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the journal of the professional helicopter pilot
Special Section - PHPA Safety Conference
Finally–A Seat at the Table
by Tony Fonze
LOOK INSIDE–THE AH-56A
COLUMNS
PHPA SAFETY CONFERENCE
FEATURES
2 From the President
9 Becoming a Pilot Examiner
4 Wimps Need Not Apply
3 Editor’s “License”
12 AH-56A Cheyenne:
6 Finally—A Seat at the Table
22 Test Pilot
20 Hurricane Ivan Rages
Lockheed’s Rigid Rotor Warrior
Volume 4
www.autorotate.com
Issue 6 November–December 2004
A u t o r o t a t e i s t h e o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e P r o f e s s i o n a l H e l i c o p t e r P i l o t s ’ A s s o c i a t i o n ( P H PA )
From the President
THANK YOU
The PHPA Human Factors Conference
was a great first step in our efforts to help
reduce the accident rate across our profession. The presentations were remarkable and I learned more about myself and
my weaknesses than I would have ever
believed. It is now up to us to look back
at this conference and start working
towards an even more effective one for
next year. With that in mind, I would ask
that during the coming year, each of you
send us your thoughts on what you would
like to see addressed at the next conference. We will also be collecting safety
information and holding online discussions on the new PHPA web site which
I hope will be online by the time you
read this.
I would like to offer my sincerest
thanks to all who attended and all who
made presentations. It was a remarkable
feeling—seeing manufacturers, operators,
regulatory agencies and pilots from
around the world, all gathered together in
one room, working towards the common
goal of accident reduction. It will be
even more remarkable next year.
I want to thank a few special folks who
really did the work in getting this conference off the ground.
Mr. Ron Whitney, a PHPA member
from PHI and the guy who keeps me
straight, handled all the logistics for this
first conference. Ron does a remarkable
job in many, many areas and PHPA
would not be the same without him.
Mr. Jeffery Smith, a PHPA member
from LSSI at Ft. Rucker, handled the
entire program and did an excellent job
of it. Jeff's opening and closing remarks
were right on the money and his organization of the agenda was perfect.
Without Jeff’s skill and expertise, the
conference would not have been successful. Jeff really pulled it all together for
us.
I would also like to thank Mr. Al
Duquette, PHPA's Safety Officer. Al has
done more for safety in the last two years
than many have done in their entire
careers. He has burned nearly all of his
off-time and vacation time working on
our safety issues. Al has spoken at length
with Senators, Congressmen, the FAA,
HAI, IFALPA, the Transportation Trades
Department and many others, too numerous to mention here, in his never-ending
quest to make our profession safer. Al
travels constantly to meetings across the
country and around the world in this
ongoing safety effort and he is making
remarkable progress. Soon you will be
able to see just what Al is doing yourself
by visiting the "Safety" area on the new
PHPA web site.
I also would be remiss in my duties if
I failed to thank Evelyn, Gloria, and
Anna, Al's, Jeff's and Ron's wives,
respectively, for their never ending
patience, while their husbands spend so
much of their free time working for
PHPA. Thank you ladies for supporting
us by supporting what your husbands are
doing for us.
I hope to see you all at next year’s conference!
Butch Grafton, President
Butch@Autorotate.org
2
www.autorotate.com
Volume 4 Issue 6
Editor’s “License”
What? An Autorotate cover that doesn’t feature helicopters? What is going on
here? I feel as though I owe you an
explanation.
Autorotate, from day one, has been all
about flying helicopters. It still is. It
was and is intended to present articles
from the pilot’s perspective. I strive to
have it answer the questions that pilots
would want to ask. Hopefully, we’ve
been on track more often than not.
But, we are pilots. And pilots’ issues
and questions go beyond just flying the
helicopter. And if they don’t, they
should. Most of us have chosen piloting
as a career. It’s how we pay for the
house and how we put the kids through
school. This means that issues of money
and security should be somewhere on our
minds. We happen to have chosen a
career that ranks as the third most dangerous career choice on the records—
right behind logger and professional fisherman. Dorcey Wingo (logging pilot)
what does this say about you?
Safety should be right up there as far
as things we want to read about and talk
about.
So, we’re broadening our horizons a
little bit to include the full spectrum of
things pilots need to care about. We’re
not de-emphasizing the flying part of the
magazine. In this issue you’ll read about
the AH-56A Cheyenne helicopter, and
flying the Gulf during the advance of
Hurricane Ivan. Stories planned for the
not too distant future include flying PHI’s
new S-92; National Guard attack helicopter training; NTSB helicopter accident
investigations; and more. We’re still
about and always will be about flying
helicopters.
But we’re also going to explore other
horizons. For example, in an upcoming
issue we will do a story on helicopter
pilot unionization. What the hell is a
“union” anyway? Do you actually know,
I mean really? Most of us do not—
myself included. But, that’s going to
change. Whether or not we support them
and whether or not they play a role in our
operation, it is an area about which we
should not be ignorant. Autorotate
accepts the challenge.
So be patient and be supportive. As
pilots, there is much we are expected to
know and we are always learning new
things. That’s what this is all about. And
please remember that you have a say in
what goes on in Autorotate. If you want
to let me know what you think, I’m not
hard to find. I’d love to hear from you.
Thank you for your support.
Tony Fonze
Editor, Autorotate
TonyFonze@autorotate.org
END
Publisher:
The Professional Helicopter Pilots’ Association
Managing Editor:
Anthony Fonze
Design:
Studio 33
Editorial Assistance:
Michael Sklar
Autorotate is owned by the Professional Helicopter
Pilots’ Association (PHPA). Autorotate (ISSN 1531166X) is published every other month for $30.00 per
year by PHPA, 1809 Clearview Parkway, New Orleans,
LA 70001.
Copyright © 2004, Professional Helicopter Pilots’
Association. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or
in part is strictly prohibited. It is illegal to make copies
of this publication. Printed in the U.S.A. by union
employees.
Subscriptions:
Subscriptions are provided to current members of PHPA.
PHPA membership is offered at $60.00 per year.
Promotional discounts may be offered. For a complete
list of membership benefits go to www.autorotate.com.
Single issue reprints offered, when available, for $5.00
each. To become a member of PHPA or to notify PHPA of
a change of address, contact PHPA at 1809 Clearview
Parkway, New Orleans, LA 70001.
Phone 866-367-7472. Fax 504-779-5209.
E-mail publisher@autorotate.com.
PHPA members may submit address changes at
www.autorotate.com. Local members may submit
address changes through their locals. Local members
with e-mail addresses, who are not registered at the
website, should contact their locals.
Article Contributions and Editorial
Comments:
Article contributions, including ideas, freelance stories,
an interest in assignment articles, Live and Learn
experiences, photographs, and comments are welcome
and should be sent to autorotate, 3160 N. San Remo,
Tucson, AZ 85715. Phone 520-298-2689.
Fax 520-298-7439. E-mail editor@autorotate.com.
Autorotate and PHPA are not responsible for materials
submitted for review.
Notice:
The information contained herein has been researched
and reviewed. However, Autorotate and PHPA do not
assume responsibility for actions taken by any pilot or
aircraft operator based upon information contained
herein. Every pilot and aircraft operator is responsible for
complying with all applicable regulations.
Cover Photography:
Cover: “The Meeting”; Aaron Reyes
Inset: courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
Photography: From Kelly Teague’s 2004 Safety Conference Powerpoint Presentation
3
Wimps Need Not Apply
If the pilot who wrote this response
had stopped there, we all would have
empathized with him and agreed that too
many pilots are flying tired. But he
wrote one more sentence that completely
changed the tone of his message, and
should become the focus of our safety
efforts for the immediate future. He
ended with, “The reason I didn’t snivel is
that I can do it.”
October 15 -16, 2004 was the beginning. We were about 75 strong at this
opening round, but many important
advances throughout history have started
small. Those who were there will
remember and perhaps someday tell their
children about the experience. Those who
were not there will forever be asking
themselves, “why did I miss it?”
OK, so perhaps that’s a little heavy.
Fact is, PHPA made a good start this
October on addressing the largest cause
of mishaps in the industry—human factors.
This Conference on Human Factors
Mishaps covered all the bases. From the
head of the rule-making arm of ICAO to
a representative of the customers we fly,
all aspects of this issue were discussed.
If you missed it, keep reading cause we
are going to tell you all about it.
But let’s start at the beginning.
Why have a conference on Human
Factors Mishaps? The causes of helicopter accidents are not exactly unknown,
and lots of fairly bright people have been
working on the issue for years. Problem
is, the most important person in this matter has been missing from most efforts to
improve the situation. That would be the
pilot, the “usual suspect” in most accident investigations.
deaths per year for the past three
decades?” The answer would seem to be
found in the “can do”, “type-A” personality that is essential to get into this business in the first place.
Self-confidence is not a commodity in
short supply when pilots gather in one
location. You know what I am talking
about. Even our “there I was” stories
that start out with some horrendous situation (probably of our own making) end
with a rendition of how the day was
saved through our superior piloting skill.
It’s an essential trait that we all share.
The unwritten sign on the flight school
door reads, “Wimps Need Not Apply.”
Changing attitudes
Consider the following response PHPA
received to a request for opinions on the
issue of flight time and length of duty
day:
Total helicopter time 17,000 hrs
Wimps need not apply
Before you shoot the messenger,
understand that we all realize that there
are a hundred things that “set-up” a pilot
for error. Excessively long work hours,
customer pressure to complete the flight,
inadequate weather support—the list
would fill pages. The question posed at
this conference was, “Why do we continue to accept an environment that by one
account has caused an average of 59
4
By Jeff Smith
Years of helicopter experience: 38
(spotless record)
“I may legally fly 10 hours per 14 hour
duty day. Other limits don’t kick in until
MONTHLY limits are reached. I am here
to tell you that flying the limit for only
TWO days is flirting with danger. You
need a “light day” to keep safe. I have
“timed-out” many times per 7-day schedule. All legal, not safe.”
This pretty well sums up the attitude of
many, if not most, helicopter pilots and it
is one of the primary reasons we are
killing 59 people year after year. We
pilots seem unable to say, “No, I can’t do
that today.” It’s the “wimp factor”, and
we all know from the sign on the door
that wimps are not welcome here.
No easy answers
Let’s assume that tomorrow, everyone
agreed to drop the ego thing and tell their
boss “forget it” if they didn’t feel like
flying that day. The system is not prepared to deal with such interruptions.
There certainly is external pressure to fly,
even if we were to control the internal
end of things. And frankly, most of the
time, we get away with taking flights we
know we shouldn’t. How do we balance
the need to perform the job we are paid
to do, while not making “luck” the arbiter
of success or failure?
Everyone would like a nice, short, easy
answer that doesn’t upset the status quo
too much or cost anything. Sure.
The answers won’t be easy, but we
don’t have to invent everything from
scratch either. Others have been where
we are now, and found answers to the
issues we face. This first ever helicopter
pilots’ conference on safety included several leaders from the pilots’ organization
in Norway. Scandinavian and European
pilots have long ago reduced the level of
www.autorotate.com
risk in their part of this business, despite
flying in the extremely adverse conditions of the North Sea. Their accident
rate is less then HALF that of US pilots.
They insist on safe aircraft and reasonable work hours. They simply will not
accept things that we take for granted,
and are amazed and a little perplexed that
we do accept the risk. If you met these
guys, you’d immediately see that there’s
not a wimp in the bunch. In fact, the
word “Vikings” comes to mind
Management and the FAA insist that
the costs of European type safety measures are economically not viable in this
country, and unnecessary to boot. True,
the Gulf of Mexico is not the North Sea.
But we have crews operating beyond the
range of the Coast Guard rescue aircraft
who are tasked to get us if we go down.
Even the GOM is an unforgivable environment if you are in it long enough.
focus on redundant system design, standardized cockpits and safety features that
are included as standard equipment.
But, none of this will happen if there
are plenty of people willing to accept
unnecessary risk because “I can do it.”
The change has to start with us.
In the past, a pilot who spoke up was
on his own, and probably out of a job.
But the landscape is changing. Pilots are
organizing to insist on better salaries and
benefits. This organization provides us
with the tool to address safety issues as
well. We can discuss reasonable duty
hours and better equipment at the bargaining table. The umbrella organization
(PHPA) provides us access to the national
and international regulatory process, and
we are already learning how the process
works and are making our presence felt.
What we must start with, however, is
an internal reassessment of what we consider “reasonable” risk. As a group, we
must start to reduce our tolerance for
working conditions that cause us to fly
tired and make us susceptible to poor
decision-making. We must begin to use
our collective bargaining power to insist
on safer equipment and operating environments. Above all else, we have to
stop taking flights when the guy next
door says “no way, the weather is too
bad.” This cultural change can only
come from us.
As a start, will someone please take
down that sign on the door that says:
“Wimps Need Not Apply?”
You may contact Jeff Smith at
JeffreySmith@autorotate.org
END
With oil recently at $55.00 per barrel,
the old economic arguments hardly are
credible for a large part of this industry –
if they ever were. It was pointed out during the conference that the 40 million it
could cost to upgrade to ICAO standards
on all 16 offshore platforms belonging to
a major producer represents less then one
months revenue from ONE of their rigs.
Meanwhile, we continue to put our passengers and ourselves at risk landing on
unsafe platforms. If we make a mistake
and hit an obstacle, pilot error is the culprit and everyone (including us) writes it
off. Management figures they can’t really control it, and we figure it won’t happen to us because “I can handle it.”
Where to from here?
This is going to take a while. It will
require changes in the regulatory structure affecting equipment, environment
and working conditions. It will require
changes in management’s attitude on risk
tolerance and the cost of doing business
safely. It will require manufacturers to
5
Cover Story
Finally–A Seat at the Table
By Tony Fonze
When you stop to think about who the
historic players are when it comes to
decision-making in the civilian rotorcraft
world, three major entities come to mind:
The operators; those who own and operate the aircraft in question, our bosses;
The manufacturers; those who build the
aircraft and make decisions on the future
design and packaging of those products
and who are, occasionally, charged with
going back and fixing things that aren’t
quite right; and the government, those
tasked with making the rules, pointing
the finger and taking names when the
rules are broken. Yet, in more than 90%
of all helicopter accidents where does
that finger point—the pilot.
What’s wrong with this picture?
That’s obvious. We’ve got a table with
four chairs around it, but only three of
those chairs are occupied. Somebody
didn’t receive an invitation. How did the
picture get this way? That’s a little more
complicated.
We want to play too
First of all, to whom should the invitation have been sent? Joe pilot? Which
one, and why? In order to take a seat,
you first have to have a body. Pilots didn’t have a body. Besides, why was direct
pilot participation required? Most, if not
all, of the operators and manufacturers
were themselves, at one time, helicopter
pilots. They know what we need, don’t
they? We share the same concerns, don’t
we? And, why would we be listened to
even if we were there? We don’t buy the
aircraft. We don’t make the operational
decisions, nor do we make the rules. Yet,
we are almost always deemed to be at
fault when something goes wrong.
Hmmm.
Now, I am not attempting to be cynical
here, merely observant. Nor am I cyni6
cal. Since I’ve been in the helicopter
world I have met many of the manufacturers’ representatives and found most of
them to be intelligent, concerned, industry participants. Many operators have
cordially invited me into their businesses
to do stories on their operations. They’ve
been uniformly sincere and supportive.
I’ve even met a few FAA people that I
liked.
I have a lot of respect for all of them
and I am confident that they are as interested in making our industry safer as am
I, the pilot. But it is time to fill that
empty seat at the table. It is time to add
another credible, experienced voice to the
mix, one with a slightly unique perspective. It is time to take our rightful place
in the discussion and our participation
should be welcomed.
Now, step forward to the Professional
Helicopter Pilots’ Association, Human
Factors Safety Conference recently held
in Biloxi, Mississippi on the weekend of
October 15th and 16th. Something
important happened at that conference.
Pilots were given a body and that body
was given a voice.
gave of their time and money to attend?
We needn’t have worried about it. What
we did, with the help of the speakers and
experts who gave of their time, was build
a foundation. It was important and exciting work.
When we arrived at the meeting room
Friday morning and took our seats, I felt
as though we were staring at a large,
blank canvas, hung before us in the front
of the room. When we wrapped up our
work at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday evening,
just over 30 hours later, the canvas displayed a painting. The painting wasn’t
literal, nor was it complete. But we had
created something together, and to me, it
was tangible.
The painting that I saw was a relatively
clear picture of the current safety situation and it wasn’t pretty. But, it was
powerful and compelling. And, I now
see that the job of PHPA and our pilot
members is to both complete and change
the painting. We need to improve its
look. We need to fill in the blank spaces.
We need to share the painting. These
things won’t happen overnight. But, I’m
confident that we will make them happen.
We created something
I think that most of us were a little
anxious about the outcome of this first
meeting. What would we actually
accomplish? What achievement would
we be able to point to? What benefit
would we give to the participants who
Photography: Tom Workman; PHPA Safety Conference; Glen Herpst, ICAO; Al Duquette
A splash of color here, a brush stroke
there
As each presenter spoke, as participants raised their hands to ask a question
or make a point, the painting began to
take shape. No one artist created the
painting alone. But the small contribu-
www.autorotate.com
tions of each and every one of us added
up to a nearly complete work when all
was said and done. I remain impressed
with the end result.
Glen Herpst; Chief, Flight Operations,
Airworthiness and the Air Navigation
Bureau of ICAO (International Civil
Aviation Organization) stayed with us
through the entire conference, from the
opening presentation to the closing dinner. Glen spoke articulately of an organization’s need to strive for maximum
resistance to risk. It became clear to me,
while he spoke, that many operators and
pilots maintain a climate of risk tolerance. Glen also introduced the idea of
latency to the group, an idea that was
brought forth again and again during the
conference.
Almost every accident represents a
series of system failures, with the final
point of failure frequently being in the
hands (literally) of the pilot. The situation is not unlike a string of dominoes
lined up, waiting for the first one to fall.
The accident scenario begins when the
first domino falls, not the last one. Why
then do we put all of our attention on the
last one?
Latent failures in the system are those
represented by the early dominoes. What
could have been done to prevent the first
or second dominoes from falling? PHPA
will spend time and attention focusing on
these latent issues as well as the active
issues: the last domino, the final shoe to
drop, the one that frequently points to the
pilot. It is an important difference in
focus that can be proffered by the seat at
the table that we intend to fill.
Kelly Teague, Senior Safety
Investigator/Instructor, Transportation
Safety Institute reminded us that, “It just
might be, that the purpose of your life is
to serve as a warning to others.” Think
about it.
Photography: From Kelly Teague’s 2004 Safety Conference
Powerpoint Presentation
Kelly spends his day teaching accident
investigation techniques and procedures.
It would be nice if we could impact our
industry to the extent that Kelly got an
extra week or two of vacation each year.
He built upon the concept of an accident
chain by elaborating on the nature of
latent failures: organizational influences,
unsafe supervision, and preconditions
required for unsafe acts to occur. It made
me wonder. When I read an NTSB
report (and I read a lot of them) why is it,
they never discuss the latent failures that
lead to an accident? Why don’t they illuminate the entire accident chain? No
doubt, money and staffing are issues, as
are the return on investment for the
increased expenditure in effort. Perhaps
this, too, is an area where PHPA can
make a difference?
Jim Kettles, American Eurocopter, and
Michael Skaggs, Sikorsky Helicopter,
spoke of advances in technology as they
relate to safety. If money were no object,
our safety margins would go up dramatically. The technology exists today: aircraft designs tolerant of in-flight damage,
redundant systems, turbine/fan burst protection and fuel system crashworthiness.
They also exist in inexpensive modifications to equipment we already have, like
GPSs that display wind speed and direction easily calculated from ground speed
observations. That is something I could
personally use every single day.
Pilots, as well as operators, understand
the need to maintain the balance between
production and protection. But pilots,
through PHPA, may be better able to
focus on the need to continually strive for
the implementation of technological
enhancements to improve safety for all of
us.
Shell Oil Company, one of the major
operators in the Gulf of Mexico, provided
Tom Workman, their Lead Air Contract
Manager to the proceedings. Tom’s nononsense style was well received. Tom
reviewed his goal of bringing helicopter
safety to airline standards: 1 fatal accident per 1,000,000 flight hours. We’ve
got a long way to go. But, things already
exist that would make an impact.
“HUMS (Health and Usage Manage
Systems) can detect 70% of problems
before they actually occur,” was just one
example cited by Tom. He also stressed
our need to identify a “duty of care” for
our passengers.
Jim Szymanski, Bell Helicopters, who
most of us know as the editor of Bell’s
safety publication, Heliprops, really hit
the nail on the head when he said,
“We’ve had an average of 59 helicopter
accident fatalities every year for more
than 10 years. If we continue to do
things the same way we always have,
we’ll continue to have the same results—
59 deaths per year, each and every year.”
We need to do something about it. And,
we can.
You must have “attitude”
Perhaps one of the most dramatic contributions to the meeting was made by
three pilots who fly the North Sea in
Norway: Olav Bastiansen, René De
Jong, and Hans Gunnar. The North Sea,
which has one of the most formidable
and life-threatening working environments in the world, has a much safer
accident record than the Gulf of Mexico.
Why is that? Frankly, it is the attitude of
all involved there: the pilots, the operators, the regulators, and, perhaps most
importantly, the customers. After a rare
accident in which all 15 on board were
killed, the crews working the oil rigs
refused to fly until they understood what
had happened and they knew what was
going to be done about it. Safety is of
paramount importance there, not an afterthought. Everyone in the North Sea has
7
an attitude fundamentally different than
our own. Theirs is one of complete intolerance of accidents—period. Any accident is viewed as a profound failure that
must be understood and eliminated.
Clearly, we do not feel exactly the same
way in the U.S. I have to ask. Is a
Norwegian life worth more than a North
American life? The Europeans were puzzled by our tolerance for unacceptable
risk and took us repeatedly to task for it.
The painting continued to be embellished with the help of Terry Palmer,
CRM Facilitator and FAA Safety
Counselor; Dale Keil, Safety Manager for
Lear Siegler (The contractor providing
flight instruction at Ft. Rucker); and
CW5 Wesley Hedman, Chief of Aviation
Safety Training for the U.S. Army Safety
Center. Terry pointed out that in 33% of
all approach and landing accidents and
serious incidents, incorrect or inadequate
ATC instructions, advice or services were
a factor. She spoke of one incident in
which an EMS helicopter was given vectors, by ATC, to supposedly intercept the
approach path for a published instrument
approach procedure at a good-sized airport. They vectored the helicopter right
into the side of a hill, yet the probable
cause, listed in the NTSB was, “Pilot
failure to intercept the approach course
and his improper execution of the instrument approach procedure.” Looks like
some work could be done there.
Training accidents, throughout the
industry, remain a consistent source of
damage and fatalities. Yet, Dale Keil
pointed out that at LSSI (Ft. Rucker)
their record is only 1.7 accidents/100,000
flight hours; a rate dramatically lower
than that observed elsewhere. Surely,
there are some things that can be learned
here and applied to the rest of us. And,
speaking of the Army, they are making
some dramatic strides in the area of
learning from their accidents.
copter will be recording real-time data
from their instrument panel in sufficient
detail that an entire flight can be automatically recreated in a simulator. CW5
Hedman showed dramatic examples of
this work, already being widely used, to
pinpoint the exact cause of many accidents. How many times do we read the
words, “Pilot error,” and then the book is
closed. What do we learn from that?
That we are fallible? That we have lapses in judgement? We know these
things—give us the details, so we can
improve. Clearly, there’s a role for pilots
and PHPA in this arena.
We are YOU
Still, there’s no getting around the fact
that pilots are responsible for a significant percentage of all accidents. I think
we all take responsibility for this and
none of us are ducking our responsibilities here. But, the “completed” painting
revealed that more, much more, is
involved.
First and foremost—maintain your
membership, even when the magazine is
late and even when you’ve found other
uses for your $60.00. Your membership
makes a real difference. This is true for
each and every one of you.
By Saturday evening, I found myself
looking at a complex portrait of Human
Factors Safety. I saw a multitude of
shapes and colors reflecting the many
facets of the problem and ultimately, the
answers. Technology, equipment, training, decision-making, procedures, supervision, investigation and perhaps most
importantly, attitude, were all intertwined
and juxtaposed on the canvas. I saw that
the ultimate answers will take time. But,
I also saw that there is plenty of lowhanging fruit to be gathered. We can
make a statistical difference and we can
do it sooner rather than later. It is
already being done elsewhere.
Can we do everything being done in
the North Sea? Probably not. Can we do
everything being done by the U.S. Army?
Probably not. Can we learn from the
work of others and do as much as possible and truly make a difference?
Absolutely! PHPA has found its cause.
In just a few years, every Army heli8
If a half a dozen presenters and around
75 pilots can complete a significant work
of art in two days, just think what 1000s
of pilots could accomplish over a handful
of years. We could make the number 59
a thing of the past. We could make our
jobs not only safer, but more rewarding
as well. This is why PHPA exists.
PHPA isn’t about the magazine. PHPA
isn’t about the hat, or the bumper sticker
or the Union Plus benefits. PHPA is
about YOU. No, PHPA IS YOU. Here’s
what you need to do.
Second, get your friends to join. Tell
them why their membership makes a difference. Isn’t your life worth $60.00 per
year of insurance? I know mine is worth
much, much more. Third, get involved.
Plan now, to attend next year’s safety
conference. Your attendance speaks volumes to the entire industry. In fact, your
participation in PHPA is what gives our
“voice” volume.
If PHPA doesn’t fill that seat at the
table, that seat will remain unfilled and
our voice will remain unheard. And 59
will remain 59 or perhaps become 65 or
73. Only you can change that. PHPA
epitomizes the well-known adage—
there’s SAFETY in numbers. Be a part
of PHPA and let your voice be counted.
You may reach Tony Fonze at
TonyFonze@autorotate.org
END
www.autorotate.com
Becoming a Pilot Examiner
Have you ever wondered what it takes
to become a Designated Pilot Examiner
(DPE)? Ever wondered just exactly what
your examiner, the one who gave you
that last checkride, had to go through?
The process can be challenging and
rewarding. If you feel like getting back
into flight instruction or are currently a
full-time flight instructor, you may want
to begin the process of becoming a DPE.
It is a lengthy and difficult trip, but one
that is well worth the journey.
Do you have the right stuff?
The first step in the process is to see if
you meet the qualifications required to be
a candidate for designation as a pilot
examiner. This can be accomplished by
accessing the Pilot Examiners Handbook
(8710.3C). The easiest way to find this
handbook is through the AFS-600 website, http://afs600.faa.gov, and click on
Examiner Handbook under the Designee
Standardization section. If you have not
visited this website before, you’ll discover that it is a wealth of information.
Everything you ever wanted to know
about the new Sport Pilot designation can
be found here, as well as Advisory
Circulars on flight instruction. One of
the more important sections is the complete text of all of the Practical Test
Standards (PTS)—yes, the whole thing,
all of them, in PDF format. If you want
to look at the PTS for a Parachute
Rigger—look no further.
Once you access the Examiner
Handbook, go to Chapter 2 and it will
outline the prerequisites for you. They
are too lengthy to list here, but here’s a
sampling of what they include: you must
be at least 21 years of age and have a
good record as a pilot; you must hold all
pertinent category, class, and type ratings
for each aircraft for which designation is
sought; you must hold a valid 2nd class
medical (for initial designation) and you
must be employed as a flight instructor or
in some other type of flight service
capacity or be a check airman. There’s
also language in there implying a safe
flying history and good relationships with
the FAA. If you meet all the requirements you have made the first step.
Where do I sign up?
The next step in the Pilot Examiner
process is to contact your FAA assigned
Principle Operations Inspector (POI) and
ask him or her about the entire process
and determine if there is a need for a
pilot examiner in your area. If you do
not have a POI assigned to your organization, contact your FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO) for
your geographical area and speak with an
Photography: Pete Shepley and Hunter French during Pete’s oral practical (I definitely think Pete was more nervous (see
last para.)); Hunter reviewing Pete’s pre-flight technique; Tony Fonze
By Hunter French
Operations Inspector. If there is a need
for an examiner in your area, they will let
you know.
If there is not a need for an examiner
in your area at this time, don’t give up
just yet. If this is something you really
want to do, you can complete the process
and be registered in the national candidate pool at your (FSDO) and when the
need arises in your area, you will be contacted. Like most of the training you
have done to get where you are, remain
focused on your goal and do not become
discouraged. The road to becoming an
examiner can take a few twists and turns.
Assuming you’ve gotten a thumbs-up
from your FSDO, or you’ve decided to
forge ahead regardless, you now want to
download the examiner application form
(8710-10). Go to the AFS-600 website
again and find the Designee
Standardization section and click on DPE
Application. This application is seven
pages long and yes, you guessed it, you
will need to break out the logbook and
complete the entire application. WARNING, if paperwork is not your thing, get
used to it!
9
You will be asked to specify the precise designation sought. There are four
categories for initial examiners: Private
Examiner (PE), Commercial Examiner
(CE), Commercial Instrument Rating
Examiner (CIRE) and ATP Examiner
(ATPE). You must also decide the category, class and type of aircraft for which
authorization is sought. In my case I
decided to apply for Commercial
Examiner (CE) in the Robinson R-22 and
Robinson R-44.
License to learn
After you rush to the post office and
mail your application you can get on to
the “fun” part—studying for the written
test. Yes, you heard me! Just when you
thought you had seen your last written
test, guess what? The written test is basically the same as the flight instructor
written test. You can study whatever
your favorite written test prep book is
and relive this memorable event.
However, you must have your letter from
the National Examiner Board stating
what examiner designation you qualify
for prior to taking the written test. Since
the National Examiner Board meets
every quarter, you have some time to
study. So depending on how long it
takes you to prep for the written, you
might want to start studying in anticipation of your application being accepted.
The next step is up to you, but I would
recommend getting registered for the
week-long Initial Pilot Examiner
Standardization class in Oklahoma City.
You do not have to have your written test
completed prior to attending this class
and the seats fill up fast. There is generally a one to two month wait for a vacancy. You can access the class schedule by
clicking on DPE Seminars on the now
familiar AFS-600 site. The cost was
$250.00 when I attended but check for
pricing. I would suggest staying at the
hotel that is hosting the seminar to cut
back on the cost of a rental car.
10
This class is great and it is taught by
excellent, knowledgeable instructors. I
had the privilege of meeting very experienced pilots from all over the country
with varying backgrounds, all training to
be examiners. The first two and a half
days are classroom lectures on the examiner’s handbook, files, evaluation, regulations and the practical test standards.
The next two and a half days are spent
in workshops broken up into your specific aircraft categories. My particular
workshop included four helicopter
instructors and one balloon instructor.
The workshops are invaluable and are
designed to get you ready for testing
applicants by developing your plan of
action. The plan of action for an examiner is the detailed syllabus he or she will
be using when conducting the oral exam
and checkride. At the conclusion of the
workshops you will be videotaped delivering a pseudo examination. It is a lot of
fun and a great learning experience, even
for those of us who don’t like to see
themselves on TV.
Climb into the hot seat
Once you’ve been deemed qualified for
the examiner designation sought, you can
take your written test. Hopefully you
have registered for the Initial Pilot
Examiner class or have completed it
already. The next step varies a little
depending on the FSDO you are working
with. But, it involves “the interview.” In
my case I had the “pleasure” of being
interviewed simultaneously by not one,
not two, but three interrogators: two
safety inspectors and an experienced pilot
examiner. I learned a lot, but it was
about as much fun as a four hour visit
with the dentist. Really—it wasn’t quite
as bad as it sounds. And, taking the class
in Oklahoma City made the entire ordeal
much easier.
Interview completed, my FSDO
requested that I attend a maintenance
course held right at the FSDO itself. In
this class we reviewed how to determine
the airworthiness of the aircraft to be
flown on the checkride. We reviewed
mandatory onboard documentation and a
methodology for scrutinizing the engine
and airframe log books.
From there, I attended yet another
class, held at my FSDO, on how to
process applicant files. It is of the utmost
importance to complete every applicant
file without a single error. Remember
when I warned you about paperwork?
For every file that is returned to the
examiner from Oklahoma City, it costs
the Federal Aviation Administration
between $300.00 and $500.00 that they
have not budgeted for. Needless to say,
if you make a lot of errors on your files
you will become a thorn in the side of
your FSDO.
The checkride
After all your administrative training is
completed it’s time for your checkride.
The Safety Inspector assigned to you will
administer your flight check. In my case,
my inspector pretended to be an applicant
and I administered the checkride to him.
After the mock oral exam was completed,
I was required to provide a check flight
in both the R22 and the R44. It helps if
you have access to the aircraft you will
be examining in. In my case, I was a
part-time instructor at a local flight
school in addition to my full-time flying
job with the Arizona Department of
Public Safety. We went through all the
maneuvers you would be expected to test
with a student and it was a lot of work
for both me and the inspector. But once
we were done, I was issued my letter of
authorization and the forms needed to
conduct checkrides.
Is that all you ask?
No, not quite. At my FSDO they have
a mentoring program offered to aid you
with any questions you may have. A
www.autorotate.com
mentor is a highly qualified examiner
that is assigned to help you as you begin
your examiner duties. This is an excellent program that helps guide you in the
right direction and gives you another person to contact if /when you have questions. In my case the mentor I chose is a
long time friend and someone who has
already been a mentor for me throughout
my aviation career.
Keeping it together
I should mention the currency requirements and the renewal process. You
must keep your flight instructor certificate current and have a current third class
medical to be a pilot examiner (you need
a 2nd class to start). In addition, you
must also meet the requirements set forth
in 61.56 and 61.57 dealing with the flight
review and recent flight experience to act
as pilot in command. There is also a
minimal level of annual activity required
to renew. A helicopter examiner must
administer at least 5 rating tests to maintain currency.
Examiner designation is renewed annually and it is up to your FSDO to determine that your service is still justified in
your local area. You are also required to
attend an annual examiner meeting held
by your FSDO, where local problem
areas, examiner performance, standards
and procedures are reviewed. You must
also attend recurrent standardization
training once every two years.
Recurrency also requires another practical test. It may be conducted in three
ways: An inspector may observe an
examiner testing an applicant; the inspector may pretend he is an applicant; or the
inspector may test the examiner on
selected maneuvers to assess pilot skill.
The entire process from beginning to
end has taken me a little over seven
months. I am thankful for all the help I
have received from everyone involved in
my training and I feel very fortunate to
have gained this experience. The entire
process has helped make me a better pilot
and instructor. I wonder who will be
more nervous during my first checkride—me or the applicant? I’m looking
forward to that new experience as well.
Editor’s Note: Hunter French is a full-time
pilot/officer with the Arizona Department of
Public Safety. He holds ATP and CFII ratings in
both fixed-wing and rotorcraft and is fixed-wing
multi-engine rated as well. On top of being a
great pilot, he is an all around good guy and
myself and other friends have been urging him
for years to get his examiner’s credentials.
Congratulations, Hunter!
END
Live and Learn—
More than just
entertaining reading
We can all learn from the experiences of each other. It is something
we can give back to our pilot community. Your story may even save a
life. With that in mind–
Get Off Your Butts and Send
Me Some Live and Learns!
They can be brief or long, rough
drafts or well crafted. Don’t worry
about your English or writing skills—
that’s why we’re here. Submit your
Live and Learn stories to Tony
Fonze, editor at
TonyFonze@autorotate.org.
You’ll be glad you did,
and so will we!
11
Feature story
Lockheed’s Rigid Rotor Warrior:
In the world of rotary-wing military
aircraft, few subjects have raised as much
controversy as the AH-56A Cheyenne,
Lockheed’s revolutionary, purposedesigned, compound, attack helicopter.
On the other hand, the Cheyenne is
somewhat of an enigmatic and unheralded aircraft, seen only in passing as an
obscure footnote in the history of military
helicopters. To those who are familiar
with it, the Cheyenne evokes a variety of
emotions ranging from frustration and
disappointment to enthusiasm and
extreme consternation regarding the decision to cancel, what initially appeared to
be, a major triumph in the field of combat rotorcraft. Although Lockheed’s pioneering research & development on the
12
rigid rotor system is a story unto itself,
this article will focus specifically on the
Cheyenne’s potential to have become one
of the most capable aircraft ever to enter
military service and, more specifically, to
have been one of the deadliest, most formidable aircraft ever to engage in battle.
The Advanced Aerial Fire Support
System
While seeing only limited use of the
helicopter in previous conflicts, the world
had never witnessed such extensive
employment of rotary-wing aircraft as
that which occurred during the Vietnam
War. During this conflict, helicopters
assumed many vital roles on the battlefield, performing everything from troop
Photography: Cheyenne flying NOE; courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
insertion to casualty evacuation; searchand-rescue to recovery of downed aircraft. With the introduction of turbinepowered helicopters such as the Bell UH1 Iroquois, more commonly known as the
Huey, the helicopter gained acceptance
and became essential to the movement of
troops, giving birth to the concept of air
mobility.
However, unlike the mission performed
by faster and higher-flying fixed-wing
aircraft, the nature of the helicopter’s
mission required it to fly low “among the
weeds” where intense small-arms fire
resulted in increasingly heavy losses of
troops and aircraft alike. Military tacticians attempted to counter this threat by
modifying a number of standard troop
AH-56A Cheyenne
By Raymond L. Robb
transports with rocket pods, machine
guns, and associated sighting systems.
Although these armed escort helicopters,
known as gunships, proved to be effective in suppressing enemy fire upon
arrival in the landing zone, it was found
that the heavy armament was too cumbersome, making it impossible for the
gunships to fly at the higher speeds of the
helicopters they were intended to protect.
What was needed was a purposedesigned attack helicopter, capable not
only of keeping pace with the helicopters
it was escorting, but also capable of dashing ahead and softening up the landing
zone prior to the arrival of the troop carriers. This concept for an attack helicopter was initially referred to as the Fire
Support Aerial System, or FSAS. In
order to fulfill the requirement, the U.S.
Army issued a Request for Proposals
(RFP) to the aviation industry on August
01, 1964 for the program, which had
been renamed the Advanced Aerial Fire
Support System, or AAFSS.
A total of twelve companies responded
and the field of selection was eventually
narrowed down to proposals from
Sikorsky and Lockheed. On November
03, 1965, after extensively studying both
proposals, the Army selected the
Lockheed design, known as the CL-840,
for further development and testing.
This was a rather surprising decision to
many, given Sikorsky’s preeminence as
an established helicopter manufacturer
and Lockheed’s status as a newcomer to
the field of rotary-wing aircraft. In
explaining its decision, the Army cited
three primary reasons for selecting the
Lockheed design. First, the revolutionary
rigid rotor design developed by Lockheed
promised inherent dynamic stability, a
key factor in providing the Army with a
stable weapons platform. Secondly,
Photography: Rockets away; courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
Lockheed’s proven superior program
management with other military aircraft
programs had given them a reputation for
building high-performance aircraft on
time and on budget. Finally, the
Lockheed design appeared generally
more promising than that submitted by
Sikorsky, taking advantage of the latest
cutting-edge flight and weapons technology.
Rotary-Wing Revolution
The Army’s need for a stable weapons
platform came at a time when Lockheed
was at its peak in research & development of the rigid rotor, sometimes
referred to as a hingeless rotor. The stability offered in the rigid rotor system
promised a high degree of weapons accuracy for the Army’s new attack helicopter. Although yet unproven in combat,
the rigid rotor was already undergoing
extensive flight testing as part of a joint
Army/Navy program beginning in
February 1962 and involving Lockheed’s
XH-51A. This aircraft, which had
evolved from earlier experiments by
Lockheed, was proving to be nothing
short of a revolution in rotary-wing flight
technology.
It routinely performed feats in the air
which were normally flown only by
fixed-wing aircraft and could not be safely duplicated by other helicopters, such
as loops, rolls, and split-S maneuvers—
not only in tests, but also at public air
shows. The pilot’s ability to maintain
positive control during inverted flight
astounded aviation experts around the
world.
In addition to its incredible maneuverability, the XH-51A had demonstrated the
capability of very high speed and stability, both key requirements in the Army’s
AAFSS program. By June 1967, the
XH-51A had already demonstrated
speeds in excess of 200 mph in level
flight, a feat unparalleled by any other
pure helicopter at the time. Even higher
speeds, in the 300 mph range, were
achieved with an XH-51A modified as a
compound helicopter, which featured
stub wings and an auxiliary jet engine
grafted onto the diminutive aircraft.
Another key feature of the rigid rotor
system was the sheer simplicity in its
design, construction, and functionality.
The small number of moving parts was a
very positive attribute from a maintenance perspective because frontline com13
AH-56A Cheyenne Statistics
Dimensions
Length (overall): 60 ft, 0.9 in
Wingspan: 26 ft, 8.5 in
Main Rotor Diameter: 50 ft, 4.8 in
Tail Rotor Diameter: 10 ft, 0 in
Propeller Diameter: 10 ft, 0 in
Height: 13 ft, 8.5 in
Powerplant
One 3,435 shp General Electric T64-GE-16 turboshaft engine (replaced late in the Cheyenne’s
development with a 4,275 shp T64-GE-716 turboshaft engine)
Weights (approximate)
Empty: 11,725 lbs
Fully Loaded: 22,000 lbs
Performance (at sea level)
Maximum Speed: 253 mph
Cruising Speed: 242 mph
Maximum Rate of Climb: 3,420 per minute
Service Ceiling: 26,000 ft
Hovering Ceiling (OGE): 10,600 ft
14 Photography: Courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
www.autorotate.com
bat helicopters would be required to
spend much of their time in the field at
Forward Operating Locations where
maintenance assets would be limited.
Lockheed’s rigid rotor eliminated the
familiar flapping and lead-lag hinges
found in conventional rotors by attaching
the blades directly to the rotor hub, taking full advantage of the gyroscopic
effect of the spinning hub and therefore
balancing the system.
A gyro ring was attached underneath
the rotor hub, fastened directly to the
swashplate. The pilot’s controls were
connected to a set of springs which acted
directly upon the swashplate and hence
the gyro, forcing the rotor to react instantaneously to the pilot’s input. The entire
system operated on a conventional, variable, collective-pitch system and fixed
rotor rpm.
Flight tests showed that the rotor, and
hence the aircraft, would automatically
right itself under extreme conditions,
including sudden, severe wind gusts from
any direction. One experiment involved
displacement of the aircraft’s center of
gravity by attaching a 17 ft boom to the
right side of the helicopter with a 170 lb
man seated on the end. Inputs by the
pilot on the cyclic stick resulted in instant
reactions by the helicopter, which automatically corrected itself. Pilots were
routinely able to hover the aircraft
“hands-off”.
Such inherent stability suitably
impressed the Army, and Lockheed initiated plans to design a scaled-up version
of the XH-51A’s rigid rotor system in
response to the Army’s pressing need for
a high-speed attack helicopter, destined
to become the Cheyenne. After selecting
Lockheed’s CL-840 for further development and eventual fulfillment of the
AAFSS requirement, the Army’s subsequent decision to purchase the Cheyenne
marked the first time in history that a
compound helicopter had been seriously
considered for mass production and operational service.
The Cheyenne: An aircraft like no
other
Lockheed was awarded a contract to
build ten developmental prototypes of its
new aircraft, which received the military
designation AH-56A. The first example
was rolled out on May 03, 1967 to a
crowd of top Lockheed and Army executives, along with numerous company
employees at Lockheed’s Plant 8 in Van
Nuys, California. In keeping with the
Army tradition of naming its aircraft after
Native American tribes, the AH-56A was
officially christened the “Cheyenne” during the rollout ceremony by Lieutenant
General Austin W. Betts, Army Chief of
Research & Development.
From its outward appearance alone, it
was obvious that the Cheyenne was an
aircraft like no other. Its long, slender
fuselage was over 54 ft in length and
stood on a set of retractable-wheeled
landing gear that reflected the requirement in the AAFSS program for highspeed.
Sprouting from long, side-mounted
fairings, or sponsons, was a set of fixed
wings, spanning over 26 ft. Not only did
these provide solid mounting points for
weapons and other external stores, but
they served to offload the rotor during
high-speed flight. The bulbous canopy
afforded excellent visibility and enclosed
two cockpits arranged in tandem with the
pilot seated in a raised position to the
rear and the co-pilot/gunner seated in the
front at a lower level. Another prominent
feature of the Cheyenne which differentiated it from other helicopters was its
three-bladed pusher propeller mounted
directly behind two horizontal stabilizers
at the extreme end of the tailboom.
During high-speed cruising flight, all but
300 hp of the total engine output was
diverted to the pusher propeller, allowing
it to provide the majority of forward
thrust. To counter torque, a conventional,
four-bladed tail rotor was mounted on the
end of the left stabilizer.
Finally, one of the most significant features of the Cheyenne, although not the
most obvious to the casual observer, was
its unique, four-bladed, rigid rotor system. Like that of the XH-51A, this gyrostabilized system was very simplistic in
construction, yet it promised an unprecedented degree of stability that could not
be duplicated by any other helicopter of
the time.
Each rotor blade was mounted independently to an immensely strong forged
titanium hub. The main rotor, tail rotor,
and pusher propeller were all powered by
a single General Electric T64-GE-16 turboshaft engine initially rated at 3,435 shp
and progressively increased to 3,925 shp.
With a height of over 13 ft, combined
with its other external dimensions, the
Cheyenne was a fairly large aircraft.
Nevertheless, its impressive maneuverability and overall performance in many
respects would prove to be nothing short
of phenomenal.
One look made it obvious that the
Cheyenne was designed with one primary
purpose in mind: high-speed attack.
Although the Bell AH-1G Huey Cobra
can rightfully claim to be the first true
attack helicopter to enter production and
service, one must remember that its
design was based largely on the proven
powerplant and other dynamic flight
components of the UH-1. Conversely,
the AH-56A was the first aircraft
designed from the ground up as an attack
helicopter.
Its overall design, inside and out,
embodied the Army’s concept of a truly
integrated weapons system, making
extensive use of advanced computers for
navigation, communication, battlefield
targeting, and employment of its weapons
15
Bred for Combat: Advanced Sensors,
Weapons Systems and …
systems. Like its Native American namesake, the Cheyenne was to be an expert
hunter, aggressively seeking out its prey
by penetrating deep inside enemy territory. Furthermore, it was to be capable of
subsistence in even the most remote locations, requiring no special tools for maintenance in the field.
Above all, the Cheyenne represented a
sharp departure from traditional rotarywing aircraft in being a compound helicopter. By definition, a compound helicopter is one in which forward thrust is
derived from a source other than the
main rotor, while achieving a significant
portion of lift by alternate means, such as
fixed wings. In many respects, the
Cheyenne was more like a fixed-wing
aircraft equipped with a rotor–not only in
its physical configuration, but also in its
performance. Fully fueled and armed,
the Cheyenne could attain speeds in
excess of 250 mph, with a service ceiling
of 26,000 ft, while weighing in at over
22,000 lbs. In the 1960s, performance
figures such as these were comparable
only to fixed-wing aircraft and were
unmatched by any other helicopter in the
world.
16
From a military pilot’s perspective, the
Cheyenne represented the ultimate combat helicopter. Every aspect of its design,
its incredible flight performance, and its
weapons delivery capability, was inspired
by the need to dominate the battlefield.
Having been given a very demanding set
of requirements and encouraged to think
freely, Lockheed engineers started with a
blank sheet of paper and created a truly
unique aircraft. As described above, the
airframe itself was built for speed and
maneuverability. However, aerodynamics were only part of the Cheyenne’s
uniqueness. The AH-56A was packed
with state-of-the-art avionics that allowed
it to navigate at night and in adverse
weather to find its way to the battlefield.
An Integrated Helicopter Avionics
System, or IHAS, served as the central
computer for all navigation, communication, and fire control functions. A
Doppler Inertial Navigation System, or
INS, permitted accurate navigation to any
point on the globe, making use of
ground-based navigational aids unnecessary. On the way to the target area, an
automatic Terrain-Following Radar
(TFR) allowed the AH-56A to fly nap-ofthe-earth among hills and valleys to minimize exposure and detection by enemy
forces. A station-keeping radar was
installed to allow automatic precision formation flying with other aircraft.
Photography: The Cheyenne with a full compliment of ammo; Lots of spinning blades; Courtesy Lockheed photo archive.
A Low-Light-Level Television
(LLLTV) system, and later an Infrared
(IR) system, were fitted for night flight,
making it one of the first such systems to
be installed in an aircraft. A laser ranging and designation system could be used
to pinpoint the exact location of enemy
forces. Since the navigation system also
served as an integral part of the fire control system, targets were quickly and easily located.
Upon arrival on the battlefield, the
Cheyenne could bring a variety of
weapons to bear on multiple targets – all
at the same time. This was made possible by integrating the weapons into the
aircraft from the very beginning.
Mounted in the nose was a flexible gun
turret which could be fitted with either an
XM-196 7.62mm Gatling-style Minigun
or an XM-129 40mm grenade launcher,
the latter being the preferred option. The
turret could rotate through 200 degrees in
azimuth, 70 degrees in depression, or 18
degrees in elevation. With the grenade
launcher fitted, the Cheyenne carried 780
rounds and fired at 350 rounds per
minute with a range of approximately
1,640 ft. For even more effective firepower, the Cheyenne was fitted with an
XM-140 30mm cannon with 2,010
rounds of ammunition in a belly-mounted
turret that could rotate through 26
degrees in elevation, 60 degrees in
depression, and 200 degrees in azimuth,
accurately engaging targets at 450 rounds
per minute up to a maximum effective
range of 9,843 ft.
www.autorotate.com
The Cheyenne’s primary armament
was carried underneath the wings, consisting of a mixture of 2.75-inch Folding
Fin Aerial Rocket (FFAR) pods and the
newly-developed BGM-71 Tubelaunched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided
(TOW) anti-tank missile. Up to six TOW
missiles could be carried at one time,
combined with various configurations of
rockets.
All of the wing-mounted weapons were
boresighted to the aircraft’s centerline,
requiring the pilot to point the nose of the
aircraft directly at the target in order to
engage it. As an added benefit, pilots
found that the helicopter’s variable-pitch
pusher propeller offered unique weaponspointing capabilities. By using the propeller to provide counteracting positive
or negative thrust, pilots could hold the
Cheyenne in a 10-degree nose-up or
nose-down attitude while hovering,
allowing the crew to fire the wingmounted ordnance down into a valley or
up a hill while maintaining a safe distance from the target. The propeller also
allowed the Cheyenne to accelerate or
decelerate very swiftly in level flight,
eliminating the need to pitch the aircraft
up or down.
Rockets could be employed against
comparatively soft area targets at ranges
varying from a few hundred feet to more
than three miles, while TOW missiles
could be used against harder point targets, particularly tanks or fortified
bunkers, at nearly two miles away.
cockpit. This assembly was fixed directly to the underside of a turntable, upon
which the co-pilot/gunner’s seat was
mounted. Known collectively as the
Swiveling Gunner Station, or SGS, this
feature was one of the most unique components of the AH-56A, having been specially designed and built for this aircraft.
As the name implies, the SGS actually
rotated within the confines of the cockpit
at the command of the co-pilot/gunner,
permitting rapid target acquisition and
identification. As the sighthead assembly
rotated, the co-pilot/gunner rotated with
it, allowing him to concentrate on a given
target independent of aircraft motion.
When desired, the co-pilot/gunner could
select one of the two gun systems and
“slave” it to the SGS, allowing him to
face directly at a target and engage it
immediately, even with the aircraft flying
in a different direction. Initially, there
were concerns that personnel manning
the SGS might experience vertigo as a
result of conflicting sensory inputs during
violent aircraft maneuvers. However,
actual tests revealed no such problems
and those using the SGS reported that it
was very effective in acquiring targets
rapidly.
Perhaps the most novel targeting system onboard the Cheyenne was the XM110 pilot helmet sighting system. This
highly advanced system allowed the pilot
to align either of the gun systems with a
target simply by turning his head to face
it. Sighting was accomplished through
use of a retractable reticle sight reflector
which extended directly in front of the
pilot’s right eye. Cockpit-mounted sensors monitored movements of the pilot’s
helmet and transmitted these movements
instantaneously to a computer which
positioned the gun systems accordingly.
Close crew coordination combined with
the Cheyenne’s advanced targeting and
navigation systems, a lethal combination
of weapons, and superb maneuverability
promised swift engagement and neutralization of targets.
Battlefield roles and missions
What began in the minds of Army
leaders as a requirement to simply provide armed escort for troop-carrying helicopters evolved into a true attack mentality, where battlefield commanders could
call upon the Cheyenne to provide Close
Air Support, or CAS, for embattled
troops at a moment’s notice anywhere it
was needed from nearby Forward
Operating Locations. Having been
embroiled in a bitter inter-service feud
with the Air Force since the Korean War,
the Army felt that the CAS mission was
too often neglected and that organic air
support was vital. Furthermore, Army
strategists, closely following the
Cheyenne’s testing and development,
began to recognize the opportunity to
expand the Cheyenne’s role and employ
its unique capabilities in an even more
aggressive role, seizing the offensive and
bringing the fight directly to the enemy’s
doorstep deep inside his own territory.
…A Swivel Chair
Although the pilot retained the option
to fire any of the weapons if necessary,
his primary duty was to fly the aircraft
and position it for optimum attack angles.
Target engagement was primarily the
responsibility of the co-pilot/gunner, who
made use of a highly advanced sensor
suite contained within an enclosed sighthead assembly located underneath his
Photography: Courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
17
fulfill the same mission, Lockheed was
also experiencing severe financial difficulties with other aircraft it produced
such as the L-1011 airliner and the massive C-5 Galaxy military transport.
Despite the success of the AH-1G in
Vietnam, the Huey Cobra was viewed as
an interim solution until the Cheyenne
entered service. In addition, thinking
beyond the ongoing conflict in Vietnam,
Army planners recognized the need to
employ an effective anti-armor capability
in the European Theater to deal with the
ever-increasing threat from the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. In the event
that the Cold War turned “hot”, U.S. military forces in Europe would be faced
with an overwhelming hoard of tanks and
artillery, and the TOW-armed attack helicopter was seen as the answer.
Fitted with external fuel tanks, the AH56A was capable of unrefueled ferry
flights to theaters of operation up to
2,510 nautical miles away while facing a
30-knot headwind. The Cheyenne was
quickly evolving into a true multi-role
aircraft with great promise as a deep
strike and interdiction platform. In short,
the AH-56A showed the potential not
only of carrying out the basic mission of
armed escort for which it was originally
conceived, but of performing a variety of
offensive tasks on a much broader battlefield – a fact which was increasingly
unsettling to the Air Force.
Timing is everything
Firmly claiming ownership of the CAS
and interdiction missions as spelled out
in its charter and battle doctrine, the Air
18
Force strongly protested what it perceived as a direct threat to its mission.
The idea that the CAS mission might be
assumed by the Army did not sit well
with Air Force leadership, and steps were
swiftly taken in the political arena to
quash the Army’s acquisition of the
Cheyenne.
One such step involved the AttackExperimental (AX) program, which was
initiated to develop a purpose-designed
aircraft to fulfill the CAS mission and
effectively undermine the Cheyenne.
The AX program eventually resulted in
creation of the A-10 Thunderbolt II
attack aircraft, the first aircraft designed
specifically for the CAS mission. As a
result, the Army was then pitted against
another new aircraft vying for virtually
the same mission, which also created
competition for funding in a budgetary
environment already strained by the escalating costs of the Vietnam War.
Additionally, the Marine Corps was
seeking to procure the AV-8 Harrier to
fulfill its own requirements for supporting troops on the ground, generating even
tougher competition for funding in the
Department of Defense. In effect, the
Cheyenne found itself fighting a number
of fierce and ruthless enemies on the
home front before it even entered production, much less service on the battlefield.
Aside from competing with other services and manufacturers for an aircraft to
Photography: 253 mph is “moving”; Courtesy, Lockheed photo archive.
Bell Aircraft, having wisely predicted
the need for a dedicated helicopter gunship along with the inevitable high costs
and engineering difficulties in developing
such a sophisticated aircraft as the AH56A, had funded and produced the Huey
Cobra in the mid-1960s based on the battle-proven UH-1 Huey. As the Cheyenne
continued to struggle for survival, the
Huey Cobra continued to prove itself in
Vietnam, making Lockheed’s high-tech
aircraft more and more difficult to justify.
“A series of unfortunate events”
On May 19, 1969, only six months
before the scheduled delivery of the first
production model, the Army cancelled
the production portion of the Cheyenne
contract. Given the vast potential of the
Cheyenne to revolutionize rotary-wing
combat aircraft, one must inevitably wonder why such a promising aircraft was
cancelled. The reason behind the cancellation lies not in a single factor, but in a
combination of unfortunate circumstances and events which encircled the
program in its final years.
As with any cutting-edge program, the
Cheyenne experienced its share of technical difficulties and developmental problems along the way. With innovation
comes risk.
The most troubling technical challenge
for the Cheyenne throughout most of the
program was a phenomenon in the main
rotor known as the _ p hop. This condition consisted of a sub-harmonic vibration which occurred every two rotations
of the main rotor, resulting in severe
aerodynamic stresses on the blades. If
unrecognized and uncorrected by the
pilot at the onset, this condition could
cause severe and sometimes fatal rotor
www.autorotate.com
oscillations. During one high-speed test
flight just off the coast of Carpinteria,
CA on March 12, 1969, the _ p hop
reared it’s ugly head, causing the main
rotor to strike the fuselage and cockpit
canopy, slicing the aircraft in half and
killing Lockheed test pilot David Beil.
All Cheyennes were temporarily grounded as a result of the crash, effectively
halting the program for a time. Six
months later, a similar accident occurred
during wind tunnel testing. Some contended that such problems with the rotor
were due to an underestimation of the
difficulties in scaling-up the rigid rotor
from the much smaller XH-51A.
Ironically, the Cheyenne’s emphasis on
high-speed attack and advanced technology integration, which were cornerstones
in the original Army requirement, became
key contributors to its eventual downfall.
Despite cancellation of the production
contract, the Army encouraged Lockheed
to continue development of the Cheyenne
in anticipation of future requirements. In
an effort to further entice the Army, modified versions of the AH-56 were proposed, some with twin engines. There
were even attempts to interest the other
military services by offering variations of
the basic Cheyenne airframe for a variety
of missions, but none of these attempts
were successful. Eventually, Lockheed
managed to cure virtually all of the problems found in the Cheyenne, including
the instability in the main rotor, through
various modifications. However, due to
the political, financial, and technical
problems encountered along the way, the
number of years spent developing a system which had yet to be fielded, and
changes in tactical philosophy, the Army
eventually became disenchanted with the
Cheyenne altogether and terminated the
program in its entirety on August 9,
1972.
Today, of the ten examples built, only
four Cheyennes survive as museum
pieces: two at Fort Rucker, AL, one at
Fort Campbell, KY, and one at Fort Polk,
LA. In a valiant effort to better preserve
this rare and unusual example of innovation in military rotary-wing aviation, a
dedicated team of volunteers is currently
restoring the Cheyenne at Fort Polk to
near-factory-fresh condition. Their
painstaking attention to detail will ensure
the Cheyenne is depicted as closely as
possible to its original configuration and
paint scheme.
Not a total loss
Despite being viewed by some as a
failure, the Cheyenne actually succeeded
in many ways, contributing much of its
advanced technology and “lessons
learned” to today’s breed of attack helicopters. It was the first military helicopter to be designed as an integrated
weapons system, a trend becoming more
common in several of the world’s current
and emerging attack helicopters. It was
also the first to employ an integral night
vision system and, had the Cheyenne
entered production, it would have been
the first to be fitted with a Cathode Ray
Tube, or CRT display, in the
cockpit–both standard items found in virtually all of today’s combat helicopters.
The Cheyenne’s advanced helmet
sighting system was the precursor to the
Integrated Helmet and Display Sight
System, or IHADSS, found in the
Apache, using infrared detectors versus a
mechanical linkage system like the one
used in later models of the AH-1. A similar system can now be found in the
Agusta A-109 Mangusta and in the
Eurocopter Tiger, two of Europe’s most
advanced attack helicopters.
Even variations of the rigid (or hingeless) rotor managed to find their way
onto several of today’s helicopters, such
as the Westland Lynx, the Eurocopter
Dauphin, and the MBB BO-105. In
terms of performance, the Cheyenne
would have rivaled even the mighty
Apache in overall agility, and it would
have outperformed the Apache altogether
in maximum speed and acceleration. In
the end, the AH-56A Cheyenne was simply ahead of its time–a true warrior, born
for battle, that never got the chance to
prove itself in combat.
Editor’s Note: Ray Robb served in the United
States Air Force for ten years. He now works as
a contractor at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
in Dayton, Ohio, and is an avid aviation enthusiast, photographer, and historian. He is currently
working on a book about the AH-56A Cheyenne
.END
19
Hurricane Ivan Rages Through the Gulf of Mexico
By Dana Raaz
Friday, September 10th
The scheduled hitch I work started routinely enough, at 5:00 a.m., at PHI’s base
in Morgan City, Louisiana. Hurricane
Ivan has skirted south of The Dominican
Republic and Haiti and brushed Jamaica
as it continues its destructive march
through the Caribbean. Forecasts call for
the category 5 storm to turn North, cross
the western end of Cuba and take aim on
South Florida, but so far it has maintained a westerly course. The offshore
oil companies and their helicopter operators keep careful watch but continue to
move workers in and out on a “business
as usual” basis.
bring in trucks to start evacuating everything that isn’t welded down.
Monday, September 13th
Saturday, September 11th
Ivan continues to track to the westnorthwest. The storm brushes the western tip of Cuba and moves into the
Yucatan Channel. PHI sends extra helicopters and crews to their bases from
Morgan City to Boothville as the oil
companies make the decision to start
bringing non-essential personnel in from
their rigs and platforms in the eastern
Gulf. Phase I of the Hurricane
Evacuation Plan goes into effect.
Sunday, September 12th
Ivan continues to track west-northwest.
The oil companies elect to begin a fullscale evacuation of the eastern Gulf.
Starting before dawn every helicopter is
pressed into service. Scattered rain
showers begin to fall on the deep-water
facilities (150 – 180 nm offshore). Most
crews will fly 8 hours plus during the
day. Some will time out at 10 hours.
Phase II goes into effect. Offshore-based
helicopters secure their support equipment and prepare to relocate to the nearest shore base. The shore bases start
securing their support equipment and
20
Ivan is now moving Northwest and
forecasts call for landfall late Wednesday
somewhere between New Orleans and
Panama City. Lines of rain squalls move
through the eastern Gulf as the evacuation continues unabated. Late Monday
afternoon the remaining platforms are
shut-in and secured. The last flights in
bring the skeleton crews off the refueling
platforms, which are the last to be abandoned. Drill ships, derrick barges and
some semi-submersible drilling rigs are
steaming west under tow or under their
own power. Those that can’t be moved
are anchored in place, secured and the
crews evacuated.
Tuesday, September 14th
Phase III is in effect. All shore bases
from Morgan City eastward are secured.
The fuel systems are shut in and the
power is turned off. The helicopters are
flown inland and westward to get them
out of harm’s way. Helicopters stand by
to fly the flight crews back to their shore
bases so they can get their automobiles,
but many elect to stay with the helicopters. The highways are choked with
Photography: From Tom Workman’s 2004 Safety Conference Powerpoint Presentation
evacuees and in many places traffic is at
a standstill. Anxious pilots and mechanics check in with their families to confirm they have taken all the necessary
precautions and those that live in the
New Orleans to Florida Panhandle area
are evacuating inland.
Wednesday, September 15th
Ivan is now moving due North. The
eye is large and clearly defined.
Sustained winds are ‘down’ to 140 mph
which makes it a strong category 4 storm.
Throughout the day contingency plans
are discussed and briefings are held in
case the storm should take an unexpected
turn to the west and it should become
necessary to move the helicopters again.
Thursday, September16th
It’s 3:00 a.m. local time. Ivan slams
ashore between Mobile Bay and
Escambia Bay. Pensacola, which is on
the eastern side of the eye, is subjected to
the highest winds.
Later in the day, ground crews drive
back to the shore bases as soon as the
roads are passable and get the power and
the fuel systems back in operation. Some
bases can’t be reached for another 24
hours. By 8:00 AM Morgan City base
www.autorotate.com
advises they are open for business and
the helicopters fly back to stand by for
instructions from their customers. Few
customer flights will be made on
Thursday as it takes a while for the offshore crews to drive back to the bases.
Some flights are dispatched to survey
the rigs and platforms to make sure they
are safe to return to. The reports brought
back by these flights are not good. The
damage suffered by the structures south
and east of the mouth of the Mississippi
River is extensive. A couple of semi-submersible drilling rigs have broken free
and are no longer on location. Fixedwing aircraft are sent out to start searching for them. One is found floating 75
miles northeast of its original position.
Pipelines on the ocean floor have broken and oil and gas is bubbling to the
surface in a number of areas. Drilling
rigs have toppled over. Dozens of platforms sustain significant damage. Seven
platforms are reported to be completely
destroyed. One of the pilots gets on the
web and pulls up the data from a NOAA
weather buoy 65 miles south of Dauphin
Island. There is a four-hour gap in its
reports. When the wave height hit 52
feet the buoy shut down. When it came
back on the air, four hours later, the
waves were 48 feet high.
so well. From Gulf Shores, Alabama to
Pensacola, Florida, hundreds of homes
are destroyed, thousands are severely
damaged. Twenty lives are lost.
Sections of Interstate 10 that cross
Escambia Bay have been blown off the
pilings and lay at the bottom of the bay.
Recovery will take months, reconstruction may take years.
As a final note, many of the pilots who
stayed on the job until all the offshore
workers were safely back at work,
returned home to find their own property
damaged by Ivan.
Tell us who you are in
Autorotate’s Member
Profile
Autorotate would like to profile
YOU in one of our next issues. All
Editor’s Note: I’m sure that I echo the
thoughts of all PHPA pilots when we extend our
appreciation, admiration and thanks to Dana
and all the pilots in the Gulf who performed
their missions with professionalism, skill and
sacrifice to get this necessary work done. You
may contact Dana Raaz at
DanaRaaz@cox-internet.com
END
we need is a good photograph of
you and your helicopter; your
name, e-mail address, and PHPA
member ID; and a brief write up
about you, your location, and your
photo. Send the information via
e-mail to Tony Fonze, the editor at
TonyFonze@autorotate.org.
Employment, Business Ads, Flight Schools,
Sales, Classifieds, Reference, Free Stuff,
The FORUM and more...
Over the next two days every aircraft
available is manned and flying. Many of
the Schedule II pilots who live in Florida
and Alabama are unable to get to work
and a number of Schedule I pilots are
asked to stay over and assist with the
operation.
Once again, the Gulf has been successfully evacuated. Thousands of offshore
workers have been brought in and later
returned to their workplace without incident, thanks to the hard work and dedication of the professional helicopter pilots
who support the offshore oil and gas
industry. Onshore, some have not faired
21
A. 80 kias
b. Provides hands off flight for specified vertical and lateral paths.
C. 100 kias
c. Provide visual guidance to the pilot to fly
specific selected lateral and vertical
modes of operation via cues imposed over
the attitude indicator.
d. Impart some stability or control capability
not typically found in the VFR configuration.
e. Short term rate damping control inputs to
increase helicopter stability.
f. Provide a cyclic centering effect.
2. The AIM contains a comprehensive
section for off-shore operations in
the Gulf of Mexico.
7. Helicopters flying GPS Copter
SIAPs must limit their airspeed on
final and missed approach segments to
A. 70 kias
B. 80 kias
C. 90 kias
8. The reason that final and missed
approach segment speed limitations have been defined for
Copter GPS SIAPs (see question 7)
is
A. Safe operations if the GPS loses RAIM
A. True
B. Aircraft stability
B. False
C. Obstruction clearance concerns
3. Relief from the prohibition to takeoff with any inoperative instruments or equipment may be provided through
9. When a helicopter is executing a
Point-in-Space (PinS) approach
procedure there is usually a visual
segment between the MAP and
the landing area. If the landing
area is 10,500 feet or less from
the MAP the pilot is required to
A. FAR 135, Subpart I
B. A MEL
C. The operators local FSDO
4. Helicopters are capable of flying
any published 14 CFR Part 97
Standard Instrument Approach
Procedures (SIAPs), for which they
are properly equipped (subject to
some limitations). In other words,
helicopters are entitled to fly all of
the approaches airplanes are entitled to fly (see caveats).
A. Acquire and maintain visual contact with
the landing site at or prior to MAP;
Maintain the published minimum visibility
throughout the visual segment; Advise
ATC whether proceeding visually and
canceling IFR or complying with the MAP
instructions
B. Maintain VFR weather minimums throughout the visual segment (as required by the
class of airspace)
A. True
C. Execute a contact approach
B. False
10. Military aircraft flying GPS
Copter SIAPs are limited to
5. Helicopters flying conventional
(non-copter) SIAPs may reduce the
visibility minima to not less than
22
B. 90 kias
A. The same speed limitations used for civilian helicopters
Answers
a. Returns helicopter to a selected attitude
after a disturbance.
1. A—d, B—e, C—f, D—c, E—a, F—b (AIM 10-1-1, b)
F. Autopilot Systems (APS)
6. The maximum airspeed for helicopters flying Copter SIAPs on
any segment of the approach or
missed approach is
5. C (AIM 10-1-2-a-1)
E. Attitude Retention Systems (ATTs)
3. B (AIM 10-1-1-i)
D. Flight Directors (FDs)
Editor’s Note: I sometimes struggle with
defining my audience for ‘Test Pilot’. If I make
it for newer pilots, then some of the more experienced pilots may get bored. If I consistently
make it for experienced IFR pilots, than the
newer folks may not relate. Here’s my advice. If
it’s easy for you, then congratulations, you knew
the subject matter well and you should feel good
about it. If it covers areas you don’t know, or
didn’t even know existed, then congratulations,
you now know that there are still new things to
learn and that you shouldn’t get bored any time
soon. If any of you would like to contribute a
test pilot in any format, please feel free to do so.
Send it to TonyFonze@autorotate.org.
Have fun!
2. A (AIM 10-2-1)
C. Trim Systems
C. 1/2 the published Cat A visibility minima,
or 1/4 sm visibility/1200 RVR, whichever
is greater
C. 90 kias throughout the procedure
4. A (AIM 10-1-2-a)
B. Stability Augmentation Systems (SAS)
B. 1/2 the published Cat A visibility minima,
is less
B. No speed restrictions
6. B (AIM 10-1-2-a-2) 7. A (AIM 10-1-2-a-3)
A. Aerodynamic surfaces
A. 1/2 the published Cat A visibility minima,
is greater
8. C (AIM 10-1-2-a-3) 9. A (AIM 10-1-3)
1. There are multiple types of recognized stabilization and Automatic
Flight Control Systems. Match the
name of the system with its
description:
(This month’s questions were derived from the AIM, Chapter 10, Helicopter Operations)
10. C (AIM 10-1-1/Table)
Test pilot
Old City Helicopters, LLC
• R44 Dual Instruction • R44 Transitions
• R44 SFAR Endorsements • R44 Time Building
Old City Helicopters, LLC offers
helicopter tours over the city of
St. Augustine, its beaches and
surrounding areas.
Take a smooth comfortable ride
over the beaches and enjoy a
birds eye view of the city and
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St. Augustine Airpor t
4900 US 1 Nor th, Suite 400 • St. Augustine, FL 32095
904-824-5506
www.OldCityHelicopter s.com
fly@OldCityHelicopter s.com

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