D E V A S T Une prﾃｩsentation succincte

Transcription

Disaster Evacuation and
Risk Perceptions in
Democracies
Norichika Kanie
(kanie@valdes.titech.ac.jp)
Noriyuki Ueda
(ueda@valdes.titech.ac.jp)
Shunji Matsuoka
（smatsu@waseda.jp）
Yui Nakagawa
Masahito Tanada
François Gemenne
(francois.gemenne@iddri.org)
Alexandre Magnan
(alexandre.magnan@iddri.org)
Reiko Hasegawa
(reiko15@olive.ocn.ne.jp)
This study aims at clarifying the disaster
evacuation process and risk perception in
demoocracies, by examining the immediate
response of Japanese politics and society to
the triple disaster triggered by 3.11 earthquake,
and providing a comprehensive and
multidisciplinary analysis.
Decision-making in the Evacuation Process
Futaba
Two municipalities,
Futaba and Naraha, are
chosen for further
investigations to explore
the immediate response
to the nuclear disaster.
The evacuation instruction in the early phases
The evacuation zone was expanded
4 times within only 24 hours
3/11
20:50…An EI to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant
3/12
2 Research Questions:
How and why were instructions determined and/or
revised?
Were those instructions actually effective?
3/11
14：46
A 9.0 magnitude
earthquake
15：42
STATION BLACKOUT of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant
16:36
Disability of the emergency
core cooling system of
Units 1 and 2.
Around 17:00
Several TEPCO executives were
summoned to the PM’s Office as
requested to explain the situation
18：10
Start of reactor core
exposure
18：50
Start of reactor core
damaged
around 20:00~
PM gathered members in a small
room on the mezzanine floor
and formed a team for the
accident response.
Actions taken right after the earthquake
METI established an
Emergency Response
Headquarters for the
disaster
NISA called up essential ERC
personnel and formed six
squads, each with a specific
function.
15:27 ~
Tsunami
arriving 15：42
Based on Article 10, Clause 1 of the
Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
notified by TEPCO. (TEPCO→NISA)
16:42
Act notified by TEPCO.
Around 17:35
METI Minister Kaieda agreed to declare a
nuclear emergency situation.
Around 17:42
METI Minister Kaieda and NISA DirectorGeneral Terasaka submitted the Article 15
Situation to PM and asked him to agree to
declare a nuclear emergency situation.
The report was suspended at 18:12 for
PM's schedules.
19:03 – 19:22
the first NERHQ
meeting was held
in the Prime
Minister’s Office
19：03
A declaration of a nuclear
emergency situation was
issued by the government .
NERHQ at the PM's Office. a Local
ERHQ at Off-site Center, and the
NERHQ secretariat in the Emergency
Response Center (ERC) were
established.
NISA Director-General
Terasaka was deispatched to
the Crisis Management
Center at the PM’s Office.
NISA informed the
PM’s Office and
other competent
bodies.
NISA informed the
PM’s Office and
other competent
bodies.
METI established a
NEPHQ in ERC and
a Local NEPHQ in
the Off-site Center
16:36
Crisis Management
Deputy Chief Ito
established an
Emergency Response
Office in the PM’s Office
PM‘s Office took
time before
launching the
emergency action.
× lack of information sharing
Fukushima Prefectural
Government had a
sense of crisis
around 20:00~
PM gathered members in a small
room on the mezzanine floor
and formed a team for the
accident response.
Around at 21:00 to 22:00
NISA Vice Director-General Hiraoka,
NSC Chair Madarame, and TEPCO
Fellow Takekuro also joined to provide
explanations.
Proposal of a venting operation
by NSC Chair Madarame
3/12
Fukushima Prefectural
Government was
feeling sense of crisis
It consisted of the Prime Minister Kan, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Edano, METI Minister Kaieda,
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Tetsuro
Fukuyama, Special Advisor Hosono , and NISA
Director-General Terasaka
21:23 ... 2nd EI
An evacuation instruction was
issued by PM to persons within a
radius of 3 km from the plant.
20:50 ... 1st EI
Fukushima Governor ordered
evacuation of Futaba Town and
Okuma Town within a radius of 2km
from the plant.
×confusion in decision-making
and communication gap
0:06
Site Superintendent Yoshida ordered
preparations for the venting of Unit 1.
1：30
Permission of a venting operation to TEPCO.
3:00 ~ 4:00
no information on the
progress in the venting to
PM’s office from NISA
3:05
The press conference held by METI to
announce a venting operation. It would
be carried out at around 3:30
×information did not reach where
decisions should have taken
The PM‘s Office was
irritated, as a venting
operation was delayed
around 6:00
MELTDOWN of Unit 1
3:30
The venting was not carried out on time.
Trial-and-error efforts were exerted manually
in carrying out the venting, due to loss of
power of the valves that operated by air
pressure
Around at 5:00
PM asked and TEPCO Fellow Takekuro why
the venting was not being carried out.
The answer was “I don’t know.”
5:44 ... 3rd EI
The evacuation zone was determined to be
expanded within a 10km radius
3/11 20:50 - 1st Evacuation Instruction
• to persons within a radius of 2km from the plant
• issued by the Fukushima Governor
• "2 km" came from the prior emergency prevention
training
• The instruction was not issued on the basis of a
specific act, but de facto measure.
3/11 21：23 - 2nd Evacuation Instruction
Persons within 10 km of the plant were told to stay
indoors.
• issued by Prime Minister.
• "3 km" came from Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ)
presented by IAEA documents
3/12 5:44 - 3rd Evacuaiton Instrcution
• issued by Prime Minister
• "10km" came form Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
presented in “Guideline for Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness” by NSC .
• “We decided to expand the zone. That’s not because
something happened. That’s because it may possibly
happen.” ( a comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary)
6:15
PM departed for the plant, together
with NSC Chairman Madarame.
In the helicopter, PM
asked NSC Chairman
Madarame about the
possibility of hydrogen
explosion. Madarame
answered “It wouldn’t
happen.”
7：12
PM arrived at the Fukushima Daiich NPP
by helicopter, for an inspectation and a
demand of implementation of venting.
8：37
TEPCO informed the Fukushima
prefectural government about carrying
out the venting around at 9:00.
They were requested to undertake a
venting when the evacuation of
residents is completed.
6:50
METI Minister Kaieda ordered
TEPCO to carry out the venting
based on Reactor Regulation Act
7：45
Issuance of the declaration of a Nuclear
Emergency Situation of the Fukushima
Daini NPP
9:02
TEPCO instructed a venting operation,
regarding the evacuation completed.
(The evacuation was actually not done at that
time.)
14：50
A vent operation of Unit 1
was finally succeed.
15：36
an explosion in the Reactor
Building of Unit 1
×
But it did happen.
This contributed
to the sense of
mistrust.
18:25 ... 4th EI
The evacuation zone was be determined to
be expanded within a 20km radius.
3/12 18：25 - 4th Evacuation Instruction
• issued by Prime Minister
• not clear how "20km" was caliculated.
• Some point out that the evacuation zone within 20㎞ was
determined by few people with their personal knowledge.
Significant amount of confusion in decision-making,
communication gap, lack of information sharing can
be pointed out at important points.
Centralization
of
information?
×
Both did not function Decentralizatio
sufficiently.
n of
information?
Evacuation Processes carried out effectively at Futaba Town ?
3/11
15：42
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
TEPCO notified METI, the Governor
of Fukushima, the Mayors of Okuma
and Futaba.
×
Municipality of Futaba
was not notified of this.
16:42
Act, TEPCO notified .
Municipality of Futaba got
contacted by phone for the
notification.
19：03
A declaration of a nuclear emergency
situation
×
On the basis of regional
disaster prevention plans,
in an accident situation, 6
relevant municipalities
were supposed to send
staffs to an Off-site
Center for coordination.
Municipality of Futaba was not
notified of the declaration.
20：50
An EI to persons within a radius of
2km from the plant
Municipality of Futaba was notified
took possible measures to alert
citizens in the area.
21：23
An EI to persons within a radius of
3 km from the plant was issued.
Municipality of Futaba alerted
citizens in the expanded area.
By using a municipal
disaster management
radio communication
networks
× Low awareness of the accident can be pointed out
"I was told to be evacuated to
a community center by
volunteer fire corps, but I
chose to stay home with my
mother all the day."
Many citizens actually did
not notice the EI in the day,
because electorical radio
networks stopped
functioning.
3/12
5:44
An EI to persons within a
10km radius from NPP
×
×
around 6:29
The evacuation instruction was sent
by FAX, but people couldn‘t notice
it at that time.
around 7:30
The evacuation of the whole town to
Kawamata Town was determined as
the instruction from the government
was transmitted.
I saw several police patrol
car coming, and was
directed to "run away."
When I found armoured
vehicles of Yamanasi
Prefectural Police, I though
"Something serious
happened." But I only
thought of tsunami, not
accidents of NPP.
"I was exposed to
radiation, when I
moved to Kawamata
Town. I wasn't
cautioned about
those things."
Because the municipality could
prepare only ten buses, most of
residents were required to
evacuate individually by their own
cars.
The evacuation was reported to be almost
completed around at 14:00 - 15:00.
Many residents did not really understand what was about to
happen and why they needed to evacuate.
As a result, some evacuated to areas which later became
evacuation zones.
It is difficult to say that safe and effective evacuation process
was achieved.
InEvacuation Processes carried out effectively at Naraha Town ?
3/11
15：42
TEPCO notified METI, the Governor
of Fukushima, the Mayors of Okuma
and Futaba.
16:42
Act, TEPCO notified .
Municipality of Naraha
was notified by phone
and FAX.
×
was not notified.
19：03
A declaration of a nuclear emergency
situation was issued.
3/12
5:22
On the basis of Article 15, Clause 1 of
the Act on Special Measures Concerning
occurrence of a Nuclear Emergency
Situation at the Fukushima Daini NPP
was issued.
5:44
An EI to persons within a
10km radius from NPP
×
×
Municipality of Naraha was not
notified of the declaration.
was not notified.
Low awareness of the accident can be pointed out
×
was not notified.
Although Naraha was located out
of the evacuation zone, the zone
seemed likely to be expanded.
Naraha started to discuss the
evacuation on its own.
7：45
Issuance of the declaration of a Nuclear
Emergency Situation of the Fukushima
Daini NPP
An EI to persons within a radius of 3 km
from NPP was issued to relevant local
governments (including Naraha)
×
8：00
Municipality determined the evacuation of the
whole town to Iwaki City on its own.
There were some citizens
who knew nothing about
accidents of NPP before
the annoucement.
15：36
an explosion in the Reactor
Building of Unit 1
"We arrived at Iwaki City around noon on 12nd. But
the evacuation sites were so full, I thought we
couldn't live in this place and decided to go back to
Naraha. Since we heard of the explosion of Unit 1
around 17:00 afternoon, we moved to Iwaki again in
a big hurry."
was not notified.
The evacuation of all
citizens of Naraha Town
was supposed to be
completed by the time of
explosion.
8：30
The evacuation instruction was issued to
citizens within a radius 3 km from NPP.
8：37
The evacuation instruction was issued to all
citizens to Iwaki City, using a municipal
disaster management radio communication
networks.
"Even when I heard of the accident
of NPP, I didn't understand why we
had to be evacuated. I though NPP
was not much dangerous."
"Since I was told to move to
Iwaki for evacuation, I went
there. But there was no room at
evacuation sites, I returned to
Naraha. I moved to Iwaki again
on 14th."
"I heard of the accident of NPP
when I was in Naraha, and
moved to Iwaki once as I was
told to do so. But I came back
to Naraha, because the
evacuation sites was full."
In the absense of appropriate risk perception, no effective evacuation process achieved
Not only smooth transmission of evacuation
instruction, but also appropriate risk perception of
residents are also necessary to carry out evacuation
process effectively.
The Nuclear `Safety Myth' in the
Context of Japanese Culture
The Fukushima accident is not a natural disaster.
It is a man-made disaster, which is deeply embedded in Japanese
society and culture.
But to what extent is it Japanese problem
or problem of nuclear industry ?
No vent filter is set at Japanese NPP
 After Chernobyl accident, European countries
add vent filters at all NPP.
＊France completed the installation in 3 years.
 Why did not Japan install it ?
“…If we add vent filter, it proves that
the NPP was not perfect and damage
the belief that NPP is absolutely safe.”
(senior engineer of a manufacturing company)
Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’
NPP is absolutely safe with no defects.
Japanese technology is so high that there is no
room for errors.
So we need not / must not think about the
possibility of severe accidents, nor must we
talk about the danger of NPP.
Is it unique to Japanese society /culture?
19
How Japanese society
make the reality invisible
Many have pointed out the defects of NPP
for over 30 years.
But government and electric power
companies denied and suppressed the
facts.
Alerts before the disaster 1/3
Takagi warned it as follows in 1986.
 The safety examination of the
nuclear power plant is not intended
for nuclear reckless driving or
meltdown and the accident such that
a storage container is broken.
Jinzaburo Takagi [1938– 2000]
A physicist, who specializes in
nuclear chemistry . Have
pointed out the danger of
Japanese NPP for 30 years.
 The accident of the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant is the last
warning. …The next will be a
Japanese turn if we fail to take this
message.
Hidekatsu Yoshii, is a
Diet member of the
Japanese Communist
Party, graduated from
Kyoto University
department of
engineering nucleonics
department.
Yoshiiat Japanese Parliament
There is a risk of meltdown due to failure
of the cooling systems in 43 nuclear power
plants (including Fukushima I), because
power transmission lines would be damaged
by earthquakes, thereby causing a complete
power failure; or the supply of cooling water
would be disrupted in the event of large
tsunami waves.
[October 2006 at Parliament]
― PM Shinzo Abe (LDP) rejected the request.
“A failure of emergency diesel generators or a failure
of the cooling systems of reactors will never occur
in Japan."
 Okamurareported the tsunami
waves caused by Jogan
earthquake in 9th century were so
big that they caused damage three
to four miles inland.
Yukinobu Okamura
A geologist and director
of the National Institute
for Advanced Industrial
Science and Technology.
 Urged TEPCO to make security
arrangements with respect to the
occurrence of large tsunami waves
in Fukushima (June 2009 in
parliamentary committee)
―TEPCO’s response: available data was
insufficient to justify such precautions.
NISA and TEPCO recognized the risk but
suppressed
 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency;(NISA) and
TEPCO were aware at least by 2006 that the Fukushima
No. 1 nuclear plant was at risk of having its power
knocked out by massive tsunami.
 “There is a possibility that power equipment could
lose their functions if 14-meter tsunami hit the
Fukushima plant, with seawater flowing inside the
(reactor) turbine buildings." (paper of study session in
response to the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia)
‘Myth’ in 70 years ago
 Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’ is
very much similar to the
‘Invincible Myth’ before
the World War II.
 Government knew the
disadvantage of Japan and
expected little chance to
win, but finally opened the
war, which resulted in 3
million deceased.
Cabinet Total War Research Institute[1941]
 Cabinet Total War Research Institute had
predicted precisely what happened in the war.
1. victory, getting oil fields in Indonesia
2. gradually losing, long war, starving
3. war ends in defeat when Soviet invades
 Cabinet ignored the report, though they
recognizes it as reality.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST (May 1946 ‐Nov. 1948)
a.k.a.
the Tokyo Trials
Former Prime Minister:
Hideki Tojo
SHIGENORI TOGO
Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Oct. 1941－Sep. 1942, Apr.－Aug. 1945)
A: “My own personal feeling was opposed to
the Tripartite alliance…”
(But Togo himself delivered the enthusiastic
speech on the tripartite alliance …)
A: “There was no room in this public speech to
include my own personal feelings,…”
A: “It would be more accurate to say that as Foreign
Minister of Japan I was in such a position that I had
to make a speech of that… ”
28
KUNIAKI KOISO 1/3
Prime Minister
(Jul. 1944 － Apr. 1945)
Governor-General of Korea
(May 1942 － Jul. 1944)
Army General
(Nov. 1937－ )
Denies responsibility
for all his orders and policy .
KUNIAKI KOISO 2/3
Q[Prosecutor Fixel ]: “ …you claim you opposed the
March 1931 Incident; you tried to prevent the
Manchurian Incident; you opposed the China
Adventure; you opposed the tripartite Pact; you
opposed going into a war against the United
States; and you tried to settle the China war
when you became Premier, and in all of these …
you were frustrated and prevented from having
your ideas and desires prevail.
If you disagreed with and were opposed to these events
and polices, why did you accept one important position in
the Government after another whereby you became one
of the protagonists of the very matters you now say you so
strenuously objected to? ”
KUNIAKI KOISO 3/3
A: “The way of we Japanese is that no
matter what our own personal
opinions and our own personal
arguments may be, once a policy of
State has been decided upon, it is our
duty to bend all our efforts for the
prosecution of such policy. This has
been the traditional custom in our
country. ”
Japanese ‘Reality’
 Masao Maruyama
Analyses the pre-war Japanese social
structure and mentality that escalated
militarism as absence of subjective sense of
responsibility
“ Reality is not thought as being
created by ourselves, but thought as
already made or happened in
somewhere.”
 “ ‘Realistic’ action is always restricted by the
past. Thus, reality is not the subjective
construction toward the future, but
inevitability from the past.”
Masao Maruyama
[1914 - 1996]
A political scientist
and political theorist.
Japanese or Nuclear Industry ?
There is not such ‘Myth’ in other industry.
cf. Toyota, Honda, Sony, Panasonic
Monopolized industry: Lack of competition
 ‘REALITY’ vs. ‘reality’
REALITY : total framework
people can not create REALITY
but very good at realistic innovation
REALIY in transition
Before WWll
Emperorship: Void-Center Leadership
ministers predict what emperor want
During Economic Growth(1950’s-1990)
Loyalty to company /Life time employment
Neo-Liberalism
Threat to lose job → forced loyalty
Japanese REALITY system + NPP Industry
= Nuclear ‘Safety Myth’
Will the Japanese ‘Reality’ change?
Q: Your factory in foreign country discharges toxic
substance to river and many people suffer from
serious disease in the lower stream. You discussed
with your boss to stop it, but rejected. What will
you do then?
A: Students of Tokyo Institute of Technology (no.=200)
disclose by your name
disclose with anonymity
do nothing
2006
2011
2012
5
30
50
15
100
120
180
70
30
Japanese society is facing the turning
point whether to create the new reality.
It may lead the revolution in consciousness
and socio-cultural system in Japan.
What about in other countries?
What do we learn from Fukushima
accident ?
Fukushima accident was deeply connected
with Japanese socio-cultural system.
But it does not mean that the NPP in other
countries are safer than Japanese NPP.
It shows that the nuclear industries in any
countries have much to do with their sociocultural background and thus the risk of them
should be examined in the context of societies
and cultures.
38
Evacuation and Risk Perception from the Japanese
triple disaster
DEVAST Field Research
•January - June 2012
•Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews
A Total of 106 Persons
66 Evacuees (37 Tsunami, 29 Nuclear)
7 Affected Municipalities (3 Tsunami, 4 Nuclear)
8 NGOs, 7 Academics, 2 Government Agencies
•Target cities/towns:
Tsunami – Ishinomaki, Ofunato, Rikuzentakada, Iwaki
Nuclear – Futaba, Naraha, Minami-soma, Iwaki
39
Towns/Cities of Origin
of evacuees for interviews
Tsunami
Evacuees
Ishinomaki
Rikuzentakada
Ofunato
Iwaki
Nuclear
Futaba
Naraha
Tomioka
Ookuma
Namie
Kawamata
Minami-Soma
Iwaki
Fukushima
Koriyama
Ootama
Interviewee
Tsunami
0
Nuclear Accident
2
Central government
4
Local government
(Municipalities)
37
2: Ishinomaki City
1: Ofunato City
1: Rikuzentakada City
9
28: Ofunato City
4: Ishinomaki City
2: Rikuzentakata City
3: Iwaki City
NGOs
3
Academics
Affected residents (and
other non-evacuees)
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
1
1: Child Fund Japan
1: Peace Winds Japan
1: Peace Boat
1: Platform Japan
1: Aoyama Gakuin
University
(at the time)
1: California Institute
for Technology
1: Kyoto University
1: Rikuzentakada City
3:
2:
2:
2:
Naraha town
Minami-Soma City
Futaba town
Iwaki City
2 11: Naraha town
9 7: Futaba town
2: Minami-Soma City
2: Iwaki City
(Hisanohama District)
1: Namie town
1: Okuma town
1: Tomioka town
Evacuees
4
1: Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI)
1:Reconstruction Agency
7
4
6
49
106
2: Fukushima City
2: Koriyama City
3: AAR
2: Fukushima CRMS
1: Kodomo Fukushima
1: ADRA
3: Fukushima University
1: Tohoku University
4: Iwaki City
1: Gumma City
1: Fukushima City
57
Risk Perception on Tsunami
High Risk Perception
Probability of a great earthquake more than 98%
within the next three years
Lessons learnt from the 1968 Chili Earthquake
Hazard map and tsunami disaster drills
Shortcomings
Disaster drills and preparation depend on ward
leader
Contingency planning contracted out to
consultancy
42
Risk Perception on Tsunami (2)
Negative effects of high risk perception
Anecdotes from former tsunami experience
“Even if a tsunami comes, it would be around 1 meter. The
maximum would be 6m.”,
“If the tsunami alert warns 1m tsunami, the actual one would be
20cm.”,
“Tsunami arrives 15 minutes after an earthquake.”,
“No need to evacuate, as we have a tsunami barrier of 6
meters.”
Underestimation of the risk due to the
Hazard Map based training
The areas outside of the predicted inundation zone produced
many victims.
43
Hazard map of Takada district
Key:
First Evacuation Point
○ Evacuation Centres
○ Watergate
□ Stairs
Public loudspeakers
Evacuation route
Risk Perception on Nuclear PP
•Low Risk Perception
“Myth of Absolute Safety”
Evacuation without training
Within a 1-3km radius
Evacuation without information
>20% know about the accident,
>10% about evacuation order, SPEEDI
45
Concluding Remarks
•Japan - one of the largest economy, known for
its highly advanced technologies.
•In the face of extreme disasters, even a
developed country could not fully mitigate the
effects of the disaster or avoid a serious nuclear
accident.
•In the absence of political will, financial
capabilities and technological advances served
little to mitigate the impacts of disasters.
•Democracies do not always respond better to
disasters, especially the nuclear one.
Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
and Fukushima disaster
•
Creation and self-reproduction of "Nuclear Safety Myth" by an
exclusive, sub governmental body called "Nuclear Power Village."
： Government and Governance （Hitoshi Yoshioka, 1999）
•
Social and industrial behaviour of Japan's electric power industry,
which is regulated by regional monopoly, integration from power
generation to distribution
：Electric Power Market （Takeo Kikkawa, 2011. Shunpei Takemori,
2011）
•
Regulatory capture, a form of government failure, can be seen in
Japanese nuclear industry
：（The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission 2012）
Relations between technical and social competences are also essential to
clarify significant factors for the nuclear accident.
46
Independene and Competence of Nuclear
Regulatory agencies
１. Throughout the analysis of the developmental
processes of nuclear regulation, path-dependency can be
found to be clarified.
→ technical and social independence of
regulatory agencies
Establishment of Nuclear Safety Committee
(Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai) in 1978
METE and Nuclear Safety Committee becomes
two main regulatory agencies:
so-called Double Checking (DC) system.
47
Regulatory agencies
2. Creation of Nuclear Safety Institute under METE
The nuclear regulatory was reorganized during the 2001
Central Government Reform. Tokaimura nuclear
accidents occurred in 1999 can be seen as one of
triggers.
Creation of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(Genshiryoku Anzen Hoanin) under METE affected DC
system negatively.
Centralized Regulation sytem by NISA would be
maintained.
48
Regulatory agencies
3. Fukushima Nuclear Disaster in
2011.3.11
Under the DC system re-organized in 2001,
the nuclear accident happened.
・Social capacity problem
・Combination of factors in DC system and
electric power industry
49
Conclusion
1. Brief history of Japan's nuclear safety regulation can be described:
First Phase（1957-1977）based on the Science and Technology Agency
Second Phase（1978-1999）Commercial nuclear power reactors：MITI,
Nuclear reactors for provide in research and test ：Science and
Technology Agency, Establishment of Nuclear Safety Committee
Third Phase（2000-2011）Government took a measure of enforcement of
Nuclear Safety Committee and creation of Nuclear Safety Institute
under METE.
2. Japan's Nuclear Safety Regulation
Institutional architecture: Consistent Pro-nuclear policy
制度論的には、開発制度が基幹制度、規制制度は補完制度
3. Overseas Cases
Independent Agency Models：Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the U.S.),
Autorite de Surete Nucleaire（France）
Ministry and Department Models：Germany/Switzerland
・Differences between countries possessing nuclear weapons and
countries not possessing（“human resource pool”, management of
Plutonium）
4. How should we cooperate for nuclear safety in East-Asia?
Japan-China-Korea: Top Regulators’ Meeting (TRM) held in 2011
50
•高木仁三郎『新装版
Reference
チェルノブイリ原発事故』七つ森書館 2011
•Japanese, Waiting in Line for Hours, Follow Social Order After Quake,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/japan-victims-show-resilience-earthquaketsunami-sign-sense/story?id=13135355, last updated: 15 March 2011.
•The moment the earthquake hit in Tokyo ,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12782427,
last updated: 18 March 2011.
•Pritchard, R. John and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL, N.Y. and London, Garland Publishing Inc., 1987.
•Reports by the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commision
(2012)
http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/
•Reports by Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (2012)
http://icanps.go.jp/eng/
•Reports of the Working Group on Nuclear Emergency
"Survey local governments affected by the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
accident" (2012)
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2012/siryo19/siryo1-1.pdf
•Survey reports of the municipality evacuation by the Nuclear Safety Commision of Japan (2012)
http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/bousin/bousin2012_15/ksiryo1.pdf
http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/bousin/bousin2012_15/ksiryo2.pdf
•Yomiuri Newspapers
•Asahi Newspapers
•Fukushima Minpo Newspapers

D E V A S T Une prﾃｩsentation succincte

Transcription

Similar documents

BEFORE: AFTER: DURING:

A REPRINT of a July 1991 Report to Congress, Executive Summary

Triple Reactor Disaster: Fukushima Five Years On

Session C14-Preparing Your Students for Career in Energy

Books of Note - Arms Control Association

160226 - WorldCover

Safer School Combined Tsunami Drill in Suva

Totaranui Beach, Map 33 Tsunami Evacuation Zones

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program