Praise without Enchantment: Griots, Broadcast Media, and the

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Africa Today 44, 4 (1997), 443-464
Praise Without Enchantment:
Griots,Broadcast Media, and
the Politicsof Traditionin Mali
Dorothea Schulz
Notions of political legitimacy have changed considerablysince the
imposition of French colonial rule in Mali. This article explores how
political elites have sought legitimacyby relying on the performance
skills of griots, praise singers and speakers.1 In the past, griots played an
importantrole-as publicspeakers,familyhistorians,and musicians-in
lending legitimacyto the rule of various kings and chiefs. Since Mali's
independencein 1962,the songs of some griotshave been broadcaston
national radio and, more recently,on local radio stations.Some griots,
most of them women, have become highly successful pop stars of
nationaland even internationalrenown.To what extent have some griot
musiciansbeen successfulin presentingthe postindependencepolitical
order as legitimateand in justifyingnew elites' claims to leadershipby
referenceto "tradition"?
And how have parallelchangesin sociopolitical
structuresand institutions,as well as the introductionof broadcasttechnology,shapednew principlesand modalitiesof legitimation?
The politicalimplicationsof broadcasttechnologycan be examined
by startingwith how people in the Malian countrysideevaluate griot
praise songs broadcaston national radio.Two questions emerge here.
First, does broadcastingimprove the capacities of postindependent
regimes to present their rule as legitimate before a nationwide audience? Second, does music broadcaston the national radio station also
reflect the listeners'changingvisions of "goodrule"and thus possess a
potentialto challengethe officialversion?Considerationof these questions will shed light on the extent to whichrepresentativesof the Malian
state are capableof controllingsymbolsof politicallegitimacydisplayed
in the public domain of broadcastcommunication.It will also provide
insightinto the particularways in whichlistenersin ruralsouthernMali
(in the circle of Kita) readjusttheir views of political legitimacyon the
basis of their diverse experiences with various postcolonial regimes.
This analysis suggests that broadcast technology not only influences
farmers'opinionsbut also gives them the meansof creatinga new idiom
443
444
Praise WithoutEnchantment
of power, "languagesthat propose another ethic of power and another
politicalculture."2
How do people in southernMali evaluate the recent establishment
of "democracy"?Do they considerthe electoral processand multiparty
competition a legitimacy-procuringprocedure? Exploration of these
questionsrequiresa historicallyinformedperspectivebecause,as several
accountsof recent elections in Africanstates reflect,the study of voting
behavior alone tells us little about whether people considera political
order,and multipartydemocracyin particular,to be legitimate.3I propose to analyze the notions of political legitimacyheld by farmersin
southern Mali, includingtheir visions,images,and metaphorsof legitimate rule,4by consideringtheir experienceswith both the colonial state
and with the postcolonialorder.5
My focus on broadcastsandtheir consumptionechoes recentcallsto
explore the politicalimplicationsof seeminglynonpoliticalartisticproductionand of everydayactivities.6The stage for these social manifestations may be on the margins of the nation-state or in more public
spheres.7The emphasison the politicaldimensionsof broadcastcommunicationand receptioncompensatesfor the absence of in-depthstudies
of the public arena that has been establishedsince late colonial rule by
the developmentof broadcastmedia.8Thislack of attentionto the political implicationsof broadcastcommunicationis all the more surprising
since radio broadcastinghas profoundly altered the previous forms,
domains,and contents of public communicationand has thus created
new spaces for the "cultureof politics"9and the politicsof culture.
Studies of mass communicationin Westernsocieties that focus on
the particularsymbolic forms throughwhich an order is presented as
"just"or "natural"providean inspirationfor similarstudies in Africa.10
Previous studies tended to interpret the reactions of broadcast consumersas eitheracceptanceof an orderas legitimateor as signsof acquiescence,11accommodation,or resistance.12
To move beyond these binary
oppositionswe need to analyzethe specificgroundson which dominant
groups assert their claims to power, as well as the particularways in
which the recipientsmightchallengethese claimsusing the termsof the
very same media.13In the case of contemporaryMalian politics, this
impliesa focus on the particularsymbolicformsthatgriots use to present
a politicalorderas legitimateand that people in the countrysidealso use
to expresstheir doubtsand disenchantmentwith the politicalstatusquo.
This articleis organizedas follows.The firstsection examinesgriots'
participationin public debate on behalf of their patronsin the circle of
Kita in southwesternMali at the time of the Frenchcolonialoccupation.
The next section illustrateshow sociopoliticalchangestriggeredby colonial rule led to the gradualerosion of the institutionalcontext that had
previouslybeen at the basis of griots'legitimizingspeech.These changes
Dorothea Schulz
445
also gave rise to new credentialsfor political office. The third section
considerswhether duringMali's first thirty years of independencethe
availabilityof broadcast technology enhanced the capacities of new
elites to present the new politicalorder in a favorablelight.The fourth
section proposesa synthesisof historicalchangesin notions of legitimate
rule, showing how farmersin southern Mali have strong reservations
about multipartydemocracyand about the principleson which the current governmentbases itsjustificatorydiscourse.
The Context and Effects of Griots' Public
Interventions in Nineteenth-Century Society
Beginning in the 1860s,French colonial troops graduallybrought the
FrenchSudan under militarycontrol.At that time, the area of today's
southernMaliwas dividedinto multiplechiefdomsandvillageconfederations that varied in size and degree of politicalcentralization.14
Many
chiefdomswere under the influence of a more powerfulchiefdomthat
manifestedits presenceonly on rareoccasions,such as the annualcollection of tributeor the settlementof conflictsamong politicalfactions.In
some areas,this external power owed its local political strengthto its
alliancewith a segmentof a local warrioraristocracy.'5
Whereasa chiefdom establishedand maintainedits influenceover a region by military
force,in less centralizedchiefdomsit was the capacityof a clan to mobilize the laborfor productionand for militaryexpeditionsthatwas crucial
to the clan'sdominantposition.
It was not superiorstrength alone, but also political maneuvering
and relianceon subtlerarts of persuasionthat ensuredthe continuityof
a rulingclan'shegemonicposition.In chiefdomswithouta strongcentral
militarypower,claimsof politicalpreeminencerelied more on heredity
and noble origin.In many chiefdoms,these claims were articulatedby
people of griot origin (jeli) 16 Dependingon their skills,jeli would work
as publicpraisespeakers,singers,familyhistorians,counselors,and confidantsand wouldthus performcrucialtasksof social mediationand reputation managementon behalf of their noble patrons.In addition,they
playeda centralrole in chiefdomsand villageconfederationsin persuading less powerfulnoble families that their patrons'dominantpositions
were a naturaloutcome of a locality'spolitical past and tradition.17At
public events,griot men evoked in elaboratespeeches the noble origins
and legendarypasts of their patron families. Griotwomen lauded the
accomplishmentsof eminent family membersin praise songs. If necessary,griots would rearrangethe historyof a chiefdom,omittingthe less
praiseworthydetails of a patronfamily'shistory.In their legitimationof
the rule of the chiefly clan,griots pursueda strategydescribedin a dif-
446
Praise WithoutEnchantment
where the currentsituationis preferent context as "narrativization,"18
sented as the outcome of a never specified past and thus of a timeless
order. Patrons generously compensatedgriots for their services in the
form of "gifts,"includingfood and housing.
The patronagerelationshipbetween griots and their noble patrons
did not meanthat their relationswere alwaysfree of tensions.Withgriots
as allies and confidantsof the patron family,noble patronssometimes
found a griot'spraiseto be a mixedblessing.Sincegriotspeech is usually
full of metaphorsand multilayeredmeanings,it can easily serve to convey subtle negative allusionsand threats.As a Malianproverbsays, "A
griot may enhance your name, but he may also destroy it."19 Nobles
knew that griotscould damagetheir reputationby alludingin their performanceto events in a patron family'shistory that would undermine
their claimto social eminence.
According to griots' and other traditionalists'contemporaryportrayals of precolonial notions of rulership,people in the past did not
drawa distinctionbetweenthe particularregimeof an individualand the
generalpoliticalorder.The notion of fangaconnotatedthe institutionof
rule or the essence of rule, an absolute and unchallengeablephysical
force, and the qualitiesof a ruler such as ruthlessnessor an uncompromising will to rule.20Both the power of an external kingdom and the
dominanceof a chief or ruling clan were called fanga. No term in the
Bamanalanguagedescribesa politicalorderas "legitimate."
Any formof
rulershipproved its raison d'etre and derived its justificationfrom its
capacity to suppressany form of politickingor maneuveringbetween
competingpolitical factions,fadenkele,a type of conflict that was perceived as most threateningto the social order of a village,chiefdom,or
family.21Other familiesliving in the area underthe controlof the dominant clan, includingless powerfulnoble families and families of clients
and slaves, evaluated any rulershipon the basis of its "performative
effects,"that is, the ruler'scapacityto maintainsocial harmonyand to
ensure the well-being of the community.The latter manifested itself
throughplentifulrainfalland harvests,a high birthrate,and the absence
of cattle epidemicsand other naturaldisasters.22
Even thoughoral traditionportraysprecolonialrulership(fanga)as
absolute power that wasjustified in and of itself,a rulercertainlycould
not sustainhis rule by mere force alone. Griots,as clients and allies of a
powerfulclan,were generallyexpectedto speakon theirpatrons'behalf;
yet there are oral accountsof griots takingon the role of "mouthpiece"
on behalfof the people and remindingthe chief,in an indirectyet clearly
understandablefashion, that he could rule thanks to his hereditary
rights,but on the conditionthat people acceptedhim.Thus the position
of griots was deeply ambiguous;they were both spokespersonsfor the
powerfuland mediatorsbetween the powerfuland the populace.Griots
Dorothea Schulz
447
would laud a patron and enhance his public renown,yet they could at
times reminda chiefly patronof the limits of his power.All of this suggests that, in precolonialtimes,rulersclaimedlegitimacyon the basis of
"tradition"and the heredityof rule and enforcedtheir rhetoricalclaims
by physicalcoercion.
It is likely that less powerfulfamilies of a chiefdomconsideredthe
politicalorder not as legitimate,but ratheras inevitable.Theirattitudes
toward the ruling clan or toward an external chiefdom ranged from
acquiescenceto consent,to subtle challengeof the political order.It is
also likely that membersof less powerfulfamilieswho attendeda griot's
praise performancedid not think or even expect that the griot would
speakthe truthin recountinga patron'sglamorousfamilyhistory.Yet the
long-termaffiliationbetween a griotpraisesingerand her patronfamily
invested both the griot and her patronwith a certaincredibilityin the
eyes of the audience.The performercould always rightfullyclaim that
she spoke the truth because her family had lived together with the
patron'sfamilyfor generations.
Althoughnoble originand a chieflytraditionwere not the sole basis
on whichrulersclaimedpoliticallegitimacy,the lack of a chieflytradition
could give the population an importantjustificationfor opposing the
ruler.Familiesof the subjectpopulationwould challengethe hegemony
of chieflyrule in times of warfareand generalinsecuritywhen the political order did not offer them the basic conditionsof physicaland social
welfare.In these situationsof populardissatisfaction,people could claim
that the rulerwas of illegitimatedescent.Whetheror not these contestations led to a chiefs overthrowdepended on the particularpower constellationof the moment-such as whetherthe rulerwas able to suppress
challengesby usingmilitaryforce.
The Shifting Grounds of Political
Legitimacy Under Colonial Rule
Under colonial rule, not only did new families and individualsrise to
power in the circleof Kita by occupyingthe lower echelons reservedfor
native auxiliariesin the colonial administration,but the credentialsof
power themselves became transformed.Members of griot families
adaptedto the new situation,that is, to the needs of the new elites in the
publicarena in a situationin whichpoliticallegitimacybecame an issue.
As colonial rule altered previous sociopoliticalhierarchies,new requisites for political office (such as education in Frenchcolonial schools)
began to displaceolder groundsfor politicallegitimacy.
The extent to whichFrenchcolonialadministrationalteredprevious
sociopoliticalhierarchiesvariedacrosslocalitiesin southernMali.Areas
448
Praise WithoutEnchantment
that had been underthe influenceof a particularrulingclanwere turned
into units of colonial administration,the cantons coloniaux that were
now defined territorially.Depending on whetherthe Frenchtroops had
encounteredresistanceto their occupation,they either replacedthe previous ruling family with a representativeof another family branch or
they appointeda representativeof anothernoble clan,or even of a family of inferiorsocial status.Althoughin some chiefdomsthe chieftainship
remainedin the handsof the formerrulingclans,the impositionof colonial administrationfueled alreadyexistingconflictsover politicalleadership (fadenya)becauseit privilegedone familybranchover another.
Under colonialadministration,two new types of politicalelites gradually emerged.Literacyand high geographicand occupationalmobility
allowed individualsfrom all social backgroundsto occupy positions in
the colonialadministrationand to benefitfromgrowingtradeopportunities. New moral and legal codes, promoted for the abolition of slavery
and the proclamationof the equalityof all membersof society,made it
possible for people of lower social origin to rise in status. Personal
achievement became a decisive credential for positions of influence.
Duringthe firstperiodof forcedformaleducation,nobles often sent children from client or slave families instead of their own childrento the
"schoolsof the whites."Forthis reason,the firstindigenousclerksof the
colonialadministrationoften came fromfamiliesof inferiorsocial status.
Previouslyinfluentialfamilies graduallycame to acknowledgethat
"power[fangalhad moved to the houses of the whites."They sought to
challengethe rule of the new canton chiefs,yet on many occasionstook
measureof theirown powerlessness,as literacygave indigenousadministrativeclerkspowerover formerrulingclans.As their descendantsput it
today,these clerkshad the powerto "exhaustthem endlessly."
Relationshipsamongnoble families,theirclients,and slaveschanged
drasticallyand led over time to the dissolutionof many patronagerelations.The suppressionof warfareand the abolition of slaverydeprived
noble and free families of importantsources of wealth.23Some were
impoverishedand could no longer support their client families. Griot
familiesoften lost their privilegedpositionsas allies of the powerfuland
were increasinglyforced to securetheir own livelihoods.As a result,griots became a more differentiatedcategory of clients whose economic
and political standingdepended on the fortune of their patrons.Especially near urbancenters,some griotssought to become clients of newly
powerful individualsand to make themselves importantin a situation
where the politicalstandingand influenceof the previousrulingfamilies
and of the new politicalelites were at risk.Literacybecamean important
credentialfor political office, yet it did not immediatelyinvalidatethe
previous groundsof political legitimacy.Fanga,the capacityto rule by
sheer violence and militarystrength,lost its relevancein the new power
Dorothea Schulz
449
constellation but kept its symbolic value. Other credentials,however,
such as descentfroma chieflyfamily,continuedto be relevantfor a claim
to political leadership,and the absence of such chiefly descent constituted a hindrancebecause it facilitatedcontestation.People drew selectively on differentlegitimatorygrounds,dependingon the specificclaims
they wanted to make.In situationswhere people felt criticalof the new
leadership,noble families,particularlythose who had lost their power
with the colonial administration,attemptedto present chiefly origin as
the exclusivebasisof politicallegitimacy.
People who filled positionsreservedfor indigenousofficeholdersin
the colonial administrationfound it expedient to rely on griots' praise
and publicizingactivities,even though their politicalpositionswere not
always contested. Precisely because noble origin was less certain than
ever before for these people, it became even more desirableto have a
griot publicly lauding one's prestigiousfamily history.Irrespectiveof
whether they belonged to the previousrulingclan or to a less powerful
family,the new chiefs probablyfelt even more challengedby competitors, and therefore public griot praise became importantfor them in a
new way. Some griots eagerly capitalized on their rhetoricalskills to
respond to this need, constructingnoble genealogies for their new
patronsin public speech and praise performances.However,the social
context of the patronagerelation that had formerlyassuredthe trutheffects of griot speech-that is, the long-term affiliation between the
griotand his patron-was no longera given.The lack of long-termaffiliation underminedthe credibilityof griots as truthfuland faithfulclients
of their patronsand weakenedtheir claimsthat their patronswere legitimate. Membersof other noble families who attended a griot'sperformance could question this praiseon the specificgroundsthat the griot's
familyhad not knownthe "patron's"familyfor a sufficientlylong time to
acquirethe competenceto recounthis real familyhistory.
The rivalrybetweenthe new elites producedby colonialschools and
the "traditional"
groupsof power elites was aggravatedduringlate colonial rule.This rivalrywas reflected mainly in the competitionbetween
the two parties leading Mali into independence:the Parti Progressiste
Soudanais(PSP)and the Union Soudanaise-RassemblementDemocratique Africain (US-RDA). In rural areas,party competitionwas often
perceived as intensifyingprevious conflicts over positions of political
leadership.Todaymanyfarmersrecallthe competitionbetween the parties in their common strugglefor independenceas a threat to a previously stableorder.As a griotput it to me in 1996,"Withthe politikitimes,
competitionbetween people [fadenya]became even worse than under
colonial rule."Formerlypowerfulclans,traders,and other eminent personalitiesusuallysupportedthe PSP.Familiesof lower politicalinfluence
or social statusoften sought to contest the rule of this "traditional"
aris-
450
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
tocracyby taking sides with the US-RDA. In the 1940s,duringthe first
years of its existence,the PSP was by far the more successfulparty.However,with the dissolutionof the colonial cantonin 1956,the powerof the
centraladministrationwas reinforcedand the PSP lost its strongholdin
the countryside.In the 1959 legislative elections, the US-RDA won
almost 75 percentof the vote.24In 1962,after the short interludeof the
MalianFederationthat broughttogetherthe formercolonies of Senegal
and Sudan,Maliwas proclaimedan independentrepublicunderModibo
Keita,the leaderof the US-RDA.
In short, colonial rule triggeredprofound changes in what constituted the legitimate basis of political office and the relevance of political legitimacy itself. In precolonial times, chiefs and ruling clans had
establishedand maintainedtheir supremacyprimarilyby militaryforce,
yet they had also justified their power by reference to long-standing
family traditions of leadership.With the emergence of new political
elites and the rule of an imperialpower to which the new elites were
accountable,new credentialsfor political office rendered some of the
previoussources of leadershipless relevant.Subsequently,it was easier
to cast doubts on any claim to leadership made by representativesof
either the formeror the new political elites.At the same time, a prestigious family backgroundcontinued to have high symbolic value, thus
maintaining"tradition"as an importantsource of political legitimacy.
Some griots knew how to take advantageof this shift in the groundsof
political legitimacy.They convinced their new patrons that griots'
clients, spokespersons,and reputation managers were crucial to the
patron'spolitical and social standing.Although some griots were thus
able to capitalizeon their rhetoricalskills to fill in the gaps of the new
discourseof legitimacy,their success in effectively lendinglegitimacyto
the new elites was limited.
Politiki Times and Pblitiki Lies:
The Regimes of Modibo Keita and Moussa Traore
With independence,the bureaucratswho had occupiedthe lower echelons of the colonial administrationno longer had to be accountableto
their Frenchsuperiors.The party militants,who had led the countryto
independence,had obtainedtheir positionswith the consentof the colonial powers,who had consideredthe politicalleadersas representativeof
the general will of the nation-in-the-making.However, as the irony
expressedin the nicknamebikitigisuggests,many people in ruralsouthern Mali were less ready to acknowledgethe leadershipof bureaucrats
and partypoliticians.Bikitigi("ballpointpen carrier")refersto "bic,"the
popularterm for ballpointpens,and mocks literacyas the credentialfor
Dorothea Schulz
451
power of the new political leaders. Bikitigi conjures up the image of
schoolchildrenand thus, in a teasing way, serves as a reminderof the
years of humiliationthat membersof this group had to endure during
their lengthyeducation.The term sets the "ballpointpen carriers"apart
Muslimclericalscribesand stressestheir originas
from the "traditional"
one of obligatoryformal schooling.Many people were aware that the
new leaderswere often of inferiorsocial origin,and so the term bikitigi
also emphasizesthe lack of authorityarisingfromtraditionalsources.
Leading members of the US-RDA party sought to justify their
claimsto rule by referenceto the party'ssuccessin the anticolonialstruggle and to their socialist orientation,which they presented as the best
way to restore to "Malian"culture the authenticitythat had been distorted by colonialism.25Nevertheless,the new leaders dressed up their
claims to political office with symbols of traditionalrule.They did this
primarilyby directinggriot musiciansand historiansto evoke a continuity between the modernnation-stateand the old politicaltraditionsand
historyof the territory,as signaledin the adoptionof the name Mali for
the new republic.The radiostation,establishedin Maliin 1957,provided
the new elites with novel means to disseminatesuch evocations of a
"national"tradition to their audience on an unprecedented,almost
nationalscale.
The cultural policies of single-party rule under Modibo Keita
stronglysupportedthose griotswho performedon nationalradio and in
nationalmusicgroups.Thesegriotswere mostlymusiciansand historians
whose familieslived in urbanareasand who had few income opportunities.They were anxiousto respondto the expectationsof the new polititasksof reputation
cal leadersand to performfor them the "traditional"
management.Artists were encouragedto create an image of Mali as a
nationalcommunitywith a long-standingpoliticaltraditionand a common languageand culture.In praisesongs on behalf of the rulingparty,
individualpoliticians,and the presidentin particular,some griots presented the first two regimes as an outcome of a long-standingpolitical
tradition.In anotherfrequentmusicalgenre-the recitationof the lives
and deeds of legendarypoliticalleaders or of famouswarriorheroes of
the past-specific slogansor policies of the rulingpartysometimeswere
"explained"and promoted.These culturalpolicieswere continuedunder
the second presidentof the country,MoussaTraor6,who assumedpower
in 1968.
In many praise songs, it was not even necessary to mention the
names of politicians.Griotssimply lauded the accomplishmentsof legendaryfigurescarryingthe familynames of the presidents,that is, Keita
or Traore.Or they merely played the rhythmand melody typicalof the
two families.Most listenersfromthe circleof Kitawere familiarwith this
musicbecause it was partof the Mandemusicaltraditionsof southwest-
452
Praise WithoutEnchantment
ern Mali. They could immediatelymake the connection between the
heroes mentionedin the performanceand the familiesof the presidents.
During its first twenty years,the nationalradio was not received in
several northernregions.26The politics of culture and communication
under Keita and Traoreprivilegedsouthernlanguagesand culturaltraditions.The culturalbroadcastsof the nationalradio displayedpredominantly the musical and other cultural traditions of southern people.
Over the years,Bamanabecame,with French,the principallanguageof
communication.Although this languageis often presentedas the lingua
franca of Mali, it is mostly spoken and understood by people in the
southerntriangleof Mali. In contrast,many people in the northerntriangle, especially women and those men who have never traveled or
worked abroad,do not speak it and therefore rarelyfollow broadcasts
in Bamana.Most griots performingon broadcastmedia were of southern urigin and sang in Bamana or Maninka.They tended to draw on
southern musical folklore and to primarilyrecount the history of the
southern kingdoms.27In this fashion, the performinggriot musicians
played a crucialrole in presentingtheir culturesand politicaltraditions
as key elements of an authenticnationalcultureand of a "Malian"political tradition.
The question arises as to whether farmersfrom the circle of Kita
took the claims of griots at face value and consideredthe new leaders'
claimsto poweras legitimateassertions.It seems thatgriotmusicianshad
little successin imbuingthe partypoliticiansand the presidentwith traditional legitimacy.Still, radio listeners certainly appreciatedperformancesof griotswho were knowledgeablehistoriansand talentedmusicians and applaudedtheir performancesregardlessof the claims and
insinuationsthat were part of the performance.Thus, prolific griots,
thanks to their compellingartisticperformances,did enhance the prestige of their patrons and sustainedtheir claims to eminent social and
politicalpositions.Also, in their recitationsof epics and other historical
genres,griotshelped presentthe nation-stateas the perpetuationof previous politicalinstitutions,or as a timelessand "natural"order.28
Over the years,however,many people in the countrysidewho followed the culturalprogramsof the national radio started to find the
praise songs on behalf of politicians"tiresome."The contexts in which
griots' speech performanceshad been effective changed in two significant respects.First,listenerswere awarethat a prestigiousnoble family
name did not indicate that its carrierwas actuallyof noble origin.Second, listenersknew that the performinggriotwas remuneratedin money
and that she performed,as they called it, "forgedsongs."29Therefore,
even a skillful praise performancedid not automaticallyconvince the
audience that the president'sclaim to a prestigiousfamily origin, and
thus to a rightfulleadershipposition,was valid.
Dorothea Schulz
453
The monetizationof praisedeprivedthe songs of some of theirsymbolic value,becausemoney came to epitomizethe alterationof previous
attitudesof client obligationtowardthe patron.Whereasin "traditional"
patron-griotrelations,the public praise of the patronwas considereda
routine service and was only occasionallycompensatedin the form of
"gifts,"the praise on behalf of new politicalleaders was often a singleevent serviceto be remuneratedin money immediately.Farmersof both
noble and griot origintended to dismissthe songs of the griotsperforming on the nationalradio as "praisefor pay,"that is, praiseperformedas
the result of a markettransaction.Thus,the commodificationof public
praise led farmersin southernMali to challengegriots' assertionsthat
they were long-standingand faithfulclientsof laudedpatrons.Thatthese
griots did not have enduringaffiliationswith patron families seriously
flawed the contents of the songs and the credibilityof the performing
griotsin the eyes of the audience.Disapprovalof griotartistsas "clients"
of the partybecame even more markedafter the militaryoverthrowof
Modibo Keita by Moussa Traore,when griots tried to adapt to the
change by shifting their loyalty and seeking to affiliate with the new
politicalleaders.
The rise and fall, in popularappreciation,of MogontafeSacko,one
of the first female griot stars of national renown,is instructivein this
regard.Mogontafe'scareeras a leadingsingerin the EnsembleNational
startedunderModiboKeita.Some of her songs paidhomageto the president, the ruling party,and its policies.At this time, her performances
were highlypopularbecause listenersgreatlyappreciatedher voice and
her broad repertoire. People began to disapprove, however, when
Mogontafe took sides with the new militaryregime underTraoreand
made several public appearanceson nationalradio and later on television on behalf of the Union Democratiquedu Peuple Malien (UDPM),
the ruling party created underTraorein 1979.As an old noble farmer
from southwesternMali reasoned in 1994, "people did not trust her
becauseshe was too quickto affiliatewith the new politikipeople.If she
had waited for them to approachher,we would havejudged her differently.She should not have walked up to them [thatis, to become their
client]. [She showed that] she has no shame, no sense of honor of her
profession"(authorinterview).
Another reason to react with reservationand doubt to the claims
articulatedin griotperformanceswas that farmersfelt that the new political leadersdid not fulfilltheir promisesof improvingrurallivingconditions.At first,the party'srhetoricabout a "nationalproject"30and the
"commonculturalbackground"3'of politicalleaders and of farmersin
southern Mali disposed the latter favorablytoward the new regime.32
Apparently farmersbegan to resent the regime only when they perceived the growing split between the new elites and themselves,and
454
Praise WithoutEnchantment
when they observed that the new leaders, as a schoolteacher put it in
1995, "started distancing themselves from the reality of the terrain."
As elderly farmers remember it today, what they resented most
about the rule of the US-RDA was that the state interfered to an
unprecedented degree with farmers' livelihoods and village politics.33
Descendants of the former aristocracy today still contrast "Modibo's
politiki times" with the golden times of the colonial state, which stayed
out of village politics. In particular, members of formerly powerful families resented the increased presence of the ruling party and its politiki in
the village in the form of youth organizations and party committees.34
These farmers felt threatened by the establishment of party structures
because they offered ample opportunities to the youth and to formerly
powerless families to "work the situation" in their own interests, backed
up by party members in the capital. But other families, even though they
sometimes benefited from the interference of the ruling party in village
life, also felt threatened. They felt that they could not control the working of politiki, nor could they anticipate its effects. Politiki came to stand
for the new system of political action where the previous hierarchies and
principles of obligation between powerful patrons and their clients were
no longer effective and new ones did not emerge, which left room for
great fluidity and inconstancy.
After 1965, it became more and more evident that the regime was
not able to secure the basic conditions of rural livelihood and that policy
implementation was inhibited by factional fights within the ruling party
and between members of the administration and politicians. In 1967,
Mali went through a government-led "cultural revolution."35For farmers, this meant an increase in the ruling party's force, and the outcome of
the revolution only reinforced farmers' perceptions of political instability in the absence of a strong central government. An elderly farmer in
southwestern Mali recollected in 1994:
Towardthe end of his rule,he [Modibo]changeda great deal.All the
time the assemblyis dissolved,everythingis put into question,therewas
an overall exasperation.But people did not understandanythinganymore!Politikihad becomeso muchrootedin the workingsof the secret
police-the childrenwho havearms,the milisi6-this
reallyputthe people off.Theywantedthe guard,the gendarmes,the militaryto ensurethe
securityof people.Why all this petty stuff of insults,all the time one
stops you, one stops you, the barriers,the barriers,well, finallypeople
said "thisis shit!"Well the militarypeople came to power [in 19681,it
was said "platcommuninterdit,37
everybodyeats whateverhe wants,you
can send your rice even to Americaif you want...." So, people became
confident... becausethey had alwaysfoughtagainsteach other,already
a long time beforethe arrivalof the whites.(authorinterview)
The US-RDA lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the rural population
when it could no longer prove its "organizational and ordering pow-
Dorothea Schulz
455
ers,"38and many farmers in the circle of Kita welcomed Traores military
takeover in 1968. They had great expectations for the rule of the Comite
Militaire de la Liberation Nationale (CMLN), as this military committee
seemed to promise a return to the "law and order" of precolonial
absolute rule. Noble families who had resented their lack of influence
under politiki welcomed the withdrawal of the youth-based party structures from village life and hoped for a return to previous social and political hierarchies.
Politiki returned in 1979 when the new ruling party, UDPM, formed
a new government under the presidency of Traore.Although the composition of the ruling clique and its networks did not change, the mere existence of party politics brought back many memories of the earlier period
of politiki as exacerbating internal village conflicts. A farmer recalled the
return of politiki in 1994 in the following terms:
When we were told "well,now you will be able to choose your own
chiefs,"they [farmers]said "Hey,it startsall over again.Now they tell us
exactlythe same thing that they have told us before.They are all liars.
Since the politicalleadersof the firsttimes of our independence,those
politicianshave said "yes,"tomorrowthey will say "no,"the day after
tomorrowthey will say "yes"again,afterthat"-they did not trustthem
anymoreas liars.To tell someone that he is a liar,and everybodywill
understandthem, they say "eee,that's a politiki person."That means:
when you say something,it is never certain.Farmerssay "politikiis the
affairof those who have been to school"becausethey themselveshave
not gotten anythingout of it. The first time [underthe US-RDA] they
haven't had anything,the second time they haven't had anything.
(authorinterview)
Once again, this statement mirrors farmers' disillusionment with the
postcolonial political order personified in party politicians who, as
patrons, had widely failed to ensure the welfare of the community.
CMLN military rule had enabled the emergence of a clientelistic network ensuring some farmer families their share of state resources
through family and patronage relations to the state bureaucracy.Starting
in the late 1970s, state resources dried up due to mismanagement and
economic adjustment measures imposed by international aid organizations. Farmers saw themselves as losers in the competition for the
remaining resources. Because farmers in the circle of Kita tended to
assess a regime by its capacity to provide its clients with their share of
redistributed state resources, farmers began to challenge the rightfulness
of leaders' claims to "represent" their clients' interests.39
Given the growing disillusionment of farmers with politiki, and their
resentful stance toward subsequent regimes, it is not surprising that for
them, griot praise songs turned more and more into a matter of annoyance. Because the family backgrounds of new elites were questionable,
griots were not successful in investing the political institutions of the
456
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
nation-state and its representativeswith "traditional"legitimacy.Notsurprisingly,the most criticalreactionscame from membersof formerly
powerful families who found it deplorable that their noble origin no
longer had any weight as a political credential in the politics of the
nation-state.Theywould thus take issue with the "forgedgenealogies"in
the praisesongs and denouncethe "lies"of the new elites who pretended
to inherita prestigiousfamilybackground.
In times of populardisapprovalwith the regimes of Modibo Keita
and MoussaTraore,some broadcastgriot songs even became a popular
source of mockery.As praisesongs often includepassageswith a double
Under the first
meaning,they easilylend themselvesto subtlecriticism.40
two presidents,the nationalradiobroadcasta numberof songs with passages that could be readboth as an exhortationand as a subtlechallenge.
In situationsof widespreaddisappointmentwith the new politicalleadership,some farmerswho listenedto the nationalradiowouldtake these
songs as mockingthe claimsof partymembers.Forinstance,some praise
songs performedby griots on behalf of the first president apparently
That
became,in the late years of his rule,a means of popularridicule.41
both governments prohibited the broadcastingof certain griot songs
shows that the regimes were well aware of their critical potential. In
some cases, even prohibitioncould not fully silence popular mockery;
during informal gatherings, musicians would play the melody and
rhythmof a criticalsong and people overhearingit would immediately
graspthe inherentchallenge.
In short,althoughthe regimesof Modibo Keita and of MoussaTraore founded their rule on institutionsand principlesmodeled after a
Westernsystem of representation,the politicalleaders were anxiousto
endow themselves with the symbols of traditionalrule. Farmersevaluated the beneficialor legitimatenatureof the regimesaccordingto criteria that,althoughneitherconsistentnor static,reflect a commonexperience of the politikitimes.Farmersassessedthe new politicalorderon the
basis of both recent experienceswith the state and visions of a "good"
political order that they derived from a nostalgicallyrememberedprecolonial, and sometimes colonial, past where absolute power ensured
social harmonyand the respect of authority.The first and foremostreason to challenge politicians'claims to a successfuland thus legitimate
leadershipwas the state'sfailureto accomplishits orderingfunctions.In
these situations,the notions of "tradition"based on a "forged"or real
genealogy did not convince disappointedfarmers that a regime was
good.
We maytake the griotpraisesongsthat servedboth legitimizingpurposes from above and subversivemockeryfrom below as an illustration
of how broadcasttechnology offered a new means to disseminatethe
dominantversionof a "legitimate"politicalorderto a potentiallynation-
Dorothea Schulz
457
wide audience.Broadcasting,however,separatesthe site of production
of a messagefromthe settingwhere the broadcastis interpreted.Listeners are able to read the message "againstthe grain,"that is, to give it a
meaningthat differs from or even contradictsthe meaningintendedby
the producerand sender of the message.Thus,broadcasttechnologyhas
introducednew possibilitiesfor people to disagreewith the officialversion of what "good"rule is and to appropriateand invertthe symbolsof
rightfulrule.Musicis a particularlyefficientmediumof contestationprecisely becausethe musicalelementsconvey allusionsthat are more difficult to pin down and to prohibitthan the text of a song.
Demokrasi as a New Cloak of the Politiki People:
The Government Under Alpha Konard
In 1991,a militaryputsch under the leadershipof Col. ToumaniToure
put an end to the rule of the UDPM, establisheda multipartydemocracy,
and organizedthe firstcompetitiveelections in the historyof the Malian
nation-state.42In 1992,Alpha Konare and his party,Alliance pour la
Democratie au Mali-Parti Africain pour la Solidarite et la Justice
(ADEMA) took over politicalrule.
This regimechangehas not motivatedfarmersto modifytheirskepticalstancetowardpolitikiand the centralstate.Farmersdismissthe governmentalslogansof "democracy"
as merepolitikitalk and presumethat
the parties' claims to popular participationare "just another bubu43
those politikipeople put on to make us believe that our life will change."
During the electoral campaignin 1991-1992,when presidentialcandidates visited villages, they were frequently confronted with farmers
franklyexpressingtheir reservationsabout the recent politicalchanges,
with statementssuch as "Thisis not our business.You made Moussafall,
not us."
Older farmersare deeply skepticalabout the competitionbetween
partiesthat was celebratedduringthe presidentialcampaignas a blessing of democracy.They often condescendinglyrefer to the new political
system as bolbwulifanga(literally,handraisingpolitics),alludingto the
gesture of voting. Farmerschallenge the assertion that the electoral
process invests an individualwith political legitimacyand assert that
"nobodyhas ever taken over office,justbecausewe raisedour hands."In
addition,the mockeryof "handraisingpolitics"reflectsfarmers'feelings
that "representation,"
as they understandit, is not guaranteedthrough
multipartydemocracy.
To most middle-agedand elderlyfarmers,demokrasiand chaos look
very muchalike.In theirview,the competitionbetween partiesatteststo
the absence of a strong central power capable of suppressingpolitical
458
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
factionalism.Demokrasi,conceived as the absence of a central power
and of the authorityof the older over the younger generation,simply
gives politiciansmore room to pursue their individualisticorientations
and maneuverings,while not complyingwith the obligationsof communal interests,than was possible under single-partyrule. Older farmers
often nostalgicallycontrast the current political disorder (they call it
"socialunrest")to the rule of precolonialchiefs (fanga)imaginedas having an unlimited capacity to exercise physical violence and suppress
fadenkel, that is, political competition.In these situations,the colonial
state and the militaryregime of MoussaTraoreacquire,in retrospect,
exemplarylegitimacyas politicalordersthat ensuredthe well-beingand
harmonyof the communityand the respectof authorityand seniority.44
Commentssuch as the following,from a farmerwho was about forty
years old and fromthe circleof Kita,are common:"Moussaknewhow to
rule over people. He ruled with force. Because the real power is exercised with arms.But Alpha? Eee! He just talks and talks and talks."
Here again,we see farmersassessingthe legitimacyof the political
order by drawing on notions of precolonial legitimacy and on more
recent experienceswith the state. Farmerstake the state's accomplishment of its orderingand organizationalfunctionsas the first and foremost source of its legitimacy.They also point to what they consideran
advantageof these politicalorders;in both cases,a strongorderingforce
was externaland distantand only occasionallyintervenedin the internal
affairs of the community.45Of course, these are idealized and partial
reconstructionsof the "golden eras of strong rule and unchallenged
power hierarchies."
They omit negativeeffects,such as the threatposed
by a state that was capableat any momentof exertingheavy taxationor
of alteringpreviouspowerconstellationsand social hierarchies.
It is hardlysurprisingthat,in the currentatmosphereof disapproval
of politiki,griotsare less successfulthanever before in lendingan auraof
traditionallegitimacyto politicians.Griots'praise on behalf of current
politicalleadersis extremelyunpopular.The few griotswho tried during
the last electoral campaign in 1991-1992 to present themselves as
spokespersonsfor currentpoliticianswere confrontedwith widespread
resentmentand criticismthat they were untrustworthyand opportunistic. These negative reactions might explain why most members of the
current ruling party and PresidentAlpha Konare do not rely on the
speech and performanceskillsof griotsfor purposesof policypromotion.
Instead, many politiciansemphasize that they acquiredtheir rights to
politicaloffice throughthe electoral process.In the circle of Kita,farmers of any social backgroundcall the rare attemptsof griotsto speak on
behalf of politiciansas a speech "devoidof meaning"and dismiss the
politicians'claims to a prestigiousorigin,formulatedin griot songs, as
mere pretention and "lies that remind us of all this politiki talk."
Dorothea Schulz
459
Although griot praise does not validate a politician'sclaim to political
office,publicpraise-and praisebroadcaston the radioand televisionin
particular-still enhancesan individual's"name"(tbgb)and his reputation as a patronwho is capableof attractingclients.Furthermore,listeners enjoy hearinga broadcastgriot song, in spite of their outspokendisapprovalof the "emptypraise"of griots, especially if the melody and
rhythmoriginatesfromthe listener'shome region.
Conclusion
Thisdiscussionhas consideredwhethergriots who performon broadcast
media are successful in conferringpolitical legitimacyon postcolonial
Malianregimes.The analysisfocused on the public domain established
by the national radio station, conceiving of it as an arena of political
action in which differentgroups of Malian society interact,and where
they mightrely on the same expressivemediumto avow theirconflicting
views of the politicalstatusquo.
To assess the effects of griots' legitimizingactivities,I analyzedthe
diverse and changinggroundson which griots constructednotions of a
"traditional"legitimacysince the time of the colonial occupation.The
discussionshowed that after independence,griots had little success in
lending legitimacyto the new politicalelites.With changingsociopolitical hierarchies,new institutionsof politicalrule,and money becominga
more common form of remuneration,the context that renderedgriots'
performed speech so convincing was substantiallyaltered. Thus, the
politicalbiographyof griots and their songs illustratesthe multifaceted
process in which a specific mode of legitimationis promoted,inverted,
and transformedover time.
Broadcastgriot praisesongs and theircriticalevaluationby listeners
in the circle of Kita illustratethat after independence,the new political
elites sought to drawon two, sometimescompeting,modalitiesof legitimation.To understandthe limitedsuccessof these modes of legitimation
in convincing farmers of the political legitimacy of the postcolonial
regimes,I analyzed criteriathat farmersin the circle of Kita apply to
judge different aspects of the postcolonial political order, particularly
the nation-state,party politics,and, more recently,the establishmentof
multipartydemocracy.Farmersassess the nature of a regime as "good"
accordingto several criteria.The importancethat farmersattributeto
these criteriachanges constantly,dependingon their particularexperiences with postcolonial regimes.Farmers'comments suggest that they
refer to past practicesand politicalordersin a selective way in order to
assess the currentpolitical order and government.Older farmersespecially present the precolonialand colonial orders-and in some situa-
460
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
tions the rule of MoussaTraore-as ensuringwelfare and security,thus
omitting aspects of these orders that were less beneficial to the ruled
population.They associatefangawith the "goodold days"and contrastit
to politiki,a new form of power and of politicalmaneuveringthat has its
originsin partypoliticsand that does not necessarilyrepresentthe interests of farmers as clients.Also, as new politicians enter the political
arena, they complicatethe clientelisticnetworksbetween farmersand
representativesof the state and render the effectiveness of previous
channelsto state resourcesless certain.46
At present, none of the grounds on which the current politicians
claim political legitimacyconvince farmersthat they will receive their
shareof wealthand favorsfromthe state or will benefit in any other way
from the establishmentof demokrasi.A noble familybackgroundand a
traditionof rulershipstill constituteimportantsymboliccapital.People
are well aware,however,thatgriotsmay inventa leadershiptraditionfor
anybodywho can pay for it. Also, the force of traditionallegitimacyis
small when so many aspects of the rural struggle for survival speak
against the beneficial nature of the political order.This situation may
appearto outsiderslike a crisisof legitimacywhere none of the sources
of legitimacyhave weight.Yet it is depictedby manyfarmersin southern
Mali as a "crisisof power"in whichthe recentpoliticalevents have left a
powervacuumthat competingfactionsand individualsseek to occupy.47
Finally,the reception of broadcastgriot songs illustratessome limitations of political elites' capacityto control the symbols of legitimacy
and to presenttheir rule as a "natural"order.Radio listenersin Mali are
not duped recipientsof messages disseminatedby the nationalradio as
the authoritativevoice of the government.Rather,listenerssometimes
attributeto griots' songs and other broadcastmusic new and changing
meaningsthat resonate more with their own experiencesand opinions.
This insightmightmotivateus to develop furtherour approachesto the
politicalimplicationsof "tradition."
Whereasmanystudies focus on the
importance that "reinventedtradition"has for legitimizing imperial
projectsor a specific rule,48the use of "tradition"in Mali by farmersin
the circle of Kita shows that it may serve the purposesof both contestation and legitimation.Membersof the politicalelites sought legitimacy
by relying on the griots' rhetoricof "tradition."But the labels bikitigi
(ballpoint pen carriers)and bblbwulifanga(handraisingpolitics) also
exemplify how "tradition,"in the form of a prestigious family background,servesas a criterionfor membersof previouslypowerfulfamilies
to challengethe legitimacyof new rulers.
We should keep in mind,however,that the opportunitiesfarmersin
southernMali have to express an alternativevision of a "just"political
order on the basis of broadcastmusic are limited. Listeners question
throughridiculewhetherthe claimsto a powerpositionarejustified,and
Dorothea Schulz
461
they challengethe claimsof broadcastgriotsto rightfullyand truthfully
speak on behalfof the new powerholders.Yet listeners'criticismsof current broadcastgriots and their "forgedsongs"cannotbe seen as contestation of the generalpoliticalorder.Thatis, such criticismdoes not challenge the basicassumptionsaboutthe "natural"relationsof inequalityin
society.Most listenerswould agree that public praise performancesare
an appropriateway of enhancinga patron'sprestige.In spite of the subversive potentialof both griot songs and broadcasttechnology,thus far
they have not enabled farmersto formulatevisions of a desirablepolitical order.
Notes
Dorothea Schulzis a memberof the FrobeniusInstitutein Frankfurt,Germany,
and editorof thejournalPaideuma.Her researchhas focusedon how new political institutionsand the introductionof broadcastmedia since Mali'sindependence in 1961 have shaped changes in the political relevance of griots. She
receivedher Ph.D.in anthropologyfromYale Universityin 1996.
1. The researchon whichthis articleis based was fundedby a grantfrom
the National Science Foundation (grant number 9413360), by a Harry
Hochschild Memorial Fellowshipgranted by the Yale University Center for
InternationalandArea Studies,and by the DeutscherAkademischerAustauschdienstin Germany.I wish to thankAngeliqueHaugerud,Donna L. Perry,Mahir
Saul,HaroldScheffler,and anonymousreviewersfor commentson previousversions of this article.The articleis based on twenty-twomonthsof field research
conductedbetween June 1992and February1996.Fieldworkwas carriedout in
three villages located in the circle of Kita in southwesternMali. Comparative
data were collected in Ouelessebougou (about 50 miles south of the capital,
Bamako)and in the circleof Bla (southeasternMali).
2. Achille Mbembe,interviewin ChallengeHebdo 79 (1992):9;translation
is mine.
3. See, for example, Roger Charlton, "The Politics of Elections in
Botswana,"Africa63, no. 3 (1993):330-371;Yves Faure,"Democracyand Realism:Reflectionson the Case of Cote d'Ivoire,"Africa63, no. 3 (1993):313-330;
David Throup,"Electionsand PoliticalLegitimacyin Kenya,"Africa 63, no. 3
(1993):371-397;andJuliusE. Nyang'oro,"ReformPoliticsand the Democratization Processin Africa,"AfricanStudiesReview37, no. 1 (April 1994):133-151.
Votingis a single-eventpracticeand does not reflectthe complexityand contradictions in people's attitudes toward a particularregime.To focus on voting
behavioralso risksblurringchangesin attitudesover time.
4. See, for example, Michael G. Schatzberg,"Power,Legitimacy and
'Democratisation'in Africa,"Africa63, no. 4 (1993):445-462.
5. See Claude Fay,"La Democratie au Mali, ou le Pouvoir en Pature,"
Cahiersd'EtudesAfricaines35, no. 1 (1995):19-53;Tom Young,"Introduction:
Electionsand ElectoralPoliticsin Africa"Africa63, no. 3 (1993):299-313.
6. KarinBarber,"PopularArts in Africa,"AfricanStudiesReview30,no. 3
(1987):1-78;Michel de Certeau,ThePracticeof EverydayLife (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1984).
462
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
7. PeterGeschiere,SorcellerieetPolitiqueenAfrique:LaViandedesAutres
(Paris:Karthala,1995).
8. Debra Spitulnik, "Anthropologyand Mass Media," in William H.
Durham,E. ValentineDaniel, and Bambi Schieffelin,eds., Annual Review of
Anthropology,vol. 22 (Palo Alto, Calif.:Annual Reviews, 1993), pp. 293-315;
Louise Manon Bourgault,Mass Media in Sub-SaharanAfrica (Bloomington:
IndianaUniversityPress,1995);for Europe,see JurgenHabermas,Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit:Untersuchungenzu einer Kategorie der Burgerlichen
Gesellschaft(Frankfurtam Main:Suhrkamp,1962).
Understandingthe Relationship
9. PearlT. Robinson,"Democratization:
Between Regime Changeand the Cultureof Politics,"AfricanStudiesReview37,
no. 1 (1994):39-69.
10. See, for example,MichaelGurevitch,TonyBennett,JamesCurran,and
Janet Woollacott,eds., Culture,Society,and the Media (New York:Methuen,
1982).
11. See, for example,MaxHorkheimerandTheodorW Adorno,Dialecticof
Enlightenment(NewYork:SeaburyPress,1972).
12. See, for example,Thomas Lindlof,"MediaAudiences as Interpretive
in JamesAnderson,ed., CommunicationYearbook,vol. 11 (NewCommunities,"
buryPark,Calif.:Sage, 1988),pp.81-107.
13. ChandraMukerji and Michael Schudson,"Introduction:Rethinking
PopularCulture,"in Mukerjiand Schudson,eds., RethinkingPopular Culture:
Perspectivesin CulturalStudies(Berkeley:Universityof California
Contemporary
Press,1991),pp. 1-62;see also Achille Mbembe,"TheBanalityof Powerand the
Public Culture4, no. 2 (1992):1-30.
Aestheticsof Vulgarityin the Postcolony,"
14. See also Jean-LoupAmselle, "Un Etat ContrelEtat: Le Keleyadugu,"
Cahiersd'EtudesAfricaines28, no. 3-4 (1988):463-483, for another area of
southernMali.
15. The majorsourcesof revenue of the warrioraristocracywere warfare,
the slave trade,and sometimes agriculturalproduction.The political and economic standingof the warrioraristocracyalso depended on its supportby the
externalkingdomand on its specificrelationshipwith othernoble familiesof the
chiefdomthat lived off of agriculturalproduction.See ShakaBagayogo,"L'Etat
au Mali: Representation, Autonomie et Mode de Fonctionnement,"in
EmmanuelTerray,ed., L'Etat Contemporainen Afrique (Paris:L'Harmattan,
1987),pp.91-122,esp.p. 97;Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali,"p. 35.
16. Maliansocietyis composedof three socialcategories:people of "noble"
or "free"origin (hbrbn);socioprofessionalgroups that perform specific and
regionallyvaryingtasks on behalf of their noble patrons (nyamakala),such as
blacksmiths(numun),griots (jeli),leatherworkers(garanke),and publicspeakers
(fune);and descendantsof formerslave families (jon).The Frenchtermgriot is
an amalgamof differentcategoriesof speech mastersthat are distinguishedin
local contexts.
17. At least this is how many people of griot origin portraytheir previous
politicalrole today.Of course,this portrayalalso reflectstheir currentnostalgic
tendencyto emphasizethe centralityof their previouspoliticalimportancein a
situationwhere manypeople assertthatgriotsare "useless"to them.
18. Max Weber, Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft.Grundrisseder Verstehenden
Soziologie (Tubingen:J.C. B. Mohr,1956),pp. 122-174.
19. Jeli b'i tbgbbonya,nga a b'i tbgbtinyafana.
20. Bagayogo,"L'Etatau Mali,"p. 93.
DorotheaSchulz
463
21. Fad6nkNel,
literallythe "strugglebetweenthe sons of a father"(meaning
half-brotherswho have a fatherin commonbut differentmothers),would occur
as the resultof fandenya.Thisdesignatesthe spiritof competitionand envy that
often rulesthe relationshipbetweenhalf-siblingsand,by extension,the conflictual relationshipbetween competing political factions, be it different family
branchesor clans.
22. Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali,"p. 41.
23. The actualemancipationof slavesoccurredafter 1905,and its effects on
landuse andthe availabilityof laborvariedfromregionto regionin the southern
FrenchSudan.See RichardL. Roberts,"TheEnd of Slaveryin the FrenchSudan,
1905-1914,"in SuzanneMiersand RichardL. Roberts,eds., TheEnd of Slavery
in Africa (Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress,1988),pp.282-307,esp.p. 297.
In most regions,it did not fundamentallyalter the previousrelationsbetween
mastersand slaves,since many slaves decided not to returnto their villages of
originbut to cultivatethe landthatwas givento them by the formermasters.
24. Ruth Schachter-Morgenthau,
PoliticalPartiesin FrenchSpeakingWest
Africa(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1964),p. 298.
25. As PatrickChabalpoints out, in the absenceof other sourcesof legitimacy,the acceptanceof the new political leaders as rightfulsuccessorsto the
colonialstate dependedstronglyon their successin constructingthe nation.See
PatrickChabal,Power in Africa:An Essay in PoliticalInterpretation(London:
Macmillan,1992),p. 137.Forthis reason,the attemptsof the US-RDA to present
Mali as the outcome of a long-standingpoliticaltraditionwere typicalof most
postindependentregimesin Africa.
26. Even today it is difficultto receive the nationalradio in some areasof
the regionsof Gao andTombouctou.
27. Forexample,they often recitedthe epic of SunjataKeita,the legendary
founder of the medieval Mali empire that controlled the southern areas of
today's Mali between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.Another empire
whose leadersand key events were often celebratedin songs and theaterperformanceswas the Kingdomof Segu,also locatedin the southerntriangleof Mali.
28. It is likelythoughthat manynorthernlistenerswoulddisagreewith this
representation,as they did not share the traditionsthat griots celebrated as
"Malian"traditions.
29. Donkili karabalende do.
30. Chabal,Powerin Africa,p. 137.
31. See also Trutzvon Trotha,"'Strengaber Gerecht'-'Hart aberTuchtig':
Uber Formenvon Basislegitimitatund ihreAuspragungenam Beginnstaatlicher
Herrschaft,"in WilhelmJ. G. MohligandTrutzvon Trotha,eds.,La Legitimation
du Pouvoir et du Droit:Le ColloqueFranco-Allemanddes Anthropologuesdu
Droit (Koln:R. Koppe,1994),pp.69-90, esp.p. 84.
32. In contrast,many people in the northerntriangleof Mali most likely
challengedthe ruleof the US-RDA preciselybecausetheywereof a differentculturaland "ethnic"originand thereforelooked downon otherpoliticaltraditions
33. Startingin 1965,each villagewas requiredto have a collectivefield for
cash crop production,and farmerswere organizedin cooperativesfor the marketing of their products.The way farmerssometimesreferredto the collective
fields,forse baarafbrb (forcedlaborfield), shows that they saw these fields as a
continuationof colonialcorvee labor.
34. Of course,currentreconstructionsby farmersof the US-RDA period
should be interpretedwithin the context of the present political situation.
Between 1992and 1996,when I conductedmy field research,farmersoften felt
464
PraiseWithoutEnchantment
compelled to express their disillusionwith politiciansand party politics.They
sometimesreferredto the times of Modiboto expresstheir resentmentof politiki.In these situations,older farmerstended to emphasizewhat they perceived
as continuitiesbetweenthe differentregimes,suchas the "greedy"and dishonest
attitudesof theirrespectiverepresentatives.
35. OumarDiarrah,Le Mali de ModiboKeita(Paris:L'Harmattan,1986),p.
170;and Bintou Sanankoua,La Chutede Modibo Keita(Paris:EditionsChaka,
1990),pp. 133-137.
36. The speakerrefers to the milicepopulaire,created in 1967 to enforce
governmentalpolicies.In the nameof the "defenseof the revolution,"the militia
exercised its arbitraryregime mostly in urban areas.See Diarrah,Le Mali de
ModiboKeita,p. 170;and Sanankoua,La Chutede ModiboKeita,p. 133.
37. As partof the "socialist"orientationof the US-RDA,villagerswere told
that they shouldshareone commondish.
38. Trotha,"'Strengaber Gerecht'-'Hart aberTiichtig,"'pp.75-78.
39. The nickname karapili (from crapuleux,rascal) takes issue with the
politicians'and bureaucrats'practicesof personalenrichmentand "greed."As I
observedduringmy research,the term is employednot to criticizethe practices
of enrichmentper se, but ratherthe "greedy"behaviorof patronswho refuseto
redistributetheirwealthto clients (see also Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali,"p. 23).
40. The performinggriot presentsthese passagesas an exhortationof the
patronto demonstratehis power.But the lines also remindthe laudedpatronof
his politicalenemieswho will eliminatehimunlessthe patronproveshis forceby
accomplishingeminentdeeds on behalfof the community.
41. These songs were intendedto laud the prestigiousancestryof President
ModiboKeita,likeninghis state-buildingprojectto that of his famouspredecessor,the legendaryfounderof the medievalMaliempire,SunjataKeita.Whilethe
performing griots had certainly intended to suggest a political continuity
betweenthese two Keita,manypeople interpretedit as a suggestionthat the currentpresidentwas not the equalof his famous"ancestor."
Otherbroadcastsongs,
althoughoriginallyperformedto enhance the prestigeof the politicalleaders,
were turnedby listenersinto a mediumof subtlecriticism.
42. These events were the culminationof monthsof popularupheavaland
protest in which urbangroups of low-skilledand unemployedyouth played a
leadingrole (cf.Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali").
43. The name of the wide cape-likerobe wornby men and women.
44. ThisresonateswithTrotha'sobservationsof currentpopularreconstructions of Germancolonialrulein Togo (see Trotha,"'StrengaberGerecht'-'Hart
aberTuchtig"').
45. See also Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali,"pp.41, 46.
46. Ibid.,pp. 19-24, and Dorothea Schulz,"Praisein Timesof Disenchantment: Griots,Radios,and the Politics of Communicationin Mali" (Ph.D.diss.,
Yale University,1996),pp. 164-176,222-313.
47. Cf.Fay,"LaDemocratieau Mali."
48. See, for example,EricHobsbawmandTerenceRanger,TheInventionof
Tradition(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983); see also Weber,
Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft.