ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

Transcription

ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

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FACULTY OF HISTORY
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ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA
AND BALTIC COUNTRIES
VOLUME LXXV – YEAR 2010
BOOK 2
ON THE 600TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD
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A l v y d a s N i k ž e n t a i t i s , Ž i v i l ė M i k a i l i e n ė : Lithuanian Žalgiris,
Polish Grunwald: two national toposes in the context of comparative analysis.
S o b i e s ł a w S z y b k o w s k i : Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich
von Jungingen of 28 October 1409. From the research on pro-Teutonic orientation
among Dobrzyń Land’s noblemen in the war period of 1409–1411. K r z y s z t o f
K w i a t k o w s k i : The first impressions in Prussia after the defeat of the Teutonic
Order in the battle of Grunwald. A d a m S z w e d a : Remarks about the armistice
and peace documents from the war period of 1409–1411. S ł a w o m i r J ó ź w i a k :
Teutonic enemy prisoners in the battle of Koronowo. D a r i u s z K . C h o j e c k i :
Two cities, two different worlds. Social-spatial diversification of infant mortality in
Szczecin in the years 1876–1913 (part II). M i c h a ł P s z c z ó ł k o w s k i : From the
history of the construction of Toruń’s university campus 1967–1973.
TORUŃ 2012
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FACULTY OF HISTORY
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ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA
AND BALTIC COUNTRIES
PUBLISHED SINCE 1908
(TO 1955 AS ZAPISKI TOWARZYSTWA NAUKOWEGO W TORUNIU)
VOLUME LXXV – YEAR 2010
BOOK 2
TORUŃ 2012
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EDITORIAL COUNCIL OF THE JOURNAL ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
Head of the Council: Mieczysław Wojciechowski
Members: Karola Ciesielska, Jerzy Dygdała, Karin Friedrich, Rolf Hammel-Kiesow,
Grzegorz Jasiński, Edmund Kizik, Janusz Małłek, Ilgvars Misāns, Michael G. Müller,
Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Stanisław Salmonowicz, Jürgen Sarnowsky, Jacek Staszewski,
Janusz Tandecki, Kazimierz Wajda, Edward Włodarczyk, Mieczysław Wojciechowski
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE OF ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE
Editor: Bogusław Dybaś, Deputy editor: Roman Czaja
Piotr Oliński (editor of the electronic version)
Members: Mirosław Golon, Tomasz Kempa, Przemysław Olstowski,
Magdalena Niedzielska, Mariusz Wołos
Editorial secretaries: Paweł A. Jeziorski, Katarzyna Minczykowska
Translation
Agnieszka Chabros, Edward Maliszewski
Editing and revision
Aneta Dąbrowska-Korzus
Typesetting and formatting
Włodzimierz Dąbrowski
Address of the editorial office
Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu
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www.tnt.torun.pl/zapiski
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Guidelines for authors are to be found on the website
and in each BOOK 1 of the journal
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Edition of the publication partially funded by
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ISSN 0044-1791
TORUŃ SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY
CONTENTS
O n t h e 6 0 0 th A n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e B a t t l e o f G r u n w a l d
Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Živilė Mikailienė, Lithuanian Žalgiris, Polish Grunwald: two national toposes in the context of comparative analysis .................................................
Sobiesław Szybkowski, Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen of 28 October 1409. From the research on pro-Teutonic orientation among
Dobrzyń Land’s noblemen in the war period of 1409–1411 .....................................
Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, The first impressions in Prussia after the defeat of the Teutonic
Order in the battle of Grunwald ...................................................................................
Adam Szweda, Remarks about the armistice and peace documents from the war period of 1409–1411 ...........................................................................................................
Sławomir Jóźwiak, Teutonic enemy prisoners in the battle of Koronowo .......................
5
17
35
51
69
Articles
Dariusz K. Chojecki, Two cities, two different worlds. Social-spatial diversification of
infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1876–1913 (part II) ................................... 83
Michał Pszczółkowski, From the history of the construction of Toruń’s university campus 1967–1973 ................................................................................................................. 145
ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
ALVYDAS NIKŻENTATIS (Vilnius), ŽIVILE MIKAILIENE (Vilnius)
LITHUANIAN ŽALGIRIS, POLISH GRUNWALD:
TWO NATIONAL TOPOI
IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Key words: national myth; culture of memory, culture of remembering
There have appeared many studies concerning the historical importance of
Žalgiris/Grunwald. The issue, irrespective of debates about – for example – the site
of the battle1, has received sufficient attention in Polish, German and Lithuanian
historiography.2 However, not much has been said in respect to the comparative
analysis of the problems connected with memory of the event. So far there has
been research into the memory of the battle in individual countries3, but the reception of the event in Poland and Germany4 has not been given enough attention.
*
The first edition of the article was published in Polish in Zapiski Historyczne, 2010: 75, z. 2,
p. 7–21.
1
S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1: Einführung und Quellenlage, Berlin 1982, pp. 354–357.
2
In the bibliography about the battle of Grunwald Publisher in 1990 there were 1662 books and
articles recorded, see: H. Baranowski, I. Czarciński, Bibliografia bitwy pod Grunwaldem i jej tradycja,
Toruń 1990.
3
There are many publications concerning the subject. Thus we shall reduce their number to
the most recent ones: F. B. Schenk, Tannenberg/Grunwald, [in:] Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, hrsg.
v. E. Francois, H. Schulze, Munchen 2001, pp. 438–454; S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg – Grunwald – Žalgiris:
eine mittelalterliche Schlacht im Spiegel deutscher, polnischer und litauischer Denkmaler, Zeitschrift
für Geschichtswissenschaft, Bd. 50: 2002, pp. 103–118; A. Nikžentaitis, Zur Bedeutung und Funktionsweise eines litauischen Nationalmythos, [in:] Mare Balticum. Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte,
Kultur an der Ostsee, hrsg. v. D. Albrecht, M. Thoemmes, Munchen 2005, pp. 98–109; R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion eines nationalen Mythos, [in:] ibid., pp. 110–132; idem, Konstruowanie pamięci. Analiza semantycznapolskich obchodów rocznic grunwaldzkich, [in:] idem, Historia – przestrzeń dialogu, Warszawa 2006, pp. 206–227; R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, Die drei Namen
der Schlacht. Erinnerungsketten um Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris, [in:] Verflochtene Erinnerungen.
Polen und seine Nachbarn im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. v. M. Aust, K. Ruchniewicz, S. Troebst,
Koln–Weimar–Wien 2009, pp. 119–136.
4
S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg/Grunwald – ein politisches Symbol in Deutschland und Polen, Journal of
Baltic Studies, vol. 22: 1991, Nr. 4, pp. 271–324; F. B. Schenk, op.cit.
6
Alvydas Nikżentatis, Živile Mikailiene
In the last few decades the importance of the battle of Grunwald has not been
considered in the context of researching the memory. This article attempts to fill in
this gap at least partly.
If we tried to answer the question concerning the significance of the battle of
Grunwald in the face of its 600th anniversary, we could ascertain the major role of
this event, which can be proved not only by celebrations taking place in Poland
and Lithuania5, the aim of which is to commemorate the event, but also by conferences organized in various countries. The name Žalgiris/Grunwald appears in
other contexts, for example as the name of a street or a sport venue. Irrespective
of the popularity of the name, the significance of Žalgiris/Grunwald in the culture
of memory of Lithuania and Poland has not been defined. Having taken into account that the event has been present in the history of Lithuania and Poland for
hundreds of years, it should be examined historically, with special emphasis given
to the representations of the event in periods of nationalism.
1. IMAGES OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD IN LITHUANIAN SOCIETY
Considering the role of the battle of Grunwald in social consciousness, five
periods may be distinguished:
1) the memory of the battle of Grunwald in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
started to develop soon after the battle; it took its final forms in the mid-16th century;
2) the image of the battle of Grunwald changed in the second half of the 16th
century, and survived until the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century;
3) in the 20th century the narration about Grunwald changed three times: in
Lithuania Grunwald was perceived differently in the inter-war period, in the Soviet period and after 1990.
We refer to the memory of the battle of Grunwald in the pre-nationalist period
only because it was then that all interpretations of the battle used in the period of
nationalism were created. The Lithuanians came back to the subject of Grunwald
wanting to emphasize their difference from Poles (in the 16th century and in the
first half of the 20th century), wanting to be closer to Poles (from the end of the 16th
century to the beginning of the era of nationalism and after 1990), and only once
– in the Soviet Lithuania – the subject of the battle was used as a weapon against
Western imperialists. Thus in all cases the discourse was connected with the problem of Lithuanian identity. In the first half of the 16th century, while the Lithuanian
nation was being politically created, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania there was a
tendency to underline the fact that Lithuanians were different from Poles. It was
then that the story about the brave duke Vytautas and his courageous Lithuanians
who defeated the Teutonic Order was created. The image of the grand leader was
5
See the programme of both parties: http://grunwald600.pl/.
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Lithuanian Žalgiris, Polish Grunwald: two national topoi...
juxtaposed with the figure of pious Wladislaw Jagiello and the indecisive Poles
who watched Lithuanians defeating the enemy.6
In the 17th century, Lithuanians knew the account of Jan Długosz according
to which the Lithuanians escaped from the site of the battle of Grunwald. The response to the allegations of the chronicler came very quickly: the Lithuanians had
not escaped as their retreat was a tactical manoeuvre.7
At the beginning of the 20th century the story of Grunwald reappeared. Although, given the gradual formation of the interpretation concerning Grunwald,
it is hard to speak about any continuation of the tradition from previous centuries, it can be stated that the arguments remained the same. The desire to separate
from Poland on the one hand, and the joint military actions of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland on the other hand influenced the fact
that in the first historical studies in Lithuania at the beginning of the 20th century
there appeared very few records about the battle. Poland’s intentions concerning
the future ensured that the subject was treated very cautiously. As could be seen
at the ceremony of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald in Cracow in 1910,
the revival of the past attempted to create the future. At the beginning of the 20th
century Poles wanted to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish
plans ensured that the Lithuanian delegation did not appear in Cracow in 1910.
The Lithuanians sent there only observers.8
In the 1920s and 1930 the attitude of Lithuanians towards the battle did not
change: it was moderate. The argument about the tactical manoeuvre of Lithuanians during the battle was underlined and presented as the major factor affecting
the result of the battle. However, Grunwald did not achieve the status of an independent historical theme in the culture of memory of the Lithuanians. It was only
talked about as a brave deed of the grand Lithuanian duke Vytautas.9 This circumspection was also the result of the cautious policy towards Germany. It was only
in 1935, when there took place a serious crisis between Lithuania and Germany
due to the conflict regarding the Klaipėda Region, that the president of Vytautas
Magnus University in Kaunas Michał Römer made a public speech in which he
mentioned the second Lithuanian-Polish Grunwald against Germany.10
The official attitude of Lithuania towards the battle is shown by an event which
took place in Prague. The military attaché of Lithuania while presenting credentials gave the president of Czecho-Slovakia a copy of the picture “The Battle of
Grunwald” by Jan Matejko, stressing that “the picture of the famous Czech painter
6
See Полное Собрание Русских Летописей, т. 32, Москва 1975, s. 151.
See Albert Wiiuk Koialowicz, Historia Litvaniae, vol. 2, Antverpiae 1669, p. 86 n.
8
R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, op.cit., p. 123.
9
Comp. K. Binkis, Kaip Vytautas Didysis sutriuškino kryžiuočių galybę [How Vytautas the Great
defeated the Teutonic Order], Kaunas 1930.
10
Comp. Vairas, 1935, Nr. 4, p. 508
7
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is given to commemorate the Lithuanian-Czech victory over the common enemy11 [bold type – A.N., Ž.M.]”.
As has been mentioned above, the discourse about the battle of Grunwald was
often used to bring Lithuanians and Poles closer together. The first time when the
event was mentioned in this context was in 1564 at the Seym in Warsaw and led
to the first public discussion about the battle. The Lithuanians mentioned the joint
campaigns of Lithuania and Poland in the past, including also the battle of Grunwald (“Mutual help took place sometimes, the evidence of which is the old Polish
anthem about the Prussian defeat [this is how the battle was referred to at that time
– A.N., Ž.M.], where our Ancestors went forward and shed their blood: go away
Poland because Lithuania has no gain”); the Cracow bishop reacted to it by recalling the Lithuanian escape from the battlefield as described by Jan Długosz and his
successors (“Lithuania had no gain because it had escaped”).12 Nonetheless, the
controversies concerning the past did not prevent both countries from signing the
Union of Lublin five years later.
The situation from 1564 was repeated at the end of the 20th century. Despite
the fact that the common memory of the battle of Grunwald was not given as
much attention as in the 16th century, the meeting of the presidents of Poland and
Lithuania took place at the Battlefield of Grunwald on 15 July 2000. In the context
of the desire to integrate with the European Union and NATO it was underlined
that the battle was a good example of “strengthening security, stabilization and
welfare in Europe”.13
The problem of Grunwald was used on a large scale in Soviet ideology. Prior to
the outbreak of WWII, Joseph Stalin referred to themes connected with the past,
exploited heavily during the war. In 1939 there appeared the first publication about
Grunwald14 in the Soviet Union. However, the topic was exploited on a larger scale
by activists from the Lithuanian SSR who remained in the Soviet Union. In the
inter-war period Soviet partisan units in Lithuania were given the names of medieval heroes, including ones from Grunwald.15 It must be noted that very soon, the
Lithuanians followed the example and named one of their units Grunwald.
The Soviet Union referred to the past in a short period of time – more or less
from 1947 to 1948. Later until the end of the 1950s both in the USSR and the LSSR,
unlike in Poland, medieval history was not used to justify the contemporary reality.
Later, the only time when the past was exploited was during the rule of Nikita
Khrushchev. The reference to the past used to strengthen policy consisted in seek11
L. Švec, Československo a pobaltske staty v letech 1918–1939. Vyvoj politickych a hospodařskych
vztahů Československa s Litvou, Latyšskem a Estonskem v mezivalečnem obdobi, Praha 2001, p. 300.
12
A. T. Działyński, Źródłopisma do Dziejów Unii Kor. Polskiej i W. X. Litewskiego, vol. 2, part
1,Poznań 1861, p. 299 nn.
13
See http://adamkus.president.lt/one.phtml?id=1428.
14
See R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, op.cit., p. 127.
15
Lietuviška tarybinė enciklopedija [The Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopedia], Vilnius 1984, vol.
12,p. 467.
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ing themes common for both the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.
The fight against West European imperialism was given much attention, the evidence of which were celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald in
Poland and the attention it received from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
On the borders of the USSR – in the Lithuanian SSSR – the anniversary of
the battle of Grunwald was celebrated with the same anti-imperialist focus. It was
best described in post-war Lithuania by one of the most outstanding historians
of the Middle Ages: “The history of Grunwald teaches us that we should observe
closely the military plans of western imperialists. American militarists feed the
Bundeswehr and supply it with weapons, but the fascist animal will not manage to
get out of its hole, because it will be immediately killed”.16 Putting aside the similar
degree of loftiness appearing in Moscow, Warsaw and Vilnius, the celebrations
of the 500th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald were much more modest in
Lithuania than in other places. Apart from a few occasional speeches, one of them
being given by a worker of the “Žalgiris”17 factory, the organizers limited themselves to placing a commemorative stone on Gediminas Hill [Pilies Kalnas] with
the inscription “the monument to commemorate the Battle of Grunwald shall be
built here”. It must be noted that the motif of the celebrations matched the general
context of the Lithuanian fight against the Teutonic Order. In the evening of 15
July, the opera of Vytautas Klova Pilienai was performed. It was a story which even
in the inter-war period was a symbol of the fight of Lithuanian soldiers against the
German knights.18 The modesty of the anniversary celebrations is understandable.
In 1960 a fear of referring to national history was still significant and was propagated by Moscow. The Lithuanian authorities understood very well how dangerous
history could be, even if in the official propaganda it was interpreted “from the
correct point of view”.
The anniversary of 1960 was an impulse to revise the Soviet historiography, on
the basis of which the new Soviet ideology was to be created. It is obvious that the
creators of the new ideology did not care much about the battle of Grunwald itself.
The most important thing was to explain the division of the world into two parts.
The representatives of the whole Soviet bloc did not have to worry for historical
reasons as the new ideologists predicted how the historical causes of the division
of the world into two camps should be properly presented. According to the newly
created historical conception, the states belonging to the Soviet camp should be
shown as historical allies. In other words, the ideological model of the USSR in the
centre of which there was the “brotherly Russian nation” was transferred to other
16
Comp. Sovetskaja Litva of 15 July 1960.
Vienybė – tautų jėga. Vilniuje atidengtas paminklinis akmuo pergalės prie Žalgirio 550 – mečio
proga [Unity – the power of nations. In Vilnius the commemorative stone was revealed dedicated to
the 550th anniversary of the victory in the battle of Grunwald]], Tiesa, Nr. 166 of 16 July 1960.
18
Comp. D. Baronas, Pilėnai ir Margiris: faktai ir fikcijos [Pilėnai and Margiris: facts and fiction],
[in:] Istorijos šaltinių tyrimai [Research of historical sources], kn. 1, Vilnius 2008, p. 27–63.
17
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countries of the socialist camp. Such a model could be carried quite effectively.
In case of Lithuania, one of the basic aims of the new ideology was to conciliate
Lithuania and Poland.
The theme of Grunwald was particularly useful in this context, for apart from
the Lithuanians and Poles, three Smolensk regiments included in the army of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania fought against the Teutonic Order. In this situation,
Długosz’s tradition of the battle of Grunwald according to which the Smolensk
regiments played a crucial role in the fights suited Soviet ideologists. Ignoring the
national identity of the Smolensk soldiers, ideologists called them Russians in the
sense of a modern nation and showed their actions as brotherly help to Poles and
Lithuanians.19 It is understandable that the element was heavily exploited for ideological purposes.
It must be stressed that the story was used by the leader of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev20, whose speech was a signal for the
ideologists of Soviet Lithuania that the battle of Grunwald should be mentioned
and that Lithuanian-Polish relations should be revised. To achieve this aim a short
work titled Draugystės santykių raida tarp lietuvių ir lenkų tautų [The development of friendly relations between the Lithuanian and Polish nations] was written
by Juozas Žiugžda. The title of the work and its author – the head of the Institute
of History of the Academy of Sciences in the Lithuanian SSR, one of the most
important ideologists of the Soviet historical policy in Lithuania – leave no doubt
that the appearance of the publication was to mark the beginning of new processes in Lithuanian historical science which was to entail the thorough analysis of
Lithuanian-Polish relations. Nevertheless, the book by Juozas Žiugžda was published only in Polish and was never translated into Lithuanian.
It is not clear why the action was started and then interrupted. On the other
hand, the reasons for the failure of the action are quite obvious. Ideologists attempted to combine two things which could not be combined: Lithuanians were
to be befriended by both Russians and Poles at the same time. The history of the
battle of Grunwald, if properly interpreted, could be used to justify such a combination. However, the whole history of the 20th century, most of all the question of
Vilnius, could become a serious obstacle in the creation of the image of the Poles
as historical friends of the Lithuanians. The Poles could not be at the same time
brothers of the Lithuanians and invaders of the Vilnius region. How should the Soviet campaigns of 1939 be explained? Thus, the question of Vilnius not only in the
first half of the 20th century, but also in the years of the Soviet rule did not facilitate
the most important ideological aims.
The unsuccessful attempt to create an ideology based on the common past
of the countries of the Warsaw Pact affected the history of the Lithuanian USSR.
19
See История Литовской ССР, T. 1, Vilnius 1953, p. 163 n.
See J. Žiugžda, Rozwój stosunków przyjaźni między narodami litewskim i polskim, Vilnius 1962,
s. 17 n.
20
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After 1960 the name “Žalgiris” was legitimized in the new context of Soviet life.
In 1962 this name was given to the Vilnius football team (before it bore the name
“Dynamo” and “Spartak”). Using Žalgiris to name a sports team was the most important factor to impart a strong emotional charge. In other words, sport had won
in the face of history. In the period of sovietization it was sport that paradoxically
helped to maintain and strengthen the national identity.21
It must be stressed that the name “Žalgiris” also appeared in literature. The
list includes a poem by Liudas Gira Žalgirio Lietuva [Lithuania of Grunwald]
published in Moscow, and a poem by Teofilis Tilvytis Žalgirio broliai [Brothers
of Grunwald] (1960).22 In 1965 as part of the celebration of the 555th anniversary
of the battle of Grunwald, the opera by Vytautas Klova Žalgiris was staged at the
Theatre of Opera and Ballet ( within a repertoire under a more neutral title Du
kalavijai [Two swords]. In 1981 a poem by Sigitas Geda Žalgiris (written from
1968 and corrected many times) was published. It must stressed that it was during
the Soviet period that the theme of Grunwald was emphasized. The myth of Grunwald23 was created at that time.
2. IMAGES OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD IN POLISH SOCIETY
The tradition of Grunwald in Poland, like in Lithuania, is deeply rooted. The
research shows that, unlike in Lithuania, the battle began to be exploited politically and was integrated into the culture of memory of Poland at the end of the 18th
century.24 It was after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that
Germany joined the list of Poland’s enemies. Besides, while planning the rebirth of
the Polish state, one had to remember about its lost lands.
The theme of Grunwald became particularly popular in Polish society in the
19th century when it was reflected in literature and art including the novels of Henryk Sienkiewicz and Jan Matejko’s historical picture “The Battle of Grunwald”,
which popularized the visual version of the event.25
The subject of Grunwald in Poland, like in Lithuania, underwent a few different stages. The historical topos of Grunwald had never lost its importance to Polish
society despite the fact that at times interest in the subject declined temporarily.
In the last century the battle of Grunwald was twice considered to be a particularly important event, which in both cases was connected with the need to create a
21
I. Butautas, Rasa Čepaitienė. „Mus vienija alus ir pergalės“? arba sportas ir lietuviškoji tapatybė
[We share beer or sport? Or sport and the Lithuanian identity], Lietuvos istorijos studijos, vol. 17:
2006, p. 101.
22
Tiesa, Nr. 165 of 15 July1960.
23
A similar situation took place in case of uprisings in the 19th century. After the transformation in the Soviet period they became the Lithuanian heritage, see D. Staliūnas, Savas ar svetimas
paveldas? 1863–1864 m. sukilimas kaip lietuvių atminties vieta, Vilnius 2008.
24
S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg/Grunwald – ein politisches Symbol, p. 276 nn.
25
J. Zdrada, Krakow – Grunwald 1910, [in:] Grunwald, „Rota”, Nowowiejski, ed. J. Chłosta,
J. Jasiński, Z. Rondomański, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 12–18.
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new national identity. In both cases the content concerning the battle of Grunwald
was significantly modified.
At the beginning of the 20th century, before the rebirth of Poland, the main
emphasis was devoted to the victory over the Reich rather than over the Teutonic
Order. The unity of the Polish state understood as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was stressed. The bishop Władysław Bandurski devoted to this subject two
out of five elements of his sermon given at the main celebration of the anniversary
of the battle of Grunwald in 1910.26 It must be underlined that the ideas included
in the sermon were to be realized through the invitation of representatives of the
nations constituting the former Commonwealth – Lithuanians and Ukrainians,
who declined the invitation and refused to visit Cracow.
After WWII Grunwald again achieved the status of national myth. However, this time it was used to legitimize the “regained territories”27 and became the
cornerstone for the anti-imperialist ideology of the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
Moreover, there were some similarities in the way the idea of Grunwald was commemorated in Poland and Lithuania: the name of the battle was effectively popularized among Polish communists and anti-communists during the war and in the
first years after the war.28
Just like during the rebirth of Poland at the beginning of the 200th century, after
WWII the major role in commemorating the Grunwald myth was played by the
celebrations of the 550th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald. It must be noted
that both in Lithuania and Poland they were placed in a wider context. In the People’s Republic of Poland they were part of a well thought out plan: the programme
devoted to the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Polish State. One of its
main objectives was to “neutralize” the Church in Poland, which prepared for the
commemoration of the Millenium of the Baptism of Poland.29 The preparations
took a few years. Communist leaders in Poland wished to give the ceremonies
a powerful impetus.30 On 17 July 1960 in the Battlefield of Grunwald there took
place ceremonies attended by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the
Polish Workers’ Party Władysław Gomułka, other leaders, representatives from
abroad, official delegations from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. During
the ceremony a monument commemorating the battle of Grunwald was unveiled.
Supposedly, the ceremony was attended by about 200,000 Poles.
26
Comp. R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion eines nationalen Mythos, [in:]
Mare Balticum. Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte, Kultur an der Ostsee, hrsg. v. D. Albrecht,
M. Thoemmes,Munchen 2005, p. 114.
27
Comp. G. Strauchold, Myśl zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1957,
Toruń 2003.
28
Comp. R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, p. 115.
29
A. Streikus, Istorinės atminties sovietizavimo ypatybės Lietuvoje, [in:] http://www.bernardinai.
lt/straipsnis/2005-11-16-arunas-streikusistorines-atminties-sovietizavimo-ypatybes-lietuvoje/5678
30
A. Dudek, Grunwald During The Communist Era in Poland, [in:] http://grunwald600.pl/
en,d47,grunwald_during_the_communist_era_in_poland_antoni_dudek.html.
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Nevertheless, unlike in Lithuania, where the commemoration of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald was considered a sign of thaw, in Poland after 1960
the commemoration of the Grunwald anniversary were received with criticism.31
Looking at the year 1960 with some perspective it can be stated that Polish society
was becoming ready to reconcile with Germany. The evidence for this was the
famous reconciliatory address of Polish bishops to German bishops32 announced
five years later. However, the intentions included in the bishops’ letter were not
fully realized until 1990 at the Battlefield of Grunwald, where the former opposition could express their opinion about the national myth created by the communist authorities of Poland.33
During two other historical epochs: the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939)
and after 1989, the myth of Grunwald was replaced by other myths. In the interwar period the centre stone was occupied by the myth of Józef Piłsudski. Nowadays, since 2002, the Warsaw Uprising (1944) has constituted the major myth of
Poland.
In literature touching upon the significance of Grunwald in those important
historical periods, the memory of the event is frequently understated – it is reduced to the list of cases when the battle was mentioned publicly. Thus, one can
agree with the opinion that the memory of Grunwald was suitable in the description of the situation of the conflict between Germans and Poles in the inter-war
period.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to limit the memory of the event only to
this. It seems that the success of the myth of Józef Piłsudski in Poland as a Polish
national hero is connected with the incorporation of the memory of Grunwald
into the content of this myth. This concerns not only Grunwald.
After the rebirth of the Polish state, Poles were particularly susceptible to historical narrations concerning fights for freedom, in the centre of which were: the
Constitution of May 3, uprisings – particularly the Kościuszko Uprising, the victory of Jan III Sobieski near Vienna and others. The success of the myth and cult of
Józef Piłsudski in many cases depended on combining all stories into one person.
Such tendencies were visible for example in the performance staged in 1933 on
the day of Piłsudski’s birthday Żywe obrazy Polski od Bolesława Chrobrego do
Piłsudskiego [Vivid pictures of Poland from Bolesław Chrobry to Piłsudski] or in
the series of stamps devoted to national heroes, published in 1938.34 The literature
31
D. Stankus, Jaunųjų turistų paštas, Lietuvos filatelijos apžvalga, 2009 Spalis, No. 2, pp. 13–27
(http://www.phila.lt/assets/Uploads/Bulletin/2009/Lithuanian-Philately-Review-2-2009-October.
pdf).
32
Comp. Versohnung und Politik. Polnisch–deutsche Versohnungsinitiativen der 1960-er Jahre
und die Entspannungspolitik, hrsg. v. F. Boll, W. Wysocki, K. Ziemer, unter Mitarbeit v. T. Roth, Bonn
2009.
33
R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, p. 123.
34
Comp. H. Hein, Der Pilsudski – Kult und seine Bedeutung fur polnischen Staat 1926–1939,
Marburg 2002, p. 288.
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describing the memory of Grunwald frequently mentions the monument commemorating the battle unveiled in New York in 1939. However, in this context it
is forgotten to say that Marshall Piłsudski35 was immortalized in the monument as
well. The tradition of Grunwald after 1910 was replaced by the “idea of the Jagiellonians” – a political doctrine of Józef Piłsudski36, which has remained valid ever
since. It must be noted that such an attitude of the cult of Piłsudski to earlier national myths does not mean that Poland was unique. It is a general rule of national
myths, which are confirmed by presenting, for example, Otto von Bismarck as a
national hero with Martin Luther, or Adolf Hitler with Paul von Hindenburg.37 In
view of the previously mentioned facts it is not justified to say the Grunwald myth
has lost its significance.
In order to understand better the importance of the Grunwald myth in the history of Poland even today we must refer to theoretical studies devoted to national
myths and the culture of memory. Dieter Langewiesche in his research on national
myths in Western Europe drew attention to Belgium, where identity differences
between the Walloons and the Flemish are justified by a myth in the centre of
which are not only events from WWII, but also from the Middle Ages – referred to
as the second national myth affecting the identity of both groups in Belgium.
Such a co-existence of two myths allowed the author to call the myth connected with WWII a basic myth (Grundungsmythos), and the myth associated with
the history of the Middle Ages – a confirmation myth (Bestatigungsmythos).38 As
Aleida Assmann points out there exists a direct relationship between a myth and
memory, because the most important medium of collective or political memory
is a myth. A myth allows memory to be shaped in a more oriented way. The task
of a myth is to make a story or a picture more credible. Apart from the traditional
Greek definition of a myth there are other definitions:
a) myth as a falsification of history which should be shown by a historian;
b) myth may be interpreted as history perceived through the perspective of identity.
The aim of such a meaning of myth is to explain the contemporary reality
through the past perspective and to show some directions for the future. History
which is transformed into a myth is changed into social reality, which influences
decisions made in a definite time and place.39
35
Ibid., p. 327.
J. Serczyk, Die Wandlungen des Bildes vom Deutschen Orden als politischer, ideologischer und
gesellscha. licher Faktor im polnischen Identitatsbewustsein des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Ritterorden. Die Rezeption und die Wirklichkeit, hrsg. v. Z. H. Nowak,unter
Mitarbeit v. R. Czaja, Toruń 2001, s. 55–64.
37
See A. Nikžentaitis, Tautiniai mitai Lietuvoje ir Vidurio Europoje [in:] idem, Vytauto ir Jogailos
įvaizdis Lietuvos ir Lenkijos visuomenėse, Vilnius 2002, pp. 108–129.
38
Comp. D. Langewiesche, Unschuldige Mythen: Grundungsmythen und Nationsbildung in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, [in:] Kriegserfahrung und nationale Identitat in Europa nach 1945,
hrsg. v. K. von Linden, Paderborn 2009, pp. 27–41.
39
A. Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik,
Munchen 2006, pp. 40–41.
36
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In the case of the culture of memory it seems that we encounter a similar situation as described by D. Langewiesche. Here we must distinguish two types of
culture of memory: the memory dominating at present in a given country is called
the culture of memory, and the memory which earlier dominated and now is in the
background – the culture of remembering, as takes place in the Anglo-Saxon world
and in the German-speaking areas.40 Such a relationship between a myth and the
culture of memory may explain the importance of Grunwald in Poland and the
fact that after 1960 when it lost its political and ideological significance, it is still
regarded as one of the most important events in the history of Poland.41 It can be
stated that after 1960 Grunwald was gradually changing from one of the basic elements of the culture of memory into a component of the culture of remembering.
The end of this process overlapped with the collapse of communism.
3. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ŽALGIRIS AND GRUNWALD
Bearing in mind the fact that the narrations of Žalgiris and Grunwald differ
in content, they can be compared as national myths of Poles and Lithuanians and
as components of the culture of memory and the culture of remembering. In this
sense Žalgiris and Grunwald are alike, because they can be called myths. The difference is that in Poland Grunwald became a myth at the end of the 19th century
and at the beginning of the 20th century, while in Lithuania Žalgiris became more
important in the Soviet period. It must be stressed that both Žalgiris and Grunwald have a structure of a national topos. Žalgiris in Lithuania in the inter-war
period did not have an independent role, but it constituted one of the elements
of a myth; particularly after 1930 in the reborn Lithuanian Republic it was just an
element of the national myth of Vytautas the Great, the aim of which was to underline the military achievements of the leader. At the beginning of the 20th century,
Grunwald had features of an independent myth manifested in the Jagiellonians,
the symbol of whom was Władysław II Jagiełło. On the other hand, in Poland
the symbol of the myth itself could be an element of the national myth. It can
be noticed in the arrangement of the monument erected in Cracow in 1910. The
monument devoted to Jagiełło (the construction of a monument commemorating Grunwald could have been unwelcome for political reasons) was received as a
monument commemorating the 15th century battle. It seems that this case created
a precedence the evidence of which is the monument put up in New York in 1939
which commemorated the battle of Grunwald. Like in Cracow, the main element
was the figure of Jagiełło.
In the inter-war period Grunwald shared the fate of Žalgiris – it became one
of the elements of the myth of Józef Piłsudski. In the inter-war period Grunwald
40
M. Csaky, Die Mehrdeutigkeit von Gedachtnis und Erinnerung, [in:] http://www.vifaost.de/
texte-materialien/digitale-reihen/handbuch/handb-mehrdeutigk/.
41
R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion.
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was finally transformed into another idea of the Jagiellonians, which originally was
a doctrine justifying the political actions of Marshall Piłsudski, and now it is still
valid in Poland (with no direct associations with Piłsudski), the evidence of which
are debates about the directions of foreign policy.
During WWII and after the war Žalgiris and Grunwald shared the same fate:
the communists exploited it as a device to motivate society to fight against Nazi
Germany, and next to justify the political system in Europe after the war. However,
in using the myths of Žalgiris and Grunwald there gradually appeared differences
in content. In Poland, Grunwald quickly lost its communist edge and it became
one of the main elements of the myth of the regained lands.
In Lithuania in the Soviet period Žalgiris was an important component of the
narration about Lithuanian-Polish brotherhood. It must be noted that the project
named after Teofilis Tilvitis: “Broliai lietuviai ir rusai, ir lenkai,– / Ginklas baisiausias pamišėlio rankoj. / Žalgirio broli, akių nesudėk,– / Dieną ir naktį už laisvę
budėk!” [Brothers Lithuanians, Russians and Poles/ In the hand of a mad man
there is a terrible weapon/ Brother from Grunwald don’t close your eyes/ Watch
for freedom day and night] was never realized – in the Soviet period Poles and
Lithuanians did not become brothers.
It must be emphasized that the subject of Žalgiris and Grunwald was also exploited by the opposition, and in case of Lithuania by the semi-opposition, where
the topoi were given a different meaning. Here we can see clearly the influence of
the culture of remembering or earlier traditions of Grunwald and Žalgiris on the
societies of Poland and Lithuania. In this sense Žalgiris in Lithuania and Grunwald
in Poland are judged differently. However, they remain elements of the culture of
remembering of both societies.
Translated by: Agnieszka Chabros
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
SOBIESŁAW SZYBKOWSKI (Gdańsk)
WITNESSES OF THE PRIVILEGE
OF GRAND MASTER ULRICH VON JUNGINGEN OF 28 OCTOBER 1409.
FROM THE RESEARCH ON PROTEUTONIC ORIENTATION
AMONG DOBRZYŃ LAND’S NOBLEMEN
IN THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF 14091411*
Key words: Polish-Teutonic War 1409–1411; Dobrzyń land, Kulm law; local noble elite; genealogy; 15th century, district offices
The document of Ulrich von Jungingen prepared for the noblemen of Dobrzyń
on 28 October 1409 in Bobrowniki has been widely discussed in literature on the
topic. The document was first analyzed in 19601 by Marian Biskup having discovered it. A decade later Karol Górski dealt with the source, and his analysis has
been the most thorough study of the grand master’s privilege of 1409 conducted
so far2. Janusz Bieniak3 included very important remarks concerning the reasons
for the creation of the source in one of his works, while Beata Możejko discussed
it in her monograph about the Dobrzyń line of the Świnka family4. However, it
does not mean that the document should not undergo another broader analysis,
taking into account literature concerning Polish-Teutonic relations and the history
of Dobrzyń land at the end of the 14th and at the beginnin’g of the 15th centuries,
which has developed in the last forty years since Karol Górski’s study was published. Here we wish to refer only to the problem concerning the identification of
*
p. 23–46.
1
M. Biskup, Materiały do dziejów krzyżackiej okupacji w ziemi dobrzyńskiej na przełomie XIV
i XV wieku, Zapiski Historyczne, vol. 25: 1960, z. 2, p. 73–74 (the review of the document), p. 79–81
(the edition of the source).
2
K. Górski, O przywileju krzyżackim dla rycerstwa dobrzyńskiego z 1409 r., [in:] Europa–
–Słowiańszczyzna–Polska. Studia ku uczczeniu profesora Kazimierza Tymienieckiego, Poznań 1970,
p. 427–436; second edition with no changes in: idem, Studia z dziejów państwa krzyżackiego, Olsztyn
1986, p. 149–158; in this article we quote the latter edition.
3
J. Bieniak, Recepcja prawa chełmińskiego na Kujawach i ziemi dobrzyńskiej w średniowieczu,
[in:] Studia Culmensia historico-iuridica czyli księga pamiątkowa 750-lecia prawa chełmińskiego, red.
Z. Zdrojkowski, Toruń 1990, p. 222–223.
4
B. Możejko, Rod Świnków na pograniczu polsko-krzyżackim w średniowieczu, Gdańsk 1998,
p. 123–126, 142–144.
18
Sobiesław Szybkowski
the people who witnessed the privilege and reasons which led to the fact that in
the first stage of the conflict of 1409–1411 they supported the Teutonic Knights occupying Dobrzyń land. The problem of the witnesses’ identity has been addressed
in Polish literature on the topic5; nevertheless, the studies were disperate and it is
necessary to recapitulate the problem in one article.
Before we move on to the main point, let us introduce the source and the context of the creation of the privilege. Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen issued the
privilege on 28 October 1409 in Bobrowniki – in Dobrzyń land – the headquarters
of Teutonic voigts (bailiffs) in the years 1392–1405, which later became the headquarters of the royal starosts6. The territory remained under the authority of the
Teutonic Order from August 1409, when the Teutonic Knights invaded the area
during the first stage of the conflict between the Monastic State and the PolishLithuanian Union of 1409–14117. Karol Górski was incorrect in suggesting that
Ulrich issued the privilege during his war expedition as a result of which Dobrzyń
land fell under Teutonic authority8. However, it is highly probable that while the
grand master was staying in Bobrowniki at the end of October 1409, at least part of
Dobrzyń’s noblemen paid homage to him. The creation of the document was probably preceded by longer discussions among the highest Teutonic dignitaries. It is
conceivable that Dobrzyń’s szlachta noblemen who had decided to remain under
the authority of the Teutonic Order and to cooperate with it were also consulted,
which is confirmed by one sentence in the privilege saying that Dobrzyń’s szlachta
came to the grand master and asked him to confer the Kulm privilege on their
lands9. The privilege is considered to be one of the elements of Teutonic policy, the
aim of which was to unite at least some part of Dobrzyń land in the interest of the
Teutonic Order, which explains why the articles included in the privilege were exceptionally liberal10. It means that the Teutonic Knights hoped to keep the territory
despite the fact that they realized that they would have to return Dobrzyń land to
Poland in exchange for Żmudź [Samogitia] which had been invaded by the Lithu-
5
Comp. the works mentioned in the two previous footnotes.
J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie się terytorium ziemi dobrzyńskiej w średniowieczu, Zapiski Historyczne, vol. 51: 1986, z. 3, p. 24–25, 36–38; idem, Średniowiecze na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, cz. 2, [in:]
Z dziejów ziemi dobrzyńskiej, vol. 2, red. Z. Goźdź, Dobrzyń nad Wisłą 1998, p. 23
7
S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka Wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1987
(ed. 5), p. 133–134; M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z zakonem krzyżackim 1308–1521, Gdańsk 1993, p. 44;
S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim
w latach 1409–1411” (in print).
8
K. Górski, op.cit., p. 149.
9
M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 79.
10
K. Górski, op.cit., p. 154–155; M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 73–74. We are not going to discuss
whether Grand Master was going to keep his promises resulting from the privilege of 28 October
1409 (which was the main concern of K. Górski (op.cit., s. 154), as he died in the battle of Grunwald.
We focus on the fact that in the autumn of 1409 the grand master offered Dobrzyń’s landowners
favourable conditions concerning their lands within the Monastic State.
6
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Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen...
anians, as confirmed by the document issued by Ulrich11. The armistice accepted
by both parties of the conflict at the beginning of October 1409 stipulated an amicable settlement of the Polish-Lithuanian-Teutonic dispute, which was to be announced by the Czech king, also referred to as King of the Romans, Wenceslaus of
Luxembourg. The grand master could not have known about the settlement at the
end of October in the first year of the war12. Thus, it was possible that the military
conflict could end with the mutual agreement on the grounds of status quo ante
bellum. Ulrich wisely secured himself in case any circumstances should arise.
The document discussed here is not the original version, but – as established
by both M. Biskup and K. Górski – it is a copy which was to be sent to one of
the squires of Strzygi (domino de Stzrigen) in Dobrzyń land, who according to B.
Możejko may be identified with Adam Świnka of Strzygi and Zielona – one of the
witnesses of the privilege13. It seems that the copy made on the basis of the original
document of the grand master in his chancellery in Malbork never reached its
destination and remained where it was created and thus became the only proof of
the original privilege which did not survive.
According to the list of witnesses from the copy of the grand master’s privilege,
the privilege was certified by: Janusz and Jakub of Radziki, Adam Świnka of Strzygi,
Jan (Świnka) of Chojnowo, Adam (Świnka) of Sarnowo, Piotr of Starorypin and
Namięta of Łapinóż14. B. Biskup was the first to identify the witnesses underlining
the fact that that the Świnka family was heavily represented. They possessed lands
both in Dobrzyń land and in Zawkrze (Masovia), the latter being in the pledge from
the Teutonic Order15. K. Górski provided more details and he identified Janusz and
Jakub of Radziki as representatives of the Dobrzyń branch of the Ogończyk (Ogon)
family. He also recognized the witnesses from the Świnka family to whom he rightly
included: Adam of Strzygi, Adam of Sarnowo and Jan of Chojnowo. Nevertheless,
he was wrong to identify Piotr of Starorypin. He also noticed that all the above11
M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 80; J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 40; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski,
A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in
print).
12
S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 149–151; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 46–47; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski,
print).
13
M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 74; K. Górski, op.cit., p. 149; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 125. Bieniak’s hypothesis seems to be less probable (Sadłowo i jego dziedzice w średniowieczu, [in:] Zamek w Sadłowie
na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red. L. Kajzer, Rypin 2004, p. 73); Bieniak assumes that the copy of the privilege was prepared for Adam’s younger brother: Jakub Świnka of Strzygi. Nevertheless, the Teutonic
officials were more likely to show more consideration to Adam on account of his seniority and the
fact that in 1409 he was holding more prominent positions than Jakub (in 1402 he was appointed
castellan of Rypin – he lost the office when Dobrzyń land was recovered by the Polish Crown). Thus,
it seems more certain that Adam, not Jakub, was responsible for copying Ulrich’s document; the data
concerning Adam’s and Jakub’s careers are provided below with the reference to the literature of the
topic.
14
M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 80–81.
15
Ibid., p. 74.
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mentioned came from the county of Rypin and Zawkrze. What is more, he also
underlined the fact that the group did not include “anyone from the Kościelecki
family” considered by him to play a leading role in Dobrzyń land16.
The identifications made by the previously mentioned researchers, based
on knowledge of the noble elites available at the time of their work, can be now
complemented and corrected, taking into account the results of J. Bieniak and
B. Możejko17. Taking into consideration the careers of the witnesses of the privilege
before 1409 and their family relations, we may now establish the reasons for which
they decided to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń
land when it was taken over by the Teutonic Knights in 1409, the clear sign of
which was their presence in Ulrich’s privilege of 28 October 1409.
The first two testators of the grand master’s privilege for Dobrzyń land, Janusz
and Jakub of Radziki (Rypin county in Dobrzyń land) were brothers – sons of
Mikołaj of Kutno (Gostynin land in the Duchy of Płock) and Skępe (Lipno county
in Dobrzyń land)18 and grandsons of the castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Wola
and Radziki of the Ogon house. Originally Janusz of Radziki used the appellation stemming from the name of his possessions in Kutno (Masovia). Nevertheless, he also used the appellation of Kościelec after he had married Dobrochna
at the beginning of the 15th century, a daughter of the Brześć judge Mikołaj, who
was the only heiress of the Kościelecki family’s lands in the Inowrocław part of
Kuyavia. Except Jakub, Janusz’s other younger brothers were: Piotr ( later known
as Piotr of Działyń, the progenitor of the Działyński family), Otto and Andrzej.
Their sister was the wife of the judge of Chełmno Janusz of Legendorf (Mgowo).
Castellan Andrzej’s grandsons at the beginning of the 15th century still remained
in the collective family property, owning the lands from the fiefdom of Skępe and
Działyń (Dobrzyń land), of Kuczbork (Zawkrze), of Kutno (Gostynin land in the
Duchy of Płock) and other more dispersed villages. Janusz Mikołajewic of Skępe
and Kościelec was a direct progenitor of the Kościelecki family – one of the most
outstanding magnate families in Greater Poland19. Prior to the outbreak of the war
16
K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153–154.
Individual works of the researchers listed here will be given below.
18
J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 222–223.
19
About family relations and estate owned by the descendants of the catellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej comp.: Słownik historyczno-geograficzny województwa płockiego w średniowieczu, z. 2, opr.
A. Borkiewicz-Celińska, Wrocław 1981, s. 156–157; T. Żychliński, Złota księga szlachty polskiej, vol.
10, Poznań 1888 (the document concerning the division of the land among the sons of Mikołaj of
Kutno of 1413); J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 222–223; idem, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej w późnym średniowieczu i jej majątki, [in:] Włocławek i jego dzieje na tle przemian Kujaw i ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red.
O. Krut-Horonziak, L. Kajzer, Włocławek 1995, p. 33–36; idem, Prawa patronackie szlachty kujawskiej w kościołach parafialnych w świetle źródeł, [in:] Religijność na Kujawach i ziemi dobrzyńskiej
w czasach staropolskich, red. A. Mietz, Włocławek 2003, p. 41–42; idem, Radziki (Radzikowo) i ich
dziedzice w średniowieczu, [in:] Zamek w Radzikach Dużych na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red. L. Kajzer,
Rypin 2009, p. 23–26 (here also the identification of Janusz and Jakub of Radziki, the witnesses of
Ulrich’s privilege, with the grandsons of the castellan Andrzej) 27–29, 40; A. Supruniuk, Otoczenie
17
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of 1409 he had already held some official posts. From 1400 he held the title of
castellan of Dobrzyń20. He was appointed castellan by Grand Master Konrad von
Jungingen. However, King Władysław Jagiełło did not recognize the promotion of
Janusz. The reason for this was that Poland refused to recognize the legitimacy of
the Teutonic Order’s ownership of Dobrzyń land in the form of the pledge which
was conferred on the Teutonic Knights in 1392 by the Duke of Opole Władysław
– the liegeman of the Polish crown. Władysław Jagiełło, who considered himself
the only disposer of district offices in Dobrzyń’s hierarchy, appointed people of his
choice to hold official positions in Dobrzyń land. His nominations were not recognized by the real territorial ruler – the grand master – who nominated his own
candidates, which resulted in the fact that many offices were held by two people
in the years 1392–1405. The problem disappeared when Dobrzyń land was repurchased by the Polish Crown, which took place in June 1405. Władysław Jagiełło
dismissed most officials appointed by the grand master (including all high and
middle ranking officials)21. It also affected Janusz, who was addressed as Dobrzyń’s
castellan in 1407, but in fact Władysław Jagiełło dismissed him from office before
the summer of 1406, when the castellan of Dobrzyń became Piotr of Radomin and
Włoszczowa nominated by the king22. The fact of depriving Janusz of his office is
confirmed by the document issued by Władysław Jagiełło in 1410, in which he is
referred to as “the former castellan of Dobrzyń land”23.
Jakub’s (Janusz’s brother) pre-war career was less spectacular, but also connected with the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land. From 1398 he was a servant (diner)
of the grand master: first of Konrad, and after Konrad’s death – of Ulrich von
księcia mazowieckiego Siemowita IV (1374–1426). Studium o elicie politycznej Mazowsza na przełomie
XIV i XV wieku, Warszawa 1998, p. 144–145, 211–212; B. Możejko, op.cit., s. 124–125; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta urzędnicza w późnym średniowieczu (1370–1501), Gdańsk 2006, p. 577–578
(however, here Janusz of Kościelec was wrongly identified with a son of the castellan Andrzej); idem,
O potomstwie kasztelana dobrzyńskiego Andrzeja z Woli i Radzików, [in:] Odkrywcy, princepsi, rozbójnicy, red. B. Śliwiński (Studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 13), Malbork 2007, p. 283–292; K. Pacuski,
Możnowładztwo i rycerstwo ziemi gostynińskiej w XIV i XV wieku. Studium z dziejów osadnictwa
i elity władzy na Mazowszu średniowiecznym, Warszawa 2009, p. 161–163 (all the above mentioned
works include older literature of the topic).
20
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34; idem, Radziki, p. 27, 40; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska
szlachta, p. 488.
21
J. Bieniak, Od wójtów Rypina do rodu szlacheckiego. Starorypińscy w XIV i XV wieku, [in:]
Rypin. Szkice z dziejów miasta, red. M. Krajewski, Rypin 1994, p. 56; S. Szybkowski, Pięć dokumentów sądu ziemskiego dobrzyńskiego z XIV i XV w., [in:] Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze, red. B. Śliwiński
(Gdańskie studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 9), Gdańsk 2003, p. 399–402; idem, Kujawska szlachta,
p. 113–114, 179–180, 193–194.
22
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, 53; idem, Radziki, p. 40; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska
szlachta, p. 488–489.
23
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, fn. 97; comp. also the annex to the source – here
I would like to express my thanks to Dr. hab. Adam Szweda from the Institute of History and Archival Science of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń for comparing my interpretation of the
source published here against its original.
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Jungingen24. He continued to serve the latter also in the autumn of 1409, after the
conflict with Poland-Lithuania broke out25.
The next witnesses of the document of 28 Oct 1409, Adam of Strzygi (Dobrzyń
land, Rypin county) and Jan of Chojnowo (Zawkrze land) were the representatives
of the Dobrzyń line of the Świnka family26. Adam of Strzygi, an heir of Zielona in
Zawkrze land, was a cousin of the remaining two testators. His father, appointed
pantler of Dobrzyń by the Teutonic Order, was Piotr Świnka (II), who died at the
turn of 1401 and 1402. His other children were: Piotr (III), Jakub and daughters:
Beata, Małgorzata and Dorota. It must be added that as a result of his marriage
with Katarzyna, who according to J. Bieniak was a daughter of one of the heirs of
Legendorf (Mgowo), he became the owner of the lands in Dobrzyń land: part of
Legendorf (Mgowo) and the village of Wronie27 . Adam of Strzygi and Zielona,
like Janusz of Skępe, started his career while Dobrzyń land was in the hands of
the Teutonic Order by way of a pledge. Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen appointed him castellan of Rypin in 1402. Like Janusz, he was deprived of his office
by Władysław Jagiełło after Dobrzyń land was repurchased by the Crown in 1405.
His successor, appointed by Władysław Jagiełło, became Jan of Wielka Chełmica
of the Jastrzębiec coat of arms28.
Adam of Strzygi’s cousins, Jan of Chojnowo and Adam of Sarnowo, were Jakub’s
sons. Jakub did not hold any district positions. According to J. Bieniak, he married an unidentified heiress of the estates in Stangenberg (now Stążki) in Teutonic
Pomesania, as a result of which his sons became heirs of the land. The grandfather
of both Adam and Jan was the castellan of Rypin Piotr (I) Świnka, who died in 1398,
which means that he held his office during the Teutonic pledge of Dobrzyń land29.
24
Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409 (further cit. MTB), hrsg. v. E. Joachim,
Königsberg 1896, s. 19, 87, 165, 179, 202, 248, 400–407, 502, 504, 502, 507, 514, 515, 530, 537, 540,
543,546, 555, 562, 567, 586, 587; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 40.
25
MTB, p. 586.
26
M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 74; K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153.
27
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 44–46; idem, Średniowieczne polskie rody rycerskie. Stan
badań, problemy sporne, możliwości i trudności badawcze, [in:] Genealogia. Stan i perspektywy badań
nad społeczeństwem Polski średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym, red. J. Pakulski, J. Wroniszewski,
Toruń 2003, p. 63–73; idem, Sadłowo, p. 36–50, 117–119, 122; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 119–126, 134
(the author believes that Adam was married twice: the first time to a woman of an unknown name
from the Legendorf family, the second time to Katarzyna – who appears in the sources as his widow;
according to Możejko the latter might have been a daughter of Mikołaj of Grzebsko).
28
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 45; idem, Sadłowo, s. 48–50; B. Możejko, op.cit., s. 120–
–121; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 501.
29
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 44–45; idem, Średniowieczne polskie rody rycerskie,
p. 63–73; idem, Sadłowo, s. 27–57; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 140–142. We do not agree with Bieniak’s
supposition (idem, Sadłowo, p. 51–57) that the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr (I) Świnka died in 1397,
and the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr Świnka in 1398 was his son Piotr (II) who was promoted to the
office from the position of the pantler of Dobrzyń. The researcher is not able to provide any source
in which with no doubt Piotr (II) would be referred to as the castellan of Dobrzyń. Moreover, his last
appearance in December 1401 corresponds with the appearance of his successor to the office of the
pantler of Dobrzyń in January 1402 (S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 499).
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The next witness of the privilege, Piotr of Starorypin, was identified with the
Świnka family30 by older literature on the topic. J. Bieniak and B. Możejko proved
this to be unjustified. According to them, the heirs of Starorypin was another noble
family coming from the reeve of Rypin (Vogt) of the mid-14th century Eberhard31.
Bieniak suggests that the brothers of Piotr were the parish priest of Rypin and
canon of Płock Eberhard and probably Jan Rasz (in the German sources referred
to as “Raschow”)32. However, Bieniak’s suggestion that their father was Andrzej
Rasz must be refuted, as it is contradicted by the source from 1406 in which
Andrzej and Jan were referred to as brothers33. Thus, the family relations between
Piotr, Eberhard, Jan and Andrzej remain an open question. Their predecessors were
undoubtedly the pantler of Dobrzyń Eberhard (Bieniak identifies him with the
above-mentioned reeve (Vogt) of Rypin) and the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Mikołaj
of Starorypin (known in 1385). Bieniak mentions also another member of Piotr’s
father’s family – Mikołaj Dudek, known to the sources of 1413. Despite its burgher
Prussian origin, in the last quarter of the 14th century the family held important
offices. It belonged to the district elite also thanks to the family connections of the
women of the family. Piotr of Starorypin’s aunt, Dorota, was the wife of the deputy
cup-bearer of Dobrzyń (from 1378), and next she married the judge of Brześć
Marcin of Tłuchowo and Baruchowo of the Cholewa house. His cousin (probably a daughter of Mikołaj Dudek) married the deputy master of the pantry of
Gniewkowo Mikołaj of Pacierzyn of the Ogon house, who was a son of the widow
of the governor (voivode) of Brześć Krzesław of Kościół (Kościelna Wieś)34. Jan
and Andrzej’s mother (who was probably also the mother of Piotr and Eberhard)
also came from a significant family. In the letter of 1405 from the grand master to
King Władysław Jagiełło, the pantler of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Lubin of the Ogon35
house was referred to as Jan Rasz’s “brother”. However, the brotherhood must mean
only that they were cousins. As in Jan’s generation there appeared the names of
Andrzej and Piotr, it is more probable that the Rasz brothers’ mother was the pantler Andrzej’s aunt. If so, she should be recognized as a sister of the sword-bearer of
Dobrzyń Piotr of Lubin and Umień (the father of the pantler Andrzej) and of the
castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Wola and Radziki (the grandfather of Janusz and
30
K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153 (here Piotr is presented as a representative of the Świnka family); M. Pelech, Die hochmeisterlichen Rate vom Jahre 1412. Ein Beitrag zur Personengeschichte des
Deutschordenslandes Preusen, Altpreussische Geschlechterkunde, N. F., Jg. 13: 1982, p. 74 (here Piotr
is identified with the grandfather of Jan of Chojnowo, Adam of Sarnowo and Adam of Strzygi – the
castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr (I) Świnka).
31
J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 61–62; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 125.
32
J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 43–46, 55–59, 67; A. Radzimiński, Prałaci i kanonicy kapituły katedralnej płockiej w XIV i I poł. XV w. Studium prozopograficzne, vol. 2, Toruń 1993, p. 51.
33
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensfolianten (further cit. OF), nr 3, p. 263 (on the basis of microforms kept in the State Archive in
Toruń).
34
J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 43–62; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 606, 641–642.
35
OF, nr 3, p. 208; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 47.
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Jakub of Radziki, who were also witnesses of the privilege of 1409). It is logical that
that the less important family took over the names of the more significant family
– the names of Andrzej and Piotr of Starorypin referred to the names used in the
family of their mother. Let us add that the father of the castellan Andrzej and the
sword-bearer Piotr was Piotr of Radziki – also the castellan of Dobrzyń)36.
Despite the fact that the Rasz family settled into the noble environment of
Dobrzyń, they did not renounce their property in Prussia. Andrzej and Jan owned
lands in Prussia in 1406 when they exchanged them with Grand Master Konrad
von Jungingen, who informed Władysław Jagiełło about this fact. Unfortunately,
the source fails to provide the location and names of the lands which were the
subject of the transaction. It is possible that they were situated in the commandry
of Dzierzgoń whose owners were reported to bear the name Rasz (“Raschow”).
In 1399 the village of Smausgheyeyn (Smausien=Bündtken) was the property of
Konrad Rasz. It must have been Konrad who sold the exchanged village to the subsequent two commanders of Dzierzgoń: Burchard von Wobeke (1404–410) and
his successor Albrecht von Schwarzburg for 850 grzywnas. In 1398 a Rasz was the
owner of part of the village of Linken (now Linki), which bordered on the estates
of Sztembark situated in Pomesania. A Rasz appeared in the sources as a squire of
Linken in 1418. According to Heide Wunder, it is possible that Rasz of Linki was
the very same Konrad Rasz37.
Jan Rasz, probably a brother of Piotr of Starorypin, was connected with the
Monastic Teutonic State not only as an owner of lands situated there. From 1399
he was a servant (diner) of first Konrad, and later of Ulrich von Jungingen38. He
started the service for the grand master at the same time as Jakub of Radziki. They
might have done it together, which should not be surprising as they were related on the distaff side (although they belonged to different generations). Jan, like
Jakub, served Ulrich also during the great war39. Piotr of Starorypin’s brother was
one of Grand Master Konrad’s confidants if he was appointed the pantler of the
court. The grand master also appointed him standard-bearer of Dobrzyń after the
death of Mikołaj of Trutowo (who last appeared in the sources in 1402). Owing to
the young age of Jan Rasz, Konrad temporarily gave the office to Andrzej of Lubin. Before Jan managed to take the position of the standard-bearer of Dobrzyń,
36
Family relations of the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr of Radziki are presented by J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 23-37, 38-44. The conclusion concerning the family relation between Jan Rasz with the pantler
Andrzej of Lubin is also given by J. Bieniak on the basis of the above-cited source (ibid., p. 47).
However, Bieniak’s divagations are not complete owing to poor computer typesetting (the sentence
remains unfinished), which causes that we are not familiar with detailed conclusions concerning the
issue. The preserved fragment seems to suggest that Bieniak changed his point of view concerning
the family affiliations of Jan Rasz and now he considers the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Mikołaj of Starorypin to be Jan Rasz’s father.
37
OF, nr 3, p. 263; H. Wunder, Siedlungs- und Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Komturei Christburg
13.–16. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 138–139, 142, 144, 151; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 58–59.
38
J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 56–58.
39
Ibid., p. 58.
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in June 1405, Dobrzyń land fell again under the authority of Władysław Jagiełło,
who did not recognize most of Konrad’s nominations to district offices in Dobrzyń
land. In 1394 Władysław Jagiełło appointed Jan of Orchowo ,who started to act as
the standard-bearer of Dobrzyń after June 1405. Originally, the grand master did
not give up and wrote letters to Jagiełło, Jagiełło’s brother Świdrygiełło [Švitrigaila]
and to the king’s advisors to approve of the nomination of Jan Rasz. However, his
efforts were fruitless, and Starorypiński never became standard-bearer. However,
it must be noted that in 1406 Konrad addressed Jan Rasz as standard-bearer of
Dobrzyń in his letter to the king40. The problems with the office of Piotr of Starorypin prove that the family fell victim to repression after Dobrzyń land had been
repurchased from the Teutonic Order in 1405.
The least is known about the last witness of the privilege of Ulrich von Jungingen for Dobrzyń land – Namięta of Łapinóż (Dobrzyń land, county of Rypin). His
ancestor might have been Piotr of Łapinóż, who appeared in the list of the witnesses of the document of Duke of Dobrzyń Władysław Garbaty of 1346. Namięta did
not come from a family belonging to the elites of officials of Dobrzyń land. Nevertheless, he belonged to one of the most significant representatives of the knightly
family of Zagroba in Dobrzyń land. He got involved in the activities connected
with the mission of Benedict of Makra in Dobrzyń land. Moreover, in the document of the szlachta of Dobrzyń of 1434 concerning the succession to the throne
after Władysław Jagiełło’s death he placed his seal as one of the two representatives
of his clenodium41.
Having introduced the witnesses of the grand master’s privilege of 28 October 1409 in terms of their family relations, material situation and contacts with
the court of grand masters (holding the position of a diner of the grand master),
we should consider the motives which led them to support the Teutonic rule in
Dobrzyń land and made them appear in Grand Master Ulrich’s document.
Janusz of Radziki, Skępe and Kościelec, his brother Jakub and Piotr of Starorypin were inclined to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Teutonic knights due
to the close institutional connections of the representatives of their families with
the grand master’s court: when the war of 1409–1411 broke out, Jakub of Radziki
and Jan Rasz of Starorypin had been servants (diners) of the heads of the Teutonic
Order for a decade. The Rasz family of Starorypin and the Świnka family were
connected with Prussia also in the way of property. The former owned some lands
in Prussia (perhaps in the commandry of Dzierzgoń), whereas the latter were the
40
OF, nr 3, p. 208, 263; Codex epistolaris Vitoldi Magni Ducis Lithuaniae 1376–1430 (further cit.
CEV), collectus opera A. Prochaska, Cracoviae 1882, nr 322; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 56; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 484–485.
41
Codex diplomaticus Poloniae [...] (further cit. CDP), T. 2, pars 2, ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A Muczkowski, Varsaviae 1847, nr 578; Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, T. 2, ed.
I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1892, s. 261, 263; A. Biliński, Szlachta ziemi dobrzyńskiej za ostatnich Jagiellonów, Warszawa 1932, p. 103; J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 226–227 (source appendix 2); idem, Od wójtów,
p. 60, 75, fn. 195.
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owners of some property of Mgowo and Sztembark. In 1409 they were subjects
of both the Polish king (owing to the property in Dobrzyń land) and the grand
master (the lands in Prussia). Moreover, Raszów was originally situated in the Monastic State of the Teutonic Order. It must be also added that when Dobrzyń land
came under Teutonic rule in 1409 the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz
family did not possess any inherited property in the territory under the direct
authority of the Polish king (excluding the lands of Kościelec which constituted
the property of the wife of Janusz of Radziki, but not his patrimony). From 1407
by way of a pledge, the Teutonic Order controlled Zawkrze in Masovia, where the
Radzikowskis owned the fiefdom of Kuczbork (they also possessed the fiefdom
of Kutno in Płock Masovia, ruled at that time by Siemovit IV) and the Świnkas
– Zielona, Niechłonin, Chojnowo and Sarnowo. It is noteworthy that the Teutonic
Order also owned Zawkrze by way of a pledge in the years 1384–139942. As has
already been suggested by B. Możejko, Jan and Adam Świnka of Sarnowo and Chojnowo must have aided the Teutonic knights if on 24 March 1409 they received 30
grzywnas from the Teutonic treasurer43.
Apart from institutional reasons (in the case of the Radzikowskis and the Rasz
family), the above-mentioned families were inclined to cooperate with the Teutonic Order for fear of losing their land and property. After Dobrzyń land was
taken over by the Teutonic Order in 1409, landowners who were loyal to the Polish
king had their property confiscated by the Order and they emigrated to the areas
directly under the Polish king’s rule44. The Świnkas supported the Teutonic Order
because they hoped to regain the fiefdom of Sadłowo with the castle erected by the
castellan of Rypin Piotr (I) Świnka. The castle was inherited on the distaff ’s side by
the Polish king’s supporter – the castellan of Słońsko Wojciech of Plecka Dąbrowa.
It must be stressed that the Teutonic Order confiscated the fiefdom of Sadłowo
42
K. Neitmann, Die Pfandverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, Bd. 41: 1992, H. 1, p. 4–6 and no. 1a, 1b, 1c; M. Radoch, Długi zastawne Siemowita IV Mazowieckiego wobec zakonu krzyżackiego, [in:] Społeczeństwo i polityka do XVII wieku, red. J. Śliwiński,
Olsztyn 1994, p. 53, 55, 57–57; idem, Z dziejów stosunków mazowiecko-krzyżackich na przełomie XIV
i XV wieku, cz. III: Jeszcze w sprawie zastawów ziem zakonowi krzyżackiemu przez księcia płockiego
Siemowita IV w latach 1382–1402, [in:] Mazowsze i jego sąsiedzi w XIV–XVI wieku, red. J. Śliwiński,
Olsztyn 1997, p. 31, 40–47, 50; idem, Zarys działalności polityczno-dyplomatycznej książąt mazowieckich wobec państwa krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1385–1407, Olsztyn 1998, p. 34, 80, 97–98;
A. Supruniuk, Zawkrze w polityce księcia mazowieckiego Siemowita IV, [in:] eadem, Szkice o rycerstwie mazowieckim XIV/XV wieku, Toruń 2008, p. 101–103, 105–106, 108–109.
43
B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 142.
44
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv, nr 28083 (I would like to thank Prof. Dr. hab. Sławomir Józwiak from the Institute
of History and Archival Science of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń for making the source
available to me); M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 77–79 (nr 3) (the correct definition of the date of the
source: J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 39, fn. 200; S. Joźwiak, Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie zakonu
krzyżackiego w Prusach. Studium nad sposobami pozyskiwania i wykorzystywaniem poufnych informacji w późnym średniowieczu, Malbork 2004, p. 97–98, fn. 190); J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej,
p. 30; idem, Sadłowo, p. 73–75.
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from Wojciech and passed it over to the hands of the Świnka family45. It is possible
that other testators hoped to get wealthier thanks to the redistribution of the confiscated lands planned by the Teutonic Order.
The witnesses’ motives to support the Teutonic Order were also affected by the
political past of Dobrzyń land. The territory ceased to be under the direct rule of
the Polish king in 1370. Authority was executed by dukes who were vassals of the
Crown: first by Kazimierz Bogusławic in the years 1370–1377, then for a short time
by his widow – Duchess Małgorzata Siemowitówna, and finally by Duke Władysław
Opolczyk, who gave the land by way of a pledge to the Teutonic Order in 139246.
During the rule of both Kazimerz Bogusławic and Władysław Opolczyk the grandfathers of the Radzikowskis and the Świnkas held the two most important offices
in the district: Andrzej was the castellan of Dobrzyń and Piotr (I) Świnka was the
castellan of Rypin47. The position of the Rasz family was somewhat weaker as its
representatives held lower offices: Eberhard was the pantler and Mikołaj was the
cup-bearer48. Andrzej of Radziki and Piotr (I) Świnka kept their offices also during
the Teutonic rule thanks to their friendly cooperation with the Order49. The Teutonic knights respected the outstanding position of the Radzikowskis and Świnkas
in the Dobrzyń elite, and after the death of both castellans they appointed their
grandsons Janusz of Radziki and Adam Świnka of Strzygi to the vacant positions.
Thus, the young members of the Radzikowski, Świnka and Rasz families identified
the rulers of Dobrzyń land with dukes-vassals and the Teutonic knights. Moreover,
the latter were perceived as “good rulers”, definitely better than Władysław Jagiełło,
who had deprived Adam and Janusz of their district offices and did not recognize
the grand master’s nomination for Jan Rasz50. Thus, the Radzikowski, the Świnka
45
J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 57–75.
M. Goyski, Sprawa zastawu ziemi dobrzyńskiej przez Władysława Opolczyka i pierwsze lata
sporu (1391–1399), Warszawa 1907, passim; Z. Guldon, J. Powierski, Podziały administracyjne Kujaw
i ziemi dobrzyńskiej w XIII–XIV w., Warszawa–Poznań 1974, p. 217–225; J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie,
p. 31–37; idem, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 48; K. Neitmann, Die Pfandverträge, s. 6–8 and nr 2a–o;
J. Pakulski, Jeszcze o zastawie Złotorii i ziemi dobrzyńskiej krzyżakom przez Władysława Opolczyka
w latach 1391–1392, Zapiski Kujawsko-Dobrzyńskie, vol. 9: 1995, p. 11–30; J. Karczewska, Kujawskodobrzyńskie władztwo Władysława Opolczyka, [in:] Władysław Opolczyk jakiego nie znamy. Próba
oceny w sześćsetlecie śmierci, red. A. Pobóg-Lenartowicz, Opole 2001, p. 53–59; J. Sperka, Wojny Władysława Jagiełły z księciem opolskim Władysławem (1391–1396), Cieszyn 2003, p. 17–23; idem, Otoczenie Władysława Opolczyka w latach 1370–1401. Studium o elicie władzy w relacjach z monarchą,
Katowice 2006, p. 37–39; J. Tęgowski, Władztwo księcia Władysława Opolczyka w ziemi dobrzyńskiej
i na Kujawach. Zarys problematyki, [in:] Książę Władysław Opolczyk. Fundator klasztoru paulinów na
Jasnej Górze w Częstochowie, red. M. Antoniewicz, J. Zbudniewek, Warszawa 2007, p. 291–308.
47
M. Szymecka, Otoczenie księcia słupsko-dobrzyńskiego Kaźka, [in:] Szlachta, starostowie, zaciężni, red. B. Śliwiński (Gdańskie studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 5), Gdańsk–Koszalin 1998,
p. 309; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, 44; idem, Sadłowo, p. 44, 117; idem, Radziki, p. 39–
–40; A. Supruniuk, Otoczenie, p. 235; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 87–100.
48
J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 60–61; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 487, 499.
49
Comp. the literature with footnote 47.
50
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 484–485, 488–489, 501; other district officials deprived
of their offices included: the judge Trojan of Kikół and Ostrowite, as well as the subjudge Beszel of
46
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and the Rasz families hoped that the stable Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land would
allow them to regain their former position among the szlachta of Dobrzyń.
It must also be underlined that the Radzikowskis and the Świnkas were related
to each other through the Legendorfs (the Mgowski family) from Chełmno land.
What is more, the Radzikowskis were also related to the Rasz family, which we
discussed above.
The conclusion drawn from what has been written so far in this article is that
the families of the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz of Starorypin had much
in common with the Teutonic Order in 1409, maybe even more than with the
Crown, particularly if we take into account the military successes of the Teutonic
Order in the first stage of the war51. Undoubtedly, they were inclined to accept the
Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land and to adopt the knight’s law of Chełmno, the liberal rules of which were familiar to them as their lands bordered on Chełmno land
and they also had land in Prussia (Świnków, Raszów).
It is more difficult to define the motives of Namięta of Łapinóż, who was the
only witness of Ulrich’s privilege whose family did not hold any offices. Perhaps he
decided to support the Teutonic rule due to some unidentified family connections
with the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz family. It is also possible that he
wanted to win the new rulers’ friendship, which could help to increase Namięta’s
status in Dobrzyń land.
There is one more question – whether all the testators of the privilege of 28 October 1409 remained the advocates of the Teutonic Order until the end of the war.
It seems that the supporters of the Teutonic knights until the Peace of Toruń were
Jakub of Radziki and Jan Świnka of Chojnowo. They were forbidden by the king
to return to their Dobrzyń and Masovian lands after the Peace of Toruń was concluded (1 Feb 1411), which was against one of the treaty’s articles. The new grand
master of the Teutonic Order Heinrich von Plauen sent Teutonic envoys who were
to intervene in the matter. The Teutonic envoys’ actions also concerned Jan Rasz of
Czarne. Their offices were taken over by the royal supporters returning to Dobrzyń land, which they
had left in the years 1391-1392 when the area became occupied by the Teutonic Order (ibid., p. 495,
497). However, the marshal of Dobrzyń Iwan of Radomin received the most severe repressions. He
was not only deprived of his office, but he was also sentenced to pay 5000 florins to Władysław
Jagiełło on charge of treason and contributing to Jagiełło’s losing Dobrzyń land. As a result, his estates were confiscated. Iwan left for Prussia with his sons Mikołaj and Henryk-Andrzej (CDP, T. 1,
ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A. Muczkowski, Varsaviae 1847, nr 158; CEV, nr 368; K. Neitmann, Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen 1230–1449, Wien 1986, p. 444; idem, Die Pfandverträge,
nr 2p, p. 57–59; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 52–53). It must be added that the repressions
directed at Iwan and depriving the officials nominated by the Teutonic Order of their offices constituted a breach of the agreement of Raciążek of 1404, which was stressed by the Teutonic highranking dignitaries in their correspondence to the Polish monarch (Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen
Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jahrhundert, Bd. 1, hrsg. v. E. Weise, Marburg 1970, nr 23; K. Neitmann,
Die Pfandverträge, nr 2p, p. 57–59).
51
S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 133–152; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 44–45; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski,
print).
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Starorypin, which means that the representative of this family also supported the
Teutonic Order until the end of the war52. We still do not know about the attitude
of his supposed brother, who was also a witness of Ulrich’s documents, for there
is no preserved source information about his activity during the war after 28 Oct
1409. As for Jakub, Jan Świnka and Jan Rasz, J. Bieniak and B. Możejko seem to be
right in saying that the former two probably participated in the summer campaign
of 1410 on the Teutonic side. Thus, it is possible that they also took part in the
battle of Grunwald53. Another piece of evidence that Jan Świnka of Chojnowo was
a supporter of the Teutonic Order is the fact that he was staying in Malbork at the
end of April where he witnessed the transumpts of documents concerning PolishLithuanian-Teutonic relations issued by the Pelplin and Oliwa abbots at Ulric von
Jungingen’s request54.
On the other hand, it seems that the elder brother of Jakub of Radziki, the
former castellan of Dobrzyń, Janusz of Skępe, Kutno and Kościelec ceased to support the Teutonic Order. J. Bieniak in his two works recognized him as the king’s
servant in the first half of 1410. According to Bieniak, Janusz was to hand over the
money lent to the monarch by the chamberlain-subcamerarius [podkomorzy] of
Łęczyca Mikołaj Jastrzębiec55. He based his opinion on the document which we
have published in the appendix to this article. Nevertheless, the content of the
article allows an interpretation which differs from the one represented by Bieniak.
The document concerns the endowment of 200 grzywnas of Prague groschens
and 50 grzywnas of circulating coins paid in Dąbie in Łęczyca land by Władysław
Jagiełło to the above-mentioned chamberlain-subcamerarius [podkomorzy], who
gave the money to the former castellan of Dobrzyń, Janusz. The phrase “recepimus cum effectu” does not really mean that the king received the sum of money.
The phrase suggests that Jastrzębiec gave Jakub of Radziki 250 grzywnas, which
resulted in a debt56. Considering the political attitude of Janusz at the beginning
of the war when he witnessed the grand master’s privilege for Dobrzyń land, it is
highly probable that the king tried to win him over using a financial argument.
The political bribery was facilitated by a brother of one of the closest supporters
of Władysława Jagiełło – the bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec57, who put in a sufficient
amount of money (his brother-bishop might have contributed to it) for the bribery, which in this way did not constitute any burden for the royal budget. Instead,
52
M. Pelech, Der verlorene Ordensfoliant 5 (früher Hochmeister-Registrant II) des Hist. Staatsarchiv Königsberg mit Regesten (nach Rudolf Philippi und Erich Joachim), [in:] Beiträge zur Geschichte
des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 1, hrsg. v. U. Arnold, Marburg 1986, nr 12; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 145–146;
J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 76; idem, Radziki, p. 40–41.
53
B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 145; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 41.
54
B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 143–144.
55
J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34 and fn. 97; idem, Radziki, p. 40.
56
Comp. source appendix.
57
J. Sperka, Szafrańcowie herbu Stary Koń. Z dziejów kariery i awansu w późnośredniowiecznej
Polsce, Katowice 2001, p. 274–276.
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he received some property in Crown land, which he had leased for some time in
fact58. The middlemen in the transaction might have been close agnates of Janusz,
the sons of the Dobrzyń sword-bearer Piotr and at the same time sons of Janusz’s
grandfathers’ brother: the Dobrzyń pantler Andrzej of Lubin, and the deputy master of the pantry Dobiesław of Umień, who both leased the fiefdom of Umień in
Łęczyca land. So, they were close neighbours of Mikołaj Jastrzębiec, who owned
the fiefdom of Borysławice (with a castle)59.
Whether it was the financial argument that convinced Janusz to support the
Teutonic knights, it must be assumed that he changed sides soon after the end of
October 1409. Soon after the end of the war Władysław Jagiełło appointed him
voivode of Inowrocław in 1412, which entailed Janusz’s becoming a member of the
Royal Council60. It must be stressed that Janusz was appointed voivode although he
had not held any lower-ranking positions under Władysław Jagiełło before. Thus,
the fact must be interpreted as the expression of the monarch’s reward for Janusz’s
services for the king during the war.
The reasons which made Janusz of Radziki change his political orientation
must have been complex. His financial situation certainly affected his decision.
When the war with the Teutonic Order broke out in 1409, all the sons of Mikołaj
of Kutno, and the grandsons of the castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Radziki still
remained in the collective family property. Probably the youngest sons of Mikołaj
– Andrzej and Otto– had become of age by that time, which means that they and
their two older brother, Jakub and Piotr, might have demanded the division of
the whole patrimony. Janusz wanted to keep most of the estate for himself, which
meant that he had to pay off his younger brothers. The document of 1413 concerning the division of the patrimony confirms that Janusz together with Jakub and
Piotr were obliged to pay 700 grzywnas to Andrzej and Otto61. Thus, the money
obtained from the king probably helped Janusz to meet his financial liabilities.
Nevertheless, family connections might also have affected Janusz’s decision.
Having married Dobrochna of Kościelec, he became related to the outstanding magnate family line of Leszczyce of Pakość and Łabiszyn, who were particularly powerful in Kuyavia and north-east Greater Poland. His wife’s paternal uncle was Maciej
of Łabiszyn, the voivode of Inowrocław, who during the great war was a member
of the Royal Council62. The above-mentioned close agnates of Janusz of Radziki,
the pantler Andrzej of Lubin, and the deputy master of the pantry Dobiesław of
Umień, were also supporters of Władysław Jagiełło in the years 1409–1411. Moreover, according to sources, Dobiesław of Umień served Władysław Jagiełło as early
58
T. Nowak, Własność ziemska w ziemi łęczyckiej w czasach Władysława Jagiełły, Łodź 2003,
p. 26–27.
59
Ibid., p. 27–28, 30–31; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 36; idem, Radziki, p. 32–33.
60
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 479, 577.
61
T. Żychliński, Złota księga, vol. 10, p. 70–72; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 24–25.
62
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 600–602 (here included older literature concerning Maciej).
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as the beginning of the war63. Andrzej of Lubin also supported the Polish monarch
in the years 1409–1411, despite the fact that he had been appointed pantler by
Konrad von Jungingen. By way of reward, Władysław Jagiełło endowed him with
part of Starorypin in 141164. As can be concluded from the above, political orientations of his close relatives and agnates probably influenced Janusz’s decisions more
than the sum of money offered by the monarch. Moreover, Janusz feared losing
the lands of Kościelec belonging to his wife, situated in the county of Inowrocław,
which was under the authority of the Crown throughout the whole period of the
war of 1409–141165.
The sources of 1410 and the beginning of 1411 do not say anything about the
attitude towards the war represented by the next two testators of the grand master’s
document of 1409 – Adam Świnka of Zielona and his brother Jakub Świnka of
Strzygi. J. Bieniak concludes that both brothers must have participated in the elimination of the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land after the battle of Grunwald in 1410,
for the Teutonic knights invaded Strzygi after the Peace of Toruń was signed66. If he
is right, it will mean that they changed their political orientation after the Polish
party won the decisive battle67.
Nothing is known about the political orientation of the least significant witness of Ulrich’s privilege – Namieta of Łapinóż in the later period of the war of
1409–1411.
To sum up, it is worth answering the question how witnessing Ulrich von
Jungingen’s privilege influenced the testators’ careers after the end of the war.
As previously mentioned, Janusz of Kościelec, Skępe and Radziki was appointed voivode of Inowrocław in 1412 and held the office until his death in 1426.
Moreover, he held the position of Dobrzyń starost twice68. King Władysław Jagiełło
entrusted him to represent the interests of the Kingdom in numerous diplomatic
63
S. Joźwiak, Wywiad, p. 187.
CDP, T. 2, pars 1, ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A Muczkowski, Varsaviae 1848, nr 354; J. Bieniak, Od
wójtów, p. 39.
65
J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 41, suggests that Janusz decided to support the Polish king due to the
fact that he resided in Kościelec; nevertheless, we do not know whether the castellan of Dobrzyń lived
there with his wife permanently. His being witness of Ulrich’s document contradicts this assumption.
Apparently, at the beginning of the war he was staying in Dobrzyń land, perhaps in Radziki, where
there was a castle unlike in Kościelec.
66
J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 77–78.
67
Another reason for the weakening support for the Teutonic Order among the szlachta of
Dobrzyń before the summer campaign of 1410 could have been the political uncertainty of Dobrzyń
land. On the strength of the sentence of Wenclaus IV of February 1410 Dobrzyń land was to be
passed over to Wenclaus’ representative and taken over by Poland if the Teutonic rule was restored in
Samogitia. Irrespective of the fact that Władysław Jagiełło did not approve of the Czech king’s settlement, in the first few months of 1410 it remained unknown whether the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń
land would be permanent; comp. S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 317–320; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 48; J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 40; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski
i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).
68
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 577.
64
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missions to Prussia and at meetings with the representatives of the Teutonic Order.
As established by Adam Szweda, he took part in diplomatic missions and meetings of this type 14 times in the years 1414–147669. Thus, Janusz can be regarded as
one of the three most important experts in Teutonic matters in the crown council
in the second half of Jagiełło’s reign in Poland, the other two being the voivode of
Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg and the voivode of Brześć Maciej of Łabiszyn. In his
diplomatic activity the voivode of Inowrocław used his good knowledge of local
relations and his family contacts (he was Janusz Legendorf ’s brother-in-law).
The former servant (diner) of the grand masters – Jakub of Radziki – had to
wait a long time to be appointed to a district office. He returned to Dobrzyń land
before 1413 when the patrimony was divided between him and his brothers. Apparently, Władysław Jagiełło acceded to the requests of the Prussian envoys of
1411. However, the permission to return to his lands did not mean that the King
had forgiven him his conduct during the war. It was not until the 1420s that the
monarch appointed him to his first quite low-ranking office in the Dobrzyń hierarchy – lesser standard-bearer in 1425. Jakub was not promoted until the last year
of Jagiełło’s life when the monarch appointed him greater standard-bearer after
Aleksy of Płomiany was appointed the judge of Dobrzyń. In the sources he appeared as greater standard-bearer only once – on 25 Jan 1434, which was the last
time he was mentioned as a living person. Probably, he died before 4 March 1436,
because at that time the office of greater standard-bearer was held by Jerzy (Jurga)
of Lasotki70. Apparently, the service for the grand masters and his conduct during
the war affected his promotion prospects negatively. He had to wait a long time
for his first district office, which he received probably thanks to the intercession
of his older brother. The next time he got promoted was short before his death.
Władysław Jagiełło took a long time to forgive Jakub his disloyalty. Nevertheless,
the king did not consider it a reason to banish Jakub. What is interesting, some
scarce sources referring to the activity of Jakub of Radziki after 1413 do not confirm that he maintained any contacts with Teutonic Prussia.
Another witness of the grand master’s privilege – Adam Świnka of Strzygi and
Zielona – did not remain in disgrace with the king for a long time. The former
castellan of Rypin (appointed to the office by the Teutonic Order) became the castellan of Dobrzyń as early as in 1416, and he held the office until his death (he died
before 1429)71. Like the voivode of Inowrocław Janusz, he took part in diplomatic
missions in Prusssia and Polish-Teutonic meetings72. It must be added that at the
end of Jagiełło’s rule, Adam’s younger brother Jakub Świnka of Strzygi started his
career. In 1430 he was the greater standard-bearer of Dobrzyń only to become the
69
A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim
w Prusach w latach 1386–1454, Toruń 2009, p. 36 and according to the index.
70
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 486; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 24–25, 44.
71
B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 127–134; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 45; idem, Sadłowo, p. 78;
S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 489.
72
A. Szweda, Organizacja, p. 338, 384, 388.
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castellan of Rypin in the same year. In 1451 he still held the office (after 1451 he
died)73. Apparently, his pro-Teutonic attitude in 1409 did not blight the career opportunities of other members of that family.
Nevertheless, the cousins of the heirs of Zielona and Strzygi – Jan Świnka of
Chojnowo and Adam Świnka of Sarnowo – did not avoid repressions. They were
both forbidden to come back to their Masovian estates, which made them forge a
close relationship with Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen. In 1412 they became
members of the council set up by the grand master, where they represented the district of Człuchów. The grand master probably endowed them with some lands in
the district of Człuchów (in Prussia they owned the lands of Sztembark in Pomesania). Jan of Chojnowo regained his lands in Masovia after the war finished with the
peace treaty signed near Lake Mełno in 1422. Adam returned to Masovia earlier.
The Świnka family’s conduct during the war influenced their decision to continue
to support the Teutonic Order even for over a decade (in case of Jan of Chojnowo).
The latter maintained close contacts with Teutonic officials also in the later period,
which was connected with the fact that he owned the lands of Sztembark until the
beginning of the 1440s. Among the most outstanding witnesses of the document
of 1409 (that is the Radzikowski and the Świnka families) Adam and Jan waited the
longest time to be appointed to district offices. They made a career only in Masovia
and it did not take place until the 1430s: Adam became the head of sąd ziemski
– judex terrestris in Zawkrze, while Jan was appointed judge in Zawkrze, and later
castellan of Płock (probably in 1444; in 1445 he died)74.
Not much can be said about the influence of the conduct during the war on the
careers of Piotr of Starorypin and Namięta of Łapinóż. The former was still alive in
1420. Nevertheless, the sources do not say that he fell victim to repression; nor that
was he appointed to any district office75. Representing the family of Zagroba in the
document of the Dobrzyń szlachta concerning the succession to the Polish throne
was the peak of his career76. Whether Piotr and Namięta maintained contacts with
Prussia after 1411 remains unknown. Namięta represented the Polish party during
the Dobrzyń stage of the mission of Benedict of Makra in 141377.
* * *
Six out of seven witnesses of Ulrich von Jungingen’s privilege for Dobrzyń
land came from szlachta families whose members held district offices, with the
Radzikowskis and the Świnkas belonging to the most significant families (the position of the Starorypiński family was somewhat lower). Only Namięta of Łapinóż
73
B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 225–230.
M. Pelech, Die hochmeisterlichen Räte, p. 74–77; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 147–200; J. Bieniak,
Sadłowo, p. 76–77.
75
J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 43–45.
76
CDP, T. 2, pars 2, nr 578; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 75 and fn. 195.
77
Lites, T. 2, p. 261, 263; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 60.
74
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came from the szlachta whose representatives did hold any offices. The Świnkas
and the Radzikowskis held held the highest-ranking district offices in the Dobrzyń
hierarchy both during the rule of the dukes-vassals of the Crown and the Teutonic
pledge of the years 1392–1405. For this reasons when Dobrzyń land was taken over
by Władysław Jagiełło they fell victims to repression – they were deprived of their
offices to which they had been appointed by the grand masters. The same situation took place in case of the Starorypiński family. The Radzikowskis, the Świnkas
and the Śtarorypińscy were related to one another. They also had family relations
and property in the Monastic State. The representatives of the Radzikowskis and
the Starorypińskis were also connected with grand masters owing to the fact that
from the end of the 14th century they served as diners first to Konrad, and later to
his successor Ulrich von Jungingen. All the factors inclined them to support the
Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land in the autumn of 1409. Nevertheless, soon afterwards the most outstanding witness of the documents Janusz of Radziki, Skępe
and Kościelec changed his political orientation and supported the king. He was
probably influenced by his relatives who were against his cooperation with the
Teutonic Order, the bribery and his hopes to make a career in the Polish Kingdom,
which turned out to be vain after all. As for the remaining witnesses we know that
Jakub of Radziki supported the Teutonic Order until the end of the war (which
resulted in the delay in his career in the Polish Kingdom). Probably the same happened with the Świnkas ( the sources confirm it in case of Jan of Chojnowo). However, their career after the war was diversified: Adam Świnka of Strzygi and Zielona
quickly won over Władysław Jagiełło who appointed him castellan of Dobrzyń (his
brother Jakub also made a career), whereas Jan of Chojnowo and Adam of Sarnowo fell victims to tough repression. Nothing is known about the conduct of Piotr
of Starorypin and Namięta of Łapinóż in the last stage of the war. However, Piotr’s
brother Jan Rasz fought on the Teutonic side until the end of the war of 1409–1411.
No representative of neither the Starorypiński family nor heirs of Łapinóż were appointed to any offices during the whole reign of Władysław Jagiełło.
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
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VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
KRZYSZTOF KWIATKOWSKI (Toruń)
THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS IN PRUSSIA AFTER THE DEFEAT
OF THE GERMAN ORDER IN THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD*
Keywords: the German Order; the perception of war events; the Polish-Teutonic war 1409–
–1411; the battle of Grunwald; late medieval Prussia; the psychological influence of events on
people’s attitudes; the 15th century
For at least a few decades it has been obvious for the contemporary humanities
that contrary to the 19th century’s misconceptions, the concept of war is not only
“a simple continuation of politics by applying other means”1, but is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted and constitutes one form of interpersonal collective conflict2. In this sense the war can be understood as one of the elements, factors and
*
p. 47–66. In the text the following sigla were used: OBA = Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (Dahlem), XX. Hauptabteilung (Historisches Staatsarchiv Königsberg), Ordensbriefarchiv; SRP = Scriptores rerum Prussicarum; MPH = Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Biblical quotations were provided according to the fifth edition of the Vulgate: Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem, instr. R. Weber, praep. R. Gryson, Stuttgart 2007.
1
C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, hrsg. v. M. von Clausewitz, Bd. I, Berlin 1832, Buch 1, Cap.
24, p. 26: „Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik unter Einbeziehung anderer Mittel”
(comp. the Polish edition: C. von Clausewitz, O wojnie. Księgi I–VIII, transl. A. Cichowicz, L. W. Koc,
F. Schoener, Lublin 1995, p. 23).
2
M. Mead, Alternativen zum Krieg, [in:] Der Krieg. Zur Anthropologie der Aggression und des
bewaffneten Konflikts, hrsg. v. M. Fried, M. Harris, R. Murphy, Frankfurt a. Main 1971, pp. 235–252;
comp. also H. von Stietencron, Töten und Krieg. Grundlagen und Entwicklungen, [in:] Töten und
Krieg, hrsg. v. eiusdem, J. Rupke (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Historische Anthropologie, Bd.
6), Freiburg a. Breisgau–München 1995, pp. 22–23. It must be underlined here that Clausewitz’s image and projection of ‘war’ became relevant in totally new contexts – particularly in reference to economic competition and conflict in contemporary market economy. Ideas of the Prussian officer are
now frequently quoted, mainly in English literature of the subject matter and Anglo-Saxon cultural
tradition; comp. H. Sherman, R. Schultz, Open Boundaries: Creating Business Innovation through
Complexity, Santa Fe 1998; H. Mintzberg, J. Lampel, B. Ahlstrand, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour
Through the Wilds of Strategic Management, New York 1998; T. v. Ghyczy, B. v. Oetinger, Ch. Bassford,
Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist, s. l. 2001 (Polish translation:
Clausewitz o strategii, transl. A. Ehrlich, Warszawa 2002). Thus, we can notice here a considerable
semantic expansion of the term “war” and the cultural diffusion of the allegedly constant rules of
the phenomenon, formulated immediately after the revolution. Naturally, it co-exists with the “standard” theoretical-military reflection using Clausewitz’s categories; comp. T. Will, Operative Führung.
36
K r z y s z t o f Kw i a t k o w s k i
determinants of culture3 – a general cultural phenomenon4. European Medieval
Studies “discovered” and conceptualized this cultural aspect of “war” much earlier5
than researchers dealing with later periods, having obtained a variety of instruments of different humanistic analytical categories which facilitate the perception
of “war” and “conflict” more in terms of Bloch’s “understanding” than “knowing”6.
It must be considered a significant acquisition in the first decades after WWII, taking into account the major psychological impact of the experience of war on the
manner of understanding the discussed phenomena7.
Within the phenomena of “war” and “conflict”8, the psychological issues connected with the perception and experience of war events, are interesting areas of
research, even for a medievalist9. However, they are quite difficult to grasp, not
Versuch einer begrifflichen Bestimmung im Rahmen von Clausewitz’ Theorie „Vom Kriege”, Hamburg
1997; R. Beck, Clausewitz’ Kriegslehre in unserer Zeit, Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift,
Bd. 146: 1980, pp. 272–276; R. Bruhl, Zur militärtheoretischen Leistung Carl von Clausewitz, Militärgerichtes, Bd. 19: 1980, pp. 389–401; and in Poland the study of M.A. Faliński: Aktualność myśli Carla
von Clausewitza, Warszawa 1991.
3
O. G. Oexle, Geschichte als historische Kulturwissenschaft, [in:] Kulturgeschichte heute, hrsg.
v. W. Hardtwig, H.-U. Wehler (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 16), Gottingen 1996, pp. 14–40.
4
It refers to the phenomenon contrary to the „Anglo-Saxon” one. It does not concern the
transposition of military categories to other areas of human activity (i.e. economic ones), with the
emphasis on non-military conditions of the phenomenon of “war”. It means treating “war” not as a
collection of physical acts of violence committed with the use of weapon and conditioned by universal rules understood as objective signs of success (= achieving the aim), but as a much more complex
phenomenon – which was successfully suggested by the humanities of the German-speaking world;
comp. e.g. T. V. Troth, Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, [in:] Soziologie der Gewalt (Kolner Zeitschrift für
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft e, H. 37), Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 9–56.
5
Comp. H.-H. Kortum, Der Krieg im Mittelalter als Gegenstand der historischen Kulturwissenschaften. Versuch einer Annäherung, [in:] Krieg im Mittelalter, hrsg. v. H.-H. Kortum, Berlin 2001, pp.
13–43. Similarly, the Romance humanities, mainly French, proposed a new general cultural trend
of presenting the phenomenon of “war” in the Middle Ages; comp. e.g. the collection of articles
published in the post-conference volume La guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age, sous la dir.
P. Contamine, O. Guyotjeannin, vol. 1: Guerre et violence, Paris 1996; vol. 2: Guerre et gens, Paris
1996; the work of Philippe Contamine La guerre au Moyen Age (Nouvelle Clio n° 24), Paris 1980 (ed.
1) (Polish edition: Wojna w średniowieczu, transl. M. Czajka, Warszawa 1999 (ed. 1)) is regarded as
pioneering in the presentation of “war” as an inherent cultural phenomenon, preceded by the dissertation: idem, Guerre, État et société á la fin du Moyen Age. Études sur les armées de rois de France
1337–1494 (Civilisations et societes, vol. 24), Paris 1972.
6
Marc Bloch’s opinion that “in our mind the desire to understand is much stronger than the desire to know” is not uncontroversial (Pochwała historii czyli o zawodzie historyka, transl. W. Jedlicka,
Warszawa 1962 (wyd. 2), p. 34), as while the human mind is undoubtedly capable of understanding,
which is the fundament of its evolutionary development, at the same time it easily tends to generalize,
categorize and simplify.
7
J. Nowosadko, Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung. Die Einführung in die Militärgeschichte, Historische
Einfuhrungen, Bd. 6: (Berlin) 2002, p. 11–17, 108–110, 131–138.
8
A. u. J. Assmann, Kultur und Konflikt. Aspekte einer Theorie des unkommunikativen Handelns,
[in:] Kultur und Konflikt, hrsg. v. J. Assmann, D. Harth, Frankfurt a. Main 1990, p. 11–48.
9
Comp. e.g. B. Ulrich, „Militärgeschichte von unten”. Anmerkungen zu ihren Ursprungen, Quellen
und Perspektiven im 20. Jahrhundert, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Bd. 22: 1996, H. 4 (Militärge-
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The first impressions in Prussia after the defeat of the German Order...
only as a result of the scarce and relatively homogenous source base, but mainly
from the mental and cultural distance between contemporary man (of the industrial and post-industrial/information technology epochs) and medieval man (of
the epoch of traditional, mainly rural, societies and oral communication)10. This
gap does not mean, however, that no attempts should be made to examine such
problems. On the contrary, the results of the last two or three decades of research
have verified all the potential and real doubts11.
The multi-faceted analysis of the conflict of the Polish King Władysław Jagiełło
and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Vytautas against Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen (as well as the Teutonic Order and everybody recognizing its
territorial authority in Prussia) also had a classical political-military nuance12. It is
worth considering the conflict also in the previously mentioned historical-cultural
perspective13.
The perspective includes, for example, the question of the psychological impact of military campaigns on man, both in an individual and collective sense. The
issue concerns both participants of war and its observers, and it refers to both the
pre and post war period. The magnitude of this impact varies according to the different stages of participation and/or the learning process.
The term “impression” used in the general sense of the word refers to a psychological condition caused by external and /or internal stimuli, so therefore means
an inner feeling14. It must be noted that etymology explicitly shows the limited
original semantic scope of the word, which originally meant a psychological effect
through the influence of an individual by means of exclusively external stimuli15.
schichte heute, hrsg. v. D. Langewiesche), p. 474–504. Issues connected with the problem of war
experiences, emotions and impressions have been researched by the team led by Anton Schindling
at Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen within Sonderforschungsbereich 437 („Kriegserfahrungen.
Krieg und Gesellscha. in der Neuzeit”).
10
J. Le Goff, Wprowadzenie, [in:] idem, Długie średniowiecze, transl. M. Żurowska, Warszawa
2007, p. 5–16; idem, Człowiek średniowiecza, [in:] Człowiek średniowiecza, transl. M. Radożycka-Paloetti, Warszawa–Gdańsk 1996, p. 11–50; and the recent work of Robert Fossier: Ludzie średniowiecza,
transl. A. Czupa, Krakow 2009.
11
Comp. i.e. A. Crépin, Les depouilles des tues sur le champ de bataille dans l’histoire, les arts et la
pensée du haut Moyen Age, [in:] La guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age, vol. 1, p. 15–24.
12
The new monograph of the war of 1409–1411 prepared by four medievalists from Toruń and
Gdańsk is part of a classical traditional trend, comp. S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print), here: „Wstęp”,
p. 11–12.
13
Some questions were touched upon in the above-mentioned monograph. Nevertheless, they
still need a more thorough analytical examination. On the other hand, they also should be presented
systematically and should not limited by the chronologically limited narration; comp. K. Kwiatkowski, „Wyprawa letnia 1410 roku”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, op.cit.,
p. 238–563.
14
Inny słownik języka polskiego, ed. M. Bańko, vol. 2: (P–Ż), Warszawa 2000, p. 1048: „Nasze
wrażenie z czegoś to nasze myśli o tym i uczucia, jakich doświadczamy w zetknięciu się z tym [...]”.
15
The verbs „wrażać”, „wrazić” in Old Polish meant the activity of inserting, jamming; thus, it
connoted the “otherness”, the “ outerness”, which may disturb the integrity of a human being, and it
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Cognitive psychology understands “impression” as one of the learning processes
of man which, being the most primitive and natural, constitutes a sensual kind of
“perception”16. The aim of this article is not to show the structure of the epistemological phenomenon of acquiring information about the defeat of the Teutonic
Order in the battle near Stębark (Tannenberg) and Grunwald (Grünfelde) – its
perception17, but to attempt to analyze the reactions of individuals or groups (of
inhabitants of the Prussian state) to the defeat, and more precisely – to various announcements concerning it. Thus, the subject matter of the article will be human
reactions resulting from not only the sensual perception of stimuli, but also from
other cognitive mechanisms of man – for instance: attention, memory and thinking18. As such reactions occurred every time in a given community, we shall deal
with collective social reactions, in other words psychosocial phenomena19.
The article has been limited to the analysis of the reactions of Prussian state
inhabitants only. However, there were many other groups of people who had perceptions of the effects of the battle of 15 July such as: 2) members of the royal army
who were not inhabitants of Prussia; 3) mercenaries taking part in the battle on
both sides, mostly living outside Prussia; 4) members of the German Order from
other branches of the corporation (of Livonia and West-European and South-European bailiwicks); 5) subjects of the Polish king who did not take part in the
summer expedition20; 6) the widely understood “public opinion” regarding Prussia, The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in neighbouring
countries21).
may affect it; comp. Słownik staropolski, ed. S. Urbańczyk, vol. X: (W–Wżgim), z. 4(64): (Wjechać–
Wronię), Kraków 1991, p. 317; see also S. B. Linde, Słownik języka polskiego, vol. VI: (U–Z), Warszawa
1814, p. 305. The same situation takes place in the German language (Eindruck) and the English language (impression), which took the term over from Latin (impressio) through French (impression)
16
E. Nęcka, J. Orzechowski, B. Szymura, Psychologia poznawcza, Warszawa 2006 (wyd. 1),
s. 278–279; T. Maruszewski, Psychologia poznania, Gdańsk 2002 (ed. 2), p. 33.
17
This problem creates research possibilities and has already been discussed in the historiography of Grunwald in the context of the question when and to what extent King Władysław II became aware of the magnitude of his victory; comp. i.e. S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z Zakonem
Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1987 (wyd. 5), p. 413, 430–431; though it must be noted
that he was not consistent in his analyses expressing sometimes contradictory opinions; comp. ibid.,
p. 434.
18
Comp. e.g. T. Maruszewski, op.cit., p. 32, 76–77, 117–120, 332–335; E. Nęcka, J. Orzechowski,
B. Szymura, op.cit., p. 278–279, 320–326, 421–423; J. Kozielecki, Myślenie i rozwiązywanie problemów, [in:] Psychologia ogólna, ed. T. Tomaszewski, vol. 1, Warszawa 1992, p. 91–92.
19
A. S. Reber, E. S. Reber, Słownik psychologii, collectiva translation, ed. I. Kurcz, K. Skarżyńska,
Warszawa 2005, p. 728.
20
Some elements of the result of the perception of the battle of Grunwald among inhabitants of
the Polish Kingdom in the 15th century was analyzed by Czesława Ochałówna: Bitwa grunwaldzka
w poezji polsko-łacińskiej XV wieku, Małopolskie Studia Historyczne (further cit. MSH), R. 3: 1960,
z. 1/2, p. 81–106.
21
About this problem comp. the works of Andrzej F. Grabski: Echa bitwy grunwaldzkiej w historiografi zachodnioeuropejskiej, Zapiski Historyczne, vol. 32: 1967, z. 1, p. 7–48; idem, Pogrunwaldzkie polemiki, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne, Seria I,
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Considering the issue of perception concerning the outcome of the battle of
Grunwald and behavioural reactions to it, we should assume three chronological
divisions – 1) the day of 15 July, which means the hours between the end of the
military activity in the main area of fighting (in various spacial areas22) and the
time when most of the victorious army retired for the night; 2) the day after the
battle, 16 July and the beginning of the following day – the time when the victorious royal army and at least some prisoners of war (inhabitants of Prussia) were
staying near the site of the battle (on the symbolical “battlefield”23); 3) the days
following 17 July. Understandably, the time boundaries of the phenomenon are
quite blurred, which is typical of humanistic research. What is more, the fact that
many of the Teutonic army surrendered en masse should be mentioned here. This
surrender resulted from a series of stimuli and messages relaying the impossibility
of continuing and winning the battle (in both an individual and collective sense).
All these events should be treated as inherent elements of the battle.
It must be stressed that the preserved source records contain only indirect information about the first reactions on the day of the battle, which, obviously, had
to be limited to Prussian veterans from the grand master’s army and not the numerous inhabitants of the Prussian state who had not taken part in the battle.
Jan Długosz’s narration presenting the events soon after the Teutonic camp
was conquered included some premises which suggest the variety of reactions
from rural inhabitants of the area near the battlefield, who had observed the bat-
z. 45, Łodź 1966, p. 45–66; K. Pieradzka, Bitwa grunwaldzka w obcych relacjach kronikarskich (pruskich, śląskich i zachodnioeuropejskich), MSH, R. 3: 1960, z. 1/2, p. 51–65; J. Radziszewska, Echa bitwy
grunwaldzkiej w ruskich latopisach, MSH, R. 3: 1960, z. 1/2, p. 67–80.
22
K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 384–432.
23
Such a symbolic projection of the battlefield is confirmed by a copy of the royal diploma of 17
July for Iwan Suszik of Romanów issued “w wojsku, na poboju, na polu w pruskiej ziemi u wsi Thanenbriku i Grymwaldu”; comp. Zbiór dokumentów małopolskich, part VI: Dokumenty króla Władysława
Jagiełły z lat 1386–1417, wyd. I. Sułkowska-Kuraś, S. Kuraś, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków– Gdańsk
1974, nr 1743; however, according to the reliable source Kronika konfliktu and Roczniki the king
moved the camp by ¼ mile (about 1940–2100 m) in the direction of Malbork on 15 July in the evening; so, he could have left the battlefield (prelii locum) of Stębark and Grunwald, which was obvious
due to hygienic and sanitary reasons and the necessity to find potable water; comp. Cronica conflictus
Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. Anno Christi 1410. Z rękopisu Biblioteki Kornickiej (further cit.
CC), wyd. Z. Celichowski, Poznań 1911, p. 29; Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni
Poloniae, ed.S. Gawęda et alii, lib. X–XI (1406–1413) (further cit. Długosz X/XI), ed. K. Baczkowski
et alii, Varsoviae 1997, p. 117; also SRP, Bd. III, Leipzig 1866, p. 426 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 868); SRP,
Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867; Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski (further cit. KDW), wyd.
I. Zakrzewski, F. Piekosiński, A. Gąsiorowski, vol. V (1400–1444), Poznań 1908, nr 163, p. 171). The
analysis of the phenomenon of the battlefield as an isolated area has been recently carried out by
Bernd Huppauf: Das Schlachtfeld als Raum im Kopf, [in:] Schlachtfelder. Codierung von Gewalt im
medialen Wandel, hrsg. v. S. Martus, M. Münkler, W. Rocke, Berlin 2003, p. 207–234; comp. remarks
of Ulrich Brockling: Schlachtfeldforschung. Die Soziologie im Krieg, [in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 189–206.
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tle24. The chronicler tells the story25 about the king’s order to destroy all barrels
with wine and gives the evidence of witnesses who confirmed that great amounts
of wine mixed with blood were to flow down to the meadows of Stębark, creating
a gushing stream26. Next, Długosz narrates that the lower social classes created
stories in which the battle was so magnificent that the blood of the slain flowed
like streams27. The fragment provides the socially conditioned stereotypical idea
that any information which includes elements of the bizarre, particularly if recounted by people from the lower social strata, is to be considered fictitious (fictio)
and fabulous (fibula) by people of noble background. Nevertheless, such a stereotypical form of perception and stereotypical descriptive systems would prove that
such “folk” stories did work in the mid-15th century. Naturally, it is hard to say
whether they were created only in the area of the Polish Kingdom28, or if they also
included information from the local people of the region of Ostróda [Osterode] in
Hockerland29, which after 1454 in the context of another war might have reached
Poles and the Polish chronicler in a more or less direct manner30. The existence of
a story about a miraculous pond31 situated next to the chapter erected after 1411
and reconstructed after 1414 seems very probable. This phenomenon of simple
24
Długosz mentions six oaks growing on the site of the first battle, from which members of one
army were to observe the fight; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 105; they might also have been local people.
25
Comp. my recent remarks: K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 428, fn. 930 p. 428–429.
26
Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Veritus autem Wladislaus Polonie rex, ne exercitus suus a vino inebriatus redderetur inutilis, facile, si quis congredi auderet, eciam ab ignavo hoste vincendus, ne quoque
ex nimia potacione in morbos et languores solveretur, vasa vini discindi frangique iubet. Quibus ad
imperium regis celerrime confractis defluebat vinum occisorum cadavera, quorum erant in loco
stativorum hostilium haut parve congeries, et mixtum cum hominum equorumque interfectorum
sanguine rubeum torrentem conficiens usque ad prata ville Tamberk visum est defluxisse et aluendo
alveum ripasque ad modum torrentis sua impetuositate effecisse”.
27
Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Inde vulgari ficcioni et fabule occasionem prestitam ferunt, qua vulgatum erat tantum eo prelio sanguinis fusum esse, ut cruor torrentis in modum deflueret”.
28
It is reflected in preserved lyric works; comp. Cz. Ochałowna, op.cit., nr I, w. 40, p. 104; nr II,
w. 10, 20, p. 105; saying there were many thousands (e.g. 40 000) of victims, or even reporting that
all members of the grand master’s army were killed.
29
Accounts of folk beliefs concerning miraculous healings were given by the Pomesanian dignitary a few years after the battle; comp. Johann’s von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des
Landes Preussen, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] SRP, Bd. III, p. 333.
30
Comp. M. Biskup, Działalność dyplomatyczna Jana Długosza w sprawach pruskich w latach
1454–1466, [in:] Dlugossiana. Prace historyczne w pięćsetlecie śmierci Jana Długosza, ed. S. Gawęda,
Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, nr 561, Prace Historyczne, z. 65, Warszawa 1980,
p. 146–149, 150–156, 158–164.
31
R. Odoj, Kaplica na Polach Grunwaldu, Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie, 1962, nr 4 (78),
p. 745; the beliefs may have been associated with the pond or with the picture of Saint Virgin Mary
installed in a chapter consecrated on 12 March 1413; comp. Das Ausgabebuch des Marienburger
Hauskomtur für die Jahre 1410–1420, hrsg. v. W. Ziesemer, Königsberg 1911, p. 114 (17–18); S. Kujot,
Pobożne fundacye i pamiątki bitwy, Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, vol. 17: 1910,
p. 359; R. Odoj, op.cit., p. 745; S. Ekdahl, Pobojowisko grunwaldzkie i okolica w XV i XVI stuleciu, [in:]
Studia Grunwaldzkie, vol. III, ed. M. Biskup (Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im.
Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie, nr 136), Olsztyn 1994, p. 63.
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oral narrations which overemphasized the great amount of blood in the Teutonic
camp shows that there existed very strong sensual stimuli causing a psychological
reaction of hyperbolic perception of the reality. The strong sensual stimuli were
caused by the magnitude of the event – a significant number of bleeding and injured bodies32. It may be assumed that the very first impression of the inhabitants
of Prussia in the evening of 15 July was a very intense emotion triggered by the
number of killed people and the concentration of fights in that place, which led
to the feeling of astonishment and disbelief. This feeling of the bizarre created the
ambience for hyperbolic interpretations33. If we take into account the fact that the
Teutonic camp was the only significant34 place in the battlefield where the fights
were so concentrated and had a quite static nature, the reaction becomes fully
understandable. The homiletic text preserved in the 15th century copy prepared on
the basis of the so-called original Chronicle of conflict35 shows clearly that in the
Teutonic camp there were killed more people than in the whole “open” battlefield36;
the author stressed that all the defenders of the camp had been killed, which was
obviously an exaggeration to intensify the impressions of the reader37.
32
The evidence are human remains excavated near the chapter, some of which bore the signs of
many injuries; comp. B. Łuczak, Ludzkie szczątki kostne z Pól Grunwaldu, [in:] Studia Grunwaldzkie,
vol. I, ed. M. Biskup (Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego
w Olsztynie, nr 124), Olsztyn 1991, p. 106–142. The memory about the bloody fight in the camp, extended with time to the whole battle of 15 July, was also vivid in the 16th century, the evidence of
which is the seal used by in 1518 by the priest of the Grunwald chapter Jakob Rauther showing two
battleaxes directed against each other; comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit., p. 65 and pict. 1 p. 66.
33
A similar psychological phenomenon was presented in the narrative about an open battle between two mounted armies in the valley. Its dynamic character, considerable magnitude and the use
of a cavalry charge contributed to the creation of oral traditions about “the bridge made of human
arms” (“quasi unus pons manu factus”); comp. CC, p. 26.
34
Using the adjective I leave aside local fights for battle standards, only one example of which is
given by Długosz – the description of the combat for the Great Banner of Cracow (1); comp. Długosz
X/XI, p. 109. Being familiar with the structure of medieval cavalry battle (comp. e.g. A. Ayton, Arms,
armour and horses, [in:] Medieval Warfare. A History, ed. M. Keen, Oxford 1999, s. 187–193; S. Ekdahl,
Die „Banderia Prutenorum” des Jan Długosz – eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaft en in Gottingen, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Bd. 3,
Nr. 104), Gottingen 1976, p. 9–23), it is hard to believe that among several dozen of battle standards,
only the Great Banner of Cracow gave rise to local fights. The Polish chronicler described only this
episode, because he had concrete information about it; moreover, he did it also for stylistic reasons
– to build tension and to make the narration more dramatic. I shall address this complex problem of
Długosz’s narration about the battle of 15 July and the whole expedition of Władysław II in a separate
study (Dlaczego i w jakim celu Jan Długosz opisał bitwę grunwaldzką tak, jak ją opisał?).
35
Z. Celichowski, Wstęp, [in:] CC, p. 12.
36
CC, p. 28: „In illo autem loco plus, quam in toto con. ictu, cadavera mortuorum apparuerunt”.
37
Ibid., p. 28: „[...] sed statim devicti omnes in ore gladii perierunt”. The poetica expresion in ore
gladii – in the clutches of the sword taken from the Vulgate (Luc. 21, 24): „[...] et cadent in ore gladii
et captivi ducentur in omnes gentes et Hierusalem calcabitur a gentibus donec impleantur tempora
nationum [...]”, the prophetic and eschatological biblical context of this extract from the Gospel of
St. Luke presented as the words of Christ makes us perceive the fragment of Kronika konfliktu (or
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The next day after the battle, on 16 July, apart from the sight of dead bodies and
horses, local people were exposed to a series of symbolic actions undertaken by
King Władysław II. These ritual actions included the previously mentioned ostentatious march of the king and horses through the battlefield and next to it, which
caused extending the “battlefield” to the area of the enemy, inside Prussia, which
took place in the evening of 15 July38.
The first action had a purely sacral nature – a liturgy which was described
both in Chronicle of conflict and in Długosz’s annals as incredibly elaborate. Both
records contain information saying that three solemn masses were conducted that
morning39. The text of Chronicle of Conflict says that they were votive masses:
about the Holy Spirit (de Sancto Spiritu), to the Holy Trinity (de Sancta Trinitate)
and about the Division of the Apostles (de Divisione Apostolorum)40, whereas according to Długosz the votive masses are called: about Saint Mary (de Benedicta
Domina Nostra Maria), about the Holy Spirit and the Trinity41. It is understandable that the votive mass in honor of the Holy Trinity was preceded by the liturgy
to the Holy Spirit – the originator of God’s involvement in human life42. Nevertheless, the remaining two liturgies raise doubts. It must be noted, though, that the
letter of Władysław II to the bishop of Pomesania Johann II Rymann written on
16 Sept 1410 included thanksgiving references both for the intercession of Saint
Mary and the Twelve Apostles. The king introduced to the Prussian bishop his
intention to found a monastery on the battlefield43. The prisoners of war must have
maybe also the original Kronika konfliktu?) differently. In such a case the quantifier omnes does not
constitute a biblical amplification.
38
I look closer at this act in the monograph of war of 1409–1411, comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit.,
p. 450–451. About ritual acts constituting an essential element of the monarch’s rule and its manifestation comp. in Polish historiography the recent studies of Zbigniew Dalewski: Władza, przestrzeń,
ceremoniał. Miejsce i uroczystość inauguracji władzy w Polsce średniowiecznej do końca XIV wieku,
Warszawa 1996; idem, Rytuał i polityka. Opowieść Galla Anonima o konflikcie Bolesława Krzywoustego ze Zbigniewem, Warszawa 2005 (both works include foreign (mostly English and German)
literature of issues connected with understanding and executing the monarch’s power in the Early,
High and Late Middle Ages).
39
Długosz X/XI, p. 118. A solemn mass was an elaborate sung service; more about this issue
comp. e.g. J. Braun, Liturgisches Handlexikon, Regensburg 1924, p. 220, 223, 225; J. A. Jungmann,
Missarum Sollemnia. Eine genetische Erklärung der römischen Messe, Bd. I: Messe im Wandel der Jahrhunderte, Messe und kirchliche Gemeinschaft, Vormesse, Wien–Freiburg–Basel 1962 (wyd. 5), p. 267.
40
CC, p. 29.
41
Długosz X/XI, p. 121.
42
The king’s letters to his spouse – Queen Anne, the archbishop Mikołaj II Kurowski and the
Bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec of 16 July express the concept of God’s help given to the king while he was
choosing the site of the battle; comp. SRP, Bd. III, p. 426 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867); Universitätsbibliothek Eichstätt, Ms. 698, s. 379, 379 (edition: E. Schnippel, Vom Streitplatz zum Tannenberge, Prussia,
Bd. 31: 1935, s. 66); SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 866 = KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 170).
43
E. Strehlke, Ein Kloster auf dem Tannenberger Schlachtfelde, Altpreussische Monatsschrift,
Bd. 7: 1870, p. 46 (= S. Kujot, op.cit., Dok. nr 1, p. 375–376); comp. S. Kwiatkowski, O zapomnianym
programie ideowym kaplicy grunwaldzkiej w latach 1410–1414, [in:] Studia Grunwaldzkie, vol. I,
p. 59.
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witnessed all those liturgical rituals, the aim of which was the manifestation of the
belief that the Polish monarch had been supported by some supernatural powers
during the battle of Grunwald. It is impossible to define to what extent those rituals were staged with the intention of emphasizing the victory, and to what degree
they reflected the actual convictions of the king and people surrounding him both
emotionally and mentally. Both these factors could be relevant. While the latter
cannot be the subject of historical analysis, the sources remaining show clearly that
several dozen hours after the battle there were some providential interpretations of
the event which had a strong moral persuasive influence.
Liturgies are closely connected with the ritual of laying battle standards in front
of the king. They could have been acquired during the battle or found later near the
battlefield44. The text of Chronicle of Conflict interprets the events symbolically. It
relates the fact that the king stayed on the battlefield “for three consecutive days”45,
and like Długosz’s annals, it describes the ritual character of the monarch’s actions
– emphasizing the victory by the physical presence of the winner on the battlfield46.
This demonstration of victory consisted in the public ritual of laying at the feet of
the king the standards of the defeated enemy47 – the signs of God’s protection over
the leader and the army understood as a physical and real medium between super44
The Polish chronicler tells the story about seven standards from the army of the grand master
abandoned by escaping Teutonic knights and found by Polish knights in a birch grove on the day of
the battle; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Reperta deinde sunt in silva parva arboribus, quas multicoraces vocamus, obsita et haut procul a stacione hostili distante, septem hostium banderia a fugientibus derelicta et terre tantummodo infixa et mandata, que ad regem continuo delata sunt”.
45
CC, p. 29: „Tribus autem diebus continuis in loco con. ictus rex moram traxit, in quibus regi
banaria portabantur hostium, ita quod ab omnibus poterant intueri”; moreover ibid., p. 30. It must
be noted here that the verb ”intuo, -ere” does not mean just ”watching”, but “scrutinizing”, “admiring”, so it implies ostentation; comp. Słownik łacińsko-polski, red. M. Plezia, vol. III: (I–O), Warszawa
1969, p. 245.
46
K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 459–460.
47
Kronika konfliktu informs that prisoners of war and battle standards were brought to the king
simultaneously; comp. CC, p. 29. The information about how prisoners of war were treated was also
included in the king’s letter to Archbishop Mikołaj II Kurowski, written on 16 July, in which the king
wrote about bringing prisoners of war to royal tents; comp. Universitätsbibliothek Eichstätt, Ms. 698,
p. 378 (= E. Schnippel, op.cit., p. 66); also the letter to Poznań’s bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec; comp.
(SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 = MPH, vol. II, p. 866; KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 171). Undoubtedly, the creator
of the so-called original Kronika konfliktu took information from those sources. Also Jan Długosz
(Długosz X/Xi, p.115) writes clearly that prisoners of war were introduced to the Polish monarch the
next day after the battle. It can be concluded from the didactic narrative about capturing Marquard
von Salzbach, about which the king was informed by Great Duke Alexander Vytautas when the fights
were about to finish. However, the prisoner (together with another two Teutonic knights) was not
introduced to the king at that time; comp. Długosz X/Xi, p. 116. Other fragments of Długosz’s description prove that such acts took place the day before. Nevertheless, the chronicler underlines that
the king left battle standards and prisoners of war in the hands of those who had captured them, with
the intention of repeating the whole ritual of laying battle standards, which had a symbolic meaning;
comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 117–118: “Tota insuper nocte insequente gentes regie a persecucione hostium cum captivis et spoliis unnumeris redibant captivosque et signa hostium regi illa nocte excubias
in observacionibus agenti dedebant, quos et que ille iubet in crastinum reservari”.
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natural and earthly powers48. The act of laying the battle standards in front of the
victor had a double message; on the one hand, it showed the defeated party having
been abandoned by the supernatural powers; on the other hand, it manifested the
providential support of the victor. Symbolically, it constituted an announcement of
God’s decree, as did every battle at that time49.
Among the Teutonic prisoners of war, the act must have aroused apprehension.
Assuming that Długosz’s story about the meeting of Marquard von Salzbach with
Alexander Vytautas is not a rhetorical construct, the feeling of dejection should
be added to the list of emotions experienced by Teutonic prisoners of war, at least
in some individual cases50. Supposedly, feelings ran very strong, and they became
even stronger every time the standards were laid at the Polish monarch. The Polish
chronicler stresses the glorification of the Polish victory calling it a “triumph” (triumphus) and writing about the “glory” (Gloria), which the event brought to the
Polish king and his army51. It must have been a reflection of the fact how the monarch and the whole army were perceived, which is confirmed by the king’s letter
sent the next day after the battle to the bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec52. The tendency
of the king to maintain “glory” is visible, for he was careful not to commit anything
that could undermine it.
Apart from the act of laying standards and presenting prisoners of war another
decree of the king must be mentioned – the decree to find the dead body of the
commander of the defeated army, as well as the personal participation of the king
in looking for dead bodies of Teutonic knights53 and sending them back to the Teu48
O. Ławrynowicz, Treści ideowe broni rycerskiej w Polsce wieków średnich (Acta Archaeologica
Lodziensia, nr 51), Łodź 2005, p. 35 (this outstanding work also includes broader literature of the
subject matter).
49
Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens (further cit. ASP),
hrsg. v. M. Toeppen, Bd. I, Leipzig 1878, nr 98; Długosz X/XI, p. 123–124 (the narrative about the
conduct of Duke of Warsaw and Czersk Janusz I; comp W. Schild, Schlacht als Rechtsentscheid,
[in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 147–168; K. DeVries, God and Defeat in Medieval Warfare: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, [in:] The Circle of War in the Middle Ages. Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History,
ed. D. J. Kagay, L. J. A. Villalon (Warfare in History, vol. 6), Woodbridge 1999, p. 87–97. Irrespective
of the above-mentioned prophetic interpretation of the events, which was the result of thinking processes, it may be stated that this formula of understanding the battle is confirmed at the earliest stage
by the liturgy, particularly by the votive masses.
50
Die „Banderia Prutenorum” des Jan Długosz – eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410
(further cit. Banderia (E)), hrsg. v. S. Ekdahl (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in
Gottingen, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Bd. 3, Nr. 104), Gottingen 1976, p. 248; and a similar,
but not identical description in Roczniki; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 116–117.
51
Długosz X/XI, p. 117, 118 (with the connotation of the Old Testament, comp. Ps. 88, 11), 120,
121, 126; comp. Also Banderia (E), p. 250.
52
SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867; KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 171).
53
Długosz X/XI, p. 146; it can be inferred from the source that such a treatment of the defeated
enemy corresponded with the norms of that period. About this phenomenon comp. some remarks of
Valentin Grobner, Menschenfett und falsche Zeichen. Identifikation und Schrecken auf den Schlachtfeldern des spaten Mittelalters und der Renaissance, [in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 21–32.
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tonic party having demonstrated proper respect54. It must have included the act of
laying the dead body of the Teutonic commander in front of the Polish monarch,
which must have been in the presence of observers. Moreover, Długosz confirms
the use of the dead bodies of the defeated knights and expresses the opinion that
the monarch would have achieved a better result had he buried the Teutonic officials in cathedrals, monasteries and chapters of the Polish kingdom so that the
tombs would have recalled the Polish triumph55. It must be emphasized that the
dead bodies of the defeated officials56, including the grand master, were laid in
front of the king in the presence of the royal procession, which constituted a real
manifestation of the king’s victory over the master of the land. On the way to the
convent in Ostróda, where the bodies were probably transported57, the procession
on 17 July demonstrated clearly the result of the battle of Grunwald. The manifestation took place outside the battlefield, whereas the monarch himself demonstrated ostentatiously his victory on the battlefield by participating in the search
for dead bodies.
There was another act aimed at manifesting the Polish monarch’s victory.
It was a ceremonial feast for which the king invited not only dukes and significant
members of his army, but also some prisoners of war such as the duke of Szczecin
Casimir V and the duke of Oleśnica Konrad VII the White58, both of whom were
members of the Teutonic army. There exist no sources which confirm or deny the
participation of prisoners of war who were inhabitants of Prussia, such as burghers
of big Prussian cities. The only prisoners of war among people invited to the feast
who were named were the servant (diner) of the grand master Stanisław (Staszek)
of Bolumin59 (he took part in the search for corpses of the Teutonic knights, so his
54
CC, p. 30; Długosz X/XI, p. 121.
Długosz X/XI, p. 121: „Prestabilius autem et gloriossius iudicio meo Wladislaus Polonie rex
egisset, si corpora magistri, marsalci et comendatorum Prussie, non remittendo in Mariemburk, in
aliqua cathedralium aut conventualium seu collegiatarum ecclesiarum sui regni humari ordinasset,
triumphum suum magnificum radio visionis assidue renovatura”.
56
The body of Ulrich von Jungingen was sent together with the bodies of Grand Marshal Friedrich von Wallenrode, the commander of Człuchów Arnold von Baden and the commander of Toruń
Johann Graf von Sayn; comp. Banderia (E), p. 172, 228, 268.
57
More about the issue comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 455–456.
58
59
In 1410 Stanisław of Bolumin was a servant (diner) of the grand master; according to Długosz,
he was one of the closest servants (familiarior) of the head of the Teutonic Order amongst all the prisoners of war; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 120. This is confirmed by the sources from between 1403 and
1413; comp. Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409 (further cit. MTB), hrsg. v. E. Joachim, Königsberg 1896, p. 218 (5–7) (the sale of three horses worth 26, 24 and 10 grzywnas to the
treasurer of the Order in Bierzgłow); 553 (35–36); 560 (30–31) (the envoy of the grand master to
Poland in July 1409); OBA, nr 1974 ( remaining outside the Prussian state together with Bertold,
next to Alexander Vytautas for fear of the hostile reaction of the Teutonic knights to his behavior in
the summer of 1410); Acta capitulorum nec non iudiciorum ecclesiasticorum selecta, vol. III, pars 2:
Acta iudiciorum ecclesiasticorum dioecesum Plociensis, Wladislaviensis et Gnesnensis (1422–1533),
ed. B. Ulanowski (Monumenta Medii Aevi Historica, vol. XVIII, Wydawnictwa Komisyi Historycznej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Nr 63), Kraków 1908, nr 529 (the record confirms that
55
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participation in the feast is highly probable60), and the mayor of the Old Town of
Toruń Johann von der Mersche61.
All the actions discussed above were to communicate the king’s total glorious
victory over the Teutonic army in all respects. The message was directed to both
the royal army and to the prisoners of war. Thus, the psychological impact of the
victory on the participants and observers of the battle must be analyzed taking into
account not only the sensual stimuli from the battlefield, but also all the rituals of
the victorious monarch which took place between the evening of 15 July and the
noon of 17 July.
The ritual acts were to manifest and emphasize the impressions of the victory and “glory” of the triumphant monarch and the commander of the victorious
army62. An important question arises here – how the message and its perception
affected the emotions and reactions of the inhabitants of the Prussian state during
the first days after the battle.
The analysis of the remaining source material shows that the psychological
impact of the events witnessed by the prisoners of wars on the battlefield on 15–17
July should not be overestimated. The subsequent events confirm that the impressions caused by the rituals of the victorious king entailed relatively few concrete
behavioural reactions which could be understood as acts of support for the Polish
king. The sources report only one action directed against the Teutonic knights
directly after the battle – in the convent of Ostróda63, while other similar attacks
on five convents in Chełmno Land (Starogród, Papowo, Bierzgłowow, Kowalewo,
Pokrzywno) and the castles in Lipienek and Rogóźno were not initiated until the
first half of August64. It turns out that the impressions form the battlefield did not
Stanisław of Bolumin owned the village of Płowce in Kuyavia in 1413, grantem to him by the Polish
king); comp. also Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos ordinemque Cruciferorum, vol. III, ed. J. Karwasińska,
Warszawa 1935 (wyd. 2), p. 45, 47. His two relatives, Bertold von Bolmen (of Bolumin) and Poleske
von Bolmen (of Bolumin) were servants (diners) of Ulrich von Jungingen in 1409; comp. MTB 545
(28–30), 551 (27–29), 553 (26–28), 560 (24–27), 572 (2–4); comp. remarks of Antoni Czacharowski
(Opozycja rycerstwa ziemi chełmińskiej w dobie Grunwaldu, [in:] W kręgu stanowych i kulturalnych
przeobrażeń Europy Północnej w XIV–XVIII w., ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1988, p. 83–84), who following the suggestions of Stefan M. Kuczyński pointed out that Stanisław and Bertold provided
information to the Polish king in 1409. The estates in Bolumin (Gros Bolmen) covering 40 lans
were the property of private owners in 1423/1424, but the proprietors’ identity is unknown; comp.
OBA, nr 3625, p. 8 (edition: S. Ekdahl, Das Dienstbuch des Kulmerlandes (1423/24), Jahrbuch der
Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg/Pr., Bd. 16: 1966, p. 97). About Stanisław, his relatives and offspring comp. the recent comprehensive study of S. Szybkowski, Rodzina Bolumińskich na Kujawach
i w Wielkopolsce w XV wieku, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, ed. A. Rachuba, S. Gorzyński, H. Manikowska,
Warszawa 2002, p. 419–443.
60
61
ASP, Bd. I, nr 98.
62
J.-C. Schmitt, Gest w średniowiecznej Europie, transl. H. Zaremska, Warszawa 2006, p. 11–29;
also Z. Dalewski, Rytuał i polityka, p. 10–11.
63
E. Schnippel, Der Verrat von Osterode (1410), Oberländische Geschichtsblätter, H. 5: 1903,
p. 94–97.
64
K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 511.
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make the inhabitants of the Prussian state sympathize with the Polish king. It can
be concluded that irrespective of the psychological perception of the battle and its
aftermath, most inhabitants of Prussia did not regard the events discussed above
as motives which could convince them to act against their territorial ruler even
in the face of the physical elimination of people exercising power in Prussia – the
Teutonic dignitaries and the grand master himself.
What affected the attitude of the inhabitants of the Prussian state was the actual, not symbolic, presence of the king’s army in the closest geographical vicinity.
It can be seen in the behaviour of major Prussian towns such as the Main City
of Gdańsk, the Old Town of Toruń, the Old Town of Elbląg and the Old Town
of Königsberg65, as well as in the reaction of two (out of four) Prussian bishops
– Heinrich IV Heilsberg von Vogelsang and Johann II Rymann. In all cases the
action undertaken by the heads of the cities and territories were determined by
information about the proximity of the Polish army66. The Prussian towns adopted
a wait-and-see attitude in first two weeks after 15 July. Thus, the opinion found
in the literature of the subject that the act of releasing the prisoners of war was to
change the attitude of the Prussian population towards the monarch67 should be
verified as the influence of the propaganda action was not at all so effective.
It seems that the aftermath of the battle of Grunwald and the rituals conducted
on the battlefield on 15–17 July were not the only factors determining the fact that
the Polish monarch achieved territorial rule over most of the Prussian state relatively quickly. There existed two more conditions which facilitated his accession to
power: firstly, the real and physical presence of the royal army in various regions
of the Prussian state, the size of which was gradually growing; secondly, actions
undertaken by the authorities of local communities, the latter being a question for
separate research analysis.
Nevertheless, the reactions of members of the Prussian branch of the Teutonic Order (both the participants of the battle and its observers) were diversified68. The sources remaining suggest that feelings of terror and panic were dominant among those who had managed to escape from the battlefield. According to
Długosz, Grand Hospitaller Werner von Tettingen was the first to escape from the
battlefield, and then from the Teutonic camp near Stębark in the direction of his
own convent of Elbląg, from where he ran away to Malbork. He was to run away
65
The Old Town of Braniewo, which was at that time the fifth biggest town in Prussia, was ruled
by the bishop of Warmia [Ermland] Heinrich IV Heilsberg von Vogelsang, who did not take part in
the battle and whose territorial rule was not interrupted.
66
I present a more extensive analysis of the phenomenon in the monograph of the war of 1409–
–1411; comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 473–526.
67
S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 417, 430; it must be underlined that the researcher’s opinion was
influenced by his specific Sienkiewicz-esque image of the Teutonic knights as the “hated foreign
parasitic ruling class maintaining power only thanks to oppression” – the image which had little in
common with the reality of the beginning of the 15th century.
68
There are no sources commenting on the behaviour of the Teutonic prisoners of war.
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with other fugitives69. Although the narration was included in Roczniki [Annals]
to contrast cowardly Werner von Tettingen with the brave commander of Gniew
killed during the battle, it was based on real information transmitted orally. The
presence of the grand hospitaller in the convent of Malbork during the summer
siege of the castle by the Polish army is confirmed indirectly by other sources70.
It must be noted, however, that he did not stay in the nearest convent of Ostróda
where he could have undertaken defence preparations and prevented the enemy
from marching into the centre of the country. The analysis of the events shows that
other dignitaries such as the commander of Balga Johann von Schönfeld failed to
organize any kind of defence, and they directly made for their convents71. Such
circumstances illustrate the feelings of panic and confusion.
Other events also confirm this kind of reaction. The commander of Świecie
Heinrich von Plauen, who did not take part in the battle, within 72 hours after
the battle undertook preparations for the defence of the headquarters of the Teutonic Order. Interestingly, such preparations were not initiated by other dignitaries
– participants of the battle – such as Werner von Tettingen, Johann von Schönfeld,
Friedrich Graf von Zollern, Sigismund von Ramungen). Moreover, Heinrich von
Plauen so far had not displayed any particular leadership or organizational skills72.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that after the battle of Grunwald the corporation bonds of the Teutonic Order were undermined. In such circumstances the
organization of action was based to a large extent on family connections, which is
confirmed by the case of the elder brother of the commander of Świecie Heinrich
(the Elder) von Plauen, who in the summer of 1410 held the office of the procurator of Barciany [Barten] belonging to the convent of Brandenburg73and whose
participation in the battle of Grunwald was highly probably in the context of his
stay in the castle of Malbork in the third decade of July. His behavior immediately
after 15 July was similar to the cases presented above – he escaped north. First, he
probably ran away to his convent in Brandenburg (Pokarmin). There he could have
witnessed the capture of his superior Marquard von Salzbach and the defeat of
the army of the grand master, which might have led him to the decision to escape
directly to Malbork. In the last half of July he appears in the convent of Malbork
as the close associate of his younger brother, who was appointed grand master
on 19 July. In the castle there were also other relatives of his such as Heinrich
VIII (younger/older) von Plauen from Świecie74. It leads to the conclusion that the
69
K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., pp. 438, 489, 579.
71
Ibid., p. 438, 508.
72
Comp. my remarks about the characteristic mythicization of Heinrich (the Younger) von
Plauen, K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 486, fn. 1269. It should be stressed here that the commander’s
impetuousness was not regarded as a military virtue, which is expressed in the 15th century military
treaties.
73
Ibid., p. 489, fn. 1291.
74
Ibid., p. 468, fn. 1163.
70
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49
defence of the headquarters between 19 and 22 July was organized mainly on the
basis of structures beyond the Teutonic corporation. It demonstrates the unprecedented situation of the Teutonic Order in the second half of July 1410, and reflects
the psychological condition of some of its members.
The impressions after the lost battle and in the face of so many victims on the
Teutonic side must have been overwhelming75. Even though after 15 July the convents were still supervised as the majority of commanders did not take part in the
battle, the loss of so many Teutonic knights (203 or 211 brothers did not return
from the battle)76 contributed greatly to the feeling of dejection. Although it did
not provoke the total panic described by Długosz in his exaggerated narrative77, in
the next few days after 15 and 17 July the pessimistic ambience was strengthened
by the new information about the royal army reaching the centre of the Prussian
state. Some individual cases prove the gloomy atmosphere in the Teutonic Order78.
The analysis conducted here shows that the Prussian branch of the Teutonic
Order felt the specific situation in Prussia in the second half of July very intensely.
The phenomenon may be illustrated by the opinion expressed by the bishop of
Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębiec two weeks after the battle of Grunwald on 29 July.
The bishop associated the events of the days after the battle with the dissolution of
the Order of Knights Templar a century before79.
75
Ibid., p. 440.
Deutschordenszentralarchiv Wien, Hs. 427c, f. 27r. About the number comp. my dissertations:
K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 437.
77
Długosz X/XI, p. 122–123.
78
OBA, nr 28290, k. 1r.
79
SRP, Bd. III, p.. 429; I discussed it more thoroughly in the collective monograph of the war of
1409–1411; comp. K.. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 497.
76
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
ADAM SZWEDA (Toruń)
REMARKS ABOUT ARMISTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
FROM THE WAR PERIOD OF 14091411*
Key words: peace; armistice; document; seal; notarial instruments; Poland; Teutonic Order;
Polish-Teutonic war 1409–1411; 15th century
Documents of treaties concluded between Poland and the Teutonic Order in
the 14th and 15th centuries have enjoyed popularity among both Polish and German
historians such as Erich Weise1, Maksymilian Grzegorz2, Antoni Gąsiorowski3,
Klaus Neitmann4, Stanisław Szczur5, Przemysław Nowak6, and the author of this
article.7 However, this does not mean that the subject matter has been exhausted. In this article I wish to discuss documents drafted during the war of 1409–
–1411, which means not only the Treaty of Toruń, but also acts connected with
armistices concluded during the conflict.8 I shall devote more attention to Polish
*
p. 67–85.
1
E. Weise, Zur Diplomatik der Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens seit 1400, Altpreussische
Forschungen, Jg. 12: 1935, p. 218–231; Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15.
Jahrhundert, hrsg. v. E. Weise, Bd. I, Marburg 1970 (ed. 2); Bd. II, Marburg 1955 – it not only provides
information about valuable sources, but also includes numerous remarks of the author.
2
M. Grzegorz, Analiza dyplomatyczno-sfragistyczna dokumentów traktatu toruńskiego 1466 r.,
Toruń 1970.
3
A. Gąsiorowski, Polscy gwaranci traktatów z Krzyżakami XIV–XV w., Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie, 1971, nr 2–3, p. 245–265; idem, Formularz dokumentów traktatów polsko-krzyżackich
z XIV–XV wieku, Archeion, vol. 66: 1978, p. 171–184.
4
K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen 1230–1449. Studien zur
Diplomatie eines spatmittelalterlichen deutschen Territorialstaates, Koln–Wien 1986.
5
S. Szczur, Traktaty międzypaństwowe Polski piastowskiej, Kraków 1990; idem, Traktat pokojowy
Kazimierza Wielkiego z Zakonem Krzyżackim z 1343 r., Zapiski Historyczne (further cit. ZH), vol. 56:
1991, z. 4, p. 7–43.
6
P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju w Raciążku z 1404 roku, Studia Źródłoznawcze, vol. 40: 2002,
p. 57–77; idem, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty Władysława Jagiełły, ibid., vol. 42: 2004, p. 97–114;
idem, Dokumenty II pokoju toruńskiego z 1466 roku, ibid., vol. 43: 2005, p. 85–110; Dokumenty strony
polsko-litewskiej pokoju mełneńskiego z 1422 roku, ed. P. Nowak, P. Pokora, Poznań 2004.
7
A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim
w Prusach w latach 1386–1454, Toruń 2009, p. 293–310.
8
The following monograph is devoted to the conflict in: S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda,
52
Adam Szweda
(Polish-Lithuanian) documents. As the title of the article implies, it is not a monograph of the problem.
On 8 October 1409 documents confirming the armistice concluded until 24
June 1410 between King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen9 were drafted. Both acts were written in German, which was a customary
office practice of the Teutonic Order, but this observation applies mainly to internal relations of the Prussian state and relations with selected foreign partners.10
Latin remained the language used in Teutonic armistice and peace treaties concluded with Poland throughout the whole 15th century. It was only in the Treaty of
Raciążek in 1404 that Grand Master Conrad von Jungingen made one document
for King Władysław Jagiełło in German, which was a response to a letter written
also in German in which the king confirmed the conditions of the peace between
the Teutonic Order and Prince Vytautas the Great concluded in 1398 in Ostrów
Saliński.11 In Polish diplomacy, the act discussed above constitutes one of the few
examples when the German language was used. There are only seven known documents in the strict sense of the word and one letter written in German dating back
to the whole period of Władysław Jagiełło’s reign.12 The fact that documents were
normally made in Latin led researchers to attempt to answer the question why it
was drawn up in German, and not in Latin. Zenon H. Nowak supposed that “the
copy of the treaty might have had a counterpart in Latin, which did not survive”.13
Przemysław Nowak rightly pointed out that such a suggestion “is devoid of positive
premises”.14 He maintained that the fact of the armistice document being made in
German by both parties was determined by “the fact that [...] the letter in which
the Teutonic Order declared war was in German”.15 Nevertheless, this premise does
S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print) (further
cit. Wojna 1409–1411).
9
Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 74 (the royal document); Lites ac res gestae
inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, vol. II, ed. I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1892 (ed. 2), supplemet
no 51, p. 440–442 (Grand Master’s document).
10
K. Forstreuter, Latein und Deutsch im Deutschen Orden. Zur Frage einer Amtssprache, [in:]
Studien zur Geschichte des Preussenlandes. Festschri. fur Erich Keyser zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, hrsg.
v. E. Bahr, Marburg 1963, p. 384–385; M. Armgart, Die Handfesten des preusischen Oberlandes bis
1410 und ihre Aussteller. Diplomatische und prosopographische Untersuchungen zur Kanzleigeschichte
des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen, Koln–Weimar–Wien 1995, p. 70–71; comp. T. Jurek, Język średniowiecznych dokumentów śląskich, Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. 111: 2004, nr 4, p. 36–39; A. Szweda,
Organizacja i technika, p. 139–140.
11
P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju w Raciążku, p. 59–60 and reg. no 4A, 6A, p. 72–74; idem, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 107–112, no 4.
12
P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 97–114 (6 cases) and complemented by A. Szweda,
Organizacja i technika, p. 143.
13
Z. H. Nowak, Akt rozpoczynający „Wielką Wojnę”. List wypowiedni wielkiego mistrza Ulryka
von Jungingen z 6 sierpnia 1409 roku, Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie (further cit. KMW), 1976,
nr 1, p. 81.
14
P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 103, fn. 47.
15
Ibid., p. 102–103.
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53
not seem convincing, either. Forms of letters declaring war belonged to correspondence, although they looked like documents.16 This rule is confirmed in case of
the act declaring war on Władysław Jagiełło by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen in August 1409.17 Starting from the spring of 1407 with very few exceptions
all correspondence sent from the Teutonic office to the Polish king was written in
German.18 Thus, it is not surprising that the same rule applied to the letter declaring war sent in 1409. It is hard to assume that the language in which the act was
written entailed any repercussions. The key to explain why the 1409 armistice acts
of both parties were written in German is the context in which they were created.
The armistice was concluded with the intermediary of the Czech and Roman king
Wenceslaus IV, whose envoys were dukes of Oleśnica Conrad III the Old and his
son Conrad IV the Elder, brothers Vaclav and Beneš von Dohna connected with the
Prague court, the starost of Wrocław and Świdnica Jan from Chotěmice, a knight
Johann von Schweyne and Wrocław’s councilors. The initiative of Luxembourg was
connected with the situation in the Reich, where the position of Wenceslaus IV
had just become stronger as against the anti-king Ruprecht Wittelsbach elected in
1400. Mediation in a serious international conflict underlined Wenceslaus IV’s execution of the prerogative of the Roman king.19 Additionally, the document defined
the procedure of amicable proceedings in front of the Czech and Roman king; thus,
it had to be comprehensible for Czech diplomats and diplomats of the royal office.
As far as Wenceslaus IV’s documents are concerned there were no strict rules concerning the language – documents were written in Latin, German and – to a lesser
extent – in Czech. Nevertheless, in the “proper” Reich (excluding the Czech lands
and Moravia) the German language tended to dominate.20 The hint that makes us
suppose that the author of the document was a person from the German-speaking
world is the date to which the decision of the mediation allermanne Fastnacht to
denote the first Sunday of Lent (Invocavit) should be added. This is a typically “folk”
term, used both in the south and north of Germany.21
16
W. Rosener, Fehdebrief und Fehdewesen. Formen der Kommunikation beim Adel im spateren
Mittelalter, [in:] Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, hrsg. v. H.-D. Heimann in Verbindung mit I. Hlavaček, Paderborn 1998, p. 96; A. Szweda,
Organizacja i technika, p. 290.
17
Z. H. Nowak, op.cit., p. 84 (edition of the source); K. Kwiatkowski, Okoliczności wypowiedzenia wojny królowi polskiemu Władysławowi II przez wielkiego mistrza zakonu niemieckiego Ulricha
von Jungingen w sierpniu 1409 roku, ZH, vol. 74: 2009, z. 3, p. 32–33 (edition of the notary instrument
with a description of the letter declaring war).
18
About the circumstances of shirting from Latin to German see A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 139–143.
19
See J. Goll, Čechy a Prusy ve středověku, Praha 1897, p. 112, 114; K. Durschner, Der wacklige
Thron. Politische Opposition im Reich von 1378 bis 1438, Frankfurt am Main 2003, p. 210–211.
20
I. Hlavaček, Das Urkunden- und Kanzleiwesen des bohmischen und romischen Konigs Wenzel
(IV.) 1376–1419. Ein Beitrag zur spatmittelalterlichen Diplomatik, Stuttgart 1970, p. 87–93.
21
H. Grotefend, Zeitrechnung des deutschen Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Bd. I, Hannover 1891,
p. 55, 57–58.
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The original copies of documents from both parties have survived. The Polish
act bears the medium-sized seal of Władysław II Jagiełło as the drafter of the document22 and seven (originally nine) sigils of the guarantors: the archbishop Mikołaj
Kurowski (impressed on red wax, like the king’s seal), the castellan of Wojnowice
Mikołaj Białucha of Michałowo, the chamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, Dobrogost Świdwa of Szamotuły, Voivode of Kalisz Maciej of Wąsosz, the Castellan of
Nakło Wincenty of Granowo and Mikołaj of Oporowo. Of two parchment stripes
with seals there are left only cuts in the parchment; according to the list of the
guarantors there were included in the document the seals of the castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo and the Marshall of the Polish Kingdom Zbigniew of
Brzezie.23
The Teutonic document also bears ten seals, the first one being (according to
the corroborating text) unsers ordens groste ingesegel, which was the image seal
of the grand master which bore the character of the official sigillum in accordance
with the Teutonic statutes. It depicted the Madonna enthroned with the child and
was impressed on black wax.24 On its reverse there was a contrasigillum impressed
on red wax – it was a smaller heraldic seal of the grand master.25 The remaining
nine seals were placed by the guarantors from the Teutonic side: Grand Commander Kuno von Lichtenstein, Grand Marshal Frederick von Wallenrode, Grand
Hospitaller and Commander of Elbing [Elbląg] Werner von Tettingen, Grand
Cloak-Bearer and Commander of Dzierzgoń Burkhart von Wobeke, Commander
of Thorn [Toruń] Albrecht von Schwarzburg, Commander of Danzig [Gdansk] Johann von Schönfeld, Commander of Grudziądz [Graudenz] Wilhelm von Helfenstein, Commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von Plauen, and Commander of
Mewe [Gniew] Siegmund von Ramungen. The seals were impressed on green and
brown wax.26
22
About the mark see Z. Piech, Monety, pieczęcie i herby w systemie symboli władzy Jagiellonów,
Warszawa 2003, p. 49–50.
23
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem (further cit. GStAPK),
XX. Hauptabteilung (further cit. XX. HA), Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 3; P. Nowak,
Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, reg. no 5, p. 112–113.
24
About the chief stamps of grand masters see zob. J. Trupinda, Ikonografia pieczęci wielkich
mistrzów, [in:] Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów w Malborku. Katalog wystawy, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork
2001, p. 22–26; por. R. Kahsnitz, Siegel als Zeugnisse der Frommigkeitsgeschichte, [in:] 800 Jahre Deutscher Orden. Ausstellung der Germanischen Nationalmuseums Nurnberg in Zusammenarbeit mit der
Internationalen Kommission zur Erforschung des Deutschen Ordens, hrsg. v. von U. Arnold, Gutersloh
– Munchen 1990, p. 370–374.
25
About the seal see J. Trupinda, Ikonografia pieczęci, p. 26–27.
26
Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Warszawa (further cit. AGAD), Zbiór dokumentów pergaminowych (dalej cyt. ZDP), nr 48 – I would like to thank Dr Janusz Grabowski from AGAD for
the possibility to examine the Teutonic originals; J. Grabowski, Źródła do dziejów stosunków Polski
z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w zbiorach Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, [in:]
Kancelarie krzyżackie Stan badań i perspektywy badawcze, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2002, p. 111 and
fn. 27.
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What is curious is a certain disproportion in the seals used by the rulers (the
main seal of the grand master, and the mere medium-sized seal of the king) and
the choice of the guarantors (the most important officials on the Teutonic side, but
on the Polish side there were two knights who did not hold any position). It seems
that it may be explained by the urgency of the situation and field conditions: the
king did not have the majestic seal with him, and the guarantors were chosen from
the people who happened to be within reach – interestingly, there were few high
officials within the chosen group.
Both acts are identical – the differences concern only the drafters, guarantors
and the way of addressing Wenceslaus IV, who for the grand master was the “most
kind master”, whereas for the king he was a “beloved brother”.27 They were simplified forms (i.e. there is no arenga), and the content of the treaty was organized into
articles.28 Both documents (the Polish one and the Teutonic one) were engrossed
by two different people29, which seems to have been a rule in case of treaties like
this one.
The armistice concluded in October 1409 was to last until 24 June 1410, and
during that period the Polish-Teutonic conflict was to be judged by Wenceslaus
IV. However, the failure of mediation proceedings led to the renewal of military
actions, preceded by the prolongation of the period of armistice for another 10
days. It took place in the morning of 24 June 1410 at the initiative of the envoys of
the Hungarian king and the vicar-general of the Reich Siegmund of Luxembourg:
Mikołaj Gary and Ścibor of Ścibórz30, who must have been given special powers
by Władysław Jagiełło as it is not known whether they were accompanied by an
envoy of the Polish king. Hungarian diplomats wanted to win some more time for
further mediation. According to Jan Długosz, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen prolonged the armistice firmavit litteris.31 With this document, which did not
survive in any form, the Hungarian envoys must have gone to King Władysław
Jagiełło, whom they met in Wolbórz on 26 June while he was consulting his advisors. The king approved of the agreement and drew up a document on his part.
Władysław Jagiełło promised to maintain the armistice until 4 July 1410 in his
name , in the name of Duke Alexander Vytautas the Great and all his subjects. On
the other hand, it also embraced the grand master and his subjects from Prussia
and the New March [Neumark]. The Polish king made a reservation that the treaty
could not be breached even if some of his subjects who did not know about the armistice agreement attacked the Teutonic Order. The document has a simple form;
27
It was pointed out by E. Weise, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 74, p. 74.
Such a form is used starting from the Treaties of Raciążek – A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 176.
29
P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 102.
30
See K. Kwiatkowski, „Wyprawa letnia 1410 roku”, [in:] Wojna 1409–1411 (in print), where the
critical analysis of sources and literature is to be found.
31
J. Długosz, Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, lib. X/XI, ed. M. Plezia et al., Warszawa
1997, p. 62.
28
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it does not list the guarantors for observing its conditions; nor does it include a
list of witnesses. The formula near the date bears the name of Mikołaj Kurowski,
the Archbishop of Gniezno. The act was authenticated by a smaller heraldic seal of
the Polish ruler (with a quadrated image of the Eagle and the Pahonia).32 The economical form of the king’s document shows that the lost document of the grand
master looked identical. In a sense the form of the document was connected with
the fact that it was a short-term armistice, and nothing in the document suggests
that it was to be used as a kind of a trial period before coming to a permanent
agreement. According to the Polish chronicler, Władysław Jagiełło was satisfied
with a prolonged armistice, for it allowed him to concentrate the army and march
towards the border with Prussia. In the same vein, for the head of the Teutonic
Order the armistice also had a purely military significance.33
After the summer and autumn campaign of 1410 the first negotiations between
the parties of the conflict took place at the end of November.34 The talks begun at
that time led to the conclusion of the armistice agreement of 7 December 1410 by
advisors of both rulers; the agreement was to be binding from 14 December 1410
to 11 January 1411. The fact of establishing the armistice and its conditions were
confirmed in the documents of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen made on 9 December in Nieszawa [Nessau] and (the New City of)
Toruń.35 In both acts there appear guarantors. The Polish document lists the following guarantors: Bishop of Płock Jakub of Kurdwanów, Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój
of Ostroróg, Voivode of Sieradz Jakub of Koniecpol, Voivode of Inowrocław Maciej of Łabiszyn, Subchamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, the judge of Poznań
Mikołaj of Czarnków, the castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, the castellan of Łęczyca Jan Rola of Łąkoszyn, the castellan of Międzyrzecz Janusz Furman
of Zaniemyśl, the castellan of Nakło Maciej Kot of Dębno, next two dots appear
on the parchment (..) followed by the word pincerna (cup-bearer), then the list
continues to give the following names: Master of the Hunt of Łęczyca Mikołaj of
Oporowo, the starost of Sieradz Bartosz, the castellan of Biecz Domarat of Kobylany and the court marshal Piotr of Niedźwiedź.36 The list raises doubts in two
cases: the anonymous cup-bearer and the starost of Sieradz Bartosz. At that time
the position of the starost of Sieradz was held by Mikołaj Białucha of Michałowo
(1406–1418)37, which is very well documented in the sources. The original of the
32
GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 7; see also Die Staatsvertrage des
Deutschen Ordens, p. 83. The seal described by Zenon Piech, op.cit., p. 50.
33
J. Długosz, Annales, lib. X/XI, p. 61, 62; K. Kwiatkowski, „Wyprawa letnia” (in print).
34
A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 375 (here sources and literature are to be found).
35
Edition: Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 63, p. 453–455 (the Polish document), supplement no 64, p. 455–457 (the Teutonic document).
36
Ibid., suplement no 63, p. 453–455. The edition omits Mikołaj of Błociszewo and dots before
the word pincerna. Original – GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 5.
37
Urzędnicy łęczyccy, sieradzcy i wieluńscy XIII–XV wieku. Spisy, opr. J. Bieniak, A. Szymczakowa, Wrocław 1985, p. 137, nr 357.
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Polish armistice document 38 allows us to solve the riddle. It bears 14 seals, and on
one parchment stripe there are only remains of the wax protective cup. The smaller
heraldic seal of the king was placed first; next to it there is the heraldic seal of the
bishop of Płock impressed on red wax, then the document bears sigils with the
coats of arms of lay officials: Nałęcz of Sedziwój of Ostroróg, Pobóg of Jakub of Koniecpol, Leszczyc of Maciej of Łabiszyn, Starykoń of Piotr Szafraniec and Nałęcz
of Mikołaj of Czarnków. The common feature of all the images is the fact that the
coats of arms are shown with jewels. The next sigils were placed irrespective of the
order in which their owners appeared in the text of the document and the images
of the coats of arms are devoid of jewels. These seals include the coats of arms of:
Rola of Jan Rola of Łąkoszyn, the remains of the wax cup on the parchment stripe,
Grzymała of Domarat of Kobylany, Pobóg of an anonymous owner, Starykoń of
Piotr of Niedźwiedź, Sulima of Mikołaj of Oporowo, a seal with a blurred image
and rim inscription, Sulima of an unidentified owner (blurred rim inscription).
The seal mark, on which there is only part of the protective cup left, and the stamp
with a completely blurred image might have borne the coats of arms of Doliwa
(Janusz Furman and Maciej Kot), or Ostoja of Mikołaj of Błociszewo. At least one
of those three men did not place his seal on the document. The two remaining sigils should be associated with the mysterious cup-bearer and the alleged starost of
Sieradz Bartosz. It seems that the latter could be associated with the seal of Sulima,
for at that time a Bartosz bearing this coat of arms was a servant of Władysław
Jagiełło. His name was Bartosz of Charbinowice and Ogrodzieniec, who from
September 1411 was a subchamberlain of Sandomierz39, connected with the royal
court as the housemaster [Hormeister] of Queen Anna’s court from 1414.40 It is
still unknown what position was held by him in December 1410. It is possible that
Bartosz was at that time the starost of Sandomierz as it is not known who held
the position at that time. In December 1408 the position was held by Krystyn of
Ostrów, and from 25 February 1411 Jan of Sprowa is documented as the starost
of Sieradz.41 It is possible that someone made a mistake and wrote “Syradiensis”
instead of “Sandomieriensis”. However, there are no premises which could allow
us to identify the “cup-bearer” (pincerna) with any official bearing the coat of arms
of Pobóg. Cup-bearers of the time bore other coats of arms, but it must be noted
that in some cases the manning of the office of the cup-bearer for some lands has
not been identified.
Apart from the problems with identification referring to particular people, it
must be stated that the Polish armistice document was prepared hastily and ad
hoc. Its draft failed to include the list of guarantors, and probably recorded inaccu38
GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 5.
Urzędnicy małopolscy XII–XV wieku. Spisy, opr. J. Kurtyka, T. Nowakowski, F. Sikora, A. Sochacka, P. K. Wojciechowski, B. Wyrozumska, Wrocław 1990, nr 841.
40
K. Piotrowicz, Charbinowski Bartosz, [in:] Polski słownik biograficzny, vol. III, Kraków 1938,
p. 263.
41
Urzędnicy małopolscy XII–XV wieku, nr 1381, 1382.
39
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rately the office held by one of them. Moreover, not all the guarantors placed their
sigils on the document, which is another argument that the document had been
prepared in a hurry.
The guarantors of the document of the grand master were: Archbishop of Riga
Johann von Wallenrode, Bishop of Würzburg Johann von Egloffstein, German
Land Master and the bishop’s brother Konrad von Egloffstein, former Land Commander of the Teutonic Order in the Czech lands and Moravia Albrecht von der
Duba (Duben), Great Commander Hermann Gans, Commander of Toruń Eberhard von Wallenfels and many “guests” and mercenaries: Heinrich VIII von Plauen,
Beneš von Dohna, Peter von Schellendorf, Franczke von Warnsdorff, Czenke von
Borsnitz, Nicolaus von Loga, Johann Rabe and Martin von Busewoy (Budziwojowic).42 The original of the act has also survived.43 It is symptomatic that only 12 out
of the 15 guarantors placed their seals there. One seal has disappeared and another
three have been damaged. Both acts were drawn up in a simple form and began
directly with the intitulation.
The subsequent armistice documents were drafted by both parties during talks
which started on 21 January 1411. They were sealed by representatives of Grand
Master Heinrich von Plauen and King Władysław Jagiełło. They were amended
with additional “points, articles and decisions”. The sources have not survived, but
we know about their existence from the records in the document of the next armistice.44 The break in military actions was to last until midnight of Friday 23 January. The following day it was prolonged until the morning of 26 January. This time
the royal document survived. Its co-drafters and guarantors were: Grand Duke of
Lithuania Alexander Vytautas, Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Voivode
of Sandomierz Mikołaj of Michałowo, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo and
Castellan of Sącz Krystyn of Koziegłowy.45 Władysław Jagiełło placed his smaller
heraldic seal on the document, and Vytautas – a smaller horse seal (with The Pahonia on the right)46; only the parchment stripe remains of the sigil of Sedziwój of
Ostroróg. Next there are heraldic seals of the remaining guarantors impressed onto
green wax: Poraj of Mikołaj of Michałowo, Doliwa of Janusz of Tuiszkowo and Lis
of Krystyn of Koziegłowy.47 The Teutonic armistice act of 1411 did not survive.
After the period of armistice had terminated, there took place military campaigns, but the negotiations of 30 January led to the conclusion of a permanent
42
Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 64, p. 455–457.
AGAD, ZDP, nr 50.
44
Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy, ed. E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845, p. 125–127. About the talks see
A. Szweda, K. Kwiatkowski, „Rokowania przed zawarciem pokoju i sytuacja militarna na przełomie
stycznia i lutego 1411 roku”, [in:] Wojna 1409–1411 (in print).
45
Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy, p. 125–127.
46
See W. Semkowicz, Sfragistyka Witołda, Wiadomości Numizmatyczno-Archeologiczne, R. 13:
1930, p. 73; Z. Piech, op.cit., p. 93.
47
43
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peace treaty on 1 February 1411 in Toruń.48 Prior to signing the peace treaty Grand
Master Heinrich von Plauen pledged to pay 600,000 grosches as ransom for Teutonic prisoners of war. The act is not well preserved.49 On 1 February the conditions were recorded in the preliminary peace documents. The First Peace of Toruń
represented, according to the terminology introduced by Klaus Neitmann, a “sophisticated” manner of concluding treaties – first the document was drawn up by
plenipotentiaries, and then it was ratified by rulers in the form of a separate act
bearing the names of all guarantors.50 The act of the Polish-Lithuanian party was
drawn up under the name of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas. The preliminary documents bear the seals of the king and the grand
duke, as well as the Masovian dukes (Siemovit IV of Płock and Janusz of Czersk),
seven Polish negotiators (Voivode of Sandomierz Mikołaj of Michałowo, Voivode
of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo, Marshal of the Kingdom Zbigniew of Brzezie, Subchamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, Castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, and the judge of Poznań Mikołaj
of Czarnków).51 Only the sigil of the grand duke, placed as the second, survived.
This is the previously mentioned smaller seal with the image of the Pahonia (an
armored knight holding a silver sword in his right hand). We can suppose that
King Władysław Jagiełło analogically used his smaller heraldic seal to stamp the
preliminary peace document.
The drafter of the Teutonic Order’s document was Grand Master Heinrich von
Plauen. The act was also authenticated by Teutonic negotiators (Archbishop of
Riga Johann von Wallenrode, Bishop of Würzburg Johann von Egloffstein, Bishop
of Chełmno Arnold Stapel, Bishop of Pomesania Johann Rymann, German Land
Master Konrad von Egloffstein, Livonian Land Master Konrad von Vietinghoff and
commanders of the mercenaries: Johann Romlian von Kobern, Werner Nothast
and Konrad Truchses).52 The head of the Teutonic Order used his smaller seal impressed on black wax, a small piece of which has survived. The bishops impressed
their seals on red wax, and the rest on green and brown wax. One seal has not survived at all – there is only a parchment stripe left. The preliminary documents were
prepared in a simple form, and their rulings were expressed in points.53
48
About the details of the last stage of the negotiations see A. Szweda, K. Kwiatkowski, „Rokowania przed zawarciem pokoju” (in print).
49
M. Pelech, Der Verpflichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrichs von Plauen bezuglich der Bezahlung von 100000 Schock bohmischen Groschen an den Konig von Polen vom 31. Januar 1411, Preussenland, Jg. 17: 1979, p. 59–62, Anhang Nr. 1.
50
K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, p. 148–149, 162–165; see also
A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 173.
51
AGAD, ZDP, nr 4487; edition: Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, ed. A. Lewicki, vol. II,
Kraków 1891, nr 35. Podobizna: J. Grabowski, Z dziejów stosunków Polski z Zakonem krzyżackim
w Prusach, Warszawa 2006, p. 24, nr 6.
52
AGAD, ZDP, nr 49; editio: Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 61, p. 461–464.
53
Comp. A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 175.
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The preliminary documents drawn up in Toruń on 1 February 1411 defined
the manner of ratifying the conditions of the peace treaty as well as the people and
towns whose seals should be included in the main documents. According to the
established procedure the stamping and the exchange of the documents took place
at the assembly of the plenipotentiaries of both parties at Drwęca near Złotoria on
10 May 1411.54 The Polish party received the Teutonic act with 41 seals. According to the corroborating text, the Grand Master placed his sigillum maiusm – the
previously mentioned seal with the image of the Madonna, but only parchment
stripes have survived in the document. Apart from Heinrich von Plauen, the following bishops stamped their seals: Bishop of Chelmno Arnold Stapel, Bishop of
Pomesania Johann Rymann, Bishop of Sambia Heinrich von Seefeld; the land masters: German Land Master Konrad von Egloffstein, Livonian Land Master Konrad
von Vietinghoff, Grand Commander Hermann Gans, Chief Marshal Küchmeister,
Grand Hospitaller and Commander of Elbląg [Elbing] Werner von Tettingen,
Grand Cloak-Bearer and Commander of Dzierzgoń Albrecht von Tonn, the treasurer Boemund Brendel; the commanders: Commander of Toruń Eberhard von
Wallenfels, Commander of Balga Frederick von Zollern, Commander of Brandenburg Ulrich Zenger, Commander of Neman [Ragnit] Helferich von Drahe, Commander of Ostróda [Osterode] Konrad Sefeler, Commander of Gdańsk [Danzig]
Heinrich (the Elder) von Plauen, Commander of Gniew Peter von Lorich, Commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Johann von Konstat, Commander of Grudziądz
[Graudenz] Johann von Bichau, Commander of Radzyń [Rehden] Georg von Wirsberg, Commander of Człuchów [Schlochau] Jost von Hohenkirchen, Commander
of Tuchola [Tuchel] Simon Langschenkel, Commander of Brodnica [Strasburg an
der Drewenz] Wilhelm von Eppingen, Commander of Kowalewo [Grünhagen]
and Golub [Gollub] Karl von Waltershausen, Commander of Nieszawa [Nessau]
Konrad von Buchsecke, Commander of Starogród [Althausen] Frederick Schott;
the reeves [vogts] : of Tczew [Dirschau] Heinrich von Querfurt, of Grabino [Grebin] Johann von Techwitz, of Rogozina Hartmann Lebe; the knights: Augustin von
Ziegenberg (of Cymbark, Cegenberg), Heinrich of Bąków [Bankau], Kaspar of
Bażyny (von Baysen, Thomas of Taszewo (von Teschow) and Nikolaus Weytkop;
the towns: Chełmno [Kulm], Toruń [Thorn], Gdańsk [Danzig], Elbląg [Elbing],
Królewiec [Königsberg] and Brodnica [Strasburg an der Drewenz]. The bishops
impressed their sigils on red wax, the officials and knights on brown wax and the
towns on green or brown wax.55
The Teutonic party received the Polish-Lithuanian act. Its original did not survive, and its contents are known from transumpts and copies made out after 1411.56
54
A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 378.
AGAD, ZDP, nr 1062; rdition: Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 83b (paralel
edition of the Teutonic document and the Polish-Lithuanian act). The image: ‘Grunwald. 600 lat
chwały. Katalog wystawy”, compiled by J. Grabowski (in print).
56
Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, nr 83b.
55
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According to the text of the corroboration of the document it was impressed with
the majestic seals of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Vytautas, the sigils of Masovian dukes Janusz I and Siemovit IV, Lithuanian
dukes Semen Lingwen Olgierdowicz, Sigismund Kęstutaitis and Semen Jamuntowicz; Archbishop of Gniezno Mikołaj Kurowski; the bishops: Bishop of Cracow
Piotr Wysza, Bishop of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębica, Castellan of Cracow Krystyn
of Ostrów; the voivodes: Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Voivode of Kalisz Maciej of Wąsosze, Voivode of Cracow Jan of Tarnów, Voivode of Sandomierz
Mikołaj of Michałowo, Voivode of Sieradz Jakub of Koniecpol, Voivode of Brest
Krzesław of Kościelna Wieś, Voivode of Inowrocław Maciej of Łabiszyn; the castellans: Castellan of Sandomierz Michał of Bogumiłowice, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz
of Tuliszkowo, Marshal of the Kingdom Zbigniew of Brzezie, Subchamberlain of
Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, Castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, the judge of
Poznań Mikołaj of Czarnków; Lithuanian magnates: Voivode of Vilnius Wojciech
Moniwid, Land Marshal Stanisław Czupurny, Voivode of Kiev Jerzy Giedygołda,
Voivode of Uszpole Krystyn Ościk, Radziwiłł57, Rumbold Wolimuntowicz, Jan
Sugajła and Jan Niemira; and the towns: Cracow, Sandomierz, Cracow, Poznań,
Kalisz, Brześć Kujawski and Inowrocław.
The Polish-Lithuanian document of the Peace Treaty of Toruń received a few
transumpts made on the request of the grand master when it was necessary to show
it as proof during international conflicts involving the Teutonic Order. Transporting the original far away was too risky.58 The first transumpt edited in the form of
a notarial instrument by the Bishop of Pomesania Johann Rymann on 8 October
57
He is commonly identified with the son of Krystyn Oscika whose name is given next, comp.
recently: R. Petrauskas, Lietuvos diduomenė XIV a. pabaigoje – XV a. Sudėtis – struktūra – valdžia,
Vilnius2003,p. 215. Taking into account that Radziwill Oscikowicz died in 1477 or 1478, and he appears in the sources from 1420 (the source printed out by Rimvydas Petrauskas: GStAPK, XX. HA,
Ordensbriefarchiv, nr 29038 – dated from 1412, por. ibid., p. 81, fn. 71, was created most probably in
1411 and might be connected with the establishment of the final list of the guarantors of the peace
treaty); the supposition of Mirosława Malczewska (Latyfundium Radziwillów w XV do połowy XVI
wieku, Warszawa–Poznań 1985, p. 30), that it may be another person is worth considering. It was also
considered by Władysław Semkowicz (O litewskich rodach bojarskich zbratanych ze szlachtą polską w
Horodle roku 1413 (printed in the years 1913–1930 in Miesięcznik Heraldyczny and Rocznik Polskiego
Towarzystwa Heraldycznego), reprint: Lithuano-Slavica Posnaniensia. Studia Historica, vol. 3: 1989,
p. 61; here also (fn. 376) a list of various members of the Radziwill family including those who rarely
appeared in sources). The statement of Tadeusz Wasilewski (Pochodzenie rodu Radziwillow-Oscików,
Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica, vol. 7: 1997, p. 12) that the person mentioned in the text is Krystyn
Oscik Radziwillowicz is wrong as Oscik was a son of Syrpuc, comp. R. Petrauskas, op.cit., p. 80–81 and
fn. 71, p. 214–215; moreover, in this case there would have been 35 guarantors, but the document bore
38 seals (see below), which means 2 seals of the drawers and 36 ones of the guarantors.
58
Such a role of transumpts of important documents drawn up by high church officials or church
chapters is widely confirmed in the medieval reality – M. Koczerska, Opisy pieczęci Jagiełły i Jadwigi
w widymacie Zbigniewa Oleśnickiego z 1427 roku, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, ed. A. Rachuba, S. Gorzyński, H. Manikowska, Warszawa 2002, p. 231–234; see also S. Szczur, Traktaty międzypaństwowe,
p. 123–124.
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1412 includes a description of thirty-eight seals fixed to the document.59 The instrument was drawn up and described by a public notary Andrzej, son of Magnus
from Nowe Miasto.
The presentation of the seal starts with the majestic sigillum of King Władysław
Jagiełło, impressed on wax of natural color, fixed on brown and green silk ropes.
After presenting the ruler on the throne under a canopy, the notary described the
coats of arms placed next to the throne. They show correct images, except the fifth
escutcheon which was to exhibit three lilies (tria lilia). It refers to the coat of arms
of Dobrzyń Land, the emblem of which was the crowned head with horns. Interestingly, in subsequent descriptions this element of the majesty of King Władysław
Jagiełło did not raise any doubts – caput pilosum et barbatum cum cornibus [...] et
inter cornua quedam crux.60 The cross mentioned here is in fact one of the fleurons
of the crown. The second was the majestic seal of Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Vytautas, fixed on silk red and green ropes.61 The seal was also impressed on
wax of natural color. The Teutonic notary noticed that the ruler on the throne holds
a escutcheon of the Pahonia in his left hand. Thus, he started describing the coats
of arms from the left heraldic hand-side to the right. In the second escutcheon he
recognized a standing knight (the coat of arms of the Duchy of Troki [Trakai]), and
in the fourth one – the cross (of Volyn). According to the notary, between them
there was figura cuiusdam animalis nondum noti- the unknown animal is a marching bear (the coat of arms of Smolensk land, or Kiev land). In further instruments it
was identified as: animal ad modum ursi, faciem vertentis ad imaginem principis.62
The majesty of the grand duke bore a contrasigillum impressed on red wax with the
previously mentioned smaller horse seal of the duke, and the rider in the Pahonia
was identified by the notary as St. Martin. The remaining seals in the main document of the Polish-Lithuanian party were fixed to parchment stripes.63 The third
seal belonged to Archbishop Mikołaj Kurowski: a round seal impressed on red wax,
representing a seated bishop (in the souce: imago sancti Nicolai – probably because
of the name of the owner, but the transumpt of 1414 fails to include this identification: imago episcope infulati) under a canopy, with his right hand raised to bless
and his left hand holding a pontifical cross (vexillum crucis, the record of 1414
informs about a crosier et crux loco curvature). In the bottom part there is a escutcheon with quoddam signum ignotum. However, in later documents the sign is
59
GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 7. Later notarizations of the Polish
main document include descriptions of some of the seals and fail to include the description of the
set of propter multitudinem (GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15 of 16 June
1414), or propter varia signa incognoscibilia et multiplices caracteres paganicas (GStAPK, XX. HA,
Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 8 of 10 May 1421 , like: ibid., Nr. 5 of 5 Nov 1421).
60
Ibid., Schiebl. 64, nr 15.
61
See about the mark. Z. Piech, op.cit., p. 94–98 (here you will find earlier literature).
62
GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 14; comp. also ibid., Nr. 8, 5.
63
Interestingly, the notary instrument of 1412 described here does not mention this fact, but it is
mentioned in later notarizations (GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15, 8, 5).
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not described, but the notary included its image: it is a coat of arms of Szreniawa in
its older form with an emblem in the form of a sphere (curvature) of a crosier on the
left, with the cross from the forehead.64 It is the well known smaller seal of the Archbishop of Gniezno.65 The fourth seal presented by the notary was a small, round seal
on green wax, and its image included scutum, cruce superposita et in circumferencia scuti quatuor magna puncta, in quorum medio parva stella videbatur. Littere
vero circumferenciales tales legebantur: S. Alberti, cetere vero littere obscure erant
et leginon poterant. Thanks to this in-depth description the sign can be unambiguously identified as the seal of Voivode of Vilnius Wojcich Moniwid, who used it in
1410. It showed an escutcheon crowned with a cross, with four squares in its field
and a five-pointed star in the middle; the inscription on the rim being: “† s. alberti:
capit: de: vilna”.66 The seal was properly identified, but describing it as the fourth
one must have been a mistake most probably caused by rearranging the parchment
stripes. The fifth seal described by the notary was the seal of the Bishop of Cracow
Piotr Wysza – round, medium-sized and impressed on red wax. The notary identified two angels in the field of the coat of arms – one at the top, and the other at the
bottom. He could not make out the elements between the angels. The description
of 1414 was better: the escutcheon was identified and the crowns in it were recognized.67 On these grounds it can be concluded that in 1411 the medium-sized seal of
the bishop of Cracow was used: in the quadrifoil there was a escutcheon divided by
a cross bearing alternately arranged heraldic coats of arms of Wysza – Leszczyc and
three crowns – the emblem of Cracow’s chapter; above the escutcheon there was a
bust of the bishop (in the transumpt taken for an angel), underneath the head of an
angel with wings.68 Next was a small, round seal on red wax belonging to Bishop
of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębiec. In its field there were two “apostle-like” figures (in
1414 rightly recognized as attributes of St. Peter and St. Paul), and in the middle
– the bishop with a crosier. It is probably a sigillum identical to the smaller seal of
the bishop, but this one was a little oval in shape.69 The seventh (perhaps again as
64
Ibid., Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15 – in the source there is no cross, but there is a knob, which probably
results from the bad condition of this part of the seal.
65
Its imperfectly copied image was published by Marian Gumowski, Handbuch der polnischen Siegelkunde, Graz 1966, Nr. 344; comp. also P. Mrozowski, Imago potestatis – na pieczęci Jana
Gruszczyńskiego, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, p. 270–271. About the Coat of Arms of Szreniawa and its
kinds see J. Szymański, Herbarz średniowiecznego rycerstwa polskiego, Warszawa 1993, p. 270–272.
66
GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 4 (edition: Codex epistolaris Vitoldi,
magni ducis Lithuaniae, wyd. A. Prochaska, Kraków 1882, nr 441 – without the description of the
seal concerned); W. Semkowicz, O litewskich rodach, p. 14–15; in Horodło Wojciech Moniwid was
granted the Coat of Arms of Leliwa.
67
68
The seal is to be found e.g. in the document of 1397 – Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakówa,
parts II–IV, ed. F. Piekosiński, Kraków 1882, nr 399; the image – S. von Karwowski, Geschichte des
Hauses Leszczyc von Radolin Radoliński, Posen 1908, Tafel 2 (between pages 8 and 9).
69
See G. Lichończak-Nurek, Wojciech herbu Jastrzębiec. Arcybiskup i mąż stanu (ok. 1362–1436),
Kraków 1996, p. 230–231.
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a result of rearranging the stripes) seal described by the notary was a small, round
seal impressed on green wax, with an indecipherable inscription on the rim. In its
field there was an escutcheon with a sign copied by the notary: a half annulet with
the base directed to the bottom and with a cross in the middle. It might have been a
sigillum of any of the remaining Lithuanian boyars.
Next came a very well described medium-sized heraldic seal of Masovian
Duke (of Czersk) Janusz I, which in a quadripartite escutcheon depicted a winged
dragon and an eagle without a crown – the notary referred to the beast as a griffin. The same seal of Janusz I was placed on the document of the Peace Treaty of
Melno of 1411.70 Next came the description of the major heraldic seal – referred
to as majestic – which belonged to Duke Siemovit IV of Masovia (of Płock) with
an image of an earl.71 The tenth (undoubtedly the order was mistaken again) was a
small round seal impressed on green wax, with an indecipherable rim inscription,
and a quadripartite circle in the escutcheon empty in the middle. This mark should
be associated with one of the marks given in the sigils formula of the Lithuanians.
Next came also a small sigillum impressed on green wax with an image of the
Pahonia, the rim inscription being written in the Cyrillic script (karacteres). It belonged to either Duke Simon Lingwen or to Zygmunt Korybutowicz. The twelfth
seal looked similar, and in its field there was figura non significativa with a small
cross above. It must have belonged to a Lithuanian dignitary, or perhaps to Knyaz
Semen Jamuntowicz. The thirteenth seal with the Pahonia belonged to either Duke
Simon Lingwen or to Zygmunt Korybutowicz. It must be stressed that it was small
and impressed on green wax. Next the seals of knights and boyars were described.
The notary was unable to identify many images in the seals; nor could he make out
most of the rim inscriptions. Sometimes he was completely helpless, as in case of
seal 22: sigillum rotundum erat de cera viridi communi impressa, in cuius medio
scutum propter obscuritatem figurarum describi nec littere circumferenciales poterant legi.
Fortunately, the seals of towns received a much better treatment. The 25th seal
was sigillum rotundum competenter magnum impressed on red wax; it was a
smaller seal of Cracow with a meticulously presented seal image: St. Wenceslaus
girded with a sword, holding a flag in his right hand and a shield with a cross in
his left hand. On his right there was an eagle, on his left a crown, and in the field
of the seal there was an inscription “S. Wence-slaus”.72 In twenty-seventh place,
70
S. K. Kuczyński, Pieczęcie książąt mazowieckich, Wrocław 1978, p. 331–332; Dokumenty strony
polsko-litewskiej, p. 23, seal 3.
71
S. K. Kuczyński, Pieczęcie książąt, p. 338–339 – it survived only in one copy where its rim is
slightly damaged. The document gives its full form:” † S. Semoviti dei gra(cia) ducis Mazovie et domini Plocensis ac Visnensis”. It was probably placed on the Peace Act of Melno, but it is not preserved
– Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 23, seal 4.
72
M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie miast polskich, Toruń 1960, p. 122, nr 213, 214 (two very
similar seal pistons used at the same time); M. Friedberg, Herb miasta Krakówa, Kraków 1937, p. 13,
nr 4, 5; H. Seroka, Herby miast małopolskich do końca XVIII wieku, Warszawa 2002, p. 139. The
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impressed on red wax there was a seal of Sandomierz with a characteristic emblem
of the Kingdom over the city gate.73 In twenty-ninth place there was described a
secret seal from Poznań impressed on green wax; in its field there are two crossed
keys, and above them an escutcheon with an eagle without a crown.74 Notary Andrzej from Nowe Miasto described a seal from Kalisz as the thirty-first; it was
impressed on green wax, with an image of the merloned wall with a gate and two
towers on either side, and a trumpeter on the left with a five-pointed star above
him.75 The thirty-third seal was a seal of Brest showing a wall with three merloned
towers, and two holy patrons between them: St. Stanislav with a crosier and St.
Peter (in the transumpt: figura episcopi i principalis imago unius sancti).76 The
thirty-sixth seal (from Inowrocław) was described as follows: impressed on green
wax presenting a field with an eagle between two merloned towers.77
The form of the main documents was somewhat more elaborate. They started
directly with an intitulation, but they included an arenga and were organized into
articles. In the Order’s act after the corroboration there comes information about
the date: datum et actum in Thorun, sub anno Domini (1411), die dominica prima
mensis Februarii, and the general testimony refers to the persons listed above as
the guarantors. The document of the Polish-Lithuanian party includes the dating
which takes into account only actum: Actum in Thorun, die dominico in vigilia
Purificacionis sancte Marie Virginis. Next comes the testimony listing the negotiators of the treaty. The document finishes with the solemn formula datum per manus, which mentions Sub-Chancellor of the Kingdom and Archbishop of Halych
Mikołaj Trąba. A. Gąsiorowski rightly pointed out that the use of the tem actum
by the Polish party was connected with the fact that in the dating formula of the
main document there was given the date of concluding the peace agreement, and
not the day of the actual drafting of the document.78 The formula datum per manus is characteristic of practically all Polish documents of that period which had a
solemn or eternal character.79
document of the Peace Treaty of Melno bears the great seal of Cracow – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 91, seal 109.
73
See M. Rokosz, Sigillum regis.... et civitatis. About the great seal of Sandomierz see in: Heraldyka i okolice, p. 311–321; comp. M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 192–193, nr 382; H. Seroka,
Herby miast, p. 32, 103–104. The same seal was used in the Melno document, but there it was impressed on green wax – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 96, seal 115.
74
M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 178, nr 349; M. Adamczewski, Heraldyka miast wielkopolskich do końca XVIII wieku, Warszawa 2000, p. 403.
75
M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 101–102, nr 167; M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 345.
76
M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 43, nr 28; M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 316–317. The
Melno act bears a damaged copy of the mark – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 93, seal 111
(there is a mistake in the reconstruction of the inscription).
77
M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 340. The same impress is to be found on the act of the Peace Treaty
of Melno – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 97, seal 117.
78
A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 178–179; comp. A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika,
p. 294–295.
79
A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 180–181.
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Adam Szweda
The question arises in what circumstances the original of the document of
the Polish-Lithuanian party had disappeared. It was passed to the representatives
of Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen on 10 May 1411. As is confirmed in the
sources mentioned above, until 1421 it was transumpted on the request of the Teutonic Order’s authorities. One of the articles of the document of the Peace Treaty
of Melno of 1422 obliged the Teutonic knights to reveal to Poland any documents
and privileges connected with Nieszawa, other estates in Kuyavia belonging to the
Order and Toruń’s river crossing which the Teutonic Order were losing in favour
of the Kingdom. It concerned mainly the acts of the Treaty of Toruń and two amicable settlements of Siegmund of Luxembourg (of 1412 and 1420).80 The main
document of the Order confirms the fact of passing certain documents to the contracting party.81 As is confirmed by the preserved register of documents passed
over to Poland during the ratification convention in Veliuona in May 1423 the list
of documents included: Die berichtunge von Thorun des datis was purificacionis.82
However, decisions of the Peace Treaty of Brest of 1435 literally repeats the article
of the Treaty of Melno concerning the fact of passing over the documents to the
Polish party, including in the list also the Peace Treaty of Toruń.83 In the oldest
preserved inventory of the Teutonic Order’s archive from about 1436 there was recorded Litera concordie facte in Thorun anno domini millesimo quadragentesimo
undecimo, and in another place the fact of keeping the transumpt of the document
was mentioned.84 The act of the Second Peace of Toruń of 1466 does not add anything new in this respect as it only mentions the annulment of all and any documents belonging to the Teutonic Order which could stand in contradiction of the
conditions of the Treaty of 1466.85
Three registers of the Teutonic Order’s documents prepared in connection with
diplomatic actions come from the beginning of the 16th century. In 1508 among
documents prepared for the amicable convention in Wrocław (which eventually
80
Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 7; Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I,
Nr. 152 (the preliminary document), Nr. 154 (the main document).
81
Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 154.
82
GStAPK, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv, Nr. 4118, s. 6; about the source see E. Weise, Zur Diplomatik, p. 226–227.
83
Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 181, art. 18.
84
The Diocese Archive in Płock, sygn. A 187, k. 131, 135; S. Gougenheim, Das Cartular von
Płock: einige Bemerkungen zur Schri. lichkeit, Archivierung und Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens in
der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Die Rolle der Schri. lichkeit in den geistlichen Ritterorden des
Mittelalters: innere Organisation, Sozialstruktur, Politik, hrsg. v. R. Czaja, J. Sarnowsky, Toruń 2009,
p. 105, here also (p. 99–119) you will find a detailed description of the content of the inventory.
About the source see also K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, p. 101–103 and
fn. 93; S. Joźwiak, J. Trupinda, Organizacja życia na zamku krzyżackim w Malborku w czasach wielkich mistrzów (1309–1457), Malbork 2007, p. 280. According to Sylvain Gougenheim (op.cit., p. 102)
registers and copies of the emperor’s documents and papal acts were included in the volume from
the 13th century until 1481.
85
Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. II, nr 403, par. 2.
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did not take place) there was transsumptum pacis perpetuae in Thorn factae.86
Two years later the envoys of the Teutonic Order submitted Litere pacis perpetue
Torunie a Vladislao rege Polonie et Alexandro alias Vitolth magno duce Lithvanie
cum ordine facte de datis MCCCCXI.87 And in 1522 Grand Master Albrecht von
Hohenzollern took with him to the Reich e.g. der ewige friede beschrieben und
sonst ander handlung, so vorm hern hobmeister zu Thorun gescheen ist.88
It must be underlined that in Poznań in 1510 Poles objected to presenting the
transumpts by the Teutonic party. The envoys of the grand master replied that they
would show the originals if a separate date for this was established.89
Eventually, the Treaty of Cracow of 1525 stipulated that Duke Albrecht von
Hohenzollernshould hand in to King Sigismund I of Poland all privileges and documents received by the Teutonic Order from emperors, popes, dukes of kings of
Poland.90 In Gdańsk in 1526 the King received a box with many documents, for
instance the Golden Bull of Rimini.91 Probably, the copy of the Polish main document of the First Peace of Toruń was placed next to it. Thus, the question is what
document the Polish party received in Veliuona in 1423? Undoubtedly, they must
have been the Polish preliminary documents, kept now in the Main Archive of
Old Files, but recorded in the inventories of the crown archive from the mid-16th
century.92 The main document must have disappeared soon after it had been given
to the Polish party in 1526.
Armistice documents and treaties still constitute a relevant research area. Documents of this type should be published as they are known exclusively from their
archival originals. As it turns out, transumpts are equally valuable, for information
included there enriches our knowledge about the manner of sealing the Polish-Lithuanian main document of the First Peace of Toruń.
86
I. Janosz-Biskupowa, Zestawienia dokumentów z archiwum Zakonu Krzyżackiego z początków
XVI wieku. Przyczynek do roli dokumentów w walce dyplomatycznej Zakonu z Polską, Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Historia XIX, Toruń 1984, p. 58.
87
X. Liske, Zjazd w Poznaniu w roku 1510, Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału
historyczno-filozoficznego Akademii Umiejętności, vol. 3, Kraków 1875, p. 306.
88
I. Janosz-Biskupowa, op.cit., p. 62. More details about the circumstances of preparing the
above-mentioned lists, see P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju, p. 64.
89
X. Liske, op.cit., p. 317, 323; A. Wojtkowski, W sprawie wydania Polsce dokumentów krzyżackich,
KMW, 1959, nr 4, p. 457–458.
90
Corpus iuris Polonici, ed. O. Balzer, t. IV/1, Kraków 1910, nr 46, par. 29.
91
P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju, p. 65 and fn. 63; idem, Dokumenty II pokoju toruńskiego,
p. 92–93.
92
Wrocław, Biblioteka Ossolińskich, rkps 134/II, k. 120v (1551 r. – next to the preliminary and
main documents of the grand master); AGAD, the so-called Metryka Litewska, dz. VIII, nr 14, s. 80
(1582 r. – again the preliminary Polish document and both Teutonic documents).
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HISTORYCZNE
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LXXV —
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BOOK 2
SŁAWOMIR JÓZWIAK (Toruń)
TEUTONIC PRISONERS OF WAR AFTER THE BATTLE OF KORONOWO*
Key words: Polish-Teutonic war of 1409–1411; the battle of Koronowo; prisoners of war;
mercenaries; ransom; the 15th century
During the war between Poland–Lithuania and the Teutonic State in Prussia
in the years 1409–1411 there took place two especially important battles which influenced the course of the war: the battle of Grunwald (15 July 1410) and the battle
of Koronowo (10 October 1410). While various aspects of the former have been
widely analyzed over the last hundred years, the presence of the latter in literature
on the topic is limited.1 The fundamental difficulty in researching the course of
both battles consists in the fact that there have survived relatively few sources concerning the events. Among those surviving prevails the chronicle of Jan Długosz2,
written a few dozen years after the events, overwhelming in its scope and evocative style. For this reason it is necessary to reconstruct the course of both battles in
an incontrovertible and reliable manner. It is particularly important in case of the
battle of Koronowo, the course of which is only known from the narration of the
Polish chronicler. However, thanks to other preserved sources, particularly from
the intensive research of the chancellery of grand masters in Malbork, it is possible to learn about some less important, but also interesting aspects of the battle.
One of them is the question of how the prisoners of war of the defeated party were
treated, to which this article is devoted.
*
p. 87–102.
1
Among the studies concerning the battle of Koronowo comp. S. Kujot, Wojna, Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, R. 17: 1910, p. 265–267; E. Kutowski, Zur Geschichte der Soldner
in den Heeren des Deutschordensstaates in Preussen bis zum ersten Thorner Frieden, Oberlandische
Geschichtsblatter, H. 14: 1912, p. 486–489; Z. Spieralski, Bitwa pod Koronowem 10 X 1410, [in:] Bitwa
pod Koronowem 10 X 1410, ed. A. Tomczak, Warszawa 1961, p. 47–67; K. Kwiatkowski, „Kontrakcja militarna Zakonu. Napływ kontyngentów pomocniczych i zaciężnych z obszarów Rzeszy”, [in:]
S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim
w latach 1409–1411” (in print). The study by Piotr Derdej – idem, Koronowo, Warszawa 2004 – is a
step back in the research concerning the battle of Koronowo owing to the author’s scarce knowledge
of sources.
2
Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, ed. M. Plezia, lib. 10–11, Varsaviae
1997 (further cit. Długosz), p. 99–115, 152–156.
70
Sławomir Józwiak
The battle of Koronowo took place in an unidentified place near the town
of Koronowo3 on 10 October 1410. The Teutonic army, commanded by Michael
Küchmeister the bailiff of the New March, consisted mostly of mercenaries from
the Reich, Silesia and the Czech lands. Some of them were sent by the ally of the
Teutonic Order – the King of Hungary Sigismund of Luxembourg. The Polish army
consisted of royal court units, the Pospolite Ruszenie (the “Noble Host”) from the
borderland and other groups. The size of the armies is in fact unknown despite
various digressions on this subject, which are devoid of any reliable evidence of
source.4 Nevertheless, it has been hitherto assumed that the Teutonic army was
more numerous.5 According to Długosz, victory in the battle which lasted until
evening fell to the Poles. The chronicler stressed twice that although the battle
was smaller than the battle of Grunwald, it might be considered superior owing
to its ferocity and significance.6 It seems that this statement of Długosz is not an
exaggeration. Earlier sources also prove the significance of the battle of Koronowo.
Particularly interesting information is included in an extensive letter written on
11 October 1410 by the temporary deputy of the grand marshal, the commander
of Balga Friedrich von Zollern to the temporary deputy of the grand master, the
commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von Plauen. The Teutonic official had
just received news from his confidant (from Toruń?), who told him that the previous day (10 October) some representatives of the town (councillors?) talked with
the king in Inowrocław, asking him for military help (it was the time when the
local authorities of Toruń were wondering which side of the conflict they should
support). The monarch probably told them that they should be brave and tenacious. He said that if God permitted him to win the conflict, he would release them
from the authority of the Teutonic Order. However, if he were to lose, the Torunians would do what they could and what they might consider right for them.7
Władysław Jagiełło was to express this opinion on 10 October, when he did not yet
know about the victory of his army in the battle of Koronowo. From what he said
3
Comp. the most recent remarks of Krzysztof Kwiatkowski about the place and time of the battle
– idem, op.cit.
4
According to Zdzisław Spieralski, the Teutonic army commanded by Michael Küchmeister
included 3500 people – Z. Spieralski, op. cit., p. 61. On the other hand, Stefan M. Kuczyński estimated the number at fewer than 4000 people – S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka Wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim
w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1980 (ed. 4), p. 502–503.
5
Długosz mentioned a few times the military preponderance of the Teutonic army. In another
place the chronicler exaggerated saying that 8000 people were killed in the battle on the Teutonic
side.
6
Długosz, p. 155–156.
7
„[...] Und die von € orun synt also gestern von Leslaw von im [krola – S. J.] gescheyden, do
się bie im gewest synd bittende umb rettunge; das her czu in gesprachen hat, das sie sich sulden
enthalden als bederwe luthe; hil. im got, das her den streyt gewynnet, her welde sie wol von uns
macht entseczen, worlust her aber den streyt, so sullen sie thun, wie sie mogen” – Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv (further cit.
OBA), nr 1355.
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Teutonic prisoners of war after the battle of Koronowo
we may suppose that he seriously considered the possibility of Poland’s defeat in
the war. In the context of this information it is hard to doubt that this Polish military triumph affected considerably the future course of the conflict.
Describing the course of the battle of Koronowo, Cracow’s canon Jan Długosz
mentioned prisoners of war and wrote about them more extensively in the summary of the aftermath of the battle. The chronicler mentioned twice Konrad von
Nimptsch [Nympcz], a knight in the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg, who
came from Silesia and fought on the Teutonic side. Prior to the battle, he was to
break out of the compact formation and call for a volunteer from the opposite
side to fight with him. The volunteer was Jan Szczycki under the Coat of Arms of
Doliwa, who defeated the Silesian knight by pushing him off his horse. Długosz
did not explain whether the defeated knight had survived or not, but he included
Nimptsch in the list of prisoners of war in his resumé of the battle of Koronowo.8
The Cracow chronicler comments on a temporary armistice established between
the second and third decisive clash. Both parties were to swap prisoners of war and
return opponents’ horses captured during the fight (this question will be discussed
more extensively in the subsequent part of this article).9 According to the chronicler, during the last stage of the battle which brought victory to the Poles, nobody
would have managed to avoid being captured but for the darkness of the night.10
Another interesting fact concerning the issue under discussion here was included
in Długosz’s extensive final commentary referring to the battle of Koronowo. The
Polish army captured many Franconians, Silesians, Bavarians, Turingians, Czechs,
inhabitants of the Rhineland and Meissen, Saxons and Swabians. The chronicler
gave the names of the commander-in-chief of the Teutonic army Michael Küchmeister – the bailiff of the New March, Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] and other
courtiers of Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxembourg: Konrad Elkinger, Konrad
Truklszesz, Baltasar of Głowno (or Sluwno)11 and Hannus Lebel.12
How many Teutonic prisoners of war were eventually captured after the battle
by the Polish army? In Rocznik Świętokrzyski there appeared a record that among
all the prisoners of war there were 300 of notable background.13 Ernst Kutowski
assumed that the number of captured noblemen was at least 120.14 On the other
hand, Zdzisław Spieralski referring to the information included in the Polish annal,
8
Długosz, p. 153, 156. The fact of Konrad Nimptsch being taken prisoner of war was also
recorded in a few sources of the Teutonic origin – about this comp. in the subsequent part of the
article
9
Długosz, p. 154.
10
Ibid., p. 155.
11
The spelling of the name varies in each copy of the chronicler’s work.
12
Długosz, p. 156.
13
„Anno eodem breui interuallo, iterum Poloni cum Cruciferis circa claustrum Corunow bellum fecerunt et Cruciferos vicerunt et 300 notabiles captiuos ad regem in Wladislauiam adduxerunt” – Rocznik świętokrzyski do r. 1490, ed. A. Bielowski, [in:] Monumenta Poloniae Historica, ed.
A. Małecki, W. Kętrzyński, K. Liske, vol. 3, Lwów 1878, p. 84.
14
E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 487.
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was quite inconclusive.15 A thorough analysis of all the preserved sources listing
Teutonic prisoners of war captured after the battle of Koronowo allows us to state
that there were at least 200 of them, 67 names of whom are identified (excluding
Michael Küchmeister).16 Taking into consideration the fact that the register of the
sums of money spent by the grand master on financial support for the prisoners of
war, which exists in two manuscripts slightly differing from each other and written
between July 1411 and August 141217, is the largest register of this kind but still
does not include all the prisoners of war (even the mercenaries and knights from
the close circle of Sigismund of Luxembourg)18, we may suppose that there might
have been over 300 prisoners of war captured after the battle.
Długosz described precisely what happened to the prisoners of war between 10
and 16 October 1410. So, on 12 October the Poles were to escort them to Bydgoszcz,
and on 15 October to Inowrocław, where the king was residing at the time. Some of
them (maybe the injured ones19) were transported on 60 carts provided by the monarch, while others walked or rode on horseback. According to Długosz, Władysław
Jagiełło treated the prisoners of war with great courtesy: they were given dinner,
their wounds were cured, and they were housed in comfortable quarters, where the
king himself visited them. After dinner, the monarch was to talk with prisoners of
war for a long time explaining to them why the Polish-Lithuanian party had waged
the war. As the chronicler wrote, the listeners became convinced that they had been
fighting for the wrong cause and had supported the wrong side in the conflict. The
15
The author misinterpreted the information included in the source. On the one hand, he maintained that there could not have been “300 notable knights” among the prisoners of war, as the total
number of knights included in Küchmeister’s army was slightly over 300. On the other hand, he concealed the fact that the given total number of prisoners of war would reflect the reality if the number
comprised knights, squires, servants, etc. – comp. Z. Spieralski, op.cit., p. 66–67.
16
OBA, nr 1375; Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411. Die Abrechnungen fur die
Soldtruppen, bearb. und ediert v. S. Ekdahl, Teil I, Koln–Wien 1988 (further cit. Soldbuch), p. 97–
–98, 102 and Anhang, nr 23, p. 177; nr 24, p. 184–187, 196–199; Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski, ed. A. Gąsiorowski, R. Walczak, vol. VII, Warszawa–Poznań 1985 (further cit. KDW), nr 670;
M. Biskup, Z badań nad „Wielką Wojną” z zakonem krzyżackim, Kwartalnik Historyczny, R. 66: 1959,
nr 3, Dodatek nr 7, p. 702–705, 709; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem,
XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensfolianten (further cit. OF), nr 13, p. 553–554; Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24,
p. 192, fn. 16.
17
The editor of the sources, Sven Ekdahl, established that they were written after 15 July 1411
and before 24 Aug 1412 – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 178, 189 – the publisher’s commentary.
18
For example, Długosz wrote that Baltasar of Głowno (Sluwno) was one of the members of the
Hungarian king’s court who was taken prisoner – Długosz, p. 156. Such a name does not appear in
any of the sources registering the names of prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. According
to E. Kutowski, the wrong spelling used by Długosz was to blame for it – E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 486.
However, it is hard to agree with the suggestion of the researcher, for in all preserved sources with
the names of prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo, there is nobody bearing the name of
Baltasar.
19
Badly injured prisoners from the battle of Koronowo (who survived) are mentioned in the
above-mentioned registers prepared between July 1411 and August 1412: „Item Lobens czwene gesellen worden gefangen und swerlich gewunth, 8 frankisch kroner” – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 185.
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following day (16 October) the names of the prisoners of war were taken down and
the king obliged them to turn up at the determined place and time for the ransom.
Later, they were released. Only the commander-in-chief of the Teutonic army was
not released. Fettered, he was sent to the castle of Chęciny.20 Długosz’s account concerning Władysław Jagiełło’s treatment of the prisoners of war after the battle of
Koronowo is confirmed in the Teutonic record. In a letter written on 20 October
1410 in Tuchola [Tuchel] the temporal deputy of the commander of Tuchola Simon Langschenkel informed the commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von
Plauen (who replaced the grand master at that time) that the Teutonic prisoners of
war were gradually arriving in Tuchola. He wrote about the arrival of Mr Nymsche
(Długosz’s Konrad Nympcz, also referred to in Teutonic sources as Nymnicz or
Nympcz) with other knights and servants (“knechte”), who had arrived earlier than
Mr Erkynger (undoubtedly it refers to Długosz’s Konrad Elkinger, a participant
in the battle who came from the Franconian family of Erkinger von Seinsheim).21
The latter was also making for Tuchola, but eventually he stayed a mile away from
the town. They were all released by the king except the Teutonic bailiff of the New
March. Some of the returning knights brought also Polish prisoners of war whom
they had captured before they were captured themselves.22 The deputy of the com20
Długosz, p. 157. The Teutonic chronicler wrote that Michael Küchmeister was treated severely
by the Poles, because he was a brave man, he had caused much damage to the Polish Kingdom and
had captured the knight Jarosław [of Iwno – S. J.] – comp. Johann’s von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, hrsg.
v. T. Hirsch, M. Toppen, E. Strehlke, Bd. III, Leipzig 1866 (further cit. Posilge), p. 323. However,
there exist sources saying that the Teutonic bailiff of the New March was not the only prisoner of
war not released on parole by the monarch immediately after the battle of Koronowo. Another was
Heinrich Harfust, who in Koronowo fought as a servant– “diener”– of the commander of Toruń and
was captured in unknown circumstances, but was to be ransomed relatively quickly. Next, he became
a member of Küchmeister’s army, and again, like the bailiff of the New March, he was taken prisoner
of war in Koronowo. A record included in the letter of Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf to the archbishop of Cologne of 20 Feb 1438 („und darnach in der Nuwenmarke mit her Michel Kochmeister,
unserm vorfar, der u} die czeit voith in der Nuwenmarke was, wart her [Henryk – S. J.] aber gefangen
und wart ouch mit em los [...]” – OF, nr 13, p. 553–554) allows us to think that the knight Heinrich,
like Michael Küchmeister, was in Chęciny and they were both released at the same time. The whole
story is known from the fact that he, and after his death his wife, claimed damages from the Teutonic
Order. The Teutonic Order rejected their claims saying that all the liabilities resulting from Heinrich’s
having been taken prisoners had already been covered. More details concerning the issue were given
by S. Ekdahl – comp. Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 192, fn. 16 (the publisher’s commentary).
21
Among the killed participants of the battle Długosz distinguished a young man, Ulrich Erkingar, probably a relative of Konrad’s , who was to come from such a rich house that if he had
been alive, the ransom for his freedom would have been estimated at 60,000 florins (about 30,000
grzywnas). He was buried in a separate tomb in Koronowo’s monastery – Długosz, p. 156. In the
light of the sums of money demanded for discharging a prisoner of war at that time the information
provided by Długosz seems to have been greatly exaggerated.
22
„[...] und sy habin etlich gevangen van den Polan mit in gebracht, dysygevangen, e das sy
gevangen wurden [...]” – OBA, nr 1375. Długosz does not mention such great courtesy. He only
informed about the exchange of prisoners of war during the second established interval in the battle
– Długosz, p. 154.
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mander asked the knights about how they had been treated after the battle. They
were to reply that they had promised (probably to the Polish party) not to say anything about it. Nevertheless, the Teutonic official managed to get some information
out of them. They stated that they had never heard of a monarch who would be
more right to fight for justice than the Polish king; the king asked the prisoners of
war whether there existed any monarch who would agree to this (in the text it is
understated – probably it refers to injustice); so he would like to do as a righteous
monarch should. That is why – as the Teutonic official stressed – many knights and
servants admitted that the Polish king was right.23 Undoubtedly, the fragment of the
letter refers to the monarch’s argumentation about the rightness of his case, which,
according to the deputy of the commander, was to convince many mercenaries to
support the Polish king.
As recorded in Długosz’s chronicle and in other sources of Teutonic origin, the
prisoners of war were released on parole by Władysław Jagiełło, but first they had
to swear to present themselves at a determined place and time for the purposes of
ransom.24 Some mercenaries serving the Teutonic Order had contracts with their
principals which included release from captivity, remaining in pay while in captivity and the payment of damages for losses and travel expenses to the place where
the ransom was to be handed over.25 That is why their names appeared in subsequent sources of Teutonic origin. However, the date of the records cannot be identified precisely. What is more, the information included therein can not be easily
interpreted in any conclusive way. It refers, for example, to Erkinger von Seinsheim.
The list of Polish prisoners of war captured in Prussia, which was written in the
period between the battle of Koronowo and the Peace Treaty of Toruń26 and kept in
the former chancellery of grand masters, announces that many Teutonic prisoners
of war were to be exchanged for Polish prisoners27, and Erkinger von Seinsheim
23
„[...] sunder also vil sagen sy wol, das sy ny keynen herren sich groslicher habin gehort irbyten
tzu gerechtykeit, wen den konyng, wen her spricht, wer irneyn herre, der sichs annemen welde; her
welde tun, als das her von rechte tun sulde. Hir ummb so gebin im vele rittere und knechte gerecht,
als ich von in gehort habe” – OBA, nr 1375.
24
How this mechanism worked is known for example from the history of one of the most important commanders of Teutonic mercenaries, who was taken prisoner during the battle of Grunwald,
Nicolas von Kottewitz (in June 1410 he brought to Prussia horse lances and many crossbowers). He
was released on parole by the king having first promised to arrive with ransom in Cracow on 29 September. There his freedom was estimated to be worth 12000 Czech grosches (about 250 grzywnas),
two armours, and four crossbows, which is known from his letter to Heinrich von Plauen written in
Cracow in October 1410. – comp. S. Ekdahl, Kilka uwag o księdze żołdu Zakonu Krzyżackiego z okresu „Wielkiej Wojny” (1410–1411), ZapiskiHistoryczne (further cit. ZH), vol. 33: 1968, z. 3, p. 126–127,
129 (with the publication of the source). If Kottewitz informed about it the deputy of the grand master, he must have hoped the Teutonic Order to pay ransom for him.
25
About the subject matter comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit., p. 111–130.
26
According to Marian Biskup the source was written before the period of 20 Oct 1410–2 Feb
1411 – comp. M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 701.
27
E. Kutowski summarized the preserved copy of the letter, dated 24 May 1412, which was
written by Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen to Duke Przemek Opawski. The head of the Teutonic
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was to be exchanged for the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Jan Kretkowski28, captured
in Bratian. However, in the subsequent part of the extensive source there appears
information that Erkinger and his servants were given a dozen Polish prisoners of
war along with their commander Jarand29, captured in Miłomłyn [Liebemühl].30
This was probably in order to arrange an exchange of prisoners of war, which is
now impossible to reconstruct. The manner and time of either the first or the second exchange does not appear in the sources. Two lists revealing the finances that
the Teutonic Order allocated in support of its prisoners of war, written between
July 1411 and August 141231, differ slightly. Nevertheless, it turns out that Erkinger
(recorded among the captured “vor der Kronaw”) was to receive from the Teutonic
Order 200 nobles, 50 Prussian grzywnas, 100 “schilde” (écu d’or) and 30 florins
(in total 340 grzywnas).32 Additionally, 50 florins (25 grzywnas) were paid to his
5 unidentified servants, and 75 nobles, 16 grzywnas and 110 florins (in total over
150 grzywnas) were received by his 5 comrades whose names were registered.33
In light of the possibility of exchanging Teutonic prisoners of war for Polish ones,
we do not know what the money paid out to Erkinger was intended for. It cannot
have been a form of payment as the Teutonic Order did not consider Erkinger and
his people as mercenaries. It is possible that the money was at least partly to cover
Order informed that the dissatisfaction of the mercenaries with the remuneration for their service
forced him to increase their pay and to guarantee that in case of their being captured he would exchange them for Polish prisoners of war.– E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 488, fn. 1. Unfortunately, the copy
used by the German researcher disappeared during WWII. Only short summaries of registers, letters and documents have survived. On their basis we can only correct the wrong date of preparing
the letter of the grand master provided by E. Kutowski, the correct date being 27 Sept 1412 – comp.
M. Pelech, Der verlorene Ordensfoliant 5 (früher Hochmeister-Registrant II) des Hist. Staatsarchivs
Königsberg, mit Regesta (nach Rudolf Philippi und Erich Joachim), [in:] Beitragezur Geschichte des
Deutschen Ordens, hrsg. v. U. Arnold, Bd. I, Marburg 1986, nr 102, p. 167. From other sources it is
known that after the battle of Koronowo the Teutonic authorities increased the pay of the mercenaries from 11 to 12 grzywnas for lances fourniers per month – comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit. p. 119; Soldbuch,
p. 25, 98 (the publisher’s commentary).
28
About Jan Kretkowski see J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej w późnym średniowieczu i jej
majątki, [in:] Stolica i region. Włocławek i jego dzieje na tle przemian Kujaw i ziemi dobrzyńskiej, ed.
O. Krut-Horonziak, L. Kajzer, Włocławek 1995, p. 38; T. Sławiński, Kretkowscy i ich dzieje od połowy
XIV wieku, Włocławek–Warszawa 2007, p. 40–42.
29
The most recent research shows that it may have referred to two people: either to Jarand of
Grabie (Brudzewo), the standard-bearer of Inowrocław, or the pantler of Brest Jarand of Mała Kłobia,
who at the beginning of 1411 received a nomination to be castellan of Kowal – comp. S. Szybkowski,
„Postawy polskich i litewskich elit społecznych wobec konfliktu w trakcie wyprawy letniej i kampanii
jesienno-zimowej”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy
z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print). Thus, if it concerned the latter, he would have
had to be released at the beginning of 1411.
30
M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 703–704.
31
About the date of the source comp. fn. 17.
32
According to the conversion rate suggested by S. Ekdahl, one Hungarian florin was equal to
half a grzywna (12 skojecs); the French gold ecu corresponded to 14 skojecs, while the English noble
was equal to 26 skojecs and 4 pfennigs – comp. S. Ekdahl, Einführung, [in:] Soldbuch, p. 18.
33
Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 186, 197–198.
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the cost of the ransom. However, it is not certain and cannot be proved. What is
certain is that shortly after the end of the war and having been released from captivity34 Erkinger and his people were to demand the Teutonic Order to pay them
wages and to cover any expenses connected with the losses suffered during the
service to the Teutonic Order during the previous conflict.35
It is worth looking at other more important prisoners of war from the battle
of Koronowo. According to the previously mentioned register written between
October 1410 and February 1411, the knight from Silesia mentioned by Długosz
– Konrad Nympcz, a courtier of Sigismund of Luxembourg, was to be exchanged
together with his two comrades for Piotr Wągiel along with his company36 captured in Tczew. According to the registers recording the sums of money allocated
by the Teutonic Order to support the prisoners of war drafted between July 1411
and August 1412 Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] received 50 Prussian grzywnas,
while his comrades-in-arms ( probably 2437) were to be given 50 grzywnas and 100
florins – 4.5 grzywnas for each of them).38 Here again the intended allocation of
the money is not clear, for Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] was not a mercenary
in the pay of the Teutonic Order, but a member of the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg. Konrad Truklszesz, as noted by Długosz, must have been the Konrad
Truchtsesse (Troksos) registered in the list of payments made to support the prisoners of war. He received 30 florins (15 grzywnas). From the second version of the
list it turns out that the sum of money was paid to him to cover his travel expenses
to Cracow, where he had to appear on a certain day.39 His seven comrades and two
servants were given in total 90 florins (10 florins each).40 The last prisoner of war
whose name was mentioned by Długosz was Hannus Lebel (in Teutonic sources
knowsn as Hannus von Lobel), also a member of the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg. He was probably taken prisoner of war together with his relative Nicolaus
and Nymand. Next to his name there was recorded 35 grzywnas and 155 florins
(which is 112.5 grzywnas) – 135 florins he was to receive for some unidentified
damage (probably to weapons and horses).41
34
More about it see later in the text.
OBA, nr 1593, 1628. In the letter of 8 May 1419, the master of the German branch of the
Teutonic Order asked Grand Master Michael Küchmeister to satisfy financial claims of Erkinger
(from the war of 1410–1411), as his friendly attitude towards the Teutonic Order would be beneficial
– comp. OBA, nr 2959; E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 506, fn. 5.
36
M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 702. Not much is known about Piotr Wągiel. It might have
been him who was mentioned among the knights of the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg in 1397
– comp. P. Engel, Magyar Orszag vilagi archontologiaja 1301–1457, vol. 1, Budapest 1996, p. 421;
Długosz, p. 271 (the publisher’s commentary).
37
This may be concluded from version B of the source.
38
Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 184–185, 196.
39
„Iten 30 goldin her Conrado Troksos czerunge sich czu gestellin”.
40
Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 198.
41
Ibid., Anhang, nr 24, p. 185, 196.
35
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Among the remaining prisoners of war captured after the battle of Koronowo
Heincze von Proffen (Profin), the commander of the larger troop of mercenaries, is
well documented in the sources. From the Teutonic “Payment Book”, written soon
after 10 October 1410, we learn that not all members of his cavalry unit – Rota
– were taken prisoners during the battle of Koronowo.42 From the previously mentioned records of the sums of money given by the Teutonic Order to support the
prisoners of war (from July 1411–August 1412) it can be concluded that he received 30 florins (15 grzywnas) as the first payment. Next, for the period of captivity he was given 262 grzywnas. The Order might have paid the money to cover the
damages for the losses during the battle or to ransom him and his people.43 It could
not have been his outstanding pay, as according to Proffen’s letter of obligation,
written probably at the beginning of 1411 (after 10 January?)44, he and his people
(“mit meynen gesellen also adirrn rittern und knechten”) agreed to have their pay
deducted for a quarter for twenty lances, the 60 cavalrymen who were taken prisoners with Proffen before the battle of Koronowo.45 The editor of the source, Sven
Ekhdal, pointed out that the commander of the mercenaries mentioned his debt
resulting from the above (“schulde”). The editor concluded that the commander
must have taken the money by 10 October 1410, which he later had to give back
when he became a prisoner of war. It is possible, however, that this was the case
since no exact sum was given. Another question is whether Proffen with his people
were released on parole after the battle having first promised to appear for ransom.
The source does not provide a definite answer.
The preserved records suggest that several days after the battle of Koronowo
negotiations were held at the highest level (originated by the temporary deputy of
grand master Heinrich von Plauen) concerning the exchange of the prisoners of
war, particularly Michael Küchmeister, the bailiff of the New March. It is known
from the letter the monarch ordered to write on 25 October as a reply to requests
made by the commander of Świecie [Schwetz]. Władysław Jagiełło suggested that
the Teutonic prisoners of the battle of Koronowo taken on 10 October should be
released on parole having promised to appear for ransom. Heinrich von Plauen
suggested similar actions towards Polish prisoners of war captured by the Teutonic
army. The monarch answered that irrespective of the requests made by the deputy
of the grand master, he was nevertheless guided by commendable Christian values
42
„Item her Heyncze Osustulit 315 m. off 21 spyse von her Heyncze Profins gesellen, dy nicht
gefangen worden vor der Kronaw” – Soldbuch, p. 102.
43
„Her Heincze von Profin 262 m., dy im unser homeister gab von Nickel Pyskerdorf, in czu
manen, als her Hincze gefangen wart, und Niclos Pyskerdorf darvonquam und henusreyth” – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 186–187, 199.
44
S. Ekdahl dated the source at the end of 1410 – the beginning of 1411 – Soldbuch, Anhang,
nr 23, p. 177 (the publisher’s commentary). The scientist, however, did not discuss the information
(included in the source) that Proffen agreed to have part of his pay deducted for a quarter as he
with his people had been captured. It would allow us to assume that three months passed from 10
October.
45
OBA, nr 1625; Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 23, p. 177.
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and he discharged on parole all prisoners of war – both from the battle of Koronowo and those who had been captured earlier, having obliged them to appear for
ransom at a specified time. Next, the king leveled a number of charges against the
Teutonic Order saying that the knights did not respect military customs concerning the release of prisoners on parole having obliged them to promise to appear
for ransom. On the contrary, prisoners of war were very often killed, tortured and
maltreated. Thus, the king insisted that such practices be abandoned. In the end,
the monarch replied to the detailed suggestion made by Heinrich von Plauen. The
Teutonic official suggested exchanging the standard-bearer of Poznań Jarosław of
Iwno, captured during the battle near Człuchów [Schlochau] (“circa Slochow”)46
for Michael Küchmeister – the bailiff of the New March, captured after the battle
of Koronowo. Władysław Jagiełło stated that it was not possible as Jarosław had already been released (the name of the person who took him prisoner is unknown).
Thus, not being bound by any promise, he was free from all obligations resulting
from being a prisoner of war.47
Let us discuss the last issue touched upon in the letter. The standard-bearer of
Poznań and the starost of Wschowa Jarosław of Iwno was at that time a very important person. From 1406 he worked in the royal diplomacy. Before 1409 he travelled throughout Western Europe, probably taking part in fights against the Moors
in Spain. After 9 September 1409, Władysław Jagiełło sent him on a diplomatic
mission during which he reached England having visited Mecklenburg, Westphalia, Kleve, Gelderland, Holland, the Duchy of Brabant, Palatinate, Burgundy
and France. Visiting the courts of German dukes, the German King Rupert Wittelsbach (Heidelberg) along with the kings of France and England presented the
arguments of Poland during the conflict with the Teutonic Order.48 He returned
to Poland in the spring of 1410. Długosz wrote that Jarosław was incorporated
into the army commanded by the voivode of Kalisz and starost of Nakło Maciej
of Wąsosz, which invaded Teutonic Pomerania on 13 July 1410. The army was
defeated in an unidentified place by the army of Michael Küchmeister – the bailiff
of the New March. Jarosław was taken prisoner of war after the battle. Długosz
underlined that the fact that the capture of Jarosław being the cause of the defeat
of the Polish army could not be concealed in the camp of the Polish-Lithuanian
soldiers who were besieging Malbork.49 As the previously mentioned letter of 25
46
The publisher of the source, Edward Raczyński, suggested the spelling „Slothow” – Kodeks
dyplomatyczny Litwy, Publisher E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845 (further cit. KDL), nr 6, p. 118. Nevertheles, in the original the name is spelt „Slochow” – OBA, nr 1383.
47
OBA, nr 1383; KDL, p. 117–118.
48
About Jarosław of Iwno and his diplomatic activity comp. A. Szweda, Na polsko-krzyżackim
pograniczu. Działalność starosty nakielskiego Jarosława z Iwna (1413–1423), Roczniki Historyczne, R. 69: 2003, p. 105–126; idem, S. Szybkowski, „Aktywność dyplomatyczna stron konfliktu na
dworach europejskich”, [in:] S Józwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski
i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).
49
Długosz, p. 85.
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October says, the battle took place somewhere near Człuchów [Schlochau].50 The
Teutonic chronicler, the canonical judge for Pomesania, Johann von Redden also
made a reference to the event. Describing the defeat of the Teutonic Order in the
battle of Koronowo, he mentioned that the bailiff of the New March was a brave
man as earlier (“vor”) he had caused much damage to the Kingdom of Poland and
had captured a significant knight – Jarosław, “who used to accuse the Teutonic
Order in the German courts”.51 Undoubtedly, he referred to the diplomatic mission
of the standard-bearer of Poznań in the years 1409–1410. It is not known in what
circumstances the knight Jarosław was released. According to the king’s letter of
25 October, it took place shortly before 25 October and the monarch seemed to
have intervened in the case. The importance of Jarosław is proved by the fact that
the Teutonic knights wanted to exchange him for the Teutonic commander in the
battle of Koronowo – the bailiff of the New March (later the grand master) Michael
Küchmeister. Nevertheless, it was impossible due to the reasons mentioned previously. The Teutonic official was set free soon after the conclusion of the Peace of
Toruń (after 1 February 1411).52
As can be seen in the example of Jarosław of Iwno, some prisoners of war
could be exchanged in a less official way, but for sure never for free. Interesting
information is included in a letter written on 21 Dec 1410 in Nakło, in which the
starost of Kalisz Maciej of Wąsosz presented to Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen
the conditions under which he would agree to release a Teutonic subject captured
after the battle of Koronowo, a certain Kaspar of Nieżychowice [Schönfeld ]53, for
whose freedom the Polish official demanded 40 grzywnas. The captured prisoner
was to pay 30 grzywnas for a letter (of debt?) of a Bogumiłek (probably a household member of Maciej of Wąsosz) to a burgher of Debrzno [Preußisch Friedland]
– a Paszek – a landowner of Brzeźno.54 He was to bring the remaining 10 grzywnas
to the starost. Maciej of Wąsosz stressed that his offer of exchange had a time limit,
and added that he had agreed to it only at the request of the grand master.55 The
50
OBA, nr 1383.
Posilge, p. 323
52
The exact circumstances and time of his release are not known. The researchers agree that it
must have taken place between February and March 1411 – comp. W. Nöbel, Michael Kuchmeister.
Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1414–1422 (Quellen und Studienzur Geschichte des Deutschen
Ordens, Bd. 5), Marburg 1969, p. 33, 43; K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit.
53
In the source he appears as “Caspar dictus Szenefelt”, which may suggest that he lived in
Schonfeld (Nieżychowice, 3 km southwest of Chojnice). Nevertheless, it is not sure as the record
called “Szenefelt” might have suggested a nickname of his. On the other hand, the appearance of
Paszek “de Brzesna” (Brzeźno Człuchowskie West of Nieżychowice) would justify the correct interpretation of the origin of Kaspar.
54
Not known from other sources.
55
„Scirevelitis, quia Casparem dictum Szenefeltincaptivavimus dum con. Ictumante Corunow
habuimus in invicem, quem eciam taxavimus super quadraginta marcas tali condicione, quod literam
a Pascone herede de Brzezna concive in Fredelant in triginta marcis exbrigare deberet Bogumilconis
et decem marcas secum aportare, ut eum a captivitate dimittemus. Hec facere habet inprotracte, hanc
enim taxacionem sic parvam fecimus causa vestri” – OBA, nr 1424; KDW, vol. VII, nr 670.
51
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source suggests that the Polish official used the fact of having a prisoner of war to
pay off the debts of one of the members of his household. One piece of information
included in the letter analyzed here is somewhat surprising. In the introduction
Maciej mentioned that Kaspar was taken prisoner during the battle of Koronowo.
However, other sources do not confirm the fact of his participation in the battle.
Jan Długosz gave the names of 40 Polish knights taking part in the battle, but his
list did not include Maciej of Wąsosz.56 It is quite improbable that the starost of
Nakło received the prisoner as a present from somebody. Incidentally, it must be
noted that the letter does not say that Maciej released his prisoner on parole immediately after the battle having obliged him to promise to appear for ransom. It contrasts with the conduct of the king, who, as the sources say, acted thus on a large
scale. It might have concerned only the mercenaries or the visitors of the Teutonic
Order who remained under the authority of the monarch, unlike born and bred
knights (terrigena) who had much freedom in treating prisoners.
Apart from the records presented above, which are the only preserved sources,
there are no other sources which could help to describe the Poles’ process of releasing Teutonic prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. Interestingly, the
issue was not regulated in the Treaty of the Peace of Toruń. In the so-called letter
of obligation of 31 January 1411 Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen in the name
of the Teutonic Order obliged himself to pay the Polish king 100,000 three score
Prague groschens (in four equal installments: 8 March, 24 April, 11 November,
and 2 February 1412) as a collective ransom to release all prisoners.57 Nevertheless,
the treaty contained only imprecise terms. It did not include any dates for releasing
prisoners of war; nor did it provide any guarantee for the Teutonic Order should
Władysław Jagiełło not release them. The Poles did not prepare any document
concerning this matter.58 Later sources inform us that prior to handing in the letter of obligation the grand master expressed his anxiety that the king should not
keep his promise to release prisoners of war. That is why the marshal Zbigniew of
Brzezie and ten Polish magnates had to make an oral vow to fulfill the declaration regarding the prisoners kept nearby within eight days of the payment of the
first installment (to 16 March), and within 14 days regarding the prisoners kept
56
Długosz, p. 157–158.
M. Pelech, Der Verpflichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrich von Plauen bezuglich der Bezahlung von 100 000 Schokbohmischer Groschenan den Konig von Polenvom 31. Januar 1411, Preusenland, Jg. 17: 1979, Nr. 4, s. 55–58 and Anhang, nr 1–3, p. 59–63.
58
The document of the peace treaty did not specify the terms and conditions of releasing prisoners of war. It only included a reservation that all hitherto unsettled financial liabilities concerning the
ransom for individual prisoners of war should be annulled – more about it in: M. Pelech, W sprawie
okupu za jeńców krzyżackich z wielkiej wojny (1409–1411) (part I), ZH, vol. 52: 1987, z. 1, p. 134;
A. Szweda, „Traktat pokojowy”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna
Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).
57
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in more distant places (to 22 March).59 The guarantors60 of the Teutonic letter of
obligation were, for example, prisoners from Koronowo Erkinger von Seinsheim
and Konrad Truchtsesse.61 It is not known, however, whether they were already
free at that time, or they were to be released after at least the first installment of
the ransom had been paid.62 There are no sources providing information about the
manner and date regarding the release of other prisoners of war from the battle of
Koronowo. It did not have to follow the conditions of the agreements negotiated
at the end of January 1411. On other hand, in the following months after the Peace
Treaty of Torun was concluded there appeared no records saying that no Teutonic
knights, known mercenaries or visitors remained in Polish or Lithuanian captivity.
Nevertheless, other sources say that at the end of 1411 there were to remain in total
at least between 600 and 900 prisoners of war in Polish and Lithuanian captivity.63
They must have been prisoners still kept in Poland and Lithuania, but they came
from lower social strata and it took a long time before they were released. Another
reason might have been delays in the payment of installments of financial liabilities on the part of the Teutonic Order. Apparently, the total amount of ransom suggested by the grand master in the letter of obligation of 31 January 1411 (100,000
three score Prague groschens – about 142,000 Prussian grzywnas) was lower than
the sums of money the Poles could have got if prisoners of war had been ransomed
individually64, which was probably one of the reasons for the conflicts.65
To recap the above dissertation, it must be stated that while it is quite hard
to reconstruct the battle of Koronowo of 10 October 1410 due to the scarcity of
sources, some secondary aspects of the battle are better documented, one of them
being the issue of Teutonic prisoners of war. The Teutonic army consisted mostly of mercenaries (from Germany and Silesia), knights, courtiers and household
59
M. Pelech, Der Verpfliichtungsbrief, p. 57 oraz Anhang, nr 1, p. 59–62; idem, W sprawie,
p. 135.
60
Each guarantor from the group of “dukes, earls and noblemen” was obliged to send to Cracow
two counselors (each with four horses), while those from the group of “knights, squires and burghers” were to appear in person, each with four horses. The departure to Cracow was to take place
not later than within 9 weeks after being informed about the Teutonic Order’s refusal to pay ransom.
They were to stay in Cracow until the Teutonic Order had covered all the liabilities – M. Pelech, Die
Verpflichtungsbrief, Anhang, nr 1, p. 59–62; idem, W sprawie, p. 133.
61
M. Pelech, DieVerpfl ichtungsbrief, Anhang, nr 1–3, p. 59–63.
62
Markian Pelech still treated them as prisoners of war – comp. M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 136.
However, it is not so obvious.
63
The information is included in the letter of 30 Jan 1412 written by Sigismund of Luxembourg
and the letter of 18 Feb 1412 written by the Teutonic procurator in the Holy See in Rome Peter
of Orneta comp. Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens an der Kurie, bearb.
v. H. Koeppen, Bd. II, Gottingen 1960, nr 68, p. 138; M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 137.
64
M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 137.
65
About Polish-Teutonic controversies (also concerning the question of releasing prisoners
of war) in 1411 comp. A. Szweda, Po Wielkiej Wojnie. Zjazdy polsko-krzyżackie w 1411 roku, [in:]
Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów i polska kancelaria królewska w XV wieku, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork
2006, p. 267 n.
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members from the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg. At least 300 participants of
the battle were taken prisoner of war by the Polish side, 68 of whom are known by
name. According to all the sources, the king was to treat them with courtesy. The
king tried to win them over, and after a few days their names were taken down and
they were released on parole under the condition that they came back with ransom
at a specified place and time. However, such treatment was probably received only
by foreign mercenaries and knights-courtiers of Sigismund of Luxembourg. Teutonic knights and Teutonic subjects taking part in the battle were not discharged
(the latter being the authority of the Polish knights, who had captured them).
The question of the manner and conditions for releasing the prisoners from
the battle of Koronowo is not very clearly presented in the sources. Apart from demanding ransom, in some cases there were attempts to exchange them for Polish
knights captured by the Teutonic army (mostly in September 1410). The status of
some prisoners caused problems to the Teutonic authorities. The Teutonic Order
had to pay damages, cover travel expenses to the site where ransoms were to be
handed over, and perhaps pay for the ransom of the mercenaries (they stopped
receiving pay while they were prisoners). At the same time, the knight-courtiers of
Sigismund of Luxembourg were treated differently (as visitor-volunteers) and the
Teutonic Order refused to pay for their ransom. It led to long-lasting conflicts and
continuous claims from the mercenaries which the Teutonic authorities regarded
as unjustified. It seems that the majority of Teutonic prisoners of war of the battle
of Koronowo were released within a few months after the Peace Treaty of Torun
was signed (after 1 February 1411).
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
DARIUSZ K. CHOJECKI
ONE CITY, TWO DIFFERENT WORLDS.
THE SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIVERSITY OF INFANT MORTALITY
IN SZCZECIN, 18761913*
PART TWO
Key words: West Pomerania; historical demography; mortality; social history; history of the
19th and 20th century; Szczecin
IN DETAIL
Breastfeeding – the basic demands
In German the word “infant” has a totally different origin than in Polish. A child
who is under one is called Säugling. The semantics of the word clearly shows that
it refers to a human being who is not yet capable of speaking and is still breastfed
– literally like a small mammal. The remark allows us to understand better the demand of the City Committee for Health which clearly stated that every small baby
has the right to be breastfed75. The desideratum which already had a history76, was
presented to the public in the first report of the committee which outlined its action plan in the field of health care. On the one hand, it demonstrates how much
importance was given to natural feeding in the struggle against the high mortality
of infants; on the other hand, it shows a “move away from nature” determined by
changes in civilization, which physicians considered to be social pathology. Nevertheless, it was commonly known that the phenomenon was not as widespread as
for example in Paris. In Szczecin, women did not give their newborn babies to wet
nurses in the countryside, which did not mean that they did not use their services
at all77, which will be discussed further on in this article.
*
From the editor: the first part of the article was published in z. 1 of Zapiski Historyczne (vol. 75:
2010, pp. 65–96); page, chart and cartogram numbers are continued from the first part.
75
Bericht über Verwaltung der Gemeinde-Angelegenheiten der Stadt Stettin 1902/1903 (further
cit. BVGASS), p. 22.
76
See. Das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen des Regierungsbezirks Stettin in den Jahren 1883, 1884
und 1885, fünfter Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Ludwig Dieterich, Stettin 1887, pp. 146–147; Das
öffentliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin wahrend der Jahre 1886, 1887, 1888, sechster Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Dr. Katerbau, Stettin 1890, pp. 116–118.
77
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen über die Kindersterblichkeit in Stettin vom Standpunkte der
84
Dariusz K. Chojecki
Chart 14. Infant deaths due to disorders in their digestive system in Szczecin in the period
from 15 June to 15 September 1902 according to the type of nutrition
zgony niemowląt z
infant
deaths
causedw by
powodu
zaburzeń
disorders
in their digestive
funkcjonowaniu
układu
system
51.5%
trawiennego
51,5%
deaths of infants
whoniemowląt
were
zgony
not breastfed
niekarmionych
mlekiem
matki
49.4%
49,4%
zgony
niemowląt
z
infant
deaths
caused
wykluczeniem
zgonów
by reasons other
z powodu
zaburzeń w
than disorders
funkcjonowaniu
układu
in the digestive
trawiennego
system
48,5%
48.5%
deaths
of infants
zgony
niemowląt
who were
both
karmionych
mlekiem
matki
i zwierzęcym
breastfed
and fed
1,7% milk
on animal’s
1.7%
zgony niemowląt
deaths of infants
karmionych wyłącznie
fed on mother’s milk
mlekiem matki
0.3%
0,3%
Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footnote 79.
Apparently, medical doctors did not reprimand the future and present mothers in order to lock them up at home to appease the conservative78. Let us have a
closer look at the results of the research. At first, let us turn to the pioneering data
about the deaths of infants in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 September
1902 collected on the request of the Committee for Health and prepared by Dr.
G. Freund Jr (chart 14)79. The data shows that within 5 months of the summer and
autumn, 981 children under one died in the capital of West Pomerania. Among
them only 93 (9.5%) were breastfed by their mothers. In the latter group only
20 (21.5%) died of enteritis, gastritis, diarrhea and other similar illnesses, while
among all dead infants the number of deaths of such illnesses amounted to 505
(51.5%)80; its relative share was twice larger than among children who were breastöffentliche Medizin, Stettin 1867, pp. 43–44. More: E. Badinter, Historia miłości macierzyńskiej, transl.
K. Choiński, Warszawa 1998, pp. 145–147, 161–165.
78
One of the reasons why the propaganda of natural feeding had many advocates was that it did
not require much financial resources unlike the measures eliminating the causes of the high mortality rate. Comp. B. Witzler, Grosstadt und Hygiene. Kommunale Gesundheitspolitik in der Epoche der
Urbanisierung, Stuttgart 1995, pp. 192–193.
79
BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23; 1904/1905, p. 227.
80
The rainy summer affected the low value of the number. See W. Gehrke, Die Sterblichkeit der
Kinder im ersten Jahr in Stettin 1905 und 1906, Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, 1907, No. 15,
p. 598.
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One city, two (different) worlds...
fed. The difference becomes even more visible if we take into account the fact that
in the previously mentioned group of 20 deaths, 17 infants were fed on cow’s milk,
substitutes and the so-called flour soup. So, among the 505 children who died of
some malfunction of the digestive system, only 3 had been fed exclusively on their
mothers’ milk. Although the data does not describe precisely the magnitude of the
phenomenon as there is not enough information about the number of breastfeeding women, it clearly shows that natural nutrition influenced the number of deaths
among the youngest children. Moreover, it turns out that breastfeeding was not as
common as it was described in the diaries of Szczecin’s midwives from the years
1907–1911, in the light of which as much as 80% of women breastfed their newborn babies for some time81. The phenomenon was presented to look even better
in Szczecin at the turn of the 1880s and 1890s (83.4–84.5%)82.
The analysis of Erich Peiper, who was critical of reports given by midwives83,
is much less optimistic. Thanks to the assistance of doctors from West Pomerania,
he obtained information about the length of breastfeeding collected when babies
were first time vaccinated (the summer of 1909). Although E. Peiper’s report lacks
data concerning Szczecin84, the loss was compensated by the fact that the statistics of breastfeeding were prepared – among others – for Szczecin’s rural district
(Randow)85, which included, among others, industrial working-class places constituting the integral municipal complex of Szczecin86. In the years 1901–1905 this
administrative unit reported the highest number of infant deaths in West Pomerania. It was there that merely 55.3% of vaccinated children who were on average
10 months-old were breastfed for some time. The number would have been even
smaller had the analysis included younger children who had died before the first
vaccination87. In the group of naturally fed children, breastfeeding lasted most often from one to three months (41.6%)88. According to a district doctor who probably was not familiar with the results of E. Peiper’s research, the decision to give
81
Archiwum Państwowe in Szczecin (further cit. AP Szczecin), Rejencja Szczecińska Wydział
Prezydialny (further cit. RSWP), sygn. 8037, k. 145 (royal district doctor – kg. Kreisarzt (further cit.
KLO) of the city of Szczecin (west region) to the authorities of RS, Szczecin, 25 Oct 1912).
82
Das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin wahrend der Jahre 1889, 1890,
1891, siebenter Verwaltungsbericht erstattet von Dr. Katerbau, Stettin 1893, p. 98.
83
E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit in Pommern, ihre Ursachen und Bekampfung, Klinisches Jahrbuch, Jg. 23: 1910, p. 260, 278–279.
84
In 1906 during the first vaccinations Szczecin’s doctor were to collect the statistical material which informed about the kind and length of nutrition. The results of the research were to be
published in a special report, unknown to me and not mentioned by other sources. Comp. BVGASS
1906/1907, p. 212.
85
The number of vaccinated children was 650.
86
See the general remarks: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój Szczecina w latach 1871–1918,
[in:] Dzieje Szczecina 1806–1945, vol. 3, ed. G. Labuda, Szczecin 1994, pp. 281–282.
87
E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit, p. 261.
88
Ibid., p. 263 (tab. XLVII).
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Chart 15. The number of dead infants in 100 children discharged from the Municipal Care
for Infants in Szczecin in 1907 – the division according to the type of nutrition
1200
40,0
35,0
30,0
800
the
number
of discharged
infants
liczba
wypisanych
niemowląt
25,0
the
percentage
of dead
infants
odsetek
zmarłych
niemowląt
600
20,0
15,0
400
odsetek
zmarłych
niemowląt
the
percentage
of dead
infants
liczba
wypisanych
niemowląt
the number
of discharged
infants
1000
10,0
200
5,0
0
0,0
breastfed
mother’s milk
and ianimal’s
fed on animal’s
milk
karmione
piersiąfed onkarmione
piersią
butelkąmilk karmione
butelką
The source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footnote 99.
up breastfeeding was not so much women’s choice, but it was made mainly due to
their biological incapacity resulting from malnutrition89.
Why are midwives’ records not reliable? District and commune doctors themselves were critical about them, pointing out that midwives did not attach much
significance to maintaining the registration90 as they were not paid for it. In contrast to nurses responsible for infant care91, they were interested in their own financial ends92 offering poorer women bad quality baby food93. To put it bluntly, for
purely economic reasons some midwives were not interested in lowering the infant
89
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 135 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 22v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24
IX 1908 r.).
90
Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 23 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24 IX 1908
r.); sygn. 8038, k. 77v, 78 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).
91
Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 39v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS,
Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).
92
Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 91v (naczelny prezydent prowincji Pomorze do władz RS, Szczecin, 17 V
1912 r.). In a circular letter referring to the treatise of Erich Peiper it was underlined that midwives
be provided steady income (Bezierkshebammen) to make them independent of their patients, which
would allow them to enforce the guidelines of the government’s policy aiming at the reduction of
infant mortality.
93
Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 78 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).
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mortality rate and promoting the idea of breastfeeding94. Nevertheless, the negative image of Hebammen had disappeared before the First World War95.
Undoubtedly, nurses paid from the municipal budget did their job well96. According to suggestions from the central authorities97, Szczecin’s Health Office ordered them to promote breastfeeding, eradicate “bad habits” and notify of conditions unfavourable for infants98. Nurses prepared, among others, statistical reports,
one of which is particularly interesting – it refers to 1907 and shows the mortality
of infants according to the type of feeding in a community of 1530 children (chart
15)99. The chart demonstrates that in the group of infants discharged from the
municipal care for infants who were breastfed “merely” 14.2% died, whereas in
the group of babies fed on both mother’s and animal’s milk – 15%. Among the
Flaschenkinder – babies fed only on animal’s milk and surrogates, the mortality
rate was 34.5% – so it was by 113.3% higher than the mortality rate of babies who
were fed exclusively on their mother’s milk. The results cannot constitute the basis
for the generalization of the results although they refer to about 15–17% of children
who were under one100 as they concern infants whose parents had untaxed income
– lower than 900 marks a year. Nevertheless, they show the differences in the group
of poorer people. It can be stated that among the less wealthy the number of deaths
of infants was not homogenous and depended largely on the type of feeding.
The establishment of the municipal bureau of statistics in 1910 gave rise to
the compilation of the complete (including all dead infants) statistics of causes
of deaths categorized according to the method and type of feeding. The statistics
were created in cooperation with Registry Offices and must have followed Berlin’s
patterns101. The capital of Germany had been collecting information about infant
mortality and their nutrition since the end of the 19th century. Szczecin’s results
were published once in 1911, which was an exceptional year as it was characterized
94
Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 42v (pruskie ministerstwo ds. wyznania, nauczania i medycyny do prezesów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Berlin, 16 VI 1908 r.).
95
Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 191 (magistrat miasta Szczecin, deputacja ds. zdrowotności do władz RS,
Szczecin, 14 III 1913 r.).
96
BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 231 and included there Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht über die Sauglingsfursorge des Jahres 1905, Stettin 1906, p. 3.
97
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 45 (pruskie ministerstwo ds. wyznania, nauczania i medycyny do prezesów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Berlin, 16 VI 1908 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 99v
(pruskie ministerstwo spraw wewnętrznych do prezesów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Berlin, 31 VIII 1912 r.).
98
Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 76v, 77 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).
99
BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 226.
100
BVGASS 1908/1909, p. 257 (data from 1908).
101
See for example: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, Jg. 33: 1916, pp. 1038–1040.
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by a very hot summer102. In August, when the mortality rate in Szczecin103 reached
its peak of 81.25%, there was not even one cloudy day, and 18 days were very hot
(during the whole summer there were as many as 47 hot days); the precipitation
amounted to 23 mm and the air humidity only 60% while the average temperature
(20.1 °C) was 2.6 °C higher than normal104. In a nutshell, it was hell for infants,
particularly the ones who were not breastfed and whose immune systems were
weaker and more susceptible to bacteria from animal’s milk which used to go off
in hot temperatures. Thus, it is not surprising that on those hot days the infant
mortality rate grew due to disorders in the digestive system. Metaphorically, it can
be said that the curve demonstrating the deaths took the shape of a tall Gothic cathedral which hid inside the youngest human beings, which can be easily observed
in Szczecin and Grabowo105 on the basis of the combined statistics concerning
seasons and causes of deaths (chart 16).
Let us now return to the starting point – the research made in 1902 as commissioned by the Committee for Health. The research, as mentioned already, proved
indirectly that in the group of breastfed infants the risk of death caused by enteritis
or diarrhea was much lower than in the group of infants fed in any other manner.
Bearing this in mind, it will be easier to analyze the data of 1911 referring to the
1306 deaths (charts 17). The statistics – like the ones above – seem incomplete as
they would be much more valuable if they included information about the method
and type of feeding of the living infants as well as their number. Nevertheless,
the results concerning the hot year 1911 show that only 12.5% dead infants were
fed exclusively on their mother’s milk and that among the youngest children the
highest mortality rate was recorded among babies fed exclusively on animal’s milk
(56.4%). In the latter group as much as 52.0% died of gastritis, enteritis and diarrhea, while in the group of breastfed babies the percentage amounted to 21.5%106
– the same107 as in the five months of 1902. The high value of the Pearson’s correla102
More about the relationship between infant mortality and the climate on the example of
Western Pomerania: E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit, pp. 235–252. See also the
discussion of weather conditions for 1907 and 1908 (AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 38; KLO
rejonu zachodniego powiatu miejskiego Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).
103
Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Stettin 1911 (further cit. VBSS), p. 66.
104
Statistischer Jahresbericht der Stadt Stettin (further cit. SJBSS), Jg. 2: 1911, p. 1.
105
Author’s calculations on the basis of Veröffentlichungen des Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamts [for
the year 1888:] No. 10, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 41, 45, 48; 13, No. 1, 6, [1889:] 10, 15, 19, 23, 28, 32, 37,
41, 45,49; 14, No. 2, 5, [1890:] 9, 13, 18, 22, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 15, No. 1, 5, [1891:] 9, 14, 18, 22,
27, 31,36, 40, 44, 48; 16, No. 1, 5, [1892:] 10, 14, 19, 23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 17, No. 1, 5, [1893:] 10,
14, 18,23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 18, No. 1, 6, [1894:] 10, 13, 18, 23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 45, 49; 19, No. 2, 6,
[1895:] 10, 14, 19, 23, 27, 32, 37, 41, 45, 49; 20, No. 2, 6. Information gaps in the sources – no information for three months of 1896 – they make it impossible to take into consideration the seasonality
of the years 1896–1899. In 1888 Grabowo had over 15,000 inhabitants, thanks to which, according
to the requirements of the Emperor’s Office for Health, information about the natural migration and
causes of deaths could be published in a bulletin.
106
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, s. 18.
107
Despite the same numerical values those numbers are incomparable as the data were collected in different times and different weather conditions.
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Chart 16. The incidence of seasonally-related infant deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system in Grabowo and Szczecin in the years 1888–1895 (the average = 100.0)
500,0
450,0
400,0
350,0
300,0
Grabowo
250,0
Szczecin
200,0
150,0
100,0
50,0
0,0
Jan
sty
Feb
lut March
mar April
kwi
May
maj
June
cze July
lip
Aug
sie
Sept
wrz
Oct Nov
paź
lis
Dec
gru
Chart 17. Infant deaths in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the manner and type
of feeding
Without
nutrition
bez odżywienia
5.0%
5,0%
Unknown
nieznany
4.1%
4,1%
Exclusively
wyłączniesurrogates
surogaty
3.8%
3,8%
wyłącznie mleko
matkimilk
Exclusively
mother’s
12.5%
12,5%
Animal’s
milk
mleko
zwierzęce
and isurrogates
surogaty
4%
4%
Mother’s
mleko matki
and animal’s milk
i zwierzęce
14%
14%
Mother’s
milk, animal’s
milk
mleko matki,
zwierzęce
and
surrogates
i surogaty
1%
1%
Mother’s
milk
mleko
matki
and
surrogates
i surogaty
0%
0%
Exclusively
wyłącznie
mleko
animal’s
milk
zwierzęce
56.4%
56,4%
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tion coefficient calculated on the basis of the statistics X2 proves that the method
and type of nutrition were associated with the causes of the deaths. For Szczecin’s
data of 1911 the statistics amounted to 0.688 (p<0.001) at a 0–1 scale. The result
may be interpreted in the following way: the more natural the baby’s food was, the
less frequently babies died of digestive disorders and the more often deaths were
caused by hereditary defects and other illnesses (chart 18).
If infant mortality differed according to the social-professional position of the
parents, as is shown in the data from the years 1902–1913, it can be assumed that
causes of deaths in the already mentioned dichotomic division should also be conditioned by the social-professional position of the parents. The data compiled for
the five months of summer and autumn of 1902108 allow us to assume that this was
certainly the case. (chart 19)109. Let facts speak for themselves: in three groups of
dead infants whose parents came from higher social and professional classes (officials and military men, craftsmen running their own businesses, merchants – including craftsmen who had their own shops), the percentage of deaths of enteritis,
gastritis and diarrhea fluctuated from 36–37%.
The situation looked different in the remaining groups of dead infants whose
parents held the lowest positions in the social-professional ladder (qualified, unqualified and day labourers). 52–56% of children died due to disorders in the digestive system before they had turned one. The highest percentage of deaths for
the above reason was reported in families of craftsmen who ran their own business
(61%), which must have referred to journeymen and apprentices. As can be seen,
the diversification of the analyzed phenomenon was conditioned by the socialprofessional position of the parents, but its magnitude should not be overestimated. The reason was the weather. The cool summer of 1902 positively affected the
infant mortality rate, weakening the structural contrasts.
The differences described above should be reflected in the geographic space
of the city (cartogram 2). Unfortunately, the information was collected only for
three districts of the Registry Offices in the city of Szczecin110. What is more, the
information was characterized by a small degree of social-professional homogeneity, which cannot be said in case of municipal statistical districts. The lowest
diversification degree belonged to district II of the Registry Office, which included
working class boroughs of Szczecin – Grabowo and Drzetowo inhabited to a large
extent by shipyard workers. Those areas of Szczecin were marked by the highest
infant mortality. In 1902 there were 33.8 deaths in 100 live births among children
who were under one. Thus, it is not surprising that district II of the Registry Office was marked by the highest percentage of infants who died due to disorders
108
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 243.
Data about the social-professional position of parents was given for 756 infants. In the group
of those children the percentage of deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system was the same
as in the group of all infants included in the research (981 children) and amounted to 51.5%, which
allows us to draw more daring conclusions.
110
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 242, 252.
109
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Chart 18. Infant deaths in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the type and manner
of nutrition and causes of deaths
450
inability
to live
niezdolność
do życia
enteritis
nieżyt żołądka lub jelit, biegunka
400
350
atrophy
atrofia
contractions
skurcze
300
other
illnesses
inne choroby
250
200
150
100
50
0
and
Exclusively
wyłącznie
mleko Mother’s
mlekomilk
matki
i
animal’s
milklub
mother’s
matkimilk
zwierzęce
or surrogates
surogaty
Animal’s
milk lub
mleko
zwierzęce
or surogaty
surrogates
Unknown
nieznany
bez odżywiania
Without
nutrition
Chart 19. the percentage of deaths of infants caused by disorders in the digestive system as
opposed to the total number of infant deaths in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15
Nov 1902 according to the social-professional position of parents
merchants
and craftsmen
kupcy i rzemieślnicy
running their
own shops
prowadzący
własny
sklep
officials
and military
men
urzędnicy
i wojskowi
independent
craftsmen
samodzielni
rzemieślnicy
craftsmen
niesamodzielni
rzemieślnicy
qualified blue-collar
wykwalifikowani robotnicy
workers
niewykwalifikowani
unqualifi
ed blue-collar
robotnicy
workers
robotnicy
daydniówkowi
labourers
ogółem
total
0%
20%
40%
60%
enteritis
and
nieżyt jelit
lubgastritis
żołądka, biegunka
80%
100%
other
illnesses
inne choroby
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Cartogram 2. The percentage of infant deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system
within the total number of deaths and infant mortality in Szczecin’s districts of registry
Offices in 1902
Infant
in 5 months
1902r.(%)
Zgonydeaths
niemowląt
w 5. m.of1902
(%)
100
50
10
−
Drzetowo
Drzetowo
Drzetowo
DS
deaths
UT zgony
other
deaths
Inne zgony
−
Infant
in 1902
(%) r. (%)
Zgonymortality
niemowląt
w 1902
55
Grabowo
Grabowo
Grabowo
Infant
mortalityniem.
(%) (%)
Umieralność
DS
UT deaths
zgony
Inne zgony
other
deaths
26,1 (1)
27,3 (1)
33,8 (1)
1
3
Note: DS deaths – deaths caused by disorders of the digestive system.
in the digestive system (55%), while the percentages of such deaths in Registry
Office III (47%) and Registry Office II (50%) characterized by a lower mortality
rate were respectively 26.1% and 27.3%. The differences could be determined by
the professional activity of women. According to a district doctor of the SzczecinZachód region (exclusive residential districts) breastfeeding was quite common111.
The mortality rate of the youngest children was the lowest in the whole city. Why?
One of the reasons is that women from such districts did not work according to the
bourgeois mentality112, since their husbands were expected to maintain the family. If they worked, they did so in their homes, which facilitated breastfeeding and
determined a lower mortality rate113.
111
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)
do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).
112
R. Sieder, Sozialgeschichte der Familie, Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 187–189.
113
Maria Nietyksza mentions the influence of professional work of women on the mortality rate
in the context of denominational groups (Ludność Warszawy na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Warszawa
1971, pp. 114–115).
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Why among babies of the poorer social strata was the percentage of deaths
caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea higher than among infants of more affluent parents? The sanitary-hygienic conditions, women’s professional activity and
bad habits could not have been the only reason. The quality of animal’s milk was
questionable. As early as in the 1860s Hermann Wasserfuhr spoke very critically
of it saying that Szczecin’s milk was often of poor quality as milking cows took
place in bad conditions; milking girls had dirty hands and their hair and dandruff
were often found in milk in which one could also detect urine and stable dust. The
situation was made even worse as fresh milk was mixed with bad milk or diluted
with water. Paradoxically, diluting milk with water could have saved many babies’
lives as it lowered the energy value of the milk. Many parents were not conscious
of the fact that too much fat and nutritive substances could be harmful for a baby’s
development, for a calf grew much more rapidly than a human infant114. Poorer
parents tended to buy cheaper milk for themselves and their children115, which was
normally not the case for the well-off116.
The police issued an order which entered into force on 1 July 1903117 the aim of
which was to prevent the pernicious practice of diluting milk. As can be supposed,
the stimulus for the order were the results of the research of 1902. It turned out
that half of dead infants had been fed on Szczecin’s milk, while the sale of imported
milk was seven times higher than the sale of Szczecin’s milk118. In the face of those
facts, the city authorities attempted to lower the infant mortality rate in the first
year of life by giving out good milk to the poor. The milk came from Szczecin’s
dairy (Eckerberger Molkerei)119 as babies fed on that milk reported a relatively
low mortality rate caused by disorders in the digestive system (54.2%). Babies fed
on milk from milkmen from outside Szczecin died much more frequently due to
digestive problems (69.2%)120. Such were the results of the research of 1902. What
knowledge is provided by the research conducted in the third quarter of 1903 after the order entered into force? It turned out that the infant mortality rate121 in
the group of babies fed on the milk from Eckerberger Molkerei amounted to 15%
(114:759), and in the group of babies in general – 14% (953:6827). A pessimist
could complain having seen the difference in the relative numbers. However, an
optimist would comment on the whole situation in the following way: nutrition
with good-quality milk brought positive results because the mortality of children
114
See G. Temme, Die sozialen Ursachen Sauglingssterblichkeit, Berlin–Schoneberg 1908, p. 38–
–39; M. Konarzewski, Na początku był głód, Warszawa 2005, p. 100–101.
115
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 84–86.
116
BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 12.
117
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 146 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)
118
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 253.
119
Ibid. (Anlage 4), p. 254.
120
121
The mortality rate here represents the relation of the number of infant deaths to the number
of living children in a given moment.
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of poor parents (usually high) did not diverge significantly from the mortality rate
of all children including infants fed exclusively on their mother’s milk!122 The results of the research, despite not being as positive as in Berlin, did not discourage
the city authorities from the idea of developing “the milk campaign”. From December 1904 they started to give out milk to the poor. In October 1905 the system
was modified and poorer families were subsidized (families with an income of less
than 900 marks a year and not more than 100 marks for one child)123. The system
was preferential to mothers who breastfed their babies as they were subsidized for
one litre of milk whereas mothers who fed their babies on animal’s milk received
a subsidy for ½ litre of milk. The system was to reduce the mortality rate of babies
of poorer parents by providing good milk whose the quality was checked by the
Health Office124. There was even a plan to introduce milk ready to drink (trinkfertige Portionen), but it was given up for fear that it should discourage women from
breastfeeding125. Subsidies were given until the outbreak of the First World War.
Emphasizing the need to breastfeed among poorer women – strongly promoted from the beginning of the 20th century, taking place while a baby was being
registered in a registry office126 and constituting one of the activities undertaken by
the Patriotic Association of Women127 and the Municipal Care for Infants – could
suggest that natural feeding was a norm among women who came from more affluent families, as they did not need to work and and wean their newborn babies
to maintain the family, unlike working-class women inhabiting areas near Szczecin128. To enable the latter group of women to breastfeed their babies during work,
factories were to be equipped with special rooms for breastfeeding129; neverthe122
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 4), pp. 255–256.
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 43v–44v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS,
Szczecin, 1 X 1908 r.) In his demands he raised the problem of the tax threshold allowing the use of
the help provided by the Municipal Care for Infants – strictly speaking the right to get the subsidies
for milk. According to him, the threshold was too low, as a result of which too few children were
given help. He put forward a demand to establish the tax threshold at the level of 1,500 marks, which
was never realized.
124
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 190–190v (magistrat miasta Szczecin, deputacja ds.
zdrowia do władz RS, Szczecin 14 III 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 149–149v (KLO powiatu miejskiego
Szczecin(rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 39 (KLO powiatu
miejskiegoSzczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.) and BVGASS 1904/1905,
Beilage:W. Gehrke, Bericht, s. 2; BVGASS 1905/1906, pp. 220–221.
125
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 79v (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13
XI 1908 r.).
126
BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 24.
127
Agnieszka Chlebowska writes more about the activity of the association (W walce o poprawę
warunków życia. Opieka nad dzieckiem jako obszar działalności organizacji kobiecych w Prusach naprzełomie XIX i XX wieku na przykładzie Szczecina, [in:] Choroba i śmierć w perspektywie
społecznejw XIII–XX wieku, ed. D. Chojecki, E. Włodarczyk, Warszawa 2010).
128
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 135 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS,
Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.).
129
Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 23v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24 IX
1908 r.).
123
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Chart 20. The capability to breastfeed newborn babies in Szczecin in the mid-1860s according to the social-professional position of mothers
Wives
of the rich
żony
zamożnych
mogły same karmić
Wives
of lower and
middlei średniego
– ranking offi
cials
żony
urzędników
niższego
stopnia
nie mogły karmić
Wives of owners
small enterprisescould
breastfeed
żony of
właścicieli
małego przedsiębiorstwa
żony
czeladników
Wives of journeymencould
not
breastfeed
żony robotników
Wives
of workers
niezamężne
Unmarried
women
wieśniaczki
(przyległe miejscowości
doto
Szczecina)
Women-peasants
(areas adjacent
Szczecin)
0
10
20 30
40 50 60
70 80
90 100
less, it was never put into action. To give a more complete picture let us add that
insured married women had the right to a short six-week paid maternity leave
(Wochengeld)130.
It is curious that the sources omit the question of the social circumstances
surrounding breastfeeding and they concentrate on poorer women. Was it a conspiracy of silence? For example, Prof. Erich Peiper who had access to the best statistical material did not say anything about the influence of the social-professional
position on the frequency of breastfeeding. Other doctors failed to speak too.
Only one doctor, Hermann Wasserfuhren, in the mid-1860s collected information
about the natural feeding of 327 newborn babies (chart 20) during his home visits.
It turned out that after labour women whose husbands were well-off (with an annual income over 1000 thalers) had most difficulty in breastfeeding. In this group,
¾ of women were unable to breastfeed their babies themselves. Among them only
one mother fed her baby on animal’s milk; the remaining 29 women enjoyed the
help of wet nurses. In the group with the 32 wives of middle and lower-ranking
officials whose income did not exceed 1000 thalers only ¼ of women could not
breastfeed themselves and 5 of them had their babies fed by wet nurses while the
130
Comp. [dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang und Bekämpfung der Säuglingssterblichkeit,
Berlin 1913, p. 50.
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remaining three fed their children artificially. The wives of the owners of small
enterprises and journeymen hardly ever had problems with breastfeeding, while
100% of working-class women at the bottom of the social ladder could breastfeed
their babies. The situation looked equally good in the case of rural women living in
areas adjacent to Szczecin: out of 98 women only 5 did not breastfeed their babies.
What their nutrition looked like later is unknown. What is known, however, is that
Dr. H. Wasserfuhr tried to explain the abnormal incapacity to breastfeed among
the wealthiest patients with the condition of their health, saying that the production of milk disappeared spontaneously or the amount of milk was insufficient.
Additionally, some women suffered from a mammary gland inflammation. What
were the reasons for such a situation? Reportedly, more affluent women inherited
their health from their parents who led an unhealthy life in cities, were not active
physically and got married too early. One of the listed reasons should be underlined – hypersensitivity (Blut- und Nervenleben) as it can prove a non-biological
dimension to the phenomenon. Reading the study of Dr. H. Wasserfuhr, the reader
can get the impression that this fragment loses its reliability, for the doctor did his
best to defend his rich patients using biological explanations131 while failing to
mention their desire to maintain a firm bust132 or to get rid of the so-called “long
leash” to be able to lead an active social life. It was not until the political ambience
changed after WWI when the ideals of the bourgeois world collapsed that district
doctors started to report that giving up natural nutrition was characteristic of the
highest social classes and was being transmitted to lower classes. The “bad” example was to come from the city133.
Non-marital children – the high-risk group
Doctors paid special attention to unmarried women because the infant mortality rate in the group was a few dozen percent higher than the mortality rate of
infants of married women (chart 21).
It was obvious that the situation was changing for the better in this field134.
At the beginning of the 20th century the infant mortality rate tended to go down
both in the group of marital and non-marital babies135, but in the latter group the
tendency was more rapid and more systematic, which must be underlined particularly in the context of the growing number of non-marital births136. In the analyzed
131
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 43–44.
Comp. G. Temme, Die sozialen Ursachen, p. 64.
133
D. Szudra, Ludność pruskiej prowincji Pomorze. Przemiany w ruchu naturalnym i migracyjnym
w latach 1914–1939, Szczecin 2005, p. 202.
134
do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 151–151v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin
(rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.).
135
SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 17.
136
In 1901 in Szczecin there were 11.5 non-marital births in 100 live births, and in 1913 – 15.0.
See: Statistische Vierteljahresberichte der Stadt Stettin (further cit. SVBSS), Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, (D. Anhang: 1. Die auserehelich Geborenen in Stettin und ihre Mütter), p. 36.
132
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Chart 21. Infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1901–1913 – according to the legitimacy
of dead children (%)
55,0
non-marital
pozamałżeńskie
50,0
total
ogółem
marital
małżeńskie
45,0
40,0
35,0
30,0
25,0
20,0
15,0
10,0
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
period the relative difference between both rates reached its peak in 1902 amounting to 96.4%, while it reached its minimal values in 1911 when it was reduced to
19.8%137. It remains unknown how the numbers were reflected in the geographical
space of the city. Although some data regarding the deaths of non-marital infants
in selected parts of Szczecin in the five months of the summer and autumn of 1902
was published, it does not have any particular value as it shows only the percentage
share in the total number of dead infants (cartogram 3)138.
It may prove that most non-marital children were born in the Old Town and
in the area of Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiesen) situated now in Gen. Henryka
Dąbrowskiego Street and in Górny Wik. The level of infant mortality was determined largely by the deaths of non-marital babies whose percentage amounted to
25 and 31% respectively. The phenomenon should not surprise us if we consider
it in the context of the remarks made by Edward Włodarczyk. In the first case the
high value of the analyzed percentage resulted from a growing proletariazation
of the Old Town at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and the worsening of its
infrastructure. In the second case it reflected social and residential relations in Fort
137
138
The author’s own calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 17.
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 245.
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Cartogram 3. The percentage of deaths of non-marital children within the total number of
infant deaths in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 Nov 1902 according to the city’s
districts (%)
Drzetowo
Drzetowo
Grabowo,
Grabowo, Dolny
Dolny Wik
Wik
Łasztownia
Łasztownia
Grünhof
Grünhof (Dolne
(Dolne Niebuszewo)
Niebuszewo)
25 do 31 (2)
18 do 25 (5)
13 do 18 (2)
Stare
Stare Miasto
Miasto
Miasto
Stare
Stare
Miasto
Tuż
Tuż Przed
Przed
Przed Bramą
Bramą
Bramą Królewską
Królewską
Królewską
Tuż
Tuż
Przed
Bramą
Królewską
ii Portową,
Portową, część
część Śródmieścia
Śródmieścia
Turzyn,
Turzyn, Westend,
Westend, część
część Śródmieścia
Śródmieścia
Szubieniczne
Szubieniczne Łąki
Łąki
Łąki (Galgenwiese),
(Galgenwiese),
(Galgenwiese), Górny
Górny
Górny Wik
Wik
Wik
Szubieniczne
Szubieniczne
Łąki
(Galgenwiese),
Górny
Wik
Cżęść
Cżęść Śródmieścia
Śródmieścia
-- okolice
okolice ul.
ul. Piotra
Piotra Ściegiennego,
Ściegiennego,
Władysława
Władysława Łokietka
Łokietka ii al.
al. Piastów
Piastów
Note: grouping by the method of equal intervals; lack of strict borders between regions; the
borders of statistical data come from 1911.
Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footonote 138.
Prusy – an area of extreme poverty. Some streets of Dolne Drzetowo139 were also
considered slums. Their polar opposites were municipal areas such as the working-class Grabowo and Dolny Wik (13%) and the intelligentsia-bourgeois Westened, Turzyn and north-west part of the city centre (Śródmieście) in the source
referred to as part of the New City140 (15%). The data concerning the latter group
should not be surprising. However, the results for Grabowo and Dolny Wik are
astonishing taking into account the fact that these areas were inhabited by workers
employed in the shipping and engineering industries. It is possible that this fact
played a role in shaping the level of non-marital births if women rarely worked in
heavy industry – they worked mainly in the garment and tobacco industries and
139
E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 324, 328.
In the official nomenclature the name Neustadt (New Town) referred to the part of the city
adjacent to the south-west of the Old Town (the areas near today’s Dworcowa Street, Trzeciego Maja
Street and part of Narutowicza Street). However, in doctors’ reports to the magistrate the district is
called ehemalige Neustadt (the former New Town), and the “proper” New Town are considered areas
situated in the axis of Wojska Polskiego Street in the part probably marked by Bolesława Krzywoustego Street and Plac Sprzymierzonych (see BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 225).
140
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as servants. It must be reminded that in the light of the data from the years 1911–
–1913, Grabowo was characterized by a relatively low infant mortality rate, which
was unusual among Szczecin’s working-class districts situated in the outskirts of
the city (see notes in the part “General considerations”). This phenomenon may be
explained by the relatively low level of non-marital births.
The difference between the number of deaths of marital and non-marital children was determined socially considering the fact that single mothers came usually from lower social strata, which is proved by the data from the years 1902–1913
(chart 22)141. Presenting the data, we can use the logarithmic scale considering the
exceptionally high value of the rate of non-marital births in the group of women
employed as servants (96.4%!). Their children prevailed in the group of non-marital births not only relatively, but also absolutely (3435 occurrences), which leads us
to conclude that the general level of infant mortality among non-marital children
was shaped mainly by deaths of babies whose mothers were employed as servants142. The deaths of babies whose mothers were hired workers of various kinds,
had managerial positions or worked as freelancers also affected the magnitude of
the analyzed phenomenon (the exception to the rule is only ostensible considering
the fact that this group of unmarried mothers included also poor needlewomen
and tailors), as well as those employed as unqualified and qualified labour in craft
and industry.
The statistics of 1914 make it possible to analyze the internal professional structure of women who had a non-marital child143. According to the statistics, in the
group of the above-mentioned mothers (899 mothers) prevailed the Dienstmädchen – servants (33.8 %); next came tailors, needlewomen and women who did
the ironing (13.6%); the last group constituted women who had no job (10.2%).
For the sake of contrast, in bigger professional groups the least represented were
women employed in the civil service and the private sector (not häusliche Dienst)
and those with liberal professions (0.7%). The source lists a pianist, three artists,
a minder of the sick and a deaconess – an Evangelical nurse.
Why did servants prevail in the group of unmarried women? Michael Mitterauer answers this question in an interesting way saying that in big cities women
employed as servants were usually immigrants living far from the religious and
social influence of their families. They left their family homes to acquire new experiences and get to know a new world. Employers were more willing to hire girls
from outside the city as it allowed them to influence and control the servants144,
141
The author’s own calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 12–13.
About the situation of house servants in Szczecin: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp.
471–472.
143
SVBSS, Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, p. 35. Db; 15,5; 665
144
M. Mitterauer, Ledige Mütter. Zur Geschichte unehelicher Geburten in Europa, München 1983,
p. 102. See also general remarks about house servants: A. Fauve-Chamoux, Służba domowa w Europie
od XVI wieku: dzieje i źródła zjawiska, [in:] Rodzina i gospodarstwo domowe na ziemiach polskich
w XV–XX wieku. Struktury demograficzne, społeczne i gospodarcze, ed. C. Kuklo, Warszawa 2008, pp.
142
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Chart 22. The absolute and relative level of non-marital births in Szczecin in the years
1902–1913 (data collected) presented according to the social-professional position of
mothers
100,0
Da; 96,4; 3 435
A – agriculture
B – craft and industry
C – trade and transport
Cb; 2,5; 54
Ca; 1,8; 72
Cd; 1,8; 151
12
13
14
15
Eb; 0,5; 13
Ea; 2,5; 42
11
Ec; 0,8; 8
Aa; 3,7; 11
10
Bb; 1,1; 20
F1; 4,3; 18
Bc; 5,1; 971
5
Ac; 5,9; 13
4
Ad; 20,4; 57
20,0
Cc; 7,2; 279
Db; 15,5; 665
40,0
Ab; 7,5; 5
60,0
Bd; 8,3; 1 195
Ea– liberal professions
Eb– regular office workers
Ec– caretakers, porters, messengers, staff of public utility places, etc.
F1 – rentiers, old-age pensioners, Altsitzers
Ba; 10,7; 885
80,0
urodzenia
pozamałżeńskie
Non-marital
births (%) (%)
Aa, Ba, Ca – independent manageresses
Ab, Bb, Cb – intellectual workers
Ac, Bc, Cc – qualified workers
Ad, Bd, Cd – unqualified workers
Da – house and personal servants
Db – hired workers of various kinds
16
17
18
0,0
0
1
2
3
6
7
8
9
ranga
rank
which was even easier as the girls were usually very young. The data of the Municipal Care for Infants gathered in 1912 show how much unmarried mother differed
from married ones in this respect. According to the data, 4/5 of women had a
non-marital child when they were under 25, while only ¼ of married women bore
a child while under 25. The average age of mothers in the first group was 22.1 and
in the other 29.9145. Obviously, the numbers do not reflect precisely the differences
because of a different frequency of subsequent births in both groups of mothers.
To compare the age we should take into account only the first births, but there is
no information about them in the source.
Complete data concerning non-marital births in 1914 allow us to suppose that
among unmarried mothers prevailed those who were 19, 20, 21 and 22 when their
baby was born. Their age during labour was most often around 21.1. The majority of
unmarried mothers were single – only 1.9% were widows (1.3%) or divorced (0.6%)146.
324–326; R. Poniat, Kontrola służby domowej na ziemiach polskich w świetle aktów prawnych w końcu
XVIII i XIX wieku, [in:] ibid., pp. 353–362 (in reference to Polish lands under Prussian rule).
145
The author’s own calculations on the basis of VBSS 1912, p. 90.
146
The author’s own calculations on the basis of SVBSS, Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, pp. 35–36.
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Chart 23. The percentage of births given by mothers from outside Szczecin in the total
number of births in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 (collected data) grouped according to
the legimization and the still/live births factor at the moment of birth
14,0
The percentage
births given
by mothers
from outside Szczecin
Udziałofurodzeń
z matek
pozamiejscowych
(%)
Non-marital
– alive; pozamałżeńskie
10.3;10,3;
334 334
żywe;
12,0
małżeńskie
Marital – dead;
martwe;
9.7; 9,7;
55 55
pozamałżeńskie
Non-marital
– dead; -
10,0
martwe;
8,4; 11
8.4; 11
8,0
6,0
Marital – alive;
małżeńskie
- żywe;
2.4;
2,4;445
445
4,0
2,0
0,0
0
1
2
3
4
5
rank
ranga
All this allows us to think that ledige Mütter had neither any financial nor social
position147.
The situation of unmarried mothers was difficult for one more reason. The
group included a considerable percentage of mothers from outside Szczecin
(chart 23). While in the years 1910–1913 the percentage of the latter in the group
of married mothers amounted to only 2.4%, in the group of unmarried women the
level reached 10.3% and was still growing (from 8.3% in 1910 to 12.8% in 1913)148.
It must be stressed that in terms of absolute magnitude, births given by unmarried
mothers from outside Szczecin did not diverge significantly from births given by
married women from outside Szczecin despite the differences in their number. Although the data of the Municipal Care for Infants concerning the year 1912 shows
that women born outside Szczecin were more heavily represented in the group of
147
In the light of the data of the Municipal Care for Infants from 1912 in the group of unmarried
mothers using obligatorily the assistance of the institution, 42.8% worked as servants, 20.9% worked
as factory workers, 19.7% were employed in non-industrial plants, 5.3% worked as merchants’s assistants (Angestellte in Geschäften), and 10.4% had no profession at all. See: VBSS 1912, p. 89.
148
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, p. 5; Jg. 2: 1911, p. 12; Jg. 3: 1912,
p. 17; Jg.4: 1913, p. 11.
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married mothers (74.6%) than in the group of unmarried ones (65.0%), it turns
out that the latter group included women who stayed in Szczecin for some time.
As much as ½ of unmarried mothers lived in Szczecin not longer than a year – the
number for married women in this case is 1/7149.
The main reason for the “labour tourism”– in the period when most children
were born in the privacy of home150 – was the desire and need to give birth to a
child far from the unfriendly rural or provincial surroundings, which normally
did not accept children born out of wedlock and put the tarnish of blame and
disgrace on unmarried mothers. The big city of Szczecin gave unmarried pregnant
women more anonymity and allowed them to give birth to their children in good
conditions in special institutions. Some women probably returned to their local
environment after labour. However, most of them remained in Szczecin to look for
a job there. As they were not supported by their families, the ones who had to pay
the highest price were their children.
Every politically involved scientist or journalist joined the heated debate about
the causes of the extraordinary infant mortality. One of the most interesting descriptions of the phenomenon was written by one of Szczecin’s doctors – Dr. Hermann Wasserfur – in the mid-1860s. Reading the work, one could get the impression that one of the main reasons for the deaths of non-marital infants were the deliberate actions of some mothers whose aim was to kill their illegitimate offspring.
The motive of such initiatives was the fear of disgrace and impossibility to carry
out life plans hindered by a child out-of-wedlock. It must be stressed here that for
most women employed as house servants having an illegitimate child meant losing
their job and modest accommodation151.
According to H. Wasserfuhr, some non-marital children were born in secret
secluded places; mothers did not provide them with warmth, appropriate clothes,
care or access to fresh air in order to provoke their death and make people believe
that their deaths were natural. He observed that illegitimate children were dropped
on the pavement and fractured their head, while others were strangled in latrines,
under the bed or squeezed under their mother’s body. It sometimes happened that
newborn babies died of hyperthermia or heavy loss of blood as they had not had
their umbilical cords tied on time. These actions were premeditated and constituted
criminal offences. Dr. Wasserfuhr concludes that children were deliberately led to
their death by being drowned, strangled, beaten up or buried152. Half a century later,
an expert in this problem – Dr. Behr-Pinnow – urged the authorities to provide innocent illegitimate newborn babies with the protection of probation officers153, for
149
The author’s calculations on the basis of VBSS 1912, p. 89.
For example, in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 only 8.1% of children were born in social
care institutions. Their mothers were predominantly from outside Szczecin. See: Preusische Statistik
(further cit. PS) 229, 1910, p. 222; 233, 1911, p. 222; 238, 1912, p. 222; 245, 1913, p. 222.
151
E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 471.
152
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 36.
153
It was introduced in Szczecin on 1 Jan 1910.
150
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they “had to bear the consequences of their parents’ mistake”, which was not justified ethically and was against Christian values. In one word, it was barbarity154. The
stigma of guilt was reinforced in social law: unmarried mothers were discriminated
against by the social insurance system as they did not have the right to a six-week
paid maternity leave (Wochengeld)155. The situation did not change until the times
of the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, the mental attitude towards non-marital
children did not change, at least in the Wets-Pomeranian province156.
The pessimistic picture of the mortality of non-marital infants should be reflected in numbers. To verify the assumptions made by Dr. H. Wasserfuhr we can
use the data published for Szczecin from 1886 about the causes of deaths presented
according to their sex and age with special emphasis being given to homicides, accidents or other forms of sudden death (gewaltsame Einwirkungen) in the group
of children who died before they had turned one. The number should demonstrate the criminal action of some mothers towards their children, which could
be euphemistically referred to as postnatal birth control. It turns out that the facts
looked different. In individual five-year periods (1886–1890–1906–1910) and the
last three-year period (1911–1913) the total number of deaths for the above-mentioned reasons fluctuated between 4 and 16. In the structure of causes of infants’
deaths they did not play a major role, as their share fluctuated between 0.6% and
2.2%, and it did not experience and upward trend157. More detailed data from the
years 1910–1913 which take into account the legitimization of infants confirm that
the phenomenon described by Dr. H. Wasserfuhr was marginal before the First
World War even if we look only at his Dunkelziffer. Officially, during those four
years in Szczecin two infants were killed – one marital and one non-marital. In the
group of the youngest children from marital relationships, six died through accident or another sudden cause, whereas among non-marital newborn babies only
one died due to one of these two reasons158.
The above data should not conceal the fact that non-marital infants ran more
risk of losing their lives for various reasons than marital newborn babies (chart 24).
In the group of the latter “fortunate enough to be born to married parents” the
number of deaths was higher only in the case of illnesses of the respiratory system
and the nervous system, excluding convulsions and contractions (Krämpfe)159.
154
[Dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang, p. 45.
Ibid., p. 50.
156
See:. D. Szudra, Ludność, p. 200.
157
The author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1886/1887, pp. 52–53; 1887/1888, pp. 38–
–39; 1888/1889, pp. 34–35; 1889/1890, pp. 36–37; 1908/1909, pp. 224–228; PS 118, 1890, pp. 54–55;
124, 1891, pp. 54–55; 132, 1892, pp. 54–55; 135, 1893, pp. 54–55; 139, 1894, pp. 54–55; 145, 1895,
pp. 52–53; 152, 1896, pp. 52–53; 157, 1897, pp. 52–53; 162, 1898, pp. 52–53; 166, 1899, pp. 52–53;
171, 1900, pp. 50–51; 179, 1901, pp. 50–51; 184, 1902, pp. 50–51; 189, 1903, pp. 50–51; 195, 1904,
pp. 50–51; 199, 1905, pp. 54–55; 208, 1906, pp. 54–55; 214, 1907, pp. 56–57; VBSS 1909, pp. 12–13;
SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15; Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.
158
SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15; Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.
159
The source as above.
155
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Chart 24. Infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 (collected data) according to
the causes of death and the legitimization of children
90,0
1. Disorders of the digestive system
1. Choroby układu trawiennego
2. Genetic incapacity to live (including body defects)
2. Wrodzona niezdolność do życia w tym wady
3.
Contractions
budowy
4.
3. Infectious
Skurcze diseases
4. Spinal
Choroby
zakaźneatrophy in children
5.
muscular
5. Illnesses
Atrofia dziecięca
6.
of the respiratory system
6. Other
Choroby
organów
oddechowych
7.
identifi
ed causes
of death
7. Inne zidentyfikowane przyczyny śmierci
8. Illnesses of the skin
8. Choroby zewnętrzne skóry
9.
of the iheart
and
the circulatory system
9. Illnesses
Choroby serca
układu
krwionośnego
10.
of the nervous
system
10. Illnesses
Choroby układu
nerwowego
(bez(without
skurczy)contractions)
11.Unidentifi
Niepodane
zidentyfikowane
11.
edlub
or niedokładnie
not clearly specifi
ed
80,0
umieralność
niemowląt
Infant mortality
(‰) (‰)
70,0
60,0
50,0
40,0
non-marital
pozamałżeńskie
marital
małżeńskie
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
(pozamałżeńskie)
i numer
przyczyny
rangeranga
(non-marital)
and the
number
of a cause
That inequality in the face of illness and death influenced the mental and physical health of mothers was reflected in the vitality of infants, whose condition was
portrayed in the data from the Municipal Care for Infants of 1910–1912. It turns
out from the data that among children admitted into care there were relatively
more “healthy and strong” babies in the group of marital infants (the difference
about 6.4–10.5%). The situation was reverse among the youngest infants who were
described as “healthy, but weak”, for in this case there were relatively more nonmarital infants (the difference of 6.5–7.7%)160. The contrast between both groups of
infants would have been even more visible had the research of the Municipal Care
for Infants encompassed most newborn marital babies as was the case in relation
to newborn non-marital babies. Considering the structure of the causes of deaths
in the categorization according to the legimization of infants, we can also perceive
the above-mentioned inequality. The difference is particularly visible in the case of
deaths due to “genetic incapacity to live, including body defects”. In Szczecin in the
years 1910–1913 the causes was more frequent in the group of non-marital infants
(24.6%) than in the group of marital babies (21.7%); the number of deaths due
for this reason was bigger by 49% among non-marital infants in comparison with
marital ones (see chart 24)161.
160
VBSS 1910, p. 62; 1912, p. 89.
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15;
Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.
161
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Chart 25. Deaths of infants in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the legitimization
and the kind of feeding
1000
100
exclusivelymleko
mother’s
milk
wyłącznie
matki
mother’s
milk iand
animal’slub
milk,
or surrogates
mleko
matki
zwierzęce
surogaty
animal’s
milk or surrogates
mleko
zwierzęce
lub surogaty
without
nutrition
bez
odżywiania
10
1
małżeńskie
marital
pozamałżeńskie
non-marital
Unmarried mothers were compelled to start working immediately after giving
birth which, according to doctors, adversely affected the frequency and length of
breastfeeding162. Some of them, in an attempt to earn money, were employed as wet
nurses in wealthy families; thus, they fed rich women’s babies with their milk, but
their own offspring with animal’s milk or surrogates163. Was this practice in decline
in Szczecin? It is hard to answer the question on the basis of remaining sources.
However, prior to WWI the institution of wet nurses did not disappear since it was
mentioned in the context of controlling them via a centralized agency164. Some
negative opinions of doctors about feeding non-marital babies can be verified on
the basis of the statistics of 1911165, which take into account the legitimization of
dead infants (chart 25). In the light of this data, the share of babies not fed on their
mother’s milk at all (fed on animal’s milk or surrogates) in the group of marital
infants was about 63.1% whereas in the group of non-marital ones – 71%. The
162
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 134 (KLO powiatu wiejskiego Szczecin do władz RS,
Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 38 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do
władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).
163
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 45.
164
do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 150 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon
wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.).
165
SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 18.
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difference between both values – as can be seen – was not so huge, as doctors
suggested. The phenomenon looked different in the light of data gathered in 1912
from the Municipal Care for Infants when as much as 35.1% of unmarried mothers fed their babies with animal’s milk while in the group of married mothers the
number was 18.4%166. It must be born in mind that the municipal care looked after
infants whose mothers came from the poorer social strata.
According to the district doctor of the district of Szczecin during hot summer
days non-marital babies particularly ran the risk of death due to disorders of the
digestive system as they were breastfed less frequently167. If this is the case, this
cause should stand out much more visibly in the structure of deaths of non-marital
infants than marital ones. Although it seems logical, empirically it is denied – to
my surprise and probably to the surprise of initiators of the research who tended
not to mention the “awkward” problem so as not to weaken the strength of the
propaganda for natural feeding. The results of the research of 1902 and 1911 show
that in the first and in the second group of dead infants the percentage of deaths
caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea was almost the same (sic!) or did not differ significantly, which of course cannot be said about the frequency of deaths. In
five cool and rainy summer-autumn months of 1902 in the group of non-marital
infants the percentage was 51.8%, and in the group of marital babies – 51.4%168.
In the year 1911, characterized by a very hot summer, the level of the percentage
of causes of deaths of infants was respectively: 44.8% and 41.6%169. Taking into
consideration the condition of the medical diagnostics at that time, we can say
that the share in both groups was in fact much higher. Many children who died
because of disorders of the digestive system, were “hidden” in two categories of
death causes – contractions (symptom!) and atrophy. Hence, it turns out that in
the years 1910–1913 in Szczecin the percentage for marital babies was somewhat
higher (58.3%) than for non-marital ones (56.4%)170. Can this fact be interpreted
as a sign of the fact unmarried mothers did not differ from married ones in the
frequency of breastfeeding?
As can be seen, the legitimization of infants did not affect the structure of death
causes examined in the dichotomous division. The data of 1902 demonstrates that
its diversification according to the social-professional position of parents, which
allows us to put forward a hypothesis the share of infant deaths caused by enteritis,
gastritis or diarrhea was correlated with housing conditions and the number of
children in the family, which, in turn, depended on the social-professional position of parents. A remark made by a district doctor supervising the western region
166
VBSS 1912, p. 89.
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 134–135 (KLO powiatu wiejskiego Szczecin do władz RS,
Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.).
168
The author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 244.
169
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 18.
170
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15;
Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.
167
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seems quite significant – he stated that the mortality of Ziehkinder (allegedly most
exposed to losing their lives, also referred to Haltekinder – non-marital and parentless children looked after by strangers) was lower than the mortality of babies in
large families171. The Municipal Care for Infants more willingly admitted children
who were born first, assuming that it would be hard to convince mothers who had
already had a few babies to adopt new rules, for such mothers had ingrained habits in infant care which were unlikely to change172. Is there any evidence for this?
Only the fact that in 1911, which had a very hot summer, the frequency of deaths
in the group of marital babies grew while in the group of non-marital ones it fell.
A similar situation, if not so spectacular, took place in 1913. Doctors commented
the phenomenon as a success of the Municipal Care for Infants173 which, since
1910, had as a matter of obligation embraced all non-marital children174.
It is worth adding that another institution – the House of Infant and Mother
(Säuglings- und Mutterheim), established in April 1907, contributed to the process
of lowering the mortality among non-marital children175. The institution promoted natural feeding, a visible example of which was the practice of having newborn
babies whose mothers were incapable of feeding breastfed by other fresh mothers.
Most women admitted to the institution were servants, workers and shop assistants. Many of them came from outside Szczecin (72.8% in the group of the 1436
women registered in the period 1907/1908–1917/1918176. There was also the House
of Henrietta (Henriettehaus) which was set up by the Foundation of Magdalene.
It helped “endangered and fallen” girls offering them spiritual and material support as well as decent conditions of living before and after labour. Its fundamental
statute aim was, apart from the protection of newborn babies, to show women
roads to a better world. The institution admitted girls with behavioural problems177
who were from outside Szczecin, and who – according to the data of April 1913
– constituted half of the residents of the institution178. The Provincial School of
171
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 39 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do
władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).
172
BVGASS 1908/1909, p. 254.
173
VBSS 1911, p. 65; 1913, p. 92; AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 147v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 151–151v (KLO
powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037,
k. 190v (magistrat Szczecina, deputacja ds. zdrowia do władz RS, Szczecin, 14 III 1913 r.).
174
VBSS 1910, pp. 60–61.
175
do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 148v–149 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin
(rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 40–40v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 78 (magistrat
Szczecina do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).
176
Das Stettiner Säugling- und Mutterheim. Denkschri. aus Anlass der Betriebseröffnung des neuen
Heims an der Turnerstr. 44, Stettin 1920, pp. 5, 9.
177
The care was extender upon girls over the obligatory school age.
178
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8200, k. 8 (inserted Dreisigster Jahresbericht des Magdalenenstifts
Asyl für gefährdete und gefallene Mädchen und seiner Zweiganstalten, des Henriettehauses und des
Kinderheims in Stettin vom 1. April 1913 bis dahin 1914, Stettin 1914, p. 4).
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Midwives (Provinzial-Hebammen-Institut) provided basic medical care during
childbirth to mostly unmarried mothers from outside Szczecin, many of whom
later went to the House of Infant and Mother179. They arrived in Szczecin to give
birth to their children far from the unfriendly rural or provincial environment. It
is impossible to discuss all the forms of assistance given to the poorest mothers180.
Living and sanitary conditions – the most important factors
Deaths of illegitimate infants were a topic of interest for journalists and scientists due to their high frequency. Undoubtedly, it was a serious social problem.
However, considering the problem globally, high mortality of non-marital children
did not affected the general level of infant mortality, particularly in the western
more affluent part of Szczecin181. The frequency of deaths of marital infants was
only slightly lower than the frequency of deaths of non-marital babies. To be able
to define the magnitude of the analyzed demographic phenomenon more precisely
let us look at the data from 1902 and 1911182, which means from the years in which
in Szczecin there took place the biggest and the smallest divergence in the level of
mortality of marital and non-marital infants. It is obvious that there would nothing to talk about in a situation where the frequency of deaths had been the same or
similar in both groups of infants under one year old. What would have happened
if the level of mortality of non-marital infants had gone down to the level recorded
by marital infants, and the remaining elements – the absolute number of living
marital and non-marital births and the absolute and relative numbers of deaths
of marital infants – had remained unchanged? It would have turned out that the
absolute number of all dead infants would have been reduced by 9.8% in 1902 and
2.8% in 1911. The hypothetical numbers show the pursuit of the ideal and the existing possibilities making us lower the elevated rate of the mortality of non-marital
infants in the total mortality rate of children under one. Szczecin’s district doctor
showed what the authorities should concentrate on insisting that the discussion
about the mortality and care of infants not focus solely on feeding and climate, but
179
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8202, k. 3–3v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)
do królewskiego prezydium policji w Szczecinie, Szczecin, 11 XII 1912 r.). Pregnant women from the
House of Infant and Mother were exposed to some inconvenience connected with a lack of a delivery
room in the institution. Sometimes they gave birth on the way to the Regional School of Midwives,
in the street or in a carriage. That is why the demand to build a delivery room appeared. In the years
1909–1911 the institution admitted on average 134–135 women and 113–114 children a year.
180
See: Wohltätigkeit und Wohlfahrtspflege in der Stadt Stettin. Ein Wegweiser, hrsg. v. der Armendirektion, Stettin 1910, pp. 17–21, 36; M. Stelmach, Tätigkeit der Stiftungen und Wohlfahrtspflegeanstalten für Kinder in Stettin im 19. Jahrhundert, [in:] Kindheit und Jugend in der Neuzeit
1500–1900. Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an die Instanzen sozialer und mentaler Prägung in der
Agrargesellschaft und während der Industrialisierung, hrsg. v. W. Bucholz, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 211–222;
A. Chlebowska, „W walce”, passim.
181
182
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 12, 17.
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also refer to social issues, in particular in the context of housing conditions, which
in Szczecin, in its eastern part, did not look very optimistic183.
Housing conditions in Szczecin and adjacent areas have already been analyzed184. That is why I feel dismissed from the obligation of providing their detailed
description. In the city space they can be synthetically depicted in two ways: by the
number of rooms in one apartment, or, which seems to be more exact, by the average number of persons inhabiting one room – the residential density of the population. Such a description of housing “conditions” is highly objective and unbiased.
The size of the living space, treated as an intervening variable, normally reflects
the wealth of the residents and defines their prestige. It can be assumed that the
level of welfare determines the mortality rate (expected negative correlation), for it
influences sanitary-living conditions, the quality and variety of food, availability of
medical and educational services including adequate infant care, etc.
Let us start with introducing a few facts which differentiate the city space considering the housing factor185 and the infant mortality rate186; next let us refer to
the synthetic measure of the mutual dependence of the two variables as expressed
by the value of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Its use is justified in the normal layout of twelve observations187 of the average number of rooms (independent
variable) and the average frequency of infant deaths (dependent variable), which
is reflected in the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). In Szczecin, according
to the working-class district of Niebuszewo and Dolne Drzetowo (1.97), while the
highest number of rooms – in rich Westend, Pogodno and part of the City Centre near the former Fort Wilhelma (3.20). The value of the analyzed average was
even higher in the case of separately examined, not densely populated exclusive
residential districts – Nowy Westend and Pogodno (4.47), for which no separate
information about the natural migration of people was given (cartogram 4). At the
same time in the above-mentioned statistical districts the average frequency of
infant deaths from the years 1911–1913 was inversely proportional to the size of
flats expressed by the average number of rooms assuming 29.98% and 13.05% as
extreme values (compare cartogram 1 and 4). This polarity is not surprising. What
is astonishing is the unexpected power of the correlation between both variables.
183
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 45 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni)
184
See: E. Włodarczyk, Zur Wohnungsfrage der Stettiner Arbeiterklasse vor dem ersten
Weltkrieg,[in:] Materialien des IX. Kulturtheoretischen Kolloquiums „Kulturgeschichtliche Probleme
proletarischer Lebensweise” am 26. und 27. November 1980 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
(Mitteilungen aus der Kulturwissenscha. lichen Forschung, Nr. 9), Berlin 1981, pp. 77–89; idem,
Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 455–465; B. Kozińska, Rozwój przestrzenny Szczecina od początku XIX wieku do II wojny światowej, Szczecin 2002, pp. 222–228.
185
SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 27. In the calculations of the weighted mean the last option of the variable – “8 and more” was treated as 9.
186
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, s. 6; Jg. 3: 1912, s. 11; Jg. 4: 1913,
p. 5.
187
The number of the city’s statistical districts.
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Cartogram 4. The number of rooms (on average) per flat in Szczecin in 1913 in the division
into municipal statistical districts
N
1. Stare Miasto
2. Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy, Górny Wik
3. Pomorzany miejskie
4. Turzyn
5. Przed Bramą Portową
6. Westend, Fort Wilhelma, Pogodno
7. Bolinko (Dolne Niebuszewo), Dolny Wik,
Przed Bramą Królewską
12
9
8
8. Grabowo
9. Górne Drzetowo
10. Dolne Drzetowo, (Górne) Niebuszewo
11. Niemierzyn
12. Prawobrzeże
7
1
10
2
5
3
6
2,73 do 3,2
2,36 do 2,73
2
do 2,36
1,97 do 1,97
11
4
(2)
(4)
(5)
(1)
Note: grouping by the method of standard deviation.
Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of sources from footnote 185.
For twelve municipal districts its negative values amounted to as much as 0.808
(p < 0.001) in the 0–[1] scale, which can only confirm the fact that in Szczecin
infant mortality was determined by housing conditions and, most importantly, by
the wealth of parents or single mothers.
The conclusion might be a target of criticism. A sceptic might undermine it by
arguing that the average number of rooms per flat is an appropriate measure of the
family’s wealth, because it does not show the population density of a flat, which
plays a significant role in spreading diseases. For example, a bedsit may or may
not be inhabited by only one person if it is relatively big. A multi-room flat may
be inhabited by a large and/or extended family and a number of lodgers, which
lowers the standard of living. Let us assume that I agree with the arguments of the
sceptic. Although I suppose that bigger flats were seldom inhabited by large families due to high maintenance costs. Now, the correlation between both variables is
clear and of course positive – it amounts 0.746 (p < 0.0025), which allows me to
state that the increase in the number of people living in one flat affected the infant
mortality rate188 (cartogram 5). But this time the determination was smaller. Why?
188
The author’s calculations of the value of the correlation coefficient.
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Cartogram 5. The number of person (on average) inhabiting one room in Szczecin in 1913
in the division into municipal statistical districts
N
1. Stare Miasto
4. Turzyn
8. Grabowo
9. Górne Drzetowo
11. Niemierzyn
12. Prawobrzeże
12
9
8
7
1
10
2
5
3
2,06 do 2,06
2,01 do 2,06
1,73 do 2,01
1,44 do 1,73
1,22 do 1,44
1,22 do 1,22
11
6
4
(1)
(1)
(5)
(3)
(1)
(1)
Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of sources from footnote 185, 188.
To answer this question let us have a look at the extreme values of the population
density of flats.
The lowest level was reported in Westend and part of the City Centre
(Śródmieście) near former Fort Wilhelma, where there was on average 1.22 persons living in one room. This fact is undisputable. What is astonishing is the fact
that the average number was the highest in Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy and Górny
Wik (2.06), where the infant mortality rate was moderate. Naturally the exception
proves the rules, but in this case we must be careful considering the fact that those
areas were inhabited by a military population living in barracks, which must have
been included in the total estimation of the population number189. This, in turn,
means that the average calculated by me does not reflect appropriately the housing conditions. The picture of the depicted phenomenon is also to some extent
distorted by empty flats190. Nevertheless, the problem may be ignored as in 1913
the number of empty flats went down considerably in all the statistical districts,
189
190
SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 4.
See: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 463.
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fluctuating from 0.3% in Przed Bramą Królewska to 2.2% in Prawobrzeże, where
the majority of people lived in Łasztownia and Kępa Parnicka191.
Housing conditions seen in the context of the average size of flats and their
population density were inferior in northern and southern suburbs of the city,
which were typically working-class and belonged to the eastern medical district.
In the case of districts situated between them, dividing them by a sort of wedge, in
the western region under the supervision of a district doctor the situation looked
much better, which did not mean that housing conditions there were not criticized, in particular in reference to the densely populated City Centre (near Fort
Wilhelma, the area Przed Bramą Portową, Turzyn). It can be said that they were
the most important192 as social issues did not play such an essential role as in the
case of the outskirts of the city and the Old Town which was undergoing a process
of rapid proletarization at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Rental barracks (Mietskaserne) used by 90% of the city’s population193, were
profit-oriented and did not provide its residents appropriate health conditions.
Even representative streets in Szczecin used to have and still have tall annexes to
old apartment houses. Such a layout meant that a yard often had the shape of a
well in which the air hardly circulated and the sunshine did not reach very often194.
Limited access to the sunshine and fresh air affected the health of infants. Parents usually put newborn babies in the worst rooms – dark, stuffy, with windows
overlooking the yard – leaving the best rooms for representative purposes. Dr H.
Wasserfuhr observed this with terror as such a conduct took place even in betteroff families residing in “healthy” Górne and Nowe Miasto. Poorer residents could
not afford to have shutters fitted in their windows which might reduce the amount
of heat getting into their rooms. Not only did “uncurtained” windows facilitate the
permeation of heat inside the flat, the thin walls of the tenement houses also made
it easier195. How the heat affected infant mortality in a big cramped city – so different from the spacious countryside196 – has already been discussed. This pessimistic
view of the picture-postcard part of Szczecin was complemented with the overpopulation of some flats. It was mainly caused by the desire to earn money rather
than by a large number of children197. Some rooms were rented to the so-called
Schlafleute, Schlafgänger – people who came there to sleep during the night. A district doctor of the western region suggested that Schlafgängerwesen was charac191
SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 27.
193
194
195
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 39, 41.
196
Comp. [dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang, pp. 73–74.
197
192
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teristic not only of working-class districts198, but also those parts of the city which
were inhabited by the lower middle class (petite bourgeoisie).
Housing in Szczecin may be associated with the image of a four-storey tenement house from La diable á Paris of 1845199, which demonstrated the social diversity depending which floor was inhabited by a given family – the higher the floor
inhabited, the poorer its residents were (naturally, excluding the basement). One
could expect that among the residents of the upper storeys the mortality should
be higher than among the residents of the lower storeys. Let us verify this supposition which Dr. Behr-Pinow took for granted200 in reference to the city of Szczecin.
It is noteworthy that the city centre was characterized by densely-packed four-storey buildings and there were at least one thousand residents living in the area of
one hectare201. Undoubtedly, the city’s authorities must have been interested in the
problem if they ordered the collection of data about it. The data, however, refer to
the number of deaths in total, and do not show infant deaths. Nevertheless, it can
be used in the preliminary analysis of the phenomenon which can be treated as an
invitation to discussion, bearing in mind that prior to WWI from 1/3 to ½ of the total number of deaths in a given year concerned infants. Their deaths depended on
the season (the highest number during the summer heat), which in turn affected
the level of the total number of deaths in quarters of a year. I use quarters as units
of time as the numbers concerning deaths of inhabitants of Szczecin were grouped
in quarters and the information about the storey inhabited was added. What are
the results of the analysis of the data202 for 1880, 1881, 1882, 1886, 1890 and 1895
(chart 26)? Firstly, in the third quarter (July-September) the percentage of deaths
achieved the highest level in each storey, which had not been expected. Secondly,
the percentage of deaths in the third quarter did not show the tendency to grow
according to the storey; we can observe complete chaos in the data, which again
had not been expected.
Naturally, I realize that in order to explain the issue one needs to know the
frequency of deaths divided according to the storey inhabited. Unfortunately, the
lack of such data makes it impossible to draw far-reaching conclusions. On the basis of the data acquired, I can only make two contradictory suppositions: either the
seasonality (including infants) was not determined socially (which seems highly
unlikely), or Szczecin’s tenement houses were not socially diversified internally, as
198
See: L. Benevolo, Miasto w dziejach Europy, przeł. H. Cieśla, Warszawa 1995, s. 187.
200
[Dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenruckgang, s. 64: „[...] Das gleiche bewirkt das Zusammenwohnen in großen Gemeinwesen, mehr noch aber in den Mietskasernen, in denen die Sterblichkeit des
Säuglings jedenfalls wahrend der Hitzperiode mit der Höhe des Stockwerks zunimmt. Die enge, mit
Koch- und Waschdämpfen durchzogene Wohnung mit Sommertemperaturen von 45 Grad und darüber bewirkt bethlehemitische Kindermorde, und zwar in einzelnen bekannten Großstadthäusern
so vollständig, das man sie mit Recht »Säuglingssterbehauser« genannt hat”.
201
202
The author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1880/1881, s. 91; 1881/1882, s. 91; 1882/1883,
p. 77; 1886/1887, p. 57; 1890/1891, p. 44; 1895/1896, p. 94.
199
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Chart 26. The percentage of deaths in the third quarter in the total number of deaths in
a given year in Szczecin in the years 1880, 1881, 1882, 1886, 1890, 1895 according to the
storey inhabited.
40,0
35,0
30,0
basement
suterena
25,0
ground
parter floor
fiI rst
floor
piętro
20,0
II piętro floor
second
III piętro
third
floor
15,0
IV piętro
fourth
floor
10,0
5,0
0,0
1880
1881
1882
1886
1890
1895
had been assumed originally, but externally, which meant that in the city space the
borders of the social division were marked by the buildings themselves – some of
them were inhabited by poorer residents, others by more affluent ones. Using address books (Adressbuch) in future research should help to explain this ‘worrying’
phenomenon.
The development of infrastructure took place more rapidly in the city centre
and exclusive residential districts, while in the working-class part of the town the
process of modernization was quite slow despite the fact that it was in workingclass areas that public utility plants were situated (gasworks, power stations, pump
stations, etc)203.
The situation in the case of the water supply system was better. Before the outbreak of WWI 89% of flats had access to running water, but central heating was
still a luxury, particularly in the outskirts of the city. For example, in Pomorzany,
Dolne Drzetowo, Górne Drzetowo and Niebuszewo only 4 flats had such facilities.
More households were equipped with gas, but there still existed disproportions
in its distributions with the suburbs being disadvantaged in this respect204. The
modernization of the city was visible particularly in the development of the sewage
203
204
More: E. Włodarczyk, E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 300–305.
Morej: ibid., p. 458–460.
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system which, together with the water supply system, played a major role in the
process of improving health conditions and lowering infant mortality205. Szczecin’s
sewage system was very old; the waste went directly into the Oder. Moreover, the
sewage system did not reach as many recipients as in other big cities situated in the
eastern part of the Prussian state206.
According to Edward Włodarczyk, in Szczecin “the poor technical standard of
the flats did not affect sanitary conditions”207. Let us examine this by starting with
the toilets (Abort) as did the city’s Committee for Health. In the summer of 1904
the committee made a survey which encompassed 304 flats of dockers spread all
over the city208. The results of the survey were not optimistic – they were far from
an ideal standard of hygiene and any moral code which may require toilets to be
a private space and this affected their cleanness, which was of great importance
to epidemiology209. In 1/3 of flats inhabited by dockers, 16 people used one common toilet seat installed outside the apartments. In 61% of cases one toilet was
used by 4 or more flats, and in 4.3% – 10 or more apartments. Most often one
toilet was used by the residents of four flats (26.3%), then two flats (22.7%) and
five (14.5%). Not many toilets were equipped with toilet cisterns. If they were, the
owners of tenement houses had them blocked and allowed their use only in special
circumstances to reduce the costs of maintenance. The worst conditions were in
Łasztownia in Energetyków street (Grosse Lastadie) and in Zachariasgang (not
existing anymore), in the Old Town in Rybaków street (Fischerstr.) and Junkerstraße, as well as in Niebuszewo in Wincentego Kadłubka stret (Zabelsdorferstr.).
The flats of well-paid and qualified workers had better access to toilets210.
Another sign of the sanitary modernization of the private space was the growing number of bathrooms, which at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries were a
more and more common element of a burghers’ flat; they were a sign of comfort,
provided intimacy and created an opportunity to take care of personal hygiene
more often (cartogram 6). The presence of bathrooms in the residential space indirectly reflected the financial status of the flat’s owners. It also proves the existence of a trend to protect health, for washing (also infants) became one of the
forms of fighting bacteria211. In the research of interrelationship the percentage
of bathrooms in flats in a given statistical district was an independent variable
205
See for example: Das öffentliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin während der
Jahre 1892, 1893, 1894, achter Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Dr. Katterbau, Stettin 1896, pp. 114–
–133.
206
207
Ibid., p 459.
208
BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 233.
209
More: G. Vigarello, Historia zdrowia i choroby. Od średniowiecza do współczesności, transl.
M. Szymańska, Warszawa 1997, pp. 237–244.
210
BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 233.
211
More: G. Vigarello, Czystość i brud. Higiena ciała od średniowiecza do XX wieku, transl.
B. Szwarcman-Czarnota, Warszawa 1998, pp. 212–229.
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Cartogram 6. The percentage of flats with a bathroom in the total number of flats in Szczecin in 1909 divided according to municipal statistical districts
N
12
9
8
7
1
1. Stare Miasto
4. Turzyn
8. Grabowo
9. Górne Drzetowo
11. Niemierzyn
12. Prawobrzeże
10
2
5
3
11
6
22,5 do 34,4 (3)
11,2 do 22,5 (1)
0,6 do 11,2 (8)
4
(data of 1909)212. The negative linear correlation of Pearson was as much as 0.833
(p < 0.001), indicating a clear relationship between sanitary conditions213 and the
frequency of deaths among infants. However, it must be remembered that the sanitary modernization of the private space was closely connected with the level of
education and wealth of the owners of a given flat.
Before the water supply reached most of Szczecin’s flats, water was taken from
almost one thousand wells located in the city214. The Committee for Health was
to decide whether it was safe to drink. The Committee for Health commissioned
a series of analyses the aim of which was to check the quality of water (once even
in connection with the mortality of infants). The results were presented for five
summer-autumn months of 1902215. The data referred to 981 dead infants in whose
group there were 178 infants who had been given water from the well. In the latter
212
Qouted Edward Włodarczyk (E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 459).
The majority of flats with a bathroom must have been connected to the water supply system
and the sewer system; moreover, such flats certainly included a toilet. The author’s calculations of the
correlation coefficient.
214
BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 237.
215
Ibid. (Anlage 3), pp. 251–252.
213
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group there were 129 deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system, which
constituted 72.5% of the causes of deaths, while the norm leveled off at 51.5%. The
highest number of children who were given water from wells came from Drzetowo
and Grabowo (as many as 134). At first glance, such a high percentage of deaths
caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea, observed in children given water from a
well, may clearly show the cause-and-effect relationship between the two phenomena. Nevertheless, its significance should be by played down – according to the
suggestion made by Dr. Freund – as the phenomenon was also caused by other bad
conditions. For example, in Łasztownia, where there were virtually no wells, and
in Drzetowo in Kołobrzeska Street (Metzstr.) equipped with a sewage system and
running water, the frequency of infant mortality was also high. The same situation
took place in Grabowo, where the percentage of deaths caused by disorders in the
digestive system was low and similar to the one of infants given water from the
water supply (44.3%) and from wells (49%), which cannot be said about Drzetowo
where the above-mentioned percentage was respectively 60.5% and 80%. Looking
at the above data, it must be remembered that we should not draw any conclusions
on the basis of the numbers owing to their randomness.
The physical features of the water delivered by the water supply also constituted a setback to the process of reducing infant mortality. Water was taken from
the Oder and cleaned in sand filters which were not technologically advanced216.
In summer the temperature of water was 20°C (after some time 17–18 °C). Such a
temperature caused the proliferation of bacteria. Moreover, tepid water could not
be used to cool milk prepared for infants217, particularly in poorer families where
a fridge was still an unattainable luxury. The installation of the pump station getting water from the ground located in Niemierzyn (Wasserwerk Nemitz)218 was
expected to improve the conditions described above. It was not until 1912 that the
water supply system reached the areas beyond the city, which Edward Włodarczyk
considered to be only symbolic219. However, the improvement of the sanitary conditions in the suburbs realized through the development of the water supply and
sewage systems did not have to determine lowering the infant mortality rate, for
before the suburbs were incorporated into the city, Szczecin was characterized by a
high frequency of deaths among the youngest children220. To “complicate” the issue
even more, let us add that on the basis of the material gathered in 1902 and compiled by Dr. Freund, no clear relationship between the density of the population
of flats and the number of infant deaths due to disorders in the digestive system
was observed221. Moreover, only half of children who died of diarrhea, enteritis or
216
Unpasteurized milk reached the customer after 12–18 hours from milking, or even after 20
hours, which increased the risk of the development of bacteria.
218
BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 12.
219
220
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 5), p. 270.
221
217
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gastritis lived in flats whose the standard did not allow parents to keep milk in appropriate conditions222.
Where shall we look for the key causes of the high infant mortality rate in
Szczecin? It seems that in places where it is the most difficult to define the causes
using clear criteria and numbers – that is in the “bad habits” of parents223. For a district doctor of the eastern area including the suburbs of the city it was an obvious
reason. He explained that the extremely high infant mortality in his district was
caused primarily by the indolence, passivity and indifference of parents (he talked
exclusively about mothers) as well as by their ignorance in the field of childcare,
not to mention the squalor and filth which he observed in tenement houses inhabited by the lower social strata. Subsequently, he mentioned bad housing conditions224. All the factors naturally depended on the financial situation of the parents
and their low level of education. There was one more very important factor not
mentioned by the district doctor – less assistance given by the family in infant care.
The last factor resulted from the fact that people relying on the assistance of the
Municipal Care for Infants and inhabiting southern (Pomorzany, Górny Wik and
Szubieniczne Łąki) and northern (Grabowo and Górne Drzetowo) suburbs were
mostly immigrants. It is proved by the relationship between the number of parents
born outside Szczecin to the number of parents born in Szczecin. For the districts
listed above it amounted to 5.8 and 4.9 while its value for the whole city was 3.0
(data from 1907)225.
Dr. H. Wasserfuhr made a list of parental bad habits defining their frequency
according to the pattern: the poor – often, the middle-class – sometimes, and the
rich – very rarely. The list includes the dark, stuffy or over-warm room mentioned
previously; next a lack of appropriate care and regular walks; using unstable cradles instead of a stable bed; wearing too warm clothes, swaddling clothes; putting
a cradle with a baby too close to a hot stove in winter and leaving it at night in
a cool room; adequate care of the child only in the presence of a midwife, etc.226
Breaking the basic rules of hygiene was noticeable – for example – in the case of
teats. According to the reports made by nurses from the Municipal Care for Infants
their condition was tragic: not only were they filthy and smelly, but they also had
holes made by their parents to “speed up” the process of drinking milk, the result
of which were frequent stranglings227. Nevertheless, the relationship between infant mortality and using bottles with teats (Rohrsaugflasche) was not confirmed.
The use of teats was to result from the high occurrence of diarrhea among the
222
BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23. The Committee for Health underlined the role of external conditions and negative habits of parents in the process of the formation of the high mortality rate.
224
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 148 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni)
225
The author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 225.
226
H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 41–42.
227
VBSS 1911, p. 66; 1912, p. 91.
223
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Chart 27. Average fertility and number of births in Szczecin in the years 1876–1913
40
160
140
35
120
100
25
80
60
rodność of
- liczba
żywych na 1000 mieszkańców
Number
birthsurodzeń
(‰)
20
płodność
Fertility
(‰)(‰)
Number
of births
rodność
(‰)(‰)
30
Fertility
płodność(‰)
- liczba urodzeń żywych na 1000 kobiet w wieku 15-49 lat
40
15
20
10
0
1876
1881
1886
1891
1896
1901
1906
1911
youngest children, which could not be verified by district doctors due to a lack of
appropriate statistical analyses228.
The quality of infant care improved considerably from the beginning of the 20th
century thanks to the activity of various institutions. It was not accepted willingly
by the lowest social strata as it was perceived as an interference in private affairs229.
Yet, it seems that the role of this external factor should give priority to the internal
one, which, to my way of thinking and according to other researchers230 was the
slump in the number of births taking place simultaneously with the decline in the
infant mortality rate from the beginning of the 20th century (chart 27)231.
In Szczecin the number of births went down by 41.9% between 1900 and 1912
despite the incorporation of working-class class areas inhabited by large families.
228
AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 137, 220–220v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon
wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 1 X 1910 i 8 I 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 213 (KLO powiatu wiejskiego Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 3 I 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 222–222v (KLO powiatu miejskiego
Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 10 I 1913 r.).
229
See ibid., sygn. 8559, k. 105v (królewski prezydent policji do władz RS, Szczecin, 19 IV
1905 r.); BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 3; VBSS 1910, p. 61.
230
BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 5), p. 270.
231
PS 118, 1890, p. 54; 124, 1891, p. 54; 145, 1895, p. 52; 152, 1896, p. 52; 171, 1900, p. 50; 179,
1901, p. 50; 199, 1905, p. 54; 208, 1906, p. 54; SJBSS, Jg. 3: 1912, p. 6, 11 (The author’s calculations concerning fertility). Preussens Städte. Denkschri. zum 100 jährigen Jubiläum der Städteordnung vom 19.
November 1808, hrsg. v. H. Silbergleit, Berlin 1908, s. 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97; SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, s. 5.
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Cartogram 7. The number of births (on average) in 1000 inhabitants in Szczecin in the
years 1911–1913 presented in the division into the city’s statistical districts
N
12
9
8
7
1
1. Stare Miasto
4. Turzyn
8. Grabowo
9. Górne Drzetowo
11. Niemierzyn
12. Prawobrzeże
10
2
5
3
11
6
28,9 do 33,1
24 do 28,9
19 do 24
17,6 do 19
(2)
(5)
(3)
(2)
4
If in 1910, the birth of the first baby constituted 23.5% in the total number of births,
then in 1912 it was only 28.1%. On the basis of the analysis of the absolute numbers one can suppose that in Szczecin the slump in the number of births resulted
from a change in the attitude towards procreation among the lowest social strata
(unqualified workers, servants). They were inspired by educated burghers, who at
the end of the 19th century started to give birth to fewer children232. Mentioning
this demographic phenomenon in the context of its influence on infant mortality,
I realize that I start a “chicken or egg” style discussion. In such a situation I can
only suppose (on the basis of intriguing facts from the years of the First World
War233) that parents (mothers) were capable of providing their children with better
care and were more open to innovations, for they gave birth to fewer children.
232
SVBSS, Jg. 3: 1913 (C. Anhang: „Die Geburtenhäufigkeit in Stettin”), pp. 42–48. See also:
K. Erler, Vier Jahre Krieg in ihren Wirkungen auf die Bevölkerungsbewegung Stettins, Stettin 1918,
p. 7.
233
See: D. Szudra, Ludność, p. 79.
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The phenomenon resulted from the process of social modernization which
also included demographic transformation – that is the transfer from extravagant
reproduction into economical reproduction, discarding the simple explanation of
infant deaths expressed in the saying: “God gave and God took”234. Bearing that in
mind, it can expected that in the divided city space we could observe a cause-andeffect relationship between the number of births (independent variable) and the
frequency of infant deaths (dependent variable)235. The supposition is confirmed
in the clear linear correlation of Pearson, the value of which was 0.679 (p < 0.002).
The number is not as high as in the case of the average number of rooms in one flat
correlated with infant mortality, but we must remember that the effective reproductiveness is not a precise gauge of the phenomenon, for it depends on the structure of the population according to age, marital status and sex236 (cartogram 7).
Unfortunately, due to the lack of data it is impossible to standardize the birth rate.
Nevertheless, it will be true to say that higher reproductiveness was usually237 accompanied by a higher infant mortality rate. In the same way, the frequency of
births was determined by the social-professional position of the parents, which, in
turn, was connected with the level of their education and wealth. Thus, we again
return to the starting point.
CONCLUSION
Rapid industrialization and urbanization of Szczecin in the second half of the
19th century led not only to the economic development of the city, but also to lower
health standards for the city’s inhabitants, particularly at the end of the 19th century. As a result of the high infant mortality rate the average life expectancy was
one of the lowest in comparison with other major Prussian cities – it was about 30
years (mortality tables from the years 1890/1891). The highest number of infant
deaths took place here much later than in other German cities and it overlapped
with the period of the highest growth in migration. Thus, supposedly, the elevated
migration to Szczecin affected considerably the level of the phenomenon under
analysis. The attempts of the city’s authorities and public institutions were an important factor in the reduction of infant mortality at the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, it was not fully successful if in Szczecin infant mortality still
belonged to one of the highest among German cities.
234
235
Comp. J.-L. Flandrin, Historia rodziny, transl. A. Kuryś, Warszawa 1998, p. 216.
The author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 6; Jg. 3: 1912, p. 11; Jg. 4: 1913,
p. 5.
236
The surprisingly low birth rate in the joint area of Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy and Górny Wik
can be associated with military units staying there. In the case of the Old Town the situation might
be explained with a probable demographic ageing of the district.
237
The relationship is not so obvious on a global scale. For example, the cities of the Ruhr area
were characterized by a relatively high birth rate and a low infant mortality rate. Szczecin’s Committee for Health emphasized this fact. See: BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23.
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Positive changes in infant mortality observed at the beginning of the 20th century resulted from a decreasing importance of external factors. Yet, the process did
not eliminate social-spatial differences existing in the context of the phenomenon
under analysis. It can even be said that by the outbreak of WWI the differences
had become even more transparent. Their hierarchical structure did not undergo
any bigger changes, except one: the leader of positive changes was the new middle-class. The short series of data let us draw far-reaching conclusions about spatial changes. Nevertheless, the data of 1911–1913 shows significant differences in
the geographical layout of the phenomenon, which depends on the segregation of
social-professional groups in the city’s space and is determined by an economic
factor. In consequence, the city’s districts characterized by the highest frequency
of infant mortality were located next to or overlapped with the areas of concentrated industry, where badly-paid workers lived. The secondary character of the
geographical space in relation to the social space could be also observed in the case
of deaths of infants caused by disorders in the digestive system. The frequency of
such deaths was correlated with the position of parents in the social-professional
hierarchy.
Among external factors determining high infant mortality the most significant
was the insufficient breastfeeding of newborn babies; this resulted in their higher mortality caused by disorders in the digestive system. According to Szczecin’s
medical doctors this dangerous “move away from nature” was practiced mainly in
working-class families where women had to work to maintain the family. It seems
that the phenomenon was much more common, which is indirectly confirmed
by a lack of bigger differences in the percentage share of deaths due to enteritis,
gastritis and diarrhea in the group of marital and non-marital infants. Promoting
breastfeeding became the fundamental objective of the Municipal Care for Infants
and other organizations and institutions. Such a treatment of the problem, the
least costly financially, resembled treating the symptoms of an illness rather than
its causes.
There were effective attempts to prevent the mortality of non-marital infants
whose high number was determined by the difficult material situation of single
mothers who came usually from outside Szczecin and were mostly employed as
servants or casual workers. The analysis of the causes of deaths does not indicate
that non-marital infants were likely to lose their lives mostly due to crimes committed by their mothers (it cannot be excluded, though). Nevertheless, it shows
that non-marital children had a weaker physical constitution and their infant
mortality rate was higher irrespective of the causes of death. It is impossible to
describe the mortality of non-marital infants in the divided city space due to a lack
of sources. In the global dimension its level affected the general infant mortality
only slightly, particularly from 1910, when non-marital children in Szczecin were
given special protection.
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In the divided city space the frequency of infant deaths was heavily correlated
with the average number of rooms in one flat, which meant that the phenomenon
under analysis was closely connected with the material status of parents. Doctors
also stressed the role of housing conditions criticizing the negative influence of
rental barracks (Mietskaserne). Nevertheless, the analysis of the structure of deaths
according to the storey inhabited before death did not indicate any correlation.
This might mean that the lines of the social division, seen in the context of mortality, did not run in the narrow perpendicular direction, but in the wide horizontal
direction of the residential space. The standard of flats did not differ in various districts. However, it must be stressed here that the bad condition of flats not always
entailed deaths of infants due to disorders in the digestive system (50% of cases),
which, in turn, makes us emphasize the role of less statistically tangible factors
differentiating the phenomenon under analysis such as the bad habits of parents,
which was closely connected with their level of education and wealth (filth, indolence, ignorance, insufficient care, etc.). The decline in the number of births from
the beginning of the 20th century was supposedly a phenomenon which facilitated
better childcare in families; it constituted a significant element of positive changes
in infant mortality.
The description and analysis of infant mortality, presented here mostly in the
social context, does not address all the problems; the author intended to invite
readers to further discussion, the axis of which might be the hypotheses drawn
here. The issues need to be discussed more thoroughly in the context of the perception of causes and effects, which in this article very often change places. It can
be achieved through the exploratory compilation of information included in the
files in the registry office and address books. The task is beyond the capabilities of
one researcher considering the size of the city of Szczecin. The need arises to create
a research team. Time will show whether such a team will be established.
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
MICHAŁ PSZCZÓŁKOWSKI (Toruń)
FROM THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION
OF TORUŃ’S UNIVERSITY CAMPUS 1967–1973*
Key words: campus; Nicolaus Copernicus University (NCU); architecture; Toruń, 20th century
As early as in the first months after the end of WWII, the reconstruction and
development of the infrastructure of higher education began. Both in western
countries and in eastern bloc countries there was a dominant viewpoint that the
high level of the society’s education would facilitate reconstruction after the war
and would influence the future of the world1. The demands of modern science and
teaching in the post-war period could be met only in new buildings. As the specialization of various disciplines of science was expanding, the spatial requirements
of universities were growing – the area of many of them exceeded the surface occupied by central cities2, which was the case particularly in small cities where large
universities were located (Würzburg, Karlsruhe). It led to the fact that universities
often renounced a central location and chose a more attractive option initiated
before the war: the construction of university buildings in the suburbs or even
out of town, which gave the opportunity for further spatial development. Such a
location allowed all the functions of a university to combine – academic-scientific,
residential, cultural and recreational – and provided a unique opportunity for architectural expression during the realization of the construction design.
The popularity of university campuses after WW II grew all over the world.
In Great Britain the idea was adopted in the early 1960s, in conjunction with the
creation of the so-called new universities (Bradford, Sussex, York, East Anglia, Essex, Warwick, Lancaster, Bath, Loughborough). Also at the same time the concept
*
p. 151–172.
1
Comp. i.a.: Manifest Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego, Dziennik Ustaw, 1944, nr 1,
poz. 1: “one of the most urgent tasks of the Polish Committee of National Liberation PKWN will be
to restore education [...], and the Polish intelligentsia, particularly people of science and art shall be
protected” – transl. AC).
2
According to evaluations carried out by the Germans, the area of a university educating 10,000
students should be 150 hectares; P. Conradi, H. Linde, Probleme bei der Planung von Hochschulen,
Bauen + Wohnen, Jg. 14: 1964, Nr. 8, p. 295.
126
Michał Pszczółkowski
of a campus became very common in Scandinavian countries (Roskilde, Oslo,
Lyngby, Likoping), the Federal Republic of Germany (Bochum, Konstanz, Ulm,
Regensburg), France (Orlean, Dijon, Bordeaux). Very often partial solutions were
introduced, which meant that campuses were limited to academic-scientific and
administrative buildings (Odense, Besançon, Delft) or only to residential-social
investments in the form of “student districts”, which very often met the needs of
several colleges (Stuttgart, Trondheim, Louvain, Stockholm, Cracow). There were
also some joint initiatives undertaken by academic and industrial centres. Many
campuses were erected in the United States – the country with the longest campus
tradition, and in the countries of the developing world (Havana, Mexico, Bogota,
Brasilia, Caracas, Akra, Ibadan, Lusaka). They were prestigious investments with
ambitious architecture, constituting monuments of national culture as evidence of
the intellectual freedom of these young states following the collapse of the colonial
system. Socialist countries were also attracted by the concept of campuses3. The
nature of the campus suited the ideology as it was associated with the “communization” of students, which facilitated control over the young and educated environment which was potentially dangerous.
The idea of the campus had numerous advantages such as the ideological factors (Humboldt’s unity of teaching and research, the epitomy of the idea of universitas as an indivisible institution located in one place), prospects for unlimited spatial development, the distance from the hustle and bustle of the city centre, contact
with nature, and finally the lower costs of maintenance (in comparison with the
central city zone). The centralisation of all the functions facilitated administrative
work and favoured the interdisciplinary character of the scientific-academic system, relieved the city centre, and contributed to the development of contacts and
bonds among members of the academic community4.
The NCU campus in Toruń was the first complete realization of the concept of
an academic campus in Poland.
Toruń’s university (Toruń’s Wszechnica) was established soon after the end of
the military activity: on 24 August 1945 the Cabinet of Poland decided to set up
Nicolaus Copernicus University5. Before the war, when there were attempts to establish a university in Toruń, the idea was to erect a compact complex of new buildings. It was obvious that buildings situated in the city centre could not be extended,
3
Comp. W. Queck, Einige Probleme des Hochschulbaus in der Sowjetunion, Deutsche Architektur, Jg. 20: 1971, Nr. 4, p. 245.
4
S. Vassal, Les nouveaux ensembles universitaires françaises, Annales de Géographie, An.
78: 1969, no. 2, p. 136; S. Wehle-Strzelecka, Kształtowanie struktury przestrzennej wyższej uczelni
w powiązaniu z miejskim organizmem, Życie Szkoły Wyższej, R. 25: 1977, nr 4, p. 44; H. Aminde,
Hochschulen als Gegenstand der Stadt- und Regionalplanung, [in:] Hochschulplanung. Beiträge zur
Struktur- und Bauplanung, Bd. 4, hrsg. v. H. Linde, Düsseldorf 1969, p. 71; A. Znojkiewicz, Lokalizacja wyższej uczelni, Architektura, R. 25: 1971, nr 6, p. 195; idem, Problemy lokalizacji wyższej
uczelni, Studia + Projekty, R. 1: 1977, nr 1, p. 54.
5
Dekret z dnia 24 sierpnia 1945 r. o utworzeniu Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu,
Dziennik Ustaw, 1945, nr 34, poz. 208
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From the history of the construction of Toruń’s University Campus 1967–1973
127
so they were only capable of meeting the needs of the academic community on
a temporary basis. The difficult post-war reality did not prevent any attempts to
construct the whole complex in one place like in American campuses. The local
authorities also appreciated the advantages of such a solution in terms of urban
planning. In 1945 the university was given the building in Sienkiewicza street (the
former college)6, and one year later it was decided to build an impressive “academic
city” – university campus. The intention was to erect a complex of academic and
residential buildings on the area of 15 hectares within 5 years7. It seems that the
design was associated with the fantastic vision of a university complex published at
that time in Głos Demokratyczny8. The university situated in Bielany was to consist
of monumentally huge university buildings, enormous faculties, residential-social
buildings for students and employees, airports, a zoo-botanical garden, a hospital
and a leisure centre. The image created by the journalists must have resulted from
their knowledge of foreign designs, for it included all the fundamental features of
the American campus: the location in the outskirts of the city, the complete functional programme, the greenery and leisure areas. Moreover, the author underlined
the problems resulting from the central location of old buildings taken over by the
university, particularly their lack of functionality. It is the first opinion concerning
the location of modern colleges in Poland. At that time it was not very realistic
that the budget of the country would cover the investment. Nevertheless, there was
a plan that the resources might come from the donations of the Polish diaspora
Polonia9. Unfortunately, Poles living in America failed to support the design, and
even the modified investment plan from the years 1947–1948 limited to only a few
buildings10 was not completed. The design of the erection of a housing estate for
professors in the so-called Stare Bielany was not completed either11.
Nevertheless, the idea of the construction of the “university campus” was
brought up more and more frequently as a result of the growing demand for space
and buildings. The question of the creation of the university zone was discussed by
local authorities in 195112, but the final years of Bolesław Bierut’s government did
not favour such a big investment. After October 1956 the next attempt was made to
construct the campus. The prospects seemed promising: the idea of the university
campus was included in the first post-war general land development plan of the
city of 1957. The complex, consisting of faculties, the NCU Rector’s building and
student dormitories was to be situated by the Vistula river, very close to the Old
6
State Archive in Toruń (further cit. APT), Akta Miejskiej Rady Narodowej i Zarządu Miejskiego
w Toruniu (further cit. AMRNiZM), sygn. 56, k. 12 (1945).
7
Ibid., sygn. 57, k. 13–17 (1946).
8
St. Mat., Wizja miasta uniwersyteckiego, Głos Demokratyczny, R. 1: 1946, nr 6, p. 7.
9
J. Bełkot, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1945–85, Toruń 1986, p. 52.
10
Por. ibid., p. 52–53.
11
Comp. APT, Akta budowlane miasta Torunia, sygn. G-846, k. 175, 185 (1948).
12
Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University (further cit. AUMK), Akta Rektoratu, sygn. R-124,
k. 7–8 (1951).
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Town. The Old Town’s panorama was to be extended by low buildings in the foreground contrasted with low-density housing dispersed in the greenery with the
architectural dominance of a huge entertainment-theatrical building13. Despite the
fact that the design was approved by the Regional National Council in Bydgoszcz,
it was never carried out due to the controversial location – it was believed that the
college should be isolated from the city’s hustle and bustle.
The new location – Bielany – was soon chosen. It was situated in the northwestern outskirts of Toruń. It was an area not too distant from the city centre and
other university buildings. Moreover, Bielany had been associated with the future
location of the university since the 1940s. The concept of the construction of the
university campus in Bielany came up again at the end of the 1950s when talks
with the local authorities recommenced. Although no agreement was reached14, in
1960 “Miastoprojekt Poznań” was commissioned to prepare the preliminary layout
of the extension of NCU’s space. The suggested location on Bielańska street was
not approved by the Senate of the university15, whose members were afraid that the
university would be too isolated from the city16. Instead, a suggestion was put forward to incorporate new buildings in the area from the building in Grudziądzka
street down to Chopina street, where the library was located17.
The model of the campus must have been very attractive for the city architect
Cezary Mathes, who led to the establishment of the Committee of Experts consisting of: Ryszard Karłowicz and Leonard Tomaszewski from the Polytechnic of
Warsaw, Bohdan Ledworowski from the Institute of Urban Economy, Krzysztof
Miller – the head of the Regional Urban Planning Bureau and Janusz Wilski – the
chief architect of the Bydgoszcz voivodeship18. The members of the committee
supported the design of the university campus’s location in Bielany at the meeting
on 27 Jan 1962. A few days later (2 February) the local authorities and the university’s authorities commissioned Ryszard Karłowicz and Eugeniusz Kosiacki from
the Department of Architecture of Warsaw College of Technology to prepare an
expert opinion19.
13
R. Sudziński, Przekształcenia strukturalne miasta Torunia w latach 1920–1975, Toruń 1993,
p. 133.
14
Toruń’s authorities offered plots in Grudziądzka street, but the representatives of NCU insisted
on the area near the district of student dormitories – between Kraszewskiego street, Słowackiego
street and Czerwona Droga street (E. Górna, „Obiekty dydaktyczno-naukowe i socjalne UMK
w latach 1945–1994”, Toruń 1995 (master’s thesis, NCU), p. 53).
15
Resolution of 22 Jan 1962 (M. Zielińska, „Inwestycje Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika 1945–
–1977”, Toruń 1977 (master’s thesis, NCU), p. 32).
16
S. Staniszewski, Wspomnienia dyrektora administracyjnego, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Wspomnienia pracowników, red. A. Tomczak, Toruń 1995, p. 299–300; M. Kaczmarek, Geneza
powstania miasteczka uniwersyteckiego na Bielanach, [in:] ibid., p. 165.
17
Comp. Na miarę potrzeb i możliwości, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 67, p. 1.
18
R. Karłowicz, Koncepcja urbanistyczna, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realizacja, red. B. Popławski, Warszawa 1974, p. 12.
19
J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 57.
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The expert opinion prepared within two months definitely rejected the concept
of extending the buildings already owned by the university (the idea was supported by Toruń’s professors) for a number of reasons: the dispersion of the university’s
buildings, their poor technical condition, limited extension possibilities, a lack of
functionality since they had been constructed for a different purpose, high costs of
maintenance20. The experts advocated the concept of the “students’ town”, which
was connected with economic advantages (better organization of work, technical support and transport during the investment process; maintenance profits –
smaller personnel, a common energy base) and non-economic profits (combining
learning, living and leisure space; the effective organization of students’ social and
political life; easier contacts with the teaching staff )21. Four options were presented: Bielany, the city centre (near Wały Sikorskiego and Al. 500-lecia), Jakubskie
Przedmieście (near Szosa Lubicka ) and Podgórz (a left-bank district of Toruń).
Having conducted the comparative analyses in functional-spatial, technical, economic and sociological terms it was decided that Bielany was the best option22.
The Bureau of Construction Designs for the Chemical Industry “Prochem”
[Biuro Projektów Budownictwa Przemysłu Chemicznego “Prochem”] (G. Kozik,
S. Tomkiewicz) was also asked to put forward their own suggestions for the location23. They offered three suggestions for the extension (May 1963): 1) the area of
Grudziądzka street and Nowickiego street (now Szosa Chełmińska), 2) the area
of Kraszewskiego street and Bema street, and 3) the area of Bielańska street and
Okrężna street. Eventually, the experts from “Prochem” also declared that the Bielany option was the optimal solution, and presented their concept for land development. The proposal included the complete functional programme of the university consisting of academic-scientific and residential-social spaces separated from
each other. Despite being quite schematic and immature, the concept suited the
western idea of the campus.
The choice of Bielany resulted from the fact that the district had numerous
advantages. Apart from being very close to the city centre and other university
buildings it also:
– occupied a large area (about 50 hectares) offering huge opportunities for extension owing to its outskirts location;
– was situated close to the water intake, sewage system, water and gas supply
systems;
– was surrounded by forest, which provided very healthy living conditions;
– provided a very good transport connection with the city centre;
20
R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 12.
Comp. AUMK, Akta Zarządu Inwestycji Szkół Wyższych (further cit. AZISW), sygn. ZI 16/53,
p. 170 (1962 r.).
22
R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 15–16.
23
AUMK, Akta Działu Technicznego (further cit. ADT), Analiza wariantów lokalizacji Wydz.
Mat.-Fiz.-Chem. z uwzględnieniem dalszej rozbudowy Uniwersytetu im. Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, sygn. DT 10/413 (1963 r.).
21
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–
was located close to the planned artery connecting Toruń and Bydgoszcz – the
possibility to extend the university’s influence to Bydgoszcz, which did not
have its own university24.
Another argument was that there was a plan to build a housing estate in Bielany, which was to strengthen bonds between the university and the town25.
Nevertheless, the official decision of the university depended on the opinion of
the university’s senate. Unfortunately, the professors still rejected the idea as they
were afraid of the pernicious influence of the industrial plants such as Polchem
and Merinotex, and of the difficulties resulting from the extension of the airport26.
Advocates for the university campus being erected in Bielany, headed by the administrative director Stanisław Staniszewski and his deputy Marian Kaczmarek,
took measures to persuade the university’s senate to approve of the location in Bielany. Fortunately, they managed to transfer their enthusiasm over to a large circle
of professors, including the university’s president Antoni Swinarski27. The study
Prospects of the Development and Extension of NCU for the period 1964–1980
written by M. Kaczmarek also played an important role. It was the first study of
this type in Poland, based on the ministerial data concerning the planned number
of students and the demand for the university’s graduates (June 1963)28. The study
argued that the number of students would grow from 4,000 in 1963 to almost
12,000 in 1980. According to Kaczmarek, the university would demand three times
more space for its academic activity, and twice as many places in student dormitories. Owing to the poor technical condition of the university buildings and their
dispersion, the only solution was to build a new complex of buildings. Prof. Ernest
Pischinger provided the most compelling argument: the central authorities were
willing to finance the construction of the university campus regarding it as a prestigious investment connected with the 500th anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’
birthday29. All the factors convinced the university’s senate to overrule the decision
of 22 January and to approve of the new location in Bielańska street30.
As the investment was planned to be completed very soon (1973), the decision
was not to invite tenders but to employ three selected teams which were asked to
present their design concepts. Apart from the team from the Faculty of Architecture of Warsaw Polytechnic (WA PW), the design concepts were to be put forward
by two more teams – one from Toruń and the other from Bydgoszcz. Nevertheless,
24
R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 16, 26.
Comp. Osiedle Fałata godną oprawą dla miasteczka uniwersyteckiego, Nowości, R. 4: 1970,
nr 152, p. 1.
26
I got the information from Prof. Ryszard Kozłowski.
27
S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 300.
28
Comp. M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 165.
29
In March 1962 Prof. Ernest Pischinger talked with the head of the Department of Investment
of the Ministry of Higher Education Zygmunt Dżuganowski, who declared to support the idea of the
extension of NCU in connection with the ceremonies of the anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’
birthday. (E. Górna, op.cit., p. 56).
30
Ibid., p. 57.
25
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the shortage of time (only 5 months) made the final two teams resign. Eventually,
on 1 August 1964 only the Warsaw design by Ryszard Karłowicz, Witold Benedek
and Marek Różański was presented31. Prior to presenting the design, the dean of
the Faculty of Architecture (WA PW) Piotr Biegański undertook to prepare all the
urban planning and architectural documentation. On the advice of the university’s
president A. Świnarski32, Ryszard Karłowicz was appointed chief designer as he
was familiar with the issue of NCU’s extension.
In 1964, after the proposal of the design was approved by NCU, the team of
designers adopted an organizational form: the Laboratory of Urban Planning and
Architecture S-77 was created in the Department of the Bases for the Construction of Cities in the Institute of Architecture of Warsaw Polytechnic. In the beginning the Laboratory included Ryszard Karłowicz – chief designer of the Toruń
campus, and the main designers of individual buildings – Marek Różański (the
NCU Rector’s building [rektorat] and the university’s main lecture theatre [aula],
Witold Benedek (the library), Józef Łucki (the Institute of Chemistry, from June
1969 Andrzej Jaworski), Bogdan Popławski (the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sciences (BiNoZ)), Wincenty Szober (student dormitories, hotels for assistant lecturers, the canteen), Zenon Buczkowski (the medical centre), as well as some auxiliary designers of architecture and urban planning33. Later, more workers joined
the laboratory. Cooperation began with other laboratories within the polytechnic:
Laboratory S-99 dealing with construction (Jerzy Teliga), S-125 dealing with installations (Józef Kozierski), S-43 dealing with the financing and organization of
the construction (Tadeusz Pałaszewski). Toruń’s branch of the Laboratory of Plastic Arts was made responsible for the preparation of the interior design34.
During the period of 1 April – 31 July 1964 the Department of the Bases for
the Construction of Cities in the Institute of Architecture of Warsaw Polytechnic
prepared the General planning of the future extension of Toruń’s university35. In
May 1965 three options for the spatial layout of the university were presented36.
The first option was based on the concept of a homogeneously shaped complex
with clear functional divisions. Buildings with scientific-academic purposes and
31
Koncepcja budowy miasteczka uniwersyteckiego w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Toruń 1965, p. 2.
33
R. Karłowicz, W. Szober, Organizacja prac projektowych i naukowo-badawczych, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realizacja, p. 111.
34
Budowa miasteczka uniwersyteckiego w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Toruń 1970, p. 2.
35
M. Rożański, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Architektura, R. 25: 1971, nr 8,
p. 201.
36
Resolution of the Council of Ministers no 224 of 29 July 1964 about economic progress in
nationalized economy and the Directive of the Head of the Committee for Planning at the Council
of Ministers and the Minister of Construction and the Industry of Building Materials of 30 July 1965
about designing investments. Resolution of the Council of Ministers no 224 of 29 July 1964 about
economic progress in nationalized economy and the Directive of the Head of the Committee for
Planning at the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Construction and the Industry of Building
Materials of 30 July 1965 about designing investments.
32
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residential-social buildings were grouped along axes running at right angles. Along
the north-east line they planned to erect the buildings of Chemistry, Biology and
Earth Sciences, Physics and Mathematics, Astronomy, Law, Economic, Humanities and Fine Arts; along the east-west axis student dormitories, assistant lecturers’
hotels and public utility buildings such as student clubs, a gym, a health centre with
a semi-sanatorium were to be erected. Both axes constituting the functional core of
the design were connected with the buildings of the library, the NCU Rector’s building and the university’s main lecture theatre [aula] – the centre of the university in
the scientific, administrative and cultural sense. In the north-east part, among the
greenery, there was to be a site for the recreational zone – a stadium, a football pitch
and a swimming pool. In the second option student dormitories were moved westwards giving space to some faculties. The central complex was placed in the east. In
the third option the complex of student dormitories was moved northwards, which
created space for the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sciences.
What all the three options had in common was the principle of separating
lanes for pedestrians from streets used by cars. The main car parks and bus stops
were planned to surround the whole complex; however, it would still be possible
to enter the complex in a vehicle in case of an emergency. The second and third
options were inferior to the first one in terms of functionality, as their role was to
emphasize the positive aspects of the first option and to stress that the first option
was the right choice 37. Changes introduced in the second and third options led
to collisions among the buildings and generated additional costs connected with
laying power lines and cutting down more trees. The main positive aspect of the
first concept was the division of functions into two groups – axes, which were at
the same time connected with the central complex, which was to provide optimal
functionality and cost-effectiveness.
In the years 1964–1967 the concept underwent a few stages determined by the
rules and regulations concerning the preparation of the investment. In 1964 a draft
concept was developed, and in the years 1965–1966 the so-called final urban-planning design of the development of the university was prepared and was approved
in 1967. Moreover, it was necessary to draw preliminary designs and technical
working designs for each building. It was assumed that all the required documentation would have been prepared by 1968.
Corrections introduced in the years 1964–1967 consisted in improving the design in terms of its functionality, cost-effectiveness and esthetics38. A major change
occurred in 1965 and it consisted in the centralization of the general spatial concept through the introduction of a clear lane perpendicular to the academic-scientific axes. It modified the original concept in which residential-social buildings
were to constitute an accidental combination of freely arranged buildings. The
37
Comp. i.a. Budowa miasteczka, passim; Koncepcja budowy, passim; Projekt Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Warszawa–Toruń 1967, passim.
38
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medical centre with its semi-sanatorium was moved into the green spaces, which
improved its functionality (healthy environment). In 1967, the homogenous student dormitory buildings were replaced by two types of buildings – low-rise and
high-rise. This solution, based on the patterns used in the construction of housing
estate areas, allowed a greater diversification in the residential area. The modifications in the central part and in the academic-scientific zone were directed mainly
to enhance the functionality of individual buildings, particularly the faculties, the
NCU Rector’s building and the main lecture theatre [aula].
Owing to the magnitude of the investment, the erection of the campus was
divided into three stages: 1967–1970, 1971–1975 and 1976–1980. Nevertheless,
it did not reflect reality since the final year was in fact 1973. The division of the
process into three five-year periods was determined by the budgeting policy of the
country. The works were organized in such a way so as to create the whole complex
from a functional point of view – so that the university had all the elements necessary to function properly such as the general university buildings (the NCU Rector’s building, the library), scientific-academic (the Complex of the Departments
of Chemistry, the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sciences) and the residential-social
buildings (student dormitories, assistant lecturers’ hotels, the canteen, gyms, the
medical centre). The dividing line marked by the year 1970 had only financial and
formal significance. It was also possible to divide the construction of individual
buildings into stages, which was actually applied in case of the buildings of the
Faculty of Biology and the Faculty of Chemistry. It was assumed that by 1970 they
would have completed the first stage of the construction process without the scientific-research base. The land development plan of 1967 provided for the following
deadlines for individual stages of the construction process – 1973, 1980 and after
198039. Thus, despite the formal arrangements, the period 1967–1973 should be
treated as the first stage of the construction process.
The socialist red tape meant that prior to receiving approval, the design of the
extension of NCU had to be scrutinized by a number of committees. On 10 May
1965 it was approved by the main architect of the voivodeship40. On 22 June 1965
in Warsaw the first option was chosen as the architectural solution for the construction of the campus at the meeting of the representatives of the Department
of Investment in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOiSzW)
and the Department of Construction, Urban Planning and Architecture in the
Voivodeship’s National Council in Bydgoszcz41. On 9 October the design was approved by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOiSzW). On 12
October the university senate approved the General Principles of the Investment
and Development of Nicolaus Copernicus University in the years 1966–1980 and
39
Projekt Uniwersytetu, p. 9.
AUMK, AZISW, Generalne założenia inwestycji rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika
w Toruniu w latach 1966–1980, sygn. ZI 16/53, p. 195 (1965).
41
40
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it sent the document to the Ministry for further approval. The Board for Investments of Higher Education (ZISW) was established in Toruń, which was responsible for preparing all the stages of the documentation such as technical-economic
principles, preliminary designs and working designs, providing furniture and
equipment. Prof. Witold Łukaszewicz, the university’s president from 1965, appointed the so-called senior-constructors – experts responsible for the preparation
of technical-economic principles for individual buildings. The senior constructor
of the whole construction project was the university’s ex-president A. Swinarski,
while the senior constructors of individual buildings were: Prof. Ernest Pischinger
(the Chemistry Departmental Complex, from 1967 Henryk Koneczny), Prof. Józef
Mikulski (the Faculty of Biology and Natural Sciences), Maria Puciatowa (librarian) the university’s president W. Łukaszewicz (residential buildings), Dr. Jadwiga
Sylwestrowicz (the medical centre), Zdzisław Marzec (the canteen), and the director S. Staniszewski (the NCU Rector’s building and the university’s main lecture
theatre [aula])42. The general principles for the investment and development of
NCU were approved on 29 September 1966. On 28 February 1967 the project was
approved by the Committee for the Evaluation of Investment Projects of the Ministry of Education and the Committee for Urban Planning and Architecture in the
Bydgoszcz voivodeship and the city of Toruń43.
This complicated chain of procedures resulted from the fact that the role of “investor” in the socialist system was reduced to organizing design works and their realization, whereas decisions concerning the launch of the investment, its scope and
financial resources allocated to it were the responsibility of the central government.
After a long time, the decision was finally made on 23 March 1967 by the Council
of Ministers in resolution no 57/67, on the strength of which the construction of
the university campus was combined with the celebration of the 500th anniversary
of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday. Moreover, the first stage of the university’s extension was approved and 215 million zlotys was allocated for this aim44.
Undoubtedly, the approval of Toruń’s investment issued by the central authorities must have been connected with the program for the celebration of Nicolaus
Copernicus’ anniversary. It is highly probable that the campus would not have
been erected had it not been for this prestigious anniversary. Nevertheless, the
personal involvement of the university authorities played a major role as well,
for in the socialist system obtaining resources for investments of such magnitude
also required many unofficial manoevres. Moreover, although the local authorities of Toruń accepted the extension of the university, Bydgoszcz – the capital of
42
R. Karłowicz, W. Szober, op.cit., p. 113.
44
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 23 March 1967 (M. Pszczółkowski, Przegląd
piśmiennictwa do dziejów budowy campusu UMK, Rocznik Toruński, R. 32: 2005, p. 239; M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 166). On the strength of the next resolution of the Council of Ministers no 132 of
2 July 1971 the second stage of the construction of the Institute of Chemistry and the technological
hall were approved (J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 59).
43
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the voivodeship where major decisions were made – had its own academic ambitions and the construction of the campus was not at all in its interest45. Publications made by the university’s employees reveal that the person who contributed
enormously first to the construction of the campus46 and then to its completion47
was the university’s president Witold Łukaszewicz. The rector maintained relations
with the Polish United Workers’ Party, ministries and other central institutions (he
was an MP during the years 1969–1975). He effectively used his contacts to promote the idea of the campus as a permanent monument of the great astronomer.
M. Kaczmarek, a former employee of the ministry, also used his contacts in unofficial discussions48. Thanks to the real involvement and personal qualities of these
people49, the design of the campus in Toruń was approved and completed.
The investment process started with the settlement of the property status of
the area where the campus was to be built. In 1967 most of 82 hectares of the plot
belonged to the city; some part was the property of the army. What is more, 3.75
hectares were occupied by allotments, and the rest belonged to the Railway Station
Toruń Zachodni and the line leading up to “Merinotex” factory. The areas now
occupied by the buildings of the Faculties of Chemistry and Economics used to
belong to private owners (3.75 hectares). The city’s property was taken over on the
strength of a notarial deed; the railway line was relocated, the railway station and
the army’s equipment dismantled, and the rest of the land purchased from private
owners. The procedures for dispossessing the private owners were most time-consuming as they were connected with altering land registry entries and providing
flats for the owners of the purchased areas50.
The construction of the campus in Bielany officially started on 9 May 1967.
The cornerstone was laid in the south-west angle of the students’ dormitory no
7, the erection of which in fact had already begun on 18 April. The ceremony was
attended by workers and students of NCU, the university’s senate, the representatives of the authorities of the voivodeship and the authorities of Toruń, and also
guests from Italian universities connected with Nicolaus Copernicus such as Angelo Baserga from Ferrara and Giuseppe Mannino from Bologna.
The construction works lasted over 5 years. The cost of the investment exceeded 540 million zlotys51, with 400 million zlotys coming from the resources provided by the Council of Ministers. The remaining 140 million zlotys were obtained
thanks to various agreements, i.e. some buildings of the Institute of Chemistry
45
S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 299.
M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 166; S. Kalembka, Witold Łukaszewicz (1911–1975), [in:] Toruńscy
twórcy nauki i kultury 1945–1985, red. M. Biskup, A. Giziński, Warszawa 1989, p. 204.
47
J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 61.
48
M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 166; S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 300.
49
Comp. S. Szarewicz, H. Jakobczak, To już 35 lat, Głos Uczelni, R. 30: 1980, nr 3–4, p. 45.
50
M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 167.
51
AUMK, Akta Wydziału Mat.-Fiz.-Chem. (further cit. AWMFCh), Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, p. 2 (1975).
46
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and the technological hall were built with the money from the Ministry of Chemical Industry in return for research works carried out on behalf of the ministry.
Some resources were also obtained from the plant “Elana” and the Social Fund
for the Reconstruction of the Capital City. Several dozen teams belonging to nine
construction companies participated in the works, including independent teams
of experts. The total capacity of the buildings was over 288,000 cubic metres, and
the usable floor area amounted to 66,800 square metres. On 2 October 1973 the
campus was opened by the representatives of the Polish United Workers’ Party and
the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland52.
The building schedule was based on the so-called Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PERT). This method of planning, only applied previously in
Poland in theory53, had been developed in the USA in 1957 for the needs of cosmic projects. In time, PERT was used for civil purposes, i.e. in the realization of
huge construction investments. The idea of PERT was based on the analysis of the
so-called critical track of a given venture, in other words the sequence of activities related to each other. This meant “counting backwards” all the stages of the
planned investment to ensure that all the stages of the process be completed at the
right time.
The network of connections was developed in the form of a linear schedule divided into three groups of basic tasks. The division resulted from the fact
that there were two main executors: Bydgoskie Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa
Przemysłowego (BPBP) and Toruńskie Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa Ogólnego
(TPBO). The former was responsible for the construction of the academic buildings (the executor BPBP, and the latter – the social and residential buildings as well
as the NCU Rector’s building and the main lecture theatre [aula] (the executor
TPBO). The third group was responsible for the laying of pipes, sewers and power
lines (the executor BPBP). Owing to technological and organizational connections
the first two groups were harmonized with the third one in the graphic layout
of the network. Next, the objectives for the completion of the investment were
planned. In this way, a transparent schedule was created which was to coordinate
and dictate the construction works54.
Such a precise schedule should have prevented problems typical of the socialist
construction industry, the most frequent of which were delays. In the People’s Republic of Poland the completion of an investment was very often prolonged, sometimes reaching incredible magnitudes (i.e. the construction of the Forum Hotel in
Cracow lasted 17 years). Sometimes investments were never completed, an example of which are the so-called Szkeletors (Skeletors) in Cracow or Bielsko-Biała.
52
M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 167.
Por. T. Pałaszewski, Ekonomiczne problemy realizacji zespołu obiektów wyższych uczelni, [in:]
Materiały z seminarium na temat budownictwa szkół wyższych (27–28 I 1966), red. B. Popławski,
Warszawa 1966, p. 53.
54
T. Pałaszewski, Organizacja inwestycji wieloletnich na przykładzie budowy Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Przegląd Budowlany, R. 45: 1973, nr 11, p. 459.
53
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The problems arose from the malfunction of the centrally planned economy: decisions made by the central authorities often came from unofficial arrangements and
had little to do with real possibilities. Additional factors such as inflation, personnel changes, time wasting and wastage of material in construction sites, changing
priorities, etc. also generated extra costs.
In the case of NCU keeping the deadlines was of the utmost importance. The
Toruń campus was perceived as being the greatest government investment connected with the Copernicus anniversary. It was a prestigious investment of an international dimension. Thus, the works were expected to be completed on time.
On the basis of the comparative analysis of the schedule and the actual process
of construction works we can notice that despite the fact that the works started
early (a month after the investment was included in the programme of the celebration of the Copernicus anniversary) and originally they were completed earlier
than planned55, several delays occurred. The first building – the complex of student
dormitories no 7 and 8 – was to be completed by 15 August and 15 September respectively, as had been decreed in June56. In fact, they were completed respectively
at the beginning of October57 and in November 196858, but not yet equipped with
central heating59. Further delays were even more worrying. The construction of the
student dormitory no 9, the completion of which was planned in October 196860
was prolonged by a year. The construction began on 14 May 1968 (despite the fact
that the preliminary design had been approved on 28 July 1967), and was completed at the beginning of December 1969, with the water and central heating system
being installed only on the first five floors61. The construction of the canteen and
the gym began on 10 November 1968, which meant almost a one-year delay. In
mid-1969 the press wrote optimistically that “TPBO will complete the construction of the canteen ahead of schedule – in a year”62; almost two years later , in April
1971, the canteen was yet to be completed63. In fact, all the works finished on 31
December 1971. The construction of the NCU Rector’s building, the main lecture
theatre [aula], the library and the medical centre was to be launched in 1968; in
November 1968 the press wrote about the plans to start the construction of the
library and the NCU Rector’s building on time64. Nevertheless, the works started
in March (the NCU Rector’s building and the library) and in September 1969 (the
medical centre and the main lecture theatre –aula). In April 1971 it was reported
55
In 1967 the investment plan in terms of expenditure was completed in 150% , and in terms of
construction works in 115% (Aby zdążyć na czas, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 48, p. 1).
56
Wyścig z czasem na Bielanach, ibid., nr 146, p. 2.
57
D. Ciesielska, Dzień powszedni w „leśniczówce” na Bielanach, ibid., nr 238, p. 3.
58
Drugi dom studencki w „leśniczowce” na Bielanach, ibid., nr 268, p. 1.
59
D. Ciesielska, op.cit., p. 3.
60
Wyścig z czasem, p. 2.
61
Przeprowadzka na Bielany, ibid., R. 3: 1969, nr 284, s. 3.
62
Rosną mury reprezentacyjnych budynków UMK, ibid., nr 193, p. 2.
63
W kwietniu – stołówka, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 85, p. 1.
64
Drugi dom studencki w „leśniczówce” na Bielanach, p. 1.
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that the NCU Rector’s building was to be completed at the turn of the third and
fourth quarter of 197165, while three months later the press wrote about the fourth
quarter66. In fact, the works finished on 31 December 1971. The completion of the
medical centre, planned in July 1971, was postponed to the beginning of 197267,
but in fact it took place on 30 March 1972. The construction of the main lecture
theater [aula] was considerably prolonged. The works started in the autumn of
1969, but the steel skeleton was installed in July 197168. In September the construction of the aula was promised to be completed by 30 November, and the library
by the end of October69, but both buildings were finished on 31 December 1972.
The construction of the second hotel for assistant lecturers began in April 1969,
of the building of the Institute of Chemistry in May 1969, and of the building of
the Faculty and Natural Sciences in September 1969 – which means earlier than
it was planned. However, it did not prevent a few months’ delay: in March 1972
it was reported that the buildings of the Institute of Chemistry and the Faculty of
Biology and Natural Sciences were to be completed respectively on 31 July and
30 October70, but in fact the completion took place on 31 December 1972 and 30
September 1973.
The zenith of delays occurred in the middle of the construction process. In
1969 only 4.2% of the planned cubic capacity was completed, and in 1970 – only
2.6%71. In 1971 the situation improved, but by June still less than 40 % of the scheduled works had been completed72. The delay was not a secret. The problem was
touched upon in the press73. W. Łukaszewicz in his inauguration speech in 1968
admonished the designers and the construction companied for “the significant difficulties which disrupted the correlation between what was planned in the documentation and what was actually completed”74. According to the president of the
university the construction companies were to blame75. The central authorities
were also concerned with the delay; the construction site was visited by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR)
Józef Tejchma (10 June 1970)76 and the minister of Science and Higher Education
65
W kwietniu – stołówka, p. 2.
W tym roku oddanie do użytku gmachu rektoratu, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 171, p. 1.
67
Ibid.
68
Trwa montaż wielkiej auli uniwersyteckiej na Bielanach, ibid., nr 186, p. 1.
69
Pomyślnie przebiega budowa miasteczka bielańskiego, ibid., R. 6: 1972, nr 222, p. 1.
70
Budowniczowie osiedla akademickiego zwiększyli tempo prac, ibid., nr 58, p. 1.
71
W. Bartkowiak, A. Chojnacki, H. Jaskólski, R. Malejka, Rozbudowa Uniwersytetu Mikołaja
Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1967–1973, Przegląd Budowlany, R. 45: 1973, nr 11, p. 468.
72
W tym roku oddanie do użytku gmachu rektoratu, Nowości, R. 5: 1971, nr 171, p. 1.
73
Comp.i.e. W przededniu nowego roku akademickiego, ibid., R. 4: 1970, nr 224, p. 1–2.
74
Gaudeamus w toruńskiej uczelni, ibid., R. 2: 1968, nr 239, s. 1; por. H. Galus, Hołd – uczonemu,
szansa – miastu, ibid., nr 259, p. 3.
75
5 tysięcy studentów na UMK, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 227, p. 1.
76
Józef Tejchma w województwie bydgoskim, ibid., R. 4: 1970, nr 135, p. 1.
66
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Henryk Jabłoński (9 July 1970)77. In March 1971 the Council for the Construction
of the Academic Estate was established, the role of which was to monitor the correct completion of the investment78. In June a meeting took place during which it
was concluded that more teams of workers should be involved in the completion of
the project79. In November 1971 the chief engineer of BPBP received an order from
the Polish United Workers’ Party to finish the construction of the Rector’s building
by the end of the year under threat of losing his job80. All these measures turned
out to be effective: 300,000 zlotys’ worth of construction works were made every
day81. Thanks to this, 47.6% of the whole plan was completed82.
There were many causes of the delays. First, the investment had begun without complete preparation. Due to prolonged procedures the works were commissioned later than planned (i.e. the commission to prepare the design of the library
– 21 July 196683), which resulted in the fact that the documentation of individual
buildings was not ready on time: preliminary designs, planned to be completed
during the years 1966–1967 were in fact carried out in the period of July 1967
– January 1969, which caused alterations to the schedule. The whole construction site was not ready on time. In 1970 the question of dismantling the railway
siding still remained unsettled84. Longer intervals in construction works occurred
from to time: on 29 May 1969 the head of ZISW wrote to BPBP requesting him to
intervene in connection with the break in the construction works of one month
and a half (student dormitory no 9)85. This is what R. Karłowicz wrote about the
construction process of the aula in November 1971: “There was no work on the
construction site for three summer months. The debates about the manner of removing underground water lasted one year and a half […] despite the fact that decisions concerning this matter were made in July 1970, no work was done throughout all of 1971”86. The team of designers was also to blame, for they did not visit
Toruń frequently enough to supervise the construction process, which led to delays87. Nevertheless, the most important reason for the delays were decisions made
77
Minister Henryk Jabłoński wśród studentów odbywających praktyki robotnicze, ibid., nr 159, p. 1.
W kwietniu – stołówka, p. 2.
79
W tym roku, p. 1.
80
AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody kopernikańskie 1971–1973, Notatka z narady KW PZPR w dn. 19 XI 1971, sygn. ZI 16/79, p. 1 (1971).
81
Budowniczowie osiedla, p. 1.
82
W. Bartkowiak, A. Chojnacki, H. Jaskólski, R. Malejka, op.cit., p. 468.
83
AUMK, AZISW, Projekt koncepcyjny architektury budynku biblioteki głównej Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu (wersja A), sygn. ZI 1/4, p. 3 (1967).
84
Osiedle Fałata, p. 1.
85
AUMK, AZISW, Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, pismo z dnia 29 V
1969 r., sygn. ZI 16/80 (1969).
86
Ibid., Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody kopernikańskie
1971–1973, pismo z dnia 23 XI 1971 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1971).
87
Ibid., Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, pismo z dnia 26 XI 1971 r.,
sygn. ZI 16/80 (1971).
78
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at the central level. In 1969 The Party-Government Committee verified the project,
reducing the investment plan by almost 5 million zlotys; in 1970 no construction
works were undertaken as the ministry had failed to include the task of building
the two faculties in the plan for 197088. What is mote TPBP became involved in
the construction of a plant in the complex of “Elana” (July- August 1970), which
meant that now there were not enough workers to continue the investment in Bielany. The phenomena resulted from the specificity of the political system of that
time, a feature of which was to make decisions to begin investments without having first checked the capacity of construction companies. The press informed that
other investments carried out by TPBO at that time were also delayed. The delay
in the construction of the City Hospital resulted in the loss of 2.6 million zlotys,
whereas the delays connected with the erection of the Chemical Technical College
entailed the loss of about 4 million zlotys89. Moreover, the main executors were not
specialized in building campuses – BPBP dealt mainly with the construction of
industrial plants while TPBO “had even less experience and capacity”90.
Delays resulted from the insufficient production potential of the construction
companies. When the deadline was close, the pace of work increased, which affected the quality. As R. Karłowicz wrote in his letter to ZISW: “the executor makes
the user and the designer accept any outcome of work, be it good or bad”91. In the
socialist system the common belief was that the newly-built “must” contain some
faults92. In Bielany it concerned mainly residential buildings (students dormitories,
hotels for assistant lecturers, the canteen93.
Another important reason for the delays were difficulties in getting building
materials. The delay in 1968 was caused by the lack of appropriate cables94. While
building the canteen there were not enough ventilators95, and there was a shortage
of cement96 and aluminium97. To save money, more costly elements of equipment
88
Ibid., Informacja dotycząca rozbudowy Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu za rok
1970, sygn. ZI 16/80, p. 2 (1971).
89
Trzeba nadrobić ubiegłoroczne opóźnienia, Nowości, R. 5: 1971, nr 6, p. 3.
90
R. Karłowicz, Organizacja inwestycji, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realizacja, p. 122.
91
AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody
kopernikańskie 1971–1973, pismo doc. Karłowicza z dnia 12 I 1973 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1973 r.).
92
Comp. i.e. D. Ciesielska, op.cit., p. 3: „przez zacinające się (bo nowe!) drzwi wchodzimy do
pokoju” (“we enter the room through the door which is jammed (just because it is new!)”.
93
Comp. the remarks in: W. Łukaszewicz, Srebrny jubileusz Almae Matris Copernicanae (1945–
–1970), Rocznik Toruński, R. 7: 1972, p. 17; W przededniu nowego roku akademickiego, Nowości, R. 4:
1970, nr 224, p. 2.
94
Aby zdążyć, p. 2.
95
AUMK, AZISW, Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, Informacja
dotycząca rozbudowy Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu za rok 1970, sygn. ZI 16/80
(1971 r.), p. 2.
96
Na Bielanach w budowie stołówka i nowy dom studencki, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 129, p. 1.
97
W tym roku, p. 1.
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were rejected98, which, as Karłowicz put it, resulted from pathological administrative structures of socialist Poland: “struggling with organization difficulties,
pathetic scenes at meetings of the Committee for the Evaluation of Investment
Projects (KOPI) and during talks with the investor and executors, who approved
unfinished buildings and the most irrational cost-cutting measures just to satisfy
their desire to get a bonus. One could write an epic about exaggerated expenses on
easy and quick investments, unrealistic deadlines and incredible efforts of teams
of designers to ensure the appropriate construction process”99. The incidences of
building material theft from the construction site was an additional negative factor
causing delays and affecting the quality of the work100.
To recapitulate, the divergences between the schedule and the factual completion of the campus resulted from one major factor – the administrative and
economic pathology of socialist Poland. Allegations that could be directed at the
team of designers (delays in the preparation of the investment documentation) or
the executors (low quality) were consequences of the political system. It was the
specificity of the political system that caused the ineffectiveness of the construction plan despite the application of the PERT method.
The question arises: whether the decision to use the western method of planning, suitable for the western reality101, was at all appropriate. The answer should
be affirmative as the network of connections allowed the creation of a certain
frame of reference which made it possible to judge the situation and reactions in
case of problems. It is true that the reactions were typically socialist: they consisted
in involving students in the construction of the campus. Students were employed
to do simple tasks such as digging the ground or cleaning. The Action “Kopernik”
belonged to the most famous ventures of this type. Thanks to the cooperation of
OHP (Volunteer Labour Troops) and Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej (the Association of the Rural Youth) students from Poland and abroad (in total about 1,000
people) took part in the construction works in Bielany102. As a result, the construction process proceeded. Within the period of five years thirteen buildings were
98
Comp. i.a. AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na
obchody kopernikańskie 1971–1973, pisma doc. Karłowicza z dnia 23 XI 1971 i 11 IX 1972 r., sygn.
ZI 16/79 (1971, 1972 r.).
99
R. Karłowicz, Projekt, który dał satysfakcję, Architektura, R. 27: 1973, nr 7, p. 269.
100
Comp. i.a. AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na
obchody kopernikańskie 1971–1973, telegram dyrektora BPIP „Binstal” z dnia 10 VIII 1976 r., sygn.
ZI 16/79 (1976 r.): “in building B [the Complex of the Departments of Chemistry –M. P.] much laboratory equipment was missing (it was stolen) [...] we won’t even be able to purchase elements of the
stolen laboratory furniture as many essential accessories are also missing”.
101
It turned out that it was impossible to do construction works according to the schedule as the
cycles of the construction process established by the PERT system were much shorter than the cycles
set by the legal norms (T. Pałaszewski, Organizacja inwestycji, p. 463).
102
Akcja „Kopernik”, Nowości, R. 3: 1969, nr 150, p. 1; Studenci pracują na Bielanach, ibid.,
nr 165, s. 2; W czynie Kopernikowi, ibid., nr 180, p. 2; Kryptonim Kopernik, ibid., nr 191, s. 3; Bielany
dziełem studenckich rąk, ibid., nr 263, p. 1.
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completed; the whole legal documentation was ready, the two-stage investment
documentation was compiled, installation works were completed, full equipment
and all the furniture was provided. Moreover, installations were laid underground;
the network of streets, squares and pavements was completed, the area of 45 hectares was provided with appropriate lighting and greenery spaces – all this according to the design plan and schedule.
The completion of the campus dramatically changed the image of the university. “Thanks to it, the university became a more stable institution. Before, it was
just an improvised arrangement which could be terminated at any time”103. Undoubtedly, the whole venture would not have taken place had it not been for the
Copernicus anniversary. Although “it would be a mistake to think that the 500th
anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday was the only reason for the completion of the university under his name”104, this argument, always given somehow
casually105, turned out to be decisive.. After the anniversary celebrations finished,
the investment works were gradually reduced.
According to the schedule approved in the 1960s which corresponded the socalled ‘five-year plans” (pięciolatki), the work within the first stage of the construction process were completed in 1975 although the resources had diminished and
the pace of work had fallen off. Thanks to the resources reserved for the period
1971–1975 the second stage of the building of the Institute of Chemistry with the
technological hall and two student dormitories were completed. The second stage
of the construction of the building of the Faculty of Biology and Natural Sciences
was moved to the period 1976–1980 (originally planned to be completed in the
period 1973–1975). Although such delays were partly justified by the creation of
a new faculty – Satellite Geophysics106 – it was already known that the extension
of NCU had lost its prestigious character for the central authorities. At the same
time, the investment needs of other universities increased, the number of which
was growing due to the social pressure of having more colleges107.
Despite the unfavourable predictions for the future, the completion of other
faculties and residential buildings was planned for the next two “five-year-periods” of (1976–1980 and 1981–1985)108. The biggest investments were divided into
so-called tasks, which was to ensure the distribution of costs for a longer period
103
J. Serczyk, Minęło życie, Toruń 1999, s. 87.
R. Karłowicz, Architektura szkół wyższych, Człowiek i Nauka, R. 5: 1975, p. 277.
105
Por. idem, Koncepcja, p. 16.
106
AUMK, AWMFCh, Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach
1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, p. 13, 21 (1974); por. ibid., Projekt potrzeb inwestycyjnych Uniwersytetu
Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1974–1975 oraz 1976–1980, sygn. WM 54/3, passim.
107
More about it in i.a. R. Bohr, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w latach 1966–1980, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 1966–1980, vol. 1, red. J. Bełkot, Toruń 1992, p. 33; M. Rożański, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. II etap rozbudowy uniwersytetu, Studia + Projekty, R. 2: 1978,
p. 95–105.
108
AUMK, AWMFCh, Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach
1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, s. 7; comp. M. Pszczółkowski, op.cit., p. 243.
104
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of time and guarantee the continuation of the investment when the budget for
the next “five-year-period” was being prepared. In 1976 the project of the second
stage was modified, which resulted from the correction of the general layout of
the city and moving an A road northwards, which gave the university an additional 30 hectares and created new prospects for development109. Unfortunately,
out of seventeen buildings included in the plan, only one was completed – a club.
M. Kaczmarek turned out to be a false prophet saying in 1972: “it would be illogical to stop at this point, but there are many “friendly” people saying: ‘wait until the
anniversary ceremonies finish...’ After all, all the installation has already been laid,
so now the only thing to do is to erect buildings”110. At the end of 1978 the Board
for Investments of Higher Education (ZISW) in Toruń was dissolved.
The campus of NCU is one the best examples showing how architects in the
People’s Republic of Poland did their best to maintain the quality and ensure functionality and esthetics despite the technical and economic conditions of the time.
The spatial solution of the first stage of the construction process was an original
concept ensuring optimal functionality and based on characteristic design trends
in Western Europe in the first two decades after WWII. Each stage of the process finished with the completion of one complex of buildings which constituted a
uniform whole. It was important to complete general university buildings, some
academic buildings and social complexes in the first stage of the process as it was
rightly expected that the resources for the investment would diminish when the
ceremonies of the Copernicus anniversary finished. Thanks to it, the first university campus – a uniform complex in a new area comprising all the functions of the
institution – was created in Poland.
109
110
M. Różański, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. II etap, p. 95.
M. Machnicki, Bielany, Zwierciadło, R. 16: 1972, nr 27, p. 4–5.
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ZAPISKI
HISTORYCZNE
—
VOLUME
LXXV —
2010
BOOK 2
LIST OF AUTHORS OF BOOK 2
Dariusz K. Chojecki, PhD, Institute of History and International Relations, Szczecin University, chojecki.dariusz@gmail.com
Sławomir Jóźwiak, dr hab., prof. UMK, Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, sj@umk.pl
Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, dr, Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Krzysztof.Kwiatkowski@umk.pl
Živilė Mikailienė, mgr, doktorantka, Lietuvos istorijos institutas Vilnius (Litwa),
ztamkutonyte@gmail.com
Alvydas Nikžentaitis, prof. dr, Lietuvos istorijos institutas Vilnius (Litwa),
nikzentaitis@istorija.lt
Michał Pszczółkowski, dr, Muzeum Okręgowe im. Leona Wyczółkowskiego w Bydgoszczy,
michal.pszczolkowski@muzeum.bydgoszcz.pl
Adam Szweda, dr hab., Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika
w Toruniu, aszweda@umk.pl
Sobiesław Szybkowski, dr hab., Wydział Historyczny Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego,
laszczuk@biotech.ug.gda.pl
SALE OF CURRENT AND ARCHIVED ISSUES OF THE JOURNAL
in:
Torun Scientific Society’s Office
ul. Wysoka 16
87-100 TORUŃ
tel./fax 056-622-39-41
www.tnt.torun.pl
e-mail: tnt.biuro@wp.pl

ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNE

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