
45. Andreas Wagner, GE and EWEA, e-mails to
author, 10 September and 18 September 2002.
46. German capacity at beginning of 1991 and
2001 from BWE, “Installationszahlen in Deutschland, 1988–Ende 2000,” at <www.wind-ener
gie.de/statistik/deutschland.html>, viewed 14
March 2001; 11,750 megawatts (MW) and 3.75
percent from “German Wind Generation to Rise
25 pct in 2002—Firms,” Reuters, 5 September
2002; 12,000 MW and number employed from
Wagner, op. cit. note 35; 26 percent of SchleswigHolstein’s electricity is generated with the wind,
according to DEWI, “Wind Energy Use in Germany—Status 30.06.02,” DEWI Magazin, August
2002; as of early 2002, 90 percent of turbines are
owned by individuals or cooperatives and more
than 200,000 Germans are involved in cooperatives, according to BTM Consult, World Market
Update 2001—Forecast 2002–2006 (Ringkøbing,
Denmark: 2002).
43. Wagner, op. cit. note 35; Gerdes, op. cit.
note 40.
47. Growth rate calculated with data from IEA,
PVPS, Statistics by Country, 2000, at <www.oja-ser
vices.nl/iea-pvps/stats/home.htm>, viewed 18
September 2002, and with 2001 data from Peter
Sprau and Ingrid Weiss, National Survey Report of
PV Power Applications in Germany 2001, prepared
for the German Federal Ministry of Economics and
the Research Centre Jülich (as part of the IEA
Cooperative Programme on Photovolatic Power
Systems), WIP-Renewable Energies Division,
Munich, Germany, June 2002, at <www.wip-mun
ich.de/homepage/projects/pdf/Executive_Ger
man_Summary_2001.pdf>, viewed 24 September 2002; projected year-end 2003 capacity from
EPVA and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 29, p. 18.
44. State programs from DEWI, Wind Energy
Information Brochure (Wilhelmshaven, Germany:
1998), pp. 30, 35; federal resource studies from
Roland Mayer, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
48. Figure of 37 percent from Patrick Mazza,
“Europe, Japan Seize Clean Energy Lead,” press
release (San Francisco: Earth Island Institute, Climate Solutions, 15 April 2000); 1,400 full-time
40. Gerhard Gerdes, Deutches Windenergie
Institut (DEWI, Germany Wind Energy Institute), discussion with author, 7 December 2000.
41. Wagner, op. cit. note 35.
42. Jochen Twele, BWE, discussion with author,
5 December 2000; Gerdes, op. cit. note 40; investment amount from Wagner, op. cit. note 22.
209
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
jobs in 1995 and 39 percent price reductions from
Ingrid Weiss and Peter Sprau, “100,000 Roofs
and 99 Pfennig—Germany’s PV Financing
Schemes and the Market,” Renewable Energy
World, January-February 2002; 2002 employment figure from Sprau and Weiss, op. cit. note 47,
p. 5; expected expansion from Reiner Gärtner,
“Fatherland and Sun,” Red Herring, 22 July 2002.
49. CO2 reductions from “German Wind Generation to Rise 25 pct in 2002—Firms,” Reuters,
5 September 2002; revenue and generation
increases from “German Renewable Revenues
Rose 35 Pct in 2001,” Reuters, 16 July 2002;
wind targets announced by German Environment
Minister Jürgen Trittin and cited in EWEA,
Another Record Year for European Wind Power
(Brussels: 20 February 2002).
50. Year-end 1993 capacity (52 MW) from Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro Energético,
Spain; Legislation Development of the Spanish
Electric Power Act, Vol. 2, Royal Decree
2818/1998; “Renewable Energy: World Renewable Energy Outlook—Western Europe,” at <envi
ronment.about.com/library/weekly/blrenew
21.htm>, viewed 20 June 2002; wind’s share of
power generation from Michael McGovern, “Wind
Weakening System Security,” Windpower Monthly,
July 2002, p. 27; manufacturer ranking from
EWEA, “Company Profile: Gamesa Eolica and
Energia,” Wind Directions, January 2002, p. 12.
51. AWEA, “Texas Wind Energy Development,”
19 June 2002, at <www.awea.org/projects/
texas.html>, viewed 24 July 2002; number
of states with Renewables Portfolio Standard
laws from DOE, EREN, “California Mandates
20 Percent Renewable Power by 2017,” at
<www.eren.doe.gov/news/news_detail.cfm?news_
id=325>, viewed 25 September 2002. Box 5–4
from the following: Carter’s goal from U.S. Government, Interagency Domestic Policy Review
Committee, Domestic Policy Review of Solar
Energy—Final Report: Research, Design and Development Panel (Washington, DC: October 1978);
U.S. wind-generated electricity in 2000 from Paul
Gipe, discussion with author, 23 March 2001;
wind’s share of early 2003 Danish electricity generation from Madsen, op. cit. note 20.
210
52. Problems with U.K. law from British Wind
Energy Association, “Promoting Wind Energy in
and Around the UK—The Government’s Policy
for Renewables, NFFO and the Fossil Fuel Levy,”
at <www.bwea.com/ref/nffo.html>, viewed 3
September 2002; problems for small firms and
cooperatives from Rickerson, op. cit. note 13, p.
4; 1999 statistics from WEC, Survey of Energy
Resources: Wind Energy (London: 2001).
53. PV4You National Consumer Project, “36
States with Net Metering,” Interstate Renewable
Energy Council, at <www.spratley.com/ncp/
board2/?i=882>, viewed 18 September 2002.
54. Share of wind capacity additions calculated by
Worldwatch and including only the years when the
feed-in laws were in force, based on BTM Consult,
World Market Update, various years, on Danish
power company statistics cited in Danish Wind
Turbine Manufacturers Association, “Installed
Wind Power Capacity in Denmark in MW,” at
<www.windpower.dk/stat/tab12.htm>, viewed
28 January 2000, on Lester R. Brown, “World
Wind Generating Capacity Jumps 31 Percent in
2001,” Eco-Economy Update (Washington, DC:
Earth Policy Institute, 8 January 2002), on BWE,
op. cit. note 46, and on Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro Energético (IDAE), Spain; 80
percent from “Danish Wind Stalled,” RENEW:
Technology for a Sustainable Future, May/June
2002, p. 12; Figure 5–5 from Paul Gipe, discussions with author and faxes, 1 October 1998 and
23 March 2001, from AWEA, “U.S. Wind Industry Ends Most Productive Year, More Than Doubling Previous Record for New Installations,”
press release (Washington: 15 January 2002),
from BWE, op. cit. note 46, from Wagner, op. cit.
note 35, from IDAE, Spain, and from IDAE,
EHN, and APPA data supplied by José Santamarta, e-mail to author, 19 October 2002.
55. Box 5–5 from Hermann Scheer, Member of
German Parliament and General Chairman of the
World Council for Renewable Energy, Address to
the American Council for Renewable Energy,
Washington, DC, 11 July 2002.
56. Janet L. Sawin, “The Role of Government in
the Development and Diffusion of Renewable
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
Energy Technologies: Wind Power in the United
States, California, Denmark and Germany,
1970–2000” (dissertation, The Fletcher School,
Tufts University), September 2001 (Ann Arbor,
MI: UMI, 2001), pp. 204–05; inexperienced
investors in wind power from Randall Tinkerman,
former wind entrepreneur, discussion with author,
12 May 1999; rate of investment recovery and lack
of generation from Alan J. Cox et al., “Wind
Power in California: A Case Study of Targeted Tax
Subsidies,” in Richard J. Gilbert, ed., Regulatory
Choices: A Perspective on Developments in Energy
Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991), p. 349, and from Vincent Schwent, California Energy Commission, discussion with author,
6 May 1999; use of untested designs from Alfred
J. Cavallo, Susan M. Hock, and Don. R. Smith,
“Wind Energy: Technology and Economics,” in
Burnham, op. cit. note 24, p. 150.
57. MNES, op. cit. note 17; mid-2002 capacity
from “Operating Wind Power Capacity,” Windpower Monthly, July 2002, p. 66; lower capacity factors and some nonfunctioning turbines from
Martinot et al, op. cit. note 16, pp. 11, 20 (draft).
58. Mazza, op. cit. note 48; growth rate calculated by Worldwatch with data from IEA, PVPS,
op. cit. note 47, with 2001 capacity additions
from Fischlowitz-Roberts, op. cit. note 31; system
cost reductions from EPVA and Greenpeace, op.
cit. note 29, p. 23; Figure 5–6 from IEA, PVPS,
cited at <www.bp.com/centres/energy2002/page
downloads/solar.pdf>, viewed 24 September 2002,
and from Fischlowitz-Roberts, op. cit. note 31;
production increases by Kyocera and Sharp from
Curtis Moore and Jack Ihle, Renewable Energy Policy Outside the United States, Issue Brief 14 (Washington, DC: Renewable Energy Policy Project,
October 1999), and from Fischlowitz-Roberts,
op. cit. note 31.
59. Benefits to those with higher income from
Sawin, op. cit. note 56, p. 151; impact of California
incentive from Rizer, op. cit. note 14.
62. China and number of turbines in Inner Mongolia from Martinot et al, op. cit. note 16, pp. 8,
22 (draft); number of people from L. Wu, “Inner
Mongolia: One of the Pioneers of Chinese Wind
Power Development,” in Proceedings of the Beijing International Conference on Wind Energy
(Beijing: Organizing Committee of the Beijing
International Conference on Wind Energy, 1995),
cited in Goldemberg, op. cit. note 2, p. 377;
Indian loans from MNES, op. cit. note 17, p. 53;
funding in India from “Why Renewables Cannot
Penetrate the Market,” Down to Earth, 30 April
2002, p. 35.
63. Tax credit in Arkansas from Robert Righter,
Wind Energy in America: A History (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), p. 205;
wind’s potential share of Arkansas’ electricity calculated by Worldwatch with consumption data
from EIA, at <www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
st_profiles/arkansas/ar.html>, viewed 7 September 2002, and with wind potential from Battelle/Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Assessment of
Available Windy Land Area and Wind Energy
Potential in the Contiguous United States (Battelle/PNL, August 1991), cited in Jan Hamrin and
Nancy Rader, Investing in the Future: A Regulator’s Guide to Renewables (Washington, DC:
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, February 1993), p. A-11.
64. Indian programs from MNES, op. cit. note
17.
65. Middelgrunden from EWEA and Greenpeace, op. cit. note 21, p. 20; benefits of cooperatives from Sawin, op. cit. note 56, p. 377; surveys
from Andersen et al., Rapport om hvordan en
dansk kommune blev selvforsynende med ren vindenergi og skabte ny indkomst til kommunens borgere, Nordvestjysk Folkecenter for Vedvarende
Energi, 1997, cited in Steffen Damborg and Soren
Krohn, “Public Attitudes Towards Wind Power,”
Danish Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association, 1998, at <www.windpower.dk/articles/
surveys.htm>, viewed 13 April 1999.
60. Sawin, op. cit. note 56, pp. 151, 340–41.
61. Goldemberg, op. cit. note 2, p. 381.
66. Impact of standards in Denmark from Sawin,
op. cit. note 56, pp. 261–62, 375; dominance
of Danish turbine manufacturers from Søren
211
NOTES, CHAPTER 5
Krohn, “Danish Wind Turbines: An Industrial
Success Story,” 21 January 2000, at <www.wind
power.dk/articles/success.htm>, viewed 28 January 2000, and from Birger Madsen, BTM Consult, discussion with author, 8 December 2000.
67. Denmark and Germany from Sawin, op. cit.
note 56, p. 375; United Kingdom from Madsen,
op. cit. note 20.
68. Low figure for conventional energy subsidies
from Thomas Johansson, UNDP, quoted in Margot Roosevelt, “The Winds of Change,” Time, 26
August 2002, p. A-44; high figure from UNDP,
“UNDP Initiative for Sustainable Energy—Summary,” at <www.undp.org/seed/energy/unise/
summary.html>, viewed 4 October 2002, and
from Scheer, op. cit. note 55; 80–90 percent from
International Energy Agency and from Martinot,
op. cit. note 6.
69. Global Environment Facility funding from
Martinot, op. cit. note 6; World Bank Group
investments from Institute for Policy Studies (IPS),
“The World Bank and the G-7: Changing the
Earth’s Climate for Business,” June 1997, cited in
Kate Hampton, Banking on Climate Change: How
Public Finance for Fossil Fuel Projects is Short
Changing Clean Development (Washington, DC:
IPS, 17 November 2000), p. 6.
70. Manufacturers’ fears from California Energy
Commission, Wind Energy Program Progress
Report (Sacramento, CA: 1982), p. 23.
71. Decline in U.S. capacity from Gipe, op. cit.
note 54; India from “Renewables Deserted?”
Down to Earth, 30 April 2002, from MNES, op.
cit. note 17, p. 69, and from “Why Renewables
Cannot Penetrate the Market,” op. cit. note 62,
p. 33; Torgny Møller, “Government Closes Door
in Denmark,” Windpower Monthly, July 2002, p.
22.
72. Lower cost of consistent policies from Sawin,
op. cit. note 56, pp. 360–63, 379.
73. Watson et al, op. cit. note 26.
74. BP from Amanda Griscom, “Got Sun? Mar-
212
keting the Revolution in Clean Energy,” Grist
Magazine, 29 August 2002; Shell from Platts
Global Energy, 2001, at <www.platts.com/renew
ables/investment.shtml>, viewed 10 October
2002; $10–15 billion from World Bank, Global
Development Finance 2000 (Washington, DC:
2000); eightfold increase from Martinot, op. cit.
note 19, and from Massey, op. cit. note 19.
75. Model T from William J. Abernathy and
Kenneth Wayne, “Limits of the Learning Curve,”
Harvard Business Review, September-October
1974, cited in Christopher Flavin and Nicholas
Lenssen, Power Surge (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1994), p. 304; wind generation by
2020 calculated to be about 6,833 billion kWh by
Worldwatch, assuming capacity factor of 30 percent; global nuclear power generation in 2001
from International Atomic Energy Agency, cited
in Nuclear Energy Institute, “World Nuclear Power
Generation and Capacity,” at <www.nei.org/doc
uments/World_Nuclear_Generation_and_Capa
city.pdf>, viewed 11 October 2002.
76. Prime Minister Tony Blair, speech entitled
“Environment: The Next Steps,” Reuters, 6 March
2001, cited in G8 Renewable Energy Task Force
Report, op. cit. note 3, p. 16; European Union
goal from European Wind Energy Association,
“European Renewable Electricity Directive: The
Final Version,” Wind Directions, January 2002, pp.
10–11; China and India from Christoper Flavin,
discussions with author, September 2002; Brazil
from Coelho, op. cit. note 17; members of Congress from Susanna Drayne, Coordinator, Sustainable Energy Coalition, e-mail to author, 11
October 2002; U.S. states from Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, at <www.dsireusa.org>,
viewed 14 October 2002.
77. Paul Appleby, Director of Strategy and Planning, BP Solarex, United Kingdom, cited in Greenpeace, Breaking the Solar Impasse (Amsterdam:
September 1999), p. 2.
78. G8 Renewable Energy Task Force, op. cit.
note 3, p. 9; BP from Griscom, op. cit. note 74;
Shell from Simon Tuck, “Royal Dutch/Shell Taking Minority Stake in Iogen,” Globe & Mail,
at <www.gogreenindustries.com/Clippings/
RoyalDutchShell8May02.pdf>, viewed 10
October 2002; Jones from Platts Global Energy,
op. cit. note 74.
79. Meeting U.S. needs with wind calculated
with data from Battelle/Pacific Northwest Laboratory, op. cit. note 63; solar in Nevada from U.S.
Department of Energy, “Concentrating Solar
Power Technologies Overview,” at <www.ener
glan.sandia.gov/sunlab/overview.htm>, viewed
25 January 2002.
80. Fuel cell cars from “Factbox—What are Carmakers Doing to Cut Emissions?” Reuters, 24
September 2002.
81. IPCC, op. cit. note 9, p. 12.
Chapter 6.
Scrapping Mining Dependence
1. Peter L. Bernstein, The Power of Gold: The
History of an Obsession (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 2001), pp. 227–30; Kenneth
Chang, “How Africa Landed Motherlode of
Gold,” New York Times, 17 September 2002;
H. E. Frimmel and W. E. L. Minter, “Recent
Developments Concerning the Geological History and Genesis of the Witwatersrand Gold
Deposits, South Africa,” Society of Economic Geologists, Special Publication 9 (2002), pp. 17–45;
Lehman Brothers, Inc., Reverse Alchemy: The Commoditization of Gold Accelerates (New York: January 2000).
2. Bernstein, op. cit. note 1; Danielle Knight,
“Communities Organize Legal Action to Clean up
City’s Mine Dumps,” InterPress Service, 10 April
2001; author’s visit to Gauteng Province, South
Africa, August 2002.
3. Bernstein, op. cit. note 1; Norman Jennings,
International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva,
discussion with author, 19 July 2002; Glen Mpufane, National Union of Mineworkers, South
Africa, discussion with author, 19 July 2002; ILO,
The Evolution of Employment, Working Time and
Training in the Mining Industry (Geneva: 2002).
4. Frank Press and Raymond Siever, Understanding Earth (New York: W.H. Freeman and
Co., second edition, 1998); Ok Tedi waste from
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development
(MMSD) Project, Breaking New Ground (London:
Earthscan, 2002), p. 243; city waste from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Environmental Data
Compendium 1999 (Paris: 2000), p. 159; deadly
occupation from ILO, “Sectoral Activities: Mining,” information sheet, at <www.ilo.org/pub
lic/english/dialogue/sector/sectors/mining.htm>,
viewed 14 January 2002.
5. Toxic emissions refers to data for the United
States per U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Toxic Release Inventory 2000, at
<www.epa.gov/tri>, viewed 1 July 2002. Table
6–1 from the following: gross world product from
U.N. Statistics Division, National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables, 1998
(New York: 2001), data supplied by Gonca Okur,
World Bank, e-mail to author, 29 April 2002, and
from World Bank, World Development Indicators
2001 (Washington, DC: 2001); employment from
Norman Jennings, ILO, discussion with author,
18 July 2002, and e-mail to author, 10 October
2002, from ILO, LABORSTA database, at
<laborsta.ilo.org/>, viewed 26 September 2002,
and from World Bank, op. cit. this note; energy is
Worldwatch estimate based on various sources
cited later in this chapter; sulfur dioxide from
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric
Research (EDGAR), National Institute of Public
Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, the
Netherlands, at <arch.rivm.nl/env/int/core
data/edgar/>, updated November 2001; forests
from Dirk A. Bryant et al., The Last Frontier
Forests: Ecosystems and Economies on the Edge (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1997), p.
15.
6. Gary Gardner and Payal Sampat, Mind Over
Matter: Recasting the Role of Materials in Our
Lives, Worldwatch Paper 144 (Washington, DC:
Worldwatch Institute, December 1998); Kenneth
Geiser, Materials Matter (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2000).
7.
John E. Young, Mining the Earth, World-
213
NOTES, CHAPTER 6
watch Paper 109 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch
Institute, July 1992).
8. Alan Mozes, “Ancient Mines Cause Modern
Pollution,” Reuters, 26 November 2001; Figure
6–1 and minerals production from Grecia Matos,
minerals and materials specialist, U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), Reston, VA, e-mail to author, 20
September 2001, from USGS, Minerals Yearbook
(Reston, VA: various years), from idem, Mineral
Commodity Summaries (Reston, VA: various years),
and from United Nations, Industrial Commodity
Statistics Yearbook (New York: various years). All
data are for primary production of non-fuel minerals, except for the data for aluminum, which
include some secondary production.
9. Production figures from Matos, op. cit. note
8, from USGS, Minerals Yearbook, op. cit. note 8,
from idem, Mineral Commodity Summaries , op.
cit. note 8, and from United Nations, op. cit.
note 8.
10. Value calculated using USGS production
data and minerals prices compiled from various
sources by Jim Kuipers, Center for Science in
Public Participation, Montana, unpublished
research, September 2002.
11. Kuipers, op. cit. note 10.
12. USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2001
(Reston, VA: 2001).
13. Ibid.
14. CRU International, cited in MMSD, op. cit.
note 4, p. 91.
15. Ibid., p. 90.
16. Emily Matthews et al., The Weight of Nations
(Washington, DC: World Resources Institute,
2000), pp. 109–16.
17. Steel information from Joëlle Haine, International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), letter to
Dave Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 30 July 2002,
and from IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2001
(Brussels: 2001); aluminum from Patricia Plunk-
214
ert, USGS, email to Dave Taylor, Worldwatch
Institute, 14 June 2002; other metals from USGS,
Minerals Yearbook, op. cit. note 8.
18. David Malin Roodman, The Natural Wealth
of Nations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); data for Figure 6–2 from Betty Dow,
commodities information analyst, World Bank,
e-mail to author, 19 April 2002.
19. Mining’s share of global economic product
from U.N. Statistics Division, op. cit. note 5, from
Okur, op. cit. note 5, and from World Bank, op.
cit. note 5; mining company information from
Raw Materials Group, Who Owns Who in Mining
(Stockholm: 2001); small-scale miners from
MMSD, op. cit. note 4, pp. 315–16.
20. Metals Economics Group, “Latin America
Tops Exploration Spending for the Fourth Year,”
press release (Halifax, NS: 16 October 1997);
idem, “Exploration Spending Drops to its Lowest
Level in Nine Years,” press release (Halifax, NS,
Canada: 1 November 2001). Data represent 80–90
percent of worldwide exploration expenditures
for precious, base, and other nonferrous hard
metals.
21. Dan Murphy, “Green Gold,” Far Eastern
Economic Review, 27 May 1999, pp. 45–47.
22. Ibid.
23. Mining and untouched forests from Bryant
et al, op. cit. note 5; Matthew Green, “Mining
Giant Treads Fine Line in Madagascar Forest,”
Reuters, 19 December 2001; “Mining Companies
Invade Peru’s Andean Cloud Forests,” Environment News Service, 17 August 2001; Simon
Denyer, “Mining Drives Congo’s Gorillas Close to
Extinction,” Reuters, 10 May 2001; “Environment Treasures to be Lost on Gag Island, Papua,”
Tempo (Jakarta), 19–25 March 2002.
24. Sulfur dioxide from EDGAR, op. cit. note 5;
U.S. toxics emissions from EPA, op. cit. note 5.
Table 6–3 from the following: Congo from
Denyer, op. cit. note 23; Papua New Guinea from
MMSD, op. cit. note 4, p. 243; Russia from
IUCN–World Conservation Union and World
NOTES, CHAPTER 6
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Metals from the
Forest (Gland, Switzerland: January 1999), p. 17;
Nevada from Robert McClure and Andrew Schneider, “More Than a Century of Mining Has Left
the West Deeply Scarred,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12 June 2001.
25. Energy use in metals production is a Worldwatch estimate. The figure includes energy used in
extraction, smelting, and refining aluminum, copper, and steel, based on 2000–01 production statistics. Energy use per ton in primary and secondary
aluminum production from U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Industrial Technologies, Energy
and Environmental Profile of the U.S. Aluminum
Industry (Washington, DC: 1997); in bauxite ore
mining from Plunkert, op. cit. note 17; in primary
copper production and extraction from Robert
U. Ayres, Leslie W. Ayres, and Benjamin Warr, The
Life Cycle of Copper, Its Co-products and Byproducts (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, in press, 2003), p. 24; in
secondar y copper production from William
Dresher, Copper Development Association,
e-mail to Dave Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 12
July 2002; in primary and secondary steel production from I. Chan and N. Margolis, “Opportunities for Reducing Steelmaking Energy Use,”
Iron and Steelmaker Magazine, vol. 29, no. 1
(2002), p. 24; in iron ore mining from IISI, LCI
Methodology Report (Brussels: 1997). Total world
energy use from International Energy Agency
(IEA), Key World Energy Statistics, “Total Final
Consumption by Fuel,” at <www.iea.org/statist/
key2001/key2001/p_0303.htm>, viewed 10 July
2002, and from idem, World Energy Outlook 2000
(Paris: 2000). Primary and secondary copper production and primary aluminum production from
USGS, Minerals Yearbook 2000 (Reston, VA:
2000); secondary aluminum production from
Plunkert, op. cit. note 17; bauxite production
from USGS, 2001 Mineral Commodity Summary
—Bauxite and Alumina, at <minerals.er.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/bauxite/090301.pdf>,
viewed 16 July 2002; iron ore production from
USGS, 2001 Mineral Commodity Summary—Iron
Ore, at <minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
commodity/iron_ore/340301.pdf>, viewed 16
July 2002; total steel production from idem, 2000
Minerals Yearbook, op. cit. this note. Fifty-nine per-
cent of steel is produced using the basic oxygen furnace method (primary) and 34 percent is produced using the electric-arc furnace method
(secondary), based on information from Michael
Fenton, USGS commodity specialist, e-mail to
Dave Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 30 April 2002.
Latin America from IEA, World Energy Outlook
2000, op. cit. this note.
26. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy and
Environmental Profile of the U.S. Aluminum Industry (Washington, DC: 1997), p. 12; cement based
on data from Henrik van Oss, cement commodity specialist, USGS, Reston, VA, discussion with
author, 6 November 1998, from Henrik G. van
Oss, “Cement,” in USGS, Mineral Yearbook 1996
(Reston, VA: 1996), and from Seth Dunn, “Carbon Emissions Resume Rise,” in Lester Brown et
al., Vital Signs 1998 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1998); perfluorocarbons from Jennifer
Gitlitz, Trashed Cans: The Global Environmental
Impacts of Aluminum Can Wasting in America
(Arlington, VA: Container Recycling Institute,
June 2002), pp. 12–13, and from EPA, International Efforts to Reduce PFC Emissions from Primary Aluminum Production (Washington, DC:
September 1999).
27. IUCN and WWF, op. cit. note 24, pp. 8, 15.
28. Waste from Canadian mines from OECD, op.
cit. note 4; dumptruck dimensions from
<www.caterpillar.com>, viewed 22 May 2002.
29. Totals and Table 6–4 from the following:
minerals production from USGS, Minerals Yearbook 2000 (Reston, VA: 2000); waste is Worldwatch
estimate based on ore grades from USGS commodity specialists, and from Donald Rogich and
Staff, Division of Mineral Commodities, U.S.
Bureau of Mines, “Material Use, Economic
Growth and the Environment,” presented at the
International Recycling Congress and REC ’93
Trade Fair, Geneva, Switzerland, January 1993.
30. Copper grade decline data supplied by Daniel
Edelstein, commodity specialist, USGS, e-mail to
Dave Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 17 July 2002.
31. Robert McClure and Andrew Schneider,
215
NOTES, CHAPTER 6
“The Mining of the West: Profit and Pollution on
Public Lands,” multipart series, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11–14 June 2001; Mineral Policy Center
(MPC), Golden Dreams, Poisoned Streams (Washington, DC: 1997).
32. U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP),
“Mining and Sustainable Development II,” special
issue, Industry and Environment, vol. 23 (2000);
MPC, op. cit. note 31.
33. “Disastrous Cyanide Spill Could Spawn Liability Reforms,” Environmental Science and Technology, 1 May 2000, pp. 202a–03a; MMSD,
op. cit. note 4, p. 240; UNEP, op. cit. note 32,
pp. 7–8, 64–65.
34. MPC, op. cit. note 31, pp. 5, 64–68.
35. Table 6–5 from the following: ZortmanLandusky from Global Mining Campaign, Digging
Deep (Washington, DC: 2002); Tambo Grande
from Scott Wilson, “A Life Worth More than
Gold,” Washington Post, 9 June 2002; Myanmar
from International Chemical, Energy, Mine and
General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), North America, “CLC and ICEM tell Ivanhoe Mines to Withdraw from Burma,” press release (Washington,
DC: 30 June 2002), and from Matthew McClearn,
“Stranger in a Strange Land,” Canadian Business,
18 February 2002; Torréon from “Greenpeace
Highlights Mexican Metals Violations,” Reuters,
27 August 1999.
36. ILO, op. cit. note 4.
37. MMSD, op. cit. note 4, p. 204; Helen
Epstein, “The Hidden Cause of AIDS,” New York
Review of Books, 9 May 2002, pp. 43–49.
38. MMSD, op. cit. note 4, p. 65; Kenneth Zinn,
ICEM North America, e-mail to author, 16 September 2002.
39. Roger Moody, “The Lure of Gold—How
Golden Is the Future?” Panos Media Briefing No.
19 (London: Panos Institute, May 1996); Indonesia from Survival for Tribal Peoples, “Indonesian
Army Kills and Rapes Tribal People,” news release
(London: October 1998); Australia from IUCN
216
and WWF, op. cit. note 24, p. 6, and from Global
Mining Campaign, op. cit. note 35; French Guiana
from Ed Susman, “The Price of Gold,” Environmental Health Perspectives, 5 May 2001, p. A225.
40. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: H.
Regnery Co., 1909); Michael Ross, Extractive
Sectors and the Poor (Boston: Oxfam America,
October 2001).
41. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner,
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for
International Development, November 1997);
Richard M. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development (Helsinki: World Institute for
Development Economics Research, 2000).
42. Thomas Michael Power, Digging to Development? A Historical Look at Mining and Economic Development (Washington, DC: Oxfam
America, 2002), quote from p. 20; idem, Lost
Landscapes and Failed Economies (Washington,
DC: Island Press, 1996); Johannes Stahl, “The
Man-Eating Mines of Potosí,” Cultural Survival
Quarterly, spring 2001, p. 50; MMSD, op. cit.
note 4, p. 232.
43. World Bank, World Development Indicators
2002 (Washington, DC: 2002), pp. 268–70.
44. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Least Developed Countries Report 2002
(New York: 2002), chapter 4.
45. Power, Digging to Development, op. cit. note
42; “The Natural Resources Myth,” The Economist,
23 December 1995–5 January 1996, pp. 87–89.
46. Social services from Nancy Birdsall, Thomas
Pinckney, and Richard Sabot, Natural Resources,
Human Capital, and Growth (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
February 2000); conflict from Michael Renner, The
Anatomy of Resource Wars, Worldwatch Paper 162
(Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, October
2002); corruption from Transparency International, “Corrupt Political Elites and Unscrupulous
NOTES, CHAPTER 6
Investors Kill Sustainable Growth in its Tracks,
Highlights New Index,” press release (Berlin: 28
August 2002), and from MMSD, op. cit. note 4,
p. 185.
47. Power, Digging to Development, op. cit. note
42, p. 27; Auty, op. cit. note 41.
48. Eugenio Figueroa, Enrique Calfucura, and
Javier Nuñez, “Green National Accounting: The
Case of Chile’s Mining Sector,” Environment and
Development Economics, vol. 7, pp. 215–39, quote
on p. 215.
Economies,” Mining Engineering, January 1997,
pp. 31–36; Travis Q. Lyday, “The Mineral Industry of Papua New Guinea,” Pablo Velasco, “The
Mineral Industry of Ecuador,” and Ivette E. Torres, “The Mineral Industry of Argentina,” all in
USGS, op. cit. note 29; Ivette E. Torres, USGS
country specialist, discussion with Dave Taylor,
Worldwatch Institute, 21 October 2002; Thomas
Yager, USGS commodity specialist, e-mail to Dave
Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 22 October 2002;
Amy Rosenfeld Sweeting and Andrea P. Clark,
Lightening the Lode: A Guide to Responsible Largescale Mining (Washington, DC: Conservation
International, 2000).
49. Power, Lost Landscapes, op. cit. note 42.
50. World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC), It’s Not Over When It’s Over:
Mine Closure Around the World (Washington, DC:
2002); Placer Dome, at <www.placerdome.com/
properties/misima/misima_history.html>, viewed
22 October 2002; idem, at <www.placerdome
.com/properties/porgera/porgera_history.html>,
viewed 22 October 2002; Ok Tedi, at <www.ok
tedi.com/ aboutus/history.php>, viewed 22 October 2002.
51. ILO, op. cit. note 3, p. 10.
52. Ibid.; “China’s Consultative Body Urges
Mining Cities to Find Alternative Industries,”
Xinhua, 27 June 2002.
53. ILO, op. cit. note 3; Power, Lost Landscapes,
op. cit. note 42.
54. Babbitt quoted in Robert McClure and
Andrew Schneider, “The General Mining Act of
1872 has Left a Legacy of Riches and Ruin,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11 June 2001.
55. General Accounting Office (GAO), Mineral
Royalties: Royalties in the Western States and in
Major Mineral-Producing Countries, report to
the U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: March 1993),
p. 6; “South Africa Mining Bill Approved,” BBC
News, 25 June 2002.
56. GAO, op. cit. note 55; James P. Dorian,
“Mining—Changing Picture in Transitional
57. MPC, Burden of Gilt (Washington, DC:
1993); Alan Septoff, MPC, discussion with author,
11 August 2002; McClure and Schneider, op. cit.
note 31.
58. Geoff Evans, James Goodman, and Nina
Lansbury, eds., Moving Mountains (Sydney: Mineral Policy Institute and Otford Press, 2001), pp.
37–39; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) and Yanacocha from Extractive Industries
Review, at <www.eireview.org/eir/eirhome.nsf/
(DocLibrary)/5F1200213759BEAA85256C2200
68CD34/$FILE/MIGA%20List%20Aug%2025
.xls>, viewed 12 September 2002; Omai from
Harvey Van Velduizen, MIGA, discussions with
Dave Taylor, Worldwatch Institute, 8 October
and 10 October 2002, and from Friends of the
Earth, Risky Business: How the World Bank’s Insurance Arm Fails the Poor and Harms the Environment (Washington, DC: 2001), pp. 14–16;
Kumtor from CEE Bankwatch, Mountains of Gold:
Kumtor Gold Mine in Kyrgyz Republic (Budapest:
2002), p. 30.
59. Energy savings is a Worldwatch estimate
based on references cited in note 25; Iddo K.
Wernick and Nickolas J. Themelis, “Recycling
Metals for the Environment,” Annual Review of
Energy and the Environment 1998 (Palo Alto, CA:
Annual Reviews, 1998), pp. 465–97.
60. Figure 6–3 from Lehman Brothers, Inc., op.
cit. note 1, based on data from the International
Monetary Fund.
217
NOTES, CHAPTER 6
61. Gold Fields Minerals Services Ltd., Gold
Survey 2002 (London: April 2002).
62. Figure 6–4 from C. Zeltner et al., “Sustainable Metal Management Exemplified by Copper in
the USA,” Regional Environmental Change,
November 1999, pp. 31–46; S. Spatari et al.,
“The Contemporary European Copper Cycle:
One Year Stocks and Flows,” Ecological Economics, in press (2002) pp. 31–46; Ayres, Ayres, and
Warr, op. cit. note 25; share from secondary supplies from USGS, op. cit. note 8.
63. Patrick Kelly, “From Cans to Autos,”
Resource Recycling, January 2002, pp. 30–31;
Gitlitz, op. cit. note 26.
64. Robert McClure and Andrew Schneider,
“Powerful Friends in Congress,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 14 June 2001.
65. Frank Ackerman, Why do We Recycle? (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997).
66. Geiser, op. cit. note 6.
67. “Eighty-Six Percent of Discarded Cars’
Weight Can Now be Recycled, Organization Says,”
International Environment Reporter, 17 March
1999, p. 249.
68. EPA, “Product Stewardship—International
Initiatives for Electronics,” at <www.epa.gov/
epr/products/eintern.html>, updated 18 June
2002; “Electronics Producers Must Pay for Electronic Wastes,” Environmental News Service, 14
October 2002.
69. Robert Ayres, Towards Zero Emissions: Is
There a Feasible Path? Introduction to ZERI Phase
II (Fontainebleau, France: European Institute of
Business Administration, May 1998).
70. Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), “CLC
Policy on Just Transition for Workers During
Environmental Change,” endorsed by CLC Executive Council, April 1999; Michael Renner, Working for the Environment: A Growing Source of Jobs,
Worldwatch Paper 152 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, September 2000); James Barratt,
218
Worker Transition and Global Climate Change
(Washington, DC: Pew Center for Global Climate Change, 2002).
71. South Africa from Mpufane, op. cit. note 3,
and from Jennings, op. cit. note 3; recycling and
remanufacturing jobs from R. W. Beck, Inc., U.S.
Recycling Economic Information Study, prepared
for the National Recycling Coalition (July 2001),
and from EPA, Macroeconomic Importance of Recycling and Remanufacturing (Washington, DC:
October 1998), pp. 3–5.
72. “Old Silver Mining Town to Cash in on
Wind,” Environment News Service, 28 September 2000; Li Rongrong quoted in “China’s Consultative Body Urges Mining Cities to Find
Alternative Industries,” Xinhua, 27 June 2002.
73. WWF International and WWF–UK, To Dig
or Not to Dig? (London: 2002).
74. Pacheco quoted in “Costa Rica Cracks Down
on Mining, Logging,” Reuters, 11 June 2002;
Carlos Zorilla, DECOIN, Cotacachi, Ecuador, email to author, 10 July 2002.
75. “Romanian Cyanide Spill Prompts Calls for
Ban on Chemical’s Use in Other Mines,” International Environmental Reporter, 30 August 2000,
p. 676; “New Czech Legislation Bans Use of
Cyanide Leaching Technologies in Mining,” International Environmental Reporter, 25 October
2000, p. 834; Federal Parliament of Germany,
“Minimization of the Environmental and Health
Hazards of Gold Production,” motion of the SPD
(Social Democrats) and 90 Alliance (Greens),
approved on 24 January 2002; Philippines from
Marcos Orellana, “Unearthing Governance:
Obstacles and Opportunities for Public Participation in Minerals Policy,” in Carl Bruch, ed., The
New “Public”: The Globalization of Public Participation (Washington, DC: Environmental Law
Institute, 2002), p. 238; Montana from CEE
Bankwatch et al., “Cyanide Mining Hazards
Endanger Communities, Environment,” press
release (Prague: 21 February 2002).
76. MPC, op. cit. note 57; World Bank and IFC,
op. cit. note 50; Jim Kuipers, Center for Science
in Public Participation, testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Resources, U.S. House
of Representatives, Hearing on Availability of
Bonds to Meet Federal Requirements for Mining,
Oil, and Gas, Washington, DC, 23 July 2002;
MPC, “Bush Administration Sets Stage for Mine
Cleanup Scandal,” press release (Washington, DC:
August 2002).
77. See, for instance, <www.theminingnews.org>
and <minesandcommunities.org>.
78. Grasberg from Extractive Industries Review,
op. cit. note 58; Rosia Montana from Neil J. King
Jr., “Romanian Gold-Mine Loan is Blocked by
Wolfensohn,” Wall Street Journal, 11 October
2002; Extractive Industries Review at <www
.eireview.org>.
79. MMSD, op. cit. note 4; John E. Young, ed.,
Not Digging Deep Enough (Washington, DC: MPC
et al., October 2002 draft).
Chapter 7. Uniting Divided Cities
1. Histor y of apartheid from Keith S. O.
Beavon, “Johannesburg: A City and Metropolitan
Area in Transformation,” in Carole Rakodi, ed.,
The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of Its Largest Cities (Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 1997), pp. 150–91; toilets in Johannesburg from Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw, and Susan Parnell, “Victims, Villains and
Fixers: The Urban Environment and Johannesburg’s Poor,” Journal of Southern African Studies, December 2000, pp. 833–55; Alexandra from
Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw, and Susan Parnell,
Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social
Exclusion in Johannesburg (London: Earthscan,
2002), pp. 154–59; inequality in public health
from Lynn Dalrymple, “Building Healthy Cities
and Improving Health Systems for the Urban
Poor in South Africa,” in Samson James Opolot,
ed., Building Healthy Cities: Improving the Health
of Urban Migrants and The Urban Poor in Africa
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2002), pp. 121–29; share of
Johannesburg’s population that is black from
Steven Friedman, “A Quest for Control: High
Modernism and its Discontents in Johannesburg,
South Africa,” in Blair A. Ruble et al., eds., Urban
Governance Around the World (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002), p. 32.
2. Stephen Berrisford, “Law and Urban Change
in the New South Africa,” in Edésio Fernandes and
Ann Varley, eds., Illegal Cities: Law and Urban
Change in Developing Countries (London: Zed
Books, 1998), pp. 213–29; Plato, The Republic,
cited in James Clapp, The City: A Dictionary of
Quotable Thoughts on Cities and Urban Life (New
Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research,
Rutgers University, 1984), p. 194; Laila Iskandar
Kamel, The Informal Solid Waste Sector in Egypt:
Prospects for Formalization (Cairo: CID with funding from the Institute of International Education
and the Ford Foundation, January 2001); African
Population and Health Research Center, Population and Health Dynamics in Nairobi’s Informal
Settlements, Report of the Nairobi Cross-Sectional
Slums Survey (Nairobi: April 2002); Mumbai
from Arjun Appadurai, “Deep Democracy: Urban
Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics,”
Environment and Urbanization, October 2001,
pp. 23–43.
3. Jane Lubchenco, presentation at the State of
the Earth conference, Columbia University Earth
Institute, 13 May 2002, updating Peter M.
Vitousek et al., “Human Domination of Earth’s
Ecosystems,” Science, 25 July 1997, pp. 494–99;
global world product from David Malin Roodman,
“Economic Growth Falters,” in Worldwatch Institute, Vital Signs 2002 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2002), pp. 58–59.
4. Definition of sustainable development from
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987). Roughly 78 percent of carbon emissions from fossil fuel burning and cement
manufacturing, and 76 percent of industrial wood
use worldwide, occur in urban areas. Some 60
percent of the planet’s water that is tapped for
human use goes to cities in one form or another.
About half of this water irrigates food crops for
urban residents, roughly a third is used by city
industry, and the remainder is for drinking and sanitation. These calculations, done by the author in
219
NOTES, CHAPTER 7
May 1999, are based on urban population from
United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects:
The 1996 Revision (New York: 1996), on share of
gross domestic product from industry and services from World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997, CD-ROM (Washington, DC: 1997),
and from World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998 (Washington, DC: 1998), on carbon
emissions from G. Marland et al., “Global,
Regional, and National CO2 Emission Estimates
from Fossil Fuel Burning, Cement Production, and
Gas Flaring: 1751–1995 (revised March 1999),”
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, <cdiac.esd.ornl
.gov>, viewed 22 April 1999, on industrial roundwood consumption from U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT Statistics
Database, at <apps.fao.org>, and on water from
I.A. Shiklomanov, “Global Water Resources,”
Nature and Resources, vol. 26, no. 3 (1990).
5. Levels of urbanization from U.N. Population
Division (UNPD), World Urbanization Prospects:
The 2001 Revision (New York: 2002); Freedom
House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey
of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2000–2001
(New York: 2001); U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report
2002 (New York: 2002); Figure 7–1 based on
UN-HABITAT, The State of the World’s Cities
2001 (Nairobi: United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements, 2001), pp. 116–17.
6. Cities in history from Peter Hall, Cities in
Civilization (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998);
cities today from Joseph Rykwert, The Seduction
of Place: The City in the Twenty-first Century (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2000); cities in 2015 from
UNPD, op. cit. note 5.
7. Richard Stren, “Introduction: Toward the
Comparative Study of Urban Governance,” in
Richard Stren and Patricia McCarney, Urban Governance in the Developing World: Innovations and
Discontinuities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University, in
press); Nick Devas with Philip Amis et al., “Urban
Governance and Poverty: Lessons From a Study of
Ten Cities in the South (Birmingham, U.K.: University of Birmingham, June 2001).
220
8. Jorge E. Hardoy and David Satterthwaite,
Squatter Citizen: Life in the Urban Third World
(London: Earthscan, 1989).
9. The United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-HABITAT) uses an index
weighted heavily toward lack of secure tenure to
estimate the number of people living in slums
worldwide; UN-HABITAT, “Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 11, Indicator 31” (Nairobi:
2001), from Christine Auclair, Global Urban
Observatory, UN-HABITAT, e-mail to author,
30 October 2002.
10. Estimates for 1993 and 2001 from ibid.;
higher estimate of more than 1 billion people living in inadequate housing from UN-HABITAT,
11. Figure 7–2 from UNPD, op. cit. note 5, p.
1; David Satterthwaite, Coping with Rapid Urban
Growth, Leading Edge Series (London: Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, September
2002).
12. World Bank, World Development Report
2000/2001 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 23 (the $1 a day estimate is in 1993 purchasing power parity terms); 1.2 billion from
Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, How Did the
World’s Poorest Fare in the 1990s? World Bank
Group Policy Research Work Paper 2409 (Washington, DC: August 2000); Martin Ravallion,
“On the Urbanization of Poverty,” Journal of
Development Economics, vol. 857 (2002, in press);
Martin Ravallion, e-mail to Elizabeth Bast, Worldwatch Institute, 15 May 2002.
13. Jeffrey Sachs, “The Economics of Sustainability,” Keynote Address for the Distinguished
Lecture Series, World Bank, Washington, DC, 16
April 2002.
14. Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op. cit. note 8, p.
15; Kenyan building codes from Richard Stren,
University of Toronto, e-mail to author, 23 September 2002.
15. UN-HABITAT, “Global Urban Indicators,”
at <www.unchs.org/guo/gui/>, data are com-
NOTES, CHAPTER 7
parable as of 1993; World Bank, op. cit. note 12,
p. 275; Stren, op. cit. note 7.
16. Transparency International, Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index 2002
(Berlin: 2002).
17. Figure 7–3 from the following: urban growth
from UNPD, op. cit. note 5; poverty from World
Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (Washington DC: 2001); corruption from Transparency
International, op. cit. note 16, based on surveys
from 2000–02.
18. Box 7–1 from the following: Mtumba
description from Lawrence Apiyo, Pamoja Trust,
Nairobi, and from George Ng’ang’a, Tom
Werunga, and Isaac Mburu, Mtumba Governing
Council, Nairobi, discussions with author, 19 February 2001; health problems from F. Nii-Amoo
Dodoo, “The Urban Poor and Health Systems in
East Africa: Voices from Nairobi’s Slums,” in
Opolot, op. cit. note 1, pp. 9–19; under-five mortality rates from African Population and Health
Research Center, Population and Health Dynamics in Nairobi’s Informal Settlements, Report of the
Nairobi Cross-Sectional Slums Survey (Nairobi:
April 2002), pp. 86–92.
19. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi Housing Survey
(Nairobi: 2001); Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op. cit.
note 8.
20. Richard Stren and Mario Polèse, “Understanding the New Sociocultural Dynamics of Cities:
Comparative Urban Policy in a Global Context,”
in Mario Polèse and Richard Stren, The Social
Sustainability of Cities: Diversity and the Management of Change (Toronto, Canada: University
of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 26–28.
21. Water prices from Jorge E. Hardoy, Diana
Mitlin, and David Satterthwaite, Environmental
Problems in an Urbanizing World (London: Earthscan, 2001), p. 48; sanitation from ibid., p. 57.
22. Two conferences from David Satterthwaite,
International Institute for Environment and Development, e-mail to author, 27 September 2002;
related health problems from Hardoy, Mitlin, and
Satterthwaite, op. cit. note 21, pp. 39–43; cholera
from Carolyn Stephens, “Healthy Cities or
Unhealthy Islands: The Health and Social Implications of Urban Inequality,” Environment and
Urbanization, October 1996, p. 16; malaria from
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Urban Governance and
Health in East Africa,” in Opolot, op. cit. note 1,
pp. 112–14.
23. Sheela Patel, Society for Preservation of Area
Resource Centres (SPARC), Mumbai, presentation
at UN-HABITAT, Nairobi, 14 February 2001.
24 “Childhood Tuberculosis in an Urban Population in South Africa: Burden and Risk Factor,”
Archives of Disease in Childhood, vol. 80, no. 5
(1999), pp. 433–37; HIV and tuberculosis from
Lisa Mastny, “Tuberculosis Resurging Worldwide,” in Lester R. Brown et al., Vital Signs 2000
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company), pp.
148–49.
25. George A. Kaplan et al., “Inequality in
Income and Mortality in the United States,” in
Ichiro Kawachi, Bruce P. Kennedy, and Richard G.
Wilkinson, eds., The Society and Population Health
Reader: Income Inequality and Health (New York:
New Press, 1999), pp. 50–59; industrial nations
from Sandra J. McIsaac and Richard G. Wilkinson,
“Income Distribution and Cause-Specific Mortality,” in ibid., pp. 124–36.
26. Thomas Friedman, “Ask Not What?” (op
ed), New York Times, 9 December 2001; Terry
McDermott, “The Plot: How Terrorists Hatched
a Simple Plan to Use Planes As Bombs,” Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2002; Douglas Frantz et al.,
“Threats and Responses: Pieces of a Puzzle; On
Plotters’ Path to U.S., A Stop at bin Laden Camp,”
New York Times, 10 September 2002.
27. John F. C. Turner, interview by Robert
Chavez, World Bank, Washington, DC, 11 September 2000, in World Bank Urban Forum, at
<www.worldbank.org/urban/forum2002/index
.html>, viewed 21 October 2002.
28. John F. C. Turner, Housing by People: Towards
Autonomy in Building Environments (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1976), p. xvi; Janice Perlman,
221
NOTES, CHAPTER 7
The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976).
29. History from Charles Abrams, Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1964); policies from
Shlomo Angel, Housing Policy Matters: A Global
Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
30. Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op. cit. note 8, pp.
126–27; Johan Silas, Surabaya Institute of Technology, e-mail to Elizabeth Bast, Worldwatch
Institute, 15 July 2002.
31. UN-HABITAT, An Urbanizing World:
Global Report on Human Settlements, 1996
(Oxford: Oxford University Press for Habitat,
1996), pp. 344–47; 1990 from Jeff Kenworthy,
“Urban Ecology in Indonesia: The Kampung
Improvement Program (KIP),” at <wwasdev.mur
doch.edu.au/cases/kip/kip.pdf>, 1997; 2001
from Johan Silas, Surabaya Institute of Technology, e-mail to Elizabeth Bast, Worldwatch Institute, 15 July 2002.
32. Mounir Neamatalla, “Zabaleen Environment
and Development Program: Cairo, Egypt,”
MegaCities Project, 1998, at <www.megacities
project.org/publications/pdf/mcp018d.pdf>,
viewed 15 July 2002; Ahktar Badshah, Our Urban
Future: New Paradigms for Equity and Sustainability (London: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 65–69.
33. Laila Iskandar Kamel, “Urban Governance,
The Informal Sector, and Municipal Solid Waste
in Cairo,” Community and Institutional Development paper, March 2000.
egory in Mumbai; percentages from Appadurai, op.
cit. note 2, p. 27.
36. Sheela Patel, Sundar Burra, and Celine
D’Cruz, “Shack/Slum Dwellers International
(SDI): Foundations to Treetops,” Environment
and Urbanization, October 2001, pp. 45–60;
nonpartisan political strategy from Appadurai, op.
cit. note 2, p. 27.
37. Homeless International, “Defending the
Housing Rights of Railway Dwellers of Mumbai,” in Jim Antoniou, ed., Implementing the
Habitat Agenda: In Search of Urban Sustainability (London: The Development Planning Unit,
University College London, with the U.K. Department for International Development and UNHABITAT), pp. 18–19.
38. Patel, Burra, and D’Cruz, op. cit. note 36;
SDI Newsletter, March 2002; Jack Makau, Pamoja
Trust, Nairobi, discussion with author, May 2002.
39. Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op. cit. note 8, p.
306; Environment and Urbanization cited in
International Institute for Environment and Development, Rethinking Aid to Urban Poverty Reduction: Lessons for Donors, Environment &
Urbanization Brief #3 (London: April 2001).
40. Akbar Zaidi, From the Lane to the City: The
Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Sanitation
Model (London: Water Aid, June 2001), p. 13;
David Sims, “What is Secure Tenure in Urban
Egypt,” in Geoffrey Payne, ed., Land, Rights,
and Innovation (London: Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), 2002), pp.
79–99.
34. Infant mortality from Neamatalla, op. cit.
note 32, pp. 15–16; number of Zabbaleen workers and tons of trash from Laila Iskandar Kamel,
“Cairo: A City That Learns from the Mokattam
Recyclers,” Community and Institutional Development (CID), The Social Research Center, The
American University in Cairo, Egypt, March 1999;
other statistics and Cairo’s future plans from
Kamel, op. cit. note 2.
41. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital:
Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
35. “Slum” is a formally defined settlement cat-
44. Payne, op. cit. note 40, p. 22.
222
42. Ayako Kagawa and Jan Turkstra, “The
Process of Urban Land Tenure Formalization in
Peru,” in Payne, op. cit. note 40, pp. 57–75.
43. Angel, op. cit. note 29.
NOTES, CHAPTER 7
45. UN-HABITAT, at <www.unhabitat.org>,
viewed 1 October 2002; United Nations, Millennium Summit Declaration, at <www.un.org/mil
lennium/summit.htm>, viewed 10 October 2002;
Cities Alliance, 2001 Annual Report (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2001).
46. Billy Cobbett, Cities Alliance, Washington,
DC, discussion with author, 24 April 2002.
47. Survey of mayors from UNDP, “Urban Problems Remain Similar Worldwide,” press release
(New York: 28 July 1997); Box 7–2 from Carlos
Zorilla, DECOIN, e-mail to Elizabeth Bast, Worldwatch Institute, 8 June 2002, from Municipality
of Santa Ana De Cotacachi, “Ordinance Declaring Cotacachi An ‘Ecological County’,” 11 September 2000, and from UNESCO Cities for Peace
Prize, at <www.unesco.org/culture/citiesfor
peace/index.shtml>, viewed 8 June 2002.
48. “Reciprocity Waste Recycling Programme
in Santo Andre,” in Antoniou, op. cit. note 37, pp.
172–73.
49. Eduardo Spiaggi, “Urban Agriculture and
Local Sustainable Development: The Integration
of Economic, Social, Technical and Environmental Variables in Rosario Argentina,” presented at
the International Development Research Centre
Agropolis Awaredee Conference, Ottawa, Canada,
26 March 2002; Eduardo Spiaggi, Centro de
Estudios Ambiantales, Argentina, e-mail to author,
4 October 2002.
50. Curitiba from Jonas Rabinovitch and Josef
Leitmann, Environmental Innovation and Management in Curitiba, Brazil, UMP Working Paper
No. 1 (Washington, DC: UNDP/Habitat/World
Bank, 1993); Juiz de Fora from Yves Cabannes,
Urban Management Programme, Quito, Ecuador,
e-mail to author, 5 September 2002.
51. UNDP, Urban Agriculture: Food, Jobs and
Sustainable Cities (New York: 1996); Calcutta
from Madhursee Mukerjee, “The Fishy Business
of Waste,” Scientific American, April 1995, p. 40;
Camillus Sawio, “Urban Agriculture in Dar es
Salaam,” IDRC Research Network, at <net
work.idrc.ca>, viewed 5 September 2002; Stefan
Dongas, “Vegetable Production on Open Spaces
in Dar es Salaam—Spatial Changes from 1992 to
1999,” Urban Agriculture Notes, <www.city
farmer.org/daressalaam.html>, viewed 5 September 2002; Tanzania’s policy from Jac Smit, The
Urban Agriculture Network, Washington, DC,
presentation at “Reducing Poverty and Strengthening Growth: The Urban Perspective,” Woodrow
Wilson International Center, Washington, DC,
25–26 July 2002; potential of policies to increase
urban agriculture from UNDP, op. cit. this note,
and from Joe Howe, “Planning for Urban Food:
The Experience of Two UK Cities,” Planning
Practice & Research, vol. 17, no. 2 (2002), pp.
125–44.
52. Alison Brown with Tony Lloyd-Jones, “Spatial Planning, Access, and Infrastructure,” in Carole Rakodi with Tony Lloyd-Jones, eds., Urban
Livelihoods: A People-Centred Approach to Reducing Poverty (London: Earthscan, 2002), pp.
188–204.
53. Jeffrey Maganya, Program Manager for the
Transport Program in East Africa, ITDG, Nairobi,
Kenya, discussion with author, 8 May 2001; Kenya
bicycle tax from VNG uitgeverij, The Economic Significance of Cycling: A Study to Illustrate the Costs
and Benefits of Cycling Policy (The Hague: 2000),
p. 42.
54. Curitiba’s bus system from Jonas Rabinovitch
and Josef Leitman, “Urban Planning in Curitiba,”
Scientific American, March 1996, pp. 26–33; zoning laws from Jonas Rabinovitch and John Hoehn,
“A Sustainable Urban Transportation System: The
‘Surface Metro’ in Curitiba Brazil,” report of the
Environmental and Natural Resources Policy and
Training Project (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 19 May 1995), pp. 35–37, and from Jonas
Rabinovitch, “Innovative Land Use and Public
Transport Policy,” Land Use Policy, vol. 13, no. 1
(1996), pp. 51–67; Bogotá from Oscar Edmundo
Diaz, “Awake at the Wheel: Bogotá’s Response to
the Transportation Challenge,” Encompass, Februar y/March 2001, pp. 5–7, from Enrique
Peñalosa, visiting scholar at New York University,
New York, discussion with author, 3 May 2001,
and from Steven Ambrus, “Bogotá Takes a
Breather,” EcoAmericas, March 2000, p. 10; Lima
223
NOTES, CHAPTER 7
from Thomas Kohler, “Public Transportation:
New Municipality Venture,” press release (Washington, DC: American Public Transportation Association, 9 April 2002); Lake Sagaris, Ciudad Viva,
Santiago, Chile, discussion with author, 18 September 2001; Patricio Lanfranco, Ciudad Viva,
Santiago, Chile, discussion with author, 18 April
2001.
55. Paul S. Grogan and Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint For Urban Neighborhood
Revival (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), p.
108.
56. UN-HABITAT, Cities in a Globalizing
World: Global Report on Human Settlements 2001
(Nairobi: 2001), p. 81. Table 7–2 from the following: India, Philippines, and South Africa from
Center for Urban Development Studies (CUDS)
at the Harvard University Graduate School of
Design, Development Alternative Inc., and U.S.
Agency for International Development, MicroEnterprise Practices, Housing Microfinance Initiatives (Cambridge, MA: May 2000); Brazil from
CUDS, “Microcredit Summit,” at <www.gsd.har
vard.edu/research/research_centers/cuds/micro
credit.html>, viewed 8 August 2001, and from
UN-HABITAT, Best Practices Database 2000,
<www.bestpractices.org>, viewed 8 August 2002.
57. South Africa from UN-HABITAT, Cities in
a Globalizing World, op. cit. note 56, p. 80; Cambodia from Asian Coalition for Housing Rights,
“Building an Urban Poor People’s Movement in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia,” Environment and
Urbanization, October 2001, pp. 61–72; Philippines from Missionaries Social Development Foundation Incorporated, Manila, “Meet the Philippines
Homeless People’s Federation,” Environment and
Urbanization, October 2001, pp. 73–84; Zimbabwe from Beth Chitekwe and Diana Mitlin,
“The Urban Poor Under Threat and In Struggle:
Options for Urban Development in Zimbabwe,
1995–2000,” Environment and Urbanization,
October 2001, pp. 85–102; other examples and
quote from “Deep Democracy; Transforming
Opportunities for the Urban Poor,” Environment
and Urbanization Brief, October 2001, p. 2.
58. Lack of political influence by urban poor
224
from Joan M. Nelson, Access to Power: Politics
and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.
168–207, 318–24.
59. McAuslan quoted in Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy, Access to Land by the Urban Poor:
Annual Roundtable 2002 (Cambridge, MA:
2002), pp. 6., 31.
60. Issac Mburu, Nairobi, discussion with author,
February 2001; Transparency International–Kenya,
Corruption in Kenya: Findings of an Urban Bribery
Survey (Nairobi: 2001); Michael Lippe, presentation at World Urban Forum, UN-HABITAT,
Nairobi, May 2002.
61. Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, op. cit.
note 57; “The Power of International Exchanges,”
in Antoniou, op. cit. note 37, pp. 192–93.
62. Celina Souza, “Participatory Budgeting in
Brazilian Cities: Limits and Possibilities in Building Democratic Institutions,” Environment and
Urbanization, April 2001, pp. 159–84.
63. William R. Long, “Brazil Lawmakers
Impeach Scandal-Plagued President,” Los Angeles
Times, 30 September 1992; William R. Long,
“Brazil, Still Reeling From Corruption Scandal, Is
Hit Again,” Los Angeles Times, 23 October 1993;
Mac Margolis, “Brazilian Authorities Link Lottery
to Political Corruption,” Los Angeles Times, 9
April 1994; income inequality from World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2000 (Washington,
DC: 2000).
64. Souza, op. cit. note 62; Mona Serageldin,
CUDS, Harvard University, discussion with Elizabeth Bast, Worldwatch Institute, 24 July 2002.
65. Souza, op. cit. note 62.
66. Priorities from ibid., pp. 167–68; sewers and
street paving from Rualdo Menegat, “Participatory
Democracy and Sustainable Development: Integrated Urban Environmental Management in
Porto Alegre, Brazil,” Environment and Urbanization, October 2002, pp. 1–26.
67. Souza, op. cit. note 62; $8 million from
Cabannes, op. cit. note 50.
75. UN-HABITAT, Cities in a Globalizing
World, op. cit. note 56.
68. Number of cities from Cabannes, op. cit.
note 50; Edésio Fernandes, “New Statute Aims to
Make Brazilian Cities More Inclusive,” Habitat
Debate, December 2001, p. 19.
76. In 2001, Norway announced a 10-fold
increase in its donation to UN-HABITAT; the
United Kingdom and Sweden increased their funding by up to 50 percent, while India, Madagascar,
and other developing nations pledged more than
ever before; UN-HABITAT, press conference,
Nairobi, February 2001.
69. United Nations, Agenda 21: The United
Nations Programme of Action from Rio (New
York: U.N. Department of Public Information,
undated), Chapter 28.
70. International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), Second Local Agenda
21 Survey, Background Paper No. 15, submitted
to the Commission on Sustainable Development
acting as the preparatory committee for the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, 28 January–8 February 2002 (Toronto: 2002); Judy
Walker, director of Local Agenda 21 Campaign,
ICLEI, Toronto, discussion with author, 29
August 2001; Porto Alegre from Menegat, op. cit.
note 66; Luz Stella Velasquez B., “Agenda 21: A
Form of Joint Environmental Management in
Manizales, Colombia,” Environment and Urbanization, October 1998, pp. 9–36; Samson Wokabi
Mwangi, Local Agenda 21 Experiences in Nakuru:
Processes, Issues, and Lessons (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2001).
71. Survey from ICLEI, op. cit. note 70, and
from Walker, op. cit. note 70; direct elections of
mayors and greater powers given to cities in Merilee S. Grindle, Audacious Reforms: Institutional
Invention and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000); Stren, op. cit. note 7.
72. Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell, Uniting a
Divided City, op. cit. note 1, pp. 99–106, 202–05.
73. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great
American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961,
1992), p. 271.
74. Jane Jacobs, interview by Roberto Chavez,
World Bank, Washington, DC, 4 February 2002,
in World Bank Urban Forum, op. cit. note 21.
77. Struggle to include cities’ role from Jay Moor,
Senior Advisor for Strategic Planning, UN-HABITAT, presentation on the World Summit on Sustainable Development at Environmental Systems
Research Institute, 22nd Annual Geographic Information Systems Users Conference, San Diego,
CA, July 2002; World Summit on Sustainable
Development Plan of Implementation, at
<www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/
summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm>, viewed 21
October 2002.
Chapter 8. Engaging Religion in the
Quest for a Sustainable World
1. National Council of Churches, at <www.web
ofcreation.org/ncc/anwr.html>, viewed 17 October 2002.
2. Is and ought stories from Richard Norgaard,
“Can Science and Religion Better Save Nature
Together?” BioScience, September 2002, p. 842;
most violent from Michael Renner, “Ending Violent Conflict,” in Lester R. Brown et al., State of
the World 1999 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); greatest environmental degradation
is evident in global statistics on species extinctions, deforestation, erosion, air and water pollution, and a host of other maladies, all of which
accelerated dramatically in the twentieth century.
Box 8–1 based on Mary Evelyn Tucker and John
Grim, “Introduction: The Emerging Alliance of
World Religions and Ecology,” Daedalus, fall
2001, p. 14. Articles from the special issue of
Daedalus on religion and ecology available at
<environment.harvard.edu/religion/publications/
journals/index.html>.
3.
Religion as central to culture from Clifford
225
NOTES, CHAPTER 8
Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures (New York:
Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87–125.
4. Societal drivers from Thomas Berry, The
Great Work: Our Way to the Future (New York: Bell
Tower, 1999); individual drivers from Gerald T.
Gardner and Paul C. Stern, Environmental Problems and Human Behavior (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1996), pp. 21–32; Nestlé from Robin
Broad and John Cavanagh, “The Corporate
Accountability Movement: Lessons and Opportunities,” a Study for the World Wildlife Fund’s
Project on International Financial Flows and the
Environment (Washington, DC: 1998), pp. 12,
30.
5. Mary Clark, Ariadne’s Thread (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 184–85; see also Robin
W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, eds., Cosmogony
and Ethical Order (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985). Box 8–2 from Mary Evelyn Tucker
and John Grim, “Series Foreword,” in Christopher
Key Chapple and Mary Evelyn Tucker, Hinduism
and Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000), pp. xxv–xxvii, and from Mary Evelyn Tucker, discussion with author, 24 October
2002.
6.
Tucker and Grim, op. cit. note 5.
7. Mathieu Deflam, “Ritual, Anti-Structure,
and Religion: A Discussion of Victor Turner’s
Processual Symbolic Analysis,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 30, no. 1 (1991), pp.
1–21; Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” in William G. McLoughlin and Robert N.
Bellah, eds., Religion in America (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1968).
8. Ritual and resource management, and ritual
and emotional connections, from E. N. Anderson,
Ecologies of the Heart: Emotion, Belief and the
Environment (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 166; Tsembaga from Roy A. Rappaport, “Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations Among a New Guinea People,” in Johnnetta
B. Cole, Anthropology for the Nineties (New York:
The Free Press, 1988), pp. 389–403.
226
9. Stalin quoted in Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 601; Pope and
Poland from Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, His
Holiness: John Paul II and the History of Our Time
(New York: Penguin Books, 1996), pp. 11–12;
Tibet from “UN Rights Chief Pressures China
on Detained Boy Panchen Lama,” Agence France
Presse, posted on Web site of the Tibetan
Government in Exile, at <www.tibet.com/
NewsRoom/panchen1.htm>, viewed 24 October 2002.
10. David Barrett and Todd Johnson, World
Christian Trends, AD 30–AD 2200 (Pasadena,
CA: William Carey Library, 2001); Table 8–1
from ibid., and from Mary Evelyn Tucker and
John Grim, Professors of Religion, Bucknell University, discussion with author, 19 October 2002
(“indigenous” is the category that Barrett and
Johnson call “animists and shamanists”).
11. Religious adherence statistics from
<www.adherents.com>, viewed 24 October 2002;
Pakistan from IUCN–The World Conservation
Union, The Pakistan National Conservation Strategy (Karachi, Pakistan: 1991), and from IUCN,
Final Report, Mid-Term Review of National Conservation Strategy: Mass Awareness Initiatives
(Islamabad, Pakistan: 2000).
12. John A. Grim, ed., Indigenous Traditions
and Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001).
13. Land area from Alliance of Religions and
Conservation (ARC), at <www.religionsandcon
servation.org>, viewed 21 October 2002; mosques
from IUCN, Final Report, op. cit. note 11; U.S.
religious buildings is a Worldwatch estimate based
on data in U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, 1999 Commercial
Buildings Energy Consumption Survey: Consumption and Expenditures Tables (Washington, DC:
1999); schools from ARC, op. cit. this note,
and from John Smith, ARC, discussion with
Erik Assadourian, Worldwatch Institute, 21 October 2002; Confucian and Vedic health systems
from Financial Times, 30 April 2002; Catholic
health systems from Catholic Charities USA,
NOTES, CHAPTER 8
at <www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/Programs/
Advocacy/letters/Letters2001/sabuse1.htm>,
viewed 23 April 2002.
14. Interfaith Center for Corporate Rsponsibility from Meg Voorhes, e-mail to author, 28 May
2002; Tracey Rembert, Shareholder Action Network, discussion with author, 15 May 2002.
15. Ismail Serageldin and Christian Grootaert,
“Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View,” in
Partha Dagupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds., Social
Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2000).
16. Clark, op. cit. note 5, p. 184.
17. Andrew Greeley, “Coleman Revisited: Religious Structures as a Source of Social Capital,”
American Behavioral Scientist, March/April 1997,
p. 591.
18. Table 8–2 from the following: World Wide
Fund for Nature (WWF) from <www.religions
andconservation.org>; Global Forum from Preserving and Cherishing the Earth: An Appeal for
Joint Commitment in Science and Religion
(Moscow: 1990), at <clawww.lmu.edu/~lvan
wensveen/courses/thst398/topic7.htm>; Parliament from <www.changemakers.net/journal/
02february/religionecology.cfm>; World Council
of Churches, “Ecumenical Earth,” at <www.wcc-coe
.org/wcc/what/jpc/ecology.html>, viewed 18
October 2002; Windsor Summit from “Religions
Vow a New Alliance for Conservation,” One Country: The Online Newsletter of the International
Bahai Community, April-June 1995, at <www.one
countr y.org>; Har vard from <www.hds.har
vard.edu/cswr/ecology>, viewed 21 October
2002, and from <environment.harvard.edu/relig
ion>, viewed 21 October 2002; symposia from
<www.rsesymposia.org>; Millennium Summit from
<www.millenniumpeacesummit.com>; Sacred Gifts
and Tehran seminar from “Religions Pledge Sacred
Gifts for a Living Planet,” press release (London:
WWF-UK, 15 November 2000).
19. Conferences from <www.hds.harvard.edu/
cswr/ecology>, viewed 21 October 2002; Forum
from <environment.harvard.edu/religion>, viewed
21 October 2002. The Harvard book series and
the comprehensive Web site of the Forum on
Religion and Ecology are helping to establish a new
academic field in religion and ecology that has
implications for environmental policy.
20. Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our
Ecological Crisis,” in Roger S. Gottlieb, This
Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment
(New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 184–93; critique of White from J. Baird Callicott, “Genesis
and John Muir,” ReVision, winter 1990, pp.
31–46.
21. Carl Pope, “Remarks of Carl Pope, Sierra
Club Executive Director, Symposium on Religion, Science, and the Environment Under the
Auspices of His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Ecumenical Patriarch, Santa Barbara, California,
November 6–8, 1997,” Ecozoic, at <www.Eco
zoic.com/eco/CarlPope.asp>, viewed 9 October
2002; St. Francis from White, op. cit. note 20, pp.
192–93.
22. Pope, op. cit. note 21.
23. Cassandra Carmichael, Director of FaithBased Outreach, Center for a New American
Dream, Takoma Park, MD, discussion with author,
9 October 2002, and e-mail to author, 24 October 2002.
24. Richard Rohr, “We Need Transformation,
Not False Transcendence,” National Catholic
Reporter, 15 February 2002.
25. Ibid.
26. Women as most involved from John Grim,
Professor of Religion, Bucknell University, discussion with author, 19 October 2002.
27. Religion Counts, Religion and Public Policy
at the UN (Washington, DC: April 2002).
28. Anne Primavesi, Sacred Gaia (London: Routledge, 2000).
29. Bruce Barcot, “For God So Loved the
World,” Outside, March 2001.
227
NOTES, CHAPTER 8
30. Ritual from Anderson, op. cit. note 8, p.
166. Box 8–3 from Susan M. Darlington, “Practical Spirituality and Community Forests: Monks,
Ritual, and Radical Conservatism in Thailand,” in
Anna L. Tsing and Paul Greenough, eds., Imagination and Distress in Southern Environmental
Projects (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press,
forthcoming); values from Mary Evelyn Tucker
and John Grim, “Religions of the World and Ecology: Discovering the Common Ground,” Forum
for Religion and Ecology, at <environment.har
vard.edu/religion/religion/index.html>, viewed
23 October 2002.
31. The Dalai Lama, “Five Point Peace Plan for
Tibet,” at <www.tibet.net/eng/diir/enviro/hhdl/
fivepoint/index.html>, viewed 18 October 2002;
Pope John Paul II, “The Ecological Crisis: A
Common Responsibility,” Message for World Day
of Peace, January 1, 1990, at <www.ewtn.com/
library/PAPALDOC/JP900101.HTM>; “Common Declaration by Pope John Paul II and
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I,” at
<www.rsesymposia.org/symposium_iv/Common%
20Declaration.pdf>.
32. Religion, Science and the Environment
(RSE), at <www.rsesymposia.org>.
33. Symposia from Maria Becket, RSE symposium coordinator, discussion with author, 25 September 2002; other details from RSE, op. cit.
note 32.
34. Black Sea from Laurance David Mee, “The
Black Sea Today,” at <www.rsesymposia.org/sym
posium_ii/overview_blacksea.htm>; Halki from
John Chryssavgis, “Conference Report: A Symposium on the Danube: Religion and Science in
Dialogue about the Environment,” Worldviews,
vol. 4 (2000), p. 82; World Bank and U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) from John Bennett, independent consultant, discussion with
author, 24 October 2002.
35. Philip Weller, former program director,
WWF, discussion with author, 20 September 2002;
Patriarch’s involvement from Jasmina Bachmann,
International Convention for the Protection of
the Danube River, discussion with author, 23 Sep-
228
tember 2002.
36. Kelly D. Alley, On the Banks of the Ganga:
When Wastewater Meets a Sacred River (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002);
Alexander Stille, “The Ganges’ Next Life,” The
New Yorker, June 1999, pp. 58–67.
37. Kelly D. Alley, “Idioms of Degeneracy:
Assessing Ganga’s Purity and Pollution,” in Lance
E. Nelson, ed., Purifying the Earthly Body of God:
Religion and Ecology in Hindu India (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp.
297–330.
38. Fran Peavey, president, Friends of the Ganges
(San Francisco), discussion with author, 4 September 2002; Dr. V. B. Mishra, discussion with
author, 5 September 2002.
39. Stille, op. cit. note 36; Mishra, op. cit. note
38.
40. Mishra, op cit note 38; Alley, op. cit. note 37;
Stille, op. cit. note 36.
41. Cleanness and purity from Alley, op. cit. note
37, p. 305; maintains respect from ibid., p. 320;
fusion from ibid., p. 317.
42. Table 8–3 from Center for a New American
Dream, “Quotes and Teachings of World Religions on Care of the Earth and Responsible Consumption,” at <www.newdream.org/faith>, viewed
16 October 2002, except for Buddhadasa Bhikkhu,
from Donald K. Swearer, “Buddhism and Ecology:
Challenge and Promise,” Forum on Religion and
Ecology, at <environment.harvard.edu/religion/
religion/buddhism/index.html>, viewed 16 October 2002.
43. “Rowan Williams Confirmed as New Archbishop of Canterbury,” The Guardian, 23 July
2002; Pope from “Pope John Paul II Addresses
Overconsumption,” Green Cross, summer 1996.
44. Sar vodaya from <www.sar vodaya.org>,
viewed 28 October 2002; Christopher Candland,
“Faith as Social Capital: Religion and Community
Development in Southern Asia,” Policy Sciences,
NOTES, CHAPTER 8
vol. 33 (2000), pp. 355–74.
<www.thearda.com>, viewed 22 October 2002.
45. Buddhism roots from A. T. Ariyaratne, Buddhist Economics in Practice in the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka (Salisbury, UK:
Sarvodaya Support Group, 1999), p. 7; consumption as a tool from Ariyaratne, quoted in
Candland, op. cit. note 44, p. 355, and from
Joanna Macy, Dharma and Development: Religion as Resource in the Sarvodaya Self-Help Movement (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1991),
p. 47.
55. Equal Exchange, at <www.equalexchange
.com>, viewed 23 October 2002.
46. Development vision from Macy, op. cit. note
45, p. 46; 10 needs from D. J. Mitchell, “Sarvodaya: An Introduction to the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka,” booklet of the
Sarvodaya Movement (Moratuwa, Sri Lanka:
undated), p. 3.
47. Macy, op. cit. note 45, pp. 27, 46.
48. Ariyaratne, op. cit. note 45, pp. 9, 37.
49. Macy, op. cit. note 45, pp. 51–63.
50. Ibid., p. 53.
51. Nestlé from Broad and Cavanagh, op. cit.
note 4, pp. 12, 30; lettuce boycotts from Susan
Ferris and Ricardo Sandoval, The Fight in the
Fields: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers’ Movement (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997).
52. Regeneration Project from <www.theregen
erationproject.org> and from Sally Bingham, e-mail
to Erik Assadourian, Worldwatch Institute, 21
October 2002.
53. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
“Energy Star for Congregations,” at <www.epa
.gov/smallbiz/congregations.html>, viewed 23
July 2002; 5 percent from U.S. Department of
Energy, op. cit. note 13; EPA calculation based on
a survey of commercial buildings carried out by the
U.S. Department of Energy.
54. Share of Americans at church from National
Opinion Research Center, “General Social Survey
2000,” at The American Religion Data Archive,
56. Participating congregations from Equal
Exchange, Building Alternatives Amid Crisis:
Annual Report 2001 (Canton, MA: 2001); 1 percent of houses of worship is a Worldwatch calculation based on data from Equal Exchange, op. cit.
this note, and from U.S. Department of Energy,
op. cit. note 13; percentage of sales from Equal
Exchange, op. cit. this note.
57. Quote from Timothy Bernard, cited in “The
Interfaith Coffee Program,” Equal Exchange, at
<www.equalexchange.com/interfaith/pcusapro
ject.html>, viewed 18 July 2002.
58. Tim Bernard, “Brewing Faith and Coffee,”
Lutheran World Relief, at <www.lwr.org/coffee/
coffee/newcoffee.html>, viewed 23 October 2002;
coffee drinking from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Food Consumption (Per Capita) Data System: Beverages,
at <www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodconsumption/
datasystem.asp>, viewed 28 October 2002.
59. Social investment from Social Investment
Forum, 2001 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States (Washington, DC:
November 2001); share of Americans at church
from National Opinion Research Center, op. cit.
note 54.
60. Interfaith Partnership for the Environment
and UNEP, “Earth and Faith: A Book of Reflection for Action” (New York: UNEP, 2001); World
Faiths Development Dialogue from “Second Summit Between World Bank and World Religions
Focuses on Projects,” One Country: The Online
Newsletter of the International Bahá’í Community,
at <www.onecountry.org/e113/e11310as.htm>,
viewed 25 October 2002; World Council of
Churches, “Ecumenical Earth,” at <www.wcc-coe
.org/wcc/what/jpc/ecology.html>, viewed 18
October 2002.
61. Tucker and Grim, op. cit. note 2, pp. 16–17.
229
NOTES, CHAPTER 8
62. Martin Wroe, “An Irresistable Force,”
Sojourners, May-June 2000.
63. Infection rate from Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS, AIDS Epidemic
Update—December 2001 (Geneva: 2001); Muslim
communities and Catholic bishop from Thoraya
Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund, “Building Bridges for Human Development: The Role of Culture and Religion in
Promoting Universal Principles of The Programme
of Action on Population and Development,”
address at Georgetown University, 25 April 2002.
64. Mary Evelyn Tucker, Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter Their Ecological Phase (Chicago: Open
Court Press, forthcoming).
65. Obaid, op. cit. note 63.
66. Gould quoted in David Orr, “For the Love
of Life,” Conservation Biology, December 1992, p.
486.
67. Ibid., pp. 486–87.
68. John Muir quoted in Trebbe Johnson, “The
Second Creation,” Sierra Magazine, December
1998.
69. Thomas Berry, “Ethics and Ecology,” a paper
delivered to the Harvard Center on Environmental Values, 9 April 1996; see also Brian
Swimme and Thomas Berry, The Universe Story
(New York: Harper Collins, 1992), and Berry,
op. cit. note 4.
230

SOW Chap 4 - Worldwatch Institute

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