Voir le texte intégral de ce prix - Ontario Police Arbitration Commission
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Voir le texte intégral de ce prix - Ontario Police Arbitration Commission
In the Matter of an Arbitration between The Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board and The Niagara Region Police Association (Pay Audit Grievance) Richard L. Jackson, Sole Arbitrator Before: Appearances: For the Association: Mike Pratt Richard Frayne Ron Stewart George Onich Administrator President Director Director For the Board: Woodward B. McKaig Bob Rippey Lynne Pay Chris Fisher Counsel Member Director, Human Resources Finance and Budget Analyst A hearing was held in this matter in St. Catharines on December 4, 1997. This is an arbitration between the Niagara Regional Police Services Board and the Police Association. The Association grieves that, in introducing a change in policy and procedure with respect to the annual pay audit, the Board violated the collective agreement. It asks that I so find. Background The situation giving rise to this grievance is somewhat complicated and confining. Accordingly, I will start with a brief history, then set out the evidence and arguments of the parties. The action giving rise to the grievance has its roots in 1986, when the parties negotiated a Compressed Work Week System, under which some officers would work four 12-hour shifts, followed by four days off The basic structure of the new system is seen in the following schematic, an excerpt from the shift schedule for December 1997: December 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1997 M T W T F S S M T W 12-A N N D D N N N N D D 12-B 12-C 12-D D D D D N N D D N N The officers on " D Platoon, for example, would work a 12-hour day shift on Monday, December 8, and Tuesday, December 9, a 12-hour night shift that Wednesday and Thursday, and would then have the next four days OK Friday, December 12, and Saturday, December 13, would be covered by "B" and "C" Platoon on days and nights, respectively, while Sunday and Monday would be covered by "A" and "B" Platoons on days and nights, respectively. Under this new system, officers would work, over the long term, an average of 42 hours per week. Given the traditional 40-hour week in the Niagara Police Service, the parties agreed that every officer on the compressed work week system would receive 104 hours of "float time" each year, to be added to the lieu-time bank1 in order to compensate officers for the extra two hours above 40 hours per week. From the outset, the parties understood that officers on each of the four different platoons would work slightly different numbers of hours in any given year, depending on how their shifts and days off actually fell during the calendar year. Nevertheless, they did not see this as a problem in the early years, given the fact that, over a four-year period, every officer in all four platoons would work the same number of hours per week. In assuming this, the parties failed to consider that some officers were transferred between platoons and, as a result, might end up working slightly more or slightly fewer hours than other officers worked, but be paid the same amount. One officer in this situation grieved. As a result, the parties agreed in 1989 to institute an annual audit of hours. Under the audit, officers were to be measured against the 2080-hour benchmark.* That is to say, officers who were found to have worked more than 2080 hours would have float-time added to their lieu-time banks to reflect that fact, while those who had worked fewer than 2080 hours would have float-time subtracted from their banks. Thus, after the 104-hour lieu-time adjustment, and also after any hrther lieu-time adjustment arising out of the annual audit, officers on the 12-hour shift (hereinafter referred to as "C.W.W. officers") would have what might be thought of as "net remaining compensable hours" of 2080 per year. The grievance arose out of the following situation that precipitated an action by the Board. On one hand and as noted above, C.W.W. officers have net remaining 1 This figure was the result of the following calculation: [42 hours (actually worked per week, on average) - 40 hours (the appropriate theoretical hours per week)] x 52 weeks. 2 The basis of the 2080-hour benchmark was that it was the product of 40 (hours per week) x 52 weeks. compensable hours of 2080 after the general adjustment of 104 hours and any specific adjustments arising out of the annual audit. On the other hand, these officers are paid the identical dollar amount received each week by those officers (of the same rank) on straight 8-hour days-that is, 40 times their annual salary divided by 2080. While all of this seems entirely logical on its face, there is a problem: namely, that the officers on straight 8-hour days (hereinafter referred to as "8-hour officers") actually work more, on average, than 2080 hours per year. The reasons for this are, first, that the 365 days in a normal year make slightly more than 52 weeks3 and, second, Leap Years have an extra day, so that every fourth year has an extra 24 hours. As a result, while 8hour officers always receive 40 hours' pay at their hourly rate of pay (their annual salary divided by 2080), every fourth year, they receive 53 rather than 52 pays. Thus, for example, 8-hour officers worked and were paid for 2096 hours in 1996 (a Leap Year) while, in 1995, they worked and were paid for 2080 and, in 1997, will have worked and been paid for 2088 hours. Given that the pay of the C.W.W. officers (who, after the lieutime adjustments are made, always have 2080 remaining compensable hours), is identical-in terms of both the amount and thefrequency of their paycheques-to that of the 8-hour officers, it can be argued that they are being paid for hours not worked. That is exactly the Board's perspective on the matter; the Board views the C.W.W. officers as having been paid for 2096 hours in 1996, but having worked only 2080, in terms of remaining compensable hours-that is, the working hours that remain to be compensated after both the 104-hour and the pay-audit lieu-time adjustments. The Association views it differently. The specific action giving rise to this grievance was the Board's unilateral decision to change the base of the 1996 annual pay audit.4 Rather than base the audit on 2080 hours, as had been the case since its inception in 1989, the Board used a new audit base of 2096 hours-that is, the exact number of hours worked by the 8-hour officers. Officers who had worked fewer than 2096 hours had their lieu-time banks adjusted downwards, 3 7 (days) divided into 365 (days) = 52.143 (weeks) = 52 weeks + 1 day (approximately). For Leap Years, this becomes 366 lvided by 7 = 52.286 weeks. Over a four-year period, the average number of weeks in a year is 52.178. That is, the audit conducted in January 1997 with respect to calendar 1996. while the banks of those with more than 2096 were adjusted upwards. The net result of this was that C.W.W. officers lost compensation, relative to the way they had been, and would have been, treated under the 2080-hour audit base. The Association argues, first, that the Board's action violates the collective agreement or, in the alternative, that the Board should at least be estopped from unilaterally implementing this change for the 1996 calendar year. Evidence The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts, which is now set out. Agreed Statement of Facts Re: 1996 Pay Audit Grievance Niagara Regional Police Members work 8, 10, or 12 hour shift. There are 388 Members who work 12 hour shifts and 118 who work 10 hour shifts. The 10 and 12 hour workers work what is called "compressed work weeks". Compressed work week workers are paid on the same basis as the 8 hour day shift workers, that is they are paid for 40 hours work each Thursday, subject to a 2 week lag, notwithstanding that the compressed work week workers will work more or less than 40 hours in any given week. In 1986, the compressed work week system was instituted. It was agreed by both management and Association that the hours worked would not be equal in a given year but over a four year period, they would work out. In the late 1980s, some Members who had been transferred from platoon to platoon complained about being treated unfairly with respect to hours. Accordingly, an audit of hours was instituted in 1989. A compressed work week worker works an average of 42 hours per week whlch amounts to an extra 104 hours per year. These Members receive 104 hours off during the year as "float" time. When the audit of hours started in 1989, it was decided that the hours should be audited against 2080 hours (52 weeks times 40 hours). In 1996, an 8 hour day shift worker worked and was paid for 2096 hours. 10. In 1996, a compressed work week worker, after the audit reduced his effective hours worker to 2080 hours, received pay for 2096 hours. 1 1. Since 1989, the hours paid to each 8 hour day worker and each compressed work week worker are as follows: 1989 2080 1990 2088 1991 2088 1992 2096 1993 2088 1994 2080 1995 2080 1996 2096 1997 2088 In each of those years, 8-hour-day workers worked the stated number of hours and were paid for those hours. However, compressed work week workers after the float time was taken and the audit process was completed, were audited against a work year of 2080 hours but were paid pursuant to the hourly equivalent as set out above. 12. The general "audit of hours" issue has been negotiated at collective bargaining sessions at various times, at least since 1993 in reference to the administrative difficulties in terms of carrying out the audit process and the current language (Article 5.09 Uniform, and 4.10 Civilian) was negotiated in connection with an attempt to alleviate the administrative problem. There was no discussion by either the Board or the Association of any overpayment to compressed work week workers. The provisions from the 1995 collective agreement which may be relevant to this situation are the following. Article 2 -Salaries 2.01 The annual salary of each member of the Bargaining Unit for the year 1995 shall be in accordance with Appendix " A and made part of this Agreement. 2.02 The Niagara Police Board agrees that the salaries shall be paid to the members of the Bargaining Unit weekly, and such weekly pay period will be on Friday of each week. Article 5 - Hours of Duty 5.01 A four platoon shfi system of three eight (8) hour shifts shall be established whereby a member shall be on duty for eight consecutive hours, followed by at least sixteen (16) consecutive hours off duty.. .. 5.06 A normal work week shall consist of forty (40) hours, but allowing for the four platoon shift system and subject to the provisions of the foregoing subsections, the hours of work shall consist of one hundred and sixty (160) hours out of every two hundred and twenty-four (224) hours, or twentyeight (28) day period. 5.08 Effective January 1, 1988, Articles 5,6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 22,23, and Appendix "B" shall be amended in accordance with the 12 hour Compressed Work Week System provisions, as set out in Appendix "E" attached hereto. Effective January 1, 1989 Articles 5,6,7,9, 11, 12,22,23 and Appendix ''I3'' shall be amended in accordance with the 10 hour Compressed Work Week System provisions, as set out in Appendix "F'attached hereto. 5.09 To ensure that no member has been scheduled to work more or less than 2,080 hours in a calendar year, the following rules relating to an audit of hours shall apply: (a) On or before March 1" of each year, each member shall meet with his or her supervisor and review the relevant material provided by the payroll office... (f) This provision applies only to those members who have worked a Compressed Work Week during the course of the calendar year and "debits" and "credits" are those that arise directly as a result of working such a system. Article 6 -Overtime 6.01 Overtime shall mean all hours worked in excess of a regular tour of duty, and shall be paid for at time and one-half for all such hours worked, save and except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Agreement. 6.05 Overtime worked and paid for in cash or by cheque shall be computed at an hourly rate based on the annual salary of the member affected at the time such overtime is worked, divided by 2,080 being the total annual regular hours of work.. . Article 13-Court Allowance 13.02 The hourly rate of pay shall be based on the annual salary of each member of the S e ~ c affected, e divided by 2,080, being the total annual regular hours of work. 13.05 Each member of the Service who is required to attend a Court sitting as a witness while off duty on annual vacation or on a statutory holiday, because of his or her duties and status as a Police Officer, shall be paid in cash or by cheque or by way of tie off as set out in Articles 6.03 and 6.04 herein, a minimum of four (4) hours of pay at double the member's regularly hourly rate.. ..The hourly rate of pay shall be based on the annual salary of each member of the Service affected, divided by 2,080, being the total annual regular hours of work. 30.11 The arbitrator shall not have the jurisdiction to alter or change any of the provisions of this Agreement or to substitute any new provision in lieu thereof, nor to give any decision inconsistent with the terms and provisions of +is Agreement or to deal with any matter not related to the subject matter of this Agreement. Re: 12 Hour Com~ressedWork Week Svstem 5.01 A four platoon system of twelve hour shift scheduling shall be established, whereby a member shall be on duty for twelve consecutive hours, followed by at least twelve consecutive hours off duty. A normal shift cycle shall contain two (2) twelve hour consecutive night shifts in accordance with the schedule set out in Schedule " A attached hereto. A normal twelve (12) hour duty shift shall be as follows: Day Shift: 0700 to 1900 hrs. Night Shift: 1900 to 0700 hrs. or: 0800 to 2000 hrs. or: 2000 to 0800 hrs. Each member, while on hidher twelve hour duty shift shall have there out, two rest or lunch periods of forty-five (45) minutes duration each. One is to be scheduled midway through the first six hours of the sift, the other midway through the second six hours of the shift. Lunch or rest periods not taken as a result of work commitments shall be paid for at straight time. 5.06 A normal work week shall consist of forty (40) hours but allowing for the Compressed Work Week System, a normal work week under the 12 hour shift schedule averages 42 hours per calendar week; therefore a bank of 104 hours "Float Time" is credited over the period of a year. Ninety-six (96) hours of that bank shall be characterized as "leave days" and scheduling of those days shall be administered in accordance with the process and time lines as established for Annual and Statutory leave days pursuant to Appendix "B". The remaining eight (8) hour float time shall be taken off during the course of the calendar year in which it was credited by agreement between the member and hidher supervisor. In circumstances of illness or Duty Injury, a member may not be able to take time off when required. Therefore it will be banked and taken off at a later time in accordance with this Agreement. 5.09 No change. 6.01 No change. 6.05 Overtime worked and paid for in cash or by cheque shall be computed at an hourly rate based on the annual salary of the member affected at the time such overtime is worked, divided by 2,080 being the total annual regular hours of work. Time worked in excess of a member's scheduled tour of duty shall not be deemed as overtime unless it exceeds fifteen (15) minutes. Re: 10 Hour Com~ressedWork Week Schedule 5.01 A ten hour shift scheduling system shall be established, hereby a member shall be on duty for ten consecutive hours, followed by at least fourteen consecutive hours off duty, unless the parties agree otherwise. The normal shift cycles shall be in accordance with Appendices "A to H" as attached hereto. A normal ten (10) hour duty shift shall be as follows: Day Shift: or: 0700 to 1700 hrs Afternoon Shift: 1200 to 2200 hrs 0800 to 1800 hrs or: 1400 to 2400 hrs or: 1500 to 0100 hrs or: 1600 to 0200 hrs Each member, while on their ten hour duty shift shall have there out, a rest or lunch period of seventy-five (75) minutes duration. Lunch or rest periods not taken as a result of work commitments shall be paid for at straight time. 5.02 A member's days off shall be established in accordance with the shift schedule. 5.06 A normal work week under the 10 hours shift schedule shall average 40 hours per calendar week 5.09 No change. 6.05 Overtime worked and paid for in cash or by cheque shall be computed at the hourly rate based on the annual salary of the member affected at the time such overtime is worked, divided by 2,080 being the total annual regular hours of work. Time worked in excess of ten (10) hour per tour of duty shall not be deemed as overtime unless it exceeds fifteen (15) minutes. The Compressed Work Week was instituted in 1986 on the basis of a report by the "Compressed Work Week Committee", a joint labour-management committee. Pursuant to the recommendations of this Committee, the parties executed a letter of understanding, part of which is set out below. Letter of Understanding Between: The Niagara Regional Board of Commissioners of Police (Hereinafter called the "Niagara Police Board) and The Niagara Region Police Association (Hereinafter called the "Association") Re: 12 Hour Com~ressedWork Week Svstem The Niagara Police Board and the Association hereby agree to implement a 12 Hour Compressed Work Week System subject to the following terms and conditions: 1. The Association and the Force Administration shall jointly monitor the Scheduling System via a committee known as the Compressed Work Week Committee. The Committee will function in accordance with the Information Manual as established in the Policy and Procedures of the Force. 2. The 12 Hour Compressed Work Week System shall commence on January la, 1987 and terminate on December 3 la', 1987, unless otheNvise agreed by both parties. 3. The 12 Hour Compressed Work Week System may be extended by mutual agreement of the parties, otherwise all Members affected shall revert back to the shift schedule that was in effect on December 3 1" 1984, as of January la, 1988. 4. During the tenure of this Letter of Understanding, the following Articles of the Uniform Branch Collective Agreement shall operate as hereinafter specified, for those members assigned to work the 12 Hour Compressed Work Week Schedule: Article 5 - Hours of Duty 5.01 A four platoon system of twelve hour shift scheduling shall be established, whereby a member shall be on duty for twelve consecutive hours, followed by at least twelve consecutive hours off duty. A normal shift cycle shall contain two (2) twelve hour consecutive day shifts followed by two (2) twelve hour consecutive night shifts in accordance with the schedule set out in Appendix " A attached hereto. A normal twelve (12) hour duty shift shall be as follows: Day Shift: 0700 to 1900 hrs Night Shift: 1900 to 0700 hrs or: 0800 to 2000 hrs or: 2000 to 0800 hrs Each member, while on his twelve hour duty shift shall have thereout, two rest or lunch periods of forty-five (45) minutes duration each. One is to be scheduled midway through the first six hours of the shift, the other midway through the second six hours. 5.02 A member's days off shall be established in accordance with the shift schedule. 5.03 No change. 5.04 No change. 5.05 No change. 5.06 A normal work week under the 12 hour shift schedule averages 42 hours per calendar week; therefore a bank of 104 hours "Float Time" is earned over the period of a year. This "Float Time7'must be taken off by the end of the year therefore the year must be divided into quarters. For the purpose of controlling this "Float Time", 26 hours "Float Time" will be taken off in each quarter by agreement between the member and his supervisor. The member shall be advised of any time left outstanding in the quarter. Any time not taken off by the first day of the thrd month in the quarter shall be taken off prior to the end of each quarter. If the member fails to provide a time off schedule upon request of the supervisor, such time will be designated by the supervisor in a minimum of four hour blocks. In circumstances of illness or Duty Injury, a member may not be able to take the time off when required. Therefore it will be banked and taken off at a later time in accordance with this Article. 5.07 No change. Artlcle 6 - Overtime 6.01 No change. 6.02 No change. 6.03 No change. 6.04 No change. 6.05 Overtime worked and paid for in cash or by cheque shall be computed at an hourly rate based on the annual salary of the member affected at the time such overtime is worked, divided by 2,080 being the total annual regular hours of work. Time worked in excess of twelve (12) hours per tour of duty shall not be deemed as overtime unless it exceeds fifteen (15) minutes. 6.06 No change. Civilian employees Article 4 - Hours of Duty Shall provide the same as the Uniform Branch Article 5 provisions. Article 5 - Shift Premiums 5.01 Civilian members required to work the shift system as provided for in Article 4 shall receive thirty-four cents ($.34) per hour additional compensation for all hours worked on the night shifts only. Article 6 - Overtime Shall provide the same as the Uniform Branch Article 6 provisions. Detective Richard Frayne, President of the Niagara Regional Police Association, testified at the hearing that it was his understanding that, when the Force instituted the compressed work week in December 1986, there was to be no change in pay, that all Board employees-including both 8-hour and C.W.W. officers-were to continue to be paid once per week, on ~ h u r s d a ~and s , ~that they were to receive 40 hours' pay at the appropriate hourly rate, which was their annual salary divided by 2080. According to Detective Frayne, this was the case with the move to the compressed work week in 1986 and remains the case today. Detective Frayne also testified that, until the 1997 audit of 1996 pay, the annual pay audit always used the figure 2080 as the benchmark. Ms Lynne Pay, Director of Human Resources for the Niagara Regional Police Service, testified for the Board that she first became aware of the fact that C.W.W. officerswere paid for more hours than they actually worked in January 1997, when it was raised in a meeting with Lucy Stevens, Director of Finance, and Chris Fisher, Finance and Budget Analyst. It was then brought to the attention of the Police Services Board and, ultimately, a decision was made that C.W.W. officers should be adjusted back to the level 5 The evidence made clear that employees were paid on Thursdays, even though Article 2.02 of the collective agreement states that they are to be paid on Fridays. of uncompensated hours they actually worked-namely, 2080. Pursuant to that decision, the Chief of Police sent out a memorandum, part of which is reproduced below. MEMORANDUM TO: All District and Division Commanders DATE: 97-02-23 FROM: Chief J. Grant Waddell SUBJECT: 1996 AUDIT OF HOURS INFORMATION Information relating to the 1996 Audit of Hours is now available and is being distributed for your attention. The Audit is primarily directed to those members who work a compressed work week and all C.W.W. members must advise. in writing, how time owing is to be handled. All members in 1996 were paid for 2096 hours and relevant adjustments will be made accordingly.. . In 1997, members assigned as follows with Shift Base B Platoon C Platoon D Platoon I 2208 2196 2220 2184 Hours Worked Less Float I I A Platoon I 104 104 104 104 discrepancies should reflect: Difference from Audit Base 2080 Hours I 2104 2092 2116 2080 Difference from Hours Paid in 1996 2096 Hours + 24 + 12 + 36 0 * All Audit adjustments will be based on the difference between hours actually worked, the Audit base of 2080 hours and the actual hours paid (2096) in 1996. The Chiefs memo was supplemented three days later by the following memo from Chris Fisher. MEMORANDUM To: TO ALL COMPRESSED WORK WEEK PERSONNEL Date: 1997-02.26 From: Chris Fisher, FinancialBudget Analyst Subject: 1996 AUDIT OF HOURS & 1997 HOURS OF PAY In addition to the correspondence dated 97-02.14 to "All District and Division Commanders" in reference to the 1996 Audit of Hours, please note the following: Members who were assigned to work the following shift base in 1996, with no discrevancies, will have been scheduled to work: Shift Hours Worked Difference from Hours Paid (2096) A PLATOON 2208 less float (104) for a total of 2 104 hours + 8 hours B PLATOON 2196 less float (104) for a total of 2092 hours - 4 hours C PLATOON 2184 less float (104) for a total of 2080 hours - 16 hours D PLATOON 2196 less float (104) for a total of 2092 hours - 4 hours NOTE: For those members thinking about 1997 hours, be advised that each person with no discrepancies will normally receive 2088 hours of pay in 1997. Therefore, you may want to consider working 2088 hours, when reviewing your 1997 work schedule. For your information, Chris Fisher It is the decision reflected in these memoranda which the Association is grieving; that is to say, the decision to adjust lieu-time banks relative to 2096 hours of work rather than 2080. Ms Pay also testified that she and Ms Stevens, Director of Finance, had had several complaints from officers on 8- and 10-hour shifts, to the effect that C.W.W. officers were getting a benefit not enjoyed by other officers. Mr. Chris Fisher, who was Director of Finance from 1989 to 1995 and, from that point on, FinanceJBudget Analyst, also testified for the Board with respect to the compressed work week. Mr. Fisher was asked what the intent or purpose of the annual pay audit was. His response was that it was intended to ensure that all C.W.W. officers were treated equally vis-a-vis all other compressed work week employees; that is, that they were paid equally in terms of pay for hours worked. In response to a question as to why the audit was tied to the figure of 2080, Mr. Fisher responded that 2080 was established as the benchmark because it was the product of 52 (weeks) times 40 (hours), and that the parties making that decision simply "did not look at a calendar7'-that is, they failed to realize that there are slightly more than 52 weeks in the average year. Mr. Fisher explained that, in fact, in most years, there are 52 weeks plus one extra paid day and, in Leap Years, 52 weeks plus two paid days. Thus, with a system that generates a cheque for 40 hours of pay (at the rate of one's annual salary divided by 2080) every Thursday, employees will receive 52 pays each year for three years but, in the fourth year, they will receive 53 pays. Mr. Fisher was asked, in examination-in-chief, what could have been done in 1989 to correct this problem. He answered that there were three possible solutions. First, the parties could have made 2088, rather than 2080, the benchmark against which the audit was to be done. Second, the wording in Article 5.09 of the collective agreement could be changed so as to make the audit base equal to the hours an 8-hour employee actually performed in a given year. Finally, the actual pay of the C.W.W. officers could be based on salary divided by the number of hours actually worked in a given year, rather than 2080. Mr. Fisher testified that he had first realized that this was a problem in late 1991 or early 1992. At that time, he had orally drawn his concerns to the attention of the thenDirector of Administration, Larry Inman, as well as to the then-Chief of Police, John Shoveller. Mr. Fisher testified that he did not know what Mr. Inman or Chief Shoveller did about the problem, but that he was not asked to prepare any sort of report for the Board or take any firther action. In any event, nothing was done about the situation until the Board's decision in January of 1997. Finally, it should be noted that, in negotiations for the 1996-97 collective agreement, the Board proposed a change to the pay system in order that officers no longer receive payment for the extra day in Leap Years. While this request was denied by the arbitration board, of which I was chair, Lucy Stevens's written explanation of the Board's proposal was submitted into evidence by the Association in this arbitration. It is reproduced below. Leap Day An attempt at explaining the payroll process in a leap year. The Niagara Regional Police Service personnel are paid on an hourly basis. Each position has an annual rate, which is then reduced to an hourly rate. For example, a first class constable has a base salary of $5 1,278.66 which, based on 2080 hours a year equals an hourly rate of $24.65. The pay is calculated on the actual hours worked in the year. For payroll purposes, the pay week runs from Monday to Sunday. Therefore, in any given year the amount of pay any individual receives may or may not be equal to 2080 hours. In 1996, an eight hour employee worked and was paid for 2096 hours. This happened because there were 52 weeks plus 2 days in the calendar year. December 3013 1 pays will be reflected in the 1997 T4's of the employees. In most years, an 8 hour/day employee works 261 days or 2088 hours. This was the case in 1995 and will be in 1997 and 1998. To equate this to the earning of the employee, a first class constable who is in a day shift will be paid $5 1,476 most years. In 1996 calendar year the pay was increased to $5 1,673 reflecting the extra day in the year. Since the employees on the compressed work week are paid in the same manner as the 8 hour employee an inequality occurs as a result of the float bank equation. Each first class constable will be paid for 262 days. However, due to the 2080 hour cap, 16 hours will be added to the float bank of every member on the compressed work week schedule. Therefore, they will have received pay for 2096 hours but only be required to work 2080 hours. In setting the base of hours for the audit purposes, if the compressed work week continues, the hours paid to an 8 hour employee must be used as the benchmark. An average daily cost for based salaries in the NRPS is 130,000. By requesting that each member have a day off without pay in the leap year the effect on each member would be unnoticed over the prior year's pay. Base salary $51,279 Actual calendar pay $5 1,476 Leap Year pay $51,673 Arguments As set out above, the Association advanced two lines of argument. Their first argument was that, in unilaterally changing the pay audit to a baseline of 2096, the Board violated the collective agreement. Essentially, this argument is founded on the notion that the parties understood that the 8-hour employees actually worked and were paid for more than 2080 hours and, when the compressed work week was brought in, it was the parties' intent that, notwithstanding that the C.W.W. officers would work 2080 hours (after the 104 lieu-time adjustment), they would continue to receive identical pay to the 8-hour people - that is, for more than 2080 hours. This slightly higher hourly rate would make sense, after all, since C.W.W. officers work night and weekend shifts, and don't receive overtime, even thought they will work 48 hours in one week. According to the Association's argument, it simply is not credible that the parties would have not have seen this, given the importance of salaries to employees, and given that this regime was drawn up by experienced and sophisticated police labour relations practitioners. This was confirmed, according to the Association, by the fact that, although this situation was drawn to the attention of the Chief of Police and Director of Administration in late1991 or early 1992, they did nothing to change it. We must conclude, in other words, that they did nothing about it because they knew that was the way it was supposed to be. The Association's second argument was that, should I find that the Board's action did not violate the collective agreement, then I should at least find that the Board should be estopped from taking the action it did, given the Association's detrimental reliance on the practice. The earliest the Board should be allowed to act should be 1999, with respect to the calendar year, 1998, according to the Association. The Association cited the following cases for my assistance: Re CN-CP Telecommunicationsand Canadian Telecommunications Union, 4L.A.C. (3d) 205 (Beatty, 1981); Re Canadian National Raihvay Co. et al. and Beatty et al., 128 D.L.R. (3d) 236 (Osler, 198 1); Re Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. and United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 175,24 L.A.C. (4")) 2 11, (Brown, 1991). The Board argued, on the other hand, that it was all a mistake, that the parties really did not realize the implications of what they were doing. To use Mr. Fisher's words, they "didn't look at the calendar" and failed to take into account that there are more than 52 weeks in any year. In other words, they built a salary-payment process on the assumption that there are exactly 52 weeks in every year, left it in place for many years, and only when the Board realized and engaged with the true implications did it try to remedy the pay-for-hours-not-worked flaw by adjusting the audit base for the 1996 calendar year from 2080 to 2096. The Board cited the following cases for my assistance: Brown & Beatty, 8:1410; Re Northern College of Applied Arts and Technology and Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 21 L.A.C. (4th) 82, 23 C.L.A.S. 435 (Burkett, 1991); Re Lincoln County Board of Education and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1 5 2 ' 3 1 L A C . (4th) 327 (Whitehead, 1993); Re Corporation of City of Belleville and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 907, 42 L.A.C. (4th) 224 (Allison, 1994); Re United Electrical Workers, Local 512, and Standard Coil Products (Canada) Ltd , 2 2 L.A.C. 377 (Weiler, 1971); Re Ottawa Board of Education and Federation of Women Teachers' Federations, 25 L.A.C. (3d) 146 (Picher, 1986). Decision The first question that must be addressed is whether or not, as the Association argues, the Board has violated the collective agreement in using a base of 2096 hours for the audit of hours worked over the calendar year 1996. To answer this question requires a detailed analysis of the collective agreement, but not just of Article 5.09, because this situation is an outgrowth of a large, complex, and long-standing set of factors. Starting from the beginning, then, the collective agreement between the parties makes clear the following: 1. that officers are to be paid weekly (Article 2.02); 2. that the normal work week is 40 hours (Article 5.06). Taken together, Articles 2.02 and 5.06 require that officers-all officers-be paid regularly once per week for 40 hours of work. The question that arises at this point is at what rate these 40 hours of work should be paid for these hours. Articles 6 and 13 seem to answer that question, especially the latter. Article 13 deals with court allowance, and 13.02 uses this language: The hourly rate of pay shall be based on the annual salary of eaqh member of the Service affected, divided by 2080, being the total annual regular hours of work. Article 13.05 refers to "the member's regular hourly rate" in the first sentence and, then, in the third sentence, defines that term as "the annual salary of each member.. .divided by 2080.. . ." Article 6.05 uses language similar to that of 13.02: Overtime worked and paid for in cash or by cheque shall be computed at an hourly rate based on the annual salary of the member affected at the time such overtime is worked, divided by 2,080 being the total annual regular hours of work. Article 13 provides for pay at time and a half for court attendance while off duty and Article 6 provides for pay at time and a half for overtime. Both articles make clear that time and a half is to be calculated using the member's regular annual salary divided by 2080. Given that it is virtually universal practice under collective agreements, not to mention common sense, that the premium rate of time and a half uses an employee's regular hourly rate of pay, it seems clear that, that under the terms of these parties' collective agreement, "member's hourly rate" means their annual salary divided by 2080. Indeed, that has been the parties' practice with respect to all officers, including those on the compressed work week. The conclusion that emerges from the interaction of Articles 13 and 6 on one hand and Articles 2 and 5 on the other is that officers are to be paid, once per week, for 40 hours of work, at the rate of each member's annual salary divided by 2080 for each of those 40 hours. When combined with the facts that (1) the C.W.W. officers are reduced, through the 104-hour and pay-audit float-time adjustments, to remaining net compensable hours of 2080 per year and (2) there are more than 2080 hours in the average year, this inevitably results in a situation which can be characterized as C.W.W. officers either being paid for hours not worked or being paid at a slightly higher actual hourly rate6 for the hours they did work (aside from those hours compensated for by the 104-hour and specific lieu-time adjustments). This is exactly how the collective agreement has been administered over the years, and, indeed, it is not clear that there is any dispute between the parties, at least up to this point. Rather, the dispute arises in what comes next-that is, whether or not the Board had the right to unilaterally adjust the annual pay-audit base in.order to overcome the situation described in the last sentence of the previous paragraph. Article 5.09 deals with the pay audit and is set out again here for convenience. 6 Higher, that is, than the rate of their annual salary divided by 2080. For example, in 1996, a First Class Constable's nominal salary, as set out in Appendix A of the collective agreement, was $5 1,278.66. That salary divided by 2080 was $24.65. On the other hand, since the First-class Constable on the compressed work week was actually paid identically to a First-class Constable on straight days-that is, C.W.W. Constable received an actual hourly rate of $24.84, when $51,673 ($24.65 x 2096-e calculated on a base of 2080 hours. 5.09 To ensure that no member has been scheduled to work more or less than 2,080 hours in a calendar year, the following rules ...shall apply. (0 This provision applies only to those members who have worked a Compressed Work Week during the course of the calendar year and "debits" and "credits" are those that arise directly as a result of working such system. The opening sentence of Article 5.09, on its face, is ambiguous and difficult to understand; taken literally, it does not at first appear to say what it really means. While the first sentence gives as the purpose for the audit, "to ensure that no member has been scheduled to work more or less than 2,080 hours", which has a clear literal meaning, we know fiom the evidence that, under the compressed work week, every member is likely to have actually been scheduled to work more or less than 2,080 hours. What it really means, on the other hand, is something along the following lines: to ensure that any member who has actually worked more or less than 2,080 hours (after the 104-hour lieutime adjustment) is properly compensated, thefollowing rules. . . ." In fairness to the original drafters of this language, one can see that the context allows for this second interpretation, although it is not as immediately obvious as the more literal interpretation set out above. The ambiguity in the first sentence of Article 5.09 allows and, indeed, requires an examination of whatever extrinsic evidence might exist to reveal the parties' joint intent with respect to this provision. Happily, such evidence is present in Chris Fisher's evidence and in the parties' agreed statement of facts, specifically the following paragraphs. In 1986, the compressed work week system was instituted. It was agreed by both management and the Association that the hours worked would not be equal in a gven year but over a four year period, they would work out. In the late 1980's, some Members who had been transferred froitl platoon to platoon complained about being treated unfairly with respect to hours. Accordmgly, an audit of hours was instituted in 1989. When the audit of hours started in 1989, it was decided that the hours should be audited against 2080 hours (52 weeks times 40 hours) In the light of this evidence, the meaning and intent behind Article 5.09 become clear. The first sentence sets out the purpose of the audit-that is, to eliminate inequities, as between C.W.W. officers, stemming fiom the fact that, while the yearly average of hours worked comes out equally over a four-year period as long as an officer remains on the same platoon, an officer who is transferred may end up working more than other officersbut not be paid for them (or, presumably, vice versa---that is, an officer might work less than other officers, but still be paid the same as those officers). Thus, the hours of each officer on the compressed work week must necessarily be compared or audited against a common base. The parties decided that that base should be 2080 hours and enshrined that specific figure in Article 5.09. It should be understood that, in order to accomplish the original and stated purpose of the audit-namely, to equalize compensation in terms of pay for hours worked amongst officers on all four platoons on the compressed work week, whether or not they had transferred--any base could have been used, including 2096. The trouble is that Article 5.09, the parties' agreed statement of fact, and Mr. Fisher's evidence all make clear that the entire audit process is centred on the figure 2080. The parties agreed on that figure; that is what the collective agreement states; and that is what they have practised over the years since 1989. There is simply no question about the audit base being anything but 2080. Thus, the Board appears to have gone beyond what Article 5.09 allows in unilaterally applying a new audit base of 2096. But there is another problem, as well. It is clear, on the basis of the wording of Article 5.09 in the light of the agreed statement of facts, as well as the testimony of Mr. Fisher, that the parties' intent in setting up the audit process was to eliminate unequal treatment in terms of pay for hours worked as between officers on the compressed work week. Subparagraph ( f ) speaks to this intent: This provision applies only to those members who have worked a Compressed Work Week during the course of the calendar year and "debits" and "credits" are those that arise directly as a result of working such system. Like the opening sentence of Article 5.09, subparagraph ( f ) is open to several different interpretations. While the first clause makes it clear that the audit system applies only to those on the compressed work week, the second clause is more difficult to understand and is open to several different interpretations. Does it mean that the debitingand-crediting system applies only with respect to whether C.W.W. officers are above or below 2080 remaining compensable hours (after the 104-hour float-time adjustment), or can it also be interpreted, as the Board has done, to apply with respect to something beyond that---namely, the actualpay received by C. W: W: ofJicers? On its face, both interpretations are possible. Again, the extrinsic evidence of the parties' agreed statement of facts helps cla* it. First, the purpose of the pay audit was to ensure equal treatment, in terms of pay for hours worked, as between the officers on the compressed work week. Subparagraph (f) then makes clear that "debits" and "credits" must arise directly as a result of working the compressed work week system and that debiting and crediting applies only to those officers on the compressed work week. The terms "debits" and "credits" clearly mean subtractions from and additions to members' lieu-time banks, which raises the questions as to what criterion determines whether a member is debited or credited and the extent of any such debit or credit. The antecedent of subparagraph (f) is the introductory sentence of Article 5.09; the determining criterion is, of course, whether or not, and the extent to which, members are above or below 2080 net remaining hours compensable after the 104hour lieu-time adjustment. Members found to have remaining compensable hours of less than 2080 hours, after the 104-hour adjustment, are to be debited float-time hours, while those found to have uncompensated hours of more than 2080, also after the 104-hour adjustment, are to be credited hours, the net result of which is that both groups (in fact, all officers in all four platoons) will end up having been compensated equally in terms of pay for hours worked. The debit-and-credit system, then, is internal to the C.W.W. regime and pivots on the figure 2080; it simply measures hours actually worked against that figure. It measures hours against hours. The Board's unilateral changing of the audit base to 2096, on the other hand, is a comparison of hours againstpay received. In effect, then, the Board's action has altered the basic principle of the audit to something that was never intended, was never negotiated, and is inconsistent with Article 5.09. It therefore must be concluded that the Board has violated Article 5.09 in unilaterally altering the base. Until and unless the Article is changed, the audit must be tied to the figure of 2080 because Article 5.09 specifies that figure. But what of the Board's argument that the parties simply did not put their minds to the fact that there are more than 52.0 weeks in a year and that, in instituting the 12-hour shift system without changing the pay mechanism under the collective agreement, they inadvertently started paying the C.W.W. officers for more hours than they actually worked? What if this situation is simply due to a mistake? According to counsel for the Board, the parties simply cannot have intended such an absurd result. At this point, it is instructive to review the different ways in which the "pay for hours not worked" problem (as the Board views it) might be resolved, and the implications each one has for the collective agreement. It will be remembered that, when Chris Fisher was asked what the parties could have done in 1989 to prevent this problem, he cited three solutions: (1) The parties could have made 2088, rather than 2080, the benchmark against which the audit would be done. (2) The wording in Article 5.09 could have been written so as to make the audit base equal to the hours an 8-hour employee actually worked in a given year. (3) In calculating the hourly rate of the C.W.W. officers, their annual nominal salary could have been divided by the hours actually worked rather than by 2080. Any of these three options could have been chosen by the parties but, unfortunately for the Board's position, were not. Options 1 and 2 are foreclosed by the fact that the parties decided on an audit base of 2080, wrote it into the agreement as Article 5.09 and, until 1996, followed it. Option No. 3 is foreclosed by the clear meaning of "members' hourly rate" in the collective agreement, the parties' long-standing understanding of that term, and the Niagara Regional Police Service's tradition and practice. The divisor has always been stated in the collective agreement and understood to be 2080 for all officers, and new language will have to be negotiated to change it for the C.W.W. officers. There are also at least four other ways in which this situation could be remedied. First, the 104-hour float time adjustment itself could be adjustable-that is, rather than a fixed 104 hours of float-time every year, officers could receive whatever number of floattime hours would take them down to the number of hours which the 8-hour people had worked and for which both groups had been paid (to take 1996 as an example, 2096, rather than 2080). The problem with this option, obviously, is that it is contrary to Article 5.06 of Appendix E, which specifies an addition of 104 hours of float time. A second option is that all officers could be paid twice monthly instead of weekly. That, of course, ignores the requirement in Article 2.02 that officersbe paid weekly, not to mention the fact that it would fhndamentally alter the entire pay regime. Third, the weekly salary paid could spec@ as the member's annual salary divided by 52.178 (the actual average number of weeks in a year over a four-year period). This, however, would require a fhndamental change in the pay model and, no doubt, new language in the collective agreement. Fourth-and this is really only a variant on the previous idea--officers could receive equal weekly payments of their annual salary divided by 52 for 5 1 weeks, and one final variable payment which would bring their compensation up to the exact hours worked during that particular year. This, too, would significantly hndamentally alter the pay model, at least for the C.W.W. personnel, and would require new language in the agreement. In the context of a rights arbitration, none of these options is an acceptable solution because, of course, all of them are inconsistent with the collective agreement. The first two options require, in effect, that Article 5.09 be rewritten, while the third option requires, most probably, an entirely new provision, explicitly stating that the hourly rate for C.W.W. officers be calculated, not as it has always been done in the Niagara Police Service for all officers-annual salary divided by 2080-but as annual salary divided by the number of hours actually worked. The fourth option requires an amendment to Article 5.06 of Appendix E to the collective agreement, and the fifth, sixth and seventh options require amendments to Article 2.02 of the collective agreement and a hndamentally new approach to remitting pay to officers. As a rights arbitrator, I am foreclosed by the general jurisprudence, as well as by Article 30.11 of the parties' own collective agreement, from doing any of these things. Article 30.11, again, is as follows. The arbitrator shall not have the jurisdiction to alter or change any of the provisions of this Agreement or to substitute any new provision in lieu thereof, nor to give any decision inconsistent with the terms and provisions of this Agreement... Some of the methods set out above for resolving the C.W.W. problem including the first two, both of which deal with the audit and Article 5.09-require the ignoring and, in effect, the rewriting of various provisions of the collective agreement. While counsel for the Board did not argue the doctrine of rectification, that is in a sense the next logical step in the hndamental thesis of his argument: that the parties intended one thing when the compressed work week was brought in (that C.W.W. officers would continue to be paid equally, in terms of pay for hours worked, vis-a-vis other officers) but that, due to an oversight (namely, that one year contains more than 52.0 weeks) in combination with the parties' pay regime (once per week, for 40 hours, at an effective hourly rate of annual salary divided by 2080), the result has been something other than equality. It seems to me that counsel for the Board, in asking that I sustain the Board's unilateral changing of the audit base, is coming close to asking that, in effect, I rectifjr the agreement so as to reflect the parties' real intent. The Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Port Arthur Shipbuilding (1968) [70 D.L.R.(2d) 693,68 C.L.L.C. 14,136 (S.C.C.)] and Metropolitan Toronto Police Association et al. v. Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police (1974) [45 D.L.R.(3d) 548, C.L.L.C. 14,223 (S.C.C.)] put very tight strictures on arbitrators in terms of their authority to rectifjr a collective agreements; that is, unless explicitly permitted to do so by the governing labour statute or a provision in the collective agreement, they could not. In more recent years, however, some arbitrators have departed from this line and have applied the doctrine of rectification. The most persuasive line of reasoning, in my view, suggests that, where it is clear that the language of the collective agreement does not reflect what the parties agreed to in negotiations (typically because of a clerical or typographical mistake), a distinction must be drawn between the document entitled "collective agreement" and the real agreement between the parties. Arbitrator Jane Devlin explained how this theory got around the strictures imposed by such provisions as Article 30.11 in the Niagara agreement. In my view, these restrictions are designed to prohibit any change or amendment to the true agreement and were not designed to impose upon the parties the results of a clerical error or omission which was never part of the bargain which they struck. Re Ethyl Canada Inc. and E. C. W.U., Local 300 (1987), 26 L.A.C. (3d) 20 1 [at 2081. The question arises, then, as to whether or not I can use this line of argument to rewrite Article 5.09 so as to free the Board to base on the audit on pay actually received and thus eliminate the C.W.W. pay "problem". The answer is that I cannot. The doctrine of rectification, while applied, is used very carefully, as Arbitrator Devlin noted in Ethyl Canada, If there is uncertainty as to whether the written document reflects the true agreement of the parties, then that uncertainty ought to be resolved in favour of the language of the written document. Arbitrator M. V. Watters put it even more forcehlly in Re Seminole Management and Engineering Co. and C.A.W., Local 195 (1989), 4 L.A.C.(4th) 380 [at p. 3881. ...there are certain restrictions inherent to the concept of rectification which will serve to limit or restrict its use.. .the party seeking its benefit has the burden of producing convincing proof not only that the document to be rectified was not in accordance with the parties' true intentions at the time of its execution, but also that the document in its proposed form does accord with their intentions. Clearly, there is no such proof in this case. While the Board argues that the parties must have made a mistake because they could not have intended such an absurd result, the Association argues that, given the importance of pay to the members and the sophistication of the parties, they could not possibly have overlooked such an outcome, a conclusion that it argues is reinforced because it is clear from the evidence that the situation was drawn to the attention of the Chief of Police and Director of Administration in late 1991 or early 1992, and they did nothing about it. Both the Board and the Association make plausible arguments; either could be right. The reality is, however, that we do not know with a high enough level of certainty what was intended. And we are not talking here about a simple clerical error; we are talking about an outcome resulting fiom a complex combination of factors, all of which have been in place at least since 1989. In the result, there is no possibility of my rewriting the collective agreement in order to sustain the Board's action. The situation with respect to the doctrine of rectification reflects a more fkndamental principle of rights arbitration and, indeed, of contract interpretation. The essence of the arbitrator's task, in a contract-interpretation case, is to ascertain the parties' intentions and to base his or her award upon those intentions. Those intentions are assumed to be found in the parties' own written words. In this situation, while I certainly have some doubts that the parties in Niagara intended this particular outcome and believe that the Board may very well be right when it argues that it was simply an oversight, those concerns must be outweighed by the specific language of the collective agreement which, when looked at in the light of the evidence of the parties' agreed statement of facts, is clear. An unintended consequence does not empower me as a rights arbitrator to ignore or alter the language of the collective agreement. Counsel for the Board argued that the parties cannot have intended a result which can only be described as "absurd. The Association, as noted, disagreed with this argument. With respect, I do not agree that it is "absurd". Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines an "absurdity7' as follows: Anythmg which is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of men of ordinary intelligence and discretion. Obviously and flatly opposed to the manifest truth; inconsistent with the plain dictates of common sense, logically contradictory; nonsensical, ridiculous. In my view, "absurdity" is too strong a word to use for this situation. If it were truly absurd, then the parties would have noticed it and done something about it long before now. A better word, in my view, would be "anomalous7'. That, unfortunately, provides no basis for ignoring the clear meaning and intent of the agreement. Arbitrator J.F.W. Weatherill's words in Re United Automobile Workers, Local 1524 and General Spring Products Ltd. 23 L.A.C. 73 (1 971) are instructive in this regard. It was contended by the company that this result was "absurd", and that the agreement should be interpreted so as to avoid an absurdity. It may well be that the result of the application of this provision according to its plain meaning leads to anomalous results in some situations, in that it is sometimes actually to the benefit of "Z" shift employees to remain away fiom work. This may be thought to be anomalous or ill-considered; it may not fit into what one of the parties regards as the pattern of vacation payments; but it is not "absurd as that term is used in the context of contract interpretation. Fundamentally, this "anomalous" o u t c o m k f it is anomalous, and not just what the parties understood all along, as argued by the Associatiorris a product of the peculiar pay regime embedded in the Niagara Regional Police Service's collective agreement and reflecting the parties' long-standing practice and tradition. It stems, first, fiom the fact that the system is based on an annual salary amount, but pays it out as if the officers were hourly rated employees. This particular "problem" came about because the pay system remained in place and unamended even as the organization around it changed in terms of the working hour arrangements of a large proportion of the Force-that is, the compressed work week. Indeed, the C.W.W. pay "problem" is but one of several aspects which could be considered anomalous: not only are C.W.W. officers either paid for hours not worked or paid a slightly higher hourly rate than non-C.W.W. people (depending on how one looks at it), but in fact all staff actually receive slightly more in most years than their salary as set out in the collective agreement. Given the clarity of the intent in the various collective-agreement provisions and the long-standing practice of the parties, this is a problem (assuming it is a problem, and not, as the Association argued, simply what the parties intended all along) that cannot be solved at rights arbitration. Fundamentally, since the elimination of the C.W.W. "problem" requires amendments or additions to the collective agreement, the parties are going to have to it work it out for themselves in negotiations. Failing that, if it has to be solved by an arbitrator, then it must be in the context of interest arbitration. However, it must be said that, given that the situation is a product of a complex and long-standing set of factors, and also taking into account the large number of different options for solving it (many, no doubt, with complex and subtle implications), it goes without saying that it would be far more preferable for the parties to do it for themselves. In any event, for all of the above reasons, the grievance must succeed. The Board violated the collective agreement when it unilaterally altered the audit base for 1996 fiom 2080 to 2096. The Board is directed to restore the lieu-time banks of all officers to what they would have been had the 1996 audit been carried out using a base of 2080. The Board is hrther directed to continue to use an audit base of 2080 until the parties jointly agree on some other base or redesign their pay model or an interest arbitrator awards a change to the pay and/or audit processes. I will remain seised in the event the parties have any difficulties implementing any aspect of this award. It thus only remains for me to thank spokesmen for both parties for their very thorough and helphl presentations on this complicated issue. Dated at Kingston, this 20' day of January, 1998. R. L. Jackson