The Emergence of the State in Sixteenth

Transcription

The Society for Japanese Studies
The Emergence of the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan: From Oda to Tokugawa
Author(s): Wakita Osamu
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 343-367
Published by: The Society for Japanese Studies
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THE WORLD SEEN FROM JAPAN
WAKITA
OSAMU
The Emergence of the State in
Sixteenth-Century Japan: From Oda to
Tokugawa
From the -beginning of the Sengoku turmoil to the establishment of
the Tokugawa Bakufu, Japan underwent a century and a half of
fundamental transformation. Our knowledge of these turbulent centuries increased significantly during the 1970s because of the continuing efforts of many historians. One of the important accomplishments of the decade was the binational Sengoku conference
held in 1977 which provided an active forum for discussion among
Japanese and American scholars.'
The principal intent of this brief essay is to analyze the transformation that occurred in the structure of political power during the
two centuries that culminated in the establishment of the Tokugawa
Bakufu. I have chosen this topic for the following reasons: This is
the topic that emerged as one of the central foci of the analyses of
these centuries undertaken by Japanese specialists during the past
decade, and it was also an important question raised in the binational
conference. Perhaps most importantly, this is the topic on which I
have completed two studies in the past decade,2 and I have some
1. J. W. Hall, K. Nagahara, and K. Yamamura eds., Sengoku-jidai (Yoshikawa
Kobunkan, 1978). An English edition of this book entitled Japan Before Tokugawa:
Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500-1650 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). Of the books published by Japanese scholars during the past
several years, the following two, which indicate the new directions in research, are
worthy of special attention by Western specialists: Katsumata Shizuo, Sengoku-h&
seiritsu-shi-ron (A study of the history of the development of the Sengoku laws)
(Tokyo University Press, 1979); and Nagahara Keiji, ed., Sengoku-ki no kenryoku to
shakai (Political power and society in the Sengoku period) (Tokyo University Press,
1976).
2. Wakita Osamu, Oda-seiken no kiso-kozo (The basic structure of the Oda rule)
(University of Tokyo Press, 1975), and Kinsei hokensei seiritsu-shi-ron (A study of
the history of the emergence of the kinsei feudalism) (Tokyo University Press, 1977).
Journal of Japanese Studies, 8:2
) 1982 Society for Japanese Studies
Journal of Japanese Studies
344
reflections that I would like to present to American specialists of this
period. I have already published in English my analyses of the
kokudaka system and the growth of the urban commerce of the
period,3 but this is the first opportunity I have had to present my
analysis of the topic of this essay to Western readers. I shall be most
gratified if this modest effort can contribute toward encouraging the
study of this period by Western scholars.
Since this paper is based on my -views of the period we call
kinsei, let me add here a brief note to indicate the basic points of my
view. Heretofore, the predominant view of Japanese scholars has
been that the kinsei period was feudal in its purest and typical form. I
too have no doubt that the social organization called the bakuhan
system was feudal. However, whether we compare the kinsei period
generally with Western European feudalism or with the Japanese
medieval period, investigation of the substance of this period reveals
many special characteristics-such as the dominance of the power
possessed by the emerging central government, the separation of the
military and peasant classes, the kokudaka system, and the likethat seem to be unique to the kinsei period. For this reason, I
maintain that the kinsei period was a period of "transfigured"
feudalism. The dominant view, long held by many, argues that the
kinsei was a period that emerged as a result of the development and
progress of a feudal system. However, I believe that the kinsei
system evolved at the end of the medieval period because the feudal
system as it then existed had lost its stability, because various
non-feudal developments grew visible, and because the military
rulers (buke-ryoshu) had to cope with these socio-political changes.
In this paper I shall examine the emergence of the kinsei period,
focusing on the process of consolidation of the central power in
order to better understand the position which the central power
attained over the nation, the feudal relationships that developed, and
the qualitative differences in the political power established by the
three unifiers of Japan.4
I.
Acquisition of the Power of the State
According to the works of many earlier Japanese historians, the
emergence of a central power occurred as a result of the evolution of
3. Wakita Osamu, "The Kokudaka System: A Device for Unification," The
Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1975), and "Oda Nobunaga's
Policies Towards Commerce and Cities" in Sengoku-jidai, cited in footnote 1.
4. Because of the page limitations of this article, I am unable to discuss problems
relating to the daimyo domains.
Wakita: From Oda to Tokugawa
345
the feudal power structure which was based primarily on local
powers (the zaichi ryoshu system). But the recent focus of analysis
of most scholars has shifted, and the central question now asked is
not how the creation of central power evolved from a medieval base,
but how the central powers that emerged came to possess what we
can regard as the powers of state. Given this new focus of analysis,
one of the most important questions to be analyzed is how the
unifiers of Japan-Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and-Ieyasu-came either
to supplant the powers of state that had existed or to create the
power structure that became a nation-state. This is the reason why
Japanese historians have begun to show interest, for example, in
Sengoku daimyo Imagawa Yoshimoto's declaration to "promulgate
the rules of the domain on the strength of my own power" -not as a
shugo appointed by the Muromachi Bakufu-and in the frequent
references of the Sengoku daimyo to their "public" authority (kagi)
in order to legitimatize power that they claimed they possessed.5
Hence, more scholars have begun to view the holders of political
power in this period as increasingly claiming that they possessed
legitimate "public" power, that is, they were not inclined to admit
that they were supplanting the established power of state, either the
Muromachi Bakufu or the Emperor.6
There is little doubt that the Sengoku daimyo represented the
zenith of the feudal power structure that was based on the strength
of local powers. Nor would many question that the foundation of the
political power of the unifiers was the same feudal power structure.
However, we should note that the process of the consolidation of the
power pursued by the unifiers could not have occurred without their
being fully cognizant of the power of the state that existed. That is,
5. An excellent and handy article on kogi is Fukaya Katsumi, "K6gi to mibunsei"
(Kogi and the status system), Taikei Nihon Kokkashi 3: Kinsei (Tokyo University
Press, 1975). Note, however, that the historical questions that we can analyze
through an examination of kogi and related concepts are limited. This is the reason
why my analysis is focused upon the structure and uses of power.
6. Asao Naohiro, "Shogun kenryoku no soshitsu" (1.2) (Creation of shogunal
power) Rekishi Hy5ron, No. 241 (August, 1970) No. 266 (August 1972) represents
such a view. Also see, by the same author, "Bakuhan-sei to tenno" (The bakufudomain system and the Emperor), Taikei Nihon Kokkashi cited in the preceding
footnote. In the latter, Asao examines the emergence of the shogunal power as a
process of creating a central political structure. I too believe that the central power
structure of this period emerged by overcoming and supplanting the existing structure, but I differ from Asao and others on the process by which this was accomplished. As I stress in the text, I believe the emerging power had to make use of the
existing power structure, one way or another, in the process of creating its own
central power structure.
346
the unifiers, in their respective efforts to gain central power, had to
grapple with the same problems that the warrior rulers of the
Kamakura and Muromachi Bakufu had faced in claiming the power
to rule. We must examine, therefore, what these unifiers retained as
the legacies of the earlier warrior rulers and what they created anew
in consolidating their power.
The central political power of the medieval period was maintained by and shared among the nobles, religious entities, and warriors, and the entire power structure was built around the Emperor.
This characterizes the power structure of the Kamakura Bakufu.
However, by the time of Yoshimitsu, the Muromachi Bakufu itself
had come to possess power analogous to the power of state. As is
well-known, Yoshimitsu was a "de facto king."7 He was, as the
seii-taisho6gun, the leader of the warrior class, and at the same time
he was able to exercise the powers of state, i.e., the rights of
diplomacy to the extent that he could refer to himself as "the King of
Japan" in documents transmitted to Ming China. Indicative of the
position Yoshimitsu came to possess vis-a-vis the Emperor's, the
latter was willing to posthumously grant Yoshimitsu the title of
Emperor Daijd. Though this offer was declined by Yoshimitsu's son,
it is known that Yoshimitsu, late in his life, was accorded all the
honors usually reserved for a retired Emperor and that he frequently
received "imperial visits."8 This practice was continued to the
Tokugawa period, and Iemitsu too was accorded honors similar to
those given a retired Emperor.9
Even Yoshiaki, the last of the Ashikaga Shoguns, continued to
exercise power similar to that which Yoshimitsu had possessed.
When the Regent (kanpaku), Konoe Sakihisa, left his position
against Yoshiaki's wishes, Yoshiaki deprived the offending noble of
his title. In this instance, Yoshiaki was clearly punishing a noble for
disobeying a shogunal order. Under the established procedures of
the Court, a Shogun could not deal with a noble in this fashion. Most
likely, Yoshiaki meted out punishment in the name of the Emperor,
but no one, seeing what occurred, could doubt that the real power of
the state was now in the hands of the Shogun.10 The reason why
7. Satd Shin'ichi, Nanbokuch5 no d5ran (The turmoil of the Nanbokuchd
[period]) (ChfJ6 Kironsha, 1965).
8. I am indebted to Professor Nagahara Keiji for bringing this fact to my attention.
9. Shimohashi Yukiosa, Bakumatsu no kyutei (The imperial court during the
Bakumatsu [period]), (Heibonsha, -1979), p. 219. Iemitsu was accorded respect similar to that given to the father of an Emperor.
10. In "the appointments of the kugy&" (kugy5 bunin) made by Yoshiaki, five
347
Nobunaga and other Sengoku daimyo came to Kyoto in their efforts
to demonstrate that they possessed the power to rule the nation was
the existence of this shogunal power, which had been held by the
Shogun in the Muromachi Bakufu. In Nobunaga's case, he came to
Kyoto after the fall of the Bakufu to attempt to claim this power. The
questions we must ask are: Did Nobunaga attempt to gain this power
as the head of the warrior class? What was his relationship to the
Emperor, to the nobles, and to the religious powers?
Nobunaga's attitude towards imperial titles and ranks was complex. While the Muromachi Bakufu continued to exist (even if in
name only), he declined all ranks above that of Danj6chi, and only
after the fall of the Bakufu in 1573 did he choose to become a
kugyo-the highest rank in the court. By becoming a kugyo, he was
now formally able to participate in the affairs of state. Before
Nobunaga, only warriors who attained the rank of Shogun had been
given kugyo rank. Subsequently, Nobunaga became Gondainagon
and Ukon'etaisho in 1574 and Udaijin in 1576. During these years,
he relinquished the headship of the Oda house to his son Nobutada
and moved into Azuchi castle to enjoy the life of a tenkajin, an
undisputed leader of the preeminent warrior house that exerted real
military power over the nation.
In 1577, Nobunaga resigned from the positions of Udaijin (the
Minister of the Right) and Ukon'etaishd (the Right general of the
imperial guard) and thereafter refused to accept any title offered
him. He met his sudden demise in 1582 before he was able to
respond to the Court inquiry as to which title he would prefer:
kanpaku, dajd-daijin, or Shogun. Noting this fact, some scholars
have entertained the possibility that Nobunaga was thinking of establishing a central political power that was free of any formal aid
from, thus totally independent of, the existing power structure of the
state. In support of this view, some have even speculated that
Nobunaga demanded that the Emperor Ogimachi abdicate, even at
the cost of seriously offending the court, especially the Emperor. I'
My own view, judging from Nobunaga's overall conduct, is that
he intended to establish a political structure of his own, making use
of the powers of the Shogun, which were well established by precekugya are listed who displeased him by disobeying "the commands of the warrior."
See Kokushi taikei (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1965).
11. This interpretation made by Asao in his "Bakuhan-se to tenno," p. 199, and
by Fujiki Hisashi, who agrees with Asao in his "The Politics of Oda Nobunaga," in
Sengoku Jidai, cited in footnote 1, is in error. See my Kinsei hokensei seiritsu shiron,
p. 268.
348
dent. He chose to become a kugyo and thus formally became part of
the existing political structure.'2 He then was given the title of
Ukon'etaisho, which formally made him the leader of the warrior
class, as was Minamoto Yoritomo who had received the same title
several centuries earlier.
The tradition that only a Minamoto could be Shogun prevented
Nobunaga from becoming the seii-taisho-gun, both because he was a
descendant of the Taira lineage and because Ashikaga Yoshiaki was
still alive in a domain controlled by the Mdri. That the imperial court
took such a tradition seriously is demonstrated in the case of
Hideyoshi -(as described below). Nobunaga, familiar with these traditions and the attitude of the court, chose not to challenge the court
on this matter. Perhaps this was because the title of seii-taishogun
was of limited importance to Nobunaga, who had already held and
resigned from a court rank that was sufficiently high for his purposes. We should be aware here that the custom of the court was to
respect the highest rank a person had ever held. In any case, as
Nobunaga intimated in his letter of resignation from these ranks, he
was fully intending to accept the highest positions that the court was
able to offer when he had established undisputed power over the
nation.
I do not deny the possibility that a man such as Nobunaga, who
rose to power from lowly origins, might have been resentful of the
Emperor and the court. However, it is an error to infer that
Nobunaga chose to confront the court to the extent of demanding
the abdication of an Emperor. In any event, it is difficult to believe
that the court would have resisted demands made by Nobunaga.
After all, he possessed the power once held by an Ashikaga Shogun
who was a "de facto king." In 1576, Nobunaga intervened in the
selection of the head abbot for the Kifuku-ji and placed the kuge
who opposed his decision under temporary house arrest. In doing
so, he was exercising his power over the nobles and temples. He
went even further and exerted his power to assure the rights to, or to
make restitution of, landholdings of the kuge, the temples, and even
of the imperial household. It is also known that Nobunaga granted
some land to the kuge and ordered that all the land that had belonged
12. The fact that it was necessary for Nobunaga to hold this position despite the
weakening of the Shogun, the Emperor, and the kuge, may be thought strange.
However, even in the Sengoku period, during which position was determined by
ability, it was necessary to occupy a position established within the power structure
in order to acquire a stable position of authority.
349
to the kuge 3 residing in Kyoto during the previous hundred years be
returned to them. 14 In these instances, Nobunaga was indicating that
he was willing to use his power for the benefit of the court and its
members if they would help establish his dominance over the Emperor and the court.
To the same end, Nobunaga in 1579 adopted a prince, a son of
the Emperor Ogimachi, and also hosted a ceremony to inspect
mounted warriors for the Emperor. The adoption of an imperial
prince meant that Nobunaga would become the father-in-law of
the next Emperor, thus assuring him of a position analogous to that
held by a retired Emperor. Also, the fact that he set aside in the
Azuchi castle a special room for imperial visits clearly indicated his
anticipation that the adopted prince, after ascending the throne,
would make frequent imperial visits to his father-in-law. By all of
these means, Nobunaga was strengthening his power within the
existing political structure and was attempting to build a political
foundation for Oda rule. His strategy apparently was to inherit the
power once held by the Ashikaga Shogun.
Hideyoshi followed Nobunaga as the ruler of the nation.
Hideyoshi's attitude towards court titles and ranks was straightforward. After being denied his wish to be made seii-taishogun
because of his humble birth, he asked to be "adopted" by Ashikaga
Yoshiaki. Yoshiaki refused the request. Thereupon, Hideyoshi, still
eager to obtain the title, succeeded in being "adopted" by Konoe
Sakihisa, who could provide Hideyoshi with a fictive but essential
"lineage" to the Fujiwara. This proved sufficient for his purposes,
and he was, as is well-known, named kanpaku.
What is the significance of the new power structure that was
presided over by a kanpaku? In substance, the kanpaku in this case
differed little from a Shogun. In everyone's mind, these terms were
virtually synonymous. However, in form, which is meaningful in
13. In his "Oda seiken no kihon rosen" (The basic course of the Oda rule),
Kokushigaku, No. 100 (1976), p. 33, Okuno Takahiro stated that this was analogous
to giving a formal fief under the vermilion seal of Hideyoshi. However, the kinsei
kokudaka system had not yet been established. Okuno wrote that the shoen system
had been abolished by Nobunaga by that time, but he provided no evidence to
support his argument. I fear that he failed to understand my analysis.
14. In the medieval period, statutes of limitation ordinarily became effective after
20 years. In the case of Tokugawa decrees, the same statutes of limitation were in
effect and land did not need to be returned to the original owner if the transaction had
occurred 20 or more years previously. Nobunaga ignored established custom and
extended the limit to 100 years.
350
S
analyzing the structure of political power, rule by a kanpaku was
distinctive and deserves careful analysis.
The kanpaku was the highest position that a kuge, a member of
the nobility, could attain. This meant that Hideyoshi, the leader of
the warriors, occupied the highest position among the kuge. Thus,
unlike a Shogun whose formal power extended only over the warriors, Hideyoshi as kanpaku had authority over the kuge, temples,
and shrines, as well as over the warriors. In this sense, by becoming
kanpaku, Hideyoshi succeeded in establishing political power that
encompassed both the court authority and that of a military ruler.
For us, looking back at this period, the establishment of a unified
authority may mean only that the civil wars had ended and a central
national authority had emerged. But, for the people of the time, the
unification of the two powers was extremely significant.
The role of a kanpaku was to counsel and to act on behalf of the
Emperor in all aspects of national governance. Thus, the power of
Hideyoshi as kanpaku was inseparable from that of the throne. He
was even able to rule on matters directly relating to the court, and he
is known to have ruled on the seating order in the court of the
princes and others who enjoyed status approximating that of the
Empress and the former Empresses. Such all-inclusive power made
Hideyoshi the supreme power in the nation and transformed the
significance of the office of kanpaku.15
The unprecedented character of the Toyotomi rule was not limited to the transformation of the power of the kanpaku. Another
important change under Hideyoshi was to make many of the powerful Sengoku daimyo kugyo. Though only Yoshiaki and Nobunaga as
the heads of the warrior class had been made kugyo before this time,
Hideyoshi's adopted son, Hidetsugu, and his brother, Hidenaga, as
well as several other daimyo, were made kugyo by Hideyoshi. The
daimyo who became kugyo included Tokugawa Ieyasu, Tokugawa
Hidetada, Ukita Hideie, Uesugi Kagekatsu, Mori Terumoto, Maeda
Toshiie, Maeda Toshinaga, and Kobayakawa Takakage. It was clear
that in elevating these daimyo to the kugyo ranks, Hideyoshi succeeded in placing them within the formal structure of the central
political authority and, at the same time, he strengthened the lordvassal ties between Hideyoshi and these kugy6-daimyo.
That these daimyo were made kugyo for other practical reasons
soon became evident. When Hidetsugu, who became kanpaku fol15. Hideyoshi was a kanpaku but was also referred to as Shogun, and he himself
believed he was a kanpaku who was unlike all other kanpaku who preceded him.
351
lowing Hideyoshi, died in 1595, six daimyo-Jeyasu,
Hideie,
Kagekatsu, Toshiie, Terumoto, and Takakage-drafted
and
cosigned a document. It was a simple document, but it contained
rules concerning the duties that must be performed by these daimyo
(who also were kuge) and the religious bodies. What occurred was
that by means of this document a small group of daimyo-kugyo was
issuing rules of conduct and duties to be obeyed by the nobles and
the temples.
Five of these daimyo (the six cosigners minus Takakage, who
died subsequently) became Senior councillors (tairb), and, as noted
in the Kobayakawa Keizu, they were charged in their formal capacity as kugyo with the task of "governing the nation." In appearance,
they were only following a long-established tradition. But we must
not forget that five other daimyo were bugyo (magistrates) who
acted on behalf of the Toyotomi house. The five tairo constituted a
political body that exercised supreme power within the nation from
the death of Hideyoshi until the battle of Sekigahara. It was this
body that ordered the withdrawal of the expeditionary force from
Korea and issued documents allocating or recognizing the fiefs of the
warriors. In short, this body acted as a national authority, not
because it drew its power from the principle of lord-vassal relationships, but because it was a formal part of the central government.
This fact is significant in explaining why, following the death of
Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was Naidaijin and the leader of
the five senior councillors, had an important basis from which to
demand undisputed political power.'6
The power of the Tokugawa government was that of a Shogun,
i.e., the power of the warrior class. But in governing the nation, the
Tokugawa government followed the precedent of Toyotomi rule
which had effectively merged the power of the head of the warrior
class with that of the throne and the court. However, one can readily
imagine that the Tokugawa government must have faced a problem
in emulating the political framework of its predecessor. Though
Hideyoshi's government was a k6bu government, i.e., a unified civil
(or court) and military government by virtue of the fact that
Hideyoshi was a kanpaku, the Tokugawa government was not.
16. Strictly speaking, the Toyotomi house was the liege lord of Tokugawa Ieyasu.
However, after the death of Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, holding the court rank of naidaijin,
became the head of the warrior class. Since only the Shogun became kuge in the
Ashikaga Bakufu, the Toyotomi rule, which established its power within the framework of the Bakufu, could be considered in a formal sense to have relied more on the
formal power of the Court than did Ieyasu.
352
Ieyasu was never made kanpaku. For Ieyasu, there was the question
of whether he should be made kanpaku, but he considered a government headed by a kanpaku to have a fundamental weakness: the
very title of kanpaku signified too close a relationship to the Emperor. This was not acceptable to Ieyasu, who had no wish to
maintain a close relationship with the Emperor whose authority he
hoped to weaken- even further.
However, if he was to be only a Shogun, it meant that a noble
would become kanpaku and enjoy the powers given him by the
established tradition of the time. How could he prevent the appearance of a powerful kanpaku? Though Ieyasu took no action until
after he had destroyed the Toyotomi house, upon his victory at
Osaka he issued various regulations (hatto) that specified and limited the rights of the court, the nobles, and the religious bodies. And
he declared that the kuge rank held by warriors should have "no
significance." By these laws and decrees, Ieyasu was, in effect,
declaring that the supreme political power of the nation resided with
the Shogun, and that his political power was totally independent of
the civil political structure. The Tokugawa rule was thus based on
the supreme power of the Shogun and was carried out exclusively by
the Bakufu, the Shogun's administration.
II.
Development of the Feudal System in the Sixteenth Century
We have seen how the head of the warrior class first defined his
position within the existing political structure and then deprived that
structure of its political power in order to create a new central
political structure of his own. This was not just a political maneuver
which affected only the capital. Rather, it must be seen as part of the
development of the feudal system, a development that reflected the
broad transformation of society during the sixteenth century.
What were the most important developments that characterized
the feudalism of this century? The separation of the warrior and the
peasant classes (heinof-bunri) and the creation of the kokudaka system undoubtedly were the two most important. Thus, we must ask
what specific characteristics of the emerging feudal system brought
about these developments. We must also ask in what ways the
process by which the new political power established itself impinged
upon these developments.
The principal reason why hein6-bunri was important was not
because it formalized the class distinctions between warriors and
peasants, but because it caused the warriors to live in the cities,
353
leaving their land, the basis of their power and upon which they had
built their medieval world. To establish a central military power
structure that could more effectively dominate the peasants, the
warriors' power had to be concentrated in the cities. And, for the
same reason, the peasants were deprived of their arms by the
sword-hunt (katana-gari). In short, because of these developments,
the warriors were removed from their private landholdings which
served as their power base; they were integrated into the feudal
lord-vassal system in which the dominance of lords became better
established; the collective strength of the warriors was enhanced;
and both residence and occupation of warrior and peasant came to
be fixed, all of which created a new system of social status.
There was a pressing reason for the separation of warrior and
peasant during the Sengoku period. Peasant uprisings (do-ikki) occurred mostly in the regions in which landholdings-thus political
power-of the powerful temples were extensive. The warriors had
to be called upon to suppress these uprisings. In a do-ikki of 1465,
the Muromachi Bakufu had to warn the Nishioka warriors of
Yamashiro, vassals of the Shogun and themselves members of the
shogunal guard, that those joining the ikki would be punished by the
Bakufu, and that they should remain in Kyoto for the duration of the
ikki.17
Such facts clearly demonstrated a need for a new political structure capable of coping with these developments. In the medieval
period, even a strong military power often faced difficulty in dealing
with the weakened but yet troublesome kuge and temples. Also, it
was necessary to force the warriors to reside within easy reach of
the dominant military powers. The warriors who did not live in their
local power base and who did not mingle daily with the peasants
would be less likely to join the ikki and, if need be, they could be
used to suppress any uprisings.
Separation of the warriors from the peasants became all the more
urgent during the period when province-wide uprisings (kuni-ikki)
and the uprisings of the Ikkd sect were occurring. These uprisings
were often led by local powers against the authority of the Sengoku
daimyo. If the feudal system of the Sengoku daimyo was to sustain
itself, the daimyo had to remove the local powers from their power
bases and gather them into the cities. That is, by having the local
powers in the cities, the daimyo could more effectively control them
17. A November 12th, 1465, entry in Ninagawa Chikamoto Nikki 2, Zoku-shiry3
taisei Vol. 11 (Rinsen Shoten, 1978).
354
as well as use their collective military strength against any uprisings
or against other daimyo. This was the reason for the adoption of the
heinoi-bunri policy.
But, wouldn't local powers resist a policy that forced them to
abandon their local power bases? In fact, we can cite an example of
the more powerful among the vassals to Asakura in Echizen; the
local powers, after they were forced by Asakura to live in the castle
town, continued to retain their power bases in the regions in which
their clans (ichizoku) and their own followers had lived since the
medieval period. It was just because of this potential for resistance
that the policy could not be carried out until Hideyoshi had succeeded in obtaining unquestioned power to command.18 Nobunaga,
Maeda Toshiie, and a few other major daimyo were able to give new
domains to their respective followers in exchange for their followers
relinquishing their regional power bases. But most Sengoku daimyo
were unable to carry out this kind of measure. The final and fundamental solution to the problem that plagued the Sengoku daimyo had
to wait for Hideyoshi who, with his overpowering military strength,
was able to undertake the Taiko cadastral survey (Taiko kenchi) that
deprived all the warriors of their local power bases.
The kokudaka system became one foundation of the feudal system established by the unifiers of sixteenth-century Japan. How did
this system come into being? Many earlier scholars noted that the
accumulation of land, either by purchase or by force, laid the basis
for the appearance of the kokudaka system. But it is not realistic to
think that accumulation per se led to the establishment of the
kokudaka system. Each strip of land had its proprietor, jito,
myoshu, and cultivator (sakunin); and the rights possessed by each
constituted a complex web of rights that were in the process of
transition, both in terms of their nature and their extent. Such strips
of land, however many were accumulated, could not begin of themselves to evolve into the kokudaka system.19
18. Historians have long considered that the development of the zaichi rydshu
system culminated, as matter of due course, in kinsei feudalism. Thus they have not
been able to offer adequate reasons for the heinJ-bunri, except to argue that the zaichi
ryoshu had no choice but to abandon their land base. My view, of course, is that the
heinW-bunri, occurred as the result of the desire of leading members of the warrior
class to reorganize the social structure. This was the reason, I believe, why many
warriors were critical of the Taiko cadastral surveys.
19. This interpretation was shared by most scholars and the most representative
work expressing this view is found in Araki Moriaki, Bakuhan taisei shakai no
seiritsu to kdz5 (The establishment and structure of the Bakufu-han system society)
355
My view is that the necessary premise for the system was the
comprehensive power exerted over land by the Sengoku daimyo
who inherited the power of the shugo. During Oda rule, the land
system was reorganized using the rights of isshiki shihai, i.e., the
rights to rule a domain. But the rights to the land each peasant
worked remained unaffected, and the rights to collect dues (naitoku)
from land by local powers and by the myoshu continued to be
respected.
Under Toyotomi rule, such rights to dues were disallowed.
Every strip of land was now made liable for taxation by the central
government, and each peasant, whose rights to own land were now
recognized, became responsible for meeting tax obligations. The
adoption of the kokudaka system was accomplished, like the cutting
of the Gordian knot, in one decisive motion. But the principal level
which made this possible was the control over land by the undisputed central power Hideyoshi now held. In other words, neither the
heinou-bunrinor the kokudaka system evolved directly out of the
medieval political system, but rather were brought about by
Hideyoshi, who held sway over the central political structure he
created. Under Hideyoshi's political system, basically feudal relationships were often maintained and strengthened within the broader
political structure of the state. Several examples follow.
In 1587, in issuing an order to banish the Jesuits from Japan,
Hideyoshi added the following words: "Land given to each vassal
belongs to the provinces and the districts, and each vassal holds the
land for the present. Each is expected to obey the laws of the nation
(tenka). Each must be aware of this duty in performing all of his
tasks." What this stresses is that the fief of each vassal was not a
private holding, but instead belonged to the state; each vassal
merely held it for the time being. And unless vassals obeyed all the
laws of the nation, the state would immediately repossess the land.
That is, even the fiefs, the fundamental vehicle of the feudal relationship, were placed within the framework of the national political
structure. We should recall here that even the Muromachi Bakufu
appointed shugo as officers serving the shogunal power, and during
the early Muromachi period they could, in principle, be dismissed.20
(Ochanomizu Shobi, 1959). Even among the specialists of the medieval period, most
scholars until the mid-1970s held the view that this accumulation of land by "landowners led to the kokudaka system.
20. Sato Shin'ichi, "Muromachi bakufu-ron"' (A study of the Muromachi
Bakufu), Nihon rekishi (Iwanami Shoten, 1963).
356
Under Oda rule, when Nobunaga gave Echizen province to Shibata
Katsuie, the former used the word "azukeru," i.e., Shibata was "to
hold the province for" Nobunaga. The use of this word is readily
understood when we realize that, in this case too, Nobunaga was
entrusting to a vassal a part of his power to rule by granting him a
fief.
Cadastral surveys and censuses (ninbetsu aratame), carried out
to secure the political power of the unifiers, were also undertaken
within the political framework of the state that was in the process of
being established. The Taikd kenchi was conducted by province and
by district, and it established basic cadastral values for each province and district on the basis of the productivity of the land surveyed. Unlike the survey made by Nobunaga, which was intended
only to identify and establish ownership over land, the Taikd's
surveys were concerned with quality and type of land, size, the tax
base (reflecting the productivity of paddies), and ownership. In
carrying out the ninbetsu aratame, Kanpaku Hidetsugu ordered a
thorough census-taking in all 66 provinces. The information
gathered in the census included number of persons, specific composition of each family, and occupation.21 That is, both the cadastral
surveys and the censuses were much more thorough, befitting the
fact that they were made by the central political power of the state.
Because of this, each holder of a fief was subjected to a close
scrutiny of his administrative conduct. The basic nengu rate was set
for "all the land of tenka (state)" at two-thirds of the total output,
i.e., two-thirds to the fief-holder and one-third to remain in the hands
of the peasants. Rates were also set for various dues levied on many
agricultural products other than rice in order to yield specified
amounts of "dues to the state." This was the same for the mines, all
of which were considered to belong to the state. Dues were levied on
winter wheat at the rate of one-third of the total yield, as a result of
the effort by the Toyotomi regime to levy an additional tax on winter
crops that were already being taxed by the holders of the fiefs.22
The status of persons, including residence and occupation,
within this central political structure became fixed by the cadastral
21. Miki Seiichiro, "Hitobarai-rei o megutte" (On the decree to survey the
population), Nagoya Daigaku Nihonshi Ronshui, Vol. II (Yoshikawa Kobunkan,
1975), pp. 103-110.
22. Miki Seiichir6, "Tamugi nengu sanbun-no-ichi choshu to k6den taisaku"
(Levying one-third of the total yield on winter crops [on paddies] and policies toward
deteriorated paddies), Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyfi Ronshfi, Shigaku, no. 18
(March, 1971).
357
surveys and the census, and the status of the peasant (hyakush6)
was now formally recognized by the state. This was a change from
the medieval period when hyakush6 was an informal status differentiating cultivators who were not economically dependent, such as
genin, etc., from those who were.23
III.
Characteristics of the Sixteenth Century
In the preceding section, I emphasized the emergence of the
power of the state that was beginning to affect many aspects of
society. But what kind of society was there in the period called
kinsei? It was not one closely administered by the bureaucracy of a
state that possessed strong central power, as can be found in some
periods of Chinese history. Sixteenth-century Japan had a daimyodomain system based on the lord-vassal system, and this meant that
society was still basically feudal. Or, if we compare the Japan of this
period with Europe with its absolute monarchs, we do not find the
increasingly dominating power of the central authority as we do in
Europe. Rather, there was what can best be called a fusion of the
daimyo-domain system with the central power of state. In essence,
we found Sengoku daimyo-the regional powers-who rose as a
result of the development of the feudal system of daimyo domains,
followed by the emergence of a supreme power-a power of state
able to transform the existing central political framework-made
possible by these regional powers themselves.
A critical question therefore is: what was the relationship between the feudal system and the state? Simply put, my view is that
the power of state was characterized and defined by the transformation during this period of the feudal domainal system itself and the
supreme military power that evolved out of the system. Let me be
more specific with the aid of the following examples. In 1591
Hideyoshi transferred his position of kanpaku to his adopted son,
Hidetsugu, and Hideyoshi himself became Taiki. Because of this,
the power of kanpaku and that of Taiki came to coexist within the
Toyotomi government. However, Hideyoshi retained the power to
command military forces and to enfeoff vassals. Also, the cadastral
surveys were conducted by order of Hideyoshi who in addition retained the power of diplomacy (as was demonstrated by the invasion of Korea). In contrast, Hidetsugu's power as kanpaku was
23. My thanks to my colleague Kuroda Toshio for bringing this point to my
attention.
358
exerted over the nobles and religious bodies, in the carrying out of
the census, and on matters pertaining to the civil regulations concerning the Korean invasion.
The death of Hidetsugu brought the end to this dual structure of
power. But the fact was that this duality of power existed in the
Toyotomi government. One could argue that this was the result of
the coexistence of two principles, i.e., one dictated by the necessity
of governing a nation and the other born of the lord-vassal relationship. But one cannot fail to note that this division of power occurred
after the establishment of a unified political structure, which included both the civil and the military powers, and that Hidetsugu
remained a warrior. Thus, in the final analysis, I believe it is accurate to say that the power which Hideyoshi possessed as a warrior
enabled him to define and delimit the basic character of the powers
of state.24
Let us now look at this subject within the more familiar framework usually used in discussing the feudalism of this period. My
view has long been that the kinsei feudalism was a "transfigured"
(iso-na) feudalism. There was a lord-vassal system, which meant
that fiefs were granted by a lord to his vassals. (The rights to land
differed by status, i.e., lord and peasants, and lord and merchants
had different rights to the same land.) But given what we have
already described of the period, one may not wish to characterize
the period as having been typically or purely feudal. Nevertheless,
what we observe, I believe, was feudalism, even if its appearance
was somewhat out of the ordinary.
This kinsei feudalism emerged as a result of fundamental social
and political transformations that occurred during the sixteenth century. As analyzed above, kinsei feudalism differed in many ways
from that found in medieval and Sengoku Japan.25 Accompanying
24. See: Asao Naohiro, "Toyotomi seiken-ron' (A study of the political power of
Toyotomi), Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9, Iwanami Shoten, 1963; Miki Seiichiro, "Taik6
kenchi to Chosen shuppei" (The Taiko cadastral survey and the military expedition
to Korea), Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9. Iwanami Shoten, 1975; and Miki's article cited in
footnote 21.
25. I once was a supporter of the so-called "refeudalization' thesis with which I
am sure all American specialists of this period of Japanese history are familiar. But,
even then, it was obvious to me that kinsei feudalism was only a reinforced version of
medieval feudalism. It is, of course, incorrect to interpret kinsei feudalism as having
emerged de novo. My works, cited in footnote 2, are attempts to answer difficult
questions concerning the nature and emergence of the kinsei feudalism. Similar
efforts to evaluate the characteristics of the sixteenth century were made by John W.
Hall many years ago, and I believe his essay is still valuable as an important milestone
359
the political and social transformation of the century, the Japanese
achieved a visible increase in their productive capabilities.26 Also,
the kinsei feudal authorities succeeded in organizing these capabilities to maintain and strengthen the political and social systems they
created. Let me clarify the above by adding the following observations of the fundamental socio-political transformation and economic change.
Within kinsei feudalism, the nature of the lord-vassal relationship
changed from what it had been in the Sengoku period: it became less
" contractual" in nature. While it retained some contractual
aspects-military
obligations were determined basically by
kokudaka-it became a relationship between a supreme and overpowering central power and those who owed military service to that
power within a unified and more cohesive national political structure. And this new relationship was conducive to nurturing a new
morality among warriors to the point of giving rise to the "hagakure" bushido or the unquestioning, faithful, and devoted service
rendered by vassals to their lords.27 Naturally a ruling class,
strongly united and armed with guns, could effectively and easily
rule peasants who had been disarmed and were no longer capable of
mounting do-ikki.
As I have stressed elsewhere,28 the role that the kokudaka system played in this period must be clearly understood if we are to gain
a fuller appreciation of the nature of kinsei feudalism. The system
served both as a measure of the productive capabilities of society
and, as emphasized in recent studies, as a basis for determining the
by an American scholar who was grappling with the same issues with which I have
long been concerned. John W. Hall, "Feudalism in Japan-A Reassessment" in
J. W. Hall and M. B. Jansen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History of Early
Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
26. Kozo Yamamura discusses these issues in his "Returns to Unification: Economic Growth in Japan, 1550-1650" in Japan Before Tokugawiua.My disagreement
with him is on the economic burdens imposed on the peasants by the ruling class
during the period. Contrary to his view, I believe that the burden was heavy because
of dues collected in rice (two-thirds of the output), and in corvee for the purposes of
meeting the expenses and needs of waging civil wars, invading Korea, and for major
construction and riparian works. I, however, have no disagreement with Yamamura's
general assessment that economic growth occurred during the century.
27. The bushid5 began to take definite form from the late seventeenth to the early
eighteenth century. But the central concern in this period was how to best perform
the duties assigned in peacetime. Hagakure too was a codification of bushid6. It is an
error to think that the glorification of death was an integral part of bushid5.
28. See Wakita, "The Kokudaka System,' and Chapter One of Kinsei hikensei
seiritsu shiron.
360
status of the daimyo (kakaku) and the extent of their military obligations.29 The kokudaka system, however, accomplished much more.
It defined the relationship each holder of a fief was to have with his
fief, and it also defined the peasants' and merchants' rights to land.
Because the direct authority over a fief was subdivided among the
daimyo and his retainers, and no part of a fief could be sold or
otherwise transferred to others, land was not the private possession
of the warriors. Though the rights which peasants had in land came
to be severely circumscribed during the early Tokugawa period by
newly imposed prohibitions against the sale of land and by restrictions concerning the crops to be planted, none of these limitations
existed during the late sixteenth century. And these Tokugawa restrictions remained effective only during the first fifty years or so of
the period.30 It is, therefore, not inaccurate to say that the peasants,
generally speaking, did not have "de facto landownership."
One more point on the kokudaka system merits a brief note. The
system, which provided a quantitative indicator of productive capacity, functioned more effectively as a basis for tax collection in rice.3 1
In assessing the yield, kokudaka was used, and not kandaka which
expresses the tax base in monetary terms and was used in the
Sengoku period. This was because of the yet inadequate degree of
monetization of the economy and, more importantly, because the
ruling class wanted to collect taxes in rice in order to prevent further
involvement of the peasants in the market economy, which might
increase the peasants' economic position to the point of their being
able to challenge the economic dominance enjoyed by the warrior
class. Taxes were collected in rice not for the consumption of the
ruling class, but for the purpose of retarding the arrival of the
cash-tax system which would further involve peasants in a
monetized economy.
The peasants, who now worked the land either in small family
units or in larger units (employingfudai, genin, etc.), were forced to
concentrate their efforts into producing rice, the principal medium of
tax payment. They were also subjected to other dues levied by the
ruling class, which was able to determine through its censuses the
29. Nakamura Kichiji, Bakuhan-taisei-ron (A study of the Bakufu-han system),
(Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1973). Also see Matsushita Shir6, Kokudakasei shakai no
kenkyuf(A study of a society based on the kokudaka system) (Hanawa Shob6, 1982).
30. This was in fact recognized in 1695.
31. My view of the adoption of the kokudaka system is a new interpretation that
reflects my analysis of commerce and use of money in the period. See my Kinsei
hokensei seiritsu shiron.
361
number in and the composition of each household. However, in
contrast to the medieval period, peasants were no longer subjected
to serf-like control imposed by the local powers and the village
leaders (i.e., myoshu). They were now cultivators whose status was
fully recognized by the central political power and they benefited
from the protection of laws issued by that power.32
We must also note that, in kinsei feudalism, commerce developed rapidly in the urban centers. Contributing greatly to this development was the heino-bunri, which caused the warriors to live in the
cities. In addition, the rakuza decrees abolished the guilds, destroying the restrictive controls the nobles and the temples once exerted
over commerce. But some specific groups of merchants and
craftsmen, necessary to the warrior class, were newly organized and
brought to the urban centers. To facilitate the relocation of these
merchants and craftsmen, rents were waived and monopolies were
allowed in some cases.33 One result of these policies to aid the
growth of cities was to encourage an inflow of peasants who were
being taxed heavily in the villages. This was the reason for
Hideyoshi's decree prohibiting peasants from moving to cities and
becoming merchants.34
Kinsei feudalism was also noteworthy in several other significant
respects. In addition to establishing the kokudaka system that became the basis for a new system of taxation and for the assessment
of military obligations, the kinsei authority was able to create a
nationwide market for rice, and it had no hesitation about manipulating the price of rice.35 Indeed, all aspects of market activities were
vigorously controlled.36 The kinsei authority resorted to alloof these
measures in order to exert a tight control over the results of the
economic growth achieved during the fifteenth and sixteenth cen32. I also agree with J. W. Hall's view, as expressed in an exchange of opinions
with me, that the nature of the kinsei peasant can be contrasted with the copyholders
of England.
33. Oda Nobunaga imposed corvee on the craftsmen of Omi who specialized in
various aspects of construction. This corvee was called kuniyaku, or corvee for the
state, was continued under the Tokugawa Bakufu.
34. The division of merchants and peasants is known as an official policy that was
intended to establish a class system, but I think this division should also be understood 'is-a-vis the conditions that prevailed during this period.
35. See, for example, my Kinsei hoken shakai no keizai kvz5 (The economic
structure of the kinsei feudal society) (Ochanomizu Shobo, 1963).
36. Basically, by means of collecting dues in the form of rice and specialty
products from each region, the ruling class obtained major marketable products, thus
assuring their ability to control market activities.
362
turies, growth that was due principally to the continuing trend toward more productive small-scale agriculture and the growth of
commerce.
IV. The Roles of Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa in the
Emergence of Kinsei Feudalism
Let us now turn to a more explicit discussion of the various
stages in the emergence of kinsei feudalism. In doing so, we must
first ask a crucial and often debated question: should the Oda rule be
considered a kinsei type or not? My view for some years has been
that the Oda rule was that of a Sengoku daimyo who had succeeded
in gaining central political power, but not everyone agrees with my
interpretation 3 7
From the perspective of cultural history, Nobunaga certainly
belonged to the kinsei period. The innovativeness of his Azuchi
castle and his religious beliefs are sufficient to indicate this. Similar
observations cannot be made for Hideyoshi or Ieyasu. But here we
are not discussing the cultural aspects of the period.
Let us examine something more directly useful to our analysis:
Nobunaga's attack on Mt. Hiei. This attack established, in the minds
of many of his contemporaries, an image of Nobunaga as a destroyer
of traditional (i.e., religious) authority, and he was accused by
Takeda Shingen, a Sengoku daimyo from Kai, of committing "most
heinous and sacrilegious crimes." But Matsunaga Hisahide of Kinai
obviously did not share Shingen's feelings, as Matsunaga burned the
Daibutsuden of the Todaiji. We also know that for Araki Murashige,
the stone statues of Buddha were no more than construction materials for his Arioka castle. In short, there were in the Kinai other
Sengoku daimyo who were no less willing than Nobunaga to commit
"heinous crimes" against traditional authority.
When we review the policies of Nobunaga in a broader perspective, we find that he recognized and assured the landholdings of such
temples as the Kofukuji, Todaiji, and Koyasan Kongd-buji. Of
course, unlike Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei, these temples did not challenge Nobunaga's power. No one can deny that Nobunaga aggrandized the landholdings of the nobles and temples, as warriors had
done since the Kamakura period. However, this did not prevent him
from adopting a formal policy to respect and preserve the landholdings of the nobles and the temples who occupied important positions
37. See Okuno's article cited in footnote 11.
363
in the political structure of the period. The point here is simply that
Nobunaga's place in history must be evaluated on the basis of his
policies in general, and not by a small number of his actions, however well known they may be.
We can go even further and argue, as several scholars have
begun to do in support of my view, that the Sengoku daimyo succeeded in establishing a more "mature" feudal power structure
which became the foundation for the kinsei power structure.38 This
argument, of course, is an integral part of my analysis that the Oda
government was the central political power that came into being in
the Sengoku period.
Another important question in discussing the stages in the emergence of the kinsei period is: what precisely were the differences
between Oda and Toyotomi rule? The first difference is that
Nobunaga, as a central political power, attained supreme national
power by inheriting the position once occupied by the Ashikaga
Shogun. It was not the unified central power of a kanpaku resting on
both civil and military powers. Nobunaga continued to respect the
nobles and temples as independent entities and was willing to recognize their landholdings and make contributions of additional land for
their benefit. On the other hand, Hideyoshi was far from respectful
of their existence as independent entities, or of their landholdings.
He freely ignored their traditional rights to bar entry into their lands
(funyfi-ken) and constantly attempted to convert their holdings into
fiefs that he could distribute at his discretion.
As for the lord-vassal relationship, Nobunaga obviously regarded
the feudal tie to be a contract between the lord, who provided
protection and benefice, and the vassals who served in return. For
example, in a note of admonition which Nobunaga wrote to Sakuma
Nobumori, his vassal (fudai), he included no specific requirement
concerning Sakuma's military obligations except to say that Sakuma
was to discharge his military obligations to Nobunaga according to
what Sakuma deemed proper based on bushido. In a similar vein,
Nobunaga is known to have counseled Shibata Katsuie on the virtues of being a samurai and on the importance of Shibata' s service to
Nobunaga.39 But for Hideyoshi, the contractual aspect of the lord38. Since the publication of Nagahara, ed., Sengoku-ki no kenryoku to shakai,
scholarly interpretation of this has undergone a visible change. For a long time, the
dominant view was that feudalism under the Sengoku daimyo was somehow 'immature" in comparison to that under the kinsei powers.
39. The standard interpretation of this counsel given by Nobunaga to Shibata has
long been that Nobunaga was, in giving such a warning, expressing total dominance
364
vassal relationship was secondary; what was essential in the relationship was his dominance over his vassals. The obligations to
Hideyoshi of his vassals were specified quantitatively within the
framework of the kokudaka system.
Finally, other important policies adopted by Nobunaga also differed from those of Hideyoshi. Nobunaga allowed self-governed
cities, such as the jinai-machi (towns on temple grounds) to continue to exist, and he permitted and made use of the existing za,
except for the za in the castle town of Azuchi.40 In contrast,
Hideyoshi tolerated no self-governed cities, strictly disallowed all
za, and vigorously sought and gained rigid control over merchants
and artisans.
For all these reasons, substantive differences can be found between Oda and Toyotomi rule. But if we are to say that Nobunaga
began the kinsei period and Hideyoshi and Ieyasu followed closely
behind to complete what he had begun, we must add some carefully
stated qualifications. Nobunaga built a central government to the
extent possible within the limits placed on him by the realities of the
Sengoku period. Nobunaga could go so far, but no farther.
Hideyoshi, on the other hand, was able to cross the barriers that
Nobunaga had been unable to overcome. To by sure, Hideyoshi
benefited from the path-breaking efforts of Nobunaga, but it was
Hideyoshi who truly opened the new historical stage we call kinsei.
This is most clearly demonstrated in the nationwide, unified system
of military obligations that Hideyoshi succeeded in establishing.
The differences between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa governments need to be further researched. However, one thing is
certain: both were kinsei governments built upon the basic kinsei
type of political and social structure. The major difference, however, can be stated briefly. Beyond the fact that the Toyotomi rule
had a kanpaku at its apex and the Tokugawa Bakufu a Shogun, there
is no doubt that the Bakufu in many ways differed visibly from the
over Shibata. This, however, is clearly in error in that such an interpretation is not
based on a more general analysis of the lord-vassal relationship that prevailed under
the Oda rule. Nobunaga was, in this instance, merely issuing a warning to Shibata
who had in the past betrayed his lord. See: Wakita, Kinsei hokensei seitritsu shiron,
pp. 218-21.
40. Toyoda Takeshi's view that Nobunaga adopted a policy to prohibit guilds in
general needs to be revised. Under Nobunaga, the za remained active in Kyoto,
Yamato, and elsewhere, and we even know that Nobunaga himself issued decrees
(ando-jo) recognizing the special privileges that were being enjoyed by some za. See:
Toyoda Takeshi, Zotei chuisei Nihon shogyoshi no kenkyu (Iwanami Shoten, 1952).
365
previous political power structure. Under both the Toyotomi and the
Tokugawa governments, the daimyo were delegated power to govern by the central government.
The Toyotomi government, however, exerted more direct control over each daimyo than did the Tokugawa. It more closely
determined how each of the domains was to be governed, and it
issued more detailed directives concerning the use of the income
generated from each domain. The supervision of the government
also extended into such matters as daimyo expenditures in Kyoto,
the specific distribution of fiefs to the daimyo vassals within each
domain, and the designation of land that owed military obligations
and land that did not. Also, the direct landholdings of the Toyotomi
house were strategically interspersed among the daimyo domains,
thus preventing the daimyo from creating closed economic units
which could be better controlled for the benefit of each daimyo. In
an extreme example, Ishida Mitsunari, a bugy&, determined the
expenditures that Shimazu was to make during his residence in
Kyoto. In short, the Toyotomi government intervened more extensively and directly in the management of the domains than did the
Tokugawa Bakufu which, though it too exerted some control over
the daimyo, basically recognized the relative independence of
each.41
Concluding Note
This brief essay is an abbreviated description of the process of
the transformation of the nature and characteristics of central political power during the sixteenth century. The major question that I
have analyzed was how and why the central political structure of the
power of state was transformed from what had existed in the
Ashikaga period to what emerged as the Tokugawa Bakufu. In
attempting to answer this question and in analyzing the process of
the transformation, I have tried also to answer the important historical question: what were the characteristics of kinsei government and
how did this type of government evolve?
Neither the significance of this question nor the extensive debate
41. Though it is difficult to measure whether Toyotomi's or Tokugawa's political
power was better established, I believe that the latter's power was. This explains why
the Tokugawa Bakufu was able to recognize the independence of each daimyo
formally, and also why the daimyo had to ask for the Bakufu's views on important
political matters before making their decisions. The power of the Tokugawa over the
daimyo was far-reaching.
366
among the Japanese specialists may be apparent to Western readers.
I should, therefore, add a brief note of explanation. Instead of
getting involved in an extended methodological discussion, let me
simply say that an understanding of the political characteristics of
the kinsei period are essential if we are to be able to analyze how
modern (kindai) Japan emerged. I am aware that some American
scholars, in the 1960s in particular, have addressed the same question, using a framework of analysis that came to be known as the
modernization thesis. I disagree with this thesis for a variety of
reasons, especially on the grounds that those who rely on this thesis
are often forced to look for their "modernizing" characteristics in
already modernized societies, i.e., Western societies that modernized before Japan began to do so. I believe this approach unnecessarily limits an historian. My own view is that in analyzing the
process of historical change one must begin with the analysis of the
characteristics of the preceding period based upon as complete a
knowledge of it as possible. That is, the kindai period can be better
understood if the characteristics of the kinsei period are fully understood and appreciated.42
Let me indicate here only what I consider the most important
points. In the kinsei period, the landholding of the ruling class was
defined within the framework of the central political structure, thus
preventing alienation of land by those who administered and benefited from the land. In the medieval period, as in the Kamakura
period, ownership of land could be and was transferred to others. In
the kinsei period, however, land could not be freely alienated even
when warriors were financially hard pressed, and their future tax
rice had to be, in effect, mortgaged in order for them to remain
solvent. This was the reason why the new Meiji government had to,
and was able to, deprive the former ruling class of their land-their
fiefs.
When this occurred, the power of the Emperor resurfaced to
replace the political structure that had just been destroyed. Under
42. A recent article by Jansen, one of the leading proponents of the modernization
thesis, presented an illuminating discussion on the modernization thesis and a description of recent works made by others in order to reevaluate the thesis. I found the
observations and views advanced in this essay extremely interesting. While I remain
unconvinced of the basic validity of the thesis, I believe it will be useful for some
scholars to undertake a reexamination of the process of the emergence of modern
(kindai) Japan adapting the insightful suggestions made in this article. See: Marius B.
Jansen, " 'Kindaika'-ron to higashi Ajiya" (The 'modernization" thesis and East
Asia), Shiso, No. 646 (April, 1978).
367
the circumstances, for the Meiji government to have the power of
state, it had to make use of the titular authority (ken'i) which the
Emperor continued to retain. The Tokugawa Bakufu, though it
possessed the central power, had a different relationship with the
nobles and the temples than it did with the warrior class. While the
Bakufu had the power of a lord over his vassals, it had no such
power over the nobles and temples. Despite the fact that the nobles
remained the servants of the Emperor, the Shogun exerted his
power over the nobles as described earlier. In fact, throughout the
kinsei period, the Emperors survived as titular authority, and for this
reason, the three main lines of the Tokugawa house chose to accept
and use court ranks. Had this not been the situation, the Emperor
would not have had the power to assume the position he did in the
Meiji Restoration.
All these legacies of the kinsei period profoundly affected the
course of the development of capitalism in Japan. Because the kinsei
warriors did not own land, but rather held it in their capacity as the
ruling class, they could not sell or otherwise lose land. This meant
that they could be compensated for the land that they still held. The
compensation, as is well known, was in the form of income-yielding
government bonds. This fact is not unrelated to the emergence of
many of these members of the former ruling class as providers of
capital to nascent industrial ventures and banks.
On the other hand, the peasants held what was virtual private
ownership over their land. Their ownership was readily transformed
into private, exclusive, and legal ownership in the modern sense of
the term. This private ownership of land by the Meiji cultivators
became an important cornerstone of the development of Japanese
capitalism because increased land productivity provided the new
government and the emerging industries with the fiscal resources
and the labor that they needed. Unlike in industrial England where
the peasants were dispossessed of their land and forced to become
industrial workers, the peasants in Meiji Japan were divided into
landowners and tenant cultivators, with the latter providing a large
number of dekasegi (industrial workers). And the living standard in
villages differed significantly from that in cities. In these and in many
other respects, the legacies of the kinsei period continued to linger,
forming and molding the political, social, and economic histories of
the decades that we call kindai Japan.
OSAKA UNIVERSITY
Translated from the Japanese by Kozo Yamamura

The Emergence of the State in Sixteenth

Transcription

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