Threatening visibility

Transcription

Threatening visibility –
Radical right Homophobes
in European Parliaments
2012
A report by Martha Hannus, Expo.
2012-12-13
Photo:© Expo
Författare: Martha Hannus
epost: martha.hannus@expo.se
Cover photo: © Expo
Contents
Foreword
5
Threatening Visibility –
Radical right Homophobes in European Parliaments
6
Summary
6
Introduction
6
The Situation of LGBT Rights in Europe Today
8
Attacks and laws limiting the freedom of expression
8
The human rights of LGBT people
8
A report on organised intolerance
10
Radical right Homophobia: History and Ideology
11
“A threat to the white race”
11
Broken families and weak men
11
Pinkwashing the radical right agenda
12
Covariation in intolerant attitudes
13
Addressing the intolerant agenda
13
A Surge of Radical Right Parties in Europe?
14
Radical right and Anti-Immigrant Parties in European Parliaments
16
16
The influence of radical right parties in Europe
European Variations and Strategies
20
Bulgaria: Widespread homophobia and a problematic discourse
20
Hungary: a nationalist majority
24
France: pinkwashing the Front National
27
The Netherlands: “Intolerance towards intolerance”?
29
Sweden: a backlash against visibility?
32
Analysis and Conclusions
36
No obvious covariation
36
Radical right homophobes steering the debate
36
LGBT rights as a part of a European nationalist identity?
37
Popular prejudice as an obstacle
38
A long term strategy to address the intolerant agenda
39
Appendix Radical right parties in European Parliaments
40
Literature appendix:
50
threatening visibility – radical right homophobes in european parliaments 2012
3
4
foreword
During the last year there have been an increase in numbers of incidents
of harassments against Pride parades in Europe, and in some countries
people have been denied permission to parade. Some countries even have
introduced so called “anti gay” legislation. These are alarming tendencies
challenging the human rights.
In many European countries, radical right parties have taken place in the
parliaments. In some cases this have led to worse living conditions not only
for LGBT persons, but also for people from other ethnical backgrounds
than the majority in those countries, for example the Romani people,
the Muslims and the Jews. The report also describes how other groups
like trade union representatives is a target for the radical right. Just as
women´s rights and the struggle for gender equality also are threatened
by their presence in the policy making. The ongoing economic crisis in
Europe, with its high unemployment rates, is also a risk factor for an increased support for those parties.
Such an evolvement would create further antagonism among people
counteracting the equal value of, and equal rights for all people. This
report was initiated by TCO, to reinforce the striving for a more open and
including society.
This Expo report “Threatening visibility, -far right homophobes in European parliaments” describes what influence radical right parties have in
the parliaments of Europe, and what role they may play when it comes to
defending or not defending human rights, and LGBT rights in particular.
The author of the report, Martha Hannus, Expo, responds for its contents.
The aim of the report is to keep up the good work for more tolerant societies, characterized by inclusiveness and human rights.
5
THREATENING VISIBILITY – RADICAL RIGHT
HOMOPHOBES IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS
Summary
The report gives an overview over the parliamentary representation of
radical right parties in EU countries. Using five different cases, the report
further investigates how different parties in different countries perceive
and address LGBT rights. Hence, the report contributes with new knowledge about the intersection between homophobia and radical right ideology
in Europe in the 21st century.
General conclusions:
• Homo-, bi- and transphobia is an integral part of the radical right ideology
• The success and influence of radical right parties varies greatly between
European countries.
• There is a difference between more traditional, openly anti-Semitic and
racist parties that oppose LGBT rights, and parties with a mainly antiMuslim agenda, that seem indifferent to LGBT rights.
• In some countries, other parties are more problematic than the radical right,
since they have more influence on policy, and have an agenda of opposing
LGBT-rights. This is particularly the case for conservative Christian parties.
• Widespread homophobia is in some places a larger threat than organised
intolerant groups.
For human rights organisations, anti-discrimination organisations and trade
unions, the issue of homophobia and radical right-wing extremism is important for several reasons. First, the agenda of these parties is in contrast
with promoting equal rights for all. Second, human rights and minority
organisations as well as unions are often also targets for extremists. Third,
all of these organisations can work together in combating widespread homo
phobia and racism in order to diminish the influence of these parties in
future elections.
Introduction
Violence and hostility towards LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bi and Transsexual)
people have long been key components of the ideology of intolerant, racist
and Nazi parties. Recent developments in Europe, including the prohibition of Pride parades and legislation to abolish so called ”gay propaganda”
as well as attacks on LGBT activists, show that the situation and the physical security and safety of LGBT persons in Europe are still matters of
great concern. Furthermore, the recent electoral successes of extreme right
parties around Europe raises concern about the stability and future implementation of existing legislation on anti-discrimination, human rights and
hate crime in European countries, as well as the possibility for progressive
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Pride, Stockholm. Photo: © Expo
developments in the field of human rights. In their parliamentary positions,
intolerant parties can influence legislation and thereby human rights for
all. For trade unions, this is a cause for great concern. Not only do the basic
values of these parties fundamentally differ from those of trade unions, but
in fact; unionists are often also targets of intolerant groups.
What influence do these parties actually have in European parliaments?
What are their positions on LGBT rights? What does this tell us about the
future prospects for people to live a life free from discrimination?
This report aims to address these questions. First, an overview of the influence of intolerant parties in European parliaments will be provided, and
second, a number of case studies will be used to show how these parties
work and what their positions are on LGBT rights.
7
LGBT Rights in Europe Today
Attacks and Laws Limiting the Freedom of Expression
In 2012, news sources all over Europe painted a disappointing picture of the
developments concerning the human rights of LGBT persons. In a statement
from September 11, 2012, ILGA-Europe expressed concern over recent violent
incidents with transphobic and homophobic motives, such as the physical attack on a man in Belgrade, the assault on participants in the annual Transgender Europe Conference in Dublin, and the ”brutal physical attack” on two persons in Montenegro(ILGA-Europe statement, 120911). In August, in Moscow,
Russia, a high court turned down an application from an LGBT activist group
to organise Pride parades, and out-ruled such events for the following 100
years. The application was a way to draw attention to the continuous prohibitions of Pride parades in the city.
Laws or law amendments, so called ”anti-gay laws”, are discussed or have
been discussed in a number of parliaments and regional bodies around
Europe, including
in several regions
in Russia, Moldova,
Latvia, Lithuania
and Ukraine. These
laws, prohibiting
”gay propaganda”
for ”the protection of
morals”, criminalise
the distribution of
information on LGBT
rights and limit the
freedom of expressiMembers of Nationaldemokratisk Ungdom, NDU, arrested
on for LGBT activists
by police after attacking Pride Stockholm. Photo: © Expo
and persons. Recently, Serbian authorities announced that the Belgrade Pride parade had been prohibited, since
the security of participants could not be guaranteed. This was the second
year that the Belgrade Pride parade was called off. The European Fundamental Rights Agency describes the European landscape with regards to
LGBT rights as mixed and uneven (FRA Homophobia Study, 2010).
The Human Rights of LGBT People
In September 2012, the European Parliament adopted a directive recognising the specific needs for protection for victims of crimes with a bias related to characteristics such as sexual orientation, gender, and gender identity (European Parliament Resolution 2012/2657). The directive is to be
transferred into the legislation of member countries. This may be seen as a
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step towards establishing a shared legal framework in order to adequately
protect the human rights of LGBT people. But despite improvements like
this, the situation is still far from perfect.
According to ILGA Europe, the legal human rights situation of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, trans- and intersex people in Europe is far from guaranteeing the
full equality of every citizen. The ILGA Europe Rainbow Index is a rating on
how well the legal frameworks of the European countries protect the human rights of LGBT persons in 42 categories, including the right to asylum,
equality, non-discrimination legislation and institutions, freedom of assembly and expression, legal gender recognition, and provisions for same sex
partnership and parenting. The result is a score ranging between 30 (respect
for human rights, full equality) and -12 (gross violations of human rights,
discrimination). The best performing country listed by ILGA is the UK, with
a score of 21, while Russia and Moldova share the lowest score, -4.5. Among
the EU countries (listed in the table below) the UK, Germany and Spain have
the most LGBT friendly politics, while Cyprus and Latvia do not manage to
protect LGBT rights. Seemingly, most European countries have a lot left to
do before they can actually legally provide for and protect the rights of LGBT
people. Because of this, the future possibilities to introduce progressive legislation in the field are of great importance and interest.
Tabell 1: Rainbow Index in EU countries 2012.
EU countries
Rainbow Index 2012
UK
21
Germany
20
Spain
20
Sweden
18
Belgium
17
Netherlands
16
Portugal
15
(Norway)
15
Hungary
14
Austria
12
Finland
11
Czech Republic
9
Denmark
9
Ireland
9
Slovakia
9
Slovenia
9
Luxembourg
8
Bulgaria
6
France
6
Lithuania
3
Italy
2,5
Estonia
2
Greece
2
Poland
2
Cyprus
1
Latvia
1
Source: ILGA-Europe Rainbow Index and Rainbow Map 2012
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A Report on Organised Intolerance
So far, reports on intolerance toward LGBT persons in Europe have focused
on the issue of discrimination of individuals, hate crimes and violence
towards LGBT persons, and restrictions on the freedom of speech – all of
which are important areas to address in order to improve the situation for
human rights in Europe. However, the intersection of racism, nationalism,
and LGBT rights, and the issue of intolerant parties and politically organised intolerance, has not received sufficient attention. Often, these two
areas are treated separately. Hostility towards human rights in general
and LGBT rights in particular, which is an intrinsic part of the ideology of
intolerant groups is therefore not addressed and accounted for. Thus, this
report contributes with a new perspective on the intersection between
radical right ideology and homophobia in Europe.
Why is hostility towards LGBT persons such an important part of the
agenda of many radical right parties? How large is their influence in European parliaments? And most importantly: in what way can we expect these
parties to act in proposals concerning anti-discrimination and LGBT rights?
The purpose of this report is to shed some light on these issues and provide
an overview of the future of anti-discrimination legislation, its implementation, and the human rights situation in an expanding Europe under crisis.
10
Radical Right Homophobia: History and Ideology
For intolerant groups, anything and anyone who deviates from the norm of
preference is seen as a threat. The enemy of choice can differ, but often, the
norm of heterosexuality is an important component of what Paul Taggart in
his work on populism has termed the “heartland”, the ideal place in time and
space that intolerant groups want to preserve or recreate (Taggart, 2000).
“A Threat to the White Race”
In racist and Nazi ideology, the idea of the superiority of the white race is
central. For groups with an ethnopluralist ideology, the idea of the separation of races or ethnicities
is crucial. The ethnopluralists argue that races and
ethnicities should be kept
separate, but that none is
superior to the other. One
part of these ideologies is
the idea of a specific cultural heritage, which is
transferred between generations. Part of this cultural
heritage is the idea of the
nuclear family, heterosexuality as a norm, and traditional gender roles, where
men and women are seen
as intrinsically different,
and are assigned different
roles in society based on
Maranata, right christian demonstration against Pride and the hbt-movement ”You
their biological characteshall not lie with a mail (!) as with a women …”. Photo: © Expo
ristics, where men are the
main earners and the home
is the domain for women (Expo and RFSL, 2005, p. 15). As a result of this,
people who in some way break or challenge the norm of heterosexuality
become a threat to the preferred societal order. Hate and hostility toward
LGBT persons have been part of the propaganda of these ideologies since
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, where gays and lesbians were killed in
the death camps.
Broken Families and Weak Men
There are several reasons why intolerant groups see LGBT persons as a threat. For many racist and Nazi movements, the nuclear family is seen as the
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smallest entity in society and an important base for coming challenges. For
other groups, non-heterosexual ways of life are seen as unproductive and
unnatural – for the race or cultural heritage to continue, the main purpose
of relationships is to produce children.
Another view held by many radical right parties and radical right groups
today is that LGBT rights, feminism, and rights for women weaken the position of man in society and make male individuals weak – rendering them
incapable of defending their families and their race from foreign elements,
or participating in the coming apocalyptic war. In his manifesto, the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik argued that this is a reason why
the West is incapable of defending themselves from the Muslim threat. In a
2005 survey of the attitudes towards LGBT people in the Swedish race ideological environment on the internet, EXPO and RFSL showed that LGBT
persons are often described in terms of disease and paedophilia, that they
need to be exterminated in order to protect the ”normal” society, and that
they are also described as a threat to the family and the survival of the race
(Expo and RFSL, 2005). Some groups speak about a “”gay lobby” as well
as a “Jewish lobby” with the agenda of crushing the nuclear family rather
than promoting LGBT rights, a view that is increasingly taking place in
racist conspiracy theories. The media is seen as collaborators that promote
a positive image of LGBT persons as a part of the conspiracy, at the same
time as LGBT persons are becoming more visible. Some, who try to soften
their rhetoric and move towards mainstream politics, still describe LGBT
persons as psychically unstable people in need of help to become ”normal”.
Pinkwashing the Radical Right Agenda
Some radical right or populist parties have somewhat changed their agenda with regards to LGBT rights. This is particularly true for groups involved
in the growing anti-Muslim movement, where the counter-jihad movement
constitutes a subgroup. This movement has largely left the anti-Semitic
radical right, and instead focus their agenda on protecting the free and democratic Europe from the “savage” Muslims and Middle Eastern countries.
In this “war for freedom”, the protection of human rights, minorities, and
freedom of speech and expression serves as a medium to attack Muslims
and Islam. In line with this, anti-Muslim groups sometimes position themselves in favour of LGBT rights – but only when it suits their overall aim:
to attack Muslims. This is especially the case for the so called counter-jihad
movement, a movement that opposes what they perceive as the islamisation of the world. Examples of this include the creation of an LGBT division
by the UK-based violent street movement English Defence League, and the
attempt by their sister organisation, the Finnish Defence League, to participate in a Pride parade in Tampere, Finland, in the summer of 2012. On the
other hand, anti-Muslim groups picture a demographic threat: the Muslims
have more babies than other Europeans (or Americans), and when they
become a majority, they will impose Sharia law upon Europe. For more
conservative anti-Muslim activists, the need to increase the birth rates of
their own population is important, and LGBT people can be a threat to this
goal as well as to conservative Christian values.
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Radical right-wing populist parties such as the Sweden Democrats in
Sweden know by now that they have to avoid expressing hostility towards
LGBT people. However, quotes from individual candidates suggest that
these parties are far from tolerant, and their traditionalist stance on issues
such as the sterilisation of trans persons and adoption for same sex parents, in combination with their continuous embrace of the cultural heritage and nuclear family suggest that the norm of a heterosexual nuclear
family is still at the core of their nationalist politics.
Covariation in Intolerant Attitudes
There is also another reason to expect that one intolerant ideology often
exist next to another one: the empirical argument. In the report “Intolerance, prejudice and discrimination: A European report”, published by the
Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung in 2011, the authors find a strong relationship
between prejudice towards one group and prejudice towards other groups
“that are at first glance completely different”. Among the people that took
part in the survey (a representative sample of 1000 persons per country
interviewed by telephone), anti-immigrant attitudes are related to antiSemitism, anti-Muslim attitudes covariate with anti-Semitism, and so on.
However, the relationship is not equally strong for all combinations – for
example, anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia appear to be more weakly
related. The strongest relationship with regards to homophobia is found
between sexism and homophobia, but the relationship is also significant
for racism, anti-immigrant attitudes, and anti-Semitism. These relationships describe the situation in Europe as a whole. However, when looking
at individual countries, it becomes clear that homophobia and racism are
more strongly related in some places. In Great Britain, the relationship
between racism and homophobia is as strong as the relationship between
sexism and homophobia for all of Europe, to give an example.
Addressing the Intolerant Agenda
It is important to note that the hostility towards LGBT persons on the part
of racist, nationalist and Nazi groups is different from the everyday homoand transphobia that LGBT persons meet, since it is incorporated in an
ideological framework and a political context (Expo and RFSL, 2005, p.
21). It is also important to note that there are clear links between homoand transphobic propaganda and actual physical attacks toward LGBT people. Thus, to address those groups that actively, with verbal and physical
attacks, target LGBT people, is of uttermost importance in the process of
securing the human rights of all citizens.
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A Surge in Radical Right Parties in Europe?
All around Europe, radical right parties place stopping immigration at
the top of their political agendas. They often also disapprove of increased
rights for minorities, and find anti-discrimination legislation and measures
to combat hate crime a waste of money, or even discriminatory towards the
majority population. These parties usually, but not always, have a history
of racism and Nazism, and an agenda of intolerance and discrimination
towards one or more groups in society. There are a number of names and
labels for these parties: radical right parties, extreme right parties, extreme right-wing populists, anti-immigrant parties, anti-Muslim parties,
anti-establishment parties and new populist parties are among the terms
used. Whichever term used, these parties have in common that they look
backwards, toward an idealised homeland or utopia: the “heartland” (Taggart, 2000, p. 2-3). The heartland is populated by the people who populists
speak to and claim to speak for, be it a specific ethnic group, race, or just
“ordinary people”. These parties also have in common that they usually
have a scapegoat, someone to blame for the problems in society – such as
the Jews, the Muslims, the Roma, foreigners in general, or the LGBT community. They also claim to speak for ordinary people in opposition to the
corrupt establishment and elite. It is not within the scope of this report to
come up with a new, all-encompassing definition of this party family (For
a discussion on how to best define the “populist radical right” party family,
see Mudde, Cas, 2007, Ch. 2). Suffice to say that the parties of interest
share an agenda of intolerance and hostility towards one group or another.
There are different ways to study the ideology of political parties in order
to determine to what party family they belong. Some look mainly at the
position of those who vote for the party, some at party manifestos and
documents and some at the position of party leaders, which can lead to
different results and definitions. For the purpose of this report, definitions
from the European Election Database are used, along with literature on
the topic. The differences between the parties included in this report need
to be stressed. Considering the aforementioned discussion on similarities
and differences between the parties included in the radical right family, it
is already evident that not all of these parties have an openly racist, antiMuslim, anti-Roma or anti-Semitic agenda. Some are best described as
anti-immigrant, nationalist or national conservative parties. More information on definitions and ideologies can always be found through the list of
references. However, they all want to defend a “heartland” from some kind
of outgroup.
The following description of potential anti-LGBT parties does not include
all parties that have a potential to be hostile towards norm-breakers. For
example, many Christian parties around Europe are hostile towards LGBT
persons, and in some countries almost all parties use anti-LGBT rhetoric
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in order to gain votes. However, this report is limited to parties that due
to ideological reasons related to nationalism, racism and protection of the
national heritage have an argument and a motivation to oppose human
rights for LGBT people.
However, even if radical right parties (and among them parties with an
anti-LGBT agenda) seem to be here to stay, it is important to remember,
as Wilson and Hainsworth note in their report on radical right parties in
Europe for the European Network Against Racism, that “the emergence,
consolidation and success of radical right parties in recent times has not all
been one-way traffic” (Wilson and Hainsworth, 2012). Parties like the Danish People’s Party, Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland, and the Norwegian
People’s Party have actually lost ground in the parliamentary elections in
2011. The vote for Front National was lower in 2007 than in 2002. In the
UK, the BNP has lost a lot of their seats on local councils during the 2000s.
But still, extremist parties take place in European parliaments. Without
overestimating the influence and success of these parties, it is important to
consider the significance of these parties in legislative assemblies around
Europe.
15
Radical Right and Anti-Immigrant Parties in European Parliaments
The parties described below are parties that have put up candidates in elections to national parliaments. Some of the parties are well known, others
less. Some of the parties mentioned do not currently have a representative in
a legislative assembly, but are included because of the increasing likelihood
that they soon will, or because they have recently held positions in parliament. In some countries, no significant radical right party can be found.
These countries are Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal
and Spain. This, of course, does not mean that there is no party with such an
agenda – only that it has not received enough support, or does not oppose
LGBT rights or immigration based on an explicitly radical right agenda. For
example, conservative religious parties are not included in this report. It is
also important to remember that cross-country comparisons are difficult,
and that attention should be paid to local circumstances. The ideas of radical
right parties differ depending on in which country they exist, and in some
countries, their agendas are more mainstream than in others.
Radical right parties in European Parliaments
An overview of intolerant radical right parties in European parliaments
2012, votes in the last election and current position in parliament. For a
more detailed account of the situation in each European country, see the
appendix.
Austria: Freedom Party of Austria 17,5 % & Alliance for the future of Austria 10,7 %, both in opposition
Belgium: Vlaams Belang 7,8 %, in opposition
Bulgaria: Ataka 9,4 %, pivotal position in opposition
Denmark: Danish People’s party 12,3 %, in opposition
Finland: True Finns 19 %, in opposition
France: National Front 3,7, in opposition
Greece: Golden Dawn 6,9, in opposition
Hungary: Fidesz 52,7 in government, Jobbik 16,7 %, in opposition,
Italy: Lega Nord 8,3 part of government coalition
Latvia: National Alliance 13,9 % part of government coalition
Lithuania: Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrates 15 %,
Netherlands: Freedom Party 10 %, in opposition
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Sweden Democrats leadar Jimmie Åkesson talking to Swedish minister of migration Tobias Billström. Photo: © Expo
Norway: The Progress Party 22,9 %, in opposition
Poland: Law and Justice 29,9 %, in opposition
Sweden: Sweden Democrats 5,7 %, pivotal position in opposition
The Influence of Radical Right Parties in Europe
As we have seen, the size and influence of radical right parties vary across
Europe. Just as the support for other parties vary, there is no constant
support for an extremist agenda – nor is it constantly absent. It has been
argued that the existence of radical right parties and right wing populism is an inherent feature of Western democracy. Even when focusing on
both the supply of radical right parties, and the demand for the same it is
important to understand the success of these parties, it does not seem like
the demand for these parties would suddenly disappear. As Van Der Brug
and Fennema argues: ”In all post-industrial societies, there is a substantial
group of citizens with so much fear of immigrants that they are willing to
support a radical-right party if they see it as democratic, and if the established parties provide no alternative” (2007). At the same time, these parties
fundamentally challenge the basic features of a liberal democracy: the
equal rights of all.
As the overview over the situation in Europe shows, some parties are more
influential than others. In most countries, radical right parties are marginalized. In countries like Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal
and Spain there are no parties of significance that campaign on a racist or
purely anti-immigrant agenda. In the UK, Slovenia, Slovakia, Germany and
the Czech republic, there are parties that have a history or an ideology that
makes them somehow significant, but they do not hold any seats in the
legislative assembly. In France, the Front National holds only 2 seats, but
receives quite a large support in for example the presidential election.
However, the successes of radical right parties across Europe are uneven when looking at the tendencies for the last two elections. In Austria,
17
France and Hungary, radical right parties have increased their number of
seats in parliaments. In Finland, the True Finns made a landslide victory,
and in Sweden a radical right party entered the parliament for the first
time in 2010. In Greece, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn entered the
parliament in 2012. In the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Germany and Norway, anti-immigrant or radical right parties have had a stable support. In
some countries such as Italy, changes in the composition of parties makes it
difficult to assess whether the support for these parties have changed. But
radical right or anti-immigrant parties are also losing support. In Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the
UK, these parties are losing support.
Hence, it is difficult to talk about a surge of extremist parties. Their electoral success might depend on many things, but presumably not on a lack of
demand for their policies, but rather
on local circumstances such as party
organisation, leadership and policy
formulation.
In some countries, the parties
are held back by other political
parties rather than by lack of support among the voters. This is the
case for Belgium, where Vlaams
Belang received almost 8 per cent
of the vote, and 12 seats in parliament, but where the other parties
are holding up a cordon sanitaire
against the party, thus effectively
excluding them from any influence.
The situation is somewhat the same
in Sweden, where no party wants to
co-operate with the Sweden Democrats. However, due to the fact that
the party has a pivotal position in
the legislative assembly, they have
the potential to influence policy. In
other countries, radical right parties
Serbian policemen stand guard at the
entrance to a conference hall in central
have themselves chosen to remain
Belgrade where Serbia’s gay activists were outside government coalitions,
forced to hold 2012 Pride indoors. The
whether asked to join or not. This is
writing on the poster signed by the Serbian
the case for Finland, where the True
ultra nationalists reads: ”Message to the
Finns proclaimed that they would
government. Stop the gay parade. Listen
not be a part of a coalition. Some
to your people not to Brussels.”
parties are large enough to become
Photo: AFP/Andrej Isakovic/Scanpix
coalition partners in coming governments. This is the case for Norway, Denmark and Poland as well as Austria,
and where there is no consistent policy to exclude the party from government. In the Netherlands, the Freedom Party has been a support party to
the government before, even if they are now excluded from influence.
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However, there are also examples of countries where extremists have quite
a large influence. The most striking example is Hungary, where the party in
government Fidesz has taken a nationalist turn, and where Jobbik holds 17
% of the vote. Here, the nationalist agenda has a lot of influence. But also
more moderate nationalist parties or parties with a lot of influence from
anti-immigrant movements are, or have been, part of government coalitions in for example Lithuania and Italy.
One can conclude that the possibility to influence legislation varies between parties and countries. Just as support for these parties vary, their
influence varies depending on possible coalition partners and their size
in the legislature. But pure size and influence are not the only things that
matters for LGBT rights, naturally, the position of the parties on LGBT
rights matter.
Not all of these parties have the same stance on LGBT rights. In order to
fit into the political system, some claim to support rights for LGBT people.
Others furiously oppose Pride parades and same sex marriage. And some
seem indifferent – focusing on other issues at hand. To better assess the
future prospects for human rights, it is necessary to find out how, and why,
radical right parties talk about LGBT rights. In order to do so, a couple of
cases from different parts of Europe, with different traits and histories,
have been chosen.
19
European Variations and Strategies
In order to better account for differences and similarities in how different
types of intolerant parties perceive LGBT rights, five illustrative cases have
been chosen: Bulgaria, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The countries selected represent different geographic parts of Europe. They
have become democratic countries at different points in time, and they have
joined the EU and thus complied with and implemented certain anti-discrimination legislation at different times. Some of the countries have a more
progressive position on LGBT rights in general. The influence of the parties
varies, as well as the main ideology of the party. These countries should not be
seen as “ideal types”, but rather as interesting cases that can tell us something
about radical right strategies on LGBT rights in different circumstances. The
result shall not be seen as an attempt to determine once and for all why and
how these parties grow, or under what circumstances they oppose LGBT
rights. Rather, the purpose is to give an overview of tendencies, positions and
thoughts on LGBT rights among radical right parties in Europe today.
Sweden is a Nordic country, perceived as tolerant and equal, which has a
small radical right-wing populist party. The party has gained representation in the parliament only recently, when running on a mainly anti-Muslim
agenda. Bulgaria and Hungary are both new EU member states in Eastern
Europe, where the main intolerant parties Ataka and Jobbik campaign on a
traditional radical right platform. However, there are important differences.
Hungary is one of the countries in Eastern Europe that has the most tolerant
legislation, but where nationalism is very influential in everyday politics.
Bulgaria shows quite a poor performance when it comes to legislation to protect LGBT persons. However, nationalist ideology is not at all as influential as
in Hungary. France is one of the founding members of the EU, and the Front
National was one of the first parties to manage to gain votes on a racist, ethnopluralist agenda in the 1970’s, after a setback for almost all racist parties
after World War II. The Front National has also increasingly embraced the
anti-Muslim agenda. The Netherlands is widely seen as a tolerant and liberal
country, and its main anti-immigrant party, the Freedom Party, has distanced
itself from the anti-Semitic agenda of many of the other European radical
right parties, and campaigned on a platform where they claim to defend
LGBT rights from Muslim extremism. Both the Front National in France and
the Freedom Party in the Netherlands have been models for other parties
around Europe, the Front National with its ethnopluralist agenda leading
up to electoral success in 1984, and the PVV (Freedom Party) with its liberal
profile and its opposition against Muslims (Rydgren, 2005; Vossen, 2011).
Bulgaria: Widespread Homophobia and a Problematic Discourse
Bulgaria, an Eastern European country, joined the European Union in the
latest wave of enlargement in 2007. The country is a free democracy with
20
An activist waves a rainbow flag in front of the Bulgarian parliament, the former headquarters of the
Bulgarian Communist Party, during the fifth Sofia Pride 2012. Photo: Reuters/Stoyan Nenov/Scanpix
limited press freedom. The main extreme right party, ATAKA, is neither
very successful, nor particularly marginalised. The Rainbow index for Bulgaria is 6 – similar to neighbouring Romania, but significantly lower than
most European countries.
In Bulgaria, the main nationalist party is the ATAKA (National Union Attack). The party was founded in 2005 by a group of smaller nationalist
extremist groups. Their policies focus on xenophobia and the preservation
of national pride and ”the centrality of orthodoxy”. (EED, 2012) ATAKA has
had stable support from the electorate and received 9.36 % of the national
vote in the elections in 2011. This gave the party 21 seats in parliament,
however, later several deputies left the party, and today only 10 remain
within Ataka. The party in government, the Citizens of the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), had the parliamentary support of ATAKA, but
the leader Volen Siderov withdrew their support in 2011 (BHC, 2011).
But homophobia is also widespread in other parties. For example, in
January 2012, Minister of Culture Vezhdi Rashidov said in an interview
that he “finds the gays to be the most unpleasant community, since they
combine the worst qualities of women and the most despicable qualities
of men” (Sofia News Agency, 120105). The Prime Minister in 2011 made
several homophobic comments and quotes, according to the ILGA Annual
Review, including stating “in our party we are normal people. (…) So we
hope to be and not embarrass ourselves in old age”, and, commenting on
charges that he ruled with a firm hand, saying that it is “better with a firm
21
hand, than with a limp wrist”. In Bulgaria, gay men are often referred to as
having “soft wrist”, which is seen as a feminine feature. This “expresses a
socially degrading attitude” in the Bulgarian context (Pisankaneva, 2007).
Overall, the political discourse in Bulgaria is a problem. Monika Pisankaneva, chairperson at the Bilitis Resource Center Foundation in Sofia, talks
about an unfavourable environment of conservatism that strengthens
radical right discourse:
“The absence of critical academic and political discourses which questions
traditional values in mainstream society contributes to strengthening the
radical right-wing parties. Both left-wing and right-wing parties in Bulgaria
refer to traditional values as something positive and healthy for society.
This creates an environment of conservatism, which is unfavourable for
LGBT-led activism.”
Among the citizens of Bulgaria, homophobia is widespread. In the World
Values Survey round for Bulgaria in 2006, 32 % of the respondents held the
opinion that homosexuality can never be justified. Only 8.5 % agreed that
homosexuality is always justifiable. The respondents were asked to answer
the question whether homosexuality is justifiable or not on a scale between
1 (never justifiable) and 10 (always justifiable). Almost 70 % of the respondents chose a number of 5 or lower, thus suggesting that they felt more
comfortable with the statement that homosexuality is never justifiable. Thus,
there is no strong mandate for increased rights for LGBT people in Bulgaria.
There are also gaps in the legislative provisions on LGBT rights. Hate
speech legislation and the Criminal Code do not include gender identity
and sexual orientation as bias (ILGA Annual Review, 2011). There is no legal recognition of same-sex partnership, and no form of adoption is available for same-sex couples. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
only concerns the areas of employment and access to goods and services.
However, there are some positive developments. In 2011, the Supreme
Administrative Court decided that a city council was engaged in discrimination based on sexual orientation, when they tried to ban displays of
homosexuality in public (ILGA Annual Review, 2011).
When it comes to Pride parades and the freedom of assembly, annual Pride
parades have been held in Bulgaria since 2008, despite opposition from
several groups. In 2008, activists from the Bulgarian National Alliance violently attacked the parade, and protests continued in 2009, when ATAKA
called for protesters to beat up LGBT persons (IGLHRC, 2010). Police presence at the parades has been high. While the city of Sofia in 2011 did not
officially endorse the Pride parade, they did refuse permission for a counter-demonstration by an anti-LGBT group (ILGA Annual Review, 2011). In
2012, the parade gathered around 2000 persons including foreign ambassadors supporting the parade (Sofia News Agency, 120629). A few radical
right activists opposed the march, claiming that foreign elements wanted
to make Bulgaria a destination for gay sex tourism (SNA, 120630). The
Bulgarian Orthodox Church did not condemn controversial homophobic
22
statements made by a representative for the church, who encouraged people to throw stones on the Pride parade, but instead called the parade an
immoral manifestation and homosexuality an unnatural lust (Sofia Pride
2012/ILGA-Europe, 120618).
International networking and awareness raising are important initiatives in
order to improve the situation, according to Pisankaneva. She also mentions
the use of social media and contact with progressive media, and collaboration with the governmental Commission for Protection from Discrimination.
“Referring to the EU directives concerning LGBT rights, and collaborating
with EU umbrella organisations, such as ILGA-Europe, would be the best strategy for LGBT activists’ NGOs in their advocacy for protecting LGBT rights. …
Sofia Pride as a specific LGBT volunteer-driven initiative has raised a positive wave of solidarity among NGOs, informal progressive civic groups and
progressive mass media. It increased its number of supporters over the years,
starting with just 100 people in 2008 and reaching to 1500 in June 2012.”
However, so far, Bilitis has not cooperated with trade unions in promoting
LGBT rights, even if Pisankaneva thinks that this kind of cooperation could
be useful, particularly in the field of employment. As it is now, Pisankaneva
is not sure about Bulgarian unions’ position on LGBT rights.
According to Monika Pisankaneva, the largest threat against the rights for
LGBT people is traditional values and radical political populism that create
obstacles for more progressive legislation. But also the Ataka party poses
a threat, according to Pisankaneva the main threat to LGBT rights since
the party entered the parliament (and many local governments) in 2005.
Ataka is opposed to the values that the EU represents, and call for a revision of some documents that they think endanger the national interest.
“Ataka brands most Bulgarian politicians and activists for human and
minority rights as national traitors, and calls for sanctions against those
who defame Bulgaria. Ataka fought against the integration of minorities
into the public sphere, and openly expressed racist and anti-Semitic values.
Ataka accuses the Romas and Turks of causing the bad economic situation
in Bulgaria. Its leader, Volen Siderov was sanctioned by the Commission
for Protection from Discrimination and banned to use hate speech against
Roma, Turks and homosexuals.”
And even if Ataka has fared poorly in the last elections, this has not improved the situation for LGBT rights. Pisankaneva says that the now leading
party, GERB, took most of the protest votes from Ataka in the last elections.
However, they maintained a conservative policy towards minorities, and
a populist discourse that refers to traditional values, and the situation for
LGBT rights has not changed. The situation both when it comes to political
discourse and the influence of radical right populism could improve with a
new government coalition, according to Monika Pisankaneva.
“The situation might get better if a new political coalition wins the next
23
general elections and establishes a more liberal and progressive public
discourse, which emphasizes the values of the EU as a basis for national
legislation and public policies.”
Hungary: a Nationalist Majority
Hungary joined the EU in the 2004 wave of enlargement. Compared to the
other countries that joined the European Union at the same time, the Rainbow Index for Hungary is higher – 14, as compared to 2 for Estonia, and 1
for Latvia. Under the former government, Hungarian policy was comparatively progressive for the region: the anti-discrimination legislation introduced
in 2003, for example, went far beyond the demands from the EU, extending
the legislation to include not only discrimination in the workplace but also in
education, housing, and access to social benefits (IRBC, 2012). However, the
situation has changed. In Hungary, the most well-known radical right party
Jobbik entered the parliament in 2010 with a large share of the vote. The
conservative party, Fidesz, has moved from being a liberal party after the fall
of the Soviet Union, to embracing nationalistic views and showing authoritarian tendencies. Thus, Hungary could be an exception in at least two ways,
since they are relatively LGBT-friendly when it comes to policies, while the
influence of nationalistic ideas is strong.
Homophobia is widespread among Hungarian citizens. In the report “Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination” from the Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung, the perception of LGBT persons among the general public in Hungary
is described as quite poor. Out of the eight countries studied (Denmark,
the UK, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Poland and Hungary), the
broadest acceptance of sexism is found in Hungary. Sexism is measured “in
terms of agreement with the traditional division of gender roles”, a situation that gives men advantages such as more power and better career opportunities and access to education (Zick et al, 2011, p. 63). The report also
gives a picture of how widespread homophobia is “by measuring rejection
of two positively formulated statements, one about same-sex marriage, and
the other about the morality of homosexuality” (ibid, p. 64-65). Two thirds
of Hungarians reject same sex marriage, and think that homosexuality is
immoral. The only country out of the eight where homophobia is more widespread is Poland. This is perhaps the reason why, as one observer notes,
rants about LGBT people are an easy way to score political points, while
risking virtually no sanctions (Bruni, NYT, 2012).
Discrimination against LGBT persons in Hungary is very common, but underreported. Hate crime legislation does not explicitly cover crimes with an LGBT
bias, but is implicitly interpreted to cover it. ILGA also notes that the new
constitution does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation, and that the constitution also defines marriage as an institution
between a man and a woman (ILGA Annual Review, 2011). The Pride parade,
established in Hungary in 1998, is one of the oldest in Central and Eastern
Europe. In 2007, the parade was attacked by large groups of people. However,
there is a wish to keep the parades: a police decision to deny the Pride parade
permission was overturned by a court in 2011 and 2012 (IRBC, 2012).
24
According to Tamás Dombos, project coordinator for the Háttér Support
Society for LGBT People in Hungary, visibility and coming out are the most
important factors in counteracting the problems LGBT people face in Hungary.
“Research shows that only very few people know that they have LGBT friends
or family members, around 12 – 15 %, meaning that people have no first hand
experiences and their information is based on often prejudiced media reports.
Encouraging people to come out and school programs that bring students and
LGBT people closer would probably have the highest impact.”
So far, trade unions have not been very vocal on LGBT rights. According
to Dombos, some of them attend seminars on matters that relate to LGBT
rights, but they have not “made any public statements countering the rise
of political homophobia in Hungary.” Some support has come from a small
political party called Szolidaritás, which has its base in union activism, and
has participated in demonstrations against the new constitution. At these
demonstrations, LGBT rights were also discussed, “although not by trade
union speakers”, says Dombos.
But the political situation is also a matter of concern. The opposition parties
in Hungary are weak, and the press is only partially free, according to the
Freedom House. The third largest opposition party is the radical right Jobbik, which holds almost 17 % of the vote and 12 % of the seats. According
to Tamás Dombos, Jobbik, which is openly homophobic, is the largest threat
against the rights of LGBT people in Hungary, even if there are also other political groups with an even more radical agenda. Besides the proposals and
speeches that Jobbik hold in the Parliament, they have paramilitary groups
such as the Magyar Gárda, that has organised violent demonstrations against
for example the Pride March and the EuroGames sports event, says Dombos.
They have also openly called for abolishing registered partnership. Jobbik
has proposed bills both in parliament and in cities to ban the “propagation of
disorders of sexual behaviour – especially sexual relations between members
of the same sex”, and to abolish registered partnership. Dombos believes that
even if the bills proposed by Jobbik in various cities as well as in the parliament were voted down by the majority mainstream parties, the proposals for
banning “the propagation of disorders of sexual behaviour” and the open calls
for the abolishment of registered partnership has had an effect on the debate.
”They were not able to directly influence legislation, none of these proposals
were adopted, but the debate on LGBT rights shifted considerably to less progressive questions. Earlier political discussion was about marriage, adoption,
etc.”, says Dombos. Now, the debate is focused on the propaganda laws.
As a result of more visible nationalist policies, LGBT persons in Hungary experience increased levels of homophobia. In a focus group study from 2012,
the authors claim that since Jobbik entered the parliament in 2010, “directly
racist and homophobic forms of public communication started to increase”
(Takács, 2012). LGBT respondents express the opinion that the political system keeps radicalising, and one of them says that “the change of government
swept away women’s rights and gay rights from the table” (ibid).
25
The problem is not limited to Jobbik. Also Fidesz and the Christian Democrats coalition constitute a problem, according to Tamás Dombos.
“The two mainstream right wing parties are also openly homophobic,
especially KDNP (Christian Democrats) who very aggressively push their
conservative family policy agenda (non-married and especially same-sex
couples are not families, etc.), and since they are needed for qualified majority, they most often get what they want from the government.”
Fidesz started out as a liberal youth party in 1988. Today, the party can be
described as national conservative. Its conservative turn corresponds with
the electoral success in 2010, which gave Fidesz and its coalition partner
more than 50 % of the vote, and a two thirds majority in the parliament. In
2010, Fidesz contested the elections in coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). With a majority of two thirds, Fidesz can itself
change laws in parliament, an advantage that they have often made use of.
The most important and far reaching change that the Fidesz has made is
the changes to the constitution of Hungary. The changes have been criticized by the Human Rights Watch as possibly discriminatory. In the constitution, marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman, which
according to the Human Rights Watch implies that a family based on marriage is the only one protected by the state, which could lead to a situation
where LGBT people are denied access to protection of families and relationships (HRW, 2011). Other problems are the fact that the constitution
has become more nationalistic and more clerical. In the preamble, reference is made to “historic constitutions”, which can be seen as a reminder of
Hungarian claims to territories in neighbouring countries (Krugman, NYT,
120121). The new constitution also mentions God, and has been criticised
for being too religious. Fidesz claim that they wanted to restore religion as
a part of public life, and that this is nothing out of the mainstream when
it comes to European constitutions. However, actually only two European
countries, Ireland and Poland, have religious constitutions, and Hungary is
at large a secular society, thus the constitution does not reflect the overall
attitude among Hungarians (ibid.).
Furthermore, concerns have been raised because of what is widely viewed
as attempts to consolidate control of the state and limiting democracy in
Hungary. Fidesz has, critics claim, tried to limit the freedom of the media
and the independence of the central bank, and reduced the independence
of the judiciary (The Economist, 120107). Some observers have called this
a “systematic destruction of checks and balances in the government” (NYT,
111211). Fidesz has not taken any further action to improve the situation
for LGBT persons, which means that progress that was achieved by the
former government has ceased (IRBC, 2012).
Instead, things seem to get worse. The Budapest City Council was asked
by Fidesz to “limit obscene marches” before the Budapest pride, a development that was noted by members of the European Parliament in a resolution in 2012 (European Parliament Resolution 2012/2657). It is hard to
26
say if the situation will improve or deteriorate further, says Tamás Dombos.
“There are positive signs, LGBT people became more out and active as
a response to growing political homophobia, but there are also negative
signs.” Many Jobbik supporters are young and will be future voters. “There
is a very high level of uncertainty with the Hungarian political system now:
over 50% of voters have no party preference, and more and more are discontent with all currently existing mainstream parties. There is a fear that
many people might turn to radical alternatives in the 2014 elections.”
France: Pinkwashing the Front National
France is a stable democracy, one of the founding EU countries and is together with Germany the core of the European Union. The Rainbow Index
for France is 6, which is low compared to other countries in Western Europe.
The main radical right party in France is the Front National, headed by Marine Le Pen. The party has a history of anti-Semitism, but today mainly targets Muslims. The party has an established position in the politics of France,
though it only holds two seats
in the legislative assembly. The
Front National has also been a
role model for other radical right
parties in Europe when it comes
to strategies, organisation, and
rhetoric. (Rydgren, 2005)
Among the general public, 52 %
think that it is not a good idea
to allow same-sex marriage, and
36 % think that homosexuality
is immoral (Zick et al, 2011,
p. 65). Furthermore, in France
57 % think that women should
take their roles as wives and
mothers more seriously, but only
13 % think that men should have
more rights to a job than women.
Thus, homophobia and sexism is
quite widespread in France.
People of the Socialist party (PS) Youth movement parade during the Gay Pride, 2012 in
Paris. Photo: AFP/ Thomas Samson/Scanpix
In the Annual ILGA report for
2011, it is mentioned that LGBT
organisations feared that the
non-discrimination agenda would be less strong after the dissolution of the
old national equality body and the transfer of the body into a new, more
general, organisation (p. 62). In 2011, a bill proposing marriage equality
for same-sex couples was blocked by the largest conservative party, Union
for a Popular Movement. Joint adoption is only allowed for married couples
or single parents, and thus the law effectively excludes the recognition of
one of the parents in a same-sex relationship. Recently, the debate about a
proposed gay marriage and adoption law led to protests by French religious
27
leaders from all affiliations as well as conservative politicians (ILGA Europe,
121105). A protest againstthe law was held in November 2012, organised
by an association called “Protest for all”. The organisation claimed that if the
state passes the law, this would mean that “the two pillars of human identity: different gender and affiliation” would not be recognised (The Local,
121105). The law has been criticized by progressives for being too limited,
since it only mentions marriage and adoption, and not other issues. Thomas
Fouquet-Lapar, member of the federation Inter-LGBT, an umbrella organisation for around 60 organisations working for LGBT rights, says that there is
also some uncertainty around the juridical details of the law, since it includes
changes in the civil code, which the Ministry of Justice will have to take into
account. “In France, you cannot touch the civil code”, says Fouquet-Lapar.
The Front National is a party with an extremely traditional view of the family, and, as a number of LGBT organisations in France wrote in 2012, want to
put LGBT people back into the closet (“Pas de tribune pour Marine Le Pen”,
2012). Even if Marine Le Pen has spoken favourably about her “homosexual
friends”, the Front National promotes a politics of invisibility – claiming that
homo-, bi- and transsexual persons should keep their sexuality to the private
sphere. However, within the youth branch of the Front National, a representative has spoken about “scandalous manifestations and the illegitimate
lobby”. Front National has also opposed support to, among other things,
organisations that work with family planning (or, with the words of Marine
Le Pen, incitement to abortion) and anti-discrimination. More importantly,
it is clear that the preferred norm for the party’s policy is the nuclear family, based on a married heterosexual couple. The party states that it wants
to defend the “family structure” and that the family should be based on a
union between a man and a woman. They also compare same-sex couples
to polygamy, thus insinuating that opening up for same-sex couples could
lead to other structures perceived as unwanted. But the Front National has
also tried to exploit violence against women and LGBT persons in order to
“normalize an anti-Muslim racism” (ibid). For example, Le Pen said in 2010
that she was increasingly hearing about areas where it was problematic to be
a woman, homosexual, Jewish or white, and where religious laws did override secular laws, thus pointing out Muslim immigrants as misogynist and
hostile towards LGBT people. She has also used the concept of laïcité, French
secularism, in order to attack and stigmatise Muslims. The LGBT community
also states that Marine Le Pen never has tried to distance herself from her
father’s discriminatory and prejudiced remarks on homosexuals and those
suffering from AIDS, and points out that the Front National has not changed.
Thomas Fouquet-Lapar says that if the Front National continues to use this
kind of rethoric, it could become a problem. “The Front National are trying
to appear as a more reasonable party, and in this, they use the fight of LGBT
activists for their own means.” Today, it is still obvious that the party is mainly
focused on issues such as immigration and their nationalist agenda, not LGBT
rights or women’s rights. Generally, Fouquet-Lapar thinks it is a problem when
people try to portray muslims or immigrants as an obstacle to everyone’s right
to live the way they want to: “This has also lead to some people saying that
LGBT people are hostile towards muslims because they are opposed to
28
LGBT rights – and this is not true, most LGBT people are progressive.”
However, the main threat to LGBT rights in France today is, according to
Fouquet-Lapar, not extremist parties. Because of the political system of
France, the Front National is still very marginalised and can not influence
policy on these issues. There are two main obstacles to LGBT rights in
France today, says Fouquet-Lapar. One is the general conservative politicians. “Some of them are homophobic, or at least oppose equal rights. And
they have influence through opinion leaders, and good contacts to the
churches, and many people listen to what the church says.” Since these
politicians are seen as respectable, they are listened to and thus have influence, while extremists such as the Front National are not taken seriously,
says Fouquet-Lapar. Another is that within the leftist political sphere, there
is also a resistance to LGBT rights from so called “left catholics”. “Even if
they are not openly homophobic, they are against equal rights”, says “Fouquet-Lapar. However, there are progressives in most parties. Also, there
are some initiatives on LGBT rights within the unions and workplaces. For
example, one trade union is a member of the LGBT federation. The largest
union, TGT, has a working group on LGBT rights within the union.
For the future, Fouquet-Lapar believes that progress will be continuous,
at least when it comes to legislative changes. But when it comes to awareness, he is less certain. “A lot has happened in society the last 15 years and
it is now easier to live as an LGBT person. But at the same time, people are
becoming more distanced from each other, there is more poverty, and there
is a comeback of religion. This could lead to LGBT rights beeing viewed as
something that concerns only a small number of progressives”. Another problem is that most of the LGBT organisations work only voluntarily, and thus
lack capacity for working on awareness-raising acitivites on a large scale.
The Netherlands: “Intolerance Towards Intolerance”?
The Netherlands is one of the founding members of the EU and is widely
known for its liberalism and tolerance towards sexual minorities. As the first
country in the world, the Netherlands introduced marriage equality for samesex couples in 2001. The country was in 2011 among the top six countries
on the Rainbow Index with a score of 16. Among positive developments the
last year is the fact that a group of seventeen churches issued a declaration
against homophobic violence, and that the Minister of Education required
schools to provide education about sexual and gender diversity (ILGA Annual
Report, 2011, p. 121). Also, a new ”LGBT and Gender Equality Policy Plan”
was presented, and a draft law on the abolishment of sterilisation of transgender people was presented in 2011, and was debated in parliament in 2012.
In the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung report on intolerant attitudes in Europe
from 2011, the Netherlands appears as having one of the most tolerant populations in Europe. Only 36.4 % agrees with a sexist statement about the
role of women (as compared to 87 % in Poland, or 53 % in the UK). When
it comes to homophobia, only 17 % reject same-sex marriage, which is the
lowest number for the countries included in the study (Denmark, the UK,
29
France, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Poland and Hungary). Only one in
six finds homosexuality immoral, which is by far the lowest figure for all
countries included (Zick et al, 2011, p. 63). Thus, politics based on hostility towards LGBT people would presumably not be very successful.
However, according to Philip Tijsma, manager of Public Affairs at COC
Nederland, an organisation working for social acceptance and equal rights
for LGBT people, the largest problem for LGBT people in the Netherlands
is still social acceptance. The Dutch population is ”superficially supportive”
when it comes to LGBT rights. While many claim to be tolerant, Tijsma
says that there is still a lot to be done. For example, half of the population think that it is shocking to see a gay couple kissing in public, whereas
only 10 percent think it
is shocking to
see a straight
couple kissing. Discrimination
and violence is
also prevalent.
The number of
bias-motivated
incidents
increased with
2012 Dutch homosexuals of Turkish ancestry have their own boat
in the boat float Prideparade. Photo: © AP/Margriet Faber/Scanpix 54 % between
2009 and 2010
(Zick et al, 2011, p. 63). Also, a newly set up hotline for neighbourhood harassment received up to 200 reports on homophobic abuse in one month.
”Seven out of ten LGBT persons are confronted with physical or verbal
violence in their lifetime because of their sexuality or gender identity”, says
Philip Tijsma.
Also in schools the situation is difficult. ”High schools are an unsafe environment for LGBT’s. The suicide rate among LGBT high school students is
up to five times higher than among straight students.”
The strategy for the COC is to work within the army, the school, the communities, and ethnic groups to promote social acceptance. ”We work with an
inside-out strategy. To mobilise people to start their own movement in their
near environment.” The organisation found out that if they asked an organisation such as a school to create a safe environment for LGBT students,
they would for example reply that they did not have any LGBT students or
teachers. Thus, the COC decided to support LGBT persons to become visible
themselves. The COC has also, according to Tijsma, successfully worked
with the largest labor union in Holland, FNV, in what they call “a gay-straight
alliance” in order to combat homo- and transphobia at work. Among other
things, the COC and the FNV have published a tool-kit for LGBT friendly
companies, and try to create networks for LGBT-employees.
30
Given the common view that the Dutch are tolerant, it is not surprising
that the main anti-immigrant, intolerant party has not vividly opposed
homosexuality, but, rather argued that LGBT rights are what they seek to
defend against intolerant Muslims. The charismatic Geert Wilders, party
leader of the Partij Von der Vrijhed (Freedom Party), has actively sought to
distance himself from his radical right colleagues such as Le Pen and Jörg
Haider. Instead, he describes himself as a defender of democratic values
and minorities. In line with this Wilders has said, with regards to the
Muslim community in the Netherlands, that ”we should learn to become
intolerant of the intolerant” (BBC News, 110623). Wilders has moved from
a neoconservative or conservative liberal worldview to a national populist
ideology. And he differs from most of his populist colleagues in his opinions on issues such as euthanasia, the right to abortion, and LGBT rights.
Among other things, the PVV has suggested that gay soldiers should be
allowed to wear their uniforms in the pride parade (Vossen, 2011).
Geert Wilders is in many ways similar to the charismatic populist politician
Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered by an animal rights activist in 2002. However, Wilders has taken the criticism of Islam further in calling for a ban
on the Koran and wanting to expel Muslims that have not integrated (Vossen, 2011). The support for Wilders shows that hostile sentiments towards
Dutch Muslims were not totally uncommon among the Dutch population.
As a result of the elections in 2010, the Dutch Liberal Party became dependent on the support from Geert Wilders in order to work in coalition
with the Christian Democrats (BBC News, 110623). But the situation has
changed. In the last elections in 2012, Wilders lost 43 % of his voters, and
lost 9 out of 24 mandates in the parliament (Expo.se, 120913). The PVV
currently holds 15 out of 150 seats in the Dutch parliament, and received
10.8 % of the votes in the last elections.
According to Philip Tijsma, manager of Public Affairs at COC Nederland,
the Freedom Party has generally been supportive of LGBT rights, or has at
least not opposed progressive legislation.
”We are a politically neutral organisation, and ask all the parties to join our
proposals. Some parties are against in some issues, others in other.”
But the Freedom Party has not always been a reliable partner, even though
they have never been against equal rights. At the end of this year, education on sexual diversity will become compulsory in Dutch schools, an issue
that COC has pushed. The Freedom Party wavered in their support on this
issue. Also, when the government decided to cut funding to cooperation
between the LGBT community and Turkish and Moroccan communities
that aimed at making homosexuality and gender identity more accepted
in these communities, the Freedom Party supported these cuts. The party
was, at the time, a support party to the government.
But few groups and parties have consistently opposed LGBT rights in the
Netherlands, according to Philip Tijsma.
”The only party that has consistently opposed gay rights is a Christian Ort-
31
hodox Party, the SGP. Other Christian groups are trying to cooperate with
us, for example on the issue of right to asylum for LGBT people.”
Tijsma also says that the organisation is in discussion with other religious and
ethnic groups where conservative views on LGBT rights are more common
than among the population in general, such as the Turkish and Moroccan community. ”There is a wide perspective of viewpoints also within these groups”.
So, there are no obvious ideological reasons for Wilders to oppose LGBT
rights from his national populist platform. However, equal rights for all is
not the purpose of the politics of the Freedom Party. Their main focus is
still an anti-immigrant, anti-muslim agenda, where they portray muslims
as the main threat to LGBT rights.
Sweden: a Backlash Against Visibility?
Sweden is widely viewed as a progressive and liberal country when it
comes to LGBT rights and equality, and is placed among the four most
LGBT-friendly countries in Europe, with a score of 18 on the ILGA Rainbow
Index. Sweden joined the EU in 1995. The main radical right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats, did not enter the parliament until 2010,
which makes Sweden an exception in comparison with other European
democracies, and to neighbouring Denmark and Norway, where radical
right-wing populist parties have been successful much earlier. However, the
popularity of the Sweden Democrats seems to be on the rise.
People in general are quite tolerant towards LGBT people in Sweden. According to figures from the World Values Survey from 2006, 60 % of the respondents think that homosexuality is always justifiable. Only 4.2 % think that
homosexuality is never justifiable. The respondents answer the questions on
a scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). Only 17.6 % of the
respondents have answered with a number of 5 or lower, which suggests a
larger acceptance for the proposition that homosexuality is always justifiable.
Still, the LGBT community in Sweden faces some obstacles. The ILGA Annual Rewiev for 2011 mentions that several religious groups which do not
allow LGBT people in their congregations continue to receive public funding. The report also mentions that increased attention was given to the
issue of forced sterilisation of transgender people. A problem mentioned in
the report is that asylum procedures for LGBT people are not consistently
followed (ILGA Annual Review 2011, p. 156). On the positive side ILGA
mentions that two high profile athletes came out during the year. The Swedish constitution also prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender
identity and sexual orientation.
Strategies for further improvement depend on the situation, says Ulrika
Westerlund, Chairman of the Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender Rights. “In the issue of compulsory sterilisation of transgender people, we used international cooperation in order to shame the
government into changing the legislation, and we also framed the issue as
32
Sweden Democrats leadar Jimmie Åkesson talking in the Swedish parliament. Photo: © Expo
an issue of human rights in general. Sweden has a reputation of being a
country that respects human rights, and this issue could have changed the
picture of Sweden. It is important to get Swedish journalists interested in
the issues, and this has been difficult. We need to draw attention to these
issues and make them visible.” The Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender Rights has cooperated with trade unions in
targeted educational projects, and Ulrika Westerlund says that they have a
well functioning cooperation with trade unions. Trade unions have generally been more interested than their counterparts, the business organisations. However, they are increasingly becoming interested in supporting
initiatives such as conferences, says Westerlund.
The Sweden Democrats holds 20 seats in the parliament and received 5.7
% of the vote in the last elections in 2010. However, recently they have
gained a lot of potential voters according to opinion polls, and some predict that they could receive as much as 10 % if there was an election today.
Today, the party has a pivotal position in the parliament, but no other party
has chosen to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats, and their influence
on policy therefore remains very marginal. They have been able to use
their new position in the parliament to discuss their issues and are increasingly seen as a party similar to others, despite their controversial past
and the fact that many of their representatives have expressed racist and
intolerant opinions. It is difficult to say if the cordon sanitaire would last if
the party was to gain a lot of votes in the next election.
Traditionally, the Sweden Democrats have opposed LGBT rights and feminism, as a part of their nationalist ideology. The party has roots and influences from the racist radical right movement in Sweden: in 1994, 39,5 %
of the candidates for the party were before, during or after their candidacy
linked to Swedish Nazi, fascist or white power groups (Ekman and Poohl,
2010). However, the party has experienced a transformation and is today a
radical right-wing populist party with an anti-immigrant and anti-muslim
agenda. When the party has tried to profile themselves as a defender of hu-
33
man rights in order to oppose immigration from Muslim countries, they have
tried to use the rights of LGBT persons for their own purposes. In 2010, the
party leader Jimmie Åkesson along with Carina Herrstedt, vice deputy party
leader, wrote an opinion piece in which they claimed that bi- and homosexual persons today saw SD as a party for them, and that this showed that
it is actually possible to combine “Sweden-friendly”
politics with respect for sexual minorities. They also
publicly issued an excuse for the “inappropriate” comments that some party representatives had made about
LGBT people. Finally, they pointed out the “increasing
islamisation” as a threat towards Swedish LGBT people
(Aftonbladet Debatt, 100330). However, the Swedish
Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Rights immediately stated that the claims from the
Sweden Democrats were not credible.
This article must be seen as an anomaly in the history of the Sweden Democrats. Since then, no further
measures have been taken from the part of the Sweden
Democrats to improve the situation for LGBT people in
Sweden. The Sweden Democrats is the only party that
has not participated in the annual Stockholm Pride-festival. When asked why, the press secretary of the party,
Jimmie Åkesson in
Linus Bylund, in august 2012 said that the parade
national dress at the
opening of parliament. was counterproductive and led to oversexualisation
of LGBT persons (SvD, 120801). Party representatives
Photo: © Expo
have continued to express themselves in degrading and
intolerant terms about LGBT people. Party representatives claim that sexuality should remain a private issue, thus effectively asking LGBT people to get
back into the closet. Furthermore, the party promotes a traditional nuclear
family and the “child’s right to both a father and a mother in its life” (Sweden Democrats Party Program 2011). The party does not believe that it is in
the best interest of the child to give same-sex couples and “polyamourous
groups” the right to adoption and insemination.
The Sweden Democrats recently changed the description of their ideology
from “nationalist” to “social conservative”. None of these terms imply any
stronger liberal or progressive values in ethical issues. Ulrika Westerlund
agrees that the Sweden Democrats have never been truly interested in
LGBT rights, and only used them when it comes to limiting immigration.
“They have a traditional conservative policy in these issues. They claim to support Swedish law, but do not really attempt to push any changes in legislation”.
In 2007, the party secretary Björn Söder, who still holds the position and is
a member of parliament, wrote on his blog that homosexuality was unnatural and compared it with paedophilia (Aftonbladet, 070805). More
recently, local party representatives have expressed the opinion that
homosexuality is unnatural, “unclean” and will lead to a “degeneration of
society”, and that the Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
34
Transgender Rights in Sweden has not distanced themselves from groups
that promote paedophilia (Expo.se, 120802, Interasistmen, 121105). It is
evident that within the party, LGBT persons are still associated with disease
and immoral behaviour.
If the party continues to grow and becomes a credible coalition partner,
they could influence the agenda on LGBT rights. According to Ulrika Westerlund, the Sweden Democrats are not a problem at the moment, but that
could change if the party continues
to grow: “But only if the other parties
start to negotiate with SD, which
they have not been eager to do so
far.”
Today, Sweden is governed by an alliance of parties, of which the Christian Democrats, who have a conservative view on LGBT rights, is the
smallest with only 5,6 percent. The
other parties in the alliance have to
convince the Christian Democrats in
issues pertaining to LGBT rights.
“Today, it is the Christian Democrats
who have been blocking more progressive legislation in the parliament, for example when it comes to marriage equality and compulsory sterilisation. The other parties in the governing alliance have had to convince them in LGBT issues. The opposition,
however, also holds a progressive line when it comes to LGBT rights.”
In theory, the Sweden Democrats could block legislation if the opposition
and the governing parties do not agree. To avoid this, the alliance has
made a deal with the Greens in issues of migration. However, usually the
parties in opposition agree with the government on progressive legislation
on LGBT rights. This means that the Sweden Democrats in fact do not have
a pivotal position on these issues.
When it comes to future developments, Westerlund argues that the situation
depends on the political situation and the governing parties. It is now apparent
that Sweden is not immune to radical right political influence. “The future
prospects are different depending on who holds the power. Because of the successes of the Sweden Democrats, Sweden is now a country like any other.”
However, among the other parties Westerlund has seen positive changes. In
all parties there are progressives trying to promote LGBT rights. “The parties
that used to be conservative are now more progressive, such as the Moderate
Party. There are also positive developments within the Christian Democratic
Party. Right now, there is a solid support for progressive legislation on LGBT
rights in Sweden”.
35
Analysis and Conclusions
As we have seen, the success and influence of radical right parties vary
between countries. The extent to which the parties promote a homophobic agenda varies greatly as well. The main obstacles for LGBT activists
are somewhat different, depending on local circumstances. However, it is
possible to outline some patterns based on the examples presented in this
report.
No Obvious Covariation
It could be argued that radical right homophobia could be a reaction to
granting more rights to LGBT people. However, the overview of party influence around Europe suggests that this is not the case. Even if the countries
that performs best on the ILGA rainbow index (UK, Germany and Spain),
also have marginalised or no radical right party, no general trends in this
regard can be outlined. For example, in countries that have a score of 10
or lower on the Rainbow Index, the influence of radical right parties varies
greatly. This suggests that country-specific circumstances, such as the
specific ideology of the party or homophobia in general, play a larger role
here. To adequately assess this, an in-depth investigation in radical right
reactions to specific legislative changes would be of great use.
Radical Right Homophobes Steering the Debate
The traditional extreme right parties, such as Jobbik and the Ataka, are,
as expected, hostile towards LGBT people. In the selection of countries
included here, it is also interesting to note that these two parties are found
within societies where people in general hold more homophobic views
than in countries where liberal views on this matter are more prevalent,
such as Sweden and the Netherlands. This suggests that for radical right
parties, there are no political gains from adopting what can be perceived
as LGBT friendly proposals, if homophobia in general is widespread in the
country. But even though these parties have tried to propose discriminatory
measures towards LGBT people, their attempts have not been very successful. Other parties have disregarded them or blocked their attempts. However, the fact that these parties hold parliamentary positions and are able to
propose legislation and policies has, at least according to some observers,
changed the debate on LGBT rights. There is a risk that these parties could
change the agenda: instead of speaking of anti-discrimination, the discussion ends up revolving around anti-gay laws. This means that progressive
legislation could be delayed. Even worse, it could change how the general
public perceive LGBT rights. For the future prospects for legislation that
benefits LGBT people and ensures their human rights, this could mean that
progress becomes slower.
36
LGBT Rights as a Part of a European Nationalist Identity?
In countries that are generally progressive when it comes to LGBT rights,
such as the Netherlands and Sweden, it is apparent that the radical right or
populist parties try to distance themselves from homophobia. This is also
the case in France, even though homophobia is more widespread there
than in the aforementioned countries. Thus, the Front National and the
Sweden Democrats have tried to appear gay friendly, even though this is
not reflected in the policies they propose, and even though party representatives make homophobic statements. In this matter, the parties are following the strategy of Geert Wilders. The Freedom Party in the Netherlands
is an exception, where support for LGBT rights seems honest. This could be
explained by the fact that the party has a different ideological background
than both the Sweden Democrats and the Front National. But while protection for LGBT rights seems to be an important part of Wilders’ ideology and
world view (however, second to anti-Muslim politics) it is more difficult
for other parties to be credible in their sudden embrace of human rights.
Looking at this phenomenon from a wider perspective, it is reasonable to
assume that this is a strategy that will become more common as parties try
37
to distance themselves from racism and anti-Semitism. When the electorate increasingly embraces liberal values, a strategy for radical right parties
is to describe themselves as defenders of democracy, facing an uncivilised
and threatening “other”. Sometimes this kind of parties, such as the Freedom Party of Austria, describe themselves as defenders of Judeo-Christian
civilisation, thus pointing out other religions, and above all Muslims, as
inherently different. This is also a way of trying to construct a European
identity that is described as tolerant and democratic, without looking more
closely at the intolerance and differences that Europe itself contains (some
of which are outlined in this report). These parties are not likely to propose
progressive legislation on LGBT rights even if they are in a position to do
so, simply because it is not a prioritised question. Defending LGBT rights is
just a means to portray Muslims as a threat, and to oppose immigration.
Overall, radical right parties do not usually employ this approach to LGBT
rights, as the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary show. But when parties try
to pinkwash their politics, it is important to point to the inconsistencies
in such a strategy. To address this agenda, a consistent approach to discrimination and racism is necessary. Assigning collective guilt to a group of
people is never a successful approach in promoting LGBT rights – because
intolerance cannot make intolerance disappear.
In order to respond to this argument, it is also important to note that in
some countries, LGBT activists mention Christian parties as a big obstacle
for progressive legislation on LGBT rights. A “Judaeo-Christian” heritage is
thus no guarantee for tolerance towards LGBT persons. Even if Christian
parties can be progressive on these issues, conservative Christian parties
can be as great a threat as radical right parties – or even a greater threat,
since these parties sometimes have a greater possibility to influence legislation. In some countries, radical right parties also identify with a religious
affiliation; such is the case in for example Romania, Poland, Greece and
Bulgaria. This report has not focused on the intolerance that purely religious parties sometimes spread, even though a few parties have been mentioned in the text.
Popular Prejudice as an Obstacle
Widespread prejudice among the general public as well as among other
parties could sometimes be an even larger threat to LGBT rights. Here,
activists seem to agree that increased visibility and openness is key to
improving attitudes. Ignorance on LGBT rights can lead to intolerance, and
more knowledge can improve attitudes. But organised racism affects the
possibility to be open. Attacks on Pride parades and hate crimes by intolerant groups can effectively reduce the visibility and freedom of expression
of LGBT people, thus depriving them of important means to voice their
concerns and become more visible in order to create change. Also the less
extreme radical right parties, such as the Sweden Democrats, seem to think
that visibility is not particularly important, as they argue that sexuality
should be a private matter. Essentially, this is the same as saying that gay
people should get back into their closets. In cases where visibility is threa-
38
tened, it is thus important to find adequate strategies to stay visible, and to
stay vocal. In some countries this could mean using international contacts
to pressure the government to adequately protect Pride parades, while in
other countries, such as Sweden, it could mean pointing out the consequences of non-visibility and the radical right rhetoric on these issues.
While this report is limited to discussing parties that are at the moment represented in parliaments around Europe, it is also important to remember
that other parties could enter parliaments and affect legislation, thereby
changing the situation and the set-up quite suddenly. An example of this is
found in Greece, where few expected that a neo-Nazi party would suddenly be represented in the parliament.
Several questions within this field remain to be explored. What would a
successful strategy on combating homophobia and extremism be? To what
extent are NGOs and unions around in Europe involved in these strategies? What is the overall stance from religious parties on homophobia and
extremism? How do these parties cooperate for example in the European
Parliament?
A Long Term Strategy to Address the Intolerant Agenda
As mentioned, some argue that radical right and right wing populist parties
are an inherent feature of Western democracy. This, of course, does not
mean that anti-racists and human rights activists should just sit back and
watch the radical right agenda unfold. Neither does it mean that radical
right parties in European parliaments will disappear by themselves. Rather,
this means that long-term strategies to address the intolerant agenda are
of utmost importance. In this report, activists have suggested some strategies to improve the situation for human rights, including cooperation with
international organisations such as the EU, cooperating internationally
to shame governments into complying with human rights standards, and
using journalists to draw attention to important issues. These strategies
seem to be useful all over Europe.
Also, a comprehensive anti-racist strategy and a strong defence for human
rights in general are important to try to counteract or reverse the success
of radical right parties. Here, the role of NGOs, progressive parties, and
trade unions are important, particularly in countries where the majority
population and most parties have hostile positions and attitudes towards
LGBT rights. By combating widespread homophobia and spreading tolerance, there is a possibility of affecting the number of votes for radical right
parties. This calls for an alliance between all social movements, trade unions and NGOs that in any way promote human rights and equality for all
citizens and non-citizens – values that the radical right parties are opposed
to as a result of their ideology. Anti-discrimination and equal rights may be
institutionalised in legislation and in conventions, but for many, equality is
not a fact, and progress not a given.
39
Appendix:
Radical Right Parties in European Parliaments
For this part of the report, information on elections and parties has been retrieved from the European Election Database if nothing else is noted. The EED
gathers information from national sources as well as international databases
such as the PARLINE database on national parliaments. Further information
has been gathered from other sources such as the Human Rights Watch and
Freedom House. For references, see the literature appendix. When no information on position in parliament or tendency is available in the summary,
this is due to the fact that, for example, no government has been established,
or that the party has not participated in elections before.
Austria
The two main parties of interest for this report are the Freedom Party of
Austria (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). The parties
are, since the elections to the National and Federal Council in the legislative assembly in 2008, among the five largest parties in Austria, with 34 and
21 parliamentary seats respectively. The parties received 17.54 and 10.70
percent of the vote respectively. In the 2008 elections, the ruling parties
saw their worst election results since the Second World War, while the FPÖ
and the BZÖ increased their strength. Both the FPÖ and the BZÖ have been
considered as potential coalition allies by some of the other parties.
The FPÖ has its ideological roots in nationalism and is described as a
populist right-wing party. The ideological base of the party does not rest
primarily on anti-Semitism, but the charismatic, now deceased former
party leader Jörg Haider did tolerate anti-Semitic expressions within the
party for strategic reasons (Mudde, 2007, p. 80-81, 84). Furthermore, the
party’s embracing of its Christian heritage has become a platform for its
anti-Muslim politics. The current party leader, Hans-Christian Strache, has
a clear anti-Muslim agenda, but has also spoken favourably about Nazi veterans as recently as this year (Expo, 120105). The peak of the FPÖ success
came in 1999, when they were included in the government coalition with
the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP).
The BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) is a right-wing populist party,
created by Haider as he left the FPÖ in 2005. The party wants to control
immigration and protect the national cultural identity. The party suffered a
severe blow when Haider died in a car accident in 2008.
• Parties: Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ. Alliance for the Future of Austria
BZÖ
• Vote: FPÖ. 17,5 %, BZÖ, 10,7 %
• Mandates: FPÖ 34, BZÖ 21 (of 183)
40
• Tendency: gaining support
• Position: In opposition/ pivotal position
Belgium
The most well-known radical right party in Belgium is the Vlaams Belang
(Flemish Interest), founded in 1954 as Vlaams Blok. The party was dissolved
after a High Court ruling found it guilty of incitement to discrimination and
racism in 2004, but the party was later reinstated as Vlaams Belang. The
ideology of the party has been described as a combination of populism, nativism and authoritarianism. (Pauwels, 2011) The other parties have formed
a “cordon sanitaire” on this nationalist and fractionalist party, which means
that no party will enter into a coalition with it. In the parliamentary elections in 2010, the party received 7.76 percent of the vote, and was granted
12 seats in the parliament. On regional level, the party won as much as 16
percent of the vote in the 2010 elections. However, this is a loss compared to
earlier campaigns. Reasons for this could be the fact that two other parties,
the Flemish nationalist Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and the populist
Lijst Dedecker (LDD), have taken up issues similar to Vlaams Belang’s, and
that people now rather vote for these parties than for Vlaams Belang, which,
due to the cordon sanitaire is unable to influence policy. (Pauwels, 2011)
• Party: Vlaams Belang
• Vote: 7,8 %
• Mandates: 12 (of 150)
• Tendency: losing
• Position: in opposition
Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, the main nationalist party is the ATAKA (National Union Attack).
The party was founded in 2005 by a group of smaller nationalist extremist
groups, led by the journalist Volen Siderov. Their policies focus on xenophobia and the preservation of national pride and orthodox religion. ATAKA is a
traditional right-wing extremist party that targets Jews, Muslims, Turks, and
LGBT people. ATAKA has had stable support from the electorate and won 21
seats in parliament since the 2009 elections, when the party received 9.36
% of the national vote. Before the elections, there were speculations about
whether the Ataka would be a coalition partner of the winning party GERB.
Of the three parties expected to be invited to a coalition, Ataka was the only
one not to mention any conditions, and also expressed full support for the
minority government that was formed. In return, “Ataka certainly expects
support by the GERB government to its patriotic initiatives” (Genov, 2010).
However, later half of the deputies chose to leave the party, and today Ataka
only holds 10 seats. The party leader Volen Siderov withdrew his support for
the incumbent government in 2011 (SNA, 110708).
• Party: Ataka
41
• Vote: 9,4 %
• Tendency: stable
Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, radical right parties have not been as successful as in
the neighbouring countries. However, racist ideas and anti-Roma sentiments
are widespread in the country. The extreme right Worker’s Party, which qualified for public funding in the elections to the European parliament where they
received 1.07 per cent of the vote, was disbanded by a court in 2010. Most of
its members moved over to the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS), established in 2004 in case the Worker’s Party would be dissolved (Mareš, 2012, p.
3). Today, the DSSS is the strongest extremist party in the Czech Republic, and
it profiles itself mainly on “the Roma issue”. DSSS only received limited support in the 2010 elections (1.14 %). However, mainstream parties in the Czech
Republic often use the same, and sometimes even worse, rhetoric on ethnic
and LGBT rights than the DSSS (Mareš, 2012).
• Party: Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS)
• Vote: 1,1 %
• Mandates: 0
Denmark
In Denmark, the main party with an anti-immigrant and largely intolerant agenda is the Danish People’s Party, established in 1995. The party is
known for its harsh rhetoric on immigration and has pushed the agenda on
immigration towards more restrictions. It has been able to influence immigration policy greatly as a support party for the government for many years
– a position the party lost in the 2011 elections (SvD, 110908). In 2011,
12,3 % voted for the party, which gave DPP 22 seats in parliament.
• Party: Danish People’s Party (DF)
• Vote: 12,3 %
Estonia
In Estonia, one of the government parties has a history of nationalism. According to some scholars, the Pro Patria and the Res Publica union (IRL)
can be described as national conservative parties (Ramet, 2010, p. 79).
42
In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union, nativist policies were
important for almost all parties in Estonia, which has now turned towards
a policy more acceptant of multiculturalism (Mudde, 2007, p. 54). The Pro
Patria was among those pushing for exclusionary citizenship after the fall
of the Soviet union, and has been accused of racist views. The party has,
however, become a more mainstream party, and can today be defined as a
“moderate conservative party of European orientation” (Bennich-Björkman
and Johansson, 2012). While they cannot today be described as radical
right, they are mentioned in this report because of their history. The IRL
union received 20.52 % of the vote in the 2011 elections, which gave them
23 seats in the parliament.
Finland
In Finland, a populist party, the True Finns, won a landslide victory in the
2011 elections, becoming the third largest party (almost as large as the
Social Democrats) and increasing their presence in the parliament by 34
seats, from 5 to 39 seats. The party left government formation discussions
and joined the opposition in order to avoid responsibility for an upcoming
decision on the European bailout, which they had opposed during the
election campaign (Jungar, 121110). In the regional elections in 2012, it
also increased its support in many municipalities by more than double. All
the other parties lost support as compared to the elections of 2008. The
party base can be traced back to the agrarian populist Finnish Rural Party,
however, today anti-immigration policies and Euro-scepticism is at the core
of the party ideology. The party has also been described as “welfare chauvinist” and use anti-establishment rhetoric (Jungar, 121110). Also, a vocal
and strong minority within the party advocates anti-Muslim policies, and
some remain on the ballot despite incidents of racist speech. Some of them
are vote magnets in certain districts. Thus, there is a potential for radicalisation within the party, as well as increased political influence for the party.
• Party: True Finns (PS)
• Vote: 19,4 %
• Tendency: gaining
France
The main radical right party in France is the Front National, founded by
Jean-Marie le Pen in 1972. Today, his daughter Marine Le Pen is heading
the party, which is represented in a number of local assemblies in France.
The party is xenophobic with a history of anti-Semitism. Today, opposition
to Muslims is central for the party. Despite the poor results of the party in
parliamentary elections, in the presidential election of 2002, Le Pen contested Chirac in the second round, and in the first round of the last elections, gained over 20 per cent of the vote in many regions. Thus, the party
43
seems to have a steady support among the French population.
In the parliamentary elections of 2007, the party received 4.29 % of the vote,
but no seats in the National Assembly. In the 2012 parliamentary elections
the party won two seats in constituencies in Southern France, and 13.6 per
cent of the total vote in the first round, and 3,66 % in the second.
• Party: Front National
• Vote: 3,7 %
Germany
In Germany, none of the extremist parties have had any larger successes in
recent years. The National Democratic Party of Germany – The People’s Union
(NPD) received approximately 1.5 per cent of the nationwide vote in the
parliamentary elections in 2009 – however, in some federal states, as much as
4 per cent. This neo-Nazi party promotes “a racial kind of nationalism” (BBC
News Europe, 120718). On a federal level, in the states of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern the party has a share of 5.6 and 6 % respectively, which
puts them above the 5 % requested for taking place in a state-elected assembly.
The perhaps most well-known populist radical right party, Die Republikaner, is
highly marginalised, and has never received over 1 % of the vote.
• Party: National Democratic Party of Germany – The People’s Union
• Vote: 1,5 %
• Mandates: 0
Greece
The Greek elections in 2012 made headlines all over the world when it became clear that the radical right neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn had made it
into the parliamentary assembly. Golden Dawn went from being a marginal
phenomenon to becoming a party with 21 mandates in the legislature. They
increased the vote by 6.7 %, to a 6.97 % share of the national vote, and in the
following re-election 6.92 %, keeping 18 seats (The Guardian, 120618). The
party is infamous for its violence towards immigrants, and its claim to provide
security for Greeks. It has also been reported that a great proportion of the
police force in Greece actually support this neo-Nazi party (Expo.se, 120509).
Another party, which was represented in the parliament of Greece until the
elections of 2012, is the nationalist Popular Orthodox Rally (LA.O.S), which
identifies with Greek Orthodox Christianity and opposes multiculturalism and
immigration. In the elections, their percentage of the vote fell to 2.7 %, and
they lost their mandates in the assembly. They fell below the threshold of 3
44
% by only 0.10 per cent (2.9 %); however, in the second round the party lost
even more votes, probably due to the fact that they failed to secure any seats in
the first round.
• Party: Golden Dawn
• Vote: 6,9 %
Hungary
In Hungary, the radical right Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary),
founded as recently as in 2003, won 16.67 % of the vote in the parliamentary elections in 2010, and with that, 47 seats in parliament. The antiSemitic and anti-Roma party also established a paramilitary guard, the
Magyar Garda, in 2007. The Garda was banned in 2009 but re-emerged
under a new name.
However, other recent developments in Hungary are also a matter of great
concern. The governing conservative party Fidesz has been increasingly
influenced by nationalism since the mid 90’s. Recent measures include revising the constitution to better reflect the Fidesz idea of national identity,
and appointing new key positions within the cultural establishment to better reflect the government’s view on appropriate culture (AN, 120209, DN
120702). These authoritarian tendencies, and tendencies regarding LGBT
rights in particular, are certainly important to be aware of. Fidesz today
holds 52.73 percent of the vote, and 262 of the 386 seats in parliament.
• Party: Fidesz, Jobbik
• Vote: Fidesz 52,7 %, Jobbik 16,7 %
• Mandates: Fidesz 262, Jobbik 47 (of 386)
• Position: In government/in opposition
Italy
In Italy, a couple of radical right parties have an explicitly anti-immigrant
or racist agenda. However, due to changes in alliances and cooperations
between parties, it is difficult to exactly determine tendencies and influences in Italy. Lega Nord (Northern League) is a xenophobic party that
opposes the nation state. La Destra – Fiamma Tricolore (The Right – Flame
Tricolor) is a radical right party with roots in the earlier neofascist/conservative party Fiamma Tricolore and the Alleanza Nazionale (the former started by AN members who were not happy with the fact that the
AN joined the prime minister Berlusconi coalition, Popolo della Liberta).
Alleanza Nationale had its roots in the neo-fascist Italian Social movement
45
(MSI) (Ruzza and Fella, 2011). Many of the anti-immigration voices from
earlier existing parties were drawn into the party Il Popolo della Liberta
(The People of Freedom) which was created under the leadership of Silvio
Berlusconi in 2009, based on his former party Forza Italia and smaller parties such as the Alleanza Nazionale. The PdL coalition furthermore entered
into an alliance with among others the Lega Nord in 2008. Another party
is the Forza Nueva, which did not reach any significant result in the 2008
elections.
In the 2008 elections the Lega Nord received 8.3 % of the vote, and La
Destra 2.43 %. The Popolo della Liberta received 37.39 % of the vote. The
Berlusconi coalition (PdL, Lega Nord and the Movement for Autonomy)
together got 46.8% of the vote, and won the elections.
• Party: Lega Nord, La Destra, Popolo della Liberta
• Vote: LN 8,3 %, LD 2,4 %, PdL 37,4 %
• Mandates: PdL 272, LN 60 (of 630)
Latvia
The National Alliance (NA) was founded in 2010 as an alliance of smaller
parties. After the fall of the Soviet Union, most Latvian parties had, as in
Estonia, a nativist agenda. (Mudde, 2007) The Latvian National Conservative Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (LNNK) was formed by two
national conservative parties, that later became a part of the national alliance. Even if the LNNK has somewhat moderated its discourse, they have
largely stuck to the “harsh nationalistic discourse” (Bennich-Björkman and
Johansson, 2012). In the elections in 2011, the NA received 13.88 % of the
vote on a national level, which equals 14 seats in the parliament. It became
part of the government holding two portfolios, culture and justice.
• Party: National Alliance
• Vote: 13,9 %
• Position: in government coalition
Lithuania
While no party with any significant influence in Lithuania can be described
as radical right, there are parties that can be expected to have a nationalist,
conservative agenda on LGBT rights. The Homeland Union – Lithuanian
Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) are ”culturally conservative and nationally
oriented”, and became the largest party in the last elections (Ramet, 2010,
p. 79-82). In 2008 they received 19.72 % of the vote, and 45 out of 141
seats in parliament. In the elections in 2012, the Homeland Union received
15 % and 33 mandates in parliament.
• Party: Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats
• Vote: 15 %
46
Netherlands
The most famous anti-immigrant party in the Netherlands is the Partij Voor
de Vrijheid, the Freedom Party, led by the charismatic Geert Wilders. The
party opposes immigration and uses a harsh anti-Muslim rhetoric. The
party has its roots in a conservative liberalism rather than nationalism, but
can today be described as national populist (Vossen, 2011). In the elections
of 2012 the party received a share of 10.08 % of the national vote, and 15
seats in the parliament, a significant loss (around 5 percentages) as compared to the elections of 2010.
• Party: The Freedom Party
• Vote: 10,1 %
• Mandates: 15 (of 150 in lower house)
Norway
In Norway, Fremskrittspartiet (FRP, the Progress Party) is the main voice for
anti-immigrant politics. The party has grown a lot in the early 2000’s and
placed itself second in the 2009 elections, with 22.91 % of the vote resulting in 41 seats in the parliament. In the elections to the local assemblies in
2011, the year of the terror attack on Utöya and at the Government Quarter, the party backed from 17.5 % in 2007 to 11.4% (BBC News Europe,
110913). The party has its roots in a movement opposed to taxation, later
combined with an anti-immigrant agenda. In the beginning of the 2000’s,
the party campaigned on an anti-Muslim platform, but following the terror
attack, they have chosen to be less vocal in their rhetoric on Muslims.
• Party: Progress Party
• Vote: 22,9 %
Poland
The party Law and Justice, PiS, is conservative with a ”euro-sceptic and
populist image”, with social policies based on values of the Catholic Church.
The party has been criticised for allowing extremist elements within the party,
and for homophobic statements from party representatives. Law and Justice
have absorbed both the radical nationalist ideology and extremists from less
successful parties (Pankowski, 2012). The party was founded in 2001 by the
47
brothers Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyński, former prime minister and president
respectively, both known for their intolerant opinions on LGBT rights. The
party holds 157 seats in parliament, and received 29.89 % of the vote in the
last elections. Jaroslaw Kaczyński is today leader of the opposition.
Poland has a number of what has been called ”national clerical” parties, of
which the PiS is one example, but also the League of Polish Families is worth
mentioning (Ramet, 2010, p. 80). The party is strictly against abortion and
same sex marriage, but did not enter the parliament in the last elections, though
it served as a support party to the former government (BBC Europe, 060509).
• Party: Law and Justice
• Vote: 29,9 %
Romania
The most significant extremist party in Romania is the Greater Romania
Party (PRM). The party wants to recover the territories lost in the Second
World War, praises the Ceausescu regime, and is described as anti-minority,
anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, and homophobic (Mudde, 2005). Another extreme
party, with marginal influence on politics, is the New Generation –Christian
Democratic (PNG-CD), which is a nationalist Christian party with potential
ties to neo-fascists. The PRM and PNG-CD were left outside the parliament
in the last elections, with a vote of 3.16 and 2.28 % respectively.
• Party: Greater Romania Party, New Generation – Christian Democratic
• Vote: PRM 3,2 %, PNG-CD 2,3 %
• Mandates: 0
Slovakia
Slovakia’s most important nationalist party is the Slovak National Party
(SNS). The SNS is a “national and Christian party”, with an anti-minority
agenda (Mudde, 2005, p. 215). The SNS received 4.56 % of the vote in the
elections in 2012, but holds no seat in parliament. The elections in 2010
saw the nationalist People’s Party/Movement for Democratic Slovakia (L’SHZDS) leaving the parliament, receiving only 4,32 % of the vote (Malová
and Ucen, 2011). But during the period up to the elections, the governing
coalition increased its nationalist rhetoric.
• Party: Slovak National Party
• Vote: 4,6 %
• Mandates: 0
48
Slovenia
The Slovene National Party (SNS) opposes ”immigration from other former
Yugoslav republics” and is described as an extremist party (Mudde, 2005,
p. 245-248). It received only 1.8 % of the vote and no seats in parliament
in the last elections.
• Party: Slovene National Party
• Vote: 1,8 %
• Mandates: 0
Sweden
In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD), a radical right-wing populist party
that was started by elements from the Swedish radical right, hold 20 seats in
the parliament since the election in 2010, when they first entered the parliament with 5.7 % of the vote. The agenda of the party is mainly anti-Muslim.
Until the elections in 2010, there was no significant anti-immigrant party in
the parliament. Due to the parliamentary situation, the Sweden Democrats
hold a pivotal position. So far, neither the government nor the opposition
cooperates with the Sweden Democrats, thus upholding a de facto cordon
sanitaire against the party.
• Party: Sweden Democrats
• Vote: 5,7 %
• Position: in opposition/pivotal position
United Kingdom
In the UK, the British National Party, founded in 1982 as a fraction from
the National Front, held 1.9 % in the 2010 elections. However, they hold
two seats in the European Parliament, one of which is occupied by party
leader Nick Griffin. The party has described itself as British Nationalist,
racist nationalist and ethno-nationalist and has recently focused on antiMuslim campaigns (Hope Not Hate, 2012). The future does not look bright
for the BNP, who despite their representation in the European Parliament
are still far from taking place in the national parliament.
• Party: British National Party
• Vote: 1,9 %
• Mandates: 0
49
Literature appendix:
Introduction, The Situation for LGBT rights in Europe today
Trends of LGBTI-phobic hatred demonstrate the need for European-wide action, ILGAEurope statement, Brussels, 11/9/2012
European Parliament resolution on the fight against homophobia in Europe
(2012/2657(RSP), 120521
Gay parades banned in Moscow for 100 years, BBC News Europe, 17.08.2012
Ukrainian Parliament discusses law amendments banning the promotion of homosexuality, ILGA Europe Press Release 20.05.2012,
European Parliament condemns, consideration of anti-gay laws, Gray, Stephen, Pink
News, 29.05.2012
Serbisk polis stoppar prideparad, Dagens Nyheter, 03.10.2012
FRA Factsheet, Homophobia Study 2010, Fundamental Rights Agency, 2010
The Human Rights of LGBT People
EU adopts Directive offering protection to victims of homophobic and transphobic
crimes, ILGA-Europe News, 12.09.2012
European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 September 2012 on the proposal
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing minimum
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, European Parliament document A7-0244/2012
ILGA-Europe Rainbow Index, May 2012, ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map, May 2012
Radical right homophobia: history and ideology
Taggart, Paul, Populism, Open University Press, 2000
2083-A declaration of European Independence, Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto, 2011
Det homosexuella hotet mot den vita rasen. Nazistisk och rasistisk homofobi på Internet, En rapport från RFSL och EXPO om nazistiska och rasistiska gruppers homofobiska propaganda på internet, RFSL and EXPO, 2005
Zick, Andreas, Küpper, Beate and Hövermann, Andreas, Intolerance, prejudice and
discrimination: A European report, Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung, 2011
(A short explanation of the methodology of the report: Anti-Muslim attitudes and
homophobia (r=.27), sexism and homophobia (r=.42), racism, anti-immigrant
attitudes and anti-Semitism and homophobia (r=.25, .28, .29 resp.) In Great Britain: racism and homophobia (r=.42). A number larger than 5 is a strong relationship, 3-5 moderate, and under 3 a weak. p. 70)
A surge in radical right parties in Europe?
Taggart, Paul, Populism, Open University Press, 2000
50
Wilson, Robin and Hainsworth, Paul, Radical right parties and discourse in Europe:
A challenge for our times, European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Brussels,
2012, p. 7
European Election Database: (Some of) the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the “European Election Database”. The data
are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analysis
or interpretation of the data presented here.
The literature used for determining the ideology of the parties:
Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, 2007
Mudde, Cas, Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2005
Ramet, Sabrina P, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989, Cambridge, 2010
For reference on the freedom of the press in the countries, information has been
retrieved from Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2012, published at www.
freedomhouse.org.
Radical right and anti-immigrant parties in European Parliaments
Austria:
European Election Database, Austria: Parliamentary Election 2008, accessed
121005
Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical right Parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press,
2007, p. 80-81, 84
FPÖs partiledare hyllar gammal nazist, Expo.se, 120105
European Election Database, Parties in Austria, accessed 121010
Belgium:
European Election Database, Parties in Belgium, accessed 121010
European Election Database, Belgium: Parliamentary Elections 2010, accessed 121119
Pauwels, Teun, Explaining the strange decline of the populist radical right Vlaams Belang
in Belgium: The Impact of Permanent Opposition, Acta Politica, Vol 46, no 1, 2011
Bulgaria:
European Election Database, Parties in Bulgaria, accessed 121010
Genov, Nikolai, Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria, Review of European Studies, Vol 2, No 2, Dec 2010
Bulgarian Nationalists ‘Ataka’ Cut Off Support for Borisov’s Minority Govt, Sofia
News Agency Novinite.com, 110708, accessed 121031
Czech Republic:
Mareš, Miroslav, Right Wing Extremism in the Czech Republic, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2012
51
European Election Database, Czech Republic Parliamentary Elections 2010, accessed 121112
Denmark:
European Election Database, Parties in Denmark, accessed 121010
European Election Database, Denmark Parliamentary Elections 2011, accessed
121119
Dansk Folkeparti på väg ut i kylan, Svenska Dagbladet, 110908
Estonia:
Ramet, Sabrina P, Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989, Cambridge,
2010
European Election Database, Estonia, accessed 121011
Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, 2007, p. 54
Bennich-Björkman, Liv and Johansson, Karl Magnus, Explaining moderation in
nationalism: Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and
Latvia, Comparative European Politics, Vol 10, No. 5, 2012
Finland:
Jungar, Ann-Cathrine, Challenges await the True Finns, Baltic Worlds, 121110, accessed 121113
European Election Database, Parliamentary Elections, accessed 121015
France:
European Election Database, Parties in France, accessed 121010
European Election Database, France Parliamentary Elections 2007 round 1, accessed 121010
Ministére de L’Interieur, Résultats des elections legislatives 2012, interieur.gouv.fr,
accessed 121119
Le Pens niece leads Front Nationals return to parliament, France24.com, 120618,
accessed 121012
Socialists set to form French government but Front National may enter parliament,
RFI, 120611, accessed 121012
Germany:
European Election Database, Parties in Germany, accessed 121010
German Radical right bucks European trend, BBC News Europe, 120718, accessed
121010
Greece:
Greece’s radical right Golden Dawn party maintains share of vote, the Guardian,
120618, accessed 121112
52
Grekland skakas, Expo.se, 120509, accessed 121112
European Election Database, Parties in Greece, accessed 121010
Hungary:
European Election Database, Parties in Hungary, accessed 121010
Rosenberg, Ervin, Gästkolumnen: Fidesz reviderar historien, DN, 120702
Hungary’s government tightens grip on arts, The Art Newspaper, 120209, accessed
121113
European Election Database, Country Hungary, accessed 121010
Italy:
European Election Database, Parties in Italy, accessed 121010
European Election Database, Parliamentary Elections in Italy, accessed 120101
Ruzza, Carlo, and Fella, Stefano, Populism and the Italian Right, Acta Politica, Vol
46, No 2, 2011
Latvia:
Mudde, Cas, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, 2007
Latvia forms a government, European Voice, 111025, accessed 121110
Bennich-Björkman, Liv and Johansson, Karl Magnus, Explaining moderation in
nationalism: Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and
Latvia, Comparative European Politics, Vol 10, No. 5, 2012
European Election Database: Latvia Parliamentary Elections, accessed 121119
Lithuania:
Ramet, Sabrina P, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989, Cambridge,
2010
European Election Database, Lithuania Parliamentary Elections, accessed 121119
The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, Election to the
Seimas…, 121029, accessed 121119
Netherlands:
European Election Database, Parties in Netherlands, accessed 121018
Vossen, Koen, Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and
his Party for Freedom, Politics, 2011, Vol 31 no 3
Norway:
Norway local elections: Breivik’s old party suffers, BBC News Europe, 110913, accessed 121113
Bengtsson, Alexander, Viktigt att peka på skiljelinjerna, Expo.se, accessed 121113
53
European Election Database, Norway: Parliamentary Election 2009, accessed
121119
Poland:
European Election Database, Parties in Poland, accessed 121010
Ramet, Sabrina P, Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989, Cambridge,
2010
Polish nationalism resurgent, BBC Europe, Jan Repa, 060509 accessed 121010
Pankowski, Rafal, Right wing extremism in Poland, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
October 2012
Romania:
European Election Database, Parties in Romaina, accessed 121010
Mudde, Cas (ed), Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2005
Slovakia:
European Election Database, Parties in Slovakia, accessed 121010,
Malová, Darina, and Ucen, Peter, Slovakia, European Journal of Political Research,
vol 50, 2011
Slovenia:
European Election Database, Parties in Slovenia, accessed 121015
Sweden:
Ekman, Mikael and Poohl, Daniel, Ut ur skuggan: En kritisk granskning av Sverigedemokraterna, Natur och Kultur, 2010
United Kingdom:
European Election Database, Country: UK, accessed 121011
Hope not Hate, Hate Groups: BNP, accessed 121015
The Influence of Radical Right Parties in Europe
Van Der Brug, Wouter, and Fenneman, Meindert, What causes people to vote for a
radical right party? A review of recent work, International journal of public opinion
research, vol 19 no 4 2007
European variations and strategies:
Rydgren, Jens, Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence
of a new party family, European Journal of Political Research, Vol 44, Issue 3, May
2005
54
Bulgaria: widespread homophobia and a problematic discourse
European Election Database: Parties in Bulgaria, accessed 121010
Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2010, Annual Report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2011
Bulgarian Culture Minister Bashes Gay Community, Sofia News Agency Novinite.
com, 120105, accessed 121113
USA, USSR Will Make Bulgaria Gay Sex Tourism Destination – Nationalists, Sofia
News Agency Novinite.com, 120630, accessed 121031
World Values Survey, 1981-2008 Official Aggregate, v.20090901, 2009, World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
Genov, Nikolai, Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria, Review of European
Studies, Vol 2, No 2, Dec 2010
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church implicitly backs calls for violence against Gay Pride,
Sofia Pride through ILGA Europe, 120618, accessed 121105
Bulgarian Radical rights to March against Gays on Sofia Pride Day, Sofia News
Agency Novinite, 120129, accessed 121010
ILGA-Europe, Country by country: Bulgaria, accessed 121010
Mail conversation with Monika Pisankaneva, chairperson at Bilitis Resource Center Foundation, Sofia, Bulgaria, october 2012
ILGA-Europe Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Trans
and Intersex People in Europe 2011, ILGA-Europe, 2011
Hungary: a nationalist majority in parliament
Responses to information requests, HUN104102.E, Hungary: Situation and treatment of sexual minorities, including legislation, state protection, and support services,
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 120627
discrimination: A European report, Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung, 2011, p. 63
Hungary: New Constitution Enshrines Discrimination, Human Rights
Watch, 110419, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
country,,HRW,,HUN,,4db6617fc,0.html, accessed 121113
Krugman, Paul, Hungary, Misunderstood?, NYT Opinion Pages, 120121, accessed 121113
Furore erupts over Fidesz call to ban Gay Pride March, Politics.hu, 090831, accessed
121015
Bruni, Frank, Would this post get me jail time in Russia?, NYT Opinion Pages,
120424, accessed 121113
55
The long march of Fidesz, The Economist, 120107
Kulish, Nicholas, Foes of Hungary’s Government Fear ”Demolition of Democracy, the
New York Times, 111221
European Parliament resolution on the fight against homophobia in Europe
(2012/2657(RSP), 120521
Takács, Judit et al, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Bother: Homophobia and the Heteronorm in Hungary, pages 79-105 in Trappolin, L et al (eds), Confronting Homophobia in Europe. Social and Legal Perspectives, Oxford; Hart Publishing, 2012
Conversation with Tamás Dombos, Project coordinator at Háttér Support Society
for LGBT People in Hungary, October 2012
France: pinkwashing the Front National
Rydgren, Jens, Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence
of a new party family, European Journal of Political Research, Vol 44, Issue 3, May
2005
discrimination: A European report, Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung, 2011, p. 65
French Church says gay marriage law just for the few, ILGA-Europe, 121105, accessed 121113
Tensions rise in French gay marriage debate, The Local France Edition, 121105, accessed 121113
“Pas de Tribune pour Marine Le Pen: Décryptage du programme et des discours du
FN par Egalité LGBT 2012”, Campagne d’interpellation egalité LGBT 2012 election
présidentielle, egalitelgbt2012.fr
Interview with Thomas Fouquet-Lapar, Inter-LGBT, Nov 2012
The Netherlands: “Intolerance towards intolerance?”
ILGA Rainbow Index 2011
discrimination: A European report, Friedrich Eberhard Stiftung, 2011
Netherlands Islam Freedom: Profile of Geert Wilders, BBC News Europe, 110623,
accessed 121113
Geert Wilders gjorde katastrofval, Expo Idag, 120913
Interview with Philip Tijsma, manager of Public Affairs at the LGBT rights organisation COC Nederland, Nov. 13 2012
56
Sweden: a backlash against visibility?
World Values Survey, 1981-2008 Official Aggregate, v.20090901, 2009, World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
ILGA-Europe, Country by country: Sweden, 121113
Ekman, Mikael and Poohl, Daniel, Ut ur skuggan: En kritisk granskning av Sverigedemokraterna, Natur och Kultur, 2010
Åkesson, Jimmie and Herrstedt, Carina, SD – ett parti för hbt-personer, Aftonbladet
Debatt 100330
SD enda parti utanför Pride, SvD, 120801, accessed 121113
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Hat-attacken mot Sveriges homosexuella, Aftonbladet, 070805, accessed 121113
SD-politiker: Homosexuella har avloppssex, Expo Idag, 120802
SD-politiker: RFSL är pedofiler, Interasistmen.se, 121105
Inteview with Ulrika Westerlund, Chairman, Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender Rights, November 2012
57
58
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Threatening visibility

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