David`s Friend Goliath - disciplinas.stoa.usp.br

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
David's Friend Goliath
Author(s): Michael Mandelbaum
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 152 (Jan. - Feb., 2006), pp. 50-56
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25461991 .
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{
Friend
1David's
\JOLJATTHJ
arrogant,
The restoftheworld complainsthatAmericanhegemongis reckless,
and insensitive.
Justdon'texpectthemtodo anythingabout it.Theworld's
and stabilitytheUnitedStatesprovides.
guilp secretisthat itenjo)sthesecuriS)
Theworldwon't admit it,but thgywillmiss theAmericanempirewhen it's
I Michael
By
gone.
Mandelbaum
E s
verybody talks about theweather,Mark
Twain once observed, but nobody does
anything about it. The same is true of
America's role in theworld. The United
States is the subject of endless commentary, most of
it negative, some of it poisonously hostile. Statements by foreign leaders, street demonstrations in
national capitals, andmuch-publicized opinion polls
all seem to bespeak a worldwide conviction that
the United States misuses its enormous power in
ways that threaten the stability of the internation
al system. That is hardly surprising. No one loves
Goliath. What is surprising is theworld's failure to
respond to the United States as it did to the
Goliaths of the past.
Sovereign states as powerful as the Unit
ed States, and as dangerous as its critics
declare it to be, were historically subject to
a check
on
their
power.
MichaelMandelbaumis theChristianA. Herterprofessorof Other countries band
to
Americanforeignpolicy at The JohnsHopkins University's e d together
School of Advanced International Studies and author of The
block
them.
Case for Goliath: How America Acts as theWorld's Govern
ment
2006)
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: PublicAffairs_
from which
this article is adapted.
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David's
Friend Goliath
1
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France in the late
18th and early 19th century, Germany during the
two world wars, and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War all inspired countervailing coalitions
that ultimately defeated them. Yet no such anti
American alignment has formed or shows any
sign of forming today. Widespread complaints
about theUnited States' international role aremet
with an absence of concrete, effective measures to
challenge, change, or restrict it.
The gap between what the world says about
American power and what it fails to do about it
is the single most striking feature of 21st-century
international relations. The explanation for this
gap is twofold. First, the charges most frequently
leveled at America are false. The United States
does not endanger other countries, nor does it
invariably act without regard to the interests and
wishes of others. Second, far from menacing the
rest of the world, the
United States plays
a uniquely
positive global role. The governments of most
other countries understand that, although they
have powerful reasons not to say so explicitly.
BENIGN
HEGEMON
The charge that theUnited States threatens others
is frequently linked to the use of the term "empire"
to describe America's international presence. In
contrast with empires of the past, however, the
United States does not control, or aspire to control,
directly or indirectly, the politics and economics of
other societies. True, in the post-Cold War period,
America has intervened militarily in a few places
outside its borders, including Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But these
cases are exceptions that prove the rule.
These foreign ventures are few in number
and, with the exception of Iraq, none has any
economic value or strategic importance. In each
case, American control of the country came as
the byproduct of a military intervention
undertaken for quite
/
different reasons:
to
rescue
dis
tressed people
in Somalia,
to stop eth
t
_
;-->
nic cleansing
in Bosnia, to
depose a danger
ous tyrant in Iraq.
Unlike
the great
empires of the past,
the U.S. goal was to
build stable, effec
tive
governments
and
then
to
leave as quick
X
YAI
ly as possible.
Moreover, unlike
past
imperial
prac
tice, the U.S. gov
ernment has sought
to share control of its
occupied countries
with allies, not to
them.
monopolize
One policy
inno
vation
of the current
Bush administration
that gives other coun
52
FOREIGN POLICY
7:
z
m
m
oz
triespause is the doctrine of preventive war. Accord
ing to this doctrine, the United States reserves the
right to attack a country not in response to an actu
al act of aggression, or because it isunmistakably on
the verge of aggression, but rather in anticipation of
an assault at some point in the future. The United
States implemented the doctrine in 2003 with the
invasion of Iraq.
Were it to become central to
American foreign policy, the pre
ventive war doctrine would pro
vide a broad charter for military
intervention. But that is not its
destiny. The Bush administration
presented the campaign in Iraq
not as a way to ensure that Sad
dam Hussein did not have the
opportunity to acquire nuclear
weapons at some point in the
future, but rather as a way of
depriving him of the far less dangerous chemical
weapons that he was believed already to possess.
More important, the countries that are now plausi
ble targets for a preventive war-North Korea and
Iran-differ from Iraq in ways that make such a
campaign extremely unattractive. North Korea is
more heavily armed than Iraq, and in a war could
do serious damage to America's chief ally in the
region, South Korea, even ifNorth Korea lost. Iran
has a largerpopulation than Iraq, and it is less iso
lated internationally. The United States would have
hesitated before attacking either one of these coun
tries even if the Iraq operation had gone smoothly.
Now, with the occupation of Iraq proving to be
both costly (some $251 billion and counting) and
frustrating, support for repeating the exercise else
where is hard to find.
points of access to it. Other countries can exert
influence on one of theHouse or Senate commit
teeswith jurisdiction over foreign policy. Or coun
tries can deal with one or more of the federal
departments that conduct the nation's relationswith
other countries. For that matter, American think
tanks generate such awide variety of proposals for
U.S. policies toward every country that almost any
what theworldsaysabout
Thegapbetween
Americanpowerandwhat itfailstodo about
AMERICA
it is thesinglemost strikingfeatureof
relations.
21st-centuryinternational
approach is bound to have a champion somewhere.
Even Sudan, which theU.S. government has accused
of genocide, recently signed a $530,000 contract
with aWashington lobbyist to help improve its
image. Non-Americans may not enjoy formal rep
resentation in theU.S. political system, but because
of the openness of that system, they can and do
achieve what representation brings-a voice in the
making of American policy.
Because the opportunities to be heard and
heeded are so plentiful, countries with opposing
aims often simultaneously attempt to persuade
theAmerican government to favor their respective
causes. That has sometimes led the United States
to become a mediator for international conflict,
between Arabs and Israelis, Indians and Pakistanis,
and other sets of antagonists. That's a role that
other countries value.
THE ACCESSIBLE
The war in Iraq is themost-often cited piece of evidence
thatAmerica conducts itself in a recklessly unilateral
fashion.Because of itsenormous power, critics say, the
policies that theUnited States applies beyond its bor
ders are bound to affect others, yet when it comes to
deciding thesepolicies, non-Americans have no influ
ence. However valid the charge of unilateralism in
the case of Iraqmay be (and other governments did
in fact support thewar), it does not hold true forU.S.
foreign policy as awhole.
The reason is that theAmerican political system
is fragmented, which means there are multiple
THE WORLD'S
GOVERNMENT
The United States makes other positive contribu
tions, albeit often unseen and even unknown, to
thewell-being of people around theworld. In fact,
America performs for the community of sover
eign states many, though not all, of the tasks that
national governments carry out within them.
For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep
order in theworld. The American military presence
in Europe and East Asia, which now includes
approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the
governments of these regions that their neighbors
JANUARY IFEBRUARY 2006
53
David's
Friend Goliath
]
most frequently used currency, the U.S. dollar.
Though the euro might one day supplant the dol
lar as theworld's most popular reserve currency,
that day, if it ever comes, lies far in the future.
Furthermore, working through the Interna
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States
also helps to carry out some of the duties that cen
tral banks perform within countries, including
serving as a "lender of last resort." The driving
force behind IMF bailouts of failing economies in
Latin America and Asia in the last decade was the
United States, which holds the largest share of
large
votes within the IMF. And Americans'
appetite for consumer products partly reproduces
on a global scale the service that the economist John
Maynard Keynes assigned to national governments
during times of economic slowdown: The United
States is the world's "consumer of last resort."
Americans purchase Japanese cars, Chinese-made
clothing, and South Korean electronics and appli
ances in greater volume than any other people.
Just as national governments have the respon
sibility for delivering water and electricity within
their jurisdictions, so theUnited States, through its
military deployments and diplomacy, assures an
adequate supply of the oil that allows industrial
economies to run. It has estab
lished friendly political relations,
and sometimes close military asso
in
ciations, with governments
most of the major oil-producing
countries and has extended mili
tary protection to the largest of
them, Saudi Arabia. Despite deep
social, cultural, and political dif
ferences between the two coun
tries theUnited States and Saudi
Arabia managed in the 20th cen
tury to establish a partnership that controlled the
they all
States seeks to prevent proliferation,
global market for this indispensable commodity.
endorse the goal, and none of them makes as sig
The
economic well-being even of countries hostile
as
that
goal
to
achieving
a
contribution
nificant
foreign policy depends on the Amer
American
to
does theUnited States.
ican role in assuring the free flow of oil through
America's services to theworld also extend to
out theworld.
economic matters and international trade. In the
To be sure, theUnited States did not deliber
confidence
international economy, much of the
ately set out to become the world's government.
needed to proceed with transactions, and the pro
tection that engenders this confidence, comes from The services it provides originated during the
the policies of theUnited States. For example, the Cold War as part of its struggle with the Soviet
U.S. Navy patrols shipping lanes in both the Union, and America has continued, adapted, and in
some cases expanded them in the post-Cold War
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, assuring the safe pas
era.Nor do Americans think of their country as the
sage of commerce along the world's great trade
world's government. Rather, it conducts, in their
routes. The United States also supplies theworld's
cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions,
forestall arms races, and make the chances of
armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for
instance, reassure Western Europeans that they
do not have to increase their own troop strength
to protect themselves against the possibility of a
resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassur
ing Russia that its great adversary of the last cen
tury,Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies.
Similarly, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which
protects Japan, simultaneously reassures Japan's
neighbors that itwill remain peaceful. This reas
surance is vital yet invisible, and it is all but taken
for granted.
The United States has also assumed responsibil
ity for coping with the foremost threat to contem
porary international security, the spread of nuclear
weapons to "rogue" states and terrorist organiza
tions. The U.S.-sponsored Cooperative Threat
Reduction program is designed to secure nuclear
materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union.
A significant part of the technical and human assets
of the American intelligence community is devot
ed to the surveillance of nuclear weapons-related
activities around theworld. Although other coun
tries may not always agree with how the United
Thealternativeto the roletheUnitedStatesplays
intheworld is notbetterglobalgovernance,but
less of it-and thatwouldmake theworlda far
moredangerousand lessprosperousplace.
54
FOREIGN POLICY
IBM"
view, a series of policies designed to furtherAmer
ican interests. In this respect they are correct, but
these policies serve the interests of others as well.
The alternative to the role theUnited States plays
in theworld is not better global governance, but
less of it-and that would make the world a far
more dangerous and less prosperous place. Never
in human history has one country done so much
for so many others, and received so little appre
ciation for its efforts.
INEVITABLE
INGRATITUDE
Nor is theworld likely to express much gratitude
to theUnited States any time soon. Even if they pri
vately value what the United States does for the
world, other countries, especially democratic ones,
will continue to express anti-American sentiments.
That is neither surprising nor undesirable. Within
democracies, spirited criticism of the government
is normal, indeed vital for its effective perform
ance. The practice is no different between and
among democracies.
Anti-Americanism has many domestic politi
cal uses. Inmany parts of the world, the United
States serves as a convenient scapegoat for gov
ernments, a kind of political lightning rod to
draw away from themselves the popular discon
tent that their shortcomings have helped to pro
duce. That is particularly the case in theMiddle
East, but not only there. Former German Chan
cellor Gerhard Schroder achieved an electoral
victory in 2002 by denouncing the war in Iraq.
Similarly, it is convenient, even comforting, to
blame the United States for the inevitable dislo
cations caused by the great, impersonal forces of
globalization.
But neither the failure to acknowledge Amer
ica's global role nor the barrage of criticism of it
means that the officials of other countries are
JANUARY IFEBRUARY 2006
55
i
David's
Friend Goliath
I
entirely unaware of the advantages that it brings
them. If a global plebiscite concerning America's
role in theworld were held by secret ballot, most
foreign-policy officials in other countries would
vote in favor of continuing it.Though the Chinese
object to the U.S. military role as Taiwan's pro
tector, they value the effect thatAmerican military
deployments inEast Asia have in preventing Japan
from pursuing more robust military policies. But
others will not declare their support for America's
global role. Acknowledging itwould risk raising
the question of why those who take advantage of
the services America provides do not pay more for
them. Itwould risk, that is, other countries' capac
ities to continue as free riders,which is an arrange
ment no government will lightly abandon.
In the end, however, what other nations do or
do not say about theUnited States will not be cru
cial towhether, or for how long, theUnited States
continues to function as theworld's government.
[ Want
That will depend on the willingness of the Amer
ican public, the ultimate arbiter of American for
eign policy, to sustain the costs involved. In the
near future, America's role in theworld will have
to compete for public funds with the rising costs
of domestic entitlement programs. It is Social Secu
rity andMedicare, not the rise of China or the kind
of coalition that defeated powerful empires in the
past, that pose the greatest threat to America's
role as theworld's government.
The outcome of the looming contest in the
United States between the national commitment to
social welfare at home and the requirements for
stability and prosperity abroad cannot be fore
seen with any precision. About other countries'
approach to America's remarkable 21st-century
global role, however, three things may be safely
predicted: They will not pay for it, they will con
tinue to criticize it, and they will miss itwhen it
is gone. ID
to Know More?]
Many historians and political scientists have examined the highs and lows of American empire. Some
of themore notable works includeAndrew J. Bacevich's American Empire: The Realities and Con
sequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2002), Colossus: The Price of
America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), by Niall Ferguson, The Sorrows of Empire:
Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), by
Chalmers Johnson, and Robert W Merry's Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign
Policy, and theHazards of Global Ambition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).
Robert Kagan explains why theworld welcomes vigorous American leadership in "The Benevo
lentEmpire" (FOREIGNPOLICY,Summer 1998). In "AWorld Without Power" (FOREIGNPOLICY,
July/August 2004), Niall Ferguson argues that theworld would be a farmore dangerous place
without U.S. dominance. Anne Applebaum looks at the places where America is loved, and why,
in "In Search of Pro-Americanism" (FOREIGNPOLICY, July/August 2005).
For amore detailed look at theUnited States' role in international security, see TheMission:
Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
2003), by Dana Priest. Robert Gilpin examines America's interaction with the global economy in
The Challenge of Global Capitalism: TheWorld Economy in the 21st Century (Princeton:Princeton
University Press, 2000).
The U.S. State Department offers regular roundups, available on the department's Web site,
of foreign media commentary on major U.S. foreign-policy issues. The U.S. Justice Department
also submits a semiannual report to congress on the foreign nations involved in lobbying theU.S.
government, available on itsWeb site.
? For links to relevantWeb sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related
FOREIGNPOLICY articles, go towww.ForeignPolicy.com.
56
FORIi I(;X
1. Ia(