Military assistance to a foreign country

Transcription

# 23
2012
DOCTRINE
TAcTIQUE
I NFORMATIONAL AND REFLECTION - BASED PERIODICAL
Military assistance
to a foreign country :
Army contribution
TABLE OF CONTENTS
“Doctrine Tactique” is an informational and discussion-based periodical. It should not
in any way be considered an official doctrinal document. On a chosen theme, it seks to
illustrate how tactical doctrine is understood or applied in the French Army, using the
individual testimony from within the forces.
Education, training, operational preparation and deployment to theaters of opération
represent the main areas of interest of this publication. Some international issues are
considered as well.
The editorial staff
Editorial
3
Directeur de la publication :
Colonel (R) Georges Michel
 histocal perspective
Rédactrice en chef :
Capitaine Gwenaëlle Denonin
 : 01 44 42 35 91 - PNIA : 821.753.35.91
French military assistance since the second half of the 19th century.
Lieutenant Colonel Rémy PORTE (CDEF)
4
Admiral Bernard ROGEL (Navy Chief of Staff since Sep 12, 2011)
6
Lieutenant General Bruno CLEMENT-BOLLÉE (DCSD)
8
Colonel François CHAUVANCY (CICDE)
12
Colonel Philippe COSTE (CDEF)
16
Colonel Alexander ALDERSON (MBE PhD)
19
Major General (retired) François GONNET (EURORECAMP)
24
The Vietnamese National Army - How France assisted the young Vietnamese State
Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Claude FRANC (CDEF)
27
A center of excellence in culture learning for readiness training: The Specialized Military Center for French Overseas
Departments and Territories and Foreign Countries (ENSOME)
Brigadier General Bertrand NOIRTIN (EMSOME Commander, 2009-2011)
31
A French officer in a regionally - oriented national school (ENVR)
Navy Commander Christian QUEFFÉLEC (cooperation DCSD)
34
Colonel Jean-François MARTINI (Chief GE 11ème RC)
37
Maquette :
Christine Villey
 : 01 44 42 59 86 - PNIA : 821.753.59.86
 Doctrine
Traductions :
Col Joncheray, LCL Palard,
CDT Revenant, LTN Davidson
The political-military context of military assistance
Révision : LCL Le Bastard,
M. Setters, CDT Stefanovic
Security and Defense Cooperation today
Operational military assistance to foreign armed forces
- Joint exploratory concept
Crédits photos :
1re de couverture :
@ CPI Sgt Marzin - SIRPA Terre
Diffusion & relations avec les abonnés :
Major Claudine Vacquier
 : 01 44 42 43 18 - PNIA : 821.753.43.18
 International
Impression et diffusion : établissement
de diffusion, d’impression et d’archives du
commissariat des armées de Saint-Etienne
Military assistance in simulation - the succes of the JANUS community
Tirage : 2 500 exemplaires
«Partnering» with local forces: a British Army Perspective
From RECAMP to AMANI AFRICA
Dépôt légal : à parution
ISSN : 2110-7378 - Tous droits de reproduction réservés
Revue trimestrielle
Conformément à la loi «informatique et
libertés» n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, le fichier
des abonnés à DOCTRINE TACTIQUE a fait
l’objet d’une déclaration auprès de la CNIL,
enregistrée sous le n° 732939. Le droit
d’accès et de rectification s’effectue
auprès du CDEF.
Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces
1, place Joffre - Case 53 - 75700 PARIS SP 07
Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Mel : pub-dad.cdef@terre-net.defense.gouv.fr
 Focus
OMLT: French and Afghan Brother-in-Arms
DOCTRINE TACTIQUE # 23
SEPTEMBER 2012
2
© Armée de Terre
Editorial
T
he central theme of this issue of “Doctrine
tactique” is Military Assistance.
Military Assistance was defined in the French
Exploratory Joint Concept Paper as “a course of
action complementary to conventional operations”
which lets France contribute to global stability
while defending French interest. Military
assistance plays a key role in the overall framework
of “helping other countries” as was elaborated in
the French Force Employment Concept Paper.
Military assistance includes both an operational
component managed by the Joint Forces
Headquarters of the Defense Department and a
technical component controlled by the Directorate
for Security and Defense of the French State
Department.
This mission is not new to the French Armed Forces
who have practiced it for more than fifty years
particularly in the independent states of
the former French “Empire”. The original aim was
to help State-building by transferring security
responsibilities to the armed forces of the fledgling
countries. Most often it pertained to training on
how to prevent crises.
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Today also, in particular in Afghanistan,
the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs) have carried out their work in stabilization
operations in order to help Afghans take full
responsibility for their own national security.
Various articles in this issue provide a general
context and a historical background to Military
Assistance, as well as, thanks to different accounts,
an understanding of how it has been dealt with at
the political and military level. This issue also
shows us how it has been carried out in Africa and
Afghanistan, as well as in the countries of the
former French Indo-China.
These missions aiming at creating security and
development within the framework of a global
approach play a key role in conflict prevention and
post crisis stabilization. For France Military
Assistance is a major component of influence
operations.
General Olivier TRAMOND,
Commander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center
SEPTEMBER 2012 DOCTRINE TACTIQUE # 23
French military assistance since
the second half of the 19th century
Lieutenant CoLoneL Rémy PoRte,
Head oF ReseaRCH at tHe Lessons LeaRned division
oF tHe FoRCes emPLoyment doCtRine CenteR (CdeF)
W
hile the concept of
military assistance
between States may be as old
as the relations between a
great power and a smaller
allied nation, it only took on
a modern form in the second
half of the 19th century.
At that time, when the Balkan
nations became independent,
the French, German, AustroHungarian, Russian and
British governments created
military attachés posts in
the new capitals and strived
to maintain a dominant
position through assistance
in training national armed
forces. This phenomenon
gained widespread
importance at the end of
the Great War. In Bucharest,
Belgrade, Athens, Prague
and Warsaw, powerful French
military missions took over
the organization, training and
sometimes, for a short period,
command of the armed forces
and HQs. With the prestige
of being the « first Army in
the world » after 1918,
Paris used its troops to extend
international outreach well
beyond Europe; a military
aviation mission trained
Japanese pilots.
SEPTEMBER 2012
t a time and in countries where
the high military hierarchy was
the backbone of high national
authorities in many respects, the aim
was that the supported countries
should adopt the organization and
working methods employed in France.
This aimed to ensure operational
compatibility through supplying
equipment, to control maintenance
and sustainment and to bolster
the diplomatic action of the Quai
d’Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
A
This active policy met its limits by
the mid-1930s when Paris no longer had
the financial means to give consistence
and substance to these missions. Then,
at the beginning of WWII, the French
Army was unable to help its Eastern
allies and was crushed in six weeks.
After 1945, France’s international
position had changed: from then on,
the United States and the Soviet Union
were the only powers able to maintain
major military missions worldwide.
Paris, like London, had to resign itself
to focusing on its former colonies, as
in Indochina at the time of the French
Union of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
The 1958 constitution and the Decree
of February 9, 1959 also emphasized
the need to ensure «comprehensive
defense» of mainland France and
the former Empire.
In the aftermath of the African
independences, a directive from then
Prime Minister Michel Debré on
November 3, 1960 set the objectives
of the new military assistance: «It is
crucial for France that the national
armed forces of the new countries that
have obtained independence be
steeped in French methods, retain
spiritual and material links with
the French armed forces, and be a
source of outreach for the French
nation». This Gaullist desire resulted in
cooperation and defense agreements.
These contributed to «comprehensive
assistance» and ensured bases, ports
and airports were available to France
(which remained in charge of their
maintenance and modernization) in
order to guarantee the external security
and internal stability of the fledgling
nations. In some specific treaties, an
article stipulated that these countries
primarily look to the former colonial
power for their military equipment and
materiel supply. There were secret
agreements that would sometimes
authorize direct intervention to defend
incumbent regimes. Therefore, three —
and later, two — ministries were
involved in the development of military
assistance: Cooperation and Foreign
Affairs on the one hand, and Defense
on the other.
As early as 1964 this effort was limited
by budget problems: in 1966, the total
number of French troops stationed in
young States of Sub-Saharan Africa was
reduced to 6,800, down from 24,000
three years earlier. Financial imperatives
also resulted in a transfer of
responsibility from the Ministry of
Defense to the Ministry of Cooperation,
and later to Foreign Affairs, marked
in 1966 by the creation of the MMC
(Military Cooperation Mission), which
became the DCMD (Military and
Defense Cooperation Directorate)
in 1999 and, since 2009, the Security
and Defense Cooperation Directorate.
The period of relatively high numbers of
French troops stationed in the different
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Rémi Labbé - ECPAD - collection Labbé
historical perspective
of the global geostrategic situation led
to successive redeployments of the
French military assistance system under
the pressure of «constant resources
management,» with no additional staff
or budget. It was no longer a question
of acting in the long term for the benefit
of a particular country and it became
necessary to adapt resource allocation
regularly; posts were closed in Frenchspeaking Sub-Saharan Africa to open
others, which were seen as priorities
at certain times. This was especially
the case with the provision of military
assistance to Portuguese- and Englishspeaking Africa.
Exchange of views between the Commander of the Military Detachment for Technical Assistance
(DMAT) and his Mauritanian counterpart in ATAR (1993-1995).
countries was followed by a period
marked by two main aspects: a few
permanent military bases were kept
in place, as was the military cooperation
organization in accordance with three
main pillars [direct equipment
assistance, seconded assistance staff
and leader development (officers and
NCOs) in the countries concerned],
which grew relatively more significant
over time.
The permanent military presence has
gradually diminished over the years
and has recently changed in nature:
the colonial soldiers and
the legionnaires, who were familiar
with these territories well before
independence, first witnessed
the development of the « rotating
units » within « framework units » to
partially make up for the departure
of the traditional units that had long
held garrison there. Later, with
the professionalization of the French
armed forces, any mainland unit could
take part in the « overseas rotation, »
which put an end to a century-long
African preserve beneath the emblems
of the golden anchor or the sevenflamed grenade1.
Direct support through supply of
equipment (free transfer), which
concerned all states but specifically
Chad and Senegal, long gave France
a dominant position in Africa’s Sahel
region. The evolution of international
practices such as the opening of these
«markets» to other «suppliers» has
tended to reduce the overall importance
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of supply in recent years and increase
the legal forms of equipment delivery,
although the loan and sale of licenses
remain exceptional.
Officer training in the national armed
forces has always been considered a
priority by the States concerned. For a
long time, it involved hosting students
(mostly officers) in French military
academies, at an average rate of 2,000
per year. The students were selected
through bilateral agreements. When
the Bouaké (Côte d’Ivoire) Inter-African
Transmissions School opened in 1983,
a new era of Regional Schools began.
These later became ENVR (RegionallyOriented National Schools). They
reduce the unit cost of training students
and also help adapt programs to local
needs. The process gained momentum
in the 1990s, and the total number
of schools rose to 16 in 2011.
The number of students trained in these
institutions increased from a little less
than 200 in 1997 to 2,400 in 2011.
In the mid-1970s began a phase of
renegotiation of the cooperation and
defense treaties signed between
France and most of its former colonies
when they became independent.
Gradually, the secret clauses
authorizing intervention in internal
affairs for the sake of stability at
the request of incumbent governments
disappeared and the concept of
« partnership » replaced that of
« assistance ». After the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Warsaw Pact, the general evolution
Operational Assistance Detachments
(DAO) and Operational Training
Detachments (DIO) were set up
occasionally from the end of 1979,
as were the Technical Training
Detachments (DIT) and Gendarmerie
Training Detachments (DIG) which
developed from the early 2000s. They
are the proof that the time when France
had large numbers of officers and NCOs
assigned to permanent posts in these
countries is gone. Today, the setting-up
of ad hoc detachments tasked with
specific objectives, often for short-term
missions, is favored. The launch of
the RECAMP process (Reinforcement
of African peacekeeping capabilities,
professional education, equipment and
training of African armed forces) from
1998 and its latest developments
illustrate the increasing role played by
regional organizations. These include
the EU of course, with EURO RECAMP,
but above all the African Union and
the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), all of which
highlights significant development.
Military assistance is undergoing slow
reform and profound upheaval. While
its very existence is not in question,
the forms it takes are constantly
adapting and new mechanisms will
need to be developed
1 Translator’s note: insignia of Marine Troops (Colonial
Troops from 1900 to 1958) and the Foreign Legion.
SEPTEMBER 2012
The political-military context
of military assistance
AdmirAl BernArd rogel,
former
generAl STAff ACoS oPS, nAvy Chief of STAff SinCe SeP 12, 2011
T
he concept and implementation of
military assistance have changed deeply
given the realities of the Afghan conflict.
It has become clear that the initial, purely
military answer to a crisis must integrate
from the outset the need to stabilize,
rebuild and gradually make the crisisstricken state self-sustained even before
the factors of violence have disappeared.
This is central to the challenge of
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) action in Afghanistan.
Beyond Afghanistan, French military
assistance has already evolved. This is
particularly visible in Africa, where States,
despite structural difficulties, are
successfully showing their determination
to take responsibility in conflict prevention
and management on the continent.

n recent years, the total war principle has gradually given
way to radically different concepts, born essentially from
the asymmetrical nature of armed conflicts in a context of
weak or failed states. Total war between states or coalitions
remains possible but is no longer the rule. Whatever the type
of conflict, the initial military phase is now always followed
or accompanied by a reconstruction phase in a necessarily
secure environment. The concepts of “three block war,”
“COIN” (counterinsurgency) and the “comprehensive
approach” have in common the replacement of military action
in the scope of wider operations, converging on a desired
end state which is always political and aims to achieve conflict
area stability. The confrontation between wills is still there,
but the whole range of courses of action, military or other,
is employed to reduce enemy freedom of movement.
Military assistance therefore meets specific needs depending
on the context of the action. It takes place in a scheme of
progressive transfer of security to a sovereign authority
I
DOCTRINE TACTIQUE #° 23 SEPTEMBER 2012
in the general framework of security sector reform (SSR).
It is of note that, contrary to received ideas, military
assistance does not apply solely to the security pillar of
the comprehensive approach but to its every dimension.
The example of military assistance in Afghanistan is thus full
of lessons. To achieve the security and stability objectives laid
down in the Heads of State and Government Declaration at
the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the campaign plan is
threefold: security, governance and development. The military
aspect of our intervention, which aims to make the Afghan
government self-sustained in security matters, contributes at
varying degrees to those three focuses.
In the security field, military assistance essentially involves
professional training of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF). The coalition is thus currently training the equivalent
of one ANSF company per day within NATO Training Mission
Afghanistan. These forces are then integrated into Kandaks
(battalions) destined to be committed with the support of
OMLTs (operational mentoring and liaison teams) which also
pursue mentoring actions. This assistance is continued thanks
to very close collaboration ranging from the planning of
engagement between coalition armed forces and the Afghan
National Army (ANA) to joint operations carried out from
collocated CPs at tactical level.
For development, military assistance consists of civil-military
cooperation (CIMIC) actions, which are part of a more
comprehensive interagency action plan aiming at setting up
stabilization units. Their functions are held by officials from
different government departments with the protection of
French military forces and the use of their facilities.
Lastly, for governance matters, even if this field remains under
the control of government employees, military resources
support the rule of law. The French gendarmerie servicemembers committed in Police Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Teams (POMLT) therefore provide long-term military
assistance in the field to build-up efficient Afghan police
forces. This support can also contribute to the security of
the electoral process in assisting the ANSF. By ensuring
acceptable security conditions around polling stations,
this military assistance showed its effectiveness during
the October 2010 general election.
Military assistance such as that provided in Afghanistan is
therefore today an essential dimension in the stabilizationreconstruction process. All coalitions must take it into account
from the outset. The applied expertise is not really new to
French armed forces, which are historically and traditionally
6
doctrine
familiar with this kind of engagement. An interagency
approach is however needed as soon as the operation is
planned to avoid any vacuum between the purely military and
the stabilization-reconstruction phases. This approach is more
recent regarding police training; in this field France knows it
can rely on the competence of its gendarmes, whose military
status is a specificity envied by many allies.
Military assistance does not apply only to conflict and postconflict situations. It more often falls into the scope of military
cooperation, which is particularly active in Africa, where
France continues to possess renowned expertise.
On the African continent, our military assistance has deeply
evolved in recent years. Having long been structured around
the principle of substituting African armed forces, it has
adapted to a new politico-military context. This is mainly
linked to the African will to handle conflict prevention and
crisis management on the continent in the framework of
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
established in 2002.
This new approach to cooperation, as laid down in
the strategic vision described in the French White Paper on
Security and National Defense was confirmed by the President
of the French Republic in his Cape Town speech on February
28, 2008. The French military presence must therefore as a
priority help Africa to build its own collective security system
without limiting our action to French-speaking countries.
The concept of ownership is central to this strategy of
cooperation which aims to meet African requirements by
supporting the African demarche.
This allows cooperation actions which reinforce or supplement
African initiatives for the building peacekeeping operations
(PKO) capacities on the continent. It deals with three main
areas enshrined in the RECAMP concept: professional
education, training and support to the operational
commitment. Professional education is delivered by 14 ENVR
(regionally oriented national schools) and to a lesser extent
by French military academies. Training is conducted in
the DIO/DIT1 framework as well as during exercises played
by our prepositioned forces in Africa (Dakar-Djibouti-Libreville)
and sovereign forces on Réunion Island. The support of African
operational commitment through our RECAMP forces’ depots
and mainland assets enables us to accompany inter-African
forces in peacekeeping operations on the continent.
Jean-François d’Arcangues/ECPAD
Two French ministries are directly involved in this military
assistance: the Ministry of Defense and Veterans’ Affairs
with the Armed Forces General Staff (EMA), responsible for
the conception of the operational cooperation plan and
the control of its implementation, and the Ministry of Foreign
and European Affairs, which, through the DCSD (Security and
Defense Cooperation Directorate), conducts officer and NCO
military professional education and provides high-level advice
to African staffs.
French-Afghan police patrol in Afghanistan (April 2010).
The support provided to the APSA is therefore of the keystone
our military assistance in Africa today. Without undermining
our bilateral relationships with different African States
(these relationships having been radically overhauled in
the framework of the revision of defense agreements),
this assistance is provided in a partnership approach which
aims to support the deployment of African Standby Forces
(ASF) by 2015.
This military assistance in Africa has a realistic and ambitious
objective, taking into account the real commitment of our
African partners. In a very different context from Afghanistan,
it also assumes determined international action. That is why,
in the framework of a joint EU-AU strategy (Dec 2007),
France wishes to make the European Union a major partner
regarding peace and security in Africa. From this will was born
the EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA cycle (2008-2010) which
officially confirmed, in Addis Ababa in 2010, the initial
operational capability (IOC) of the AU strategic command
structure
T
hese examples illustrate the wide spectrum of military assistance which can be provided by France, be it
“cold” assistance, as in Africa, or “hot” assistance, as in Afghanistan. In all cases, the nature of operation
mandates puts our forces increasingly in support of local forces, requiring assistance tailored to objectives but
also to initial experience of the police and the military. This assistance will therefore from now on rarely be isolated
but delivered in an international and interagency environment, which must be taken into account very early where
assistance is part of the scope of an operation. Whatever the environment, the strategic aim of military assistance is
to transfer gradually the security effort to the local forces which are responsible for it.
1 DIO/DIT: Operational Training Detachment/Technical Training Detachment.
7
Security and Defense
Cooperation today
Lieutenant GeneraL Bruno CLement-BoLLée,
SeCurity anD DefenSe Cooperation DireCtor
at the frenCh miniStry of foreiGn anD european affairS
T
he expression of “ military cooperation ” sounds somewhat dated today, as this concept, well
understood in the past, has evolved over the last few years. The expression of “ security and
defense cooperation ” is now preferred. If there were a single word to describe the transition from
the military cooperation inherited from the 1960s and today’s security and defense cooperation,
it would be “ openness. ” This has become necessary under pressure from events, and a dramatic
openness has gradually expanded the geographic coverage, fields, actors, methods and principles
of action of cooperation. This profound movement is not complete – far from it – and it is still
the spirit of openness that guides those who ponder the future of security and defense cooperation.
To better understand what security and defense cooperation is, and to convey it in line with
the scope of French cooperation, we need only study its evolution since its creation. Yesterday,
today, tomorrow…! The simplicity of the plan of study guarantees effectiveness but not ease,
and must be well understood. After all, as a wise old Baoulé man from Côte d’Ivoire would say,
« we must not say that the black mamba is not white! ”
But what security and defense cooperation are we dealing with, operational or structural? Precision
is vital before getting down to the subject. Operational cooperation is that practiced by the armed
forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the Directorate for International Cooperation (DCI), which
reports to the Ministry of the Interior. In terms of time, operational cooperation focuses on crisis
management, which it supports when it comes to developing solutions. Structural cooperation, on
the other hand, is the preserve of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. It aims to help build
security and defense tools before crises break out, during the prevention phase, but also post-crisis,
during the crisis exit phase. It is above all the business of the Security and Defense Cooperation
Directorate (DCSD). Operational and structural cooperation are closely linked and coordinated,
and efficiency is key.
Structural security and defense cooperation emerged in the aftermath of the Independences,
in the 1960s. Initially confined to the field of defense, it was long conducted by two separate
institutions: the Ministry of Cooperation’s Military Cooperation Mission, for the Sub-Saharan African
States, and the Division for Military Assistance that reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for the rest of the world. The aim was to maintain strong and direct ties with the countries born
of the former colonies, which took the form of a so-called cooperation “ of substitution, ” mostly
in Africa. Military assistance workers held positions of responsibility within the armed forces of
partner countries.
SEPTEMBER 2012
8
doctrine
• 1998, from military cooperation
to the military and Defense
Cooperation Directorate (DCmD)
n 1998, a first major change was needed following a series
of events, each generating the next. The end of the Cold
War, the emergence of new actors in Africa in the field
of security, the devaluation of the CFA franc and
the destabilization of Central Africa in the mid 1990s, inter
alia, all contributed to the decision to merge the Ministry
of Cooperation into Foreign Affairs in 1998. The Military and
Defense Cooperation Directorate (DCMD) then created was
in charge of structural military cooperation. As early as that
time, the evolution stood out by its three-fold openness.
A geographical evolution first, as all the African States so
desiring were now eligible for this new cooperation.
A functional evolution, with deliberate and displayed
transparency for commonly decided projects through official
agreements between partners. Finally, a conceptual evolution
through comprehensiveness of actions consolidated in a
same function called project. Attached to the latter,
This new state of mind is perfectly symbolized in
the Regionally Oriented National Schools (ENVR), created
and supported by the DCMD, which train African students
from across the continent in African national schools.
All the traditional areas of security-focused cooperation are
explored, from leader development to healthcare, including
mine clearance, peacekeeping and law enforcement.
All the principles of action of the DCMD are honored:
ownership, transparency, partnership, sustained action
and international influence.
It should also be noted that at the same time and in
the same Ministry, the Directorate-General for International
Cooperation and Development (DGCID) was created and
alongside the DCMD. It managed structural cooperation
in the fields of police and civil protection, working closely
with the Ministry of the Interior.
Photo provided by the DCSD
I
the cooperating actor became the bearer of the flame so to
speak, ensuring that the contracting parties did not forget
the mutually agreed objectives. The commitment was as
strong as it was clear. The principle of substitution was
abandoned, giving way to that of partnership.
Joint France-Chad exercise with the participation of the joint military academies group (Chad).
9
SEPTEMBER 2012
• 2009, a comprehensive concept
of security, from the DCmD to
the DCSD
ore recently, a second significant development has
led to the current tool, the Security and Defense
Cooperation Directorate, created in March 2009.
This decision is a direct consequence of the proposals laid
out in the White Paper on Defense and National Security.
Among other things, this document stressed the need to have
a comprehensive concept of security. In those circumstances,
the idea of merging the DCMD and DGCID into a single
organization quickly imposed itself. Thus, today’s DCSD
perfectly embodies the will to put together structural
cooperation for defense, internal security and civil protection
in order to better coordinate them. The DCSD is made up of
soldiers, diplomats, gendarmes, police and civil protection
experts, and works closely with the Ministry of Defense and
the Ministry of the Interior.
M
Openness to partnership, already mentioned with
the creation of the DCMD, is further emphasized of the latter.
This partnership is not only African but also European, and
this is meant to be even truer in coming years, in order to
develop innovative cooperation ensuring enhanced efficiency
through sharing responsibilities and resources.
In terms of objectives, security and defense cooperation
today aims to ensure the stability of partner countries,
which is essential to their development, while supporting
the expansion of French influence in the world.
Thus, with the enlargement of the scope of security and
with the proliferation of stakeholders and areas of action,
openness remains the key feature of the DCSD. Current
focuses of reflection continue in this vein.
• Continue to expand our scope for
further action
The conditions under which the DCSD operates today,
especially in terms of financial and human resources may
lead to a limitation of action if nothing is done. The aim
therefore is above all to regain some room for maneuver
which, beyond action, would also allow for a degree of reaction
to unforeseen events. It means being consistent with the political
conjecture (in terms of cooperation, of course) and this primarily
in Sub-Saharan Africa, to which three quarters of DCSD resources
are still dedicated. Thus, current thinking aims to help prioritize
actions and focus on the areas of security and defense cooperation.
In doing so, it is important to first determine the criteria that will
guide the choices and set the general framework to help bring
coherence to action.
Observing the geopolitical context helps identify current
major trends. The comprehensive concept of security, the link
between security and development, and the response to
DOCTRINE TACTIQUE #° 23 SEPTEMBER 2012
emergency situations, for example; all these principles have
become necessary in today’s environment. At the same time,
we have to ask ourselves if African defense tools, which are
often founded on from inherited systems and play a major
role in the country, are suitable for the interests they
are supposed to defend against current threats. Beyond
the question of the assets to acquire, reflection preparing
the organization of defense and national security, as in
the White Paper on Defense, should be launched.
In Sub-Saharan Africa today, conducting an analysis in
the form of a strategic review could lead naturally to
organizing national forces around three pillars: security,
development and emergency. Indeed, fundamental interests
(vital, strategic, power) to protect currently face major
threats, including international terrorism, various forms of
extremism, domestic insecurity, destabilization by external
elements generating uncontrolled migration flows, plundering
of resources of all kinds, poverty and underdevelopment
and their social consequences, and natural and man-made
disasters. Such threats clearly show that reorganizing
the defense tool around the three aforementioned pillars is
necessary and will become even more so in the future.
Security first
Organization around the pillar of comprehensive security
essentially requires several capabilities for forces. They must
be capable of protecting the population as well as borders
and their approaches. They must ensure domestic security in
both urban and rural areas, and also be able to assume their
international responsibilities with the chosen objective, while
ensuring the quality of the proposed contributions (quotas
dedicated to peacekeeping operations, to the Standby Force,
etc.). Our cooperation is already contributing to help our
partners meet this need, even if room for improvement
remains in the level of integration of defense, domestic
security and civil protection actions.
next, development
Before dealing with the development pillar, one has to be
aware that unfortunately, poverty and underdevelopment
are often the rule on the African continent, to such a degree
that they represent a major threat to national stability.
Under these conditions, dedicating a part of the armed
forces – which often constitute a substantial workforce –
to the development of the country, in the form of a national
service for development actions, can be a response both
useful to the country and beneficial to the image of
the national armed forces in image terms. In practice,
it involves offering young volunteers the opportunity to
perform a national service that first includes a professional
training phase ending with a qualification in a chosen
trade, followed by a phase of application, where volunteers
10
doctrine
participate in the country’s development. Finally, trained
volunteers are integrated in the country’s economy following
their national service. In addition, the aspect of youth
education and economic integration after national service
also contribute to overall stability. So far, our cooperation has
done little in exploiting this area that would nonetheless be
eligible for external financing, although a project of this kind
carried out in Madagascar proves that it can work well under
certain conditions, and the keen interest shown by other
partners indicates that the approach is promising.
finally, emergency
Emergency consideration results in taking civil protection
measures in order to be able to react to major disasters as
quickly as possible. They may be natural (floods, cyclones,
drought, etc.) or man-made (major pollution, terrorist attacks,
etc.). Those who have managed such events know that it is in
the first hours that the most deaths occur, often simply
because the most seriously injured cannot be treated in time.
However, few countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are truly
organized in a rational way to act in this area, in which
our cooperation is only beginning. Of course, early actions
have been conducted here and there, but only on a caseby-case basis and without the comprehensive approach
that the matter deserves. For a partner country, what
should be organized is a force capable of a first immediate
response to fill the gap of 48-72 hours between the event
and the arrival of the first emergency resources from
the international community. Ideally, this force should
build on capabilities already present in the forces but too
rarely used in initial response: military engineers (mobility
support), healthcare (emergency personnel),
transportation (trucks, helicopters), logistics
(coordinators) and signals (network equipment). Such a
choice would give clear guidance to our civil protection
cooperation. Here again, in a bilateral and multilateral
rationale, external financing could be considered, and as
for development, the exploitation of this niche could only
be beneficial to the image of the national forces 
T
o conclude, the aim of these subjects of debate is not to question the commitment of the DCSD
in Africa, which is already highly appreciated by its partners. The ENVR (regionally oriented
national schools) network is a perfect example of this. They simply aim to refocus our commitment
on major current trends, and thus better assert, at the moment of decision, the comprehensive
framework of French defense and security cooperation to integrate each of its actions therein. At a time
when budgets make it necessary to prioritize efforts, the time has come to reconsider certain projects
for the benefit of areas that can no longer be ignored, such as civil protection. This three-pillar approach
– security, development and emergency – would give genuine existence to the comprehensive approach
sought, both regarding the defense-domestic security continuum and the link between security and
development. The «national service for development action» or «emergency response» type of project
is likely to appeal to African partners; they are eligible for external financing in a bi-multi rationale,
with a well marked dual nature. They are truly useful and the political benefit that can be gained from
them is obvious, as we can see from the few trials already conducted on the ground.
Only questioning the nature and scope of this cooperation will allow the DCSD to maintain an action
and response capacity in line with the ambitions we have set for our nation in the field of security and
defense cooperation
11
SEPTEMBER 2012
Operational military assistance
to foreign armed forces
Joint exploratory concept
COlOnel FrançOis ChauvanCy,
PrOJeCt OFFiCer, JOint FOrCes Centre FOr COnCePt DevelOPment,
DOCtrine anD exPerimentatiOn (CiCDe1)
O
n January 4th 2011, the French armed forces staff validated the joint exploratory concept
(CEIA)2 produced by the Joint Forces Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and
Experimentation (CICDE) concerning operational military assistance to a foreign force.
CEIA 3.21, a “ restricted ” document, defines the purposes of this course of action which supplements
conventional operations and enables France to act in support of its interests. Integrated into general
military strategy, particularly as part of prevention, the aim of military assistance is to establish
French military influence among recipient foreign armed forces in the long term while preserving
our own forces by restricting their direct commitment in case of conflict.
the French approach to
assisting a foreign force
T
he Afghan and Iraqi conflicts are a
reminder that military assistance
to a foreign force can be an
effective course of action. Today, any
crisis exit requires the building up
of national armed forces to ensure
the stability of a rebuilt sovereign State,
capable of assuming sovereign
responsibilities (particularly as regards
security), and the disengagement of
foreign forces. In this respect, military
assistance within an indirect strategy,
as described by General Beaufre, is
relevant once more. French armed
forces thus need to re-discover skills
which were familiar to them in past
commitments.
These doctrinal considerations
do not therefore rely on intuition
alone, but most often on lessons
learned from recent or historical
events. The French National
Association of Commandos in North
Vietnam (ANCNV)3, whose members
were veterans who had trained and
organized local forces in Vietnam,
decided to disband in October 2010.
Those soldiers, who wrote a glorious
chapter of our military history in
Indochina, are passing away one
after another. The military assistance
concept was signed on January
4th 20114 by the Joint Vice-Chief of
Staff. History had the two events
coincide, placing our history in a new
context and respecting the memory
of our forebears.
history and context
Military assistance by one State to
another is a traditional course of
action for a military power acting in
accordance with its strategic or power
interests.
Thus States with recognized military
power, like France, have often assisted
foreign armed forces in support of
their national interests. A French
military mission provided assistance
to Poland in 1919-1921 against Russia.
In order to fight the Viet Minh in
Indochina, auxiliary commandos,
made up mainly of airborne troops
of the three Services, with illustrious
commanders like Delayen and
Vandenberghe5, were created on July
1 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations.
2 Concept exploratoire interarmées.
3 Association Nationale des Commandos Nord-Vietnam.
4 CEIA 3.21 “Operational military assistance to a foreign force,” No. 009/DEF/CICDE/DR, January 4th 2011.
5 Jean-Pierre Pissardy, “Commandos Nord Vietnam: 1951 - 1954” (Commandos in North Vietnam, 1951-1954), Indo-Editions, December 1999, 338 pages.
SEPTEMBER 2012
12
Vincent Larue/ECPAD
doctrine
A French OMLT soldier and two soldiers from the 201st Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Afghanistan in 2007.
2nd 1951 by General Jean de Lattre
de Tassigny, High Commissioner and
commander-in-chief in the Far East.
Thus 45 commando teams were
activated6, resulting in 3,664 killed,
481 wounded and 4,649 prisoners
among the Viet Minh, with losses
amounting 16 officers, 49 NCOs and
21 soldiers, as well as more than
100 local troops killed or missing in
action. During decolonization in
the sixties, France built up the armed
forces of the new States which had
become independent, including in
Africa. Operational assistance
detachments (DAO)7 have often been
employed with African forces from
French-speaking countries, for example
with Chadian forces against Libya in
the eighties. Military cooperation
continues today, particularly through
deployment of officers and NCOs in
the scope of technical military
assistance.
With the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts,
Western governments re-discovered
the military assistance course of
action, which proves both useful and
efficient. It has proven necessary once
again within the general framework of
21st century international relations;
the offensive against the Taliban was
carried out in 2001 with assistance
from local forces originating mainly
from the non-Pashtun population and
assisted, equipped and financed by
US forces, either Special Forces or CIA.
110 agents and 316 Special Forces
personnel were initially deployed.
Six months after the start of combat,
the US had spent only €9 billion
(compared to €49 billion allocated
for operations in Afghanistan in
2010)8, and had lost 12 personnel.
The northern forces had lost several
hundred combatants, but Taliban
losses were around 20,000. However,
that military success was not
exploited. Then, in support of
operations in Afghanistan, various
States did deploy forces for mentoring
and training local armed forces and
police (OMLT – Operational mentoring
and Liaison Team, POMLT – Police
Operational and Liaison Team).
However, favoring only the training of
a national army and police by
significant military assistance proved
insufficient within the Afghan context.
The various insurgent groups could
regroup because of an insufficient
commitment of foreign military forces
which failed to fill the operational void
left by a lack of trained local forces.
Likewise, commitment of an
expeditionary force, even with a
mandate from the international
community, does not seem to be
sufficient for success if we consider
recent or current conflicts. In the past
the goal was most often to maintain
6 Minister for Defense’s decision (No. 45), October 19th 1955.
7 Détachements d’assistance opérationnelle.
8 Joint Special Operation Forces, “Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach,” April 2010.
13
the dominant position of a country
with a view to preserving its national
interests alone, but now the objective
is different. Of course, the strategic
issue is still the defense of national
interests, but this is performed within
the context of an international
community trying to achieve peace
as well as democratic, sovereign and
economic progress in assisted nations.
Lastly and above all, a national army
is in theory a factor of domestic peace
with one aim: to defend the State
and its people. It is essentially a
demonstration of a stable order of
things and national unity. It should
therefore perform security missions
itself and not delegate those missions
to a foreign force, except on a
temporary basis. Moreover, every
national of those countries should be
able to do his duty in (re)constructing
his country, through his own
commitment and not that of foreign
troops.
military assistance today
Thus current operations demonstrate
the importance of efficient help in
training, organizing, preparing or
reorganizing a local armed force.
Military assistance, whether or
operational, is once again a course
of action which bolsters conventional
operations and is suited to
international relations today.
It enables France to reinforce a
partnership within a framework
directly exposing neither its security
nor its vital interests. As an integral
part of general military strategy, its
purpose is to establish long-term
French military influence among
recipient foreign armed forces, while
contributing to protect our forces
by limiting direct commitment in case
of conflict. Through commitment in
support of local armed forces, thanks
to well-trained staff personnel, armed
forces can reduce the political, human
and financial costs of an intervention
while supporting the national security
strategy defined by the White Paper.
Military assistance, which has been
internationally identified, observed
and acknowledged, is not neutral as it
is an important component of a State’s
influence strategy9.
The joint exploratory concept of
military assistance to a foreign force
thus defines the possible contribution
of French armed forces in this area.
It addresses generic situation No. 10
“Assistance to a foreign country ”
within the “ Concept of forces
employment ” (CIA – 01). An integral
part of the diplomacy of defense of
the French Ministry of Defense and
Veterans’ Affairs10, it includes two
aspects which can be complementary:
- Technical military assistance is
performed within the framework
of structural cooperation, which is
the responsibility of the Ministry
of Foreign and European Affairs
(Security and Defense Cooperation
Directorate). While relying on
the skills of armed forces, it is most
often performed within a non-hostile
environment.
- Operational military assistance is
most often performed in a hostile
or semi-hostile environment.
The supported State does not assume
all of its sovereign responsibilities.
The aim is also to decrease
the numbers of foreign forces which
may have been deployed there as
intervention forces. This last aspect
contributes to the concepts of
the comprehensive approach11,
stabilization, military influence in
support of operations, and counterinsurgency doctrine. Military
assistance can – or even must – be
sustained, as return on investment,
through future military cooperation
to be developed in support of the
national security strategy and
therefore of general military strategy.
Technical military assistance actions
within the framework of structural
cooperation are usually no matter
of urgency. They permit a gradual and
planned implementation of skills,
especially human skills. In the case
of operational military assistance,
excellent responsiveness is needed
for timely implementation of required
competences and skills. Actions may
be long-term.
the purpose of military
assistance
The French approach focuses on
making the recipient State selfsufficient after assistance. For that
purpose, by implementing operational
assistance detachments (DAO),
military assistance contributes to
building the capacities of host nation
armed forces (professional military
education, training, accompaniment,
equipment supply, etc.) through our
armed forces. The aim is to enable
the recipient nation to acquire
the security forces necessary to
exercise or restore sovereignty within
the scope of a comprehensive
approach. It can also be an integral
part of the wider scope of support to
institutions, particularly through
security system reform (SSR), and
possibly a demobilization,
disarmament and reintegration (DDR)
process.
It can be defined as follows:
❝ Operational military assistance is
performed by French armed forces
providing a foreign force with the
various areas of skills, knowledge,
9 A State’s influence strategy is the art of organizing and using its diplomatic, economic, informational, military and cultural capabilities in order to support its
national interests in the long term, through perceptions, representations, attitudes and behaviors.
10 DIA – 001, “ Joint doctrine on prevention, crisis prevention and defense diplomacy ” No. 000556/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP and 000014/DEF/EMA/SCRI/NP of July
3rd 2002, which provides that “defense diplomacy may be defined as participation of armed forces in activities of French diplomacy, which tries to prevent any
risk of a crisis, and to assist in the achievement of French objectives abroad. Outside any manifest crisis in a given country, it includes assistance from, or even
employment of military resources. ”
11 Guidelines on comprehensive approach No. 550 DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP.
SEPTEMBER 2012
14
doctrine
expertise and experience in the field
of defense and in the capability to
take action in an operation. Within
a bilateral, interagency or possibly
multinational framework,
operational military assistance
involves instructing, advising,
training, and even providing direct
military support for a foreign
country. It aims to:
- Reduce risks and prevent threats
to the stability of the recipient
nation, and/or
- Assist in restoring its sovereignty.
For any given situation, it is
performed as long as is necessary or
until the mission defined by signed
agreements is achieved.❞
Therefore the purposes of military
assistance may be:
- To create then support an armed
force (recruit, organize, train, equip,
provide direct support, provide
infrastructure) in accordance with
capabilities and chosen missions,
- To enhance an armed force by
developing its warfighting functions,
or by creating them (command and
control, intelligence, fires, maneuver,
sustainment, training of personnel
and particularly officers, counterinsurgency training) with a view to
its possible employment,
- To collaborate and cooperate
(advising on defense policy and
implementation, strategic planning
and evaluation of situations,
responsiveness, cost management,
planning and budget development,
and interoperability with either our
own or regional forces) in order to
develop a lasting defense policy.
CEIA 3.21 identifies possible missions
as well as the Ministry of Defense and
Veterans’ Affairs personnel
appropriate to achieve them. More
particularly, operational military
assistance requires long preparation
of personnel. Depending on missions,
theaters and local cultures, exhaustive
training including the various levels to
be trained (forces, leaders, HQ staffs)
should be provided for soldiers
assigned for military assistance.
Because they will be isolated in
the midst of a foreign force, including
possibly within a half-hostile or even
hostile operational context, personnel
should be carefully selected:
volunteering spirit, strong will, openmindedness, mental and
psychological resilience, strong
motivation for the mission and its
objectives, which will have to be
explained to the supported forces.
The selection of personnel should as
much as possible rely on individual
comprehension based on experience
gained from prior long-lasting
missions, perhaps in the countries
concerned.
Personnel should also be briefed on
the human environment of operations,
which may be defined as the network
of interactions between the individual
or collective players, organized into
systems, which may affect force
employment in a specific area.
The purpose of that briefing is to
provide the key for understanding
assisted forces and their human
environment, to enable operational
assistance teams to adapt their
behavior and skills to local forces.
to conclude, military assistance, whether technical or operational,
is a course of action which is relevant as regards France’s influence
strategy. it is integral to the country’s general military strategy,
in particular as part of prevention. its purpose is also to determine
French military influence after implementation. When
accomplishing a military assistance mission, the French soldier is
also an ambassador to local armed forces 
15
Military assistance in simulation –
the success of the JANUS community
ColoNel PhiliPPe CoSte, heAd of the SiMUlAtioN ANd oPerAtioNS reSeArCh diviSioN (dSro),
forCeS eMPloyMeNt doCtriNe CeNter (Cdef)
O
DSRO/CDEF
n 13-15 September 2011, thirty-three French and foreign members of a
unique community, the users of the JANUS simulation system, gathered near
Paris. Most of the Army staff know this simulation system, at least by name.
It is used to conduct exercises in the different stages of the officer training
curriculum, but also for forces training and doctrinal assessments. What is less
known, however, is that JANUS is used by several foreign armies under a
cooperation scheme that is more than ten years old.
JANUS offers a realistic representation of the area of operations.
SEPTEMBER 2012
16
DSRO/CDEF
International
Foreign officers and French cooperation officers during their annual forum.
J
ANUS simulates combined arms combat in a way that
makes it possible to control CPs from company team to
brigade level. During these exercises, trainees design
and run their operation from a TOC similar to that used in
real life without direct contact with simulation. It can be
accessed only by those representing neighboring or
subordinate units and the higher command echelon.
It replicates a two-sided tactical maneuver and penalizes
misuse of combat support or combat service support, a
lack of coordination or poor assessment of the enemy.
It then provides the detailed assessment that always
concludes an exercise – the after action review (AAR).
Since 2000, numerous JANUS cooperation agreements
have been signed. The first beneficiaries were the Tunisian
Junior Staff College and the War College in 2001. Then, in
2003, Morocco built a JANUS center at the Royal College
of Higher Military Studies (CREMS) in Kenitra. In 2005,
a JANUS center was set up at the Command and General
Staff College (ECEM) in Beirut and finally, in 2010, one was
created at the Belgrade Military Academy.
All these cooperation schemes relied on a three-phase
process:
- After studying the need and the possibilities offered
by schools, the initial phase was to set up and equip
the JANUS center, most often from new dedicated
infrastructure.
- The next phase, training staff and adapting the culture
of the institution’s management is more delicate. It is
therefore led by a French cooperation officer embedded
either in the center itself or at Academic Board level.
17
- Lastly, foreign centers gain autonomy following
the withdrawal of the French cooperation officer.
However, they continue to receive regular support from
the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) for
technical training and assistance.
Assistance is maintained by a community of JANUS users.
It is expressed by the permanent support network
implemented by CDEF and, specifically, at the annual
forum bringing together in France all French and foreign
commanders of JANUS centers.
This forum is an eagerly awaited event for the community,
as it enables all members to share their knowledge
of the tool, compare their experiences and present
original solutions to specific methods of simulation use.
CDEF seizes the opportunity to inform users on new
developments of the application and collect new needs
to be processed by the DSRO. As it can be easily tailored
to the specific requirements of each country thanks
to French control of its development, JANUS is capable
of meeting the needs of the various centers.
The advantage of simulation in officer training curriculums
and during overall replication exercises no doubt makes
it possible to emphasize French expertise in this area
and, more generally, in the areas of initial and advanced
training, through JANUS. Actions conducted for the benefit
of JANUS can demonstrate French experience in
simulation and, more generally, in initial and advanced
training. Moreover, simulation is often perceived by foreign
schools as a factor of excellence or even prestige.
SEPTEMBER 2012
POINT2 from France. Taking into account lessons learned
from their latest operations, the Lebanese are also
interested in simulation tailored to the training
requirements of artillery observers – the SOTA system.
This is how JANUS became a real influence vehicle beyond
the strict framework of simulation. A true French-style
military culture is regularly and cheaply spread in foreign
training and operational readiness centers and is reaching
a wide audience. In addition, the French language is
promoted, as JANUS is only run by French-speaking
operators and supervisors.
DSRO/CDEF
JANUS-focused cooperation has increased unceasingly as
simulation use becomes more developed. Having proved
its worth for leader training, simulation has became vital
for the readiness of units. Poor availability of resources
and the significant cost of exercises with major end
equipment have compelled the commanders of many
armies to favor simulation. In Morocco, going through
JANUS centers has become mandatory for units before
any exercise in open terrain and has been integrated into
the brigades’ standard training course in Lebanon. In Ben
Guerir, near Marrakesh, a second JANUS center has been
JANUS center at the Tunisian war college and staff school of BORDAL HALDER in the suburbs of Tunis
established for training Moroccan operational units
stationed in the north zone and a third center is planned
near Agadir for training units in the south zone.
In Lebanon, the JANUS center is now under the dual
supervision of the school and Army Headquarters for
battalions’ and brigades’ initial and advanced training.
In Tunisia, operational control of units is now based on a
new JANUS center created in the suburbs of Tunis, while
a third center is being built at El Hamma for training units
and infantry and artillery officers.
The excellent results achieved through JANUS simulation
have also generated new requirements for the training of
young officers and NCOs. It is through new actions of
cooperation that Lebanon, Morocco and Serbia have
acquired – or are currently acquiring – new simulation
tools such as ROMULUS1, INSTINCT or OPERATION FRENCH

Lastly, French doctrine is not left out. It stands as a
reference for cooperation officers preparing exercises
in foreign centers and is thus disseminated initially.
The most recent cooperation action took place in Serbia
and is illustrative of this. Setting up a JANUS center in
the Belgrade Military Academy led to the definition of
standards for initial and advanced training as well as
the development of functions for doctrine and lessons
learned in the Serbian Armed Forces Joint Staff.
Such cooperation initiated by simulation can then
contribute to improving the interoperability of forces
to facilitate their integration in multinational operations,
particularly in a European context.
1 ROMULUS: simulation developed by Army Personnel Command (DRHAT) for command levels 6 and 7.
2 INSTINCT and OPERATION FRENCH POINT: French adaptations of commercial games for training command
SEPTEMBER 2012
18
International
❝ Partnering❞ with local forces:
a British Army Perspective
Colonel AlexAnder Alderson MBe Phd,
l And ForCes ForCe develoPMent And trAining CoMMAnd
C
ontemporary and ‘classical’ counterinsurgency (COIN) theories emphasize
the importance of securing the local population, enabling the host nation’s
political processes, and developing the host nation’s security forces to establish
and maintain security. These ideas are enduring and British forces have a long history of
partnering with local forces to achieve these three imperatives. Close examination of
history shows that British Imperial control was expanded, maintained and eventually
handed over to local forces which were raised, trained and commanded by British
officers.
This process continues today because the logic of local forces providing security for their
own people is hard to challenge. As Steven Metz1 notes, there is a “long-standing truth of
counterinsurgency support: outsiders can influence the outcome, but only locals can
determine it. ” Building and fighting with local forces therefore required British officers who
could learn two or three languages, and understand and work with several cultures. They
had to be able to manage complex cultural or religious tensions which in normal life might
result in bitter inter-ethnic disputes and conflict. These were operational necessities, not
nice skills to have. They were very much as important as having good military skills.
The British Army’s history is a patchwork of small wars interspersed with occasional major
conflicts. This short paper looks at the British experience of partnering with local forces and
the cultural and professional impact this has had on the Army today. Small wars were those
where regular soldiers had to confront irregular enemies. To be successful, they had to
adapt organisations and tactics to deal with difficult terrain and even more difficult
opponents. «Plus ça change, ...».
Today, the British Army is partnering with the Afghan National Army and Uniformed Police
to confront the threat of extremists. Afghan Forces are essential to establishing and then
maintaining Afghanistan’s long-term security. The Army’s latest COIN doctrine (published
in 2010) blends old lessons with very recent experience, and today’s approach and
techniques in Afghanistan reflect the very many old lessons of historical campaigns.
This paper explains how and why such a distinctive approach has developed to an
important and enduring security issue: how to build local forces to maintain local security.
1 Steven Metz, Decision-making in Operation Iraqi Freedom: the Strategic Shift of 2007, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2010, p. 4.
19
india: the Foundation stone
One of the most important influences on the British approach comes from its time in India. It was, after all, the largest
volunteer army in history. It grew from small roots defending trading posts to become an army of over two and a half
million men. Its principal role was, until 1914, to secure British possessions in India. Initially this was from Indian rulers
and France’s imperial objectives. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the Army’s role was to protect India from the
Russian threat. The Army in India’s experience over two hundred years was important in shaping British thinking in two
areas.
The first was fighting the local people; the second was how to create and then lead and fight alongside local
forces.
Organised and trained on British Army lines, the Army in India remained distinctly Indian in character. However, there
was one important difference. The ethnic, linguistic, religious and caste divisions which ran through Indian society were
somehow neutralised by military discipline. The Army forged a new social identity for its soldiers, for example it allowed
families to live in the military camps, and it built loyalty by guaranteeing soldiers’ pay and providing good pensions as
reward for long, loyal service.
The Army in India’s nineteenth century expansion was the product of young adventurous officers going out and raising
irregular regiments. Regiments such as Skinner’s Horse, Hodson’s Horse and the élite Guides Cavalry were raised on a
largely tribal basis where kinship and ethnic loyalty bound the soldiers together. The deep local knowledge which British
officers gained in these conditions often made the difference between military and political success and failure. This was
particularly true in the remote and troublesome areas of the North-West Frontier—what is today’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan—where small detachments of Indian Army troops and a handful of British colonial
officers used traditional tribal organisations and rules to maintain control for much of the time.
The regular British Army also learned a great deal from serving across the Empire where British regiments worked
alongside local forces. In India, after the Mutiny in 1857, regulations were introduced to ensure that every Indian Army
brigade contained one British battalion. Whether commanding local forces or working alongside them, the Empire gave
officers and men experience of working with other cultures.
the dhofar Campaign ▬ 1970-1976
In the decades following the Second World War, British colonial rule ended but the operational imperative of working
with local forces remained. In fact, the experience of withdrawal emphasised the importance of local forces. In several
campaigns, the idea went far beyond training and operating with local regular forces to include the creation of local
irregular units. In Malaya, between 1948 and 1957, a large auxiliary home guard had to be raised to protect villagers
from Communist terrorists. In Borneo, following British intervention in 1963, the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)
recruited tribesmen from the jungle to act as scouts and to provide an informal surveillance screen to warn of
Indonesian incursions.
The lessons from these and other campaigns fed directly into the best example of British post-war partnering which took
place in the Dhofar Campaign in the Oman between 1970 and 1976. The campaign is generally considered to be one of
the most successful counter insurgency operations of its kind of the twentieth century. It contains many useful lessons
for today.
Dhofar is Oman’s southern province, bordering with Yemen. From the outset and for strategic political reasons, British
support to the Sultan of Oman was limited to an advisory role. Initially, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) only had two
battalions and small air and naval wings. By spring 1970, the Chinese-backed Dhofari insurgents operating out of Yemen
completely dominated Dhofar Province. The People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG)
wanted to destroy the old tribal structures and replace them with a Communist form of governance. Worryingly,
the Sultan had no real plan to deal with either the insurgents or the root cause of the insurgency.
In July 1970, Sultan Said Bin Taimur was replaced by his son, Qaboos bin Said, in a successful coup. Qaboos was half
Dhofari and was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He recognised that the war was being lost and set
out to reform the government’s strategy. British military advisers suggested a plan which emphasised intelligence, public
information, medical care for Dhofaris, veterinary care for Dhofari cattle, and the build-up of local forces. The campaign
plan was written to secure and pacify Dhofar from east to west and it was intended to accommodate the different
SEPTEMBER 2012
20
Flick/Brian Harrington Spier
International
Post at Mirbat (Dhofar, Oman) held by the British forces.
societal and religious needs of the local people. The Sultan and his government retained full command of the campaign
from its start to its completion. The British offered counter insurgency advice that had to be implemented by
the Omanis.
The British plan was to support the rapid expansion of SAF following the coup. This began by expanding the existing
system which used seconded and contracted officers from the British Army and Royal Marines. This had the advantage
of embedding officers within battalion command structures for long tours of duty. It is important to see what Brigadier
Iain Gardiner, who served in Oman as a platoon commander, said of the experience of working with SAF and
the personal qualities this required of British forces:
officers whom Britain sent to Oman, both contracted and regular, were highly trained
" The
volunteers. Most had the necessary commitment to stick it out and those who didn’t left pretty
soon… The patience and tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude
to be content with less than comfortable circumstances for prolonged periods; an
understanding of and sympathy for a foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a
new language; the flexibility, imagination and humility necessary to climb into the head of
the people who live by a very different set of assumptions; none of these are to be found
automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture. These attributes, and
the attitudes they imply, often have to be taught in addition to purely military skills2.
"
The other important development was once more led by the SAS. It created company-sized groups of light infantry,
called Firqat, to fight on the Jebel alongside their SAF counterparts and to provide security for cleared areas. Six to 10
SAS soldiers trained tribal fighters and then provided the command and control, medical and fire support for the Firqat
on operations. Being very tribal, the Firqat had distinct strengths and maintained a very individual identity. This
2 Ian Gardiner, In the Service to the Sultan (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2006), p. 197.
21
sometimes caused difficulties with discipline and command and control, but they were an important capability. This was
because they knew the local area and they attracted many surrendered enemy personnel who joined the Firqat and then
fought hard for the Sultan. Former enemy fighters provided a great deal of intelligence and their presence helped with
information operations. The Firqat played an important role in the war as General Tony Jeapes original proponents of a
concept that has been supported since by other commanders:
Firqats’ understanding of ground and their speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF
" The
troops, but when it came to straight military tactics the SAF’s discipline told every time. The two
forces were complementary; neither could have won the war alone3.
"
«Partnering» with local forces: Contemporary themes
The two examples highlight enduring and important themes and characteristics for effective partnering. It should be
evident that military success—defined as effective local forces, not just effective partnering—depends on professional
military knowledge and good, effective inter-personal skills which can help bridge often quite distinct cultural
differences. Partnering with local forces serves two important functions. The first is it improves our own contribution to
the operation through better knowledge and understanding of the environment. The second, and arguably the most
important, is to improve the host nation’s military capabilities so that they can provide effective security on their terms.
Good inter-personal skills are most important. They enable effective key leader engagement and are prerequisite in
conflict resolution. Skills necessary include the capacity for passive observation, judgement, and being able to work
effectively through interpreters; being able to interpret body language and expressions; understanding the role of
humour, power and authority; understanding local societal norms and expectations; and having an understanding
of how family life works. Military training on its own is not enough. It therefore has to be refocused to develop
the interpersonal skills that will provide soldiers with the mindset and skills to work comfortably with and for local
people and their armed forces. Understandably, not everyone is suited to direct partnering, just as not everyone is
good with the media. This means that some judgement is necessary about who is selected for partnering roles.
Rank is no guarantee that an individual will get on with his partner unit.
Partnering requires intelligence and information processes to be recalibrated to provide soldiers with a better
understanding of what is referred to as the ‘human terrain’. This requires an understanding not just of threats and
the people behind them, but also a clear view of who are the key influencers in local society, traditional formal and
informal social and power networks, their motivations, religion and culture, and illicit aspects of local life.
Understanding the difference between insurgents or extremists and their active and passive supporters will help shape
both the conduct of security operations but also how conflict resolution may be achieved. The relationship between
the local people and local forces will be important in determining how quickly this sort of important information will
be obtained from the population. Good partnering will produce effective local forces; effective local forces improve
the security situation and this is often rewarded by good intelligence from local people who want a better, more
peaceful life.
The crucial logic of ‘wars among the people’ is that it is the local people who are the prize. Local people determine if
the insurgents or extremists will win, or the government. Population-centric operations are not an alternative to
offensive counter-insurgent or counter-terrorist operations. They are a vital part of them and protecting the people has
to remain at the forefront of all operational planning. This means countering intimidation; thoroughly understanding
issues such as Escalation of Force; preventing and reducing civilian casualties; being able to deal effectively with
the aftermath of an incident where there are civilian casualties; and enabling freedom of movement for the population,
not just security forces. This needs a military mindset that recognizes that success is achieved through investing in
the both the population and their security forces—in ISAF’s case this is the Afghans—not through conducting effective
operations ourselves. This means moving at their tempo. All this must be supported by a clear moral and ethical
foundation. Soldiers partnering with local forces must understand the standards expected of local forces, and know
how to hold them accountable.
3 Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, (London: William Kimber Publishing 1980), p. 281.
SEPTEMBER 2012
22
International
Conclusion
The rewards of successfully using local troops are potentially enormous. The indigenous soldier can provide an insight
and understanding of the operating environment far more complete and deep than most foreign soldiers can ever
develop on their own. Using confident, competent indigenous forces help to build the legitimacy of their own
government and, certainly during COIN operations, on an operation to achieve significant information operations
successes and free British forces for other tasks.
Caporal Mark Webster/MOD - Crown copyright 2011
Today, partnering in Afghanistan emphasises the fundamental importance of the Afghans taking the security lead. It
correctly places Afghans at the forefront of the campaign. This requires Afghan understanding and agreement to ensure
success, and to avoid failure. COMISAF’s direction that all operations are to be conducted by ISAF and the Afghan
National Security Forces as a single, integrated entity working in partnership reinforces this. In the year since the
partnering policy was implemented, this has led to significant changes in the operational design in theatre and it has
transformed both the Afghans’ and ISAF’s ability to conduct population-centric COIN. Partnered operations, planned,
rehearsed, and conducted by commanders and troops living and working together, are now the norm. This is a major
achievement but further commitment to partner better and more widely, with ISAF supporting the ANSF, is required if its
full benefits are to be reaped. British forces are committed to developing Afghan capabilities so that Afghans can take
responsibility for their own security, on their terms, and for their people
British soldiers training the assisting and Afghan troops during an operation in 2010.
23
From RECAMP
to AMANI AFRICA
MAjOR GENERAl (REtIREd) FRANçOIs GONNEt,
dIRECtOR,
EURORECAMP/AMANI AFRICA tRAINING CyClE
L
aunched by France in 1998, the RECAMP
concept has for more than a decade
been the cornerstone of our military
cooperation with African nations.
Taken up by the EU in 2007 at strategic level,
this concept is today the tool on which
the African Union relies to develop
the African Standby Force (ASF), within
the framework of the strategic partnership
between the EU and Africa. In October 2010,
the African Union was thus for the first time
able to conduct an exercise on a continental
and strategic scale, called AMANI AFRICA1.
From RECAMP to EURORECAMP
About fifteen years ago, driven by ambition to help African
nations to develop their own peacekeeping capabilities
across their continent, France developed a concept based
on a threefold principle: voluntary participation, a
comprehensive approach and African ownership. It aims to
improve crisis prevention and African operations within a
regional integration framework. Initially, priority was given
to sub-regional organizations and the strategic level, but
this has gradually expanded to internationalization.
Cooperation, training and force commitment are the three
pillars on which the concept relies, applying at three
different levels: decision-makers, HQs and forces.
The strategic training of decision-makers is its major cycle,
lasting two years. A first exercise with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), RECAMP 1
(GUIDIMAKHA exercise) took place in Senegal in 1998
and validated the concept. This concept was continually
enhanced in the course of the next four exercises,
organized from 2000 to 2006 in various sub-regions of
the African continent2.
From 2002, the African Union became closely involved in
the RECAMP cycles (strengthening of African peacekeeping
capabilities), as did European and non-European partners
including Canada, Japan and Brazil. That gradual
internationalization logically led the EU to agree to take
over the major cycle at strategic level, as proposed by
France. France continues nevertheless to implement
the other dimensions of the RECAMP cycle within its
bilateral cooperation with African sub-regions.
In November 2007 the cycle, now called EURORECAMP,
was proposed to the African Union in order to help it
prepare the African Standby Force (ASF) for operations.
The EU asked France to be the framework nation,
conducting the cycle on its behalf, and a small team of
experts was built up in the first three months of 2008
to run it3. Based in Creil and sustained by the Joint Forces
and Training Staff (EMIA-FE4), it is under the authority
of retired Major general François Gonnet. To achieve its
mission, the light and responsive team is supported
by two service providers: on the one hand, the Canadian
1 “Peace in Africa” in the Swahili language.
2 RECAMP 2 on behalf of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), in January 2010 in Gabon, which involved 8 African countries as well as 8 other countries;
RECAMP 3 on behalf of SADC (Southern African Development Community), in February 2002 in Tanzania, which involved 16 African countries as well as 16 other countries;
RECAMP 4 on behalf of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) in November 2004 in Benin, which involved 12 African countries as well as 11 other countries;
RECAMP 5 on behalf of the Economic Community of Central African States, in 2006 in Cameroun, with participation of 11 African countries as well as 17 contributor countries,
with an additional operational-level training session in Libreville as well as a strategic-level training session in Luanda.
3 In addition to the team leader, the team includes a British military expert, acting as deputy leader; a French military expert, an Italian police expert, and a Finnish civilian expert.
4 Etat-major interarmées de forces et d’entraînement.
SEPTEMBER 2012
24
International
Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC), which has been
tasked with developing a basic scenario (CARANA)
which is reusable, as well as specific scenarios necessary
for conducting the cycle and performing the final exercise;
on the other, the French Economat des Armées (EdA),
whose task is to sustain the main training activities
included in the cycle. Assistance from those two
organizations was financed through joint funding
of €1.8 million from various EU Member States5 and
Canada, as well as through a contribution from France as
framework nation, amounting to €600,000 over 3 years.
The EURORECAMP team also created a website
(www.amaniafricacycle.org) to follow the progress of
the cycle, but could not replace official information channels
on the combined strategy which should no doubt have been
more fully developed by the African Union and the EU.
From EURORECAMP
to AMANI AFRICA
At the Lisbon summit in December 2007, the EU and Africa
agreed on a strategic partnership. One of its four main
objectives6 is to strengthen and promote peace, security
and democratic governance. Among the eight specific
partnerships selected within the framework of the first
Euro-African action plan extending over 2008-2010, this
area is considered a priority. Three focuses have been
identified: development of strategic dialogue in the fields
of peace and security, development of the African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA), and predictable peace
support operation financing. Within APSA, implementing
the African Standby Force is a priority of the two partners.
The African Union therefore accepted the European offer to
use EURORECAMP and decided to build its own planning
team within the African Union Commission (AUC). Made up
of permanent members of the Peace Support Operations
Division (PSOD) and based in Addis-Ababa, it was only
placed under the authority of retired General Samaila Iliya
(Nigeria) on November 21st 2008, during the cycle initiation
meeting. The cycle was then named AMANI AFRICA by the
African Union. Its implementation was thus launched and it
took place in 2009-2010, before ending with the final
lessons learned conference in Dakar, in late February 2011.
As early as the beginning of 2009, the various phases of
the cycle went without major difficulties, despite repeated
delays due to its experimental nature. This was the first
time a cycle of exercises focusing on training for planning
peace support operations took place on a continental
scale respecting an integrated approach7, in accordance
with African doctrine. Under these circumstances,
EURORECAMP proved an effective tool, setting
intermediate objectives on specific objectives while
allowing enough flexibility to tailor the cycle to the specific
requirements and priorities of our African partners.
Two essential phases were added to the initial pattern.
First, a Strategic Decision Makers Seminar (SDM) allowed
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to
validate the doctrine and decision-making process to be
implemented to deploy the African Standby Force. Then,
a strategic planning course, organized at the Joint Defense
College (CSID: Cours supérieur interarmées de defense)
in Yaoundé enabled some thirty senior African Union
Committee and Regional Economic Community/Regional
Divisions executives to become acquainted with African
Union doctrine and procedures.
AMANI AFRICA: the first pan-African
exercise at continental and strategic
level
The final CPX (command post exercise)8, in Addis Ababa
from October 13-17th 2010 was the culmination of the
AMANI AFRICA cycle. It involved around 100 civilian,
military and police representatives of the African continent,
organized into one African Union CP, one mission CP with
exercise control (EXCON) jointly performed by two planning
teams, and one assessment team. The purpose of the final
exercise, simulating the deployment of a peace support
mission, was to assess the ability of the African Union to
conduct such missions.
Despite difficulties due to its experimental nature and
heavy time constraints, particularly in its final phase,
AMANI AFRICA was completed successfully. That success
is easily explained: the cycle and the final exercise made
it possible to:
• gather for the first time about 150 civilian, military and
police personnel from the African Union and various
African regions for a single exercise implementing
identical doctrine and procedures;
• create useful training tools, reusable by the African
Union, which will retain ownership and access to such
items as the CARANA scenario and the “ aide-mémoire; ”
5 The European contributing countries are the following, in decreasing order of contribution: the UK, Germany, France, Finland, Luxemburg, Cyprus and Slovenia.
6 European Council document 16344/07 (press release 91), Lisbon, December 9th 2007.
7 The integrated approach involves considering the three components simultaneously (military, police and civilian) of a peace support operation, both in the planning and
execution phases.
8 A CPX (command post exercise) is a CP exercise without troop deployment.
25
SEPTEMBER 2012
Photo Caption: Roland telle
Strategic Decision Makers Seminar (April 2009 in Addis Ababa).
• improve awareness and perception of APSA among
African Union Member States, and increase African
ownership of the African Standby Force;
• assess accurately and tangibly the current ability of
the African Union to plan and conduct peace support
operations, and draw on lessons likely to improve them
in future.
Three areas on which the African Union must focus its
efforts were thus identified. In particular, the African Union
should set up the permanent and integrated nucleus of a
staff within the AUC, build a continental strategic
communications network, and develop its doctrinal and
conceptual body (standard operating procedures, etc.).
Realizing there is still a long way to go, the African
authorities, during the last EU-AFRICA Summit in Libya,
late November 2010, expressed their wish to continue
the partnership in the area of peace and security so as to
achieve the final objective which they have set: validation
of the ASF in 2015. AMANI AFRICA should therefore be
followed by a second cycle whose object is still to be
defined by the African Union. 2011 could be devoted to
the preparation of that second two-year cycle, which is
likely to be performed in 2012-2013.
SEPTEMBER 2012
On the European side, the new cycle will probably be
directed by a team based in Brussels, operating under
the political control of the Political and Security Committee
(PSC). This organization could facilitate necessary, deeper
involvement of European authorities in the conduct of that
aspect of joint strategy. Thus the European planning team
might receive guidelines from the head of peace and
security partnership, who is still to be appointed in
the new European External Action Service of the European
Union; the team could become part of a European agency
such as the European Union Military Staff (EUMS),
or the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
(CMPD), in charge exclusively of providing support for it.

Whatever organization will eventually be selected,
the EU, and France in particular, having launched
the process, can be pleased to have in EURORECAMP
a tool which is remarkably suited to the African Union’s
requirements and makes it possible to support progress
in ASF readiness.
26
Focus
The Vietnamese National Army – How France
assisted the young Vietnamese State
LieuTeNANT CoLoNeL (ReSeRVe) CLAude FRANC, PRojeCT MANAgeR, doCTRiNe diViSioN, CdeF
T
he foundations of the Vietnamese
National Army’s establishment
were laid on November 4-5th 1950
in Dalat, during a conference between
Letourneau1, Pignon2 and Bao Dai3.
The two parties agreed to create a
four-division Army with corresponding
support elements, i.e. 115,000 service
members whose cadre would initially
be largely provided by France and
equipment by the United States.
The following December 8th, France
recognized in a bipartite agreement
the full independence of the Vietnamese
Army, with its own command structure
as well as a central administration
comprising a Ministry and a General
Staff.
A month later, when General de Lattre
took command of the French
Expeditionary Corps, the creation
of this Army became a priority. Its
establishment would of course decide
the battle of manpower in favor of the
Expeditionary Corps, as the Parisian
headquarters were reluctant to grant
him the reinforcements he considered
necessary. However, for de Lattre,
the crux of the matter lay elsewhere.
He considered that creating this Army
would demonstrate clearly Vietnam’s
determination to defend its freedom,
and therefore that of the free world.
He thus hoped to put an end to Bao
Dai’s waiting-game. This was the reason
he did not object – far from it – to this
Army being under effective Vietnamese
command. This was central to his fierce
determination to create these units.
A French Military Mission was then set
up and placed under the command of
General Spillmann, recently arrived from
Metropolitan France. The Mission was
tasked with overseeing the
establishment of the National Army.
De Lattre simultaneously launched a
program to activate 25 infantry
battalions, 4 armored companies and
8 artillery batteries as well as various
command and support units.
At the same time, the United States were
approached with a view to them
supplying supply arms and equipment
to the Vietnamese Army. Although it
was swiftly agreed in principle and first
deliveries were planned, only
the triumphant voyage of de Lattre to
the United States in September 1951
would bring any movement on the
matter. The equipment which the United
States intended to ship was so overdue
that the establishment of new
Vietnamese units was necessarily
delayed, the battalions often fielding
only half of their standard issue of
equipment. Received and listened to by
America’s highest political and military
authorities, de Lattre would succeed and
the United States would assume provide
almost all of the equipment of the new
Vietnamese Army formations. However,
this situation of subjection to
Washington was to have unpleasant
consequences.
When de Lattre returned to France in late
1951, less than a year later, Vietnamese
Army personnel had more than doubled:
from 65,000 men including 30,000
active-duty personnel, it had reached a
strength of 128,000 men made up of
54,000 active-duty personnel, 59,000
standby troops and 15,000 conscripts4
called up further to Bao Dai’s
mobilization decree on 15th July, 1951.
It was task-organized in 35 battalions
as opposed to 11 one year previously.
As regards units of other branches,
29 had been created out of
the 47 planned. Concerning
the operational value of this Army,
General Spillmann rated it as follows:
“ One third of the battalions good, one
third very average and one third bad. ”
The battalions were established by
merging existing ones with voluntary
personnel. For example, for a battalion
whose TOE5 provided for a strength of
800 men, 350 officers, NCOs and soldiers
came from units already fielded
(“yellowed” units of the Expeditionary
Corps and units of the National Guard)
and 450 volunteers were assigned
alongside them for initial training.
At the end of a three-month common
training period, the merge was completed
and, properly supervised by elders, young
soldiers would fight honorably.
The true brake on the development of
the Vietnamese Army was not the issue
of manpower, as the high number of
1 Minister for Associated States.
2 French High Commissioner.
3 Former Emperor of Annam, head of the new Vietnamese State.
4 For their part, the Khmer Royal Army increased from 5,000 to 10,500 men and the Laos National Army from 4,000 to 9,500 men. In Gras, idem.
5 Table of Organization and Equipment. TOEs of Vietnamese National Army units were directly copied from those of the French Army.
27
He appointed Lieutenant Colonel Gribius,
a cavalryman, as Commander of
the active-duty officers’ school which
opened up in Dalat – EMIAD, the École
Militaire Interarmes de Dalat (Dalat
Combined Arms Military Academy) –
three months after the decision had been
made. In fact, Dalat soon became a
“Vietnamese Coëtquidan6.” Apart from
the fact that all training was conducted
in French, the curriculum as well as
the training methods were purely and
simply copied from what was being done
in Brittany’s moorland. This attempt at
symbiosis with the French example went
as far as the ceremonial and even
extended to the academy’s traditions.
However, it was clearly a Vietnamese, not
French, institution and the only colors to
fly over the school were the Vietnamese
yellow and gold. In 1951, for example,
the graduating classes provided
220 platoon leaders and the four
regional training schools which had
been created for the occasion, between
600 and 650. In total therefore, a little
less than 1,000 platoon leaders had been
trained within a year. However, a
minimum of 2,000 platoon leaders were
needed. De Lattre decided therefore to
create two schools of reserve officers,
Robert Bouvet/ECPAD
voluntary enlistments sufficed to cover
the needs of active-duty units.
The actual limitations would be the units’
leader-to-led ratio and equipment, two
areas which took far more time to
achieve than the induction and training
of young voluntary recruits. As American
deliveries were far behind schedule,
the activation of some formations had
to be delayed because they could not
be equipped.
The training of Vietnamese cadre,
notably at junior level, was deemed
extremely important by General de
Lattre. A great effort was made in this
area in 1951.
Graduation day at the Military School of Dalat, with Major General Bondis and His
Majesty Bao Dai in attendance, 2 December, 1951.
one in Nam Dinh and the other in Thu
Doc, and to call up a thousand young
Vietnamese graduates. The Vietnamese
government only managed to provide
767. At the end of the year, 800 young
Vietnamese officers straight out of
the newly created Vietnamese training
schools would be appointed to train
and lead regular units. They would be
supplemented by additional personnel
provided by General Spillmann’s7 French
Military Mission. In addition to liaising
between the Expeditionary Corps and
the Vietnamese National Army, the
Mission was also tasked with setting up
a pool of French officers who might be
seconded to the Vietnamese Army in
order to ensure the leadership of its units.
By early 1952, after much effort, 1,100
cadets were being trained in Vietnamese
training schools. The effort had been
huge. The target set was that, at the end
of 1952, all junior infantry officers and half
of those of other branches would be
“Vietnamized.” Whilst the similarity in
the programs for French and Vietnamese
platoon leaders was of course a
guarantee of cohesion in combat, it never
occurred to anybody at that time to
consider whether these training methods
would fit well with an Asian mentality.
It would be the same later for Thu Duc
and Nam Dinh. This attempt at instilling
the character of a Western Army into an
Asian Army was certainly not wise.
Whilst it was relatively easy to train junior
infantry officers8, the problem of senior
officers, however, turned out to be far
more complex. The answer would only
be found several years later. In the
meantime, French officers, graduates of
the Junior and Senior Staff Colleges, could
take over, especially for key positions at
headquarters level. As regards command
positions in late 1951, 20 infantry
battalions were under Vietnamese
command out of a total of 35.
On 1 May, 1952, the Vietnamese Army at
national level came into being when
General Headquarters, Vietnamese
6 Translator’s note: The French Military Academy is located at Coëtquidan, Brittany.
7 For example, from 1951, half of the junior Armor officers deployed in Indochina were serving in the ranks of formations of the Associated States.
8 The French Army, rearmed in 1943, tried it satisfactorily in Cherchell and would repeat it during the Algerian War.
SEPTEMBER 2012
28
Focus
Armed Forces, was established.
It directly oversaw four newly-created
military districts which corresponded
to North, Central and South Vietnam
as well as the Southern Highlands.
Emperor Bao Dai appointed as Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces General
Nguyen Van Hinh, formerly of
the French Air Force, where he had
served with the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel.
At that time, in 1952, the Vietnamese
Army had gone well beyond the initial
program of setting up six divisions,
dispersed between regions9. The
image of its early days, of disparate
units, of auxiliary or back-up forces for
the French Expeditionary Corps, was a
thing of the past. When the fall
campaign began in 1952, the
Vietnamese National Army had
become a reality.
Whilst the reality of this National Army
made French policy towards
the Associated States more tangible,
conversely, its training and
maintaining became increasingly
dependent on the United States.
It was conducted through the MAAG
(Military Aid and Advisory Group),
an American agency responsible for
disseminating aid and controlling its
use in the field, which provided
the US Army with first-class
opportunity for gaining influence in
the Vietnamese Army. In 1951,
American aid amounted to 149 billion
francs’ worth of equipment. In 1952,
it totaled 96 billion francs, including
86 billion franc’s worth of equipment.
France was unable to finance
the young Vietnamese Army’s
equipment and operating costs.
This Vietnamese subjection to US
financing would weigh heavily during
the French withdrawal.
What were the military capabilities
of the TDKQ (Tieu Doan Kinh Quan)
or light battalions? They were
battalions with a reduced strength of
625 men instead of the 820 provided
for in the standard battalion’s TOE.
Companies were equipped with light
infantry weapons only and organic fire
support was limited to 60mm mortars.
This made training personnel easier
and command of the companies and
battalion was also simplified, fire
coordination at those various levels
being reduced to its simplest
expression. Apart from major
operations against Viet Minh forces
or in guerrilla operations imposed on
them by the Viet Minh, the light TDKQ
battalions were committed at the local
level of the zone, under Vietnamese
command. In the Expeditionary Corps,
it was fashionable to look down on
them, but after a trial period, they
proved their effectiveness.
As the villages felt protected by their
presence, inhabitants abandoned
their reserve and began to rally
behind the new regime, slipping
away from Viet Minh clutches10.
The latter understood very quickly
the dangers of such a practice, in
terms of pacification and rallying
the population. They fiercely and
unrelentingly attacked the villages
concerned in order to prevent their
relief.
The objectives of the Vietnamese
leaders to increase the national Army’s
strength were entirely consistent with
those of the new Commander-in-Chief,
General Navarre, who assumed
command in May 1953.
The general scheme of his plan
covered a two-year period and had
been designed following contact with
all levels of command. It was based on
rapid development of the Vietnamese
Army. He expected it to relieve
the Expeditionary Corps of its static
territorial tasks by progressively taking
them over, from the first year, and
conducting its effort in the South of
Vietnam. Relieved of the static burden
of pacification areas and having
managed in that way to build up
powerful reserves, the Expeditionary
Corps could then represent a tool
capable of successfully opposing
the Viet Minh forces with favorable
relative combat power.
Operation Atlante proved to be
the high point of the Vietnamese
National Army’s engagement. It was
both an operation in the tactical
meaning of the word and a large-scale
pacification action, aiming to remove
the Viet Minh zone from Central
Annam – which extended over 400km
between the sea and the Highlands
south of Tourane up to the north of
Nha Trang – and then to bring it under
Vietnamese administration by rallying
the public en masse. The pacification
action failed, as the Vietnamese
National Army had not previously
prevailed over the opponent in a
tactical victory. With regard to
the Vietnamese National Army’s
formations, some behaved very well;
in late May, a mobile group made up
mostly of Vietnamese units stopped
a Viet Minh regiment which had broken
through. Nonetheless, every rose has
its thorn: this blocking action was to be
9 1st and 6th divisions in South Vietnam. 2nd division in Central Vietnam. 3rd and 5th divisions in North Vietnam. 4th division in the Southern Highlands. Source: Note No. 2460/EMIFT/1, 8
November, 1952. Origin: Historical Branch, Defense Department (SHD).
10 Revue Historique des Armées No. 194, March 1994, page 29. Interview of General Hinh, by the Air Force Historical Branch.
29
conducted by two Vietnamese mobile
groups, but the second was, alas, on
strike at the time11!
The rest is history: Diem, encouraged
by the United States, toppled Bao Dai
whose power was by then mostly
nominal, and established his own
power as a dictator, with the national
Army coming under the direct control
of the Americans. While the last French
personnel were still in Saigon, they
witnessed what must have been
difficult to bear: Vietnamese officers
conspicuously burning their French
rank badges and replacing them with
those of the U.S. Army. The page had
turned for good
11 Quoted by Colonel Grintchenko in L’opération
Atlante, ultime operation de pacification en
Indochine (Operation Atlante, the final
pacification operation in Indochina), Doctrine No.
12, May 2007.
ECPAD
While negotiations were underway
in Geneva, Bao Dai considered that
the salvation of a nationalist Vietnam
lay in US support and called on Diem,
their loyal supporter, to form a
government. To stem the flow of
desertions that began to spread within
the units, the Chief of Staff, Hinh,
managed to convince Diem to enlist
the support of the French Navy to
evacuate the 17th Parallel units,
families, and the population who
wished to live in the South, in a
nationalist Vietnam, away from the
Communists. Despite his apparent
anti-French feelings, Diem accepted
and tasked his Chief of Staff with
carrying out the operation, knowing he
had only three months under the
terms of the armistice agreement.
Visit of Mr Letourneau, Minister of State for Associated States, and presentation
of General de Lattre de Tassigny, the new French High Commissioner in Indochina
and Commander-in-Chief, in December 1950.
SEPTEMBER 2012
30
Focus
A center of excellence in culture
learning for readiness training:
The Specialized Military Center for French
overseas departments and Territories and
Foreign Countries (eMSoMe)1
BRigAdieR geNeRAL BeRTRANd NoiRTiN, eNSoMe CoMMANdeR, 2009-2011
Focused on culture learning for any soldier committed outside Metropolitan France on short-or longterm missions, and also on overseas operations since 2003, ENSOME provides preparation for living
abroad, allowing troops to acquire behavior suited to the host nation from the outset.
Situated in Rueil-Malmaison2 on the prestigious Guynemer site of the former Swiss Guards barracks
which were erected in 1754, EMSOME is the French Army training center for all personnel assigned
to serve in French overseas departments and territories or abroad. It is thus under the authority of
the Military Training and Schools Department.
hile the prerequisites for
Alliance disengagement in
Afghanistan are still being
drawn up, counterinsurgency methods
are now beginning to bear fruit. In this
context, the French soldiers’ remarkable
adaptability, their behavior and their
relative ease among the populace
whatever the terrain or operational
environment arouse growing interest
among foreign armed forces, particularly
those of the US.
W
Those skills may be regarded as the
legacy of a rich, lasting colonial history
which gradually spread to all French
armed forces through professionalization.
Far from being innate, these skills require
constant training to be retained. This is
the rationale and the main mission of
EMSOME.
The Center was established to provide
training for service in the French
colonies. At a time when attention is
focused on a strategy for Afghanistan’s
crisis exit, does the Center remain
relevant? What are its current missions?
What are its resources?
As all current engagements are
undertaken among populations, a center
devoted to culture learning clearly
addresses a major requirement by
contributing to operational readiness
training of deployed personnel. No
French soldier can today be deployed on
a theater or territory without some
knowledge of its human and
geographical features, and of any risks.
Created in 1901, the Technical Office
for Colonial Troops3 (BTTC, Bureau
Technique des Troupes Coloniales)
trained mission leaders before their
departure for Africa, the Middle East
or the Far East. This organization
addressed the needs of the many
soldiers serving overseas at that time
across France’s Colonial Empire.
Their missions in the field were never
limited to mere military action.
From that period, CHETOM4 has kept
invaluable historical records.
After decolonization, France chose to
preserve a sizeable footprint in most
of its former colonies as well as
numerous cooperation missions,
mainly in Africa, maintaining the
relevance of BTTC’s successors.
New developments in the international
context, as described in the White Paper,
as well as the increasing number of
operations outside Metropolitan
Further information: www.emsome.terre.defense.gouv.fr
1 EMSOME: Ecole militaire de spécialisation de l’outre-mer et de l’étranger.
2 Translator’s note: Rueil-Malmaison is located in the western suburbs of Paris.
3 Translator’s note: the Troupes de Marine were called Troupes Coloniales (Colonial Troops) from 1900 to 1958. They are part of the French Army.
4 The Center for Overseas Troops History and Studies (CHETOM, Centre d’Histoire et d’Etudes des Troupes d’Outre-Mer), created in 1996, is located alongside the Troupes de Marine
Museum in Fréjus. It makes available 10,000 specialized works to historians and research workers as well as numerous documents which can be read on-site.
31
SEPTEMBER 2012
Caporal-chef SEYCHELLES - 5ème RIAOM
research with its USMC
counterpart, the Center
for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning (CAOCL).
US Marines are
developing a “cultural
awareness” module
similar to French
readiness training, to
integrate the culture
factor in unit operational
readiness training, aiming
to better apprehend
the environment of
theaters in which their
units are committed.
With limited but sufficient
resources, the Center
provides a wide range
Conversation over combat rations.
of training tailored to
all types of students,
France, rapidly pushed the French
covering all theaters or territories
armed forces towards
where French troops are deployed.
professionalization and adjustment of
It thus instructs more than 26,000
their overseas positioning. Of course,
trainees a year, with emphasis placed
culture learning by deployed
upon behavior, key to the success
personnel proved an operational
of any mission outside Metropolitan
requirement in the conduct of
France.
missions and an additional asset in
the resolution of modern conflicts. And
Twelve regularly retrained specialist
while the French forces demonstrate
instructors provide training and
real talent for such missions, it is
monitor more than twenty theaters.
important to maintain and hone those
Each year, the multimedia library
skills. That task was officially entrusted
publishes a monograph covering
to EMSOME in 2003.
46 territories, which is provided to
students. Its infrastructure and central
Since then, the Center has been able
location near Paris are additional
to adapt so as to become a link in
significant assets for training many
the forces’ operational readiness
individuals originating from all French
training chain, whose influence now
armed forces units. Originally
reaches far beyond the Army itself.
reserved for Army personnel, most
The French cultural approach has
training courses are now open to
appealed to the US armed forces in
trainees from the Air Force, Navy,
particular. General Conway, then
joint directorates and Gendarmerie,
Commandant of the Marine Corps,
who account for 16% of all trainees.
visited the Center in November 2009,
as did Major General BEYDLER,
The common purpose of all training
commanding the Strategy and Plans
courses is to hand down the “ keys ”
Division at USMC HQ, in March 2010.
which will enable units and
EMSOME increased its cooperation in
individuals to adapt and be integrated
the area of theater human terrain
naturally in their new environment
SEPTEMBER 2012
and to know how to behave with
the various social-cultural groups or
foreign forces among which they
will have to achieve their missions.
The training courses, of one week
maximum, are intended for all troops
of every rank, as well as their
partners. They are tailored to
the knowledge and experience of
the personnel to be trained. They are
usually enhanced by academic
contributions from organizations
specialized in geopolitical issues.

The main training courses are:
- Predeployment training: an
instructor is assigned to the
modules earmarked for an overseas
operation or a short-term mission,
usually within the supporting
battalion. For half a day, the
instructor provides basic knowledge
concerning the anticipated theater
(geography, history, culture,
economy, etc.), and also practical
advice on the behavior to adopt
there to be best integrated in the
environment. Individual soldiers are
gathered into sessions, and receive
training directly in Rueil-Malmaison.
- Country information: before
departure, individual soldiers – and
partners – assigned abroad or to
overseas France for a long-term
mission may be provided with a
one-day information course in RueilMalmaison. They receive thorough
information about the place where
they are to be deployed. Half of
that day is devoted to general
information, the other half to
practical advice (administrative
formalities, daily life, health issues,
children’s schooling, etc.).
32
Focus
- Key personnel training courses: some
key personnel (force commander,
higher echelon commander, joint
force commanders and battalion
commanding officers) are expected
to be given responsibilities in
overseas France or abroad, in
permanent contact with a civilian
environment and/or local armed
forces. Those key personnel can
attend advanced training for three
days in Rueil-Malmaison, giving them
an overview of the sub-region and
very good knowledge of their
assigned territory.
Caporal-chef MASRAR - 3ème RAMa
- Specific training courses: military
higher authorities (Army Inspector
General, Brigadier General
commanding the French Foreign
Legion, etc.) due to tour or inspect
sites in overseas France or abroad
are provided with specific training
courses. In addition, instructors go
to the Army Human Resources
Directorate (DRHAT, Direction des
Ressources Humaines de l’Armée
de Terre) every year in order to train
administrators on the specificities
of territories.
- Officers and NCOs courses: young
army leaders expecting to serve
outside Metropolitan France can
attend a one-week adaptation training
session before being assigned to their
first long-term mission. This training
provides a complete overview of
French deployments in overseas
France and abroad, enabling them
to widen their general knowledge
(origin and consequences of current
conflicts, social and cultural
specificities of local populations, etc.).
- NATO courses: since 2010,
the Center has been the lead agency
for the training of the 300 cadre
personnel assigned to NATO posts,
relayed by Oberammergau teams.
R
elying on a core group
of specialized trainers,
the Center provides
specialized and up-to-date
training for all personnel
deployed outside Metropolitan
France regardless of their level
of responsibility, enabling them
to fully apprehend their
operational “expatriation”.
Although EMSOME is a
specialized center of learning
outside the ordinary training
courses and devoted to culture
learning, it is above all a
readiness training body; it is
seen as an authority with skills
recognized by French and
foreign Armies as well as in
the civilian world
Initiation to women’s daily tasks in Dioroko, Chad.
33
a french officer in a regionally oriented national school (enVR)1
naVy commandeR chRistian Queffélec,
Regionally oRiented national school (enVR) of yaoundé, cameRoon
Regionally-oRiented national schools: « a flagship pRoject »
o
ne of the most emblematic actions of the french security and defense cooperation
directorate (dcsd) is the support provided to regionally-oriented national schools
(enVR). created on the basis of an agreement between france and a host nation, they
have taken a major role as on instrument for the training of african military elites. these
national specialized schools are primarily focused on regions but their reach extends over
the whole african continent. enVRs are supported by france through the dcsd and sometimes
by other partners as well. there are sixteen schools located in ten african countries, attended
every year by approximately 1,400 students from over 30 countries (42 french cooperation
workers are deployed).
the courses proposed address all the typical areas of security cooperation including health,
mine clearance, law enforcement, criminal investigation, general engineering and leader
development. civil protection or maritime security will soon be available. over 60 different
courses are delivered.
all the principles of action of the dcsd are emphasized, including ownership, transparency,
partnership, sustained action and influence.
the csid, a recent creation
T
he Advanced Joint Defense School of Yaoundé
(CSID, Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense),
which I joined in summer 2010 through the Security
and Defense Cooperation Directorate, is the fruit of shared
efforts by the Governments of Cameroon and France in the
early 2000s. Four years of joint work and reflections
culminated in the creation of the school on January 13th,
2005 by decree of the President of Cameroon, and the first
students joined the school in September of that same year.
The CSID brings together future 2nd level higher military
education graduates from the three services and
the Gendarmerie. Its mission is to prepare field grade officers
to take on high responsibilities in their respective services,
in high level headquarters, and joint, allied and international
organizations. Depending on cases, officers are appointed
either following a selective competitive examination or
through a full application submitted by candidate countries.
After a strictly national first year, the CSID received three
foreign students in 2006, and seven in 2007. In 2008-2009,
the 4th group brought together 33 students from 19 African
countries.
1 Ecole nationale à vocation régionale.
SEPTEMBER 2012
34
Témoignages
Focus
Focus
In order for the CSID to become and to remain a centre of
excellence of 2nd level higher military education in Africa,
Cameroon and France signed an agreement establishing a
partnership with the Joint Defense College (CID, Collège
Interarmées de Défense) which returned to its former name
of “Ecole de Guerre” (War College) on January 1st, 2011.
This agreement allows effective exchanges between
the two academies, including retraining of leaders,
prestigious speakers’ conferences, student participation
in planning exercises in Paris, and joint development of
training programs. The training provided by this college
for African military elites is now recognized as equal to that
of the Paris War College.
In March 2009, the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) honored the CSID by placing it among its
centers of excellence for the strategic level in peacekeepers
training. The arrival of the first French student-officer
in September 2009 was a second strong recognition of
the level achieved by the school.
Arriving in Cameroon two weeks before the beginning
of the academic year, I had just enough time to adapt to
the daily life in Cameroon, or «tropicalize” myself, before
welcoming the new CSID group on September 15th.
I was positively surprised when I first visited the school,
located in Symbock, in the suburbs of Yaoundé. It is isolated
at the foot of Mount Eloundem, similar to a «morro»
(mound) of Rio de Janeiro (see photo). The CSID is thus
located in a pleasant location, with one foot in the city and
one in nature. On the other hand, it takes no less than half an
hour to reach the center of Yaoundé, which can be a problem
for the students staying at the school as most of them do
not have a vehicle.
I then met the eleven Cameroonian supervisors from
the academic affairs department. Some knew me already,
as I had met them when the fifth class visited Paris for a
study trip. The welcome was warm and this first impression
was not contradicted.
As the students arrived, I tried to identify them from
their uniforms, national badges or physical traits.
After the Frenchman, the American and Cameroonians,
it took me little time to know each of them thanks to the time
spent together and the various common activities (courses,
fact-finding missions, shared classes at the University of
Yaoundé II-Soa for their master’s degree, exercises, etc.).
photo Capitaine de Frégate Christian Queffélec
Lastly, for the academic year 2010-2011, an American
student came to join the group which included nineteen
other nationalities from Sub-Saharan Africa.
The ambition of the school is to increase the number of
students from 33 to 42 in the short term, and up to 60 at a
later stage. The CSID also hopes to integrate other nonAfrican students. In a context of partnership three French
officers who graduated from the War College and originate
from the three services have been given training
responsibilities in the school.
the experience of a newly assigned
cooperation worker
The CSID at the foot of Mount Eloundem
35
Focus
photo fournie par la DCSD
module, as did my colleague from the French
Army. Most of the remaining third was handled
by a delegation of experts from the Libreville Joint
Staff. This module followed a seminar on strategy
and aimed to enable students to tackle
the learning of planning method, followed by an
application exercise.
As an organizer, I am currently working on
the development of an «operational
communication» module alongside the director
of a Yaoundé journalism school.
A classroom
There are fewer students here than at the Paris War College,
but they nevertheless have the same pride and the same
thirst for knowledge and for engaging with planning method
or strategy.
My «tropicalization» continued, as I observed lectures on
geopolitics of Africa delivered by professors at the University
of Yaoundé (I was not submitted to assessment) and through
the presentations the students made of their own armed
forces.
Then came the time to switch from observer to lecturer in a
module entitled «knowledge of the armed forces,» as did my
French colleagues from the other services. I thus presented a
«generic» navy, stating the specificities and issues involved
in the sea environment and maritime world. I also presented
the various fields of action and the specialized equipment
and tactics associated with them. As the class included only
two naval officers, my objective was to provide sufficient
knowledge for the other students to integrate naval actions
in their operational level planning exercises.
This module was completed and illustrated by visits to
Cameroonian army regiments in the West of the country and
air and naval bases in Douala. A visit to the «Delta» base of
the rapid reaction battalions (BIR, bataillons d’intervention
rapide) in Limbé (south-west) also gave me the opportunity
to see some of the assets deployed by the country in
the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, specifically
in the Bakassi area.
The «joint knowledge» cycle aimed to provide the students
with the basic knowledge for the employment of forces
in joint operations. I conducted a third of the classes in this
SEPTEMBER 2012
While preparing and delivering courses, I realized
that I would have to extract from French concepts
the elements that would later be useful to African
students, either in their own armed forces, whose sizes and
structures differed greatly from those of the French, or as
members of a multinational force operating on the continent.
This implies rapidly understanding the contexts in which
the students will have to operate.
One of the difficulties in achieving the «Africanization»
of the contents of strategic education is the fact that
the strategic culture hardly exists and that African concept
and military doctrine documents are scarce. Similarly, it is
difficult to illustrate the course with examples taken from
wars between African countries as the bibliography covering
these conflicts is almost non-existent. These facts led my
Army counterpart to set up a committee of students
dedicated to the study of African military history.
Nevertheless, the Africanization of education is making
progress. The students of this class, like their predecessors
no doubt, are so eager to learn that one can but be
optimistic about the development of this strategic culture.
This is clear from the enthusiasm raised by the strategy
seminar and the many questions that punctuate each class.
I
was assigned to the CSID at a time when
the school was no longer in its early
stages, and I have the pleasant
impression that I am participating in an
expanding human adventure. I am optimistic
for the future, as the enthusiasm of students
and of the staff is palpable 
36
Focus
OMLTs:
French and Afghan Brothers-in-Arms
COLONeL JeAN-FrANçOiS MArTiNi,
COMMANder, FreNCh OMLTS iN AFghANiSTAN, MAy-NOveMBer 2009.
T
his article, based on the speech delivered by Colonel Martini to the Parliamentary Committee on
National Defense and the Armed Forces in 2010, describes how land forces’ military assistance in
support of local forces takes shape throughout an OMLT mandate.
“I am particularly honored to be called to testify regarding my involvement in OMLTs in 2009. It is
always a pleasure for a commander to see the work of his men valued.”
I would like to focus on three key points for the period
from May to November 2009: very high tension and
numerous engagements were of little surprise to us, as
summer always being a good time for them; elections in
August, leading to numerous security problems; and finally, a
change of zone and brigade, as our OMLTs (Operational
Mentoring and Liaison Teams) moved to the French zone in
Kapisa-Surobi.
“
Six months hand in hand at both company
and brigade level, with a single aim – an
autonomous ANA.
OMLT teams were set up to help the ANA (Afghan National
Army) gain autonomy. With this aim, our mission was twofold:
on the one hand, initial and advanced training in the field –
which took up 70% of our time – and on the other, liaison –
30% of our time – both within the ANA as well as between
the ANA and coalition forces in order to provide the necessary
support resources that the Afghans don’t have, such as air
assets for casualty evacuation and fire support. Combat
support was not an aim per se, but a consequence of the two
previous dimensions; we always took care to let the Afghans
lead fighting themselves.
The ANA is a young army – it’s been around for seven or eight
years– which has been built up gradually. Initially consisting of
a single battalion (kandak), it currently has five corps.
Its strength increases regularly. The aim is to reach
37
260,000 personnel by 2014, which is significant for a country of
34 million inhabitants. It is fully involved in securing
the country and as such assumes command over the majority
of joint operations with coalition forces.
The military personnel joining OMLTs are not run-of-the-mill
soldiers: they volunteer for it and are selected on criteria of
maturity, composure, teaching skills, and the ability to fight
and live in a hostile environment. They are separated from
their parent units and form teams of six, ahead of a 6-month
training course including physical, English language and
technical training covering a broad spectrum from the use of
Afghan arms, to knowledge of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) or combat first aid, to guidance of US aircraft. Building
up solid knowledge of ANA standard missions also takes up a
fair amount of time. On arrival in-theatre, the first two weeks
are set aside for a final training phase incorporating the latest
developments of the situation on the ground.
With no restrictions on employment, they can operate
independently and may be deployed throughout Afghan
territory, which is not the case of all OMLTs provided by other
coalition countries. French teams can thus accompany the
Afghan units with which they work across the entire territory.
French OMLTs, with a footprint of about 220 service members,
are attached to an ANA brigade – totaling 2,600 men – and
distributed among its battalions. Each battalion is supervised
by a group of fifty French OMLT personnel, divided into teams
of six personnel per company of 90 to 100 Afghan soldiers
with whom they live on a permanent basis for the six months
of their deployment. Each six-man team, the very heart of
the OMLT, is issued with two vehicles. It is made up of a
platoon leader, a first lieutenant or captain; a platoon
sergeant, a seasoned NCO; and soldiers, each with a different
MOS1 (communications, engineering, medical, crew-served
weapons). A seventh has great importance: the interpreter.
He is a full member of the team, lives with it for the duration
of the mission, goes fighting with the unit and contributes a
great deal into the mission. A team of 50 OMLT personnel
assists the brigade staff.
We worked in two zones under the control of the 201st Afghan
corps, an elite unit whose mission is to protect Kabul and
which has the best generals and officers in the ANA. We first
worked in a US environment, in the Wardak, Logar and
Bamyan areas, and then in a French environment, in Kapisa
and Surobi with Task Force La Fayette.
Stealthy, clever and responsive opponents.
Concerning the terrain, the aim is always the same, regardless
of the area: to secure the logistical routes supplying Kabul or
bypassing it to the north. These routes go through valleys, and
insurgent safe heavens are located in the mountains or
adjacent valleys. This topography explains why areas of
confrontation are concentrated along these routes, where
we need freedom of action and the insurgents aim to deprive
us of it.
It is difficult to come up with a general typology of insurgents.
We face several types of insurgency, closely associating
criminals and Taliban. For ten insurgents, in the broad sense,
there are two real Taliban who are dedicated and trained, and
eight combatants who fight part-time or provide contractual
assistance for a fee. For example, participation in laying an
IED is paid between $100 and $200 – far more than a month’s
salary. The insurgents, in groups of 3 to 20 people, know the
area perfectly, and some have been roving it more than thirty
years. They monitor us and are familiar with our techniques to
which they adapt very quickly, forcing us to adapt regularly.
It’s clear that when we prevent them from bringing pressure
to bear on our common stake – the local population – we
generate greater insurgent activity. The ANA, with the help
of OMLTs, seeks to restore the population’s confidence and
security. This largely explains Taliban activism.
1 Translator’s note: Military Occupational Specialty.
SEPTEMBER 2012
All-encompassing, comprehensive and permanent coordination – a demanding priority for OMLTs.
Our first assignment area, the Wardak, was under American
command. There were five US battalions, positioned along
routes, and six ANA battalions, on the same positions and
tasked with the same missions, as well as a Jordanian
battalion and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
responsible for reconstruction, development, security and
governance. Coordination between all these elements, a task
of paramount importance, was conducted by OMLTs.
In northern Wardak, American and ANA positions were often
co-located and OMLTs ensured coordination. ANA units and
their OMLTs were however occasionally isolated.
The Combat Operating Post (COP) is a fortified camp behind
earth berms, which includes living and combat areas.
For six consecutive months, French OMLT personnel and
the Afghans of the ANA live together in a COP, which is
generally isolated and difficult to sustain, except by helicopter
and often by night. They are located in valleys along routes
they are tasked with defending, and may be protected from
potential dangers from the surrounding heights by small
observation posts preventing the enemy from infiltrating their
positions. During elections, mobile posts were set up, which
were constantly harassed by insurgents.
About three quarters of the way through our mandate, we
moved from the Wardak and Logar areas to Kapisa and
Surobi. This move presented a particular difficulty as it was
to be conducted without stopping the supervision of ANA
brigades under the combined responsibilities of the
Americans and the French in the middle of Ramadan.
The Kapisa-Surobi area includes a main axis whose opening
is currently the major issue in order to create a bypass around
Kabul to reach the Salang Tunnel in the north without going
via the capital. We found the same topography of strategic
axes in valleys, with adjacent valleys being used as safe havens
by insurgents. Some of their names, like Alasay, crop up
regularly in the news. In this area, more OMLTs are alone with
Afghans rather than co-located with coalition forces. COPs are
set up according to the same principle as previously described.
In Surobi, the disposition is the same, with many additional
small posts occupied on an irregular basis by the ANA.
On a day-to-day basis, OMLTs are under four different
command structures: the French chain of command, under
the Armed Forces Chief of Staff; that of the coalition, i.e.
the ISAF (International Security Assistance force) chain of
command; Training Control, whose purpose is to control
38
Focus
Photo fournie par l’auteur
Similarly, the combined arms dimension is still very
lacking: they struggle to use their guns, their engineers,
or even their nascent aviation. Planning is almost nonexistent at headquarters level.
Missions conducted by OMLTs cover the whole spectrum,
from civil-military cooperation to reconnaissance to
supply. The format of the forces committed varies a lot
and is tailored to each operation. OMLTs sometimes
operate alone for internal missions. Most operations
however are conducted in coordination with the coalition
force in charge of the zone (battlespace owner).
Exchanges of gifts between brothers in arms
the way training is provided; and finally the Afghan chain of
command. Contrary to our practice, the Afghan Interior and
Defense ministers do not hesitate to deal directly with units,
bypassing usual command structures.
The OMLTs were deployed for two years with the 201st ANA
Corps first brigade, bringing it to the highest operational level
(CM 1), which allows it to act entirely independently.
The Afghans were very proud to obtain this qualification. They
also welcomed the fact that these results had been obtained
with French military support, which they particularly appreciate.
The progress was perhaps less immediately visible as regards
the third brigade; when we arrived, it already had a significant
operational level.
Total operational commitment in support of local forces – a
unique and extremely rewarding mission for any French soldier.
All in all, I am firmly convinced of the usefulness and the
effectiveness of our supervising mission. I believe it is due
largely to the relationship of confidence between the French
and the Afghans. Soldiers eat together, fight together and get
to know each other. My men would show the same emotion for
the death of an Afghan soldier as for that of a French soldier,
proving that they did not distinguish between combatants. It
was a matter of confidence: when I traveled with General Razik,
I trusted him completely. He would introduce me to our
contacts as “his brother,” a very strong term in Afghan culture.
The Afghan soldiers are men of great value, excellent fighters
with great courage and very high reactivity. I’d like also to
emphasize that the results we achieved were possible because
these soldiers were independent of any tribal demands and
were loyal to the State.
Of course, the Afghan Army still has much progress to make,
particularly regarding command: its officers must move from
the concept of gang leader to that of military commander.
39
Let me now say a few words about the future and
the challenges faced by OMLTs in Afghanistan. To combat
an insurgency effectively, it is admitted that one soldier
is needed per 50 inhabitants. In the Wardak and Logar areas,
the ratio was only 0.45 soldiers per 50 inhabitants. Because
of insufficient resources, we had to focus on certain populated
areas. The buildup of the ANA should allow better coverage
and physical occupation of the terrain.
The second issue is intelligence. The ANA has no intelligence
culture. It often satisfies itself with information purchased from
informers of highly variable credibility. We improved the sharing
of intelligence with deployed forces so that from now on
exchanges are conducted in real time, which often gives a
decisive advantage.
Our commitment in a zone controlled by French forces
facilitated our work as were fully au fait with methods and
procedures and could work in the same language. Cooperation
was just as satisfactory with other allies, but we needed
additional time to adjust.
To conclude, I would like to state once more that
OMLT missions are difficult, with soldiers subjected
to constant pressure in extreme conditions. Often
isolated, they must respond to almost daily conflicts.
Despite these difficulties, we are proud of concrete
achievements. I am a fervent advocate of our method,
which allows the ANA to acquire skills. The Afghans
are building up their autonomy and are truly
dedicated to achieving this goal. Lastly, I would like to
emphasize that the resources at our disposal were
most substantial: this is the first time I have had such
resources available to me and we lacked nothing to
accomplish our missions. Beyond these elements,
I must say that my involvement in Afghanistan has
been a highly rewarding and extraordinary human
experience
DOCTRINE
TAcTIQUE
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center

Military assistance to a foreign country

Transcription

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